Why did Claudius Annex Lycia?

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Introduction

Generally speaking, the available ancient sources provide us with very little clue as to exactly what motivated individual Roman emperors to annex fresh territories and make them a part of Rome’s imperium. Thus the question as to why a particular region was appropriated by one of other emperor is more often than not a matter of speculation on the part of modern scholars, relying as they have to on individual interpretation of a somewhat limited ‘data-set’ rather than a concise series of clear-cut ‘facts’. This is not, or so it might seem at first sight, the case with the annexation of Lycia by Claudius in AD 43. The two ancient sources on the matter directly report that a state of ‘discord’ or ‘civic unrest’ motivated the decision to take control of a territory that had long been a compliant client state and firm ally of Rome.

Absolute belief in this ‘fact’ has a long history, and is also the basic conclusion of the most recent discussion of the annexation of Lycia, as provided by Sencer Şahin and Mustafa Adak in their magisterial Stadiasmus Patarensis. Indeed, these authors begin their analysis of the matter with the terse heading ‘Politische Instabilität auf der lykischen Halbinsel als wesentliches Motiv der Annexation’. True, they do make a series of cursory remarks on other motives advanced by earlier scholars in connection with the annexation of the territory - the craving on the part of Claudius for ‘imperial glory’, best achieved through territorial expansion; a desire on his part to extend his personal patronage; and perhaps even ‘fiscal advantages’. Yet Şahin and Adak peremptorily dismiss these alternative (or parallel?) motives with the conclusion that ‘Nach der kaiserlichen Sichtweise konnte die Annexion Lykiens nicht länger hinausgezögert werden, weil seine Bewohner in einem endlosen Bürgerkrieg verwickelt waren, den sie aus einiger Kraft nicht beenden konnten’. In other words, the annexation of Lycia was

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1 Suet. Claud. 25.3; and Dio 60.17.3–4.
3 Şahin – Adak 2007, 49-62.
4 ‘Political instability in the Lycian peninsula as the substantive motive for the annexation’: Şahin – Adak 2007, 49.
5 Magie 1950, 529.
6 Jameson 1973, 278.
8 ‘From the imperial viewpoint, the annexation of Lycia could no longer be put off because its inhabitants were involved in an endless civil war that they could not end in their own manner’: Şahin – Adak 2007, 79.
forced on Rome by the necessity to maintain stability in the only part of Anatolia that was not under direct Roman control.

Şahin and Adak’s all too-easy conjecture that it was indeed internal strife alone that prompted the annexation of Lycia, and their somewhat curt and certainly emphatic exclusion of any other motives that may have played a part, demands a response: otherwise their thesis risks becoming the orthodoxy. In other words, what we need to consider is that although an extreme political situation may have persuaded Rome to intervene into the affairs of Lycia, it does not elucidate why the territory was then formally provincialised. This writer believes that a better understanding of what brought about this course of action can best be found through an analysis of Şahin and Adak’s verdict along with a consideration of those alternative motives already mentioned.

To resolve a dangerous level of political instability?

Let us first consider the evidence for Şahin and Adak’s assertion that Claudius annexed Lycia essentially because of a high level of political strife in the region. As it is, the only ancient commentaries that survive regarding the event certainly indicate that a degree of ‘discord’ in Lycia prompted the process. According to Suetonius, writing some 60-70 years after the event, ‘Lycias ob exitiabiles inter se discordias libertatem ademit’ - ‘The Lycians lost their liberty because of their destructive internal conflicts’. Dio, writing a further 100 or so years later, not only dates the event to 43, but elaborates to an extent on Suetonius’ bland statement, reporting that Claudius ‘reduced the Lycians to servitude because of social unrest (στάσις) among them and the slaughter of some Romans: and [he then] incorporated them [the Lycians] in the prefecture of Pamphylia’: Dio then goes on to indicate that around the time of the annexation, Claudius received a Lycian embassy, presumably sent either to explain current events in the territory, or to plead for a return to the status quo ante. To which we might add that Dio’s History is an essentially chronologically driven work, and he indicates that the annexation of Lycia took place before the invasion of Britain, an event that has to be associated with the month of May or June 43.

On the face of it, then, our two ancient sources - although both written post eventum - concur in that a state of instability motivated the annexation of Lycia. Indeed, the reports of a degree of ‘discordia’ or ‘στάσις’ if not actual revolt in Lycia at the time are borne out by several epigraphic sources. To begin with we have the statement in the primary text

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9 It should be stressed at the outset that a quibble with this specific issue of Şahin – Adak 2007 should not be viewed as belittling the main body of that text, a major contribution to our understanding of the early history of Roman Lycia.
10 Şahin – Adak 2007, 49 and 79.
11 Suet. Claud. 25.3.
12 Dio 60.17.3 (Dio’s observation that Lycia was then formed into a province with Pamphylia is now known to be incorrect: cf. Şahin – Adak 2007, 84-92). Dio also notes (60.17.4) that Claudius summarily deprived one of the Lycian ambassadors of his Roman citizenship as he failed to understand a question put to him in Latin (cf. Suet. Claud. 16.2, presumably the same man): Levick 1989, 114-16, has suggested that the ambassador did not so much have a difficulty with Latin but with Claudius’ indistinct and slurred manner of speech. Note also that two of the ambassadors may be commemorated on inscriptions from Lycia: Şahin - Adak 2007, 52.
13 Dio’s account of Lycia’s annexation at 60.17.3 is followed by a discussion on events in Rome, after which comes his account of the invasion of Britain at 60.19.1, an episode dated to May or June: cf. Levick 1990, 141, with n. 15.
Why did Claudius Annex Lycia?

on the Stadismus Patarensis itself\textsuperscript{14}, a monument precisely dated in its opening lines to 46 as it associates Claudius with his fifth year of holding the tribunicia potestas and his forthcoming fourth consulate\textsuperscript{15}. The text continues by describing Claudius as ‘the saviour of the (Lycian) nation’, and after stressing the loyalty and allied status of the Lycians, it notes how they were ‘freed from [internal] faction, lawlessness and brigandage’, thanks to the foresight of the emperor. It then specifies how the emperor has restored ‘concord, the fair administration of justice, and the ancestral laws’ to Lycia, and how the system of local administration has been modified so that the ‘incompetent majority’ are now ruled by councillors chosen from ‘among the superior people’\textsuperscript{16}. It concludes by noting that the ‘Lycians’ had dedicated the monument to Claudius ‘in return for the many benefits they received from him through [the agency of] Quintus Veranius’, signalled here as πρεσβευτής καί ἀντιστράτηγος, the Greek equivalent for legatus pro praetore and so the serving governor of Lycia\textsuperscript{17}.

As it is, Veranius’ incomplete but essentially restorable cursus honorum, as supplied on the surviving lower right hand half of the funerary monument erected at Pratolungo for one of his daughters, also and quite explicitly confirms that a state of chaos in Lycia occasioned Rome’s intervention into Lycian affairs\textsuperscript{18}. The surviving part of the text can be restored as beginning with a reference to Veranius’ appointment to a five year term there, and goes on to note that after destroying a fortress of the ‘[T]racheotae’ and restoring the defences of a city whose name is now lost (but which is likely to be Cibyra\textsuperscript{19}), Veranius ‘pacified’ the region\textsuperscript{20}. The inscription also implies that his successes in Lycia brought Veranius the exceptional honour of the ordinary consulship, which he took in 49, (suffect consulships being the more usual award for military success), along with appointment as an augur, and elevation to patrician rank\textsuperscript{21}.

Apart from the reports of Suetonius and Dio, these two epigraphic texts stand as our best evidence that there was a degree of ‘discord’ in Lycia before and at around the time of its annexation. But they do not stand alone, for there are others that also testify to a state of unrest if not actual anarchy there in the late 30’s and early 40’s AD\textsuperscript{22}. We need only note here the Bonda Tepesi altar, dated to 45, with its expansive assertions of Lycian

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Şahîn – Adak 2007, 28-35, summarised at 35.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Cf. Kienast, 1990, 91.
\item \textsuperscript{16} On the restoration of the ‘ancestral laws’, see now Kantor [n.d].
\item \textsuperscript{17} Mason 1974, 153.
\item \textsuperscript{18} CIL 6.41075. Several restorations have been offered of this text since it was first reported in Gordon 1952, the most recent being Birley 2005, 37, and Şahîn - Adak 2007, 63-64, these differing in few details - except that Şahîn – Adak refrain from attempting a detailed reconstruction of the missing left hand part of the text.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Şahîn – Adak 2007, 60-61; also Syme 1995, 273, stressing the strategic location of Cibyra in regional communications and its established status as a centre for Roman and Italian traders in the region.
\item \textsuperscript{20} The surviving text specifies that Veranius ‘pacified’ something, but exactly what he pacified was specified on the missing part. There is little to choose between the alternative restorations offered for the relevant part, i.e., [a rebellius complevit cietas obсидone acerbil[a] pacavit (Gordon 1952, 170); ‘perfecit discordis provinciae placatis urbil[a] pacavit (AE 1953.251); [hiuius civitatis complevit et regionis oppildil[pacavit] (CIL 6.41075); or [totam provinciam a latroni[b]us pacavit’ (Syme 1995, 273): but however it is to be restored, the general sense is clear, that Veranius brought peace to Lycia or one of its regions.
\item \textsuperscript{21} For Q. Veranius’ four-month ordinary consulship in 49, see now Tortoriello 2004, 422-23 and 585-88.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Şahîn – Adak 2007, 56-62.
\end{itemize}
loyalty to Claudius, and specifically honouring him for bringing peace to the region; and an inscription from Corinth set up by Lycian koinon to thank a Lycian woman, Junia Theodora, for giving shelter to some exiled Lycians during a period that can be dated immediately prior to the annexation.

Unfortunately, the exact cause and nature of the unrest in Lycia in the years leading up to the annexation are not specifically explained in any of the surviving texts, literary or epigraphic. Except, that is, that the references in the Stadiaismus Patarensis to a restoration of concord, fair administration of justice and the ancestral laws, along with the re-establishment of local government, all suggest a high degree of factional infighting that probably involved some level of violence - and perhaps, even, the quasi-judicial execution of Roman citizens. Clearly, however, this state of ‘discord’ was of an essentially political nature, as Şahin and Adak argue, citing, inter alia, inscriptions from Arneai and Cibyra to support their premise. On the other hand, Veranius’ cursus honorum signifies that the situation was further exacerbated by the activities of ‘bandits’ and others apparently in the mountainous regions in the north of the territory, although as C. Kokkinia reminds us, these ‘bandits’ might in truth be the political opponents of those oligarchs who controlled Lycia.

Either way, the situation in Lycia was certainly serious enough to require Roman intervention to resolve matters: but was it serious enough to justify on its own the annexation of the territory? The point being that aside from the other motives alluded to above that may have played their part in prompting the decision to provincialise Lycia, there are good reasons for doubting that events there were of such a critical nature to warrant on their own depriving the Lycians of their freedom and their long held status as a territory registered as populi Romani amicus et socius - ‘friend and ally of the Roman people’.

We should first consider the fact that if Lycia did indeed face a state of ‘endless civil war’, then Veranius was hardly the most appropriate choice to deal with this. The only military service he could have seen at the time of the annexation was his term sometime in the 30’s as a legionary tribune with the legio IV Scythica in Moesia, a position he held during the course of a normal senatorial career. And although Claudius did need skilled generals for his imminent invasion of Britain the same year, we can be sure that if the situation in Lycia really desired it, then there were sufficient men with more military experience who could have been assigned to the command. True, as Şahin and Adak and others have observed, Veranius was clearly one of Claudius’ favourites: but at this stage in his career, immediately after his praetorship, his qualifications were those of an administrator.

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25 Şahin [n.d.], 16.
26 Şahin – Adak 2007, 49-62.
27 Kokkinia 2004, 45-49.
28 Cf. Şahin – Adak 2007, 49-51, for Lycia’s long-standing relationship with Rome.
29 Şahin – Adak 2007, 79.
30 Birley 2005, 39.
31 Cn. Domitius Corbulo, suffect consul in AD 39 (?), made commander of the Upper Rhine legions in 47, and Q. Curtius Rufus, suffect consul in AD 43, and Corbulo’s successor on the Upper Rhine, spring to mind.
Why did Claudius Annex Lycia?

not of a military commander\textsuperscript{32}. And we must not forget that supervising an efficient bureaucracy was a major responsibility in the formalising and governing of a province at all times. Interestingly enough, it so happens that one of the few inscriptions attesting to Veranius’ service in Lycia is a copy of a letter he wrote addressing administrative issues at Tlos, but which was evidently distributed to other places in the region, and which attests to the close attention he paid to local administrative matters\textsuperscript{33}.

We should also note that if Lycia was in a state of ‘endless civil war’ that needed a forceful resolution then it is surprising that there is no epigraphic or other evidence for a single Roman military unit ever having served in Lycia proper in the Julio-Claudian period - or, for that matter, at any other time during the later principate. The point being that if the political and social situation in Lycia was such that it required annexation to bring order to the region, then it logically follows that a garrison of some kind would have been needed to secure the new province, even if this was only required for policing duties in a ‘mopping-up’ phase after order had been re-established. After all, even the most peaceful of regions in Anatolia had a garrison of some kind: consider, for example, Bithynia, with its cohors VI Equitata registered there by both literary and epigraphic records\textsuperscript{34}. True, the absence of any evidence for an auxiliary unit having been stationed in Lycia is not \textit{de facto} evidence of absence. But even so, it does seem suspicious that while Lycia proper has produced well over 350 inscriptions dating to the principate, none of these relate to any auxiliary unit having been stationed there in that period\textsuperscript{35}. Compare this state of affairs with, for example, the province of Thrace, another territory annexed by Claudius (in 44/45) after a period of civil unrest there. Of the 400 or so known inscriptions from that province, eight on stone and three bronze auxiliary diplomat\textit{a} refer to one or other of the auxiliary regiments regularly stationed there, the normal complement apparently being two cohortes. Admittedly, this number of 13 epigraphic references is a small proportion of the overall total of epigraphic texts from Thrace: but it does make the point that in regions where military units were stationed on a permanent basis then we might with good reason expect to find this reflected in the epigraphic record.

However, we must assume that Veranius had some military elements at his disposal: how else could he have restored order to the poleis of Lycia, never mind deal with the ‘bandits’ in the mountains and - or so it would seem - a threatening situation at Cibyra? He may have relied on the existing civic militias of the Lycian poleis, but as they seem to have been unable to deal with the situation in Lycia before his arrival, then it seems likely that he was also supplied with a cadre or Roman troops, perhaps auxilia detached from Galatia and/or Asia, or even auxilia and possibly legionaries seconded from units outside

\textsuperscript{32} Cf. Şahin – Adak 2007, 81. That Veranius went on to become governor of Britain in 57, with the specific duty of subduing the Silures, does not negate the claim that he had very little military experience: in Britain he had three battle-hardened legions with experienced legates at his disposal, the legates presumably directing military actions. That said, it is believed that the Veranius to whom Onasander dedicated his \textit{Strategikos} is the same man (Birley 2005, 40–41), the implication being he was an experienced general as well as a student of war: but the treatise may well have been dedicated to congratulate Veranius on his appointment to Britain.

\textsuperscript{33} Wörrle 1975, 254-86 (= AE 1976.673).

\textsuperscript{34} Pliny \textit{Ep.} 10.106 and 107, with IGR 3.1396.

\textsuperscript{35} All of the Roman military-related texts from Lycia proper record stationarii or the like, that is, soldiers on detached duty from their parent unit, based at either Perge or Side in Pamphylia: cf. Bennett 2007, 143–48.
of Anatolia. Yet, when all is said and done, there is nothing in the available evidence to suggest that Veranius was ever involved in serious or sustained military action in Lycia, even though some have speculated that the missing part of his *cursus honorum* may be restored as indicating that he won *ornamenta triumphalia* for his service there. But even if this was the case we need to note that Claudius was notoriously profligate with the award: for example, *ornamenta triumphalia* were awarded to Cn. Domitius Corbulo for the canal he dug between the Rhine and the Meuse, and to his successor, Q. Curtius Rufus, for opening silver mines in Germania. So, even if Veranius was honoured with the *ornamenta triumphalia*, it could well have been for the road-building programme he directed in Lycia, as is commemorated on Face B of the *Stadiasmus Patarensis* and also on the Bonda Tepesi altar.

Yet when all is said and done, there can be no doubt that, as Şahin - Adak have cogently argued, Roman intervention into Lycia affairs in 43 was prompted by a state of ‘discord’ there. Likewise, Veranius evidently restored peace and freedom from this discord, which helps explain what might otherwise be seen as an ironic gesture by the Lycians: the issue, shortly after they essentially lost their independence, of coins with the personification of *libertas* - ‘liberty’ - on the reverse. The reference is clearly to a restoration of liberty from the civil strife that had preceded the annexation. Even so, as we have seen there are reasons for doubting that a state of ‘discordia’ amounting to an imminent or even an on-going ‘Bürgerkrieg’ in Lycia occasioned the intervention, and that such a state of affairs was the single ‘essential’ or ‘substantive’ reason for its annexation. Which perforce means that we need to consider what part other motives may have played in the process.

A need for Imperial glory?

According to D. Magie, the annexation of Lycia was ‘in accord with Claudius’ desire for the glory of extending the Empire which [then] led to the annexation of Mauretania [formalised in 42/43], Britannia [43], Thrace [44/45] and Judaea [44]; he goes on to observe the ‘specious grounds’ for the seizure of Lycia, ‘that no other means could be found for preventing the Lycians from quarrelling with one another’, and adds the ‘further pretext … that Roman citizens had wrongfully been put to death’. Now, it cannot be denied that Claudius greatly enlarged the number of territories directly controlled by Rome: in addition to those just mentioned, he also annexed the client states of Noricum (in 46) and the Alpes Graiae et Poeninae (sometime before 47); and transformed Rhodes from a free to a...

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36 Birley 2005, 40, has suggested he was given troops from Syria.
37 Birley 2005, 40.
38 Tac. *Ann.* 11.20, where it is also claimed that the soldiers of the legions involved wrote a secret despatch to Claudius begging that triumphal distinctions be given in advance to all newly-appointed governors responsible for legionary troops.
40 Şahin – Adak 2007, 78-79.
41 Compare the situation in Judaea after the death of Herod, where most of his relatives openly preferred to have the ‘freedom’ brought by direct Roman rule rather than continued instability over the succession: *Jos. AJ* 179 with *BJ* 2.6.
42 Şahin – Adak 2007, 49.
43 Magie 1950, 529. The notion essentially goes back to Dessau 1924, 148-149. For Mauretania and Britannia: see below; for Thrace: Bechert 19999, 178; for the re-annexation of Judaea: see below.
subject territory (in 44, again ostensibly because of rioting and the death of Roman citizens, although it regained its independence in 53). He also established Moesia as a separate province by detaching it from Achaia and Macedonia (in 44/45); and perhaps also detached Raetia from Gallia Belgica. Added to which we might note that in his 13 years as princeps, Claudius eventually received 27 imperial salutations, the greatest number awarded any princeps, strongly suggestive of an inordinate need and desire on his part for military glory.

There again, the idea that Claudius was desirous of Imperial glory essentially stems not just from the number of territories he annexed to create new provinces, but also from what is known of his personal circumstances and the nature of his accession. As the grandson of one famous military commander, Marc Antony, the son of another, Drusus Claudius Nero (also the stepson of Augustus), and the brother of a third, Germanicus, much must have been expected of Claudius at the time of his birth. But he suffered a physical affliction that made him unfit for either public office or military service, and was doomed to a life in the shadows until his nephew, Gaius-Caligula, raised him to the consulship in 37. So, it might be construed that when Fortune eventually smiled on Claudius, with his sudden elevation to the rank of princeps after Gaius-Caligula was assassinated on 24th January, AD 41, he would avidly take the chance to establish a reputation for himself in a like fashion to that of his forebears and his brother.

More pertinently, it could be better argued that it was essential for Claudius to quickly win military glory as a way of confirming and legitimising his position as princeps in the eyes of the senate, the people, and especially the army of Rome. After all, the Praetorian Guard had ensured his succession as princeps, so openly certifying for the first time since the creation of the principate that the military ultimately held the reins of power. And as luck would have it, Gaius-Caligula’s inept foreign policy had left Claudius with two early possibilities to win such military glory. To begin with, there was warfare in Mauretania occasioned by Gaius-Caligula’s decision in the winter of 39/40 to summarily execute the kingdom’s ruler, Ptolemy, and then provincialise the territory. Some success in this matter was achieved more or less at the same time that Claudius became emperor, so allowing him to accept triumphal honours for the victory, although further hostilities had to be suppressed in 42, following on from which the land was sub-divided to form the

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45 Four more than Domitian and six more than Augustus: most of the other principles received less than 12 or so.
46 Suet. Claud. 3.2, reports that Claudius’ mother allegedly said he was ‘A monster of a man, one not finished but merely begun by Mother Nature’. The exact nature of his affliction is uncertain, but cerebral palsy has been adduced: e.g., Levick 1990, 13–14 with 200 n. 7: if so it must have been a mild form.
47 Suet. Claud. 2.1-2, on Claudius being kept out of the public eye as an embarrassment to his family.
48 Cf. Wells 1984, 120: ‘Claudius … realised how necessary it was for him to acquire military prestige’.
49 On the role of the Praetorian Guard in Claudius accession see Seut. Claud. 10. His debt to them was made explicit in the substantial cash grant they received on his accession (see below) and even advertised on his coinage (e.g., BMC 5 and RIC 7, showing the Praetorian Camp and Claudius, with the legend IMPER RECEP; BMC 9 and RIC 12, showing Claudius with a Praetorian signifer (standard bearer) and the legend PRAETOR RECEPT).
50 Gaius-Caligula’s intention to provincialise Mauretania is indicated by the provincial era beginning in AD 40: cf. CIL 8.8360; the process of annexation is fully discussed in Fishwick 1971.
51 Dio 60.8.6; also Suet. Claud. 17.1.
equestrian provinces of Mauretania Tingitania and Mauretania Caesariensis\textsuperscript{52}. Further military glory for Claudius came with the two separate campaigns in Germania in progress at the time of his accession, one against the Chatti, the other against the Chauci, these being ended in 41, occasioning Claudius’ second imperial salutation\textsuperscript{53}.

Yet while Claudius could claim credit from the way that it was his generals who successfully concluded matters in Mauretania and Germany, both campaigns began under his predecessor Gaius-Caligula: as such they could hardly be claimed as personal successes. But more to the point, the attempted \textit{coup d’etat} in 42 by L. Arruntius Camillus Scribonianus, a distant relative of Pompey, then serving as governor of Dalmatia, brought with it the clear need for Claudius to assert his position as commander in chief, one way of doing so being by some form of active warfare which would serve to raise the morale of the entire Roman army\textsuperscript{54}; and so the decision which must have been made the same year to invade Britannia\textsuperscript{55}.

One justification for the invasion was, or so we are told, that the Britons were ‘causing trouble because Rome had refused to return certain noble refugees’\textsuperscript{56}, although we might concur with Suetonius, that the main reason for the invasion was military glory for Claudius himself\textsuperscript{57}. What better way to win such than through capturing a territory that the great Caesar had failed to conquer, even if some believed that the cost of administering and controlling the territory likely outweighed any potential financial advantages through making it subject to taxation\textsuperscript{58}.

So it was that a Roman army commanded by Aulus Plautius landed in Britannia in, probably, the May or early June of 43\textsuperscript{59}, and once Roman dominance was asserted over the southern part of the island, Claudius himself arrived to formally conclude hostilities with the capture of Camulodunum, the \textit{de facto} British capital. He stayed in Britannia for 16 days, during which time he received the submission of various British kings and their tribes\textsuperscript{60}, and at least two more imperial salutations, and possibly as many as nine in all for the invasion, so bringing the number to the eleven recorded on the \textit{Stadiasmus Patarensis}\textsuperscript{61}. The senate then voted Claudius the title \textit{Britannicus}, along with a triumph (Claudius becoming the first \textit{princeps} to celebrate one since 29 BC), and also decreed two

\textsuperscript{52} Dio 9.1-6. The territory was certainly sub-divided by 44: cf. ILM 56, with Fishwick 1971, 481-482.

\textsuperscript{53} Dio 60.8.7: his first such salutation was the (by now) normal accession salutation.

\textsuperscript{54} For the revolt of Scribonianus, see Suet. \textit{Claud}. 13.2, and Dio 60.15.1-3; on the need for conquest as a morale booster, see Levick 1990, 139.

\textsuperscript{55} Cf. Levick 1990, 139, with 196.

\textsuperscript{56} Suet. \textit{Claud}. 17.1; Dio 60.19.1, adds that the campaign was to restore a refugee British chieftain to his realm.

\textsuperscript{57} Suet. \textit{Claud}. 17.1: ‘He made only one campaign and that of little importance. When the senate decreed him the \textit{ornamenta triumphalia} [for the German campaigns], thinking this beneath the imperial dignity and desiring the glory of a legitimate triumph, he chose Britain as the best place for acquiring it, for none had attempted this since the Deified Julius’: Cf. also Levick 1990, 139; and CIL 6. 40416 = ILS 216, from the triumphal arch at Rome commemorating the victory, stating that Claudius was the ‘first to subject to the rule of the Roman people barbarian tribes across the Ocean’.

\textsuperscript{58} Strabo 4.5.3 (200).

\textsuperscript{59} For the date of the invasion see the discussion in Levick 1990, 141 with n. 15.

\textsuperscript{60} Suet. \textit{Claud}. 17.2; Dio, 60.21.1-4, provides a more detailed account (his stay as 16 days at 60.23.1), while CIL 6. 40416 = ILS 216, states that Claudius personally received the surrender of eleven kings.

\textsuperscript{61} Cf. Dio 60.21.5.
arches to commemorate the capture of Britannia, and that his two-year old son, Tiberius Claudius Germanicus, should also be hailed as Britannicus. As already stated, Suetonius emphatically points to the need for military glory as being the main factor behind Claudius’ invasion of Britannia. However, it takes a great leap of imagination to insinuate from this, as Magie and others have done, that military glory was a or even the principal motive for the annexation of all those other free territories that Claudius took under the direct control of Rome, namely the Mauretanias, Lycia, Thrace, Judaea, Noricum, the Alpes Graiae et Poeninae, and Rhodes (from 44 until 53). Apart from the fact that Gaius-Caligula had already decided on the provincialisation of Mauretania, we need to remember that all of these territories were of the type usually (and euphemistically) referred to in modern documents as ‘client states’: that is, they had some form of treaty relationship with Rome as being among her socii et amici - ‘allies and friends’ - and according to the doctrine established by Augustus, they only remained free of direct control at Rome’s discretion. What’s more, there is no evidence for any warfare that accompanied or was necessitated by Claudius’ transformations in the status of Judaea or of the other ‘client states’ he provincialised. Thus the claims of Magie and others that Lycia and the other territories were annexed simply to enhance Claudius’ imperial glory do not withstand closer analysis: which leads us to the examination of the third motive alleged for the annexation of Lycia, that it was done to enhance his personal patronage.

To enlarge the scope of his personal patronage?

S. Jameson, having averred that ‘Die Motive für die Annexion [of Lycia] sind nicht ganz klar’, then refers to D. Magie’s claim as discussed above, that Lycia was annexed to enhance Claudius’ own imperial glory, before stating that ‘Vielleicht können wir darin

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63 Suet. Claud. 17.1
64 Cf. Strabo 17.3.25 (840), referring to the ‘client states’ as being under the control of ‘Caesar’ (i.e., Augustus), and so territories that were his to manage as he saw fit; also Tac. Ann. 12.45.5, with its reference to the kingdom of Armenia being in the gift of ‘the Roman people’.
66 It is true that the occasions or events for which Claudius received his imperial salutations from the nine he held in 46 to the 27 in 53 are not entirely clear, but none of them can be associated with the annexation of either Lycia, Thrace, Judaea, Noricum, the Alpes Graiae et Poeninae, or Rhodes.
auch ein Streben nach Erweiterung seines Patronats sehen': in other words, that an additional reason for Claudius’ annexation of Lycia was to extend his personal patronage. Unfortunately, Jameson does not explain exactly what she means by this rather enigmatic statement, although it can be inferred she had in mind what B. Levick later referred to as Claudius’ ‘notorious generosity over granting the citizenship’. What might be called the nub of the matter here is that the grant of citizenship brought with it the obligation of loyalty through the patronage-client system, and so the greater the number of people who owed their citizenship to Claudius then the greater his popular support in the wider imperium. It also brought with it the implicit obligation that those who made the citizenship grant should be counted amongst the legatees of those who received it, although Claudius, like Augustus and Tiberius, refused bequests from those who had surviving family members.

Now, it is true that Claudius had a generous and original attitude towards the question of who should benefit from receiving Roman citizenship. But we must remember that his reasoning for extending the franchise was to make the best use of provincials in the service of the state, and specifically the Senate. And although several Tiberii Claudii are to be found in Lycia, we must also bear in mind that not all men so-named necessarily belonged to families enfranchised by Claudius: those so honoured by Tiberius (Claudius Nero) before the annexation or by (Tiberius Claudius) Nero after could also have these names - apart from which we are told that Claudius did not insist on those he enfranchised taking his own nomenclature: and indeed some Lycians who were awarded citizenship under Claudius (and later) chose to take the name of the serving governor at the time rather than that of the emperor. More to the point, very few Lycians seem to have made a mark in the imperial service before the end of the 1st century, one exception is M. Arruntius Claudianus, the first Lycian to have been adlected to the senatorial order (as is proudly reported on a text from Xanthus), perhaps by Domitian but more likely by Trajan: but he was more probably descended from a family enfranchised under Augustus rather than Claudius. Indeed, it is not until the early 2nd century that we see the start of a series of Lycian Tiberii Claudii entering State Service, and as observed, these need not be members of families enfranchised by Claudius.

It is hard to see, then, how the annexation of Lycia might have resulted from a systematic process on the part of Claudius to extend his personal patronage in order to encourage those newly enfranchised to enter State service. And so we now turn to the last of those alternative motives that have been offered to explain why Lycia was provincialised, that financial reasons played their own part in determining such a course of action.

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67 Jameson 1973, 278.
68 Levick 1990, 164.
69 Dio 60.6.3.
70 Dio 60.17.5; also Levick 1990, 164-65. It seems that Claudius also instituted the practice of giving Roman citizenship to auxiliary veterans after they had honourably served their 25 years or so: Sherwin-White 1973, 247, with Birley 1986, 256-57.
71 Tac. Ann. 11.23-24; also Sherwin-White 1973, 238.
72 Dio 60.17.5; note, for example, Q. Veranius Philagrus, named after Quintus Veranius himself.
For financial reasons?

R. Syme observed that some territories were annexed by Rome for fiscal advantage, quoting as one example the territory of Cappadocia (which allowed Tiberius to halve the centesima rerum venalium, the 1% sales tax): but he then goes on to confess that to what extent a financial motive may have directed the annexation of Lycia ‘baffles conjecture’75. True, it is alleged of Gaius-Caligula that already by the end of his first or second year as princeps he had squandered the sum of either 2,700, or 2,300 or 3,300 million sesterces (HS) allegedly left him by Tiberius76, which might be taken to imply that Claudius would quite likely have faced financial difficulties when he assumed the purple. If such were indeed the case this might well have encouraged Claudius to follow a path of imperial expansion through provincialisation as a means of restoring the state of the imperial treasury.

And yet an analysis of the imperial finances during Claudius’ reign does not at first sight support the supposition that he faced any real financial difficulties when he became princeps77. Indeed, to the contrary. In the first years of his reign he spent large sums of money, beginning with the some 880 million HS distributed as the cash handouts a new princeps gave on accession to the Praetorian Guard, the Urban Cohorts, the legionaries, and the citizens resident in Rome78. While we do not know if this enormous sum was distributed in one instalment or in a series of one-off payments, it still accounts to more than a single year’s tax-revenue79. Even greater expenditure following with his building programme, which included completing the two aqueducts initiated by Gaius-Caligula, building the port of Ostia, and the draining of the Fucine Lake80. Added to all this, Claudius is reported to have reduced the tax increases introduced by Gaius-Caligula and repealed other new taxes that emperor initiated;81 restored property confiscated by the same emperor to the original owners or their families; and returned monies confiscated for one or other reason by Tiberius and Gaius-Caligula, either to the victims or to their children82. And if that were not generous enough, in 41 Claudius went so far as to restore to client status the territories of Commagene (with the addition of part of Cilicia), Judaea and Samaria, and the Chalcis83.

76 Suet. Gai. 37.3, for the allegation, and which gives the first sum; Dio 59.2.6 for the second, the surviving texts allowing for either 2,300 or 3,300. But note Burgess 2001, 103-105, where it is speculated that these sums may well be exaggerated for effect, while Philo Leg 9 simply refers to Gaius-Caligula as having inherited a fortune.
78 Depending on the strength of the Praetorian Guard, they alone received between 67.5 and 135 million HS: Levick 1990, 130 and Burgess 2001, 106.
79 The annual tax revenues and army expenditure of Rome have been calculated at being between 824 million HS, with about 54% of this, some 445 million HS going to the army (Hopkins 1980, 120 and 125); and 832 to 983 HS, with the army absorbing 72 to 77% of the total (Duncan-Jones 1994, 33-46, with table 3.7).
80 For a comprehensive and fully referenced summary of Claudius’ principal expenditure see Burgers 2001, 105-106, with 108, where it is estimated that he distributed between 142.5 to 210 million HS during the first years of his reign, equal to 17 to 25% of the annual tax revenue. Note, however, that neither Claudius’ road building programmes in the European provinces (Levick 1990, 168-173) nor that in Lycia, as reported on the Stadiasmus Patarensis, feature in these calculations.
81 But not the tax on prostitution (Dio.59.28.8), still in force in the early 3rd century: SHA Sever. Alex. 24.3.
82 Dio 60.4.1 and 6.3.
83 Cf. Levick 1990, 165-166.
Although the scale of Claudius’ largesse in the early years of his reign indicates that he had money to spare, nonetheless, his extreme generosity in restoring large tracts of land formerly under tribute to quasi-independent client rulers must have impacted on the Imperial revenues. Consider, for example, what we know of the taxable value of Commagene. During the two decades after its annexation in 17, the territory apparently returned a total of one billion sesterces in taxes to Rome\(^{84}\), a sum equivalent to 50 million per annum, or some 7% of the estimated Imperial revenues - and so enough to pay the basic annual stipendium for two legions\(^{85}\). Now it is well known that until the systematic taxation reforms of Diocletian the Roman Empire effectively lived on a hand-to-mouth basis, receiving enough revenue to pay for what was needed, chiefly the army and any military campaigns, with some left over for a relatively small bureaucracy and any necessary State-funded building projects\(^{86}\). What this meant was that any shortfall in revenue or increase in expenditure had to made up from somewhere.

One common way of making a little go a bit further was to lower the precious metal content of the imperial coinage and/or to limit the introduction of new coins\(^{87}\), the first being a method especially popular in the later principate. And yet analysis of Claudius’ coinage shows that not only was some 60% of his gold and silver issues struck between the years 41/42 and 51 (24.5% of the total in 51 alone), but that until 51, the denarius at least was struck at a slightly higher weight and fineness that was usual under Augustus\(^{88}\). To this we might add than in the 14 years he served as princeps, Claudius issued considerably more precious metal coinage than Tiberius and Gaius-Caligula combined over a total period of 27 years\(^{89}\).

If Claudius did not manipulate the coinage to maintain State expenditure at a proportionate level after the loss of Commagene, Judaea-Samaria and the Chalcis - and it is surely not unreasonable to assume that the tax revenues from Judaea-Samaria cannot have been much less than those from Commagene, although those from tiny Chalcis were perhaps negligible -then he must have made up the deficit by other means. Common alternative methods for so doing - and ones favoured by Gaius-Caligula - included raising the tax burden, imposing new taxes, confiscating land and property on spurious grounds, and the sale of imperial lands. But such revenue-raising methods are not attested for the reign of Claudius. Quite the opposite: as we have already seen, he lowered the tax increases and even cancelled some of the new taxes implemented by Gaius-Caligula, and returned confiscated property and monies to those who had suffered under that emperor and Tiberius.

It seems, then, that Claudius must have made up the loss in tax revenue through the tribute now being paid by the newly annexed territories of Mauretania, Lycia, Thrace and Noricum\(^{90}\), although as the Mauretanas, Thrace and Noricum were provided with

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\(^{84}\) Suet. Calig. 16.3.

\(^{85}\) On the basis of each legion having 5,500 men, each man paid in three annual instalments of 400 denarii: cf. Speidel 1992, 88, although immunes, centurions and officers would have received a higher rate of pay.

\(^{86}\) Finley 1968, 159.

\(^{87}\) Jones 1974, 190.

\(^{88}\) Burgers 2001, 100 and 102, with 109.


\(^{90}\) Levick 1990, 133. Although the invasion of Britannia may have resulted in a short-term profit from the capture of booty and the rapid exploitation of its mineral resources (especially the silver-rich lead of the Mendips, already
auxiliary garrisons - a substantial one in the case of the Mauretanias - then some of the tribute raised in these provinces must have been diverted to pay for these units. But Lycia seems never to have been provided with even a single auxiliary unit, and so the tax returns from that province would have gone direct to Rome; and they may have been quite substantial. As it is, the wealth of Lycia was derived from a wide variety of natural resources and products\textsuperscript{91}. These included, \textit{inter alia}, sponges, goat hair for ropes, \textit{Lycium} (a type of healing substance), gazelles and panthers for the circus, fish, some of which was apparently processed as \textit{garum} and/or \textit{salsamenta}\textsuperscript{92}, and even gilded sandals; but perhaps the most valuable commodity of all was its timber, used for ship-building and for furniture.

Although we cannot even begin to guess the potential tax return to be gained to Rome from provincialising Lycia, it must surely have exceeded that of Commagene, a smaller area with far fewer natural resources. Indeed, some idea as to the high economic worth of Lycia is still to be seen in the many surviving remains that dot the Lycian landscape: but it is shown most clearly by the text of an Antonine-period statue base erected at Xanthus, (most probably) in honour of Opramoas of Rhodiapolis. This states how the honorand distributed a series of benefactions to the \textit{koinon} and \textit{poleis} of Lycia totalling 1,300,000 \textit{denarii}, thus 5,200,000 \textit{HS}\textsuperscript{93}, a sum equal to one tenth of the probable annual tax revenue of Commagene. That one man alone could amass such a disposable fortune is the clearest indicator we have of the economic status of Lycia, admittedly, at least in the Antonine period, by when Lycia had enjoyed a century of protection under the \textit{Pax Romana}. But we cannot doubt that in the mid-1\textsuperscript{st} century Lycia was already known to be a territory of substantial economic worth\textsuperscript{94}, even if its full potential had not yet been fully exploited. Thus it seems quite likely, on balance, that financial reasons played their part in determining the annexation of Lycia.

**Discussion**

Of the four claimed motives inspiring or resulting in the annexation of Lycia that have been examined here, two have been found distinctly wanting. To begin with, there is no evidence that the annexation would in any way have enhanced Claudius’ military or imperial glory, as intimated by D. Magie: Lycia was, after all, a subservient and generally peaceful client state, and so in any case a nominal if not \textit{de facto} part of the Roman \textit{imperium}. Nor does it seem that S. Jameson’s idea that Claudius’ programme of extending citizenship throughout the Empire as a means of enhancing his personal patronage, and encouraging provincials to enter State service, played any part in the decision to assume direct control of the territory: few Lycians are known to have entered State service before the time of Domitian, and most who did so entered during the 2\textsuperscript{nd} century.

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\textsuperscript{91} Brandt – Kolb 2005, 100-101, with full references.

\textsuperscript{92} Zimmermann 2000, esp. 339, where it is estimated that perhaps 400 tons of fish could be processed at Teimusa alone on an annual basis.

\textsuperscript{93} Cf. Brandt – Kolb 2005, 109, with references.

\textsuperscript{94} Even in Augustan times Lycia was known to be entirely self-sufficient: Ver. Aen. 7.721.
This leaves us with the two remaining motives, the long-held one that Lycia was annexed simply because of internecine political strife, perhaps leading to a *de facto* civil war, or, as R. Syme speculated, because of the financial benefits the territory brought to Rome. As we have seen, the belief that there was civil strife in Lycia in the years preceding its annexation cannot be disputed: but it does not follow from this that the resolution of such political strife was the reason for Lycia's annexation - especially as the situation there was clearly resolved in a short period of time, allowing Veranius to implement a road-building (or rationalisation?) programme completed by 47. The main point is, however, that while Rome often intervened to settle matters in her client states, this was not necessarily followed by annexation: internal matters in Thrace and Nabataea, for example, resulted in Roman intervention on several occasions before these territories were annexed as provinces, Thrace in 44/45, Nabataea in 106/112, in both cases because of the lack of any alternative.

Which leads us to consider if financial motives were involved in the decision to annex Lycia. This does seem likely. As we have seen, although Claudius evidently inherited a prosperous economy and full treasury when he became *princeps*, his instantaneous and excessive generosity to his soldiers and the Roman people, and the return of Commagene, Judaea-Samaria, and the Chalcis to client status, must have placed a severe strain on the imperial revenues. His largesse to the military and the people of Rome, for example, if paid all at once may have totalled as much as 880 million *HS*, more than a single year's tax-revenue. Matters would have been made worse by the loss of the territories he returned to client status: it seems likely that Commagene alone may well have contributed enough in the way of tribute to maintain two entire legions. When we take into account that the negative impact of Rome's finances brought about by Claudius' impetuous behaviour on accession (no matter his reasons) would be further exacerbated by his planned invasion of Britain and his substantial public works programme, along with his lowering of the taxes heightened by Gaius-Caligula and the cancellation of others that emperor introduced, it becomes clear that alternative sources of revenue needed to be found - and at short notice - to maintain the monies required by the State treasury to fulfil its financial obligations.

As we have seen, one way of balancing the books, so to speak, was to manipulate the supply and quality of the coinage, another was by introducing new taxes or raising existing ones, and yet Claudius took neither of these steps. So, the only real alternative left to him was to extend the tax net itself, by incorporating new territories into the *imperium* and so compensate - at least in part - for the loss of those he returned to client status. In other words, although a state of 'discord' and 'στάσις' might have stimulated *intervention* into the affairs of Lycia (and, later, Thrace), we might with reason conclude that the *decision* to annex the territory was directed by financial considerations. Indeed, it might even be suggested that the decision was taken late in 41 or in 42, when Claudius' advisers had the chance (or courage?) to inform him of the real negative effects on the State treasury of his extreme generosity at the time of his accession, and especially so with the return of Commagene, Judaea-Samaria and the Chalcis to client status. Thus we might envisage a situation in which all that was needed was a reason to intervene into the affairs of a generally compliant client state and convert such intervention into longer-term annexation: and so the annexation of Lycia.
Why did Claudius Annex Lycia?

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Claudius, Lykia'yı Neden İlhak Etti?


İmparatorluk Roma’sının, normalde sadık ve barışçıl müttefik bir devleti sırif iç siyasi huzursuzluğu var diye ilhak etmeye kalkıştığına da dair çok nadiren kanıt görülür. Ki bu durumda, Lykia’yı ilhak etmek için rol oynayabilecek diğer motivasyonlara bakmak gerekiyor. S. Şahin ve M. Adak’ın da yaptığı gibi başka belgelerin önune süren bir alternatif savların temelde göz ardı edildiği Lykia’nın ilhakı konusunun özellikle diğer hususlara bakmak gerekliyor. Söz konusu alternatif açıklamalara göre Lykia’nın ilhakı en azından kısmen Claudius’un şahsi askeri veya imparatorluk şanını iyileştirmek; veya (Roma’da siyasi desteği garantilemek için) kendisinin şahsi hamiliğini artırmak amacıyla; ya da mali sebeplerinden dolayı gerçekleştiştirdiği.

Lykia’nın ilhakı için öne sürülün dört motivasyon ayrıntıyla irdelemiştir. İç huzursuzluk her ne kadar Roma’nın Lykia’nın iç işlerine karışmasına giden yolu açmış olmasının karşılığında bu sebeple yapılmıştır daa çok az kanıt vardır. Bu ilhak imparatorluk şanını veya imparatorun hamiliğini artırmak sebeplerinden dolayı kararlaştırılmıştı. Ancak Lykia’nın sıradan bir Roma eyaleti yapımında mali konular önemli bir rol oynamış görünüyor. Bu durum Claudius’un tahta çıktığı İ.S. 41 ve izleyen on yıllık Roma ekonomisine bir bâlışla ortaya çıkıyor. İ.S. 41 yılında imparatorluk maliyesi açıkça iyi durumda olmasına ve Claudius’un ordu ya ve Roma halkına önemli miktarlarda bağış yapmasını sağlamasına karşılık, si VE bir Roma ana, KOMMAGENE, JUDAIA-SAMARIA ve Khalkis’i tekrar vasal konuma döndürmesi imparatorluk gelirlerine önemli bir etki yapmış olmalıdır. Örneğin, vergi potansiyeli bağlamında KOMMAGENE’nin ekonomik değeri konusunda kaynaklarını güvencece olursak sadece bu bölgeden gelen vergi gelirleri en azından iki leyonu yıllık ödemenleri karşılıştırır.

Gelirlerdeki bu kayıp imparatorluk bütçesinde bir şekilde tazmin edilmek durumundaydı ve Claudius’un imparatorluk döneminin tipik özelliği olan muazzam kamu projelerinin