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MILITARY IN MODERN REPUBLICAN THEORY

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MILITARY IN MODERN REPUBLICAN THEORY

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by

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Ankara
May 2016

To my family...

MILITARY IN MODERN REPUBLICAN THEORY

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

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In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
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THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA


May 2016

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
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ABSTRACT

MILITARY IN MODERN REPUBLICAN THEORY

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May 2016

This thesis examines the status of the military in modern normative republican theory. In classical republicanism there is a strong relation between the republic and the military, which was envisaged to perform three critical internal functions in a republic: preventing executive tyranny, promoting civic virtue and providing the best civic engagement for the citizens that produces common good. However, a study of modern republicanism reveals a diminishing emphasis on the role of military. Some prominent advocates of contemporary republican theory have little or no role for it in their conceptualization, while there are still some advocates who believe either military itself or its civic

alternatives can and should contribute to effective functioning of the republican system. I argue that military may not be central as it was before, but if a modern state needs to keep military, it can still contribute to motivational and institutional challenges of republicanism. These contributions will only be possible if military can be established as a democratically-controlled institution that will not abuse its power to de-politicize the political realm and thwart citizens' capacity for self-rule. In addition, I also argue that removing the central concept of citizen-army from republican theory will create inconsistency unless same functions are performed by other means.

Keywords: Military, Republicanism, Pettit, Citizen-soldier

ÖZET

MODERN CUMHURİYETÇİLİK TEORİSİNDE SİLAHLI KUVVETLER

Karabulut, Ali Nedim

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. James Alexander

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Bu tez, modern normatif cumhuriyetçi teoride silahlı kuvvetlerin konumunu incelemektedir. Klasik cumhuriyetçilikte devlet ile silahlı kuvvetler arasında kuvvetli bir bağ vardır ve silahlı kuvvetlerin ülke içinde üç kritik fonksiyonu yerine getirmesi düşünülmüştür: yönetimin diktatörlüğünün engellenmesi, sivil erdemin teşvik edilmesi ve vatandaşlara kamu yararı oluşturacak en uygun sivil etkileşim ortamının sunulması. Bununla beraber, modern cumhuriyetçilik üzerine yapılan bir çalışma, silahlı kuvvetlerin rolü üzerindeki vurgunun giderek azaldığını ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Günümüzdeki cumhuriyetçi teorinin bazı önde gelen savunucuları kendi teorik yaklaşımlarında silahlı kuvvetlere çok az yer vermekte ya da hiç vermemektedir. Diğer bazı modern

cumhuriyetçiler ise hâlâ silahlı kuvvetlerin kendisinin veya onun sivil alternatiflerinin, cumhuriyet sisteminin etkin işlemesine katkıda bulunabileceğine ve bulunması gerektiğine inanmaktadır. Bu tezde, silahlı kuvvetlerin eskiden olduğu gibi merkezî bir rol oynamayabileceği, yine de eğer modern bir devlet silahlı kuvvetlere sahip olacaksa onda cumhuriyetçiliğin motivasyonel ve kurumsal problemlerinin aşılmasına katkıda bulunabileceği iddia edilmektedir. Bu katkılar sadece silahlı kuvvetler demokratik olarak kontrol edilebilen, sahip olduğu gücü suiistimal ederek politik ortamı ortadan kaldırmaya ve halkın kendi kendini yönetmesini olumsuz etkilemeye yeltenmeyen bir kurum olarak ortaya çıktığında mümkün olacaktır. Ayrıca kritik öneme sahip vatandaş-asker konseptinin cumhuriyetçilik teorisinden çıkarılmasının, onun yerine aynı fonksiyonları yerine getirecek başka konseptler üretilmediği sürece teoride önemli bir uyumsuzluk oluşturacağı iddia edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Silahlı Kuvvetler, Cumhuriyetçilik, Pettit, Vatandaş-asker

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The subject of this thesis is the status of the military in contemporary republican theory. Most states have some sort of military. I am not concerned with the status of the military in actual states, but with the question of what the role of the army should be, given that most states have an army. The problematic of the thesis emerged when I observed that the leading theorist of the revival of republicanism in the last twenty years, Philip Pettit, has made no or little reference to the military in his writings: a fact which would have surprised classical republicans like Machiavelli and Rousseau. I set myself the problem of seeing what exactly he did say about the military, in order to offer a criticism of republicanism from a fresh perspective. In this thesis I have also responded to his normative silence about the military by making some positive suggestions of my own about how the military could be justified within the frame of republicanism.

In the first chapter, I examine theoretical background of republicanism which dates back to ancient republics of Rome and Athens, while second chapter provided an

in-depth analysis of civil-military relations in traditional republics. Study of traditional advocates of the republican theory highlight that there is a close link with the armed forces and basic tenets of republicanism. Armed forces are closely associated with the society that republicans have in their minds and tasked with a fundamental role in creating it. As an important characteristic, republicans have higher expectations from the citizens and the society, especially when compared to liberalism. Republican ideals cannot be achieved if citizens do not meet these expectations both in character and in practice. Since the “ideal citizen” is a very critical and maybe the weakest point of aspiring republicans, it was in all times a matter of discussion and focus how to construct them. High expectations from the citizens requires an intensive learning process, and military was always considered to have a significant instrumental value in providing that.

Another concern of traditional republicans was to achieve and maintain people’s rule. Protection of the state and the system from the external threat did not ever lose its priority, but in addition, republicans were deeply concerned with protection against internal threats to the freedom and autonomy. The most important threat in this regard is the tyranny of the sovereign, which can easily happen when the sovereign is also the main power holder in the republic. Hence as a remedy, most of the republicans thought that this power should have been given to the citizens and they advocated citizen army. In addition to creating a safeguard against possible tyranny of the sovereign, some republicans also advocated citizen army from the principles of the republican spirit, which they believe, at the very basics, include participation in performing the main

functions of the republic. Protection is one of these main functions whose responsibility should not be delegated to a certain party, therefore all citizens should be a part of it.

I examine modern theory in the third chapter and take a closer look at Philip Pettit's ideas in the fourth and fifth chapters. There I note basic changes, some of which are radical, regarding central concepts of republicanism. Since modern republicanism has emerged in the part of the world where liberalism is dominating, new and allegedly different conceptualizations of freedom occupied the central place of the modern theory. I chose Philip Pettit to conduct a more detailed examination because he is believed to be the "most ambitious architect" of the contemporary republican theory both in terms of published works and interest. His version of civic republicanism introduced a new formula for freedom as a remedy that is supposed to cure all ills of the modern society. Other modern republicans emphasized additional concepts such as participation and deliberative action.

Study of modern republicans reveals a diminishing emphasis on the concepts of common good and civic virtue. While former republicans paid a significant amount of time to identify necessary civic virtues for a republic and to define ways for adorning citizens with them, modern followers barely touch these issues. Even more significantly, "constructing" a citizen tailored for republic is a discussion they try to avoid.

I argue that the main reason for this change is the universally accepted principles of the modern political environment which demonizes any kind of coercive and aggressive effort associated with social engineering. Today, efforts aimed at structuring people's minds cannot be easily justified either at group or individual level. Our freedom based

society is highly concerned and most of the time critical of any kind of domination, restriction or coercion over people, and a theory which is enthusiastic about shaping people is not likely to find any acceptance among public or political scientists. This also seems to be the main reason for modern republicans to focus on more socially and theoretically accepted ideals such as freedom.

In line with this trend, Philip Pettit bases his version of republican theory on a new understanding of freedom. His theory did not have major role for the military as opposed to traditional theorists. On the contrary, military was conceived as a potential threat to the republic and people's rule when its power is used against them. This view marks a radical turn in opposite direction regarding the position of the armed forces in republican theory; from being a safeguard against tyranny, to a potential threat that citizens should be safeguarded against, regardless of its composition. The reason for this change may be conflicting examples in the history of the world where even the armies consisting of compulsory or voluntary citizens easily became an instrument in the hands of totalitarian regimes for suppressing people's sovereignty. This threat is clear and obvious for Pettit, and cannot be counterbalanced by citizen-army.

Duty of the military according to Pettit was restricted in the internal domain and was mainly about protection against external threats; however, he also envisaged some additional and untraditional roles for the military, again in the external domain, which can be summarized as promoting republican values in the international domain.

I argue that military does not have significant role in Pettit's and some other republicans' theory, because the functions it was mainly instrumental for do not have

priority for them. Constructing citizenship and providing civic virtues are not accounted for in Pettit's theory. Similarly, participation does not have intrinsic value, hence participating in the common duty of defense by all citizens is not critical. Finally concern for preventing tyranny is less significant, and a citizen-army has not been envisaged as a safeguard against it. Instead, there are some counter-arguments that military (either constituted as citizen-army or not) as a power holder is a potential threat to republican order.

This is not same for all the supporters of the modern republican theory. The sixth chapter is dedicated to the thoughts of other modern republicans. Thinkers who focus on some other essential concepts of republicanism, such as participation, may still support citizen army. In addition, the idea of common good and civic virtue is not totally forgotten. In this case, sometimes less coercive and restrictive types of civic service alternatives are supported. Although modern republicanism is more distant to military values or ideas when compared to traditional one, role and nature of armed forces are still points of discussion. As a primary role, military is always important from the point of assuring a political society to exist and a viable political order to be established. In addition, military may or may not gain an instrumental and theoretical value depending on the view of a theorist and the concepts he or she focuses on. When the focal point is participation or common good, military itself or its alternatives may find a place in theoretical discussions.

In seventh and eighth chapters I develop my own view on military-society relations in a modern republic. These chapters provided a subjective and normative

analysis of possible roles that military can still play in today's environment. My intention is not bringing military back in the central position it used to occupy in the past; however, if a modern state needs to keep military for external protection, there is no need for excluding it from contributions it may provide. These contributions may differ from the ones envisioned by early republicans. For example citizen armies likely to fall behind professional ones in terms of capability when the requirements of modern technological warfare are taken into consideration. On the other hand, military can still be a democratic institution that contributes to motivational and institutional challenges of republicanism. Any military service can still be helpful in inspiring citizens for prioritizing common good over their individual interest. These contributions will only be possible if military can be established as a democratically-controlled institution that will not abuse its power to de-politicize the political realm and thwart citizens' capacity for self-rule. Otherwise military as a power holder will always be a salient threat to people's rule.

CHAPTER II

REPUBLICAN TRADITION

2.1. Theoretical Framework

Republicanism and what it means to be a republican is a contested matter (Honohan, 2001: 7). This contestation refers to both its theoretical principles and (as a result) its historical background. At its least, republicanism is a theory based on politically constructed common good, politically defined freedom and some sort of self-government. However republican ideas vary in a wide range because of different conceptions on these central concepts. Common good represents what is in the interest of all citizens and it should be dominant over different interests of individuals or groups, while self-rule and autonomy should be achieved and protected by legal framework. Therefore, maintaining an appropriate balance of political power is the central problem of republicans.

Although there are different interpretations in practice, basic concepts of republican thought have not been changed since the early ages. First, republicanism

signifies a fundamental commitment to serve the common good of all citizens (Sellers, 2003: 96). Laws and the state should always serve the common good or *res publica* of a nation's people or citizens (Sellers, 2003: 1). Common good is the only legitimate basis of justice, government and law (Aristotle, 350 B.C.). It is not considered as the opposite of the individual interests; rather, it includes a conglomeration of the goods of the all individuals (Grazia, 1989: 176), but it should not benefit a specific individual interest at the expense of others, as in tyranny. On the other hand, it is also different than just balancing the individual interests as liberalism offers. It has to be constructed through various mechanisms.

Republicanism also signifies commitment to freedom and self-rule. It can be deduced that there is a close link between republic and democracy, although this link may be one-directional. All republics should also be democracies as a common result of these assertions, because common good can only be produced by the participation of the all citizens. Ruling elite can always have a tendency to prioritize their private interests, therefore they have to be monitored through certain measures including elections. Self-rule requires people's involvement in the ruling as well as a legal framework. Real freedom cannot be achieved if the citizens are subject to arbitrary rule of single sovereign. Therefore, we can assert that as a common characteristic, all republics should be democracies; however, that does not necessarily mean that all democracies are also republics. Democratic majorities may abuse their position as well as any other group in power (Sellers, 2003: 96). In order to prevent that, republics require institutional measures and rule of law. A central idea in republican theory is that

freedom, self-rule or sovereignty can all be realized, constructed or protected by political means. Therefore, institutional measures are closely linked with republican ideals, and sometimes associated with them, although not necessarily fixated on them.¹

All republican theories in one way or the other accept the idea of inescapable interdependence among human beings. Humans can only flourish in the political community. They have common, as well as separate and conflicting interests. The common interest that would benefit the whole community should always have priority over individual goods. Therefore, republicanism is actually a mission impossible; a quest for self-rule where the rule is shared by the whole, a quest for freedom where no one is actually free but on the contrary is dependent on each other, a quest for the common interest where individual interests are de-prioritized. Therefore, it requires certain interpretations of these concepts, which may differ from their literal meanings.

Since interdependence and priority of the common good are deemed essential, freedom cannot be understood in its literal meaning – as being free from dependence, free from some kind of intervention, or free to follow individual interests as long as they do not coincide with the others'. Therefore, since the ancient times until today, republican theorists (and even the liberals who accept some level of commonality in the society) spent considerable effort for conceptualizing the freedom in an un-free society, and they are separated along the line according to definitions of it or the ways to achieve

¹ Some political scientists go even further and argue that institutional measures in republicanism is exaggerated and prioritized over values, which caused it to lose its flexibility to adapt different political structures. Elisabeth Digeser, for example, claims that even the original republicans in Rome defined republicanism according to the values and goals served by government, not according to the institutions or form of government (Digeser, 2004). She suggests that neither Romans in general nor Cicero himself defined their polity in constitutional terms but as a community of citizens bound together by justice and common interest (Digeser, 2004). Therefore, republicanism can survive regime changes as long as the governments serve these values.

it. But in all republican versions, freedom is conceived as something we gain in the society, or as a political achievement, contrary to the belief which takes it as a natural possession of individuals. Freedom requires and achieved through political participation as well as civic virtue. Since it is only possible in the society but not something we gain by birth, it also brings along some responsibilities as well as rights. It provides the citizen some rights as an individual, some rights to exercise collective control over others, and some rights to other citizens to control individual. Citizens of a *polis* are free because they are not ruled by and they are not subject to a master. Some form of governing authority is necessary, so being free can be understand as both “ruling and being ruled in turn”, not being free from the rule. Therefore, it can also be described as a theory based upon an original understanding of political freedom and of its institutional requirements (Weinstock, 2004: 1).

Another common point of republicanism is that a kind of self-government has to exist in a republican system, although, again, there is a big difference among republicans based on how this self-governance can take place. Combination of the priority of the common good over individual interests and self-governance to a certain degree requires some concrete principles rather than certain individuals or groups to be dominant over society, which brings the superiority of law. Freedom is being free from the domination of other human beings, not being free from the laws. Contrary to liberal perspective which considers laws are more or less as a limiting factor of the individual freedom, republicans believe that laws are actually serving to freedom, because they are actually making it possible by preventing personal dependence or domination.

Common good can easily be overlooked by individual interests in a society. It is possible for individual-interest-seekers to gain unwanted advantage over the cooperators of the public good. Therefore, certain level of civic virtue among citizens is existential while corruption, understood as prioritizing individual interest over common good, is a main threat for republics. Republicanism, usually as a discriminative characteristic, requires certain type of individual to be achieved. All instrumental measures are, although crucial, supplementary and meaningless if citizens do not show necessary “virtues.” As Quentin Skinner put forward:

Self-governing republic can only be kept in being ...if its citizens cultivate that crucial quality which Cicero had described as *virtus*, which the Italian theorists later rendered as *virtu*, and which English republicans translated as civic virtue or public-spiritedness. The term is thus used to denote the range of capacities that each one of us as a citizen most needs to possess: the capacities that enable us willingly to serve the common good, thereby to uphold the freedom of our community, and in consequence to ensure its rise to greatness as well as our own individual liberty (1991: 303).

In this regard, training² or constructing the citizen is a primary concern, because as another characteristic, virtues cannot be gained naturally from birth. Same republican approach to “freedom”, which is not accepted as a natural right gained through birth but has to be developed politically, applies to virtues. Human are not naturally virtuous creatures who possess the minimums for establishing and maintaining a political society; these virtues have to be developed through certain processes including education and, more importantly, actively engaging in civic practices.

² Training, educating or constructing the citizen are sometimes used with more or less the same meaning by different thinkers which refers to a basic requirement in republicanism: a certain type of individual (or citizen) who possesses at least the minimum requirements for being a citizen.

Since education cannot be limited to schools and it cannot be enough for constructing citizens, participating in civic practices are as critical as civic virtues for the republic. Only by the help of these activities citizens both learn and apply the requirements of public life. Defending the republic has always been the uttermost civic practice which would generate civic virtue in addition to its apparent benefit.

In its shortest form, the uttermost republican effort can be summarized as a quest for the best form of government in which power rests with the people instead of a monarch (Honohan, 2001: 7). After being established in ancient Greece and Rome, its political and legal theory has been revived in renaissance Italy, restated in commonwealth England, realized in George Washington's North America and reanimated by the French revolution (Sellers, 2003: 77). Significant figures include Polybius, Marcus Tullius Cicero, Titus Livius, Niccolò Machiavelli, James Harrington, Algernon Sidney, John Adams, James Madison and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Following section will aim to shed more light on its historical development.

2.2. Historical Background

Although there is some contestation on both theoretical and historical principles of republicanism (Honohan, 2001: 7), by general acceptance, its historical roots dates back to ancient Greece and Rome, which formed two main streams of republican thought. Certain key features of republicanism were crystallized in Athenian city-states from fifth to third centuries BC (Honohan, 2001: 8). However, the fact that Rome was more

instrumental in bringing republican ideals into life led some scholars to associate Roman tradition more directly with republican theory. In specific, the roots of “republican” ideology has especially been attributed to Rome’s republican constitution of 509–49 BC, which corresponds to the period right after the collapse of the “seven kings” period and implies a procedural commitment to certain “republican” political and legal institutions created in order to cure previous failure of the empire. (Sellers, 2003: 2). Etymology of the term supports this argument; *Res publica* was Latin word for “public concern” (Honohan, 2001: 9) and gained its essence in Rome. It was Romans’ own translation of Plato’s Greek “*politeia*, and used for their state, its public business, all public property, and the purposes these served (Sellers, 2003: 2). In Roman historian Cicero’s words, the republic was the people’s affair: “*res publica res populi*” (2014:1.39). Romans further materialized republican ideals for living as a whole while assuring self-rule and restraining the power of the sovereign. The principles they introduced were developed throughout the centuries and became the topic of contemporary discussions, sometimes with re-interpretations according to prevailing conditions and sometimes with appreciable similarity to their original forms. Athenian influence and contribution, on the other hand, cannot be denied in these discussions. Sometimes this influence was limited to forming a background and sometimes went so far as to present and advocate competing theoretical principles. In this regard, it may be more consistent to acknowledge two main schools of thought in republicanism. Aristotle in Athens and Marcus Tullius Cicero, Polybius and Titus Livius in Rome are the most prominent figures who are associated with these two main strands, which still continue today as

neo-Athenianism and neo-Romanism. Very broadly, while Aristotelian view emphasizes political participation in self-government as the basis of republican freedom, Cicero's and Roman perspective puts more emphasis in instrumental measures and especially rule of law.

2.2.1. Greek Era

Athens was a democratic and law abiding republic, which was well balanced between the interests of the many and the few (Strauss, 2004: 20). State system in Athens put into action the principles of liberty, equality and common life, which are still advocated by modern theorists of republicanism (Pettit 1997; Skinner 1998; Strauss 1999).

Citizens of the Greek Republic; adult male Athenians, formed a self-ruling body regardless of their wealth. The term "citizen" excluded important portion of the society such as women, slaves and non-Greeks. However, the people who were considered as citizens practiced their own rule without being subject to the will of a tyrant. They were free and equal; in front of the law, in having opportunity to serve in the public office, for speaking in the Assembly and so on. Public decisions that were related with the whole were discussed and taken by the whole. In order to support equality, provide a chance to as many citizens as possible and prevent corruption, public duties were occupied by the public servants for a relatively short time, and they were chosen sometimes by lottery or served in rotation (Honohan, 2001: 8). Contribution to the ruling of the state and public business was the main concern and duty of the citizen (Thucydides, 1954). In the direct

democracy, it was people's main responsibility to discuss matters that affect all in equal terms to find the best way.

Aristotle, one of the most influential philosophers in Athens, described the man as a "political animal" (Aristotle, 350 B.C.), which means that a man can only achieve good life in the society and with political interaction (i.e. by being a citizen). Although he did not support absolute form of "equality" in which every citizen has equal say, he believed that the *polis* was not only a place for living, but also for developing and realizing one's own being. He defined three main characteristics that makes a man citizen: participating in the public, serving in the office and defending the *polis* (Aristotle, 350 B.C.). However, he also recognized the differences among the capacities of the human beings and prescribed a state system which can be described as a mixture of democracy, aristocracy and monarchy. Therefore, ordinary citizen would have the opportunity to contribute in the ruling, raising his concern and reflecting his personal perspective and experience, while more eligible and gifted ones would assure best practice and provide general guidance.

Prioritizing the common good while deliberating in the public was critical, therefore Aristotle stressed the need for education to achieve this purpose (Aristotle, 350 B.C.). Since all the citizens' fate are interconnected, they have to think on behalf of the others, not only for their private concerns. Because of this interconnectedness, understanding of freedom in republican tradition cannot be understood in its absolute meaning. In republican terms, people are free, when they are not subject to a tyrant. In other words, freedom can be defined as "ruling and being ruled in turn" (Honohan,

2001: 9). In this sense, it excludes domination by others, but does not exclude domination by laws and public institutions, which gave rise to further interpretations by civic republicans later.

Aristotle also saw the importance of some conditioning factors to achieve self-rule and best politics by the citizens. In order to generate common concern, basic needs had to be met. Inequalities in socio-economic conditions would eventually lead to inequalities in political contribution to the polis, and eventually destabilize it. He advocated distributive justice and prescribed some measures such as public provision of land and employment and payment for participating in the assembly (Honohan, 2001: 9). However, Aristotle always credited philosophical life and contemplation more than any other aspect of political life. Therefore, for Aristotle, a useful individual life and philosophy was much more valuable than the political one, which would not be meaningful without the existence of the former.

2.2.2. Roman Period

Republican ideas were further developed later in the Roman republic. Works of Polybius, Marcus Tullius Cicero and Titus Livius (Livy) has shed lights on to Roman state structure and set the basic principles of republican theory. Fundamental references which characterize Roman state structure include Cicero's *de officiis* (on duties), *de legibus* (on the laws) and *de re publica* (on the republic), first ten books of Titus Livius

on the history of Rome, and the sixth book of the Histories of Polybius (Sellers, 2003: 2).

In Rome, *res publica* also referred to the “government without kings,” which historically falls in the period between the last Roman king, Tarquinius Superbus, until the rise of Augustus (Everdell, 1983). The guiding principle of this republican tradition, was government for the public good (or “*res publica*”), perceived as naturally antithetical to monarchy and to any other form of arbitrary rule (Paine, 1989: 168).

Main characteristic of Roman republic, and maybe its main difference from its Greek predecessor can be described as less democratic political institutions while extensive system of legal framework to protect them. Roman interpretation of freedom, which puts more emphasis on legal status of the citizen and its assurance by the laws rather than actual participation in the ruling has planted the seeds for two main approach to freedom in specific and politics in general in the following centuries. Cicero defined the law as the bond that makes citizens free (Honohan, 2001: 10). Contrary to Aristotle who valued political life more than the private or philosophical one, he emphasized the value of civic virtue for following public good rather than personal interest. Especially in the era of warlords such as Caesar, Anthony and Octavian, Cicero advanced an ideal of the active statesman who engages in political rather than military activity, puts duty to the republic before personal concerns, and values honor and respect more than material rewards (Honohan, 2001: 10). Key republican ideals of civic virtue according to him were “justice, prudence, moderation and courage” (Honohan, 2001: 10).

Necessary components of Roman model “republican” state structure include a bicameral legislature, standing laws and elected magistrates (Sellers, 2003: 2). The institutional measures and especially the legal framework have always been the central concern of republican theory, but they always have to be supported by the civic virtue. Vices and legal flaws can result in tyranny (of an individual or a group) or tragedy of civil war. Cicero had proposed the maintenance of frequent rotation in office for executive officials, and a strengthened senate, to control both the magistrates and the popular assembly (Sellers, 2003: 2).

Polybius described Rome’s success with constitutional system of checks and balances achieved by political mixture of monarchical (executive), aristocratic (legislative), and democratic (elective) power (Polybius, B.C.219-167). Similarly, Cicero and Livy also emphasized balance of power based on checks and balances as well as rule of law and common good. In the same fashion Cicero defined people or *populus* of the republic as not just any collection of humans, but as a large group associated in pursuit of a shared sense of justice and their own common welfare (2014: I.39).

Marcus Tullius Cicero, the most prominent Roman political theorist, lived during the crisis in leadership that characterized the last decades of senatorial rule (Digeser, 2004). After the collapse of seven-king period around 500 B.C., certain “republican” political and legal institutions were created in order to cure previous failure of the empire. To replace the leadership of the kings, a new office was created with the title of *consul*, which possessed all of the king’s powers in the form of two men, elected

for a one-year term, who could veto each other's actions. Rome's republican constitution of 509–49 BC established a procedural commitment to the republican values and introduced a checks and balances system (Digeser, 2004: 8). According to Cicero, *res publica* was an “assemblage of people in large numbers” (i.e., the *populus*) came together “in an agreement with respect to justice (*consensu iuris*)” and “for the common good (*communione utilitatis*)”, regardless of the form of government adopted (Cicero: 1.39, 1.42). Such a conception imposed obligations upon both government and citizens (Digeser, 2004: 8). In contrast to Greek understanding, citizenship according to Romans is a matter of status and rights, not ethnicity or “worth” (Buttle, 2001). The ultimate responsibility of the government was to preserve justice, which can be ensured when the law reflects the natural law, which is “eternal and unalterable,” and whose author is the God, “the universal master” (Cicero, 2014: 3.33). When this link was broken, the result was tyranny (Cicero, 2014: 3.43). In return, the citizens had obligations against the republic, which was mainly consisting of obeying the law. And since the law was reflecting the natural law created by God, obligations included civic and religious duties (Cicero, 2014).

The basic desiderata of republican government derived from Rome include secure government for the common good through the checks and balances of a mixed constitution, comprising a sovereign people, an elected executive, a deliberative senate, and a regulated popular assembly, constrained by an independent judiciary, and subject to the rule of law. Some republicans would add representation, the separation of powers, or equality of material possessions, to protect public liberty (*libertas*) and avoid Rome's

eventual descent into popular tyranny and military despotism. Republican liberty signifies subjection to the law and to magistrates, acting for the common good, and never to the private will or domination of any private master. (Pettit, 1997)

Common themes of both Athenian and Roman tradition can be summarized as the value of membership and participation in a political community; freedom, contrasted to slavery, as a political achievement, guaranteed by the rule of law and 'mixed' government; the need for a virtuous citizenry, shaped by laws as well as good institutions; the state as a bounded community of citizens who share common goods, distinct in form from family and voluntary associations (Honohan, 2001: 10). The main difference was the interpretation of the freedom and what constitutes it. While Aristotle and Greek tradition put more emphasis on the participation, Roman tradition believed the legal framework would be the main instrument to constitute it.

2.2.3. Classical Republicanism and Machiavelli

Following the Greek and Roman republics up until the late middle ages, traditional western history does not mark any significant progress in terms of republican values (Honohan, 2001). Mediaeval period can be a time for recession for republican thought, when prevalent ideas mainly supported monarchs rather than the people. Only some minor exceptions are noted for this period, one of which may be the Marsiglio of Padua, who defended popular rule both in church and state (Honohan, 2001: 10). A search for historical prescriptions to cure emerging political problems started with the emergence

of Florence and Venice as independent city states. What gave rise to republicanism again later was the struggle between the nobilities and the people. The ideas emerged during this period is called classical republicanism.

Classical Republicanism emerged around fifteenth century as an opposition to the Christian worldview and political order (Pocock, 1975a: 51-2; Snyder, 1999: 22). According to Pocock, medieval Christian “scholastic and customary” political ideology and understanding of citizenship has changed with a new look at the history and revival of ancient Greek mentality and Aristotelian view. With a new emphasis on wisdoms of human mind, civic republicanism in this era attacked Christian political view, including its hierarchic social structure and justification of monarchy and aristocracy (Pocock, 1975a). Republicans favored autonomy, liberty and equality to being a subject to a tyrant and God-given unchangeable laws.

Raised in the early sixteenth century Florence, which was dominated by the rule of Medici family, Machiavelli has been the most prominent figure of this period. In his *Discourses*, Machiavelli advocated dynamic political action as the only cure that can better arrange and organize social and political life, which would otherwise be shaped by necessity and chance. He argued that in republics, citizens “neither arrogantly dominate nor humbly serve” (Machiavelli, 1517). Republican government was more promising in providing citizens freedom and prosperity. He supported Roman type of mixed government and balance of interests between the noble and ordinary people to prevent them from following their own interests. The struggle between the two would help the public good to emerge.

In line with the characteristics of the republican revival in this era, which were raised as a reaction against scholastic and submissive Christian view, Machiavelli “unequivocally preferred the republic to revealed religion” (Pocock, 1975b: 390). He rejected the idea of an objective moral order which is determined by God, in accordance with whose prescriptions individuals live the ‘best’ life (Snyder, 1999). He was a pagan and admirer of the ancient Romans, especially because of their strong sense of public duty and willingness to make great sacrifices for the republic. These qualities stem not from religious beliefs but from motives of honor and patriotism (Snyder, 1999). He redefined the central republican concept of virtue different from goodness and godliness and put forward a tougher and more heroic citizen.

For Machiavelli, *virtu* was indispensable to the citizen and the state. According to Pitkin, *virtu* in Machiavelli means “energy, effectiveness and virtuosity” and “derives from the Latin *virtus*, and thus from *vir* which means “man”. *Virtu* is thus manliness, and refer to those qualities found in a ‘real man’” (Pitkin, 1984: 25). Machiavelli’s understanding of virtue also includes other manly characteristics such as strength, vitality, power, courage and efficiency. As an important feature, these virtues can be used to achieve specific purposes, good or bad, in specific conditions. Virtue in this sense does not imply goodness in the conventional sense. One can therefore define Machiavellian virtue as the “exceptional capacity” that is required for success in achieving particular purposes in particular circumstances (Anglo 1971: 211). He also admires courage, intelligence, tenacity of purpose and other qualities regardless of their political effects.

Machiavelli highlighted political and military service and limiting desire for wealth as other important virtues, while corruption as a threat to all (Honohan, 2001: 11). Corruption, again, was described as the negative balance between the personal vs. public interests, at the expense of the latter. He did not perceive republic as an easy goal to achieve; on the contrary, very challenging and a demanding one. He supported laws, civic education, military training and civic religion as well as severe sanctions against corruption as measures to achieve it (Honohan, 2001: 11). However, he was too pessimistic for a prospering republic to be free from corruption, unless there is a common concern that threatens the whole citizens and unifying bond emerged against it. That idea and pessimism led Machiavelli to favor “difficult times” to serve as a catalyst for uniting people and providing sufficient motivation, agility and dynamism that are required for a republican system to survive. In his *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio* Machiavelli suggested that republics thrive best in poverty and war, which unite citizens in pursuit of the common good. He concluded that wealth and leisure made Rome too corrupt to be free (Sellers, 2003: 3). Along with his favoritism for militaristic virtues, Machiavelli is often criticized as being a pro-war republican.

Machiavelli is also known and sometimes criticized for being a “pragmatist” republican, who promotes a type of citizen that does everything that is required in order to maintain the republic. In this sense, rather than being “good”, “godly”, “humble” and/or “otherworldly”, the citizen should be harsh and heroic. This is also needed in order to preserve the citizens’ own freedom. In this sense sometimes he is also called as “a republican for hard times” (Honohan, 2001: 11).

Machiavelli has several original republican ideas. His interpretation of republicanism allows pursuing individual goals, while their deepest interest is their commitment to the whole, which can be seen as an originality of Machiavelli (Berlin, 1979). His understanding of citizenship was not defined in racial and cultural terms, but rather in terms of commitment to the republic and common goals. In this regard, he emphasized equality, which is necessary to make it possible for every citizen to commit equally to the republic.

Machiavelli's emphasis on power and harshness against the ones who fail directly contrast with Christian ethic. That approach also caused him to be known as someone for whom the end justifies the means. However, he also condemned Caesar for monopolizing power at the expense of the freedom of the state. Therefore, means are justified as long as they expand freedom or increase the power of the state.

It should be noted here that not all the scholars see Machiavelli as the republican theorist (Snyder, 1999: 16). Especially his book *Prince* puts forward an autocratic approach, while *Discourses* can be considered closer to republican ideas. Machiavelli has been a very controversial political figure and has been identified with as many different ways as no other political figure would have been; as “teacher of evil” (Mansfield, 1975), advocate of imperialism (Hullung, 1985), a protofascist who contributed to the emergence of nationalism (Martin, 1963; Hegel, 1964), an amoral theorist who divorced morality from politics and justified pure power politics (or *realpolitik*) (Mansfield, 1996), or a realist theorist who made a technical study of politics and favored evil only for the sake of good (Cassirer, 1946). However, many scholars

acknowledge the strong republican themes in some of Machiavelli's works, especially in *Discourses* as well as his lifelong practices (Pocock, 1975a; Skinner, 1981).

2.2.4. Harrington's Oceana

Within Anglophone political discourse, the republican theory first rose to prominence in the course of the disputes between crown and parliament preceding the outbreak of the English civil wars in 1642 (Skinner, 2008: 84). The turmoil that the country was facing led to the prevailing idea among some portion of the society that only a central single sovereign can guarantee freedom and peace (Honohan, 2001: 12). Some scholars as well as politicians rejected this idea. Members of Parliament complained that a number of specific rights and liberties were being undermined by the crown's legal and fiscal policies. They argued that, by emphasizing its prerogative rights, the crown was laying claim to a form of discretionary and hence arbitrary power that gave it the means to undermine specific rights and liberties with impunity (Skinner, 2008).

A notable rejection of single sovereign and further emancipation of republican ideas came from James Harrington, who advocated basic republican motto that citizens of a republic are freer than subjects of a sovereign, because they are not vulnerable to the arbitrary will of a ruler (Honohan, 2001: 12). In 1650's, in a time that falls about after the execution of Charles I, he wrote his famous book "Oceana". Characteristics of his imaginary republic Oceana envisaged how republican ideals can be revived and maintained in a political system. He also tackled the issue whether a republic can

survive in larger territorial states; an issue about which Machiavelli only narrowly jarred the door. Superiority of law was a primary measure that would free citizens from being subject to arbitrary people or decrees. Most notably, he characterized the republic in one of his most quoted words as “the empire of laws and not of men” (Harrington, 1992). He supported balanced institutions and popular participation as a measure to guarantee laws being non-arbitrary. As a form of balanced institutions, he envisioned to separate “deliberation” and “decision” from each other. Therefore, his government presupposed two assemblies, which he called the senate (for the former task of deliberation) and the popular assembly for decision making. In order to make it more suitable for larger states, he put more effort in describing a system of representation, which includes a combination of election as well as lottery among some portion of the citizens. Compared to Machiavelli, he relied more on institutional measures than civic virtue (Honohan, 2001: 12). A central requirement for his system to be plausible was equality, which has to be provided in economic terms in order to be achieved in political domain. Hence he advocated certain redistributive measures. According to him, the determining element of power in a state was property, and in order to eliminate culmination of it in a smaller group, the land ownership had to be limited. This concern is the basis of another central idea of republicanism, which can be phrased as “being independent of others’ influence.” This idea also led Harrington’s contemporary republicans to support to preventive measures against accumulating private property including agrarian laws. While equality was essential, it did not include all portions of the public. Therefore,

groups who were conceived not to be capable of being independent (such as women and servants) were naturally excluded from the citizenship.

Classical republicanism included freedom as the primary value, which needs to be politically constructed and supported by the civic virtue and active citizenship (Honohan, 2001: 12). An important portion of active citizenship is participation in the ruling and public tasks, which essentially includes military service (Honohan, 2001: 12). Therefore, main distinction of republicanism from the natural rights and/or contract theory, which were gaining popularity roughly at the same time advocated by Hobbes and Locke, was the conception of freedom which needs be constructed politically, rather than being a natural property of the individuals. Consequentially, promoting common good is not a concern for natural rights theorists, and for the political ideologies based around them. Government action is only required to protect citizens' freedom on behalf of them, which, in turn, compromises some portion of their freedom. Although this idea is also same for the supporters of contract theory, it is not same for J.J. Rousseau, author of the famous "Social Contract."

Harrington advocated limits on landholding, and rotation in office, to maintain the civic equality necessary for true republican virtue (Sellers, 2003: 3). One thing common for Machiavelli and Harrington was that they both defined wealth as a potential to corrupt people and consequently as a possible threat to the republic (Sellers, 2003: 3). Some decades later (in 1698) Sydney would reject this idea and claim that wealth actually would strengthen the republic (Sydney, 1698).

2.2.5. Rousseau and Social Contract

In the eighteenth century, two important reformulations of republicanism emerged. Rousseau³ highlighted the modern concern for individual freedom with an ideal of a small republic of free, virtuous, self-governing citizens. Madison, on the other hand, tried to fit republican ideas to the large commercial states.

Rousseau re-emphasized that since people live in a society, they are not independent and although their freedom might be natural, it still has to be politically realized as self-rule (Honohan, 2001: 14). The real question for Rousseau was to find a social system in which although people are inevitably dependent on each other and they are subject to the collective force, they still remain as free as before (Rousseau, 1762). He criticized the natural rights theory, for it only talks about a potential which needs an extensive effort in political domain to come into life. He elaborated the interdependence among individuals, which had both good and bad, psychological and physical aspects, and sought how it did not turn into a force that oppresses people. Therefore, Rousseau took dependence in a wider sense; in addition to the apparent physical and material dependence, he also talked about the dependence of people on others' opinions, what he called "*amour propre*" (self-love in French) (Rousseau, 2002). This kind of self-love depends on the opinions of others; hence the person sees himself or herself as the others see him or her. In contrast, another type of self-love (*amour de soi*), which is independent of others' opinions. He saw *amour propre* as a challenge to freedom and

³ According to Philip Pettit, Rousseau is not a republican but a *communitarian*, which is significantly different than republicanism (Pettit, 2012: 11-18). Pettit criticizes people who confuse the two; however, Rousseau's contribution to the republican theory is more widely acknowledged.

happiness within society, and actually as a form of corruption (Delaney, n.d.). Therefore, for a person living in a society, freedom cannot only be obtained by political measures but also by personal development. That created a theoretical problem, because Rousseau was supporting two extremes at the same time: complete individual self-reliance both in physical and psychological dimensions while being wholly absorbed in the collective life. According to some, he was “torn” between the two, as was disclosed in his another famous work “Emile” and failed to reach a consistent theoretical solution (Honohan, 2001: 14).

Rousseau believed that sovereignty means self-rule and being dependent on the whole as a collective body, but not on any individual. Major dilemma, according to him, is to reconcile individual freedom, which includes individual will, with the general one. The answer lies in the definition of sovereignty. True sovereignty is directly related with the general will of the whole, not particular individuals. Therefore, he also justifies any intervention on behalf of the sovereign, which means the whole people and their interests materialized as general will. Intervention secures freedom, not limits it (Later Pettit will argue that it *conditions* freedom). He specifically emphasized the necessity of equality for generating the general will and importance of redistributive measures to assure it. In his own words, “no citizen should be so rich as to buy another” (Rousseau, 1762: 96). Equality should also be achieved through education and collective activities.

As a noteworthy deviation from classical republicanism and also as an important factor related with the main subject of this thesis, Rousseau substituted military drill with other type of collective activities that would build cohesion among citizenry

(Honohan, 2001: 14). Therefore, he can be listed as the first republican that has a less-militaristic, and maybe less totalitarian view. However, he cannot be defined less-masculine or more-egalitarian in gender terms; he still excluded women from citizenship, and actually prescribed what he demonized for men; being dependent on others. Main virtues for women were staying at home to support and rear republican citizens (Honohan, 2001: 14).

2.2.6. American and French Revolutions

Although its basic ideas are deeply rooted in ancient history, republicanism found its fullest expression between Fifteenth and Eighteenth Centuries, when it influenced the whole world and gave rise to American and French revolutions (Honohan, 2001). Both American and French revolutionaries proclaimed their desire to re-establish the “stupendous fabrics” of republican government that had fostered liberty at Rome (Sellers, 2003: 16). French political activists attributed the French Revolution to Cicero’s ideal of Roman politics (Parker, 1937). But civic republicanism more profoundly shaped the ways in which early Americans conceptualized politics (Snyder, 1999); a consensus existed on “republican principles” in “one form or another” since the beginning (Pole, 1987: 14). In his inaugural speech as the first President of the United States under the new federal Constitution, George Washington stated that “...the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered, perhaps, as deeply, as finally, staked on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people”

(Washington, 1789). This government was designed to restore the “sacred fire of liberty” in the new world (Washington, 1789). According to J.G.A. Pocock, early Americans understood themselves as heirs of “the Atlantic Republican Traditions” which began with the work of Niccolò Machiavelli (Snyder, 1999). Republican themes were apparent in federalist as well as anti-federalist papers with appeals for “liberty” and “virtue” against “tyranny” and “corruption, along with explicit and/ or implicit references to the Roman Republic, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Rousseau (Pole, 1987: 14). Actually “it was a rare newspaper essayist who did not use a Greek or Latin phrase to enhance an argument or embellish a point and who did not employ a classical signature” (Wood G. , 1969: 49). This was also apparent in more mainstream works. American political theorists James Maddison and Alexander Hamilton were the primary authors of the federal constitution. They produced federalist papers under the pseudo name “Publius” (referring to Publius Valerius Poplicola, founder and first consul of the Roman republic (Maddison, 1818) in order to defend their ideas. Main theme in their design was the Roman ideal of the republic.

It is a question whether Rousseau was able to provide a complete theoretical solution but he was able to address the central problem: independence in an interdependent system, freedom where people are not totally free. James Maddison provided different answers to this common problem. Discussions during the establishment of the United States and in the following years around individual and collective rights as well as other republican themes contributed to the republican revival which came until today. Adopting Roman approach, Maddison advocated legal and

institutional measures to achieve freedom, rather than active participation (Honohan, 2001: 15). He also emphasized civic virtue and civic spirit as essential ingredients for collective self-determinism achieved through government. Different from Rousseau, he did not pay special attention to economic inequality. However, his main deviation from classical republicanism was his practical solutions for realizing republics in larger territorial states and for mediating the majority tyranny which can be caused in democracies. In this sense, he envisaged an elaborate system of representation, federation and separation of powers. He argued that freedom and civic spirit can co-exist in a government where these three are combined (Honohan, 2001: 15). His complex system of representation was a kind of safeguard against the ignorant and biased majority dominating the individual. Therefore, he trusted more on the elective nature of the representatives rather than the citizens having equal voice and rights. In this regard, also as a novelty among republicans, he separated republican political system from democracy. Since the representatives had a duty to define what is best for the whole and what is not, they needed to be carefully chosen. Therefore, he advocated electoral colleges and other indirect election procedures and excluded lottery. Separation of powers was a main mechanism against corruption. Although he underlined the importance of civic virtue, he mainly focused on institutional solutions for maintaining the republic. However, his understanding of limited government control which does not require active and equal participation of all citizens in essence brings him very close to liberals. According to early Americans, the “common good” included individual interests. Since every citizen living in a republic is organically linked to the others,

whatever good for the whole was also good for the individual (Wood, 1969: 58). Later this idea was moderated with Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, which were designed to secure individual rights against the community and the state.

Eighteenth-century republicans viewed the individual and the collective well-being of citizens as the only legitimate purpose of government (Sellers, 2003: 16). Elements of classical republicanism until the end of eighteenth century can be summarized as follows (Honohan, 2001):

- Freedom, although perceived differently, is an essential element. However, it is secondary to virtue and common good, and it is specific to certain elite group. It is understood as a political gain rather than natural right. Citizens of a state are free if they are self-governing and are independent of external rule and internal tyranny.
- Instead of a single sovereign, the political structure (institutions and laws) provide basis for people to form an agreement to live together.
- In place of a single sovereign, there is “mixed” government, in which social forces or institutions of government are balanced against one another to prevent the domination of the state by particular interests and thus to realize the common goods of citizens.
- Freedom is guaranteed by, and compatible with, the rule of established laws in place of the will of a ruler.
- Citizens must be active, accepting duties and performing public service both military and political.

- In addition, they need to recognize the value of what they share with other citizens. They must cultivate civic virtue, or a commitment to a common good. (So they need to be a specific type of people, and that needs training)
- Since humans have private interests as well as those they share with other citizens, from the republican perspective primary problem is **corruption** (emphasizing individual interests more than the common good). All political solutions are fragile and require continuous injections of energy to sustain them.

During Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, republicanism was in some kind of recession because of the dominating clash between liberalism and socialism. Today, a new generation of republican thinkers is giving way to new ideas. The main reason for re-generating republicanism and still seeking a different prescription for the state and politics results from the dissatisfaction with the current system. Excluding individuals from the state and from one another caused some unrecoverable damages that both modern states and philosophers are trying to cover. In this respect, some are seeking the solution by changing the meaning and scope of liberalism, while others making new interpretations of republicanism in a way to respond to contemporary issues. Before going deep into the characteristics of the new republicanism, I will investigate another certain characteristic of the republican tradition: its close relationship with the military and its values.

CHAPTER III

MILITARY IN TRADITIONAL REPUBLICAN THEORY

3.1. Introduction

Traditionally there is a strong relationship between republicanism and military (Sunstein, 1988: 1539-40, 1564). This relationship has several dimensions. In addition to its instrumental benefits, republicans believed that the citizens of the republic can and should not be excluded from the task of protecting the republic from both external and internal threats. This belief led to the idea of “citizen army”, which was favored throughout different courses of republican tradition. In Greek and Roman republics, mercenaries (as opposed to citizen army) were sometimes held main responsible for losing on the battlefield. Later, Machiavelli did not only support the idea of citizen army, but also prescribed militaristic values for any citizen in daily political life. He also thoroughly elaborated martial affairs of the city republics of the Italian Renaissance. Similarly, the cities of the Dutch Republic were protected with “companies of the

guard” (Goodin, 2003: 65). In Harrington’s *Oceana*, “county assemblies” were at once “assemblies of the electorate and musters of the militia” (Pocock, 1973: 114).

The idea of citizen army was supported by several reasons which have both internal and external aspects. Overall, military was essential for a republican state in three dimensions:

1. In relation to other states,
2. In relation to the internal tyrants,
3. In relation to its citizens.

Military’s main task related in relation to the outer world is defending the country against external threats by using or displaying force. Every republican, including the ancient and the modern ones, emphasized the crucial need for protection of the state in order to be free from domination (Pettit, 2002: 151) in a relatively stronger manner compared to other theories of the state. However, its ancient origins and many following republicans called for even stronger connection with the military and the society. For a republic to survive, it has to be protected from external threats. That required a strong military force as a prerequisite for any republican system to survive. Military power is traditionally important in classical republicanism for providing existential conditions for the *polis*. Protection can be provided by either direct use of military power, or sometimes only by deterrence. For most of the world history, wars were inevitable part of the daily life, making protection an essential need and diverting the focus from the individual to the state. However, republicans always found time to maintain their internal gaze and question the links between the republic and its citizens.

In the internal dimension, real fight of republicans was about making the citizens the owners of the republic. In this sense, internal enemies of the republic, i.e., enemies that threaten the citizens' ownership rights and their freedom, were considered equally if not more dangerous than the external enemies. The republic and its citizens needed to be protected against tyrants that would deny or limit other citizens' rights. Therefore, another equally important task of the military was to protect the citizens from the internal tyrants, which may appear easily if the citizens do not have any leverage within their hands.

Yet another function of the military was defined in relation to the regular citizen, who needs to be raised and educated in republican tradition. Military was always seen as the primary medium for donating the citizen with the right interpretation of the civic virtue. In this regard, citizen armies were seen both as the source of these virtues and the effective instruments for transporting them.

Last two dimensions (military's role in relation to the tyrants and to its citizens) together can be called as the "internal dimension" in which military was conceptualized in republican tradition. This chapter will focus on different periods in which republican ideas were relatively dominant and examine how military was conceptualized in the internal domain. Military in relation to the external domain, i.e. its function as protection from outside enemies, will not be examined since there is not much change in the overall acceptance of the validity and significance of this task. However, I do not totally rule out the need for questioning its effects, mostly because of the change in the perception of threat. History is full of examples in which the tyrants were emerged and

legitimized their arbitrary rule because of the perception of the threat of an external enemy. More importantly, current concepts on security are much broader and are not limited to external threat. Today, security discourse itself has the capacity to legitimize arbitrary rule with or without the help of the existence of an external enemy and can itself be considered as a danger to autonomy. Security concept and protection against perceived enemies inside or outside should not be a justification medium for arbitrary actions of the state. Protection against threats is considered to have extra-political status, and has priority above everything political, simply because for the politics and everything related with the state to exist, first the state should exist and be safeguarded. Therefore, protection from threats is a prerequisite for and consequently has priority above politics. If this discourse on threat and security is expanded to include several other factors, that means these factors can also be taken outside the political domain. Similarly, any activity regarding defense of the state would take place outside the political domain, which has the potential to de-politicize politics and lead to arbitrary implementations.

I will suffice to note that there is still space for discussion on the perception of security and its consequences in modern politics. This chapter will focus on the position of armed forces in relation to the citizens of a republic and explore how it is envisaged or advocated by prominent figures of the republican thought.

3.2. Military and Citizenship in the Ancient Republics

3.2.1. Military Structure

In the ancient republics of the West (understood as Greece, Macedonia, or Rome) role of warrior was related to the role of citizen (Santosuosso, 1997). The middle class, characterized by the agricultural societies of the period, dominated the Greek *poleis* (Santosuosso, 1997: 4). The “hoplites”, citizen-soldiers serving as heavy infantrymen, formed the backbone of the Greek Army, estimated at a third to a half of its adult male population (Gat, 2006: 295-8). Some argue that regular wars were necessary to perpetuate citizenship, because only the goods and slaves gained by wars would make it possible for a city to survive. Therefore, peace actually meant ruin for citizenship (Weber, 1998). In addition to being a mirror of the social structure, military system also reflected promoted society’s values and virtues. Both battle system and the equipment of the soldiers placed the safety of the collective entity over that of the individual. In the long lines of soldiers, each man stood next to his neighbor (Santosuosso, 1997: 10). The army was fighting in “phalanx” system, in a rectangular mass military formation, which had hoplite soldiers ranked shoulder-to-shoulder in a “compact mass” with each soldier’s shield guarding the soldier to his left (Hosking, 2005). If a single fighter failed to keep his position, then the entire formation could fall apart (Hosking, 2005). Individual soldiers were generally protected provided that the entire mass stayed together. Soldiers were armed with a long spear and a large shield, weapons that were effective only if used to protect the whole line of soldiers (Santosuosso, 1997: 1). Discarding one’s

shield was a great disgrace, much more than throwing away the helmet and the breastplate, mainly because they carried the shields for the benefit of the whole line, while wore the others for their own benefit (Santosuosso, 1997: 1) Although encountered some difficulties, Greek armies managed to overcome massive Persian attacks by the help of this idea of unity. The conduct of war and the actions of the warriors on the battlefield reflected and reinforced the values of the ruling class, in most cases the middling farmers (Santosuosso, 1997: 20). The hoplite army was the army of the middle strata of Greek society, which formed the core, heart, and brains of warfare (Santosuosso, 1997: 20). The hoplite style of fighting implied and required the sizeable proportion of the citizenry with that economic capacity and self-enrolment (Cartledge, 2003: 165).

Following the Great Persian Wars, increasing use of mercenaries and the introduction of *peltasts* (light infantry) started to challenge the hoplite system and eventually the traditional concept of the citizen-soldier (Santosuosso, 1997: 1). But the real turning point for use of mercenaries was the Peloponnesian War. Until that time, being a soldier was inseparable part of being a citizen, just as the war was part of daily life. Prestige in the army was equated with the prominence in public life and sometimes a change in the military structure was a natural outcome of a new societal arrangement (Santosuosso, 1997: 82).

After the Peloponnesian war, however, the requirements of the warfare, both in terms of time and capability, was more demanding. Soldiers needed to go distant battle zones, usually one followed the other. They needed to stay in the service for longer

period of times and needed to develop better skills for war-fighting, which would be a pity to lose for the armies. The battles of Leuctra and Mantinea marked the end of the citizen-warrior (Santosuosso, 1997: 4).

Similar to Greeks, Macedonians also assumed that “those who owned the state would manage, stage, and fight its wars” (Santosuosso, 1997: 4). However, the military structure was greatly changed along with the change in the social and political structure. Macedonians had powerful, authoritarian kings and a strong aristocracy. The class and ethnic differences were also reflected in the military system. Aristocracy emerged as a middle owner of the state between the ruler (the king) and the rest of the citizens. Mercenaries were also present in Macedonian military system, however, they formed the lowest place along with the subject people and fought essentially for financial rewards, rather than the defense of “their *polis*, their land and their families” (Santosuosso, 1997: 4).

In the Roman Republic, defense of the state was provided by legions of citizens, enlisted by military commanders acting on commission from the Senate. Social status was also reflected in military role in Rome. Different from Greek cities which were dominated by middle class or Macedonians which were dominated by the aristocracy, Roman cities were ruled by a mixed structure. Roman aristocracy had to share power with the commoners, who were the property owners (Santosuosso, 1997: 4). The result was legions, which a citizen owning certain amount of property could join and fought next to aristocrats, who provided leadership to them. Roman citizens were obliged to

serve 16 campaigns between the ages of 17 and 46. If needed, upper age limit could rise up to 60 (Santuosso, 1997: 150).

This practice underlines two essential criteria for being a citizen and exercising citizenship duties: wealth and military duty, which were not separate from each other. Citizenship was closely related with the wealth citizens possess, which was closely related with their duties as soldiers. However, this application was always linked to the necessities of the conditions. The number of *assidui* (people qualified for military service) was increased depending on the requirements of the battle ground.

Until 107 B.C. and at least since the time of Servius Tullius (ca.580-530 B.C.), only those who owned certain amount of property has the prerogative of becoming a soldier (Santuosso, 2001: 10). One's positions in the army as well as the equipment he can have was also dictated by his personal assets. A citizen-soldier was allowed to carry armors proportionate with his wealth (Gabba, 1976: 2).

Among the division of five classes of wealth, first three classes with the higher wealth constituted heavy infantry, while remaining two classes played less crucial roles in the battlefield (Santuosso, 2001: 10). In 107 B.C., Gaius Marius opened the army to all Roman citizens regardless of their wealth and started "troops' proletarianization" (Santuosso, 2001: 10). This practice had some important changes in the virtues of the soldiers, who now had less reason to defend the traditional structure of their society than the men with the property, who had believed to *be* the (owner of the) state. Among this new generation of soldiers, the loyalty to the republic has shifted to the generals, upon whom they relied for economic survival. This dedicated, loyal army of amateurs of the

past would eventually become the professional army of the future (Santuosso, 2001: 26) and would instigate still ongoing discussions on the citizenship - military duty relationship.

The state was even more heavily involved in the citizens' lives in the Spartan society. Some thinkers suggest that not Athens but ancient Sparta was the originator of the concept of citizenship (Heater, 2004: 157). Spartan citizenship was based on the principle of equality among a ruling military elite (Heater, 2004; Hosking, 2005). All Spartans followed a rigorous life pattern that began at birth and was designed to create a good citizen a good soldier. Decision for the child to live or die was made by magistrates of the state, the "ephors," depending on the seeming health of the child (Santuosso, 1997: 85). At the age of seven, the state would remove male children and take over his education until he is thirty (Santuosso, 1997: 85). At the age of thirty, they were graduated from the rigorous regimen of military training and received a land allotment called *kleros*, although they had to keep paying dues to pay for food and drink to maintain citizenship (Worthington, 2009). This system was designed to distinguish real Spartans from the rest of the society and foster in them those physical and emotional characteristics typical of a good soldier – a strong body, a warlike spirit, a sense of camaraderie, and the habit of obedience (Santuosso, 1997: 85). The Spartans were attempting to create and sustain perfect citizen-soldier, even at the expense of rewriting most traditional societal and familial arrangements. For example, stealing food was not punished unless they are caught, but, on the contrary, encouraged among the young in order to boost their warlike spirit:

...it is evident that he who intends to steal must watch during the night, and cheat during the day, and lay snares, and if he expects to receive anything, he must even employ spies. It is plain, then, that, the children were thus instructed ...to (be) most dexterous in procuring provisions and well trained for warfare (Xenophon, 1843: 706).

They were punished if they are caught because that meant they had not acted properly and stolen in a “bungling” manner (Xenophon, 1843: 706). The acquisition of money and conducting business were forbidden in order that the lure of money would not poison their minds (Santosuosso, 1997: 86). Every citizen was responsible for raising the boys and capable of punishing them in case of inappropriate behavior. “Whatever citizen was present, should be master...” so that “the boys of Lacedremon are never without a leader,” and “neither boys nor men respect any person more than their rulers” (Xenophon, 1843: 707).

3.2.2. Citizen Army/Soldier Citizen

As discussed in the previous section, citizen-soldiers are definitive characteristics of republican political tradition since the early ages. “No standing armies” and “no professional soldiers” were central principles of republics from the earliest days (Goodin, 2003: 66). Both in Greece and in Rome, the military function of the soldier remained an extension of his social function (Santosuosso, 1997: 150). J.G.A. Pocock have suggested that the modern-day ideal of citizenship was first articulated by the ancient Athenians and Romans (Pocock, 1998: 31). An in the ancient city states of Athens, Rome and Sparta, the citizen-soldier, ready to fight for his ancestral land in

word and deed, was regarded as the ideal citizen (Strauss B. S., 2004: 20). Political participation was thus linked with military effectiveness (Hosking, 2005).

In the western Ancient republics, military as an institution and war fighting as a practice were adopted as an integral and contributive part of the social and public life. Main reasoning was not too much different than today. Greek writers and orators often justified war as a defense of freedom (Santosuosso, 1997: 20). Growth of slavery in this age made Greeks equally conscious of the value of their freedom (Hosking, 2005: 1-2). Some thinkers believe that it was this appreciation for the importance of freedom which gave rise to the idea of citizenship in ancient Greece (Hosking, 2005: 1-2). During Persian Wars, for example, Greeks believed that they fought not only for the triumph of civilization over barbarism but also for the freedom of all Greece (Santosuosso, 1986: 41). But its instrumental use in the social life was much ahead of the need required. This connection was much more apparent in Republican Rome (Harris, 1979), in which waging war was the best example of social organism: War fulfilled the psychological need to use violence and brutality, attain enrichment and power, relieved societal tensions, achieved social mobility and keep newly conquered people in line (Santosuosso, 1997: 5).

Military system was not only reflecting the social structure of ancient republics, but also their social and cultural values. The virtues that a citizen should have were defined and thought by the help of the military institution. Being a citizen meant having some moral obligations against the society and the republic, and following these obligations was the most important virtue. In this regard, moral obligations and civic

virtues were intertwined with each other, and most of the time defined in militaristic (and of course, masculine) terms (Snyder, 1999). The most prominent moral obligation of a citizen was standing against all enemies (Rind, 1979). The virtues he needs to possess were defined in the way to best serve this purpose.

The basis of citizen virtues and the ideals of community life in Rome were the traditional values that were developed by old generations and carried over to the new ones. *Mos maiorum* (customs of our ancestors) was the basis of idealized community behavior and key virtues of the citizen (Santuosso, 2001: 23). *Mos maiorum* was supported by examples of virtuous behaviors (*exempla virtutis*) and included acts of courage, patriotism and selflessness, glory (*gloria*), greatness of spirit (*magnitudo animi*), praiseworthiness or honorability (*dignitas*), authority (*auctoritas*), seriousness (*gravitas*), public recognition (*honos*), and nobility (*nobilitas*) (Santuosso, 2001: 23).

As seen, these key virtues are associated the good citizenship with the military success and characteristics that would make it possible. For example, “glory” was the most emphasized virtue (Rind, 1979). It was given to those “who had selflessly defended their country with great personal danger and dedication” (Santuosso, 2001: 23). Other virtues were also either closely or directly connected with the state and/or military activities, and were never individualistic: They needed to be shown not for one’s own ends, but for the republic as a whole (Rind, 1979: 20) For example greatness of spirit was about the heroic actions that a citizen demonstrated in war against Rome’s enemies (Santuosso, 2001: 23). Honor, or *honos*, was nothing but recognition of this greatness of spirit or glory by other citizens. Praiseworthiness was achieved if someone

advanced the interests of the republic at the expense of his own (Santuosso, 2001: 24). Therefore, patriotism and duty to the state were inseparable aspects of this virtue (Rind, 1979: 27-9), and the best arena for displaying it was military environment. (Santuosso, 2001: 24). These values were first articulated by Cato the Censor in the second century, and then by Cicero in the first century B.C. (Santuosso, 2001: 25).

With all these characteristics, the military system and the war itself was actually the main mechanism in defining the members of a city/state as the citizens. It created the values that they must have, strengthened the social structure by creating bonds between the citizens, and became an instrument of economic gain and wealth distribution. It defined the citizens also by defining the enemy.

The dilemma of war centric states comes from the ancient times. On one hand, being a soldier was directly related with the citizenship status of a state. On the other hand, intensifying battles required more soldiers with more professional characteristics. As a consequence of this need, mercenaries (as oppose to citizen-soldiers) were always used in Greek states, sometimes as personal guards of tyrants. However, they did not appear in greater numbers until dramatic Peloponnesian War, during which Greek cities were engaged in mutual slaughter (Santuosso, 1997: 88). Alexander the Great had about 50,000 mercenaries in his army in 329 B.C. (Garlan, 1975: 94-5). Very soon afterwards, they became the main force of Hellenistic armies (Garlan, 1975: 95).

This change had important repercussions in the relationship between the military and the society (Santuosso, 1997: 89). A mercenary was different from the citizen-soldier. He did not have anything –land, houses, wife or children – that bonds him to the

land he fights for. More importantly, he did not have ideals to fight for. Although citizen-soldiers also fought for some profits that war might bring them, their main concern was protecting their and their relatives' freedom (Santosuosso, 1997: 89). Employment of mercenaries, who did not fight for ideals related with their homeland but only for monetary gain, eroded the "jealously guarded privilege that had made the role of warrior an extension of the role of citizen" (Parke, 1981: 237). This also had an effect on the citizens who started to have a tendency to regard their military service as an economic, not a civic, function (Santosuosso, 1997: 92). By the inclusion of mercenaries, occasional elected generals of the fifth century tended to become permanent, probably because of the inadequacy in leadership (Santosuosso, 1997: 92). Inclusion of mercenaries made it possible for the rulers to have better trained soldiers and implement better tactics in the battlefields; however, it also led to a disruption of the link between the citizens and their cities.

3.3. Machiavellian Republic and Citizen Army

Citizen army tradition of ancient republics were further developed and theorized by Machiavelli. His ideas strengthened the theoretical grounds for the central position of the citizen army in the republican tradition in general. These ideas are encountered in various republicans in different times with varying tones, but generally circling around similar themes.

Centuries later than Greek and Roman republics, Machiavelli also supported the idea of citizen-army. At the first instance, an army made up of citizens emerge as a practical requirement; simply because they would provide better protection. Machiavelli defines four types of armies: citizen army, mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand “neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful...” (Machiavelli, 1515: 56). More importantly, they do not have the same fidelity to the government that a citizen soldier would have. They have “no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you” (Machiavelli, 1515: 56).

Machiavelli’s book Prince is highly rich in providing several historical examples of mercenaries that failed while citizen-armies succeeded even with few. According to him:

(A wise prince) ... has always avoided these arms (mercenaries and auxiliaries) and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them (his own army) than to conquer with others, not deeming that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others... (Machiavelli, 1515: 64).

Besides, no principality is secure without having its own forces (Machiavelli, 1515: 67). One's own forces are those which are composed either of subjects, citizens, or dependents (Machiavelli, 1515: 67).

Therefore, Machiavelli’s case for citizen-soldier has an instrumental reason: Only the ones whose property and family and whole gains are at stake can protect the state with the highest devotion and sacrifice. This is the natural consequence of the direct link between the protector and the protected. This justification does not only apply

to the outside threats, but also to the internal ones. Internal threats include possible tyrants who may threaten citizens' freedom and autonomy. Citizen-army is an important safeguard against such tyrants. This is an important reference to the need of power to resist any dominating actors within the republic, and this power can be gathered in the hands of the citizens by the help of citizen- army according to Machiavelli.

This power is not only required for resisting the tyrants, but also implementing the laws in the way they are intended. There are two pillars of Machiavellian republic: the laws, and the arms:

The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws" (Machiavelli, 1515: 55).

According to Machiavelli, "all men are evil"; what makes them good is the law (Machiavelli, 1517). While the good laws are the mechanism for a good republic, good arms, which can be read as arms being in the hands of the citizens, is the enabler. Law is the primary mechanism for safeguarding freedom and achieving common good, while arms or the military power is the necessary institution for assuring proper implementation of the law. In this sense, arms in good hands are equally important and existential for the state as the laws. This is not only normal because the state would not exist without a capable army, but also because if the arms in wrong hands in a state, fair implementation of laws would not be possible.

Therefore, citizen-army composed of the real citizens is important for both internal and external purposes. Internal domain is not limited to the fair implementation of laws or resisting against tyranny. More importantly, it is the core civic practice which

builds the citizenship, which is not a status gained neither by blood, nor by being born in a territory. It provides crucial civic virtues that a citizen should be adorned with.

As an important characteristic of it (and as discussed in Chapter 1), the republican tradition envisages certain type of individual in order to be rightfully implemented. Citizenship is politically constructed; apart from its legal status, it is gained through possessing certain values and acting accordingly. These values and actions in accordance with them are usually referred to as “virtues”. Machiavelli’s concept of virtue connects public domain with the military one and the soldier with the citizen.

In republican ideology, citizenship is not automatically gained by blood, by living on a piece of land or by any other means; it has to be developed in a continuous process which involves actively taking part in civic practices. And traditionally, taking part in the military formed the main practice through which citizenship is constructed (Snyder, 1999: 15). Citizenship is not automatic, because it requires a combination of certain habits, political view and characteristics among individuals, which are mainly called civic virtue, although some characteristics are sometimes referred to by other names such as civility or public spirit. Similar to the citizens, soldiers are not also born; they are made. They are made “if only there is someone who can direct them toward soldiership” (Machiavelli, 1520).

Pocock argues that “...through military discipline that one learns to be a citizen and to display civic virtue” (Pocock, 1975a: 201). Virtues such as courage, selflessness, fraternity and patriotism attach the individual to the others and forces him or her to think

for the benefit of the whole. Therefore, the citizen learns to prioritize the common good and gains necessary skills to actively participate in constructing it. Military virtues are necessarily linked to republican ones in most of the cases. A soldier puts his life at risk for the sake of his republic and its citizens. Participating in the military and fighting for the country requires the citizen to act together with other citizens for the common good of the whole and not for individual interests (Snyder, 1999: 23). In this sense, military service forms a type of civic education that trains and formats individuals to be a part of the community rather than a separate human being.

Machiavelli also privileges military action and soldiership over other forms of civic actions in constructing the citizens (Snyder, 1999: 38). Machiavelli's citizen soldier (and citizen) is a "man". The *virtu* he has to bear requires three interconnected characteristics: masculinity, soldiering and citizenship (Snyder, 1999: 22). These characteristics are inseparable from each other and improved through martial practices. Leading theme of Machiavelli's *Discorsi* (second book) is that martial virtues such as "courage and determination" are the characteristics that citizens need to possess to uphold the common good and protect the individual and societal liberty (Skinner, 1991: 303). Some argue that citizen soldier is central to Machiavelli's theory of republicanism because it links some seemingly contradictory ideals: "the civic realm and the militia, participatory citizenship and armed masculinity, civic virtue and *virtu*, republican ideal and militarism" (Snyder, 1999: 10).

There are some other important characteristics of Machiavellian citizen soldier, which is not necessarily prevalent in the rest of republican tradition, but is more related

with the characteristics of his era. As a significant indicator of Machiavelli's ideology, citizen soldier should be secular. Rather than God or religious ideals, he fights for protecting secular political order and civic ideals (Snyder, 1999: 22). This idea reflects the general nature of the republican revival of the fifteenth century, which had emerged as an opposition to the Christian worldview and political order (Pocock, 1975a: 51-2; Snyder, 1999: 22). Certain ideals such as autonomy, liberty and equality were consecrated and replaced supernatural beliefs. Being subject to a tyrant or God-given unchangeable laws has the effect of limiting these ideals. In this sense, Machiavelli "unequivocally preferred the republic to revealed religion" (Pocock, 1975b: 390), hence advocated that the citizen soldier should do the same.

Accordingly, Machiavelli's virtues are also secular or "pagan" as opposed to the ones offered by Christianity, which are mild and, according to some thinkers, "feminine" (Hullung, 1985; Snyder, 1999). Pagan virtues manly and fiercer; they include "glory, grandeur, magnificence, ferocity, exuberance, action, health and manliness," where their opposite Christian virtues are humble and contemplative; and include "humility, abjectness, contempt for human things, withdrawal, inaction, suffering, and disease" (Hullung, 1985). Therefore, Machiavelli "seek(s) in *virtu* a manly alternative to what (he) describes as the feminizing, enfeebling and immobilizing virtue of Christianity" (Hullung, 1985). Christian "otherworldliness" turns men away from the human worldly endeavors.

On the other hand, different approaches and different set of virtues in Machiavelli's two prime work lead to different interpretations. Some argue that

Machiavelli offers different set of virtues in the *Prince* and the *Discourses*; a perfect republican citizen in the *Discourses* versus the strong and ferocious (or princely) virtues in the *Prince* (Honig, 1993). According to others, rather two characteristics are unified by the ideal of “citizen soldier” (Snyder, 1999: 25). And some others argue that the *Prince* is not republican at all (Leo Strauss, (Strauss, 1958; Mansfield, 1975).

Military action and soldiership is preferred over other forms of civic actions in constructing the citizens; however, in order to be effective, it requires constant presence of enemy (Snyder, 1999: 38). What makes soldiership a more effective civic practice and military a more powerful organization to construct citizenship that any other mechanism or institution? There may be some additional features hidden in the nature of both, but an essential ingredient is the motivation, which in this case can be stated as “fear”. Fear of war, or in more general terms, existence of a threat to the whole has a unifying effect by itself according to Machiavelli. What dissolves republics is usually the “idleness and peace”, while “the cause of unity is fear and war” (Machiavelli, 1517: 135). This assumption conflicts with Machiavelli’s statement that citizen-army is defensive in nature. He puts too much emphasis on the need for “enemy” as a unifying and motivating factor, which can in practice change this alleged defensive characteristic and adopt a hostile and consequentially assaultive nature. Even though a country cannot always be engaging in war, the preparation for it should be continuous.

3.4. Military Service According to Rousseau

Citizen soldier tradition had continued with Rousseau in the eighteenth century (Snyder, 1999: 45). There are important similarities between Machiavelli and Rousseau regarding republican citizen (and citizen-soldier) understanding. First, he shares the idea that a republic's "true defenders are its members" (Rousseau, 1772). Again similar to Machiavelli, this has two dimensions. From an instrumental and practical point of view, the citizens can defend their republic and their liberty better than mercenaries: "we always defend our own goods better than the goods of others" (Rousseau, 1772). But more importantly, this task of protection should be the duty of the citizens "Each citizen should be a soldier by duty, none by profession" (Rousseau, 1772). Secondly, army of citizens has internal and more important functions; it is a safety measures against the tyrants, who would have the absolute power if they get control of their own armies. It is only with regular and standing armies that "the executive power can ever enslave a state" (Rousseau, 1772). Thirdly, both Machiavelli and Rousseau do not advocate aggressive military power that threatens and attacks other countries. Therefore, it has a defensive nature, because "conquests and to acquire offensive power... is incompatible with the (republican) government" (Rousseau, 1772). Besides, "Whoever wants to deprive others of their freedom almost always ends by losing his own" (Rousseau, 1772). In this sense, citizen army emerges as a safety measure also for aggressiveness of the states, by curbing the appetite and personal flaws of the tyrants. Fourthly and more importantly, Similar to Machiavelli and maybe most of the other republicans, Rousseau also advocates citizenship based on performance. This concept sometimes called

participatory citizenship, performative citizenship or citizenship of civic practices. Since defending the republic and liberty is the most crucial job of every citizen, Rousseau also links citizenship with military service. As a consequence, and similar to Machiavelli, Rousseau also argues that military service produces necessary virtues for the protection and maintenance of the self-rule (Snyder, 1999: 47).

As a main difference, however, the crucial position of military service in educating citizens is not same for Rousseau. Military service does not constitute the almost only civic engagement that unites the citizens and adorns them with necessary virtues. Citizenship can and should be constructed through a wide range of common activities. Military service is still central, however it is not exclusive as it is for Machiavelli (Snyder, 1999: 47). In addition, Rousseau does not rely too much on an enemy to make citizen army work. In combination with other civic engagements, military service can produce a suitable environment for the citizens to participate collectively with the common purpose without feeling the heat of a close threat. This approach makes the idea of “defensive” military more possible and realistic for Rousseau than Machiavelli, who needs an enemy and consequently a war to properly bind and educate citizens.

Therefore, citizenship by performance and/or by participation is a stronger theme for Rousseau, which includes a wider range of civic activities. Sense of “duty” is critical:

(In the ancients) Citizens were neither lawyers nor soldiers nor priests by profession; they performed all these functions as a matter of duty. That is the real secret of making everything proceed toward the common goal, and of preventing the spirit of faction from taking root at the expense of

patriotism, so that the hydra of chicanery will not devour a nation (Rousseau, 1772).

The category of citizenship is not granted or inherited by any other means other than engagement in civic practices. In a way, a proper republic only creates opportunity for the people living on a land to become a real citizen by preparing the necessary conditions. Therefore, Rousseau's social contract transforms "private people" into "moral and collective body of citizens" through social practices (Snyder, 1999: 48). If private individuals do not participate in the collective activities, they lose their citizenship status: "If the people promises simply to obey...it loses the status of a people" (Rousseau, 1772). Citizenship should be constantly constructed and reconstructed through engagement in civic practices (Snyder, 1999: 48).

Along this stream of ideas coming from ancients and then evolving with Machiavelli and Rousseau, three important concepts of republican tradition emerge. These concepts are usually intertwined with each other. First, the understanding of the citizenship which needs to be (continuously) constructed rather taken or received for granted. This characteristic can be identified as a typical characteristic of republican tradition which does not seem to be revised, since it has always and is still a central theme for republican ideas to stem from. Citizenship status has to be earned, and the main mechanism for earning it is the action or performance of the individual in relation to the others and the republic. In almost of versions of the republican thought, performance based citizenship or citizenship by participation occupies a central position. However, sometimes this participation is critical by itself, but sometimes it has more instrumental role (see discussion in Pettit's chapter). Second, in traditional

republicanism, main area of civic engagement is the defense of the republic and values it provides (i.e. liberty, people's sovereignty, etc.). Military service and citizen soldier is main and most important form of civic practice that can construct citizens. This construction both includes participation in the common activity and adorning the individuals with necessary virtues to be a citizen. The third characteristic is related with the gender discussions since the citizen always envisioned as the masculine male. What changes is the centrality of the military service in this construction. If we move from Machiavelli to Rousseau, we can clearly see some other type of civic activities in addition to the military service are also considered equally important for collective execution. This division hints the later difference of ideas on this matter that comes all the way today. While the understanding of citizenship based on civic engagement and participation does not change significantly, we see that the discussion on the type of activities and whether military service should still be a part of it still continues.

3.5. Military in the Nineteenth Century England

Citizen soldier understanding has been part of the English constitutional tradition (Biagini, 2003: 65). Right to bear arms has been considered as one of the ancient rights of the "free-born Englishmen" (Biagini, 2003: 65). Therefore "right" comes before "duty" when it comes to defending one's own country, although the latter is also not forgotten. The idea of sharing the sovereignty by participating in every state activity was a common theme in English republicanism, but volunteerism in performing these tasks

were more strongly highlighted rather than emphasizing that these were the duty of every citizen.

Nineteenth century (Victorian period) was already a period in which volunteerism made its peak point unprecedented to that time (Cunningham, 1975: 1; Prochaska, 1992: 392; Morris, 1992: 405, 426-7, 430-9). This era has been seen as a revival in British self-oriented, volunteerism and social clubbing, organized popular leisure in which several voluntary committees and associations flourished (Cunningham, 1975: 1; Prochaska, 1992: 392; Morris, 1992: 405, 426-7). Voluntary committees and associations shaped British political environment and mindset (Prochaska, 1992: 392). They did not only promote citizenship as an ideal and set of values, but in terms of comprehensiveness and cohesiveness, because all social, cultural, ethnic, religious and/or political groups were brought together regardless of their status of gender (Morris, 1992: 430-9). Educating their members was a central concern for most of these clubs and associations. These associations served as “spontaneous school of civic virtue, whose influence and effectiveness surpassed that of any other institutional device contrived by Mill, Freeman or Greento bring about their ‘neo-roman’ (or perhaps ‘neo-Athenian’) ideals” (Biagini, 2003: 65-6).

Increasing volunteerism in this period was prevalent in many other forms as well as military. Revival of associations co-existed with the revival of citizen militias as a voluntary movement. Volunteering in the citizen-army was a “mass-phenomenon” between 1859 and early 1860s (Biagini, 2003: 66). There were different interpretations about the causes of this phenomenon. According to some, this was a reaction to French

threat (Salevouris, 1982). However, others argue that it was more related to home politics (Biagini, 2003: 66). According to Cunningham, revival in voluntary citizen militia in Victorian period was ‘the military expression of the spirit of self-help’ (Cunningham, 1975: 1). It may be more reasonable to associate this increasing interest in citizen-militia with the general interest in volunteerism. Volunteerism was linked with “patriotism”, which was interpreted as the “love of the public good”. According to Berkeley, “A patriot is one who heartily wisheth the public prosperity, and doth not only wish, but also study and endeavor to promote it” (Berkeley, 1685-1753: 114, Maxim 15) and “To be a real patriot, a man must consider his countrymen as God’s creatures, and himself as accountable for his acting towards them” (Berkeley, 1685-1753: 115, Maxim 24). Berkeley was not alone in these ideas; on the contrary, it was very common for British political figures at that time to highlight the significance of the military virtues. John Stuart Mill, for example, was an ardent supporter of the volunteerism and the citizen army. He underlined three areas that it will be useful: 1. Economy 2. Morality and 3. Character building (Mill, 1871). Very similarly, Baxter Langley and Josephine Butler were also linking citizen army with morality and economy approximately around same years (McHugh, 1980: 83).

3.6. Early Americans and Military

Commitment to the republican ideals in early Americans was also equally valid in commitment to the ideal of the citizen-soldier (Snyder, 1999). This idea, at least at the

beginning, was more common among antifederalists, who were the most explicit advocates of civic republicanism during the founding (Snyder, 1999). Later, it became general characteristic of American republicanism. Citizen-soldier was a culturally and politically a central concept for all Americans in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century (Pocock, 1975a; Chambers, 1987; Cress, 1982; Mahon, 1983; Millett and Maslowski, 1984). Underlying reasons for adoption of this concept were not different than what was described by Machiavelli and Rousseau. An important reason was to protect the freedom and self-rule from tyranny (Pole, 1987). In addition, American republicanism also required individuals to engage in civic and martial practices to become real citizens (Snyder, 1999). Engaging in these practices meant participating in the self-rule, without which republican citizenship would not exist (Tocqueville, 1956).

The second amendment of the American Constitution openly defined a “well-regulated Militia” as necessary for the security of the state and secured the “right of the people to keep and bear arms” (Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America). Therefore, armed citizen and militia existed as “dynamically interrelated elements” (Shalhope, 1986). “Right to bear arms” in the second amendment immediately follows the other rights of the citizens such as “freedom of speech” or “assemble” in the first one, which shows how critical did the early Americans saw these rights as constitutive of ideal republican citizenship.

In addition to the second amendment, the Militia Act of 1792 has reinforced the citizen-soldier understanding and institutionalized this tradition by establishing universal military obligation; it required every male citizen (provided that he is white and healthy

of course) between the ages of 18 and 45 to enroll in “unorganized” and “common” militia with his own weapons (Weigley, 1984: 93).

According to Samuel P. Huntington, there are three strands of American militarism which were all originated prior to the Civil War: technicism, popularism and professionalism (Huntington, 1957: 193). The popular strand of this tradition is directly linked with the citizen-soldier concept and stresses the “general capability of all Americans” (Huntington, 1957: 193). A military officer is a “citizen-soldier inspired by the ideals of democracy and liberty” (Huntington, 1957: 193). Even the technicism strand is directly associated with this idea, since “the roots of military technicism were widespread in American culture” (Huntington, 1957: 193). Thomas Jefferson, one of the American founding fathers and most influential figures, was also a strong advocate of citizen-soldier (Snyder, 1999). He believed that the difference between the civil and military should disappear (Huntington, 1957: 196). In this sense, he strongly favored obligatory military duty and wanted to make military training a key part of college education (Huntington, 1957: 196-8). Civic and martial practices together provided the necessary foundation for republican self-government aimed at the common good; such as feelings of patriotism, fraternity, and civic virtue as well as a common civic identity (Snyder, 1999).

3.7. Summary – Republicanism and the Citizen Army

Citizen-soldier/citizen-army is a concept associated with republicanism. Its instrumental values and practical benefits in the external domain appears as the first and obvious reasons used for justification by its advocates: In order to remain republic free from domination and create a suitable environment for the self-rule, the republic should be protected from enemy attacks and citizen soldiers can do it the best. Even when there is no war, possibility of an aggression can negatively affect internal politics. Therefore, threat of enemy has to be deterred to a degree where internal policy making would not be affected by it. However, neither the external domain nor any other benefits it can provide in terms of protection against enemies are main motives for advocating citizen soldiers. Actually the centrality of the citizen-soldier idea for all republicans since the ancients is much more related with its crucial, and most of the times irreplaceable role in the internal domain.

The first reason for supporting citizen-army is the need to counter-balance any possible source of arbitrary power in a republic. If the power is not in the hands of the citizens, then it would provide its owners the possibility to disrupt people's rule and impose whatever is in benefit on all. Therefore, it is a necessity for achieving real freedom, which requires removing any possibility of others to dominate the citizens and making it possible for the citizens to express their free will at its least. Rule of law is critical for ensuring republican order and freedom, but in order for the laws to be fair and equal and to be implemented rightfully, power should be in the hand of citizens at

all times. Therefore, first internal value of the citizen army is to be a safeguard for freedom against tyrants and any type of arbitrary domination over citizens.

Second important task, which is actually another dimension of the previous one, is to provide the power for “rightfully” implementing the laws, as also highlighted by Machiavelli. Rule of law is critical for citizens’ autonomy; however, rightful implementation of laws cannot be taken for granted. Power is always a game changer, even when the institutional measures are in place, such as separation of legislation, execution and judiciary. Machiavelli is far from following the power discourse as some modern theorists do today, but at least he acknowledges its role, although in one dimension, for the effective implementation of the law.

Third reason for supporting and justifying citizen army are the core concepts of “volunteerism” and “participation” in republican thought. People should be the owner of the republic, and owner of the all core functions of the republic. These functions should not be delegated to certain groups. This point is emphasized by Machiavelli, definitely an important one for Rousseau, partially valid for English and American republicans as well as some of their modern followers. When the task is about protecting the republic, it is should definitely be conducted by the citizens of it.

The last function of the citizen army in the military domain may be the most important one. Citizen soldier constitutes a normative ideal which entails a commitment to republican principles (Snyder, 1999: 15). Taking part in de defense of the republic as a citizen soldier has internal function of educating the citizen. When the citizens are individually responsible for the protection of a state, they need to adopt the role of the

military, and show militaristic virtue. Such virtue is not only a requirement for providing a belligerent character, but also for providing necessary spirit among the citizens. Such spirit is needed in every aspect of citizenship. Therefore, militaristic and republican values evolved together and became inseparable. It was thought that martial virtue should extend throughout the entire community (Goodin, 2003: 66).

The ideal of citizen soldier forms the centerpiece of some civic practices that constitutes citizenship (Snyder, 1999: 15). In republican tradition, individuals do not automatically become citizens because of living within the same borders (*ius solis*) or with heritage or ethnic bonds (*ius sanguinis*). Individuals actually become citizens as they participate together in the civic practices, which includes defense of the republic as the uttermost duty. They have to develop a civic identity that requires taking part in the self-ruling and adopting certain virtues. Just as the freedom itself, citizenship is also not a natural possession; they have to be politically (and continuously) constructed. Traditionally, participating in the military is the main practice through which citizenship is constructed (Snyder, 1999: 15).

In this sense, the most important function of military in the republic emerges in the internal domain as constructing citizenship by donating it with necessary virtues. Discussions on the technical side of how to gain citizenship should not overshadow the ideology built around the ideal form of it. A republic can grant citizenship status through either of the formats described above: by blood (*sui sanguinis*) or by living in the same soils (*sui solis*). However, republican citizenship as a demanding a challenging one, which has active and passive dimensions (which cannot be separated). It requires both

participation of the ruling, and possessing certain virtues at the same time. This is critical in all schools of republicanism. For some tradition, participation is central by itself because it is the core of the politics, and the only medium for self-realization. But it is not limited to the understanding of politics. All critical concepts of republicanism can be realized by citizens' actions and their qualities. Certain idea of the self-rule can only be achieved when citizens exercise the ruling themselves. Freedom is directly linked to citizens' participation, with various level of emphasis. And the common good can only be produced when every citizen collaborates in producing and achieving it.

CHAPTER IV

BACKGROUND OF MODERN REPUBLICAN THEORY

With modern republican theory I will relate to the works of past 25 – 30 years in this field. Although what it means to be a republican is a contested matter, we can talk about two main streams in modern republicanism which date back to the Athenian – Roman traditions, which were also discussed in the first chapter. This distinction is sometimes referred to as the communitarian forms of republican thought, in which central ideas are popular sovereignty and universal participation; and civic republicanism, which focuses on freedom and superiority of law. They can also be called as Franco-Prussian tradition vs. Mediterranean – Atlantic tradition (Martí and Pettit, 2010). We will see that the same tradition continued within the modern republican theory, which came into fashion following a relatively “silent” period.

4.1. Silent Period: Domination of Liberalism – Socialism Dichotomy in the Political Agenda

The central claim of most modern republican theorists including Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit, Maurizio Viroli and Richard Bellamy is that before the ascendancy of liberalism, the neo-Roman view of liberty was a prominent political conception (Slaughter, 2005: 186). However, it “slipped from sight” during the nineteenth century (Skinner, 1998: xii). During this period, the political agenda in the Western world was first dominated by the debates between the socialism and liberalism, and later on mostly by liberal ideas and their advocates following the “sweeping” victory of liberal democracy over socialism (Honohan, 2002: 2). Disappearance of republican ideas also occurred in thinking about politics in an international sense (Onuf, 1998: 2-3). When it came to 1990’s, liberal theorists were not only dominating the political agenda, but were also raising severe criticism against republican ideas, and sometimes, as in Goodin’s case, “rejecting” them (Goodin, 2003)⁴.

During the debate between socialism and liberalism, political trends were positioned in comparison to one another, which seemed to exaggerate two ends of political spectrum: collective life and absolute commonality vs. individual freedom and limited government control. This positioning led to an inclination to emphasize the differences by focusing on the extreme points. In its simplest form, republican ideology can be considered to be in between along this spectrum. Its voice was downsized when

⁴ At the end of his piece Goodin said “we were right to have a look, and we were right to reject”.

the struggle between the two was high, but re-opened when neither was able to provide an adequate solution.

The reason for disappearance or at least fading of republican thought maybe also linked to some practical difficulties in its implementation. Republican ideas were mainly developed in smaller, more homogeneous societies (Honohan, 2001: 16). Republicanism as a theory always involved some level of participation in the ruling. Although there is no consensus among Republicans on how to achieve this, it is the main guarantee against arbitrary domination. However, as city states became enlarged and the number of citizens increased, it was a challenge for the Republicans to maintain republican ideals. Representation, federalism and constitutional checks and balances were conceived of as institutional devices intended to preserve the liberty and public spirit by traditional republicans, such as Madison (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 10). Implementation of these principles in bigger states required further theoretical and practical study, and some motivation which lacked during the realignment.

The same motivation was highly present when neither socialism nor liberalism was able to address the problems and needs of a modern society. Through the end of socialism-liberalism debate, liberal voices gained higher volume; however, there were still concerns that freedom is not realized by simply removing government controls, that some all important issues cannot be represented as a battle of sectional interests, and that for many people real citizenship lacks any real meaning (Honohan, 2001: 16). Therefore, the consequence of the existing political environment was an important factor that triggered the quest for new (version of) ideas that can better design political system.

The revival of republicanism, which mainly falls in the period after 1990's, has been largely prompted by this dissatisfaction with the solutions that existing political trends were offering both in theory and practice. It was centered on it being distinct from both liberalism and communitarianism; criticized liberalism for individualism or social atomism, and socialism for the idea that involvement in a pre-political community can (solely) characterize freedom (Slaughter, 2005: 186).

Being the dominant discourse by then in the Western world, liberalism was the main pivotal point according to which contemporary republicanism mainly positioned its theoretical stance and offered new solution to what it criticized about liberal solutions. Liberalism, at least in its previous forms, was designed to protect liberty from politics, by declaring rights against power (Sellers, 2003: 8). Although some later versions such as “political liberalism” advocated by Rawls (Rawls, 1993) tried to mediate conflicts of rights and to construct common values, republican scholars believed that state needed to be put back in more strongly to protect the “commons”, while still protecting individual freedoms. In this regard, modern republicanism shares communitarian critiques of right-based liberalism on the basis that it would cause social disintegration and isolated individualism, and advocates more interconnected society with shared ideals and common good (Oldfeld, 1990; Sandel, 1996; Pangle, 1988). Instead, republican scholars tried to provide a different meaning and rationale for freedom and at the same time necessary political structures that would “coordinate public reason” in pursuit of the common good.

How to manage increasing individualism in the unstoppable age of globalization also instigated the quest for incorporating individual rights and freedom with the awareness of the others in the society. Some scholars advocated that adapted form of republicanism (which can be called global civic republicanism) can facilitate the democratic regulation of global capitalism in a world that is increasingly integrated at a global level (Slaughter, 2005: 185). In this regard it is claimed to be a better alternative to contractual nationalism and extended neo-liberalism, from which it markedly deviates (Slaughter, 2005).

4.2. Republican Revival

A deeper look in republican ideas started among historians and continued with lawyers and political scientists. Revisionist historians started to challenge the hegemony of liberal thought and conventional view that liberal modernity in the Anglo-American world emerged out of Lockean natural-rights ideology (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 2). Scholars such as Hans Baron, Zera Fink, Caroline Robbins, J.G.A. Pocock, Claude Nicolet, Gordon Wood and Quentin Skinner showed continuity of republican tradition since ancient times. Studies of these scholars made republican models more readily available to researchers and inspired a new interest in republican theory (Sellers, 2003: 8). At the same time, American constitution and the state structure provided legal grounds for discussion on republican principles and their implementation by institutionalizing republican political architecture (Sellers, 2003: 8). Republican ideas

that were interpreted by legal theorists contributed to establish a coherent vocabulary and offered viable grounds for broader discussions about republican concepts such as freedom, participation, deliberation and political community already current among political philosophers such as Phillip Pettit, Jürgen Habermas and Michael Sandel. Some everlasting concepts of politics are questioned and re-interpreted under the new circumstances of modern life. Republican ideals of free and equal citizens in a self-governing community has attracted many political theorists as well as members of other disciplines to express their prioritized concepts in republican ideals (Goodin, 2003). Core concepts such as participation, deliberation and civic engagement (or their preferred blend) were “re-appropriate(d)” in republican language (Michelman, 1986; Sunstein, 1988; Sandel, 1996; Dagger, 1997). The works of these scholars showed that republicanism of some form or another was still a viable ideal and a genuine force in contemporary politics (Goodin, 2003).

4.3. How Different and Self Sufficient is Modern Republicanism?

New republicans believed that republicanism was not taken as seriously as it deserved, especially in relation to its comparison with the liberalism. According to Laborde and Maynor, this was due to “wrong-headed” claim that republicanism was unable to provide a “comprehensive alternative philosophy to the dominant philosophy of liberalism” (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 1). They argue that this claim was “wrong-headed from two important points. First, it judges republicanism as opposed to

liberalism from overall compatibility and disregards “conceptual connections and normative proposals” that it provides. Secondly and maybe more importantly, these claims are based on the original (pre-liberal) ideas of republicanism and ignore the touches of liberal modernity on the contemporary republicanism, on issues such as more individualism or ethnic pluralism (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 1).

Laborde and Maynor call this reviewed version of republicanism as “liberal republicanism”. In their defense against liberal claims, Laborde and Maynor suggest that republican theory benefited from liberal ideas to mature itself. These benefits, of course, are not one sided; they are mutual and caused a significant “rapprochement” between the two (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 5). However, this interpretation is not overwhelmingly accepted by both sides. Some hardliner republicans such as Quentin Skinner and Phillip Pettit, strongly oppose this idea and believe in the self-sufficient completeness of the republican theory, which does not (need to) take anything from liberalism, but actually offers more to expand some existing critical concepts such as freedom (Pettit, 2002; Skinner, 2008). According to Honohan, alleged agreement on the concept of freedom is actually a “superficial” one while there is still deep divergence on its interpretation and realization (Honohan, 2001: 16). Similarly, Slaughter argues that the contemporary republicanism is distinct from both liberalism and communitarianism, and criticizes both ideologies (Slaughter, 2005: 186). I will examine the differences and similarities between liberalism and republicanism as well as different concepts of freedom in detail in chapter 3. Here, I will suffice to say that there is no consensus on the liberal-republican rapprochement; modern republicanism addresses critical liberal

ideas and re-conceptualizes them with a modern look, either by the help of liberalism or by re-interpreting its own original sources.

4.4. Classification of Modern Republican Ideas

Adoption of modern republican ideas among historians, lawyers and political scientists resulted in its revival in these separate but interrelated fields, which also influenced its categorization. Modern republicans can be organized or categorized in different ways according to their background and their approach to politics. As mentioned, Martí and Pettit define two distinct types republicanism: the communitarian forms of republican thought, in which central ideas are popular sovereignty and universal participation; and civic republicanism, which focuses on freedom and superiority of law (Martí and Pettit, 2010). Iseult Honohan makes a more detailed and plausible, although sometimes interwoven classification. Not strictly abiding by above distinction, Honohan uses the term “Civic Republicanism” to refer to the contemporary version of the theory. The addition of “civic” (which means “relating to a city or town”) to the modern idea of republicanism may be an attempt to highlight the “limits” on the humans’ freedom caused by being a member of a city, which we should read as any political or social community today. Therefore, civic republicanism, as Honohan asserts, addresses the problem of freedom among human beings who lives together in a community and who are “necessarily interdependent.” (Honohan, 2002: 1) Since republicanism has always recognized and treated the individual as a member of the society, this addition may seem

redundant from a theoretical point of view. However, if we think that modern republicanism has emerged in an era of liberalism and as a response and maybe an alternative to it, this emphasis does not seem so redundant. Either way, most of the modern republican theory developed under the civic republican ideas and focused on critical concepts of freedom, participation and equality.

Honohan states that civic (read modern or contemporary) republicanism has arisen in historical, legal and normative political theory (Honohan, 2002). Abiding by her categorization, main strands along with prominent thinkers among modern republicanism can be categorized as follows:

History of political thought: Followers in this field re-identified republicanism as a coherent tradition and continued central ideas they have borrowed from the past. Scholars such as Hans Baron (Baron, 1955), Zera Fink (Fink, 1962), Caroline Robbins (Robbins, 1959), J.G.A. Pocock (Pocock, 1975a), Gordon Wood (Wood, 1969) and Quentin Skinner (Skinner, 1998) focused on various periods of earlier republican tradition and inspired a new interest (Sellers, 2003). As early as 1950s, Baron explored how civic humanism and republican freedom was understood and implemented in Renaissance Italy (Baron, 1955). More than a decade later, Bailyn and Wood focused on American history and interrogated the ideological origins of the American Revolution (Bailyn, 1967; Wood, 1969). Around same time, Fink explored recovery of pattern of thought in Seventeenth Century England (Fink, 1962).

Two intellectual scholars of this tradition who made the most significant contribution are J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner (Pocock, 1975a; Skinner, 1978; Skinner, 1998; Goodin, 2003; Honohan, 2002). Pocock explored how ancient Roman ideas were received and implemented by Anglo-American republicans, primarily by Harrington (Harrington, 1992) in England and by the Founders in America. He tried to highlight the continuous thread coming from Aristotle, Machiavelli and Harrington. Pocock argued that American Revolution was based on Lockean natural-right principles:

An effect of the recent research has been to display the American Revolution less as the first political act of revolutionary enlightenment than as the last great act of the Renaissance. In a variety of ways, we are now to see the Founding Fathers as the culminating generation of civic humanists and classical republicans (1972).

He focused on central republican ideas of political participation and civic virtue as well as corruption; the historical fragility of republican politics.

Quentin Skinner followed neo-Roman conception of republicanism, which was formulated by Machiavelli and further specified by Harrington and Sydney (Skinner, 1978). He supported neo-Roman conception of freedom as the status of independence guaranteed by legal limitations on a ruler's arbitrary domination. He paid special attention to city-states of Renaissance Italy and explored how ancient Roman ideals were understood and represented in them (Goodin, 2003).

Constitutional Legal Theory: Developments in this field was done mainly in the United States of America and challenged prevailing understanding of constitution as primarily a set of rules to limit power, regulate competing interest groups and protect

individual rights. Legal scholars Cass Sunstein and Frank Michelman asserted that constitution has a historical and continuing role as a framework for collective self-government, based less on private interests than on deliberation on common goods (Sunstein, 1997; Michelman, 1986). This implied a stronger role for the judiciary, and a more active and deliberate role for all branches of government than a neutralist liberal model supports (Honohan, 2002).

According to Peter Sellers, constitution of the United States institutionalized republican political architecture with its senate, its many references to liberty and its state system which guarantees a republican form of government (Sellers, 2003: 8). Modern cases and controversies led to discussions among modern lawyers and judges on the implementation of republican political principles (Sellers, 2003). Discussions among lawyers influenced modern republican terminology and led to broader discussions about deliberation and political community already current among political philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas and Michael Sandel.

Normative Political Theory: This strand talks about a wide spectrum of expression of republican ideas in normative political thought. Rawls revived liberal Kantianism and enabled many thinkers in this field to realize what they were against. Within normative political theory, different thinkers re-interpreted and prioritized different dimensions of republicanism. Some scholars such as Michael Sandel and Adrian Oldfield emphasized virtue and the shared values of a political community, while others such as Philip Pettit and Richard Dagger focused on a distinctive account of freedom as central to republicanism, and for some such as Benjamin R. Barber and

Hanna F. Pitkin, participation was the key point of a better democracy (Honohan, 2002). In general, Roman vs. Athenian/Aristotelian currents of republican thought continued with their updated terminology in normative field. While Aristotelian trend is closer to the concept positive freedom, in which the individuals is free by participating in the ruling, Roman tradition is more likely to emphasize institutional measures to support freedom and assure priority of the common good.

Although Honohan's classification is very useful, it is very difficult to separate discussions in normative field from the discussions in the others. Any contribution in constitutional legal theory would inevitably have implications in the normative field and trigger discussion on certain concepts. As a consequence, it seems quite sufficient to focus on the concepts on which contemporary republicans convened or diverged from each other. In general, modern republican ideas are rearticulated today in three main fields: freedom, active citizenship and the political community in interdependence (Honohan, 2001: 16). Sub-dividing some of these concepts, main ideas that new republicans concentrate can be reviewed under four main categories, as highlighted by Honohan (Honohan, 2002):

- Civic Virtue (or common good)
- Freedom
- Participation
- Recognition

This classification may better serve to explore contemporary developments in core concepts of republicanism and the contributions that republican theory claims to offer for each of them.

4.4.1. Freedom

Freedom may be the most widely endorsed value in contemporary societies and can be considered as a central theme that modern republicans based their ideas and marked their difference. As briefly mentioned before, modern political scientists do not seem to agree whether there is a convergence among different schools of political thought today on the concept of freedom or not. It can be said that mainstream of modern republicanism has been based on the assumption of its divergence.

Earlier I claimed that the context of the theoretical environment in which a theory or its revised version emerges, sets the baseline for this theory to position its own conceptualization. Since republican theory revived when liberalism gained superiority over socialism, its critical concepts are usually defined marking its differences from liberal version. This claim cannot be truer for any concept other than freedom. Modern mainstream republican theory claims to offer a better understanding of freedom than current and previous ideologies and especially better than liberal conceptualization of it. This stream of modern republicanism can also be considered as the neo-Roman trend. In Rome, concept of freedom was closely related with the legal notion of dominium (ownership) and can be defined as being one's own man (rather than another's servant).

Later it was interpreted with the medieval notions of “the freedom of the city” (Goodin, 2003: 60). Finally, it is reconstructed as a notion of freedom as non-domination by Pettit (Pettit, 1989a; 1996; 1997a; 2002).

In the neo-liberal view, freedom is generally stated as lack of interference, which mainly stems from government control. Therefore, governments are the main threats to the freedom and the individuals are free as long as they are not interfered with. According to this idea, the problem with socialism was too much government control, and the solution mainly lies in more privatization and deregulation, contracting out public services and cutting taxation and increasing individual income (Honohan, 2001: 17).

Main criticism of modern republicans on liberal understanding of freedom is that government is not the only and the most important entity that threatens and limits freedom (Pettit, 2002). Traditionally republicans fought against domination by one person, while (as criticized by liberals) being more permissive against interference of the governments ruled by the citizens, or at least formed by their participation. While liberals focused on the dangers of such justification of government action would pose on citizens, they are accused of forgetting about the other types of domination that can be inflicted upon citizens by other citizens or conditioning factors. Main idea of contemporary republicans who based their concept on freedom and its difference as opposed to liberalism is that anyone who is subject to the arbitrary power of others is unfree, even when they are not actually interfered with (Pettit, 2002). These people may include welfare seekers in front of government officials, wives in front of husbands or

asylum seekers in front of border control officers. Therefore, reducing taxes or government control is too simplistic way of thinking about freedom. If a citizen needs to adjust his or her action because of fear or intimidation from others, then he or she cannot be considered as free. Freedom is achieved when any source of such fear and intimidation as well as possibility for its slightest reflection on the individuals are removed. Since this is not an easy task and cannot be achieved by itself within the society, states should take assertive actions to limit domination (Pettit, 2002; Honohan, 2001).

The practical outcome of this understanding of the freedom shows itself in two ways. First, republican theory does not directly disapprove increased government action, extensive system of law or heavy taxation. On the contrary, these measures may be required for intensive government actions to prevent arbitrary domination. Only an effective system of law and active state-level measures can guarantee freedom; not the lack or reduction of them. Secondly and connectedly, restrictions or enforcements by law are considered to be non-arbitrary interference to the freedom, which are considered not to be limiting it. This controversial issue requires more detailed investigation which will be done in the following chapters.

In addition to other human beings in flesh and blood as possible source of domination, many conditioning factors are also argued to negatively affect freedom by republicans. This concern is not limited to the modern supporters of the theory; as early as ancient cities, republicans always gave special importance for the participants of the ruling to be free of any intimidation or restriction that would affect their decisions. In

this regard they generally supported welfare provisions and social guarantees. J. J. Rousseau went so far to advocate distribution of land among the citizens (Rousseau, 1762). Mostly economic inequalities which have the potential to make some people disproportionately dependent on others were stressed as handicaps for effective self-rule, although very seldom did the republicans advocated extreme measures such as abolishing private property as in communism (Honohan, 2001: 18). Actually right to property of some kind was seen as part of the conditions of political equality, however concern for the negative effects of economic inequality led supporting significant redistributive measures. On the other hand, it is also true that not every modern republican gives the same importance to the conditioning factors, which actually forms one of the main area of criticism against them. Again, this issue will be elaborated in following chapter, mainly because Philip Pettit, the most prominent thinker of modern republicanism, seem to fall short of adequately addressing this issue.

In most of the cases, laws and other state institutions emerge as the primary tool of establishing and supporting republican political system. However, some republicans emphasize additional concepts such as civic virtue, participation and deliberative politics with either a supportive or primary function. They argue that laws alone cannot establish a good society and sound political system without a political culture and active citizens, who have the necessary level of civic virtue and who conduct their tasks as citizens by participating in the ruling. Civic virtue and participation are sometimes emphasized with a supportive role for establishing a good law system, producing common good or establishing some checks and balances. In some other cases, they are

advocated as the main concerns that actually form the basis of politics, for the sake of themselves, not for any other instrumental use.

4.4.2. Civic Virtue

According to Madison, “to suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people is a chimerical idea” (Sandel, 1996: 132). This belief is commonly shared by republicans. Although any (good) management of a system would depend on the political culture and appropriate virtues of the citizens, that may be even more critical in a republican system, which over-emphasizes politically created common good and rests extreme power on it. Corruption has always been a central concern of republican thought and legislation alone will not prevent corruption (Honohan, 2001: 18). It is not only the actions of some corrupt individuals that have the ability to negatively affect the whole system. Pervasive attitudes and practices, unwillingness to show necessary courage for resisting these actions, pursuing individual interests rather than or at the expense of the common good would severely undermine the political system.

Following or at least prioritizing the common good is the most critical virtue that is required. It should be noted that a connotation to common good in today’s political principles causes considerable criticism, because of some notorious use of the term in the past to justify overbearing power over individuals. Although this led to different terminology (civic virtue, civility, public spirit, etc.) to be created and used to refer to

the same or similar ideas, they are also criticized for being equally problematic. Civic virtue, for example, can be seen as “anachronistic, oppressive, moralistic or unrealistic”, talking about “obligations rather than rights,” or “subordinating the individual to society, or private life to public life” (Honohan, 2002). Moreover, feminists argue that discourse on civic virtue discriminate against women (Pateman, 1988; Vogel, 1991). However, in spite of some revisions that are made on the interpretation of these terms, both civic virtue and common good are so central in republican theory that they cannot be omitted or downgraded. Actually in some cases, they simply mark the main difference of republicanism from other political thought systems. In one way or the other, republican citizens are expected to prioritize common good over their individual interests. Ambitious republicans see it as a prerequisite to put duties before rights (Skinner, 1991: 309). For others, at least they have to be correlated (Honohan, 2001: 18).

In addition to the discussions on the oppressive and exclusive nature of the common good, its combination is also highly controversial. Common good may include others’ interests as well as other factors that would have a general benefit, such as environmental issues. Traditional sense of common good comes from Aristotelian and religious roots and assumes a naturally determined goal or purpose for human life (Honohan, 2001: 18). Today, it is not customary to talk about fixed and determinate common goods and a single hierarchy to define them. In this regard, sometime they are referred to as shared goods or common concerns (Honohan, 2001: 19). Modern republicans are more cautious about talking about the pre-determined common goods

that are clear to everyone, and accept that everyone may have different opinions on them. Some paid special attention on the ways to extract common good in the public. Broadening participation and deliberation while still protecting the individual freedom are common proposals for achieving this objective.

The ambition for the civic virtue may seem to be less than the past republicans today; requirements for it may be less heroic than was envisaged by Machiavelli, but not less important (Honohan, 2001: 20). As said, duties have to go before rights and be in synch with them. Both civic virtue and common good (which are inter-connected and sometimes used for similar meanings) are still essential ingredients of neo-republican outlook, although no modern republican seems to base his or her theory solely on it. According to republicans, liberal democracy without a sense of commonality in citizens' mind is bound to fail in acting in unity and cohesion. However, significant revisions needed to be done in this field in order to eliminate liberal criticism and appease concerns that over-emphasizing them may lead to oppressive and exclusive attitude in politics. Today, although civic virtue keeps its essential position, it is not (or at least less) moralistic, coercive or based on predetermined ideals (Honohan, 2002: 250). Therefore, the rapprochement that Laborde and Maynor mentioned is evident in this field.

This claim also opens door to different approach to rapprochement vs divergence ideas. Distances among different schools of political thought may follow different path for different concepts. Common good may be an important candidate to support this claim. Liberalism's approach to introduce some type of cohesive elements to the society,

republican revision to make them less oppressive and discriminative, and even socialism's new look to incorporate individual goods in it makes common good an important and critical element for all political currents. However, it is still a concept associated with the republican theory. Modern republican approach in this manner, as discussed, can be summarized as a move to incorporate liberal criticisms in it, while still emphasizing its central position.

4.4.3. Participation

Political participation is an essential mechanism to reinforce citizen commitment. Difference of republicanism from communitarian ideologies is that for republicans, common goods of society should be politically developed, whereas for communitarians they can be derived from ethnic identity or shared pre-political understandings (Honohan, 2002). Participation is a critical political medium to construct critical political values. Participation and deliberative politics are mutually reinforcing concepts and most of the time one is implied when the other one is mentioned. Sometimes they are taken together as a part of "active citizenship" (Honohan, 2002).

Since interests or goods vary according to individuals or groups, participation and deliberation are critical for reaching a consensus and making officials accountable and contestable. Deliberative (or discursive) politics signifies speeches, publications and other statements made in pursuit of the public good (Sellers, 2003: 62). According to republicans, the sole aim of government, laws and the state is to serve the common good

of the people, and public discourse offers the primary practical technique for finding (or clarifying) what the laws should require (Sellers, 2003: 62). In this sense private discourse in pursuit of citizens' own interests or friendship, even if they are made in public, is different from public discourse which is in pursuit of the policy making. Therefore, civic virtue becomes an essential or assumed part of public discourse, since it would otherwise be very difficult to differentiate private interests from the common ones.

In today's environment, peoples' interests and interactions are far more complicated than in the past. Therefore, to prevent decisions from being optimal for a smaller portion of the society, active public life proposes "the possibility of a shared, collective, deliberate, active intervention in our fate" (Pitkin, 1981: 344). Deliberative politics or public life is different and more demanding than an environment where different and conflicting interest collide a medium way is found. It is not (solely) about bargaining, although it has all the characteristics for that. Main difference, or maybe the main wish, is for its participants to have a broader and more reflective view, to be open to changing their minds, to be more flexible to other opinions and so on. They need to be able to openly explain their views to others, be ready to modify them if necessary. They need to be able to listen to them with a positive and reflective manner. More importantly, they need to think beyond their potentially selfish interests. Deliberative politics should go beyond the legal and official forms such as parliament. Direct representation is not an issue to advocate today, but additional formal and informal public spaces are supported.

Most of the time the concept of participation is taken together or complemented by the concept of recognition. This is because especially in republican understanding, there is a direct link between the two.

4.4.4. Recognition

Recognition is another central theme and point of discussion in all versions of modern politics. It basically refers to political and social acceptance or confirmation of identity and considered essential for human development and integration with the political system (Honneth, 1997: 29). It is naturally linked with the definition of and developments in the concept of identity, which actually followed its own pattern of development as a concept due to socio-economic and cultural developments, while political systems all reacted against and interpreted it in line with their own basic principles. Sometimes similar ideas are discussed around other terms such as equality or inclusion.

According to the scholars who underlines its importance, individual actions and values cannot be sufficient to express personal identity; it has to be expressed through social and cultural practices as well as legal and political relationships (Honohan, 2002: 250). Political structures and practices should be neutral and not reflecting the norms and values of the dominant group in a society. Differences should be acknowledged; not overlooked, excluded or marginalized. In this regard, recognition or inclusion in the society establishes an equally challenging domain for struggle in political domain

similar to struggles over distribution of power and resources. Legal and institutional equality forms the basic requirements of recognition in the public. However, real recognition shows itself in internal relationship between the citizens. Respect, solidarity and public spirit are the key words that connect citizens.

Main problems regarding recognition includes concerns about realizing one's identity and its acceptance within the society. Not surprisingly, most of these problems are suffered by ethnic, religious and cultural minorities, women, gays and lesbians, the disabled, and so on. Common problems include physical oppression, cultural assimilation, stigmatization as inferior, or marginalization from public life. In parallel with these concerns, main debates in modern politics have an inclination to focus on these problems.

For liberals and pluralists, recognition is closely related with justice and requires more equal distribution of resources (Fraser, 1995; 2000; Phillips, 1997; Young, 1997). As a minimum, it includes providing more equal legal and political rights and opportunities, but also goes beyond them. With the shift of emphasis on "what constitutes justice", debates on "what constitutes recognition" has also shifted. This shift can also be explained as a turn from a politics of economic distribution to a politics of culture (Honohan, 2002: 250).

Tolerance can be the least form of recognition, since it still signifies disagreement and disapproval, and denotes a "home owner" and "guest" position. Similar discussion can be raised over the meaning of "respect", which is commonly

accepted among liberals as a reference to minimum level of equality and justice. Every citizen should have respect for each other, but what does it consist of? According to naturalist liberals, equal respect is best achieved by a neutral approach by the state to moral and cultural difference, supported by tolerance, nondiscrimination and an attitude of civility or respect between strangers (Honohan, 2002: 251). According to them, positive recognition is gained by their personal worth and love of family members in the private realm, and by equal legal status in the public realm. The public realm should be neutral with respect to any potentially divisive difference. However, confining difference to the private realm and assuming uniformity in the public realm minimizes certain values and practices, and marginalizes or oppresses those who hold them (Honohan, 2002: 251).

Republican approach and contribution to recognition can be said to be more comprehensive and can be summarized in two main fields. First, republicans highlighted the importance of “intersubjective” realm in which recognition has to be achieved. In this sense, liberal understanding of recognition which includes private confirmation and legal respect for differences establishes only two parts out of three. In addition to the “love” at private realm and “respect” at the legal and political realm, they also focus on the intersubjective recognition among citizens, which can be defined with the term “solidarity” (Arendt, 1977). All of these three levels of the recognition are needed to guarantee personal integrity (Honneth, 1997: 30). Love at private realm is required for personal happiness and well-being, respect at the legal and political realm is required for

guaranteeing personal rights and establishing the basis for political action, and solidarity at inter-citizen level is required for coherence within the society and contribution to it.

Second, republican contribution is more related with the definition of citizenship and tries to answer the question “what constitutes it?” Therefore, republicans focus on the ordinary citizen, even if he or she has no identity or recognition problem in traditional terms. Recognition is a part of citizenship and can be achieved by political action. In this sense, it is also related with the expressive dimension of the republican politics. Citizens are valued according to their contribution to the public by projects and works.

It can be said that recognition replaced the traditional and the fundamental value of “honor” in modern version of the republican theory. Honor is a highly criticized value from several points, primarily because it is based on inequality in the society. It is hierarchical and connotes class distinction. It is a positional value; its existence depends on others not having it. Additionally, it links (good) citizenship with achievement rather than status. Modern republicans aim to find a better alternative to honor that would establish more equal system among participants in a political system. For some republicans, that lies in a better understanding of freedom, which is based on non-domination (Pettit, 1997a; 2001; 2002). By securing citizens against arbitrary will of others, freedom as non-domination provides every citizen equal status and self-respect. For some others, however, additional measures need to be taken in order to make citizens part of the political system. From political autonomy point of view, recognition of citizens can be achieved only when public institutions are shaped by their

contribution and donated with their values (Honohan, 2002: 258). What forms the identity in a republic, or at least a part of it, is the political activity. Sometimes republicanism (especially civic republicanism) is criticized from this point of view, since it assumes that identity and human nature can be fully realized by political action (Kymlicka, 2002: 294-8). (As mentioned, same argument can be raised against the concept of common good. Therefore, it is a common criticism against republicanism that it assumes some core issues such as common good or identity can be created via political means and through political action and once created, they can be oppressive over the citizens).

Two thinkers are important for setting the terms of debate for neo-Aristotelian version of republican revival: Hannah Arendt and Charles Taylor (Honohan, 2002). They both focused on recognition and participation as core central ideas and stressed the expressive dimension of politics, which leads to self-realization and recognition. Arendt, clearly specified recognition as a key factor in politics (Arendt, 1958). For individuals to flourish, their most central concerns need some kind of confirmation in the public arena. Therefore, politics is an arena of personal expression, self-realization, self-development and self-definition. The fact that so many issues associated with the “self” could only be achieved with “others” actually represents the main dilemma of republicanism. This is of course against the idea which sees politics as a mechanism for reconciling diverging interests and sees self-realization and recognition as private or social issues, not political. But for Arendt, individual freedom and recognition are achieved through participation (which is mainly described as expressive action) in the public realm of

politics. Individuals realize their distinct identities in political action. Similarly, Taylor conceives political participation as positive conception of freedom. Recognition of culture and collective identity is also an important political issue. Arendt and Taylor had many followers, some of which tried to go beyond the conceptual basis and define politics in more applicable and concrete manner.

In conclusion, it can be said that Athenian/Aristotelian vs. Roman conception of republicanism continued their separate, although close course in modern conception of the theory. In general, neo-Aristotelian theory is closer to the positive liberty and put more emphasis on the political participation, which is also the basis of the good life. This theory was mostly re-vitalized by Hannah Arendt Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel (Bellamy, 2000). Neo-republican theory stems from ancient Roman authors and continued with Machiavelli in the Mid-Century, and does not seem participation as an adequate measure for guaranteeing liberty and “good life”. It does not also share the neo-Athenian belief that participation is the only means to establish a society free from domination. Rather, civic involvement is needed, as urged by Machiavelli (Bellamy, 2000: xii). This is only possible by collectively constituted and institutionalized moderation of power (Slaughter, 2005: 187). In this sense, the republican tradition posits a political conception of the ethics and institutions needed to construct the conditions of liberty (Slaughter, 2005: 187). Institutions, judicial guarantees and constitutional restraints are critical; however, all institutional and institutional measures need to be animated by patriotic and virtuous citizenship (Viroli, 1995: 12).

Real momentum of modern republican thought was gained in the neo-Roman tradition under the name of civic republicanism and especially showed itself in discussion over freedom. One of the most prominent figures in this field is Philip Pettit, on whom I will dedicate the following chapter.

CHAPTER V

A SPECIFIC LOOK: PHILIP PETTIT'S REPUBLICANISM

5.1. Introduction

Philip Pettit is believed to make significant contribution to revive the republican theory in the modern world. He is one of the most prominent republicans who challenged the conventional view that liberal modernity in the Anglo-American world emerged out of Lockean natural-rights ideology (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 2). By re-visiting traditional Western thought and revealing historical facts, he showed that there was a coherent republican tradition, running from the neo-classical times.

Pettit follows Roman republican conception of freedom as the absence of domination by others as opposed to Aristotelian/Athenian form of self-government in which citizen achieves freedom by participating in the ruling of the state, or as opposed to the conception of freedom as non-interference which liberals advocate. According to him, freedom as non-domination is the most comprehensive and distinctive one of three basic concepts associated with republican tradition since Rome, the other two being the mixed constitution and the contestatory citizenry (Pettit, 2012: 6-7). He argues that both

liberalism and Aristotelian/Athenian form of self-rule fail to take into account serious threats to freedom, which do not always come from the state or which do not always take form of real intervention (Pettit, 2002). Domination, according to him, is essentially the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in someone else's life. To think of freedom as the social status of being relatively proof against arbitrary interference by others is not sufficient today with citizenship extended beyond the realm of propertied males. Freedom is central to Pettit's ideology and it might be better to start with it. In order to understand his theory, one should understand different concepts of freedom.

5.2. Concepts of Freedom⁵

5.2.1. Positive / Negative Dichotomy

Distinction of negative and positive liberty was made famous by Isaiah Berlin (Berlin, 1958). Negative liberty is thought as absence of interference by others and positive liberty as the mastery over the self. In the former, freedom consists in the absence of external obstacles to individual choice, while the latter involves the presence, and usually the exercise of the facilities that foster self-mastery and self-fulfillment (Pettit, 2002).

In its pure form, negative freedom suggests that a person is unfree to perform some action if and only if some other person renders that action physically impossible (Taylor, 1979; Gorr, 1989; Kramer, 2003; Carter, 1999; Steiner, 1994). This is still valid,

⁵ For this study I will use the terms "liberty" and "freedom" interchangeably.

even when there is considerable threat or limit on the options one has to make. Therefore, it does not construe such forms of power as inimical to freedom. For example, Thomas Hobbes, who is one of the most famous supporter of the pure negative conception of freedom, believed that when a highwayman confronts you with the alternatives “Your money or your life,” you are free to refuse to hand over the money, as it is not physically impossible, but only very costly, for you to do so (Carter, 1999: 62, 63). As can be seen, Hobbes was very strict about physical barriers in order to talk about interference to freedom and his view was always criticized for not distinguishing between “freedom to act” and “acting freely” (or “freedom with which people act”). However, negative freedom has expanded its vision in many ways in its contemporary conception and distinguished between these two.

Carter notes the differences between “pure” and contemporary understanding of negative freedom, and reveals that even in the purest form, there is more room for accepting non-physical barriers as interference to freedom. Nevertheless, modern advocates of negative freedom extended it even further. He defines pure negative freedom as an “opportunity concept” rather than an “exercise concept” (Carter, 2008 62). Freedom is about the doors that are open rather than about which doors one goes through or how one goes through them. It is about possible actions rather than actions that are actually performed (Carter, 2008: 62). In this sense, as Olsaretti points out, I can do the very same action and be free if I chose to do so among several alternatives, or unfree if the reason I have done it is because I do not have any other acceptable choice (Olsaretti, 2004).

In a similar fashion Kramer defines negative liberty as a state of “unpreventedness”, as opposed to positive liberty which is a kind of “accomplishment” (Kramer, 2003: 2). Therefore, positive liberty aims more; it includes exercise of certain faculties or the reaching of certain decisions or the attainment of certain objectives or the following of certain procedures. Whereas positive liberty is a matter of accomplishments, negative liberty is a matter of opportunities. (Kramer, 2003: 2).

From another point of view, what differentiates the two is the source and nature of limiting factors. Positive liberty can be said to focus on internal obstacles to freedom, while negative liberty focuses only on external ones. The underlying argument in positive liberty is that humans cannot achieve freedom by themselves. Therefore, they cannot and should not be left to themselves. Real freedom achieved only when the barriers inside them are removed in addition to the external ones. However, this suggestion does not necessarily mean that positive freedom already includes negative freedom and expands it by also addressing additional internal factors. This is simply impossible, because addressing internal barriers means imposing some kind of power relations on, and eventually interfering with individuals’ freedoms in order to rescue them from these barriers. Such interference sometimes may be contrary to the individuals’ will, and it would be interpreted as compromise of freedom according to the advocates of negative liberty.

5.2.2. Liberty as Non-domination

For some, republicanism has offered a different (and better) understanding of freedom. Republican ideal of freedom, although dates back to the Roman times, has gone through different conceptualizations, and was believed to be long forgotten in contemporary politics until it has been revived by revisionist historians and modern republicans. Being a prominent one of those, Pettit claims that this notion of liberty proposes a third, and actually better alternative. According to him, the negative-positive distinction has served us ill in political thought: It has sustained the philosophical illusion that there are just two ways of understanding liberty: as the absence of external obstacles to individual choice; or as self-mastery and self-fulfillment (Pettit, 2002). Before everything, there is philosophical space left unoccupied by this dichotomy, “because mastery and interference do not amount to the same thing” (Pettit, 2002: 21). Instead, Pettit proposes a republican understanding of freedom, which he calls “freedom as non-domination” (Pettit, 2002; 2008; 2012).

Pettit defines freedom as not being subject to others’ will (Pettit, 2012: 26-74). Contemporary belief of freedom as non-interference is not enough because domination can take several different forms. For example, individuals in certain positions (such as a welfare dependent in front of a counter clerk or an employee in front of an employer) do not retain their freedom even if they are not actively coerced or obstructed. Whether or not they avoid interference, they certainly have a grievance. They live in the shadow of the other's presence and individuals in such a dominated position are straightforwardly un-free. According to Pettit, there are two broad types of ways that may cause

domination without actually practicing interference: invigilation and intimidation (Pettit, 2012: 60), which can take place with or without each other (Pettit, 2012: 61). Invigilation denotes a “watch guard” position, who can and will intervene if the action is not in accordance with his or her will. Therefore, it is about the “potential” interference, which would still limit freedom even if it is not realized. Intimidation, on the other hand, refers to the belief in the individual about possibility of an interference, which may or may not be real. Regardless of its veracity, it limits freedom, even if it is not true and even if it was established by threat, bluff, etc. (Pettit, 2012: 61). The arbitrariness and being subject to others’ will can only be prevented by a fair system of law. So being unfree does not mean being restraint, but rather means being subject to “arbitrary sway”, or being subject to the “potentially capricious will or the potentially idiosyncratic judgment of another” (Pettit, 2002: 5). Freedom involves emancipation from any possibility for arbitrary interference.

Pettit is especially critical of negative liberty, which may be considered closer to his concept of freedom at first look. According to him, domination can occur without interference, because “it requires only that someone have the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in your affairs; no one need actually interfere” (Pettit, 1997c: 27). Furthermore, domination may not occur even in case of interference, as long as this interference is justifiable. Therefore, there are critical differences in two main domains. First, a person can be dominated without suffering any actual interference. This can occur in case of a threat even if it is never applied; or in case of anticipation of threat, even if it is not even issued. More importantly, Pettit equals the capacity to dominate to

the actual domination. Therefore, even when there is no actual interference and there is no real or perceived threat for interference, domination occurs if an agent possesses the capacity or power to interfere, and if it is at his or her will to do so. Even more, an individual can be deceived to feel intimidated and act contrary to his or her will, without any real capacity to interfere with them (Pettit, 2012: 60-4). Negative liberty theorists are “unable to see” that there is unfreedom when “some people hav[e] dominating power over others, provided they do not exercise that power and are not likely to exercise it” (Pettit, 2002: 9). Second, Pettit claims that interference to freedom does not have to mean domination all the time. Good intended, non-arbitrary interference that are defined in accordance with law and principles of democratic republic does not compromise freedom. In Pettit’s terminology, non-arbitrary interference may cause “non-freedom” but not “unfreedom” (Pettit, 1989b; 2002: 26; Carter, 2008: 64).

With this specific interpretation, discourse on freedom becomes pivotal point for Pettit’s arguments on modern republicanism and a modern state. He claims that the language of freedom as non-domination shaped many of the most important institutions that we associate with democracy (Pettit, 2002: 4) It is still valid and even compulsory today to think of freedom as non-domination rather than freedom as non-interference, because it gives us a better and more persuasive picture of what it is reasonable to expect of a decent state and a decent civil society (Pettit, 2002). Limiting freedom to democratic participation or any other current ideas would not provide sufficient basis for modern political debates.

According to Pettit, populist image of government, which is shaped mostly under the influence of liberal view of liberty, represents the people as “master” and the state as “servant.” The republican or commonwealth image, on the other hand, depicts the people as “trustor,” the state as “trustee” (Pettit, 2002). However, he is not a communitarian as this statement may suggest⁶. The people trust the state to ensure a dispensation of non-arbitrary rule. From this position, direct democracy may often be a very bad thing, since it may ensure the ultimate form of arbitrariness: the tyranny of a majority.

Although there are some other competitive arguments, Pettit’s ideal of non-domination became central to contemporary republicanism and was advocated by other republicans although sometimes with minor deviations and under different names (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 2). For example, historian Quentin Skinner prefers to use the term “independence” to refer to similar idea with Pettit, however with occasional differences. Skinner has suggested that Pettit’s notion of freedom as non-domination is “more or less equivalent” to the neo-Roman conception of freedom as “absence of dependence” (Skinner, 2003: 255). However, he criticized “moralized element” of Pettit’s conception, which does not accept non-arbitrary interference as a type of unfreedom.

There are two claims in Pettit’s conception of liberty. First, an individual is not free as long as there is capacity or intimidation of interference, even if it is never practiced (Pettit, 2012: 60-4). Second one is that if the interference is non-arbitrary, we

⁶ On the contrary, he is critical of the people who confused both. According to him, the term 'republican' has come to be associated in many circles with a communitarian and populist approach, probably under the influence of Hannah Arendt (Pettit, 2002: 8).

are still free. In the first instance there is domination without actual interference, while in the latter there is no domination although there is interference. An act is arbitrary if it is subject just to the decision or judgment, of the agent, or the agent is in a position to choose it or not choose it, at his/her pleasure (Pettit, 2002: 55). It is non-arbitrary as long as it is required by law. In this sense, interference to one's freedom as required by law (such as prison) is not domination (Pettit, 2002: 56, 65). This constitutes the "moralized element" which Skinner mentions and criticizes, as it can draw and actually alter the limits of freedom.

In the following section, I will focus more on the characteristics of domination, which is critical in order to have a better understanding of Pettit's theory. Later sections will further explore Pettit's philosophical stance and both liberal and intra-republican criticisms about it.

5.3.Characteristics of Domination

Domination is a critical element and single enemy that has to be eliminated in the state-citizen and citizen-citizen relations. Pettit defines three aspects of domination, which all appear to be equally important and equally required for domination to exist. First, there has to be a capacity to interfere. Second, the interference has to be on arbitrary basis. And third, the interference should be done on certain choices that one is in a position to make (Pettit, 2002: 52). In another part of his book, Pettit describes characteristics of

domination with different words and with some additions. According to him, dominating power of general kind exists when there is;

- an agent, personal or corporate,
- that is able (actually able) to exercise,
- intentional influence,
- of a negative, damaging kind,
- in helping to shape what some other person or persons do (Pettit, 2002: 79).

Additional factors he mentions in his second formulization (the agent and negative characteristic of the interference) are not mentioned as a figure of speech. They are also clearly explained and supported by Pettit in various places. It is clear that according to Pettit, the interference has to make things worse and has to be intentional in order to be accepted as a limitation to freedom. Also this limitation should result from an agent; not from other factors such as natural or socio-economic conditions. Choice of words while referring to same characteristic of the domination reveals different aspects of the same notion and clarifies how it is understood by Pettit. For example, domination is not understood in abstract, but is tried to be materialized by its effects on the subject individual. These effects eventually show themselves on individual's choices.

The capacity to interfere is same as actual interference and needs to be eliminated for real freedom to exist. This can be considered a core idea of the concept of freedom as non-domination and constitutes Pettit's main criticism against liberals. Capacity to interfere maybe even more dangerous because it might hide itself as if it does not exist, and it might deceit some naïve social scientists to accept freedom as non-

interference as the real freedom. Therefore, capacity to interfere should be the main concern that republicans should focus on and take measures against. An actual interference is only the part of the iceberg that comes over the water in suitable conditions.

On the other hand, we can note that formulization of this argument creates some ambiguity and area of criticism. It can be deduced from the general nature of Pettit's arguments that what he means should be the equivalence of the real and possible interference. Therefore, a fair conclusion would be that "the capacity should be equally treated as the actual imposition." However, this is not what he only means; he refers to the capacity as a "requirement" to accept an act of interference as domination. Once an agent's choices are affected by another, seeking whether this agent did it by using his or her capacity or somehow did it by other means is either redundant, or reductionist. After all, if one agent is interfering in another's freedom, that means this agent has the capacity to do so, then why is there a need to define it as a characteristic? From the other side, if an agent does not have the capacity to limit the choices of another but somehow does so, why should we not accept it as a type of domination, although maybe a temporary one? This approach can be criticized from two points. First, Pettit does not focus on the action that limits freedom, but on the agent and his/her intention. He accepts domination if and only if it is imposed by an agent. Second, it introduces a "permanency" requirement. If interference occurred a result of temporary imbalance in power relations, it is not considered as a domination. He disregards interference to

freedom that might result from inadvertent and unintentional actions of an agent or from the onset of temporary position of the agents.

Such an acceptance might be inevitable for practical implications of the theory. Political system can only target areas of domination if they are caused by real capacities which continue to exist. However, we can argue that a proper political system should also eliminate any occasional limitation of individual freedoms. If certain individuals or groups occasionally gains this possibility to limit others' choices, that may be considered as an important problem of this system. These possibilities create an environment every entity would fight to take this advantage to their side and use this possibility whenever possible.

Claiming that interference should be on arbitrary basis has more to talk about, mainly because of the meaning that can be deduced from this sentence: A non-arbitrary interference is not considered as an act of interference to freedom. Creating any kind of reasoning to justify any limitation of freedom is always problematic in freedom based theories. Limitation of some freedoms is inevitable, as anyone would accept. No political system can avoid it because of the real life necessities. But how can we explain it? Standard liberal solution to this problem is considering liberties as a whole and claiming that they can be reduced only for the sake of other liberties (Rawls, 1971: 204). With his greater emphasis on freedom which defies non-domination, Pettit is more reluctant to justify any kind of interference to it. Instead, he argues that non-arbitrary intervention (i.e. intervention by law) does not limit freedom, but conditions it. Such a premise relieves Pettit's burden to accept that some freedoms need to be compromised

for the sake of more important ones. On the other hand, it places the burden to prove that non-arbitrariness can be achieved. In a way, Pettit draws a line between the “greater evil of domination (which leaves us “unfree”) and the lesser evil of interference (which leaves us “non-free”)” (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 8). Therefore, what makes interference non-arbitrary constitutes a major part of Pettit’s work. The claims that interference needs to make things worse and needs to be intentional can be elaborated under the same subject.

The third premise (the interference should be done on certain choices that one is in a position to make) seems as a non-necessary emphasis with no practical implications on the theory or on its application. For example, can an actual infliction of violence which did not leave any permanent effect and which is not likely to happen again, still be explained by its effects on choices? Probably majority of interference to freedom consists of limiting or influencing one’s choices, but can freedom as a whole be limited to making choices, and even if so, is there a need to mention it? Such a premise is worthy of noting only when there are some interferences to freedom that do not contain limitation of choices, and when Pettit does not accept them as interference to freedom. Both sides are difficult to understand, and not further elaborated by Pettit.

In general sense, Pettit’s conceptualization of freedom as non-intervention both expands and tightens the limits of freedom at the same time. It expands the limits of freedom because in addition to removing already existing barriers in front of freedom, it also targets any possible capacity to limit freedom. Elimination of actual interference is not enough, and actually cannot be accepted as real freedom alone because real freedom

needs something more than the absence of interference; it requires “security against interference”, and in particular against interference on an arbitrary basis (Pettit, 2002: 51). This is why Pettit prefers to use the term “domination” as the opposite of freedom because according to him, it has a wider meaning than interference to freedom and includes possession of the capacity to interfere. However, in sync with his concept of freedom, his understanding of domination is circumscribed from the other end; whenever it is considered to be “non-arbitrary” or “beneficial” for specific individual, or if it is not intended, there is almost no limit in obstructing it. Contrary to his arguments against positive freedom and limitations based on self-mastery, his conceptualization allows and justifies a wide range of interventions to individual freedom. For Pettit, on the other hand, the basis for intervention is different, although he accepts that his concept can be considered as positive “at least in one respect” (Pettit, 2002: 51).

“Intention”, “making worse”, “capacity” and “agent” are the key elements of Pettit’s formula and from a technical point of view, only the notion of “capacity” has an expanding effect, while the others actually decrease the scope of freedom. Not only focusing on the actual interference but also attempting to remove any likelihood of interference makes the system more cautious against any possibility of interference. Therefore, it is more likely to increase the level of freedom which citizens enjoy in a state. However, the need to satisfy other criteria of “intention” and “making worse” decreases the range of possible interferences that are eligible to be accepted as limiting the freedom. Interference by a non-arbitrary state, one suitably invigilated and checked

by the constitutional people, does not compromise republican freedom. Even when there is an apparent obstacle, Pettit's freedom is not constrained, or domination did not occur;

1. If there is no intention in limiting the freedom,
2. If there is an intention, but it is for the good of subject individual(s) as agreed by the greater whole and contestable by the individual, or
3. If such interference is not caused by an agent, but by other factors.

Therefore, causes of such limitations to freedom are not of concern for Pettit and his formulation does not address or aim to remove them. I will refer to these points as "reductionist approach in Pettit" and elaborate in a specific section under discussion points.

5.4.Pettit's Philosophy

After a direct entry into the main discussion points of contemporary republicanism as interpreted by Pettit, it is easy to lose the general grasp of Pettit's ideology in relation to other ideas and theories and be a part of his dominant discourse. In order to evade that, a more analytical exploration of his methodology has to be done in order to place his theory in appropriate place. Where does he stand, how does he make his deductions and how does he justify his conclusions? Why does he eliminate some competitive ideas and solely focus on single point?

Pettit is a normative republican who starts with acknowledging several factors that are effective in modern politics, but in the end come up with only one norm:

freedom as non-domination. One has to follow Pettit's logic in order to understand his almost solitary focus on freedom. He accepts that two important groups of factors shape today's political discussions: The interests of the parties involved, and their views (or ideas) on empirical questions (Pettit, 2002). These two main categories of factors determine the forms that institutional policies assume, and the shape in which institutional patterns stabilize. Yet the ideas (and maybe the ideals) come before the interest. Normative ideas are of the first importance, mainly because he puts too much emphasis on legitimacy. A proposed course of political action has to be legitimized according to these normative ideas, in order for it to be accepted within the community. Although complicated in today's modern political life, main ideas or trends that shape modern politics according to him are economic ideas, universal rights, welfare, fairness or equality and democratic ideas (Pettit, 2002: 1-5).

These ideas, which can also be referred to as currents or discourses by different thinkers, are placed above the interests of individuals or groups, however, they are not necessarily in accord with each other. On the contrary, they are often represented as rival languages or discourses of legitimation; they allow those who speak them to disagree and debate with each other on matters of detailed policy. Therefore, politics always has the aspect of a conversation according to Pettit (Pettit, 2002: 2,131). And the duty of the political philosopher is the examination of the languages of political discussion and legitimation (Pettit, 2002: 2).

The process advised for a political philosopher here is close to the process of a "discourse analysis" as understood by some other philosophers (Wooffitt, 2005). But an

important point and maybe a difference in this view is that Pettit totally excludes (or attempts to exclude) “power” from his equation, as I will elaborate under discussion points at the end of this chapter. This is interesting because he accepts the role of interests in politics. When interest comes to the scene, it is very unlikely to think an involved party not to resort to its power to reach it. But for Pettit, thinking of politics as a “power game” is a misconception, or illusion and comes from philosophers’ “inability to understand their limitations” (Pettit, 2002: 3). Once political philosophers do not understand their limitations, they become skeptical about the possibility of a conversation and are disillusioned to see politics as a power game.

When we see politics as conversation, when we see the role of philosopher as to disclose the underlying currents of a political debate, and when we understand political debate as to using rival ideas to legitimize political views, next step automatically becomes exploring the rival currents on certain key ideas and for Pettit, the most important key idea appears to be freedom. Along the way, all the other normative ideas disappear and Pettit stands out as a theorist solely focused on a specific conception of freedom. He also justifies his approach within the republican theory. According to Pettit, republicanism has three main ideas which date back to Roman republican thought and practice; freedom as non-domination, the mixed constitution and the contestatory citizenry (Pettit, 2012: 6). Among these idea conception of freedom as non-domination is the most distinctive one (Pettit, 2012: 7). His whole work treats this distinction more like comprehensiveness which includes the others, and the law and contestatory

citizenry emerge as supplementary factors that would support and ensure freedom as non-domination.

Pettit justifies his mono-emphasis by raising two arguments. First, he points out to the historical fact that all languages of legitimation today and maybe for one or two centuries long, invoke the notion of freedom. Second, he claims that, when theoretically defined in the right way (i.e. when defined within republican concept of freedom as non-domination), it has the capability to define every aspect of a decent state and decent society (Pettit, 2002: 4) and to cope with the demands of other trends or ideas such as environmentalism, feminism, socialism, and multiculturalism (Pettit, 2002: 134). This claim is significantly mitigated in Pettit's later works,⁷ however, I will argue that it is still another characteristic of Pettit's theory which contributes to its reductionist side.

Equally important as establishing the characteristics of a modern state is defining ways for promoting and maintaining these characteristics. According to Pettit, there are important measures that have to be taken at every level, but none of them can be superseded by the uttermost requirement: eternal vigilance of the citizens.

5.5.Measures for Maintaining the Republic

While institutional guaranties are critical for any theory on state, it may be more important for republicanism. This may be because the success of a republican state and its understanding of freedom as non-domination is directly associated with the institutional structure and guarantees provided by it. Therefore, there is a tight

⁷ See Pettit, 2012 "On the People's Terms..." especially introduction.

conceptual fit between freedom and forms of political rule, which has strengthened the republican normative commitment to the political institutionalization of non-domination (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 9).

Some scholars argue that this is a general characteristic of republican theories which differentiates them from negative liberty based ones. For example, List argues that even when negative liberty was re-interpreted and got closer to freedom as non-domination on conceptual basis, it did not create or necessitate causal links to institutional ideals of participation, popular contestation or constitutional measures (List, 2006). In accordance with this argument about republican tradition, Pettit does not only introduce a conceptual account of republican freedom, but also an institutional account that shows how this freedom can best be promoted in real life applications. Pettit's theory which focuses on freedom as non-domination makes definitional connections between the ideals of liberty, the rule of law, popular contestation and the common good.

5.5.1. Contestatory Democracy

Non-domination does not mean non-interference, as mentioned, but it requires absolute non-arbitrariness of any intervention. Therefore, main task for a republican state is not to minimize interference (as opposed to liberal theories), but to achieve non-arbitrariness. A state will be non-arbitrary to the extent that it is forced to track common avowable interests of the citizens, and the best instruments for forcing the state to track

requires “electoral democracy” (Pettit, 2002: 154) and “contestability” (Pettit, 2002: 154, 184). Taken together, sometimes he names his formula as “contestatory democracy” (Pettit, 2001: 154). The ideal of democratic freedom is intimately tied up with the ideal of democracy (Pettit, 2001) which has to be contestable by the citizens in order not to fall into domination in its ruling.

Pettit’s republic is designed to ensure that the government can reliably track the common interests of its citizens, who can then contest and review decisions through judicial, tribunal, ombudsman-like, multi-cameral, and localized institutions. (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 11) Contestability is not an easy task that can be achieved; it requires democracy and its preconditions, which includes a deliberative public sphere (Pettit, 2002: 185-7). The people should be able to act as “editors” of policy in addition to the more traditional authorial role they play through their elected representatives (Pettit, 2001: 163). Non-Arbitrariness of the laws can only be achieved by active democratic participation. If every interested party is involved in making laws, it ensures that the laws are created for the benefit of everyone.

Contestatory democracy emerges as an overarching term, which refers to the general aspects of republican state. In Pettit’s texts, sometimes it replaces freedom as non-domination, or the state design which is able to promote it. Therefore, some other characteristics of republican state can be defined as a requirement of contestatory democracy (which is sometimes shortened as contestability itself), or directly as a requirement of non-domination. In this regard, same other characteristics such as “reciprocal power” and “constitutional provisions” are sometimes defined as a

requirement of non-domination (Pettit, 2002: 67), or of contestatory democracy (Pettit, 1997c: 181).

5.5.2. Reciprocal Power and Constitutional Provisions

Reciprocal power and constitutional provisions emerge as the two main strategies to achieve non domination (or contestatory democracy, in the sense described above) (Pettit, 2002: 67). Constitutional provision, reciprocal power and contestability appear as complementary concepts of one another. The strategy of reciprocal power simply refers to somewhat equal distribution of resources so that a relationship of domination cannot be established, and, ideally, “a previously dominated person can come to defend (himself) against any interference on the part of the dominator.” (Pettit, 2002: 67). Therefore, it aims to donate individuals with necessary means and capabilities to defend themselves effectively against any kind of domination, hoping to reach a kind of balance of deterrence, at least in its defensive form. In this defensive form, since any individual has the capability to counter-balance any domination attempt, none is going to be subject to arbitrary interference by another on permanent basis. However, the idea of reciprocal power is downgraded by Pettit, although not completely abandoned. According to him, this “defensive” form of reciprocal power is the ideal, however it is not realistic. What is realistic or feasible in terms of reciprocal power would be to threaten any interference with punishment and to impose punishment on actual interferers (Pettit, 2002: 67). The punishment or threat of it is already another form of

interference, which exerts a type of domination while trying to evade one. However, this is not the real concern of Pettit for discrediting it, since a non-arbitrary interference does not constitute domination according to him. Real problem is that such punishments or threat of them do not track the interests of the individuals are affected by an act of domination. Therefore, there is an inconsistency between the action and the consequence. From another perspective, the idea of reciprocal power resembles a war-like situation in which threat-counter threat logic may result in reducing the extent of undominated choices citizens can enjoy (Pettit, 2002: 151). Therefore “the strategy of reciprocal power, at least in its military version, looks very unattractive, and republicans must naturally look for more constitutional provisions” (Pettit, 2002: 152).

Based on these views, although Pettit acknowledges the importance and necessity of reciprocal power in a republic, this is not a preferred and completely successful measure compared to constitutional provisions. In addition to the existence of appropriate means to achieve contestability, constitutional constraints are critical for being non-manipulative by arbitrary will (Pettit, 1997c: 181). Different than reciprocal power, constitutional provisions seeks to eliminate domination, “not by enabling dominated parties to defend themselves against arbitrary interference or to deter arbitrary interferers” but rather “by introducing a constitutional authority—say a corporate, elective agent—to the situation.” (Pettit, 2002: 67-8). Therefore, compared to a balance of deterrence, it will seek a balance of deprivation: “The authority will deprive other parties of the power of arbitrary interference and of the power of punishing that

sort of interference.” (Pettit, 2002: 67-8). The acts of constitutional authority will not be domination, since it will always seek common good.

With this attempt, Pettit tries to save politics from turning into an arena where individuals clash with each other or where arbitrary actions are punished by some state organization. Neither personal conflicts nor punishment by government are preferable strategies according to Pettit for achieving non-domination (Pettit, 2002: 66-7). Instead, he envisages a constitutional agent (an elected body and/or law) which has the absolute, non-arbitrary rule and referee-like position over citizens with the sense of common, not individual good. His main mechanism of contestability for evading arbitrary domination becomes mainly limited to citizen-to-state relations, overshadowing intra-citizen contestation. In citizen-to-citizen relations, it is tried to be prevented by the intervention of the constitutional provisions. This suggestion creates a strange situation in which in order to prevent other citizens’ domination, one should contest the constitutional provisions and the law itself, rather than contesting this specific individual. The constitutional bodies or law become extremely powerful, hence it becomes highly critical for them to reflect the common good, while the role of contestability in establishing the common good is not clear. Individual contestation (of both other individuals and the system) may become problematic because it might be not possible for an individual to have insight to every details of a domination and to counter it. Therefore, “in a complex society, the exercise of civil vigilance cannot be conducted by individuals alone, since the informational demands are too heavy. It is best conducted via independent, non-governmental organizations” (Pettit and Martí, 2010: 92).

With this emphasis, Pettit's main mechanism of contestation becomes above-individual and is left to either non-governmental or governmental bodies, sometimes in a contradictory manner in different texts. In either case, individual level action is discredited while constitutional provisions/bodies and independent organizations are highlighted. Constitutional provisions can better be described as a collective body of rules and restrictions as well as elected agents. They may include a bill of rights and "balance" or "dispersion" of power. In terms of dispersion of power, Pettit prescribes several political level measures ranging from good old republican principle of separation of legislative, executive and judiciary powers to bicameral arrangements, federal state or being subject to international covenants and conventions (Pettit, 2002: 178-9).

The ultimate form of constitutional provisions is the law, which has a central place for the success of Pettit's republic. Supremacy of law can be stated as one of the common characteristics of all different versions of republican theory. However, in Pettit, it gets even a higher position and finds its empire.

5.5.3. Empire of Law

More than anything else contestatory democracy and freedom as non-domination requires is the "the empire of law." Pettit's republic could not have been characterized by a better term. What Pettit is trying to establish is not non-domination, but domination by law, which will supersede every other types of dominations. And this is allowed, because when the law is created in the correct way, domination of law is not arbitrary.

As a representative of the ultimate form of common good and people's consent, law can interfere in every domain without even interfering and can limit liberties while actually enhancing them⁸. In this sense, Pettit's republic is an absolute imperium of laws. However, what saves it from being arbitrary imperium lies in the nature of laws, which, according to Pettit, should have two aspects. First aspect refers to the general constraints as described by contemporary rule-of-law theorists, such as Fuller (Fuller, 1971) and Ten (Ten, 2007). The laws should conform to certain constraints: they should be general and applicable to everyone, including the legislators themselves; they should be promulgated and made known in advance to those to whom they apply; they should be intelligible, consistent, not subject to constant change; and so on (Pettit, 2002: 174). Conforming to these constraints is crucial in order to make laws independent from any influence and not allow them to serve any group instead of the whole community. The second aspect suggests that the government always rules by these laws and does not make particularistic interpretations. The decisions of the governments should honor the rule-of-law constraints rather than being *ad hoc* or *ex post*. In other words, the idea of rule of law should be extended as far as possible.

Laws do not dominate individuals, because they serve the public interest, or the common good. Superiority of the common good automatically brings the superiority of the laws. In Pettit's republican theory, public interest or common good becomes tangible as laws and gains an exceptional status. This idea is also advocated by some other scholars, although sometimes it is called as republican conversion to legal constitutionalism (Sunstein, 1988; Michelman, 1988; Richardson, 2002). According to

⁸ See discussion under topic "Good Intention and Non Arbitrariness" at the end of this chapter.

this concept, non-arbitrary power and the rule of law are best guaranteed if certain matters are de-politicized and entrusted to judicial vigilance (Pettit, 2002).

The criterion for good law is the degree it promotes freedom, not the majoritarian support behind it. In this sense, although Pettit defines electoral democracy as one of the major instruments for assuring non-domination, he is very cautious against it. But we have to understand that democracy is only the medium for contestation and non-arbitrariness in this conceptualization. Pettit's theory does not consider participation or common action as core ideals of republicanism. Assuring that every citizen finds the opportunity to participate in every related act of ruling just for the sake of republican spirit is not his main concern. Nevertheless, he does not count on these concepts for instrumental purposes either. Core ideal of Pettit's republicanism is freedom as non-domination, which can be achieved mainly through contestatory democracy and imperium of law. In this sense, what Pettit understands from democracy is mainly related with the law-making process and with making laws non-arbitrary.

However, democracy also carries the danger of reflecting majority will rather than promulgating freedom. Wide level participation itself has the potential for domination, which shows itself as majority tyranny or populism (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 11). Therefore, laws should not be subject to easy majoritarian change. Especially basic and important laws or any amendments to them should have to pass along a particularly difficult route (Pettit, 2002: 181). Power should not be concentrated at any point or group, even at the majority.

In order to compensate for majoritarian challenge, democracy has to *deliberative, inclusive* and *responsive* (Pettit, 2002: 195). On the other hand, even deliberative democracy can be a place for domination, if its format is not appropriately chosen. In order to establish a basis for contestation and deliberative democracy, public decision making can take two forms: bargain based form of decision making and debate based form of decision making (Pettit, 2002: 187). The former, according to Pettit, is nothing but a power game between different interest groups with predefined interests. Therefore, it puts power back in the politics; something he strongly rejected in the beginning. The latter, on the other hand, is where the decision is formed. Debate based decision making is an arrangement in which participating parties recognize certain relevant considerations in common and try to reach an “agreed outcome by interrogating one another about the nature and import of those considerations and by converging on an answer to the question of which decision the considerations support.” (Pettit, 2002: 187). Therefore, people’s preferences are formed within the process, contrary to bargain-based decision making in which preferences are given because people come with predetermined interests and with hearts and eyes closed. And the rest is a competition over the interests, with no intention to find a common good. Pettit believes that if we want public decision-making to be contestable in a republican manner, we have to follow debate based form of decision making. This might be the only part where Pettit’s politics can be conceived as a speech act, which he claims when he starts formulizing his theory in the beginning.

As in the case of democracy and participation, Pettit is equally cautious against deliberative action and does not accept its result as a consensual common good, because same kind of group domination can easily take place in it, no matter how it is managed. Different voices are dominated in a group by subtle ways, which Pettit calls discursive control (Pettit, 2001: 140). Citizens adopt certain status in a group and tend to reflect what is expected from their identity. Groups dominate individuals by marking out whatever is unexpected or unacceptable from a specific identity as “different”. Therefore, individual’s voice is authorized by others.

Although widely accepted as the most influential modern republican, there is strong criticism for Pettit both from republicans and liberal/communitarians. Following two sections will try to provide an overview of these criticisms.

5.6. Republican Critique

I have already argued that Pettit’s republicanism is solely centered over a specific concept of freedom. He did not totally disregard several other core ideas of republicanism, but interpreted them with only their instrumental value to promote freedom as non-domination. Therefore, these concepts, some of which are core issues for other republicans, appear as auxiliary or supportive factors. A degree of republican ethic, participation and deliberative democracy can be listed as some of them. Although they definitely find place as requisites of the appropriate environment for establishing and maintaining freedom as non-domination, they do not appear as primary concerns for

Pettit. Such stance creates the impression that main purpose of their acknowledgement is to relieve some of the criticism on this ground, which can be directed mainly from fellow republicans. However, some criticism still exists.

5.6.1. Criticism from the Advocates of Participatory Republic

One of the most severe criticisms against Pettit arises from other Republicans who put emphasis on other dimensions of Republicanism. Autonomy and/or participation are among these primary concepts, which seemed not to be sufficiently emphasized by Pettit. Preference to use the terms participation and autonomy depends on how you look at a problem or how you capture it, but they both refer to similar concerns and call for active citizen in the republic. For Pettit, participation or autonomy are not totally disregarded, but reduced to secondary importance and given supportive role. What he says about democratic participation (which practically refers to participating in the elections) should be valid for any type of related activity according to Pettit: “Democratic participation may be essential to the republic, but that is because it is necessary for promoting the enjoyment of freedom as non-domination, not because of its independent attractions...” (Pettit, 2002: 8).

Advocates of participatory democracy argue that contestability by itself is not enough for the voice of the disadvantaged groups to be heard. Instead, more robust forms of self-government should be in place to ensure political involvement of the citizens (Southwood, 2002; Dryzek, 2000; Barber, 1984). For those, participation is

important even in the cases of absolute non-arbitrary freedom. Assume a state in which non-domination is achieved as a result of both institutional measures and people's agility. When this situation is also believed to be guaranteed, there will not be enough motives for an individual agent to participate in politics from Pettit's point of view. Participation itself has a value in republicanism, because of its direct link to autonomy and self-rule, not (only) because of its link to contestation and non-arbitrariness. Hence according to many republicans, it has to gain a paramount status, at least equivalent to freedom.

As mentioned, participation is not a major concern for Pettit as a republican concept, at least not as much as other Republicans. Although the value of participation in every common action is questionable in Pettit's conceptualization, it is more important in certain fields such as law-making because of two main reasons: First, the state is still a republic and the laws have to reflect or be based on the common good, which has to be produced by the commons. Second and more importantly, laws are so powerful that they require very careful process and participation of the majority to be developed. But same level of aspiration for participation cannot be seen in Pettit for other types of common actions, such as self-defense or public discussions. Participation is important because of the value it adds to contestability, and it still needs to be safeguarded against tyranny of majority.

In this regard, the concept Pettit defines does not propose any solution or control mechanism for achieving widespread participation or autonomy. It has a more passive dimension; if a state has necessary mechanisms for its citizens to contest any law or

regulation, it tends to be accepted as sufficient for Pettit. Many Republicans or other social thinkers who emphasize participation or autonomy, this is far than being sufficient. For them, participation does not only include the existence of means and mechanism and is not limited to contestability, but makes the core of republicanism.

5.6.2. Criticism from the Advocates of Deliberative Republic

Republicans who think that politics is action or a speech act⁹ raised similar criticism. Advocates of deliberative democracy drew attention to the self-corrective function of rational deliberation (Richardson, 2002). By enhanced means of active deliberation, all of the citizens find a chance to speak, and maybe more importantly chance to listen to the others, make their contribution to solve a problem, maybe change their initial ideas in favor of the best argument provided. Citizens' initial preferences and values are transformed in the process of interacting with others, generating virtuous circles of trust and participation (Sunstein, 1988; Cohen, 1989; Habermas, 1994; 1996b; Miller, 2000). Therefore, deliberation has an important function for the emergence of the optimal common good. In addition, it makes the participants a part of the outcome, even though they do not totally share it in the beginning. In the end, deliberative democracy creates a meeting point for the citizens on which a wider portion of citizens are likely to agree. Contestable democracy focuses on individual goods and tries to protect them; however,

⁹ Pettit also believes that politics has a deliberative aspect (Pettit, 2002: 1-20, 130.). However, it does not appear as a priority concern for his view of republicanism, but rather appears as acknowledgement of a fact and proposal of a methodology. He advises political philosophers to analyze the language of politics and identify main currents, rather than falling into "power" games. Deliberative actions also have an instrumental value for achieving contestatory democracy.

it may fall short to establish necessary environment for the emergence of the common will and public interest.

5.6.3. Criticism on Contestability

By focusing on contestability rather than participation and deliberation (or some other core concepts such as republican ethic), some important points seem to be missed, or not emphasized thoroughly in Pettit's conceptualization. To start with, contestability implies an individualistic act. It emphasizes the individual or an interest group, and calls for the existence of necessary means and methods for them to defend their individual rights against the ruling mechanism, to make sure that no arbitrary domination is established over them. In this sense, Pettit tries to achieve a collective common purpose primarily by individualistic actions. Pettit assumes that contestation would be done to reach and protect the common interests, not the individual ones. However, how "common good" will gain this priority is not clear. A procedure cannot define its target on its own. In other words, contestation itself cannot guarantee that it will be used to defend the interests of general public. Therefore, if Pettit does not mean to promote an environment in which clash of individual interests would produce the interest of all, he needs a second process for defining the common good and making it possible for every citizen to adopt it. Otherwise, what makes contestatory democracy better environment for achieving freedom as non-domination, and not freedom as non-interference? What makes it more suitable for following the common ideals and not the individual ones? On

the contrary, one can argue and easily prove that contestatory democracy is the best political system for seeking individual right, and it is perfectly suitable with liberal theories about rights and individualism, which regard individuals as “self-originating sources of claims” (Rawls, 1971) If shared ideas and common good are not produced and adopted by citizens in a state, democracy would only be a conglomeration of individual voices, and contestation would be a medium for defending individual interests. Only when certain level of civic virtue exists and maintained in a state, and only when every citizen adopts and prioritized the common good, then this system has a chance of survival.

In addition to being individualistic, contestability is also a negative, responsive and defensive concept. On the other hand, participation and deliberation are more positive, constructive and contributive ones. By active participation and deliberation, a citizen feels to be a part of solution to a problem, and adopts the solution, even when his or her contribution is the least. He feels more positive and connected with the others. Contestation usually invokes resentment, even anger. It invokes the kind of feeling that some natural or earned rights of one are brazenly seized. It requires some level of energy to be built up in the individual to contest the institutions; an energy which is easy to obtain with exaggeration and frustration. It is more likely for the individual to feel abused and disadvantaged by an unjust action, rather than to feel the comfort and content for exercising a right provided by lawful state. When appropriate level of interaction is not obtained, it has the potential to go beyond the level of vigilance and instead provokes distrust, doubt and insecurity both against other people and against

institutions that are established by them, without any contribution from him/her. When isolation of the self is increased, these dangers also tend to increase in an asymmetric manner. In an age of individualism where individuals can create their totally isolated own virtual worlds with the help of technological means, where they can create substitutes for other people or alternative means of interaction in which they don't really interact with the real person, this must be a special focus of any republican idea.

5.6.4. Ambiguity on Common Good

Pettit assumes that non-arbitrariness can be achieved when there are clear institutional measures and suitable means for the citizens to question and contest arbitrary actions. However, he does not have a certain formula for generating common good. Contestability is a mechanism for preventing arbitrary domination, not for producing common good. One cannot conclude from Pettit's suggestions that, if every citizen has the power and capability to can contest the others and the system, the common good appears at the end. To put it other way, the main focus of Pettit is freedom and its protection from arbitrary interference, and the main mechanism for achieving it is contestatory democracy. And the common good is expected to be created along the way, or sometimes it is expected as given. This creates a vicious cycle: the citizens should be able to contest the system in order to prevent any arbitrary domination over them. But the system can exert power over them without domination, because they claim to be the

holder and defender of the common good. Therefore, development of common good and every citizen's abidance by it is critical for republicanism and for Pettit.

When contestation is short of acquiring the common good, a vacuum exists in Pettit's theorization. It is not clear why focusing directly on the ways to achieve freedom (even if it is understood as non-domination), and not on other core concepts of republicanism, would lead to a republican order, and not right based liberalism. Participation and deliberation, although always conflicting about how to achieve them, are other primary concepts highlighted by other Republicans for achieving the common good. Common good, self-rule and non-arbitrary laws can only be achieved when there is enough participation in ruling of the state, when majority or all finds opportunity for engaging in adequate discussion, express oneself and contributing to a solution, finding an opportunity for listening to others and finding the best argument by changing initial point. In the theory of Republicanism in which collective action and interests of groups gains priority over individuals, and especially in Pettit's Republicanism in which non-arbitrary interference gains such an exclusive and exceptional status so that even an interference done under this scope is interpreted as increasing the freedom, a special attention has to be given to its development. Contestability might be crucial for eliminating arbitrariness, but not enough.

5.6.5. Instrumental vs. Existential Status of Republican Concepts

One should not be blurred by Pettit's concerns about instrumental use of some core concepts. There are two issues here which are separate, although maybe equally critical. First one is about how Pettit sees politics in general and republicanism in specific. He does not regard these core issues such as participation and deliberation as essential pillars of politics. They only have instrumental value for achieving what he sees as what politics is about: eliminating non-arbitrariness. And second, their instrumental value is also questionable since they are themselves can be source or reflection of existing power relations in the community. Therefore, criticisms against Pettit can be based on these two fields: Instrumental vs. existential position of these concepts. For the ones who attribute them existential value, their instrumental benefits become secondary. Eventually it becomes a matter of priority: What is the main goal and what needs to be tailored to achieve it? When participation or deliberation is perceived as the ultimate purpose of politics (or politics itself), possible obstacles in front of their rightful implementation becomes the challenges to overcome. When they are not primary objectives, then they are assessed based on their contribution to the primary one.

The latter is the case for Pettit and it does not have to be a point of criticism but also maybe theoretical stance. Neither politics nor republicanism is comprised of them. However, they are important, although as secondary measures, for achieving what republicanism is really about. In this case, one can argue that even when perceived totally as instrumental, aims of the Republic cannot be achieved solely focusing on

contestation and not without sufficiently emphasizing participation, deliberation, civic virtue, common good and so on.

I will argue that Pettit can be criticized in both areas, which are eventually interrelated. Primary focus on contestation underpins individual and individualistic actions, does not promote inter societal connections and does not contribute to the common good. Common good itself is also (or should be) critical for Pettit as for any republican. However, how to define common good is not sufficiently emphasized. Whole focus on non-arbitrariness inevitably puts too much value in common-good, because it basically defines what is arbitrary and what is not. Still, Pettit puts whole his effort on the afterwards; after the common good is defined and after what is known as arbitrary and non-arbitrary, what are the ways to fight the latter. But the main challenge remains unsolved: How to define common good in a dynamic, constantly changing world and in a community of conflicting interests? We should first present ways how to achieve it, and then proceed and suggest ways on how to achieve it.

5.7.Liberal/Communitarian Critique: How Much Difference?

5.7.1. Negative Freedom vs. Freedom as Non-domination

Not surprisingly the most vigorous challenge to republican freedom came from advocates of the negative view of liberty as non-interference, especially after the revision of traditional liberal theory brought two concepts closer than ever. Some liberals rejected any innovation that Pettit in specific and revival of republicanism in

general may offer. They mainly argued that Pettit did not introduce any novelty which contemporary liberal theories would not cover (Goodin, 2003; Kramer, 2008; Carter, 2008; Rawls, 2001). According to Ian Carter, it is possible to derive equivalent judgments about degrees of freedom and unfreedom arrived at by the republican and the negative conception of freedom (Carter, 2008). Similarly, Kramer argues that conclusions arising from modern republican focus can be elaborated rigorously with the categories and techniques of a modern negative-liberty theory (Kramer, 2008: 56). Some even went further and denied the whole republican revival as a comprehensive theory. Robert Gooding accused key references of “the republican ideal” of being both “allusive and elusive” (Goodin, 2003: 56). Frank Michelman argued that:

Republicanism is not a well-defined ...doctrine. As a ‘tradition’ in political thought, it figures less as canon than ethos, less as blueprint than as conceptual grip, less as settled institutional fact than as semantic field for normative debate and constructive imagination (1986: 17).

Such strong criticism sometimes found grounds even in Pettit, who defined republicanism “more like a useful lens through which we can view many things but the object in view is rarely republicanism itself (Pettit, 2002).

Liberal criticism gained momentum and support especially after the revision of negative freedom has expanded its scope. Traditional Hobbesian paradigm included several critical points that would justify Pettit’s claims about its inadequacy to provide real freedom. However, modern liberals expanded (and maybe diverged from) the traditional theory of negative liberty by introducing two main ideas. First, they recognized that freedom is reduced by potential as well as by actual interference, as exemplified by cases of subtle coercion, threats, arrogant displays of superiority and so

forth. Second, freedom is reduced not only by the removal of single options, but also by the foreclosing of sets of options (Carter, 2008; Kramer, 2008). Many liberals advocate that these two acceptations covered most of the bases on which Pettit has established his criticism against the theory of non-interference. Laborde and Maynor give the example of “highwayman’s threat” (your money or your life) to reveal the difference between the traditional and contemporary liberal theories. On the Hobbesian view, the persons who are threatened are free to keep their money and free to keep their life (they are not physically prevented from doing either). But, on the “new” negative freedom theory, what they are not free to do is to keep both their money and their life: they are not free, that is, to exercise both options conjunctively. By analogy, if people are dominated, they may be able to exercise most of their liberties, but their overall liberty is reduced by the fact that they cannot exercise them in conjunction with (for example) non-deferential behavior toward their dominator. (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 6). By introducing the concept of “readiness to interfere” as equivalent of the actual one, liberal “interference” and republican “domination” got closer.

It can be said that similar move occurred on republican side, an important one being in the field of individual rights. Most of the contemporary republicans including Pettit do not deny individual rights; on the contrary, they accept them as prerequisites for republican citizenship. However, they are careful about not raising rights language to central status. There is always societal side of exercising individual rights. In other words, republicans try to prevent individual rights from becoming individualistic ones. On conceptual basis, Pettit only emphasizes legal and constitutional rights which will

ensure non-domination (Pettit, 1997c: 101,181; Rawls, 1971) and stay away from rights language. On the other hand, one can claim that his main mechanism for ensuring non-domination is not different in any way from that of liberal rights theories would advocate.

With these alterations, two theories can be considered closer to each other than their initial points would suggest. Some scholars refer to it as a kind of “rapprochement” between modern liberal theory and freedom as non-domination (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 5). However, this idea is not adopted by everyone. Both republicans and liberals continue to highlight differences, blame the others to be restrictive in nature and claim to expand freedom more than the other. Skinner and Pettit argued that this rapprochement is still insufficient to cover all the aspects of domination, because even in the revisited theory of freedom as non-interference, there has to be a “plausible” threat of interference for one to be considered “unfree.” In this sense, slaves who have benign masters who have almost no probability to interfere can still be considered as free. For republicans, threat is not necessary for domination as long as one agent has capacity to interfere. Republicanism aims to entirely disconnect the presence of unfreedom from the likelihood of interference (Skinner, 1998). We are unfree just by being dependent on the will of others, because everything we do by their leave and under their control. We are unfree when our fate depends on the dispositions of our princes, no matter how benign and gentle they are. Therefore, he advises not to “put...trust in princes” unless they are strictly unable, rather than merely disinclined, to exercise arbitrary power over us (Skinner, 1998).

Similar to Skinner, Pettit also dedicated some portion of his works to respond rapprochement arguments underlines differences (Pettit, 2008; 2012: 26-74). Giving the example of “alien control”, he claims that as long as such control by others can negatively affect the agent’s freedom of choice with or without interference, we cannot talk about republican freedom. This is even true when the controlled subject is unaware of living under control; unaware that his or her choices are implicitly limited or his or her “deliberative assumptions of personal choice” are undermined. The agent can believe to act free and still be unfree. He also re-asserts that actual interference is only a small proportion of, maybe a subset of the possibilities; “alien control will remain in place so long as the agent can interfere or not interfere, whatever the reduced probabilities of interference that are dictated by the agent’s nature” (Pettit, 2008).

While “alien control” was still a concern for republicans, allowing “non-alien” and “non-arbitrary” control was equally criticized by liberals. After all, this is a freedom-restricting nature of non-domination based theory. Many republicans including Pettit claimed that non-arbitrary laws and good-intentional interference do not limit freedom, but condition it. While trying to remove the merest possibility of any interference, control of the individual in the republic is normalized to the point that is not accepted as interference to the freedom.

Considering these constraints of republican freedom, some liberals claimed that liberal understanding of freedom is even “more capacious” than what the republican approach proposes because it is able to accommodate domination and dependence, as well as interference, as reductive of liberty. (Kramer, 2008; Carter, 1999). According to

them, liberal freedom does not only encompass what republicans eloquently champion, but also extends further (Kramer, 2008: 31).

A standard critique of the republican view, which claims that non-arbitrary interference does not limit freedom, is paradigmatically articulated by William Paley, Jeremy Bentham, and Henry Sidgwick (Kelly, 2001). They believe that republicans simply confuse “liberty” with the “security of liberty”. The law can protect one’s freedom or contribute to make it stronger; however, it does not constitute it. When Republicans insist that government intervention by law does not really constrain freedom, they need to explain how a prisoner is still free, while an employee who is happily working under a non-vigilant and benign employer with exceptional benefits is unfree.

Another criticism at this point may be raised about the possibility of non-arbitrariness. Republicans need to prove that non-arbitrariness, which is not achievable in interpersonal or societal relations, is so when it comes to making and implementing laws. The real aim of liberalism is not to allow some possibility of interference to exist; but on the contrary, to remove extensive efforts to control the individuals by exaggerating the common good, adopting a holy role of knowing better than the ruled at state level, which is actually represented by a few elites and/or rulers, and taking actions in wide range of political and social life on behalf of citizens, for the alleged interest of these citizens. From this point of view, Republican attack at the possibility of interference may serve as a distraction to cover wider actual interferences on the other side.

Robert Goodin also supported the idea that security (or “resilience” in his terminology) of liberty cannot be taken as a totally separate concept, and republicans were wrong to do so. He claimed that what Pettit calls as freedom as non-domination is nothing but “resilient liberty” (Goodin, 2003: 60), as Pettit himself accepts in various places (Pettit, 1989a; 1996; 1997a; 1999) and resilient liberty is not a different kind of liberty (Goodin, 2003: 60-5). According to Goodin, common mistake is to confuse between the first and second order values, and to treat the latter as new and totally different concepts. Resilient liberty is not something different from securing the liberty, which is the second order value of the liberty itself. When we value liberty, we also value security in our liberty as well as other second order values such as the efficiency and durability of it. Therefore “caring” about some good, “caring about securely retaining” it, “enjoying it for a longer time” and “never settling for a situation in which you get less of it” are part and parcel of a single concern. None of security, durability or efficiency of a good is independent of these good; they are derivative from this good and simply attached to it (Goodin, 1988; LeGrand, 1990; Barry, 1990). Therefore, there is “nothing analytically distinctive” about republican freedom as non-domination (Goodin, 2003: 61).

Carter believed that similar to the idea of “resilient liberty” (or in addition to it), republican freedom can also be defined as not being subject to the will of another, or as “absence of dependence.” According to him, on the other hand, both characterizations of republican freedom; “freedom as resilient non-interference” and “freedom as non-subjection to the will of another” (or absence of dependence), were compatible with

negative liberty (Carter, 1999: 72) However, there is more space covered by republican freedom, and there is more to criticize. Although these suggestions correctly characterize the first aspect of Pettit's notion of non-domination, they fail to do so for the second aspect, which Carter calls as "moralizing" element. By this element, Carter simply referred to Pettit's notion on non-arbitrary interference. Pettit's concept favors domination on moral grounds, as long as it is justified by law.

Neither Carter nor other republicans totally disregard this "moralizing element" and call for total limitless freedom in negative freedom. Some level of interference to freedom might be inevitable and this is already accepted by liberals since its earliest times. Liberals argue that non-arbitrary interference for the sake of common good is not unique to Republicanism; on the contrary, it is accepted in most schools of democratic liberalism. Emphasizing this characteristic of liberal theories, Charles Larmore and some others have pointed out that Pettit's concept of non-arbitrariness is perfectly compatible with liberal understandings of the common good, founded on basic ideals of equality and respect for individuals (Larmore, 2001; Richardson, 2002; Laborde and Maynor, 2008).

John Rawls believes that liberalism does not only include some level of interference, but also some other core concepts of republicanism, such as participation, self-rule, constitutionalism and civic (which he calls "political") virtue. Therefore, there is no incompatibility between the two (Rawls, 1971). He describes liberalism very close to republicanism as:

...the view that the safety of democratic liberties, including the liberties of nonpolitical life... , requires the active participation of citizens who have

the political virtues needed to sustain a constitutional regime...The idea is that unless there is widespread participation in democratic politics by a vigorous and informed citizen body moved in good part by a concern for political justice and public good, even the best-designed political institutions will eventually fall into the hands of those who hunger for power and military glory, or pursue narrow class and economic interests, to the exclusion of almost everything else (Rawls, 2001: 144).

According to Christian List, there is still difference between the two theories, even though they might refer to similar ideas regarding freedom. He points out that Pettit's concept of non-domination is more comprehensive, and thus more "parsimonious" than any liberal ideal (List, 2006). It makes definitional connections between the ideals of liberty, the rule of law, popular contestation and the common good. Laborde and Maynor acknowledge this argument as "conceptual" points which differentiate liberal and republican theories. For liberals, according to them, these ideals are more independent and contingent (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 9). In addition to conceptual difference, they point out the differences in "normative" point of view, by which they mainly refer to closer institutional connection in republican theory. According to them, republican freedom cannot be separated from the political structure. Therefore, political institutionalization of freedom as non-domination is the core of republican theory, while liberal freedom has not so tight institutional aspects (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 10).

As can be seen, there are arguments and counter arguments in respect to the difference and similarities between the negative/positive liberty and freedom as non-domination. Depending on interpretation, two concepts can get very closer and even identical. Moreover, practical implications tend to get even more similar in both approaches. However, it is a fact that republican ideals definitely create some ground for

expanding discussions on several concepts of contemporary politics such as freedom, participation, deliberative society, self-rule, constitutional democracy, rule of law and so on. Within this scope, Goodin and Michelman's criticisms that republicanism (as it is and as with its revival) does not make any contribution to any of these concepts may be not fair. Without republican gaze (or "lens" in Pettit's words), these concepts may not be elaborated thoroughly. However, the claim that the concept of freedom can be (and already is) further analyzed within rights and liberal theories might find more ground and support.

5.7.2. Positive Freedom vs. Freedom as Non-domination

Pettit's acceptance and justification of non-arbitrary interference draws a distinct line between non-interference and non-domination based understanding of freedom, however puts the latter in a closer place to positive one. Therefore, it should also be explored whether Pettit's concept is a variation of positive freedom with minor differences and different focus, or whether it is also equally distinct from it. The only way to do it is to look at the types and conditions of intervention that both Pettit and supporters of positive freedom consider necessary. For what purpose can interference be done? When is it acceptable, and when is it not?

A critical term here emerges as "self-mastery"; a basis of intervention to individual freedom, which is criticized by Pettit when emphasizing the difference of his understanding from the positive freedom. In positive type of freedom, intervention to an

individual can be done on two main bases: For the sake of community (or for the greater good), or for the sake of the individual him/herself. It is clear that Pettit's concept of freedom allows interference to freedom for the sake of the community. Therefore, what should be sought is its approach to self-mastery.

Self-mastery is about the individual (or the "self" as it openly states) and puts forward a seemingly contradictory argument: "intervention of others" for the sake of "self". There are different and demanding conceptions of self-mastery. Some argue that real freedom requires the elimination of all kinds of obstacles, or at least all obstacles standing in the way of worthwhile or reasonable actions (Green, 1861; Crocker, 1980; Raz, 1986). Only lack of interference from others would not be possible to perform these actions. This version of freedom is still external; it is about removing outside obstacles, although these obstacles are defined in a wider sense, in order to provide the individual necessary conditions for enjoying the real freedom. Another perception of positive liberty goes beyond the limits of the inside and outside, or the self and the all the external factors. This perception establishes some internal criteria within the agent. According to its supporters, self-mastery requires a harmony of first- and second-order desires, or the achievement of mental tranquility (*ataraxía*), or the rational control of one's desires in a Kantian sense (Crocker, 1980).

When we look at Pettit's conceptualization of freedom, our first impression is to believe that freedom as non-domination does not accept any internal criteria within the agent and therefore does not accept interference for self-mastery. However, such a distinction is not clear. Pettit does not accept "good intentional" interference as

domination. Therefore, there is possibility for the intentions of the interference to go beyond individual criteria. What makes an intervention acceptable is not related to its nature, its scope or its target, but rather its subjective vs. objective position, where objectivity is defined as rule of law. Pettit does not define the limits of laws, and does not specify how much space they can organize. Therefore, there is always a possibility in such a system to produce laws that are believed to enhance individual development. Consequently, we can claim that there is a possibility to interpret freedom as non-domination within the terms of positive freedom.

5.8. Discussion Points

Best way to understand Pettit's republicanism might be exploring the condition of certain points which are considered important or understood differently in politics. This will also allow comparing Pettit's conceptualization with similar and/or contemporary ideas under the light of some critical points raised by different social scientists.

5.8.1. Reductionism: One-dimensional vs. Multi-dimensional Approach

As a main criticism, I will argue that Pettit's approach seems extremely minimalist both in theoretical and republican sense. In an analytical manner, a big portion of Pettit's arguments can be summarized as follows:

- Politics mostly is a speech act.

- Political debate is shaped by both interests and normative ideas.
- Ideas are of more importance.
- Current trends (ideas) are economy, universal rights, welfare/fairness/equality and democracy.
- Although they have a common point, they differ in detail and they are rival to each other.
- Ideas are legitimized in relation to these trends, which are actually conflicting with each other. The currents in the “whirlpool” of contemporary politics are often represented as rival languages or discourses of legitimation.
- Political philosopher should examine the language of political discussion, should identify the discourse, and identify various assumptions from which these discourses stem.
- Main idea that shaped political debate, that legitimation has been made is the idea of freedom.
- Contemporary understanding of freedom is being free from interference, but it should be freedom as non-domination.
- This idea of freedom as non-domination was used by early republicans, but later on it was replaced by the negative understanding of freedom.
- Original concept of freedom as non-domination of the republican idea should be replaced, and then the society should make a republican turn, because it can still shed light on many current political debates about how a decent state and civil society should be.

While these steps are inclusive in terms of acknowledging factors in politics, they are highly exclusive in terms of deductions and judgments. He starts with recognizing the place of both interests and ideas in politics. Then he places the ideas in primary position, and then totally disregards the idea or effect of interests, or any implication of power to gain these interests. Then among the current ideas, freedom becomes the main paradigm. Therefore, Pettit's reductionism is a gradual decrease which gets rid of some burden at every step. Although power relations and interests are acknowledged in political sphere, their effect compared to normative ideas was totally disregarded. This is not a relative un-priority, but total disappearance. Same mentality is applied among current trends and ideas. Current trends of economy, universal rights, welfare/fairness/equality, and democracy are accepted to have some level of capacity to shape political domain, although allegedly less than the capacity of the idea on freedom. However, freedom emerges as not only the main important idea, but as the single one. And within different understandings of freedom, freedom as non-domination monopolizes his whole concept on republicanism. Same reductionist approach is also valid for republican theory as a whole because he reduces the main paradigm of republicanism to (a specific interpretation of) freedom, although some other concepts are much more important for some other republicans, such as autonomy for Dagger, or participation for Hannah Arendt. Then, he reduces every other aspect of political sphere to an issue that can be rightfully handled, discussed and solved by this single concept. In the end, he reduces all discussions to single dimensional space by rejecting other ideas, minimizing their affect or making them collateral.

In this sense, Pettit attempts to solve all problems of political life-social, political, cultural aspects of everyday human life, even the international problems, with only one concept. One argument is solid: “Republican conception of liberty can articulate what a (decent) state ought to try to achieve... in the modern world” (Pettit, 2002: 129). This claim is not limited to a certain area of the decent state; it is as a comprehensive concept that covers every aspect of politics. A decent state, a righteous political order, a true application of republicanism can be established based on the right concept of freedom (which is the freedom as non-domination). Not only can it be based on it, but solely on it. Idea of freedom as non-domination stands alone as the sole idea that is sufficient for everything, including economic or environmental problems. What Pettit proposes is not a single idea, but a comprehensive thought system that can shape or structure the whole state and provide all the necessary criteria to assess its success. In his works, he defines how modern institutions of government can be based around the ideal of freedom as non-domination, and how this idea can provide important basis for other thought systems such as feminism, environmentalism, socialism and multiculturalism (Pettit, 2002: 130-5). In his another book about a practical implementation of his concept on a real case, he gives practical examples on how his concept can be used on every day practical issues in the political life of Spain. His version of republicanism, which is solely based on the idea of freedom as non-domination, “represents a philosophy that we can live with and act on” (Pettit, 2002: 130). Therefore, it is not supposed to leave anything out. It is not acceptable for Pettit’s

ambition to leave either any important value or institution out of the reach of his concept.

This criticism had to be revisited after examining Pettit's later works, in which he mitigated his claims (very likely due to some criticism) and highlighted that freedom "is not meant to be the only value in life, or the value that ultimately matters" (Pettit, 2012: 3). Moreover, he admits that there are still some "goods" other than freedom, and there are some "ills" that cannot be cured by the concept of freedom, such as misery and poverty, unfairness and inequality (Pettit, 2012: 3). This is a confession you would not meet directly at Pettit's former works and a radical turn if we consider his previous highly enthusiastic statements. Especially economic equality and social justice seem to occupy more space in his ideas (Pettit, 2012: 75-130). However, although he more distinctly recognizes other factors, his theorization of social justice or any other concept is still linked with the concept of freedom as non-domination or implementation of it. Freedom as non-domination is the common-language (Pettit, 2002: 131) and main paradigms that shapes everything.

Pettit's single dimensional space of politics should be discussed both in terms of necessity and validity. It is a fact that, as a natural consequence, this approach brings many practical availabilities and ease in understanding, implementation and discussion. However, there are important questions that need to be answered to justify it. Can the political debate really be reduced to single dimensional space, and maybe a better question, is there a need for it? Why should we diminish our scope to single item and does not pay attention to several other factors? Political life is complex and deserves to

be handled by a multi-dimensional approach, why is there a need for reducing the dimensions? These questions are important to be answered satisfactorily especially when the other factors are not denied, but on the contrary, approved to be important. Relative priority is accepted as absolute dominance by Pettit. Unless other factors are totally devaluated, this approach cannot be justified. Think of several important factors that you use your computer for; work, leisure, communication and so on. Then pick one of them, and define its most important part of it. After several steps, you end up with a very important task you use your computer for, but that will probably be far from being the sole reason you bought your computer for, and far from explaining all other uses.

Justification for a minimalist approach may be two folded. At one side, one can claim that political arena cannot handle too many factors together, because if the deadlock it would create. Another argument may be that considering some main determinants will be enough because it can explain all the others. It is very difficult to assess Pettit's answer to these questions, although he seems to be inclined to adopt the latter argument. He states that the idea of freedom dominates the political debate more than the others. Although he represents the normative ideas as rival to each other, it is apparent that he does not totally excludes any of them, but believes the concept of freedom has the capacity to establish a better political order than all the others. The rivalry is in the competition to take place or dominate the political agenda, not excluding the other. Petit does not come to his conclusion by rejecting some of the factors that are traditionally considered to be important (such as interests, democracy, participation, freedom as non-intervention), but by claiming that a concept of freedom as non-

domination is capable of bringing any improvements that other concepts might propose. Therefore, the first thing he does for sure is “reduction”, which is questionable not only in terms of applicability but also necessity.

Freedom has always been a crucial concept since the early ages, and especially important since the emergence of modern theories on state, society and the individual. Understanding of freedom plays important role in defining state – society - individual relations. Explaining a crucial term that has an important place in political debate since ancient times is already a critical task. But making it the main criterion of a successful state and attaching every solution to its new understanding is another thing, which, I will claim, is bound to fail. Neither Pettit’s, nor anyone else’s view on neither on freedom nor any other single concept is capable of solving overly complex and detailed problems of today’s politics, simply because no single concept can regulate so many dynamics. Pettit never explains why the existence of multiple factors is bad for shaping the political environment and creating a decent society. I believe limiting the scope and maybe aspirations would eliminate most of this criticism. The importance of freedom and its place on political debate is already uncontroversial. Therefore, proposing a better understanding will already be a priceless contribution, maybe like introducing a very effective medicine against cancer. Claiming that every health problem stems from cancer and therefore can be solved by this medicine, on the other hand, will incite rightful criticism.

As a result, I will argue that Pettit’s reductionist theory which reduces every problem that can exist in state-society relations to a space that can be arranged by his

understating of freedom as non-domination is questionable both in terms of necessity and validity. And this is not all; his concept of freedom itself is another example of reductionism. Since freedom is the core concept for Pettit, his reductionist approach in freedom is especially noteworthy and should be elaborated separately.

5.8.2. Concept of Freedom

Pettit's definition of domination requires capacity, an agent, intention and worsening factor. While considering capacity equal to the actual interference may promote freedom, all the other factors have an opposite effect. I will focus most of these factors separately, and I will claim that in aggregate, reduction in Pettit's conceptualization of freedom is much more apparent than the expansion it brings. In this regards, reductionism emerges as the main criticism of Pettit; reducing political sphere only to normative ideas, reducing normative ideas to concepts on freedom, reducing the concept of freedom to freedom as non-domination and finally reducing the limits of domination to above listed criteria.

Pettit lists three main prerequisites for domination, which practically specify three areas of reduction for freedom:

1. Intention: Although an agent's freedom is apparently limited, it is not considered as a type of domination as long as the intention cannot be verified.

2. Bad intention: The interference has not only to be intended, but also to be “bad” intended. If it is a result of “good intention”, it is still not considered as limitation.
3. Agent: Interference cannot be caused by factors other than humans.

Requirement for intention and agent excludes both conditioning factors, and unintentional interference such as the ones caused by inadvertence. Requirement for bad intention excludes or justifies any interference made with a good cause

5.8.2.1.Intention and Agent:

Emphasis on intention already necessitates existence of a conscience agent. Therefore, they result in similar consequences and can be dealt together. As pointed out, intention is different than good intention vs. arbitrariness discussion, and has to exist before exploring the arbitrariness. Within itself, characteristics of intention and agent diminish the scope of freedom by unaccepting the limitations of freedom based on;

1. Inadvertent acts or negligence,
2. Non-human and conditioning factors.

Inadvertent exercise or sustainment of domination by an agent, or domination of any kind by non-agents is not considered as real domination by Pettit, or at least not as considerable threats that political system should address. The reason behind this approach can be explained by Pettit’s willingness to focus on relations among political agents, hence creating a political system which will highlight economic, social or natural incapacities. He states that:

Were non-intentional forms of obstruction also to count as interference that would be to lose the distinction between securing people against the natural effects of chance and incapacity and scarcity and securing them against the things that they may try to do to one another. This distinction is of the first importance in political philosophy, and almost all traditions have marked it by associating a person's freedom with constraints only on more or less intentional interventions by others (Pettit, 1997b: 52-3).

Pettit can be said to have "good intention" here; he might be cautious against types of domination established over people by exaggerating or solely focusing on other non-human factors. The term "intention", by definition, presupposes existence of a conscience being. By focusing on conscious agents, Pettit may want to prevent possible domination areas exercised by the state or the rulers by over-emphasizing the primacy of economic factors, security concerns, certain ideologies, etc. I will cover the absence of conditioning factors in a separate part. But first, a little more elaboration might be useful on former.

Pettit makes difference among agent's motive and disregards acts of interference caused by inadvertent acts of an agent. Such supposition inevitably causes us to think that an interference caused by the negligence of an agent does not limit freedom. In fact, this category of "intentional interventions" is more expansive than would normally be true of a category so labeled (Kramer, 2008: 40). Although he insists on this prerequisite on theoretical and definitional terrain, his further clarifications and real life study on Spain may address other types of actions. Therefore, we can say that his conceptualization includes "the sort of action in the doing of which we can sensibly allege negligence", as he already affirms (Pettit, 1997b: 52). This creates a conflict with definition and implications. Negligence can call for responsibility, but, by definition, is

different than deliberate or intentional actions. Pettit must have correctly perceived that deliberate violence and coercion are not the only sources of unfreedom, however he does not address this in his conceptualization. It is not clear why he chooses to focus on the motive behind an activity rather than on the activity itself and its effect on certain agent. It is equally unclear why he designates negligently produced results as “intentional”. Considering his conflicting statements elsewhere, Pettit’s insistence on intention as a characteristic of domination is at least a definitional and linguistic, if not a theoretical fault.

Even when negligence is included as a form of intentional obstruction to others’ freedom, it is still not clear why Pettit does not encompass all types of human actions. Potential sources of unfreedom should include various unintentional effects of other people’s actions, or even possibility of such effects, even if they are not due to negligence at all. Pettit’s insistence that unfreedom can be due to intentional obstructions cause his theory to disregard obstructions caused by of sheer chance, scarcity or incapacity or as results of other people’s unintended endeavors.

Another problem occurs here is the possibility of defining same consequence on people as an interference or not. Matthew Kramer gives an example of two people encountering same consequence as an act of other person but interpreted differently according to Pettit’s theorization:

Suppose that Mark and Molly are both in a room, and that they are endowed with roughly equal strength. Simon shuts and locks the only means of exit from the room. Knowing that Molly is inside, Simon has locked the door because he wants to confine her there. Simon knows nothing of Mark’s presence in the room – either because Simon has been negligent or because there were no reasonable grounds for him to be

aware of Mark's location...If we correlate the "intentional"/ "unintentional" dichotomy with the distinction between "unfree" and "not free," we shall have to conclude that Simon's act of locking the door has made Molly unfree-to-leave but has made Mark merely not-free-to-leave. In other words, we arrive at the verdict that a single human act which imposes exactly the same physical constraints on two people of similar capacities has affected their unfreedom in markedly different ways (2008).

The example can be expanded to include other non-human factors. We should be aware that similar limitations can happen in the political life, which will be interpreted differently according to Pettit's concept. Then the question is, should we try to establish a system which will solve the domination imposed on Molly, and not on Mark? In a simple form, Pettit's theory does totally forget about Mark, but does not try to save him as hard as it does for Molly either.

5.8.2.2. Conditioning Factors

Pettit is criticized for focusing on domination which originates from other agents, and paying very little attention to other factors that can equally capable of exerting domination, or can create significant disadvantage without any domination (Dagger, 2002). Although he recognizes conditioning factors and their effect on reducing the "undominated" choices (Pettit, 2002: 76-7), he emphasizes that domination at his target is exercised by an agent, not by conditions. Conditioning factors can be important so long as not to provide any capacity for domination to a certain agent. Other than that, disadvantaged position of the citizens in a state because of some non-breathing conditions is not of concern. There is no such thing as interference to freedom which is resulted from non-personal factors for Pettit.

In order to differentiate between different types of restrictions to freedom, Pettit creates a new terminology: non-free and unfree. Someone is unfree so far as their freedom is compromised by arbitrary domination, while he or she is non-free insofar as their freedom is subject to certain conditioning factors (Pettit, 1989b; 2002). Therefore, being “non-free” because of certain factors does not necessarily mean being “unfree” (i.e. being subject to arbitrary domination). Different terms indicate different perception of freedom or limitation of it, and clearly “non-freedom” is not a major concern for Pettit as much as “un-freedom.” In this respect, Pettit falls far away from some prominent republicans (such as J.J. Rousseau and Dagger) who emphasize the importance of conditioning factors in achieving real freedom, participation and autonomy in a republic. For Pettit, such claims are similar to the ones that are raised by the advocates of freedom as non-interference: we should not only focus on the interference that is done possible choices of the citizen, but we should also focus on increasing these choices. Between the two, Pettit focuses on removing obstacles on available choices rather than increasing them.

Limits on available choices are inevitable facts according to Pettit. These limits may be some natural or physical obstacles. Pettit regards conditional factors equal to natural obstacles. Natural obstacles mostly connote inevitability and obligatory acceptance, such as in case of a disability. Their effect on freedom is not a limitation, but more of a “conditioning”. Justification on this argument might be because some choices actually never exist because of certain conditions, which can be defined either by nature or by common law. In this respect, natural and man-made laws are equal. This

acceptance is used to strengthen his argument that prison does not limit freedom. Non-arbitrary restrictions to freedom, such as the ones exerted by law, are very similar to natural conditions and they do not restrict freedom, but condition it. According to Pettit, this is the difference between the adherents of freedom as non-interference and freedom as non-domination.

5.8.2.3. “Good Intention” and “Non Arbitrariness”

In the first look, Pettit seems to be attempting to widen the limits of freedom. There are many ways of interfering in one’s life, or limiting his/her freedom, without actually physically interfering. Modern and complex, interdependent and interconnected structures definitely create more ways and means and availability for this interference, since they will inevitably bring more state bureaucracy and more humans in charge of certain decision points, and therefore which might always carry the potential of “arbitrary sway”. Any state and any society should be careful about this potential and take necessary precautions to minimize it. However, while focusing on this, Pettit does not pay too much attention to the other side of equation: how much and to what degree a non-arbitrary interference is acceptable?

Domination is unacceptable if it is not for the “good” of the individual, or if it is arbitrary, which means it is not established by the law. It should be intended by the interferer to worsen the agent’s choice situation (Pettit, 2002: 53). If interference is seeking the interests of someone, it is not interference (Pettit, 2002: 55). Therefore, if it is not “intended” and if they do not “worsen” the agent’s choice, they are acceptable. Reading more carefully, if “interference” is not created by a person, it is not in the scope

of Pettit because it would not be intended. If it is for the good of a person, it is not interference, but maybe a conditioning of freedom. Within this sense, prison, for example, does not obstruct freedom, but condition it (Pettit, 2002: 56 footnote). Similarly, public official may actually interfere with a citizen without dominating that person (Pettit, 2002: 65). Intentional interferences that are non-arbitrary are like natural obstacle to freedom (Pettit, 2002: 77). If you cannot fly, this is not a limitation of your freedom to fly, but a result of your natural means and capabilities. Similarly, if you are coerced into some action by state, if you are eligible (or not eligible) for certain opportunities, or if you are put into prison because of a crime, this is a result of your nature.

Since interference is “allowed” and actually “necessary” in the concept freedom as non-domination, the only criterion that has to be assured is that it has to be done for the avowed interest of the individual or the whole group. Interference within this scope is non-arbitrary, and it is not only allowed, but is considered essential for the republic. Therefore, Pettit’s purpose is not minimizing interference, but maximizing the public, non-arbitrary control over interfering factors. Such a claim, as a starting point, fails to satisfy main concerns of the advocates of the negative freedom who believe that interfering in people’s freedom, “for” people but “in spite of” people, is the mother of all evils. Restricting people’s lives or forcing them without their willingness with the claim that these restrictions and enforcements are better for them carries the assumption that someone or some institution knows better than the individuals themselves. In Pettit’s case, this instrument is the law, which removes individuality and arbitrariness.

Laws is the ultimate reflection of the common good, therefore its production is of great concern and importance.

Interference can be required by law in the interest of the individual, or in the interest of the community. Pettit assumes that they are intertwined with each other and cannot be treated differently. However, when a pertinacious thief is imprisoned, it is apparently for the sake of others rather than himself/herself. This separation may not be so obvious in the complexity of everyday life, in which interests of an individual, group or the state are inevitably privileged at the expense of others, but hopefully according to some basic principles that benefit all. But it is not obvious why an individual who is coerced in the collective interest is still considered to be free, and why Pettit feels a need to accept it as domination. Unless the common interest is defined very narrowly, there will always be conflicts between one's personal interest and the common interest. Where such conflicts occur, common interest can be privileged over one's personal interest within the limits of personal rights and proper role of the state.

5.8.3. Power

Pettit openly rejects power and accuses political scientists who try to explain political issues with it with being unable to understand the situation. As mentioned before, thinking of politics as a "power game" is a misconception, or illusion and comes from philosophers' "inability to understand their limitations" (Pettit, 2002: 3). Probably Pettit does not claim that power does not exist in the political space. But apparently he

believes that focusing on it too much overshadows the effect of ideas. This reaction leads him to accept it as a factor which can and should be disregarded.

An attempt to emphasize normative ideas in political debate and trying to draw people's attention away from dominating power discourse can be understandable to certain degree. However, one does not need to be the supporter of power discourse in order to raise several objections to these claims. Such a strong opposition to power is very difficult to justify. The supporter needs to prove that either power does not exist in the real life and that is why it can be disregarded, or that although it exists, it does not have considerable affect in political live or in choices of others. Consequently, rejecting power relations in political sphere carries the assumption that a good political order (or a good republican state in this case) does not need to handle the issue of power to be successful.

In general sense we can claim that power relations are inevitable in a political society and power, by definition, has the capacity to force, coerce and/or limit others' choices. Therefore, it has a direct effect on freedom because it can limit or even remove freedom and Pettit's objection to pay attention to use of power in political sphere does not seem understandable or justifiable arguments. However, it would not be fair to raise the same criticism over his conceptualization. Although Pettit rejects seeing politics as a power game, how he describes freedom as non-domination is nothing but eliminating any possibility of coercion or limitation in political-social life. Domination after all is nothing but a power relation established by one individual, group or institution over another. Similarly, an interference to one's freedom is nothing but exercising power on

him or her. Pettit's own definition of domination is no different. According to him interference includes coercion of the body as a restraint or obstruction, coercion of the will, and manipulation (Pettit, 2002: 53). Especially when you examine his ideas on the coercion of the will and manipulation, he comes very close to the supporters of power discourse (I can even claim that when you replace interference with exercising power in most of his words, you end up with very close arguments which Foucault raised). Manipulation for example is usually covert and may take the form of agenda-fixing, the deceptive or non-rational shaping of people's beliefs or desires, or the rigging of the consequences of people's actions (Pettit, 1989a). All interfering behaviors are, coercive or manipulative as Pettit accepts (Pettit, 2002: 53).

Therefore, Pettit already accepts existence of power. Actually his sole purpose can be defined as eliminating its arbitrary use. What he does not accept is its role in policy making. He refuses to see politics as a power game. This is an understandable claim for Pettit and maybe for republican theory in general, because Pettit has to believe that common good and non-arbitrary laws can be achieved in politics without resorting to power conflicts. If we see politics as a power game, the result becomes an indicator of the existing balance of powers, maybe a compromise at its best. However, Pettit and in general all republicans (have to) accept that common good, which will benefit public as a whole including even the least powerful citizen, can be defined by the help of institutional measures as well as civic virtue of the citizens. Citizens are capable of thinking beyond themselves and their individual interests. Since laws justify any constraint on freedom, ability to reach common good and non-arbitrary laws which will

not benefit any specific agent or group of agents is critical for Pettit. And a power game would severely damage, if not totally destroy this ability.

Although excluding power from politics and accepting it as an arena of consensus rather than an arena of conflict is essential for Pettit, its possibility and availability is questionable. Logically, an imposition of force from one side can only be countered by equal force from the other side. Unless creating an equal reaction, it is questionable to stop an action. Besides, since it already exists in the real life, it might not be possible to eliminate in politics. If domination is a power relation, or at least if power can apparently be used to establish domination on others, then resistance against it should be equivalent power that would balance it. This power can stem from state measures as well as stem personal power. Even if a system aims at minimizing personal power struggle to resist domination, it has to take into account use of it to establish domination. Some agents would always seek possible areas for using it.

Pettit's theoretical approach creates a contradiction because of its ambiguous approach towards power. He already accepts that power exists in the community and people should be guarded against it. He also accepts that individuals, groups, state representatives, etc. can resort to power in daily life and can attempt to establish a power relation over others for any reason, even without a gain. However, when it comes to law, which will guard people against power, he assumes that it can be produced by the same group of political agents who, this time, will not (be able to) use their power. It is a question why an agent would resort to its power (which shows itself as domination) over another one when there is an opportunity, but would not resort to the same power during

a law making process in a way to produce advantageous conditions. From this point of view, Pettit's understanding of freedom might be more dangerous since it disregards and consequently allows systematic use of power which may use state instruments, while solely focuses on individual use of it. Other than individual domination between agents, other uses of power as well as the role of interests are excluded from the political sphere which, in my opinion, creates a vacuum and failure to reflect the reality.

As a final note, Pettit himself gives instrumental value to power and contradicts with his earlier arguments. Referring to the historical development of non-interference and non-domination based freedoms, he argues that although the rights language was always more successful to challenge acts of interference, it was not equally successful to challenge the acts of domination. This was only achieved by power; freedom of slaves, workers, and women has historically been more effectively furthered by their gaining more power (or "anti-power") than by their being granted formal rights (Pettit, 1999: 304). It is questionable why the same language which can effectively sanction a type of domination cannot do the same for other types. The same language can be accepted as the most important concept which shaped the modern world for centuries. Somewhere else Pettit also states that non-domination requires reciprocal power as much as constitutional provision (Pettit, 2002: 67). What he understands from reciprocal power is a kind of balance by the help of which the ruled can challenge the ruler. The aim of reciprocal power is "to make the resources of dominator and dominated more equal so that, ideally, a previously dominated person can come to defend themselves against any interference on the part of the dominator." (Pettit, 2002: 67). Oddly, power emerges as

the most effective instrument to achieve Pettit's main focus of freedom as non-domination.

Therefore, a criticism for excluding politics in politics would not be a fair criticism for Pettit's argument. On the contrary, his main aim can be interpreted as trying to eliminate the capacity to establish an arbitrary power relation (read as domination) between entities of the political space. In this sense, I believe Pettit's rejection of power is a definitional consequence, and maybe an unnecessary denial. Domination is closely linked to power as he already accepts and is not disregarded in Pettit's argument. Arbitrary use of power is scrutinized and targeted to be removed. However, when it comes to taking measures against domination, he totally ignores the role of power in this process. Therefore, main criticism in this field can be raised from the opposite side, that power is not included as a factor in law-making or other republican governance process.

5.8.4. Interests

Interests and power are closely related and same arguments can be raised. If an individual's interests are greatly influenced by the outcome of a certain process, he or she uses any source of power that is available to him or her to shape this process. Political sphere is an arena which has influences on people's and institutions gains and losses. Actually it maybe the arena which has the most influence on them. Political debate shapes political environment in which every political entity is affected.

Therefore, a political agent would use any possible means available to him or her to shape this environment in an advantageous way. Gains and losses can also be defined as interests, which are also rejected by Pettit as considerable factors of the political debate. Pettit does not see the political debate as clash of interests among different groups and individuals and consequently does not see the state as a referee or a balancing mechanism of this conflict. When we accept differentiating interests among different groups and when we accept political environment as the most critical determinant which can affect these interests, it is difficult not to accept that political actors do not define their agenda based in their interests and it is difficult not to task the state mechanism to manage them in the proper way.

Can a theory on state and governance be realist, or real, if it totally ignores interests? According to many, it cannot. Richard Bellamy, for example, argues that conflicts of values and interests are an ineluctable and inseparable part of politics and suggests another approach which he calls “realist democracy” (Bellamy, 2008: 159). Some other scholars also share this idea of realist republicanism (McCormick, 2001; Maddox, 2002; Maynor, 2003; Laborde and Maynor, 2008). By ignoring the effects of values and interests, Pettit tend to rationalize and justify democratic outcome by giving a semi-objective, consensual content to the public interest.

Interest is not disregarded, but, on the contrary, deified in every variant of republican theory as long as it refers to the interest of the public as a whole. Personal interests are thought to be closely associated with it. Political best is not going to be achieved when every individual seeks their own interest but at the end they reach a

compromise which will benefit all. Rather, they contend to define the common good, which, once established, will turn and provide everyone's best interest. What Pettit demonizes is actually selfishness. If interference is seeking the interests of subject person, it is not domination (Pettit, 2002: 55-6) and Pettit does not differentiate here between legitimate state instruments or agents acting on their own. In other words, good-intentional interference of your close friend, or maybe even of a total stranger, is not considered domination according to the criteria Pettit defined. Therefore, what he tries to eliminate is the subjective interpretation of interests by individual agents and a chaotic political arena which will emerge as a result of the inevitable conflicts among them. This might be an indispensable effort in any theory of republicanism in order to turn politics into an arena of mutual trust and friendship in which you work together with fellow citizens to reach a common desired end. However, it is still bound to raise rightful criticism on the grounds that such a system may fail to reflect the reality.

5.8.5. Civic Virtue

Pettit's theory does not define sufficient means and methods to foster republican virtue, although acknowledges its criticality. Virtues are safeguards to domination (Pettit, 2002: 64); however, the system he has in mind does not have the primary function of promoting them. Pettit already accepts that his theory is almost entirely addresses a group with certain level of civic virtue (Pettit, 2002: 253). Therefore, he does not have anything for establishing civic virtue from zero: "We know little or nothing about how

to generate widespread civility where it has more or less ceased to exist” (Pettit, 2002: 253). The best system can do is to maintain it, not create them, according to Pettit.

Non-virtuous behavior is not only something un-desired, but something unacceptable because it leads to domination (if it does not, it is out of question for Pettit, which can be another point of criticism regarding his theory. On the other hand, in most cases, same type of non-virtuous act-to-domination link can be established). For example, selling an item at a higher price is not considered (only) as a non-virtuous act, but also as a type of domination (Pettit, 2002: 56), and that is why it should also be prevented. However, Pettit carries the assumption that this type of non-virtuous behavior “can” be prevented non-arbitrarily either by “intangible hand” (Pettit, 2002: 254), which is simply social approval and disapproval, or by a highly tangible one; the law.

Regarding the former medium (social approval or disapproval), a discussion can be developed on the grounds that it is actually nothing but a type of social domination established over individual, and there is no guarantee that it can always be non-arbitrary. Therefore, by prescribing such social control, Pettit opens door to what he tries eliminate. However, I will focus more on the latter argument of organizing ethics by law, which is more strongly emphasized by Pettit. Maybe because of being aware of the consequences it may create, Pettit does not highlight and give examples about the social control, but rather claims that some behavioral ethics can be organized by law, as if higher or lower price, or any moral anything similar, do not have subjective dimensions and can be defined and known objectively by everyone. Virtues are considered as tangible factors that can and should be put into material terms, so that they become

eligible for regulation by law. In this sense, non-domination safeguarded by law emerges as the tangible interpretation of a domain governed by intangible factors (i.e. civic virtue), so that it allows the conceptualization of a social-political sphere to be organized and regulated by more solid criteria.

Although his effort to turn intangible into tangible can be understood, the task Pettit defines here is a very difficult one, especially since he also talks about the behavioral aspects of domination (such as the attitude of a state employee in front of a social welfare dependent), which, in most of the cases, cannot be banned or defined by law. It is impossible to create a rule for every detail of socio-political life or personal behavior. In addition, some ethics need to be pre-existent in order to make laws non-arbitrary, in both creation and implementation phases. That is why republicans refer to republican traits as essential elements for Republicanism to survive. Primacy of the group, agility in public activity, participation in decision making can be listed as some of them. Promotion of these values is also not an easy task that can be taken for granted.

Law can be the medium to provide domination a non-arbitrary basis, but it is not a self-sufficient and already existing instrument. It is created by humans; Therefore, it inevitably carries all the characteristics that are associated with humans. When it comes to domination, it carries the potential to favor more influential groups. Pettit seems to rely on two aspects of law that would it non-arbitrary: First, it is not personal; applied to everyone in similar situations. Second, it needs to be approved by everyone, which means a type of common sense to be established.

Although Pettit accepts supportive role of civic virtue, he believes that a state system cannot be based on abstract values. When they are needed, the conditions that require virtue should and can be defined in tangible terms. Moral judgment is not a judgment, but a clear fact that can be regulated by law.

Even if this is possible, this approach proposes a negative approach to civic virtue. Instead of supporting positive measures for promoting civic virtue, he tries to forbidden anything that can be interpreted as being against one's advantage. This brings many practical problems. Even the fairly tangible example of "not selling at a higher price" disregards basic economic principles. It brings forwards the simple question: higher or lower according to whom? If we put a quantitative limit such as ten per cent over production cost, what will be included in this production cost? If someone manages to produce for less, will he earn less? If he or she failed several times before producing a successful item, should such previous efforts can be counted as "know how" or experience and included in the overall production cost? Of course, selling at higher price and exploiting people's needs is not acceptable, but it is also very difficult to obstruct this by bans, if no other market rules are applied appropriately, no other state mechanisms are defined and no civic virtue exist in exchangers. When this is valid for semi-concrete issue, it is almost impossible to regulate morals in much more abstract world. Pettit develops a negative understanding of civic virtue and proposes forceful measures for providing it.

By referring to the law, Pettit seems to free the concept of non-arbitrariness from subjectivity. He tries to make this decision not a personal one. After all, ethics is a

personal issue. A state cannot be based on personal wisdom; instead it should be based on tangible and objective values. However, both Republicanism as a political system and laws in general require certain type of ethics that cannot be quantified and therefore cannot be maintained by negative measures. No social system or any of its instruments such as law can be impersonalized by simply denying its personal side. Instead, this possibility has to be noted and taken care of. It is more likely for a system to prosper if it founds its main basis on solid, objective principles, but also recognizes personal effect in both interpreting and implementing them, and therefore if it also manages to establish certain traits in its incumbents, by creating suitable means and mediums for these traits to flourish. For some, military can be one of them.

Law is crucial, but it is a negative measure. It regulates by punishing non-compliers. For this, it needs to catch, needs to be detailed, and needs non-corrupt implementers. But before all, it does not have any kind of motivating (meaning positive motivation), inspiring or educating function. Pettit proposes supremacy of law which is not supported by any secondary measures. Pettit's conceptualization might be the acceptance of a fact that if you do not want to establish a political system on intangible values, you have to make them quantifiable, in spite of its weak points.

It is not a novelty or success on a philosopher's account to describe an end state or to define how something should look like, but it is a real success to describe the ways to achieve this end, to bring forward plausible means and methods that would make it possible. Defining basic idea of system might be the first step in establishing it, but can it be enough all the way through? Can we eliminate the human factor and solely depend

on the system? Who will create this system, and who will maintain it? How will we eliminate corruption? These questions remain unsolved.

5.8.6. Economy

In general, modern republicanism is believed to contribute to the “political economy of citizenship” substantially (Sandel, 1996; Sunstein, 1997; Allen and Regan, 1998; White, 2003; Pettit, 2006; Dagger, 2006; Laborde and Maynor, 2008). This contribution can also be seen in Pettit, but as a cautionary way rather than providing solutions. Pettit himself dedicated an article to the “freedom in the market” (Pettit, 2006), which is not more than a culmination of possible domination areas which can be established within market forces, and, therefore, should be eliminated. Modern republican theory mainly shares these concerns. In this respect, Gerald Gaus characterizes contemporary republicanism as a “post-socialist critique of market society” (Gaus, 2003). On the other hand, a common critique of republicanism is that, because it is primarily a theory of political citizenship, it is relatively indifferent to questions of socio-economic justice and equality (Goodin, 2003: 62) although overall economic success of the republic is critical. On the contrary, Pettit considers social justice as an inevitable requisite of a republic and argues that republican understanding of freedom as non-domination promotes it in several ways (Pettit, 2012: 75-130). Most important contribution in this regard is providing equality and basic liberties status (Pettit, 2012: 83)

Economic success is a requirement for effective functioning of a republican system. Economic destitution exposes people to domination by the few. Flourishing economy is an infrastructural requirement for non-domination (Pettit and Martí, 2010: 75). It is important for social help, health system, preventing congestion in judicial system by increasing the number of courts and judges, education system and so on. In better economic conditions, there are fewer opportunities for people to be exploited and manipulated, and the prospects for freedom as non-domination are improved.

In addition to the general economic conditions, individual wealth is also important in republicanism. Traditionally and naturally, in order for the members of the state to become real citizens and exercise any activity related to or stems from this citizenship, they should not be dependent on any other person; i.e. they should have sufficient and guaranteed independent means. If there is a dependency relationship, we cannot talk about (ideal) republican citizenship (Goodin, 1988: 171-2; Isaac, 1988: 365-370). Pettit also acknowledges that citizens need sufficient material resources in order to qualify for being a citizen by republican standards (Pettit, 1997b: 158-63). His republican state is heavily dependent on citizens' economic independence and social justice which is guaranteed by law (Pettit, 2012: 75-130). However, he does not propose radical measures such as proper distribution of land and the assignment of property rights to it, as advocated by J.J. Rousseau (Rousseau, 1762). His solution mainly includes welfare provisions and social guarantees.

Pettit supports market economy, because it guarantees citizens' self-sufficiency and independence (Pettit, 2006). Market by itself cannot secure non-domination; on the

contrary, it can be source of numerous domination possibilities. Therefore, Pettit's approach to the market is cautious and restrictive. Market's corruptive effect can also deteriorate common good and republican ethic. It is not only an economic system, but also a constructive force, which is capable of constructing its own society. And naturally, although republicans may support market economy, they object to the "market society," where market relations spill into, and corrupt, parts of life where they should not reign supreme (Dagger, 2006)

How can republican state still improve (market) economy, when it sees its constructive force, its society and its harsh conditions as potential dangers? Pettit suggests that the state may prepare the basis for the economy to flourish by providing a good infrastructure for industry and commerce, by facilitating productivity in the workplace, by fostering market development and choice, and by establishing trade linkages with other countries (Pettit, 2002: 162). In addition, suitable environment can be established by following right legal policy and implementing proper legal instruments. He defines three type of programs which state should develop and actively pursue: infrastructural, insurance and insulation (i.e. criminalization) (Pettit, 2012: 110-22). On the other hand, economic prosperity at the expense of freedom is not acceptable. In this respect, state interventions and legal instruments should be carefully examined not to create any type of domination between the parties. Law of contract, for example, is not a private matter, but a public one. Free contract, in which parties create some kind of binding arrangements, can provide power of domination which is not acceptable even when parties entered voluntarily. Therefore, republican state should not allow

domination by contract, even if established between willing parties (Pettit, 2002: 164-5). “Providing equal status” should be one of the main pillars of the state’s social justice policy (Pettit, 2012: 83), which should not be overridden by economic concerns.

In spite of its critical role in supporting freedom, economy also carries the danger to replace it as a primary concern. It has the potential to gain priority for both the state and the citizens, potential to override concerns over freedom, and potential to legitimate some public or individual acts of domination. It may easily become the primary, if not the only, indicator of success and development of a state, a state system or a government. However, even Pettit himself treats economy the same way. In his study on Spanish government, economic success during Aznar administration emerges an indicator of the success of civic republicanism in the same term. This is rather strange, because his theory does not necessarily put any target or prescribe recipes for economic development. It is not clear how Pettit would interpret the success of civic republicanism in Spain if every measure regarding preventing the arbitrary domination had been taken, but the economy had been staggering. Civic republicanism is not designed for economic success; it does not claim to better organize business rules and market forces, does not claims to put forward a more efficient production capability and so on. Therefore, taking economic prosperity as a criterion to measure civic republicanism’s success seems controversial, while accepting it as a prerequisite may be necessary.

Therefore, economy emerges both as a precondition and measure of success for Pettit’s republican state, although the system he proposes has major impediments for

economic development. This, I will argue, presents a dilemma in Pettit's theory which is not solved. I will elaborate more on this topic in the next section.

5.8.7. Inability to Address Dilemmas

A theory does not offer much unless it addresses certain dilemmas or conflictions. Pettit's republican theory does not attempt to solve that historically occurred in political systems.

5.8.7.1.Economic Prosperity vs. Protectionism and Welfare Dilemma and Some Republican Answers

Pettit's republic needs to achieve economic prosperity with a formula designed to cripple it. Certain suppositions work at the expense of each other and achieving both at the same time creates a dilemma. In terms of economy, certain counter-effective targets exist for Pettit's republic such as providing social incentives, guaranteeing welfare provisions and making citizens socially independent, while at the same time developing an economy which can provide necessary resources to support such a system and which can still generate enough motivation for people to work, to donate themselves with necessary skills and so on. It is the dilemma of keeping labor at a competitive rate so that employers can gain money and give more taxes that would nurture welfare system, while providing this welfare system which will not make citizens needy; not needy enough to work at competitive rates! It is a dilemma, because when people socially and

economically secure in order for them to exercise their citizenship duties without any influence, they tend not to seek challenging jobs, or any job at all. They tend not to spend many years for acquiring necessary qualifications and tolerate work hours, which are unavoidably more demanding than spending free time at home. It may be a harsh judgment, but people tend to eat more, or seek food more actively, when they are hungry. So the dilemma is making sure people do not forget to eat while the system does not allow them to suffer hunger. However, Pettit does not attempt to solve this dilemma of “protecting the individuals, guaranteeing their rights and welfare, while still providing a suitable environment in a competitive economy”.

Pettit’s system does not only require constitutional welfare provision, but also eliminates any kind of whims while providing it. Citizens must not be in a submissive position in front of a state official, or in front their employer. Critical question is how to achieve wealth and flourishing economy in a domain of cruel competition with a system based on guarantees; guarantees against employers’ actions, guarantees against any loss of income even when someone loses job, guarantees against any feeling of insecurity among citizens regardless of their economic productivity and so on. Economic prosperity to support these guarantees constitutes a critical part of republican state. However, such a “costly” nature of don-domination may produce an environment which is likely to contradict with the rules of market economy.

Therefore, Pettit’s theory of republicanism imposes some economic burdens on the state. Governments’ and other economic actors’ flexible area is circumscribed in order not to allow any actual or possible exertion of domination over any agent of the society.

Remembering Pettit's example again, domination may or does include "selling an item for a higher price" (Pettit, 2002: 55-6), or even "free contract" (Pettit, 2002: 164). In order to eliminate such domination, the state is tasked to provide not only legal and jurisdictional framework, but also sufficient economic guarantees. Such a demanding political system also needs to empower the state with the ability and economic prosperity to cope with these impositions. This creates a real complication when the state has to act within these limitations in a highly competitive global environment and when its primary concern is not economic prosperity. Therefore, first challenge of republicanism is to achieve equally effective and efficient republican economies as the ones governed by more liberal principles.

Another challenge to republicanism comes from the other side: eliminating any actual or possible domination in current economic order might not be secured by the republican state acting alone. In the age of global capitalism, private interests and transnational networks of capital are able to dominate public institutions and weaken the public control of the state. It is more difficult for the state to fulfill a civic purpose and balance the democratic pursuit of prosperity, social cohesion and liberty – thus moving towards addressing the adverse social consequences of economic globalization (Slaughter, 2005).

In order to cope with this challenge, some new republicans tried to compromise the premises of republicanism with challenges of contemporary economic environment. Steven Slaughter, for example, advocated the idea of global civic republicanism, which proposes a formulation of governance that is inspired by republican thought adapted to a

world that is increasingly integrated at a global level (Slaughter, 2005: 185). In order to achieve this adaptation, complex forms of cooperation and delegation of state power are required to enable the joint interstate regulation of global capital and the negotiated governance of other global issues.

Therefore, how to manage economy is a problem in republicanism and Pettit's contribution may not be adequate for solving it. However, it might be plausible for a theory solely based on freedom (of any type) not to define every aspect of a political system. No matter how they are interpreted, freedom based theories may fail to provide detailed recipes for every functional area of the state such as how to manage economy, achieve development, manage science and technology, promote art and so on. Arguing otherwise before everything would be an insult to the specific disciplines. A theory based on freedom can still make its contribution in all of them and promote a better society. I believe this is not a fault for Pettit's theory, but it may be a fault for his claims about establishing a comprehensive system solely based on the non-domination understanding of freedom. In other words, Pettit claims to solve all economic problems with his concept which is mainly based on an interpretation of freedom is bound to fail, especially when it only imposes burden on economy without addressing any critical economic problems.

Another point one can make here is not about insufficiency, but about inconsistency in Pettit's view of economy. Although economy is not a main concern to promote, it emerges as such in evaluation of the performance of a system. How would we define a republic which prevented every possible real and actual types of

domination, but had staggering economy? Pettit's answer to this question is clear; both in his later explanations and especially in his study of Spain as a case study of civic republicanism, economy success is set both as a pre-condition and measurement of success (Pettit and Martí, 2010: 72-5).

In the beginning of his book on civic republicanism, Pettit states that in contemporary political domain, ideas are legitimized in relation to four main trends (economy, universal rights, welfare/fairness/equality, and democracy) which are actually conflicting with each other, and what political philosopher should do is to examine the language of political discussion and to identify the dominant discourse (Pettit, 2002: 2-4). If we apply this analysis to Pettit's work as a whole, economy emerges at least as an equally dominant discourse in addition to freedom, contrary to his claims.

5.8.7.2. Personal vs. Impersonal (Or Effectiveness vs. Representativeness, Leadership vs. Law)

Since public gained more say in policy making, a major dilemma dominated state systems: when representativeness increased, effectiveness was negatively affected and when more effective leaders came to power, representativeness diminished. Strong leadership and dynamic ruling led to more responsive state management than the systems that called for more active and wide level participation of the citizens. When the representativeness was increased by aspiring systems, states' adaptation to external changes was sometimes paralyzed. So the question still remains unanswered for Pettit: how to provide effective governance while providing adequate representativeness.

Supremacy of laws (or empire of laws in Pettit's terminology) is the main guarantee for non-domination in Pettit's republic, and non-arbitrariness of the laws can only be achieved by democratic participation. Since laws are capable of conditioning individual freedoms without even being accepted as interference to their freedom, law making requires a lengthy process and participation of even the smallest minority, interest group or individual, in order to assure that their wills should not be disregarded. However, laws cannot simply reflect the majority will; they are even over majority will and they need to be protected against it. Therefore, law making process also requires scrutinized examination of laws according to some basic principles.

Such a system is designed to remove any interpersonal imposition, any domination whereby one person has a certain mastery in the life of another (Pettit, 1996; 1997; Skinner, 1998). Freedom as non-domination is crucial unifying theme for those who work in civic republican framework, though there are some differences in emphasis and detail (Pettit, 2002). The Republican tradition is always concerned with the situation where the dominated are aware of the control exercised by others over their lives.

While Pettit puts too much emphasis on creating guarantees against personal domination, he does not prescribe any possible solution as a remedy for the likely outcome of slow, stagnant and inflexible state. He doesn't answer how laws will be responsive against changing conditions in the short term while they require such a detailed process and wide level participation. How effective leadership and dynamic ruling can be achieved in this system. In other words, how can the "personal" be achieved in such an "impersonal" system?

As such, Pettit's theory does not account for a remedy for effective leadership, or to put it in a greater context, for the "personal element" in ruling. On the contrary, one can conclude that he is against effective leadership. It would be fair to say that leadership, dynamic ruling, adaptation and flexibility in state life are not important concerns. Pettit's theory can be summarized as an effort to remove the "personal" element in politics and establish the supremacy of the "impersonal". Personal element cannot be limited to the ruler in politics; it covers both the citizens and the rulers, along with their characteristics and interpersonal relations.

There is a very long standing discussion to answer a question that goes back to Aristotle's time: "Who should be sovereign, law or the leader?" Rescuing the state and the politics from the boundary of strong rulers and capricious power is a centuries-old effort of philosophers and social scientists. Throughout time, law proved itself as being the main basis for political and social life: it is very reliable, and it is equalitarian. However, influential leadership proved to be equally important in the state life. Neither the supremacy of law nor the majority rule was able to cure all the problems by themselves and put forward the best functioning state system.

Leadership or personal element cannot be excluded from any system in which human beings are involved. It is a natural consequence of human organizations and has psychological and social aspects. Human beings are inclined to follow influential leaders. More importantly, it is a necessity. Laws can't deal with emergencies or crises. Implementation of laws even in a perfect world takes time. States need strong rulers and influential leaders in times of crises. In a more dynamic world where speed, adaptability

and flexibility gains utmost importance and when change is fast and deep and only the ones who can cope with it can succeed, removing the personal element might have dire consequences.

A complete and through law system which will be so strong and dominant over the people as Pettit suggests will require a very complex procedure which will need time to be developed, and more time to be changed as Pettit also acknowledges and delineates. The time required for the law to be developed and later changed to adapt to the changing conditions in the environment makes a state stagnant and less adaptive, which is a considerable peril in today's world. Even when there is no need to change the law, implementation of it might require the same amount of time.

Ultimate dominance and perfect implementation of law would lead to an incapable state, which lacks effective and fast decision making process. State life and governance require everyday decisions that are either cannot be transferred into law, or will take too long time to do so especially when a higher level of representation is sought. So in short, by focusing on the procedure and not the result, Pettit's republic is very likely to lack strong leadership. It may lead to a slow, inflexible and un-adaptive state which will have important difficulties in coping with every day developments, occasional crises and dynamism of the world, maybe very much similar to Weimar period in Germany after World War I.

CHAPTER VI

MILITARY IN PETTIT'S REPUBLICAN THEORY

6.1. External Defense

Pettit defines five broad areas of policy-making for a republican state to involve itself: external defense; internal protection; personal independence; economic prosperity; and public life (Pettit, 2002: 147-70). Therefore, modern republic has to exercise two significant tasks in two different domains regarding security: external defense and internal protection (Pettit, 2002: 150-7). Modern republic, like any form of state, has to defend itself against external enemies. In this sense Pettit acknowledges that military is important for protecting the state from outside domination. If the country is not adequately defended, there is going to be a “live and continuing prospect of domination” from outside (Pettit, 2002: 151). In its simplest form, another country may occupy the republic, and thereby dominate its citizens. But he also points out that in terms of providing international security, the solution never rests in arms. Being a post-Cold War philosopher, he believes that engaging in an arms race with other republics might have

devastating effects on its citizens. Therefore, if a republic conceives a major threat, proper response is not to arm itself to the teeth or, even worse, to strike preemptively against potential opponents, but developing some prospects for non-domination in the international front (Pettit, 2002: 151)

External defense and internal protection are unavoidable policies that a modern republican state should follow. Pettit's choice of words as well as his classification give hints about his stance about military. First, he divides external and internal security, which requires using different agents in respective domains. Military is only responsible for providing security against external enemies. Therefore, no internal task is envisaged for the military. Second, he chooses to use "defense" in external domain rather than "protection", which he chooses to use for internal one. Protection has a wider meaning and can include efforts in a wide range of area against a variety of sources depending on the assessment of threat. An interpretation of "protection" along with some tolerant political view of military which allows its instrumental use within the boundaries of a state may lead to dire consequences. Similarly, should he choose to use the term "security", the scope of this task could easily be expanded to include a wide range of actions and preventive measures in order to eliminate perceived insecurity of changeable valued referent objects. Contrary to Realist paradigm, which considers state as the main referent object¹⁰, today's security conceptions re-conceptualized international security to

¹⁰ For more information on Realist School see Lamy, Steven L. 2004. "Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism." In John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 182-200; Morgenthau, Hans. 1993. *Politics Among Nations-The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1993; Baylis, John. 2011. "International and Global Security in the Post-Cold War Era." In Baylis and Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 253-276; Nye, Joseph and Sean M. Lynn-Jones. 1988. "International Security Studies: A Report of

include economic, societal, environmental and demographic issues (Waeber, 1993; Booth, 1991; Bilgin, 2003). Perception of “insecurity” justifies counter actions. The wider you define; the more freedom of action you have. Moreover, security considerations can be exaggerated by the involvement of third parties. Security can be attached to issues which are “staged as existential threats to referent objects by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind” (Buzan, Waeber, and de Wilde, 1998: 5). “Defense”, on the other hand, is passive by definition, draws a narrower scope, and usually does not invoke vigilant and hostile actions. Any politician, statesperson or theorist who refers to the same task as “defense” is more inclined to limit the role of military in a state, while the ones who refer to “security” are inclined to widen it.

6.2. Military as a Threat

Pettit is clearly among the former ones with understandable reasons. According to him, military constitutes a “salient” sort of threat to republican values as a power holder with possibility of arbitrary use (Pettit, 2002: 155). Military coups and interventions that took place in different places of the world must have strengthened Pettit’s concern with this issue. This salient threat is represented by “modern police” in the domain of internal protection (Pettit, 2002: 155) and requires the state to be equally cautious, because “...given enormous powers, they are exposed to huge temptations to abuse those

a Conference on the State of the Field,” *International Security* 12 (4): 5-27.; Aydın, Mustafa. 2004. “Uluslararası İlişkilerin Gerçekçi Teorisi: Kökeni, Kapsamı, Kritiği,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 1 (1): 33-61.

powers, and their use of the powers is subject only to very imperfect controls” (Pettit, 2002: 155). As long as this power exists, there will be temptations to use it, temptations which include: “...the age-old temptation just to assert yourself and command attention; to realize an identity as part of a powerful, self-reinforcing group; to achieve influence and impact in certain areas; and, perhaps above all, to bribe and blackmail your way to affluence...” (Pettit, 2002: 155).

The concept of military, the ideas or values that military stand for, are also taken cautiously by Pettit. Contrary to classical thinkers, militaristic ideas and military logic are considered potentially dangerous. He claims that as states rely more and more on their arms and their armies to inhibit each other, they become hostage to military pressures and logic, which will make the state stray from its normal path. Pettit calls this military logic as “sustained prospect of war”, and claims that it will always exist as “the generals on the different sides assume responsibility for national security and impose on the polity at large a militaristic image of how to discharge that responsibility” (Pettit, 2002: 151). However, this is fatal for the republic because when war becomes a sustained prospect, and when states defend themselves against one another by threat and counter-threat, then the cause of non-domination is compromised, since this kind of militarization leads to spending more and more on military defense. This cost has to be borne by the citizens of the countries in question have to bear those costs, which severely reduces their undominated choice.¹¹

¹¹ Undominated choice is a term used by Pettit to refer to conditioning factors that are not arbitrary, but are also important for making freedom possible, such as physical health or distribution of wealth. Pettit’s theory does not focus on conditioning factors of republicanism

6.3. A New Task: International Expansion of the Republican Ideas

Although sustained prospect of war is dangerous for the public, Pettit believes that the struggle for establishing rightful implementation of freedom as non-domination goes beyond the boundaries of the republic itself. This issue is two dimensional: In one dimension, the republican state has to be protected against the domination of other states and other international bodies such as multinational companies, religious institutions and other networks. (Martí and Pettit, 2010: 56). Domination can take place in sundry areas, hence the protection should be provided against active intervention in military, economic, or cultural terms, against exposure to a capacity for uncontrolled intervention, and against the invigilation and intimidation that this can impose. In the other dimension, the republic has to promote a type of international order of non-domination in the international arena, an order of Kantian cosmopolitan justice, in which every state has the same duties to all individuals, citizens and noncitizens alike (Martí and Pettit, 2010: 56-7). Therefore, an important task emerges for the republican state in Pettit's theory: intervention to the "ill-ordered" and "disordered" states:

The ideal of non-domination imposes on the community of well-ordered states the obligation to do everything that is possible to facilitate the formation of suitably popular states, provided the costs of what is done count as intuitively proportional and reasonable (Martí and Pettit, 2010: 57).

If a state is dominated by other states or by global bodies like multinational corporations and international agencies, then the citizens of these states are dominated, too. When this happens, the states which established an order of non-domination inside their borders, should seek to provide assistance and even exercise coercion for the members

of “oppressive” and “failed” states; i.e., the states which “do not have a claim to freedom as non-domination in their own right” (Martí and Pettit, 2010: 104-5).

Such a license for a republican state for intervening into the others, of course, is likely to raise highly critical problems in practice and theory. It is the most likely situation for every state to claim that they own the most appropriate political system, be it republican or other. Trying to promote its own system to others and believing that they have the right to intervene into the others might turn international relations easily into a chaos, rather than an environment of freedom. Since this kind of activities will be conceived as highly hostile and would cause reciprocal reaction, the tension may easily turn into a security dilemma and make the republican states prone to *sustained prospect of war* more than ever. More importantly, while Pettit defines freedom as non-domination and as being free from arbitrary power for the individuals in a state, he disregards possible arbitrariness of the power in international arena. What makes a restriction on freedom fair is the absence to arbitrariness, which can be achieved by the establishment of fair system of law. Since there is no international law and Pettit does not predict establishment of one, any intervention by the states to the others would be inevitably arbitrary, no matter how much they justify themselves on it. So in a sense, Pettit prescribes for the states what he strongly criticizes for humans: using arbitrary power on others.

Protection from the external threats is not in the monopoly of the military. On the contrary, its necessity is questioned and de-prioritized. In order to cope with the threats in the international arena, other non-militaristic types of provisions should be

developed, such as “establishing cultural, economic, and legal networks to the extent that such regional or global systems of relationships inevitably discipline members in the manner of constitutional commitments”; “supporting a body like the United Nations insofar as it promises to be able to contain conflicts and ultimately to make conflicts unlikely” or “encouraging different layers of multinational cooperation and institutionalization” (Pettit, 2002: 152).

The other dimension of international action, coercion of “failed” states to adopt republican freedom, also includes military actions but again as secondary measures. Still, military finds an additional place in Pettit’s theory: Not only *protecting* the state, but also *projecting* it. Inside the state, however, it is always problematic. Military power as an institution, militaristic ideas as a thought system and military generals as individuals are possible internal enemies of republicanism. The idea of internal military protection is severely criticized by Pettit, even if it would be used to protect the constitution. In his work devoted to the application of civic republicanism in Spain, some articles of the Spanish Constitution which requires the armed forces of Spain “to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order” are considered as a dangerous threat to the democracy which should be amended, even though it is never likely to be implemented in real life (Martí and Pettit, 2010: 180, note 5 to Ch2).

6.4. Traditional Republicans vs. Pettit: Why is Military Absent in Pettit's Theory?

There may be different criticisms of Pettit's republicanism, but regarding my point of interest, an important issue would be the lack of conditioning or supporting factors that are required for establishing and maintaining a proper republican order in general, or freedom as non-domination in Pettit's case. Republicanism is a complete package, maybe more than any other theories of politics. It has to include specific type of people, institutions and conditioning factors in it. It has to envisage, at least to some degree, the means and methods to achieve and maintain these requisites. The people have to embrace some certain characteristics. Therefore, they have to be shaped in order to gain some civic virtues and maintain them. Certain type of equality has to be managed, the law has to prevent any exercise of arbitrary power, institutions have to be balanced, the government has to promote common good not individual interests and some conditioning factors have to be properly addressed for republican political action to take place. Focusing on some certain key issues and disregarding the others means excluding the essentials of republicanism, not only military. There are a lot of issues republican theorists have to deal with, like how to elicit and continue civic virtue, how to promote participation, how to provide equality and so on. Pettit's arguments do not address most of these issues. Even in his conception of freedom, the rest of the equation stays unclear.

The limits of freedom are defined by the law, which is a critical element for all republicans including Pettit. With a magic hand, the law converts arbitrary intervention to an act of common good, a restraining act to a part of social responsibility, a limitation

of rights to an important constituent of freedom and so on. This magical hand has the power to convert any attempt to limit citizens' freedoms to the acts that are actually setting them free. But how this un-arbitrary, just law will be managed in the society? How will the citizens be adorned with characteristics to produce such law? How will other conditioning factors or undominated choices will be limited? How will the state provide active participation environment and enough motivation for the citizens? These questions are not answered.

Pettit's concept of republicanism addresses some issues that are deemed critical in republicanism such as civic virtue, education or participation, but only by their side effect to freedom as non-domination. Pettit does not totally disregard other core ideas of republicanism; on the contrary, he emphasizes almost all of them, although with respect to their contribution to safeguarding freedom as non-domination. He also devises practical methods for providing them, but military neither as an institution nor as an idea takes part in them.

This exclusion may be more apparent in Pettit than other republicans. It partially comes from the rejection of some traditional republican ideas, and partially from different perceptions about them. Following section will try to analyze these topics in which military is emphasized by other republicans and will inquire why and in which ways Pettit differs from them.

6.4.1. Promoting and Providing Civic Virtue

Some values associated with the military such as courage, agility, sacrifice, love of country, etc. are traditionally considered to be consistent with or in some cases reflected as civic virtue. Military was thought to both generate these values and export them to the citizens. When civic virtue is understood in this way, or when donating citizens with these values become primary concern, a possible role of military can be emphasized and military may find a better place in the overall theory of republicanism. They respect the virtues it has, and its capacity in providing those to the citizens.

Civic virtue (or civility in his terminology) is also important for Pettit. However, there are important differences in two areas. First, he does not make direct references to the militaristic virtues and does not consider them critical for the republic. Actually he rarely makes any direct reference to some specific virtues, but his overall concept highlights constitutional provisions and governmental/non-governmental entities rather than individualistic actions. Even his prior measure of contestation has been prescribed to be conducted by elected bodies and/or independent organizations. Therefore, agility, courage, discipline, etc. are understood differently. Second, even when same type of ethics applies, Pettit does not emphasize military's possible role in helping provide them. He defines other instruments to promote civility such as ensuring the legitimacy of law, fostering intangible hand (which is basically social approval and disapproval)¹²,

¹² Again, this issue is not elaborated here because it is not directly related with my subject, but it certainly contradicts with Pettit's previous arguments. Social approval or disapproval is a type of domination which is not guaranteed to be non-arbitrary, and for sure it is not regulated by law. This "intangible hand" is nothing but a dominating hand which has at least the capacity to influence individual's choices.

applying complier-based strategy (which simply means using rewards and incentives) and achieving internalization and identification (Pettit, 2002: 252).

6.4.2. Contributing to Participation and Autonomy

An important argument for advocating “army of citizen” stems from the core idea of some republicans that each and every common task has to be perpetuated by participation of every citizen to the extent possible. And since defending the republic has the highest priority, it cannot be delegated to a specific group of mercenaries.

Pettit does not understand self-rule or self-governance as some other republicans do. He is against the conscription and his objection can be understood within the same scope. Common action is not important as a primary concern for Pettit. Participation and autonomy are not important for their indigenous value. Rather, they are important because of their secondary effect on improving freedom as non-domination. They are essential for deciding whether any interference is arbitrary, or justifiable based on the laws which are produced with every citizen’s participation. Other than this consequential effect, common action is not deified as a core concept of republicanism. In this respect, protecting the state from external threats does not have to be common, unless it has a function of preventing arbitrary use of military power.

6.4.3. Citizen Army to Control the Tyrant

One of the main struggles of republicans was to make the people sovereign, and eliminate, or, as second best, to control the tyrant. Some republicans believe that army of citizens would be an important safeguard for keeping the tyrant under control, since the hard power would be in hands of the people themselves.

Making people sovereign is equally important for Pettit. However, he differs from traditional republicans in two distinct ways. First, he defines other means and methods for assuring people's sovereignty. As thoroughly discussed in previous sections, his main mechanism includes some constitutional provisions and above all, the law. This idea may stem either from the belief that the law and other provisions would be more effective than personally taking place in military organization, or from a mistrust that citizen army achieve this task. Control mechanism might not work just because some citizens take part in military. Second, he is more concerned about the military turning into a sovereign itself. As a power holder, military is more of danger than a contribution to the republic. Therefore, he thinks just the opposite: military may easily turn into a power holder and citizens should be guarded against it.

Within Pettit's understanding of republicanism, which is reduced to a specific interpretation of freedom, military emerges as a possible threat because of its capacity to exercise arbitrary power within the state. This is an area to which military can contribute both the most and the least: It can make the most significant contribution by providing security against external threats and can make any republic possible. But other than that,

it has potential to endanger, not promote freedom. Since the threat of a coup has been severely diminished in modern republics, army of citizens is unnecessary:

There may not be the spectre of the army coup that haunted traditional republican thinking and led republicans to favor the citizen militia over the standing army; in many countries the division of the military into different armed services, and the development of a democratic ethos, has reduced that prospect considerably (Pettit, 2002: 151).

6.4.4. Emotional Aspect: Enthusiasm for a Strong State and a Strong Army

It would be fair to claim that republicans emotionally favor stronger states, which are characterized by strong military power. Strong states are a natural consequence of better rule (i.e., people's rule), and indicator of people's interconnectedness and strength as a whole, and an important measure for protecting the republic.

The idea of strong state partially applies to Pettit's case. He does not have the same aspirations for a strong state; however, he shares similar concerns. Moreover, he defines an additional role of promoting republican values to the other states, which can only be supported by strong armies. However, this is not a sufficient motivation to highlight military in the republic, especially compared to its negative aspects in other domains.

6.4.5. Infrastructural Requirements: Building a Republic from Ground Zero

This is not a traditional characteristic of republicans; however, for some supporters of republicanism, military represents an opportunity to establish a proper republic where

not enough republican values exist. Building a republic from another type of governance is usually absent in republicanism. Most interpretations of republican theory including the one belongs to Pettit's, create a vicious cycle (chicken and egg loop), in which certain values and structure make republic possible, which in turn promotes same values and the structure. Therefore, there is no defined point to start the loop. For some, military was thought as a possible solution to enter the loop from the middle.

Although Pettit defines some ways for maintaining infrastructure of the republic, he already accepts the insufficiency of these measures in creating them from scratch. In order for his theory can be applicable, several pre-conditions have to be satisfied:

1. Infrastructure of non-domination is in place and prospering.
2. Social security is provided, leading to the empowerment of the vulnerable.
3. Protection against crime and punishment is provided.
4. Powerful groups are constrained (Pettit and Martí, 2010: 74-5).

The infrastructure of non-domination, which he mentions as the first requirement, includes several challenging and demanding pre-conditions itself:

1. Flourishing economy,
2. Reliable rule of law,
3. Inclusive knowledge system (which is practically the education system),
4. Sound health system,
5. Sustainable environment (Pettit and Martí, 2010: 75).

In addition, here Pettit seems to forget another critical element which he strongly emphasizes elsewhere: ethic grounds. Non-domination requires certain level of civility

to be pre-existing in order to be established. He accepts that his theory is almost entirely addresses a group with certain level of civic virtue (Pettit, 2002: 253). He does not have too much to offer for establishing civic virtue in a society which lacks them. “We know little or nothing about how to generate widespread civility where it has more or less ceased to exist” (Pettit, 2002: 253). This idea is shared by some other republicans, who claimed that a decent legal and political order is only possible in a society where there is a lot of active, successful trusting and a relatively intense level of civil life (Putnam, 1993; Gellner, 1994). Therefore, Pettit only prescribes ways to maintain already existing level of civility, which emphasizes “reward” type of measures.

I will argue that if such presupposition exists in a theory, it would create an important logical inconsistency: If there is no practical application of this theory, then it means that its supporters already accept its unlikelihood of coming to life, unless they argue that the characteristics it requires can be created by other means (which they do not know and do not define). They accept that it cannot be established from zero. If, in spite of this acceptance, there is a practical application of this theory, in other words if it is somehow realized, then it means that the people who are trying to conceptualize it were unable to capture its whole dynamics and incapable of understanding it in its entirety.

Republicanism is likely to fall into the second category; it is somehow emerged without sufficient infrastructure is in place and without necessary ethics were formed. Eventually some civility occurred in the world that led to contemporary republic, and also in return, republicanism itself helped create necessary infrastructure. Failure to

understand how they emerged and how they self-sustained themselves might lead to failure in designing ways to maintain them. More importantly, it fails to understand and define autopoietic¹³ nature of the systems, which donates it with self-enforcing and self-generating characteristics. Besides, establishing some virtue in people and creating some infrastructure may eventually be needed. Pettit does not actually much to offer on this ground, other than accepting his theory's incapability to cover this part. Civility has to be pre-existent and once it already exists, it is "self-enforcing" (Pettit, 2002: 254). And this is not different for other infrastructural elements.

If we accept this presupposition, how should we interpret it? Is republicanism not a solution for thriving country? How was it achieved at the first place? How did the civility come to life? Were there some other processes which contemporary theorists are unable to capture? These questions are not answered which constitutes a significant point of criticism and suggests that republicanism as it is presented by Pettit is exclusively available and suitable for Western democracies.

Within the interest of this study, there is a more critical question: Does this confession justify some additional measures to establish a republic in countries which do not have pre-existing virtues? And if so, can military be instrumental in it? In a way, Pettit calls for some extra measures, although he does not go this far. Since his recipe is not applicable for a new born republic, other recipes are still need to be explored. It is

¹³. Autopoiesis literally means "auto (self)-production" or "auto-creation" and expresses a fundamental dialectic between structure and function. It refers to the self-generating nature of a system and suggests that a consequence of a system, or an effect that was introduced to the system or processed by the system, would eventually affect the system. A system generates a concept, and that concept re-defines the system. According to many, there is no cultural or social process to which this model does not apply, if they are working and if they are not natural. For more information see Maturana, Humberto and Francisco J. Varela. 1980. *Autopoiesis and Cognition; the Organization of the Living*. Boston: Reidel.

another question whether military can be instrumentalized to establish republican values and to establish a republic form ground zero.

In summary, republicans may put more emphasis on military because of several reasons, including below:

1. They respect the virtues it has, and its capacity in providing those to the citizens.
2. They believe in participation and autonomy; everything has to be common work, and self-defense is one of the main functions of any state. Therefore, it has to be done by all.
3. They believe that army of citizens would be the main safeguard for controlling the sovereign, since the main power would be shared by the people.
4. Emotionally; they like strong states, of which strong army is an important indicator.
5. For some, and combined with the first statement, military represents an opportunity to establish a proper republic where not enough republican values exist.

Pettit does not have too much place for military, because of his different position in these issues:

1. Although civic virtue is also important for Pettit, he does not prioritize all virtues associated with military. More importantly, he does not support military's role in promoting them.

2. Participation and autonomy is interpreted differently by Pettit. It is not important for its indigenous value; it has secondary benefits for improving freedom as non-domination. He does not think that it is critical for a common task to be done common. Hence participation in self-defense is not of great concern.

3. He does not share the idea that army of citizens would be a safeguard for controlling the sovereign; actually he thinks just the opposite: military may easily turn into a power holder and citizens should be guarded against it.

4. The idea of strong state partially applies. He does not have the same aspirations for a strong state which is mainly defined by strong army; however, he defines an additional role of promoting republican values to the other states, which requires strong states and strong armies. However, this is not a sufficient motivation to highlight military in the republic, especially compared to its negative aspects in other domains.

5. And finally, he does not propose a way to establish a system from scratch, for people who do not possess republican values.

6.5. Conclusion

Pettit's republicanism does not suggest any additional instrumental use of military to promote republican state, because of the reason outlined above. His core idea of freedom as non-domination requires elimination of both actual and possible

interference. Therefore, any capacity to interfere with others' freedom causes domination and needs to be removed. Military is naturally source of significant power, which at least indicates capacity to dominate other agents. Its power should not be emphasized, but controlled and diminished to the point that no single member of it can think of using it for domination.

What military can contribute in a republic is not consistent with Pettit's core concept n republicanism. As I will discuss in a separate chapter, military can mainly improve republican ideas of civic virtue and donating citizens with it, participation, common action and so on. Pettit, on the other hand, advocates freedom based interpretation of republicanism. Although he does not disregard the rest, he does not put effort to explain how to achieve participation, how to elicit civic virtue and what it includes, how to educate the citizens about practicing self-rule and prioritizing common good and so on. For example, when participation or self-governance is not of significant importance or when they understood in a different manner, the discussions on compulsory vs. volunteer military service is out of question.

In this sense, military is limited to certain roles according to Pettit, which can be stated as preventing external threat and proliferating "just order" to the other nations. Other than that, it is a possible threat because of its capability and historical use of arbitrary power. This role is limited, because Pettit's vision of republicanism is limited itself, mainly to the concept of freedom as non-domination, and it excludes certain issues that are still valid and strongly associated with republican theory today. He does not challenge the requirement for these issues; on the contrary, he also emphasizes them.

But his focus does not account for them. So maybe it is not sufficient to say that military is mainly excluded in Pettit's theory; but rather, it is excluded along with some important functions that it is believed to be important in some other republicans.

CHAPTER VII

MILITARY FOR OTHER MODERN REPUBLICANS

7.1. Supportive Republicans – Barber and Dagger

Pettit's views on the role of military in modern republican theory should not be generalized. Many modern republicans have either advocated traditional role of military and citizen army or proposed a civic alternative to it. Benjamin Barber, for example, is another prominent figure in normative civic republican theory, who conceives participation and civic virtue as core issues for political realization of freedom. And unlike Pettit, Barber underlines contributive role of military service in republican system.

The difference of focus between Pettit and Barber is clearly reflected on their views on military. Pettit focuses on freedom as non-domination, which can only be negatively affected by the influence of military. He acknowledges the essential position of civic virtue, but does not have a prescription for promoting it. Rather, it is envisaged as a pre-requisite. Participation is also important, but not because of its contribution to

developing civic virtue or not because of the value it has per se, but because of its contribution to the implementation of non-domination. Barber, on the other hand, takes participation as an ideal, which has a part in constructing the citizen and therefore which has to be achieved through some special methods in the public. Since participation in civic practices and military service can offer some useful tools in this area, he is more supportive of them. Therefore, we can say that the concepts a theorist focuses on determines his view on the military and it would be a false judgment to claim that military does not take place in modern republican theory at all.

Barber believed in the value of common military service to build a community spirit maybe more strongly than classical republicans. He argued that the army should be conscript, because “Neither a professional nor a "volunteer" army is compatible with democratic citizenship: the former separates national defense from democratic responsibility, and the latter makes service a function of economic need.” (Barber, 1984: 209) If the army is consisted of professionals or volunteers, it functions in just the opposite way and becomes corrosive to citizenship in other realms.

Common action exerts a powerful integrating influence, which finds its strongest form in common military service. It can also serve other special purposes such as “providing government employment opportunities to the disadvantaged portion of the society and donating them with individual and civic virtues” (Barber, 1984).

Military is not the only type of common action. On the contrary, maybe due to the realities of modern political environment, he proposes an alternative which he calls “universal citizen service” to achieve the same objectives in less contradiction with

modern concerns. He argues that this kind of civic practice can sanitize socially and politically incompatible traits of the military service, such as chauvinism, exclusion or gender separatism, while it can still offer the same undisputed virtues such as “fellowship and camaraderie, common activity, teamwork, service for and with others, and a sense of community” (Barber, 1984: 302). It can also avoid some other disputed characteristics of the military environment or replace them with more appropriate ones; “in place of military hierarchy, it could offer equality; in place of obedience, cooperation; and in place of us/them conflict of the kind generated by parochial participation, a sense of mutuality and national interdependence” (Barber, 1984: 302). In this regard, Barber defines several branches of civic practice in addition to the military, and prescribes a very specific program for the young citizens:

A program of universal citizen service would enlist every American citizen-male and female alike-in a service corps for one to two years of either military or nonmilitary training and service...Before entering the corps of their choice (including the military), individuals would undergo a rigorous three-month training period in physical fitness, in applied skills of general utility such as mechanics, agriculture, tools, and ecology, and in civic education, including parliamentary and electoral skills, community structure and organization, some elementary social science, and perhaps American history... (1984: 209-303).

Barber’s views are very much in line with those of ancient philosophers, such as Plato, who stressed the necessity of education for making the citizens a suitable member of society, and who even supported extreme measures such as taking children from their mothers. That shows a significant hole in republican theory and a centuries-old quest to fill it; requirement for a certain type of citizen, which cannot exist by itself. Citizens do not inherit these characteristics by birth. In the extreme, one can claim that republicans

are not satisfied with the humans as they are. The human factor and need for education is not underestimated in any political theory; however, direct relation with the envisioned role of the citizen and prescriptions for achieving this cannot be disregarded. Higher the expectations from the individuals, higher the enthusiasm philosophers showed for creating appropriate measures to achieve this.

Some other political scientists such also made similar calls to voluntary military service (Viroli, 1995) or its civic alternatives (Moskos, 1988). Among them, Richard Dagger's ideas are worth noting. Dagger, who actually describes himself as republican liberal, puts strong emphasis on the military's role in republican/liberal¹⁴ order (Dagger, 1997). Although he highlights many aspects of military, his main point of interest is the military service. This is simply because it is the main environment for interaction of the regular citizens with the militaristic ideas. It is the most effective, if not the only, mechanism for passing over all the "good" that military can provide to the other citizens. His firm commitment on the essentiality of the military duty assumes that military does already possess and have the ability to transfer certain critical characteristics that are vital for the state. It is so vital that anyone who does not take part in it has to be denied the rights of citizenship (Dagger, 2002).

¹⁴ Dagger defines himself as republican – liberal and believes that two are compatible (Dagger, 1997). This is an ongoing and un-dissolved discussion however I believe that some of the liberal arguments can be considered within the republican range, mainly because of three reasons. First, it is very difficult to differentiate two traditions on certain issues. In addition to Dagger, Charles Taylor also argue that they are not different or incompatible (Taylor, 1989). Although there are counter arguments, it is a fact that on certain issues they are extremely similar. Especially increasing emphasis of freedom in modern republican thinking and emphasis on common good in some liberals (such as John Rawls (Rawls, 1971) and Joseph Raz (Raz, 1986) brought them together and in some cases inseparable. Second, and maybe more importantly, I believe the focus should be on certain functions or concepts that constitute the ideological background of republicanism. While exploring the role of military in republican theory, one has to explore its traditional roles and missions and compare those with today's roles and missions. Liberal and republican thinkers alike can or cannot emphasize the same roles and missions on the similar concepts. Therefore, very seldom I plan to quote some liberals if they are addressing the same issue as republicans.

In order to support his arguments, Dagger refers to many other theorists from different traditions. He prefers to use the term “civic service” to include other types of voluntary work which can be done on voluntary or compulsory basis. However, it can be inferred from his work that he prefers “civic” in order to include more supporters of the idea, while his main preference is the military service. By not differentiating among types and conditions of public works, he avoids the debate on whether it should be in the military or in any other public field, or whether it should be compulsory or voluntary.

By the help of this generalization, Dagger convincingly argues that the very same concept of military service is still supported by thinkers from different currents of thought although sometimes its nature and scope is expanded to include other types of community work performed by citizens. According to him, well-designed scheme of this kind of civic service is an important element in the political theory of republican-liberalism (Dagger, 2002). This is true even when these two traditions are taken separately; civic service is compatible not only with the republican emphasis on civic virtue but also with the liberal emphasis on individual freedom. He does not differentiate between voluntary and compulsory forms of civic service and argue that they are equally compatible.

In general sense, civic service is understood as something you do for the community; not for money and it can either be voluntary or compulsory. A main and most appropriate form of it is military service, but it may include some other tasks such as working as a hospital orderly, a teacher’s assistant, an aide to the elderly, or a member of conversation crew (Dagger, 2002).

The goods or virtues that civic service can adorn the citizens are numerous and are mentioned explicitly or implicitly by Dagger. Some main issues can be summarized as follows (Dagger, 2002):

- Increasing volunteerism (which is important for citizens to associate themselves with the public and the common good),
- Strengthening civic bonds and weakening the forces of corruption and dependence,
- Promoting autonomy (which, according to Dagger, should be the central concern in republicanism, not freedom),
- Cultivating and sustaining civic virtue,
- Presenting a way of discharging one's responsibility to those who make one's citizenship possible,
- Making the members of a community aware in which ways they are interconnected and interdependent, how they have benefited and will continue to benefit from the cooperation of others,
- Donating them with useful skills such as the rules and means of collaborative work and participation,
- Avoiding personal dependence.

I believe the last issue deserves more elaboration. Avoiding personal dependence is critical for republicans. In Aristotle's words, the citizen is someone who rules and is ruled in turn (Aristotle, 350 B.C.). Someone who is dependent on others is likely to be ruled, and definitely not in a position to rule. In order to avoid that, republicans

defended rule of law and supported different measures (such as distribution of private property, (Rousseau, 2002)) to achieve some kind of equality in the society. Dagger claims that civic service helps avoid personal dependence by;

- Reinforcing equality; because people serve as citizens under same conditions for same common enterprise,
- Breaking down the barriers of class and privilege.

In short, civic service teaches citizens what it means to be a citizen and makes them a part of the political community they are living in. “Civic” in its definition stresses the connection to the ideals of citizenship that a program of civic service will aim to promote. It makes them aware that they are interconnected with others, that they have to participate in the self-governing in order to implement their duties as a citizen, that they have to adopt certain civic virtues, that they have to put common good before themselves and so on. Therefore, civic duty in general is essential for republican liberal system to survive. It is so essential for Dagger that he proposes to grant full citizenship rights, such as right to vote, only to the people who participated in civic duty. (Dagger, 2002) In other words, an individual becomes citizen only after he serves his duty.

7.2. Role of Civic Service and More on Military

It can be seen that the functions that military can play in republic is highly rich, although not limitless. It is limited with the rule of law and rule of self-governance. Within this respect, supportive ideas about military’s more intensive role in the public do not

conflict with those of Pettit's. Different thinkers just focus on some other requirements and make prescriptions in which military takes place. The limit of military is where the self-governing activity starts. Military cannot intrude in the self-governing activity of the citizens. In other words, it cannot be a power holder. A protective or superior role that can by-pass citizens' self-rule is out of consideration. As mentioned earlier, modern republicanism is a local concept which mostly (maybe solely) focuses on Western states where certain problems relating the role of military in state have already been solved. Therefore, issues such as military intervention in the governance activity are not of main concern. Ideas are confined to the field of legitimate support (or hindrance) for better politics.

As I briefly mentioned before, an important and maybe the only mechanism for the citizens to be enriched with politically critical qualities that military or other types of civic service can provide is conscription, by which the citizens are exposed to a condensed formative project, at least for a short duration of time. Since military as an institution has gone out of the politics by far in modern theory, it cannot be an active participant even with equal voice. Nonetheless, equal position is not sufficient for an actor to play the role of a teacher. If we want the military system to educate or shape the citizen, it has to be in a higher position.

At their early years while they were striving to establish a perfect system, some republican states acknowledged and appreciated critical functions that military can play for republicanism. To use this advantage, they gave a higher and above politics status to the military as an institution in order for it to perform these tasks effectively (One of

these countries is of course Turkish Republic). This choice resulted in some unwanted consequences, created an above politics institution and a power holder which inevitably established some sort of domination over citizens.

Therefore, a permanent formative status and higher position of the military as an institution in politics is unacceptable. On the other hand, every “teaching” activity requires a “teacher”, who should exercise some kind of domination over others. This statement creates a dilemma: If one acknowledges the usefulness of the military in donating the citizens with critical qualities for the implementation of politics, military institution should have some kind of formative function and dominating power on them. But if the ideal politics requires non-domination and strict equality, this domination is not acceptable.

A solution to this problem is limiting the duration that a citizen will expose to this process. Formative action should take place for a temporary period of time. In other words, citizens should be dominated temporarily, in order not to be dominated in the future. They have to be ruled for a short period of time, in order to learn how to rule in an interdependent society. Conscription serves exactly to this purpose. If you believe in the necessity of military virtues, conscription stands out as the only feasible one. By temporarily allocating individuals, military finds a way to reach them and turn them into citizens. Some philosophers also supported voluntary public work, mainly due to their concerns about freedom. In these cases, voluntary civic service is strongly encouraged and even tied to the rights of full citizenship as can be seen in Dagger’s ideas.

7.3. Additional Ideas

An important figure who believes in the value of public service is Rousseau. He argued that men must share in socially necessary work as well as politics and war, if they are ever to be the citizens of a self-governing community (Rousseau, 2002). Participation is required for politics, military service and labor service. Otherwise society divides into masters and servants, which creates dependency. He believes that the republic is in decay when its citizens “would rather serve with their money than with their persons:”

When it is necessary to march out to war, they pay troops and stay at home: when it is necessary to meet in council, they name deputies and stay at home...In a country that is truly free, the citizens do everything with their own arms and nothing by means of money...I am far from taking the common view: I hold enforced labor to be less opposed to libertarian taxes (Rousseau, 2002: 92)

Compulsory military service (conscription) is advocated by some liberals, even by John Stuart Mill, who is an ardent advocate of individual liberty. In *On Liberty*, Mill states that:

...(there) are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which (the individual) may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defense; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence . . . , things which, whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing (1869: 21).

In both his correspondence and public statements, Mill also endorsed “the Swiss system” of compulsory military service for men (Dagger, 2002).

Providing a strict environment of equality is an important characteristic of military or civic service that cannot easily be achieved by other means. This feature

makes it highly attractive for any thinker who prioritizes equality for proper functioning of political system. Liberal Mickey Kaus claims that money liberalism (overly taxes and other methods of equalizing income) has resulted in a relatively permanent underclass (Kaus, 1992: 81-5). It is critical to increase social equality and bring together the rich and the poor. He proposes that public sphere can be improved by some measures which would assure a minimum level of equality in the public. These measures include a guarantee of a government job (at slightly less than minimum wage), at least minimal health care to all, offering public day care services, making changes to the public school system and finally reinstating the draft (compulsory civic service).

William F. Buckley, an American conservative, similarly advocates voluntary and non-military national service. This is an alternative of military service in which participants would do environmental work, health care, care for the aged, child care, and other kinds of work. The function he focuses on is creating awareness especially among the young generation for the liberties they enjoy and providing a sense of belonging to their country (Buckley, 1990).

With similar motives, Charles C. Moskos favored a voluntary, decentralized program that links civilian and military service. He envisaged a common service for young citizens in day care, correctional facilities, with the aged and infirm, as well as in non-profit associations and public agencies or as citizen-soldier components in the All-Volunteer Military Force (Moskos, 1988).

Similar to Pettit, socialist Michael Walzer also argues that domination is the real enemy of freedom, and it can take many forms. However, unlike Pettit, he envisages an

important mission for the military. He believes that the citizens who are donated with militaristic values can stand against the forces of oppression. Therefore, conscription should be implemented for every kind of hard work, because "...citizen soldiers are less likely than professionals and mercenaries to become the instruments of domestic oppression" (Walzer, 1983: 171).

Sociologist Amitai Etzioni is mainly concerned about egocentrism and "me-ism", which can only be avoided by creating institutions that foster "mutuality" and "civility" (i.e., a sense of the common good) (Etzioni, 1983). An important mechanism for fostering these qualities is civic service.

As can be seen, military stands out as an effective mechanism to promote certain values in modern political system within in legitimate limits. This role is supported by a diversity of thinkers from different fields of thought, with similar reasons that republicans advocate.

7.4. Problem of Common Defense

As can be seen, there are two domains of discussion. First one is between liberals and republicans as well as within themselves and is about whether common defense should be a common duty or not. Most of the republicans acknowledge the value of military duty in promoting republican politics. In the modern world where liberalism and individual rights constitute a very strong discourse, an appropriate medium for exposing general public to these values emerges as a limited time of duty. And also concerns

about keeping the war spirit alive result in proposing some substitutes for the military service, which can be done in several other public areas without getting any financial gain.

Same considerations on liberty and individual rights as well as some other concerns cause another segmentation on the nature of the civic service and some support conscription, in other words obligatory military duty, whereas others advocate or at least consider the possibility of voluntary civic duty.

Among advocates of military or some kind of civic service from any thought system, there are two main reasons. First and very effective one is the benefits that civic service can provide to the citizens. These benefits were already mentioned in the forthcoming chapter. The requirements for some functions in the modern republic can be best met with some kind of civic service for these thinkers.

In addition to the advantages that military or civic service can present to the citizens, there is another concern for republican philosophers: concern for damaging the internal consistency of the comprehensive republican theory. In other words, there is a fear for damaging the basic ideal of a republican state. Establishing a political common good with the participation of the whole public, and then working for it altogether is the ultimate aim. While the highest common good is the security of the public, contracting it to commercial bodies in a consumerist approach, just as contracting a house construction carries the potential danger of extricating the whole idea about the common good and common action. If defense can be contracted, any other action related with the common good can be contracted, and when something is contracted, it is the main

responsibility of the contractor. The funder just defines the need and waits for an appropriate accomplishment about it. If providing security turns to something not different from giving some money and having your garden arranged or having your roof fixed, why not any other need related with the common good? And if they all turn into merchandise that are in trade with money, then this is not an ideal republican public, but on the contrary the most individualist, consumerist, liberal economic community.

This reality is enough to terrorize some republicans. While civic service can provide an alternative to the ones who highlight its usefulness in donating the citizens with republican values, the other who support it because it is the common good, does not accept an alternative civic service. This is even true for some hard core liberals like Rawls, who does not reject conscription when it comes to protecting liberties (Dagger, 2002).

CHAPTER VIII

REVISITING ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY IN A MODERN REPUBLIC

In this chapter, I will explore the position and the availability of certain “additional” functions in which military can play, execute or contribute to in a republic. My focus will not be on military’s main and traditional task of protection, although I will not challenge the value and necessity of it. Security still maintains its position at the top of the needs hierarchy, maybe stronger than ever, because of increased number of threats to an increased number of valued referents in a wide range. Protection itself can still be considered as the most crucial contribution for the survival of a state and for the success of a political system. On the other hand, how to provide best protection and how to maintain fully capable armed forces can be subject of other scientific studies. For the purpose of this study, military’s secondary effects on public domain will be investigated. As secondary effects, I will refer to the functions that military can conduct in relation to the citizens of a state. These functions will mainly include the ones which are

traditionally and contemporarily highlighted by republicans, but also the ones which I believe are applicable today. Therefore, my focus will mainly be on internal functions which are performed within the boundaries of a state. I will argue that other than providing a safe and secure environment, military's contribution to republican values and its implementation outside the boundaries of the republic is extremely limited. This is mainly because external activities (i.e. activities aimed at structuring other states and nations) are potentially considered hostile, especially when an instrument of hard power is involved. It is fair to say that they are bound to fail even when they are initiated with good intentions. However, I will not totally ignore any possible contribution of the military outside the borders and I will try to show that there are still some possibilities in the international arena.

In addition to exploring what military can do inside and outside the state, a special attention is also required to explore what it cannot do today, especially if this argument differentiates from traditional republican view. Contemporary conditions may cause some previously highlighted contributions to become impossible today. In this sense, I will basically question whether military can still be considered as a safeguard against the tyranny of the sovereign. As the sub-title of this section suggests, I will argue that this suggestion is not valid today.

David Miller argues that contemporary republican democracy has to confront two main challenges. The first is the "motivational" challenge of providing contemporary composition of civic virtue, or suitable modern substitutes for it, which are capable of generating trust and solidarity between citizens. The second one is the

“institutional” challenge and seeks how popular self-rule can be operationalized in large and complex political societies (Miller, 2008). Both challenges are widely acknowledged by other scholars. Recognizing Miller’s argument and abiding by his classification, military’s internal contribution to contemporary republic can be explored under categories as contribution to motivational and institutional challenge.

8.1. Contributions to Motivational Challenge – What Makes Military More Effective?

This part will mainly explore what kind of military values and militaristic personality traits are consistent with those of contemporary Republicanism, and whether they can revive republican ideas and way of life within the boundaries of a state. Military may set preconditions and effectively implant certain virtues and social habits which will be beneficial for a republican state.

What makes military a more effective instrument to foster and convey these virtues can be explained in three domains; the motivation which justifies the process and energizes the individual, the environment and culture¹⁵ which sets the preconditions and facilitates the process, and the process itself through which its members go through. The motivational factor for a soldier to adopt the values and procedures of his or her environment already exists in the highest form: fear, or need for security, depending on where you are looking from. Necessity of the military organization and need for

¹⁵ By the term culture, I mean “the customs, beliefs, entire way of life, activities, of a people, group, or society” as noted by Smith and Riley (Smith & Riley, 2009).

challenging circumstances in it are already justified by the citizens. This motivation is enough for instigating the need for learning and pumping enough energy to the individuals. Military environment and culture along with the lifestyle a soldier pursues are the other factors that are intertwined with each other and they give military a unique capability for transferring its values.

Shared environment, teamwork, discipline and obedience, responsibility, trust and interdependency are some characteristics of military environment and culture, which are designed to erode individuality at the expense of the group identity. The moment you enter into a military association you leave an important part of your privacy at the door. This also means abandoning an important part of your freedom and individuality. Private life as it exists in modern world cannot be enjoyed at the same level in the military. This is simply impossible because of military life style which includes increased responsibility and work distribution, austere and common living conditions as well as routine activities that occupies the whole day. Both training and real life tasks require active group action in small or large scales. Group of soldiers should act as single entity and perform its duties as a part of a bigger group. The smallest military unit (usually a platoon) is a part of the bigger unit (a company), which is a part of a bigger one and this goes on and on. Every group has to perform its own share as a part of the bigger group for the whole system function effectively.

Maybe more importantly, soldiers share the same enemy and the same purpose, which might create the strongest bonds among themselves. In front of enemy, one's life is at others' hands, and sometimes the lives of the members of the whole company are at

the hands of one single soldier. If the group achieves, they all achieve and if not, there is possible gain at personal level. Therefore, they share the same fate. In the end, military life is a shared one which cannot be lived in isolation.

In such a shared environment and interdependency, soldiers develop common traits, common understanding and common behaviors. They eventually adopt similar feelings and develop similar responses. They learn how to live together and how to respect others. A soldier needs to show traits that are acceptable by the group, or else he or she would become alone. Being alone is much more intolerable in a military environment than it is in modern life in which you can limit your interaction with the others and virtually establish your whole world in your private sphere.

A fellow soldier from your military service is usually your closest friend, probably not because he or she is more eligible person you met in your life in terms of personality, but because you know the most about each other. In such a close group life, there are no personal barriers. You can reach beyond any shelter one can maintain around him or her, and get to know the real person with all weaknesses and tweaks of the character.

Military missions require every military personnel to be dependent on each other more than any other organization. All the tasks in the military are complementary of higher level missions and they need to be achieved as a team effort. Therefore, each member has to do his or her part to achieve the common goal. Your success is based on the works of others and vice versa. There is no individual gain in military environment. Even the lowest rank soldier needs to do his portion right in order for the more complex

ones to be completed thoroughly. Dependency is unavoidable in military life even in peace conditions, although it is the highest in a combat environment, where your life depends on others. Trust, respect and commitment are essential elements for building necessary environment for achieving effective teamwork.

Military environment melts the self in the whole and dictates priority of the group over the individual. It erodes individuality traits and develops team spirit. Participation in group activities is not only something you cannot avoid, but something completes your existence. Your mortal body only becomes meaningful when you perform your part of the duty within the group. In a way, you only exist when you participate in the group. If you do not contribute to a solution, your individual influence is lost. Since there is very small room for individual space in military life, this space has to be created within the group and as a part of it. The individual eventually adopts group identity and makes his or her contribution to it.

In wider context, serving in the military results in identifying the individual with the military organization and the state. Military provides a separate identity to its member in which he cannot exist as an individual, but as a part of the larger group. In some cases, this identification can go much further to the extent that it exceeds the identification with the state and becomes limited with the military organization or the military commander one serves. The role of identification can be fortified with some other functions such as education. Identification is still accepted as an important function, although it is a modern term and was not mentioned or emphasized by earlier

republicans with the same terminology as it is today. Contemporary theories on republicanism address the same issue in a wider sense and with expanded terminology.

Another characteristic of military culture is discipline and obedience. These two terms are closely associated with military and its ethic. Complying with rules and orders is of utmost priority in military culture. Discipline guarantees this compliance at the highest level. Eventual aim for the soldier is to achieve self-discipline, which shows itself even in the absence of any outer control. Discipline is important for establishing an environment of mutual respect, following rules and respecting everybody's' rights.

Discipline and obedience make it possible for the military to function as a single entity. Strict measures are taken in order to guarantee ordered, implied or expected behaviors to be implemented effectively and without objection. Democracy or common decision making is not an option in any kind of armed forces. Because of the overriding priority of its mission, military is not a process-oriented, but a target-oriented organization. It has to work like a machine to achieve a designated end, and it developed structure and value system which is capable of this.

Discipline and obedience are critical for commander's decisions to come into life as they are intended. Questioning an order is not possible, because it causes the machine to respond unexpectedly. After all, military is not designed for self-rule or self-management, but for effective implementation of single-rule.

This fact seems to constitute a contradiction with what this study suggests. Can an institution which is specifically designed to implement single-rule in the most effective manner, be also instrumental for effective implementation of public self-rule?

In spite of increased sharing and participation, military from many aspects sets an environment which is directly opposite of popular self-rule. Answer to this question may lie in the difference between the production and application of law in a self-governed society. In republicanism or any democratic state system, laws should be produced by the rulers' participation. However, once they are developed, complying with them is not an option for the citizens. From this point of view Pettit's republicanism may be even more disciplinary than military, since it does not even accept any interference to freedom as an actual interference as long as it is required by law. Public sphere requires some common rules and regulations as well as citizens' abidance by them. Discipline is an intrinsic and natural part of ruling. It is required in every government organization such as schools, courts or other government organizations. In the republic, discipline should not be understood as following whatever is imposed by the ruling class, but as following pre-determined procedures to participate in this ruling or to contest it. Similar traits which are useful for obediently complying with an order from a superior would also be useful for complying with common procedures for achieving different aspects of self-governance. In addition, military service is usually limited in time and can set an exemplary case. In this short time, it can still help develop some habits which are also useful in any type of community life.

The ultimate purpose in military is not providing discipline by the help of external measures, but by individual's self-control. What is expected from military personnel in certain conditions can be equally or maybe more important than what is

ordered. This alone requires internalization of a group identity at the highest level, so that individuals should know what is expected from them and act accordingly.

Serving in any unit of an armed forces expects certain behaviors from and puts different levels of responsibility on the soldier; something very similar in republicans expect from the citizens in a republic. Regardless of his or her rank, all military personnel are responsible for specific action, entity or group of other soldiers. Along with this responsibility, there has to be corresponding authority. Authority involves having the power to enforce obedience or compliance. It can also involve a sense of having the right to control others.

Responsibility provides individuals a feeling of usefulness and pride in their tasks. In addition, it gives the feeling of being a part of the team, rather than just a cog in the machine. It is a sign of reward and trust. It urges its beholder to earn this trust and to adopt given task more willingly. Without any kind of responsibility, a task can easily turn into a burden. Responsibility is also a challenge, which motivates the individual to accomplish it.

Responsibility implies a relationship. The person responsible has to ensure that something happens in the expected manner. Therefore, he or she should know exactly what the expected manner is. Responsibility requires acting reasonably to achieve your obligations and duties. It involves communicating, and being aware of your relationships with others. In its simplest form, exercising responsibility and authority connects the individual to the group and to the system. A member of the military finds opportunity to implement a sample of military principles within the area of his or her

responsibility. In a way, the responsible has to create a replica of military system in this area. He or she has to give orders, set control mechanisms, motivate subordinates and give account to superiors. In time, effective implementation of this process requires learning and adopting system norms and values.

With these characteristics, military environment is designed to effectively transport certain values and conduct certain transformation functions, which I will explore in the following sections.

8.1.1. Patriotism

Many republicans understood patriotism as “love of country” and associated civic virtue with it (Taylor, 1989; Viroli, 1995). Prioritizing one’s community and country is essential for republican state, although some forms of this prioritization gained negative reputation. In general sense, patriotism is a more euphemistic term which does not refer to a country at the expense of everything else, but covers priority of the state, its citizens and its values over individual interests. It can be defined as devoting to one’s country as a combination of above all, putting them before self and sacrificing individual interests for the sake of them when needed. However, republican understanding of patriotism sometimes differed even among its own supporters.

Some level of patriotism is considered existential not only for republicanism but also for other state theories. In a dedicated text, Charles Taylor argued that “democracy needs patriotism” (Taylor, 1996). Although basic tenets of this argument are not

contested, the nature and scope of patriotism instigated some conflicting arguments. Contemporary republicans argued that, for people to discharge their duties as citizens, they must identify with one another and share strong bonds of fellowship (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 14). However, with what should they associate themselves at the highest level was the main point of contestation. Some argued that such bond can only be achieved at national level (Miller, 2000). Sandel argues that collective identity is not easy to be achieved, and before all, it is not easy to be defined. Nation state proved itself to be the most effective instrument to both define and construct it by the help useful bonding ties such as common history, language or tradition. The “link between identity and self-rule” is best provided by the nation state, which is the “unit that gave expression to the collective identity of a people defined by a common history, language or tradition” (Sandel, 1996: 344). Even at national level, establishing collective identity among citizens might be problematic if there is not enough cultural affinity or strong historical bonds (Miller, 2000).

Cosmopolitan republicans, however, have denied that such virtues can only manifest themselves as expressions of national fellow-feeling. According to them, republicans should champion the universal promotion of democracy and liberty as non-domination, and as they care about their common liberty, so they will care about the common liberty of others (Viroli, 1995; Nabulski, 1999; White, 2002). In this regard, Iseult Honohan proposed that the closest term to refer to the citizens of a state can be colleagues, because they are the members of the same institution, they have equal rights and obligations and they share common concerns (Honohan, 2001). This understanding

also envisages an alternative to nation and describes it as some form of enterprise, which is at least partially owned by its members, and to which they all contribute to maintain. (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 15). In this sense, citizenship is not limited by the national boundaries or ethnicity. In addition, since all members own the enterprise and share the same future, allegedly there is still sufficient motivational foundation for civic virtue (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 15).

Pettit also introduced a cosmopolitan view republican, in which citizens feel responsibility for republican values both inside and outside the borders of their state. He is cautious of patriotism to be degenerating into a “thoughtless nationalism” of ‘my country for good or ill.’ Rather, patriotism should be about “my country for the values it realizes” (Pettit, 2002: 260). Similarly, Habermas argued that there is not an existential connection between Republicanism and nationalism. When it exists, it is only contingent and can be replaced by what he suggests as “constitutional patriotism” (Verfassungspatriotismus) (Habermas, 1996a: 286), in which citizens would feel “politically responsible for each other” without having been affiliated by national and even cultural bonds. In this respect, citizens are expected to develop a political identity rather than a collective one (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 14). Within this scope, one’s country does not gain self-standing position and unquestioned love; it is loved because of the values it stands for. Therefore, nation’s goods cannot be separated from republican goods and patriotism does not only require to work for the benefit of one’s country at the expense of republican values. In Maurizio Viroli’s words, “democratic

politics do not need ethno-cultural unity; they need citizens committed to the way of life of the republic” (Viroli, 1995: 176).

Although similar ideas are stated, we can argue that nationalism is not a term which is preferred by modern political scientists. There might be three main reasons for that. First, nationalism has become increasingly infamous after the World War II. It found more bases in, or at least was associated with, radical, reactionist, discriminating contemporary politics rather than being a focal point of modern social scientists. Second, it was argued to be not consistent with the new global world and the conditions of modern states. Because of this reason, in some cases it needed to be redefined to express the nation, the citizen and the connection between the two. And finally, within my point of interest, republicans were more interested in establishing emotional link and loyalty to the republican ideals that will contribute to realization of ideal political community, simply because direct loyalty to the nation has potential to support its interest at the expense of other nations, its own citizens, even the values it should stand for. In addition to those, some has directly attacked the idea of nationalism and accused it as an instrument for establishing home-rule by subsuming primordial tribal sentiments under some newly constructed national ideals and identities (Geertz, 1963).

Consequently, nationalism is not widely supported among republicanism or other modern political theories, while its influence and most of the time usefulness cannot be rejected. A common solution was presenting a mixture of ideas, such as nationalism tempered by liberalism, which was preferred by many from a moral point of view (Tamir, 1993). Republican alternative on that theme emphasizes patriotism which

will manifest itself as republican pride in good political institutions rather than ethnic or other tribal identities (Viroli, 1995). Thus, it suggests a different understanding of patriotic virtue, which is still crucial and indispensable; it does not require citizens to identify themselves with the country as it is, but rather with the shared institutions and practices that have arisen out of social and political interdependency and underpin the feeling they have of sharing a common fate (Mason, 2000). Therefore, democracy and self-rule are prioritized over ethnic differences, which is more likely to create a coherent society and less likely to create ethnic tensions (Dahl, 1979).

Likelihood of such a conversion of tribal sentiments to political ones is questionable. Several writers claimed that creating an equivalent bondage to republican values and political institutions rather than to the nation itself is not possible (Goodin, 2003: 58). Almond & Verba supported this argument by their study, which showed only three per cent of Italians and seven per cent of Germans manifested pride in their political institutions (Verba, 1963: 64). Goodin argues that “If good institutions were all that mattered to our patriotic pride, we would have no reason to ... (replace) Westminster-style institutions imposed by a Colonial Office with Westminster-style institutions all our own” (Goodin, 2003). In a similar fashion Geertz gives the example of colonial people who wished for their own institutions, and did not pay too much attention to the forms of institutions (Geertz, 1973; Geertz, 1977)

Goodin and others seem to miss a critical point. Self-rule always has the highest priority in republicanism; therefore, providing that the institutions belong to people is completely consistent with republican ideas. There is a fine line between belonging to

the people (as a result of self-rule) and belonging to a specific ethnic identity. Therefore, colonial examples may falsely represent these ideas. However, the power of nationalism still cannot be disregarded, and it is highly questionable whether it can be completely turned into a love of institutions and values that a nation stands for, that the nation in its exclusivity. In either form, even when it reveals itself as pure nationalism regardless of the values this nation has, love for country is not incompatible with republicanism. When this love gains a more intellectual background and combines the notion of country also with what it stands for, it may gain self-constructive status and be more beneficial for the long term maintenance of these values.

All these discussions show that patriotism is a widely accepted common virtue in republicanism despite some discussions on its nature. While the republic has priority over individuals, the answer to the question “what forms the republic” creates different interpretations. When it comes to military, question would be “what form of patriotism would and can military promote, and how effectively can it do that?” It is widely accepted that membership in a military unit has the highest potential to promote patriotic values. Since military has several other values such as loyalty to the group, discipline, absolute obedience to the superior, etc., a soldier is more likely to have nationalist feelings and love for the country per se, regardless of too much contemplating on the values it stands for. However, all of these issues also depend on the education and training that is given within (and outside) the military. Therefore, armed services can still be an effective school of republican patriotism as it is defined and can promote patriotic feelings of any sort.

8.1.2. Providing and Promoting Civic Virtues

In addition to good laws and institutions, a republic is also underpinned by special type of citizens who have supporting norms of civic virtue or civility (Dagger, 1997; Pettit, 1997a). Successful implementation of republican system requires certain type of individuals who are equipped with certain virtues. This is a natural outcome, because republican citizenship is demanding: it requires that people willingly share in practices of social cooperation (such as wealth distribution), be able to make compromises for the sake of the common good, and also that they be ready to defend the institutions of their common liberty (Laborde and Maynor, 2008: 14).

An important function of military is to provide a role model for the citizens. Most of the characteristics of an ideal citizen – agility, active participation, self-sacrifice for the sake of the group, courage – are either directly drawn or somehow related to the military organization therefore in relation to its citizens, military was a primary source of virtues that can be taken or shown as an example. When we consider that war was an essential part of daily life in the past, participating in the defense of the country was another requirement for the ideal citizen because it was the highest common good of all. Every citizen's participation was an important factor for associating themselves with the group instead of focusing on their individual interests.

As discussed, republican ethic or civic virtue is understood differently by different scholars and in different times. However, it can be seen that differences are very minimal especially regarding a political theory rooted in ancient times. Most of the times difference stems from varying degrees of emphasis rather than complete rejection.

Change of emphasis is either a result of different conceptions of what politics or republicanism is about, or as a response to modern world challenges which made it more difficult for the republicanism to be implemented.

Chapter 2 revealed that traditionally most of the republican virtues were either defined in military terms, or developed by the help of it. Military provided values and virtues for ideal citizen since the ancient republics, although encountered some minor changes throughout the time. Soldier citizen overwhelmed the republican discourse for a significant period of time. Therefore, the virtues of both were so intertwined was that it was impossible to differentiate which traits refer to that of soldiers and which ones to other citizens. As a minimum, it can be said that an ideal republican “soldier” citizen is always described to prioritize the common good above his or her personal interests. As a wish list or sometimes as a critical ingredient, they are defined to be vigilant, active, strong, courageous, energetic, sacrificing themselves for the sake of the whole, fighting for the common good, and so on. Some virtues such as solidarity, friendship and loyalty which found their best forms in military action and organization are also highly appreciated for republican citizen.

In addition to the direct links between soldiers and republican citizens, similar connection can be (and was) established between organizational and/or behavioral aspects of the state and the military, since both principles are consistent with each other. They underline serving country before self and obeying the authority. Vigilant and agile citizens are necessary for actively participating in the governance and protecting the rights of the community and themselves. For example, courage can be defined as the

most dominant and respected characteristic of military members and it is also reflected as a prominent characteristic of a citizen. However, it does not (only) mean fiercely waging war or risk one's life. On the contrary, it is much more needed for the community when the individual is alive. In public sphere, courage is required to take part actively in political-social life, fight with corruption and protect the common values of the whole.

Such strong connection and reference to militaristic values also raised gender based criticism. Military is always, and in the past was definitely more strongly, associated with the male citizens. Republicanism is severely criticized for being not only militarist, but also (consequently) too masculinist (Snyder, 1999). Traits of a virtuous citizen could only be found on male citizens. And on the opposite side, non-virtuous traits are manifested either in female form, or with some relation to them (Pateman, 1970). Therefore, feminists have argued that the demands imposed by civic virtue discriminate against women: they were defined in militarist and masculinist terms which depended on their exclusion. Subsequently they were given a gender-differentiated citizenship that prescribed for them a distinct civic virtue devoted to rearing male citizens and soldiers (Pateman, 1988; Vogel, 1991). Although these points have to be acknowledged, looking at all of the virtues with the same gaze might be inappropriate.

Republican ethic in general accepts individual as a member of the group and emphasizes commonality. Out-directedness is not only limited to republicanism, but is in the nature of virtue. Almost always, virtues are either directly or indirectly described in social and communitarian terms. Even the ones that can be individualistic are defined

in relation to other people or institutions such as state or religion. Its relation to the self or to the others, in other words its direction determines its value. The very same trait can be applauded or scorned, accepted as virtue or fault. For example, agility to protect others or pursuing some common goal in face of significant threats can be accepted as courage and determination, while the same agility to protect individual interests can be accepted as selfishness, or at least is not praised at the same level. Courage can exhibit itself in any difficulty one encounters. However, traditional courage or braveness is exemplified through stories about the defense of the state, religion or other peoples.

Therefore, republican ethic did not significantly alter, but adopted and expanded already existing virtues. Priority of the community was not emphasized, but also became an existential issue. Individual was not defined as single entity, but as a member of the society. Although varied among different types of republicanism, individual did not considered to have any isolated status. Not the individual, but a citizen is the brick of a republic. And the citizen has some rights and duties. Rights are gained as a result of duties; in other words, they have to be earned. They have to be earned by performing designated duties to the public, and they have to be earned by showing the necessary agility to protect them. Citizens do not wait for others to give them some rights, and they do not passively delegate the ruling of the state. They have to be involved, and this involvement cannot be about their personal gains. They have to be involved with everybody's interest in their mind. In this sense civic virtue is not something desired but an obligation for the system to work.

In general, military virtues represent strengthened form of republican ethic. Even very specific virtues such as discipline and order, respect for the authority and strict obedience to the orders and commanders represent either same or similar favored characteristic traits. Republicanism also respects status lines and expects every citizen to perform what this status requires. Republicans of all stripes are committed to a public order in which every citizen has a definite standing or place (Hanson, 1998: 7422). Each place in the community is associated with specific responsibilities as well as certain rights or legal protections for citizens and their property. As long as all citizens assume their proper place and perform their appointed role in civic life, the public good is served (Hanson, 1998: 7422).

Virtues strongly emphasized in military. Soldiers are encouraged to put the group in front of themselves even at the expense of their lives. Group priority takes the ultimate form of sacrificing the self for the sake of others. Soldiers always hear about fabled military heroes who gave their lives for the sake of their country. Courage is overprized and applauded, and it is never about the individual; it is always defined in pluralistic ways and in relation to others.

8.1.3. Constructing/Educating the Citizen

Constructing citizenship can be interpreted as making some transformational changes in his or her character and value system. This (sometimes controversial) task is a necessity in republican understanding. Educating or shaping the ideal citizen is one of the most

critical, and maybe also the most fragile part of republicanism. If a system requires certain type of citizen as an essential ingredient in its application, it also has to provide means and methods for shaping those citizens in the required way. An aspiration to include every individual in their self- government cannot be achieved in isolation from them. That does not have to be the same for every type of political thought on the state; if a tradition emphasizes the institutions, laws, the ruler, etc., it may only require changes in them. For example, maybe you can achieve liberalism only by changing political ideology and changing the laws. Ordinary people can stay only at acceptance level. But if your solution includes people's active participation as a general rule, you have to shape them so that they always keep common good in mind and play the game by the rules.

Military was considered critical in transforming the citizens in republican way. In military, men become used to live as a part of the whole, adopt the common good as superior to their individual interests, and learn ways to contribute to it. If you involve people in your solution with a specific type of mindset, you have to change them, or shape them. So education is an important task for republicanism to take care of, and military is traditionally an effective institution in this. As mentioned, a more specific look at the military transformation process will be executed in the 8th chapter.

8.1.4. Participation and Active Citizenship

Although popular forms of mass participation have shifted historically, formal politics and civic associations have usually been viewed as forms of “good citizenship,” by which ordinary citizens could be part of public life and exert their influence on it (Schudson, 1998). Creating institutions and methods to encourage participation among people to increase their ties with the public, making them adopt common good and making them part of the whole is critical. Almost all republicans in the past or today heavily emphasize this issue. Even small public tasks are encouraged to increase participation. Other political theories may also include participation of the people at varying degrees, but allowing participation is much more different than basing your decision on it. In the first one, you may just act like you appreciate people’s involvement, maybe just to relieve the pressure and prevent social distrust, sometimes even base your decisions on their feedback, but you do not put too much value on the outcome being publicly processed and produced. You might even appreciate more if they do not intervene a lot and choose not to participate in state business. But if you need to base your decision on everybody’s participation, you have to make sure they understand the importance of it, prioritize common good before their individual interests, and take necessary actions. Therefore, participation should be a habit that has to be established in republican citizens’ mind.

Military’s role in participation was essential in the past especially because defending the city was the main and maybe the most important task and activity of the state. Waging wars with other states was a part of daily life. More importantly, the

nature of participation is much more condensed and much more demanding in military action. People were not only participating as they do in a conversation by throwing some ideas, but also by putting their lives at risk, and by sacrificing themselves for the sake of the whole when needed. In other words, they were experiencing the ultimate form of commonality in which the citizen as an individual dissolves in the blend of the group and individuality disappears both mentally, as you forget every petty interest about yourself, and physically as you sacrifice your mortal body for the sake of everlasting community. When you put your life at stake, you inevitably identify yourself with the values of the state you are defending. One cannot fight with individual interest; therefore, contract theory is useless in the face of war. You cannot make logical calculations about the reason for your sacrificing your life based on individual gains.

Participation is crucial in republicanism, because the common goods of society have to be politically determined by every citizen. But for some republicans, it is important in itself, not only for practical purposes. According to Sandel, participation is intrinsically important because:

...unless citizens have reason to believe that sharing in self-government is intrinsically important, their willingness to sacrifice individual interests for the common good may be eroded by instrumental calculations about the costs and benefits of political participation (1998: 325).

Some other strong republicans like Barber and Pitkin see active participation in political activity as a central part of freedom “I am not yet fully taking charge of my life and of what I am doing until I join with my fellow citizens in political action” (Pitkin, 1981: 349). Participation also promotes identification of individual with the state; by being

part of the decision making process, citizens feel connected and adopt the decisions even when they are not done totally in accordance with their thoughts.

Increased populations as well as increased emphasis on individuality poses a big challenge on how to achieve participation. Modern republicans (or liberals who also emphasize priority of some common values) emphasize participation in different types of public works in order to solve this problem. Tocqueville talks about participation in jury duties, local governments and military duties in America as a supporting element for establishing ties between the individual and the community. Actually military service has been considered as the main function that many modern scholars refer in order to increase participation in modern state and there is an extensive discussion on this issue.

Military can serve as a training ground to prepare adult citizens for participation in republican state. To start with, military is a civic organization. Many scholars argue and many studies verify that participation in civic organizations helps to facilitate political participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). By simply bringing citizens together, it opens the ways of interaction. Even getting together becomes more and more important in today's communities in which self-oriented individuals can create their isolated domains with minimal interactions with the outer world. Meaningful get-togethers are not an obligation but done at the pleasure of the person. It is more possible for an individual to live, work, drive, shop, dine and spend leisure time alone or with virtual friends. People do not need each other as much as before. Even the family as the smallest group of people with closer bonds is becoming a very difficult collective effort

to maintain. Modern states need to promote civic organizations to increase people's interactions. Military is capable of providing such an environment and teaching how to live in it collaboratively.

At the same time, military is different from all other types of civic organizations: It is capable of creating closer bonds and group identity more effectively as discussed. It has strict and clearly defined rules and regulations for every activity, harsh discipline, self-esteem and high respect for superiors and comrades. It has a complex training and education system which is capable of transferring its values to its members on a permanent basis. It brings citizens together, makes them a part of a collective effort, teaches them the value of doing their part to follow common good, trains and educates them on how to produce collaborative work and its value, provides them an opportunity to work together and hone their leadership/organizing skills. They get responsibility of a specific job or a group, distribute workflow and take the responsibility for the whole group. They learn how to use initiative while strictly obeying orders. Such a strong transformation of an individual as a group member is likely to have follow-on effects in socio-political life.

Suzanne Mettler, who conducted an analytical survey to identify the effects of military service and follow-on government policies on political behaviors of World War II veterans in the US, argues that America's participatory democracy has significantly flourished in this era (Mettler, 2005). She provides evidence that World War II generation widely pursued government supported education and training programs, actively participated in every aspect of political life and joined civic organizations at

record rates. Through all such forms of involvement, members of the World War II generation helped fortify and invigorate the practices of self-governance eventually helped fortify and invigorate the practices of self-governance (Mettler, 2005: 3). With similar arguments Robert Putnam depicts this period as a “golden age” of American civic life (Putnam, 2000). In this period, a great number of societal organizations flourished in a wide range including fraternal associations, professional associations, labor unions, religious groups and so on (Skocpol, 2003: 67, 130-1). Political participation was not limited to being member to these organizations but also included high level of voting, party membership and participation in political campaigns (Mettler, 2005: 3). Official evidence supports Mettler’s arguments. In this period voter turnout hit twentieth-century peaks (Rusk, 2001: 52; Putnam, 2000: 32).

There are also numerous studies about civic involvement in the latter part of the twentieth century which indicate that all else equal, nonveterans of the same age group were not less active than veterans in civic affairs. (Putnam, 2000: 485; Jennings and Markus, 1976; Jennings and Markus, 1977). Christopher Ellison did find higher rates of high-initiative political activity among black male veterans than nonveterans, but his study does not control for G.I. Bill usage (Ellison, 1992). More importantly, some linked these changes to the effects of war, not to the military, arguing any such gain is likely offset by the “terrible experiences of warfare” (Polenberg, 1972: ch. 5).

Such a change in political behavior is likely to be the result of a combination of factors including a common war experience, intensive participation of citizens in armed forces as well as other public works to support them, and several government policies

initiated to foster civic participation in the follow on period. In every case, military creates a channel for individual-government interaction. By different ways the state becomes more involved in citizens' lives. American post World War II experience demonstrated that the effect of social provision policies of the government increased political participation of military and ex-military members. Two important question raise here:

1. Would these policies reach the same result if they were not backed up by other complementary actions by governments?
2. Would they reach the same result if they were not implemented in the aftermath of war deprivation or on people who do not have military experience?

The answer to the first question is apparently negative as clearly shown in US case by Mettler's study. The government initiated several policies to bolster socio-economic and political life of veterans and their families, which consisted of the majority of the population and without them. It would be fair to make a deduction that destructive effects of war, which are already emphasized by some scholars, would be more effective. However, the answer to the second question also seems to be a negative one. It does not mean that similar government policies are useless in peace time or among non-military participation; however, perception level is likely to differ significantly. In face of disastrous events when the common good of all of the citizens is at stake and can only be protected by everybody's contribution, when citizens are intensely interacting with each other to achieve it, and when there are specific

institutions designed to achieve the most cooperative environment, the effects naturally become more positive from a republican point of view.

Overall, it would be fair to argue that military's effective contribution to political life will be less effective in the absence of war or a credible threat, or when military duty is conducted on non-voluntary basis. It is a fact that the need for security will never fade away, but it is also a fact that the less this need is felt, the less effective military would be in making permanent changes in citizens' traits. I will explore these issues in the last part of this chapter under the title of motivation.

8.1.5. Recognition and Providing Incentives

Recognition is a modern term which today's republicans heavily emphasize. In the past, it was not mentioned in the same way it is today. Rather, some other incentives such as honor were highlighted. Honor is disregarded today by almost all modern thinkers; contractarians reject it because it is factious, others reject it because it is hierarchical. In terms of honor, usually wealth and power were appreciated which excluded ordinary people. David Hume thinks that "honor is a great check upon mankind" (Hume, 1994: 24). It was a debased currency, associated with aristocratic "debauchees' and 'spendthrifts" (Hume, 1994: 294). Similarly, according to William Paley, "the Law of Honor is a system of rules constructed by people of fashion, and calculated to facilitate their intercourse with one another; and for no other purpose" (1815: 4).

However, honor and other similar incentives are always supported in republican tradition. Montesquieu, for example, argued that in moderate, monarchical regimes—including the sort of monarchy that conceals a republic (Montesquieu, 1989: 70). The incentives of shame and glory appear in the Federalist Papers as one of the two great securities, alongside the possibility of discovery and impeachment, against the abuse of power (Pettit, 2002: 226). Pettit considers honor as a part of the complier centered strategy, which focuses on positive dispositions to encourage citizens for the implementation of republican system. Sanctions should be complier-supportive in character.

Providing incentives is important for eliciting civic virtue in the past and today. If we take it in more general terms, a reward and punishment system (some carrots and sticks) should be established in system which aims to establish and maintain a community based on shared values. Ones who share these values should be publicly applauded as prominent figures for the next generation to model themselves after them. It is also important to motivate people and prevent corruption (which in republican terms mainly means prioritizing your individual interests more than the common good). Punishment of the non-standard citizens can be done in a wide range of actions, such as by frowning upon in the street, discrediting in mythical stories or in theatrical acts, or by real punishing. Recognition, providing incentives and providing a reward and punishment system in order to elicit civic virtue in the community is an important part of republicanism.

Military might be considered as an important institution for providing honor incentive to the citizens in a more egalitarian way, maybe with proportion to a soldier's service to his community. It offered another way for ordinary people to be appreciated for their possession of the civic virtues in the group. In the modern world, it continues to serve this function. Serving in the military is always considered as serving one's country and highly respected in the community.

8.1.6. Identification with the Group

Another point which can be missed when rational deliberation and interaction among citizens are not achieved at appropriate levels is the identification of the individual with the greater whole, and the outcome of this whole in front of political issues, which can also show itself as part of the common good. Every interaction among a group of subjects increases the chance for the emergence of the group spirit and the level of identification of each individual with the group. A public bus full of random people going to work during a specific time of the day hours might have a very limited, if nil, level of group identity and common spirit. When the same people continue going to work with the same bus at the same time every day, this group of people start to develop some bonds and connections. When random chatters and daily talk begin among them, these bonds tend to get stronger. By the time interactions increase in terms of nature and scope, some level group identity also emerges. This group of people tend to know more about the others, gets curious when someone does not get on to the bus that day, shares

each other's emotions when one is upset or loses his or her relative and so on. When these people meet in another environment when there are other people, they are more inclined to get together and act accordingly. When one sees another members of the group in a competition, he or she tends to support them to the others, when sees them as seller in a market full of sellers, tend to buy from them and so on. Therefore, when the level of interaction increases, so does the group spirit. Increased level of interaction is not the only mechanism that would promote formation of group identity of course. When it is combined with other factors, military provides the best type of civic service for this purpose.

8.1.7. Psychological Aspect: Feeling of Security

An important function of military in relation to its own citizens is about the cognitive or psychological dimension of protection. Providing the feeling of being secure and protected for the citizens in the city is critical for them to actively engage in political action. Both for creating the sense of confidence among a state's own citizens and fear among others, military does not only wage war but also does some other activities such as 'making a display in front of other states' or 'actively manifesting strength in the face of one's enemies. This kind of activities does not only deter the adversaries but also give confidence to a state's own citizens. This may be the most important contribution of the military, and it is the psychological result of military's organic function of protection, which should also be covered in its institutional contributions.

8.2. Contributions to Institutional Challenge

8.2.1. Protection

Military's role as security provider against external threats is not questioned neither in republicanism nor any other modern theory on state, due to the overwhelming and continual discourse on security. Although there are arguments for decreasing the effects of this discourse, there is no major attempt or any prediction for its removal from national or international domain. As long as need for security continues, military's role as an institution remains unchanged. Only in a safe and secure environment can the citizens of a state enjoy their rights and perform their duties in the public. External threat cannot only ruin every gain of a republic, but also carries the potential to overshadow other individual and social priorities. We can say that this role refers to the military as hard-power, and this iron hand is required against external threats.

8.2.2. Disaster Relief

Protection can also be understood against acts of nature or humans. Although total protection is not possible in this case, military can be effectively used to mitigate the effects of catastrophic incidents should they happen. Disasters and catastrophic events caused by nature or humans can have double sided effects. If they can be managed timely and effectively by state institutions, they strengthen bonds between the state and its citizens. However, when this cannot be achieved, they produce complete opposite

effect. They can cause wide-spread insecurity and mistrust against government (as targeted in case of terrorist attacks) as well as within the community. They can trigger unlawful actions such as riots and plunder which would be fatal for the society.

Military is the most capable organization for comprehensive and short-notice response to natural or manmade disasters. Although primary responsibility can stay in civilian control, military's capabilities including manpower, equipment, training, and organization can be used to relieve a catastrophic incident. A surprising incident might have devastating effects, which would call for a massive coordinated response on short notice. Military organization can make some structural changes and adequate training in order to improve its clear, effective, and coordinated military response capability.

However, there are many scholars who are critical of the employment of military in this kind of tasks (Etkin, McBey and Trollope, 2012). For example, J.K. Mitchell argues that increased military involvement of the military in disasters might signal an erosion of citizen rights and responsibilities to those who are advocates of civil authority (Mitchell, 2003). Some argued that top down command and control model is not appropriate mechanism to manage different aspects of disaster management (Dynes, 1994; Quarantelli, 1984; Hightower and Coutu, 1996: 69; Waugh, 1996). Similarly, Drabek advocates an emergency resources coordination model which will be more effective for emergency management than one based upon command-and-control (Drabek, 1991). Waugh warns about possible “clash of civilian and military organizational cultures...” with “some perceived disrespect for local capabilities” (Waugh, 1996: 347). And finally Clarke argues that “... many of the demands that

disasters place on society are not well met by bureaucracies... Social networks, rather than formal organizations, are far more likely to save... life” (Clarke, 2006: 168)

In almost all of these criticisms, military forces are typically equated with “command and control” management approaches. This may be a very simplistic a perspective, since military forces are not necessarily bureaucratic nor `command and control oriented, especially during crisis/emergency situations (Etkin, McBey and Trollope, 2012). Liberty based objections also seem to be over-emphasized, since military forces are employed in catastrophic incident only after having received a formal request from civilian authorities. In addition, their scope of employment can be defined in detail by legislation to avoid any risks to civil liberties.

Employing military capabilities to remedy some societal needs is not limited to the functions stated above and can be enhanced as required. Whenever there is a shortage of specific capability that military holds, it can be called to duty. There are specific examples such as transportation of donated organs to distant locations by military jets to assure timely arrival. The benefits of employing military for such purposes are likely to offset its possible disadvantages. Some positive effects may include increased trust to the government, provision of more secure environment which will facilitate exercising citizenship duties, and increased level of connectedness among the citizens.

8.2.3. Equality and Social Provisions

Equality of the citizens, at least at basic level, are considered important for contemporary republicans with various intensity, but definitely as something has to be achieved for rightful implementation of politics. “Who is citizen” was originally understood differently. In ancient Rome, citizens consisted of very small portion of the population. Britain and the early American republic excluded the majority of people from the franchise and other rights for long time. Modern republicanism, however, has a more comprehensive vision of equality and embraces the claims of historically excluded groups and minorities (Hanson, 1998).

The citizens should have equal rights and opportunities. Equality should also be reflected in economic terms as much as possible, at least they should not be reliant on each other so that their decision is not affected by their immediate needs, or by their dependency on other sources. The rule of law is crucial, for example, in order to avoid personal dependence; in order to make citizens subject to laws, not to other persons. Some republicans such as James Harrington and Jean-Jacques Rousseau went so far and suggested that property should be distributed equally so as to prevent economically disadvantaged citizens from being dependent on other wealthy ones (Laborde and Maynor, 2008). Pettit emphasized equality in terms of constituting sufficient reciprocal power, which is critical for safeguarding non-domination (Pettit, 2002: 67).

Military service reinforces equality because it calls people from every segment of the society to serve as citizens next to each other in (ideally) equal terms. Military environment is a place in which every citizen even with different wealth, status or

culture live at the same level. There is a hierarchy, but this hierarchy is defined in different terms and does not reflect the socially or politically approved or enforced hierarchy. Especially in compulsory military service, citizens from very different classes of the society find an opportunity to share the same meal, live through the same difficulties, strive for the same goal and so on. These people have to establish an environment of mutual trust and dependency.

In addition to presenting an environment based on equality among different socio-economic classes, military can also be used as a source of social provision in many aspects. It can be used to prepare disadvantaged population for a wide array of occupations both during and after their service time by financing vocational or business schools, utilizing apprenticeships or on-the-job trainings and/or providing useful skills and credentials that can be used in outside world. Armed forces can be used as a place for conscripts to gain some basic skill and education if they needed. Illiterate conscripts can learn reading, soldiers without any skills and educations can find the opportunity to gain some handy craftsmanship which they are able to continue when they go back to their homes to gain continuous income. Benefits are even better for permanent members. Professional trainings and education in a wide array of fields are inseparable part of military life. Economically disadvantaged families can find opportunity to send their smart and promising children to military schools. Social provisions can be used more extensively depending on the conditions of the society. Armed forces can grant scholarship in exchange of temporary or permanent military duty.

While these policies are optional and can be used alternatively or in a mutually supportive manner with other government policies, they become extremely critical in case of a real war when majority of the population is directly influenced with it. Assuming that citizens with war experience will be ready to participate in socio-economic and political life would be a fatal mistake. Military members can be supported after their service in terms of educational and vocational benefits as

Social provisions for military personnel provided during or after their military service can enhance equality and foster democratic participation. These provisions can include financing or directly providing education and training, occupational advancement or other benefits such as housing and health. Such provisions can be inclusive of majority of the population. Military personnel who have benefited from these provisions would feel treated with respect regardless of their class, race, social or religious background. They would feel to be compensated after paying their duty to their country and maybe putting their lives in danger for the sake of it. They are more likely to feel the supportive hand of the government and the community they served, and to understand that government was for and about people like them. Beneficiaries of these provisions are more likely to embrace the duties and obligations of active citizenship and become fully cooperative and participant members of the community. They are likely to be more independent and therefore more “free”, which will help prevent any arbitrary domination to be established on them.

The extension of social provisions would ensure some guarantee of wellbeing and convey to their beneficiaries a sense of dignity and value as citizens (Walzer, 1983).

This may make them more devoted and fully incorporated members of the society. If coverage is broad and inclusive, fair provision of social rights and privileges may promote a shared sense of civic identity and solidarity among beneficiaries. In response, they may become more fully engaged citizens, more active in civic and political life (Beiner, 1995; Kymlicka and Norman, 1995). Mettler reports that after the World War II, war veterans who had achieved higher levels of education or who has received social provisions through post-war programs joined more civic organizations than others (Mettler, 2005: 108).

Social provision through military can also be criticized from several aspects. An important concern may be related with the danger of militarization. Moreover, some scholars oppose the expansion of social rights by any means. They argue that increased emphasis of rights-language weakens civil society, creates dependency among citizens or to the state public assistance programs, and instigates a rights-claiming orientation that displaces attention from civic obligations (Glazer, 1988; Glendon, 1991; Fukuyama, 1995). However, these arguments are not generally accepted by republicans, or at least considered to have more disadvantages than benefits for civic involvement and effective self-rule.

8.3. External Contributions

Possible external contributions of the military other than protection has very limited literature, although there are still some ideas on it.

8.3.1. Disseminating Republican Values in the International Environment

Very seldom, an additional role is also envisaged for the military in which it will use its hard power in international environment for the tasks other than protection, and Pettit can be considered as one of these exceptions. He defines an additional role of promoting the Republicanism to other states and helping it to be practiced the right way. I argued that such a role is not only inconsistent with Pettit's concerns about its potential to use arbitrary power, but also carries the danger of turning international environment into a chaos. Any use of hard power outside the state, or any policy which justifies such use is likely to raise suspicion and strong reaction against its supporters and their nation. Therefore, military force as hard power is not likely to achieve any fruitful outcome in terms of promoting republican values in the international world. As opposed to "nation building" or "bringing democracy" attempts in the modern world which almost always resulted in failure, what Pettit suggests is a kind of "republic building" outside one's own state, which is very much like to encounter the same destiny. Therefore, I do not see any plausible and feasible use for neither military nor any kind of hard power for the establishment of republican (or democratic, etc.) values in another state. Best service in this sense can be establishing a solid protection for the republican state so that no external threat can challenge its appropriately applied values, by which it represents a good example to every other nation. In other words, a republic can present a good example to every other nation by its achievements inside. Therefore, a strong military may not be so useful in terms of forcefully projecting and imposing own values.

8.3.2. Promoting International Peace and Security

On the other hand, there might be some additional ways in which a strong military power can be beneficial for expanding republican values in the international environment, not by directly using its hard power, but by some other means. To start with, it may greatly contribute to setting a good and attractive example for the other states in several ways. We can start with traditional or even psychological aspects: Although it needs to be supported by economic, social, humanitarian and environmental aspects, military power is still an indicator of the strength and success of a state. A state who achieves almost the best in every other aspect can still be less influential in international environment unless it also possesses equivalent military capability. Military force alone cannot be enough for a modern, developed country but the opposite is almost equally questionable: How influential can a state be if she does not capable of protecting herself against any kind of threat? Some part of this psychological and traditional feeling might be part of a genetic code that we naturally inherit: we as humans might have tendency to believe the ones who can demonstrate their capability they gained by the help of these values, or simply we might be affected by the appearance. But it might very well have logical foundation which links it to the first duty of the military. Even when it is never meant to be used, ability to protect one's values whenever there is an attack makes it more considerable. This might be explained in Pettit's terminology. Existence of the possibility of the use of non-arbitrary power is equivalent to its actual use. Therefore, if there is a possibility that domination can be established over an individual or a state, if this person or this state does not have

sufficient means and capabilities to counter this domination, this person or state is not considered to be free. Therefore, unless every possibility of this domination is removed at personal or state level, under the conscience of other people and other states, they are not free; their ideas can be dominated by others and nonetheless they cannot be influential on others. After all, any success in any other state organizations should be equally reflected also in these major organizations of any state, including the military. Failure in one can have halo effect on others.

In addition, humanitarian relief operations can also be conducted outside the borders of a state whenever they are required. As mentioned already, military is not composed of soldiers and battalions but unique capabilities, which would be extremely helpful in catastrophic events. Its effective and appropriate use in such events does not only bolster the image of its owner state, but also promote the similar values of cooperation, common good, and so on. And finally, military organizations also have an extensive area of activities and relations with other organizations, which enhance the possibility of interaction with the citizens of other states. This might be another place to represent and exchange values.

Therefore, external use of military in international arena to promote republican values can be expanded, although should never be reduced to using or even connoting use of hard power. Military can be used as an extension of the whole republican state and its institutions. Protection without using hard power (i.e. possessing the necessary capability without being an agile force), intensive relations with counterpart

organizations as well as its psychological aspects may make the biggest contribution in this field.

CHAPTER IX

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

9.1. Introduction – External vs Internal Functions

Can military still have internal functions in a republic? Can it be used to promote republican ideals and help establish people's rule? Are the functions associated with the military along the line of whole republican tradition still possible, and are there any dangers about them? This chapter will try to answer these questions and develop some proposals.

Theoretical discussions on the internal roles and functions of the armed services and concept of citizen-soldiers are mostly specific to the republican tradition. Literature on such roles and functions in other political discourses is very limited. Current discussions on roles and functions¹⁶ of military in different countries are most of the time further elaboration of external tasks, which sometimes need to be customized according to the needs of the modern security environment. I will refer to Paul

¹⁶ For more discussion on the definition of roles and functions see Shemella (1997), "The Spectrum of..."

Shemella’s study, along with Metin Gürcan’s very helpful elaboration, to provide a summary of discussions on possible roles military can play in modern state, which, we will see, that solely focus on “protection” (Shemella, 2006; Gürcan, 2013) Shemella classifies these roles as micro and macro ones. Macro roles include the ones that are assigned to the armed forces as a whole and act as a national “brand” both nationally and internationally (Shemella, 2006: 138). In line with Shemella, Gürcan breaks down macro roles as follows (Gürcan, 2013):

NAME	EXPLANATION	EXAMPLE
WARRIOR	Large militaries capable of both fighting offensive and defensive wars	U.S, Russia, China, Britain and France
DEFENDER	Military solely created to defend homeland against attack from an external enemy	Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Kuwait
PEACEKEEPER	Military specializes in peace support operations and regards peace operations as the most important macro role	Canada, Sweden, Argentina, Bangladesh, and Mongolia (often these countries have no immediate or extremely high levels of external threats)
DOMESTIC GUARD	Military that tend not to be externally focused, and is used for various domestic roles from disaster relief and infrastructure building to temporary civil enforcement	Peru, Botswana, Mexico, Georgia, and Brazil.
POLICE	Military that is the primary law enforcement institution within its country because of the weakness of other law enforcement agencies	Indonesia, Honduras, Albania, Togo, and Bolivia.

Table 1: Possible Roles Military Can Play in a Republic

By macro roles, Shemella refers to the roles that operate at policy level, where governments decide how military forces will be used generally in domestic and foreign affairs. Micro ones on the other hand are at operational level (Shemella, 2006: 125) and they define which military forces will be used to achieve a vision (Shemella, 2006: 128). Therefore, even the micro roles do not include any function related with what republicans had in mind. And regarding macro roles, all are external other than the “police” function, which is actually a transfer of responsibility in some countries due to incapacity. Therefore, macro (i.e., main and important) roles of the military are still envisaged as the external ones or related with the traditional perception of security.

Shemella’s general summary indicates that republican views on the roles of military are not reflected on general discussions. Focus on Pettit’s theorization in chapter 4 indicated some disappearance in some parts of modern republican thought, while some others are still supportive of traditional roles. In this chapter, I will try to examine the validity of internal “republican” roles of the military in modern political environment. In terms of internal “republican” functions, I will refer to three main functions of constructing citizenship, safeguarding against tyranny and ensuring self-rule by participating in civic and martial practices.

9.2. Contributions to Republican Ideals

Q1: Should the state still aim to construct the citizenship?

“Constructing” is a strong word which even republicans try to avoid today, although this function is not totally ruled out in the theory. Citizenship, no matter how it is gained formally, has to be politically constructed according to republican thought system. Today’s republicanism still has the same notion of duties that have to exist in balance with rights in the community. Republicans expect citizens to perform some basic citizenship duties and prioritize the republic over themselves. However, the discourse on civic virtue and donating the citizens with them is not highlighted by modern republicans. As discussed in Chapter 3, although concepts of common good and civic virtue cannot be stripped from the genes of republicanism, same level of enthusiasm is not shown today. Modern version of republican theory predominantly focuses on the concepts of freedom, participation and recognition. This is actually a radical turn compared to previous versions which prioritized common good and civic virtue in the first place. The underlying reason is obvious; concepts of common good and civic virtue have a coercive nature which conflicts with today’s democratic and rights-centric environment in many ways. Modern politics highlights difference rather than similarity and disproves any kind of coercive measure on people’s lives. That of course does not mean total non-interference in citizens’ lives. Although less demanding, raising and educating citizens is still an important concern. At varying degrees, this requirement cannot be disregarded for any political system and for any political community. If there are rules, rights and duties that are important for well-functioning of a community, there has to be means defined for donating the generations with them. There is an unquestionable need to educate the citizens, and education always aims to meet basic

expectations from the citizens as a state. However, a comprehensive transformation and structuring mission of the state is hard to justify. The intensity of these expectations from the citizens will always be a political issue to be discussed, while there will always be a need to establish basic traits in the citizens and there will always be a quest for effective means for this purpose. In this sense, as an answer to this question, targets for constructing citizenship should be carefully defined and some anti-democratic, restrictive measures should be avoided. The purpose should be rephrased as “educating of the citizens” rather than constructing their status. Even the term “constructing citizenship” is not totally consistent with modern understanding of freedom.

When this function is justified at a lesser degree, next question would be whether military may or should have a part of it.

Q2: Can and should military be an effective medium used for educating the citizens?

Any state organization may contribute to the overall effort of educating citizens depending on the nature of their functions. So the answer to this question is simply yes, without too much hesitation. Whether it should be a primary mission of the armed services, on the other hand, requires further elaboration. I will directly support that educating the citizens, donating them with certain values should be a primary function of the military on three main grounds. Firstly, I accept republican understanding of citizenship which highlights duties as well as rights and the requirement of civic virtue and certain values among the public. Secondly, I believe that current education system may fall short of providing these values in a highly versatile environment where

generations are exposed to so many negative effects and in which education institutions are highly sanitized and stripped of any dominating position. Even if they are effective, they can always get support from other suitable domains. But more importantly, the education system is mostly based on exposing students to several different issues in a class environment rather than giving them an environment to learn through “living.” Therefore, as a third reason, I believe that participating in civic practices is still required for effectively donating useful values to the citizens. And military in this regard cannot be surpassed by other civic practices in terms of effectiveness. There are two main factors which simply make this impossible. First one is the motivational effect of fear and threat. Military exists, because every individual on earth puts security as the first priority. It is an existential concern that would overrun any other concern, and that would go beyond the limits of politics and justify coercive actions, raise sufficient energy and pump enough hormones to activate the individuals and so on. Second factor that makes military unique is the discipline and order it has as an institution, justified by the first factor: a serious task of providing security should be handled seriously. Every teaching position creates a domination-subversion status between the teacher and the student, and it is effective when this power relation is accepted (and properly used) by both. A strong power relation just for the sake of teaching at educational institutions would not be compatible with modern values; however, exposing the individuals to this for a short term and for the crucial need of security would still be justifiable.

If we accept a unique effectiveness for military to provide some values to the citizens, should we make it compulsory?

Q3: Citizen-soldier: Is it still a necessary concept? If so, should it be compulsory or voluntary?

Accepting effectiveness of the military in educating the citizens would normally lead to supporting compulsory conscription and citizen-army. However, compulsory military duty is not compatible with modern democratic values and more importantly may not produce desired results in the absence of credible threat. I argued that what makes military unique is the motivation in the individual and the discipline in the institution. When an individual is torn apart from his life without his consent and without enough justification, it is questionable for these factors to have the same effect. The individual would not feel the same motivation in him or her, and would not be prone to authority with his or her free will.

Advocates of compulsory military training also base their argument on the importance of participation: to the extent possible, every important task of the state should be done with the participation of all the citizens. Many modern republicans as well as some states adopt this idea. Such an implementation would undoubtedly produce important benefits if applied in the correct way. It would bring different portions of the society together, which would normally live their own separate lives, unaware of what is going on at the other parts of their country. It would create connections among different socio-cultural layers, promote inter-personal relations and so on. However, one should not forget that justification for compulsory military training should be realized on public or individual conscience; not only on some social thinkers' or rulers' mind. Unless conscripts believe in the rightfulness of the reasons that take an important part of their

social and business lives right in the middle of their fruitful period in such a competitive world, the benefits will be highly suspicious. Constructing a soldier (hence citizen) today cannot be considered as a forceful action that reaches the same result for everyone. Donating the citizens with some useful traits in a military environment require willful participation, or at least an acceptance of the underlying reason for such an act that will be powerful enough to mobilize individuals, convince them to forfeit some of their rights and accepts certain limitations on their lives. Therefore, a strong motivation, as strong as the threat of war, should be present for enforcing compulsory military service.

Conscription army would not serve its institutional purpose either, contrary to what many republicans advocated. A central republican claim is that the owners of a property would protect their belongings better than anyone else. In today's technology-centric world, armed forces which consist of citizens who are taken apart from their normal life for a temporary period would not provide a better protection. Today's modern armed forces rely more on technological systems than the number of soldiers they have. They need skilled and specialized personnel, who need to go through extensive training, which will cost time and money. Therefore, it would not be possible or efficient to train temporary citizens for many tasks. Advanced weapons systems require professionals, not temporary by-stoppers. An army consisting of amateurs would need to bear a significant cost to maintain them but would not gain much in return. Besides, service to the nation can take place in different ways. If a scientist invents a

new technology or if a businessman creates jobs for thousands, they may be serving their country more than anyone else.

If soldiership becomes voluntary, length of service can be designed to achieve desired level of professionalism while assuring sufficient level of motivation among them. That of course does not eliminate economic factors that may be the real concern for an individual to join military forces. However, even in this case, there is still a motivation for the individual to voluntarily remain in the service and adopt its values, without which he or she would not be able to become a real soldier and team player. Although the ones with economic motivation are less likely to adopt values than the ones with more patriotic feelings, being in the same environment would definitely have a better effect than being in isolation. By establishing a system based on both voluntary and professional human resources and still emphasizing its role as educating its members, military institution in a modern republic can provide acceptable solution. In this case, armed forces can be considered to have a supportive function in educating the citizens, rather than more demanding role of constructing citizenship.

Another role of citizen-soldier in the republic is to provide a safeguard against tyranny. One should question whether this is still an effective medium in today's political systems.

Q4. Can citizen-army be instrumental in controlling the sovereign? Can it be an effective measure against tyranny?

The ability of the armed forces to control the tyranny of the sovereign is unquestionable because of its position as the main hard-power-holder. However, the question whether citizen-army will grant this ability to the citizens is highly questionable.

To control the sovereign so that it cannot establish domination over the people of the republic has always been a critical, if not the most critical, purpose of republicans. Since the sovereign has rooted its power in the military (or greatly supported by it), being composed of citizens for an army would provide a practical solution to this basic problem. Making the people sovereign can best be achieved by making the core strength of the sovereign inclusive of the people itself.

I argue that this function is not possible today, and it was not even successful in the past either. As many examples showed in the history, either compulsory or voluntary armies do not necessarily bestow this privilege to its members. Even when the military is formed of citizens, it does not necessarily mean that ruling elite within the military will reflect the same social structure.

Safeguarding against tyranny was not possible even for citizen-armies because of two main reasons. First, citizen soldiers always stayed at lower levels in the military organization. Military is a highly (if not the most) hierarchical organization in which there exists strict chain of command and obedience to the higher authorities. Conscripts are destined to from the power ranks. Higher-ranked officers are relatively fewer in number and have to go through a competitive process to get promoted. Therefore, it was very easy for the ruling class to manage who is going to be the leader and who will stay as grassroots. Secondly, the ability to make military serve the citizens, not to tyrant in

general is related with the success it achieves in transforming the citizens. As argued, military can effectively convey its ideas and ideals to its members and transform their value system. If this argument is valid, then same process can be used to convey some other ideas to its members and make them protector of the ruling class, rather than the public in general. Maintaining the link between regular citizens and military may not always be possible. In other words, military institution may develop a separate sense of allegiance and identification within itself. In some cases, this allegiance and identification can go much further to the extent that it exceeds the identification with the state and becomes limited with the military organization or the military commander one serves. This is not preferable situation for the state since it can work against its advantage, something Cicero mentioned as an important problem in late Rome (Cicero, 1887). In short, there are several real historical examples for ineffectiveness of the measure, many dictatorships which have started with military coup or relied on them, even when the armed services were consisting of citizens. Assuring citizen rule is a challenge by all state institutions, which can be achieved by providing openness, visibility, equal opportunity for all citizens to join and be promoted, but more importantly, by the agility of the citizens themselves. If these do not exist, control of the whole state machinery can easily be hijacked by any power holder by keeping certain control points in hand.

In spite of many possible benefits, instrumental use of military in the internal domain always carries potential risks. I will try to cover these concerns in the last section of this chapter, under the topic of “risks of employing military”.

9.3. Risks of Employing Military

Instrumental use of military beyond its natural role can bring some advantages as well as considerable risks. These risks may be associated with the emphasis on military both as an institution and a mentality. An apparent risk can stem from military-as-institution: it can try to be an active political player with an unfair advantage of arbitrary power, as warned by Pettit as well as many other political scientists of all kind. However, an equally important threat may come from military-as-idea. Militaristic ideas or wide spread securitization may carry the risk of de-politicizing politics and dominating socio-political domains. A widened and deepened understanding of security has the capacity to turn every issue of the state into a security problem, which means taking them out of the political domain. Therefore, this kind of securitization, and the military as an institution which can contribute to this act, is considered as a potential threat to the republic by some thinkers including Pettit.

Instrumental use of military for creating role-model citizens may conflict with universal values. Any kind of limiting or structuring activity would be considered as an attempt to spoil the nature of politics and exclude some portions of the society. Ambitious activities for structuring people's minds would be strongly criticized. Some level of education can be accepted by the majority, but using armed service for formatting citizens would be beyond acceptable limit.

The motivation for establishing and maintaining military organization stems from the most basic need of humans: security. Existence of real threat and possibility of war not only justifies extraordinary measures, but also creates a very strong

transformative capability. The intense and challenging process which military members go through needs significant motivation in order to produce effective results. In chapter 2, I have discussed two main approach to this issue. For Machiavelli, war, or likelihood of war, was a necessary catalyst for citizen-army to function as envisaged; while for Rousseau, participation in the military can be substituted by other civic practices and can still achieve similar results. Both arguments may be true at the same time; participation in civic practices may have a considerable effect in educating citizens. On the other hand, it is a fact that in times of war, power of armed services to incorporate and transform citizens were always considerably higher than peace times when nobody was feeling warm breath of an imminent threat.

If the usefulness of fear of war is recognized as an important motivation, there is a danger that it may be utilized. Fear has the power to organize masses and gives them an un-debatable reason to change their preferences. It has the power to justify actions and limit freedoms even in the most liberal country. Because of these practical benefits, some level of fear may be found useful in the eyes of rulers to justify their actions or design the political environment according to their wishes. From republican point of view, it has the power to transform individuals who are living as individuals to citizens who are cooperating for a shared future.

In the era of rights, it is difficult to find suitable agents of transformation. In its simplest form, transformation means change from what will normally happen if no extra power is imposed. Therefore, it means a force inflicted upon a usual course of action. Organized state education aims a transformation among young citizens in the way of

being a better citizen. It is designed to foster personal developments and raise good citizens. Education establishes a power relation on the subject in favor of the teacher. This power relation maybe a temporary one limited to the hours of education, however its effects are expected to be stationary and last until the end of the lives of citizens. This is not a hard power which uses cruel methods, but rather shows itself in other subtle ways; as discipline in class behavior, directions and guidance given by instructors, approval and disapproval for students' behaviors and so on. Although no hard power is used, it is eventually a power relation established and therefore requires a justification. The motive for the education, to establish such a power relation and to use power on prospective citizens is clear and accepted by the whole: humans need to learn many things useful for their lives and they need to learn how to live in community. All citizens willingly enter into the education system and put their infants in it.

More drastic transformation of the human behavior requires more intense measures. Military establishes a much stronger power relation over the individual to achieve a more drastic transformation. Both military schools from the start and all military institutions throughout the course of life of military personnel are designed to foster certain types of behaviors and severely penalize contradictory ones. In order for this power relation to be exerted, it needs to be justified by the community as a whole. Such a strong motivation and justification always exists in the face (or in the danger) of war. In the absence of war or its likelihood, military may not be as effective.

9.4. Conclusion

In this thesis I have visited republican theory with a specific focus on modern republican revival pioneered by Philip Pettit and examined how the military-society relations were conceptualized in modern as opposed to traditional versions of this theory. I have also developed my interpretation on possible roles and functions military can play today.

Overall, I have examined traditional roles of the military in republican theory and reached following conclusions:

Constructing citizenship and promoting civic virtue: I have argued that this function as it was in the history of republican thought is not fully advocated with the same enthusiasm today. Educating citizens from the younger ages and providing them with civic virtue (which are slightly adjusted according to universal principles for example to be less masculine, more inclusive, less savage, etc.) is among the accepted tasks of any state and military can still be a part of this function. In a better term, today this function can be called “contribution to civic education.” While the formal education system may be the primary responsible for this task, any other appropriate state or even private institution can contribute to it. Military can and should be an effective player in this field.

Being a safeguard against tyranny of the sovereign: History proved that even the citizen army prescribed by many republicans cannot assure this function. Most of the times “newbies” of a military unit stay at the lowest levels while the leadership is kept exclusively for the members or supporters of the state elite. There are several other measures that need to be taken to support this function in all state institutions, such as

openness, accountability, availability of promotion to all citizens, justice and so on. In this regard, I agreed with Pettit that military is an important power holder in the political system and either as a citizen army or not, emerges as a challenge to the democratic rule. Against its arbitrary use in the internal politics, there have to be some institutional measures rather than trusting on the citizens who constitute it. In this regard, I will argue that a citizen army without any additional would be ineffective in this function.

Providing participation and assuring autonomy: A common task of protection should be done by all people's participation according to some republicans. Even if one accepts this point as an ideal, it would be highly unrealistic to expect all of the state functions of a republic to be performed by participation. Division of labor is inevitable and actually not-so-harmful for the republic. Citizens can serve their country in various ways. Besides, protection today does not only include external enemies nor even physical trends. A country has to be protected against disasters, contagious diseases, ignorance, and so on. Taken as whole, citizens can contribute in protecting their republic against any of those.

As a conclusion, I tried to answer a basic question: Can modern republicanism present a coherent theory without military has an internal function in it? I argue that yes, it can present a coherent theory without the military present in it, but it cannot do that without accounting for basic tenets of republican values, such as how to elicit common good and how to promote civic virtue. Prioritization of common good over individual interests and bearing some civic virtue are fundamental concerns all republicans, and an advocate of it should have some ideas about how they can be established and maintained

today. In the past, armed forces have an extensive and important role in this function. Today if this function will not be bestowed upon the military, some other alternatives have to be defined. Although Pettit acknowledges the essentiality of these themes and accepts that republicanism cannot survive without them, he envisions them as a preconditions that have to be present in order for a republican order to survive. In this sense, I argued that this is an important gap in Pettit's theory. A theory of republicanism which still centers around the idea of common good and requires a certain degree of civic virtue (at least having a sense of common good for example) among citizens cannot be complete if existence of these ideas are assumed to happen by themselves. Modern republicanism has emerged as a response to liberalism after its alleged victory over socialism with an assumption that it cannot solve all the problems in public life such as loss of group identity and sense of common good, prevalence of increased individualism and self-interest seeking. Therefore, this has to be a main field to which republicanism should aim to contribute to and bring new ideas, although the solution does not necessarily involve military in it.

Another question may follow this argument: If utilized, how effective can military contribute to effective implementation of republicanism? Military is an effective organization not only for security, but also for social transformation. I argued that some form of civic education is still required today and every appropriate state institution can be employed with this purpose. Some useful civic virtues can still be promoted with the help of military. Republicanism, even in its modern interpretation, requires some critical functions to be performed in the public. In many ways, the military stands out as an

effective organization that can perform these tasks or can contribute to them. Overall, military can contribute to better functioning of republicanism as long as it stays within the legitimate limits, which means that it does not turn into a power holder which has the capacity to exercise arbitrary power on other citizens,

Not the military itself, but expansion of the security discourse may bring some risks to republican freedom and self-rule. The definition of security today both widens and deepens (Bilgin, 2003). Any interest at individual or state level has the potential to be raised to the level of a security concern. It is a very strong discourse than can mobilize citizens, validate anti-freedom state actions, and narrow down the scope of politics. It has the power to establish itself as a common good which means positioning itself over individual freedoms or interests. Any modern state which exercises one of the most democratic regimes in the world cannot be sure what kind of actions can be legitimized once its citizens (or politicians) believe that its security is at stake. Therefore, securitization emerges as a more salient threat than military-as-institution because of its capacity to de-politicize the political realm and thwart citizens' capacity for self-rule.

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