

Jean - Jacques  
Rousseau  
and  
International  
Relations

A. Critical Assessment

A THESIS PRESENTED  
BY  
KEREM KARAOĞMANOĞLU  
TO  
THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
AND  
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

BILKENT UNIVERSITY  
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*Kerem Karaosmanoğlu*  
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I certify that I have read this thesis, and in my opinion it is fully adequate in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Political Science and Public Administration.

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# Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the problematic character of a specific interpretation of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's views concerning international relations by focusing on the 'special' relationship between political theory and international relations theory. To a great extent, Rousseau is supposed to have provided (along others such as Machiavelli, Hobbes and Thucydides) a philosophical pretext for the 'realist school' of international relations. By referring both to Rousseau himself and to some alternative interpretations, a profile of a different Rousseau is drawn unlike the realist version. Both the extent of Rousseau's realism and the scientific validity of the realist/idealist opposition are the primary concerns.

# Özet

Bu tezin amacı, siyaset teorisi ile uluslararası ilişkiler teorisi arasındaki ilişki üzerinde durmak ve bu çerçevede içinde, Jean-Jacques Rousseau'nun belli bir yorumunun sorunlu niteliğini ortaya koymaktır. Uluslararası ilişkiler üzerine çalışan önemli sayıda bilim adamı, Rousseau'nun fikirlerini "gerçekçi okulun" felsefi temellerinden biri saymaktadır. "Gerçekçi" görüşün aksine, kendi eserleri ve bazı yorumlarına atıfta bulunarak, Rousseau'nun farklı bir profili çizilecektir. Rousseau'nun "gerçekçiliği" ve "gerçekçi/idealist" karşıtlığının bilimsel geçerliliği bu tezin öncelikli konusudur.

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# **CHAPTER 1**

## **Introduction**

The conventional understanding of international relations distinguishes two distinct bodies of thought, separate from each other, and each one having its own problematic. It creates an inside/outside relationship in order to legitimize the 'independent' nature of international relations theory.<sup>1</sup> Political theory deals with the inside: the state in general; state formation and structure; the state's legitimacy; and its relation to the civil society. International relations theory<sup>2</sup> was born independently of those concerns which, it assumes, belong to the sphere of political theory. Thus, in accordance with the division of labour tacitly created between the two disciplines, international relations theory is concerned to analyze the relations between (nation-) states in order to emphasize its scientific 'independence' from other related disciplines, especially political theory with a view to ascertaining its own legitimacy. It is on the basis of this division of labour that international relations theorists take certain political thinkers and try to (re)interpret their views to construct a philosophical foundation for international relations theory. Views of those political thinkers (such as Machiavelli, Kant, Hobbes, Rousseau) are analyzed from a perspective by fitting them into a specific position within the simple, well-known opposition in international relations : realism-idealism. Rousseau is often associated with a highly influential stream of thought in international relations : realism. His romantic inspiration, his moral approach to politics and philosophical problems, as well as his notion of the ideal

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<sup>1</sup> R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside : International Relations As Political Theory* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> By 'international relations theory', what is referred to is a specific way of theorizing which is under the discursive influence of 'realism'.

state somewhat de-emphasized, Rousseau has been interpreted in the realist context as an easy pessimist, so that he could be shown to constitute a philosophical cornerstone for the realist articulation of international relations theory.

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the 'functional' relationship between political theory and international relations theory by examining interpretations and misinterpretations of Rousseau's views which place him in relation to the realism/idealism opposition. Both the extent of Rousseau's realism and the scientific validity of the realist/idealist dichotomy will be the primary concerns of the thesis.

In Chapter Two, the relationship between political theory and international relations theory will be discussed. Specific perspectives adopted by significant international relations theorists, will be emphasized within the context of significant works of political theory. By examining relevant texts in connection with realism-idealism opposition, this discussion, it is argued, will help to elucidate the way in which international relations theory contributes to the formation of an intellectual discourse. There will follow a critical argument involving the views of Chris Brown, James Der Derian, Richard K. Ashley, Jim George and R. B. J. Walker, whose scholarly contribution has helped to shed light on the limits of conventional readings of political thinkers from the realist perspective. An argument will be made to show, through this exercise, how some certain 'well-known' political thinkers were interpreted by the help

of specific strategies to provide a 'tradition', a philosophical 'origin', for international relations theory.

One of the strategies is to put special emphasis on Rousseau's works which are claimed to be directly related to international relations theory such as *The State of War*, *Fragments on War* and *Abstract and Judgement of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace*, instead of *Emile* and *The Social Contract* for instance. In Chapters Three and Four which are concerned with Rousseau's understanding of 'the state of war', a close reading of Rousseau's own works will be provided.<sup>3</sup> Chapter Three will constitute a close reading of Rousseau and his notion of 'the state of war'. It will explain such questions as : 'What is the meaning of 'the state of war' ? Why does it take place ? What are the underlying causes behind it ?' Chapter Four, will focus on Rousseau's suggestions regarding how to avoid 'the state of war'. The discussion will show how Rousseau's attempted solutions are far from being merely 'international' remedies, but more comfortably fit into the state and the individual/citizen level, which can hardly be evaluated by the realism/idealism opposition of international relations.

Chapter Five will mainly cover the arguments of critical scholars such as A. O. Lovejoy, Merle L. Perkins, Ernst Cassirer, N. J. H. Dent and Michael C. Williams who have worked on Rousseau. The chapter will aim to show how their arguments stand in opposition, directly or

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<sup>3</sup> During focusing on the 'story' Rousseau presents, his employment of the words such as 'man', 'men' and 'he', is left unchanged.

indirectly, to the conventional reading of Rousseau within the context of international relations theory. Their arguments prove that Rousseau's supposed realism is problematic, since there is enough evidence to demonstrate the importance he attributes to the form of the state and the citizenship.

It is through a textual reading that the specific discourses influencing international relations theory will be analyzed in order to understand and criticize the conventional readings of Rousseau associating him with realism in international relations. Chapters Three, Four and Five will be like 'the case study' of Chapter Two. Generally, the thesis presents a critique towards a specific perspective belonging to the discourse of international relations; in other words, both relevance and validity of the realism-idealism opposition while evaluating the views of some major political thinkers will be questioned. More so, I believe that the critique of the realist interpretation of Rousseau's philosophy is also important to stress the importance of the levels of the state and the citizen for any attempt to produce effective solutions to international conflict which realism situates only at the level of the (anarchic) system.

# **CHAPTER 2**

## **International Relations : A Discipline Under The Yoke Of Positivism**

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the special links between international relations and political theory by focusing on some regularities prevailing in international relations theory. Accordingly, the 'nature' of international relations seems to be vital for understanding the specific strategies used to interpret the well-known political philosophers without giving up certain elements of an ahistorical way of thinking. Thus, it is important to notice the effort to provide philosophical 'origins' for the theoretical background of international relations theory.

## 2.1 - The Special Relationship Between International Relations And Political Theory

From Martin Wight to Hedley Bull, from the English School to the heydays of the behaviouralist period, international relations as an 'independent' discipline, was always based on an inside/outside problematic.<sup>1</sup> This problematic is the result of a modern tendency, in this case demonstrated by international relations, towards negation, in other words, trying to define itself in terms of what it is not.<sup>2</sup> Of course, without any doubt, 'what it is not' is political theory. This is obviously compatible with a 'unity of science' narrative which grants international

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<sup>1</sup> First special use of the phrase 'inside/outside' belongs to R. B. J. Walker, although later it became a common reference for the critical international relations literature. R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside : International Relations As Political Theory* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1993).

<sup>2</sup> Walker, p. 33.

relations its independence vis-à-vis other disciplines as a special compartment of a total entity, a complex 'machine'. Accordingly, functional 'independence' of international relations excludes political theory, or rather politics inside, as 'another story'. A relationship of 'equal twins' is adopted.<sup>3</sup>

Within the core of international relations literature, one can notice two special emphases (or analogies) in conformity with its definitive character. First is the effort to avoid 'the domestic analogy'. Thus, what is emphasized is that, within the international arena, there exists no central authority, nothing like a world government, over the states (unlike the situation concerning the state and the individuals). With the absence of a kind of world government, one is left with the necessary conclusion of the inevitability of conflict. Usually, the phrase 'inevitability of conflict' proves nothing more than a tautology regardless of any political, social, cultural, economic or global influence.<sup>4</sup> Conflict becomes for conflict's sake; mystically driven by 'another invisible hand'. Independent from the formation of the state, it becomes a unique feature of international relations.

Apart from the attitude of avoiding 'the domestic analogy', 'black-box' and 'billiard ball' analogies are favoured. 'Black-box' and 'billiard ball' analogies involve the assumption of state-centricity. 'Black-box' analogy focuses on nation-states that are assumed to have the capacity of rational action by only dealing with the 'inputs' and the 'outputs'.

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<sup>3</sup> Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory : New Normative Approaches* (London : Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 6.

<sup>4</sup> For a good example, see J. W . Burton, *International Relations : A General Theory* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1967), p.44.

Thus, the state is reduced to an unproblematic given. Similarly, with the 'billiard ball' analogy, what is emphasized is nothing but an international arena full of sovereigns, all of which aim at pursuing power on an equal basis. All of those analogies are often used together with an effort to imply the never-changing 'realities' of international politics. State sovereignty is no doubt a constant theme central to international relations which is rarely exposed to deep analysis.

Within the theories of international relations, using a specific method of the 'levels of analysis', state sovereignty (analytically) is seen as a level. The 'levels of analysis' simply requires the differentiation of three separate levels of analysis : Individual, state and the system.<sup>5</sup> However, according to Walker, what is seen is just on the surface; thus even with this analysis, state sovereignty remains the core element of international relations. Concerning the individual, the state and the systemic levels, the image of a 'rational actor' is still apparent (at least potentially). Moreover, the argument is put forward as if there can not be another category other than those three : the individual, the state and the system.<sup>6</sup> How possible is it to *represent*, for example, the gender, racial or ethnic differences under the modern category of the individual ? Where does 'the rise of Islam' fit as a cultural, political phenomenon within the state-centric frame of mind ?<sup>7</sup> In short, the 'levels of analysis', provides a limited way of dealing with the complexity of international relations.

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<sup>5</sup> The schema was used by Waltz in 1959 and was problematized by David Singer in 1961. K. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1959), J. D. Singer, 'The Level-of-Analysis Problem In International Relations' in K. Knorr and S. Verba (eds.), *The International System : Theoretical Essays* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77-92.

<sup>6</sup> Walker, p. 131.

<sup>7</sup> For a strong critique of the 'levels of analysis' schema, see 'The Territorial State and the Theme of Gulliver' in Walker, pp. 125-140. For another critique of the schema, see Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 99-201 & pp. 203-216.

State sovereignty in international relations is further legitimized by the realism/idealism opposition. Thus, as long as the argument goes on around the realist/idealist opposition, it seems not possible to go beyond the systemic level or the so-called 'third-image' level. In other words, the affirmation of the state-centric approach is realized by closing the debate without any kind of choice or possibility other than those two; either 'paradigmatically' accepting the anarchical nature of international conditions, or making an effort to change the 'state of anarchy' from the top (that is by way of a world government, international society or supranational organizations).

In international relations theory, positivism has traditionally played an influential role. Without any doubt, one can notice indications of an ahistorical positivist methodology in the 'traditional' texts of international relations. Wight, for instance, underlines the repetitive, constant, anti-progressive character in international politics, which is considered, in a sense, 'immune' from change.<sup>8</sup> Ahistoricism (contrary to claims) was a significant feature of the 'traditional' school of international relations. However, behaviouralism's critique and challenge of 'traditional' realism brought the argument further to a more positivistic stance. Vasquez analyzes well the precise implications of behaviouralist/positivist influence :

(a) Nation-states or their decision-makers are the most important actors for understanding international relations.

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<sup>8</sup> Brown, *International Relations Theory : New Normative Approaches*, p. 6.

(b) There is a sharp distinction between domestic politics and international politics.

(c) International Relations is the struggle for power and peace. Understanding how and why that struggle occurs and suggesting ways for regulating it is the purpose of the discipline. All research that is not at least indirectly related to this purpose is trivial.<sup>9</sup>

Quantification was the fashion of the 1950's and 60's, which led inevitably, to an increasing degree of indifference towards history. The 1950's and 60's behaviouralism goes hand in hand with a kind of 'end of ideology' discourse. Pluralism, structuralism and neo-realism follow one after the other with an effort to match the existing 'truths' of the philosophy of science reflecting the historical periods to which they belong.<sup>10</sup> All in all, it can be concluded that, international relations, to a great extent, was exposed to the scientific authority of positivism during the 1950's up to the 1990's. Hence, according to George, 'at the fundamental discursive level, there is no great difference between the British positions and the pseudoscientific approach of American realism'.<sup>11</sup>

Realism was the dominant pole within the realist/idealist debate. Of course, the modern distinction between positive and normative, between 'is' and 'ought' was important for the construction of the dominance of realism. With the introduction of the 'behaviouralistic turn', the argument turned out to be more 'scientific'; normativity,

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<sup>9</sup> J. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics : A Critique* (New Brunswick NJ : Rutgers University Press, 1983), p. 18, quoted from Hollis and Smith, p. 31.

<sup>10</sup> Michael Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate' in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom, *International Relations : A Handbook of Current Theory* (London : Frances Pinter, 1985), pp. 7-20.

<sup>11</sup> Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics : A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder, Colorado : Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 80. For the resemblance of British and American schools of International Relations, see Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics*, Chapter 2.

considered within the category of 'value-judgements', further lost its 'weight'. 'The prevailing philosophy in the social sciences - taken from economics but influential everywhere - drew a sharp distinction between positive and normative analysis, in effect eliminating the latter.'<sup>12</sup> International relations theory represented a 'micro reflection' of a modern, but at the same time a 'macro project' based on positivist science with an extent of 'division of labour' between the disciplines.

## 2.2 - The Invention of 'Tradition' : Rousseau As Providing An Origin For The 'Realist School' Of International Relations

Despite the behaviouralist attitude of underestimating the value of history and philosophy (as well as everything which is evaluated as 'unscientific'), there was another tendency to base international relations theory on a historical, philosophical origin referring to a 'tradition' : a tendency seeking more 'originality' for the legitimization of the central claims of international relations. It was an effort to create a historical root, a 'myth of origin', for an ahistorical theory.<sup>13</sup>

The 'discovered' historical texts, for international relations theory, became embedded in a logocentric process in which it is essential to rely

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<sup>12</sup> Brown, p. 8.

<sup>13</sup> For Walker it is an interesting contradiction. 'Claims about a hard material reality' on the one hand, and 'the textual strategies through which these claims are lodged within contemporary scholarship' on the other. Walker, p. 34.

on an ahistorical, unquestionable, universal *logos* .<sup>14</sup> Thinking in terms of binary oppositions (like order/anarchy, positive/normative, nature/culture, peace/war, irrational/rational, realism/idealism etc.), at the same time sticking to an hierarchical structure by favouring a single pole, is an integral part of the procedure.<sup>15</sup>

The views of 'great' political philosophers (such as Plato, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Kant, Rousseau) are taken 'selectively', filtered through the realist/idealist opposition. Often without paying attention to the historical context, in accordance with a 'familiar' narrative, philosophical figures as ahistorical subjectivities, are 'directed' to 'speak' the language of international relations usually being positioned somewhere within the realist/idealist opposition.<sup>16</sup> Of course the supposed eternal, trans-historical 'dialogue' between those great figures soon turns out to be an 'essentialist monologue' in parallel to the realist/idealist opposition as a

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<sup>14</sup> Richard K. Ashley, 'Living on Borderlines : Man, Poststructuralism and War' in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), *International/Intertextual Relations : Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (New York : Lexington, 1989), p. 261.

<sup>15</sup> In accordance with the logocentric procedure, within the international relations literature, it seems really not difficult at all to come across titles of various pieces reflecting binary oppositions :

\* Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War : Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1991).

\* John A. R. Marriott, *Commonwealth or Anarchy ? : A Survey of Projects of Peace : From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century* (London, 1937).

\* Joseph Frankel, *International Politics : Conflict and Harmony* (Middlesex : Penguin, 1969).

\* Eric Herring, *Danger and Opportunity : Explaining International Crisis Outcomes* (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1995).

\* Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York : Alfred . A . Knopf, 1967, 4th edition).

\* Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1976).

\* Stanley Hoffmann, 'Obstinate or Obsolete ? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe', *Daedalus* , 95, (Summer 1966) 862-915.

\* Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States : Reform and Resistance in the International Order* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1989).

<sup>16</sup> According to Walker, as far as Machiavelli is concerned, reference to an origin is far from being innocent, since one can notice an attitude which 'have turned an historical problematic into an ahistorical apology for the violence of the present'. Walker, "The Prince and 'The Pauper' : Tradition, Modernity and Practice the Theory of International Relations " in Der Derian & Shapiro (eds.), *International/Intertextual Relations : Postmodern Readings of World Politics* , pp. 29-30.

result of a logocentric hierarchy.<sup>17</sup> The process is well explained by George :

Textually, thus, International Relations continues to be characterized by a crude essentialism centered on a cast of caricatured historical figures. Dominating this textual monologue are Thucydides Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Morgenthau and Carr.<sup>18</sup>

Often, 'great' figures of political theory are contrasted to each other and positioned within the realism/idealism opposition. Wight, for instance, referring to Machiavelli, Grotius and Kant distinguishes between the realists, the rationalists and revolutionaries, respectively.<sup>19</sup> Hoffmann and Clark prefer to analyze Kant *as opposed to* Rousseau.<sup>20</sup> By asserting a 'permanent dialogue' between Kant and Rousseau, they, in a sense, push the ahistorical realist/idealist problematic to a 'trans-historical' stance.

Rousseau's pessimistic realism, seems to be a common reference (an 'easy-access' origin) sometimes even for the American behaviouralists.<sup>21</sup> As a result of a specific way of reading and an

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<sup>17</sup> Walker, *Inside/Outside : International Relations As Political Theory* , p. 32.

<sup>18</sup> George, *Discourses of Global Politics : A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations* , p. 71.

<sup>19</sup> Martin Wight, 'Why There Is No International Theory ? ' in H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations* (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1966).

<sup>20</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War : Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 86.

<sup>21</sup> Barry Buzan, Charles Jones & Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy : Neorealism To Structural Realism* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 222.

J. W. Burton, *International Relations : A General Theory* , p. 44.

Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* , p. 63.

Karl, W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 152.

P. A. Reynolds, *An Introduction To International Relations* (Lancaster : Longman, 1971), p. 4.

Joseph Frankel, *International Politics : Conflict and Harmony* ,(Middlesex : Penguin, 1969), pp. 44-45.

Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War : Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 166.

P. Savigear, 'European Political Philosophy and International Relations' in Trevor Taylor (ed.), *Approaches and Theory in International Relations* (New York : Longman, 1978), p. 44, p 49.

attitude of 'functional' selection,<sup>22</sup> Rousseau necessarily becomes a part of a binary opposition, transforming into a trans-historical figure playing not an insignificant role in the modern narrative of this century.

Therefore, by avoiding the conventional, 'selective' attitude towards the texts of Rousseau, bearing in mind the role of *Social Contract*, *Discourses* and especially *Emile*, an alternative reading of Rousseau seems possible which puts the realist conclusion into question. This thesis will provide both a critique of the realist interpretation of Rousseau and a map of alternative readings of Rousseau, which demonstrate the significance of internal dynamics of international conflict.

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Howard Williams, *International Relations Theory In Political Theory* (Philadelphia : Open University Press, 1992), pp. 68-79.

Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States : Reform and Resistance in the International Order* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 67-89.

Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading : Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 47-48.

<sup>22</sup> Two books involving selected texts from 'significant' political thinkers are; M. G. Forsyth, H. M. A. Keens-Soper and P. Savigear (eds.), *The Theory of International Relations : Selected Texts From Gentili To Treitschke* (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970) and Howard Williams, Moorhead Wright and Tony Evans, *A Reader in International Relations and Political Theory* (Philadelphia : Open University Press, 1993). For the purposes of international relations, only *Abstract and Judgement on Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace*, *The State of War* and *Fragments on War* are picked.

# **CHAPTER 3**

## **Rousseau and the Problem of the State of War**

What is the underlying significance of the state of war for Rousseau ? This chapter will deal with Rousseau's analysis of the state of nature, the transition from *amour-de-soi* (the original self-love) to *amour-propre* (vanity and selfishness) and how the social contract was misjudged by some readers and soon turned out to be an element of corruption. The state of war, for Rousseau, is nothing but a tragic consequence, a 'moral scandal', which blossoms not independent from underlying 'previous' developments.

### 3.1 - Back to the Nature ?

The state of war represents Rousseau's discontent with the present situation of Europe of his time which was based on a particular state formation. Rousseau's state of war emerges as a result of transformations within human nature and society involving the formation of the state. It signifies the story of mankind constantly falling away from its roots through a process of corruption which does not cease to exist at the state level. It is the final stage of a moral deterioration. Rousseau goes back to the state of nature in order to be able to explain the dynamics of this change.

In contrast to Hobbes, for Rousseau man in the state of nature is far from being selfish and aggressive. He is not selfish, because he is

not conscious enough to pursue private interests and not aggressive because he does not have a complex memory to remember and wage conflicts. As Roche indicated :

Timidity, not wickedness, was the mark of these primitive beings. To preserve themselves from harm, rather than to inflict it on others, was the only preoccupation; and knowing so little of one another, they could know nothing of those vices that spring from a life in common; vanity and ambition, suspicion and contempt, all of which are bred by competition among men. Thus, there could be no hatred of a lasting nature, nor thought of vengeance. Occasional acts of violence there may have been, but these were done solely on the impulse of a moment, and no sooner done, were forgotten by both aggressor and victim.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, man was living for the moment, in a state of immediacy. As he did not have any desires or ambitions, he did not attack and fight all the time. Neither did he know of good or evil nor could he make comparisons between his strength and real dangers. Timidity, for Rousseau, is not without its limits. Man, has an ability to learn, hence there is a chance for man not to behave in a timid manner (rather than aggressiveness) if he is faced with a familiar situation.<sup>2</sup>

Self-sufficiency is another feature of man in the state of nature. Rousseau's self-sufficiency has two dimensions. First of all, there is

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<sup>1</sup> K. Roche, *Rousseau : Stoic and Romantic* (London, 1974), p.30.

<sup>2</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality' in *The Social Contract and Discourses* (translated and introduced by G. D. H. Cole) (London : Everyman, 1993), p. 54. All quotations from 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality' are taken from this book.

physical self-sufficiency. Rousseau mentions nature's capacity for healing when man gets wounded.<sup>3</sup> Apart from this rather narrow sense of self-sufficiency, man also lives in a state of mental self-sufficiency. Man lives within himself in a kind of isolation. In order to be happy he does not need other people except for sex. Rousseau calls sex in the state of immediacy, 'physical love'. Moreover, in the state of nature, man lives for himself. He is never judged by other people's values. His self never reflects what other people think of him.

According to Rousseau, what distinguishes man from animal is not precisely man's capacity to use his 'reason'. The gap is not that wide for Rousseau. The key element Rousseau has in mind seems to be 'memory' - a memory which enables man to learn more quickly than any other animal. Senses provide an understanding of the external world and learning is achieved through senses by coding the information into the memory obtained after several repetitive experiences :

Every animal has ideas, since it has senses; it even combines those ideas in a certain degree; and it is only in degree that man differs, in this respect, from the brute.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 57.

<sup>4</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 59.

After a couple of pages, Rousseau introduces language as a distinctive tool of man's cognition :

Add to this, that general ideas cannot be introduced into the mind without the assistance of words, nor can the understanding seize them except by means of propositions. This is one of the reasons why animals cannot form such ideas, or ever acquire that capacity for self-improvement which depends on them.<sup>5</sup>

Therefore, this sense of memory is a crucial part of Rousseau's conception of the state of nature. But what is the significance of the state of nature for Rousseau ? Where does it stand, what is its status in terms of other subsequent historical stages ? Is it an actual, historical stage ? Or is it a methodological tool which is basically used in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of today by creating a contrast between the past and the present ? Is the state of nature hypothetical or is it based on facts ?<sup>6</sup> An easy answer seems impossible.

What does Rousseau mean by 'nature' ? Miller asserts that Rousseau cannot help falling into a state of paradox given he regards civil society as independent from nature. According to Miller,

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<sup>5</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 68.

<sup>6</sup> See C. J. H. Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* (New York : Garland Pub., 1987), pp. 45-8, Ernst Cassirer, *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe : Two Essays* (Princeton, 1945), pp. 22-4, Asher Horowitz, *Rousseau, Nature and History* (Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 49, p. 52, Alfred Cobban, *Rousseau and the Modern State* (London, 1934), p. 17, pp. 230-1.

Rousseau's state of nature, gradually turns out to be an 'artificial' civil society mainly because of 'natural' reasons.<sup>7</sup> Maurice Cranston, however, tries to clarify Rousseau's position by associating the problem with Rousseau's special usage of the word 'nature'. He writes : ' But what Rousseau is saying is that the state of nature is man's 'original' state, not his natural state; for man can only realize his full nature as a man by making the social compact and living under law.'<sup>8</sup>

However, did Rousseau have in mind a state of nature which really existed ? Rousseau at times gives the strong impression that he is writing about an actual historical stage relying on factual evidence. In *Discourse on Inequality* he seems to be clear enough : ' The times of which I am going to speak are very remote : how much are you changed from what you once were'.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, in *Rousseau Judge of Jean-Jacques* , he puts forward a self-description as 'the first truthful historian of human nature'.<sup>10</sup> In fact, Rousseau does not neglect to use empirical evidence in his analysis; he often refers to travellers' accounts in order to support his argument. However, apart from that, in *Discourse on Inequality* , he also indicates :

Let us begin then by laying all facts aside, as they do not affect the question. The investigations we may enter into, in treating this subject, must not be considered as

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<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, for the inconsistent aspects of Rousseau's work, see R. D. H. Miller, *The Changing Face of Nature in Rousseau's Political Writings* (York, 1983), pp. 1-4.

<sup>8</sup> Maurice Cranston, 'Introduction' in Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (translated by m. Cranston) (London : Penguin, 1968), p. 29.

<sup>9</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 51.

<sup>10</sup> Quoted from E. Cassirer, *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe : Two Essays* , p. 24.

historical truths, but only as mere conditional and hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain the nature of things, than to ascertain their actual origin...<sup>11</sup>

Again, in the preface of *Discourse on Inequality* , he finds it difficult 'to form a true idea of a state which no longer exists, perhaps never did exist, and probably never will exist, and of which it is, nevertheless, necessary to have true ideas, in order to form a proper judgement of our present state.'<sup>12</sup> Thus, Rousseau gives the impression that he is always inconsistently swinging like a pendulum from one position to another. According to Cassirer, the situation is far from being clear : 'In Rousseau himself it is never entirely clear to what extent his notion of a state of nature is 'ideal' and to what extent it is 'empirical' '.<sup>13</sup>

It seems that Rousseau is more concerned with understanding the present than the past. He is aware of the difficulties to prove the real existence of the state of nature. He wants to explain the problems of the present by creating a contrast with the past, thus he uses the state of nature within the framework of an ideal conceptualization, but not without some reflection of actual practice. It is a method which stand close to Weber's notion of 'ideal-types' where a certain amount of idealization or even exaggeration may be

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<sup>11</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 50.

<sup>12</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 44.

<sup>13</sup> E. Cassirer, *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe : Two Essays* , p. 24.

useful to understand reality.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, in light of all this, it seems we must accept Carter's remarks :

It should be said that Rousseau is by no means averse to the use of 'facts' where they support his argument; hence the many, often extensive footnotes to the text of the *Discours* which make use of material gathered by contemporary voyagers on the condition of 'primitive' peoples. However, Rousseau's argument stands without these, and he is not concerned with the empirical proof of his reasonings in historical and contemporary data.<sup>15</sup>

### 3.2 - From ***Amour-De-Soi*** To ***Amour-Propre***

Having put the methodological stance of Rousseau in relation to the state of nature, it is important to look at the process of change the state of nature went through. For centuries, no drastic change was witnessed within the state of nature. Communication was minimal. Population increase was of utmost importance to prepare the necessary grounds for the transformation. As the population increased, man felt more and more the necessity to live with other men. This led to an increase within the level of contact between them. Man now had a chance to exchange what he learnt as a

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<sup>14</sup> Julien Freund, *The Sociology of Max Weber* (trans. by Mary Ilford) (New York : Vintage, 1969), pp. 59-70.

<sup>15</sup> Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* , p. 47.

response to the danger coming from the external world. He began to learn how to be protected from other animals and how to fight against them.<sup>16</sup> 'Memory' increased information access. Living within small communities, men happened to see other men more often than other animals. This marked the creation of a sense of 'consciousness'. The discovery of the new techniques led to a new form of perception and self-perception. Man began to realize that he was different from other creatures. Apart from being different, man also discovered that he was superior to all other animals. He began to compare himself to other animals. Not only a simple sense of superiority was created, but also a series of abstract concepts which enabled him to *compare* . Comparison led to the creation of 'the good' and 'the bad', 'the strong' and 'the weak', 'the beautiful' and 'the ugly', all of which blossomed out of the invention of 'we' and 'other'.<sup>17</sup> According to Rousseau, 'every adjective is an abstract idea, and abstractions are painful and unnatural operations'.<sup>18</sup> Thus, man's forming a self-perception in relation to other animals was an initial stage preceding the birth of inequality.

As the physical conditions changed further due to the population increase, men tended to live together and families were formed. With the establishment of the family, people began to live under one roof in very small units.<sup>19</sup> Small huts were introduced and

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<sup>16</sup> Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* , pp. 62-4.

<sup>17</sup> Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* , p. 63.

<sup>18</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 67.

<sup>19</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 88.

a zone of agriculture appeared around each hut. Nomadic life was being replaced by settled groups and agriculture. For Rousseau, it was a revolutionary achievement when the first man happened to say 'this land is mine'.<sup>20</sup> Before that, elementary forms of property were not absent, but they did not cause dependency at such a drastic level. With the establishment of family and agriculture, differentiation of the functions, a kind of division of labour emerged which undermined material self-sufficiency even further. As the changes were more and more institutionalized, dependency became obvious. Roche describes the process clearly :

As agriculture advanced, it became necessary that the idea of property be made more exact. In the scramble for land, it was inevitable that some should fail and become dependent economically on their successful brothers. Thus, to the earlier distinctions was now added the distinction between rich and poor.<sup>21</sup>

As inequality in the material sense developed, man began to use comparison as a cognitive tool while looking at his own kind whereas in the past it was only used with respect to other animals. Comparison bred competition. There was now a social criterion to conform with. The 'mirror' was invented, supplying a criterion from which it seemed impossible for the individual to escape :

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<sup>20</sup> Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 84.

<sup>21</sup> Roche, *Rousseau : Stoic and Romantic* , p. 35.

Each one began to consider the rest, and to wish to be considered in turn; and thus a value came to be attached to public esteem... As soon as men began to value one another, and the idea of consideration had got a footing in the mind, everyone put in his claim to it, and it became impossible to refuse it with any impunity.<sup>22</sup>

However, the consequences were far from being desirable for Rousseau :

It now became the interests of men to appear what they really were not. To be and to seem became two totally different things; and from this distinction sprang insolent pomp and cheating trickery, with all the numerous vices that go in their train.<sup>23</sup>

In Rousseau's theory, this change is conceived as a shift from the original self-love, *amour-de-soi*, to vanity and selfishness, *amour-propre*.<sup>24</sup> *Amour-de-soi* is not a characteristic which is unique to men, but exists in all other animals.<sup>25</sup> *Amour-propre* stands for the new psychological condition of men. *Amour-propre* introduces in man a sense of artificiality, a sense of something other than himself :

In reality, the source of all these differences is, that the savage lives within himself,

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<sup>22</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 90.

<sup>23</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 95.

<sup>24</sup> Allan Bloom, 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau' in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (eds.), *History of Political Philosophy* (Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 566.

<sup>25</sup> N. J. H. Dent, *Rousseau : An Introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political Theory* (Oxford, 1988), p. 90.

while social man constantly lives outside himself, and only knows how to live in the opinion of others, so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his own existence merely from the judgement of others concerning him.<sup>26</sup>

In fact, Rousseau does not favour a return to the old values of *amour-de-soi* by idealizing the state of nature<sup>27</sup>. Rather, he is trying to show that a significant change or a shift occurred which meant the loss of an original condition. However, he seems clearly unhappy with the existing system, and cannot help at times expressing himself in a moral tone, referring, for instance, to 'the corrupt imagination of mankind in civilized countries'.<sup>28</sup> In a sense, the transformation can be explained by the notion of 'alienation'. Nevertheless, all in all, Rousseau did not have in mind a change which had absolutely pessimistic consequences whatsoever :

The cultivation of the earth necessarily brought about its distribution; and property, once recognized, gave rise to the first rules of justice ; for to secure each man his own, it had to be possible for each to have something. Besides, as men began to look forward to the future, and all had something to lose, everyone had reason to apprehend that reprisals would follow any injury he might do to another.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 116.

<sup>27</sup> See Judith Shklar, *Men and Citizens : A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory* (Cambridge : Cambridge university Press, 1969) for an interpretation of Rousseau's idealization of the state of nature.

<sup>28</sup> Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality ', p. 121.

<sup>29</sup> Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality ', p. 94.

After the introduction of *amour-propre* , but before the rise of civil society and the state, man now lives in a state of *de facto* society, or a 'fallen' state of nature.<sup>30</sup> But, it is not easy to claim that 'corruption' is the sole element of this 'fallen' state of nature. Moreover, Rousseau was not intent upon idealizing the original state of nature by attributing superior, virtuous and sentimental qualities to the man living in that stage. Roche clarifies Rousseau's position well when he directs us to these words from Rousseau's letter to Mgr de Beaumont :

Conscience is nought in the man who has made no comparisons and has never known relationships. In that condition, man knows nothing but himself ; he does not see his well-being either opposed to, or in conformity with, that of anyone else ; he neither hates nor loves anyone ; limited to physical instinct alone, he is nothing, he is a beast ; that is what I have shown in my *Discours sur l'Inégalité* .<sup>31</sup>

Rousseau appreciates the fact that men have different qualities by birth. However, he claims that this kind of inequality plays no significant role until the process of change takes man away from his original position. Since Rousseau relied on material conditions as a determining cause, he regarded material inequality as a source of

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<sup>30</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War : Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (New York : Praeger, 1965), pp. 57-8.

<sup>31</sup> Roche, *Rousseau : Stoic and Romantic* , p. 42.

other inequalities. As far as the determining aspect of the economic causes and the notion of 'alienation' are concerned, Rousseau's thought seems to be close to Marx.<sup>32</sup>

Due to population increase, the change is marked by an initial stage where mankind gains a sense of self-awareness in relation to other animals. Gradually, mainly because of the changing conditions, comparison, competition and vanity become common among men as the inequalities are institutionalized. It is a shift from *amour-de-soi* to *amour-propre*. However, apart from these, virtue, justice and conscience are also introduced representing the positive consequences of the transformation. Thus, Rousseau emphasizes the significance of the change at this level while never forgetting that the previous stage was a state of animality. Moreover, he does not feel trapped by a kind of deep pessimism which considers the shift a total catastrophe.

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<sup>32</sup> I could show that among these four kinds of inequality, personal qualities being the origin of all the others, wealth is the one to which they are all reduced in the end; for as riches tend most immediately to the prosperity of individuals, and are easiest to communicate, they are used to purchase every other distinction. By this observation we are enabled to judge pretty exactly how far a people has departed from its primitive constitution, and of its progress towards the extreme term of corruption.' Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 111. 'The wealthy, on their part, had no sooner begun to taste the pleasure of command, then they disdained all others, and, using their own slaves to acquire new, thought of nothing but subduing and enslaving their neighbours; like ravenous wolves, which, having once tasted human flesh, despise every other food and thenceforth seek only men to devour.' Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 96. For a comparison of Rousseau and Marx, see Lucio Colletti, *From Rousseau to Lenin : Studies in Ideology and Society* (New York : Monthly Review Press, 1972).

### 3.3 - 'Fraudulent' Social Contract

As wealth accumulates due to institutionalized private property, the values of *amour-propre* become more and more settled. The growing material inequalities and competition gradually give way to violence. In that respect, Rousseau's 'fallen' state of nature is quite similar to the Hobbesian state of nature. Thus, for both Rousseau and Hobbes, there is a need for a civil society to rule out violence.<sup>33</sup> In order to avoid the anarchical situation creating violence, and to provide order, Hobbes rather enthusiastically affirms the absolute sovereignty of the state as the condition of order. For Rousseau, on the other hand, order was introduced on the basis of inequality. The clash between the ruler and the ruled was nothing but a reflection of a 'premature' dichotomy between the rich and the poor. Dependence is spread all over the community functioning like a cement unifying different segments to form a solid entity. In fact 'interdependence' might be a better term since, along with the poor and the ruled, the rich and the ruler have something to depend on. This mutual dependence has a strong psychological, mental connotations as well, which was described by Dent with the phrase : ' If I do not weep, he (the ruler) is not happy, who loses by this ?'<sup>34</sup>

Rousseau cannot simply reconcile force which is something physical with morality which is not physical. 'Surely it must be

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<sup>33</sup> Stanley Hoffmann and David Fidler, 'Introduction' to *Rousseau on International Relations* (eds. Hoffmann & Fidler) (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1991), p. xlii.

<sup>34</sup> Dent, *Rousseau* , pp. 61-2.

admitted then' he says, 'that might does not make right, and that the duty of obedience is owed only to legitimate powers.'<sup>35</sup> In that respect, he is firmly opposed to the idea of 'divine right of kings'. By favouring the right to rebel against illegitimate authority, he seems to reflect the profile of a revolutionary, a man of Enlightenment; but he is more than that. Rousseau's approach to natural law, in a way, rejects the system of deducing axioms from rational intuition, because 'nature has given us sensations and not knowledge'.<sup>36</sup>

It is hard to claim that Rousseau is against the idea of social contract. However, Rousseau's social contract involves serious deviations both from the social contracts of Hobbes and Lock. For Rousseau, it is not simply acceptable to be exposed to oppression in order to neutralize anarchical violence. According to Rousseau, the rise of civil society and the state relies on a 'fraudulent' social contract based on inequality which is far from being a mutually advantageous agreement.<sup>37</sup> He emphasizes the inevitability of the rule by the rich and the strong. He does not regard private property a natural right, but a human construction and attributes to it a crucial role within the transformation from the state of nature. Thus, within this hierarchical structure based on material inequality, as the rulers hold a major concern for the protection of their property, the law cannot avoid being a functional tool of arbitrary rule. Rousseau's vision of private property seems to be diametrically opposed to the

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<sup>35</sup> Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (Trans. by Maurice Cranston) (London : Penguin, 1968), p. 53.

<sup>36</sup> Horowitz, *Rousseau, Nature and History* , p. 47.

<sup>37</sup> Maurice Cranston, *Jean-Jacques* (London, 1983), p. 248, quoted from Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* , p. 75.

liberal tradition. He rejects the liberal notion that laws, as Oakeshott claims, are indifferent to the satisfaction of substantive wants.<sup>38</sup> Rather, inequality and arbitrary rule become institutionalized and legitimized by the right of property. As a consequence, the right of property supports nothing but the self-interests of the rulers. According to Rousseau, inevitably tyranny emerges on the basis of 'the right of the strongest' - a 'right' that sounds like something intended ironically, but is actually laid down as a principle'.<sup>39</sup> Hence, there is a problem of legitimacy stemming from Rousseau's belief that 'might does not make right, and the duty of obedience is owed only to legitimate powers'.<sup>40</sup>

Overall, one must conclude that Rousseau gives special emphasis to the rise of civil society and the (tyrannical) state. Order, for Rousseau, is introduced as a result of the anarchical violence of the 'fallen' state of nature, but, unfortunately, on illegitimate grounds : the need of the rich to 'protect' themselves from the rest of the community. The right of property is a false principle because it legitimizes inequality. Justice and virtue cannot flourish under the authority of the tyrannical state which is so based on a 'fraudulent' social contract.

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<sup>38</sup> Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* , p. 83.

<sup>39</sup> Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (trans. by Cranston), p. 52.

<sup>40</sup> Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (trans. by Cranston), p. 53.

### 3.4 - The State of War As A Tragic Consequence

Within the international sphere, a sort of 'system' was formed since the states were everywhere and it became possible to predict the conduct of the states in relation to each other. The violence of the 'fallen' state of nature was replaced by the states confronting each other, knowing no superiors. Thus, the state of war emerged as a simultaneous consequence of the tyrannical attitudes which were now everywhere :

Societies soon multiplied and spread over the face of the earth, till hardly a corner of the world was left in which a man could escape the yoke, and withdraw his head from beneath the sword which he saw perpetually hanging over him by a thread.<sup>41</sup>

The tyrannical states are far from representing the will of the people, thus they will remain totally artificial institutions serving the self-interests of the rulers. As the self-interests will always clash, they will continue to fight. For Rousseau, there is simply a physical limit to what an individual can get, but no such limit for the state.<sup>42</sup> Further, tyrants provoke wars, because wars constitute a means for them to secure or even strengthen their positions at the domestic

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<sup>41</sup> Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 99.

<sup>42</sup> Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War*, p. 99.

level. Wars provide material wealth for the tyrants together with the prestige they gain. Moreover, it might become easier to oppress people when they have something else to think of. Rousseau asserts that tyrannical rule leads to alienation and further alienation causes the depersonification of the state. Wars, thus, occur between the states rather than the people :

War, then, is not a relation between men, but between states; in war individuals are enemies wholly by chance, not as men, not even as citizens, but only as soldiers; not as members of their country, but only as its defenders.<sup>43</sup>

This sense of depersonification leads to tragic consequences, for Rousseau :

The most distinguished men hence learned to consider cutting each other's throats a duty; at length men massacred their fellow-creatures by thousands without so much as knowing why, and committed more murders in a single day's fighting, and more violent outrages in the sack of a single town, than were committed in the state of nature during whole age over the whole earth.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (trans. by Cranston), p. 56.

<sup>44</sup> Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', p. 100.

Therefore, Rousseau's state of war is composed of alienated and depersonified states. Within these circumstances, war is inevitable for Rousseau mainly because the tyrants will pursue their own self-interests conflicting with each other and not because there is no institutional authority to stop them. According to Rousseau, within the dynamics of the state of war, even if a superior authority is established, the problem will not be resolved. The supra-national authority will have to use force in order to provide international order; however, it will not be legitimate since its authority will be based on power. Similar to the tyrannical state, it will suffer from the problem of legitimacy. Moreover, the so-called provided 'peace' will not last long since the source of the order will not be duty, but force. Hence, without transforming force into right and obedience into duty, it is not possible to prevent wars.<sup>45</sup> Thus, the state of war is the final consequence of previous developments. In that respect, the state of war, for Rousseau, represents the exposed part of the iceberg.

What, then, is the source of the international problem - the state of war ? The state of nature begins to change by the population increase. A significant transformation occurs and man's state of animality ceases to exist. Mankind first gains a self-awareness in relation to other animals. As the material conditions change further, *amour-de-soi* is replaced by *amour-propre* . Man begins to judge and understand himself in relation to the other members of the community. Competition is introduced together with the notions of

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<sup>45</sup> Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (trans. by Cranston), p. 52.

justice, virtue and conscience. *Amour-de-soi* signifies the period when men's needs were limited whereas the resources were limitless. By *amour-propre*, a material imbalance, however, appears as the situation turns upside down when the needs become limitless, but the resources limited. Private property, at that stage, is important since it turns out to be the source of an apparent material inequality. However, Rousseau does not favour an attitude of turning backwards to the state of nature.

Order is introduced, in a paradoxical way, on the basis of a kind of social contract Rousseau would never favour of. Out of further material inequality, there emerges the state. Power is legitimized by laws. The right of property serves the interests of the rich and the rulers. The tyrannical state appears as an 'undesirable' product of *amour-propre*. A kind of 'alienation' between the prince and the people seems inevitable. The formation of the state takes place in a way quite distinct from what Rousseau had in mind.

The development of the tyrannical states directly leads to the emergence of the state of war. States, as artificial bodies, now confront each other, and war is nothing but an inescapable product of this confrontation. Rousseau emphasizes the formation of the state and deems it a crucial value since the existence of war is determined by the tyrannical attitudes. As Carter has described it :

The states system, in other words, is not the cause of the conflict amongst men, but the formation of the state is the cause of *war* , defined as organized conflict among fixed groups of men.<sup>46</sup>

Thus, contrary to Waltz, it seems really quite hard to accept Rousseau as a 'third-image' writer.<sup>47</sup> Rousseau, tries to reach the roots of the problem, and at times criticizes the tyrannical state and the inequality on which it is based :

Government had, in its infancy, no regular and constant form. The want of experience and philosophy prevented men from seeing any but present inconveniences, and they thought of providing against others only as they presented themselves. In spite of the endeavours of the wisest legislators, the political state remained imperfect, because it was little more than the work of chance; and as it had begun ill, though time revealed its defects and suggested remedies, *the original faults were never repaired* .<sup>48</sup>

Without doubt, Rousseau presents his story concerning the state of war as a 'moral scandal', a destructive tragedy against all humanity which has to be stopped. This significantly moral aspect of his philosophy and his efforts to come up with 'ideal' solutions, create

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<sup>46</sup> Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* , p. 95.

<sup>47</sup> The phrase 'third image' was used by Waltz in order to refer to the third (systemic) level of the three 'levels of analysis'. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War : A Theoretical Analysis* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 165-186.

<sup>48</sup> Rousseau, 'A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality ', p. 101 (emphasis added).

great difficulties for any attempt to render him consistent with the *realpolitik* of international relations theory. The main causes of the state of war are related to the formation of the state which emerged under the influence of the 'artificial' values of *amour-propre*. Rousseau's (primitive) state of nature was neither 'full of virtue' nor was it desirable. What Rousseau had in mind as a solution, as a way out, is the topic of the next chapter.

# **CHAPTER**

## **4**

# **Rousseau and the Way Out from the State of War**

In a society the values of which are determined by *amour-propre* , nothing can emerge but tyranny as a form authority; and a world which is full of tyrannical states, can produce nothing but a state of war. If so, what could be done in order to avoid such a consequence ? Rousseau's solution does not address one single cause. Rather, he wants to discover remedies at different levels which tend to represent the complementary parts of a whole, consistent solution. By focusing on *Emile* , *The Social Contract* and the general will, which are closely related to each other, this chapter will elaborate Rousseau's solution to the state of war. A general discussion focusing on the relationships of these attempts will follow after a descriptive analysis.

## 4.1 - Emile and Education

*Emile* represents Rousseau's response to the values of *amour-propre* at an individual level. As a product of the romantic trend, Rousseau believed in the wisdom of sensations. 'Cold-blooded reason' was not a main quality of his ideal man. In the state of nature instincts are the dominant element in man's life. In *Emile* , Rousseau does not try to leave man alone with his instincts in the society. True, he wants man to feel more, but not without using his mind and getting use of his experiences.

Emile lives like Robinson Crusoe until the age of twelve, with little intervention by his tutor. His tutor allows him to live in an isolated and primitive manner and prevents him from hurting himself at this stage.<sup>1</sup> Between the ages of twelve and fifteen, Emile is educated without any force or punishment. He is rarely told what he should learn by his tutor, rather 'it is for Emile to desire to seek and to find'.<sup>2</sup> After the age of fifteen, Emile's isolation comes to an end. The social world is introduced to Emile. Now he is faced with a social life, but different from the other members of the society as an 'educated' man, he has a strong inclination to be happy by using his 'sensations'.<sup>3</sup> At the age of twenty-two, his tutor takes Emile away from his lover Sophy, in order to be able to make him find the real happiness by drawing lessons from his experiences.<sup>4</sup> Emile has a capacity to learn and in society he has a chance to experience psychological love different from physical love, and learn from it. Emile's love of Sophy is described by Rousseau : 'His pleasure, genuine, pure, delicious, but more imaginary than real, serve to kindle his love but not to make him effeminate.'<sup>5</sup>

Naturally man has 'sensations', but in society he uses his ability to remember his experienced 'sensations'. Man's relation to the external world is actualized through 'sensations' :

For I continually experience either directly or indirectly through memory, so how can I know

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<sup>1</sup> K. Roche, *Rousseau : Stoic and Romantic* (London, 1974), pp. 45-6.

<sup>2</sup> K. Roche, *Rousseau : Stoic and Romantic* , p. 46.

<sup>3</sup> K. Roche, *Rousseau : Stoic and Romantic* , p. 48.

<sup>4</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile* (translated by Barbara Foxley and introduced by P. D. Jimack) (London : Everyman, 1993), pp. 491-3.

<sup>5</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile*, p. 477.

if the feeling of *self* is something beyond these sensations or it can exist independently of them ?

My sensations take place in myself, for they make me aware of my own existence; but their cause is outside me, for they affect me whether I have any reason for them or not, and they are produced or destroyed independently of me. So I clearly perceive that my sensations, which is within me, and its cause or its object which is outside me are different things.<sup>6</sup>

Man does not know anything by birth; however, he has a capacity to learn. By this special quality, Rousseau intends to educate Emile to create an ideal man living within a social world.

We are born capable of learning, but knowing nothing. The mind bound up with imperfect and half-grown organs, is not even aware of its existence.<sup>7</sup>

Emile has little knowledge, but what he has is truly his own. He knows nothing halfway. Among the small number of things he knows and knows well, the most important is that there are many things of which he is ignorant... Emile has a mind that is universal not by its learning but by its faculty to acquire learning; a mind that is open, intelligent, ready for everything...<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile*, p. 278.

<sup>7</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile*, (trans. by Barbara Foxley), (New York, 1976), p. 28, quoted from Asher Horowitz, *Rousseau, Nature and History* (Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 226.

<sup>8</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile*, (translated and introduced by Allan Bloom) (New York, 1979), p. 207, quoted from N. J. H. Dent, *Rousseau : An Introduction To His Psychological, Social and Political Theory*, (Oxford : Blackwell, 1988), p. 107.

What is Emile expected to learn in society ? Emile's education enables him to live for himself in a self-sufficient manner without comparing himself with the other members of the society. He knows what is good for him. He knows what makes him happy. He is *conscious* of his happiness. According to Horowitz's description : 'It is rather the human form of that happiness that Rousseau considers almost the birthright of man. The enemy of mankind is no longer time; Emile enjoys time without being its slave.'<sup>9</sup>

At the end of his educational process, Emile emerges as a man who experiences, learns and uses his initiative differently from the man in the state of nature. He refuses to become another passive agent of society. However, he lives within that society as a good citizen. Man and citizen are not irreconcilable ideals, contrary to Shklar's claim.<sup>10</sup> In *Emile* one can see both ideals reflected. Emile is a man of reconciliation. He is an ideal man and an ideal citizen at the same time. The role of *Emile* within Rousseau's other works, especially *The Social Contract* , seems to be clear in Dent's words :

However, he (Rousseau) makes it clear that his object in *Emile* is to unite 'man' and 'citizen' in such a way that they are not in contradiction, but the 'double object', of being for oneself and being for others, can be united in harmony. It would be surprising, therefore, if he showed no concern with accomplishing this 'double object' in his concrete political

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<sup>9</sup> Horowitz, *Rousseau, Nature and History*, p. 250.

<sup>10</sup> J. N. Shklar, *Men and Citizens : A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1969) and Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* , pp. 22-23.

suggestions, but abolished the man and created only the citizen.<sup>11</sup>

*Emile* contributes to the construction of an ideal state which is based on the social contract and the general will. Therefore, *Emile* is just one part of Rousseau's overall attempt to find a way out from the present situation of state of war in general, and tyrannical state in particular. Only by itself, out of context, it cannot acquire an effective meaning. *Emile* should be considered in relation to Rousseau's project for an ideal state.

## 4.2 - Social Contract and the General Will

Social contract is the basis of his ideal state. Especially, in *The Social Contract*, Rousseau draws a sharp distinction between the contract, which *is* and that which *ought to be*. Rousseau attributes the existing tyrannical state to a sort of contract which emerged out of power, based on material inequalities between the rich and the poor, thus it is not legitimate.

The words 'slave' and 'right' contradict each other, and are mutually exclusive. It will always be equally foolish for a man to say to a man or to a people : 'I make with you a convention wholly at your expense, and wholly

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<sup>11</sup> N. J. H. Dent, *Rousseau : An Introduction To His Psychological, Social and Political Theory* , p. 226, for the same point, see Horowitz, *Rousseau, Nature and History* , p. 165, 212, 251.

to my advantage ; I shall keep it as long as I like...' Finally, it is an empty and contradictory convention that sets up, on the one side, absolute authority, and, on the other, unlimited obedience...<sup>12</sup>

Power is replaced by right, on the contrary, without the existence of material inequalities, in Rousseau's ideal contract :

...the social pact, far from destroying natural equality, substitutes on the contrary, a moral and lawful equality for whatever physical inequality that nature may have imposed on mankind; so that however unequal in strength and intelligence, men become equal by covenant and right.

Under a bad government, this equality is only an appearance and an illusion; it serves only to keep the poor in their wretchedness and sustain the rich in their usurpation.<sup>13</sup>

So what is the primary difference between these two contracts - which *is* and which *ought to be* ? If the social contract is regarded as a composition of two different contracts - one, the contract derived from the consent of the people to provide themselves with security (*pactum societatis*) and the other, the contract representing the transfer of power to the authority (*pactum subjectionis*) - Rousseau does not accept the latter, but only conforms with the former.<sup>14</sup> Only the first contract

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<sup>12</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'The Social Contract' in *The Social Contract and Discourses* (translated and introduced by G. D. H. Cole) (London : Everyman, 1993), p. 189, p. 186.

<sup>13</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (translated and introduced by Maurice Cranston) (London : Penguin, 1968), p. 68.

<sup>14</sup> Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* , pp. 159-160 and Lucio Colletti, *From Rousseau to Lenin : Studies in Ideology and Society* (New York : Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 181.

can be considered as legitimate for Rousseau, because it represents the birth of civil society.

Since the nation was a nation before it chose a king, what made it a nation, except the social contract ? Therefore, the social contract is the foundation of all civil society, and it is in the nature of this contract that we must seek the nature of the society formed by it.<sup>15</sup>

For Rousseau, apart from this very first contract, there exists no other permanent contract or principle but the general will. The general will replaces the functional role of the second contract (*pactum subjectionis*). The general will remains morally right and binding as long as it is represented by the will of the people which is to be determined by the will of the majority. Thus, the transfer of power takes place at this stage and the general will becomes the sovereign authority through a majority rule. The general will, however, is not permanent and it is always subject to change, both from time to time and from place to place.<sup>16</sup> In that respect, it is hard to conceive of *one* best government.

However, even if one could not talk about the best government, the general will does not reflect the mere totality of individual wills. At this

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<sup>15</sup> Rousseau, *Emile* (trans. by B. Foxley) (London : Everyman, 1993), p. 508.

<sup>16</sup> Howard Williams puts it clearly : 'The kind of domestic community that Rousseau sees emerging as a result of his social contract would be in a continual process of change. Since the sovereign is never wholly identified with the government, the government can always be undermined where it fails properly to reflect the will of the people (the sovereign).' Howard Williams, *International Relations in Political Theory* (Philadelphia : Open University Press, 1992), p. 73, for the same point, see Alan Bloom, 'Rousseau' in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (eds.), *History of Political Philosophy* (Chicago : Chicago University Press, 1987), pp. 574-5.

point, Rousseau's public-private interest dichotomy becomes relevant. The general will represents the public interests of the people which stand above each individual private interest. The closer one gets to Rousseau's ideal state, the smaller becomes the gap between the general will and the public interest. Private interest is an obstacle for the representation, thus it should be eliminated.<sup>17</sup> In other words, there exists no difference between the public and the private interest in an ideal citizenship. A well-educated citizen knows what is good for him. Moreover, as the material inequalities are minimal in an ideal state, power does not stand on the basis of the political government, and the private interests seems to be seductive.<sup>18</sup> Private property is an important source of inequality and without it, thus without the private interest, man can gain a sense of freedom. According to Rousseau, any government which is not based on the general will cannot be legitimate, but is tyrannical : power-based. The general will is a way out from the state of war for Rousseau, because the state of war is nothing but a creation of the tyrannical states. In Carter's words : 'Despotic states are inherently inclined to war because their chief 'object' will be aggrandizement, and this in turn because such states are internally divided between rich and poor, rulers and ruled.'<sup>19</sup>

As the general will signifies a sense of solidarity, the role of the individual, as an active creative agent seems to be endangered within the society. *The Social Contract* , in general, gives the impression that

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<sup>17</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'Discourse on Political Economy ' in *Rousseau on International Relations* (edited by Stanley Hoffmann and David Fidler) (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 2-4. All quotations from 'Discourse on Political Economy ', 'The State of War ', 'Fragments on War ', 'Abstract of St. Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace ', 'Judgement of St. Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace ', 'Constitutional Project for Corsica ' and 'Considerations on the Government of Poland ' are taken from this book.

<sup>18</sup> Bloom, 'Rousseau ', p. 577.

<sup>19</sup> Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* , p. 110.

Rousseau's ideal state turns out to be a supra-personal authority leaving little space of individuality for its members to perform.<sup>20</sup> However, if *The Social Contract* is considered in relation to *Emile*, then Rousseau's aim of not just creating a good citizen but also a good man, can become clearer. Horowitz intends to stress the point that Rousseau was not just aiming to form an ideal political system, but rather was looking forward to creating an ideal society and ideal man as well :

In raising up Emile in his imagination, Rousseau has sought to indicate that a lifting of excess denaturation would make possible a society in which alienation could be overcome... In all these ways, the community foreshadowed in *Emile* goes beyond even the austere democracy that was the ideal of *The Social Contract*.<sup>21</sup>

### 4.3 - Resistance to the State of War : A Patriotic Small State

In order to *resist* the present situation of state of war, Rousseau emphasizes the necessity of a small patriotic state. At the same time, patriotism is a continuation of Rousseau's effort to reconcile man and citizen in society. He wants to prevent citizenship from being a mere result of responsibilities. Accordingly, Rousseau introduces patriotism,

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<sup>20</sup> Roche, *Rousseau : Stoic and Romantic*, p. 136.

<sup>21</sup> Horowitz, *Rousseau, Nature and History*, p. 247.

the love of the community, in order to soften the depersonal requirements of the citizenship.<sup>22</sup> A patriotic community seems convenient for the actualization of the general will. This specific role can be observed in Rousseau's works on Corsica and Poland :

Good institutions for Poland can only be the work of Poles, or of someone who has made thorough first-hand study of the Polish nation and its neighbours.<sup>23</sup>

Everything foreign to the constitution should be carefully banished from the body politic. Leave then to other states all such titles as count and marquess, titles which degrade ordinary citizens.<sup>24</sup>

Basically, patriotism fulfils a function of providing power to the state as long as the state of war is present. For Rousseau, a community which is full of patriotic sentiments carries an element of firmness, a tendency not to yield. 'If you see to it that no Pole can ever become a Russian, I guarantee that Russia will not subjugate Poland.'<sup>25</sup>

To be able to implement patriotism and the general will in an effective manner, Rousseau requires the existence of a small state. If there is a small state then the general will can be actualized with more representation, thus with less private interests and a patriotic solidarity can spread all over the country with less effort. More important than

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<sup>22</sup> Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* , pp. 170-1.

<sup>23</sup> Rousseau, 'Considerations on the Government of Poland ', p. 162.

<sup>24</sup> Rousseau, 'Constitutional Project for Corsica ', p. 148.

<sup>25</sup> Rousseau, 'Considerations on the Government of Poland ', p. 168.

that, within the international arena, a small state dealing with agriculture can be less seductive for its neighbours and even more deterrent. In order to see in what circumstances a small state can attain such characteristics, it is necessary to elaborate more on Rousseau's patriotic state.

As indicated before, material inequality was the primary source of the tyrannical state. To be able to change the existing situation of hierarchy between the rich and the poor and the ruler and the ruled and to be able to consolidate equality, Rousseau introduces agriculture. Everybody owning a reasonable amount of land, but not too much, can live self-sufficiently without being dependent upon other members. Agriculture, moreover, serves to defeat the values of *amour-propre* by enabling man to live without comparing himself to other men. On the contrary, commerce tends to promote competition, accumulation of wealth and thus inequality. Rousseau insists that commerce and agriculture are not compatible with each other and cannot be reconciled in any way : 'I am so fully convinced that any system of commerce is destructive to agriculture that I do not even make an exception for trade in agricultural products.'<sup>26</sup>

Apart from the individual level, agriculture can help to maintain self-sufficiency and independence from other states again in contrast to commerce. Commerce leads to inter-dependence which is something disastrous within the dynamics of the state of war since it is totally undesirable for Rousseau to be dependent upon the tyrants.

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<sup>26</sup> Rousseau, 'Constitutional Project for Corsica ', p. 156.

In the state of war, the military should be a deterrent factor serving the interests of Rousseau's small state. It should be composed of patriotic citizens (which is easier to find in agricultural areas<sup>27</sup>) and should only be directed for defensive purposes. Patriotism contributes to the efficiency of any army, thus every soldier should regard what he is doing as a duty, but not as a profession.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, Rousseau asserts that a defensive army will cost far less than an army which tends to engage in offensive campaigns.<sup>29</sup> Finally, as long as the state of war exists, Rousseau does not believe in the wisdom of diplomacy. Diplomacy, for him, leads to nothing but inter-dependence which contributes to the *status quo*. It is impossible to come to terms with the tyrants. Rousseau, for the same reason, seems to be opposed to alliances and treaties.<sup>30</sup> In such a way, Rousseau's small state can avoid the state of war. However, of course, one state can only resist with a sense of isolationism, deterrence and a lack of attraction but cannot put an end to the state of war unless the states cease to be tyrannical. Rousseau claims on similar grounds that if the Poles establish a state which is very close to his state (a small patriotic state), then they might successfully resist the existing system.

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<sup>27</sup> Rousseau, 'Constitutional Project for Corsica ', pp. 144-5.

<sup>28</sup> Rousseau, 'Considerations on the Government of Poland ', p. 184.

<sup>29</sup> Rousseau, 'Considerations on the Government of Poland ', p. 186.

<sup>30</sup> Rousseau, 'Considerations on the Government of Poland ', p. 192-3. It should be noted that, for Rousseau, Poland can ally with the Sultan of Turkey as an exception.

## 4.4 - Federation and Saint-Pierre's Project

Rousseau's analysis of a possible world federation in *Abstract and Judgement of Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace* does not seem to be directly related to his ideal state project. In *Judgement* and to a lesser extent in *Abstract* as well, Rousseau tries to respond to the 'impractical' approach of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Within the existing conditions of the state of war, Rousseau claims the impossibility of such a 'moderate' project. Without going for a rather radical change which should take place at socio-political and individual level, a federation cannot be effective for Rousseau. He is highly sceptical of the Abbé's method of taking the *status quo* as a starting point. The Abbé's position is described well by Marriott :

The *status quo* , both as regards territory and Government, was to be taken as the starting-point of the whole scheme, and was to be guaranteed by the scheme in perpetuity - The Sovereigns were 'to have full and lasting security for the preservation of their persons, for the preservation of their States, complete, such as they are in actual possession of, and security for the lasting preservation of their prosperity on the Throne, in spite of conspiracy, sedition and revolts of their subjects'.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> John. A. R. Marriott, *Commonwealth or Anarchy? A Survey of Projects of Peace : From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century* (London, 1937), p. 64.

This point, which is the crucial difference between the approaches of the Abbé and Rousseau, is also stressed by Souleyman : 'The principle of the *status quo* , which is the cornerstone of the Abbé's plan, does not find a supporter in Rousseau.'<sup>32</sup>

Rousseau's dissatisfaction with the Abbé's plan, in fact, does not stem from, St. Pierre's 'naive' attitude of relying on the tyrants. Rather, for Rousseau, the Abbé is aware of the fact that the sovereigns will always pursue their private interests. At this stage, Rousseau comes to terms with the Abbé. Therefore, according to St. Pierre, a system based on deterrence should be formed in order to turn the private interests of the sovereigns into the same form but not to persuade them to pursue a general public good which is totally different from their (former) private interests.<sup>33</sup> Rousseau's diagnosis is similar, but not his prescription. For him the problem is not simple enough to be solved by means of a federation which is based on deterrence. He is, in fact, overly-concerned of the tyrant's attitudes :

The whole life of kings, or of those on whom they shuffle off their duties, is devoted solely to two objects : to extend their rule beyond their frontiers and to make it more absolute within them. Any other purpose they may have is either subservient to one of these aims, or merely a pretext for attaining them.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Elizabeth B. Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century France* (New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941), p. 142.

<sup>33</sup> Rousseau, 'Abstract of St. Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace ', p. 74, p. 84.

<sup>34</sup> Rousseau, 'Judgement of St. Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace ', p. 90.

However, the problem does not exactly emerge from the tyrant's personal authority, but it is related to the formation of the tyrannical state which is based on inequality, competition, ambition and misrepresentation.

Ministers are in perpetual need of war, as a means of making themselves indispensable to their master, of throwing him into difficulties from which he cannot escape without their aid, of ruining the state, if things come to the worst, as the price of keeping their office... They are in need of it, as a means of gratifying their passions and driving their rivals out of their favour... With a lasting peace, all these resources would be gone.<sup>35</sup>

For Rousseau, thus, without changing the structure of the state, it does not seem probable that an effectively working federation leading to perpetual peace can be established.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, as far as peace is concerned, it can produce rather negative results since force shall be used in order to gain obedience - to this extent war (use of force) will continue.<sup>37</sup> Thus, in a way, this will not put an end to war.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Rousseau, 'Judgement of St. Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace', p. 93.

<sup>36</sup> Marriott, *Commonwealth or Anarchy? A Survey of Projects of Peace*, p. 64.

<sup>37</sup> Marriott, *Commonwealth or Anarchy? A Survey of Projects of Peace*, p. 88, Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War*, pp. 144-5.

<sup>38</sup> The strong, moral, humanistic aspect of Rousseau's theory, to a certain extent seems to be influenced by the Encyclopaedists. 'The rationalism of Montesquieu, Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists, far from drying up their hearts, made them very human. Humanitarian feelings, transformed by the intellect, found clear expression in their writings. None of them could be enthusiastic about such peace plans as that proposed by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre because it was based on the political *status quo* of Europe and depended for its execution on the goodwill of sovereign Princes. All of them believed that social changes were first necessary.' Elizabeth B. Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century France* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941), p. 142. For the influence of the Encyclopaedists on Rousseau see also, Michael C. Williams, 'Rousseau, Realism and *Realpolitik*', *Millennium*, 18 (1989), 185-203.

## 4.5 - Confederation and *Fragments on War* : 'Last-Minute' Solutions

Having reached the conclusion that it is not possible to end the state of war without introducing fundamental changes within the state and society, Rousseau comes up with two 'last-minute' solutions : a confederation for his few (small, patriotic) states, and the laws of war. Perhaps 'solution' would not be the right word, since the first one signified an effort to protect his small states from the external world of state of war and the second just aimed to limit the potential violence of wars as much as possible. Thus, Rousseau was fully aware that he did not solve anything.

Rousseau appreciates the fact that in such a 'jungle' represented by the state of war, it is quite difficult for his small states to keep secure and not to lose their identity. Hence, confederation plays a role of compensation due to the vulnerability of the small state because of its size.<sup>39</sup> Thus, Hoffmann seems to be right in defining Rousseau's confederation as 'a shelter against the storm'.<sup>40</sup>

Rousseau is highly pessimistic regarding the effectiveness of international law, due to the lack of a just authority. In *The State of War*, he writes :

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<sup>39</sup> Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* , p. 186.

<sup>40</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War : Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 80.

As for what is commonly called international law, because its laws lack any sanction, they are unquestionably mere illusions, even feebler than the law of nature. The latter at least speaks in the heart of individual men; whereas the decisions of international law, having no other guarantee than their usefulness to the person who submits to them, are only respected in so far as interests accord with them.<sup>41</sup>

Thus, in keeping with his attitude towards international law, in laying down the laws of war in his work of *Fragments on War*, Rousseau is hardly optimistic. He seeks to establish principles on the declaration of war, the rights of prisoners, the status of the civilians and the right of property.<sup>42</sup> Yet, *Fragments on War* represents Rousseau's moral discontent against the ongoing atrocities of the state of war. However, towards the end of *Fragments on War*, he hints where the traces of a solution were to be sought :

When thousands of bellicose peoples have slaughtered their prisoners, when thousands of doctors in the keeps of tyrants have justified these crimes, do in truth man's errors matter or their barbarity to justice ? Let us not search for what has been done but rather for what should be done and let us dismiss evil and mercenary authorities who end up making men slaves, evil and miserable.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Rousseau, 'The State of War ', p. 44.

<sup>42</sup> Rousseau, 'Fragments on War ', pp. 48-52.

<sup>43</sup> Rousseau, 'Fragments on War ', pp. 51-52.

## 4.6 - Way Out From The State Of War

In light of all this, it can be seen that Rousseau does not try to come up with an effective, 'third image' solution, because the problem seems to be far from a systemic problem. He intends to neutralize the effect of *amour-propre* on human nature in *Emile*, creating, through a special education, ideal man and citizen. Further, in order to replace the tyrannical state, which is another source of trouble, he introduces an ideal state and society of which the elements are the general will, social contract and majoritarian rule. Roche states the general will-*Emile* connection well :

The General Will is thus identical with the will of man truly enlightened and completely purged of all selfishness - the will for example, of the Stoic or of the full developed *Emile*.<sup>44</sup>

It is very difficult to conceive these elements (the general will and *Emile*) independently from each other, and all of them develop from his views on education. Education is essential to Rousseau's conception of the ideal state and society. He needs citizens for his state : 'Now to form citizens is not the work of a day; and in order to have them as men, it is necessary to educate them as children.'<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Roche, *Rousseau : Stoic and Romantic* , p. 72.

<sup>45</sup> Rousseau, 'Discourses on Political Economy', p. 20. With regard to patriotism in the Polish case, Rousseau seems to be clear on the essential role of education : 'When first he opens his eyes, an infant ought to see the fatherland, and up to the day of his death he ought never to see anything else... At twenty, a Pole ought not to be a man of any other sort; he ought to be a Pole. I wish that, when he learns to read, he should read about his own land; that at the age of ten, he should be familiar with all its products, at twelve with all its provinces, high-ways and towns; that at fifteen he should know its whole history, at sixteen all its laws; that in all Poland there

For Rousseau, education is an important way of implementing change :

It is too late to change our natural inclinations when they have already taken their course, and self-love is confirmed by habit. It is too late to lead us out of ourselves when once the human ego, concentrated in our hearts, has acquired that contemptible activity which absorbs all virtue and constitutes the life and being of little minds.<sup>46</sup>

However, it should be stressed that Rousseau's aim is not to create merely a 'citizen' who will be raised up by public education. Next to his role of being a citizen inclined to lose his individuality within the solidarity of the general will and patriotism, man must carry a sense of creativity, a sense of emotion, and a sense of being able to choose by reflecting on his experiences. Rousseau tries to fulfil both tasks in *Emile*. Dent describes Rousseau's analysis :

I do not see him forgetting, or underplaying, one side of the 'equation'. Rousseau does not envisage the commitment to citizenship as one's dominant principle as being the commitment to becoming a 'worker bee '. Priority attaching to one's civil responsibilities does not entail their claim to exhaust all legitimate human commitments.<sup>47</sup>

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should be no great action or famous man of which his heart and memory are not full, and of which he cannot give an account at a moment's notice.' Rousseau, 'Considerations on the Government of Poland ', pp. 172-3.

<sup>46</sup> Rousseau, 'Discourses on Political Economy ', p. 21.

<sup>47</sup> Dent, *Rousseau : An Introduction To His Psychological, Social and Political Theory* , p. 228.

Rousseau's whole analysis of a world federation seems to be nothing but a response to the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's project for a perpetual peace. Rousseau knows that the Abbé himself is aware of the difficulties of his plan, but in the final analysis, he cannot help rejecting the Abbé's faith in a 'universal reason'.<sup>48</sup> The main difference between the approaches of the two philosophers is that they tend to come up with attempted solutions at different levels. Souleyman makes the point clearly :

It is obvious that Rousseau's thoughts move in just the opposite direction to those of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. The latter puts his hopes in sovereigns; Rousseau, on the contrary, does not believe that one could expect to see a pacified Europe until the downfall of the European monarchies has come to pass.<sup>49</sup>

Rousseau, then, does not aim to end the state of war through a world federation staying within the systemic level. Rather, he seeks to prepare the grounds for his radical change at a socio-political and individual level. Besides, with his project of 'the small, patriotic state', he tries to provide resistance against the state of war rather than offering a long-term solution. The plan of a confederation of his small states and *Fragments on War* , on the other hand, signify nothing but his immediate, 'reflexive' attitude against the *status quo* .

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<sup>48</sup> Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* , pp. 149-150.

<sup>49</sup> Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century France* , pp. 141-142.

The form of the state is of utmost importance for Rousseau. Thus, the state of war is dependent upon the form of the state. In *Considerations on the Government of Poland*, Rousseau advises the Poles to ally with the Sultan of Turkey. Even though he maintains that it will be for the sake of convenience, and the private interests will still be influential, he implies that the form of the state *makes* a difference :

Not that his statecraft is much more reliable than that of the other powers ; with him too everything depends on a vizier, a favourite, a harem intrigue. But the interests of the Porte is clear and simple ; it is a matter of life and death to it ; and although the Porte has much less enlightenment and finesse, it generally shows more honesty and common sense. With it, as contrasted with the Christian powers, you at least have the added advantage that it likes to fulfil its obligations and ordinarily respect treaties.<sup>50</sup>

Therefore, as the cause Rousseau elaborates is not a 'third image' cause, his solution is not a 'third image' solution. *Emile* supplies an answer to *amour-propre*. At the same time, it postulates the conditions of the emergence of an ideal citizen which is an indispensable element of an ideal state and society. The social contract and the general will are parts of Rousseau's search for an 'ideal' solution. Thus, Rousseau did not believe in the practicality and the effectiveness of a 'third-image' solution. However, this does not mean that he was 'trapped' within a state of systemic despair. On the contrary, unlike the dominant, general attitude prevailing in international relations, the state, for Rousseau, was not an unproblematic given. His philosophical, psychological, political

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<sup>50</sup> Rousseau, 'Considerations on the Government of Poland', p. 193.

and social analyses cementing *Emile* and *The Social Contract* seem to be, to a great extent, ignored within the international relations literature. In opposition to international relations theory, the state of war, for Rousseau, represents nothing but a global catastrophe, a moral scandal which requires a deep, wide-scope analysis. The state of war is but the part of the iceberg we can see.

**CHAPTER  
4**

**Alternative Interpretations of  
Rousseau**

In international relations theory, one finds a considerable body of literature which places Rousseau within a realist position as opposed to an idealist one.<sup>1</sup> Apart from the difficulty that stems from the question of whether the realism-idealism opposition can reflect Rousseau's philosophy successfully or not, within the boundaries of the related argument itself, usually nothing but the extent of Rousseau's realism is discussed.<sup>2</sup> Two tendencies seem to contribute to the concluding image of Rousseau, as a follower of *realpolitik*. Rousseau's realism of despair is partly a result of readings which focuses on his works more related to international relations like *The State of War, Judgement and Abstract*. On the other hand, and possibly more important, Rousseau's pessimism is usually constructed through a particular interpretation of his political philosophy paying almost no attention to the alternative interpretations.

Thus, this chapter aims to cover the arguments of five critical scholars; namely A. O. Lovejoy, E. Cassirer, N. J. H. Dent, M. L. Perkins and M. C. Williams.<sup>3</sup> In his essay, Lovejoy tries to refute a conventional reading of Rousseau in which the main assumption is that Rousseau

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<sup>1</sup> See Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War : Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (New York : Praeger, 1965), S. Hoffmann & David Fidler, 'Introduction' to *Rousseau on International Relations* (edited by Hoffmann & Fidler), (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1991), C. J. H. Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* (New York : Garland Pub., 1987), K. Waltz, *Man, the State and War : A Theoretical Analysis* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1959), F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1963), Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States : Reform and Resistance in the International Order* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1989), Howard Williams, *International Relations in Political Theory* (Philadelphia : Open University Press, 1992).

<sup>2</sup> For instance, see Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War* , pp. 190-6.

<sup>3</sup> A. O. Lovejoy, 'The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality* ', in A. O. Lovejoy, *History of Ideas* (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Press, 1948), N. J. H. Dent, *Rousseau : An Introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political Theory* (Oxford : Blackwell, 1988), Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (trans. and intr. by Peter Gay) (Bloomington : University of Indiana Press, 1975), Merle L. Perkins, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre* (Geneva, 1959), Michael C. Williams, 'Rousseau, Realism and *Realpolitik* ', *Millennium : Journal of International Studies*, 18 (1989), 185-203.

creates, in fact, an ideal out of human nature and simply favours a return to the primitive state of nature.<sup>4</sup> Cassirer, Dent and Williams make the same point. Dent, on the other hand, while analyzing Rousseau's ideal, focuses on the role of *amour-propre*. Dent, in his unique analysis, tries to redefine the 'notorious' notion of *amour-propre* as a part of Rousseau's ideal project.<sup>5</sup> Cassirer is a significant figure since his Kantian reading of Rousseau seems to be against an intellectual tendency in international relations towards understanding Rousseau *in contrast to Kant*.<sup>6</sup> Perkins shows the similarities between the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau and denies the existence of a 'gap' between them. Williams explicitly mentions a conventional reading of Rousseau in international relations theory regarding him as a follower of *realpolitik*. Each writer is, to a certain extent, interested in different aspects of Rousseau's philosophy, and their readings are not in all respects complementary. However, for our purpose, they have a common theme. To the extent that all these interpretations are convincing, Rousseau's supposed realism of despair in international relations becomes dubious.

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<sup>4</sup> Relevantly, Lars-Henrik Schmidt mentions about five common prejudices on Rousseau: 'One must make clear that (1) Robespierre's politics are not the most legitimate inheritance of Rousseau's political philosophy; (2) that Rousseau has no illusions of turning backwards towards nature; (3) that he not without reflection idealizes the noble savage or sees man as basically good. Finally, there is reason to renounce the new prejudice that (4) he unproblematically became party to the history of Western metaphysics, and (5) that he has a problematic relationship to his own writing, and that this relationship contradicts his stated intentions.' Lars-Henrik Schmidt, *Immediacy Lost : Construction of the Social in Rousseau and Nietzsche* (Copenhagen : Akademisk Forlag, 1988), p.23.

<sup>5</sup> See Allan Bloom, 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau' in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (eds.), *History of Political Philosophy* (Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 566, Alfred Cobban, *Rousseau and the Modern State* (London, 1934), pp. 218-9, Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War* (New York : Praeger, 1965), p. 59, Carter, *Rousseau and the Problem of War*, p. 42.

<sup>6</sup> See, for instance, S. Hoffmann, *The State of War*, S. Hoffmann and D. Fidler, 'Introduction' to *Rousseau on International Relations*, Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States : Reform and Resistance in the International Order*.

## 5.1 - A. O. Lovejoy and the State of Nature

According to Lovejoy, it is false to ascribe to Rousseau a primitivism and idealization of the state of nature. This kind of a conclusion is due to a clear misreading of Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*. Lovejoy starts his argument by summing up the three possible meanings of the term : 'the state of nature'.<sup>7</sup> First, regardless of any other characteristics, it can have a chronological signification, representing a 'primeval' condition of man. Second, it may mean simply the status of humans where and when there is no authority (the pre-political stage). Third, the term can signify a period when arts and sciences - civilization in its non-political elements - made least progress. They are referred to, by Lovejoy as chronological, juristic and cultural criteria respectively. He attributes the miscomprehension of the main theme of *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* to the confusion of the second and third meanings.<sup>8</sup> The pre-political stage, in fact, represents relatively a very wide period of time involving the stage represented by the third meaning. In other words, a transformation occurs in a cultural level as arts and sciences progress. The state of nature, in its third meaning comes to an end; however all these changes can take place in a pre-political stage, thus still in the state of nature, if the juristic criterion is taken for granted.

According to Lovejoy, Rousseau divided the pre-political stage into four cultural sub-stages. Thus, when Rousseau referred to 'the state of

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<sup>7</sup> Lovejoy, 'The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality* ', pp. 14-15.

<sup>8</sup> Lovejoy, in that respect, particularly gives W. A. Dunning's usage as an example.

nature', he did not mean the pre-political stage as a whole, but the first of these cultural stages.<sup>9</sup> The first stage is the most primitive stage and never considered to be an 'ideal'. The third stage is the one he favours most and the fourth stage is quite similar to the Hobbesian state of anarchy.

In the first stage, man lived for the moment just like an animal, developing 'only those faculties which were needed in attack or defence, either to overcome his prey or to protect himself from becoming the prey of other animals'.<sup>10</sup> Rousseau, while mentioning the physical superiority of man in this particular stage, gives the impression that he idealizes the state of nature. Again, he tends to accept that the primitive man was happier than the civilized man, but it is not a reason for him to prefer the former. This stage, in short, for Rousseau, does not represent a state of primitive perfection, but a state of pure animality.<sup>11</sup>

By the second stage, *amour-de-soi* begins to be replaced by *amour-propre* and man gains a self-consciousness against other animals. Man learns the use of simpler tools and weapons. Language is invented, permanent families are developed, private property is institutionalized during that stage. This second stage is followed by a third stage where social relations become more common and established. Man, at that stage, lives in loose, unorganized village groups.<sup>12</sup> Lovejoy, at that point, claims that it is this stage which is being generally confused with the first, primitive stage by many writers. According to

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<sup>9</sup> Lovejoy, 'The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality*', p. 16.

<sup>10</sup> Lovejoy, 'The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality*', p. 17.

<sup>11</sup> Lovejoy, 'The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality*', p. 24.

<sup>12</sup> Lovejoy, 'The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality*', p. 29.

Lovejoy, for Rousseau, the third stage is a kind of leveller, a stage of balance. There, man is less good-natured, but also less stupid and less unsocial. It is not an ideal condition in a teleological sense, it is not a kind of natural perfection. It is a mixed condition which is favoured by Rousseau.<sup>13</sup>

The fourth stage is introduced through a series of transformations. The introduction of agriculture and metallurgy is followed by the establishment of private property in land. This leads to an accumulation of capital and an increasing inequality in the wealth and power of individuals. *Amour-propre*, different from the two previous stages, becomes more institutionalized. Competition, selfish desires and comparison threaten the existence of security. Thus, this stage seems more or less identical to the Hobbesian state of nature. Again, similar to Hobbes, according to Lovejoy, for Rousseau, political authority is invented in order to put an end to violence and insecurity; however it soon turned out to be a trick of the rich to protect their property and legitimize their power.<sup>14</sup>

Lovejoy concludes his essay by indicating that Rousseau finds his ideal in the future, not in the past :

The Pessimism of the concluding passage of the *Discourse* has thus been overcome by the more hopeful implications of the evolutionistic strain in that writing; and Rousseau, having now ceased to idealize any past stage of social development, finds his ideal in the future : "Far

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<sup>13</sup> Lovejoy, ' The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality* ', p. 32.

<sup>14</sup> Lovejoy, ' The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality* ', pp. 33-34.

from thinking that there is no longer any virtue of happiness attainable by us, and that heaven has abandoned us without resource to the depravation of the species, let us endeavour to draw from the very evil which we suffer the remedy which shall cure it."

This remedy consists, of course, in the reorganization of society upon the basis of a properly drawn social compact.<sup>15</sup>

Lovejoy's analysis takes place primarily within the "first image" since his main concern is man in the state of nature. By elaborating on the notion of "the state of nature", he comes to the conclusion that Rousseau was not a philosopher who was desperately returning to nature as an ideal after standing against all forms of social solutions. On the contrary, by emphasizing the third cultural sub-stage, he wants to make clear that Rousseau was not favouring a condition where men were deprived of social relations. Thus, Rousseau had a *social* ideal in his mind which can be an alternative to both the primitive state of nature and the state of war. Even with this element of 'hope', Lovejoy, to some degree, opposes Rousseau's supposed pessimism and despair in international relations.

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<sup>15</sup> Lovejoy, 'The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality* ', p. 35.

## 5.2 - N. J. H. Dent's Understanding of *Amour-Propre*

Dent's argument in a way completes Lovejoy's thesis. Dent claims that Rousseau is by no means against any kind of communication between the individuals, but on the contrary in favour of it. For Dent, Rousseau did not completely criticize any human communication, but particular ones.<sup>16</sup> In order to reach such a conclusion, the terms '*amour-de-soi*', '*amour-propre*' and '*pitié*' should be carefully redefined. Dent, in his analysis of Rousseau's theory, gives particular importance to *Emile*. *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* and *The Social Contract* are also significant works, but according to Dent, Rousseau himself assigned particular authority to *Emile* among his books.<sup>17</sup>

Dent's analysis is based on an opposition to the common dualistic understanding of *amour-de-soi* and *amour-propre* in which they are considered as simply 'good' and 'bad' and mutually exclusive. Traditionally, *amour-propre* is taken as something 'evil', but, Dent claims, it can have some truth only as far as the 'inflamed' form of *amour-propre* is concerned. For Dent, the distinguishing connotations of the term '*amour-propre*' are not 'selfishness' or 'vanity'. *Amour-propre* can be selfish and can lead to undesirable social consequences, but it is not necessarily the case. *Amour-propre* is defined by Dent as different from its 'inflamed' form : '*amour-propre* is due care of or claim for ourselves, our status and proper power as morally significant beings.'<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Dent, *Rousseau : An Introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political Theory* , p. 37.

<sup>17</sup> Dent, *Rousseau : An Introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political Theory* , p. 1.

<sup>18</sup> Dent, *Rousseau : An Introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political Theory* , p. 56.

'Inflamed' *amour-propre* takes place when an extreme level of dependency is achieved. This kind of dependency exists when one rests his own being on other people's opinions and prejudices, in other words, when one begins to live for others almost completely. Therefore, in order to understand Rousseau, 'inflamed' *amour-propre* should be distinguished from 'proper' *amour-propre* and should never be identified with *amour-propre* in general.

In parallel to that, *amour-de-soi* is not diametrically opposed to *amour-propre* and they are not totally different concepts. Dent claims that *amour-propre* is a continuation or a disclosure of *amour-de-soi*, but not a substitution or replacement of it.<sup>19</sup> Thus, they are not irreconcilable. The crucial key element of *amour-de-soi* is that it is not confined to human species.<sup>20</sup> It exists within the animals as well. According to Dent, Rousseau, at that point, does not support *amour-de-soi* in the sense that it leads to isolation and elimination of social contact among human beings.<sup>21</sup> Thus, we are not asked to live in total isolation by Rousseau, but we are expected to evaluate our own selves with our own terms as much as possible without being much dependent upon others. However, Rousseau is aware that dependency cannot be eliminated, nor does he desire it. Similar to Lovejoy, Dent stresses that Rousseau does not favour a return back to nature. It is possible to live with dependency and it will not be something far from ideal, nor will it be a second best solution. However, Rousseau seems to be against a certain, extreme form of dependency represented by 'inflamed' *amour-*

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<sup>19</sup> Dent, *Rousseau : An Introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political Theory*, p. 91.

<sup>20</sup> Dent, *Rousseau : An Introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political Theory*, p. 90.

<sup>21</sup> The name of the chapter concerning *amour-de-soi* is : ' A Rejected Solution : The Self In Isolation ' . Dent, *Rousseau*, pp. 87-112.

*propre* which is actualized by and dependent upon the unhappiness of other members :

'Inflamed' *amour-propre* devises a significance for others which directly denies the possibility of achieving its own inherent goal, that of securing categorically recognized standing. It is, if and only if, I attribute inherent value and moment to the feelings and attitudes of others that my receipt of recognition from them can afford to me potent human signification, as I wish to enjoy. My *amour-propre* can attain its own purpose if, and only if, it allows, it grants, to others dignity and weight as counting beings in their own right.<sup>22</sup>

For a fuller understanding of Rousseau's thought, Dent requires a reconsideration of *amour-de-soi* , *amour-propre* and *pitie* and the relation between them. Dent's Rousseau seeks the ideal within the social world and within human relations rather than a primitive state of nature represented by *amour-de-soi* . Dent's analysis of the role of *amour-propre* is innovative in the sense that Rousseau's ideal is to be achieved *without* getting rid of *amour-propre*. This brings the whole project close to a more practical stance since an 'impossible' return to the state of nature, where there is only little communication and the least of human relations, is not really necessary. Dent contributes to the element of 'hope' in Rousseau, and in a sense keeps going from where Lovejoy left the argument. Thus, if Rousseau had a social ideal, Dent's reading of Rousseau is closely related to how it is going to be achieved.

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<sup>22</sup> Dent, *Rousseau : An Introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political Theory* , p. 119.

## 5.3 - E. Cassirer's Kantian Reading of Rousseau

According to Cassirer, the major problem Rousseau tries to resolve is : 'how can civilized man recover the benefits of the natural man, so innocent and happy, without returning to the state of nature, without renouncing the advantages of the social state ?'<sup>23</sup> Cassirer tries to consider each of Rousseau's works as part of a system and adopts *verstehen* as a methodology. He claims that a deeper understanding of Rousseau is essential in order to be able to see the sophisticated meaning of his theory :

The attempt to measure Rousseau's world of ideas by the traditional antithesis of 'rationalism' and 'irrationalism' results in equally ambiguous and uncertain judgements. That Rousseau turned away from the glorification of reason which prevailed in the circle of the French Encyclopaedists, that he appealed, instead, to the deeper forces of 'feeling' and 'conscience' - all this is undeniable. On the other hand, it was precisely this 'irrationalist' who, at the height of his struggle against the *philosophes* and the spirit of the French Enlightenment, coined the phrase that the loftiest ideas that man could form of the Deity were purely and exclusively grounded in reason... Furthermore, it was this 'irrationalist' whom no less a man than Kant compared with Newton and called the Newton of the moral world.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Peter Gay, 'Introduction' to Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* , p. 19. and Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* , p. 54.

<sup>24</sup> Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* , p. 39.

Similar to Lovejoy, Cassirer argues that Rousseau has no intention to go back to nature, and moreover he is not interested in the original state of nature or the real origin of mankind as well. Rousseau introduces the state of nature as a 'tool' for us to understand and judge correctly our present condition.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, for Cassirer, the characteristics human beings acquired in the primitive state of nature cannot be a key element of Rousseau's ideal. Further, Rousseau's problem is not a problem of happiness, but a problem of freedom, and at that point the state is not going to be responsible for the emancipation of the individual. However, justice and freedom will only be secured by law.

Man, different from animals, has a gift of perfectibility. For Cassirer, this means that man has a self-capacity to develop his own self in the direction of reason which will lead him to emancipation. Reason will guide man ethically and make him a good citizen; an indispensable element of the ideal state. In this sense it is very similar to Kant's notion of 'categorical duty'. Cassirer's claim is that Rousseau's ethics is not an ethics of feeling, but 'the most categorical form of a pure ethics of obligation, that was established before Kant'.<sup>26</sup> Further, Cassirer extends his argument to Rousseau's influence on Kant's belief in 'cosmopolitan constitution'.<sup>27</sup> According to Cassirer, Rousseau's universalism makes him equate the order of nature with the order of reason.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* , p. 50.

<sup>26</sup> Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* , p. 96.

<sup>27</sup> Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* , p. 82.

<sup>28</sup> Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* , p. 93.

Reason involves a valuable aspect which puts it above mere feelings. It is consciousness. Thus consciousness which emerges out of reason completes man's freedom. The state, as a consequence, can only be exposed to change by the conscious will of the free agents, individuals.

The society will never change if it is not confronted with categorical duty... This spiritual and ethical decay, the educational plan of *Emile* desires to prevent. It places the pupil outside society in order to protect him from infection and to let him find and go his own way.<sup>29</sup>

Cassirer stresses the point that the notion of 'feeling' is, in Rousseau's ideal, always under the domination of the free and conscious agency of reason; and reason as a human potential, is a source of progress. Through miscomprehension 'feeling' and 'reason' may not be treated as they deserve. According to Cassirer :

. . . 'feeling' becomes a mere slogan in no way adequate to characterize the uniqueness, the true originality, of Rousseau's philosophical formulation of the problem.<sup>30</sup>

Cassirer emphasizes the element of 'hope' within Rousseau's theory by standing against the romantic reading of Rousseau. Rousseau, according to Cassirer, tries to enlarge human capacity and reach an ideal man and society with the help of reason beyond mere feelings. In that

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<sup>29</sup> Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* , p. 123.

<sup>30</sup> Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* , p. 92.

respect, Rousseau resembles Kant and his notion of 'the categorical imperative'. Cassirer's Kantian reading of Rousseau challenges the common notion of Rousseau's 'despair' in social and political philosophy in general, and international relations in particular. In Cassirer's Rousseau, 'reason', 'general will' and 'ideal state' acquire universal meanings. Rousseau, in a very unorthodox manner, approaches cosmopolitanism. The sense of reason in Rousseau's theory brings him closer to Kant and in a way it becomes rather difficult to make an analysis regarding Rousseau *in contrast to* Kant. 'Hope' becomes a major element of Rousseau. However, Rousseau's is in no way an easy option, but a highly sophisticated one : 'even Voltaire's pessimism remained playful, while Rousseau's optimism was filled with and sustained by tragic seriousness'.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* , p. 81.

## 5.4 - M. L. Perkins' Analysis of Rousseau and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre

Perkins is specifically concerned with a rather different aspect of Rousseau; the relation between the works of Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau. Perkins' thesis is based on an assumption that there is in fact no significant, qualitative difference between the theories of the two philosophers, despite the common intellectual approach to analyze the two views as opposed to each other. His analysis should be considered both as a *re* interpretation of both Rousseau and Abbé de Saint-Pierre, thus in that respect, Perkins seems to be unique. According to Perkins, it is possible to assert, that Rousseau was deeply influenced by the Abbé. For Perkins, it is wrong to claim that Rousseau did not take Saint-Pierre's opinion seriously. However, one can observe that he simplified and even distorted St. Pierre's views in order to strengthen his own intellectual position against the Abbé.<sup>32</sup>

According to Perkins, the dominating theme within Rousseau's *Judgement* is mainly his attack on the rulers and ministers of Europe rather than his disagreement with the Abbé's plan. Apart from this, their arguments tend to reflect striking similarities. First of all, both St. Pierre and Rousseau stress the disunifying factors in Europe rather than the unifying ones. Similarly, they both are doubtful about the effectiveness of the treaties and international law.<sup>33</sup> Their like-

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<sup>32</sup> Perkins, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre* , p. 99.

<sup>33</sup> Perkins, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre* , p. 103.

mindedness goes further than that, though. Both of them are aware of the fact that balance of power can not in any way be an answer or a solution to war. A federation is needed to accomplish such a task. According to Rousseau :

One must conclude that a federation, if it is to be solid, must place each of its members in such dependence, that none of them or a league can resist the combined force of others.<sup>34</sup>

For St. Pierre, the situation is no different, following Perkins analyses : 'Only by federation may nations overcome the effects of the natural swing between equilibrium and instability.'<sup>35</sup>

After several introductory points, Rousseau summarizes the articles of the treaty of federation which are essentially the Abbé's. However :

Before attempting to prove that these conditions are in the interest of all nations, Rousseau objects to St. Pierre's naive appeal to the altruism of rulers ... Rousseau does not offer new ideas in his presentation of the articles of peace. He makes omissions which even in the opinion of Frederick show St. Pierre to be at times 'more realistic and practical' than Rousseau.<sup>36</sup>

Furthermore, Perkins claim that Rousseau's *Social Contract* to a certain extent reflects the Abbé's ideas. For both philosophers, 'the right

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<sup>34</sup> Perkins, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre* , p. 104.

<sup>35</sup> Perkins, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre* , p. 104.

<sup>36</sup> Perkins, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre* , p. 105.

of the strongest' cannot be a 'right', because it emerges out of necessity, but not duty. In that respect, both seek the conditions of a *legitimate* civil society and state. To do this, they first have to discover the nature of a *legitimate* social contract. For both the distinction between *pactum societatis* and *pactum subjectionis* is gone - there is only *pactum societatis*.<sup>37</sup> Thus, the general will and the majority rule are essential. Rousseau's and St. Pierre's agreement still continues even at that level. For both law is a liberating rather than a restraining concept.<sup>38</sup> Their approaches to the law-liberty relationship seems to be similar. For both lawful control is liberty. In other words, 'laws according to both authors, are guides to liberty rather than chains'.<sup>39</sup> In the final analysis, both Rousseau and St. Pierre, according to Perkins, try to provide equality and liberty, under the influence of republican values, by making the government simply an agent of the general will.<sup>40</sup> Thus, Rousseau's criticism of St. Pierre seems to be based on weak foundations:

... when Rousseau openly attacks St. Pierre, he is usually attributing to him principles which the Abbé himself rejects as inadequate foundations of a political philosophy. Rousseau's often quoted complaint that Saint-Pierre relied on kings and ministers in conceiving his European republic is directly refuted by the Abbé's emphasis on governments with republican features.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Perkins, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre* , p. 132.

<sup>38</sup> Perkins, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre* , p. 129.

<sup>39</sup> Perkins, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre* , p. 133.

<sup>40</sup> Perkins, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre* , p. 133.

<sup>41</sup> Perkins, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre* , p. 131.

As it can clearly be seen, in essence, Perkins' analysis, does not assume a considerable 'gap' between Rousseau and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Perkins, in distinction from the first three authors, discusses the issue of 'federation' as a 'third image' aspect. He tends to show the strikingly similar views of the two on federation, balance of power and international law. However, his analysis goes beyond that level. Similar to Rousseau, the Abbé emphasizes the crucial role of the republican values. 'Social contract', 'the general will' and 'majority rule' are common notions for both philosophers. It seems that Perkins recognizes Rousseau's effort to find a solution within the 'second-image' level, but he attributes such a role to the Abbé de Saint-Pierre as well. Thus, they can hardly be regarded within the boundaries of *realpolitik*. In that respect, Perkins' approach to both St. Pierre and Rousseau is clearly different from the readings of two figures in international relations theory.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> See M. G. Forsyth, H. M. A. Keens-Soper and P. Savigear, 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau' in M. G. Forsyth, H. M. A. Keens-Soper and P. Savigear (eds.), *The Theory of International Relations : Selected Texts from Gentili to Treitschke* (London : Unwin University Books, 1970), S. Hoffmann, *The State of War*, F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace : Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States*.

## 5.5 - A Different Interpretation of Rousseau in International Relations by M. C. Williams

Michael C. Williams is the only scholar elaborating on the issue of Rousseau and International Relations differently from the first four scholars. He explicitly criticizes the conventional approach in international relations theory identifying Rousseau's ideas with the tradition of *realpolitik*. He mentions the possibility of a different reading reinterpreting his political theory in general and the *Abstract and Judgement of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace* in particular.

In his analysis, Williams at times comes very close to Lovejoy and Cassirer. He firmly rejects the general inclination to take 'the state of nature' as an ideal and to de-emphasize Rousseau's social ideal by creating a '*fallen* state of nature'.<sup>43</sup> In parallel to Cassirer, Williams presents Rousseau as a figure who is favouring reason for the emancipation of the individual and the citizen. Rousseau's ideal state required the existence of ideal citizens. Williams argues that Rousseau can in no way be considered a 'third-image' structuralist.

Williams' claim is that the major disagreement between the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau takes place at the level of *problem*, but not *solution*. For Williams, what Rousseau cannot accept within the Abbé's analysis is his evaluation of the present situation of the state of war.

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<sup>43</sup> Williams, 'Rousseau, Realism and *Realpolitik*', p. 186.

According to Rousseau, St. Pierre wrongly relies on the existing rulers and expects them to pursue their real interests and form a confederation. Rousseau's criticism is striking. He claims that as long as the princes of Europe are aware of their real interests, they will never conform with such a project. St. Pierre's diagnosis, rather than his remedy, is flawed :

In misunderstanding the nature of contemporary society and the state, Rousseau claims, St. Pierre failed to realise that the very entity to which he intended to appeal in order to establish his confederacy would ensure its impossibility. But this was due not, as contemporary realism claims, to the very division of humanity into 'citizens' of particularistic states, but rather to the nature of that particularistic division itself... In Rousseau's opinion, St. Pierre 'judged like a child' *not* in the reasonableness of his plan, but rather in his evaluation of the present reality.<sup>44</sup>

Williams, after redefining the nature of the gap between the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau, extends his argument in parallel to Cassirer's Kantian reading of Rousseau. Similarly, he stresses that human freedom is achieved through 'the categorical duty'. Thus, the general will will be formed by the citizens who use their 'reason'. In that respect, Williams claims that Rousseau's solution applies not to citizens only, but to all humanity. It thus takes on a universal character in *principle* .

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<sup>44</sup> Williams, 'Rousseau, Realism and *Realpolitik* ', pp. 192-3.

However, Rousseau's universal aspect is, in a way, 'controlled'. It goes hand in hand with a rather different kind of realism, other than *realpolitik*, which is not confined to the international arena. For Williams, Rousseau seems extremely careful not to make easy conclusions and totally aware of the difficulties standing in the way of his ideal :

The 'imperative' of moral freedom is for Rousseau always compelling, but is never determining.<sup>45</sup>

The choice is not between universality and anarchy (world government or the state of war) but confederation is neither an automatic solution nor an *a priori* impossibility. International Politics depends upon both the particular historical relationships between states and the nature of these states and citizens themselves.<sup>46</sup>

Williams' essay ends by stressing the need for a more complex and rich analysis of Rousseau and international relations. Only an analysis which is not limited to the realist/idealist opposition (focusing on the 'third-image' level) can extend the argument, rather than putting an end to it :

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<sup>45</sup> Williams, 'Rousseau, Realism and *Realpolitik* ', p. 199.

<sup>46</sup> Williams, 'Rousseau, Realism and *Realpolitik* ', p. 198.

In all these ways Rousseau's conceptions of international politics may be seen not as the scientific closing off of debate, but rather as potential contributions to an emergent critical conception and consciousness of creative political initiatives.<sup>47</sup>

In general, the analysis of Williams does not diverge drastically from Lovejoy's or Cassirer's. Cassirer, after accepting, in parallel to Lovejoy, Rousseau's unwillingness to return to nature, introduces Rousseau's use of 'reason' in order to reach his ideal. Cassirer's idea of emancipation through reason contributes to the creation of an ideal citizen as well as leading to an ideal state and society. Lovejoy clearly shows that Rousseau does not favour a return to a state of nature which is represented by *amour-de-soi*. On the other hand, Dent's redefinition of *amour-propre* does not seem to be familiar for the other four writers. He attributes *amour-propre* a social ideal role within Rousseau's theory. Dent's rather sophisticated analysis of *amour-propre* and its social role is to a certain extent shared by Cassirer and Williams though they never address *amour-propre* explicitly. Perkins is concerned with another aspect of Rousseau. He compares Rousseau's ideas to the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's and underlines their similarities. For Perkins, Rousseau distorts the Abbé's views, who should not be considered as a 'blind optimist'. Unlike Williams, who claims that the Abbé's argument does not go beyond the state of war, Perkins claims that St. Pierre's views on state formation and social contract, contrary to common belief, in fact inspired Rousseau. On the other hand, in Perkins' mind, Rousseau is cynical about

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<sup>47</sup> Williams, 'Rousseau, Realism and *Realpolitik*', p. 200.

the reliability of balance of power, but is never reluctant towards the options concerning a world federation.

For our purpose, these critics share a common theme. Lovejoy aims to prove that Rousseau did not have a pre-social ideal of a state of nature which, realistically, can not be retrieved. Dent, on a similar basis, shows that Rousseau does not try to do away with *amour-propre*, but regards it an essential element of his social ideal. Cassirer introduces 'reason' as a cornerstone of Rousseau's philosophy and his ideal project. Perkins, while emphasizing Rousseau's 'flexibility' concerning a solution for the state of war, takes notice of Rousseau's 'effort' to influence the formation of the state. Finally Williams notices a universal aspect of Rousseau, stemming from 'reason' and 'the general will', and finds in Rousseau a sense of realism without any connotations of 'despair'. This is quite different from the *realpolitik* of the 'third image' level.<sup>48</sup>

As it can be observed, the critics do not place Rousseau between an ideal 'state of nature' to which cannot be retrieved, and a disastrous, systematic state of war which is impossible to get rid of, thus they do not support the thesis of Rousseau's 'despair' from the perspective of international relations theory. On the contrary, their arguments, in general, attribute a sense of 'hope' to Rousseau (an indication of a 'sign' for change) which emerges from his social and political ideals and stands against the claims of *realpolitik*.

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<sup>48</sup> It is worthy to note that Williams does not favour Waltz's scheme of images, regarding it an inadequate methodological 'tool' to analyze Rousseau.

# **CHAPTER 6**

## **Conclusion**

In this thesis, I have attempted to provide an intellectual critique of the attitude that regards Jean-Jacques Rousseau's philosophy as one of the origins of realist international relations theory. This attitude requires a selective reading of Rousseau. Thus, *The State of War* and *Judgement of Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace* become the center of analytical attention to the neglect of *Emile* and *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*. One can notice three tendencies which seem to contribute to the formation of that specific attitude.

The first tendency is to think of the state of nature as a desirable impossibility. Rousseau's identification with realist international relations theory is associated with a special sense of 'despair'. Rousseau, having rejected all social solutions, is left alone with an impossible (romantic) return to the state of nature, represented by *amour-de-soi*. In other words, one is faced with nothing but the 'undesirable' realities of the state of war. Fidler and Hoffmann tend to adopt this approach in an explicit manner :

Paradoxically, Rousseau who recognized that man could never revert to the state of nature, advocated for nations a return to an isolation that the march of history had proved impossible long before he wrote... Men, citizens, and states find themselves, like Ulysses' comrades, imprisoned in the cave of the Cyclops waiting to be eaten.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Stanley Hoffmann and David Fidler, 'Introduction' to *Rousseau on International Relations* (edited by Hoffmann and Fidler) (Oxford, 1991), p. lxvii. It is not hard to find quotes from Rousseau supporting the opposite argument, in fact. Here is (another) one : 'So the sweet voice of Nature is no longer an infallible guide for us, nor is the independence we have received from her a desirable state... There is yet another point : if this imperfect

In the third chapter the special meaning of the state of nature in Rousseau is analyzed, and in the fifth chapter the way in which Lovejoy and Dent contribute to a strong alternative interpretation concerning the state of nature.

Second, it seems evident that a direct way to suggest Rousseau's realism in international relations theory is to present him as a 'third image' figure as far as the cause of the problem is concerned. However, we have shown that this 'third image' figure<sup>2</sup> does not come up with a 'third image' solution.<sup>3</sup> In the final analysis<sup>4</sup>, Hoffmann, Hinsley, Clark

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independence and this liberty without rules had remained united with primitive innocence, it would still have had an essential vice harmful to the development of our most excellent faculties : It would have lacked that link between the parts which constitutes them into a whole. The earth would have covered with men between whom there would have been almost no communication... each one of us would have remained isolated among the others, each one of us would have thought only of himself; our understanding would have been unable to develop; we should have lived without feeling anything, and we should have died without having lived... there would have been neither kindness in our hearts nor morality in our actions and we should have never enjoyed that most delicious sentiment of the soul which is the love of virtue.' Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'The General Society of the Human Race' in *The Social Contract and Discourses* (translated and introduced by G. D. H. Cole) (London : Everyman, 1993), pp. 170-1.

<sup>2</sup> According to Ian Clark, in international relations realists, in general, can be divided into two in terms of where they look for the cause of the problem. Human nature is the source of the problem for some, while others claim that it is the system. Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States : Reform and Resistance in the International Order* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 69. However, in both cases, there seems to be almost nothing left to do in order to change the existing state of 'despair'. In fact, 'putting the blame on' human nature seems to be just another form of analysis which is again centered upon a 'third image', no-way-out anarchy. Waltz, who is known to be a 'third image' realist, not paradoxically, supports his argument by relying on Rousseau's 'stag-hunt' story which is understood as a 'preliminary' form of anarchical violence (this time between men instead of states) based on mistrust and thus, reluctance to co-operate.

<sup>3</sup> According to Hoffmann, what seems to be significant is whether Rousseau can come up with a 'third image' solution or not. 'It is true that (Rousseau's) analysis of the international milieu provides what Waltz has called the third image, in which the absence of any common superior over the states is seen as the 'permissive' cause of war. But Rousseau does not therefore propose a European or a world federation to put an end to war.' S. Hoffmann, *The State of War : Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (New York : Praeger, 1965), p. 72. See also, Hoffmann and Fidler, 'Introduction', p. lxxiii.

<sup>4</sup> There seems to be very little difference between 'putting the blame on' human nature and tautologically asserting that it is the 'system' itself which is the cause.

and Waltz, attribute the state of war to a 'third image' cause.<sup>5</sup> In the fourth chapter, by referring to Rousseau himself and by reviewing the works of Dent, Cassirer, Perkins and Williams (in the fifth chapter) an attempt was made to demonstrate Rousseau's vision involving social and political 'investigations', his romantic inclinations preserving ideals rather than merely sticking to the 'hard-core' realities of international politics.

Third, in parallel to that, it is quite common to consider Rousseau *in contrast to* Kant in international relations theory, as well expressed in Hoffmann's 'famous' statement<sup>6</sup> : 'Whoever studies contemporary international relations cannot but hear, behind the clash of interests and ideologies, a kind of permanent dialogue between Rousseau and Kant.'<sup>7</sup> Hoffmann, while analyzing Kant and Rousseau's philosophies, finds in Kant an element of 'moral progress' opposed to Rousseau : 'For Kant, the best society is not the one that *makes* man behave morally, it is the one in which man is most *free* to behave morally if he wants to.'<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, according to Cassirer, this feature of Kant - the existence of a 'categorical imperative' - is a direct result of Rousseau's influence on Kant. Thus, Rousseau in that respect, does not diverge from Kant. As was pointed out in the fifth chapter, Cassirer's Rousseau can hardly be discussed *in contrast to* Kant.

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<sup>5</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War* (New York ; Praeger, 1965), Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States : Reform and Resistance in the International Order* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1989), F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace : Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 46-7, K. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1959).

<sup>6</sup> By the way, of course, one should not forget Ian Clark's work, *The Hierarchy of States : Reform and Resistance in the International Order*, in which there exists two separate chapters, one for Rousseau and one for Kant, in order to be able to make the contrast sharper.

<sup>7</sup> Hoffmann, *The State of War*, p. 86. See also, Hoffmann and Fidler, 'Introduction', p. lxx.

<sup>8</sup> Hoffmann, *The State of War*, p. 83.

This specific attitude, involving certain strategies, and seen in three intellectual tendencies described above, is surely under the influence of a way of looking at things, which is independent from Rousseau. Within this attitude what is required (as was put forward in the second chapter) is a clear-cut distinction between political theory and international relations theory; between inside and outside. International relations, as the name of an 'independent' discipline, emerged through a 'division of labour' stemming from a modern project based on the methodological assumption of 'scientific unity'. In keeping with this specific discourse's influence on international relations, the realism/idealism opposition is the favoured 'scientific' tool. Rousseau is situated within realism, and this renders Rousseau's philosophical discourse ahistorical. Hoffmann and Fidler extend the scope of this reduction and analyze contemporary international issues<sup>9</sup> in light of Rousseau and Kant, attributing them positions derived from the well-known realism/idealism opposition :

Realism and Liberalism, along with Marxism, have been the three main philosophies of international politics. Marxism's failure to pay sufficient attention to states and nations as autonomous actors, and to develop an adequate vision of post-capitalist economies and polities, appears to have finally undermined its appeal as an international political theory. Rousseau as the deepest of Realists, and Kant, as the most profound of the Liberals, both tell us a great deal about different aspects of world affairs...<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Hoffmann and Fidler, 'Introduction', pp. lxxii-lxxvi.

<sup>10</sup> Hoffmann and Fidler, 'Introduction', pp. lxxvi-lxxvii.

However, in Rousseau, it seems that there is more than that. His analysis is hardly a 'third image' one, and he is not 'imprisoned' within the present 'realities' of the state of war, reflecting a sense of 'despair'. In *The General Society of the Human Race*, it can be seen that he holds a certain degree of optimism :

... yet we should not think that there is neither virtue nor happiness for us and that heaven has abandoned us without remedy to depravity. We should rather try to extract from the evil itself the remedy which can cure it. If possible we must make up for the lack of any general association by creating new associations. Let our violent interlocutor himself be the judge of our success. Let us show him that the art of living together can, as it develops, repair the evils which, in its initial stages, it caused to human nature... Let us enlighten his reason with new knowledge, let us warm his heart with new feelings; let him to multiply his being and his felicity by sharing them with his fellows. If my zeal does not blind me in this enterprise... this enemy of the human race will finally abjure his hatred together with his errors; reason, which led him astray, will bring him back to humanity; he will learn to prefer to his apparent interest his interest properly understood; he will become good, virtuous and compassionate. In short, this man who wanted to be a fierce brigand will become the most firm support of a well-ordered society.<sup>11</sup>

The aim of this thesis has not been to put Rousseau into a one single, 'true' context; but rather to demonstrate the disregarded aspects

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<sup>11</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'The General Society of the Human Race', pp. 176-7.

of Rousseau's philosophy, referring to Rousseau's own works together with the alternative interpretations of Rousseau (at times revealing contradictions within political theory itself).

One can conclude that, since Rousseau's philosophy goes far beyond the boundaries of the 'third image' level, focusing primarily on the question of whether Rousseau offers federation as an effective solution or not (in other words, presenting Rousseau as either a realist or an idealist) is not a sound way to understand him. Considering his philosophy as a whole, it is not possible to associate Rousseau unproblematically with the tradition of *realpolitik* in international relations theory. To do so is to misconstrue his philosophy. To understand him beyond the realism/idealism opposition, on the other hand, is a reminder that the management and the prevention of conflict requires an attempt to move international relations theory beyond its restricted systemic level, so that one can search for solutions to conflict beyond the third image and in the realm of the state/citizen complex which is, in fact, what Rousseau suggests.

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