

RETHINKING THE WELFARE PARTY: ANALYSIS OF
THE 1991 ELECTION CAMPAIGN

A Master's Thesis

by

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Administration

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The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

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in

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August, 1999

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ABSTRACT

RETHINKING THE WP: ANALYSIS OF THE 1991 ELECTION
CAMPAIGN

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August, 1999

This thesis is an attempt to reconsider the Welfare Party- WP on the basis of its 1991 election campaign. The thesis introduces the Welfare Party from a historical point of view, considering the party as a continuum of a tradition in the Turkish political thought. Based on the picture drawn from the analysis of the texts of the 1991 campaign, the thesis tries to discover the constituents of the discourse of the party. In doing so it is attempted to interpret the WP by enlarging the limits of the interpretative hermeneutic circle shaped around the blueprints of laicist-Kemalist perspective. The conceptualisation of 'alternative modernities' as well as social and political thought of Ziya Gökalp is employed in rethinking the WP.

Keywords: The National Order Party, The National Salvation Party, The Welfare Party, Political Advertisement, Propaganda, Alternative Modernities, Ziya Gökalp.

ÖZET

REFAH PARTİSİNİ YENİDEN DÜŞÜNMEK: 1991 SEÇİM KAMPANYASI ANALİZİ

Alemdarođlu, Ayça

Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Orhan Tekeliođlu

Ađustos, 1999

Bu tez, Refah Partisini 1991 seçim kampanyası temelinde yorumlama çabasıdır. Tez Refah Partisini, tarihsel bir perspektiften değerlendirerek, partiyi Türk sosyal düşünce tarihinde bir geleneğin devamı olarak görmektedir. Tez, partinin 1991 seçim kampanyasının analizini temel alarak, Refah Partinin söylemini oluşturan unsurları laik-Kemalist perspektif etrafında şekillenen yorumsama alanının sınırlarını genişleterek anlama girişimidir. Refah Partisini yeniden düşünme çabası içinde tez, 'alternatif moderniteler' kavramlaştırması ve Ziya Gökalp'in sosyal ve siyasal düşüncesine başvurur.

Anahtar kelimeler: Milli Nizam Partisi, Milli Selamet Partisi, Refah Partisi, Siyasal reklamcılık, Propaganda, Alternative Moderniteler, Ziya Gökalp.

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I dedicate this thesis to Berat Sancar Yücel whom I owe everything I have, I learned and lived through.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZET.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
APPENDICES.....	viii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER I: THE WELFARE PARTY (WP)	
1.1 Historical Background.....	11
1.1.1 The National Order Party.....	13
1.1.2 The National Salvation Party.....	17
1.2 The Welfare Party till 1991 Election Campaign.....	25
CHAPTER II: ANALYSIS OF THE WP's 1991 ELECTION CAMPAIGN	
2.1 From <i>Tebliğ</i> to Propaganda.....	30
2.2 A note on Political Advertising.....	31
2.3 General Strategy of the WP's 1991 Election Campaign.....	33
2.4 Narrative Structuring of the Advertisements.....	37

2.5 Images.....	40
2.6 Themes and Issues covered in the Advertisements.....	41
2.6 The Significance of Advertisements for Alternative Interpretation of the WP.....	58
 CHAPTER III: ALTERNATIVE MODERNITIES	
3.1 Theoretical approach.....	66
3.2 Interpretation of Ziya Gökalp within the framework of Alternative Modernities.....	75
3.3 An Appraisal of Turkish Modernisation with regard to Alternative Modernities	86
 CONCLUSION: RETHINKING THE WELFARE PARTY.....	90
APPENDICES.....	102
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	121

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: "*Hakkımı versinler!..*" ("Give me what I deserve!..")

APPENDIX 2: "*Enflasyon büyüyor, maaşım küçülüyor!..*" ("Inflation is rising, my salary is falling!..") (In appendix 2)

APPENDIX 3: "*İki yakamız biraraya gelmiyor!..*" ("We fail to make two ends meet...")

APPENDIX 4: "*Vergiler belimizi büktü!..*" ("The taxes broke our back...")

APPENDIX 5: "*Köylü çalışıyor karşılığını alamıyor!..*" ("Peasant works but can not get his due...")

APPENDIX 6: "*Faiz beni batırdı!..*" (Interest rate bankrupted me!..)

APPENDIX 7: "*Gencim Gelecek istiyorum!..*" ("I'm young, I want a future!..")

APPENDIX 8: "*Emekli insan huzur ister!..*" ("A retired man needs peace...")

APPENDIX 9: "*Babamı işten attılar!..*" ("They fired my father!..")

APPENDIX 10: "*Okuldan atıldım!..*" ("I am dismissed from the school...")

APPENDIX 11: "*Demokrasi mi?..*" ("Democracy?..")

APPENDIX 12: "*Doğulu Olmak Suç mu?*" ("Is it a blame to be an Easterner?..")

APPENDIX 13: "*Başkalarının hayatının kadınıyım. Ya kendi hayatım?..*" ("I'm the woman of other people's life. What about mine?..")

APPENDIX 14: "*Kadınım. Yani insan!..*" ("I'm a woman. Namely a Human!..")

APPENDIX 15: "*Kim ister gecekonduda yaşamayı?..*" ("Who wants to live in *squatter house*?..")

APPENDIX 16: "*Yaşanabilir bir çevre istiyorum!..*" ("I want a livable environment!..")

APPENDIX 17: "*Oyumu Amerika'ya vermek istemiyorum*" ("I do not want to vote for America!..")

APPENDIX 18: "*Bir lider istiyorum..*" ("I want a leader...")

APPENDIX 19: "*Bu nasıl düzen anlamıyorum!..*" ("I do not understand how this order is!..")

INTRODUCTION

The social, cultural and economic dynamics of the modernisation process in Turkey have imposed the Welfare Party and its preceded tradition of the National Order Party and the National Party as a reality of modern political life.

The tradition has its origins in the very early days of the 19th century Islamic movement. The reason of the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire after glorious centuries was the most prominent question in the minds of Ottoman elite. According to Westernists the existence of Islam as a primary order of life was the reason for backwardness of the Ottoman Empire with respect to the West.

In order to prevent further regression and to catch the Western nations, reforms, starting with the *Tanzimat* era were applied primarily in military field and state bureaucracy. The

reforms were aimed to keep together both old and new components of social life alive, which resulted in the resistance of the former to the latter (Sarıbay, 1985:62). Similarly, imposition of the reforms from above upon the society brought about the alienation and resistance of the various sections of society to the central authority. In that context the first resistance to the Westernisation movement came from the high-ranking religious functionaries- the *ulema* and military classes- *Yeniçeri*. Their strong opposition was rather caused by the fear of losing their status and power in the society than their dedication to Islamic reason (Berkes, 1973: 69-70). However the reaction to Westernisation reforms took an Islamic dimension. Because on behalf of the society the formal changes brought by the reforms within the traditional institutions were considered as alienation from Islam, which used to form the basis of state and society in the Ottomans (Sarıbay, 1985:63).

As the idea of Westernisation became more prominent among the Ottoman bureaucrats in controlling the central authority as well as in imposing reforms from above the society, Islam have come to be the component of the periphery culture. The modernisation of education has deepened the existing cultural cleavage between the centre and the periphery, leading

the latter to embrace Islamic values more intimately as the basis of their reaction against their exclusion from central processes of modernisation (Mardin, 1975:19).

Hence during the last periods of the Empire, Westernisation reforms attracted the reaction of different sections of Ottoman society. While centralisation of government triggered the reaction of the local landowners, the formal changes in the social institutions, which were previously organised on the basis of religion, attracted the reaction of the people who had stayed in the periphery of those changes.

Although the Westernisation movements could not slow down the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the elites of the newly founded Turkish Republic insisted on the necessity of Westernisation. Islam has continued to be the field of reaction of those who have been excluded, alienated or less benefited from the central processes of westernisation/modernisation. It is the reaction or in fact an attempt of those sections of society to turn and adapt the way of modernisation in accordance with their own needs and desires rather than a call for a life in the past. As the social, economic and political structures of 'modern' Turkey have differentiated, the response of the alienated and excluded social

classes have found opportunity to be represented in the political field.

First the National Order Party (NOP) and the National Salvation Party (NSP) in the 1970s than the Welfare Party (WP) in the 1980s and 1990s became the voice of those who have discontent with the changing economic and social structures. Preservation of morality, tradition and culture are the basic tenets of these parties. Tradition and Islam, as the most important source of tradition, have taken a political and ideological function in representing the discontent of the people with the way the modernisation processes reflected in their lives. Since the 19th century the religion has been considered as the fundamental obstacle in the road of modernisation. Because of that reason, the Islamic tenet in the discourse of the NOP-NSP-WP has inevitably been considered as the sign of challenge to the Kemalist project of modernisation. The debate about the strength of the Islamic ingredient in the formation of the three parties is still valid.¹ Definitely, as we will see in the first and second chapters, Islam is not the only constituent of the program and discourse of the parties.

¹ For a satisfactory discussion of the issue see Serdar Şen. 1995. *Refah Partisi'nin Teori ve Pratiği*. İstanbul: Sarmal, 13-29.

This thesis is an attempt to rethink the NOP-NSP-WP tradition through hermeneutic inquiry that would enlarge the boundaries of the "interpretative circle". The task of hermeneutic inquiry in politics is to grasp the meanings that constitute the features of political life; political actions, relations, practices and institutions (Davison, 1998:3). The field of interpretative circle is the field of struggle between opposed positions, rival interpretations each claiming to dominate others. In confronting different views and perspectives, alternative life forms and world-views within the interpretative circle, we become aware of different possibilities of making sense of politics, so that we can rearticulate languages of those opposed positions that make intelligible the contested and shared, the subjective and intersubjective meanings and understandings that constitute political life. Our initial understanding, our interpretative circle expanded in reflection and communication with those we seek to grasp. The rearticulation of our language is what Gadamer (1986) calls "fusion of horizons." That is the horizon through which we formerly taken for granted to make sense of the world broadens alongside alternative meanings, alternative perceptions. The fusion of horizons can only be achieved when we open our language to a dialogue with those we seek to understand. And understanding occurs only when our conceptual frame is

expanded and when we became aware of our prejudices through a critical dialogue with the constitutive languages of others.

The common way of interpretation of the WP and its predecessors, the NOP and the NSP has been constituted by inevitable laicist character of Kemalist modernisation. In that sense the NOP-NSP-WP tradition is considered as Muslim "reactionaries" that go after an Islamic Shari'a, fundamental threat to the foundations of the Turkish Republic and its modernisation process.

In order to expand the framework, in which we understand and explain the WP and to encounter with the view that Kemalist modernisation project might not be the only imagination of modernity in Turkey, I would analyse the 1991 election campaign of the WP. Through analysis of the texts of advertisements of the campaign, I seek to account for the significance and constitutive meanings of the WP in Turkish political arena. By bringing those meanings to our language, we inevitably confront what Davison (1998) calls the "secular modern" prejudice of modern politics which leads us to interpret the NOP-NSP-WP as anti-modern, anti-systemic and reactionist due to the Islamic component in their discourse.

In confronting the secular modern prejudice of Kemalist perspective in understanding the NOP-NSP-WP continuum, the thesis claims for a better understanding of this tradition in enlarging the limits of the interpretative circle. The initial point of this claim was the rejection of interpreting the WP's propaganda texts in the 1991 election campaign as *takiye*.² The advertisements are not only signifying the party politics of the WP but also the founding principles of the NOP and the NSP, supporting the argument of the 'continuum'. Of course, regarding the three parties as continuum or as a part of a tradition never means to say that the WP remained totally same with its preceders in the changing conditions of the world context and Turkey, especially after the three military intervention experienced in the country.

The advertisements have not only been an initiative for me to go beyond the understanding of the WP as a threat to the Turkish Republic, but they have also provided the clues for an alternative, or a better understanding of the discourse of the party. Despite its 'political radicalism', it was the 'social

² Any deviance in the discourse and practice of the WP from the anti-laic, anti-democrat and anti-modern character that is attributed to the party by the secular modern prejudice is considered as *takiye*. It signifies the widespread belief that the WP is acting pragmatically in order to come to power through democratic means, which it would abandon soon after it came to power.

conservatism' of the party that appears in the advertisements which shed light to the way of interpreting the WP in its relation with Ziya Gökalp.

The significance of Ziya Gökalp for interpreting the WP lies in the role that he has attributed to religion in the modernisation of Turkey and his conceptualisation of the West within his tripartite project of Turkism, Islamism and modernism. Tradition, religion and the persistence of social community on the one hand, the technology and science of the West on the other are the devotions of both Ziya Gökalp and the NOP-NSP-WP. Gökalp's distinction between civilisation and culture and Erbakan's 'National Outlook' depicts their significant similarity in conceptualising Islam and modernity.³

Although the NOP-NSP-WP tradition's deviance from Kemalist conception of modernity is significant, through analysis of the texts of the 1991 campaign, the thesis tries to establish that the WP is not something out of modernity but on the contrary its discourse and program is shaped within the processes of Kemalist modernisation. Therefore, the NOP-NSP-WP is a product of an

³ Necmettin Erbakan was the first and the prominent leader of the NOP-NSP-WP continuum.

‘alternative articulation of modernity’ rather than an anti-modernist reaction to modernisation in Turkey.

In conclusion, this thesis attempts to develop a better understanding of the Welfare Party with enlarging the *interpretative circle* by confronting the secular modern prejudice that shape the fundamental dichotomy of Turkish politics between reactionists, anti-modernists and Islamists; and progressivist, modernist and Kemalists.

The first chapter covers the history of the WP till the 1991 general elections. The program and discourse of the NOP-NSP are analysed in the first chapter. The chapter reveals that the program of the three parties fundamentally implies a continuum, in the way they perceive tradition and modernity. Spiritual and moral development, revival of the national moral consciousness, advancement of science and technology, heavy industrial development, and social equality and justice are the key terms that remarks the continuum.

In the second chapter the analysis of the 1991 election campaign is done. The difference of the strategy of the WP from its prececeders in communicating with the masses is stated under the

title "From *tebliğ* to propaganda." The texts of the advertisements are analysed with respect to their narratives and images. An elaborated attention is given to the themes and issues covered in the advertisements.

Finally, in the third chapter the theoretical framework of the thesis is drawn around the conceptualisation of "alternative modernities" which mainly indicates a break of the necessary correspondence between modernisation and secularisation; and modernisation and westernisation. Within that framework the significance of Ziya Gökalp's and the NOP-NSP-WP's project of modernisation are interpreted as alternative to Kemalist one that has been directly associated with westernisation and secularisation.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The history of the Welfare Party goes back to late 60's. The 1960's were the years of accelerated development of capitalism and industrialisation in Turkey. While the increasing economic development was ensuring the growth of a big capital by facilitating its cooperation with the West, it at the same time gradually brought the small capital of the periphery to a dependent position to the big capital of the centre. During the end of the 1960's, the conflicting interests between the large industrialists and businessmen of the larger cities, especially İstanbul, and the small businessman and artisans of smaller cities and towns of Anatolia became irreconcilable under the Justice Party. This led the latter group to search for a new political formation.

The origins of the National order Party lies in the power struggle between the big capital of the big cities and traditional small capital of Anatolia within *Odalar Birliđi*. In 1969, Necmettin Erbakan¹, who would become the leader of this new political formation, was elected to the presidency of the *Odalar Birliđi* with the support of small and middle businessman, traditional artisans and merchants of Anatolia, after a campaign that harshly criticised the JP because of being dependent on big and especially foreign capital, being the servant of the Zionists and Freemasons.

Erbakan's presidency to *Odalar Birliđi* was not confirmed by the Minister of Trade of the JP government because of the rejections of Trade Unions of İzmir and İstanbul. This development together with the religious political formations within the JP stimulated the preparations for the foundation of a new party. However the preparations could not be completed before the general elections of 1969. Consequently the members of this new formation participated in the elections as independent candidates. However, among those members only Erbakan who was elected as a Konya deputy, the city known to be the bastion of conservative religious opinion, succeeded in the elections.

¹ Necmettin Erbakan became a general director of a medium scale engine factory when he was a

1.1 The National Order Party

After the elections, in January 1970 Necmettin Erbakan and his 17 friends founded the National Order Party, NOP, (*Milli Nizam Partisi*).² With the join of two deputies of the JP, the NOP came to be represented with three deputies in the parliament.

The founders of the NOP were mostly rurally originated religious professionals, theologians, merchants, artisans and small and middle entrepreneurs. Also religious communities, known as tariqats, especially *Nakşibendi* community³, supported the NOP during and afterwards the establishment. (Çakır, 1994: 21; Çalışlar, 1997: 31-33; Mardin, 1998: 109)

The need for a new political formation was not only stimulated by economic anxiety of small and middle capital. Besides, it is also important to mention that not all of the small and middle capital in Turkey supported the NOP, and its follower parties. Together with economic struggle between the two layers of capital, the reaction of the Islamic circles to the laicise politics of

professor in Istanbul University.

² See Oral Çalışlar (1997: 39), *Refah Partisi Nereden Nereye*, for the full list of the founders the party.

the Republican regime played a significant role in the emergence of the NOP.

Under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the major goal of the party was stated as "to revive the moral qualities of and the spiritual excellence of dormant in the Turkish character so that Turkish society can regain peace, order and social justice." (*Milli Nizam Partisi Kuruluş Beyannamesi*: 1) In NOP's view, the Western countries had been weakening the Ottoman Empire not with their superiority in military or science but through imposing of their own culture during *Tanzimat* era. However, the Western countries of both the capitalist and the socialist systems, despite their material advancement through enslaving other nations by imposing their own cultural and economic interests, are themselves in spiritual crises.

The NOP identified two categories of problems that Turkey faces: material and spiritual problems. The material problems involves the dependence of Turkish economy on foreign markets and capital, a low level of income per capita and unjust wealth, and a weak financial situation, as a result of which Turkey

³ Necmettin Erbakan was a disciple of Mehmet Zait Kotku, leader of *Nakşibendi* Tariqat. It is claimed that the new party was set up with the permission of Zait Kotku as a political organ of the *Nakşibendi* Community. See Oral Çalışlar (1997: 33, 59-61).

became dependent on foreign aid and consequently lost its autonomy in the foreign policy. In the spiritual category, the NOP complained about the failure of the education system, that was based on the inadequate Western worldview, which is itself the cause of spiritual crises, in educating the youth for national ends (Toprak, 1981: 98).

More specifically the Party's goal was to modernize the country through both spiritual and technical development programs, which emphasise rejection of Western cultural influences and return to a "national moral consciousness" in the spiritual field in addition to creativity rather than imitation of Western technology in technical field. However for the NOP, at the end, the material well-being of Turkey is dependent on the establishment of a moral and just society. Depending on the party program, Toprak (1981: 98-99) mentions that for the Party, the moral and just society is a democratic one where democracy is defined on the basis of morality of people, morality and justice of the political system, unity and faith in common goals and historical consciousness of the nation.

The NOP is considered to be the extension of the 19th century Islamic movement. In opposition to the Ottoman

Westerners who advocated the adoption of both culture and the technology of the West for modernisation of the Ottoman Empire, the NOP defended the idea that the Western influences should be limited to the technical field alone (Toprak, 1981: 99; Sarıbay, 1985: 61). For Islamists a nation would lose its dependence if it loses its own laws, institutions and traditions.

An observer (Ertürk, 1990: 123) considers the NOP's ideology as "a product of reconciliation of rational socialist-positivist science and technology view with traditionalist discourse." While another observer (Çakır, 1994: 20-21) briefly defines the ideology of the NOP developed around "Ottomanist, national independentist, Islamist and modernist" character of the party.

Erbakan's speeches, which were explicitly criticising the laicist politics of the Republic and Atatürk's reforms, and the rising right-left struggle, brought the end of the party very early. In May 1971, just after the 1971 military intervention, the NOP was outlawed by the Constitutional Court because of the prohibition of the Political Parties Law forbidding the use of religion for political purposes.

1.2 The National Salvation Party

The conditions created by the military intervention were softened very soon after the intervention that led to the allowance of the establishment of a new party seemingly representing 'the religious ideology'. In September 1972, National Salvation Party (NSP) was founded. Military allowance to the new party, related with the 'Green Belt'⁴ project of the USA, was due to the tendency of the Turkish military to see religion as an impediment to expansion of communism and leftist ideas in Turkey. It is also argued (Çakır, 1994: 22; Çalışlar 1997:43; Duman, 1997:80) that the foundation of the NSP would serve to the intention of the military to weaken the Justice Party while integrating Islamic opposition to the system.

Although the founding 19 members of the NSP were totally different than those of the NOP (Çakır, 1994:22), the NSP's worldview and program were basically a continuation of the NOP (Toprak, 1981: 99; Alkan, 1984:82; Duman, 1997:81; Mardin, 1998:106). However this time, in order not to be closed as happened to the NOP, the new party was more cautious to express

⁴ After the Second World War, US allocated its foreign policy in the Middle East around 'Green Belt' theory, which suggests to circumscribe the Communist countries with Islamic countries in order to prevent the expansion of Communism.

its views (Toprak, 1981:99; Sarıbay, 1985:109). That is the reason why Erbakan apparently had stayed outside the new formation till he took over the leadership when the coalition negotiations started in November 1973. Süleyman Arif Emre was the first leader of the NSP.

According to Toprak (1981:99; 1984:123), in the same line with the NOP, the major issue, which the NSP sought to politicise was the question of how and why the powerful empire came to be one of the less developed countries of the world.⁵ The answer for the NSP leaders was Turks' lost of power as a result of their alienation from their own cultural heritage, which was accompanied by their failure to industrialise. The NSP leaders were arguing that Turks took the Western culture, what they needed least, but failed to take what they needed most, the Western technology. (Toprak, 1981: 100) They were seeing the origins of the Western technological development in Muslim civilisation and arguing for the West's indebtedness to Muslim civilisation. The NSP was claiming that the only way of the development for Turkish nation was to re-appreciate its own

⁵ This question was also significant for 'the left' in that time. Besides many things, this might be one of the reasons in understanding the easy shift of the leftist support to the NOP continuum in the later years.

history and culture and to regain its Muslim consciousness as a society.

The NSP calls its ideology 'National Outlook-NO' (*Milli Görüş*), and declares it as a third, an alternative, a superior and an authentic way based on "morality" in contrast to the "leftist view of the Republicans People Party (RRP)" and "liberal (colourless) view of the Justice Party" which was based on a "materiality" that was imported from the West. According to Erbakan (1975:28), while the liberal point of view is originated from exploitative, interest based capitalist view; leftist view, having its roots in unproductive socialist thought which oppress the liberties in the West has never been able to find its way in the history. He argues that both views are far from being responsive to our national need as they give primacy to material development while neglecting moral development of the nation. Accordingly, for the NSP Justice Party's liberal and RRP's leftist view are incomplete and are unable to bring "happiness" and "salvation" to the nation.

Although the object of the NO is to attain both material and spiritual development, it gives primacy to spiritual development of persons and aims to revive the national conscious through giving

spiritual, moral and intellectual education to people. The NSP insisted on its emphasis on spiritual development depending on the articles (10-14) of the Constitution (1961 Constitution with the amendments of 1971) concerning the spiritual development of persons and the articles (11,19,22,26,29) concerning the necessity of community order based on spirituality and morality (Erbakan, 1975:26).

The NSP's plea for the revival of the Muslim society, of the national consciousness and of morality followed by its strong emphasis on rapid industrialisation. During the coalition governments between 1973-1978 the party took on the Ministry of Industry and Technology. And the years between 1975-1978, the Party claimed to initiate "The Heavy Industry Effort" (*Ağır Sanayi Hamlesi*) and force the JP to speed up the heavy industrialisation. The NSP's aspiration of Grand Turkey (*Yeniden Büyük Türkiye*) passes through its promise of a factory for each city.

Within the primary goals of the NO, there is strong emphasis on the necessity to attain the fusion of the state and society, social peace and solidarity. Giving recognition and showing respect to the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons are inevitable conditions for the attainment of social

peace and solidarity as well as the fusion of state and society. (Erbakan, 1975:30) According to Erbakan (1975:31), the fusion of the state and the nation, which is the fundamental condition for national development, entails that the state should be protective, just and guiding to its citizens, state officials should be aware that their duty is to serve the nation rather than domination and they should be respectful to traditions and moral values of the nation.

Criticising the Justice Party governments for their indifference to underprivileged and poor sections of the society, the NSP was also displaying great sensitivity to the issue of social justice. The party was loudly criticising rising inflation and unemployment rates, lack of social security and medical insurance, misuse of governmental credits, unjust taxation system and unequal distribution of wealth. The NSP and Erbakan felt that they were speaking out for the sectors of society that had been neglected and forgotten within the process of economic development since the 1950's, and supported to replace contemporary income tax with wealth tax (Mardin, 1997:106). Besides the Party was also protesting against dependence on international capital and exploitation by its allies, the big capital in Turkey. Furthermore, the NSP was seeing the role of state as fundamental

in the processes of economic and social development. In these respects the Party's rhetoric was quite similar to that of the left.

The program and propaganda of the NSP, therefore, were obviously not solely based on religious themes. Although the Party idealises the Ottoman past, it obviously was not in a reactionary formation (Ahmad, 1996:386).

Mardin (1998:106) summarises the official doctrine of the NSP as religious worldview, rapid industrialisation, populist economic distribution and social morality. With its modernist economic program and religious politics the party forms a different articulation of modernity, which rejects to see Westernisation as a prerequisite of modernisation, nourished with a sense of resentment to the cultural and the economic imperialism of the West. In that manner, the NSP's view is thought to be a "third world view of modernisation (other than the leftist and the liberal ones) within Turkish political spectrum", which corresponds to the nationalist movements in colonial countries (Toprak, 1981:104).

For the first time a political party opposing the laic-Westernist discourse of the regime with its discourse loaded with

traditional Islamic terms received wide support from the sects of the society which have been in conflict with the regime till the foundation of the Republic. In fact the program of the party has no novelty, in a way, than repeating the arguments of the 19th century Islamist. The originality of the party lies in its political identity, which it bestows on Muslims within the politicisation process (Metiner, 1987:63). It mobilises and represents the sects of society, which remained in the periphery of the modernisation process.

In 1973 general elections, winning 11.8 % of votes, the NSP came out of the election as the third party and sent 48 deputies to the Turkish Grand Assembly. The NSP's success in the elections has indicated that religion is a significant factor in the political choices of the Turkish electorate even if it was not the only factor for the success of the party (Toprak, 1981:96).

With respect to the profile of the voters of the NSP, Mardin argues that the NSP's support mostly come from small merchants or artisans. He asserts that it is Kemalism's failure in solving the social and economic problems, which made people turn to religion

as an alternative reference point.⁶ This argument seems reasonable as the analysis of 1973 elections indicates that the NSP's electoral strength is greater in less developed regions of Turkey. It is significant that the party's performance was considerably above national average in Eastern and Central Anatolia while it was weak in the Aegean Region, the Mediterranean and the Western Black Sea Coast, and about equal with national average in İstanbul and its periphery, as well as in the Eastern Black Sea Region (Alkan, 1984; 102-110).

The 1973 election results indicated that no party had enough votes to form a government. This initiated a period of coalition governments, which would not last even after the general elections held in 1977. The NSP was presented in the parliament between 1973-1980 and also took part in three coalition governments: one with RRP, led by Bülent Ecevit, in 1974; and other two with the JP, led by Süleyman Demirel between 1975-1977. The period ended with the military coup in 1980, which dissolved all political parties.

⁶ Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Turkish Social Transformation", Paper presented at the conference on "The Republic of Turkey, 1923-1973: Studies in 20th Century Nation Building," held at the University of Chicago, December 1973. In Toprak, 1981:105.

The most significant aspect of period on behalf of the NSP was not only the legitimation of Islam as a part of the modern political life but also the establishment of the party's legitimacy in parliament and in government (Sarıbay, 1985: 188; Ahmad, 1996:383). While the NSP have assured its legitimacy in the eyes of the public, it at the same time did not fail to serve to its supporters both in ideological and material terms. The party used the ministries to distribute patronage to its supporters as well as to place its cadres to the important positions in the ministries to step forward within the state. During the coalition period, the NSP gave no compromise to the big partners of the coalition from its ideology, which caused governmental crises both during the coalition with the RRP and the two Nationalist Front (*Milliyetçi Cephe*) governments (Sarıbay, 1985: 204-205).

1.3 The Welfare Party till 1991 Election Campaign

The NSP was dissolved in 1981 and reappeared as the Welfare Party (WP) under the leadership of Ali Trkmen in July 1983. The party was not allowed to participate in the general elections held in the same year, as number of its founders were vetoed by the military regime. Under the leadership of Ahmet Tekdal the party

re-voiced National Outlook (*Milli Görüş*) and National Consciousness (*Milli Şuur*) implicitly attempting to indicate in the repressive conditions of the time that the party was the successor of the NOP-NSP tradition (Çakır, 1994: 24). However the WP could not assure much strength in the political arena as large number of its experienced leaders had prohibited from politics and others preferred to stay away from active politics and from the party in order not to attract further attention of the military. Furthermore, the Motherland Party under the leadership of Turgut Özal, which claimed to combine all political points of views, has recruited number of educated qualitative cadres from the National Outlook tradition. In the early 1980s under the repression of the military and after being lost its leaders, the most significant attempt of the WP was to guarantee the continuity of the National Outlook tradition (Çakır, 1994: 25).

In the local elections held in March 1984, the WP gained 4.4% votes. In 1987 general elections the party increased its electoral strength to 7.7%. However 10% threshold of the electoral system did not allow the WP's representation in the parliament. In the local elections of 1989, the party won 9.8% of the votes and took over the centre municipalities in a number of cities. Çakır argues that the increasing strength of the WP was related firstly to

the party's strong organisation based on its members' patient and devoted work of all its members at every level of the party organisation and secondly with the decreasing popularity of the Motherland Party (Çakır, 1994: 26).

In the 1980s the Welfare Party did not only gradually increased its electoral support, but also built a powerful organisation with well-organised grassroots membership. "It increased its autonomy as a political party vis-à-vis other religious groups, at times subordinating their interests to its own, expanded its electoral base, radicalised its ideology" and disseminated its popularity through a vast propaganda machine (Ayata, 1996:55).

In the general elections held in October 1991, in alliance with Alparslan Türkeş's National Work Party (NWP) and Aykut Edibali's Reformist Democracy Party (RDP), the Welfare Party won 16.88% of votes and 62 seats in the parliament.

The alliance was strongly supported by nationalist-conservative power blocs who were intending to show a reaction against the pragmatist politics of the Motherland Party and the True Path Party, which led them to ignore the national and moral

values. The advocates of the alliance also did not want to allow Türkeş's National Work Party to disappear after a defeat in the elections. Moreover they were intending to prevent the Welfare Party from appropriating fundamentally a radical Islamic perspective entirely against the existing regime (Çakır, 1994:32).

The WP at the beginning did not look to the alliance with sympathy, since such an alliance would take the reaction of its most important electoral and organisational support provided by the Kurds. Similarly the party's strong emphasis on "community" (*ümmet*) was definitely contradicting with the idea of an alliance with racist-nationalist NWP. Furthermore, the WP in 1989 assured almost ten percent of the votes, most probably with a little effort it would gain more than ten percent and take its seat in the parliament in 1991 (Çakır, 1994:29). In spite of these considerations, the WP confirmed the alliance in order to reach out to the NWP supporters based especially in Central Anatolia. The WP as the strongest party of the alliance also believed in its strength and domination that it would establish in respect to other two parties in the election campaigns. Çakır argues that the confidence of the party was depending on their belief in the superiority of their program, "Just Order" (*Adil Düzen*) over the other parties of the alliance, as well as their belief in the power

and success of the election campaign prepared by *Anajans* (Çakır, 1994:31).

The success of the election campaign was evident in the results of the 1991 elections that left the WP with 40 deputies in the parliament following the demise of the alliance very soon after the elections. Nevertheless the influence of the 1991 election campaign that reflected the changing strategy of the WP in communicating with the masses prevailed in the coming electoral successes of the party in 1994 and 1995 elections. The significance of the election campaign lies in the success of the party in combining its program with a successful propaganda strategy.

CHAPTER II

ANALYSIS OF THE WELFARE PARTY'S 1991 ELECTION CAMPAIGN

2.1 Change in Strategy: From "*tebliğ* to propaganda"¹

The NOP, NSP and WP line comprises a historical continuum. However the time brought certain differences through which the WP came out with different forms of action and operation than the NOP and NSP. As I mentioned in the first chapter, the most significant of these differences is the transition appeared in the method of action of the Party from "*tebliğ*" (communication) to "propaganda". (Çakır, 1994: 81) The NOP and the NSP attempted to legitimise Islam as a part of the modern political life, which has been entirely shaped by the secular understanding. For that purpose, they used *tebliğ* as a method or tool for making political

¹ The title "*Tebliğ to propaganda*" is borrowed from Ruşen Çakır's *Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi*.

definition and legitimation of Islam rather than calling people to religion (Sarıbay, 1994: 213).

The WP has sought to consolidate this legitimacy that was established by its predecessors. As consolidation requires the support of masses, the WP has attempted to become a mass political party. For that objective the party has employed modern propaganda techniques to reach the masses. The WP was no longer involved in interpreting Islam but and was giving worldly promises to people. The attempt to transform the WP to a mass political party became very apparent and, indeed, successful with the advertising campaign held by *Anajans* in 1991 general elections.

2.2 A Note on Political Advertising

The electoral campaign strategies usually address the people who are not considered to be the devoted supporters of the party. Since the attempts to persuade the decisive voters are somewhat futile, the advertisements are usually directed to *floating* or *waving* votes. They are for the persuasion of *undecided* voters who do not have an ideological stand or a stable tendency towards

certain political parties. Those voters can be identified in two categories; those who deal with politics from a critical point of view but don't have precise tendencies; and those who do not have any conscious interest in politics (Topuz, 1991:180-182).

The electorate in the first category are the potential target for propaganda, however to persuade them is more difficult than to persuade those in the second category since more sophisticated information or persuasion techniques are required to attract their votes. The second category voters, as I mentioned above, have no or little interest in political parties and elections, their voting behaviours change from one election to another. Denis Lindon (1986) calls them "*le marais*" (the marshes) that they have no interest in politics, no precise ideology and they are easily affected by propaganda that addresses to their affections or interests. Most of the time, nationalist and religious leaders easily attract their votes but still it is usually very difficult to know for whom these people would vote. Generally, the voters who are considered to be in this category generally do not follow the events, nor read newspapers, their 'cultural capital'² is below the middle level.

² Pierre Bourdieu expands the notion of capital beyond its economic conception which emphasises material exchanges, to include "immaterial" and "non-economic" forms of capital, specifically cultural and symbolic capital. The term cultural capital represents the collection of non-economic forces such as family background, social class, varying investments in and

However, they are the ones who participate in electoral meetings with great enthusiasm and affectivity.

2.3 General Strategy of the WP's 1991 Election Campaign

The advertisements (ads) of the 1991 campaign are very much significant in reflecting the 'new face' of the NOP-NP-WP continuum. A visible shift from *tebliğ* to propaganda appears in its most successful way in the advertisements. The advertisements are primarily targeted to the first category voters that I mentioned in the previous section; namely those (first of all who read newspapers) who are interested in politics from a very critical point of view and have no precise tendency towards any party or those who are disappointed by the parties they have previously voted.

Selim Kutsan, owner of *Anajans*, declares in the daily *Cumhuriyet* of 25 October, 1991 that their aim was to challenge the prejudice of the electorate about the WP, to change the

commitments to education. See Bourdieu (1984), *Distinction: A Social Critique of Judgement of Taste*. Richard Nice, trans., London; NY: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

negative image of the party in the public opinion and finally to make the WP a mass supported political party.

The messages given to the electorate in the 1991 ads were the first and successful steps taken by the WP towards becoming a mass political party. The effectiveness of the ads in appealing large segments of society can be explained with respect to the success of the Party in analysing economic deprivation and social oppression in the Turkish society. Like the social democratic parties, the WP has targeted its propaganda strategy at the economically deprived classes however, unlike other parties of the system the WP has recognised that economic deprivation in those sects of the society is experienced together with identity crises. The messages in the WP's advertisements were designed to draw votes of oppressed and deprived sections of society as well as those who have discomfort with the existing 'order.' In the advertisements, 'the repressed people', 'the man on the street' or 'the little man' and in general 'the mass' with the expression of their affections, problems and needs are exalted by the anti-elitist discourse of the WP which appears as the partaker in the sufferings of the people. Workers, civil servants, peasants, oppressed under the conditions of heavy economic problems of high inflation, low salaries and high tax payments; bankrupted

investors protesting high interest rates of credits; youngsters complaining about unemployment and hopelessness for the future; veiled students asking for human rights; intellectuals questioning democracy, politics, dependence to the West (especially to USA); prostitutes protesting against the system that drag them into bog; people living in *gecekondular*³ squatter towns who feel lost in the big cities are represented in the advertisements.

The advertisements obviously seem to be strategically designed as a marketing project. Firstly because, from the advertisements, one can easily detect that the problems and needs of different oppressed groups were successfully identified prior to the campaign, in a sense that a standard voter who belongs to one of these sections having similar problems or desires could easily identify himself or herself with one of these narratives and images in the advertisements.

Second, advertisements were published in newspapers in accordance with their reader profile. The advertisements in the

³ *Gecekondular* is a name of a type of a house which is illegally constructed as a result of rural to urban migration on state land in the periphery of the big cities.

seven daily newspapers are analysed for the purposes of the thesis. These are the four mainstream newspapers *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Sabah*, and *Türkiye*⁴, leftist-Kemalist *Cumhuriyet* and two religiously oriented newspapers *Milli Gazete*⁵ and *Zaman*. *Milli Gazete* and *Zaman* were then the voice of the Party and its supporters in the mass media.⁶ The significant thing observed about the party's propaganda strategy is that certain advertisements, like texts on common economic problems voiced are available in most of these seven newspapers while some others are only observed in the newspapers that are close to the WP's ideological stand. For instance the text on freedom of conscience voiced by a veiled student who is thrown out of her last year in the university and the text voiced by the prostitute protesting against those who lead them to that way and make money out of her and others like her. It is significant that the WP stand as the Party considers those advertisements will not be effective in appealing to the readers of the mainstream newspapers.

The difference of WP's advertisements is significant with respect to other parties. Firstly, the advertisements are not

⁴ *Türkiye* can be considered as one of the mainstream by the number of sold copies but known with its closeness to conservative circles in Turkey.

⁵ *Milli Gazete* is unofficial daily of the WP.

⁶ *Zaman* has become critical about the WP's politics specially after the party came to power in 1996.

constructed upon the image of the leader of the party but upon the message of the party that covers problems of the 'people'. In that sense they are not rough marketing of the party but involve different stories of exclusion, deprivation, anxiety, and discomfort from different sects of the society. Secondly, unlike other parties, the slogans employed in the WP's advertisements are not directed toward other parties or leaders. The advertisements are not designated to offend any party or leader but they voiced a general criticism to ongoing order having its roots in the history of the Turkish Republic.

2.4 Narrative Structuring of the Advertisements

Structurally, the advertisements were designed as a *dialogue* between the people voicing their complaints about the existing system and their anxieties about future, and the Welfare Party. The Party shares the complaints of the people and gives a promise for change in the order that make people live with that sense of discomfort and frustration in the present, and sense of anxiety and hopelessness for the future.

Each advertisement comprises a narrative and an image. The images and narratives constitute a textual unity in which the reader is put in a direct relation or a face to face position with the text. The advertisements are titled with the demands or complaints of the images written in large scripts, which are very much appealing to the reader at first look. Then comes, again in large scripts, the promise of the party as a slogan, which is posed as a solution to that particular problem voiced by the image. "A New World" (*Yeni bir Dünya*) is the common slogan used in each advertisement. Even without reading the whole narrative one can easily grasp the message from the design of the slogans and the image.

The advertisements can be categorised according to their narrative types. Two types of narratives come to the fore in the advertisements. Most of the narratives represent the problems of different sections of society with personal story of one of its members, such as a worker, a bankrupted investor, a rank and file civil servant, a prostitute, a peasant, a merchant, a retired person, wife of a civil servant, a youngster, a veiled student, The profiles of the people drawn for each stratum are very common with which a standard person from one of these strata can easily identify himself or herself. The narratives in this category are

written in a daily language so that the given messages can be easily understood by a standard reader. The language, the expressions used in the texts are highly culturally and socially coded. Expressions like *'bereket versin'* (may god give you blessed increase, thank heaven), *'ne elde var ne avuçta'* (to own no money, nothing; poverty- stricken), *'dikiş tutturamamak'* (to be incapable of keeping a post or to be unsuccessful in every enterprise), *'hanımın bileziklerini bozdurmak'* (to change wife's bracelets for money) are highly peculiar to and common in Turkish society. Through these expressions, the stories of the people in the texts become more open and more realistic for a potential reader.

Other narratives are not constructed on personal histories. They cover the general problems of Turkey like 'inflation', 'economic deprivation', 'rising economic inequality', 'social discomfort', 'lack of democracy', 'lack of justice', the issue of woman, and 'dependency to West and Washington'. The narratives are written in more sophisticated language voiced by visibly more intellectual people who seem to be consciously dealing with social and political issues from a general perspective, including internal problems and external relations of Turkey.

2.5 Images

The significant thing about the images is that one side of the faces is blurred with a black background giving the sense that they are speaking out from the darkness. In this sense, darkness seems to signify the loss voices of the oppressed and deprived people. Darkness can also be interpreted as a trick to shade or hide the precise image of the faces, so that they serve better to various different significations. That is to say a blurred face is more open to possible attribution or meanings than a clear face. This is very significant in the images of moustached faces. Moustache is very common in Turkish society, but the shape of moustache sometimes connotes a certain kind of world-view like nationalism or socialism. However as the images are half blurred in the advertisements, they are open to several different meanings.

Eyeglasses are also widely and significantly used especially in most of the advertisements in the second narrative category (see above) signifying certain level of intellectuality. The striking point about the use of moustache and eyeglasses in the advertisements is that moustache is primarily used as the sign of rurality and the periphery while eyeglasses is used to signify urbanity and the centre. For instance, in all of the images in the

texts on general problems of Turkey, are voiced with a more sophisticated language and have a more intellectual approach. Eyeglasses are used to complete the narrative, signifying some sort of awareness of other problems of the Turkey rather than the personal ones.

2.6 Themes and Issues Covered in the Advertisements

In general, eight main issues are covered in the ads. Namely, the economic problems, unemployment, democracy, the issue of woman, the issue of environment, immigration and squatter house problem, the Kurdish question and finally dependency of Turkey to the West. Not all of these issues have equal weight in the campaign. For instance the issues of economic problems, unemployment and democracy appear in many different ads, while there is a single text dedicated to the issue of woman, *squatter house* problem, Kurdish question and environmental problems.

There are six advertisements conducted mainly on economic problems. The main economic problems issued in the advertisements are high inflation, low salaries, high interest rates

of credits and high tax payments. The general feature of the narratives is that they are set up on personal stories of people from different strata of Turkish society. The strata are determined according to professions that individuals hold. There are six positions represented in the advertisements; namely, a rank and file civil servant, a merchant, a worker, a peasant, an investor, and a wife of a civil servant. While the narratives are written in first person singular form, the stories are representing common economic problems of each group. As I mentioned above, the profiles of the people drawn for each stratum are very common that a standard person from one of these strata can easily identify him or herself with. The language, the expressions and certain experiences used in the narratives are significant in creating this affinity between the texts of the advertisements and their potential reader.

The issue of unemployment is covered in three different texts. It is interesting that the WP not only associates the problem of unemployment with young people but also to retired people. In both advertisements there is an emphasis on coffeehouses ("*kahve köşeleri*") as the place of unemployed youngsters and retired people.

On the issue of democracy, there are two advertisements. Both advertisements question the existence of democracy in Turkey. One of the narratives is voiced by a veiled student who is told to be dismissed from the university in her last year and the second one is an intellectual who protests against those who are arguing for the existence of democracy in Turkey.

The advertisements can be differentiated by looking at the promises of the WP given in response to the declared complaints in each advertisement. 'Just Order' (*Adil Düzen*) or 'National Outlook' (*Milli Görüş*) which supposed to cover every aspect of the WP program are only pronounced in certain texts, while in others the party avoids pronouncing them. For instance in all of the narratives on economic problems, except the one voiced by the worker, 'Just Economic Order' (*Adil Ekonomik Düzen*) is declared as a remedy to economic problems. It is striking that the Party noticed that the Just Order, most probably because of its religious connotation in the public opinion, would not be appealing to the workers. Similarly 'National Outlook' (*Milli Görüş*) is only declared with regard to its independent foreign policy and its agriculture policy, while it used to be the name of the ideology of the party in the 1970's.

Now the significant points of each advertisement will be covered. The texts of the advertisements are available in appendices in the order that they are analyzed below.

A worker: "*Hakkımı versinler!..*" ("Give me what I deserve!..")

- A worker wants the requital of his labour. He complains about the low salary, high inflation, and the 'lack of respect to his labour'.
- The worker profile is very common, living in a rented apartment with four children. The expression he uses signifies a future anxiety, a sense of oppression and exclusion from society. "*Ne olacak bu halimiz?; Büyüklerimizden fazla birşey istemiyorum; İstedğim sadece insan gibi yaşamak.*" ("What will happen to us? I don't expect much from our governors; what I want is only to live like a human being.")
- The Welfare Party responds to him with the promise that labour of workers would be compensated in the governance of the WP. The party promises to abandon unjust taxes. Significantly, there is no direct utterance to 'Just Order' or 'National Outlook'. This implies that in the eyes of the Party, they do not constitute an appeal to workers. Perhaps it is

because of the religious connotation embedded in both terms as indicators of an ideology of a party whose emphasis on Islamic values is very significant.

A rank and file civil servant: "*Enflasyon büyüyor, maaşım küçülüyor!..*" ("Inflation is rising, my salary is falling!..")

- His objection is about rising inflation and devaluation of present low salaries.
- Similar to the worker, it is indicated that he also lives in a rented apartment and he has more than one child.
- It is mentioned that the wife of the civil servant is working. It is significant because the advertisement is the unique one within the ads on economic issues with its utterance to a working woman other than a prostitute.
- The Welfare Party responds him with the promises of abandonment of unfair taxes and resolution of salary problems. The Party declares that "in the 'Just Economic Order', the inflation would have no place."
- The solidarity values of the Turkish society are emphatically mentioned as in a number of other advertisements. "*Bereket versin bizim mahallenin bakkal ve kasabı, devlet memurunun halinden anlıyor.*" ("May god give blessed increase [thank

heaven], the grocer and the butcher of our neighbourhood understands the situation of a civil servant).

A wife of a civil servant: "*İki yakamız biraraya gelmiyor...*" ("We fail to make two ends meet...")

- Her complaints are same with the previous narrative. She starts with telling "My husband is a civil servant ".
- It is interesting that she is the only woman who appears within the texts on economic issues. However she is not a working woman.
- The solidarity is again mentioned by an emphasis on the father of the woman who is assisting financially to the family.

A merchant: "*Vergiler belimizi büktü...*" ("The taxes broke our back...")

- A merchant complains about taxes and high inflation rates.
- The WP explicitly accuses 'the state' collecting unjust taxes from merchant and distributing them to five star hotels, to casinos, to death investments, to usurers, and fake traders.
- The WP promises to abandon unfair taxes. 'Just Economic Order' is given as a solution to the problems of tradesmen.

- The emphasis on solidarity is also significant in the advertisement. "*Eşden dosttan denkleştirdik, ...büyük umutlarla şu ekmek teknesini kurduk.*" (With the money we borrowed from our friends and acquaintances,... we set up this ...)

A peasant: "*Köylü çalışıyor karşılığını alamıyor...*" ("Peasant works but can not get his due...")

- Similar to the worker, his complaint is about not being rewarded fairly for his labour. The common economic problems as the high interest rate of given credits, as well as the specific problems of rural areas, such as inefficiency of land, lack of road, water, doctor and medicine also appear in the narrative.
- The Party promises for irrigation opportunities, opportunity to market their own goods without mediation of the usurer and to expand the industrialisation to villages. More significantly the party declares that the agriculture policy of National Outlook' will increase agricultural production.
- It is also important to note that there is a reproach to Mustafa Kemal's phrase in the words of the peasant that say: "*Köylü milletin efendisidir*" diyorlar. *İyi, güzel de, böyle efendilik olmaz*

ki!' ('They say that "Peasants are the lord of the people the nation." Well, what kind of a lordness this is!..')

An investor: "*Faiz beni batırdı!..*" (Interest rate bankrupted me!..)

- A bankrupted investor, his moan is for the high interest rate of credit that he failed to repay, which causes him to go bankrupt.
- The significant thing about this advertisement is that the message is explicit and very radical in comparison to other advertisements. The WP declares that it will change the capitalist order based on interest. "*Refah Partisi, Faizci Kapitalist Düzeni Değiştirecek*"

A youngster: "*Gencim Gelecek istiyorum!..*" ('I'm young, I want a future!..')

- The basic theme is future anxiety. He could not succeed in university entrance exam. He wants a permanent job to secure his future.
- Like other advertisements, the WP vows more than the youngster wants. The Party declares to provide equal opportunity in education, to increase work opportunities to

make the youngsters participate in production and to provide freedom of thought and conscience. It is important to mention that the party also promises to provide certain quota for the students from the East and Southeast regions of Turkey.

- There is a stress on the increasing street tramps as a result of unemployment. With reference to the stress on social peace (*huzur*) and solidarity that is dominant in most of the advertisements, deliberate emphasis on street tramps signifies that the maintenance of morality, community and order is a very fundamental issue for the WP.

A retired man: "*Emekli insan huzur ister...*" ("A retired man needs peace...")

- He wants peace (*huzur*). His complaint is about being forgotten by the state after his retirement. He wants to work again.
- The WP announces a new program for retired people for their participation to production that will save them from coffeehouses. It also promises to increase their salaries, to compensate their health expenditures and to solve their all other problems.

Daughter of a worker: "*Babamı işten attılar!..*" ("They fired my father!..")

- Her father was fired from the factory. She emphasised that the family live on with the help of the grandfather. As the father does not have enough money for the school expenses, she can not go to high school. She asks, "who is going to pay the school expenses?"
- The WP declares that there are millions of people who became unemployed as a result of the economic recipes provided by the West. According to the Party, those recipes make our nation lost its way. The WP promises for new work opportunities and unemployment insurance.
- The crying girl image is significant part of the text, which brought the narrative more impressive for the reader.

A veiled student: "*Okuldan atıldım...*" ("I am dismissed from the school...")

- She protests against the prohibition of *türban* in universities. Because for her education right of individuals can not be interfered due to their beliefs and clothes. The WP promises that the school will belong solely to the students.

- The significance of the advertisement is that we can not find this advertisement in the mainstream newspapers. This indicates that the WP never shows itself to the voters in its full appearance.

An intellectual: "*Demokrasi mi?..*" ("Democracy?..")

- The advertisement reflects a critical perspective with regard to the issue of democracy. This time narrative is not based on a personal story.
- He declares that in Turkey, where the people are imprisoned because of their thoughts, where living according to personal beliefs and opinions is not allowed, where torture still exists, where it is not possible to found a political party outside the official ideology and where the books are burned, the belief in the existence of democracy is a deception.
- The WP's response supports his ideas and emphasises that the WP is the only party that declares that this is not "a democratic regime but a fake regime."
- The narrative of the democrat is completed by his intellectual image supported by his eyeglasses and his 'Western face' signified by the absence of a moustache.

A Kurd: "Doğulu Olmak Suç mu?" ("Is it a blame to be an Easterner?..)

- He is saying that "for hundred years we live together, we fight together, we die together in this country. Whatever has happened, happened in the last century, we lost the peace." He is criticising the state's ignorance of the East which led to immigration resulted in the break of the families and alienation of those people in their home country. He states that we are all from the same religion and he asks as if it is a blame to be an easterner. He also asks if they have the right to live in liberty in their home country.
- The party considers the problem in the East of Turkey as the outcome of the acts of the governors who did whatever the Westerners say in the last two hundred years. The imperialist countries of the Europe injected hostility within the Middle East, in order to control the region easily. According to the party the Europe has intended to do the same thing in the east of Turkey. The promise of the party is for an 'order' based on equality, fraternity, love and justice (*hak*)⁷.

⁷ In Turkish "*hak*" signifies right and justice, as well as god when it's written in title case.

- The narrative obviously covers the Kurdish problem however the party avoids pronouncing the name "Kurd". The WP intends to assimilate ethnic difference on the basis of religious brotherhood as well as historical and geographical common fate. In that sense, while the party is cautious of being in conformity with the law, it at the same time gives importance to its Kurdish support without affronting the sections of society that are restless about Kurds.

A prostitute: "*Başkalarının hayatının kadınıyım. Ya kendi hayatım?..*" ("I'm the woman of other people's life. What about mine?..")

- A prostitute protests against those who lead them to that "way" and make money out of her and others like her.
- This is one of the two advertisements that promise explicitly for the change of the existing order as slogan of the advertisement. The other one was about the investor bankrupted because of the high interest rate of credits. ("*Refah Partisi, Faizci Kapitalist Düzeni Değiştirecek*")
- The significance of these two advertisements is that, in the eyes of the WP, '*fuhuş*' and '*faiz*' are the twins of the capitalist system without which the system collapse. Both

advertisements were avoided to be published in the mainstream journals.

A woman: "*Kadınım. Yani insan!..*" ("I'm a woman. Namely a Human!..")

- The narrative is about the oppression of women in Turkey. The oppression of woman is considered as a result of modernity. 'Commodification of woman's sexuality and beauty', 'woman as cheap labour force' and 'woman as invaluable commodity' are the terms that seems to compose the image of the 'modern woman' in the eyes of the Welfare Party. The narrative signifies the party's attitude against modern world, which is presented as the cause of the oppression of woman in the narrative.
- In the narrative she tells that "women work outside if necessary..." The phrase 'if necessary' implies that in the view of the party a woman can only work outside home if the conditions force her to do so. It signifies that the party attributes mainly a domestic position or value to woman. This also explains that why no working woman appears in the advertisements of the party.
- She has modern appearance with her eyeglasses and her earrings different than other women appear in the

advertisements. The eyeglasses that she wears connote level of her intellectuality.

A squatter: "*Kim ister gecekonduya yaşamayı?..*" ("Who wants to live in squatter house?..")

- She tells how they left their village and came to the city in which they lost themselves.
- The WP promises to be in side of the *squatters*, however there is no precise expression about how it will be. For instance there is no promise of certificates.

An environmentalist: "*Yaşanabilir bir çevre istiyorum!..*" ("I want a livable environment!..")

- A modern looking woman again with the eyeglasses complains about the environmental pollution.
- The WP sees capitalism as the source of pollution. And it calls for the people who believe in the necessity to stop capitalism from exploiting Turkey.

A Layman: "*Oyumu Amerika'ya vermek istemiyorum*" ("I do not want to vote for America!..")

- His protest is against the leaders that cultivate the dependency of Turkey to America. He wants to vote for the party that will save 'his country' from its dependency to abroad. He criticises the military presence of America in Turkey with emphasis.
- The WP propagates 'National Outlook' for economic and political independency of Turkey. The WP promises for 'Independent Turkey'.
- It is the advertisement that specifies the attitude of the WP towards significant issues in Turkish foreign policy however it is not published in any of the mainstream newspapers specified above.
- The advertisement obviously targets the nationalist tendencies.

A Layman: "*Bir lider istiyorum..*" ("I want a leader...")

- An old man wants a leader who will save Turkey from being a toy of the West. He complains about the general problems of Turkey; such as, the future of Southeast Anatolia, the absence of social peace (*huzur*), foreign debts and dependency to the West.

- Erbakan is the genuine leader.
- The significance of the advertisement is that it issues almost the same thing with the previous one. But it is simplified under a different title and with promising only Erbakan, instead of 'National Outlook'.

A Layman: "*Bu nasıl düzen anlamıyorum!..*" ("I do not understand how this order is!..")

- The advertisement gives a general view of the whole campaign with explicit utterance to 'Adil Düzen'. It emphasises the continuance of terror and anarchy, the absence of freedom, the rising social inequality, the operation of the system for a happy minority while others live in deprivation, the absence of social justice and peace, the lack of equality in education opportunities, and the oppression of people with dogmas and taboos. His stress is on social anonymity and lack of social peace.
- Adil Düzen was the object of the overall propaganda. The WP suggests it as an alternative to the existing system. ("Refah Partisi, Hakkı Üstün Tutan 'Adil Düzen' Kuaracak.") Adil Düzen will provide social equality, social justice, and equal access. It

will secure freedoms and rights of individuals. It will abandon the exploitation of Turkey's resources by imperialists.

2.7 Significance of the Advertisements in Interpreting the Welfare Party

The 1991 election campaign reflects that the Welfare Party no longer accepts to be at the margins of the system but it plays for the support of the masses. In doing so it employs modern propaganda techniques and strategies. While the Party attempts to increase popularity, it also emphasises its difference from the so-called system parties. It may seem contradictory to increase popularity with radical opposition to the system. However in a period in which the 'system parties' fail to give any hope to the masses for changing the existing order which most of the time works against them, the WP's accomplishment in securing its popularity by emphasising its difference in respect to other parties is conceivable. The 1991 election campaign is very much significant in reflecting the alternative provided by the WP. Its alternative rests on the 'political radicalism' of the party in its claim to represent the poor, oppressed and unhappy masses as well as its 'socially conservative' perspective in addressing moral

and cultural dissatisfactions of the masses with its strong emphasis on community, solidarity and morality.

The analysis of the advertisements show that the WP has developed a double discourse by espousing a combination of religious and non-religious to bridge the gap between traditional elements in society who held deep religious beliefs and a nationalist-conservative outlook and who has formed the traditional bases of the continuums' power base, and the modern aspirations of its diverse power base of the WP. For the first group the party promises for a return to Islamic polity in terms of moral and religious values while to the second group the party appealed with a program of scientific and technological development, industrialisation, and social-justice oriented redistribute policies (Cizre-Sakallioğlu, 1996,242). A direct reflection of catch-all strategy of the party is that any disclosure of meaning is avoided in the advertisements. In fact similar to Özal's claim to gather all tendencies under the Motherland Party after 1980 coup d'etat, the WP unquestionably plays for support of all sections of society. Erbakan's words "If Atatürk had lived today, he would been the supporter of the Welfare Party" reflects the party's degree of pragmatism in its attempt to diversify its power base.

However, it is argued that this pragmatism of the WP has led the party to lose its radicalism (Çakır,1994:43-44; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1996:242). The political radicalism of the party can be best recognised around the debate on the 'centralisation' (*merkeze kayması*) or 'right-isation' (*sağcılaştırması*) of the WP. Ruşen Çakır (1994; 43-44) interprets the alliance with racist-nationalist National Workers Party in the 1991 election as a force that brought the WP away from its radical line to a more conservative rightist one. He argues that the alliance with the nationalist-conservative parties led the WP to abandon its claim for "religious nationalism" (*dinsel milliyetçilik*), to separate its way from Kurdish Islamism and to come to confirm a more nationalist-conservative point of view. The alliance also contradicted the WP's claim for Islam as being the "third way", 'the national way', hence, an alternative way with respect to the left and right wing parties of the system. Çakır argues that WP's "right-isation" led party to remove its developing discourse against the regime, which sides with 'the poor' and 'the oppressed' sections of society. In short, Çakır sees the alliance as problematic in a sense that the alliance led the WP to lose its radical perspective regarding the economically and culturally oppressed sections of society.

Çakır's argument on "right-isation" of the WP with the alliance it made during the 1991 elections that led the party to lose its alternative and protest standing against the system seems reasonable at theoretical level. However, it is not always possible to grasp the WP by an attempt to squeeze the party to 'the right'.

First of all the Welfare Party, as the successor of NOP and NSP, is unquestionably embedded with Islam as its constituent discourse. That is to say it is not difficult to consider the party as one of the parties of Turkish right. Religious nationalism has always remained to be the basis of the WP's ideal integrated society in which all the differences are digested through Muslim brotherhood. Furthermore, in contrast to Çakır, the results of the 1994 local elections and especially 1995 general elections demonstrated that the alliance did not cause to the permanent loss of Kurdish support.

Secondly, the party has a significant difference in organisation structure with respect to other conservative and rightist parties. Even if the democracy within the party is a debatable issue, the party is organised, unlike other parties of the 'right', in a way that it mobilises different sections of society, which previously had no chance to participate in politics. From

bottom to top in a very strict hierarchical order the party give duty and responsibility to every member with its rewards and punishments. This way of organisation not only creates an active grassroots movement but also makes the members much more devoted to the party.

Thirdly, the texts of the 1991 campaign provide the very evidence that protest image of the party in side of the deprived, excluded and anxious people who have complaints with the existing 'order' is a fundamental constituent of its discourse.

Finally, it can be also argued that the alliance is dismantled very soon after the elections that it had no permanent effect on the party politics. Moreover, as Mert (1996:54-60) rightfully asserts, if we come to accept Çakır's argument, then we also have to think about the meaning of the 'right' in Turkey.

Hence the party preserves its radical political standing even if its radicality only manifests itself in the world of symbols. Radical line of a political party is certainly related to its distance from and critical standing towards the existing social, economic and political conditions. The degree of WP's radicality in the existing socio-economic system can be discussed by questioning

the capacity of the WP's alternative to the system 'Adil Düzen' in meeting with the demands of the repressed sections of society. However it is clear that the WP carries out a radical role in the clashes of symbols, and styles of lives and ideologies associated with these symbols. This is in fact very much related to the way modernity is conceptualised and practiced in the "Kemalist tradition"⁸, in which symbols constitute the very bases and appearances of modernity in the 'modern' Turkey.

Although the Welfare Party, despite the sickness of the system in Turkey to gather every potential social and political opposition in the centre, still preserves its radical standing at least at the symbolic level, the party with its strong emphasis on emphasis on 'community', religion, traditions and social peace can be considered as a conservative one. I prefer to say 'social conservatism'.

Social conservatism of the party is very much reflected in the narrative of the advertisements. The party considers the society as integrated community composed of professional groups. This is in fact very much similar to the populism of Kemalism.

⁸ For conceptualisation of "Kemalist tradition" see Keyman's "Kemalizm, Modernite, Gelenek: Türkiye'de Demokratik Açılım Olasılığı."

There is no sign of the existence of social classes in the advertisements. The party clearly talks about the oppressed people however it disregards the fact that the degree of oppression of a bankrupted investor can not be the same with squatter or with a worker. The party perceives society as an integrated whole based on morality, solidarity and tradition. In the ads, the social differences in the society are integrated on the basis of religious brotherhood (see appendix 12) and solidarity which has embedded in the culture of the society (see the ads on economic issues.)

For the party, the lack of morality in the modern society is the source of all problems. In that sense the exploitative nature of the capitalist system is the result of immoralities of the system. As we have seen in the ads, “interest” and “prostitution” are the twins of the capitalist exploitation caused by the lack of morality in society. The strong emphasis on community and solidarity, the fear of increasing street tramps and decreasing social peace are significant in the ads.

As I mentioned above, it is true that the party organisation politically mobilises the sections of society that were previously excluded from the system, but the question is that does it have policies or at least the intention to mobilise those sections

socially. The content of *Adil Düzen* has been presented as remedy for every kind of social problem, but its content and potential for social welfare remains a debatable issue.

CHAPTER III

ALTERNATIVE MODERNITIES

3.1 Theoretical Framework

In reference to Gadamer's insights on illuminating and hindering prejudices of all interpretations¹, Andrew Davison evaluates the "secular modern" prejudice of modern politics which assumes the necessary institutional separation of religion and politics as well as the disappearance of religion from public sphere. For Davison, secular modern prejudice is a hindering one that causes a failure in understanding the dynamics of modern politics especially revival of theopolitics in the late twentieth century.

¹ For Gadamer every interpretation has embedded with prejudice. That is to say there is no understanding independent free from prejudices. However for Gadamer it is possible to examine prejudices within the practice of understanding. For detail discussion of Gadamer within the context of secularism-modernism, see Davison's *Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey*.

Secularism, the privatization and institutional separation of religion and politics is promoted by the Western standards as the fundamental criterion of modern politics with the claim of value-free project of modernist tradition that assume universal validity. Religion in modern politics has been considered as incompatible and dysfunctional to political and economic development required by modernity.

Modernism judges tradition and religion as the part of the underdeveloped past that has to be replaced by new and modern values. In that sense, secularism is one of those values that have to supersede religion and tradition. This indicates that with its groundless imposition of the idea that the newer is always better, modernism not only justifies itself (Schabert, 1985:27) but it also assumes an endless superiority and solidity of its own values. This is one of the reasons why modern politics totally neglects the existence or reappearance of religion and traditions, or interprets them as the manoeuvre of regression.

However, the 'classic' conceptualisation of modernity, which was essentially identified with the secularism of the West has been left long ago. Many have argued that the modern does not totally abandon the traditional, instead the traditional institutions

and symbols coexist or revitalise in certain historical periods in the existence of the modern ones (Eisenstadt, 1970; Tipps, 1973; Sarıbay, 1985). In that respect the revival of Islamic movements are not a return to the tradition but they are the products of modernity itself (Göle, 1999:140).

Göle points to the discontinuity between tradition and modernity in the countries like Turkey in which modernity is imposed in the form of a total rejection of tradition. She argues that as long as tradition is not included in the modernisation phase as an input of transformation, modernity has not had a transformative effect on tradition. The traditional and the modern continue to coexist as totally different realities of life in what she (1999:139) calls "discordant time and chaotic space." In a context where different practices from 'different times' breathe together, the conception of modernity over which the West has its monopoly remains desperate in grasping the scene. In that situation it interprets the confusing reality either as something out of modernity or as a return to tradition, or it totally ignores the deviant factors.

In that sense, Turkey is a very good example of the coexistence of the religious traditionalism and modernism.

According to Mardin (1998:108), the inadequacy of the official Islam of the modern laic Turkey in relieving the pains of the people caused by "vulgar" (word belongs to me) modernisation and in providing necessary means or values through which the people make sense of their world, strengthen the persistence of religion and tradition in 'modern' Turkish social life.

However modern and secular presumption of modern social science fails to understand the persistence of religion and traditional way of life in the modern world. The secular modern presumption of the modern social science about the nature and character of public life, identity, history etc. overlooks, limits and flattens the possible relations between tradition and public life in modern politics (Davison, 1998:30). In order to capture the dynamics and significance of modernity and especially the relation between religion and politics, Davison, in reference to Pocock, suggests thinking 'modernity' as a 'consciousness' rather than the condition of being 'modern'. He argues that there is no single definition of modern on which all those who name themselves as modern could agree. Modern certainly marks a different situation than the previous one but the content of this new situation is highly dependent on the historical and social context from which it arises.

Similarly, in questioning the conventional spatialization and temporality of modernity, Bhabha (1991) talks about different manifestations, different nuances and different times of modernity dependent on the linguistic and cultural differences. For him (1991:207), "each repetition of the sign of modernity is different, specific to its historical and cultural conditions of enunciation." He suggests that "there is no 'real' modern in itself, modernity comes out of a temporarily continuous and spatially relational perspective" (King, 1995; 113).

In social and historical context of modernity, in fact there are not only secular factors but also traditional, religious and non-modern ones contesting the political configurations that were emerging. Thus the modernist grand narrative of "transition by replacement" which assumes that the traditional would fade away and replaced by the modern remains insufficient for understanding the temporal relation between the tradition and the modern. Davison (1998:37) argues that the political significance of each can not be captured by a priori categories but be captured only within their shared context.

Davison (1998:38) suggests reconsidering of "the historical prejudgements in such a way to see modernity as a much more

hotly contested set of realities, consisting of different modernities as well as traditionally based, but dynamic, responses to ongoing changes in life." He points that there is a significant difference between considering religious traditionalism as a meaningful response to sociopolitical change and seeing it as refuge from that change. Evidently, in Turkey, in the context of disappointments caused by the failure of 'westernist' modernisation movements and the national development policies in embracing all sections of society, an interpretation (Gülalp, 1999:43-53) of the emergence of Islamic politics as a critique of modernism seems more reasonable than an interpretation of it as a desire for the past.

In both ways of interpretation it is accepted that the tradition 'still' exists. However while the latter sees the traditions as out of modern world, the former sees them as "alternative, contemporaneous forms of life in the modern world" (Davison, 1998:42).

The range and pluralisation of responses to modernity is varied due to historical and social characteristics of societies. Obviously not every nation-state can be fitted easily into a development line of tradition-modernity-postmodernity derived from Western experience (Featherstone and Lash, 1995; 3). In fact

the application of these concepts to other non-Western contexts may well overlook to the widely differing national realities of modernity.

In order to capture the different manifestations of modernity instead of totally disregarding every deviation from Western model as anti-modern, an alternative conceptualisation of modernity is needed. There are various attempts to break with the boundaries of the framework provided by Western model. One of them is Göle's (1999) conceptualisation of "non-western modernities" which claims for an elaborated concept of modernity which attempts to break with the modernist idea that modernity is unique to the West. She argues that modernity that has been defined with the culture, history and geography of the West have become globalised while becoming a desire for all, but at the same time localised while being produced and reproduced in the non-West. In that context, the acultural, ahistorical and unilateral modernist category based on dichotomies such as primitive/civilised, reactionary/progressive, irrational/rational, religious/scientific, traditionalist/modernist fail to capture the ways in which those dichotomies exist together.

Göle (1999:133-138) suggests the concept of "non-Western modernity", a theoretical conceptualisation to indicate the effort to reject the centrality and dominance of the Western model of modernity; to re-conceptualise of the time dimension of modernity by rejecting unilateral conception of time, that is to reject the chronological and hierarchical positioning between the traditional and modern, by adopting collateral modernities; and to evaluate the peculiar manifestations of different ways perceiving modernity in non-Western societies.

All of these perspectives contribute to the idea that modernity is no longer unique to the West or it is no longer necessarily associated with Western secularism. There are alternative modernities, in which tradition and modernity, religion and modernity are related to each other in various different ways than commonly conceptualised in modern social science.

The concept of alternative modernities enables us to capture multiple possibilities of modernity. Through interpretative method, we seek to understand others as they understand themselves; we become aware of different perceptions and devotions of modernity rather than labelling them totally anti-modern. 'Alternative modernities' provide the tool to enlarge the

framework of interpreting modernity. It opens up the dialogue between those claimed to be modern and those accused to be anti-modern.

In that sense, alternative modernities provides a useful framework in rethinking the WP and its preceded the NOP-NSP. In this framework, the Islamic component in the discourse of the parties, the emphasis on tradition and the conceptualisation of modernity in terms of technology and science in their programs indicate that the NOP-NSP-WP line constitutes an alternative with respect to Kemalist modernisation project.

In that line of thought I try to interpret Ziya Gökalp, a Turkish sociologist who believed that Turkey's modernisation could be reconciled with its Islamic traditions, in his contribution to the understanding of alternative modernities and more importantly in providing a better understanding of the WP.

3.2 Interpretation of Ziya Gökalp within the Framework of Alternative Modernities

Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) was the thinker who tried to answer the very problematic question of how the Turks should adopt the Western civilisation, and how this effort should be harmonised with the Turks' two historic traditions of Turkish and Islamic backgrounds in the formation of national identity.

He produced his major writings between 1911 and 1918, and between 1922-1924. The 1910s were the years of the dissolution of Ottoman Empire under the winds of rising nationalism among both Muslim and non-Muslim population. Throughout the 19th century, the Ottoman elites had tried to secure the Empire by adopting military, political, legal and administrative technics from the Western states. However the westernisation reforms taken under *Tanzimat* regimes remained insufficient to save the Empire from dissolving. For Gökalp it was because of the reason that:

Whatever they (the makers of *Tanzimat*) wanted to take from Europe, they always took not fully but by half...Another great mistake committed was their attempt to create a mental amalgam

made up of mixture of the East and the West. They failed to see that the two...could not be reconciled...It is hopeless to carry the old and new conceptions of law, the old and new standards of ethics, side by side. (Berkes, 1981: 278)

One of the consequences of *Tanzimat* regimes was the creation of a series of dichotomies in almost every field of life. In politics, in administration, in the legal and juridical system, in intellectual life, two sets of institutions, two loyalties – one to the old and the other to the new – stood side by side. Gökalp found that the real nature of the question was nothing but an auxiliary part of the problem of civilisation, in fact, he pointed out that:

In this country there are three layers of people differing from each other by civilization and education: the common people (...still not freed from the effects of Far Eastern civilisation...living in an ancient age), the men educated in *medreses* (...still living in Eastern civilization...in a medieval age), the men educated in (modern) secular schools (...which had some benefits from Western civilization...living in a modern age) (Berkes, 1981: 278).

According to Gökalp, the reason for this anomalous cultural situation was a lack of adjustment between the two essential distinct aspects of social life – civilisation and culture. In his

analysis, these two concepts do not represent antithetical and mutually exclusive entities as each answered a different need of society, but rather two closely related and complementary traits of social reality. In short, civilisation refers to the "sum total of social institutions (i.e. certain ways of thinking and acting) shared in common by several nations that have attained the same level of development", culture, on the other hand, is composed of the "integrated system (i.e. the sum total of the institutions peculiar to a particular nation) of religious, moral, legal, intellectual, aesthetic, linguistic, economic and scientific spheres of life of a certain nation" (Berkes, 1981:104, 269).

Gökalp believed in the necessity of an adjustment between civilisation and culture, in fact, he argued that the former simply becomes a matter of mechanical imitation without cultural basis, it never penetrates into the inner life of the people. That was exactly what had happened with the *Tanzimat*, the reformers "entirely neglected the national culture, equating culture with civilisation, that is common to all nations" (Berkes, 1981:286-287). Gökalp stressed that culture is something that is alive only among the people themselves, whereas civilisation is carried by the elites, who do not have culture.

The dichotomy between the formal civilisation and the civilisation of the people (culture) lies in the fact that the Ottoman elite borrowed the institutions of the West and produced an artificial civilisation out of them instead of creating their own by developing their own ways of thinking and acting. As Gökalp points out that "They forgot national traditions for the sake of their court life...They scorned the peasant (who has the national culture) as stupid Turk, the people of Anatolia were ridiculed as outsiders, the title given to the people was vulgar" (Berkes, 1981:98, 260).

For Gökalp, in nations in which the civilisation subordinate the culture, the decline is inevitable. "Conversely, nations inferior in civilisation but superior in culture overcame the nations, which were superior in civilisation but inferior in culture", furthermore, "civilisation, owing to its attributes- utilitarian, egoistic, individualistic, self-interested- destroyed culture which is non-utilitarian, altruistic, public spirited and idealistic, as well as solidarity and morality in the society (Parla, 1985:31).

Gökalp's main concern was related to the problem of Turkey *vis-à-vis* Western civilisation, he clearly realised that the Turks, as a nation, had to adapt themselves to contemporary Western

civilisation, since the Islamic civilisation to which they belonged in the past was not appropriate for the creation of modern nationality. Thus, he attempted to synthesise Islam and the modern state by an effort to integrate Islam and European civilisation under within the framework of the Turkish Nation. He claims that (1981: 98) "When we have merged and combined the science, philosophy, and technology of our age with our national and religious traditions... we shall be able to create a contemporary Islamic-Turkish civilisation."

There emerged the substance and premises of the social and political thought, which he titled as Turkism-Islamism-Westernism. Gökalp (1996:70) summed up his social ideal as: "We are of the Turkish nation (*millet*), of the Islamic religious community (*ümmet*), of Western civilisation". As Parla (1985:25) rightfully asserted, "Gökalp attempted to integrate into a single theory Islamic and Western intellectual traditions which seemed to some irreconcilable and inconsistent and to others combinable only by acknowledging inescapable contradictions."

Nationalism was the primary collective representation of the time. According to Gökalp, Turkish nationalism is a cultural ideal, which laid the basis for the social solidarity. Gökalp's ideas all

revolved around his understanding on nation, he set about giving the Turks a new definition and to this purpose, he mobilised all his energies to demolish the theocratic conception of nationality. He argues that nation should not be confused with other two sociological entities. One was *ümmet*, an international religious community, the other was the 'Ottoman nation', a political organisation comprising several nationalities as well as religious communities. In Gökalp's view, the true nation could be identified with neither of these. In fact, through the civilisation process, the confines of the nation have widened, the modern nation is a new type on the one hand, it is a community in an unique complex of cultural values ("...folk traditions, the usages, *mores*, oral or unwritten literature, the language, music, and religious beliefs, the moral and aesthetic and economic institutions of the illiterate") and on the other it is a society based on organic solidarity, division of labour, and functional differentiation, on the other (Berkes, 1981:280).

These were the views of Gökalp on nation under which he combined the other two components of his tripartite system-Islamism and Westernism, which introduce two critical questions that are significant for the intentions of this study. What does modernity signify for Gökalp? And what is the role of religion in

his ideal society? In fact, Gökalp's distinction between culture and civilisation and the way he defines them give the answers of these two critical questions.

In bare terms, Gökalp associates modernity with the modern civilisation's, namely the Western, technological and scientific development. In this sense becoming modern means becoming scientifically equal to the most scientifically and technologically advanced nations of the Western civilisation. According to Gökalp, "the ideal modernity necessitates only the acceptance of the theoretical and practical sciences and technics from Europe" (Berkes, 1981:75), but not the adoption of the European way of life and moral values. Instead Gökalp's idea of modernity entails independence from Europe. As Parla (1985:27) rightfully asserts "he called for a defensive modernisation without accompanying a sense of cultural inferiority."

As a positivist sociologist, Gökalp considers modern scientific knowledge, technology and industry as independent of culture of different societies, for him they are universal and common to all humanity. The new internationality, what he calls "true internationality based on science is taking place of the internationality based on religion" (Berkes, 1981:76-77). Japan

and Turkey in the modern civilisation are the evidences for him to argue that the modern civilisation was increasingly becoming non-religious. For him neither those who followed the old internationality and believed in Islam remained the basis for Turkish civilisation, nor those who followed Europeanization or westernisation to its cultural roots consider fully the social-structural realities of Turkey's situation.

For Gökalp without losing the distinction between culture and civilisation, civilisation must be adopted to the culture with the maintenance of the cultural ethos of the people. A nation, therefore, absorb the modern civilisation, for instance by way of education, through its language and ethos. Cultural meanings are important in the way civilisation "forms" are adopted because they give those forms a unique, nationally specific content. His ideas on education depict how he puts this form-content relation in the context of Turkey.

While we are not in need of Europe from the point of view of culture and education, we badly need it from the viewpoint of techniques and learning. Let us try to acquire everything in techniques from Europe, but let us find our culture only in our own national soul" (Berkes, 1981:247)

For Gökalp therefore, the content is obviously the natural spirit and the natural culture composed of pre-Islamic traditions and Islamic traditions of Turks. However, Islam seems to remain central to Gökalp's conceptualisation of national culture (Davison, 1998:121).

Religion is the most important factor in the creation of national consciousness as it unites men through common sentiments and beliefs. It is because of this that genuinely religious men are those who have national fervour, and that genuine nationalists are those who believe in the eternity of faith. (Berkes, 1981: 192-193)

The place Gökalp, as a positivist sociologist, assigned to religion seems to be the consequence of his rational consideration of the important function of religious sentiments in modern life and conscience of society. Gökalp regarded religion as an ethical normative system supplying the bases of solidarity in the society, together with the cultural-normative system of Turkish nationalism (Parla, 1985:38). As Parla (1985:38) asserted, "Gökalp adopted Durkheim's sociology, the "science of morality" above all, as one of the tripods of his synthesis, in which he tried to combine a solidaristic analytical model of society with a non-individualistic moral philosophy."

Accordingly, following Durkheim, Gökalp argues that religion performs an important function in the structurally differentiated societies of modernity by tying individuals to society and by strengthening the social solidarity. Religion performs this function not only through the values and norms that people have in making sense of the world but also through practices that brought people together. Therefore, for Gökalp religion is more than a matter of private conscience, it fulfils several functions in public life of individuals.

The significant point in Gökalp's view of religion is in fact the reflection of his social evolutionist perspective. That is, as I mentioned above, he believes that social entities are living organisms, they evolve as the society change. However their vitality depends on their independence from politics, because political power tries to dominate and tries to formalise. Gökalp thinks that Islam, as a living institution of Turkish national culture in order to maintain its vitality as a spiritual force as a "social shari'a" should be independent from the stabilising power of the state. While criticising sharia rule in the Ottomans, he says that:

The state is legal machinery; it tends to legalise and formalise any social force upon which it touches. It is because of this fact that Islam started to lose its vitality from the moment it began to be fused with the political organisation and began to be formalised as a system of law closed against all *ijtihad*. (...) The state today officially recognises only one shari'a, that of Hanefi schools. Thus, a sect that has only a scholastic value is held prior to religion, which is the main thing. The situation is different in those places where Islam is independent. As religion is understood to be a religious life in these countries, the shari'a find its sources only in the Book and the Sunna, on the one hand, and in the social life, on the other, and increasingly becoming a social shari'a (Berkes, 1981:102-103).

Thus, for Gökalp religion neither disappears nor becomes merely a private matter as proposed by modernist theories. It is true that Islam can not be the basis of a civilisation any longer, however it is still vital and functional in the private and social life of Turkish nation.

Despite his immense effort in providing a social project answering the essential question of Kemalist elites of the early republic about how the Turks should adopt the Western civilisation in the 'making of modern Turkey' and how this effort be harmonised with pre-Islamic and Islamic past of the Turks, Gökalp's project was not appreciated much by the Kemalist cadre who could not tolerate the religious component in his synthesis.

He sees Islamic factor as the core of national identity however this contradicts with the conception of national identity in the minds of Kemalists. Thus although the effect of Ziya Gökalp is observable in the cultural policies of the Republic, his ideas were always remain in the margins of the Kemalist circle. Gökalp stood as the ideologist of cultural and educational matters, with not much influence on politics of Kemalism.

3.3 An Appraisal of Turkish Modernisation with regard to Alternative Modernities

'Alternative modernities' provide the tool to enlarge the framework of interpreting modernity out of the limits of the Kemalist perspective. In doing so it enables us to capture the relation among Kemalism modernism and secularism; and the relation between Ziya Gökalp and the WP tradition in their alternative articulation of modernity with respect to the Kemalist one.

With regard to relation between Kemalism and modernism, Kemalist regime, in line with its narrow conceptualisation of modernity, has identified modernisation with secularisation and westernisation as if it is the only way of modernisation. However,

even remaining within the narrow frame of equating the modern with the West, indeed the Kemalist project itself also remained an alternative. The secularist premises of Kemalism in reality applied in the form of laiciest policies. Although religion was excluded from state governance, similar to the Ottoman period, state preserved its claim for the true interpretation of Islam. Hence, there was obviously a form of secularism, but it does not necessarily mean an independence of religious as well as other social institutions from the state dominance.

The Kemalist reforms tried to restrict the significance of Islam by actively adopting adverse policies towards it, because in the eyes of the Kemalist elite Islam was considered as dysfunctional to political and economic phases of modernisation. For that reason, the Kemalist reforms' attempted to replace traditional Islamic values of social life with a 'modern', 'civilised' and scientific values.

In contrast to Kemalist project of modernity, the NOP-NSP-WP continuum integrated Islam as the fundamental component of their discourse. Having its origins in Ziya Gökalp the tradition tries to make a synthesis of Islam and modernity in their program and discourse. Contrary to Kemalist perspective that identifies

modernisation with westernisation, both Ziya Gökalp and the NOP-NSP-WP defend the idea that modernity should be synthesised with traditions, particularly with Islam. For them, modernity signifies the pursuit of the scientific, technological, and industrial, civilisation of the West. It does not demand the adoption of the European "way of life" and "moral values." Nor did it suggest the simple transfer the technology of the West. Rather it required becoming "independent" of the West while being reached the level of the most technologically and scientifically developed nations. According to both Ziya Gökalp and the NOP-NSP-WP, the West could only contribute Turkish modernity in scientific, technological and industrial terms. In fact, in their view, science and technology do not belong to the Western civilisation, but they are universal. For the continuity and stability of Turkish nation, Islam should be the very important constituent of Turkish modernisation process, because as Ziya Gökalp and the WP emphasise, 'Islam is the way of life of Turkish people.' Thus it is the idea that sees Islam as the reality of society that would absorb modernity instead of being an enemy of modernity, which should be totally excluded from processes of modernisation. In that sense the way Ziya Gökalp and the NOP-NSP-WP locate Islamic values and traditions through which the people make sense of the world to the basis of their imagination of modernity. As one of the

authors stated (Parla, 1985:27), in fact this might be interpreted as a call for a 'defensive modernisation' without accompanying sense of cultural inferiority.

Therefore, from above discussion one can conclude that the conceptualisation of alternative modernities provides us the necessary framework within which it becomes possible to discover not only that Kemalism is not the only modernist discourse in Turkey, but also that other articulations of modernity, especially those with an Islamic component are necessarily, anti-modernist and reactionist.

CONCLUSION: RETHINKING THE WELFARE PARTY

The purpose of this study has been to rethink the Welfare Party by enlarging the limits of our interpretative framework within which we seek to explain the WP and its preceding tradition in Turkish politics. Kemalism as the only legitimate discourse of modernity in Turkey inscribed the WP and its preceeeders, the NOP and the NSP in terms of their antagonism to the modernity. As discussed in the last chapter there is a significant difference between the Kemalist and the NOP-NSP-WP tradition with respect to the role they have attributed to Islam in their imagination of modernity. Kemalism in accordance with what Davison (1998) calls the “secular modern” prejudice of modern politics, regards religion and tradition as the components of the "anti-modern" that belongs to the past, while the NOP-NSP-WP line attributes tradition and Islam an important role both in their political discourse and in the party program as the basis of the organisation of Turkish society. This difference in fact forms the fundamental dichotomy in the Turkish political

system in the Republican period between modernists and anti-modernists; laicists and anti-laicists; Kemalists and so-called 'anti-Kemalists'; the 'guards' of Turkish Republic and 'foes' of it. This set of dichotomies dichotomy is a never-ending story that characterises not only the understanding and discourse of modern Turkish politics but also the crises of Turkish democracy.

In order to overcome these dichotomies (not in the least, if possible to reconcile them) and to develop a better understanding the components of modern Turkish politics -in our case the WP - instead of hindering understanding with the deadlock of laicist-anti-laicist dichotomy, the thesis proposes to integrate alternative meanings -alternatives to the idea of seeing the party as anti-modern- to our language through which we understand and explain modern Turkish politics.

In its attempt to develop a better understanding of the WP that goes beyond the "secular modern" prejudice of Kemalism, the thesis employs an interpretative method through which alternative and contested meanings and outcomes of our subject come to the front and the way out of the "secular modern" prejudice of modern politics is opened. The thesis by analysing

the texts of the 1991 election campaign of the party, tries to explore the constitutive themes and meanings of the WP's discourse and to enlarge the framework in which the party is interpreted. For this purpose, the 1991 election campaign is chosen since it comprises the most significant texts of the party that reveal its discourse which responds to the an absence - that is the absence of a political discourse that represents both material and cultural aspirations of the repressed masses in the Turkish political life. The 1991 election is also remarkable since the WP has increased its support gradually during and after the elections.

Of course in rethinking the WP the thesis not only use the advertisement texts of the party but also looks at the preceding tradition -the National Order Party and the National Salvation Party, the conditions of their emergence, the basis of their support, the ideology and program, which indicates a continuum between the two parties as well as a continuum with the WP.

The program and discourse of the NOP-NSP as well as the analysis of the ads of the WP also remark the relation between Ziya Gökalp and the NOP-NSP-WP tradition, which is employed in

the thesis as a tool to enlarge the framework within which we understand of the WP.

In contrast to modernisation thesis that regard religion and tradition as the main components of the anti-modern, Ziya Gökalp's distinction between culture and civilisation indicates the ability of Islam, as an important constituent of culture, to endure under conditions of modernity. In that sense Gökalp's thought is interpreted as an illustration of 'alternative modernities' (Davison, 1998:90-134).

The notion of “alternative modernities” mainly indicates a break of the necessary correspondence between modernisation and secularisation; and modernisation and westernisation. It enables us to think of “alternative modernities” in which religion neither enter the private sphere nor fade altogether under the conditions of modern politics.

In that framework for a better understanding of the WP, the thesis also employs Ziya Gökalp's thought regarding his conceptualisation of modernity and the role he has attributed to Islam in it. In contrast to laicist politics of Kemalist's

modernisation project, Gökalp associated modernity with the technology and science of the western civilisation while preserving Islam as an ethical system of Turkish culture. In the same line of thought with Gökalp, the NOP-NSP-WP tradition incorporates Islam into their discourse as a marker of local identity. However the Kemalist regimes insistence on the exclusion of Islam from the political domain positioned Islam as the possible location of an alternative political discourse.

Nevertheless, Islam is not only theme in changing discourse and program of the NOP-NSP-WP line. With respect to the NOP and the NSP, the emphasis on spiritual development followed by material one form the fundamental vein of their program. The main goal of these parties could be argued to be to modernise Turkey through both spiritual and technical development programs, which emphasise the rejection of Western cultural influences and return to the "national moral consciousness" in the spiritual field in addition to creativity rather than imitation of Western technology in the technical field. This is the program of the NOP-NSP, named under the rubric of 'National Outlook' which is proposed as the alternative and the authentic way based on morality in contrast to liberal and leftist ideologies.

The NOP and the NSP achieved to become the political representative of the traditional conservative and Islamist sects of the society. However their successor, the WP, under the conditions of increasing social and economic differentiation and especially the development of market economy after 1980s, have enlarged its support from the culturally alienated and economically deprived small merchants, businessman and artisans of the periphery to different sections of society of the centre like women, students, intellectuals etc. In becoming a mass political party, the WP has had to change its strategy from *tebliḏ* to propaganda. The WP has attempted to politicise and control the 'new opposing masses' that has no faith in the existing order (Pen, 1995:91).

The 1991 election campaign is a very significant example of the changing strategy of the NOP-NSP-WP line. Appeal of the WP in the ads primarily addresses the urban lower-middle and lower income groups with regard to their economic problems as well as other sections of society like Kurds, youth, women, environmentalists with regard to cultural problems in addition to economic ones.

The texts of the ads voice the complaints and desires of the poor. The party promises material benefits such as employment, fair salaries, abandonment of unfair taxes and interests to economically deprived classes. However success of the campaign in fact lies more in the ideology that the ads signify, which offers an explanation to discontent people about what is wrong with the individuals, the society, the state and the country. The party asserts the presence of a moral degeneration of the individuals and decreasing social peace and equality in the capitalist system that is based on interest, immorality and prostitution (see appendix 4,6,7,13). With respect to Turkey, the party questions the absence of democracy, social justice, equality and peace as well as dependency of the country to the West (see appendix 11,12,17,18,19). As a solution to all of these problems the WP promises a new order, "a new world", 'Just Order' (*Adil Düzen*) as an ideology that offers a heaven in the world. Even if the sincerity, intention and capacity of 'Just Order' in its claim of a just regime is a debatable issue, it fulfils an important lack among other political parties in providing an utopia and hope in the future to the repressed and discontent sections of society living under the conditions of insecurity and exclusion. Moreover, in the ads the WP offers to the ordinary audience an appreciation of the

difficulties of everyday life for the man in the street, for his work and his struggle. The ads give the feeling to the ordinary audience of personal closeness, social belonging and companionship. Each text is presented as a dialogue between a discontent person and the WP, in which the party agrees with the complaints voiced by that person and gives a word for a remedy in the 'Just Order'.

As significant in the ads the WP tried to bring together the traditional, conservative Islamist sections of society whose origins depend on the Ottoman Empire and whose challenge to the order primarily focuses on cultural reason and new opposed classes whose challenge is the combination of economic as well identity problems.

However with the expansion in the power base of the WP to new sections of society, it becomes more problematic for the party to bridge the gap between the religious and non-religious components. As it is significant in the ads, Islam as a religion is not very much prominent in the discourse of the WP. As an author observed (Cizre-Sakallıođlu, 1996:247), the emphasis on Islam in the WP tradition also takes a different dimension in response to increasingly culture oriented discourse of the 1990s.

The WP in comparison to its preceders "has focused more on defining and sustaining the cultural-moral parameters of a Muslim Turk promoting cultural change than altering the legal and prohibitionist framework of the political system." However, "the conditions of the opposition politics within which the WP operates makes its symbolic-cultural vision seem like real politics" (Cizre-Sakallıođlu, 1996:248).

As many have argued the catch-all strategy brought the WP truly extend its power base while it causes a serious problem to the party in preserving the Islamist and politically radical stance. However the ads indicates that the party compensate the radicalism it loses by the absence of manifest Islam with its discourse appealing the poor, repressed and discontent people. The party's Islamist stance, even at the symbolic-cultural level that is considered as anti-systemic becomes effective in rallying the support of both socioeconomically and culturally discontented sections of the society.

Although it is clear from the ads that the party advocates a 'politically radical position' towards the existing order by representing the opposition of the culturally and economically

repressed sections, the analysis of the ads also indicates that the design of the stories, the strategy of the campaign and the promises the party give to the electorate signifies the 'social conservatism' of the WP. At this point, Ziya Gökalp's social thought is very illustrative in understanding the WP around the concept of 'social conservatism', in the sense that the ads clearly reflect that the party perceives society as a collectivity based on shared moral and traditional values. The ads signify that it is the moral poverty and degeneration that engender the decay of the existing order. The strong emphasis on solidarity, community and order as well as the emphasis on the essentiality of the perseverance of social peace implies the model of the society that the WP longs for. In the eyes of the party the society is an organic whole composed of professional groups. There is no utterance to the existence of social classes. In the ads the WP brings together the economically and socially conflicting classes, as if there is no conflict of interests among them. As I mentioned before, the party claims to represent the repressed people but, it disregards the fact that the degree of repression varies among different classes. This inevitably implies that the remedy that the party promises would hardly be responsive to the social inequality among the repressed sections of society.

In fact social conservatism of the party is parallel to the general axis of the political movements in Turkey based on the collectivities and collectivity discourses which simply reduces social differences to a community membership. Thus although the WP seems to mobilise various sections of society with its claim to voice their discontent, along with its party organisation that necessitates a responsible and a participatory membership which previously has little chance to be represented in the political sphere, the WP totally restricts this space that it opens up in discourse with its view of society as an integrated entity that is controllable and adaptable into an ideal situation.

As many have argued (Çýnar, 1996:32-38; Cizre-Sakallýođlu, 1996:241; Tosun, 1999:188) the political course and discourse of the WP depended more on the organising principles of the Kemalism than the aspirations of its followers. In this context perhaps, an attempt to capture the similarities between the WP and Kemalist modernism, instead of seeing them in irreconcilable opposition would not only solve the deadlock dichotomy of Turkish politics but also gives way to a search for 'real alternatives.'

Bir felsefe doktoru olan Ahmet Doğan liderliğindeki

BDP, BSP, HCH ve BCP'nin ilk sonuçlara göre, oylarını ve olası milletvekili sayısını Demokratik Güçler Birliği (DGB)

görevi vermesi bekleniyor. Bu

görevi vermesi bekleniyor. Bu

görevi vermesi bekleniyor. Bu

görevi vermesi bekleniyor. Bu

görevi vermesi bekleniyor. Bu

görevi vermesi bekleniyor. Bu


“Hakkımı versinler!..”

Onbeş yıllık işçiyim. Bunca zahmetlerime, alınterime karşılık ücretim çok düşük. Emeğe saygı diye bir şey kalmamış. Enflasyon durmadan artıyor, bizim maaşlar da durmadan azalıyor. Her şey ateş pahası! Geçinemiyorum. Ev kiramı güçlükle ödüyorum. Dört çocuğum ne yiyor, ne içiyor düşünen yok. Çalışıyorum ama, aklım hep evde. Bütün işçi arkadaşlar, aynı dertten muzdarip. Ne olacak bu halimiz? Büyüklerimizden fazla bir şey istemiyorum. İstedğim sadece insan gibi yaşamak. Hakkımı versinler yeter!

Siz işçi kardeşlerimiz, büyük bir fedakârlıkla çalışıyorsunuz, yoruluyorsunuz. Fakat kazancınız, insan gibi yaşamanız için yeterli değil. İşten ayrılacak olsanız, yeni bir iş bulmanız çok güç. İşçiyi düşünen yok. Oysa Türkiye, işçisinin emeğine, alın terine çok

şey borçlu. REFAH PARTİSİ iktidarında işçimiz, emeğinin karşılığını alacak. Memur ve işçimizin gelirinden vergi alınmayacak. REFAH PARTİSİ iktidarında işçinin gelirinin büyük bir kısmı vergi ve faize akmayacak.

Refah Partisi İktidarında ‘kes Hakkını Alacak!..



REFAH PARTİSİ

“Yeni bir dünya”



N

“İki yakamız bir araya gelmiyor...”

Eşim memur. Evliliğimizin ilk yıllarında daha iyi geçinebiliyorduk. Hayat gittikçe zorlaştı. Çocuklar büyüdü, üçü de okula gidiyor. Okul masraflarına yetişemiyoruz. Ne yapacağımızı şaşırdık. Babam zaman zaman geçimimiz için yardımcı oluyor. Geçenlerde eşimin maaşına zam yaptılar, ama arkasından her şeye daha fazlasıyla zam geldi. Bir türlü iki yakamız bir araya gelmiyor...

Maalesef. Ülkemizde yaşamak her geçen gün daha da zorlaşıyor. Düşük gelirliden vergi alan, vatandaşı faiz yüküyle inim inim inleyen, zengini gözetip yoksulu hiçe sayan bu zulüm düzeni işbaşında oldukça sıkıntınız asla

bitmeyecek. Bugün ekmeğin alırken ödenen paranın üçte biri vergiye, üçte biri de faiz masraflarına gidiyor. REFAH PARTİSİ iktidarında, örneğin, bir ekmeğin üçte bir fiyatına alacaksınız.

Refah Partisi İktidarında, İki Yakanız Bir Araya Gelecek!



REFAH PARTİSİ

“Yeni bir dünya”

Arayış

ANAP yüzde 21,2, DSP
yüzde 14,0, DİP
yüzde 5,9 ve SP + Bağımsız
Genel seçim sonuçları
göstergesini göstermektedir.
ANAP'un gerçekleştirme
Araştırmalarının ortaya
çıkardığı şudur:
SP ve DYP'nin oluşturdu
Birinci Araştırmada yü
düğü sosyal demok
34,6 dir, aradaki fark
karşın sekizinci araştı
yüzde 48,0, sosyal d
vermektedir, aradaki
Araştırmaya göre, merke
Genel Seçim Araştı
gen seçim propagandası
nde sosyal demokrat
Ok bir artış göstermiştir.
başka noktada da GALLU
Genel Seçim Araştırmaları
ndan bağımsız olarak
duğu sonucunu vermi

Yılmaz: İstanbul' İktidarımdum Ecevit

ANKARA- Başbakan Mesut Yılmaz, birinci parti olacağını belirtirken, "Bak tek başına iktidar olacağım" dedi.
Mesut Yılmaz Ankara'da, İstanbul'a giderken, 10 bin kişiyle karşılaştı. SABAH'ın sorularına karşılık, "Seçim sonuçları çok güzel. Başbakanlık görevi İstanbul'da da çok güvendi. İstanbul'da asgari 30 milliyetçi olarak, "DSP biraz daha güçlü olmalı."
Yılmaz, "Seçim sonuçları karşılıklı en şanslı partiyi seçtik. Birinci parti iktidara gelmez. İktidara gelmemiz için ANAP'ın yüzde 30 oyla ilktidara gelmesi gerekir, diğer partiler bulunmaz."

50-0 İDDİASI
ANAP Genel Başkanı Mesut Yılmaz, kendilerini çok şanslı gördüklerini belirterek, Milletvekilliğini garantiye alacağını söyledi. Yılmaz, "DSP biraz daha güçlü olmalı" diye konuştu.
Başbakan Mesut Yılmaz, karşılaştığı Genelkurul toplantısında, Güreş'ten Irak sınırlarını kapatan operasyonla ilgili Yılmaz, Güreş'e, gerektiğinde sürdürülmesi için sözlü gerekçeyi açıkladı. "Hükümet danışmanlarını seçim yasakları süresince görevden almalı, basın danışmanlarını devlet memurunu kullanmalı."

GECE YOL ALIP GİTTİ
Başbakan Mesut Yılmaz, döneminde temposu hafifta geceleri yol almasını düzenleyecek.
Olay TAN


“Vergiler belimizi büktü...”

Esnafım. Eşten dosttan denkleştirdik, hanımın bileziklerini bozdurduk, büyük umutlarla şu küçük ekmeğ teknesini kurduk. Biraz yüzümüz güler diye beklerken, iyice batağa saplandık. Veresiye vermezsen işçiye, memura bir şey satamıyorsun. Her gün yeni zamlar geliyor. Bugün 1000 liraya sattığımı, yarın 1500 liraya almak zorunda kalıyorum. Anlayacağımız; kâr edelim derken zarar ediyoruz. Bir de çeşit çeşit vergiler yok mu! İyice belimizi büktü.

Ne yazık ki öyle. Enflasyon, sattığımızı aynı fiyatla yerine koymanızı engelliyor. Bu yetmiyormuş gibi, zarar etseniz bile, devlet sizden vergi alıyor. Kazancınız size yetmezken, sofranıza ortak oluyor. Sizden alıp varlıklı kesimin cebine, beş yıldızlı otellere, kumarhanelere, tefecilere, vurgunculara, hayali ihracatçılara ve ölü yatırımlara aktarıyor. Altta kalan daha da

eziliyor. İşini uyduran “Kârım yok” deyip vergi vermiyor, ama öbür taraftan servetine servet katıyor. Bu sistem değişmedikçe, küçük esnafımızın yazgısı nasıl değişecek? REFAH PARTİSİ, “Adil Ekonomik Düzen”i yerleştirerek, küçük esnafımızın sorunlarını çözecek... yıllardır süregelen haksızlıkları önleyecek. REFAH PARTİSİ, küçük esnaftan vergi almayacak!

Refah Partisi, Haksız Vergileri Kaldıracak!



REFAH PARTİSİ

“Yeni bir dünya”

Kolej galip
...deplasmanda Po-
Stalbobrek takımını
...ikinci turu kolayla-
...yanan karşılaşmanın
40 Ankara ekibinin lehine

Rıza'yı kut
Baştarafı 20. Sayfada
...devamlılık gösteren başarı
...Dünya Futbol Karması için
...haklı ile ülkemizi temsil
...ulaştı. Rıza her zamanki
...yaklaşımı ile de dünya kar-
...sağladı ve dünyada bir
...bulunduğu olgusunu da
...ortaya koydu.
...giden ve çok anlamlı
...ise “ Maçın bitmesini
...idi. Dürüst ve sevgi dolu
...kabul ettik bunu.
...futbolcu gerçekten mesleğine
...bunu arzulu bir şekilde yerine
...böyle bir akademik doruğun
...istemaz. Dünyanın en ünlü en
...hızları ile birlikte bu futbol
...yer alıp kariyerinin en tepe-
...futbolcu için böyle mutlu bir
...yaşanır ki...
...bunu bu derece açık ve dürüst
...belirtmekte işte Rıza gibi bir
...yaktır.
...deki Aralık ayının başında
...1994 Dünya Kupası Eleme
...Kuraları çekilecek.
...yıl İsveç'te yapılacak Av-
...Finallerine katılmak için hiç
...olmadığı biliniyor.
...hafta buna rağmen liglerimi-
...ile 16 Ekimde Londra'daki
...nedeni ile ara verdik.
...Rıza kaptan olarak Milli Takı-
...başında bir kez daha ünlü
...çıkacak. Bu onurlu görevi
...en iyi şekilde başaracağına ina-
...Ancak kaptan Rıza'nın arka-
...böyle bir maçta motive etmesi

YENİ B EMEK BA AI

...manâlar vardı. Çoğu tutulmuştu. Sözü peşindeydi. Söz gelimi İngilte-

...dünları kendine özel söyleşiler-
de söylediklerini aktardı bize.

...şin anlayışı ile yorumlamasına Kar-
şınm. Buna çok kızzıyorum" dedi.

...midekiyle ters düşen Sırtı Köktaş'ın yer-
rine Mustafa Küçükay'ın getirildi.

...Denizli, daha sonra
Sovyetçiklerinin yapılmadığını

...telefon eşeydi durumu
öğrendik" dedi.

...kalece. Aybaba'nın bu operas-
yonunda Bolşeviklerin devam et-

...ziriklarına devam et-

“Köylü çalışıyor, karşılığını alamıyor..”

“Köylü milletin efendisidir” diyorlar. İyi, güzel de, böyle efendilik olmaz ki! Efendilerin bu kadar derdi olur mu? Bizde dert çok.

Hangisini anlatsam!

Kredi faizleri canımızı çıkardı. Alsak bir dert, almasak bir dert.

Tefecilerin insafına kaldık. Biz çalışıyoruz, onlar terlemeden kazanıyor.

Yılın oniki ayında çalışıyoruz. Ne elde var, ne avuçta! Yıldan yıla sadece borcumuz artıyor. Borcun faizlerini ödeyemiyoruz.

Topraktan verim alamıyoruz. Masraf çok, gelir az. Yaşama şartları zorlaştı. Su yok, yol yok, doktor yok, ilaç yok. İnsanca yaşamak,.. o da

yok! Efendilikten vazgeçtik. Alınterimizin karşılığını alalım,

şu dertler bitsin, yeter!

Bunlar gerçek. Köylümüz, köyünde mutsuz. Taban fiyatları enflasyonun gerisinde. Ödemeler zamanında yapılmıyor. Mazota, gübreye ve tarım araçlarına sık sık zam geliyor. Daha da önemlisi, nehirler boşa akıyor, tarlalar sulanmıyor. REFAH PARTİSİ, sulama imkânlarını artırarak verimin de artmasının yollarını açacak. Köylümüzün kazancı artacak. Aracıya, tefeciye gerek duymadan, kendi ürününü kendisi

değerlendirebilecek. Ayrıca REFAH PARTİSİ, fabrikalar kurup sanayi hamlesini köylerimiz kadar yaygınlaştırarak, köydeki işgücünü değerlendirecek, köylümüze yeni kazanç kapıları açacak. Köylümüzün borç senetlerinin yerini, hisse senetleri alacak. Milli Görüş'ün tarım politikası, üretimin artmasını sağlayacak. Köye refah, REFAH ile gelecek!

Refah Partisi İktidarında Köylü, Emeginin Karşılığını Alacak!



REFAH PARTİSİ

“Yeni bir dünya”

SÜKRÜ
(K.O.Gücü)
NE
(H.)
BAYBURT
BU
(Mu
L.Y.)

UNC

SEREF TABLOSU

Hafanun Takımı
BAYBURT
Hafanun Hakemi
Tulu KAYA
Hafanun-Kare As

Gol Krallığı
Gol Krallığı
Gol Krallığı

İN DÜRLÜMÜ

İN DÜRLÜMÜ	İN DÜRLÜMÜ	İN DÜRLÜMÜ
1	2	3
4	5	6
7	8	9
10	11	12
13	14	15
16	17	18
19	20	21
22	23	24
25	26	27
28	29	30
31	32	33
34	35	36
37	38	39
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43	44	45
46	47	48
49	50	51
52	53	54
55	56	57
58	59	60
61	62	63
64	65	66
67	68	69
70	71	72
73	74	75
76	77	78
79	80	81
82	83	84
85	86	87
88	89	90
91	92	93
94	95	96
97	98	99
100	101	102

SEREF TABLOSU

Hafanun Ta
MARMAR
Hafanun Hakem
Hafanun Kare A

Gol Krallığı
Gol Krallığı
Gol Krallığı

İN DÜRLÜMÜ

İN DÜRLÜMÜ	İN DÜRLÜMÜ	İN DÜRLÜMÜ
1	2	3
4	5	6
7	8	9
10	11	12
13	14	15
16	17	18
19	20	21
22	23	24
25	26	27
28	29	30
31	32	33
34	35	36
37	38	39
40	41	42
43	44	45
46	47	48
49	50	51
52	53	54
55	56	57
58	59	60
61	62	63
64	65	66
67	68	69
70	71	72
73	74	75
76	77	78
79	80	81
82	83	84
85	86	87
88	89	90
91	92	93
94	95	96
97	98	99
100	101	102

“Faiz beni batırdı!..”

Sanayicim. Daha doğrusu sanayici idim. Artık değilim.
Çünkü battım. Faizden!

Oysa daha düne kadar işlerim iyi gidiyor sanıyordum. Üretim iyiydi. Ürettiğimi hem iç, hem de dış pazarlarda pazarlama imkânım vardı. Artan talepleri karşılayabilmek için üretim tesislerimin kapasitesini arttırmaya karar verdim ve nasıl olsa öderim diye faizle banka kredisi aldım. Ama ödeyemedim. Talepler de birden azaldı. Kurduğum tesisler, aldığım yeni makineler yatıyor. Birden her şey tersine döndü. Kredi faizlerini bile ödeyemez oldum. Öbür yanda vergi borcu... vadesi çoktan dolmuş senetler... işçilerin ücretleri. Ne yapacağımı şaşırdım. Beni faiz batırdı!..


Üzücü bir durum. REFAH PARTİSİ, faizle iş yapmanın aslında büyük zararlara yol açtığını yıllardır söylüyor. Faizle iş yapan, sonunda mutlaka kaybediyor. Çünkü faiz kazancı kemiriyor. Ne yazık ki bu sistem, faizi meşrulaştırdı.

REFAH PARTİSİ, “Adil Ekonomik Düzen” anlayışı ile faizci sistemi kökünden kazıyacak. Çünkü faiz haksızlıktır, zulümdür.

**Refah Partisi,
Faizci Kapitalist Düzeni Değiştirecek!..**

Çalışanın kazancının %80'inin başkaları tarafından sömürülmesi demektir. Dolayısıyla bu, insanımızın kazancının büyük bir kısmına, faizi yürürlükte tutanlar tarafından el konulması anlamına gelir.

Faiz sorununun çözülmesi, enflasyonun ve hayat pahalılığının ortadan kalkması demektir. Refah iktidarında dürüst ve yetenekli olan herkese yatırım ve üretim için faizsiz kredi verilecek.



REFAH PARTİSİ

“Yeni bir dünya”

Genel Başkanlığı
Kültür
Çevre”, “Çevre
Masalar”,
ADUS
gibi konular
kan
ne
11 milyon ceza
Denizi
Belirlenen ABD
gemi, 100
para cezasına
Anakent
nden yapılan
da, “Cape
13 bin 211
gemiye,
Çocuklarında
sarı ve pis
çesaltığı
para cezası
bildirildi.
Emre
sozyumu
Atatürk Kültür
düzenlediği
Yunus Emre
Türk Dil
Korferans
dünyayı
Gökhan
’u sadece
düzeyinde
gerekliğini
Dün felsefesine
bizim somut
çözüm
politikalar
öncelik etmek
dedi.
gazla
otobüs
Türkiye’de
çalışabilen ilk
DOTÜ’de
bildirildi.
yapılan
meda,
1990 yılında
Prof. Dr. Selçuk
Doç. Dr. Demir
Prof. Dr. Cahit
Doç. Dr.
Albayrak’tan
grupun önce bir
otorunu doğal
çalıştırmayı
daha sonra
otobüse
bildirildi.
Senatör
saç öldü
ARA - Kirşehir
Senatörü Emrah Akp
dün Ankara’da
Albayrak, 1977-1980
arasında
mentoda görev
66 yaşında ölen
için bugün
de tören
lanacak.

“Emekli insan huzur ister...”


Emekliyim. 25 yıl devlet hizmetinde çalıştım. O günlerde iyiydik, kıymetimiz biliniyordu. Şimdi her şey değişti. Büyüklerimiz “Emekli ettik, gönderdik” diye düşünüyorlar. Yoo... öyle değil! Emekli oldu diye insanlar bir köşeye atılmamalı. Devlete hizmet ettiğimiz günler ne çabuk unutuldu!

Emekliler çalışmıyor. Çoğumuz kahve köşelerinde sürünüyoruz. Nereye gidelim, ne iş yapalım? Üç ayda bir verdikleri maaşlarımızı alana kadar canımız çıkıyor. Maaş kuyrukları tam bir işkence! Emekli insan huzur ister. Bizde huzur yok. Ama sorumlularımız çok!

Size saygı duyuyoruz. Çünkü siz yıllarca çeşitli hizmetlerde görev yaptınız. Bugünkü durumunuz elbette daha iyi olmalı. Sadece üç ayda bir emekli maaşı ödemek emeklilere olan vefa borcunun ödenmesi için yeterli değil. REFAH PARTİSİ, emeklilerin daha huzurlu yaşamalarını sağlayacak bir “emeklilik hayali” vaat ediyor. Emeklilerimizin

de, diledikleri takdirde üretime katkıda bulunmalarına imkân verecek bir program hazırlıyor. REFAH PARTİSİ, emeklilerimizi kahve köşelerinden kurtarıp huzur içinde yaşamalarını sağlayacak. Emeklilerimizin, enflasyonun genişinde kalan maaşlarını artırarak diğer bütün sorunlarını çözecek. Ülke içinde ve dışında, tedavi masrafları devletçe karşılanacak.

**Refah Partisi İktidarında Emekli Olmak,
Huzurlu Olmak Anlamına Gelecek!**



**REFAH
PARTİSİ**

“Yeni bir dünya”

UEFA'ya şikâyet edildiler.

Gaziantepspor, her iki ş...
talvan kulübü tarafından...

Avr...
Motel...
bankette ol...
Ancak kokteylden...

Öte yandan olaya şahit o...
lanlar ise: Necmi Gençalp'ı...

patlelerinden...
Kocibey Dakar...
90'ye Arme, Utku ve Mus...

lanit düzenlenen ve usun...
eknoloji ile vahşi doğanın...

SPOR

B... G...

“Babamı işten attılar!..”

Babam bir fabrikada işçiydi. “Fabrika zarar ediyor” deyip, babamı işten attılar. Şimdi aylardır işsiz. Dedemin yardımıyla geçinmeye çalışıyoruz. Bu yıl liseye başlayacaktım. Fakat babam okul masraflarımı karşılayacak durumda olmadığı için, okula gidemiyorum. Oysa ben okumak istiyorum! Bu gidişle nasıl okuyacağım, okul masraflarımı kim karşılayacak?

Ülkemizde milyonlarca işsiz var. Bu çocuğun babası da onlardan sadece biri. Onun babası da Batı'nın sunduğu reçeteleri uygulayan yöneticilerin kurbanı oldu. Bizi yoksulluğa sürüklemekten başka hiçbir işe yaramayan bu reçeteler sayesinde, yolunu kaybeden bir millet olduk. Oysa zengin yeraltı ve yerüstü

kaynaklarımız akıllıca değerlendirilmiş olsaydı, Türkiye’de işsizlik bu boyutlara ulaşmazdı. REFAH PARTİSİ, mevcut kaynaklarımızı en iyi şekilde değerlendirecek ve herkese yeni iş imkânları sağlayacak. Öte yandan, işsizlik sigortası ile işçi ve memur güvence altına alınacak.

**Refah İktidarında
Babalarınız İşsiz Kalmayacak!**



**REFAH
PARTİSİ**

“Yeni bir dünya”



ık'taki Süleymaniye kenti y
ri kentin göbeğinde teshi

uz hirs

kalacağı bildirildi.
in, BM'ye yaptığı bu
Kürdistan Yurtsever Be
labani de, Türkiye'nin K
kleştirdiği operasyonda
mu açıkladı. İngiliz Do
etkilileri, Talabani'nin ö
nden sorumlu Devlet Be
gg ile yaklaşık 50 dakika
Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak
sınır ötesi operasyonun
işleri dile getirdiğini kay

tehd

kisi bulunmadığı
ederdi. Türkiye
muz değildir. Biz
dost olamayız."

•TEHDİT
KDP lideri,
aynca, Türkiye
sınır ötesi hareketi
halinde hareketin
cıklarını bildirdi.
"Türkiye bir
bir harekatta bulun
mergelerini siz
Sivil Kürt halkı za
biz de Pesmergele
topraklarına gös
leşmiş Milletler ge
lanan yerleri gör
manlık mı değil m
sin."

EL...

TAKSİT	TOPLAN
4x172.000	860.000
4x213.000	1.065.000
4x247.000	1.235.000

nibir ölü ve rançe göre de
KDV ve MONTAJ dahil

ABİN

sorumluluktur
125 5 486,
22. BARTIN Kemal Camo 11
NTEP Boydar Köll. Sa. 11 97
mköy Alanlar A.S. 250 49 12
27. Mecidiyeköy Dağı. 1
90
İZMİT Akar Köll. Sa. 11 025

çıkmadığından 59 mil
lira, 13 bilen çıkmadığı
271 bin 870 lira 8. haf
bilen 7 kişi ise 38 milyon
kramiye kazandı.

GENÇLERBİRLİĞİ'nde
üzücü gün..
Kırmızı-Siyahlı ekibin
genel kaptanı Yaşar Kayal'ın
oğlu dün vefat etti.

Dün önce hasta olan Kayal
in oğlu Çağlayan'ın ölümü
Gençlerbirliği camiasında
üzüntü yarattı.
Bu arada Kırmızı-Siyahlı
takım, sabah antrenmanını

mek için erken bitirdi. Çağla
yan'ın cenazesi dün öğle
namazını takiben toprağa ve
rildi. Milliyet merhuma Tanrı'
dan rahmet, ailesine başsağlığı
diler..


sağlık, doping, kusuruları, sporda şid
det hareketleri, harkes için spor ve beden
sel yetenek araştırmaları konusunda
görüşlerini sunacak.
Kamiloğlu ile Şipal Perşembe günü
yurda geri dönecek.

buçukları çıkarıyor. İşte buhar için Sınımlı
olan o ilk golü atmak." dedi.
Biz de diyoruz ki bizim için önemli
olan o Lineker'in hayalindeki golü at
tırmamak. Bunun için de özellikle
savunmamıza büyük görev düşüyor.

arayışında yitmiş, sorduruyoruz.
Çünkü, Weahley gibi bir futbol arc
nasında sonucun ne olacağını Piontek bile
uygun bir lisanda tarif edemediğine göre,
biz bilinmez bir kehanete niye soyunalım
ki?

Demokrasi mi?..”

Bu ülkede demokrasi var mı gerçekten? Ben inanmıyorum. İnsanlar
"Bu ülkede demokrasi var" diye aldatılıyor. Demokrasinin olduğu bir
ülkenin hapisanelerinde fikir suçlarının ne işi var?
İnsanlar, inançlarına göre yaşayamıyor. Özgür düşünce nerede kaldı?
İnsan hak ve özgürlükleri sadece lafta var. İşkence? Düşünmek bile beni
hükütüyor. Şu seçim yasasına bakın. Demokrasilerde yasalar böyle mi
olmalı? Resmi ideolojinin dışında, parti kurmanız mümkün değil.
Demokrasilerde kitaplar toplatılıp yakılır mı? "Demokrasi var" diye
aldatıldığımı hissediyorum. Doğrusu ben buna demokrasi
diyemiyorum!..



Kadar doğru. REFAH PARTİSİ, bu
ülkede demokrasi olmadığını yıllardır
söylüyor. Bu ülkede demokrasi yok, hile
rejimi var. İnsanlar adalet karşısında eşit
değil. Güya 141, 142 ve 163. maddeler
aldırıldı. Ama "Anti-Terör Yasası" diye,
bu kötü bir yasa konuldu. Oysa herkes

inandığı gibi yaşamalı, inandığı değerler
çerçevesinde örgütlenebilmeli, çocuklarını
bu değerler doğrultusunda eğitebilmeli. Hatta
kendi kanununu kendisi yapabilmeli.
Bir seçim yasası var ki evlere şenlik!
Bunun demokrasi olmadığını REFAH
PARTİSİ'nden başka hangi parti söylüyor!

Türkiye'deki Demokrasi Değil, Hile Rejimi!..



REFAH PARTİSİ

"Yeni bir dünya"

“Başkalarının hayatının kadınıyım. Ya kendi hayatım?..”

Ben bir hayat kadınıyım. Hayatımı bir anlatsam, ciltler dolusu roman olur. Bu işi isteyerek mi yapıyorum sanıyorsunuz? Kim sever böyle pis işi. Her türlü hastalık bu işte. Parayı bastıran, bizimle gününü gün ediyor. İstersen yapma. Fedailer döverken ‘Allah yarattı’ demiyorlar. Yaşadığımız hayat, hayat değil. Kurtulmak istiyorum, kurtulamıyorum. Öyle batmışım ki, gırtlığımıza kadar. Umutlarımızla oynayıp bizi bu yollara düşürerek zengin olanlar, “vergi rekortmeni” olup, topluma sevimli gösteriliyor. Asıl namussuz onlar. Elim, bizi kötü yolları düşürenlerin iki yakasında olacak. Ben dışlanmış bir hayat kadınıyım. Kendi hayatı olmayan bir hayat kadını.

Sizi anlıyoruz. Bu sistem hayatı sizlere zindan etti. Çünkü fuhuş sektörü, bu düzenin bir parçası. Faiz, fuhuş... bunlar olmazsa bu düzen yaşayamaz. Onun için sizleri kötü yola düşürüyorlar. Bu düzen, insanları faize, fuhuşa bulaştırıyor. Ekonomik sorunlarından ötürü evlerinden kaçıp, fuhuş tacirlerinin eline düşen binlerce genç kızımız var.

REFAH PARTİSİ, toplumun bu kanayan yarasını mutlaka tedavi edecek. REFAH PARTİSİ, kadının bir eğlence aracı haline getirildiği, fuhuşun içine itildiği bir düzene hayır diyor. Onurlu bir yaşam herkes gibi sizin de hakkınız. Size onurlu ve temiz bir hayat vaadediyoruz.

Refah Partisi, Sizi Bu Hayata Mahkum Eden Düzeni Değiştirecek!



REFAH PARTİSİ

“Yeni bir dünya”

Arayın

Hidayat GÜNEL / Berkant KİPOZ

Yeni bir dünya...
ANAP, dördüncü araştırmada...
DYP'den sonra...
İkinci olarak...
İttifakında da gözlen...
Önceki araştırmaya na...
2.1'dir. Dikkati çeken...
Arasızlar oranındaki yüz...
erken genel seçim araştı...
GHP'nin oy oranları de...
İttifakın, DSP'nin oy oranı...
Azalma göstermiştir.
Önceki araştırma sonuçları şö...
yüzde 21.4, SHP yüzde 2...
27.0, DSP yüzde 11.4, İtt...
CP+İDP) yüzde 13.6, k...
0.0, SP/Bağımsız yüzde...
yukarıda belirtilen dikka...
birlikte mütalaa edilirdi...
dardan, ANAP ve İttifak'a...
öylenilebilir.

40'İ İYİMSER
...ndan, GALLUP araştırma...
...deki gelişmelere iyims...
... yüzde 40'lardaki oranı...
...kadır. Bu da partilerin k...
...yan yine hoşgörü ortamı...
... seçimleri götürme olgusu...
...nabilir.
...LLUP'un yedinci erken gene...
...masının sergilediği partile...
...masında, bu hafta da DYP...
...lerden aldığı oy oranı olar...
...alma durumunu korumakt...

MERSİN İSTİY

1163 Sayılı K
Mersin'de Kurul

(x) m² s	
80	2 Oda, 1 Salon
100	3 Oda, 1 Salon
120	3 Oda, 1 Salon

AYLIK ÖDE

Sececeğiniz konut tipini
Konut kredisi bütün üye
Emlak Bankası Mersin Ş
Şubesindeki 56063-0 r
Havale dekontu ile bir
vesikalik fotoğrafı ad:
adresinize gönderilece
ADRES: S.S. SOYDAŞ KONUT
hönü Cad. Anadolu Sk

80 m²	5.760.000 T.L
100 m²	7.200.000 T.L
120 m²	8.640.000 T.L

Son Katılım Tar
Konutlar Kayıt tarl.
Taksitle:
NOT : Sadece SO

...yürülmüşler. Eskişehir, Tekstil de
...yorlar. Necati Levant, "Eğer SHP
...oy alsaksı barajı aşarsız ve mücadele
...DSP arasında geçer" diyor.
...deki canlanma SHP açısından dü-
...Sivas'ta seçim bölgesinin ikiden
...
...o seçimin çok ayrı bir tarafı var. Sivas'ta 4-0
...esez rüzgarların ANAP'ta estiğini söyleyebilir-
...sınız? Soaç DYP'nin 4-0 galibiyetidir" diyorlar.
...DYP gibi en rahat partilerden biri de Sosyal-
...demokrat Halkçı Parti. Gerçekte Isparta'da Sosyal-
...demokrat Halkçı Parti'li olmak oldukça zor.
...birlikten Erbakan'ın İsparta'da
...şun sayılır bir oy artışı sağlayacağı muhtemel.
...Ecevit'in DSP'si de Isparta'da havi atan bir başka
...sol parti. Tahmin DYP'nin 4-0 galibiyeti.
...Sürpriz 3 DYP 1 ANAP.
...ilk günden Ermenek'teki İzzet Emmiyet Müdü-
...rü Naci Parmaksız'ın isteğiyle baş yapıyor için il örgü-
...tünü küstüren, aynı şekilde Karaman seçiminin
...de tepkisini çeken DYP, bir türlü toparlanamamış.
...Dışa dönük mücadele yerine, Karaman-
...gini de alacağını savunuyorlar.

'Kadınım. Yani insan!..'

Kadınım. Yani insan! Ama insan olduğum unutuluyor. Oysa kadının toplumdaki yeri çok önemli. Türkiye'de kadın eziliyor...değersiz bir eşya gibi kullanılıyor. Modern dünyada kadının cinselliği ön plana çıkarılıyor. Güzel kadınlar, bir ticarî meta haline getiriliyor. Çalıştığı iş yerinde, "ucuz işgücü" olarak değerlendiriliyor. Kadın, evinin işlerini yapmak, çocuklarını büyütmek ve gerektiğinde dışarıda çalışmak yetmiyormuş gibi, bir-de kocasından dayak yiyor. Hayır. Bunlar olmamalı. Kadın, saygı görmeli, hakları korunmalı. Çünkü kadın, önce insandır.

Yerinde bir tesbit. Ama maalesef, çağdaşlık adı altında, kadını hiç hakemediği bir yere konuluyor. Oysa onun gerçek yeri, bugün bulunduğu yer değil. Kadın, modern dünyanın kurbanı. REFAH PARTİSİ iktidarında kadın bir ticarî meta haline getirilemeyecek.

Kadınların hakları korunacak. Kadın, adalet önünde, erkek ile eşit haklara sahip olacak. REFAH PARTİSİ, kadını dört duvar arasında kapatmayacak. Ona, toplumda hakettiği saygınlığı, önemli yerini iade edecek. Kadın, REFAH PARTİSİ iktidarında ezilmeyecek.

Refah Partisi, Kadının İnsanlık Onurunu Çiğnetmeyecek!



REFAH PARTİSİ

"Yeni bir dünya"

Anıjans

BUGÜN MI OLDU?

Baştarafı 1. sayfa
...Büce, liderler arasında
...yi kullanan oldu. Hemen her
...er komuda, seyirci çoğunluğuna
...Miting meydanlarında yeni
...imajını büyük ölçüde silmiş.
...i tartışmaya hiç girmemiş. Baş-
...çılara önceden yapılan "Açık
...ra satışlarımız, cevap kiti-
...ü var mıydı? Bilmiyoruz. İ-
...le bir polemğe girmemiş. B-
...şur. Öylece, seyircilerin baş-
...l bu işleri biliyor. Tecrübe-
...i toparlayabilir" ilenimi
...irse yeniden karga çıkar" t-

...isine ayrılan zamanı -ANAP
...ve Demirel'i eleştiren birka-
...zla, partisinin programını
...onuların çeşitliliği ve prog-
...li oluşu, hep aynı yeterince
...tat hiç olmazsa "satar-başlar-
...mik ve sosyal alanda yap-
...mü."
...da her lider, vermek istedi-
...e başarılı oldu?
...karındaki gibi. Demirel'in
...ri, sanıyoruz daha yüksek
...değerlendirmesi kendine göre
...dur. TRT'nin böylece, 1984
...arak, "kamyonunun serbet-
...baharına" sardı.
...n bundan sonrası için bir be-
...mızda birkaç gün öncesi
...olduğumuz, "kamyonunun
...da baharına" cabaları, tar-

EN


Kim ister gecekonduya yaşamayı?..”

İster miydik köyümüzü bırakıp buralara gelmeyi. O temiz havayı, baba yadigarı toprağı... arada bir gidip Fatiha okuduğum anamın-babamın mezarını. Ne varsa satıp savdık, yerimizi yurdumuzu terkedip geldik bu şehre. Kolumdaki bilezikleri bozdurduk, kenardaki birkaç kuruşu da ekleyip diktik gecekonduyu, nasıl olsa çok para kazanınca daha iyi bir ev yaparız diye. Ama olmadı. O gün bugündür gecekonduyuz. Kocam seyyar satıcılık yapıyor. Kaybolduk bu kocaman şehirde, dikis tutturamadık. Bizi iki göz odada yedi nüfus yaşamaya mahkûm ettiler. Yoksa kim ister gecekonduya yaşamayı?..

Sizler, şehirlerde ‘üçüncü sınıf’ insan muamelesi görüyorsunuz. Bunu elbette hak etmiyorsunuz. Sorunlarınız büyük. Yaşadığınız yerlerde doğru dürüst su yok, yol yok. Sağlık sorunlarınız sayılamayacak kadar çok. Çocuklarınızın geleceğinden endişelisiniz. Bir de, üstüne üstlük gecekonduyarınızın her an yıkılma, sizlerin de çoluk-çocuk sokakta kalma tehlikesi var.

Evet, sizler adeta diken üstünde oturuyorsunuz. Bu zamana kadar yöneticiler, köyünüzde kalmanızı sağlayacak tedbirleri alamadıkları gibi, yanlış kentleşme politikaları sonucu size geldiğiniz yerde de hizmet sunamadı. Elbette isteyen istediği yerde oturabilir. Refah Partisi, köyde kalana da, kente gelene de mutluluk sağlayacak projelere sahip tek parti.

Refah Partisi Gecekondu Halkının Yanında!



REFAH PARTİSİ

“Yeni bir dünya”

Avrupa

7. Etiler, Trabzon...
tesisleri yanlış işleniyor ve
hava koşullarından dolayı
Körfez savaşı sırasında
imha edilemediği belirtildi.

anlaşma planı meclisin genel
alınmasını istiyor. Bunun için
tarafı genel sekreterlik görev-
lileri ile görüşmeleri sürdürme-

Karar, tarafların "kendü kar-
rularını yaratmalarını" yo-
lunda uyararak Denktas'a üstü
kapalı bir mesaj yolluyor...

kiyle Federal ordunun "Hirvaziya"
kilnesi konusunda anlaşmaları
Ancak, Federal Başkanlık Konse-
bir açıklama yaparak "Federal birliklerin

one saruda.
Yugoslavya Savunma Bakanlığı Enfor-
masyon Bürosu'ndan dün yapılan bir açıklama da "Lahey'de Yugoslavya Halk

nün bir ayık sürenin gerçekleştiğini
belirtmişti. Hirvatistan Devlet Başkanı
Franyo Tudjman ise anlaşmayı onayladık-
larını söylemişti.

tan çıkaracağından ve
ransın işlevini yitireceği
kaygı duyuyorlar.

Dün
bu
bugü

“Yaşanabilir bir çevre istiyorum!..”

Dünyamız, her geçen gün biraz daha yaşanmaz hale geliyor. Havamız, suyumuz, toprağımız, denizlerimiz inanılmaz ölçüde kirlendi. Doğal güzelliklerimiz turizm uğruna bilinçsizce talan edildi. İçtiğimiz suya karışan fabrika atıkları, ciğerlerimizi yakan egsoz dumanı ne iğrenç! İnsanlar, yaşadıkları çevreye karşı sorumluluk duymalı. Herkes yaşadığı çevreye özen göstermeli, onu temiz tutmalı. Ağaçları kesmeye, fabrikasının atıklarını denizlerimize akıtmaya, soluduğumuz oksijeni kirlletmeye... hatta sokaklara tükürmeye kimsenin hakkı yok. Çünkü dünya hepimizin! Kirlilik, gün geçtikçe artıyor. Nefes alamıyorum! Yaşanabilir bir çevre istiyorum!

Söyledikleriniz doğru. Ancak ortada, pek çoğumuzun görmediği daha önemli bir kirlilik var: insan kirliliği! Çevre kirliliğinin temelinde de insanın kirlenmiş olması yatıyor. İşte insanın yaşadığı çevreye karşı sorumsuzluğu da buradan kaynaklanıyor. Kirlettiği oksijenin kendi soluduğu oksijen; kirlettiği suyun kendi hayatı için gerekli olan su olduğunu düşünmüyor. Bu da, çevre kirliliğinin artmasını hızlandırıyor. Ayrıca yükselen ve gelişen kapitalizmin, daha da gelişmek için çevre kirliliğine katkıda bulunduğu, tabiatın her geçen gün biraz daha

tahrip olmasını sağladığı da ortada. Ozon tabakasının delinmesi gibi, dünyamız için çok tehlikeli bir olayın, kapitalizmin bir sonucu olduğunu unutmamak gerek! Denizlerimize zehirli bidonlarımızı boşaltan, ülkemizi çöplük olarak kullanan kapitalizme “dur” diyebilececek yürekli bir iktidara ihtiyaç var. REFAH PARTİSİ, çevre temizliğinin insan temizliğinden geçtiğini düşünüyor. REFAH PARTİSİ, “temiz insan, temiz çevre” diyor. REFAH PARTİSİ, temiz bir çevrenin insan hayatı için taşıdığı önemi biliyor.

Refah Partisi, Yaşanabilir Bir Çevre Vaadediyor!



REFAH PARTİSİ

“Yeni bir dünya”

Gün
olmayan
Yıllar
dahi ç
Özal
Ustayla
lar... 12
Çırac z
sonra"
işin sın
Çırac
Bu dö
iç ve c
ru zed
verdi.
Yıla
Çekiş

“Oyumu Amerika’ya vermek istemiyorum!..”

Yıllardır oy kullanırım. Güvenip oy verdiğim liderler bu ülkeyi Amerika’ya bağımlı hale getirdi. Türkiyemiz sanki Amerika’nın bir eyaleti oldu. Bu ülke bizim ülkemiz. Her şey Amerika’nın istediği gibi yürümeli. Toprağımız Amerikan askerlerinin çizimleriyle çignenmemeli. Semalarımızda Amerikan jetleri istediği gibi uçmamalı. Denizlerimizde Amerikan gemileri istediği gibi dolasmamalı. Yöneticilerimiz Amerika ile dostluğa bu kadar önem vermemeli. Ben ükemi seviyorum. Ülkemi Amerikan bağımsızlığımdan kurtaracak bir partiye oy vermek istiyorum.

Haksızız. Ülkeyi yönetenler yıllardan beri Amerika ne derse onu yaparlar. Amerika, İsrail ve diğer Batı ülkelerinin emperyalist çıkarları için, taahhüt ilişkilerimiz olan komşu ülkelerle aramız bozuldu. İsrail’i tarıyanlar, Cezayir’in bağımsızlığında taratsız kaldılar. Millî Görüş iktidarda iken, Kıbrıs sorunu çözülüş, halkı müslüman olan ülkelerle

ilişkilerimiz gelişmişti. AET’ye girmeç veya girmemek gibi bir sorununuz yoktu. Ama bugün, her şey tersine döndü. Bağımsızlığına kavuşan Türk devletlerini tanımakta bile tereddüt ediyorlar. REFAH PARTİSİ, Türkiye’yi siyasi ve ekonomik bağımsızlığına kavuşturacak “Millî Görüş” anlayışını savunuyor. Haysiyetli bir dış politika vaadediyor.

**Refah Partisi,
Tam Bağımsız Bir Türkiye Vaadediyor!..**



REFAH PARTİSİ

“Yeni bir dünya”

bu Amasya’da
sözleri
Erdal İnönü nazır
ax emnen geldi
manya çalıştıgı hem
bir saat kadar t
buğunda, buzele
ta munatop oimam
ta okumayı terditi
te sadece bir kü
paz yemiyor.
ŞAP 20 günü
za kramış, ka
kız, kış, ke paz
seyahat ediyor.
Sivas’a giderken
gazeteciler v
beyan), Teomun L
Muammer Yasar B
ler, Hasan Çermi (G
tıb Gökçe (mün
lık (Terdeman), Az
sanıyor)...
Bcm, Yervuz, Tec
me Beyler le Amasy
as için ayrı bir plan
ve Sivas’a gitmek y
Amasya’da ya
Kudate üzenin
mek... Muammer S
Kuş” adını verdiğ
biz Amasya dan at
Amasya PTT’si, m
gazeteciler göre
smeç diye bir “Ba
Amus Orada, PTT’i
emeyen gay itram
iz yemiyor. Sonra
tı yürüterek vani
tıza’na gonyoruz.
Zaman’ın hemen her
ları ark. Görevi en
kıza kemeye arı
Zamanlar: Kild
k gazeteci doctları
siyasi havayı yan
DYP herde, R
shede sevdiğü için
pazacak gibi, ŞH
vren pesinde...
Sopiere fazla zama
sün partier son atır
nizec hafta ipensin
Heps umudu, hepe
recaılarından oldu
kız hepsinin birde
fimes mümkün de
ünde eşyan binen
Yazarın siyasi hay
den gazetecienn bu
DYP’ın binen p
inliyor. Ankara’da
le moe, Yervuz D
ve Muammer Y
ANAP’ı Mustafa
do dan bir ebi
proje, ANAP be
part olarak çık
öndrecek, aksi d
nel...
Büf manginge
Ezanne yazmış b
n baş: “Yüregi
paz.”
B. soğan da Me
Eben acaba?

Özgeçmişini hatırlıyor. Fazlî'nin benliğini kâğıda
taçla.
► Soru: Devleti yönetenler arasında tari-
katçı var mı?
Dalmaz: Tabii canım... Ekrem Pakdemirli

başkanlık makâmında. Bu ANAP'ın kar-
kariye getiren bir diğer önemli faktör de bu-
gün Güneydoğu'da devletin zaafa uğratıl-
ması. Irkçılığa dayalı bir Kürçüklük an-
layışının hortutulması. Belki biliyorsunuz,

bu soru. A. Necde Şişman bu
değil. Biz o kadar çoktan ağız. Ben ANAP'la
kaldıysam, bertalide Mesut Yılmaz'ın koltu-
ğuna oturdum. Bunu Senara Hamza da
söylemiş. Mesele Türkiye'nin birliğinin, bü-
tünüğünün sağlanması için bir siyasi or-

militer ve kolluğunda istifa ederim.
► Soru: Hemen mi seçime gideceksiniz?
Dalmaz: Hayır, tabii ki belli bir müddet
sonra. Bir, bir buçuk sene içinde. Çünkü
alınması gereken acil tedbirler var.

menüsüne. Köşk'te takılması
düküme zorda bırakırken,
Yılmaz'ın da yakın çevresinde
Özal'ın tutumuna sert tepki
gösterdiği, "Ba, engellenmedi"
dediği ileri sürülüyor.

Retah zayıf. DYP ile DSP açma salıyortur.
Keçiören'de ise beşinci tüm partileri ördüküyor.
bölünme SHP'nin işine yarayacak gibi. Ama Refah
ANAP da birincilikte iddialı. DYP barajı aşabilirse tek
kili çıkarabilir.


“Bir lider istiyorum...”

Türkiye, sorunlar ülkesi oldu. İçeride sosyal refah seviyesi çok düşük. Anarşi sürüyor. Güneydoğu, akıbeti belli olmayan bir karmaşayla başbaşa. Halkta huzur kalmadı. Dışarıdaki itibarımız yok olma noktasında. Dış borçlarımız 50 milyar doları aştı, her yıl milyarlarca dolar da faiz ödüyoruz. Batılılar, bir telefonla her şeyimize karışıyor. Liderlerimiz ise buna direnmek yerine, telefon görüşmelerini bir şeref kabul ediyorlar. Batılıların oyuncağı olduk! Liderlerimiz, Batılıların ördüğü ağın dışına çıkamıyor. Oysa bu ağı delemek onurlu, kişilikli ve yürekli bir lider olsa, alınımız ak, başımız dik olur.

Size hak vermemek mümkün değil. Bütün bunlar, aslında çözülebilir nitelikte sorunlar. Bir kere yeraltı ve yerüstü kaynaklarımız zengin. Nüfusumuzun büyük çoğunluğu 35 yaşın altında. Daha da önemlisi, yüzyıllara dayalı bir devlet tecrübemiz var. Yani her şey elverişli. Ancak, Washington'dan gelen telefonlarla ülkeyi yönetenler, sömürüyü artırdılar.

Oysa bu kaynaklar, yabancıların baskısına direnebilen inançlı ve yürekli bir liderin etrafında bütünleşen kadrolar tarafından değerlendirilebilir. Sizin de aradığınız bu lider, aslında size çok yakın. REFAH PARTİSİ lideri, 20 yıldan beri zaten bunları söylüyor... şahsiyetli bir dış politika ve kendi kaynaklarımıza dayalı bir kalkınma modelini savunuyor.

Aradığınız Gerçek Lider, Erbakan!



REFAH PARTİSİ

“Yeni bir dünya”

HASAR ANAP'ın seçim bürolarına
hidroya sabaha karşı ablan paltayıcı çev-
re (Fotoğraf: Ali Fuat Duatepe)

TÜRK HAVA YOLU DUYU

Son yıllarda tüm hava-
trafik koridorlarının ve
yetersiz kalması nede-
çeşitli tehirlere karşı
Bu tehirlere, Yugoslavya
sinin kapanması sonu-
bulunmaktadır.

Avrupa uçuşlarımızda
dollarlarının geçtiği ülk-
luk nedeniyle, uçuşla-
getirilmekte, belirli b-
likleriyle seferlerimiz
Bu da zaman zaman
melere neden olmak

Elimizde olmayan ne-
gecikmeler, uçakları
yakın ortaya çıkmak-
cularımızın binış sal-
bulunmalarını ve an-
etmelerini özellikle
meler için şimdiden

TÜRK HAVA

"Yeni bir Türkiye için başkan seçildi." dedi.

"Silahsızlanma süreci hızla ilerliyor. Bu süreçte eğitimli PKK'lılar da çok silahla otorite boşluğu kamplarıdır" diye konuştu.

"Bu tür olaylar ile gerçekleştirilen eğitim alanının içinde atış eğitimi için panolar da var. Ala-

neli top (20 mm'lik), 300-1000 litrelik klasik parça tesirli bombalar kullanıldı. Napalm bom-

ması ve diğer silahlarla da yapıldı. Bu tür operasyonlar da 2 saat sürdü.

"Bu tür operasyonlar da 2 saat sürdü. Bu tür operasyonlar da 2 saat sürdü. Bu tür operasyonlar da 2 saat sürdü."

"Bu nasıl düzen, anlamıyorum!.."

Türkiye ilginç bir ülke. Hiçbir şey sağlıklı yürümüyor. Huzurumuz yok. Terör ve anarşi devam ediyor. İnsanlarımız hür değil. Her şey küçük bir mutlu azınlığın lehine işliyor. Zenginler daha da zenginleşiyor. Milyonlarca insan hızla fakirleşiyor. Ortadirek yok oldu. Yöneticiler dersenez, milleti hiçe sayıyor. Nedir bu Washington telefonları? Ülkemizi kim yönetiyor? Çarpıklıklar diz boyu. Bir yanda üç-beş kuruşla geçinmeye çalışan emekçiler, diğer yanda kolay para kazanan vurguncular, tefeciler, hayali ihracatçılar. Soygun ve rüşvet her yanı sarmış. Eğitim imkânlarından ancak parası olanlar yararlanabiliyor. Fakir çocuklar, cehalete itiliyor. Nerede kaldı fırsat eşitliği? İnsan hak ve özgürlüklerinin sadece lafı yapılıyor. Baskı ve sömürü nefes aldırıyor. İnsanımız tabular ve dogmalarla eziliyor. Adalet hak getire! Bu düzen, düzen değil. Bakalım huzur ne zaman?

Çok doğru. Bir ülkede iktidarın gücü, insan haklarıyla sınırlı olmalı. İnsanlar huzur içinde ve özgürce yaşayabilmeli. İstedığı gibi inanabilmeli, inancına göre yaşayabilmeli... çocuklarını kendi inançlarına göre eğitebilmeli. Yönetimler, insanlara hizmet vererek, toplumsal gelişmeye katkıda bulunmalı. Ülkemiz büyük bir sosyal dengesizliğe ve hızla artan haksızlıklara sahne oluyor. REFAH PARTİSİ, bu haksızlıkların

ve çelişkilerin üzerine, hakkı üstün tutan "Adil Düzen"i sağlayarak gidecek. Böylece Türkiye, zenginlerin kayırıldığı, fakirin ezildiği, holdinglerin kurtarıldığı, insan hak ve özgürlüklerinin yok edildiği, adaletin sarsıldığı bir ülke olmayacak. Türkiye, Washington'dan değil, Türkiye'den yönetilecek. Emperyalizm, ülkemizin kaynaklarını sömüremeyecek. Fırsat eşitliği sağlanacak. Tabular ve dogmalar yıkılacak!

Refah Partisi, Hakkı Üstün Tutan "Adil Düzen" Kuracak!



REFAH PARTİSİ

"Yeni bir dünya"

Renault 11 TXE Flash öz-
özgürce yaşamayı seven,
sınırlanmış bir hayattan
otomobildir...

Flash gençlerin dilini
kendisi de gençtir.

Hızı, heyecanı sever... Hız
la belirlenen dış çizgileri.

Flash, her an meydan
bir sporunun yüreğine

çevik ve güçlü motoruncu

In rethinking the Welfare Party, with a critical confrontation with secular modern prejudice of Kemalism, the thesis makes an interpretative attempt to analyse the 1991 ads of the WP. By doing so, it is tried to open up our interpretative framework to new meanings, new understandings that would lead to a better understanding of the WP phenomenon. 'Political radicalism' and 'social conservatism' were the two axes, derived from the analysis of the ads that were employed in the thesis. Ziya Gökalp is also applied in understanding the WP tradition's conceptualisation of modernity, the role it has given to Islam in modernity and its social conservatism. Following Davison's interpretation of Gökalp's proposal as an illustration of 'alternative modernities', it is argued that the WP tradition's approach to modernisation as a call for an alternative modernity. However in conclusion, within the framework of tolerance provided by the 'alternative modernities', the thesis went beyond the Kemalist prejudice of regarding the WP as the anti-modern and anti-systemic and conceived the NOP-NSP-WP tradition as one of the fundamental constituents of the 'modern' Turkish politics, emerged as a response shaped within the economical, political and cultural processes of the Kemalist modernisation project.

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