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From *kanun-ı kadim* (ancient law) to *umumun kuvveti* (force of people): historical context of the Ottoman constitutionalism

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The Young Ottoman and the Young Turk movements are considered to be the first clear expressions of a desire for a constitutional and parliamentary regime in the Ottoman Empire. As already demonstrated in the existing literature, the foremost objective of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks was to orchestrate an institutionalized limitation to the power and authority of the sultan, by effecting a constitution and parliament. On the other hand, however, there is a consensus in the existing studies that it was the political system of Europe, which had provided the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks with the motives and inspiration for their political projects.¹ Şerif Mardin, for instance, emphasized that the constitutionalist movements in the Ottoman Empire from the Patriotic Alliance (*İttifak-ı Hamiyet*) to the Young Turks ‘thought of themselves as aiming to follow the political lead of Europe’.² Bernard Lewis also emphasized that the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks ‘learned’ the concepts such as constitutionalism and parliament ‘from their European teachers’.³ This narrative in the literature gained so much a hegemonic character in time that many other prominent historians such as Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Stanford Shaw, Roderic H. Davison, Kemal Karpat and Feroz Ahmad also took up this pattern, refining and strengthening it.⁴

Needless to say, it is unviable to oppose this approach categorically as there is no doubt that one of the major goals of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks was to integrate the Ottoman Empire into what they thought as the ‘Western World’.⁵ They did not only introduce the political system and institutions of Europe, but also acquainted the Ottoman public with its social and cultural structures. In many of his writings, for instance, Namık Kemal praised such civic establishments as theatres, libraries and observatories in Europe, even applauding a zoo in London in his article ‘Terakki’ (*Progress*).⁶ Therefore, one could assert that the emphasis in the current literature mirrors the historical reality to a great extent.

Nevertheless, existing studies on the Young Ottoman and the Young Turk movements show a serious deficiency at the same time. Accepting the western influence as the sole source of the constitutionalist movements’ political agenda, they concentrate on European impact in an isolated manner, thus overlooking not only the manifold sources of Ottoman constitutionalism, but also the means of legitimation that the Young Ottomans

and the Young Turks cultivated.⁷ Most importantly, perhaps, the historical context of the Ottoman constitutionalism has hitherto been neglected.

This approach, which underlined the European influence as the sole factor, is a product, and perhaps the final refuge, of the 'modernization theory'. As it is well known, modernization theory presented the western political, economic and social transformations as a universal experience. This approach considered that all features of 'modernity' were up for adoption by the follower 'traditional' societies, which then 'naturally' transformed into 'modernized' ones.⁸ Furthermore, scholars usually heralded Turkey as one of the most successful models of a universally defined 'modernization process', after the Second World War.⁹ From this perspective, the 'Ottoman and Turkish modernization' was seen to be succeeding as an elite-driven and institution-building process that took its inspiration exclusively from the West.¹⁰

My own purpose here is not to criticize the modernization theory. This critique had been done by scholars from 1970s onwards and the modernization theory was abandoned to a great extent.¹¹ In addition to the theoretical dimension, thanks to the existing studies on Ottoman history, which had been especially carried out by the early 1990s, questioned the 'modernization process' of Turkey, and thus demonstrated the internal dynamics of the social, economic and political transformation.

Nonetheless, in terms of intellectual history in general and the Ottoman constitutionalism in particular, the old paradigm is still considerably influential. In other words, the accepted reading on the roots of the Young Ottoman and Young Turk movements' political projects still bears traces of the modernization theory today, since it underlines that the western institutions and governmental systems were the only political models of the constitutionalist movements in the Ottoman Empire; and therefore, neglects the historical context of the Young Ottoman and Young Turk thought.

The continuities between the early modern era and the nineteenth century, as well as the Young Ottomans' and the Young Turks' perception of earlier political transformations have been substantially ignored in reading nineteenth-century intellectual history. This approach deems it unnecessary to examine the history of the previous 200 years, which has been considered irrelevant to the constitutionalist thought of the nineteenth century.¹² As a result, the prevailing scholarly view on the Young Ottoman and the Young Turk movements postulates that the concept of constitutionalism was solely and directly based on the western model, imported by the constitutionalist movements to the Ottoman Empire.

My aim here is to shed light on the historical context of the Young Ottoman and the Young Turk movements. The existing systematic studies of the so-called 'traditional period' of the Ottoman history serve as my point of departure. It is worth noting that my approach sprang from Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj's perspective that states political change in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire depended as much on internal dynamics from late sixteenth century on, as it did on external influences.¹³ Therefore, one of the major pillars of this article is the thesis put forward by the Ottoman historiography that argues the nineteenth-century transformations were a synthesis of a 200 year sequence of experiments and *ad hoc* solutions.¹⁴

Briefly summarized, one significant theme that appears in the existing literature on the Ottoman policy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is the power struggle between the groups that aimed to limit the royal authority and the political position,

aiming at strengthening the power base of the sultan.¹⁵ According to Baki Tezcan, this bifurcation in the Ottoman polity began in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, in response to the development of loci of powers, such as the vizier households and the lords of the law.¹⁶ During the fierce struggle in defining the boundaries of royal authority, the sultans' powers became contested and dispersed. Instead of a state understood as one imperial household, power shifted among elite households, divided by factional rivalries.¹⁷ Carter Findley recorded that factional rivalries, janissary revolts and *ulema* opposition *vis-à-vis* the absolutist policies of the Ottoman sultans, were recurrent themes of the seventeenth century.¹⁸ The janissaries, in alliance with the men of pen, and *ulema*, became a formidable obstacle to the palace's autocracy. Hence, there was an open acceptance of the receding power of the Ottoman sultan in face of those pressure groups, by the second half of the seventeenth century. Moreover, the charismatic model of leadership became irrelevant since the Ottoman dynasty had lost much of its former power. In its place, a collective leadership, based in power of the groups aimed at limiting the royal prerogative, became consolidated. Abou-El-Haj emphasized that by the second half of the seventeenth century, most of the sultans acted mainly as symbolic leaders, providing a facade of continuity for the old practices as they helped to legitimize new ones.¹⁹ The sultans, as Findley aptly stated, appeared as almost immobile figures in an endless pageant of court ceremonies and religious rituals.²⁰

Given this conflict-ridden historiography, my first goal is to hint at how the power struggles in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were viewed by the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks and how that contributed to their thought. In other words, I seek to point out the means of legitimation that the Young Ottoman and the Young Turk movements exploited and built continuity between themselves and the political position that aimed to restrict the royal prerogative during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For this purpose, I will mainly concentrate on the writings of three pre-eminent figures in the nineteenth-century intellectual history, İbrahim Şinasi, Namık Kemal and Ahmed Rıza, each representing a different generation of Ottoman constitutionalism.

Şinasi: 'Your Law Brings the Sultan into Line'

Şinasi, who is considered to have established the foundations of the Young Ottoman thought, produced much of his intellectual work with obvious political motives, and the objective that his political ideas could be followed through them.²¹ A notable theme among his *qasidas*, for instance, was the eulogy of his patron, Mustafa Reşid Pasha.²² One could consider that Şinasi's eulogy of the personality and wisdom of the latter was only natural because of the patronage relationship between them. However, if one takes a closer look at the totality of his poems, it also becomes obvious that he went against the common Ottoman practice and completely ignored Abdulaziz, who was in power when his book was published. In addition, while praising Mustafa Reşid Pasha, who was considered the symbol of the Tanzimat bureaucracy, the clearest expression of the objective to limit the power base of the sultan in the modern era, Şinasi strongly criticized the absolutist period of Mahmud II.²³

According to Şinasi, Mustafa Reşid Pasha guaranteed the security of right to life and property in the Ottoman Empire with 'law', as the Gülhane Rescript of 1839 was often referred to. Therefore, Mustafa Reşid Pasha invalidated the period prior to the Tanzimat

era precisely through the 'law he established'.²⁴ Şinasi portrayed the absolutist period of Mahmud II as an era of tyranny and violence and as Butrus Abu-Manneh demonstrated a century later, a time within Ottoman history, in which the rights to life, possession or honour of the empire's subjects, were utterly insecure.²⁵ For Şinasi, people were merely slave to despotism in the age of Mahmud II and they gained their freedom only with the 'law of Mustafa Reşid Pasha'.²⁶ In a highly graphic description, Şinasi characterized Mahmud II as a 'contemptible butcher' (*'cellâd-ı le'im'*), a quite severe insult for an Ottoman sultan.²⁷ Mustafa Reşid Pasha, on the other hand, was the very person who brought this 'contemptible butcher' into line (*'Bildirir haddini sultana senin kanunun'*).²⁸

One theme that appears often in the literature on Şinasi is that he was a proponent of 'westernization' and 'modernization' projects. The implication was that these concepts left a deep imprint on his emphasis on 'law'.²⁹ Thus, we are commonly led to believe that Şinasi's eulogy of Mustafa Reşid Pasha and the *Gülhane Rescript* sprang from the concepts of 'civilization', 'enlightenment', 'Europeanization' and so on.³⁰ While, this commonly held view that highlighted Şinasi's westernist approach is to some extent self-explanatory, considering it as the single explanation of Şinasi's strong emphasis on 'law' is quite problematic, since this perspective analyses the political thought of Şinasi only within the frame of his adherence to westernist or Europeanist inclinations.

In a similar vein, in Şerif Mardin's view of Şinasi's emphasis on 'law' severed him from the traditional Ottoman political approach completely, since it included the concept of a human lawgiver. For Şinasi, Mardin contended, 'one of the most important contributions of the grand vizier was that the latter [Mustafa Reşid Pasha] had established a fundamental law which set limits to the power of the sultan. It is this idea of a lawgiver other than the ruler which is quite foreign to earlier Ottoman thought where law is either the law of God, set once and for all (only to be modified by dint of interpretation or by outright distortion of the meaning), or that of the ruler, the edict of the sultan.'³¹

Mardin's point of departure elucidates the meaning that Şinasi had attributed to the concept of 'law', which was to be understood as limiting the power of the Ottoman sultan. However, Mardin's explanation is debatable since he argued that Şinasi's attribution represents a clear break with Ottoman political thought and practice. If one takes a closer look at the Ottoman political structure and its transformation throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and particularly how Şinasi and other Young Ottomans saw it, it becomes obvious that no sharp break existed in Ottoman policy in terms of restricting royal authority. The power bases, which sought to limit the royal authority during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, too legitimized their claims and activities by frequent allusions to the concepts, such as 'law', 'the ancient law' (*kanun-ı kadim*) and the 'Ottoman law' (*kanun-ı Osmani*).³² Such was the case with the contemporaries of Murad III, for instance, who criticized his autocratic policies highlighting the concept of law.³³ In another instance, a significant chronicle on the seventeenth-century Ottoman history, *History of Tûgî*, faulted the absolutist rule of Osman II by accusing the latter and his supporters of deviating from 'Ottoman law'. Accordingly, *Tûgî* portrayed the political actors that had dethroned Osman II, as the protectors of the law.³⁴ In addition to *Tûgî*, Katib Çelebi, another chronicler sympathetic to the groups that aimed to limit the royal prerogative, also used a similar justification: 'On the same day the soldiers petitioned the sultan [Mustafa] for execution of those who left the path of the ancient law (*kanun-ı kadim*) and invented new laws.'³⁵ Similarly, the opponents of the 'New Order' (*nizam-ı cedid*), a project

aimed at modernizing the autocratic government, criticized Selim III for shunning away from the 'ancient law'. Moreover, the proponents of Selim III, tried to legitimize this project by emphasizing the necessity of the replacement of the 'ancient law' by the 'New Order'.³⁶

According to Baki Tezcan, almost all historical texts written by those holding political rank and aimed at limiting royal authority, opposed the autocratic policies of the sultans and accused them of deviating from Ottoman tradition; these political agents presumed that the Ottoman political tradition was based on the recognition of their political and economic privileges which they had gained over time. Thus, for them, absolutist policies meant abolition of their privileges, so to speak, a violation of their rights, and therefore, a judicial issue. Hence, the sultans who deviated from 'Ottoman law' or 'ancient law' ought to be dethroned.³⁷ Consequently, in comparing Şinasi's emphasis on the concept of 'law', with the content of the historical texts that mirrored the power struggle during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one can trace certain similarities. In the same vein as the groups that aimed to limit the royal prerogative throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Şinasi gave substance to the content of 'law' in terms of restricting the power base of the sultan, as evinced in his lines 'Your law brings the sultan into line'. In this respect, one can consider him as a bearer of the political stand in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that aimed at constraining the royal authority.

If there was continuity between Şinasi and the mentioned political actors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in terms of restricting the power of the sultan, then what were the breaking points? In other words, at what points Şinasi in particular and the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks in general differed from those groups of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? One can find some clues for these in Şinasi's foreword to the first issue of his newspaper, which started to publish in 1860:

Since people living in a given social community are circumscribed in their actions by multifarious legal obligations, it is quite natural that they should consider the expression of opinions aimed at the protection of the interests of the patria part of the totality of their vested rights. If tangible proof of this assertion is sought, it is sufficient to point to the political newspapers of those civilized peoples whose limits of understanding have been expanded by the power of knowledge.³⁸

As already mentioned, Şinasi declared that the people had 'rights' in exchange for obligations. The freedom of expression, for instance, constituted an integral part of these rights. From this viewpoint, he sought to build a doctrine that legitimized the people's freedom of opinion and expression. Therefore, he explained his newspaper's *raison d'être* as being a tool of this right, hence using the press to create and improve public opinion.³⁹ In this context, Şinasi not only popularized the crucial concept of 'the Ottoman people', but also tried to portray public opinion as the opinion of the Ottoman people.⁴⁰

As a result, Şinasi emphasized the importance of the public opinion in administrative and governmental decisions. Kemal Karpat argued that Şinasi dedicated himself to inform and educate the Ottoman public about state administration, world events and opinion making.⁴¹ According to Şerif Mardin, employing journalism as a means for enlightening the people was a significant innovation on its own. Most importantly, perhaps, Şinasi recognized the public as a legitimate participant of the politics and worked on the internalization of this thought by the Ottoman people.⁴² Later on, he attempted to deliver his readers the essentials of parliamentary government and defended the principle of 'no

taxation without representation'.⁴³ From this viewpoint, one could assert that the concepts such as parliament, public opinion, constitutional government and Ottoman people, which would be identified later on with the names of Namık Kemal and Ahmed Rıza, initially became apparent in the writings of Şinasi.⁴⁴

Namık Kemal: 'Better to Obey a Bad Law than Allegiance to a Benevolent Sultan'

Namık Kemal picked up where Şinasi left off. Kemal's logic did not diverge from that of his immediate predecessor, who sought to make the public a significant component of politics. Namık Kemal made the tone and frames of the endeavour, which were set by Şinasi, more sophisticated. As Mardin emphasized, the kernel of Namık Kemal's thought consisted of a determined effort to introduce the concept of popular sovereignty into Ottoman political thinking.⁴⁵ In his article, *Efkâr-ı Umumiye* (Public Opinion), Namık Kemal stressed that there was no power superior to public opinion and the force of people in society, a formulation which brought forth the belief that birthright and personal freedom belonged to the public force alone.⁴⁶ He warned the people to be vigilant against the rulers, since they could abuse the authority that they were warranted by the people. The power of the public which ordinarily protected the individual from any source of attack on his life or property, turned into a tool for this very violation, in the case of an abuse. Hence, the damage inflicted by the government would parallel the harm of the state of nature. For Namık Kemal, when the political morality of a society deteriorated, 'a Louis XIV' sprang up and established an absolute monarchy over the society.⁴⁷ Therefore, he displayed a strong emphasis on the political responsibility of the people to prevent despotic tendencies, which governments could provoke.⁴⁸

It is within this context that Namık Kemal portrayed Mustafa Reşid Pasha as the 'conqueror of civilization', since he put an end to the absolutist period of Mahmud II by means of 'law', before the public itself could assume any responsibility for it.⁴⁹ In particular vein, Namık Kemal stated, in his *Ottoman History*, that it was better to obey a bad law than to pledge allegiance to a benevolent sultan,⁵⁰ repeating the emphasis on the 'rule of law', a distinctive feature of Şinasi's political thought that preceded him. For Namık Kemal, the Gülhane Rescript closed an era⁵¹ in which 'political morality' deteriorated and Mahmud II established an absolutist rule,⁵² and was declared precisely for the conservation of law. Therefore, Mustafa Reşid Pasha not only guaranteed the right to life, property and honour of the people via the inauguration of the Tanzimat,⁵³ but also 'saved the Ottoman Empire' itself.⁵⁴ As a result, echoing Şinasi, Namık Kemal described the reign of Mahmud II, who reestablished the unlimited power of the Ottoman sultan, as a 'period of unlawfulness during which nobody could be sure of his life and property'.⁵⁵ In this particular context, Namık Kemal argued that Mustafa Reşid Pasha paved the way for constitutionalism by ending the absolutist regime of Mahmud II.⁵⁶

From Namık Kemal's point of view, the legislative and executive powers united under the rule of Âli and Fuad Pashas, despite the fact that Mustafa Reşid Pasha had provided a sound basis for a constitutional regime.⁵⁷ Thus, the government gained an arbitrary character in the hands of a few people, since there was not a supervisory control over the administration.⁵⁸ In this respect, his criticism was levelled at Âli and Fuad Pashas,⁵⁹ but it had wider implications. It is true that the criticism of Namık Kemal and the Young

Ottomans against the high-ranking bureaucrats has received a lot of scholarly attention. However, the commonly held view in the current literature is that their opposition concerned itself solely with the Sublime Porte, and was not addressed to the sultan.⁶⁰ In this sense, existing studies of this subject show a serious deficiency, since they have hitherto neglected the nub of the criticisms of the Young Ottomans against the absolutist rule.

From the promulgation of the Tanzimat up to 1871, the strings of political power were not in the hands of an absolutist sultan. Rather, the Ottoman sultan was merely a symbolic figure when the Young Ottoman movement was founded and flourished. In a political environment that Âli and Fuad Pashas had established a power monopoly, the Young Ottoman opposition to the high-ranking bureaucracy seemed most valid, rather than just critical of a 'figurehead sultan'.⁶¹ In this context, the Young Ottomans placed much greater emphasis on seeking to restrict the power of the Sublime Porte by making the public an integral component of the politics. As already mentioned, Namık Kemal repeatedly pointed out the significance of people's participation in politics by stating that in every society, the right to sovereignty belonged to all.⁶² He even faulted the Gülhane Rescript for not including the freedom of opinion, the sovereignty of the people and constitutionalism.⁶³ On the other hand, when the palace tried to reestablish its absolute power following the deaths of Âli and Fuad Pashas, the criticisms of the Young Ottoman movement were directly aimed at the sultan and the palace. The Young Ottomans overtly characterized, in the years between 1871 and 1876, the absolutist era of Abdulaziz, as the 'age of atrocity' and 'despotism'.⁶⁴ Furthermore, Namık Kemal portrayed Abdulaziz as a 'traitor',⁶⁵ and compared the periods of high-ranking bureaucracy and Abdulaziz, and made it clear that his preference lay with the former.⁶⁶ Thus, the criticism of the Young Ottoman movement was twofold. They not only rallied against the power of the Sublime Porte, but also openly criticized the absolutist rule of the sultan, whenever necessary. They further deepened the views of their predecessors, most notably Şinasi, who preached for the legitimate participation of the people in political processes. What is more, the Young Ottomans defended the containment of the autocratic policies of both the sultan and bureaucracy by a constitutional and parliamentarian regime that would be the product of the people, were they to form a political community.

Another theme that illuminates the struggle between the constitutionalists and absolutists in the nineteenth century is whether or not there were different formulations of Mahmud II and his reign than what Şinasi and Namık Kemal had proposed. To exemplify one of these varied formulations, in his book *Üss-i Zafer* (The Basis of Victory), which reflected the official view of Mahmud II's rule and published only two years after 1826, Esad Efendi offered a quite dissimilar depiction than those observed in the writings of Şinasi and Namık Kemal. By picturing Mahmud II as a reformer of the state, Esad Efendi underlined that the reign of Mahmud II was an age of peace and happiness.⁶⁷ In a similar vein, the history textbooks of the Hamidian period characterized Mahmud II as the second founder of the Ottoman Empire, since he started the 'real progress' of the state.⁶⁸ Lastly, as Christoph Neumann underscores, Ahmet Cevdet Pasha praised the absolutist practices of Mahmud II, in his book *Tarih-i Cevdet* (History of Cevdet) also.⁶⁹

In addition to their disagreements on the reign of Mahmud II, the constitutionalists and absolutists also differed from each other on the interpretation of the Janissary Corps, one of the most significant groups that limited the power base of the Ottoman sultan through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Şükrü Hanioglu recorded that the

constitutionalist movements in the nineteenth century did not necessarily see the suppression of the Janissaries as 'The Auspicious Incident'.⁷⁰ Namık Kemal overtly stated his views on the Janissaries as follows:

The Ottoman Empire was governed by the will of the community, a form of constitutionalism so to speak, until the destruction of the Janissaries. The people themselves assumed the right to administer, which they would delegate to parliament ... The Janissaries were the armed consultative assembly of the people.⁷¹

For Namık Kemal, the balance of power in the political system of the empire had been destroyed due to the suppression of the Janissaries by Mahmud II, hence justice was replaced by despotism.⁷² In the history textbooks of the Hamidian period, on the other hand, the Janissaries were described as a restricting force that prevented the progress of the empire.⁷³ In a pamphlet he wrote, Mahmud Nedim Pasha, another supporter of the absolutist rule of the nineteenth century, as well as the Hamidian autocracy later on, accused the Janissaries of being unruly and characterized the corps as one of the main bringers of corruption.⁷⁴ Ahmet Cevdet Pasha also defended the suppression of the Janissaries as they usurped the state power.⁷⁵

It must be noted that Namık Kemal's somewhat exaggerated appraisal of the Janissary issue could be considered a result of a teleological reading of Ottoman history. In this respect, he sought to legitimize the constitutional regime by looking towards the Ottoman practice prior to the nineteenth century. Therefore, along with his assessment of the Janissaries, he also leaned towards other pressure groups that had restricted royal authority in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Namık Kemal openly declared that the Ottoman Empire had always been a constitutional government, in which the *ulema* held the legislative power, the viziers had the executive power, while the people in arms represented by the Janissary Corps controlled the action of the executive.⁷⁶ According to him, therefore, the establishment of a constitutional regime in the Ottoman Empire would not be an innovation at all. On the contrary, instituting a mechanism of governmental control would mean the refinement of a mode of government that had been in use in the empire before the absolutism of Mahmud II.⁷⁷

Last but not least, the question of fratricide, as the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks understood it, was another one of the major problems within the power struggle between the absolutists and their opponents through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, since having an alternative sultan at the palace was a point of leverage against the existing sultan.⁷⁸ It was precisely in this context that Namık Kemal modelled his severe criticism of fratricide on Bayezit I for executing his brother Yakup Çelebi.⁷⁹ For those who were party to the power struggles of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a sultan could be deposed but the political system would still survive with the enthronement of his brother; hence the incumbent sultan, being aware of this, would not exceed certain limits.⁸⁰ On balance, however, the sultans who had absolutist political projects as Osman II or Murad IV executed their brothers to eliminate the alternative candidates for the throne.⁸¹ The fratricide came to an end as a result of a crucial consensus between the absolutists and their opponents about the limits of royal authority.⁸² With all this in mind, Namık Kemal's sharp criticisms against fratricide in general and Bayezit I for killing his brother Yakup in particular, create an impression that he spoke through a discourse within the frame of the power struggle in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Ahmed Rıza: 'The Palace is ours. The state is ours. We are the people, so the right is ours'

Şerif Mardin stated that the intellectual depth of the Young Turks was rather frivolous in comparison with their predecessors, the Young Ottomans.⁸³ The Young Turks, for Mardin, could not formulate any original or peculiar theory, and used political ideas only selectively.⁸⁴ Although Ahmed Rıza came to be seen as an exceptional figure within the group, he too shared the same limitations of his intellectual milieu. Despite these intellectual impediments of the period, however, both Ahmed Rıza and the Young Turks correlated their constitutionalist opposition strongly with the activities of the groups that sought to limit royal authority in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as Şinasi and Namık Kemal had done before them.⁸⁵

It must be noted, first of all, that Ahmed Rıza and other contributors to *Meşveret* (Consultation), one of the leading newspapers and the intellectual outlet of the Young Turk movement, underscored the concept of 'law' against the absolutist Hamidian regime. Similar to the political position that aimed to limit the royal prerogative in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ahmed Rıza and his followers sought to restrict the sultan's power, through a discourse framed by law. In this context, Halil Ganem, a significant contributor to *Meşveret*, notably underscored that it was the 'law that had the importance, not the sultan' (*ehemmiyet kanundadır, padişahı değil*).⁸⁶ Moreover, as an article published in another outstanding Young Turk newspaper *Mizan* (Balance) in 1896 put it, if the gathering of Parliament was not possible under the existing circumstances, the sole measure for the salvation of the state was then to accept the principle of consultation. The writer declared that everyone in the empire, including the sultan, had to obey the judgments of law, even when it was inadequate or insufficient.⁸⁷ In a similar vein, Ahmed Rıza stressed that their duty, as a group, was to remain within the confines of justice and the laws of the Ottoman Empire. The crucial point here, as also emphasized by Ahmed Rıza, was that the Young Turks did not accept a power superior to the law, which was their unique guiding principle.⁸⁸

Second, in contrast to the accepted interpretations of Ottoman constitutionalism, one could argue that the Young Turks were well aware of dissimilarities between Ottoman history and the European past. Rather than perceiving the western path and transformations as universal experiences, they sometimes highlighted the very uniqueness of each society's political struggles and institutions. For instance, an article printed in *Mizan* overtly reflected the Young Turks' perception of the peculiarities of Ottoman history. The article maintained that every state had its own distinctive character, morality and national history and the political, civil and social revolutions arose from *sui generis* conditions in each society; at times, attaining entirely different outcomes. Therefore, appealing to European history would be a great mistake in exploring the reasons for the reforms in the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁹

In keeping with that perspective, Ahmed Rıza and his followers frequently turned to Ottoman history to legitimize their political projects. For example, in an article published in *Meşveret* in 1896, they argued, not unlike Namık Kemal, that a form of constitutionalism had already been established in Ottoman history,⁹⁰ in which 'affairs of state ... had been consulted in the Imperial Council. The Viziers, pashas ... grand vizier and the *ulema* discussed the topics without hesitation.'⁹¹ Ahmed Rıza laid a particular stress on the

separation of powers in Ottoman policy prior to the nineteenth century.⁹² According to him, the empire had been governed primarily through consultation with the sultans, the notables and the ministers of state.⁹³ However, Ahmed Rıza underlined that some sultans acted above the law and in time turned away from the consultation principle due to their 'ignorance' and 'unruly despotism'. Moreover, he added, those sultans not only tyrannized the people, but even their own brothers, touching upon the negative role of the autocratic sultans who singlehandedly 'prevented the progress of sciences and education'. It was under these circumstances, Ahmed Rıza contended, that the empire started to decline, as a direct result of absolutism.⁹⁴ Nonetheless, he also emphasized that the Ottoman people 'had never submitted to abjection', and thus, they had never obeyed autocratic sultans,⁹⁵ clarifying the matter as follows: The sultans who had not recognized the order and the rule of law ... had been overpowered by ... the armed forces of Janissaries and cautious administration of the notables.⁹⁶ The power of the two parties, that is the Janissaries and the *ulema*, Ahmed Rıza further asserted, had protected the laws and customs of the country.⁹⁷

In conjunction with Ahmed Rıza's position, other Young Turks also highlighted the role of the *ulema* and the Janissaries in the Ottoman history. In terms of limiting the royal authority, the Young Turks attributed great importance to both of these groups and their political activities. For instance, an article that appeared in *Şura-yı Ümmet* (Council of the People), the central organ of the Young Turk movement after 1902, stated how the Janissaries safeguarded the empire in the past by keeping their weapons pointed at those sultans 'who had wounded the honor of the Ottoman people by tyranny'.⁹⁸ In the aftermath of the 1908 revolution, the same newspaper published another article, entitled 'Memories of Our Internal Politics', and took a clear stance that the Janissary Corps had been one of the major barriers for the absolutist sultans in attaining and exercising more power in the Ottoman history.⁹⁹

Moreover, it was commonplace to evoke the dethronement narratives of the autocratic sultans in the writings of the Young Turks. An article printed in the first issue of *Meşveret* depicted the deposition of Ahmed III in 1730, culminated with the 'uprising of the people' because of his absolutist tendencies,¹⁰⁰ while another one recited the dethronement and murder of Ibrahim I in 1648, by an alliance between the *ulema*, high officials and the Janissary Corps.¹⁰¹ *Şura-yı Ümmet*, also made common references to the upheavals against despotism throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the depositions of the sultans such as Osman II, Mustafa I, Mehmed IV and Ahmed III which had been accomplished through the endeavours of the Ottoman people, for the sake of the country.¹⁰²

It is important to note in this context that the Sublime Porte, another locus of political power that had limited the royal authority in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had been characterized by Ahmed Rıza and the Young Turks as the 'hope of prosperity' (*ümid-i saadet kapisı*). Ahmed Rıza further pointed that the Sublime Porte had been 'an asylum for the people' as it had deemed their grievances and criticism important and had preserved 'order and law'. Yet, after the death of the great and powerful grand vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha, he continued, the palace once again felt entitled to intervene in politics. Ahmed Rıza argued that despite the commencement of provincial councils which comprised the notables and the Council of the State, which was composed of Muslims and Christians in the capital city, the realm of politics could not be spared from 'despotism and arbitrary intervention of the Palace'. For Ahmed Rıza, there was only one solution

against 'despotism and arbitrary intervention' of the sultan, and that was to break away with the old regime and consequently replace it with a new one¹⁰³:

There seemed no other way than to change the type of government (*usul-i idare*). The Constitution promulgated. Sultan Hamid using the excuse of the defeat in the Russian War, seized the mission, influence and independence of the Sublime Porte. He suspended the Parliament and the Senate. He began destroying the old foundations and customs. He, one by one, devastated the powers that could prevent his obstinate will. The government, the state was merely reduced to the personality of the sultan. The law was replaced with decrees and imperial orders that were arranged by ignorant court chamberlains and wizard sheiks ... in the palace cellars. The statutes of the canonical law and order declined. This corruption, this interregnum is a result of the sultan's ignorance. Therefore, the sultan has the entire responsibility of calamities and tyranny ... Emphatically, a sultan, who confined the government to himself and fostered away the people from the politics, is responsible for ... the defeat and perpetual crisis.¹⁰⁴

Halil Ganem reflected a similar attitude on absolutism and underlined the importance of the Sublime Porte in constraining the royal authority. In one of his writings, he connoted that if reinstating the constitutional regime was not possible at the time being, it was then necessary to restore the Sublime Porte to its previous powerful position. After confirming the essentiality of a strong Sublime Porte, 'which had increased the glory and prosperity of the country' for centuries, he emphasized the 'independence' of the grand vizier from the palace. According to him, the Sublime Porte was one of the major institutions that could stand against the interventions of the palace, which caused, in Ganem's view, the predicament of the country.¹⁰⁵

In the same manner as Ahmed Rıza, other writers of *Meşveret* severely criticized the Hamidian policy for neutralizing the power of the Sublime Porte. An article published in the first issue of the newspaper contended that the sultan was the sole responsible of the despotism in the empire since he had subdued 'the most powerful political institution in the world'.¹⁰⁶ Again, Halil Ganem stressed that Abdulhamid II destroyed 'the great organization' of the Sublime Porte, which had been 'a product of successive endeavors of Köprülüs, Mustafa Reşid Pashas, Âlis, and Mithads', describing the interference of the palace in the affairs of state as 'serious madness'¹⁰⁷:

High officials, marshals, pashas are all slaves of the sultan. If any one of them ... unmasks the dreadful circumstances, he would immediately fall victim to royal wrath and be exiled. The law and other regulations do not hold any significance. The sultan can abolish all of them at will. There is no governmental wisdom in Turkey anymore. The government is limited to the sultan's will and pleasure. The sultan tramples on ... law and justice.¹⁰⁸

By the same token, Ahmed Rıza recorded that the Hamidian rule had eliminated all the 'adherents of freedom and reform' within the ranks of *ulema* and high officials.¹⁰⁹ An article that appeared in *Şura-yı Ümmet* in 1905 also stressed this point and related the autocratic character of the regime to the deficiency of the high officials.¹¹⁰ Another commentary that appeared in *Meşveret* faulted the sultan for the destruction of both old and new institutions, order and law, by overthrowing high-ranking bureaucrats and the ministers.¹¹¹ Moreover, according to Ahmed Rıza, Abdulhamid's absolutist regime was a direct result of the 'absence of an independent cabinet of ministers ... *ulema* ... and a Senate and Parliament ... that supervise the execution of laws',¹¹² a regime in which 'no one is sure of his life and property'.¹¹³

It is noteworthy, in this context that alluding to the *Gülhane Rescript*, by emphasizing the significance of security of life and property,¹¹⁴ denotes that the Young Turks identified the Hamidian period with the absolutist reign of Mahmud II. In this conjuncture, Prince Sabahaddin, another significant Young Turk leader, took up the views of Namık Kemal and stated almost 30 years after him that Mustafa Reşid Pasha was the first of the constitutionalists who realized that a state could not survive with an autocratic regime amid rival states. For Sabahaddin, Mustafa Reşid Pasha manifested that the salvation of the empire was due to the unity of the people under the aegis of the Ottoman patria.¹¹⁵ Other Young Turks also concentrated on the antagonism between tyranny and personal liberty. For instance, an article published in 1896 sought to demonstrate the correlation between the absence of security of life and absolutist character of the Hamidian rule.¹¹⁶

In sum, Ahmed Rıza accused Abdulhamid II of being ‘the major person responsible for and the sole perpetrator of the tyranny’ because of his absolutist rule.¹¹⁷ In line with Şinasi, who portrayed Mahmud II as ‘contemptible butcher’, Ahmed Rıza declared that Sultan Abdulhamid was malicious,¹¹⁸ ‘brutal and a despotic ignoramus’ who did not deserve the throne.¹¹⁹ The country, Ahmed Rıza further claimed, was ‘entrusted to the Ottoman people by their forefathers’, and by no means the property of the sultan.¹²⁰ In the same manner as Ahmed Rıza, Tunalı Hilmi, another outstanding Young Turk leader, defended that the state was not identical with the sultan and that the sultan was only an intendant of the state affairs.¹²¹ In one of his articles published in *Mizan*, Tunalı Hilmi put a particular emphasis on the difference between the dynasty and the state; and equated the latter with the Ottoman people.¹²² Hence, the Young Turks repeated the discourse of Şinasi and Namık Kemal that pertained to making the public a significant component of Ottoman policy.¹²³ Therefore, *Meşveret* writers underscored that the Ottoman state was founded not only by the Ottoman dynasty, but also by the Ottoman people themselves.¹²⁴ Ahmed Rıza coined the core of the argument famously as follows: ‘The Palace is ours. The state is ours. We are the people, so the right is ours.’¹²⁵ Another article published in *Meşveret* also underlined that ‘to demand justice and work for the prosperity of the patria were both the duty and the right of each and every Ottoman’.¹²⁶ Finally, as well as this mission and right, ‘all Ottomans’ were called on to struggle for the reinstatement of the constitutional regime against the absolutist rule of Abdulhamid II.¹²⁷ Congruent to this call was a vision of the status of the sultan as the ‘chief servant’ (*serhademe*) of the Ottoman Empire.¹²⁸ This perfectly paralleled the purposes of the political position that had aimed to restrict royal authority during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Conclusion

What was the major source of inspiration for the Young Ottoman and Young Turk movements’ political projects? This question cannot be tied to one single fact. A child of the modernization theory, the hegemonic narrative on the Ottoman constitutionalism that emphasizes the European governmental systems was the sole political model of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks, has become quite insufficient for understanding the historical context of these movements. For many reasons, including this one, this approach turns a blind eye not only to the power struggles and political transformations throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but also how the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks viewed these earlier political struggles. Therefore, this narrative

entirely overlooks both the political powers whose purpose was to limit the royal authority *vis-à-vis* the absolutist policies of the Ottoman sultans before the nineteenth century, and their perception by the Young Ottoman and Young Turk movements. However, comparing the opponents of the absolutist rule of the sultan throughout the 300 years, one can discern some similarities and indicators of the consciousness that the nineteenth-century constitutionalism had about their predecessors.

As I discussed above, the outstanding themes in the writings of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks, such as public opinion, freedom of expression, political representation or constitution, had already been in circulation throughout Europe in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. The constitutionalist movements put a particular emphasis on a new political actor, differently from the opponents of absolutism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in their struggle for constraining the royal authority: the people. Consequently, they were involved in making the public the fulcrum of their political goal, that is the proclamation of a constitutional and parliamentary regime. Hence, the Young Ottoman and the Young Turk movements promoted the idea that the people were not only the major guarantor of freedom, but also constituted the main obstacle to absolutism of a sultan or bureaucracy.

Therefore, the fine line between the constitutionalists of the nineteenth century and the forces that aimed to limit absolutism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the demand for a concrete constitution and a parliament. Although this key difference was intended for the institutionalization of restricting the royal authority, they met on a common ground. At the outset, both groups that opposed autocracy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and constitutionalist movements in the nineteenth century attributed great importance to the concept of 'law' against the power base of the Ottoman sultan. In parallel with the accusation of deviating from 'Ottoman law' or 'ancient law' through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks also gave substance to the content of 'law' in terms of limiting the power of the sultan.

Second, the strong criticism against the absolutist sultans, such as Osman II, Murad IV, Mahmud II and Abdulhamid II was another theme that corresponds to the opponents of the autocracy throughout the 300 year period. On the other hand, in parallel with the political stand in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks severely faulted the fratricide, since having an alternative sultan at the palace was a point of leverage against the existing sultan. Ahmed Rıza, for instance, reviled Abdulhamid II for the imprisonment of the princes¹²⁹ and declared that the Young Turks 'would acknowledge' the reign of 'Prince Murad or Mehmed Reşad', if they would recognize the constitution.¹³⁰ Moreover, *Meşveret* published numerous articles of the *ulema* members on fratricide and right of succession. These writings sought to legitimize dethronement of Abdulhamid II by emphasizing that the right of succession and caliphate did not belong to him.¹³¹

Constitutionalist movements interpreted the Ottoman history in a utilitarian and teleological manner. Therefore, the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks surveyed the Ottoman past, without omitting to emphasize its dissimilarities with the European history, through a periodization based on a dichotomy of the reigns of absolutist sultans versus the era of justice and law. Within this dichotomy, the Young Ottoman and the Young Turk movements openly advocated the '*ulema* and janissary' 'parties' in the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries due to the aimed limitation of the royal authority. These traditional 'parties' were characterized as the foundational organizations of the empire and bases of justice and order, since they were considered as barriers to the sultan's autocratic power. Moreover, the constitutionalist movements cherished the Sublime Porte and the viziers such as Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, for reducing the Ottoman sultan to a symbolic figure. There is no doubt that this perspective is a significant indicator of the consciousness that the Young Ottoman and Young Turk movements had about the power struggle during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Connected to this aspect, the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks made the power balance and separation of powers within the Ottoman policy the focus of their attention. In consequence, they explained their political projects with reference to the Ottoman institutions, which had been constructed by the groups that aimed at limiting the royal prerogative in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What is more, they even argued that the empire was governed by a form of constitutionalism due to the existence of those institutions and political actors. They, therefore, defended that the establishment of a constitutional regime would not be a new practice. From this viewpoint, it is no coincidence that the neutralization of those institutions and power groups during the reign of absolutist sultans was considered as tyranny by the constitutionalist movements.

All in all, the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks defended the institutionalization of limiting the royal authority by a constitutional and parliamentary regime, since the absolutist sultans could diverge from the path of the noninstitutional 'law' and neutralize the traditional 'parties' which had been against autocracy. The constitutionalist movements often correlated their goals with the political stand in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that sought to restrict the power of the sultan. In other words, the power struggle in the Ottoman policy before the nineteenth century, found its echo in the writings of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks. With all these in mind, one could argue that along with the European political model, one of the major mainstays of the constitutionalist movements for their political aims was the Ottoman practice prior to the nineteenth century.

Disclosure statement

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Notes

1. For a recent example of this narrative see Florian Riedler, *Opposition and Legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire: Conspiracies and Political Cultures* (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp.26 and 41.
2. Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), p.21.
3. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.173.
4. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), pp.2 and 58–9; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808--1975* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.132; Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire: 1856--1876* (New Jersey: Princeton

- University Press, 1963), pp.172–5; Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.181; Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), pp.3–4 and 23–6.
5. For an elaborate discussion of this point see M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981).
 6. Namık Kemal, 'Terakki', *İbret*, no.45, 3 Ramazan 1289-23 Teşrin-i Evvel 1288 [1872], pp.1–3. Also see Namık Kemal, 'Maarif', *İbret*, no.16, 28 Rebî'ülâhir 1289-22 Haziran 1288 [1872]; idem, 'Medeniyet', *İbret*, no.84, 2 Zilka'de 1289-20 Kanun-ı Evvel 1288 [1873]; idem, 'Tiyatro', *İbret*, no.127, 2 Safer 1290-19 Mart 1289 [1873]; idem, 'İnşaat-ı Umumiye', *İbret*, no.115, 14 Muharrem 1290-1 Mart 1288 [1873].
 7. It is worth noting that the 'Islamic roots' of the Young Ottoman and the Young Turk movements is a significant exception of this situation. A good deal of research has been done on the importance of Islam in the Young Ottoman and the Young Turk thought, as an important means of legitimation. For instance, see Butrus Abu-Manneh, 'The Porte and the Sunni-Orthodox Trend in the Later Tanzimat Period', in *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826–1876)* (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2001), pp.125–40; Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, pp.81–106.
 8. Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.7.
 9. For some examples, see Roderic H. Davison, 'Environmental and Foreign Contributions: Turkey', in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp.91–116; S.N. Eisenstadt, 'The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Perspective', in Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun (eds.), *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State* (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1981), pp.127–42; Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965); William Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey* (London: Croom Helm, 1981); Jacob M. Landau (ed.), *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 1984); Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*; Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*; Metin Heper, 'Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with Special Reference to the 19th Century', *International Political Science Review*, Vol.1, no.1 (1980), pp.81–105; Kemal H. Karpat, 'Structural Change, Historical Stages of Modernization, and the Role of Social Groups in Turkish Politics', in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis* (Leiden: Brill, 1973), pp.11–92; idem, 'The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.3, no.3 (1972), pp.243–81.
 10. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (eds.), *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp.3–4. Also see Aykut Kansu, *1908 Devrimi*, trans. Ayda Erbal, 4th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), pp.9–22.
 11. For some examples, see Joyce Appleby, 'Modernization Theory and the Formation of Modern Social Theories in England and America', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.20, no.2 (1978), pp.259–85; Anthony Smith, *The Concept of Social Change* (London: Routledge, 1973); Alejandro Portes, 'Modernity and Development: A Critique', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol.8, no.3 (1973), pp.247–79; Dean J. Tipps, 'Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.15, no.2 (1973), pp.199–226.
 12. Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), pp.9–10.
 13. *Ibid.*, pp.71–2.
 14. *Ibid.*, pp.64–5.
 15. See Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics* (Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1984); idem, 'The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683–1703: A Preliminary Report', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol.94, no.4 (1974), pp.438–47;

- Gabriel Piterberg, *An Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Cemal Kafadar, 'Janissaries and Other Riffraff of Ottoman İstanbul: Rebels Without a Cause?', in Baki Tezcan and Karl K. Barbir (eds.), *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World: A Volume of Essays in Honor of Norman Itzkowitz* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), pp.113–34; Rhoads Murphey, 'Continuity and Discontinuity in Ottoman Administrative Theory and Practice During the Late Seventeenth Century', *Poetics Today, Cultural Processes in Muslim and Arab Societies: Medieval and Early Modern Periods*, Vol.14, no.2 (1993), pp.419–43; Leslie P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Carter Vaughn Findley, 'Political Culture and the Great Households', in Suraiya N. Faroqi (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol. 3: The Later Ottoman Empire 1603–1839* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.65–80.
16. Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, p.80; idem, 'The Politics of Early Modern Ottoman Historiography', in Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (eds.), *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.170 and 187.
 17. Tülay Artan, 'From Charismatic Leadership to Collective Rule: Introducing Materials on the Wealth and Power of Ottoman Princesses in the Eighteenth Century', *Dünü ve Bugünüyle Toplum ve Ekonomi*, no.4 (Nisan 1993), pp.53–93.
 18. Findley, 'Political Culture and the Great Households', pp.66–7.
 19. Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, p.44.
 20. Findley, 'Political Culture and the Great Households', p.67.
 21. Bedri Mermutlu, *Sosyal Düşünce Tarihimizde Şinasi* (İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2003), p.319.
 22. For instance, see Şinasi, *Müntahabât-ı Eş'âr*, Süheyl Beken (ed.) (Ankara: Dün-Bugün Yayınevi, 1960), 26, pp.28–9.
 23. Erdem Sönmez, *Ahmed Rıza: Bir Jön Türk Liderinin Siyasi-Entelektüel Portresi* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012), pp.36–7.
 24. Şinasi, *Müntahabât-ı Eş'âr*, p.29.
 25. Butrus Abu-Manneh, 'The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript', in *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826–1876)*, p.78.
 26. Şinasi, *Müntahabât-ı Eş'âr*, pp.26 and 29.
 27. Ibid., p.24.
 28. Ibid., p.29.
 29. For instance see Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 8th ed. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2010), p.188.
 30. Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, 9th ed. (İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 2010), p.66.
 31. Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, pp.271–2.
 32. Baki Tezcan, "'Genç" Osman Neden Tahttan İndirildi? Osmanlı Tarih Yazımında Bir Yolculuk', in Jane Hathaway (ed.), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda İsyân ve Ayaklanma*, trans. Deniz Berktaş (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınları, 2007), p.76.
 33. Tezcan, 'The Politics of Early Modern Ottoman Historiography', p.172.
 34. Tezcan, "'Genç" Osman Neden Tahttan İndirildi?', pp.50 and 77.
 35. Quoted in ibid., p.77.
 36. Mehmet Öz, *Kanun-ı Kadîmin Peşinde: Osmanlı'da 'Çözülme' ve Gelenekçi Yorumları (XVI. Yüzyıldan XVIII. Yüzyılın Başlarına)*, 4th ed. (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2010), p.124.
 37. Tezcan, "'Genç" Osman Neden Tahttan İndirildi?', pp.61–2. Also see Öz, *Kanun-ı Kadîmin Peşinde*, p.108.
 38. Şinasi, 'Mukaddime', *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl*, no.1, 6 Rebi'ülâhîr-9 Teşrin-i Evvel 1277, p.1.
 39. See Şinasi, 'Mukaddime', *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, no.1, 30 Zilhicce-15 Haziran 1278 [1862], p.1.
 40. Karpāt, *The Politicization of Islam*, p.119.
 41. Ibid., p.119.
 42. Şerif Mardin, '19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı'da Kamusal Kimlik İnşası Üzerine Bazı Değerlendirmeler', in *Türkiye, İslam ve Sekülerizm*, trans. Elçin Gen and Murat Bozluolcay (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), pp.18–19. Also see Riedler, *Opposition and Legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire*, pp.27–8.
 43. Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, pp.254 and 262.

44. Mermutlu, *Sosyal Düşünce Tarihimizde Şinasi*, pp.55–6.
45. Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p.366.
46. Namık Kemal, 'Efkâr-ı Umumiye', *İbret*, no.40, 26 Şaban 1289-16 Teşrin-i Evvel 1288 [1872], p.1.
47. *Ibid.*, pp.1–2.
48. *Ibid.*, p.2.
49. Namık Kemal, 'Rumeli Demiryolunun Akdeniz'le Olan Münasebatına Dair Bazı Mütalaat', *İbret*, no.49, 8 Ramazan 1289-28 Teşrin-i Evvel 1288 [1872], p.1.
50. Namık Kemal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Vol.1 (İstanbul: 1326), p.104.
51. Namık Kemal, 'Tanzimat', *İbret*, no.46, 4 Ramazan 1289-24 Teşrin-i Evvel 1288 [1872], p.1.
52. Namık Kemal, 'İslahat-ı Dâhiliye', *İbret*, no.48, 6 Ramazan 1289-26 Teşrin-i Evvel 1288 [1872], p.1.
53. Namık Kemal, 'Vilâyât', *İbret*, no.47, 5 Ramazan 1289-25 Teşrin-i Evvel 1288 [1872], p.1.
54. Namık Kemal, 'Tanzimat', p.1.
55. Namık Kemal, 'Sebeb-i Kaht-ı Rical', *İbret*, no.38, 22 Şaban 1289-12 Teşrin-i Evvel 1288 [1872], p.1.
56. Namık Kemal, 'Sadaret', *Hürriyet*, no.36, 17 Zilka'de 1285-1 Mart 1869, p.2.
57. Namık Kemal, 'Sadaret', p.2.
58. Namık Kemal, 'Mülâhazat', *Hürriyet*, no.23, 13 Şaban 1285-30 Teşrin-i Sâni 1868, p.4.
59. Namık Kemal, 'Hasta Adam', *Hürriyet*, no.24, 23 Şaban 1285-7 Kanun-i Evvel 1868, p.2.
60. For some examples see Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 108; idem, 'Âli Paşa ve Hürriyet', in *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, 18th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011), p.268; idem, 'Yeni Osmanlıların Hakiki Hüviyeti', in *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, p.276.
61. Namık Kemal, 'Hasta Adam', p.2.
62. Namık Kemal, 'Ve Şavirhum fi'l-emr', *Hürriyet*, no.4, 30 Rebi'ülâhir 1285-20 Temmuz 1868, p.1.
63. Quoted in Tunaya, *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri*, p.57.
64. N[amık] K[emal], 'Meclis-i Umumi', *İttihad*, no.76, 12 Teşrin-i Evvel 1292-6 Şevval 1293 [1876], p.1.
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