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The Relation between Socioeconomic Development and Democratization in Contemporary Turkey

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ABSTRACT This article investigates the relation between socioeconomic development and democratization in contemporary Turkey with reference to modernization theory. Based on studies showing that there is a positive correlation between socioeconomic modernization and democratization, it is argued that the relatively increased level of socioeconomic modernization in contemporary Turkey has created a more conducive environment for further democratization and democratic consolidation. In this regard, Turkey's GDP per capita, income distribution (Gini coefficient), level of industrialization and urbanization, educational attainment, and human development index (HDI) are analyzed in terms of their influence on democratization. Taking into account Turkey's increased level of socioeconomic development, EU-based reforms, and recent Freedom House ratings, it is argued that Turkey could be getting closer to democratic consolidation.

The founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, characterized Turkey's goal as attaining the level of contemporary (Western) civilization and even surpassing it.¹ Contemporary civilization in his understanding implied material, sociocultural, and political modernization. As of 2010, the question as to how close Turkey is to the goal of catching up with contemporary civilization in terms of development and democracy is a politically relevant and important issue that will be discussed with reference to modernization theory. According to modernization theory, socioeconomic development facilitates democratization. In this regard, recent improvements in Turkey's socioeconomic modernization signal a positive development and will be put under scrutiny in relation to democratization.

Regarding Turkey's level of socioeconomic and political modernization, Turkey is a candidate country for EU membership, and its economy and democracy are approaching a level of certain maturity. Turkey is the world's seventeenth largest economy with a GDP (nominal) per capita that has surpassed \$10,000,² and through democratization reforms and relative civilianization, Turkish democracy is at a point where democratic consolidation seems within reach more than ever before.³ There

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are, however, some factors which could hinder democracy's consolidation in Turkey, such as the government's ambivalent attitude toward democratization, its rising authoritarianism,⁴ political polarization,⁵ problems concerning the Kurdish issue, the politicization of the judiciary,⁶ and the military's continuing influence in politics. However, at the macro level, certain sociopolitical trends can be observed that signal that democracy in Turkey is approaching a situation in which military coups become much less likely. The most solid factor leading to such a positive expectation for Turkish democracy is that Turkey today has a relatively large and effective middle class that takes democratic representation seriously, resists anti-democratic attempts, and views democracy as the only legitimate political system.⁷ While anti-democratic groups and parties are neither minor nor ineffective in Turkey, it is becoming increasingly more difficult for these groups to reverse democratization, thanks to the EU process, the existence of plurality in the media, and the military's relatively more moderate and pro-democratic stance.⁸

While discussing the issue of democratic consolidation in Turkey, it would be appropriate to develop a more systematic and theoretical framework. First of all, liberal democracy as a political regime does not emerge in a void but rather in places where a sufficient level of capital accumulation, urbanization, communications technology, a relatively high literacy, and human development are in place. Without the improvements in these fields and the development of a sufficiently large middle class, it can be argued that there would be little demand for democratic representation. However, if a developed middle class does exist, it is quite difficult for the political elite to suppress democratic demands for too long. In this regard, the increase in democratic demands and support for democratic regime in Turkey could possibly be linked to the increasing level of socioeconomic development and the emergence of a larger pro-democratic middle class. The connection between development and democracy, in this regard, is a crucial and central issue that needs to be addressed. This article, therefore, applies modernization theory to Turkey and Turkish democracy and makes two main contributions: it applies modernization theory to Turkey using recent data and information, and sheds light upon the relation between development and democratization; it also analyzes the possible reasons for the fluctuations in Turkey's democracy ratings over the last few decades (as reported by Freedom House) and presents comments on Turkey's increased chances for democratic consolidation.

Modernization Theory and Democratization

Modernization theory originates from Seymour Martin Lipset's article, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," which appeared in 1959 in *American Political Science Review*.⁹ Lipset showed that there is a positive correlation between development and democracy. In a subsequent study, Lipset stated that "democracy is related to the state of economic development" and that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy."¹⁰ Lipset reached these conclusions by classifying countries

into two groups—the first comprising European countries, North America, Australia, and New Zealand, and the second being those from Latin America—according to their regime types as stable democracies, unstable democracies, unstable dictatorships, or stable dictatorships. In order to find if there were any significant socioeconomic differences among countries having different regime types, Lipset investigated the level of socioeconomic development among the countries within each regional group. Eventually, he discovered that the more democratic countries within both groups had dramatically higher levels of socioeconomic development. That is, they had higher levels of wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and literacy when compared to their less democratic counterparts. Lipset found that the more democratic countries had a greater per capita income, a greater number of radios, telephones, and newspapers per thousand persons, and fewer people per motor vehicle and physician.¹¹ Lipset thus concluded that economic development is the “single most important predictor of political democracy when controlling for other variables.”¹² This conclusion constitutes the gist of what is called modernization theory.

Several other scholars have empirically investigated the relation between development and democracy, and they have consistently found a high positive correlation between the two.¹³ On the other hand, Lipset’s modernization theory and its political economy has been challenged by authors who put more emphasis on human agency and elite settlements in explaining democratization, such as Dankwart Rustow,¹⁴ and some scholars such as world systems theorists and dependency theorists who argued that the “core countries” had a benefit in keeping the “dependent countries” undemocratic and unresponsive to popular demands to keep low wages in these dependent economies upon which the wealth of the core countries rested. This criticism expressed by authors such as Samir Amin has found resonance among radical left groups.¹⁵

Among authors who investigated the relation between macro factors and democratization, various scholars found supportive empirical evidence for Lipset’s arguments. For example, Coleman conducted a study of 75 countries in which he clustered them into three categories—competitive, semi-competitive, and authoritarian—and found that “countries with competitive regimes had the highest levels of development, semi-competitive countries the next highest, and authoritarian countries the lowest.”¹⁶ Olsen found that an index of 14 socioeconomic factors had a 0.83 correlation with an index of political development/democracy, and the correlation between the socioeconomic variables and Cutright’s democracy index was 0.84.¹⁷ It can be said that such evidence strengthens the validity of Lipset’s arguments concerning the relation between development and democracy.

It is argued by various authors that higher socioeconomic development leads to a larger middle class and increases the demands for further political representation, participation, contestation,¹⁸ and demand for accountability of the political realm among the middle class.¹⁹ It is argued that the middle classes serve as a control mechanism against authoritarian tendencies within the polity.²⁰ The presence of intermediary organizations, which is probably the result of a certain level of wealth, is depicted as another critical factor by Lipset, since such organizations, by

increasing participation, play a countervailing role towards authoritarian tendencies.²¹ Evaluating and commenting on Lipset's argument as to how and through which mechanisms development fosters democracy, Diamond concluded that a careful reading of Lipset's arguments reveals that economic development promotes democracy only by "effecting changes in political culture and social structure."²² This explanation seems to be sound when explaining the relation between development and democracy.

Per Capita Income

Lipset concluded that economic growth and increase in income engender a culture of democracy and provide the foundations for democratic institutions. As to why income is important for democracy, Lipset argued that increased wealth reduces the overall level of objective inequality, weakening status distinctions, and increasing the size of the middle class.²³ Lipset also argued that in order for a gradualist and democratic regime type to emerge, an increase in average income is crucial.²⁴ Similarly, Diamond argued that

better socio-economic conditions generate the circumstances and skills that permit effective and autonomous participation...[and] when most of the population is literate, decently fed and sheltered, and otherwise assured of minimal material needs, class tensions and radical political orientations tend to diminish.²⁵

Diamond found that liberal democracies are seen almost exclusively among high income and upper-middle income countries, while closed regimes are seen among low-income countries.²⁶ Within the middle range, he observed that partially open countries are mostly seen among lower-middle income countries and sometimes among upper-middle income countries. Overall, Diamond concluded that there is a high correlation between economic development and democracy. Diamond investigated the statistical relation between a country's income level and democratic rating according to Freedom House. He tested the data for statistical significance with two forms of the chi-square test, both of which showed the association to be "highly significant at the 0.0001 level."²⁷

As to why a low level of wealth and income could hinder the necessary institutions for democracy, Diamond noted that in poor countries, favoritism and nepotism undermine the possibility of a well-functioning bureaucracy, which is necessary for a democracy.²⁸ It can be argued that increasing levels of wealth might be functional for establishing a well-functioning democracy. Similarly, Barro noted that "increases in various measures of the standard of living forecast a gradual rise in democracy" and that "democracies that arise without prior economic development tend not to last."²⁹ It seems that the positive relation between income and democracy applies except for cases such as Germany, India, and some oil-rich Arab countries.³⁰

The relation between development and democracy, Diamond noted, is not unilinear,

but in recent decades has more closely resembled an “N-curve”—increasing the chances for democracy among poor and perhaps lower-middle income countries, neutralizing or even inverting to a negative effect at some middle range of development and industrialization, and then increasing again to the point where democracy becomes extremely likely above a certain high level economic development (roughly represented by a per capita income of \$6000 in current US dollars (year 1992)).³¹

Although there are a few democracies in the world such as India or Mongolia that have an income per capita of between \$1000 and \$2000, it is observed that most democracies have an income per capita over \$5000–6000. Whether there exists a certain threshold concerning the relation between income and democracy, Przeworski noted that “no democracy ever, including the period before World War II, fell in a country with a per capita income higher than that of Argentina in 1975, \$6,055.”³²

Income Distribution

The number of studies concerning the relation between income distribution and democracy are limited in number; however, there are a few well-conducted and methodologically sound studies that indicate a positive correlation between economic equality and democratic survival.³³ Regarding the relation between income distribution and democracy, Przeworski notes:

Democracies are more likely to survive when the Gini coefficient or the ratio of incomes of top-to-bottom-quintile are lower. Data concerning functional distribution are more extensive and they show the same: democracy is four times more likely to survive in countries in which the labour share of value added in manufacturing is greater than 25 percent.³⁴

Przeworski *et al.* conclude that “democracy is much more likely to survive in countries where income inequality is declining over time.”³⁵ These authors found that “the expected life of democracy in countries with shrinking inequality is about 84 years, while the expected life of democracies with rising income inequality is about 22 years.” (These numbers refer to the aggregate lifespan of democracies with rising and declining inequality among 135 countries over 40 years.) In a similar way, Boix and Garicano, based on their empirical investigation, concluded that “economic equality and capital mobility promote democracy... By contrast, at higher levels of both inequality specificity [of capital], authoritarian regimes prevail.”³⁶

Regarding the reason why better distribution of income is important for democracy and the flourishing of democratic attitudes, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs wrote:

It is only when individuals break out of poverty that they begin to demand a role in and provide support for democracy. Thus, the removal of mass poverty is essential to inculcate within the population the attitudes and behaviours that are supportive of democracy. Economic growth “leads to an increase in the number of individuals with sufficient time, education, and money to get involved in politics.”³⁷

Lipset argued that reducing poverty is critical for securing the basis of democracy and for equalizing the subjective perception of honor and equality of some citizens in the eyes of other citizens. On this issue, he wrote:

The poorer a country, and the lower the absolute standard of living of the lower classes, the greater the pressure on the upper strata to treat the lower classes as beyond the pale of human society, as vulgar, as innately inferior, as a lower caste.³⁸

Chong argued the relationship between inequality and democracy might be a non-monotonic relationship and argued that “poor and highly unequal countries are the ones where such a link [between inequality and democracy] tends to be positive” and that “relatively equal countries are the ones where such a link tends to be negative.”³⁹ Taking into consideration these studies together, although one needs to be cautious about the relationship between equality and democracy, it seems that there could be a positive relation between the two. The possibility of mutual causation needs to be also considered, since the two variables might well feed each other.

Industrialization and Urbanization

Industrialization can be measured by the percentage of employed people in industry compared to agriculture and the per capita commercially produced “energy” used in the country. Lipset noted that the average percentage of employed people working in agriculture and related occupations was lower for more democratic European countries and higher for less democratic and dictatorial Latin American countries.⁴⁰ The differences in per capita energy employed in the country, Lipset noted, are also equally large. Such large differences denote differences in terms of historical development in terms of industrialization. Cutright found the correlation between industrialization and democratic stability to be 0.72.⁴¹

Urbanization, which is a natural result of industrialization, is also a crucial factor in terms of democracy. Harold J. Laski asserted that organized democracy is the product of urban life.⁴² The argument that urbanization is directly linked to democracy is best depicted by Lerner, who argued that democratic participation is the end result of an evolutionary historical process, the initial stage of which is urbanization, the second stage literacy and media participation, and the third stage political participation.⁴³ Concerning this sequence of evolutionary development, Lerner put forth his argument as follows:

Society appears to involve a regular sequence of three phases. *Urbanization* comes first, for cities alone have developed the complex of skills and resources which characterise the modern industrial economy. Within this urban matrix develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases, literacy and media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, for the literate develop the media, which in turn spread literacy. But, historically, *literacy* performs the key function in the second phase. The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform the varied tasks required in the modernizing society. Not until the third phase, when the elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce *newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale*. This, in turn, accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of *participation (e.g., voting)* which we find in all advanced modern societies. For countries in transition today, these high correlation's suggest that literacy and media participation may be considered as a supply-and-demand reciprocal in a communication market whose locus, at least in its historical inception, can only be urban.⁴⁴

A study supporting Lerner's argument was done by Cutright, who found that the correlation between urbanization and democracy is 0.69.⁴⁵ This shows that the relation between urbanization and democracy is a strong one.

Education

James Bryce argued that if education does not make people good citizens, it makes it at least easier for them to become so.⁴⁶ Almond and Verba concluded that education "had the most important demographic effect on political attitudes."⁴⁷ Lipset argued that "through better education, citizens come to value democracy more and to manifest a more tolerant, moderate, restrained, and rational style with respect to politics and political opposition."⁴⁸ Many authors have found that there is a positive correlation between education and democracy. Cutright found that the correlation between education and democracy is 0.74. In terms of the relation between education, democracy, and democratic values, Lipset noted that "the most important single factor differentiating those giving democratic responses from others has been education. The higher one's education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support democratic practices."⁴⁹ Winham found that there is even a causal relationship among education, communication, and democracy.⁵⁰ Lipset argued that education leads to more moderate and democratic citizens, stating:

Education presumably broadens man's outlook, enables him to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains him from adhering to extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity to make rational electoral choices.... The higher one's education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support democratic practices.... If we cannot say that a "high" level of

education is a sufficient condition for democracy, the available evidence suggests that it comes close to being a necessary one.⁵¹

Concerning the issue of how education leads to further democracy, an intermediary mechanism, communication media, is put forth by authors. Diamond argues that “education...stimulates the expansion of communication media, which then has a large effect on democratization.”⁵² Similarly, Inkeles found that education and exposure to mass media create an active and participatory citizenry, which is critical for the emergence and proper functioning of democracy.⁵³ It can be argued that literacy is the most important component of education in relation to democracy. Lipset pointed out that according to his data set “the more democratic countries of Europe are almost entirely literate: The lowest has a rate of 96 percent, while the less democratic nations have a literacy rate 85 percent. In Latin America, the difference is between an average rate of 74 percent for the less dictatorial countries and 46 percent for the more dictatorial.”⁵⁴ The numbers Lipset mentions concerning literacy have changed since then, but the relation he points out still more or less applies today. Literacy in relatively more democratic countries such as Argentina (97.2 percent), Chile (95.2 percent), and Brazil (88.6 percent) are higher than in Guatemala (69.1 percent), Honduras (80.0 percent), and Bolivia (86.7 percent), which are less democratic today.⁵⁵

Human Development

Human development consists not only of economic development but also of social and cultural development. The UN measures human development by the human development index (HDI), which is composed using three main criteria: income, educational attainment, and life expectancy. The HDI was created in 1990 and is widely used by social scientists to assess a country’s level of socioeconomic development. The HDI has a maximum rating scale of 100; a HDI of 80–100 denotes “high human development,” 50–79 denotes “middle human development,” and HDI between 0–49 denotes “low human development.”⁵⁶

In regard to the relation between human development and democracy, Diamond notes that the HDI is a better predictor of a country’s level of democracy than the GNP per se. He found that while there is 0.51 correlation between the GNP and the index of political freedom, there exists a considerably higher correlation between the HDI and the Freedom House index, which is 0.71.⁵⁷ Thus, it is reasonable to say that a country’s human development is highly correlated with freedom and democracy. The reason for such a high positive correlation might be explained by the fact that high human development may form some basis for higher social capital and generally more civilized conditions, which might be more conducive for democracy.

Modernization Theory and the Case of Turkish Democracy

Turkey’s socioeconomic and political data expose a particularly interesting case. Different components of socioeconomic modernization in Turkey are approaching

the threshold of “high” values that lead one to think that Turkey might be on the verge of experiencing a leap in terms of socioeconomic and democratic development. Although there exists no linear relationship between development and democracy, from a probabilistic point of view socioeconomic development in Turkey seems to be promising in terms of democratic survival. Bringing together some of the pivotal developmental factors mentioned above as well as the Freedom House ratings, it can be seen that Turkey is quite close to meeting the minimal official requisites for becoming a country with a “high” GNI (gross national income) per capita)⁵⁸; relatively lower inequality of income (possibly a “low-middle” Gini coefficient)⁵⁹; “high” HDI; and a “free” rating in the Freedom House report.

The implications of the factors shown in Table 1 as well as of other relevant socioeconomic factors are discussed throughout the next pages. Turkey’s socioeconomic factors are thus evaluated in terms of their effect on democratization in Turkey.

Per Capita Income

As mentioned above with reference to Przeworski, in no country that has surpassed an income per capita of \$6,055 has democracy ever fallen. Although it is not easy to establish a definite income level to be necessary or sufficient for democratic consolidation, Turkey’s 2008 income level today seems to be at a level conducive to democratic survival. Turkish GDP has surpassed \$10,000, and Turkey could soon reach the level of “high income country” despite decreasing growth. Turkey’s income gives it an advantage for further democratization and democratic consolidation when one takes into consideration that there is high correlation (0.51) between income and democracy. Turkey’s income level is close to the income level of Eastern European and Latin American countries that have recently experienced democratic consolidation, such as Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina.⁶⁰

Income Distribution


The Turkish Statistical Institute reported that there has been some improvement in Turkey’s income distribution (Gini coefficient) in recent years. Below is presented a simple illustration of the Gini coefficient and its general manner of usage, some

Table 1. Turkey’s Socioeconomic and Political Ratings

	GNI per capita	Gini Coefficient	HDI	Freedom Rating
Threshold	High ≥ \$11,906 (World Bank)	Low ≤ 0.30	High ≥ 80 (UN)	Free ≤ 2.5 (Freedom House)
Turkey	\$9,340 (2008)	0.38 (2005)	79.98 (2008)	3.0 (2008)

Sources: Turkey’s GDP per capita and Gini coefficient values are taken from www.tuik.gov.tr, and HDI values taken from www.undp.org.

Table 2. Gini Coefficients



The Gini coefficients:

- Brazil: 0.57
- Mexico: 0.46
- Russia: 0.39
- Portugal: 0.38
- UK: 0.34
- Denmark: 0.24

Source: *United Nations Human Development Report, 2007–2008*, www.undp.org.

Turkey’s Gini Coefficient, 1987–2005

Year	Gini coeff.
1987	0.44
1994	0.49
2002	0.43
2004	0.40
2005	0.38

countries’ Gini coefficient in order to paint a general picture, and a table of Turkey’s Gini values.

As Table 2 shows, the inequality of income in Turkey increased during 1987–1994 and decreased during 1994–2005. Turkey’s Gini coefficient in 2005 indicates a medium level.⁶¹ It seems that as long as amelioration in distribution of income continues for some time, Turkey’s Gini coefficient in the coming years might become closer to low-medium values (such as 0.30–0.35). This would be important in terms of achieving a larger middle class and a more substantive and popular democracy in Turkey. Turkey’s income distribution, although not totally satisfactory yet, could become better and more conducive for a more popular and participatory democracy if the amelioration in income distribution continues without any interruption in the coming years. The Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP*), a conservative party in government, has a relatively limited vision of “social justice” due to its neoliberal priorities, and it is dubious as to whether the AKP would have the intention to decrease Turkey’s income inequality to as low as 0.30, which would be normally be expected from a social liberal or a social democratic party.

Industrialization and Urbanization

Turkey started industrialization in the late nineteenth century and experienced a high level of industrialization, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. As of 2010, Turkey is considered a NIC (newly industrialized country) along with Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, China, India, Thailand, and the Philippines.⁶² Turkey has a relatively developed bourgeoisie, which is predominantly pro-democratic. It is observed that globalization, increasing capital, and better technical education increase industrialization in Turkey. As a result, Turkey has become an “emerging market” in the global economy. It can be argued that Turkey’s relatively developed industry and market economy are advantages for democratization.⁶³

It has been reported that urbanization in contemporary Turkey, parallel to increased industrialization, was 75 percent as of 2008.⁶⁴ The level of urbanization in developed countries varies from 65 to 90 depending on geographical and demographic factors.⁶⁵ It is observed that Turkey’s level of urbanization is roughly within the range of “developed” countries, though on the lower end. Turkey’s level of urbanization increased especially since the 1970s and continues to increase. The increase in the level of urbanization, a result of migration, has created certain urban problems, such as poverty and crime. On the other hand, increased urbanization has created greater opportunities for literacy and education, social mobility, and political representation, which altogether increase the chances for further democratization.

Education

A widely used index for measuring educational attainment is the UN’s education index, which is one of the three components of human development index. The education index is formed as a composite of two factors: literacy rate and gross enrollment rate. The index has a maximum of 100. In terms of the first component of the education index (i.e. the literacy rate), Turkey has made a great deal of improvement in recent decades. The rate of literacy in Turkey was approximately nine percent in 1923, when the Turkish Republic was founded; it was 88.1 percent as of 2008 (and will likely exceed 90 percent in 2011).⁶⁶ Turkey’s gross enrollment rate was 71.1 percent in 2006.⁶⁷ The education index was 82.4 in 2008, which is considered to be in the “high” category by UN standards.⁶⁸ As a result, considering the high correlation between education and democracy, Turkey’s relatively increased rate of literacy and gross enrollment rate are important assets for further democratization in Turkey.

Human Development

Turkey’s human development index was 79.98 in 2008. To compare, the HDI of Norway was 96.8, the United States 95.0, Portugal 90.0, Mexico 84.2, Brazil 80.7, the Philippines 74.5, Honduras 71.4, South Africa 67.0, India 60.9, Pakistan 56.2, Tanzania 50.3, Rwanda 43.5, Niger 37.0, and Sierra Leone 32.9. Turkey’s HDI according to UN criteria is at the verge of high HDI (80.00) and will most likely

exceed the threshold which will be reflected in the 2009 report (to be published in October 2009). Turkey will thus be considered in the category of “developed countries” for the first time by the UN.⁶⁹ Turkey’s being at the verge of a “high” HDI in this regard is an important and promising factor for democratization, when the 0.71 correlation between HDI and the Freedom House score of a country is considered.

Turkey’s Freedom House Ratings over the Years

Taking into account the fact that Turkey’s level of income per capita, income distribution, and human development index are close to certain threshold values, further democratization could be expected. In fact, this expectation seems to be supported by both Turkey’s meeting the Copenhagen political criteria already as well as Turkey’s relatively satisfactory Freedom House scores. Turkey’s Freedom House rating in 2008, as shown in Table 1, was 3.0, which implies a “semi-free” regime, one that is approaching the “free” category. Freedom House is a US-based non-governmental organization that publishes reports every year on the condition of freedom and democracy in various countries around the world and rates the countries on a composite score from 1 to 7. The composite score is actually constructed by two factors, civil liberties and political liberties. Both political and civil liberties are evaluated by an index from 1 to 7 (1 denotes most free, and 7 denotes most authoritarian), and combining these two indices, a single composite index is created by the arithmetic average of the two indices. This index is used to evaluate whether a country would be considered either “free,” “partly free,” or “non-free.” A composite index from 1.00–2.50 is defined by Freedom House as free, 2.50–5.00 as partly free, and 5.50–7.00 as non-free. Such numerical representations might be methodologically disputed; however, they can somehow offer a general idea about the comparative situation of freedom and democracy in a country.

In order to provide an account of Turkey’s scores over the years, and in order to be able to make comments on Turkey’s chances of democratic consolidation in the coming years, the yearly performance of Turkey during 1972–2008 is shown in Table 3 and Figure 1.

Figure 1 shows that Turkey achieved “free” ratings during the 1974–79 period (a rating of 2.5) despite the fact that there was political terror in those years.⁷⁰ However, it is observed that the 1980 coup decreased this score to “partly free” (5.0). It is a generally admitted fact that the military junta caused significant authoritarianization in Turkey during 1980–83. However, the country made a re-transition to democracy in 1983, after which some relative civilianization took place in the

Table 3. Democratization and Authoritarianization: Freedom House Scale

1.0	1.5	2.0	2.5	3.0	3.5	4.0	4.5	5.0	5.5	6.0	6.5	7.0
Free	Free	Free	Free	Partly Free	Non-Free	Non-Free	Non-Free	Non-Free				



Figure 1. Turkey’s Freedom Ratings over the Years, Published by Freedom House.
 Source: See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAAllScores.xls>.

country. During 1983–92, Turkey experienced a significant civilianization and democratization (reaching a rating of 3.0 during 1986–92). However, in the aftermath of this relatively free period, Turkey experienced another wave of authoritarianization during 1992–2001, and its rating worsened to values around 4.5.

Possible Reasons for the Fluctuations in Turkey’s Freedom Ratings: Income Threshold, Market Development, and EU-Turkey Relations

As to why there have been fluctuations in Turkey’s freedom ratings over the years and why Turkey could not consolidate its democracy in the 1970s or in the 1990s despite favorable conditions, it can be argued that Turkey’s level of income per capita in those years was still below a certain threshold. Therefore, despite relatively high freedom ratings, democracy could not be consolidated then. However, it can be reasonably argued that Turkey today has surpassed a certain level of income and development, and therefore could be in a more advantageous position in terms of democratic survival. This argument has the advantage of relying on evidence from all the existing democracies since 1975 that have survived after surpassing the income threshold of \$6,055.⁷¹ It can be argued that surpassing a certain threshold of income could be critical in solving many social and political problems in Turkey, including the Kurdish issue, which is predominantly a result of socioeconomic underdevelopment as well as deficiencies in Turkey’s practice of liberal norms.⁷²

Institutionalization is another critical issue that needs to be mentioned in terms of explaining the problems of liberalization and democratization in Turkey. Demet Yalçın Mousseau argues that weak market development has been the underlying reason as to why individual rights and civil liberties have not become rooted in Turkey.⁷³ She asserts that a mass market based on equality and rule of law has not been institutionalized in Turkey, and instead of this, rent-seeking and clientelism through state mechanisms and political parties have been widespread. Mousseau claims that if Turkey can foster a more institutionalized market economy, this will lead to a more institutionalized democracy, which then would allow for more civil rights and liberties. Concerning this issue, she wrote:

A liberal political culture that respects individual rights may be connected to the development of an economy where most are dependent on the market rather than in-groups for their livelihood and a regulatory state that enforces the rule of law impartially.⁷⁴

Mousseau contrasts South Korea with Turkey and argues that South Korea pulled ahead of Turkey in terms of democratization by virtue of “creating regulated markets with egalitarian policies for the creation of a modern, broad-based mass market economy.”⁷⁵ Mousseau argues that Turkey has a chance to follow the same path as South Korea for further democratization and a more liberal political regime. This liberal institutionalist approach may possibly be complimentary in its implications for the argument in this paper: a better institutionalized market economy can lead to higher and more equally distributed income, which can in the longer run enhance democratic survival.⁷⁶ It can be argued that the market economy in Turkey has started to become more institutionalized and better regulated following the 2001 economic crisis. Income distribution has also been relatively improved since then, and all these factors seem to be advantages for the institutionalization of the market economy, as well as the institutionalization of a more liberal and democratic regime in Turkey.

Another critical factor that needs to be mentioned in regard to explaining the failure of democratic consolidation in the 1980s and 1990s is the EU factor. Turkey’s lack of EU support from 1986 to 1992 might have been a critical factor as to why Turkey was not able to make a leap from 3.0 (partly free) to 2.5 (free). Here, it should be mentioned that the EU has a two-fold effect on Turkey’s democracy, which probably enhance each other mutually. First, the EU exerts direct political influence on Turkish democratization by encouraging democratic reforms, which leads to further democratization and also liberalization.⁷⁷ Additionally, EU-based socioeconomic reforms in Turkey lead to further socioeconomic development, which facilitates further democratization. Regarding the EU factor in relation to Turkish democratization, the EU’s influence might be similar to the EU’s influence on the early stages of Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish democratization.

Turkey’s EU-related harmonization process, along with other facilitative factors, has enabled the country to sustain a rating of 3.0 during 2004–08. This relatively

successful rating is also in line with the fact that Turkey sufficiently met the Copenhagen political criteria as of December 2004. It should be mentioned that Turkey's rating in 2008, which was 3.0, is merely a half-point away from 2.5. That is to say, taking into account the 2008 score, Turkey is quite close to the threshold of obtaining a "free" score. Taking into account that Turkey was close to the threshold of a "free" rating from 2004–07, authoritarian and illiberal backlashes were an imminent possibility that actually came to pass in 2007 and 2008 through events such as the military's e-memorandum on April 27, 2007, against Abdullah Gül's presidential candidacy,⁷⁸ and party banning cases against the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP), a pro-Kurdish party alleged to be separatist, which is still continuing; and against the AKP, which is alleged to be anti-secular, which eventually ended up avoiding a ban.⁷⁹

It can be argued that such anti-liberal events might be evaluated as being some of the transitional hurdles Turkey faces in trying to make a transition from what Schedler calls an "electoral democracy" to a "liberal democracy,"⁸⁰ or a transition from what O'Donnell calls a "democratic government" to a "democratic regime."⁸¹ In this transitional process to a fully democratic regime, the creation of a civil constitution would be especially critical. The AKP government actually attempted to have a civil and liberal constitutional draft prepared by a commission of prominent law professors but has not been able to publicly legitimize it or bring it to parliament. However, if it can succeed in passing such a constitution in the coming months or years with the support of major opposition parties and civil societal organizations, it will be quite critical for political modernization in Turkey. It can even be argued that such a civil and more liberal constitution can safely move Turkey to a "free" rating on the Freedom House scale.

Conclusion

If Turkey continues political and socioeconomic modernization in the years ahead, especially in terms of economy, education, and human development, and also carries out the necessary political reforms such as passing a civil constitution, Turkey might possibly find itself in a position to experience further democratization and even consolidate its democracy. In this regard, the EU would be quite important for Turkey, which could mutually enhance socioeconomic modernization and political modernization. Provided that the EU develops fairer, more inclusive and supportive policies throughout the next years, Turkey's earning, and more importantly sustaining, a democratic rating for a couple of years, might possibly signal the beginning of Turkey's transcending the "partly free" authoritarian regime and eventually reaching a "free" and genuine democracy.

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Notes

1. The goal of reaching the level of contemporary civilization was expressed by Atatürk in his speech on the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic in 1933; see <http://www.turkiyecumhuriyetidevleti.com>.
2. According to the World Bank data, Turkey's GDP (nominal) per capita in 2008 was \$10,745, while its GDP (purchasing power parity) per capita was \$13,920. For general information on GDP (nominal) per capita versus GDP (purchasing power parity) per capita, see http://economics.about.com/od/economicindicatorintro/a/measure_economy.htm). World Bank data concerning Turkey's GDP is derived from the available information on these two sites: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP_PPP.pdf and <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/POP.pdf>. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, however, Turkey's GDP (nominal) per capita in 2008 was \$10,436, which is used and referred to in this study. Note that the method by which GDP per capita is calculated by the Turkish Statistical Institute actually changed in 2008 in order to conform to the EU standards. Turkey's GDP per capita seems to have considerably increased after Turkey adapted to this new system. In order to see the technical details of how GDP per capita is calculated, see <http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/ESA95/en/een00sum.htm>, and for the details of the recent changes in relation to how GDP per capita is calculated by the Turkish Statistical Institute according to ESA 95, see <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/jsp/duyuru/upload/mg080305.doc>.
3. As part of the EU harmonization process in Turkey, the Turkish parliament has passed nine reform packages since 2001, which have significantly improved political and civil liberties in Turkey. Among the legal reforms are the abolition of the death penalty; freedom of education and broadcasting in local languages such as Kurdish; increased freedom of speech, assembly and association; the abolition of the State Security Courts; and decreased military influence in politics.
4. The AKP government's policies toward some secular media and NGOs, as well the detentions in the Ergenekon case, are seen as undemocratic and repressive by many people in Turkey. The Ergenekon case started in 2007 after some weapons and hand grenades were found in a house in Istanbul that were allegedly planned to be used for plotting a coup against the AKP government. Since 2007, 12 waves of detentions have taken place among active and retired top military officers, bureaucrats, academicians, journalists, artists, NGO leaders, and many other prominent political and social figures. While it can be argued that the Ergenekon case is an opportunity for further democratization and civilianization, the AKP's using the Ergenekon trial in order to suppress its opponents presents a dangerous situation in terms of Turkish democracy.
5. One crucial issue that should be noted is the emergence of a conservative middle class in Turkey, represented by the AKP, that has complicated the political scene and caused tension, such as during the presidential election process of Abdullah Gül, the headscarf controversies at the constitutional level, the closure case against the AKP, and the controversial Ergenekon case.
6. During 2007–08, as a result of the judiciary's and military's meddling in politics, some authoritarian events, including the closure cases against political parties, took place. These include the e-memorandum published on the webpage of the Chief of General Staff against the presidential candidacy of Abdullah Gül, who comes from an Islamic political background and whose wife wears the Islamic headscarf, in April 2007; the Constitutional Court's controversial decision annulling the first round of the presidential election arguing for the necessity of 367 parliamentarians to be present during the election process in May 2007; and the closure cases filed against the pro-Kurdish and allegedly separatist DTP in November 2007 and the AKP, for anti-secularism, in March 2008.
7. See Göksel, Nigar, "Turkey: A Maturing Democracy," August 6, 2007, <http://www.turkish-weekly.net/news/47374/turkey-a-maturing-democracy.html>.

8. The relatively moderate and pro-democratic attitude of the military took place the policies of Chief of Staff Özkök (2002–06) and continuing with Chief of Staff Başbuğ (2008–). In between these two periods, a relative authoritarianization took place under Büyükanıt (2006–08).
9. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (1959).
10. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960), p. 31.
11. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy", p. 75.
12. Seymour Martin Lipset, Kyung-Ryung Seong and John C. Torres, "A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy," *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1993), p. 12.
13. See: Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1963), pp. 253–264; Marvin E. Olsen, "Multivariate Analysis of National Political Development," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 33, No. 5 (1968), pp. 699–712; Phillips Cutright and James Wiley, "Modernization and Political Representation: 1927–1966," *Studies in International Comparative Development*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1969), pp. 23–44; Robert W. Jackman, *Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis* (New York: John Wiley, 1973); G.M. Thomas, F. Ramirez, J.W. Meyer and J.G. Gobalet, "Maintaining National Boundaries in the World System: The Rise of Centralist Regimes," in J. Meyer & M. Hannan (eds.), *National Development and the World System*, pp. 187–209 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Kenneth Bollen, "Political Democracy and the Timing of Development," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (1979), pp. 572–582; Kenneth Bollen, "World System Position, Dependency and Democracy: The Cross-national Evidence," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (1983), pp. 468–479; Michael T. Hannan and Glenn R. Carroll, "Dynamics of Formal Political Structure: An Event-history Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1981), pp. 19–35; Kenneth Bollen and Robert Jackman, "Political Democracy and the Size Distribution of Income," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (1985), pp. 438–457; Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman, "Constitutional Design and Democratic Performance," *Democratization*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2002), pp. 43–66; Thomas Kern, "Modernization and Democratization: The Explanatory Potential of New Differentiation Theoretical Approaches on the Case of South Korea," Global and Area Studies Working Paper No: 15, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies (2006).
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15. Samir Amin, *Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).
16. Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," in Marks, Gary and Diamond (eds.), *Re-examining Democracy, Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset* (London: Sage Publications, 1992), p. 96.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
18. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 59, No. 1 (1994), pp. 1–22.
19. Valerie Bunce, "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 6-7 (2000), pp. 703–734.
20. Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Cambridge: Policy Press, and Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1992), pp. 53–57.
21. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," p. 84.
22. Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," p. 128.
23. Lipset, *Political Man*, pp. 47–51.
24. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," p. 78.
25. Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," p. 126.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

29. Robert J. Barro, "Determinants of Democracy," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 107, No. 6 (1999), p. 160.
30. Regarding the exceptional situation of Germany, Lipset wrote: "Germany is an example of a nation in which the structural changes—growing industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education—all favored the establishment of a democratic system, but in which a series of adverse historical events prevented democracy from securing legitimacy in the eyes of many important segments of society, and thus weakened German democracy's ability to withstand crisis." (Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," p. 72). Another exceptional case is India. Although there is very limited socioeconomic development in this country, it has an established democracy, which might be the result of India's peculiar historical development. Some oil-rich Arab countries might be considered exceptional cases in the sense that there is some socioeconomic development in these countries but no consolidated democracy. It is important to emphasize that in these countries, the industries and economic activities are not varied much but rather rely on oil revenues that are allocated to the citizenry by the state in exchange for control and manipulation of civil society and politics. See Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
31. Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," p. 109.
32. Adam Przeworski, "Democracy and Economic Development," paper written for United Nations Development Program (2003), published at <http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/przeworski/papers/sisson.pdf>, p. 9.
33. See: Edward N. Muller, "Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (1988), pp. 50–68; F. Zehra Arat, *Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991); Przeworski *et al.*, "What Makes Democracy Endure," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1996), pp. 39–55; Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez *et al.*, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Przeworski, "Democracy and Economic Development" Carles Boix and Luis Garicano, "Democracy, Inequality and Country-specific Wealth" (2002), paper published at www.yale.edu/leitner/pdf/PEW-Boix.pdf.
34. Przeworski, "Democracy and Economic Development," p. 10.
35. Przeworski *et al.*, "What Makes Democracy Endure," p. 43.
36. Carles Boix and Luis Garicano, "Democracy, Inequality and Country-Specific Wealth" (2002), paper published at www.yale.edu/leitner/pdf/PEW-Boix.pdf, p. 2.
37. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs, "Development and Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 5 (2005), pp. 79.
38. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," p. 83.
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41. Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1963), pp. 253–264.
42. Harold J. Laski, "Democracy" in *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Volume 5 (New York: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 76–85.
43. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Free Press. Delhi: Sage Publications, 1958), p. 60.
44. Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, p. 60, emphasis added by the author.
45. Cutright, "National Political Development."
46. James Bryce, *South America: Observations and Impressions* (New York: Macmillan, 1912), p. 546.
47. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).
48. Lipset, *Political Man*, pp. 39–40.
49. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," p. 79.

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51. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," pp. 79–80.
52. Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," p. 104.
53. Alex Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63, No. 4 (1969), pp. 1120–1141.
54. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," p. 78.
55. See <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008>.
56. See http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_TUR.html.
57. Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," p. 102.
58. Economies are divided according to 2008 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, \$975 or less; lower middle income, \$976–\$3,855; upper middle income, \$3,856–\$11,905; and high income, \$11,906 or more (World Bank, country classification, 2008, <http://www.worldbank.org>.) Turkey's GNI per capita is taken from <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf>.
59. Although there are no strict criteria for the categorization of countries based on the Gini coefficient, according to the general view of economists, a low level of inequality is considered to be between 0.00–0.30, middle level of inequality 0.30–0.45, and high level of inequality between 0.45–1.00.
60. In 2007, the mentioned countries had the following GDP per capita: Bulgaria \$5,175; Romania \$7,703; Chile \$9,877; Argentina \$6,641; and Brazil \$6,859. Turkey's GDP per capita was \$8,893. The information is mathematically derived by using the GDP and population data from the following two sources of the World Bank: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf> and <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/POP.pdf>.
61. See <http://economics.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/g/gini.htm>. See information about the Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient at www.unc.edu/depts/econ/byrns_web/Economicae/Figures/Lorenz.htm.
62. Newly industrialized countries (NIC) are countries that are not as developed as "developed" countries but are more advanced than most other "developing" countries. See Pawel Bozyk, Pawel, *Newly Industrialised Countries- Globalization and the Transformation of Foreign Economic Policy* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p. 164.
63. See Ahmet Kılıçbay, *21. Yüzyılın Türkiye'sinde Çağdaşlaşma* [Modernization in 21st Century Turkey] (Istanbul: Bilim Teknik Yayınevi, 1999) and Demet Yalçın Mousseau, "Democracy, Human Rights and Market Development in Turkey: Are They Related?," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2006), pp. 298–326.
64. See www.tuik.gov.tr. An important issue concerning industrialization is the proportion of the labor force by sectors. The Turkish Statistical Institute, DIE, reported that the agricultural population in Turkey in 2008 fell to 25 percent. Turkey's GDP by sector is reported to be as follows: agriculture, 8.5 percent; industry, 28.6 percent; services, 62.9 percent. 2008 estimates, taken from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2012.html>.
65. The following are the rates of urbanization for certain developed countries in 2003: Japan, 65 percent; Italy, 67 percent; Spain, 76 percent; United States, 80 percent; UK, 89 percent; Australia, 92 percent. See http://www.geohive.com/earth/pop_urban.aspx. (Note that Turkey's urbanization rate was 66 percent in 2003.)
66. <http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/74157> and www.webfoot.com/advice/Written-Arabic.html.
67. http://hdrstats.undp.org/2008/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_TUR.html.
68. According to UNESCO, 0–49 depicts "low" educational attainment, 50–79 "middle" educational attainment, and 80–100 "high" educational attainment. See <http://hdr.undp.org/en/mediacentre/news/title,15493,en.html>.
69. It needs to be acknowledged that Turkey's development still needs to be evaluated as uneven development due to deficiencies in areas such as press freedom, gender equality, and environmental protection.

70. It should be noted that political freedom may not necessarily, or always, guarantee peace and security within a country. Despite a relatively high level of political freedom in the country, there was widespread political terror in Turkey in the 1970s.
71. Przeworski, "Democracy and Economic Development."
72. On this issue see Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey* (London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997) and Zeki Sarıgil, "Curbing Kurdish Ethno-nationalism in Turkey: An Empirical Assessment of Pro-Islamic and Socio-economic Approaches," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (forthcoming).
73. Demet Yalçın Mousseau, "Democracy, Human Rights and Market Development in Turkey: Are They Related?," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2006), pp. 298–326.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 326.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 311.
76. The author thanks Dr. Zeki Sarıgil for encouraging him to use Mousseau's views as complimentary ideas for his main argument.
77. See Ziya Öniş and E. Fuat Keyman, "A New Path Emerges," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2003), pp. 95–107; Senem Aydın and E. Fuat Keyman, "European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy," CEPS, EU-Turkey Working Papers, No. 2 (2004); Ergun Özbudun and Serap Yazıcı, *Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004* (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2004); Metin Heper, "The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy," *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2005), pp. 33–44; Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party* (London: Routledge, 2007); Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Politics Today: Elections, Protest, and Stability in an Islamic Society* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007).
78. The Turkish military was against Gül's presidential candidacy because he comes from an Islamic political background and his wife wears the Islamic headscarf.
79. The AKP was not closed down by the Constitutional Court but was punished by losing half its state funding, due to the court deciding the AKP was against the principle of secularism.
80. For the difference between electoral democracy and liberal democracy, see Andreas Schedler, "What is Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1998), pp. 91–107.
81. Guillermo O'Donnell argues that "democratic transition" has two stages: "The first is the transition from the previous authoritarian regime to the installation of a democratic government. The second transition is from this government to the consolidation of democracy or, in other words, to the effective functioning of a *democratic regime*... The second transition will not be any less arduous nor any less lengthy; the paths that lead from a democratic government to a democratic regime are uncertain and complex, and the possibilities of authoritarian regression are numerous." Guillermo O'Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities, Paradoxes," in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.), *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 48–49. It can be argued that Turkey is trying to make the transition from what O'Donnell calls a "democratic government" (formal democratic government) to a "democratic regime" and is experiencing the hurdles of such a transition to full democracy.