

UFUK: HOW THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY MOLDED
TURKISH ELITE OPINION, 1960-1980

A Master's Thesis

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To mom, dad, Caner and Merve

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Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.

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ABSTRACT

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This study argues that the United States Information Agency carried out an intense public diplomacy program in Turkey between 1960 and 1980 in order to ameliorate the U.S. image among the Turkish urban elite, especially among the members of the Republican People's Party and thus to prevent Turkey from having closer relations with the USSR. For this purpose, the study contains a close reading of the USIA propaganda material targeting this small but influential group, namely *Ufuk Magazine* and uncovers the image that the USIA aimed to create in order "to win hearts and minds" of the RPP members, members of Turkish Foreign Ministry of the time, academics and journalists in a period of Cold War where the peripheries rather than Europe became the target of the U.S. public diplomacy efforts.

Keywords: USIA, United States of America, Turkey, 1960s, 1970s, Republican People's Party, USSR, Cold War, public diplomacy, propaganda, *Ufuk Magazine*.

ÖZET

UFUK: BİRLEŞİK DEVLETLER ENFORMASYON AJANSI TÜRK ELİT KANAATİNİ NASIL ŞEKİLLENDİRDİ, 1960-1980

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Bu çalışma, Birleşik Devletler Enformasyon Ajansı'nın (USIA) Türk entelektüel kesiminin, özellikle de Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi üyelerinin kanaatinde Amerikan algısını düzeltmek ve böylece Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliğiyle yakınlaşmasını önlemek üzere 1960-1980 yılları arasında yoğun bir kamu diplomasisi programı uyguladığını ileri sürer. Çalışma, bu amaçla, bu küçük fakat etkili grubu hedef alan *Ufuk Dergisi* isimli propaganda materyalinin alt metin okumasını yapar ve Enformasyon Ajansı'nın, Soğuk Savaş'ın az gelişmiş ülkelerin odak noktası olduğu bir dönemde, CHP'nin, Türk Dışişleri Bakanlığının, akademisyenlerin ve gazetecilerin “gönüllerini ve akıllarını fethetmek” için kamu diplomasisi yoluyla oluşturmaya çalıştığı Amerikan imajını ortaya çıkarır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Birleşik Devletler Enformasyon Ajansı (USIA), Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Türkiye, 1960'lar, 1970'ler, Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi, Sovyetler Birliği, Soğuk Savaş, kamu diplomasisi, propaganda, *Ufuk Dergisi*.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The period between 1960 and 1980 can be considered as one of the turning points of the relations between the two countries, because the US-Turkey relations, which had been virtually free of problems in the period between 1946 and 1960, became a problematic one due to political crises between the two countries as well as the changing political atmosphere in Turkey, which presented challenges to the way Turkey perceived the US and to the relations between the two countries.¹ During these years, the US made

¹ The 1946-1954 period was a period of closer and unproblematic relations since Turkey found the support it needed in the fields of economic development and security with such developments as *US Missouri's* visit in Istanbul, the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the military aid provided by the implementation of this doctrine, inclusion of Turkey to the Marshall Plan in 1948 providing economic aid besides the military, and closer relations during the Korean War. Turkey's NATO membership in 1952 institutionalized the US-Turkey military relations. Between the 1960 and 1980, many crises occurred in relations between the US and Turkey, such as Jupiter Missile Crisis of 1962, Johnson Letter of 1964, U-2 crises and American bases crises between 1960-1965, poppy trade problem of 1970, Cyprus crisis and arms embargo between 1975-1978. All these problems gave the United States a bad reputation in Turkey and rendered relations between the two countries more stressful than ever. Although the arms embargo was removed in 1977, negative image of the US and the anti-Americanism as a result remained until the coup d'état of September 12, 1980, after which Turgut Ozal, who was

efforts to fix these foreign relations problems with Turkey, and considering the increase in the radical politics in Turkey both in the Left and the Right, aimed to eliminate the threat of communism by promoting an American way of life and economy especially among the elite class of Turkey, thus creating a political environment that favors stronger relations with the US again. Therefore, during this decade of the Cold War period, the United States Information Agency carried out public diplomacy programs in Turkey by publishing a small circulation magazine called *Ufuk* targeting the Turkish urban elite, especially the members of the Republican People's Party. By publishing *Ufuk* between 1968 and 1973, USIA set out to influence the RPP group and other intellectuals in their policy-making decisions so that Turkish foreign policy would remain in favor of the US and to prevent this group from getting closer to the USSR as a solution to Turkey's need for development.

The USIA officers' account of their time in Turkey and *Ufuk* indicate that the US had an image of Turkey as a developing country leaning toward the West in its modernization efforts and conducted public diplomacy accordingly, strongly emphasizing the possible advantages of following the American system in this development process and the aids the US had been giving to the developing countries, including Turkey. At the same time, Turkey had an image of the US, which was positive for some groups, namely the politically powerful democrat (rightist) groups, and negative for others, such as leftist student groups. The US worked to change the undesired aspects of its image in

known for his sympathy for the US and the free market economy, became the prime minister opening a new page for the relations between the two countries. Until the Ozal administration, however, as a logical extension of these problems, in order to correct the negative US image in Turkey, American diplomatic efforts intensified during these 20 years.

the eyes of the Turkish people in order to foster public opinion that would fix the aforementioned problems. The USIA chose to target the elite class, consisting of journalists, academics and policy-makers, instead of the Turkish public per se, since this small group of people were the opinion leaders and they determined the foreign policy of the country. *Ufuk* was a bimonthly journal, which consisted of articles published elsewhere and translated into Turkish as well as original articles written for the magazine on various subjects ranging from descriptions of life in the US, to the American economic and political system, the importance of NATO or even the dangers of environmental pollution and solutions to it. As indicated by the selection of topics and articles in *Ufuk*, USIA officers, in harmony with the national objectives of the US, sought to keep Turkey among the allies of the US and to prevent the spread of Soviet ideology and influence to Turkey. In other words, USIA aimed to contain communism in its existing boundaries by making an appeal of the US to Turkey.

In this framework, this study does a close reading of *Ufuk Magazine* and traces the careers of USIA diplomats in Turkey, such as public affairs officer Robert A. Lincoln and cultural attaché Leon Picon, in order to draw a picture of how USIA presented the US to Turkish urban elite. When we evaluate the propaganda material, the picture we get of the US is one that represents a model for developing countries with its progressive nature, values and lifestyle. While this image was successfully drawn for the urban elite population by *Ufuk Magazine*, USIS officers in Turkey also managed to forge close relations with Turkish policy makers and opinion leaders, such as RPP

leader Nihat Erim and journalist Abdi İpekçi, although the political environment of Turkey, which still contained the same kind of fights between the Right and the Left over pro or anti-American sentiments during the 1960s, 1970s and later, suggests that the USIA was not particularly successful at changing Turkish opinion of the US.

1.1 Literature Review

US foreign policy is one of the most studied subjects in the world. However, the USIA, which was an integral part of American foreign policy and the official information program, has been a neglected part of the historiography of US diplomatic relations. Although recently there have been studies on the USIA and the US information activities carried out by this agency, there is still a huge lack of focused studies on the subject. Since the USIA was created by Eisenhower and was a central aspect of Eisenhower's foreign policy, the works pertaining to the USIA activities during the Eisenhower administration are more numerous than the later periods of the agency. However, most of the early works were written by a few of the former USIA employees (or by USIA employees still working at the time), which render them not particularly useful because the usual pattern of these works are the justification/rationalization of the USIA programs they used to work for followed by a section of advice for future employees of the program (or for

anyone else who would conduct cultural diplomacy).² USIA veteran Wilson Dizard's book *Inventing Public Diplomacy* is an exception in this respect, focusing both on the successes and the failures of the agency rather than giving justifications for the actions the agency carried out and openly defining the USIA as a propaganda operation, albeit with the addition of new dimensions such as its wider scope and the fact that it provided the basis of the US commercial media's postwar expansion into global markets. Dizard pointed out that USIA activities worldwide helped initiate and/or expand the US media, cultural organizations and international trade. This was especially true of markets where the US had little or no presence before, such as Asia, Africa and the Middle East. In this 2004 study, Dizard also asserted that the scholarly study of the role of public diplomacy in US foreign policy was in its early stages.³ An examination of the studies that have been added to the body of works on the USIA since then shows the same result. The USIA as a scholarly subject still needs attention.

Part of the reason for the lack of studies on the USIA is the Smith-Mundt Act, which prevented the USIA from going public with its records (which were kept in a very random manner anyway due to President Dwight D. Eisenhower's and the first USIA director Ted Streibert's concerns for secrecy). Another reason is the reluctance to admit that the US carried out propaganda activities in foreign regions. Propaganda is still an unsympathetic word for the

² See Wilson Dizard, *Strategy of Truth: The Story of the U.S. Information Service* (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1961); Fitzhugh Green, *American Propaganda Abroad: From Benjamin Franklin to Ronald Reagan* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1988); Thomas Sorensen, *The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda* (New York: Harper&Row, 1968).

³ Wilson Dizard, *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the US Information Agency*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).

public and for scholars, who tend to opt for the more politically correct term “public diplomacy”. Detailed studies of the USIA would require accepting that the US government(s)’s activities in foreign regions can be categorized under the name of propaganda. This concern contributed to the unwillingness to study the subject academically.⁴

With the rising interest in the cultural aspects of American foreign policy in the 1980s, considered as a period of “cultural turn” of diplomatic history, and consequently the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the interest in the USIA has increased as well, although the value of the works conducted by historians concerning the area of American public diplomacy was still accepted with suspicion. In the 1980s and the 1990s, historians of cultural relations had to “justify their work” in Frank Ninkovich’s words.⁵ When studied, the studies were focused almost solely on the cultural impact of the United States on other countries, especially on Europe, which was termed in simplistic phrases such as “Americanization” and “coca-colonization” offering little agency to the

⁴ Nicholas Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989*. (New York: Cambridge, 2010). The earliest studies on the United States public diplomacy and USIA labeled the activities of USIA as “propaganda.” Oren Stephens wrote in his 1955 study *Facts to a Candid World* that the United States overseas information programs were propaganda programs. Likewise in 1961 Wilson Dizard wrote in *The Strategy of Truth* that “The United States has been in the international propaganda business, off and on, for a long time.” [in Nancy Snow, *Propaganda, Inc.: Selling America’s Culture to the World*, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2010), 67] However, others studying the subject later and USIA officials did not agree referring to the idea that USIA disseminated known facts and not disinformation. For instance Edward Murrow insisted on the stating the truth aspect of the conduct of their work as follows: “American traditions and the American ethic require us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive, we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that.” (The Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow>) Nevertheless, as is apparent in Murrow’s words too, dissemination of the truth can also be identified as propaganda. The distinguishing factor in fact is not the type/quality of the disseminated material, but the fact that it is disseminated in order to win hearts and minds on the side of a nation and everything it stands for, against another/others.

⁵ Frank Ninkovich, *Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950*. (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1995), 3.

Europeans.⁶ Although the primary “target area” of American Cold War propaganda between the 1950s and 1990s was the Third World, propaganda and public diplomacy efforts of the United States in those countries remained underexamined. Although they helped contextualize USIA’s place in the larger cultural emphasis of the Cold War period, even the works of Kenneth Osgood and Walter Hixson, who are pioneers in the subject, do not present case studies focused on specific USIA programs in particular places and time periods.⁷

Nicholas Cull’s 2010 work *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency* provided the most comprehensive study on the subject, being the first archive-based history of the agency. However, since the USIA was not a monolithic presence and followed different guidelines under different styles of management in each country, the need for case studies is evident.

1.2 The Rationale for Choosing A History of US Public Diplomacy in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s

As mentioned above, the focus of American public diplomacy in the years between the 1950s and 1990s was on keeping the peripheries intact rather than dealing with Soviet cultural impact on Europe, but the studies in this field

⁶ Michael J. Hogan, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 9.

⁷ Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda Culture and the Cold War, 1945-1961*. (London: Macmillan, 1997).; Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*. (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2006).

fail to represent case studies of these areas. Therefore choosing a time period between the late 1960s and early 1970s in US public diplomacy efforts in Turkey only makes sense.

Case studies of areas other than Europe clarify the way the USIA pictured the US and the particular country in which it led public diplomacy efforts. In addition, they shed light on the strength and/or weakness of the American cultural diplomacy and anti-communist propaganda, and make it possible to see the differences and similarities between the USIA approach to European countries and to these countries. Therefore this study aims to present such a case study on Turkey and to answer questions such as 1) What was the image of the US, which was presented to the Turkish elite by the USIA? and 2) How were these images transmitted? These questions matter for the larger picture of the US foreign policy as well as for an understanding of the US relations with Turkey. Examining the USIA experience in Turkey both through the examples of propaganda in the region and through what important officials of the agency during the time – namely Robert A. Lincoln, Leon Picon, Seymour I. Nadler, Kenton W. Keith and Patrick E. Nieburg- had to say about that experience gives a better picture of the American public diplomacy activities in the region. In addition, having a closer look at the specific examples of USIS activities in Turkey, namely the USIS publication of *Ufuk Magazine*, will help to see the content of the U.S. anti-communist propaganda in Turkey. Using this case study, this thesis investigates what American values the US attempted to transmit to Turkey, the changes and/or continuities in the

message and how this message was designed to influence the way Turkey perceived the US.

Also important to note here is that until the year 1960 the party in power in Turkey was the Democrat Party (DP), which sought close relations with the US for the benefits of American aid in economic development. Therefore, the political environment in Turkey allowed such a close partnership to flourish between the two countries as well. However, the popular support for DP began to deteriorate in 1960, although the party won the elections again, due to poor economic condition of Turkey in the form of high inflation, shortages of food and slow economic development despite the aid. The reaction of DP to the lack of support and increasing opposition was an authoritarian approach of tuning out these voices, which ended with the overthrow of the DP government with a military coup. At the same time, the 1960s was a decade of student movements and labor unions in Turkey.⁸ According to the USIA report of the year 1966, these socialist developments threatened the alliance between the US and Turkey by making the socialist, and by extension Soviet, system an alternative that Turkey might want to follow at the time of these internal conflicts.

The 1960s was just as a period when the civil rights and student movements were at their peak in the US as it was in Turkey. This enabled USIA to associate Turkish political problems with the American ones while

⁸ As a result of the hunt for communists in 1970, the student movement came to an end with the execution of the leaders of the Revolutionary Student Union -Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan- in 1972 and others consecutively, but a conservative, rightist and pro-American government was established only in 1983 by Turgut Özal of the Motherland Party (ANAP).

also obliging them to make an explanation of these movements so as not to leave any doubt that these were only temporary and were happening only because the US was democratic enough to allow it.

1.3 USIA's Rationale for Focusing on Elite Opinion and Publishing *Ufuk Magazine*

Turkish foreign policy has been traditionally determined by a small group of bureaucrats and opinion leaders, in our case by the members of RPP. Therefore, USIA's choice of molding the Turkish urban elite's opinion rather than conducting public diplomacy is logical. This choice also helped determine the way USIA prepared its propaganda material. A look at the 1966 USIA report reveals that the Agency was successful at reading the current political and social conditions of Turkey so that it could adapt its objectives accordingly. If we examine the studies of Turkish foreign policy, we can see that the USIA evaluations of Turkey are clearly in line with the historical realities of the time. USIA knew the basic tenets of the way Turkish elite (i.e. policy-makers and opinion leaders) made foreign policy decisions.

The main tenets of Turkish foreign policy have not gone through significant change since near the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and can be

grouped under 3 categories.⁹ One of these is the legacy of the Ottoman past, which gave Turkish foreign policy a realist approach to foreign relations and a tradition of keeping up with the balance of powers.¹⁰ Although the 1966 USIA report did not mention this side of the Ottoman legacy, it elaborated another aspect of it, namely the traditional hostility between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Starting with the expansionist policy of Russia in the 17th century usually described in Turkish primary school textbooks as Russia's policy of "accession to warm seas," the two empires became enemies and this hostility continued throughout the history of the republic as well, although never reaching the point of clashes between the two countries. The fact that there was a history of hostility between the two countries made it easier for Turkey to continue its tendency to pursue development in Western terms and not to turn to the opportunities offered by the socialist system of the Soviets.

The second basic aspect of Turkish foreign policy-making is the strategic importance of Turkey's geopolitical location. Studies on Turkish foreign policy also state that Turkish policy-makers attached (and has been attaching) great significance to the geopolitics and strategic location of Turkey

⁹ These basic principles of Turkish foreign policy are the synthesis of many works on the subject. All of these works share the same opinion about these basic principles. For more detailed arguments on these, see Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis* (Ankara: SAM Papers, 2004); William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*. (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 2000); Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, eds., *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004); Baskın Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*. (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010).

¹⁰ However, the same studies also talk about the "Sèvres-phobia" haunting the Turkish policy-making in the form of skepticism and caution against other countries. Although it is easy to understand the traumatic effect Sèvres agreement had on Turkish minds, since the agreement attempted to partition Turkey leaving only a small insignificant part of it to the Turks, the agreement was never implemented. This "phobia" has led policy-makers to take more caution than possibly needed at times, contradicting the realist approach the Turkish foreign policy is claimed to have adopted.

even at times that this significance no longer existed in the sense that it used to due to changes in the system, international politics and technology.¹¹ Especially during the Cold War, the position of Turkey as a bridge between Europe and Asia became understandably important for the success of the containment strategy, where the US wanted an exemplary country in the Middle East that modeled its own system as a buffer zone between the Soviets and the Middle East countries. The geopolitical location of Turkey also gave Turkey a chance to model the Western civilizations, while also not cutting off its Islamic connections, creating a sometimes problematic dual identity as to which way to turn at different times.

The geopolitical position of Turkey also created insecurity in the sense that all four sides of Turkey are “surrounded by many neighbors with different characteristics, regimes, ideologies, and aims; and that relations between them and Turkey may not always be peaceful, and especially in the Middle East, may occasionally take the form of armed clashes.”¹²

Also creating anxiety over security was the idea that if the Aegan Islands were controlled by an enemy power, Turkey would lose its control of Istanbul and Izmir harbors as well as the Straits. Cyprus was also important for the same security concerns. Therefore, Greece’s desire for *Enosis* received a harsh reaction on the Turkish side and the American approach of not protecting

¹¹ It should be noted here that this geopolitical importance of Turkey was and still is one of the most emphasized subjects in Turkish history classes. Therefore, it becomes part of the person’s thinking on the subject of Turkey and the place it holds in the world.

¹² Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 25.

Turkey on this issue, the Johnson letter and implementing an arms embargo did not help the relations between the two countries.

The third basic tenet is Atatürk's ideology (Kemalism) and its impact on Turkish foreign policy. Atatürk was a reformist leader and his domestic policies aimed to depart from the Ottoman past, especially on three points, namely imperialism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism. In order to provide this departure in the country and achieve social and political reforms accordingly, the foreign policy of the country needed to be peaceful. In other words, Turkish foreign relations needed to allow Turkey to become politically stable, to economically develop and to reach "the level of contemporary civilization" in Atatürk's words. His foreign policy was also strongly connected to his domestic policy described by six key principles.¹³ Accordingly, Kemalist foreign policy opposed totalitarian tendencies, hostility towards non-Islamic states, unattainable goals such as Pan-Turanism or Pan-Islamism and spending the country's energy for this end, while supporting peace, order, independence, democracy and economic development for Turkey. These Kemalist principles helped create a foreign policy promoting peaceful relations with other countries and a continuation of Western orientation.

All in all, these three basic tenets of Turkish foreign policy suggest that there is a continuation of the importance attributed to geopolitics, of Turkey's security thinking, of its Western orientation, of its desire for economic

¹³ These are Republicanism (replacement of absolute monarchy with the law, popular sovereignty and the liberty of citizens), Secularism (replacement of Islamism with a state where the religious and political spheres are separate), Nationalism (Turkishness defined by citizenship rather than ethnic identity), Populism (transfer of the political power to the people of the country), Statism (economic and technological development), and Reformism (replacement of traditional institutions and concepts with modern ones).

development and independence, while the Kemalist ideology changed the way Turkey conducted its foreign policy to be more peaceful, avoiding unnecessary conflicts for unattainable goals.¹⁴ In the works on Turkish foreign policy, public diplomacy is non-existent as a subject, indicating a gap in the field of Turkish foreign policy studies and stressing the concentration of the power of policy-making in the hands of the urban elite, which once again confirms the success of the USIA decision of choosing its target population and evaluating its conditions and features. The fact that all of these basic tenets of Turkish foreign policy were stated in the report indicates that USIA was aware of what it was dealing with in terms of evaluating its target's conditions and features.

1.4 The Significance of USIA's Public Diplomacy Efforts at The Time and Beyond in US-Turkish Relations

During the Cold War the traditional balance of power between the European countries was replaced by the bipolarity of the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. The Cold War era especially required other types of contact between the countries. Part of the reason is that neither side of the conflict was willing to use nuclear power as suggested by the word `cold`

¹⁴ However, Turkish policy-makers did not of course automatically respond to every foreign relations incident using this framework. While, the framework is important in seeing the background and the way of thinking of Turkish policy-makers, they responded to incidents also considering the current international and domestic politics and the current interests of the country at the same time.

while at the same time making it an element of the indication that they were superior in the battle of arms and power. This meant that ideological power was not only a part of the battle, but also perhaps the most important aspect of it. While the Soviet Union had a program to expand socialist ideology in the world starting with the Eastern European countries, the US aimed to contain the spread of this ideology, because it would eventually come into conflict with its national interests in the form of losing trade partners, military bases, and allies, which would mean the weakening of the US while the Soviet Union would solidify its power. The US needed buffer zones such as Turkey and Greece to stop the spread of socialism, an ideology against the capitalist ideology of the US.¹⁵ Therefore, it needed to show the people in these areas the benefits of choosing to follow the example of the American ideology and system over the Soviet one, such as fast economic development and the

¹⁵ In the Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Lyndon B. Johnson on normalizing the U.S. relations with the Greek Government dated July 21, 1967, Rusk suggested that Turkey and Greece had a rising importance for the U.S.: “We have in Greece facilities important to the Air Force, the Navy, [less than 1line of source text not declassified] and USIA; they have increased in value since the Arab-Israeli war. That war underlined the importance of Greece (along with Turkey and Iran) to U.S. interests.” Then he explained the reason for the interest in the region as such: “Greece, like Turkey and Iran, emerges as particularly important to the U.S. given the uncertainties in the Middle East and the Soviet thrust in that area.”

In the 1970s, Turkey’s importance started to rise especially for its geopolitically strategic place. In a memorandum of August 21, 1974, for example, Henry Kissinger recommended President Gerald R. Ford to choose a middle-ground approach towards Turkey on the issue of the repeal of the ban on opium production in Turkey while also adding that the Departments State and Defense, CIA and USIA also supported this approach, because a harder-line approach “could also jeopardize our mutual security relationship with Turkey , threatening such US security interests as our use of military bases and intelligence installations there, our Sixth Fleet’s ability to operate in the Black Sea and use Turkish ports, and our extensive use of Turkish air space to fly from Europe into the Middle East and Asia. Turkey is, of course, an important NATO ally and its control over the Turkish Straits gives NATO an ability to cut off Soviet access to the Mediterranean if necessary.” As a matter of fact, Turkey not only cut off Soviet access to the Mediterranean, but also provided 25% of NATO intelligence on the Soviets during the Cold War (Halil Siddik Ayhan, *Dynamics of the Alliance Between Turkey and USA: The South Caucasus Case*. Unpublished master’s thesis. Ankara: Bilkent University, July 2003), 10).

financial aid the US might offer for it, the freedom of opportunity and self-determination, or the disadvantages of choosing the Soviet system as are exemplified in *Ufuk Magazine* the USIS headquarters in Ankara published, which will be analyzed in details in the third chapter.

In parallel with the national ideology, USIA objectives reflected the commitment to the doctrine of containment. As Leo Bogart (1995) explained in his study, the main objectives of USIA were fighting communism, showing mutuality of interest, building friendship (or at least an understanding of the US policies), while the main themes of the propaganda material were capitalism, democracy and freedom, which were the three pillars necessary for every country to develop. The Truman Doctrine was an obvious manifestation of the workings of this ideology and the activities in Turkey clearly reflected the US mantra towards underdeveloped countries. In fact, according to David E. Krugler, VOA owed the continuance of its existence to the Truman Doctrine. Krugler explained in his book, *The Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945-1953*, that the VOA was subject to strong objections by both the House of Representatives and the Senate and after the Truman Doctrine it gained the support of Congress because it was strongly associated with the containment policy stemming from this Doctrine. Not only liberals but also conservatives started to give importance to the information activities of the US, especially after the report of the State Department stating that the Soviet information services did not only state “facts” and “explanations” of policy but were also disseminating half-truths and sometimes lies, resulting in a bad image of the US and the ideology it represented.

Therefore Krugler took the Truman Doctrine as the pushing force of expansion of the US information activities, whose first areas of expansion were Greece and Turkey, and the containment policy as its underlying ideological framework.¹⁶

From the receiving end, namely Turkey, we see a need for a powerful ally that could support the newly established country, geographically between the Soviet Union, Europe and the Middle East, in its Westward-looking modernization efforts and economic development. As said before, Turkey, with its traditional hostility towards Russia and historical Western-orientation, found this ally in the US. The public and state opinion over the perception of the US in Turkey changed during different time periods and under different governments, but the US remained an important ally over the years thanks to a similar calculation of pros and cons. At this point, it is also important to note that the Soviet information programs were highly financed and intense, which stood as a threat for at least the credibility of the U.S., therefore making it essential to keep up with the communist efforts of information and propaganda.¹⁷

¹⁶ David F. Krugler, *The Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945-1953*. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 57-75.

¹⁷ Ron Rubin, *The Objectives of the U.S. Information Agency: Controversies and Analysis*. (New York: Praeger, 1968), 17.

CHAPTER II

USIA PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES IN TURKEY BETWEEN 1960 AND 1980

2.1 A Brief History of US Cultural Diplomacy Activities in Turkey

The US cultural diplomacy activities in Turkey officially began in 1943, when “the formal title of cultural relations attaché first appeared on State Department diplomatic lists. The first appointments included a cultural attaché in Ankara.”¹⁸ In 1947, the Truman Doctrine was implemented in order to provide help to countries who were resisting political subversion from internal or external sources. With the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, the US initiated information programs in Greece and Turkey.¹⁹ Voice of America

¹⁸ Nicholas Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989*. (New York: Cambridge, 2010), 19.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 36.

added a Turkish language broadcast in December 1949²⁰ and the ship *Courier* was given the charge to transmit broadcasts in 9 languages in the Middle East including Turkish in 1952.²¹

Although Truman's presidency gave more funding and expansion to the US information and propaganda activities around the world, increasing the USIA posts called USIS to 88 and the VOA languages from 23 to 46, the information and propaganda activities during this period were short-term and more militarized (aggressive) opting for psywar operations, which did not contribute to the longer term relations between the US and the countries where the USIS posts had been established. In 1953, Eisenhower appointed William Harding Jackson to run the Committee on International Information Activities (also known as the Jackson Committee) to evaluate the psywar operations, which had been initiated by the Truman administration. During his tenure, the structure of the information and cultural diplomacy activities changed. As a result of the evaluations, "The Jackson committee ... recommended abolishing the Truman-era Psychological Strategy Board as part of a general policy of downgrading the role of psychological operations in any quick-fix attempts to turn back Moscow's aggressive international actions,"²² meaning the US information activities would turn to a more long-term outlook. There would be an emphasis on cultural relations as well. Therefore, the operations were reconstructed, with covert operations being given to the CIA and overt operations including the USIS posts and the VOA staying under the

²⁰ *Ibid*, 51.

²¹ *Ibid*, 78.

²² Wilson Dizard, *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the US Information Agency*. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 54.

International Information Administration (IIA). After being subject to four investigations, the program was given independent bureaucratic status and the USIA was created in this way. Finally, the agency's activities were checked by the State Department and were given a voice in the National Security Council, therefore supposedly strengthening the role of public diplomacy in American foreign policy. However, this role was never fully achieved, and the USIA mostly remained a tool for implementing foreign policy decisions, rather than being a factor in decision-making.²³

2.2 USIS Objectives and Activities in Turkey

In order to understand the activities of USIS Turkey, we should examine the general framework this office worked in, the objectives defined by the Agency and the target of the American public diplomacy efforts. The report by Office of Policy and Research of USIA entitled "Attitudes and Values Confronting Current USIA Objectives in Turkey" dated October 1966 indicated that USIA was particularly disturbed by the domestic political and ideological changes in Turkey and the Turkish drive for more independent and multilateral foreign relations giving up on its former foreign policy position of having the US as its strongest and closest ally. Especially the latter change was of particular concern for USIA, which claimed that "the principle obstacle

²³ *Ibid*, 58-9.

confronting the Agency's program is the current political movement away from "overcommitment" to the US and the West and toward a more neutral, independent posture." The report warned that "In the 1950's when the Menderes regime was in power and the Cold War was at its most extreme US-Turkish relations were the most friendly. Today it is obvious that the honeymoon is over. The pendulum is swinging against us."²⁴ While the report accepted that not everything could go back to its past status in terms of the relations between the two countries, it also suggested that "the erosion of attitudes favoring a close relation with the US... may be significantly inhibited."²⁵ Therefore, USIA tuned its efforts to eliminate the threats posed against a close relationship between the US and Turkey.

While USIA was disturbed by these changes and saw the need to act upon them, the report concluded that these changes did not mean that Turkey was undergoing a fundamental change in terms of political and social values, therefore they did not need to be alarmed by the changes:

Until such time as this present trend crystalizes, the US image may decline still further. Despite this, and barring a drastic development, there is no reason to believe that Turkey's basic political and social identification with the West will be altered. The present situation offers a challenge to USIA activities in Turkey that is more difficult than ever before.²⁶

In order to meet this challenge, the objectives of the USIS needed to be adapted to the changing attitudes and values of the target group. The objectives

²⁴ Office of Policy and Research of the United States Information Agency. *Attitudes and Values Confronting Current USIA Objectives in Turkey*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. National Archives, October 1966), 19.

²⁵ *Ibid*, "Abstract."

²⁶ *Ibid*, 19.

of the USIS and the themes related to these objectives were as such according to the report: (1) increasing public, particularly elite, awareness of the advantages of US-sponsored mutual security institutions, especially of NATO, (2) increasing the understanding of the advantages of Turkey's cooperation with the US and Europe, (3) and reminding the Turks of the continuing dangers of communism.

The question of whether or not USIS in Turkey acted in line with these objectives can only be answered by accounts of their activities during the time period. We can obtain most of the information on the inner workings of USIS in Ankara by examining a collection of interviews with the veterans of USIS carried out by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST) and digitized by the Library of Congress. The interviews of such diplomats as Robert A. Lincoln, Leon Picon and Kenton Keith reveal the actual workings of the USIS post in Turkey, drawing a picture of the way the officers in the field conducted public diplomacy. Although "their personal recollections and opinions are not official statements of the U.S. Government or ADST and interviewees have agreed not to divulge classified information," as the Library of Congress overview of the collection states "this restriction makes the transcripts no less edifying or entertaining. These interviews offer more than individual personal perspectives on the formulation and implementation of

American foreign policy.”²⁷ In fact, they offer insight into how the diplomatic work was actually carried out.

The above-mentioned 1966 report defined the USIS target group as “the politically frustrated elites of the RPP” whose position was one of favoring a “guided democracy” and “who tend to interpret such actions as US aid efforts to assist in Turkey’s modernization as attempts to side with their political opponents, whom they characterize as ‘American stooges’.”²⁸ It is also important to note here that “on the political scene the opposition RPP has had only limited success, but it is able to hamstring JP government decisions since it still controls much of the bureaucracy.”²⁹ Therefore, the urban elite group represented by RPP remained the most important target group for the USIS. In the interview done by G. Lewis Schmidt on April 19, 1989, Robert A. Lincoln, who was the Public Affairs Officer of USIS Ankara between 1965 and 1970, asserted several times that since they wanted to appeal to RPP together with Leon Picon, Cultural Attaché of USIS Ankara in 1968, the USIS post carried out “a definite left-of-center program. Our basic theory was that somehow or other within a few years the leftist party, the Republican People’s Party... would come into power.” He said that the Embassy had strong relations with the RPP between 1960 and 1965, and did not know the Justice Party well, because in 1960 Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was unseated by the military, which was “pretty much in the left”, and Bülent Ecevit of RPP came

²⁷ The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, “Overview,” <http://www.loc.gov/collection/foreign-affairs-oral-history/about-this-collection/#overview>.

²⁸ Office of Policy and Research, *Attitudes and Values*, 3.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 16.

into power. However, in 1965 Süleyman Demirel was elected the prime minister, so in this period, “the embassy and CIA had the closest imaginable contacts with Demirel and the Justice Party. They apparently did not know the RPP very well.”

Lincoln praised the ability of the USIS to have strong connections with the right persons at the right time unlike the American Embassy and CIA, who in his opinion focused only on the current government in power. Estimating the victory of the RPP in the coming years, USIS did not let their relations with the RPP group deteriorate during Suleyman Demirel’s administration. Rather the USIS diplomats had personal contact with the RPP members. For example, Lincoln was good friends with the RPP leader Nihat Erim, who was assassinated in 1980. Lincoln recalled the times when “approximately half of the cabinet were people we knew one way or another. I remember several of them telephoned Catherine (his wife) to let her know: ‘Guess what, I’ve just been installed’ and that sort of thing.” He explained the favorable USIS tendency towards the RPP on the grounds that RPP was not extremist and was preferable to an extremist group:

The RPP in early 1971 was, first, pretty much unknown to the official United States except for USIS and, second, socialist very definitely, but moderate socialists. The majority weren’t the far left socialists. I felt that this was beneficial to the United States in this case. They were about to come in and I would rather see the moderate socialists come in than the violently anti-American socialists of the far left.

Therefore, Lincoln explained the role of the USIA as maintaining good relations with the Turkish political parties, but not controlling the direction of

the politics. According to his account, the USIS only observed the political atmosphere in Turkey and predicted a future outcome, which suggested a continuity of relations with the RPP, and acted accordingly. He claimed they saw the positive results of their policy when they had forged close relations with half the cabinet members and the Prime Minister Erim as a close friend. As Lincoln said: “Finally, the USIS left-of-center program worked. We were doing the right thing. There wasn’t any question, so if you ask whether USIS had an impact, yes, we had a huge impact at that time in Turkey,” although he did not go through the details or the explanation of what kind of impact they made. One can only deduct the expectation that the USIS had of more favorable opinion of the Erim administration for the US, since apparently the administration did not have personal biases or negative feelings for the US or Americans. It is however not possible to find proof or indications for Lincoln’s claims on this point.

The ‘left-of-center’ program Lincoln and Picon carried out was “meant to appeal to the upper intellectual levels in the foreign ministry, the academic world, the media and so on.” As Thomas Sorensen, another USIA veteran and one of the earliest writers on the agency, asserted that the USIA activities were not “easily identifiable ‘world public opinion’ per se, but influential people’s opinion in each country, which affects their government’s opinion.”³⁰ He suggested that the US needed to make propaganda to influence these influential people, because just giving information would not be enough to convince people who otherwise tended to think that the US was only interested in saving

³⁰ Thomas Sorensen, *The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), ix-x.

itself due to the heavy Cold War terminology that had been used for years.³¹ The USIA diplomats, according to Sorensen, needed to make a case for the US and be an advocate of that case, therefore persuade people with an organized and deliberate effort. Lincoln and Picon were doing just that. As a part of their persuasion efforts, Lincoln said, together they eliminated a mass appeal magazine, of which we are not given the name, which they found as unserving or at odds with their purposes and replaced it with a magazine which was edited by Picon himself. Thinking that one of the duties of the USIA should be publishing this kind of magazines in order to inform the public, this does not sound interesting, but actually this was not a usual practice for the USIS posts, because the USIS magazine in Ankara came out of the cultural section of the agency, not the information section, which dealt with this job in all other countries. Lincoln explained, “I don’t believe that the only USIS publication in any USIS country post before had been one that came out of the cultural section. Rather, basic publications normally came out your information section.” This shows that first of all as the directors of the cultural section, Lincoln and Picon felt the need to undertake such an initiative relying on their experience in the country and on their experience with Turkish people (mostly the political and opinion leaders). In addition, this indicates that the propaganda and information activities of the USIS Ankara at the time were being carried out on a personal level and with personal initiatives, making decisions as they went, and according to the circumstances of the country and of the time period, rather than following a set of strict plans and guidelines

³¹ *Ibid*, xi.

from Washington. This is not to say that the USIS post was acting by itself without communicating with Washington of course, but it means that it had the liberty and elasticity needed to carry out cultural diplomacy.

The magazine USIS started to publish in 1967 was called *Ufuk* (meaning “horizon”) and it was published locally, unlike other magazines of this type, which had been published at the Regional Service Center in Beirut. Lincoln explained that

our goal then was to publish a magazine which would carry only translations of U.S. works from intellectual publications. By intellectual I mean everything from *Kenyon Review* to *Harper’s* to *the New York Times* magazine. The agency was very cooperative. USIA would make arrangements to get the approval for us to use an article. We published about six articles per issue. The magazine came out every month

with a small circulation of 1500. The target reader of the magazine was the intellectual class as said before:

selected people from the academic world; all universities- Ankara, Izmir, Istanbul, people from the foreign ministry, because the foreign ministry had tremendous power in the country, as you may recall; people from the government as a whole - - but, again, individually selected; certain people from the media, selected writers, and so on.

According to Lincoln’s account, the magazine did achieve its purpose by creating the necessary connection and relations with the intended people. Lincoln said that “for example, one of the men who liked the magazine very much and became practically an advisor was the editor of the daily newspaper, *Milliyet*. *Milliyet* was powerful then” especially among the members and supporters of the RPP. The editor Lincoln mentioned was Abdi İpekçi, who

was one of the biggest journalists in Turkey. Lincoln described their relations with Abdi İpekçi and his foreign editor Sami Kohen as such: “İpekçi was an intellectual leader. It took us about two years to get to know İpekçi very well. He simply didn’t like Americans but he gradually became a rather good friend. Sami Kohen, the foreign editor, was the opposite. Sami liked Americans... He was the stringer for Newsweek.” Therefore, Lincoln indicated that the USIS had good relations with the media, and one of the most influential newspapers. However, it is not possible to prove the perks of this relationship through the writings of İpekçi, who kept the same balanced perspective on the US and its actions. The opinion of İpekçi over the US does not seem to be either anti or pro-American, since he frowned over such American foreign relations blunders as the Johnson Letter, he did not seem to oppose the US on ideological grounds stressing over the American political, social and economic harmony and its technological strength. If we are to discuss the changes of İpekçi’s opinion of the US, we can actually talk about a change for the worse, since his writings not only failed to reflect the friendship Lincoln claimed, but also expressed more and more anger towards the US, including such adjectives as “inexperienced and injudicious”³² and “emotionally carried away”³³ for the attitude of the US over Cyprus and poppy production problems. Perhaps this was due to the separation of the two spheres of politics and friendship, which PAO Patrick E. Nieburg (1977- 1978) talked about in his February 4, 1988 interview to Allen Hansen:

³² Abdi İpekçi, “Böyle Hatalı Karar Ancak Amerikadan Çıkar,” *Milliyet*, 12.12.1974.

³³ *Idem*, “Amerikan Hariciyesinin Unuttuğu,” *Milliyet*, 10.7.1974.

I found the Turks to have a political culture which is absolutely superior... in many places where I have served if there was a political animosity or disagreement this was carried over into personal life. I found that in Turkey you could have serious political differences and still maintain a personal relationship which was warm and friendly.

Apart from the magazine, whose target audience was the intellectual circle, the USIS in Turkey did not deal extensively with other publications. Leon Picon suggested Turkey was not a reader country, so the USIS did not have a major book translation program in Turkey. Picon said that they only dealt with “neutralizing” some popular Marxist books. For example, Doğan Avcıoğlu’s *Türkiye’nin Düzeni* was

straight out the Marxist economic approach to the needs of Turkey. Hard hitting, nearly violent in its statements about what was wrong with what’s going on. Of course, this was a book that the students seized upon... we aimed our sights at neutralizing this single book...by making available books from the American point of view. With some success. But the book program was nothing very much, as was proper, in Turkey.

Finally in 1977, USIS Istanbul began to run a book translation program as told by Patrick E. Nieburg in his interview to Allen Hansen on February 4, 1988.

As with the book program, Picon gave huge importance to providing Turkish people with the American point of view. He was in charge of the Fulbright program and he regarded the exchange program as an introduction to American values and culture. About the program he said that it was “out of balance. About 80 per cent of our funds went into sending Turkish students to the United States” and the fields that these students were in did not actually

serve the purposes of the program according to Picon. One of the reasons of this was

the presence of the Turkish Foreign Ministry in the Fulbright program... They tended to regard the Fulbright program - - wrongly, I believe- as an instrument for building up expertise in the hard sciences and developmental subjects... In terms of our interest in mutual understanding, I'm sure that those things did a bit of good, but they would not match up at all with sending Turkish students to the United States to study American thought, American concepts of democracy, the social sciences in various forms. And that in turn would not make the contribution nearly that sending a Turkish professor in the social sciences field to an American university would make.

Therefore, he worked to balance out the Fulbright program. In his interview, he made a comparison of his experience in Turkey with Japan, where he had worked before coming to Turkey, saying that

to a satisfactory degree I was able to develop the same kind of dialogue, again, between American scholars who came to Turkey and Turkish scholars. I always regarded that as probably the most important phase of the operation. On the other hand, I became much more deeply involved with the people in the artistic world in Turkey than I had in Japan, though my involvement in Japan was pretty much. It was sort of a shift in emphasis.

The shift of emphasis moved towards theater, because the left "was making inroads into the field of theater." Therefore, the USIS carried out a theater program, which made translations of American plays and musicals such as *Fiddler on the Roof*, *Man of LaMancha* and *My Fair Lady*. Picon would have Turkish people translate these first, Lincoln said. Sometimes there would be problems with the content of the plays. For example,

the gentlemen on the left in Turkey took exception to *Fiddler on the Roof* and regarded this as a piece of propaganda in that it was anti-

Russian and, they said, needlessly so. And they took exception to the State Theater's putting this thing on. The director of the state theater, a man by the name of Cüneyt Gökçer, was interviewed on television about the criticism that he was facing. I was very pleased with his retort when he was asked about this. He said, 'You regard me as a propagandist for the United States because of *Fiddler on the Roof*? You've seen me do *Julius Ceasar*. Was I then a propagandist for Rome? You've seen me do *Hamlet*. Was I a propagandist then? And if so, for England or Denmark?'

The musical was a success for the purposes of the US. As Picon suggested: "I can say that the overall impact of *Fiddler on the Roof* in Turkey was one of deepening distrust for Russia. And there was plenty of distrust before I got there, but did deepen it further."

Kenton W. Keith, Cultural Attaché to USIS Istanbul between 1968 and 1972, also mentioned the American influence in the field of theater in his interview to Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 4, 1998:

There was an extremely active cultural life in Istanbul, and American culture was highly respected... Successful Turkish adaptations of American plays were regularly seen. James Baldwin directed *Fortune and Men's Eyes* in the theater of his friend, Engin Cezzar. There was everything from *Hair* to *Man of La Mancha*. Most of these cultural figures were on the left, and they were opposed to our involvement in Vietnam and other American policies and actions, but that didn't prevent me from forging some very close relationships that have endured over the years.

Then he went on to say that:

The theater in Istanbul was a major venue of Political debate and activism. A lot of politics were acted out on stage and plays were chosen by directors and theater-owners because of the political message they conveyed. Plays were written by politically engaged Turks. It was my purpose to try to promote as much contact as I could with those institutions and we did a lot. We routinely obtained the rights to translate American works, financed translations, brought in specialists in stagecraft, and even had a major American theater figure, Art Housman, spend a year in Istanbul as a kind of free-floating consultant.

He also explained how he helped create a political science program at Istanbul University, where he arranged distinguished American political scientists such as Lucian Pye and Daniel Lerner to give lectures, discussions and consultations at the university. He claimed he sent most of the young professors at the department to the US on a Fulbright grant or an international visitor program. He expressed how strongly he believed in the benefits and powers of these cultural programs carried out by USIS. However, just as Lincoln, he did not really explain how to prove their effects: “Turkey was... where I really found out how potent the kind of work we do can be... We used cultural programming and educational exchange as the fundamental building blocks of our activity in Turkey. I sincerely believe that we can prove – if any proof be needed – how indispensable this kind of work can be.”

Leon Picon also talked about the binational centers in Turkey at the time. There were 4 binational centers in Turkey, one in Izmir, one in Iskenderun, one in Istanbul and a larger one in Ankara. The directors of these centers were American, however, the Board of Governors and the President of the Board of Directors had to be a Turk by Turkish law. The President of the Board controlled the activities of the Center Director, who was American. Picon said that they did not always run smoothly with the Turkish president and the Turkish board: “he took quite a bit of exception to some of the things we were doing at times... the Turkish members of that Board considered it an important thing to be very active in controlling the activities of the Binational Center. Fortunately, in most cases, the problems were administrative rather

than in terms of content.” These centers had libraries, which served Turkish people for long years and Picon said that Turkish librarians were “bright.” He was “very impressed that they included [in the list of order recommendations] a lot of hard hitting stuff and they really wanted that in the library.” Another program being held at the centers was an English language program, which was a huge success: “Those programs attracted many more people than we could actually handle. Everybody wanted to learn English. I think the English language teaching program is a very worthwhile activity of USIA.”

All in all, the interviews of the officers reveal that there was an emphasis on the American influence over Turkish arts, theater being the major area of influence, while there was no mention of cinema or music. The aim of the USIA in Turkey as explained by these former officers was to build relations between the institutions of Turkey and the US, which indicates a focus on the influential people, the academic circle and the policy-makers as a target for the US public diplomacy efforts. This was stated in both Kenton Keith’s and Patrick E. Nieburg’s interviews in order as such: “trying to form effective relationships with the institutions that had been essentially closed to the US,” and “the most important job there was to build institutional bridges between Turkish and American institutions.” It should also be noted that we do not have any interviews with the officers who worked in Turkey between the years 1972 and 1980, leaving nearly a decade of the time period of the thesis in the blind.

CHAPTER III

A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF *UFUK*

Ufuk Magazine, the USIA publication between 1968-1973, was the primary propaganda material of the USIS Turkey programs. Although USIA conducted public diplomacy, the target audience of the magazine was not the public per se, but the elite, including academics, bureaucrats, government representatives, journalists, etc. The magazine started by stating that the articles reflected the authors' own opinions and not necessarily the opinion of the US government, which would possibly grant more accountability and trust to what was written. Although diverse in topics, *Ufuk Magazine* reflected more of an emphasis on the military alliance, followed only by economic relations in importance. There was particular emphasis on alliance through NATO and with this alliance bringing peace to the World. America is portrayed as the major responsible party for this peace, while the Soviet Union is reflected as the major obstacle to a peaceful world.

The articles almost always commented on one or more of the following values: democracy, individualism, optimism, and progress (progress being the key element here). The US was reflected as a country where everything gets better in time and in a rapid manner. Emphasis on the youth and education of the youth is one of the key elements of this American image of progress. Another reason of this emphasis in the form of student movements is the tremendous activity of student groups in Turkey especially in 1968 as in all around the world.

When all the articles of the *Ufuk Magazine* are considered, three general aims of the USIS Turkey seems apparent: 1) providing an accurate image of the US and fighting with anti-Americanism, 2) anti-communist/anti-Soviet propaganda and the defense of the capitalist system, and 3) cultivating a consciousness of a global world. The three aims of the magazine will be explained by the examples below.

3.1 Providing an Accurate Image of the US and Fighting with Anti-Americanism

One of the three main purposes of the USIA was to provide an accurate/fair image of the US and to fight with anti-Americanism in the target country. In order to do that, USIA needed to explain the US in a way that matched the interests of the US whether it be protecting the free world from the influence of

communism or to obtain a mutual understanding between the US and the target country. This explanation included American values, institutions and past and present actions of the US (diplomatic, economic and military).

The content of *Ufuk Magazine* in pursuit of this aim can be categorized in 6 sections, which are (1) economic development and the presentation of the US as a model (2) American Dream and American exceptionalism and the American character (3) democracy (4) justification of the American interventions and presence in Europe and developing countries (5) defense against issues of racial segregation and discrimination (3) the youth and explanation of student activism.

3.1.1 Economic Development and The Presentation of The US as a Model

The necessity of emphasizing this theme in USIS material was stated in the Office of Policy and Research Program Action Memorandum in December 1966 for adapting the USIS programming in Turkey to the recent erosion of Turkish attitudes favoring close US-Turkey relations: “Given the social and economic over-expectation of the younger generation, USIS output should probably reflect the fact that progress, regardless of political ideology, is a long

term haul, that it would be no faster under Communism and would be achieved at the cost of individual freedom”³⁴

The articles under this category in the magazine almost always insist on the long term nature of economic development, although the magazine went further by showing the US as an example of the system to adopt if a country wanted to achieve economic development. Throughout the content of the magazine there are many examples of the presentation of the US as a model for other countries, especially for underdeveloped/Third World countries. For instance, in the very first volume of the magazine, the article “Creation of a National Market” by American economist and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Walt W. Rostow depicted the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) as an example of a development strategy for developing countries. Rostow argued that the development of these countries and consequently their involvement in the world market was only possible through an effort such as TVA. Accordingly, agriculture should be rendered more efficiently and the problem of imbalance between cities and villages should be countered. For this end, the private sector is auxiliary to the government, yet in a rather important position determining the opportunities and prices of the market by itself or by collaboration with the government.³⁵

However, it was much later in the volumes, namely in the first issue of the fifth volume, which is the latest year of the magazine’s publication, that

³⁴ Office of Policy and Research of the United States Information Agency, *USIA Program Action Memorandum* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. National Archives, 1966), 2.

³⁵ Walt W. Rostow, “Creation of a National Market,” *Ufuk* 1, no. 1: 74-8.

the editorial office, run by the Turkish journalist Doğan Poyraz made a comment about development in the third world saying,

If we put aside the prevention of war and the destruction of the environment, there is no goal promising bigger hope for a bigger number of people around the world than economic development... I find it quite encouraging that this main principle dominates the latest writings on economic development: it is not true that the countries would absolutely benefit from economic development unless it helps them cover their basic human necessities such as jobs, health, education and social justice. Therefore, success should be measured by the higher standards of living and not by higher statistical numbers.³⁶

In issue 3 of volume 1, the unknown author the article, “Economic Structure of America”, declared that the notion of the US as an example is not one that has been imagined by the US or Americans, but accepted by a global audience of peoples: “Developed and developing countries, communist or non-communist nations looks up to American living standards as a necessary purpose to achieve. Goethe’s famous words a century ago, “Amerika, du hast es besser,” perfectly asserts the universal belief that the humankind can materially and mentally create a brand new life in the US.”³⁷

The author went on to explain that developing countries could take the US as a model for development reminding the reader that the US started from scratch as a country as well:

Recently, especially since World War II, American experience has been attractive for the newly developing countries. This attraction does not only come from the developing countries’ deep interest in fast economic development, but also their reminiscence of the US as a new nation struggling until a short time ago to set up a politically working

³⁶ Doğan Poyraz, “From the Editorial Office,” *Ufuk* 1, no. 5: 2.

³⁷ “Economic Structure of America,” *Ufuk* 3, no.1: 50.

constitutional system and to turn a financially simple agricultural economy into a developed industrial economy.³⁸

Although the American economic system seems attractive as a model, the author warns that the economic system does not stand alone but rather there are supportive social and political elements providing the existence of the economic structure. Therefore, the whole American lifestyle should be taken as a model if one aims to achieve success with the economic system.

However, in issue 2 of volume 2, historian Cyril E. Black said in his interview titled “There Is No Such Thing as Abrupt Modernization” that the US could help other countries by being an example/ a model of the level of success that these countries would like to achieve on the way to becoming developed countries. Although the US would inspire these countries with its modern institutions working on rational principles rather than on traditional principles that might not apply to the current system, the countries should be careful to take the example and adapt it to their own conditions, because the cultural and historical conditions of a specific country might not work well with the American system if it was to be adopted as is. He insisted that “the system cannot be exported as a whole.”³⁹ Therefore, the magazine included different interpretations of how the US should be a model to other countries, while keeping the idea of the US as a model at all times.

In the article, “Three Conditions of Development,” James S. Killen gave the blueprint of development for the developing countries in three

³⁸ *Ibid*, 51.

³⁹ C.E. Black, “There Is No Such Thing as Abrupt Modernization,” *Ufuk* 2, no. 2: 48.

elements, namely “the ability to accept change, modernization of the education, and the impact of government.”⁴⁰ By “impact of government” Killen meant that the impact of the government should not be felt except for some social and economic duties and that the government should allow the free market economy to run.”⁴¹

In his article “Over-population,” the president of the World Bank, Robert S. McNamara added a third element to these conditions of development, mostly in the form of a warning, saying that developing countries should avoid high population growth that they cannot support. He warned that the equation “the higher the population, the bigger the prosperity of the country” is a myth and that it certainly did not apply for developing countries even though it might for the developed.⁴²

In the first issue of Volume 5, the president of Overseas Development Council, former vice president of AID and president of the AID programs in Turkey and Ceylon, James P. Grant also referred to McNamara’s opinions on the population problem of the developing countries saying that the main problem of these countries was the increase in what McNamara called “marginal men” who became adults but did not or could not serve their country. Grant pointed out that

The impact of the population explosion on employment has been aggravated in most developing countries by an equally unprecedented migration from the countryside to the cities, by the use of increasingly capital-intensive technology and by financial policies favoring use of

⁴⁰ James S. Killen, “Three Conditions of Development,” *Ufuk* 4, no. 1: 86.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 86.

⁴² Robert S. McNamara, “Over-Population,” *Ufuk* 2, no.2: 56-64.

capital rather than labor. At the same time, living standards are rising rapidly for a sizable segment of the population. This sharpens the contrast between those who are relatively well off and those for whom the present system is not working at all... It is probably no accident that many of the most severe of these upheavals in recent history have occurred in countries with the highest level of unemployment.⁴³

However, Grant did not think that the situation was hopeless. He said that the developing countries had the means to fix the relationship between capital and labor, through raising the interest rates by devaluating the exchange rate. In this way, poor countries could help farmers and small entrepreneurs in particular to increase their savings. At the same time, governments of these countries should support labor intensive enterprises more and capital intensive ones less. He gave Japan as an example that had implemented and benefited from this advice.⁴⁴

Grant asserted that in all the big cities of developing countries, a 15-20 percent unemployment rate became a common problem. This rate was even higher among young people, especially the educated ones, which resulted in the problem of brain drain.⁴⁵ Deputy Director of Population and Nutrition Projects Department of World Bank, George B. Baldwin claimed in his article "Brain Drain or Overflow" that the major portion of the 'brain drain' is in reality the 'overflow' of talented people who cannot be put to efficient use in

⁴³ James P. Grant, "Marginal Men," *Ufuk* 1, no. 5, 15-16. Originally published in *Foreign Affairs* October 1971 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/24296/james-p-grant/marginal-men>

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 18.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 16.

their own countries.⁴⁶ The reason for this was that “there is a great pressure on each country to expand university education and many has achieved to do so. As a result, the number of university graduates (including those who has graduated from vocational fields) increased more rapidly than the economies of these countries could absorb.”⁴⁷

Baldwin also gave Turkey and Iran as two “most interesting” examples of braindrain. He wrote

Both countries have had a high number of students in foreign countries (most of whom covering their own expenses) and the university system of both is rapidly expanding. We also witness a common problem in both, which is the accumulation of professional work force usually in one or two cities and as a result, there is a lack of desire for some jobs (especially in the field of medicine) and there is the problem of ensuring that educated people live and work in rural areas. Therefore, just like many countries in Latin America, Turkey and Iran thus face an even more serious problem of a type of brain drain than much of the attention gathering brain drain to foreign countries. consequently, both Turkey and Iran are wonderful examples to developing countries in having well-planned, well-managed and highly successful programs for bringing their citizens abroad back home to work at “modernized” domestic institutions, especially at universities and hospitals.⁴⁸

Therefore, the problem of brain drain was a problem only so much as the developing country could not increase the demand for a highly qualified work force, which could be achieved by continuing efforts to develop. So development itself was the cure to this problem and this issue was never mentioned again in the whole series of articles *Ufuk* published.

⁴⁶ George B. Baldwin, “Brain Drain or Overflow” *Ufuk* 2, no.3: 40. Originally published in *Foreign Affairs* January 1970 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/24147/george-b-baldwin/brain-drain-or-overflow>

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 42.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 44.

Besides the problems of developing countries, in the article “Development with Social Justice,” a scientist working on political issues for the United Nations International Development Committee, Edgar Owens admitted that there were also mistakes made by the planners and theoreticians of development on the way to development. He argued that first of all development was bound to happen in different ways and at different rates in different times and countries. Believing in the uniformity and universality of development was an overall mistake. He went on to say that “The first mistake is... the hypothesis that the fastest way is to build large factories in urban areas, to equip these with the most modern machines, and to turn to agriculture in the form of huge mechanized farms... They claimed that small companies are less efficient than big companies.”⁴⁹

Owens also agreed on the opinion that the capital intensive investment in low income countries was a mistake due to the fact that these countries were rich in labor force but poor in capital. Therefore, choosing the latter would create more employment which would bring about social justice and development. Accordingly, the goals should be as follows: 1) increasing employment, not economic development (this development would eventually come as a side effect) and 2) supporting the small producer. He also suggested that development started with the market towns and if there were none around the producers to bring their products to the market, then expecting development

⁴⁹ Edgar Owens, “Development with Social Justice,” *Ufuk* 4, no.5: 11. Originally published in *Monthly Commentary on Indian Economic Conditions*, Vol. 14, 1972, 4, p.17-22. <http://www.worldcat.org/title/monthly-commentary-on-indian-economic-conditions/oclc/1758636>

to occur under these conditions was unrealistic.⁵⁰ He claimed that “as the conditions under which small producers thrive, these producers would work more than they do now... I think when millions of people in the developing world can say ‘we are doing it ourselves’ and only then, the problem of development will be solved.”⁵¹ Therefore, he suggested that the solution for developing countries was to take small businesses into the system, not to exclude them, and he accepted the responsibility of the planners in development efforts.

The magazine also referred to foreign aid, though less extensively than the other aspects of development. In one of the only two articles on this subject, professor of economics Raymond F. Mikesell advised that the foreign aid programs should be long term programs (at least 15 years) so that the developing country could slowly deal with the payments and that there would be constant capital flow to the country, since this was what the US did when it was a developing country itself.⁵² In the other article, Canadian President between 1963-68 Lester B. Pearson warned that the fact that a country provided aid to a developing country did not give it the right to intervene in the latter’s domestic politics, while also agreeing that the payments should be more relaxed.⁵³

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 13.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 21.

⁵² Raymond F. Mikesell, “External Debts of Developing Countries,” *Ufuk* 2, no.2: 20. Originally in *Public International Lending for Development* (New York: Random House, 1966).

⁵³ Lester B. Pearson, “Partners in Development,” *Ufuk* 1, no.3: 56. Originally in *The Unesco Courier*, February 1970.

Apart from opinion pieces by economists, politicians etc *Ufuk* published two articles which can be considered more official opinions on development. One of these is by the United Nations Development Program Director Paul G. Hoffman, who previously ran the Marshall Plan. The article titled “Future is Full of Promise” is the transcription of Hoffman’s farewell speech at the United Nations General Assembly on 14 October 1971. In the speech he explained how the special fund for development was established under the United Nations in 1959, of which he was the director. He said he believed that giving direct aid to developing countries did not suffice unless they were also provided with the necessary skills to run their own development programs using their own sources:

citizens of these countries needed help with the acquisition of the skills and knowledge to control their own development, especially the domestic sources that would back up this development. Only in this way can these countries be economically and politically independent and take their places in the world community... They needed to acquire scientific and technologic abilities too.⁵⁴

While also accepting problems such as unemployment, pollution and health, he insisted that these were all solvable problems.⁵⁵

In “Two Opinions on Economic Development,” the United Nations Director of Latin America Economic Commission David H. Pollock explained two reports on development prepared by Praeger, written by two different authors. One of whom was Lester B. Pearson – former President of Canada and an academic owning a Nobel Peace Prize – and the other was Raul Prebisch –

⁵⁴ Paul G. Hoffman, “Future is Full of Promise,” *Ufuk* 3, no.4: 69.

⁵⁵ *Ibid* 72-73.

“the Argentinian spokesman for the underdeveloped world and as once described by the Washington Post ‘independent enough to take Che Guevara as a source.’”⁵⁶ The Pearson Report, titled “Partners in Development,” was published in 1969 and the Prebisch Report, titled “Change and Development – Latin America’s Great Task,” was published in 1971. Interestingly, while Prebisch avoided attacking rich countries unfairly for their responsibility in development of the underdeveloped countries, Pearson did the same for poor countries. Both insisted that development should be taken as a whole plan, so that it would work as a system. If some steps were implemented but others were neglected even the ones implemented would be less efficient. Therefore programs should be well-planned in a spirit of teamwork between developing and developed countries.⁵⁷

In all the articles on development, one of the most important elements of the American system that was to be adopted by developing countries was education. In an article titled “The Education of the Scientists,” the authors Christopher Jencks and David Riesman asserted that “The university is clearly one of the major elements of the American culture. The existence of most of the American intellectuals still depends on the university. Indeed, anyone who is a member of the upper-middle class believes in the necessity of having a university degree and preferably a higher degree.”⁵⁸ As for the quality of higher education, Jencks and Riesman claimed that “grad schools are... better than their counterparts in other countries; these are indeed models for other

⁵⁶ David H. Pollock, “Two Opinions on Economic Development,” *Ufuk* 3, no.4: 86.

⁵⁷ *Ibid* 85-86.

⁵⁸ Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, “The Education of the Scientists,” *Ufuk* 3, no.1: 33.

people around the world.”⁵⁹ The above mentioned article “Economic Structure of America” made an explanation of how the American education worked in comparison with other countries’ education systems: Other countries obliged students to make their educational and career decisions much earlier and as a result the education of the individual was not as extensive as it was in the US (not to mention the system’s rigidity which allowed no room for turning back to academic life). Every child in the US graduated from high school at the age of 18 and only then was he/she supposed to choose whether or not to continue with his/her academic endeavors in accordance with the principle of equality of opportunity. According to the editor of *Fortune Magazine* Charles E. Silberman, the American higher education system which was adopted by other countries “has achieved to provide intellectual perfection and skills of creative science in an atmosphere of mass education.”⁶⁰ This article was one of the leading criticisms of the American education system and was very popular and famous at the time it was published. Columbia University Professor of Economy Eli Ginzberg wrote that accordingly the second decade of development programs focused on a creating domestic labor force, especially a qualified labor force, while the first decade was mostly about the flow of capital flow from rich countries to less rich ones. In order to achieve that, an emphasis on education systems, student exchanges and scholarships occurred.⁶¹

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 34.

⁶⁰ Charles E. Silberman, “Crisis in the Classroom,” *Ufuk* 2, no.5: 54. Taken from *Crisis in the Classroom: The Remaking of American Education* (New York: Random House, 1970).

⁶¹ Eli Ginzberg, “Skills for Development,” *Ufuk* 2, no.1: 55-58. Originally in *Dialogue* 4 (1972), no.5: 65-72.

The magazine also mentioned the children's television program Sesame Street, which was exported to Turkey in the 1980s as well. The program is introduced in the magazine as an "experiment of education through television"⁶² and it was highly appreciated by the authors E. Horwitz and J. O'Connor, and according to them, by children, parents and teachers not only in the US but also in over 30 countries around the world for giving a chance to children who could not afford to get a good education.

However, this positive attitude changes when it comes to comments on the behaviour of the youth and student activism. Most of the authors were convinced that the education system should change in various degrees from completely to minor finetunings. This will be further discussed in subsection 3.1.6 Youth and Explanation of Student Activism, although it is important to note here the change in attitude. All in all, with the choice of articles, the magazine seemed to support an idea of adopting the American education system in terms of its qualities in providing a skilled and better workforce, company directors, and overall wellbeing of the newly developing economic system. However, it also did not deny that there must be disadvantageous aspects of this education system since it produced the youth that were revolting for misguided reasons and in the wrong way according to adults.

Besides asserting that the US could be a good model for other countries, especially for developing countries, the magazine also included articles explaining why the Soviet system would not work for these countries, such as one written by the professor of economics and former president of the

⁶² E. Horwitz and J.O'Connor, "Education through Television," *Ufuk* 2, no.5: 62.

American Political Science Association, Charles E. Lindblom's article "Redefining the Market."⁶³ In this article, Lindblom argued that developing countries needed the market mechanism, simply because they would not be able to develop by big investments and limited consumption as done by the Soviets. This system worked for the Soviets because firstly they were able to limit consumption, thus obliging saving, by taking up violence as a means to do so. Secondly, the Soviet Union was already on the way to becoming a fully developed country, highly industrialized and obtaining great food source. Developing countries did not have these advantages therefore they could not successfully imitate the Soviet example. In other words, "The Soviets way is closed."⁶⁴ The article "Turkey and The European Economic Community" described Turkey as a country which "has been linked to Europe with political, economic and cultural ties for centuries and aims to achieve economic development in the Western world in a fast way."⁶⁵ Therefore, *Ufuk*, once again strengthened the idea of alliance between Turkey and the West and the US, while conversely appreciating Turkey's rejection of the Soviet values and system.

⁶³ Charles E. Lindblom, "Redefining the Market," *Ufuk* 1, no.1: 64-73. Taken from *Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems* (New York: Basic, 1997).

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 72.

⁶⁵ "Turkey and The European Economic Community," *Ufuk* 3, no.1: 44.

3.1.2 American Dream, American Exceptionalism and American Character

Under this theme, the magazine aimed to explain what the US was like as a country, who an American was, what kind of values the American society had and what kind of political/social/economic system the country had. By doing this, the magazine tried to introduce the US first hand to the audience in order to create an understanding of the US on the Turkish side and perhaps persuade the audience that it was the best system to adopt, while at the same time putting the US on a pedestal so that the audience would be persuaded of its power.

In the article “Economic Structure of America” that was mentioned in the previous section, the American was “a new man” and the article suggested that it was a better man too, implying that the United States was a better nation than the Old World nations, which were static and lacked the dynamism of the US:

Crevecoeur saw the economic opportunities in America in a very clear way: The French man who made the statement that ‘Here, the fruits of people’s effort is in direct proportion with the work he does,’ also asked the following question: ‘How can a poor European immigrant feel loyalty for his old country where he had nothing?’ ... He also saw that the American abundance depends on deeply humane foundations. In his writings, he said ‘Here, people from all nations melt together to make a new race... The American is a brand new man living with new principles; therefore he is inclined to have new ideas and new opinions.’⁶⁶

⁶⁶ “Economic Structure of America,” 51.

This passage clearly states the American exceptionalist idea, while also suggesting that the US was inclined to do even better in the future, thus emphasizing the belief in American Dream.

In issue 3 of volume 1, Peter Schrag, the author of *Paradise Lost*, searched for an answer to the question “What is American?” or “Who is an American?” through the autobiography of Willie Morris, the author of *My Dog Skip*, in the article “Local Roots”. In this search, he described the “American” as dynamic and constantly on the move, which helped shape the US into what it was, and the US as an ever changing and improving new place where people built up a new reality:

America, in its profound meaning, is a product of the romantic and escapist imagination of the European. Many people, who have come here, could not find what they anticipated, but what these people anticipated and their desire to believe in that anticipation turned what was present into a new reality: everywhere the reality is changed to match the imagination when possible. The belief in change may be the biggest American characteristic.⁶⁷

Therefore, Schrag claimed that the immigrants who went to the US with an American Dream in their minds could find the opportunity to either realize their dreams or find another dream to satisfy themselves, bending reality into a shape they desired since the US was not a rigid but a dynamic and progressive country. Schrag generally described the “American” as someone who is a mixture of general ideologies and beliefs, and local thoughts and beliefs.

⁶⁷ Peter Schrag, “Paradise Lost,” *Ufuk* 3, no.1: 21. Originally in *Paradise Lost: California’s Experience, America’s Future* (New Press, 1998)

In volume 1, no.4, the Polish journalist and novelist Leopold Tyrmand recounted his observations about the US. As an outsider, his first observation is about the size and variety of things in the US. He is amazed with the “incredible” amount of the variety of products and the resulting conspicuous consumption.

He asserted with amazement that the US is as big and colorful as it is seen in Hollywood movies. It is no use to compare anything in the US with European measurements. Tyrmand claimed that attempting to do this is “ridiculous” even. He comments on the negative opinions or prejudices over the “American Dream” saying that the Europeans are wrong about their negative convictions, supporting the recurrent idea in the magazine that the US is not a cruelly competitive society, where only the biggest amounts of success gets the individual the acknowledgement he needs to belong in the society. According to the same conviction, those who cannot achieve this kind of success are left out as failures. He claims that this is true only to the extent that the US is a very big country, where every social act appears bigger than it actually is:

The general conviction over America among Europeans depends on the imaginary belief that the inable of this kind cannot belong in America. This belief comes especially from the letters to the relatives in the Old World by their successful relatives in America. In European perspective, success in America is achieved through the impact of the effort for it and not through the volume/amount of the effort. And in America, impacts can be pretty stupendous.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Leopold Tyrmand, “Observations from the US,” *Ufuk* 4, no.1: 18. Taken from his book *Notebooks of a Dilettante* (MacMillan, 1970).

Tyrmand asserted that the average person in the US is a multidimensional character, knowledgeable in the fields of literature, music and stage arts by reading and frequently attending concerts whether or not it is related to his/her career. He regards this as a “cultural revolution.”⁶⁹

However, what he admired the most was the moral values of the American people:

For example, the greatness of the person. I personally never liked Franklin Delano Roosevelt. I personally never liked Franklin Delano Roosevelt. But he was such a great person and did a lot for his country. I am not one of his fans, while I can never deny his greatness, especially after seeing his monument in Washington... on a modest quadrangular stone these words are written: ‘In memory of...’ The greatness I am talking about here should not be taken as only the modesty of Roosevelt. I am also talking about an American society, who could accept this modesty. If the relatives of Gladstone, Bismarck, Clemenceau or Lenin had attempted to remember and commemorate these great men in such a way, all hell would have broken loose. In this case, greatness comes to life in perfect simplicity. This type of simplicity has been seen in many American institutions and great American statesmen. One of the main American values is this simplicity and it is rarely known and appreciated in Europe.⁷⁰

While appreciating the embracing power of American society and claiming that he does not feel like a “stranger” in the US, Tyrmand also asserted that the US is the “city upon a hill” and has a feeling of a duty to be a model for those who are below itself. He also appreciates this American exceptionalism and wants the American culture to be a global culture:

American society was established with a fusion of pragmatism and materialism, but at the same time a certain type of idealism and a feeling of duty and responsibility against the world had had an important place in this society. Quakers, Woodrow Wilson, UNRRA

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 21.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 18-19.

and Peace Corps represent the other side of American materialism... I hope that this kind of work will help the development of a strong American universalism.⁷¹

Pragmatism is also mentioned as “the American” trait in Vol. 2.2 in relation to William James as the “Philosopher of Opportunity.” The author of the article Richard W.B. Lewis describes Pragmatism as the philosophy of potentiality/opportunity pointing out to the significance the philosophy gives to the freedom of opportunity, therefore rendering it distinctively American, and William James as “the man of a terrific and surprising future.”⁷²

Another “American” concept that is emphasized in the magazine repeatedly is the city. The city as a concept reflected the American Dream, because it represented a world of opportunities. The famous Jewish-American writer Alfred Kazin, wrote about the connection between the concept of the city and literature in Vol. 2.3 and argued that just as the American Dream becomes a nightmare when the individual does not succeed in achieving it, the city becomes a source of disappointment, disillusion and trouble that begs for discussion instead of an experience to share.⁷³ On the other hand, New York University professor Irving Kristol wrote that the city symbolized different things for Americans and Europeans and that the city for Americans was a melting pot of culture, where all immigrants and people from lower classes started their lives and blended into the American lifestyle, while for Europeans it was an inseparable part of the person’s identity. City was not the final destination for the American but was a pool of labor force, who would like to

⁷¹ *Ibid*, 20-21.

⁷² Richard W.B. Lewis, “Philosopher of Opportunity,” *Ufuk* 2, no. 2: 83-84.

⁷³ Alfred Kazin, “Writer and the City,” *Ufuk* 3, no.2: 67.

live in more peaceful rural areas as soon as they managed to earn the money to do so. The success of the city, therefore, could be measured by the amount of migration from the city to the suburbs. Kristol asserted that this amount was rapidly increasing for black people and it would continue on this trend until the end of the 1970s.⁷⁴

As the above mentioned concepts and traits suggest, the important umbrella concept of the American culture which is emphasized in all volumes and numbers of the magazine is the freedom of opportunity, something which could not be found in communist countries as the magazine also liked to emphasize. The US was a place full of freedom in every aspect, freedom of opportunity being one of the most important. Therefore, the US symbolized a place away from determinism as the journalist John Kettle in his article “Future Is Not Inevitable” asserted. There were infinite possibilities in the US and the future could now be foreseen so that it could be changed in need, which granted the US the responsibility to be a model by shaping futures in the best way possible.

Freedom of opportunity was an old ideal in the US that dated back to the first Europeans on the American continent. America was a new frontier when it was first colonized and when the US was founded. The economist Robert L. Heilbroner wrote that “in Canada, the concept of frontier was considered in a more defensive way and encouraged the central government to expand its authority,” while in the US it was considered as a new horizon and

⁷⁴ Irving Kristol, “An Urban Civilization Without Cities,” *Ufuk* 4, no.5: 70-81. Originally in *Horizon* 4 (Autumn 1972), no. XIV.

encouraged a small government so that people could pursue their goals. Therefore “it is not a coincidence that while one culture [the US] produced the cowboy as the first ‘hero’ of the frontier, the other produced the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to implement laws.”⁷⁵ Now, however, there was a need for another frontier which could offer new opportunities to people. This frontier was likely found in space. Therefore, space research and studies, especially the moon landing is glorified in the magazine as something which could provide new opportunities to humanity. For example, in vol. 2.1 the magazine published colored photos of the moon landing, which are the first photos in the magazine as a whole, and Archibald MacLeish, one of the authors, asserted that the moon and space is as much the frontier as America was in the past and that a new generation of people and culture could rise from this frontier.⁷⁶ In Vol 2.3, the writer of *2001: A Space Odyssey* Arthur C. Clarke regarded the trip to the moon as a challenge to the power of humanity, which in this case was overcome. Just like MacLeish, he predicted that this new place will be the source of new people and a new culture, perhaps “a new Renaissance.”⁷⁷ Therefore, the magazine turned something very scientific and complicated for an ordinary person into something legible and more simple by creating an analogy between the space and the US.

However, the emphasis on freedom of opportunity did not mean that everyone was free to do what they pleased at the expense of others’ well-being.

⁷⁵ Robert L. Heilbroner, “Societies and Change,” *Ufuk* 3, no.3: 92. Originally in *The New Republic* (July 13, 1968): 26-28.

⁷⁶ Archibald MacLeish, “From the Moon: A New Image of Man,” *Ufuk* 1, no.2: 61-65. Also in *World Literature*, eds. Rebecca D. Alcantara, Josefina Q. Cabanilla and Alejandro J. Casambre (Quezon City: Katha Publishing Co., Inc., 2000).

⁷⁷ Arthur C. Clarke, “The Lure of Space,” *Ufuk* 3, no.2: 83-88.

The rector of Haverford College John R. Coleman wrote in his article “Economy as a Flow” that the most important aspect of the American economy was that most economic decisions were given in a decentralized way so that the rivalry between companies could continue, which would enable companies, and thus the American life, to develop. According to Coleman, “most of the Americans live well though not like they do in Hollywood films” and he was convinced that “only those who are controlled by the competition of others with the same goals can aim for the stars.”⁷⁸ However, he also stated that “Most Americans would feel little discomfort from achieving goals such as a competitive society, persistent prices, high level of employment, a higher rate of development and fair distribution of income at the expense of some freedom.”⁷⁹

Even American arts can be considered to offer new perspectives, thus new opportunities, to people in that art is made more for society in the US than it is in Europe. For example, in Vol. 2.2, art critic Harold Rosenberg argued that the New York school of arts represented the American arts with prominent painters such as Jackson Pollock and Willem de Kooning and that this is a new kind of art inviting people in, not standing in front of them.⁸⁰ In Vol. 2.4, art critic Hilton Kramer argued that the center of art had been replaced from Paris to New York. New York was the new center of modern art.⁸¹ The USIS’ emphasis on the New York school and the arguments over it being the latest and best way of conducting art reflected their USIS strategy of presenting the

⁷⁸ John R. Coleman, “Economy As A Flow,” *Ufuk* 4, no.3: 52.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 52.

⁸⁰ Harold Rosenberg, “Modern Artist and Society,” *Ufuk* 2, no.2: 23-32.

⁸¹ Hilton Kramer, “The New York School,” *Ufuk* 4, no.2: 33-34.

US to the world. Likewise, American music is also open to new possibilities with its experimental, pluralistic and progressive characteristics, which are qualities associated with the US. In the article “New Directions in American Music,” Daryl D. Dayton wrote that the most serious compositions of American music were starting to be created through the use of every kind of audio tool, using new techniques of musical notes, playing classical instruments in new ways, using electronic voices, etc.⁸²

Although progressive, creative and innovative, “the main feature of the American voter is being average” wrote the director of Washington D.C. Research Center for Elections Richard M. Scammon: “This mass of people are not only middle aged and middle class but also fairly educated and fairly smart. University diploma is not a rule. For most Americans secondary education is the average education level.”⁸³

Finally, one of the most important comments on the US under this category is the idea that the next big revolution would take place in the US. Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs of Columbia University and former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey’s advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in “The Future of the United States” about two revolutions previously in the United States. One of which was the United States Declaration of Independence and the other was the abolition of slavery. He asserted that the US was a dynamic country and now it had begun to be

⁸² Daryl D. Dayton, “New Directions in American Music,” *Ufuk* 3, no.4: 49-50.

⁸³ Richard M. Scammon, “The Real Majority,” *Ufuk* 4, no.4: 45-52. From his book *The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the American Electorate* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), which is said to have inspired Nixon’s strategy for 1970 and 1972 elections.

even more open to taking examples from other developed countries in the fields of political revolution and social restoration.⁸⁴ The French philosopher Jean-François Revel then wrote in the same issue of *Ufuk* that the US was the only country that was not wrapped up in out of date social and religious philosophies and therefore the only country that could feed creative change and revolution in the world:

United States benefits from an increasing rate of development and economic prosperity, without which no revolutionary project can achieve success; technology is adequate there and they do fundamental research at a high level; it is culturally headed to the future rather than the past and it has been experiencing a revolution in the acceptance of individual rights and equality; it rejects authoritarian control, increases creative initiative in all mental fields, especially in arts, lifestyle and emotion, and it allows different subcultures, which complete each other to exist together... There are five types of revolution, which should either occur at the same time or they do not occur at all. These are political revolution, social revolution, technological and scientific revolution, revolution of culture, values and norms and international and interracial revolution. United States is the only country I can see these organically happening at the same time to constitute a single revolution.⁸⁵

3.1.3 Democracy

Democracy is one of the key themes used by *Ufuk Magazine* to promote a positive image of the US. The magazine defined the ideology of the country placing the concept of democracy at the center of this ideology. In the articles that aimed to describe the basic institutions of the US, such as the Congress

⁸⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Future of the United States," *Ufuk* 2, no.4: 48.

⁸⁵ Jean-François Revel, "Without Marx or Jesus," *Ufuk* 4, no.3: 69. Originally *Without Marx or Jesus: The New American Revolution Has Begun* (Delacorte Press, 1972).

and the judicial system, democracy or the significance attributed to it is presented as the central aspect of these institutions. For example, in Vol. 1.2 James MacGregor Burns wrote about the importance of the checks and balances between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government and the highly authoritative powers of the states as opposed to the ideally small central government. Burns argued in the article that thanks to this system of separation of powers there is no power that cannot be resisted or that can turn into a dictatorship, which distinguishes the US from other types of governments in that it grants more democracy and freedom to its society.⁸⁶

In the magazine, the definition of democracy hinges on freedom of speech which is a strong argument for promoting the positive image of the US as opposed to the communist countries, especially the Soviets, where freedom of speech was nonexistent. For example, in Vol. 1.2, John Brademas argued that the role of the intellectual is “to think critically of the status-quo and not to become its servant. In the end, he may or may not attack the accepted politics. However, as an intellectual, his primary duty is to interrogate into it.”⁸⁷ Likewise John Updike said in his interview that “what an author needs the most is intuitive honesty. The author should raise his fist to reject everything that has been lazily accepted, hastily understood, or religiously expected” and gave J.D. Salinger as an example to this.⁸⁸

In another article titled “Mass Media in the US,” Vice President of the Newspaper Association of America Leo Bogart wrote about the importance of

⁸⁶ James MacGregor Burns, “Congress Against the President,” *Ufuk* 2, no.1: 15-21.

⁸⁷ John Brademas, “Intellectuals in American Politics” *Ufuk* 2, no.1: 25-34.

⁸⁸ John Updike, “Realism, Melodrama and the Novel,” *Ufuk* 2, no.4: 80.

the level of freedom of speech in mass media. He asserted that Edward R. Murrow contributed to the deposition of Senator Joseph McCarthy through a critical tv documentary. According to Bogart:

When compared to those countries where radio (or even media) is owned by the government, the American media system which is owned by the private sector tends to offer various things from which the customer can choose, since the capital would always flow to marketable new products and technics. In a free market, many and various innovations come up due to the competition between the old and the new, and after their period of trial, new tastes are born.⁸⁹

Therefore, this system guarantees an ever-changing, ever-improving atmosphere unlike the other alternative, mentioned above, which is a recipe for a static atmosphere.

Brzezinski also argued in his article that

Modern America is a society, which criticizes itself more sincerely and expects more from itself compared to other countries. National reports demonstrating social failures, ruthless criticism of national flaws, hard efforts in social control – all these demonstrate a national mood of self-examination and rationalism... The American tradition of freedom of speech and the freedom in expressing inapproval of something has been an important factor in developing this openness to change.⁹⁰

Brzezinski thus stated that freedom of speech was one of the most important elements in the development of American society.

⁸⁹ Leo Bogart, "Mass Media in the US," *Ufuk* 1, no.5: 86.

⁹⁰ Brzezinski, 47.

On this subject *Ufuk* also had articles on the American judiciary system which apparently guaranteed a fair trial for everyone regardless of social status and race, and which was independent from the government⁹¹. The government provided a free attorney for poor citizens so that they could have a fair trial and decisions were made with the help of a jury, which was a positive element of the American judicial system (although sometimes confusing for other nations).⁹² The Supreme Court is especially of note on this issue due to its ability to outlaw acts of congress and the executions of laws. This guaranteed a system of checks and balances as stated earlier.⁹³

The last point in this category is the election system, which allowed American people to freely decide who they would like to have as a president and more importantly which allowed them to direct the politicians to whichever way they would like.⁹⁴

⁹¹ See Harold J. Berman “Trial by Jury” *Ufuk* 3, no.3: 49-58, originally in *Harry Berman Papers* (1967); Earl Johnson Jr. “Legal Aid and Social Reform” *Ufuk* 3, no.3: 67-73; Martin Mayer “The American Lawyer” *Ufuk* 3, no.3: 42-48; Byron R. White “Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals” *Ufuk* 3, no.3: 34-41.

⁹² Johnson Jr., 67-73.

⁹³ White, 34-41

⁹⁴ Leo Janos, “The President Elected by the Public” *Ufuk* 4, no.4: 15-25.

3.1.4 Justification of the American Interventions and Presence in Europe and Developing Countries

This category deals with both the American economic and military presence in European countries and developing countries. The focus is mostly on the American presence in European countries both economically and militarily and on the Vietnam War; with multinational companies and their benefits for the countries' development and world peace. Later on in the magazine, this section deals with US relations with the European Community; and with the isolationist trends in the US and why this trend could not and should not continue to be the actual foreign policy of the US. The sensitivity of the Turkish political scene to the US military presence in Turkey is part of the aforementioned 1966 report as well. Therefore, by explaining the reasons for American presence especially in Europe, the magazine also indirectly explained the reasons for the same presence in Turkey, which was mainly the threat of Soviet aggression.

According to economist Robert L. Heilbroner's data in his article "Multinational Companies and National Government," 62 of the biggest 100 American companies had facilities in at least 6 other countries, the US exported goods and service amounting to 43 billion dollars in 1966 to various countries, and in the same year the total amount of the overseas exports of factories and facilities in foreign countries owned by Americans was 110

billion dollars, more than double the amount of American exports.⁹⁵ Due to this heavy American economic presence in Europe, “people are afraid that the US will dominate the whole market.”⁹⁶ However, as it was stated many times in various articles in *Ufuk*, this was an unnecessary concern, firstly because the system worked both ways and it was not only the US that had a strong presence in the foreign market, but also Europe had a strong presence in the European American market too. According to Dr. Louis Hacker, “even in 1929 the total amount of foreign private investment in the US was 8.900.000.000 dollars”⁹⁷ and this was due to the amount of freedom and assurance the US provided to foreign companies so that they were always sure that they were safe in the American market. Heilbroner also stated that “what Europeans see as an American challenge can also be considered as a European challenge **against** American companies for European companies expand their production both in Europe and in other countries faster than **all** sales of the American giants (both at home and abroad).”⁹⁸ Journalist J.J. Servan-Schreiber claimed in his article “The American Challenge” that the US was about to conquer the European market with its investments but this actually contributed to European technical development since the US was superior in every field from industry to education.⁹⁹ He wrote, “what we are experiencing today is not an example of classical imperialism, but a mechanical occurrence. It is a an overflow of power due to the difference of “pressure” between the North America and the upper

⁹⁵ Robert L. Heilbroner, “Multinational Companies and National Government,” *Ufuk* 1, no. 2: 76.

⁹⁶ “Foreign Investments: Who Benefits the Most?” *Ufuk* 1, no. 2: 85.

⁹⁷ Louis Hacker, “Foreign Investment in the US”, *Ufuk* 1, no. 1: 52. Originally *Foreign Investment in America’s Growth* (US Information Agency, 1967).

⁹⁸ Heilbroner 76

⁹⁹ J.J. Servan-Schreiber “The American Challenge” *Ufuk* 3, no.2: 25. Originally the writer’s international best-seller *The American Challenge* (New York: Atheneum, 1968).

parts of the world including Europe”¹⁰⁰ and it was a natural occurrence since the Americans had “the ability to adapt to new conditions, flexible structures, creative teams.”¹⁰¹ Also the US invested directly in the companies of other countries which nearly covered the gap between the US and other countries and the US could get reimbursed for this after 6 years, or at times never.¹⁰² Therefore, *Ufuk* promoted the idea that the American economic presence in other countries actually contributed to the development of these countries and that sometimes the US did not even benefit from this relationship.

On the issue of multinational companies, although Heilbroner accepted that multinational companies had the opportunity to dictate more of their demands to the governments of developing countries, he also claimed that most developing countries would like foreign investment from Europe and the US in their countries. The reason why this was the case was that “multinational companies pay higher than domestic industries, keep more honest financial records, pay higher tax and provide more managerial education and know-how. These companies also offer better social service to their workers and provide great professional opportunities for a happy minority of the elite. Apart from this these companies are the main way the technology of the West enters into developing countries.”¹⁰³ While Heilbroner asserted that the opinion of multinational companies as a catalyst for a new world system promoting peace as transnational institutions was a mistake because this opinion neglected to consider the gap between “the ‘western’ big cities and the ‘eastern’ countryside

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 26.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, 27.

¹⁰² “Foreign Investments,” 86

¹⁰³ Heilbroner, 80.

of the underdeveloped world” and that multinational companies would most probably widen this gap rather than narrow it down. His is the only critical piece on the subject of multinational companies. Others in the magazine supported the former opinion.¹⁰⁴

In the later issues of the magazine, the articles in this category started to cover the relations between the US and the European Economic Community (EEC). In “The Common Market and the United States,” Robert M. Ball, Commissioner of Social Security between 1962-73, asserted that “the discomfort of the US about the EEC comes from the unfamiliar obligation of negotiation with an economically larger and in some ways even stronger creature than itself” and unfortunately this creature was “like a dinosaur” in its reactions meaning the Community could not move into action without the collective work and decision of all member countries.¹⁰⁵ Likewise in another article, president of the Ford Foundation and advisor to presidents Kennedy and Johnson, McGeorge Bundy said in a speech at the Conference on Foreign Relations of the EEC that

It was easy to urge the crucial importance of Europe and the necessity of the unification of the West Europe in 1962. The two fears which kept this simple doctrine alive significantly decreased in time and lost their importance. One of these and the obvious one was the fear of the Soviet Union. This fear has decreased as we all notice, but most of us are also aware that it can show up again... But the other fear disappeared for good... I am talking about our secret fear of Germany.”¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ See Neil H. Jacoby, “Multinational Corporations,” *Ufuk* 4, no. 3: 36-46, originally from *Corporate Power and Social Responsibility* (New York: Macmillan, 1973) and Frank Tannenbaum, “Beyond National Government,” *Ufuk* 3, no. 2: 45-49, originally “The Survival of the Fittest,” *Columbia Journal of World Business* 2 (March/April 1968), no. 3.

¹⁰⁵ Robert Ball “The Common Market and the United States” *Ufuk* 1, no. 5: 4.

¹⁰⁶ McGeorge Bundy “The Common Market through the Eyes of an American” *Ufuk* 2, no. 5: 15-16.

Bundy claimed that while these kept the US busy, Europe or the unification of Europe was not an immediate goal to pursue, so that while in theory the US supported this, it did not actually put much effort or thought into it. Now that it happened, Bundy went on, the US was glad that it did but at the same time worried that all the fundamental relations would change. However, he said that Europe is still very important for the US because most of the US investments, trade and dollars were still in Europe.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, Robert Ball asserted that “despite these problems on the surface there are inevitable common interests and responsibilities. In the future the US and the Community will share the responsibility of shaping the monetal policies and trade of the noncommunist world” and the following is especially of note since it summarizes the position of *Ufuk Magazine*:

And despite the difficulties of working with a Europe whose interests are no longer an extension of ours, the US should understand the political importance of an economically robust and ever expanding European Community. Would we like West Germany to pursue Ostpolitik on its own, or as a member of the European Community? What would please us more: the labor unions dominated by French and Italian communist parties and communists to roam freely in a fragmented Europe or in a more moderate prosperous society?¹⁰⁸

All in all *Ufuk* seems to suggest that US relations with the EEC would be better after a period of adaptation and that there was nothing to fear about this.

Ufuk's articles on the military presence of the US in other parts of the world reflected a need for buffer zones and the continuity of relations so that

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 13-14.

¹⁰⁸ Ball, 13-14.

world peace could continue. In order to do this, the world needed transnational institutions such as NATO, which is defended and supported in many articles. Also these articles explained why there was an American presence both in Europe and in Vietnam, why this presence needed to continue and that Europeans knew that the US troops were there for their own good and that they actually would like them to stay. For example, in “NATO Looks Forward,” US permanent representative to NATO, Robert Ellsworth wrote

What the French President Pompidou said in Washington this Tuesday is noteworthy... ‘We believe that the American presence in Europe is desirable and necessary... This should not be just symbolic, but its amount should be tangible.’ And only yesterday did German Chancellor Willy Brandt declare that his government would do the best they could in order to keep the American troops in Europe.¹⁰⁹

Then he went on to explain why Europe was important for the US and thus why the US could not possibly withdraw forces from Europe: “If Western Europe is not safe, the United States is not safe either... The idea that urged the President to say ‘We cannot leave Europe as much as we cannot leave Alaska’ applies for Belgium, Norway, Germany, Turkey and all NATO allies as well.”¹¹⁰ McGeorge Bundy also supported the idea that the safety of the US was inseparable from the safety of Europe, therefore, it was natural for the US to have military presence in Europe, especially now that nuclear weapons were not useable due to their power of destruction, and unilateral disarmament was

¹⁰⁹ Robert Ellsworth, “NATO Looks Forward,” *Ufuk* 4, no. 2: 17.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, 17.

even more impossible because then the apparent balance between the Soviets and the West would break, which was considered dangerous.¹¹¹

In Volume 3 Issue 2, Elliot R. Goodman explained that the sensitivity over this issue mostly came from the Soviet propaganda against the American presence in Europe and the existence of NATO, according to which these two were the barriers against the detente. To this sentiment, Goodman answered as such:

Soviet leaders want detente; but a detente in their own terms... According to the Soviet approach, detente is compatible with engaging in big military adventures as long as it does not require using nuclear weapons or jeopardize the Soviet Union. In other words, if there is a detente between the East and the West, there is also an expansion of the area of engagement between the super powers.¹¹²

The few articles on the Vietnam War focus on the post-war economy and how the US could go through this transition period. The articles all settled on the idea that while for some American sectors the transition will be hard, for most others it will be smooth and even the hard transition periods would be

¹¹¹ Bundy "To Cap the Volcano" *Ufuk* 1, no. 3: 39-47, originally in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1969. Bundy also warned Europeans in a harsh language in another piece: "But for now, until we can see the future further than the most clear-sighted eye can see, if there is anything real for both the US and Europe, it is that the peace of mind of your 'determined warrior society' depends on the willingness of our society to give up twice its national income for collective security. I do not see this expense unnecessary. I believe that this is crucial for our safety as well and that if there were no Europe to defend, our dollar income would very little... But it is too much to ask from my citizens and the representatives they have chosen not to consider the fact that one of the North Atlantic and Pacific nations provides more than all the others in a system of collective security." (in "The Common Market Through the Eyes of an American" *Ufuk* 2, no.5) See also Robert Ball, "Reconsideration of European Security" *Ufuk* 3, no. 5: 18-32; John Newhouse, "American Troops in Europe," *Ufuk* 4, no.4: 71-82; Peter G. Peterson, "Monetary Policy and Changing Economy," *Ufuk* 3, no.5: 54-61; Stanley R. Resor, "American Forces in Europe," *Ufuk* 1, no.3: 48-55; Eugene V. Rostow, "Atlantic Relations," *Ufuk* 4, no.4: 3-9 originally "Atlantic Relations: Perspectives toward the Future," *NATO Review* 2 (1973), no.21: 7-10.

¹¹² Elliot R. Goodman, "Soviet View," *Ufuk* 2, no.3: 32. Originally "Detente: The Soviet View," *Atlantic Community Quarterly* 3 (1965), no.3: 40-46.

tackled well with the US' strong economy. Apart from the post-war economy, the only concern was to change the anti-American idea that the US was in this war just for economic reasons. The articles all asserted that the US economy was already strong and did not need the addition that would come as a wartime economic advantage. Moreover, they insisted that the Vietnam War actually caused losses for the economy rather than gains, so this argument did not apply. There is also an apparent reassurance that the Vietnam War would be the last war of its kind, in that it was fought to protect the free world heroically and all alone.¹¹³ On the other hand many articles were on isolationism and why it could not be pursued by the US since the world was smaller and more interconnected than before and isolation was not even a choice if the US would like to stay safe as stated by the Nixon Doctrine.¹¹⁴ This gave assurance that the US was there to protect the free world and had no interest in withdrawing itself from the system, because first of all it had its own security and economic interests in Europe and the developing world.

¹¹³ See Thomas S. An "A Look at Geneva Accords" *Ufuk* 1, no.1: 30-41; Walter W. Heller "Preparing for Peace" *Ufuk* 3, no.1: 60-67; Richard Nixon "Asia After Vietnam" *Ufuk* 3, no.2: 12-21, originally in *Foreign Affairs* (October 1967).

¹¹⁴ See Selig Adler "The Ghost of Isolationism" *Ufuk* 3, no.3: 86-90, originally in *Foreign Service Journal* (November 1969); Barry Brown "The International Commitment of the US" *Ufuk* 3, no.5: 13-17; "Foreign Economic Policy of the United States and Domestic Economy" *Ufuk* 1, no.5: 24-33; Sanford Rose "Making the Turn to a Peacetime Economy" *Ufuk* 1, no.3: 33-39, originally in *Fortune* 3 (1970), no. 82: 110-3; Hugh Sidey, "Is the US Withdrawing?" *Ufuk* 1, no. 5: 56-62.

3.1.5 Defense Against Issues of Racial Segregation and Discrimination

The articles under this category are few in number. In the first issue of the first volume, the article “Dangers of Democracy” stated that

When one sees today’s conflicts, he can think that the American democracy is collapsing. In reality, the conflicts occurring in the cities are actions of those very few people who are interested in the disaster called Martin Luther King. Most of the black people are horrified by the violence as much as the whites, and many of them have been the victim of this violence.¹¹⁵

The article “Economic Structure of America” that was mentioned before stated that the whole reason why there was a civil rights movement was that the government and/or the system in the US allowed or even encouraged it to happen, which was a good feature of the democratic system as opposed to a totalitarian system that would not allow such a movement.¹¹⁶ This idea is repeated in other articles too.¹¹⁷

The articles made great emphasis on how things were changing for the better for blacks, including the building up of experimental cities such as Columbia for blacks to live under better conditions, the changing representations of blacks in the media giving them more agency and sophistication, and appreciation for the abilities and culture of the blacks, jazz

¹¹⁵ “Dangers of Democracy” *Ufuk* 1, no.1: 49.

¹¹⁶ “Economic Structure of America,” 58.

¹¹⁷ See Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Future of the US,” *Ufuk* 2, no.4: 46-57; Jean-François Revel “Without Marx or Jesus Christ” *Ufuk* 2, no.4: 68-78.

and blues being the number one point of appreciation.¹¹⁸ However, two articles also went with the approach of blaming the victim and suggesting that the racial problems did not belong to the whites now that they supposedly did not discriminate or alienate the blacks, but it belonged to the blacks, since the blacks discriminated among their own community by feeling suspicion and hatred against the more prosperous blacks.¹¹⁹ Apart from the blacks, there is only one article on Native Americans and how they suffered from cultural difference when Europeans colonized their lands by the famous author N. Scott Momaday in the form of an excerpt from his novel *The Way to Rainy Mountain*.¹²⁰

3.1.6 The Youth and Explanation of Student Activism

This subject reoccurs frequently in the magazine and there are several general points to make about the articles on it. One point the magazine makes

¹¹⁸ See Ernest Dunbar, "Elegant, Disciplined, Beautiful..." *Ufuk* 2, no.5: 46-52, originally in *Topic* (1972), no.69: 17-21; Frederick G. Dutton, "The Politics of the New Generation," *Ufuk* 3, no.4: 13-20, originally in *Changing Sources of Power: American Politics in the 1970s* (McGraw-Hill, 1971); Wolf von Eckhardt, "Two American Experiments," *Ufuk* 1, no.4: 62-67; Isa Kapp, "Black and White Conflict," *Ufuk* 4, no.3: 81-93; Irwing Kristol, "Urban Crisis and the Lower Class," *Ufuk* 2, no.4: 41-45; Marion Merrill, "Columbia: The America of the Future," *Ufuk* 2, no.4: 35-40; Richard M. Scammon, "The Real Majority: 1972," *Ufuk* 4, no.4: 45-52.

¹¹⁹ See Nathan Glazer, "Racist Behavior and the City," *Ufuk* 4, no.1: 42-48; Martin Kilson, "Birth of the Politics of the Black," *Ufuk* 4, no.4: 37-44.

¹²⁰ See N. Scott Momaday, "The Way to Rainy Mountain," *Ufuk* 3, no.3: 74-79.

is that the student activism of the 1960s and 1970s was just a trend among students. For example, Charles Frankel wrote:

This is not to say that the students are managed from one place. I would like to state that the events are only some kind of student trend. Students match both their clothes and their actions. International trends can spread fast through television. Student leaders gain reputation overnight. Successful student boycotts and defeatist actions are immediately broadcasted to students in other countries.¹²¹

According to Frankel, students were pushy and impatient in nature. While he accepted the benefits of their actions as pushing for quicker development, he also refuted the seriousness of the issue by claiming that the events were only the results of a worldwide trend and nothing more. He evaluated the students as “kids” and not adults, making them “others” to the adult world, which automatically decreased the effects they might have in that world.¹²² He also claimed that “they do not know what they want either. They want revolution for the most part but they do not know what they exactly want; at the same time they want the student demands to be listened.”¹²³ Some articles also asserted that the most radical students were a very small group and that they were not appreciated or accepted by their fellows as well. Most of the other

¹²¹ Charles Frankel, “University Today: Problems and Expectations,” *Ufuk* 3, no.1: 3-4.

¹²² See also Steven Kelman, “Youth and the Foreign Policy,” *Ufuk* 1, no.4: 24-30, originally in *Foreign Affairs* (April 1970); Kenneth Keniston, “Youth, Change and Violence,” *Ufuk* 1, no.2: 11-18, originally in *American Scholar* 2 (Spring 1968), no.37; Leopold Labedz, “Students and Revolution,” *Ufuk* 1, no.2: 34-40, originally in *Survey* (July 1968): 3-28; Elliot L. Richardson, “Generation Gap and American Foreign Policy,” *Ufuk* 1, no.2: 3-6, originally “The Generation Gap,” *Vital Speeches of the Day* 19 (July 15, 1970), no. 36; George Santayana, “America’s Young Radicals,” *Ufuk* 1, no.2: 20-21, originally in *The Forum* (May 1922): 371-4; Edward Schwartz, “What Do Students Want: Opinion from the Liberal Left,” *Ufuk* 1, no.2: 22-26; James Russell Wiggins, “The Rights and Responsibilities of the Opposition,” *Ufuk* 4, no.2: 3-10.

¹²³ Frankel, 5. See also Robert A. Nisbet, “The Deterioration of Authority,” *Ufuk* 3, no.2: 11-15.

students according to this claim were still conservatives and even the liberals were very uncomfortable with the disruption in education caused by these radical students.¹²⁴ Some claimed that most radicals were also the members of the elite class, who had no other battles to fight and who were not actually familiar with the real conditions of society nor the workings of politics.¹²⁵ Another group of articles insisted that this was not the students role to play, they were supposed to study, not create political change.¹²⁶

As for the reason for the way the students behaved, the most prominent factor explained by the articles is the lengthy period of education that students needed to go through to achieve their goals, which broke off their links with the society they lived in. Other possible explanations were the fact that the students had not encountered the long and hard wars and depressions that their parents had, thus making them demand more from an already good system, and also the influence of mass communication.¹²⁷

In general, these articles tried to illustrate a small group of students, who did not even have a consistent ideology, trying to destroy the already well-working traditional institutions. While some of the articles tried to give the message that they were fighting in vain and actually damaging society and that

¹²⁴ See Seymour Martin Lipset, "Students and Politics in Comparison," *Ufuk* 2, no.2: 33-46; Arnold Steinberg, "What Do Students Want: A Conservative Perspective," *Ufuk* 4, no.1: 27-30.

¹²⁵ See George Keller, "Student Activism from the Perspective of a Student," *Ufuk* 1, no.4: 42-44 and Steven Kelman, "The Youth and Foreign Policy," *Ufuk* 1, no.4: 24-30.

¹²⁶ See John Corson, "If It Is Not University," *Ufuk* 4, no.2: 29-32; Steven Kelman, "A Look Into Student Activism," *Ufuk* 3, no.1: 68-71; David Riesman, "Political Crusades and University," *Ufuk* 1, no.4: 45-49; Stephen J. Tonsor, "Dangers of Social Commitment," *Ufuk* 4, no.2: 25-28.

¹²⁷ See Bennet M. Berger, "Student Unrest and Prolonged Period of Youth," *Ufuk* 1, no.4: 34-41; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Future of America," *Ufuk* 2, no.4: 46-57 and "The Year of Europe/ International and Terrestrial," *Ufuk* 3, no.5: 3-12; Frederick Dutton, "New Generation Policy," *Ufuk* 3, no.4: 13-20

they had better work in the system to demand and achieve their goals,¹²⁸ the most important message the magazine gives to the audience is a message of relief that the events were just temporary and should not be taken as a serious threat.

In order to make these points, *Ufuk* made use of articles by successful students from prestigious American universities including Harvard. The selection uniformly consists of conservative students, such as Steven Kelman from Harvard, who supported the idea that there is no place for radical activism at universities.

3.2 Anti-Communist/Anti-Socialist and Anti-Soviet Propaganda and Defense of the Capitalist System

One of the most important aspects of the *Ufuk Magazine* articles is that they reflect a strong feeling of disturbance by the image of unrestrained market economy in the US as it was stated in the 1966 Memorandum: “In trying to correct the commonly held 19th century image of American capitalism, more attention might be paid to the significant regulatory role of the government in the US economy and the many public social welfare programs.” Therefore, the articles emphasizing that precautions are being taken for the economy in the

¹²⁸ See Robert Harris, “What Do Students Want: An Activism Without Words,” *Ufuk* 4, no.1: 31-33 and Steven Kelman, “The Youth and Foreign Policy,” *Ufuk* 1, no.4: 24-30.

US to protect small business, that capitalism in the US is not cut-throat but more regulated than before, that it has been adopting the practical aspects of socialism so as not to leave any need for full-blown socialism make up the bulk of each volume. However, the articles are careful to not emphasize the material richness of the US despite the emphasis on the market economy. The market economy is emphasized mostly in terms of the democratic values it represented, such as freedom of opportunity and the chance for development it offered to the developing countries. Therefore, many articles in the *Ufuk Magazine* aimed to explain and/or defend the United States, while they also made tremendous effort to explain and/or defend capitalism. The general message of the articles was that the US was a capitalist country and would like to clear the reputation of capitalism so that the actions the US had taken could be rationalized/justified. This effort is evident in many *Ufuk* articles. Although in one case the author of “The Economic Structure of America” denied the association of the US with capitalism saying that “The economic experience of the United States cannot be defined with any ‘ism’s, slogans or simple theories,” the same author made an effort to explain the structure of the US economic system and went on to say that capitalism was way ahead of communism and instead of labeling the systems as such, one should consider the promises of the two systems in terms of living standards and whether or not those promises were kept.¹²⁹ He also made a historical evaluation of the capitalist system deciding that capitalism was not the unbridled cruel system as it was used to being considered. Especially now, the government had a “moral

¹²⁹ See also Arthur F. Burns, “The Triumph of the Free Enterprise,” *Ufuk* 3, no.3: 80-85, originally “Adress by Arthur Burns to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,” Tokyo/Japan, 2.7.1970.

responsibility” against the society and was in charge of regulating the system for progress and improvement. Anti-trust regulations and laws were a proof of this. Another proof was social security which was provided by the government and more so than the social security which was offered by socialist governments: “In 1967, the public spending of the federal government and state and local administrations rose up to 240 billion dollars, which is 31% of the national output. This percentage is twice the one in officially socialist countries such as India and Mexico.”¹³⁰

Moreover, American laborers had the right to strike and lockout, which meant that they had a voice in the system unlike those in communist or fascist countries: “In nondemocratic (fascist, communist or despotic) countries, labour unions are established and run by governments and in these countries strikes are prohibited by law.”¹³¹

In this way, the author argued, the US adopted the pragmatic aspects of socialism so that there would be no need for socialism itself. Furthermore, socialism could never be a strong movement in the US because “the American economic system has already provided the future promises of socialism. Thus, getting rid of poverty and creating social equality are almost already achieved goals.”¹³² Therefore, the fact that there was social equality and upward mobility in the US and that with the help of the civil rights movement soon the

¹³⁰ “Economic Structure of America,” 54-55.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, 56-57.

¹³² *Ibid*, 58.

blacks would gain their demands all showed that the model to follow was the American model, not socialism.¹³³

The author of “Economic Structure of America” also explained taxing in the US in comparison with the taxes implemented by socialist governments as a way of demonstrating with statistical data why the American system was better than the socialist/communist system:

The meaninglessness of the words such as capitalism, socialism, collectivism and communism is apparent when the domestic politics of the countries are checked out. For example, many socialist governments does not implement as high stages of taxes as it is done in the “capitalist” American society... In the Soviet Union, income tax stages rises only up to 13%; more than 80% of the government’s income is obtained through indirect sales and transfer taxes, which damages the low income class the most. There is no inheritance tax. These communist governments, who are implementing this financial politics, in fact follow the track of what the capitalist countries had been doing 60 years ago by putting pressure on the low-income class by sale and transfer taxes and taxing consumption instead of production.¹³⁴

An idea repeated in the magazine several times by different articles was that communism/socialism was dying and/or there was too much reaction against it by even socialists/communists themselves. According to this argument there was no way to revive or fix this either. This idea sounds like a message to the developing world that socialism was not the system that they

¹³³ The idea of capitalism pragmatically adopting the good elements of socialism so as not to leave any reason to go for full-fledged socialism is a recurrent one in the magazine. For examples of this, see John W. Bennet, “Challenge of the Communes,” *Ufuk* 1, no.4: 16-23, Harry Fleischman, “American Socialism,” *Ufuk* 3, no.1: 4-7; Michael Harrington, “An Italian Marxist,” *Ufuk* 2, no.5: 90-92; Seymour Martin Lipset, “Political Parties and Social Movements,” *Ufuk* 3, no.5: 3-12, originally “Third Parties and Social Movements,” *Dialogue* 2 (1972), no.5: 3-11; Bertram G. Murray, Jr. “What The Ecologists Can Teach The Economists?” *Ufuk* 4, no.5: 22-31, originally in *Earthkeeping*, eds. Susan Mehrstens and Charles Juzek, (Pacific Grove, California: Boxwood Press, 1974); Harold L. Wilensky, “Class Consciousness and American Workers,” *Ufuk* 1, no.3: 66-74, originally in *Labor in a Changing America* (New York: Basic Books, 1966).

¹³⁴ “Economic Structure of America,” 53.

might want to invest in, since it apparently did not work, although it had offered so many promises in the beginning.

The threat of communism and the dangers of having close relations with the US was also one of the points made in the 1966 Memorandum: “Make clear that while the present degree of East-West detente permits a cautious degree of cooperation, it must be based on genuine Bloc reciprocity, and that despite the current thaw, the self-proclaimed objectives of Communism are inimicable to Turkish interests.” In order to achieve this aim, the magazine chose to publish articles on small communist countries under Soviet rule, and on how they experienced an economic and social backward trend instead of developing. Czechoslovakia was the choice of example in these articles.¹³⁵

In only two articles did the magazine directly attack the Soviets for being dangerous to the free world and for having the determination to do whatever they could in order to keep their “empire” intact and/or expand this empire. In these two articles, the Cold War jargon is clear; the Soviet Union is the enemy of the free world and the US is the protector and superpower of the free world.¹³⁶ In addition, in only one article did the magazine state distrust and suspicion over another country, namely China. While China’s efforts to communicate with the free world was a positive thing, it still received

¹³⁵ See Harlan Cleveland, “NATO After the Invasion,” *Ufuk* 4, no.1: 24-34, originally in *Foreign Affairs* (January 1969), “Communist Ideology and Economic Revolution,” *Ufuk* 1, no.2: 83-84; Lewis S. Feuer, “Opposition of the Intellectuals,” *Ufuk* 4, no.3: 3-13; William J. Parente, “Opinions of a Soviet Intellectual,” *Ufuk* 2, no.4: 86-88; and for examples of suffering under the Soviet rule see Ota Sik, “The Economic Impact of Stalinism,” *Ufuk* 4, no.4: 68-70, originally in *Problems of Communism* (May 1971): 1-10 and “Soviet Type Economy According to Czechs,” *Ufuk* 4, no.1: 95-97.

¹³⁶ See Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Year of Europe/ International and Terrestrial,” *Ufuk* 3, no.5: 3-12; Paul-Henri Spaak, “The Basic Truth,” *Ufuk* 1, no.2: 41-45; “Russia’s Right to Intervention in the ‘Socialist Camp’: Brejnev Doctrine,” *Ufuk* 1, no.2: 44-45.

suspicion on the US side because China's actions did not represent an approach of truly friendly relations.¹³⁷

All of these articles were pointed towards the target group in order to show them the continuing danger of communism and the USSR. At a time when Turkey was not as much disturbed by the Soviets in terms of ideology and politics as before, USIA needed to remind the audience of these dangers. This would prevent Turkey from getting closer to the USSR and contain the communism in its existing boundaries.

3.3 Cultivating a Consciousness of Globalism

This subject is first covered in the 3rd issue of the 2nd volume of the magazine with Robert F. Ellsworth's "The Future of the Atlantic Pact."¹³⁸ Ellsworth discussed in this article the importance of NATO, of decreasing the tension between the East and the West, of protecting the environment, and of keeping technology under control.

Later in Volume 3 Issue 1 the magazine published some articles on this issue as a special section, because NATO had set up a committee named "The Challenges of the Modern Society (CCMS)." Seven pilot projects were approved one of which being a project to address air pollution in Ankara.

¹³⁷ L. La Dany, "China: The Period of Anticipation," *Ufuk* 1, no.4: 7-15.

¹³⁸ Robert F. Ellsworth, "The Future of the Atlantic Pact," *Ufuk* 3, no.2: 3-6.

These articles covered environmental subjects such as environmental pollution, ecology, recycling, the reason for the importance of these subjects and solutions to these issues.

Later on Dr. Kay H. Jones wrote in “International Cooperation for Clean Air” the results of this project along with the results of two other projects in Frankfurt and St. Louis:

The results we had in Ankara were promising. The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) had started four surveys on decreasing the air pollution before the CCMS project... CCMS project accelerated these surveys. The measurement stations built during the project are still being used. In the meanwhile, the Turkish government set up an energy council. More importantly than all these, the project was advertised enough to the public to create an awareness of air pollution control in this country.¹³⁹

Jones also suggested that these results were important not only for developing countries but also for developed countries, because environmental pollution was a problem for both. Sharing the results of these projects was also important for creating a spirit of alliance between countries on the subject.

All in all, articles under this category demonstrate the new awareness of a small and interconnected world, which can be transcribed as a consciousness of globalism.¹⁴⁰ Therefore the US made efforts to protect this one world from further pollution and destruction.

¹³⁹ Kay H. Jones, “International Cooperation for Clean Air,” *Ufuk* 4, no.5: 35.

¹⁴⁰ See Spiro T. Agnew, “The Future of the Oceans,” *Ufuk* 3, no.3: 20-23; Norman E. Borlaug, “Green Revolution,” *Ufuk* 1, no.4: 3-13; Frederic Brewer, “Innovations and Difficult Problems to Solve,” *Ufuk* 2, no.5: 90-96; John Coppola, “The Artist and the Restoration of the Environment,” *Ufuk* 1, no.5: 42-46; René Dubos, “The Continuity of Life,” *Ufuk* 2, no.5: 3-12, originally in *The Torch of Life: Continuity in Living Experience* (Pocket Books, 1963); Paul R. and Anne Ehrlich, “Population, Resources, Environment,” *Ufuk* 2, no.3: 47-56, originally in

Other than these major categories of writings, there are some articles on cultural aspects such as arts and music. Those articles which cover cultural aspects are mostly focused on high culture rather than popular culture. This may be a reaction to the anti-Americanist opinion that the United States did not have a sophisticated culture of its own. There is major emphasis on museums, galleries, painters and literary figures, while popular culture elements such as blockbuster Hollywood movies are usually downplayed unless they made a point about a current issue such as racial relations in the US. Art is also important because it makes a showcase of freedom of expression in the US. *Ufuk Magazine* is especially filled with commentary on modernist forms of art, which was apparently appreciated in the US, an aspect that furthers the notion of freedom of expression.

Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 2 (July 1970), no.18: 123-5; Robert F. Ellsworth, "The Future of the Atlantic Pact," *Ufuk* 3, no.2: 3-6; Peter Gaskell, "There Is No Cleaning Without Its Cost," *Ufuk* 1, no.5: 47-55; Kay H. Jones, "International Cooperation for Clean Air," *Ufuk* 4, no.5: 32-38; Wesley Pedersen, "Food from Leftovers, Road from Broken Glass... Why Not?," *Ufuk* 2, no.4: 21-28; Eugene B. Skolnikoff, "Technology and World Politics," *Ufuk* 2, no.4: 58-67, originally in *The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology and the Evolution of International Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1994); Henry Still, "Earth: the Only World That Belongs to Us," *Ufuk* 2, no.4: 14-20; Maurice F. Strong, "Environment: An International Perspective," *Ufuk* 4, no.4: 9-14; Russell E. Train, "Environment as an International Problem," *Ufuk* 4, no.5: 55-59; Harvey Wheeler, "Science and Laws," *Ufuk* 3, no.3: 3-13; Thomas W. Wilson, Jr., "Environment and Development: Is There a Conflict?," *Ufuk* 3, no.4: 3-8.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Turkey and the US have never been enemies, although relations between the two countries have not always been unproblematic. Especially in the 1960s the two countries started to have a problematic relationship due to such problems as the Cyprus Crisis and the Turkish poppy seed production and trade, as well as the domestic political and social changes in Turkey, which influenced the way Turkey approached its relations with the US. In the 1960s and 70s the Cold War had come to a point where both sides, namely the US and the Soviet Union, asserted the requirement for detente. Therefore, as other countries around the world, Turkey was looking for more multilateral foreign relations including relations with the Soviet Union. US-Turkey relations had been criticized for Turkey's overcommitted attitude towards the US, while the US did not show the same commitment to the interests of Turkey. All these created an unfavorable US image in Turkey, especially in the minds of the urban elite, which was USIA's target group for its public diplomacy activities.

As a result, and in an attempt to continue relations with Turkey in a favorable manner for the US, USIA observed the need to adapt its objectives and program to the new political conditions of Turkey. Among these objectives were increasing the elites' awareness of the advantages of Turkey's association with US-sponsored security institutions, namely NATO and CENTO, explaining the reasons and importance of the American presence both in Turkey and other parts of the world, making special emphasis over Vietnam, raising the level of understanding of the benefits of economic cooperation with the US and the West, while also reminding the elite that the political and intellectual dangers of the Soviet Union still prevailed.

In this study my aim was to provide examples of how USIS in Turkey implemented these objectives. For this end, I made use of interviews with the former USIS officers in Turkey, which revealed the actual field work remembered by the officers and most importantly the official USIS publication *Ufuk Magazine* prepared for the purpose of accessing to the target population, namely the urban elite, which clearly presented the way USIS intended to portray the US in order to ameliorate the US image in the minds of the Turkish elite. Among the material used in this magazine were articles by well known writers, social scientists, philosophers, artists and politicians including President Nixon. The focus of the magazine content followed the line of the USIA objectives mentioned above, although going even further in some subjects such as cultivating an awareness of globalism among its audience. All in all, when we examine the issues we can see that the magazine achieved to portray a favorable image of the US in terms of its chosen content.

However, one question still remains to be answered. Were the USIS efforts of public diplomacy including the magazine able to win the hearts and minds of the Turkish elite? A look at the fight between the political factions of Turkey, namely the Right and the Left, over their opinions of the US, which continued to the 1980 military coup, indicates that there was hardly any change in the “hearts and minds” of the public. General knowledge of Turkish politics also suggests that the fight between the politicians, policy-makers and academics, which were the target group of USIS Turkey, went on the same way and anti or pro-Americanism was still an issue of conflict and accusation in the quarrels between the right and the left of the urban elite. In other words, despite all the USIS effort, American presence in Turkey and such actions as the arms embargo, which especially for the leftists represented the US opinion of Turkey as a client state rather than an ally, therefore alarming Turkish sensitivity over its sovereignty, remained as one of the most cited issues by the elite in their domestic propaganda against each other. This presents us an American image that generally did not change for either one of the factions.

It is also important to notice the political awareness of the public in terms of both domestic and international issues. Student movements is an apparent example of this awareness together with the near “awakening” of the less educated members of the society due to developments such as the expansion of electricity, roads, telephone and most importantly the radio to Anatolia, where such an awareness did not previously exist. These developments allowed Turkish people to have an opinion of the US of their own (or as an expansion of their choice of political parties). As a result, those

who had anti-Americanist tendencies used phrases such as “American lackey” against those who were pro-American. The mere existence and prevalence of this rhetoric shows that being for or against the US is a point in determination of one’s political faction, thus a strong sentiment in Turkish political rhetoric. Turning this awareness back was not possible and the point USIA missed was that although it was the targeted small group of people who made foreign policies, the same people needed to please their voters more than ever at the same time. Therefore, targeting only the elite population seems fruitless compared to a mixed program targeting the other population groups in Turkey.

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