

THE KING’S EUROPEAN MOROCCO: A POSTCOLONIAL
APPROACH TO MOROCCO’S QUEST TO BECOME A EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY MEMBER

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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Ankara
June 2015

To Nilgün, Tayfun and Yağmur İpek

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COMMUNITY MEMBER

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
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by

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in

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İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

June 2015

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

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ABSTRACT

THE KING'S EUROPEAN MOROCCO: A POSTCOLONIAL APPROACH TO MOROCCO'S QUEST TO BECOME A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MEMBER

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This study aims to analyze the membership application of the Kingdom of Morocco to the European Community in 1987 through postcolonial nationalism, which refers to the fact that the impacts of colonizer states continue on the national identity of the colonized states after colonialism. It analyzes the membership application of the Kingdom of Morocco to the European Community in terms of how Morocco felt European so that it claimed its Europeanness according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome that required the applicant states to be European, as the main article of the Treaty that founded the European Community.

Taking the Bhabhaian approach to hybridity as one of the main tenets of postcolonial nationalism, this dissertation argues that the Kingdom of Morocco's relations with the European Community in 1987 should go beyond why it applied to be one of its members that was already explained by different economic and political

reasons. Instead, it offers a cultural aspect defined by postcoloniality that analyzes how Kingdom of Morocco asserted its Europeanness, and how it explained to the European Commission that it was a European state according to the Treaty of Rome.

Framing Morocco's colonial status between 1912 and 1956, this dissertation examines how Morocco that constructed its national identity both during and after colonialism against Europe (against France) due to European colonialism (the French Protectorate) added Europeanness into this national identity in its postcolonial period, by claiming that Moroccan nation and state together are European, with King Hassan II's membership application to the European Community.

Accordingly, this dissertation argues that Morocco's 1987 membership application to the European Community is the instrumentalization of hybridity that was created by the French among Moroccan locals between 1912 and 1956 by King Hassan II, in the postcolonial Moroccan national identity to claim that Morocco was European according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.

Keywords: Morocco, European Community, Postcolonial Nationalism, Hybridity, Culture, National Identity

ÖZET

KRALIN AVRUPALI FAS'I: FAS KRALLIĞI'NIN AVRUPA TOPLULUĞU'NA ÜYELİK BAŞVURUSUNA POSTKOLONYAL BİR YAKLAŞIM

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Bu çalışma Fas Krallığı'nın 1987 yılında Avrupa Topluluğu'na yaptığı üyelik başvurusunu, kolonyal dönemde kolonici devletlerin kolonize devletlerde yarattığı etkilerin kolonyal dönemden sonra da kolonize devletlerin milli kimliği üzerinde devam ettiğini vurgulayan postkolonyal milliyetçilik teorisiyle açıklamaktadır. Çalışma, bu bağlamda, Fas Krallığı'nın Avrupa Topluluğu'na yaptığı üyelik başvurusunu Fas Krallığı'nın kendini nasıl Avrupalı hissettiği ve bu Avrupalılığını Avrupa Topluluğu'na başvuracak olan devletlerin Avrupalı olması gerektiğini vurgulayan Roma Antlaşması'nın 237.maddesine göre nasıl iddia ettiğini/açıkladığını incelemektedir.

İncelemeyi Homi Bhabha'nın postkolonyal milliyetçiliğin ana unsurlarından biri olan *hibridite* yaklaşımı temelinde yapan bu çalışma, Fas Krallığı'nın Avrupa Topluluğu ile 1987 yılı itibariyle olan ilişkilerini(günümüzde Avrupa Birliği ile olan ilişkilerini) derinleştirmeyi hedeflemektedir. Çalışma, bu anlamda, Fas Krallığı'nın 1987 yılında Avrupa Topluluğu (bugünkü Avrupa Birliği) ile olan ilişkilerini “Krallık Topluluğa üyelik için neden başvurdu?” sorusuna yanıt olan ekonomik ve siyasi içerikli cevaplar yerine “Krallık Roma Antlaşması'na göre kendini nasıl Avrupalı hissetti?” sorusuna yanıt olabilecek, postkolonyallik çerçevesinde şekillenen kültür kavramıyla incelemektedir.

Fas Krallığı'nın 1912 ve 1956 yılları arasındaki kolonize devlet konumunu değerlendiren bu tez, milli kimliğini kolonyal dönemde ve kolonyal dönemden sonra Avrupa kolonyalizminden (Fransız Protektorasından) dolayı Avrupa'ya (Fransa'ya) karşı oluşturan Fas Krallığı'nda, Avrupa Topluluğu'na üyelik başvurusunda bulunarak Fas halkının devletiyle ve milletiyle Avrupalı olduğunu iddia eden Kral İkinci Hasan'ın Avrupalılık bileşenini Fas milli kimliğine nasıl eklediğini sorgulamaktadır.

Tez, Roma Antlaşması'na göre Fas'ın Avrupalılığının, 1912 ve 1956 yılları arasında Fransızların Fas'ta yarattığı hibriditenin Kral İkinci Hasan tarafından postkolonyal Faslı milli kimliğine araçsallaştırılarak açıklandığını iddia etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Fas Krallığı, Postkolonyal Milliyetçilik, Avrupa Topluluğu, Hibridite, Kültür, Milli Kimlik

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

An author from Cameroon says: To start is the half way to succeed, but the start is the difficulty of the success”. In a dissertation where I analyzed a state’s national identity from colonial to postcolonial times in eight different chapters, I never felt the difficulty of writing a section on acknowledgements. Not only because I do not know where to start for this part, as the author says, but I hardly choose the proper words that would express my thoughts and emotions.

First of all, I never thought I would write this section, since I never guessed I would come to this point with a consistent psychological and physical health. To write this dissertation was quite difficult to me, both in terms of the resources I utilized, the places I visited, the things I witnessed, the incidents I experienced to collect more data in Africa, and also in terms of my relations with people while writing it. I very often felt that to protect the stability in these relations with my parents, friends and professors was more difficult than to construct my dissertation chapters. I quite a lot broke hearts of people around me, sometimes disappointed them, sometimes made them cry, and even sometimes made them hate me in this process. I am also aware that I was quite selfish many times while writing this dissertation, always thought about myself first, and neglected people who loved me. This dissertation, primarily, is my gift to all these people, whom I hope will understand me one day, if not today.

Second, I see this dissertation as a legend that I created, since I believe everyone in this world creates at least one legend when they are alive. Remembering the first days I knocked my first supervisor's office door and told her that I wanted to work on Morocco, I knew that a very tough job was going to wait for me. Lack of resources that I needed to use in Turkey on the one hand, I had an IR mind focused on bilateral relations between countries, that was humiliating nationalism, cultural, and identity studies, on the other hand. In addition, the lack of people around me who already worked on Morocco doubled the unfeasibility of this dissertation research. Last but not least, I did not have a defined place in the world where I would find the necessary documents I needed. The wish to open a new branch in Turkish political science, to explain something that was never studied before in Turkey and in the world, to throw myself into an African adventure were the basis of this ambition. Today, I am clearly and openly proud of myself, maybe the first time in my life, because I managed to finish my dissertation, conclude this ambition, and offer an original study to the readers in the world.

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By hoping that this dissertation opens new horizons in readers' mind, I declare that I get the whole responsibility of what is written in chapters.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	xi
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Background	1
1.2. Scope and significance of dissertation	8
1.3. Methodology	25
1.4. Dissertation Organization	27
CHAPTER II: POSTCOLONIAL NATIONALISM	31
2.1. Etymology of Postcolonial and Nationalism	31
2.2. Colonialism: The Development	32
2.3. Colonialism: The Philosophical Interpretation	35
2.4. Postcolonialism and Nationalism: Overviews	40
2.5. Postcolonial Nationalism: An Overview	46
2.5.1. Critique of Colonialism	47
2.5.2. Inbetweenness	54
2.5.3. Admiration of Europe	58
CHAPTER III: SETTLEMENT OF THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE IN MOROCCO	64
3.1. Morocco in the Maghreb History	64
3.2. The End of Morocco's Isolation from Europe: 1415-1631	69
3.3. The French in Morocco: 1631-1912	73

3.4. The French Protectorate in Morocco: Morocco in the French Colonialism in Africa.....	81
3.5. The Motivations of the French Colonialism in Africa	85
3.6. The Method of the French Colonialism in Africa	87
CHAPTER IV: SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION OF THE FRENCH WITH MOROCCAN ISLAM: CREATION OF POSTCOLONIAL HYBRIDITY IN 1912-1925 MOROCCO	94
4.1. Theoretical Match of Moroccan Hybridity in 1912-1925	94
4.2. The Essences of the French Protectorate in Morocco	95
4.3. Use of Islam in Morocco by Blad al Siba Amazighs against the French.....	100
4.4. Use of Islam in Morocco against the French by Blad al Makhzen Amazighs	109
4.5. Use of Islam in Morocco against the French by Blad al Siba Amazigh literature.....	116
4.6. Successful integration of the French with Moroccan Islam	121
4.6.1. <i>La politique musulmane</i> of General Lyautey.....	121
4.6.2. Islam in the Blad al Makhzen reforms.....	122
4.6.3. Reforming Islamic Education	127
4.7. Manifestation of the 1912-1925 Hybridity among Moroccans	131
4.8. The French Protectorate in Morocco between 1912 and 1925: An Assessment	141
CHAPTER V: UNSUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION OF THE FRENCH WITH MOROCCAN ISLAM AND NATIONALISM: THE 1925-1956 CONTINUUM OF HYBRIDITY CREATION UNDER THE RISE OF MOROCCANNESS	144
5.1. End of General Lyautey Rule in the Protectorate.....	144
5.2. Reformist Moroccan Nationalism	146
5.2.1. The Rif Republic.....	146
5.2.2. The 1930 and 1935 <i>Dahirs</i>	151
5.3. Separatist Moroccan Nationalism: Rise of Political Parties.....	155
5.3.1. The Communist Party	156
5.3.2. The Istiqlal Party.....	159
5.3.3. The Democratic Party for Independence	165
5.4. The Unsuccessful Integration of the French with Moroccaness	167

5.5. The French Protectorate in Morocco between 1925 and 1956: An Assessment	175
CHAPTER VI: ATTEMPTS TO NULLIFY THE PROTECTORATES' IMPACTS IN MOROCCO BETWEEN 1956 AND 1984	179
6.1. The Unended Colonialism in Morocco	179
6.2. The 1956-1962 Period in Postcolonial Morocco.....	180
6.2.1. Nullification Attempts of Protectorates' Impacts through Moroccanness	180
6.2.2. Nullification Attempts of Protectorates' Impacts through Maghrebness	188
6.2.3. Nullification Attempts of Protectorates' Impacts through Africanness..	192
6.3. The 1963-1969 Period in Postcolonial Morocco.....	196
6.3.1. Nullification Attempts of Protectorates' Impacts through through Moroccanness	198
6.4. The 1969-1984 Period in Postcolonial Morocco.....	202
6.4.1. Nullification Attempts of Protectorates' Impacts through Moroccanness	203
6.4.2. Nullification Attempts of Protectorates' Impacts through Africanness..	210
6.5. The Role of Islam in Postcolonial Moroccan National Identity between 1956 and 1984	211
6.6. The 1956-1984 Postcolonial Period in Morocco: An Assessment.....	214
CHAPTER VII: THE KING'S EUROPEAN MOROCCO	218
7.1. The Road to the King's European Morocco.....	219
7.2. Discussions on the King's European Morocco in Morocco	229
7.3. Support to the King's European Morocco.....	234
7.4. Reaction to the King's European Morocco	239
7.5. European Response to the King's European Morocco.....	244
7.5.1. The King's European Morocco According to European Bureaucrats	244
7.5.2. The King's European Morocco according to European Commission officers	246
7.5.3. The King's European Morocco According to the European Media	251
7.6. The King's European Morocco: An Assesment.....	256
CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION.....	259
BIBLIOGRAPHY	272

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The first chapter of dissertation could be analyzed in four headings: These are the background part which shows how the dissertation argument dissertation was constructed, literature review part which shows how the dissertation contributes to the related literatures, methodology part which shows the methods used in the dissertation, and the organization part which shows what the content of dissertation chapters.

1.1. Background

The Turkish daily *Cumhuriyet* published a new on October 12nd 1987. Accordingly, the Belgian journal *Le Soir* argued that the European Commission would reject the membership applications of Turkey and Morocco to the European Economic Community (E.E.C) that would eventually make them members to the European

Community (E.C.)¹. *Le Soir* argued that neither Turkey's nor Morocco's applications to the E.E.C would be accepted, and added that this rejection would definitely disappoint these states. That is why, *Le Soir* stated that the European Commission was currently seeking for a way to "kindly reject" the membership applications of Turkey and Morocco to E.E.C so that they would not be offended. *Le Soir* referred to the speech of Mr. Claude Cheysson, the responsible bureaucrat at the European Commission of the Mediterranean Affairs, about this kindly rejection:

The membership applications of Morocco and Turkey, two countries from another world to Europe, are quite similar. The European Community believes that it is quite important to develop bilateral relations with Turkey and Morocco in the final analysis. However, the club of twelve, as the founders of the European Community, are deeply concerned about these states' membership applications to the organization. The application of Morocco, which is not geographically part of Europe, encountered judicial obstacles and therefore was rejected with no hesitation. The membership application of Turkey, on the other hand, was sent to the European Commission to be discussed in more detail. However, I do not believe that the Commission will respond to Turkey in a short time. In any case, the answer of the Commission will not be clear. I believe that another compromise solution must be found for the membership applications of Turkey and Morocco to the European Community².

Mr. Cheysson's declaration about the future of the membership applications of Turkey and Morocco to European Community seemed quite pessimistic, but he was at the end a European bureaucrat who was working for a European organization that was already sensitive about who was and was not European. With this speech, Mr. Cheysson spoke on behalf of the European Commission that regarded Turkey as

¹ European Communities consisted of three different bodies; European Coal and Steel Community(ECSC), European Atomic Energy Community, and European Economic Community. European Economic Community was the only body that was open for the enlargement of the European Communities with according to the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Accordingly, King Hassan II applied to the European Economic Community to be a member to the European Community. European Economic Community as a part of European Community (or European Communities as some sources indicate) became the European Union in 1993 with Maastricht Treaty.

² Cumhuriyet, October 1987

more European than Morocco. In other words, Mr.Cheysson meant that Turkey had met the criteria of article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, which said that every European state could apply to become a member of the European Community. In accordance with this article, the European Commission decided that Turkey was more European than Morocco thanks to land borders with Greece and Bulgaria. On the other hand, the European Commission did not regard Morocco as European due to the Gibraltar Strait splitting Morocco from Europe. This difference, at the end, made the European Commission reject Morocco's membership application to E.C.

The rejection of Morocco's membership application was a political decision that did not surprise many who already knew Morocco was not geographically a European state. Nevertheless, there is a political science aspect of this decision that surprises many, and thus that cannot be ignored. Morocco's membership application to the E.C was not solely an attempt to integrate with the organization members for various reasons, but also an act of assertion of Morocco's Europeanness. The application to E.C, in this sense, was a means for Morocco to argue its Europeanness in order to comply with article 237 of Treaty of Rome that required the applicant states to be European. Accordingly, a political science aspect to the rejection of Morocco's membership application appears if we analyze how Morocco asserted its Europeanness before applying to the European Communities in 1987. This dissertation was written to examine this aspect by presenting such an analysis. Accordingly, this dissertation is the first substantial academic attempt to analyze Morocco's Europeanness.

Such an analysis first of all needs awareness that come from observing contemporary world politics. Most of the today's states can be divided into two; those who colonized and those who were colonized. This distinction shows that

many of the colonized states still carry on several remnants of their European colonial heritage on their flags, state mechanisms, cultures, and even footballs. In addition to Australia, Bermuda, New Zealand, Tuvalu, for instance, that gave space to the flag of the Great Britain (as their colonizer) in their national flags, the Central African Republic, Guadeloupe, Seychelles and Mayotte gave space to the flag of France (as their colonizer) in their national flags after independence. In contrast to their colonizers' flags in their ones, some of the colonized countries used the red color in their national flags to symbolize the blood spent in the independence struggle against European colonialism. Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Bolivia, Peru, Bolivia, Puerto Rico, and Morocco are among these states. Independence struggle that was symbolized by the red color in some cases was also symbolized by other colors, such as the flag of the French colony Niger, which used the white color to symbolize the nation's innocence and the orange circle to symbolize its unity against future colonialism. The impacts of the colonizers on the colonized are not only measured by national flags of course. Many of the colonized states today speak the languages of their European colonizers as one of the official languages besides their national languages, such as Nigerians, Indians, Pakistanis, New Zealanders who speak English besides Yoruba, Igbo or Urdu, Algerians, Haitians, Cameroonians, Chadians who speak French besides Arabic or Kabylie, Brazilians, Cabo Verdeans, Angolese, Mozambique who speak Portuguese besides Bantu, and the majority of Southern and Central American states who speak Spanish. Some of the colonized states even developed special languages like *darija* in Morocco that contains words and expressions from both French and Arabic. There are also colonized states that retained place names from their colonizers' languages

after independence in addition to the place names in their own language. Gabon as a French colony, for instance has two cities called Franceville and Libreville in French besides the cities of Akok, Lalara, Gamba in ethnic Fang language. Algeria has a city called Constantine in French besides Wahan, El Oued, Bejaia in Arabic, and Benin has a city called Malanville in French besides Bori, Lokossa, Kandi in Fon. Botswana as a British colony has a city called Francistown in English besides Palapya and Tulokweng in Setswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo as a Belgian colony has two cities called Brazzaville and Pointe Noire in Belgian French besides Aru and Basankusu in Kituba, Argentina as a Spanish colony has its capital Buenos Aires, Bolivia has a city called San Iglesio del Velasco. In addition, even though colonized states fought their European colonizers to get their independences, they later voluntarily became members of international organizations such as Commonwealth founded by the Great Britain, Organization International de *Francophonie* found by the French, Hispanic American Organization founded by the Spanish, *Comunidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa*. Many football players from Sub-Saharan Africa prefer to play not in their national teams but in the national team of France or Great Britain because they want to do so. In addition, many colonized states named their national currencies with the currency unit of their colonizer, such as Argentina that uses the peseta, West African states that use the franc CFA, and East African ones that use pounds. All these examples show that the colonized states still have a cultural link to their colonizers even after independence.

The second step for such an analysis is to comprehend significant points in Moroccan history. As stated above, the Treaty of Rome required the applicant states to be European before applying for membership. Unlike other Mediterranean countries such as Malta, Turkey and Cyprus, who asserted how European they were

to fulfill article 237 with an accord between state and non-state actors (Redmond 1997; Preston 1997; Theophylactou 1995; Nas & Özer 2012), Morocco claimed how European it was with one single state actor; King Hassan II, who has been the commander of the faithful and also the supreme representative of the Moroccan nation according to the Moroccan Constitution. Looking at his discourses on the Europeanness of Morocco in this sense, one sees his view of Europeanness as a component of the Moroccan national identity because he asserted that Moroccan nation was European as well with this membership application to E.C. In addition, King Hassan II tried to add Europeanness into Moroccan national identity that composed of different components that were often constructed against European colonialism that was represented by the French and Spanish Protectorates in Morocco between 1912 and 1956. These components are Islam, Moroccanness, Maghrebness, Africanness, and Arabness before the 2011 constitutional changes. The 2011 Constitutional changes in the aftermath of Arab Spring also added Amazighness to Moroccan national identity.

Accordingly, these two awarenesses are essential to understand the Europeanness of Morocco. It is again these awarenesses that construct the first assumption of this analysis that correlated the European Morocco argument of King Hassan II with the French and the Spanish Protectorates that ruled Morocco between 1912 and 1956. This assumption states that King Hassan II asserted the Europeanness of Morocco through the history Morocco had had with the French and the Spanish Protectorates between 1912 and 1956. Further research partly proves it, but some more shows that the way the French and the Spanish ruled Morocco in their Protectorates was totally different not only in terms of how they had administered Morocco but also how they had approached to the Moroccan locals. Then, the

analysis assumes, for instance, that it was impossible for King Hassan II to base Morocco's Europeanness on the Spanish Protectorate after the usage of chemical gas in 1926 against Moroccans; in contrast the French had accepted the religious authority of the Moroccan sultan and ruled Morocco in an indirect way. Further research justified this conceptual difference between the two Protectorates because the primary documents found in Morocco and France showed that the anticolonial policies of King Hassan II were never directed against the French but to the Spanish Protectorate. As a result, the assumption of the analysis reaches a clearer point when we take into account the theoretical approach of postcolonial nationalism that argued that the impacts of the European colonialism continue on the national identity of the colonized people even after colonialism. The dissertation, at the end, evaluates this assumption about that King Hassan II's European Morocco as a direct outcome of the impacts of the European colonialism symbolized by the French Protectorate on Moroccan national identity using postcolonial nationalism theory. This evaluation addresses a main research question with significant sub-questions in each chapter of the dissertation. Accordingly, the main question of the dissertation is how King Hassan II added Europeanness on Moroccan national identity even though each of its components was constructed against Europe due to European colonialism during the colonial and postcolonial episodes. As an answer to this question, the dissertation argues that the European Morocco argument was King Hassan II's instrumentalization of hybridity between Moroccans and French -which was created in the French Protectorate episode- in postcolonial Moroccan national identity to explain/assert the European Commission that Morocco was a European state (and nation) according to article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. In this sense, the dissertation regards King Hassan II's membership application to E.C through his thinking of

Morocco as a European state as an illustration of hybridity created by the French in Morocco in colonial period in postcolonial period. Therefore, this dissertation explains the Europeanness of Morocco according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, as a reflection of the hybridity between Morocco and France that started in the French Protectorate episode in Morocco's postcolonial period and thus, national identity. In this sense, this dissertation regards the European feeling of Morocco on the basis of the French protectorate, as the reflection of the hybridity that was created in the colonial period by the French. While doing this, this dissertation brings an alternative definition, and also meaning of Europe, that is hybrid with Moroccanness, to the existing definition and meaning of Europe.

1.2. Scope and Significance of Dissertation

The scope of this dissertation is the postcolonial Moroccan national identity; it analyzes the Europeanness of Morocco that was carried to the Moroccan agenda in 1987, a year in the postcolonial episode of Morocco after the independence in 1956. The significance of this dissertation is twofold. First, it contributes to the literature that analyzes the postcolonial Moroccan national identity with more than one component in a hybrid way. As a study that analyzes this identity on the axis of Europeanness, Africanness and Arabness, as did King Hassan II in his application letter to the E.C, the thesis so far is the only study that analyzes the European component of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity. Moreover, the dissertation analyzes the formation of the components of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity in colonial times. The second significance of this thesis concerns the grounds

of the Moroccan membership application to the E.C. Besides numerous economic and political reasons that explain this application, the thesis shows that the application was built on identity ground. In addition, the thesis is dealing with the Moroccan voice on how Morocco had felt European and then had applied to the E.E.C, in contrast to the literature that reflects the European voice on this application by discussing how the European Commission had rejected Morocco's application. While doing this, the thesis falsifies a certain amount of misinformation about the application of Morocco to the European Community written by previous authors.

Postcolonial Moroccan national identity has many components. In terms of nationality, Morocco is Moroccan. In terms of religion, Morocco is Muslim and Jewish. In terms of In terms of microregion, Morocco is Maghrebian. In terms of macroregion, Morocco is African. In terms of race, Morocco is Arab-Amazigh. The reason why these components are taken into account in the postcolonial Moroccan identity is because each of them was used in the nation building process of Morocco that started before the independence and continued after independence. Nevertheless, the limited academic literature on the postcolonial Moroccan identity never expressed all of these components at the same time because of an unknown reason. The existing literature on the postcolonial Moroccan national identity is divided into four themes. These are the literature that expressed the Islamic component of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity, that which expressed the Arabness component that expressed the Amazighness component and that expressed two or three of these components of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity together.

John Entelis in *Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan politics* expresses the Islamic component of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity through the islamization of Moroccan monarchy. According to Entelis, Islam is more and more

channeled into Moroccan political life because of the political actions' blending with Islam. It is this situation that merge Islam and politics and creates political Islam in Morocco that has been regarded as an ideal since independence (1989:10). Entelis believes that the islamization of Moroccan politics was related to the social existence of the Moroccan community after independence. In this sense, the fact that Moroccans refer to themselves as Muslims in the postcolonial episode signifies that Islam actually reaches the Muslim consensus by admitting religion and Islam as the parts of the collective identity (1989:12). Islam that has always been regarded in the politics has such a strong position that it also defines the ethnic sovereignties. According to Entelis, it is the power of Islam that identifies the view of the Moroccan state to the Amazighs who had never been regarded as an ethnic group until the constitutional change in 2011. Entelis wants to show the power of Islam in the postcolonial Moroccan national identity by referring to the view of the Moroccan state to the Amazighs (1989:26). In his view, this power of Islam leads to the case in Morocco where there is no distinction between umma-watan because government symbols, institutions and practices are already designated to reinforce the religious and secular legitimacy of the state (1989:42). This is why Entelis refers to Clifford G. Geertz who underlined the importance of Islam and nationalism in the motto of "Long live Islam, long live Morocco, long live the sultan" on the eve of Moroccan independence (1989: 57).

The relation of Islam with politics in Morocco was discussed through the Moroccan monarchy by C. R. Pennell in *Morocco since 1830: A history*, a work that expresses the Islamic component of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity. According to Pennell, the Moroccan independence brought a specific Moroccan form of politics which the Moroccan monarch is the sultan but also the caliph. As an

example, Pennell states the Moroccan king's adoption to recognize the rights of citizenship and the exercise of public and trade union freedoms in every religious day is an example (2000:298). In addition, Pennell also gives the example of King Hassan's riding a horse every Friday to the mosque to lead the community in prayer after he had come to throne. In addition, Pennell shows how the King Hassan II instituted a series of talks given by religious scholars from around the Islamic world called Hassanian lectures during Ramadan (2000:317). Pennell does not limit his indicators that show the location of Islam in Moroccan politics with the Moroccan state. He also analyzes the Islamist movements that help him to declare the postcolonial Moroccan national identity with Islam only. In this sense, Pennell gives the example of several Islamists such as Abd al Karim Muti, a former official of the Education Ministry, who founded a radical youth movement with the name of al Shabiba al Islamiyya in the early 1970s that attacked the King. Pennell exemplifies this attack with a letter sent to the King that said: "We say to you: Fear God in his religion and the religion of the Prophet before he turns you into a monkey, after having changed you into a drunkard and opium addict" (2000:21).

Moreover, there was also another important Islamist actor that Pennell analyzes; Abd al Salam al Yassine. He had published two books in 1972 and 1973 that called for an Islamic state in Morocco, led by a moral leader inspired by the Prophet. What made him famous was an open letter to the King in 1974 entitled Islam or the Deluge in which he blamed the coups on Hassan's failures as ruler, saying that he was corrupt, that he advocated liberal western values and that he was indebted to foreign, particularly Zionist capital. Yasin asked whether the King was Muslim or not (2000:353).

The relation of Islam and the Moroccan monarchy is also discussed by Lawrence Rosen in *The Culture of Islam: Changing aspects of contemporary Muslim life* that expresses the Islam component of the postcolonial national identity. Rosen analyzes the submission relation between the people and the monarch in postcolonial Morocco. He argues that it is the relationship of Sufi disciple to Sufi master that makes the Moroccan ruler as the father of the nation. According to Rosen, it is this relationship that creates the particular religious patterns and structure of Moroccan authoritarianism. According to Rosen, as long as the ruler possessed the necessary armed strength to seize and hold power, and as long as he was a Muslim, however minimal and however nominal, that suffices (2002:34). Rosen analyzes the authoritarian character of the Moroccan monarchy by referring to the famous sayings of the King Hassan who once said: "Power is a milestone: if you rub up against it adroitly it stimulates you in return, but if you lean on it too strongly it rolls away. Moroccans are sometimes difficult people to lead...May father always told me: Morocco is a lion that you must guide with a leash, he should never sense the chain" (2002:66).

Last but not least, Mohsine el Ahmadi in *La Monarchie et l'islam* also touches upon the relation of Islam with the Moroccan monarchy while expressing the Islam component of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity (2006:9). According to el Ahmadi, Islam has always been in the process of the Moroccan politics that makes Islam actually an indispensable element for the comprehension of what has been going on in Morocco. In el Ahmadi's view, the King Hassan II and Mohamed VI always wanted to legitimize their domination on the Moroccan masses by using the Powers Islam gave to them (2006:11). This is why El Ahmadi argues that Islam has had a historical function, a cultural role in the rationalization of the religious and

political behaviors of the monarch actors in Morocco (2006:13). In this sense, El Ahmadi explains the role of Islam in the Moroccan monarch by analyzing the Moroccan flag which has the red surface symbolizing the blood of the Prophet and the green colored star that symbolized the green veins of the Prophet (2006:55). El Ahmadi, then, argues that Islam is the state religion that was fixed by all the constitutions from 1962 to 2011. El Ahmadi concludes that the history of the monarchy was based on Islam first, the monarch second and the Arabness third (2006:124).

As it is the case for Islam, there are also works that expressed the Arabness component postcolonial Moroccan national identity. William Zartman in *Government and Politics in Northern Africa* argues that the dominant culture there is Arabness even though Morocco is a mixture of Arab and Amazigh populations. According to Zartman, the Moroccan foreign policy has an intimate connection with the pressures of domestic politics that was defined by the Arabness politics of the Istiqlal Party. Zartman argues that the Arabness that was used by the King Hassan II to cut the activist opposition against him was also used in Moroccan foreign policy. The inclusion of Arabic states like Egypt and Algeria in the Casablanca Group that was founded by the King Hassan in January 1961 is an example of this implementation for Zartman (1963:37).

Arabness was also highlighted by Hans Tütsch in *From Ankara to Marrakech: Turks and Arabs in a changing world*. Unlike Zartman who argued that Arabness became dominant over Amazighness, Tütsch argues that Arabness dominates Islam in postcolonial Morocco. Tütsch does not underestimate the importance of Islam in the national identity since the King is known for his being head of all the community of the faithful, even though his actual power is small

(1964:180). However, Arabness comes out as the most important component because the pan-Arabness movement that started to be effective by the independence intended to replace Amazigh as the Amazigh language and French with Arabic. Tütsch argues that Arabic today is being used with French in Morocco by the actors of the upper classes and the government officials. This movement, in Tütsch's view, led to the non-development of the Tamazigh as a written language (1964:182). Tütsch also shows that the Arabness is so important for Morocco that the Moroccan state wanted to be a part of the Arab Union (1964:189).

The Arabness in the postcolonial Moroccan national identity was also employed as a tool of anti-colonialism by Abdallah Laroui in *Le Maroc et Hassan II*. In the book, Laroui argues that the Arabization movement started in Morocco in 1961 as an anticolonial policy that was arranged to provide the immediate Moroccanization of the public administration, nationalization of the foreign enterprises, and the evacuation of foreign troops from Morocco. In addition, Laroui stated that Arabization was decided to implement in the educational and judicial system in the postcolonial Morocco (2005:20). Laroui stated that the arabization of the justice was a first step for the islamization of the public life according to Allal al Fassi who thought that the Moroccan independence would have meant nothing without a new Moroccan legislation in 1961 (2005:39). Laroui then adds that the impacts of Arabization were strongly felt in 1966 with the Istiqlal Party, which was working to make the Moroccan administration similar to the ones in the Arab states (2005:48).

Arabism in the context of Arabness in the postcolonial Moroccan national identity was also analyzed through the Arabic language. Ali Alalou in his article *Francophonie in Maghreb: A study of language attitudes among Moroccan teachers*

expresses the Arabic component of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity by analyzing the education system after independence. According to Alalou, whereas French was the sovereign language in education, administration, and the media in Morocco, Arabic replaced French in education. Calling this period as Arabization, Alalou argues that the courses such as history, geography, and philosophy that were once taught in French started to be in Arabic. This Arabization process was completed in 1990 when the first Arabized students graduated from high schools (2009:559).

Last but not least, Arabism as the expression of Arabness in the postcolonial Moroccan national identity was analyzed as a significant movement that was used to suppress the Amazigh culture, as did Amal Bouhrous in *The Amazigh Question: Transnational as renegotiation of Moroccan identity*. According to Bouhrous, the pan-Arabist movement in all periods of the postcolonial Moroccan history excluded Amazigh elements from the broader Moroccan national identity. In Bouhrous' view, the Istiqlal Party and the UNFP in the postcolonial Morocco wanted to impose their Arabo-Islamist nationalist model in addition to the monarchy that tried to use the Amazigh rural elites as a counterweight to the Istiqlal challenge while implementing a nation building project. According to Bouhrous, the Arabness always excluded the Amazighs from the Moroccan community because it always took place in the constitutions after independence in a form that described the shape of the postcolonial state. These constitutions did not leave any room for Amazighness until the constitutional change in 2011 that recognized Amazigh as an official language (2013:4).

As there are studies that express the Islam and Arabness components of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity, there are also some that express its

Amazighness component. Dwight Ling in *Morocco and Tunisia: A comparative Story* is among these studies. Ling analyzes the Amazighness with the impacts of the Amazighs to the Moroccan national identity before and after the independence. Ling maintains that the Arabness of the Maghreb region is limited to some extent because of the 40 % of the pure Amazigh race that has been living in the Maghreb for centuries even before the Arab invasion. This is why Ling argues that the Maghreb must chiefly be considered Amazighland. Nevertheless, Ling argues that the Amazighs disappeared from the region because of numerous invasions from the east and north. According to Ling, the Arab invasion was the strongest one because it Islamized and Arabized these Amazighs (1979:5). In addition to this pre-independence Arab invasion, Ling analyzes the role of Amazighs in the Moroccan national identity through the separation of Moroccan lands into Blad al Makhzen and Blad al Siba in 1822. According to Ling, the Amazighs in Blad al Siba were always the real defenders of the Moroccan lands integrity against the French. Moreover, Ling emphasizes that the administration of Blad al Siba by a jema'a was one of the first models of democracy in Maghreb history (1979:6). Regarding the postcolonial impacts of the Amazighs on the other hand to the Moroccan national identity, Ling argues that the Amazigh's participation in the Kharijite movement today enabled a Amazigh to claim to be a caliph or imam, something that was peculiar to the Arabs only before the Kharijite movement. Moreover, Ling also argues that the Arabness component of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity was not consistent because the King Hassan who was so in favor of Arabness in Morocco cut the relations between Morocco and Egypt when Nasser sent economic assistance to Algeria in the 1963 Sand War and Morocco broke off diplomatic relations with Egypt. King Hassan II boycotted meetings in 1964 where Nasser was present (1979:163). Ling also talks

about the role of the Amazighs in postcolonial Moroccan history with the role of General Oufkir who organized the coup d'état against King Hassan II in 1972 (1979:172).

Amazighness in the postcolonial Moroccan national identity was also expressed by Sarah Fischer in *Amazigh Legitimacy through Language in Morocco* through its resistance to Arabization. In Fischer's view, the Amazighs today have been suppressed by the governments in Morocco and Tunisia, and that there have been attempts to erase Amazighness from the Moroccan national identity. Fischer also argues that the Amazigh community today in Morocco has not been recognized even as a minority community, which is an action that limits their rights. Fischer at the end emphasizes that the usage of Amazigh language also lacks official status.

Like a response to Fischer, Said Bennis in *The Amazigh Question and National Identity in Morocco* expresses the Amazighness component of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity through the Amazighs' demands of their rights. According to Bennis, the Amazighness started to be a component of the postcolonial Moroccan identity when they started to demand the recognition of their rights of the legalization of their Amazigh language as an official language of the country and a compulsory subject of study, the re-writing of Moroccan history, the use of the Amazigh language in public life, the authorization of Amazigh names, the development of Amazigh regions and their share of natural resources on August 20th 1994 (2009:2). Upon these demands, King Hassan II called for the integration of the Amazigh language into the education system which in one year introduced the usage of Amazigh dialects of Tarifit, Tamazight and Tachelhit in the new bulletin in 2001 the very first time. (2009:4) Bennis argues that this step opened the door for the Moroccan monarch to recognize the linguistic and cultural rights in the Moroccan

Amazigh. This was followed by the establishment of the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture in 2003, and a specific project of teaching the Amazigh language in 120 schools throughout Morocco. All these attempts at the end led to the Amazighation movement in morocco (2009:9).

Postcolonial Moroccan national identity was not always analyzed with only one component. There are some studies that express two or three of these components at the same time. It is also these studies that defend that Moroccan identity is multiple. Charles Gallagher in *The United States and North Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia* expresses Islam, Arabness and Africanness together as the multiple components of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity. Gallagher argues that Morocco was an absolute monarchy in which the King held an accumulation of executive, legislative, and judicial power as he chose to use or delegate it until 1962. But in December, Morocco became a constitutional monarchy that regarded Islam as its official religion, Arabic as its official language, Maghreb as its regional belonging, and an Arab-African state after colonialism (1963:129).

Another study that analyzes the multiple components of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity is the *Old land new nation* written by Mark I. Cohen & Lorna Harn. In the book, the authors express the Arab-Islam components of the Moroccan national identity after colonialism by basing their argument on coronation speech of the sultan in 1956 that promised municipal and rural elections first, and then the creation of a Constitutional Assembly to draw up a constitution in the framework of an Arab and Muslim democratic monarchy (1965:119). According to the authors, it was the Istiqlal Party congress in Rabat in 1961 that made Al Fassi rally diverse groups behind the Istiqlal's platforms of an Arab-Muslim state and democratic constitutional monarchy. In the view of the writers, this was a way to

stress the Moroccan unity under Islam to the Amazighs (1965:122). In July 1957, the sultan formally invested Moulay Hassan as Crown Prince. He also changed his title to King and the name of the country from Sharifian Empire to Kingdom of Morocco (1965:130) In addition, the writers underline that Hassan II issued a fundamental law in 1961 that made Morocco an Arab and Muslim Kingdom at the same time on its way to being a constitutional monarchy (1965:133). The writers also argue that the constitution of 1962 that was issued by Hassan II made the King of Morocco as the symbol of national unity and guarantor of state and requires him to safeguard respect for Islam and laws. The declaration of the 1962 Constitution was followed by the Arabization of schools in 1964, where the Arabic language became the universal language of the Moroccan education. This was consolidated by the foundation of National Arabization Center in the same year by King Hassan II.

Another study that analyzes the postcolonial Moroccan national identity with multiple components at the same time is *Bargaining for Reality: The Construction of Social relations in a Muslim community* written by Lawrence Rosen. By analyzing the relationships of Arabness and Amazighness in the postcolonial Moroccan national identity in the city of Sefrou, Rosen emphasizes Arabness with the usage of Arabic language in the city. According to Rosen, the Arabs were distinguished from the Amazighs with Arabic language. Rosen here shows the different locations around the city of Sefrou and signifies that whereas the vast majority in Sefrou spoke Arabic, the people living in Ait Yusi very close to Sefrou had very few speakers of Arabic. These people were speaking the Amazigh language, as the language of the Amazighs, a situation that the Moroccan government has been trying to remove since 1956 according to Rosen. In her view, this is an attempt to arabize the language in Morocco fully (1984:136). After the analysis of Arabness, Rosen then argues that the

Amazighs of Morocco decided to work actively in the Istiqlal Party during the independence struggle because there was no room for the expression of the Amazigh identity yet (1984:138).

The analysis of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity with multiple components also took place in the article called *Globalization, culture and Moroccan identity* written by Meriem el Amine. According to el Amine, the postcolonial Moroccan national identity was composed of many dimensions such as Arabo-Amazigh, Muslim, African and modern (2007:2). According to el Amine, the expression of the Islam component of the Moroccan national identity has been very active recently due to the modern component that emerged in the Moroccan national identity, which creates more and more complex fields of interference (2007:5). According to el Amine, the interference of the modern component with the Islam especially at the end leads to the creation of between the two (2007:6). El Amine relates the situation of the creation of between the two to the impacts of globalization. In her view, the interference of modernity to Islam directly influences the culture that was constructed by globalization at the end in Morocco (2007:7).

Last but not least, postcolonial Moroccan identity with more than one component was expressed with globalization and hybridity concepts. According to Abdesselam Cheddadi who wrote *Comment peut on etre Marocain*, it is difficult to talk about a pure nation in today's Morocco because the nation was impacted by many of foreign impacts such as globalization. In this context Cheddadi argues that neither theory nor practice of the pure nation remains today in Morocco (2009:11). Like Abdessalam Cheddadi, Fouad Bellamine thinks that the concept of nation, especially for the young generations, was disengaged in today's Morocco. Bellamine thinks that media have a great role in the evacuation of the meaning of nation that

was once upon a time very highly regarded in the Moroccan community. Bellamine argues that it is the lack of an education system in Morocco after 50 years of independence that led to the absence of national feelings today. (2009:23) Jalil Bennani, on the other hand, approaches the multiple identity of Morocco today through language. Bennani argues that Moroccans speak today three languages, which are Darija, French and Arabic. According to Bennani, there is no difference in the discourses of these three languages, but they are the outcome of the colonial system in Morocco (2009:80). Khalid Zekri, last but not least, talks about the hybridity aspect of the Moroccan community in the postcolonial episode. According to Zekri, today the Moroccan population was formed by a hybridity between the African and Arab world, and also between the real and the utopic. According to Zekri, being a Moroccan today means belonging to imagined communities that led the Moroccan to think he belongs to them as a result of the hybridity. Zekri also argues that the Moroccan people like to stand in these hybridity such as Arabo-islamism, Orientalism- Occidentalism. According to Zekri, Moroccans today are the results of such a process (2009:191-2).

Unlike the literature on the postcolonial Moroccan national identity, the literature on the application of Morocco to the E.C that necessitated a justification of King Hassan II's European Morocco claim was analyzed with two main themes only. One theme brought different perspectives to understand why Morocco applied to this organization, and the other one deals with the European perspective of the application by pointing out how this demand of Morocco was firmly rejected by the E.C authorities.

The reasons for Morocco to become a member of the E.C were explained by three main subthemes; these are the modernization of Morocco, the personal

protection of King Hassan II himself and his family, Moroccan foreign policy and economic difficulties in Morocco by that time. The first subtheme, in this sense, analyzes the application of Morocco to the E.C as a modernization plan in Mark Tessler's *Morocco: Institutional Pluralism and Monarchical Dominance*. Accordingly, Tessler does not openly relate the E.C application to this process but he points out that Morocco went into a modernization process, where King Hassan II wanted to liberalize political life and monarchy in Morocco. Moreover, Tessler's argument on that King Hassan II had already an attachment to European culture as a result of his youth under the French Protectorate could lead him to apply for the E.E.C membership to side with France in the same organization (1982:43). Similar view was shared by Mohsine el Ahmadi in *La Monarchie et l'islam* who argues that the road of Morocco to the E.C. was an outcome of the King Hassan the Second's progressivist policies that aimed at modernizing the Moroccan community while keeping its religious morality. El Ahmadi who sees this modernization as an ideal, argues that the level of the modernization in Morocco had accelerated in the 90s (2006:43-44). The intersection of the Morocco's membership to the E.C and these modernization policies could provide necessary hint for the background of this application from this perspective.

A second subtheme that analyzes the application of Morocco to the E.C is the argument that points out the personal safety expectations of the King Hassan II for himself and his family from this application. Tahar ben Jaloun said in *Etre Marocain*, King Hassan II was someone who just thought about himself and his family in the policies he had implemented, and who just did not care what the Moroccan people would think about his decisions (2009:39).

A third subtheme that analyzes the reasons why Morocco had applied to E.C though E.E.C was about foreign policy. Flory Maurice in *Note sur la demande d'adhesion du Maroc a la CEE* argues that Morocco applied to E.E.C to get some interlocutor status from the E.C that would render an advantageous position to Morocco in the Maghreb. Moreover, Rachid el Houdagui in *La politique etrangere sous le regne de Hassan II* argues that Morocco by 1975 felt alone after the conflicts with Algeria and the Organization of African Union because of the Sahara problem. Moreover, Houdagui believes that the application to the E.E.C was an outcome of the wish to provide a historical continuation between Europe and Morocco. This historical belonging was felt for France and Spain (2003:130). In addition, Abdallah Laroui in *Le Maroc et Hassan II* argues that Morocco had applied to the EEC so that the E.E.C would not be annoyed by the federation that Muammar El Qaddafi planned between Libya and Morocco (2005:112).

A fourth subtheme that analyzes the reason why Morocco had applied to the E.E.C was the economic concerns in Morocco. Ahmed Aghrout and Keith Sutton Source in *Regional Economic Union in the Maghreb* related the reason of Morocco to apply to E.E.C to the threat that Morocco felt in its export quota to Europe after the accession of Greece in 1981, the accession of Spain in 1986, Turkey and Cyprus' membership seeking in 1987, and with the creation of the 'Europe of the Twelve'. The authors argue that Morocco was faced with the imminent dangers of not being able to sell its citrus fruit, tomatoes, table grapes, wine, and olive oil to Europe since Europe started to supply these products from Spain, Portugal or Turkey after 1981. As a result, Morocco applied to E.E.C not to lose the European market (1990:131). This view was supported in the same year by Bassma Kodmani Darwish who argues that Morocco applied to EEC to get some credits from Bruxelles that gave 160

milliard pesetas to Spain when Spain applied in *Maghreb: Les années de transition* (1990:90). In addition, C.R.Pennell in *Morocco since 1830: A history* argues that Morocco applied to the E.E.C because of the size of its government deficit, which was equivalent to 14 % of the Moroccan GDP in 1981. According to Pennell, it was hard to reduce this amount because the government was required to trade at the same time where inflation was 6% in 1983. Pennell also explains the interest of Morocco to the E.E.C with its irrigation investment that gave Morocco very high quality products to sell to external markets. In this sense, E.E.C countries were good customers for Morocco (2000:358).

The second theme that analyzes Morocco's application to the E.C is the approach that looks at the case from the European side. Accordingly, this approach analyzes Morocco's quest to be a member of the E.E.C from the European side that rejected its membership demand. Tzvetan Todorov in the article *European Borders*, for instance argues that the countries of the Maghreb are not destined to be part of the European Union because the European geography or demographics do not cover these countries (2003:153). In addition, Karen E. Smith Source, in *The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy*, argues that Morocco's application to the E.E.C was problematic because of the ambiguity in the definition of the European Commission who accepted the implications of such a decision do not come easily to itself (2005:769). Last, Bahar Rumelili in *Constructing identity and relating to difference: Understanding the EU's mode of differentiation* claims that when Morocco applied for membership in the E.E.C in 1987, the response of the European Commission was an absolute no. Rumelili also defends that the application was not even forwarded to the European Commission for an opinion, as is the regular

procedure, and that Morocco was told that E.C membership is open to Europeans only and Morocco is not part of geographical Europe.(2004:33)

The dissertation, by analyzing the identity grounds of Morocco's quest to be a part of the E.C, also contributes to this theme because it shows how Morocco's application was evaluated by the Moroccan and non-Moroccan state and non-state actors. The findings show that the E.C authorities did not say a direct no to Morocco's quest to become a member, and that some of them had shared King Hassan II 's idea of a European Morocco. The dissertation, all in all, does not only explain how Morocco's European being was reflected the very first time in these literatures, but also analyzes the nature of the application to the E.C that works over the instrumentalization of hybridity in the culture of Morocco with France in national identity of Morocco to justify the Europeanness of Morocco. This side of the thesis also contributes to the mechanism that explains how Morocco justified its European being to be able to seem a European state as depicted by the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. The thesis, then, analyzes the European Morocco claims of King Hassan II in a timeline between July 8th 1987 when the membership application letter was submitted, and October 14th 1987, when the application was rejected by the European Commission.

1.3. Methodology

The dissertation adopted case study, historiography, and qualitative content analysis methods. The dissertation applied postcolonial nationalism theory to Morocco, which

became a case study for this dissertation. Moreover, the dissertation used the historiography and qualitative content analysis while evaluating the primary resources found both in Morocco and France in the way to relate them to the main argument of the dissertation.

The dissertation also used the method of deduction since it is a qualitative research that was written in a discursive way. The aim of a discursive thesis is to help the reader find herself/himself in different periods of the Moroccan history and to comprehend the different views of the Moroccan community about the Europeanness of Morocco. In Chapter 6 where the views of the contemporary Moroccan non-state actors try to help reader to get this different views on the Europeanness of Morocco, whereas the earlier chapters take her/him into these different period of Moroccan history to understand better the argument of dissertation.

While constructing the chapters, primary resources that were found in the Nantes Archives of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Rabat Archives, and conducted interviews were used to reflect the Moroccan voice in this topic as much as possible. Therefore, the thesis gave specific emphasis to the Moroccan side of all these archives, and tried as much as possible to find the discourses of not only Moroccan state but also the non-state actors so that the impacts of the French and Spanish protectorates would be interpreted more properly. In addition, certain interviews with the Moroccan people who witnessed the application process(but who did not want me to use their names for security reasons) were conducted to hear their opinion of this application and to hear what they were thinking today. In both documents and interviews, discourse analysis and qualitative content analysis were used as important methods of the thesis. Since King Hassan II claimed the Europeanness of Morocco on the basis of France only but not Spain, and that no

available data found on the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco because of the different way how Spain had administered Morocco than the French, the priority was given to the French Protectorate to see how the Moroccan national identity was impacted by the European colonialism to explain the dissertation argument.

1.4. Dissertation Organization

The dissertation is composed of eight chapters that are intended to explain the King Hassan II's European Morocco argument.

Chapter 2 is about the theoretical part of the dissertation that evaluates King Hassan II's European Morocco argument on the basis of Morocco's history with France, with postcolonial nationalism. Accordingly, the chapter is intended to show how postcolonial nationalism was formed, what postcolonial nationalism actually argues, and how postcolonial nationalism explains hybridity in Moroccan culture with France that started in French Protectorate episode, and that was instrumentalized by King Hassan II in postcolonial Moroccan national identity to explain/assert Morocco's Europeanness according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.

Chapter 3 covers how Islam as the first component of Moroccan national identity and the origin of Moroccanness, that was transformed from cultural identity into national identity in a historical perspective covering a time period between the antique Maghreb times and establishment of the French and Spanish Protectorates in 1912. The significance of this chapter is to show the reader how Islam as the first

component of Moroccan national identity and the origin of Moroccanness was formed against Europe due to European colonialism. This chapter is also intended to show how the Moroccan locals defined the Europeans according to their religion, how they were defining themselves with Islam only, and how Islam was used against the Europeans from the early history. This chapter is also about the settlement of the French and Spanish Protectorates as the symbols of the impacts of European colonialism on Morocco. It is therefore intended to show how Moroccan colonization was regarded in the general African colonial policy of the French, and the French Protectorate that also led to the establishment of the Spanish one. This chapter also shows how the French and the Spanish Protectorates differed from each other so that at the end the King Hassan II instrumentalized the hybridity in the culture of Moroccans with French in Moroccan postcolonial national identity but not with Spanish to explain/assert Morocco's Europeanness according to article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.

Chapter 4 is about the way how the Amazigh population in Blad al Siba and Arab and Amazigh populations in Blad al Makhzen implemented Islam as their national identity against the French administration. The chapter shows how these people regarded the French, how they used Islam against French, and how they reflected their struggle against the French. This chapter, then, analyzes how the French created a hybridity with Amazighs and Arabs in Blad al Makhzen by successfully integrating with Moroccan Islam and education between 1912 and 1925. The chapter at the end not only explains how Islam was implemented by Blad al Makhzen and Blad al Siba Amazighs against the French forces, but also how the French used this Islam as the unique component of Moroccan national identity by that time while creating a hybridity, that was instrumentalized by King Hassan II in

postcolonial Moroccan national identity to explain/assert Morocco's Europeanness according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.

Chapter 5 is about the rise of Moroccanness as the second component of Moroccan national identity that was formed against Europe (France) between 1925 and 1956. The chapter is explaining how Moroccanness component of Moroccan national identity emerged as a result of deviations from the French Protectorate's respect for Moroccan Islam in this period. Accordingly, the chapter comprehends the hybridity between the French and Arab/Amazigh population of Morocco through the unsuccessful integration of the French with Moroccan Islam and Moroccanness and it explains it under the shadow of the rise of Moroccanness that aimed at nullifying it. The chapter, then, is an attempt to show the very roots of Moroccanness as one side of the hybridity between Morocans and French, that was instrumentalized in postcolonial Moroccan national identity by King Hassan II to explain/assert Morocco's Europeanness according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.

Chapter 6 is about how the postcolonial nationalism's first theme of critique to colonialism was implemented in Morocco between 1956 and 1984. This chapter shows how the French and the Spanish Protectorates were regarded by the Moroccan state and non-state actors, how these actors addressed their critiques of colonialism to the French and Spanish Protectorates, how they tried to pacify the impacts of the French and Spanish protectorates by trying to get rid of this hybridity that was created in the colonial times. The chapter also shows how King Hassan II did not nullify the impacts of the French Protectorate, but rather, he focused on the Spanish Protectorate. The chapter also shows how Moroccanness was developed against Europe and European colonialism and how Moroccanness was preferred to Africanness and Maghrebness if necessary. The chapter also gives clues on why

Morocco wanted to become a part of the E.C. The chapter is significant for the dissertation also because it showed the development of Moroccanness in the postcolonial period that finally constituted the Moroccanness side of the hybridity with France that was instrumentalized in postcolonial Moroccan national identity to explain Morocco's Europeanness according to article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.

Chapter 7 is about the process where the King Hassan II thought that Morocco was European because it was a part of the French Protectorate. This chapter shows how King Hassan II instrumentalized hybridity between Moroccans and French in Moroccan postcolonial national identity to claim Morocco's Europeanness according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. The chapter does it by presenting primary resources on how King Hassan II regarded Europe in the national identity of postcolonial Morocco to the reader. The chapter also includes personal interviews with the Moroccan state and non-state elites who witnessed this application and shows what they thought of King Hassan II's European Morocco claim. The chapter also presents the first views of the European media, bureaucrats and actors on the Europeanness of Morocco. In addition, it also includes the reactions of the Moroccan non-state actors, the Islamists, and how they refuse the idea that Morocco was European on Islamic grounds.

Chapter 8 presents the findings about the dissertation chapters. Accordingly, it shows how King Hassan II claimed that Morocco was European on the basis of hybridity created in the French Protectorate, and how this Europeanness was an alternative to the Europeanness that was defined by the Europeans in Europe.

CHAPTER II

POSTCOLONIAL NATIONALISM

2.1. Etymology of Postcolonial and Nationalism

Postcolonial nationalism is the harmonious alliance between two terms; postcolonial and nationalism. The term postcolonial, as it implies, concerns the period after that in which the colonizer ruled the colonized. On the other hand, the term nationalism implies attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity, which is, they way how they show their belonging to their own state or nation (Gellner 1982; Smith 1991).

The term postcolonial comes from postcolonialism that could be simply defined as the mathematical addition of the prefix “-“post” onto the word “colonialism”. As the abbreviation of “-posterior to”, “-post” means beyond, later, or after, like the word postmodernism that signifies beyond modernism or after modernism. However, to define colonialism is not as simple as to define the prefix – post because of its historical development. Different actors and events developed the implementation of colonialism over time. Besides its historical development, there is

also its philosophical interpretation that discusses whether colonialism was necessary. It is therefore colonialism with its historical development and philosophical interpretation that needs to be taken into account before studying postcolonialism (Loomba 1998: 54).

2.2. Colonialism: The Development

Colonialism is the rule of a civilization over another civilization by conquering its land and goods (Bosschére 1967:21; Ferro 1997: 2-5; Osterhammel 1995:17; Prakash 1994:3). These conquests were first seen in ancient history. The Babylonians ruled a landscape in Asia when it was conquered by Hammourabi in 2472 B.C. The Egyptians ruled Syrians and Cypriots after the latter were conquered by the Egyptian Pharaon Thoutmes II between 1492 and 1479 B.C. The people of Phoenicia ruled the Cypriots as well when that island was conquered by the Phoenician king Tyr in 1300 B.C. The Hittites ruled Syrians when its Emperor Shouppulilima conquered them in 1278 B.C. Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, and Arabs on the Maghreb followed this pattern.

The Romans were one of the first civilizations that implemented assimilation in colonialism by converting the culture of the local people of the conquered lands into a Roman one. It was through assimilation that the Romans managed to rule technically more developed civilizations such as the Carthagians, the Greeks and the Egyptians (Luraghi 1975:14) The words “colonia” signifying the colonies also emerged in the Roman literature the very first time (Bosschere 1967:2; Haddour 2000:6). However, its first usage with contemporary meaning was after the 1492

expedition of Christopher Columbus. The usage of assimilation in colonialism was also used after the collapse of the Roman Empire. The Arabs assimilated the people of North Africa in 644 A.D under the command of Caliph Omar and Oqba bin Nafi, and the people of Iberian Peninsula in 661 A.D under the command of Uthman Ibn Affan. The years between 711 A.D until 1492 passed as the struggle of the Spanish and the Portuguese against the assimilation of Iberian Peninsula by the Arabs. Europeans call this period as Reconquista.

By 1492, transatlantic voyages of Christopher Columbus started the Great Discoveries that accelerated the formation of the European overseas empires (Fieldhouse 1982: 23; Ferro 1994:5; Osterhammel 1996:83). After 1492, the Europeans became the masters of colonialism that at the end gave rise to the colonization of Morocco by the French and the Spanish in 1912. The first of these was Spanish. After the Castilian succession of 1479, the first steps of the Spanish overseas empire were taken; the Spanish army under the command of explorers like Christopher Columbus and Francisco Pizarro sailed to South America and conquered Argentina in 1502, Uruguay in 1516, Mexico in 1519, Bolivia in 1520, Venezuela in 1522, Chile and Colombia in 1525, Peru in 1532, Paraguay in 1537 and Ecuador in 1563.

At approximately the same time, the Portuguese also used transatlantic voyages to form their overseas empire. In addition to the already conquered lands of Ceuta in 1415, the Cape Verde Islands in 1456, Senegal and Congo in 1485, and the Cape of Good Hope in 1487, the Portuguese sailed to India in 1498, Brazil in 1500, and Asia in 1510. The borders of the Portuguese Empire reached to the Indian Ocean from Lisbon in 1571. The whole Indian Ocean, from Eastern Africa (Sofala, Mozambique, Mombasa) to Indonesia (Amboine, Ternate, Tidore and Solor), from the

Persian Gulf (Ormuz and Mascate to Birmania (Colombo, Ceylan Island, Malacca) were under Portuguese control in the last quarter of the 16th century.

The Spanish and Portuguese overseas empires were modelled by other states of Europe. The French and the British also started their own overseas empires to keep the balance of power with Portugal and Spain. The French conquered Rio de Janeiro in 1555, Florida in 1562, Nova Scotia in 1605, Quebec in 1608, Sao Louis in 1612, Guiana in 1624, Saint Kitts in 1625, Haiti in 1664, Senegal in 1677, Algeria in 1812, Eritrea in 1838, Gabon in 1839, Ivory Coast in 1843, Djibouti in 1862, the Republic of Congo in 1875, and Tunisia in 1881. The British conquered Carolina in 1586, Perews in 1610, Barbados in 1624, Barbuda in 1628, St.Vincent and Grenadines in 1630, Cape Colony in 1806, Egypt in 1814, and the Gambia in 1816.

The Dutch overseas empire was supervised by two state companies; the Dutch East India Company established in 1602 and the Dutch West India Company, established in 1621. The Dutch East India Company conquered Ceylon in 1602, Formosa in 1624, Iran in 1623, Iraq in 1645, Pakistan in 1652, Bangladesh in 1664, Burma in 1608, Cambodia in 1620, Vietnam in 1636, Japan in 1641. The Dutch West India Company conquered the Dutch Gold Coast in 1598, the Dutch Slave Coast in 1660, Dutch Angola in 1670 and Senegambia in 1617. Assimilation was implemented in all these occupied lands by the Europeans, which made the Europeans the main colonizers in the world (Easton 1960:10; Bosschére 1967: 24). It was again the Europeans who partitioned Africa in the Berlin Congress of 1884-1885. The administration of Africa was divided among the states of Europe, and thus resulted in an African colonization. The German colonial administration in Africa included Burundi, Rwanda, Tanganyika, Cameroon and Namibia. The British colonial administration in Africa was founded in Nigeria, Malawi, Swaziland, and

Kenya. The French colonial administration in Africa was founded in Benin, Mali, Guinea, Niger, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Chad, Mauritania, Morocco, and Cameroon. The Spanish colonial administration in Africa was founded in Western Sahara and Equatorial Guinea. The decolonization process that started in 1880 in South America, that spread to Asia in 1947, and to Africa in 1956 arose in opposition to colonial administration of all these European states.

2.3. Colonialism: The Philosophical Interpretation

In addition to the development of colonialism in history, the philosophical interpretation of colonialism discussed its necessity. Together with its historical development, the philosophical interpretation of colonialism constructs the basis of postcolonialism, which at the end became a tenet of the postcolonial nationalism, the theoretical framework of this dissertation.

The first written source on the philosophical interpretation of colonialism belongs to Christopher Columbus. On his trip to America in 1492, Columbus wrote in his diary that he wanted to find as much as gold as revenue for the Spanish Empire to use it in fighting the Muslims in the Crusades: “I do not want to stop, but to proceed further to visit many islands and to discover gold. I hope finding gold and similar quantities that my King will be able, in three years, to prepare and undertake the conquest of Holy Land”³ (Ferro 1996:7).

³ Ferro, Marc: Colonization: A Global History, 1996:7

As said, the Great Discoveries that was started by the transatlantic sailings of Columbus in 1492 was used for the states of Europe in their overseas empire. The states of Europe sailed to territories such as America, Africa and Oceania and founded colonial administrations over the people of these regions by conquering their lands between 1492 and 1920. This was not an action to be ignored by the philosophers of Europe. In *On Colonialism* written at the end of the 19th century, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels stressed the collapse of the proletariat class due to colonialism. Marx and Engels, who regarded colonialism as land exploitation argue that exploitation developed the trade life that developed manufacturing, and that finally damaged the proletariat in these lands. This situation, as Marx and Engels argues, led to a conflict “between the classes when colonization of the newly discovered states triggered the trade war between European states”⁴ (1974:6). From this point, Marx and Engels move to the rise of bourgeoisie in Europe. In their views, it was the exploitation of America and Africa that raised the power of the European bourgeoisie. Marx and Engels conclude that this rise of bourgeoisie and collapse of the proletariat led to the creation of the industrial millionaires⁵ (1974:7-8).

⁴ Amerika’nın keşfi ve doğu Hint adaları ile bağlantı sağlayan deniz yolunun bulunması sonunda gelişen ticaret hayatı, manüfaktürün ve genel olarak üretimin çok büyük gelişme göstermesini sağlamıştı. Bu ülkelerden ithal edilen yeni ürünler ve tedavüle sokulan altın ve gümüşler toplumsal sınıfların aralarındaki ilişkileri tepeden tırnağa değişikliğe uğrattı. Hem derebeylik toprak mülkiyetini hem de emekçileri büyük çapta etkiledi. Yeni keşfedilen ülkelerin sömürgeleştirilmeleri uluslararası ticari savaşı kızdırdı ve sonuç olarak bu savaşı daha çetin ve geniş bir hale getirdi.

⁵ 15.yüzyılda Amerika’nın ve Hint adalarının keşfinden sonra, 16. Ve 17 yüzyılda kuzey ve güney Amerika, Avustralya, Tasmanya ve Antiller iyice tanınmıştı. Bu keşifler yükselmekte olan Avrupa burjuvazisine yeni sürüm alanları ve ticaret yolları açmış, derebeyliğin çöküşünü hızlandırmıştı. Böylece Avrupa’da kapitalist sömürgecilik sistemi doğdu. Bu sistemle Asya, Afrika halklarının yağma edilmesi operasyonu başlatıldı Amerika’nın keşfi ve Afrika’nın deniz yoluyla güneyden aşılması doğmakta olan burjuvaziye yeni bir faaliyet alanı yaratmıştı. Hint ve Çin pazarları, Amerika’nın sömürgeleştirilmesi, sömürge ticareti, mübadele araçlarının çoğalması ve genel olarak emtia üretiminin genişlemesi; çözülmekte olan derebeylik toplumu içindeki devrimci unsurun (burjuvazinin) da hızla gelişmesini sağladı. Yeni pazarlar açıldıkça lonca üretiminin yerini manüfaktür, pazarlar daha da çoğalmaya başlayınca manüfaktürün yerini sanayi üretimi aldı. Manüfaktürün orta burjuvazisi yerini, sanayi milyonerlerine, modern burjuvalara bıraktı.

Marx and Engels' introduction of colonialism as economic exploitation that led to the rise of bourgeoisie and collapse of the proletariat was moved one step further in 1917 when Vladimir Ilyich Lenin wrote *Imperialism*. Basically, Lenin related the empire being of European states to capitalism, which later gave rise to imperialism. By following Marx's definition of manufacturing and industrial product, Lenin describes two levels of capitalism: a competitive and an imperialist one. Calling imperialism the monopoly stage of capitalism, he located colonialism in imperialism in five points. These are the concentration of production and capital developing to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life, the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this finance capital, of a financial oligarchy, the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquiring exceptional importance, the formation of international monopolist capitalist combines which share the world among themselves, and completion of the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers (1917:6-7).

Marx, Engels and Lenin demonstrated the inevitability of colonialism with the concepts of economic exploitation and imperialism in the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. In contrast, the same time period contained some statesmen in Europe who attempted to justify colonialism. These statesmen regarded colonialism a necessary step to be a modern empire. Jules Ferry from France for instance defended the notion colonization was what the French Empire had merited due to civilized national being. As a Prime Minister between 1880 and 1881, and 1884 and 1885, Ferry regarded colonization as the right of France as a civilized nation. This justification was supported by two different aspects. First, Ferry believed that France should not have remained passive in the world because of the

risk that could place her third or fourth class. Second, Ferry also believed that France always needed to be a rich state and therefore it should be accepted that France would rule lands that offer her the best economic resources. In one of his speeches in the Chamber of Commerce on 28 July 1884, he said;

To radiate without acting, without getting involved in world affairs, by keeping the gap of all European combinations, by watching like a trap, like an adventure, whole expansion through Africa or Orient, to live like this, for a grand nation, as you could imagine, that is abdicate and in a shorter time than you could imagine, that is to descend from the first rank to third or fourth. We cannot be a great nation by staying in our lands. Economic considerations also must incite France to conquer lands, the markets of overseas. France is rich and the colonies are for the rich states where they offer the more advantageous capitals.⁶

Second, Ferry's attempt to justify colonialism involved the export of civilization and modernism from Europe to the nations he had called barbarians. In the same speech he gave to the Chamber of Commerce, he said:

I say, Gentlemen that we did the expeditions that we had to do. I cannot accept that we constructed our empire by coincidence. We were driven by the necessity, by the right, and by an obligation that were given to civilized people of being respected by the barbarian nations. Here is the history of our colonial politics.⁷

⁶ Speech at the Chamber, July 28th 1885 : Rayonner sans agir, sans se mêler aux affaires du monde, en se tenant à l'écart de toutes les combinassions européennes, en regardant comme une piège, comme une aventure, toute expansion vers l'Afrique ou vers l'Orient, vivre de cette sorte, pour une grande nation, croyez-le bien, c'est d'abdiquer, et, dans un temps plus court que vous ne pouvez le croire, c'est descendre du premier rang au troisième ou quatrième. Les considérations économiques aussi doivent inciter la France à acquérir des terres, donc des marchés outre-mer. La France est riche et les colonies sont pour les pays riches un placement des capitaux des plus avantageux (Bouche 1991).

⁷ Speech at the Chamber, July 28th 1885 : Je dis, Messieurs, nous avons fait les expéditions que nous devons faire: Je n'admets pas qu'on dise de nous que nous avons été conduits par le hasard. Nous avons été conduits par le nécessité, par le droit, nous avons été conduits par cette obligation et de devoir qui s'imposent à tous les peuples civilisés de faire respecter par les nations barbares. Voilà l'histoire de notre politique coloniale (Bouche 1991).

The justification of colonialism was also observed in the speeches of Cecil Rhodes who was the British Prime Minister for the Cape Colony between 1890 and 1896. Similar to the arguments of Jules Ferry, Rhodes regarded colonialism as the British property on African lands. Rhodes defended the idea that the entire world should have belonged to the British. In one his speeches on April 21st 1875, he said: “I walked between earth and sky, and when I looked down I said: This earth should be English and when I looked up I said: The English should rule the earth”.

The justification of colonization by European statesmen like Ferry and Rhodes was also observed in the pieces of some European writers. In the *Heart of Darkness* written in 1902, Joseph Conrad described the pleasure he was having from exploring new lands and new people. He said: “I was losing myself when I was analyzing South America, Africa or Australia. These were the years where there were many unknown lands in the world and all seemed quite inviting. When I saw some of them on map, I was pointing it by my finger and said I would go there when I grow up.”⁸

In 1910 on the other hand, Jules Harmand in *Domination et Colonization* defended the right of some groups to administer some others, based not only on a military but also on a traditional superiority:

Then, to admit that there is a civilizational hierarchy and we are the members of the superior race brings us many responsibilities besides several rights. The need to conquer the local people cannot be explained merely through military superiority but also a traditional one. Our dignity finds its origins in this basis. That is why, we need to rule the rest of humanity. Material power is nothing else but a tool that serves this purpose.⁹

⁸ Saatlerce Güney Amerika’yı, Afrika’yı ya da Avustralya’yı inceleyip o keşif heyecanında kendimi kaybederdim. O zamanlar yeryüzünden pek çok bilinmeyen alan vardı, bunlardan harita üzerinde özellikle davetkâr görünen hepsi öyledir ya, birine rastgeldiğimde parmağımı üzerine bastırır ve büyüdüğüm zaman oraya gideceğim derdim.(Conrad,Joseph; Heart of Darkness, 1902:19)

⁹ Öyleyse, ilke ve hareket noktası olarak, bir ırklar ve uygarlıklar hiyerarşisinin varlığı olgusunu ve bizim üstün ırk ve uygarlıklara mensup olduğumuzu kabul etmek, bunun yanında üstünlüğün haklar

The history and the philosophical interpretation of colonialism were not satisfactory to stop the collapse of colonialism at the end. It also argued that no matter assimilation or association, colonialism could never be justified. The first declaration of independences in Asia that involved the Philippines, South Korea, Burma, Ceylon, India and Indonesia between 1947 and 1949 constituted the very first sample of a national decolonization. The 1955 Bandung Conference, on the other hand, opened the postcolonial episode.

2.4. Postcolonialism and Nationalism: Overviews

During more than two thousand years of the story of colonialism, European colonizer states left significant impacts on the people of the colonized lands. Accordingly, postcolonialism is the collection of studies that analyze these impacts of these colonizer states on the independent states of today and the colonized states of yesterday. Postcolonialism analyzes these impacts on the culture, identity, administration, language, and norms of the colonized after colonialism. Jean Paul Sartre is among the very first authors who worked on postcolonialism. In *Colonialism and Neocolonialism*, Sartre views the ongoing impacts of European colonialism on the colonized as a still functioning system. In this perspective, Sartre

tanımakla birlikte bunun karşılığında sıkı yükümlülükler de getirdiğini teslim etmek gerekiyor. Yerli halkları fethetmemizin asıl meşruluğu, bizim üstünlüğümüze, yalnızca makine, iktisat ve askerlik alanlarında değil, aynı zamanda törel alanda üstün olduğumuza dayanan inançta yatar. Saygınlığımız bu özelliğe dayanır. İnsanlığın geriye kalanını yönetme hakkımızın altında yatan da budur. Maddi güç bu amaca hizmet eden başka bir şey değildir.” (1911:56)

argues that European colonialism is embodied in a million colonists, children and grandchildren of colonists, who have been shaped by colonialism and who think, speak, and act according to the very principles of the colonial system (1964:37). The ongoing impacts of European colonialism on the colonized states were later interpreted by Chris Dixon in *Colonialism and Development*, over imperialism. Dixon explains postcolonialism through imperialism of the capitalist world economy from its European-Atlantic cradle becoming global in scope by about 1900 (1991:7). Ania Loomba in *Colonialism and Postcolonialism*, on the other hand, defines the ongoing impacts of European colonialism on the colonized states as a process and action where the past continues to talk to us. Loomba argues that it has been suggested that it is more helpful to think of postcolonialism not just coming literally after colonialism but as the contestation of colonial domination and colonial legacies (1998: 12). These ongoing impacts of European colonialism were also analyzed by Henry Schwarz in a *Companion to Postcolonial Studies* that defines postcolonialism as an engagement with the experience of colonialism and its past and present effects, both at the local of ex-colonial societies, as well as the level of more general global developments thought to be the after effects of the empire. According to Schwarz, postcolonialism often discusses the experiences of various kinds of slavery, migration, suppression and resistance, difference, gender, race, place, and the responses to the imperial Europe, such as history, philosophy, anthropology and linguistics (2004:94). Last but not least, Sebastien Konrad in *German Colonialism* explains these ongoing impacts of European colonialism on the colonized states of yesterday today with the investigation of colonial discourses and the question of representation, a closely linked strand of research that focuses on importance of colonial knowledge; that is, knowledge generated about the colonial territories and

populations, the construction of subjectivities under the conditions of colonial asymmetry about race, class, nation, gender, and sexuality, and the remembrance and memories of the colonial past that are at the center of a number of studies that examine the after-effects of a history of repression and violence and the biographical tensions and traumas involved (2012:11). At the end, postcolonialism rose as an ideology that analyzes the impacts of the European colonizer states on the colonized lands after colonialism.

The academic review of nationalism, on the other hand, has been covering a strong discussion between primordialists and modernists since the 1950s. Two sides have been trying to convince each by pointing out either nation was an ancient or a modern term. Nevertheless, the scope of this discussion has been using the concepts and aspects attributed to nationalism by writings of certain philosophers who highlighted the importance of national identity aspect of nationalism that was revealed in the 19th century. According to these philosophers, nationalism is the form of national identity that is welded to the state. The reason, then, why the national identity defines who the person is before this person dedicates herself/himself to her/his nation is because people have an identity that they identify with figures and representations which are made available to them (Poole 1999:45). Umut Özkırmılı in his *Nationalism: A critical view* summarizes these philosophers' ideas.

Özkırmılı discusses the term national identity by referring first to Johann Gottlieb Fichte who regarded national identity as an entity that gives meaning to the individual existence. By defending that it was only nationalism that had the ultimate power to embrace the individuals in a community, Fichte stated those individuals' living together gains meaning only with national identity. In this sense, Fichte sees a community without nationalism merely as a unity of ghosts in a town (2008:37).

Fichte's definition of national identity over individual existence was developed by Johann Godfried Herder who argued that the presence of language was much older than the presence of individuals, which made language as the basis of national identity. Contextually, Herder argues that national identity that was formed by language must be regarded as the biggest part of a nation (2008:39). Herder was followed by Jean Jacques Rousseau who defined national identity through citizenship. Parallel to Fichte's argument, Rousseau argued that without offering citizenship to the individuals, nationalism would never have the power to protect a significant group of people in this community from the possible suppression of another dominant one. At this point, Rousseau believes that the citizenship would not only provide safety for the community members, but also raise the general will that ultimately will lead to independence (2008:40).

In contrast to Fichte, Herder and Rousseau who defined national identity over the individual dimension, Özkırımlı starts analyzing the state dimension of national identity. In this sense, Heinrich Von Treitsche argued that nation must be in the very foundations of the state corps. Treitsche, who significantly locates the nation above the community values, even more than citizenship, argues that a state cannot exist without a nation (2008:42). This was later criticized by Jules Michelet, who saw not national identity but individual freedom. While locating individual freedom on nationalism, Michelet refers to the 1789 French Revolution, which eroded all inter and intra class and communal conflicts (2008:44). In addition to Treitsche and Michelet, John Stuart Mill regards national identity as the solidarity link between a group of people that depends on the close relationship on ethnic similarities, a common culture that covers language, religion, souvenirs and memoirs. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels later correlated national identity to the emergence of

modernization which they defined it as the transition from feudal production to the industrialization (2008:48). Later, national identity was defined by Anthony Smith in terms of territory. According to Smith, national identity involves some sense of political community that implies a definite social space, a fairly demarcated and bounded territory with which the members identify and to which they feel they belong (Smith 1991:9). This view was then supported by Otto Bauer who defined nationalism as an entity that had emerged with the changes in agricultural production to the capitalist one. (2008:51)

Academic nationalism discussions that were constructed on the 18th and 19th century's national identity definitions took place among the primordialists and modernists. Accordingly, whereas primordialists defend that nationalism has existed since ancient times, modernists believe that nationalism is a result of a modernization. From this sense, the reference of primordialists to Fichte's individuals and Herder's language were answered by the reference of modernists to Von Treische's state, Rousseau's citizenship and especially Marx and Engels' industrialization.

Going deeper in this discussion, we see that the modernist premises emerged earlier than the primordialist ones. The very first author of the modernist stream is Karl Deutsch. Deutsch defines nations as a product of the modern era (2008:64). Definition of nationalism as a modern concept was later defined by Tom Nairn, who views nationalism as a failure of Marxism that was developed by the unbalanced growth of capitalist economy since the 18th century (2008:67). This argument is later analyzed by Michael Hechter who shows that the unequal allocation of modernism and its different impacts in different geographic areas created two types in the same state, the center and the periphery. As a result, it is shown that these groups were

ready to fight for the resources of the state, and at the end the center would exploit the periphery. Hechter called this exploitation internal colonialism, and he clearly refers to Rousseau's citizenship concept that would work to protect the suppression of one group by another one (2008:122). The exploitation of the periphery by the center was differently narrated by another modernist, John Breuilly, who argues that nationalism consists of political movements that aim at capturing or using the government and to justify these attempts by nationalist premises (2008:133). The usage of nationalism by the political power was also referred Ernest Gellner. In his piece, Gellner argues that nationalism is the principle that defends those political and national units must always be consistent. Gellner mainly argues that political organizations were not constituted according to nationalism, and that is why it is impossible to talk of nationalism as an ancient concept. Gellner then refers to the fact that neither city states of the antique Greece, nor feudal communities, nor empires carry any nationalist traces (2008:146).

The modernist approach of nationalism gained a different momentum when Eric Hobsbawm published *Invented Traditions*. According to Hobsbawm, nationalism is a social engineering process that becomes meaningful by certain ceremonial and symbolic rules that have been repeated in time. Hobsbawm therefore sees nationalism as the biggest invented tradition that was brought to establish a bridge between the past and the present (2008:147). Hobsbawm inspired Benedict Anderson, who argued in *Imagined Communities* that nations are imagined, sovereign and limited communities. According to Anderson, a nation is imagined because even the members of the smallest nations do never meet each, never talk to each other, never hear each other but they feel commonality in their minds. Anderson adds that nations are limited because even the greatest nation on earth has some limits that were

defined by the boundaries of another nation. Last, Anderson argues that nations are sovereign because they were born by the enlightenment philosophy and revolutions of the 18th century. (2008:181)

In contrast to the modernist theory of nationalism, primordialist one was born first in 1957 through the texts of Edward Shils. Accordingly, Shils argued that nations have existed since the beginning of history (2008:61). His view was mostly elaborated by Anthony Smith, who argued that the most important thing that would bring the members of a community is not communal interaction but natural kinships. Called this perennial, Smith favors the view that nationalism is an old concept and had nothing to do with modernism (2008:267). Similar to Smith, Connor argues that nationalism is the nation belonging of a group of people who think that they were ancestrally related. (2008:228)

2.5. Postcolonial Nationalism: An Overview

The cultural hybridity between Morocco and France that King Hassan II instrumentalized in postcolonial Moroccan national identity to explain/justify the Europeanness of Morocco according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome could be explained by postcolonial nationalism. Postcolonial nationalism associates the national identity segment of nationalism with the ongoing impacts of colonialism on the colonized communities segment of postcolonialism. In total, postcolonial nationalism argues that the impacts of colonialism continue to influence the national identity of the colonized communities in the postcolonial episode. In addition, since it is a modern concept that emerged after 1947, postcolonial nationalism adopts the

modernist approach of nationalism. Postcolonial nationalism, in this sense, casts Europe as the colonizer and the communities of Africa, South Asia and South America as the colonized. It then argues that these impacts of European colonialism persist in the different definitions (individual existence, citizenship, language, state corps, individual freedom, common culture, modernization, territory) of the national identity of these regions' people after colonialism. By arguing that colonialism did not actually end completely, postcolonial nationalism analyzes the impacts of European colonialism on the national identity definitions of the colonized people after colonialism with three main themes: critique of colonialism, inbetweenness, and admiration of Europe.

2.5.1. Critique of Colonialism

The first theme that analyzes the impacts of European colonialism on the national identity of the colonized communities after colonialism is the critique to colonialism. By showing how administration, land policies, language, gender relations, and citizenship concepts of the colonizer in the colonial period impacted the national identity of these lands' communities in the postcolonial period, it urges state and non-state actors of the colonized states to nullify these impacts of colonialism. Scholars who work on this theme admit the hybridity at the national identity of the colonized communities with Europe that was formed in the colonial period, but they are calling on the people of the colonized states in the whole world to nullify this hybridity.

The critique of colonialism goes back to the writings of Aimé Césaire at first. Just after the 1947 South Asian decolonization, Césaire wrote *Discourse on Colonialism*, where he criticized Europe because of its colonialist side. Césaire mainly addresses the impacts of European colonialism on individual existence and individual freedom of the African national identity in the book where he regards Europe as the colonizer and Africa as the colonized. By arguing that colonialism never contributed to modernity in Africa, Césaire shows that the so-called modernization impacts of colonialism actually damaged the individual freedom of the colonized people since it served the European interests but not the Africans, who want more property in Africa (1950:10). In Césaire's view, the Africans do not have any freedom to use this modernity because the Europeans never showed them how to use it after colonialism. Césaire, in *Discourse on Colonialism*, also defines the colonial impacts of Europe on the African national identity through how the African was defined by the European in the colonial episode. Césaire points out how these definitions restrict the individual existence of the Africans who were known by these definitions of the Europeans. He simply tries to understand why the Africans want to accept the definitions made by Europeans. Césaire relates this to the impacts of the Europeans on Africa and criticizes Europe for this (1950:77). Césaire at the end invites Africans not to accept these definitions after colonial episode as a way to nullify the negative impacts of colonialism.

The postcolonial critique of colonialism was also discussed by Frantz Fanon in *Black Skin White Masks*. As did Césaire, Fanon also addresses the impacts of European colonialism on individual freedom and language definitions of the African national identity. Fanon, who casts Europe as the colonizers and Africans as the colonized gives priority to the Algerian independence struggle in *Black Skin White*

Masks. Here he analyzes how the individual freedom of the African was impacted by colonialism through the imitation of the white man by the black man. In this sense, Fanon does not only argue that white people do not regard black people as humans, but also questions the reasons why black people always want to imitate white people. As an answer, Fanon refers to the inferiority complex of black people who would like to resemble white people, and thus who would lose their image of being slaves. Here is the point where Fanon believes that the impacts of European colonialism damage the individual freedom of the African. (1952: 8-9). In *Black Skin White Masks*, Fanon shows that when the black man imitates the white man, he actually tries to show to the white man that he is not as backward as the white man thought. Fanon recommends the black man stop proving himself to the white man as a way to pacify the negative impacts of colonialism after decolonization (1952:10). *Black Skins White Masks* uses language and sexuality to explain how black man imitates the white man. In terms of language, for instance, where Fanon shows how Europe impacts the language constructor of the national identity of the African communities, Fanon argues that the black man tries his best to speak French like the white man because he knows that he has already been labeled already labeled bad speakers by white man (1952:25). In terms of sexuality, on the other hand, Fanon tests how the black man and woman feel when they are with white man or white woman. Accordingly, Fanon argues that if a black woman marries a white man, this marriage opens her way to freedom. Regarding the relationship of black man and white woman, on the other hand, Fanon refers to the same impact which approaches black man to the world of white man by marrying a white woman. Accordingly, Fanon argues that this marriage shows black man as white but not black. Different from the relationship between a black woman and a white man, Fanon also argues

that black man wants to marry white woman to be her master. The assumed mastery of white people created such a complex in black man against whites. In *Black Skin White Masks*, all in all, Fanon defends that black man should stop imitating white man because the more black man imitates the white man, the more he falls under white man's norms about black man. In Fanon's view, imitation of white man by black man will always keep the inferiority complex alive in black man. The way to get rid of this complex lies in acting like a black man, against how the white man defined the black man in the colonial period. In this sense, Fanon recommends the black man to get rid of this complex as a way to nullify the negative impacts of colonialism after colonial episode.

Fanon's criticism of black man turns into a complete challenge against white man in *The Wretched of the Earth*. This time Fanon turns his sights in the Europeans, as did Cesaire in *Discourse on Colonialism*. Again by addressing the impacts of colonialism on the individual freedom definition of the African national identity, Fanon clearly suggests all relations must be cut with Europe after decolonization to stop the impacts of Europe on the African national identity (1963:2). Different from *Black Skins and White Masks*, which analyzes the impacts of Europe on language and sexuality, *The Wretched of the Earth* highlights the racist aspect of the Europeans towards Africans that at the end impacts the individual existence of the Africans. Fanon who sees that racism and capitalism are two important bodies of colonialism, again argues that the best way to get rid of the impacts of Europe for the African is to cut the ties with Europe. According to Fanon, holding relations with Europe after decolonization is quite dangerous. Fanon argues that the European has an advantage over the colonized in Africa since he already injected the idea that he was the master there. As did Cesaire, According to Fanon, once he declares himself

as the master of the colonized, the European creates some notions about the African that actually define him from his eyes (1963:57). As did Césaire, Fanon shows how Europe impacts the individual existence and also individual freedom constructors of the national identity of the African communities.

The postcolonial critique of colonialism was also taken into account by Albert Memmi in his book *The Colonizer and the Colonized*. Like Césaire and Fanon, Memmi casts the European as colonizer and the African as the colonized. Memmi also addresses the impacts of colonialism on the individual existence and individual freedom definitions of the African national identity. However, Memmi starts discussing how the African was identified by the European in a different way from both Césaire and Fanon. Instead of replying directly to this question, Memmi tries to understand how the African, who suffered a lot from the European, could still admire the European, and how the European, who hated the African, sometimes could recall the African (1965:9). The discussion of the impacts of Europe on the African national identity is shown with its racist and capitalist sides in Memmi's *The Colonizer and the Colonized*. According to Memmi, the portrait of colonizer and the colonized is different, but the one of the colonized is constructed by the colonizer. Accordingly, there are two types of colonizer in Memmi's view; the one who accepts colonialism, and the one who refuses it. In his view, members of both groups are looking for more profit and more privileges. However, some of them, Memmi argues, do not necessarily behave like a colonizer in the colonies. The ones who refuse colonialism decided to be one of the colonized once they discover the economic, political and moral exploitation of the colonized man. Some of them may become leftist, who could defend the national awakening and all national struggles against the colonizer (1965:24). Contrary to the colonizer who refuses colonialism,

the one who accepts tries to fully behave like a colonizer by looking for a better career and more economic profit. According to Memmi, this one never cares of how to behave toward the colonized (1965:57). Regarding the definition of the colonized, Memmi does not go for a separation including the colonized that refuses or the colonized who accepts. In Memmi's view, the colonizer superiorizes himself by negatively defining the colonized. In this context, the colonized is the man who smells bad, who is lazy, who is coward and who is always otherized. This of course damages the African's individual existence. In Memmi's view, what the colonized are actually what the colonizer is not (1965:84). In the end, Memmi agrees with Fanon that the colonized are not able to manage its own state in the postcolonial period because of this admiration of the colonizer. Unlike Fanon, however, Memmi does not analyze the social class background of the colonized in the postcolonial time, but blames the colonizer. In his view, the colonizer did not have any positive impact on the whom he also did not teach how to rule his own people. According to Memmi, the colonized was alienated from him by the colonizer, and that is why now he might not show any ability to govern. As did Césaire, Memmi also invites the Africans to reject these definitions at the end of his book to nullify the negative impacts of colonialism after decolonization.

Africa was not the only region where the colonial impacts of Europe was studied with critique of colonialism. The Cuban writer Fernández Retamar in the *Caliban* shows that the even in Cuba these impacts could be felt. In the book where Retamar addresses the impacts of colonialism on the language definition of the Cuban national identity, Retamar questions how the Cuban language contains some words that were originated in Spanish despite Cuba attaining its independence from Spain. As an answer at the end of his article, Retamar finds out that the majority of

the Cuban people are so racially mixed with the Spanish people that they naturally continue to use the Spanish language instead of the original Cuban language (1974:46). Retamar argues that this is the cultural impact of colonialism on Cuba and suggests using natural Cuban words instead of these Spanish ones to nullify impacts of colonialism after the colonial episode at the end.

Postcolonial critique was also highlighted by the contemporary authors who have witnessed the emergence of neocolonialism and the failure of the colonized states that developed anticolonial policies at the beginning of their independences. Bart Moore Gilbert in *Postcolonial Theory* defines postcolonialism as a more or less distinct set of reading practices, if it is understood as preoccupied principally with analysis of cultural forms which mediate, challenge or reflect upon the relations of domination and subordination between nations, races or cultures, which have roots in European colonialism and imperialism which continue to be apparent in the present era of neocolonialism (1997:12). In Gilbert's view, the way to nullify impacts of colonialism is to challenge the colonial norms and legacies. Like Moore, Leila Gandhi in *Postcolonial Theory* also studies the postcolonial critique. Gandhi argues that postcolonialism is historical self-invention or the need to make a new start to erase painful memories of colonial subordination. In response, Gandhi argues that post-colonialism can be seen as a theoretical resistance to the mystifying amnesia of the colonial aftermath. It is also a disciplinary project devoted to the academic task of revisiting, remembering and interrogating the colonial past that is not simply a reservoir of raw political experiences and practices to be theorized from the detached and enlightened perspective of the present. Gandhi adds that it is also the scene of intense discursive and conceptual activity, characterized by a profusion of thought and writing about the cultural and political identities of colonized subjects (1998:5).

The ongoing impacts of colonialism on the colonized as a critique are last but not least interpreted by Robert Young in *Postcolonialism*. According to Young, postcolonialism involves a political analysis of the cultural history of colonialism, and investigates its contemporary effects in western and tricontinental cultures, making connections between the past and present politics (2011:6). In Young's view, the origins of postcolonialism lie in the historical resistance to colonial occupation and imperial control, the success of which then enabled a radical challenge to the political and conceptual structures of the systems (2001:60).

2.5.2. Inbetweenness

The second theme that analyzes the impacts of European colonialism on the national identity of the colonized communities after colonialism is inbetweenness. Unlike the authors who analyzed the impacts of European colonialism on the postcolonial period and who addressed the people of Africa to reject the European norms, the authors of this theme rather prefer to analyze the origins of the ongoing impacts of European colonialism in the colonial period. The authors of this theme instrumentalize the culture definition of John Stuart Mill in the national identity of the colonized states while analyzing the impacts of European colonialism on the national identity of the colonized after colonialism. At the end, the theme argues that the colonized falls into a cultural inbetweenness between himself and the European, having its origins in the colonial period reflected in the postcolonial period.

The theme of inbetweenness in the form of culture was first analyzed by Nicholas B. Dirks in *Colonialism and Culture*. Dirks, who analyzes Africa within the

context of colonized nations, addresses the impacts of colonialism on the culture definition of the national identity. According to Dirks, then, colonialism is a cultural and scientific process that aims to control the colonized (1992:6). In this context, Dirks also views the culture of the colonized as a product of colonialism. According to Dirks, colonialism not only has had cultural effects that have too often been either ignored or displaced into the inexorable logics of modernization and world capitalism, but also a cultural project of control. Colonial knowledge both enabled colonial conquest and was produced by it; in certain important ways, culture was what colonialism was all about. Cultural forms in newly classified traditional societies were reconstructed and transformed through colonial technologies of conquest and rule, which created new categories and oppositions between colonizers and colonized. At the end, Dirks suggests that the culture of the today's colonized was created in the colonial time by the colonizer. This is why the colonized of today feel close the colonizer.

The theme of inbetweenness was moved one step forward in *Black Atlantic*, written by Paul Gilroy. This book addresses the impacts of colonialism on the individual existence definition of the national identity. Gilroy regards this inbetweenness with the concept of "double consciousness" and argues that the history of African diaspora, when it encounters the European imperial conquest of the past, creates a postmodern situation where the Africans feel a mixture today (1993:30). Inspired by Pan-Africanism, Gilroy argues that the black people feel a double identity, a double soul in their mind, which at the end makes them two minds and two thoughts. Gilroy's double consciousness specifies three basic dimensions: thinking, being and seeing. He thinks that black people think, be and see like Europeans. He argues that the black people benefitted from the white man's culture

and intellectuality for their emancipation, autonomy and citizenship through their independences. According to Gilroy then, the culture of white man who colonized the black man was the real catalyzer that moved the black people to attain their civilized status in the post-colonial period (1993:87).

Inbetweenness was also elaborated in *Location of Culture* by Homi Bhabha, who analyzes the impacts of European colonialism on the culture of the Indian national identity. Inspired by Fanon, Bhabha who analyzes Indian postcolonial period in his book, calls this inbetweenness situation “hybridity” and argues that one must regard hybridity as a cultural necessity of colonialism in the postcolonial episode. According to Bhabha, the cultural interaction of the colonizer with the colonized in the colonization led to a creation of a culture in the postcolonial states that involves an intermingling. Bhabha defends that hybridity then comes from the cultural interactions between colonizer and colonized that finally impact the identity of the colonized. According to Bhabha, this situation eventually leads to a creation of a mixed culture in all the world where colonialism was seen. This is why, according to Bhabha, multiculturalism is a result of this interaction of the culture of the colonizer with the culture of the colonized in the postcolonial people. According to Bhabha, what we call international culture is related to the postcolonial being (1994:38-9). Homi Bhabha in *Location of Culture* also tries to replace nationalism in the anticolonial nationalist practice. Bhabha also uses the term hybridity for this process where he explains that the colonized one did not fully refuse the colonizer norms but he went the way of repeatability and mimicry. In this sense, Bhabha’s hybridity shows parallelism with Smith’s civic nationalism of the African states that are Western oriented. According to Bhabha, the colonial mimicry was the tool of the

colonized for his desire for a reformed, a recognizable other. Bhabha explains the mimicry as the effect of colonial power over the colonized, which is called hybridity or hybridization. Bhabha explains hybridity, in short terms, “almost the same but not white” (1994:91). In total, Bhabha shows how the history and culture of the colonizer still is going on and effective in today’s postcolonial societies and how it constitutes transcultural relations between the West and the East.

As did Dirks, Edward Said in *Culture and Imperialism* refers to the linkages of colonialism with imperialism, and addresses the impacts of colonialism on culture that is an ongoing process of imperialism. Said analyzes how this culture that was created during colonization was reflected in British and French literature. In this sense, Said actually views culture as a source of the national identity, similar to Mill (1994:14). Accordingly, Said argues that culture should never be regarded as a pure and single term but as a notion that was produced within the imperialist attitudes and behaviors. In this context, Said defends that the imperialism is not only the thought of settling away from home and managing lands there, but also the tool of controlling and creating this culture. To concretize his premise, Said refers to the low level of challenge by the Algerians to the terms that were brought by the Europeans in the 19th century (1994:15). In *Culture and Imperialism*, Said defends that the impact of the imperialism on the colonized that is instantiated by culture is a postcolonial process. In this context, Said believes that the culture created by imperialist forces still exists even after the independence movement:

In our time, colonialism ended but imperialism goes on in terms of general culture. I believe that there is a melancholy of governing and to set sovereignty in all cultures that were recognized in national platforms. French, British, Indian and Japanese cultures merge at that point. Who can in today’s Algeria and India separate the British or French component of the past from

today? Who can draw a circle in Britain and France without the impact of India and Algeria over British London and French Paris? ¹⁰

Besides Dirks and Said, the correlation between culture and colonialism was also touched upon by Nicholas Thomas in *Colonialism's Culture*. According to Thomas, who analyzes Africa in general, colonialism could be best understood when regarded as a cultural process. In Thomas' views, colonialism is not best understood primarily as a political or economic relationship that is legitimized or justified through ideologies of racism or progress. Rather, colonialism has always, equally importantly and deeply, been a cultural process; its discoveries and trespasses are imagined and energized through signs, metaphors and narratives, so even what would seem its purest moments of profit and violence have been mediated and unframed by structures of meaning(1994:29).

2.5.3. Admiration of Europe

The third theme that analyzes the impacts of European colonialism on the national identity of the colonized communities in the postcolonial episode is the admiration of Europe as a result of colonial legacy. Just like the colonial critique, the authors of the admiration to Europe theme analyze the impacts of European colonialism as

¹⁰ Çağımızda sömürgecilik sona ermiştir ancak emperyalizm genel kültür anlamında varlığını devam ettirmektedir. Ulusal düzlemde tanımlanan tüm kültürlerde bir hükümlanlık, hükmetme, egemenlik kurma özlemi bulunduğu inanıyorum. Fransız ve İngiliz, Hint ve Japon kültürleri bu noktada birleşiyor. Aynı zamanda da, aykırı bir biçimde, tarihsel ve kültürel deneyimlerin ne denli tuhaf bir melezliği olduğunu, genellikle çelişik deneyim ve alanları nasıl paylaştıklarını, ulusal sınırları aşip basit dogmanın ve bağırğan yurtseverliğin polisiye etkisine nasıl meydan okuduklarını bugün her zamankinden daha iyi biliyoruz. Bugün Hindistan ya da Cezayir'de kim, yanılgıya düşmeden, geçmişin İngiliz ve Fransız bileşenini şimdiki gerçeklikten ayırabilir? İngiltere ya da Fransa'da kim, İngiliz Londra'nın da Fransız Paris'in çevresine Hindistan ve Cezayir 'in bu iki emperyal kent üzerindeki etkisini dışlayan net birer çember çizebilir?

movements that started in the colonial times and continued in the postcolonial episode. This theme mainly argues that the African state elites after the independence expressed their admiration of Europe in their countries as a result of the colonial legacies. In this sense, the theme addresses the impacts of colonialism on the state corps definition of the national identity.

This theme was first elaborated in *National identity* written by Anthony Smith. *National Identity*, where Smith analyzes the impacts of European colonialism on the territory definition of the national identity, addresses the impacts of colonialism on African national identity. According to Smith, post-independence nationalism is the effort to create a territorial nation out of the old colonial state (1991:79). In *National Identity*, Smith also defines ethnic nationalisms as post-independence movements whose concept of the nation is basically ethnic and genealogical but who will seek to expand by including ethnic kinsmen outside the present boundaries of the ethno-nation and the lands they inhabit or by forming a much larger ethno-national state through the union of cultures similar to ethno-national states (1991:82). Smith at the end argues that the anti-colonial nationalism is not anti-colonial in Africa except for the case in Somalia. According to Smith, there is another aspect of this anti-colonialism, which is the westernizing orientation. Smith argues that there is resentment at the unmerited exclusion by the one sided love affair of so many intelligentsias with the West and its values. He defends that the colonial nationalists are unable to forget the real nations (1991:108).

In addition to Smith, this theme was discussed by Rupert Emerson in *Nationalization of Colonies*. Emerson mainly argues that the colonized states in the postcolonial episode want to seem more European than the European themselves. In Emerson's view, whereas the African states were giving importance to the African

symbols and institutions on the eve of independence, this scenario returned vice versa after the independence by including an amalgamation of both African and European symbols and institutions. In addition, Emerson argues that this phase is the one where the Africans are the defenders of the European culture more than the Europeans do (1995:122). Moreover, Emerson also links this amalgamation to the monopoly of nationalist movements in the hands of African political elites who were educated in Europe. Emerson underlines that Habib Bourgiba was educated in Paris, Kwame Nkrumah was in Lincoln University, Obafemi Awolowo in London and Leopold Sedar Senghor in Paris (1995:193).

Admiration of Europe as a result of the colonial legacy was also studied by Montserrat Guibernau in *Nationalisms*. In this book where the impacts of European colonialism is analyzed on the state corps definition of the national identity, Guibernau argues that the colonial administrations gave names to the new states, they drew their boundaries, constructed their capitals and formed central administrations and political institutions. At the end, Guibernau shows that the new states of Africa constructed the sum of the rights and pieces of these colonizer states. Guibernau refers to the fact that the African state is directly imported from Europe, a simple copy and a source of an inefficient violence. According to Guibernau, a reason of this case is that nationalism in the postcolonial Africa was shaped by the political elites who obtained a western education especially in English and French. Guibernau argues that these elites were so western educated that they could not escape from the European impacts and modernization of their countries with European values (1996:188).

April A' Gordon is another scholar who discusses admiration of Europe on the basis of colonial legacy in *Understanding Contemporary Africa* by analyzing the

impacts of European colonialism on the state corps definition of national identity. Gordon said that the first generation of African presidents often pursued foreign policies strongly tied to the former colonial powers. In addition to formal ties they developed a policy of dependency on Europe with a shared culture and political values of colonially trained African presidents and their European counterparts. 'A Gordon here works on the common culture perception of nationalism. In *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, A'Gordon argues that even though they campaigned for independence, they tried hard to get the sympathy of the Europeans. In Senegal, Leopold Sedar Senghor is known as more French than the French. The flag of Central African Republic contains the French flag. Senghor is the only African to be inducted into France's prestigious and selective Academie Française (2013:133). Moreover, Gordon underlines that the first generation of African presidents signed a variety of defense agreements with France rather than protecting their borders from France as Fanon suggests in *Wretched of the Earth*. Gordon also shows that France intervened militarily at least thirty times in its former colonies between 1963 and 1993. Even in cases where pro-French leaders were overthrown by military coups during the decade of the 1960s, the guiding principle of French involvement was the willingness of a particular leader to support French foreign policy.

The admiration of Europe of the colonial legacy that analyzes the colonial impacts of Europe on state corps was also studied in *Africa in world politics* by John Harveson and Donald Rotschild. Here, the authors argue that the colonial past is still valid in Africa today, especially in its state system. Most of the vast sub-Saharan African domains under French domination were joined into two large federations of French African Occidental and French African Equatorial. The authors, later, bring a

new perception about the admiration of France, and argue that France managed to create this admiration through cultural policies such as *francophonie* in the postcolonial episode. According to the authors, the Francophonie found form in the Franco- African summit conferences by the 1970s. In this context, *francophonie* as a cultural instrument found expression in the French education systems and linguistic policies. The situation became so popular that the French language in the Maghreb competed with Arab language and culture. In sub-Saharan Africa on the other hand, retention of French as the primary state vehicle has been internalized as a political value by most of the state class (2013:32). Francophonie here shows how Europe impacts the culture constructor of the national identity in Africa.

Guy Martin is another author who dealt with the French admiration of the postcolonial African states. In *African political thought*, Martin argues that France benefitted very well from the fact that Francophone African states have always been considered to be a part of the French sphere of influence. As a result, they created the Francophonie culture, and managed to assemble the French African states under the same roof (2012:105). Martin also analyzed the Francophonie concept that was related with the French admiration of the African states to François Mitterand. According to Martin, Mitterand's socialist regime that started in 1981 found its room strictly limited by historical constraints and by the weight of economic, political and strategic interests. Martin here points out that a wide network of intergovernmental organizations and conferences tried to institutionalize linguistic, cultural, educational, and communicational links existing between Africa and France by the opening of the Ministry of Francophonie in 1988. In addition, Martin shows one other important point for the link between African and France. He argues that François Mitterand's Africa adviser was his son; Jean Christophe Mitterand, who

pledged to liberalize the French foreign policy on Africa. In this context, President Mitterand made thirteen visits to Africa acting on the reports of his son. Moreover, he underlines the fact that Morocco became a member to the Francophonie group that started by the 1973 Franco-Africa summit in 1982 (2012:117).

Postcolonial nationalism shows us that the hybridity concept that was taken into account in the inbetweenness theme has close relationships with other themes. While the colonial critique theme comes up as efforts to get rid of this hybridity as Memmi, Cesaire, Fanon, and Retamar suggests, the inbetweenness theme highlighted by Bhabha, Said, Gilroy, argues that the culture of the colonized after colonialism is not pure but made by the colonizer in colonial times. The admiration of Europe theme, on the other hand, argues that the leaders of the colonized states especially in Africa express their wish to model Europe in their state structures on the basis of this hybridity.

CHAPTER III

SETTLEMENT OF THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE IN MOROCCO

3.1. Morocco in the Maghreb History

Morocco is a part of the Maghreb region in North Africa, a name given it by the Arabs in the 8th century. The term Maghreb is an abbreviation of Djazirat al Maghreb, meaning “where the sun sets”, in contrast to Mashraq, meaning “where the sun rises” (Parker 1985:21; Balta 1990:8; Julien 1994:19). Geographically speaking, the Maghreb covers a 5000 km² landscape from the Eastern border of Egypt to the Gibraltar Strait, and 2200 km² landscape from the Sahara Desert in the city of Erfoud to the Port of Tangiers. The Sahara Desert, starting in southern Morocco separates the Maghreb from Sub-Saharan Africa, in addition to the Mediterranean Sea to the north of Morocco that separates the Maghreb from Europe (Amin 1970:22; Ochsenwald & Fisher 2004:2) Morocco belongs both to the Micro Maghreb that only recognizes Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria as its center actors and Mauritania

and Libya as its periphery ones, but also to the Macro Maghreb that regards the North African region as a whole without using a cultural distinction as the Micro Maghreb does (Elyass 2001:12-13; Lacoste 1995:43). Some sources also include Morocco as an actor of the Middle East, an area which includes states as distant to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (Goldschmit&Davidson 2005:7; Armajani&Ricks 1986:21). The ethnic population of Morocco consists of Amazighs and Arabs, who became part of the ethnic mix of Morocco today.

History of the French Protectorate in Morocco- the basis of King Hassan II's justification of Morocco's Europeaness in 1987- started in 1912. Nevertheless, the relations of Morocco with Europe go back to the antiquity. The successive settlements of the Phoenicians, the Romans, the Vandals, the Byzantines and the Arabs between 814 B.C and 730 A.D. in the Maghreb did not only constitute the very first interaction of the Maghreb locals with Europeans but also the very first examples of imperialism in the Maghreb. It is significant to point out this imperialism as the early implementation of colonialism to show that Maghreb in general and Morocco in particular was already colonized before the French rule in 1912 (Brett&Fentress 1997; Harden 1962; Gras&Teixidor&Rouillard 1995; Moscati 1968;Mattingly&Alcock 1997; Collins 2000) As well as for Arabs, the colonialist rule of these antique civilizations on the Maghreb left significant impacts on the local Maghreb Amazighs' religion, language, architecture, military and some other practices to be used in their daily lives(Laroui 1995:27; Rogerson 1998:3). These impacts were political in terms of administration and military matters, economic in terms of industry, trade, urbanization, navigation, and agriculture, and cultural in terms of religion and literature. The cultural hybridity between Morocco and France that King Hassan II tried to instrumentalize in the postcolonial national identity of

Morocco while justifying the Europeaness of Morocco according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome thus started in antiquity.

Administrative and military practices were the strongest political impacts of the ancient nations on the Maghreb Amazighs. With regard to administration, the Phoenicians were the most active. They introduced direct rule to the Amazighs with two different systems. One was the monarchy that was implemented in the eastern cities and the other was the republic that was implemented in the western ones. (Moscati 1988: 202) The Phoenicians were also good at introducing military techniques, together with the Romans and the Byzantines. By manufacturing many war ships in the Maghreb ports, they taught the Maghreb Amazighs military technologies. The Romans, on the other hand, focused on the land army. They aimed at turning Maghreb Amazighs into modern soldiers who could protect the Roman interests in the Maghreb in the future. The Roman soldiers sent to Maghreb from Rome had a training mission, and they educated the Amazighs to be strong soldiers. They created soldier farmers among the Amazighs. In the end, the Amazighs became soldiers who not only knew how to fight but also became competent in agricultural works. These soldier-farmers managed to produce olives, cereals, and stock (Wacher 1987: 235). Besides the Phoenicians and the Romans, the Byzantines introduced defensive strategies to the Maghreb Amazighs. Emperor Justinian, who did not want to lose the Maghreb, gave priority to territorial defense. He used the Maghreb Amazighs to construct fortresses for the protection of territories (Vesiliev 1964:168). However, these walls could not stop the Arab conquest.

The Phoenicians and the Romans were prominent in introducing economic practices to the Maghreb Amazighs. The Amazighs under Roman and Phoenicians rule learnt how to mine silver, copper, tin and gold to exchange in trade with Egypt.

The Romans showed the Amazighs how to cultivate numerous agricultural products such as olives, cereals and stock. Among them, the olive had a significant importance since it had a great value to use in public baths, domestic cooking, cleaning and lightning. In addition, the Romans also used Maghreb grapes in wine production. Maghreb grapes were used within the concept of *annona*, a term to describe the supply of the whole Rome's wine demand from Maghreb. Innumerable farms and villages containing olives and grapes were used to horticulture in the Maghreb. All these Roman activities developed the Maghreb economy (Frend 1955:79). Thanks to these agricultural reforms in the Maghreb, urbanization also developed. Growth in agricultural production and rural population led to modern cities being constructed by the Romans. Trade volume between these cities increased, and the Maghreb Amazighs developed their trading skills thanks to the Romans. The large scale foodstuff export from Africa to Rome was a significant factor behind the agrarian and trade development in the Maghreb (Mattingly 1997: 93-4). Urbanization was also developed by the Phoenicians, the Romans and the Arabs. The Phoenicians constructed many cities in the region and also brought the culture of the "capital city" by declaring Carthage as their political and economic capital. They also gave emphasis on architecture. Compared to the Phoenicians, however, the Romans gave much higher priority to architecture. The architectural influence of the Romans on the Maghreb consisted of security buildings involving fortresses and barriers, and urban constructions entailing roads, markets, farmers and ports (Alston 1988:207). As well as the Phoenicians and the Romans, the Arabs also worked for urbanization, but in more a cultural way than the Phoenicians and the Romans. The Arabs shifted the world cultural center from Rome and Constantinople to Cairo when they conquered the Maghreb. They constructed mosques, madrasas, and other similar

religious buildings in the region (Frend 1955:87). Moreover, their rule in the Maghreb led to the escape of some Amazighs who adapted to a life in the mountains (Dwight 1979:5). It was the ability of the Amazighs to survive in the mountains that helped them to attack the Spanish in 1921 (Balfour 2002: 20).

Speaking of the cultural impacts, the Phoenicians introduced the usage of alphabet to the Amazighs, which was developed by the later usage of Latin and Arabic. In time, Arabic replaced all these previous languages and became the official language in the whole of the Maghreb. However, there was a more important cultural impact of these civilizations; religion. During the classical era of the Maghreb, the Amazighs were canaanitized by the Phoenicians, orthdoxized by the Romans, arianized by the Vandals, again Christianized by the Byzantines, and islamicized by the Arabs (Raven 1984; Shaw 2004; Merrils 2004; Abn Nasr 1975). The Jews who settled in the Maghreb in 587 BC, on the other hand, managed to keep their religious beliefs despite occasions forced conversion. Religion, which started to be adopted as a cultural identity by the Amazighs, was transformed into national identity when Morocco was established in 1055. The Arab and Amazigh community living within the borders of Morocco were defining who they were in terms of religion; Muslim or Jewish. This was because the Arabs and Amazighs of Morocco lacked national consciousness. This situation continued until the declaration of the Rif Republic in 1921 (Erckmann 1885; 11; Budgett 1905: 329; Ayache 1968:407). During the period of autonomous Amazighs who ruled Maghreb with the Kharijite rebellion against the Arab rule at the end of 8th century¹¹, the shared role of Islam and Judaism in Moroccan national identity ended in 1348 when an imam called Abou Inan al Marini started an Islamic campaign that suppressed the Jews.(Cohen 2011:30). The Jews did

¹¹ These Amazigh tribes were the Almoravids, the Almohads, the Merinids, The Wattasids, the Saadians and the Alaouites (Lugan 2001: 65, Nkoju 2006: 34)

not leave Morocco despite this campaign and have continued to live in Morocco to this day¹². After this period, the national identity of the Moroccans was constructed only by Islam with the Amazighs of Morocco who were calling themselves and each other as Muslims (Laroui 2009:57). The Islamic campaign isolated the Amazighs of Morocco from Europe until 1415. Many aspects of European life horrified them, such as dances and public entertainments where men mingled with women, they regarded European religion as deeply perverse, specifically Catholicism's strange religious festivals, its monasticism, its papacy and priesthood, and above all its deification of Jesus Christ (Elboudrari 1995:377). Until 1415, European Christians were regarded as horrifying subjects by the Amazighs and Arabs of Morocco.

3.2. The End of Morocco's Isolation from Europe: 1415-1631

Relations between Morocco and Europe after the period of isolation restarted with the Portuguese conquest of the city of Ceuta in 1415. The Portuguese were giving specific emphasis to Morocco because they were looking forward to bringing the high quality raw materials in Morocco to Portugal. The export of Moroccan raw materials institutionalized the Moroccan economy, and especially the trade system. The opening of the Moroccan market to Portugal also developed the Moroccan

¹² Morocco's Jews were treated as equals of the Muslim population, although they were not citizens but rather *dimihi* (guests or wards of the sultan under his personal protection) They were paying *jeziya*, a poll tax that was taken from non-Muslims. In 1921, there was no Christian in Morocco since they were mercilessly treated by the Moroccan rulers and slave trading pirates (Cohen&Harn, 1965: 24). The Jews occupied the status accorded them under the Islamic law as a people of the book, a non-Muslim group of free people who, by the payment of a tax were granted the protection of Muslims and its leaders (Rosen 2002:150).

agriculture that helped the sultan to unite people under his authority. (Laroui 1977:26)

The Portuguese intensified their economic activities in Morocco over time. When they conquered the city of Larache in 1471, the sultan Moulay Abu Zakariyya was forced to sign for specific trade privileges by the Portuguese. The trade agreement that was signed by the sultan set a Portuguese monopoly on the Moroccan trade. Moroccan merchants blamed the sultan for these privileges. In their view, the Portuguese domination of the Moroccan economy would have meant a direct threat to the unity of Islam in the monarchy. They caused a crisis among the merchants who were also regarding themselves as holy men (marabouts) and who were said to possess the spiritual powers of the Prophet Mohammed's descendants (Rosen 1984: 8). It was these feelings in total that made Islam a tool for solidarity in Morocco against the Portuguese, and defined who the Moroccans were (Afigbo 1986:183; Rivet 1996: 88).

The reactions of the Moroccan merchants against the sultan because of the trade privileges impeded Portuguese, who did not want to lose their dominance in the Moroccan market¹³. Meanwhile, Islam which was used to define who the Moroccans were, started to be institutionalized in the Moroccan state after the Arab conquest period. The law makers adopted the institution of *fqih* in 1483 in addition to the adoption of Islamic law in 1496. Moreover, the sultan bestowed status of *shurafa* on the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (Rivet,1994:151). Accordingly, the *shurafa* would have the right to claim honor if they could prove that they were the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. The sultan even brought a system that protects the rights of these people by appointing *Nakibul shurafa*. Among the

¹³ Morocco was so important for the Portuguese that the King Manuel the First asked Queen Elizabeth of Britain to recognize Morocco as Portugal's most favorite nation in 1482 (Laroui 2009:87).

shurafas, El Cezuli said “One is honored just because of its shurafa. I am a shurafa. The representative of God is my ancestor. And I am closer to Allah more than the ones who were created by Allah.”¹⁴

The Islamic law that was accepted in 1486 had important implementations in Morocco between 1490 and 1600. Three cases exemplify this implementation. In 1490, an important personality of Marrakech city Ali Ebil Ula wanted his virgin daughter Tawatara to marry his friend. The man offered a prostitute to Ali as a gift since he convinced Tawatara to marry him. Ali had a sexual relation with this prostitute called Meymuna and they had a baby; Salim. When Ali died, Salim wanted to get his portion from the bequest but the earlier sons of Ali did not let him do so. Then Salim went to the court and the cadis decided that he had not have a right to get a portion because he was born as a result of adultery, which was a crime according to the Islamic law. In another case that happened in 1493, a man called Haskuri made love to his ex-wife after he had divorced her. At the end, the court decided to punish him by stoning his head in front of his family. In another one in 1496, a man called Ibn İsa insulted another one Ebul Ferc as “son of a dog”. The court agreed that this insult was directly addressed to the father and grandfather of Ebul Ferc, whose names were Ebu Yahya and Abu Abdullah Muhammad. Since there was the word “Muhammad” in one of these names, İbn İsa was sentenced to death (Powers, 2002:117-195).

The institutionalization of Islam in the Moroccan state came to its peak point when Islam was declared as state religion under the Saadian dynasty in 1549. This was against the Portuguese who were moving to the southern Morocco by conquering the cities of Azzemour, El Jadida, Safi, Souria Kedima, Essaouria,

¹⁴ Kişi şerefının ve nesebinin yüceliği sebebiyle yücedir. Ben neseben şerifim. Allahın elçisi benim atamdır. Ve ben ona Allahın yarattıklarından daha yakınım (Powers 2002:31).

Agadir and Sidi Rabat between 1505 and 1521. In addition, the Portuguese also started to convert Moroccans from Islam to Christianity, inspired by the Crusades to Jerusalem. For Christian missions, the Portuguese explorers started to organize expeditions to Morocco for mythical goals such as finding Priest Prester John who was lost in Africa for fifty years (Chamberlain,2010,10). It was not easy for the Moroccan sultan and society to tolerate these activities in a time where Islam was being institutionalized. By declaring Islam as the state religion, the sultan tried to get the support of the Arabs and Amazighs to fight against the Portuguese under the shadow of Islam. It was again the Saadians who declared that they would be the savior of Islam in Morocco against the Portuguese. Sultan Moulay Abdalmalik declared war on the Portuguese in 1576 and beat them in the Battle of Three Kings with the help of the Turks. After this victory, Sultan Moulay Abdelmalek decided to cooperate with the British who became the biggest trade partner of Morocco between 1580 and 1610. Even though they were satisfied with the export of cotton to Morocco and import of sugar from Morocco, the British felt the pressure of Islam that was used by the Moroccans as a uniting tool against Europeans. When sultan al Mansour died in 1610, the Arabs and Amazighs organized Islamic campaigns to expel the British from the Moroccan lands. It was actually these revolts that introduced the French, who were already doing business with Senegal, and the Dutch who were doing business with Ghana into the Moroccan scene. This was the origin of the French Protectorate in Morocco that was used as a justification of King Hassan II's European Morocco according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.

3.3.The French in Morocco: 1631-1912

The French managed to impress the Moroccan sultan Moulay al Walid by using their prestige in international trade with Senegal. They convinced the sultan to offer the French some economic privileges by the Marrakech Accords signed in 1631. The sultan gave the French such important privileges that a French consul was appointed to Marrakech in 1643. In 1650, the French and the Dutch signed a common trade agreement with the Moroccan sultan es Seghir that was revised in 1655 and 1659.

The economic privileges that were offered to the French increased the discontent of the Arab and Amazigh population in Morocco. The French were also regarded as Christians, the same identity used for the Portuguese and the British, and their dominance in the Moroccan economy was viewed as the dominance of the Christians on Islam. When Ismael became the new sultan, he started to see the French as the enemy of the country and Islam. At the end of the 17th century, Ismael removed all the protection of the Moroccan state on the French ships that were being attacked by Moroccan pirates. Second, he deported all the French merchants and diplomats from Morocco in 1689. The import and export with France was also suspended, and this later caused a serious economic crisis in 1727. Morocco experienced a twenty years famine.

The deportation of French from Morocco ended in 1757 when Moulay Ben Abdallah became the new sultan upon Ismael's death. The replacement of Ismael by Abdallah normalized the relations of Morocco with France until his death in 1789. However, this normalization did not affect the already existing anti-Christian feelings in the Arab and Amazigh population of Morocco. When Abdallah died in 1789, Moulay Sulaiman became the new sultan. He was passive in the face of the French in

Morocco, who increased their presence after the 1789 Revolution. This passivity of Sulaiman was causing unrest, especially among the Amazighs in the north and in the south. The sultan knew that he had needed the French to recover the Moroccan economy, but the pressures from the Amazighs in the south was so great that he decided to deport the French from Morocco one more time. This deportation started the second isolation period of Morocco from Europe. With this isolation, the Amazigh tribes in the south of the Atlas Mountains who pressurized the Moulay Sulaiman to deport the French started to call themselves the real guardians of Islam instead of the sultan. When Moulay Sulaiman died in 1822, these tribes came together and declared that they would not obey the Moroccan sultan's authority anymore. They set the Blad as Siba in the south of the Atlas Mountains as an independent state from the Blad al Makhzen where the Moroccan sultan had the full authority in the north of the Atlas Mountains. This led to the division of Morocco into two, as Blad al Makhzen where the sultan had the full authority, and Blad al Siba where the Amazigh tribes in the south of Atlas Mountains had their own authorities. (Abn Nasr 1987:8)

The first French contact with Morocco after the deportation was in 1822. The decision to end the isolation of Morocco was implemented to end by the 19th century Alaouite dynasty members; Moulay Abderrahmane (1822-1859), Mohamed the 4th (1859-1873), Hassan the First (1873-1894), Moulay Abdelaziz (1894-1908) and Moulay Abdelhafid (1908-1912). The Alaouite Moulays were thinking of recovering the Moroccan economy that had been harmed by this isolation through a new economic partnership with Europe (Brignon, 1967:257). This new partnership included economic privileges offered to Portugal in 1823, Great Britain in 1824, and France in 1825.

The French who started a new period with Morocco in economic terms changed their relationships with Morocco in 1832 when it was learnt that sultan Moulay Abderrahmane had sent an army to Algeria to support the rebellion of Abdelkader. The French navies bombarded Tangier as soon as they heard about this support. This bombardment pushed Morocco to fight the Isly War in 1844 that in the end made Morocco lose the city of Oujda to the French. Nevertheless, the French did not move further after the conquest of Oujda. They continued their economic cooperation with Morocco.

While the Dutch, the Spanish and the British were looking for more privileges from Morocco in this period, the rule of Sultan Mohamed 4th opened a new chapter for the relations between France and Morocco. In 1863, Morocco signed a new protection treaty with France. When Hassan the First came to the throne in 1873 just after his father's death, the protection agreement signed with France in Mohammed rule caused tension among the Amazigh tribes of Blad as siba. The Amazighs rebelled against Hassan the First, who let Morocco drift into another economic crisis that led to a new famine in 1878. When the French established the indigenat regime in Algeria by 1881, Morocco was on the brinks of bankruptcy. In order to save the country, Hassan also signed two different agreements with France and Germany. In addition, he started to invite French intellectuals to Morocco to observe his country; these already had a mission from by the French state via La Mission Scientifique du Maroc. Accordingly, the location of Islam in the Moroccan national identity that forms hostility against the Europeans was also remarked on by certain French intellectuals. Among them, Onesime Reclus argued in 1873 that despite all the beauties of this country, its religious barbarism which the locals are proud of (Rivet; 1996: 19). In 1890, on the other hand, Pierre Loti said that the impression for a

European to be in Morocco, in Fez, is an impression of asphyxie, as he was amazed by the silhouette of Islam in this city that is the heart of Islam (1890: 162). In 1903, F. de Pressensé said that he was convinced that the Muslim populations in Morocco would revolt against the French (Rivet 1996:40). Among this mission, it was only Eugène Étienne who saw the economic benefits of Morocco for France (Garvey 1962:343). He said:

My friends...What a wonderful field for your activity...It is in Morocco that you will find phosphate deposits and iron mines...wheat fields and olive plants. It is there you will find markets for your cotton goods of Rouen and the Vosges. Wool to supply our weavers in Roubaix and Tourcoing...Railroads to build, harbors to develop...We will have a free hand from Moulaya to the ocean, from Tangier to Sahara.

The actual motivations of the French for the Moroccan conquest started after the Berlin Congress of 1884-85. The Fes Accords that was signed in 1902 between Morocco and France was the first step for the settlement of the French Protectorate. The French Prime Minister Théodore Delcassé forced Moulay Abdelaziz to sign the accords that would add Morocco to the French colonial policy in North Africa. In return, Delcassé offered Abdelaziz to erase the Moroccan debts to the French banks incurred after the Isly War.

The signing of Fes Accords caused tension among Moroccans who thought that the sultan was throwing Islam into danger again. Revolts were organized under the leaderships of Moroccan imams such as Bou Hamara, al Raissouli and Ma el Amin against the sultan Moulay Abdelaziz (Rivet 1996:94). People who assembled around these imams gave serious damage to the French properties. It was the visit of Prussian Kaiser Wilhelm the Second that saved Morocco from bankruptcy. Wilhelm II visited Morocco in 1905 to give his support but this could not stop the French

movement in Morocco. The French forces conquered the city of Chachuia and bombarded Casablanca on March 19th 1907, when the French Doctor Mauchamp was killed in Casablanca. Four French workers were also killed in Casablanca train station, when they were fixing the railway.

A year after the assassinations, Moulay Abdelhafed became the new sultan in 1908. He immediately called for a jihad against the French but he could not get satisfactory support either in and out of Morocco. The French moved to the city of Fez, neglecting the Algesiras Accords of 1906 that internationalized Tangier and Moroccan banks. As a result, the Germans sent the ship Panther to Agadir in order to protect the German people in Morocco against a possible French aggression.

In 1909, General Eugene Douette said that for all the Moroccan doctors and things that Lyautey was talking about Morocco is sort of a China in in front of the doors of Europe and a real paleontological museum of Islam (1909:132). As the French activities in Morocco turned into a political conquest, the Amazighs' rebellion against them turned into a jihad in 1910. Independently from the sultan, the imams declared jihad against the French in order to stop their expansion. Islam as the unique component of Moroccan national identity at that time also showed itself when the first jihad of the 20th century in Morocco was declared by a Marrakech imam called Ali al Susi and Rissani el Hadjani on 3rd March 1910 (Rivet 1996:93).

Nevertheless, the jihad calls of the imams in Blad al Makhzen and Bad al Siba did not find the necessary support from the Moroccan sultan Abdelhafed and from the rest of the Muslim world. Moreover, the jihad calls did not discourage the French military staffs, who were ready for the conquest. The French military observed the lack of nationalism in Morocco by that time. Accordingly, population of Morocco was incapable of political cohesion because they still were not familiar with the

concept of nation, and also incapable of a religious cohesion since the confrontation between rival tribes destroyed orthodoxy and disaggregated Islam (Segoznac 1911:24).

The sensitivity of Moroccans on Islam was also observed by General Lyautey. When the French entered Fez, the level of reaction against the soldiers was so high that Lyautey described this revolt as “being on the verge of an historical evolution as serious and as radical as ours of 1789” (Gershovich 2000: 46). However, this Islamic resistance against the French could not stop the foundation of the French indirect rule on March 30th 1912. The association based Treaty of Fez that was signed on March 30th 1912 did not only turn Morocco into a French Protectorate but also completed the French colonization of Maghreb. The French got the administrative control of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco together thanks to the Treaty of Fez. This treaty did not only settle the French Protectoate but also the Spanish one. When the French conquered Tunisia in 1881, Spain threatened the French to occupy the cities of Larache and Tangier that were already in the French sphere of influence. When the Treaty of Fez was signed in 1912, the French gave the cities of Ceuta and Melilla to Spain so that it would not interfere with the French affairs in its Protectorate. On November 27th 1912, the Treaty of Madrid set up a Spanish sub-protectorate in these regions that had 20.000 Km. square in total (Balfour 2002:5). However, the Spanish tried to model their protectorate in their lands, but at the end they failed especially in terms of policies for the locals (Pennell 2000:167). The northern Spanish zone was governed jointly by a khalifa chosen by the sultan in the French Protectorate from two candidates nominated by the Spanish. The Spanish, unlike the French, made only half-hearted attempts to improve the already bad economy there and held on the zone for their prestige only (Dwight 1979:105). However, the Spanish did not rule

Morocco as the French did. The French influence on Morocco was much more impressive before and during the Protectorate. They did not only break the trade hegemonies of the Portuguese and the British, but also managed to attract Moroccan people. Neither Portuguese nor the British could similarly attract the people as the French did. This argument was valid for the Spanish as well. They showed no respect to Islam for instance. The letter addressed to the son of Tatouan Sharif Mohamed Bin Sidi Lahemn from his father on February 21st 1910 represents it:

They are not like the English or like the French who respect our religion and our customs in Egypt as just in Tunisia and in Algeria. The Spanish respect nothing and hate our religion. Never speak to us of peace. From el Hauz to the Rif we are all prepared for the holy war and we will win by the help of God (Pennell 2000).

The difference between the French and the Spanish Protectorates for the Moroccan people was not only a matter of respect or disrespect to Islam. The French were already in Morocco long before they declared their Protectorate, and interacted with the people much earlier. Moreover, the French Protectorate under General Lyautey aimed at the development of the country and the people, and followed a non-assimilationist rule. On the other hand, the Spanish came to Morocco just two years before they had declared the Protectorate, and never interacted with the people of Morocco as the French did. In addition, they followed an assimilationist rule just to get the maximum strategic profits from the Mediterranean Sea. An article published in the Spanish “Correspondia Militar” on June 9th 1911 expresses what Morocco had meant for the Spanish Royalty;

However, at the end, protecting Spain’s strategic interests was more important than to spread civilization into Morocco. The whole nation could perish before tolerating the occupation by another people, another power because this occupation would entail not only the dishonor of the Fatherland but also the future of loss of nationality. It would be a total ruin if France takes possession of that piece of coast and enclosed her

dreamed of Europe in Morocco in order to destroy completely our strategic position in Europe(Pennell 2000)

The way how the Spanish saw Morocco was also highlighted by the deputy Fransisco Cívola on August 23rd 1911. The interview he gave that to the journal *Correspondia Militar* shows that Spain had no profit from Morocco. Cívola said: “We should banish from our thoughts the idea that the situation in Morocco represents profit and wealth for us, when, on the contrary, it is the source of poverty, sterility, and stagnation for Spain.”¹⁵

At the beginning of 1920 however, people of the northern cities of Fez and Meknes started to rebel against the French forces. This was the year when the French developed a harsh attitude towards the Amazighs in Southern Morocco and followed armed strategies. This revolt also happened as a result of the use of chemical gas in Melilla by the Spanish. There was a change in the attitudes of Moroccans to the French, and this change could be visible in the bulletins promulgated by 1920. As the bulletin on August 14th 1920 reports:

In the region of Taza-Fez, we are always signalled that a bunch of chiefs are looking forward to increase hostility and aggression against us. The Amazighs in the south very well influence the Amazighs in the north after our attacks to the South.¹⁶

¹⁵ Debemos desterrar de nuestros pensamientos la idea de que la situación en Marruecos representa el beneficio y la riqueza para nosotros, cuando, por el contrario, es la fuente de la pobreza, la esterilidad, y el estancamiento de España.

¹⁶ Dans la région de Taza-Fez, on signale toujours une dizaine des chefs de bandes qui cherchent à augmenter l’hostilité et l’horreur agressive contre nous. Les Berbères du sud très bien influencent les Berbères au nord après nos attaques au sud.

The south eastern region of the Blad al Makhzen was also boiling by that time. In the city of Meknes, the Amazighs started to mobilize against the French. The official bulletin on October 4th 1920 says;

In the region of Meknes, two small detachments happened. One in Meknes, the other is in Ifrane did their own junction in the center of the Beni Mtir territories. The people seem angry about the chemical gas incident in Melilla.¹⁷

After the Rif War where the Rif Amazighs had destroyed the Spanish army, the French started to supervise the Spanish Protectorate that continued to rule Morocco again from Madrid until 1956.

3.4. The French Protectorate in Morocco: Morocco in the French Colonialism in Africa

The settlement of the French Protectorate in Morocco was a direct output of the French colonial policy in Africa. This policy was composed of three different steps: the conquest of Algiers in 1830, the conquest of Tunisia in 1881, and the Berlin Congress in 1884-85 were the steps to the French Protectorate in Morocco (Abn Nasr, 1971: 237; Sperber, 2009: 119).

The conquest of Algiers in 1830 was not actually in the context of the French colonial policy in Africa. However, when the Algier Dey Hussein slapped the face of

¹⁷ Dans la région de Meknès, deux petites détachements sont venus, l'un de Meknès, l'autre d' Ifrane, ont fait leur jonction au centre de territoire des Beni Mtir. La population semble être fâchée contre l'usage de gas à Melilla.

the French consul Pierre Deval because he asked him to pay the necessary amount of the wheat he bought from him, the French King Charles X used this slap as an insult to the French Empire and conquered Algiers on July 5th 1830 (Prochaska 1990: 62). Known in the history as the Fan Affair, the French colonial policy in Africa had begun. The conquest of Algiers was regarded by the French state as the rehabilitation of the stagnating French economy and the empowering of the French King's prestige in the eyes of the aristocrats (Okoth 1979:247; Davidson 1983: 40; Metz 1993: 22). With the conquest, the Moroccan economy which was mostly based on piracy by that time, started to be threatened by the French navies that were sailing in the Mediterranean Sea. As a result of the French navies, which did not tolerate the Moroccan pirates, the Moroccan sultan Moulay Abderrahmane signed trade and friendship pacts with Great Britain to provide protection from the French navy. The British acquired important economic privileges with this pact, which later was also signed with the Spanish.

The conquest of Algiers in 1830 did not stop the stagnation of the French economy. After the 1848 Revolution that brought Napoleon 3rd to power instead of Louis Philippe in 1852, he saw the conquest of foreign lands as a solution to the stagnating French economy. The French army under his command conquered Indochina and New Caledonia. However, he lost Alsace Lorraine to the Prussians in the Sedan War of 1871. The loss of Alsace Lorraine to the Prussians at the Sedan War reduced his credibility in the eyes of the French people. The Sedan War also ended the Second Empire.

In 1871, the Third Republic was founded with the same principles of making France a strong economy in Europe. The first President of the Third Republic Adolphe Thiers and Patrice Mac Mahon wanted to accelerate industrialization and

saw colonialism as the best way to reach their goal. In order to realize the development of the French state on the basis of the conquest of foreign lands, Tunisia was regarded as a good option. The French conquered Tunisia in 1881 and signed the Treaty of Bardo that settled the Tunisian Protectorate. The Tunisian conquest by the French triggered the colonial ambitions of the Third Republic under the leadership of Jules Ferry. The expedition into Tunisia which marked the resumption of French expansion, also developed his colonial abilities (Brace 1969:59).

The conquests of Algiers and Tunisia increased the colonialism hunger of France for its economic development. Thanks to its achievements in Algiers and Tunisia, Quai d'Orsay was directly invited to the Berlin Congress in 1884 that would discuss the land partitions in Africa. The Congress that assembled in 1884 would discuss three important points. First, the Congress wanted to find a solution to the Belgian company Neutral International African Association that was threatening the potential free trade possessions of the French and Portuguese in the Congo region. By the early 1880s, The Belgian King Leopold II selected the basin of Congo River as the field of his business activities. His plan was to establish a claim to the Congo waterway, thereby encouraging competition among the European powers to seize the areas of their own. The International African Association dispatched agents to Congo and staked a claim against the French and the Portuguese (Woodruff, 1982: 117). In their discussions at Berlin Congress, the participants agreed that Leopold's African colony would belong to him only without any state control (Barber, 1993: 228). Second, the Congress discussed the British monopoly on the African free trade system that was bothering France, Germany, Belgium and Italy. Mainly France in addition to others, Africa was regarded as a great resource for the developing economics of the European states. By the level of industrialization at home, these

states faced a great need of new markets. Britain's main trading rivals, France and later Germany, realized that the way to beat British competition was to establish colonies or protected areas in Africa (Shillington, 1993: 305). Third, the Berlin Congress was assembled to promote the idea of how to modernize the locals of Africa with the European moral values. Thomas Pakenham in *The Scramble for Africa* refers to this point as follow:

At two o'clock, on 15 November Bismarck rose to welcome the delegates with a short speech in French. He looked magnificent in his scarlett court dress, as fit as a guardsman, sleeker and younger than ever. Yet he seemed curiously uncertain of what he had to say. He began with a pious declaration that took them back to the 3Cs: commerce, Christianity and civilization (1991: 241).

The Berlin Congress at the end decided on the partition of Africa (The Scramble for Africa) that would bring European civilization. Accordingly, the land usage rights of Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria, Niger, Gambia, Ghana (Gold Coast) Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa and Rwanda was given to Britain. Similarly, the ones of Congo were given to Belgium. Germany would be responsible for the land usage rights of Togo, Cameroon and Namibia. Portugal would be in charge of the land usage rights of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, in addition to Spain, which would be in charge of the ones of Equatorial Guinea and Western Sahara¹⁸. Finally, France would be in charge of the land usage

¹⁸ The Spanish colonialism on Western Sahara (Rio de Oro) was linked to the Spanish government in Madrid between 1884 and 1936. After 1936, the rule of Western Sahara was linked to the Spanish protectorate in Morocco (Saxena 1981:5-6). According to Ahmed Rhazoui from the Department of International Relations at Al Akhawayn University, the Spanish protectorate wanted to increase its efficiency in Morocco that it lost in 1926 Rif War to the French by taking charge of the Western Sahara lands where its national identity was constructed by Morocco in the postcolonial episode as a Moroccan land.

rights of Senegal, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania and Madagascar. (Davidson 1983:5; Fresnette 1962:93).

3.5. The Motivations of the French Colonialism in Africa

The French kept in mind three important motivations in their African colonialism. These were bringing civilization to Africa (*la mission civilisatrice*), the reparation of the French prestige after the defeat in the Sedan War, and to provide an advantage in its political rivalry with the British.

The most essential was *la mission civilisatrice*. By assuming that they would upgrade the level of modernization of the African locals, the French saw themselves as the agents of civilization. For this purpose, the French had to perceive the African locals as inferior races, and they did so. On the basis of such an admission, the French wanted to expand the citizenship and freedom concepts that rose after the 1789 Revolution. *La mission civilisatrice* was an important step for the development of the cultural hybridity between the Africans and the French in Africa. The French considered themselves the elected nation who would incarnate human rights and citizenship in the world after the 1789 Revolution (Wesseling, 1996: 18). Besides *la mission civilisatrice*, reparation of the state prestige that was traumatized after the loss of Alsace Lorraine to the Prussians in the 1871 Sedan War was quite important for the French in their African colonialism (Gildea 1996:71). The defeat in the Sedan War did not only make the French lose Alsace Lorraine, but also triggered the colonial ambitions of the Third Republic that saw the African colonialism as an efficient treatment to the French economy (Wesseling 1996:11). Last but not least,

the traditional rivalry with Britain spread to Africa, and this pushed the French to colonize the continent (Maurois 1956:493; Trevor 1996:238). All these motivations at the end were practiced in the hands of Jules Ferry as the leader of French colonialism in Africa. Minister of Education between 1879 and 1885, Jules Ferry always defended secular transformation of French education. He implied the republican notions of *laïcité* in order to break down the authority of the Church on schools. His major goal was to create a rational French society. His interest in colonialism, on the other hand, started just after the Sedan War when he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Okoth 1979:87).

Ferry argued that colonialism was necessary for the future of the French Empire. He emphasized that colonialism would promote material progress and trade by extending the domain of industrial civilization and open markets. He also related colonization to civilization, as premises of *la mission civilisatrice*. In one of his speeches at the Senate on July 28th 1885, Ferry said:

Economic considerations must also incite France to penetrate lands, that is, the oversea markets. France is rich, and colonies are for the rich states that can advantage from capitals. France will export its capitals, its men, its products. In an episode where Europe was inherited of custom barriers, where the South American market is being conquered by the United States, where industries meet the mévente, the foundation of a colony is a must. The colonial politics is the daughter of the industrial politics (Bouche 1991:54).¹⁹

¹⁹ Speech at the Senate, July 28th 1885 : Les considérations économiques aussi doivent inciter la France à acquérir des terres, donc des marchés outre-mer. La France est riche et les colonies sont pour les pays riches un placement de capitaux des plus avantageux. La France exportera ses capitaux, ses homes, ses produits. A une époque où l'Europe est hérissée de barrières douaniers, ou le marché Sud-Américain est en passé d'être conquis par les Etats Unis, ou les industries connaissent la mévente, la fondation d'une colonie, c'est la création d'un débouché, La politique coloniale est la fille de la politique industrielle.

3.6. The Method of the French Colonialism in Africa

The final act of the Berlin Congress manufactured African colonialism for the European states, but it didn't mention the method of how to do it. To find an answer to this question was more crucial for France and Britain since they were the two who got the most land usage rights of the African states. However, all of them tried to find some formulas. The Belgian King Leopold II searched for the support of the Belgian Parliament to rule Congo. The Germans adopted an authoritarian regime to repress the African local rebels against the German army in Togo and Cameroon. The Portuguese kept Mozambique and Angolans closer to their culture, the Portuguese men even married the African women. The British preferred an indirect rule instead of a direct rule. Different than the British, the French adopted first indirect rule, then direct rule, and then indirect rule again (Wright 1987:219).

French adopted indirect rule (association) in the foreign lands they conquered. The direct rule that brought assimilation into the French colonial policy in the world rose after the French Revolution. Through the declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen, the revolution underlined the importance of the will of the people. This was embodied in the French Civil Code in 1804 that founded the right wing Republicanism that was concerned with assimilation (Gershowitz 1999:20; Tombs 1996:435). The implementation of assimilation in the French colonial Africa was described by Evans Pritchard in *Arab Status in Cyreanica under the Italians*;

First, the colony conquered by superior arms and the native leaders and populations killed or suppressed. Second, that part of the country is taken over by Europeans and settled by immigrant Europeans and the natives are driven to less attractive places. Third, the power of the State are kept in European hands and Europeans are given higher status and economic opportunities. Fourth, native customs and laws are preserved where they do not conflict with

European interests. Fifth, the ruling power sets out to raise the standards of the native population with educational, agricultural and other benefits. Sixth, the patterns of social relations within the native community tend slowly to take the form of European patterns as political, economic, and kinship-family institutions including culture, religion, personal laws. Seventh and last, a class of évolués as a bridge between the rulers and mass of the native population emerges (1944:17).

Assimilation that became the method of the African colonialism after the 1789 Revolution continued in the Third Republic as well. Its first usage in the French African colonialism was in the Algiers conquest in 1830. The conquest of Algiers in 1830 gave the Third Republic the opportunity to add Algeria into the French Empire. Since the Third Republic regarded Algiers as an annex to the French Empire, the French state tried to impose the French culture into the Algerian life. Above all, it tried to frame modernity in Algeria with the imposition of the French knowledge, power, and identity (Naylor 2000:12).

Jules Ferry effectively implemented the assimilationist method in the French colonialism in Africa on the eve of the First World War. The economic costs of the preparation for war forced the French to reimplement association as they did before the Revolution (Gueraud 1959:373). Mosheu Gershowitz in the *Military Rule of France in Morocco* lists the three possible reasons of this shift as follow;

First, assimilation perceived the other cultures as inferior and insignificant when compared to French culture, and the French often envisaged the replacement of these traditions by the unifying French culture to be a slow, careful and lasting process. Second, the assumption that diverse societies were the equal members of the French civilization started to annoy the elites. Third, the introduction of new ideas to colonized youth educated in a European style could erode their respect for their French masters and lead them to demand reforms which the colonial system would not tolerate (2000:56).

Once the Third Republic implemented assimilation in Algiers, they abstained from using it for the Tunisian conquest in 1881. First of all, they were quite busy with home affairs, and Tunisia was too small and unpopulated to imply assimilation. Instead, they decided to use indirect rule brought by association. However, colonialism of Africa after the Berlin Congress led the Third Republic to use assimilation again (Vesseling:1996: 5). Accordingly, Senegal would be the center of the French assimilationist method in West Africa, and Africans would be ruled by the local chiefs- *chefs de province, chefs de canton and chefs de village*. Whereas a Ministry of Colonies was founded in 1894, a presidential degree established the General Government of West Africa which grouped together all the French West African states including Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Guinea, Niger, Sudan, Senegal, Mauritania, Upper Volta in 1895. Because of Senegal's strategic importance to France, Senegal was ruled by a General Governor who would be responsible to the Quai d'Orsay in France. This policy changed into association again on the eve of the First World War. The Protectorate that was found in Morocco adopted an associationist method instead of an assimilationist one.

Association as the method of the French colonial policy in Morocco was not originally a French idea. Copied from the British indirect rule that was implemented not only in Africa but all in the colonies, the French adopted indirect rule only when the First World War forced the French state to change it in Africa. A second difference between French and British indirect rules was about the status of the local chiefs. The British did not unite their West African lands as the French did, and they did not use the metropolis officers for the final decisions of these colonies unlike the French who did. The British tried as much as possible to see that all the chiefs they used were traditional rulers whereas the French were not particular at this point, and

the *chef de canton* was not a traditional chief. Third, the British were more inclined to respect the chiefs under them and to give them more powers than the French did. Local chiefs were more important for the British. Fourth, the British administered each of their four colonies separately. This was partly because the British colonies were so widely scattered that they could not be efficiently administered from one center. Last, the British, unlike the French, did not attempt to pass laws in London for all their West African colonies. On the contrary the Governor of each territory drew up laws according to needs of his particular area (Okoth 1979:223).

Not only British, but also German, Portuguese, Italian and Belgian indirect rules were different from the French one. The French African administration differs from the German one in the sense that the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was against colonialism at first, unlike the French who based their African colonialism on deeper grounds than the Germans. Another difference of the German indirect rule in Africa from the French was in the type of the colonial regime. Whereas French ruled her African lands through assimilation at the end of the 19th century, the Germans preferred associationism from the beginning. When colonialist ideas flourished in Germany, the Colonial Association (Kolonialverein) was founded in Frankfurt on December 6th 1882. The real birth of the German colonial empire, however, took place on April 24th 1884, when Bismarck extended Reichschutz (Protection of the Reich) to Lüderitzland. That act was the beginning of German South West Africa. On 5 July Togo was declared a German Protectorate with 12 July as of Cameroon. Between 1886 and 1890, the Germans also came to East Africa.

The difference at the Belgian indirect rule in Africa from the French is also visible. The colonization of Congo by the Belgian King Leopold II was committed without the approval of the Belgian Parliament, which is something totally different

from the French one. King Leopold II was considering Africa as a cake to get a slice, nothing more. In this sense as well, Africa meant less to Leopold than the British and the French. He said: “We must be careful, skillful and ready to act to get us a slice of this magnificent African cake”.

A second difference was that African colonialism was already approved by the Assemblée Generale in France. Until the day where the Congo Free State was established because of the chaotic atmosphere King Leopold II could not prevent, Congo was a personal property of King Leopold II. More than the cake value he attributes to Africa, King Leopold II followed a different way to acquire a colonial land throughout the world. Instead of spending any military efforts to have colonial lands in Africa, King Leopold kindly asked the state leaders to share or to give some of their lands with/to him;

One day he asked a Spanish correspondent: Are the Philippines for sale? He wrote to Queen Victoria: Would you perhaps consider organizing an expedition to China? He also wrote to Victoria that the Japan Emperor’s treasure is quite rich and poorly protected in 1859. In 1861, he asked a Belgium naval officer: Do you know of an island in Oceania, the China Sea or the Indian Ocean, that suits us? He once told that New Guinea has his interest. But no one wanted to get rid of their colonies” (Wesseling, 1996: 45).

The Portuguese indirect rule in Africa, on the other hand, was closer to the French one, especially after the rule of General Salazar. The Portuguese ruled their African colonies with indirect rule Salazar’s Estado Novo, an ideology that is parallel to Greater France of the Third Republic. In addition to the French, the Portuguese married the women of the colonized lands. (Davidson1983:163). The Salazar Government made the constitutional changes that transformed colonies to overseas provinces in 1951 as did Charles de Gaulle in 1953.

From the settlement of the Phoenicians to the French, this chapter showed that the Maghreb was conquered. This colonization of the Maghreb left significant cultural impacts on the Maghreb Amazighs including the Arab-Amazigh population of Morocco. In this sense, the inbetweenness theme that analyzes the impacts of the European colonialism on the national identity of the colonized through the concepts of double consciousness, hybridity and cultural heritage could also be observed even before the French and Spanish Protectorates.

Islam, as one of these cultural impacts, started to be transformed into a component of the Moroccan national identity by the establishment of Morocco in 1055. The territorial belonging that Smith argued in his national identity definition transformed Islam from cultural identity into a national identity. In a time where the Arabs and the Amazighs were unable to define themselves with a particular ethnic concept, Islam was the unique way of defining who they were. The role of Islam in the national identity of the Arabs and Amazighs of Morocco deepened by the activities of the Portuguese in the mid-16th century and continued until the settlement of the French and Spanish protectorates in 1912. Europeans that were regarded as Christians were tired to expel from Morocco by the Islamic movements that in 1822 caused the division of the Moroccan lands into Blad al Siba and Blad al Makhzen. Rupert Emerson's argument that the Africans were more European than the Europeans themselves could also be visible in the relationship with the Amazighs and the Arabs. Amazighs were always more volatile in the Islamic reaction to the Europeanness, as the next chapter shows.

The French Protectorate, eventually, was settled in Morocco under these conditions where Islam had been established as the unique component of the Moroccan national identity in that time. Morocco was colonized by the French in the

context of French colonialism in Africa, and it was an example of the implementation of associationism as the new method of the French colonialism after assimilationism. It was again the policies that were implemented as a result of associationism, the respect to Islam for instance unlike the Spanish Protectorate showed, that led King Hassan II to instrumentalize hybridity that was formed in that time in postcolonial Moroccan national identity while asserting Morocco was European according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. It is the transformation of Islam from Moroccan cultural identity into the national identity that formed the very basis of Moroccanness as one side of this hybridity that the King had instrumentalized in postcolonial Moroccan national identity to claim the Europeanness of Morocco according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.

CHAPTER IV

SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION OF THE FRENCH WITH MOROCCAN ISLAM: CREATION OF POSTCOLONIAL HYBRIDITY IN 1912-1925 MOROCCO

4.1. Theoretical Match of Moroccan Hybridity in 1912-1925

It was said about postcolonial nationalism that three themes cover the impacts of European colonialism on the national identity of the colonized: the colonial critique, the inbetweenness and the admiration of Europe. While analyzing the inbetweenness theme, I mentioned that Homi Bhabha in his study *The Location of Culture* gave the name of hybridity to the duality at the culture of the colonized in the postcolonial period that was constructed by the colonizer in the colonial period. This inbetweenness that was referred to by Bhabha as hybridity was also called as

“double consciousness” by Paul Gilroy in *The Black Atlantic*, or “cultural heritage” by Edward Said in *Culture and Imperialism*.

In accordance with this theme, the instrumentalization of a cultural hybridity between Morocco and France in postcolonial Moroccan national identity by King Hassan II to explain/justify the Europeaness of Morocco in 1987 according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome is an example of this theme of postcolonial nationalism. In this sense, the French during the Protectorate created such a cultural hybridity in Morocco between 1912 and 1956, especially between 1912 and 1925, that King Hassan II in 1987 instrumentalized it in postcolonial Moroccan national identity to explain/justify the Europeaness of Morocco according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. This and next chapters, accordingly, intend to explore how this cultural hybridity that was instrumentalized by King Hassan II in 1987 was created in Morocco by the French administration during the Protectorate. It aims at showing the reader how this hybridity was created in Morocco between 1912 and 1925 for now, by also pointing out how Islam was used as a national identity against the French forces in both Blad al Siba and Blad al Makhzen.

4.2. The Essences of the French Protectorate in Morocco

The French Protectorate that was settled in Morocco by the Treaty of Fez was regarded as the best implementation of French indirect rule in the Maghreb. The French came to Morocco with eighty years of experience of the Algerian, and twenty five years of experience of the Tunisian conquests. Briefly, French administration in Morocco was the honeymoon of the Protectorate regime (Montagne 1948; 362).

During the forty four years of the Protectorate, seventeen Resident Generals were appointed by the Quai d'Orsay. Among them, it was General Hubert Lyautey who ruled the Protectorate the most, from 1912 to 1925. From the beginning of the Protectorate, Lyautey was regarding Morocco differently than Algeria and Tunisia. Lyautey said: "We are not here in Tunisia. There, the Protectorate was a fiction. Here, it must be a reality"²⁰ and "Morocco is not Tunisia or Egypt. The Residency invokes the theoretical nature of the *sharifian*"²¹ powers. The Tunisian *beyliks* and Egyptian khedives were different."²²

The French Protectorate in Morocco was an example of the French African colonial policy that used the method of association. According to the Treaty of Fez signed between France and the Moroccan sultan in 1912, Morocco would be indirectly ruled throughout the Moroccan sultan, who would be the final authority on the power of Moroccan state. In addition, Moroccan laws would be respected, education level of Moroccan locals would be developed by respecting religious education, and the French settlers would be expected to respect the social relations of the natives. As the first and third articles of the Treaty of Fez stated:

1-The government of the French Republic and his Majesty Sultan agreed over Morocco to establish new political, judicial, military, economics and finance on the basis of new reforms. This regime will accept the current religious and traditional values of the Sultan, exercise of Islam religion and its institutions. It will comport a reformed Makhzen. The government of the French Republic will also recognize the Spanish interests in the country. Tangiers will retain its international status. 3-The Government of the French Republic accepts taking all necessary steps in case the personality or the power of the Sharifian Majesty would be endangered (Lugan; 2011: 237).

²⁰ Letter of Lyautey to Pichon: Nous ne sommes pas ici en Tunisie. La bas le protectorat est une fiction,ici il est,et il doit etre,une realite.(Rivet 1996)

²¹ The sultan was called *sharif* in Morocco by that time.

²² Le Maroc n'est plus Tunisie n'est plus Egypte. La résidence invoque la nature théocratique du pouvoir chérifien. Le beylik tunisien et le khédive égyptien était différent (Rivet 1996)

The Moroccan Protectorate would assume the indirect rule by appointing Moroccans as the rulers and mediators. Inspired by the British indirect rule in Nigeria²³, France would not post any French into Moroccan administration circles, but Moroccan locals in these posts would directly be responsible to the Resident General. This was stated by Lyautey himself on July 5th 1916:

Morocco is a Protectorate. Before the war, people resisted direct government for the cost of pain and even death. The war gave us a harsh lesson to change or voice. The protectorate is an economical and moral penetration of a people, not by asserting our force or our view of liberty, but in a narrow association in which we will administer Morocco in peace through her own government organs by following her own customs and liberties (Gruner 1984:21).²⁴

In Lyautey's Protectorate comprehension, the use of force on Moroccan locals was not favored at all. General Lyautey told the French soldiers who were sent to Morocco:

Show your strength to avoid using it. Never enter in a village without reflecting that a market should be opened in it next day. In so far as you are not forced to impose your will in order to avoid disorder, leave the Moors in peace.²⁵

²³ The 1966 movie Khartoum featuring by Charlton Heston shows that the British General Gordon as the mayor of Khartoum defended the city against the mahdi Mohammed Ahmed in 1885. General Gordon rules Khartoum in an indirect rule, where he respects Islam and where he teaches the Sudanians how to make mines for instance. Because of the lack of support from the British Empire, General Gordon lost the city but his administration until that time was commemorated by a statue of Gordon on a camel. The Moroccans also made a statue of General Lyautey in Casablanca, not on a camel but a horse. Lyautey's indirect rule in Morocco carries significant similarities with the indirect rule of the British in Sudan.

²⁴ Le Maroc est un protectorat. Avant la guerre, on résistait avec peine et déjà presque sans conviction à cette poussée que beaucoup croient fatale vers le gouvernement direct, vers l'annexion de fait, précédant l'annexion légale. La guerre nous a fait une nécessité absolue de changer de voie. Le protectorat c'est la pénétration économique et morale d'un peuple, non par l'asservissement à notre force ou même à nos libertés, mais par une association étroite dans laquelle nous l'administrons dans la paix par ses propres organes de gouvernement, suivant ses coutumes et ses libertés.

²⁵ Residence General, La renaissance du Maroc.

General Lyautey's indirect rule in Morocco started with serious confrontations with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Raymond Poincaré. Poincaré envisioned a Morocco that would serve the benefits of the French colons in the Protectorate. The Protectorate idea of General Lyautey, in contrast to what Poincaré was thinking, was the development of Morocco together with the people of Morocco and the French settlers. In the letter sent to his friend Theophile Delcassé, Lyautey talked about how the French needed to develop the Protectorate in Morocco on behalf of the Moroccan sultan. The letter shows how Lyautey did not want any military or police action against the locals. He also criticized colonialism:

I think that the colonial war is not dirty and destructive of civilization as it is in Europe. It alone makes life, and it is constructive. Second, imagery of the pacification must be for the name of sultan. This type of propaganda suggests that there is no military operation here in Morocco but police actions to order the Makhzen. Furthermore, France does not conquer a foreign country but she re-establishes the order threatened by anarchy. It restores the state here in Morocco, it unifies an Empire.²⁶

The perception of the French Protectorate between General Lyautey and Poincaré was not the only difference. Two men also had different views about Moroccan locals. General Lyautey regarded people living in Morocco as citizens. Poincaré, in contrast, had a totally opposite view. In a letter sent to Lyautey, Poincaré said:

To place the French in the same rank with the Moroccan, is to diminish his prestige, a risk of spilling French blood, when everyone is jealous of us when

²⁶ Letter to Delcassé from Lyautey: Je pense que la guerre coloniale n'est pas une guerre sale et destructive de civilisation comme en Europe. Elle seule fait de vie, elle seule est constructive. Deuxièmement, l'imagerie de la pacification doit être pour le compte du sultan. Cette trouvaille de propagande suggère qu'il n'y a pas au Maroc des opérations militaires, mais des actions de police pour régler le makhzen. Ainsi la France ne conquiert pas un pays étranger, elle rétablit l'ordre menacé par l'anarchie. Elle restaure l'Etat ici au Maroc. Elle unifie une Empire (Rivet 1996).

we are commanding them. The French must then become a chief or at least a monitor in Morocco.²⁷

Same argument was repeated by the General Chief of Staff of the French Henry Barrieu. In a letter sent to General Lyautey, Barrieu said:

It is necessary, first, to have a point of view on the fact that these races that form the Moroccan people are prejudged, and that they are inferior to us. They are different, here's the whole story.²⁸

In contrast, General Lyautey rejected the superiority of the French to Moroccans, whom he saw them as equal as the French. In a letter he replied to Poincaré, he said;

The Tunisian is a woman, the Algerian is a man, and the Moroccan is a lion. In the fronts of France, the Moroccans seem the most heroic soldiers among all the overseas troops.²⁹

He repeated the same argument in another letter sent to Theophile Delcassé:

Moroccans are descendants of the Amazighs who made North Africa as part of the Roman Empire arsenal. Morocco is an artifact of the Moroccans without any trace of the Europeans.³⁰

²⁷ Letter to Lyautey from Poincaré: Mettre un Français dans un rang, au même titre que l'indigène, c'est diminuer son prestige, c'est un risque de gaspiller le sang français, alors que tout nous commande de la ménager jalousement Le français alors doit être donc avant tout un chef ou au moins un moniteur au Maroc (Rivet 1996).

²⁸ Letter to Lyautey from Barrieu: Il est nécessaire, d'abord, d'une point d'avoir des préjugés des races, de ne point s'imaginer a priori, que les races qui peuplent le Maroc son inferieurs a nous. Elles sont differentes, voila tout (Rivet 1996).

²⁹ Letter to Poincaré from Lyautey: Le Tunisien est une femme, l'Algerien est un homme, Le Marocain est un lion. En de fait sur le front de la France, les Marocains semblent avoir été les hommes de guerres les plus héroïques parmi tous les contingents originaire d'outre-mer (Rivet 1996).

³⁰ Letter to Delcassé from Lyautey: Les Marocains sont les descendants des Berbères qui avaient fait de l'Afrique du Nord un des greniers de l'Empire Romain. Le Maroc est un œuvre des Marocains sans traces des Européens (Rivet 1996).

In the event, Lyautey's indirect rule in Morocco was always intervened by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris that bothered Lyautey considerably. In one letter he addressed to the French senator Peretti de la Roca, he said;

I hold Morocco till now just with my *la politique musulmane*. I am sure that it is good, and I ask you directly that nobody comes and spoils my game here.³¹

4.3. Use of Islam in Morocco by Blad al Siba Amazighs against the French

In order to achieve the goals that were listed in the treaty of Fez, General Lyautey knew that he would be respectful to Islam in Morocco that so far was the unique component of Moroccan national identity since 1342. The French very well knew that Islam in Morocco had been used as a solidarity tool against the Europeans for many years, and they did not want to launch a strong rebellion that would stop them to implement the ideal Protectorate in their minds by harming or disrespecting it as the case was in Algeria. The Arab and Amazigh population in Blad al Makhzen was already under the French control since the locals of this region had no chance to reject the sovereignty of the Moroccan sultan, who already agreed with the establishment of the French Protectorate in Morocco. However, the Amazigh tribes who moved to the southern Morocco and established Blad al Siba as a reaction to the Moroccan sultan whom they thought was incapable of protecting the prestige of

³¹ Letter to de la Roca from Lyautey: Je n'ai tenu le Maroc jusqu'ici que par ma politique musulmane. Je suis sûr qu'elle est la bonne et je te demande instamment que personne ne vienne gâcher mon jeu (Rivet 1996).

Islam were a significant threat to the pacification of the whole country (Afigbo 1986:183; Rivet 1996:88). The Amazigh tribes who defined themselves as the real guardians of Islam in southern Morocco (Blad al Siba), resisted the French forces and quite effectively implemented the role of Islam in Moroccan national identity to fight the Christian French. The official bulletin on June 4th 1913 expressed how the aggressive Amazigh tribes in the south harmed the troops of French General Alix;

In the Oriental Morocco, General Alix stopped the offensive movements of the hostile tribes on May 28th 1913. A group of troops stayed in Safsafat in case a manoeuvre intervention would be necessary nearby M'Çoun.³²

The pacification of southern Morocco was going on together with the increasing hostilities of the Amazigh tribes in the region. The official bulletin on July 4th 1913 expressed how the Amazighs in the Ben Bou Yahy mountains and the Amazighs of Beni Ouarani in the city of M'çoun mobilized against the French troops even though the French did not regard this mobility as a threat:

In the Oriental Morocco, the situation is very satisfying. On the left Bank of Moulaya, there is a grouping of 200 armed hostiles in the mountains of Beni Bou Yahy in the North East of M'çon. Finally, in the South of Mçoun, the Beni Ouranais were confined in their mountains.³³

The Amazigh activism was more intensive in the south of Blad al Siba than in the north. The official bulletin on January 5th 1914 expressed how the French troops forced the Amazighs of Blad al Siba to migrate to the south of Fez. The bulletin also

³² The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, June 4th 1913: Au Maroc Oriental, le succès remporté par le General Alix, le 28 Mai 1913, au Nord de M'çoun a enrayé pour le moment, le mouvement offensif des tribus hostiles qui ont été éprouvés des pertes très sensibles. Un groupe de manœuvre reste concentré à Safsafat en mesure d'intervenir de nouveau si quelque désordre se manifestait auprès le kasbah de Mçoun.

³³ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, July 4th 1913: Dans le Maroc Oriental, la situation se maintient très satisfaisante. Sur la rive gauche de Moulaya, il subsiste qu'un groupement hostile de 200 fusils dans les montagnes de Beni Bou Yahy, aux nord-est de Mçoun. Enfin, aux sud de Mçoun, les Beni Ouarani restent confinés dans leurs montagnes.

showed that the Ksima Amazighs in this region tried to capture the city of Agadir but they failed to do so:

By the operations of General Henrys to the Beni M'tir, numerous dissidents of this tribe migrated to the southern region of Fez to Ait Tserrouchen. Their presence at this turbulent group is already worrying for the security of the Sais. Agadir was protected against the hostile enterprises of the Ksima tribe and all the region was surrendered by the Houarar. Around Tiznit, the grouping favorable to the Makhzen continued to be formed thanks to the influence of the Tazeroualt Cherif and the intervention of Caid ben Dahan. These results, in real terms, cannot be considered as definitive. They are acquired, in fact, in a country that abides under the influences of recent troubles.³⁴

The Amazigh aggression against the French continued in the following days. The Amazigh dahir that was promulgated by General Lyautey on 1914 intensified this aggression. The Amazigh tribes' efforts to create a national resistance against the French consisted of a union between the Amazighs of Blad al Siba, and the Amazighs and Arabs of Blad al Makhzen. Nevertheless, the Amazighs of Blad al Siba were much more interested in an alliance with the Blad al Makhzen Amazighs because of cultural closenesses. The Blad al Makhzen Amazighs participated in some of these organizations. In order to prevent the interaction of Blad al Siba Amazighs with the Blad al Makhzen Amazighs, General Lyautey promulgated a dahir on October 5th 1914 that would give some privileges to the Blad al Makhzen ones. This dahir aimed at separating the Blad al Makhzen Amazighs, and also Arabs, from the

³⁴ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, January 5th 1914: A la suite des opérations du General Henrys aux Ben Mtir de nombreux dissidents de cette tribu s'étaient réfugiés au sud de la région de Fez, aux Ait Tserrouchen. Leur présence chez ce groupe peut turbulent, déjà inquiétant. Par la sécurité de la plaine de Sais exigeait de nouvelles mesures de protection des tribus soumises. Agadir est protégé contre les entreprises hostiles par la tribu âme de Ksima et toute à la partie soumise des Haouara. Autour de Tiznit le groupement favorable a Maghzen contre à se constituer grâce à l'influence de chérif de Tazaoualt et à l'intervention de cadi Ben Dahan. Ces résultats ne peuvent à vrai dire, être encore considérés comme définitifs. Ils sont acquis, en effet, dans un pays qui demeure encore sous l'influence de troubles récents. Mais ils sont d'autant plus intéressants qu'ils ne sont pas exigés l'intervention de notre force et ont été obtenus par notre action la plus indirecte.

Blad al Siba Amazighs. In order to isolate the Arabs and Amazighs of Blad al Makhzen from the Amazighs of Blad al Siba General Lyautey thought of a specific training program that would include French language education. This *dahir* awakened a strong reaction among the Blad al Siba Amazighs who were providing guns for the Blad al Makhzen Amazighs. The official bulletin on November 13th 1914 expressed that the Amazigh *dahir* of 1914 had awakened the resistance feelings of the Blad al Siba Amazighs:

The month of November was characterized by the brutal events of the aggressive Amazighs of the Middle Atlas after eleven months of passivity. They woke up all of a sudden after the 1914 *dahir*.³⁵

The one on November 29th 1914 expressed how the Harka Amazighs were challenging the 1914 *dahir* in the Sous region:

In the Sous, the notable rebels and enemies put up a fight that is supported by the Harkas tribes. They are ambitious to do every possible thing to nullify the 1914 *dahir*.³⁶

The one on December 3rd 1914, on the other hand, showed how the Amazighs in the Tadla region were hostile to the French:

In the South of Tadla and in the east of Marrakech, the grand Amazighs chiefs put their propaganda into practice. The number of hostile unions rises.³⁷

³⁵ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, November 13th 1914: Le mois de novembre a été caractérisé par le brusque réveil agressif des berbères de Moyen Atlas, après plus de onze mois de passivité. Ils se sont réveillés juste après la déclaration du *dahir* de 1914.

³⁶ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, November 29th 1914: Dans le sous, les notables rebelles et presque hostiles les luttes interminables soutenues par le harkas Maghzen contre les partisans de la cause hobbiste ont finalement porté leurs fruits. Ils sont ambitieux à faire tous à éliminer le *dahir* de 1914.

The impacts of the 1914 Amazigh *dahir* on the Amazigh resistance against the French went on between 1915 and 1918 in Blad al Siba. The official bulletin on January 14th 1915 showed that the Amazighs there stopped their actions during the Ramadan but then restarted at the end:

By the end of Ramadan, we encountered with a certain number of agitators who, especially in the Northern front, are looking forward to provoking an offensive action on behalf of the population of the non-surrendered zone.³⁸

Fighting the Amazigh tribes on one hand, the French were also trying to protect some tribes from militant reactions in Blad al Siba. The official bulletin on February 2nd 1915 expressed how Morocco was problematic by that time:

On the basis of Moulaya the calm was maintained in the region of Guilliz, in the south of the country of Beni Bou Yahi, by a police force in the right Gaza of the river. The components and the troops of the tribes who came from the left Gaza were protected against any attack that came from the Bnei Bou Yahis. In the South, the war between the Magkzen and its supporters go on around the Haida du Mouiz as the Pacha of Taradout. This movement was not defined hostile yet but it is a sign of trouble in this problematic country.³⁹

The official bulletin on January 7th 1916 expressed how the French regarded the Amazigh resistance as propaganda again:

³⁷ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, December 3rd 1914: Au Sud de Tadla et à l'est de Marrakech, les grands berbères chefs poursuivent actuellement leurs propagandes. Les réunions hostiles se multiplient.

³⁸ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, January 14th 1915: Avec la fin de Ramadan, on a coïncidé une certaine activité des agitateurs qui, surtout les fronts Nord, cherchent à provoquer une action offensive des populations de zone insoumise.

³⁹ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, February 2nd 1915: Sur la base Moulayya le calme a été maintenu dans la région de Guilliz, au sud de pays, de Beni Bou Yai, par une tournée de police effectuée sur la rive gauche du fleuve. Les composants et les troupeaux de des tribus venus de la rive droite ont été protégés contre une attaque tentée par les Beni Bou Yahi. Dans le sous, la lutte continue contre les adversaires de Maghzen et ses partisans, groupés autour de Haida du Maiz, la Pacha de Taradout. Ce mouvement n'a pas un caractère hiberniste mais ne manque qu'un épisode de luttes incessantes qui ne sont toujours déroulé dans ce pays trouble.

The news of our success in Tadhra and in Tafifalet on one hand, and the perpetually active propaganda in Semlali on the other, simultaneously influence the populations of High Moulaya.⁴⁰

The activities of the Amazighs that were regarded as “propaganda” by the French started to form unions among the Amazigh tribes in Blad al Siba in 1917. As the official bulletin on March 29th 1916 expressed, the Beni Ouarain and Harira tribes formed a union against the French in a war that was called the July 16th Combat:

According to the information, the Beni Ouraian Gberaba and all other Ait Segrouchen of Harira tribes would participate to the 16 July Combat against us.⁴¹

An Amazigh rebel leader Abdelmalek had a specific role in the formation of unions between the Amazigh tribes against the French. His role in these unions that were being formed between the Amazigh tribes was expressed by the official bulletin on May 21st 1916:

Abdelmalek again tends to unite some dissidents around him. He is making an active propaganda by letters that have failed to produce a response in the tribes that are not surrendered in Taza. Many new agitators raise in the Rif tribes.⁴²

⁴⁰ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, January 7th 1916: Les nouvelles de nos succès au Tadhra et au Tafifalet d’une part, la propagande toujours active de Semlali d’autre part influence simultanément les populations de la Haute Moulaya.

⁴¹ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, March 29th 1916: D’après les renseignements tous les Beni Ouarain Gberaba et tous les Ait Seghrouchen de Harira auraient participé au combat de 16 juillet contre nous.

⁴² The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, May 21st 1916: Abdelmalek tente encore de réunir autour de lui quelque contingents dissidents, il fait par lettre une active propagande qui reste sans écho dans les tribus non soumises de Taza. Plusieurs agitateurs nouveaux se sont révélés dans les tribus de Rif.

Among these tribes, it seems that the Beni Ouaran were very active. The official bulletin on September 22nd 1916 expressed that the Beni Ouaranis were setting up ambushes against the French;

The Beni Ouaraian Bheraba continues to set up ambushes to our allies and execute groups against our garrisons of the advanced posts.⁴³

Abdelmalek also had a role in formation of these unions the official bulletin on December 2nd 1916 expresses. The bulletin admits he is active in these formations, but predicts that he would not be able to be successful due to the lack of financial power:

It is for sure that Abdelmalek, under the pretext to organize a possible resistance and aggression of Khemlacha, tries to group them against us. He does not have money and thus few influence.⁴⁴

The struggle of the Amazighs against the French continued under the command of Abdelmalek by 1917. Abdelmalek was one of the most powerful chiefs of the Amazigh tribes in the south. As the letter sent to Quai d'Orsay from Rabat expressed, Abdelkader forces attacked and damaged the troops under the Colonel Charles command:

On June 13th, the lieutenant Colonel Charles as the Commander of Taza was violently attacked by a group of Abdelmalek contingent.⁴⁵

⁴³The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, September 22nd 1916: Les Beni Ouarain Gheraba continuent à tendre des embuscades à nos reconnaissances et à exécuter des groupes de la main contre nos garnisons de nos postes avancés.

⁴⁴The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, December 2nd 1916: C'est en vain que Abdelmalek, sou pretexte d'organiser la resistance a une aggression possible des Khemlacha, essaie de les grouper contre nous. Il n'a pas d'argent at pourtant peu d'influence.

⁴⁵ Letter from Rabat to Quai d'Orsay, June 15th 1917 : Le 13 juin le lieutenant-colonel Charles Commandant de Taza a été violemment attaque par l'ensemble des contingents d'Abdelmalek.

The efficiency of Abdelmalek in Blad al Siba was growing every day. The letter sent to Quai d'Orsay on July 10th 1917 expressed that Abdelmalek had become a real trouble for the French:

Suitable to our previous telegrams, the question of Abdelmalek here dominates all. This problem is the greatest problem that we have ever met for the sake of our situation in Morocco.⁴⁶

The forces of Abdelmalek were organizing irregular attacks that were taking long hours for the French to repel. The official bulletin on August 12th 1917 expressed that the French were using soldiers from Senegal in the pacification of the Southern Morocco:

Here is the situation: The contingents of Abdelmalik reacted harshly in the morning of 7, in the night of 7 to 8, and of 8 to 9. The attack of 8 to 9 lasted 21 hours. The enemy lost 78 bodies, and we lost 2 Senegalese and a surgent on the 9th regiment.⁴⁷

The Amazigh rebels under the leadership of Abdelmalek continued in the following year as well. The official bulletin on February 12th 1918 expressed that his forces had even targeted the Amazigh tribes that surrendered to the French in the southern Morocco:

⁴⁶ Letter from Rabat to Quai d'Orsay, July 10th 1917 : Conformément à prévisions de nos précédents télégrammes, c'est ici la question d'Abdelmalek qui domine tout. Elle est des plus sérieuses et l'on peut dire que c'est devenu aujourd'hui une question vitale pour notre situation au Maroc.

⁴⁷ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, August 12th 1917, p.6 : La situation est suivante: Les contingents d'Abdelmalek ont réagi vivement dans la matinée de 7, dans la nuit de 7 au 8, et de 8 au 9. L'attaque du 8 au 9 na dure de 21heures à nuit. L'ennemi a perdu 78 tues comptes. Nous avons perdu 2 sénégalaises tues et un sergent le 9.

The mehallas of Abdelmalek retook their activities and operate a serial of aggression on our posts and on our tribes who were surrendered on February 2nd, 3rd, 7th, and 9th without success.⁴⁸

By the end of May 1919, it was seen that Abdelmalek had managed to reach to the northern border of the Blad al Makhzen. The official bulletin on May 6th 1919 expressed that Abdelmalek's forces were in the Spanish border by that time. The Amazighs were coming to the northern borders and were giving support to the Amazighs there since the beginning of the Protectorate:

The information I got in Fez confirmed me about the attention to Abdelmalek. He is installed at the Senadja on the Spanish borders. He has already grouped 700-800 weapons in few weeks.⁴⁹

The Amazigh resistance under the leadership of Abdelmalek was also continued by other Amazigh chiefs such as al Hadjan, Pacha el Kasbah, Ali Ould el Hadj, Cheikh Moulaud el Mammouchi, and Sherif Moustapha. The official bulletin on August 23rd 1920 expressed how al Hadjan, for instance, was effective on the Riata and Branes Amazighs to start a collective rebel against the French forces:

We signal a recrudescence of agitation at the Riata and the Branés where the chief Chingetti el Hhadjan and the emissaries of our enemies deploy a big activity. The contingents of these two tribes acted against us nearby Amelil on January 11th.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, February 12th 1918: Les mehallas d'Abdelmalek ont repris leur activité et opéré une série d'agressions sur nos postes, sur la voie ferre et sur les tribus soumises les deux, trois, sept et neuf février sans succès d'ailleurs.

⁴⁹ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, May 6th 1919 : Renseignements que je trouve à Fez me confirment l'attention à Abd el Malek. Il est installé chez les Senadja, sur les confins espagnols. Il a déjà groupé en quelques semaines 700-800 fusils.

⁵⁰ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, August 23rd 1919: On signale une recrudescence d'agitation chez les Riata et les Branés, ou le Chinguetti el Hadjani et les émissaires de nos ennemis européens déploient une grande activité. Les contingents de ces 2 tribus ont, le 11 janvier, ont tenté une action sur nous près de l'oued Amelil.

On the other hand, the official bulletin on January 18th 1921 expressed how the Pacha el Kasbah united the Ait Bessous tribes under his rule:

From January 12th to 14th, enemy groups undertook two initiatives. One was observed in the Amazigh installation in Ain Bou Kellel; the other was the fraction of Beni Taggous (Branes). On January 16th, the cavaliers of Ait Bessous were united under the orders of Pacha El Kasbah, who realized a *razzia* over rebel camps several kilometers far from our post.⁵¹

4.4. Use of Islam in Morocco against the French by Blad al Makhzen

Amazighs

In contrast to the Arab-Amazigh community who were living in the Blad al Makhzen and who obeyed the sultan's authority that had accepted the French rule already, the Amazigh tribes of the south tried to organize the Blad al Makhzen Arabs and Amazighs to fight the French together. That is why several reactions were witnessed against the French particularly among Blad al Makhzen Amazighs as well. These reactions at the beginning of the French Protectorate intensified around the city of Fez. The official bulletin on May 4th 1912 expressed the strategic importance of the city of Fez for the French Protectorate in Morocco. It argues how the Amazigh tribes of the Hayanna, Tsouls, Branes and Riata were active in the Souk el Arba and Taza

⁵¹ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, January 18th 1921 : Du 12 à 14 Janvier, des groupements ennemis ont fait deux tentatives, l'une sur le baou d'un détachement d'observation installé à Ain Bou Kellel, l'autre contre la fraction ralliée des Beni Taggous(Branes). Le 16 Janvier le guich et les cavaliers Ait Baboos réunis sous les ordres du Pacha de Kasbah Ben Tella ont effectué une razzia sur des campements rebelles à quelques kilomètres à notre poste.

regions near Fez. It also shows how the French were already organizing operations in the southern Morocco against these Amazigh tribes:

In Fez the situation is good and calm around capital. Organization of the Confederation of the Hayanna takes place around Souk el Arba. Several actions of the Tsouls, the Branes and the Riata in the region of Taza were replied. The neighborhood of the city was calm. The operations in the South were conducted with success. We must guarantee the communication security of Fez by sea.⁵²

The activities of the Amazigh tribes around the city of Fez were also expressed in further official bulletins. Among them, the one on May 11th 1912 expressed that the Amazigh tribes of the Tsouls and Branes were active around Fez. The bulletin also showed how the Arabo-Amazighs of the Blad al Makhzen had fun with the French in a festival in the city of Meknes. It also shows how the Colonel Henrys tried police actions in the city of Ifrane:

We signal from Fez that new troubles were perceived at the Tsouls and the Branes. However, these actions were not interpreted as hostile. In Meknes, several brilliant equestrian festivals were given on May 12nd and 13th 1912 with a competition of commoners of the tribes of the region together with an alliance of Europeans and indigenous people. In Beni Mtir, the colonel Henrys went on to exercise his police action on the point Azrou-Ifrane by assuring our installation on that front by constructing of blocks. Several groups of enemies keep the country on the left bank of Oum er Rebja.⁵³

⁵² The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, May 4th 1912: A Fez la situation est bonne et calme negre dans les environs de la capitale. L'organisation de la confédération des Hayanna se poursuit autour de poste de Soyk el Arba. Quelques excitations du desordre repandues chez les Tsouls, les Branes et les Riata avaient fait craindre dans la région de Taza. Un trouble n'est pas produit. Le voisinage de la ville reste tranquille. Les opérations entreprises sur notre front sud se sont poursuivies avec succès. Il s'agit de garantir la sécurité des communications de Fez avec la mer.

⁵³ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, May 11th 1912 : On signale de Fez que nouveaux troubles seraient survenus chez les Tsouls et les Branes. Mais, ils ne sont pas encore traduits par aucun acte d'hostilité. A Meknes, des brillantes fêtes hippiques ont été données le 12 et le 13, avec le concours de non-cavaliers des tribus de la région, et devant une assistance considerable d'Européens et d'indigènes. Aux Beni M'tir, le colonel Henrys a continué d'exercer son action de police sur le point d'Azrou-Ifrane en assurant notre installation sur cette ligne par la construction des blockaus. Quelque groupe d'ennemis peux nombreux tiennent encore le pays sur la rive gauche de l'Oum er Rebja.

The Amazigh activism around Fez continued in the following month. However, the official bulletin on December 21st 1912 expressed how the Sharif of the city of Chinguetti in the southern Morocco created disorder in the city of Taza:

In the East of Fez and the North of Hayanna, a beginning of agitation compared to its external excitaitons, have just manifested. There was no hostility observed, however. The calm continue to last around M'Çoun where we have just received the news of disorder in the region of Taza by the cherif of Chinguetti.⁵⁴

The French found themselves successful against the Amazigh reactions in the first year of the Protectorate. The Amazigh tribes were showing their reactions to the French rule in the non-pacified regions by that time. The official bulletin on May 9th 1913 was about one of these situations in the north of Fez. It expressed that the actions of the Harka Amazighs were well replied by the French troops in the cities of M'çoun and Beni M'tir:

Favorable events were observed in whole Moroccan territory. In M'çoun, the Harkas enemies received a good lesson from us. In the North of Fez, the agitation did not give any hostility to us. In Beni M'tir, the situation was maintained with peace and the rebels surrendered. The Moroccan experience showed us how frequent the surprises and doubts in a country where many elements try to hit us, especially at a point where were not really present.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, December 21st 1912 : Dans l'est de Fez, et au nord des Hayannas, un commencement d'agitation, du a ses excitations exterieurs vient de se manifester .il n'en est résulté encore aucun acte d'hostilité. Le calme continue à régner autour M'Çoun ou l'on a seulement reçu la nouvelle du désordre propagée dans la région de Taza par agissant de Cherif Chinguetti.

⁵⁵ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, May 9th 1913 : Des événements favorables sont survenus dans toute l'étendue du territoire marocaine. A Mçon the harkas ennemies ont reçu un solitaire leçon.au Nord de Fez, l'agitation précédemment signale n'a donné lieu a aucun acte d'hostilité contre nous. A Beni M'tir, la situation s'est maintenue et les rebelles ont subi des nouveaux échecs. L'expérience Marocaine a déjà montre combien étaient fréquentes les surprises et redoutables es événements surtout dans un pays ou tant d'elements nous échappent surtout quand il s'agit d'une région ou nous ne pouvons pas être excellent présents.

One year after the French had argued that they were satisfied with the situation in the north, the Amazigh activism in the south was still going on. The official bulletin on April 2nd 1914 expressed how the Northern zone was satisfactory unlike the South. The French one more time called the Amazigh tribes in this region as propagandists:

In the Northern zone, the internal politics is satisfactory. The indigenous have a correct attitude. In contrast, in the southern zone, the political situation has become quite serious. Agitation is carried out by the propagandists.⁵⁶

As the official bulletin on June 19th 1914 expressed, the Amazighs of the city of Ouerira had revolted against the French under the leadership of the Sharif Adjami, who was regarded as the enemy of the Blad al Makhzen. The bulletin also showed show the Moiz Pasha as the Sharif of the city of Taradouant was remaining in his position against the French:

In the region of Ouerira, in the North of Fez, a little anomaly exists at the indigenous populations by the presence of Rogui nearby Sharif Adjami, enemy of the Makhzen. In the region of Sous, Haida ou Mouiz Pacha of Taradouant continued to reaffirm his situation.⁵⁷

Similar official bulletins about the Amazigh mobilizations in the south and north were published during the next two years. The one on May 21st 1916 was about the increase in the frequency of these movements. It expressed how the Amazighs of the Brais, Tsouls and Beni Ouarraïn were effective in the region of Fez. This bulletin showed how the French started to worry about their future in Morocco:

⁵⁶ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, April 2nd 1914: Dans la zone Nord, la politique intérieure se maintient satisfaisante. Les indigènes ont une attitude correcte. Par contre dans la zone Sud, la situation politique est devenue assez sérieuse. L'agitation y est entretenue par l'échange des émissaires entre les foyers de la propagande.

⁵⁷ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, October 5th 1914 : Dans la région de Ouerira, au nord de Fez, un peu de malaise persiste chez les populations indigènes par suite de la présence du Rogu auprès de Cherif al Adjami, ennemi de Maghzen. Dans le sous, Haida ou Moiz Pacha de Taradouant a continué à réaffirmer sa situation.

In the region of Fez, new notable marches that belong to diverse fractions of Brais, Tsoul, Beni Ouarain go on. The frequentation of marches of the periphery by the mountaineers is the symptoms of the development of our influence.⁵⁸

The separation of the Amazighs of Blad al Makhzen from the Amazighs of the Blad al Siba and the Arabs by the 1914 *dahir* did not awake enough resistance to the French among the Amazighs of the Blad al Makhzen, as the Blad al Siba Amazighs predicted. In accordance with this situation, the Amazighs of the Blad al Siba started to seek the support of the Amazighs in eastern Morocco instead of the north. However, they also could not find the same support there. The Protectorate policy of not touching the local customs did not cause any hostility against the French among the Eastern Amazighs. The official bulletin on January 4th 1917 reported that the Angad tribes in the East had the liberty to celebrate their own annual festival in the city of Sidi Yahya near Oujda:

No important event forced the political situation to the instability. The Angad tribes celebrated, on November 9th, their annual festival of Sidi Yahya, near Oujda, with a traditional ceremony.⁵⁹

The 1914 *dahir* also did not create any rebel against the French in the Western Morocco whose cities were also under the authority of Blad al Makhzen. The official bulletin published on December 21st 1918 expressed that the merchants in

⁵⁸ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, May 21st 1916: Dans la région de Fez, de nouvelles démarches de notables appartient a divers fractions Brais, Tsoul, Beni Ouarain continue. La fréquentation des marches de la périphérie par les montagnards sont des symptômes de développement de notre influence.

⁵⁹ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, January 4th 1917: Aucun évènement important n'est venu troubler la situation politique intérieure qui demeure partout satisfaisante. Les tribus de Angad ont célébré, le 9 Mai, leur fête annuelle de Sidi Yahya, près Oujda, avec le cérémonial accoutumé.

Casablanca were thinking of their economic well-being instead of the world affairs such as the end of the First World War:

The political situation of Casablanca continues to be satisfactory. The locals are interested less and less in the events that take place now in Europe and that they only do care about their economic situation.⁶⁰

At the beginning of 1920, however, people of the northern cities of Fez and Meknes started to rebel against the French forces. After this year, the Blad al Siba Amazighs managed to persuade the Blad al Makhzen Amazighs rebelling against the French. This was the year when the French got a harsh attitude towards the Amazighs in Southern Morocco and followed armed strategies. There was a change in the attitudes of Moroccans to the French. This revolt also included the reaction against the usage of chemical gas in Melilla by the Spanish. It was possible to observe this change in the official bulletins. As the one published on August 14th 1920 expressed:

In the region of Taza-Fez, we are always signaled that a bunch of chiefs are looking forward to increasing hostility and aggression against us. The Amazighs in the south very well influence the Amazighs in the north after our attacks to the South.⁶¹

The south eastern region of the Blad al Makhzen was also boiling by that time. The official bulletin that was published on October 4th 1920 expressed that the Amazigh tribes started to mobilize against the French in the cities of Meknes and Ifrane, one in the north and one in the south:

⁶⁰ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco; December 21st 1918: La situation politique de région de Casablanca continue à être satisfaisante. Les indigènes s'intéressent de moins en moins aux événements qui se déroulent en ce moment en Europe et ne se préoccupent que de la situation économique.

⁶¹ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, August 14th 1920: Dans la région de Taza-Fez, on signale toujours une dizaine des chefs de bandes qui cherchent à augmenter l'hostilité et l'horreur agressive contre nous. Les Berbères du sud très bien influencent les Berbères au nord après nos attaques au sud.

In the region of Meknes, two small incidents happened. One in Meknes, the other is in Ifrane did their own junctions in the center of the Beni Mtir territories. The people seem angry about the chemical gas incident in Melilla.⁶²

These movements were also valid in the central northern zone of Morocco. The Amazigh tribes in the city of Taza started hostile campaigns as the official bulletin on March 10th 1921 expressed:

In the region of Taza, the hostility of the dissident tribes was manifested by the aggressions of some groups who damaged the post offices.⁶³

At the end of 1922, even the city of Fez, which was under the control of the French, started to be represented as dangerous instead of calm and safe, as the official bulletin on March 26th 1921 expressed:

General Maurial estimates that the situation of a front in Northern Fez is very serious but not hopeless. He is certain that the locals will turn this situation for their advantage when the colonies in Issoual join the French army.⁶⁴

⁶² The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, October 4th 1920: Dans la région de Meknès, deux petites détachements sont venus, l'un de Meknès, l'autre d'Ifrane, ont fait leur jonction au centre de territoire des Beni Mtir. La population semble être fâchée contre l'usage de gas à Melilla.

⁶³ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, March 10th 1921: Dans la région de Taza, l'hostilité de tribus dissidentes est rendue manifesté par les agressions de quelque bande qui damaient les sentinelles des postes.

⁶⁴ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco; March 26th 1921: General Maurial estime qu'en ce qui concerne un front Nord Subdivision Fez situation est très sérieuse mais non inquiétante. Il est certain qu'au point de vue politique, indigènes exploitent a leur avantage le fait que la colonne d'Issoual s'est repliée sur l'armée.

4.5. Use of Islam in Morocco against the French by Blad al Siba Amazigh literature

The military resistance of the Amazigh tribes in Blad al Makhzen against the French showed the location of Islam in the Moroccan national identity. The French had to put up a strong struggle against the Amazighs in order to pacify southern Morocco as well, and they actually never managed to do it. The Blad al Siba region was never fully pacified.

The role of Islam that led these Amazigh tribes to give this struggle was also observed in the poems written by the Amazighs. *La Resistance marocaine a travers l'histoire ou le Maroc des resistances* written by Mohammed Hammam et Abdellah Salih shows some Amazigh poems that expressed the resistance against the French with Islamic feelings (Hammam&Salih, 2005, 299-323) The first poem is the one of Hammam Salih who wrote about a Amazigh from the city of Azrou who talked about the mercilessness of the French during their pacification of Blad al Siba. The poem uses the Qoranic term “Aroumi”⁶⁵ to refer the French, which means Christians that adhere to the Greek rite and, in historical texts, the Byzantines:

Men with blues eyes, Aroumi, are an enemy that respects no rule. He shows no mercy or pity, he has no heart and humanity; he does not spare children, old people. He just moves, does not stop.⁶⁶

The same poet also wrote about how the Amazigh called Tirwallal rejects the French rule in his city. The poem shows how Tirwallal prefers to get cold in a mountain

⁶⁵ Maalouf, Amin: “My web of words-5”, September 1st, 2009, available at the web address of www.aminmaalouf.net/en/tag/roumi/

⁶⁶ İla wuididu tasa ila tt uqtae i,izzyan, İla wmyill rriemn ggul nns ilin t tayt talatt, Da ttawin amuggu nw zrin arraw g laman, Yas aze, wal n titt a wr issin lhierr n tasa nw, İnya yulli d izyar iyrs i lmsakin, İv Yqqs tasa ycabarr nna ieurranin

rather than to be a slave to the French whom he sees as Christian. Compared to the previous one, this poem uses the word “christian” instead of “aroumi”:

Tirwallal said: I choose a pig, come on, be a savage man. Climb to the mountain. I prefer cold to being the dog of the Christian.⁶⁷

More than Hammam and Salih, the Amazigh author Aziz Kich also refers to such poems in his book *De la Litterature comme forme de resistance le cas de la poesie amazighe*. According to Kich, the amazigh poet must always tell the truth, respect moral and religious traditions, defend their tribe, learn and teach, inform his group, conserve knowledge in his memories, and be faithful (1980,318). The first poet Kich refers to is about an Amazigh called Mohamed Ajana from the Ait Mgould –Azrou region. The poem shows how Ajana was restricted by the French rule in his own land whereas to speak is his right as long as it is accordance with the Quran. The poem also highlights criticism of Moroccan Sultan Youssef, who had signed the Treaty of Fez with the French in 1912:

I am an Amazigh poet who was forbidden to lie, I have the right to speak since I was born, we are similar to the Docte, just our language is different, If the poet speaks, it is because he knows that God wants him to speak; when it is time to speak, he speaks as in the Quran. I inform the newspapers about my country. Take my word, it is Amazigh; take my words sirs, it is the reality. If I fall one day, who would protect the tribe of Ait Youssi from wolves? I would tell you that Morocco fell down when it was conquered. Be like a raindrop in the clouds to be protected from shooting, you tell yourself: Hey patriots, Ben Youssef or we will not exist anymore. Are we going to forget that our feeds were enchained?⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Tenn as terwillal: iwxl abulwir, accem/ a uammu w cmr! Yat ajebli, ggafiy ur, Inn t yuf ac ugris ula leylubiyt urumi!

⁶⁸ Emk isiwl umdiaz issen mas icfa rabbi, Adda yamz aneghmis ig ami ghurs Imshaf, Gixd aneghmis n timizar eg tjidat, Amzat awal ad ghuri iga amazigh, Amzat awal inw a midden Ihaqq agga, Mr mmux a yimazighen assenna awdx acal, Magha yhdun assun uyussi zeg uccan, Ad awn inix ussar tuhix ayenn ikkan xf Lmughrib ellig ittwaru, Ellig da teggat a rrsas anzar exf unna ur ilin mas eknid itrara, Ghas tekterm a ait umur dar ettinim Ben Yussef a neghd ad ur telli, Max iss da tuyattun willi ighewweghn adax rin ajbir enna egg iqqn udar ?

Another poem of Ajana shows how the Amazighs of Blad al Siba were concerned about the fall of the cities in Blad al Makhzen. This one talks about the invasion of Fez. It says that Fez needs help, and it tries to mobilize the Blad al Siba Amazighs to move for Fez. The poem describes the French as the wolves and Europe as the Gharb, as the West was defined in the Qoran:

Fez calls for help, O it calls for help. Come on, people of Gharb, the wolves will soon run away.⁶⁹

Besides Ajana, Kich refers to another poet, Taograt Oult Aissa, who promises in his poem that he will fight the French to save Morocco. Oult Aissa in his poems describes the French as the ones who prays to Satan:

Our lands that the djins invaded with pride, will never belong to the one who prays to Satan, even if they kill me in the day, my ghost will kill them in the night.⁷⁰

Aissa in another poem is emphasizing the pain of the Amazighs for the people who died in the pacification of the Blad al Siba:

Let us cry for the ordeal of Mahjouba and Tihihit, let us cry for the blood of Mimouna N'Hmad in the bed.⁷¹

Kich then refers to another poet Moha Ouhammoomu who showed the psychological situation of the Amazighs. Ouhammoomu shows in his poem how the Amazighs prefer to eat poison instead of the food provided by the French who one more time was called Roumi:

⁶⁹ Igad Fas aaban eg tizi elle isghuyyu, Awi ella isghuyyu, Ahiwt a yait lgahrb ad ur rahn wuchan

⁷⁰ Tamazirt ennex ed ujjan imyas s uburz, Ur asn i telli iwid itzallan exf iblis, Emk inghan es wass eggid atten tezzaa tawukt inw

⁷¹ An ammer iwghirb en Mahjouba oula Tihihit, Ed idammen en Mimouna N Hmad innghall i tissi

How good the potatoes and the onions of the roumi taste, for you who turn your back to your mother. I will not, I will not eat it, I will eat poison but not the food of the roumi.⁷²

Miaami from the region of Azrou is another poet cited by Kich. Miaami expresses his feelings when the French completely pacified the Blad al Siba in 1923. The poem shows that even though Blad al Siba failed, he would not surrender to the French that was seen as again Roumi:

Goodbye my homeland, you could not shoot me, I will not accept being the dog of the Roumi.⁷³

And in response to Miammi, Kich shows the poem of another Amazigh Icqqirn who blame the sultan Moulay Hassan the First since he had accepted the French in Morocco. Hassan was seen as a betrayer by Icqqirn:

O Miammi, May the God welcomes you Saint and pure, the betrayer Hassan will be burnt in Hell with fire.⁷⁴

Tawgrat Ult Aissa is another poet cited by Kich. In his poem, Aissa talks about how the French deceived the Moroccans by telling the Amazighs that they were their friends. The French were one more time defined as Arumi in the poem:

Irumin arrived, drank the source of chene, they were not scared, they settled with horses and tents, they told you: we are your neighbors.⁷⁵

⁷² Axxid batata ed elfçel igatn urumy, A wenna ittezzaan agga xef tadawt en mays, Ad eccex ur eccex tadist, Ad eccex iderran ula eddelt urumy

⁷³ Darkunt Iman a tamazirt inu ur itezziaa, Ur erdix ad ettabaax arumy

⁷⁴ A miammii akkid irr rabbi s Iman, Uma Hassan ad ig asmun unkmud

⁷⁵ Eddand irumin eswan eg ughbalu n tasaft, Ur eggidn eqqenn iyssan aha ezzin tiwas, Ennan am an emyajjar s ixamen.

In another poem, Tawgrat condemned the Moroccan men who did not fight the French. Tawgrat in the poem calls the women to fight instead of men:

Wake up Tuda, call Izza and Itto, now it is the turn of women to take the guns, even though men are numerous, it's like they do not exist.⁷⁶

Analysis of these poems together with the military resistance of the Amazigh tribes of Blad al Siba and Blad al Makhzen were intended to show the implementation of Islam as the Moroccan national identity against the French forces in Morocco. Having remarked the religious nature of this resistance against the French in Morocco, General Lyautey always maintained the respect to Islam. This was not only because Islam was the unique sense of belonging for the Arabs and Amazighs in Morocco by that time, but also it could be used as a tool to unite them under the framework of the French Protectorate. The respect to Islam during General Lyautey's rule in Morocco was the greatest factor for the creation of a cultural hybridity between colonizer and the colonized-Morocco and France- during the Protectorate. This hybridity was created through the successful integration of the French under the command of General Lyautey with Moroccan Islam between 1912 and 1925. This showed itself basically through an admiration of France and Lyautey among the Moroccan state and non-state actors and naturalization movements in this period.

⁷⁶ Ettawg a Tuda, gherd i Izza ed Itto, Tiwtmin ami iga lhal ad assinn ilaffen, Imazighen waxxa egguddin ami ur ekkin

4.6. Successful integration of the French with Moroccan Islam

4.6.1. *La politique musulmane* of General Lyautey

From the beginning of the Protectorate in Morocco, General Hubert Lyautey decided to rule it by guarding the sultan and Islam. From his previous experiences before Morocco, Lyautey predicted that the success of the Protectorate would require respect to Islam, which he saw it as the unique component of Moroccan national identity at that time. In the letter he sent to Poincaré on January 3rd 1912, he showed the first clues of how he was thinking of integrating the Moroccan Islam by not touching it. This was a factor for the reconciliation of Islam with Europe in King Hassan II's European Morocco argument in 1987:

It would be wrong not to respect Islam in Morocco that I see it became the main identity. Our administration should never disrespect Islam here, because it can make our job here more and more difficult. We must achieve the pacification as soon as possible.⁷⁷

Accordingly, Lyautey's respect for Islam would cover the sultan's authority, customs and traditions, and human rights of Moroccan locals (Charif 1988:112). Against the process of assimilation, he developed a philosophy to maintain a Protectorate in Morocco on the basis of *la politique musulmane*, that would respect the integrity of Moroccan locals and the inalienability of Islamic institutions in Morocco (Rivet 1996:131). General Lyautey planned to assure this respect to Islam with *la mission*

⁷⁷ Letter to Poincaré from Lyautey, January 3rd 1912 : Ça sera une erreur de ne pas respecter Islam ici. Isla mest dans la possession des Marocains. Notre administration ne doit jamais cesser de montrer du respect à Islam. Sinon nos affaires seront plus difficiles. Nous devons achever la pacification de ce pays le plutôt possible.

civilisatrice that would be used on Morocco to leave impacts of the French civilization (Hoisington 1995:33). However, since Morocco would be ruled by an indirect rule where General Lyautey already decided to protect the local customs, *la mission civilisatrice* would be implemented by guarding Islam, as it constructed the Moroccan national identity in the absence of a Moroccan or regional nationalism at that time⁷⁸. In this context, General Lyautey implemented some administrative and educational reforms by taking Islam as basis in the first twelve years of the Protectorate. However, these reforms only covered the lands of Blad al Makhzen where the sultan was recognized, instead of Blad al Sib where the French were struggling to nullify the Amazigh resistance under the lack of a sultan's authority (Mac Millan 1992:13).

4.6.2. Islam in the Blad al Makhzen reforms

Blad al Makhzen was ruled by the Moroccan sultan with the assistance of the vizirs before the French Protectorate. Islam that started to be institutionalized by the 15th century appointed the Moroccan sultan several statuses. These made the sultan the descendant of the Prophet Muhammed, the Commander of the Faithful, and the head of Churafa. (Bidwell 1973:90). The sultan was able to use his judicial power over the community and was appointing naqibs to exercise his rule. He was also appointing

⁷⁸ Interview with Prof.Ahmed Rhazaoui, University of Al Akhawayn, Department of Internaitonal Relations, March 23rd 2010. Interview with Fatima Ezzahra Saadane, Journalist, May 4th 2010.

caids as the rulers of Morocco representing himself. The caids were responsible of each their own tribes, and all the caids were at last linked to the Sultan himself.

When the Protectorate was set up, the first article of the Treaty of Fez assured the survival of the Moroccan institutions and the sultan's religious powers (Sherif 1988:112; Esperandieu 1947:11). However, it also foresaw some reforms in the Makhzen institutions to fulfill la mission civilisatrice. Even though the sultan would remain all his religious prestige, there would be an accord between the government of the French Republic and the Moroccan sultan. This accord introduced some reforms that would contribute to the development of Morocco's economy by regarding the religious situation, the respect and the prestige of Sultan, the exercise of Islamic religious practices, and all other religious institutions including chiefly the Moroccan lands. Lyautey was giving specific vehemence to these reforms because he was regarding the Moroccan sultan as the sultan of the whole Muslim world. He said once:

The sultan is the key of this system. He is the Moroccan atom.⁷⁹

And;

For all the Muslims of the Maghreb until the southwest Wahran and to Timbouktou, the Moroccan sultan was the legitimate power of Islam without any comparison between the bey of Tunis and the khedive of Egypt.⁸⁰

In the immediate aftermath of the Treaty of Fez, General Lyautey started the Makhzen reforms from the sultanate level. Before the French protectorate, the Sultan

⁷⁹ Le sultan est la clé du voute de système, l'atome marocain. (Rivet 1996 :130)

⁸⁰ Pour tous les musulmans du Maghreb et même au-delà, jusqu'au sud-ouest oranais et même à Tombouktou, il est le vicaire légitime de l'Islam sans comparaison avec le bey de Tunis ou l'khédive de l'Egypte (Rivet 1996: 132).

as the descendant of the Prophet was enjoying absolute power, and his religious authority went hand in hand with his political authority. General Lyautey decided to protect the powers of sultan in the Protectorate as well. Once he guaranteed the survival of sultan's religious and political prestige so that there would be no more Islamic rebellion, he first replaced Moulay Youssef with Moulay Abdelhafed. The viziers also continued their works except the vizier who was in charge of foreign affairs. Lyautey said once:

The sultan and his vizirs conserve their prestige due to the religious nature of their governments, had to live isolated from Europe. The caïds and the religious chiefs must find the vizir sitting on the carpet as was the case in ancient customs.⁸¹

La politique musulmane of General Lyautey was prepared on the basis of protecting Islam in the social Protectorate policies as well. Lyautey tried to guard the principles of Islam in Blad al Makhzen with some social rules. First of them was prostitution. French prostitutes were working in the cities of Rabat and Casablanca, which was particularly annoying the conservative Moroccan locals. Lyautey declared that the French women would be imprisoned if they solicite in Casablanca and Rabat. General Residency promulgated a dahir on December 18th 1912 that brought some restrictions on the activities of these women. It ordered these women to be imprisoned in the event that they were caught in one of the brothels that were found in quarters of these cities.

Second, *la politique musulmane* included a strict prohibition of alcohol sale by the French settlers or soldiers to Arabs and Amazighs in Blad al Makhzen. This

⁸¹ Le sultan et ses vizirs en raison du caractère religieux de leur gouvernement devaient, pour conserver leur prestige, vivre plus isolés de l'élément européen. Les caïds et les chefs religieux qui se rendent dans une benîqa du makhzen doivent y trouver le vizir entouré de ses secrétaires travaillant assis en cercle sur des tapis, selon l'ancien coutume" (Rivet 1996:179).

was brought up with General Lyautey by the Grand Vizir Mohammad al Moqri, who complained about the sale and usage of alcoholic beverages in religious capital city Fez. According to Moqri, the French colons were selling alcoholic drinks near the mosques and madrasas. Moqri argued that the French soldiers were being bribed not to control the sale of alcoholic drinks in city of Azrou. In a letter he addressed to Moulay Youssef on January 10th 1913, he said;

Considering the opposition of the European foreigners in our Cherifien empire that installed some alcoholic beverages sellers, it is important to remind that the usage of these beverages are forbidden to Muslims. I urge you to pass a rigorous rule for this situation.⁸²

Upon the demand of Moqri, Moulay Youssef asked Lyautey to make an arrangement to stop the sale of alcoholic drinks in Blad al Makhzen. In return, Lyautey passed a *dahir* on January 14th 1913 that prohibited the sale and usage of alcohol for locals in Blad al Makhzen.

Third, a *dahir* on August 30th 1914 forbade the entrance of the French people to Islamic places such as mosques, zaouias, turbas, and cemeteries. This *dahir* was followed by another one that expropriated the lands of the Islamic buildings on October 3rd 1914. According to this new *dahir*, the lands of the Islamic buildings would belong to the Sharifian Empire. Two years later, Lyautey passed a new *dahir* on June 26th 1916 that forbade the photographing or filming of the religious buildings and the sultan's palace⁸³. A *dahir* was promulgated on May 18th 1921 that made possible the entrance of the French colons to the Islamic places with a special

⁸² Letter to Moulay Youssef from al Moqri, January 1st 1913 : Considérant que l'accroissement de la population européenne dans notre empire chérifienne a mené l'installation de nombreux débitants de boissons alcooliques dans certains de nos villes fortunés. Que l'usage de ces boissons étant interdit aux Musulmans il emporte d'empêcher ceux-ci de contracter des habitudes contraires aux perceptions de notre religion. Je vous prie d'arrêter ça par un règlement rigoureux.

⁸³ The *dahir* of June 28th 1916: Tous les moyens qui seront utilisés à filmer ou photographier les résidences islamiques, concernant le palace du sultan, seront interdites.

permission from the General Residency upon the complaints of the colons to Quai d'Orsay. Lyautey himself refused enter the *harem* of Moulay Idriss in Fes in 1923 when he was sick, for instance.

Fourth, *la politique musulmane* did not touch the religiously important traditions such as qaidas. Likewise, the *hadiyya* custom that included the offer of a present to the sultan in religious days and festivals when he was addressing to the people was not touched. Since he saw that the religious customs were quite important for the locals in Morocco, Lyautey did not want to change or touch them. In the letter Lyautey wrote to Lieutenant Le Glay on February 3rd 1916, he said:

We must continue to live with the qaida. We must not defame it when it annoys us but we must consider qaida as a young woman who does not hate that we have the wisdom, if we know how to do it.⁸⁴

As a symbol to show the respect he had for Islam in Morocco at that time, General Lyautey even gave permission to the celebration of religious Aid al Kebir festival in the streets during his Residency. He even provided assistance to the poor Moroccans who were not able to buy an animal to sacrifice. As the official bulletin on October 17th 1916 expressed:

Aid el Kabir was celebrated with minimum incident. In the city of Meknes, assistance was provided for the poor people who could not afford buying and sacrificing sheeps in the market.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Letter to Le Glay from Lyautey, February 3rd 1916 : Il faut continuer à vivre avec la qaida. Il ne faut pas la maudire quand elle nous gene, mais plutôt la considérer comme une bonne fille qui ne déteste pas qu'on a la lutine, si l'on sait y faire.

⁸⁵ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, October 17th 1916: L'Aid el Kabir a été célébrée partout sous le moindre incident. Dans la ville de Meknès, l'aisance étant cette année générale et les moutons affluant au marché, les pauvres qui n'avaient pu célébrer la fête ces dernières années ont pu acheter et sacrifier leurs moutons.

This implementation continued even in 1917. As the official bulletin on September 14th 1917 expressed:

The Aid el Kabir festivities passed without any incidents. The indigenous chiefs and notables while returning from Fez were very satisfied with the reception that was shown to them during their trip to Fez.⁸⁶

4.6.3. Reforming Islamic Education

General Lyautey decided to protect Islam and sultan in Protectorate policies to successfully integrate with the Moroccan Islam, that later paved the way to the emergence of a cultural hybridity between the Moroccan locals and the French. However, this integration involved merely Blad al Makhzen, in contrast to Blad al Siba. Geographic conditions in the region with high mountains stopped the French troops accessing southern Morocco. On the other hand, the brutality of the resistance by the Amazigh tribes against the French was nerving the French soldiers. Moreover, the Amazigh tribes there already denied the sultan's authority. Lyautey who could provide the control of the Blad al Makhzen was not able show the same performance he did about Islam through *la politique musulmane* in Blad al Siba. The Blad al Siba Amazighs were quite angry about the French presence in Morocco and they were discreetly approaching Blad al Makhzen borders. These Amazighs of Blad al Siba were trying to influence the Amazighs and Arabs of Blad al Makhzen to join their resistance. Under such conditions, General Lyautey decided to prevent this

⁸⁶ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, September 14th 1917: Les fêtes d'Aid el Kebir se sont passées sans incidents. Les chefs indigènes et notables de retour de Fez ont été très satisfaisants de l'accueil, qui leur a été réservé en tous lieux ainsi de leur séjour a Fez.

interaction. In a letter sent to General Lyautey from Lieutenant Henry on May 2nd 1914, he suggested General Lyautey to start a cultural campaign that would alienate the Amazighs and Arabs of Blad al Makhzen from the Amazighs of Blad al Siba. In the letter, Lieutenant Henrys said:

It clearly seems to me that it would be impossible to hold the Amazigh tribes under our control whom we met in the south. What we must do, first and foremost, is to prevent their interaction with the people here so that they would not be influenced of them. It would be great to alienate the Amazighs here from these barbarians, as soon as possible.⁸⁷

Three months after he received the letter from Lieutenant Henrys, General Lyautey promulgated a dahir on July 31st 1914 that concerned the Amazighs of Blad al Makhzen. Called as the 1914 Amazigh dahir, the alienation of the Amazighs and Arabs in Blad al Makhzen from the Blad al Siba Berbes would be provided by a new intensive education system. This system carried out by General Lyautey involved teaching of French to the Amazighs (also Arabs) in Blad al Makhzen. Accordingly, this system would not only differ the Blad al Makzhen Amazighs from Blad al Siba ones but also modernize the education system based on Koran. The policy to instruct French language in Blad al Makhzen came up within the letters of General Bremont and General Marty to Lyautey. In his letter sent on June 3rd 1916 to Lyautey, General Bremont said that the Arabic language would just make the Amazighs more Islamic:

⁸⁷ Letter of General Henrys to General Lyautey, May 2nd 1914: Il m'apparaît nettement qu'il est impossible de ne pas tenir compte de l'état particulier des tribus avec lesquelles nous venons d'entrer en contact. Ce qu'il faut à tout prix, c'est d'éviter de leur inculquer la patrie makhzen qui ne pourrait que nous aliéner, sans retour, ces montagnards.

That we let the Amazighs be Islamize in their mountains under the imposition of Arabic and *cadi* is a mistake. We must train them with the French language.⁸⁸

In addition, General Marty in his letter to Lyautey on June 25th 1916 argued that the Amazighs must be evolved with the French language:

First of all, we should not teach Arabic to this population. Arabic is a factor of Islamization because this language was thought in the Koran. Our interests command us to make Amazighs get rid of Islamic context. Islam was not believed among the Amazighs. These people do not practice their religion.⁸⁹

General Lyautey replied to Marty and Bremont on April 2nd 1916 to declare his decision to instruct French to the Amazighs:

In the linguistic view, we must directly switch from Arabic and Amazigh to French. For this, we need that our education officers work on the study of Amazigh dialects. Moreover, we must found Franco-Amazigh schools where we are going to teach French to the young Amazighs. It is the mountains where we are going to construct these schools so that they would be away from the Arabic influence.⁹⁰

At the end of this decision, the French decided to train the Amazighs in *Blad al Makhzen* in the French language so that they would be alienated from the Amazighs in the *Blad al Siba*. This triggered an education reform movement in *Blad al Makhzen* where the French started to teach French language to the Amazighs in *Blad*

⁸⁸ Letter from Bremont to Lyautey, June 3rd 1916 : Que nous islamisons les Berbères de la montagne, leur imposant l'Arabe et le *cadi*, c'est une erreur; il nous faut leur enseigner le français.

⁸⁹ Letter from Marty to Lyautey, June 25th 1916 : Tout d'abord nous n'avons pas à enseigner l'arabe à des populations qui s'en sont passés. L'arabe est le facteur d'islamisation, parce que cette langue s'apprend dans le coran. Or, notre intérêt nous commande de faire évoluer les Berbères hors du cadre d'Islam. Nous devons nous garder soigneusement d'intervenir sur le terrain religieux. L'islam n'a déposé sur les Berbères, j'entends ceux qui ont conservé leur Indépendance, qu'une empreinte très superficielle. Ces populations ont rejeté du Coran tous les concepts juridiques.

⁹⁰ Letter from Lyautey to Marty and Bremont, April 2nd 1916 : Au point de vue linguistique, nous devons tendre à passer directement du berbère au français. Pour cela, il nous faut des Amazighaisants et nos officiers de renseignements doivent se mettre résolument à l'étude des dialectes berbères, il faut créer aussi les écoles franco berbères où l'on apprendra le français aux jeunes berbères. C'est dans la montagne qu'il faut les former et les garder pour protéger de toute imprégnation arabe.

al Makhzen (Hardy 1921:77). Accordingly, three principals were brought to education system. First, General Lyautey modeled the role of French state in education system in Morocco. Associating the French system with Islam in Morocco, General Lyautey rendered the Protectorate state as the only authority in education. According to this system, the role of mosques in education would remain but their authority would be reduced. Accordingly, no school would be opened in Morocco without the permission of the Protectorate state. Second, General Lyautey divided the schools of the Protectorate into the schools for Europeans-Israelites and the schools for Muslims (Rivet 1996:242). General Lyautey let the Koranic schools continue with their programs but they were not considered in the official education system determined. General Lyautey was looking forward to settling an education system that would train the future leaders of Morocco. That is why he decided to set the *Ecole Supérieure de Langue et des dialects Amazighs* (E.S.L.D.B)⁹¹ in 1921. E.S.L.D.B had one basic role which was to act as a linguistic study center and training school of European and local administrations in Morocco. This new institute had two duties: to form functionaries for the Protectorate by preparing children on interpretation, linguistics and local law and to prepare kids for examinations in literature in relation with the faculties of University of Algiers and Bordeaux. Third, Lyautey also let the state to open the Franco-Arabic schools in Morocco besides E.S.L.D.B. These schools were represented by either public schools' elite schools, or the Mohammedan colleges in Fez and Rabat for the secondary education. These schools would have both a religious and scientific education at the same time. The elite schools, on the other hand, would be represented by the Mohammedan schools in which the Moroccan families were paying in the way to train their kids. The

⁹¹ Superior School of Arabic Language and Amazigh Dialects

French were attaching a special importance to public schools since it was quite important to train artisans in Morocco who could work for the French interests in the future. These schools were supposed to train agriculturists, merchants, and artists in the production circuit and exchanges with Europe (Merrouni 1993: 20). In the last year of the post of General Lyautey in Morocco, the Protectorate education was headed by European Israelites schools on one hand and Franco-Arabic schools & E.S.D.L.B, on the other hand.

In the first thirteen years of the French rule in Morocco, Protectorate education worked successfully. Moroccan locals started to be trained according to French methods by positive sciences besides the religious education (Bensamoun 2007:268). Between 1925 and 1930, the number of Franco-Arabic schools dramatically increased. However, nationalist rise by 1925 influenced this education system. Qarawiyn University as the center of superior studies for religion turned into a venue of political discussions and Moroccan nationalism. The Moroccan Action Committee was founded in Qarawiyn in 1934. In 1941, the Protectorate decided to separate girls from boys in classes and created a special college for them in Rabat. In 1944, this system was extended to all schools in Morocco and continued until 1956.

4.7. Manifestation of the 1912-1925 Hybridity among Moroccans

The French Protectorate in Morocco that was structured by General Hubert Lyautey respected Islam between 1912 and 1925. Since Islam was the unique component of the Moroccan national identity at that time, the respect shown to Islam by General

Lyautey was highly internalized by both Moroccan state and non-state actors between 1912 and 1925. Together with the educational reforms that introduced French language to the Arabs and the Amazighs in Blad al Makhzen, respect to Islam by the French created a cultural hybridity with the Arabs and Amazighs in Blad al Makhzen and the French in Blad al Makhzen. This hybridity included an admiration to France through the administration of General Lyautey (as stated by the admiration to Europe theme of the postcolonial nationalism theory), and it continued with a naturalization process where many Arabs and Amazighs in Blad al Makhzen applied to the French authorities to become French citizens by 1922. The naturalizations were not only the roots of the transition to the French citizenship of the population in Morocco but also the beginning of the double consciousness at the Moroccan population, that could evaluate King Hassan II's instrumentalization of cultural hybridity between Morocco and France in postcolonial Moroccan national identity to explain/justify the Europeanness of Morocco according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in 1987. The performance of General Lyautey that was rated positively according to his *la politique musulmane* mainly did not only showed the role of Islam in the Moroccan national identity by that time but also the way the Moroccan state and non-state actors were involved in the cultural hybridity created by the French through their successful integration with Moroccan Islam. In this sense, letters written to Lyautey by Moroccan state and non-state elites are both expressing the role of Islam in the Moroccan national identity and also the hybridity they felt with the French as a result of the successful integration of the French with the Moroccan Islam.

Moulay Youssef was the chief state actor who supported Lyautey in his policies on Islam. The first example of this support of General Lyautey by Moulay

Youssef was observed in a letter to General Lyautey on March 11th 1916, which argues that he had done a great job in Morocco, and that the union of the French and Moroccans would work for the development of his Muslim subjects. Besides hybridity, this letter also showed Moulay Youssef's admiration to the French civilization, as suggested by the admiration of Europe theme of the postcolonial nationalism.

I have the pleasure to admit that in all the regions I passed, I saw the most perfect order and peace thanks to the collaboration that qualified and that united the French and Sharifian authorities. This collaboration could just be an advantage of a union in our imperial city Rabat. Animated with biggest desire to ameliorate the conditions of my Muslim subjects, I am resolute to continue the most loyal and active concurrence to the artifact of progress and civilization that was integrated by the government of your Republic.⁹²

Another example of this support to General Lyautey from Moulay Youssef was observed in a telegram on November 2nd 1917. Moulay Youssef in the telegram argued that Lyautey was a friend of Moroccans since he was able to penetrate the Muslim community. The admiration to Europe theme was also valid in this letter:

For the occasion of the fifth year of your entrance to the glorious French army in Morocco, we congratulate with the best wishes that our friend and collaborator is still in our hearts. He was so integrated with the Muslim community and with the rights of our ancestors. We express the unanimous thought of our people by wishing you a great glory for France protecting of our state. We owe you a lot for the pacification and progress you gave to us.⁹³

⁹² Letter from Youssef to Lyautey, March 11th 1916 : M. Le General, J'ai eu le plaisir à me rendre compte que par toutes les régions où j'ai passé règnent l'ordre le plus parfait, la paix la plus complète grâce à la collaboration si extraite qui unit les autorités français et chérifiennes. Cette collaboration ne peut que se rassurer davantage par la Réunion dans notre ville impériale de Rabat. Anime du plus grand désir d'améliorer la condition de mes sujets Musulmanes, je suis résolu à continuer mon concours le plus entier et le plus loyal à l'œuvre et de civilisation entreprise par le gouvernement de votre république.

⁹³ Letter from Youssef to Lyautey, November 2nd 1917 : A l'occasion de cinquantaine de votre entrée dans la glorieuse armée française, où vos services illustres devaient vous conquérir le premier rang, nous félicitons les plus cordiales avec les vœux que nous formons pour conserver longtemps encore auprès de notre ami si cher notre cœur et éminent collaborateur pénétre de nos devoirs envers la

Islam was one more time reflected in the support of Moulay Youssef to Lyautey in the letter on July 4th 1924. Moulay Youssef argued that he would remember the respect Lyautey had showed to the Moroccan religious institutions and local customs as a way of the integration of the French with Moroccan Islam;

We will try, Mr.Marechal, to glorify the admirable artifact that you realized in this country. We very well know that you will never take care of this country since you estimate that, in your long career, you just responded to the call of duty. History then will possess, this great artifact, of rendering the just and equitable man who did a lot for this Sharifian empire. It lets us to recall with gratitude, in this meeting, all the respect that you showed us, our religious institutions, our traditions, and our local customs, with order and peace.⁹⁴

One year later, Moulay Youssef repeated the same argument in his letter to Lyautey on February 6th 1925. Youssef one more time claimed admiration of France in his letter paralleling General Lyautey's respect for Islam:

About you, Excellency, member of Makhzen, Pachas, Notable residents of Rabat and Salé, let me reread the feelings we have for you. Everything that makes the essential of life is common for us, respect to religion, to traditions, the social hierarchies, love of order and peace. We understood among the Muslim population sympathy and a reciprocal confidence that led us to accomplish together in this country, yours, artifact of pacification, of reconstruction and the progress that France gave to us.⁹⁵

communauté musulmane et de nos droits souverain sur l'empire que nous avons lègue nos ancêtres sanctifies. On exprime la pensée unanime de notre peuple en vous souhaitant longue une pour la plus grande gloire de la France protectrice et en témoignage de notre pays pour les bienfaits de pacification et de progrès dont il vous est redevable.

⁹⁴ Letter from Youssef to Lyautey, July 4th 1924 : Nous n'essaierons point, Monsieur le Marechal, de glorifier ici l'œuvre admirable que vous avez réalisé dans ce pays. Nous savons bien qu'on ne vous laissera jamais éblouir par les élues et les louanges, car vous estimez que, durant votre longue carrière, vous n'avez fait que répondre à l'appel de devoir. Il appartiendra donc à l'histoire, ce grand arbitre, de rendre le juste et l'équitable hommage à celui qui a tant fait pour cet empire chérifien. Il nous permet de rappeler avec gratitude, dans cette Réunion, tout le respect que vous avez toujours témoigné, pour nos institutions religieuses, nos traditions, et nos coutumes locales, portant avec ordre et paix.

⁹⁵ Letter from Youssef to Lyautey, February 6th 1925 : Quant à vous excellence, membre de Makhzen, Pachas, Notables habitants des villes de Rabat et de Salé, ai-je à vous relire les sentiments qui nous cassent. Tout ce qui fait l'essentiel de la vie bous est commun, respect de la religion, des traditions, des hiérarchies sociales, amour de l'ordre et de paix. Nous nous sommes compris et il s'est

Similar to Moroccan state actors, Moroccan non-state actors also praised Lyautey regarding his performance on the Moroccan Islam. The views of the Moroccan non-state actors in Blad al Makhzen for Lyautey were first revealed in the book of a British journalist Walter Burton Harris. He (1933:46) expressed how General Lyautey waxed sympathetic to the people:

I was with him on the next day when the submitted tribesmen with their women and children came down from the higher mountains to look at Lyautey. The women decked in their best, and weighed down with their silver jewellery, offered him the traditional bowls of milk and he waded amongst them, gazed at wonderingly by the small children who pressed around to touch or kiss his hand. It was the magic of his name, the magic of his personality. He had the greatest gift of all the qualities of colonial administration.

Reference to Islam in the support of Mouley Youssef to General Lyautey was also observed in some letters sent to General Lyautey from the non-state actors. A person called Mohammad Guebbas wrote to General Lyautey on July 14th 1914 that the people of Morocco love General Lyautey a lot because he had respected the Muslim traditions during his rule:

We have a great confidence in your love for this Sharifian Empire, love also for the people of Morocco. The best proof of this love is in the respect that you have for the religious rites, also to the religious institutions Muslim traditions since Islam is not a religion of obscurity and abasement. You also conquered the hearts of Moroccan people by your gestures. The order and the peace established in this country are as much as important as the friendships in these lands. Be certain General, Moroccan people will never forget your

noue entre le peuple musulman et moi une sympathie et une confiance réciproque qui nous ont permis d'accomplir ensemble dans ce noble pays, le vôtre, l'œuvre de pacification, de reconstruction, et de progrès que la France s'y était donnée partout.

services, and all Moroccans would like to see you among them. This empire will take its place among the most civilized nations thanks to you.⁹⁶

General Lyautey's respect for Islam was also referred to in an anonymous telegram that was sent to him on April 3rd 1915. The telegram was about how General Lyautey comprehended the Muslim soul in Morocco in the context of education and social life:

Everything has been said concerning life of the colonial artifact. This magnificent artifact made at the same time the great soldier, a pacificator, a constructor of cities, and organization of the French Morocco. He attained among Moroccans an incomparable prestige thanks to the charm that brought by his personality, his qualities of heart, and also his comprehension of the Muslim soul. He liked the Muslims and in return the Muslims were attached to him. He was a Christian who liked the Muslims. We can say that the secret of Lyautey's success in indigenous politics resides mostly in the fact that he liked the Muslims while at the same time he knew how to administer them. Thanks to Lyautey, reorganization of high Islamic education, institutions of the Muslim colleges, the schools of notables, Muslim primary schools were carried out.⁹⁷

And Si Abdellah el Fassi wrote on September 24th 1918 that Lyautey had brought civilization to Morocco by not touching religion:

⁹⁶ Letter from Guebbas to Lyautey, July 14th 1914 : Nous avons pleine confiance dans votre amour pour cet empire chérifien, amour aussi grand que celui du peuple marocain pour votre personne. La meilleure preuve en est dans le respect que vous professez à l'égard de rites religieux, ainsi qu'à l'égard des institutions musulmanes et des traditions nationales qui, d'ailleurs, méritent bien d'être conservés. Car l'islam n'est pas une religion d'obscurité et d'abaissement. C'est ainsi que vous avez conquis les cœurs de tous les Marocains, à tel point que toutes les bouches chantent vos louanges et ne cessent de citer vos faits et gestes. Et y a aucune exagération, car l'amitié est fondée sur les bienfaits, et quel bienfait plus important que la sauvegarde des personnes et des biens et l'établissement de l'ordre et de la sécurité de tout le pays. Le peuple n'oubliera jamais vos bienfaits. Tous les Marocains veulent vous voir demeurer parmi eux, sains et saufs. Le Maroc va placer dans les pays les plus civilisés grâce à vous.

⁹⁷ Anonymous telegram to Lyautey, April 3rd 1915 : Tout est dit sur la vie de l'œuvre coloniale. Cette œuvre magnifique appartient désormais à l'histoire et la postérité que le Maréchal Lyautey a été en même temps qu'un grand soldat, un pacificateur, un bâtisseur des villes, et organisateur de Maroc français. Il a exercé sur les Marocains un prestige incomparable, grâce à la séduction qui menait de sa personne, à ses qualités de cœur, et aussi à sa compréhension intuitive de l'âme musulmane. Il a aimé les musulmans et en retour eux-ci qui ont voué un attachement que l'épreuve de la grande guerre a révélé sincère. Il était un chrétien qui aimait les musulmans. On peut dire que le secret de l'étonnante réussite de Lyautey en politique ingénieuse réside en grande partie dans le fait qu'il a aimé les musulmans en même temps qu'il a su les gouverner. Grâce à Lyautey, réorganisation du haut enseignement islamique, institutions des collèges musulmans, des écoles notables, des écoles primaires musulmanes sont construites.

The idea that pervaded the whole program of the Protectorate is to make the Moroccan people progress and to bring it to the same level of other civilized nations, by introducing reforms that would bring progress, well-being and peace, without touching religion, by assisting and empowering the Makhzen and by offering its Sharifian sovereigns power to it⁹⁸

The respect for General Lyautey was also referred to by several citizens in the form of describing Lyautey as the founder of Morocco. Salah ben el Fqih Zaroui el Marrakech in his telegram to Lyautey on, February 26th 1923 said:

You are the great, the powerful, the universal, the wise, the clement, the recoverer, the light, the sun, and the dirigent of our Maghreb, the one who made the order, the prosperity, the birth, glory of this country. God bless you General. I one more time glorify your angels, your saints, people who always obey you and people who know your felicity. I wish that your great name be exalted as the Great Recoverer.⁹⁹

The support of the non-state actors to Lyautey for his religious tolerance in Morocco was highlighted by the Jewish minorities as well. A Jewish Moroccan called Moqarram el Hamzaoui expressed the admiration he had for Lyautey and the French rule in his letter on October 5th 1915:

On behalf of the universal Israelite people, on behalf of the professors and students of the Israelite community in Morocco, I wish you a warm welcome. We greet the French occupation in our country because we believe that the honor to work under the three colors of France will bring our families dignity and prosperity. Our love for your beautiful and noble France is more than esteem; it is an admiration. Our teachers taught us to praise France by talking

⁹⁸ Letter of el Fassi to Lyautey, September 24th 1918 : L'idée qui résume tout le programme de Protectorat est de faire progresser le peuple marocain et de l'amener au même niveau que les nations civilisées, en introduisant les réformes qui amèneront les progrès, le bien-être et la paix, sans toucher la religion, en assistant et en renforçant le makhzen et en lui conservant sa puissance chérifienne souveraine(Rivet 1996).

⁹⁹ Letter of Zaroui to Lyautey, February 26th 1923 : Toi le grand, le puissant, l'universel, le sage, le clément, le Miséricordieux, le Guérisseur, accorde la guérison de celui qui a rétabli l'ordre, la propreté, l'aisance, la gloire de ce pays. Dieu guérisse Mr le Marechal. J'intercède auprès de tes prophètes, tes saints, des gens qui t'obèrent, et de ceux qui jouissent de ta félicité. Grand Maître que ton nom soit exalte, le Grand guérisseur.

to us about how France emancipated human history in our history courses. Moreover, we want you to believe that if we are Moroccan by birth, we definitely hope to be called French one day, French at heart.¹⁰⁰

The reverence of Islam in the support to Lyautey from Moulay Youssef and Moroccan subjects was also used in the challenge against Lyautey. Religiously conservative locals strictly opposed General Lyautey and the French rule in Morocco since they regarded the Protectorate as the rule of the Christian. Several letters point out that Lyautey was held as the main responsible of the rule of Christians on Islam in this period. The official bulletin on May 12th 1924 shows a telegram sent to the qadi of Rabat Abdelkerim from the qadi of Fez Abderrahmane el Korchi. It calls the French Christians and blames Moulay Youssef since he cooperated with the French. These letters showed how Islam was the dominant component of the Moroccan national identity by that time and how it was used to unite Moroccans to resist the French forces:

We warn you about the critical situation in which the Moroccans are currently placed. There is no entente between the tribes and cities because the governors and the people allow religion to be humiliated by the infidels. This is contrary to the religion of Mohammad. Among them, there are wise people like Ibn el Abdi cadi of Fez Djedid who betray Muslims. People like Moulay Youssef and his circles were assimilated to Christians to get some subsidies from the infidel Lyautey. We wrote eight telegrams once Raissouli fell. Now we are back to eradicate the French tyrants. This year was bad for Morocco, but nothing was lost yet due to the infidels. Most of the tribes are blind. Where did you see that Muslims help their enemies? Moulay Youssef accepts the French authority,

¹⁰⁰ Letter of al Hamzaoui to Lyautey, October 5th 1915 : Au nom de l'alliance israélite universelle, au nom des processors, des élevés, je vous souhaite la bienvenu. Nous saluons avec bonheur l'occupation française de notre pays, car nous savons que sous le protectorat de la beauté de trois couleurs mes pères pourront dignement et tranquillement travailler à la prospérité de leurs familles. Notre amour pour votre belle et noble France est fait encore de beaucoup d'estimation de beaucoup d'admiration. Nos maitres en nous enseignât histoire, en nous parlant dur le de la France en émancipation de l'humanité, nous ont appris à tendrement la chérir. Aussi, nous vous prions de croire Monsieur le Résident General, que si on est des Marocains par naissance, on sera un jour des Français et des Français de cœur.

constructs palaces and play with people's money. May God give us the power to hunt the unfaithful¹⁰¹

Similarly, the letter of an imam from Taza Si Abdelaziz Bennai to Moulay Youssef was published on the official bulletin on August 12nd 1924. He called the French unfaithful, and also referred to religion for the defense of the country. Bennai also criticized Moulay Youssef since he went into cooperation with the French:

Moroccans deny their religious duties. There are some Sharifs who kiss the shoes of infidels who give them advises. Is not this behavior improper to the Prophet's descendants? There are some people who, just to please the infidels, harm their religious brothers. There are also the qadis who give every year considerable sums for the orphans of France. Moroccans became puppets by imitating the infidels. Here are Moulay Youssef and his circles for instance. No religion asks to help the enemy to capture the motherland. Are not the people of Mohamed the noblest of all? We know that the Mujahidin will bring back the victory against the unfaithful. We follow just one aim, the aim of chasing the French from Morocco.¹⁰²

In addition, the official bulletin on October 6th 1924 published a declaration of the imam of Fez Jafar al Kattani:

¹⁰¹ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, May 12th 1924, p.9 : Nous vous prévenons que vos frères notables, de la situation critique dans laquelle se trouve le Maroc. Point d'entente entre les tribus et les villes parce que les lettres, les gouverneurs et le peuple négligent la religion pour s'humilier devant les infidèles. Ces est contraire à la religion de Mohammad. Il y a parmi les savants comme Ibn el Abdi cadî de Fez Djedid qui trahissent les Musulmans. Certains comme Moulay Youssef et son entourage se sont assimilés aux Chrétiens pour avoir des subventions comme Lyautey l'infidèle. Nous lui avons écrit huit lettres après Raïssouli est tombé. On est revenu à supprimer le tyrannie français. Cette année a été mauvais pour le Maroc mais rien n'a paru à cause de la perfidie des infidèles. La plupart des tribus sont aveugles. Ou avez-vous vu des gens aider leurs ennemis? Youssef accepte l'autorité français, construit des palais et jouent de l'argent du peuple. Puisse Dieu les mettre d'accord pour chasser les infidèles.

¹⁰² The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, August 12nd 1924: Les Marocains négligent leurs devoirs religieux. Il existe des chorfas qui pissent loin leur excès de seule et cherchent à se faire estimer par les infidèles dont ils baissent leur chaussures en leur donnait des conseils. Ce conduit n'est-elle pas indigne des descendants de Prophète? Il y a des gens qui, pour plaire aux infidèles, nuisent à leurs coreligionnaires. Il y a enfin des Cadis qui donnent chaque année des sommets considérables pour les orphelins de France. Les Marocains sont devenus roumis, en imitant les infidèles. Tels sont le Moulay Youssef et son traître entourage. Aucune religion ne prescrit à ses adeptes d'aider les ennemis à conquérir leur pays. Le peuple Mahométan n'est-il pas le plus noble de tous les peuples? On sait que les Moudjahidines remporteront la victoire contre les tribus et les infidèles. On ne poursuit qu'un but, de chasser du Maroc la France.

The Muslim should have minimum contact with the non-Muslims. It is forbidden to him to stay with the non-Muslim alone, to accompany him, to travel with him, to visit him, to cultivate friendship with him, to imitate him, to envy him, to admire him and to consult him.¹⁰³

By 1922, many Arabs and Amazighs in Blad al Makhzen applied to the Residence in Rabat to be naturalized and pass to the French citizenship. As stated by General Lavendé to General Lyautey on April 14th 1922:

The Moroccan local called Abdesselam ben Oumar, conductor of the 10th Artillery group of an African campaign, had a request to be naturalized.¹⁰⁴

The letters of the French staff to General Lyautey about the wish of the Arabs and Amazighs to be naturalized continued. As General Jambon started to General Lyautey on June 9th 1923, even the Moroccans who were living in the Spanish Protectorate cities like Tangier requested to be French citizens with naturalization:

A Moroccan local, original of Tangiers, having done 3 years of military service in one of our regiments, and currently working at the Casablanca Hospital asked me the ways to be naturalized. This local lived two years in the Metropole, which means I believe there is no obstacle to make him French.¹⁰⁵

These quests also came from the Arab and Amazigh people of Morocco, such as this one below sent by Arab on October 4th 1923:

¹⁰³ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, October 6th 1912: Le Musulman doit avoir minimum de contact avec le non-Musulmane. C'est interdit pour le Musulmane de coopérer avec lui, de voyager avec lui, de lui guider, de lui visiter, de cultiver amitié avec lui, de l'admirer.

¹⁰⁴ Letter of General Lavendé to Resident General Lyautey on April 14th 1922: M.la Garde des sceaux vient de faire savoir à cette résidence General que le nommé Abdesselam ben Oumar d'origine Marocaine, canonnier conducteur du 10eme groupe d'Artillerie d'une campagne africaine l'a saisi d'une requête de naturalisation.

¹⁰⁵ Letter of General Jambon to Resident General Lyautey, June 6th 1923: Un indigène marocain, originaire de Tangiers, ayant accompli 3 ans de service militaire dans un régiment tirailleur et employé actuellement à l'hôpital de Casablanca, m'ayant demandé la marche à suivre pour se faire naturaliser français. L'Indigène en question serait disposé à faire séjour de 2 ans dans la métropole, si, comme il l'a entendu dire, ce séjour devait favoriser sa naturalisation.

Mister Chief, I am following your achievements in Morocco. Desirous of being naturalized, I kindly ask you to send me my certificate of French citizenship. I was born in Casablanca on March 16th 1898, with my mother's name Nesseada Babbout and my father's name Yahya Hassan.¹⁰⁶

Another Arab also wanted to be naturalized. In a letter he sent on July 21st 1923:

I have the honor to ask you to naturalize me so that I could be a French citizen. Having engaged to the 64th regiment of the Moroccan soldiers, I served for more than 3 years to the regiment and I constantly became familiar with the French policies.¹⁰⁷

4.8. The French Protectorate in Morocco between 1912 and 1925: An Assessment

The inbetweenness theme of the postcolonial nationalism discusses the impacts of the European colonialism on the national identity of the colonized after colonialism with three main concepts, double consciousness, hybridity and cultural heritage. These three terms argues that the emergence of the inbetweenness in the national identity of the colonized after colonialism starts in the colonial episode.

Accordingly, this chapter was intended to show the creation of hybridity (that was instrumentalized in postcolonial Moroccan national identity to explain/assert the Europeanness of Morocco according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome by

¹⁰⁶ Letter to Resident General Lyautey, October 4th 1921: Monsieur le Chef, Désireux de me faire naturaliser français. Je vous prie de vouloir bien me faire parvenir mon certificat d'Allegiance. Je suis né à Casablanca le 16 Mars 1898, et je suis fils de Yahya Hassan et Nessaouda Babbout.

¹⁰⁷ Letter to Resident General Lyautey on July 21st 1923: Monsieur le Marechal, J'ai l'honneur de vous demander de vouloir bien me faire connaitre les démarche que j'aurais à faire pour me faire classer protégé français. Engagé au 64eme régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains, j'ai servi pendant 3 ans et j'ai servi constatement colonne avec ce régiment.

King Hassan II) between Arabs and Amazighs in Morocco and the French during 1912-1925 years of the French protectorate. This chapter analyzes the French administration in Morocco between 1912 and 1925, by giving specific emphasis to how Islam as the unique component of Moroccan national identity at that time was implemented against the French Protectorate both in Blad al Makhzen and Blad al Siba that was the representation of European colonialism in Morocco. This analysis was essential in order to show the reader how the people in Morocco implemented Islam as their national identity against the French, after Islam had been transformed into a national identity from cultural one after the Portuguese activities in the 16th century. In addition, this chapter also showed how the French Protectorate under General Lyautey rule created a cultural hybridity by respecting this Islam as national identity of Morocco, and also through an education system with intensive French language training.

In this sense, this chapter shows that the hybridity that was instrumentalized by King Hassan II in postcolonial Moroccan national identity to explain/assert the Europeanness of Morocco in 1987 according to article 237 of the Treaty of Rome started in the French Protectorate times, as Bhabha, Said and Gilroy underlined that the hybridity at the postcolonial period of the colonized states start in the colonial episode. It was shown that the French managed to create this cultural hybridity with the people of Morocco through a successful integration with Moroccan Islam and education. Accordingly, the Arabs and Amazigh populations of Morocco started to naturalize themselves by the end of General Lyautey's rule. This shows how *la politique musulmane* and the French education policies of General Lyautey were successful, and also impressive on the Moroccan locals in the creation of this hybridity. The roots of hybridity that was instrumentalized by King Hassan II in

postcolonial Moroccan national identity to claim the Europeaness of Morocco go back to the 1912-1925 episode of the French Protectorate. In this sense, the chapter shows that General Lyautey as the symbol of the French administration in Morocco had a huge role in the instrumentalization of this hybridity in postcolonial national identity.

CHAPTER V

UNSUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION OF THE FRENCH WITH MOROCCAN ISLAM AND NATIONALISM: THE 1925- 1956 CONTINUUM OF HYBRIDITY CREATION UNDER THE RISE OF MOROCCANNESS

5.1. End of General Lyautey Rule in the Protectorate

The chapters until now have intended to show that Islam was the unique component of the Moroccan national identity after the suppression of Judaism in 1342, and that the French Protectorate managed to create a cultural hybridity in Morocco by successfully integrating with Moroccan Islam and language between 1912 and 1925. The introduction of the French language to the Arab and Amazigh population in Blad al Makhzen showed that the French impacted not only Moroccan Islam through *la politique musulmane* but also Moroccan education system. The successful integration of the French with Moroccan Islam and language therefore created the basis of a cultural hybridity in the population of Morocco at that time that was instrumentalized by Hassan II in 1987 while claiming the Europeanness of Morocco according to the

rticle 237 of the Treaty of Rome. The associationist method, introduction of the French language, *la politique musulmane* of General Lyautey, the letters written by state and non-state actors to General Lyautey and the request of the people in Morocco to be naturalized for French citizenship clearly showed how this cultural hybridity was created in Morocco between 1912 and 1925 by the French Protectorate.

Nevertheless, the implementation of association method that the French used in Morocco did not continue after General Lyautey's resignation in 1925. His departure from Morocco did not only mark the end of his official post in Morocco, but also the Protectorate policies that protected Islam above all. The next Resident Generals after Lyautey did not continue *la politique musulmane*. The prestige of the Moroccan sultan, who was regarded as the atom of the French Protectorate by Lyautey, was eroded. In addition, the usage of chemical gas by the Spanish and that the fact that the French were aware of it but did not prevent it in 1921 led to a nationalist action. Together with Islam, Moroccanness as a result of this Moroccanist action became the two components of Moroccan national identity by 1926. This chapter is intended to show the rise of Moroccanness by this year, one side of cultural hybridity that was instrumentalized by King Hassan II in postcolonial Moroccan national identity to explain/justify the Europeanness of Morocco according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.

Three indicators might explain the loss of succesful integration of the French with Moroccan Islam that paved the way to Moroccanism and then to Moroccanness after General Lyuatey era. These are the establishment of Rif Republic, the 1930 and 1935 *dahirs*, and the Moroccan political parties. Whereas the Rif Republic and the 1930 & 1935 *dahirs* could be evaluated as the parts of the reformist Moroccanism

between 1921 and 1944 that intended to reform the Muslim society against the Protectorate. Moroccan political parties, on the other hand, could be evaluated as a part of the separatist Moroccanism between 1945 and 1956 that intended to reform the Muslim society to found independent Morocco (Halstead 1969: 77).

5.2. Reformist Moroccan Nationalism

Previous chapter discussed the militarist and literary resistance of the Blad al Siba Amazighs to the French Protectorate within the context of Islam as the unique component of Moroccan national identity at that time. Besides the activism of the Blad al Siba Amazighs against the French Protectorate, there was also activism of these Amazighs against the Spanish Protectorate.

5.2.1. The Rif Republic

In addition to the Blad al Siba Amazighs, the Amazigh tribes on the Atlas Mountains had been fighting the Spanish Protectorate since 1920. This fight became brutal when the Spanish forces in Morocco used chemical gas against these Amazighs in 1920 around the city of Melilla. This usage clearly showed how the Spanish administration did not care about the people living in Morocco, unlike General Lyautey's administration in the French Protectorate. As the letter sent by the Foreign Affairs

Minister to the Spanish Protectorate Resident General Juan Picasso expresses, the Spanish government was criticizing the administration of the Spanish Protectorate:

How you can feign to ignore that it is in the interests of Spain herself to conclude peace with the Rif, to recognize its rights and its independence, to respect the links of neighborhood, and to cement a union with the Rifian people, instead of treading on it, humiliating it, and attacking its legitimate human rights in accordance with the code of civilization and the Treaty of Versailles which ended the First World War? (Balfour, 2002: 92)

The usage of chemical gas triggered the Islamic resistance of several Amazighs who were united under the command of Mohammad bin Abdelkrim al Khattabi and founded the Rif Republic on September 18th 1921 (Balfour;2002:91). The Rif Republic, that was established independently from the Spanish Protectorate, had the real motivation to separate Morocco from the French Protectorate. As Vincent Sheean in *Adventures among the Riffians* argues, “a minor local qaid who told a visiting American journalist that when the Spanish were broken, the Rifis would clear the French from the rets of North Africa and the proceed to liberate the ld Islamic territories in the Iberian Peninsula (1926:83).

By assuming the title of president of the Rif Republic, Abdelkrim claimed that he was descendant from the Prophet Mohammad and declared war against the Spanish Protectorate a day after he had settled the Rif Republic. The Riffians defeated the Spanish forces near Ceuta, and forced them to withdraw in the city of Melilla. This defeat hit the Spanish plans of expansion through the northeast of Morocco. Abdelkrim’s victory near Ceuta encouraged him to organize further attacks in the Spanish Protectorate. He attacked Tetouan in 1924 with an army of 120.000 Amazigh men made up of regional supports. This was the first time the French recognized Abdelkerim’s power in the Spanish Protectorate. The official bulletin on

March 17th 1924 expressed that Abdelkerim was trying to convince other Amazigh tribes that were dependent on the French rule to join his Rif Republic: It said: “Abdelkrim exercises more and more pressure over the Ouergha tribes who are dependent on our zone by giving those contributions, contingents and by declaring that they would be a part of the Rif Republic.”¹⁰⁸

Tetouan’s fall to the Rif Amazighs was a direct threat to the French Protectorate. The support of the Amazigh tribes of Eastern Morocco to Abdelkerim could endanger the stability of the Protectorate in Blad al Makhzen. On the other hand, support for Abdelkrim was growing every day. The official bulletin on May 4th 1924 expressed that even newspapers in Tunisia were calling him as the man who would make Islam shine in Morocco:

I have the honor to report you the following information: I was alerted that these meetings were held twice a week at the house of Si Mohammad Sassi, a suspected subject, who had already been reported several times. Independently from the forbidden newspapers, he receives the Tunisian one called L’Ouazir, the importation of which was forbidden in Morocco due to its propaganda in favor of Abdelkrim. In the last issue, we find the following sentence: The real sultan of Morocco is Abdelkrim because he makes the prestige of Islam shine.¹⁰⁹

The Riffan army under the command of Abdelkrim was gaining significant victories against the Spanish. The Riffian Amazighs killed 8000 Spanish in a week and drove the Spanish from the Moroccan coasts towards the Atlas Mountains. The Rif

¹⁰⁸ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, March 17th 1924: Abd el Karim exerce pression de plus en plus vive sur les tribus riveraines de Ouergha dépendant de notre zone, y levé contributions, y recrute contingents, et fait déclarer qu’elles feront la partie de la République Rifain.

¹⁰⁹ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, May 4th 1924: J’ai l’honneur de porter à votre connaissance les renseignements suivants: On me signale que ces réunions sont tenues deux fois par semaine au domicile de Si Mohammad Sassi, sujet suspect, qui a déjà fait l’objet de nombreux rapports. Indépendamment des journaux interdits, il reçoit le journal tunisien L’Ouazir dont son entrée au Maroc est interdite à cause de sa propagande en faveur d’Abdelkrim. Dans un dernier numéro se trouverait la phrase suivante: Le vrai sultan du Maroc est Abdelkrim car il fait rayonner le prestige d’Islam.

Republic was a direct threat to the French Protectorate in Blad al Makhzen. Abdelkerim also started to develop an anti-French attitude at this point (Sheean, 1926;44). The official bulletin on June 3rd 1924 expressed that the hostility of Abdelkrim for the Spanish Protectorate would soon turn against the French one. It said: “It is certain that the plane Abdelkerim has is giving him popularity in the Rif and makes him acting more hostile against us.”¹¹⁰

With all the support he got from the Amazigh tribes in the Blad al Siba, Abdelkrim’s forces attacked the French Protectorate on January 19th 1925. The official bulletin on the same day expresses that whether Abdelkrim’s forces win or not, he was implementing a strong pressure on the French Protectorate: “The action of Abdelkerim at the tribes of High Ouerghs, reordering to our zone, develops with alternatives of success by following a pressure intensity exercised by his contingents.”¹¹¹

A year later, Abdelkerim once again attacked the French Protectorate from the north and got control of several cities there. The official bulletin on January 21st 1925 expresses that the south of the city of Djebala and Chefchaouen were conquered by the Riffans: “Abdelkrim seems to capture the south of the Djebala according to information we received. He reestablished his authority in Chefchaouen and made the locals pray for his name there.”¹¹²

When Abdelkrim’s forces came closer to the borders of the city of Fez, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs- *Quai d’Orsay*- criticized General Lyautey since

¹¹⁰ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, June 3rd 192 : Il est bien certain que le fait de posséder un avion parfait état de marche vient de donner a Abdelkrim un regard de popularité dans le Rif, lui ramène les fractions d’hostilité contre nous.

¹¹¹ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, January 19th 1925 : L’action d’Abdelkrim chez les tribus du Haut Ouerghs, réassortissant à notre zone, se développe avec des succès et d’insuccès suivant intensité de la pression que ses contingents exercent.

¹¹² The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, January 21st 1925 : Abd elkrim parait, d’après les renseignements, avoir repris le dessus de chez les Djebala. Il a rétabli son autorité à Chefchaouen et oblige les gens de faire la prière en son nom.

he was unable to stop the Riffans' attacks. *Quai d'Orsay* decided to put an end to General Lyautey's rule in Morocco when he also had admitted in his letter to *Quai d'Orsay* on January 29th 1925 that Abdelkrim had made a great progress: "The situation in the last days turns more in favor of Abdelkrim. Abdelkrim's lieutenants chased Raissouli of Djebel after some time in the country of Khmes on the North of Loukkos. They took possession of Tazraout, and burnt and destroyed the house of the sharif there."¹¹³

Upon this letter, *Quai d'Orsay* asked for the resignation of General Lyautey, who was replaced by the General Theodore Steeg in 1926, and who stayed in power until 1929. *Quai d'Orsay* sent Mareshal Petain with Theodore Steeg to Morocco, so that these two men would suppress the Riffans. Mareshal Petain defeated the Riffan forces who came to the Fez borders and abolished the Rif Republic. The motivations to guard Islam for the settlement of the Rif Republic and its achievements against the French and the Spanish Protectorates awakened a territorial consciousness of the Amazighs that finally led to Amazigh nationalism. In 1926, the French forces defeated the Riffans around Fez, abolished the Rif Republic, and exiled Abdelkrim. Meanwhile, the Rif Republic seriously damaged the prestige of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco, added to the fact that Spanish officers in Morocco had already been careless about Morocco since the beginning of their Protectorate in 1912. After this war, many Spanish settlers and officers left Morocco and the Spanish Protectorate lost all its meaning. The usage of chemical gas against the people of Melilla by the Spanish forces, on the other hand, led to the first deviation from General Lyautey's *la politique musulmane* in the French Protectorate since it happened within the information of the French officers in Morocco.

¹¹³ Letter from Lyautey to Quai d'Orsay, 29.1.1925

5.2.2. The 1930 and 1935 *Dahirs*

The second indicator that shows this deviation from *la politique musulmane* that symbolized the loss of successful integration the French Protectorate had with Moroccan Islam in 1912-1925 period was the 1930 Amazigh *dahir*. This *dahir* was promulgated by General Theodore Steeg who replaced General Hubert Lyuatey in 1926. Unlike the one passed in 1914 that aimed at providing the alienation of the Blad al Makhzen Amazighs and Arabs from the Blad al Siba Amazighs, the 1930 *dahir* directly aimed at the separating Blad al Makhzen Amazighs from Blad al Makhzen Arabs. According to this *dahir*, the freedom of the Amazighs in Blad al Makhzen to use sharia with the French codes would be abolished. This *dahir* pushed the Blad al Makhzen Amazighs to adopt French secular laws only, whereas it kept the same right for the Arabs. It also consisted of a “claw” of missionaries to launch the Pope Gregoire XV’s bubbles as the foundation of the Christianisation mission of Amazighy (Benlahcen 2012:111).

When the *dahir* was promulgated, the Blad al Makhzen Arabs and the the Blad al Siba Amazighs revolted against the French. The law that bound the Amazighs to the French laws was only a step to separate the Blad al Makhzen Amazighs from the Blad al Makhzen Arabs, who had been ethnically mixed since the Arab conquest in the 8th century. Moreover, an effort to create a Christian mission in Blad al Makhzen angered both Amazighs and Arabs. Having been already inspired by Amazigh nationalism during the Rif Republic, they regarded this *dahir* as a threat to Islam and the unity of Arabs and Amazighs in Blad al Makhzen. The 1930 *dahir* constituted the second step of the reformist nationalism in the Protectorate. The *dahir* of 16 May 1930, signed by the sultan of Morocco at the request of the French

Protectorate, exploited the anti-French feelings in all cities of the Protectorate. Moreover, the 1930 *dahir* that aimed at separating the Blad al Makhzen Amazighs from Blad al Makhzen Arabs served as a catalyst for the burgeoning Arab nationalism in the French and Spanish Protectorates together. A small network of young Arab nationalists started to come together in Fes, Rabat, Salé, Tetouan and Casablanca to discuss what they could do to abolish the Protectorate. These people were strongly inspired by Salafi reformism, Wilsonian principles of self-determination, military success of Ataturk in Turkey, Abdelkerim's Rif Republic, the rise of Pan Islamic movement, and stirrings of nationalism in the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent (Wrytzen 2011: 231).

The deviation from General Lyautey's *la politique musulmane* continued in the following years under the next General Residents. The Resident General Auguste Henri Ponsot who ruled the Protectorate between 1933 and 1936 promulgated a *dahir* on May 3rd 1935 that intended to settle the Muslims in the Jewish quarters called *mellahs* in Blad al Makhzen. In addition, the *dahir* also forced Muslim women to work as cleaning ladies in Jewish houses. This *dahir* raised once more the tensions between the Arabs and Amazighs both in Blad al Makhzen against the French. A group of Arabs and Amazighs in Blad al Makhzen declared a manifesto on May 9th 1935. As the official bulletin on May 10th 1934 expressed, this group declared the French rule in Morocco as assimilationist, illiberal, obscurantist and racist. This manifesto was also important since it referred to the term "Moroccans" used by the people who live in Morocco for the very first time. Moreover, it clearly showed that this group regarded the French Protectorate in negative sense, compared to positive views of both state and non state actors on General Lyautey between 1912 and 1925.

The politics of France, in a country where 200.000 French and seven million Moroccans live is characterized as follows. It is racial: People are divided into Europeans and Moroccans. It practices fiscal and budgetary favoritism: Islamic justice is not inscribed in the general budget. It is obscurantist: The French director of Muslim education in Morocco said that the politics in the European sense will be taught to students. It is illiberal: Moroccans, currently, do not even have a publication channel to express their own opinions. It is colonialist: The best, most fertile lands are being distributed to the Europeans. It is assimilative: It inspires direct administration and an organized struggle.¹¹⁴

The conflict that this *dahir* created in Blad al Makhzen was highlighted by Commander Brat to General Ponsot. In the letter of June 4th 1935, Commander Brat admits that the 1935 *dahir* was a problem in the Blad al Makhzen: in the letter he said: “Dear Commander, the question to habitation of Muslims with the Jews in the same quarter, or the employment of Muslim women in Jewish houses was occupied Makhzen for a long time until now.”¹¹⁵

The 1935 *dahir* guarded its efficiency in the Blad al Makhzen for the next six years. The annoyance that was created by this *dahir* was once more touched upon in the letter of the vizir al Moqri to the Resident General Charles Hyppolite Nogués on October 20th 1941. In the letter, al Moqri asks General Nogués to reconsider the validity of this *dahir* by looking at its implementation. He wrote: “The sultan wants to keep his religious principles and his sacred traditions. The Muslims were settled in the same houses with the Jewish whereas their beliefs and values are totally different.

¹¹⁴ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, May 10th 1934: La politique de France, dans un pays qui compte, à cette époque 200.000 Français et 7 million de Marocains, y est ainsi caractérisé: Elle est raciale: On est traité selon qu'un Européen, ou Marocain. Elle pratique le favoritisme fiscal et budgétaire: le contribuable marocain est surimposé. Il est même beaucoup imposé que l'Européen. La Justice islamique n'est même pas inscrite au Budget Générale. Elle est obscurantiste: le directeur français de l'enseignement musulman au Maroc a dit: l'école se contente d'accroître la valeur normale de la capacité professionnelle du Marocain. la politique au sens européen et actuel de mot ne peut convenir à l'œuvre du progrès qui s'accomplit ici. Elle est antilibérale: les Marocains, à l'heure actuelle, n'ont pas une seule publication pour exprimer leurs opinions, même dans le cadre rigide des lois en vigueur. Elle est colonisatrice: en ce sens qu'elle se préoccupé de rafler les meilleures terres des Marocains pour les distribuer a des colons parfois improvisés. Elle est assimilatrice: elle s'inspire de l'administration directe et se traduit par une lutte organisée.

¹¹⁵ Letter from Commander Brat to General Ponsot, June 4th 1935 : Cher Commandant, Les questions d'habitation des Musulmanes et les juifs dans un même quartier, ou d'emploi des femmes musulmanes chez des Israelites préoccupent le Makhzen d'une manière qu'a toujours jusqu'à présent.

The sultan started to conduct a survey on the possibility of such implementation. Please proceed with this survey.”¹¹⁶

The deviation from protecting Islam in the French Protectorate with the 1930 and 1935 *dahirs* caused hostility for the French rule in Blad al Makhzen. This hostility, however, did not stem solely from these *dahirs*. The international status of Islam in that period was also influential for people living in Morocco. The official bulletin on November 9th 1943 expressed that the Moroccans were influenced by European attacks in the Middle East:

Taking into account the hostilities in the Mediterranean Basin, the Moroccans are sad and worried. On the one hand, they are suffering because they see that Muslim solidarity is endangered by British attacks on Syria, and the bombing of Alexandria. These hostilities against the European powers exemplified some attacks on the French forces in the Moroccan territories with a pro-Muslim attitude.¹¹⁷

In addition, the decision to set up an Arab Union that would oppose the European attacks made the French rule as the main target for the Moroccans. As the official bulletin on November 28th 1943 expressed, France was declared the enemy of Islam: “Nationalists in Rabat criticized the position of the French government that opposed the formation of such a union. They added that France was the first enemy of Islam.”¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, October 20th 1941: S.M veut garder ses principes religieux et leurs traditions sacrés. Les juifs ont commencé à loger avec des musulmans dans la même maison, alors que leurs croyances et leur values sont totalement différents. S.M Cherifien a commencé à organiser une enquête sur la possibilité de cette implication. Procédez-vous s’il vous plait cet enquête.

¹¹⁷ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, November 9th 1943: A mesure que les hostilités se propagent autour de bassin méditerranéen orientale, les Marocains éprouvent une tristesse et inquiétude croissante. D’une part, une contestation impose à eux, dont ils souffrent dans un sentiment de solidarité musulmane par les bombes à Alexandrie. De cette hostilité croissantes contre les puissances européens, dont les notes s’accordent si peu avec les sentiment pro musulmans, la France a poursuivi la lutte à son territoire au Maroc.

¹¹⁸ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, November 28th 1943: Le congrès panarabe de Caire suscite un vif intérêt dans les milieux nationalistes de Rabat ou est dit que le projet tendant à la création après la guerre de el Ouhadia al Arabia (Union Arabe) saurait été adapte par les délégués de

The deviation from *la politique musulmane* was also reflected by some French intellectuals. As Felix Ferdinand Taillard argues in *Moroccan Nationalism*:

The French girls bicycling in short skirts menaced the entire future of the Protectorate. This lack of respect for Islam could be seen even in the officials: the Controleur Civil Pussié used to send his clerk to preach in the mosque, while in 1934 the Government permitted Catholics to hold a Eucharistic Congress in Fez (1947:163).

5.3. Separatist Moroccan Nationalism: Rise of Political Parties

The Rif Republic and the deviation from General Lyautey's *la politique musulmane* with the 1930 and 1935 dahirs resulted in the support of the Muslim society against the French Protectorate that was the ultimate sovereign in Blad al Makhzen. These movements emerged with the loss of respect shown to Islam by the Resident Generals in the post-Lyautey administration. They added the Blad al Makhzen Arabs to the struggle of the Blad al Makhzen Amazighs against the French Protectorate.

After the 1935 dahir especially, Arabs and Amazighs living in Morocco started to form nationalist alliances in the cities of Blad al Makhzen that later paved the way for the formation of political parties that aimed at Moroccan independence. The political parties' formation started the separatist Moroccan nationalism in both Blad al Makhzen and Blad al Siba, that was influenced not only from domestic events but also international ones. In addition, the Wilsonian self-determination

Caire. Il est également précise que le 'union Arabe grouperait Egypte-Iraq-Syrie-Liban-Afghanistan-Iran-Musulmans de la Russie- Afrique du Nord. On indique que les délégués d'Algérie et la Tunisie partiraient prochainement pour le Caire. Le Maroc était déjà représenté sur place par Hadj Mohamed Ben el Yamani Naari. Les nationalistes de Rabat critiquent la position de gouvernement français contre ce projet. Ils ajoutent que la France se place au premier rang des ennemis de l'Islam.

principle, the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the British conquest of the Middle East, the defeat of France to Germany in 1940 and the American soldiers' landing to Morocco in 1942 vitalized the separatist nationalism that intended to set up the independent Morocco. The debarkation of the American troops in 1942 rendered more sensitive the weakness of France. As a result of all these events, the reformist character of Moroccan nationalism transformed into a separatist one by the foundation of political parties in 1943. These parties started to work for Moroccan independence from both the French and the Spanish Protectorates. Such a separatist nationalism in Morocco was guided by the Communist Party, the Istiqlal Party and the Democratic Party for Independence between 1943 and 1956. They were established to pursue the aim of Moroccan independence.

5.3.1. The Communist Party

The Communist Party was the first political party that was founded in 1943 for Moroccan independence. The First Congress of the Party was in the same year, where the Communist delegations decided to fight for Moroccan independence. The party issued the Manifesto for the Unification and Independence of Morocco, that called all the Moroccan communists to take part in the armed struggle against the French for independence. As the official bulletin on January 7th 1944 states, the manifesto urgently demanded that Moroccans work for a social state in Morocco:

There has been a new factor that we need to consider since November 1942. The aim of this party is to liberate Morocco from indigenous feudalism. The Communists reclaim the abolition of all racial discrimination and ask

Moroccans to introduce an obligatory, civil state, liberty of expression, and trade unions. Since February 1944, there are many adherents to the party among mediators and among some of the railway workers. Casablanca and Rabat are the two cities the most affected.¹¹⁹

The Communist Party in Morocco had an interesting characteristic. Unlike the ideological communism that does not accept religion, the Moroccan Communist Party did not exclude Islam. One of the members of the Istiqlal Party, Abdelhak Hamyani, expressed the unity of communism and religion in a speech he made in the First Congress of Istiqlal Party in 1946: “The Communists help us. We must adhere to a Communist party. Very soon, I will unite all Muslims and I will explain to them that communism in fact is not the enemy of Islam.”¹²⁰

With public support, the Communist Party began to grow in strength and started to make official declarations against French rule by 1947. Accordingly, the Communist Party openly criticized the French rule in Morocco. In addition, the party went to alliance with the Istiqlal Party since it did not exclude Muslims. The official bulletin on February 3rd 1947 expressed that the party was allying with all segments and parties in Morocco and that the unity of Islam and Communism was welcomed, against colonialism:

Faithful to its glorious past of wartime record, the Communist Party declares today that it is siding with all Moroccans who fight for liberty and independence of Morocco. Deciding to fight with all the political parties wish to obtain the liberty in good faith, independence and sovereignty of Morocco, the Communist Party stays faithful to the democratic traditions of the

¹¹⁹ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, January 7th 1944: Il s’agit là d’un nouveau facteur avec lequel depuis Novembre 1942, il faut de plus en plus compter. Le but du parti est de libérer le Maroc de la féodalité indigène. Les Communistes réclament à l’abolition de toute discrimination raciale et demandent pour les Marocains l’instruction obligatoire, état civil, liberté d’expression de Réunion, de syndicat. Depuis Février 1944, les adhésions sont multiples dans la classe pauvre des médinas et des petits fonctionnaires de chemin de fer. Casablanca et Rabat sont les villes les plus contaminées.

¹²⁰ Les Communistes nous aident. Il faut adhérer un parti communiste. Bientôt je réunirai les musulmans et je leur expliquerai que le communisme n’est pas l’ennemi d’Islam.

Moroccan people and the movement of Ali Yata, our leader, who never stopped fighting the colonizers. Long live the friendship of the Istiqlal Party with the Communist Party.¹²¹

The Communist Party, which was looking forward to increasing its efficiency, decided to ally with other parties too besides the Istiqlal Party. As seen in the French official bulletin on June 10th 1949, the Communist Party asked for an alliance with the Istiqlal and Democratic Party for Independence. Here was an example of the Communist Party was looking for setting alliances with other parties for the Moroccan independence:

The Moroccan Communist Party sent a letter to the Istiqlal Party and the Democratic Party for Independence that contains such points; signature of a common proclamation that protests the declarations of Coste Floret on the way to integrating Morocco in the French Union, the envoy of a delegation to Paris to talk to the French President, the envoy of a common delegation to the sultan so that he denotes officially and publicly the declarations of the Minister, preparation of a national protest day that contains the declarations, meetings, strikes etc...¹²²

At the end, the French government banned the Communist Party due to its provocative messages and critiques of the French Protectorate. The letter sent to the Communist Party head Ali Yata from the Resident General on June 23rd 1951 states that the Moroccan sultan Mohammed V banned the Communist Party: “His High Majesty has condemned communism. It is no longer possible to tolerate this party’s

¹²¹ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, February 3rd 1947 : Fidèle à ce glorieux passe de lutte, le parti Communiste Marocain(P.C.M) proclame hautement aujourd’hui qu’il est aux cotes de tous les Marocains qui combattent pour la liberté et l’Indépendance du Maroc. Résolu à lutter avec tous les parties de bonne volonté pour obtenir l’indépendance, la souveraineté et la liberté du Maroc, le P.C.M reste fidèle aux traditions Marocains démocratique du peuple et au mouvement de Ali Yata qui n’a jamais cessé de lutter contre les colonisateurs. Vive l’amitié du parti d’Istiqlal avec le parti Communiste.

¹²² The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, June 10th 1949: Le Parti Communiste Marocain a envoyé le parti Istiqlal et au Partie de Démocratie de l’Indépendance une lettre contenant les points suivants: Signature d’une proclamation commune protestant contre les déclarations de M.Coste Floret, relatives à l’intégration de Maroc a Union Française, envoi d’une délégation commune a Paris pour une Réunion avec le Président, envoie d’une délégation commune au sultan a dénoncer officiellement et publiquement les déclarations de Coste Floret, Préparation d’une journée nationale de protestation, comprenant des manifestations, des réunions, publiques, des grevés etc...

declarations. It is formally forbidden to putake activities or propaganda in favor of this Communist Party.”¹²³

Despite the ban, the Communist Party did not stop its activities, and it was even supported by the Moroccan sultan Mohammed 5th. When the French learnt that Mohamed V had supported the Communist Party, they sent him into exile. When he came back from exile on December 5th 1955, the Party leaders made their most serious declaration as expressed the official bulletin on December 5th 1955. By declaring the French Protectorte in Morocco as a “corpse”, the Party calls for a democratic election in an independent Morocco:

The Communist Party is happy to see the return of the sultan to Morocco. The Communist Party supports the idea of a national government that leads the country towards national independence. The Communist Party thinks that the Protectorate has become a corpse. The Communist Party thinks that a democratic election must be made as soon as the country gets its independence and that the government must rule with its people and for its people.¹²⁴

5.3.2. The Istiqlal Party

The Maniesto of the Communist Party for the Unification and Independence of Morocco was followed by the Independence Manifesto that declared the foundation of the Istiqlal Party on January 11th 1944. The scope of the Istiqlal Party’s

¹²³ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, June 23rd 1951: S.M le sultan ayant condamné le communisme, il n’est plus possible de tolérer dans l’empire chérifien des manifestations de ce parti. Il est formellement interdit de se livrer à quelque manifestation, activité ou propagande en faveur de ce parti communiste.

¹²⁴ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, December 5th 1955: Une délégation de Partie Communiste Marocaine a été reçue le 5.12.1955 par le Sultan Moulay Youssef. Le Partie a fait telle déclaration: Le parti Communiste est ravi de voir le retour de Sultan au Maroc et il supporte l’Independence du pays. Le parti Communiste Marocain supporte l’idée d’un gouvernement nationale qui dirige le pays dans une Independance nationale. Le parti communiste marocain pense que le protectorat français est devenu un caduc. Le parti communiste marocain pense que le Maroc doit être gouverné par une démocratie ou le gouvernement est élu par le peuple pour le peuple.

Independence Manifesto was the same as the Communist Party's: the unity of Morocco. In addition, this manifesto also used the words "Moroccans" as the Communist Party manifesto did. It also highlighted how the French Protectorate tried to damage the Moroccan community by implementing a direct rule, unlike Lyautey era:

Considering that the authorities of the Protectorate substituted the regime of direct rule for the profits of the French, considering that it is only through this rule that the French could exploit from Morocco the fullest, considering that the regime thus established, tried to break the unity of the Moroccan people in various ways, considering that the world is developing in the way that this Protectorate regime does not want to see, considering that the allied forces accepted the self-determination principle, considering that the allied forces exhibited different views sympathetic to Islam and that they accorded independence to some of the nation whose civilization degree is lesser than ours, and considering that our nations would like to take its place in international politics by regarding the democratic liberties related to our religion, the Istiqlal Party has decided to demand the independence of Morocco within its territorial unity and solicits the Sultan to interact with the nations who are interested in guaranteeing our independence, demand the adhesion of Morocco to the Atlantic Charter and its participation in the Peace Conference.¹²⁵

¹²⁵ Considérant qu'à ce régime, les autorités du Protectorat ont substitué un régime d'administration directe et d'arbitre au profit de la colonie française, dont un fonctionnariat pléthorique et en grande partie superflu, et qu'elles n'ont pas tenté de concilier les divers intérêts en présence, Considérant que c'est grâce à ce système que la colonie française a pu accaparer tous les pouvoirs et se rendre maîtresse des ressources vives du pays au détriment des autochtones, Considérant que le régime ainsi établi a tenté de briser, par les moyens divers, l'unité du peuple marocain, a empêché les Marocains de participer de façon effective au gouvernement de leur pays et les a privés de toutes les libertés publiques individuelles, Considérant que le monde traverse actuellement des circonstances autres que celles dans lesquelles le protectorat a été institué ; Considérant que les alliés qui versent leur sang pour la cause de la liberté, ont reconnu dans la Charte de l'Atlantique le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes et qu'ils ont récemment, à la Conférence de Téhéran, proclamé leur réprobation de la doctrine qui prétend que le fort doit dominer le faible ; Considérant que les Alliés ont manifesté à différentes reprises leur sympathie à l'égard des peuples musulmans et qu'ils ont accordé l'indépendance à des peuples dont le patrimoine historique est moins riche que le nôtre, et dont le degré de civilisation est d'un niveau inférieur à celui du Maroc, Considérant enfin que le Maroc constitue une unité homogène, qui, sous la Haute direction de son Souverain, prend conscience de ses droits et de ses devoirs, tant dans le domaine interne que dans le domaine international et sait apprécier les bienfaits des libertés démocratiques qui sont conformes aux principes de notre religion, et qui ont servi de fondement à la Constitution de tous les pays musulmans; Décide De demander l'indépendance du Maroc dans son intégrité territoriale sous l'égide de Sa Majesté Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef, que Dieu le glorifie, De solliciter de Sa Majesté d'entreprendre avec les nations intéressées des négociations ayant pour objet la reconnaissance et la garantie de cette indépendance, ainsi que la détermination dans le cadre de la souveraineté nationale des intérêts légitimes des étrangers au Maroc. De demander l'adhésion du Maroc à la Charte de l'Atlantique et sa participation à la Conférence de la paix, available at, http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manifeste_de_l'indépendance

Like the Communist Party Manifesto, the Istiqlal Party Independence Manifesto was not considered serious by the French Protectorate. As a result, one of the founders of the Istiqlal Party Allal al Fassi wrote a letter on January 1st 1947 to the French Ambassador and reminded him of the importance of the manifesto and Moroccan independence. He very openly stated that a Moroccan independence was necessary:

The Istiqlal Party, faithful to Moroccan aspirations, affirmed in a manifesto dated January 11st 1944 the impossibility of the evolution of the country in the context of the Protectorate. However, we see today that the French Republic wanted to adapt a political system in Morocco on behalf of the Istiqlal Party that is not suitable to the dignity and the blood of the Moroccan community. It is only the establishment of Moroccan independence that guarantees the integrity of its territory.¹²⁶

The Istiqlal Party leader al Fassi had the impression that France did not want the independence of Morocco. This was stated by himself in an article written for the Istiqlal Party weekly on March 4th 1947:

France is not willing to grant Moroccan independence outside of the French Union. It wills, however, to restrict the Protectorate treaty and to accord an internal autonomy in Morocco, among the members of the French Union. France estimates that the members of French settlers in Morocco would be considered as Moroccan citizens. The French language must conserve its place besides the Arab language in administration, commerce and education.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Letter from Al Fassi to the French Ambassador, January 1st 1947 : Le Parti Istiqlal, fidèle interprète des aspirations marocaines, affirma dans un manifeste de 11 Janvier 1944, l'impossibilité d'assurer l'évolution du pays dans le cadre de protectorat. Mais aujourd'hui, que la France vient de donner à la 4eme république, le peuple marocain, par la voix de Istiqlal, non seulement dénonce le abus d'un régime de tutelle incompatible avec sa dignité, mais encore réclame à son droit à la liberté par laquelle il a généreusement verse son sang sur les champs de batailles. Seule, le rétablissement de l'Indépendance du Maroc garantie son intégrité de son territoire.

¹²⁷ Istiqlal Party bulletin, March 4th 1947 : La France n'était pas disposée à accorder l'Indépendance au Maroc en dehors de l'Union française. Elle était disposée, en outre, à abolir le traité du protectorat et à accorder au Maroc une autonomie interne dans le cadre de L'Union Française. La France était disposée à considérer le Maroc comme étant un premier pays parmi les adhérents à l'Union Française. La France estime que les membres de la colonie française au Maroc soient considérés comme étant des citoyens marocains. La langue française devait conserver sa place aux cotés de la langue arabe dans l'administration, le commerce et l'enseignement.

Having faced French who did not want to accept the Moroccan independence, Allal al Fassi tried to draw the attention of the Moroccan sultan Mohamed V to the fiscal policies of the French that were imposed on Morocco. As he expressed in the party journal on January 22nd 1947, the French were working on certain projects that would make the Moroccan people suffer, besides its being con-Moroccan independence:

On January 28th 1947, the representatives of the French administration in Morocco held a meeting to discuss the budget that struck the national sentiments of the country and that is unequally calculated by the French officers. In this context, Eirik Labonné is preparing a new fiscal plan that the Moroccan people can never accept since it will be against the Moroccan people's natural rights to independence. The Istiqlal Party neglected, in all occasions, to affirm its position with regard to this residential program, and warns that the Moroccan people are being put in danger. Respectfully, we would like to attract the attention of the sultan to the inequalities and illegalities of these policies.¹²⁸

The following three months showed that the Sultan Mohamed V was touched by al Fassi's article. He gave a speech on April 10th 1947 in Tangier where he underlined that Moroccans want their full rights. This speech showed how Morocco was attached to the "oriental world" in which Arab states are located. The speech of Mohamed V was the first time where the emphasis of the Maghreb region's independence was taken into account at the same time with Moroccan independence. In this sense, this speech gave rise to the Maghrebness component of Moroccan national identity:

¹²⁸ Istiqlal Party bulletin, January 22nd 1947 : A la date du 28 Janvier 1947, les représentants de la colonne française du Maroc se sont réunis pour discuter le budget par les prestations frappant le patrimoine national, et repartir les dépenses, dans une portion inéquitable, entre les différents intérêts en présence. Dans ce contexte, Eirik Labonne maintenant, intacte, un plan de réformes que le peuple Marocain n'a et n'aura jamais accepté comme incompatible avec son droit naturelle a l'Indépendance réclamé. Le Parti Istiqlal n'a pas manqué, a toute occasion, d'affirmer sa position a l'égard de programme résidentiel et de mettre en garde les Marocains contre danger qu'il y a adhérer ou à participer a sa réalisation. Respectueusement, on attire la haute attention de sa majesté le sultan sur l'illégalité de cette politique résidentielle.

The ones who believe and are afraid of God have happy news of dignity in this world and in the next one. We are thankful to God and his concern for the integrity of the country. We work to guarantee its brilliant and glorious future, and we are going to realize this hope that will touch the hearts of each and every Moroccan. Moroccans want their full rights. Needless to say, Morocco, as a state attached to the states of the Orient with solid links, desires naturally that its links become stronger as the Arab League becomes an important organism that plays a great role in world politics. The legitimate rights of the Moroccan people cannot be lost and will never be lost. The Arab states make a total nation, whether in Tangier or in Damascus. I appreciate greatly the services rendered by the American Republic to the Arab states.¹²⁹

The attachment of Morocco to the Arab world in the orient was also highlighted by Istiqlal Party member Abdelkarim Khattani in his speech on January 5th 1948. Khattani evaluated Moroccan nationalism within the context of a Maghreb Union, that could be evaluated as a consolidation of the Moroccan independence leaders' attempt to attain independence for other Maghreb countries as well besides Morocco's. This speech also shows how Maghrebness component of Moroccan national identity was developed against France, who was called colonizers by the party members:

Since we were liberated by the great prestige of King Farouk, we did not hesitate to unite all supporters of political parties in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria to fight colonialism. Now it is time for us to strengthen our solidarity where we feel the necessity to fight against colonialism. We are pleased to declare that everyone we contacted so far, whether they were chiefs of Maghrebian parties or delegations from Cairo, approved our suggestion and declared themselves convinced by the cause to conduct a common war for independence.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Istiqlal Party bulletin, April 10th 1947: Ceux qui croient et craignent Allah ont l'heureuse nouvelle de la félicité en ce monde et dans la vie future. Nous veillons par la grâce divine et par effet de sa bonté, à l'intégrité du pays, nous travaillons à la garantie de son brillant et glorieux avenir, et nous allons à la réalisation de cet espoir qui fera le cœur de chaque marocain. Le Maroc désire ardemment ses droits entiers. Il va sans dire que le Maroc, étant un pays attache par des liens solides aux pays arabes de l'Orient, désire naturellement que ces liens se raffermissent de plus en plus, surtout depuis que la Ligue Arabe est devenue un organisme important qui joue un grand rôle dans la politique mondiale. Les droits légitimes du peuple marocain ne peuvent se perdre et ne se perdront jamais. Les pays arabes ne forment qu'une seule nation: que ce soit à Tanger ou à Damas, cela ne fait qu'une, j'éprouve beaucoup d'estime et de respect pour les services rendus par la république américaine aux pays arabes et notamment pour sa participation à la délivrance de son oppression.

¹³⁰ Istiqlal Party bulletin, January 5th 1948 : Depuis que nous nous sommes libérés et installés dans la grande cour de prestigieux Farouk, nous n'avons cessé de tenter d'unir tous les dirigeants des partis politiques en Tunisie, d'Algérie et de Maroc pour qu'ils luttent contre le colonialisme. Il nous appartient alors de renforcer notre solidarité dont nous ressentons la nécessité pour vaincre le

Maghrebness within the context of Moroccan nationalism also found support at the level of the Moroccan Sultan. Mohammed V in his speech on April 22nd 1948 said that the independence movements of the Arab Maghreb states must have gone on together with the Moroccan one:

The Arab Maghreb exists by Islam, lives in Islam and will live for Islam. The Arab Maghreb is a part of the Arab world and cooperates with the Arab League. Independence of the Arab Maghreb is a total independence for all the states of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco: No objective would be realized until independence is achieved. We refuse to negotiate with the colonizers. The negotiations will take place after independence.¹³¹

Calls for national independence of the Arab Maghreb states by Istiqlal Party and Sultan Mohamed V were also expressed in the official bulletin on November 24th 1951. The bulletin spoke of a Coordination Committee that was founded between the nationalist parties of the Arab Maghreb states and the Istiqlal Party. This seeking of a political alliance with the parties of the Maghreb countries was nother symptom of the Maghrebness component in the Moroccan national identity at that time.

The parties of Istiqlal, Neo Destour, and P.P.A created in March 1951 a Coordination Committee. Following the 1952 cases in Tunisia, these three parties seem to have new contact with other nationalist parties in the World. The responsible people from Morocco are Ahmed el Alaoui, Ben Salen el Kahen, Naciri Mekki, Abdelhaleq Torres, and Hassan Ouazzani.¹³²

colonialisme qui est abattu sur nous comme calamité. On est heureux de déclarer que tous ceux que nous avons contactés à ce sujet, qu'ils soient des chefs de partis maghrébins ou délégués au Caire, ont approuvé notre suggestion et se sont déclarés convaincus de sa nécessité pour mener une lutte commune en vue de réaliser l'Indépendance souhaitée.

¹³¹ Istiqlal Party bulletin, April 22nd 1948: Le Maghreb arabe a excité par l'islam, vécu pour l'islam, et vivra sa vie selon l'islam. Le Maghreb arabe fait partie du monde arabe et sa coopération dans la ligue arabe. L'Indépendance de Maghreb arabe est une indépendance totale pour les trois pays: Tunisie, Algérie, Maroc. Aucun objectif ne sera réalisé avant l'Indépendance. Refus de négocier avec les colonialistes est essentielle. Les négociations seront lieu après l'Indépendance.

¹³² The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, November 24th 1951 : Les parties d'Istiqlal, Néo Déstour, P.P.A créèrent au mois de Mars 1951 la Comité de Coordination en Afrique du Nord. A la suite des incidents à Tunisie en 1952, ces trois ont décidé d'élargir leur coopération avec des autres

5.3.3. The Democratic Party for Independence

The separatist nationalism was also represented by the Democratic Party of Independence founded in 1947. The Democratic Party for Independence (P.D.I) directly adopted the nationalist principles of total independence, the end of French rule in Morocco, and a sovereign state in Morocco. The party leader Mohamed Hassan Omezani refers to how the P.D.I attributes these notions in his letter to the French General Vincent Auroli on January 6th 1947. Omezani in this letter stated that Morocco was aiming at having good relation with France after independence:

I have the honor, by sending you my best wishes from Fez, of revealing to you the position of Democratic Party for Independence on the so-called Moroccan problem that since January 1944 that is in favor of national independence. By reasserting the independence of Morocco, our party does not wish for hostility with France. On the contrary, a free and independent Morocco will have the best relations with France. We believe that, from now on, important treaties will be signed between our countries. Moroccan nationalists do not fight for their country with a bourgeois mentality, but with the spirit and resolution of men loyal to their people, conscious of its moral and maternal prosperity for a national sacred cause.¹³³

Seven months later, the party was launched with an immediate action plan that was referred to in the French official bulletin on August 12th 1947. Accordingly, the

nationalistes. Les responsables marocains sont Ahmed el Alaoui, Ben Salen el Kahen, Naciri Mekki, Abdelhaleq Torres, Hassan Ouazzani.

¹³³ Letter from Omezani to Auroli, January 6th 1947 : J'ai l'honneur en vous souhaitant la bienvenue de Fez, de vous exposer très succinctement la position du Parti démocratie de l'Indépendance à l'égard du problème marocain depuis le grand mouvement de Janvier 1944 en faveur de l'Indépendance nationale en revendiquant l'Indépendance du Maroc, notre Parti s'entend pas épouser celui-ci à un divorce avec la France. Bien au contraire, le Maroc libre et Indépendent tiendra certainement à avoir les meilleurs relations possible avec la France. Nous admettons, dès maintenant, le Principe de conclure librement avec votre pays une traite ayant pour objet de garantir notre Indépendance. Les nationalistes marocains ne luttent pas pour la cause de leur pays avec la mentalité et les arrières pensées de bourgeois, mais avec l'esprit et la résolution d'hommes loyaux envers leur peuple, soucieux de la prospérité morale et maternelle dévoué à une cause nationale sacrée.

party was clearly stating that there were no respect of the French for Moroccan customs and the problems of the Moroccans:

The immediate action plan of the Democratic Party for Independence to solve the Moroccan problem: It is an undeniable fact that the current relations between France and Morocco are not in the context of cordiality and comprehension. It is also an undeniable fact that these relations are becoming more and more threatened. The view of the Moroccan people, there is disillusion with the French and French administration because they live in this country without respecting the Moroccan way of life, and they remain indifferent to the sufferings of the Moroccans. In other words, the tension between the Makzhen and the Residence is getting bigger and bigger every day.¹³⁴

The party's ambition for Moroccan independence was also reflected in the party member Abdelhaq Torres' article called *The Moroccan* on April 14th 1948. According to Torres, the Moroccan must govern Morocco by himself, without any imposition. Torres' article was a clear document that showed that the French administration of Morocco in the post-Lyautey era had changed in a negative way and thus it had triggered Moroccanism and Moroccanness:

The Moroccan people must govern themselves. The Moroccan must have religious freedom and freedom of expression. He must choose how to act in the internal and external activities of the Moroccan state. The Moroccan must have the right to be educated. The Moroccan must have all the means to live. The Moroccan must have all the rights to a social life. The Moroccan must have fair salary if he is a worker and must have all facilities and encouragements if he is an artist. The Moroccan must have all the doors open for a free schooling where all their children could have a good education. The

¹³⁴ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, August 12th 1947: Il est un fait indéniable que les relations franco marocaines ne sont pas, à l'heure actuelle, empreintes de cordialités, et de compréhension. Il est un fait aussi que ces relations tendues ne font qu'empirer de jour en jour et qu'elles ménagent même de provoquer une coupure de plus en plus profonde, sinon définitive, entre Marocains et Français. Du côté de peuple marocain, il y a méfiance et désillusion à l'égard des Français et de l'administration française à l'égard des premiers parce qu'ils vivent dans ce pays en marge de la vie marocaine, incompréhensifs et insensibles aux souffrances des Marocains. Autre part la tension entre le Makhzen et la Résidence accentue le jour au jour.

Moroccan must have enough research centers, hospitals, factories, and other institutions for his personal development.¹³⁵

The party also referred to Islam in the context of independence as expressed the official bulletin on March 14th 1950. This shows how the party was bothered of the direct control of the French Protectorate in Morocco in contrast to the Lyautey administration's indirect rule. Moreover, the disrespect shown to Islam by the French was also emphasized:

The French authorities exercise often direct administration and control on Morocco. Moroccan people are conscious of their rights and duties. Martial law is being upheld, and there are restrictions on our liberties. Education is not harmonious with the Arabic language, and to Islamic culture.¹³⁶

5.4. The Unsuccessful Integration of the French with Moroccaness

Moroccaness that was added into Moroccan national identity with Moroccanism by 1925 where we see a clear deviation from *la politique musulmane* of General Lyautey developed within the frames of reformist and separatist nationalism. Being closely watched by the French Protectorate, Moroccanism gained power especially

¹³⁵ Istiqlal Party bulletin, April 14th 1948: Le peuple marocain doit gouverner lui-même. Le marocain doit être libre dans l'exercice de sa religion et liberté d'expression. Il doit choisir librement à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur du pays, pour assurer sa subsistance au triple point de vue agricole, industriel et commercial. Le Marocain doit être pourvu d'un minimum vital pour vivre, qu'il soit homme ou femme, valide ou important. Le Marocain doit avoir toutes les possibilités dans les limites des droits sociaux. Le Marocain doit avoir un salaire proportionnel a son rendement s'il est ouvrier et toutes facilités et encouragements s'il est artisan. Le Marocain doit avoir toutes les portes ouvertes pour une éducation gratuite et obligatoire. Le Marocain doit avoir, pour lui et ses besoins personnels, suffisamment décollés, d'institutions de recherches, des services, d'hôpitaux, d'usines, d'asiles, et autre institutions.

¹³⁶ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, March 14th 1950: Les autorités françaises exercent à la fois administration directe et le contrôle. Le peuple marocain a mieux pris conscience de ses devoirs et de ses droits. L'état de siège est maintenu et il y a les restrictions des libertés. L'instruction ne conserve pas à la langue arabe et a la culture islamique dans le rang qui leur revient.

after the conquest of France by Germany in 1940 that showed the Moroccans how weak actually France was.

The policies with regards to Islam, like the 1930 and 1935 dahirs, that were implemented by post Lyautey Resident Generals in the French Protectorate were the scintillas of the Moroccan nationalist rise. In accordance with the reactions shown to this deviation from la politique musulmane, when the Moroccans started to resist and criticize the French Protectorate within a framework of Moroccan independence desire, the French Resident Generals restricted their administration that turned the indirect rule in Morocco into a direct rule. Accordingly, any attempt of the people or institution in Morocco about Moroccan independence started to be regarded as a threat to the French Protectorate. This attitude represented an unsuccessful integration of the French Protectorate with Moroccaness, that was being formed in terms of Moroccanism. The French, then, went to the way of softening, or, breaking the rise of this Moroccanism by facilitating naturalization conditions for the Moroccan people to become French. As the new law that passed on February 5th 1939 argued:

They could be naturalized, without any condition of residence permit, by the Ministry of Justice and with the confirmation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moroccans who were naturalized on August 1st 1914 through a registration at the Embassy of France are like French protégés, and their children who were born on August 1st 1914 or still younger than this date.¹³⁷

After this law, Moroccans naturalized with groups. The letters written to the Residence General talk about these groups of Moroccans who wanted to be

¹³⁷ Peuvent être naturalisés, sans condition de résidence par le décret rendu sur la proposition du Ministère de la Justice et sur avis conforme du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, ces étrangers qui, au 1^{er} Aout 1914, étaient inscrits sur le régime d'un consulat de France, comme protégé français, et ceux de leurs enfants qui sont nés depuis le 1^{er} Aout 1914 ou qui étaient mineurs à propos de cette date.

naturalized. An example of such a letter written by an anonymous French staff member on March 9th 1941 said:

Dear General, I am honored to inform you about the naturalization wishes of these people on the list. Please do what is necessary for them: Mohammed ben Larbi, Larbi Oould Machlouf, Bouazza ben el Ghazi, Mohammed ben el Fatmi, Mokaddem Tahami al Alia, Bouazza ben en Mejdab, Lahsen ben Ahmed, Bouchab ben el Guellab, Chebeb ben Ahmed, El Mekki ben Ahmed. Cordially.¹³⁸

The French view of Moroccan nationalism as a danger to the French protectorate started when the naturalization demands of Moroccan people ended. The official bulletin on August 28th 1942 expressed that there was an anti-French attitude in the city of Fez where Lyautey was once highly admired:

When General Juin came to Fez, the population was quite hostile. The increase in the costs of living made them angry. These increases that coincided with the Af Seghir Feast and were very badly received and triggered nationalist feelings. General Juin was accused of provoking the Moroccan population. These price increases will definitely be used in the anti-French propaganda in Morocco.¹³⁹

French administration in Morocco increased its pressure on the nationalists when the political parties started to be founded in 1943. The early foundation of the Istiqlal Party gave rise to the assemblies of individual nationalists in Morocco. When the party was officially founded by the Independence Manifesto on January 11th 1944,

¹³⁸ Monsieur le General, Je suis honoré de vous exprimer le voeu des Marocains a naturaliser. Leurs noms sont Mohammed ben Larbi, Larbi Oould Machlouf, Bouazza ben el Ghazi, Mohammed ben el Fatmi, Mokaddem Tahami al Alia, Bouazza ben en Mejdab, Lahsen ben Ahmed, Bouchab ben el Guellab, Chebeb ben Ahmed, El Mekki ben Ahmed. Cordialement,

¹³⁹The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, August 28th 1942 : Au moment de l'arrivée de Général Juin, la masse de population de Fès était hostile à toute manifestation susceptible d'entraîner des troubles. Il n'en est plus de même aujourd'hui à la suite de la récente augmentation du prix de la vie (transports, tabac, farins, charbon etc...). Ces augmentations coïncidant avec les fêtes de Af Seghir ont été très fâcheusement commentées en médina et les nationalistes ont su exploiter le mécontentement ainsi créé. Le General Juin est accusé d'affamer la population marocaine.

the French appointed secret services to follow several of these figures whom they were blacklisted as dangerous nationalists. The official bulletin on June 22nd 1944 expressed how one of these figures Abdesselam Doukkali was important for the French:

A nationalist meeting was held on 15 Juin 1944 between 10h-12h.30 in the house of Abdelkader ben Abdesselam Doukkali known as el Hennai. The nationalists from Fez, Meknes, Rabat and Salé, who were not be able to be identified also participated to this meeting. A summary of 40.000 francs was collected in the meeting.¹⁴⁰

Another bulletin on September 7th 1944 on the other hand was about El Hassani el Ouzaani. It was clearly showing how nationalists were dangerous for the French protectorate. Moreover, Ouazzani one ore time asked the respect of the French to cultural legacies of Moroccans:

We signal the possibility of a regrouping of partisans of El Hassani el Ouazzani in the cities of Rabat and Casablanca where the Khoumiyyas were numerous. These people ask for compulsory education, protection of indigenous property, increased protection of cultural legacies, creation of industries, freedoms to organize trade unions, and justice reforms.¹⁴¹

The French tried to turn the Moroccan sultan against these political parties. The official bulletin on December 1st 1944 expressed that the sultan was forced to side with the French against the nationalist rise in Morocco.

¹⁴⁰ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, June 22nd 1944 : Une Réunion nationaliste s'est tenue le 15 Juin 1944 à 10h-12h.30 au domicile du nommé Abdelkader Ben Abdesselam Doukkali. Des nationalistes de Fez, Meknès, Rabat et Salé n'ont pas pu être identifiés, participé à cette Réunion. Une somme de 40.000 franc a été collectée.

¹⁴¹ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, September 7th 1944 : On signale la possibilité de regroupement des partisans de HEL Hassani el Ouezzani dans les villes de Rabat et Casablanca où les Khoumiyyes sont nombreuses. Ils demandent alors instruction primaire obligatoire, protection de la propriété indigène, amélioration des conserver de la culture, création d'industries, liberté syndicale, réforme de la justice.

The Sultan who had tended to flee from the guardianship of France and openly supporting the nationalists, now declares his adherence to the French government and encourages the pachas and caids against the tenants of Istiqlal whose name must be removed from brains and glossaries, accordingly. On the other hand, the nationalist party became less effective. It lost most of its sherifs, and its major actors are in prison. The schools where students started to rebel were closed. In the month of May 1944, the sovereign and the viziers obey us. A unique black mark: the bridges between the nationalists and the French governments were cut. There were some reactions to some reforms on Aid el Kebir. The recent throne feast was for Sidi Mohamed for the occasion of second nationalist wave.

Apart from the establishment of the political parties in the Protectorate, the French started to talk about Moroccan nationalism as propaganda, that was thought to be created by Moroccans and even foreigners. The official bulletin on April 16th 1945 expressed that the nationalist rise was even observable in the city of Marrakech and that even the British was supporting Moroccan independence:

An active propaganda developed in practice actually in this region as much as by Moroccan nationalists as by foreigners. The *chleuh* fighters and the Arabs provoke the tribes and the souks for the psychosis of liberation. A *chleuh* fighter was screaming like this: "Liberation could be earned only by unity". Union could be obtained only by absolute fidelity to Sidna. The fidelity to Sidna could be earned only by fidelity to God. It is also the way how we save our country from the infidels. On the other hand, the women of English Methodist Mission also organize lots of activities and act under the slogan of the martyr ex consul Naihan. They say that the French occupied Morocco thanks to the assassination of Doctor Mouchamp. Numerous brochures and pumplets are being sold cheap in the souqs by the British and Egyptians.¹⁴²

¹⁴² The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, December 1st 1944 : Une active propagande est exercée actuellement dans cette région tant par les nationalistes que par les étrangers. Des bateleurs chleuhs et arabes parcourent les tribus et les souks pour créer les synopses de la libération. Un bateleur chantant sur la place Djeam Flah disait en berbère Nifa: Libération ne peut s'obtenir que l'union. Union ne peut s'obtenir que par fidélité absolue a Sidna. La fidélité à Sidana ne peut s'obtenir que par la fidélité préceptes de Dieu. C'est ainsi que nous libèrerons nos pays de l'infidèle exerce. D'autre part, des dames de Mission Méthodistes anglaises déploient elles aussi une grande activité et se servent autour de slogan de consul Naihan. Elles disaient notamment les Français ont occupé le Maroc grace a l'assassinat du Docteur Mouchamp. De nombreuses brochures d'édition Egyptienne et anglo-saxonne se vendent dans les souks et et tribus a des prix très bas.

The nationalist propaganda that was thought to be started by the settlement of the political parties was developed by the opening of other political parties. After the opening of the Istiqlal Party, the Communist Party and the Democratic Party for Independence became the symbols of Moroccan separatist nationalism. The pluralism in the range of Moroccan political parties was not only preceding the nationalist propaganda, but also was pitting the Moroccans against the French rule. The official bulletin on November 24th 1946 expressed how the people of Fez welcomed in a cold mood the General Resident in his routine trip:

Here is the summary of the visits to the media of Fez, by the General Resident. The visits took place in a very cold atmosphere. There were not any French flags in the roads but just in the police stations. Many shops were either closed or semi-closed. There was no one in the roads. Nobody saluted the Resident General. We heard some screams such as “Long live Morocco, Long live Free Morocco, France must give independence to Morocco, Independence and Liberty, Long live independence, Long live Allal al Fassi, victory to zaim allal al Fassi, Long live Hassan al Ouzaani.”¹⁴³

Among these parties, the Communist Party was carefully observed by the French. Accordingly, the party was establishing links between the communists in cities of Tangier and Casablanca. The official bulletin on August 2nd 1949 expressed that a Moroccan Communist Abdessam Soussi must be watched closely since he was organizing the Communist Party in different cities:

We were signaled that a man named Abdessam Soussi must be watched. We believe that he is making links between the communist elements of Tangier and Casablanca. A man named Otera, Spanish, employed at the

¹⁴³ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, November 24th 1946: La visite de médina de Fez s’est déroulée dans une atmosphère froidure totale. Les seuls drapeaux français étaient ceux de service municipaux avait fait sur les portes des postes de police. Les boutiques étaient fermées ou mi- fermés. Il n y avait que très peu de gens dans les rues. Personne n’a salué le Résident General. On entendait des slogans tels: Vve le Maroc, Vie le Maroc libère, Vive Independence, Vive Allal al Fassi, Vive Allal al Fassi, Vive Hassan al Ouzaani.

administration department of Tangiers must also be watched. Anarchist slogans are sometimes written on the walls in Tangier. We deleted those above the mailboxes at the Grand Poste.¹⁴⁴

Apart from 1950s, the French tried to put pressure on the Moroccan sultan by blaming him as the supporter of the nationalists. The official bulletin on November 11th 1950 openly criticized the sultan for his role in supporting the nationalist movements of these political parties:

The relations between France and Morocco became more and more strained since the return of the sultan. The warm welcome of the Moroccan people for the return of their sultan showed how they ask for independence and the abolition of the Protectorate. It seems that the continuation of the bilateral relations depends on insisting the sultan on an insistence by the sultan on the way that protectorate would be abolished. The sultan therefore applauds the nationalist organizations that orient public opinion to the interiors of the country.¹⁴⁵

In addition, Moroccan nationalism was regarded as a terrorist attempt together with the nationalist leaders who were regarded as terrorists by the French. The official bulletin of January 28th 1954 gave the names of some of the P.D.I members who were considered terrorists. It showed the unsuccessful integration of the French with Morocanness in the 1925-1956 period:

¹⁴⁴ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, August 2nd 1949 : On signale que le nomme Abdeslam Soussi comme devant être surveillé. Il ferait, croit-on, la liaison entre les éléments communistes de Tanger et de Casablanca. Un nommé Otera, espagnol surveillant de Travaux Publics à l'Administration Internationale de Tanger, également a surveiller. Des slogans anarchistes seraient opposés de temps en temps sur les murs à Tanger. On en a enlevé au-dessus des boîtes aux lettres de la Grande Poste.

¹⁴⁵ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, November 11th 1950 : Les relations franco marocaines sont devenues plus en plus tendue depuis le retour de sultan. L'accueil chaleureux que le peuple marocain a réservé à son souverain a prouvé clairement la perspicacité de tous les milieux, lesquels lançaient des acclamations à l'adresse du sultan, réclamant l'Indépendance de pays et l'abolition de protectorat. Il résulte de la situation politique présente que le sultan est convaincu de ce que l'abolition du Protectorat est la condition principale des relations entre son pays et la France. Elle appuie, grâce à cette position, les organisateurs nationalistes qui orientent opinion publique à l'intérieure du pays.

28 April was the date when some of the volunteer's militants were behind the Mister Military Judge. Ahmed Ben Bachir ben Mohamed, Brick ben Mohamed Ben Abdallah, Mohamed ben Said ben Lahcen, Mustapha Ben Ahmed Ben Celili: These Moroccans became part of terrorist group called P.D.I.¹⁴⁶

The blacklisting of the nationalists by the French continued in 1954. The official bulletin on January 26th 1954 listed some names that were thought to have relations with a terrorist organization in Tangier. It also demonstrates the hostility of these people for the French Protectorate:

El Khamal and El Filali are two important people of the *La Main Noire* in Tangier. They are known as nationalists, with Spanish inspiration, who think that if Tangier today is an international zone we owe it to the Spain. Khamal, Filali, Kassara, Bennani are part of a terrorist organization in Tangier.¹⁴⁷

The official bulletin on August 1st 1955 specified an organization called "Pedala" among those considered as terrorists by the French: "I have the honor to inform you that the General Chief of the Judiciary of Casablanca got an order on the 18th June 1955 to inform Paris about the members of a terrorist organization called Pedala where Mahjab Ben Tahar was its leader."¹⁴⁸

The power of the Istiqlal Party peaked by 1955 when the Party's propaganda was declared terrorist by the French rule. The Istiqlal Party made a statement upon

¹⁴⁶ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, January 28th 1954 : Le 28 avril a été déféré devant M. Le Judge d'institution militaire sous l'inculpation d'homicides volontaires, tentative d'homicide, détention d'armes, association de malfaiteurs. Ahmed Ben Bachir ben Mohamed, Brick ben Mohamed Ben Abdallah, Mohamed ben Said ben Lahcen, Mustapha Ben Ahmed Ben Celili. Ces Marocains faisaient partie du groupe de terroristes de PDI.

¹⁴⁷ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, January 26th 1954 : El Khamal et El Filali sont deux personnages importants de la Main Noire à Tanger. Leur employés ont été chargés de diffuser dans la population les mots d'ordre nationalistes, d'inspiration espagnol, rappellent que si Tanger est un zone internationale, c'est l'Espagne qu'on le doit. Khamal, Filali, Kasara, Bennani sont parties d'une action terroriste a Tanger.

¹⁴⁸ The official bulletin of the French Protectorate August 1st 1955 : Comme suite à votre lettre rappelée en référence, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que le General Chef de la Circonscription Judiciaire de Casablanca a délivré le 18 Juin 1955 un ordre d'informer à l'encontre des membres d'une organisation terroriste de Pedala parmi lesquels figure un nommé Mahjab Ben Tahar. Renaudeau Arc (Commissaire des troupes de Maroc)

the accusations of the French government in the way that the independence movements in Morocco were terrorist activities. The leader of Istiqlal Party Allal al Fassi openly threatened the Ambassador of the Netherlands since he thought that the representative office of the Netherlands worked in favor of the French rule. In a letter he wrote to the Ambassador on June 20th 1955, al Fassi said:

We have the honor to inform you that we are not criminals but nationalists. We are the cell of the youth in Morocco. Now we are writing to you on behalf of the Moroccan population. Here is the case: your consulate in Rabat works for the deterioration of relations between the two countries. The Moroccan people ask you to change your consulate in Morocco. If you do not do it, military measures will be taken by us. We will also sabotage your commercial existence in Morocco.¹⁴⁹

5.5. The French Protectorate in Morocco between 1925 and 1956: An Assessment

The successful integration of the French Protectorate under General Lyautey's rule with Moroccan Islam and language started the cultural hybridity process between the French and the Moroccans did not show the same performance after 1926. In the 1912-1925 period, the cultural hybridity created by the French Protectorate among Moroccans was more obvious thanks to *la politique musulmane* and the introduction of French language in Moroccan education system. In that period, there were more naturalizations to French citizenship among Moroccans as well. In contrast, the 1925-1956 period developed more in the framework of the rise of Moroccaness as

¹⁴⁹ Letter from al Fassi to the Netherlands Ambassador, June 20th 1955 : Nous avons l'honneur de vous informer que nous ne sommes pas des criminels, nous sommes des nationalistes d'origine. Nous sommes de la cellule de la main de la jeunesse abatie. Voilà le cas, c'est que votre consulat à Rabat travaille pour le trouble des deux pays; Maroc-Hollande. Le peuple marocain demande du changement de ce consul, et si le gouvernement ne décide pas à le changer, la main de jeunesse va le faire avec une mitraillette et nous faisons ballotage de votre commerce.

the second component of Moroccan national identity, and partly Maghrebness as the third one, as tools to fight this hybridity created by the French Protectorate. For instance, we cannot see the admiration of Europe theme of postcolonial nationalism as we did in 1912-1925 period among Moroccan state and non-state actors this period. The 1925 -1956 period of the French Protectorate in Morocco shows us that the Moroccan state and non-state actors criticized the French administration within a wish of Moroccan independence. Creation of cultural hybridity continued between 1925 and 1956 with the ongoing education policies that included French language and naturalizations to French citizenship. Moreover, it also involved with economic endeavours like making Moroccans to work in phosphate mines after 1930 and zinc mines between 1938 and 1945, settling Moroccans into the cooperative systems after 1945, initiating the *Secteurs de Modernisation de Paysannat* (SMP) in 1950 that taught Moroccans how to dry farming, corn production, irrigation, horticulture, mountain and desert cultivation, and pastoral farming. However, this cultural hybridity was shadowed by the development of Moroccanness to fight this hybridity between 1925 and 1956. The greatest example of this situation was the Moroccan state and non state actors' usage of French while demanding Moroccan independence.

This chapter, then, shows the basis of the emergence of Moroccanness as one side of the instrumentalization of cultural hybridity by King Hassan II in 1987 to explain/justify the Europeanness of Morocco. In addition, it shows the role of Islam in Morocco in the emergence of Moroccanness by pointing out that Moroccanness was born as a result of deviations from *la politique musulmane* of General Lyautey with the chemical gas issue, the 1930-1935 dahirs and the political parties' independence desires that were based on the disrespectful administration of the

French Protectorate for Islam. Besides, this chapter shows that both Moroccaness and Maghrebness components of the Moroccan national identity were constructed against France that symbolized European colonialism, as Islam became the first component of Moroccan national identity against the Portuguese that symbolized European colonialism in the 16th century. In this sense, Moroccaness as one side of this hybridity with Europeanness as another in King Hassan II's mind started to develop in the 1925 and 1956 period when the French officers lost their respect to Islam. Addition of Moroccaness to the Moroccan national identity was thus a result of the loss of respect to Moroccan Islam in 1925 and 1956 period, that covered a lack of General Lyautey's sensitivity to Moroccan Islam. This is why General Lyautey was still remembered in the last years of the Protectorate, as an essay written by Ahmed Dlimi in a literature competition in Morocco on October 3rd 1954 touched upon how he was important for Morocco by the respect he had had for Islam:

Few great men, in fact, could be action men. One of the best examples that we can cite is General Lyautey. Often, in a single day in Morocco, he attends many consuls, runs many kilometers, makes contact with many tribes, finish his courier with 3-4 o'clock in the morning. He never acts for the sake of acting, but always to fight to create and to give life. But above all, the thought that drives Lyautey is the respect for preexisting models in Morocco. He also wants to save the indigenous cities from unrelenting modernism of the Europeans by leaving to the Moroccans the freedom to live according to their religion and within the limits that they were self-assigned.¹⁵⁰

Kadri Mohamed's essay came in third place in the same competition the next year, and also refers to Lyautey's tolerance for Islam:

¹⁵⁰ Dlimi essay on October 3rd 1954 : Peu de grands hommes, en effet, peuvent être la pensée d'action. L'un des plus beaux exemples que l'on pût citer est Lyautey. Souvent au Maroc, en une seule journée, il assistait à plusieurs conseils, parcourait des centaines de kilomètres, prenait contact avec des nombreux tribus, et terminait en rédigeant son courrier jusqu'à 3-4 heures du matin. Il n'a jamais agi pour agir mais il a toujours agi pour bâtir, créer et donner vie. Mais avant tout, la pensée qui dominait Lyautey était le respect des œuvres préexistantes. Il voulait ainsi sauver les villes indigènes de l'impitoyable modernisme des Européens, par laissant aux Marocains la liberté de vivre selon leurs religions et dans les limites qu'ils étaient eux même assignés.

If one needs to clarify one of Lyautey's greatest qualities around young-intellectual collaborators who are capable of working with him, he choose in Algeria and Tunisia the functionaries who distinct their quality Professional. Morocco also found it among the French administrations that knew the Muslims since longtime, by consequent that were susceptible of understand them and Orient them through the new voice that were destined for them. Plus, Morocco is the first ring of alliance between the French and the Moroccans for the greatest glory of the two states. Pacify a state where dissidence ruled it for centuries was not easy. Lyautey knew the qualities of the Moroccan people. He always attributed a particular value to the evolution of clans, could not disinterest of the Muslim organizations that the civilization of their villages. Education then was methodically organized in Morocco.¹⁵¹

To sum up, it could be said that the cultural hybridity between France and Morocco among Moroccan people that started in the 1912 and 1956 period continued in the 1925 and 1956 period, with the unsuccessful integration of the French Protectorate with Moroccaness. Accordingly, it could be said that the French much better integrated with Islam as the unique component of Moroccan naitonal identity in 1912-1925 period, than the Moroccaness as the second component of Moroccan naitonal identity in 1925 and 1956 period. This better integration, of course, impacted the level of hybridity among Moroccan state and non-state actors, but it did not disappear.

¹⁵¹ Mohamed essay on October 3rd 1954 : Si une des plus grandes qualités de Lyautey fut de s'entourer de collaborateurs jeunes, setifs, intellectuels, déroutés, capables de le seconder, il choisit en Algérie, et en Tunisie les fonctionnaires qui distinguaient leurs qualités professionnelles. Le Maroc se trouva ainsi pourvu d'administration qui connaît les musulmans depuis longtemps, par conséquent qui étaient susceptibles de les comprendre et de les orienter vers la voie nouvelle qu'il leur était trachée. Ainsi le Maroc veilla le premier anneau de l'alliance entre les français et les marocains pour la plus grande gloire des deux pays. Pacifier un pays où régnait depuis des siècles une dissidence qui ébrouait même parfois jusqu'au trône des souverains, Lyautey connaissait les qualités de peuple Marocains. Lyautey a toujours attribue une valeur particulière à l'évolution des clans, e pouvait se désintéresser de l'organisation musulmanes que la civilisation entrent dans leur villages.

CHAPTER VI

ATTEMPTS TO NULLIFY THE PROTECTORATES' IMPACTS IN MOROCCO BETWEEN 1956 AND 1984

6.1. The Unended Colonialism in Morocco

With the abolition of the French and the Spanish Protectorates, Morocco became independent in 1956. Many thought that Moroccan national identity that had started to be defined with Moroccanness and Islam would flourish with the end of colonialism. It was true that Moroccan national identity flourished, especially with the introduction of Africanness, Arabness and the Maghrebness as new components to Moroccan national identity after 1956, but colonialism survived culturally, if not literally. Even though the French and Spanish Protectorates withdrew their forces from Morocco in 1956, their impacts on Moroccan national identity remained as postcolonial theory had argued. The years between 1956 and 1984, therefore, were the years where the Moroccan state and non-state elites tried to nullify these impacts on Moroccan national identity through different components of postcolonial

Moroccan national identity and by developing specific policies, as highlighted by the critique of colonialism theme of postcolonial nationalism.

It is possible to divide this into three periods. The first one starts in 1956 when Morocco declared its independence and ends in 1963 when Morocco declared the Sand War against Algeria. The second one starts in 1964 and ends in 1972 when the King Hassan II decided to act for the Moroccanization of the Western Sahara. The third starts in 1972 and ends in 1987 when King Hassan II sent his application letter to the European Community.

6.2. The 1956-1962 Period in Postcolonial Morocco

6.2.1. Nullification Attempts of Protectorates' Impacts through Moroccanness

The role of Moroccanness in the construction of Moroccan national identity became much clearer with the rise of separatist nationalism led by the political parties in 1943. Moroccanness that developed in such an orbit continued to be effective on the construction of Moroccan national identity during the whole postcolonial episode. Allal al Fassi as the leader of the Istiqlal Party was the leader of Moroccanness until the Istiqlal Party lost power in the 1977 elections. Allal al Fassi and other state actors wanted to nullify the impacts of the Protectorates on individual freedom and territory definitions of Moroccanness that were a component of the Moroccan national identity. A year after independence, the Istiqlal Party decided to change and

rearrange the agrarian policy in Morocco that was shaped by the French Protectorate by General Lyautey. In this context, the Istiqlal Party launched a complete agrarian reform on September 27th 1957 that distributed the lands once possessed by the French to Moroccan villagers to pacify the impacts of the French Protectorate on the individual existence and territory definitions of the Moroccan national identity. This reform aimed at liberating the Moroccan villagers from the agrarian policy organized by the French in the Protectorate and that favored the French over these villagers.

The agrarian reform was announced by the Istiqlal Party deputy Mehdi Ben Barka who gave a speech in the Moroccan Parliament. The speech was addressed to the Istiqlal Party deputies and was intended to show how the Moroccan lands would then belong to the Moroccans after the independence. The speech was related to the postcolonial process in Morocco and contained the symbols of the words “invaders” and “stagnation” to represent the French protectorate regime. Barka’s speech could be evaluated thorough Marx, Engels and Sartre who argued that colonialism was an economic exploitation since it showed how the French arranged the land policy in the Protectorate according to their economic benefits. In addition, Barka’s speech echoes the postcolonial critique of Leila Gandhi in *Postcolonial Theory* who defined postcolonialism as the historical self-invention or the need to make a new start to erase painful memories of colonial subordination. At the end of this speech, the Moroccan state decided to cancel this land policy that was designed in the French Protectorate and implemented its own for the people of Morocco. In this sense, Barka’s speech was an example of how to implement Frantz Fanon’s argument of the necessity of cutting relations with Europe after independence in *The Wretched of the Earth*. Moreover, Barka’s speech shows the importance of the Moroccan lands for the post-independence nationalism as stated by Anthony Smith in *National Identity*.

Barka's speech also reflects Aimé Césaire's argument in *The Discourse on Colonialism* who argued that all colonization is negative for those who are colonized. The suffering of the Moroccan people due to French land policies are evident in Barka's speech:

The Moroccan villager will make its own revolution. Our rural world that played a fundamental role in the national history unfortunately stayed in a state of stagnation in the last couple of centuries due to the invaders. History would say that the Moroccan nation had to pay a hard cost to keep its integrity and sovereignty. And it is our villagers who suffered the most in this secular self-defense. That is why we declare an agrarian revolution today. We want the villager himself to make his own revolution by understanding his proper interest and the interest of the nation.¹⁵²

After the agrarian reform liberated the Moroccan peasants from the land policies implemented in the French Protectorate, a civil society organization called *La Manutention Marocaine* highlighted the impacts of French and Spanish Protectorates on the language question with regard to Moroccaness that needed to be nullified. According to news published in the daily *L'Opinion* on October 28th 1957, *La Manutention Marocaine* emphasized the necessity to use Arabic as the language of labor to nullify the impacts of French Protectorate on Moroccan language. By using the words "French language" to symbolize colonialism, the declaration of *La Manutention Marocaine* is similar to Fernandez Retamar's argument in *The Caliban* where he argues that Cuban words must also take place in the Cuban language along with the Spanish words. Moreover, this call was also an attempt to reject the

¹⁵² *L'Opinion*, September 28th 1957: Le paysan marocain fera sa propre révolution: Notre monde rural qui a joué un rôle fondamental dans l'histoire nationale est malheureusement resté durant les derniers siècles dans un état de stagnation à cause des envahisseurs. L'histoire dira que la nation marocaine a dû payer un lourd tribut pour sauvegarder son intégrité et souveraineté. Et ce sont nos paysans qui ont supporté les plus lourdes charges de cette lutte séculaire de self-défense. C'est pour ça que nous déclarons une révolution agraire. Nous voulons que le paysan, par lui-même, comprenant sa propre intérêt et l'intérêt de la nation fasse son révolution.

hybridity that started in the French Protectorate with the introduction of the French language in General Lyautey's educational policy:

It is not beneficial to signal the difficulties of Arabic as the language of labor because of the richness in the French language that we observe in its style (common style, literature, scientific, journalistic). But the Arabic language still remains dependent on stylistic standards. It is true that we do not want to use [Modern Standard] Arabic names from day to day. But this is a style that we want design by using Arabic as the language of labour.¹⁵³

The attempts of the Moroccan state and non-state actors to nullify the impacts of the French Protectorate continued with the state corps definition of Moroccaness as the component of the Moroccan national identity. The Editorial Board of the press organ of the Moroccan Union of Labour (*Union Marocaine de Travail*) wrote an article on November 8th 1957 to the daily *L'Opinion*. The Board emphasized the necessity of the Moroccan state to abstain from the common market idea covering the Maghreb states that was proposed by the Treaty of Rome in 1955. As the way to pacify the impacts of the French Protectorate on the Moroccan state, the Editorial Board argued that Morocco must have never taken place in this market that had an imperialist and capitalist background. In the article where the Board used the words “occidental capitalism”, and “imperialism” to symbolize colonialism, the Board showed how the E.E.C could damage the independent state mechanism of the third world countries by imposing certain rules on bilateral economic relations. The Board's proposal to exclude Morocco from the common market of the E.E.C would be an implementation of Fanon's argument in *The Wretched of the Earth* who argued that

¹⁵³ *L'Opinion*, October 28th 1957 : A quand la langue arabe de travail? Il est inutile de signaler les énormes difficultés auxquels se hurlera l'équipe l'arabe du travail, car la langue française est riche en variété de style (style commun, style mondain, littérature, scientifique, journalistique). Mais la langue arabe demeure encore dans une grande mesure tributaire des normes qui la gignent dans un style. Il est vrai que déjà ce qu'on ne veut pas appeler d'un nom d'arabe moderne fait sa place de jour en jour. Mais c'est un style de ce que nous voulons designer par l'arabe de travail.

there is a necessity for African states to cut relations with colonialist Europe after independence. The Board wrote:

Of the problems that currently occupy the governments of Occidental Europe, the common market is one. It seems that this project, if it sees the light of day, would no doubt constitute a radical solution to all the difficulties in which occidental capitalism and which result in an economic gigantism that traverse the colonized states. What is left to Morocco is to show prudence and not to replace its future in these unnecessary engagements. It is then not beneficial for us to take this subject into account. What we can add is that the common market is just an aspect of the appetite of the imperialist capitalism born in Europe. It is up to us not to join in.¹⁵⁴

One day after this article appeared, Istiqlal Party member and editor of the newspaper *Al Istiqlal* Mohammad Lahbabi wrote an article. In the article, Lahbabi intended to nullify the impacts of French Protectorate again relying on the state corps definition of Moroccanness as a component of Moroccan national identity. According to Lahbabi, the administrative reforms in the French Protectorate led to a dysfunctional Moroccan government and institutions. Contextually, Lahbabi offered to make new reforms to nullify the impacts of the French Protectorate on Moroccan state corps because he thinks that Morocco was administrated by a weak mentality under the influence of the French Protectorate. By using the words of “colonial regime” to symbolize colonialism, Lahbabi’s article implemented the argument of Aimé Césaire in *Discourse on Colonialism* about Europe’s failed attempts to modernize the colonized world. In addition, Lahbabi’s article implemented Albert

¹⁵⁴ *Al Istiqlal*, November 8th 1957: Impérialisme d’un nouveau genre, La Marché commune : Parmi les problèmes qui préoccupent à l’heure actuelle des gouvernements d’Europe occidentale figure celui de marché commun. Il semble que ce projet, s’il voit le jour, soit susceptible de constituer la solution radicale à toutes les difficultés dans lesquelles se débat le capitalisme occidentale et qui résultent d’une part gigantisme économique qui traverse les pays colonisés. Il appartient donc au Maroc, qui ne cesse d’être sollicité de Marché Commune, de faire montrer de prudence et de ne pas compromettre son avenir à des engagements inutiles. Il n’est donc pas utile de nous étendre davantage sur ce sujet. L’on peut seulement ajouter que le marché commun n’est que l’un des aspects de l’appétit du capitalisme impérialiste qui est né en Europe. A nous de ne pas y exposer.

Memmi's point in *The Colonizer and the Colonized* that the colonizer devalues the colonized by defining it, and of Frantz Fanon in the *Wretched of the Earth*. Lahbabi writes:

The Protectorate was counting on the realization of depersonalization of the Moroccan state and the consolidation of the colonial regime. The reforms of the Protectorate had the official goal of liquidating Moroccan institutions, in order to erase their efficiencies, and their character. The government of the French Republic and the Government of his Sherifian Majesty established a regular regime founded on internal order and general security that would allow the introduction of reforms providing economic development is not recognizable. Since 1953 directions have been taken by weak administrators. We must then reform the Moroccan government.¹⁵⁵

Lahbabi's view was shared by the journalist Said Belhoucine in his article published on December 12th 1957. Belhoucine summarized Albert Memmi's book *The Colonizer and the Colonized*. In the article, Belhoucine advised a re-analysis of the colonial past in Morocco to pacify the impacts of colonialism on individual existence and state corps definitions of Moroccaness. Belhoucine writes:

Albert Memmi has written a book called the *Portrait of the Colonized*. The revolution of the colonized people was organized, it is in the sense of history, it moves. It gave the results that must be judged dialectically by reanalyzing the colonial past. This is what we also must do in Morocco today.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵ *L'Opinion*, November 9th 1957: Le Protectorat comptait réaliser la dépersonnalisation de l'état marocain et la consolidation de régime coloniale »: Le Protectorat n'a jamais cessé de se trouver placée sous un régime légal d'état siège. Les reformes du Protectorat ont eu but officiel de la liquidation des institutions marocains, effacer ses efficacités, et son caractère. Le gouvernement de la République Française et le gouvernement de sa majesté chérifienne, soucieux d'établir au Maroc un régime régulier, fondé sur l'ordre intérieur et la sécurité générale, qui permettre l'introduction des reformes et assure le développement économique du pays 'est plus reconnaissable: les directions sont pris par des directeurs disparus depuis Aout 1953. Il faut alors réformer l'Etat Marocain.

¹⁵⁶ *L'Opinion*, December 12th 1957: Un livre d'Albert Memmi : La révolution des peuples colonisés s'est organisée, elle est dans le sens histoire, elle est en mouvement. Elle a donné des résultats qu'il faut juger dialectiquement représente le passe coloniale. C'est ce que nous devons faire au Maroc aujourd'hui.

Citizenship was another area where the impacts of the French Protectorate were analyzed in order to pacify the Moroccan component of Moroccan national identity. In journalist At Talia's column, Talia points to how the French were still regarding the Moroccans as "colonized locals" and how the French air and navy forces were still active in Moroccan lands and seas. According to Talia, the way to nullify the impacts of French Protectorate so that such actions would never take place would be to thoroughly realize the wishes of Moroccan independence. At Talia's article showed how the citizenship definition of Moroccan as a component of Moroccan national identity was still impacted by the French Protectorate. It also refers to the state corps definition of Moroccan, since it pointed out how the Moroccan state was harassed by the French air and navy forces. In this context, At Talia used the words "indigenous" to symbolize colonialism in his article where he implemented Fanon's argument in the *Wretched of the Earth* about how independence is the creation of a "new man" and a new state completely independent from Europe after decolonization. At Talia writes:

It is even the same in the countries of the East, under socialist regimes, or in the states of America. We are being considered as foreigners. But it is completely different in the European countries where the Moroccan citizen continues to be called indigenous. In France, for instance, Moroccans are arrested and imprisoned for anything, sometimes for nothing, with the application of certain exceptional laws that were taken against our Algerian brothers. The well-being of Moroccan citizens is not respected, without the need to say how much harder implementations such as chasing a Moroccan plane or the continuous violation of our frontiers and our water territories. In order to prevent such events, it is necessary to be independent, and to want it in real terms.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷ *Al Istiqlal*, January 1st 1958: Sommes–Nous vraiment indépendants? : Il en est de même dans les pays de l'Est, sous régime socialiste, ou des chefs d'Etats d'Amérique. On y jouait de la considération d'un étranger. Mais il en est tout autrement dans les pays Européens ou le Marocains continue d'être l'indigène. En France par exemple, les Marocains sont arrêtés et emprisonnés pour n'importe quel motif, et parfois sans motif, en application des certaines lois exceptionnelles prises à l'encontre de nos frères algériens. Le bien des citoyens marocains ne sont pas respectés, sans parler de comportements bien plus graves, tel l'arraisonnement d'un avion Marocain ou la violation continuelle de nos

The Moroccanism movement of the Istiqlal Party also included a Great Morocco Project in addition to agrarian reform. In this sense, the Great Morocco Project of al Fassi was getting the biggest support from the Moroccan sultan Mohamed V. In a regular visit of his to the city of M'hamid in southern Morocco near the Western Sahara border, Mohamed V gave a speech on February 25th 1958. In his speech to the people of M'hamid, the sultan Mohamed V emphasized the impacts of Spanish Protectorate on the territory, individual freedom and state corps definitions of Moroccanness as the component of the Moroccan national identity. The sultan's speech to the people of M'hamid criticized the possession of the Western Sahara that was annexed to the Spanish Protectorate in 1936. The sultan argued that the territorial unity of Morocco would be complete when the Sahara region belongs totally to the Moroccan state. Mohamed V said that the remaining Spanish colonial administration in the Western Sahara was unacceptable after Morocco's independence. By emphasizing the Moroccanness of M'hamid and all of Sahara region, Mohamed V asked the Spanish to leave their territories. The sultan used the word "foreigners" to symbolize colonialism, and the verb "return" to symbolize the future actions of Morocco to render the Western Sahara independent. The speech of the Sultan echoes Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities* where Anderson argues that nations are imagined because there exists a feeling of togetherness even though its members cannot see or hear one another. The sultan's speech about a specifically *Moroccan* Western Sahara instead of a Spanish Western Sahara also Memmi's and Césaire's arguments wherein the colonized must get rid of the definitions and norms that were given to him by the colonizer. Fanon's "new man"

frontières et de nos eaux territoriales. Pour éviter cela, il faut évidemment être vraiment indépendant et le vouloir.

discourse from *Wretched of the Earth* suggests that the “new man” of the Western Sahara, post-independence, is Moroccan, rather than Spanish. The sultan said:

Faithful subject of the Sahara! One of the dearest wishes we have long held is to pay a visit to this part of Moroccan Sahara, to find ourselves among these people, to show you our interest to this region of our country. Our grandfather Moulay Hassan paid two visits to the Sahara in order to consolidate the unity of Morocco and its sovereignty over the total parts of our national territory when the foreigners were ruling our lands. We are determined to continue to work to improve your living conditions and to assure progress in your religious, social, economic and cultural needs and to make you benefit from independence and the liberty of our country. We solemnly swear that we will follow up with these actions for the return our Sahara to us, in the context of our historical rights and the wish of Sahara residents to join our state. It is for us an encouragement to realize the aspirations of the Sahara residents who are already ours and all the free Moroccan citizens who want their state to recognize the dignity and greatness of the Sahara region.¹⁵⁸

6.2.2. Nullification Attempts of Protectorates’ Impacts through Maghrebness

As shown by the Chapter 4, the separatist Moroccan nationalism also included Arab Maghrebness in addition to Moroccaness. The Istiqlal Party not only aimed for the independence of Morocco, but also for the independence of its neighbors Algeria and Tunisia. In this sense, it was said that “Maghrebness” in Moroccan national identity rose in the orbit of Moroccaness in the last years of the French Protectorate.

¹⁵⁸ *L’Opinion*, February 28th 1958: Le discours de Mohammed V à M’Hamid : Fidèles sujets de Sahara, L’un de vœux les plus chers que nous nous nourrissions depuis longtemps était de rendre visite à cette partie du Sahara Marocain, de nous trouver parmi ses habitants, pour leur montrer notre intérêt à cette région de notre pays. Notre grand père Moulay Hasan a effectué deux voyages dans le Sahara pour consolider l’unité de Maroc et sa souveraineté sur l’ensemble des parties de son territoire nationale au moment où il était l’objet de converties étrangères. Nous sommes bien décidés à continuer à œuvrer pour améliorer vos conditions d’existence à continuer et vous assurer le progrès dans les domaines religieux, social, économique et culturel, et à vous faire ainsi participer aux bienfaits de l’Indépendance et de la liberté. Nous proclamons solennellement que nous poursuivrons notre action pour le retour de notre Sahara, dans le cadre du respect de nos droits historiques et conformément à la volonté de ses habitants. C’est pour nous un réconfort et un encouragement pour réaliser les aspirations des habitants de Sahara qui sont les nôtres et celles de tous les citoyens marocains libres qui veulent que leur pays connaisse la dignité et la grandeur.

Therefore, the Moroccan state actors were thinking that Moroccan Maghrebness was also subject to the impacts of European colonialism.

The first step to pacify the impacts of the Protectorates through Moroccan Maghrebness was taken up by Istiqlal Party member Mohamed Lahlaou. In an interview he gave to *L'Opinion* on February 22nd 1958, Lahlaou offered the foundation of the Mauritanian Union as an organization that would unite the members of the Grand Maghreb against future European colonization. As a step to liberate the individual existence and individual freedom for the people of Algeria and Mauritania from French colonialism, Lahlaou proposed the creation of a fusion between occupied Algeria, Mauritania and free Morocco, Tunisia and Libya. The Mauritanian Union would be founded on confederal basis and would be yet another implementation of Fanon's "new man" argument in the *Wretched of the Earth*. Lahlaou said:

The idea of a Maghreb federation that would group Mauritania, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia would resurrect the state of a united Mauritania that existed already before Jesus Christ (United Mauritania). Algeria and Mauritania are occupied now, but we can take the first step for this union with the fusion of parties, trade unions, student unions, and education programs that would be sent to these countries now.¹⁵⁹

The very next day, Allal al Fassi gave a speech to the Moroccan Parliament that emphasized the necessity of the Maghreb Union to protect the states of the Maghreb from further European colonization. The Maghreb Union idea of al Fassi would also

¹⁵⁹ *L'Opinion*, February 22nd 1958: Une idée originale : L'idée de confédération de Maghreb groupant la Mauritanie, le Maroc, l'Algérie, le Libye, la Tunisie, qui serait la résurrection de l'état Mauritanien uni qui existait déjà avant J.C (la Mauritanie Unie). L'Algérie et la Mauritanie sont occupées mais nous pouvons faire un premier pas par la fusion des partis, des syndicats, des unions d'étudiants, et des programmes d'enseignements.

create a definition of Maghrebian citizenship that would enable the people of Maghreb countries to travel freely across borders despite the French rule in Algeria. Just like the Mauritanian Union idea of Lahlaou, the Maghreb Union idea of Allal al Fassi would be the implementation of Fanon's very same argument in the *Wretched of the Earth* with the citizenship of the Maghrebian against the French. Al Fassi said:

Our wish is to see at last the three countries of North Africa united by the institution of a federation that recognizes and justifies the geography, history, economy, and common civilization. Our wish is to see that the people of North Africa are going to be called Maghrebian and not French. You will be able to visit these countries freely, and all the people of these countries will have friendly relations not only on an official level, but also in daily life forever.¹⁶⁰

The idea of the Maghreb Union with the same motivations and goals was also supported by the Istiqlal Party vice Secretary Boubeker Kadiri. In an interview he gave to *L'Opinion* on March 30th 1958, Kadiri referred to the commonalities between Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco as a justification for this union. As a resolution to the colonization in Algeria at that time, Kadiri offered to form this union between the Maghreb countries. Kadiri's speech used the words of "national liberty of North Africa" that symbolized colonialism would be again an implementation of Fanon's argument about the creation of the new man in *Wretched of the Earth* by signifying the Arabic side of the Maghrebi citizenship while French colonialism was going on in Algeria. Kadiri said:

¹⁶⁰ *L'Opinion*, February 23rd 1958: Notre vœu est enfin de voir tous les trois pays de L'Afrique du Nord unifiés par l'institution d'une fédération qu'appellent et justifient la géographie, l'histoire, l'économie, et une commune civilisation. Notre vœu est que le peuple du l'Afrique du Nord sera appelé come le Maghrébin mais pas le Français. Vous allez pouvoir visiter librement le pays, vous rendre compte par vous moresque tous les éléments de la population entretiennent des relations amicales, non seulement sur le plan officiel mais dans les contacts de la vie et toujours.

The union of North Africa: [...] A single people united by a common religion, geography, linguistics, and history will be our objective. We must live our century. The movements of the National Liberty of the North Africa were constituted by the unity of Arab Maghreb. We did not get our liberties to stay isolated. We must unite.¹⁶¹

Allal al Fassi's Maghreb Union idea was realized in the Tangiers Conference on April 27th-28th 1958. Al Fassi gave a speech at the conference that touched upon the benefit of such a union to pacify the impacts of the colonization of the Maghreb and Moroccan Maghrebness. Fassi's speech used the word "colonizers" to symbolize colonialism led to the Tangier Chart that determined the common action of three Maghreb states to find solutions to the problems in the Maghreb region. The Chart considered which actions to take in order to promote Maghreb unity against any future actions of the colonizers. The speech was the full implementation of Fanon's idea of the creation of the new man after decolonization in *Wretched of the Earth* by signifying the Maghreb Union that defined the citizen of the Maghreb as the Maghrebi instead of French. Fassi said:

Conscious to express the unanimated wish of the people of the Arab Maghreb to unite in their destiny in the national solidarity of their interests; convinced that the moment has arrived to concretize this wish of union in the context of common institutions by letting them to assume the role that they would possess in the concert of nations; decided to realize this union, considering federalization would respond better to the realities of the participating countries; proposed the construction of an institution that would unite the assemblies of Tunisia and Algeria; recommends periodical meetings between the three states to consult the problems faced by the member countries; recommending to the states of the North Africa not to take any action

¹⁶¹ *L'Opinion*, March 30th 1958: Union de l'Afrique du Nord: un seul peuple aux intérêts communs et imposent l'union, surtout après les démarches alliances. Un seul peuple qu'unissent des liens religieux, linguistiques, historiques, et géographiques qui exigent notre union, on doit vivre notre époque. Les mouvements de Libération Nationale d'Afrique du Nord se sont constitués à la volonté populaire favorable à l'unité de Maghreb Arabe. On n'a pas reconquis nos libertés à rester isolé.

independently in foreign relations and national defense of the region against colonizers.¹⁶²

Almost a year later, the first fruits of the Tangier Chart were born. On June 30th 1959, the Bank of Morocco that was still being run by the French was nationalized, and the French franc was replaced by Moroccan dirham. Four months later on October 18th 1959, the Bank of Maghreb was officially opened. Moreover, the Istiqlal Party declared in the Arab Union of Baghdad on the January 30th 1960 that they formally boycotted French politics in Algeria.¹⁶³

6.2.3. Nullification Attempts of Protectorates' Impacts through Africanness

The Moroccan regional nationalism that began with the addition of Maghrebness in Moroccan national identity at the end of the colonial period also included "Africanness" after 1956. Moroccan state and non-state actors started to regard Africanness as a new component of Moroccan national identity due to the anticolonial struggles of African states to gain their independence. In a short time,

¹⁶² *L'Opinion* April 4th 1958: Consciente d'exprimer la volonté unanime des peuples du Maghreb arabe d'unir leur destin, dans la solidarité étroite de leur destin, dans la solidarité étroite de leurs intérêts. Convaincue que le moment est venu de concrétiser cette volonté d'union dans le cadre d'institutions communes a fin de leur permettre d'assumer le rôle qui leur incombe dans le concert des nations, décide d'œuvrer a la réalisation de cet union, considère que la forme fédérale répond le mieux aux réalistes des pays participants, propose l'institution d'une assemblée consultative de Maghreb arabe issue des assemblées nationales locales en Tunisie et du Maroc et du conseil national de la révolution algérienne. Cette assemblée aura compétence pour étudier les questions d'intérêt commun et formuler des recommandations aux organes exécutifs locaux. Recommande des rencontres périodiques et chaque fois que les circonstances l'exigent entre les dirigeants locaux de trois pays pour se consulter sur les problèmes du Maghreb et pour examiner la mise en exécution des recommandations de l'Assemblée Consultative de Maghreb arabe. La conférence recommande aux gouvernements des pays du Maghreb arabe de ne pas engager séparément le destin de l'Afrique du Nord dans les domaines des relations extérieures et de la défense contre les colonialistes.

¹⁶³ *Le matin de Sahara*, January 30th 1969: La proposition Marocaine d'un sommet Arabe a Baghdâd: La proposition d'un boycottage totale de la France pour sa politique en Algérie.

Morocco adopted Africanness in such a way that it became the spokesperson of these African states.

Moroccan state and non-state actors started to feel the impacts of European colonialism on Africa and Moroccan Africanness first in the Casablanca Conference in January 1961. Many African delegations were hosted in Morocco for this conference. Discussion topics ranged from Congolese and the Algerian independences, racial discrimination against African citizens, the unity of Africa, the organization of African societies' institutions, the nuclear proliferation of the French in the Sahara Desert, and the Ruanda Urundi ethnic conflict. At the end of the conference, delegates signed a resolution called the Casablanca Chart for the establishment of the African Union for an Independent Africa. Individual freedom was the first definition of Moroccan Africanness in the Moroccan national identity where impacts of European colonialism were attempted to be erased. The sultan Mohamed V made an opening speech on January 4th 1961 that emphasized the independence, liberation and sovereignty of all the states in Africa. The aim of this speech was to liberate the individual existence and individual freedom of the African states that had not yet declared their independences. In the speech Mohamed V talked about the full support of independent states to non-independent ones in Africa. He emphasized the Africanness of Morocco. Mohamed V also underlined how Morocco would fight against the future colonization of Africa and used the words "neocolonialism", "economic pressures", and "foreign domination" to symbolize colonialism in his speech. The sultan also implemented Fanon's argument in *The Wretched of the Earth* about the need for creating a new man in Africa after colonialism, by pointing out that Africa must be completely free from Europe. The sultan said:

We, the chiefs of African states, brought together in Casablanca from January 4th to 7th January 1961, are conscious of our responsibilities towards the African continent. By proclaiming our determination to make liberty triumph all over Africa, and to realize its unity, by affirming our wish to conserve and consolidate our unity of vision and action to keep the independence, sovereignty, territorial, and national integrity of Africa in our international relations, by proclaiming our wish to liberate African territories under foreign domination and to deliver them help and assistance, to liquidate colonialism and neocolonialism in all forms, not to encourage the establishment of troops and foreign military bases that would endanger the liberation of Africa, to employ ourselves to fight against the political interventions and economic pressures, by proclaiming the necessity of all African states to use the natural resources for the benefits of their own people and nation, we express our aim to free Africa, our fight for its unity and provide its security.¹⁶⁴

At the end of the Casablanca Chart where Morocco highlighted its Africanness, the 1962 Constitution referred to the Africanist side of Morocco. Article 1 states: “Morocco is a constitutional monarchy that belongs to Africa, Islam is the official state religion and Arabic is its official language”.¹⁶⁵

The impacts of colonialism on Moroccan Africanism were also observed in the image of Africans. Mohamed V gave a speech to the African delegations on March 22nd 1961 about that the need to get rid of the racist attitude of the European colonialism as soon as possible. In the speech he emphasized the impacts of European colonialism on the individual freedom and individual existence of the

¹⁶⁴ *Le Petit Marocain*, January 5th 1961: Nous, chefs d'états africains réunis à Casablanca du 4 au 7 Janvier 1961, conscients de nos responsabilités à l'égard du continent africain. En proclamant notre détermination de faire triompher la liberté dans toute l'Afrique et de se réaliser son unité, en affirmant notre volonté de conserver et de consolider notre unité de vue et d'action dans les affaires internationales pour sauvegarder l'Indépendance chèrement acquise, la souveraineté, l'intégrité, et la nationalité territoriale de nos états, de renforcer la paix dans le monde en pratiquant une politique de non-alignement, en proclamant notre volonté de libérer les territoires africains encore sous domination étrangère, de leur prêter aide et assistance, de liquider colonialisme et le néocolonialisme sous toutes leurs formes, de ne pas encourager l'établissement des troupes et des bases étrangères qui met en danger la libération de l'Afrique, et de nous employer également à débarrasser le continent africain des interventions politiques et des pressions économiques, en affirmant notre volonté d'intensifier nos efforts en vue de créer une coopération effective entre les Etats Africains dans les domaines économique, social et culturel, nous exprimons notre but de consolider la liberté de l'Afrique, de bâtir son unité, et d'assurer sa sécurité.

¹⁶⁵ Article 1: le Maroc y est une monarchie constitutionnelle appartenant à l'Afrique, dont l'islam est religion d'état et l'arabe langue officielle.

Africanness of the Moroccan national identity. He intended to liberate all of the African nations from the colonial system in Africa which was still racist and neocolonialist. For this purpose, Mohamed V called for African states to cooperate under the shadow of the United Nations. In his speech he repeated that being African means to fight colonialism and neocolonialism, using the words “racism” and “neocolonialism” to symbolize colonialism. The sultan’s speech was an implementation of Fanon’s argument in *Wretched of the Earth* and also Memmi’s one in *Discourse on Colonialism* that defined Europe as morally corrupt, racist and the *raison d’état* of colonialism. The sultan said:

Let us map the course for a new Africa, through the vital interest of the people of Africa who are obsessed with peace and liberty. In fact, the regime of the classical colonialism that we know accepted its defeat at last. We, who trust the mission of the United Nations, who believe in the benefits of international cooperation decided to liquidate the remaining colonial regime. We are the men of good standing whose principal desire is to put an end to the colonial system. Africa lived a period in its history in which it was colonized, divided, exploited and humiliated. The main aim of this summit is then to liquidate the colonial regime, eliminate racism, fight against neocolonialism, defend the independence of African states, provide the non-alignment movement in Africa, and evacuate all foreign forces from our lands.¹⁶⁶

Africanness became a component of Moroccan national identity at the end of this first period. Feeling that Morocco took place in the struggle of African people against colonialism, the sultan hosted the Casablanca Summit in 1961. Two years

¹⁶⁶ *Le Petit Marocain*, March 22nd 1961: Elaborons la charte de l’Afrique nouvelle avec un vif intérêt par tous les peuples près de paix/liberté, abattisse a des résultats positifs pour la libération de l’Afrique. En effet, le régime colonial classique tel que nous le connaissons a refusé à admettre sa défaite. Nous, qui avons foi en la Mission des Nations Unis, qui croyons aux bienfaits de la coopération internationale et qui sommes décidés à liquider le régime coloniale qui existe encore sommes en force. On est des hommes de bonne volonté dont le principal souci est de mettre une fin au système coloniale. L’Afrique a connu une période de son histoire durant laquelle elle a été colonisé, divisé, exploitée, privée de ses droits et humilié. Notre objectif doit être liquidation de régime coloniale, élimination du racisme, lutte contre le néocolonialisme, défense d’Independence des pays africains, non alignement de l’Afrique à l’Ouest, évacuation de toutes les forces étranger de nos pays.

after the summit, the Organization of African Unity was founded and Morocco became a member in 1963 to show its Moroccan Africanness.

The first seven years of postcolonial nationhood in Morocco was quite peaceful. There was no serious threat or opposition to the policies or discourses of the Istiqlal Party. State elites in the Istiqlal Party very clearly criticized colonialism in general, and that which was particular to Morocco, and implemented important policies like agrarian reform, exclusion of Morocco from the common market, the Maghreb Union to pacify negative impacts on Moroccanness, Moroccan Africanness and Moroccan Arab Maghrebness that constructed the Moroccan national identity in this period. The pacification of the negative impacts of colonialism was softened after 1959 when former Istiqlal Party member Mehdi ben Barka founded the socialist National Union of Popular Forces. The years 1959 and 1963 passed with the struggle of the Istiqlal Party to eliminate Ben Barka's party. This struggle finished when Ben Barka was exiled in 1963.

6.3. The 1963-1969 Period in Postcolonial Morocco

The 1963-1969 period different greatly from the period between 1956 and 1963. The first change was the name and the status of the Moroccan ruler. Sultan Mohamed V died in 1961 and was replaced by Hassan II. However, Hassan II preferred the name of King, instead of Sultan, which actually changed the status of the Moroccan throne. Morocco entered the period of 1963-1972 with the leadership of Hassan II as the new (and first) King. The second difference was in the political sphere. Unlike the 1956-1962 period where the absolute ruler was the Istiqlal Party, the 1963-1972 period

passed under the authority of King Hassan II. In this sense, King Hassan II was an active ruler unlike his father Mohamed V who left the governmental affairs in the hands of the Istiqlal Party. The third difference was in the number of public opposition movements. Unlike the 1956-1963 period where the Istiqlal Party did not receive any serious threat from the people, the 1963-1972 period was characterized by people protesting against King Hassan II. The actions that created an opposition to Hassan II started as soon as he came to power in 1962. Hassan II strengthened his rule and the monarchy by changing the 1962 Constitution. He dissolved the Parliament in 1965, which created public tension against him. Moroccans marched against Hassan II's authoritarian rule in Casablanca on March 22nd 1965, but the police suppressed it and killed 8 students. Casablanca became the venue of another march against Hassan II by students when Hassan II decided that the primary class students would continue their education in the secondary class without taking any comprehensive exams. The previous students who continued their secondary class with the exams thought that the policy was unfair to them and assembled in *La Corniche* quarter of Casablanca to protest the king's decision. The royal army under the command of Hassan II intervened on the march and killed 23 students that day. As a result, Hassan II declared a state of exception that started in 1965 and ended in 1970. The state of exception, of course, prevented opportunities for revolt against Hassan II. At the end of state of exception, the king had to contend with two unsuccessful military coups (1971 and 1972). The fourth major difference during this time period is that the postcolonial critiques addressed to colonialism in the 1963-1972 discourses worked out mostly over Moroccanism. This situation was different in the 1956-1963 period where the critiques of colonialism were not addressed only through Moroccanism, but also Africanism and Maghrebism. In this period,

Moroccanness was the only component of the Moroccan national identity where the impact of the Protectorates was attempted to be mitigated.

6.3.1. Nullification Attempts of Protectorates' Impacts through through Moroccanness

Nullification of the impacts of the Protectorates through Moroccanness started with the 1963 Sand War with Algeria. The Resident General Augustine General Guillaume who ruled Morocco between 1951 and 1954 decided to give the Moroccan cities of Tindouf and Bechar to Algeria when it was found out that these two cities had rich iron and magnesium resources. The French, however, did not want to directly import these minerals from Morocco in order not to annoy the Moroccan sultan. Instead, they preferred to use the advantages of Algeria as a French colony since it was easier to justify their rule thanks to the assimilation policies they implemented.

When Morocco declared independence in 1956, the sultan Mohamed V did not want to claim any authority over Tindouf and Bachar until Algeria gained its independence. He was counting on a future Arab Maghreb Union and believed that Algeria would lend these two cities to Morocco as a result of Morocco's support for Algerian independence. However, the sultan's plans did not pan out in the way he thought. Algeria refused to lend these two cities to Morocco when it became independent in 1962. As the elites of a country that completely rejected colonial arrangements after independence, Morocco urged Algeria to evacuate these cities (Wild, 1966; Heggoy, 1970). Upon the refusal of this demand by the Algerian

President Ahmed Ben Bella, Morocco declared war against Algeria on October 14th 1963.

Four days before the royal army had moved on Algeria, King Hassan II gave a speech to the Moroccan people from his palace in Rabat. In a speech where he wanted to pacify the impacts of the French Protectorate based on the territorial definition of Moroccanness in the Moroccan national identity by liberating the people of Tindouf and Bachar from the colonial policies of the French, he used the words “blood” and “ancestors” to symbolize colonialism. Hassan II did not accept Tindouf and Bachar as belonging to Algeria as defined by French land policy in colonial Algeria. Accordingly, King Hassan II thought that these two cities must have belonged to Morocco, in contrast to the colonial arrangements made by the French. The king’s speech drew on almost all of the arguments about postcolonialism as the efforts to get rid of colonial norms. Moreover, it could be evaluated with the argument of Frantz Fanon in the *Wretched of the Earth* that the creation of a new man for Moroccans consisted of the people of Tindouf and Bachar as not Algerian defined by the French, but Moroccan. Hassan II said:

If we claim that we are a strong nation, if we claim that we are independent, and if we claim that we reject all the colonial implementations on us, we must take what belongs to us from the colonial policies. Our neighbor Algeria is invading our lands and they do not respect Morocco as Morocco respects them. We cannot leave our lands to Algeria. If we do this, we harm our territorial integrity for which our ancestors gave their blood.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁷ *Le Petit Marocain*, March 9th 1963: Si nous disons que le Maroc est un état fort, si nous disons que le Maroc est un état indépendant, et si nous disons que nous refusons toutes les politiques coloniales sur notre pays, nous devons prendre en retour ce qui nous appartient de ces politiques. Notre vision [est que ?] Algérie envahit nos terres et il ne respecte pas le Maroc comme le Maroc les respecte. Nous ne pouvons pas laisser nos terres à l’Algérie. Si nous laissons nos terres, ça sera dommage pour notre intégrité territoriale dont nos ancêtres ont sacrifié leur sang pour l’obtenir.

The Sand War that started upon the refusal of King Hassan II's proposal by the Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella to evacuate the cities of Tindouf and Bechar ended with no concrete outcomes. It was the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Sellasie who mediated between Hassan II and Ben Bella to end the war on March 11th 1964. However, the war resulted in King Hassan II spending most of the Moroccan annual budget for that year. Specifically, the treasury spent the whole amount of the budget that was earmarked for the 1962-1963 Moroccan education term. Moreover, a harsh famine hit Morocco in 1964. Accordingly, the King had to take austerity measures at the end of which increased his and the Istiqlal Party's authority. All of these problems pushed Morocco into a state of exception between 1965 and 1970.

Through the last years of the state of exception, the Istiqlal Party under the supervision of King Hassan II started an Arabization program. It was during this time that the Arabness discourse of Morocco emerged in the Moroccan national identity. According to a professor of Law in Casablanca, the Arabization program aimed at Morocco turning its back to Europe. The movement was cultural, like the one of Cultural Revolution in China, and it aimed at purifying the Moroccan dialect from the impacts of the French. This program was regarded by journalist Abdellah Memmes as a way to pacify the impacts of the French Protectorate on the language definition of Moroccaness. In an article he wrote on October 14th 1969, Memmes argued that the impacts of French language on Arabic must have not taken place. His article used the word "French" to symbolize colonialism, and could be compared with the argument of Fernandez Retamar in *On Caliban* where he criticizes the usage of Spanish words in the Cuban language that could be regarded as a direct impact of colonialism. With this article, Memmes showed his opposition to the cultural

hybridity that started in the French Protectorate with the introduction of French language to the Arab and Amazigh populations of Morocco. He wrote:

We must speak Arabic or French. Arabic French, this meaningless language, denaturalized, cacophonic magma, issue of two languages for their poetry, starts to be implanted among us. Meanwhile, if anybody is happy to use such words or expressions in their conversation by respecting their accent, the other completely denaturalizes the language and conjugates the Arab verbs in French. Rani m'elegati (je suis degati), marocanisaw (ils sont marocains) are examples.¹⁶⁸

The impacts of the Protectorates on Moroccaness changed direction from Algeria and language to the Western Sahara by October 1969. This was the time when King Hassan II started to follow his father Mohamed V's M'hamid opening to Western Sahara. The Western Sahara was still being administered by the Spanish administration in Madrid after the abolition of the Spanish Protectorate in 1956. The Spanish were regarding the citizens of Western Sahara as Spanish, which was opposed by the Moroccans and they were not willing to give the Western Sahara lands to Morocco even if Spanish colonization had ended. When a special European journal called *European Chemical News* declared that Spain would use the phosphate resources of Western Sahara, King Hassan II started a nationalist campaign in order to totally end the colonial status of Western Sahara. As Allal al Fassi said on October 20th 1969, Western Sahara was being used for Spanish and French propaganda in the colonial period. Allal al Fassi observed the impacts of French and Spanish Protectorates on the Western Sahara lands that the Moroccan state thought belonged

¹⁶⁸ *L'Opinion*, October 14th 1968: Il faut parler arabe ou le français. L'arabo-français, ce langage broutard, dénaturé, magma cacophonique, issue de deux langues réputées pour leur poésie, commence triomphalement à s'implanter parmi nous. Cependant, si quelqu'un se content d'employer dans leur conversation des mots ou des expressions françaises en respectant leur Accent, d'autres dénature complètement la langue et conjuguant en arabe des verbes français, ou vice versa. Rani m'degati (je suis degati), marocainisaw (ils sont marocains).

to Morocco. By pointing out the impacts of the French and Spanish Protectorates on the territory definition of Moroccanness, he argued that Morocco would not accept the Spanish character of the Western Sahara. Allal al Fassi's speech showed how the French were effective in the Spanish protectorate in the colonial rule. His speech could be evaluated by the argument of the postcolonial critique on the reconsideration of history after decolonization. (It can also be evaluated, once again, by Fanon and Césaire.) Al Fassi's speech was also an implementation of Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* since al Fassi imagined the people of Western Sahara as the people of Morocco:

We do not accept such claims, and we are aware of that the authorities that are close to Paris would like to shift the Moroccan character of the Sahara to the Spanish. They do not want to accept that the phosphate exploitation rights belong to the Moroccans. To offer to France and Spain the possibilities, concessions, and advantages of the exploitation of phosphate of Moroccan Sahara could constitute the charm propaganda declared only by the Spanish.¹⁶⁹

6.4. The 1969-1984 Period in Postcolonial Morocco

The third period in which the impacts of colonialism can be observed on postcolonial Moroccan national identity started with two military coups against King Hassan II in 1971 and 1972 by the end of state of exception. King Hassan II survived these coups

¹⁶⁹ La revue spécialisée européenne *Chemical News* a dit l'exploitation des gisements des phosphates du Sahara était espagnole. On n'accepte pas ça. On remarque, néanmoins, que pour la première fois, des sociétés françaises et non est moindres, dont plusieurs sont très proches de gouvernement de Paris, sont cités parmi les trusts s'intéressent à l'exploitation du gisement minier de Sahara Marocain. Offrir à la France et à l'Espagne possibilités, concessions et avantages dans l'exploitation des gisements de phosphate du Sahara Marocain peut constituer dans la campagne de charme déclenchée par L'Espagne.

and became the pioneer of the “Moroccanization” of Western Sahara. Between 1969 and 1984, efforts by Moroccan state and non-state actors were addressed to pacify the impacts of the Spanish Protectorate on Moroccanness, and European colonialism in general on Moroccan Africanness and Moroccan Islam. Moreover, it was this third period where the Moroccanness started to be the dominant component of Moroccan national identity with the collapse of Maghebness due to the conquest of the Moroccan city Tantan by Algeria and the withdrawal of Morocco from the African Union with the African Union’s admission of Saharaoui Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as its new member. Therefore, this period was the one where Moroccanness was most strongly mobilized.

6.4.1. Nullification Attempts of Protectorates’ Impacts through Moroccanness

The first event where the impacts of the Spanish Protectorate on Moroccanness were attempted to be mitigated by state actors was with regard to Western Sahara. Western Sahara was colonized by the Spanish at the 1884 Berlin Congress. However, the unpopulated area of the lands due to the Sahara Desert made the Spanish link the administration of the Western Sahara lands to the Spanish Protectorate in 1936. After the abolition of the Spanish Protectorate, the Spanish did not want to evacuate the lands of Western Sahara due to their rich phosphate reserves. This was why in 1972, King Hassan II decided to bring the Moroccan population there and started the Green March campaign.

The Green March organization process started in 1972 when the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to solve the problem of Western Sahara

with a referendum on self-determination. The Foreign Affairs Ministers of Morocco, Spain and Mauritania came together in the Nouakchott Summit of 1973 to discuss the details of the referendum. However, the summit was canceled when the Moroccan Minister argued that Western Sahara must have been considered as an important part of Moroccan territorial integrity.

The referendum was held on April 1975 and favored Spain. King Hassan II did not recognize the referendum results and decided to launch a nationalist campaign against Spain. First, the King decided to apply to the International Court of Justice to render the referendum results inactive. The court evaluated Morocco's demand and concluded that Western Sahara was not a *terra nullius* during the Spanish invasion. The court also recognized all the legal and solidarity links between Western Sahara and Morocco. These decisions gave Hassan II enough justification for the Green March.

One day before the march, Hassan II gave a speech to the Moroccan people on television. He pointed out the impacts of the Spanish protectorate on the territorial definition of Moroccaness, and asked the Moroccan people to march into Western Sahara to possess the lands against the Spanish. The King used the words of "integrity", and "motherland" that symbolized colonialism, and he talked about the importance of the Western Sahara for the unity of Morocco. His speech covered a critique of colonialism as used by Ania Loomba and Leila Gandhi, by indicating that Western Sahara would belong to Morocco in the end. Hassan II regarded the people of the Western Sahara as Moroccans. He said:

This march will be the victory of the Moroccan people. Dear people, in the first place, we have never been so attached to our country, our emblem and our anthem as we are today. You know very well how to sacrifice yourself for your motherland. Dear People, tomorrow, you will cross the border.

Tomorrow, you will start your march. Tomorrow, you will take a land that belongs to you. Tomorrow, you will embrace a part of land that belongs to the integrity of your soil.¹⁷⁰

The King's decision to march on Western Sahara found great support among the Moroccan people. The journalist Akram al Yassaoui wrote on his *L'Opinion* column on November 29th 1975 that the problem of the Sahara was a problem of imperialism. By implementing Lenin's imperialism argument, Césaire's argument that colonization is a system that works for the benefits of the colonizer, Fanon's argument of capitalism as a market, Yassoui said:

The Arab lawyers stigmatize the colonization of our Sahara and denounce the conspiracy conducted by Spain and imperialism. Stigmatized once again by the pursuit of colonization by Spain of our Sahara of an Arab-African nation, we condemn the waves of repression engaged by the occupation forces.¹⁷¹

Moreover, the chief editor of the *Le Matin de Sahara* Mohnir Rahmani wrote about the imperialistic side of the Spanish invasion of the Sahara, again by attributing the same arguments the same day. In his column, he wrote:

The recuperation of our Sahara is a question of life and death. It is a colonial occupation: there are palaces on the dunes of our Sahara. The Moroccan youth is conscious of the role it would play to liberate or Sahraoui brothers from the hands of colonialism and the unconditional return of the territories occupied to the motherland, Morocco. The occupation of Sebta, Melilla, Sahara and Jafariya Islands cannot be accepted.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ *Le Matin de Sahara*, November 5th 1975 : Sa Majesté le Roi: Que cette marche soit celle de la victoire du peuple marocain. Cher Peuple, en premier lieu, nous avons acquis la conviction a présent que le Maroc et son devenir sont entre les mains des patriotes surs, convaincus généreux, et attaché plus que jamais à leur sol et emblème. Tu sais bien sacrifier toi-même par [pour ?] ta patrie. Cher Peuple, demain, tu franchiras la frontière. Demain, tu en termineras ta marche. Demain, tu fouleras une terre qui est tienne. Tu palperas.

¹⁷¹ *L'Opinion*, November 29th 1975: Les avocats arabes stigmatisent la colonisation de notre Sahara et dénoncent le complot trompé par l'Espagne et impérialisme. Stigmatisé une nouvelle fois la poursuite de la colonisation par l'Espagne notre Sahara de la colonisation par l'Espagne notre Sahara de la nation arabo-africaine, condamne les vagues de répression engagées par les forces d'occupation.

¹⁷² *Le Matin de Sahara*, November 29th 1975: La récupération de Notre Sahara: Une question de vie ou mort. L'occupation coloniale c'est des châteaux sur le sable de notre Sahara. La jeunesse

With the participation of 750.000 people, the march positively served the Moroccan interests but did not totally end the conflict. Three countries, Morocco, Spain and Mauritania, signed a territorial accord on November 14th 1975. However, another actor was involved in the problem. Algeria started to support the armed Polisario group that had been defending the independence of Western Sahara since 1973, in order to use the Sahara lands for the oil pipeline project they would construct between Algeria and the United States, according to a journalist living in Rabat today. When the accords were signed, Algeria understood that its Western Sahara interests would be in danger and declared war against Morocco on January 27th 1976 by shooting a Moroccan F5 in Mauritania. The war took a month and ended with no concrete result. On March 26th 1976, Spain declared that it had completely withdrawn from Western Sahara but Morocco now had a new problem. After the withdrawal of Spain from Western Sahara, a group of people from Western Sahara with the support of the Algerians founded the Saharaoui Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on May 20th 1976. SADR forces attacked Mauritania and Morocco on August 20th 1977 and conquered the city of Tantan on January 28th 1979.

Morocco faced with a new struggle after the declaration of the SADR on Western Sahara. Moroccan state elites this time emphasized the Moroccanism of Western Sahara not against the Spanish, but against the SADR and Algeria. This was the first moment where the Maghrebness of Morocco started to collapse and Moroccaness became dominant over it. The King was already touched by the SADR conquest of the city of Tantan. On July 9th 1979, he gave another speech to

marocaine est consciente du rôle qu'elle a joué en vue de libération de nos frères Sahraouis de la joué de colonialisme et du retour inconditionnelle des territoires occupés à la mère patrie, le Maroc. L'occupation de Sebta, Melilla, et les îles des Jafariyas ne peuvent pas être acceptés comme le Sahara.

the Moroccan people. In his speech, the King one more time underlined that Western Sahara would belong to Morocco by one more time emphasizing the Moroccaness of the Western Sahara:

Today, you celebrate with me my 50th birthday. It is an occasion to express my gratitude to God who made me the mother and father of Moroccans. It is now the 50th year of my citizenship and to think of its responsibility. These feelings were born in 1944. I was then a 15 year old boy and my father gave me this advice: If you want to liberate your country, then study. After the days and months since this day, we claim, dear people that the nature of the essence of the Sahara problem is moving to the advantage of the Algerian state. The Sahara question is a Trojan horse for the recognized powers and forces in Africa. We are going to try to express to the African states that the only authority that is known in Western Sahara is Morocco. And then we will one more time ask the people of Sahara: Do you want to be Moroccan or not?¹⁷³

The King's arguments were supported by the Chamber of Moroccan Representatives Dey Old Sidi Bab. Bab repeated the superiority of Moroccaness over Maghrebism by arguing that he cannot accept any Algerian authority over the Western Sahara. On October 12th 1979, he said:

The attachment of Moroccans to their Sahara territories has the same value as the French were attached to Alsace Lorraine. Morocco is ready to fight on all fronts, military or diplomatic. Four years after the Green March, the spirit is the same. Morocco wants its Sahara back and does not want to see the creation of an Algerian nation over Moroccan territories.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ *Le Matin de Sahara*, July 9th 1979: En ce jour, tu célèbres avec moi mon 50e anniversaire. C'est la une occasion d'exprimer ma gratitude au tout puissant qui m'a fait par sa grâce Marocain de mère et de père. Il est temps après 50 ans de vie enfant que citoyen, de penser à évaluer la responsabilité et la citoyenneté. Ces sentiments ont germé en 1944, j'étais alors un jeune homme de 15 ans et mon père me donnait ce conseil: Si tu veux la libération de ton pays, alors étudie. Au fil des jours et des mois, nous constatons chère peuple, que la nature de l'essence du problème de Sahara change à l'avantage de l'état algérien. La question du Sahara est un cheval de Troie pour des puissances connues et acculés en Afrique. Nous essayerons d'expliquer aux chefs d'état africains étant le seul état d'autorité au Sahara que le Sahara est au Maroc. Et après, on va demander encore une fois aux peuple de Sahara: Vous voulez ou pas être Marocains?

¹⁷⁴ *Le Matin de Sahara*, October 12th 1979: L'attachement des Marocains à leurs territoires sahariens est aussi vivace que celui des français à Alsace Lorraine, a dit M.Dey Ould Sidi Baba. Le Maroc est prêt à battre sur tous fronts, militaire et diplomatique. Quatre ans après la Marche Verte, l'esprit est le même. Le Maroc veut son Sahara et n'existe d'un peuple algérien sur nos frontières de Sahara.

There were no concrete developments on the Western Sahara problem for Morocco in the next five years. In order to protect Sahara lands from SADR, Morocco started to construct a wall in January 1980. Called *Sahara utile*, the project was not fulfilled due to budgetary reasons. Nevertheless, the year 1984 was critical for the conflict. In 1984, the dimension of the Western Sahara changed from the direction of Algeria to the Organization of African Union (OAU). After the collapse of Maghrebness due to the attacks of Algeria on Morocco to possess Western Sahara lands, this change also pushed Morocco to question its Africanness. Accordingly, the OAU declared that SADR could start membership negotiations with the organization. As soon as this declaration was received in Morocco, King Hassan II directly urged OAU not to accept SADR as its member. The King stated that if OAU accepted SADR as a member, he would have to withdraw Morocco's membership from the organization. The withdrawal of Morocco's membership from the OAU was used to mitigate the impacts of the Spanish Protectorate on Moroccaness. The King said on October 29th 1984:

If SADR is admitted to the African Union, Morocco will leave it and those who would take the responsibility of pushing Morocco away will have taken a historic decision with regards to Africa. Morocco will say: Gentlemen I leave you, I wish you good luck with your new partner by hoping that it would bring you all that Morocco brought you until now. My country is not bigger than it was but you must not forget that it is not smaller than you think.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁵ *Le Matin de Sahara*, October 29th 1984: Si la prétendue RASD est admise, le Maroc quittera OUA et ceux qui prendront la responsabilité de le pousser jusqu'à cette limite intolérable, auront pris une responsabilité historique à l'égard de l'Afrique. Le Maroc dira: Messieurs je vous quitte, je vous souhaite bonne chance avec votre nouvelle patrie en espérant qu'il vous apportera ce que le Maroc vous ai apporté jusqu'au présent. Mon pays n'est pas plus grand qu'il ne l'est. Mais il ne faut pas oublier qu'il n'est pas plus petit que l'on pense.

Le Matin de Sahara gave full support to Hassan's decision to withdraw Morocco from OAU. In the second edition of the paper on November 11th 1984 we read:

Africa will be ridiculous if it recognizes the SADR because it will be the only organization to do so. If Morocco will withdraw from the African Union, it will do it physically and morally. But it will stay faithful to the resolutions of Nairobi I-II. We will keep our whole bilateral relations with the members of the African Union.¹⁷⁶

Despite the threat of Hassan II, the OAU accepted SADR as its new member. As a result, Morocco withdrew its membership from the organization with Zaire who followed Morocco. The withdrawal decision of King Hassan II found great support in the Moroccan media. *Al Maghreb* from the national press said on November 2nd 1984:

It is an absurdity that a founding member of an organization is obliged to leave it to be replaced by a ghost entity. Paradoxically, the ones who play this game are the same who think they are progressivist, anti-imperialist, and working for the emancipation, the progress and the liberation of Africa, whereas they actually falsify history and continue the colonialist strategy which consists of ongoing, balkanization of the continent and to damage the unity and sovereignty of the African states.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁶ *Le matin de Sahara*, November 11th 1984: L'Afrique sera ridicule si elle reconnaît la RASD car elle sera la seule organisation à le faire. Si le Maroc se retire d'OUA, il se retirera physiquement et moralement. Mais il restera lié par les résolutions de Nairobi I-II. Nous conservons nos relations bilatérales avec les membres d'OUA.

¹⁷⁷ *L'Opinion*, November 2nd 1984: Il n'est donc plus grande aberration ni plus grave absurdité que de voir un membre fondateur d'une organisation obligé de quitter celle-ci pour être remplacé par une entité fantôme. Paradoxalement, ceux qui se livrent à ce jeu puéril sont ceux la mêmes qui se targuent d'être progressistes, anti impérialistes, et d'œuvrer à l'émancipation, au progrès, et à la libération de l'Afrique alors qu'en fait ils ne font que falsifier histoire et continuer la stratégie colonialiste qui consiste à dépecer, à balkaniser le continent et à attenter à l'unité et à la souveraineté des états Africains.

6.4.2. Nullification Attempts of Protectorates' Impacts through Africanness

Before the withdrawal of Morocco from the OAU after its decision to admit the SADR as a new member in 1984, which caused the collapse of Moroccan Africanness, it was seen between 1969 and 1984 that the Africanness component of the Moroccan national identity was promoted in order to work against the impacts of colonialism. On August 20th 1975, King Hassan II addressed the Moroccan Parliament with regards to the importance of freedom in Africa, echoing Fanon's argument on the necessary delinking from colonialism after decolonization in *Wretched of the Earth*. The King who used the word "eradication" to symbolize colonialism's impacts said:

The date of August 20th constitutes the starting point of the eradication of colonialism in our African continent. It is evident that the ones who sacrificed their liberty and their lives are the heroes of this history.¹⁷⁸

On the other hand, Prime Minister Dr. Azzeddin Laraki highlighted on July 12th 1980 that Morocco was an African nation. Laraki in his interview to *L'Opinion* regarded the cooperation of Morocco with the Latin American states as the way to pacify the negative impacts of colonialism on Moroccan Africanism. By using the word decolonization as a symbol of colonialism, Laraki used the arguments of Frantz Fanon in *Wretched of the Earth* about the creation of new man after decolonization by pointing out the African Morocco. He said:

¹⁷⁸ *Le Matin de Sahara*, August 20th 1975: La date de 20 aout constitue le début de l'effrontement du colonialisme dans notre continent africaine. Il est évident que ceux qui ont sacrifié leur liberté, leur vie, leurs biens furent les héros de cet épopée.

Morocco is an African state and nation. We are maybe the African state that is best cooperating with Latin America because we have the instrument of Spanish language. Morocco represents In the process of decolonization Morocco represents a unique case. It is a parenthesis in a long history if we take into account 50 years of colonization.¹⁷⁹

And on October 7th 1984, Moroccan princess Laila Fatima Zahra one more time stated the Africanism of Morocco in the Women African seminar in Casablanca:

We will treat together the problems and will find solutions by assuring that our people will be in good shape and with a better future. I estimate that these meetings will have the same success in the African continent where all of us are part of it. Morocco is an African state, and Moroccans are Africans.¹⁸⁰

Hassan II's African identity for Morocco was also supported by Leopold Sedar Senghor. In his speech at the Marrakech National Congress of poets on December 13th 1984, he said:

Hassan II is one of the most cultivated among the African chiefs in all domains. His state is one of the countries that work actively to help the symbiosis of Arab-Amazigh Africa and Negro African Africa.¹⁸¹

6.5. The Role of Islam in Postcolonial Moroccan National Identity between 1956 and 1984

¹⁷⁹ *Le Matin de Sahara*, July 12th 1980: Le Maroc est un pays et nation africain. On est peut-être le pays africain le mieux situé par la coopération avec Amérique Latine parce que sur le plan culturel, nous avons l'instrument de la langue espagnole dans notre pays. Le Maroc représente dans le processus de la décision un cas unique. C'est une parenthèse dans une longue histoire avec 50 ans de colonisation.

¹⁸⁰ *Le Matin de Sahara*, October 8th 1984: Nous traiterons ensemble les problèmes et trouverons les solutions en vue d'assurer à nos peuples le bien-être et un avenir meilleur. Je souhaite également que ces rencontres réalisent le même succès par le continent africain ou le Maroc est un pays africain.

¹⁸¹ *Le Matin de Sahara*, December 13th 1984: Marrakech au Congrès National de poètes Leopold Sedar Senghor a dit: Hassan II est l'un des plus cultivés parmi les chefs Africains dans tous les domaines et son pays est l'un de ceux qui travaillent activement pour aider symbiose de l'Afrique arabe berbère et de l'Afrique negro africaine.

In the 1956 -1984 period where this chapter analyzed the development of Moroccanness in the Moroccan national identity that after 1984 was constructed via hybridity by King Hassan II with Europeanness, the role of Islam also continued all the time. As the basis of Moroccanness, Islam was at the center of the Istiqlal Party leader Allal al Fassi's nationalist vision. The one party rule of the Istiqlal left no room for any leftist ideas, and Islam was used to eliminate all these opposing views. Islam was the main tool to fight against any leftist ideas. Islam was so important in the first years of independent Morocco that the alliance it had established with communism in 1943 was abolished by King Hassan II, who banned the Communist Party. In an interview we read:

Eric Laurent: I ask you this question because the Communist Party was banned in 1960 and it was done by your father who was condemning all the materialist ideologies.

Hassan II: This was a marvelously rendered judgment. The affair was absorbed under a religious angle. The Communist Party was atheist and they could not have the right to work in a country where its religion was Islam. The ones who stayed out of the ban changed their names and somehow survived.¹⁸²

The importance of Islam in Moroccan national identity was also reflected in the 1962 Constitution that made the Moroccan King the Commander of the Faithful (Amir al Muminin) and that the state religion would be Islam.

During the 1963-1972 period, King Hassan II tried to found an Islamic League that would be complementary to the Organization of the Arab League. The Islamic League was also a step of King Hassan II to divert Morocco's foreign policy

¹⁸² Je vous pose cette question car en 1960 le parti communiste a été interdit et le jugement de la cour d'appel faisait état d'un discours prononcé par votre père, dans lequel il condamnait toute idéologie matérialiste. Hassan II: Ce fut un jugement merveilleusement rendu. Les magistrats n'ont pas jugé au fond d'affaire a été absorbé sous l'angle religieux. Le Parti communiste étant athée ne pouvait avoir droit de citer dans un pays dont la religion est l'islam. Du reste, les communistes ont changé leur nom et ils ont été de nouveau autorisés.

towards the Islamic World. When he survived the 1971 and 1972 coups, he embraced Islam and declared the Moroccan state as the guardian of the Islamic civilization. In one of his speeches as the Parliament on July 9th 1972, he said:

Our state has always been a guardian of patrimony and Islamic civilization. Today, our view is to move from subject to another. Fundamentally, it is about moral and religious emancipation. Islam is characterized by spirit. Islam makes people by puberty.¹⁸³

In a different speech four months later on November 5th 1972, he said:

Proud of our language and our civilization: Its Islam, in fact, that perfects our morality that makes of us a nation conscious of itself. It's again Islam that let us be proud of our language and civilization. It is Islam again that led us to participate in the biggest humanity victory driven by Prophet Mohammed.¹⁸⁴

Islam was part of Moroccan national identity since the 8th century also felt the impacts of colonialism in this period. The Istiqlal Party leader Mohamed Boucetta observed the negative impacts of colonialism on Moroccan Islam with the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. In an interview he gave to *L'Opinion* on January 24th 1980, Boucetta said that Morocco would give maximum assistance to Afghanistan as it was conquered by the imperialist Soviet Union. As a way to pacify the negative impacts of colonialism on Islam and Moroccan Islam, Boucetta declared that Morocco would have send support to Afghanistan: "To defend Afghanistan is to defend Islam and ourselves. These are our values and our faith that moves us to

¹⁸³ *L'Opinion*, July 9th 1972: Notre pays a été demeure un des gardiens du patrimoine et de la civilisation de l'Islam. Aujourd'hui notre propos est de retirer d'un sujet à un autre ordre. Il s'agit fondamentalement de la formation et d l'émancipation sur le plan moral et de religion. Islam ne se caractérisé point par l'esprit. Islam rend individu par la puberté.

¹⁸⁴ *L'Opinion*, November 5th 1972: Fier de notre langue et de notre civilisation. C'est bien Islam, en effet, qui ont parfait notre morale, qui a fait de nous une nation consciente de ses actes et de ses choix pour le sacrifice. C'est Islam qui nous a permis d'être fiers de notre langue-civilisation. C'est Islam encore qui nous a permis de participer à la plus grande épopée humaine conduite par notre ancêtre Mohamed.

support this Muslim state. Intervention in Afghanistan is a direct punch to the sovereignty and international affairs of an independent state.”¹⁸⁵

6.6. The 1956-1984 Postcolonial Period in Morocco: An Assessment

This chapter has intended to show how the Moroccan state and non-state actors implemented the colonial critique of postcolonial nationalism theory with their own policies or plans to nullify the impacts of French and Spanish Protectorates through Moroccan Africanness, Moroccan Maghrebness, Moroccan Arabism and Moroccanness components of postcolonial Moroccan national identity between 1956 and 1984. While doing this, this chapter has also intended to show how these impacts of the Protectorates on the postcolonial Morocco were the reflection of hybridity that was established among Moroccan people between 1912 and 1956. Accordingly, this chapter showed how the Moroccan state and non-state actors in the 1956 and 1984 period of the postcolonial Morocco were disturbed by these impacts, which actually shows how they were annoyed by hybridity that was created in especially the French Protectorate time. In this sense, the nullification attempts of the Protectorates impacts on postcolonial Moroccan national identity by the Moroccan state and non-state actors in this period must not only be understood as their critiques of colonialism but also as their critique of hybridity, especially against France as the main representation of European colonialism in Morocco.

¹⁸⁵ *L'Opinion*, January 24th 1980: Défendre Afghanistan c'est défendre l'Islam et nous-même. Ce sont nos valeurs et notre foi et non des surenchères politiques qui nous incitent à soutenir ce pays Musulman. Intervention en Afghanistan est une atteinte à la souveraineté et dans les affaires internationales d'un pays indépendant.

In addition, this chapter has intended to show how the Moroccanness that was added to Moroccan national identity after 1925 grew in this period together with Moroccan Maghrebness, Moroccan Africanness and Moroccan Arabness components that were each born against Europe due to European colonialism that was represented by France and Spain. Accordingly, this chapter showed how Moroccanness was the most important component of the Moroccan national identity for the Moroccan state and non-state actors in this period, especially through the preference of Moroccanness to the Moroccan Africanness and Moroccan Maghrebness by the state and non-state actors after 1975. In this context, this chapter showed that Moroccanness was preferred to Moroccan Africanness when Morocco withdrew from the Organization of the African Union after it decided to add Western Sahara as a member in 1984. Similarly Moroccanness was preferred to Moroccan Maghrebness when Algeria did not evacuate the Bechar and Tindouf cities and that it had invaded the city of Tantan in 1976. In this context, this chapter showed that Morocco as a state that developed its Africanness and Maghrebness components were forced to prefer its Moroccanness when these two former ones collapsed. When it came to 1984, Moroccanness was the unique component of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity that led King Hassan II to instrumentalize cultural hybridity with France to explain the Europeanness of Morocco according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.

Besides the development of Moroccanness in the 1956-1984 period, this chapter also pointed out an important point. While stating the colonial critiques to the European colonialism symbolized by French and Spanish Protectorates in this period, as the colonial critique theme of postcolonial nationalism theories suggest, the Moroccan state and non-state actors except for King Hassan II tried to nullify the

impacts of the France and Spanish Protectorates on postcolonial Moroccan national identity. In this sense, the nullification attempts of the impacts of the Spanish Protectorate focused on territory definition of the Moroccan national identity whereas the attempts to nullify the French Protectorate impacts covered individual existence, individual freedom, state corps, language, culture, citizenship, and modernization. These attempts are also showing how the nature of the French Protectorate and the nature of the Spanish Protectorates were different in Morocco in the colonial episode.

These attempts to nullify the impacts of Protectorates also have an additional thing to say. Accordingly, it must be remarked that King Hassan II did not try to nullify the impacts of the French Protectorate in this period, rather, he strengthened the Moroccan component of Moroccan national identity by resisting against the Western Sahara invasion by the Spanish Protectorate. In this sense, King Hassan II tried to nullify not the impacts of the French but of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco, that the Spanish government left the administration of the Western Sahara after 1936. Moroccanization of Western Sahara, therefore, was a struggle against the impacts of Spanish Protectorate on the postcolonial Morocco. In this sense, the non-attempts to nullify the impacts of the French Protectorate by King Hassan II constructed the very basis of the hybridity as the culture of Morocco with France but not with Spain that was instrumentalized in Moroccan national identity while justifying his European Morocco argument according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. Accordingly, this chapter shows that hybridity was differently interpreted by King Hassan II and other state and non-state actors, but it was there. That is why this chapter shows that even in the years where the colonial impacts of the French and Spanish Protectorate were nullified with regards to Moroccan national identity,

King Hassan II was quite sensitive about the French Protectorate to whom he instrumentalized cultural hybridity between Morocco and France to claim the Europeanness of Morocco according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in 1987.

CHAPTER VII

THE KING'S EUROPEAN MOROCCO

The chapters until now showed how Moroccan national identity was formed, first by Islam and Moroccanness during the French Protectorate, and then Africanness, Maghrebness and Arabness components after the French Protectorate that ended the European colonialism on Morocco. They also showed how hybridity between Morocco and France started during the French Protectorate years, how it continued after the Protectorate, and how Moroccan state and non-state actors tried to nullify its impacts on the definitions of territory, individual existence, individual freedom, citizenship, language and culture through Moroccanness, Africanness, and Maghrebness as the components of postcolonial Moroccan national identity. This last chapter of dissertation aims at pointing out how King Hassan II instrumentalized Moroccan hybrid culture with France in terms of Moroccan national identity to highlight Morocco's Europeanness, and how he regarded Europeanness as Morocco's new national identity component between July 8th and October 1st 1987 when the European Commission evaluated the membership application of Morocco

to E.C. Accordingly, this chapter charts the Europeaness side of this instrumentalized cultural hybridity by King Hassan II to explain/justify the Europeaness of Morocco according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in 1987. It analyzes the “European Morocco” discourses of King Hassan II according to the inbetweenness and admiration of European themes of postcolonial nationalism. Moreover, it shows how Moroccan state and non-state actors welcomed the King Hassan II’s European Morocco, together with the European Commission bureaucrats’ response to it, media coverage and opinion.

7.1. The Road to the King’s European Morocco

The very origins of King Hassan II’s “European Morocco” argument go back to 1961 actually, when he came to power and changed the status of the monarch head from “Sultan” to the “King”. Deeply impressed by the Christian and European status, King, Hassan II opened a new chapter in Moroccan monarch with this change. Later, King Hassan II continued to emphasize the European side of Morocco in 1976 where Morocanness was rising just after the Green March. In a period where Morocanness was being constructed with regards to the Western Sahara especially, King Hassan II used a metaphor in his autobiography. The metaphor he used was symbolizing the Morocanness of Morocco, together with Europe as the destination of the Moroccan nation. The King described Morocco as a tree with roots in Africa and leaves in Europe, as the first indicator of his European Morocco argument. In this sense, this metaphor was also the first implementation of the inbetweenness theme of postcolonial nationalism that is explained by themes such as double consciousness,

hybridity and cultural heritage that blend Moroccanness, Africanness components of Moroccan national identity with Europeanness. Having located Morocco between Africa and Europe, the King echoes Nicolas Dirks' argument in *Colonialism and Culture* as well as Edward Said's take in *Culture and Imperialism* where both contend that the culture of the colonized in the postcolonial period was a product of the colonizer. Moreover, King Hassan II's metaphor can be read through the double consciousness argument of Paul Gilroy in *The Black Atlantic* when the King says Moroccans are "both oriental and occidental". In his autobiography, King Hassan II writes:

Morocco looks like a tree whose roots could be found in the land of Africa, and who breathes by its leaves that are turned to Europe by the wind. For this reason, life in Morocco is not vertical. It also goes horizontally to the Orient where we unite ourselves through cultural links and secular cults. Therefore, we are both oriental and occidental.¹⁸⁶

In the same very year, King Hassan II gave a speech in Parliament where we can see an implementation of the inbetweenness and admiration for European themes of postcolonial nationalism. In the speech he gave on April 23rd 1976, King Hassan II emphasized that a nation must not forget its past, for it is the past that constructs its current culture. In the speech the King clarified the tree metaphor he used in his autobiography by arguing that the Moroccan tree grows on an axis of Rabat - Paris by also passing through Madrid. In a speech where he clearly signified the French Protectorate as the limits of the Moroccan tree's leaves, he also pointed out the role of the Spanish Protectorate on the construction of Moroccanness with the Western

¹⁸⁶ Le Maroc ressemble à un arbre dont les racines nourricières plongent profondément dans la terre d'Afrique, et qui respire grâce à son feuillage bruissant aux vents de l'Europe. Cependant, la vie du Maroc n'est pas seulement verticale. Elle s'étend horizontalement vers l'Orient auquel nous nous sommes unis par des liens culturels et culturels séculaires. Même si nous le voulions-et nous ne le voulons pas, il nous serait impossible de les rompre.

Sahara issue. This speech was the first one where the King Hassan II reflected on the impacts of the French protectorate on the cultural definition of the Moroccan component of postcolonial Moroccan national identity, and also the basis of the hybridity he had instrumentalized between Morocco and France while justifying the European character of Morocco in 1987. Moreover, the King Hassan II's speech also points out the argument of Montserrat Guibernau in *Nationalism* who argued that the new states of Africa were constructed on the sum of the rights and pieces of their colonizer states. The admiration of Europe in the King Hassan II's speech was so strong that it was the first time King Hassan II regarded Morocco closer to Europe than some other European countries. In this sense, it was the first time the King divided the countries of Europe into those similar to Moroccan culture and those far from Moroccan culture. The view of Morocco as closer to Europe than even some European states did not only point out the hybridity he had instrumentalized between Morocco and France in postcolonial Moroccan national identity but also implemented the argument of Rupert Emerson in *Nationalization of Colonies* who said that some countries would like to seem more European than Europeans after colonialism. King Hassan II said:

I do not really think that it is beneficial for a nation to completely forget about its past. Our Soviet friends are praising their ancient wise as they praise the heroes of the Soviet revolution. The nations that do not have roots have unhappiness. The tree that does not have any roots has no fruits. It is a dead tree. The tree of Morocco is closer to Spain and Portugal than Federal Germany and Britain. The tree of Morocco is rising on the way to Rabat-Madrid-Paris. France, Spain and Morocco have been interrelated to each other with Atlantic and Mediterranean, and they also have common cultural links with the new and old culture and civilization.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁷ Bir ulus için eskiyi tamimiyle unutmak da pek yararlı bir şey değildir. Sovyet dostlarımız eski büyük bilginlerini bir ihtilalin kahramanlarını övdükleri gibi övüyorlar. Kökleri olmayan halklarda mutsuzluk vardır. Kökleri olmayan ağaçlarda ne yaprak ne de meyve bulunur. Ölü bir ağaçtır. Fas ağacının dalları İspanya ve Fransa'ya Federal Almanya ve İngiltere'dekinden daha yakındır. Fas ağacı Rabat-Madrid-Paris genel yönüne doğru yükselir. Paris-Madrid-Rabat'ın müşterek ekonomik yararları

The roots of King Hassan II's European Morocco argument, started to become stronger by 1979. The importance of France for King Hassan II started to become clear in the speech he gave to Parliament on March 5th 1979. He said that people who asserted that France turned Morocco into an underdeveloped country between 1908 and 1945 must know perfectly well that they are lying. In a speech where he referred to the economic contributions of the French Protectorate after 1925, King Hassan II also showed how he was impacted by the fact that the French had respected Moroccan Islam. We can see here how Homi Bhabha's hybridity argument is reflected in King Hassan II's words, that which is established in colonial times reflects on the postcolonial episode. Moreover, King Hassan II admits in this speech that he had copied the French industrialism for Moroccan agricultural development between 1960 and 1970. In the speech, King Hassan II said:

Every single Moroccan citizen must know that the anticolonial mentality which argues that the French underdeveloped the Moroccan economy between 1925 and 1945 is wrong. The foundational logic of the French Protectorate was to develop the Moroccan economy and Moroccan people by respecting Moroccan culture and Islam. I myself tried to implement the agricultural reforms of the French in my own country between 1960 and 1970.¹⁸⁸

The importance of France in the mind of the King Hassan II continued to strengthen in an interview he gave to the Marrakech paper *Le club de la presse du tiers monde* on April 9th 1980. In the speech the King accepted that his culture was coming from the French one. He also prepared the grounds for the instrumentalization of hybridity

mevcuttur. Fransa, İspanya ve Fas Atlantik ve Akdeniz'le birbirlerine bağlı olduğu gibi, evvelce söylediğimiz gibi eski ve yeni kültür ve medeniyetle de ortak bağları bulunmaktadır.

¹⁸⁸ Tous les citoyens du Maroc doivent savoir que, les uns qui pensent que les Français ont heurté l'économie marocaine entre 1925 et 1945 ont bien tort. Développer l'économie et l'humaine Marocaine en respectant la culture et islam Marocaine étaient toujours dans les fondations de Protectorat Français. Moi par exemple, j'ai essayé d'implémenter les politique agricoles des Français au Maroc ente 1960 et 1970.

of Moroccan culture with France in postcolonial Moroccan national identity, by stating that there is some Frenchness in his life. In the interview, he reflected upon the impacts of the French protectorate on the culture and language definitions of Moroccanness within the context of his admiration for Europe and the inbetweenness themes of the postcolonial nationalism theory. The King Hassan II said:

I want to tell the French people that I am closer to them more than they imagine as state and nation. Some of my attitudes that were commanded by the notion of state, I govern it without a spirit, I govern a state. I have some reactions, many times, that might seem absurd to the French people. As I was just saying, the French have absurd reactions to us as well. These are visceral reactions. Why? Because half of my culture is French. Half of my language is French and when I started speak my first words, I spoke both French and Arabic at the same time, with my Moroccan nanny and French governess.¹⁸⁹

The impacts of the French Protectorate on King Hassan II continued the same year when he gave a speech at the anniversary of the foundation of the Istiqlal Party. The King talked about the necessity of Morocco to become a member of the France-Africa Group, directly referring to French rule in Morocco between 1912 and 1956. By giving such a speech that reflects the impacts of the French Protectorate on the culture, state corps, individual existence, and citizenship definitions of Moroccanness, King Hassan II pointed out again the French Protectorate while justifying the necessity of Morocco to join this organization. As he did in the interview he gave to *Le club de la presse tiers monde*, he one more time instrumentalized the hybridity-as-culture theme of Morocco with France in

¹⁸⁹ Je voudrais dire au peuple français que je suis plus près de lui qu'il ne le pense comme Etat et nation. Certaines de mes attitudes, commandées par la Notion de l'Etat, on le gouverne sans états d'âme, on gouverne l'Etat. J'ai des réactions, quelquefois, qui peuvent lui paraître bizarres. Comme je le disais tout à l'heure, les Français ont des réactions bizarres à Notre égard. Ce sont des réactions viscérales. Pourquoi? Parce que la moitié de ma culture est française. A moitié de ma langue est française et quand j'ai commencé à balbutier les premières paroles, j'ai parlé en même temps le français et l'arabe, avec ma nourrice qui était marocaine et avec ma gouvernante qui était française.

Morocco's national identity, in order to make Morocco a member of the France-Africa Group. By arguing that Morocco is a Eurafrican state, King Hassan II showed how the hybridity argument of Homi Bhabha in *Location of Culture* and the double consciousness argument of Paul Gilroy in the *Black Atlantic* that were established in the colonial times are reflected in the postcolonial episode, in the postcolonial Moroccan national identity. In addition, he also implemented the arguments of Gordon who argued that the colonized states might try to arrange their foreign policies according to their colonizers in the postcolonial episode by trying to orient Moroccan foreign policy towards France. Last but not least, the King's desire to make Morocco a member of the France-Africa Group could also be evaluated as an admiration for Europe, as explained by Harveson and Rotschild, and as a French sphere of influence on the colonized world as suggested by Guy Martin in *African political thought*. In the interview he gave to Eric Laurent on June 6th 1983, the King said:

It is a necessity for Morocco to join the France-Africa Group. Morocco is a bridge between Africa and Europe through Gibraltar Strait. It also shares the Mediterranean Sea. Besides, Morocco is a part of both Africa and Europe. We have existed in Africa since the time we were created. This makes Morocco Euro-African, and thus the biggest contributor to this organization.¹⁹⁰

The admiration for Europe theme can also be observed in the King's speech he gave in the Parliament on November 9th 1984. King Hassan expressed the bridge status of Morocco between Europe and Africa with the Gibraltar Strait that would be constructed, he once more flagged the inbetweenness and admiration for Europe

¹⁹⁰ *Le Matin de Sahara*, June 6th 1983 : C'est une nécessité pour le Maroc à joindre le Groupe France-Afrique. Le Maroc est un pont entre l'Europe et l'Afrique sur le Gibraltar, et il partage la méditerranée avec l'Europe aussi. Le Maroc alors appartient à l'Europe et à l'Afrique. Nous existons sur l'Afrique depuis que nous soyons créés. Tout ça fait le Maroc un pays Euro-Africain, et puis le plus grand donneur de cette organisation.

themes, arguing that Morocco was more European than some of the southern European states like Greece. In the speech he reflected on the impacts of the French Protectorate on Moroccan modernization, state corps, and the individual existence of Moroccanness in the postcolonial Moroccan national identity. The King's speech implemented the argument of Rupert Emerson in *Nationalization of the colonies* who said that colonized states might want to seem more European than the European states. At the end of his speech he referred to Ahmed Balafrej, who once argued that the Moroccan community always aimed at constituting a political regime on the basis of equality, liberty, and democracy.¹⁹¹ King Hassan II said:

In the very following years, we will have a bridge on the Gibraltar Strait. This was fixed. Moreover, things in the Maghreb are going to be well arranged one day. If we can bring gas and petrol one day to Europe by this bridge, then Europe won't be able to ignore Morocco, which I think is more European than Greece. Plus, Morocco made a choice. It is multiparty, it has a constitution and public liberties.¹⁹²

The idea of France as a part of Moroccan culture was repeated once again when King Hassan II met the French President François Mitterrand in 1984 at the Fontainebleau Summit of the European Communities and openly asked him to support Morocco's right to be an E.E.C member (2000: 80). Morocco's request to join the E.C. through E.E.C found traction in Europe. The European Communities enlargement officer Noel Fanhy told the Belgian press that relations between the E.E.C and Morocco would be based on relations with Spain and Portugal. With this declaration, Mr. Fanhy showed that he agreed with the King's idea that there were some European

¹⁹¹ "Morocco plans for independence", *Foreign Affairs*, CXXXIV, No: 3, April 1956.

¹⁹² *Le Matin de Sahara*, October 9th 1984: Dans quelques années nous aurons le pont sur Gibraltar. C'est règle ensuite, les choses du Maghreb vont bien s'arranger un jour. Si on peut emmener le gaz et le pétrole un jour à l'Europe, par ce pont, alors l'Europe ne peut pas ignorer le Maroc et Afrique du Nord. Car, en définitivement, Le Maroc est plus européen que la Grèce. Puis, il a fait une option, il est pluripartiste, plurisindicaliste. Il a une constitution et des libertés publiques comme la France.

countries whose cultures are similar to Morocco. Moreover, the Portuguese President of the Defense Commission of the Portuguese Parliamentary Angelo Carra touched upon the common history of Morocco and Portugal and the benefits of future cooperation between the two nations. In the common press conference with Angelo Carra, Noel Fanhy emphasized how Morocco contributed to European history in general and Portuguese history more specifically, and how Morocco's history is shared with the history of Portugal. He also gave reference to the common history of the Portuguese with Morocco signifying the times when Portugal was very active in Morocco in the 15th century:

Hassan II contributed a lot to the Portuguese-Moroccan relationship. Morocco and Portugal are destined to cooperate. It was equally referred to the long common past and to the secular relations between two states. Above all, the Moroccan people contributed to the creation of the Portuguese man. The presence of the Portuguese in the Atlantic shores makes a common history between two states which will render them cooperative in cultural and strategic domains.¹⁹³

The first concrete step of the King's European Morocco argument was realized on the 38th session of the European Federation of Zootechnics. In the opening session, the Federation declared that it had admitted Morocco as a member to the organization.¹⁹⁴ A week after this admission, the King submitted his official membership application to E.E.C on July 8th 1987. In a letter addressed to the Head of Enlargement Uffe Elleman Jansen, the King justified how Morocco corresponds to Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome by arguing that Morocco was a European state

¹⁹³ *Le Matin de Sahara*, October 13th 1984 : Majesté Hassan II a contribué énormément au développement des relations entre Maroc et Portugal. Le Maroc et le Portugal sont destinés à coopérer. Il est également référé au long passé commun et aux relations séculaires entre les deux pays. Tout d'abord le peuple marocain a contribué à la formation de l'homme portugais. La présence portugaise sur la côte atlantique se trouve dans l'histoire commune qui va faire deux pays coopératifs dans les domaines culturels et stratégiques.

¹⁹⁴ *Le Matin de Sahara*, October 2nd 1987: Le Maroc adhère a la Feederation europeenne de Zootechnie

because it had not only a common history but a common culture with Europe. In the letter where he indirectly meant the French Protectorate while saying that Morocco and Europe were so united and interpenetrated by history, King Hassan II blended the Europeanness of Morocco with the Moroccanness by putting Europeanness above Moroccanness, Moroccan Arabness, and Moroccan Africanness. The letter sent to Mr. Jansen was the implementation of the inbetweenness theme of postcolonial nationalism theory that specifically implemented the reflection of hybridity in the postcolonial episode (Bhabha). In the letter King Hassan instrumentalized hybridity as the culture of Morocco with France. to national identity of Morocco that covered Europeanness by arguing that Morocco integrates the European nations, the letter was also an implementation of the admiration to Europe theme of postcolonial nationalism theory that found body with Guy Martin's argument of that the colonized states in Africa admire France in *African Political Thought*. Here is the King Hassan II's letter reproduced in full:

Mister President,

On 15th of June 1984, we sent a letter to President François Mitterand, the President of the European Council by that time, in which we talked about the wish of Morocco to adhere to the Treaties that institute the European Community.

Apparently, we were guided by our conviction that it was then important to give an institutional framework to ancient, multiple, and privileged links that unite European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, within the context of perennity and intensification of the relations between two sides.

The option taken by Morocco for the biggest rapprochement with the European Economic Community finds its justification in many orders, which have the same significance and importance.

Close geographically, Europe and Morocco have been so united by history, our civilizations are so interpenetrated, and our destinies are so maintained.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ According to an International Relations Professor, the only period where the history of Morocco was united with Europe was during the official French and Spanish Protectorates time. Moreover,

Two world conflicts showed in this century that Morocco, crossed by the Mediterranean and Atlantic on the doors of Arab world and Africa, integrates perfectly in the same place of peace and stability with European nations.

Strong of its fundamental choices, the Kingdom of Morocco did never stop to consolidate and deepen a democratic and liberal experience that, not only approaches to free Europe, but also that leads herself to adopt an institutional analogy that was created between the government systems of Europe and Morocco.

This political choice, which we proceed before its celebration in the Moroccan laws, corresponds to the society and to the civilization that made unanimity of the Moroccan nation.

Adhesion of Spain and Portugal to the European Communities as an event that we consider a reasonable action accentuate the Mediterranean sensibility of the Community and approach the boundaries between two sides.

More than ever, we have the conviction that it's not only Morocco who thinks that Europe and Morocco will benefit from the economic and political integration but also Europe thinks so.

In addition, we officially submit you an admission demand of Kingdom of Morocco to the European Communities.

Please accept our best salutations, Mister President¹⁹⁶

Rhazaoui also points out that the only period where the civilizations could be interpenetrated could again be the Spanish and the French Protectorates since the perception of the Europeans as Christians before 1912 would never allow for such an interpenetration.

¹⁹⁶ General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Transparency Service, Access to documents, no: 1049/2001: Monsieur Le Président, Nous avons, en date du 15 Juin 1984, adresse une lettre à Son Excellence le Président François Mitterrand, en exercice du Conseil Européen, par laquelle Nous lui faisons de part que la volonté de Royaume de Maroc d'adhérer aux Traités instituant les Communautés Européennes. Ce faisant, Nous étions guidés par notre conviction qu'il importait désormais de donner aux liens anciens, multiples et privilèges, qui unissent la Communauté Européenne et ses membres à la Royaume de Maroc un cadre institutionnelle garantissant, à travers un choix irréversible, la pérennité et l'intensification des relations étroites établis entre l'ensemble communautaire et notre pays. L'Option prise par le Maroc pour un plus grand rapprochement avec la C.E.E trouve sa pleine justification dans des considérations de divers ordres, aussi pertinentes, et aussi fondées les unes que les autres. Proche géographiquement, l'Europe et le Maroc ont été si intimement unis par l'histoire que nos civilisations se sont fortement interpénétrés et que notre communauté de destin a été maintes fois en mise en évidence. Deux conflits mondiaux ont démontré au cours de ces siècles que le Maroc, à la croisée de la Méditerranée et de l'Atlantique et aux portes de l'Afrique et du monde arabe, s'intégra parfaitement dans un même espace de sauvegarde et de paix que les pays d'Europe Occidentale. Fort de ses choix fondamentaux, le Royaume de Maroc n'a cessé de consolider et d'approfondir une expérience démocratique et libérale qui, non seulement le rapproche de l'Europe libre mais lui permet de y s'insérer du fait de l'analogie institutionnelle qui s'est ainsi créée entre les systèmes de Gouvernement européen et marocain. Ce choix politique, auquel Nous avons procédé bien avant sa consécration ans les lois écrites de notre pays correspond en réalité a des choix de société et de civilisation qui ont fait l'unanimité de la nation marocaine. L'adhésion de l'Espagne et le Portugal aux Communautaires Européennes que nous avons salué comme un événement politique considérable, accentue la sensibilité méditerranéen de la Communauté et en rapproche les frontières de nos rives septentrionales. Plus que jamais, nous avons la conviction que l'intérêt bien compris, non

7.2. Discussions on the King's European Morocco in Morocco

Morocco's membership application to the European Communities on July 8th 1987 created ripples both in Morocco and outside. The state elites and non-state elites evaluated this application throughout postcolonial Moroccan national identity.

Morocco's application to the E.C through the E.E.C stated that the King's "European Morocco" claim was shared by the General Secretary of the Istiqlal Party, Saad Benghazi. As the *Al Bayane* newspaper expressed on July 12nd 1987, Saad Benghazi justified Morocco's European being with the Protectorate years as did King Hassan II in the application to the France-Africa Group and the E.E.C application. In a speech that reflected the impacts of the French Protectorate on the state corps of Moroccanness, Benghazi said:

The French Economic and Social Council analyze the situation of Morocco and the problems posed by the enlargement of the E.E.C. Morocco have been under the influence of the protectorate since the 20th century. It is therefore Morocco's right to be regarded as a European state.¹⁹⁷

The very same day, King Hassan II reemphasized the location of Morocco between Europe and Africa in an interview given to the BBC. The King one more time showed the instrumentalization of cultural hybridity in Morocco with France in the Moroccan national identity to explain the European side of postcolonial Moroccan national identity. By underlining that Morocco was in the middle of both Europe and

seulement du Maroc mais également celui de l'Europe, rend nécessaire une meilleure intégration économique et politique de Notre pays avec les Douze. Aussi, nous avons décidé de vous soumettre officiellement une demande d'adhésion du Royaume du Maroc aux Communautés Européennes. Nous vous prions d'agréer, Monsieur Le Président, l'expression de notre très haute considération, Hassan 2, Roi du Maroc, 8th of July 1987.

¹⁹⁷ *Al Bayane*, July 12th-13rd 1987 : Conseil Economique et sociale Français analyse de la situation au Maroc, problèmes posés par l'élargissement de CEE au Maroc. Le Maroc s'est trouvé depuis le début de 20eme siècle sous l'égide de protectorat et c'est alors son droit d'être considéré comme un pays et nation Européen.

Africa, King Hassan II talked about Morocco attached to Europe that would also serve to benefit relations between Europe and Africa. In the interview, he said:

Interviewer: Do you think that, for example, on the plan of relations between Morocco and European Community, there are particular points that you would like to state when you meet Margaret Thatcher?

King Hassan II: One must say that the position of Britain for Morocco is one of the most flexible, let's say one of the most hospitalized, because it makes a part of a country in Northern Europe that does not have any specific problem in its agricultural plan. We can maybe have plans on sheep and milk, and we are now ready to discuss this chapter with Britain. In this context, effectively, the British part was the most comprehensive, or one of the most comprehensive to us, about the discussions that we have had with the E.E.C in the last months.

Interviewer: You are always a long term candidate...

King Hassan II: More than never, we cannot imagine a fixed relation between Europe and Morocco and Africa without trying to reattach Morocco to the European Communities, from one perspective to another.¹⁹⁸

Four days later, the King talked about Morocco's ambition for Europe coming from its history and its institutions, underlining similarities with Europe on the basis of French Protectorate. In the speech he gave to the British press during his visit to Great Britain, he one more time instrumentalized cultural hybridity between Morocco and France, emphasizing Morocco's common history with France as a basis for his European Morocco argument. In the speech he reflected on the impacts of the French Protectorate on the state corps of Moroccaness:

¹⁹⁸ *Le Matin de Sahara*, July 12 th 1987: Pensez-vous que, par exemple, sur le plan des relations entre le Maroc et la Communauté Européenne, il y a peut-être certains points que vous voudrez évoquer plus particulièrement avec Mme Thatcher? R: Il faut dire que la position anglaise à l'égard du Maroc est l'une des plus souples, des plus flexibles, disons les pus hospitalisantes, si ce terme peut être employé parce qu'elle fait partie de ce pays de nord qui n'ont aucun problème de concurrence particulière sur le plan agricole. Nous l'aurions peut-être sur le plan de la laine et de mouton mais enfin nous sommes prêts à passer sur ce chapitre. Donc effectivement, au cours des discussions que nous avons eues avec la CEE ces derniers mois, la partie anglaise était la plus compréhensive ou l'une des plus compréhensives. Q: Vous êtes toujours candidat à long terme...R: Plus que jamais, on ne peut pas imaginer la liaison fixe entre l'Europe et le Maroc et l'Afrique sans essayer de rattacher le Maroc à la Communauté Européennes, d'une façon ou d'autre.

Our democracy, our liberalism, our potentials, our richness lead us to become a member of the E.E.C. Our ambition for Europe is even bigger than it seems for Europe. We have been a part of Europe since the 12th century. We personally addressed a demand to the ex-president of the Community and we wish that it will contribute our ambition to convince the United Kingdom to support our demand and we become a member of the E.E.C.¹⁹⁹

The cultural hybridity that the King tried to instrumentalize in Moroccan national identity to explain/justify the Europeanness of Morocco according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome was also supported by the Minister of Fisheries Benselem Smili. As *Le Matin de Sahara* reflected, Smili agreed with King Hassan II who said that the attachment of Morocco to Europe would serve the benefits of this mutual relationship. In addition, Smili emphasized the common history and culture justification of the King by pointing out that Morocco's place in E.E.C could explain this common history and even culture. He said:

Morocco could play a determinant role in the rapprochement between the two sides of the Mediterranean. Morocco and the E.E.C share a convergence of interests that will explain history, cultural affinities, political systems and economy.²⁰⁰

One day later, the chief editor of *Le Matin de Sahara* Ahmed Alaoui and journalist Mohamed Benissa joined a conference in the Summer School of al Mouatamid Ibn Abbad d'Asilah. In the conference where they were invited as speakers, the authors underlined the inbetweenness of Morocco with Europeanness and Africanness by

¹⁹⁹ *Le Matin de Sahara*, July 17th 1987 : Notre démocratie, notre libéralisme, nos potentialités, et les richesses sont à même de nous permettre de devenir un membre de CEE. Notre joie est d'autant plus grande après que nous venons d'entendre dans votre allocution pertinente dans laquelle vous aviez traité avec précision des principes historique entre le Royaume Uni et le Maroc depuis des siècles de 12eme époque. On a adressé personnellement une demande dans le sens à l'ex président de la communauté et nous espérons que celle-ci saisira le bien fondé de notre démarche pour convaincre Royaume Unis d'accepter notre demande afin qu'on soit membre de la CEE.

²⁰⁰ *Le Matin de Sahara*, July 29th 1987: Le Maroc peut jouer un rôle déterminant dans le rapprochement entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée. Le Maroc et le CEE disposent d'une convergence d'intérêts qui explique l'histoire, les systèmes politiques et économique.

arguing that Morocco has a multicultural identity that included Latin Americanness as well. He said:

Morocco possesses a multidimensional culture because it managed to enrich its culture by numerous contacts with other civilizations. There is then a harmonious mixture of Africanness, Europeanness and Latin Americanness in Moroccan culture. One cannot deny the European side of Moroccan identity as one cannot deny the African, Latin American and the Arab sides of Moroccan national identity.²⁰¹

Morocco's position within Europe was also supported by the writer Abdelkader Berramdane. In his article, Berramdane showed that the culture of Morocco was formed over a century ago by the great powers that ruled Morocco. Berramdane's article could be evaluated via the arguments of Said, Dirks and Thomas who said that the culture of the colonized was formed by the colonizer. Berramdane writes:

Morocco and the Occident; for a century, Morocco has been located at the intersection of the big strategies of foreign powers, which impacted its authority, art, sensibility. These relations structured today's Morocco.²⁰²

A week later after Berramdane's interview, King Hassan II made a parliamentary speech about Morocco's position in the E.E.C. The King saw Morocco as a competent of the Southern European states rather than the Northern ones. As he did in previous speeches, the King continued to regard Morocco's European being in the same level with Spain and Portugal as he made a similar statement about Morocco's

²⁰¹ *Le Matin de Sahara*, July 30th 1987, p.11 :12 : Le Maroc possède une culture pluridimensionnelle car il a réussi à enrichir sa culture par de nombreux contacts avec d'autres civilisations. Il y a alors un métissage harmonique africaine-européen et latino-américain. On ne peut pas ignorer la coté Européenne de l'identité Marocaine, comme on ne peut pas ignorer la coté Arabique, Africaine de l'identité nationale Marocaine.

²⁰² *Al Bayane*, August 2nd 1987 : Depuis un siècle, Le Maroc se trouve à l'intersection des grandes stratégies des puissances étrangères qui ont bien influencé son autorité, son art, et sa subtilité. Ce sont ces relations qui ont formé le Maroc d'aujourd'hui.

more European being than Greece. He also said that it would be unfair to Morocco to be excluded from the E.E.C:

Morocco is a part of French history that makes us a European state eligible for the European Economic Community that was actually divided into two parts. One part is composed of southern states, and the other part is northern states. We, Morocco, are similar to the southern states of the Common Market. Today, if the E.E.C accepts Spain and Portugal as members, we also must be accepted as member. If we cannot be a member of the E.E.C as Spain and Portugal are now, how will our commercial relations be with these two countries? It would be difficult to speak of justice.²⁰³

In addition, the King repeated his European Morocco argument a week later in an article he gave to *Le Matin de Sahara* on October 9th 1987. In the article the King again saw Morocco more European than some Southern states like Greece. He also underlined that Morocco's application was more cultural than economic and political. This article showed how Morocco's European being as formed by the colonialist culture was so strong that it even rivaled Greece's European character. In the speech where he reflected on the impacts of the French protectorate on the culture, state corps, modernization, individual existence and individual freedom components of Moroccanness, the King said:

Before being commercial or economic, Morocco's demand to be a member of the E.E.C has a political and cultural character. In fact, we think that our choice corresponds to the ones of France and Europe in the domains of institutions, liberties, public freedoms, political organizations, and trade unions. Our options are therefore similar. Moreover, Morocco estimates to be the closest to Europe, more than Greece. It is certain that the states of the Common Market are divided into two groups: the Southern group and the

²⁰³ *Le Matin de Sahara*, October 2nd 1987: Le Maroc est une partie de l'histoire française qui nous fait en faite aussi un pays européen pour la CEE .Aujourd'hui, la CEE est divisée entre deux: les pays du Sud et les pays du Nord. Nous, le Maroc, est similaire a des pays de sud comme l'Espagne et le Portugal. Si la CEE les accepte comme membres, alors le Maroc doit aussi être un membre de la Marché Commune. Si la CEE accepte l'Espagne et le Portugal comme membre, et nous accepte pas comme membre, alors ça serait difficile de parler d'une justice.

Northern group. Climatically, the states of the Southern group are concurrent with Morocco. Northern states are another subject. Our demand is not commercial, but a political and a cultural wish. We have a geopolitical ambition to bring Southern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea²⁰⁴.

7.3. Support to the King's European Morocco

The King's justification of "European Morocco" was also shaped by the French Protectorate years according to some Moroccans who witnessed the application process at the time. Interviews conducted with Moroccan non-state actors who witnessed the period of the application show that the hybridity at the heart of Morocco's cultural links to France was instrumentalized by King Hassan II via Moroccan national identity in order to explain the Europeanness of Morocco. This was also valid for the Moroccan people in 1987. Among them is an officer of the Liberla Party today, but who was a deputy of the Independents in the Moroccan parliament when the application letter was submitted. Accordingly, this gentlemen said that this argument of a common history and culture with Europe for Morocco must be very well studied. In his view, the King actually showed how Morocco is a part of the European world with this application by referring to the French Protectorate. In this sense, he justifies the Europeanness of Morocco on the basis of

²⁰⁴ *Le Matin de Sahara*, October 9th 1987 : Avant d'être économique ou commerciale, la demande d'adhésion de Maroc a un caractère politique et culturel. En effet, nous pensons que nos choix correspondent à ceux de la France et de l'Europe dans les domaines des institutions, des libertés, des libertés publiques, organisations politiques et syndicales. Nos options sont donc similaires. Par ailleurs, le Maroc estime être plus proche de l'Europe que l'est un pays comme la Grèce. Il est certain que les pays de Marché Commun se divisent en deux: le groupe Sud et le groupe Nord. Climatiquement, les pays du groupe Sud sont forcément des concurrents du Maroc. Le Nord c'est d'autre chose. Notre demande n'est pas commerciale, mais une demande et une volonté politique et aussi culturelle. Nous avons l'ambition géopolitique d'approcher l'Afrique du Sud et Sous Saharien a l'Europe par la Méditerranée.

the colonial history Morocco's colonial connections with France, as did King Hassan

II. He said:

History defines a lot. It tells us who we are and where we came from. So Hassan said Morocco comes from Europe and Morocco is European. He was right, no one could challenge him because no one can deny the French Protectorate here in Morocco. So Hassan II used the European part of Moroccan national identity to be a member of the E.E.C. He was wise, and intelligent. He believed in Morocco's future with Europe. In this sense, he used France to be counted as European in the eyes of the European Commission. If the Liberal Party comes to power, we will follow King Hassan's path and we will apply for the European Union again. Now we have advanced status, the degree we got in 2012. If we work hard, we can make this status as full member.

Another contemporary Moroccan who lived through those days in 1987 is now a businessman. This gentlemen is now working as the head of an investment consulting company that assists foreigners who want to do business with Morocco. He has extensive experience working with Europeans, so he has certain ideas about what Europe is and how Morocco is located in Europe. According to him, King Hassan II was right to suggest that Morocco was also European, in addition to being Arabic and African, because it had a common history with Europe—and France especially:

Hassan II was right to say Morocco had a common culture and history with Europe. Morocco could never get rid of the French influences, and actually it does not want to, if you ask my opinion. Since our independence, we have been speaking French in this country. We also have our own language, *darija* that was composed of French and Arabic words. But classical Arabic is not understandable here in Morocco. And if you think of the French Protectorate years, all these factors place Morocco in the middle of Arabness, Islam, Africanness and Europeanness. We are a culturally mixed country, and that's why our national identity is highly mixed.

Another contemporary Moroccan who lived these days is a journalist, who is now working as the chief redactor at a media agency in Morocco. This gentleman was at the beginning of his journalism career when King Hassan II submitted the application letter. According to him, King Hassan II was so wise because he knew how to use the history of Morocco with France for the European identity of Morocco and the application to the E.E.C could therefore not be regarded as a mistake. He explained:

The French gave Morocco a lot, by introducing their language and lifestyle. At the end, Moroccans became French and shared a common culture with the French since the Protectorate. I do not believe that the King must be criticized because of his wish to make Morocco European because we cannot deny our history. The European Communities on that day cannot be called capitalist and imperialist because these were the times where Europe was recovering in the middle of the Cold War.

Another contemporary Moroccan who lived these days is currently working as the General Secretary of a Moroccan Bank now. This lady was working as an officer at the Moroccan Central Bank when the King sent the application letter. She argued that Morocco could be regarded as a European state and nation with its culture, unlike Europe who defined what the European is according to the economic performance of the applicants. She said:

With this application, Hassan II drew attention of the Europeans to the past. Even in Spain, there were Moroccans during the Middle Ages. The Mediterranean Sea is full of Moroccan traces in Europe. I believe he made a right choice. It is through identity that a state could be European, not with reforms or economy. After our application to the European Union, they changed the criteria of being European. Now they are defining a country's Europeanness with economic and human rights criteria. Morocco is the 'white page' of the Maghreb in Europe, unlike Algeria as the 'black page', I think.

Another Moroccan who lived the days of the application is now a writer, who by that time was working at a private newspaper in the days where King Hassan II sent the application. According to her, Morocco had the right to be among the other members of the E.E.C in 1987. She thinks that the King referred to the French Protectorate years when he applied to the E.E.C to be a member to E.C. She also added that the King's admiration for Europe comes from the French Protectorate years, especially during the time of General Lyautey. The respect that was shown to Islam by General Lyautey seemed to impress the King and he developed sympathy for Europe over the French. She said:

King Hassan II did not see any hesitation in applying to the E.E.C because he trusted the positive history of Europe with Morocco in the Lyautey times. Then he said in his letter that Morocco was European, and he was right, actually. Morocco was also called French Morocco in the protectorate years, which made Morocco a French possession. In his letter, then, Hassan II said Morocco has also a European side, besides its known identities such as Arab, Islam, and African. He tried to show Europe that Morocco was part of Europe, by highlighting the European dress Moroccans wore. He played a clever game with Europe by using the French history card.

Another contemporary Moroccan who lived these years is an officer in Rabat. As one of the contemporary intellectuals of his circle, this gentleman was working as an officer at the Ministry of Culture and Education when King Hassan II sent his application letter. According to him, the King's European Morocco was a vision and it confused the minds of the European Communities at that time. He said:

The King used the history of Morocco with Europe. These were the days the E.C was not imposing economic conditions on the applicants. The treaty was saying, 'if you feel European, just come'. It was like the saying of your country's Rumi: 'Come whatever you are, come'. Hassan wanted to come, but then E.C said: 'Don't come.' It was strange. The E.C settled this problem by inventing the Copenhagen criteria in the 1990s. Before there was no such criteria that defined who the European was. Morocco caused the E.C to invent

these criteria. Morocco confused the E.C about what European was. We needed the E.C those days, that's for sure. Europe would help to define who we were. And The King wanted the world to call Morocco European by being in the E.C. These were the days when we did not want to stop our relations with Europe, and especially with France, our historical boss.

Another contemporary Moroccan who witnessed the application of Morocco to the E.E.C. is now working as professor of economics in Casablanca. In 1987, he was writing his dissertation in Paris. Morocco's application came during a period where he was in Morocco to discuss his thesis with his professors. According to this gentleman, King Hassan II argued that Morocco was a part of Europe by referring to the French Protectorate years, while justifying his admiration of the King's decision. Masraoui defended the fact that the culture of Morocco that was shaped by the history of France in Morocco, and that this led the King to think that Morocco was European. He recalled the tree metaphor of King Hassan II:

The King said that Morocco was a tree whose roots are in Africa but his leaves are in Europe. We cannot deny that we were a French protectorate. We were not a colony like Algeria but we were also ruled by the French. France is in our history. We learned a lot from France. We speak French, we dress like the French, we eat like the French, we live like the French, and even our banking system is French. On the other hand, we are Moroccan. And this was the case in the late 1980s as well. The Moroccan intelligentsia, except for the hardcore nationalists, were formed by French values. And not Spain because we did not know anything about Spain who never took care of Moroccans. We knew all about France, on the other hand. The Spanish left nothing in Morocco. But the French did. They built all of our infrastructures, in the protectorate era. 7000 doctors were sent to France and they worked in the French hospitals. Hassan II encouraged us to go and live in France. He opened our eyes. Morocco must be proud of his clever mind that showed Europe that Morocco was part of a European history and culture which at the end insisted that Morocco has Europeanness in its identity.

A final interview that was conducted to see how the Moroccan people who lived these days interpret this membership application is an officer. This gentleman is working now as an archive officer in Rabat, and he was working as the Rabat

National Library officer on the day when the King submitted his application letter. He argued that Morocco has been a part of Europe since the beginning of the 15th century, but the way how it was shown as identity was provided only by the King. He also stated that the impacts of Europe on Morocco cannot be denied, but it is a political act to apply to the E.C to show Morocco as a European nation. He said:

King Hassan II referred to the history, to the French protectorate, of course. But not Spain. Spain behaved with us very differently than the French. They did not like us. Hassan II did something that had to be done much earlier. He used the geopolitics, Gibraltar. He said Gibraltar must not divide Europe and Morocco, but must unite them. From this case, his application has also a geopolitical aspect. So he said Morocco and Europe have things in common, so why be separated instead of being united? He wanted to make Morocco a part of Europe because he was under the influence of European life and European systems. Law, economy, the constitutions of the French all were admired by Hassan II. And let's not forget that he was also educated in the French language, and he went to France for his doctorate. So he was also under the influence of French culture. Then he said to E.E.C: 'Hey, even though we are independent, we are you. We are not different from you. You ruled us for years, now it is time to give us our right to enjoy the E.C.

7.4. Reaction to the King's European Morocco

The application of Morocco to the E.E.C by the King also had reactions other than support. Moroccans criticized this application in two senses: Moroccan economics and Moroccan national identity. The ones who criticized this application on economic grounds argued that the European Economic Community as the part of the European Communities would negatively impact the Moroccan economy. One of these critics came from *Al Bayane* journalist Mimoune Habrite who recommended the Moroccan state look for partners other than the E.E.C in commercial relations. In

an article published on July 16th 1987, Habrite criticized the E.E.C. option for Morocco's commercial future with the common history argument:

Instead of continuing to show how the Moroccan economy suffers with its current chronic lack of diverse commercial partners, national interest necessitates that Morocco looks for partners outside the European Economic Community. How many times have we underlined the fact that there must be no place for emotions in commerce? Our past experience with the European Economic Community is here to prove it. Brussels is not only not sensitive to the arguments appealing to emotions, but also to the common history of Morocco and cultural affinities with Europe by accepting the membership of Spain and Portugal to the E.E.C.²⁰⁵

Moreover, El Khyari Abdelhak published an article on July 23rd 1987 about the threat of the E.E.C. as a part of the European Communities to Morocco in terms of the colonialist context. Abdelhak criticized the E.E.C. by arguing that their aim was to keep Morocco as an annex to their old colonial empire. He said:

We think that there is no formal nature of the relations with the E.E.C., whatever its content. Currently, our diplomats are negotiating with Brussels for a fishery agreement, the end of an accord which follows the enlargement of E.E.C with Spain and Portugal. What must we choose - maintaining dependence or the fight for the independence? The relations between Morocco and the E.E.C are not on equal terms. The E.E.C does not respect even the engagement towards us. Their aim is to make Morocco a market annex of Old Europe. In their view, Morocco would be nothing more than a subjugated partner, dependent, and non a member of the club.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ *Al Bayane*, July 16th 1987: Au lieu de continuer à montrer que l'économie marocaine souffre d'un manque chronique de diversification de ses partenaires commerciaux et que le simple de bons sens, l'intérêt nationale, militent en faveur de la prospection de nouveaux partenaires en dehors de l'Europe communautaire. Combien de fois on a souligné qu'en matière de commerce il n'y a pas de place pour sentiments. L'expérience passée de nos relations économique avec CEE est là pour le prouver. Bruxelles n'est nullement sensible a des arguments faisant appel aux sentiments, a l'histoire commue, aux affinités culturelle de Maroc en acceptant l'adhésion de Portugal et de l'Espagne.

²⁰⁶ *Le Matin de Sahara*, July 23rd 1987: On pense que ce n'est pas toute la nature formelle des liens avec la CEE que leur contenu qui importe. A l'heure où, notre diplomatie négocie avec Bruxelles la conclusion d'un Accord de pêche tandis que nous pâtissons déjà des suites de l'élargissement du Marché Commun sur l'Espagne et le Portugal. Que faut-il choisir, le maintien de dépendance ou la lutte pour l'Indépendance? Maroc-CEE est léonine. CEE ne respecte pas les engagements solennels envers nous. Faire du Maroc un marché annexe de vieux continent est leur objectif. Dans leur optique, le Maroc ne saurait être autre chose qu'un partenaire vassalisé et dépendant et non un membre du Club.

On the other hand, the ideological aspect of the reactions focused on the colonialist and Christian side of the European Communities as a whole. This side of the critiques developed in the orbit of the postcolonial critique. The colonialist aspect of the critiques of Morocco's application to the E.C was also highlighted by Ahmed Alaoui as the chief editor of *Al Bayane*. In his article published on September 20th 1987, Alaoui tried to highlight the dangers of imperialism if Morocco would be accepted as a member. He said:

By forgetting of the lessons of the recent past, world imperialism guided by the United States now wants to conquer the Gulf under the pretext of protecting it and to provide the liberty of navigation. What does imperialism want? To give another lesson to the mullahs? Morocco's acceptance to the European Communities will be a total victory for colonialism that Morocco has been fighting since independence.²⁰⁷

Last but not least, Istiqlal Party leader Mohamed Boucetta declared that Morocco should have been very careful in its relations with the E.E.C. Similar to Abdelhak and Alaoui, Boucetta also talked about the colonialist aspect of the future of Morocco and Europe after the application. In a press conference Boucetta argued that Portugal was regarded in the same identity with Morocco by King Hassan II and must have been regarded as a symbol of the Morocco's struggle against Europe:

We must learn lessons from the current history. The war was not against Portugal before the Protectorate, but against the entirety of Europe and against Christianity. What is the reason for taking Morocco and putting it in the middle of a European Christian club? What can Morocco do there with the Christians? Was it not the Europeans Christians who killed our men,

²⁰⁷ *Al Bayane*, September 20th 1987: Oubliant les enseignements d'un passé récent, l'impérialisme mondiale guidé par des Etas Unis veut repartir à la conquête du Golfe sous prétexte d'en protéger l'accès et d'y assurer la liberté de navigation. Que veut l'impérialisme? Donner une autre leçon aux mollahs? L'acceptance du Maroc à l'CEE sera la victoire du colonialisme dont le Maroc lutte pendant l'indépendance.

women and children during the Protectorate? What kind of common history we can share with this Europe? ²⁰⁸

Morocco's application to the E.E.C was also criticized by the Yassiniste movement of al Adl wal Ihsan. Yassine was evaluating the application from an Islamist perspective. He was definitely against the idea that an Islamic Morocco can be called as European at the same time. When the King sent the application letter to the E.E.C. on July 1987, Yassine gave a speech to *jama'a*:

Modernity should be Islamized. The benefits of humanity in knowledge and technology are today in the hands of the Occident. Before teaching the world whatever it is, we must learn from the West's prodigious capacity. ²⁰⁹

When King Hassan II went to Great Britain and said that Moroccan democracy is comparable with Europe, Yassine repeated an argument similar to the one above:

Secularism is unislamic, these are western ideas. ²¹⁰

In one his speeches to the *jama'a* where he criticized Europe, Yassine said that Morocco must have not got involved with Europe whom he regarded as the pioneer of secularism and democracy. Yassine said on September 23rd 1987 to the *jama'a*:

²⁰⁸ *L'Opinion*, July 28th 1987: Nous devons tirer les leçons de cette épopée historique. La bataille n'a pas été donnée contre le Portugal avant le Protectorat, mais contre l'Europe totale entière et contre le christianisme. Qu'est-ce que c'est la raison de prendre et mettre le Maroc au milieu d'un club qui est bien Chrétien et Européen? Qu'est-ce que le Maroc peut faire avec des Chrétiens? Ce n'étaient pas les Chrétiens Européens qui ont tué nos hommes, femmes et enfants à l'histoire du Protectorat? Quel genre d'histoire commune nous pouvons partager avec cet Europe?

²⁰⁹ La modernité devrait être islamisée, les acquis de l'humanité en savoir et en techniques sont aujourd'hui entre les mains de l'Occident. Avant d'enseigner au monde quoi que ce soit, il faut nous mettre à l'apprentissage des prodigieux moyens dont dispose l'Occident. (El Mostapha, 2007: 212).

²¹⁰ Les éléments non musulmans sont l'idées de la laïcité, sont des idées d'Occident. (El Mostapha, 2007: 220)

Expressed in our language, secular ideologies neither express our realities, nor our real personality, nor the hopes of our people turned toward this lost cause. He [the King] must immediately stop negotiations with Europe. As Morocco, we cannot toleration these European notions.²¹¹

Thierry de Beaucé, a visiting French cultural official, provoked a storm in 1988 when he reaffirmed the importance of Francophonie in Morocco. He declared that French language and culture are part of the Moroccan identity. The Istiqlali paper *al Alam* complained about a colonial invasion and a secret war against Arabic as the language of Quran. *L'Opinion* declared: Our identity is not a French identity, our language is not French language, and our culture is not French culture. But it made the declaration in French. In 1988, King Hassan II dismissed the all or nothing Arabisers as suffering from an inferiority complex (Pennell 2000:383).

The reaction to the King's application was also observed among contemporary Moroccans who lived these days. Among them, a gentlaman is now working as a radio producer in Rabat. As a Jewish Moroccan, he said that he did not believe that Morocco was European because the Jewish people were never active in Morocco. He said:

King Hassan wanted to continue the historical tradition of Morocco with France, in a period where Morocco tried hard to get rid of France. But he forgot something. He tried to pluralize Moroccan identity with Europeanness, but he did nothing on the Jewish element. How about Jewish Morocco? I think he should have initiated a campaign for Jewish Morocco before European Morocco. But then he used Jewish people for Europe. He liked the idea that if we have a Jewish population, then it means we are European. He thought if the mountain does not come to me, I would go to the mountain. Did he succeed? He succeeded in explaining his *raison d'être* for E.E.C membership, but Europe did not accept it. I really wonder what the Africans thought of a European Morocco. Probably they laughed.

²¹¹ Les idéologies laïques forcenés dites et écrites en notre langue n'expriment en aucune façon ni notre personnalité vraie, ni l'espoir de nos peuples tournés vers notre idée perdue. Il doit immédiatement arrêter les négociations avec l'Europe. Nous ne pouvons pas tolérer les notions d'Europe, comme le Maroc (El Mostapha, 2007: 219-220).

There is also a lawyer in Rabat, who expressed the challenges to King Hassan II's membership application to E.C. He said that there were some protests in Rabat about the application to the E.C.:

I remember that some workers met in front of the parliament and they shouted that they did not want European capitalism in Morocco. But this was arranged against capitalism I think, not for the protection of Islam and Arabism against Europe. Even these workers knew that Morocco needed Europe so that they would live in better conditions.

7.5. European Response to the King's European Morocco

It was not only Moroccan non-state actors who witnessed the application day but also the European Commission bureaucrats who interpreted King Hassan II's European Morocco argument. Europeans showed great interest in the application of Morocco to the E.E.C and its desire to be called a European state according to the Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.

7.5.1. The King's European Morocco According to European Bureaucrats

Morocco's position in Europe started to be discussed among European bureaucrats before Morocco had submitted its application letter and on the basis of the European Economic Community. The Spanish Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernando Maron supported Morocco's position in the E.C but also argued that its existence

could destabilize the organization at the same time. Maron's response was summarized on June 1st 1987:

The E.E.C needs Morocco for the European trend in North Africa. [Maron] indicated that Spain must not pose obstacles against Morocco's candidacy. However, if Morocco becomes a member, it would be catastrophic for its industry because of it lacks of competition with European counterparts. In reference to Gibraltar, the former minister indicated that the rock is British. The cities of Sebta and Melilla are in Spanish borders now but they will become Morocco's in time.²¹²

The very same day, the former Prime Minister of France, Marie Laura Colson also spoke of Morocco's relations with the E.E.C. Colson emphasized the attachment of Morocco to France, who she believed that it must have been the spokesperson of Morocco in the E.C in the future:

As the number one commercial partner of Morocco, France must be its spokesperson in the E.C and adapt itself to the real development needs of this country.²¹³

Similar to Colson, the Spanish Minister of Agriculture Carlos Romero said that the Spanish government must guide Morocco in its attempts on June 3rd 1987:

Spain must be the Morocco's key for Europe. It is through Spain that Morocco contacts Europe.²¹⁴

²¹² *MAP Bulletin*, June 1st 1987: Fernando Maron: La CEE a besoin de Maroc à tendance Européennes en Afrique du Nord. Il a indiqué que l'Espagne ne devrait pas poser des obstacles à la candidature marocaine. Mais si le Maroc serait partie de CE ça serait catastrophique pour ses industries car elles ne pourraient concurrencer celles des pays européennes. Se référant à Gibraltar, l'ancien ministre espagnol de l'affaire européenne a indiqué autant que le rocher est britannique. Les villes de Sebta et Melilla seront au Maroc par temps.

²¹³ *MAP Bulletin*, June 2nd 1987: Marie Laure Colson, Ancien premier ministre française: Première partenaire commerciale du Maroc, La France se doit d'être son porte-parole à la CEE et de s'adopter son engagement aux besoins réelles de développement de ce pays.

²¹⁴ *MAP Bulletin*, June 3rd 1987: L'Espagne doit être la clé du Maroc pour l'Europe. Ça sera par l'Espagne que le Maroc peut communiquer l'Europe seulement.

Morocco's application to the EC was mostly welcomed by European diplomats. Among them, the Ambassador of France in Madrid François Guttman said to *Le Matin de Sahara* on July 14th 1987 that Morocco had the potential to shape the future of Europe if it becomes member. Guttman said:

Morocco's demand for inclusion is very important for a country that will help the future of Europe.²¹⁵

A week later, Bernard Bousson, the French Minister of European Affairs emphasized Morocco's Islamic character. In the interview he gave to the *Financial Times* on July 21st 1987, Bousson argued that Morocco's wish to be among the E.C members as a Muslim country was a 'touching' gesture. He said:

We are touched by this demand, especially of an Islamic state. Morocco knows it well that only European states could join the E.E.C. However, its gesture shows solidarity with Europe.²¹⁶

7.5.2. The King's European Morocco according to European Commission officers

The European Commission was not late in replying to Morocco's membership application. In almost three months, the E.E.C. board decided not to accept the Moroccan demand for full membership. Accordingly, the E.E.C recognized Hassan II's arguments, but refused Morocco's membership in the organization. Instead, they

²¹⁵ *Le Matin de Sahara*, July 14th 1987: La demande d'adhésion de Maroc est très importante pour un pays qui aidera l'avenir de l'Europe.

²¹⁶ *Financial Times*, July 21st 1987

decided to offer Morocco a privileged partnership. The E.E.C. reply is reproduced below:

Your Majesty,

I am very honored and thank his Majesty for his letter of July 8th 1987 that I discussed with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Community.

We considered with a very great attention the message of your Majesty at our meeting on September 14th 1987.

My colleagues shared their diverse considerations that I would like to share with Mister Filali when I met him on July 20th 1987.

They expressed all their appreciation for the wish of your Majesty of a bigger rapprochement between the community and Kingdom of Morocco where we also give the same importance as you give to the economic and political cooperation.

The ancient and multiple links between Morocco and the member states of the Community in multiple domains; cultural, political, economic, and social, the community of destiny we are sharing, the eminent role that your Majesty possesses makes and will make the Kingdom of Morocco a privileged partner particularly important for the European Community.

The Community, on the basis of its recent enlargement, wished to open a new phase in its relations with Morocco. The negotiation accords will always provide the pursuit of a reinforced cooperation by taking into account the specificity of our relations and our common interests.

In the light of our common desire, we will follow our reflections in a positive spirit on the possibilities of getting more advantage from other domains that we can cooperate for the well-being of our populations and our common aspirations for the peace and liberty in the World.

I would present you my highest respect, Your Majesty,

Uffe-Ellemann Jansen
President of the Council of European Communities²¹⁷

²¹⁷ Majesté, très honoré je remercie votre Majesté de sa lettre en 8 Juillet 1987 dont j'ai fait part à mes collègues les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères de la Communauté. Nous avons considéré avec la plus grande attention le message de votre majesté dès notre rencontre du 14 Septembre 1987. Mes collègues ont partagé les diverses considérations que j'avais fait valoir lors de mon entretien du 20 Juillet avec Monsieur Filali. Ils ont exprimé toutes leurs appréciations pour le souhait de votre Majesté d'un plus grand rapprochement entre le Royaume du Maroc et la Communauté auquel nous attachons de de notre cote également la plus grande importance politique et économique. Les liens anciens et multiples qui se sont noués entre le Maroc et les Etats membres de la Communauté dans les multiples domaines; culturel, politique, économique et social, la communauté de destin que nous partageons, le

The wish to see Morocco as a privileged partner by Mr. Jansen was reflected by the European Commission publications. One of these reports underlined that the E.E.C wanted to extend its cooperation with Morocco. The report reads:

On July 8th 1987, the Moroccan King Hassan the Second presented an application for Morocco's accession to the Community. The President of the Council replied on October 1st, by pointing out that the Community wished to continue strengthening and extending its cooperation with Morocco, in view of the special nature of existing relations and joint interest.²¹⁸

Another report also underlined that the community would strengthen its relations with Morocco:

In reply to the application for accession to the Community submitted officially by King Hassan the Second in July, the President of the Council recalled the points made when the application was submitted and emphasized the various factors which make Morocco a special partner of the Community. The agreements being negotiated between the Community and the Kingdom of Morocco should enable cooperation to be strengthened and extended, taking into account the specific features of the relations between and the common interests of two partners.²¹⁹

The application of Morocco to the E.E.C was a document that showed the justification of Morocco's European being on the basis of its national identity. King Hassan II adopted Europeanness into the Moroccan national identity on the basis of

rôle éminent que joue Votre Majesté, font et continueront de faire le Royaume de Maroc un partenaire privilégié particulièrement important pour la Communauté. La Communauté, suite à son récent élargissement, a souhaité ouvrir une phase nouvelle dans ses relations avec le Maroc. Les Accords en négociation devraient assurer la poursuite d'une coopération renforcée et plus étendue, tenant compte la spécificité de nos relations et de nos intérêts communs. A la lumière de notre désir commun de relations aussi étroites que possible, nous poursuivrons dans un esprit positif de nos réflexions sur les possibilités d'étendre davantage encore notre coopération à d'autres domaines au service du bien-être de nos populations et de nos aspirations communes à la paix et à la liberté du monde. Je vous prie, votre majesté, de daigner agréer l'expression de mon très profond respect, 1st of October 1987.

²¹⁸ Article 749, 21st General Report on the activities of the European Communities, 1987, pp. 306.

²¹⁹ Article 2.2.20, Bulletin of the European Communities, No:9, 1987:64, Volume 20.

Morocco's common history and culture with France as stated in the official letter submitted to Uffe Elleman Jansen on July 8th 1987. Morocco's application to the E.E.C was also evaluated among the officers of the European Commission. When Jansen received King Hassan II's letter on the 8th of July 1987, he argued that he clearly understood the way the King had linked Morocco with Europe. Jansen also admitted that the King's European Morocco claim led to his re-interpretation of the Treaty of Rome:

It is wrong to state that the Moroccan demand was rejected. On the contrary, it will be examined in the next Council of Ministers in the future. The demand raises several problems linked to the Treaty of Rome. But we welcome the signal that is quite net and the orientation of E.E.C to Morocco.

Mr. Jansen's argument was also shared by Abdellatif Filali in the press conference with Jacques Delors in Morocco. The journal *Al Bayane* on October 9th 1987 reflects this press conference as above:

Jacques Delors: The question is to know if Morocco will be able to participate to the adventure of the European construction as do the other states in a frank, honest, realistic way. Filali replied: E.E.C did not reject Morocco; we are now in the position of waiting.²²⁰

In the press conference, the member responsible for the EC enlargement, Jacques Delors, held Morocco in an exceptional position due to its plural identity. Delors also mentioned the example of Turkey when he talked about the location of Morocco:

Jacques Delors: I think we have a lot to do in order to recognize the exceptional position of Morocco in the world.

²²⁰ *Al Bayane*, October 9th 1987: Delors: L'avenir est important mais le présent test primordiale. Pour Delors: la question est de savoir si Le Maroc pourra comme d'autres pays, dans des formes qui sont réalistes, franches, honnêtes, participer à l'aventure de la construction européenne. Filali a répondu: CEE n'a pas rejeté la requête de Maroc, en position d'attente nous sommes.

Claude Cheyson: Morocco's position, like that of Turkey, is situated in one of the two extreme points of the Arab-Islam world. These two states want to justify their desire to access Europe more with their intrinsic qualities.²²¹

In addition, Mr. Delors stated that the reason why they hesitated about Morocco's application was not because they did not see Morocco as a European state, but because of the internal concerns at the EC enlargement at that time:

The states around Europe, from Norway to Turkey, from Austria to Morocco ask themselves one question: Whether they will stay outside of the European dynamism. We are now twelve but we can enlarge three or four times in the future. The question we ask to ourselves is how the European Communities can afford this enlargement and this deepening and manage our projects. This is the question we are thinking about when considering the reply we will give to Morocco's membership demand.²²²

Uffe Elleman Jansen commented on King Hassan II's 'European Morocco' argument by emphasizing the hybridity of Morocco with Europe. He said on October 19th 1987:

Morocco is a state between the Arab and the European world. The E.E.C and Morocco have been linked since 1978 by commercial, financial and cooperation terms. Morocco is now in the phase of renegotiating the fact of the Spanish and Portuguese admissions to the E.C.²²³

²²¹ *Le Matin de Sahara*, October 9th 1987: Jacques Delors: Je pense que nous avons beaucoup à faire pour reconnaître la position exceptionnelle du Maroc dans le monde. Claude Cheyson: la position du Maroc, comme celle de la Turquie, situés aux deux extrêmes points du monde arabo-islamique. Ces deux pays justifient leur désires d'accéder en Europe en plus de leurs qualités intrinsèques.

²²² *L'Opinion*, October 11th 1987: Jacques Delors: Les pays autour de l'Europe, de la Norvège à la Turquie, de l'Autriche au Maroc, se demande s'ils vont rester en dehors de ce dynamisme. Nous sommes douze maintenant et nous aurons largement trois ou quatre fois dans la future. La question que nous demandons nous même c'est de comment la CE peut comporter l'élargissement et aussi l'approfondissement pour réussir ses projets. Voilà la question qui s'est posé d'une manière générale avec aucun traitement particulier désagréable pour le Maroc.

²²³ *L'Opinion*, October 19th 1987: Maroc est un pays cherier entre le monde arabe et européen. Ils sont liés depuis 1978 par des termes financière, commerciale et coopératif. Le Maroc est maintenant en cours de renégociation pour tenir compte de l'entrée de Espagne et de Portugal à la CEE en 1986.

Lastly, the Belgian Internal Affairs Minister Joseph Michel harshly criticized the Moroccans as barbarians whom the Belgians must deal with urgently. He said:

The Arabs, the Moroccans, the Turks, The Yugoslavs, and the Islamic people are barbarians. 55% of these people who live in Belgium are foreigners. No one pays their taxes any longer. It is no longer a Belgian community here. We must urgently do something.²²⁴

7.5.3. The King's European Morocco According to the European Media

Morocco's application to E.E.C to be a member to E.C was also evaluated in the world media. The *Financial Times* was the first media organization that interpreted Morocco's application to E.E.C as a strategic action. In the July 14th 1987 edition, the paper offered:

The demand of Morocco to the E.E.C has a strategically dimension. 1 million Moroccans live in the E.E.C, 1.5 million tourists come to Morocco from Europe every year. For some period of time, the sovereign of a state whose cultural, economic and military relations with Spain and France was administered from Fez and Marrakech in the Middle Ages. Such a demand deserves to be considered with serious respect and not with skepticism. 4437

In addition, the Brussels publication *Geopolitique Africaine* referred to the political character of Morocco's application to the E.E.C. *Geopolitique Africaine* approved

²²⁴ *L'Opinion*, October 31st 1987: Les Arabes, les Turcs, les Yougoslaves, et les peuples islamiques sont des barbares. Le Ministre Belge de l'Intérieur Joseph Michel a qualifié les étrangers Arabes, Marocains, Turcs, Yougoslaves, les peuples des pays Musulmane menacent la société belge. %55 des habitants de cette commune sont des étrangers. Plus personne n'y paye encore des impôts. Ce n'est plus une commune belge. Nous devons faire urgemment quelque chose.

the King's European Morocco claims based on the common history of Morocco with Europe:

Morocco's demand to join the E.E.C is a political act. Logically, the E.E.C can only effectively furnish a political response to a political demand, and not a response that remains prisoner to article 237 [of the Treaty of Rome]. The *Wall Street Journal* was right to say that article 237 does not limit non-European countries in applying to be a member. The article in the FT is correct in saying that Moroccan cultural, economic and military relationships were administered by the French in Fez and Marrakech for more than fifty years.²²⁵

The Europolitique, on the other hand, evaluated Morocco's quest to be a member of the E.E.C as a new phase between the E.E.C and Morocco:

According to President Jacques Delors, relations between the European Community and Morocco should be based on confidence and recognition of mutual interests. He stated that the respect for these principles would enable the parties to resolve their current difficulties. He also stressed that these immediate problems should and would be dispatched today without delay. The Commission president stressed that the exchange of letters between Hassan the Second and the Community's Presidency was a major event opening new prospects for European Moroccan relations. (Morocco submitted a membership letter to the European Communities this year.) The President of the Council's position is shared by the Commission President, who stressed that the Community's responsibility vis à vis neighboring countries wishing to be a part in the European undertaking and share in Europe's future. Indeed Mr. Delors stated that a new political constellation should be considered, given the heterogeneity within the Community and the diversity of many countries desirous of themselves in one way or another with the Community's political and economic Project. He ended by asserting that he had fully grasped the message the King Hassan II had addressed to him, that a new dealing of political cards, based on recognition of Morocco's political, economic and cultural specificity, was within the Community's reach.²²⁶

²²⁵ *Geopolitique Africaine* édité à Brussels, October 7th 1987: L'adhésion du Maroc à CEE est un acte politique. Logiquement, la CEE ne peut effectivement fournir qu'une réponse politique à une demande politique, et non une réponse qui reste prisonnière de l'article 237. *Wall Street Journal* a raison de dire que l'article 237 ne limite pas aux pays non-européens de ne pas appliquer à être un membre de CEE. L'article en *FT* a raison en disant que les relations culturelles, économiques et militaires du Maroc sont été administrés par les Français dans Fez et Marrakech pour plus de 50 ans.

²²⁶ European Report, October 14th 1987, no:1348.

The *Europe Report*, on the other hand, blamed the Commission President Uffe Elleman Jensen since he did not give a clear message to Morocco about its membership application:

How does one reject Morocco's request for membership without seeming negative? This painful dilemma was at the heart of the E.E.C Foreign Ministers' debates in Brussels on September 14th as they officially examined Rabat's application to join the E.E.C submitted on July 20. While the answer is clear, the form it will take definitely creates a Ministerial predicament. The first difficulty is to explain to the Moroccans that there is a legal problem. (Morocco does not meet the conditions stipulated in the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, for it is neither a European state nor member of the Council of Europe, the two criteria used till now to accept the applications.) The second is how to explain that the request cannot be considered without striking the hand that King Hassan II has extended. Bernard Bosson, the French Minister charge of European Affairs, who voiced these concerns, suggested creating a special form of cooperation to meet this request concretely. The French Minister failed, however, to specify what form this new type of cooperation might take. This might at the same time serve as a standard answer for other membership requests offered by the Third states of the Mediterranean. Beyond questions of pure diplomatic control, the E.E.C's member states have decidedly difficult problem of not alienating by too cut and dry a refusal, which could offend it, a moderate Arab state that vaunts its ties to the Western World, calls itself Islamic while combating severely all forms of religious fundamentalism, and with which, furthermore, the E.E.C has been entangled delicate trade negotiations that have dragged on since Spain and Portugal's accession on 1986. However, it is hard to imagine such cooperation would work. Morocco is already the Community's leading trade partner in the Mediterranean and many member states like Denmark, which advocates a no without appeal to Rabat's request, are not ready to open their doors any wider to Moroccan products.²²⁷

Europe Report in its next issue expressed a clearer message with regards to Morocco's membership to the E.E.C. According to the *Europe Report*, Hasan II's European Morocco claims do not have any basis even though the Treaty of Rome did not openly stress what it had meant by saying "Only European states can apply":

²²⁷ European Report, September 16th 1987, no:1340.

Although none of the member states, meeting in the General Affairs Council on July 20, seemed to have any fundamental objections to the Moroccan request, the majority of them underlined that there would be major legal difficulties. Article 237 of the Treaty in fact states that any European states may apply to become a member state to E.E.C. Although what is meant by European is not defined in the Treaty, the criteria which has been accepted until now has been the membership of the Council of Europe. This is not Morocco's case. Mr. Elleman Jansen emphasized that considerable legal obstacles lay in the path of Moroccan request. Bernard Bosson, French Deputy Minister for European Affairs, made the same remark, although he admitted to being touched by the application.²²⁸

On the other hand, the journal Europe declared that the application of Morocco to the E.E.C was welcomed by the member states of the E.E.C:

President of the Council Mr. Elleman Jansen said in his closing press conference that the General Affairs Council will examine Morocco's membership application in September. We were very happy to receive this letter, he said, because we interpreted it as a very clear signal of this country's European orientation and its desire to develop and strengthen relations with the Community. Mr. Elleman Jansen admitted that legal obstacles exist, concerning the type of country that may apply to join the Community, and said that his Moroccan counterpart was aware of this. Mr. de Clercq said that the Twelve were touched by King Hassan's initiative, which is a positive fact in itself.²²⁹

Morocco's application to the E.C was also commented upon by the *Los Angeles Times*:

Morocco on Monday asked to join the European Communities, a move reflecting the North African country's concern for its farm exports to Western Europe, but the bloc's foreign ministers said Morocco is ineligible. Diplomats said Morocco's King Hassan II must have expected the negative response after being told that only European countries could join when he first extended informal feelers two years ago.²³⁰

²²⁸ European Report, July 22nd 1987, no: 1332.

²²⁹ *Europe Report*, July 21st-22nd 1987, no:4594.

²³⁰ *Los Angeles Times*, July 21st 1987:5.

In another issue, *Europe Report* expressed the timing problem of the Moroccan application in terms of an economic approach:

The request for accession to the E.E.C submitted by Morocco on July 8th came as a surprise to a number of observers, not because of the move in itself (which has been expected for the past three years) but rather because of the wrong timing. The European Community is going through a particularly difficult period with intense negotiations just underway to enlarge Morocco's bilateral fisheries agreement with Spain to the E.E.C's other member states. After an examination of legal problems posed by this request, *Europe Report* turns to an appraisal of the state relations between the E.E.C and Morocco. Morocco's request is far from being the end of result a harmonious procedure towards closer relations with the European Community and the gradual removal of all major obstacles. On the contrary, since early 1986 with Spain's and Portugal's accession to E.E.C, countless difficulties have appeared on the horizon. Morocco is considered to be hardest hit amongst third countries by member state enlargement, mainly because of direct competition from Spain with farm products such as citrus fruit or tomatoes on the common market. Last October, the E.E.C's member states entrusted the European Commission with a mandate to negotiate protocols to adapt existing agreements with their Mediterranean partners with the aim of including two new member states. The basic principle of the mandate was to maintain traditional trade flows between the E.E.C and the Mediterranean third countries through a steady level of trade of several years. Morocco immediately rejected the Community's position, first because the period 1980-1984 which was to be used as a basis for calculating traditional flows was marked by the extreme drought in the country and therefore considered by Moroccan authorities as non-representative of their nations export potential. Hence, oranges exported to E.E.C now represent no more than 56% of their level in 1976 when the cooperation agreement was signed. Accordingly, Moroccan products termed as being new, such as cut flowers, kiwis or new potatoes are not taken into account. Another area of contention was the permission granted to Canary Islands, which are not integral part of the E.E.C, to export tomatoes on the same conditions as Mediterranean countries. The conclusion is that the Community's offers do not constitute a basis for acceptable negotiation and do not take into account Morocco's specific position. Morocco wants a special treatment, affected more than other Mediterranean countries.²³¹

Europe stated that the E.E.C already agreed on the non-Europeanness of Morocco and argued that the European Commission now has to declare this to Morocco without offending it:

²³¹ *Europe Report*, July 29th 1987, no: 1334.

The adhesion of Morocco to the EC is not possible because it is incompatible with the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome which read as follows; Any European state may apply to become member of the European Community. However, Morocco is not European. On the legal side, it is clear and definitive. What now remains to do is A: to detail these concepts in written form to Morocco's application, in such a way not to offend Morocco's sensitivity and susceptibility, B: to define the ways that might be followed or explored in order to deepen relations, which is unanimously desired.²³²

7.6. The King's European Morocco: An Assessment

Previous chapter showed that the Moroccan state and non-state actors were annoyed of this hybridity that was created in the French Protectorate, and they tried to nullify its impacts on postcolonial Morocco by using different components of Moroccan national identity. These actors were annoyed of the hybridity that was created in the Protectorates' period in Morocco, and they saw its impacts of European colonialism on Moroccan national identity. Therefore, they used components of Moroccan national identity to nullify this hybridity.

However, previous chapter also showed that King Hassan II never tried to implement a policy, or give a speech, that was directly addressed to the French Protectorate. In this aspect, it could be said that the hybridity created by the French, and its reflection in postcolonial Morocco, was differently interpreted by King Hassan II and other state, non-state actors. If we see King Hassan II's actions since he came to power in Morocco, in 1961 when he adopted the status of the King instead of sultan, and his metaphor saying that Morocco has roots in Africa but leaves in Europe, we see that King Hassan II interpreted this hybridity not as something to

²³² *Europe Report*, September 16th 1987, no: 4618.

nullify but as something to add into Moroccan national identity. Talking about his membership application to the European Community in 1987 that was founded by a Treaty that asked the applicant states to be European King Hassan II used this hybridity that was created in the French Protectorate time as a tool to show how Morocco was European. This is why actually, the argument of thesis says that King Hassan II instrumentalized this hybridity that was created in French Protectorate times (not the Spanish due to the ways how the Spanish administered Morocco unlike France) into postcolonial Moroccan national identity because he asserted that not only Moroccan state but also Moroccan nation was European. In addition, the discourses of King Hassan II show that the reasons for Morocco to be a member of the European Community through membership to European Economic Community was not political, economic, or strategical, but cultural. In this sense, the hybridity that was created in the French Protectorate time made him feel European, so that he applied to the European Community to be its member. In this case, even the instrumentalization of hybridity in postcolonial Morocco that was created in the French Protectorate constitute an example to postcolonialism that argues that this branch analyzes the impacts of the European colonialism in the postcolonial episodes of the once colonized states.

In addition, there are two other important points to highlight in this chapter. First of all, the interviews conducted on what the Moroccan people thought of the King's European Morocco shows that the hybridity that was interpreted in the same way as Hassan did was also visible in the Moroccan people. In this sense, even though Moroccan membership application to the European Community was led by King Hassan II alone, his instrumentalization of hybridity with France was shared by Moroccan people. Second, this chapter also showed that maybe not the European

bureaucrats but European media did not fully understand Morocco's application to European Economic Community (which was actually regarded by King Hassan II as a way to make Morocco a member to European Community in the official application letter). Moreover, the European media, and especially the organs of the European Commission's reaction to Morocco's quest show how the European Commission and its media organs was regarding Europe as a pure culture, and how even Europeanness that was developed in a colonized nation's culture in hybrid form was not acceptable to count this state as European.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

This dissertation examines how King Hassan II asserted that Morocco was a European state and nation according to article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, by applying for membership to the European Community through European Economic Community (E.E.C.) that opens their way to be a member to European Community. In this sense, this dissertation mainly looked for an answer to the question: How did a formerly colonized state added Europeanness into its national identity even though this identity was constructed against Europe (France) due to European colonialism (French Protectorate), both in the colonial and postcolonial episodes. As an answer to this question, the dissertation underlines the leading role of King Hassan II in this application to the European Economic Community, by revealing how he instrumentalized hybridity between Moroccans and French that was created by the French during the French Protectorate in postcolonial Moroccan national identity to assert Morocco was a European state, as required by article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. While saying it, this dissertation showed an impglementaiton of the

inbetweenness theme of postcolonial nationalism that was developed by Bhabha, Said, Gilroy and Dirks, who show that the culture of a colonized state in the postcolonial period is hybrid with the culture of its colonizer. This dissertation, then, shows this cultural formation, cultural hybridity, through analyzing how state felt European and thus wanted to become a part of a European organization.

Accordingly, the chapters of the dissertation have all intended to explain this hybridity between Morocco and France as was instrumentalized by King Hassan II to assert his European Morocco argument. Chapter 2 offered a theoretical framework for the dissertation that explains the nature of this instrumentalized hybridity. It introduced the postcolonial nationalism theory, which argues that the impacts of European colonialism continue to go on over the national identity of the colonized state after colonialism. This chapter showed that hybridity concept of Homi Bhabha, as one of the authors who worked on the inbetweenness theme of postcolonial nationalism, explains the King's European Morocco as a kind of interpretation of the postcolonial Moroccan national identity through culture, as John Stuart Mill did. Chapter 3 explains the nature of Moroccan national identity, outlining the steps that transformed Islam from a Moroccan cultural identity into a national identity by emphasizing Islam as the unique answer to how the Arab and Amazigh populations in Morocco had defined themselves between the foundation of Morocco until the settlement of the French and Spanish Protectorates. It also showed how the French Protectorate of Morocco was regarded in French colonial policy in Africa, in order to show that the hybridity instrumentalized by King Hassan II in 1987 has its roots in the colonial policy of France in Africa, to establish the colonizer and the colonized relationship. Chapter 4 analyzes colonial history in Morocco, demonstrating how the French Protectorate created cultural hybridity in Morocco and among Moroccans,

with its successful integration of Islam and education, between 1912 and 1925 where Resident General Hybert Lyautey was in charge of the Protectorate administration. In this sense, this chapter also showed that not all colonial administrations in Africa intended to assimilate the local populations, by underlining General Hubert Lyautey as the prominent figure of the creation of *la politique musulmane* and the introduction of French language to Moroccan locals that led to the creation and also internalization of a cultural hybridity between France and Morocco, among Moroccans. Chapter 5 showed that even though this hybridity continued in the post Lyatuey administration period between 1925 and 1956, the Moroccanness that emerged again against European colonialism represented by the French Protectorate as a result of deviations from Lyautey's respect for Islam shadowed it. Moreover, this chapter showed the rise of Moroccanness as the second component of Moroccan national identity, that constituted one side of King Hassan II'd instrumentalized hybridity, while explaining/justifying Morocco's Europeanness according to article 237 of Treaty of Rome. Chapter 6 analyzes Morocco's postcolonial history by analyzing the period of 1956 and 1984, showing how a critique of colonialist theme of postcolonial nationalism was implemented in Morocco by both Moroccan state and non-state actors, and through different components of Moroccan national identity. By showing how the Africanness and Arabness components of Moroccan national identity emerged against European colonialism, together with how Moroccanness and Maghrebness developed in this context and were used to nullify the impacts of the French and Spanish Protectorates after colonialism, this chapter shows how the hybridity created in the colonial period annoyed the Moroccan state and non-state actors and mobilized them to nullify these impacts on Moroccan national identity. Chapter 7, finally, analyzes the Europeanness side of the cultural

hybridity in King Hassan II's mind that was instrumentalized in Moroccan national identity while explaining the Europeaness of Morocco. Accordingly, the chapter analyzes the discourses of King Hassan II with regards to his European Morocco claim, and shows how he instrumentalized the hybridity that was already constructed at the center of Moroccan culture with France in the French Protectorate period in Moroccan national identity in 1987. The chapter shows through interviews conducted in Morocco, as well as through media reports from the time how the Moroccan state and non-state actors interpreted the Europeaness of Morocco, and what they thought about it. The chapter ends with King Hassan II's European Morocco argument as interpreted by bureaucrats of the European Commission and European media.

So what does the hybridity of Moroccans with the French that was instrumentalized by King Hassan II in postcolonial Moroccan national identity to explain/assert the Europeaness of Morocco according to article 237 of the Treaty of Rome tell us? The application of Morocco to the European Communities reveals this instrumentalization in order to show that there is the "how a state feels European" aspect in addition to "why a state applies to the European Communities" in the European Union expansion. Accordingly, this instrumentalization shows that a country must first explain how it is European before offering why it wants to become a member to the European Union today. While looking at the existing literature, we see that this explanation is often visible in Mediterranean countries such as Malta, Cyprus and Turkey, but not in discourses regarding Northern or Central European states. In this sense, this dissertation points out that the further a state is from a geographically defined Europe by the European Union, the more it has to show *how* it is European. Regarding Morocco's explanation on how European it is, this dissertation shows that even though a state is not located in the defined geography of

Europe, it can *feel* European all the same. Turkey, which applied for European Union membership at the same time as Morocco, maybe, would have problems explaining how it is European. This could be a problem in the long negotiation process that has continued since 2005. On the other hand, the ways in which Malta and Cyprus were able to explain their Europeanness (better than Turkey) became a factor in their acceptance to the European Union. Even though Morocco was rejected, I believe that Morocco could much better explain how it was European than Turkey, who tends to blame the European Union since it restricts the definition of European with religion, namely Christianity. In my view, Turkey must also follow similar path like Morocco, and state how it is European in a more proper way. The discourses of King Hassan II that were analyzed in the last chapter of this dissertation show that the national identity nest of Europeanness in Morocco goes back to 1976. In this context, the Europeanness of Morocco highlighted by King Hassan II started many years before the membership application to the European Commission, which shows us that this discourse was not just to impress the European Commission but rather related with Moroccan national identity. Accordingly, Morocco *felt* European long before it had submitted its membership application, rather than it wanting to seem European just so that its membership application to E.C would be accepted. The discourses of King Hassan II could not be evaluated as simple political rhetoric because the dissertation shows that he uses the culture of Morocco with France that was developed in a hybridity context as basis for his European Morocco argument. Moreover, this dissertation shows that King Hassan II did not only address the Moroccan people, but also to the European Commission, the responsible organ of the European Community about the membership applications of the states. In this sense, the dissertation shows that the instrumentalization of the cultural hybridity at the culture of Morocco with

France was used not only to persuade the Moroccan community but also the European Commission about how European Morocco was.

Other than this, this instrumentalization is a reflection of hybridity that was created in the French Protectorate times and continued into postcolonial Morocco. Dissertation uses 'France' here only because the chapters showed us that even though Spain also had a Protectorate administration in Morocco, it ruled Morocco so unlike the French, that King Hassan II did not even establish this instrumentalization of hybridity with Spain. Chapter 6, for instance, showed that the impacts of the Spanish Protectorate on Moroccan national identity were limited with the territory definition of national identity, whereas the French ones covered almost all other definitions in Özkırımlı's book. Accordingly, the application of Morocco to the European Economic Community to be a member to European Community was the reflection of this hybridity in postcolonial Morocco, and that used the hybridity between Moroccans and French that was created in the colonial episode. Due to the strong construction of Moroccaness in the postcolonial period of Morocco, King Hassan II could not maybe say that Morocco was also a French nation, but he used the French side of Morocco, the cultural hybridity between French and Moroccans that goes back to 1912, to say Morocco was European. It is therefore the European *feeling* of Morocco on the basis of the French Protectorate that was the main locus of this dissertation. So, the nature of the cultural hybridity that we see in in postcolonial Morocco and analyzed by this dissertation is between Moroccaness and Europeaness, but on the basis of the cultural hybridity between France and Morocco that was constructed between 1912 and 1956.

Moreover, the instrumentalization of hybridity between Moroccans and French in postcolonial Moroccan national identity to explain Morocco's

Europeanness in postcolonial Morocco is also a study that shows how the components of Moroccan national identity constructed against European colonialism were reconciled with Europeanness, a new component that King Hassan II tried to add onto Moroccan national identity. Accordingly, the chapters of this dissertation showed that the components of Moroccan national identity are Islam, Moroccanness, Africanness, Maghrebness and Arabness. All of these were constructed against Europe due to European colonialism, and King Hassan II tried to add (and managed to add, I believe) Europeanness onto this national identity. Accordingly, Morocco's feeling of being European is the reflection of the cultural hybridity between France and Morocco that was constructed in the French Protectorate in the postcolonial episode, and we see that this Europeanness was reconciled with the other components of Moroccan national identity. It reconciles with Islam on the basis of the respect that was shown by General Lyautey to Moroccan Islam through *la politique musulmane*; it reconciles with Moroccanness on the basis of this hybridity that makes Europeanness not to exclude it; Africanness and Maghrebness on the basis of their collapse in the postcolonial episode with Algeria's declaration of war against Morocco and African Union's decision to add the Western Sahara as a member; and Arabness that was actually an internal policy which at the end could not stop the production of the *darija* language, composed of both French and Arabic words. It is seen that Morocco's Europeanness reconciled with all other components even though these others were constructed against European colonialism. This actually makes Morocco's colonial status very interesting, since it saw Europeanness as a component to its national identity. In addition it shows that Morocco tended to become what it struggled against at the end.

This instrumentalization also shows that there is no 'pure' culture for formerly colonized states after colonialism, as Bhabha, Said, and Dirks argue. It is not only King Hassan's instrumentalization of cultural hybridity with France that explains Morocco's Europeanness, but also the interviews conducted in Morocco about the King's European Morocco argument show that Moroccan society's culture was influenced by French culture, and makes Moroccans think in a hybrid way in many senses. Not only do some Moroccans think Morocco is a European state with reference to the French Protectorate, but also the way Moroccans eat, dress, talk, shop, and read are highly mixed with French culture today. France and French language were so internalized by the people of Morocco both today and in the colonial periods that it replaced Arabic language between 1912 and 1925, and it led to the Moroccan state and non-state actors to criticize the French Protectorate in French language. The Arabization program that started in 1970s, therefore, was an attempt to nullify these impacts of the French Protectorate in the Moroccan language, which was regarded a definition of national identity. Coming to postcolonial episode, for instance, we see that there was a television program where the commentator asked King Hassan II and the French President François Mitterand to write a text on a paper that was dictated by him. When King Hassan II and Mitterand finished writing, the commentator analyzed the papers and saw that King Hassan II's French was grammatically more correct.

This instrumentalization, then, shows that whereas the impacts of the French Protectorate on Moroccan national identity after colonialism were regarded as the reflection of hybridity that was a threat to Moroccanness by the Moroccan state and non-state actors between 1956 and 1984, this cultural hybridity between 1984 and 1987 led to impacting Moroccan national identity with the European feeling of

Morocco that at the end mobilized King Hassan II to apply for membership to the European Economic Community to become a member to European Community. In other words, cultural hybridity with the French Protectorate was attempted to be eliminated by Moroccan state and non-state actors in the 1956 - 1984 period as the critique of colonialism theme of postcolonial nationalism offers, and was later used by King Hassan II to add Europeanness in Moroccan national identity as the inbetweenness and admiration of Europe themes of postcolonial nationalism offers.

In addition, this instrumentalization shows that Islam is the strongest component of Moroccan national identity in the postcolonial period, much more so than Moroccanness. It was those people who defined Morocco with Islam that criticized King Hassan II's application to European Communities, and they all highlighted that the Islamic component of Morocco cannot accept Europeanness in Moroccan national identity. While considering the fact that Islam was the first component of Moroccan national identity, it could be said that it was and is the strongest component since it not only constructed the basis of Moroccanness and other components but also the only component that challenged Europeanness and even King Hassan II himself.

Furthermore, the instrumentalization of hybridity between French and Moroccans in Moroccan postcolonial national identity to explain Morocco's Europeanness according to article 237 of the Treaty of Rome is the first Europeanization attempt of Morocco within the European Community sense. If the European Community accepted Morocco's membership application, Morocco would today be among the members of the European Union. This, at the end, would make the discourses of King Hassan II as the basis of Morocco's Europeanization policies that must have been adopted by Morocco. Morocco, then, must have adopted its

justice, economics, and internal regulations according to the European Union, as Turkey does today.

Last but not least, the Europeanness of Morocco in King Hassan II's mind that led Morocco to be able to apply for membership to the European Communities shows that if the European Union refuses a country's membership, it does so directly, without any hesitation. This is especially important information for Euro-sceptics in Turkey, who tend to argue that the European Union plays with Turkey, that the European Union is a Christian club and will never consider Turkey as a member, that the European Union does not want Turkey, and that the European Union thinks of Turkey as strategic member, but not a full member. This dissertation, in this sense, is an antidote to these skeptics because it shows that if the European Union rejects a country's application, it does it. Turkey, then, still in the negotiation period with the European Union, must not be skeptical about its future in this organization by looking at how the European Union evaluated Morocco's membership application. If Turkey wants to be a full member of the European Union, it is enough that it adopts itself to the European regulations for full membership.

The role of the Europeanness of Morocco in its relations with the European Union today also has a comparative perspective, especially with other colonized states like Algeria, and another state that asserted that it was European as well by applying to the membership of European Community; Turkey. The hybridity that was created in Morocco by the French through the successful integration of the Protectorate with Islam between 1912 and 1925 never happened in Algeria. In Algeria, the cultural hybridity that was created by the French was an outcome of an unsuccessful integration of the French with Algerian Islam during whole the colonization period. In contrast to General Lyautey's rule in the French Protectorate

in Morocco that provided this successful integration through respecting the Moroccan Islam with *la politique musulmane*, the French administration in Algeria followed an entirely different path. This different picture of Algeria in the hands of the French was shaped when General Bugeaud came to power in Algeria in 1840. Bugeaud took strict measures against the Amazigh tribes and Arabs that revolted the French rule that were similar to the ones in Morocco. In this sense, Bugeaud ordered the French soldiers and settlers to destroy Muslim villages, take away their cattle, and burn their harvests in case they resist. The rebels were so strong that Bugeaud's policy became much brutal between 1844 and 1847 when French officers burnt the defeated Amazighs who surrendered with their own will. The same brutality continued even after the resignation of General Bugeaud in 1847. The next Generals, for instance, destroyed the vast majority of the Banu Abbas tribes, burnt Arab villages, confiscated the property of Arabs and Amazighs, and killed many Muslim chiefs. In Morocco, General Lyautey only used military forces against the Amazigh tribes in the Blad al Siba and only when they attacked the French, and never touched the Arab population in Blad al Makhzen. Moreover, General Lyautey was not categorizing the Arabs and the Amazighs of Morocco as the same, and he even went the way of separating the Amazighs from the Arabs through introduction of the French language.

The French colonization of Algeria showed us that the way the French colonized and the way the French approached the colonized has an identifying role as to what extent a colonized country like Morocco could define itself as European. In this sense, it can be said that the cultural hybridity that was created by the French with Moroccans through a successful integration of the French with Moroccan Islam under General Lyautey rule made King Hassan II argue that Morocco was European.

On the other hand, the unsuccessful integration of the French with Algerian Islam between 1829 and 1962 did not make any Algerian leader in postcolonial Algeria argue that Algeria was European. In contrast, the Algerian postcolonial history that developed on the axis of development of Algerian Islam until late 1995 was a direct attempt by the Algerian government to nullify the impacts of the French administration that from the beginning until the end of its administration undermined the Algerians and Algerian Islam. As a result, the fact that Algeria is a much more Islamic state than Morocco, in my view, is because the French undermined Islam so much in the colonial episode that now Algeria strengthened its identification with Islam as a reaction to French colonization. In this sense, it could be said that General Lyautey as the actor of *la politique musulmane* in the French Protectorate of Morocco had a great role in shaping King Hassan II's European Morocco argument.

Morocco's membership application also has several similarities with Turkey's. As two states that applied to the European Commission to be a member, both states used the discourses of a "bridge". Whereas Morocco thought that it would be a bridge between Europe and Africa, Turkey said it would be a bridge between Europe and Asia. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to deny the differences in the nature of these states' Europeanness as well. The first difference is that Turkey was regarded as more European than Morocco because its membership application was evaluated in such a way that Turkey today became a candidate country. Morocco, on the other hand, could not convince the European Commission about its Europeanness on the basis of the French Protectorate, and it became the only country that was directly rejected in the history of the European Community. The second difference is that Morocco used its colonial history with France to justify its Europeanness whereas Turkey did not because it was not a colonized state like Morocco. One last

difference, and interesting point about the relationship of the European Community with Turkey and Morocco, is that the European Commission signed the Barcelona Process in November 1995, the European Union-Morocco Association Agreement in February 1996, the Association Agreement Plan in 1998, the Agadir Free Trade Agreement in February 2004, the European Union-Morocco Fisheries Agreement in 2006, the advanced status in October 2008, the European Union-Morocco Summit in March 2010, and the European Neighborhood policy and partnership agreement in 2013. In contrast, it is seen that European Commission signed only two important enlargement agreements with Turkey: the Customs Union Agreement in 1995 and the Negotiations agreement in 2005, even though it was regarded as a candidate state.

To sum up, this dissertation shows that the instrumentalization of hybridity that was created by the French in the Protectorate Morocco by King Hassan II who claimed Morocco was a European state brings us an alternative definition and meaning of Europeanness. Accordingly, even though the European Commission refused Morocco's membership application by saying that Morocco was not a European state geographically, Morocco's being monarch but not ideal democracy, and also the Europeanness it carries in hybrid but not pure form caused this refusal. In this dissertation where Moroccan national identity was analyzed as much as possible with its multiple components rather than solely Moroccaness, the story of King Hassan II's European Morocco claim, however, is my original study.

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