

# “Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey’s Geography”<sup>1</sup>: The uses of “geopolitical truths” in Turkey<sup>☆</sup>

Pinar Bilgin\*

*Bilkent University, Department of International Relations, Bilkent, Ankara 06800, Turkey*

---

## Abstract

Following Critical Geopoliticians’ re-formulation of geopolitics as discourse, this article historically traces, politically contextualizes, and empirically analyzes the linguistic practices as found in myriad actors’ formal geopolitical writings and public articulations in Turkey. It shows how the production and dissemination of a particular understanding of geopolitics as a “scientific” perspective on statecraft, and the military as an actor licensed to craft state policies (by virtue of its mastery over geopolitical knowledge) has allowed the military to play a central role in shaping domestic political processes. Subsequent to the erosion of bi-partisan consensus on foreign policy from the mid-1960s onwards, civilian actors also began to tap geopolitics but as a foreign policy tool. By the end of the 1990s, geopolitics had become rooted in the discourses of both military and civilian actors shaping (for “better” or for “worse”) Turkey’s “foreign” relations with the European Union as well as “domestic” political processes.

© 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

*Keywords:* Turkey; Geopolitical discourse; Civil–military relations; The European Union

---

---

<sup>☆</sup> The author would like to thank the anonymous referees for helpful comments and criticisms, Kivanç Coş and Hande Şahin for research assistance, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, for research support.

\* Tel.: +90 312 290 21 64; fax: +90 312 266 43 26.

*E-mail address:* [pbilgin@bilkent.edu.tr](mailto:pbilgin@bilkent.edu.tr)

<sup>1</sup> İlhan, 2000: 36.

“It was never easy being a Turk; nor is it today; nor will it be tomorrow. This is what history and geographical variables point to” (İlhan, 1999)

The title and the quote heading this paper are borrowed from Turkey’s foremost geopolitician, General (Ret.) Suat İlhan,<sup>2</sup> who has, over the years, maintained that Turkey’s geography is the envy of friend and foe alike due to its “significance” for world politics, and that Turkey needs to be a “strong unitary nation-state” to exist in constant peril of “*fait accomplis* of geopolitics” (İlhan, 1986, 1989, 2000). When set against the background of four military interventions (1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997), the military’s seemingly incessant forays into the political sphere to prevent civilian actors deviating from constitutive principles of the Republic, and the destructive experience of “low intensity warfare” in southeastern Turkey (from the mid-1980s to late 1990s), İlhan’s words could be taken as a plea for a “stronger” state, understood in military-focused terms. This is in contrast to a people- and democracy-focused understanding favored by those who have sought to strengthen the rule of law, democracy and the economy. In what follows, the article presents a theoretically-informed analysis of how and with what consequences civilian and military actors have used geopolitical discourse in Turkey.<sup>3</sup>

The ways in which discourses shape and are shaped by foreign policy is central to Critical Geopolitics and International Relations (see, inter alia, Campbell, 1992; Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992). Through historically tracing, politically contextualizing and empirically analyzing the formal writings and public articulations of various civilian and military actors in Turkey,<sup>4</sup> the article seeks to contribute to the critical line of inquiry into the politics of “inside/outside” (Walker, 1993) and “power/knowledge” (Foucault, 1980) in geopolitical discourse. What is of particular interest in Turkey’s case is the ways in which geopolitics is put to work in shaping not only foreign policy (as per practice) but also (perhaps more so) domestic political processes. To hint at what is to come: contra those explanations of civil–military (im)balance as a consequence of a pre-given culture of militarism, the article argues that the current situation is better understood as a consequence of the production and dissemination of a particular understanding of geopolitics as a privileged perspective on statecraft and the military as an actor licensed to craft state policies by virtue of its command over this perspective.

<sup>2</sup> İlhan is no ordinary retired general. He is a prolific author who has published some twenty formal studies on geopolitics including his 1989 book *Jeopolitik Duyarlılık* (Geopolitical Sensitivity) which has gone through several prints. During 1967–1969 he set up and taught the first geopolitics course at the Military Academy. His lecture notes, which were later compiled into a book (İlhan, 1971, 1989) have been used as teaching material at military institutions. İlhan makes regular TV appearances and contributes to magazines and journals.

<sup>3</sup> It is also significant to note what the article does not do: it does not provide an analysis of Turkey’s geopolitical tradition, or an historical rendition of how geographical designations and assumptions have been employed in Ottoman–Turkish policy-making.

<sup>4</sup> The research archive for this project was built around formal studies accessible via the National Library in Ankara. For articles published in journals, I have surveyed the scholarly journals (*Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, *Coğrafi Bilimler Dergisi* [Journal of Geographical Sciences], *Ege Coğrafya Dergisi* [Aegean Journal of Geography], *Coğrafya Araştırmaları Dergisi* [Journal of Geographical Research], and *Coğrafya Araştırmaları* [Geographical Research]) as well as policy journals and magazines (*Jeopolitik* [Geopolitics], *Avrasya Dosyası* [Eurasian Dossier] and *Strateji* [Strategy]). For public articulations of military and civilian actors, I have collected the original texts of speeches delivered by policy practitioners at the Grand National Assembly, speeches delivered by military actors, and the texts of press conferences held by civilian and military actors. The findings of these research and interpretation offered in this paper have been checked and re-worked through adding secondary sources and the memoirs of some of the critical actors.

By showing how Classical Geopolitics ideas and concepts (such as “Heartland” and “state-as-organism”), that were originally designed to rationalize foreign policy, have been adopted and adapted to help justify foreign and domestic policy-making, the paper also seeks to complement the literature on geopolitical discourse in different parts of the world (see, for example, Dodds & Atkinson, 2000; Fukushima, 1997; Kuus, 2002; Sidaway et al., 2004; Smith, 1999).

The discussion opens with the introduction of geopolitics to Turkish audiences during World War II (first section). In the years that followed, interest in geopolitics mostly remained confined to the military. During this period, the production and dissemination of a particular understanding of geopolitics as “science” has allowed the military not only to begin to regain the room for maneuver it lost during 1944–1960, but also to discursively justify the centrality of the role it began to play in Turkey’s politics with the 1960 *coup d’etat* (second section). While failing to resist this challenge, Turkey’s civilians were, in time, socialized into deploying geopolitics as a foreign policy tool (third section). Taken together, second and third sections, while historicizing and contextualizing the adoption, adaptation and dissemination of geopolitical notions in Turkey, also show how the geopolitical discourse has helped to shape (and, in turn, has been shaped by) civil–military dynamics. The fourth section looks at post-1999 debates on Turkey’s accession to the European Union to illustrate how geopolitics has become rooted in the discourses of military and civilian actors shaping both Turkey–EU “foreign” relations as well as the character of “domestic” polity.

### World War II years: notions of classical geopolitics are introduced

“Geopolitics” as a term and a body of knowledge was introduced to Turkey for the first time during World War II in a series of articles published in the newspapers (Eren, 1964; Sezgin & Yılmaz, 1965).<sup>5</sup> The use of the original German word *geopolitik* in these articles suggests from where their authors derived their inspiration. During the early years of the war when Germany was still going strong and allied victory was far from certain, the authors of these articles, clearly impressed by the contributions of German geopoliticians to their country’s offensive, called for developing the study of geopolitics to inform Turkey’s policies.<sup>6</sup> “It would prove vital to use the weapon of this new science against those who may set their eyes on our territories in the post-war period”, wrote Professor Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu in 1941 (Fahri [Fındıkoğlu], 1946: 93). Geopolitics, then, was introduced to Turkey for instrumental reasons: here was a new and potentially useful approach that should be mastered if Turkey was not to lag behind in its foreign relations.

Notwithstanding Fındıkoğlu’s representation of geopolitics as a “new science”, many considered its “scientific” status as suspect. Whereas some expressed their confidence that mastery over this “new science” will “show the way” to Turkey’s policy-makers (Koyulhisarlıoğlu, 1946; Runciman, 1946), others begged to differ. Fındıkoğlu, for instance, quipped that the “will of God” was being replaced by the “will of the terrain” in German geopoliticians’ writings (Fahri [Fındıkoğlu], 1946: 84). Noting how geopolitical knowledge was far from being

<sup>5</sup> İlhan (2004b) located an earlier reference in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s conversations with General Douglas MacArthur during his visit to Turkey before WWII. Other than this passing remark, however, there is no evidence of Atatürk having invoked geopolitics in communicating with audiences at home or abroad.

<sup>6</sup> There was also a considerable degree of sympathy towards Germany in Turkey during the early years of World War II.

“scientific” or impartial, Findıkoğlu reminded his readers that geopolitics itself did not speak; people made geopolitics speak in line with their own preferences.

Findıkoğlu, nonetheless, was no critical geopolitician. While pointing to the policy-oriented and partial nature of geopolitical knowledge, Findıkoğlu nevertheless considered geopolitics to be a “necessary evil” whose benefits he did not want Turkey to miss out on. On this point, Turkey’s authors agreed with their British colleagues that geopolitics was a “hardheaded strategic approach to the study of world politics” that one could only ignore at his/her own peril (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 259).

By the time World War II ended, geopolitics had become stigmatized in the West because of its links with Nazi expansionism. In Turkey there was little sign of such stigma attached to geopolitics. Far from it, Turkish authors continued to represent geopolitics as a “new science” that was studied at “Western institutions of higher education” and used for shaping post-war policies in the West and elsewhere (Osmanağaoğlu, 1968; Turfan, 1965). The connotation being that Turkey’s “Western” orientation, its “rational” outlook to world politics, and its foreign policy interests required achieving mastery over this “new science”.<sup>7</sup> In presenting geopolitics as a “science” like any other, Turkey’s geopoliticians did not only gloss over the role played by geopolitics in Nazi Germany or its origins in imperial statecraft in late 19th century, but also made a break with their predecessors who were skeptical of its scientific status. Although geopolitics was not shunned in Turkey as in the West, interest nonetheless remained confined to military institutions well until the late 1960s.

### **The Turkish military and geopolitics as a privileged perspective on statecraft**

Following World War II, the Military Academy introduced to its curriculum a series of lectures on geopolitics, which were delivered by professors from leading universities. One can only try to imagine the degree of the military’s interest in geopolitical ideas and theories, or infer from Professor Bilge’s (1959) warning, delivered in one of his lectures, that geography was but one factor shaping the foreign relations of a country and that it had to be treated as such. Such warnings seem to have done little to curb the enthusiasm of the military that went on in 1967 to introduce a course devoted to geopolitics to the curriculum of the Military Academy. Suat İlhan, as the first instructor to teach the course, set it up as an introduction to Classical Geopolitics (İlhan, 2003). During this period, a formal geopolitics literature in Turkish also began to build up with the lectures delivered by university professors being published through military outlets (Bilge, 1959; Eren, 1964; Turfan, 1965; Öngör, 1963). Since then, the majority of contributors to Turkey’s formal geopolitics literature have been of military background (Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı, 1963; İlhan, 1971, 1986, 1989, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Olcaytu, 1996; Sezgin & Yılmaz, 1965; Tarakçı, 2003; Tezkan, 2000, 2005; Tezkan & Taşar, 2002; Türsan, 1971; Uzun, 1981).

What was the attraction of geopolitics for the military at a time when its revered Western counterparts wanted to have very little to do with it? In answering this question, two post-war era developments regarding foreign policy and domestic politics should be considered. To begin with foreign policy, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union

---

<sup>7</sup> Such representations constructed, by explicit and implicit contrast, the Ottoman Empire as “Eastern” and Ottoman policy-making as colored by religion, i.e. not rational. This, in turn, was in line with the positivist precepts of the elite discourse through the late Ottoman to early Republican era (Göle, 1986).

demanded joint control of the strategic waterways of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and indicated its desire for territorial adjustments in the eastern border of Turkey. Given the history of rivalry between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, Russia's age-old desire to control these waterways, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's oeuvre in Central and Eastern Europe in the last phases of the War, and post-War US ambivalence regarding its commitment to Turkey's security, the military could have found in geopolitics a body of knowledge that would provide insight into the dynamics of regional and world politics, and/or a discourse to be employed when defending Turkey's interests in world fora.

However, looking merely into perceived Soviet threat provides only part of the answer. For, the institutionalization of US commitment to Turkey's security (that began with the Truman doctrine in 1946 and was reinforced with Turkey's accession to NATO in 1952) and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's policies did very little to curb the military's enthusiasm about all-things-geopolitical. Indeed, the military's interest in geopolitics grew independent of the Soviet threat and not necessarily in tandem with other NATO allies.<sup>8</sup>

On the domestic politics front, during 1944–1960 the military suffered from a loss of authority vis-à-vis civilian actors. From the inception of the Republic (1923) onwards, but increasingly since 1944, successive governments had taken steps to prevent the military from emerging as a rival source of authority.<sup>9</sup> So much so that one external observer, writing in 1959, noted how the military had become a relatively marginal actor in Turkey's politics (Rus-tow, 1959). The 1960 *coup d'état* must have taken him by surprise.

In effect, joining NATO served as a catalyst for civil-military dynamics in that it allowed the military to go through a process of modernization, which some consider as having increased its self-confidence and desire to enhance its status at home. Indeed, some have explained the 1960 ("first") military coup as an unintended consequence of the military's post-1952 self-advancement (Harris, 1965a, 1965b; Savcı, 1961: 52–53). It is difficult to know whether it was the increase in the military's knowledge, skills and self-confidence that led them to seek more say in Turkey's politics, or it was their search for more say in shaping political processes that led them on the path to self-advancement. Perhaps both. What is crucial for the purposes of this article is the ways in which the framing of geopolitics as a "science" has permitted tipping the civil–military balance in favor of the latter.

Consider an article that was authored by the Office of the Commander of the Military Academy and published in *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi* (the official journal of the Turkish Armed Forces) in 1963, soon after the 1960 coup.<sup>10</sup> Entitled "A Study on Turkey's Geopolitical Situation", the article introduced geopolitics as a "science" that would constitute a foil to the failures of politicians who had "brought the country to the brink of chaos" (Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı, 1963). The remainder of the text illustrated the insights to be gleaned from geopolitics by providing an extensive discussion of various aspects of Turkey's domestic and

<sup>8</sup> Two other states whose interest in geopolitics deviated from the generality of NATO members were Portugal and Spain (joined NATO in 1982 following transition to democracy) both of whom were then under authoritarian rule.

<sup>9</sup> Until Marshal Fevzi Çakmak (Chief of Staff since 1924) retired in 1944, "the Chief of the General Staff enjoyed a position of cardinal importance in the government, taking precedence over Cabinet members and ranking just below the Prime Minister" (Harris, 1965a: 60). Following Çakmak's retirement, civilians began to gradually limit the autonomy of the military by subordinating the Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister in 1944 and to the Ministry of Defense in 1949. After the 1960 *coup d'état*, the Chief of Staff once again came under the authority of the Prime Minister.

<sup>10</sup> The 1960 *coup d'état* was followed by 14 months of direct military rule and a lengthier period of civilian governance under military tutelage.

foreign policy (including society, agriculture, economy and administration as well as the strategic implications of geography). Geopolitics was thus framed as a privileged perspective (by virtue of its “scientific” quality). The framing of geopolitics with rationalist predicates (“science” and “study”) and demonstrating the military’s command over geopolitics (through its authorship of the article) helped to constitute the military as a subject who has mastered this privileged perspective on statecraft and was, therefore, licensed to craft state policies.

The ground for such representations was already laid with previous texts that introduced geopolitics as a “new science”. What was different in the military’s new texts was that they rested on an inward-focused conception of geopolitics with geography constructed as having consequences for not only “foreign” but also “domestic” policy. This conception, in turn, was more akin to South American militaries’ version than that of Classical Geopoliticians. In South America, too, geopolitics had emerged as the preserve of military actors and provided a

general theory of the military state, a bridge that allows the military a legitimate and commanding place in all aspects of the political and economic life of the state, all in the name of the security of the state organism from both internal and external threat (Hepple, 1992: 148).

Viewed as such, Turkish Military’s production and dissemination of an inward-focused understanding of geopolitics constitutes an instance of re-working notions of Classical Geopolitics (in this particular case, Ratzel’s “state-as-organism” metaphor) to fit their own particular context, which prioritized “internal” concerns.

Subtext turned to text in an article by İlhan that came out in 1971 (about the same time as the “second” military intervention).<sup>11</sup> İlhan’s text made the contrast between the subject positions of military and civilian (politician) explicit by way of arguing that “politicians no longer have a monopoly on foreign policy issues” and that “geostrategic issues are of interest not only to the Military but also scientists”. Whereas the military was represented as possessing “objective” insight (by virtue of geopolitics as “science” and the military’s preference for searching solutions through “rational” institutions and “scientific” studies), politicians, by implicit and explicit contrast, were represented as superimposing their “subjective” beliefs and ideals onto statecraft (as prisoners of “ideological hang-ups and political choices”, İlhan, 1971: iii–iv). Articulated as such, İlhan’s words left no room for politicians’ input into policy-making. The practical implications of such representations cannot be underestimated. As the notion of geopolitics as a privileged perspective began to disseminate, alternative perspectives were easier to marginalize by default; for, they could be represented as inadequate, unscientific, idealistic, political or outright ideological.<sup>12</sup>

Instrumental in this process of dissemination has been the compulsory high school course, “National Security”, designed and taught by the military. Although the course has been in the curriculum of all high schools since 1926, it was in 1973, shortly after the 1971 intervention, that a geopolitics component was added with geopolitics described in the textbook as “the definition and administration of government politics in accordance with the necessities and inclinations of geography” (quoted in Altınay, 2005: 133). Since then, each time the textbook was

---

<sup>11</sup> The so-called “coup by memorandum” (1971) was carried out by the military through forcing a change of government.

<sup>12</sup> The study of International Relations in Turkey was also far from providing an alternative knowledge base, with history and law constituting the body of students’ training (see Bilgin, in press).

revised in 1980 and 1998 (which coincided with the “third” and “fourth” military interventions)<sup>13</sup> the geopolitics component was further beefed up (Altınay, 2005: 133). The 1998 textbook, which is currently used in high schools, opens as follows:

The Turkish Republic, because of its geopolitical position, has had to face [political] schemes devised by external powers. The Turkish youth needs to be prepared to deal with such schemes (*Lise Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi*, 2004 [1998]: 7).

In assigning insidious intentions to “external powers”, the text constructs them as aggressors in opposition to Turkey that is represented as acting out of defensive urges. The text thus depoliticizes foreign policy-making and presents Turkey’s statecraft as mere responses to threats, which are taken as pre-given. True to the logic of the “state-as-organism” metaphor of Classical Geopolitics, Turkey is represented as responding to external stimuli in an attempt to maximize its life chances. In the “National Security” textbook (as with the other texts quoted above) politics does not come into the picture when considering what Turkey should do (note the definition of geopolitics quoted above) thereby leaving no room for “politics” (or “politicians”) in Turkey’s statecraft.

To recapitulate, Turkey’s Military has been far from being merely the beneficiary of a culture of militarism that renders its interventions inevitable and helps its forays into day-to-day politics seem “normal”. Through introducing geopolitics as a “science”, disseminating a particular framing of geopolitics as a privileged perspective on statecraft, and proposing itself as the master of this perspective, the military has helped to (re)produce the centrality of its role in shaping political processes.

### **Civilian actors and geopolitics as a foreign policy tool**

Notwithstanding the implications of the military’s embrace of geopolitics for civil–military (im)balance, Turkey’s civilians have not disputed the “scientific” status of geopolitics; nor have they sought to level the playing field by resisting the military’s limiting of the group of “experts” licensed to have a say on Turkey’s statecraft. Rather, civilians were gradually socialized into invoking geographical determinism when articulating their preferred foreign policy. In what follows, the paper traces how Turkey’s geopolitical discourse has shaped and, in turn, been shaped by the practices of civilian actors.

Explicit references to Turkey’s geographical location have never been absent from the discourses of Turkey’s policy-makers (the majority of whom had a military background until the 1950s). Well until the mid-1960s, however, assumptions of geographical determinism were seldom invoked when articulating foreign policy. This was partly because there was little discussion on foreign affairs. The legacy of Kemal Atatürk and his successor İsmet İnönü was one of single-handed formulation of foreign policy, leaving the Foreign Minister and his office to implement already-made decisions. The rest of the ruling elite, including the Prime Minister, were occasionally consulted but mostly merely informed about the developments. Following the transition to multi-party democracy in 1946 and especially with DP (*Demokrat Parti*—Democratic Party)

<sup>13</sup> The 1980 *coup d’etat* was followed by a lengthy period of direct military rule. Although multi-party elections were held in 1983, General Kenan Evren, head of the military council that staged the coup, served as President until 1990. The 1997 intervention is referred to as “postmodern coup” because of the way in which the military, in direct and indirect coalition with a number of civilian actors, forced a change of government.

coming to power in 1950, foreign policy-making was opened up for the input of the Foreign Ministry. Still, foreign policy-making largely retained its bi-partisan and top-down qualities.<sup>14</sup>

It was during this period that assumptions of geographical determinism first began to be invoked by Turkey's policy practitioners, and then only when talking to "foreign" audiences. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (1950–1960) and Foreign Minister Professor Fuat Köprülü (1950–1956) referred to Turkey's geographical position when talking to Western allies to write into space Turkey's quality as an asset for NATO. Likewise, when challenged by Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru at the 1955 Bandung Non-aligned Conference on the issue of Turkey's staunchly pro-Western stance, State Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu resorted to geopolitics. Only those who were not located in Turkey's geopolitical position, he averred, could afford to criticize Turkey's policies (quoted in Bağcı, 2001: 49, 58, 60).

When talking to "domestic" audiences, on the other hand, DP policy-makers chose to articulate threats not in geographical but ideological (as with Soviet Communism or its regional allies) or economic (need for aid or investment into education, health, defense) terms. For example, the decision to join NATO was explained with reference to perceived Soviet threat to Turkey's security; NATO membership was represented as having been made possible by Turkey's solidarity with the West in the Korean War.

Consensus on foreign policy broke down for good soon after the 1960 *coup d'état*. The coup-makers introduced a new constitution (1961) which helped to create a domestic environment that allowed for questioning the very basis of this consensus: Turkey's "Western" orientation. It was not only the transformation of the institutional and legal setting but also changes in the political environment that fuelled these debates. For, the post-1960 period was characterized by further deterioration of the situation in Cyprus (1963), the increase in the number of actors interested in and wanting to have a say on foreign policy issues, and the entry into TGNA (in the 1965 elections) of new parties with radically different views. Among these factors, the conflict in Cyprus was of particular significance because it made it easier to challenge long-established policies towards the United States and/or NATO without being branded as a "leftist"/"communist" for dissent on foreign policy issues was not without its dangers in Cold War Turkey. Those who wanted to challenge the policies towards the United States and/or NATO risked being labeled as being on the "left" therefore a "threat" to national security. Given the Cold War context, this was no small danger. Cyprus, however, was a "national cause" in defense of which criticisms of the United States and/or NATO was allowed (Firat, 1997: 284).

As foreign policy issues began to be publicly debated, policy positions, which previously went on the nod in the National Assembly and were merely declared to the public, had to be discursively justified. This, in turn, required civilian actors to gain mastery over new discursive tools in order to enhance the authority of what they "said". It is during this period that civilians began to turn to geopolitics as a foreign policy tool. An analysis of the 1960s debates on Turkey's foreign policy orientation shows that both sides explicitly invoked assumptions of geographical determinism to make their case.<sup>15</sup> Foreign policy conservatives sought to resist the calls for change by stressing Turkey's geopolitical position (Sezer, 1972: 508). Those

---

<sup>14</sup> Consider Foreign Minister Zorlu's (1957–1960) speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly made on the occasion of the debates on his Ministry's annual budget. The text reads more like a treatise on various foreign policy issues rather than a defense of DP policies (Zorlu, 1958).

<sup>15</sup> Sezer (1972) identifies the terms of the 1960s' debates. My argument rests on her findings.

who wanted change, while starting from assumptions of geographical determinism, nevertheless pointed to the changing conditions of world politics and called for new thinking. Consider the following comments by Nadir Nadi Abalıođlu,<sup>16</sup> the chief columnist of the Kemalist daily, *Cumhuriyet*:

We continue to rely on the West by virtue of the opportunities our geographical position provides them. We seldom consider the fallacy in this. The first step to take towards keeping up with a developing, advancing and changing world is to shed off the passive stance of relying upon our geography and our friends (quoted in *Sezer, 1972: 151*).

Turkish foreign policy conservatives' mid-1960s turn to geopolitics as a foreign policy tool is no exception to developments elsewhere where geopolitics has been "conspicuously conservative in orientation...not at the forefront of querying the *status quo*" (*Taylor, 2003: 47*). During a turbulent period in history (the 1960s–1970s) when anti-NATO and anti-US sentiments were high in Turkey and elsewhere in Europe, those with more conservative convictions on foreign policy issues resorted to geopolitics when defending the status quo (*Murphy, Bassin, Newman, Reuber & Agnew, 2004*).

Having said that, then Prime Minister and head of CHP Bülent Ecevit does not fit this profile in that he utilized geopolitical discourse to call for foreign policy change. Bülent Ecevit succeeded İsmet İnönü as head of CHP and served two short stints as Prime Minister in 1974 and during 1978–1999.<sup>17</sup> What distinguished Ecevit from his many predecessors was his frequent resort to geopolitical notions to justify his government's foreign policies. For example, when seeking to justify his government's reevaluation of Turkish foreign policy, Ecevit reminded his audience that the world was changing and

we cannot deny an interest in any of these changes, because Turkey is geopolitically situated in such a critical part of the world that she is bound to be influenced by events and developments taking place in the distant parts of the world (*Ecevit, 1978: 17*).

Whereas "critical", in the context of this speech, connoted geographical "significance", it was used to refer to "sensitivity" when *Ecevit (1978: 50)* explained how much Turkey was hurt by the arms embargo (1974–1978) imposed by the US following the Cyprus operation: "Turkey is situated, as you know, in a very critical part of the world". Notions of both geographical "significance" and "sensitivity", danger and opportunity ran through Ecevit's speeches.

This section of the paper has so far showed how Turkey's civilian actors gradually embraced geopolitics as a foreign policy tool. Whereas it was initially foreign policy conservatives who turned to geopolitics, eventually geopolitical discourse began to be deployed when calling for change as well. In doing this, civilian actors re-worked some of the notions introduced by military geopoliticians. To illustrate this point, let me focus on an example.

### *Turkey as a "central state"*

The "central state" metaphor was first offered in a text authored by the Office of the Commander of the Military Academy (1963) and has, since then, been frequently deployed by

<sup>16</sup> Nadir Nadi also served as an independent Member of the Parliament during 1950–1960 and as a CHP Senator during 1964–1970.

<sup>17</sup> Ecevit served as Prime Minister again during 1999–2002.

various actors (see, for example, Davutoğlu, 2004a, 2004b; Doğanay, 1989; Hacısalihoğlu, 2003; Okman, 2002; Özdağ, 2003; *Stratejik Öngörü*, 2005; Türsan, 1971; Uzun, 1981). At the time, it was through building upon the “central state” metaphor that military authors had emphasized the need for caution in and “expert” input into Turkey’s statecraft. Their texts presented the “central state” metaphor as an upshot of the ideas of Halford Mackinder. In these writings, the significance Mackinder attaches to the region surrounding Turkey is somehow transformed into an affirmation of its centrality for world politics. That is to say, in the process of re-working Mackinder’s “Heartland” into “Turkey as a central state”, what Mackinder “says” is less relevant than what cursory references to his works allow these authors to “say”. The irony here is that in order to substantiate their warnings about “Western” schemes plotted against Turkey, these authors seem to need to appeal to the authority “Western” geopoliticians.<sup>18</sup> Having said that it is no more ironical than AKP leader (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—Justice and Development Party) and Prime Minister Erdoğan’s (2005) embrace of the notion of Turkey as a “central state”. Given AKP’s “conservative democrat” credentials and tense relations with the military, Erdoğan’s resort to a geopolitical notion produced and disseminated by the military is illustrative of the flexibility of geopolitics as a tool.

Clearly, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s discourse is informed by the ideas of his chief foreign policy advisor Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu, who has articulated the need for activism in foreign policy to realize the potentiality of Turkey’s location as a “central state” (Davutoğlu, 2001, 2004). Professor Davutoğlu was appointed as Ambassador without portfolio by the AKP government when it came to power in late 2002. He has also served as the chief foreign policy advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Davutoğlu’s (2001) book *Stratejik Derinlik* (Strategic Depth) went through several prints in a manner unusual for a book of academic nature and generated debates (see, for example, Akyol, 2003; Kömürcü, 2003; Yılmaz, 2001). Critical of Euro-Atlantic Cold War policies (that were based on the axiom of “Turkey’s geopolitical significance for the West”) for “denying” Turkey its “natural sphere of influence” and its “strategic depth” (which he locates in the former Ottoman territories by implicit reference to the state-as-organism metaphor), Davutoğlu has called for a “new strategic theory” that would help Turkey’s policy-makers to make use of the opportunities created by the post-Cold War “geopolitical and geoeconomic vacuum” (Davutoğlu, 2001).

Emerging in the discourse of military geopoliticians (who offered it as an upshot of the ideas and theories of Classical Geopoliticians), the “central state” metaphor has evolved from a tool of domestic politics (produced and used by the military) to one of foreign policy (used by civilians); from a tool advising caution (military authors) to one calling for activism (AKP actors’ twist on the military’s pro-status quo construct). More recently, it has been employed by civilian and military actors to argue against Turkey making the reforms required by EU conditionality. The following section uses the debates on Turkey–EU relations to illustrate how different actors tap geopolitics to justify pursuit of conflicting positions.

<sup>18</sup> Even the conservative intellectual Ahmet Davutoğlu, who is otherwise keen on Turkey’s Ottoman legacy (the “strategic depth” argument), has not made use of Ottoman authors such as Naima (Thomas & Itzkowitz, 1972), who had also employed early versions of the state-as-organism metaphor. Indeed, it is interesting to point to the appeal of geopolitics to both the ‘secular’, who seem to ground knowledge claims on the ‘science’ of geopolitics, and the ‘Islamic-oriented’, who seem to be attracted to the ‘pre-given’ (god-given?) nature of geography as a factor shaping politics.

### “Turkey’s geography does not allow for more democracy”?<sup>19</sup>

Membership to the European Union is not a vision shared by all in Turkey. Indeed, recent years have been characterized by heated debates on EU conditionality and the reform process. As the prospect of Turkey’s accession to European integration became clearer with the 1999 decision of the EU to grant Turkey candidate country status, debates became even more heated with various participants tapping geopolitics to justify different positions.

- Those who favor Turkey’s membership to the European Union have deployed the metaphor of “bridge” to substantiate Turkey’s case when talking to EU audiences. The official webpage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reads:

As a cosmopolitan state in a multi-cultural global community, Turkey employs a multi-dimensional foreign policy that reconciles the West with the East and the North with the South and is active in all continents. She serves by way of her geographic disposition and close historical and cultural ties across a vast landscape as a crucial bridge and interaction between civilizations at the heart of Eurasia.<sup>20</sup>

Such representations of Turkey as a “bridge” between regions, continents and cultures have resonated with some EU actors as well in that they invoked similar notions to convince the skeptics within the EU of the virtues of Turkey’s membership.<sup>21</sup>

- Those who oppose Turkey joining the EU have deployed similar notions to arrive at different conclusions. Consider the following quote from General İlhan’s (2000) book entitled *Why No to the European Union: The Geopolitical Perspective*, where he lays out what the European Union stands to gain “geopolitically” from Turkey’s membership:

it enhances its horizons and sphere of influence to include the Caucasus, Middle East, Central Asia; attains the opportunity to enhance and reinforce the advantages created by the Customs Union treaty...prepares the ground for the resolution of the Turco–Greek dispute in favor of Greece...paves the way for carving out Turkish territories via endeavors in “minority rights”; and generates hope for the resolution of the “Eastern Question” by way of side-tracking Turkey (İlhan, 2000: 22).

Articulated as such, Turkey’s geography constitutes enough reason to say “no” to the European Union. This is because, in General İlhan’s zero-sum thinking, what the EU gains Turkey loses. In making this argument, İlhan invokes an understanding of geopolitics as “science” thereby rendering his recommendation the geo-politically correct course of action. This is in contrast to the policy-makers’ efforts to join the EU, which are represented as erroneous in so far as they go against the *fait accomplis* of geography (the decision to join the EU is “not merely a political choice”, İlhan [1989: 127] writes, it is geopolitics that “decides what Turkey should do”).

<sup>19</sup> Military officer quoted in Belge (2003c: 229).

<sup>20</sup> See [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA\\_tr/DisPolitika/GenelGorunum/](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/GenelGorunum/). Internet. Accessed 18 April 2006.

<sup>21</sup> See [www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report\\_2004/pdf/issues\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/issues_paper_en.pdf); and [www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report\\_2004/pdf/tr\\_recommandation\\_en.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/tr_recommandation_en.pdf). Internet. Accessed 18 April 2006.

- There is a third, “yes, but...” position (Bilgin, 2005: 189–190), which is adopted by those who favor Turkey’s membership provided that the EU agrees to accommodate Turkey’s “unique” characteristics, which are articulated in geopolitical terms. Consider the debates that surrounded the “National Program” of 2001, which was prepared by the coalition government headed by Bülent Ecevit as a blueprint for the steps to be taken towards meeting EU accession criteria. When it was pointed to Prime Minister Ecevit that the National Program fell short of meeting EU requirements, he responded: “Given its geopolitical sensitivity, Turkey could conform [to EU criteria] only so much” (Ecevit, 2001). Ecevit also called the European Union to turn a blind eye to Turkey’s limited compliance with EU conditionality, through representing the National Program’s promises as already “far too bold for a country occupying Turkey’s geography” (also see Ecevit, 2003a, 2003b).

Notwithstanding such differences, the discourses of seemingly diverse actors collude with one another to produce one assumption: that Turkey’s geographical location is more unique than others are, and that it has more deterministic power over Turkey’s policies than in some other countries. Over the years, tapping into geopolitics has allowed both civilian and military, ‘secular’ and ‘conservative democrat’ actors to de-politicize what are essentially political issues thereby rendering inevitable certain courses of action while marginalizing the alternatives. Where the Turkish actors differ is on the question of what exactly it is that geography tells Turkey to do. Let me focus on two issues that are frequently raised in Turkey–EU relations to illustrate this point: civil–military (im)balance and the Cyprus question.

#### *Civil–military (im)balance*

Notwithstanding the implications on civil–military dynamics of the dissemination of an understanding of the military’s current status as a *fait accompli* of geography, such assumptions have, over the years, become well rooted in the discourses of civilians as well. In responding to criticisms regarding the military’s encroachment into foreign policy decision-making and implementation, none other than Ambassador (Ret.) Şükrü Elekdağ submitted:

due to its geopolitical and geostrategic characteristics, external security issues play a major role in shaping Turkey’s foreign policy....This requires the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Chief of Staff to work in tandem with each other (Elekdağ, 1997).

Coming from a former member of the Foreign Ministry, an institution known for jealously guarding its realm, Ambassador Elekdağ’s words are all the more striking.

In the post-1999 period, the European Union’s calls for redressing civil–military (im)balance as one of the conditions for acceding to European integration has been met by various civilian and military actors’ unequivocal resort to geopolitics. Commander of the Land Forces General Başbuğ (2006) expressed the military’s response in no uncertain terms. If Turkey’s Military plays a role unlike any of its EU counterparts, he argued, this was because Turkey’s “difficult geography” required the military to be “strong at all times” and act as a guarantor of the constitutive principles of the Republic. The parallel between the General’s and former Prime Minister Ecevit’s position is worth pointing to: “Turkey is located at the most sensitive geopolitical location in the world...this is why the Turkish Armed Forces play a crucial role” (Ecevit, 2003a). As Turkey’s military and civilian actors wrote into space the centrality of the military’s status, envisioning alternative ways of managing civil–military dynamics has become all the more difficult.

### *The Cyprus question*

The deterioration of the situation between the two communities in Cyprus from the mid-1950s onwards was identified above as one of the factors that allowed geopolitics to become rooted in the discourse of Turkey's civilian actors. Still, references to the geopolitical significance of the island for Turkey's security had remained sparse (but not totally absent) throughout the years of crisis and turmoil (Belge, 2003b), with policy-makers putting the emphasis on solidarity with Cypriot brethren and humanitarian responsibility in explaining Turkey's position. Since the mid-1990s (when the military's involvement in foreign policy making and implementation was an all time high and Turkey was coming under increasing EU pressure to change its policy) Turkey's position came to be justified almost exclusively on geopolitical grounds. Indeed, when the AKP government, in the aftermath of the 2002 elections, sought to make a historic break with the past and put pressure on the Turkish Cypriot leadership to accept the Annan Plan<sup>22</sup> as a basis for further negotiations, pro-status quo actors in Turkey had a range of geopolitical notions at hand to defend their position. "Cyprus is a matter of security for Turkey...it is a matter of being", wrote General İlhan (n.d.) in an article entitled "The Geostrategic–Geopolitical Position and Influence of the Cyprus Island: The Annan Plan". Professor Çeçen (n.d.) concurred: "Cyprus is the geopolitical centre of the earth". It is because Cyprus is the centre, argued General (Ret.) Yavuz (2003), "it is one of the very few places of strategic significance on earth and is of crucial importance for Turkey's geopolitics and security". When asked to justify his intransigent position on the issue, then President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Rauf Denktaş replied by tapping into Turkey's geopolitical discourse: "We cannot erase Turkey's rights by endorsing this document. This is the geopolitical right of 70 million people" (quoted in Belge, 2003a).<sup>23</sup> The theme running through all these texts was the determinacy of geography over politics and the centrality of Cyprus for Turkey's security as a *fait accompli* of geography.

Over the years, the "securityness" of Cyprus, which was confirmed through resort to "geopolitical truths", has permitted more "accommodating" policy alternatives to be marginalised. The AKP government was able to change Turkey's position not by way of challenging the "securityness" of Cyprus (Bilgin, 2007) or casting doubt upon Turkey's "geopolitical rights" over the island but through calling for a more accommodating policy that would ease Turkey's way into the EU without risking the well-being of Turkish Cypriots.

### **Conclusion**

"The texts of geopolitical discourse", writes Leslie Hepple,

are not free-floating, innocent contributions to an "objective" knowledge, but are rooted in what [Michael Foucault] calls "power/knowledge", serving the interests of particular groups in society and helping to sustain and legitimate certain perspectives and interpretations (Hepple, 1992: 139).

<sup>22</sup> Proposed by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as a basis for negotiations. The text is available at [http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan\\_Plan\\_Text.html](http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_Text.html). Internet. Accessed 17 October 2006.

<sup>23</sup> The term "geopolitical right" was introduced by İlhan (1986: 620).

The case of Turkey provides ample support to that effect. Constructed through texts authored by military geopoliticians, and disseminated through a variety of institutions including compulsory military service (with access to all males 18+ years of age), the National Security Academy (providing in-service training to high level civil servants and journalists), and the compulsory high-school course “National Security”, Turkey’s geopolitical discourse has allowed the military to not only play a central role in shaping domestic political processes but also make this role seem “normal”.

Turkey’s case also provides a contribution to the literature on the dynamics of geopolitical discourse in “non-Western” settings. Through pointing to the ways in which notions adopted from Classical Geopoliticians’ texts were re-worked to provide justify particular policy positions the analysis here has shown that geopoliticians in non-Western contexts are no “geopolitical dupes”. While benefiting from the authority created by writing footnotes to “Western” geopoliticians’ texts, Turkey’s authors have turned their arguments around and warned against “Western conspiracies”.

Finally, Turkey’s case also helps to illustrate the Critical Geopolitics argument that geopolitical discourse shapes and, in turn, is shaped by domestic and foreign policy-making. Turkey’s geopolitical discourse, initially emerging as an inward-focused and status-quo oriented instrument used by military actors was later utilized by civilians as a foreign policy tool. By the end of the 1990s, Turkey’s geopolitical discourse had come full circle as a domestic politics tool with civilian and military actors deploying geopolitical notions to argue that “Turkey’s geography does not allow for more democracy”. The adverse implications of such representations for the reform process cannot be underestimated.

The difficult position in which those who want to push ahead with the EU-led reform process have found themselves reinforces the observations made elsewhere that geopolitics serves better the purposes of the conservatively oriented (by virtue of the “stasis” that is thought to inhere in geography; see Murphy et al., 2004: 626; Taylor, 2003: 47). Turkey’s case also reinforces a related observation that the consequences of the works by such conservative actors are “often disturbing to the established ‘international order’” (Sidaway et al., 2004: 7). The argument here qualifies these two observations by pointing to the relationship between them: what seems to allow the conservatively oriented to make a case for preserving the status quo “inside” is calling for “radical” foreign policy projects (“outside”). The call for Turkey turning towards “Eurasia” (İlhan, 2000, 2002, 2005; Özdağ, 2003), as radical as it may be for Turkish foreign policy, is also conservative in terms of its domestic implications in that, if successful, it would stall the EU-led reform process. Through representing such a radical turn in foreign policy as the geo-politically correct alternative, Turkey’s geopoliticians’ texts serve to foreclose domestic reforms. Through framing the need for Turkey to be a “strong unitary nation state” as a *fait accompli* of Turkey’s geography, these texts endorse a common sense about Turkey’s foreign policy that renders joining the EU a threat to Turkey’s security.

Those who seek Turkey’s accession to European integration have so far found it difficult to resist this challenge for previously they had deployed similar assumptions of geographical determinism to make the opposite case—in favour of Turkey’s EU membership. Having committed themselves to assumptions of the determinacy of geography over policy-making, the way out for those who want to see Turkey in the European Union is to begin renegotiate the terms of the geopolitical discourse to be able to appeal to “domestic” audiences on this (geopolitical) ground.

## References

- Akyol, T. (2003). Stratejik Derinlik [Strategic Depth]. *Milliyet* February 17.
- Altınay, A. (2005). *The myth of the military-nation: militarism, gender, and education in Turkey*. London: Palgrave.
- Bağcı, H. (2001). *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar [The 1950s in Turkish foreign policy]* (2nd ext ed.). Ankara: METU Press.
- Başbuğ, İ. (2006). Başbuğ'dan ABD ve AB'ye Sert Uyarı [Başbuğ's delivers warnings to the USA and EU]. *Barem*. [www.baremdergisi.com](http://www.baremdergisi.com) Accessed 12.10.06.
- Belge, M. (24 January 2003a). Kıbrıs [Cyprus]. *Radikal*.
- Belge, M. (15 November 2003b). Gene Jeopolitik [Geopolitics, again]. *Radikal*.
- Belge, M. (2003c). *Yaklaşıkça Uzaklaşıyor mu: Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye [Moving away as one gets closer? The European Union and Turkey]*. İstanbul: Birikim.
- Bilge, S. (1959). Jeopolitik [Geopolitics]. *Kara Kuvvetleri Dergisi*, 2(5), 1–30.
- Bilgin, P. (2005). Turkey's changing security discourses: The challenge of globalisation. *European Journal of Political Research*, 44, 175–201.
- Bilgin, P. Turkey's 'geopolitics dogma': international and intra-national relations. In S. Guzzini (Ed.), *Self-fulfilling geopolitics?* in press.
- Bilgin, P. (1–2 June 2007). Making Turkey's transformation possible: hijacking 'security-speak'—not desecuritization! Paper presented at conference 'Dismantling Security', Koç University, İstanbul.
- Campbell, D. (1992). *Writing security*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Çeçen, A. (n.d.). Kıbrıs; Dünyanın Ortasında bir Uçak Gemisi [Cyprus; an aircraft carrier at the centre of the world]. *Aydınlanma* 1923. [http://aydinlanma1923.org/sayi/45/A1923\\_45\\_8CECEN.pdf](http://aydinlanma1923.org/sayi/45/A1923_45_8CECEN.pdf). Accessed 21.04.05.
- Davutoğlu, A. (2001). *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu [Strategic depth: Turkey's international position]*. İstanbul: Küre.
- Davutoğlu, A. (2004a). İş Dünyası artık Dış Politikanın Öncülerinden [The business world has become the pioneers of foreign policy]. *TurkishTime*, April–May. [www.turkishtime.org](http://www.turkishtime.org). Accessed 19.05.05.
- Davutoğlu, A. (16 February 2004b). Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı [Turkey should be the central state]. *Radikal*.
- Dodds, K., & Atkinson, D. (Eds.). (2000). *Geopolitical traditions: A century of geopolitical thought*. London: Routledge.
- Doğanay, H. (1989). Türkiye'nin Coğrafi Konumu ve Bundan Kaynaklanan Dış Tehditler [Turkey's geopolitical position and the external threats it causes]. *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları*, 10(58), 9–69.
- Ecevit, B. (1978). *Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit's speeches*. Ankara: The General Directorate of Press and Information of the Turkish Republic.
- Ecevit, B. (22 March 2001). Ecevit'in Mazereti Var [Ecevit has an excuse]. *Yeni Şafak*.
- Ecevit, B. (25 May 2003a). Ecevit: 27 Mayıs Tehlikesi Görmüyorum [Ecevit: I do not see any risk of re-living May 27]. *Hürriyet*.
- Ecevit, B. (7 October 2003b). Ecevit: Kürt Devleti Kuruldu [Ecevit: a Kurdish state has been set up]. *Yeni Mesaj*.
- Elekdag, Ş. (14 July 1997). Başbakanlar ve Dış Politika [Prime Ministers and foreign policy]. *Milliyet*.
- Erdoğan, R. T. (26 February 2005). Dış Politikada İnce Ayar Devri [A time for fine tuning foreign policy]. *Radikal*.
- Eren, A. C. (1964). *Jeopolitik Tarihine Toplu bir Bakış [An overview of the history of geopolitics]*. İstanbul: Nurgök Matbaası.
- Fahri [Fındıkoğlu], Z. (1946). Jeopolitik [Geopolitics]. In M. Koyulhisarlioğlu (Ed.), *Jeopolitik: İhmi Antoloji Denemesi [Geopolitics: A Scientific Anthology Effort]* (pp. 81–93). İstanbul: Gençlik Kitabevi.
- Fırat, M. (1997). *1960–1971 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu [Turkish foreign policy and the Cyprus problem during 1960–1971]*. Ankara: Siyasal.
- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977*. In C. Gordon (Ed.). New York: Pantheon Books.
- Fukushima, Y. (1997). Japanese geopolitics and its background: what is the real legacy of the past? *Political Geography*, 16(5), 407–421.
- Göle, N. (1986). *Mühendisler ve İdeoloji: Öncü Devrimcilerden Yenilikçi Seçkinlere [Engineers and ideology: From vanguard revolutionaries to reformist elites]*. Ankara: Metis.
- Hacısalihoğlu, I. Y. (2003). Jeopolitik Doğarken [Geopolitics born]. *Jeopolitik*, 1(1).
- Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı. (1963). Türkiye'nin Jeopolitik Durumu Üzerine Bir İnceleme [An analysis of Turkey's geopolitical situation]. *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi*, 83(210), 3–17.
- Harris, G. (1965a). The role of the military in Turkish politics—part I. *Middle East Journal*(Winter), 54–66.
- Harris, G. (1965b). The role of the military in Turkish politics—part II. *Middle East Journal*(Spring), 169–176.

- Heppele, L. W. (1992). Metaphor, geopolitical discourse and the military in South America. In T. J. Barnes, & J. S. Duncan (Eds.), *Writing worlds: Discourse, text and the metaphor in the representations of landscape* (pp. 136–154). London: Routledge.
- İlhan, S. (1971). *Jeopolitikten Taktiğe* [From geopolitics to tactics]. Ankara: Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı.
- İlhan, S. (1986). Jeopolitik ve Tarih İlişkileri [The relationship between geopolitics and history]. *Belleten*, XLIX(195), 607–624.
- İlhan, S. (1989). *Jeopolitik Duyarlılık* [Geopolitical sensitivity]. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu.
- İlhan, S. (1997). *Türkiye'nin ve Türk Dünyasının Jeopolitiği* [The geopolitics of Turkey and the Turkic world]. Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü.
- İlhan, S. (1999). *Türk Askeri Kültürünün Tarihi Gelişmesi: 'Kutsal Ocak'* [The Development of Turkish Military Culture]. İstanbul: Ötüken.
- İlhan, S. (2000). *Avrupa Birliğine Neden Hayır: Jeopolitik Yaklaşım* [Why no to the European Union: Geopolitical perspective]. İstanbul: Ötüken.
- İlhan, S. (2002). *Avrupa Birliğine Neden Hayır—2* [Why no to the European Union—2]. İstanbul: Ötüken.
- İlhan, S. (2003). Jeopolitik Çalışmaları [Geopolitics studies]. *Jeopolitik*, 1(1).
- İlhan, S. (2004a). *Türkiye'nin Zorlaşan Konumu: Uygarlıklar Savaşı-Küreselleşme-Petrol* [Turkey's deteriorating position: Civilisational warfare-globalisation-oil]. İstanbul: Ötüken.
- İlhan, S. (2004b). Jeopolitik Dehanın Kurduğu Ulus Devlet [The nation state founded by the geopolitics genius]. *Jeopolitik*, 3(9), 25–27.
- İlhan, S. (2005). *Türklerin Jeopolitiği ve Avrasyacılık* [The geopolitics of the Turks and Eurasianism]. Ankara: Bilgi.
- İlhan, S. (n.d.). Kıbrıs Adasının Jeostratejik-Jeopolitik Konumu ve Etkinliği; Annan Planı [The Geostrategic-Geopolitical Position and Influence of the Cyprus Island: The Annan Plan]. www.kibris.gen.tr. Accessed 21.04.05.
- Koyulhisarlioğlu, M. (1946). Önsöz [Foreword]. In M. Koyulhisarlioğlu (Ed.), *Jeopolitik: İlmî Antoloji Denemesi* [Geopolitics: A scientific anthology effort] (pp. 5–6). İstanbul: Gençlik Kitabevi.
- Kömürçü, G. (29 August 2003). Bu İsm'e Dikkat; Ahmet Davutoğlu [Watch out for this Name: Ahmet Davutoğlu]. *Akşam*.
- Kuus, M. (2002). Sovereignty for security: the discourse of sovereignty in Estonia. *Political Geography*, 21, 393–412.
- Lise Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi* [National security knowledge for high school students] (2004) (7th ed.). İstanbul: Devlet Kitapları.
- Murphy, A. B., Bassin, M., Newman, D., Reuber, P., & Agnew, J. (2004). Is there a politics to geopolitics? *Progress in Human Geography*, 28(5), 619–640.
- Okman, C. (19 March 2002). Jeopolitik Kaymalar, Ağırık Merkezlerine Açılış ve Türkiye [Geopolitical shifts, the centers of gravity and Turkey]. *Zaman*.
- Olcaytu, T. (1996). Türkiye'nin Jeostratejisi [Turkey's geostrategy]. *Atatürkçü Düşünce*, 3(25), 8–9.
- Öngör, S. (1963). Siyasi Coğrafya ve Jeopolitik [Political geography and geopolitics]. *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 18, 301–316.
- Osmanağaoğlu, B. (1968). In M. Koyulhisarlioğlu (Ed.), *Jeopolitik: Devlet İdaresinde, Dış Siyasette Coğrafyanın Rolü* [Geopolitics: The role of geography in statecraft and foreign policy]. İstanbul: İstanbul Ticaret Odası.
- Ó Tuathail, G. (1996). *Critical geopolitics: The politics of writing global space*. London: Routledge.
- Ó Tuathail, G., & Agnew, J. (1992). Geopolitics and discourse: practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy. *Political Geography*, 11(2), 190–204.
- Özdağ, Ü. (2003). *Türk Tarihinin ve Geleceğinin Jeopolitik Çerçevesi* [The geopolitical framework of Turkish history and future]. Ankara: ASAM.
- Runciman. (1946). Jeopolitiğin Tanımı [Defining geopolitics]. In M. Koyulhisarlioğlu (Ed.), *Jeopolitik: İlmî Antoloji Denemesi* [Geopolitics: A scientific anthology effort]. İstanbul: Gençlik Kitabevi.
- Rustow, D. A. (1959). The army and the founding of the Turkish Republic. *Foreign Affairs*, 11(4), 513–552.
- Savcı, B. (1961). Türkiye'de Devlet Hayatında Askeri Mahiyetin ve Tesirin Seyrine Bir Bakış [A glance at the military component of state practice and its influence in Turkey]. *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 16, 39–45.
- Sezer, D. (1972). *Kamuyu ve Dış Politika* [Public Opinion and Foreign Policy]. Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi.
- Sezgin, E., & Yılmaz, S. (1965). *Jeopolitik* [Geopolitics]. Ankara: Harp Akademileri Yayınları.
- Sidaway, J. D., Bunnell, T., Grundy-Warr, C., Mohammad, R., Park, B., & Saito, A. (2004). Translating political geographies. *Political Geography*, 23, 1037–1049.
- Smith, G. (1999). The masks of Proteus: Russia, geopolitical shift and the new Eurasianism. *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers*, 24, 481–500.
- Stratejik Öngörü* (2005), no. 4.

- Tarakçı, N. (2003). *Devlet Adamlığı Bilimi: Jeopolitik ve Jeostrateji* [The science of statesmanship: Geopolitics and geostrategy]. İstanbul: Çantay.
- Taylor, P. J. (2003). Radical political geography. In J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, & G. Toal (Eds.), *A companion to political geography* (pp. 47–58). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Tezkan, Y. (2000). *Siyaset, Strateji ve Milli Güvenlik* [Politics, Strategy and National Security]. İstanbul: Ülke.
- Tezkan, Y. (2005). *Jeopolitikten Milli Güvenliğe* [From Geopolitics to National Security]. İstanbul: Ülke.
- Tezkan, Y., & Taşar, M. M. (2002). *Dünden Bugüne Jeopolitik* [Geopolitics—Yesterday and today]. İstanbul: Ülke.
- Thomas, L. V., & Itzkowitz, N. (1972). *A study of Naima*. New York: New York University Press.
- Turfan, R. (1965). *Jeopolitik: Jeopolitikle İlgili Ana Konular* [Geopolitics: Major issues in geopolitics]. İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaacılık Okulu.
- Türsan, N. (1971). Jeopolitik ve Jeostratejinin Işığı Altında Türkiye'nin Stratejik Değeri parts I, II & III [Turkey's strategic value in view of geopolitics and geostrategy—I, II & III]. *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, 40–42, 2–7.
- Uzun, H. (1981). Türkiye'nin Artan Jeopolitik Önemi [Turkey's increasing geopolitical significance]. *Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi*, 100(279), 43–47.
- Yılmaz, M. (4 June 2001). Derin bir Kitap [A Deep Book]. *Zaman*.
- Walker, R. B. J. (1993). *Insidel/outside international relations as political theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zorlu, F. R. (1958). *Turkey's foreign policy 1958*. New York: Turkish Information Office.