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Explaining Right-Wing Violence in Germany: A Time Series Analysis*

Lauren M. McLaren, Bilkent University

Objective. Although some research exists on the relationship between the economy, foreigners, and support for right-wing parties, the effect of the economy and foreigners on instances of right-wing violence in Germany has not yet been explored. The purpose of this paper is to determine the nature of the relationships between these variables. Methods. Data were obtained from the German government on the number of instances of right-wing violence, the number of foreigners, and unemployment, and simple OLS was performed after correcting for minor time series problems. Results. The findings indicated that the relationship between the economy and acts of right-wing violence is not simple, but is moderated by the change in the number of foreigners. Specifically, increasing unemployment has little or no effect on the change in right-wing violence, unless the number of foreigners in the country is also on the rise. Conclusions. While a declining economy may create psychological and physical hardship for individuals, at the aggregate level, a country's economic difficulties will not necessarily result in violence against outgroups. Thus, solving economic problems will not likely reduce right-wing violence, and instead, governments need to emphasize reducing the hostility toward immigrants and other outgroups by focusing on the root causes of this hostility, which do not appear to be economic in nature.

Beginning in 1991, instances of attacks on foreigners, their property, and their residences in Germany captured the world's attention. Ranging from firebombings of apartment buildings resulting in the deaths of foreigners to beatings of foreigners, the acts seemed atrocious and unprecedented. Indeed, between 1990 and 1991, the numbers of attacks on foreigners quintupled, increasing from about 300 to close to 1,500. While much of the postunification violence began in the eastern part of Germany, it spread quickly to western Germany (see Bade, 1994: 85, 92). The estimate of the vice president for the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution was that approximately 60 percent of the violence occurred in the former

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Right-Wing Violence in Germany

western länder, while the rest occurred in the five former eastern länder (Tuttle, 1994: 67). Thus, the problem of right-wing violence affected the entire country.¹

Extraordinary social changes occurring in Germany at this time may have provoked such an enormous increase in attacks. First, German reunification meant that citizens in the east were under pressure to adapt to a new economic and political system, and in the process were forced to give up the economic security of the communist system (see Bade, 1994, for a discussion of the “psychosocial” problems accompanying reunification). Citizens in the western part of the country came to realize what a huge cost reunification might mean to them, especially in terms of the possibility for raised taxes and lost jobs. Individuals in both parts of the country were suddenly faced, once again, with questions about German identity that had not been adequately addressed after World War II (see Tuttle, 1994, for a discussion of the effect of this problem on violence against foreigners). Thus, tremendous social upheaval and uncertainty about the future was one result of this historic event.

The other important event was the collapse of communism (which, of course, produced the first event) and the resulting war in Yugoslavia, which meant that Germany, with its liberal refugee policy, was receiving thousands of refugees, who naturally put stress on the social and economic system. According to Bade, “[T]he Federal Republic has absorbed more immigrants annually than the two classic immigration countries, Canada and Australia, combined” since 1987 (1994: 89). Along with these strains on society, part of the provocation of violence may have been the refusal of leaders to openly and thoroughly discuss immigration issues and to attempt to formulate a coherent, comprehensive immigration policy.² This meant that questions and conflicts were bubbling up, with no legitimate outlet for debate (Bade, 1994; Tuttle, 1994).

Although these (and other) specific events may be important causes of the increase in right-wing violence, including attacks on foreigners, the purpose of this paper is to explore the systematic causes in an attempt to better explain instances of right-wing violence in Germany. The general explanations of the related phenomenon, support for right-wing parties, tend to center around immigration and the economy (but see Tuttle, 1994). However, quantitatively based empirical tests of these explanations are quite rare.³ Further, the findings at the individual level with regard to hostility toward immigrants, which is also related to right-wing and antiforeigner violence,

¹ A review of the New York Times articles from the period indicates that the violence was not concentrated in any particular city, with attacks on foreigners, their property, and Jewish monuments and cemeteries occurring in cities and towns across the country.
² This is, of course, because German leaders continued to argue that Germany is not a country of immigration; thus, if there is no “immigration problem” or “immigration question,” there cannot be an immigration policy.
³ Pia Knigge (1997) and Duane Swank and Hans-Georg Betz (1996, Nd.) are some of the few researchers who focus on cross-time analyses of right-wing extremism.
have been perplexingly inconsistent: sometimes the person’s economic status matters (Quillian, 1995), and sometimes it does not (McLaren, 1996a, 1996b); sometimes the aggregate economic situation matters (Quillian, 1995) and sometimes it does not (McLaren, 1996a, 1996b).

The purpose of this research, therefore, is to model the effects of fluctuations in the economy and in the numbers of foreigners on right-wing violence in Germany. This paper attempts to explain apparently inconsistent past findings with the hypothesis that poor economic conditions only provoke violence to the extent that the number of foreigners is on the increase. Specifically, the combination of increasing unemployment and numbers of foreigners should provoke larger numbers of acts of violence. The economy alone simply is not enough; there must be a salient group that can easily be scapegoated and blamed for the negative changes in the economy.

**Past Research on the Economy, Migration, and Right-Wing Extremism**

Although research specifically focusing on right-wing violence is quite limited, many have studied right-wing extremism, especially support for extremist parties of the right, and this particular area of research should be useful for informing hypotheses about rightist violence. It is generally argued that increases in levels of extremism of the right can be traced to turbulence in society (Cotter, 1996; Betz, 1994; Zimmermann and Saalfeld, 1993; see also, Swank and Betz, 1996, Nd.), specifically two kinds of turbulence—economic upheaval and mass migrations. In one major work specifically on right-wing violence, the same argument is made: this form of violence appears to be a result of threatening changes in society (Bjørgo, 1995).

Further, fluctuations in the economy have been associated with a great number of political activities and attitudes. First, voting generally seems to respond to shifts in the economy (see Lewis-Beck, 1988, for a comprehensive comparative analysis; see also Knigge, 1997). Support for extremist parties is said to increase during times of increased unemployment (see Valen, 1990, for a discussion of the relationship between unemployment and right-wing voting in Norway). Thus, individuals who operate through the accepted democratic channels (i.e., the voting booth) are likely to take their anger about the economy out on incumbent parties. Second, levels of postmaterialism—the preference for protecting freedom of speech and giving people a say in government decisions—also fluctuate with the economy (Inglehart, 1990; Clarke and Dutt, 1991; Duch and Taylor, 1993). Individuals care less about protecting such values and more about order and the economy when the economy takes a nosedive. Third, and perhaps most alarming, levels of satisfaction with democracy appear to fluctuate with the economy (Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg, 1993). People in industrialized democracies become significantly less satisfied with democracy in general when the economy is bad.
Clearly the economy is important in determining people's attitudes and behaviors, and there are specific reasons that the economy may affect levels of right-wing violence: People simply become angry about the economic situation and act on this anger violently. While it is well established that the economy affects the rational and legal behaviors of individuals, the question that will be answered here is: Does a bad economy contribute to such extreme behaviors as right-wing violence? As the former president of the European Parliament, Enrique Baron Crespo, argues, both racism and xenophobia are rooted “in the fear and insecurity of the individual facing the future”; they found “nourishment in unemployment and poverty” (Betz, 1994). It seems that right-wing violence must, at least in part, stem from these feelings of threat that result from a bad economy.4

The other primary reason given for greater levels of support for the right is an increase in the numbers of foreigners (Knigge, 1997; Swank and Betz, 1996, Nd.; Betz, 1994; Zimmermann and Saalfeld, 1993; Husbands, 1992). Even in Norway (which is not often considered a country with an “immigration problem”) preliminary electoral analyses indicate that in regions where immigration is relatively high, there is increased support for the extreme right wing party, the Progress Party (see Valen, 1990). Furthermore, it has been found that in regions of the Netherlands where there are a higher number of Turks and Moroccans, there is also a higher percentage of the vote going to extreme right wing parties (see Husbands, 1992). More recent, pooled cross-sectional time series analyses have also found that throughout Western Europe, higher levels of immigration are associated with greater support for right-wing extremist parties (Knigge, 1997; Swank and Betz, 1996, Nd.; Cotter, 1996). More sophisticated analyses reveal that support for the right is higher in locations where more crimes are committed by immigrants (Chapin, 1997b).

Among individual-level studies, the concentration of immigrants in a person's environment has been conceptualized as providing a threat to that person, making him or her more hostile to immigrants generally. Findings indicate that individuals are indeed more hostile when the concentration of immigrants is high (Quillian, 1995; McLaren, 1996b). Does this necessarily mean that rightist violence will also be on the rise when immigration becomes more pronounced?

Part of the reason that immigration may be associated with right-wing extremism is that in bad economic times, immigrants become scapegoats and get blamed for the bad economic situation (Betz, 1994; Lewis-Beck and Mitchell, 1993).5 Immigrants are accused of other specific problems,

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4 It should be noted that the author is not attempting to show that unemployed individuals are necessarily committing acts of right-wing violence. Indeed, research on the topic indicates otherwise (see Bjørgo, 1995). However, a bad economy is likely to provide the stimulus that provokes criminal activity generally (Chapin, 1997a) and, more specifically, crimes against foreigners.

5 German specialists may hear alarm bells when I use the term “migration” or “immigration” because they react from the perspective of official German policy, which has been that...
too, like crime, urban decay, housing shortages, and a general national de-
cline (Betz, 1994; Chapin, 1997a). As Hollifield (1994a, 1994b) argues, by
the mid-1980s, foreigners were being blamed for taking jobs, housing, and
public services away from German citizens.

It should be noted that the arguments presented above point to the
possibility of something other than a simple, additive linear model. Spe-
cifically, it was argued that in bad economic times, individuals may
become angry and use immigrants as scapegoats. This implies that im-
igrants must be a large enough group, or must be visible enough, to provide
a clear scapegoat target. Thus, it is possible that a better specification of
the relationship between the economy, immigration, and violence is multi-
pllicative. The hypothesis, therefore, is that the combination of high
immigration with a bad economy is likely to stimulate much more violence
than a bad economy or high immigration taken individually. Indeed,
Lewis-Beck and Mitchell (1993) find that aggregate-level unemployment,
when considered by itself, has almost no effect on voting for the French
National Front (the extremist right-wing party). Instead, the combination
of high unemployment and a large number of foreigners is key to produc-
ing increased support for right-wing parties. Swank and Betz (Nd.) also
find little evidence to support the notion that aggregate unemployment
is related to support for extreme right-wing parties, but do find support
for an interaction between immigration and unemployment. Again, this
process seems to accurately explain the more legitimate forms of outgroup
(anti-immigrant) hostility. However, does the relationship hold in the more
extreme forms of hostility, namely right-wing violence? A qualitative
analysis of the rise of right-wing extremism in Germany in the 1990s indi-
cates that one of the important elements in these events was indeed the
combination of high unemployment and the sudden massive influx of for-
egers. As Watson argues, by 1992 “unemployment and immigration had
converged to create laboratory conditions for the growth of xenophobia”
(1993: 10). The implication of this analysis is that when the increase in the
number of foreigners is relatively low and the economy is in good shape,
right-wing violence should not be on the increase. The conditions of
relatively high unemployment and increased immigration are the circum-
stances under which violence by the right starts to rise.

Analyses of the perpetrators of right-wing violence support this theory
by indicating that the majority of these individuals are in economic posi-
tions that give them a propensity to become violently hostile toward
foreigners. Willems (1995) reviews German police records from 1991 to
1994 and finds that beyond the pure “right-wing activist”—who appears

“Germany is not a country of immigration.” The author recognizes that this has been official
policy, but takes the perspective of many immigration specialists, which is that such a state-
ment is utterly ridiculous—Germany may not wish to be a country of immigration, but it, in
fact, is one (Esser and Korte, 1985; Martin, 1994).
to be completely motivated by right-wing ideology—the “ethnocentric youth” and the “criminal youth” make up the bulk of the perpetrators. These latter two groups consist of individuals who subscribe to some degree to right-wing ideology, especially racism and xenophobia, but are also likely to be motivated by threat because they do not have extensive job training and they do experience periodic unemployment problems.6

Data and Measures

Before discussing the measurement of the variables in the model, the meaning of right-wing violence should be clarified. The author here draws on the definition of right-wing extremism offered by Bjørgo, which is taken from Heitmeyer’s research: Right-wing extremism is “an ideology of considering inequality between people as a nature-given principle, combined with an acceptance of violence as a legitimate way of acting” (Bjørgo, 1995). Thus, right-wing violence is violence committed by individuals who subscribe to this ideology; the specific acts include arson, attacks on persons and property, bombings, and murder.

The numbers of instances of right-wing violence were gleaned from the yearly reports by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, entitled Verfassungsschutzberichte, or Reports of the Office of Constitutional Protection, for the years 1971–92. Estimates for 1993, 1994, and 1995 were acquired from the German government’s home page,7 which reports the same information that appears in the Verfassungsschutzberichte. The German government attempts to keep an accurate record of the activities of extremist groups, both on the left and right, and reports summaries of acts that are fairly certain to have been committed by these groups. Fortunately, the report separates the acts of violence on the left from acts of violence on the right. These acts of violence include a whole range of activities: murder, assault, bombings, arson, and attacks against possessions. When an act of violence is determined to have been committed by someone subscribing to right-wing ideology, it appears as such in the report.8

6 It should be noted that the other typologies developed by Willems (based on police reports) indicate that a large minority (perhaps 40–45 percent) of perpetrators do not belong to a group that is economically motivated by threat. As mentioned above, approximately 15 percent of the perpetrators appear to be ideologically motivated, and tend to have fairly successful jobs and good educations. Another 25–30 percent, referred to as the “fellow travellers,” is motivated neither by ideology nor by economic threat, but more by peer pressure and “the desire to prove oneself in front of friends or not to leave them in the lurch” (Willems, 1995: 173). Thus, the violence tends to be started by those who are economically or ideologically motivated, with the “fellow travellers” coming along for the ride.


8 The reports are based on police investigations of crimes. Police departments, while conducting their investigations, often will determine that crimes were committed by certain types of groups and this information is included in the investigators’ final reports; the federal government then simply compiles the final statistics on acts of violence (and crime in general) in a yearly report.
Figure 1 displays the numbers of acts of violence across 1971–95. As illustrated in Figure 1, the numbers of instances of violence prior to unification show seemingly small fluctuations, but after reunification, these numbers dramatically increase. To control for the possibility that this part of the series (post-unification) is contributing overwhelmingly to the findings, a unification dummy variable will be included in the regression below. Also, both qualitative analyses (Willems, 1995) and inspection of the data make it clear that 1991 was an extraordinary year in terms of right-wing violence. This was the year following unification, and in order to try to capture the turbulence of the year, an additional dummy variable representing 1991 will be included.

The high degree of violence during reunification makes it appear as if right-wing violence prior to this time varied little. Figure 2, however, shows that there was indeed large variation, with the instances of right-wing violence ranging from around 20 to almost 120 per year.  

These data are certainly not without problems. One of the problems is that only reported crimes are included; thus, any crime that has gone unreported will not be included. A second problem is that the various police precincts use different criteria for determining whether a crime is “right-wing,” meaning that reporting across parts of Germany may be inconsistent (Willems, 1995: 164). The result is that in some precincts, it is assumed that attacks on foreigners, homosexuals and other outgroups are the work of right-wing extremists, and in other precincts there is more of an attempt to ascertain the ideology of the perpetrator. However, since these differences should remain constant, these statistics should yield valid measures of change in right-wing violence across time.

As indicated in note 16 below, the analysis was conducted for the entire series and for the preunification years only, and the relationships reported below hold for both series.
Turning to the independent variables, it should first be noted that the term "foreigner," when used in the German context, has a fairly clear, specific meaning. Generally, individuals who are not of German descent and who reside in Germany are considered "foreigners." Thus, a guest worker who has been in the country for twenty years, for example, unless he/she has gone through a very lengthy and difficult naturalization process, is still counted as a "foreigner." On the other hand, individuals entering the country from Poland, the former Soviet Union, etc., who can show that they are "of German blood" are not counted as foreigners. In general, individuals who have German heritage are not foreigners; individuals who cannot illustrate German heritage are foreigners.\(^\text{10}\)

The numbers of foreigners during 1971–93 come from Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer die Lage der Ausländer in der BRD: 1994 (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, 1994: Ch. 6). I obtained the numbers of foreigners in 1994 and 1995 from the German government home page.\(^\text{11}\) These statistics are displayed in Figure 3. As might be expected, based on qualitative research and news accounts, the period in which there was a tremendous increase in right-wing violence coincides with the period in which there was an increase in the number of foreigners.

\(^\text{10}\) Some might even argue that it is this conceptualization of “foreigner” and German citizenship that contributes to xenophobia and right-wing violence.

The economic indicator chosen for this study is the unemployment rate, which is the one important economic indicator normally mentioned in conjunction with immigration and right-wing extremism; the measure is from the *Yearbook of Labor Statistics* and is displayed in Figure 4. Any potential relationship between unemployment and right-wing violence is fairly unclear from this figure because unemployment had already been on the rise, starting in the mid-1980s, then dropped in 1991 (the most intensive year for right-wing violence) only to rise again shortly thereafter. Thus, there is already some support for the notion that unemployment, if it is important at all, is probably not the sole trigger for right-wing violence.13

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12 Inflation was also considered. However, it is not normally a specific problem associated with right-wing extremism, and it was so highly collinear with unemployment that the regression results were uninterpretable. Further, with the inclusion of the interaction term, an even greater potential for multicollinearity problems exists. Thus, unemployment will be the sole measure of the economic situation.

13 The descriptive statistics for the key variables in the regression below are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right-Wing Violence</td>
<td>425.65</td>
<td>726.57</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>2,639.00</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(number of acts)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Population</td>
<td>4,784.84</td>
<td>1,123.77</td>
<td>3,438.70</td>
<td>7,342.80</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1000s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis

One problem that arose in analyzing these data is a fairly common problem with any time series analysis: nonstationarity in one of the series. Based on the Dickey-Fuller unit root tests for each of the series, only the dependent variable displayed nonstationarity. Under the circumstances, the usual solution is to difference the nonstationary series. However, this corrective would mean that levels of unemployment and foreigners would produce change in right-wing violence. Because this is theoretically unappealing and difficult to analyze conceptually, and because the hypotheses stated above are in terms of the relative number of foreigners and relative unemployment, I differenced all of the variables. Thus, the regression estimates focus on the change in levels of the dependent and independent variables. Recall that dummy variables will also be included to control for reunification and specifically for the year 1991. Thus, the estimated equation is:

\[
\Delta \text{Violence} = b_0 + b_1 (\Delta \text{Unemployment}) + b_2 (\Delta \text{Number Foreign})
+ b_3 (\Delta \text{Number Foreign} \times \Delta \text{Unemployment})
+ b_4 (\text{Reunification Dummy}) + b_5 (1991 \text{ Dummy})
+ e.
\]

The results from the regression are displayed in Table 1.

14 The Dickey-Fuller statistics (followed by t-values in parentheses) are: Right-Wing Violence, -15.63 (-2.63); Foreign Population, -0.19 (-0.06); Unemployment, -4.77 (-1.60).
TABLE 1

OLS Estimates for Δ Right-Wing Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Δunemployment</td>
<td>24.35</td>
<td>-46.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(64.14)</td>
<td>(59.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δforeigners</td>
<td>.54**</td>
<td>.42*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reunification dummy</td>
<td>93.41</td>
<td>-361.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(232.41)</td>
<td>(250.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 dummy</td>
<td>869.56**</td>
<td>1,649.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(328.78)</td>
<td>(386.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δunemployment * Δforeigners</td>
<td></td>
<td>.77**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-48.54</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(67.73)</td>
<td>(59.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEE</td>
<td>243.49</td>
<td>203.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durbin Watson</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>2.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Figures in cells are $b$, followed by standard errors printed below in parentheses; * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$.

Surprisingly, unemployment has no significant effect in Model 1. In the linear, additive model, the change in the number of foreigners contributes significantly to explaining changes in the levels of right-wing violence, but change in unemployment does not.

Recall, however, that the general argument about the effect of the economy is that a worsening economy is associated with anger and hostility about the economic situation, which is often taken out on outgroups, who are made the scapegoats for economic problems. This implies that such a scapegoat must be salient enough to receive the general wrath of extremists. This multiplicative hypothesis has yet to be tested. The expectation for this hypothesis is that when there is rising unemployment and increasing numbers of foreigners, violence will be at its highest; when neither unemployment nor the number of foreigners is increasing, or when unemployment is increasing and the number of foreigners is not, violence will be much lower. When both variables register little change, the degree of violence will be on the decline.

The results indicate that the interactive specification performs much better than the linear specification (see Model 2). Specifically, the interaction contributes a nontrivial 0.14 to the variance explained, with a slope coefficient that is highly significant, statistically.15

15 Collinearity diagnostics (tolerance and variance inflation factors) indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem, despite the inclusion of the interaction term. It should be noted
What do the coefficients tell us about the nature of the relationship? The best way to determine this is to substitute values from the original data set to see how the slope is affected by the moderating variable (Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990). Low, medium, and high scores were selected for both change in unemployment and the change in the numbers of foreigners. As seen in Figure 5, the slope for unemployment does indeed change depending on the number of foreigners. When the change in the number of foreigners in the country is negative (below average), the slope for the relationship between unemployment and instances of right-wing violence is actually negative. In other words, increases in unemployment produce less violence when there is a decreasing number of foreigners. When the change in foreigners is average, the relationship between unemployment is slight but positive. Stated differently, when the change in the number of foreigners in the country is small but positive, right-wing

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16 It is important to note that the equation was reestimated for the preunification years (the years prior to 1990), and a similar relationship was discovered. The primary difference is that the relationship was not quite as strong in these years as it is in the entire series. However, this reestimation makes it clear that the relationship does indeed hold even prior to reunification.

17 The medium value for each distribution is the mean, and the high and low values are one standard deviation above the mean and one standard deviation below the mean, respectively.
violence increases slightly as unemployment increases. Finally, when the change in foreigners is large and positive, increases in unemployment produce a much larger increase in acts of violence. Thus, it appears that only when a clear scapegoat (like increasing numbers of foreigners) exists does a bad economy manifest itself in violence by the right. This is quite consistent with the findings of Lewis-Beck and Mitchell (1993), where voting for the FN (National Front) in France was dependent upon this interaction between unemployment and immigration. The combination of their findings with those in the current study provide very strong evidence that, in contrast to the arguments made in much of the immigration literature, a bad economy is not the primary stimulus necessary for right-wing extremist behavior, but the interaction of a bad economy and immigration is quite powerful in predicting such behavior, whether this behavior is legitimate (i.e., voting) or not (i.e., carrying out violent acts).

Conclusions

This analysis began by asking what effect the economy and the number of foreigners have on instances of right-wing violence in Germany. This question was motivated partly by the lack of such studies in the past and by the inconsistencies of studies conducted at the individual level, particularly with regard to the effects of the economy on hostility toward immigrants. The answers to these questions are intriguing.

First the economic variable appeared insignificant. In the linear, additive model, unemployment seemed to make no difference in the instances of violence. However, upon further investigation, the economy—specifically rising unemployment—did seem to matter, but only in combination with increases in the size of an outgroup at whom violence could be directed. That outgroup here was foreigners. Thus, as the number of foreigners increases, so too does the effect of unemployment on the numbers of acts of violence. The question then becomes: What would happen if the economic situation was to worsen but there was no clear target group? The results here indicate that the number of acts of violence would have remained fairly steady, with no such dramatic increases. On the other hand, another outgroup might have become the focus of such attacks.

The next logical step in the study of right-wing violence would be an attempt to better understand the link between the economy, foreigners, and violence, expanding on the existing studies of perpetrators of right-wing violence. This paper has established that the three variables interact, but the reason for the interaction needs to be discovered. Are the people committing the violence directly affected by the economy? Have they lost their own jobs recently? Alternatively, do they have reason to fear the future loss of employment? Or, are they using the economic downturn as an excuse to play out violent tendencies? An answer to these questions might make it
possible to design public policies that would reduce the incidence of right-wing violence.

REFERENCES


