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The particular pattern the bureaucratic development in Turkey has evinced suggests that legal rationality is a prerequisite for the successful institutionalization of rational productivity. Whereas there is a zero-sum type of relationship between patrimonialism on one hand and legal rationality and rational productivity on the other, there is a positive-sum type of relationship between legal rationality and rational productivity.

**IS LEGAL-RATIONAL BUREAUCRACY A PREREQUISITE FOR A RATIONAL-PRODUCTIVE BUREAUCRACY?**

The Case of Turkey

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**THEORETICAL BACKDROP AND A HYPOTHESIS**

Three ideal types of bureaucracy—(a) patrimonial bureaucracy and (b) legal-rational bureaucracy, both formulated by Weber (1978, pp. 212-241), and (c) rational-productive bureaucracy defined by Ilchman (1969)—have had a better fit with the general lines of political evolution in the Anglo-American polities than elsewhere. The transformation of patrimonial bureaucracy into legal-rational bureaucracy took place following the substitution of the supremacy of parliament for those of the king and his bureaucracy. In the wake of this evolution, bureaucrats began to owe obedience to a legal impersonal order established by parliament (Diamant, 1962, p. 88). Each office came to have a defined competence and an administrative staff; the latter was to carry out its duties with a view...
to broad guidelines determined, to use Riggs’ (1969) terminology, by the “constitutive system,” that is, elected assembly, electoral system, and party system (p. 17).

Later, rational-productive bureaucracy emerged as a result of the increased complexity of social and economic issues and the advanced levels of knowledge needed to tackle those issues (Ilchman, 1969, pp. 476-478). The common bond that joined rational-productive bureaucrats derived essentially from their legitimating source in knowledge, their loyalty to substantive programs, and their value commitment to productivity. The rational-productive bureaucrat differed from the legal-rational bureaucrat in that whereas the latter basically placed emphasis on efficiency—to carry out a policy or program with least cost—the former was interested in policies and programs based on expertise and in effectiveness—the ability to carry out those policies or programs. The rational-productive bureaucrat differed from the legal-rational bureaucrat in another dimension, too: Whereas politics was the source of law for the legal-rational bureaucrat, the rational-productive bureaucrat claimed expertise often superior to that of the politician. Consequently, the rational-productive bureaucrat engaged, tacitly or actively, in the “politics of antipolitics,” or politically unresponsive behavior (Ilchman, 1969, p. 476).

This proclivity to politics of antipolitics, however, did not lead bureaucrats in the Anglo-American settings to have a condescending attitude toward politicians. Although they insisted that technically they themselves were well equipped to make the most rational decisions, they nevertheless granted that politicians had the last word. In contrast, historically the Bonapartist bureaucracy in France and the Rechtsstaat bureaucracy in Prussia-Germany tended to emphasize “substantive” rather than “instrumental rationality” (Heper, 1985a); they thought that on the whole, they themselves, rather than politicians, could come up with better policies and programs and, therefore, should have the last word on these matters. For instance, in 19th-century France, guided by the idea of the general interest, bureaucrats perceived themselves as the true agents of a neutral state—a state that was powerful, functional, and set apart from civil society and its political representatives (Birnbaum, 1987). During the same century, in Prussia, the bureaucratic ethic came to embody the idea of the political neutrality of a state represented by its civil servants, and its superiority to social interests and the assemblies representing them (Southern, 1979, pp. 110-140).
During the 20th century, bureaucrats in both France and Germany became more political (Dyson, 1977, pp. 57-58; Suleiman, 1974, pp. 181ff). Still, in both countries bureaucrats continued to have greater autonomy than their counterparts in the Anglo-American settings. This situation led rational-productive bureaucracies in France and Germany to tend toward politics of antipolitics to a greater extent than bureaucrats in the United States and United Kingdom. Yet, because of their (partial) “politicization,” bureaucrats in France and Germany, too, increasingly evinced characteristics of responsive competence rather than neutral competence, that is, expert, objective performance of one’s functions without much regard to political party or other loyalties. However, bureaucrats in France and Germany became more open to political directives as well.

All in all, the phenomenon of responsive competence has been a consequence of a successful marriage between two bureaucratic traditions—legal rationality and rational productivity—that one came across in the Anglo-American and recently in the French and German settings. The legal-rational tradition brought with it the notions of an objective assessment of merit (as efficiency) and political responsiveness; the rational-productivity tradition added to the above formula the notions of substantive rationality and effectiveness.

We would like to suggest that the legal-rational tradition constituted a critical prerequisite for the development and institutionalization of rational-productive bureaucracy that does not evince characteristics of either patrimonialism or antipolitics. For one, because political responsiveness was one of its basic characteristics, the legal-rational tradition moderated the antipolitics tendency inherent in rational productivity and prevented that tendency from developing into political unresponsiveness. Second, because impersonal order and the resultant objective assessment of merit constituted its other basic characteristics, the legal-rationality tradition was instrumental in the maintenance within the framework of rational-productive bureaucracy, too, of the notion of an objective assessment of merit that was not intermingled with patrimonial practices—that is, nonobjective criteria creeping into the assessment of merit.

The particular way the bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish polity evolved lends credence to our suggestion that legal-rational tradition is a prerequisite for rational productivity that is untainted by patrimonialism. A successful marriage of the two bureaucratic traditions—legal rationality and rational productivity—could not be consummated in the case of the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy. In that polity, an attempt was made to
transform the patrimonial bureaucracy into a rational-productive bureaucracy without first successfully transforming it into a legal-rational one. This led to the emergence of some rational-productive features in the bureaucracy, but they were accompanied with patrimonial characteristics. The result was the fragility of rational productivity of the economic bureaucracy. The degeneration of the rational productivity of that bureaucracy had a high probability, and that degeneration did take place. The present article takes up the relevant developments in the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE OTTOMAN-TURKISH BUREAUCRACY UP TO THE 1980s

Until recently, the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy had been even more Bonapartist than the French and Prussian-German bureaucracies. From the 19th century onward, the bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish polity aspired to represent a state that was more autonomous from civil society than the state in France and Germany.

In France, from the 9th century onward, there was a constant tug-of-war between the local grandees and the king (Finer, 1975, p. 126). In late 18th-century France, the local parlements effectively challenged the taxing powers of the kings (Blanning, 1987, p. 29; Myers, 1975, pp. 136-141). Similarly, the state in Prussia-Germany was confronted by a largely self-governing aristocracy. In that polity, too, the central authority did not come to have virtually unlimited powers (Rosenberg, 1958, pp. 137ff; Taylor, 1945, p. 21).

In contrast, in the Ottoman Empire the localities did not have autonomous powers. During the earlier centuries, drawing on their unchallenged sovereign powers, the Ottoman sultans had a dominating presence in the polity. The Ottoman local notables did not develop into an aristocracy able to impinge on the affairs of the center. Under the Ottoman fief (tymar) system, the granting of benefice in return for service to the sultan did not bring with it extensive political-territorial rights. In the Ottoman Empire, the political realm was, in fact, identical with a huge sultanic manor. The Ottomans opted for a royal household full of slaves—recruited from among the non-Muslim subjects of the empire and educated about and socialized into the norms of the state. By the successful deployment of the members of this group to the critical posts both at the center and the localities, the Ottomans were able to maintain a centralized system of government. With the disappearance from the scene of sultans with dominant
personalities, particularly during the mid-19th century, the bureaucracy amassed virtually unlimited powers (Heper, 1980, pp. 82ff).

Both in the 19th and 20th centuries, efforts were made to render this bureaucracy into a legal-rational one. In the 19th century, it was stressed that the behavior of officials should be governed by impersonal rules. Efficiency and regularity of administration was considered indispensable for the proper functioning of the state. Various regulations sought to introduce formal organizational and procedural patterns. New titles, precedence, and tables of rank were attributed to offices rather than persons (Chambers, 1964; Findley, 1980; Weiker, 1968). In the 20th century, Atatürk, the founder in 1923 of Turkish Republic, was the initiator of the reforms that aimed at eliminating personal rule. Atatürk viewed bureaucracy as a mere instrument—an organization structured on the principle of strict hierarchy and staffed by civil servants acting in accordance with the letter of the law (Heper, 1984; Mardin, 1975). In the following decades, administrative reforms aimed at a more rational distribution of functions, the institution of hierarchical controls, more extensive (legal) regulation of the activities of the bureaucracy, a better coordination among administrative agencies, and the like (Dodd, 1965).

However, in the absence of a politically influential economic middle class that would have effectively demanded a more predictable political environment and efficient performance of governmental functions and policies, these endeavors did not meet with success. The Ottoman bureaucracy did not operate within the framework of impersonal rules and regulations. Both the sultans and the bureaucratic elite, who doubled as minisultans, placed emphasis on loyalty rather than merit. Among other things, the earlier practice of sons and relatives following in the footsteps of their sponsors continued (Heper, 1979). Patrimonialism carried the day during the Republican period, too. One came across overlapping jurisdictions; the complexity of, and confusion in, the relevant legal system; and a lack of trust toward subordinates (Heper, 1979; Presthus, 1961). As late as 1972, of all the newly hired civil servants, 31% was not subjected to any kind of examination, and another 30% started work to fulfill their obligatory service to the state (Bağıl Reform Danışma Kurulu, 1972, pp. 157-158).

All in all, the lingering patrimonialism in the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy was basically due to the fact that, until the transition to multi-party politics in the mid-1940s, the bureaucratic elite constituted part of the ruling strata (Evin, 1996, p. 49). Consequently, their functions could not be distinguished from those of politicians, and proper criteria for
entrance to bureaucratic posts could not be institutionalized. In the multi-party period, too, at least until the 1970s, the bureaucratic elites kept alive their aspirations to act as the state elite responsible for the long-term interests of the community.

More specifically, during the Republican period, the bureaucratic elite considered themselves as the guardians of the Republican norms, or the Atatürkian principles, and remained staunchly Bonapartist until at least the transition to multiparty politics in the 1940s. For them, law was important only as a means to maintain their own autonomy from political elites; when a higher civil servant was removed from a significant administrative post, he or she could apply to the (bureaucratically staffed) Council of State (the highest administrative court—the Turkish version of French Conseil D’Etat), and quite often he or she would be reinstated in his or her previous post. The Council provided a secure bulwark against “politicians’ encroachments to bureaucrats’ turf” (Heper, 1985b, p. 70).

The bureaucratic elite tended to ignore the constitutional principle that granted final authority to politicians. They considered the guardianship of the Atatürkian principles as more important than the efficient implementation of policies preferred by politicians. In 1969, all of the 36 retired higher civil servants disagreed with the statement that “to alleviate some of the tensions and bottlenecks in Turkish political life it might perhaps be wise in political debates to compromise on some tenets of Atatürkism like secularism, nationalism, and étatism” (Heper, 1976a, p. 517). These former higher civil servants thought democracy required education, tolerance, and self-discipline on the part of politicians; in their opinion, politicians in Turkey did not have such qualifications (Heper, 1976a, p. 515). At the time, the bureaucratic elite in Turkey were also of the opinion that politicians in Turkey hindered national development (Roos & Roos, 1971, pp. 168ff). Thus, they did not look with sympathy at the differentiation of the roles of political and bureaucratic elite and a careful delineation of the respective areas of professional competence. For them, loyalty to their self-designated mission of the bureaucracy—that of safeguarding Atatürkian principles—had greater significance than merit—efficient implementation of policies adopted by politicians. Thus, their Bonapartism was coupled with strong doses of patrimonialism.

With the coming to power from 1950 onward of such antistate parties as the Democratic Party, the Justice Party, and the True Path Party, the problématique, as the new political elite perceived it, became those of first destatizing and then politicizing the bureaucracy. Thus, efforts were made
to render the bureaucracy responsive to the constitutive system, but not to make it more efficient.

For a while, the bureaucrats tried to resist such encroachments to their traditional autonomy and worldview (Heper, 1976b; Heper, Kim, & Pai, 1980). In fact, the 1960 and 1971 military interventions were made by officers who shared the bureaucrats’ statist vision in question; in each case, the latter removed from power anti-Atatürkian governments (Harris, 1988).

In the long run, this was a hopeless struggle against governments now more than ever determined to put an end to the supremacy of the Bonapartist cadres in the Turkish polity. The result was either the virtually complete politicization of the bureaucracy such that bureaucrats not only lost their neutrality but also competence, or a resort to bureau-pathology—overemphasis on rules and regulations to block effective action by politicians (Heper, 1977).

As noted, in post-1983 Turkey, the Motherland Party (MP) governments under Turgut Özal tried to transform the partially legal rational and partially patrimonial bureaucracy into a rational-productive one (Heper, 1989). Yet, the efforts to render the bureaucracy into a rational-productive one too had patrimonial overtones. Many of the appointments to the upper reaches of the bureaucracy were not based solely on an objective assessment of merit. It is true that in the short run the new bureaucratic cadres contributed to the successful economic performance of the MP governments. However, as appointments were not made strictly with a view to merit, some appointees turned out to be virtually complete failures. Although few in number, appointees were partly responsible for the eventual demise of the MP governments. Patrimonialism further increased in the post-Özal period.

**STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM AND THE NEW PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY**

**THE POST-1983 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM**

From 1983 onward, the MP governments in Turkey launched an ambitious structural adjustment program that aimed at substituting an outward-oriented export promotion policy for an inward-looking import-substitution policy. This program of “radical transformation” aimed at an
economy open to competition—in particular, the substitution of market forces for administrative decisions for the determination of commodity and factor prices, the partial liberalization of foreign trade, and the development of the domestic financial market. The Price Control Commission that in the past had, from time to time, interfered in the setting of the prices of the goods and services of the state economic enterprises, which held a monopolistic position, was abolished. The state economic enterprises themselves were no longer fully subsidized. Negative real interest rates were abandoned, and the Turkish lira ceased to be overvalued. Capital markets were created. All controls on imports, except for duties, were lifted, and considerable tariff reductions were made. Incentives were provided for exports through a flexible exchange rate policy and tax rebates (Bütün yönleriyle Özal ve dönemi, 1993, p. 53; Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1989, pp. 1-2).

Turgut Özal played a critical role in devising and implementing the structural adjustment program in question. In late 1979, as then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel’s chief aide, Özal prepared the January 24, 1980, Stabilization Program that paved the way to the structural adjustment program. During the 1980 to 1983 military regime, for a time Özal served as deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs; he persuaded the military about the merits of the program he had initiated. With the reinstallation of a multiparty government in 1983, Özal’s MP came to office, and Özal became prime minister. He remained in that post until 1989 (when he became president).

The structural adjustment program gained full steam while Özal was prime minister (Bütün yönleriyle Özal ve dönemi, 1993, p. 53). As noted, Özal sought to achieve a radical transformation in the economic sphere, along with far-reaching changes in other areas necessary to bring about the transformation in question. One of those areas was the public bureaucracy.

The New Public Bureaucracy

Not unexpectedly, Özal found the bureaucracy unable to keep pace with, and in any case not sympathetic to, the transformation he had in mind. As noted, some bureaucrats still had Bonapartist inclinations. These bureaucrats wished the state to have a prominent role in the polity and society, including extensive controls over the economy. In respect to the economy, they were étatists. Others had sympathies toward the previous governments. In addition, as noted above and as Özal also thought,
many of the bureaucrats did not have the necessary expertise or were too steeped in their old ways to contribute to the structural adjustment program adopted in the early 1980s (Kazdal, 1990, p. 190).

According to Özal, the expertise in question meant not only neutrality and efficiency (characteristics of a legal-rational bureaucrat) but also a program-oriented (substantive) rationality (contribution to policy making based on expert knowledge) and effectiveness (characteristics of a rational-productive bureaucrat). In Özal’s opinion, the bureaucracy was either too slow, not dynamic, and unresponsive to people’s demands, or ideologically too committed to state intervention, not market oriented, and too caught up in its procedural maze (Atiyas, 1996, p. 304). With a view to these bureaucrats, Özal argued that Turkey’s greatest problem was the tendency in particular on the part of the graduates of Ankara University’s School of Political Science to rule the country all by themselves. Özal also pointed out that when they deemed it necessary, these bureaucrats sought the support of particular political forces. Özal also thought that politicians with the qualities he sought in bureaucrats were in great scarcity in his own party. At the time the MP was founded (1983), the military regime then still in power had not given its endorsement to that party. The military had popularity among the people because it had “saved the country from chaos and anarchy” (Hale, 1994, p. 247). Consequently, many qualified people had not expected a MP victory at the polls and had not joined that party.

In Özal’s estimation, the scarcity of qualified politicians in the MP made it all the more necessary to have innovative bureaucrats with program-oriented expertise who could function effectively as well as
efficiently. As he had reservations about the bureaucracy he had inherited, whenever possible Özal closely worked with those politicians who had the said qualities. Among these politicians were Ekrem Pakdemirli, Adnan Kahveci, and Hüsnü Doğan; they were all considered by Özal as very “intelligent” (Gökmen, 1992, pp. 114, 217, 219-220). Among the three, Kahveci had a special status; Özal had complete trust in him (Gökmen, 1992, p. 220). It must be noted in passing that intellectuals, politicians, and bureaucrats who had different political views, too, had great respect for Kahveci.16

The scarcity of such qualified politicians, however, obliged Özal to bring the bureaucracy into the picture as well. Here Özal worked with some selected agencies and units in the economic bureaucracy, having separated the said agencies and units from others. He created a number of autonomous units within the existing agencies. Such a unit was, for instance, created within the State Planning Organization and made responsible for the southeastern Anatolia Project. In addition, Özal transferred what he considered to be critical functions from an existing agency to a newly created one. For example, the newly established Undersecretariat for the Treasury and Foreign Trade was affiliated to the Prime Ministry as part of Özal’s efforts to bring some critical agencies of the economic bureaucracy under his own direct control and was given the responsibility of devising and implementing economic, financial, and monetary policies; the Ministry of Finance was left with the responsibility of collecting public revenues. Özal also brought some key already existing agencies under the closer control of the government. For instance, the Central Bank was rendered less autonomous (Heper, 1990, p. 611).

In addition, Özal brought to the heads of the units and agencies in question people from outside the bureaucracy; many of the latter were educated in the United States. He preferred outsiders to insiders because “the former were people who were not tainted with the bad habits” of the latter, and also, they had connections, particularly in the United States. To Özal, those connections were important because he aimed at fully integrating Turkish economy with Western economies. The outsiders were expected to help Özal have an effective liaison with such organizations as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as the European Union and the Council of Europe. These prensler (princes), as they had been called, were to report directly to the prime minister.17

Most of the outsiders Özal brought to the heads of selected units and agencies in the economic bureaucracy were engineers by profession. Özal equated engineers’ logic with rationality. This was in line with the general
perception in Turkey about engineers’ being realists who easily solved problems. In Turkey, until recently, students of social sciences have had basically a normative-utopian approach at the expense of an empiricist-analytical approach. The normative-utopian approach in question partially derived from the fact that, as noted, in Turkey, until recently there has been a very sharp rift between the state and society. For several centuries, the state elite have preoccupied themselves with the salvation of the state and showed little interest in how the society functioned (Mardin, 1973). They thought they could easily manipulate the society by regulation from above (Mardin, 1980, pp. 44-45). Consequently, their prescriptions often had little affinity with reality, and sometimes even bordered on utopia. The flourishing of a utopian approach was also due to the fact that in the Ottoman Empire, for centuries the dominating tradition was unquestioned theological belief (Kazamias, 1966, p. 223). In the Republican period, dogmas that held a sway on the intellectual faculties of the many members of the intelligentsia derived first from an ideological version of Atatürkism that took it as a political manifesto rather than as a worldview or a mentality—to act rationally and not to take religious tenets as one’s decisional premises (And, 1956, p. 25)—and secondly from the hard ideologies of rightist and especially leftist variety (Landau, 1974; Ülgener, 1983).

Under the circumstances, to many, students of natural sciences in general and engineers in particular seemed to be realists with an ability to effectively solve problems. It is true that several persons with a natural science background also subscribed first to the ideological version of Atatürkism and then to the said hard ideologies (Göle, 1986, pp. 86ff); yet, because their ideological orientations could not be reflected in what they wrote or did as part of their profession, these people were considered not to have utopian inclinations.

Beginning with the 1930s, engineers joined the ranks of the elites in increasing numbers (Göle, 1986, pp. 83-86). Then, from the 1950s onward, engineering became a very prestigious profession in Turkey. Several graduates of Istanbul Technical University, including Özal and Demirel, began to join the bureaucratic and political cadres.

Here, the case of the Turkish Export-Import Bank is a telling example. The Turkish Banking Code required that the head of this bank should have at least an undergraduate degree in economics, finance, or banking. To circumvent this provision and bring another engineer, Turgut Özkan, to the head of this bank, Özal government appointed Özkan as the Acting Director-General of the Turkish Export-Import Bank (Kozano—lu, 1993,
pp. 201-206). The respect for engineers was so high that the exceptionally successful director of the Central Bank, Rüştü Saracoğlu, was, in fact, referred to as “money engineer,” even though Saracoğlu had a Ph.D. degree in economics.

**Patrimonial Rational Productivity**

One may argue that the restructuring in the upper reaches of the Turkish economic bureaucracy, effected by the Özal governments, began to transform that bureaucracy into a structure that resembled a rational-productive one—a bureaucracy that provides specialized input to public policy making and effectively implements the policies adopted by politicians. For instance, the newly established High Coordination Council of Economic Affairs, founded in 1981 and made up of politicians and top bureaucrats, sped up the decision-making process vis-à-vis economic issues and became instrumental in the emergence of a harmonious relationship between the minister of state responsible for economic affairs on one hand and the heads of such critical agencies as the State Planning Organization, the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade, and the Central Bank on the other.

Policy implementation also picked up pace. For instance, the export promotion policy that involved granting tax rebates to the exporters was carried out quite effectively by the General Directorate of Incentives and Implementation, which was first affiliated with the State Planning Organization and then with the Prime Ministry. Between 1980 and 1990, Turkey’s exports increased at the annual average rate of 15.8% in U.S. dollar terms (State Planning Organization, 1992, p. 1). During this period, the value of exports increased from U.S. $2.9 billion to U.S. $13.0 billion (U.S. dollars) (Atiyas, 1996, p. 293).

Also, at the time, Turkish economy experienced significant transformation and growth. The trade, finance, and banking sectors made gains at the expense of the sectors in the manufacturing industry. Whereas in 1980 the share of the production sector in the gross fixed investments was 34.7%, in 1989 it dropped to 14.5%. Also, the share of the service sectors in the gross fixed investments rose from 38.7% to 63.8%. The corresponding figures for education, health, tourism, and transport were 1.3% and 3.2%, 0.9% and 1.3%, 0.5% and 4.2%, and 14.8% and 18.4%, respectively (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1990, p. 35). These structural changes in the economy were paralleled by an annual average GDP growth rate of 5.5%

As already noted, these achievements were due not only to the organizational restructuring of the economic bureaucracy that led to a more effective implementation of policies, but also to the rather satisfactory performance on the part of some of the engineer princes (Cemal, 1989, p. 148). Some nonengineer princes, too, significantly contributed to the success of Özal’s policies. One of the latter group of bureaucrats was the money engineer Saracoğlu who, as noted, had been the Director of the Central Bank (from 1986 to 1993). Saracoğlu had been instrumental in enabling the bank to gain considerable stature in the economic system. He was known for his strong support for the liberalization of the economy. To that end, Saracoğlu saw to it that his bank kept the Turkish lira stabilized. To the extent possible, Saracoğlu avoided making short-term treasury advances to the government. Consequently, he prevented inflation from getting completely out of control. Saracoğlu had also been instrumental in maintaining the flexible exchange rate policy adopted in 1981, particularly by establishing a foreign exchange market and by further monetarizing the Turkish economy. He achieved this by making sure that money supply was essentially determined by open market operations and by establishing a gold market.

Another such nonengineer wizard was Coşkun Ulusoy, who served as the director general of the state-owned Agricultural Bank, one of Turkey’s largest banks. During his term as director, the bank became a competitive commercial bank (Ada, 1991, p. 137). Already in 1988, the bank had profits higher than the average profits of other banks. It has been reported that in 1988 the bank had brought to zero all of the nonperforming loans it held (Ada, 1991, pp. 134-152). Ulusoy also successfully stood against political patronage appointments in his bank (Milliyet, 1994).

The other side of the coin was that all this was achieved without much regard to the bureaucratic norms and propriety. As noted, in some cases appointments to the heads of the critical agencies were not solely based on an objective assessment of the candidate’s level of skill and knowledge. If a person was personally known by Özal, or by his wife and particularly by his son, Ahmet Özal, he or she could be brought to a an important post. Despite the fact that Ahmet Özal had no official position, during the 1980s he was in effect the most important figure behind the appointments of the key economic bureaucrats. The majority of the princes recruited from
abroad were Ahmet Özl’s friends. Besides being Ahmet Özl’s friend, it was all the better if the candidate for prince had also an engineering degree. If the person both had an engineering degree and was also a relative, it was even better. For instance, Özl’s brother Yusuf Özl, with a degree in electrical engineering, was appointed as undersecretary of the State Planning Organization. Only in exceptional cases a person who had previously proven his ability in the bureaucracy was appointed to the head of a critical agency. Two examples here are Ali Tigrel and Turgay Özkan. Yet even Tigrel’s and Özkan’s cases are not clear-cut because Tigrel was personally known by Özl and by Özl’s brother Yusuf Özl and Özkan by Ahmet Özl.

Under the circumstances, whether persons who were placed in charge of critical agencies would perform well was left to chance factors. Many did well. Obvious examples were Saraco—lu and Ulusoy. But then there were complete failures like Bülent Ömiler, another close friend of Ahmet Özl. Ömiler was first appointed director-general of the Turkish Housing Bank and then was transferred to other posts before he had to resign because of the charges of impropriety (in the handling of public funds) made against him. Eventually he was convicted by court. Another example was Engin Civan, who also served as director general of the Turkish Housing Bank and who, as noted, was also convicted by court on charges of corruption. Özl’s version of iÖbitircilik—getting things done—often led to going around rules. In the process, established rules and norms were given short shrift, and as noted, in some cases even criminal offenses were committed.

It follows that Özl’s strategy of transforming the economic bureaucracy in a rational-productive direction had strong doses of patrimonialism. Özl could easily adopt such a strategy because legal rationality had not taken firm hold in Turkish bureaucracy. This strategy further weakened the already feeble legal rationality of the bureaucracy. Not unlike their ultimate protégé Turgut Özl, the princes appointed to key positions in the economic bureaucracy were not very careful in conforming to bureaucratic norms—for instance, they jumped echelons, and at times, they were impatient with rules and regulations. Furthermore, Özl himself and the politicians in Özl’s close entourage had, on the whole, little respect for nonprince bureaucrats. Consequently, the autonomy of particularly those bureaucratic agencies that were not led by prince bureaucrats was further undermined (Evin, 1996, p. 51). The patrimonialism that informed the appointments of the princes placed into peril the institutionalization of
rational productivity in the bureaucracy. The cases of corruption that involved some of the princes facilitated in the post-Özal period some further reversal from the practice of appointing bureaucrats on the basis of merit, measured by a bureaucrat’s program-oriented expertise and effectiveness.

**The Post-Özal Period**

Concerning the appointments to the key positions to the economic bureaucracy, the post-Özal governments have not adopted the model of recruiting engineers from abroad. The governments in question preferred to make such appointments basically from within the economic bureaucracy and from among those without an engineering background. For instance, Yaman Törüner, who served as the director of the Central Bank from February 1994 until October 1995, was a graduate of Ankara University’s School of Political Science and had worked at that bank from 1972 until 1987 and in the economic bureaucracy until 1990. His successor, Gazi Erçel, came from the Treasury (when the Treasury was part of the Ministry of Finance). Similarly, the undersecretary of the SPO from 1993 to 1997, Necati Özfırat, another nonengineer, had worked in the SPO since 1968. In the post-Özal period, among those who headed the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade for a long time were Tevfik Altınok and Ayfer Yılmaz, both of whom were brought to this post from the Ministry of Finance; Osman Ünsal, who once was at the SPO (before taking up jobs at private banks); and Osman Bırsel, previously the undersecretary of the Prime Ministry.

Thus, in the post-Özal period, there was a general tendency to appoint to the upper reaches of the bureaucracy insiders who were not engineers and some of whom did not have program-oriented expertise (Evin, 1996). Another characteristic of this period was that, as compared to the Özal era, there seems to have been an increase in the improper handling of funds by bureaucrats (as well as politicians) (Evin, 1996). Also, because of the appointments from inside the bureaucracy and because of the increased politicization of the bureaucracy, the quality of the persons in the top positions seemed to have experienced a decline. One evidence here was that, as compared to the Özal period, in the 1990s there was a higher turnover among the key higher civil servants. Politicians were more frequently obliged to sack their favorites in the top bureaucratic positions as a consequence of serious doubts voiced especially in the media about the
program-oriented expertise of the bureaucrats in question. One such bureaucrat was Ünsal. He had been recruited by Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, who had declared that Ünsal constituted “half of her brain.”

Doubts about the key bureaucrats of this period having the appropriate expertise were due to the acceleration of inflation and the skyrocketing of the public sector borrowing in the first part of the 1990s. Whereas in 1989, the inflation rate was 63.3%, in 1994 it rose to 106.3%, and in 1995 to 93.6% (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1996, p. 90). Similarly, whereas in 1989, the ratio of public sector borrowing requirement to GNP was 5.3%, in 1991 it increased to 10.2%, in 1992 to 10.6%, and in 1993 to 12.2%. Despite the fact that in 1994 a stabilization program was adopted, that year this ratio was still 8.1%, and in 1995, 6.7% (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1996, pp. 53-54). It should also be noted that foreign reserves of the Central Bank decreased from U.S. $7.2 billion in November 1993 to U.S. $3 billion in April 1995. Between January and April 1995, the currency depreciated by 150% (Atiyas, 1996, p. 303).

If the economy in the first part of the 1990s did not fare even worse, it was due to the efforts of a few isolated top bureaucrats who had either climbed to those positions from the ranks or had been recruited from the private sector. Not unlike others, these few isolated bureaucrats, too, had earlier been close to politicians and/or they had the right political credentials; but unlike others, they happened to have the right expertise (Evin, 1996, pp. 50-51).

There is little reason to expect a weakening of patrimonialism in the Turkish public bureaucracy in the near future. It is true that Turkey’s lingering, although somewhat weakened, resolution to become a full member of the European Union will continue to oblige governments in Turkey to upgrade particularly the economic bureaucracy in both legal-rational and rational-productive directions. Yet, with the coming to power of the True Path Party-Prosperity Party (PP) coalition in June 1996, as compared to the previous periods, public policies began to display equal if not higher degrees of populism, in particular due to the political preferences of the religiously oriented PP wing of the coalition government. The Prosperi- tians have also attempted to pack the bureaucracy with their coreligionists, without much regard to their qualifications and expertise. The said approaches on the part of the Prosperitians have stood in the way of a further transformation of the economic bureaucracy in Turkey either in a legal-rational or rational-productive dimension.
CONCLUSION

The extreme Bonapartist tendencies in the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy prevented its being transformed into a legal-rational bureaucracy. When it was destatized and then politicized by the antistate-oriented political parties, the bureaucracy’s neutrality turned into responsiveness, but the bureaucracy remained inefficient because the antistate-oriented political parties paid attention to political loyalty but not merit.

In post-1980 Turkey, an attempt was made to render this politicized bureaucracy, which evinced strong signs of patrimonialism, into a rational-productive bureaucracy. Some agencies or units within particular agencies were considered critical for the formulation and effective implementation of the structural adjustment program launched by the MP governments. Outsiders (princes) were brought to the top positions in these agencies and units. An effort was made to select the princes to the extent possible from among engineers, because engineers were considered as having a program-oriented expertise and the ability to implement policies effectively as well as efficiently.

Yet, knowing someone personally was important in the selection of outsiders. In some cases, this last factor contributed to the unsuccessful performance and even corruption on the part of outsiders. The patrimonial dimension of the efforts to turn the upper reaches of the Turkish public bureaucracy into a rational-productive one undermined the efforts to transform the bureaucracy in the said direction.

In such countries as France and Germany, where historically public bureaucracies also had Bonapartist characteristics, the bureaucracies first approximated the legal-rational bureaucratic model and only then took on the characteristics of the rational-productive model. The transition in question did not lead to the abandonment of the principle of the objective assessment of merit in the bureaucracy. What changed was the nature of the merit sought in bureaucrats; politics-oriented instrumental rationality was replaced by program-oriented substantive rationality. In either case, a patrimonial orientation did not continue to play a role in determining merit. In Turkey, because of the unusually strong Bonapartism on the part of the bureaucracy, a legal-rational public bureaucracy could never be developed. Consequently, rational-productivity in Turkish bureaucracy was tainted by a lingering patrimonialism, which undermined the institutionalization of rational-productivity.

With a view to the Turkish case, we would like to suggest that legal rationality is a prerequisite for the successful institutionalization of
rational productivity. Whereas there is a zero-sum type of relationship between patrimonialism on one hand and legal-rationality and rational-productivity on the other, there is a positive-sum type of relationship between legal rationality and rational productivity.

NOTES

1. The basic characteristics of the ideal type of legal-rational bureaucracy are (a) a clearly defined sphere of competence subject to impersonal rules; (b) a rationally established hierarchy; (c) a regular system of appointment, and promotion made with a view to merit; and (d) technical training as a regular requirement. The corresponding characteristics of the ideal type of patrimonial bureaucracy are (a) conflicting series of tasks and powers, (b) absence of clear rules on who shall decide a matter or deal with appeals, (c) appointments and promotions based on loyalty, and (d) lack of technical training as a regular requirement (Weber, 1978, pp. 212-241).

2. We take up rational-productive bureaucracy below.

3. The three bureaucratic models in question are ideal types. When we talk about a fit between them and actual bureaucracies, we refer to a situation where actual bureaucracies approximate these ideal types.

4. The Bonapartist bureaucracy sees itself as the guardian of the general interest and, therefore, acts unresponsively to disparate social interests and their political representatives. Marx believed that in France, political power was in the hands of the bureaucratic state, and consequently, Bonapartism was the central model in particular for his analysis of the relationship between classes and the state in France (Beetham, 1987, pp. 76, 79, 82; Krygier, 1979, pp. 46ff). Bonapartism continued to be used in this sense in the 20th century, too. For instance, see Ehrmann (1968, pp. 8-9, 150, 202, 203, 234-235).

5. On these two concepts, we draw on Aberbach and Rockman (1994, pp. 461-463).

6. Here we refer to those bureaucrats involved in formulating and implementing economic policy.

7. On the political inefficacy of the economic middle classes in Turkey, see Buğra (1994) and Heper (1991).

8. Atatürk was the founder of Turkey and its president from 1923 to 1938. Atatürkian principles is composed of republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, étatism, and reformism.

9. At the time, Özal was both Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry and Acting Undersecretary (head) of the State Planning Organization.

10. Özal picked up and elaborated on the criticisms of bureaucracy that had been made since the mid-1970s—that the bureaucracy could no longer contribute to the socioeconomic development of Turkey and that, in fact, it had become a financial burden on the economy. Indeed, increasingly far too many people worked in the bureaucracy; whereas in 1931, the population per civil servant had been 197.7, in 1980 it dropped to 44.7 (Ömürgönül, 1995, p. 24). Moreover, many of these bureaucrats were unqualified and incompetent (inter alia, Turkish Industrialists’ and Businesspersons’ Association, 1983).

11. Yüzyıl Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (1996, p. 185). Until at least the 1970s, the graduates of this school had a virtual monopoly at the highest echelons of
the public bureaucracy in Turkey. See, inter alia, Szyliowicz (1971, pp. 371-398). (Mekteb-i Mülkiye was the older name of the School of Political Science in question.)


13. See Bağışkan Turgut Özal’ in birinci basın toplantısı (1984, 8.2).


16. One such intellectual was Emre Kongar, who in the 1990s served as the undersecretary of the Ministry of Culture when one of the Republican People’s Party’s successor parties—the Social Democratic People’s Party—was a coalition member. In his memoirs, Kongar (1996) relates how Kahveci, after his party (MP) had taken its place in the opposition (1989), still supported those government policies he personally deemed appropriate (p. 242).

17. We return to princes below.

18. See, inter alia, Ökyar. (1968, pp. 213-243). As Kazamias (1996) has pointed out, “armchair discussions” devoid of analysis based on careful theory and empirical observation was also the upshot of the education people received at both secondary and high schools in Turkey (p. 147).

19. This university was opened in 1944.

20. The phrase money engineer was coined by journalist Çekirge (1993).


22. Here and below we are not assuming a one-to-one relationship between key economic bureaucrats’ performance and the general state of the economy; however, it is patent that there was a certain degree of relationship.

23. In the same time period, the respective figures for the EC had been 2.3% and, for the EFTA, 2.4% (Devlet Planlama Teşkilati, 1990, p. 2).

24. It is widely believed that the increase in exports was basically due to better use of capacity rather than to the creation of new capacity.


26. On the gold market in Turkey, see Devlet Planlama Teşkilati (1990, p. 21).


28. Our interview with Tigrel. Tigrel was a chemical engineer who joined the State Planning Organization (SPO) in 1969. Between 1971 and 1984, Tigrel worked at the oil refinery plant Petkim, a state economic enterprise. In 1984, he again joined the SPO, and between 1988 and 1990, Tigrel served as the undersecretary of the SPO. In the post-Özal period, among all the princes, Tigrel managed to serve in the bureaucracy longest, until summer 1996. His last position was that of the coordinator of Turkey’s relations with the European Union. He left this job following the coming to power of the coalition government of the religious-oriented Prosperity Party and the secular center-right True Path Party. Other princes—few in number—who also continued to serve in the bureaucracy in the post-Özal period did so until 1994 when one of them, Engin Civan, was found to be involved in a corruption case and was convicted. (The name of the Prosperity Party in Turkish is Refah Partisi. Refah is usually rendered into English as welfare, and this party is referred to in English as the Welfare Party. Yet, in Turkish refah means prosperity and not welfare.)

29. Özkan was a Massachusetts Institute of Technology Ph.D. in electrical engineering. For a while, he worked at the World Bank. Then, because he was personally known by Ahmet
Özal, he was appointed as the general director of the Eximbank. Three of the assistant general directors of the Eximbank were also engineers, one of them a Professor of Mechanical Engineering.

30. Earlier, Ünsal was Professor Çiller’s student at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul.
31. Some lateral transfers of managers from the private sector to governmental agencies in this period was due to the increasingly challenging nature of the tasks facing the upper reaches of the bureaucracy. See Evin (1996, p. 51).

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