

PERCEPTIONS OF THE US INVOLVEMENT
BY ATHENS AND ANKARA
IN THE GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE (1954-1999)

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by

THEODORA KALAITZAKI

DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BILGENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

SEPTEMBER 2004

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The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

THEODORA KALAITZAKI

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
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
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
Assistant Professor Hasan ÜNAL
Supervisor

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Assistant Professor Dr Gülgün TUNA
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.



Assistant Professor Nur Bilge CRISS
Examining Committee Member

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
Assistant Professor Ömer Faruk GENÇKAYA
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.



Dr. Emel Gülden OKTAY
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences



Professor Kürşat AYDOĞAN
Director

To my parents
Georgio and Kaiti Kalaitzaki
and
Evgenia

ABSTRACT

PERCEPTIONS OF THE US INVOLVEMENT
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Kalaitzaki, Theodora

Ph.D., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assistant Professor Dr Hasan Ünal

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Greek-Turkish relations became strained a few years after the starting of the Cold War despite that both countries have become parts of the same alliance, NATO, and belonged to the western camp against the Soviet Union. The eruption of the Cyprus conflict was the main reason for worsening the relations between the two states. In the decade of 1970s additional problems in the Aegean deteriorated relations further, and both states have almost come to the brink of a war several times. The United States as the most powerful ally has always needed to be involved in order to keep NATO's cohesion and preserve stability in the southeastern flank of the Alliance.

The aim of this study is to analyze the American involvement towards the Greek-Turkish dispute which includes the Cyprus problem and the Aegean issues from 1954 until 1999 emphasizing in the most serious Cyprus crises (1963-64, 1967, 1974, 1997) and the Aegean crises (1976, 1987, 1996). Further, this study will attempt to analyze the Greek and the Turkish perceptions of the American involvement, and to evaluate to what extent the United States presence has affected the course of the long-standing Greek-Turkish dispute.

Keywords: Greek foreign policy, Turkish foreign policy, Greek-Turkish dispute, Cyprus, United States involvement

ÖZET

ATİNA VE ANKARA'NIN 1954-1999
YUNAN-TÜRK UZLAŞMAZLIĞINDA
AMERİKAN GİRİŞİMLERİNİ ALGILAMALARI

Theodora Kalaitzaki

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hasan Ünal

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Türk-Yunan ilişkileri, iki ülkenin Sovyetler Birliği'ne karşı NATO ittifakı ve Batı kampında yer almalarına rağmen Soğuk Savaş başladıktan birkaç yıl sonra gerginleşti. Kıbrıs Sorunu'nun patlak vermesi ilişkilerin kötüleşmesindeki en önemli nedendi. 1970'lerde Ege'de ortaya çıkan diğer problemler ilişkileri daha da kritik bir hale getirdi ve iki devlet birkaç kez savaşın eşiğine geldiler. İttifakın en güçlü müttefiki olarak Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, NATO'nun bütünlüğünü korumak ve ittifakın Güneydoğu kanadındaki istikrarı devam ettirmek için her zaman Türk-Yunan ilişkilerine müdahil olmaktadır.

Bu alıřmanın amacı, 1954-1999 yılları arasında, Kıbrıs sorunu ve Ege meselelerini de iine alan Trk-Yunan anlaşmazlıđı hakkındaki, varlıđını bilhassa en ciddi Kıbrıs (1963-64, 1967, 1974, 1997) ve Ege (1976, 1987, 1996) bunalımlarında gsteren Amerikan siyasetini analiz etmektir. Daha sonra bu alıřmada, Trkiye ve Yunanistan'ın bu Amerikan giriřimlerini nasıl algıladıkları incelenecektir. Amerikan varlıđının bu uzun sreli Trk-Yunan anlaşmazlıđını nasıl etkilediđi de deđerlendirilecektir.

Anahtar szckler: Yunan dıř politikası, Trk dıř politikası, Trk-Yunan anlaşmazlıđı, Kıbrıs, Amerikan giriřimleri

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My gratitude to His Eminence Bishop of San Francisco Antony who has been always supportive emotionally and financially throughout my graduate studies, is enormous. Mr. Nikos Prokopakis has also been actively involved and ready to supplement my meagre, at times, scholarships to facilitate my research. My supervisor in National Bank of Greece Mrs Athanassia Toumpaniari in more than one occasion has been patient with my long absences from work to complete my writing up and for that I am indebted.

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INTRODUCTION

Greece and Turkey emerged from the Second World War as solid members of the Western alliance and their bilateral territorial disputes appearing settled. The historic conflicts dating back to Ottoman times seemed memories, fading into a new tradition of peace and friendship established in the early 1930s in the historic reconciliation between the two neighboring states.

In the post war era Greece and Turkey sided with the western countries and with their participation in the western European institutions (Council of Europe, NATO) became “officially” part of the Western block led by the United States (US) against the Eastern block of the Communist states led by the Soviet Union.

In the first years of the Cold War, the two countries concentrated their efforts to improve their bilateral relations as allies and to strengthen their ties with the US. Both Greece and Turkey received significant financial and humanitarian support to recover from the war, and were under the security umbrella of the US. In return, the US was allowed to install military bases with special privileges for the American personnel in both countries. In the difficult Cold War environment the three allies

seemed to have harmonious relations focusing on the external communist danger coming from the north¹.

This cordial era was ended in 1954 with the internationalization of the Cyprus problem at the UN forum by the Greek government. Greece and Turkey had “legitimate rights” over the island because of the presence of the Greek and Turkish populations. However, Greece and Turkey had completely divergent perceptions over the future of the British colony². In 1955 after the failure of the Greek appeal to the UN, Greek Cypriots started a national struggle against the British with indirect Greek support aiming at *Enosis* with Greece. Turkey, on the other hand, opposed the Greek Cypriot movement and adopted the *Taksim* thesis.

Each of the three NATO countries felt that their vital interests were at stake, and they soon entered into a dangerous collision course. The task for the United States-then the unquestioned leader of the Western Alliance- was to carve out policies that would lead to peaceful settlement that would not simultaneously rupture the cohesiveness of the strategic southern flank of NATO³.

In August 1960 Cyprus emerged as an independent state. Both Greek and Turkish sides came to a compromise abandoning their extreme positions (*enosis* or *taksim*). The leaders of the two Cypriot communities put their signatures on the treaty, which

¹ T. Couloumbis, 1983. *The United States, Greece and Turkey The Troubled Triangle* (New York: Praeger Publishers), pp. 7-21; M. Hatipoğlu, 1997. *Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954* (Modern History of Greece and Turkey) (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi), pp. 262-289.

² S. Torun, 1956. *Türkiye İngiltere ve Yunanistan arasında Kıbrıs' nın Politik Durumu* (Turkey, England and Greece and the Political Situation in Cyprus) (İstanbul: Gazeteciler Matbaası); A. Vlachos, 1982. *Deka xronia Kipriako* (Ten Years of Cyprus Problem) (Athens: Estia Publications).

³ C. Nicolet, 2001. *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention* (Bibliopolis Mannheim und Mohnesee).

foresaw vast security guarantees for the Turkish Cypriot community, providing for greater representation in political institutions and in the army, than their percentage of population would have allowed. The diplomatic settlement was a positive development for the US, as it seemed to eliminate a serious friction point in the relations of two of its allies.

The outbreak of violence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island in 1963 led the US involvement in the Cyprus issue for the first time, since in George Ball's words "Cyprus was merely one more step in Britain's painful shedding of the empire, and London had no longer the will or the resources to preside over such a quarrel"⁴.

During the 1960s the US had to intervene several times directly and on its own to prevent a renewed outbreak of war on the island and between Greece and Turkey. The danger of a Greek-Turkish war, and thus dissolution of NATO's southeastern flank as a consequence of disagreement over the status of Cyprus was the main reason of American involvement in Cyprus after 1960. However, regarding the level of involvement the US was dependent on the cooperation of its NATO allies: Greece and Turkey. In 1964 despite the determination of the US diplomacy to settle matters once and for all and to eliminate a situation which could be exploited by the Soviet Union, Greece and Turkey could not agree on the proposed Acheson plans⁵.

The July 1974 coup d'état organized by Greek junta against President Makarios as the later had increasingly differentiated by the idea of Cypriot union with Greece.

⁴ G. Ball, 1982. *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: W.W. Norton), p. 340.

⁵ C. Nicolet, *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974*, pp. 247-290.

The Turkish army intervened in order to protect its minority and the Turkish strategic interests as there was the danger the island to go under total Greek control⁶. Once again, the US's close relationship with Greece and Turkey and its concern for stability in the region led it become involved in prevention of another crisis in Cyprus. When a compromise between Greece and Turkey could not be reached during the following weeks, the Turkish army advanced further, conquering more than a third of the island, formulating the situation that stands today.

From the 1970s onwards as the Aegean dispute⁷ emerged between the two countries, the scope of US involvement rose, as the dangers of a Greek-Turkish war increased. The poisonous political climate created by the conflict in Cyprus increased the tension in the common sea of the Aegean.

Gradually Greek policy makers, especially in the 1980s under PASOK government, became convinced that Turkey had been an aggressor and perceived the Turkish claims over the Aegean as a threat to its territorial integrity. Turkey, on the other hand adopted a hard-line attitude affected by Greece's intention to extent its territorial waters from six to twelve miles, disputing the territorial status quo of the Aegean in an effort to escalate pressure upon Greece.

For the Greek side there was only one and real problem in the Greek-Turkish relations, that is the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf which Greece

⁶ S. Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations*, p. 195.

⁷ The Aegean dispute includes the question of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea; the militarization of the eastern Aegean islands; the limits of the Greek national air space, the Flight Information Region (FIR) and air operational control within NATO; and the extent of the Greek territorial waters. See for details, Chapter IV, pp. 110-122.

and Turkey should solve by appealing to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Instead of the mediation of The Hague, Turkish side insisted on bilateral negotiations over the continental shelf and all the other Aegean problems.

The first serious incident in the Aegean occurred in August 1976 over the exploration and exploitation of resources in the continental shelf. The US did not get involved directly as it was not much welcomed in the region due to the recent developments in Cyprus. Greece attempted to internationalize the problem of the Aegean continental shelf by appealing to the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice. Turkey for its part, proposed bilateral negotiations, an idea which was totally rejected by the Greek side. However, as the danger of a clash minimized, all the efforts for a resolution were abandoned.

The second Aegean crisis of March 1987 was again over oil explorations in disputed waters and as the crisis escalated rapidly, NATO Secretary General was mobilized at the time to end it. The two parties finally backed off and a process of dialogue started between the two countries searching for a solution which again led nowhere.

The end of the Cold War with the collapse and dismantling of the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc brought about some important changes in the security perceptions of the US. The Containment policy was no longer relevant, since the Soviet threat had disappeared and the US remained the only hegemonic power.

However, the end of the Cold War did not diminish the US strategic interests in the Mediterranean⁸ as Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish dispute is concerned.

Regarding the Greek-Turkish dispute in the post-Cold War era, it did not change substantially. However, new challenges and problems came up for the two allies in their foreign policies. Antagonism increased between Ankara and Athens in the post-communist Balkans. It seemed that both states exported their rivalry in the Balkan region competing to extend their influence in the Balkan states.

Tension was constant throughout the first decade of the post-Cold War era in both the Aegean and Cyprus. In December 1995 an incident which seemed a usual Greek-Turkish episode in the Aegean became the most serious Aegean crisis between the two states. The eruption of Imia/Kardak crisis in January 1996 over two uninhabited islets brought to the surface the depth of the old feud between the two NATO allies, put the stability in the Aegean into danger and caused immediate intervention of the US which prevented a full-scale war between Greece and Turkey at the eleventh hour.

In Cyprus, the US's abilities in crisis mediation tested again when a new crisis erupted over the Greek Cypriots' decision in January 1997 to purchase S-300 anti-aircraft Russian missiles in order to achieve quantitative and qualitative improvements in the country's defense capabilities vis-à-vis Turkey, seen as the single major external threat. The rising danger posed by the Greek-Cypriot rearmament in the eastern Mediterranean alarmed Turkey which stated that it would not allow the weapons to be deployed in the island, threatening to move militarily.

⁸ I. Lesser, 1992. **Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for US Policy** (Santa Monica: RAND), p.3

With the opposition of the Greek government led by Kostas Simitis over the issue of the missile deployment, the Greek Cypriot side withdrew and finally the missiles deployed in Crete. However, the latest Cyprus crisis urged the US to initiate a new diplomatic attempt with the goal of reaching a long-lasting settlement.

Having set the origins and the course of the deterioration of the Greek-Turkish relations, this study analyzes the American involvement in the Greek-Turkish dispute from the beginning of the Cyprus issue in 1954 until the decision of the European Council in 1999 to accept Turkey as a candidate state in the European Union, depending the progress of accession upon the progress of a resolution in Cyprus and the Aegean dispute. The present study focuses on the most dangerous crises over Cyprus (1963-64, 1967, 1974, 1997) and over the Aegean (1976, 1987, 1996). The reasoning behind the US involvement was mainly to prevent a war between the two allies Greece and Turkey and to maintain the cohesion of NATO's southeastern flank. Additionally, the US concentrated their efforts aiding both sides to resolve the dispute and to reduce tension.

This study is focused on how the Greek and Turkish political elites perceived the American involvement in the Greek-Turkish crises. Therefore, it is important to put emphasis on the Greek and Turkish perceptions of the US involvement, to understand expectations of both sides from the US in this long-standing dispute.

The main argument of this dissertation is that as soon as the Cyprus crisis erupted in 1955 the "mother countries", namely Greece and Turkey concentrated on the problem and undervalued their priorities and commitments in the NATO alliance. It was the first clear indication for both NATO allies and the US that, when their vital

interests were at stake, the alliance solidarity and the common perception of the Soviet threat became a back-burner. Meanwhile, both were expecting at least the understanding and the support of the United States against one another. When the expectations of each country were not met by the US in accordance with their national interests they would take their distance from their major ally. This was the case for Turkey in 1964, when the Turkish government prepared to land forces on Cyprus as a result of the intercommunal conflict, but was stopped by the US. President Johnson had sent a letter to the Turkish Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü declaring that the US would cease to support Turkey, if the Turkish intervention in Cyprus could lead to an involvement of the Soviet Union. As a result, the Turkish landing did not take place. But Turkey realized that the US was not as reliable an ally as it thought, and Turkey started to improve her relations with the Soviet Union⁹.

Ten years later, in 1974, it was Greece's turn. The coup organized by the Greek dictatorship against Cypriot President Makarios caused the Turkish military intervention. The US stepped in to persuade the Greek government not to declare war against Turkey and due to that involvement a full-scale Greek-Turkish war was avoided. But the Greek side was disappointed by the US stance, withdrew from the military wing of NATO, and started to improve her relations with the European Community and strengthened her efforts to become a full member¹⁰.

Nevertheless, both Greece and Turkey had recognized the importance of being allies of the US. But as the first problems appeared in their bilateral relations, these became priorities in their foreign policies and not the alliance's commitments.

⁹ S. Bölükbaşı, 1988. **The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus** (Lanham: University Press of America), pp. 65-79.

¹⁰ C. Rozakis, 1986. **Eliniki Exoteriki Politiki** (Greek Foreign Policy) (Athens: Maliaris-Paidia).

Moreover, both states realized that their vital ally's attitude in the dispute was motivated by its strategic considerations without taking into account the vital interests of each country. Additionally, both states consistently held the view that the United States was in favor of the other.

Having set the scope and the purpose of this study, the basic questions arise in this work are: which were the changing patterns of the Greek and Turkish perceptions of the US; which were the results of the American involvement in the dispute; and if the US involvement has perpetuated the dispute or whether it has eased the tension between the two allies.

In order to seek the answers to the above questions the primary sources consulted were the Greek and Turkish newspapers and interviews with Greek and Turkish officials who served in the Greek and the Turkish Foreign Ministry holding political and diplomatic positions. The Greek newspapers used more for this study are: Kathimerini, To Vima, Ta Nea, Eletherotipia. From the Turkish side, Turkish Daily News and the periodicals Briefing and Turkish Probe have been used.

Covering the Greek side, mostly benefited works were the books written by Greek Foreign Ministers. Evangelos Averof-Tositsa's book, **Istoria Xamenon Efkerion: Kipriako 1950-1963** (History of Lost Opportunities: Cyprus Problem 1950-1963), covering the period of 1955-1963; Dimitrios Bitsios's books **Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic** and **Pera apo ta sinora** (Beyond the Borders) covering the period from 1974 until 1977. Additionally Pavlos Petridis's book **O Georgios Papandreou kai to Kipriako Zitima 1954-1965** (George Papandreou and the Cyprus Question 1954-1965) is important for getting information about the period

1963-1965. Then the book by Yiannis Kapsis **Oi tris meres tou Marti** (The three days of March) is quite useful for the 1981-1989 period.

The book by Alexandrakis, Menelaos, Vyron Theodoropoulos, and Efstathios Lagakos. **To Kipriako 1950-1974 :Mia Endoskopisi** (Cyprus Problem 1950-1974: An Introspection) is also important as the three authors were senior Greek diplomats and all of them spent significant part of their career dealing with the Cyprus problem and the Greek-Turkish dispute. A thorough analysis for the Greek-Turkish dispute is offered in Vyron Theodoropoulos' book **Oi Tourkoi kai Emis** (The Turks and Us), in Theodoropoulos, Vyron et al. **Skepseis kai Provlmatismoi gia tin Exoteriki mas Politiki** (Thoughts and Concerns for our Foreign Policy) and in Alexis Alexandris, A (ed.) **Oi Elinotourkikes Sxesis 1923-1987** (Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1987). Another noteworthy work is the Theodoros Couloumbis' book **The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle** covering the Cold War period.

From the Turkish side, important works include Suat Bilge's chapter "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey" in Karpat, Kemal. (ed.) **Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1959-1974**. Bilge's writing is important because he was a diplomat dealing with Cyprus problem in the 1950s. Other useful works are Suha Bölükbaşı's **The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus** and Faruk Sönmezoğlu's book **Türkiye ve Yunanistan İlişkileri & Büyük Güçler** (Turco-Greek Relations and the Great Powers) along with the Şükrü Sina Gürel's books **Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960)** (History of Cyprus) and **Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993)** (Turkish-Greek Relations in a Historical

Context). A detailed analysis of the Greek-Turkish dispute both in Aegean and in Cyprus is offered in Tozun Bahceli's book **Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955**.

Existing literature is quite rich for the analysis of the evolving US policy towards Cyprus from 1954 onwards. The most noteworthy examples based on American and British archives are Sotiris Rizas's books **Enosi, Dixotomisi, Anexartisia: Oi Inomenes Polities kai i Bretania stin Anazitisi Iisis gia to Kipriako 1963-1967** (Union, Division, Independence: United States and Britain Seeking for a Solution for the Cyprus Problem 1963-1967), and **Oi Inomenes Polities, I diktatoria ton Sintamatarxon kai to Kipriako Zitima 1967-1974** (The United States, the Dictatorship of the Colonels and the Cyprus Problem 1967-1974) and the Claude Nicolet's work **United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention**.

After the 1974 crisis several articles appeared in political and historical periodicals, some of which criticized the US policy in Cyprus. The most worthy contributions are the articles by Van Coufoudakis, "US Foreign policy and the Cyprus Problem: An Interpretation", Laurence Stern's "Bitter Lessons: How we failed in Cyprus" and Ivar-Andre Slengesol's "A Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Crisis". Slengesol criticizes US for not having averted the Greek coup in Cyprus which caused the 1974 crisis.

A detailed, critical analysis of American policy towards the countries of NATO's southeastern flank is offered in Monteagle Stearns's book **Entangled Allies: US Policy towards Greece and Turkey, and Cyprus**. Stearns worked for the State

Department since 1955 and served as ambassador in Greece from 1981 to 1985. His findings based on personal experience are considered as quite useful.

For the post-Cold War era the most useful works were Morton Abramovitz's book **Turkey's Transformation and American Policy**, Sabri Sayari's article "Turkish Perspective Toward German and US Foreign Policy" in **The Parameters of Partnership: Germany, the US and Turkey, Challenges for German and American Foreign Policy**, along with Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişci's book **Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power** .

From the Greek side important works were Coufoudakis, Van.; Harry, Psomiades. and Andre Gerolymatos' book **Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities**, Theodore Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, Fotini Bellou's book **Greece in the Twentieth Century** and Christodoulos Yialouridis and Panayiotis Tsakonas' book **Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War**.

This study is structured chronologically. The four main chapters analyze the reasoning of the American involvement, and how this involvement was perceived by the Greek and the Turkish side; and the impact of this involvement upon the Greek-American relations, the Turkish-American relations and the dispute itself.

Chapter I starts with a brief evaluation of the Greek-Turkish relations after the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. Both states pursued to develop good and stabilized relations, which was achieved due to the common perception of their security interests in the interwar period. The collaboration continued after the end of the

Second World War and it was only interrupted with the eruption of the Cyprus problem in 1954.

Chapter II focuses on the American perception of post-war Greece and Turkey. The Americans committed to their Cold War strategy decided to provide all the necessary humanitarian, military and political support to both Greece and Turkey to secure these countries positions in the western camp. This support was welcome in both countries as both expected containment of the Soviet penetration in their domestic affairs (Greece) and in their external affairs (Turkey).

Chapter III discusses the outbreak of the Cyprus conflict in the early 1950s, and how this issue deteriorated the relations between the two countries. In the first phase of the dispute until the signing of the Zurich (1959) and London (1960) Agreements the United States were attending cautiously but as outsider. During the independence period until 1974 the US involved as both communities did not manage to govern the island peacefully. In this chapter the American involvement in 1963-64, 1967, 1974 crises and its mediation efforts will be analyzed and the perception of the Greek and the Turkish side to that involvement will be evaluated.

Chapter IV analyzes additional problems which appeared in Greek-Turkish relations in the beginning of 1970s over the Aegean and the United States' attitude. The second part of chapter IV will focus on the Aegean crises of 1976 and 1987. The disagreement between Greece and Turkey about their sovereign rights over the Aegean continental shelf brought twice the two countries close to a war.

Chapter V starts with a discussion of Greek-American and Turkish-American relations in the post-Cold War era. The new challenges and priorities in the Greek-American relations and Turkish-American relations respectively are examined. Then in the last chapter of the dissertation, the US role in the Greek-Turkish dispute is discussed, focusing on the Imia/Kardak crisis in the Aegean in 1996 and the S-300 missiles crisis in Cyprus in 1997.

The final part of this study is devoted to the analysis of the Greek and the Turkish perceptions of the US towards the Greek-Turkish dispute. The similarities and differences in the perceptions of the two parties and how these perceptions have affected the long-standing dispute will be discussed. Finally, this study concludes that the US involvement aiming to prevent a war between the two allies Greece and Turkey was successful. It has also eased the tension caused during the Cyprus and Aegean crises between the two NATO partners to a manageable level. But the diplomatic efforts conducted by the US, concerning a solution of the problems between the two neighboring countries failed to produce any substantial results.

CHAPTER I

GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER LAUSANNE TREATY (1923)

The settlement reached at Lausanne (July 24, 1923), after the Greek-Turkish war (1919-1922)¹¹ solved the territorial and minority issues and laid the foundations for peaceful relations between Greece and Turkey. Exhausted by many years of wars, both countries faced enormous problems of domestic reconstruction.

Greece had to recover from a ten-year of constant war, reconstruct its economy and provide aid to the refugees who came from Anatolia¹². Turkey, for her part, under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk pursued essential reforms to transform Turkey into a

¹¹ In Lausanne, Turkey's boundary with Greece was set at the Maritsa river which separates Western and Eastern Thrace. Greece retained her sovereignty over the Aegean islands except for Imvos (Gokceada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada); these islands, which guard the entrance to the straits, were restored to Turkey (Lausanne Treaty: Part I: article 2). The islands of eastern Aegean because of the Turkish security concerns decided to be demilitarized (Lausanne Treaty: Part I: article 13). In addition, Lausanne Treaty arranged the fate of the Greek and Turkish minorities. The Protocol signed on the 30th of January 1923 at Lausanne provided for the compulsory exchange of the Greeks of the Asia the Minor and the Turks of Greece, with two exceptions - the Greeks of Istanbul and the Muslim Turks and Pomaks of the western Thrace in Greece (articles 1-2). The Treaty safeguarded the cultural and educational rights of the minorities (Part III: articles 40-43). See **I sinthiki tis Lozanis** (Lausanne Treaty) (Athens: Papazisis Publications), pp. 45-50, 71-86; F. Vali, 1971. **Bridge Across the Bosphorus** (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press), pp. 220-223; Ş.S. Gürel, 1993. **Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993)** (Turkish-Greek Relations in a Historical Context) (Ankara: Umit Yayıncılık), pp.30-34; M. Gönülöbol, et. al. 1996. **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995)** (Turkish Foreign Policy in Cases), 9th Edition (Ankara: Cem Ofset), pp. 48-59; K. Ari, 1995. **Büyük Mübabele Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç 1923-1925** (The Great Exchange. The Forced Migration to Turkey) (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları).

¹² H. Psomiades, 1968. **The Eastern Question: The Last Phase A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy** (Institute for Balkan Studies: Thessaloniki).

modern nation-state¹³. Thus the two states were interested in having good and stabilized relations and both pursued this during the interwar years¹⁴.

An additional factor in the development of eventual détente between Greece and Turkey which gained ground in the late 1920s was a growing perception of common defense interests. While Greece and Turkey still mistrusted each other¹⁵, both of them had serious concerns for Bulgaria's ambitions to gain access to the Aegean, as well as about Italy's intentions in the eastern Mediterranean¹⁶.

After the electoral victory of Eleftherios Venizelos in 1928, the path for a Greek-Turkish rapprochement seemed more prosperous. In July 1929, the new Greek ambassador Spyridon Polychroniades, was accredited in Ankara with personal instructions from Venizelos to intensify the peace efforts. Likewise, President Kemal Atatürk directed the Turkish Foreign Ministry to eliminate all the obstacles hindering a peace treaty with Greece¹⁷.

¹³ B. Lewis. 1968. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford : Oxford University Press), pp. 323-480.

¹⁴ T. Veremis, 1993. *Ellada-Evropi. Apo ton Proto Polemo eos ton Psixro Plemo* (Greece-Europe. From the First War to the Cold War) (Athens: Plethron Publications); M. Gönlübol, et. al. *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995)*, pp.60-70.

¹⁵ A number of irritants still existed in the years after Lausanne treaty. For instance, each side accused the other of maltreating its minorities during the mid-1920s. Relations became tense when, during the brief dictatorship (1925-26) of Theodore Pangalos in Greece, threatened war and contemplated an attack on Turkish Thrace. In the same period, also the election of the Patriarch became a quarrel between the two states. See with details, M. Hatipoğlu. 1997. *Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954* (Modern History of Greece and Turkey) (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi), pp. 65-77; A. Alexandris, 1983. *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974* (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies), pp. 149-159.

¹⁶ K. Svolopoulos, 1994. *I Eliniki Exoteriki Politiki 1900-1945* (Greek Foreign Policy 1900-1945) (Athens: Estia Publications), pp. 211-232; M. Hatipoğlu. 1997. *Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954*, pp. 24-25; M. Türkes, 1994. "The Balkan Pact and its Immediate Implications for the Balkan States", *Middle Eastern Studies* 30:1, p. 130.

¹⁷ A. Alexandris, 1983. *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, p. 176.

In June 1930 the Greek ambassador Spyridon Polychroniades and the Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras signed the first Greek-Turkish agreement in Ankara. The Ankara Agreement dealt exclusively with the remaining disputes arising from the implementation of the Lausanne Treaty and of the Protocol on the exchange of populations. On the thorny issue of property belonging to exchangeables, both governments came to the conclusion that it was impossible to reach at a just and accurate estimate. Thus, each government undertook to compensate its own refugees¹⁸. Although the terms of the agreement were criticized in Greece as too favorable to Turkey, Venizelos attached a high priority to a policy of conciliation with the Turks.

A few months later, in October 1930 the Greek Premier accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Andreas Michalakopoulos, arrived in Ankara. On the 30th of October 1930 Venizelos and the Turkish Premier İsmet İnönü signed a Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration, as well as a protocol providing for parity of naval armaments and a commercial convention¹⁹. While in Ankara, Venizelos reportedly declared that his presence there “signified the end of a conflict between Greece and Turkey which had lasted for ten centuries”²⁰.

¹⁸ A. Tounta-Fergadi, 1986. *Themata Elinikis Diplomatikis Istorias* (Issues in Greek Diplomatic History) (Athens: Paratiritis Publications), pp. 243-249; Ş.S. Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993)*, pp.35-52; O. Sander, 1998. *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası* (Turkish Foreign Policy) (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi), pp.161-172.

¹⁹ See with details, M. Hatipoğlu. *Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954*, pp. 79-106; A. Alexandris, 1983. *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, pp. 178-180; I. Anastasiadou. 1980. “O Venizelos kai to Elinotourkiko Simfono Filias tou 1930” (Venizelos and the Greek-Turkish Friendship Pact of 1930) in *Meletimata Giro apo ton Venizelo kai tin Epoxi tou* (Studies For Venizelos During his Time) (Athens: Filipotis Publications), pp. 309-476.

²⁰ T. Bahcheli, 1990. *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955* (Boulder: Westview Press), p. 14.

After the 1930 Friendship Pact the diplomatic relations between Greece and Turkey entered a cordial phase. Even after the fall of Venizelos government in 1932, the subsequent administrations of Panagis Tsaldaris (leader of the Conservative party) and Ioannis Metaxas²¹ carried on the policy of rapprochement. In September 1933, the two countries signed a Defense Pact guaranteeing the inviolability of their borders and committing them to consult each other on matters of common interest²².

During the following year, the two countries took another step in collaboration when they joined the Balkan Entente in 1934 with Yugoslavia and Romania. By joining the Balkan Entente, Greece and Turkey hoped to discourage anticipated pressures from Italy and Germany²³. However, neither this, nor subsequent bilateral Greek-Turkish agreements deterred Italy and Germany from pursuing their ambitions to penetrate and control the Balkans. In any case, Greece and Turkey were unprepared to undertake obligations that might involve them in war with a great power (i.e Italy). So, when German troops occupied Greece, following the unsuccessful Italian invasion in October 1940, Turkey remained neutral.

Turkey's decision to stay neutral during the Second World War disappointed Greece. Greek leaders felt that Turkey was under an obligation to come to Greece's aid under

²¹ Metaxas was a predominant military official who established a dictatorship between 1936 until 1940. See with details T. Veremis, 1983. *Oi Paremvaseis tou Stratou stin Elliniki Politiki Zoi 1916-1936* (The Interferences of the Military in Greek Political Life 1916-1936) (Athens: Odysseas Publications), 189-229; T. Veremis and R. Higham, (eds.) 1993. *Aspects of Greece 1936-40: The Metaxas Dictatorship* (ELIAMEP-Vrionis Center).

²²F. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, pp. 224-225. D. Kitsikis, 1981. *Istoria tou Elinotourkikou Xorou apo ton Venizelo eos ton Papadopoulos 1928-1973* (History of Greece and Turkey from Venizelos until Papadopoulos 1928-1973) (Athens: Estia Publications), pp.17-25; M. Gönülöbol, et. al. *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, pp.99-105.

²³ K. Svolopoulos, 1974. *To Valkaniko Simfonon kai I Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki 1928-1934* (The Balkan Pact and the Greek Foreign Policy 1928-1934) (Athens: Estia publications); See also A. Korozis, *Ta stena kai ta Pepromena mas: Ellinotourkikoi Agones kai Fillies kata epitagi* (The Straits and our Faith: Greek-Turkish Antagonism and Friendships by order), pp. 559-602. D. Kitsikis, 1981. *Istoria tou Elinotourkikou Xorou apo ton Venizelo eos ton Papadopoulos 1928-1973*, p.46.

the terms of the Balkan Entente and subsequent Turkish assurances to help Greece²⁴. However, Turkey continued to recognize the Greek government in exile, and offered Greece help in terms of food and other relief items²⁵. One other issue that strained Greek-Turkish relations during the Second World War was Turkey's imposition of an emergency capital levy called *Varlik Vergisi* on non-Muslim communities in Turkey including the Greeks in November 1942²⁶. The Turkish government justified the tax on the grounds that it needed to raise revenue to finance Turkey's growing military expenditures. However, Greeks and members of other minorities complained that they were assessed higher levies than Turks, and the Greek government in exile lodged protests to Ankara. The Turkish government removed the tax a year after its imposition²⁷.

In general terms, despite the suspicions and irritants experienced during the Second World War, bilateral relations were stabilized and after the war the same concerns over the Soviet expansion in the Balkans, prompted Greece and Turkey to act in concert in their external relations. An axis between Ankara and Athens was essential to counter-balance the weight of the other Slav states in the Balkans, especially as these were now dominated by the Soviet Union.

²⁴ A. Alexandris, 1988. "To Istoriko Plaisio ton Elinotourkikon Sxeseon, 1923-1955" (The Historical Context of Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1955) in A. Alexandris, (ed.) *Oi Elinotourkikes Sxesis 1923-1987* (Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1987) (Athens: Gnosi Publications), pp. 84-89; D. Kitsikis, *Istoria tou Elinotourkikou Xorou apo ton Venizelo eos ton Papadopoulo 1928-1973*, pp.92-101.

²⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 120-132.

²⁶ B. Lewis. 1968. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford : Oxford University Press), pp. 296-298.

²⁷ A. Alexandris, 1983. *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, pp. 211-233.

The announcement of the of the Truman Doctrine²⁸, with its implied assumption that Greece and Turkey were targets of the same international forces, paved the way for the strengthening of ties between the two countries. In May 1947 a committee for Greek-Turkish cooperation was formed in Athens under the then deputy Prime Minister, Sophocles Venizelos, while in Ankara President İnönü spoke of the urgent need for close consultation and unity. In the following months negotiations were held between representatives of the two General Staffs. The Turks had given up their misgivings about the cession of the Dodecanese islands to Greece²⁹ and began to view the Aegean islands as convenient bridges between Greece and Turkey.

Gradually, the ground was prepared for closer cooperation³⁰. In June 1950 the two governments pledged to promote unity and confidence between their two nations. The two governments also worked closely together to present their cases for joining the Atlantic Alliance. Similarly, their applications were viewed as one, and officially on 15 October 1952, both became members of NATO³¹.

Meanwhile, closer political ties discussed in length when Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos visited Ankara in February 1952. During his talks with the Turkish leaders it was decided that a permanent mixed Greek-Turkish committee should be established to deal with questions of common interest, such as encouraging trade and commercial relations. However, the main topics of the talks were the questions of

²⁸ See for details in Chapter II, p. 13.

²⁹ The Dodecanese islands were annexed to Greece under the Paris treaty in 1947. In order to alleviate the Turkish fears due to their proximity in the Turkish shores, the Dodecanese were to be demilitarized. See for details, C. Rozakis, 1988. "To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou kai I Elinotourkiki Krisi" (The International Legal Status of the Aegean and the Greek-Turkish Crisis) in Alexandris, A. (ed.) *Oi Elinotourkikes Sxesis 1923-1987* (Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1987) Athens: Gnosi Publications, pp. 407-444.

³⁰ J. Iatrides, 1968. *Balkan Triangle: Birth and Decline of an Alliance Across Ideological Boundaries* (The Hague), pp. 76-78.

³¹ *Ibid.*

security and integration to NATO while there was a general agreement that both sides would seek to induce the Yugoslav government to join them in a regional defense agreement³².

In the official visit of the Turkish Premier Adnan Menderes in Athens in April 1952 this issue was discussed further. Finally in February 1953 in Ankara a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Assistance signed between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. This was followed by the conclusion of a formal treaty of alliance of the three countries in August 1954 at Bled in Yugoslavia³³.

These developments provided for a substantial degree of confidence both for military and political cooperation. The warming trend in Greek-Turkish relations was reflected in the statement by Turkish President Celal Bayar during a state visit to Greece in November 1952, when he described Greek-Turkish cooperation as “the best example of how two countries who mistakenly mistrusted each other for centuries have agreed upon a close and loyal collaboration as a result of recognition of the realities of life”³⁴.

For nearly a decade after the Second World War both countries developed a warm relationship based on their common interests (fear of the Soviet Union and commitment to the Western Alliance). However, when the vital interests of one

³² A. Alexandris, 1983. *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, pp. 234-236; M. Hatipoğlu, 1997. *Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954*, pp. 287-289.

³³ M. Gönlübol, et. al. *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 237-244; M. Hatipoğlu, *Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954*, pp. 287-289.

³⁴ F. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, p. 228; K. Gürün, 1983. *Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Politikası (Foreign Relations and Turkish Policy)* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları), pp.376-378.

seemed to be threatened by the other, as happened with the Cyprus issue³⁵ during 1954-1955, the progress attained in Greek-Turkish reconciliation and collaboration was seriously threatened.

³⁵ N. Güvenç, 1983. **Kıbrıs Sorunu, Yunanistan ve Türkiye** (The Cyprus Problem, Greece and Turkey) (İstanbul: Çağdaş Politika Yayınları); S. Torun, 1956. **Türkiye İngiltere ve Yunanistan arasında Kıbrıs' ın Politik Durumu** (Turkey, England and Greece and the Political Situation in Cyprus) (İstanbul: Gazeteciler Matbaası); A. Vlachos, 1982. **Deka xronia Kipriako** (Ten Years of Cyprus Problem) (Athens: Estia Publications).

CHAPTER II

THE US AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AFTER THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

2.1 The US Involvement After the End of the Second World War

At the end of the Second World War the foreign policy of the United States, dominated by the personality and rhetoric of President Roosevelt, displayed a sense of mission and a dedication to certain political and economic ideals (the right of self-determination, economic integration) concerning the international system in general, as well as its member-states. Rooted in America's unique historical experience and political-economic legends, many of these ideals were incorporated in the wartime pronouncements, such as the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration on Liberated Europe, and the United Nations Charter³⁶.

Taken together, these principles appeared to summarize the ideological justification for America's involvement in the war and suggested the broad parameters of the political and economic conditions that the United States desired to be adopted abroad, especially in those European states that the Allies liberated from Nazi

³⁶ H. Kissinger, 1994. *Diplomacy* (London: Simon & Schuster), pp.401-402; J. L. Gaddis, 1997. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 36-37.

Germany³⁷. The declaration on Liberated Europe, incorporated in the Yalta Accords in February 1945³⁸ at the insistence of the American government, spoke of assisting these European states “to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems”, to “create democratic institutions of their own choice”, and “to form interim governmental authorities broadly representatives of all democratic elements in the population and pledged the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people”³⁹. These US declarations emphasized its intention to support the restoration of “sovereign rights” and “self-determination” of the liberated European countries.

In addition, the United States emerged from the war, insisting that intervention in the domestic affairs of non-enemy states was reprehensible, undemocratic, and dangerous, giving rise to international tension and violence. As stipulated in the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, the Allies would play a role in the internal politics of the liberated countries but only for the purpose of assisting in the restoration of order and of the democratic process⁴⁰.

Soviet Union’s tactics in Eastern Europe served as the most important initial cause of anti-Soviet feelings in Washington, despite the fact that several of the states concerned had until recently belonged to the enemy camp⁴¹. Thus, on April 1945, Roosevelt wrote to Stalin that while he was particularly preoccupied with the

³⁷ As Kissinger pointed out, the promotion of democracy was also valuable as a propaganda tool in Europe at the time when countries in Eastern Europe were rapidly being turned into Soviet satellite states. H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 419.

³⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 415-418.

³⁹ J. Iatrides, 1980. “American Attitudes Toward the Political System of Postwar Greece” in T. Couloumbis, and J. Iatrides, (eds.) *Greek-American Relations. A Critical Review* (New York: Pella), p. 51.

⁴⁰ H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, pp. 415-418.

⁴¹ J. L. Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp. 40-43.

problems encountered in establishing a democratic government in Poland, “I must make a brief mention of our agreement embodied in the declaration on Liberated Europe. I frankly cannot understand why the recent developments in Romania (where Vyshinsky had forced King Michael to dismiss the government of General Radescu and replace it with one under the communist Petru Groza) should be regarded as not failing within the terms of that agreement”⁴². President Truman expressed to Stalin the same concern: the Romanian and Bulgarian governments he wrote on June 7, 1945, “do not accord to all democratic elements of the people the rights of free expression and... are, in my opinion, neither representative of nor responsive to the will of the people”⁴³.

The Soviet Union was not the only one to be lectured on the subject of people’s rights. Britain’s role in India, the Middle East, and elsewhere received much unfavorable attention in the United States and prompted Winston Churchill to warn Roosevelt (on August 9, 1942) that the “proposed application” of the Atlantic Charter “to Asia and Africa requires much thought”⁴⁴.

In southeastern Europe, British domination of Greek affairs was viewed with similar disapproval, and the American government repeatedly stressed that liberated countries should be allowed to search for their political destinies without outside interference. Thus, in December 1944, unhappy with British policies in Italy and Greece, the Department of State released a statement as follows:

“ the United States policy has always been to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of other nations. In conformity with this policy, the United States scrupulously refrained from interfering in the affairs of other countries

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ J. Iatrides, “American Attitudes Toward the Political System of Postwar Greece”, p. 56.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

which have been liberated from the Germans. The United States Government will continue to refrain from interference in the affairs of other countries. Unless the military security of the allied armies is at stake, the United States will make no attempt to influence the composition of any government in any friendly country. The American people have naturally viewed with sympathy the aspirations of the resistance movements and the anti-fascist elements in liberated countries”⁴⁵.

While admonishing both its principal allies not to seek to dominate the internal affairs of liberated states, Washington appeared confident that after the war the United States would play a key role in influencing not merely the international political system but also the internal development of the liberated nations. This would be done not through unwelcome interference in their affairs, as Moscow and London appeared to be doing, but through America’s tremendous prestige as the world’s greatest democracy and military power. Its political system model, flourishing economy, dynamic leadership, and armed strength would be the instruments of American influence abroad⁴⁶.

Despite the strong but ineffective protests of the United States, Eastern Europe was soon compelled to adopt Moscow’s version of a “Peoples’ Democracy”, the very antithesis of the American ideal. Truman’s efforts, prompted by ideological as well as strategic considerations, to browbeat the Soviet government into honoring the Declaration on Liberated Europe, were counter-productive. Moscow proceeded to challenge the United States not merely over Eastern Europe but, more importantly,

⁴⁵ L. Wittner, 1982. *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949* (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 25.

⁴⁶ J. Iatrides, “American Attitudes Toward the Political System of Postwar Greece”, p. 55.

over Germany as well. The ensuing Cold War brought about a drastic reordering of American priorities, with security considerations becoming paramount⁴⁷.

As the US gradually realized the real intentions of Stalin, it initiated the policy of “Containment”⁴⁸. The idea of “Containment” was based on the proposition that it was necessary to keep the peace while preserving the balance of power. The gap that had developed during the 1930s between the perceived requirements of peace and power was not to happen again⁴⁹. If geopolitical stability could be restored in Europe, time would work against the Soviet Union and in favor of the western democracies⁵⁰.

The instruments in the strategy of Containment were the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall plan. At that time, in the mid of the Greek civil war, early in 1947 Britain notified the United States of their inability to continue assistance for Greece and Turkey⁵¹. The declining British Empire made it clear that the US should support

⁴⁷ J.L. Gaddis, 1992. **The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implication, Reconsiderations, Provocation** (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 22-23.

⁴⁸ J. L. Gaddis, **We Now Know**, pp. 37-38; D.H. Allin, 1995. **Cold War Illusions: America, Europe and Soviet Power, 1969-1989** (New York: St. Martin Press)

⁴⁹ For the Interwar period see, R. Albrecht-Carrie, 1958. **A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna** (New York: Harper & Row Publishes), pp. 484-540.

⁵⁰ George Kennan, an American diplomat, believed in this, from studying the history of empires. E. Gibbons wrote in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* that the Roman Empire fell because its sphere of influence was too huge. Kennan believed that Stalin's empire would have the same fate. The territorial acquisitions and spheres of the Soviet Union had made would ultimately become a source of insecurity. This would take place for two reasons, because of the resistance to Moscow's control that was sure to grow within those regions and because of the outrage the nature of that the control was certain to provoke in the rest of the world. G. Kennan also believed in the philosophical and conceptual framework for interpreting Stalin's foreign policy. In an embassy report which became known as the Long Telegram (1946) Kennan maintained that the US should stop blaming itself for Soviet intransigence; the sources of Soviet foreign policy lay deep within the Soviet system itself. Soviet foreign policy was an amalgam of communist ideological zeal and old-fashioned tsarist expansionism. According to Kennan, communist ideology was at the heart of Stalin's approach to the world. Stalin regarded the western capitalist powers as irrevocably hostile, the friction between Washington and Moscow but inherent in the Soviet Union's perception of the outside world. See with details for the policy of Containment, H. Kissinger, **Diplomacy**, pp. 446-472.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, pp. 452-453.

these two countries and not abandon them to their fate; otherwise, they would face a sort of Finlandization in the periphery of Soviet power.

Since Britain had expressed its decision to abandon its military and economic support in Greece and Turkey, the US government responded with the historic proclamation of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947. The Truman Doctrine despite considerable skepticism⁵² among some members of the US administration⁵³ was announced by President Truman, declaring that the United States was to support free peoples who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures⁵⁴. If Greece fell under the control of an armed minority, its effect on Turkey would be immediate and serious, and the ensuing confusion and disorder might well spread through the Middle East. For this purpose he asked an allocation of four hundred million dollars of aid to be spent for supporting the shattered economy of Greece and provide military aid both to Turkey and Greece.

Washington was becoming convinced that the communist danger was spreading, feeding on poverty and despair, and that the US should act to “contain” this menace.

In June 1947, G. Marshall, Truman’s Secretary of State, announced an extensive recovery plan to hail Europe to its feet. A massive aid package was offered to all

⁵² D. Acheson, 1969. *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton), pp. 197-198.

⁵³ George Kennan one of President Truman’s major foreign policy advisors was of the opinion that emphasis should have been placed on “firmness of diplomatic stance, not on military preparations”. His fear was that US military aid might provoke Soviet aggression. See S. Taşhan, 1979. “Turkey’s Relations with the USA and possible future developments”, *Foreign Policy* 8:1-20 (Ankara), p.17.

⁵⁴ For the Truman Doctrine see for details H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 453; O. Sander, 1979. *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964* (Turkish-American Relations 1947-1964) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları), pp.12-16; G. Gianouloupolous, 1992. *O metapolemikos kosmos. Eliniki kai Evropaiki istoria 1945-1963* (The Post War World: Greek and European history 1945-1963) (Athens: Papazisis Publications), pp. 81-89; G. Mc Ghee, 1990. *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection* (New York: St. Martin Press).

European powers who were having great difficulty recovering from the war. This plan had three complementary aims: to help the Europeans; to sustain lucrative export markets for US industry; and to eliminate poverty as a breeding ground for communism. The Americans were convinced that economic stability would secure democracy in the European states, including the defeated Germany⁵⁵.

In the post-war era soon the US realized that Soviet Union had different perceptions of how the new world would and should be. Cold War came about because there was a cultural gap between the US and the USSR (different ideologies and political systems). In the end, both of them found a consensus by dividing the European continent silently in two different blocs. By implementing the policy of Containment the US wished to restrict Soviet Union's hegemonic control and dominance in Central Europe, and Southeastern Europe as Greece and Turkey were concerned.

2.2 An Overview of the US Perception of Greece and Turkey after the End Of the Second World War

2.2.1 The US Perception of Greece

In October 1944, Greece after experiencing four years of repressive and extractive occupation was evacuated by the German forces. Throughout the occupation years two significant resistance movements developed and gained control of certain parts

⁵⁵ In the Marshall plan the US invited Stalin to participate but he was suspicious about the whole idea. Thus the Soviet representatives and the other Eastern European representatives abandoned the negotiations. By that time, Stalin had consolidated his influence with the coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and had established control over other eastern European states like Poland, Hungary and the Soviet occupied eastern Germany. See for details, J. L. Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pp. 40-50; P. Duignan, and L.H. Gann, 1992. *The Rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the Democratic World, 1945-1958* (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers), pp. 303-326.

of Greece⁵⁶. Both carried out acts of sabotage and harassment against the German supply lines leading to northern Africa that passed down through Greece. The first movement was called EAM (National Liberation Front), and its military arm was ELAS (National Popular Liberation Army). The EAM and ELAS were dominated at the leadership level by members of the Greek communist party however, other parties, agrarian and socialist groups, participated in EAM and the overwhelming majority of the rank and file were not communists⁵⁷.

The second resistance group was republican and anticommunist in orientation. It was called EDES (National Republican Greek League), whose power base was in north-western Greece. The British had been in contact and were quite supportive of both groups so long as their primary objective was the resistance against the German occupation and harming the German forces⁵⁸.

Meanwhile, outside Greece operated a government in exile nominally headed by Greece's King George II, but substantially functioning under the shadow and protective umbrella of the British command structure. During a meeting with Stalin in Moscow in October 1944, Churchill made an offer to Stalin for percentages of influence in countries of importance to them. The Soviet Union was to get 90 percent control in Rumania and the 75 percent of Bulgaria, and Britain was to get 90 percent control of Greece. Yugoslavia and Hungary were to be 50-50⁵⁹. King George, who ruled Greece under a system of shared dictatorship with General

⁵⁶ G. Gianouloupoulos, *O Metapolemikos Kosmos: Eliniki kai Evropaiki Istoría 1945-1963*, pp. 191-221.

⁵⁷ S. Grigoriadis, 1982. *Sinoptiki Istoría tis Ethnikis Antistasis 1941-45* (Short History of National Resistance 1941-45) (Athens: Kapopoulos Publications).

⁵⁸ A. Vakalopoulos, 1993. *Nea Eliniki Istoría 1204-1985* (New Greek History 1204-1985) (Thessaloniki: Vaniás Publications), pp. 420-428.

⁵⁹ H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* p. 413.

Ioannis Metaxas from 1936 to 1941⁶⁰, was not a popular figure in Greece and had little contact with the occupied Greece. The British, however, under the strong-willed leadership of Winston Churchill, had been clear their oft-repeated preference of restoring King George to his throne. This policy had predictable polarizing consequences on the Greek political horizon⁶¹.

Under the British influence, a Greek government –in exile headed by George Papandreou⁶² was formed. Royalist and Republicans politicians as well as five EAM ministers participated in the first Greek government after the end of the war.

The first Greek government arrived in Athens on the 12th of October 1944. As the euphoria of liberation began to fade away practical problems were compounded by political ones. The situation was indeed so volatile that only a spark could set off a major explosion. The spark came during an antigovernmental demonstration in Athens' Constitution square on the 3rd December 1944, and hostilities that quickly spread in the Athens region between ELAS arm forces and the British troops⁶³. Papandreou resigned as he could not run the cabinet as a true national unity

⁶⁰ See Chapter I, footnote 11.

⁶¹ For the British role in Greek politics see T. Coulombis, 1983. **The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle** (New York: Praeger Publishers), p.9; W.H. McNeill, 1947. **The Greek Dilemma War and Aftermath** (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd), pp. 212-214; P. Papastratis, 1984. **British policy Towards Greece during the Second World War** (Cambridge).

⁶² George Papandreou was a predominant figure of the Liberal Venizelist party. See A. Vakalopoulos, **Nea Eliniki Istoría 1204-1985**, pp.434-438.

⁶³ V. Mathiopoulos, 1994. **O Dekemvrios tou 1944: Souidika, Elvetika kai Simaxika Diplomatika Dokoumenta** (The December of 1944: Swedish, Swish and Alliance Documents) (Athens: Nea Sinora Publications). Y. Margaritis, 2000. **Istoría tou Elinikou Emfiliou Polemou 1946-1949** (History of the Greek Civil War 1946-1949) (Athens: Vivliorama Publications); K. Koutsoukis, and I. Sakkas. 2000. **Ptixes tou Emfiliou Polemou 1946-1949** (Aspects of the Civil War 1946-1949) (Athens: Filistor Publications).

government and EAM forces left Athens to continue fighting against British and Greek governmental forces in the mountains⁶⁴.

While the Greek civil war was real and Greece was considered under the British influence according to the “percentage agreement” between Stalin and Churchill⁶⁵, American attitudes toward Greece were in fact influenced by the liberal ideas and by the belief that the United States government could play a major role in bringing about significant changes in the Greek political system. Thus, the Department of State had disapproved the Greek monarchy both as an institution and as personified by King George II. The institution was viewed as foreign to Greek traditions, highly politicized, therefore, the cause of perennial division, suspicion, and violence. King George was thought to be a man of limited vision and the legacy of the Metaxas fascist dictatorship⁶⁶.

Similarly the State Department was highly critical of Britain’s continued support for the Greek king and repeatedly expressed the view that the Greek people had the exclusive right to decide their constitutional questions, including that of the monarchy’s fate, without outside interference. In particular, the State Department objected to London’s declared intention to preserve king’s position and strongly

⁶⁴The communist and anti-communist resistance groups had been waging a conflict, building on an atmosphere of mutually paranoid reverence. Most of the countryside was in the hands of communist controlled resistance groups while the British troops were in Athens and Thessaloniki. See with details R. Clogg, 1992. *A Concise History of Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 136-143; M. Themis, 2003. *O Efialtis tis Ethnikis Antistasis* (The nightmare of the National Resistance) vol. 2, (Athens: Papazisis Publications).

⁶⁵ See footnote 21.

⁶⁶ L. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949*, pp. 71-72.

questioned British assertions that in Greece the monarchical system was a better guarantee of stability than a republican regime⁶⁷.

American officials were similarly critical of Greek political leaders, regarding them as unrepresentative of the people, small-minded, incompetent, and extremist. While the principal targets of disapproval were men of the right (Mavromichalis, Tsaldaris, Zervas)⁶⁸ in the American view the country was without able democratic leadership no matter what the party affiliation. Thus the American embassy in Athens commented in October 1946:

“Lack of leadership is certainly what principally ails this country at the present time—leadership which can see beyond political problems which are not only local in character but also completely out of date. The five-year Metaxas dictatorship seems to have effectively prevented the rise of a new generation of politicians to take the place of the oldsters, who have now come back into the political scene, for lack of other leaders, and who still in terms of the old struggle between Royalists and Venizelists, entirely missing the meaning of the developments in Europe and the world which World War II and the rise of Russia have brought about. Small men, old men, and men entirely lacking in the sense of realism which the situation requires, are what we are having to deal with now. In addition, the king who has been brought back as a “solution” for the problems which the politicians will not tackle is the same old muddled indecisive figure that he always was”⁶⁹.

When civil war broke out in Athens in December 1944, American officials had blamed the British as well as both extremes of the Greek political spectrum: “at bottom,” MacVeagh wrote to Roosevelt, “the handling of this fanatically freedom-loving country as if it were composed of natives under the British Raj, is what is the trouble, and Mr. Churchill’s recent prohibition against the Greeks attempting a

⁶⁷ J. Iatrides, “American Attitudes Toward the Political System of Postwar Greece”, p. 57.

⁶⁸ C. Tsaldaris was the leader of the Populist party (Laiko komma) and Mavromichalis was one of the most important members inside the party. N. Zervas was the leader of EDES, the resistance rightist group against the German forces and after the war became a predominant figure in Greek politics. See with details, G. Gianoulopoulos, 1992. **O Metapolemikos Kosmos: Elinikai kai Evropaikei Istoria 1945-1963** pp. 254-259.

⁶⁹ J. Iatrides, “American Attitudes toward the Political System of Postwar Greece”, p. 59.

political solution at this time, if a blunder, is only the latest of a long line of blunders during the entire course of the present war”⁷⁰. Once the fighting had stopped, MacVeagh had been anxious to be helpful but carefully avoided becoming entrapped in British efforts to make it appear that in crushing the Greek left they had been pursuing an Anglo-American policy. Instead, the United States pressured the Greeks to hold national elections at the earliest opportunity so as to legitimize the Athens government, and through a testing of the nation’s will and the establishment of a parliament provide the needed mandate for a program of reconstruction and reconciliation. Until conditions of political stability had been achieved, until the Greek government could be made democratic and responsive to the popular will, and until it had learned to manage its financial affairs, American economic assistance would not be forthcoming.

Washington considered it imperative that the approaching elections be fair and free of coercion and to accomplish this, the Department of State insisted on the need for foreign supervision. If the Greeks objected to foreign observers, Washington was prepared to argue that the Declaration on Liberated Europe had mandated such international action. Through the 1945-46 winter, American officials warned the Greeks against rumored rightist coups, hinting that the United States would find it impossible to recognize a government installed by military action or other illegal means. Similarly, they insisted that every Greek was to be permitted to express his political views freely and no one prosecuted except for the commission of a definite crime. Once the elections were held on March 31, 1946 the United States sought to

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 60.

emphasize that they had been reasonably fair, and to discount claims that, since the leftist parties had abstained, the results had seriously distorted the popular will⁷¹.

The American government's opposition to the reactionary features of the Greek political system was destined to be short-lived. At the very moment that the United States was committing itself to a policy of massive support to Greece, its devotion to the ideals of Liberal Democracy was being eclipsed by other, more urgent considerations.

With the wartime alliance discredited by growing disagreements and the Soviet-American confrontation assuming a dangerous character, the United States began to shift its priorities and objectives. What mattered now was not Greece's political system but its security from what was perceived as a Moscow-directed campaign of aggression.

In the spring of 1947 the US government had convinced itself that Greece was directly in the path of Soviet expansion. Accordingly military and security considerations dominated by the Truman Doctrine and concern for the spreading of democratic principles faded away⁷². The shift of the American preferences to the solution of Greece's political problems included the political, economic and

⁷¹ L. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949*, p.34; See also V. Kontis, 1986. *I Aggloamericaniki Politiki kai to Eliniko Provlima 1945-1949* (The English-American Policy and the Greek Problem 1945-1949) (Athens: Paratiritis Publications).

⁷²L. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949*, p.35-40; K. Koutsoukis, and I. Sakkas. 2000. *Ptixes tou Emfiliou Polemou 1946-1949* (Aspects of the Civil War 1946-1949) (Athens: Filistor Publications).

administrative control over the Greek state. The United States undertook the principal responsibility of the Greek economic and security affairs⁷³.

The American Ambassador was assigned as the Chief of the United States Economic mission by the State Department in July 1947 having the authority and the dominant voice on the following: a. Any action by the United States representatives in connection with a change in the Greek cabinet; b. Any action by the United States representatives to bring or prevent a change in the high command of the Greek armed forces; c. Any substantial increase or decrease in the size of the Greek armed forces; d. Any disagreement arising with the Greeks or British authorities which, regardless of its source, may impair cooperation between American officials in Greece and Greek and British officials; e. Any major question involving the relations of Greece with the United Nations or any foreign nation other than the US; f. Any major question involving the politics of the Greek government toward Greek political parties, trade unions, subversive elements, rebel armed forces, including questions involving the holding of elections in Greece⁷⁴

2.2.2 The US Perception of Turkey

Turkey remained neutral during the Second World War. Despite the British efforts to get Turkey to enter the war, the latter resisted⁷⁵. After the Moscow Foreign

⁷³ V. Kontis, *I Aggloamericaniki Politiki kai to Eliniko Provlima 1945-1949*.

⁷⁴ J. Iatrides, "American Attitudes toward the Political System of Postwar Greece", p. 66.

⁷⁵ In 19th of October 1939, the Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty of mutual support was signed. Turkey received financial aid for the purchase of military equipment. In a separate protocol attached to the treaty, Turkey was excused from any obligation which could involve her in a war with the Soviet Union. The treaty stipulated that Turkey would "collaborate effectively" with France and Britain in the event of an act of aggression of a European power leading to war in the Mediterranean (a clear reflection to Italy). However, after Italy declared war on France and Britain in June 1940, Turkey stayed out of the war, invoking the separate protocol. Despite that pressures upon Turkey increased

Ministers Conference in October 1943, an allied delegation was sent to Turkey to urge the Turks to side with the allies. George Allen representing the State Department told Turkish Foreign Minister Menemencioglu that unless Turkey entered the war, it “could not assume a respected position in the postwar world”⁷⁶.

The pressure increased even further at a Conference of İnönü, Churchill and Roosevelt in Cairo in December 1943. The allies now clearly held the winning hand and they pointed out that, if Turkey stayed out of the war for much longer, it risked being isolated after the war. The implied threat was that it would have to face the Red Army and any demands Stalin might make on its own. İnönü finally accepted that Turkey would become an active belligerent on the allied side, but he asked for an overall campaign plan for the allied conquest in the Balkan first. This was a clever tactic because the allied powers differed widely about the desirability of a Balkan campaign since Stalin objected to any British or American interference⁷⁷.

Throughout 1944, the Turks kept stalling, although it broke its diplomatic relations with Germany in August 1944. Their attitude led the British and the Americans to be more sympathetic to Soviet demands. In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference,

after the German occupation of Greece in April 1941 and the German invasion in Soviet Union in June 1941 Turkey kept up a neutral position, pleading lack of preparation and the need for supplies with the British governments. Turkish stance was considered in a large extent as immoral from the allies and country's international reputation was damaged, but for Turkey having the recent experience of the First World War and the disasters brought upon the country, was a satisfactory development. See with details, S. Deringil, 1989. **Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An “Active” Neutrality** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 71-116; F. Weber, 1993. **O Epiritidos Oudeteros: I Tourkiki Politiki kata ton Deftero Pagosmio Polemo** (The Evasive Neutral: Turkish Policy during the Second World War) (Athens: Thetili Publications), pp. 71-102.

⁷⁶ S. Bölükbaşı, 1990. “The Evolution of a Close Relationship: Turkish-American Relations Between 1917-1960”, *Foreign Policy* (Ankara) 1-2:XVI, p.83.

⁷⁷ B. Kuniholm, 1996. “Turkey and the West since World War II”, in Mastny, Vojtech. and Nation, Craig. (eds) **Turkey between East and West** (Boulder:Westview press), p. 49; M. Gönlülbol, et. al. **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası**, pp.175-176.

they agreed in future changes in the Montreux Treaty⁷⁸. Shortly, afterwards, on the 23rd of February 1945, Turkey officially declared war on Germany⁷⁹. This last move provided Turkey with a seat at the United Nations Organizational Conference in San Francisco⁸⁰.

Throughout the war İsmet İnönü who was the successor of Kemal Atatürk after his death in 1938 ruled the country. The end of the war signaled the beginning of important changes in the Turkish political system⁸¹. President İnönü announced in the Turkish Assembly on 1st November 1945, that he was prepared to make major adjustments in the political system and to bring it in line with the changed circumstances in the world, a reference to the victory of the democracies over fascism. The main deficiency in the Turkish system, he noted was the lack of an opposition party and he was prepared to allow it⁸². Though external factors were significant in pushing Turkey towards political change, it was the erosion of the political alliance between the military –bureaucratic elite and the landlords that made the status quo difficult to remain⁸³.

During 1945 new political parties appeared. The most important was the Democratic Party (DP) which was formed by important former members of the RPP. The leader

⁷⁸ H. Howard, 1974, **Turkey, The Straits and US policy** (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press).

⁷⁹ S. Bölükbaşı, "The Evolution of a Close Relationship: Turkish-American Relations", p. 86.

⁸⁰ E. Zürcher, 1993. **Turkey: A Modern History** (London: I.B Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers), pp. 213-214.

⁸¹ Since the establishment of the new Turkish state in 1923, the country was ruled by the Republican People's Party (RPP) which was formed by Atatürk. See with details K. Karpat, 1959. **Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System** (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

⁸² F. Ahmad, 1993. **The Making of Modern Turkey** (London and N. York: Routledge), p. 102.

⁸³ For this transitional period, see F. Ahmad, 1977. **The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975** (Boulder: Westview); E. Özbudun, 2000. **Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation** (Lynne Rienner Publishers).

of the party was the former Prime Minister Celal Bayar⁸⁴. Another important change took place in the RPP itself. In its congress in May 1946, it took a number of liberalizing measures: it accepted direct elections and the position of permanent chairman of the party was abolished, as was the title of the “Milli Şef” (National Leader)⁸⁵.

Along with the policy of liberalization in the internal scene immediately after the war, Stalin’s aggressive behavior towards Turkey facilitated the rapprochement with the West in general and the United States in particular.

At the Yalta Conference, Stalin raised the issue of the Straits⁸⁶ on 10th of February 1945 and argued that the Montreux treaty (1936) was absolute and a product of a period when the USSR was weak. He suggested that “it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia’s throat⁸⁷. Without discussing the merits of this argument, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin agreed to leave the issue to the negotiations of the foreign ministers.

On the 7th of June 1945 Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov informed Selim Sarper, the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow that the USSR wanted revisions in the 1921 Treaty

⁸⁴ Y. Sarıbay, 1991. “The Democratic Party, 1946-1960” in M. Heper and J. M. Landau, **Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey** (London : I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd), pp. 119-130.

⁸⁵ F. Bahrapour, 1967. **Turkey: Political and Social Transformation** (New York: Theo. Gaus’ Sons), pp.19-21.

⁸⁶ When Turkish Foreign Minister Sükrü Saraçoğlu visited Moscow in September 1939, the Soviets demanded from Turkey the adoption of a new straits regime which would be favorable to them. Since Turkey considered a pro-Soviet revision of the Montreux Convention unacceptable, Saraçoğlu returned home without signing the mutual assistance pact he had gone to Moscow to obtain. One year later, the Soviets indicated that they were still interested in controlling the straits. In his 25 November 1940 reply to the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop’s “Four Power Pact” proposal, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov asked for a base in the Straits area. These two events were good indications of what the Soviets had in store for Turkey after World War II. See B. Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West Since World War II, p.22.

⁸⁷ S. Bölükbaşı, “The Evolution of a Close Relationship: Turkish-American Relations”, p. 87.

of Friendship which ceded the provinces of Kars and Ardahan to Turkey. He also demanded the revision of the Montreux Convention by Turkish-Soviet agreement and the joint defense of the Straits by Turkey and the Soviet Union⁸⁸. When the State Department was informed about this conversion, let Turkey know that it considered the Molotov-Sarper conversation as informal and exploratory; and that it saw no need to protest “a preliminary exchange of views”⁸⁹.

The United States detachment towards Turkey’s security problems continued at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. American policy makers considered Turkey “an area of diplomatic, economic and military conflict between the USSR and Great Britain”⁹⁰.

At Potsdam, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov once more stated that the Straits should be jointly defended by Turkey and the USSR. In his reply, Truman objected to Soviet bases in the Straits, but he proposed to replace the Montreux Convention with an international regime which would guarantee all states free access to the Straits. At the end of the Conference, the Big Three agreed that the Montreux Treaty should be revised and that all three governments should discuss the matter with Turkey individually. Truman’s Straits proposal indicates that he believed that Soviet concerns were justified. He hoped to alleviate Soviet anxieties concerning the Straits and save the wartime cooperation in the postwar period⁹¹.

⁸⁸ Ibid p. 86; E. Athanassopoulou, 1999. **Turkey-Anglo- American Security Interests 1945-1952. The First Enlargement of NATO** (London: Frank Cass), pp. 38-50.

⁸⁹ S. Bölükbaşı, “The Evolution of a Close Relationship: Turkish-American Relations”, p. 87.

⁹⁰ E. Athanassopoulou, **Turkey-Anglo- American Security Interests 1945-1952**, pp. 38-50.

⁹¹ G. Harris, 1972. **Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971** (Washington DC: Hoover Institution), p. 17.

Gradually, the US became more supportive of the Turkish position. When the Soviet demands were communicated officially to Turkey in August 1946, the US advised Turkey to take a firm line⁹². Thus encouraged Turkey to refuse the Soviet demands, but it did so in conciliatory terms. The Soviet note to the Turkish government came at a time when the United States was beginning to question its policy vis-à-vis the USSR in the face of Soviet actions establishing communist regimes in Eastern Europe. This led Washington to re-evaluate the strategic importance of Turkey. The turning point in US foreign policy towards Turkey was the announcement of the Truman Doctrine. The US no longer expected that an accommodation with the Soviet Union would be possible, and there was no reason to fear that American aid to Turkey may alienate the Soviets.

In the American eyes, Greece and Turkey looked quite differently at the end of the war. Greece's internal political situation was totally unstable and the country was in the middle of a tragic civil war. This gave to the United States the "right" to involve and later on almost to decide for the developments in the Greek internal affairs. The Americans in the beginning thought that they could apply the principles of liberal democracy but soon after they realized that it was impossible because the situation in Greece was chaotic and in the fear of the Soviet expansionism.

In Turkey they were never allowed to be involved in the domestic affairs. Turkish political system took important steps towards democratization in an effort to be closer to the changes of the post-war environment. With regard to Turkish security concerns *vis-à-vis* Soviet Union, the US was not very sensitive. They even voiced a

⁹² K. Kirişci, 2001. "US-Turkish Relations: New Uncertainties in a Renewed Partnership" in B. Rubin, and K. Kirişci, (eds.) **Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power** (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p. 130.

willingness to accept changes in the regime of the Black Sea Straits established by the Montreux Treaty of 1936. Only when they realized the danger of the Soviet revisionism, they shared the Turkish concerns and decided to include Turkey under their security umbrella.

2.3 Greek and Turkish Perception of the US at the End of the War to the Eruption of the Cyprus Conflict

2.3.1 Greek Perception of the US Involvement

Immediately after the end of the war the civil strife erupted in Greece created a deep political division in the political scene. The Greek government and public were too preoccupied in 1947 with the ranging civil war to raise any objections to what would prove to be pervasive American interference in their domestic affairs⁹³. The American support was essential improving the strength and fighting capabilities of the Greek armed forces so that they could go on the offensive and defeat the communist insurgency quickly and decisively.

After the American involvement in 1947 the government forces overpowered, defeated the co-called Democratic Army (the Communist forces) in less than two years. Americans helped in the modernization of the Greek armed forces, but at the same time the powerful Greek army was involving in politics and military secret

⁹³T. Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey*, p. 15.

organizations continued to regard themselves as a praetorian guard and arbiters of legitimacy of the nation's governing authority⁹⁴.

However, significant part of the American aid was the financial support and technical guidance needed to repair the country's devastation and build the foundation for longer term development. As the country was included in the Marshall plan, whose primary purpose was to restore Europe's economy by providing the necessary working capital. Serious work was done to build the foundations for industrialization, by repairing and expanding the road and rail systems, introducing a countrywide network of electrification, and strengthening the health services⁹⁵.

Greece with the proclamation of the Marshall Fund in June 1947 received 1.7 billion dollars in economic aid (loans and grants) and 1.3 billion dollars in military aid. Nevertheless, much of the assistance was channeled to government's military effort⁹⁶.

US military and economic aid became the primary level of US presence and influence in Greece. The dependency of the Greek governments allowed the American interference in the domestic affairs which planted the seeds of anti-Americanism in the following years.

⁹⁴ J. Iatrides, 2003. "The United States and Greece in the Twentieth Century" in Couloumbis, Theodore, Kariotis, Theodore and Fotini Bellou (eds.) *Greece in the Twentieth Century* (London: Frank Cass Publishers), pp.74-78.

⁹⁵ A detailed analysis for the spending of the American aid in Greece in P. Kazakos, 2001. *Anamesa se Kratos kai Agora. Oikonomia kai Oikonomiki Politiki stin Metapolemiki Ellada 1944-2000* (Between State and Market. Economy and Financial Policy in Post-war Greece) (Athens: Pataki Publications), pp. 86-128.

⁹⁶Ibid.

The absence of strong and effective governments that would have vision, restraint and patriotism to form a political coalition which would include all the moderate Greek political forces deteriorated Greek politics even further⁹⁷. With the American tolerance and in the name of anti-communism the Greek authorities intensified police controls, trade unions remained under close government supervision and political intrigues continued among the military⁹⁸.

Nevertheless, the general view was that American involvement in Greece's affairs brought welcome relief and the assurance that people would not share the fate of their communist-dominated Balkan neighbors. Hence, after the end of the civil war in 1949 closer relations with the US was the primary objective for Greece's national interests. For Greece a major objective was the entrance to NATO as equal partner. Entry was expected to lead to a direct US commitment through NATO, thus achieving greater deterrent power. In an effort to build good credentials with NATO, Greece participated in the Korean War in June 1950. Finally, it entered NATO in 1952 along with Turkey⁹⁹.

America's institutional and structural presence in Greece strengthened in the early 1950s with the signing of bilateral agreements regulating the status of US bases in

⁹⁷ The US would have played a different role in the political evolution of Greece than the one Washington chose in the late 1940s. The promotion of the democratic process and the liberalization of the country's political system was primarily the responsibility of the Greek people and their leaders and not the outsiders.

⁹⁸ For the American role in the post-war Greece see T. Couloumbis, J.A Petropoulos, and H.J. Psomiades, 1976. **Foreign Interference in Greek Politics** (New York: Pella); Y. Roubatis, 1987. **Dourios Ipos: I Amerikaniki Diisdisi stin Ellada 1947-1967** (Trojan Horse: The American Interference in Greece 1947-1967) (Athens: Odysseas Publications); D. Charalambis, 1985. **Stratos kai Politiki Exousia: I Domi tis Exousias stin Metaemfiliaki Ellada** (The Army and the Political Power: The Structure of Power in post civil war Greece) (Athens: Exantas Publications); I. Stefanidis, 1999. **Apo ton Emfilio ston Psixro Polemo: I Ellada kai o Simaxikos Paragontas** (From the Civil War to Cold War: Greece and the Allied Role) (Athens: Proskinio Publications).

⁹⁹ T. Couloumbis, **The United States, Greece and Turkey**, pp. 17-20; E. Hatzivassiliou, 1995. "Security and the European Option: Greek Foreign Policy, 1952-1962" in Journal of Contemporary History, 30:1: pp. 187-202.

the Greek territory. The bilateral agreements were signed in February 1953. These agreements provided for America's right to establish bases; to man, equip, and resupply these bases; to overfly Greek territory; and to provide generally for the legal status and local accountability of US forces. These executive agreements were to be supplemented over the years by numerous *ad hoc* arrangements revising the legal status of US forces, adding new functions and provisions in specific installations and providing for coordination between sending and host state¹⁰⁰.

2.3.2 Turkish Perception of the US Involvement

At the end of the war, Turkish government's aim was to involve the US in defending Turkey against the Soviet Union. This was an urgent objective for Turkey after the Soviet revisionist demands. The US obliged, cautiously at first and enthusiastically later. The US was convinced that Turkey's geographic location rendered it a key to the Middle East and began to be interested in the territorial integrity of Turkey¹⁰¹.

The Truman Doctrine signified the formal emergence of the US as Turkey's principal supporter in the West. The need for declaring a doctrine of resolve the Soviet Union was dramatized by the Greek civil war, which was fast shifting in favor of the Communist guerrillas. Turkey, on the other hand, was not considered to be on the danger list. However, in the words of a US official, Turkey "...was slipped into the oven with Greece because that seemed the surest way to cook a tough bird"¹⁰².

¹⁰⁰T. Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey*, p. 16; I. Stefanidis, 2003. *Asimetroi Etaireoi. Oi Inomemes Polities kai I Ellada ston Psixro Polemo 1953-1961* (Unequal Partners. The United States and Greece in the Cold War 1953-1961) (Athens: Patakis Publications).

¹⁰¹ G. Harris, ed. 1985. *The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations* (The Heritage Foundation).

¹⁰² G. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*, p.26.

Internally, in contrast with Greece, the Turkish regime appeared not to be in any immediate danger. Political liberalization was continuing, the political contest seemed harmonious, problems still existed but they did not seriously threaten the Turkish political system¹⁰³.

Through the Aid Agreement signed in June 1947 Turkey received 1.1 billion dollars in economic aid (loan and grants) and 1.9 billion dollars in military aid¹⁰⁴. In contrast with Greece, Turkish government paid much more consideration in this agreement. The Turks being conscious through their history to the pain of offering special privileges to foreigners (the capitulations during the Ottoman Empire) insisted that US officials monitoring aid to projects would be limited in their movements by requirements of Turkey's national security considerations¹⁰⁵.

This financial help offered the opportunity to equip the Turkish military establishment in order to improve its mobility and power. Also the aid agreement provided for the modernization and maintenance of the Turkish armed forces. Much of the financial aid through Marshall Plan concentrated on developing agriculture¹⁰⁶.

The basic need was not only to equip and strengthen the army, but to infuse new blood, new methods and new tools into the economy in order to bring about a

¹⁰³ For the emergence of the DP and its rivalry with RPP in the years 1946-1950 see F. Ahmad, 1993. *The Making of Modern Turkey*, pp. 105-107.

¹⁰⁴ T. Coulombis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey*, p.15; O. Sander, *Türk-American İlişkileri 1947-1964*, pp.46-52. See also G. Mc Ghee, 1990. *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection* (New York: St. Martin Press), pp.35-50.

¹⁰⁵ G. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*, pp.54-61.

¹⁰⁶ A. Kılıç, 1959. *Turkey and the World* (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press), pp. 142-143.

development which would offset the load of national defense in the budget, and also support the defense efforts by a healthy economy. Nevertheless, the US support to a certain extent increased the level of the Turkish dependency on the US.

In the Turkish political scene, the American stance was accepted positively. There was a consensus –except the left wing socialist parties- to depart from the interwar neutralism towards a western orientation. Throughout the period between 1947 and 1950 there was a consensus between the RPP government and the opposition party DP on pursuing closer relations with the west and searching for a formal alliance with the US in order to strengthen its security posture against the Soviet Union¹⁰⁷.

After the establishment of NATO in April 1949, Turkey was immediately interested in participating in the new military organization. Entry was expected to lead to a direct US commitment through NATO, thus achieving greater deterrent power. To increase its possibilities for entry Turkish government decided to send troops to Korea which actually was the third largest contingency after the Americans and Koreans¹⁰⁸. The DP government which came in power in 1950 seemed to be more enthusiastic for the NATO membership¹⁰⁹.

Turkish entry delayed because of western indecision as well as British-US conflicting interests with respect to organizing for western defense in the Middle Eastern area. In the late 1940s Britain was interested in establishing a regional Middle Eastern organization that would have been placed under its control and

¹⁰⁷ E. Çayhan, and N. Güney, (eds.) 1996. **Avrupa'da Yeni Güvenlik Arayışları: NATO-AB-Türkiye** (The Search for a New Security in Europe: NATO-EU-Turkey) (İstanbul: Afa Yayınları).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, pp. 151-152; G. Harris, **Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective**, pp.38-40.

¹⁰⁹ O. Sander, **Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964**, pp.46-52.

would have included Turkey, as well as Greece. A number of Scandinavian states in NATO were also not so positive about the idea of expanding the NATO treaty to include such clearly non-Atlantic states as Turkey and Greece¹¹⁰.

Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuat Köprülü, declared publicly on August 1, 1950, that NATO entry would be an “acid test of US interest in Turkey”¹¹¹. The constant diplomatic requests reminders and complaints finally bore fruit. With the United States pressure a NATO foreign ministers meeting in Ottawa (September 1951) approved Greek and Turkish accession into NATO. British interests were secured later by including Turkey in the British-led Baghdad Pact (subsequently renamed CENTO), established in 1955, and thus rendering NATO and CENTO interdependent, as British and Turkish membership was common to both pacts¹¹².

The American presence in Turkey was further reinforced through bilateral agreements with the US signed in June 1954 which allowed the establishment of military and communications bases in Turkey to be used against the USSR. These agreements allowed the US to man, equip and supply these bases; to fly over Turkish soil; and established the legal status and local accountability of US forces in Turkey¹¹³.

¹¹⁰ E. Athanassopoulou, *Turkey-Anglo- American Security Interests*, pp. 236-242; O. Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964* pp. 25-34; N. Eren, 1977, *NATO and Europe: a Deteriorating Relationship?* (Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs).

¹¹¹ M. Gönübol, et. al. *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 223-227.

¹¹² S. Tashan, “Turkey’s Relations with the USA”, p. 15; O. Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964* pp.79-84; H. Bağcı, 1998. “Demokrat Partinin Ortadoğu Politikası” (The Middle East Policy of the Democratic Party) in F. Sönmezoglu, (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (An Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy) (Istanbul: Der Yayınları), pp. 101-133.

¹¹³ G. Harris, *Troubled Alliance Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*, p.54-61; F. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, pp. 116-125.

Reasoning the triangular relationship between the United States and its two junior partners after the end of Second World War, we can reach the following conclusions:

- The beginning of the Cold War era was a period of rapid and unquestioned US global ascendancy concurrent with a rapid decline of the European power.
- Stalin's attempts to establish a wide buffer zone in Eastern Europe were perceived as a revisionist objective in the Greek-Turkish area. Therefore, the governments of Greece and Turkey sought to secure commitments, peacetime entanglements, presence and guarantees from the west – and especially from the United States. The various Greek cabinets did so with the utmost urgency and with no other options. The cabinets of Turkey, on the other hand, sought US aid after a careful weighing.
- The objectives of both Greece and Turkey were simple: contain Soviet penetration in their domestic affairs, simultaneously neutralizing left-wing (Socialist and Communist) opponents at home that were laying claims to power. Further, by maximum participation in organizations such as the Council of Europe and NATO, Greece and Turkey could “institutionalize” their relationship with other western states which in the past had manipulated them informally. Through formal participation on the basis of legal equality in these multilateral organizations, both Greece and Turkey were gradually developing legal, political and psychological filters muting direct intervention and maximizing perceptions of sovereignty and independence with predictable political benefits at home.

- The US commitment towards Greece and Turkey was explained in the context of Washington's Cold War political strategy as soon as the US became convinced of Stalin's real intentions to "export communism".

Considering that Greek-Turkish bilateral relations were on good-to-excellent terms throughout this postwar period, the diplomatic task for the United States was relatively trouble free. It was not until 1955 and the emergence of the "Cyprus question" that US policymakers began realizing that when its junior partners experience serious disputes, there occurs an automatic spill-over effect disturbing the smoothness of the southeastern flank of NATO, placing vital US and western interests in the Greek-Turkish strategic space in jeopardy.

CHAPTER III

THE OUTBREAK OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT AND DETERIORATING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO NATO ALLIES

3.1 The First Phase to 1960

Greece and Turkey, together with the remaining Balkan states, had emerged from the ashes of the slowly disintegrating, multinational, and Turkish-administered Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of First World War. World War I and, to a lesser extent, World War II provided the guidelines for the disposition of territories among the various national states. Since World War II, the Balkans –once referred to as the “powder keg of Europe”- entered into a phase of regional stability.

One small, but strategically very important, area in the region that had escaped allocation after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was the island of Cyprus, which had been under British colonial control since 1878. With the decolonization pressures growing in the 1950s and 1960s, the problem of Cyprus emerged as a major bone of contention dividing the Greeks, the British, and the Turks. Each of the three NATO countries felt that its vital interests were at stake, and they soon entered into a dangerous collision course. The task for the United States - then the

unquestioned leader of the Western Alliance- was to carve out policies that would lead to peaceful settlement that would not simultaneously rupture the cohesiveness of the strategic southern flank of NATO.

Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea after Sicily and Sardinia. It is located in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea 60 miles west of Syria, 40 miles south of Turkey, and about 150 miles east of the Greek Dodecanese islands.

The cultural presence of Greeks on Cyprus can be traced back to the earliest times of recorded history, and it has been continuous ever since. Through the ages, however, Cyprus has been the prize of frequent and extractive invasions and has been administered by Phoenicians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, mainland Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Venetians, Ottomans, and the British¹¹⁴. The Turkish community's presence on Cyprus goes back to 1571 with the conquest of Cyprus by the Ottomans Turks. The Ottomans ruled Cyprus directly until 1878, when, in exchange for British support against the Russians, they leased the island to the British¹¹⁵. The British annexed Cyprus in 1914 after the Ottoman Empire joined forces with the Central Powers in World War I. In 1925, finally, the British converted Cyprus to the status of a Crown Colony¹¹⁶.

¹¹⁴ For a detailed study of the history of Cyprus see F. Alasya, 1939. *Kıbrıs Tarihi* (History of Cyprus) (Nicosia); D. Alastos, 1955. *Cyprus in History* (London: Zeno).

¹¹⁵ A. L. Macfie, 1996. *The Eastern Question 1774-1923* (Revised Edition. Longman: London and New York), pp.35-45; J. McHenry, 1987. *The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919-1939* (New York and London: Garland Publishing), pp.1-32; Ş.S. Gürel, 1984. *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960)* (History of Cyprus 1878-1960) (Ankara:Kaynak Yayınları) vol. 1, pp. 17-33

¹¹⁶ R. McDonald, 1988. "Alliance problems in the eastern Mediterranean – Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part II Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean," *Adelphi Papers* 229, pp.7-8; Ş.S. Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960)*, pp. 65-80.

Throughout the centuries of the Ottoman and later the British administration, the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots maintained a remarkably conflict-free record. Although the two groups did not frequently intermarry, they lived and cooperated side by side throughout the island whether residing in small towns or mixed villages. The Turks generally concentrated their talents in administration, security (army, police), and agricultural sectors, whereas the Greeks gravitated toward commerce, small industry, and professions being involved in the island's main activity of agriculture.

The first half of the twentieth century was an age of fierce nationalism and Cyprus was not left unaffected. Nationalism as a powerful mobilizing political and psychological force began spilling over from the Turkish and Greek mainland into the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. Among the majority community of Greek Cypriots, the dream was to attain *enosis* (union) of Cyprus with the motherland of Greece. Agitation for enosis was given added impetus and some hope once Cyprus was transferred to British administration. In 1915, Great Britain, seeking to enlist the Greeks into the entente ranks in World War I, offered Cyprus to the then neutralist Greek government under the control of King Konstantine I. The offer was rejected by the German-leaned King, and a chance was missed to attain this important Greek objective¹¹⁷. Subsequently, the slow ferment in favor of enosis continued, with an uprising by Greek Cypriots in 1931 and the British had to use force to quell it¹¹⁸. During World War II, when Greece and Britain once again were

¹¹⁷ T. Xristodoulides, 1991. *Diplomatiki Istoría 1815-1919* (Diplomatic History 1815-1919) (Athens: Sideris Publications), pp. 555-557; J. McHenry, *The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919-1939*, pp. 32-33.

¹¹⁸ The riot was organized by the Greek Consul Alexis Kyrou. Venizelos who opposed the riot, recalled Kyrou immediately to Athens. As a result the British ruled the island with harshness. Kyrou as a General Director of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the protagonist of the Greek

fighting side by side against Germany and her allies, the Greek expectations for the postwar annexation for Cyprus were revived.

But once World War II ended and the Cold War gradually assumed its tension-filled course, the British appeared determined to maintain their control over strategically located Cyprus. Matters came to a head in the mid-1950s, following a number of undiplomatic rebuffs by British high officials to representations and inquiries by Greeks and Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots, enjoying the strong backing of the Papagos government in Athens, began setting the foundations of a struggle for the self-determination of Cyprus. Greek Cypriots expressed that their struggle would lead to enosis because of the structure and preferences of the great majority of the population¹¹⁹.

The struggle for self-determination was designed to be two-pronged. On the military side, a small but extremely efficient, anti-British terrorist network was established. It was called EOKA (Ethniki Organosi Kiprion Agoniston - National Organization of Cypriot Fighters). Its leader was a Cypriot born, right wing Greek Army officer, George Grivas; and its supply lines and logistical support could clearly be traced to Athens. The EOKA initiated acts of sabotage against British military targets and

appeal in the UN in 1954. V. Mathiopoulos, 1984. *Tha xasoume ti Kipro?* (Are we loosing Cyprus?) (Athens: Livani Nea Sinora), pp. 27-30; J. McHenry, *The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919-1939*, pp.85-89; Ş. S. Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi*, pp.134-141.

¹¹⁹ In 1950, a plebiscite organized by the Greek Orthodox church overwhelmingly was in favor of union with Greece. In this period, though the Greek government had significant concerns for raising the Cyprus issue in the international scene. It has raised their objections to Archbishop Makarios a number of times. But, by the fear of the domestic political cost and the rhetoric of Makarios they were urged to agree. See for details, M. Alexandrakis, V. Theodoropoulos, and E. Lagakos. 1987. *To Kipriako 1950-1974 Mia Endoskopisi* (Cyprus Problem 1950-1974 An Introspection) (Athens: Evroekdotiki), pp.21-22; A. Heraclidis, 2002. *Kipriako: Sigrousi kai Epilisi* (Cyprus Problem: Conflict and Resolution) (Athens: Sideris Publications), pp. 40-42; C. M. Woodhouse, 1982. *Karamanlis The Restorer of Greek Democracy* (Oxford University Press: New York), p. 63; Ş. S. Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi* vol.2, pp.65-69.

against Cypriots showing a soft attitude toward the British colonial authorities. These acts were designed to draw world attention to the Cypriot problem. Simultaneously, on the political front, the Greek Cypriots, led by young Archbishop Makarios, were hoping to secure a settlement of the issue in the United Nations with the Greek government's support and resting their case on the principle of national self-determination¹²⁰.

The British argued that Cyprus was their "domestic affair, not subject to U.N jurisdiction. The Turks of Cyprus first allied themselves with Britain and opposed the idea of Enosis. Later, during the mid-1950s the Turkish Cypriots argued that if Britain wanted to forgo its sovereignty over Cyprus, then Turkey should reclaim the island. When the Greek Cypriots with the support of Greece formed EOKA, the Turks also formed their own paramilitary organization, the TMT (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı - Turkish Resistance Organization). Towards the end of 1950s, the TMT adopted partition of the island between Greece and Turkey as its major goal¹²¹.

Turkey followed a similar course. Turkish governments until the 1950s considered events in Cyprus as a British internal affair. İnönü, who had represented Turkey at the Lausanne peace negotiations in 1923, did not bring up the Cyprus issue for fear

¹²⁰ T.W. Adams and A. Cottrell, 1968. *Cyprus Between East and West* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press), pp. 8-10.

¹²¹ D. Bitsios, 1975. *Cyprus The Vulnerable Republic* (Thessaloniki: Institute of Balkan Studies), pp. 22-46; S. Bilge, 1975. "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey" in Karpat, Kemal. (ed.) *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1959-1974* (Laiden: E.j. Brill), pp.138-139; S. İsmail, 1997. *Kıbrıs Sorununun Kökleri : İngiliz Yönetiminde Türk-Rum İlişkileri ve ilk Türk-Rum Kavgaları* (The Roots of the Cyprus Problem. Turkish-Greek Relations During the British Administration and the First Turkish-Greek Dispute) (Nicosia: Kıbrıs Türk Mücahitler Derneği), pp. 354-364; X. Ioanides, 1991. *Neo-Othomanikos Imperialismos 1955-1995* (Neo-Ottoman Imperialism 1955-1991) (Athens: Troxalia Publications), pp.61-95.

that Britain would become more intransigent over the capitulations¹²². Actually, after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Ankara encouraged the migration to Turkey of a significant number of Turkish Cypriots.

During the late 1930s and in the 1940s Ankara was satisfied with the British presence on the island, believing that this would serve as a deterrent against Soviet as well as German expansionism in the area. Hence, it is not surprising that on 30 October 1948 the foreign minister of the ruling People's Republican Party (PRP), headed by İnönü, told the National Assembly that for Turkey "there is not a Cyprus problem as such"¹²³.

Turkey's interest in Cypriot affairs increased in 1954 when Greece brought up the question of Cypriot self-determination at the UN General Assembly¹²⁴. Britain opposed the Greek attempt, and Ankara supported Britain, arguing that Cyprus was British internal affair. The decision of Greece to internationalize the issue in 1954 as well as the starting of the EOKA's activities in 1955 led Britain to organize the London tripartite Conference with the participation of Turkey (August 29-September 7, 1955).

¹²² S. Bölükbaşı, 1993. "The Johnson Letter Revised," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29:3, p.507; Ş. S. Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi* vol. 1, pp.109-114.

¹²³ S. Bölükbaşı, "The Johnson Letter Revised", p.508.

¹²⁴ It is unclear as to whether the Papagos government chose to ignore the Turkish factor in its decision toward the 1954 U.N. appeal, or simply miscalculated the degree of the Turkish interests in Cyprus. The latter seems more valid for the following reasons: First, it was still the euphoric phase in the post-war Greek-Turkish relations; second, the low response at the Turkish official level towards the growing demands on Cyprus for *enosis*. Thus the Greek government underestimated the negative messages coming from the Turkish press and public opinion indicators as not representing the views of the Turkish government; Third, Greek policymakers assumed that the Menderes government, then in power in Turkey, like its predecessors would abide by articles 16 and 20 of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and fifth, Greece and Turkey participated in NATO, in bilateral defense arrangements with the US, and in the tripartite Balkan Pact. As a result, the Greek government did not anticipate Turkish fears of encirclement by Greece in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean if Cyprus also came under Greek sovereignty; See also Ş. S. Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi* vol. 2, pp.78-82.

The Conference led nowhere as Greece insisted that self-government should not exclude enosis in the long run, however, for the first time Turkish stance became clear on the issue: Turkey preferred the continuation of the British rule on Cyprus, but if any change was to come in the island's status, Cyprus ought to revert to Turkey because of prior possession, geographic contiguity, and the presence of the 18 percent Turkish Cypriot minority. Thus the only compromise Turkey appeared to be willing to make was based on the policy of *taksim*, the Greek-Turkish partition of Cyprus¹²⁵.

The consequences of these miscalculations were damaging the Greek interests as well as Greek-Turkish relations. Shortly thereafter, on September 6-7, 1955, unruly Turkish citizen groups, with the backing of the Menderes government in Ankara (which proved later in the Menderes trial in 1961) attacked the property and persons of the Greek minority in Istanbul. The damage was considerable in blood and treasure¹²⁶. As a result of the 1955 events, a serious number of the prosperous Greek minority left for Greece¹²⁷.

The Papagos government in Athens was incensed and ordered back all the Greek officers who were serving in the mixed NATO regional command operating in Izmir. The Greek side expected a strong official US reaction. Instead, the American reaction was mild as the US was not prepared to go as far as the Greeks would have

¹²⁵ F. Vali, **Bridge Across the Bosphorus**, p. 237.

¹²⁶ A. Alexandris, 1983. **The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974** (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies).

¹²⁷ In 1952, in a meeting between Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Evangelos Averof and Makarios, the first referred that a possible rising of the Cyprus Issue would have a negative impact on the Greek minority of Istanbul. Makarios agreed to that possibility and added that despite that Hellenism of Istanbul is important, it is convicted to disappear in the long-term. E. Averof-Tositsa, 1982. **Istoria xamenon efkerion:Kipriako 1950-1963** (History of Lost Opportunities :Cyprus Problem 1950-1963) (Athens: Estia Publications), vol A p.35.

wanted to go. Secretary Dulles sent two identical letters to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, deploring antagonism between the two countries and calling for restraint¹²⁸. The message the US was sending to all parties concerned was to be repeated many more times during the coming years: that the Cyprus problem, as well as bilateral problems between the countries involved, were relatively unimportant and had to be subordinated to the real danger, which continued to be communist infiltration and exploitation of the weakness in the southeastern European region. US ambassador Stearns wrote :

It was inconceivable to the US government that two states which felt themselves directly threatened by the Soviet Union, which had insistently sought the protection of NATO membership, and which were receiving large amounts of military and economic aid from the United States would permit bilateral problems to get out of hand¹²⁹.

Stearns carried on criticizing his government,

...we have consistently behaved as though Greece and Turkey erased a millennium of their history when they signed the North Atlantic Treaty in February 1952, abandoning forever those national interests and objectives that were incompatible with US efforts to maintain a balance of power with the Soviet Union¹³⁰.

The equal distance stance between the two countries that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles took with his letter on the 18th of September disappointed Greeks. In a moderate message King Paul made Dulles know that the “feelings of indignation of the Greek people with respect to the Turkish atrocities and feeling of abandonment by our friends run far higher than you may realize”¹³¹.

¹²⁸ T. Coulombis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey*, p. 29; for a thorough analysis and harsh criticism of the two letters to Papagos and Menderes see: M. Stearns, 1992. *Entangled Allies US Policy Toward Greece and Turkey, and Cyprus* (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press), pp. 29-34.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, p.9.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, p.6.

¹³¹ C. Nicolet, 2001. *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention* (Bibliopolis Mannheim und Mohnesee), p.65.

Concerning the developments in Cyprus, US policy in the 1950s was one of seeking damage control within the NATO alliance. In a conflict pitting Greece on one side against Britain (and subsequently Turkey) on the other, the United States reluctantly tilted on the side of Britain and Turkey. During the 1950s, US votes in the UN were considerably closer to the British and Turkish preferences; this, quite naturally, created resentment and disappointment in Greece.

The US position was opposed to the internalization of the Cyprus question in the UN, and instead favoring a quiet settlement of the problem within the “NATO family”. The US was concerned about the involvement of the Cypriot Communist party AKEL in the nationalist movement¹³².

The inability of Greece to find enough support at the UN¹³³ as well as its reluctance to deepen the dispute with Ankara led it to consider independence an acceptable first-stage solution of the Cyprus crisis. For the Turks an independent Cyprus was also more acceptable than a Cyprus unified with Greece. So, when Greece opted for negotiations after the November 1958 UN debate, Ankara agreed. Unexpectedly, negotiations led to a rapid agreement between the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers, Menderes and Karamanlis, and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots had to follow suit¹³⁴. The London summit of four parties in February 1959 led to a settlement which provided an establishment of an independent Cyprus¹³⁵.

¹³² “Documents: Cyprus, 1950-1954; The Prelude to the Crisis, Part II: The View of the United States, 1988. *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, XV: 1-2, pp. 72-73; C. Nicolet, *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention*, pp. 32-42.

¹³³ S. Xydis, 1968. “The UN Assembly as an Instrument of Greek Policy: Cyprus,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12:2, pp. 141-158.

¹³⁴ US Department of State, Vol X, 18,

<http://www.dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus58-60x1/18cyprus5.html>;

On August 16, 1960, Cyprus emerged as an independent state. The outcome was a product of an asymmetrical compromise. The Cyprus constitution, accordingly, sought to protect the major interests and expectations of each of the contending parties. Cyprus was named an independent republic, but Britain was allowed to maintain sovereign rights over two good-sized base areas in the southern and eastern regions of the island. Greece and Turkey, together with Britain, were named guarantor powers with the right of collective or individual intervention to restore the constitutional status quo of the young republic. Greece and Turkey, in addition, were permitted to maintain small military units on the island and to act as suppliers and overseers of their respective ethnic communities. Union (*enosis*) with another state and partition (*taksim*) were expressly forbidden. This was accepted with serious reservations by the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios. The Turkish Cypriot leader, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, on the contrary, initiated the new arrangement quite readily.

The bicomunal form of government established in 1960 contributed to the separation rather than the integration of the ethnic groups. The two communities were set constitutionally to be educationally, culturally, and religiously apart. The legal system provided that the Greek Cypriots should be judged by Greek Cypriot judges, Turkish Cypriots by Turkish Cypriot judges, and cases involving litigants from both communities by special mixed two-judge courts. The President of the Republic was always to be a Greek, elected separately by the Greek community, and the vice president, always a Turk, was to be elected separately by the Turkish

Ş. S. Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi* vol 2, pp.152-154; A. Vlachos, 1982. *Deka Xronia Kipriako* (Ten Years Cyprus Problem) (Athens: Estia Publications).

¹³⁵ S. Bölükbaşı, 1993. "The Johnson Letter Revised," pp. 510-511; M. Sarıca, E. Teziç, and Ö. Eskiyyurt, 1975. *Kıbrıs Sorunu* (The Cyprus Problem) (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları), p.12.

community. Each of these executives was granted an irreversible veto over foreign affairs, defense and internal security. Simultaneously, a system of ethnic quotas was set up for both executive and legislative branches. The Turkish Cypriots (whose population was about 18 percent of the total) were designated to have 30 percent of the portfolios in the cabinet and 30 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives (where the representatives were to be elected separately by each community). The Turkish Cypriots were also assured 30 percent of the posts in the civil service and police forces and a 40 percent quota in the army. Important legislation (on matters of taxation and the economy in general) needed separate majorities of both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot caucuses in the House of Representatives, and constitutional amendments were rendered virtually impossible because they required the consent of separate two-thirds majorities of both ethnic caucuses¹³⁶.

This complicated political/legal arrangement broke down three years after the establishment of the Cyprus republic. The Greek Cypriots had been complaining that the Turkish minority had been given disproportionate rights and that the business of governing the island could hardly proceed under legalized deadlock circumstances. The Turkish Cypriots, for their part, saw in potential Greek constitutional revisionist tendencies an attempt to erode their hard-earned rights and to move gradually toward the isolation and the political and even cultural elimination of the Turkish Cypriot presence from the island. However, the Greek Cypriot administration which had the upper hand in ruling the island never had endeavored sincere efforts to apply the provisions of the Treaties that established the Cypriot state.

¹³⁶ A. Heraclidis, *Kipriako: Sigrousi kai Epilisi*, pp. 68-72; S. Bilge, "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey", pp. 151-154; M. Sarica, *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, pp.16-19.

In retrospect, the Cyprus crisis during the 1950s and the early 1960s at first, pitted a strong NATO member, Britain, against a relatively weak one, Greece. The stronger party sought to have the matter resolved and possibly quietly forgotten through direct bilateral negotiations. The weaker party, Greece employed the classic levers of weakness: adopting harassing terrorist activity in Cyprus and resorting to the public multilateral forums hoping to embarrass Britain in open debate. The British, seeking to weaken the Greek hand in Cyprus, encouraged Turkish Cypriot and Turkish mainland involvement in the disposition of the case. The Turks, considering their own security concerns and interests, became a part of the problem. So what began in 1954 as a British-Greek dispute over Cypriot self-determination had been transformed by 1959 into a dangerous Greek-Turkish bilateral dispute over the future of Cyprus with the British now playing the role of the “honest broker”.

American efforts, throughout, were designed to prevent Cyprus from disrupting the smooth functioning of the southeastern flank of NATO. The US adopted a passive role toward Cyprus during the 1950s because it considered Cyprus within Britain’s sphere of influence. The US was mainly concerned that the Cyprus crisis would cause a deterioration of relations between three of its allies and weaken NATO. It did not object to *enosis* or *taksim*, provided that these solutions would come as a result of trilateral negotiations. Hence, the US opposed Greece’s recourse to the UN and called for negotiations among interested parties.

The Zurich-London settlement and the declaration of Cyprus’ independence was thus a welcome development for the US. It was pleased with the compromise agreements, which seemed to eliminate a serious friction point in the relations of

three of its allies. For the moment the stability and viability of the western alliance seemed assured.

3.2 The Second Phase, 1963 to 1974

Having settled the Cyprus issue at Zurich, both Greek and Turkish governments turned their attention to other areas of concern. The acceptance of the agreements posed greater difficulties and risks for the Greek than the Turkish government. After all, the Greeks in Greece and Cyprus had to come to terms with abandoning the old national dream of *enosis*. The Zurich Accords may have settled the Cyprus dispute, but the desire for *enosis* did not wane in Cyprus or Greece. Thus, in due course, Makarios, Grivas and some Greek politicians in Athens were able to exploit widespread national disenchantment in their renewed bid to pursue union.

Forsaking *enosis* was not easy even for Karamanlis who well understood the limitations of Greece's power. According to C.M. Woodhouse, Karamanlis' biographer, the Greek Premier believed in the historical inevitability of *enosis*. But he also believed in the need for avoiding a confrontation with Turkey. As Woodhouse stated: his advice had been that Makarios should seek to assuage the suspicions of the Turks, to co-ordinate his policy with the Greek government, and to join NATO as an independent state. Thus the Greek nation would have two voices in all international bodies. Karamanlis later argued that if Makarios had followed his advice, we should arrive one day at *enosis*¹³⁷.

¹³⁷ C. M. Woodhouse, *Karamanlis The Restorer of Greek Democracy*, p. 87.

In Turkey, the Menderes government, which negotiated the Cyprus agreements, was overthrown in a military coup in May 1960, before the Cyprus Republic was proclaimed. However, one day after their takeover on May 27, 1960, the military rulers “went on record in support of the Zurich and London agreements”¹³⁸. The new military leaders channeled their energies into introducing a new Constitution and civil administration. After the elections of October 1961, a civilian government took office from the military.

In Cyprus, in the presidential elections of December 1959, Archbishop Makarios was challenged over his abandonment of *enosis*. Among the critics of the settlement was EOKA leader G. Grivas, who returned to Greece to a hero’s welcome. Nevertheless, Makarios defeated John Clerides, the rival candidate for the presidency, winning two-thirds of the votes. He proceeded to win every subsequent Greek-Cypriot election with huge mandates. The Archbishop’s political acumen and charismatic personality enabled him to exercise enormous authority in the Greek-Cypriot community.

On the Turkish Cypriot side, Dr. Fazil Küçük was acclaimed as Vice-President. Another Turkish Cypriot leader of considerable stature was Rauf Denktaş, a brilliant lawyer, who became President of the Turkish Communal Chamber and who exercised an influential role in his community’s politics.

Cypriot leaders saw themselves as guardians of their respective communities’ interests. This approach, as well as the absence of a consensus on how to cope with

¹³⁸ T. Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, p.52.

the major aspects of government, led to constitutional disputes within less than a year¹³⁹. One of the contested provisions stated that civil service jobs were to be allocated between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the ratio of 70:30. Since the Turkish share of the population was 20 percent, Greek Cypriots argued that this was discriminatory to them. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, whose job prospects in the private sector were less favorable than Greek Cypriots, were eager to have their allocation of public service jobs without delay.

Another controversial issue that seriously damaged intercommunal relations concerned the division of municipalities in the five major towns. The Constitution provided for the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish municipalities. However, after independence Greek Cypriots leaders wanted to defer separation, claiming it could be used as a basis for partition in the future. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots pressed for implementation because they feared that Turkish neighborhoods would be poorly served by unified municipal authorities controlled by the Greek majority. The issue was referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court of the Republic, which ruled in favor of separate municipalities in April 1963.

Yet another disagreement arose over the organization of the Cyprus army. The Constitution provided for an army of 2000 men, to be recruited after independence: its composition was to be 60 percent Greek Cypriot and 40 percent Turkish Cypriot. The Constitution did not specify whether Cyprus army contingents were to be integrated or formed as separate units. Both Vice-President Küçük and Defense Minister Örek favored separate units, pointing out that integrated contingents would

¹³⁹ Z. Stavrinides, *The Cyprus Conflict National Identity and Statehood*, p.52.

face great difficulties due to linguistic and religious differences of Greek and Turkish Cypriots soldiers. Makarios opposed separate units. Consequently, the Greek Cypriot majority in the council of ministers decided on unified contingents. Upon Küçük's use of veto, Makarios decided not to have an army at all. These and other lesser issues caused deadlock and immobilized the partnership government¹⁴⁰.

On November 30, 1963 President Makarios, acting of the advice of the British High Commissioner on Cyprus¹⁴¹ released a document proposing 13 substantive amendments to the 1960 constitution. Makarios's amendments sought to eliminate the veto rights of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and the Turkish Cypriot caucus in the House of Representatives and to seriously reform the quota system as it had been applied to governmental practices¹⁴².

Both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots rejected Makarios' proposals out of hand on 16 December 1963; and the level of tension increased. Soon the threshold of physical violence was crossed leading to intercommunal bloodshed. Turkey and Greece moved to protect the interests of their surrogate communities in Cyprus, and the United States and NATO were, once again, faced with a situation where two important junior partners were at the gates of warfare¹⁴³.

The Greek Cypriot decision to remove the Zurich-London Accords was a calculated risk given the anticipated reaction of the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. Makarios and

¹⁴⁰ S. Sonyel, 1997. **Cyprus, The Destruction of a Republic, British Documents 1960-65** (The Eothen Press), pp. 13-29; D. Bitsios, **Cyprus The Vulnerable Republic**, pp. 115-124; P.N. Vanezis, 1974. **Makarios Pragmatism v. Idealism** (London: Abelard-Schuman), pp. 115-121.

¹⁴¹ Officially British side denied any involvement. See for details, M. Alexandrakis, **To Kipriako 1950-1974 Mia Endoskopisi**, pp.32-34.

¹⁴² S. Mayes, 1981. **Makarios A Biography** (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd), p.161.

¹⁴³ S. Bilge, "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey", pp.157-158.

his associates had to take into consideration the ability of Turkey to respond militarily.

On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots had the advantage of considerable local military superiority. Former EOKA directing Greek Cypriot armed forces felt confident of their ability to crush Turkish Cypriot resistance before Turkey had a chance to intervene. In addition, Makarios expected the new Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou who came to power in November 1963, would help to deter a Turkish intervention by threatening Greek retaliation. Papandreou had disapproved the Cyprus settlement and promised further support for a policy of *enosis*¹⁴⁴. This had encouraged Makarios to set his amendments proposals, something would have never attempted if Karamanlis were in power.

The United States under President Lyndon Johnson, fearing a war between Greece and Turkey, took its first step in crisis management on 23 December when Secretary of State Dean Rusk asked US ambassadors to tell Ankara and Athens to “urge maximum restraint on three governments and on both communities in Cyprus¹⁴⁵”.

The intercommunal violence continued¹⁴⁶ which had resulted in the Turkish air bombing of Nicosia on 25th of December; and this brought the establishment of a

¹⁴⁴ Papandreou when came to power had two main options: either to continue with Karamanlis’s NATO-oriented policy patterns in Cyprus or to seek a more politically advantageous (popular) road of pursuing a Cyprus settlement through the United Nations. Papandreou chose the second road.

¹⁴⁵ S. Bölükbaşı, 1988. **The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus** (Lanham: University Press of America), pp. 59-60.

¹⁴⁶ A. Çay, 1989. **Kıbrıs’ta Kanlı Noel-1963** (Bloody Christmas in Cyprus-1963) (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları); R. Denктаş, 2000. **Kıbrıs: Elli Yılın Hikayesi** (Cyprus: The Story of Fifty Years) (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları), pp.182-192.

“joint” peace force mainly by British that seemed to please all the parties¹⁴⁷. Makarios was pleased because Turkish military intervention was avoided. The Turkish government also seemed pleased because the introduction of the British troops was to keep order and prevent the outbreak of new hostilities.

Despite the establishment of the “joint” peacekeeping force, violence did not end in Cyprus. Meanwhile, the breakdown of the constitutional order had convinced the Turkish Cypriots that the 1960 constitution needed change so as to grant them additional guarantees against violence. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, renewed their calls for a unitary state without the “fetters” of the 1960 constitution. Since all parties desired a change in the constitution of Cyprus, they readily accepted a British proposal to convene a conference in London¹⁴⁸.

Greece and Turkey sent to London their foreign ministers, Costopoulos and Erkin, whereas Britain was represented by Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs Duncan Sandys. On 16 January, the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, Clerides and Denktas, joined the conference. During the first phase of talks they discussed the political status of the island. Three different plans were proposed by Greeks and Turkish Cypriots and Britain.

Greek Cypriots demanded the establishment of a unitary state and the elimination of special rights granted to Turkish Cypriots by the 1959 Treaties. Denktas, too, called for a revision of the 1959 Treaties so that a bizonal or cantonal federation could be established. His plan envisaged the establishment of one or two Turkish cantons and

¹⁴⁷ B. O'Malley, and I. Craig. 1999. *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers), pp.92-93.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 62; M. Sarica, *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, pp.62-64.

the transfer of the Turkish population to these areas. Denктаş added that if federation were not accepted, partition would be the only alternative left¹⁴⁹.

As expected, the Greeks and the Turks rejected each other's proposals. In order to save the conference, Duncan Sandys offered a compromise solution on 20 January 1964. The British plan contained several aspects which could be considered pro-Greek or pro-Turkish, such as the adoption of a parliamentary system without communal quotas or local autonomy. The British plan satisfied neither the Turkish nor the Greek side. After its rejection on 21 January, the conference was suspended for two days. The same day, Secretary of State Rusk asked US ambassador Hare to assure the Turkish government that if the London Conference failed, the NATO Council could take up the issue. He added that Turkey should be reminded that it was an integral part of the NATO family and that the US would do its best to accommodate Turkey's interests¹⁵⁰.

Rusk realized that the situation was getting out of hand, and that if the US wanted to prevent a debacle in NATO's southeastern flank, it had to act. The US proposed in February 1964 a NATO force sent to Cyprus which was accepted by Greece and Turkey but was rejected by Makarios¹⁵¹. Upon Makarios's rejection of the NATO force on 4 February 1964, the US Administration decided to send Undersecretary of State, George Ball, to the area to convince Makarios that some kind of a

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ S. Rizas, 2000. *Enosi, Dixotomisi, Anexartisia: Oi Inomenes Polities kai i Bretania stin anazitisi lisis gia to Kipriako 1963-1967* (Union, Division, Independence: United States and Britain seeking for a solution in Cyprus Problem 1963-1967) (Athens: Bivliorama), p.40.

¹⁵¹ C. Melakopidis, 1996. *Peace in Cyprus: Time for a Comprehensive Initiative* (Ontario: Center for International Relations, Queen's University), pp.21-24.

peacekeeping force was necessary in Cyprus to prevent Turkey's intervention¹⁵². Ball went also to Turkey to convince İnönü that the US was doing its best to end the crisis.

İnönü accepted Ball's proposal of a peacekeeping force without US participation on 10 February 1964. Ball's negotiations with Makarios were not so successful. Two days later, Makarios told Ball that he could accept a UN peacekeeping force composed of troops from Commonwealth countries. Makarios added, however, that a UN Security Council resolution "guaranteeing the political independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus should precede the establishment of such a force"¹⁵³. In other words, Makarios wanted the UN to annul the Treaty of Guarantee and support the "unfettered" independence of Cyprus. As Ball put it, Makarios' central interest was to block off Turkish intervention¹⁵⁴.

Ball then turned to Ankara and tried to reassure İnönü that the US would support Turkey and would not ignore Turkey's rights in Cyprus. In the meantime, intercommunal violence continued and the arrival of the UN forces (March 1964) was not enough to end violence. The Turkish government publicly protested these actions in Cyprus and the National Security Council in June 1964 decided to intervene in the island to establish "a political and military beachhead". It was hoped

¹⁵² US Department of State : Vol XVI: 3,

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4755.htm>

¹⁵³ S. Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations*, p.70; C. Melakopidis, *Peace in Cyprus: Time for a Comprehensive Initiative*, pp.27-29.

¹⁵⁴ S. Rizas, *Enosi Dixotomisi Anexartisia*, pp. 63-69; C. Melakopidis, *Peace in Cyprus: Time for a Comprehensive Initiative*, pp.15-16.

that the intervention would enable Turkey to negotiate a satisfactory settlement within a short time¹⁵⁵.

On 4 June 1964, İnönü called US ambassador Raymond Hare to inform him of the government's decision to intervene in Cyprus. İnönü said that despite all American assurances, attacks against Turkish Cypriots did not stop and that the situation was becoming worse every minute. The Turkish fears further increased, because Greek government was increasing its military presence in the island¹⁵⁶.

President Johnson, in order to avoid a Turkish landing in Cyprus, which would have resulted in a Greek-Turkish war, replied with a letter delivered to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü on June 5, 1964. The letter, written in a rather undiplomatic style, categorically rejected İnönü's suggestion that all peaceful means had been exhausted and stated that Turkey's "right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable". In İnönü's words, this letter made use of all the means that could be assembled. Johnson stated that Turkey's intervention would lead to a war between Greece and Turkey¹⁵⁷. By pointing to the possibility of a Greek-Turkish war, Johnson was in fact stating that the US would not prevent Greece from attacking Turkey. Furthermore, Johnson maintained that "a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union". Johnson added: "I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in

¹⁵⁵ S. Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations*, p.74.

¹⁵⁶ The first months of 1964, Papandreou government secretly sent Greek troops in Cyprus which reached the number of 10,000 (well above the limits set by the Zurich and London agreements). Greeks aim was to provide a credible deterrent against a possible Turkish invasion which would create a fait accompli of partition of Cyprus.

¹⁵⁷ "Document President Johnson and Prime Minister İnönü," *Middle East Journal*, XX, p.386.

Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies”¹⁵⁸.

Johnson also stated that he had “no doubt that the general membership of the United Nations would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey...”, and added that “the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances”. Johnson concluded with the assurance that the US would remain “deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of Turkish Cypriots” and invited İnönü to Washington to discuss the crisis¹⁵⁹.

İnönü received the letter with serious consideration. Johnson dwelt on the dangers İnönü feared most. He stressed that a Greek-Turkish war would be likely and failed to indicate what the US would do to avert it. More significantly, Johnson insinuated that if Turkey’s intervention led to a Soviet attack on Turkey, the US might refrain from coming to its aid. The possibility of its contingency was bound to affect İnönü’s decision to intervene, given the fact that only one month earlier Khrushchev had once more opposed Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus¹⁶⁰. Johnson also intimated that the US might join other members of the UN in condemning Turkey and even imposing sanctions on it. Finally, Johnson reminded İnönü that he could not use American supplied military equipment. İnönü knew only too well that non-compliance could mean an American embargo¹⁶¹.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, p.387; M. Sarıca, *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p.68.

¹⁶⁰ S. Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations*, p.79; M. Fırat, 1997. *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu* (Turkish Foreign Policy in 1960-1971 Period and the Cyprus Problem) (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi), p. 130.

¹⁶¹ C. Nicolet, *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974*, p. 243.

Johnson had left İnönü a way out by proposing consultations in Washington. İnönü cancelled the intervention and accepted the offer of discussions by writing to Johnson that "...a settlement is likely to be reached if you lend your support and give effect with your supreme authority to the sense of justice inherent in the character of the American nation"¹⁶². İnönü informed the public that Johnson had asked for the postponement of the intervention and had invited him to Washington to review the situation. He did not reveal, however, the full content of the Johnson letter. İnönü probably feared that a full disclosure would create an instant public uproar and backlash which could harm Turkey's alliance relationship with the US.

However, Johnson's words created doubts among the Turks about the credibility of the NATO umbrella in case of a Soviet attack on Turkey. Furthermore, it became apparent to many Turks that the alliance with the US entailed a number of limitations to their freedom of action in vital matters of foreign policy¹⁶³.

After forestalling Turkey's intervention, Johnson knew that he had to make an equally forceful presentation to Papandreu in order to induce him to be as forthcoming as İnönü. The President made several attempts to influence Greek officials. In one of them, Johnson told the ambassador of Greece, Alexander Matsas, that "Greece must avoid at all costs humiliating its ally Turkey" and should negotiate with her to reach a settlement. Johnson hinted that the next time he might not be as

¹⁶² "Document President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu," p.387.

¹⁶³ C. Nicolet, **United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974**, pp. 244-245.

influential with İnönü by saying that negotiating with the Turks was difficult, but it would be more difficult to talk after an invasion¹⁶⁴.

During June 1964 the Greek Premier, George Papandreou, and Turkish Premier, İnönü visited Washington. İnönü accepted bilateral negotiations¹⁶⁵, in contrast to Papandreou. The later was “tough” in his meeting with Johnson and rejected any attempts for Greek-Turkish talks¹⁶⁶. Papandreou estimated that time was in Greek side’s favor, and it was a matter of time to achieve *enosis*¹⁶⁷. Eventually, Greek Prime Minister only agreed to separate talks of Greek and Turkish representatives with an American emissary, if UN mediator Tuomioja specifically asked for American assistance.

The American mission finally started on July 5 in Geneva with former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson as mediator. On 14 July 1964 Acheson submitted his proposals to the delegations headed Nihat Erim, and Dimitris Nicolareizis. His plan provided for a union with Greece. Greece in return would make certain concessions to Turkey. A portion of the island should be ceded to Turkey in full sovereignty which should be used as a military base¹⁶⁸. Then special arrangements for the protection and the welfare of those Turkish Cypriots not included within the Turkish sovereign base¹⁶⁹.

¹⁶⁴ A. Papaxelas, 1997. **O Viasmos tis Elinikis Dimokratias O Amerikanikos Paragontas 1947-1967** (The Rape of the Greek Democracy: The American Factor 1947-1967). Athens: Estia Publications, pp.116-118.

¹⁶⁵ M. Firat, 1960-71 **Arası Türk Dis Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu**, pp. 133-135.

¹⁶⁶ US Department of State : Vol XVI: 71,74,

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4758.htm>.

¹⁶⁷ S. Rizas, **Enosi Dixotomisi Anexartisia**, pp. 127-129.

¹⁶⁸ US Department of State : Vol XVI: 83,

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4765.htm>.

¹⁶⁹ S. Rizas, **Enosi Dixotomisi Anexartisia**, pp. 127-129; Murat., Sarıca, **Kıbrıs Sorunu**, pp.79-83.

The Turkish side accepted the plan as a basis for negotiations, however, Greek side rejected it, as it was disapproved from President Makarios¹⁷⁰.

A modified version of the first Acheson plan then proposed a leasing of the base to Turkey for 50 years instead of ceding it. Moreover, the special provisions and guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots envisioned as the first plan. This time both sides rejected it¹⁷¹.

Though Acheson mission did fail, the United States could have contained the conflict, prevented a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey and advanced a settlement that would have safeguarded western interests in the Mediterranean region. In practical terms, the Acheson's plans for the Cyprus solution would have provided for the dissolution of the state of Cyprus on the basis of a Greek-Turkish agreement, offering the annexation option to Greece while allowing, in compensation, a smaller, but sizeable, portion of Cyprus, to be administered by mainland Turkey.

All the versions of the American plan could have been sold to the Greeks as *enosis* and to the Turks as *taksim*. The plan in the American eyes would have solved the problem of Cyprus permanently and to the west alliance's advantage. The island would have been retrieved from the status of a non-aligned state and placed in the NATO sphere, apportioned among the three NATO allies (as the British presence would have been continued in the sovereign base areas).

¹⁷⁰US Department of State : Vol XVI: 94,

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4765.htm>.

¹⁷¹D. Brinkley, 1998. "The Cyprus Question: Dean Acheson as Mediator," Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 24:1, p. 13.

In order to reach to such solution Greece and Turkey should have agreed on the proposed terms (portion of the territory) and should have convinced their respective peoples in Cyprus. On the first issue Greece could not even accept the idea of making territorial concession even if it was only a military base of the size of the current British base. Turkey, on the other side, was trying to get a larger portion of the island for their military base, including space for as many Turkish Cypriot civilians as possible.

On the second issue, the Turkish government did not face any problem as Turkish Cypriot community fully approved Turkish actions all along. In contrast, the Greek government had to cooperate and convince the hard-to-control President Makarios who was in favor of *enosis* but at the same time had formulated his own non-aligned policy.

Papandreou himself faced an enormous problem, as he could not control Makarios, and to commit him with the Greek policy, and simultaneously persuade Americans to achieve the best agreement he could make with the Turks¹⁷². So he was entrapped between Makarios policy (whose policy totally disapproved) and his own vague populist policy toward *enosis*.

¹⁷² Papandreou after the rejection of the first Acheson plan, discussed with the American side the possibility to “overthrow” Makarios and declare “instant *enosis*” by a joint action of the Greek Cypriot and Greek parliaments, while the three guarantor powers and the US could reach agreement to provide for a Bill of Rights for the Turkish community and a NATO base with a Turkish commander. C. Nicolet, **United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974**, p. 107. These conspiracy plans never implemented because US feared the Soviet involvement and there was also sufficient support from Grivas in Cyprus. Additionally, Americans were convinced that Papandreou was weak and had no real power to impose such risky plans.

After the failure of the American mediation, it was clear that the Greek Cypriots had no intention of going back to the pre-December 1963 order in Cyprus. Makarios strengthened his power and made clear that he was one of the main players of the game that no one could ignore. In the military level, the gradual infiltration of 10,000 Greek troops in the island preserved the status quo and in the political level he continued verbally to pursue enosis. He was saying: "I aspire to unite the entirety of Cyprus with Greece, not part of her. To succeed in doing so, I shall remain firm and unbent, prepared to sacrifice myself and die"¹⁷³.

On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots quickly established their own administration which resembled a small state but controlled only 5 percent of the island. The Turkish administration possessed all the political, military, administrative, judicial and social institutions. It should be added that Turkey subsidized most of the functions of this administration by an annual grant of 10 million British pounds.

Two and a half years later, Athens' newly established military regime¹⁷⁴, in a Greek-Turkish meeting in September 1967, proposed to the Turkish side the union of Cyprus with Greece due to the communist danger, and in exchange Turkey would acquire a military base under the status of leasing or sovereignty. Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel rejected the offer and proposed partition of the island¹⁷⁵.

¹⁷³ A. Papaxelas, *O Viasmos tis Elinikis Dimokratias*, p. 129.

¹⁷⁴ During the mid-1960s, the political situation in Greece was dangerously destabilized. The government of George Papandreou fell under pressure from the palace in July 1965 over the disagreement between Papandreou and the young king Konstantino for the control of the army. The problematic democratic process interrupted after the military coup under the leadership of Colonel George Papadopoulos on 21 April 1967. D. Kitsikis, *Istoria tou elinotourkikou xorou apo ton Venizelo eos ton Papadopoulo*, pp.275-285.

¹⁷⁵ M. Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p. 212; S. Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations*, p.129; M. Sarıca, *Kıbrıs Sounu*, pp.136-143; D. Kitsikis, *Istoria tou Elinotourkikou Xorou apo ton Venizelo eos ton Papadopoulo*, p. 304.

For one more time, it was proved that Greece and Turkey could not agree on a political solution for Cyprus on the basis of *enosis*. Two months later, in November 1967 a third crisis burst, provoked by the unwarranted attack against two small Turkish villages led by Grivas and elements of the Greek national guard¹⁷⁶.

The Turkish government threatened to retaliate with military intervention unless Grivas was removed from the island together with the 10,000 Greeks' mainland troops that had been infiltrated into Cyprus in 1964. The American diplomacy activated again between Athens, Ankara and Nicosia and Cyrus Vance, then President Johnson's special representative, convinced Papadopoulos -one of the leaders of the Junta regime established in Athens in April 1967- to remove Grivas and the Greek army division from Cyprus, development that satisfied the Turks¹⁷⁷.

With the removal of the Greek troops -Makarios did not oppose it- Greece lost a credible deterrent against Turkish use of force in the island and seriously damaged its prestige. Greece also showed that she desired *enosis*, however, she was not determined to make a war for it. Additionally, the military regime's stance showed that it could make easy concessions in order not to dissatisfy the US. During the 1967 Cyprus crisis, the Americans did get involved mainly to settle the crisis, and as this was achieved, they did not pay further attention to the problem.

¹⁷⁶ A. G. Xydis, 1976. "I Exoteriki Politiki tou Stratiotikou Kathestotos (The Foreign Policy of the Military Regime) in G. Gianoulopoulos, and R. Clogg, (eds.) *I Ellada kato apo Stratiotiko Zigo* (Greece under the Military Yoke) (Athens: Papazisis Publications).

¹⁷⁷ US Department of State : Vol XVI: 340,
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4761.htm>.

3.3 The Third Phase, 1974 and After

After the crisis of winter 1967, to be followed by the removal from Cyprus of the 10,000 supernumerary Greek troops and the departure of activist General George Grivas, the ethnic troubles on the island seemed to settle down to a state of relative stability. But as negotiations between the two ethnic communities strung out over the years, the political center stage moved into a new phase involving an intra-Greek Cypriot political conflict aggravated by the interventionist policies of the military junta that was ruling Greece.

The pressure from the Greek military regime against a progressively independent Makarios gathered momentum in the early 1970s. Makarios's "greatest sin" according to the Athens colonels was that he was involved in aiding anti-junta elements¹⁷⁸. Furthermore, the Athens junta accused Makarios that he "had betrayed *enosis*". Hence they encouraged the reactivation of EOKA, which became known in its reorganized version as EOKA-B. The EOKA-B attacked Makarios's self-serving and autonomist policies as the first steps toward the dehellenization of Cyprus.

During this phase EOKA-B was once more under the leadership of the aging, but popular, George Grivas, who reentered Cyprus secretly in September 1972 and mounted a campaign of intimidation against Makarios and his supporters.

Concerning the future Cyprus settlement, the policies between Makarios and the Greek government diverged completely. The colonels' objective appeared to be

¹⁷⁸ T. Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey*, p.77.

moving in the direction of securing a generous version of Acheson Plan as they did in September 1967. If carried through, such a plan would have eliminated the Makarios government and led to the annexation of the bulk of Cyprus to Greece allowing in the form of “adjustments” for some territorial presence of mainland Turkey to Cyprus. These adjustments, the junta felt, were necessary in order to allay the Turkish fears regarding the threat of Greek encirclement. Greek diplomats accordingly met secretly with their Turkish counterparts in Lisbon and Paris in connection with NATO meetings that were held in these capitals. Without reaching formal agreements, Greek and Turkish interlocutors moved closer to consensus based on some form of “double *enosis*” (or partition). Athens at that time showed clearly that she was seeing the Cyprus issue as a Greek-Turkish problem which should be settled between the two countries, ignoring the Cypriot government¹⁷⁹.

Makarios completely disagreed with these initiatives and he refused to cooperate with Athens regime. In January 1968 before the presidential elections he declared that “*enosis* is the long-term aim, however, at the time being it is not feasible”¹⁸⁰. Makarios rejected *enosis* indirectly. Having the full control of the government, he was believing that time was in *favor* of the Greek Cypriots, and that he was delaying the progress in the inter-communal talks¹⁸¹.

Situation seriously deteriorated when Papadopoulos was replaced (November 1973) by his trusted security chief, Colonel Dimitrios Ioannides. Ioannides established a civilian front-type government. He reserved for himself the exercise of real power,

¹⁷⁹ Y. Kranidiotis, 1984. *Diethnopiisi kai Apodiethnopiisi tou kipriakou Provlimatos* (Internalization and De-internalization of the Cyprus Problem) (Ph.D. Thesis. Athens: Panteion University), pp. 196-197.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p.179.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid*, p.241.

but he operated from the sidelines. The new dictator remained for years in virtual anonymity. He formed a reputation of being fanatically anti-Communist and uncontrollably anti-Makarios. He was a deep believer in *enosis*. His hatred toward Makarios verged on the pathological and dated back to the time Ioannides had served in Cyprus in the early 1960s. Unlike Papadopoulos, who was prepared to see Makarios fall through the use of political pressure, manipulation, and even assassination techniques¹⁸², Ioannides had no inhibition against using large-scale military force in order to remove his bitter rival from the political scene.

The death of General Grivas in January 1974 was the second event that exacerbated the Cypriot situation. Despite Grivas's personal anti-Makarios feelings, Grivas had acted throughout as a relatively restraining influence on EOKA-B terrorist activities. Grivas was opposed to assassination attempts against Makarios, and even more opposed to taking the type of action such as a military coup that would provoke Turkey¹⁸³.

On July 15, 1974, finally, the Athens junta attempted a coup against Makarios¹⁸⁴. The Cypriot National Guard, aided by units of EOKA-B was ordered to grab power in a blunt and bloody coup. Archbishop Makarios, whose Presidential Palace was reduced to rubble by National Guard artillery fire, escaped from death and fled over

¹⁸² A secret plan, code-name "Hermes", was used by mainland Greeks and Greek Cypriot operatives, who in March 1970 managed to shoot down the Archbishop's helicopter. The helicopter crash-landed, but the Archbishop and his pilot escaped death, T. Coulombis, 1996. **Kipriako: Lathi, Didagmata kai Prooptikes** (Cyprus Problem: Mistakes, Lessons and Prospects) (Athens: Sideris Publications), p.34.

¹⁸³ T. Coulombis, **The United States, Greece and Turkey**, pp.78-80.

¹⁸⁴ For the inaction of the US to stop the Greek junta see I. Slengesol, 2001. "A Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis", *Mediterranean Quarterly* 1:2, pp.96-129; C. Nicolet, **United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974**, pp. 414-429; S. Rizas, 2002. **Oi Inomenes Polities, I Diktatoria ton Sintamatarxon kai to Kipriako Zitima 1967-1974** (The United States, The Dictatorship of the Colonels and the Cyprus Problem 1967-1974) (Athens: Pataki Publications), pp. 175-192.

the mountains to a British base. From there he was flown with the British aid to safety through Malta to London. Nikos Sampson, a right-wing, pro-EOKA-B operative was installed by the Greek junta as president. The “new regime” pledged to continue a nonaligned foreign policy, to hold free elections within a year, to continue intercommunal talks with the Turkish Cypriots, and to address immediate problems of the Cypriot people that had been allegedly threatened by a communist-inspired conspiracy¹⁸⁵.

In the meantime, the view from Turkey was one of grave concern for the fate of the Turkish Cypriot community¹⁸⁶. The Turks were clearly prepared and determined this time to take advantage of the opportunity for intervention provided by the Athens regime’s brutal action.

Shortly after the anti-Makarios coup, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit issued a statement which tersely asserted that Turkey would “...never accept any fait accompli of this kind. We will not permit anyone to intervene in the rights of the Cypriot Turks”¹⁸⁷. Following emergency meetings of the Turkish National Security Council, Ecevit made it clear that the coup in Cyprus was considered by Turkey as a mainland Greek intervention and could not go unanswered. Simultaneously, General Semih Sancar, the chief of Turkey’s General Staff, announced that Turkey’s armed forces had been placed in a state of readiness.

¹⁸⁵ R. Denктаş, *Kıbrıs: Elli Yılın Hikayesi*, p.379.

¹⁸⁶ M. Şahinler, 1979. *Türkiye’ nin 1974 Kıbrıs Siyaseti* (Turkey’s Policy towards Cyprus in 1974). (Istanbul).

¹⁸⁷ T. Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey*, p.91; M. Sarıca, *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p.182.

Athens response to Turkey's complaints was that the recent events in Cyprus were an internal affair of an independent state and member of the United Nations. But this denial did not pacify Turkey or any other opponents of the Athens junta. The day after the coup, July 16, shortly the announcement of the formation of a government in Cyprus under Nikos Sampson¹⁸⁸, the Turkish government delivered a note to Great Britain seeking arrangements for joint action in Cyprus in accordance with Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, which granted Britain, Greece and Turkey the right to intervene in Cyprus for the purpose of restoring the status quo of the Zurich and London treaties.

Prime Minister Ecevit flew to London on July 17 determined to secure a prompt British answer (the Turkish note of July 16 had requested a British response within 24 hours) to Turkey's proposition regarding joint action in Cyprus. Ecevit, in statements released in Ankara and London, made it clear that Turkey would not recognize the regime established in Cyprus¹⁸⁹.

The US response to the management of the crisis, unlike the 1964 and 1967 crises, was little and late. On the night of July 17, US Undersecretary of State, Joseph Sisco, was sent by Henri Kissinger to the trouble zone. Sisco must have known that the Turks at this stage were virtually unstoppable, and that the time to have applied US pressure on anybody should have been prior to the Athens junta's decision to unseat Makarios in a bloody coup. Nothing would have proven more sobering, for

¹⁸⁸ Nikos Sampson was a newspaper publisher Machi, of extreme right-wing political orientation whose declared objective had been enosis at all costs. During the EOKA struggle in the 1950s, he had developed the reputation of being an arch-terrorist who enjoyed killing British soldiers and was said to have a deep hatred against the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots. See T. Coulombis, **The United States, Greece and Turkey**, p.101.

¹⁸⁹ H. Cem, 1974. **Ecevit'in Savunması** (The Defense of Ecevit) (İstanbul: Aktüel Yayınları), pp. 17-18.

example, to the Athens colonels than to have been told in unequivocal terms that the United States would not be responsible for the likely Turkish military reaction to an Athens-sponsored coup in Cyprus. But apparently no such warning was ever issued to the Ioannides regime¹⁹⁰.

Ecevit held an inconclusive meeting with Sisco in London on July 18, and shortly thereafter he stated that “the situation is very grave. Time has become a very important factor, because Greek military presence in Cyprus increases by the hour. The illegal administration is taking root”¹⁹¹. Back in Ankara the next day, Prime Minister Ecevit held another emergency meeting with the Turkish military high command. Throughout this time a tremendous amount of military activity was taking place, such as large-scale movements of Turkish troops in the ports of Mersin and İskenderun opposite the northern coast of Cyprus. The Turkish media reported information was indeed pointing to the direction of an imminent Turkish military operation in Cyprus.

In New York the UN Security Council, with US concurrence, agreed to hear Archbishop Makarios in his capacity as the head of the Cypriot state. But, simultaneously, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Ambassador Anderson announced in Washington that the new, Sampson-appointed Cypriot foreign minister, Dimis Dimitriou, had received US Ambassador Rodger Davis in Nicosia. Anderson, however, hastened to add that the Cypriot “political situation remains unclear and ...the question of recognizing does not arise now”¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ B. Özkeçeci-Taner, 2002. “1974 Cyprus Conflict in Perspective: Theory and Practice”, Foreign Policy (Ankara): XXVII: 1-2, pp. 42-44.

¹⁹¹ H. Cem, Ecevit'in Savunması, pp.18-19.

¹⁹² To Vima, 17/07/1974.

Joseph Sisco arrived in Athens early on July 19. From the start, Sisco had great difficulty locating members of the Greek government. Late in the day he managed to have a meeting with Ioannides, his civilian Prime Minister Androutopoulos and his chief of staff Bonanos. Sisco's message – transmitting gently Turkey's minimum expectations – including the following points:

- Removal of Nikos Sampson
- Safe return of Makarios in Nicosia
- A timetable for the withdrawal of Greek officers with meaningful provisions for inspection and reinforcement of his condition
- Replacement of Greek officers by neutral personnel under UN auspices
- Guarantees of the Turkish Cypriot community, with a land corridor under Turkish Cypriot military control to link the Turkish Cypriot enclave in Nicosia with the coast¹⁹³.

Ioannides' response to these terms was negative. Had his regime acceded to the removal of Greek officers in Cyprus, this act probably would have been equated with capitulation under pressure and could have triggered Ioannides's political coup de grace. Athens, in an apparently inadequate response for the purposes of placing Turkey, offered only to replace, rather than remove, the Greek officers from Cyprus.

Sisco then went to Ankara to tell Ecevit about the Greek "concession". Ecevit insisted on his demands. Sisco once more flew to Athens but came back empty-handed. In the meantime Kissinger had conducted eleven phone conversations with Ecevit who "advised Kissinger against the kind of pressure Lyndon Johnson had

¹⁹³ S. Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations*, p.192.

exerted in 1964 and warned him that such a tactic would mean the permanent “loss” of Turkey to the Western Alliance”. Kissinger continued to oppose the intervention, but as Ecevit acknowledged, he never tried to intimidate Ecevit. Moreover, Kissinger created the impression that he believed Turkey’s grievances concerning Cyprus were justified¹⁹⁴.

At 3:00 a.m. on 20 July 1974, only two and a half hours before the Turkish operation started, Sisco returned from Athens and asked Ecevit for another forty-eight hour delay in the Turkish intervention. Ecevit replied that “ten years ago both Turkey and the US made mistakes. The US prevented Turkey’s military action, and Turkey acquiesced”. Ecevit added that as a result of the 1964 Johnson letter, Turkey-US relations were harmed and that Greek-Turkish relations further deteriorated. He concluded that “this time Turkey will not repeat its mistake. I hope that you would not either”¹⁹⁵.

The factors that affected Ecevit’s decision should be examined: Ecevit believed that the Cyprus question, like other Greek-Turkish problems, could be solved in Turkey’s favor if Turkey acted assertively. Ecevit also thought that US omnipotence belonged to an earlier era, and smaller allies of the US could therefore ignore American preferences, creating *fait accompli* with reasonable prospects for a favorable outcome.

Ecevit also found encouragement in the fact that as a result of the Sampson coup, the unpopular Greek junta was further isolated internationally. Ecevit calculated that

¹⁹⁴ H. Cem, 1974. *Ecevit’in Savunması*, p.23.

¹⁹⁵ S. Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations*, p.192.

world public opinion could not be any more favorable for a Turkish intervention, and that if executed carefully, Turkey's landing could be projected as a rescue operation of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Ecevit realized, however, that any change in conditions might remove the cover of legitimacy from the Turkish intervention and that the West might fall back on its traditional identification of Turks as barbaric invaders. In fact, some high-ranking military leaders believed from the outset that the world would have hated us even if we had fired roses instead of bullets¹⁹⁶.

Ecevit's pro-invasion stance seemed to be further justified when Greece continued to send reinforcements even after the coup of 15 July 1974. The Greeks undertook their build-up in daylight and Turkish reconnaissance planes discovered dozens of Greek transport aircraft and ferryboats carrying troops to Cyprus. The Greek build-up lent an additional urgency to the situation, causing Ecevit, who was not known for his patience, to become increasingly restless.

A major factor that contributed to Ecevit's assertiveness was the Soviet acquiescence in, if not support, of a military intervention. The Soviet leaders knew that the Sampson coup not only would eliminate the Cyprus nonalignment, but that *enosis*, which they believed would follow shortly, would bring Cyprus under the firm control of Greece and thus NATO. Ecevit carefully exploited the Soviet opposition to *enosis*. Both he and his foreign minister Güneş told Soviet Ambassador Grubyakov that Turkey "did not intend to annex or partition Cyprus and ... will respect not only the independence of the island, but also its nonalignment"¹⁹⁷. Throughout the week

¹⁹⁶ S. Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations*, p. 196; İ. Sabahattin, 1988. *Kıbrıs Barış Harekati' nın Nedenleri-Gelişimi-Sonuçları* (The Cyprus Peace Operation: Reasons, Developments, Consequences) (Akdeniz Haber Ajansı Yayınları).

¹⁹⁷ S. Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations*, p. 195.

following the 15 July 1974 coup, Turkish-Soviet dialogue continued. The Soviets consistently indicated that they were ready to accept a limited Turkish action, provided that Cyprus' international status was preserved.

On July 20 at 5: 30 a.m., the Turkish landing began attacking Cyprus. According to the general staff's plans, Turkey would conduct the operation in two stages. During the first stage, which was to last for two days, Turkish forces would capture a bridgehead in northern Cyprus. After the completion of the first stage, officials would begin negotiations to conclude a new settlement in Cyprus. If the Greeks refused a new constitutional order, the Turks would launch the second operation and achieve their goals forcefully¹⁹⁸.

Ecevit went on the radio at 6:30 a.m. and announced his government's decision to the Turkish people as follows:

The Turkish Armed Forces have started landing in Cyprus from the air and sea. Let this operation be auspicious to our nation and to all Cypriots. We believe that by acting in this manner we shall be rendering a great service to all mankind and to peace. I hope that our forces meet no resistance and that a bloody clash is avoided. We in fact are going to carry peace and not war to the island, and not only to the Turks but also to the Greeks. We have to make this decision after we have exhausted all diplomatic and political methods. Meanwhile, I wish to express my gratitude to friends and allies, particularly the United States and Britain, which have displayed well-meaning efforts to have the dispute settled through diplomatic methods. If their efforts were abortive those responsible for this operation are not those who displayed these good intentions¹⁹⁹.

The Turkish forces, meeting sporadic resistance by the feuding and disorganized Greek Cypriot side, established an area of control in the Nicosia-Kyrenia corridor.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 195; H. Cem, *Ecevit'in Savunması*, pp.38-40.

¹⁹⁹ T. Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey*, p.93.

The invasion had stunned the Greek and the Greek Cypriot military regimes and their dwindling supporters.

While the Greek Cypriots were still under the impact of the fratricidal anti-Makarios coup, Ioannides in Athens was being informed of the Turkish military landings. He was reported to have become furious at what he considered outright Turkish treachery and deceit. After, exclaiming, “We have been betrayed”, he gave his military staff an order for general mobilization intent upon retaliating against Turkey in Cyprus and perhaps elsewhere. With Ioannides’s apparent determination to widen the war against Turkey, Washington’s crisis management team finally moved into high gear. The key aim of the US effort was to avoid an all-out war between the two NATO allies.

Sisco was ordered, therefore, to continue the shuttle process between Athens and Ankara and his task was to secure a quick cease-fire on the ground in Cyprus and to begin a process of negotiation and, hopefully, gradual troop disengagement. In the meantime the Athens junta entered into a rapid process of disintegration. Ioannides’s order for mobilization resulted in near chaos. It became obvious that there was considerable confusion and unpreparedness in the Greek war plans. Senior generals, such as Gregorios Bonanos, Andreas Galatsanos, Alexandros Papanicolaou, and Petros Arapakis balked at the prospect of fighting an unlimited all-fronts war with Turkey over Cyprus. They concluded that Greece was badly prepared and such a war would have resulted in the loss of exposed and undefended Greek islands of the Aegean that were close to the coast of Turkey²⁰⁰. Furthermore, the bulk of the Greek

²⁰⁰ S. Psycharis, 1976. *Oi 70 krisimes meres* (The 70 Critical Days) (Athens: Papazisis), pp. 15-38.

forces stationed in northern Greece under the command of General Ioannis Davos indicated clearly that they were prepared, if necessary, to march toward Athens (rather than Istanbul) in an attempt to remove the adventurous junta from power and to replace it with a responsible government of national unity.

Joseph Sisco, in the meantime, was confronted with the virtual disappearance of the members of the Athens junta, including Ioannides. All of them seemed to have vanished from the face of the earth. Sisco managed to locate only Admiral Arapakis in the early morning hours of July 22. Arapakis took it upon himself to agree to a cease-fire with Turkey in the name of the Athens regime. He assured Sisco that he had cleared this decision with Ioannides²⁰¹.

On the morning of July 23, the Greek high command held a final meeting with the shadowy dictator, whose rank of brigadier general rendered him formally subordinate to them. In effect, they informed him of their decision to invite the up-to-that time banned political leadership to form an emergency government of national unity. Ioannides stormed out of the conference room furiously asserting that Greece (i.e. Ioannides) had been betrayed both in Cyprus and now in the mainland. A number of important Greek politicians were then summoned by the military command and began conferring at the old parliament building. After some hesitation they agreed to invite Konstantinos Karamanlis from his Paris exile to form a government of national unity that would begin the process of democratic restoration while facing the critical problems in the Greek-Turkish crisis.

²⁰¹ Ibid, pp. 15-38; T. Coulombis, *Kipriako: Lathi, Didagmata kai Prooptikes*, pp. 52-53; M.A. Birand, 1985. *30 Hot Days* (London: Rustem and Brother), pp. 25-28.

The signing of the Cyprus cease-fire on July 22 and the collapse of the Athens junta on July 23 led to the collapse of the Sampson regime in Cyprus, too. Glavkos Clerides, the president of the Cypriot House of Representatives, assumed temporarily, but constitutionally, the duties of acting president. Makarios, the formal president of Cyprus, remained near the UN scene in New York city.

The action now moved to Geneva, where two rounds of vigorous negotiations started. These were five-party negotiations by representatives of the three guarantor states – Greece, Turkey and Britain – as well as Glavkos Clerides and Rauf Denktaş, acting as the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. The conference was chaired by Britain’s foreign minister, James Callahan. While these negotiations proceeded, the Turks steadily reinforced their Nicosia-Kyrenia beachhead and inched forward continually enlarging the pocket of land under Turkish military control²⁰².

The military landing of Turkish troops on Cyprus altered radically Turkey’s stated diplomatic objectives. The Turks argued now that the Zurich and London agreements, which had been violated by the Greek Cypriots since 1963, no longer provided a margin of safety for the Turkish Cypriot community. Instead, Turkey presented the Greek and Greek Cypriots sides with two alternative plans calling either for a loose bi-zonal federation or a loose multicantonal federation. The latter was referred as “Güneş Plan” from Ecevit’s foreign minister, Turan Güneş. Both Turkish plans, in the eyes of the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots, called for masked

²⁰² Ibid, pp. 59-62.

forms of partition of Cyprus, a condition that they had rejected systematically from the very outset of the Cyprus dispute²⁰³.

Washington, with the Athens junta gone from the scene and replaced by a considerably less manipulable democratic government, began to shift away from Greece and closer to Turkey. The revised judgment of Washington was that a Turkish presence in Cyprus was now a *fait accompli* and that no future settlement could be arrived at without some separation of the ethnic populations and the attainment of considerable autonomous rights for the Turkish Cypriots in territorially distinct regions of Cyprus. The Güneş Plan, which had been developed with heavy inputs from Henry Kissinger, was unveiled in the Geneva talks on Saturday, August 13, 1974, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Simultaneously, Washington offered encouragement to Ankara in a formal statement that had been reviewed carefully by both Kissinger and Sisco :

The United States position is as follows: we recognize the position of the Turkish community in Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection. We have supported a greater degree of autonomy for them. The parties are negotiating on one or more Turkish autonomous areas. The avenues of diplomacy have not been exhausted and therefore the United States would consider a resort to military action unjustified. We have made this clear to all parties²⁰⁴.

Greek foreign minister, George Mavros and Greek Cypriot Acting President, Glavkos Clerides²⁰⁵, upon receipt of the Güneş Plan, asked for 36 hours so that they could consult with their governments. Foreign minister Güneş, citing that time had

²⁰³ G. Camp, 1980. "Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus," Political Science Quarterly 95:1, pp.58-60.

²⁰⁴ T. Coulombis, **The United States, Greece and Turkey**, p.97; I. Slengesol, "A Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis", pp.96-129.

²⁰⁵ Clerides believed that the Greek Cypriot side should accept a bizonal federation. But he was powerless to commit given the opposition of Makarios and the Greek government. See G. Clerides, 1992. **My Deposition**. vol. IV. (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing), p. 42.

run out and pointing out that further delay would create security problems for the exposed Turkish troops in Cyprus, demanded as immediate yes-or-no answer. The negotiations thus broke down²⁰⁶.

The next morning the reorganized and heavily reinforced Turkish troops on Cyprus were ordered to launch a second and major phase of the invasion. It resulted in the occupation of about 37 per cent of the territory of Cyprus, creating a large refugee problem of over 180,000 Greek Cypriots who fled to points in southern Cyprus to avoid contact with the advancing Turkish troops. Subsequently, most of the Turkish Cypriots living in southern enclaves also left their homes and sought refuge in the Turkish-occupied northern zone²⁰⁷.

In Athens, the new Karamanlis government was facing a major dilemma. Greece was a guarantor state of Cyprus and, according to constitutional procedures, had a right to take appropriate action to redress the impact of the Turkish invasion. Greek governments in the past had indicated clearly that a Turkish invasion in Cyprus would have resulted in a full-scale Greek-Turkish war. Karamanlis's initial predilection, therefore, was to declare war on Turkey and confront the Turkish forces in Cyprus and in other fronts if that became necessary²⁰⁸. But the Greek Army chiefs at the war council in Athens informed Karamanlis that the state of readiness of the Greek armed forces was inadequate to pursue the war in relatively distant Cyprus and simultaneously defend the exposed eastern Aegean islands. The Prime Minister angrily acquiesced to the military status quo in Cyprus. It was a major diplomatic

²⁰⁶ M. A. Birand, *30 Hot Days*, 97-113; S. Rizas, *Oi Inomenes Polities, I Diktatoria ton Sintamatarxon kai to Kipriako Zitima*, pp. 229-234.

²⁰⁷ T. Couloumbis, *Kipriako: Lathi, Didagmata kai Prooptikes*, pp. 64-68; S. Rizas, *Oi Inomenes Polities, I Diktatoria ton Sintamatarxon kai to Kipriako Zitima*, pp.224-240.

²⁰⁸ M. Alexandrakis, *To Kipriako 1950-1974 : Mia Endoskopisi*, p. 34.

and psychological humiliation for Greece. So, Karamanlis, seeking to defuse the explosive state of public emotions, made the drastic decision to withdraw Greece from the military arm of NATO. This dramatic step was taken in order to express feelings of anger and bitterness against NATO's apparent inability or unwillingness to react to the Turkish use of force in Cyprus²⁰⁹.

Moreover, there was a strong Greek-American lobby in the US Congress and it was felt this could be used to exert pressure on Turkey. In February 1975 Congress imposed an embargo on arms shipments to Turkey, on the grounds that American equipment had been misused in the Cyprus landing. The embargo stopped the delivery of arms already purchased by Turkey, and the disbursement of 200 million dollars in grants. The action was vigorously opposed by the US administration, particularly by Secretary of State, Kissinger, who argued that it would seriously weaken Turkey's defensive capability and thus damage the Alliance²¹⁰.

Turkey's reaction to the US-imposed arms embargo came almost five months later. On 26 July 1975, Turkey suspended US operations at all military installations within Turkey. Eventually, the US arms embargo was lifted three years later in 1978²¹¹.

The 1974 Cyprus crisis altered the substance, nature, and structure of the whole dispute. Throughout the 1955-1974 period, the Cyprus question had been described from two distinct perspectives. One perspective (probably the dominant one)

²⁰⁹ Y. Valinakis, 1989. *Isagogi stin Eliniki Exoteriki Politiki 1949-1988* (Introduction to Greek Foreign Policy 1949-1988) (Thessaloniki, Paratiritis Publications).

²¹⁰R. McDonald, "Alliance problems in the eastern Mediterranean", p.61.

²¹¹ B. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West Since World War II", pp.57-58.

considered Cyprus a leftover province of the Ottoman Empire that was up for disposition between rival claimants. According to this approach, the Cyprus settlement had been delayed because the island had been a British colony at the end of the First World War. From this viewpoint, Cyprus could have been unified with Greece (given its over 80 percent Greek Cypriot majority and the preference of its inhabitants) or assigned to Turkey (on the grounds of geopolitics) or divided between the two countries as an act of political compromise splitting, the difference of opposing Greek-Turkish mainland interests. One could argue that the policies of Greece (pursuit of *enosis*-union with Greece) and Turkey (*taksim*-partition between Greece and Turkey) and the United States (the Acheson Plan-a form of partition referred to as “double *enosis*”) were all attuned to this first perspective. In short, the Cyprus problem was to be treated as an irritant affecting NATO’s southeastern flank. As such, the problem was to be solved by Athens and Ankara with the concurrence of London and Washington. The solution, once arrived at, should just be announced to the inhabitants of Cyprus, who were not seen as Cypriots, but as either Greeks or Turks.

The second perspective, alternatively, focused on Cyprus as a distinct political entity – a new state with a bi-ethnic composition whose goal, as was the case with most newly emerging ex-colonial states, would be to develop effective constitutional structures that would accommodate its culturally and politically diverse elements. It appears that this perspective was adopted in substance (but not always in terms of rhetoric) by the Cypriot government. Its basic premise was that, given the incompatible security objectives of Greece and Turkey (*enosis* versus *taksim*), the only viable alternative for Cyprus would be the development of an independent,

neutralist, and bi-ethnic Cyprus that could maintain its diverse cultural identity, but which would remain politically intact. As an independent, neutralist or neutralized entity, Cyprus expected to reduce anxieties in Turkey that some day it would be annexed by Greece, adding to the “encirclement” of Turkey by Greek controlled islands.

The second perspective suited the political needs of the Cypriots (the Greeks maybe more than the Turks), for their status and identity would be more significant as long as Cyprus remained as independent state, member of the Commonwealth of Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations, rather than becoming just a province appended to either Greece or Turkey or split somehow between them.

After the adventure of July-August 1974, the second perspective may be in the upswing. Greek Cypriots have realized that, in their moment of greatest crisis (the Turkish military intervention of 1974), the Greek motherland was both ill-equipped militarily and too far (in terms of physical, if not also psychological, distance) to come to their decisive aid. Greece realized that the dream of *enosis* was no longer feasible. The Athens junta-supported coup against President Makarios-following years of friction between the Athens and Nicosia governments served to indicate on both sides of the relationship that the interests of Greeks and Greek Cypriots were not in all cases identical.

Since 1974 the negotiating positions of Greek and Turkish Cypriots have taken a very distinct form. Despite protracted rounds of bi-communal talks between representatives of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities under UN

auspices, no breakthroughs have been announced and the two sides seem to be far apart in their demands and expectations. The position of the Turkish Cypriots – backed and heavily influenced by mainland Turkey-has hardened considerably compared to the pre-1974 period. Arguing that the Zurich and London Agreements had proven unworkable (which was a Greek Cypriot position before 1974), the Turkish side proposes the creation of a bi-zonal federation to be established roughly along the administrative occupation lines created after the 1974 crisis. They envisioned a relatively weak federal government in which both communities would be represented on the basis of political equality. The federal government would be complemented by strong state governments under the exclusive control of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots respectively.

The central premise of the Turkish Cypriots is that, once the proposed federal state is mutually agreed upon, provisions will be made for the Turkish community to remain the majority element in the northern region in Cyprus to avoid being culturally, politically, and economically overwhelmed by the majority of Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots also envision a system of guarantees (including some type of symbolic presence of mainland Turkish troops on Cyprus) for the long range viability of the new federal Cypriot state. However, Turkish Cypriots (and Turkey) give assurances that the bulk of the Turkish forces stationed in northern Cyprus would be withdrawn once a mutually acceptable settlement is reached by the two communities.

In the interim period the Turkish Cypriots have unilaterally declared the creation of a Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC), which, they hope, will serve as the

Turkish Cypriot component of a proposed bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. They have organized this entity as a federated parliamentary republic with an elected president, a legislative assembly, and a prime minister, with a ten member cabinet appointed by the president. The Turkish Cypriot community leader, Rauf Denktaş, served as president of the TFSC since its formal proclamation on June 8, 1975 until 1983. For some administrative functions the TFSC had been appended to the Turkish mainland system. This gradual integration includes the adoption of Turkish import, export, and customs rules; the use of the Turkish lira as the operative currency in northern Cyprus; and the assignment of the whole Turkish controlled zone to the mainland Mersin Postal District for coordination of international mail²¹².

Initially, the Turkish federated “state” did not seek separate international recognition. Turkey, however, maintained its embassy in the Turkish sector of Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, and refused to recognize the Cyprus government in any capacity other than a Greek Cypriot community administration. Turkish Cypriot community with the Turkish support finally attempted to declare their independence unilaterally in November 1983 but could not gain international recognition.

The Greek Cypriot negotiating position (backed by mainland Greece) has been considerably different from that of the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots view the Turkish proposal for a bi-zonal federation as constituting a demand for de facto partition of the country through a loose confederative scheme. The Greek Cypriots are willing, unlike the pre-1974 period, to proceed with a bi-communal and territorially organized federation; but they argue that the size of the territory of each

²¹² M. Sarıca, *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, pp. 232-242.

federal component should be analogous to the percentage of each community's population (agreed by both sides to be 18 percent for the Turkish Cypriots and 80 percent for Greek Cypriots). In addition, the Greek Cypriots argue that the future federal government should have substantive (rather than only marginal and ceremonial) functions and should be organized to reflect the demographic character (that is, the 80: 20 population ratio) of the island. Also they believe that a future federal Cyprus should permit all its inhabitants to enjoy the standard freedoms of movement and economic activity in the entire territory of the country²¹³.

The Greek Cypriots maintain that the Turkish Cypriots, being under the virtual occupation of mainland Turkey, are not allowed to express freely the wishes of the Turkish Cypriot community. They assert that negotiations that have taken place "under the gun" of partial Turkish occupation of Cyprus cannot lead to a genuine and mutually acceptable settlement, and they demand that Turkey must heed the relevant UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of its occupation force from Cyprus²¹⁴.

Reacting to the often repeated argument advanced by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots regarding the need to provide for a sense of security to the Turkish Cypriot community and to Turkey proper, the Greek Cypriots have officially offered to accept a regime of total demilitarization in Cyprus (hoping to remedy any Turkish mainland security anxieties) and the installation of a multinational (UN supervised) police force to provide, for a long period of time, the function of internal security and to accommodate for the fears of the Turkish Cypriot minority community.

²¹³ V. Coufoudakis, 1989. "I Diethis Diastasi tou Kipriakou: 1960-1987" (The International Dimension of the Cyprus Problem: 1960-1987) in *Sixroni Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki* (Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy) (Athens: Sakoulas Publications), pp.79-84.

²¹⁴ M. Sarica, *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p. 111.

Ultimately, the Greek Cypriot position rests on the principle of maintaining the unity of the state of Cyprus and opposing alternatives – such as union with Greece, partition between Greece and Turkey, or just plain partition into two economically nonviable ministates that will continue on a course of mutually erosive conflict – a conflict that may spill over into a generalized confrontation between the motherlands of Greece and Turkey.

Despite the inconclusiveness of many rounds of intercommunal negotiations over the years, the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable compromise is still strong – especially if the political decision is made in both Greece and Turkey proper to permit the two communities to move toward a logical *modus vivendi* – in short, to stop viewing Cyprus as a disputed province and to accept it as a small and independent state of bi-ethnic makeup that should be encouraged to find workable constitutional arrangements.

In November 1978 and shortly after the embargo on Turkey was lifted, the Carter administration, seeking to demonstrate that easing the pressure on Turkey would facilitate a settlement, proposed a 12-point plan which enjoyed strong Canadian and British backing. Although the plan, known after its primary drafter as the Matthew Nimetz Plan, was quickly rejected by the Greek Cypriots and, eventually, by the Turkish Cypriots, some of its useful principles could have been used for a mutually acceptable compromise package.

The main provisions of the Nimetz plan²¹⁵ envisioned the creation of a bi-regional, independent, federal republic, forbidding simultaneously the unification of part of the whole of the state of Cyprus with any other state. The country would be divided into two constituent regions. The federal government's functions would include foreign affairs, defense, currency and central banking, interregional trade, foreign trade, communications, federal finance, customs, immigration, and civil aviation.

Finally, the Nimetz Plan made provisions for delineating territorial jurisdictions of the two constituent states based on criteria of economic productivity and viability, security, population distribution, and historical factors. It was clearly suggested that the lines ultimately agreed upon would result in significant territorial changes to the post-1974 occupation lines in favor of the Greek Cypriot side. The plan called for compensation of refugees who could not, or chose not to, return to their homes; the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces except for small contingents remaining by mutual agreement; and the institutionalization of a demilitarized republic possessing only small regional police forces. Of special interest to the Greek Cypriots, the plan provided for the priority resettlement by Greek Cypriot refugees of the Varosha region in Famagusta under the interim administration of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. Future economic development projects for the proposed Cypriot Federal Republic would be financed by a general fund of the federal government administered by the two regions²¹⁶.

²¹⁵ P. Savvides, 1998, "US Foreign Policy Toward Cyprus: Is the "Theory of Continuity" Still Relevant?", *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 24.1: pp. 46-47.

²¹⁶ T. Coulombis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey*, p.115.

Since 1979 the negotiations scene has shifted once again to intercommunal talks carried out in Nicosia by the representatives of the two communities under the auspices of the United Nations. The negotiators have been polite and patient, but no visible signs of progress seem to have taken place to date.

3.4 The US Stance towards the Greek-Turkish Dispute over Cyprus

Before the Cyprus problem was internationalized with the first Greek appeal to the UN in 1954, the US avoided the growing conflict between the Greek Cypriots and the British, holding an ambivalent opinion over the issue. In answer to the Greek defeat at the UN in 1954 the Greek Cypriot EOKA started its violent *enosis* struggle in the spring 1955. The US feared a deterioration of NATO cohesion in its southeastern flank, and it supported an “inside” solution among the involved parties (British, Greeks and Turks). But, it did not take a position regarding the substance of the issue.

This attitude disappointed especially the Greek side as when riots broke out in Istanbul against the Greek minority after the breakdown of the 1955 London Conference, Secretary of State, Dulles wrote identical letters to the Greek and Turkish Governments, calling for subordination of their bilateral problems to the real danger of East-West antagonism. The Greeks, who were the principal victims of the Turkish riots, were deeply hurt about being put in the same position with the perpetrators²¹⁷.

²¹⁷ E. Averof-Tositsa, *Istoria xamenon efkerion:Kipriako 1950-1963*, pp. 77-82.

After the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the events of 1963, American policy toward Cyprus was primarily motivated by the following considerations:

- the need to contain the conflict on the island and thus the risk of a Greek-Turkish war.
- to restore the cohesion of NATO's southeastern flank.
- to avoid Soviet involvement in this inter-allied dispute.
- concern over Makarios' non aligned policy, as well as over the support he received from communist and leftist Cypriot parties, such as AKEL and EDEK, and his reliance on the United Nations to promote Greek Cypriot interests.
- the increasing recognition of the strategic importance of Cyprus for the defense of American economic, political, and military interests in the Middle East.
- the "sensitivity" shown towards Turkey, based on the American appraisal of Turkey's strategic importance in the region and,
- "sensitivity" shown towards Greece to fulfill *enosis*. Thus, the United States sought to resolve the problem based on the above considerations.

During the first serious crisis in 1964, the US administration involved actively to contain the conflict and the risk of a Greek-Turkish and mediating towards a new settlement in Cyprus between the two allies. The United States being convinced that the "independence" solution did not work out, they came up with the conclusion that union with Greece would have been the best outcome. However, this was only to be achieved in return for Greece's territorial concessions to Turkey, whom the US was determined not to humiliate.

Nevertheless, a gradual alienation of Turkey by the US took place, in the beginning of June 1964, when the Johnson administration threatened it in order to keep it from military intervention in Cyprus. Every Turkish threat of intervention involved the US more deeply in the search of a solution²¹⁸.

The US handling of the Cyprus problem in 1964 was not so successful for three reasons: First, the US kept the problem within the NATO family, perceived Greece and Turkey as being the countries which would be able to decide on the fate of the island, and thus underestimated the power of the Cypriot government which refused to let those countries determine its future. Second, the US fought the symptoms rather the roots of the problem, as they continued to see the Cyprus problem as a Greek-Turkish thorn in the south-eastern flank of NATO. Third, they did not anticipate that both Greek and Turkish side considered Cyprus more important in their foreign policy priorities than NATO solidarity.

Having the unpleasant experience of the Geneva negotiations, in 1967 crisis the Americans only cared to settle the crisis. The US diplomacy mobilized its efforts immediately and proved again that only the most powerful western nation was able to pull the two NATO allies back from the brink of war. In the aftermath of the crisis, the US became convinced that no solution could be found without the involvement of the Cypriot communities and “recognized” the authority of the President Makarios and the need consult him²¹⁹.

²¹⁸ C. Nikolett, **United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974**, 236-247.

²¹⁹ Ibid, 305-324; S. Bölükbaşı, **The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations**, pp. 125-146.

Once the split between Athens and Nicosia came to a head, with the coup d'état by the Greek colonels on Cyprus in the summer of 1974 the US diplomacy became active again. Its aim was to keep Greece and Turkey from clashing over Cyprus and harming the NATO flank. This time, the United States could not stop Turkey from intervening in the island but as a general war was avoided, the US and particularly then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was not really concerned about the eventual outcome of the crisis. However, if the US had acted more actively like in the 1963-64 and 1967 crises, it is not clear whether it would have been able to prevent the outcome that we know today, taking into account the nature of the Cyprus conflict in 1974²²⁰.

Nevertheless, despite the Turkish military intervention and the clashes erupted in the island, a general Greek-Turkish war was avoided. State Department after the events of 1974 believed that the damage caused to NATO's southeastern flank by the limited Greek withdrawal from that organization and the closing of American bases in Turkey in response to the arms embargo could be repaired, given the presence of a cooperative conservative Greek government. Additionally, they expected that the change of balance of power among the involved parties in Cyprus would provide a quick resolution of the problem.

²²⁰ S. Rizas, *Oi Inomenes Polities, I Diktatoria ton Sintamatarxon kai to Kipriako Zitima*, pp. 229-234; C. Nikolet, *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974*, 414-429.

3.5 The Greek and Turkish Perceptions of the US involvement in the Cyprus Crises

Both Greece and Turkey throughout this period were worried about and suspicious of the American involvement and each side had its own concerns. As communal dispute broke out almost two years after the independence of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey accepted the US mediation. Both sides preferred to be faced with a solution package from outside, rather than to have to formulate painful concessions themselves. However, Greece and Turkey could not agree to a solution based on *enosis* with concessions.

All governments that ruled Greece from 1964 to 1974 were confronted with American pressures designed not only to minimize the possibility of a Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus, but also to seek a solution of the problem through direct negotiations. This was perceived positive from the Greek side as all Greeks agreed that a new Cyprus settlement was needed; however, the real obstacle was that there was no cooperation and co-ordination with the Cypriot government²²¹.

The elected government of George Papandreou in 1963 was reluctant to undertake such dialogue but finally he did it with no results. It seemed that Papandreou desired to have a solution imposed from the US in order to be able to excuse it in the face of domestic criticism as a result of massive pressure.

²²¹ S. Rizas, *Enosi Dixotomisi Anexartisia*, pp. 127-129.

His handling of the Cyprus problem contributed to the destabilization of his government and his resignation from office in July 1965. The conservative minority governments that succeeded him and the military junta that governed Greece from 1967-1974 did undertake such negotiations with Turkey, behind the back of the Cyprus government²²².

The military coup in Athens in April 1967 was regarded as enhancing the chances for a quick solution to the Cyprus problem. The military government believed that it was able to impose a solution on Cyprus by making concessions to Turkey without serious domestic reactions. Greek government seriously misjudged the Turkish attitude, as it expected that Turkey would still endorse a deal based on *enosis* with concessions. Athens junta failed, and to a certain extent, the Americans realized that Ankara's attitude had toughened in the face of growing Soviet support for its position, and that it was after all the Turkish Cypriot community that was suppressed under Makarios' policy.

The Greek military regime orchestrated plans behind the scene against Makarios in an effort to achieve the long-standing desire of Greece, *enosis*. No elected Greek government dared to attempt such a brutal action, despite the fact that during the decade of 1960s there were such plans. Athens junta was convinced that the United States would not allow Turkey to get involved in the island. This action caused the Turkish military intervention as Turkey was determined this time to protect its vital interests in the island²²³.

²²² . Y. Kranidiotis, 1984. *Diethnopiisi kai Apodiethnopiisi tou kipriakou*, pp. 196-205.

²²³ S. Rizas, *Oi Inomenes Polities, I Diktatoria ton Sintamatarxon kai to Kipriako Zitima*.

After the collapse of the military regime the new civil government under Karamanlis could not really act effectively neither diplomatically nor militarily. In the diplomatic level, during the Geneva conference the decision should be approved from Makarios who at that time chose for himself the role of the victim from both sides (Greek and Turkish) and even in front of the military defeat could not accept a compromise and the Cyprus problem perpetuated until today.

In the military level, Karamanlis did not undertake the high risk to declare war against Turkey without being aware of the real capabilities of the Greek forces. And at that particular time it was impossible to trust the military high officials. So as a protest for the US ineffectiveness to stop Turkey, he withdrew from the military wing of NATO. Greek side considered the US as responsible for the outcome of the crisis-maybe even more than the Turks. It is noteworthy that Greek political and military elite have not made yet their self-criticism for this “black page” of the Greek modern history.

The Turkish side was pressurized by the Americans as well. The first attempt was successful as the Turks did not intervene in 1964. Turkey became basic player in a possible new settlement and Turkish policymakers began a thorough examination of the overall Turkish foreign policy in order to find the reasons for Turkey’s failure to intervene. The consensus reached by most political parties and the public in general was that Turkey’s political dependency on the US and its isolation in the

international community were the causes of the Cyprus debacle, and that Turkey needed to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the Third World²²⁴.

Turkey, recognizing the political and diplomatic weakness of the Greek governments especially after 1967 proposed solutions that amounted to a partition of Cyprus and attempted to safeguard the Turkish Cypriot community.

In July 1974 Turkey landed its forces in the island. Despite the concern of the Turkish policy makers due to the US opposition, the Turkish government was determined this time, as strongly believed that unless Turkey intervened, Cyprus would be unified with Greece. This would be a serious compromising for the Turkish national interests. The failure of the negotiations towards a political solution in Geneva resulted in the de facto partition of the island.

The US arms embargo in the aftermath of the 1974 crisis led Turkey to retaliate by closing all the American military installations in Turkey and thus imperiling US security interests. Moreover, the Turkish perception of the US importance to Turkish National security reconsidered. As a result, Turkish foreign policy targeted its efforts to lessen its reliance on the US²²⁵.

The American role in the Cyprus conflict during the decade 1964-1974 significantly altered the Greek and Turkish perception of US in Greek and Turkish national security. Both realized that NATO membership was not a panacea for all security contingencies. As a result, both countries strove to decrease their dependency on the

²²⁴S. Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations*, pp. 130-140.

²²⁵ Ibid.

US. Greece shifted its foreign policy to western Europe and Turkey improved its relations with the Soviet Union and other regional states.

CHAPTER IV

EMERGENCE OF THE AEGEAN DISPUTE AND THE US

4.1 Emergence of the Aegean Dispute since 1974

The primary cause of Greek-Turkish disputes during the 1950s and 1960s was the Cyprus question. In the late 1973, following the discovery of oil deposits off the southern shore of the island of Thasos in the northeastern part of the Aegean Sea, a number of jurisdictional issues were added to the already emotionally heavy Greek-Turkish agenda.

The Aegean Dispute is a composite term covering three separate but related issues between Greece and Turkey:

1. The dispute about sovereign rights over the Aegean continental shelf.
2. The question of the territorial sea limits claimed by each country.
3. A dispute over military and civil air traffic control zones in the Aegean area.

Three other questions are intimately involved and must be considered in connection with the Aegean dispute: the remilitarization of the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean, whose demilitarization was ordered by the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947); the problem of minorities (the Greek orthodox minority of Istanbul and

on the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos), and the Muslim (mainly Turkish origin) minority in Western Thrace.

The friction emerged in the Aegean deteriorated the already tensed relations of the two allies because of the Cyprus problem. As a result, both Greece and Turkey changed their perceptions towards the US and NATO. After 1974, Greece came to regard its NATO membership as a buffer, not primarily against the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union but against Turkey, and as a reinforcement of its ties not to the United States but to Europe.

In the light of the Cypriot experience the Athens government was afraid that Ankara might be tempted to employ military force in this area as well. In order to avoid this, Greek diplomacy sought political and military assistance from the United States. The aim of the Greek strategy was designed to firstly get the US to guarantee the territorial status quo in the Aegean, and secondly to allocate its military aid to Greece and Turkey in a manner that would not disrupt the regional balance of power.

As to the US guarantees for the territorial status quo, that is the present borders of the Aegean, Greek diplomatic efforts have not been quite so effective. Nevertheless, in 1976 the Karamanlis government obtained an official commitment from the then US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, “that the United States would actively and unequivocally oppose either side seeking a military solution and will make major efforts to prevent such a course of action”²²⁶. This was the closest the Greeks ever

²²⁶ D. Bitsios, 1983. *Pera apo ta Sinora* (Beyond the Borders) (Athens: Estia Publications), p.254.

got to an official guarantee for their borders with Turkey. In 1981²²⁷ the new Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou went further by asking from NATO to guarantee Greece's eastern borders²²⁸. The Greek demand for border guarantees was repeated for some years, but then shelved, as neither Washington nor NATO (let alone Turkey) were inclined to accept this kind of an arrangement.

On the other hand, Ankara began to consider NATO, to some extent, as a buffer against over-reliance on the United States. Turkey was suspicious with the US, whose security policies, in Turkish eyes, were unduly influenced by Greece or the Greek-American lobby. During the period of the United States-Turkish arms embargo between 1975-1978, Ankara relied heavily on the continuing flow of military assistance from another NATO member, the Federal Republic of Germany, to compensate for the interruption of supplies from America.

Turkey, too, tried to forward its position in the bilateral dispute via NATO. Turkish side was constantly blocking the Greek re-entry to NATO until 1980 and internationalized the "Lemnos problem"²²⁹. Athens maintains that this strategically important island close to Dardanelles may be militarized, thus stationing air force and army units on the island. Turkey quotes the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) and

²²⁷ In October 1981, PASOK under Andreas Papandreou came to power after having warned the Greek electorate in numerous speeches of what he called the "Turkish threat". The search for allies against "Turkish expansionism" became the prime goal of Greek foreign policy. In December 1981-only a few weeks after his triumphant election victory – Papandreou attended a NATO defense ministers' meeting, where he stubbornly insisted on a guarantee by the alliance to shield to Greece from aggression by Turkey. As the NATO members were not willing to agree to this demand, the entire meeting ended in failure. For the first time in NATO's thirty-year history no joint communiqué was issued. This was the most spectacular example of Papandreou's internalization strategy in NATO. V. Coufoudakis, 1993. "PASOK and Greek-Turkish Relations" in R. Clogg, (ed.) *Greece, 1981-8. The Populist Decade* (New York: St. Martin Press), pp.172-173.

²²⁸ R. Clogg, 1991. "Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-1974 Period" in D. Konstas, (ed.) *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s : Domestic and External Influences* (London: Macmillan), p.18; Ş S. Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri*, p.92.

²²⁹ N. Barbarousis, "I Stratikopoiisi tis Limnou"(The militarization of Limnos), *Tetradia*, 21, pp. 79-87.

argues that this island must be demilitarized. The Lemnos problem is a part of the overall Greek-Turkish dispute pertaining to the military status of the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean²³⁰. Ankara has successfully internationalized and NATOised this bilateral problem by preventing – to the dislike of the Greeks- an inclusion of Lemnos in all NATO exercises.

Both protagonists believed in particular that the United States tilted in favor of the other. The Greeks were convinced that strategic considerations – the notorious *realpolitik*- invariably gave Turkey more weight because of its larger population, troop's strength and border with the Soviet Union. The Turks, on the other hand, believed that the weight of their membership was limited by its purely strategic character, and that NATO tended to side with Greece for historic, cultural, and religious reasons.

4.2 The Aegean Issues

4.2.1 The Aegean Continental Shelf

Greece and Turkey make rival claims over certain portions of the Aegean continental Shelf²³¹. The Greek position is founded on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the

²³⁰ J. Brown, *Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey*, pp. 13-14; A. Gündüz, 1985. *Limni Adasının Hukuki Statüsü Üzerinde Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı* (Istanbul: Bayrak Yayıncılık); S. Ligeros, 1989. "I Natoiki Ptixi tis Elinotourkikis Dienexis" (The NATO Dimension of the Greek-Turkish Dispute) *Tetradia*: 25, pp.53-62.

²³¹ C. Rozakis, 1988. "To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou kai I Elinotourkiki Krixi" (The International Legal Status of the Aegean and the Greek-Turkish Crisis) in Alexandris, A. (ed) *Oi Elinotourkikes Sxesis 1923-1987* (Greek-Turkish Relations 1923-1987) (Athens: Gnosi Publications), pp. 272-492; G. Papadimitriou, 1975. *I Diafora gia tin Ifalokripida tou Aigaiou kai to Kipriako Provlima* (The Dispute over the Aegean Continental Shelf and the Cyprus Problem) (Athens: Papazisis Publications); F. Sönmezoğlu, 2000. *Türkiye ve Yunanistan ilişkileri & Büyük Güçler* (Turkish-Greek Relations and the Great Powers) (Istanbul: Der Publications) pp. 180-190.

Continental Shelf, which was signed and ratified by Greece and many other countries, but not by Turkey. The Convention provided, *inter alia*, that the “continental shelf refers to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the continental sea to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of natural resources of the said seas”²³². Further, the convention provides that populated islands are entitled to continental shelves. Because the Aegean Sea is dotted with over 2000 islands that are part of Greece’s sovereign territory, and given that well over 200 of these islands are significant in terms of size and population, a delimitation of continental shelf rights in accordance with the 1958 treaty would result in about two-thirds of the Aegean continental shelf being awarded to Greece.

Turkey’s position on the continental shelf emphasizes what the Turks consider political, rather than legal, considerations. Turkey argues that the Aegean should be viewed as a special sea with unique characteristics, and that “equity” rather than strict interpretation of traditional international law should become the operative criterion for a settlement. The Turks point out that an arrangement acceptable to them would delimit the Aegean continental shelf on the basis of a median line east, of which Turkey would have primary jurisdiction for purposes of exploration and exploitation of seabed and subsoil resources. As a minimum, the Turks are willing to consider plans for joint exploitation in continental shelf areas that are subject to dispute²³³.

²³² C. Rozakis, “To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou kai I Elinotourkiki Kriisi”, p.277.

²³³ T. Bahçeli. *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, pp.129-141; Ş.S. Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri*, pp.71-72.

The Greek response to the Turkish position is that the median line proposed by Turkey would, in effect, enclave Greece's eastern islands in a Turkish jurisdictional zone. Given, further, Turkey's behavior in Cyprus in 1974 as well as a number of Turkish leaders' statements suggesting dissatisfaction with the territorial status quo in the Aegean²³⁴ any such "solution" would just open up the road toward more Turkish territorial revisionism and adventurism in the area.

In terms of dispute settlement, the Greek position is that the matter, as has been the case with similar disputes involving other states, should be submitted for adjudication to the International Court of Justice²³⁵. The Turkish view, on the contrary, prefers the road of bilateral negotiations between Turkish and Greek diplomatic experts, and Turkey is not willing, at least in the short run, to submit the issue for international adjudication to ICJ²³⁶.

The danger of military conflagration is continuous while the dispute remains unsolved. Every time Greece or Turkey carries out scientific experiments and sends exploration ships to perform seismic work over disputed areas of the continental shelf, the chances of armed conflict increase. Such incidents in the summer of 1976 and the spring of 1987 came very close to breaking out into a Greek-Turkish war.

²³⁴ X, Sazanidis, 1979. *Oi elinotourkikes Sxeseis stin Pentaetia 1973-1978* (Greek-Turkish Relations in the Five Years 1973-1978) (Thessaloniki), pp.122-123.

²³⁵ X. Dipla, 1992. *I Elino-Tourkiki Diafora gia tin Ifalokripida tou Aigaiou* (The Greek-Turkish Dispute over the Continental Shelf of the Aegean) (Athens: ELLAMEP).

²³⁶ S. Bölükbaşı, 1992. "The Turco-Greek Dispute: Issues, Policies and Prospects" in C. Dodd, (ed.) *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects* (London: The Eothen Press), pp.33-34.

4.2.2 Territorial Waters and their Limits

Another potential point of friction between Greece and Turkey relates to the width of territorial waters. For the time being, both countries observe in the Aegean area a six-mile territorial waters limit. Turkey, however, maintains a 12-mile limit on the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts. Under present arrangements, and given the plethora of Greece's Aegean islands, about 35 percent of the Aegean is designated as Greek territorial sea and about 9 percent as Turkish territorial sea²³⁷.

The Greek government has indicated repeatedly that it reserves the right to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles, but has not done so to date despite the fact that Greece has signed the 1982 Sea of the Law Treaty and it was ratified by the Greek Parliament in May 1995. In response to the Greek Parliament's action, on June 8, 1995 the Turkish Parliament gave its government authority to take all necessary measures, including military ones, if Greece exercised the right to 12 miles and increased its territorial waters²³⁸.

The Turks frequently declare that the adoption of the 12-mile limit by Greece would convert the Aegean into a "Greek lake". It would be, consequently, totally unacceptable to Turkey and would be treated as a *casus belli*²³⁹. An arrangement – employing the 12-mile limit- would result in a disposition where Greece's share of

²³⁷ A. Wilson, 1979/1980. "The Aegean Dispute," *Adelphi Papers*, 155, p.36; Van Dyke, Jon. "The Role of the Islands in Delimiting Maritime Zones: The Boundary Between Greece and Turkey", *Foreign Policy* (Ankara) IXIV: pp.3-4; *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri ve Megalo Idea* (Turkish-Greek Relations and the Great Idea) 1985. (Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı), pp. 53-56.

²³⁸ P. Robins, 2003. *Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (Seattle: University of Washington Press), p. 115.

²³⁹ T. Bahçeli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, pp. 141-142.

total Aegean Sea space would increase to 64 percent; Turkey's would remain at less than 9 percent, with the remaining area being designated as international waters²⁴⁰. The application of the 12-mile limit by Greece, assuming it was done peacefully, would remove the continental shelf issue from the Greek-Turkish dispute agenda, because most of the currently disputed continental shelf area would fall under Greek territorial waters.

In the territorial waters issue, as was the case with the continental shelf, Greece emphasizes its rights and responsibilities under international law. Greece responds to Turkey's objections about "closing of the Aegean" by emphasizing that all states in the area - and especially Turkey - will continue enjoying the rights of freedom of navigation and innocent passage as provided by customary international law and in particular the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty.

4.2.3 Air Space, Command and Control Issues

A matter of some importance in the triad of jurisdictional issues that divides Greece and Turkey is the air space control question. Greece, by an executive declaration back in 1931, established a 10 nautical mile territorial air limit extending out from the coasts of its mainland and its islands²⁴¹. This arrangement placed close to 55 percent of the Aegean's territorial air under Greek territorial air control. In addition, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), without Turkish objections, assigned to Greece in 1952 the air traffic control responsibility in the Aegean Flight

²⁴⁰ A. Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute," p.37; Ş. S. Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri*, pp. 72-79.

²⁴¹ A. Giokaris, A. Dimitrakopoulos and X. Dipla. 1994. *Simia Trivis stis Elinotourkikes Sxeseis* (Points of Friction in Greek-Turkish Relations) (Athens: Sideris Publications), pp. 2-50; *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri ve Megalo İdea*, pp.56-58.

Information Region (FIR). This region covers the entire Aegean area up to the median line separating mainland Turkey from Greece's eastern Aegean islands such as Samothrace, Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and the Dodecanese. Prior to 1974 Cyprus crisis and while Greece and Turkey were fully functional members of NATO, command and control responsibilities for air and sea operations over the entire Aegean region had been assigned by NATO internal agreements to the Greek military command²⁴².

Since the mid-July 1974 crisis, Turkey has raised serious objections to all these arrangements. In the electrified atmosphere that followed the Cyprus 1974 events, Turkey issued NOTAM 714 (a notice to air users through ICAO) declaring a mid-Aegean line running north to south and requiring all approaching aircraft flying from west to east to report their positions and flights plans to Turkish air controllers. Greece rejected this instruction and issued its own NOTAM 1157 declaring the Aegean air routes to Turkey unsafe because of the threat of conflicting control orders and jurisdictions. The Aegean as a result, became virtually closed to international air traffic until the middle of 1980s when, in an attempt to improve the climate of bilateral relations, Greece and Turkey removed their respective notices, restoring commercial traffic over the Aegean²⁴³.

Turkey has insisted, however, that the median line – dividing the Aegean into approximately equally sized sectors of responsibility – must become the guiding principle for any lasting and mutually acceptable settlement. The median line, Turkey has argued – especially after Greece's withdrawal (1974-1980) from the

²⁴² C. Rozakis, "To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou kai I Elinotourkiki Krixi", pp. 355-358.

²⁴³ T. Bahçeli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, pp. 149-152; Ş.S Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri*, p.82.

military structures of NATO – should extend over assigned command and control responsibilities within NATO. Further, Turkey, in terms of the modus operandi of its own military aircraft, has been acting as if it does not recognize a 10-mile air territorial zone for Greece’s mainland and islands, but rather a 6-mile zone coterminous with Greece’s territorial waters²⁴⁴.

Greece has asserted persistently that it considers any unauthorized foreign flight within its ten-mile territorial zone as a violation of its air space and has been registering its complaints systemically with Turkish authorities while seeking to escort the violators out of the disputed air space. Needless to say, this situation – especially during periods of national or NATO coordinated military exercises raises the possibility of incidents that may escalate into violent hostilities between the two NATO allies.

Attempts at settlement of the command and control issue have followed the route of bilateral negotiations and NATO technical discussions. Greece has objected systematically to any arrangement that would enclave its eastern Aegean islands into a Turkish “security envelope”. This, in the view of Greece, would weaken the sovereign status of Greek territory in the Aegean.

4.2.4 Militarization of the Eastern Aegean islands

This issue is often raised in informal statements made by politicians and strategic analysts that appear in the Greek and Turkish press. But the “dispute” as such has

²⁴⁴ United States recognizes Greek airspace as only six miles as well. See C. Migdalovitz, 1997 “Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues – Background and Recent Developments”, CRS Issue Brief, p. 1.

not been included formally in the published agenda of bilateral talks nor has there been any suggestion of submitting the dispute as a case for third-party arbitration or adjudication.

Turkey's position is that since 1974 Greece has violated the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) and the Treaty of Paris (1947). These treaties provide for the demilitarization of the eastern Aegean islands and the Dodecanese islands, respectively. The Turkish view is that the fortification of these islands, which are very close to the coast of Turkey, poses security problems and points to revisionist tendencies in Greece²⁴⁵

The Greek response is that, with respect to the Greek islands of Lemnos and Samothrace, the Lausanne treaty provisions are no longer applicable, having been superseded by the Treaty of Montreux (1936), of which Greece is a signatory. The Montreux treaty, which regulates the regime of the straits has, in effect, permitted the remilitarization of the whole area including the two Greek islands. The treaty gives Greece the same rights of remilitarization of its territories as it does for Turkey. With respect to other major Aegean islands (such as Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria), Greece argues that the treaty of Lausanne does not prohibit local self-defense arrangements, and that Greek military facilities fall into that category²⁴⁶.

Turning to the Dodecanese islands and their "disarmed status", Greece argues that Turkey has no legal interest in the case – not being a party to the Treaty of Paris –

²⁴⁵ T. Bahçeli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, pp. 146-147; H. Pazarcı, 1992. *Doğu Ege Adalarının Askerden Arındırılmış statüsü* (Ankara: Adalet Matbaacılık).

²⁴⁶ D. Dontas, 1987. *Greece and Turkey: The Regime of the Straits, Lemnos and Samothrace* (Athens : Eleftheroudakis) (distribution), pp. 91-102.

and furthermore, that the Paris treaty provides for the maintenance of “internal security forces”²⁴⁷. Finally, the Greek position justifies the need for limited security arrangements on the islands as required by a number of threatening revisionist claims on the Aegean islands advanced by Turkish officials²⁴⁸. Additionally, the establishment in 1975 of the “ominous” Turkish Fourth Army (known in Turkey as the Army of the Aegean) is viewed by Greece as posing a clear and present danger to the peace and security of the Aegean islands²⁴⁹. Ultimately, the Greek position is founded on the UN Charter – that supersedes all other treaty obligations – which provides that every state has an inherent right to take steps to guarantee the self-defense of its territories²⁵⁰.

In an attempt to diffuse mutual suspicions, each side has made a number of offers designed to placate the fears of the other. From the Greek side there are statements reiterating constantly that Greece has no claims whatsoever on Turkish territory. Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis in 1976 suggested, in this vein, that Greece and Turkey should enter into a mutual nonaggression pact. The Turkish side responded, however, that such a pact would be superfluous and embarrassing, given that both sides were signatories of the NATO alliance. From the Turkish side one also hears frequent official pronouncements that Turkey has no territorial designs on Greece’s Aegean islands, and that the issues dividing the two countries deal only with jurisdictional matters regarding the disposition of Aegean continental shelf, air space, and territorial sea.

²⁴⁷ C. Rozakis, “To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou kai I Elinotourkiki Krisi”, pp. 432-433.

²⁴⁸ A. Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute”, p.40.

²⁴⁹ T. Coulombis, 1983. *The United States, Greece and Turkey*, p.122.

²⁵⁰ K. Ikonomidis, 1989. *To Nomiko Kathestos ton Elinikon Nision tou Aigaiou* (The Legal Status of the Greek Aegean Islands) (Athens: Gnosi Publications).

4.3 Other Frictional Issues - The Question of Minorities

Another frictional issue, but which has not been raised officially in bilateral negotiations is the mutual treatment of minorities. It is a question that strikes sensitive chords in both countries and that appears frequently in the columns of the Greek and Turkish popular press.

Turkey's concerns focus on the status, rights, and privileges of the Muslim Turks and Pomaks (numbering about 120,000) who are located primarily in the region of Western Thrace not far from the Greek-Turkish border, which is formed by the river Evros²⁵¹. Turkish media frequently complain that Greek legislation discriminates against Turkish-speaking landowners, making it very difficult for them to acquire and hold on property while providing extremely favorable incentives to their Greek-speaking and Greek Orthodox counterparts²⁵².

Greece denies these charges, indicating that Greek Muslims elect at least two members in Greece's House of Representatives, and that, since the treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923 (which provided for the balanced protection of minorities in both countries), the size of the Turkish-speaking community increased from 100,000 to 120,000²⁵³. In contrast, Greece points out that the Greek Orthodox

²⁵¹ Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece (A Helsinki Watch Report, August 1990); A detailed analysis of the problems of the minority in B. Oran, 1991. **Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu** (The Western Thrace Problem in Turco-Greek Relations) (Istanbul: Bilgi).

²⁵² B. Oran, 1996. "The Sleeping Volcano in Turco-Greek Relations: The Western Thrace Minority" in K. Karpat, **Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments** (Wisconsin: Madison), pp.119-128; T. Bahçeli, **Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955**, pp. 169-188.

²⁵³ A. Alexandris, and A. Paresoglou. 1994. "Mousoulmanoi tis Ditikis Thrakis (The Muslims of Western Thrace) in T. Veremis, (ed.) **Valkania: Apo ton Dipolismo stin Nea Epochi (Balkans: From Bipolism to the New Era)** (Athens: Gnosi Publications), pp. 816-820.

minority of over 100,000 in Istanbul has been reduced to the current low level of less than 6,000 as a result of systematic measures of economic discrimination, threats, and generally ill treatment by the Turkish authorities. Also, the Greek side protests against the near total elimination of the Greek populations on the islands of Imbros and Tenedos as a result of years of oppressive Turkish administration²⁵⁴.

4.4 The US Attitude towards the Greek-Turkish Dispute over Aegean Issues until the End of the Cold War

As a result of the 1974 crisis, US relations with each country suffered, and a period of US retrenchment from the region set in. Policy-makers were reluctant to pursue activist or high-profile initiatives²⁵⁵ both because of continued hostility to the United States in each country.

The Ford Administration tried to restore relations with the new civilian government in Athens. One contributing factor to this repairing of relations was the public debate in the US Congress over the shortcomings of US policy toward the junta, viewed as a kind of a semi-official mea-culpa, led in large measure by liberal democrats²⁵⁶. In addition, the legislative branch insistence on punishing Turkey for its actions on

²⁵⁴ B. Theodoropoulos, 1988. *Oi Tourkoi kai emis* (The Turks and Us) (Athens: Fitraiki Publications), pp. 301-313; A. Alexandris, 1983. *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974* (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies); *Denying Human Rights & Ethnic Identity: The Greeks of Turkey* (Helsinki Watch, March 1992).

²⁵⁵ One exception was the US involvement in humanitarian and refugee relief in Cyprus, including a major US role in financing the resettlement of the refugees. US aid in support of refugee resettlement and relief was over 50 million dollars in the period 1974-76. See E. Laipson, 1991. "US Policy towards Greece and Turkey since 1974" in D. Konstas, (ed.) *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s Domestic and External Influences* (London: Macmillan), p. 166.

²⁵⁶ P. Watanabe, 1984. *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy: The Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press).

Cyprus by means of the arms embargo tried to divert the anti-American feelings of the Greeks²⁵⁷.

US relations with Turkey in the 1974-1977 period went in the opposite direction: initially satisfied with the administration's hands-off reaction to events in Cyprus, the Turks were shocked by the imposition of the embargo, which, in their view, gravely undermined the alliance relationship and set back Turkey's ability to fulfill its military obligations to NATO. The embargo had also a different political impact on informed Turks: it exposed the weakness or inability of the US administration to conduct its own foreign policy. For Turkey, the embargo was a rude awakening that ~~the~~ shook the premises of the 1950s commitment to partnership with the United States²⁵⁸.

The Ford administration saw the need to return US relations with the eastern Mediterranean states on a surer footing, but its policy efforts fluctuated between exasperated expressions of harm to US and NATO interests and quiet acceptance of the need to pull back from status quo ante relations with the two principal parties. Renewal of agreements governing the use of military facilities in both countries proved politically impossible, particularly in light of Greece's withdrawal from the military command of NATO to protest at what it viewed as the alliance's failure in Cyprus, and in light of Turkey's downgrading of bilateral cooperation after the embargo. The bases continued to operate on an ad hoc basis, but the arrangement was less than satisfactory from the US point of view.

²⁵⁷ R. Hackett, 1980. "The role of the Congress and Greek-American relations" in T. Coulombis, and J. Iatrides, (eds). 1980, **Greek-American Relations. A Critical Review** (New York: Pella), pp. 131-148.

²⁵⁸ P. Henze, 1993. **Turkish Democracy and the American Alliance** (Santa Monica: RAND), pp. 28-30; M. Gönlülbol, et. al. *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, p.605.

During the Carter administration the arms embargo was lifted and a linkage of military aid to the two countries was (7: 10 ratio) established²⁵⁹. In Athens the Karamanlis and Rallis governments were firmly committed to restoring Greece's credibility in the Western camp, including becoming a full member of the European Community, and returning to the military command of NATO. In effect, this pro-Western policy gave the Greek government considerable leverage in its relations with Washington, and there were pressures on US policy to facilitate Greek re-entry in order to complete a new base agreement. Thus the US and NATO commanders, US generals Alexander Haig and Bernard Rogers, became involved in trying to mediate Greco-Turkish problems, resolution of which had become a Greek condition for re-entry into NATO²⁶⁰.

Turkey initially sought to use its power of veto in the NATO military committee to block a return to the pre-1974 arrangements which had placed the Aegean under the responsibility of the Greek command. Turkish representatives argued that in the post-1974 circumstances, new arrangements should be made and proposed the use of the Aegean median line to divide responsibilities²⁶¹. Greece rejected this proposal which would have placed its Aegean islands within a proposed security zone controlled by Turkey. Greece threatened to close the remaining American bases in Greece unless offered satisfactory terms for re-entry. Subsequently, following prolonged negotiations, General Bernard Rogers, NATO Supreme Commander, persuaded Turkey's General Evren (the head of the military government then in

²⁵⁹ Since 1978 it became an accepted practice for the US Congress to allocate military aid for Greece and Turkey in the ratio 7: 10. In other words, the US was given to the Greeks 70 per cent of the military assistance attributed to the considerably larger Turkish armed forces, in spite of Turkish protests and the occasional unwillingness of the US administration. See C. Migdalovitz, 1995. "Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues" CRS Issue Brief, p.2.

²⁶⁰ E. Laipson, "US Policy towards Greece and Turkey since 1974", p.166.

²⁶¹ Ş. S. Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri*, pp.90-91.

power) to drop Turkish objections, and Greece returned to NATO in October 1980. Greece and Turkey agreed to postpone negotiations on command and control arrangements after Greece's re-entry²⁶², but base talks with the United States were not completed until governments changed in both Athens and Washington.

In Ankara, the lifting of the embargo allowed base talks to proceed. In March 1980, the two governments signed a Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, which included US government "best efforts" pledges to help finance a multi-year weapons modernization program. For Turkey this may have been as an effort to compensate for the defense deterioration of the embargo years, although in the US community, there continued to be disagreement about the extent to which the embargo could be blamed for the sorry state of Turkish military equipment²⁶³. In the US defense establishment, there was widespread relief at the restoration of defense relations, colored dramatically by the fall of the Shah of Iran, and its related loss of US access and influence in Turkey's eastern neighbor²⁶⁴.

In the decade of 1980, the Reagan administration did not show much concern for the Eastern Mediterranean and the Greek-Turkish dispute. During the Reagan era, the policy towards the two countries had essentially two discrete and separate components. This was mainly because of the cordial ties developed between Washington and Ankara, as the military government that ruled Turkey from September 1980 until elections in 1983 won favour in Regan's camp, because of its

²⁶² T. Bahçeli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, p. 149; R. McDonald, 1988. "Alliance problems in the eastern Mediterranean – Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part II Prospects for security in the Mediterranean," *Adelphi Papers* 229, pp 75-78.

²⁶³ E. Laipson, "US Policy towards Greece and Turkey since 1974", p.167; O. Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, pp. 97-100.

²⁶⁴ P. Robins, *Suits and Uniforms Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, p.133.

anti-Soviet stance. The 1983 election of Turgut Özal to the premiership further strengthened the bonds, based on shared strategic and economic philosophies.

Across the Aegean, an opposite set of dynamics was in place, and this led to friction with Washington. The election of PASOK leader Andreas Papandreou in 1981 did not make for harmonious relations with the new American president. Papandreou's official positions on NATO, US bases and East-West relations in general, even if best understood as rhetoric or hyperbolic abstractions, harmed the relations of the two allies²⁶⁵.

During this period US activism was directed at conflicts with a clear East-West dimension, which did not pertain to Greek-Turkish disputes or Cyprus. Additionally, in late years of 1980s, it seemed that the US had become accommodated to the chronic friction between Greece and Turkey.

While encouraging any bilateral moves between Ankara and Athens to discuss their differences, the United States never attempted to take a more active role as a mediator, nor did it take public positions on the various bilateral disputes²⁶⁶. This was the case in the short-lived Davos process, a series of meetings between the premiers Papandreou and Özal in 1988. The rapprochement encouraged but with little apparent US involvement, stalled in autumn 1988 due to Papandreou's illness and political difficulties at home.

²⁶⁵ M. Spourdalakis, 1988. **PASOK: Domi, Esokommatikes Kriseis kai Sigentrosi Exousias** (PASOK: Structure, Inter-party Crises and the Concentration of Power) (Athens: Exantas Publications), pp. 297-306.

²⁶⁶ E. Laipson, 1988. Greek-Turkish relations: Beginning of a new era?, Congressional Research Library (CRS), p.59.

In the end of Reagan presidency with remarkable warming in US-Soviet relations, and the extraordinary collapse of communist regimes in eastern Europe, the US interests shifted even more from the eastern Mediterranean. Relations with Greece and Turkey were moving in a new concept of power sharing in the post-Cold War world.

To sum up, in the immediate aftermath of 1974, the United States was not a credible outside mediator, because of suspicions on the Greek side, in particular, that Washington had encouraged or acquiesced to Turkey's actions in Cyprus. On the other hand, Turkey was worried about American intentions after the imposition of the arms embargo. After 1978, the United States became indirectly involved in the NATO-sponsored efforts to solve the Aegean command issue. Concerning the other Aegean issues, it showed no preferences for direct initiatives. Since the US recovered the loss of influence lost in the 1970s, it seemed to have accustomed to the Greek-Turkish quarrel in the eastern Mediterranean²⁶⁷.

4.5 The 1976 Crisis between Greece and Turkey and the US

On 1 November 1973, Turkish government granted the Turkish State Petroleum Company (TPAO) exploration permits to search for petroleum in the Aegean seabed. Greece had granted similar permits for similar activities in the same area since 1961²⁶⁸. After an American company struck significant deposits of oil off the Greek island of Thasos, the matter gained enough importance to trigger a protracted quarrel.

²⁶⁷ J. Brown, 1991. *Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey*, p.5.

²⁶⁸ T. Bahçeli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, p. 130.

Greece protested against granting of such permits by Turkey for the first time on February 7, 1974 partly to preclude a finding of acquiescence in international law.

The first Turkish response, on 28 February 1974, was to propose negotiations. Greece accepted this on 25 of May “in accordance with the international law as codified in the Geneva Convention” - a step described by the Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit “as positive development”²⁶⁹.

Three days later, however, Turkey announced that a survey ship the *Çandarlı* was to make magnetometric studies in the Aegean in preparation for oil-drilling. The area of the survey, according to the Minister for Power and National Resources, Mr. Cahit Kayra, was to be “in the Turkish continental shelf”. The *Çandarlı* entered the Aegean on 29 May and, accompanied by 32 warships of the Turkish navy, spent six days exploring and sailing along the western limit of the areas in which Turkey had granted mineral exploration concessions. In the ensuing tense situation Greece sent a new protest, which Turkey rejected²⁷⁰.

At this point (in mid-July) the continental shelf dispute was overtaken by a sequence of outside events: the Samson coup and the Turkish landing in Cyprus on 20 July 1974, and more particularly the second landing, on 14 August, gave the whole Aegean dispute a very much more serious aspect.

Throughout the winter of 1974-75 Turkish leaders made serious statements that caused Greece to fear an attack. This could have come either in Thrace (where

²⁶⁹C. Rozakis, “To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou”, pp. 280-282.

²⁷⁰Ş. S. Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri*, pp. 86-87.

heavy security measures were imposed) or against the islands, which Turkey appeared to see as the bases for Greek raids against Anatolia²⁷¹. In Greece, too, there were belligerent statements – particularly by Andreas Papandreou, leader of the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) which, if heeded nationally, could have increased the danger of war²⁷². But the Greek government itself adopted a restrained policy.

It was in this spirit that Greece proposed on 27 January 1975 that the two countries should jointly take the continental shelf issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Turkish Prime Minister welcomed the idea, and was attacked for doing so by the then Opposition Leader, Bülent Ecevit. Turkey accepted the proposal on 6 February. But almost at once there was a change in policy following the replacement of Prof. Irmak by the Justice Party leader Süleyman Demirel. On 6 April, Demirel declared that the boundaries of the continental shelf would have to be established “through a negotiated settlement”. And on 16 April the Foreign Minister, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, spelled out the principle that has dominated Turkey’s approach ever since: Let us talk first- we may reach an agreement – and not go to the Hague²⁷³.

In spite of Turkey’s preference for a political rather than a legal settlement, Çağlayangil met his Greek counterpart Dimitrios Bitsios, in Rome on 19 May 1975 for preliminary discussions on a *compromis* for a joint submission of the Aegean question to the International Court. Twelve days later Karamanlis met Demirel at a NATO summit in Brussels and they agreed to speed up the work of legal experts preparing it. This meeting later acquired legal significance when Greece cited the

²⁷¹ A. Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute”, p. 7.

²⁷² V. Coufoudakis, “PASOK and Greek-Turkish relations”, p.169.

²⁷³ T. Bahçeli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, p. 133.

joint communiqué as evidence to the International Court that Turkey had agreed to submit to the latter's adjudication²⁷⁴. The communiqué said that the two Prime Ministers had decided that their problems should be resolved peacefully by means of negotiations and, as regards the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea, by the International Court at the Hauge. It also said that they had defined the general lines on which the forthcoming meetings of the representatives of the two governments would take place²⁷⁵.

From now on, the two sides' legal experts met at more or less regular intervals. But progress remained slow. In June, there was tension when a Canadian hydrographic vessel, *Goel I*, arrived at Izmir to prospect near Greek territorial waters on behalf of an American company, the Dorchester Gas Corporation, with Turkish experts aboard. More tension occurred in July when Turkey set up a new military command, the Fourth Army, with headquarters at Izmir. Dubbed the "Army of the Aegean" by the Turkish Press, it was given the task of defending the Anatolian coast, and pointedly excluded from Turkey's commitment to NATO.

In September of 1975 the Demirel government, under attack from the opposition (and particularly Ecevit) for agreeing to go to the International Court at Greek insistence instead of first "creating Turkey's legitimate rights to the Aegean seabed", announced that it was postponing a further meeting of legal experts about to be held in Paris. It gave as a reason that Greece wanted the immediate drafting of a *compromis*, whereas Turkey sought the examination of "every method" for a solution

²⁷⁴ D. Bitsios, *Pera apo ta Sinora*, pp.70-75; Ş. S. Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri*, pp.87-88.

²⁷⁵ A. Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute", p.7.

of the problem. It was, of course, perfectly true that the Greek government attached primary importance to the signing of the *compromis*. Its reasons were twofold. First, it believed that the two sides would never be able to resolve all their differences by themselves. Second, a handed-down legal decision would encounter less opposition from Greek public opinion than a negotiated one.

Hard-line pressure by the Turkish opposition continued, with dramatic results the following year. In February 1976 Ecevit accused Demirel of allowing “the balance of power in the Aegean to change against us”. Next day the government announced that a hydrographic research ship, the *Hora*, later re-named *Sismik I*, was being fitted out to prospect for oil near the Greek island of Thasos, the area of Greek discoveries three years previously. That the main purpose of the *Sismik I* was to assert Turkey’s claim to the seabed seemed to be confirmed by Power and National Resources Minister Selahattin Kılıç, when he said that the issue of exploration licenses for 8 million hectares covered all Turkish claims to the continental shelf.

While the preparation of the *Sismik I* went ahead, Greece made a proposal for a non-recourse-to-force pact. This was initially welcomed by Turkey but rejected when Opposition leaders described it as a Greek maneuver in preparation for extending territorial waters from six to twelve miles²⁷⁶.

On five occasions between March and August, Greece expressed anxiety to Turkey about *Sismik I*’s intended operations. Greece also announced that if the vessel entered the area of the Greek claim it would create a dangerous situation. Turkey

²⁷⁶ D. Bitsios, *Pera apo ta Sinora*, p.77.

replied that if Greece interfered with the vessel, she would be forced to retaliate. The *Sismik I* sailed from Çanakale and entered the disputed area on 6 August 1976 accompanied by a Turkish minesweeper and naval cooperation aircraft. For three days it prospected on the Greek-claimed continental shelf west of Lesbos. Although *Sismik I* was closely observed and its movements plotted by the Greek navy, there were no attempt to interfere²⁷⁷.

Although Greek sources affirm that there was a danger of war between Greece and Turkey on this occasion (and clearly the possibility of an accident existed) the episode appears in retrospect as evidence of both sides' determination to stop in the eleventh hour. At the same time the *Sismik I* short voyage abruptly raised the level of the Aegean dispute and accelerated legal and political developments²⁷⁸.

On 10 August 1976, within hours of the *Sismik I*'s return to Çanakale, Greece asked for an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council, on the ground that "repeated violation by Turkey" of Greek sovereign rights in the Aegean continental shelf had created a dangerous threat to peace and security. She also started proceedings against Turkey in the International Court and filed a request for interim measures of protection. The appeal to the Security Council cited article 35 of the United Nations Charter and was accompanied by an Explanatory Memorandum referring to the "already very serious" Greek-Turkish dispute, Turkish naval and air

²⁷⁷ Ş. Kut, "Türk Dış Politikasında Ege Sorunu" (The Aegean Problem in Turkish Foreign Policy) in F. Sönmezoglu, (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (An Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy) (Istanbul: Der Yayınları), pp. 264-266.

²⁷⁸ A. Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute", p. 9.

maneuvers of the *Sismik I*, and Turkey's insistence on continuing exploration of the seabed²⁷⁹.

In the Council the Greek representative asked members to instruct Turkey to suspend her "provocative acts" and to prevent in the Aegean the kind of tragedy it had been too late to stop in Cyprus. He delivered a statement, made a few days earlier by Konstantinos Karamanlis reiterating Greece's interpretation of the Geneva Convention as binding countries, such as Turkey, that had not signed it. The statement recalled Turkey's February 1975 acceptance of the Greek proposal to refer the continental shelf question jointly to the International Court and accused Turkey of adopting inflexible positions in negotiations on a *compromis* for joint submission²⁸⁰.

Turkey responded to the Greek request for a Security Council meeting by restating her position on the continental shelf question that, in the absence of an agreed delimitation, the Greek claim that she had violated Greek sovereign rights was unfounded. Turkey said that the *Sismik I* was conducting research outside Greek territorial waters, where the continental shelf had yet to be delimited, and that, while engaged in this lawful pursuit, the vessel had been harassed by the Greek navy and air force. Ankara complained that Greece had violated the treaties of Lausanne and Paris by militarizing the East Aegean islands²⁸¹.

In the Council the Turkish representative repeated Turkey's claim to sovereign rights where the continental shelf was a prolongation of the Anatolian land, adding that a

²⁷⁹ C. Rozakis, "To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou", pp. 290.

²⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 291.

²⁸¹ Ş. Kut, "The Aegean Continental Shelf Dispute between Turkey and Greece", p.190.

Greek vessel, the *Nautilus*, was “at this very moment” conducting research similar to those of the *Sismik I* in a neighboring region. Turkey hoped that the Council would invite Greece to enter into “meaningful negotiations” and that it would also examine Greek violations of treaty obligations regarding demilitarization of the islands. Other points were that:

- Turkey did not exclude recourse to the International Court to settle certain relevant aspects of the problem, but the dispute must first be negotiated between the parties. Only then should aspects that could not be resolved be submitted to the Court “or any other legal or judicial instance”.
- The Geneva Convention was not applicable to the Aegean, whose shape made it a special case; and in any case legal doctrines on the continental shelf were in a state of flux, particularly in the light of UNCLOS III, which had been discussing the subject since December 1973.
- The task of *Sismik I* was to collect scientific data necessary for conducting negotiations with Greece, whose government had been kept fully informed about the preparations for the ship’s voyage²⁸².

The Security Council did not apportion the blame for the Aegean situation attributable to either party or attempt to deal with the substance of the dispute. Instead, it adopted Resolution 395, offering a procedural framework for seeking a settlement²⁸³. After referring to various provisions for the peaceful resolution of disputes in Chapter VI of the UN Charter, it appealed to the two parties to “do

²⁸² A. Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute”, p. 9.

²⁸³ C. Rozakis, “To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou”, p. 289.

everything in their power to reduce present tension in the area so that the negotiating process may be facilitated”²⁸⁴.

The operative paragraphs of the resolution were Nos. 3 and 4 Paragraph 3 called on the governments of Greece and Turkey to resume direct negotiations over their differences and appealed to them to do everything in their power to ensure that these resulted in mutually acceptable solutions. Paragraph 4 invited them in this respect to continue to take into account the contribution that appropriate judicial means, in particular the International Court of Justice, were qualified to make to the settlement of any remaining legal differences which they might identify in connection with their present dispute²⁸⁵.

The wording of Paragraph 4 was, of course, extremely ambiguous. Some authorities considered that it conformed to the Turkish position in envisaging that the two parties should decide through negotiations what issues should be submitted to the Court. Others argued that it endorsed Greece’s unilateral application by inviting the parties to “continue to take into account” the potential contribution of the court²⁸⁶. From any point of view the Security Council resolution must be considered indefinite and unsatisfactory. It did, however, manage to take some steam out of the dispute.

Simultaneously, Greece unilaterally petitioned to the International Court in two separate actions. The first instituted proceedings against Turkey over delimitation of the continental shelf and the rights of each country to explore and exploit. The

²⁸⁴ Security Council Resolution 395, 31 UN SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions of the UN Security Council 15, UN Doc. S/INF/32 (1976).

²⁸⁵ D. Bitsios, *Pera apo ta Sinora*, p. 90.

²⁸⁶ Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Interim Protection, Order of 11 September 1976, ICJ REP. 3.

second, a request for interim measures of protection, asked the Court to direct both countries to “refrain from all exploration activity or any scientific research, with respect to the continental shelf area in which Turkey has granted such licenses” and also form any further military measures or actions which might endanger the two countries’ peaceful relations²⁸⁷.

Greece based her request for interim protection on two grounds: first, the grant of licenses to the Turkish State Petroleum Company and the activities of *Sismik I* constituted an “irreparable prejudice” to Greece’s right of exclusivity of knowledge about her continental shelf and to the Court’s future judgment on the merits of the case. And second, that any continuation of the grant of licenses and of exploration would undermine friendly relations between the two countries. Turkey opposed this on the grounds, *inter alia*, that her exploration activities did not prejudice any of Greece’s rights in the disputed areas, and that even if they did, compensation would be given and the Court would not be prejudiced²⁸⁸.

The Court refused the Greek request for interim protection because it could not find enough risk of “irreparable prejudice” to justify exercising its power to grant an interim injunction. However, the request gave rise to an interesting argument as to the Court’s jurisdiction in the case. In contentious cases the jurisdiction of the International Court is dependent, under its Statute, on the consent of the parties. In this particular case Greece alleged two independent expressions of Turkish consent. The first was the General Act on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 1928. This, Greece argued, gave the Court jurisdiction, since under Article 37 of its Statute it had

²⁸⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

inherited the function of the former Permanent Court of International Justice, to which the General Act refers. The second was the joint communiqué issued after the Brussels meeting of the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers on 31 May 1975.

Article 17 of the General Act (to whom both Greece and Turkey acceded) says that all disputes over which the parties are in conflict shall be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, unless the parties agree to arbitration. Turkey raised two objections to its application to the present case. The first was that the Act might no longer be in force, the second that its application was in any case precluded by the Greek reservation. A similar argument about the desuetude of the General Act had been made by France in the Nuclear Tests case (in which Australia sought relief from French nuclear tests in the Pacific), but had been rejected by four judges upon whose opinion Greece relied heavily. She also adduced evidence of the General Act's continuing vitality, based on the fact that the UN Secretary-General, having for several years dropped the Act from his list of multilateral treaties, reinstated it in 1974²⁸⁹.

The Greek reservation on which Turkey based her second objection had been made at the time of Greece's accession to the treaty. It withheld from the Court disputes "relating to the territorial status of Greece, including disputes relating to its rights of sovereignty over its ports and lines of communications"²⁹⁰. Greece argued that this use of the phrase "territorial status" covered only land territory (the reservation was directed at a dispute with Bulgaria) and that "sovereignty" was quite separate from the sovereign rights claimed in the seabed. Turkey contended that there could be no

²⁸⁹C. Rozakis, "To Diethes Nomiko Kathestos tou Ageou", p 291.

²⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 291.

such distinction, citing ruling in the North Sea Continental Shelf case in support of its case.

The Brussels communiqué offered a fall-back position for Greece. The communiqué said that at their meeting the Prime Ministers had agreed that Greco-Turkish problems “should be solved peacefully by means of negotiations and as regards the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea by the International Court at the Hague”. Greece contended that this amounted to a “joint and several” acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction, and that the communiqué, being a juxtaposition of two binding unilateral statements, was sufficient to endow the Court with responsibility to adjudicate under Article 31 of its status. Turkey contended that, since the two countries had never been able to define the scope of their dispute over the Aegean, they could not have reached an agreement to submit it to the Court at the Brussels meeting, and that, by agreeing to speed up a proposed meeting of experts on the question of the continental shelf, the Prime Ministers had given priority to political negotiations.

The effect of Security Council Resolution 395, followed on 11 September by the International Court’s rejection of the Greek request for a temporary injunction, was to throw the parties back on their own resources. In November experts from both sides met in Berne and, after 10 days of talks, signed a declaration establishing a code of behavior to govern future negotiations on the continental shelf²⁹¹.

The most important points of the declaration were that such negotiations should be sincere, detailed and confidential with a view to reaching a settlement based on

²⁹¹ A. Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute”, p. 10.

mutual consent: both parties should abstain from anything that might prejudice the negotiations; and both agreed to study state practice and international rules “with a view to implement certain principles and practical criteria that could be of use in the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries”²⁹². For further talks a method of work was accepted by the two Secretaries-General of Foreign Ministries. The declaration was released in Athens and Ankara on 20 November. Despite some lapses in respect of the paragraphs on prejudicial initiatives, it remains the recognized framework for bilateral discussions. ✓

For five years following the Berne Agreement, Turkey and Greece from time to time, showed some willingness to negotiate the issue. The most notable effort, in this respect, was the 1978 Montreux meeting of Prime Ministers. Upon the invitation of the new Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit and his Greek counterpart Karamanlis met in Montreux on May 10-11, 1978. The two leaders confirmed that the issue must continue to be discussed in bilateral meetings. The Montreux meeting was followed by various meetings of foreign ministry under-secretaries and of technical committees²⁹³.

In January 1978 the Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case²⁹⁴. This foreclosed one of the three avenues open for the peaceful solution of the dispute. The others were political negotiation (which shows signs of being insufficient), or some form of non-judicial arbitration, which has yet to be explored. However, Greece and Turkey were not able to reach an agreement on

²⁹² Ş. Kut, “The Aegean Continental Shelf Dispute between Turkey and Greece”, p.193.

²⁹³ K. Svolopoulos, 1987. *I Eliniki Exoteriki Politiki sta Valkania 1974-1981* (Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans 1974-1981) (Athens: Evroekdotiki), pp. 47-49.

²⁹⁴ Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Jurisdiction), ICJ, Reports, paragraph: 94-108.

the delimitation of the continental shelf because of the general tension in their relations as a whole. Finally, all these half-hearted efforts, meetings and negotiations came to an end in 1981 with Andreas Papandreou's coming to power in Greece.

During the 1976 crisis both parties did not attempt to involve the US. After the ending of the crisis, the Greek government launched two separate appeals one in the Security Council²⁹⁵ and the other to the International Court of Justice in an effort to internationalize the issue as much as possible and to involve as many international players as possible.

On the other hand, the failure of the US crisis mediation in Cyprus either to prevent the Turkish military action or to bring about its quick withdrawal of the Turkish troops after a civilian government was restored in Nicosia is deeply imprinted in Greek and Greek-Cypriot political consciousness as evidence of US approval of Turkey's actions. Due to these developments in Cyprus, the US was very careful to get involved in the 1976 Aegean crisis.

4.6 The 1987 Crisis between Greece and Turkey and the US

Like the previous crisis of 1976, this hinged on proposed oil explorations in disputed waters and likewise involved the survey ship *Sismik I*. The Turkish government granted exploration and exploitation licenses to the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation in international waters near the Greek island of Samothrace. At the same time, Turkey accused Greece of having violated the Berne Protocol of

²⁹⁵ Greek Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs asked from the American Ambassador in Greece Jack Kioubitz, his government to play "fair play" and do not act behind the scenes in favor of Turkey during the discussions of the Security Council in the UN. D. Bitsios, *Pera apo ta Sinora*, p. 82.

November 1976, whereby both sides undertook to avoid provocative actions, by proposals to nationalize the foreign –owned consortium that had been given the concession to exploit the existing Thasos (Prinos) oilfield²⁹⁶.

Beyond the causes of the crisis and who started it, the crisis escalated. On 28 March, the Turkish survey ship *Sismik I*, under naval escort, set sail for the Aegean, Greek and Turkish forces were placed on alert and Papandreou declared that all necessary measures would be taken to safeguard Greece's sovereign rights²⁹⁷. Holding NATO²⁹⁸, and, in particular, the United States, to be responsible for the crisis, Papandreou ordered the suspension of communications facilities at the American base in Nea Makri and promptly dispatched his foreign minister, Karolos Papoulias, to Sofia to brief the Bulgarian leader, Theodor Zivkof. In a calculated snub, the

²⁹⁶ According to the Greek sources, the crisis begun with the Turkey's National Security Council ordered the oil exploration vessel *Sismik I* to sail through the Dardanelles under naval escort to start prospecting in the Aegean. At the same time, the Turkish government published a map of the area the research vessel was supposed to explore. See A. Platias, 1991. "Greece's Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence" in D. Konstas, (ed.) **The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s Domestic and External Influences** (London: Macmillan), p.103; Y. Kapsis, 1990. **Oi Tris Meres tou Marti** (The 3 days of March) (Athens: Nea Synora).

According to the Turkish sources, the immediate reason of the crisis was the Greek government's decision to nationalize the Canadian-led international North Aegean Petroleum Consortium, which had received drilling permits in the Northern Aegean. Subsequently, in early March Greece has ordered the national oil company to start drilling for oil near the Greek island of Thasos. See Ş.S. Gürel, **Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri**, p.94; S. Bölükbaşı, 1992. "The Turco-Greek Dispute Issues, Policies and Prospects" p. 37; N. Akıman, "Turkish Policy Towards Greece: From the Brink of War to a Diplomatic Breakthrough Five Years in Athens", http://www.ksg.harvard.edu.kokkalis/leaders_akiman.

Greek Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yianis Kapsis, replied denying this, explaining that the reason that Greek government bought the shares of the Canadian Consortium was to prevent it of exploring beyond the Greek territorial waters. See Kapsis's letter, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu.kokkalis/leaders_akiman.

²⁹⁷ Prime Minister Papandreou declared in an emergency television broadcast that, "the maps published by Turkey show clearly that the planned route of the *Sismik I* lies 95 per cent within the area under which the Greek continental shelf extends...It is our decision not to allow the *Sismik* to go on with its seismic research in the Aegean. It is our duty to defend both our borders and our sovereign rights". It was very fortunate, the premier said, that this ship "has not showed up yet in Athens waters". But if it did, and a war situation arose, he warned, "a catalytic change might also occur in the entire Balkan area, even in the very defense system of the west, that is NATO itself..." See **Ta Nea** 28 March 1987: pp. 14-15.

²⁹⁸ NATO was mobilized immediately. NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington asked for an emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Council, and offered to use his good offices to help resolve the dispute in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey. See **Kathimerini** 28 March 1987, p.4, **NATO Update** 27 March 1987.

ambassadors of Warsaw Pact countries in Athens were briefed on the crisis in advance of their NATO counterparts²⁹⁹.

The threat of outright hostilities was averted only when Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal made a statement in London³⁰⁰ saying that it was Greece and not Turkey who was violating the Bern Agreement by drilling on the continental shelf. So if Greece had no such plans Turkey would call back its ships because Turkey never had the intention to drill on the continental shelf anyway. Mr. Ozal added that Turkey always wanted to establish friendly relations with Greece and that this last incident showed the imperative of starting a dialogue³⁰¹.

The Greek government announced that no drilling would take place in disputed waters and bilateral negotiations should begin only to explore possibilities of signing a “compromise” for submitting the case to the International Court of Justice; and during the period of negotiations a de facto moratorium would prevail³⁰².

The March 1987 crisis, like the confrontation in the Aegean eleven years earlier, demonstrated the potential dangers of an outbreak of violence in the Aegean. Just like the 1976 confrontation was instrumental in helping reach an understanding for stability in the Aegean for just over a decade, the 1987 crisis became a catalyst for improved Greek-Turkish relations. Greek and Turkish premiers exchanged

²⁹⁹ R. Clogg, 1991. “Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-1974 Period” in D. Konstas, (ed.) **The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s Domestic and External Influences**. pp. 12-26; *Ptisi (Flight)*, 1987. “Aigaio kai Tourkiki Proklitikotita” (Aegean and Turkish Provocativeness), May-June, p. 4.

³⁰⁰ Turkish Premier Ozal was absent during the escalation of the crisis, recovering from a heart surgery in the United States.

³⁰¹ http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/leaders_akiman; S. Bölükbaşı, 1997. “Türkiye’nin Yakındaki Avrupa ile İlişkileri: Türk-Yunan Sorunları” in A. Eralp, *Türkiye ve Avrupa* (Ankara:İmge Kitabevi), pp.264-267.

³⁰² *Kathimerini* 28 March 1987, p.5.

correspondence and proposals which led to their first high-level meeting at Davos, Switzerland in January 1988.

On 31 January, Papandreou and Özal issued a joint statement which emphasized the need to avoid the kind of confrontation that, in March 1987, had brought the two countries to the verge of war. The Davos agreement was subsequently referred to by the PASOK government as the “*symphonia mi-polemou*: the “no-war agreement”³⁰³. With a view to creating a much-improved climate in bilateral relations the two leaders agreed to establish a “hot line” between Athens and Ankara, undertook to meet at least once a year and to visit each other’s countries. They called for an intensification of contacts at all levels, with particular emphasis on the encouragement of tourism and cultural exchanges. To this end, two joint committees were established to discuss the development of closer political and economic relations. These political and economic committees met twice in 1988 and their sub-committees more frequently³⁰⁴.

In an early gesture of good will, the Turkish government rescinded the 1964 decree restricting the property rights of Greek nationals in Turkey. In return, Greece lifted her objections to the reactivation of 1964 Association Agreement between Turkey and European Community, which had been “frozen” since the 1980 Turkish military coup. Reciprocal visits by, among others, the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers were followed by an official visit, the first such visit by a Turkish Prime Minister for

³⁰³ K. Botsiou, 2001. “Oi Elinotourkikes Sxeseis 1974-2000(Greek-Turkish Relations 1974-2000)” in P. Kazakos, et. al. *I Ellada kai to evropaiiko mellon tis Tourkias* (Greece and the European Future of Turkey) (Athens: Sideris Publications), pp. 169-170.

³⁰⁴ R. Clogg, “Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-1974 Period”, p.20; N. Gianaris, 1988. *Greece & Turkey Economic and Geopolitical Perspectives* (New York: Praeger Press), pp.67-72; *Anti*, 11/3/1988 “Erotimata gia to deftero Davos” (Questions for Second Davos), 368, pp. 4-7.

thirty-six years, by Özal to Athens³⁰⁵. Papandreou had not reciprocated Özal's visit by the time of his defeat in the elections of June 1989.

The defeat of PASOK and the beginning of an unstable situation in Greek domestic politics (1989-1991) terminated the efforts for further improvement in Greek-Turkish relations and further effort to deepen in the Greek-Turkish Aegean problems. The global and the regional changes brought new challenges, priorities and problems in the two allies and the US as well, so the overall Greek-Turkish dispute was left aside in the foreign policy agenda of all parties concerned.

To summarize the third chapter, the Aegean dispute which broke out in early 1970s, soon developed into a major bones of contention between Greece and Turkey. It is true that the poisonous political climate in Cyprus exacerbated initial disagreements over the delimitation of Aegean continental shelf and over the extension of the territorial waters in the Aegean.

Since the mid-1970s, the Aegean dispute has become the primary source of tension between the two allies. Each side has well developed and structured its arguments over the Aegean issues with no real intention or will to move even slightly towards a peaceful solution. The US did not endeavour real effort to bring the two parties closer to a solve the Aegean dispute as both Greece and Turkey for different reasons perceived American involvement with suspicions. And the Americans themselves gradually got used with this friction since it was under control.

³⁰⁵ Dış Basında Başbakan Turgut Özal' in Atina Ziyareti (13-15 Haziran 1988) Basın-Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü. Ankara, pp.96-99, 137-138; S. Bölükbaşı, "Türkiye'nin Yakındaki Avrupa ile İlişkileri: Türk-Yunan Sorunları", pp.267-268.

With the end of 1976 crisis Greece attempted to internationalize the Aegean problem in the UN and the International Court of Justice with no real results. For the next six years, the Aegean continental shelf dispute remained a categorical problem in Turkish-Greek relations: no real crisis, but no effort to solve the problem, either. Then in 1987, the issue of the Aegean continental shelf erupted again and brought Turkey and Greece once again to the brink of war. This time Greece tried to mobilize NATO in an effort to resolve the crisis without asking the direct involvement of the United States. Papandreou went further by holding the US responsible for the crisis. Eventually with the mediation efforts of NATO Secretary General the tension subsided.

CHAPTER V

GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

5.1 Greece's Relations with the US in the 1990s.

Since the 1974 Cyprus crisis the Greek-American relationship became strained as the wide-held view in the Greek public and the Greek political elite was that the American foreign policy was greatly responsible for the success and preservation of the Colonel's regime (1967-1974), and in Cyprus it seemed to have consistently favored Turkish policies.

The 1974-1981 New Democracy governments, by setting as the primary goal the accession of the country to the European Community, took a strategic decision which had the most positive impact on the consolidation of Greece's democratic institutions and on its formulation of long-term political economic and security policies³⁰⁶. Greek foreign policy makers believed that apart from the fact that European Community's membership would serve Greece both as a diplomatic lever and as a restraining mechanism, it also would operate as a means to change the nature of Greek-US relations from a highly hierarchical to a more balanced one. Nevertheless,

³⁰⁶ P. Kazakos, and P. Ioakimidis, 1994. (eds.) *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated* (London: Pinter Publishers).

New Democracy governments had remained steadfast in its conviction that the United States was Greece's natural partner³⁰⁷.

With the rise of PASOK in power in 1981, the confrontational tactics and the anti-American dogma of Papandreou's government added considerable irritation to already strained US-Greek relations³⁰⁸. The PASOK government found it politically expedient to condemn the foreign policy of the Reagan administration at every opportunity³⁰⁹, while at the same time expecting American officials to accommodate Greece in its feuds with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean.

For its part, Washington paid no particular attention to Greece but continued to base its policy toward its small ally on narrowly-defined collective defense considerations dictated by the logic of the Cold War³¹⁰. In the issue of the military assistance, it expected the PASOK government to live up to its NATO obligations and permit the existing American bases to remain on Greek soil. PASOK once in power dropped its vocal opposition to the presence of the US bases in Greece. Instead, it started bilateral negotiations with the US which led to the signing of a five-year base

³⁰⁷ J. Iatrides, 1983. "Greece and the United States: The Stained Partnership" in Clogg, Richard (ed.) *Greece in the 1980s* (London: Macmillan Press), pp. 168-169; C. Rozakis, 1986. *Eliniki Exoteriki Politiki* (Greek Foreign Policy) (Athens: Maliaris-Paidia).

³⁰⁸ A. Borowiec, 1983, *The Mediterranean Feud* (New York: Praeger Press), pp.84-86.

³⁰⁹ Papandreou's government differentiated itself from the American or the European Communities policies in order to demonstrate the "independence" of Greek foreign policy and strengthened the PASOK leaders' sense of self-importance. Such incidents were the refusal to condemn the Jaruzelski's crackdown of the Solidarity Movement in Poland in 1982; PASOK government's decision to veto a European Council statement condemning the Soviets for shooting down a Korean civilian airplane in 1983 and the harsh condemnation of the Reagan administration over the bombing of Libya in 1986. See with details, J. Iatrides, 1993. "Beneath the Sound and the Fury: US relations with the PASOK Government" in R. Clogg, (ed.) *Greece, 1981-89. The Populist Decade* (New York: St. Martin Press), pp. 161-16; A. Kalaitzidis, and N. Zahariadis, 1997. "Papandreou's NATO Policy: Continuity or Change" *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, 23: 1, pp. 105-116..

³¹⁰ E. Laipson, 1983. *U.S Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean: Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus*, *Congressional Research Library (CRS)*, pp. 34-35.

agreement in the summer of 1983³¹¹. The presence of the US bases, from the PASOK perspective, was to be made conditional on the preservation of the Greek-Turkish military balance in the Aegean – understood in terms of the 7:10 ratio in US military aid and sales to Greece and Turkey respectively³¹².

PASOK's impact on Greek-US relations was negative. But both parties came to a realization that there was a divergence of their respective interests and that they could not count on the other's support except in limited areas. For the Greeks, it was clear that in facing their principal adversary, Turkey, they could not have substantive American support. On the other hand, for the Americans it became clear that Greece's cooperation in critical matters for the American foreign policy was questionable³¹³.

The electoral defeat of PASOK in 1989 paved the way to an improvement and a more friction-free relationship between Greece and the United States. One of the immediate aims of the new conservative government of Konstantinos Mitsotakis was to improve the climate of Greek-US relations. Mitsotakis visited Washington soon

³¹¹ C. Migdalovitz, 1995. "Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues", CRS Issue Brief, pp.2-3.

³¹² PASOK declared that the expiration of this agreement, late in 1988, would signal the final removal of these bases from the Greek soil. This, apparently, was a tactic designed to soften the impact of the public from PASOK's pre-election promises. For as early as the autumn of 1985 the Papandreou government had opened the door for the continuation of the US bases in Greece by indicating its readiness to begin a new round of negotiations for a new base agreement which – it was argued – once concluded with mutual satisfaction, would be submitted through a referendum to the final arbiter – the Greek people. Base negotiations begun early in 1988 and were suspended after many sessions (in May of 1989) in view of the June elections. It fell to the New Democracy government to complete the task by concluding an eight-year agreement shortly after assuming to power in April 1990. The new government argued that 80 per cent of the new defense and cooperation agreement had been worked out by the previous PASOK government. See with details, T. Coulombis, 1993. "PASOK's Foreign Policies, 1981-89" in R. Clogg, (ed.) *Greece, 1981-8. The Populist Decade*, pp.119-120.

³¹³ For the Americans was much irritating the refusal of the Greek authorities to cooperate closely with the United States and the other western governments in countering international terrorism. American officials were especially perturbed by the PASOK government's handing of several extradition cases of suspected terrorists. J. Iatrides, "Beneath the Sound and the Fury: US relations with the PASOK Government" p.164.

after he came to power and concluded a number of economic agreements. Moreover, Greek careful participation in the Gulf war displayed the strategic significance and the logistical value of Greece and its “loyalty” to the alliance. Nearly 90 percent of the logistical support for all allied operations in the Persian Gulf moved through the Mediterranean, and a significant part involved Greek and Cypriot facilities³¹⁴.

Despite the better understanding between the Mitsotakis and the Bush administrations, the State Department’s report on human rights which in 1991 referred to a “Slavo-Macedonian” minority in northern Greece, largely irritated the Greek government and the public³¹⁵.

Simultaneously, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the Communist bloc and the end of the Cold War signified the most radical changes in Europe since 1945. With the end of the bipolar structure of the East-West competition Europe’s morphology was transformed and posed new challenges for Greece³¹⁶ and the United States.

The collapse of communism in southeastern Europe brought an end to the Cold War security system and its familiar arrangements. The potential consequences of possible conflicts are now less all-encompassing than any direct East-West

³¹⁴ One of the main arguments of New Democracy government in order to convince the Greek public opinion in favor of the Greek participation in the Gulf war was that later, in the end of the war Greece would have the chance to improve and strengthen its position in the Cyprus issue. However, the Bush administration only expressed its appreciation, agreed in principle to sell to Greece Patriot missiles and repeated the familiar assurances concerning country’s security. *The Southeastern Yearbook 1991*. ELIAMEP, pp. 262-263.

³¹⁵ J. Iatrides, 2003. “The United States and Greece in the Twentieth Century” in T. Couloumbis, T. Kariotis, and F. Bellou. *Greece in the Twentieth Century* (London: Frank Cass Publishers), p. 102.

³¹⁶ V. Theodoropoulos, et al. 1995. *Skespeis kai Provlmatismoi gia tin Exoteriki mas Politiki* (Thoughts and Concerns for our Foreign Policy) (Athens: Sideris Publications).

confrontation, but the likelihood of smaller, more complex conflicts was greater³¹⁷. While for Greece, the Balkan problem was rightly perceived as affecting vital national interests, for the US it merely represented the first serious challenge to the American attempt to come to terms with post-Cold War security threats and a complication in the process of identifying its security interests in Europe³¹⁸.

At the initial stage of the Yugoslav crisis, there was coincidence of Greek and American policy for different reasons. The United States did not want to get involved in a European crisis which was under the European Union's sphere of influence and in addition was still preoccupied with the developments in the Gulf. However, the United States immediately chose to support the Tirana and the Skopje regimes (the ministates of the region) in order not to expand the crisis³¹⁹.

Greece on the other hand, during 1990-91 sought to perpetuate the regional stability of the Cold War era through the continuation of the "traditional" Greek-Yugoslav relationship that had developed after 1949. In the same period, Greece had been concerned about the fate of the Greek minority in Albania, an issue that affected the relations between the two countries. Furthermore, Greece focused on the task of preventing the international recognition of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) under her old name³²⁰. This proved to be an uphill struggle, since the

³¹⁷K. Ifandis, 1996. "Greece and the US after the Cold War", p.155.

³¹⁸ D. Keridis, and R. Pfaltzgraff, (eds.) 1997. **Security in Southeastern Europe and the US-Greek Relationship** (Massachusetts: Brassey's Inc).

³¹⁹ N. Stavrou, 1995. "The Dismantling of the Balkan Security System: Consequences for Greece, Europe, and NATO" *Mediterranean Quarterly* 6:1, pp.47-48.

³²⁰ Mitsotakis government pressured by an aroused public and rhetoric of church, focused its effort to convince the international community that FYROM had revisionist claims towards Greece. But it was hard for the outsiders to be convinced that such a small vulnerable state can pose a threat towards Greece. For a detailed analysis see N. Rizopoulos, 1993. "Pride, Prejudice, and Myopia Greek Foreign Policy in a Time Warp" *World Policy Journal* X:3, pp. 17-28; N. Zahariadis, 1996. "Greek Policy toward the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 14:2,

international community found it difficult to call this republic by any other name than that which it had since 1944.

Greece did succeed in persuading the UN Security Council in 1993 to accept this republic as a member of the United Nations only under the graceless temporary name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”³²¹. Moreover, from February 1994 to September 1995, Greece imposed an economic embargo on the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. This was an economic pressure to force FYROM to drop the ancient Macedonian symbol from its flag, as well as to amend its constitution by dropping references to “unliberated” fellow “Macedonians” in neighboring countries³²².

These Greek “successes” came to a high cost in terms of Greece’s international standing. The United States and to a certain extent the EU were highly concerned about preventing the spread of the Yugoslav conflict in the south. In this direction chose to support the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, the only former Yugoslav republic that completely escaped armed conflict in the process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Greek hostility to this republic seemed to undermine western efforts to contain the Yugoslav crisis. Greece, instead of a regional stabilizer, appeared to have become a destabilizing factor in the Balkans³²³.

pp. 303-327; Y. Valinakis, and S. Dalis. 1996. **To Zitima ton Skopion** (The Issue of Skopje) (Athens: Sideris Publications).

³²¹ C. Papatotiriou, and D. Konstas. 1999. “Greek Foreign Responses to the Post-Cold War Balkan Environment” in V. Coufoudakis, H. Psomiades, and A. Gerolymatos. (eds.) **Greece and the New Balkans Challenges and Opportunities** (New York: Pella), p. 229.

³²² Y. Valinakis, **To Zitima ton Skopion** (The Issue of Skopje), pp. 194-197.

³²³ V. Coufoudakis, 1996. “Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues and Challenges” Mediterranean Quarterly 7:3, p. 27.

Additionally, Greece perceived with fear the activist Turkish policy in the Balkans and the Turkish initiative to cultivate political, military and economic relations with all the Balkan states and especially with Albania³²⁴. Turkey's policy in the Balkans at a time when Greece was embroiled in problems with Albania and with the consequences of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia gave rise to theories of encirclement among nationalistic circles in Greece³²⁵.

Greek policy shifted gradually as Greek forces participated in the NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and with the resolution of the problem with FYROM. In September 1995 Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia signed the Interim Accord. With this accord, the Greek side lifted the embargo, which had been instituted in February 1994, while the other side removed from its flag the ancient Macedonian symbol of Vergina and undertook to amend its constitution to remove clauses open to irredentist interpretations³²⁶. Negotiations concerning the new state's formal name were to continue without much appearing in public through diplomatic channels, and that particular controversy no longer attracted much attention³²⁷.

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During the NATO campaign in Kosovo in 1999, the Greek government withstood overwhelming public opposition to bombing Serbia in order to uphold its alliance

³²⁴ S. Konstantinides, 1996. "Turkey: The Emergence of a New Foreign Policy The Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 24, pp.330-331.

³²⁵ The recognition of FYROM by Ankara with the name of "Macedonia" only a few hours after the February 1992 Davos meeting was considered in Athens as particularly "provocative", given the especially that Prime Minister Mitsotakis had explicitly asked his Turkish counterpart Demirel to wait for an EC-wide decision on this sensitive issue. Y. Valinakis, 1994. *Greece's Security in the post-Cold War Era* .(Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. SWP-S394), p. 48.

³²⁶ C. Papatirou, "Greek Foreign Responses to the Post-Cold War", pp. 230-232.

³²⁷ C. Rozakis, 1996. *Politikes kai Nomikes Diastasis tis Metavatikis Simfonias tis Neas Iorkis metaxi Elladas kai Proin Giougoslavikis Dimokratias tis Makedonias* (The Political and Legal Dimensions of the Interim Accord of New York between Greece and FYROM) (Athens: Sideris Publications).

commitments. The port of Thessaloniki and the natural terrain features connecting Greece with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo remain key to keeping the logistic lines of communication open to US and other NATO troops. The only exception was the banning of Turkish warplanes from crossing over Greek airspace as they flew to German and Italian bases to participate in NATO raids on Yugoslav targets³²⁸.

The reorientation of the Greek Balkan policy was very important and showed that Greece could utilize its comparative economic and political advantages to help the Balkans towards the West and away from instability and crisis. These developments were positive for the Greek-US relationship, as the US realized that it could count on Greece as a reliable partner in this troubled region even if the Greek choices did not always coincide with the American interests.

5.2 Turkey's Relations with the US in the 1990s.

During the Cold War period the Turkish-US relationship was based essentially on the strategic concerns of both states. Faced with the challenge from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, Turkey sought to protect its national security and territorial integrity by forging close military and political ties with the United States. Turkish officials viewed membership in NATO primarily as a means to strengthen Turkey's bilateral relations with the US. For American policymakers, Turkey was a

³²⁸ J. Iatrides, 2003. "The United States and Greece in the Twentieth Century", p.105.

valuable geostrategic asset against the perceived Soviet threat and for protecting vital American interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East³²⁹.

However, Turkish-American relations have been marred with difficulties and to a certain extent Turkish mistrust of US friendship and intentions. This resulted from three developments: First, it was the US decision to remove the Jupiter missiles from the Turkish territory following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis³³⁰. The Turkish elite's view was that a bargaining was made by the two superpowers behind its back which fostered doubt about the US commitment to Turkish security. Second, in 1964 the then Prime Minister İsmet İnönü received what was considered a harsh letter from President Lyndon Johnson. The letter warned Turkey not to use US weapons in Cyprus and that if its involvement there provoked a Soviet military response Turkey could not count on US support³³¹. Third, the United States imposed arms embargo on Turkey after the 1974 Cyprus crisis when Turkish forces captured one-third of the island. The Turks felt let down by their American ally and Turkish reliance on the Americans were severely undermined³³². However, during the Ronald Reagan period relations improved between Washington and Ankara³³³.

By the end of the Cold War Turkey was one of the states that was profoundly affected by the transformation of the political and strategic conditions forming

³²⁹ D. Rustow, 1987. *Turkey America's Forgotten Ally* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations); M. Evriviades, 1998. "Turkey's Role in United States Strategy During and After the Cold War", *Mediterranean Quarterly* 9:2, pp.30-51.

³³⁰ N. B. Criss, 1997. "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963", *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 20:3, pp.97-122.

³³¹ See with more details, Chapter III, pp. 55-58.

³³² As a result Turkish government closed all the American bases in Turkey. The arms embargo was lifted in 1978 but still there was a careful standing from the Turkish side. H. Kramer, 2000. *A Changing Turkey. The Challenge to Europe and the United States* (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press), pp. 224-225.

³³³ E. Laipson, "US Policy towards Greece and Turkey Since 1974", pp.170-171.

European security³³⁴. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact removed adversary communist regimes from Turkey's eastern borders for the first time since the end of the Second World War. These historic changes removed the perceived Soviet threat from the agenda of US foreign policy after more than four decades of US-Soviet rivalry and competition in world politics.

The new post-Cold War order did not lead to fundamental changes in Turkish views concerning the importance of the US for Turkey³³⁵. If anything, Turkey began to attach even greater importance to strengthening its bilateral ties with the US in the 1990s. This was primarily due to growing strains in Turkey's relations with Europe over the issue of Turkey's full membership in the European Union³³⁶ and the post-

³³⁴ S. Sayari, 1992 "Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf War", The Middle East Journal 46:1, pp. 9-21; B. Yılmaz, 1994. "Turkey's New Role in International Politics", Aussen Politic-German Foreign Affairs Review 45, pp.90-98; M. Gönlübol et. al., Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, pp.650-654.

³³⁵ There is a broad consensus among Turkey's important political actors- the military, political parties, the media, and major important groups- about the importance of the US for Turkey despite the often harsh criticism. C. Çandar, 2000. "Some Turkish Perspectives on the United States and American Policy toward Turkey" in M. Abramovitz, (ed.) **Turkey's Transformation and American Policy** (New York: The Century Foundation Press), pp. 133-146. Even the country's Islamist political forces – which are by no means pro-western or pro-American – realize the importance of the US to play over a broad range of issues regarding Turkey's foreign policy concerns and interests. P. Robins, 1997. "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan" Survival 39:2, pp. 82-100; K. Courtier, 1997. **US-Turkish Relations in the Post-Cold War Era** (Istanbul: Friedrich Ebert Foundation).

³³⁶ The negative reply of the European Commission in 1989 to Turkey's 1987 application for full membership in the European Community had a very bad impact on Turkey. Additionally, the EU's decision in December 1997 to reject Turkey's bid for full membership – while inviting five formerly communist countries, including Cyprus, to become candidates and giving another five other East European states pre-candidate status – further exacerbated the problems in Turkey's relations with Europe. This development is generally perceived by most Turks as a "rejection" of their country by Europe. So Turkish officials have intensified their efforts to expand Turkey's political and economic relations with the US. See "Special Issue Turkey and the European Union Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics" 2003. Turkish Studies, 4:1, pp .2-251; B. Buzan, and T. Diez, 1999. "The European Union and Turkey", Survival 41:1, pp. 42-46. In respect with the EU, the United States has been actively pushed for Turkish membership even when it has meant friction with some European members. The United States played a critical role in ensuring the ratification of the Custom Union Treaty signed between Turkey and the EU in 1995. The United States clearly sees the issue of Turkish membership in strategic terms and argues that membership would enhance Turkish economic development and democracy, while also helping make Turkey a much more stable country in a critical neighborhood. This logic has also been pursued in respect to including and actively promoting Turkey as one of the big ten emerging markets deserving US investment See A. Makovsky, 1997. "Turkey and the European Union" in **The Parameters of Partnership: Germany, The US and Turkey Challenges for German and American Foreign**

Cold War developments in the former Soviet Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East.

A key point of convergence between Turkey and the United States was their interest in the emergence of democratic, secular, pro-western regimes in Central Asia. Turkey came to be regarded as a pivotal state in the geostrategic developments in Eurasia, especially the newly independent states in the former Soviet south. The US administration furthers this development through bilateral economic cooperation and military assistance within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace. Turkey also strongly engages itself within the NATO framework and has developed intensive bilateral ties with these states over a broad range of political, economic, and cultural issues³³⁷.

Turkey was of even greater value for American regional strategic interests as the crucial link within the east-west corridor, which is promoted by the United States as the best solution for bringing Caspian and Central Asian energy resources to market. The strategic idea is to prevent a reemergence of Russia as the dominant political and military power in the region³³⁸. The plan was part of the American strategy of double containment because it could prevent Iran from a stronger engagement in the Caspian region's emerging energy transportation plans³³⁹.

Policy (American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University), pp. 58-60.

³³⁷ G. Fuller, and et al. 1993. **Turkey's New Geopolitics. From the Balkans to Western China** (Boulder: Westview Press); O. Tunander, 1995. "A New Ottoman Empire? The Choice for Turkey: Euro-Asian Center vs National Fortress", *Security Dialogue* 26:4, pp. 415-417.

³³⁸ K. Kirişçi, 1999. "Turkey and the United States: Ambivalent Allies", in B. Rubin, and T. Keaney, (eds.) **Friends of America: US Allies in a Changing World** (London: Frank Cass), pp. 218-226; Gönlübol, Mehmet. et. al. **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası**, pp. 695-708.

³³⁹ K. Kirişçi, "Turkey and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, pp. 225-230.

The developments in the Middle East seem to offer a mixture of cooperative as well as conflicting views between Ankara and Washington. The most notable example was Turkey's support to the allied coalition led by the United States following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990³⁴⁰. Despite the severe economic costs and the criticism within Turkey³⁴¹, President Özal decided firmly to side with the US and Turkey played a significant role in the victory of the allied coalition against Iraq³⁴².

In terms of broader Middle East security and stability, Turkish and the US views overlap considerably. The development of further relations with Israel especially after the 1993 Israel-PLO agreement has the full support from the US side especially in the military cooperation³⁴³. In addition, Turkey supports the peace process and sees its success as the best guarantee against a resurgence of any form of radicalism that could damage Turkey. US-Turkish interests also coincide in Turkey's effort to strengthen relations with Jordan and other moderate Arab states. At the same time, Turkey's closer relations with Israel developed counter-alliances against Turkey involving Iran, Syria, Greece and Armenia³⁴⁴.

³⁴⁰ P. Robins, *Suits and Uniforms Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, pp.312-318; M. B. Aykan, 1996. "Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations concerning Persian Gulf Security in the Post-Cold War Era: 1989-1995" *Middle East Journal* 50:3, pp. 345-358.

³⁴¹ Özal decided to close down a double oil pipeline that carried half of the Iraq's oil exports. In the political level, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence and the Chief of General Staff Necip Torumtay resigned over disagreements with Özal's Gulf policy. See N. and H. Pope, 1997. *Turkey Unveiled Atatürk and After* (London: John Murray), pp. 219-220.

³⁴² W. Hale, 1992. "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis", *International Affairs* 68:4, pp.683-687; A. Mango, 1994. *Turkey The Challenge of a New Role* (Washington DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies), pp. 111-113.

³⁴³ A. Makovsky, 1996. "Israel-Turkish Relations A Turkish "Periphery Strategy?" in H. Barkey, (ed.) *Reluctant Neighbors: Turkey's Role in the Middle East* (Washington DC: USIP Press), pp. 263-275.

³⁴⁴ The US gave critical support to Turkey in urging Syria to expel the leader of the PKK Abdullah Öcalan, in October 1998 to Russia and since then has stood next to Turkey throughout the crisis See M. B. Aykan, 1999. "The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish view" *Middle East Policy* VI:4, pp. 174-191; A. Makovsky, 1998/99. "Defusing the Turkish-Syrian Crisis-Whose Triumph?"

Another area of cooperation involves UN or NATO peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. US-Turkish military cooperation was common in NATO exercises. In Operation Provide Comfort, launched in April 1991, the two armies actively cooperated in a humanitarian assistance program. The operation came after the mass influx of Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq to help them to enable repatriation to their homes in northern Iraq. The operation provided the creation of a safe zone north of the 36th parallel in Iraq, coercing the Iraqi military to stay out³⁴⁵. Although the two military successfully cooperated in the operation's first stages, considerable tension emerged between Turkey and the United States over the purpose of the operation and disagreement over the status of northern Iraq's Kurdish region. The Turkish leadership wanted to keep Iraq intact and prevent the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish political entity in northern Iraq, which would be expected to destabilize Turkey's own Kurdish area.

As a consequence, Turkish-American cooperation in dealing with Iraq has often been accompanied with some Turkish mistrust of American moves. This became evident in the aftermath of the accord between the two rival Iraqi Kurdish groups that was brought about with American mediation in Washington in September 1998, as Ankara had been left out of the negotiations³⁴⁶.

In addition, frictions arose from the US policies on Turkish human rights violations and weapons' acquisition programs. The escalation of human rights abuses as a

Turkish Review of Middle East Studies ISIS: Istanbul: 10, pp. 127-134; M. Mufti, 1998. "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy" Middle East Journal 52:1, pp. 34-36.

³⁴⁵ M. B. Aykan, "Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations, pp.349-351; A. Sever, 1998/99. "Evolution of Turkish-American Relations in the Middle East since 1945", Turkish Review of Middle East Studies ISIS: Istanbul: 10, pp.159-160.

³⁴⁶ H. Kramer, A Changing Turkey, p.227.

result of confrontations between the PKK and Turkish security forces between 1992 and 1996 attracted adverse congressional and public interest, affecting US foreign policy toward Turkey. This interest translated itself into legislation cutting of foreign aid to Turkey as well as demanding that the Administration prepare reports on the use of US military equipment in situations of human rights violations. The powerful lobbying capacity on human rights and arms control groups together with anti-Turkish ethnic lobbies on the Cyprus and Armenian issues significantly reduced the executive branch's ability to shield Turkey. As a result of these factors, there were substantial cuts in US foreign assistance to Turkey during the mid-1990s and the transfer of remaining aid was conditioned on Turkey improving its human rights performance³⁴⁷.

In the Balkans, the cooperation had better chance as both Turkey and the US had a similar perception of how to deal with the post- Cold War Balkan setting. In the Yugoslav crisis Turkey followed a careful stance of non-involvement in the beginning, much similar to the US stance. Turkey became involved only by participating in NATO sanctions' enforcement operation when the war spread to Bosnia and maintained a military unit as part of UNPROFOR there. This unit subsequently became part of the NATO exercises along the Albanian-Serbian border in a western effort to deter Serbia from using force against refugees displaced as a

³⁴⁷ Arms exports were also affected. The US government for a long time found itself unable to deliver warships paid for by Turkey, and the Turkish government was forced to withdraw plans to acquire large number of US attack helicopters in November 1996. These helicopters were critical for the Turkish military's ability to fight the PKK in the mountainous terrain of southeastern Turkey and the northern Iraq. Further, such a helicopter force was also considered important to balancing the larger forces of Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors. P. Robins, **Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy** pp. 196-198; C. Migdalovitz, 1998. "Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues", CRS Issue Brief.

result of the violence in Kosovo. Additionally, Ankara participated actively in the NATO campaign against Serbia in 1999³⁴⁸.

For the United States having the military of a predominantly Muslim country involved in such operation was seen as an important way of assuring the local Muslim population. On the other hand, this gave Turkish government the chance to be seen doing something for the Muslims in the Balkans whom most Turks see as descendants of their Ottoman past.

Immediately with the collapse of the communist regimes in the rest of the Balkan states, Turkey sought to improve its existing links with them³⁴⁹. This policy perfectly suited with the American one. Rapid rapprochement was pursued with post-Zhivkov Bulgaria³⁵⁰, commercial ties were established with Romania and close military relations were cultivated with Albania. Turkey followed a careful activism in the Balkans mostly inspired by Turgut Özal's policy and orientation which improved Turkey's economic, political and military relations with these countries³⁵¹.

What characterizes the relationship between Turkey and the United States from 1990s onwards is a complex convergence and divergence of interests in bi-lateral and

³⁴⁸ Hasan. Ünal, 2000. "Turkey, Emerging Regional Power, and the Balkans in the 1990s," *Economic Dialogue Turkey*, p. 105.

³⁴⁹ E. Manisalı, 1990. *Turkey and the Balkans*, (Girne Conference); Ş. Çalış, and B. Akgün. 2001. "Çatışmadan Uzlaşmaya: 21 Yüzyıla Giren Balkanlar'da Türk-Yunan Rekabeti (From Conflict to Compromise: Turko-Greek Rivalry in the Balkans at the Outset of the 21st century)" in I. Bal, (ed.) *21 Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası* (Turkish Foreign Policy in the Eve of the 21st Century) (İstanbul: ALFA Yayın Dağıtım Ltd), pp. 226-233.

³⁵⁰ E. Giatzidis, 2002. *An Introduction to Post-Communist Bulgaria. Political, Economic and Social transformation* (Manchester and York: Manchester University Press), pp. 149-150; N. Özgür, 1998. "1989 sonrası Türkiye-Bulgaristan İlişkileri (The Turkish-Bulgarian Relations after 1989)" in F. Sönmezoğlu, (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (An Analysis of the Turkish Foreign Policy) (İstanbul: Der Yayınları), pp. 359-362.

³⁵¹ H. Yavuz, 1998. "Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism" *Critique*, Spring, pp. 565-576.

regional level. Turkey's geopolitical location and western, secular credentials are factors supporting strategic cooperation. Turkey seeks for American support in its effort to upgrade and assure its regional role in the Former Soviet Central Asia and the Middle East.

5.3 Change and Continuity in the US Policy towards the Greek-Turkish Dispute

The end of the Cold War brought about significant changes in the foreign policy priorities and new challenges for both Greece and Turkey and the United States as well. However, the bilateral problems³⁵² between the two allies as well as the Cyprus issue remained intact and relations further deteriorated during the last decade of the 20th century³⁵³.

United States policy towards the Cyprus dispute did not change substantially after the end of the Cold War. The US continues to preserve stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, a region bordered with conflict zones and prevent NATO from being embroiled in local controversies. In order to achieve these goals, the United States has tried to remain "neutral" and worked to resolve disputes between the two NATO members, Greece and Turkey. Comparing with the 1974-1989 period, the United

³⁵²C, Rozakis, 1989. "Oi Ellinoturkikes Sxeseis: I Nomiki Diastasi" (Greek-Turkish Relations: The Legal Aspect) in *Sixroni Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki* (Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy) (Athens: Sakoulas Publications), pp. 21-68; E. Kurubaş, 2001. "Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinin Psikopolitiği ve Sorunların Çözümü Üzerine Düşünceler" in İ. Bal, (ed.) *21 Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 243-262.

³⁵³ Yialouridis, Christodoulos and Panayiotis Tsakonas (eds.) 2001. *Greece and Turkey after the end of the Cold War* New York & Athens: Caratzas Publishers.

States was more active between the two parties. The eruption of the Imia/Kardak crisis was stopped only by the American intervention and the deployment of the Russian S-300 missiles in Cyprus did not take place after intensive American mediation. Additionally, after the mid-1990s American diplomacy became reactivated in Cyprus and encouraged some kind of dialogue between the two parties. A new important parameter in this triangular relationship in the 1990s was European Union, whose policies were welcomed from the American side.

5.3.1 The Imia/Kardak Crisis

The Imia/Kardak crisis was the first “hot” incident in the Aegean in the post-Cold War era. A small Turkish cargo ship went aground in late December 1995 less than four miles off the Turkish coast on an uninhabited rocky islet group, called Imia by the Greeks and Kardak by the Turks. The Turkish captain refused to have his vessel rescued by Greek authorities, claiming that he was in Turkish territorial waters³⁵⁴. The two foreign ministries thereafter exchanged information, holding to differing positions on the islets sovereignty but refraining from making confrontational demands or going public.

One month later this event created more publicity as the local Greek mayor raised the Greek flag over this islet. Turkish news reporters took to the scene from a helicopter and hoisted a Turkish flag in place of the Greek one. Media in each country

³⁵⁴ F. Aksu, 2001. “Turkish-Greek Relations from Conflict to Détente the Last Decade”, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, Istanbul: ISIS:6, p 172.

exaggerated over this issue³⁵⁵. Both governments dispatched warships and the Turks landed a detachment of marines in one of the islets³⁵⁶.

Washington moved to defuse the crisis. President Clinton placed calls for a peaceful outcome, and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke began intense mediation. American diplomatic efforts targeted to bring the situation back to its former status (*status quo ante*) and succeeded in its endeavor³⁵⁷. The US position was that “in case of not opening fire to the Turkish soldiers there is order not to open fire to the Greek military team and if the Greek military force withdraws its presence and the Greek flag, the Turkish military forces will do the same”, the statement from the US emphasizing: “the party that shoots the first bullet will find the US against it”³⁵⁸. Finally both sides withdrew and a return to the *status quo ante* was achieved³⁵⁹.

It is true that the issue came up just after the accidental grounding of the Turkish ship. Until then nobody had doubts about the sovereignty of these islets which according to a Turkish-Italian document from 1932 specifically lists these islets as belonging at the time to the Italians, which means sovereignty would have

³⁵⁵ C. Migdalovitz, 1997. “Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues – Background and Recent Developments”, CRS Issue Brief, p.4; A. Kourkoulas, 1997. **Imia Kritiki Prosegesi tis Tourkikis Politikis** (Imia A Critical Approach of Turkish policy) (Athens: Sideris Publications).

³⁵⁶ C. Migdalovitz, “Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues – Background and Recent Developments”, p.4.

³⁵⁷ F. Aksu, “Turkish-Greek Relations from Conflict to Détente the Last Decade”, p.174; K. Ioannou, 1997. “A Tale of Two Islets: The Imia Incident Between Greece and Turkey” *Thesis*, 1:1, pp.1-7.

³⁵⁸ F. Aksu, “Turkish-Greek Relations from Conflict to Détente the Last Decade”, p.174; A Greek view for the management of the crisis is provided by the then Greek Chief of Staff in C. Liberis, 1997. **Ethniki Stratigiki kai Xeirismos Kriseon** (National Strategy and Crises Management) (Athens: Piotita Publications).

³⁵⁹ During the crisis in Greece, Kostas Simitis had just come out as the new Prime Minister after the resignation of the ill Andreas Papandreou. Simitis at that time did not had the full control of the government and in a certain degree there was lack of coordination. On the other hand, in Turkey then Prime Minister Tansu Çiller ruled a coalition government with the CHP and was in a middle of an effort to form a new government after the elections of December 1995. The above statement does not argue that the crisis would not have taken place if in both states there were more stable governments but the domestic instability might have a part in the escalation of the crisis See Ta Nea 1/2/1996:10; Turkish Daily News 1/2/1996: 6-8; Ta Nea 31/1/1996: 7-9 ;To Vima 4/2/1996: A7.

transferred from Italy to Greece after World War II under the terms of the 1947 Paris Treaty³⁶⁰. The Turkish government, however, asserted that this Italo-Turkish protocol had never entered into force and that the rocks themselves had been “registered” by the onshore Turkish province of Mugla³⁶¹.

In the period that followed, the Turkish government did not just refuse to concede on this issue but also insisted that there are “gray zones” in the Aegean and numerous small islets or rocks whose sovereignty is unclear despite Greek claims³⁶². Ankara did not provide specifics, but neither did it abandon the position, which garnered broad public credence in Turkey³⁶³. This aftermath angered Greek public opinion enormously. The Turkish government was seen to have embarked on a new and more aggressive course, threatening to redraw boundaries throughout the Aegean at Greece’s expense³⁶⁴.

The Greek-Turkish crisis showed that when the situation is escalated the Greek and the Turkish governments have been unable or unwilling to deal directly with each other and the mission fell to the Americans. During the crisis both sides followed an adamant position, not to lose face, even if the consequence would have been war. Afterwards and when the worst was avoided, both decided in favor of a peaceful resolution, recognizing that a war was not in either’s side national interest.

³⁶⁰ **Borders, Sovereignty, Stability. The Imia Incident and Turkey’s Violations of International Law** 1996. (The Citizen’s Movement & ELIAMEP).

³⁶¹ Y. İnan, and S. Başeren, 1997. **Status of Kardak Rocks** (Ankara), <http://www.kbl.com.tr/kardak/>

³⁶² <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>; M. Fırat, 2002. “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Yunanistan Dış Politikası (Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era)”, in M. Türkeş, and İ. Uzel, (eds.) **Türkiye’nin Komşuları (The Neighbours of Turkey)** (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi), pp.56-59.

³⁶³ *Ta Nea* 5/2/1996: 2.

³⁶⁴ *Ta Nea* 6/2/1996: 2; Nikos. Kouris, 1997. **Ellada-Tourkia: O Penintakontaetis Polemos** (Greece-Turkey: The Fifty Years War) (Athens: Livanis Publications).

5.3.2 Initiatives in the Cyprus Issue and the Aegean Dispute

Soon after the serious 1996 crisis Clinton administration took active steps again in the Greek-Turkish bilateral dispute and in Cyprus. Immediately after the crisis the then Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Holbrooke planned a trip to Greece and Turkey to help them achieve a more permanent end to tensions in the Aegean. That trip did not take place as the Greek side cancelled the meeting and appeared annoyed as the US side did not share the Greek concerns over Turkish revisionism in the Aegean and particularly accused Washington that had taken Turkey's side in defusing the Imia/Kardak crisis for forging a humiliating Greek back-off³⁶⁵. Mr. Holbrooke himself was totally unwelcome in Greece³⁶⁶.

Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, architect of the Dayton agreements in former Yugoslavia had better chance with Cyprus when in June 1997 was appointed as US special presidential envoy³⁶⁷. His efforts aimed to make some progress in the Cyprus negotiations which had reached their lowest point in 1996³⁶⁸. Leaders of the two Cypriot sides were induced to participate in talks under the UN secretary-general's help in New York and a month later in Switzerland³⁶⁹.

³⁶⁵ Christian Science Monitor: 12/2/1996, p.7.

³⁶⁶ To Vima 4/2/1996, p. A12; To Vima 11/2/1996.

³⁶⁷ D. Payne, 1998 "The Cyprus problem: A Need to Defend Principles", Mediterranean Quarterly, pp. 9-15.

³⁶⁸ The leaders of the two Cypriot communities agreed based in two declarations –in 1977 and again in 1979- to work towards a unified, "bizonal" and "bicomunal" state. Negotiations followed on this basis under the UN auspices, and in 1992 the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, proposed for negotiations a new plan known as "set of ideas". The new plan was initially accepted by Greek Cypriots under President George Vasiliou and with some objections from Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Dentash. Later on as Clerides came to power both sides abandoned the plan. E. Prodromou, 1998. "Reintegrating Cyprus: The Need for a New Approach", Survival, 40:3, pp. 6-9. N. Uslu, 2001. "Kıbrıs Sorunu (Cyprus Problem)" in İ. Bal, (ed.) 21 Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Yunan Dış Politikası, pp. 266-270; Ş. S. Gürel, Tarihsel Boyut içinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri, pp.111-124.

³⁶⁹ For an historical analysis of the Cyprus problem in the UN see, M. Ioannou, 1992. "I Triakontaetis Thitia tou Kipriakou sta Inomena Ethni" (The Thirty years of the Cyprus problem in the United Nations), in I Nea Diethnis Taxi, i Ellada, i Tourkia kai to Kipriako Provlima (The New

Holbrooke³⁷⁰ then brokered a meeting on security issues in September 1997 and another in November. All these meetings did not produce tangible results and even worse the Luxemburg EU decision in the end of that year for EU-Turkish relations affected negatively the whole process³⁷¹.

In the meantime, on the margins of the July NATO meeting in Madrid, with the indirect US involvement Greek Prime Minister Simitis and Turkish President Demirel signed the Madrid declaration³⁷². The six-point declaration had a style of “a convergence of views on a basis for promoting better relations”³⁷³. Nevertheless, the document did not include potentially significant commitments, in effect achieving the Greek agreement to refrain from unilateral acts (such an extension of the territorial waters), and for Turkish agreement to refrain from the use of force or threat of use of force (as happened in the Imia/Kardak incident). There was,

International Order, Greece, Turkey and the Cyprus Problem) (Athens: Sideris Publications), pp. 365-390.

³⁷⁰ Holbrooke made a proposal to then Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Mr Şükrü Sina Gürel to solve the Cyprus problem in the EU framework. The latter denied such a proposal. Interview with former Foreign Minister Mr. Şükrü Sina Gürel, Ankara, January 8, 2004.

³⁷¹ T. Bahçeli, and N. Rizopoulos. 1996/97. “The Cyprus Impasse What Next,?” *World Policy Journal* Winter, pp. 27-29.

³⁷² J. Wilkinson, 2000 “The United States, Turkey and Greece – Three’s a Crowd” in M. Abramovitz, (ed.) *Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy* (New York: The Century Foundation Press), p. 206.

³⁷³ The principles of the declaration provided for:

1. mutual commitment to peace, security and the continuing development of good-neighboring relations;
2. respect for each other’s sovereignty;
3. respect for the principles of international law and international agreements
4. respect for each other’s legitimate vital interests and concerns in the Aegean;
5. a commitment to refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual respect and a willingness to avoid conflicts arising from misunderstandings;
6. a commitment to settle by peaceful means based on mutual consent and without use of force or threat of force.

See C. Migdalovitz, “Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues – Background and Recent Developments”, pp.7-8.

however, no follow-on mechanism ; neither side seemed to take the document as a basis for action, and the “spirit of Madrid” began almost at once to évaporate³⁷⁴.

The decision of the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 to approve not only Cyprus³⁷⁵ but also ten Central and East European countries for membership negotiations without Turkey being in that list was a shock for Ankara. This was a negative development for Turkey and even worse as the linkage of Turkish membership prospects was connected with the progress in the Cyprus problem³⁷⁶.

As a result of it Turkey remained committed to continuing economic cooperation with the EU but promptly suspended all political dialogue³⁷⁷. Further it hardened its position and joined with the Turkish Cypriots to counterattack on the issue of Cyprus by suspending UN negotiations and later by abandoning the bizonal, bicomunal approach in favor of separation and co-federation. After these developments in the EU-Turkish relations Washington could not help much. After a last visit to Nicosia in May of 1998 and in conclusive private sector meetings with all parties represented, Holbrooke gave up³⁷⁸.

³⁷⁴ H. Ünal, 1999. “Implications on the EU-Turkey Relationship” in S. Baier-Allen, (ed.) Looking into the Future of Cyprus-EU Relations (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), p. 83; Turkish Probe 11/7/1997, p.15; E. Athanassopoulou, 1997. “Blessing in Disguise? The Imia Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations” Mediterranean Politics 2:3, pp.93-94.

³⁷⁵ J. Joseph, 1996. “Cyprus at the Threshold of the European Union”, Mediterranean Quarterly 7:2, pp.112-122.

³⁷⁶ The Conclusions of the Luxemburg European Council, December 12-13, 1997; Statement of the Turkish Government regarding the Conclusions of the Luxemburg European Council, (Ankara, December 14, 1997); M. Firat, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Yunanistan Dış Politikasının”, pp. 62-63.

³⁷⁷ H. Kabaalioglu, 1999. “Turkey and the European Union Converging or Drifting Apart?”, Marmara Journal of European Studies, 7:1-2, pp.109-165.

³⁷⁸ Richard Holbrooke in an interview in Los Angeles Times says that negotiations did not even started because of the Turkish Cypriot side preconditions, firstly, to be recognized in advance and secondly, the Clerides government to withdrew its application to join the EU. Los Angeles Times 7/6/1998.

Along with the American efforts, two more initiatives were taken by NATO and the Dutch Presidency to resolve the Aegean dispute. Soon after the Imia/Kardak crisis, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana proposed confidence-building measures (CBMs) based on a May 1988 Memorandum of Understanding between Karolos Papoulias and Mesut Yılmaz, the Greek and the Turkish Foreign Ministers, respectively³⁷⁹. Solana renewed his CBM efforts in February 1997. His proposals were strongly supported by the United States, called for

- a. a memorandum on military exercises between June 15 to September 15;
- b. combat training missions only by unarmed planes;
- c. planes to use identification, friend or foe devices (IFF) (instead of submitting flight plans) to preclude intercepts, reduce the need to scramble interceptors, and decrease the number of mock dog fights;
- d. direct communication between Greek and Turkish air defense operations offices; and
- e. establishment of a center at NATO Command Headquarters in Naples to monitor Aegean airspace operations³⁸⁰.

Both parties agreed partly with modifications. Greece agreed to the moratorium on military exercises for the proposed period while Turkey agreed to July 1 – August 15

³⁷⁹ That memorandum was actually the major achievement of the 1988 Davos process which contains Confidence Building Measures, Tension Reduction Measures and Good Neighborliness Measures. Turkey and Greece agreed that to;

- a. respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other and their rights to use the high seas and international space of the Aegean
- b. avoid interfering with shipping and air traffic while conducting military activities in the high seas and international airspace; and
- c. avoid conducting military exercises in the high seas and international airspace during the peak tourism period of July-September and main national and religious holidays.

In September 1988, Papoulias and Yılmaz signed Guidelines for the Prevention of Accidents and Incidents on the High Seas and International Airspace, which called, *inter alia*, for the parties to act in conformity with international regulations See C. Migdalovitz, "Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues", p.4.

³⁸⁰ C. Migdalovitz, "Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues", p. 5.

and said it would use IFF during that time. As it has done for decades, Greece rejected use of IFF because it carved out a special exception to the Athens FIR, which, it said, applies to all countries. Turkey called for an exchange of information concerning flights in the Aegean, which Greece considered an infringement of its FIR responsibilities. Greece refused to disarm its combat aircraft in its national airspace, and said that training flights would not be armed. Greece reportedly agreed to hotlines between Athens and NATO, and Turkey and NATO.

The other initiative came during 1997 as the President of the European Union Council, the Netherlands, proposed a committee of “wise men” to deal with Greek-Turkish Aegean issues³⁸¹. Greece did not accept a direct dialogue with Turkey that might be perceived as willingness to negotiate what it views as its non-negotiable sovereignty issues or the involvement of third parties. It proposed the creation of separate Greek and Turkish committees of non-governmental experts who would report to the Dutch Presidency, which would then evaluate the reports for common ground. The whole effort did not lead anywhere as Turks pursued a more comprehensive agenda and the Greeks feared that this project might urge them to a direct dialogue with the Turks.

Regardless of all these efforts and initiatives for the resolution of the dispute, subsequent events pushed bilateral Greek-Turkish relations near a breaking point. These were the S-300 missiles and the Öcalan affair.

³⁸¹ M. Aydın, 1997. “Cacophony in the Aegean; Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations”, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations XXVII, p.137.

5.3.3 S-300 Missiles Crisis

The first issue which resulted in the American involvement again, was the decision of the Cypriot government in January 1997, to contract with Russia the purchase of S-300 missiles, an anti-aircraft system similar to the American Patriot missile³⁸². The Turks reacted strongly. They denounced the missile buy as unwarranted escalation, denied there was any threat from Turkish planes, and described the S-300 missiles as jeopardizing not only Turkish Cypriots but the security of Turkey itself³⁸³. Ankara said it would “not tolerate” deployment and the general staff was directed to take “additional military measures”. Washington decried both the deployment and the threat of military action in response³⁸⁴.

President Clerides postponed implementation twice in 1998 and in December of that year announced a decision taken in consultation with Athens to cancel the deployment – the missiles were instead to be sent to Crete. The Clerides government, which backed down despite strong domestic calls, received intense pressure from the United States and the Europeans and possible adverse effects on

³⁸² The purchase of the missiles was a part of the implementation of a military modernization program designed to produce quantitative and qualitative improvements in the country's defense capabilities vis-à-vis Turkey, seen as the single major external threat. In addition to a deterrence strategy, based on a military cooperation agreement and common defense doctrine instituted with Greece in 1993; Greek-Cypriots opened an air base at Paphos, and completed a \$425 million purchase agreement for 30 Russian S-300 medium-range surface-to-air missiles. According to the Greek-Cypriots, this military strategy would reinforce their position in the intercommunal talks and put some pressure in the international community to achieve the withdrawal or even a serious reduction of the Turkish troops. It would also guarantee the security of the Greek-Cypriot population; as they perceive living under a shadow of a permanent menace To Vima 29.11.1998, p.6; 29.3.1998, p.13; 15.11.1998, p.6; 8.11.1998, p.17; 8.11.1998, p.14, Turkish Probe 6.12.1998, p.4.

³⁸³ H. Kramer, 1997. “The Cyprus Problem and European Security”, Survival 39:3, p.19; H. Ünal, 1999. “Missiles off to Crete, Is Peace Any Nearer?” The Strategist, February-March, pp.35-37; G. Ayman, 2002. “A Case of Brinkmanship: S-300 Missile Crisis”, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies Istanbul: ISIS: 7, pp.5-34.

³⁸⁴ Washington had additional concerns. The possible deployment of Russian weapons in the already overly-militarized island was undesirable development for the American side. See Interview with Nicholas Berns: <http://www.ana.gr/hermes/1998/sep/interview/htm>.

Cyprus's application for EU membership. Although statements from Athens were carefully phrased to maintain the credibility of the "joint defense doctrine"³⁸⁵, the Greeks did not oppose deployment presumably because it would have been nearly impossible to defend effectively against Turkish military action.

5.3.4 The Öcalan Affair

The second event was in the beginning of 1999. After Öcalan's "European trip" that took place following his deportation from Syria, he was finally captured upon his leaving from the Greek embassy in Nairobi, Kenya in February 1999. For the Turks, that was another evidence that Greece supported PKK³⁸⁶. The Turkish President Suleyman Demirel proclaimed Greece to be a "rogue state" and added that "Greece did not respect international laws, and supported terrorism, and that such actions were not befitting to a country that considered traitors as ally and friend"³⁸⁷.

The Öcalan affair was an important catalyst as the relations between the two countries had reached a very low point. After the resignation of Theodore Pangalos and his replacement in the Greek Foreign Ministry by George Papandreou, both sides met and announced a process of bilateral talks. During the second half of 1999,

³⁸⁵ Eletherotipia 6.9.1998, p.4.

³⁸⁶ Most Turks, especially those in the security forces, have been convinced that the Greek government (along with others, notably Syria) gave military training and supplies to the PKK, as part of its effort to strengthen PKK secessionist moves in the southeastern Turkey See S. Elekdağ, 1996. "2 1/2 War Strategy", Perceptions Journal of International Affairs:III, p.4; **Greece and PKK Terrorism**. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 1999. Greek government always denied these allegations argued that provides nonmilitary assistance to Kurds which stemming from its human rights concerns, along with other Europeans.. For the events of February 1999 Öcalan was helped from unofficial Greek channels and since the whole story became public caused a serious crisis inside the PASOK government with the resignations of the Ministers of foreign affairs, Public Order and Public Administration. The Greek citizens involved went to court but finally were not found guilty. Ta Nea 25/6/2003.

³⁸⁷ F. Aksu, "Turkish-Greek Relations from Conflict to Détente the Last Decade", pp. 181-182.

bilateral relations entered a phase of détente. Although this rapprochement remains tenuous, it has brought some positive results in decreasing tension in the Aegean, promoting low politics cooperation and opening the way to Turkey's candidacy to the EU.

5.3.5 The 1999 Helsinki European Council Decision

In the end of 1999 the European Council summit was again critical for Turkey. This time the decision in December 1999 pleased Ankara as she caught the status of the candidate member in the EU but without a timeframe. Greece supported Turkey's EU membership in principle, although emphasizing particular conditions favorable to Greeks³⁸⁸.

The EU's Presidency Conclusions underlined that "a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus" but added that it was not a precondition³⁸⁹. This formulation and its acceptance by Ankara clearly angered Denktash, who had hoped for direct linkage, in line with his position that accession was unacceptable unless Turkish Cypriots agreed to the terms for Cyprus, and Turkey became an EU member³⁹⁰. The Helsinki conclusions did not name the Aegean, but it was clearly there between the lines of language calling on candidates (that is Turkey) to resolve "border disputes and other related issues" and failing to achieve this within a reasonable time, "to bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The

³⁸⁸P. Kazakos, et al. 2001. *I Ellada kai to Evropaiko Mellon tis Tourkias*; *Ependitis* 18-19/12/1999. pp.20-21; *Briefing* "Time to Find the Right Route to EU", 13/11/2000: 1318, pp.12-15.

³⁸⁹The Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, December 10-11, 1999; *Briefing* "The End of a 36-Year Struggle: a Journey Down a New Path", 13/12/1999: 1272, p.8.

³⁹⁰N. Tocci, 2003. "Cyprus and the European Union Accession Process: Inspiration for Peace or Incentive for Crisis?", *Turkish Studies* 3:2, pp. 105-110; A. Theophanous, 2003. "The Cyprus Problem: Accession to the EU and Broader Implications", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 14:1, pp. 61-65.

European Council stated it would review the situation at the latest at the end of 2004, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the ICJ”³⁹¹.

As it is analyzed above, during the last decade and especially under Clinton administration, the US policy was active towards the Greek-Turkish dispute. The American crisis management role was successful during the serious crisis of 1996. A quiet effort led by the United States succeeded after years of patient work in reestablishing NATO command and control mechanisms suspended since 1974³⁹².

The relative ineffectiveness of the world’s only superpower in this specific peacekeeping enterprise stems in a large extent from the US political considerations. The fact that the US considers Turkey more important than Greece ³⁹³ in their strategic considerations is always a disadvantage in the US mediating efforts. On the other hand, America’s Greek lobby ensures through its congressional influence that no US administration can deal with Turkey unless it deals with Greece.

The EU parameter has also undermined the US position. Washington and Brussels consult constantly, but their perspectives on Turkey have often differed. The United States supports the Turkish integration in the EU and sees Turkey as important bridge between the west, on the one hand, and the Middle East and the Caucasus and Central Asia, on the other. The Europeans, however, tend to see Turkey more like a

³⁹¹ Briefing, “The End of a 36-Year Struggle; a Journey Down a New Path”, p.10; Y. Acer, 2002. “Recent Developments and Prospects for Settlement of the Aegean Disputes”, Turkish Studies 3:2, pp. 201-206.

³⁹² T. Dokos, 2003. “Greece in Changing Strategic Setting” in T. Couloumbis, T. Kariotis, and F. Bellou. Greece in the Twentieth Century, pp.46-48.

³⁹³ Interview with former Greek Foreign Minister Mr. Theodoros Pangalos, Athens, December 18, 2003.

barrier that stands between Europe and unstable areas in the Middle East or the Caucasus³⁹⁴. The EU actions on Turkish and Cypriot membership issues from 1995 to 1998 undervalued US presidential envoys' efforts.

Additionally the EU was literally absent during the dangerous crisis of 1996 despite the fact that one of the parties involved was a member of the EU. Also the EU initiative, the "wise men" committees, did not offer much in the whole problem.

The search for a more effective US role in the Greek-Turkish dispute will continue for the American decision makers. At least keeping and strengthening Greek-Turkish detente which continues is a positive element. Furthermore, the involvement of the EU may give the chance for the US to disengage itself to a certain extent from the bilateral dispute.

³⁹⁴ I. Lesser, 1993. "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War", in G. Fuller, et al. **Turkey's New Geopolitics. From the Balkans to Western China** (Boulder: Westview Press), pp. 100-102.

CONCLUSION

The US involvement in the long-running dispute between Greece and Turkey was targeting to prevent a war between the two allies and thus the disruption of the alliance's southeastern flank. This was consistent throughout the period under review. Especially during the early Cold War years, this would have caused a more active involvement of the Soviet Union in the strategic region of Eastern Mediterranean. Additionally, the US was trying to mediate between the two parties holding an equidistant position, aiding both sides to resolve the dispute and to reduce tension.

The Greek and Turkish side has viewed Washington's attitude according to their security interests in the region but also according to Washington's policies in the Greek-Turkish crises. Both Greece and Turkey recognized the importance of being allies of the US. In the post-war era the governments of both sides sought to secure guarantees from the US, pursued their participation in NATO and focused their endeavor to improve their relations with the United States.

As the first problems appeared in their bilateral relations, these became priorities in their foreign policies and not the alliance's commitments. This was the case immediately after the starting of the Cyprus problem in 1955. Greece internationalized the conflict with the Greek appeals in the UN General Assembly despite the disapproval of the American side. Turkey, on the other hand was

determined not to let Greece receive the whole of the island of Cyprus. After the 1963 crisis both sides agreed that a new settlement needed and welcomed the US mediation because they preferred a solution package from outside, rather than formulate painful concessions themselves.

Moreover, in the 1970s they mobilized their NATO membership to secure as much as possible their respective positions in the Aegean. Greek government under Karamanlis was seeking for US guarantees, in order to protect Greek territorial status quo. Papandreou went even further asking NATO guarantees against Turkey. But Turkey also tried to improve its position with regards to NATO in the bilateral dispute by blocking Greek re-entry until 1980.

Both states realized in different years (Turkey in 1964 and Greece in 1974) that their vital ally was motivated by its strategic considerations without taking into account the vital interests of each country. As a result both Greece and Turkey took their distances, concentrated their efforts to decrease their political dependency on the US. After 1964 notorious Johnson letter not allowing Turkey to intervene in Cyprus, Turkey opted for a more multi-dimensional foreign policy. Furthermore, it initiated a rapid process of improving its relations with Soviet Union which had remained cool and distant since the early 1950s. Greece, respectively, after 1974, withdrew from NATO and shifted to a more European-oriented foreign policy. Major goal of the Greek foreign policy became the entrance in the European Community which was finally achieved in 1981. Greece managed to strengthen its ties with the western European states along with the improvement of bilateral relations with the Balkan countries.

Despite these common themes, the perceptions of Greece and Turkey towards the US involvement diverge in a large extent. Since the two NATO countries have not only found a way to reach a kind of compromise in their differences but also their relations deteriorated further, each side has formulated a different view of the American involvement to their respective policies and the intentions regarding the involvement.

During the Cold War era the United States was concerned because of the additional Aegean problems in the Greek-Turkish relations but it was keeping an equidistant position. Additionally, it never attempted to propose a plan as it did in Cyprus in the 1960s. This equal distant stance of the US was perceived as pro-Turkish from the Greek side and Greece often held the US responsible for the deterioration of the Greek-Turkish relations. Turkey, on the other hand, was milder towards the US and especially under Turgut Özal's premiership in the 1980s.

In the most serious crisis over the Imia/Kardak islets in 1996, the American intervention was the catalyst to prevent a war. The main concern of the Americans, as always in the past, was to eliminate the immediate threat of war. During the escalation of the crisis, they did not try to take the side of one or the other but to resolve the crisis. Afterwards, the US kept the usual neutral stance trying to bring the two parties closer towards a solution.

The Greek side welcomed the American contribution in finding out a way of deescalating the crisis. However, when the danger was over, for domestic considerations recalled its earlier stance and accused the US, saying that it

encouraged Turkish revisionism towards Greece. The Greek side maintains that an equidistant US stance benefits Turkey and ignores what they believe is the right (Greek) position on the Aegean issues and in Cyprus. Greek political elite and the Greek public believe that the United States has always favored Turkey because it has greater value in US strategic planning³⁹⁵. The West has given the Turks to understand that during the decades of the Cold War but also after, Turkey is the “indispensable nation”, and that the west is willing to close its eyes if Turkey violates the human rights of its citizens or bullies its neighbors³⁹⁶.

Particularly, in the case of Imia/Kardak crisis in 1996, the issue for the Greek side was the respect and continued validity of international agreements and established international borders. Washington failed to recognize this important legal principle, in order not to displease the Turks. In the Greek eyes, the policy of equal distance has alienated the United States, undermined its ability to act as a mediator in the region, and has encouraged Turkey’s revisionism in the Aegean and intransigence in Cyprus³⁹⁷.

Despite Greece is not satisfied by the American role, by recognizing that Turkey is a more powerful player, seeks or demands third party intervention to level or weigh them in Greece’s favor. It is a must for the Greek policy makers despite that they

³⁹⁵ Interview with retired ambassador Mr. Vyron Theodoropoulos, Athens, September 13, 2003 and with former Greek Foreign Minister, Mr. Theodoros Pangalos, Athens, December 18, 2003.

³⁹⁶ V. Theodoropoulos, 2003. “Greek-Turkish Relations: A New Era?” in *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, p.317.

³⁹⁷ Interview with retired ambassador Mr. Vyron Theodoropoulos, Athens, September 13, 2003. Mr Theodoropoulos gives an other dimension arguing that the US do not assist Turkey enough to realize the benefits of a peaceful neighboring relations with Greece.

know very well after all these years that the US constant “neutrality” fails to fulfill that need.³⁹⁸

During the 1990s an important change in the Greek perception towards US took place, at least in the level of governments. Comparing with Andreas Papandreou era, the relations have improved; Greece has contributed in the NATO Balkan operations and has become a key US partner for regional development. The anti-Americanism still exists in the public, among the leftist parties and in some members of PASOK government who feel nostalgia for Papandreou’s nationalist coronas but it seems that it does not affect vital decisions for Greek foreign policy. In addition, anti-Americanism is often used as rhetoric serving populist political needs.

In an effort to counter balance the US involvement, the Greek side mobilizes its membership in the EU and the Turkish desire to become a member as well. This gives Greece an advantage as a prerequisite for Turkey’s accession is the resolution of the Greek-Turkish dispute. Moreover, it accomplishes Greek aim of siding with a stronger power “against Turkey”. And since the end of the Second World War that stronger for the first time is not the “neutral” US³⁹⁹. This development makes Greece more self-confident. Nevertheless, the Greek foreign policy makers know that the game of bargaining and compromising inside the EU will carry on since the Greek stance toward the dispute has not moved an inch from the legalistic perception based on “rights” rather than national interests.

³⁹⁸ Interview with retired ambassador Mr. Vyron Theodoropoulos, Athens, September 13, 2003.

³⁹⁹ Interview with Prof. Theodoros Kouloubis, Athens, September 20, 2003.

The Turkish perception of the US is quite different from the Greek one. Turkish side does not criticize US neutrality and generally appreciate and expect US services in mediating with controversies with Greece. The Turkish side looks more self-confident for the US role in the Greek-Turkish dispute and they seem that that they do not need further assistance in their bilateral problems with Greece. In the Greek-Turkish dispute, Turkish side as the larger power, assumes that it can obtain a more favorable outcome from negotiations solely between the two governments and usually calls for a bilateral dialogue.

The search for a solution in the Aegean dispute is really a hard task because each party preferred different means for the resolution. Greece is in favor of a legal solution through the International Court of Justice even though the first Greek appeal was negative for Greece. Turkey prefers a political solution through bilateral negotiations. Each side has not moved an inch from those positions all these years and thus, it is almost impossible to have the slight progress in the Aegean issues.

However, the Turkish perception is different for the US Congress. Congress under the pressure of the Greek and the Armenian lobbies was always very critical over Kurdish issue and Turkey's human rights problems. The rise of sharp criticism directed by US Congress contributed to the increase of negative attitudes toward the US among the Turkish public. The US Congress began to restrict arms transfers to Turkey to pressure Ankara to change its policies towards the Kurds, improve its human rights record, and make concessions to Greece in the Aegean and Cyprus. All these pressures for strengthening democratic institutions much irritate the Turkish

political elite which expected more tolerance from the US. Furthermore, Turkish side can not accept that an ethnic group would dictate and instruct Turkish politics.

Turks more generally believe that the United States is the only power that really matters in world politics and that it has the power, capability and political will to play a major role in regional issues that concern Turkey. This perception is bolstered by Washington's political leadership and military campaign during the 1990-91 Gulf war, America's role in bringing to an end to the Bosnian tragedy, and by Washington's crisis diplomacy during several political crises between Greece and Turkey and especially during the Imia/Kardak dispute. Furthermore, many Turkish policy makers think that in comparison with the US, the European states do not have the capability or the interest to play a similarly critical role or mediating in regional conflicts.

The Turks believe that they are more important ally of the United States, due to their proximity to the Middle East and the Caucasus⁴⁰⁰. So the US help is essential in other regions where vital Turkish interests are at stake. Turkey expects US influence on Turkey's relations with Europe⁴⁰¹. Additionally, as the resolution of the Greek-Turkish problems appeared as a precondition for the Turkish membership the US aid counts significantly.

⁴⁰⁰ It was a common point by Mr Vyron Theodoropoulos, Mr. T. Couloumbis and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Theodoros Pangalos .

⁴⁰¹ Turkey had vital US support for signing the Custom Union's Agreement in 1995. Interview with former Foreign Minister Mr. Murat Karayalçin, Ankara, January 7, 2004. However, this support was not the same the following years. It seemed that the US is not willing to offer the same aid to Turkey as the US knows that Turkey's road to the EU is quite uncertain. Interview with former Foreign Minister Mr. Şükrü Sina Gürel, Ankara, January 8, 2004.

As Turkey moves closer to the EU and aspires to obtain full membership, its domestic politics are coming under increased scrutiny from the Brussels mechanisms. Certain part of the Turkish political elite is reluctant and skeptical to give up the state's mechanisms of social control and the army's prerogatives in favor of an elusive and distant European future. Turkey for itself will use its pivotal position in Europe's periphery to gain as much as possible from the two strong players, the US and the EU, and giving away as less as possible of what it considers Turkish vital national interests.

In the 1990s as the EU emerged as a new factor in the bizarre triangular relationship, the United States seemed ready to make more space to the EU to search for a solution inside the EU framework. Greece is a member of the EU, Cyprus will become officially a member in May 2004 and Turkey is a candidate, so all the involved parties in the dispute have vital political links to the EU. The decisions of the European Councils in the last nine years have showed that the whole Greek-Turkish dispute has moved to Brussels.

Greece uses EU mechanisms effectively and has managed to interrelate her bilateral problems with Turkey, along with Turkey's accession to the EU. She expected that the eternal problems of Cyprus and the Aegean would be solved in a "fairer way" through EU diplomatic channels⁴⁰². This accomplishes Greece's aim, as she is sided with a larger power which seems to be more favorable comparing with the US against Turkey.

⁴⁰² Interview with Prof. Theodoros Couloumbis, September 20, 2003.

The decision of the European Council to accept Turkey officially as a candidate country at its Helsinki Summit of December 1999 showed that the Euro-Turkish relations entered a more promising phase. But the progress of the accession negotiations is dependent on the progress of a resolution of the Cyprus and Aegean dispute. Ankara is expected to play an active role in bringing about a settlement in Cyprus as all parties concerned perceive it as having a key part in achieving the resolution of this imbroglio.

The United States seems to encourage a solution of the Cyprus problem and the Aegean dispute through EU diplomatic channels and ideas. The Annan Plan proposed by the UN Secretary General (which was heavily influenced by the ideas of the British special envoy for Cyprus Sir David Hannay), is totally promoted by the United States who is actually putting pressure on both sides to accept it. A final settlement in Cyprus would be quite useful for the American side as Cyprus can be used for the aims of the American strategy in the Middle East⁴⁰³.

The Annan plan satisfies the basic demands of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island. The plan offers the Turkish community political equality with the Greek Cypriots and envisages the formation of a common state composed of politically equal component states enjoying legal equality with the central level and exercising sovereign powers in their respective spheres of jurisdiction. It also allows for the continuation of a Turkish military presence on the island, although on a reduced scale and within a certain timeframe. Greek Cypriots would be benefited from the

⁴⁰³ Interview with former Turkish Foreign Minister Mr. Şükrü Sina Gürel, January 8, 2004.

reunification of the island and will obtain control over a larger proportion of the island's territory⁴⁰⁴.

Turkey under these evolutions should take crucial decisions whether it will encourage the Turkish Cypriots to accept the Annan Plan in Cyprus. However, despite the outside pressures, the Turkish side is not willing to be committed to a plan in a hurry⁴⁰⁵. It is questionable if Turkey will accept compromises of its rights over Cyprus since the island is so indispensable for the strategic interests of Turkey. None of the political parties dare to make far-reaching concessions on Cyprus for whatever the objective would be. Decision like the compromise of March 6, 1995 which guaranteed Cyprus that the accession negotiations in return for the lifting of the Greek veto on the Customs Union agreement with Turkey, provoked strong reactions and criticism in certain part of the Turkish political elite⁴⁰⁶.

Concerning the Aegean problems, since the candidate status for Turkey is still quite unclear; it is questionable if Turkey would accept a solution imposed by the EU for the Greek-Turkish Aegean agenda. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for the resolution of the Greek-Turkish problems as the Helsinki summit decision has indicated⁴⁰⁷.

On the other hand, Turkey expects the United States' support in her endeavor towards the EU. Actually, in the first half of the 1990s the United States was

⁴⁰⁴ For more details of the UN plan on Cyprus see <http://www.un.org/news>.

⁴⁰⁵ Interview with former Turkish Foreign Minister Mr. Şükrü Sina Gürel, January 8, 2004.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ See Chapter V, p. 158.

lobbying strongly for Turkey's membership⁴⁰⁸. It seemed that at the end of the decade the US does not show the same enthusiasm. This might be explained because the Turkish membership is still vague and to a certain extent, Turkey is not as such loyal ally as the US would expect it to be in the Middle East.

It might be argued that the United States involvement in the dispute was successful in its crisis management role. It preserved the stability of NATO in southeastern Europe and avoided the unthinkable; the two allies going to war, which would have produced severe results for the NATO alliance and the two states themselves. However, in their attempt of searching for a solution, the American administrations were not very successful. This can be explained by the fact that the solution of the Greek-Turkish dispute was never a priority in their agenda and despite the pressure that they were able to put on both Greece and Turkey, it was not enough to make the two parties move.

On the other hand, both parties have a certain perception for the US which is completely different. The Greeks ask from the Americans support and understanding for their problems with Turkey. Greece's perception of its problems with Turkey is viewed as a matter of justice. The repeated references to rights rather than interests, make negotiations and a bilateral give-and-take with Ankara almost impossible, whatever the Americans propose. The Turks on the other side think that they can deal with the Greeks by themselves. Turkish side seemed more prepared for such a process as it has identified its national interests in a large extent clearer than Greece.

⁴⁰⁸ Interview with former Turkish Foreign Minister Mr. Murat Karayalçın, January 7, 2004.

Greece and Turkey were satisfied with US the crisis management role. Additionally, they would have expected more effort towards a solution by the US, but this necessarily does not mean that they would negotiate deeper and commit themselves to a settlement. Domestic considerations, the danger of a national humiliation, the national pride were always in a higher position than a discussion of what is really vital and the benefits of a possible settlement of the Greek-Turkish dispute.

Additionally, the US has a certain degree of putting pressure in the two parties but there are certain limits to that. The whole history of the dispute and the American role in it has shown that whatever the Americans propose, it is the two governments that should have the political courage and will to decide and commit. In this respect, the involvement of the EU in a sense relieved the US, as the initiatives now would start from Brussels and nobody would accuse them as ineffective. With the inclusion of the EU in this game, Greece seems to have an advantage since she is already a member in the Union and Turkey in on the way to obtain the full membership. However, it is still early to evaluate if under this procedure and with the encouragement of the US, the Greek-Turkish dispute would be resolved.

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