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The myth of ‘Europeanization’ of Turkish foreign policy: the Cyprus debacle as a litmus test

Burcin Ulug-Eryilmaz*

Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey

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This article examines Turkish–EU relations and the Cyprus issue within the Europeanization framework. It seeks to underline how and to what extent EU conditionality was performed in Turkey’s Cyprus policy in the post-Helsinki period. The exploration of the relationship between domestic political pressures and the foreign policy choices of the AKP government on the Cyprus issue suggests that EU’s potential in transforming the foreign policy of candidates is both context dependent and questionable. Alongside EU-related factors such as the credible membership perspective, what accounts for change is predominantly determined by how domestic actors perceive it, and how much domestic power struggles are affected by it.

Keywords: Turkey; Cyprus; Europeanization; foreign policy; AKP

Introduction

Over the last decade, discussion has widely concentrated on the term ‘Europeanization’ in researching the EU’s potential to affect several policy areas, including the foreign policy, of its members and candidate states (Grabbe 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 2007). The lure of membership does indeed enable the EU to promote changes in candidate states’ foreign policy. The academic scholarship on Turkish–EU relations overwhelmingly concentrates on issues about the pace of Turkey’s domestic transformation due to EU candidacy (EU-induced change, lack of change, and backlash) with reference to the ups and downs in relations between the two (Müftüler-Baç 2005, 2008; Narbonne and Tocci 2009; Ulusoy and Verney 2009); the EU’s accession dynamics in relation to the transformation of the Cyprus conflict (Tocci 2002, 2003, 2005; Müftüler-Baç and Güney 2005; Ulusoy 2008); and the EU’s role in conflict resolution concerning the Cyprus dispute (Diez and Tocci 2009). There is also an emerging literature on Turkish Europeanization, addressing the limits of the EU’s transformative power and whether the Europeanization approach needs further qualification in the Turkish case (Börzel 2012; Nas and Özer 2012). Looking through different theoretical lenses such as rational choice institutionalist and/or sociological institutionalist (Terzi 2010, 2012; Nas 2012; Yılmaz 2012), as well as examining discursive accounts (Kaliber 2012), scholars of Turkish Europeanization converge on the idea
that the EU’s domestic impact on Turkey shows significant variation when discussing certain policy areas (Terzi 2010, 2012; İzci 2012; Kaliber 2012; Macmillan 2012; Tsarouhas 2012), actors (Öniş 2009; Öner 2012; Terzi 2010) and issues (Özer 2012; Yılmaz 2012). Moreover, it is generally observed in those studies that EU conditionality and the credibility of the accession perspective have been widely studied as foreign policy pressure, yet, the role of domestic actors and/or factors in relation to conditionality and the accession process in inducing domestic change have been either eliminated (Aydın and Açıkmeşe 2007; Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy 2010; Oğuzlu 2010) or overestimated (Kaliber 2012). Although the bulk of those studies are stimulating, they fall short of addressing the complex interactive pattern between the EU and domestic levels, which in fact lies at the heart of more recent Europeanization studies (Börzel 2012).

In contrast, building on the rational choice variant of neo-institutionalism, this article departs from existing scholarship practice to tackle the questions of ‘how’ and ‘to what extent’ the EU generates changes in accession states’ foreign policies by exploring how the EU impacted Turkey’s Cyprus policy between 1999 and 2012. This article argues that among so many hurdles on Turkey’s journey to the EU, the Cyprus problem occupies a special place because different EU bodies have consistently put pressure on Ankara to recognize the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ and to withdraw Turkish troops from the island. To what extent can the ‘EU anchor’ lead to change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy, in view of its candidacy dating from 1999 and accession talks since 2005? Indeed, by assuming a key role in Turkish–EU relations, the Cyprus issue has not only determined, but also been determined by, those relations before and since 1999. How do the dynamics of domestic politics in interaction with the EU play a part in changing Turkey’s Cyprus policy? While looking at Europeanization as a non-linear and context-dependent process in Turkish–EU relations and examining endogenous sources of change, this article not only deals with the EU impact on Turkey’s foreign policy per se, but also tackles the EU’s influence on power distribution in the domestic context and the cost-benefit calculation of the government in power in deciding a policy change.

Europeanization is concerned with explaining how EU impact occurs. In fact, establishing causality in Europeanization and the notion of research design have been successfully studied (e.g. Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009). Much time has also been spent on discussing the causal mechanisms of the Europeanization of national foreign policy to detect the causal significance of the EU (e.g. Moumoutzis 2011), and to measure outcomes, for example, by presenting process tracing as a method of inquiry (see Exadaktylos 2012). The Europeanization literature has identified incompatibility (misfit), EU conditionality and the differential empowerment of domestic actors as the most important variables to account for domestic change in member and candidate states (Börzel 1999; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001). Europeanization starts with incompatibility emanating from EU demands and requirements in the form of conditionality on the one hand and the domestic situation on the other. During the accession process, Europeanization is achieved ‘directly’ through negotiations and the principle of EU conditionality (e.g. see Grabbe 2003, 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2007). Candidates are required to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria and to achieve complete transfer of the acquis communautaire, including the acquis politique of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), before membership is finalized. In the area of foreign policy, for example, conciliatory rhetoric and the win-win approach
adopted by Turkey towards the Cyprus problem would have been unthinkable without the EU conditionality and membership perspective given to Turkey, cemented by the European decisions to grant candidacy in 1999 and opening accession talks in 2005 (Aydın and Açıkmeşe 2007; Terzi 2010).

Europeanization provides a framework that enables one to explain policy change in a country; it puts forward the EU’s impact per se, and at the same time highlights the interaction of this impact with domestic factors. Thus, the EU’s transformative power has its limits; the domestic impact of the EU has been differential, showing significant variation across policies and institutions (Börzel 2012). Therefore, to account for variation in domestic change, Europeanization scholarship has increasingly focused on factors mitigating the EU’s transformative power and the conditions under which domestic change occurs. In the context of accession, by creating incompatibility between EU requirements and the domestic situation, EU conditionality disturbs the domestic status quo in the candidate state (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 2007). More precisely, in the EU accession process, conditionality may solve some policy problems in favour of certain domestic actors, generally by increasing their influence in the political system. Thus, Europeanization also operates ‘indirectly’, through redistributing resources across domestic actors. Following the rational institutionalist logic, incompatibility may furnish some domestic actors with opportunities (i.e. political, legal and economic resources or legitimacy for their ideas) to surpass opponents and comply with EU criteria (Börzel and Risse 2003, 58; Grabbe 2003). Conversely, adopting EU requirements may produce ‘welfare or power costs’ (Börzel and Risse 2003) for actors who would like to rebuff EU conditionality on several grounds to retain their relative power positions in and influence on the political system. Indeed, since Turkey’s declared candidacy at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, the European accession process has apparently disturbed the country’s domestic political equilibrium by boosting the power and influence of some domestic actors over others. In other words, incompatibility between the EU and Turkish positions over Cyprus took the form of EU conditionality by leading to a realignment within Turkey of two opposing coalitions (veto players and facilitating actors) and their power struggles. In this study, the veto players include the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK); the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and the other opposition party, the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), who all emerged as passionate advocates of the status quo ante in Turkey’s Cyprus policy. The facilitating actors, acting as pro-EU reformists and championing a federalist solution in Cyprus, include the government under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) and, increasingly, NGOs, especially the most eminent and effective ones in terms of lobbying activities across the Ankara-Brussels axis, such as the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD).

The Europeanization framework also suggests that any policy ‘change’ required by EU conditionality is ultimately decided and implemented by the government, which assesses the benefits of complying with EU rules vis-à-vis the domestic costs for their adoption (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). While it was the AKP government that decided on a policy ‘change’ in Cyprus by actively endorsing the UN-sponsored peace plan for the reunification of the island, the capabilities of domestic actors as veto players and facilitating actors should not be overlooked;
those actors influenced the government’s decision to facilitate, retard or reject policy change, particularly once the cabinet became reluctant after 2005 to take radical steps to transform the Cyprus policy to comply with EU conditionality. This situation highlights the fact that the pace and extent of Europeanization is not linear and homogenous but context dependent; therefore, one needs to deconstruct the interactive pattern between various elements at the domestic and EU levels. Keeping in mind that governments as political actors may act with different motivations at different periods, this article argues that the cost-benefit calculation by the AKP government in formulating its Cyprus policy was largely affected by a dynamic combination of EU-related and domestic factors, such as the prevalent desire in Turkish society for EU membership and the state establishment, the ability of the EU to provide a credible membership perspective backed by an even-handed approach to the Cyprus problem and the strong resistance of anti-reformist domestic circles in their struggle with pro-EU forces.

This article continues in four parts: the first part lays out a brief overview of Europeanization as a research agenda and discusses its application to the unique area of foreign policy with particular reference to the enlargement context. The second part briefly explains of the origins and development of the Cyprus case. The third part explains sources of incompatibility between EU requirements and Turkey’s responses to the Cyprus dispute; it particularly looks at the positions of Turkey (before and during the AKP era) and the EU with regard to the Cyprus problem as well as at how Turkish–EU relations have been affected by the issue. The fourth part of this study analyses different factors affecting the AKP’s cost-benefit calculation in implementing the Cyprus policy. In conclusion, dwelling upon Turkey’s Cyprus policy in the accession process, the article provides a critical analysis of the EU’s potential for inducing change in the foreign policies of ‘candidate’ nations. It explains how Europeanization has operated in the Cyprus case in different periods by concomitantly generating differing levels of impact on policy change. The EU’s impotence is particularly elaborated on with regard to its credibility of membership perspective, institutional structure and political will (or lack of it) by paying additional attention to the repercussions of and interaction with Turkey’s domestic political settings.

The conceptual framework of Europeanization and its application to national foreign policy

Europeanization is generally referred to when domestic structures, identities, national policy preferences, interests and national patterns of governance are affected by pressure from developments at the European level. The most refined and minimalist definition of the concept might be: domestic political change generated by European integration (Harmsen and Wilson 2000, 14–8; Risse et al. 2001, 3; Olsen 2002, 923–24; Featherstone 2003; Vink 2003; Bache and Jordan 2006, 20–3). Europeanization as an analytical framework is generally categorized with regard to the direction and pattern of domestic change, i.e. how European-level developments feed back into the domestic level as a result of pressure from the EU. Among several approaches to the concept, Europeanization refers to a national adaptation of policies, institutions and policy-making processes for domestic use in response to developments at the EU level (top-down dimension –EU as a source of change) (Harmsen and Wilson 2000). In contrast, the Europeanization process may also involve states’ proactive
exportations of their policy, positions or models to the EU level by getting them adopted as European common policy (bottom-up dimension – EU as a subject of change). For example, Germany was able to Europeanize its low deficit and strictly defined macro-economic policies as convergence criteria in the framework of the Economic and Monetary Union. Also, the United Kingdom succeeded in Europeanizing its sanctions on Argentina during the Falkland conflict in 1982 (Wong 2006, 9).

Europeanization helps gauge not only domestic changes themselves, but also the processes of change. Laying out a framework for the domestic adaptation process opens the state’s black box by giving primacy to endogenous factors in terms of state actors’ capacity to modify or limit European signals, thereby setting the pace and degree of Europeanization. After all, accepting the pressures from the EU as a dominant variable may lead to an overestimation of European impact (Wong 2007, 332). As this article shows, apart from EU-level factors such as effective conditionality and a credible EU accession perspective, domestic sources of change in the form of capacity, willingness, government political and ideological preferences, pressure groups, public opinion and political parties as constraining or facilitating factors need to be considered. The Europeanization scholarship tends to conceptualize the process of domestic change through rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, which are embedded in neo-institutionalist theory. While both theories prioritize agency in bringing about domestic change, they differ in describing how actors define their goals and in what they perceive as rational behaviour (Börzel 2012, 11). More precisely, and providing a basis for this article, the former takes up the issue of ‘domestic change’ in the sense of the policy-makers’ strategic interests and preferences (cost-benefit analysis), as well as a redistribution of resources (as opportunities and constraints) across domestic actors by particularly taking into account the existence of veto players (Börzel and Risse 2003). Domestic change is catalysed if veto players are constrained from pursuing their goals or if the EU furnishes pro-reformist coalitions with additional resources to exploit the opportunities provided by Europeanization (Börzel 2003, 9). The latter theory, on the contrary, postulates that actors are guided by collective understandings of appropriate and socially accepted behaviour while defining their goals. It concerns Europeanization as a horizontal process of socialization, persuasion and collective learning, which focuses on the transformative impact of long-term interaction with EU institutions and elites through which actors’ interests, identities, attitudes, perceptions and expectations are altered, and EU norms and interests are internalized (Knill and Lehmkühl 1999; Börzel and Risse 2003, 59; Jacquot and Woll 2003; Bulmer and Radaelli 2004; Terzi 2010; Nas 2012). The extent of internalization is contingent, on the one hand, on norm entrepreneurs such as epistemic communities or advocacy networks that persuade actors to redefine their identities and interests, and on the other hand, a political culture that embraces a consensual atmosphere conducive to change (Börzel 2012, 12). The debate on accession Europeanization further focuses on the extent and nature of Europeanization, denoting that while socialization is a slow but steady process, change through the rationalist mechanisms of differential empowerment via EU conditionality may only give rise to cosmetic Europeanization, which is reversible, as opposed to entrenched Europeanization (Grabbe 2006; Terzi 2010, 2012). In this process, domestic actors may potentially use EU accession as a ‘legitimization device’ to push and justify their political agendas (Börzel 2012; Kaliber 2012; Tsarouhas 2012), thereby paving the
way for contextual Europeanization (Kaliber 2012). Yet, the EU’s differential impact on candidate states requires further empirical research because domestic actors/factors’ roles are still regarded as underspecified and ambiguous in the literature (see Börzel 2012, 12).

The EU impact on change in foreign policy is invisible, minimal, and thus difficult to detect, compared to the first pillar. Notwithstanding the methodological problems of the application of the conceptual framework of Europeanization to foreign policy and the unique characteristics of this policy area at the national and EU levels, there exist some changes documented in the study of Europeanization as a result of interaction between national and European levels.

Overviews of studies on foreign policy Europeanization in member states reveal that Europeanization occurs predominantly through voluntary policy convergence (top-down), bottom-up projection of national policy and socialization (Glarbo 2001; Tonra 2001; Aggestam 1999), rather than through forced adaptation to European requirements, which is frequently seen in first-pillar policy areas. This phenomenon occurs because it is believed that repeated interactions with the EU and enduring participation in CFSP mechanisms pave the way for a reorientation of foreign policy cultures (Smith 2000, 2004) as well as for the emergence of a ‘coordination reflex’ (Tonra 2003) among bureaucrats and decision-makers. Unlike the obligatory implementation of Community Law in the first pillar, in the absence of a supranational and authoritative actor in the CFSP, the EU can hardly enforce changes in the foreign policies of its members. Thus, the dominant pattern of Europeanization becomes ‘horizontal’, via learning, emulating and socialization. ‘Bottom-up’ Europeanization, via uploading of specific interests, policies and preferences to the EU level, also occurs. Examining the French, German and British cases suggests that policy projection capabilities and the intentions of those major powers have been influential in the pace and nature of political integration and in the formation of the CFSP and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Gross 2009). To further exemplify this, the bottom-up mode can be seen in the cases of France projecting the creation of the Political Union; Britain exporting the pillar structure of the CFSP, the EU’s Strategy Document; Greece uploading its Cyprus policy and its approach to Turkish–Greek relations; Germany uploading its creation of the Political Union and Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and Spain projecting its Latin American and Mediterranean policy. Policy changes in member states are predominantly nationally directed and in the form of voluntary adaptation instead of coercive convergence, and are by and large orchestrated by national capitals so as to better conform to European measures.

In addition to exerting pressure on current members, the EU also exerts pressures on candidate states. As opposed to member states, however, potential entrants are exposed to more hierarchical and coercive form of Europeanization through EU conditionality in almost every area, including foreign policy. During the formal accession process, each candidate state must adopt the acquis politique of the CFSP until accession. An ‘unequal’ relationship with the EU, consisting of accession negotiations and the principle of conditionality, furnishes it with more coercive ways to influence candidate states’ domestic policies. Because acceding states are not equipped with enough powers, such as the veto card, to influence the EU’s decision-making system from the inside, they must comply with EU conditionality to become a member. Unlike member states, they have no room to negotiate derogations and opt-outs (perhaps only transitional periods). Close monitoring by the
European Commission regarding adoption and implementation of EU policies multiplies the coerciveness of the accession process for candidates. This observation allows one to detect the magnitude and extension of the EU impact on Turkey’s Cyprus policy since 1999.

Europeanization is defined in this study as the process of change at the domestic (policy) level originating from adaptational pressures coming directly or indirectly from the EU, a process whose nature and extent is determined by a complex combination of factors, such as the level of incompatibility; credibility of conditionality and membership perspective; endogenous factors and the relative position of a state vis-à-vis the EU, i.e. whether it is a member or candidate.

Indeed, there is a widespread assumption that the EU policy of conditionality, declared at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, has become the basis for fostering change in candidate states (Grabbe 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006; Schimmelfennig et al. 2003; Hughes et al. 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005, 2007). The effectiveness of conditionality is mostly determined by the presence or absence of a credible membership perspective, preferences of the government in terms of the domestic political cost of change and preferences of the veto players (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). In fact, the close linkage between effective conditionality and maintaining a credible membership perspective was reflected in the 2005 Strategy Paper of the Commission. The paper emphasized that

the effectiveness of conditionality (...) depends on maintaining a credible political perspective for eventual integration into the Union. Aspirant countries can best sustain public support (...) when the EU supports them (...) and keeps its own promises.

(European Commission, Brussels, 9 November 2005)

In the context of enlargement, conditionality in the area of foreign policy is formalized through the third aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria: embracing the capacity to take on the obligations of membership as well as the adoption and implementation of the (CFSP) _acquis_. Acceding countries are expected to participate in the political dialogue to regularly align their positions with those of the other members of the Union, including around sanctions and restrictive measures, statements, declarations and démarches, where required. As far as settlement of the Cyprus dispute is concerned, EU conditionality (in foreign policy) can be considered part of the CFSP _acquis_ (the third Copenhagen criterion), relating to the Union’s common positions, declarations and statements on the Cyprus issue or, alternatively, as part of ‘enhanced political dialogue and political criteria’. The EU tends to handle the Cyprus problem as part of the latter, namely, enhanced political dialogue and political criteria, ‘sufficient’ fulfilment of which is regarded sine qua non for any candidate to embark upon accession talks, and non-compliance of which may result in suspension of talks. Although not formally uttered as part of the Copenhagen political criteria or as a precondition for membership by either Brussels or Ankara, the Cyprus issue has become a ‘non-Copenhagen benchmark’ at the rhetorical and political level that has been determining the pace and extent of Turkish–EU relations, particularly after Helsinki. Moreover, since 2006, the EU has treated the dispute not merely as a bilateral problem, dealing a blow to Turkish–EU relations in the political domain, but also as a legal and contractual issue, which further reduces room for bargaining and negotiation.
Practically, the legal and political basis for EU conditionality vis-à-vis Turkey is predominantly embodied by the Ankara Agreement (Association Agreement) and its Additional Protocol, Accession Partnership(s), Negotiating Framework Document, Enlargement Strategy Paper(s) and European Council Presidency Conclusions, as well as by Regular Reports. As will be detailed in the following parts, the Cyprus problem appears to be the main roadblock in Turkey’s otherwise smooth progress in accession negotiations.

**The Cyprus debacle: its genesis and evolution**

The island of Cyprus was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1571 until 1878, when it came under British colonial rule that lasted until 1960, when it became an independent republic. The Republic of Cyprus was a functional federation based on political equality of its two main communities, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and their obligation to share sovereignty with their respective powers of self-government. Geographical separation was avoided through a guaranteed system of bi-communal partnership. Three years later, the constitutional order threatened to deteriorate when President Makarios proposed to amend the constitution. The proposed changes were unacceptable to Turkish Cypriots and Turkey alike because the former would be relegated to minority status. The tension between the two communities led to anti-Turkish violence and civil disorder between 1964 and 1974. Since 1964, however, the Greek Cypriot side of Cyprus has enjoyed legitimacy via recognition of its government as the ‘Government of Cyprus’ by UN Security Council Resolution (186 S/5575). The issue rekindled in 1974 once the military junta in Athens attempted to overthrow Makarios and install a pro-enosis Nicos Sampson as president. Relying on Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee (to protect the island’s independence and restore constitutional order), Turkey landed troops in Cyprus and occupied the northern part in 1974, which resulted in the island’s de facto partition.

The UN has been exercising a good offices mission between the two communities on the island since 1968. Accordingly, a solution must be based on a State of Cyprus having a single sovereignty, an international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation that must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession.

Even if parties more or less accepted the UN-sponsored formula of bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, differences would still exist as to what this formula in fact would imply for each party (Axt 1999, 190–91). For the Greek Cypriots, a federative solution would mean swinging back to the pre-1974 status quo: a federation with a strong central government; single sovereignty, personality and citizenship for all Cypriots; free movement of persons; unrestricted purchase of property; restitution of lost property in the North instead of global exchange or compensation; some territorial readjustments; removal of Turkish troops; removal of Turkish settlers and continuation of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ by federalizing it via a constitutional exercise.

On the contrary, for Turkish Cypriots, a federal solution would embrace recognition of the equality of two separate peoples with differing cultures, religions and languages; continuance of the Treaty of Guarantee, emphasizing guarantees by Turkey, including troops on the island; a weak central government and stronger
federal governments; readjustment of Turkish territory, excluding Güzelyurt (Morphou) and Gazi Mağusa (Famagusta); compensation, global exchange and ‘limited’ return instead of property restitution; creation of a ‘new’ partnership state; and emphasis on strong bi-zonality.

The parties cannot even agree on when and how the conflict was triggered. For instance, the Greek Cypriots treat the Cyprus question as a ‘problem of invasion’ (of Turkish troops) that started in 1974, whereas for Turkish Cypriots, the genesis goes back to 1963, when they were ousted from power by their Greek compatriots, thus ending the partnership state of the former ‘Republic of Cyprus’. As to what the constitutional style of the Republic implicated, Greek Cypriots perceived that it was nothing but a ‘unitary state’; for the Turkish Cypriots, it was a ‘partnership state’ based on functional federation. For Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, the state of affairs that had been established through the 1959 and 1960 Agreements in Cyprus had been damaged: the internal balance was upset by the Greek Cypriots’ move to end the 1960 partnership in 1963. Further, the external balance was altered with the UN’s decision in 1964 legitimizing the ‘Government of Cyprus’, which was at the time composed only of Greek Cypriots via Greek Cypriots’. It further deteriorated when, Greek Cypriots gained EU membership under the banner of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ on May 2004 without settling the issue and before Turkey has become a member. In 1983, in an attempt to recover the internal balance and assert equal partnership vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriot side, by claiming the right of self-determination, declared independence under the name of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), but this entity is not recognized by any member of international community other than Turkey. Concerning the external balance, Turkey has reacted with a ‘persistent objection’ to what it regards as the ‘illegal’ unilateral application of Greek Cypriots for entry into the EU and the EU acceptance of that membership. 

Sources of incompatibility between the EU’s requirements and Turkey’s Cyprus policy

The level of mismatch between EU requirements and a country’s existing policies lies among factors determining the nature and extent of Europeanization. Thus, pinpointing the EU’s impact on Turkey’s Cyprus policy necessitates us to underline sources of incongruence between the requirements of Brussels of Ankara on the one hand, and Ankara’s position on the other. Understanding the nucleus of incompatibility is also of significance because the Cyprus impasse has always played a pivotal role across the Brussels–Ankara axis and presently lies at the heart of the current pause in Turkish–EU relations. In the post-Helsinki period, adaptation pressures – in the form of conditionality and a linkage policy – led to incompatibility between the Turkish and EU positions, the roots of which constitute the basis of the next section of this article.

The EU’s position: from self-declared ‘impartiality’ to active engagement

The EU and its predecessor, the European Community, have displayed considerable interest in the Cyprus dispute (e.g. see Brewin 1999, 2000; Müftüler-Baç and Güney 2005). Actually, the EU’s indirect involvement in the conflict began in the 1960s, when Greece (1962) and Turkey (1963) concluded association agreements;
the association status granted by the Community to Cyprus in 1972; Britain gained membership in 1973 by virtue of its colonial past and military bases on the island; and Greece gained membership in 1981 through its historical, cultural and ethnic links with the island as well as its political strategy of ‘enosis’. Because UN recognition is regarded as a standard for other international actors, the EU followed suit. The EU and its member states regard the UN as an appropriate framework for resolution of the Cyprus dispute and strongly endorse UN parameters for solution.

In fact, the Union had previously adopted a ‘policy of even-handedness’ towards its associate members of Turkey and Greece and asserted ‘the rule of non-discrimination’ in the Association Agreement signed with Cyprus in 1972. That policy, however, could only be sustained until Greece became a member in 1981. Since then, Greece has strived to upload its twin-pillar political strategy towards Turkey, involving first, the accession of Cyprus to the EU, and second, linking a rapprochement between Ankara and Brussels with progress on the Cyprus problem (Stivachtis 2002, 50). Greece’s strategy was adopted at the Community level in April 1988, when the European Council stated that ‘the Cyprus problem affects EC–Turkey relations’; this was later reiterated in the Dublin European Council decisions on 25–26 June 1990.

Indeed, the Greek Cypriot application to the Community and its eventual accession process leading to membership in 2004 helped deaden the issue for the EU and partly resulted in the current impasse in Turkish–EU relations. In the beginning, the widespread view in the then-EC underlined that Cyprus membership was not possible without prior political settlement. Nonetheless, beginning at the Corfu and Essen Summits of 1994, and the 6 March 1995 decision of the EU General Affairs Council, the EU has considerably revised its position, arguing that Cyprus can become a member even without prior settlement of the issue, though it was still thought that Cyprus’ accession to the EU would act as catalyst for a negotiated solution.

Particularly since the 1990s, Turkish–EU relations have not been able to evolve independently of the problems between Turkey and Greece, including the Cyprus issue. While granting Turkey candidacy status, the Helsinki European Council reported that resolution of the Cyprus debacle was not a precondition for accession of Cyprus to the EU, yet it explicitly linked Turkey’s pre-accession process to settlement of its problems with Greece and Cyprus. This condition was also included in the 2001 Accession Partnership Document for Turkey as one of the short-term priorities. The EU assumed that given the strong possibility of a veto by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to block Turkey’s eventual accession to the EU, Turkey was expected to adopt a more active and conciliatory approach in the dispute before Cyprus’ entry (Tocci 2002, 107–9).

Accession talks with Turkey were finally launched on 3 October 2005. One of the conditions articulated for Ankara was to extend the Ankara Agreement of 1963 with the European Economic Community (EEC), to the Union’s ten new members, including Cyprus, which is not recognized by Turkey. Further, under the Negotiating Framework document prepared for Turkey, which sets out the principles governing accession negotiations, Ankara’s progress in accession talks will be measured, inter alia, by its ‘continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and (...) to contribute a [progress in the normalization of bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU
Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus. On 29 July 2005, the Turkish government signed the Additional Protocol, but issued a declaration saying that its signature did not denote recognition of Cyprus. Ankara ultimately declined to implement the Protocol by refusing to open its harbours and airports to Cyprus-flagged vessels and aircrafts. In the wake of Turkey’s move, the EU adopted a counter-declaration on 21 September 2005 to make it clear that the ‘(...) opening of negotiations on the relevant chapters depends on Turkey’s implementation of its contractual obligations to all Member States’, and underlined the importance of Turkey recognizing all Member States and normalizing relations with them as an indispensable component of the accession process (Council of the EU, Brussels, 21 September 2005). Upon the Commission’s recommendation for the partial suspension of talks on the grounds that Turkey had failed to comply with the Protocol and thus prevented the free movement of goods, on 11 December 2006, EU foreign ministers decided to suspend talks with Turkey on eight relevant chapters by declaring that ‘no chapter will be provisionally closed until Turkey has fulfilled its commitment’. Moreover, five other chapters have been blocked by France and six chapters have been blocked by Cyprus for political reasons – mostly because of the Cyprus problem. Hence, not only the settlement of the Cyprus dispute but also the recognition of it has become a condition for Turkey’s bid for EU membership, thereby setting the stage for ongoing incompatibility between Brussels and Ankara.

Contrary to what the EU expected, allowing Cypriot accession to the EU by dropping conditionality for Greek Cypriots during 1994–1995 decreased Turkish (including Turkish Cypriot) incentive for conciliation, at least until 2002. Indeed, the membership perspective given to Greek Cypriots under the name of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ and the concomitant evolution of Turkey–EU relations have direct implications on Turkish policy regarding the Cyprus debacle.

**Turkey’s position: before the AKP era**

The Cyprus impasse has always occupied a central place within Turkish foreign policy, with implications for regional and global security starting from the early 1960s, but especially since the 1974 Turkish military intervention on the island. The Cyprus question is such a controversial issue that no government in Turkey, even if it desired, can go beyond the ‘national settlement package’ that has emerged so far, and which is so powerful in shaping Turkish public opinion.

As a matter of fact, Turkey’s official position regarding its parameters for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem has evolved over the years, beginning with (between 1964 and 1974) endorsing an equal say for the Turkish Cypriot community in the central administration and special (security) guarantees, to (between 1974 and 1998) favouring federalism (based on geography), especially after Bülent Ecevit came to power as Turkish Prime Minister, to (between 1998 and 2003) confederation and demand for prior recognition of the TRNC to (since 2003) buttressing the Annan Plan’s federative solution. During those periods, while pledging support to inter-communal talks under the good offices mission of the UN, Ankara consistently asked that Turkish Cypriots’ security needs be met, for preservation of an internal balance between the two communities and an external balance between Turkey and Greece, and for equal participation of the Turkish Cypriot community in the central government.
For Turkey, Greek Cypriot EU membership as ‘a second Greek state’ implies ‘an indirect integration with Greece’, which is in contravention of international treaties. Turkey considered Cyprus’ application for membership illegitimate because there has not been a joint government representative of the entire island since 1963. Ankara further maintains that only after the two communities agreed on the sovereign equality of the sides and reached a political settlement should the issue of EU membership have been considered, and that a federal Cyprus should have joined the EU only simultaneously with Turkey’s accession.

As opposed to what the EU had hoped for, the smooth accession of Cyprus to the EU without precondition for political settlement was made possible at the expense of: first, unstable relations between Brussels and Ankara; second, hardening of the latter’s position on a comprehensive political solution to the Cyprus dispute (at least until 2002); and third, the establishment of even closer relations between Turkey and the TRNC. For Turkey, concomitant with the EU’s decision to launch accession talks with Cyprus in March 1998, the framework for a federal settlement and the relevant parameters that had accumulated to that point became invalid and inapplicable. Turkey then formulated a Cyprus Confederation thesis, referring to the pre-acceptance by Greek Cypriots of the recognition of the political equality and sovereignty of the TRNC as a basis for resuming any inter-communal negotiations on the island.

Although institutional, legal and policy Europeanization started with Turkey’s candidacy in 1999, the EU accession perspective could not generate a change in Cyprus policy at the governmental level until 2002. Between May 1999 and November 2002, the coalition government of the DSP (Democratic Left Party), the MHP and the ANAP (Motherland Party) led by veteran Bülent Ecevit was in power in Turkey. Despite the mounting EU pressure in 2001 and 2002, intra-coalition dynamics did not allow the expected policy change in Cyprus. Apart from high public support concerning Turkey’s EU perspective, domestically empowered liberal reform coalitions, eager to question traditional foreign policy over Cyprus, generally embraced the relatively weak and liberal coalition partner ANAP and business circles. Yet, domestic pro-reformists could not override the conservative impact of the DSP and the nationalist-statist MHP nor the political preferences of the state establishment (Narbonne and Tocci 2009; Ulusoy and Verney 2009; Terzi 2010). The lack of political will and capacity on the part of government to change the status-quo in its Cyprus policy was due largely to a perception of Greece encircling Turkey, the linkage policy of the EU, ambivalent jargon adopted at Helsinki, EU membership of Cyprus before Turkey, and uncertainties on the way to Turkish membership. The pace of Europeanization was stepped up with the AKP’s coming to power in November 2002, yet visibly slowed after a date for accession talks was established in 2005. The change in Ankara’s Cyprus policy – a shift from the confederation proposal made in 1998 to striving for a federalist solution as indicated by the UN-sponsored Annan Plan in 2004 – was facilitated by the AKP government, which adopted a conciliatory rhetoric and a win-win policy in Cyprus.

The Cyprus issue during the AKP era: what difference?

While explaining how the EU has affected Turkey’s policy change in Cyprus, the conceptual framework of Europeanization tells us that whether incompatibility leads to change depends on the presence of various factors facilitating or hindering
national adaptation and change. A credible prospect of Turkish membership after 1999 contributed to the process of emergence and consolidation of a collective of formal facilitating actors in the Turkish political landscape, who ardently advocated EU membership and made a powerful commitment to undertake the related reforms. As Kaliber (2005, 334) succinctly put it, the boundaries between ‘foreign policy devoid of public discussion and political input’ on the one hand, and ‘politicians representing political will’ on the other, began to disappear in the wake of Helsinki. The traditional Cyprus policy pursued by pro-status quo, pro-establishment and nationalist veto players has begun to be challenged by a combination of ‘the executive and civil society’. The influential ingredients of such a coalition are comprised of the majority government formed by the AKP, as well as NGOs (particularly those embracing representatives of big business, such as TÜSİAD), that are increasingly manifesting themselves in the political arena by advocating democratization in the Turkish context.

Following Turkey’s November 2002 parliamentary elections, the AKP government established itself as an enthusiastic player determined to facilitate the fulfilment of the accession criteria; therefore, settling the Cyprus problem would provide relief across the Ankara–Brussels axis. The idea of pledging support for federation in Cyprus as foreseen in the Annan Plan was considered by Turkish decision-making elites as the most comprehensive peace plan ever, and it was brought to the newly elected government at the appropriate time. As part of a tactical move, it was thought that the Plan should have been given a chance to be negotiated because it had enjoyed the widespread support of major powers and the international community as a whole. Accordingly, Turkish policy was based upon the strong supposition that because Greek Cypriots would likely reject the Plan, Turkey would capitalize on an affirmative approach either way.

Indeed, with the newly elected government, some aspects of Turkey’s Cyprus policy were redesigned. First, unlike the former policy stance of denying linkage, the AKP grasped the linkage between Turkey’s bid for EU membership and settlement in Cyprus because its leadership believed in the necessity of changing the status quo, and felt that non-settlement in Cyprus was not a solution. The AKP’s election manifesto explicitly referred to the Belgian model based on a federation composed of two communities (rather than states). While endorsing the Annan Plan’s vision of a single state with two self-governing zones, the government challenged the status quo on the island since the 1974 military intervention. The second aspect of the new policy was to reverse the long-standing perception that Turks had been the reluctant and obstructionist party throughout the peace talks. The AKP government wanted to send a message that the Turkish side would always keep psychological superiority by being receptive to new peace proposals and throwing the ball into the court of the Greek Cypriots (Robins 2007, 297). Notwithstanding its visible gravitation towards a federalist solution offered by the Annan Plan, constant themes in Turkey’s official Cyprus policy has been the persistent objection to Cypriot EU membership and an emphasis on the rights of Turkey, emanating from the London–Zurich Accords.

Following the above discussion, given Turkey’s membership aspirations, the change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy between the years 2002 and 2005 can be overwhelmingly attributed to the EU’s adaptational pressures, such as the inevitable fact of Cypriot membership before Turkey and without precondition of settlement (indirectly), and the conditionality and linkage policy of the EU as evidenced by the
Helsinki conclusions (directly). Further pressure came from TÜSİAD between 2001 and 2002, which conducted Brussels-based lobbying activities, embarked upon an extensive media campaign, and made frequent public statements, trying to build mass support for EU membership and exert mounting pressure on the government to revise the official policy stance in Cyprus and endorse the Annan Plan.

Ankara had always officially backed Northern Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş, who was usually regarded as a nationalist hardliner. Yet, there had been a growing tension between Denktaş and the AKP government as the latter adopted a constructive stance towards the Annan Plan. Denktaş’ hesitancy to seriously negotiate the Plan was facing strong societal and political pressures from within the TRNC as well. Against the eventual reconfiguration of political forces in Northern Cyprus, pro-EU actors in favour of reunification, led by leftist-unionist Mehmet Ali Talat, gained the upper hand, gradually removing the nationalists from power in parliamentary elections in December 2003 and then in presidential elections in April 2005.

Given the looming deadline of Cyprus’ accession, Turkish and Greek Cypriots resumed negotiations at the end of 2001. In December 2002, the Copenhagen European Council declared that accession talks with Cyprus had been concluded and that the country would become an EU member. It also stated that ‘if the December 2004 European Council [in Brussels] decides that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the negotiations will be opened without delay’. The intercommunal talks on the island based upon the Annan Plan could not secure a deal in 2002 due to the strong reservations of the Turkish military and Denktaş concerning security, bizonality, sovereignty and equality (Ulusoy 2008). Yet, both before and after the Copenhagen summit, societal dissent in the form of public demonstrations and business and media pressures in Turkey and the TRNC, indicated an explicit preference for reunification of the island before its EU membership, thereby pushing the Turkish side to negotiate the Annan Plan (Ulusoy 2008). This time, endorsed by a significant part of civilian and military bureaucracy, the AKP government decided to return the negotiation table. Following intercommunal talks during February and March 2004, the Annan Plan was brought to referendums in both parties on 24 April in an attempt to reunify the island before its membership. Unfortunately, the attempt failed due to its overwhelming rejection (75.83%) by the Greek Cypriot people. This result was in stark contrast to the strong affirmative vote of the Turkish Cypriots (64.91%). Behind the Greek Cypriots’ rejectionist stance lay an already guaranteed EU membership on 1 May 2004, and the likelihood of negotiating better terms for Cyprus in the future, and a veto power to defer Turkey’s membership. Indeed, the rejection of the plan was explicitly called for by the other side’s nationalist hardliner leader Tassos Papadopoulos, in a televised address on 7 April 2004, where he asked for a resounding no to the Annan Plan from the Greek Cypriot people. In December 2004, the Brussels European Council decided that Turkey ‘sufficiently’ fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, and thus it would open accession negotiations on 3 October 2005. The Turkish government was also called upon to extend the Ankara Agreement to the EU’s ten new members including Cyprus. While the Union’s decision to launch accession talks with Turkey enforced the latter to sign the Additional Protocol on 29 October 2005, Ankara simultaneously fell short of expectations with neither its implementation nor its recognition of Cyprus. The Erdoğan government justifies its refusal to implement the Protocol on account of the fact that the EU has not been able to live
up to its promises concerning direct trade and easing of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots on cultural and athletic affairs so far. In order to overcome the difficulties deriving from the bottleneck in Cyprus and to reflect its dedication to comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus impasse, Turkey came forward with two initiatives in 2005 and 2006, which called upon all relevant parties to simultaneously eradicate all restrictions imposed on both sides around freedom of goods, persons and services. The accelerated pace of Europeanization continued until 2005; however, given the mismatch between the implementation of the Protocol and the recognition of Cyprus, as well as the EU’s failure to give Turkey a credible membership perspective and fulfil its promises of easing the isolation of Turkish Cypriots, it registered an apparent deceleration following the opening of accession talks in 2005 (Robins 2003, 2007; Patton 2007, 344). Also, the EU’s decision on December 2006 to partially suspend talks with Turkey on eight chapters appeared to underline once again the linkage between Turkey’s accession and concessions on Cyprus, thus the EU’s unwillingness to maintain its commitment to Turkey’s membership (Ulusoy and Verney 2009, 122). Against a nationalist backlash at home, the EU’s move contributed to the government’s reluctance to take further action in favour of a solution. Subsequent to a visible inertia between 2005 and 2008 in Turkish–EU relations, the government decided to complete preparations for the remaining chapters regardless of whether they were blocked until 2013 so that until the Cyprus deadlock is overcome, Turkey could gain time and the EU would be deprived of any pretext to slow Turkish–EU relations again. The AKP’s ‘rediscovery’ of the EU anchor for democratization at home in 2008 coincided with the lawsuit filed for its closure by the Constitutional Court. After the failure of the Annan Plan, inter-communal negotiations were given a fresh boost by the UN Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari in 2006. Yet, it was not until PM Erdoğan sent a letter in 2008 that the process was rejuvenated, leading to negotiations between Talat and pro-solution Greek Cypriot leader Christofias on 3 September 2008. The basic principles that would guide the negotiations had already been declared by those leaders at a meeting on 23 May: bi-communal and bi-zonal federation with a single international personality, single sovereignty and single citizenship composed of the politically equal founding states of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The negotiations regarding the 2008 peace process has been particularly built on six major issues: government, EU affairs, security and guarantees, land, property and economy. As an extension to its policy of being one step ahead, Turkey’s motivation for this initiative was to work out the protocol crises and to detach the Cyprus imbroglio from Turkish–EU relations. The EU’s decision to incorporate Cyprus as a divided island and its disregard of Turkish Cypriots’ support for the Annan Plan by failing to deliver on its promises of termination of their isolation created disappointment in the North, where hardline nationalists led by Derviş Eroğlu eventually displaced Talat in parliamentary elections in April 2009 and then in presidential elections in 2010. Yet, the fact that Eroğlu’s leadership did not lead to the collapse of talks shows the continuing commitment of Turkish governing elites to reunification on the basis of the UN body of work. Similar to the 2001–2004 period leading to the Annan Plan’s referenda, Greek Cypriots are enjoying the legitimacy, the benefits of the title of Republic of Cyprus representing the whole island, and more recently the EU membership leverage, and seem to be unwilling to cede their superiority at the negotiation table.
In the Turkish general elections held on 12 June 2011, PM Erdoğan won a victory for the third time, raising party votes to 49.9%. The third AKP government chose to visibly adopt a hardline rhetoric not only in domestic politics (i.e. the Kurdish issue) but also in foreign affairs, including Israel, Syria, Armenia, the EU and the Cyprus issues. As the Erdoğan government consolidated its political power, which has been attended by sound economic performance, a more self-confident tone is increasingly noted in its handling of the Cyprus issue and the pattern of Turkish–EU relations. For example, on his visit to Northern Cyprus on 20 July 2011 after the elections, Erdoğan warned that if Cyprus assumed presidency of the EU on July 2012 and negotiations on the island were not finalized by then, Turkey would suspend its relations with the EU. In a similar vein, Turkish President Abdullah Gül said on an official visit to London on November 2011 that when Cyprus takes over rotating presidency of the EU on July 2012, it would be a ‘half-country leading a miserable union’ and added that unless the EU persuaded the Greek Cypriots to reach a compromise by July 2012, there would be no reason for the Greek Cypriots to reconcile, and Turkey might consider a two-state solution. As has been frequently pointed out by Turkish leaders in recent years, inter-communal negotiations cannot continue indefinitely; for the Turkish side, putting a final date for settlement is necessary to compel the Greek Cypriot side to compromise. Likewise, Eroğlu acknowledged that negotiations would not continue after 1 July 2012, and that the only chance for settlement would be to convene an international conference; otherwise parameters for solution would have to be revised. Given the split in the UN Security Council and Greek Cypriot objections to the idea of arbitration, scheduling and international conference, a more likely option would be to devise a new peace plan. A Ban Ki Moon Plan is expected to be agreed upon in early 2014 and put to referenda after March 2014. In case this attempt fails to conclude a peace agreement, too, the UN would most probably be announcing the international community the termination of its good offices mission that has been lasting since 1968, in the absence of a will in favour of reunification. In fact, this would legitimize a search for alternative parameters of solution other than reunification, including peaceful coexistence of two states as a last resort.

Concomitantly, as far as the rising strategic importance of Cyprus’ location in the context of Baku-Tsiblis-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the East–West energy corridor, and its proximity to the geography of the ‘Arab Spring’, a Turkish presence in Cyprus is occupying a more noteworthy place in regional leadership calculations and the Turkish government’s multidimensional foreign policy (see also Kaliber 2012). For example, in September 2011, the Greek Cypriots initiated exploratory drilling for natural gas and oil in the Mediterranean with the partnership of an American-Israeli firm. Turkey reacted by signing the Continental Shelf Limitation Agreement with Turkish Cypriots and sent the Turkish vessel Piri Reis to carry out research in the region. In fact, in the light of its ascending regional role and activism in recent years, Turkey is highly likely to aim to prevent any unilateral advantage by Greek Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean without the Cyprus issue being resolved. Interestingly, as hopes for a settlement erode and the government’s patience for determining a final date for solution, its post-election discourse on the Cyprus debacle has become considerably closer to the hawkish, pro-status quo, security-first policy based on the two-state solution proposed by the former Northern Cypriot leader Denktaş and some Turkish decision-making elites in the late 1990s.31

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At the end of the day, policy change required by EU conditionality is ultimately decided and implemented by a country’s government, which evaluates the benefits of complying with EU rules vis-à-vis the domestic costs of their adoption by taking into account domestic and EU-related pressures and the maximization of its political advantages (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). How this calculation relates to Turkey constitutes the next section.

The AKP government’s cost-benefit calculation

The structure of the accession process, strictly underpinned by demands through negotiations, requires involvement of national executives who are considered to have a ‘privilege over legislature and judiciary in terms of political attention and commitment of resources, both human and financial’ (Grabbe 2001, 1016). The Turkish political system does not constitute an exception in that regard; the executive branch – especially when holding the majority in the parliament – is afforded considerable power and influence in the decision-making process, including in matters of foreign policy.

This article suggests that in deciding to change Turkey’s stance on its Cyprus policy, the AKP’s cost-benefit analysis appeared to be affected by four related sets of factors: first, support pledged by Turkish society to the EU accession process; second, EU membership as a state policy for almost fifty years; third, EU-related factors, such as the presence and/or absence of a credible EU membership perspective and the asymmetrical relationship with the EU during the pre-accession period, bolstered by both the conditionality and the linkage policy of the EU; and fourth, the effects of veto players.

The first factor relates to domestic public opinion with regards to the EU and its support of membership, mostly due to expected material benefits and a better standard of living. This support is accompanied by – somewhat ironically – fears, scepticism and mistrust of the Union. In fact, fluctuations in public support of Brussels stem from various factors, including unfavourable statements by politicians in member states regarding Turkey’s European credentials and eventual membership; perceived double standards for Turkey regarding the Cyprus issue and EU’s linkage policy, especially in the face of the principles laid down in the Negotiating Framework document and other declarations and reports; and the non-reciprocal demands of the EU. The level of support is also related to the historical factor of the ‘Sevres trauma’, denoting the emergence of the modern Turkish Republic following the anti-imperialist war waged against European powers. Together, these factors incite scepticism towards the so-called ‘Western powers’. According to Eurobarometer polls, the percentage of Turkish people who think that ‘membership to the EU is a good thing’ has varied between 55% in the autumn of 2005 and 42% in the spring of 2008, with a rise to 48% in the spring of 2009 and drop to 42% in the autumn of 2010. As long as support to the EU accession process in Turkey is identified with economic welfare, one may expect further erosion to the enthusiasm for membership to the Union given the recent economic and political turmoil in the Eurozone.

Such public anxiety may occasionally give rise to nationalism, which is partly boosted by the perceived psyche of being discriminated against by the EU. According to a 2008 public opinion research poll on nationalism in Turkey, 50.1% of people think that nationalism has risen recently in Turkey (although
30.4% rejected this argument). The reasons for this observed increase in nationalism include ‘the EU’s ostracizing and annoying attitude towards Turkey’ (33.8%); ‘Turkey’s inadequacy in foreign policy, Iraq and Cyprus (23.6%), and ‘some groups in Turkey made their claims by relying on the US and the EU’ (16.1%).

Given the general support of Turkish society towards the idea of EU membership, however, steps aiming at bringing Turkey closer to the EU at home would raise the AKP’s share of the votes, boost its domestic legitimacy as a pro-EU, liberal and democratic mass party, and consolidate Turkish democracy in the case of a settlement in Cyprus. Similarly, in the face of a good deal of sympathy and solidarity registered by the Turkish people towards Turkish Cypriots, termination of their isolation and embargo in the event of a solution, would no doubt lead to the development of the northern part of the island, which would in turn increase the domestic endorsement the AKP enjoys.

Conversely, public opinion in the sense of rising nationalism (partly as a result of the EU’s perceived discriminatory policy), also acts as an important factor in the AKP government’s care to not alienate its electoral constituency, especially since 2005, in the face of opposition by veto players. The AKP government took a political risk by buttressing the Annan Plan, because the Cyprus issue, for the most part, acts like a barometer in terms of directing incitement of nationalistic impulses and fluctuations in Turkish societal support for EU membership. Although the AKP emerged stronger after the June 2011 general elections, it is well aware of the need to sustain as much public support as possible (including from the nationalists), for the upcoming new constitution and Erdoğan’s probable claim for presidency.

The second factor concerns EU membership as a long-standing state policy in Turkey (almost 50 years), which means that ‘becoming European’ and ‘being involved in European structures’, have been long-pursued goals, and can be even traced to the Tanzimat period in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire (Karaosmanoğlu 2000). If the AKP aspires to be a mass party of national standing, it cannot merely pay lip service to the goal of EU membership; in Turkey, Westernization, Europeanization and modernization have long been used interchangeably. This factor signifies the possible domestic and international prestige and credibility that the AKP would garner by bringing Turkey one step closer to the EU. The AKP feels that in the event of a settlement on the island, the international embargo and isolation of Turkish Cypriots would be increasingly difficult to sustain. More importantly, Turkey would dissolve perhaps one of the most significant barriers on its journey to EU accession. Although Turkey’s relations with the EU are the lowest since 2005, the AKP continues to pursue reforms to align its legislation with the EU acquis. Ankara’s long-awaited dream of joining the EU club has been mirrored recently by the words of Turkish president Gül ‘Turkish-EU relations are not contingent on conjunctural fluctuations of economic life. Membership to the EU is a strategic goal that Turkey has declared’ (Abdullah Gül 16 September 2011, http://www.euractiv.com).

The third factor corresponds to EU-related factors, such as the presence and/or absence of a credible EU membership perspective and an asymmetrical relationship with the EU during the pre-accession period, bolstered by both conditionality and the EU linkage policy. Basically, this factor is related to the transformative power of the EU vis-à-vis the candidate state Turkey.
The case of Turkey’s Cyprus policy suggests that once a state achieved candidacy, rule adoption becomes more unlikely in the absence of conditionality, the credibility of which is most effectively achieved with the start of accession negotiations. Later, however, credibility necessitates perpetuating the ultimate membership perspective, marked by a reasonable and pre-determined period of time for accession.\textsuperscript{34} In the Turkish case, there has been too much emphasis on the ‘open-ended’ nature of the talks, on the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’ and on the possibility of ‘permanent derogations’ in key areas such as free movement of persons, structural funds and agriculture.\textsuperscript{35} There have also been various factors adversely affecting the credibility of the EU membership perspective and thus the EU’s capacity and potential to influence Turkey’s Cyprus policy. Those factors embrace both circumstantial and deep-rooted troubles, stemming from the EU’s institutional structure (complex political bargaining and veto politics); economic and political crises;\textsuperscript{36} prominency of debates (focusing more on pressing and existential matters such as deepening rather than widening) involving the Union’s future political and institutional vision; a return to discussions of the ‘multi-speed Europe’ of the early 1990s; prevalent political unwillingness in Europe regarding Turkey’s membership; and the politicization of the Cyprus question following Cyprus’ membership.

European Union conditionality’s transformative power has an unwritten aspect that affects Turkey’s position, particularly its perception regarding the benefits of Turkey’s EU membership. Notwithstanding the EU’s decision to launch negotiations, perceived unjust aspects of the negotiating terms and other factors related to the overall pattern of Turkish–EU relations (discussed above) have raised serious suspicions on the Turkish side with regard to the EU’s sincerity, political will and credibility. For example, in late 2011, Gül commented that ‘the failure to open new chapters in Turkey’s negotiating process is harming the 27-nation bloc’s reputation and it could suffer its biggest loss of credibility in 2012 when Cyprus takes over the rotating EU presidency in July’.\textsuperscript{37} Sceptical and somehow hostile statements by European leaders as to Turkey’s European credentials and membership prospects\textsuperscript{38} consolidate these suspicions. The credibility of EU conditionality for Turkey is most likely to be affected by the increasing tendency of some EU members, foremost France and the Netherlands, towards basing a decision about Turkey’s EU membership on the results of national referenda, and by letting arguments against Turkey’s membership overly occupy the agenda during national and EU Parliament election campaigns. Moreover, the political discourse of some countries, such as Germany and Austria, that it is better to offer a ‘Special Status’ to Turkey than full membership leads many to the impression that even if Turkey fully complies with the accession criteria, it would still not be offered full membership.

That the relationship between Turkey and the EU is still laden with ambiguities undermines the perceived benefits of EU membership (for the government). These developments also pave the way for resentment in a public susceptible to inducements of the Eurosceptic and conservative veto playing wing in Turkey, with their implications of jeopardizing the legitimacy of the reforms and change.

The asymmetrical relationship between Turkey and the EU since 1999 denotes that neither temporal factors (only a decade-long and limited participation in the EU as a candidate) nor the EU’s decision-making system (allowing candidates little room to manoeuvre) can endow Ankara with an opportunity to upload or gradually transform its foreign policy via socialization the way a member state can. By
capitalizing on the EU’s institutional structure and complicated political bargaining as members of the Union, both Greece and Cyprus have a strong lever by which to defend their strategic positions in the Cyprus dispute. This situation increased the degree of asymmetry already embedded in Turkish–EU relations; and cognizant of that, the AKP government had to take into account the clear message given by the EU that finding a solution in Cyprus would facilitate Turkey’s accession process.

A fourth factor involving the government’s cost-benefit calculations relates to the effect of veto players. Generally speaking, whether domestic policy change is achieved as a result of conditionality depends not only on government preferences but also on the existence of veto players, for whom the conditionality and domestic adoption costs are disadvantageous for their relative power positions but ‘whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo’ (Tsebelis 2002). That is, the relevance of veto players for government decision-making emanates from first, their capability to block, retard or slow the process of change, and second, the necessity of their ultimate agreement or consent to change in the status-quo ante.

As a result of the indirect operation of Europeanization in the post-Helsinki period, different actors have played a part in affecting the government’s decision—in interaction with the EU—concerning change in the period between 2002 and 2005 and in persistence with and current standstill in Turkish–EU relations since then. Developing close relations with Europe and full membership in the EU has been long seen as an ultimate goal by the veto players led by the CHP, MHP, and the military in Turkey. Ironically, they fear that the EU process of ensuring a country’s democracy, pluralism, human rights and individual freedoms standards might endanger the unitary and secular characteristics of the Turkish state. The veto players are not completely against the idea of membership, but they have a certain level of distaste for it, particularly for the political conditions of full membership. They are sceptical of the ‘road’ towards the EU, rather than the ultimate end of ‘EU membership’. More recently, they have also disagreed with what they consider the ‘unfair’ terms of the negotiations, including open-endedness, long-term membership prospects, and the ambiguous mix of the conditions and incentives set by the EU. Therefore, they would like to see the terms changed to reflect their thinking, especially pertaining to the political criteria regarding the ‘security risks’ involved. Also, as part of their prevalent state-centric and security-oriented state of mind, they are reluctant to delegate national sovereignty to a supranational authority like the EU or to local authorities in the event of membership because both cases would undermine national autonomy.

Since 2005, the EU’s treatment of Turkey in the Cyprus problem has not only dampened enthusiasm for accession but also spurred anti-EU nationalist sentiments in Turkey by preventing the AKP government from taking bold steps towards implementing the Additional Protocol. Apparently, the decline in domestic support for the EU prepared a base susceptible to exploitation by the veto players’ statist-nationalist rhetoric.

After not receiving enough votes in the 1999 elections to be in Parliament, the CHP became the main opposition party in the November 2002, July 2007 and June 2011 general elections. During negotiations over the Annan Plan between 2002 and 2004, by adopting a state-centred and security-first platform, the CHP carried out a massive rejectionist campaign against changing in Turkey’s Cyprus policy.39
every occasion, CHP officials harshly criticized the AKP’s commitment to the Annan Plan as a basis for settlement by pointing out its shortcomings concerning bizonality, territorial adjustments and Turkey’s guarantorship rights. Security considerations and the strategic importance of the island for Turkey provide the basis for the CHP’s approach towards the Cyprus problem. Despite being at the centre-left of the political spectrum, in recent years (at least until Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu assumed the party leadership in May 2010 with a strong social democratic rhetoric), the CHP has paradoxically acted as one of the strongest veto players in the Turkish domestic political landscape, with its continuous effort to boost its electoral base by capitalizing on rising nationalist and anti-EU feelings. The new leadership’s stance on Cyprus remained unchanged. Kılıçdaroğlu noted that the Cyprus problem has become more complicated during AKP government’s tenure and should be immediately settled through negotiations based on the UN’s proposed bi-communal, bi-zonal federation composed of two founding states with political equality of the parties.

Built around the ideological tenets of nationalism and Turkish–Islamist synthesis, the MHP remained in power between the 1999 and 2002 general elections as the second major party (after the DSP) and as part of the coalition government forged between the centre-left DSP and centre-right ANAP. After a five-year absence following the November 2002 elections, it became the third largest party in both the July 2007 and June 2011 general elections. The MHP is in favour of the status quo in Cyprus but does not reject a confederal solution based on the existence of two separate states, as has been propounded by former Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash and some Turkish state officials since 1998. The MHP has seriously opposed the EU’s handling of the Cyprus problem, terms of the accession talks, and the AKP’s support for the Annan Plan. For instance, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli termed the EU ‘the main stumbling block for the settlement’ because they allowed Cyprus to join the Union in contravention of international law, and comitantly discouraged Greek Cypriots from settling the problem (Bahçeli 2002). Bahçeli denounced the government’s policy of relegating the framework of the solution to the EU (i.e. essentially making it a party to the conflict) because it would put the solution advocating a bi-communal and bi-zonal partnership structure composed of the two states, as well as Turkey’s guarantorship rights, in complete jeopardy. If this process were to continue, he warned, ‘our national survival will suffer’ (Bahçeli 2009, 33–5). Having secured itself as pro-establishment with its strong Euro-sceptic, ‘security and state-first’ tone, the MHP balances the government’s pro-change and pro-EU policies, although mirrors the EU’s own ambiguity over Turkey’s eventual membership and Cyprus policy.

Despite being the vanguard of Westernization and holding a long-standing aim of membership in European institutions (including the EU), the Turkish army is believed by many to be involved in the country’s anti-EU coalition, largely because of its guardianship role and focus on securing a secular and unitary state. For the military, the need for a presence on the northern part of the island has been accompanied by a strategic dimension since the mid-1990s, with the looming prospect of Cyprus becoming an EU member before Turkey. During the post-Helsinki reform process, rather than acting as a totally rejectionist veto player vocally opposing the idea of settlement in Cyprus altogether, the military acknowledged the primacy of civilian authorities and political responsibility on Cyprus, and preferred to share its
reservations about the Annan Plan with the government through the National Security Council (NSC). For example, the ‘red lines’ of the military concerning undiluted bizonality, maintenance of Turkey’s guarantorship rights, and ensuring in a peace plan that derogations (i.e. freedom of movement and freedom of settlement, among others) become part of EU primary law, were articulated in a meeting of the NSC on 5 April 2004. Given their emphasis on the island’s geographical proximity and the strategic importance of defending Turkey’s southern borders on the one hand, and the freedoms and lives of Turkish Cypriots on the other, the military elites are wary of the EU’s stance on the grounds that the latter has failed to stand at an equal distance from the parties to the dispute. One of the major faultlines between the military and the government concerned the former’s opposition to the Erdoğan’s view that the Annan Plan could be accepted as it was. Between 2002 and 2003, the military elite backed Denktas’ leadership in contrast to dissociation of the AKP government from his negotiating position. Once inter-communal negotiations collapsed in March 2003, the government began to realize that revisions to the Plan would be necessary (Akşit and Melakopides 2008, 9). Hence, despite an initial veto, the military establishment reluctantly endorsed the Annan Plan as a reference for negotiations and paved the way for a change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy at the NSC meeting on 23 January 2004. Its consent to that change was only materialized in view of its sensitivity over the prospect of long-term political stability and fulfillment of long-term foreign policy goals (Akşit and Melakopides 2008). Increasingly devoid of its policy-shaping power in line with the political transformation induced by the EU accession process, particularly since 2005, the military has adopted a relatively low-profile position and even reconciled with the government over its determination to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots in international fora, denouncing the EU for its failure to reward Turkish Cypriots’ consensual attitude towards the Annan Plan (Robins 2007, 298), pledging support to the new negotiation process for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem revitalized by Erdoğan’s 2008, 43 and supporting the government’s post-2011 election rhetoric that Turkish Cypriots and Turkey would go their own way in case of a non-solution in 2012. 44

Although they seemed unable to reverse or block the processes of change, the MHP, the CHP, and to a lesser extent the military, could slow it by playing on rising nationalist sentiments in Turkish society largely as a response to the perceived vagueness and double standards of the EU vis-à-vis Turkish membership and the Cyprus problem. The current standstill between Turkey and the EU resulted from the suspension of talks; due to the resentment it created in the public and veto players alike, the AKP government declined to implement the Additional Protocol because the adaptation cost for full compliance would alienate its electoral constituency (i.e. too much opposition from the veto players). Ironically, when the government’s re-strategization of the Cyprus issue (a return to the two state solution offered by Denktas), and its message to the EU that relations would be suspended in the event of Cyprus’ EU presidency are considered together, it can be argued that the rhetorical disparity between the government and the veto players diminished substantially. Although the AKP apparently consolidated its domestic political power vis-à-vis its opponents in the post-2011 election period, the upcoming agenda of drafting a new constitution and thus the need for a compromise with the nationalist veto-playing wing, still emerges as a non-negligible political consideration.
Conclusions

This article intends to shed light on how the Europeanization process takes place in the context of enlargement by providing empirical findings as to the EU’s potential to influence the foreign policies of candidate countries. Built upon the analytical toolkit of Europeanization, it deals with the question of how the EU commands a change in candidate states’ foreign policies. It particularly analyses the extent of the EU’s impact on Turkey’s Cyprus policy.

A more specific attempt is directed towards understanding the relationship between domestic political pressures and foreign policy choices by the AKP government concerning the Cyprus problem. This study argues that how domestic actors perceive the credibility of EU conditionality and the accession perspective should be regarded as significant because how the accession perspective and conditionality establish those actors in domestic power struggles affects how power is redistributed among them. Therefore, the EU’s potential in transforming candidate countries’ foreign policies should be critically assessed.

Once the implications of EU conditionality for Turkey’s Cyprus policy case are analysed, the ‘Europeanizing’ potential of the EU seems questionable. Notwithstanding the Cyprus issue being nearly a political condition, Greek and Greek Cypriot pressures, and Turkey’s 50-year bid for membership, one can observe that the EU has not been able to transform the policy but only managed to generate a ‘limited, superficial, and short-lived’ change between 2002 and 2005 on an issue predominantly characterized by strategical priority, solidarity, and nationalist sentiments. To reiterate, the nature and extent of change have been confined to support for a federalist solution that was crystallized by the Annan Plan and obtained acceptance at the level of the Turkish NSC and the Turkish Cypriot leadership; and to pursuing a win-win and consensual foreign policy to show the international community that Turks are not intransigent. During that period, the EU’s linkage policy, the enthusiasm of the Erdoğan government in getting a date from Brussels for accession talks, and the desire to solve the Cyprus problem prior to Cyprus’ EU membership, appeared to be responsible for a change in the Cyprus policy. From the perspective of the Turkish army, there seemed to be a reluctant collaboration – notwithstanding the caution and reservations attached – with the AKP government. Particularly, during the last phase of the Cyprus negotiations in Bürgenstock (Switzerland), senior military officers were incorporated in the process alongside diplomats at all stages, but most notably during discussions on security and on the Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance. Moreover, as a facilitating actor, TÜSİAD’s pro-EU lobbying activities concerning the Cyprus issue had a direct impact on shaping public opinion in Turkey in favour of reaching an agreement with Greek Cypriots. TÜSİAD also had an indirect impact by weakening Denktas’ position by claiming him to be a ‘pro-status quo stumbling block on the way to a settlement’.

Conversely, since 2005, it has been recognized that EU-related factors more intensively interacted with Turkey’s domestic factors, and that domestic considerations have played a dominant role in circumventing the AKP government, as a ‘political’ actor, from making a radical change in Cyprus policy. At the same time, the Turkish case suggests that, unless accompanied by a credible membership perspective and even-handed policies towards the parties to a dispute, the EU’s ability to change policy in the pre-accession period, which is underpinned by the very coercive nature of Europeanization, is eroded. It has been observed that the EU’s
credibility was undermined in domestic public opinion with two consequences building on each other: triggering scepticism towards the EU in public and playing into veto players’ hands. The government was thus barred from implementing the Additional Protocol in full, from agreeing swiftly to a settlement plan in concurrence with Greek Cypriot demands in the rejuvenated inter-communal talks on the island since 2008, and from recognizing Cyprus to comply with EU conditionality. In the latter period, the politicization of the problem by the EU has been attended by ‘legalization’ involving ‘contractual obligations’ on Turkey’s part. Despite coercive top-down pressures from the EU, the pace and extent of Europeanization have been relatively determined by endogenous factors, thereby signifying ‘nationally directed and limited Europeanization’ in the Turkish case. Put differently, the EU-dominated factors, emanating mostly from its institutional structure and lack of political will, have been largely overridden by domestic considerations, which in turn appear to be responsible for the current standstill in Turkish–EU relations. Also, it shows that the pattern of EU’s impact in the framework of Europeanization is not unidimensional and homogeneous. Although governments are the key actors in deciding ultimate policy changes, variables including the unfavourable domestic political atmosphere, shifting attitudes of the electoral constituency and increasing opposition of the plurality of actors in government foreign policy may well create a contextual political risk for governments at home.

Regarding Turkish–EU relations in the context of the Cyprus issue, it can be argued that since 2005, and continuing with the AKP’s hawkish and self-confident tone after the June 2011 elections, the leverage and Europeanizing impact of the EU on Turkey has seemed to diminish. This has especially been the case in accession negotiations coming to a deadlock, candidate state perceptions of a lack of EU credibility, epidemic economic and political crises in many member states, financial problems in the Eurozone, enduring political disinclination in Brussels to revitalize Turkish–EU relations and the eclipsing of the enlargement debate by the EU’s more immediate internal problems. Viewed in this light, it may appear that the more the pace of accession negotiations between the EU and the candidate state slows and relations worsen, the more the latter tends to show nationalist reflexes and pursue independent policies. In Turkey, those EU-related variables are accompanied by post-2011 domestic ones, such as power consolidation of the AKP government vis-à-vis veto players, a well-performing economy, and an expanding regional role and foreign policy activism. Turkish–EU relations have certainly been nebulous since 2005, but what we have observed that relations pass through a ‘circumstantial’ crisis period. The Turkish government needs wide societal consensus to change policy, including consensus from the veto-playing Euro-sceptics and those in pro-EU circles, as well as a persistent democratization process and EU-induced reforms not only for the sake of the domestic political calculations of new constitution and presidency elections but also to retain its sphere of influence and attractiveness as a regional power. It is at this juncture that attachment to the EU anchor and continuation of a credible membership perspective are key in fulfilling those ends. Moreover, EU-originating investments play a significant role behind Turkey’s breathtaking economic growth in the last two years (8.5% in 2010 and 2011, and 3.1% in the first half of 2012). As Egemen Bağış, then-Turkish Minister for EU Affairs put it, ‘(...) assume that the EU is our dietician. You may get angry with your dietician and and you may not even find her sympatetic at all. (B)ut if the prescription is fine, you comply with it’.47 Thus, the hardline rhetoric used by the...
Turkish government towards the EU should be perceived as a circumstantial reaction to the dietician, not to her prescription. Given another statement from Bağış that ‘Turkey will never abandon Cyprus for the EU, nor the EU for Cyprus,’ it is most likely that the Cyprus problem and Turkey’s accession to the EU will be viewed together in the foreseeable future, continuing to determine one another.

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Notes
1. Börzel and Risse (2003) call them as multiple veto points and formal facilitating institutions. For further information about veto players see also Héritier et al. (2001). For formal facilitating institutions, see Caporaso and Jupille (2001).
2. Another variance of neo-institutionalist theory underpinning Europeanization is historical institutionalism. It seeks to know why a certain choice was made and why a certain outcome occurred by examining the historical evidence. It argues that political events happen within a historical context, which has a direct consequence on decisions or events. Its emphasis on ‘critical junctures’ as moments of radical change that constitute a breaking point at which historical development moves onto a new path, and its particular method of ‘path dependency’ would be helpful in tracing the cycles of continuity and change (though not radical one) in Turkey’s Cyprus policy. I would like to thank one of the anonymous referees for raising this point.
3. For example, based on intergovernmental cooperation, foreign and security policy is a domain where national governments are key actors, allowing only limited involvement of the Commission and the European Parliament and where Community law is not prominent.
4. Those constraints include existence of divergent signals by the European Parliament, the Commission and member states embedded during pre-accession period; methodological challenge in pinpointing the net EU impact from other domestic and global processes for change. See Börzel (2003), Major (2005, 175–90), Grabbe (2001).
5. Rather than affecting the substance and content of policy change, top-down Europeanization is more evident in policy styles, policy rhetoric and the institutional and organizational making of foreign policy. For Greece, see Economides (2005); for France, see Wong (2006), for Britain, see Bache and Jordan (2006).
6. Most probably owing to the EU membership of Greece and Cyprus.
7. Beginning with the Regular Report and Accession Partnership of 2006, the EU began to handle Cyprus under the sub-section of ‘regional issues and international obligations’ (again as part of enhanced political dialogue and political criteria).
8. Specifically, UNSC 649/90; UNSC 716/92; UNSC 750/92; UNSC 774/92; UNSC 1251/99.
9. Denoting the political and military situation before the Turkish military intervention in 1974.
11. An anonymous career diplomat responsible for Cyprus affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal interview of the author, 3 June 2010, Ankara, Turkey.
12. In this study, ‘Cyprus’ denotes the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ which has not been recognized by Turkey, formally calling it the ‘Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus’.
13. According to the Luxembourg European Council’s Presidency Conclusions, a political solution should be found ‘under the aegis of the UN (…) with a view to creating a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation’ (EU Council, Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg, 12–13 December 1997, paragraph 28).
14. The then-EC was trying to stand at an equal distance in the Greek-Turkish disputes, taking into account the Cold War political conditions.

15. Designed primarily to protect British privileges and Turkish Cypriots’ economic rights, Article 5 of the Agreement stipulated that ‘The rules governing trade between the contracting parties may not give rise to any discrimination between the member states or between nationals or companies of these states or nationals and companies of Cyprus’. See Brewin 2000, 23.

16. The original text can be found on the official website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.tr.

17. Those chapters cover Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations.


19. The London and Zurich Accords as the offspring of the Republic of Cyprus refer to three agreements: (1) the Treaty of Establishment, which defines the territory of the Republic of Cyprus; (2) the Treaty of Alliance, by which Turkey, Greece and Cyprus agree to cooperate in their common defence and (3) the Treaty of Guarantee by which Cyprus undertakes to uphold the 1960 Constitution and ‘Turkey, Great Britain and Greece guarantee Cyprus’ independence and territorial integrity.


21. Also known as the ‘Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem’, the Plan prepared by then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan aimed at ending the division of the island before its accession. It was presented on 11 November 2002 and went through four sets of adjustments to take into account the points of both parties. The Plan proposed a Swiss-style confederation and a Belgian-type federation under the name of the United Cyprus Republic, with a rotating presidency and two component states that were to share sovereignty. It also called for a single sovereignty and international legal personality with partition and secession prohibited. It would have established a limited right to return between the territories of the two communities, and would have allowed Turkey and Greece to maintain a military presence, though with phased reductions in troop numbers.


23. For example, then-AKP Foreign Minister, Yaşar Yakış noted that ‘we told the Europeans that granting Turkey a date for inauguration of negotiations [at the Copenhagen summit on 12 December 2002], could compel us to rethink our policy over ESDP and Cyprus’ [author’s translation]. 2002. Cumhuriyet.

24. As compensation for the rejection of the UN-sponsored Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots, the Commission adopted three different regulations: the Green Line Regulation, the Aid Regulation, and the Direct Trade Regulation. So far, the third one has not been implemented due to the Greek Cypriot veto. Nonetheless, these regulations are only partial compensation for the relevant economic backwardness of the Turkish Cypriots. What is significant for the Turkish side is the opening of Ercan Airport in Northern Cyprus to direct flights as well as the formal espousal of this move by Greek Cypriots.

25. Votes for the AKP have steadily increased from 34.28% in the November 2002 parliamentary elections to 46.47% in July 2007 and to 49.9% in July 2011 elections.


32. Eurobarometer National Reports on Turkey confirm that ‘[f]or Turks, the EU means, first and foremost, economic prosperity.’

33. The research was conducted by the A&G Research Company on 28 April 2008. More detailed information can be attained from http://www.agarastirma.com.tr/pdfler/abye-uyelik-anketi.pdf.


35. The ‘open-ended’ and long-term nature of the accession process was especially noted by the 2004 Commission Progress Report and Recommendation on Turkey, Negotiating Framework document and Strategy Papers (of 2005 and 2008–2009). For example, the Strategy Paper of 2005 explicitly emphasized that the pace of enlargement must take into account the EU’s capacity to absorb new members.

36. For example, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, in his speech before European Parliament’s Foreign Relations Commission on 16 February 2012, considered Turkey a ‘challenge’ for the EU and stated that ‘our economic crisis confirmed that our political project intended for the EU would be unable to survive the accession of such a weighted country like Turkey’. http://www.abhaber.com/haber.php?id=38937; accessed 17 February 2012.


38. For example French President Nicolas Sarkozy asserted that ‘I am in favor of signing a contract with Turkey. I am in favor of a joint market with Turkey. But I am against Turkey’s integration into Europe. Turkey is a small Asia. And there is no reason for it to be a part of Europe…Turkey is a great civilization; but not a European one’ (quoted in Müftüler-Baç 2008, 66). Further, statements in some EU circles (led by France) as to the ‘need to redefine EU’s borders’ or that ‘absorption capacity’ should be taken into account in future enlargements fuelled already existing sensitivities in Turkish public opinion.

39. In fact, the 1974 military intervention of Turkey was conducted during then-CHP leader and PM Bülent Ecevit’s tenure.

40. For example, see then-deputy chairman and former ambassador Onur Öyman’s statement published in daily Cumhuriyet on 18 January 2003. Also see the views of the former ambassador and Istanbul deputy of the CHP Şükrü Elekdağ written in Yankı Dergisi [Yankı Journal] on 1 May 2009.


42. It was at the time of coalition government of the DSP-MHP-ANAP that Turkey attained candidacy status.
43. For example, the NSC meetings dated 30 December 2008 and 24 April 2008 buttressed the new process but reiterated that any solution should be based on bizonality; existence of two distinct peoples; political equality of the two parties; equal status of two founding states; establishment of a new partnership state; and continuation of Turkey’s effective and virtual guarantees.

44. Exceptions to the compatible attitude of the military included the government’s Action Plan in January 2006 to open Turkey’s harbours and airports to Greek Cypriot sea vessels and aircrafts in return for opening the Northern Cypriot sea ports of Gazimagusa, Girne and Gemikonaşı to international traffic, and Ercan Airport to direct flights. Yaşar Büyükant, Chief of General Staff portrayed the government’s decision as ‘a departure from the state’s official policy’ and a ‘surprise’ (Aşıt and Melakopides 2008, 10). The military also openly criticized Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat’s initiative to open up the intersection of Lokmacı/Ledra Street in Lefkoşa in 2007, which was located in the forbidden military zone, on the grounds that such steps should be taken reciprocally (Aşıt and Melakopides 2008, 10).

45. Meanwhile, ‘expected transformation’ denotes more precisely the implementation of the Additional Protocol in full, agreeing swiftly to a settlement plan consistent with Greek Cypriot demands made in the rejuvenated inter-communal talks on the island that have taken place since 2008, or even recognition of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ in full compliance with EU conditionality.


Notes on contributor

Burcin Ulug-Eryilmaz is a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University, Turkey. She specializes in Europeization and Turkey’s relations with the EU with a particular focus on the Cyprus dispute.

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