

BILKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE CRITICAL TURN IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY:
FERTILITY OF METATHEORETICAL EXPLORATIONS

BY
ASUMAN DAYICAN

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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
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I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree on Master of International Relations.



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Assist. Prof. Gülnur Aybet

ABSTRACT

The critical turn in international relations theory that has accelerated particularly in the second half of the 1980s has exacerbated the sense of crisis within the field of international studies. The main accusation directed to the initiators of this crisis is the overemphasis on superfluous metatheoretical issues and lack of due attention to the 'substantive' issues of world politics. This thesis is a discussion paper that counterposes these arguments. It tries to offer an overview of the dissenting voices by focusing mainly on postmodernism and Critical Theory. Through a theoretical exercise related to security studies, that has been directed by the insights of postmodernism, it tries to demonstrate the fertility of the metatheoretical ferment.

ÖZET

Özellikle 1980 lerin ikinci yarısında yaygınlaşan eleştirel yaklaşımlar uluslararası ilişkiler alanındaki kriz algılamalarını arttırdı. Bu krizin yarıtılmasında asıl pay sahibi olanlara yöneltlen başlıca suçlama önemsiz meta-teorik konularla fazlaca meşgul olmaları ve dünya politikasının temel meselelerine gerekli ilgiyi göstermemeleridir. Bu tez bu tür argümanlara karşı duran bir tartışma yürütmektedir. Ağırlıklı olarak postmodernizm ve Eleştirel Teori üzerinde yoğunlaşarak muhalif görüşlerin bir genel görünümünü sunmaya çalışmaktadır. Güvenlik çalışmalarıyla ilgili, postmodernist görüşlerden esinlenmiş bir teorik egzersiz aracılığıyla meta-teorik arayışların verimliliği ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır.

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This dissertation owes its greatest debt to Assist. Prof. Gülgün Tuna. In addition to her encouragement and guidance as my supervisor, I am indebted to her for introducing me to international relations theory and particularly the dissenting voices for the first time.

Last, but not least, I would like to express my gratitude to my father, my first instructor in life.

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PREFACE

This study was initially inspired with a special interest in the question of Eurocentricism and its implications both in international relations theory and on the foreign policy behavior of developing countries like Turkey. I began with a rereading of Edward Said's "Orientalism" and continued with a review of its critiques. Then I found myself proceeding into the heart of a debate in international relations theory in which Eurocentricism constitutes one of the central themes. This new debate is quite appealing and even striking particularly due to the celebratory rhetoric on the part of the initiators of this crisis as opposed to the despair that has been prevailed in the 'previous crisis'.

Finding one's way within this debate poses a hazardous task. For a discordant chorus of dissident voices (postmodernism, poststructuralism, Postcolonialism, feminism, Gramscian Critical Theory, Habermasian Critical Theory, historical structuralism, etc.) is further complicated with the too sophisticated jargon of the dissenters and philosophical subject matter that is quite alien to an average student of international relations. This complexity of the metatheoretical ferment brought forth by the recent debate lead many conventional international relations scholars to see the recent debate as an 'imbroglio' that led nowhere and to caricature the dissenters as confused and confusing intellectuals in a Woody Allen film.

The main argument forwarded by the mainstream scholars is that critical approaches, although they give a dynamism to the field, caused theoretical confusion and

the critical turn would soon lose its zeal leaving a trace on rationalist approaches that could not alter the essence of the preexisting international relations theory. Nevertheless a meticulous reading of the critical literature would reveal that dissenters have a point to make and their role can far transcend that of stimulating a review of the conventional approaches as against the arguments and wishes of the conventional scholars.

Sympathetic to the critical turn in international relations and assuming a postmodernist/poststructuralist vantage point, the main aim of this thesis, is to give a brief review of the critical turn in international relations. Thus our aim is to provide the reader with a sense of the issues that created resentment in a wide variety of different circles and to show that critical approaches could initiate theory construction and could yield praiseworthy results. We will concentrate mainly on postmodernism and Critical Theory in this review.

A frank interest in critical approaches is vital in that they provide ways to opt out of the despairing positivist game of becoming a scientific discipline. They could provide trajectories for the field that could take studies to a line in accord with that of the broader social sciences. Critical approaches could challenge and replace the parochial approaches of the international relations scholarship that sever the links between the area and wider debates within the social sciences. They could provide more elaborate depictions of social reality, for they are putting emphasis on the fact that 'reality' that we are dealing is the 'social reality', and hence historical, constructed and intersubjective. These approaches might turn reality into a slippery surface on which proceeding to an Eden of true and complete knowledge becomes an elusive quest. However, their genuine merit lie in the fact that they have a distinguished role in opening up a space to mention normative

questions within this elusiveness and challenge the pessimistic analysis that reiterate the hopelessness of positive change. One of these changes that create optimism is the intellectual plurality that has prospered by the rise of the critical turn. Eschewing to propagate any kind of closure in the name of a new grand theory of international relations, our discussion contemplates to project the contributions of this plurality in curbing down the isolation of the international relations discipline, in enriching the intellectual assets of the field and in coming over its parochial view.

This thesis is composed of two main parts that assume equal significance with respect to our aims. The first part might be considered a (meta)theoretical exercise. After explicating the present crisis in international relations in the first chapter, I will dwell on postmodernism by its major related arguments in the second chapter. The second chapter aims to show the intimate relevance of the questions posed by postmodernism to the dead hand of the discipline and particularly its realist core. However, it must be stated that critical turn is not limited to the transposition of the postmodernism into the international relations field. The second part consisting of the third chapter would be a theoretical application of these metatheoretical concerns in the field of security. In the third chapter, we would interrogate the rationalist/instrumentalist conception and consequent depoliticization of security issues. This chapter aims to procure a more vivid example for the contributions of critical approaches in international relations. In the fourth and last chapter, a general overview of the contributions made, the questions raised and prospects for the field created by the critical turn will be given. This chapter tries to summarize the merits of a critical approach not only for radical movements but also for the formulation of foreign policy both in theory and practice.

CHAPTER I: CELEBRATING THE CRISIS

1.1 Irony of the “Present Crisis” in International Relations Theory

Any student who glances at the literature on contemporary international relations theory would find him/herself vociferously greeted by a plethora of depictions of ‘disciplinary crisis’ with ensuing explanations or descriptions of it. However, this would seem rather anachronistic to a student of international relations, especially to those who have been educated in a graduate or undergraduate program in this field. Hence, international relations students are familiar to this sense of crisis, at least to a modicum of theoretical confusion since the first classes taken in international relations theory or world politics courses.

At least once through our education probably we were all intimidated by the long list of “doctrines, images of the world, ideologies, paradigms or perspectives” that could influence a particular writer’s work¹. Courses commence with an enumeration of the “alternative images or perspectives of international relations” with their “certain assumptions” concerning “critical actors, issues and processes in world politics”. Then they continue with a brief description of the certain types of answers, as well as questions, and the use of certain methodology in this process rendered necessary by these

¹See Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory- Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, (New York: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 1-2. See Michael Banks, “The Inter-Paradigm Debate” in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), International Relations: a handbook of current theory, (London: Frances Pinter, 1985) for a review of the literature enhancing paradigmatic debates revolving around realism, structuralism and pluralism triangular.

underlying images². These descriptions were supplemented by brief critiques of each perspective. Courses end by lamenting the yet unfulfilled goal of constructing a rigorous social science of international relations. Of course laced by the often reiterated excuse of the complexity of the subject matter and a wish for the completion of this task even though there is no hope seen in the foreseeable future.

To epitomize, constructing a scientific discipline, defined in terms of a rigorous positivism, remains as the only way to follow that can not be interrogated and hence it was set from the outset that we, the academicians, must fly to this Eden of science like flies flying to the light by the aim of reaching ‘true knowledge’ or at least by the aim of chasing ‘truer knowledge’³. This eternal and holy (at least venerable) quest for ‘true knowledge’, having its own inner logic, is graphically guided by “frames of reference”⁴, that is “belief systems, which can neither be proven absolutely true or false”⁵. Nevertheless theories sprung out of these frames must be tested empirically, so a hypothesis must consist of a “testable statement of relationship between two or more variables”⁶. With this requirement of empirical testing, simultaneously scientific research is also constrained within the confines of the researchable questions –questions of ‘What is?’ related to facts, not ‘What should?’ that is questions related to values. Thus there is no way reflecting upon ones’ own “frames of reference” as they are not empirically testable. Only in time, these philosophies or belief systems underlying scientific

² Viotti and Kauppi, op. cit note 1, p.2-3.

³Gerald R. Adams and J. D. Schwane Weldt, Understanding Research Methods, (New York: Longman, 1985),p.12.

⁴ Ibid., p.35. Adams and Schwane, use the term “frame of references” similar to world views, paradigms or models of man, indicating the philosophies or the set of values and beliefs that effect scientific enterprise by helping “to *define meaningful research problems and establish criteria for truth*”(36) “in subtle but important ways”(35).

⁵ Ibid., 41.

⁶ Ibid.

enterprise could be evaluated according to the performance of their theories, when they are tested against utilitarian scales of explaining the world, providing 'true knowledge' about it and making correct predictions.

When the lamented plight of the discipline and hardships of recovering it from this malaise infuse with the constraints of 'scientific ideals' and utilitarian understandings of scientific knowledge, students are left with "a take it or leave it" choice in the face of weaknesses and inadequacies of each alternative and the tremendous risks of any kind of eclecticism. Thus, any student of IR is likely to experience a crisis (at least a personal one) at the outset of her/his academic life.

These pessimistic conclusions are reiterated by different writers, even when they follow different lines of analysis. Mansbach and Ferguson,⁷ in their book that I have read with a taste of despair as a graduate student, endeavour to explain the plight of the international relations discipline by the lack of a paradigm, and thus a foundational consensus in the field. They deplore the lack of consensus on the subject matter to be studied, the methodology to be utilised, and the criteria to evaluate the acceptability of the solutions, that renders the borders of the discipline ambiguous and insecure⁸. International relations studies proceed in the dearth of any "broadly shared conceptualization of the important puzzles or problems to be solved and any adequate theory to guide us in the solution of these problems"⁹. In this respect international relations might be seen less than "a true discipline"¹⁰ as it "fails to meet the basic objective of any science" which is defined in terms of constituting "a body of

⁷R. W. Mansbach and Y. H. Fergusson, The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988)

⁸ *ibid.*, pp.22-3.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.23.

theoretically organised knowledge that is based on cumulative empirical research”¹¹. Thus, debates within the international relations field resemble neither to the Kuhnian scientific progress, that occurs through replacement of one paradigm by another nor to the additive or incremental scientific progress suggested by Holsti¹². In this view international relations are seen as an open area that could not be closed off and thus could not achieve scientific progress.¹³ In contrast to the conviction of Adams and Schwane that frames of reference (or paradigms) can generate scientific knowledge through the utilisation of scientific methods, Mansbach and Ferguson strongly contend that the interference of value-laden paradigms hindered scientific progress. They discarded realism as a paradigm as “it is less a theory, than a self contained syllogism that closes off further analysis and sustains a particular ideology”¹⁴. Mansbach and Ferguson concluded their analysis by pointing out becoming a true scientific discipline (that was defined in completely utilitarian terms in the sense of reaching true and useful knowledge) as the unequivocal ideal.

Strikingly, despite the depth of their insights in evaluating realist approaches and despite their aptitude in realising the value-laden nature of it, they exonerated ‘scientific knowledge’ of any entanglements with power. Instead of interrogating ‘scientific ideals’ they incriminated only the enormous complexity of the social reality that makes it

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p.24.

¹¹ McGowan and Shapiro cited in Mansbach and Ferguson, p. 213.

¹² K. J. Holsti, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which are the Fairest Theories of All?”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:33 No:3 (1989), 255-261.

¹³ Mansbach and Ferguson employed the concept of “paradigm” in a radically different meaning than it has assumed in the article of Lapid or Hoffman. What they call a paradigm is commensurate to an “empirico analytical” conception of theory, i.e., “a conception of theory as an abstract device by which to understand social realities. For this concept of empirico analytical conception of theory see E. Fuat Keyman, Globalisation, State, Identity/Difference: A Critical Theory of International Relations Theory, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), p.92. This definition, on which Mansbach and Ferguson discarded realism as an ensemble of values, not a paradigm, comes closer to the conception of paradigm in Lapid as a metatheoretical construct.

intractable to empiricism and implicitly invokes the necessity of decisive detachment of scientific enterprise from values. By their urge to detach values from scientific enterprise they neglect that every statement about world around us is based on a “general mental map which shows how the world society is structured and which aspects of it are the most significant”¹⁵. And moreover, Mansbach and Ferguson overlook the fact that this general mental map is inevitably value laden.

These arguments, whether optimistic or pessimistic about the present situation of the discipline, can be considered as integral parts of the crisis, that we would designate, ‘yesterday’s crisis’. As there is a ‘reality out there’ to be discovered and it is one and only, they all point to the need for a consensus, secure borders, accepted tools for attaining objective knowledge and the graphic lack of them. However, they close all the ways for self-reflectivity by their positivist/empiricist bias.

1.2. Difference of the Present Crisis: Visibility of Dissonance

Having this much debated plight of the discipline in mind, one cannot help but ask the question ‘What is new to be coined “today’s crisis” that paved the way for this inflated sense of disorder within the field of international studies that is argued to be comparable to the subject matter it studied?’. Working in a field that neither seems to have strictly defined boundaries, uncontested theories or methodologies nor is likely to have these in the foreseeable future, what can the so-called “third debate”, i.e., “third discipline defining debate” mean?¹⁶.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.216.

¹⁵ Banks, op. cit. Note 1, pp.7-8.

¹⁶This is a term coined by Lapid. Yosef Lapid, “ The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:33 No:3, 235-254.

The first point that seems appealing is that these analyses of the present crisis involve references both to the past and present state of the discipline that generally overlook the prior plight of the field, and the prospects for its future evolution. While some writers define explicitly or refer implicitly to a “pre-crisis past”, some base their arguments on an illustration of the discipline as a site of ceaseless struggle and unsettled bickering. Nevertheless both lines of arguments are underlined by the same understanding of evolution, which asserts that despite alterations something remains unchanged.

Whereas Lapid argues that the “third debate”, that is preceded by the “idealism versus realism” schism of the 1920s and 1930s” and the more recent “history versus science” exchange of the 1950s and 1960s”¹⁷, flanged open the gates of the discipline for “a vigorous plurality by its epistemological relativism”¹⁸. On the other hand, Holsti asserts that pluralism has always been a characteristic of international relations studies in the sense that “at no time has a single paradigm commanded the field as a whole and replaced all others, although some have been predominant in various periods”¹⁹. He sketches out six dimensions of international relations theories that are structured as dichotomies (like “atomistic anarchy versus community as visions of the world” or “pessimism versus optimism about the outcomes of processes”²⁰). When “any particular theorist inhabits the extremes of four or more of these dimensions, a stream of thought

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 236.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 243.

¹⁹ K. J. Holsti, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which are the Fairest Theories of All?, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:33 No:3 (1989), p.258.

²⁰ Holsti borrowed this classification from Mansbach and Ferguson (1986) and added two more dimensions. Whereas Mansbach and Ferguson mention these dimensions as ceaselessly reiterated stale positions that served shaping allegedly new postures with only slightly altered jargons, thus as a signifier of the inert character of the field, Holsti utilises them as the propitious ground where the progress of the field was rooted.

invariably develops to challenge that position”²¹. Through this process of ‘revision breeding revision’, the study of international relations as a field progresses additively, coming closer to a more accurate understanding of the realities of the world by recognizing “multiple realities and hence of multiple theories”²²

A similar vision of the field that proceeds cumulatively (or using a more appropriate term to the Habermasian orientation of Hoffman, dialectically) is invoked by Mark Hoffman²³. International relations, since it was first established as an academic discipline in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Hoffman posits, was proceeded through a series of debates and it finally reached a major crossroads, or in other words it reached the point of an “interparadigm” debate²⁴.

Another description of the flux in international relations field can be found in James Der Derian’s “Antidiplomacy”²⁵. Der Derian figures out three main stages – respectively, realism, neorealism and hyperrealism- through which international relations studies drifted smoothly and swiftly around a rationalist axis, one following the other.

“In a very short period the field has oscillated from *realist* theory, in which world-historical figures mean what they say and say what they mean, and diplomatic historians record it as such in Rankian fashion (“wie es eigentlich gewesen ist”); the *neorealist* in which politico-economic structures do what they do, and we do what they make us do, at least up until 1989, to *hyperrealist*, in which the model of the real becomes more real than the reality it models, and we become confused.”²⁶

What is striking and significant in respect to our concern, in these analyses offered by scholars affluent to different and often contrasting intellectual postures, lay more in their convergence than their points of departure. All illustrate a relatively

²¹ Ibid.

²² *ibid.*, pp.258-61.

²³ Mark Hoffman, “Critical Theory and the Interparadigm Debate”, in Hough C. Dyer and Leon Mangasarion (eds.), *The Study of the International Relations: The State of the Art*, (London: Macmillan, 1989)

²⁴ Michael Banks cited in Hoffman, p.60.

²⁵ James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy –spies, terror, speed, and war*, (Cambridge& Oxford: Blackwell, 1992),

peaceful and secure disciplinary terrain prior to the crisis -a territory under the sovereign control of the dominant paradigm of realism that gives no lease of life to dissident voices and thus manage to survive uncontested. They invoke a natural being that has a natural space of life, either which it has ever inhabited or destined to expand out to fill this natural space through evolutionary progress. Before present crisis, although the field of international relations is characterized by lack of consensus about the right perspective or paradigm to be adopted, at least a modicum of unison exists about the stances of the antagonists, what are the lines of contention between them. Even though, there are countless shades of difference within any single paradigm, one can collapse different writers under the rubric of one paradigm without much difficulty. One can sketch out the main tenets of realism, neorealism or world system theorists.

To demonstrate such an imagination of the discipline that awaits in relative tranquillity before the present crisis and fissured endlessly by the rise of it, writings of the scholars like Holsti or Keohane²⁷ must be examined meticulously. Although they disguise this sense of crisis by their efforts to normalize the dissident voices or rejections as the natural process of scientific questioning to reach better understanding of the “realities of the world” and claim that there is nothing new in this state of the discipline since plurality or evolution by revision is an inherent characteristic of the field, this theme of a pre-crisis past is easy to recognize from the highlighted areas of coherent, evolutionary liberated zones in the name of realism and its versions, or rationalist approaches. Thus, the dominant paradigms of it are also represented as consensual points of view, a unitary voice of a consensus, speaking in unison through a single interlocutor, evolving but

²⁶ibid., p.5.

consistent in time. In accord with this vision of the discipline, present crisis is conceived as the contestation of realism from a number of critical perspectives. Subsequently, these challenges are contemplated to pop up all of a sudden in the field of international relations, drawing on the currency of critical social theory acquiesced long before in other fields or disciplines²⁸. The critiques of the dominant paradigm are illuminated as excited teenagers that can be tolerated and might be stimulating but sooner or later these revolutionary mood would lose its zeal.

On the other hand, ironically, there are also proliferating accounts about the dominant paradigm and the field that conceives it neither monolithic nor uncontested or totally consistent, neither in the past nor in the present. Proliferated rereading and counter-memorializing of the great texts of the field that are conventionally presented as a consistent lineage that stretches from antique ages to the present upset the idea of a pre-crisis past in the sense of coherent and consistent intellectual postures and unchanging foundations. These analyses invoke not an illustration of consensus inherent to the field, but the insidious strategies or sovereign practices that serve to hide discordant voices. Ashley mentions the use of the “taboo terms” as “instruments of political power” to secure disciplinary boundaries and the scientific status of the discipline²⁹. Taboo terms like the one mentioned by Ashley, i.e., economism, are designed to tackle with the contestations manifested by dissent voices and to silence them. Or to give another example, Ashley, in another article, “Poverty of Neorealism”, defies the understanding of smooth or evolutionary progress of the field by declaring neorealism as more a fallacious

²⁷Holsti, op. cit . note 17.Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two approaches”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:32 No:4 (1988), 379-396.

²⁸ For an example see Yohan Arrifin, “The Return of Marx in International Relations Theory”, (Review article), *Economy and Society*, Vol:25 No:1 (1996), p.128.

pretender than a righteous inheritor to realism³⁰. Walker's point that although a long list of names are traditionally connoted with the single label of realism there are significant rifts between these alleged realists, like Hobbes and Machiavelli³¹, deflects the image of a unitary, unchanging or at least consistent realist core that defines the 'discipline of international relations'. Walker conveniently asserts that "political realism must be understood less as a coherent theoretical position in its own right than as the site of a great many contested claims and metaphysical disputes"³². It is evident that "claims to realism in international political theory carry meanings and implications from a much broader discourse about politics and philosophy"³³. The point is that only a selective and biased reading of these celebrated sources represent them as coherent and consistent.

This confusion of contrasting viewpoints about the state of discipline and the crisis that it is alleged to be experiencing provides a propitious starting point for our analysis of the so-called 'third debate' or emerging dissidence. As Ashley and Walker rightly stress, "remembrances of a supposed "pre-crisis past" are by much a part of the disputed terrain in the crisis of today"³⁴.

"...Dissident works of thought, we can say at the outset, have not incited a sense of crisis by approaching a naive and insular discipline, a paradigm, or tradition from beyond its boundaries, as if bearing news from far-off lands or, as detractors might say, from the foreign capitols of contemporary fashion All of these images involve imagining territories, borders, walls already in place.

...If, in crisis, we are unable to decide how to limit, read, and remember the textual history in which to anchor a discipline or paradigm, this can only be because the textual history to which we refer has *never* been a territory of unequivocal and continuous meaning. It has never been fixed through time, well-bounded, and closed to contesting interpretations. *The disciplines textual history has always*

²⁹Richard K. Ashley, "Three Modes of Economism", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:27 (Winter 1983), 464-5.

³⁰Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism", *International Organization*, Vol.: 38 (Spring, 1984)

³¹R. B. J. Walker, "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:31 No:1 (1987). pp.70-4.

³² *Ibid.*, p.67.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.67.

³⁴Richard K. Ashley, R. B. J. Walker, "CONCLUSION- Reading Dissidence/ Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies", *International Studies Quarterly, Special Issue, Vol. 34, No.3, September 1990b*, p. 387.

*been paradoxically open to a proliferation of mutually destabilizing readings, It has always contained tensions and paradoxes that not only threaten to undo the supposed certitude of any position from which interpretation proceeds but also threaten to make way for other readings that a supposedly correct reading, to be thought correct, must exclude.”*³⁵ (emphasis added)

These “remembrances of a pre-crisis past”; however are also arbitrary and the result of a power play as the supposed boundaries of the discipline itself. It is aimed to create a sovereign effect in order to be able to speak from the locus of the privileged sovereign core of a discipline. As the divisions of disciplines are as arbitrary as the boundaries of the states, dissidents that traverse these boundaries are always likely to be existent. The discipline is considered to be insular as long as these persona non grata can be dispelled from the sovereign domain of the discipline or normalized within it.

“...Even if its possible to romanticize a past in which the discourse of international studies manage to sustain some semblance of an unequivocal voice at one with a continuous disciplinary heritage and occupying a definite territorial domain, this could not have been because this voice and the supposed boundaries demarcating its place really were fixed, sure, and undisputed. It could only have been because it was possible for a time (and by means analyzable) actively to marginalize, forget, and defer encounters with paradoxes, contesting themes, and resistant interpretations that are always part of the disciplinary inheritance, that transgress all imaginable boundaries, and that render radically unstable all renditions of an unequivocal voice. It could only have been because it was possible for a time to marginalize the very paradoxes, themes, and interpretations whose increasing visibility at the supposed core of the discipline have produced the sense of disciplinary crisis today.”³⁶

Hence, the sovereign ‘core’ of a discipline which determines the right questions to be asked, forbidden zones to be avoided and adequate answers to be given as we have seen in the examples of Viotti and Kauppi, Mansbach and Ferguson or Adams and Schwabe, is not “a territory, position or homogeneous point of view anchored and defined by reference to a coherent, continuous and well-bounded textual inheritance”. In Ashley and Walker’s words;

“What constitutes a “core” is the ability, in whatever location, actively to sustain for some time a semblance of a commanding sovereign presence by adopting a certain blindness to the paradoxical

³⁵ Ibid., p.386.

³⁶ Ibid., p.387.

labors by which, even now, memorializing readings of a textual inheritance are undertaken and unsettling encounters with paradoxes of space, time, and identity are marginalized.”³⁷

Now, let us return to our first question: What is the difference of today’s crisis? Or what is the reason of this exacerbated sense of crisis? To give an answer to this question we have to first reformulate anew the term "crisis" itself. Fortunately this term does not remind any more the perpetual frustration of the yearnings to become a rigorous science fashioned in the model of positivist natural sciences. Following Ashley and Walker, if we highlight the “discipline’s opening out into a region of intrinsically ambiguous, intrinsically indeterminate activity” -where all boundaries are insecure, conceived as arbitrary and contingent and where endeavour to enclose a safe terrain for the discipline-are faced up with the unruliness of the marginal sites- as the core of the crisis we can conceive the present crisis in international relations as

“...a crisis that folds out beyond a discipline’s imagined boundaries, connecting to a crisis of the human sciences, a crisis of patriarchy, a crisis of governability, a crisis of late industrial society, a generalized crisis of modernity”³⁸

Then, it becomes visible that this exacerbated sense of crisis is intimately related to the increasing visibility of the “active and arbitrary work of marginalization”³⁹ which was in turn caused by the proliferating “marginal sites” in late industrial society⁴⁰. These marginal sites, characterized by the dearth of a “unique and ultimate sovereign identity” are “intrinsically ambiguous” sites of perpetual struggle where to “construct a coherent representation that excludes contesting interpretations” is not possible or at least not uncontested, and where metanarratives of modernity are put in doubt as arbitrary

³⁷ *ibid.*, p.388.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p.376.

³⁹ *ibid.*, p.,389.

⁴⁰Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, “Speaking the Language Dissident of Exile: Thought in International Studies”, *International Studies Quarterly, Special Issue, Vol. 34, No.3, September 1990a*, p.260.

constructs of a “sovereign subject of knowledge” whose ability to create the effect of sovereignty is injured⁴¹

1.3. Common Grounds, Different Strategies

This definition of the present crisis that folds out beyond the imaginary boundaries of a single discipline and reveals its intimacy with the crisis of modernity or in other words a disbelief in the discourses of modernity –“all varieties of social and political thought dominant in the west since the Enlightenment”⁴²-sets our starting point to delineate a common ground for the wide variety of critical perspectives, proliferation of which are held to be the source of today’s crisis that has been aggravated in the field, by the circles who held themselves to be the hard-core of the discipline as being “the children of the Enlightenment”⁴³. The critical turn in international relations, beside stretching to interdisciplinary sources, has also been compounded by the end of the Cold War era and sudden transformations of the global politics experienced in the immediate aftermath of it⁴⁴.

Relocating the recent critical turn in international relations as a parallel debate to that of the wider debate going on in Western social sciences provides an efficient way to understand its commonalties. This common ground can be labelled as the “critical social theory”⁴⁵. In Lapid’s view “demise of the empiricist-positivist promise for a cumulative

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p.260-2.

⁴²Chris Brown, “ ‘Turtles All the Way Down’: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International Relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 23 No 2 (1994), p.214.

⁴³ Keohane, *op. cit.* note 24.

⁴⁴Andrew Linklater, “Dialogue, Dialectic and Emancipation in International Relations at the End of the Post-War Age”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vole 23 No 1 (1994), p.120.

⁴⁵ Here, the term social theory is used in a broad sense as the texture of social sciences, in the words of Anthony Giddens;

behavioral science recently has forced scholars from nearly all the social disciplines to reexamine the ontological, epistemological, and axiological foundations of their scientific endeavors.” This questioning of the foundations culminated in “an acute bout of self-doubt and heightened metatheoretical ferment” through which the “most highly prized premises of Western academic discourse concerning the nature of our social knowledge, its acquisition, and its utility – including shibboleth such as “truth”, “rationality”, “objectivity”, “reality”, and “consensus” - have come under renewed critical reflection⁴⁶.

Critical social theory itself is not a monolithic, coherent body of thought, it is a “wider search for thinking space” within contemporary social theory centered on a broad “agenda of dissent”. It is an “ongoing interdisciplinary debate of Western social theory which was sought to problematize the entrenched legacies of an Enlightenment concept of history, the relation between power and knowledge and the character of human sciences”⁴⁷. From the outset, what seems sanguine about the present crisis is that the exceptional challenges of the recent years have brought forth “an appreciation for previously “alien” approaches to knowledge and society, drawn from interdisciplinary sources”⁴⁸ and the termination of relative isolation of the field⁴⁹.

“Social Theory...spans social science. It is a body of theory shared in common by all the disciplines concerned with the behaviour of human beings. It concerns.....sociology, economics, politics, human geography, psychology- the whole range of the social sciences. Neither is social theory readily separable from questions of interest to an ever wider set of concerns: it connects through to literary criticism on the one hand and to the philosophy of social sciences on the other.”

Cited in Jim George, “International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:33 No:3 (1990), p.271. This definition is widely accepted among the writers of the critical turn. See, Keyman, op. cit note 11 and David Campbell and Jim George, “Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations”, *International studies Quarterly* (1990) 34, 269-293.

⁴⁶ Lapid, op. cit. note 14, p.236.

⁴⁷ George and Campbell, op. cit. note 41, pp.269-71.

⁴⁸ George, op. cit. note 41, p. 269.

⁴⁹ Linklater, op. cit. note 40, p. 119.

Underlining this common background, we can posit several common themes in the critical turn of the recent years in the field of international relations.⁵⁰ Keyman enumerates three different levels that the critical approaches in international relations launched assail in a parallel way to the wider dissent in social sciences. These levels, Keyman posits, are epistemological, ontological and normative⁵¹. Although common themes are separated as distinct levels, it must be considered as due to the exigency to render the critical move more easily comprehensible, for they are intimately related, and even intertwined⁵² as indispensable elements of a whole, one level entailing other inexorable or possible.

1.3.1 Epistemological Contentions

The first common feature of the critical discourses in international relations is the question of epistemology which first and foremost highlights the inadequacies of the positivist/empiricist approach -that serve as the dominant theory of knowledge both in classical realism, neorealism and in its modified versions- in understanding society and

⁵⁰ In face of the enormous complexity of the critical approaches, endeavours to delineate a common posture for these approaches, some kind of a common agenda of dissent, can be found abundantly in the recent literature. Lapid, pointing the new philosophical posture underlying these dissident voices concerned mainly with the epistemological issues and highlights three important interrelated themes –paradigmatism, perspectivism and relativism- which has shaken the positivist orthodoxy. George (1990) also focus on mainly with the question related to knowledge, its construction, how the claims of truth are forwarded, made possible on what kind of grounds, how they are sustained. George and Campbell (1990) used same classification with a slight revision. In addition to George’s initial list they mention the “extension of these issues to the construction of meaning and identity in allits forms” and the question of subjectivity. For the purposes of this study classification of Keyman (1996) is more appropriate as it is more extensive and offers a more comprehensive illustration of the critical move in international relations. In this subject, we will heavily rely on Keyman’s classification.

⁵¹ Keyman, op. cit. note 13, pp.4-12.

⁵² See Vivienne Jabri and Stephen Chan, “The ontologists always rings twice: two more stories about structure and agency”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol:22 No:1 (January 1996), 107-110.and Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, “A Response: Why Epistemology Matters in International Theory”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol:22 No:1 (January 1996), pp.111-116, for a debate on the relation between ontological and epistemological ‘projects’. While Jabre and Chan are advocating the essential ascendancy of ontological ‘projects’ for post-positivist international relations theory , Hollis and Smith are contending that the two projects are intertwined and indispensable to each other. While assuming the argument of

politics⁵³. Epistemological debates also provide a way for self-reflection of scientific enterprises⁵⁴. Labeling of these approaches in an all-encompassing sense as “post-positivist”⁵⁵ might be telling in the sense that epistemological questioning lies at the heart of these debates.

The epistemological questioning can be epitomized as the problematization of representation, i.e., “the assumption that the theory corresponds to the external reality which it represents” or in other words problematization of the “casual” relation between the representing and represented⁵⁶ that positivist/empiricist epistemologies commenced from. Positivism’s “ahistorical and extra social” “knowledge-defining standards “which are sanctified as if they were ‘nature’s own’ or given human standards and constructed on the tenet of “‘truth as correspondence’ to ‘the facts’” is shaken by the contention that “ideas, words and language are not ‘mirrors which copy the “real’””⁵⁷. The foundations of the ‘true knowledge’ are shaken deeply.⁵⁸ This problematization has the merit of revealing the political character of epistemology by the underlying relationship between power and knowledge and thus challenging the potentially autonomous conception of

Hollis and Smith, one more point that is to be underlined is their common conviction that universalist epistemological assertions must be eschewed.

⁵³ See George, op. cit. note 41, p.272 and Jim George, “Understanding International Relations after the Cold War: Probing beyond the Realist Legacy” in Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (eds.), Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities, Vol:2, (Minneapolis-London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 40-53.

⁵⁴Mark Neufeld, “Reflexivity and International Relations Theory”, *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, (1993, Vol 22 No1, p.55.

⁵⁵ See. *International Studies Quarterly* Special Issue, Vol.: 33 No:3 for a multisided debate of this trend in international relations.

⁵⁶ Keyman, op. cit. note 13, p.5.

⁵⁷ Neufeld, op. cit. note 50.

⁵⁸ Anti-foundationalism in the sense of being against foundationalism of discourses of modernity might be considered as a common theme of the critical approaches. Chris Brown (1994) uses ‘antifoundationalism’ as a scale against which critical approaches can be categorised as reconstructive those trying to find new foundations (e.g. Habermasian Critical Theory) and deconstructive those celebrating unhindered pluralism brought about by anti-foundationalism (e.g. postmodernism advocated by Ashley and Walker) and appreciates the oncs stood as a secure midwayhouse as opposed to the two extreme responses. Brown

epistemology. Now, realist paradigm itself arises as practice, unfortunately complicit with the power politics that it putatively only analyzes and could not find an alibi easily.

Underlying this problematization is a new postulation of science and scientific knowledge as a “triadic complex” consisting of 1) a “phenomenic” axis covering the empirical content of scientific theories; 2) an “analytic axis” covering hypotheses, explanations, and theoretical models; and 3) a “thematic axis” covering reality defining assumptions, epistemological premises, and other types of distinctly “ideological” or “metaphysical” ingredients”⁵⁹. This vision of science makes “eliminability of the human” impossible.⁶⁰ “Critical social theory draws our attention to the way in which the discursive effect of the representation occurs within the realm whereby human agents are in a position to convey a meaning to the represented”⁶¹. So the subject of knowledge does not merely describe and explain the “reality” that s/he investigates but recreates it within a discourse or, in other words, within the confines of “supportive meta-scientific domains in which they are holistically embedded”⁶² that is centered around a certain position of subjectivity.

By this understanding every representation is a misrepresentation to an extent. By this stand the object-subject duality, the myth of objectivity which are embedded in positivist-empiricist approaches are challenged by a double move of intersubjectivity. Not only the object of knowledge but also the subject can not be considered as given and hence, the existence of a space where the absolute truth can be revealed could be considered to exist. This can be epitomized as the repudiation of the “external sources of

conveniently points that deconstructive approaches are less susceptible to criticism with respect to theory than to practice

⁵⁹ Lapid, op. cit. note 14, p. 240.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

understanding” and as a “concern to ground meaning as unambiguously social, historical, and linguistic in construction, and to connect knowledge to power”⁶³. This stress on the social, historical, and cultural themes rather than other themes “reliant on “cogito” rationalism, notions of autonomous individualism, or variants on the “sense data” or “correspondence rule” formats in the construction of knowledge”⁶⁴, i.e., anti-foundationalism embedded in the critical turn, dislocates the sovereign subject of knowledge which has a privileged content of Cartesian rational cogito or occupies “an independent foundation, or Archimedian point, from which to orient or judge social action”⁶⁵. In short the epistemological questioning destabilizes a set of themes related to the acquisition and justification of scientific knowledge that has been taken for granted for so long. However, this does not mean the denial of all epistemological grounds, although there exists no consensus for the appropriate epistemological tenets for a critical international relations theory. The most significant achievement of these endeavour is likely to be the acquiescence of the plurality of possible epistemological stances.

1.3.2 Ontological Inquiry: Essentially Contested Concepts

The absorption of these epistemological questions into the international relations field has shaken the “orthodoxy at the North American disciplinary centre that acknowledged as valid only one form of knowledge (scientific rationalism), one methodology (deductivist empiricism), and one research orientation (problem-solving).”⁶⁶ When epistemology is politicised in this manner, in more explicit terms, when the insidious myth of subject-object duality and hence the ensuing claim of objectivity is challenged, and the sovereign

⁶¹ Keyman, op. cit. note 11, p. 5.

⁶² Lapid, op. cit. note 14, p. 240.

⁶³ George and Campbell, op. cit. note 41, p. 270.

⁶⁴ George, op. cit. note 41, p.272.

privileged subject of knowledge is dislocated, doors for the second common endeavour of the critical approaches in international relations –namely the question of ontology- fling open.

The intimate relationship between the first and the second level can be explained by the “positivist bias”. Positivism dominated the 20th century scientific enterprises as an epistemological bias⁶⁷. Positivist bias rests on a “radical distinction between facts and values which accords epistemological priority to factual knowledge.”⁶⁸ The basic assumption of the positivism about the social reality is that it is accessible to anyone who would observe them.⁶⁹ By simply observing facts, it is possible to formulate “objective” factual statements that are supposed to be congruent with the social reality⁷⁰.

Trying to overcome this epistemological bias, critical endeavour in the ontological level directed an assail on the conceptual framework and unit of analysis of the international relations which are “avowedly rationalistic”⁷¹. These concepts or categories created through a positivist bias “seem to have a clear and solid meaning, a referent in the world, and to be the sort of self evident social reality that needs no other explication”⁷². Nevertheless all these terms are rather elusive, volatile and informed by philosophical beliefs. At the ontological level critical approaches try to destabilize these understandings by revealing this nature of these concepts. On the other hand, ontological questioning has the task of uncovering what is covered, mentioning explicitly what is

⁶⁵ George and Campbell, op. cit. note 41, p.270.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, p.382.

⁶⁷ FROST, M., Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.11.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*

⁶⁹ *ibid.*, p.16.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*

⁷¹ Keohane, op. cit. note 24, p. 381.

implicitly presumed, however, what is on the other hand, underlying, always referred implicitly and venerated as the unchallenged boundaries of modern political thinking. Underlying this effort is the “the desire to change “the categorical structure and patterns within which we think and act”⁷³.

These categories of the political discourse are typically *appraisive*⁷⁴ and these appraisive concepts are constructed by not merely naming something but by characterizing it.

“A description does not refer to data or elements that are bound together merely on the basis of similarities adhering in them, but to describe is to characterize a situation from the vantage point of certain interests, purposes, or standards”⁷⁵

Thus the separation of normative/empirical is rather artificial and constraining in the sense that it severs the relation between any concept and the point of view from which it has been ideated and to transcend limits imposed by this distinction concepts must be understood by their ‘maternal sources’. As William Connolly has stated;

“The terms of political discourse set the frame within which political thought and action proceed. To examine that discourse is to translate tacit judgements embedded in the language of politics into explicit considerations more fully subject to critical assessment.”⁷⁶

Naturally, ardent exponents of representational epistemology hold their categories as if they are reflecting reality exactly as it is and in this sense s/he is a philosophical idealist in the depths of her/his heart that the world’s nature is prearranged to adopt the

⁷² Nash, Manning. *Ethnicity and Vicissitudes- The Ethnicity in the Modern World*, (Chicago- London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp.1-3.

⁷³ George, op. cit. note 41, p.270.

⁷⁴ See William E. Connolly, *Terms of the Political Discourse*, 3rd Edition, (Oxford UK- Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1993). Connolly borrows this term from W. B. Gallie. A concept can be *appraisive* “in that the state of affairs it describes is a valued achievement”(10). Also Connolly describes the “essentially contested concepts” as;

“..when the practice described is *internally* complex in that its characterisation involves reference to several dimensions, and when the agreed and contested rules of application are relatively open, enabling parties to interpret even those shared rules differently as new and unforeseen situations arise, then the concept in question is an “essentially contested concept”.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p.23.

⁷⁶ Ibid., preface to the third edition.

metaphors that he has ideated in his/her mind⁷⁷. They are made possible by the rationalistic texture (or posture) of the international relations theories which has presumed a foundational rationality that naturally entails and requires

“a sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, a clear delineation between descriptive and normative statements, and a neutral method of discrimination (such as falsification or some principle of confirmation) through which scientific (testable) theories could be distinguished from un- or extra scientific doctrine”

The epistemological question that is taken forward by the critical turn, at this point renders the reevaluation of these concepts. In the field of international relations, critical assessment on the ontological level focuses mainly on the “taken-for-granted ontological categories of “the international”, “totality”, and “historicity” on the basis of which fundamental concepts of IR are produced such as globalization, the state, and hegemony.”⁷⁸ Critical writers such as Ashley, Linklater or Rob Walker first initiated their assaults on the conventional theories of international relations by interrogating these concepts.

Especially the concern with “the international”⁷⁹ has a special resonance in the recent critical literature as this concept itself served as a significant pretext for the efforts to delineate the borders of the discipline and impose a certain interpretation, that is the

⁷⁷ Connolly, 1995, p.5.

⁷⁸ Keyman, op. cit. note 11, p.6.

⁷⁹ The two other concepts would not be mentioned due to the lack of space. Keyman epitomise the concept of totality problematized as the conception of international as an “organic totality which acts as a reality in itself, expresses the functioning of its parts, and thus engenders regularities in itself to secure its reproduction as a whole.”(1996,9) For an example of this theme as a harsh critique of neorealism and its structuralist leanings see. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism” (1984). This line of critique can also be found within the critiques of Marxist and Neo-Marxist approaches. The concept of historicity mainly refers to the problematization of “the determinate reality of an objective historical process”(ibid,10) or more explicitly it refers to the critiques of linear evolutionist understanding of history that represents history as a teleological process that is forwarded and destined to reach a certain end.(Keyman, Mutman, Yeğenoğlu 1996:9) This Eurocentric narratives of history signifies West as the vanguard of humanity and so the rest of the world has been located as the natural followers that could often despite their strong yearnings and laborious endeavours considered to be hopeless to catch up with the dazzling achievements of West . See Samir Amin, Eurocentricism, (trans. By Russell Moore) (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989), pp.

realist paradigm, on to this created cosmos which is characterized by the lack of community or by the omnipotence of anarchy⁸⁰. We might highlight two main responses to this issue. The first, might be labelled as the post-structuralist stance, which conceives the problematization of “the international” as a prerequisite for initiating a critical inquiry. To open the gates of international relations field to critical approaches, that are “inherently communitarian” in that they “stress the community-shared background understandings, skills, and practical predisposition’s without which it would be impossible to interpret action, assign meaning, legitimate practices, empower agents, and constitute a differentiate, highly structured social reality”⁸¹, Ashley argues, the concept of community must be reformulated so that it would not come to an end by the frontiers of the state⁸².

The second response came from Habermasian Critical Theory as an attempt to develop an emancipatory project underlining universality. Andrew Linklater highlights the tension between universalism and particularism as a recurrent theme of the international thought that involves “three competing visions of community –the nation-state, the society of states, or a community of humankind” constituted on different levels of commonness and a problematic of conferring primacy upon one of them and takes his stance at the universalist side to develop the defense of a universal community.⁸³

1.3.3 Normative Level: Emancipatory Projects

1-10, and Bryan S. Turner, *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*, (London- New York: Routledge, 1994),pp.39-42.

⁸⁰Richard K. Ashley, “The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics”, *Alternatives*, Vol:12 (1987), p.404.

⁸¹ *ibid.*, p.403.

⁸² *ibid.*, p.411.

⁸³Andrew Linklater, “The Problem of Community in International Relations”, *Alternatives*, Vol:15 No:2 (1990),135-153.

These two levels of the critical approach intermingled with the third one, that is the normative level. This level also constitutes the most lively one in which an ongoing debate or in better terms a dialogue persisted among the different strands of the critical approaches. There is a common aim of traversing the constraints imposed on thinking by the discourse of modernity, and helping to flourish creativity in that new alternatives can be ideated, dissident voices can be aggrandized.⁸⁴ However, this aim of creating emancipatory projects has taken different and often contrasting forms.

In this level the problematic of identity/difference⁸⁵ gains a special resonance which points out the ways to recognize the “other”. This poses a challenge to the claims of superiority of the one particular identity –Western rational subject.

“This in turn brings to the fore the question “democratic community” that is the question of the recognition of the other as difference. The point here is that the more international relations theory is derived from a strong Western rationalist and universalist posture, the more it reduces the “ethical space” for the other to represent itself in its own ownership of its history. Thus, IR theory tend to dissolve the Other into the unitary conception of the modern self as a rational, knowing subject, to privilege that self as the universal point of reference, and limits the political imagination, that is, the imposition of limits on the way in which we think about community. Hence, while as a discipline in constant interaction with the Other (whether it be female, racial or cultural/ethnic Other), IR theory operates as a practice of inclusion/exclusion, in which the privileged role of the Western sovereign self is maintained as a rational, Cartesian, modern cogito, and what is perceived as its Other is excluded, marginalized, and denied to be recognized as different.”⁸⁶

Thus first we have to underline the flourished meta-theoretical ferment in international relations studies as an expression of the increasing sensitivity to the question of self-reflectivity.⁸⁷ These common themes are harbingers of a new interest in the

⁸⁴ Keyman, op. cit note 1, p.11.

⁸⁵ Connolly defines this problematic as the “paradoxical relation of identity to difference”. Identity (that is “us”) is defined not in absolute terms existing in ideal or prior to any existence but as a result of the nature of language always “consolidates and stabilises itself by distinguishing itself from different modes of being”(1993, Preface to the Third Edition)

⁸⁶ Keyman, op. cit. note 11, p.11.

⁸⁷ See Mark Neufeld,(1993:53-61) for the relation between the traditional lack of reflectivity and neglect of metatheoretical questions. Neufeld defines reflectivity as “reflection on the process of theorising” and enumerates three core elements for reflexivity in terms of international relations theories; “(i) self-awareness regarding underlying premises, (ii) the recognition of the inherently politico-normative dimension of paradigms and the normal science tradition they sustain, and (iii) the affirmation that

discipline itself as if the discipline and scholars concerned with this field of study stop and try to look at themselves and their works, beside the subject matter studied. In this sense Keohane's reference to the critical turn as the "reflective approaches"⁸⁸ is telling. For these approaches have the merit of not only criticizing individual theories but the gospel of the field and they try to locate not only the international relations as the subject matter but also the study of it within the context of modernity where it has taken its roots. Thus, "the question of modernity"⁸⁹ constitutes the central issue in the 'disciplinary crisis' of international relations field in two respects; first it is an indispensable element in shaping the contemporary world, second, it is a necessary point of reference to reflect upon the field.

"IR theory functions as a gendered and occidental metanarrative of modernity, and for this reason an effective critique of theory can be achieved by locating it into the philosophical discourse of modernity."⁹⁰

1.4. Defense From the Mainstream

After making clear what stood for today's crisis we have to mention that it is not all accepted by all the scholars in the field. After a period of unrecognition, it has faced with resentment and counter criticisms. Keohane, one of the most liberal scholars who can be considered within the main stream as we consider the responses to the critical turn⁹¹, was one of the first mainstream scholars who felt the necessity to give a response to the

reasoned judgements about the merits of contending paradigms are possible in the absence of a neutral observation language."(55)

Among these elements the third one is probably the most debatable under the designator of the problematic of incommensurability.

⁸⁸ Keohane, op. cit. note 24.

⁸⁹Richard Devetak, "The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory", *Millennium*, (Vol.24, No 1, 1995, p. 27.

⁹⁰ Keyman, op. cit. note 11, p.11.

⁹¹ William E. Connolly, *Kimlik ve Farklılık- Siyasetin Açmazlarına Dair Demokratik Çözüm Önerileri*, trans. by Ferma Lekesizalın, (İstanbul:Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1995), p.77.

dissident voices. Keohane first admits that “the reflective approach” which he differentiated from the sociological approaches to the international institutions⁹² rightly underlined the inadequacies and failure of the rationalistic approaches to international relations⁹³. He underlined the critics’ point that individual agents’ interest can not be considered as a given but must be considered as “affected by institutional arrangements, by prevailing norms, and by historically contingent discourse” and continued that the merits of both approaches –rationalistic and reflective- must be taken into consideration⁹⁴. And then, Keohane forwarded his main counter critique; “the greatest weakness of the reflective school lies...in the lack of a clear reflective research program that could be employed by students of world politics”⁹⁵.

Holsti feels the need to remind in the face of celebratory responses to the critical turn in international relations, that flourishing of new approaches is not good in and of themselves but can be venerated as long as they help to increase our understanding of the “reality” and props up his argument by emphasizing that “the main purpose of the theoretical activity” is to render the world around us comprehensible⁹⁶ not to make it incomprehensible by an uncontrollable proliferation of theoretical approaches. Also Biersteker argues that critical approaches, challenging the foundations of conventional scientific endeavors, itself did not provide “any clear criteria for choosing among the multiple and competing explanations it produces”⁹⁷, thus points out the danger of debilitating nihilism, accepting no foundation to base true knowledge, recognizing no

⁹² Keohane, op. cit. note 24, p.383, defines institution as “a general pattern or categorization of activity or a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized.”

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 382.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.392.

⁹⁶ Holsti, op. cit. note 17, pp.255-6.

reality.⁹⁸ To show that these approaches are worthy of veneration they have to move beyond criticism or metatheoretical scrutinization at which they proved to be worthy of appreciation and must “engage in the construction and elaboration of alternative interpretations or understandings”⁹⁹. This same point is reiterated by Marco Verweij. He concluded that as long as critical approaches lack “a clear research program” they are destined to remain as the dissident voices at the margins of the discipline¹⁰⁰.

Critiques point the same direction; there is not an alternative (empirical) research program, and even though the objections of the critiques of rationalistic approaches could have merit, they did not necessitate that the rationalistic approaches be abandoned, but rationalist approaches might be supplemented. This view has two interrelated implications. First it creates a “take it or leave it” situation for the readers. The alleged choice must be between the old guy who proved its merits and the “reflective” approaches which are good at criticizing but still did not provide something that can be compared to that of rationalistic approaches and carry the imminent dangers of ceaseless debate and theoretical confusion without any prospect of reaching a consensus. They all accept that rationalistic approaches have some failures or inadequacies to grasp the “realities” of the world and to provide a complete depiction of it, but still they are useful tools as they help to develop an understanding of the world. This is a reaffirmation of ‘yesterday’s crisis’ and a reassertion of it as the best malaise that is bearable and can be

⁹⁷ Thomas J. Biersteker, “Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:33 No:3 (1989),263-267

⁹⁸ This point would be handled in the next chapter, as it has a significant place in the dialogue between scholars committed to the different strands of the critical approaches.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.266.-

¹⁰⁰ Marco Verweij, “Cultural Theory and the Study of International Relations”, *Millenium*, (Vol. 24, No. 1, 1995),pp. 87-8.

hoped to be recovered in time, even maybe by the stimulation given by the “reflective approaches”.

The important point that must be underlined is that counter critics are launching their assaults from a position of denial and ignorance. They do not mention that the dissidents are resenting just to this conception of theoretical activity as a neutral tool to reflect upon the world and opposing just to this vision of social reality existing outside the subject of knowledge waiting to be discovered. They made this critique without mentioning that critical turn in international relations mainly centered around the rejection of the empirico-analytical conception of theories. So the research program of the critical turn is not and cannot be a “rationalist or empirical” one but it is “historical and emancipatory”¹⁰¹. On the other hand it is undue to claim that critical writers are only interested with meta-theoretical scrutinization. It is visible in recent studies that a new phase has started in which these writers begin their “relay function” drawing on the insights of the critical turn¹⁰². There are increasing efforts within the critical terrains to initiate theory construction.

¹⁰¹Keyman, *op. cit.* 13, p.94. Ashley and Walker (1990b) admit that critical turn eschews to construct an “alternative” paradigm or framework” and justifies this as an expedient strategy in the face of both practical and theoretical exigencies of the field. (398) However, this stance can not be generalised as illuminating for the whole area of dissidents. For example William E. Connolly tries to provide an alternative to theory building within the poststructuralist/postmodernist frameworks. instead of being limited to deconstruction. (1995,84-5)

¹⁰²Ashley and Walker, *op. cit* note 30, p. 398. See *International Studies Quarterly Special Issue, Vol:34, No:3 (Sep. 1990)* for articles about different subjects ranging from security to international debt using the main premises of the critical turn (mainly poststructuralist).

CHAPTER II: FOCUS ON POSTMODERNISM

2.1. Postmodernism: A Difficult Name to Articulate

In this section we will try to examine more closely one of the dissenting voices within the framework of 'present crisis' that has been viewed in the first chapter. Postmodernism/poststructuralism that posits probably the most challenging questions, that celebrates ambiguity as opposed to enclosure and represents a radical break with the rationalist-positivist approaches will be our main concern. Instead of trying to give a complete account of postmodernism, we will proceed with handling main critiques of it after a brief description of its most common elements that assume significance with respect to its reflections on politics and ethics.

Beside the complexity of the issues involved by postmodernism, this limitation posits itself as an exigency in the face of the fact that there is no postmodernism that can be considered as a "homogeneous entity" or a "consciously directed movement"¹. There are several ways in which postmodernism can be seen –"as a particular type of textual practice or 'style', a cultural context² and "a mode of analysis"³ as a philosophical

¹Neville Wakefield, Postmodernism: The twilight of the Real, (London-Winchester:Pluto Press, 1990)

² As a cultural context postmodernism involves intimate relations to a post-modern or late capitalist condition. Although features of this condition are illuminated in similar terms with reference to technology, communications systems, mass media etc., its relations with modern is complex and unconsensual. The main problem is whether it is a rupture of the modern signifying the dawn of a new era or a continuation of it. The second point of divergence with respect to the new era or cultural is related to the nature of difference within this new context. See John R. Gibbins, "Contemporary Political Culture: An Introduction", in John R. Gibbins (ed.), Contemporary Political Culture: Politics in a Post modern Age, (London: Sage, 1989)

"While postmaterialism is a unified field of attitudes, postmodernism refers more generally to the absence of unity and identity in contemporary culture. In short, a postmodern culture is one with no

reassertion against modernity or as a theory. Partially, the ambiguity that surrounds the term 'postmodernism' can be partly explicated by its attachment to "numerous meanings within the context of art, theatre, film, literature, philosophy and sociology"⁴. Secondly, the meaning of the term, postmodernism, variegates in accordance with the meaning attributed to 'modern' and prefix 'post'.

Leaving aside the genealogy of the term 'postmodernism', we will limit our investigation mainly by its connotations in the political science and especially in international relations theory. Postmodernism is not based on one *Weltanschauung* but it involves different strands imbued with major philosophical differences⁵. Thus in the face of this wide variety of enmeshed and sometimes contrasting bundle of approaches it would be expedient to claim that there is not a "postmodernism" but "postmodernisms"⁶.

Our concern would be the postmodernism(s) as a "form of thought or trend within the humanities and the social sciences"⁷ that can be conveniently coined as a

linear pattern of change nor an identifiable form but is rather a picture of fragmentation, multidirectional change and a psychedelic collage of contemporary attitudes, values and beliefs."

This point constitutes one of the main cleavages between Critical Theory of Frankfurt School and Postmodernism.

³ Wakefield, op. cit. note 1, p.21.

⁴ See Gibbins op. cit. note 2, p.14. Margaret A. Rose in her book, The post-modern and the Post-industrial-A Critical Analysis, (New York- Melbourne- Posrchester-Sydney: Cambridge University Press,1991) offers an elaborate and detailed review of the usage of these two terms across a wide variety of disciplines stretching from literature to architecture and from philosophy to geography, that dates back to 1914 for 'post-industrial' and 1934 for 'post-modern'. Rose makes a distinction between the initial and most recent usages of the term 'post-modern' that in its recent meaning postmodernism involves reference to a 'post-industrial' age (20-21) which also has been assigned numerous and ambiguous meanings.

⁵ Margaret A. Rose, op. cit. note 4, p.176., enumerates three broad categories within which the different strands of postmodernism can be placed as the "deconstructionist", "double-coded" and "ideal" postmodernisms according to their conception of and their stances vis-à-vis the modernity. Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism, Modern European Philosophy Series, (Cambridge- New York- Port Chester-Melbourne-Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1991), makes a distinction between "oppositional and non-oppositional modes of postmodern thought" (1-2) with respect to their stance to the "modernity".

⁶See James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy -spies, terror, speed, and war, (Cambridge&Oxford: Blackwell,1992), p.5.

⁷ See Gibbins, op. cit. note 2, p.14. Brayn S. Turner, Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism, (London-New York: Routledge, 1994),p.16.

“metatheoretical paradigm” rather than a theory⁸. A long list of names could be enumerated as the father or main contributors to this trend, among whom Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard, Kristeva, Barthes would be probably the most celebrated ones. Explicitly these names are ““foreign” to a discipline dominated from its Anglo-American center”⁹. Furthermore, so-called postmodernists, these foreigners do not lend themselves and their ideas to be grouped under a single designator easily. It must be reminded from the outset that their ideas are not in complete accord with each other.

However there is a common ground that takes them together, and this is a rereading of modernity, its main constitutive elements and its universal strategies¹⁰ or in more explicit terms a problematization of sovereign practices of modernity, that is instigated by the so-called postmodern condition. Linklater epitomizes this orientation.

“The central problem of post-modernists is the existence of ‘sovereign’ claims to shape human loyalties, construct linear histories and impose social and political boundaries, when truth and meaning are in doubt and forms of identity are in question...Post-modernism aims to bring all ‘sovereign’ solutions into question.”¹¹

⁸Postmodernism’ assumes different meanings in the United States and in Continental Europe. Generally in the academic circles of the United States, French thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard are put together under the designator postmodernist or poststructuralist. However, strikingly these Parisien thinkers refuse the title poststructuralist and even some consider themselves against the stances attributed to them as a classification and assume no compatriotship with other names in the same list of poststructuralists. It is ironical that the idea of poststructuralist theory, genesis of which is attributed to the French thinkers is mainly an American enterprise. See, Judith Butler, “Contingent Foundations” in Stephen Eric Bronner (ed.), *Twentieth Century Political Theory: A Reader*, (New York-London: Routledge,1997), pp.248-249; Mark Poster, *Critical Theory and Poststructuralism- In Search of a Context* (New York: Cornell University Press,1989), pp.4-7. These writers taken together under the single designation of ‘poststructuralist’ or ‘postmodernist’ by the help of the assumption that “theories offer themselves in bundles or in organized totalities and that historically a set of theories which are structurally similar emerge as the articulation of an historically specific condition of human reflection”. (Butler, 1997:250) This tendency which reflects a distaste for cacophony, undermines plurality of intellectual endeavors and abundant dissonance among them.

⁹Jim George, “Understanding International Relations after the Cold War: Probing beyond the Realist Legacy” in Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (eds.), *Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities*, Vol:2, (Minneapolis-London: University of Minnesota Press,1996), p.58.

¹⁰ See Fuat E. Keyman, “Farklılığa Direnmek: Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramında ‘Öteki’ Sorunu” in Fuat Keyman, Mahmut Mutman, Meyda Yeğenoğlu(eds.), *Oryantalizm, Hegemonya ve Kültürel Fark*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996),p.73. and Wakefield, op. cit. note 1, p.20.

¹¹Andrew Linklater, *The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-Theoretical Point of View*, *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol:21 No:1 (1992), p.88.

Modernity has a special resonance within this context of the aim of “bringing all ‘sovereign’ solutions into question”. However, this element –i.e., problematization of modernity does not provide a magic stick that could organize and give vivid strands to the massive literature on post-modernism. As we have mentioned above, a plethora of definitions of ‘postmodern’ and ‘postmodernism’ can fold out as it assumes different meanings in accordance with the specific meaning attributed to modern and ensuing derivatives of modernity, modernization, modernism and the prefix ‘post’¹². Modernity¹³ signifies not a stale and coherent set of answers but more a given set of questions molded within the container of modernity. It can be considered as a frame sculptured by interpretations of the “persistent questions of meaning, the relation of human life to nature, the relation of the present to the past and the future, the form of a well-grounded order, and the relation of life to the death”¹⁴.

“Individualism and community, realism and idealism, the public interest and the common good, technocracy and humanism, positive and negative freedom, utility and rights, empiricism and rationalism, liberalism and collectivism, capitalism and socialism, democracy and totalitarianism – all grow up together within the confines of modernity. ..The fundamental importance of these differences must be comprehended in conjunction with an appreciation of how they establish and delimit each other upon the field of modern discourse.

¹² See Margareth A Rose, op. cit. note 4, p.176.

¹³ Different understandings of the present crisis in the social sciences or in the field of international relations and variegated critical approaches are underlined mainly by different conceptions of modernity. The understanding of modernity that is central to post modernism is in general focusing on the implications of modernity in relations of domination, control and power. However, the conception of modernity held by Habermasian Critical Theory differs radically and opens up a deep cleavage between these two critical strands with respect to their quest for a normative basis. For an example, see Richard Devetak, “The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (Vol.24, No 1, 1995), pp.30-2. The conception of modernity as a project as it is borrowed from Habermas, Devetak argues, constitutes “a fruitful approach to the question of modernity”. The project of modernity can be epitomised as the “intentions of Enlightenment”, that are enumerated under the headings of “the ethos of critique” and “the spirit of cosmopolitanism”. This view, Devetak asserts, would provide a normative basis in the dearth of universal foundations. But like other writers affluent to Critical Theory, he severs the relation between “project of modernity”, that is “intentions of the Enlightenment”, and its intimacy to a particular cultural domain intermingled with power relations thus bringing together the risk of establishing new hegemonies in the name of emancipation. Modernity in this sense is to be elevated to the status of a universal, transcendental foundation that an emancipatory project might be initiated through communicative rationality or the progress of reason.

¹⁴William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p.2.

Only to the extent we can map the terrain upon which these modern debates occur can we hope to open up possibilities of thought these very debates obscure.”¹⁵

2.2. Attacks Against the Sovereign Practices

The frame of modernity delineates mainly the forbidden or irrelevant questions and once the realm of questions is constrained, then answers, which can be forwarded, are simultaneously and automatically limited. It erects an axis around which contrasting answers revolved within the same terrain of modernity. In order to map out the terrain in which modern solutions to modern questions are formulated, post-modernism brings forth a certain degree of skepticism toward master or grand narratives of modernity or in more fashionable terms “incredulity toward metanarrative”¹⁶. Lyotard elicits these grand narratives as

“...overarching philosophies of history such as the Enlightenment view of the gradual but relentless progress of reason and freedom, Hegel’s dialectic of the spirit coming to know itself, and perhaps most importantly Marx’s drama of the forward march of human productive capacities via class conflict culminating in the just and revolutionary triumph of the proletariat”¹⁷

These grand narratives are privileged discourses empowered to characterise and evaluate all other discourses but unreflective unto themselves. The most important function of them is that of legitimisation of “scientific-technological and political project in the modern world”¹⁸ by operating as interpretative schemes or “epistemological frameworks without which ‘man’, the subject of history, is decentered and the ‘universe’ is drifted into a new dark age in which chaos theory” reigns¹⁹.

2.2.1. The Quell of the Truth: Gods of the Modern Man vs. Power-Knowledge

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p.3.

¹⁶ Stephen K. White, *Political Theory and Postmodernism*, Modern European Philosophy Series, (Cambridge- New York-Port Chester-Melbourne-Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.4-5.

¹⁷ Lyotard cited in Wakefield, *op. cit.*, note 1, p.22.

¹⁸ White, *op. cit.*, note 16, p.5.

One of the main assaults of the postmodernism against modernity is directed by its interrogation of the myths about “truth”, the possibility of reaching it and the myth of progress intermingled with these myths. Underlying the advent of secularism as the “death of God”, Connolly illustrates the quest in Western thought for a foundational locus from which “truth” has emanated. Here secularism and humanism, hand in hand, tear the link between “world and creation” by taking into question “the assumptions about nature, knowledge, self, the past and language”, that is the cultural terrains on which God is enabled for his omnipotence²⁰.

In pre-modern readings of the world, it is characterised by harmony emanating from the will of the creator. The human being, through his will to knowledge, tries to understand the will of the “great Harmonise” amidst the mysteries of the nature and hence to come closer to its creator²¹. Once the idea that the “world is not God’s creation” has been ideated, then truth is inexorably dispersed. Neither the world and hence ‘truth’ of it nor the human capacity to conceive it can be presumed as predesigned to match each other any longer.

“If the world is not God’s creation, truth is jeopardized. For, Nietzsche contends, the correspondence theory of truth, the theory that defines true statements to be those that ‘correspond’ to the way the world is in itself, is a thinly veiled theology. If the world is not designed by a creator, it is very unlikely that human capacities for cognition will correspond to the way the world is in itself or that the shape of the world will correspond to the human ability to know it. In an uncreated world the very possibility of correspondence between a knowing self and a world to be known depends upon an improbable coincidence of human capacity with worldly structure. *No pre-design of knowing self and known world ensures the coincidence sought. The will to knowledge is likely to encounter that which does not articulate smoothly with the categories imposed upon it.* Once the import of the death of the God becomes apparent to those who killed him, the ‘will to truth’ will appear as the will to impose human form upon the world and then to treat the imposition as if it were a discovery. The more tenacious that will is the more insistent it will have to be in making the world over to fit into its capacities for knowing and the more ruthless it will have to be with those people, actions and events deemed by it to be abnormal, irrational, perverse, unnatural or

¹⁹ Wakefield, op. cit., note 1, p.22.

²⁰ Connolly, op. cit, note 14, pp.7-9.

²¹ *ibid.*, p.9.

anomalous. In a world without a divine designer knowing is not a correspondence but an imposition of form upon the objects of knowledge. Or so Nietzsche says. ²²(Emphasis added)

Then the death of the God signals a long and acrimonious quest for new secure foundations and stale essences from which truth can be quelled. This quest is acrimonious because it is based on a strenuous tension and necessitates a relentless labor to remedy or disguise this paradox lying at the very heart of these theories²³. In the history of truth in the West it was molded as an endeavor to resuscitate the understandings of God under different guises “by transplanting God into reason, or nature, or Spirit or the subject”²⁴. Yearning to sanctify a “definitive standard”, a secure home in these categories that could afford to shoulder the task of propping up a meaningful existence in the world, by procuring a direction to it, by procuring a reason to live and complacently bear the agony of death in the face of the death of God culminated in modern grand (or master) narratives. Modern thinkers and thus the modern discourse tried to create its own God that infers meaning upon the world. This new God, engrained as the foundation, is the purveyor of the key to ‘truth’, such as reason or particular methodologies such as positivism/empiricism. So the ‘external source’ that defines true knowledge, that differentiates it from false, is immersed in

“..God (or when that becomes incredible) in the dictates of universal reason, or the light of nature, or the contractual agreement of rational individuals, or the consensus of virtuous citizens, or the categories of a transcendental subject or the telos of history.”²⁵

The will of the ‘external source’ is materialized in logos (a unitary sovereign identity). This first move required and activated the second desire that the world upon which a particular form, emanating from the logos, is tried to be imposed, should be or inevitably

²² *ibid.*, p.10.

²³ *ibid.*, p.137.

²⁴ *ibid.*

would be transformed in a way dictated by the foundations of truth that reveals hidden essences.

Thus external source stipulated a teleological understanding of life or history that is underlined by transcendence albeit it vividly suffers from a lack of secure basis. This external source, in the service of Logos, endowed it with the superior term as a "higher presence"²⁶. Just as the God and understanding of creation provided a basis for understanding and giving meaning to the world, this logos signifying "a "priority" seen as simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical"²⁷ offered the basis to comprehend the world, to give meaning to it, by transplanting its understandings into the identity/difference axis.

By this account of modern history of truth in the West, it becomes apparent that modernity is imbued with a will to tyrannize in the sense of imposing a form on the world through a logocentric strategy to turn to a "pure origin" that enables hierarchization favoring logos or identity. Reading modernity in this sense and "giving up of this eternal quest for a return to Eden" is the common ground for postmodernist/poststructuralist approaches. Giving up of this relentless quest, in more explicit terms, represents a wholesale assault on the

"foundationalism and essentialism of post-Enlightenment scientific philosophy, its universalist presuppositions about modern rational man, its hidden metaphysics, its metatheoretical commitment to dualized categories of meaning and understanding, its logocentric strategies of identity and hierarchization, its theorized propositions about human nature, its dogmatic faith in method, its philosophies of intention and consciousness, and its tendency toward grand theory and the implications of its imposition."²⁸

²⁵ *ibid.*, p.13.

²⁶ Jonathan Culler, cited in, Sankaran Krishna, "The Importance of Being Ironic" A Post Colonial View on Critical International Relations Theory", (Review Essay), *Alternatives*, Vol:18 (1993), p.385.

²⁷ *ibid.*, p.386.

²⁸ Jim George and David Campbell, "Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations", *International studies Quarterly* (1990) 34, p.280.

This comprehensive interrogation is underlined by a rejection of the “narrative disposition of epistemic realism”²⁹ which presumes a ‘reality’ and knowledge of it³⁰ independent of discursive effects of representation and interpretation. There is not a pre-designed world as a harmonious unity having an essence to be discovered and a pre-designed subject as the knower having capacity to comprehend it. Thus, what remains is life in the world, not preordained or consecrated to be organized in a certain predetermined way, but both ceaselessly tried to be organized and is itself organizing contingently and arbitrarily by the power plays. Hence there is always a resistance to this arbitrary imposition of form upon form³¹.

When will to power is defined as the will to impose a form on life, knowledge³² is revealed as a distinctive tool or form of power³³ neither exterior nor identical to power³⁴. Knowledge as a tool and form of power made its impact on the humanities and social sciences as it abandoned the artificial boundaries between theory (or act of theorizing) and practice, and dispensed with the locus of theorizing high in the skies as a neutral act of understanding the world. The act of theorizing is both constrained and constraining, and enabling in that it occurs as a tool of imposing a particular interpretation on the world or affirming such an interpretation of it.

²⁹David Campbell, *Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War*, Critical Perspectives on World Politics Series, (Boulder- London:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 7-8.

³⁰ Connolly, op. cit., note 14, epitomised this process as consisting of six stages that commenced with Platonism and culminated in the “abolition of the apparent world” that ensues the abolition of the “real world” and hence in a new conception of knowledge.(pp., 141-4)

³¹William E. Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse*, 3rd Edition, (Oxford UK- Cambridge USA: Blackwell,1993), Preface to the Third Edition.

³² See Aytekin Yılmaz, *Moderninden Postmoderne Siyasal Arayışlar*, pp. 124-126, for a brief review of different conceptions of knowledge and reality.

³³ Connolly, op. cit., note 14, p.144.

³⁴Tom Keenan, “The “Paradox” of Knowledge and Power: Reading Foucault on a Bias”, *Political Theory*, Vol. 15 No 1 (Feb 1987), pp. 5-37.

Where the concept of knowledge-power comes to forefront, probably the most (in)famous concept of the postmodernist lexicon, 'discourse', simultaneously erupts as an indispensable part of analysis. As opposed to the positivist conceptions of reality, postmodernism conceptualizes "social existence as human practice" and tries to find out how power exercised through its production and reflection. Language that is socially structured³⁵ and preceding the social agent, provides the structures within which subject is constructed, through which s/he understands and reflects the social life. Language as "a form of life", is "inseparable from the necessarily social construction of that reality"³⁶. By a broader definition of the "language" we reach to the definition of discourse;

"In Foucault's terms, discourses are much more than linguistic performances; they are also plays of power which mobilize rules, codes and procedures to assert a particular understanding, through the construction of knowledge within these rules, codes and procedures. Because they organize reality in specific ways that involve particular epistemological claims, they provide legitimacy, and indeed provide the intellectual conditions of possibility of particular institutional and political arrangements. The rules, governing practices, often implicit and not clearly articulated. But understood subconsciously by practitioners, are socially constructed in specific contexts."³⁷)

Thus, it is concisely epitomized that there is no transcendental reality outside the discourse³⁸. There is a material world and a plethora of events within it but facts does not speak for themselves, they must be interpreted so as to be understood. Discourses are embedded within power relations and hence produce political knowledge³⁹. The process of othering is inherent to the discursive practices that structure social practices, impose particular articulations of the reality and offer a circumscribed portfolio of possibilities for change. Discursive practices, being intrinsically sovereign practices, defines its object about which knowledge would be derived (be it the neighbor country, the distant Oriental

³⁵Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War- The discourse of Politics*, (London: Printer Publishers, New York: Guilford Publications, 1990), p.5.

³⁶George and Campbell, op. cit., note 28, p.273.

³⁷Simon Dalby, "Geopolitical Discourse" The Soviet Union As Other", *Alternatives*, Vol:13 No:4 (1988), p. 416.

³⁸Campbell, op. cit., note 29, p.8.

or the pagan natives of America), determines how this knowledge would be derived, and differentiates normal from abnormal, civilized from barbarian, legitimate from illegitimate, moral from immoral. In this sense they have an ideological function in obscuring power relations, procuring legitimacy, naturalizing temporal conditions, and standing against change⁴⁰. By this ideological function discursive practices buttress hegemonic “political and ideological structures”⁴¹.

The knowledge-power problematic constitutes probably the most significant and illustrative differences between Critical Theory of Frankfurt School and post modernism/poststructuralism⁴². Although the Critical Theory, especially its Habermasian version affirmed power-knowledge relation by the knowledge constitutive interests⁴³, it differs radically from postmodernist/poststructuralist stances as it tries to provide another basis to liberate knowledge and consciousness of people from technical or practical interests which are imbued with enabling tendencies to tyrannize. Emancipatory interests, upon which the liberatory “process of self-understanding” and “self-reflection” could yield a critique of the existing social order, Habermasian Critical Theory asserts, pave the way for the realization of the previously tempered human potentialities through communicative rationality⁴⁴. Postmodernism reads this grand project for universalistic emancipation through communicative rationality as a yearning for the realization of “in practical political terms what traditional theory only contemplates”⁴⁵ by its insistent quest

³⁹ Dalby, op. cit., note 35, p.6.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p.8.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴² George and Campbell, op. cit, note 28, pp. 280-1.

⁴³ HOFFMAN, Mark, “Critical Theory and the Interparadigm Debate”, in Hough C. Dyer and Leon Mangasarion (eds.), *The Study of the International Relations: The State of the Art*, (London: Macmillan, 1989),pp. 64-7.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.69.

⁴⁵ George and Campbell, op. cit, note 28, pp. 280-1.

for a “pristine state”⁴⁶. This stance of the Critical theorists is in striking contrast to the postmodernism’s abandonment of the quest for ‘reality’ or ‘absolute truth’.

2.2.2. “Death of the Subject”

This endeavor of poststructuralism that can be coined by the term politics of representation or epistemology entails on the other hand, interrogation of “the historical embodiment of humanism’s grand ambitions- the author”⁴⁷. Death of the author or death of the subject signifies an expansion of the politics of epistemology and its premises over the visions of modern man as a skepticism that problematizes “man’s position as the centered origin and source, as well as the subject, of representation”⁴⁸. This vision of the subject or the author is embedded within the two ideological narratives of modernity – humanism and logocentricism⁴⁹.

Humanism deploys the human with an essence, with an irreducible core of the human. The assumption that the human being is endowed with certain ethical notions or capacities that has been coded into their defaults or transcendental nature is the remnant of the belief in creation. This nature or essence is presumed to be brought out and hence tamed through “self-knowledge” or “self-consciousness” and consequently the human being can become “more unified and coherent in the sense that its desires, purposes and principles increasingly assume the shape of a unified whole”⁵⁰.

Ideation of the human being in this way as a unified and coherent entity implies the internalization process of the power plays that try to impose a form on life, hence, on

⁴⁶ Krishna, op. cit. note 26, p.386.

⁴⁷ Wakefield, op. cit. note 24.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p.24.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

⁵⁰ Connolly, op. cit. note 14, p.147.

the human being. This internalization process posits a social compulsion to the individual. The quest for self-knowledge produces a unified and coherent entity in accord with the requirements of modernity through an ongoing struggle⁵¹. The subject, not as a given and later discovered reality, but as a construction, is the subject of genealogy. This genealogy has the aim of replacing essentiality with contingency, destabilizing established subjectivities⁵² and by giving an intersubjective character to subjectivity⁵³ it tries to alter the relation between identity/difference that exhibits the logocentricism of Western thinking.

“The alienated subject of modernism has been radically displaced from his or her position as founder of meaning. Representations (be they of the author or of the subject that the author wishes to (re)present) can no longer be tested against the real, as the real is itself constituted as everyday common-sense reality, in representations. In this sense, the metaphysics of modernism are no longer tenable. Distinctions between false consciousness and by implication ‘true’ consciousness and between the self and the ‘other’ are no longer available within the terms of a poststructuralist critique that jettisons the notion that there is any essential self preceding the social construction of the self.”⁵⁴

Where there is no irreducible human essence before social production or where the human being becomes an incomplete animal before social production, postmodernism makes one of its significant contributions to social theory by shaking our assumptions about the cultural production and subjectivity by discarding the secondary position that has been assigned to culture in the analysis of the social reality. It elicits a space where cultural traits could be causal in themselves instead of being determined by a one way relation between infrastructure and superstructure. This issue would be handled again

⁵¹ Ibid., pp.147-50. Here Connolly refers to an ontology of resistance which can be seen as the answer to the question of Habermas, “Why to fight?”. There is always a resistance against the imposition of form on life and human who is seen as an incomplete animal before it is socialised. And this resistance, not any kind of universal norm or value that calls for fight against the hegemonic dictates of modernity (1988:160-1)

⁵² Ibid., pp.162-4.

⁵³ Yilmaz, op. cit. note 32, p.124.

⁵⁴ Wakefield, op. cit, note 1, p.29.

within the critique of postmodernism, especially while we are considering the resentment of postcolonial writers.

2.2.3. Sovereign Claims to Identity: A New Lease of Life for the “Other”

This problematic of identity/difference, which is initiated by the exposition of relational and constructed character of identity and a quest for a different demonstration of the power within the context of identity/difference⁵⁵, constitutes the backbone of the normative or democratizing concerns of the postmodernist approaches which has a special intimacy to the study of international relations. Anti-essentialist conception of identity underlines the politics of identity/difference and its intimacy to conventional ethical philosophy.

Following Connolly, we can commence our analysis of the identity/difference problem and the evil residing in it, by defining two interrelated problems. The first problem is the endeavour to construct the purity and decisiveness of identity. To give a meaning to life, a secure identity must be constructed and the difference must be externalised so that such a meaning could be conferred upon the self and the world around it by organising the subject. For this endeavour itself is based on a tension and, as in the every play of power, greeted with resistance, then the second problem of evil comes with this hegemonic practice of sanctifying the identity as natural and universal. In other words it tries to delineate an arbitrary boundary and desires it to be uncontested, where it could never be so. The second evil, as a result, endeavours to enchant this tension and safeguard the identity. This tension can be depressed by constructing the

⁵⁵William E. Connolly, Kimlik ve Farklılık- Siyasetin Açmazlarına Dair Demokratik Çözüm Önerileri, trans. by Ferma Lekesizalın(Istanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1995),p.9.

“other”⁵⁶ that materializes the difference, and difference in turn signifies a kind of perversion. The “self” and the “other”, both constructed simultaneously and relational, reflected the power relation between the two. Subject, whether it be an individual or a state, is constructed in the domain of “the interhuman” through “the interrelationship of ethics, subjectivity, and responsibility”⁵⁷. There is no being prior to that relation between the Self and the Other⁵⁸.

Thus, the perception and conception of “other” is integral to the discursive and historical construction of identity as a sovereign subject.⁵⁹ As self and identity is constructed as a unitary, coherent body, so is the “other”. Whereas identity that is “us” is set as a sovereign universal norm and as a center according to which the “other” is evaluated (or devaluated) and the other is also constructed as the mirror image of “us”. The most relevant example of such an identity construction and process of othering integral to it, is the discourse of Orientalism, that locates the West and Western subject as the dominant universal norm and as a center⁶⁰ which we will later dwell on in detail.

⁵⁶ibid., p.14-23. The first problem is the endeavour to answer the injustice of life such as the agony and incomprehensiveness of death that are imbedded within the existential vulnerability of the human. This point which is resolved by the belief in the duality or fissure of the Holy being, was a point where Christianity set itself as a hegemonic identity. the complete rejection and condemnation of Manism as a blasphemy served this end. For this end the concept of responsibility and will must be invoked and the basis must be exonerated from any entanglement with this responsibility as in the case of God creating everything but not the evil on the world that leads to the agony and pain of the human and condemnation of the first sin as the source of it. Then a great fissure is underlined by this account between Manism and Christianity. As the aggrandisement of such a distancing is not without its tensions and internal conflicts, this first move of constructing identity in relation to identity, requires the second. The second move, which is however simultaneous to the first designed to suppress these tensions within the identity by creating an “other”.

⁵⁷David Campbell, “Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics, and the Anarchical World” in Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (eds.), Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities, Vol:2, (Minneapolis-London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996),p.131.

⁵⁸ ibid., 133.

⁵⁹ Keyman, op. cit. note 10, p.72.

⁶⁰E. Fuat Keyman, Mahmut Mutman, Meyda Yeğenoğlu, “Giriş: “Dünya” Nasıl Dünya Oldu?” in Fuat Keyman, Mahmut Mutman, Meyda Yeğenoğlu(eds.), Oryantalizm, Hegemonya ve Kültürel Fark, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996),p.9.

However, it must be reiterated that neither the self nor the “other” is totally inert entity that has been determined once and for all. Instead what the identity/difference problematic defines is rather an active practice of constructing borders, determining centers and locating the periphery, and giving the sense of staleness both to the identity and difference⁶¹. In this sense it directly refers to the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. Here difference is located within a scheme of oppositional dichotomies that inevitably informs a hierarchization. Difference is represented within this ready-made scheme that enjoys secure foundations and essentials cultivated within an elaborate and complex power/knowledge device, that is the hegemonic discourse. Hierarchization assumes those attributes assigned to the identity (or logo) is superior, according to the foundations and essentials taken to be universal evaluative criteria. As the evaluative criteria are deducted from the special experience of the sovereign self, its practices and power relations, the evaluative criteria match with the constructed essence that is imposed on the sovereign self as identity. Thus most of the time the “other” is represented by the lack of appraisive attributes inherent to “us”⁶². The formation and stabilization of identity requires the construction and distancing of the “other”. The distancing of ‘other’, creating the interval between the Self and Other opens the space “where being is being realised”⁶³. Thus, as “us” is idealized, the “other” is also totalized and reduced to an essence with a double move of centering of the logo and othering of the difference.

⁶¹Mahmut Mutman, ‘Under the Sign of Orientalism: The West vs Islam’, *Cultural Critique*, Vol:23 (Winter, 1992-93), p.172..

⁶²Keyman, et. al., op. cit. note 60, pp.10-1.

⁶³ Campbell, op. cit note 55, p.133.

In international relations, where to understand the “other” has a vital importance, this process of othering has more profound and striking effects. Conventional international relations theories, molded within a western originated rationalist universalist perspective aggravate the problematic of identity difference and leave no space for the other to be represented within their ownership of their own history and culture⁶⁴. This denial and neglect of the other cultures is underlined by a specific conception of culture and community, which in turn dovetail each other.

The process of othering and hierarchization of alien cultures is underlined by a particular definition of culture that holds it to be common values and meanings constructed in time through interaction of separate subjects. For these theories reduced the “other” to an empiric and cultural entity, as they conceive culture as an ontological existence, neglecting its intersubjectively constructed nature and underlying the allegedly objective and neutral knowledge derived by the sovereign subject of knowledge as the essence of these ontological entities. This theoretical attitude toward other cultures is characterized by “I-it relationship” to the “other” in which “one knows and uses other persons or things without allowing them to exist for oneself in their uniqueness”⁶⁵. The interrogation of this relation and endeavor to give a lease of life for other modes of relations has a significant resonance in the recent critical literature.

In contrast to conventional approaches to culture, poststructuralist approaches define culture as an ideological/discursive practice through which meanings and values are constructed and exchanged within a given space⁶⁶. For meaning is always relational

⁶⁴ Keyman, *op. cit.* note 10, p.72.

⁶⁵ Campbell, *op. cit.* note 55, p.133.

⁶⁶ Keyman, *op. cit.* note 10, pp.76-9

and signifies a relation based on difference ⁶⁷ as we have mentioned in the case of construction of the self as a subject having a unitary identity that inexorably requires and invokes the “other”, the identity/difference axis becomes fundamental in deconstructionist/genealogical strategies for the purpose of creating an ethical space for the self representation of other.

Moreover, this understanding of culture in turn entails a different understanding of community contending the “ahistorical and monistic interpretation” of it. Community, particularly the international community, as relational and historical, can be conceived as “a never completed product of multiple historical practices, a still-contested product of struggle to impose interpretation upon interpretation”⁶⁸. The main difference between the two conceptions of community is that whereas in the first one identity is taken for granted as an essential, in the second definition identity is understood to be a state of sovereign subject that has been yielded from the relation between self and the “other”.

Another inclination of the conventional international relations theories that is complicit in this denial and neglect of other cultures is the hypocritical eschewal of cultural elements. Whereas realist or neorealist approaches deny attributing any causal significance to cultural matters, other approaches having neo-Marxist leanings, like Dependencia or Modern World System theories attribute a secondary role to culture. Their attitude toward culture is hypocritical in the sense they are based on premises

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, pp.79-80.

⁶⁸Richard K. Ashley, “The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics”, *Alternatives*, Vol:12 (1987), p.406.

rooted in Western cultural traditions⁶⁹ and disguise such a commitment to particularistic cultural values under the velvet of universals.

Winfred L. Amaturio⁷⁰ highlights the grave consequences of this neglect. Not only the international relations theory, but the emergence, expansion and consolidation of the international system⁷¹ and its workings have cultural underpinnings. Although there is a wide range of agreement on the point that “the international system came into being through the expansion of the Western European states system”⁷², the great cultural worldwide transformations it has entailed and the particular role played by culture is ignored. Amaturio claims that to get a more complete picture of social reality, the cultural component must be added to our analysis. A reservation that must be posited to Amaturio’s suggestion is that, this requirement erupts not because social reality is interdependent but because reality is social. Hard realities of guns and money are meaningful in a social context and this meaning is constituted and transmitted through rhetoric and image.

2.3. Contribution of Postmodernism: Critique and Redeployment

By these challenges posed to the conventional understandings of modernity, modern identity, and a wide variety of related concepts such as community, sovereign subject of

⁶⁹Nick J. Rengger, “Incommensurability, International Theory and the Fragmentation of Western Political Culture” in J. R. Gibbins (ed.), *Contemporary Political Culture: Politics in a Post modern Age*, (London: Sage, 1989), p.235.

⁷⁰Winfred L. Amaturio, “Literature and International Relations: the Question of Culture”, *Millennium: Journal of International Relations*, (Spring 1995, Vol. 24, No. 1)

⁷¹ See Hedley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society”, in H. Bull and A. Watson (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) for an account of the emergence of the international system as a by product of the European expansion and consequent Western tenets of the system.

⁷² *ibid.*, p.3.

knowledge, postmodernism/poststructuralism open the gates of international relations to a critical inquiry

“...one that would refuse the dichotomies of identity and difference, surface and depth. It would not pretend to an “apocalyptic objectivity”, a totalizing standpoint outside of time and capable of enclosing all history within a singular narrative, a law of development, or a vision of progress toward a certain end of humankind....The appropriate posture is disposed to a view very much akin to that of Michel Foucault’s genealogical attitude: “a form of history which accounts for the constitution of knowledge, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to refer to a subject, whether it be transcendental in relation to the field of events or whether it chase its empty identity throughout history.... There are no constants, no fixed meanings, no secure grounds, no profound secrets, no final structures or limits of history. Seen from afar, there is only interpretation, and interpretation itself is comprehended as a practice of domination occurring on the surface of history (Foucault, 1977:150). History itself is grasped as a series of interpretations imposed upon interpretations –none primary, all arbitrary.”⁷³

The postmodernist/poststructuralist approaches signify important contributions to the social sciences and International Relations by their critique of modernity and its gospels such as scientific thinking, positivism/empiricism, rationalism, etc., and particularly by its endeavor to create an ethical space for the “other” to represent itself. The critical turn in international relations, in general, ameliorates the tensions and despair of ‘yesterday’s crisis’ and gives a dynamism to the field. It has procured a thinking space for the cultural production of subjects by shaking the orthodoxy of scientific methodology which has assumed no realities beyond its confines.

“In the postmodernist contribution to International Relations, consequently, there has emerged an alternative way of understanding and articulating reality, one focused on intertextuality and socio-linguistic discursive practice, rather than monological literary convention and positivist objectivism and foundationalism. Whatever else this alternative approach achieves, it problematizes the dominant International Relations commitment to a world of given subjects and objects, and all other dichotomised givens. In so doing it reformulates basic questions of neorealist understanding in emphasising not the sovereign subject (e.g., author/independent state) and/or the object (e.g., independent world/text) but, instead, the historical, cultural, and linguistic practices in which subjects and objects (and theory and practice, facts and values) are constructed.”⁷⁴

Its stimulating effect is probably the most appreciated one in different circles, even among the most austere main stream scholars. Nevertheless there are a wide variety

⁷³Richard K. Ashley, op. cit. note 63, pp.408-9.

⁷⁴ George, op. cit. note 9, p.59.

of criticisms to it that must be mentioned here to set our theoretical perspective. These critiques vary on a wide spectrum. One main classification, however, can be made according to the attitude of the critiques. In the first category we can mention those who consider themselves as the representative of the mainstream approaches, or in more explicit terms as the defenders of modernity and children of Enlightenment. These critiques try either to dismiss postmodernism or to amalgamate it into rationalistic approaches by reducing it into a stimulating critique. On the second category, those who are sympathetic to post modernism and do not try to abrogate it but resenting to its inadequacies at different points can be counted. Within theory we will make a distinction between those who try to merge Critical Theory and postmodernism and those who warn against the logocentric biases of postmodernism.

2.3.1. First Group: Postmodernism, Dismissed!

Critiques in the first group mainly focus on the lack of an empirical research program, eschewal of theory construction on the part of postmodernists and the threat of being lost in an endless chain of deconstruction and destructive nihilism.⁷⁵ As we have mentioned this in the first chapter we would not dwell on this group again, however the point that these critiques are often underlined by misreading and misunderstanding of postmodernism, which is not totally innocent must be reiterated here. These criticisms are imbued with “common metaphors” and given direction by their “aesthetics” that “frame possible responses, to impose parameters on what these works...must be heard to say and

⁷⁵ See Chapter One1.

mean.”⁷⁶ This strategic move involves a debilitating reductionism as it tries to enclose postmodernism as a set of positions despite its richness of variegated postures. It creates a stereotype of postmodernism by taking an example text within it as symptomatic of it⁷⁷.

The main reservations of these critiques to postmodernism cemented around the “warnings against impending nihilism”⁷⁸ which refers to anti-foundationalist and anti-essentialist stances of postmodernists, albeit in a totalized and caricatured manner. The claim is that postmodernism greets every statement with a question mark, turns every method to reach knowledge into a power play, mutates knowledge to unknowable and thus makes any kind of qualitative judgement impossible and thus it reaches to the point “anything goes”. This line of argument generally concludes that its enthusiasm for metanarrative interrogation make no venerable contribution to the progress of knowledge⁷⁹. These critiques holding conventional visions of modernity, science (main aim of science is to reach useful and true knowledge), knowledge, methodology and so on which poststructuralists are refusing to accept, and generally without mentioning the contention on the part of so-called postmodernists against these conceptions and eschewing to directly referring these challenges, try to evaluate the achievements of poststructuralists by the criteria that poststructuralists are already challenging.

Habermas⁸⁰ provides a different example among the sharpest critiques of postmodernism who tries to dismiss it as “degenerative and reactionary paths taken by

⁷⁶Richard K. Ashley, R. B. J. Walker, “CONCLUSION- Reading Dissidence/ Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies”, *International Studies Quarterly, Special Issue, Vol. 34, No.3, September 1990b, pp.368-75*.

⁷⁷ Butler, op. cit note 8, p.249-50.

⁷⁸ *ibid.*, p.248.

⁷⁹ See Stephen Eric Bronner, “Introduction” (1997:10-11) and Winfred L. Amaturio 1995.

⁸⁰ Mark Poster in his book Critical Theory and Poststructuralism- In Search of a Context, where he tries to create a rapprochement between these two main strands of critical approaches, asserts his alignment to Critical theory. However, he provides a stimulating critique of the Frankfurt School and especially its

French intellectuals”⁸¹. The striking point is that Habermas through his critique of postmodernism revised his own stance against the Enlightenment reason and by an inadequate move tries to appropriate the poststructuralists perspective rooted in language theory to compensate the weaknesses of his theory with this respect. Habermas’ yearning for a Critical Theory that promotes emancipation (emancipation here is defined as “achievement of rational autonomy” in a Weberian sense) tries to formulate a new theory of truth distant from that of positivism or hermeneutics. He made a distinction between instrumental and communicative rationality

“Communicative rationality, in Habermas’s view, is not subject to the poststructuralist critique of reason. Only instrumental reason supports domination and is therefore open to the poststructuralist objection. Communicative rationality requires a democratic context in which anyone may question the argumentative claims of one else, so long each party aims at consensus and agrees to concur with positions that he or she cannot refute”⁸²

However, what Habermas has defended as the essence of enlightenment under the rubric of reason, is something pertinent to western history providing a secure basis for sovereign practices of inclusion and exclusion. In Poster’s words, “he universalises the particular, grounds the conditional, absolutizes the finite.”⁸³. This new foundation is a rational consensus that can be reached in an “ideal speech situation” through free argumentation⁸⁴. First, he privileges rationality, albeit specified and distinguished as communicative reason, as the basis of any kind of emancipatory project. Ignoring the exclusionary practices embedded in science that assume male rational western subjects and invalidates “culturally determined subjects”, he exonerated it of any entanglement

Habermasian strand. Moreover, Poster provides an outstanding account of the dialogue between Frankfurt Critical Theory and poststructuralism.

⁸¹ David Ashley, “Habermas and the Completion of the Project of Modernity” in Bryan S. Turner (ed.), Theories of Modernity and Post modernity, (London-Newburg Park-New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1990), pp.89-90.

⁸² Mark Poster, op. cit note 8, p.23.

⁸³ *ibid.*, 22.

with oppression of women and minorities, or “the other”. Reason postulated as a transcendental universal principle marks a return to the logocentric and foundationalist philosophies of Enlightenment where he just tries to escape its domination. Secondly, Habermas assumes the possibility of “complete transparency” in inter-personal relations contrary to the “essential ambiguity of inter-personal relations”.⁸⁵ Thirdly, the commitment to a rational consensus might be commensurate to the commitment to the elimination of difference, and equality of identity with reservation of amalgamating and homogenising each in the consensual agreement gradually.

2.3.2. Second Group: A Promiscuous Marriage Between Critical Theory and Postmodernism

Beside the idea of dismissing postmodernism as an unworkable theoretical stuff, there is one more group of writers that implicitly confers the critiques of postmodernism with respect to its anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism but instead of declaring it absolute, tries to refine it. Ironically in this vein we can enumerate writers who are generally disciples of Habermas. They appreciate the merits of poststructuralist stances in contesting “political concepts of sovereignty, identity and difference”⁸⁶ and try to make an agenda of agreement within the critical front.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, they try to find a solution to the paradox of anti-foundationalism

⁸⁴ Chris Brown, “ ‘Turtles All the Way Down’: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International Relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 23 No 2 (1994), pp.218-9

⁸⁵ *ibid.*, p.221.

⁸⁶ Devetak, *op. cit.*, note 132, pp.41-46.

⁸⁷ See David Ashley, “Habermas and the Completion of the Project of Modernity” (1990).for an example of endeavour to delineate a common ground between Habermasian critical Theory and postmodernism.

For example Richard Devetak⁸⁸ tries to stick to an ideal of enlightenment which he argues is the spirit of modernity and may offer a basis for a critical social theory. However, his posture poses the risk of elevating another essential in the name of emancipation and defies the very spirit of postmodernism by sanctifying the so-called project of modernity as a transcendental universal ideal that can be held by all the human kind.

Another example can be given from Andrew Linklater, who makes it clear from the outset that he assumes the vantage point of Frankfurt School but Critical Theory has to be articulated more fully to offer a base for the next stage. Linklater's proposal⁸⁹ is to conceal "Foucault's analysis of systems of exclusion" and "Habermas's aim of bringing patterns of moral and cultural learning within a new critical theory". Underlying the systems of inclusion and exclusion as a universal phenomenon that has an inexplicable role in the molding of every society, Linklater tries to find a normative basis to choose among them⁹⁰. He goes on by determining universals and trying to find ways to cluster different approaches to international relations to mould a common intellectual enterprise as a way to the rationalization process. However, with his unharrassed eclecticism, Linklater brings forth the danger of intransigent intellectual foreclosure by trying to provide an all-encompassing explanation of international relations once and for all. Moreover, he reiterated the Habermasian yearnings to find emancipatory universal

⁸⁸ Here Devetak makes a distinction between postmodernism and poststructuralism. And he emphasises that poststructuralism is neither for nor against the project of modernity. By his interpretation of project of modernity, which is an idealisation of intentions of enlightenment and elevating these intentions to transcendental foundations in an ahistorical manner, he implies that post modernism or the understanding of "a socio-cultural condition, or period following modernity" is a result of misreading modernity.

⁸⁹ Linklater, op. cit note 12. Also see Mark Hoffman, "Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical International Theory" *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol:20 No:2 (1991), 169-185. for a review of Linklater's proposal for the next stage in his book Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations, (London: Macmillan, 1990)

elements within the modernity⁹¹. So these endeavors to give an answer to the question of how one can judge in the dearth of universal morals that enables one to choose, informed by Critical Theory is discarded as it reiterates the insidious universalistic, logocentric tendencies of it.

Still this paradox of anti-foundationalism or in other words the total effect of, “power-knowledge”, “death of subject”, and denunciation of universals and the need for a base to choose among different alternatives and to take political action is in need of rearticulation for our purposes in this thesis. Tom Keenan⁹², has epitomized the contentions of three important critiques of Foucault- Habermas, Nancy Fraser and Charles Taylor, on the point of “power-knowledge” as the interrogation of the normative basis of Foucaultian politics. This challenge was raised by one simple question of “Why fight?”. Where the right for resistance resides in, if there is nothing behind surface, no essence or foundation that can confer upon us such a right? How and why we try to subvert power as domination when there is no truth outside of regimes of truth and these regimes were intertwined with the exercise of power? If “participating in struggles certainly involves knowledge, where the content of the knowledge does not validate the struggle”⁹³, how one claim right to struggle? As Campbell succinctly epitomized; “the ground for moral theory has been removed once the *logos* of metaphysics has gone”⁹⁴. This is the paradox underlined by these critiques.

⁹⁰ *ibid.*, p.83.

⁹¹ Mark Hoffman, “Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical International Theory”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol:20 No:2 (1991), p.173.

⁹² Keenan, *op. cit* note 34.

⁹³ *ibid.*, p.7.

⁹⁴ Campbell, *op. cit.* note 29, p.91.

In theory it can be answered through highly complex “technical, terminological measure”⁹⁵, however, in politics the only answer that can be offered is that in politics the terms that have been interrogated such as right (to speak, to act, to struggle), ration or knowledge are indispensable. But this indispensability does not justify their essentializing or universalizing. They are displaced and temporalised so as to prevent a foreclosure in their name⁹⁶. And a more viable answer to this paradox can be found in the replies of so-called postmodernists and their postcolonialist critiques. First of all, I would like to underline that I would not ascribe to “a utopian epistemological vantage point” as Mark Poster has pointed out;

“Many American poststructuralists, especially deconstructionists, appear to believe that a political position and a social theory are built into their interpretive strategy. If one avoids closure and titilli in ones own discourse, they contend, if one unsettles, destabilizes, and complicates the discourses of humanities, if one resists taking a stance of binary opposition in relation to the position one is criticizing, one has thereby instantiated a nonrepressive politics”⁹⁷.

It is apparent that sovereign practices, insidious plays of power, or imposed subjectivities can not be overcome by simply mentioning them, or by trying to develop sensitivity against them. The aim is not to deconstruct the hegemonic discourses once and for all to uncover some kind of eternal truth or a final subjectivity, or to reach a consensus and amalgamate all differences. Rather the aim is to create an ethical space for the excluded and marginalized subjects to speak, to accept the other as being other. My inclinations in this thesis are towards something like the “celebratory” attitude defined by Lapid that is informed by Connolly’s urge to initiate theory construction. However, as to claim a status for my self beyond any subjectivities is not possible, the “contingent and

⁹⁵ Keenan, op. cit. note 34, p.28.

⁹⁶ *ibid.*, p.29.

⁹⁷ Poster, op. cit. note 8, p.9.

contextual essentialism”⁹⁸ seems as an appropriate way. Campbell provides an eloquent example of this stance by defining ethics bound to subjectivity and its being linked to other. According to his concept of “radical interdependence” that takes not only increasing material interactions between states but which emphasizes the intimate relation of “the fundamental situation of a subjects being-in-the-world” with the other and hence sets this subjectivity as something that must be “politically contested and negotiated”⁹⁹.

2.3.3. Third Group: Postmodernism Sensitized to Eurocentricism

Although postmodernism represents itself as the most ardent advocate of democratization and made a great contribution with this respect it has some other inadequacies in dealing with the question of other. The process of othering that marginalizes the difference is central to the rationalist international relations theories¹⁰⁰. Postmodernism in international relations represents a resentment to the exclusionary structure of international relations theories¹⁰¹. It opposes the idea of the unitary modern subject and emphasizes the marginal sites in which the imposition of the modern unitary subject becomes more and more problematic. The idea of improving sensitivity to the difference is central to postmodernist approaches¹⁰². However, this good intention that neglects the insidious resistance of the conventional approaches to any attempt to shake the throne of the modern western (male) identity carries the risks of reinvigorating cultural essentialism and eurocentricism that it stood against¹⁰³.

⁹⁸ Krishna, op. cit note 26, pp.405-6.

⁹⁹ Campbell, op. cit. note 29, pp.91-9.

¹⁰⁰ Keyman, op. cit. note 10, p.72. This section is mainly based on the views of E. Fuat Keyman.

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*, p. 73.

¹⁰² *ibid.*, p.89.

¹⁰³ *ibid.*

The first point that must be stated is that the strategy of deconstructing modernity by demonstrating its cultural essentialism is not commensurate to produce a non-eurocentric narrative of international relations or, to write or conceptualize the history of international relations from the perspective of the “other”¹⁰⁴. As Sankaran Krishna has diagnosed that the problem mainly lies in the fact that most of the postmodernist writers have a tendency to commence their writings “from a remarkably self-contained and self-referential view of the West”¹⁰⁵.

The first part of this view revealed in historical analysis like Connolly has initiated in his book “Political Theory and Modernity”. He outlines the history of truth in the West and implicitly designates postmodernism as a part of it¹⁰⁶. But he does not mention like many other postmodernist writers, “the intimate dialogue between “Western” and “non-Western” economies, societies, and philosophies that underwrite the disenchantment with modernity”¹⁰⁷. This neglect can be seen also in many definitions of either the postmodern condition¹⁰⁸, proliferating marginal sites¹⁰⁹ or late modern condition¹¹⁰ which take into consideration first and foremost the conditions in the most developed countries but generally neglect the acrimonious experience of imperialism in the colonized world, the movement of decolonization, efforts of westernization that put into jeopardy the social texture of many non-western societies.

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, p.90.

¹⁰⁵ Krishna, *op. cit.* note 26, p.388.

¹⁰⁶ Connolly. *op. cit.* note 53, pp. 141-44.

¹⁰⁷ Krishna, *op. cit.* note 26, p.388.

¹⁰⁸ Jean-François Lyotard, “Introduction to the Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge”, in Stephen Eric Bronner (ed.), *Twentieth Century Political Theory: A Reader*, (New York- London: Routledge, 1997)

¹⁰⁹ Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, “Speaking the Language Dissident of Exile: Thought in International Studies” *International Studies Quarterly Special Issue, Vol. 34, No.3, September 1990a*.

¹¹⁰ James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy –spies, terror, speed, and war*, (Cambridge&Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)

Postmodernism with its neglect of the subjects in the rest of the world can be mainly the beginning point for the resistance of the western subject. Beside this constraint, this neglect imposes other risks of eurocentricism when neglect itself is neglected. The crisis of meaning involved in many definitions of the postmodern condition must not be universalized as the problem of everybody and the points of resistance must not be reduced to this one pertinent to the modern western subject¹¹¹ Postmodernist critique of modernity is initiated by a refusal of the humanist view and proceeded with a strategy based on the death of subject and in turn this strategy, that is based on a Western type resistance, is universalized as the only way of anti-humanist resistance to modernity. For example Connolly illustrates a Nietzschean ethic based on “ontology of resistance” -- that is “human life cannot be without the creation of the social form” and “every social form will engender that which resists it”¹¹². However, one cannot help but ask whose resistance this is. It emphasizes one kind of resistance, that is the resistance of modern Western subjects, the killers of God.

Postmodernism has a tendency to neglect the historical difference between the Western subject and colonial subject that is rooted in the othering of the later, in other words it ignores the role of imperialism in the construction of the colonial subject. In postmodernism the resistance that is elevated as the only resistance is the resistance of the modern Western subject, thus, in order to prevent a foreclosure with respect to the different strategies, the construction of the other as the subject, in other words other subjects particularly the colonial subject must not be ignored. Thus postmodernism, despite its normative commitments to open up an ethical space for the “other” to speak,

¹¹¹ Kcyman, op. cit. note 10, p.91.

¹¹² Connolly, op. cit note 14, 161.

can assume the task of speaking in the name of the “other” just like the narratives of modernity it was refusing¹¹³. The question of how to articulate the non-western subjects resistance is silenced within the postmodernist discourse. However, to speak as the other on its own entails not merely exposition of the cultural essentialism of modernity but to construct an alternative subject position.

The second problem with postmodernism can be summarized as the underemphasis of the material world. This problem shows up itself first in the overemphasis on meaning and its discursive construction on the bases of identity difference at the expense of the multidimensional and complex process of identity construction. Even if we accept that the other is constructed discursively, both discursive and political, economic, military factors must be taken into consideration. Postmodernism is inadequate to analyze the construction process of the “other”, for it has a tendency to conceptualize terms like power, authority and conflict as textual strategies rather than material practices¹¹⁴. Another area where this problem resonates related to the first is that being preoccupied too much with the “practices of representation and signification”, some postmodernist writings bring forth the danger of “losing a vital and physcalistic sense of the violence”¹¹⁵, domination, exploitation, and the pauperization of the non-western world¹¹⁶.

¹¹³ Keyman, op. cit. note 10, p.92.

¹¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.93.

¹¹⁵ Sankaran Khrishna, op. cit note 26, in her review article (with reference to the chapters related to the Gulf War in Der Derian’s, *Anti-diplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War*, Michael J. Shapiro’s “Reading the Post-modern Polity: Political Theory as Textual Practice” and Chaloupka’s “Knowing Nukes: The politics and the Culture of the Atom”) underlines the fact that postmodernist analysis of the Gulf War “leaves one with little sense of the annihilation visited upon the people and land of Iraq”(1993:399). We have expanded this problem of unbalanced or one sided representation of violence with overemphasis of the “representation, sign systems” and of “the signifier over signified” to the relations of domination and exploitation. This critique is not directed only to the postmodernist writers but also to many postcolonialist writers like Gayatri Spivak, Akeel Bilgrami and probably the most celebrated one Edward Said. These intellectual avant garde “brought the concerns of the hitherto marginalized people to the front of intellectual

Postcolonialism, at this juncture, provides an efficient strategy to resolve the problematic in postmodernist views neglecting the different historicity of colonial culture and the subject positions that have been constructed historically and spatially.¹¹⁷ Although postcolonialism, generally utilizes postmodernist assumptions, differs from postmodernist approaches in that it started the deconstruction of global history of modernity from the non-western and colonized subject positions.¹¹⁸ It rejects the Third World ideology through which, whereas First and Second worlds defined by their internal traits through their own histories, Third World as a space constructed externally by imperialist relations denied its own history and cultural formations. Postcolonial¹¹⁹ critique aims to put into jeopardy what is monolithic and homogeneous in the name of variety, plurality and heterogeneity and aims to deconstruct the abstract, general and universal around the axis of the material, contingent and local. This is not to privilege local against universal, or internal factors as opposed to external ones, but to underline

debates” ,however, the effect of postcolonial theory is ambiguous. First of all it “obfuscate some of the enduring legacies of colonialism, including the pauperization of the Third World in the age of late capitalism” (Majid,1995-1996:6).

¹¹⁶Anouar Majid, “Can the Postcolonial Critic Speak? Orientalism and the Rushdie Affair”, *Cultural Critique* (Winter 1995-96).

¹¹⁷ Keyman, op. cit. note 10, p.99.

¹¹⁸ *ibid.*, p.100.

¹¹⁹ At this point we must be alert about the “ahistorical and universalising” deployment of the postcolonialist discourse. As John Docker, “Rethinking Postcolonialism and Multiculturalism in the Fin de Siècle”, *Cultural Studies*, Vol:9 No:3 (1995), 409-426.(1995) has warned the students interested in culture, postcolonialism when employed as a theoretical framework, having global ambitions might lead to fatal reductionisms.

“It collapses into one term and history very different national-racial formations, as between settler-colonial societies like the United States, Australia, and Canada, and societies like Nigeria, Jamaica, and India as together postcolonial simply because they were both colonies equates a society dominated by white settlers with a society composed of an ex-colonized indigenous population. Used in this way, ‘postcolonial’ becomes a totalizing category neutralizing geopolitical differences across the globe.”(Shohat, quoted in,Docker, 1995:410)

The approach in this paper borrowed from Keyman (1996b) secures the more contingent and historical usage of the term.

the relational nature of the identity and thus to locate global history within the identity/difference context¹²⁰.

Postcolonialism points out that any interrogation of global modernity that does not include both textual and historical deconstruction of the identity construction process carries the risk of reiterating eurocentric narratives. Secondly postcolonial critique does not present the criticism of humanism as the death of the subject, for political action requires a subject position.¹²¹ So it tries to articulate the resistance of the non-western subjects. Thirdly Postcolonialism asserts that in the face of the multidimensional construction of identity, both the problematization of global modernity and creating alternative identity policies must be based on a plurality of theoretical frameworks. It advocates a theoretical plurality and a dialogue between these alternative frameworks¹²².

By these traits postcolonialism provides just one of the contingent and contestable foundations needed for theorization and political action. The point that makes it worthy of appreciation is the curious balance that it established between a peculiar subjective position and tolerance for plurality.

¹²⁰ Keyman, *op. cit.* note 10, p. 101.

¹²¹ *ibid.*, p. 104.

¹²² *ibid.*, p. 105.

CHAPTER III: A POSTMODERN OVERVIEW OF THE SECURITY DISCOURSES

3.1. The State of Security Studies After the Cold War

The recent critical turn in international relations, that has been allied to the wider debates in the social sciences and hence has an intimacy to the great alterations experienced by the late capitalist societies and global states system, has a momentum of itself to destabilise the international relations field. Nevertheless this destabilisation is further aggravated by the enormous changes experienced dramatically in international politics by the abrupt end of the Cold War. After the initial euphoria of triumphalism has abated, post-Cold War Era stood as a source of theoretical confusion with its dramatically altered circumstances, ambiguous opportunities and roaming dangers. Such considerations about the New World Order give stimuli for a reevaluation of many issues.

Within this zeal for reevaluation probably issues related to security rank high due to several reasons. First reason is the substantiality of the discrepancy between the security parameters of the Cold War and considerations arouse by the demise of it¹. Secondly, the bold decline of the Cold War and the sheer failure of the field to anticipate the end of it are far more embarrassing for the field of security studies that lead to an accelerated resonance within the field. For it is a field that has been heavily permeated by

¹Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourses", *Alternatives*, Vol:17 No: (1992), pp.95-7

the Cold War thinking' and furthermore claims special expertise with respect to the Cold War².

After the Second World War, especially during the Golden Age of the field between 1955 and 1965 and its revitalisation in 1980s by the second Cold War³, the scope of the security studies has been narrowed. "The primacy of national security defined largely in military terms" is set as a premise⁴. Then on "what security is, how important it is relative to other goals and the means by which it should be pursued" were not prevalent topics to be debated⁵. Consequently, the main concern of the security specialists, "the study, of the threat, use, and control of military force"⁶ dovetails this definition. This parochial understanding of security and the security studies, dictated by a closure entrenched within the circumstances of the Cold War is the main target of the heightened criticism.

Studies urging for alternative security frameworks, underlining the need for a reconceptualisation of the main analytical tools of the security studies, or offering new study guides for the field in the new era abruptly proliferated.⁷ Within this new

²David A. Baldwin, "Security studies and the end of the Cold War", *World Politics*, Vol:48 No:1 (October 1995), p.132.

³ See Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:35 No: (1991), 211-239 for a review of the field of security studies that reflects the strict orthodox view.

⁴ Ibid.,p.126.

⁵ Ibid.,pp. 123-32.

⁶ Stephen M. Walt cited in Baldwin, op.cit note 2 p.125.

⁷ See Carolyn M. Stephenson, "The Need For Alternative Forms of Security: Crises and Opportunities" *Alternatives*, Vol:13 No: (1988), 55-76, for a review of arguments that "suggest the breakdown of old models of security and push us towards a new system"(55). Barry Buzan in his article "Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol:21 No:2 (1984), 109-25, tries to evaluate the merits of idealist and realist approaches to the security issues and criticising their polarisation and endeavours to offer a more expedient perspective through a reconceptualisation of 'security'. Ken Booth, in his "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice", *International Affairs*, Vol:67 No:3 (1991), pp.527-45, provides a challenging critique of incalcitrated realist views and proposes "utilitarian realism" as a workable alternative. However, his too optimistic evaluation of the trends in world politics and nascent optimism as to the withering away of the state does not provide the secure grounds on which a utopian realist security could be formulated. Ken Booth and Barry Buzan's attitudes coincide on their premature proclamation that the main referent of the

reverberation, Barry Buzan directed a plain but highly challenging question, albeit his own answer received much criticism⁸. Security of whom? Around this plain question a plethora of critical voices heightens to question the existing understandings of security and to reformulate anew the concept with a wider scope and meaning. This debate for a reformulation of security has loomed large over a wide variety of issues ranging from environmental issues to gendered politics, human rights to the problems of Third World, pauperisation to global inequalities and Eurocentricism.

Demand for the reformulation of security, which sometimes even amounts to a program to dissolve the whole prevalent discourses of security that revolve around the concepts of state sovereignty, military power, national interests and anarchy thematic, poses a serious challenge for the realist hegemony that enjoyed an omnipotent authority, particularly in the field of security studies. These developments have instigated a reassertion of the continued relevance and inevitable ascendancy of (neo)realist approaches within the field of security studies through a delimitation of the probable future horizons in which the concept of security may unfold over issues such as ecology, feminism and human rights just to mention a few. Reiterating the conventional meanings of security and proclaiming them as largely immutable, the importance and relevance of

security is individual, however states would play a significant role as long as the threat of war continues, although Booth's approach is far too optimistic compared to that of Buzan's. Bradley S. Klein in his article "After Strategy: The Search for a Post-Modern Politics of Peace", *Alternatives*, Vol:13 No: (1988), 293-318, initiated a quite ambitious task of formulating a postmodern security understanding. Stephen M. Walt's arguments in his widely debated article "The Renaissance of Security Studies" provides a prolific example of the orthodox response to the great alterations experienced in World politics and the consequent challenges directed against the security studies.

⁸ For criticisms of Barry Buzan's approach see Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse", *Alternatives*, Vol:17 (1992), especially pp.100-3 and 106, G. M. Dillon, "Modernity, Discourse and Deterrence" *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, Vol:12 No:2 (1989),p.92, Bill Mcsweney, "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School", *Review of International Studies*, Vol:22 No:1 (January 1996),81-93 and Martin Shaw, "There is no such thing as society: beyond individualism and statism in international security studies", *Review of International Relations Studies*, Vol:19 No:2 (April 1993), pp.161-166.

other issues are belittled.⁹ Albeit this reassertion on the part of the conventional experts and scholars and the vivid examples that illuminate the unabated prevalence of such conceptions in international politics on the part of the policy makers, such as the case in the Gulf War¹⁰, critical approaches made a visible impact so as to enforce co-optation on the part of conventional views.

As our main concern in this chapter will not be a new formulation of security appropriate to the post-Cold War era, we will not dwell on these debates in detail. What we endeavour to investigate in this chapter is the dominant instrumental notion of security that characterises it as nearly above politics and as a mechanistic issue by its main features, and that depicts it as a sacred land of expertise. This conception of security

⁹ Stephen M. Walt, op. cit. note 3, responded to these challenges by a gesture of co-optation, however, with his abundantly clear reservation of unconditional loyalty to the essence of realism and its state centric focus. He defines security studies as “*the study of the threat, use, and control of military force*”, emphasis in original). Although he advocates a broadening of the concept of security over non-military issues, the main components of realism, as power and state centricism, remain as the real world issues which require expertise to tackle with. Walt tries to mark the natural habitus of security studies as somewhere between that of the advisor to the prince and that of the wise man of the academy, closer to that of the first. For merit of security studies is bounded to their policy relevance and utility in the sense of applicability to policy issues. His concept of “methodological self-consciousness” reduces reflexivity to objectivism and to the merits of verification procedures, totally effacing other epistemological questions. Walt’s distinction between serious scholarship which committed to the main tenets of behaviouralism and propaganda (213-5) ignores the inherent political character of the issues gathered under the rubric of national security. Though Walt emphasises the need for debate on security, his requirements for expertise that enforces the participants first to internalise the dominant discourses and then to speak, for policy relevance, and his conception of security limited to national security refusing any radical alteration of it, obscure much of the probable contention lines. His behaviouralist commitment totally discards any problematization of foundational presumption such as the perceptions of threat or the two dimensional role of state in (in)security. Edward A. Kolodziej, in his article “Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:34 No:4 (1992), pp.438-421, responded to the flaws in the Walt essay and provided a stimulating critique of it.

“...Analytically, it limits the objects of study and, ipso facto, constricts the scope of relevant theory needed to understand and explain what security is and what security problems are. Normatively, it focuses almost exclusively on American national security rather than on international security or security per se; and, in the name of relevance, delegates too much of the agenda of security studies to policy makers. Methodologically, it restricts security to a highly selective and largely traditional array of disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches.”(p.421)

¹⁰ See David Campbell, Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War, Critical Perspectives on World Politics Series, (Boulder- London:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993)

empowers a narrow circle of academic/policy elite putatively endowed with the required “technical rationality”¹¹ whereas disabling public to speak.

Commanding silence around the concept of the security is what we will try to challenge. This contestation is rather an exercise with the insights of the critical turn, more specifically that of postmodernism. The main point made in this chapter is that security is not merely instrumental in securing state and its community against the possibility of depredation of outsiders. Security discourses that sustain such an instrumental and unchangeable view of security issues, assume a significant role in the very construction of these entities and maintenance of their stability that they putatively secure. In other words, the instrumental conceptions of international security are instrumental for the construction and maintenance of collective identity serving as discursive sources.

To reveal the constructive character of security and to challenge its instrumental vision, hence to deontologise the ontologised premises on which this particular understanding of security is established as inevitable and immutable, is essential for a critical approach. More specifically, a critical approach requires raising questions about the central terms of conventional analysis. These concepts range from nation to state, anarchy to community. State sovereignty and anarchy will be the main subjects of our critical inquiry. To epitomise, what we are trying to do is to reveal the political character of security issues and to open a space for increasing democratic participation by undermining its theoretical foundations¹².

¹¹Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations*, Critical Perspectives on World Politics Series, (Boulder-Colorado:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994),pp. 209-10

¹² *ibid.*, p. 210.

We will try to find answers to questions of how security came to be conceived in this parochial and apolitical sense directly and was merely related to states, the military and power in its traditional meaning. How are alternative forms of security discarded and how is the prevalent one sanctified as the only plausible way through a complex web of discourses pertaining to international politics, the international system and consequent discourses of foreign policy and more specifically discourses of security? In answering these questions we will try to locate our answers in the context of modernity as both the international system and the study of it are artefacts of modern European history. The following part will be an interrogation of the realist conception of international politics that elevates security to its instrumental and consequently above politics status. In the ensuing parts we will try to demonstrate the indispensable relationship of the instrumental conceptions of foreign policy and more particularly security policy to this foundational articulation of international politics as an intrinsically different domain from the domestic. Simultaneously, we will interrogate the identity constitutive nature of the security issues.

3.2.Sovereignty vs. Anarchy: No Way Out?

Realist¹³ approaches as the dominant paradigm in international relations field, and more substantially, probably the most venerated and internalized approaches among the foreign policy makers as the gospel of statecraft provide somehow simplified models of the international system and state as the main actors, that try to explain foreign policy behavior. Security issues, especially questions related to peace and war have an

¹³ In this chapter, due to lack of space, different strands of realism are to be collapsed into one category of realism. Here we have to neglect the differences within the classical realist school and between classical

outstanding significance within the studies of international politics. Till the recent decades, efforts on this subject have been fissured along the main contention axis of realism-idealism. Alleged inheritors of realism and idealism (e.g., neorealism and neoliberalism) have advanced this contention, albeit altering significance is attributed to various aspects of the debate.

Yet, their common commitment to rationalism and consequent “behavioral conception of both process and institutions” and the conception of “self interested state” as the major agent of international politics¹⁴ conceals two putatively opposite approaches on the familiar grounds of anarchy. In other words, in these rationalist paradigms the dichotomy of domestic and international that is “distinguished along the lines of community and anarchy”¹⁵, has a central place as the inception point of analysis.

The reification of this distinction between domestic and international is molded around the valorized concept of state sovereignty which contrary to many political concepts that are “essentially contested”, “elicits a commanding silence” as the “primary constitutive principle of modern political life”¹⁶.

realism and neo-realism. Realism is defined by two main features; i) state centric analysis and ii) the central place of power as the main mediator between state actors.

¹⁴Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics”, *International Organisation*, Vol:46 No:2 (1992), pp.391-2. See Robert Latham, “Getting Out From Under: Rethinking Security Beyond Liberalism and the Levels of Analysis” *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol:25 No:1 (1996), 77-108. for a concise debate on the inadequacies of the recent resort to liberalism for rethinking security. Latham put emphasis on the state centricism of liberalism, that might be considered as far transcending that of realism from different perspectives. Beside acquiescing states as the main agents in international politics they argue that peace can be maintained through the perfection of state. Due to this shortcoming liberals could not advance a profound understanding of international community beyond a conception of it as the gravitation between state units yielded by the transborder interaction, which was in turn enabled by the very existence of state.

¹⁵ G. M. Dillon, “Modernity, Discourse and Deterrence”, *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, Vol:12 No:2 (1989), p.91.

¹⁶R. B. J. Walker, “Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice”, in R. B. J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlowitz(eds.), *Contending Sovereignities- Redefining Political Community*, (Boulder-London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,1990), p. 159.

Current arguments about state sovereignty reveal the Janus-faced character of the concept.

“From the inside, state sovereignty appears to be a matter of monopoly or centering. The primary concern is then whether sovereignty lies with the state itself or with the people who are somehow “represented” by the state. From the outside, by contrast, state sovereignty is usually taken to mean just the opposite –fragmentation, autonomous “powers”, and a system of relations rather than a society, community, or polity. *How has it been so easy, it may be asked, to construct accounts of political life by assuming that state sovereignty means either monopoly or fragmentation, community or anarchy, the possibility of a theory of political life guided by normative ambition or a theory of international relations guided only by hopes of pragmatic accommodation and regret at the tragic necessities of war?*”¹⁷ (emphasis added)

On the community side there is order, sovereignty, peaceful coexistence, and thus progress. There is the possibility of “good life” within the state. For there is the possibility “to become a citizen; to establish society, community, culture, and nation; to trade of obligations with freedoms”¹⁸. The other side of the border that is enforced by the boundaries of the nation-state is defined by the dearth of these traits peculiar to the community. In more explicit terms, there, anarchy reigns. Anarchy as the logical corollary of state sovereignty stipulates self-help and power politics as inexorable¹⁹. Thus the conventional vision of international politics as a “*realm of wars, force and violence; of deviousness, intrigue, and diplomacy; and of power politics unfettered by considerations of justice and legitimacy*”²⁰ (emphasis added) becomes inexorably strong and unchangeable.

In this way, rationalist paradigms by this way attribute overriding causal powers to the anarchic structure that pervades with its prevalent rules and “constitutes states with self-interested identities exogenous to practice”²¹. “Logic of anarchy” is entrenched as the

¹⁷ Ibid., p.160.

¹⁸ WALKER, R. B. J., One World, Many Worlds: Struggles For A Just World, (Boulder, L. Rienner, 1988), p.35

¹⁹ Wendt, op. cit. note 14, p.396.

²⁰ Walker, op. cit note 18, p.36.

²¹ Wendt, op. cit. note 14, p.392.

major determinant of state behavior²². Realist representation of the 'real world' "in terms of generalized, universalized and irreducible patterns of human behavior" reduces the whole range of issues in world politics to ceaseless struggle instigated by the anarchic structure and guided by the "utilitarian pursuit of self interest"²³.

In this formulation of instrumental views of state behavior and security, two subthemes are interwoven with each other; first the positivist claim of depicting the 'reality' existing "out there" as it 'is', and second, the "necessity" of accommodating to it. The second theme of necessity is assured through conferring "eternity, objectivity, gravity, substantiality and positive resistance to human purposes" upon the "reality"²⁴. In other words, this conservative stance is based on the belief that reality is as it is for it could not be in another way. Hence, there remains no lease of life for alteration in interests and identities of the agents as this depiction fixes the system and the character of agents in it as eternal. From this vantage point, the ceaseless bickering of world politics is the natural result of nothing but the nature of state actors in an anarchic system. Therefore, power is the invaluable asset to be pursued in such a system in order to survive and rational behavior based on these presumptions is the indispensable trait of statecraft²⁵.

To recapitulate, in realist analysis of international politics the concept of state has been regarded as "the key to understanding the operation of the international system, its structure, and its fundamental characteristics", even it is assumed that "states and

²² *ibid.*, p395.

²³ Jim George, "Understanding International Relations after the Cold War: Probing beyond the Realist Legacy" in Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (eds.), Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities, Vol:2, (Minneapolis-London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p.34.

²⁴ *ibid.*, pp.42-3.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

interactions among them constitute the system itself”²⁶. However, in bizarre contradiction to its sanctified status as the basic unit of analysis in the study of international relations, accounts about the nature of the state hardly transcend beyond simplistic definitions that assign to it several attributes, such as ‘eager for power maximization’. This lack of theorization on the concept of state is due to its acceptance as an ontological entity, “an unproblematic unity”²⁷. As a consequence state is conceived to be commensurate to nation, power and sovereignty²⁸. When state is ontologized as a given reality that needs no further theoretical elaboration, the system that is assumed to be the direct product of the existence and interaction of states is also assigned a similar status.

These approaches based on an ontological distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ are short of explicating formation and articulation of state identities and interests that are pivotal in molding the institutions and characteristics of anarchy and the multidimensional relation between them which in turn might be crucial in explaining state behavior. This distancing of ‘international’ from ‘domestic’ by delegating community to the sovereign domain of states is in complicity with the lack of interest of social theory in the field of international relations²⁹. As international signifies a domain where community does not exist social theory is silenced at its water edges. Beyond the borders of community, the analysis of political-military strategy, heart of the classical realist international relations studies, is dominated by state-centric reductionism in turn

²⁶E. Fuat Keyman, “Problematizing the State in International Relations Theory”, in Claire Turenne Sjolander and Wayne S. Cox (eds.), Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations, (Boulder-London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p.154.

²⁷ *ibid.*, 155.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence, Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 34, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.1-3.

contributing to the plight of 'international relations discipline'. As Bradley S. Klein has stated

“What passed for “theory” among scholars of International Relations was largely a collection of totalizing efforts by postwar behaviouralists concerned to isolate various levels of analysis and to reduce political dynamics to static hypothesis and predictions. From the standpoint of sheer style, most of this was clumsily written. Worse yet, it tended to be narrow in terms of the range of its concerns and the intellectual horizons it embraced”³⁰.

Thus what is needed is the articulation of international relations by the insights from social and political theory. In other words to initiate a critical study with respect to foreign policy behavior that does not reiterate these uncontested conceptions, an ontological problematization of them is essential. This is what the postmodernists in the recent critical debates are engaging to do. Here two concepts, state and anarchy, reveal great significance due to their centrality in the analysis of international politics.

Both the untheorised status of the concept of state as an ontological existence³¹ and the bleak articulation of anarchy putatively rendering power politics inexorable and the current state of affairs inevitable and intransigent received much criticism from different scholars having divergent views of world politics³². A plausible solution to the theorization of state is to dwell on the concept in relational terms by underlining the interrelationship between state and society³³. This “both/and logic”, as Keyman puts,

³⁰ Ibid., p.2.

³¹ E. Fuat Keyman, “Problematizing the State in International Relations Theory”, for an account of the urges and combined endeavours to problematize the concept of state both in international relations theory and sociology. Keyman provides a critique of the “state centric model” which tries to retheorise state as an institutional agent.

³² See Barry Buzan, “Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations” for a review of alternative interpretations of anarchy; one emphasising negative sides of anarchy, the other providing a mainly positive interpretation and the last, one advocated by Buzan, comprising a middle ground between the two. Also See Ken Booth, “Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice”. Booth contends that realist power politics is not the only way to deal with the anarchy problematic and through a practical utopianism the potential for an “anarchical global ‘community of communities’ might be appreciated better than an incarcerated realist ignorance did.

³³ Here also the “ahistorical and monistic interpretation of community” as a “fixed thematic unity, a kind of essence, an identity transcending and uniting manifest differences in the world of human practice” is abandoned and a more dynamic vision of it is adopted where society does not refer to a unity or to an

“..brings about a conception of the state not only as a complex institutional ensemble with its own spatial and temporal specificity, but also as a site where condensation of political forces takes place. The state constitutes not only “the sovereign place within which the highest internal laws and policies are enacted and from which the strategies toward external states and nonstate peoples proceeded,” but also “the site of the most fundamental division between inside and outside. us and them, domestic and foreign, the sphere of citizen entitlements and that of strategic responses”. In this sense, the both/and logic enable one to take into consideration not only the geopolitical dimension of international relations, but also the economic and discursive/cultural practices integral to the process of the constitution and reproduction of world orders, states, and societies.”³⁴

Eschewing the complex debates on the retheorisation of state as an autonomous agent, we would put from the outset that the state must be conceived of not as a preestablished, unproblematic identity, but as a domain of sovereign practices. With respect to our aim in this chapter of procuring a more sophisticated analysis of foreign policy behavior and particularly security issues by challenging their instrumental conceptions, the intimate relationship between “national-social formations” and “context of global conditions and pressures”³⁵ in constructing the state and determining state action. Here the territoriality of the state is uncovered as a main component of the state that creates the inevitable link between external and internal dimensions of it³⁶. It must be underlined that “the existence of international relations was integral to the process of the very constitution of the modern state as nation-state”³⁷. Furthermore, external dimensions of state action constitute one of the ways through which state appropriates autonomous power³⁸.

As evident from the brief account of the state above, this line of reasoning also challenges the conventional meaning of the anarchical structure of the international system. Instead of the conventional conception of anarchy as an ontological existence,

organic identity. Richard K. Ashley, “The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics”, *Alternatives*, Vol:12 (1987),p.406.

³⁴ Keyman, op. cit. note 24, p.154.

³⁵ *ibid.*, p.158.

³⁶ *ibid.*, p.159.

³⁷ *ibid.*, p.177.

following Alexander Wendt³⁹, our approach would be that “*Anarchy is what states make of it*” holding ascendant the role of practice and performance as “intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction”⁴⁰. However, we would abrogate the assumption of the prior construction of state domestically as an empty apparatus, so as to recognize the embeddedness of state and international system.

Still, conventional accounts of political life both within states and among them which are commenced from the assumption of unitary preestablished states as the container of the community cemented around a sovereign identity has relevance for our purposes as international relations discourses are generative of the very ‘fact’ that they are putatively merely interrogating as discursive resources. Through a problematization of these uncontested concepts we can peer in the veils of power. From now on we will dwell on the characteristics of the modern territorial state so as to highlight the interrelationship between domestic and international politics.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p.166.

³⁹ What is to be appreciated in Wendt’s approach is the boundedness of structure to process or in other words the emphasis on identity construction and interest formulation endogenous to interaction. However his commitment to modernism and its theory of knowledge, defects the study with implicit presuppositions of conventional approaches that has remained unmentioned in Wendt’s analysis. For example although he has underlined identity as relational and social, his definition reduces it to a kind of role perception on the part of the agent in relation to a specific area of performance with great degrees of alteration in response to changing social contexts. Commenced from this vantage point Wendt’s analysis effaces the multidimensional interrelations between agent and structure, domestic and international etc. Also his assumption of the prior establishment of state apparatus and will to survive domestically together with his conception of identity, limits the effects of intersubjective process only to the meaning formation in the realm of international against the other and obscures the radical interdependence of self and other, neither one preceding the other. See David Campbell, “Political Prosais, Transversal Politics, and the Anarchical World”, pp12-13. for a brief critique of Wendt’s “modernist constructivism” and his “epistemic realism”.

⁴⁰ Wendt, *op. cit* note 14, pp.394-5.

3.3. The Territorial Sovereign State: Convergent Boundaries of Community and Anarchy

The entrenched dichotomy of international and domestic signifies “[t]he central attribute of modernity⁴¹ in international politics” as a “peculiar and historically unique configuration of territorial space”⁴². The territorial state as an artifact of European history and its omnipresent acquiescence as the potent and legitimate agent of politics have required a long period of transformation and expansion. The emergence of the modern system of states presumes astounding alterations both in the material environment, social settings and relations within their confines, and “the mental equipment that people drew upon in imagining and symbolizing forms of political community”⁴³. The last category, *social epistemology*, in terms of John Gerard Ruggie, signifies sets of modern discourses for modern societies.

In the formulation of the concept of absolute and exclusive state sovereignty, the understanding of private property, the burgeoning public sphere, the atomistic conception of community, all merge into one another. The organization of political space into modern territorial states and hence a system of states composed of this “territorially disjoint, mutually exclusive, functionally similar, sovereign states” requires “two

⁴¹ John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations”, *International Organisation*, Vol:47 No:1 (1993), 139-47, giving an account of the evolution of postmodern debates first in the realm of aesthetics and style and then in international relations field dwell on the questions posed by these debates on the ‘project of modernity’.

“...the postmodernist debate has shifted in barely two decades from the domain aesthetics, to culture more broadly, to political economy. Correspondingly, the meaning of “modern” in “postmodern” has shifted from what it is in modern art, the modern novel, or modern architecture, first, to the so-called age of Enlightenment; next, to the structure of capitalist production; and then to the very epoch in Western history that was initiated by Renaissance.” (147)

Following Ruggie we would dwell on the last of these “space-time frames” as it was the epoch that “marks the transformation that produced the modern mode of organising political space: the system of territorial space” (ibid.)

⁴² Ibid., p. 144.

fundamental spatial demarcations: between public and private realms and between internal and external realms”⁴⁴.

Conventional accounts of political life, based on a fissure between the two domains -inside the state and outside of it- have been interwoven into the texture of “Western tradition of political theory”⁴⁵ within the context of the permanent tension between **universalism and particularism**. State sovereignty, as a “peculiar form of sociopolitical individuation”⁴⁶, reified a modern resolution of the claims of universality and particularity by confining the claims of universality to the *territory* under the sovereign control of the state.

“Inside the particular state, concepts of obligation, freedom, and justice could be articulated within the context of universalist accounts of Revelation, Reason, and History. Yet these claims to universal values and processes presumed, implicitly or explicitly, a boundary beyond which such universals could not be guaranteed. Beyond the boundary, beyond the borders of the sovereign state, lay a world of difference: a world of others who were both spatially outside and usually presumed to be temporally backward; and a world of international relations, even of international anarchy, in which different rules applied.”⁴⁷

The entrenched fissure between domestic and international realms, demonstrates that “the problematic identified by the principle of state sovereignty is an effect of a more encompassing principle of sovereign identity”⁴⁸. State sovereignty is only one of the expressions of the quest for a basis to fix a point of identity, “a universality in space and time- against which all differences in space and time can be measured, judged, and put in their place.”⁴⁹ Similar and parallel to the developments in visual arts, the “single-point

⁴³ *ibid.*, pp.152-60.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.155. As our main concern is the international politics we would mainly dwell on the second demarcation. However the essential role of the first demarcation between public and private realms in buttressing the second, must not be ignored. As the anarchy and sovereignty constitutes the two opposite ends of the same spectrum and interdependent on each other by their very definition we would try to elaborate on them simultaneously.

⁴⁵ Walker, *op. cit.* note 16, p.164.

⁴⁶ Ruggie, *op. cit.* note 39, p.152.

⁴⁷ Walker, *op. cit.* note 16, p.165.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p. 175.

perspective” has also been transposed to the field of politics as the prevailing mode of conceiving and perceiving space. In the definition of political space “precision and perspective from a particular point of view: a single point of view, the point of view of a single subjectivity, from which all other subjectivity’s were differentiated and against which all other subjectivity’s were plotted in diminishing size and depth toward the vanishing point”⁵⁰ has been reified by the concept of state sovereignty.

State sovereignty implies the closure of the political space by exclusion/inclusion mechanisms that create an effect of sovereign identity. This can be inferred from the reasons why ‘domestic’ is illustrated by order and hence progress and on the other hand ‘international’ is illuminated as anarchy and staleness. Within territorial (nation) states, claims of many, mainly individuals are tried to be conciled by the claims of the sovereign identity that are enabled by the locus of sovereignty and authority in the name of the state and community. However, relations between states can be understood as the interaction between the many claims to sovereign identity, ultimate conciliation of which within an account of one universal community (or one universal sovereign identity) seems impossible and inexorably lead to conflict and sometimes clashes⁵¹. The perennial anarchy that reigns in the international domain signifies the lack of a sovereign identity.

This modern resolution to the tension between universalism and particularism is made plausible within the spatial understandings of the possibility of political community peculiar to early modern European intellectual life. In turn this conception of space particular to Western societies is based on “a particular naturalized, uniform Newtonian

⁵⁰ Ruggie, op. cit. note 39, p.159.

⁵¹ Walker, op. cit. note 16, p.174.

space”⁵². In more explicit terms the principle of state sovereignty is sanctified, stabilized and articulated “*in the context of an attempt to fix political community within spatial categories, categories in which time and change are understood as dangers to be contained*”⁵³. This principle of state sovereignty embedded in a “spatial account of territory, fixed boundaries, and geopolitics” rendered the conception of territorial state as “territory, as geography, as extension across the physical surface of the earth” prevailing⁵⁴.

State, beside being a geographic space, and even more important than this, signifies the political container of community as a textual space as opposed to the anarchic character of the ‘international’. As a textual space, it is merely one of such spaces that have been delineated by similar spatial practices and sanctified by the “novel political doctrines and metaphysics”⁵⁵ of the modern times. In this sense we can enumerate public and private spheres, work space and leisure space or commercial space as similar textual spaces⁵⁶ by reserving the distinguished character of state as the one that has preserved the most intimate and vivid references to a physical place in constructing its textual meaning.

Political analyses in general are tranquil about this textual categorization of living spaces. As Shapiro and Neubauer puts;

“The shape of a society’s spaces, e.g., leisure space, work space, public space, military space, etc., tends to remain largely implicit for a variety of reasons. One is, of course, the relatively long duration of that shaping process so that few can discern a process of actual boundary shaping or movement. However, part of the inattention to spatial predicates of policy discourse is positively administered. Dominant forms of social theory, for example both liberal and Marxist, fail, with

⁵²Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War- The discourse of Politics*, (London: Printer Publishers, New York: Guilford Publications, 1990), p.90

⁵³ Walket, op. cit note 16, p.173.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

⁵⁵ Ruggie, op. cit note 39, p.158.

⁵⁶ Michael Shapiro and Deane Neubauer, “Spatiality and Policy discourse: Reading the Global City”, *Alternatives*, Vol:14 (1989), p.303.

some exceptions, to encode the spatial dimensions of human association. *For the dominant tendencies in both these theoretical traditions, space is either natural or neutral; it is either the empty arena within which political association and contention develop or it is the sanctified, historically destined places whose boundaries and internal configurations should remain inviolable.*⁵⁷ (emphasis added)

Depoliticization of space must be resisted as these textual spaces have direct influence on the re/production of discourses and conduct of power plays under their aegis. The politician, declaring something number one public enemy, strongly drags his foot on the textual space of the public sphere, or incriminating enemy being an implacable disaster surfs between the textual spaces of domestic and international.

“The meaning and value that statements confer are inseparable from mapping of persons within which the statements are deposited. Intelligibility is intimately connected to standing, to the sites and locations from which meanings are shaped.⁵⁸” The conception of spatial organization of human society as a social construct means to recognize various forms of power and authority at work in its construction and hence commensurate to politicizing space⁵⁹. In our case, politicizing the space of state does not mean to ignore its existence or its sustained importance. It means to open the concept to critical scrutiny in order to desacralise the space it constituted by deconstructing spatial practices entailed necessary for its sustained strength and challenging the conception that spatial demarcations of the social life delegate everything to its natural habitus, be it the public or private sphere or work versus leisure space. Through this genealogical/deconstructionist analysis we can have a more comprehensive analysis of foreign policy behavior than the realist account of billiard ball.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*

⁵⁸ *ibid.*

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, p.309.

The modern resolution of the tension between claims of universality and particularity that reifies community in spatial terms around a sovereign identity sanctified by state, also opens up an aporia in ethical understandings. Politics and ethics might converge as long as claims of universality can be maintained. State within its sovereign confines monopolized the legitimate use of power on behalf of providing public order and promoting national interests. So this resemblance or articulation of ethics to politics can be maintained only within the domain of state sovereignty, where claims of universality are held to be prevailing. The only “ethical disposition of states is grounded internally” which is associated with the “integrity and security of the state”⁶⁰.

Here we can observe the paradigmatic dichotomy of ‘men versus citizens’ through the lenses of which international relations theory “involves conceptual aspects of international relations concerned with particularistic duties to one’s community by virtue of membership in that community”⁶¹ and ignore any universalist moral claims such as in favor of peace. State acting immorally in the international realm behaves morally according to a morality confined to the concepts of national interest. It is evident that there are rules governing international politics. In the international realm, the legitimate use of power became fused with “statecraft, steadily discrediting its deployment for primitive expansion and aggrandizement”⁶². However, this does not mean that “primitive

⁶⁰David Campbell, *Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War*, Critical Perspectives on World Politics Series, (Boulder- London:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p.81.

⁶¹Beverly Neufeld, “The Marginalisation of Peace Research in International Relations”, *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol:22 No:2 (1993), p.173. Beverly Neufeld tries to evaluate the reasons for marginalisation of Peace Research and tries to offer expedient ways for conciliation of the two fields. First part of article that explains why peace theory is self-marginalising and marginalised is more striking. Neufeld asserts that the main reason for distancing of peace research from international relations studies lies within their different responses to the tension between universalism and particularism. Their conceptualizations vary in accordance with their stance vis-a-vis men and citizens dichotomy. Whereas international relations view issues through the lenses of particularistic interests of particular communities, peace research “concerned with universalistic obligations to humanity.”

⁶²Ruggie, op. cit. note 39, p.161.

expansion and aggrandizement” disappeared or steadily diminish. This means that a forceful pretext emerges for practices of othering, relegating the other to an inferior status both morally and physically, especially in case of conflict.

In the dearth of a sovereign identity that could mediate the difference, the “I-it relationship” to the other in which “one knows and uses other persons or things without allowing them to exist for oneself in their uniqueness”⁶³ gains the upper hand. The “I-it relation” to other and universalist narratives on politico/ethical theory have underlined the “egoism-anarchy thematic” and “ethic of (non)responsibility in International relations” that have been foundational both for realist and neo-realist streams⁶⁴. Driving on a selective reading of Western philosophy, realism created a self-affirming cosmos of its own that has been unfolded out from “otherworldly and/or externalized premises and foundational sources”⁶⁵.

These foundations delineate the “unchanging politico-ethical foundations of global existence”⁶⁶. The universalized and essentialized themes of the “‘all-permeating’, power-lusting, egoistic human nature” that has been transposed to the relations between states⁶⁷, inherent evil in political behavior and unchanging structural forces embedded within the anarchical system render any conciliation between ethics and politics inconceivable and detached political responsibility from “temporal political actors caught in an evil system”⁶⁸. Realist discourses, incriminating the system and the ‘other’ as the

⁶³David Campbell, “The Politics of Radical Interdependence: A Rejoinder to Daniel Warner”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, (1996), Vol. 25 No 1,p., 133..

⁶⁴ Jim George, “Realist ‘Ethics’, International Relations and Post-modernism: Thinking Beyond the Egoism-Anarchy Thematic”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, (1995, Vol. 24 No 2, pp.198-203.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp.198-9.

⁶⁷ Walker, op. ci. npote 18, p.118.

⁶⁸ Jim George, op. cit. note 62, pp.199-200.

uncivilized actor who is caught by its primitive instincts, procure “politics of principle and claims of moral righteousness”⁶⁹.

Presumptions that constitute a fertile ground for this double move -detachment of ethics from international politics on the one hand and securing the claims for moral righteousness on the part of the concerned agent on the other hand- are embedded within discourses of foreign policy and aggrandized by sovereign practices. All kinds of exclusion/inclusion mechanisms, practices of othering, discourses of threat and similar discourses intermingle with each other as a loosely knitted bundle of sovereign practices that secures identity and tackles with the ambiguity surrounding it.

3.4. A Critical Formulation of Foreign Policy Behavior

Foreign policy analysis, although a central subject for the field of international studies, is mainly based on “ideas and frameworks introduced before 1975” and till recent decade has attracted feeble excitement and “modest theoretical ambitions”⁷⁰ Nevertheless, still the bulk of studies on foreign policy analysis exhibit a quite different character than the systemic theories. Especially, in studies about decision making that challenges mechanistic rational actor models by their focus on ideological and cultural variables, psychological factors or the significance of organizational factors on policy outcomes⁷¹, the difference between the two levels of analysis becomes more apparent. Difference rooted from the fact that sway of “strict behaviouralism” that reigns unabated in systemic theories, enfeebles in this area and is transformed into a "meaning oriented

⁶⁹ Campbell, op. cit. note 58, p.23.

⁷⁰Christopher Hill and Margot Light, “Foreign Policy Analysis”, in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), International Relations : a handbook of current theory, (London:Frances Printer, 1985), p.156,.

behaviouralism” which tries to take into consideration “the subjective meanings attached by state managers to their actions”.⁷²

However, approach that we try to advance here is quite different from these previous approaches. For it rejects the conceptualization of the subjective meanings as merely “intervening variables between the stimulus (the action context) and the response (behavior)”⁷³, a “filtering device –between the empirical reality of the international context and international behavior”⁷⁴. Our approach, in line with what Mark Neufeld dubbed interpretivist approaches, tries to formulate not subjective but intersubjective meanings that unfold within complex web of discourses. To reiterate, this approach aims to unravel their constitutive role.

To reformulate foreign policy behavior, not as an instrumental device of the state but as a constitutive act of the state that reproduces and rooted in the intersubjective meanings, taken for granted conceptions of the state, the state sovereignty, community, anarchy or the international system and their claim to be natural must be destabilized and unfamiliarised by rendering their claim untenable through a genealogical/deconstructionist approach. Then the ‘billiard ball’ states of realism become inefficient to explain foreign policy behavior and field is open to theoretical explorations for different conceptualizations.

Both the state sovereignty and the arena of ‘international’ are “domains of political conduct” and signify power relations within their construction and

⁷¹For a literature review of these issues that comprises first half of the 1980s see Christopher Hill and Margot Light, “Foreign Policy Analysis”.

⁷² Neufeld, *op. cit.* note 59, p.52.

⁷³ *ibid.*, p.42.

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, p.53.

conceptualization, which in turn interwoven into the power-knowledge texture⁷⁵. As state is not a preestablished, stable identity, it requires active performance to create the effect of a secure identity and to gain the status of the agent in the international realm through the well-entrenched concept of state sovereignty⁷⁶.

Foreign policy has assumed a pivotal role in this performance of constructing state as the sovereign identity through political practice. Foreign policy practices, with respect to creating an effect of sovereign identity, have the peculiarity of establishing “an alignment between territoriality and the various dimensions of identity, so that it becomes possible to speak of a particular state with a definable character”⁷⁷. Being a sovereign practice on the axis of identity/difference, foreign policy has a strikingly intimate relationship with the discursive effects of representation and interpretation.

In more explicit terms “the conduct of foreign policy depends upon and has a predilection for texts” both in its literally meaning and in its broad usage similar to discourse⁷⁸. The first thing to be mentioned here is the role of the depictions of the international system -as we have outlined in the previous section-, modern political doctrines and metaphysics as discursive resources⁷⁹. The very agents (or subjects) of foreign policy are subjectified through complex modes of language that could be read as the “systems of signification”⁸⁰. Also the widely acknowledged agents in international politics were established and developed in the legal sense through the “dense archive of

⁷⁵G. M. Dillon, “The Alliance of Security and Subjectivity”, *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, Vol:13 No:3 (1990-91), pp.101-3.

⁷⁶ Campbell, op. cit. note 58, p.24.

⁷⁷ ibid..

⁷⁸ ibid.p.9

⁷⁹ Bradley Klein, op. cit. note 27, p.5.

⁸⁰ Dillon, op. cit. note72, p.103.

written documentation”⁸¹. Secondly, the foundational information about the world outside national borders received in forms of reports that are themselves products of interpretation and try to offer a re/representation of complex events, is subject to further interpretation in the process of policy formulation.

As David Campbell concisely captures, “the basis for decision making in foreign policy is invariably some form of mediated experience in which those referents signified as belonging to “external” reality are in actuality “internal” to discourse.”⁸² Then foreign policy is not a mere reaction to the outer world by unitary preestablished entities as the reality that seems having a reality outside is internal to foreign policy discourses. The first source of contention is the fact that “states are not subjects with essences” endowing them with “essential properties and propensities”, which are in turn assumed to set the explanatory ground for state activities⁸³, one of which is claimed to be the need and quest for security. The second contention, which is intimately related to the first one is that these two domains of domestic and international politics, ‘us’ and ‘them’ do not have autonomous existence from each other or one does not precede the other. They are constructed through their relation with the other. Foreign policy practices signify one of these constitutive practices.

“This means that the domestic and the external, the state and the international system, and the sovereign and the anarchic are not domains that exist in essence prior to a relationship with each other. While the precise form and content of the identities of these domains is dependent on specific historical contexts, we can say that identity in the realm of global politics can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the inside are linked through a discourse of danger to with threats identified and located on the outside. This demarcation is achieved through an inscription of danger on ambiguity in such a way that the differences within are transformed into differences between.... *Foreign policy is thus to be*

⁸¹ *ibid.*

⁸² Campbell, *op. cit.* note 58, p.9.

⁸³ Dillon, *op. cit.* note 72, p.113.

*retheorized as a boundary-producing practice central to the production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates.*⁸⁴ (emphasis added)

Foreign policy is, hence, in more explicit terms, an identity constitutive act of the modern nation state, which invokes inclusion/exclusion mechanisms on different levels of sameness and difference. This identity constitutive dimension of the foreign policy can manifest itself in a very complex fashion as it is emerged through the interaction of a multitude of internal and external factors. Here several types of systems of inclusion/exclusion mechanisms and accompanying dominant discourses converge into one another. The task of formulating foreign policy or in more explicit terms, task of making foreign is performed through delicate discourses of national security production of which based on political realigns.

3.5. High Politics: Securing ‘us’ against ‘them’

In the evil system of the realist cosmos imbued with unfettered dangers threatening the very existence of the actors, it is plain why security issues are considered to be ranking high as ‘high politics’. In the sense of being defined “in reaction to threats”, security is defined in “negative terms” as the duty of the state authority to defer threats and preserve the certainty of life.⁸⁵ This negativity and intimacy to the status quo inherent within the wide usage of the concept renders security “essentially empty”.

“For all the verbiage devoted to the concept, it is not a sign of positive political initiative. Coupled to the modern conception of territorially sovereign states, a dominant theme of international political reasoning is the protection of state boundaries from military incursion from another state. The conventional military understanding of security represents security in geopolitical terms as the spatial exclusion of threats

..This metaphysical construction of security as stasis and spatial exclusion fundamentally contradicts the predominant theme of modern society, which is change, interaction and acceleration. This

⁸⁴David Campbell, “Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States”, *Alternatives*, Vol:15 No:3 (1990), p.265.

⁸⁵ Simon Dalby, op. cit. note1, pp.97-8.

understanding of security is inherently politically conservative precisely because *it emphasises permanence, control, and predictability*, and, it should be noted, it can easily invoke the use of violence to maintain the desired stability.⁸⁶ (emphasis added)

However, the factor that would be emphasised here in explicating the resonance of security issues and more specifically their above politics status is its direct relevance to subjectification⁸⁷ or in more explicit terms identity constitution of major political units as potent and legitimate agents of politics. The relation between subjectification (objectification) and security discourse is effaced by the ontologization of the political agents as we have mentioned above. As G. M. Dillon has put it;

“Even for those who question strategic and realist conceptions of security, therefore, *the subject of security remains then an autonomous subject* whether that subject is the domestic community of the realist school of international relations, the nation-state of the strategists, Buzan’s atomistic biological individual, the basis of the reasoning remains the same.....

In sum, from a modernist perspective, discourse about security is premised upon a conception of the subject (individual, group or state) possessing a particular and fixed identity, an authentic reasoning self whose ambitions are realised in time and space according to the instrumental plans, strategies and tactics which constitute its politics.”⁸⁸

However such an ontologized conception of subject must be resented if we want to dwell on often unmentioned dimensions of security policies and discourses. First, security constitutes one of the main pretexts on which claims of legitimacy of the state sovereignty are formulated and hence its claim to a sovereign identity and legitimate agency is buttressed. The foundation of political agency and legitimacy is based on the discourse of danger. The very essence of state sovereignty and conception of state as a subject, in the Hobbesian tradition, is based on a conception of radically endangered self who seeks obsessively self-preservation⁸⁹. This is prevalent and also necessary both on individual and the state level to carve out a secure identity in the face of the alterity of

⁸⁶ Ibid., p.98.

⁸⁷ Dillon, op. cit. note72, p.114.

⁸⁸ G. M. Dillon, “Modernity, Discourse and Deterrence”, *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, Vol:12 No:2 (1989),p. 92..

⁸⁹ Dillon, op. cit. note 72, pp.105-7.

life. For the imminent danger and the belief in the existence of the enemy impose discipline on the human being to socialise and accept the authority of the Leviathan⁹⁰.

Secondly, related to the first one, sovereignty, as the decisionistic power, endows the ruler with the right and conditions him to set the norm and to distinguish the “exception” to overcome insecurity. “[S]tate practices not only claim a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a given territory but also make a more pervasive and insidious claim to monopolise the legitimate definition of danger, and so identity.”⁹¹ This dimension of security procures the appropriate discursive devices to impose discipline on the diversity of the society. In short security is fundamental in fixing the identities of political persona ficta. Practices of differentiation also function as the practices of identity construction and maintenance. Thus, “there could be no discourses of (in)security, however, without them also, and simultaneously being discourses of identity and danger⁹²”.

„[b]ecause “security” is a process of subjectification and not the end of an unproblematic subject. Securing one thing requires its differentiation, classification and definition. It has, in short, to be identified. What distinguishes the political discourses of modernity are their preoccupation with securing the grounds and characteristics of political subjectivity. That is to say, discourses of (in)security have always to be, in the first instance, processes of separating out and characterising that it can knowingly, be secured. And they do this not simply according to what is feared, but rather according, in the first instance to what is different; for in the war against alterity, everything that is different is immanently dangerous and can, therefore, take the form of threatening otherness.”⁹³

In accordance with the spatial conception of state and community that it is presumed to represent, security undertaken by state is also based on a “spatial exclusion”⁹⁴. In other words, in accordance with the concept of state representing a spatially limited resolution to the question of sovereign identity, security is based on a

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 106.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 109.

⁹² Ibid., p. 108.

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 114-5.

⁹⁴ Walker, op. cit. note 18, p.121.

sovereign practice of determining difference as 'other' and controlling the determined difference. And hence constructing 'identity' in relation with the difference and stabilising this 'identity'. This spatialization confers a new significance to geopolitical understandings. Discourse of otherness and geopolitics merge with each other within the discourse of realism.

In the fact that geopolitics gained an increasing visibility in the interpretation of world politics again we see the essential role of the European outward expansion and the emergence of a truly global states system. For geopolitics, denoting "a general concern with the interrelationship of space and power", began to assume significance in the articulation of world politics by the end of the nineteenth century when the European imperial powers had swallowed the uncolonized world with greed and when an enormous world wide change has swept the globe⁹⁵.

Geopolitics mainly concerned with the maintenance of order in the states system and assigns this important task to the great powers. In the play of great power, geography turns into empty space on a chess board that can be conceived and distributed as zones of domination, influence and security belts or bastions against other great powers. All the permanent themes prevailing in geopolitical understanding are underlined by the darkly connotations of realism which emphasizes the inequalities between states and the irrelevance of all normative concerns. Ethical concerns are silenced by a commanding resonance of mechanistic power politics, alliance formation and efforts for domination, penetration etc.. These institutions are seen as the mechanistic devices of the great powers to maintain world order.

⁹⁵ Simon Dalby, op. cit. note 50, p.35.

This conception of security based on spatial exclusion of otherness, in turn, denotes a claim to sovereign right to differentiate foe from friend, enemy from citizen, other from self as we have mentioned above⁹⁶. State as the embodiment of national-social formation assumes this right and the task. The construction of other signifies a power relationship, and power is exercised through differentiation. Drawing on the perennial theme of identity/difference which privileges identity as opposed to the 'other', creates dichotomous scales of hierarchy, identity is tried to be purified by "a spatial and temporal deferment of the Other"⁹⁷.

"The exclusion of the Other and the inclusion, incorporation and administration of the Same is the essential geopolitical moment. The two processes are complementary; the Other is excluded as the reverse side of the process of geopolitics in which territory is divided, contested and ruled. The ideological dimension is clearly present in how this is justified, explained and understood by the populations concerned; "the Other" is seen as different if not an enemy; "We" are "the Same" in that we are all citizens of the same nation, or parts of the Western system."⁹⁸

The 'other' might be located within or outside of the community. Nevertheless, in both cases, the 'other' being within or outside the community, the spatial dimension of the 'other' is underlined. When the 'other' is within the community it is a leakage from outside, society is contaminated by the devil of the 'other' occupying somewhere else. The sense of internal enemies allied to the external ones expand the conception of security "to provide order within ... boundaries" and to use a wider range of means such as "police functions and surveillance, counter "subversion" and counter "terrorism"⁹⁹.

Furthermore, the sanctified concept of integrity of state with its people and territory serves as the main pretext in the disciplining of the society, which putatively is and must be homogeneous, by the help of discursive assets of security. In accord with

⁹⁶ Walker, op. cit. note 18, .119.

⁹⁷ Dalby, op. cit. note 50, p. 18.

⁹⁸ Simon Dalby., "Geopolitical Discourse" The Soviet Union As Other", *Alternatives*, Vol:13 No:4 (1988), p.418.

the monolithic and st le conception of community, it requires silencing, undermining, marginalising and exclusion of differences existent within the society by creating a sense of collective unity and superiority through “aestheticized experiences”¹⁰⁰.

Public sphere, which is the putative realm of “rational and consensus-seeking debates” in Western type democracies, is imbued with a teleological understanding of history through which society realizes its own ideal prototype¹⁰¹. This embeddedness of such an ideal in the form of yearning to reach social cohesion and unity carries with itself the risk of offsetting political debates by the aestheticization of politics that aims to procure citizens with the “pleasurable collective experience of a unified national body”¹⁰². A sophisticated set of signs such as flag or the war hero that can “help counteract the linguistic, cognitive, and institutional differentiation of modern societies”¹⁰³, are invoked in order to create “Oneness and Otherness” ensuing each other. Here, we examine multiple moves as internal and external enemies are indispensable for the sake of imaginary unity¹⁰⁴.

Moreover, security issues, due to the indispensable vitality of the national security and the necessity of promoting national interests, require consensus. Defying consensus that has been buttressed through security discourses carries the risk of being marginalised as traitor or the number one public enemy. From this perspective it is not surprising that during the Gulf War, in the United States, Deconstruction, “a movement in humanities

⁹⁹ Dalby, op. cit note 1, p.98.

¹⁰⁰Jochen Schulte-Sasse and Linda Schulte-Sasse, “War, Otherness, and Illusionary Identifications with the State”, *Cultural Critique*, Vol:19 (Fall, 1991),p.68. Jochen and Linda Schulte-Sasse (1991) gives a vivid example of “aestheticized experiences of collective unity and superiority for the cultural reproduction of U.S. society” through an analysis of the Experiences stimulated by the Gulf war to simulate “a unified body politic”

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*, p.69.

¹⁰² *ibid.*, pp.68-70.

¹⁰³ *ibid.*, p.74.

that investigates the rôle of Otherness in culture and thus may undermine the smooth and unquestioned functioning of cultural reproduction” was declared as number one public enemy by some columnists¹⁰⁵. In addition to this taboo status, security issues with their increasingly technical nature “lead to a fundamental withdrawal from the participation in questions of life and death, a capitulation to expertise and specialists”¹⁰⁶.

Rationalist approaches to security based on well established realist paradigms of international relations, in the final analysis, depoliticize security issues reducing them to an instrumental device and processes of state actor vis-a-vis external world that must be handled by experts. This depoliticization is hypocritical in two ways; first it obscures the essentially political nature of the security issues and secondly, it empowers groups and individuals occupying the power nexus of a society to create political iconography around security issues. The mainly conservative power that it yields devalues any kind of normative assertion that tries to alter the “best of all possible worlds”.

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, p.79.

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*, p.81.

¹⁰⁶R. B. J. Walker, “Culture, Discourse, Insecurity”, *Alternatives*, Vol:11 No:4 (1986), p.491.

CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION

In this thesis our concern was mainly (meta)theoretical. Our inquiry of the critical turn was restricted to postmodernism and through occasional references to Critical Theory. Because of these limitations, a long series of relevant and salient debates related to historical structuralism, neo-Marxism, feminism, ecological movements and others have been neglected. Secondly, the literature through which this study was proceeded was not a coherent body in which congruent debates are advancing but a bundle of different and loosely knitted arguments advanced by different concerns. So our review is far from being comprehensive for various reasons. Still, taking into consideration the modesty of our aim, we think and hope that these omissions and self-imposed limitations do not culminate in a considerable subversion in our conclusions that can be detrimental with respect to our aim.

The cardinal aim of this study is not to procure a full agenda for post-Cold War international relations studies, but to demonstrate the fertility of the recent metatheoretical ferment in the field that has been exacerbated by the critical turn. This fertility is evident in its ability to procure new and promiscuous conceptualizations, theoretical approaches, fresh questions within many subfields, in addition to meditate on brand new areas. By its main tenets this study posits ideas which counterpose that the metatheoretical inquiries are superfluous to the study of international relations. Its

celebratory mode refers largely to this conviction in favor of the merits of the recent metatheoretical reverberation.

However, this celebratory mode is also intimately pertinent to the urge for theory construction. Thus, we try to exhibit a more ample example of how the metatheoretical arguments can culminate in different theoretical orientations toward the most immediate concerns of international relations scholarship, even in the most incarcerated areas such as security studies. The critical turn and the metatheoretical ferment that it instigated make their first category of contributions via interrogating and often rejecting what is conventionally held to be primary or substantive study issues vis-a-vis superfluous issues according to the holy bible of the discipline. Epistemological, ontological and normative questioning fling open the doors of the field to the previously undermined or neglected issues, like gender, ecology, or more broadly to culture. In our case of security studies the critical turn paved the way to the introduction of new and broader conceptions of security. Secondly, the subfield of security studies has been enriched by the adoption of the new approaches that handle the field of security studies as a bundle of discourses embedded into the discourses of international relations. This second move helps to deepen the area by trying to answer how conventional conceptions of security come to be dominant.

Within this study we mainly focus on the theoretical issues and their intricate relationship to politics. To remind a few, we have dwelt on politics of representation, the knowledge-power imbroglio, normative implications of a denial of the normative concerns, identity/difference etc. Underlined in this study are the themes mainly related to the postmodern interrogation of the sovereign practices of modernity that leads to “the

closed nature of world political imagination”¹. As we will mention again in the following section, the celebratory mode of this thesis has highlighted the resistance to closure that has an indispensable role in opening an ethical space for the other or the marginalised to speak on behalf of itself. However, our concern was limited to the resistance to closure mainly pertinent to the theoretical imagination. We neglect the questions related to the formulation of an agenda of postmodern politics. Although this is not a question that can be dwelled on within a few pages, we have to remind that the warnings of postcolonialism about the universalizing tendencies of postmodernism must be taken into view when considering an agenda of postmodern politics.

4.1. Celebrating Confusion

4.1.1. Quest for Consensus vs Indulgence Toward Intellectual Plurality

The contribution of the critical turn with respect to intellectual plurality is a controversial one. As we have mentioned before it was criticized as a plurality directed to an unremarkable aim, a plurality for its own sake. The counter argument of this thesis is that the critical turn both widens and deepens the field of international relations. One ample achievement of the critical turn with respect to widening the field is to open the gates for new research questions about ideologies, values, discourses, etc. which has been previously been left to the radical or marginalised intellectuals who are hardly venerated among university circles. This achievement is paradoxically related to the reconceptualization of a celebrated concept of realist analysis, namely power. Instead of a

¹Molly Cochran, “Postmodernism, Ethics and International Political Theory”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol:21 No:3 (July 1995), p.238. In addition to this theme, Cochran enumerates two more themes as “the closed nature of world political imagination” and “a politics of resistance”.

primitive notion of power, a more elaborate one, more suitable for the exercise of power in modern times is put on the spots. This is crudely the power on minds, more pervasive and incisive than the physcalistic notion of realist power.

These new areas can be summed up under the rubric of 'culture'. Culture here does not denote another additional, secondary factor to be patched into the previously ideated models of the world 'out there'. It is not epiphenomenal but causal and pervasive. However, still we can not add the revival of cultural issues in the analysis of international politics as a site of complete success. Culture² is still a term, even the meaning of which is difficult to sketch out. Consequently increasing concern with cultural phenomena poses new problems for the analysis of the social reality. The concept of culture and its relation to other social factors also remain to be worked thoroughly³.

New mode of analyses have been achieved, like deconstruction and genealogy. New research methods like literary criticism have emerged. These have enriched the intellectual assets of the field inevitably extending the field of international relations studies to previously alien terrains. Here the question is whether the positivist/empiricist methods are or can be declared void and null in the face of new methods or their inadequacies with respect to the analysis of the social phenomena. The answer to this question is hardly affirmative. It might be argued that our studies must not be method driven. But what are the implications of the question driven study? Does it mean that we could use different methodologies for different problem areas reducing them to neutral

²See R. B. J. Walker, "World Politics and Western Reason: Universalism, Pluralism and Hegemony", World Order Models Project, Working PaperNo:19, 1982, especially pp.15-17, for a brief review of different conception culture and its relevance to other social factors and Robert J. C. Young, "Colonial Desire- Hybridity in theory, culture and Race" (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 30-31 for a historical review of the evolution of meaning and connotations of the word 'culture'.

tools or ignoring the intricate relationship between the theory and knowledge underlining intellectual enterprise and the concerned methodology? Hence the proper relationship between these different methodologies and research questions would be debated further.

The celebratory and optimistic mood as to the state of the discipline is carried by the significant differences between ‘yesterday’s crisis’ which we have defined as the perpetual defrustration of the yearnings to become a rigorous science fashioned in the model of positivist natural sciences and the present crisis. The present crisis served to deepen the intellectual enterprise within the field. At first hand, probably one of the most salient consequences of the critical turn is that it managed to alter the foci of the disciplinary debates by questioning the ideal of becoming a ‘science’ fashioned in the model of the natural sciences and its expression in the positivist bias. It largely managed to outdate the quest for a foundational consensus about the subject mater, analytical tools, methodologies within the field as a prerequisite of a truly scientific discipline.

Still, if the greatness of the issues and the salience of their implications for the study of international relations is taken into consideration, these debates are unlikely to be resolved in the immediate future. Furthermore the desirability of such a resolution is marred by incredulity. For example what is at stake in the epistemological debates is not only the appropriate method for the study of world politics or a contest between empirical and interpretative methodologies. It is a debate far transcending the issues of methodology. In other words this debate is not confined to the concerns of international scholarship. Naturalism, which Hollis has defined as the belief that “human beings and societies belong to a single natural order, which yields its secrets to a single scientific

³ See R. B. J. Walker, “World Politics and Western Reason: Universalism, Pluralism and Hegemony”, pp. 16-7 for different conceptions of the relationship between culture and other aspects of

method”, is the indispensable underpinning for the claim of the social sciences to be scientific⁴. When this belief is abrogated where could we drop the anchor of the claims of objective, scientific knowledge? Or must we ideate a different understanding of the social sciences as a whole, a new route for their studies other than the one aiming to reach the Eden of the truth? Questions outflank into the limitless horizons of the philosophy of the social sciences⁵, unlikely to be resolved once and for all.

More specifically, what the critical approaches have managed is to rattle the throne of the rationalist approaches to international relations and more profoundly the realist paradigm, the long enduring hegemon of the field roaming around the every corner of the field with great self-confidence. Nevertheless this success is not commensurate to a relinquishment on the part of the dominant paradigms of the field. Still the impact of the critical approaches is hardy enough to create a “sense of humility and puzzlement” that forces us to “remain in awe of the complexities and changes at work in the world, ever ready to concede confusion and reminding ourselves that our conclusions must perforce be tentative”⁶. Rosenau claims that to generate such a sense of awe, we must deal with observable and substantive issues of the world affairs and their mysteries instead of superfluous issues of understanding, meaning methodology or others related to the “activities of the theorists”⁷. Our contention is that contrary to Rosenau’s statement such a bewilderment and curiosity was instigated by the strong assertions of the issues related

human life in different schools of thought.

⁴ Martin Hollis, “The Last Post”, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), “International Theory: Positivism and Beyond”, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996), p.304

⁵ Ken Booth, “Dare not to Know: International Relations Theory versus the Future”, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, “International Relations Theory Today” (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 330.

⁶ James Rosenau, “Probing puzzles persistently: a desirable but imporabable future for IR theory” in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), “International Theory: Positivism and Beyond”, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996)p.p. 309-11

⁷ *ibid.*, pp.310-13.

to theory that have been labelled by Rosenau as a hindrance to remain in awe as well as the abrupt changes experienced in world politics. Because “..thinking about thinking always threatens to undermine any confidence we may have in what we know and how we act.”⁸

In short, the present crisis seems to attain the legitimacy of intellectual plurality. Increasing indulgence toward intellectual dissonance is the harbinger of the new era in the field. As K.J. Holsti succumbly epitomized;

“Given the divisions that characterize international theory today, it is unlikely that we will ever have a single ‘grand theory’ of political and economic life at the international or global level. Gone are the days when, as Quincy Wright and others hoped, we could develop a sophisticate ‘science’ of international relations, much less a standard repertoire of critical questions to be explored. Fragmentation and pluralism are the essential characteristics of the theoretical enterprise today.”⁹

4.1.2. Widening the Realm of the Normative

This plurality is not commensurate to an interparadigm debate. Issues at stake in the ‘present crisis’ do not revolve around debates concerning levels of analysis or different actors to be taken as the main unit of analysis or factors that must be added to the models. Here, the concepts of knowledge, reason, power and too many related phenomena, such as representation, subjectification or objectification are at issue. In many of these debates, although it is possible to outline what these critical writers are challenging, recapitulating their conclusions or their own alternatives is a relentless task. This is partially due to the postmodern affinity for ambiguity and partially to their resistance to closure. Critical approaches and postmodernism in particular are criticized as they do not produce a research agenda and do not proceed into everyday events from metatheoretical inquiry and perpetual criticism. However, the ‘positive value’ of the critical stances in the face of

⁸ Ken Booth, “Dare not to Know: International Relations Theory versus the Future”, p.330.

⁹K. J. Holsti, “International relations at the end of the millennium”, *Review of International Relations Studies*, Vol:19 No:4 (October 1993), p/401.

the modern discourses' ability "to close down the discussion"¹⁰ and hence "limit the play of political practice"¹¹ is praiseworthy.

Resistance to closure has significant normative connotations. First it enforces the mainstream positivist scholars to reconceptualize and reassert their stances by taking into account the marginalized voices. Secondly, it is commensurate to resisting the exclusionary or domination mechanisms. These normative underpinnings of the postmodern approaches are one of the traits that differentiate the present crisis from the previous one. To refer again to Holsti;

"The serious challenges today come not from those who want to add or subtract types of "essential" actors, or those who argue that not all of international politics can be characterized as a "struggle for power". The most serious onslaught against the classical tradition comes from those who would change the core subjects of the field. This is essentially a normative rather than scientific question."¹²

Here we have to make a reservation to Holsti's statement. This is a question that involves implications about the normative basis of science, more specifically the normativity of International Relations. The term 'normative' entails further explication because it is used in a different, or more appropriately, in a broader meaning than its conventional meanings. As the counterpart of the empirical or factual, 'normative', in its common sense, denotes prescriptive¹³. By this dichotomization, what is descriptive or explanatory becomes empirical or factual. Through their assaults on positivist/empiricist bias critical writers problematize this dichotomy and eschewal from so-called normative questions. Normative international relations theory gained an increasing visibility with the critical turn.

¹⁰Chris Brown, "International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches", p.226.

¹¹ Molly Cochran, "Postmodernism, Ethics and International Political Theory", p.237.

¹²K. J. Holsti, "The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory", (Boston-London- Sydney: Allen& Unwin,1985), p.2

The first thing they achieved was to reveal that what is thought to be empirical is intermingled with putatively universal norms, standards and values. What is held to be objective is intersubjective. All these intersubjective values are socially constructed and mediated within an economy of intersubjective meanings. They are not implanted within a foundation or an essence, but all artifacts of the 'life world'. This stance promotes democratic plurality both in practice and theory.

4.1.3. Theory as Practice

Through the transposition of the different understandings of knowledge, meaning and in general theory, critical approaches that came to be known as post-positivist, enforce the international relations scholars to think out what they are doing. "Theory as everyday practice" that has been propagated particularly by postmodernists, is a real shock for the ones that hold the conventional conception of "theory as a tool"¹⁴. This signifies the inception of a long debate that has reached the watershed of an intellectual impasse.

"Academic conferences, and the resulting volumes, are often the places where insults get hurled both by those who consider themselves, or are considered, to be primarily concerned with theory (we can call these the 'theorists') and those who regard theory as something of a dubious, even self-indulgent, pursuit (we might refer to these as the 'real worlders'). The 'theorists' regularly claim that the 'real worlders' don't understand what theory is or how important it is. The 'real worlders' claim that 'the theorists' are stuck in their ivory towers and have little to say that can help us understand or do something about events such as the Holocaust, the Second World War or the contemporary war in the former Yugoslavia."¹⁵

Within the framework of this debate critical writers, particularly postmodernists are incriminated by their neglect of the 'substantive events of the world affairs'. And incriminations culminated in the same rhetorical move. 'Let's leave aside these trivial issues of theory. Show me your research agenda!' The idea behind these arguments is

¹³ See Chris Brown, "International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches", pp.1-4, for a brief account of the empirical normative theory dichotomy.

¹⁴ See Marysia Zalewski, " 'All These Theories Yet the Bodies Keep Piling up': Theories, Theorists, Theorising" in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), "International Theory: Positivism and Beyond", (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996)

ample; metatheoretical issues are superfluous and at best epiphenomenal. But no argument is forwarded as to why they are so, except the assumption of theory as a neutral tool in the hands of the theorists. What is advocated all through this thesis is a contrasting conception of “theory as everyday practice”¹⁶.

This conception of theory, as Marysia Zalewski has epitomised, has significant implications for the study of international relations. First it signifies that “the theorising that counts or that matters, in terms of affecting and/or creating international political events, is not confined either to policy makers or to academics”¹⁷. Secondly, the distinction between theorists as mere observers and global actors as the real initiators of the world affairs became more and more problematic as “theorists are global actors and global actors are theorists”. Theorists who assume the distinguished tasks of teaching in the universities and speaking the truth to and/or guiding power find themselves reflected upon as exercising power. Questions posited by ‘theory as everyday practice’ or more precisely by the new focus on the power/knowledge nexus is rather different from the ongoing debates on the enigmatic relationship “between the two worlds of policy and academe”¹⁸. For the current debate does not presume two separate and interrelated worlds. The third implication of theory as practice unfolds into the unsettled terrain of ontology. Theorising as an act that is not limited to the sophisticated intellectual minds

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p.340.

¹⁶ *ibid.*,346-51

¹⁷ *ibid.*,346.

¹⁸ Christopher Hill, “Academic International Relations: The siren song of Policy Relevance” in Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff, “Two Worlds of International Relations: academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas”, (London-New York: Routledge,1994)p.20. Hill urges for the need to attain ones “academic comparative advantage and hence to distance oneself from the contemporary political issues to a level. See William Wallace, “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol:22 No:3 (July 1996), 301-21 for an opposite line of argument which was based on the same assumption or the separateness of the world of academe and policy but advocates a different relationship between the two worlds.

functions as a practice that attributes necessary salience to the issues that are theorised about. In other words what becomes important enough to be theorised about, is also determined through a complex process of theorising as a practice of power.

This line of argument has implications for various levels of theorizing and practice. Theory as practice constitutes one of the facets of the normative debates within the critical turn. It leads to a long series of perplexing questions about the role and responsibility of academicians, the right way to engage in politics etc. If every statement is based on a theory and every theory is molded by values, in short, if the claim to objectivity and the aim of reaching the 'true' knowledge is undermined and the political nature of the academic studies is acknowledged, on what grounds could the academic studies be justified as necessary and more importantly as useful? Even if we accept theory as practice, what would be the nature and direction of this practice? Should critical writers position themselves against the state in the name of leaving no space for power to hide and align themselves with marginal groups? What would be the impact of such an orientation in the context of developing non-Western countries where such marginal groups are far weaker and a different network of relations are at process? These questions are only exemplary of the wide range of problem areas that critical debates proceeded into or would be likely to proceed.

4.2. Widening and Deepening the Debate: A Different Responsibility to

Educate

However, there is a limit to the celebratory mood. Although it would be unjust to claim that critical writers regress to a position of perpetual criticism, it is a fact that

metatheoretical debates consume too much time before proceeding into the ones directly related to the every day life, affecting the lives of millions, and more visible and easy to comprehend than the theoretical issues. Another issue related to the first, is that the studies of critical writers, which are hardly easy to understand, can reach a narrow circle of audiences. Debates within the recent critical literature might seem as secret exchanges between professors written in a sacred language to most of the undergraduate students. When the alienness of the areas that they are adventuring on is taken into consideration, it becomes apparent why the too sophisticated and complex style of critical writers would easily intimidate a large number of students in the field and limit the extent of the audiences and the probable participants.

However, this is not totally due to the sophisticated and impenetrable jargon of the critical and especially that of the postmodernist writers. First of all, most students might be graduated from an undergraduate program in international relations without having any familiarity with the critical approaches. Although they gain increasing salience through the second half of the 1980s to this date, there might be a considerable resistance against the incorporation these approaches into the curricula. Professor Roy E. Jones provides us with an example of the typical response, laced with an extraordinary austerity. Jones in his review article "The Responsibility to Educate"¹⁹, beside criticizing R. B. J. Walker's arguments in "Inside/ousted: International relations as Political Theory", tries to answer questions such as "What is a discipline?", "What does a discipline assume to do?", and "Why must R. B. J. Walker and his companions not be taken seriously?". The first pillar of his arguments is the idea of a discipline.

¹⁹ JONES, Roy E., "The Responsibility to Educate", *Review of International Studies*, Vol:20 (1994), pp.299-311.

“A discipline is not a subject. A discipline trains its pupils or apprentices to acquire skills applicable to recognized practical enterprises. They learn to do something so that they may go on doing it with greater expertise. ... What can not be at issue is that it is a subject. And what it offers undergraduates is not a training but the beginning of an education.”²⁰

In Jones’ arguments it is not clear what he meant by training and education and what is the supposed difference between the two. Further it is also not clear what should be the aim of the international relations departments. Is it to educate qualified bureaucrats or experts for ministries of foreign affairs or is it to raise academicians or both? But what is clear from Roy Jones’ arguments is that he is an ardent advocate of an education that prepares students for the ‘real life’ and he contends that this is not possible through repetitive interpretation and reinterpretation of Machiavelli as Walker did. Thus Walker is incriminated as eschewing the responsibility to educate.

“What of Professor Walker, the smug accuser? He is contemptuous of the institutions within which, somehow, the will to learn and to educate is strenuously kept alive. For him, the learning is dogma and the education is indoctrination and his is the endless duty to denounce both. He is the new man, the empty intellectual, the critical mind, the self-dramatizing hero of the margins, where education is devoid of responsibility and learning is playing with other people’s footnotes.”²¹

Jones’ arguments in favor of an education preparing students to the ‘real life’ might seem uncontestable. However, the question that is highlighted by Walker and his companions is mainly about the ‘real life’ that Jones dedicated himself to teach about. Real life is not the reality ‘out there’ any more that we can lecture about. It is a social reality that is socially constructed, mediated through intersubjective meanings and can be changed, that is filtered through our interpretation and can be re-interpreted. What Jones is missing is that his interpretation is only one of the interpretations among many probable alternatives. Offering his alternative as the only one, at least the only plausible item, Jones defies the idea of liberal education. Claiming to teach about ‘what is’, he totally ignores the intricate relationship between our ideas about ‘what is’ and ‘what

²⁰ Ibid., p.300.

should be' or 'what might be'. In other words, his revelation about the mysteries of the 'real life' might turn out to be self-fulfilling prophecies.

"Real, critical self-reflection and post-positivist critiques will not take root until they are taught as part of the methodological sequence we require of all our graduate students and until they are reflected in the hiring practices of major research departments. It is not just in the writing and reading of international relations but in the teaching of international relations that these tendencies toward openness, tolerance, and post-positivist reflection must ultimately be manifested."²²

To epitomize, critical approaches must be incorporated into the international relations curricula for two reasons. First it is required by the ideal of liberal education. Second, to deepen the intimacy of the field to the wider debates within the social sciences. Nevertheless change in the curriculum would not suffice if it would be limited to a few additional elective courses about new approaches. Even if the critical approaches have been incorporated into the international relations curricula, it is unlikely that international relations undergraduate or probably even graduate students who know little or nothing about the political and social theory could understand these new approaches with easy. At this point Fred Halliday's views are appreciated although his conclusions are and must be counterposed.

"Issues of methodology and philosophy of social science are central to the study of international relations; they need to be handled on the basis of an adequate grounding in the general literature on the subject. This should be a compulsory subject for all students of the international: this would provide IR students with abroad social science culture but also diminish the danger of IR specialists wasting their time, and that of others, with mediocre reflections on methodology."²³

We acknowledged the need for a deep change in the international relations curricula to open the gates of the discipline to critical approaches by procuring students with the essential and necessary background. Here Halliday's proposal seems plausible as

²¹ *ibid.*, p.311.

²² Thomas J. Biersteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:33 No:3 (1989), p.265.

²³ Fred Halliday, "The Future of International Relations: Fears and Hopes", in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), "International Theory: Positivism and Beyond", (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996)

it acquiesced the need for deeper involvement in political and social theory. However, it is difficult to testify Halliday's assertion that this is necessary for the purposes of preventing the waste of time "with mediocre reflections on methodology". Because reflecting on methodology is not the first and foremost aim of the critical turn. There is more to these debates. As we have mentioned in the first chapter, critical approaches proceeded in multiple directions and at three different levels. All these have something to say about the theory and practice of the international relations. More significantly metatheoretical issues can not be resolved once and for all and in a way the results of which can be transferred to students through years once such a resolution is reached. In contrast to Halliday's view these issues are not controversial only among international relations scholars because of their ignorance of the developments in the social philosophy. Instead, metatheoretical debates within the field as we have mentioned before is an integral part of the wider debates within the social sciences and critical turn in international relations is the harbinger of a rapprochement between the field and the other social sciences. Thus, incorporation of social and political theory into the international relations curricula would lead to a greater rapprochement between the field and the political and social theory and the recent debates within social philosophy that has fueled the critical turn. Surely the field has a lot to gain from deepening this nascent intimacy.

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