

**INTELLIGENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY:
A COMPARISON OF BRITISH, AMERICAN AND
TURKISH INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS**

A THESIS PRESENTED BY HAKAN FIDAN

**TO
THE INSTITUTE OF
ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**BILKENT UNIVERSITY
MAY, 1999**

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tarafından hazırlanmıştır

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
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
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I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree on Master of International Relations.



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Asst. Prof. Gülgün Tuna

ABSTRACT

One of the main arguments of this thesis is that better intelligence is needed for designing sound foreign policy. While good intelligence cannot guarantee good policy, poor intelligence frequently contributes to policy failure. Then, what are the essentials of good intelligence? How should intelligence agencies be organized? What can bring about reliable intelligence? To answer these questions two countries that are widely acknowledged to incorporate intelligence successfully into foreign policy making and implementation, namely the UK and the US, are examined in terms of the structure of their intelligence systems in support of foreign policy. Therefore answers to the questions of how their systems are organized, overseen and coordinated are sought in this study. Then a comparison between the UK and the USA, which are accepted to have the highest standard in this respect, and the Turkish system is made in order to show differences between the systems. At the conclusion, based on findings from the comparison of the systems, recommendations are proposed to improve Turkish foreign intelligence capabilities.

ÖZET

Başarılı bir dış politika için kaliteli ve güçlü bir istihbaratın gerektiği bu tezin ana argümanlarından biridir. İyi istihbarat her zaman için iyi bir dış politikayı garanti etmezken, kötü istihbarat sıkca yanlış politika üretimine sebep olur. O halde iyi bir istihbaratın esasları nelerdir? Nasıl bir istihbarat yapılanması başarılı bir dış politika için gerekli olan istihbaratı üretebilir? Bu soruları cevaplamak için, istihbaratı dış politikada başarılı bir şekilde kullanan iki ülkenin, Amerika ve İngiltere'nin, istihbarat yapılanmaları incelenmiştir. Bu ülkelerin istihbarat yapılanmalarınının nasıl örgütlendiği, koordine edildiği ve denetlendiğinin cevapları aranmış, daha sonra da Türk istihbarat sistemiyle aralarında mukayese yapılmıştır. Sistemlerin kıyaslanmasından elde edilen verilerle de Türk istihbarat sisteminin daha da geliştirilmesi için bazı öneriler sonuçta verilmiştir.

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INTRODUCTION:

Throughout the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was insular and passive. Turkey focused its energy on internal development and sought to avoid foreign tensions that could divert it from that goal. Therefore Turkey did not need to collect foreign intelligence in any significant way. Instead it heavily relied on intelligence provided by NATO allies.

After the Cold War Turkey started to follow a more activist foreign policy. In joining the Gulf War coalition, Turkey broke several years of its long-standing silence. Since 1993, Turkish forces have participated in numerous peacekeeping, peace-monitoring, and related operations, in Somalia, Bosnia, Albania, Georgia, Hebron, Kuwait (the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission), Macedonia, and Pakistan (training Afghan refugees on mine clearing). As a result of another Turkish initiative, several Balkan states agreed in September 1998 to set up a Balkan peacekeeping force to be deployed in NATO or WEU led operations sanctioned by the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Turkey also proposed a similar force for the Caucasus and a naval peacekeeping force for the Black Sea. In the Balkans, Turkey established working relations with all the states of the region. It developed close ties with Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia. Disintegration of the Soviet Union allowed Turkey to exploit opportunities in the region. It has developed close ties with the Turkic states of the former Soviet Union.

Turkey cannot expect a continuation of intelligence-sharing of the past. It needs foreign/strategic intelligence tailored for its foreign, military, and economic policies. Is Turkey's current intelligence system able to meet its above-mentioned needs? This study

is an attempt to identify the problems of Turkish intelligence structure in terms of providing support for foreign policy decision-making by comparing it with the UK and the US intelligence systems.

Intelligence is a relatively new subject in academic circles although it has been playing a great role in international affairs and foreign policy. Intelligence, therefore, is described as the “missing dimension” of the study of international relations. Among intelligence disciplines foreign intelligence is probably the broadest category, in that it is related to the defense of a country and the conduct of its foreign policy. Supporting diplomats and foreign policy decision-makers is usually a principal mission for foreign intelligence. This support includes providing advance warning of developments in other countries that will or could affect a state's interests. Such advance warnings give policymakers the time to frame an appropriate response and, if possible, to avoid conflicts that might require the introduction of the state's forces. Foreign intelligence can also provide information that assist policymakers in determining which of several diplomatic steps may be most effective. Intelligence also plays crucial role in monitoring of treaties and other agreements.

One of the main arguments of this thesis is that better intelligence is needed for designing sound foreign policy. While good intelligence cannot guarantee good policy, poor intelligence frequently contributes to policy failure. Then, what are the essentials of good intelligence? How should intelligence agencies be organized? What can bring about reliable intelligence? To answer these questions two countries that are widely acknowledged to incorporate intelligence successfully into foreign policy making and implementation, namely the UK and the US, are examined in terms of the structure of

their intelligence systems in support of foreign policy. Therefore answers to the questions of how their systems are organized, overseen and coordinated are sought in this study. Then a comparison between the UK and the USA, which are accepted to have the highest standard in this respect, and the Turkish system is made in order to show differences between the systems. At the conclusion, based on findings from the comparison of the systems, recommendations are proposed to improve Turkish foreign intelligence capabilities.

There are several reasons why the UK and the USA are chosen for comparison with the Turkish system. First of all, the systems of the UK and the USA are those that are mainly imitated and/or followed by many states in the world. Secondly, the type of the regime is important while organizing security and intelligence organizations. Turkey's regime, which is a parliamentary democracy, is similar to Western democracies. This is another reason why these two countries are selected to compare with the Turkish system. Thirdly, it might be said that the UK and the USA have set standards of intelligence both in academic and practical sense.

Turkey has been suffering from foreign policy failures. Answers to whether those failures could be explained by the lack of an appropriate intelligence system that the west operates by are also sought.

This study includes six chapters. Chapter 1 (What Is Intelligence?) is an attempt to provide the reader with a comprehensive but brief definition and explanation of intelligence and of related subjects. It also shows how broad the intelligence discipline is in contrast to perceiving intelligence as a tool of “dirty tricks” and subject of spy movies. The entire intelligence cycle and types of intelligence are explained in the chapter. Thus

the reader will have an understanding of intelligence right from the beginning of the thesis. There are many well-written sources on the subject. Information from major sources are compiled and redesigned. Chapter one is particularly important since the rest of the study is built around the terms provided in the chapter.

Chapter 2 (Intelligence and Foreign Policy) basically aims to explain why good intelligence is necessary to formulate a better foreign policy from a theoretical perspective. It summarizes briefly the importance of intelligence in foreign policy process, in models of foreign policy making, in foreign policy goals, and in foreign policy implementation. The relationship between the policy-maker and intelligence is also discussed. The factors influencing decision-makers' attitudes toward intelligence, such as personal background, leadership style, politicizing intelligence, and setting priorities are explained.

Chapter 3 (The UK System) and Chapter 4 (The US System) are descriptions of the UK and the US systems. How these two intelligence communities are organized, coordinated and overseen in order to serve better their national defense and foreign policy is explained.

Chapter 5 (The Turkish System) deals with the Turkish intelligence community. The organizations in Turkish intelligence community are introduced briefly to the reader under the same headings in chapters 5 and 6. Thus the basic information to compare the systems is completed by the description of the Turkish system.

Chapter 6 (Comparison of the Systems) is new in the field. Even the Western sources lack comparative intelligence studies. Studies on comparative intelligence are limited only to articles and collected essays. However, none of them touches on

comparison of the Turkish intelligence system with any other state's intelligence system. In the first section of chapter 6, three main areas of differences between the systems are discussed. Firstly, structure of intelligence communities, secondly the place given to foreign intelligence within the intelligence community, and lastly oversight and accountability of intelligence community are found to be the main differences between systems.

Chapter 6 also includes the conclusion of this study. Having explained, described and discussed main concepts (intelligence and foreign policy) and successful systems (the UK and the US systems), at the conclusion, recommendations drawn from the comparison of the systems are given to improve the Turkish system. How the Turkish intelligence system should be organized in order to serve better for the national defense and foreign policy is also discussed at the conclusion.

Writing about intelligence bears difficulties due to the nature of the business that intelligence involves. Most of the intelligence operations conducted in the past are still kept in secrecy. Only a small percentage of them is being declassified. Sources on intelligence operations are either declassified intelligence activities, such as Ultra and Magic, or the cases that were accidentally publicized due to scandals involved such as in the Iran-Contra Affair and the Bay of Pigs. Daily intelligence analysis and interaction within the government machinery are naturally secret. Therefore, while investigating the intelligence systems of the states this study follows the descriptive method.

There are vast amounts of American and British sources as well as Canadian on every aspect of intelligence. Most of the sources are so well organized and analyzed that a beginner does not have much to add on the literature. On the contrary the number of

open sources were not nearly enough for the Turkish system. Therefore, an analysis of the collected information was necessary. Hence, most of the emphasis was placed in writing the chapters 5 and 6, which required extensive analysis.

Due to the sensitivity of the subject, namely intelligence, a question may come to one's mind if any classified information is ever used, exposed, searched or put into the thesis. No classified material is used or exposed in this thesis. On the contrary, the foreign open material and sources were so abundant that a problem of scanning, reading and digesting the sources arose.

CHAPTER 1 - WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?

Historical Background:

Intelligence was early recognized as a vital tool of statecraft of diplomacy or war. Writing almost 2500 years ago, the Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu stressed the importance of intelligence. His book *The Art of War* gave detailed instructions for organizing an espionage system that would include double agents and defectors. Egyptian records indicate the extensive use of spies. Hanibal's invasion of Italy (218 B.C.) during the Second Punic War was based on careful intelligence work, which included learning everything possible about the personal traits of the various Roman commanders. Intelligence, however, was properly organized by rulers and military chiefs during the rise of nationalism in the 18th century and the growing of standing armies and diplomatic establishments. In the 19th century Napoleon's strategy and tactics benefited from a comparatively modern intelligence system. The significant step in the creation of modern intelligence was the introduction of scientific methods of information analysis from a wide variety of sources. One of the first to do this was Wilhelm Stieber, the Prussian chief of intelligence under Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck. Intelligence has benefited immensely from technological progress.

Intelligence and the Academic World:

Although espionage and activities of secret services have long been of interest to the public and journalism, it is only since the mid-1970s that they have been objects of systematic academic research. The study of security and intelligence has developed as an inter-disciplinary field drawing upon contributions from history, political science, law, peace and defense studies and sociology. There are two main traditions within the field.

One is the historical approach, which mainly deals with the role of intelligence in time of war, and the other is the political science/international relations concern with intelligence policy. The former has been dominant in the UK while the latter has been more influential in the USA.¹ During the past 25 years, serious research has been made on intelligence. Even two scholarly leading journals have been published for the last 10 years. *Intelligence and National Security* edited by Christopher Andrew and Michael Handel, is one primarily for historians. *The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, edited by F. Reese Brown, is more for political scientists and intelligence professionals.² Intelligence studies have become a recognized part of history and political science courses at universities and colleges in the United States, Canada and Britain. At the last count some 130 of them were identified at 107 institutions. In Britain, for instance, universities with intelligence courses and options include King's College London, Cambridge, Salford, Edinburg, Birmingham, Aberystwyt, St. Andrews and Aberdeen.³

Meredith Hindley, a PhD candidate at American University, has collected a list of dissertations currently being done on intelligence studies. She notes that "the work currently being done by graduate students on the history and practice of intelligence demonstrates how far intelligence studies has come in the past 25 years."⁴ The list

¹ Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power In Peace And War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. XI - XV.

² Earnest May, 'Studying and Teaching Intelligence' *Studies in Intelligence* vol. 38 no. 5 (1995), <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/95unclas/may.htm>

³ Michael Herman, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁴ Meredith Hindley, 'First Annual List of Dissertations on Intelligence' *Intelligence and National Security* vol. 13 no. 4 (Winter 1998), p. 208.

contains 54 entries from six countries. If a more organized attempt had been made, the number of entries in the list would have been much more. A survey of the dissertations suggests four main areas of interest. First, graduate students are taking a close look at the relationship between intelligence and policy making. Second, some of the dissertations explore the role of science and technology in advancing intelligence gathering techniques and ramifications for foreign policy, military planning, and civil-military relations. Third, questions are being asked about the role intelligence plays in influencing a government's perceptions of its allies and enemies, and implications for diplomatic and military affairs. Finally, some studies examine the effects of collaboration and competition between intelligence services and the impact on the success of operations.⁵

What Is Intelligence:

Definition of intelligence and related terms are important in order to provide a clear introduction to the subject. One of the experts in the field describes intelligence as the "information not publicly available, or analysis based at least in part on such information, that has been prepared for policymakers or other actors inside the government. What makes intelligence unique is its use of information that is collected secretly and prepared in a timely manner to meet the needs of policymakers."⁶ An intelligence operation is the process by which governments, military groups, business, and other organizations systematically collect and evaluate information for the purpose of discovering the capabilities and intentions of their rivals. With such information, or intelligence, an

⁵ Ibid.,

⁶ *Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence* Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, www.cofi.com/articles/IntelRpt/cfr.html

organization can both protect itself from its adversaries and exploit its adversaries' weaknesses.

In a broader meaning intelligence has to do with certain kinds of information, activities and organizations: Intelligence refers to "information relevant to a government's formulating and implementing policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats to those interests from actual or potential adversaries."⁷ Intelligence activities or cycle includes collecting, analyzing (evaluation) and disseminating (utilization of) of data.⁸

Intelligence work, including spying, proceeds in a five-step process. Initially, what the decision-makers need to know is considered, and requirements are set. The second step is collecting the desired information, which requires knowing where the information is located and who can best obtain it. The information may be available in a newspaper, radiobroadcast, or other open source; or it may be obtained only by the most sophisticated electronic means, or by planting an agent within the decision-making system of the target area. The third step is intelligence production, in which the collected raw data are assembled, evaluated, and collated into the best possible answer to the question initially asked. The fourth step is communicating the processed information to the decision-maker. To be useful, the information must be presented in a timely, accurate, and understandable form. The fifth and crucial step is the use of intelligence. The decision-maker may choose to ignore the information conveyed, thus possibly courting

⁷ Abraham N. Shulsky, *Silent Warfare: Understanding The World Of Intelligence* (New York: Brassey's, Inc., 1993), p. 1.

⁸ Amos Kovacs, 'Using Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security* vol. 12 no. 4 (October 1997), p. 145.

disaster; on the other hand, a judgment may be made on the basis of information that proves inaccurate. The point is that the decision-maker must make the final crucial judgment about whether or how, to use information supplied. The intelligence process can fail at each or any of these five basic steps.⁹

1.1. TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE:

Intelligence can be divided into two broad categories; the first category is classified according to the field intelligence activities involved: Security Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Commercial/Economic Intelligence, and Criminal Intelligence. The second category is classified according to the methods that intelligence is collected; Human Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, Open Source Intelligence.

1.1.1 Security Intelligence:

Security Intelligence - some prefer to call Domestic Intelligence¹⁰ - deals with threats to a state's security and interest originating internally. Usually terrorist and spying activities inside the homeland are the main areas of concern for security intelligence. Counterintelligence activities that include measures to counter and prevent espionage activities run by hostile states constitute an important part of security intelligence. Most of the developed nations in the west have separate counterintelligence and security intelligence organizations, such as Germany's BfV, United States' FBI, Great Britain's

⁹ Ibid., pp. 145 -146.

¹⁰ Abraham N. Shulsky, op. cit., p. 4.

MI5. Counterespionage utilizes some of the same methods as espionage itself. The best method of crippling an adversary's espionage program is by planting one's own agent (a "mole") into the hostile espionage organization. Another successful practice is to capture hostile spies and turn them into "double agents" that channel false information to their original employers.¹¹

1.1.2. Foreign Intelligence:

"Foreign intelligence", alternatively named *Strategic* or *National* Intelligence, is defined as "information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons."¹² Foreign Intelligence usually encompasses national security, political, economic and social trends in the target nation.

Among intelligence disciplines foreign intelligence is probably the broadest category, in that it is related to the defense of a country and the conduct of its foreign policy in the widest sense. Supporting diplomats and foreign policy decision-makers is usually the principal mission for foreign intelligence. This support includes providing advance warning of developments in other countries that will or could affect a state's interests. Such advance warnings give policymakers the time to frame an appropriate response and, if possible, to avoid conflicts that might require the introduction of the state's forces. Foreign intelligence can also provide information that assists policymakers

¹¹ Ibid., p.

¹² Blair Seaborn, 'Intelligence and Policy: What Is Constant? What Is Changing?' *Commentary* No: 45 June 1994. <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/cng/comment/com45c.html>

in determining which of several diplomatic steps may be most effective. Intelligence also plays a crucial role in support of monitoring treaties and other agreements.

In short foreign/strategic intelligence encompasses two meanings: First, the collection, analysis and dissemination of information about global conditions – especially potential threats to a nation’s security, and second, based on this information, the use of secret intelligence agencies to help protect the nation against harm and advance its interests abroad.

1.1.3. Military Intelligence:

Observing military activities of target nations as well as collecting information about their military force structure, military intelligence "could be either tactical; relating to the disposition of the enemy's troops and equipment in the field; or strategic, relating long term-capabilities in the light of total military strength and the capacity to maintain it."¹³

The mission of military intelligence encompasses not only warning of attack on a state's territory and installations, but also providing information needed to plan and carry out military operations of all kinds. Supporting defense planning is another traditional mission of military intelligence. This mission entails providing information on foreign military capabilities in order that defense planners shape the size, nature, and disposition of military forces. It also includes necessary information to guide military research and development activities and future military acquisition decisions. It encompasses

¹³ Ibid.,

information about foreign military tactics and capabilities, which can then be used to train and protect military forces.¹⁴

1.1.4. Economic Intelligence:

Economic intelligence is described as "policy or commercially relevant economic information including technological data, financial, proprietary commercial and government information, the acquisition of which by foreign states could either directly or indirectly, assist the relative productivity or competitive position of the economy of the collecting organization's country."¹⁵ Economic intelligence is related to the "capabilities and intentions of one's commercial rivals and competitors, often to the acquisition of confidential or proprietary information about their strategies, e.g., bid information, processes, finances or markets."

This activity focuses on those areas that could affect state's national interests, including the economies of foreign countries, worldwide economic trends, and information to support trade negotiations. While much of this information is available from public sources, there were many countries where such information was restricted or not readily available. Economic intelligence filled a considerable void.

Most large corporate enterprises today have divisions for strategic planning that require intelligence reports. Competitive enterprises are undeniably interested in the plans of their competitors; despite laws against such practices, industrial espionage is difficult to detect and control and is known to be an active tool to gain such foreknowledge. Many

¹⁴ Michael Herman, op. cit., pp. 16-19.

¹⁵ Sainuel Porteous, 'Economic Espionage (II)' *Commentary*, No: 46 July 1994. <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/comment/com46e.html>

of the tools of government intelligence work are used, including electronic surveillance and aerial photographic reconnaissance. Attempts are even made to recruit defectors. Recent examples of attempts to obtain economic information are as follows; in April 1993, Hughes Aircraft decided not to participate in the Bourget Airshow after CIA warned the president of Hughes that his company was on a list of 49 American companies targeted by the French; China is reported to be using members of visiting delegations and exchanges to conduct economic espionage in the USA, Canada and other developed countries; business travelers were warned in 1992 not to fly Air France after it was discovered that the French intelligence service was bugging airline seats and using undercover agents to pose as airline passengers and flight attendants.¹⁶

1.1.5. Criminal Intelligence:

Criminal intelligence applies to that which the police should know in order to counter and apprehend those engaged in organized crime, smuggling, extortion, terrorism and the like.¹⁷ Criminal intelligence plays a major role in countering international organized crime. Intelligence focuses upon international organized crime principally as a threat to domestic interest, attempting to identify efforts to smuggle aliens into a state's territory, counterfeit currency, perpetrate fraud on financial institutions, or violate intellectual property laws. It also attempts to assess international organized crime in terms of its influence upon the political systems of countries where it operates.

¹⁶ Samuel Porteous, 'Economic Espionage', *Commentary*, No. 32, 1993. <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/comment/com46c.html>

¹⁷ Abraham N. Shulsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-7.

1.2. COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE

The first phase of the intelligence cycle is collection.¹⁸ At this phase targeted data are collected by using several methods. These methods include human intelligence collection (Humint), technical intelligence collection which has various subfields, and open source collection.¹⁹

1.2.1. Human Intelligence (Humint) Collection

Human intelligence collection, or espionage, is what the term "intelligence" is most likely to bring to mind. Although espionage is only one aspect of intelligence operations, it is an important source of information for any government attempting to learn the secrets of other nations. Its essence is in identifying and recruiting into one's service someone who has access to important information and who is willing, for some reason, to pass it to officers of an intelligence service.²⁰ Typically, such people have access to this information by holding positions of trust in governments. In some cases (especially in wartime), the person providing the information may not be a government official but a private individual who has the opportunity to observe something of interest, such as a ship's arrival in and departure from a harbor.

Usually individuals in two different roles are involved: an intelligence officer, who is an employee of the foreign intelligence service, and the source, who provides the officer with information for transmission back to the intelligence service's headquarters. The intelligence officer, or "handler" maintains communications with the source, passes

¹⁸ Amocs Kovacs, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

¹⁹ Abraham N. Shulsky, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

on the instructions from the intelligence service's headquarters, provides necessary resources (such as copying or communications equipment), and in general, seeks to ensure the continuing flow of information.

Espionage is chosen over other means of intelligence collection when physical acquisition of a document or object is required, or when only an on-the-spot observer can procure the information desired. Espionage methods are generally the same whether conducted for reasons of national security, economic gain, or political leverage. Agents can install wiretaps or "bugs" (concealed microphones), steal, buy, or transcribe documents, steal equipment, or simply observe with their own eyes. Agents convey the information thus acquired to a parent intelligence service by radio, by leaving the information at a "drop," or by hand-delivery either in person or through a courier.

There are several types of espionage agents. The professional spy popularized in fiction is often an "illegal" who passes him- or herself off as a fictitious person complete with forged identity papers. The "illegal" may work alone or establish a spy ring. Another type of agent is the part-time spy who maintains an open, legal existence (often as a diplomat or businessperson) and conducts espionage on the side. A "plant" is an agent who is positioned within the target organization for an extended period of time. The "insider" or "recruit" is a member of the target organization who has shifted loyalties and who produces information on a regular basis. Historically, the "insider" is probably the most productive type of agent. "Insiders" can be recruited by ideological appeals, by offers of money, or by blackmail.²¹

²⁰ Michael Herman, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-62.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 63-66.

1.2.1. Technical Intelligence Collection

All forms and techniques of intelligence are now aided by an accelerating technology of communications and a variety of computing and measuring devices. Miniaturized cameras and microfilm have made easier for persons engaged in all forms of espionage to photograph secret documents and conceal the films. Satellites also have an espionage function - that of aerial photography for such purposes as detecting secret military installations. The vanguard of these developments is highly secret, but it is known that telephones can be tapped without wires, rooms can be bugged (planted with electronic listening and recording devices) without entry, and photographs can be made in the dark.²²

1.2.2.1. Signals Intelligence (Sigint)

Signals intelligence (Sigint) is traditionally considered to be one of the most important and sensitive forms of intelligence. The interception of foreign signals can provide data on a nation's diplomatic, scientific, and economic plans or events as well as the characteristics of radar, spacecraft and weapons systems. Sigint can be broken down into three components: Communications intelligence (COMINT), Electronics intelligence (ELINT) and Radar intelligence (RADINT).²³

As its name indicates, COMINT is intelligence obtained by the interception, processing, and analysis of the communications of foreign governments or groups, excluding radio and television broadcasts. Communications may take a variety of forms--

²² Şafak Akça, 'Elektronik İstihbarat Teknolojisi', *Strateji* no: 96/1, pp. 119-124.

²³ Abraham N. Shulsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-35.

voice, Morse code, radio-teletype or facsimile. Communications may be encrypted, or transmitted in the clear. The targets of COMINT operations are varied. The most traditional COMINT target is diplomatic communications-- communications from each nation's capital to its diplomatic establishments around the world.

Electronic intercept operations are intended to produce electronic intelligence (ELINT) by intercepting the non-communication signals of military and civilian hardware, excluding those signals resulting from atomic detonations. The earliest of ELINT targets were World War II air defense radar systems. The objective was to gather emanations that would allow the identification of the presence and operating characteristics of the radar--information that could be used to circumvent or neutralize the radar (through direct attack or electronic countermeasures) during bombing raids. Information desired included frequencies, signal strengths, pulse lengths and rates, and other specifications. Since that time, intelligence, space tracking, and ballistic missile early-warning radar have joined the list of ELINT targets.

Radar intelligence--the intelligence obtained from the use of non-imaging radar--is similar to ELINT in that no intercepted communications are involved. However, RADINT does not depend on the interception of another object's electronic emanations. It is the radar which emanates electronic signals--radio waves--and the deflection of those signals allows for intelligence to be derived. Information that can be obtained from RADINT includes flight paths, velocity, maneuvering, trajectory, and angle of descent.

The most secure form of transmission is that sent by cables, either landlines or underwater cables. Communications or other signals transmitted through such cables cannot be snatched out of the air. Interception of cable traffic has involved physically

tapping into the cables or using "induction" devices that are placed in the proximity of the cables and maintenance of equipment at the point of access. This might be unobtainable with respect to hardened and protected internal landlines, the type of landline that carries much high-priority, secret command and control communications. Undersea cables are most vulnerable since the messages transmitted by them are then transmitted by microwave relay once the cable reaches land.

A tremendous volume of communications is sent via satellite systems. Domestic and international telephone messages, and military and business communications are among those regularly transmitted via satellite using ultra, very, super, and extremely high frequencies. By locating satellite dishes at the proper locations, an enormous volume of traffic can be intercepted. Ground stations that send messages to satellites have antennas that direct the signals to the satellite with great accuracy; satellite antennas, on the other hand, are smaller and the signals they send back to earth are less narrowly focused--perhaps covering several thousand square miles.

1.2.1.1. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)

Imagery, or IMINT, is the use of space-based, aerial, and ground-based systems to take electro-optical, radar, or infrared images. The raw data for Imagery Intelligence is the aerial photos taken by Unmanned or Manned Aerial Vehicles, and satellites. Both the United States and the former USSR have orbited considerable numbers of reconnaissance satellites for photo surveillance, electronic intelligence, nuclear-explosion detection, and

strategic-missile launch detection. Other nations have also launched a few such satellites.²⁴

The advent of the reconnaissance satellite has revolutionized clandestine collection. In 1961 the United States first orbited its Satellite and Missile Observation System, a photographic-reconnaissance satellite apparently designed for the express purpose of locating and monitoring Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) sites. Since then, the United States and other nations have launched photo reconnaissance satellites on a regular basis. By using satellite sensors for microwave, X-ray, and infrared wavelengths, valuable data can be obtained about land and sea resources. Such sensors can distinguish between land and water, cities and fields, and corn and wheat as well as between distressed corn and vigorous corn.²⁵

1.2.2. Open Source Collection:

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence derived from public information or intelligence which is based on information which can be obtained legally from public sources. Intelligence services have always made extensive use of open sources from studying foreign press to debriefing businessmen and tourists and collaborating with academics and scholars.²⁶

The official definition of OSINT by the U.S. Intelligence Community provides a better and more detailed definition.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 22-28.

²⁵ Ibid.,

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 40-43.

By Open Source we refer to publicly available information appearing in print or electronic form. Open Source information may be transmitted through radio, television, and newspapers, or it may be distributed by commercial databases, electronic mail networks, or portable electronic media such as CD-ROM's. It may be disseminated to a broad public, as are the mass media, or to a more select audience, such as gray literature, which includes conference proceedings, company shareholder reports, and local telephone directories...²⁷

The information revolution and the proliferation of media and research outlets mean that much of a state's intelligence requirements can today be satisfied by a comprehensive monitoring of open sources. As the volume and availability of information from "open sources" has multiplied as a result of the evolution in information technology, ascertaining what relevant information may be on public record has become more difficult. While the use of secret information distinguishes finished intelligence from other analysis, no analyst can ease his or her conclusions solely on secret information without considering what is on public record (open source). Indeed, analysts must have command of all relevant information about their subjects, not simply command of secret information.

1.3. ANALYSING AND DISSEMINATING INTELLIGENCE

Analysis refers to "the process of transforming the bits and pieces of information that are collected in whatever fashion into something that is usable by policymakers and military commanders. The result, or 'intelligence product' can take the form of short

²⁷ Robert D. Steele, *Open Source Intelligence Professional Handbook 1.0*, http://www.oss.nct/proceedings/96 Vol1/Appendix_A.html, 1996.

memorandums, elaborate formal reports, briefings or any other means of presenting information.”²⁸

The collection of raw intelligence is not an end in itself. Once intelligence has been collected, it is typically processed, analyzed, and reported by analysts at the collecting agency who determine its relevance to existing validated requirements. This "raw" or "current" intelligence is then reported electronically or in printed form to the customers and to the all-source analytic organizations in the intelligence community. The all-source intelligence organizations meld these reports with other information available from other intelligence and open sources and provide analytic statements, assessments, and reports on the significance of the information. Such all-source analyses may be performed on topics of long-term interest and broad scope, which are called "estimates," or they may pertain to ongoing or transient events of immediate interest to policymakers.

Computerized data storage systems aid greatly in bringing together the related pieces of information that make up a complete intelligence picture. Human intuition and creativity play important roles in developing the "informed guesses" that fill gaps in the picture. This process of digesting raw intelligence, known as evaluation, yields a product that is usable by policymakers. It is up to the policymaker to utilize the intelligence that he or she receives in a timely and responsible manner.

Intelligence assessment must be policy relevant. Intelligence does not exist for its own sake; it must be relevant to the concerns and problems on which decision and policy must be made. Policymakers need support from intelligence to help deal with uncertainty. Analysts and their analysis are deemed most useful when they; clarify what is known by

²⁸ Abraham N. Shulsky, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

laying out the evidence and pointing to cause and-effect patterns; carefully structure assumptions and argumentation about what is known and unknowable; bring the expertise to bear for planning and action on important long-shot threats and opportunities.²⁹

1.4. COVERT ACTION

Covert action is quite different from intelligence collection and analysis. It is a part of intelligence activities, which is used as an instrument of foreign policy. Such actions seek to influence the political, economic or military situation in a foreign country without revealing the country that planted the covert action.³⁰ Covert actions usually take place in one of the forms given below:³¹

1. Provision of political advice and counsel to leaders and influential individuals in foreign states.
2. Development of contacts and relationships with individuals who, though not in leadership or influential positions at the time, might advance to such positions.
3. Provision of financial support or other assistance to foreign political parties.
4. Provision of assistance to private organizations such as labor unions, youth groups, and professional associations.
5. Promulgation of covert propaganda undertaken with the assistance of foreign media organizations and individual journalists.

²⁹ Jack Davis 'The Challenge of Managing Uncertainty: Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations' *Studies in Intelligence* vol. 39 no. 5, 1996. <http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/96uncclas/davis.htm>

³⁰ Turgut Değerli, *Milli Güvenlik Siyaseti ve Stratejisi*, (İstanbul: Harp Akademikeri Basımevi, 1996), p. 80, Mehmet Atay, 'Örtülü Faaliyetler Konsepti', *Strateji* no. 95/4

³¹ Abraham N. Shulsky, op. cit., pp. 83-109.

6. Establishment of relationships with friendly intelligence services to provide technical training and other assistance.
7. Provision of economic operations by which financial assistance can be provided to foreign states for various purposes but conducted through intermediate sources not overtly connected with the planting state.
8. Provision of paramilitary or counterinsurgency training to regimes facing civil strife where acknowledgment of official involvement is not desired.
9. Development of political action and paramilitary operations that attempt to topple foreign regimes and install successors more favorable to the state planting covert action.

In the past and still today, covert action has always been the way of silent warfare between adversary countries. Cold War years were full of covert operations. Even today it is possible to see activities of nations which fall into one of the covert actions forms given above. Syria, for instance, has been supporting and training, PKK militants in their guerrilla war against Turkey. Thus Syria does not pay a high cost while undermining Turkey's economic and political situation which is a very important foreign policy objective for Syria. Not only Syria but also a number of other states such as Greece and Iraq have allegedly been using PKK in their covert actions. Operations of Turkish security forces have revealed ties between PKK and supporting states.

CHAPTER 2- FOREIGN POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE

Foreign policy is a goal or series of goals that a country hopes to achieve with respect to other countries and international issues. States are not the only actors in international politics, and increasingly a country's foreign policy extends beyond relations with other countries to include interactions with other international actors including international organizations, multinational corporations, alliances, regional organizations, and others. Foreign policy also includes the tools or instruments that a country employs to achieve its international goals. In sum, foreign policy includes how a country decides, what it decides, and how it acts.³²

Intelligence is in fact essential to the maintenance and expansion of political (and military) power.³³ In practice, intelligence rarely affects the determination of policy - although it does happen. Frequently, however, it does affect the execution of policy. Tactical intelligence support adds to certainty and confidence in foreign policy execution; it gives immediacy, practicality, and focus to existing general conclusions.

Intelligence does not exist purely for its own sake. Intelligence activities (collection, analyzing, disseminating, counterintelligence) and machinery (organizations) exist to help the decision-maker decide better in the area intelligence is needed. In other words, taking the necessary action is the last step of the intelligence cycle although it is not named in the intelligence activities list.³⁴

³² Frederic S. Pearson, *International Relations: The Global Condition In Late Twentieth Century*, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1992, p. 111.

³³ Michael I. Handel, *War, Strategy and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 1989), p. 219

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 188-220.

National Security and Foreign Policy: National security policy overlaps with foreign policy, sometimes even they are almost indistinguishable. However, national security differs from foreign policy in at least two respects³⁵: (1) National security purposes are more narrow and focused on security and safety of the nation. (2) National security is primarily concerned with actual and potential adversaries and their use of force. This means there is a military emphasis that is not usually the case in matters of foreign policy. In short, foreign policy is one leg of national security the other one is national defense. Thus, national security usually encompasses all the matters of foreign policy.

Intelligence both serves national defense and foreign policy. This makes intelligence vital for national security, especially during peacetime when the principal arm of national defense, the military, is not in use.

2.1. THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE IN FOREIGN POLICY:

In order to adopt and implement foreign policy, to plan military strategy and to organize armed forces, to conduct diplomacy, to negotiate arms control agreements, or to participate in international organization activities, nations have vast information requirements. As a result of these requirements many governments maintain some kind of intelligence capability as a matter of survival in a world where dangers and uncertainties still exist. The cold war may have ended, but hostilities continue in parts of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

³⁵ Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), p. 5.

One fundamental reason for the existence of the intelligence community is the purpose of reducing uncertainty on political and military issues. The more nations can reduce uncertainty about the capabilities and intentions of their adversaries, the more likely they can avoid conflicts resulting from fear of surprise attack or from other mistakes. Foreign/Strategic intelligence, in short, can have a stabilizing effect on world affairs. Conducting and avoiding diplomatic surprise also require intelligence and counter intelligence activities.³⁶

2.1.1. Foreign Policy Process and Intelligence:

The foreign policy process is how a country decides on policy and its implementation. Policy choices are influenced by who makes decisions and how decisions are made. Within a particular type of government, such as a democracy, there is no single foreign policy process, but rather a variety of processes. There are several explanations about how and why the policy process varies. The most common is the idea that different types of issues are processed differently. One distinction is between crisis and non-crisis policy. Crisis policy is normally decided by the political leader (such as the president or prime minister) and a small circle of the leader's close advisors with little general debate or public dissent. Non-crisis policy is subject to wider discussion and dissent and may even be decided by lower levels of the government.³⁷ In both cases intelligence plays a vital role in policy process. Crisis or non-crisis, a policy can not be effective without proper intelligence provided in a timely manner.

³⁶ Michael I. Handel, op. cit., p.

³⁷ Frederic S. Pearson, op. cit., pp. 203 -206.

2.1.1. Models of Foreign Policy Making and Intelligence:

There are a number of models of the foreign policy process. One of the most common is the "rational-actor model." This model suggests that policymakers examine their options, define their goals, examine the various alternative ways of achieving their options, and select the most effective method to implement the chosen policy.³⁸ This model requires reliable intelligence. Without the intelligence rational actor model does not work properly.

Another view is the "bureaucratic model." Here, various parts of the executive branch have differing views of what policy should be. These views are based, in part, on the divergent, self-interested goals of bureaucratic units. Policy, according to this model, is the result of the struggle among the bureaucratic actors.³⁹ Since the national security institutions such as military and intelligence agencies are parts of the bureaucratic mechanism, intelligence has a word to say in the bureaucratic model too.

2.2. Foreign Policy Goals and Intelligence:

The international goals that a country is trying to achieve range from the very specific (resolve a border dispute) to the general (enhance the country's influence). In an international system of sovereign, often competing, countries, foreign policy goals are usually self-interested objectives. Less frequently, goals may be cooperative among several countries (alliance behavior) or, still less often, motivated by idealism (humanitarian foreign aid). When countries pursue self-interested goals, they are said to

³⁸ John Spanier, *Games Nations Plays*, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993), p.647.

³⁹ Frederic S. Peterson, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-22.

be following their "national interest." In pursuing national interest policies countries have vast intelligence requirements. The following lines explain the elements of national interest.

The core element of national interest is national defense providing for the physical safety of a country's citizens. A second element is providing for the economic prosperity of the country insofar as it is affected by the supply of resources, trade balances, monetary exchange rates, and other factors of the international political economy. A third element of national interest is providing a favorable political environment. At a minimum this includes the ability of a country's citizens to choose their own form of government, and it may also include promoting values (individual rights) and processes (democracy) in other countries that are compatible with one's own values and processes. A fourth national interest element is ensuring national cohesion. This means avoiding foreign policies or other pressures (separatist movements that threaten civil war), irreconcilable domestic divisions, or other clashes that could fragment the country.⁴⁰ None of these elements of national interest can be satisfied without proper intelligence and counter intelligence activities.

2.3. Foreign Policy Implementation and Intelligence:

Countries have a variety of instruments by which they can attempt to achieve their foreign policy goals. These tools include military instrument, penetration and intervention instrument, diplomatic instrument and covert operations. The degree to which a country can use any of these instruments will vary according to the country's power, which is

⁴⁰ K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, (London: Prentice/Hall, 1974), pp. 136-139.

defined as its ability to force or persuade another country to act in a desirable way. A country may be powerful in some ways and not in others. Japan has vast economic power and much less military power. The former Soviet Union had enormous military power and little economic power. The applicability of power will also vary with the situation. The military instrument relies on the implicit or explicit threat to use force and the actual use of force. The possession of military power is also a tool because it enhances a country's reputation and increases its influence. Despite its staggering economy and political disarray, the Soviet Union remained a superpower because of its military capability.⁴¹

Cross-border invasion is now less acceptable behavior, although some still justify the application of limited force, especially within implicitly recognized spheres of influence by a major power (the U.S. incursions into Grenada and Panama, for example). Penetration and intervention involves trying to manipulate another country's domestic political situation and process. This instrument can be accomplished through such methods as propaganda, military support of dissidents, co-opting political leaders, sabotage, and terrorism.

The diplomatic instrument involves communicating with another country. Methods include direct, government-to-government negotiations and presenting its case in the arena of an international organization. The United Nations, for example, is the forum for debates and diplomatic maneuvering on a wide variety of issues, and it has rendered decisions (often rejected or ignored) on many international disputes.

⁴¹ John Spanier, *op. cit.*, pp. 371-462.

Covert action, as explained in Chapter 1, is a part of intelligence activities. Foreign intelligence activities, particularly the covert actions are widely conducted by countries to implement foreign policy. As noted by one of the experts in the field "every nation with a capacity for covert action finds it a virtually irresistible alternative at times to more overt instruments of foreign policy, such as overt war and diplomacy. Open warfare is always too noisy and formal; diplomacy is often too slow and frustrating."⁴²

2.2. DECISION-MAKERS AND INTELLIGENCE:

Decision-makers usually have little knowledge of the whole intelligence cycle, especially about those which occur behind the scenes; collection, exploitation, processing, and evaluation of raw data.⁴³ Therefore from the perspective of the intelligence professional, policy makers usually do not pay necessary attention that intelligence deserves. In fact several reasons are involved in shaping the relationships between decision-makers and intelligence.

2.2.1. Personality and Leadership Style: The type of relationship between intelligence and decision-maker is heavily affected by the management style that surrounds the intelligence community and the whole government machinery. In a democratic society, for instance, the attention that intelligence attracts would be much more different from

⁴² Loch K. Johnson, 'Strategic Intelligence: An American Perspective', in A. Stuart Farson (ed.) *Security and Intelligence In A Changing World: New Perspectives For The 1990s* (London: Frank Cass 1991), p. 60.

⁴³ Kevin Stack, 'Competitive Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security* vol. 13 no. 4 (Winter 1998), p. 194.

the one in a totalitarian system.⁴⁴ No leader is expected to accept intelligence estimates without first considering their relevance to his/her preferred policy or strategy. Hitler or Stalin could not tolerate information that contradicted their own beliefs or policies.⁴⁵ On the other hand “intelligence- based action is the antithesis of leadership by ideology.”⁴⁶ “It is particularly noteworthy that many policy disasters have occurred when intelligence was not consulted. When statesmen rely solely on their own beliefs about environment they may steer the ship of state straight toward a reef, as Kennedy did in the Bay of Pigs and Khrushchev did 18 months later when he placed missiles in Cuba.”⁴⁷

2.2.2. Setting Priorities: Decision-makers need to set clear foreign policy objectives and priorities. If the priorities of policymakers are unclear, the intelligence community will be uncertain about what it is expected to deliver and will exert its energies toward efforts that may be ignored. In democracies, the intelligence community does not exist for its own sake. Rather it exists to serve to the needs of decision-makers in their decision-making process. Collected intelligence once delivered to the decision-maker, might be a part of foreign policy or military issues.

2.2.3. Understanding the world of intelligence: Naive politicians often do not have enough information on the intelligence community’s activities and products.

⁴⁴ See for detailed information Michael I. Handel, *War, Strategy and Intelligence* (London: Frank Cass, 1989), pp. 283-300.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*,

⁴⁶ Michael Herman, *op. cit.*, p. 138

⁴⁷ Robert Jervis, ‘Strategic Intelligence and Effective Policy’, in A. Stuart Farson (ed.) *Security and Intelligence In A Changing World: New Perspectives For The 1990s* (London: Frank Cass, 1991), p.169.

Misperceiving the intelligence world leads the policymakers to stay away from everything that intelligence business involves. Thus they become inefficient in using intelligence in policymaking.

2.2.4. Politicizing intelligence: Intelligence assessments must be policy neutral.⁴⁸ The hallmark of intelligence is that it is based on fact, knowledge and rigorous analysis to explain as objectively as possible what is happening and what is likely to happen in an area or situation which requires that decisions be taken or policy made. The product of intelligence analysis must present the situations as one sees them, without regard to whether judgments will support or challenge decision-makers' perceptions and the existing policy.⁴⁹ Intelligence is useful only to the extent that provides objective value. Not only the attitude of decision-makers cause politicization of intelligence, competition among different intelligence services within the government may also politicize intelligence activities, products, and use.

2.2.5. Lack of coordination: Policymakers sometimes fail to communicate effectively their needs to the intelligence community and generally make poor use of the intelligence. Although it is not directly related to the personality of the policy maker, a strong and effective coordination between the intelligence community and office of the policy-maker is essential for better decision making. The decision-maker, therefore, should pay attention to better coordination.

⁴⁸ Blair Scaborn, 'Intelligence and Policy: What Is Constant? What Is Changing?' *Commentary*, No:45, June 1994.

2.2.7. Underestimating the intelligence product: Some policymakers tend to heavily rely on their own analysis and judgment whilst the finished intelligence product is waiting for attention in a given situation. One of the reasons why policymakers pay little attention is that they think their own general knowledge of the situation provides an adequate basis for their decisions.⁵⁰

2.2.8. Measures of Effectiveness for Intelligence: Can a policy-maker measure effectiveness of intelligence? This question is particularly important since the intelligence community needs clear policy guidance and feedback from the policy-makers. An expert on the subject answers this question as follows: Intelligence is deemed effective when;

1. Causing a commander or decision-maker to change a previously chosen policy or course of action. 2. Enabling a different (hopefully better) execution of a chosen policy or course of action. 3. Playing a pivotal role in the decision-making process (in the sense that had this intelligence not been available, a different decision would have been reached.) 4. Forcing the adversary to change or modify the execution of his policy or course of action; 5. Enhancing the effects of our own chosen policy or diminishing adverse effects of the enemy's actions.⁵¹

Summary:

Chapter 2 basically aims to explain why good intelligence is necessary to formulate a better foreign policy from a theoretical perspective. It summarizes briefly the importance of intelligence in foreign policy process, in models of foreign policy making, in foreign policy goals, and in foreign policy implementation. The relationship between the policy-

⁴⁹ Hasan Köni, 'İstihbarat Pazarlama ve Dış Politika', *Avrasya Dosyası* vol. 2 no. 1 (summer 1995)

⁵⁰ Robert Jervis, op. cit., p. 172.

⁵¹ Amos Kovacs, 'Using Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security* vol. 12 no. 4 (October 1997)

maker and intelligence is also discussed. The factors influencing decision-makers' attitudes toward intelligence, such as personal background, leadership style, politicizing intelligence, and setting priorities are explained.

Having explained, described and discussed main concepts in Chapters 1 and 2 (intelligence and foreign policy), now an introduction to successful systems (the UK and the US systems), can be made. The following chapters will investigate the British and American intelligence systems.

CHAPTER 3 - THE BRITISH SYSTEM

3.1. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN UK

British Governments have long refused to acknowledge that they have foreign espionage services.⁵² Only the 1994 Intelligence Services Act placing the functions of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) on a statutory basis echoed the existence of these services officially for the first time.⁵³




Figure 3.1. The UK Intelligence Community

⁵² Christopher Andrew, 'The British View of Security and Intelligence', in A. Stuart Farson (ed.) *Security and Intelligence In A Changing World: New Perspectives For The 1990s* (London: Frank Cass, 1991), p. 10

⁵³ K. G. Robertson, 'Recent Reform of Intelligence in the United Kingdom Democratization or Risk Management?', *Intelligence and National Security* vol. 13 no. 2 (Summer 1998)

As depicted in figure 3.1. the United Kingdom has three intelligence and security services, collectively known as the Agencies - the Security Service, SIS and GCHQ. The operations and functions of all three have been placed on a statutory basis, by the provisions of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, and the Security Service Acts 1989 and 1996. Another important contributor to the central intelligence machinery is the Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS), which is an integral part of the Ministry of Defense.

3.1.1. Security Service

The Security Service, also known as MI5, originated in 1909 as the internal arm of the Secret Service Bureau, tasked with countering German espionage. In 1931 it assumed wider responsibility for assessing threats to British national security which included international communist subversion and fascism. The Security Service Act places the service under the authority of the Home Secretary. The Act also sets out the functions of the Service, as well as certain controls and oversight arrangements.⁵⁴ As the UK's domestic security intelligence agency the service's purpose is to protect the state against substantial, overtly organized threats, primarily from terrorism, espionage and subversion. Most recently, since the passing of the Security Service Act 1996, its role has been expanded to provide support to law enforcement agencies in the field of organized crime. Within the UK intelligence machinery, the Service's role is to investigate threats by gathering, analyzing and assessing intelligence; to counter specific threats by taking action, where appropriate in conjunction with others; and to advise the government and others as

⁵⁴ HMSO, *MI5: The Security Service*, (London: The Stationery Office, 1998), p. 5.

necessary on the nature of the threat, and on relevant protective security measures.⁵⁵

3.1.2. Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)

The Secret Intelligence Service, also known as MI6, originated in 1909 as the Foreign Section of the Secret Service Bureau. With the passing of the Intelligence Services Act, SIS was placed on a statutory basis under the Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary to whom it is responsible for all aspects of its work.⁵⁶ The act defines the role of MI6 as; “a) to obtain and provide information relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands; and (b) to perform other tasks relating to the actions or intentions of such persons, [in relation to] the interests of national security, with particular reference to defense and foreign policies...the interests of the economic well-being of the UK or in support of the prevention or detection of serious crime.”⁵⁷

The Service's principal role is the production of secret intelligence in support of government's security, defense, foreign and economic policies within the framework of requirements laid upon it by the Joint Intelligence Committee and approved by Ministers. It meets these JIC requirements for intelligence gathering and other tasks through a variety of sources, human and technical and by liaison with a wide range of foreign intelligence and security services. Specific operations are subject to long-standing procedures for official and ministerial clearance.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 6-12.

⁵⁶ K. G. Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

⁵⁷ Ibid.,

3.1.3. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)

GCHQ provides government departments and military commands with signal intelligence (Sigint) in support of government's security, defense, foreign and economic policies. The Director of GCHQ is responsible to the Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary. GCHQ derives signal intelligence by monitoring a variety of communications and other signals, such as radars. For this purpose it controls and administers the Composite Signals Organization which operates from a number of locations in the UK and overseas. Like SIS and the Security Service, it also works in liaison with a range of foreign intelligence and security services.⁵⁸ In addition to providing signals intelligence, GCHQ also provides advice and assistance to government departments and the armed forces on the security of their communications and information technology systems.⁵⁹

3.1.4. Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS)

The Defense Intelligence Staff, part of the Ministry of Defense, is an essential element of the central intelligence machinery. The Chief of Defense Intelligence (CDI) is responsible for the work of the DIS and is charged also with the overall direction of intelligence within the defense community. The task of the DIS is to analyze information from a wide variety of sources, both overt and covert. In order to make decisions, Ministry of Defense (MOD) policy-makers, military planners and force commanders need an accurate view of world developments, timely warning of impending crises, and informed reporting on areas where British forces are or may be deployed. These are the tasks of the Defense Intelligence Staff

⁵⁸ Ibid.,

⁵⁹ Government Communications Headquarters official web site. <http://www.gchq.gov.uk>

(DIS), which produces assessments drawing on material from a variety of sources, including both open literature and classified reports. These assessments range from studies of the characteristics of weapon systems held by potential opponents, to the analysis of the influences at work in any part of the world where the United Kingdom has important interests.

3.2.OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILTY OF THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY:

Under the Security Service Act and the Intelligence Services Act, legislative and executive branches oversee UK intelligence agencies.

3.2.1. Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services (IS)

In their day-to-day operations the Intelligence and Security Agencies operate under the immediate control of their respective heads that are personally responsible to Ministers. The Prime Minister is responsible for intelligence and security matters overall and is supported in that capacity by the Secretary of the Cabinet. The Home Secretary is responsible for the Security Service; the Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary for SIS and GCHQ. The Secretary of State for Defense is responsible for the Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS) which forms an integral part of the Ministry of Defense.⁶⁰

There is also a Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services (IS), whose Terms of Reference are "To keep under review policy on the security and intelligence services" for example, the Committee considered policy issues connected with the

⁶⁰ 'The UK Central Intelligence Machinery' official web site
<http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/cabsec/1998/cim/cimrep1.htm>

Intelligence Services Act. The Prime Minister is its chairman and the other members are the Deputy Prime Minister, Home, Defense and Foreign & Commonwealth Secretaries and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

3.2.2. Permanent Secretaries' Committee on the Intelligence Services (PSIS):

Ministers are assisted in the oversight of the Agencies by the Permanent Secretaries' Committee on the Intelligence Services (PSIS) which scrutinizes the Agencies' annual expenditure forecasts, management plans and intelligence requirements, as part of the Public Expenditure Survey arrangements. These plans, together with the recommendations of the PSIS, are then submitted to Ministers, who agree the appropriate level of funding for the Agencies through the Single Intelligence Vote (SIV). For 1996-97 this is £751 million. PSIS is chaired by the Secretary of the Cabinet and its members are the Permanent Under Secretaries of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defense, Home Office and Treasury. The Intelligence Coordinator acts as adviser to PSIS, and chairs an advisory committee, known as the Preliminary Committee, which conducts the first scrutiny of the Agencies' Expenditure Forecasts.⁶¹

3.2.3. The Intelligence and Security Committee:

Parliamentary oversight of the Agencies is provided by the Intelligence and Security Committee, established by the Intelligence Services Act and operating within the 'ring of secrecy', which examines their expenditure, administration and policy. Its cross-party

⁶¹ Ibid.,

membership of nine from both Houses is appointed by the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. The Committee is required to report annually to the Prime Minister on its work. These reports, after deletions of operationally sensitive material, are placed before the Parliament by the Prime Minister. The Committee may also, and does, provide ad hoc reports to the Prime Minister from time to time.⁶²

3.2.4. Commissioners

Under the Security Service Act and the Intelligence Services Act, the Agencies are subject to oversight by two commissioners (the Security Service Commissioner and the Intelligence Services Commissioner) who must hold, or have held, high judicial office. They review the issue and authorization, by the relevant Secretary of State, of warrants for interference with property and also assist the Tribunals established by the Acts to investigate public complaints against the Agencies. They report annually to the Prime Minister on their work and their reports are in turn laid before the Parliament. A third commissioner operates in a similar manner under the Interception of Communications Act of 1985 in respect to the authorization of warrants to intercept mail and telecommunications on application from the intelligence and security Agencies and law enforcement organizations. The Commissioner also assists a Tribunal established to investigate public complaints about interception.

⁶² K. G. Robertson, 'Recent Reform of Intelligence in the United Kingdom Democratization or Risk Management?', *Intelligence and National Security* vol. 13 no. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 149-150.

3.3. COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY MAKING

3.3.1. The Central Intelligence Machinery

The Central Intelligence Machinery is the central mechanism, based in the Cabinet Office, for the tasking, coordination and resourcing of the United Kingdom's intelligence and security Agencies, for scrutinizing their performance and for reporting on the intelligence they produce.⁶³

3.3.2. The Joint Intelligence Committee

The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) is the main instrument for advising on priorities for intelligence gathering and for assessing its results. The JIC is responsible both for setting the UK's national intelligence requirements and for producing regular intelligence assessments on a range of situations and issues of current concern for ministers and officials. It meets weekly, and its members are senior officials in the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defense, Department of Trade & Industry, and the Treasury, the Heads of the three intelligence and security Agencies, the Intelligence Coordinator and the Chief of the Assessments Staff. Other Departments attend as appropriate. The JIC is supported by a permanent Assessments Staff and Secretariat as well as a number of specialist interdepartmental Sub-Committees.⁶⁴

The JIC's support staff is the Assessments Staff, which comprises a mixture of senior and middle ranking officers seconded from various departments, services and

⁶³ The UK Central Intelligence Machinery' official web site can be found at <http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/cabsec/1998/cim/cimrepl.htm>

⁶⁴ Ibid.,

disciplines, and is responsible for drafting assessments of situations and issues of current concern. These assessments are subjected to inter-departmental scrutiny at the drafting stage in sub-committees of the JIC, known as Current Intelligence Groups (CIGs), which bring together experts from a range of Government Departments and Agencies. The text is then normally submitted to the JIC for approval before being circulated to Ministers and senior officials, though in cases of urgency it can be issued immediately. The Assessments Staff and the CIGs draw on all relevant information, overt and covert.

The Joint Intelligence Secretariat is responsible for the administration of the JIC and its sub-committees, and for support to the Intelligence Coordinator. Together with the Assessments Staff, it is located in the Cabinet Office; its personnel are either seconded from other Departments or permanent Cabinet Office staff.

3.3.3. Intelligence Coordinator:

The Intelligence Coordinator advises the Secretary of the Cabinet on the coordination of the intelligence machinery and its resources and programs. He chairs various formal and informal groups charged with intelligence management. He has particular responsibility for establishing the United Kingdom's intelligence requirements and for advising on the allocation of the resources to enable the agencies to meet them.

3.4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE BRITISH SYSTEM:

The importance of the intelligence to UK may be best explained by the following expressions; "...apart from intelligence's influence on particular decisions, there is the cumulative influence on national standing of having well-informed policies. This has been particularly relevant to Britain as a nation of declining economic power wishing nevertheless to maintain world status... Intelligence has been one element in this position. Good intelligence has helped Britain to play bad hands with some finesse."⁶⁵

With its military capacity –including nuclear power-, economic capacity, geographic location, natural resources, educated population, quality of the political system and leadership and relatively high national morale, Britain is ranked among the most powerful states of the world.⁶⁶ Engaging in two major world wars (WWI and WW II) and one cold war, British intelligence community has had the chance of testing, developing, and improving its structure to meet the nation's needs. The wartime prestige of the British success caused its pattern to be copied fairly widely after 1945. The US and the Commonwealth countries adopted the British pattern.⁶⁷

Cold War years are especially important to the development of the intelligence community. Foreign intelligence activities have played a key role during the Cold War. Clandestine collection techniques were improved. Covert operations were widely exercised. Technical intelligence collection capabilities were increased. Moreover combating against internal terrorist threats (IRA) have led the British Intelligence to develop a strong security intelligence agency.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 153.

⁶⁶ John Spainer, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-178.

Declassified intelligence operations give ideas on how successful the UK system. However, real success should be sought in the overall foreign policy performance. As explained in Chapter 2, sound foreign policy-making and implementing should be accompanied by high quality intelligence analysis and operations. The overall performance of British foreign policy in world affairs proves that the UK foreign intelligence is successful, especially compared with other states' intelligence systems.

At the Lausanne Conference in 1922-23, decrypted telegrams, which provided most of the Turkish delegation's correspondence contributed to British negotiating tactics.⁶⁸ British intelligence played a major role in bringing the US into WWI. Public revelations of German intelligence attempts to prevent US industry and the financial sector from assisting the UK angered the American public. British intelligence intercepted and decrypted German diplomatic traffic, also as the known Zimmerman telegram, showing a German effort to push the Mexican government into joining Germany against the US in return for Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico if Germany won the war.⁶⁹

One of the crucial successes of British intelligence is the operation named ULTRA. During WW II Germany committed virtually its entire secret communication system to the Enigma cipher machine. British code-breakers managed to construct a model of the Enigma machine and, as a result uncovered its secrets. The intercepted secret German signals decrypted by the Enigma machine, gave unparalleled advantage to the Allies. The Allies learned in advance all the plans and moves of the Germans. This

⁶⁷ Michael Herman, *op. cit.*, p.24.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 153

enormous advantage remained a secret not only for the duration of the war but for almost thirty years afterward.⁷⁰ Starting actively in the mid of 1960 IRA's terrorist activities disturbed the British governments. The response to these activities from British governments were decisive and served as a deterrent by the help of high quality intelligence operations.⁷¹

As stated previously, the current British intelligence system has developed through the major wars and the political events of this century. In chapter 1, the main concepts of intelligence, and in chapter 2 the relationships between intelligence and foreign policy making are explained. Main collection disciplines of intelligence are met in the British system by separate organizations. The SIS collects foreign intelligence including economic intelligence and conducts covert operations. The GCHQ collects and analyzes the foreign signal intelligence. Defense Intelligence Staff is tasked the military intelligence. The Security Service is responsible for domestic intelligence in combating terrorism, and counterespionage. Thus the British Intelligence Community covers all aspects of intelligence.

Table 3.2. Shows the organizations tasked for oversight and accountability of the intelligence community. These external oversight agencies from executive and legislative branches of the British government play an important role not only in watching closely the activities of the community but also in giving feedback, and in fostering improvement of the agencies.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 154

⁷⁰ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence*, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 146-155.

Collection	Secret Intelligence Service (Foreign Intelligence)
	Government Communication Headquarters (Signal Intelligence and Information Security)
	Defense Intelligence Staff (Military Intelligence)
	Security Service (Domestic Intelligence)
Oversight and Accountability	Ministerial Committee On The Intelligence Services
	Permanent Secretaries Committee on the Intelligence Services
	The Intelligence and Security Committee
	Commissioners
Coordination	Central Intelligence Machinery
	The Joint Intelligence Committee
	Intelligence Coordinator

Table 3.2. The U.K. Intelligence Establishments in Relation to Collection, Oversight and Accountability

The intelligence community in the British system finds its place in the policy-making process through the establishments, Central Intelligence Machinery, The Joint Intelligence Committee, and the Intelligence coordinator. These establishments are in the Cabinet, which is the highest level of the policy making process.

⁷¹ See for example James Rennie, *The Operators: Inside 14 Intelligence Company*, (London: BCA, 1996).

CHAPTER 4 - THE US SYSTEM

The surprise attack by Japan on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was a great intelligence success for the Japanese and an intelligence failure for the Americans. That failure stimulated the postwar growth of a massive intelligence apparatus in the U.S.A. Before World War II the U.S. intelligence system was not a significant one; after the war the US government authorities gave the start to build up a massive intelligence apparatus.⁷²

4.1. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE U.S.A.

In the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense HUMINT Service, an element of the Defense Intelligence Agency, are the primary collectors of HUMINT. Signal intelligence is collected by the National Security Agency.

The Central Imagery Office coordinates imagery collection and processing.

Director of Central Intelligence	Central Intelligence Agency
	Community Management Staff
	National Intelligence Council
Department of Defense (DoD)	Defense Intelligence Agency
	National Security Agency
	National Reconnaissance Office
	Air Force Intelligence
	Army Intelligence
	Marine Corps Intelligence
	Navy Intelligence
	National Mapping Agency
Departmental Intelligence Elements (non-DoD)	Department Of State
	Department of Energy
	Department of the Treasury
	Federal Bureau of Investigation

Table 4.1. The U.S. Intelligence Community Members:⁷³

⁷² Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence*, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 177-183.

⁷³ Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), p. 137.

4.1.1. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), established by the National Security Act of 1947, is led by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who manages CIA in addition to serving as head of the Intelligence Community. CIA collects, evaluates, and disseminates foreign intelligence to assist the President and senior US Government policymakers in making decisions relating to national security.⁷⁴ CIA's mission is to provide the President, the National Security Council, and all officials who make and execute US national security policy with accurate, comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence on national security topics. CIA also conducts counterintelligence activities, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security, as directed by the President.

CIA collects foreign intelligence information through a variety of clandestine and overt means. The Agency also engages in research, development, and deployment of high-leverage technology for intelligence purposes and--in support of the DCI's role as the President's principal intelligence advisor--performs and reports all-source analysis on the full range of topics that affect national security.⁷⁵

4.1.2. National Security Agency (NSA)

The National Security Agency is the largest and the most secret of the intelligence agencies of the U.S. government. It has two main functions; to protect U.S. government communications and to intercept foreign communications. It protects government

⁷⁴ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence*, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 201-209.

⁷⁵ Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), pp. 129-133.

communications by enciphering messages and taking other measures to ensure their secrecy. In its foreign intelligence function the NSA employs a vast corps of intelligence analysts who use sensitive electronic equipment to monitor, decipher, and translate the communications of foreign governments. It could follow space rocket launchings in the former USSR and can overhear conversations between aircraft pilots and ground-control personnel in remote areas of the globe. The NSA was established in 1952 as a separately organized agency within the Department of Defense. It replaced the Armed Forces Security Agency.⁷⁶

4.1.3. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is a designated combat support agency and the senior military intelligence component of the intelligence community. Established in 1961, DIA's primary mission is to provide all-source intelligence to the US armed forces. Intelligence support for operational forces encompasses targeting and battle damage assessment, weapons proliferation, warning of impending crises, support to peacekeeping operations, maintenance of data bases on foreign military organizations and their equipment and, as necessary, support to UN operations and US allies. In addition to these, DIA has other important customers, including policymakers in the Department of Defense and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, DIA plays a key role in providing information on foreign weapons systems to US weapons planners and the weapons acquisition community.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence*, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 192-193

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

4.2.OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The US Intelligence Community is subject to external oversight from the Executive and Legislative branches. Within the Executive, the Intelligence Oversight Board, a standing committee of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, exercises overall oversight of the Community's activities, including the responsibility to oversee the functioning of the agencies' internal oversight mechanisms. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget plays a role in ensuring consistency with the President's program. Within the Congress, principal oversight responsibility rests with the two intelligence committees, but other committees occasionally become involved in an oversight role.⁷⁸

4.2.1. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB): The PFIAB is an entity within the Executive Office of the President formed to assess the quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and other activities of the intelligence community. The PFIAB reports directly to the President, and provides recommendations for actions to improve and enhance the performance of intelligence efforts. It also examines issues raised by the President or the Director of Central Intelligence and can make recommendations directly to the DCI.⁷⁹ Membership of the PFIAB consists of not more than 16 persons appointed by the President. The PFIAB,

⁷⁸ Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US Intelligence, March 1996, http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/dpos/epubs/int/report.html

⁷⁹ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence*, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 352-353.

through its intelligence Oversight Board, also advises the President on the legality of foreign intelligence activities.

4.2.2. President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB): The IOB is a standing committee of the PFIAB. The IOB is composed of four members of the PFIAB appointed by the Chairman of the PFIAB. The IOB conducts independent oversight investigations as required and reviews the oversight practices and procedures of the inspectors general and general counsels of intelligence agencies.

4.2.3. Office of Management and Budget (OMB): OMB is part of the Executive Office of the President. It reviews intelligence budgets in light of presidential policies and priorities, clears proposed testimony, and approves draft intelligence legislation for submission to Congress.

4.2.4. The Congress

Principal oversight responsibility rests with the two intelligence committees. By law, the President must ensure that these two committees are kept "fully and currently" informed of the activities of the Intelligence Community, including any significant anticipated intelligence activities. Notice is also required to be provided to both committees of all covert action programs approved by the President as well as all significant intelligence failures.

4.2.4.1. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI): Membership of the SSCI has ranged from 13 to 17, with the majority party in Congress having one more member than the minority. Members of the SSCI serve 8-year terms. In addition to its role in annually authorizing appropriations for intelligence activities, the SSCI carries out oversight investigations and inquiries as required. It also handles presidential nominations referred to the Senate for the positions of DCI, Deputy DCI, and Inspector General of CIA, and reviews treaties referred to the Senate for ratification as necessary to determine the ability of the intelligence community to verify the provisions of the treaty under consideration.⁸⁰

4.2.4.2. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI): The HPSCI has 19 members. Members may be appointed for terms up to eight years. Like its Senate counterpart, the HPSCI conducts oversight investigations and inquiries in addition to recessing the annual authorization of appropriations for intelligence.⁸¹

4.3. COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY MAKING:

There are many actors in making foreign policy in the U.S. system. Some of them are formal actors whose roles are defined by either constitution or law. Some of them are informal. Public opinion, media, interest groups, parties, think tanks, congress, bureaucracy (State, Defense, CIA.), The National Security Council and finally the President.⁸²

⁸⁰ Howard J. Wiarda, *American Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes* (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), p.186.

⁸¹ Ibid.,

⁸² Howard J. Wiarda, op. cit.,

4.3.1. The President: In the U.S. system the President is ultimately held responsible for foreign policy and its conduct.⁸³ The President is commander in Chief, which means that he has the power to deploy American forces that is a way usually seen in American foreign policy. A second major power of the President is the treaty-making. The Constitution gives the president power to sign treaties. A third power of the President is appointment of high-level foreign policy officials. These include secretaries of State, Defense, the director of the CIA, UN representative, NSC staff, all ambassadors, and undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. And lastly, the President is also the nation's chief spokesperson on foreign policy, and the only official voice.⁸⁴

4.3.2. The National Security Council:

The National Security Council is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. Since its inception under President Truman, the function of the Council has been to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies. The council also serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.⁸⁵ The National Security Council (NSC) was established by the National Security Act of 1947 as part of the Executive Office of the President of the United States. Its purpose is to advise the President on national security matters, taking into consideration the country's domestic, foreign, and military policies. Statutory

⁸³ Stephen Knot, 'Executive Power and the Control of American Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security* vol. 13 no. 2 (Summer 1998), p.175.

⁸⁴ Howard J. Wiarda, op. cit., pp. 270-74.

⁸⁵ Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (Colorado: Lynnc Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), p.91.

members of the NSC are the President, the vice-president, and the secretaries of state and defense. Military advisor to the NSC is the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the intelligence advisor is the director of central intelligence. The NSC's staff of analysts is directed by the assistant to the President for national security affairs (or national security advisor).⁸⁶

4.3.3. The National Intelligence Council (NIC):

The National Intelligence Council, managed by a chairman and a vice chairman, is comprised of National Intelligence Officers--senior experts drawn from all elements of the community and from outside the government. The National Intelligence Officers concentrate on the substantive problems of particular geographic regions of the world and of particular functional areas such as economics and weapons proliferation. They serve the DCI in his role as leader of the intelligence community by providing a center for mid-term and long-term strategic thinking and production. Through routine close contact with policymakers, collection, research, and community analysis, the NIC provides the DCI with the information he needs to assist policymakers as they pursue shifting interests and foreign policy priorities. The NIC also draws on non-governmental experts in academia and the private sector to bring in fresh perspectives and analytic methods to enhance the intelligence process. Finally, the NIC assists the intelligence community by evaluating

⁸⁶ Sam C. Sarkesian, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

the adequacy of intelligence support and works with the community's functional managers to refine strategies to meet the most crucial needs of senior consumers.⁸⁷

4.3.5. The National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB): The NFIB is responsible for approving all National Intelligence Estimates for coordinating interagency intelligence exchanges and the numerous bilateral relationships with foreign nations that share intelligence with the United States, and for developing policy for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.⁸⁸

4.4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE US SYSTEM:

The US intelligence system is similar to the British intelligence system. They both have separate organizations for foreign, signal, military and security intelligence. As is the case in the UK, US intelligence agencies are subject to external oversight. The necessary establishments also warrant close relationships between policy-making and intelligence in the US system. This pattern of intelligence structure is adapted by many leading states of the world, such as Germany, France, Canada, Australia and more recently the Russian Federation.⁸⁹

As shown in table 4.2. The intelligence collection in the US system is performed by separate organizations. This is particularly important since each of the collection areas requires great attention and expertise. Oversight of the intelligence agencies provides

⁸⁷ Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US Intelligence, March 1996, http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/dpos/epubs/int/report.html

⁸⁸ Charles D. Ameringer, *U.S. Foreign Intelligence*, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), p.361.

⁸⁹ For more information on states' intelligence structures visit the web site of the Federation of American Scientists, the intelligence resources program. <http://www.fas.org/irp/>

agencies with policy guidance and feedback. The intelligence community is also given significant place within the policy-making structure.

Collection	Central Intelligence Agency
	Defense Intelligence Agency
	National Security Agency
	Federal Bureau of Investigation
Oversight and Accountability	President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
	President's Intelligence Oversight Board
	Office of Management and Budget
	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Coordination	National Security Council
	National Intelligence Council
	National Foreign Intelligence Board

Table 4.2. The U.S. Intelligence Establishments in Relation to Collection, Oversight and Coordination

Declassified Successes:

Covert Action in foreign policy implementation: The U.S. may be the one of the few countries who uses covert action excessively. Not only in wartime, which provides a legitimate ground to conduct covert action, but also in peacetime, may be more than wartime, covert action has become an irresistible tool of foreign policy conduct.⁹⁰ Moreover, the Iran-Contra Committee of U.S. Senate noted in its report that “peacetime covert action became an instrument of US foreign policy following the WW II.”⁹¹

⁹⁰ Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secrets Wars of the CIA 1981-1987*, (New York: Pocket Books, 1988). This book provides important and detailed information on covert actions conducted by U.S. policy-makers in foreign policy.

⁹¹ Stephen Knot, 'Executive Power and the Control of American Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security* vol. 13 no. 2 (Summer 1998), p.172.

CIA has long been associated with the overthrow of governments and the installation of military regimes. Examples include the unseating of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, the overthrow of Guatemalan President Arbenz in 1954, the failed invasion of Cuba in 1961, and the toppling of Chilean President Allende in 1973. There can be several reasons of using covert action. It may even change from government to government and from state to state. As for the U.S., among several government-financed intelligence reports, the report that was prepared by the Brookings Institution concludes on foreign action as follows:

The United States should consider covert action as one of its instruments of foreign policy. We have become conditioned to accept the use of military force to change situations that are unacceptable to us. Why should we be so reluctant to use political action or clandestine military support to affect change if our policy is clearly defined and our interest fully identified? Supporting a political group that is trying to change its country's government or policies or trying to replace a bad leader is in our interests. Using information 3/4 or, if you wish, propaganda 3/4 to change the behavior of a government while concealing the hand of the United States is better option than sending the F-16s or the Marines. Obviously, covert action requires special attention from the policymaker and must be part of an overall policy. It should not be a last resort after all else has failed....⁹²

Post Cold War Successes: A report prepared for the U.S. Congress on the future of the American intelligence community gives the following declassified intelligence successes while justifying the existence of the intelligence community: U.S. intelligence uncovered the first evidence suggesting that North Korea was planning to construct a nuclear weapons capability and supported the subsequent diplomatic efforts to restrain and end such activities. In at least two cases, with the help of U.S. intelligence, the sale of radioactive materials that could be used in the production of nuclear weapons was halted

⁹² *'In From the Cold'* Report of a Task Force on the future of US Intelligence funded by Twentieth Century Fund, <http://epn.org/tcf/intel.html>

by other governments. Since 1990, U.S. intelligence has uncovered the clandestine efforts of several countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems. In some cases, this information provided the basis for diplomatic actions by the United States and by the United Nations to counter such efforts. U.S. intelligence played a crucial role in supporting U.S. combat operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf by collecting information on the size, capabilities and location of hostile forces, providing information which permitted the targeting of precision-guided weapons, assessing the damage inflicted by U.S. and allied aircraft, and warning of threats to the security of U.S. and allied forces. The deployment of U.S. military forces to Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia to perform other than combat missions similarly received the vigorous support of intelligence agencies, which provided information on threats to the security of U.S. forces as well as on local conditions. U.S. intelligence played a key role in the rescue of the downed American pilot in Bosnia. U.S. intelligence provided support, which was a key to the U.S. side in numerous bilateral and multilateral negotiations. U.S. intelligence has played an instrumental role in the efforts of the Colombian government to break up the Cali drug cartel, including the arrest and/or capture of its leaders, and, in other cases, provided information which kept drug shipments from reaching the United States. U.S. intelligence played key roles in helping other countries identify and/or arrest several notorious terrorists, including Carlos the Jackal in Sudan, the alleged ringleader of the World Trade Center bombing in the Phillippines, the head of the Shining Path terrorist group in Peru, and those involved in the bombing of Pan Am 103. On at least two occasions, U.S. intelligence provided information that led to successful U.S. diplomatic efforts to head off potential armed conflicts between two countries. Information was

provided by U.S. intelligence on two occasions which foiled assassination plots abroad and led to the arrest of the perpetrators. In several instances, U.S. intelligence uncovered foreign competitors of U.S. commercial firms using bribery and other illegal tactics to obtain contracts with foreign governments. Diplomatic intervention with the government concerned to assure a "level playing field" eventually led to a U.S. firm obtaining the contract by winning the competition. U.S. intelligence has identified violations of military and trade sanctions imposed by the United Nations in connection with the situations in Iraq and Bosnia, and provided the principal capability for monitoring the "no-fly" zones in both countries. On several occasions, U.S. intelligence provided information warning of financial collapse in other countries, leading to actions by the United States and other governments. U.S. intelligence provided information with respect to human rights abuses and election-rigging by certain governments which altered the U.S. diplomatic posture towards those governments. U.S. intelligence provided information about the military capabilities of other governments that altered the research and development of U.S. weapons systems, providing potential cost savings and improving their effectiveness. U.S. intelligence provided information to civil authorities in the United States, as well as in other countries, to help cope with natural disasters, environmental problems, and humanitarian crises. U.S. intelligence has supported United Nations' peacekeeping and other operations around the world. Considerable information has been provided by U.S. intelligence to the Bosnia War Crimes Tribunal.⁹³

⁹³ Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US Intelligence, March 1996, http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/dpos/epubs/int/report.html

Conclusion:

Like the British intelligence community, the US intelligence community has developed through the major wars and political events of this century. The UK-US close cooperation on intelligence has brought a common standard on intelligence for the democratic and strong states of the west. British intelligence carried the intelligence burden for the allies in the WW I and WW II, in return the US intelligence community did same thing during the Cold War. Winning the Cold War without firing even one bullet is enough to prove how successful the US intelligence community has been.

The major wars and political events gave the chance to the US and to UK to test and develop their intelligence apparatus. Therefore their system is widely adapted by other western states.

CHAPTER 5 - THE TURKISH SYSTEM

5.1. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN TURKEY:

By law the primary responsibility for collecting, analyzing and reporting security and foreign intelligence rests with the National Intelligence Organization (MIT). There are also departmental intelligence units/agencies. The National Police, the Military and the Gendarmerie have their own intelligence apparatus to perform related duties. Unlike the U.S. and U.K., there is no separate technical and foreign intelligence collection agency. Collection of electronic intelligence is carried out both by MIT and Military electronic intelligence units.⁹⁴ Collection of foreign intelligence is performed by MIT, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MFA) (not in professional terms), and Military – to some extent. The General Secretariat of the National Security Council is the main consumer of the finished intelligence.

	National Intelligence Organization MIT	National Police Intelligence	Gendarmerie Intelligence	Military Intelligence
Strategic/Foreign Intelligence	X			
Security Intelligence (Domestic)	X	X	X	X
Criminal Intelligence		X		
Signal Intelligence (Foreign)	X			X
Economic Intelligence				

Table 5.1 Intelligence Collection in the Turkish System

5.1.1. The National Intelligence Organization (MIT)

The Law numbered 2937 embodies the guiding principles governing the production and

⁹⁴ Faruk Bildirici, *Gizli Kulaklar Ülkesi*, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998), p. 19-259. This book is the first open source on security electronic intelligence activities of the Turkish Intelligence Community.

utilization of national intelligence; as well as the structure, duties and responsibilities of the National Intelligence Organization. While the Law Numbered 644 was entitled as the "Statute of the National Intelligence Organization", the Law Numbered 2937 amends it as the "Statute of the State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence Organization".⁹⁵

MIT Undersecretary is responsible to the Prime Minister. The designation of the MIT Undersecretary is first discussed at the National Security Council, then proposed by the Prime Minister, and finally approved by the President of the Republic. By the Law numbered 2937 The MIT is authorized to produce statewide national security intelligence relevant to the internal and/or external activities, actual or potential, that may be detrimental to the Republic of Turkey. The intelligence produced by MIT is submitted to the President of the Republic, Prime Minister, Chief of the General Staff, Secretary General of the National Security Council, and to other relevant authorities, as may be required.

The MIT submits proposals, relevant to the management of the intelligence function of the public establishments and institutions, to the National Security Council and to the Prime Minister. The MIT is also authorized to offer intelligence and counter-intelligence expertise to the public institutions on security matters within their respective jurisdiction, and may coordinate such activities. In addition to the above duties defined by the Law, the MIT may be called up on to assume additional responsibilities pursuant to the National Security Council decisions.

⁹⁵ MIT's official web site <http://www.mit.gov.tr/>

Counter-intelligence includes prevention of the activities of foreign intelligence services in Turkey, supporting the counter-espionage efforts of the public institutions, and executing counter measures for psychological threats posed against Turkey.

The current MIT statute, that is, the Law Numbered 2937, forbids involvement or orientation of the MIT in pursuit of objectives other than intelligence services relevant to the security of the State as prescribed above. The MIT is authorized to benefit from the archives and Electronic Data Processing (EDP) centers of the Ministries and other public institutions on matters relevant to its terms of reference.




Figure 5.2. Structure of the MIT

Structure of the MIT : The Undersecretariat of National Intelligence Organization is comprised of the Office of the Undersecretary, the Offices of the Deputy Undersecretaries, Directorates, Divisions, and Branches and other units. The central and provincial organizations are regulated and managed through standing and ad hoc directives. The MIT is organized in the form of Principal Services, Advisory Groups and Auxiliary Service Unites, as well as internal and external organizations, which are maintained depending on the exigencies. Beside the Central Organization of the MIT, there are the Domestic Intelligence Gathering Centers and the MIT Residencies abroad.

5.1.2. The National Police Intelligence:

The National Police are responsible to maintain law and order in urban areas. Among its duties National Police Intelligence Units collect intelligence on criminal and terrorist activities. Police intelligence mainly deals with matters of state security, organized crime, smuggling and other criminal issues. The National Police is organized in every city and it has intelligence departments along with other police departments in every province of Turkey.⁹⁶ A general director who is responsible to the Minister of Internal Affairs commands the National Police.

5.1.3. Military Intelligence:

Turkey has relatively strong armed forces. However it is hard to claim that the ability of military intelligence matches that big military power. The Turkish armed forces are organized in a highly centralized command structure unlike the American and British

⁹⁶ Bekir Çınar, *Devlet Güvenliği, İstihbarat ve Terör*, (Ankara: Sam Yayınları, 1997), pp.172-174.

military forces. Army, Navy and Air Forces are commanded by a four star general each and all three forces is responsible to the Chief of General Staff. Each force has its own intelligence structure. There is also a strong intelligence cadre within Headquarters of the Turkish General Staff that coordinates, plans and analyzes the intelligence activities of the armed forces. Armed Forces Intelligence School is subordinated to Headquarters of the General Staff.⁹⁷

5.1.4. Gendarme Intelligence:

Turkish Gendarme is a security force in a military structure that maintains law and order in rural areas. Commanded by a four star general, the gendarme serves under the Minister of Interior Affairs. Gendarme forces maintain a strong intelligence structure to support its combat against terrorism and organized crime. Like the police forces, Gendarme has intelligence units along with other departments in every city of Turkey.

5.2. OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILTY OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The law numbered 2937 "Statute of the State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence Organization" does not provide an oversight agency independent from the chain of command. There is no external oversight, control or performance review agency over the intelligence community. There are numerous committee and commissions within the structure of the Turkish Parliament. But none of them is related to intelligence. Thus intelligence community in Turkey, except for its internal control mechanism, is not overseen.

⁹⁷ Bekir Cinar, *Devlet Guvenligi, Istihbarat ve Teror*, (Ankara: Sam Yayinlari), 1997, pp. 170-172.

5.3. COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY MAKING:

5.3.1. The National Security Council: According to article 118 of the Constitution, NSC has ten members. The President of the Turkish Republic is head of the NSC. The remaining nine members are the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, National Defense, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, Commanders of Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie. The council makes decisions by majority vote. The council is responsible for the formulation of the policy for the security of the state and for taking decisions and applications, as well as for presenting to the Council of Ministers its views related on how the necessary coordination can be carried out. It mainly deals with national security matters, internal and external threats. According to the constitution the NSC advises the government on national security matters. The decisions taken by the NSC has to be considered by the government in the decision-making process.⁹⁸

5.3.2. General Secretariat of the National Security Council: The Secretariat is vested with the responsibility of carrying out surveys, research and investigations into matters related to the duties of the Security Council, and to present its conclusions and proposals to the Council. The secretariat sets all the intelligence requirements and priorities.

5.3.3. National Intelligence Coordination Committee: Military and civil intelligence requirements are formulated by the National Intelligence Coordination Committee. This committee includes members from the staff of the National Security Council, to which it is directly responsible. The constitution of the National Intelligence Coordination Board

⁹⁸ A. Şeref Gözübüyük, *Türkiyenin İdari Yapısı*, (Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi yayınları, 1995), p. 56.

(MIKK), established with the Law Numbered 644 of 1965, has been carried over to the Law Numbered 2937 without any alteration. The MIKK is authorized to maintain coordination among the public offices in intelligence gathering efforts, and to formulate recommendations in directing the same.⁹⁹




Figure 5.2. Intelligence in process while making policy

As depicted in figure 5.2., MIT provides intelligence to the NSC and the Council of Ministers. Since the elected government is ultimately held responsible for policy making and implementing, it takes into consideration recommendations given by NSC and intelligence inputs provided by the MIT. This is the formal process defined by the constitution and law.

⁹⁹ Tuncay Özkan *Bir Gizli Servisin Tarihi: MIT*, (İstanbul: AD Yayıncılık, Milliyet Kitapları, 1996), p. 277.

CHAPTER 6 - COMPARISON OF THE SYSTEMS

6.1. THE MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.K.-U.S.A. AND THE TURKISH SYSTEMS:

6.1.1. Structure of the Intelligence Communities

The world's intelligence, espionage, and covert action programs may be said to follow three distinct organizational patterns; the American, the Soviet (totalitarian), and the British (parliamentary) systems.¹⁰⁰ Similarities exist among them yet distinctions are sharp. In the U.S. "intelligence agencies were shaped by individuals who understood the mechanics of totalitarianism and wanted none of it here".¹⁰¹ Most countries have a tightly contained and hierarchically organized intelligence service. In the United States, however, pluralism - that is, multiple centers of power- characterizing its political system is reflected in its intelligence community as well. Competition within the community leads to a wider array of collection operations, sharpens minds, keeps the analysts honest, allows policy-makers a better sense of options and most importantly, offers vital safeguards against a concentration of power that could evolve into the creation of a secret police.¹⁰² "Combining domestic and foreign intelligence functions creates the possibility that domestic law enforcement will be infected by the secrecy, deception, and ruthlessness that international espionage requires. Dividing the responsibilities among different agencies reduces that risk..."¹⁰³ It is surely no accident that the Russian

¹⁰⁰ Suat İlhan, 'İstihbarat: Gizil Güç', *Strateji* no. 95/3, p.90.

¹⁰¹ Stewart A. Baker, 'Should Spies Be Cops?', *Foreign Policy* no. 97, (Winter 1994 - 95) p. 36.

¹⁰² Loch K. Johnson, 'Strategic Intelligence: An American Perspective', in A. Stuart Farson (ed.) *Security and Intelligence In A Changing World: New Perspectives For The 1990s* (London: Frank Cass, 1991), p.52.

¹⁰³ Stewart A. Baker, op.cit., p. 37.

democrats who helped break up the Soviet Union also stripped the KGB of its internal security duties-adopting, in essence, an American system of divided responsibility.¹⁰⁴

In the U.S. the CIA continues to sit at the corner of an elaborate complex of some dozen separate intelligence organizations. Each has a specific role and a carefully guarded area of operations. The director of central intelligence is both head of the CIA and the President's principal intelligence adviser. In the latter job, the director theoretically coordinates all the separate intelligence units, setting their requirements, budgets, and operational assignments. In reality many of the major units in the system—such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, both parts of the Department of Defense—operate in quasi independence. The National Security Agency, which engages in code breaking and code making, is much larger in staff size and budget than the CIA. The military also maintains a major tactical intelligence capability to assist field commanders in making on the spot decisions. Other major units in the U.S. intelligence system includes the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Department of Treasury, the FBI, and the Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of Justice. The American model influenced the intelligence structures of those countries where the U.S.A. was dominant at the end of WW II, such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

In contrast to the federated American intelligence structure, the typical totalitarian setup is highly centralized. In the Soviet Union, for example, the power of the KGB pervaded every aspect of national life. Its director was generally a powerful member of the Politburo (the governing political committee of the USSR). The KGB had two chief directories. The most important was the First Directorate, which was responsible for

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foreign intelligence gathering. The Second Directorate's principal responsibilities involved providing counterespionage protection to the regime and recruiting foreign agents within the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵ Most Eastern European governments followed the KGB model in their intelligence operations. China, Cuba, and many Middle East countries such as Syria and Iraq still do.

The third model of intelligence systems is the British, a confederation of agencies coordinated by a cabinet subcommittee and accountable to the cabinet and prime minister. The two principal units are the Secret Intelligence Service and the Security Service. With some national variations, the intelligence services of France, Italy, Israel, and the members of Commonwealth of Nations follow the British pattern of organization.¹⁰⁶

The Turkish Intelligence System is somewhere between the British and the Soviet systems. The regime is a parliamentary democratic regime. Every function of the government is closely watched by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). In this respect the system looks like the British (parliamentary) system. However, an exception is made within the parliamentary system for the national security organizations and consequently for the National Intelligence Organization (MIT). Unlike the British system, MIT is accountable to the Prime Minister. MIT combines security and foreign intelligence in one hand. There exists no independent or parliamentary oversight over MIT.

¹⁰⁵ John J. Dziak, 'The Soviet System of Security and Intelligence', in A. Stuart Farson (ed.) *Security and Intelligence In A Changing World: New Perspectives For The 1990s* (London: Frank Cass, 1991), pp. 25-45.

6.1.2. The Place Given to Foreign Intelligence within the Intelligence Community:

For a strong foreign policy-making and implementation there is a great need for intelligence apparatus. The U.S.A. and the U.K. have given significant importance to foreign/strategic intelligence within their intelligence communities. In the U.S.A., while CIA gathers and analyzes foreign human intelligence, the NSA provides technical foreign intelligence. In the U.K. a system similar to the one in the U.S. exists. Secret Intelligence Agency (SIS) provides foreign human intelligence and conducts covert operations, Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) collects and analyzes foreign signals intelligence. Both countries have separate security intelligence organizations to deal with internal threats and counterintelligence activities.

	SECURITY INTELLIGENCE	FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE	COMMUNICATION /ELECTRONIC INT.
US	FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation	CIA Central Intelligence Agency	NSA National Security Agency
UK	SS Security Service	SIS Secret Intelligence Service	GCHQ Government Communication Headquarters
Turkey	MIT Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı		

Table 6.1. Intelligence Agencies

Unlike most of its allies and competitors, Turkey does not have an agency dedicated to gathering solely foreign intelligence. More specifically, Turkey does not have the equivalent of the United States' Central Intelligence Agency or the United Kingdom's Secret Intelligence Service.

In Turkey the whole intelligence activities are conducted under one organization. MIT is held responsible for all kinds of intelligence collection and analysis. Naturally this causes big gaps between the actual need and provision of foreign intelligence. If there had

¹⁰⁶ Michael Herman, op. cit., pp.24, 226.

been a separate foreign/strategic intelligence organization, Turkey would have been much more successful in making and implementing foreign policy. The seriousness of internal threats and the issue of terrorism have led MIT to assign number one priority to domestic security matters. Thus all intelligence activities have been shaped by domestic security concerns. In fact, a separate foreign intelligence organization that is independent of all domestic issues and concerns would contribute much to Turkey's national interests. As noted earlier, domestic and foreign intelligence are the assigned responsibilities of MIT, whereas in most developed countries these tasks are usually divided between separate agencies. In its current form, MIT is a typical *security* intelligence agency, just like the UK's Security Service (MI 6) which gathers security intelligence within and outside of the UK or America's FBI.

What about political, economic, technologic, intelligence and assessment on foreign matters? Who is going to meet the need for foreign/strategic intelligence? As noted by a diplomat, "Turkey is not successful in gathering foreign intelligence."¹⁰⁷ In fact there has been a heavy dependence on Western allies in foreign intelligence. Therefore, Turkey needs new strategic intelligence concepts, plans, personnel and organization before entering the new millennium.¹⁰⁸

6.1.3. Oversight and Accountability of the Intelligence Community:

For the public, one of the most troubling aspects of intelligence activities is their perceived lack of accountability. Operating in secrecy, intelligence agencies are seen not

¹⁰⁷ Kamran İnan, *Dış Politika* (Ankara: Ötüken Yayınları, 1994), p.26.

¹⁰⁸ Mehmet Atay, 'Stratejik Ulusal Güvenlik İstihbaratı', *Strateji* no: 96/1, pp. 91-92.

simply as mysterious, but often uncontrolled. Compared with the other institutions of the government, intelligence agencies pose unique difficulties when it comes to providing accountability. They cannot disclose their activities to the public without disclosing them to their targets at the same time. As a result, intelligence agencies are not subject to the same rigors of public or congressional/parliamentary debate or the same scrutiny by the media as other government agencies. Their budgets are secret; their operations are secret; their assessments are secret.

	Congressional/Parliamentary Oversight	Executive Oversight
U.S.	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)	President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)
	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)	President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB)
	Other Committees	Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
UK	The Intelligence and Security Committee	Commissioners
CANADA	The Security and Intelligence and Review Committee (SIRC)	Commissioners
AUSTRALIA	Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO	Inspector General of Intelligence and Security
		Security Appeals Tribunal
TURKEY	NONE	NONE

Table 6.2. External Oversight of the Intelligence Agencies

Intelligence agencies, however, are institutions within a democratic form of government, responsible not only to the President/Prime Minister, but to the elected representatives of the people, and, ultimately, to the people themselves. They are funded by the taxpayers.

To solve this dilemma, special oversight arrangements for intelligence have been established within the Executive and Legislative branches of the USA and the UK. As shown in table 6.2., both the UK and the US intelligence communities are subject to

external oversight from the Executive and Legislative branches. In US, for example, in the Congress, special committees in each House are charged with the oversight function, serving as surrogates for their respective bodies and for the public as well. Within the Executive branch, Inspectors General have been established within the agencies themselves or within their parent organizations. The White House also has an intelligence oversight office. Because of the need for secrecy, these bodies normally carry out their oversight functions in private, reporting as necessary and appropriate to the public without exposing the intelligence activities they are overseeing.

In Turkey, however, there is no such external oversight from either Legislative or Executive branches. Therefore the quality, quantity and adequacy of intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and other functions of the Turkish intelligence community cannot be assessed. Consequently there is no feedback to improve the system to the level of contemporary intelligence services.

6.1.4. Coordinating Intelligence and Policy Making:

Intelligence agencies cannot operate in a vacuum. Like any other service organization, intelligence agencies must have guidance from the people they serve. They exist as a tool of government to gather and assess information, and if they do not receive direction, chances are greater that resources will be misdirected and wasted. Intelligence agencies need to know what information to collect and when it is needed. They need to know if their products are useful and how they might be improved to better serve policymakers. Guidance must come from the top. Policymaker direction should be both the foundation and the catalyst for the work of the Intelligence Community.

As stated previously, the intelligence community does not exist for its own sake. The community, like other organs of state, has certain functions to fulfill. The intelligence community is not above the importance of proper coordination. A well planned, laid out and prioritized intelligence requirement will guide the intelligence community and will, in return, provide clear cut information that policy makers need.

In Turkey, although there are necessary organizations, some believe that this coordination function doesn't work properly.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, the Adviser to the President on security and intelligence urges that a new intelligence coordination system should be created.¹¹⁰

6.2. CONCLUSION:

Throughout the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was typically insular and passive. Turkey focused its energy on internal development and sought to avoid foreign tensions that could divert it from that goal. Therefore Turkey did not need to collect foreign intelligence in any significant way. Instead it heavily relied on intelligence provided by NATO states.

After the Cold War Turkey started to follow a rather activist foreign policy. The reasons for Turkey's greater assertiveness are various and overlapping: more prosperity a better-equipped and more experienced military, the decline of neighboring states, greater regional opportunity, and a greater sense of policy interdependence marked by the ending of restraints imposed by the Cold War.

¹⁰⁹ Mehmet Eymür, *Analiz: Bir MİT Mensubunun Anıları*, (İstanbul: AD Yayıncılık, Milliyet Yayınları, 1991), p. 42, Tuncay Özkan, *Bir Gizli Servisin Tarihi: MİT*, (İstanbul: AD Yayıncılık, Milliyet Kitapları, 1996), pp. 276-27. , Suat İlhan, 'İstihbarat: Gizil Güç', *Strateji* no. 95/3, p.88.

Since 1993, Turkish forces have participated in numerous peacekeeping, peace-monitoring, and related operations, in Somalia, Bosnia, Albania, Georgia, Hebron, Kuwait (the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission), Macedonia, and Pakistan (training Afghan refugees on mine clearing). As a result of another Turkish initiative, several Balkan states agreed in September 1998 to set up a Balkan peacekeeping force to be deployed in NATO or WEU led operations sanctioned by the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Turkey also proposed a similar force for the Caucasus and a naval peacekeeping force for the Black Sea. In the Balkans, Turkey established working relations with all the states of the region. It developed close ties with Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia. Disintegration of Soviet Union let Turkey exploit opportunities in the region. It has developed close ties with the Turkic States of the former Soviet Union.

Turkey needs to have an intelligence agency which provides necessary intelligence in formulating (and sometimes in implementing) its foreign, economic and military policies. Turkey cannot expect a continuation of the generous intelligence-sharing of past. Turkish Intelligence Community needs a strong foreign intelligence agency. MIT and other intelligence agencies might continue with their security intelligence work, or even it can be increased as the circumstances dictate. However, nothing will match or fulfill the foreign intelligence requirements that are essential to pursue an effective foreign policy. MIT is considered as an agency that also produces strategic/foreign intelligence as well as security intelligence. In fact, by the time MIT has become a security intelligence agency like Germany's BfV, United States' FBI, Great

¹¹⁰ Mehmet Atay, 'Stratejik Ulusal Guvenlik Istihbarati', *Strateji* no: 96/1, p. 92.

Britain's MI5. These are security intelligence agencies gathering intelligence and conducting operations mainly in their homeland as well as abroad. In Turkey there are four intelligence units collecting security intelligence, whereas only a branch of MIT is gathering foreign intelligence. Even foreign intelligence collection is tasked for security concerns.

Turkey's internal and external security concerns dictate having a strong security intelligence organization. In recent years Turkish security forces made a successful struggle against terrorist activities. Intelligence surely had a big share in this success. Turkey, however, needs equally a strong foreign intelligence agency to deal with its near abroad, to protect the rights of the Turks living abroad, to detect early, emerging threats to the Turkish National Interests (not only to the Turkish National Security) in wherever on the globe, to protect the rights of Turkish firms and businessmen that are increasingly engaging with international contracts, to provide strong and accurate intelligence estimates for the planing of foreign policy.

A tradition of external and independent oversight and performance review should be initiated within the Turkish system. This is not only a prerequisite of a democratic republic, but also one of the essentials of maintaining a strong national security structure.

Another important element of the modern intelligence communities that is not acknowledged within the Turkish system is a separate Electronic intelligence gathering agency. NSA (National Security Agency) in the U.S., GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) in the U.K., CSE (Communications Security Establishment) in Canada are the examples of such agencies that collect foreign signals intelligence and conduct high-tech intelligence operations.

While setting priorities in intelligence collection, security is given number one priority. NSC, which has a great role in directing and setting intelligence goals, mainly deals with security matters. Decisions taken by the Council usually do not include economic, foreign and political and technical intelligence matters.

Contribution from non-governmental sources such as academia and institutes into the Turkish intelligence community is virtually none. Thus, fresh analysis and brains is prevented contributing to the system.

To sum, Turkish Intelligence Community should be reformed in order to encompass the following missions effectively:

1. Support to Turkish diplomacy
2. Support to monitoring of treaties and other agreements
3. Support to military operations
4. Support to defense planning
5. Economic Intelligence
6. Countering activities abroad that threaten Turkey's interests.
7. Support to criminal justice and regulatory agencies
8. Collecting and analyzing environmental information
9. Support to "Information Warfare"¹¹¹

¹¹¹ "Information Warfare" refers to activities undertaken by governments, groups or individuals to gain electronic access to information systems, manipulating or fabricating data, or perhaps even bringing the systems down, as well as activities undertaken to protect against such activities. In Turkey, government and public communications, transportation, financial, energy, and other industrial systems have become critically dependent on a complex set of interconnected automated information and control systems. Many of these systems are potentially vulnerable to computer-based disruption, manipulation, or corruption by hostile individuals, groups, or countries. Turkey, therefore, urgently needs an "information warfare" concept and emergency plans.

It is obvious that a centralized intelligence agency like MIT can not perform all above- mentioned missions effectively. Therefore a reform for Turkish intelligence system is inevitable.

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