The clash of security identities

The question of Turkey's membership in the European Union

The main contention of this article is that security considerations play a vital role in determining the attitudes of the European Union (EU) and Turkey towards each other. The more the Turkish elite sees the ongoing accession process and future membership in the EU as a way of enhancing Turkish security, the more willing they will be to shoulder the costs involved. The more EU members believe that Turkey's membership will contribute to EU security, the more willing they will be to pay the costs of Turkey's journey to Brussels.

Even though it might seem that this is a two-way street, in reality Turkey's chances of EU membership are strongly bound to its performance in successfully adopting distinctive EU values and norms, which are less about security than they are about democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and transparent and impartial procedures. The often-heard Turkish argument is that, if the current members of the EU display a strong desire to turn their club into a global security actor with fundamental interests in Turkey's vicinity, usually defined in conventional strategic terms, they would be more accommodating towards Turkey's EU membership. But that argument simply does not hold for two main reasons. One is that 'strategic security considerations are

The author is a PhD student at the University of Bilkent, Turkey. He would like to thank one anonymous referee.
marginal to the EU in the consideration of Turkey's full membership"; the other concerns the fact that the EU of today is a civil rather than a military power.2

Given the legacy of the EU's enlargement history, one could safely argue that the compatibility of Turkey's strategic-security conceptualization with that of the EU would certainly not lead the EU to extend full membership to Turkey. Strategic-security similarities contributed in the past only to Turkey's placement in the EU's 'near abroad' as a strategic actor.3 Therefore, what is required for Turkey's membership in the EU is not that the EU should evolve into a global military actor but that Turkey should embrace the many faceted identity of the EU. The danger for Turkey is that placing too much emphasis on 'strategic-security compatibility,' without internalizing the normative basis of the EU's distinctive identity, would in the long term make it less likely for the Europeans to conceive of any role for Turkey beyond its current presence as a strategic partner and insulator on the periphery of the EU.4

This article begins with a short analysis of the conventional Turkish understanding of Turkey-Europe security relations, usually defined in strategic-security terms. Then an attempt is made to account for the main factors that have both fundamentally challenged this conventional view and contributed to Turkey's further estrangement from the EU in the post-cold war era by revealing the differences between Turkey's concept of the EU and the reality. Finally, I conclude that while the EU has not become a strategic security actor in the aftermath of the

1 See Atilla Eralp, 'European security and Turkey,' Privateview (spring 2000), 52-5. According to Eralp, the European Union granted formal candidacy to Turkey in December 1999 because geopolitical considerations between December 1997 and December 1999 necessitated a more inclusive approach by the EU. The transregional and interdependent character of the strategic-security issues in Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Eurasia required a much closer relationship between the EU and Turkey than the EU's Luxembourg summit foresaw in 1997. However, the reader should be aware that there is a huge difference between candidacy status and full EU membership. Even if the EU had acted geopolitically when it approved Turkey's candidacy, that would not change the argument of this article.


4 Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, 'The European Union and Turkey,' Survival 41 (spring 1999), 41-57.
cold war, nor has Turkey succeeded in complying with the EU’s membership criteria, which reflect the distinctive security norms of the European Union. However, the events of 11 September 2001 may provide Turkey with its longed-for opportunity to come closer to the EU in security terms even as it maintains its strategic security relationship with the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This will not be an easy task, and it will be greatly affected by the nature of Turkey’s co-operation with the United States against global terrorism.

THE DYNAMICS OF TURKEY-EUROPE SECURITY RELATIONS: 1923-90

One can safely argue that an identity-security nexus has long been at the heart of Turkish perceptions of the EU, a legacy of the centuries-old relations between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. Given that the Empire came to an end as a result of European attempts to dismember its territories, the Turkish elites of the 1920s tended to be ‘cynical’ about the European powers; they did not want to see the fate of the Ottomans repeated.

The Ottoman elite believed that the security and territorial integrity of the Empire would be guaranteed if the Empire were incorporated into the European state system with the distinctive identity of the state preserved. For their part, the new Republican elites largely held to the idea that the overall security of their new state would be guaranteed only if the Europeans recognized the Turks as Europeans. In other words, the more the Europeans recognized Turkey as ‘European,’ the more ‘secure’ Turkey would feel. And the more the Europeans saw Turkey as vital to European ‘security,’ the more the Turks thought of Turkey as ‘European.’ So, to the Turkish elite, as long as Europe and Turkey saw each other as ‘security providers,’ Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’ would be uncontested. As a contributor to European security and peace, the Turkish elite could legitimately claim that Turkey was a ‘European’ country and its security would be assured.


6 Hasan Kösebalaban, ‘Turkey’s EU membership: a clash of security cultures,’ Middle East Policy 9 (June 2002), 130-46.

That logic suited the Turkey of the early 1920s when what mattered to the Turkish elite was successful nation-building along the 19th century positivist credentials of European nationalism. A strong state authority endowed with draconian instruments to keep it that way was deemed essential for this project, the main purpose of which was to root out the factors that had led to the demise of the Ottoman Empire, namely an Islamic social structure and a multi-ethnic society. The primary goals of the Republican elite - a homogeneous secular nation within a unitary state - were in close harmony with the prevailing European norms of the time. From this perspective, the 'Europeanization' attempts of the Turkish elites were mainly instrumental in nature; they were, after all, modelled on the European nation-states of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The same elites were also aware that if they really wanted their project to come to fruition they would have to maintain peaceful relations with the European powers of the time. For the founding fathers of the republic, an ideal security relationship between Turkey and the European powers would be built on the following principles: non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other; respect for the territorial integrity and normative cultural backgrounds of each other; non-participation in rival camps; common alliances in the face of common threats; military preparedness for future contingencies; and, finally, Turkey, as the weaker entity, would oversee and help preserve European strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

Turkey's membership in NATO and many other European international institutions in the early 1950s was a direct result of this thinking. Even though the goal of Westernization was a factor in the background, the decision to join the Atlantic alliance and to establish an associate membership with the European Economic Community was mainly strategic in nature. In the face of the looming Soviet threat to the north, Turkey had no credible choice but to join NATO, which it did in 1951. It also hoped that stronger links with the EEC would strengthen Turkey's Western orientation and bolster its European identity.

---


9 Kösebalaban, 'Turkey’s EU membership,' 131-4.

Indeed, one could see the foreign policy practices of the Turkish Republic since the early 1920s as ongoing attempts to construct a European identity for Turkey, defined in terms of strategic-security relations. Siding with European powers in issues of international politics and joining inter-governmental European institutions were seen as the most cost-efficient ways of encouraging Europeans to recognize Turkey's European identity.

However, Turkey has neither become a constituent part of the EU's integration process nor fully embraced the norms of the emerging European identity. Though the Turkish elites knew that the process of Europeanization would have two main dimensions - a domestic reform process aimed at internalizing the constitutive norms of the European international society and participation in the European state system - they preferred to give primacy to the second. The prevailing view was that the EU was not radically different from the old European state system that embodied the Westphalian logic of balance-of-power politics. Therefore, the Turks could not successfully detect the differences between membership in the EU and in other inter-governmental European institutions, of which NATO was the most important. For the most part, they thought that membership in NATO would enable them to argue safely that they contributed to European strategic security and that therefore they deserved to be recognized as 'European.'

In a nutshell, the cold war period was relatively problem-free in Europe-Turkey relations in terms of security considerations. Turkey appeared to be content with the inter-governmental character of its relations with EU member states within NATO and other European institutions and considered itself 'European' when it united with EU members around the common goal of defending Western style democracy against the Soviet threat. For their part, EU members acquiesced in Turkey's participation in the cold war European security architecture as a 'European country' only after the United States convinced them

11 Yücel Bozdaglioglu, Identity and International Relations: Turkish foreign policy in the post-World War II era, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Kentucky, 2001, 76-117.


that Turkey's inclusion in the Alliance and in other European institutions would benefit European security interests. During those years, Turkey at least saw itself as a reciprocal security provider with Europe. But what about the EU?

Contrary to Turkish thinking, the Europe of the EU was no longer a conglomerate of independent states with distinctive domestic and foreign policies. But neither was it a non-security organization dealing only with issues of low politics. Within the EU, member states gradually converged on common liberal and democratic norms. The EU's integration process started to change the rules of the old interstate game in the European theatre. At least within the new Europe, the EU was a security organization that rendered the logic of balance-of-power politics redundant. France and Germany, the two arch rivals, could reach a secure relationship within the EU as the integration process contributed to the emergence of an embryonic collective identity and the lure of traditional balance-of-power politics was lost within the emerging post-Westphalian Europe.

Although NATO may have been the main security organization -- it institutionalized the American military presence in Europe, checked the German influence, and protected Europeans against the external threat from the east - one should not underestimate the role of the EU in the maintenance of peace and security in Western Europe. Forming a collective defence alliance against the Soviet Union proved to be a much easier task than efforts to stem the tide of balance-of-power logic among traditional belligerents in Western Europe. Here the role of the EU has been immense, guided by the statesmanship of the leaders of the major EU member countries who contributed to the ' politicization' of the main security issues by helping move them from the arena of 'security' to that of 'politics.' In other words, if potential 'security' issues were framed as 'political' issues, then the need to solve them with the threat or use of force would recede because political problems require a domestic discussion process in which the procedures

of engagement and consensus-building would be privileged over containment and the use of force. The politicization of potential security issues would lead to compromise solutions, without feeling the need to mobilize armed force.\textsuperscript{17}

However, the crucial point remains: to move the process successfully beyond security, a more inclusive ‘self-other’ relationship would have to emerge among the discussants. The post-sovereign institutional environment of the EU, with its norms of ‘peace,’ ‘liberty,’ ‘human rights,’ ‘rule of law,’ and ‘pluralist democracy’\textsuperscript{18} made it possible for a more inclusive ‘self-other’ relationship to take root among the members. It was hoped that if EU members succeed in ‘politicizing’ their potential domestic security issues, then they would be able to more easily ‘politicize’ their external security issues. It would then become nearly impossible for a unitary, strictly authoritarian, overtly centralized, and unicultural polity to be admitted to the EU because the supranational characteristics of the EU’s institutional environment would make life easier only for those states content with either the upward or the downward diffusion of sovereignty. In polities in which sovereignty is diffused, possible security problems would be more easily seen as political issues because people would tend to reach compromise solutions through discussion and consensus-building, whereas in highly centralized domestic political structures, solutions to such problems would likely be imposed by the central authority, often by privileging the concerns of those who hold power. Thus, ‘more integration’ and ‘EU centralization’ would result in greater collective identity, which would in turn result in greater security.

The important point here is that the common strategic-security considerations of West European countries against the Soviet danger were only one of the factors that led to the EU. The more important factor was the need to normalize relations among the main belligerents of the pre-war era, namely Germany and France. NATO membership implied much less. NATO was mainly a collective defence organization designed to protect the strategic-security interests of West European powers against the Soviet Union. Because it shared similar


\textsuperscript{18} Manners, ‘Normative power Europe,’ 242.
strategic-security concerns about the Soviet Union, Turkey had no problem embracing NATO; once under the NATO roof, Turkey could claim to be 'European.'

POST–COLD WAR PRACTICE
Everything changed in the 1990s with the end of the cold war. For the first time in the republican era of Turkey-Europe relations, both sides began to feel suspicious of the 'security provider' role of the other. For Turkey, its perception of the EU as a global security actor has not been matched by the post–cold war international identity of the European Union. As Turkey's accession process unfolded, both sides became aware of a growing difference in their concepts of security. This in turn has played a significant role in the unwillingness of the EU to offer Turkey credible membership prospects.

There are many possible contributing factors to worsening EU-Turkey security relations over the last decade. The questions to bear in mind are why strategic-security considerations have played no significant role in leading the EU towards a more inclusive approach to Turkey's membership and how the incompatibilities between the security identities of both sides have become more apparent.

The Common Glue
When the legitimacy of the Western security community was based on efforts to preserve and defend the Western way of life against the communist alternative through the projection of American military power and nuclear deterrence to Europe, Western powers could happily accommodate Turkey within Europe. The most important strategic-security link tying the two sides together evaporated along with the communist threat.

Enlargement/Exclusion Nexus
When the EU was faced with the prospect of extending membership to the countries of central and eastern Europe, what was at stake was its very identity. If the EU was indeed to preserve its identity, it would then have to enlarge its borders further east by incorporating new members, which would gradually internalize pluralist democracy and

When the EU's post–cold war identity was strongly bound to enlargement, what mattered was the direction of enlargement. Although the majority of members had no fundamental economic interests in the enlargement of the EU further east to central and eastern Europe, the EU soon had to initiate the enlargement process by signing Europe Agreements with those countries when the successful 'rhetorical norm manipulation' of the potential members combined with the EU's kinship-based cultural approach to enlargement.

Even though the level and quality of Turkey's pluralist democracy and liberal economy were not sufficiently strong to bind Turkey and the EU together when the EU gradually came to regard the internalization of its fundamental norms as an important criterion in evaluating the suitability of aspirant states for membership, it was mainly EU members' doubts about Turkey's European identity, defined in cultural and kinship terms, that led to Turkey's placement in the membership list far behind the countries of central and eastern Europe. Those countries, after all, had no better records when it came to plural democracy and liberal economies. This attitude was a clear signal that strategic-security considerations would no longer be a primary and facilitating factor in the EU enlargement process. Otherwise, Turkey's geopolitical and geostrategic value would result in a more accommodating European attitude. Add to this the EU's cultural approach to the enlargement process and it is not surprising that the Turkish elite gradually came to believe that Turkey would be excluded from the post-cold war EU. Hence they began to see the new EU not as a security provider but as a 'security threat.'

Requirements of the EU's Accession Process

Until the 1990s, it was tremendously important for the Turkish foreign and security policy making elite to maintain and strengthen Turkey's

20 Aybet, A European Security Architecture, 17-36.
23 Ziya Önis, 'Turkey, Europe, and paradoxes of identity: perspectives on the international context of democratization,' Mediterranean Quarterly 10(summer 1999), 107-36.
strategic-security relationship with Europe as defined by common external threats so that the European identity of their country (and therefore its security) would be recognized by EU members. After 1990, however, the same elite had to deal with two important changes. The first was that their performance in meeting EU accession requirements, which for the most part reflect the EU’s distinctive security identity, would be the main criterion by which Europeans would recognize (or not) Turkey’s European identity. The second was that the EU was a radically different entity in the post–cold war age. The new EU imposes detailed political and economic criteria on candidate states; it intervenes in their domestic affairs in such a way as to encourage pluralistic democracy, fundamental human rights, the supremacy of civilian authority over military, good governance, the resolution of territorial disputes from a win-win mentality, and so on.

Unfortunately, the Turkish elite has not always interpreted the conditions put forward by the EU as positive from the point of view of its security interests. In general terms, it does not disagree with the criteria laid out by the EU at its Copenhagen summit in June 1993 - full democratization, completion of a liberal economic order, and adoption of the EU’s Community Law have all been regarded as legitimate demands. Turkish anxiety has arisen out of the changes Turkey would have to make domestically. Recognition of the Kurdish citizens of Turkey as a distinct minority group with guaranteed rights to education and publication in their mother tongue is anathema to the Kemalist state elite and would be seen as a fundamental blow to the ‘unitary state’ and ‘homogeneous nation’ characteristics of Turkish nationalism, once the backbone of Turkey’s security conceptualization. If EU membership were to result in more decentralization of the political structure of the state, replacing its unitary character with a federal structure, as is the case with many EU member countries, then the accession process would be seen as a grave threat to the national interest. Both the preservation of the territorial integrity of the country and the maintenance of its secular democratic credentials are seen by the


25 Turkey recognizes only Christians and Jews as minorities within the state. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which recognized the Turkish Republic internationally, defines minority status on the basis of religious differences.

26 Kösebalaban, ‘Turkey’s EU membership,’ 136-44.
Turkey and the EU

establishment elite as 'nationally sensitive' issues. They think that partitionist Kurdish fractions and fundamentalist Islamist groups would find a protected niche if Turkey were accepted as a member of the EU.

But there is another criterion for membership that may be even more problematic for the Turkish elite, and that is the EU's demand that candidate countries resolve their border disputes by the end of 2004. This was mentioned both in the Helsinki conclusions of 1999 and among the medium-term political criteria of Turkey's Accession Partnership Document of 2000. The EU requires all candidate countries to settle their border problems with their neighbours, ideally through bilateral negotiations but if that is not possible then through the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the Hague. What might have been seen as a fairly simple requirement for most EU member states was a strong challenge to Turkey's strategic-security relations vis-à-vis Greece, a member of the EU since 1981. The Turkish elite tend to think that such demands are instigated by Greece in an attempt to 'Europeanize' the dynamics of Turkish-Greek relations. The majority of the Turkish elite thinks that Greece has been trying to score goals against Turkey by exploiting the mechanisms of Turkey's accession process with the European Union. Having calculated that Turkey's road to Brussels would pass through Athens, successive Greek governments since the early 1980s have tried first to obscure Turkey's relations with the EU and then to demand as many concessions as possible from Turkey in the resolution of the Cyprus and the Aegean Sea disputes. Given that one of the pillars of Turkey's security policy is to maintain the strategic balance with Greece in and around the Aegean Sea, the Turks are quick to conclude that EU demands here would eventually disrupt the balance in the region in


favour of Greece. If further 'Europeanization' were to result in the loss of Turkey's relative strategic advantages vis-à-vis Greece, then it is not a large step to an interpretation of the accession process as a threat to Turkey's security.

The first signs of Turkey's discontent with what it perceived as a pro-Greek EU position could be seen in Turkey's response to the EU's invitation to participate in the European conference scheduled for March 1998. Prospective participants were asked to indicate a commitment to take unresolved border issues to the International Court of Justice. Turkey, already disgruntled at the EU decision at the Luxembourg summit in December 1997 to exclude Turkey from the first and second waves of enlargement, resolved to suspend its political dialogue with the EU and declined to join the planned conference on the grounds that its participation would imply agreement with the Greek interpretation of how to resolve the Aegean disputes.

Turkey's discontent with the accession process only increased when the EU seemed to agree to Turkey's candidacy in Helsinki in 1999 if Turkey agreed that the political resolution of the Cyprus dispute would not be a precondition for Cyprus's membership in the EU (at least the Greek Cypriot part of it). In attempting to interpret the EU position on the Cyprus conflict, the Turkish security elite came to two main conclusions: the EU was unwilling to put enough pressure on Greek Cypriots to compromise with their co-islanders in the north; and Turkey's EU membership might depend on Turkish concessions over the island, which would in turn jeopardize Turkey's strategic (one can read national security) interests in the eastern Mediterranean. Instead of working for a legitimate solution to the Cyprus dispute within the EU framework, the Turkish elite hastily concluded that the EU should have nothing to do with Cyprus and that Greece had been using the EU as a political lever against Turkey.

Turkey and the International Identity of the EU

This discussion would be incomplete without reference to the kind of international entity the EU became in the post-cold war era and the

31 Itir Turan and Dilek Barlas, 'Turkish-Greek balance: a key to peace and cooperation in the Balkans,' East European Quarterly 32(January 1999), 469-89.
Turkey and the EU

extent to which Turkey could have internalized its security identity. Depending on the answers to those questions, one can more truly assess the prospects for future membership. Here, I would like to present two interrelated arguments. The first is that the EU has evolved into a kind of civilian-normative international actor rather than a strategic-security one. The second is that even the strategic-security interests of the European Union have deviated from those of Turkey.

Although EU members showed some interest in a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the bloody wars of the last decade in the territories of the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia derailed those efforts. Were it not for the last minute intervention of the United States, through NATO, the efforts of the EU would not have generated stability in the Balkans. The war in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 revealed once again the inability of the EU to act in a strategic-security fashion. Despite reinvigorated European efforts to turn the EU into a military actor at the Cologne summit in June 1999, the fact that EU members have been further scaling back their military spending seems to have blocked that initiative as well. The EU's determination to make operational a rapid reaction force of 60,000 by the end of 2003 might seriously founder on the low military budgets of the member states.

However, despite these apparent weaknesses in the military area, the EU has performed well as a civilian and normative power. Its civilian power is bolstered by the huge economic resources of its members, and its normative power stems from its ability to determine the confines of 'normalcy' and appropriate state behaviour in global international society. The best example of the EU acting as a normative power is the ongoing accession process in which it simply appears to have a 'power of attraction' in the eyes of those states that want to join. Aspirant countries are encouraged by the European Union to adapt their socio-economic and political structures to existing EU norms. In this way, it is hoped, the structural causes of potential instability and conflict will fade away. In other words, the EU is equipped with the tools to contribute to 'positive peace' rather than to 'negative peace.' Thus, Turkey's chances of membership within the EU will be slight if the Turkish elites fail in their efforts to transform their country along the lines of the EU model. The danger of exclusion will be higher if the country's security

33 Ian Manners, 'Normative power Europe,' 238-42.
conceptualization continues to privilege strategic dimensions at the expense of the EU's civilian and normative security identity.

The 1990s also witnessed a record in Turkish foreign and security policy practice that not only displayed Turkey's failure to move closer to Europe's security identity but also demonstrated the persistence of the well-established strategic-security mentality. In the process, Turkey became gradually estranged from the EU in terms of security considerations.

First, the EU and Turkey diverged on the definition of the nature of conventional threats to security. Turkey continued to regard developments in Russia and the Middle East, particularly attempts by the latter to develop weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles to deliver them, as possible sources of conventional threats to its security. EU members on the other hand shared the view that today's world posed no conventional threat to Europe's security. Therefore, a great many European security analysts believed that Turkey's inclusion within the EU might increase 'conventional threats' to European security because Turkey lies at the epicentre of so many zones of instability, and its hard-security mentality might risk bringing the EU into open conflict with any one of Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbours.

For many EU members, new threats and risks to European security lie in the unstable regions on the peripheries of Europe along a rim stretching from northwest Africa through the Balkans to the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Problems that might emanate from the unhealthy domestic structures of the countries in these regions include immigration to the developed European countries, ethnic intrastate wars, environmental pollution, drug trafficking, organized crime, and so on. This supports the view that in the security referents within post-Westphalian Europe, 'society' and 'individuals' have gradually replaced the 'nation-state.' In Turkey, on the other hand, the elite continues to view the Turkish state and its territorial integrity as the main objects of security.


35 Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, 'The European Union and Turkey,' Survival 41(Spring 1999), 41-57.

In addition to their partial differentiation in terms of conventional and non-conventional threats, the EU and Turkey have also diverged in their approaches to terrorism. Turkey sees various kinds of terrorism as one of the greatest threats to its national and global security interests and prefers to rely on conventional military capabilities and military co-operation with the United States and Israel to 'contain' those threats. The European Union has adopted a rather more selective approach both to the definition of terrorism and to the means of dealing with it. The EU refuses to treat all sorts of anti-Western (anti-United States, anti-EU) and organized anti-regime political activities generating from 'weak' and 'failed' states of north Africa and the greater Middle East as terrorist activities. When the EU does define an activity as 'terrorism,' it tends to struggle with it through 'engagement' rather than 'containment.' For many Europeans, if the socio-political roots of terrorism are not destroyed, terrorism will never be eradicated.

As applied to Turkey, EU members have long refused to incorporate the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and other leftist-oriented organizations into their list of terrorist groups, despite repeated pleas from Turkey to do so. As long as such groups do not disturb the domestic order in EU member countries or abuse their right to express their claims peacefully within the plural democratic system of the EU area, the EU refuses to see them either as terrorist organizations or as threats to security.

Another difference can be found in attitudes towards NATO and transatlantic relations. For Turkey, membership in NATO is its most important security guarantee. Thus, Turkey's major post-cold war security concern has to do with NATO's collective defence characteristic and the possibility of the dilution of article 5 commitments. Would Turkey continue to feel secure in a NATO that included Russia and various central and east European countries and that had become a collective security organization rather than a collective defence organization? Turkey assumed that NATO would evolve into a loose collective security organization once it opened the way for new members from


38 Bruce Hoffman, 'Is Europe soft on terrorism?' Foreign Policy (No 115, summer 1999).
the east.\textsuperscript{39} Because the Turkish elite saw the emerging European army as part of a European attempt to construct an autonomous foreign and security policy identity that would transform the EU into a global geopolitical security actor, it was imperative for Turkey to become a contractual party to it. With this perception in mind, it is not difficult for the Turkish elite to evaluate non-membership in this new arrangement from a 'self-other' dichotomy.\textsuperscript{40}

However, the Turkish elite misread the situation. The European Union has been eager to develop its own autonomous military capability not because of a desire to ward off conventional security threats to the continent or to extend European influence to other parts of the world to challenge other global military actors, namely the United States. Rather, it wants to prevent unconventional security risks and challenges from disrupting the stability and prosperity of the continent.\textsuperscript{41} When the rationale for establishing an autonomous European army is attributed to these modest goals, which give priority to the low end of the Petersberg tasks, the European Union would see no reason to extend an invitation to Turkey just because Turkey is a NATO member with geopolitical and sophisticated military assets.\textsuperscript{42} From this point of view, the European members of NATO see NATO military capabilities as of great potential help for the embryonic European Rapid Reaction Force. They want NATO to function in the European theatre not to protect Europeans from a conventional source of threat but to intervene in possible crises that might erupt on the peripheries of the continent (Petersberg tasks) until such time as the European Union could mount its own army in the field.

Because of the EU's negative stance on its participation in the mechanisms of the emerging European army, at least on the basis of Turkey's Associate Membership in the Western European Union and NATO's

\textsuperscript{39} Anthony Forster and William Wallace, 'What is NATO for?' \textit{Survival} 43(winter 2001-2), 107-22.

\textsuperscript{40} 'The Turkish general staff view on ESDP,' \textit{Insight Turkey} 3(April-June 2001), 87-95.

\textsuperscript{41} The evidence is in the modest terms for a European army and in the decreasing levels of military spending by EU member states. See Ethan B. Kapstein, 'Allies and armaments,' \textit{Survival} 44(Summer 2002), 141-55.

\textsuperscript{42} In fact, Müftüler-Baç argues that it was because of Turkey's geopolitical and military assets that the EU offered Turkey candidacy status in Helsinki in December 1999. See Meltem Müftüler-Baç, 'Turkey's role in the EU's security and foreign policies,' \textit{Security Dialogue} 31(December 2000), 489-502.
Turkey and the EU

Washington Treaty of April 1999, Turkey has long vetoed the EU's right of assured access to the assets of the Atlantic alliance. Its approach to this issue is from the traditional security-identity nexus: if Europe no longer welcomes Turkey's participation in European security institutions, then Turkey's European identity will further erode. This will in turn exacerbate Turkey's security concerns to such an extent that Europe might be considered a 'threat' rather than a 'security provider.'

One fundamental ground for assessing the compatibility of Turkey's membership in the EU from the strategic-security perspective concerns the approach of each to the use of military force to deal with terrorist or other non-conventional security threats. EU members are predisposed to use military power only if such action would contribute to strengthening sociopolitical structures in unstable countries. For them, the use of the military does not constitute an end in itself in eradicating structural conflicts around the peripheries of the continent, but rather as a means to pave the way for the efficient implementation of 'structural development.' Thus, efforts to endow the EU with a military capability would not mean that the EU was inclined to evolve into a military security actor on a global scale, but rather that it might use military means to accomplish civilian goals. If the EU's development aids to unstable regions around Europe's peripheries are to be successful in rooting out the structural causes of instability and terrorism, it is now necessary to rely from time to time on military means (European army). The EU hopes to provide at least a minimum degree of internal stability, defined as the absence of militarized warfare, before investing in structural development.

When Turkey both 'broadened' the range of issues that it sees as threats to its national security and 'narrowed' its perspective to deal with them to largely military means, the use of force as an instrument


44 Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, 'Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture,' International Affairs 77(July 2001), 584-603.

in dispute settlement became more likely, at least in initial stages. This can best be seen in Turkey's new military doctrine, which has moved on from 'territorial defence' to 'forward defence.' One of the most important components of the doctrine is the 'forward deployment of Turkish troops in a pre-emptive manner.'

Not only do Turkey and the EU diverge on the definitions of threats to European security and stability from outside EU borders; they also fall out over the possible contributions of Turkey's membership to the distinctive security identity of the EU. While the majority of the Turkish elite argues for membership on the grounds that Turkey's inclusion would contribute to the multicultural and inclusive European identity, as well as its geopolitical needs, a great many in European circles speak loudly against Turkey's inclusion on the ground that its membership would seriously challenge the cohesiveness and homogeneity of the European identity. Turkey's membership becomes a possible threat because to them the main security referent of contemporary Europe is the highly interdependent and functionally well-developed integration process within the EU. As long as the EU integration project is conceived of as the main security-generating mechanism and as long as it is based on efforts to forestall the 'fragmentation' of the EU, Turkey's inclusion might seriously undermine those efforts.

When Turkey's foreign policy approach to its neighbours is combined with its non-European cultural and social characteristics, it is quite possible that a great many Europeans might see Turkey's inclusion in the EU as a fragmenting influence.

Other Alternatives
In the 1990s, one question with which the Turkish foreign and security policy elites had to grapple was whether Turkey should adopt an international outlook that would help bring it closer to the European Union or whether it should pursue a 'more-Eurasianist, less-Europeanist' foreign and security policy practice that would enable it

46 Michael R. Hickok, 'Hegemon rising: the gap between Turkish strategy and military modernization,' Parameters: US Army War College 30 (summer 2000), 105-20. Turkey's military incursions into northern Iraq in pursuit of PKK militants and Turkish readiness to use force if Syrian and Greek Cypriot governments did not bow to Turkish demands are two examples of the changing nature of Turkey's military doctrine.

to exploit the advantages that the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire seemed to offer. For the first time since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the Turkish elite saw Turkey as the 'heir of the Ottoman Empire.' Its economic, military, and cultural potential could enable it to play a more 'confidant' role in the traditional areas of the Ottoman Empire. The danger was that such a course in the area of high politics would drive Turkey further from the EU because membership would no longer be the prime national interest.

What has made the 'Eurasianist' choice an attractive alternative over the last decade is that Turkey has been able to co-operate with the United States on the basis of its well-established strategic-security understanding. The overlapping of American interests with those of Turkey in many traditional Turkish spheres of influences has made it possible for Turkey to follow such a course. Certainly, on its own, it could not have done so. The Turkish elite is comfortable co-operating with the United States because American governments have always supported Turkey's membership in the EU, particularly its participation in the mechanisms of a common security and defence policy, and co-operation with the United States enables Turkish elites to argue that Turkey is a Western country, especially when Turkey is frustrated with the EU's discriminatory attitudes to its membership. The United States has always been there to console Turkey.

Other factors have also played a role. First, it may have been possible for Turkey to develop a more healthy relationship with the United States over the last decade because the United States was more preoccupied with Turkey's 'stability' than with its 'democracy.' Although EU members have rebuked Turkey for the methods it used in its struggles against the PKK and fundamental Islam, the Americans have always sympathized in the name of domestic stability.


50 At the Helsinki Council, for example, President Bill Clinton made many phone calls to various European leaders to argue for Turkey's EU candidacy.

Second, Turkey and the United States have concurred on many issues, not the least of which are threat perceptions and the appropriate means of dealing with them. Both believe in the merits of the realpolitik security culture in their understandings of international relations. Both tend to see conventional and non-conventional challenges as vital threats to national security. Both have adopted the principles of 'forward defence' and 'projection of power outside the borders' principles in their military doctrines. Both underline the importance of conventional military capabilities in their efforts to contain terrorism and other hard and soft threats. Both believe that 'unilateralism' and 'internal balancing' are the most promising strategies for dealing with 'national security' issues.

And then there is the modernization of Turkey's conventional military capability through the procurement of sophisticated American weapons. Turkey's highly developed military capabilities have undoubtedly contributed to its 'regional power' position and enabled it to bring Syria and Greece/Greek Cypriots in line over the Abdullah Ocalan and S-300s issues. Nor has Turkey ever felt that the dynamics of its security relations with the United States might damage its overall security interests, despite some fundamental disagreements between the two countries over the future of Iraq and the legitimacy of American efforts to contain Iran. Indeed, the Turkish elite welcomes the increased possibilities of bilateral co-operation with the United States, particularly in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, because a co-operative relationship in the fight against global terrorism has offered the state elite in Turkey a valuable opportunity to underline once again Turkey's Western identity and its indispensable place within the Western international community. Besides, when the Turks claim that their country is a 'security producer' because Turkey participates in many of the NATO and United Nations international


53 In October 1998, Syria expelled Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, from Damascus under Turkish pressure. In January 1997, Russia agreed to sell S-300s missiles to the Greek Cypriots. Turkey immediately and repeatedly objected, and almost two years later the Greek Cypriots bowed to international pressure and acquiesced in the deployment of the missiles to Crete.

54 Ilter Turan, 'Short term pains for long term pleasures,' Private View, spring 2002, 10-18.
peacekeeping operations, as well as in NATO's Partnership for Peace activities, they find a receptive ear in Washington.

Nonetheless, cooperation with the United States has many drawbacks. First, the alliance will last only so long as the bilateral security interests of the two countries continue to overlap. For Turkey, as the weaker and more dependent party, this could create strong pressure to forsake some national interests for the sake of the alliance. Second, it would be irrational for the Turkish elite to find solace in a strategic-security relationship with the United States in the absence of institutionalized economic relations with Washington. It seems that the Americans are content with keeping the relationship a military one, despite repeated Turkish calls for more free trade and social interaction.\textsuperscript{55}

Third, if reliance on the strategic relationship with the United States is at the expense of the 'Europeanization' of Turkey, Turkey's march to a 'more pluralistic-less authoritarian' democracy and 'more liberal-less statist' economic order would certainly be delayed.\textsuperscript{56} Even though it is not my intention to portray the accession/integration process with the European Union as the best possible alternative to Turkey's strategic-security dominated relationship with the United States, one needs to be cognisant of the fact that Turkey's interests in gaining EU membership are far more important than a continued strategic-security relationship with the United States. More than half of Turkey's trade is with EU countries, and traditionally Turkey's Western identity lies in Europe, not across the Atlantic.

Even though the majority of the Turkish elite does not fall into the trap of either the United States or the EU and seems to recognise the different dynamics of EU-Turkey and United States-Turkey relations, the danger is that further 'Americanization' of Turkish foreign and security policy orientation might risk derailing Turkey from the EU track. This danger will be more acute if the West becomes more divisive.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{55} The latest of many attempts to establish institutional economic relations with the United States occurred in February 2002 when the Turkish prime minister visited Washington DC.

\textsuperscript{56} Ihsan Dagi, 'Competing strategies for Turkey: Eurasianism or Europeanism?' Analyst, Biweekly Briefing, Wednesday, 8 May 2002.

\textsuperscript{57} Stephen M. Walt, 'The ties that fray: why Europe and America are drifting apart,' National Interest (no 54, winter 1998-9), 3-11.
PROSPECTS AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

Against the background of these problematic security relations, it is difficult to make any sound predictions about the prospects for Turkey's future EU membership. At the time of writing, two fundamental questions might affect those prospects from a security perspective. The first concerns the degree to which the nature of Turkey-United States co-operation against global terrorism differs from that of the EU. The second concerns any potential split in the Western international community between the EU and the United States, with each embodying divergent normative worldviews. The answers to these questions are not yet clear, but some particular developments in the EU-United States-Turkey triangle in the post 11 September world encourages me to make two claims. The first is that the divergence of views between the EU and the United States on strategic-security considerations seems to have narrowed. The second is that Turkey has taken some important steps in its efforts to adhere to the EU's distinctive security identity. If both trends continue, particularly the second, it is possible that the EU will agree to the start of accession talks with Turkey in the next one-to-two years.

As for the steps Turkey has taken, the European Union invited Turkey at its Leaken summit in December 2001 to take part in the European Convention. This is a remarkable development given that before 11 September 2001 the EU had refused to issue an invitation to Turkey, even though it had invited all the other candidate countries. Second, Turkey, implicitly or explicitly, encouraged Rauf Denktas, the president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), to restart face-to-face talks with President Glafcos Clerides of the Greek Cypriot Administration on 16 January 2002. This is an important about-turn for Turkey because Denktas had refused to sit with Clerides around the same table until the sovereignty of the TRNC was recognised.

Third, Turkey and the EU could finally come to an accord over the thorny issue of NATO assets. Though the approval of the Greek government seems to be a must for the Ankara agreement to enter into force, it is important that Turkey and the major powers of the EU have come to such an agreement in the aftermath of 11 September. In reaching a common understanding with the United States and the United

58 Missiroli, 'EU-NATO cooperation.'
Turkey and the EU

Kingdom in Ankara in December 2002 over the use of NATO’s assets by the EU’s rapid reactions forces, Turkey has proved that its intention was not to contribute further to intra-alliance divisions but rather to ensure that the EU’s evolving security structure would develop in close cooperation with NATO. All three developments show that Turkey does not want to become a part of the strategic-security problems in the eastern Mediterranean, but rather to contribute to the resolution of some potential conflicts within the EU’s institutional framework.

The fact that the EU has finally agreed to include the PKK and other leftist groups in its list of terrorist organizations could augur well for future Turkish-EU co-operation against terrorism. And Turkey and the European Union have come to realise that their interests in the Middle East are not so divergent as some in Turkey and in the EU had insisted they were. In the face of American attempts to depict the Iraqi and Iranian regimes as parts of an ‘axis of evil,’ Turkey and the member countries of the EU (except for the United Kingdom), share in the idea that ‘engagement,’ not ‘containment,’ is the most appropriate mechanism to deal with such regimes. Because of the geographical proximity of Iraq and Iran to Turkey and Europe and strong Turkish and European economic interests in closer co-operation with both countries, it is clear that Turkey and the EU could gain from a co-operative approach. If the EU has designs on becoming an important international actor in the regions that surround Turkey, Turkey’s inclusion in the EU would obviously be of some considerable assistance.

One of Turkey’s most pressing concerns does not seem to have materialized in the post 11 September era. The Turkish fear that it might have to choose between the EU and the United States was scaled back in joint efforts against global terrorism. In the United States, the administration of George W. Bush has toned down the unilateral characteristics of its foreign policy, and the EU has gradually increased its support for American efforts to eradicate the roots of various global terrorist organizations.59

Then there is the role of NATO. Its importance seemed to be underlined once again when European members invoked article 5 in joining with the United States against terrorism. Despite the fact that in the post 11 September world, NATO’s role has been as a political body rather than a military defence organization, it has become clear to all

the allies that its health and its continuation are vital to the maintenance of transatlantic relations. The United States has rediscovered the importance of NATO as a necessary tool in seeking legitimacy for its struggle against terrorism. 'Coalitions of the willing' became possible only within NATO. In return, the European allies have come to understand that their voice in concert within NATO is one that the Americans cannot ignore. NATO has proved to be the most important institution in which Europeans can legitimately voice their opinions. Closer cooperation between the EU and the United States has had the added benefit for Turkey of bolstering its hopes that the credentials of its European identity (and the security this identity would bring) are more solid if the EU is one of the constituents of a transatlantic security structure that complements rather than rivals NATO. Under such circumstances, Turkey's chances of becoming a member of the EU might increase from a strategic-security perspective.

Turkey's concerns that the European Union might evolve into a collective defence organization through the establishment of an autonomous European army have not materialized over the last years, largely because NATO has regained its importance as the most appropriate security organization in dealing with European security issues and because EU members fell short of keeping their promises in this regard. One can safely claim that if the EU members continue to scale down their military spending, they are not so interested in transforming their union into a strategic-security actor.

For its part, Turkey, too, has helped its chances for membership. On 3 August 2002, the Turkish parliament passed a reform bill that abolished the death penalty and lifted the ban on education and broadcasts in Kurdish and other languages. Since both are political criteria that the EU requires from candidate countries, one should regard these steps as proof of Turkey's willingness to accept the constitutive norms of the European Union. The second significant development concerns the decision of the Turkish military-political elite to revise the country's National Security Concept in early August 2002 in line with the requirements of the EU's distinctive security identity. In the new document, neither Greece nor Syria is mentioned as the most important security threat. Since both have been at the top of the list of security threats in the latest National Security Concept of 1997, it is difficult to attribute their absence to anything other than a desire to become a member of the EU.
CONCLUSION

Even though it would be legitimate for the EU to ask Turkey to adapt its security conceptualization to that of the EU before the merits of its membership could be debated, EU members should do all they can to encouraged Turkey in that direction. Therefore, the EU should take note of the latest positive developments mentioned above and offer Turkey a clear date for the start of accession negotiations. Indeed, if the EU does not start accession talks, and particularly if they use the pretext of no resolution to the Cyprus dispute because of Turkey's intransigent and unco-operative stance, then one might expect a gradual deterioration in Turkey-EU security relations. The EU and Turkey might face each other as strategic rivals in the eastern Mediterranean, which includes Greece and Cyprus as represented by the Greek Cypriot Administration, both of which could well become members of the EU, leaving Turkey out in the cold. As long as the accession process drags on, and as long as the process is built on vague promises to Turkey, the probability that Turkey and the EU will come to see one another as 'security threats' will increase. From Turkey's perspective, 'exclusion' from the EU would accentuate 'difference' from the EU, and 'difference' from the EU would increase the probability of 'conflict' with the EU.
The Marcel Cadieux Distinguished Writing Award is an annual award of $1000.00 in recognition of the author of the best article on Canadian foreign policy to appear in any given volume of International Journal. Articles are judged by the editors of International Journal and by two independent experts from different disciplines (for example, history, political science, economics). Evaluations are based on scholarship, contribution to knowledge, clear writing, and accessibility to the general public.

In a 40-year career with the Department of External Affairs (as it then was), Marcel Cadieux was under-secretary of state for external affairs and Canada’s first francophone ambassador to the United States. Allan Gotlieb’s eulogy, delivered at M. Cadieux’s funeral on 25 March 1981, neatly captured the essence of the man: ‘Marcel Cadieux was a man who cared. Often he more than cared. He was passionate ... about what he believed in - justice, fairness, and doing the right thing ... Faced with a committed Marcel, what colleague was not moved by the enormous sense of personal involvement, by the outpouring of his concern, by that passion that could arouse people, change things and events?’

In 1961 the CIIA was pleased to publish in translation Cadieux’s The Canadian Diplomat: An Essay in Definition, a pioneering work for aspiring diplomats, particularly francophone Canadians. In the foreword to that book, John Holmes stated that ‘few men have done so much to enhance the good name of Canadian diplomacy as M. Cadieux’ and praised his ‘acumen, tenacity, integrity, style, and esprit vraiment canadien.’

The International Journal is grateful to the Donner Canadian Foundation for a grant which enables us to offer this award in the name of such a distinguished Canadian.