SITUATING THE QUESTION NATIONAL IDENTITY;
THE TURKISH CASE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

by

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POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

BILKENT UNIVERSITY

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The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
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by

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BILKENT UNIVERSITY
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I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

Assistant Professor Fuat Keyman
Supervisor

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
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ABSTRACT

SITUATING THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY:

THE TURKISH CASE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

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September 1998

This thesis adresses the question of national identity
in contemporary Turkey, with reference to the impact of
globalization on national identity in general. It is
suggested that globalization has a fragmenting effect
on national identities and Turkey is also effected from
this process. As a result of both the challenge of
globalization and internal dynamics, Kemalism as the
dominant code of definition of national identity in
Turkey, faces a crisis. The thesis also adresses some
recent developments in Turkey such as the strengthening
of political Islam, the Kurdish movement, and the rise
of Turkish nationalism within the framework of the
above argument.

Keywords: National identity, globalization, Kemalism

ÖZET

ULUSAL KİMLİK SORUNU:

KÜRESEL BAĞLAMDA TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ

Aslı Özgür PEKER

Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Fuat Keyman

Eylül 1998

Bu çalışma, küreselleşme sürecinin genel olarak ulusal kimlik üzerindeki etkileri çerçevesinde, günümüz Türkiye'sinde ulusal kimlik sorununu ele almaktadır. Çalışmada, küreselleşmenin ulusal kimlikler üzerinde parçalayıcı bir etkisi olduğu ve Türkiye'nin de bu süreçten benzer şekilde etkilendiği önerilmektedir. Küreselleşmenin ve çeşitli iç dinamiklerin ortak bir sonucu olarak Türkiye'de baskın ulusal kimlik tanımlamasının çerçevesini oluşturan Kemalizm bir krizle karşı karşıyadır. Bu arguman çerçevesinde çalışma, ayrıca, siyasi İslam'ın güçlenmesi, Kürt hareketi ve Türk milliyetçiliğinin yükselmesi gibi kimi güncel olguları da konu edinmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Ulusal kimlik, küreselleşme, Kemalizm

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my father…

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INTRODUCTION

>	*Nowadays, everybody wants to talk about
>	identity. Being a key word of contemporary
>	politics, identity is associated with so many
>	different connotations that it sometimes comes out
>	that people are not even talking about the same
>	thing. At least one thing is clear -identity, only
>	when it is in crisis, when a process of doubt and
>	ambiguity takes the place of something that is
>	assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable, becomes
>	a question. From that point of view, the
>	enthusiasm to talk about identity is the symptom
>	of the postmodern impasse of contemporary
>	politics.*[1]

Beginning with 1980s, Turkey has experienced a

period of important transformations. The decade started

with the 1980 military coup, and under the conditions

of military rule (and later, under the government of

Motherland Party) serious economic and social measures

were taken. The traditional economic model of import-

substitution was replaced with the export oriented one,

urban population has increased, communication networks

developed. On the other hand, Islam was articulated to

the official ideology in order to function as cement to

assure and strengthen national unity. Towards the

middle of the decade, many economic and social

indicators were pointing to an improvement.

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[1] Kobena Mercer, "Cangıla Hoşgeldiniz: Postmodern Politikada
Kimlik ve Çeşitlilik," in *Kimlik: Topluluk, Kültür, Farklılık*, ed.
Jonathan Rutherford (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1998), 49

As a result, as Tanıl Bora claims, Turkey has entered 1990s with a strong self-confidence.[2] The capital accumulation caused by New Right policies of the 1980s, the distance taken in the path of articulation with global capital, the improvements in some sectors of economy, the modernisation and expansion of consumption created an optimistic atmosphere. The application to European Union for full membership was made in such an atmosphere. Turkey was at last entering the "first league" of nations. The situation in USSR and emerging Turkic states further accelerated the optimism. There was a growing belief that "the 21st Century would be the century of the Turks".

However, the optimism and self-confidence of 1980s soon turned into frustration. Turkey's membership to EU was not accepted and the relations with Turkic Republics failed to fulfil the expectations. Similarly, the outcomes of the Gulf War were a frustration for Turkey. Neither in the economic sphere did the positive atmosphere long live. As a result, the early optimism and confidence of 1980s were soon replaced by ambiguity and frustration and the term "crisis", together with

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[2] Tanıl Bora, "Melez Bir Dilin Kalın ve Düzensiz Lügatı." *Birikim.* 67(November 1994), 10

various adjectives, has become frequently employed in order to explain the current situation in the country.

The notion of "identity crisis" has been one of the approaches in explaining the social unrest. What brought the concept of identity under question were the challenges to the national identity as it was formulated by Kemalism as a result of both inner dynamics and global ones. In the last two decades, Turkey experienced a realisation of the fact that the society was not as homogeneous as it was suggested by the official discourse.[3] Two critical dynamics behind this realisation have been the rise of political Islam and the Kurdish movement. Both developments have raised questions about Turkish national identity. The rise of alternative identities and their increasing efforts to be represented in the public sphere has challenged the homogeneous definition of Turkish nation. Further more, such a questioning had an important implication on state legitimacy as the latter was based on the principle of national unity. Therefore, as Levent Köker claims, the ability of the state, defined as the organised political-institutional form of the nation as

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[3] Levent Köker, "Kimlik Krizinden Meşruluk Krizine: Kemalizm ve Sonrası." *Toplum ve Bilim*. 71(1996), 150

a homogeneous unity and also the guarantor of that unity, to reproduce its legitimacy diminished while the significance of social-cultural differences accelerated.[4]

Together with the frustrations that emerged in the process of articulation with the global capitalism, the crisis even grew deeper. As Sevda Alankuş Kural claims, Turkey, unable to locate itself into the global, was now also unable to show a place to the emerging localities within its territory.[5] Those dislocated with the process of globalization, with their reactionarily redefined identities, on the one hand, were spreading their forms of solidarity in the civil society and on the other hand, struggling with their coomunication organs, political parties, associations and representatives in order to be included public sphere.[6]

Within such a picture of the last two decades, what this thesis aims to do is to understand the above summarised developments of the post 1980 period in Turkey and to locate them into the process of Turkey's

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[4] ibid., 150-151

[5] Sevda Alankuş Kural, "Yeni Hayali Kimlikler ve Yurttaşlar Demokrasisi." *Birikim.* 71-72(March-April 1995), 90

[6] ibid., 90

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articulation with global capitalism. To offer a deep
analytical account of the socio-economic dynamics
giving rise to those developments goes well beyond the
scope of this study. What is tried to do instead is to
address the question of national identity within the
broader framework of globalization.

With such a goal in hand, the thesis is based upon
an extensive reading and interpretation of the
available literature on the question of national
identity. Through the critical and extensive readings,
my focus will be on what was said in the available
literature with a special reference to globalization.
In doing so, I would like to emphasise the connection
between globalization and the emergence of an 'identity
crisis' in Turkey. In the literature that I rely upon,
it is usually the historical dynamics that are
emphasised as the reason behind the identity crisis.
Hence, I believe that my thesis will contribute to the
literature by establishing the link between the
globalization process and the challenges to national
identity.

I will substantiate my argument first by
developing a general understanding of the tension
between globalization and national identity. Hence, I
will begin with the general question of national

identity within the modern framework. The constitution of national identity on the general framework of Western Enlightenment and its adaptation by non-Western countries is discussed in the first chapter. What follows is an evaluation of the cultural impacts of the process of globalization leaving the economical and political dynamics aside. This is not to overlook the "questions of power and questions of appropriation which …are lodged at the very centre of any notion of a shift between the dispositions of the local and the global in the emergence of a cultural politics on a world scale"[7], but rather, it is a conscious limitation to keep in line with the scope and purpose of the study. Within such a framework, the understanding of globalization as a twofold, or rather, contradictory process, including both universalistic and particularistic dynamics, is adopted. Next, the impact of globalization on national identity and the challenges it poses on national unity are questioned.

Having examined the tension between globalization and national identity, the second chapter addresses the question of national identity in Turkey, namely how it

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[7] Stuart Hall, "Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities," in *Culture, Globalization and the World System*, ed. A. D. King USA: MacMillan Education Ltd, 1991), 41

was formulated by Kemalism with reference to the constitution period of the Republic. Although it is not assumed that Kemalism and its definition of national identity remained unchanged until today, the main reference is to the early years of the Republic because the basic premises of national identity are more or less the same and are adopted by many of the Kemalist intellectuals in the recent debates about national identity. In line with such an understanding, first, the general framework on which Kemalism rests is evaluated. This is done with reference to Western positivism and modernisation theory. Next, Kemalist definition of national identity is taken into consideration, with its emphasis on homogeneity and unity. Accepting that identities are defined and redefined against the 'other', the question of the 'other' for Kemalist national identity is addressed lastly.

The third chapter begins with a brief historical review of Turkey until 1980s. What is attempted is to offer an introductory summary of the period rather than a deep analytical account of the economical, political and social developments and the stress is more on the post-1980 period. The reason behind this is that, although the period between 1930s and 1980 was marked

with crucial transformations for Turkey, when the question of national identity is considered, 1980 appears to be the turning point. Until 1980s, although some developments occurred with implications on the definition national identity, there has not been a serious challenge to the Kemalist understanding.[8] Besides, the notion of identity crisis has not been one of the main topics in the political agenda of the related period. Only with the developments after 1980, the very grounds that the Kemalist national identity rests on have begun to shake and its ability to reproduce its legitimacy has diminished. By 1990s, the notion of identity crisis became widely pronounced as a tool to understand the current situation in Turkey. Therefore, it is the post-1980 period that is evaluated in more detail. Putting the emphasis on that period, first, the social, economic and cultural transformations that Turkey has experienced will be evaluated. Then, the impacts of these transformations on national identity are to be considered. In line with this goal, the debates on Second Republic, the rise of

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[8] Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism: The Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) Identity in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey.* 13(Fall 1995)

Islam and Kurdish question will each be discussed separately.

The fourth chapter will cover the same period of time, but this time with a different question in hand. Seemingly but not really paradoxically, the decade marked with the challenges to national identity and erosion of its legitimacy, is also a decade of the rise of nationalism. The reaction to the rise of alternative conceptualisations of collective identity, together with other dynamics, results in a restrengthening of nationalism. However, nationalism is not a united block. Rather, what is at stake is a struggle among different nationalisms to become hegemonic. I will evaluate these different versions of nationalism with their strengths and weaknesses in the struggle for hegemony.

Following out the steps outlined above, what is attempted to do in this study is to understand the current situation in Turkey, labelled as an "identity crisis", and to locate it into the process of Turkey's articulation with global dynamics in the post-1980 period. It is suggested that the simultaneous development of the two processes, that is to say, the increasingly felt effects of globalization and problematisation of the notion of national identity is

not merely a coincidence but rather, the former has been influential in the emergence of the latter. Similarly, the current questions in Turkey such as the strengthening of Islamic identity, the Kurdish movement and the rise of Turkish nationalism are evaluated within this broader framework, as the outcomes of the same process.

CHAPTER I

THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON

NATIONAL IDENTITY

Globalization has been employed by many scholars as a key word in understanding the social, economical and political developments in the contemporary world. On the one hand, it is argued that as a result of the process of globalization, the era of the nation-state is over, and we are entering a new world of economic giants and superpowers, of multinationals and military blocks, of vast communications networks and international division of labor. In such a world there is no room for medium or small scale state let alone submerged ethnic communities and their competing and divisive nationalisms.[9] On the other hand an alternative perspective claims that globalization involves an opposite dynamic which results in a re-

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[9] A. D. Smith, "Towards a Global Culture?" in *Global Culture*, ed. M. Featherstone, (London, Sage Publications,1990),175

emergence of nationalism, ethnic and religious identities.

What we actually witness in the recent years is, on the one hand, a rise of ethnic and religious nationalisms and their struggles to built nation-states on these basis. On the other hand, the already existing nation-states experience an identity crisis. They face the problem of recognizing cultural differences in the public sphere which conflicts with the principle of national unity on which most of those nation-states were built upon.

Hence the interaction between globalization and national identity is quite problematic, shaped by tensions and contradictions. Assuming that the recent challenges to national identity in Turkey is closely related to its experience with globalization, it becomes crucial to have a closer examination of this problematic relation between national identity and globalization.

1.1 National Identity within the Modern Framework

The age of modernity has been the age of nations. The nations, nation-states, and national identities have constituted an important part of our understanding

of the modern world. Contrary to the impression it leaves, these are quite new phenomena, with only a short history. As Wallerstein claims, "a world consisting of these nation-states came into existence even partially only in the sixteenth century. Such a world was theorised and became a matter of widespread consciousness even later, only in the nineteenth century. It became an inescapably universal phenomenon later still, in fact only after 1945."[10]

In spite of its relatively short history, nationalism succeeded in becoming the norm throughout the world. What is more striking is that we came to conceive nationalism and national identities as ahistorical, natural phenomena which have existed all through the time. As Ernest Gellner claims:

> The idea of man without a nation seems to impose a (great) strain on the modern imagination. A man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears. All this seems obvious, though, alas, it is not true. But that it should have come to seem so very obviously true is indeed an aspect, perhaps the very core, of the problem of nationalism. Having a nation is not an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to appear as such.[11]

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[10] Immanuel Wallerstein, "The National and the Universal: Can There Be Such a Thing As World Culture?," in *Culture, Globalization and the World System*, ed. A. D. King (USA: MacMillan Education Ltd, 1991), 92

[11] Stuart Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity," in *Modernity and Its Futures*, eds. Stuart Hall, David Held and T. McGrew (Cambridge, Polity, 1992), 291, 292

If one feature of national identity is its existence as an ahistorical, natural entity, one other is its claim to homogeneity. It defines the nation as an integrated whole, with a fixed and stable unity. Another element of national identity is the idea of progress. A belief in continuous progress is internal to the definition of national identity. These features, when taken together, remind us the basic premises of Western modernity as it was built on the basis of the Enlightenment. Therefore, it would be helpful to begin with the development of the individual subject within modernity before looking in detail to these basic features of national identity.

Using Stuart Hall's argument, the unified form and rational identity of the human subject was presupposed by and essential to both the discourses of modern thought and to the process which shaped modernity. The subject has shifted three strategic points during modernity. The modern age gave rise to a new and decisive form of individualism, at the centre of which stood a new conception of the individual subject and its identity. The development of modernity freed the individual from pre-modern traditions and structures. The birth of the sovereign individual between the Renaissance humanism of the 16th century and the

Enlightenment of the 18th century represented a significant break with the past. Some argue that it was the engine, which set the whole social system of modernity in motion.

This new formulation of the subject had two distinct meanings:

1) the subject as an indivisible and unified whole

2) the subject as a singular, unique, distinctive entity

Different developments contributed to this new formulation: the Reformation and Protestantism freed the subject from religion. Renaissance humanism put "Man" at the centre of the universe. Scientific revolutions gave the capacity to inquire into mysteries of nature. And the Enlightenment emphasized the image of rational, scientific Man, freed from dogma and intolerance, before whom human history was laid out for understanding and mastery.

So was the Cartesian subject formulated by Descartes, as a rational, cognitive and conscious subject at the centre of knowledge: "I think, therefore I am".

As modern societies grew more complex, the definition of the individual subject acquired a more collective and social form to adjust to the structures

of the nation-state. With this adjustment, the individual was now more located into the modern society. This helped to internalise the outside within the subject and externalise the inside world of the subject through action in the social world.

So the Enlightenment understanding of the subject was based on the conception of human person as a fully centred, unified individual; endowed with the capacities of reason, consciousness and action, whose centre consisted of an inner core which first emerged when the subject was born, and unfolded with it, while remaining essentially the same. With the sociological contributions to this definition, the inner core of the subject was no longer seen as autonomous but as developed in relation to others. This was an attempt to bridge the gap between inside and outside making both reciprocally more unified and predictable.[12]

The formulation of national identity followed the basic premises of the Enlightenment and its construction of the individual subject. It defined the nation as a unified, homogeneous, fixed entity. It defined the population as homogeneous, sharing a common descent, a common history, with common expectations

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[12] ibid., 281-285

from the future and a common identity. The idea of progress was a major element in this definition. The nation was defined as ahistorical, always-ever existing. It had a stable essence, a core and although it changed by time, it essentially remained the same.

Stuart Hall defines five aspects of how such a national identity is constituted:

1. It is constituted through told and retold national histories, literatures, the media and popular culture.

2. It is constituted through the emphasis on the origins, continuity, tradition, and timelessness.

3. It is constituted through the invention of tradition.

4. It is constituted through a foundational myth, a story which locates the origins of the people so early in time that they are lost in the midst of mythic time

5. It is constituted through the idea of a pure, original people or 'folk'.[13]

In this way, national identity presents itself as perfectly natural, condensed, homogenous and unitary. However, as Hall claims, "It was always negotiated

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[13] ibid., 293-295

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against difference. It always had to absorb all the differences of class, of region, of gender, in order to present itself as a homogenous entity."[14]

By identifying modernity with progress and by putting Reason at the core of its definition, Western national identity has been constituted as opposed to its backward, traditional other, that is to say, the Orient. On the other hand, national identity in the Third World has also been defined within the same premises of Western modernity. As Chatterjee claims, the nationalist thought in the Third World, which is often thought as the major source of resistance against the colonial West, can not break its tie with the universality claim of Western modernity. The essential question for Chatterjee is, therefore, why non-Western countries should have no alternative other than trying to approximate the given properties of modernity.[15] According to Chatterjee, the question of nationalist thought is only a part of a more general, epistemic problem which results from the constitution of 'universal' thought on the basis of a bourgeois-

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[14] Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity," in *Culture, Globalization and the World System*, ed. A.D. King, (USA: MacMillan Education Ltd, 1991), 22

[15] Partha Chatterjee, *Milliyetçi Düşünce ve Sömürge Dünyası*, (İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 32

rationalist conceptualisation of knowledge after the European Enlightenment. This is a knowledge announcing its own universality; it claims validity regardless of cultures. National thought, accepting to be 'modern', also accepts this universality claim of modern knowledge. But, at the same time, it assumes the authenticity of a national culture. By doing this, it both accepts and rejects the hegemony of a foreign culture. This is the main feature of nationalist thought in the colonial world for Chatterjee.[16] So, the dilemma of nationalist discourse lies in its simultaneous acceptance and rejection of the dominance of Western modernity.

What nationalist thought does, instead of breaking its tie with Western modernity, is to absorb the political life of the nation into the body of the state by declaring the latter as the representative of the nation, as "the principal mobilizer, planner, guarantor and legitimator of productive investment. The result is the construction of a community within which different subject-positions are dissolved into the national identity.[17]

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[16] ibid., 32,33

[17] Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism," *New Perspectives on Turkey.* 13(Fall 1995), 101,102

As a result, national identity both in Western and non-Western societies is defined on similar grounds. Hence, the idea of national identity as homogeneous, integrated, fixed, stable and ahistorical has become rapidly globalised with only few exceptions. It is such an understanding of national identity, which is under challenge because of the dynamics caused by globalization, which will be dealt in more detail in the next section.

1.2 Globalization as a Contradictory Process

Globalization has been defined in many different ways. Some scholars have defined it as solely a process of homogenisation, as the world's becoming an integrated place or as some has put it, a process of Americanization. On the other hand, another approach to the phenomenon of globalization has questioned this one-dimensional definition. Robertson, for instance, claims that through globalization the world has in many ways become a united place, but in no ways an integrated one.[18] He himself defines globalization as

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[18] Roland Robertson, "Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept," in *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*, ed. M. Featherstone, (London, Sage Publications, 1990), 18

"a massive, twofold process involving the interpenetration of the universalisation of particularism and the particularisation of universalism."[19] Similarly, Arjun Appadurai identifies globalization with the tension between cultural homogenisation and cultural heterogenisation.[20] According to him, the main feature of globalization is "the mutual effort of sameness and difference to cannibalise one another."[21] Defined in this way as a two folded, or better to say, contradictory process, globalization can highlight many of the developments of our day such as the resurgence of ethnic identities, the erosion of national identity, and the rise of religious fundamentalism. Therefore, it would be useful to have a closer examination of globalization as a contradictory process.

Fuat Keyman emphasizes this contradictory character of globalization as such:

> The process of contemporary globalization in its most general form involves a tension between universalism and particularism (see Robertson, 1992, pp. 8-61). On the one hand, with Francis

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[19] Roland Robertson; "Social Theory, Cultural Relativity and the Problem of Globality," in *Culture, Globalization and the World System*, ed. A. D. King, (USA, MacMillan Education Ltd, 1991), 73

[20] Arjun Appadurai, *"Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy*," in Global Culture, ed. M. Featherstone, (London, Sage Publications, 1990), 328

[21] Roland Robertson, *"Social Theory"*, 77

Fukuyama's "the end of history thesis" which suggests universalisation of liberal democracy, along with the globalization of free market ideology, the dissolution of differences into sameness can be said to mark an emergence of cultural homogenisation. On the other hand, it can be suggested that particularistic conflicts have begun to dictate the mode of articulation of political practises and ideological/discursive forms in global relations, which draws our attention to the tendency towards cultural heterogenization. Arjun Appadurai asserts in this context that "the central problem of today's global interactions is the tension between cultural homogenisation and cultural heterogenisation.[22]

Stuart Hall develops a similar argument. Following his argument, globalization has a peculiar form of homogenisation. It is not an attempt to produce little mini-versions of Americanness everywhere. Rather, it aims to recognise and absorb differences within the larger framework of what is essentially an American conception of the world. It does not attempt to destroy those differences; on the contrary, it operates through them. Hall links this feature of globalization to the logic of capitalism -that capitalism operates only on contradictory terrain and advances by overcoming these contradictions.[23] Capitalism splits old societies and uses different forms of labour force. Some developments on the side of production and consumption further feed

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[22] Fuat Keyman, "*On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism,*" 93,94

[23] Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global," 28-31

this process. According to Robertson, "the consumerist global capitalism of our time is wrapped into the increasingly thematized particular-universal relation-ship in terms of the connection between globewide, universalistic supply and local, particularistic demand. The contemporary market thus involves the increasing interpenetration of culture and economy." And he continues: "the contemporary capitalist creation of consumers frequently involves tailoring of products to increasingly specialised regional, societal, ethnic, class and gender markets -so-called 'micro marketing'."[24] Hence, the capital falls in love with difference, and the advertisements begin to sell cultural difference,[25] as it is well illustrated in a billboard slogan of Mobil: "Our difference is our strength. Let us appreciate it."[26]

This is closely linked to another point that Hall reminds us: It is the emphasis on the "pleasure of difference". You go around the world and do not come back with a "everything is the same" but rather, "how

[24] Roland Robertson, "Social Theory," 74,75

[25] Jonathan Rutherford, "Yuva Denilen Yer: Kimlik ve Farklılığın Kültürel Politikaları," in Kimlik: Topluluk, Kültür, Farklılık, ed. Jonathan Rutherford, (İstanbul, Sarmal Yayınevi, 1998), 11

[26] Kobena Mercer, "Cangıla Hoşgeldiniz," 73

nice, everything is different".[27] The differences of every group, every culture is emphasised and underlined. This is "the exotica of difference."[28]

Hall results with the claim that:

> So the notion of globalization as a non-contradictory, uncontested space in which everything is fully within the keeping of the institutions, so that they perfectly know where it is going, I simply do not believe. I think the story points to something else: that in order to maintain its global position, capital has had to negotiate and by negotiate I mean it had to incorporate and partly reflect the differences it was trying to overcome. It had to try to get hold of, and neutralise, to some degree, the differences. It is trying to constitute a world in which things are different. And that is the pleasure of it but the differences do not matter.[29]

Having defined globalization as the interplay between contradictory dynamisms, the question now becomes what the emerging global culture is like —to the extent that we can talk about such a coherent global culture. As Featherstone reminds: "...there is little prospect of a unified global culture, rather there are global cultures in plural."[30] However, the process of homogenisation involves the circulation of a

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[27] Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global," 31

[28] Stuart Hall; Old and New Ethnicities; p.55

[29] Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global," 32,33

[30] Mike Featherstone, "Global Culture: An Introduction," in *Global Culture*, ed. M. Featherstone, (London, Sage Publications,1990), 10

set of shared values. According to Hall the emerging

global mass culture is still centred in the West: It is

the stories and the imagery of Western societies that

are circulating around the globe. Its language is

English but it is a new form of international language,

not the same English as it was spoken in England.

Rather, it is a hybrid culture reflecting the different

cultures over which it circulates.[31] Hence,

globalization, in this sense, is a celebration of the

values of the West and their adaptation by different

societies. However, as globalization also involves a

dynamic of heterogenisation, it is not possible to

identify the emerging global culture totally with the

West and to label the process as one of Westernisation

or Americanisation. Accordingly, Smith claims that the

global culture is tied to no place or period -it is

context-less, a true melange of disparate components

drawn from everywhere and nowhere.[32]

So, on the one hand, globalization is a

homogenising process and involves the formation of a

global mass culture. Through the communications

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[31] Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global," 28

[32] A. D. Smith, "Towards a Global Culture?" 177

network, the world gets smaller and as Jan Aart Scholte claims, "in the globalised world of today people can by various means relate with one another irrespective of their longitudinal and latitudinal position, as they were on a 'supraterritorial' plane."[33] Parallel to this feature of globalization, it also involves an announcement and celebration of Western modernity and values as universal. As Gillian Youngs claims, Fukuyama's thesis of 'the end of history' well illustrates such a celebration. Fukuyama declares the globalization of liberal democracy as a universal ideal and the highest rational form of human organisation. The thesis emphasises the universalisation of the values associated with liberal democracy and economic liberalism. Fukuyama's thesis could be argued to be the ultimate post-cold war discourse of globalization. It identifies the progressive imperatives and homogenising power of the liberal capitalist system as an irresistible incorporating influence both economically

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[33] Jan Aart Scholte, "Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a Critical Theory of Globalization," in *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, eds. E. Kofman and Gillian Youngs, (London, Pinter, 1996), 45

and politically. It involves a sense that questions have been answered, ultimate solutions reached.[34]

On the other hand, globalization involves an opposite dynamic with its emphasis on difference. As Hall puts it,

> Through globalization, the emergence of new subjects, new genders, new ethnicities, new regions, new communities, hitherto excluded from the major forms of cultural representation, unable to locate themselves except as decentred or subaltern, have acquired through struggle, sometimes in very marginalised ways, the means to speak for themselves for the first time. And the discourses of power in our society, the discourses of the dominant regimes, have been certainly threatened by this de-centred cultural empowerment of the marginal and the local.[35]

Globalization brings forth a return to the local as a response to the uncertainties of the global. The local provides more stable, knowable identities and relations in a world where "the very idea of uncertainty promises to become globally institutionalised."[36] Because of this very feature of globalization, it also involves an overall questioning of modernity. The ideas of progress, of the nation-state as the major agent of history, of its capability

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[34] Gillian Youngs, "Dangers of Discourse: The Case of Globalization," in *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, eds. E. Kofman and Gillian Youngs, (London, Pinter, 1996), 65

[35] Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global," 34

[36] Roland Robertson, "Mapping the Global Condition," 16

to narrate the whole population, the understanding of national-identity which defines the people as a homogeneous, integrated whole, are all under erosion. This is what gives globalization its contradictory character: It is the declaration of Western modernity as universal on the one hand, and the questioning of the basic premises of that modernity on the other.

1.3 The Impact of Globalization on National Identity

National identity, in the course of its history, has performed two different roles in two different spheres. In the international sphere, nation-states and national identities have claimed their authenticity and cultural difference. In the domestic sphere, however, they have been the representatives of cultural uniformity and homogeneity. Through the process of globalization, both roles of national identity are under challenge.

As stated above, globalization has two opposite dynamics. On the one hand it is a process of homogenisation, and an accompanying declaration of Western modernity as universal. On the other, it is a process of heterogenisation, a return to the local and an accompanying questioning of the very principles of

modernity. It is the two processes at work simultaneously. And because of this very nature of globalization, it has two interrelated effects on national identity:

(i) Globalization brings forth a pressure over the national identity from above. Because self-determination is one of the basic principles of national identity, and one that gives it legitimacy, globalization has an eroding effect over it. National identity is defined on the premises of sovereignty and self-determination; it defines the nation as governing itself, making its own conscious choices. With the process of globalization, and growing global interdependence, such a premise starts to lose value and hence occurs diminish in the legitimacy grounds of national identity. Besides, the homogenising dynamics of globalization challenges the claim of national identity to cultural authenticity in the international sphere.

(ii) Globalization brings forth a challenge on national identity from below. First, the communication networks through which the global mass culture circulates, also makes possible a dense, more intense interaction between members of communities who share common cultural characteristics and this results in the

re-emergence of submerged ethnic communities and their nationalisms.[37] Besides, the cultural homogeneity imposed by globalization generates identity-reinforcing reactions.[38] Furthermore, the local identities offer individual a firmer ground against the cultural flux caused by globalization. As a result of these factors, the re-emerging local identities and loyalties bring forth serious pressure on the homogeneity claim of the national identity. The resurgence of local identities brings forth a questioning of the legitimacy of the homogeneous national identity. Those local identities, with the process of globalization, begin to struggle for representation in the public sphere and to become alternative definitions of collective identity.

These two challenges -from above and from below- are simultaneous, they are the two faces of the same process. As Hall puts it;

> One of the things which happens when the nation-state begins to weaken, becoming less convincing and less powerful, is that the response seems to go in two ways simultaneously. It goes above the nation-state and it goes below it. It goes global and local in the same moment. Global and local are the two faces of the same movement from one epoch of globalization, the one which has

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[37]A. D. Smith, "Towards a Global Culture?" 175

[38]M. Featherstone, "Global Culture," 7

been dominated by the nation-state, the national economies, the national cultural identities, to something new.[39]

As a result, one the one hand, we are experiencing a process of cultural homogenisation; the world is becoming smaller, and transterritorial identities and organisations are finding their place in politics. On the other hand, we are experiencing the fragmentation of already-established national identities, ethnic revivals and religious fundamentalisms. Besides, those (re)emerging ethnic identities are struggling to become national identities and to form new totalities in many other parts of the globe. Globalization is a multi-faceted process and has different impacts on national identities, which do not work the same way around the globe.

It should also be noted that the erosion and fragmentation of national identities certainly do not point to their totally disappearance. As a result of these fragmentations, there emerges a possibility of redefining national identity on a new basis, which recognises and accommodates the representation of local identities without repressing them to form a homogeneous whole. However, there is also a contrary

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[39] Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global" 27

evidence that the national identities are being redefined on an even firmer basis than ever before as a response to such fragmenting dynamics. As Hall claims:

> The erosion of the nation state, national economics and national cultural identities is a very complex and dangerous moment. Entities of power are dangerous when they are ascending and when they are declining and it is a moot point whether they are more dangerous in the second or the first moment…So when I say the decline or erosion of the nation state, do not for a moment imagine that the nation state is bowing off the stage of history…it goes into an even deeper trough of defensive exclusivism.[40]

So the evidence seems to point to national identities entering a process of transformation and redefinition. But what the outcome of this process will be seems uncertain from this point of history. It may bring forth a more democratic definition or an even more homogeneous one. It seems more logical not to expect the final triumph of one over the other but rather a period of continuous struggle in which they will coexist.

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[40] Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global" 25

CHAPTER II

KEMALIST NATIONAL IDENTITY

As stated in the first chapter, globalization has contradictory dynamics with challenging effects on national identity. In the Turkish case, those effects started to be felt increasingly in the post-1980 period. As a result, 1990s were marked with challenges to the Kemalist definition of national identity. In order to understand the emergence of such challenges, it is first necessary to look at those characteristics of Kemalism and its definition of national identity, which are being questioned today.

2.1 The Features Of Kemalist National Identity

Western Enlightenment and positivism were constitutive elements of Kemalist national identity as conceived and articulated by Kemalism. In the Kemalist conception, Enlightenment stands for a linear understanding of history and an established reason as the core of reality. Kemalism regards positivism as an integral part of the Enlightenment that replaces

metaphysics and religion with science as the means of conceiving that reality.

Dating back to Auguste Comte, positivism provided a conception of society that is subject to invariable laws. Science, as the means of conceiving those laws, makes social control possible. Hence comes order and progress. Therefore, if one of the important features of positivism is its emphasis on science for understanding and having control of social reality, another is its conceptualisation of society as based on harmony rather than conflict.

Feeding from these schools of thought, scienticism and modernisation are key elements of Kemalist national identity. Positivism gives the opportunity to ignore the impact of Christianity on Western civilisation because it replaces religion with science as the basis of that civilisation. Besides, it offers social harmony rather than conflict, which is a fruitful ground to build a homogeneous national identity on. The element of scienticism is very powerful in Kemalism. Mete Tunçay quotes an interesting anecdote to illustrate this.[41] Grace Ellison, the writer of the book "Turkey

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[41] Mete Tunçay, *T.C.'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-1931)*, (İstanbul, Cem Yayınevi, 1992), 323

Today" (written in 1928) talks to a schoolteacher while travelling from Konya to Adana. The teacher says: "Our prophet is Mustafa Kemal. We are finished with the guy from Arabia. Mohammed's religion was good for the Arabs but not for us." Then Ellison asks him whether he does not have any beliefs. He replies: "I do have. I believe in Mustafa Kemal, I believe in science, I believe in the future of my country and I believe in myself. The author asks "what about God?" The man replies: "Who can know anything about God? There exists science, there exists the power of good and bad and nobody can know anything about the rest."

One of the basic premises of Kemalism is that "science is the only true guide in life". This illustrates the belief in the assumption that the world has a rational order and that rational order can be conceived by human reason. All that is needed is to raise the Turkish nation to the necessary scientific level. Islam is seen as an obstacle to that end. Therefore religious moral values should be replaced by science. Hence August Comte's positivism is used as a new form of religion: a new but rational system of belief instead of the existing religion.[42]

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[42] Levent Köker, *Demokrasi Üzerine Yazılar*, (Ankara, İmge Kitabevi, 1992), 202

Another main feature of Kemalism is the emphasis it places on modernisation. Using the Enlightenment understanding of history, the claim to modernisation and progress are building blocks for Kemalist identity. Forming a nation-state and a national identity are seen as the prerequisites of modernisation. Since the establishment of the Republic, modernisation was considered as a state policy. The process of modernisation was identified with the nation-state. To oppose modernisation was viewed as opposing to the state, and to question the state was an adequate reason to be placed into the anti-modern camp.[43]

In the light of this general framework, it is now necessary to look at the more specific features of Kemalist national identity. There are different approaches as regards the criteria on which national identity is defined in Kemalism. Some argue that Kemalism has a dual character. For instance, Taha Parla claims that Kemalist nationalism has a second face besides its cultural, humanist side based on law. This second face rests on ethnical unity and homogeneity and includes an ethnic domination, monopolism, and

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[43] Çağlar Keyder, "Kimlik Bunalımı, Aydınlar ve Devlet," in *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik*, ed. Nuri Bilgin, (İstanbul, Bağlam Yayınları, 1997), 153

exclusivism directed against minorities.[44] Tanıl Bora

also points to the same ambivalence in Kemalist

national identity. Such an ambivalence also exists in

Western nationalisms but it is well hidden. It arises

as a result of the duality between the political-legal

definition of national identity based on the concept of

citizenship on the one hand, and an essentialist,

sacred definition of identity based on ethnicity on the

other.[45] However, the concept of citizenship is also

more than a mere legal-political status in Kemalist

national identity. It is a gained status, depending on

the commitment to the nation. It is defined like a

cultural identity and is linked to a performance.[46] The

distance between citizenship and belonging to the

nation and how separate these two statutes are, can be

most easily seen in the position of minorities in

Turkey.[47] Non Muslim minorities, although they are

entitled to equal citizenship rights, are not conceived

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[44] Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları, Cilt 3: Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku*, (İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 207-211

[45] Tanıl Bora, "İnşa Döneminde Türk Milli Kimliği," *Toplum ve Bilim.* 71(1996), 172-173

[46] Ibid., 177-178

[47] Tanıl Bora, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik," in *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik*, ed. Nuri Bilgin, (İstanbul, Bağlam Yayınları, 1997), 57

as Turks in the sociological sense.[48] Turkish identity is not thought to suit especially to religious minorities.

Kemalist national identity is not a homogeneously well-defined block and such ambivalence about the ground it rests on may has occurred from time to time. The two different faces of Kemalist national identity have been emphasized differently at different times. However, it is the cultural definition that generally prevails. As Ergun Özbudun claims, when we take Kemalist national discourse as a whole, its legal, cultural side is the one that is more emphasized.[49] Baskın Oran, after showing some ethnic implications of Kemalist national identity, concludes similarly. He claims that Atatürk's nationalism is definitely limited with the territory and its core is the concept of the Turkish nation defined on the criteria of common culture.[50] Atatürk, himself, emphasised common culture, language and history as the constitutive elements of nation and defined nation on a cultural basis. He

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[48] Ergun Özbudun, "Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu," in *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik*, ed. Nuri Bilgin, (İstanbul, Bağlam Yayınları, 1997), 67

[49] Ibid., 70

[50] Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme*, (Ankara, Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, 1988), 231-237

listed the constitutive elements of Turkish national

identity as:

-Political integrity

-Linguistic integrity

-A common history

-A common morality

-A common descent and race[51]

In the 1931 and 1935 programs of the Republican

People's Party, the nation is defined similarly on

cultural grounds: "The nation is a political and social

entity formed by the citizens bound to each other with

a common language, culture and destiny."[52]

Another striking point in these definitions, to

which Levent Köker draws our attention, is the absence

of the element of religion, which could also be

employed within the concept of culture. M. Kemal

explains that absence as follows:

> "Some claim that religious integrity is also
> important in the constitution of a nation.
> However, the Turkish case illustrates the
> opposite. Turks were a great nation before they
> accepted Islam as their religion, too. After they
> did so, Islam caused neither the Arabs nor the
> Acems who had the same religion to integrate with
> Turks to constitute a nation. Rather it caused to
> loosen the national bounds of Turkish people, it
> diminished their national feelings and

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[51] A.Afetinan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve M.Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları,*
(Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1969), 22

[52] Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi,* (İstanbul,
İletişim Yayınları, 1995), 151

excitements. This was very natural. Because, the aim of the religion established by Mohammed was to form a community transcending all nations"[53]

Kemalism tended to base the new social organisation it aimed to establish on the nation and to define nation with anti-religious elements. Religion was the ground for the traditional rather than the national state, so to separate religion from state was the first and essential step towards forming a nation-state. So, religion would be limited to the individual sphere alone.[54]

As can be seen from the above definitions, in spite of a continuous ambivalence, it is often the cultural and legal-political elements that are more emphasised within the Kemalist definition of Turkish national identity. Religion is often excluded from those definitions. However, it is important to underline an important point that Tanıl Bora reminds us: A cultural identity defined as unchangeable and unique and made sacred, constitutes a ground for racism and essentialism. Turkish nationalism, even with its humanistic and universalistic claims, has such an essentialist understanding of identity. Turkish

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[53] Ibid., 152-153

[54] Ibid., 162,165

identity, as a constant entity independent of time, with its definition as a supreme category, is an illustration of such an essentialism. The Turkish nation is thought to exist with its national consciousness since the beginning of human history, as an ahistorical entity.[55] What is important here is that although Kemalist national identity is defined more on a cultural basis than ethnical ones, it still is an essentialist understanding of identity as a constant, ahistorical, and sacred entity.

2.2 Kemalist National Identity as a Homogeneous Identity

Defined on the general grounds of positivism and modernity, the Kemalist definition of Turkish national identity takes the nation as a homogeneous whole. The Turkish nation is seen as an integrated whole without classes and without privileges. This ideological premise is partly supported by practice, too. The newly established Republic is no more a heterogeneous empire. At least, it has become more homogenous on a religious basis after the establishment of the Republic as a

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[55] Tanıl Bora, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik," 56

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result of population exchanges and lost territories. Both in ideological and practical levels, there was an emphasis on the homogeneity of the population. As Çağlar Keyder claims, in the ideological sphere, that claim to homogeneity was used as a legitimising ground for the state: "If there was a homogeneous nation with a common past, their interests and future goals should have been common, too. The state would be the narrator and the agent to realise those common goals and interests. Therefore, opposition to state, or to put it in a better way, to question the state's ability to represent the nation was something unacceptable."[56]

Consequently, the establishment of the republic also marked the transition from a multi-national empire to a new political structure in which a single, redefined nation was dominant.[57] By the time of the establishment of the Republic, the nation has become much more homogeneous than it was under Ottoman Empire, at least on religious grounds. However, the claim to homogeneity was not only on religious ground. Ethnic divergences and differences based on social class were also totally ignored. This feature of Kemalist national

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[56] Çağlar Keyder, "Kimlik Bunalımı," 153

[57] Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi,* 154

identity became explicit only after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. As Ergun Özbudun claims, throughout the years of independence war, concepts like Turkish nationalism and being Turk were not pronounced. The community was defined by traditional elements such as Ottoman Empire and Islam. Furthermore, the community was not seen as a monolithic entity but rather, it was recognised as being formed of different elements. However, these were the results of the conditions of war and the necessity to form alliances. As the regime was consolidated, such a pluralistic discourse was left and Turkish nationalism was emphasised.[58]

Baskın Oran, similarly, points to that transformation. He claims that throughout the years of the War of Independence, the phase "Nation of Turkey" was used to define the population. However, after the end of the war, the sensitivity was over and the name used was "Turkish nation". The phrase, "the nation of Turkey" was never used again in Atatürk's speeches after 1923.[59]

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[58] Ergun Özbudun, "Milli Mücadele," 64-66

[59] Baskın Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, 164

Atatürk himself, in one of his speeches in 1920, well illustrates that sensitivity during the years of war: He accepts that the nation that they are trying to defend is certainly not formed of one element. Rather, it is constituted of several Muslim elements. All the Muslim groups, constituting the whole, are brothers and the citizens have shared interests.[60]

As it can be seen, during the years of the war, the necessity to form alliances with other groups (such as Islamist conservatives and non-Turkish Muslim minorities) resulted in such a sensitivity in using the nationalist discourse and for the same reasons, Islam was used as a unifying and defining element of the population. However, after the solidification of the republic, the attitude was replaced with a strict denial of any claim to difference either based on ethnicity or social classes.

There were said to be no class conflicts in Turkey because there were no conflicting interests of different groups. Rather, society was defined on an occupational basis: the occupational groups, based on the principle of division of labour, work for the common good and each needs the others in order to

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[60] Ergun Özbudun, "Milli Mücadele," 66

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survive. There is one common interest of the whole society and the state is the representative or it would be better to say, the materialised form of that common good. Atatürk himself claims that "conceiving the Turkish nation not as constituted by different classes but as a society divided into different occupational groups based on the principle of the division of labour in order to supply individual and public survival" has been one of their essential principles. The work of each group is necessary for the survival and happiness of the others and for the society as a whole.[61] One outcome of this feature was the legitimation of one party rule. There are two implications of such a definition. First, the liberal state is seen as a damaging factor for national solidarity. It opens the way for class conflict. Nation-state ideal, on the other hand, rejects classes and offers integrity and unity of the nation. Therefore, it is the nation-state principle, rather than the liberal state principle, which is thought to be suitable for the Turkish nation. Only the idea of the classless nation-state corresponds to the realities of the country. Secondly, by defining

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[61] Zafer Toprak, "Aydın, Ulus-Devlet ve Popülizm," in *Türk Aydını ve Kimlik Sorunu*, ed. Sabahattin Şen, (İstanbul, Bağlam Yayınları, 1995), 71

Turkey as a classless unity and entitling the state as the representative of the shared interests of that unity, the need for the existence of different parties was outdated. Such a need, which was a characteristic of the West, was the result of the existence of conflicting interests and classes in society. This was not suitable for the social realities of Turkey. The nation, the state and the party were identified and the Republican Party was seen as the only legitimate organ to represent the interests of the nation. The questioning of the party's capability to represent the nation was unacceptable. However, this claim to a classless society was later left and the existence of social classes and therefore the need for different political parties were recognised.

Similar to the attitude to the existence of classes, the existence of ethnicities was also denied. Everyone living within the Turkish territory was said to be a Turk. Once again comes the question of the identity defined on the legal status of citizenship versus the ethnic nationalist principle. What is implied by the denial of ethnic differences is not only the sameness gained by the equal status of citizenship. Rather, there is an implied claim to homogeneity in the ethnic sense, a reference to a common decent and race.

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In order to support such a claim, tremendous effort was given to the studies on Turkish history and language. The Turkish history and language thesis formulated at the time well illustrates this enthusiasm.

The claim to homogeneity is closely tied to a constitutive element of Turkish identity: the fear of fragmentation and division. After experiencing a long period of fragmentation and division the Turkish nation and republic was formed as a response and a means to prevent any further divisions. As a result, such a fear -or it is better to say 'phobia'- was an internal constitutive element of national identity. The outcome was the denial of the existence of ethnic minorities and any demand from a non-Turkish group was conceived as part of a plan to divide the country by the centre.[62]

2.3 The Question of 'Other' For Turkish National Identity

Any identity, individual or collective, is formed against the image of the other. We are what the "other" is not. Further more, identities are not frozen,

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[62] Taner Akçam, *Türkiye'yi Yeniden Düşünmek*, (İstanbul, Birikim Yayınları, 1995), 24

constant entities. Rather, they are constituted against continuously redefined "others". An Arabic phrase well summarizes this: "I against my brother, my brother and I against our nephew, my brother, our nephew and I against the whole world."[63]

Therefore, in order to develop a holistic understanding of Kemalist national identity, it is important to examine the "other" against which such an identity was constituted.

Tanıl Bora claims that the other for Turkish national identity was not the Kurds or the minorities. It was not Greece or West either. Rather, Turkish identity was constituted by including the Western identity in its body. He claims that it is difficult to find the 'other' of Turkish national identity outside. Rather such an "other" is internal to the social-historical reality of Turkey. It is the "Ancient Turkey", it is the Ottoman Empire, and it is the old civilisation in which the religious worldview was dominant. Choosing its own history as the other, national identity also redefines that past. According to this new definition, the Ottoman Empire was the obstacle that kept the potential of Turkish people

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[63]Bozkurt Güvenç, "Açış Konuşmaları," in *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik*, ed. Nuri Bilgin, (İstanbul, Bağlam Yayınları, 1997), 27

underdeveloped and prevented its progress. Islam is thought of as a potential for reviving that old civilisation and the Ottoman legacy. The Arabic identity is seen as linked to that ancient identity and serves as an external other.[64]

Sevda Alankuş Kural, on the other hand, claims that the Kurdish population fulfils the role of the external other. According to her, Kurds were the most important group that Turkish modernisation process left outside. The ideal of Turkish modernisation was to form a homogeneous nation and the discourse reflecting that ideal excluded those who were not Turks or who were not conceiving themselves as Turks. As a result of the phobia of separatist movements, the Kurds, who were the only ethnic group with a separatist history were seen as potential enemies and external others.[65]

Though these two claims seem to offer different answers to the same question, they are not very separate. What they share in common is that the imperial past based on religious ground constituted the internal other to Turkish national identity. It was not Islam per se that was defined as the other but rather

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[64] Tanıl Bora, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik," 58,59

[65] Sevda Alankuş-Kural, "Yeni Hayali Kimlikler", 99

the ancient structure legitimised through religion. Islam was used as far as it constituted a ground to integrate the population. However, efforts were made to rationalise Islam. What was opposed was the irrational form of the religion caused by the religious clerks and what was to be done was to purify Islam, which was in fact compatible and even parallel to reason and science. On the other hand, the Arabic or Kurdish identity constituted external others for Turkish national identity with different emphasise on one or the other from time to time. What made these identities suitable for an external other was their relatedness to the ancient order of the Ottoman Empire and the fear of separatist movements which both identities had a past to revoke such a fear.

Hence was the Kemalist national identity defined against these others, and the definition of these others by the new Turkish State was a constitutive element of the national identity. As stated earlier, the claim to homogeneity has been one of the chief features of that definition. However, in the post-1980 period, this feature of Kemalist national identity has been one of the most questioned components of Kemalism. Similarly, the relation of Kemalism with religious and ethnic -mainly Kurdish- identities was problematised.

Such challenges were the outcomes of complex processes experienced in the post-1980 period, which will be the main concern of the following chapter.

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CHAPTER III

THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON TURKEY,

THE POST-1980 PERIOD

Having evaluated the basic features of Kemalism and its formulation of national identity, the question now becomes how and why these premises were challenged in the post-1980 period. However, before passing to that period, it will be useful to review the social, economical and political transformations that Turkey has experienced until 1980s. Only after that it will be possible to understand the developments of post-1980s and the current situation in Turkey.

3.1 A Brief Historical Review Of The Pre-1980 Period

The basic premises of Kemalist nationalism and its definition of the national identity were outlined in the previous chapter. These premises were solidified through the six major principles of Kemalism and the Republican Peoples Party (RPP). Under the conditions of one-party rule, and with very little space for

opposition, these principles were set into practise through a series of reforms.

The reforms had a wide spectrum, ranging from matters of daily life (such as regulation of clothes) to those of law (such as the replacement of sharia with the Civil Law). However, the reforms had a common orientation, that of "imitating the superstructural aspects of Western capitalist modernization."[66] One important step was the adaptation of Latin alphabet. This did not only aim to increase the percentage of literate population but also contributed to the loosening of the ties with the Ottoman past. According to Zürcher, this was a way of breaking Turkish society off the religious traditions of Ottomans and the Middle East and to direct it to the West.[67] These reforms were accompanied by the establishment of new institutions such as Turkish Language Institution and Turkish History Institution. Through these changes, the national identity ideal of Kemalism was indoctrinated over the population. Both the educational institutions and the press were mobilized to spread the Kemalist ideology. Many people, especially writers, teachers,

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[66] Çağlar Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy." *New Left Review.* 115(May–June 1979), 12

[67] Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, (İstanbul, İletişim yayınları, 1995), 275

doctors, the self-employed and students, adopted the Kemalist vision of modern, secular and independent Turkey.[68] However, it would not be true to claim that these changes meet with no resistance and were easily accepted by the masses. In spite of the lack of opposition mechanisms, there emerged a discontent in some parts of the population, including the reactionaries as well as the ordinary Muslim people. The two short-lived experiments of transition to multi-party system (one of which was personally initiated by Atatürk) displayed the extent of social unrest. However, it was only in 1940s, a few years after Atatürk's death, that this unrest could be materialised as an opposition party.

In the economic sphere, the free economy of 1920s, as a result of the crisis caused by the world-wide decline in agricultural prices and the resulting trade deficits, was transformed into *etatism* and strict state control after 1929. The state-led economy resulted in an increase in industrial production, accompanied by oppressive measures against workers and declining earnings in agriculture. Together with the militant secularism, economic worsening further alienated the

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[68] Ibid., 263

peasantry, exporting landowners and petty bourgeoisie from the regime. The Second World War even worsened the situation, with shortages, rising prices, falling wages and black-markets.

In this respect, the end of the Second World War marked the beginning of a new era for Turkey as it pointed to the triumph and celebration of democratic principles throughout the world. In such an international atmosphere, together with the rising Soviet threat and USA's new approach through Marshall Plan and promotion of an open economy, a democratic transformation was becoming more beneficial for Turkey. As far as domestic politics was concerned, there was a widespread discontent in the society, accelerated by the negative challenges of the War. Besides, the alliance between the military/ bureaucratic elites, landowners and bourgeoisie had eroded.[69] Soon, the first signals of the softening of one-party rule were seen in İnönü's speeches. The Democrat Party (DP) was established in 1946 by the former opposition wing of RPP. There was not a sharp ideological difference between RPP and DP. In the following years, the boundaries between the two parties became more blurred

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[69] Feroz Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, (İstanbul, Sarmal Yayınevi, 1994), 148

as RPP adopted a more liberal policy in order to prevent the flow of support to DP.

Furthermore, the party began to give concessions from its strict secularism -a legacy from Atatürk's era. This was the beginning of the decline of Kemalist militant secularism, which later continued in the Democrat era. In line with this softening, optional religion courses were put in the curriculum. According to Ahmad, the Republican party even promised to remove the Kemalist principles from the Constitution if re-elected.[70]

In spite of all these measures, DP won the 1950 elections with a majority and Democrats (and together with them, a new elite) came to power where they would stay for the next ten years. Keyder calls this "a decisive shift in Turkey's history from elite rule to full class rule, and from one pattern of capitalist development to another."[71]

In the first years, the agricultural export economy, with the help of the boom created by the Korean War, caused an economic dynamism and as a result, the party increased its votes in 1954

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[70] Ibid., 155

[71] Çağlar Keyder, *The Political Economy*, 19

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elections. In fact, the transformation of economy towards a more liberal one began in 1947, when İnönü, in line with the IMF requirements, implemented a series of measures including devaluation of Turkish Lira and import permissions. The policies of DP, aiding agricultural industrialization and promoting exports, satisfied the expectations.

However, the situation started to change in 1954, together with the declining export earnings and growing trade deficits, the growth rate started to decrease whereas inflation increased. In spite of the continuing high incomes in agricultural sector (as a result of state subsidies), the wage earners -most importantly bureaucrats and military members- experienced a drastic decline in their income as a result of the inflationary policies. The economic crisis also enstrangered the commercial and industrial sectors of bourgeoisie from the party.[72] This resulted in a decrease of support (mainly the urban support) to DP and a following increase of the authoritarian tendencies in the party policies. Hence, after 1954, the Democrats began to sacrifice political liberalism for the sake of the

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[72] Ibid., 24

economic.[73] Opposition in and outside the party, together with the social tension increased. The tension came to a peak in September 1955 when, the protests about the situation in Cyprus turned into a massacre and was followed by an increase in authoritarian measures.

The 1957 elections was an important decline for DP for it lost its parliamentary majority. During the election campaigns, DP used religious issues in order to increase its support base and was criticised by RPP and other intellectuals for violating the principle of secularism, which pointed to the further alienation of the urban elite from the party.

Actually, the strict secularism of 1930s and 40s started to soften with the transition to multi-party politics as a result of the political parties' interest in attracting the votes of the Muslim population. During 1950s, DP leaders were very sensitive to emphasize that they would not allow any change in the secular characteristic of the state. Once in power, they assumed a more tolerant attitude towards religion. The Turkish *Ezan* was replaced with the Arabic, religious education extended, and the number of

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[73] Feroz Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, 335

religious schools increased. As the party started to loose its support, its emphasis on religion grew further. With this attitude, they disturbed the educated elite's (including buraucrats, teachers, military members, etc) cultural hegemony.[74] As a result, the criticism against DP grew more and more and the party was blamed for betraying the Kemalist tradition. Meanwhile, economic decline, together with the social tension and government repression continued to increase. Finally, on 27 May 1960, the first military intervention took place, opening the path for the two future interventions, in the name of preventing the fight between brothers and recovering democracy from the crisis that it faced.

As a result of the military take-over, Committee of National Unity (CNU), formed by the coup leaders, took the power. However, the committee was not homogeneous in itself and soon, its radical wing, lead by Türkeş (who would later become the leader of ultra-nationalist movement) was eliminated. After that, the new democratic institutions started to be constituted. The Constitutional Assembly formed the new constitution which was different from its precedent and aimed to

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[74] Erick Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 339-340

strengthen alternative power centers other than the parliament in order to prevent a monopoly of power.[75] With this goal in hand, the Republic Senate was formed as the second chamber of National Assembly, an independent Constitutional Court was constituted, the autonomy of judiciary, university and media was granted.

Another important outcome of the coup and the widening scope of political activity allowed by 1960 Constitution was the establishment of Turkish Labour Party, the first "ideology based" party contesting in the national elections. And with its existence, the Labour Party forced the other political parties to define themselves clearly in ideological terms.[76] Meanwhile, leftist movements were gaining popularity among students and industrial workers.

Like the political sphere, 1960 marked important transformations in the economic sphere. One point of criticism towards DP coming from both the military and RPP (and also supported by the modern industrial bourgeoisie) was the lack of economic planning. The haphazard running of economy was seen as the main

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[75] Ibid., 357

[76] Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 359

reason causing the economic decline. Hence, one of the results of the coup has been the establishment of State Planning Organization in September 1960 to form five year plans. In fact, Turkey was among the last of the developing economies to adopt a system of comprehensive planning.[77] A second outcome was, the adaptation of import substitution model accompanied by import limitations and control over exchange rates. Besides, high wage increases for industrial workers were allowed in order to create a dynamic domestic market. These general economic policies were followed by different governments and Turkish economy, within this protected environment and oriented towards internal market, experienced a period of growth.

After the referendum on the new constitution in June, national elections were held in October 1961. However, the Democrat Party was closed, its leaders trialed, and three of them, including the ex-prime minister, were punished with death penalty. The newly established Justice Party (JP) was the major successor of the Democrat Party. RPP won the 1961 elections by only getting slightly more votes than JP, proving that DP's appeal to the rural masses was continuing.

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[77] Morris Singer, "The Economic Performance of Turkish Republic." *Middle Eastern Studies.* 20:4(October 1984), 158

Actually, after a period of coalition governments, when the 1965 elections were held (during which such topics as socialism, capitalism, land reform, foreign policy and economic development were debated at length for the first time[78]) JP, led by Demirel got a majority and stayed in power for five years. The party itself was a coalition of industrialists, tradesmen, landowners and villigers, religious reactionaries and Western liberals. The party employed two strategies for electoral success: emphasis on religious and traditional values on the one hand and anti-communist propaganda on the other.

Although DP and its leaders were criticised for using the religion for political aims and for jeopardizing the secularist principle, there has not been a return to the militant secularist and anti-Islamist politics of pre-1945 period after the coup. Hence, JP found the chance to use religious feelings to increase its support.

The anti-communist discourse and the campaign to beat leftist movements (who were severely criticizing JP policies) was supported also by CNU. However, it was taken so far by JP that, finally, one of Atatürk's

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[78] J.S. Szyliowicz, "The Turkish Elections: 1965." *The Middle East Journal.* 20(1996), p.473

speeches was included into the scope of communist propaganda.[79] However, JP did not have the chance to totally repress its opponents and rule arbitrarily as its precedessor, DP, because of the equilibrium established by 1960 Constitution.

Because of the above mentioned policies of religious and anti-communist propaganda, JP lost its appeal among urban intellectuals. However, it continued to be supported by the rural population as the 1969 elections proved. This was partly the result of the economic situation. The second half of 1960s were years of economic boom and development for Turkey and real incomes showed a steady increase as a result of the import substitution policies implemented since 1960. Hence, JP continued to be the major party in 1969 elections with only a slight fall.

Meanwhile, RPP was experiencing a period of transformation. There was a growing belief, represented by Ecevit, that the party's faith was closely tied to the votes of the workers and squatter population. With the support of İnönü, the party shifted towards the "Left of Center", with a program emphasizing social

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[79] Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi, 366

justice and security. In spite of this shift, the party could not gain an electoral victory.

The shift in RPP was the result of a social transformation. The 1960s were the years of rapid change. Social and physical mobility was increasing. As a result of the inner migrations, shantytowns became usual around large cities. There was a growing student and industrial worker population. As a result of the liberal atmosphere created by the 1960 Constitution, intellectual debates were taking place on social and political issues and many periodicals were being published. The growing strength of the left was not unique to Turkey, but rather, were accompanied by similar developments throughout the world. However, the left was very fragmented among different groups and parties, (some of which favored political violence) and the Labour Party was also divided towards the end of the decade.

Meanwhile, on the right wing of the political spectrum, new parties were being formed on more extremist basis. The first was the Republican Peasant Nation Party (soon to be called Nationalist Movement Party-NMP) lead by Türkeş. The party emphasized ultra-nationalist and anti-communist elements and was not far from violence. The second party, (National Salvation

Party-NSP) emphasized religious elements and was lead by Erbakan. The two parties together formed a threat to JP which rested on a loose coalition. Meanwhile, different sectors of bourgeoisie with differentiated interests were forcing JP to make a choice. As JP increasingly implemented policies that served the interests of industrial bourgeoisie, its electoral base, namely the farmers and petty bourgeoisie, started to alienate from the party and shift towards the Islamic and radical nationalist parties.[80]

The growing opposition within JP came to a peak in 1970 and the government was forced to resign. The new government formed by Demirel was unable to control the increasing radicalism among left and right movements and the growing political violence and could not pass any social or economical reform package from the parliament in the first months of 1971.

The growing tension was followed by the 12 March 1971 military intervention through a memorandum given by generals that asked for the resignation of the government and the implementation of a reform program. After JP resigned, a new government was formed by technocrats. With the amendments in 1971 and 1973, the

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[80] Ibid., 370

constitution was shifted towards a more authoritarian line. However, the socio-economic reform program was not realised.

The repression of the left has followed. One outcome of this move was the ending of the progressive role that was seen fit to the army by some of the leftist groups who saw the military as a natural ally. From then on, the military was conceived as a potential threat by most of the leftist movements.[81]

Actually, the social and economic crisis prior to the intervention was not that deep to necessitate a military intervention. However, the increasing social and political dynamism and the growing leftist tendencies among students and workers, which was a new experience in Turkey, were conceived as a threat by the ruling elites who could not enjoy a widely accepted consensus within the society.[82]

As a result of such a discontent, a conservative-authoritarian cultural policy was followed under the label of Atatürkism. Both the RPP-NSP coalition and the National Font coalitions that followed confronted with

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[81] M. T. Müftüoğlu, and Yavuz Sabuncu, *Türkiye ile Batı Dünyası Arasındaki Kültürel İlişkiler*, 1993, 49

[82] ibid; p.49

such a line, with a growing emphasis on nationalism, religion and morality.

However, the political violence continued its increase in the 1975-1980 period. Besides, there was a growing economic crisis, accelerated by the rise of oil prices. Furthermore, there was a political unstability as a result of the weak coalition governments (6 governments between 1975-80, 2 of which could not get a vote of confidence). Although RPP increased its strength as a result of its "left of center" politics and the growing prestige of Ecevit because of the Cyprus crisis, non of the parties were able to come to power alone. This situation increased the influence of small radical parties in a manner unproportional to their electoral base. Hence, the political system was paralised towards the end of 1970s. Such a paralysis resulted in the disability to take any measures against the growing terrorism. Besides, the tension further increased when the seperatist Kurdish Labour Party (PKK) was established in 1978.

In the economic sphere, it was no longer possible to sustain the economic growth through the import substitution model. As a result of the model's dependence on the import of intermediate goods and raw materials, there was a growing foreign trade deficit

and foreign dept, and the repayment capacity was exhausted. In fact, the payment crisis was postponed upto that time with the help of foreign borrowings and remittances from Turkish workers in Germany. However, the oil crisis of the 1970s further deepened the crisis.

As a result of the negotiations with IMF, World Bank and OECD in 1978 and 1979, new credits were granted to Turkey on the condition that a reform package (including the lifting of import limitations, cutting of the state subsidies, decreasing state expenditures, increasing prices and strict control of wages) would be implemented. The reform package, then after known as 24 January decisions, was put into motion after Demirel came to power. However, the decisions meet with a widespread resistance as they have foreseen a download pressure on worker wages and agricultural support prices. The activities of the unions prevented the realisation of the program. Soon it became clear that it was very difficult for the civil government to implement the decisions within the atmosphere of political tension, turmoil and terror. One last resort within the limits of parliamentary democracy seemed to be a "grand coalition" between JP

and RPP.[83] However, the deep polarization in the society and the differing interests soon dismissed this possibility, too.

The political unstability, increasing terrorism, Kurdish seperatism, the growing economic crisis, the inability to restructure the economy and the rising threat of Islamic fundemantalism resulted in the 1980 military coup. This was the beginning of an era of important transformations in political, social and economic spheres together with the process of Turkey's articulation with global capitalism. As a result of those transformations, the Kemalist definition of national identity, in a totally new sense, became the question. This very feature of the post-1980 period differentiates it from the early years that were reviewed above. The pecularity of the period and the nature of those transformations will be dealt with in detail in the next section.

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[83] Turgut Taylan, "Capital and State in Contemporary Turkey."
Khamsin. 11(1984), 33

3.2 The Post-1980 Period and Turkey's Articulation with the Globalization Process

The year 1980 marked a turning point for Turkey in many respects. In September 1980, a military coup took place, abolishing democratic institutions for a three-year period. In 1982, the new constitution was put into effect and a year later, in November 1983, a return to parliamentary procedures was realised. However, 1980 marked a much more intense shift for Turkey in economic, political and social terms, namely, the country's articulation to global capitalist process.

As stated in the previous section, in the late 1970s, Turkey experienced a high degree of economic and political instability. Import-substitution, the dominant economic model of accumulation in Turkey proved inefficient vis-a-vis the oil crisis and the country experienced a serious economic crisis. The political space was highly polarised and the weak coalition governments were unable to create political and economic stability.

The military came to power on the ground that democratic mechanisms were unable to overcome political instability and the economic crisis. The main objective was "to inject a substantial measure of stability into

the political system" and in this way, "to eliminate any potential threats to the consolidation of the market-oriented reform process by accomplishing a series of measures designed to depoliticise the economy."[84] Immediately, political parties, interest associations and labour unions were closed and the party leaders were banned from political activity.

The 1982 constitution was accepted and put into effect after a referendum. The constitution, quite different from its precedent, was marked with the limitation of the power of legislation, the increasing power of the executive and president, the decline in the independence of judiciary and the end of the autonomy of institutions like universities and TRT (Turkish Radio and Television).[85] Civic associations were restricted in their activities and social rights were strictly limited. Contrary to the 1961 Constitution, the 1982 Constitution, borrowing Binnaz Toprak's terms, aimed to strengthen the state against civil society.[86]

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[84] Ziya Öniş, "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: the Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective." *Third World Quarterly.* 18:4(1997), 749

[85] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Sivil Toplum ve Neopatrimonyal Siyaset," in *Küreselleşme, Sivil Toplum ve İslam*, eds. E. Fuat Keyman and A. Yaşar Sarıbay, (Ankara, Vadi Yayınları, 1998), 120

[86] Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey," in *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. A.R. Norton, (Leidon, E.J.Brill, 1996), 94

As Ziya Öniş claims, two actions taken by the military at the time had far-reaching consequences.[87] The first was the employment of Islam by the military elite as a means of social control. With the major aim of weakening the political power of the left, they formulated the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis', bringing together nationalist and religious elements. This new discourse was institutionalised in the 1982 Constitution through a set of parallel legislations such as compulsory religious education in primary and secondary schools. This was an important shift for Turkey, a shift of state identity from radical secularist to "neo-republican" in which Kemalist principles were no longer seen as the only means for providing national uniformity.[88] Although the employment of Islamic discourse, as Fuat Keyman puts it, "was considered by the regime to be a temporary and short-term pragmatic strategy to restructure the political and to restore the performative power of the Kemalist republican state", the move "weakened very conditions of existence of Kemalist nationalism and the

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[87] Ziya Öniş, "The Political Economy," 749

[88] F. Birtek and B. Toprak, "The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Hazards of Rewriting Turkish Modernity." *Praxis International*. 13(1993), 192-211

republican state."[89] As a result, although the military regime had a Kemalist orientation, it opened "a discursive space for the revitalisation of the language of difference, a discursive space which created a possibility for the marginalised and silenced identity to surface and express its resistance to the national secular identity."[90]

The second critical action of the military regime, according to Ziya Öniş, was the closure of political parties and the bans imposed on their leaders. Besides, a 10% national threshold in order to limit the participation of small parties, became a law. However, these measures, taken in order to maintain political stability, contributed to the further fragmentation of the party system with the return of the banned politicians to politics in 1987. The result was two separate parties on both centre right and centre left, hence, a relative weakening on both sides, providing an opportunity for more marginal parties.[91]

With the national elections of 1983, a return to parliamentary democracy was realised. In spite of the

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[89] E. Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism," 112

[90] Ibid., 113

[91] Ziya Öniş, "The Political Economy," 751

support of military regime for another party, the neo-liberal Motherland Party was the winner of the election. The Motherland Party represented an attempt "to synthesise market modernism and Muslim identity,"[92] with its loyalty to Muslim conservatism together with a strong commitment to economic liberalism. Turgut Özal, the head of the party, "represented the new identity and ideal, since he defined himself as both 'a Muslim and modern'."[93] In fact, the party's electoral success was partly the outcome of the discourse of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis employed by the military regime. Once in power, the party was further "instrumental in the integration of Islamists into Turkey's hierarchy of power and status, as the party had an influential Islamist clique within its leadership ranks."[94]

The post-1980 period marked important transformations with far-reaching consequences also in the economic sphere. The transformation of the Turkish economy gave its first signals with the declaration of a structural adjustment program in January 1980. The period beginning with the military intervention meant

[92] Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: the Case of Turkey," in Civil Society in the Middle East, ed. A.R. Norton, (Leidon, E.J.Brill, 1996), 30

[93] Ibid., 32

[94] Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society," 108

the realisation of the fact that Turkey had no alternative other than opening its economy to the West and the accompanying demand to be articulated with global capitalism unconditionally.[95] Hence, a new phase of adjustments under IMF directions took place. The traditional model of industrialisation through import-substitution was replaced with export-oriented growth through the free-market. Restrictions on imports were lifted, the Turkish lira was adjusted to international rates of exchange, and state subsidies were reduced. Much more emphasis was made on market forces, liberalisation of the economy and privatisation. The structural adjustment programs of the post-1980 period had important impacts on the Turkish economy. An increase in the sectoral share of industry in economy (from 23.8% in 1979 to 30.1% in 1992), in the share of total exports (from 2.7% in 1979 to 9.1% in 1992) and in the share of manufacturing exports within total exports (from 34.7% in 1979 to 82.8% in 1992) was experienced.[96]

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[95] Sevda Alankuş Kural, "Yeni Hayali Kimlikler," 90

[96] Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society," 102

The economic transformations of the post-1980 period had important social outcomes, too. For the first time in Republican history, the urban population exceeded the rural population. The urban culture, especially in metropolitan areas was opened to international influence. Through the spread of telephone lines and increasing usage of fax machines, computers, satellite broadcasts of international television companies, private televisions and radios, Turkish society was increasingly linked with the global communications network. The media gained an increasing strength in public-opinion making. There was also an increase in international travel. Hence, the economic transformations brought forth important changes in the social structure.

Up until 1980s, Kemalist principles and national identity determined the path to civilisation in Turkey. The constitution of the nation-state and the definition of national identity were deeply shaped by what Fuat Keyman calls, the Kemalist will to civilisation. As he notes, "the shift in industrialisation was in fact the transformation of the 'Kemalist will to civilisation' to 'civilisation via laissez-faire', which was fundamentally contradictory with the Kemalist image of the organic state." In this way, the post-1980 period

was marked not only with the export-oriented integration of Turkey to global capitalism, but also a growing crisis of Kemalist nationalism to reproduce its hegemony. [97]

3.3 Turkey in the Globalization Process

As it was noted above, the post-1980 period was marked by significant transformations in the Turkish Republic. One main reason of these overall transformations in economic, political and social spheres was the country's articulation to the global process beginning with 1980.

One major impact of this articulation through the transformation of economic model towards an export oriented one and the opening up of the Turkish economy to global capitalism, was the growing crisis of Kemalist ideology and national identity. The crisis was firstly initiated with the growing inability of Kemalist discourse to motivate the nation towards civilisation within the project of modernity. Furthermore, the 1980s were marked by the celebration of market economy and the globalization of

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[97] Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism," 111,112

communication and culture. Since the mid-1980s, Turkey experienced a process of increasing cultural encounters, both between its east and west and with the global culture as a whole. This has challenged the existing definitions of identity and created new conceptualisations of 'us' and the 'other'.[98] Therefore, such a crisis of Kemalism emerged simultaneously with another process in which the "total exposure of Turkish society to global modernity was radically transforming identity-conceptions and social configurations into ambivalence and uncertainty."[99] Hence, Turkey has experienced a period since 1983 in which many traditional values, conceptions and institutions, together with the basic premises of Kemalist nationalism and national identity have been questioned and challenged.[100]

One reflection of these questionings was the debate over the Second Republic, which will be evaluated in more detail below. Another parallel consequence was the rise of different identity definitions, which throughout the long history of the

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[98] Sevda Alankuş Kural, "Yeni Hayali Kimlikler," 90

[99] Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism," 113

[100] Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve İslam,* (İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 1995), 175

republic were neglected and kept in the private realm, and their accompanying struggle to exist in the public sphere. The rise of Islamic identity and Kurdish nationalism was the most significant developments in that sense, each of which deserves a separate evaluation in terms of its inner dynamics. Besides, Alevi identity and the feminist movement also became more visible in the public sphere. These new conceptions of identity were initiated by the process of globalization, through which large proportions of the population experienced a physical and cultural dislocation. These localities, as Sevda Alankuş Kural calls them, provided their holders with the feeling of belongingness and locatedness vis a vis the uncertainty and ambiguity caused by the global process.[101] On the other hand, all of these movements with their emphasis on 'difference' challenged the homogeneous, unifying definition of national identity by Kemalism. As Fuat Keyman claims:

> The present political landscape in Turkey exemplifies very clearly the tension between the universal and particular, where at stake is the clash between the secular national identity as the bearer of cultural homogenisation and the revitalization of the language of difference through the rise of Islam, the re-emergence of Kurdish nationalism in organised form, and the feminist movement that has been effective in

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[101] Sevda Alankuş Kural, "Yeni Hayali Kimlikler," 87

putting the 'women question' at the centre of the process of 'rewriting Turkish historiography'.[102]

In return, these developments have also contributed to the formation of a response, namely the simultaneous rise of Turkish nationalism, or as Tanıl Bora defines it, "the dark spring of nationalism."[103] This national awakening, which will be the main concern of the next chapter, was partly the result of the social and cultural dislocation caused by the globalization process and partly a reaction to the rise of identities. Hence, the period was marked by seemingly contradictory, but closely related developments.

3.3.1 The Second Republic Debates in Turkey

One of the reflections of the transformations caused by globalization in Turkey has been the debates over the Second Republic. The debates were initiated by a number of journalists and soon were joined by a number of social scientists and politicians. The supporters of the Second Republic criticised the anti-

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[102] Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism," 95

[103] Tanıl Bora, *Milliyetçiliğin Kara Baharı,* (İstanbul, Birikim Yayınları, 1995)

democratic structure of the Turkish State and Kemalist principles. They emphasised the necessity of establishing a new consensus. The main points of criticisms were the inefficient, huge and authoritarian state, the anti-democratic 1982 Constitution, the role of the military in politics, and the homogeneous conceptualisation of national identity by Kemalism. What the supporters of Second Republic proposed instead was a liberal economy and a minimal state, a new constitution, decentralisation, stronger civil society and a new approach in state-society relations.[104]

The criticism of Kemalist principles and national identity constituted one core of the Second Republic debate. Kemalist ideology was criticised for its emphasis on sameness and for trying to create a one-type population, namely a Turkish, Muslim, Sunni population. It was blamed for forcing the population to deny its own identity and culture. It was said that those identities which were banned for long years had now came to the surface again and Turkey was trying to get rid of the narrow suit that it was forced to put on. Hence, a new conceptualisation of national

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[104] Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar eds, *2. Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları*, (Ankara, Başak Yayınları, 1993), several places

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identity, taking also in consideration the Kurdish, Islamic, Alevi elements, was required.

The serious criticisms of Kemalism and its definition of national identity were quite new phenomena in Turkey. This was a step towards breaking a taboo in the society and a sign of the growing challenge to the hegemony of Kemalist discourse.

A simultaneous and related debate was initiated by Neo-Ottomanists who claimed that the world, after the collapse of socialism, has started to resemble its condition before the First World War, with only the Ottoman Empire missing. Especially, with the collapse of USSR, new opportunities appeared before Turkey to establish closer relations with the Turkic Republics, the Balkans and the Middle East. What Turkey should do was to develop an 'imperial vision', transcend the limits of *Misak-ı Milli* and increase its power in the region.[105]

Another related debate was initiated by an Islamist intellectual, Ali Bulaç, who proposed a reorganisation of society based on the model of the *Medina Agreement*. The model was based on the peaceful coexistence of different communities all with their own

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[105] Cengiz Çandar, in *2.Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları*, eds. Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar, (Ankara, Başak Yayınları, 1993), 103-106

law systems within society.[106] According to Bulaç's project, the model would constitute the base of the civil society. The proposal immediately promoted new debates with the participation of left-wing intellectuals, and marked the inclusion and contribution of Islamic intelligentsia to the debates around the discourse of identity and difference. As a result, "groups both within the Islamist and the secular intelligentsia have adopted a postmodernist discourse, the former arguing for a legal system based on separate law for different communities of belief, while the latter are questioning the universalist claims of the republic and calling for its dismantlement in favour of a decentralised 'Second Republic'."[107]

The significance of the debates on the Second Republic, Neo-Ottomanism and the Medina Agreement was that they were the reflections of the substantial transformations that the country had experienced through the process of globalization. The basic propositions brought forth in these debates were parallel to actual developments like the articulation

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[106] Ali Bulaç, "Sözleşme Temelinde Toplumsal Proje." *Birikim.* 40(1992)

[107] Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society," 111

of Turkey to global capitalism, the celebration of liberal economy, the rise of identities, and the challenges to Kemalist principles and national identity. As can be expected, the debates also created a large number of opponents, especially among the Kemalist intelligentsia, who doubted that through the changes proposed by the pro-group, the principle of secularism and the unitary structure of the nation-state would be jeopardised. This group generally employed the Kemalist understanding of the national identity as it was formulated in the early years of the republic -as a homogenous, ahistorical, stable entity. Nevertheless, the debates contributed to the creation of a discursive space where new issues, as well as the old ones that used to be taboos before, entered into the agenda of public debate.

3.3.2 The Rise of Islamic Identity in Turkey:

The post-1980 period, together with some other important developments, was also marked by the rise of Islamic identity and political Islam. Within the same period of time, in which "the social reconstruction of Turkish modernisation took important strides forward, the economy was radically liberalised, and a smooth

transition to a post-coup democratic regime was almost thoroughly accomplished, Islam also emerged as an important political variable."[108] Although the two developments seemed quite contradictory and it could be expected that the former set of developments should lead to a decline in the latter; in fact they were two different outcomes of the same process of transformation experienced in the post-1980 Turkey.

As noted above, one main reason behind the rise of Islam was its practical employment by the military regime to consolidate social and political stability and to weaken the power of the left. This move of the military regime unintentionally opened up the path for the revival of Islamic identity. Such developments like compulsory religion education and the increase in the number of schools giving religious education contributed deeply to this process. After the return to parliamentary politics, the Motherland Party, with its ideal of forming a synthesis between Islam and modernity, further accelerated this process. The developments were accompanied with the emergence of Islamic organisations (both in the form of political

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[108] F. Birtek and F. Toprak, "The Conflictual Agendas"

Party -the Welfare Party,[109] and Islamic brotherhoods)
and the increasing visibility of Islamic identity in
the public sphere. The turban affair, through which
Islamic women were made the representative of and the
display window for political Islam,[110] was the
crystallisation of this increasing visibility.

Along with these inner dynamics, globalization and
the social and cultural dislocation accompanying it,
contributed to a large extent to the rise of Islamic
identity. Not only did it cause a weakening of Kemalist
national identity but also it gave rise to religious
identity definitions and a resurgence of communitarian
loyalties, which provided a solid ground for
individuals against the flux and ambiguity that
globalization, has caused. As Fuat Keyman notes,
"Islamic discourse acted successfully as an
articulating principle of resistance to such
uncertainty by identifying ambivalence with global
modernity and certainty with community, that is, with a

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[109] During the course of this study, the Welfare Party, as a result
of the developments beginning in 28 February 1997 and with the
smooth intervention of military, was closed in 16 January 1998 by
a decision of the Constitutional Court and some of its leading
figures, including Erbakan, were banned to be a member of a
political party for a five-year period. The newly established
Virtue Party emerged as the party's successor.

[110] Sevda Alankuş Kural, "Türkiye'de Alternatif Kamular/Cemaatler
ve Islamcı Kadın Kimliği." *Toplum ve Bilim.* 72(Spring 1997), 9

turn to religion."[111] Hence Islam with its communitarian bounds, provided a shelter for the atomised individual, especially in the urban space where he faced the flux of modernity all alone and provided an answer to his "search for greater certainty, control and protection."[112] The religious community represented "a high degree of personal closeness, emotional depth and moral submission."[113] The rise of Welfare Party in the last decade was partly an outcome of this dynamic; and because it has found such a social ground for its ideology in urban places, it gained an important electoral victory especially in the metropolitan areas like Ankara and İstanbul.[114]

The Welfare Party, as a result of the above noted dynamics as well as some other factors such as the fragmentation of the party system and weakening of the centre and the inability of traditional parties to provide any solutions to the social, economic and

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[111] Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism," 113

[112] Ziya Öniş, "The Political Economy," 747

[113] Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve İslam*, 203

[114] Ibid., 203

cultural crisis, arose as a political force in 1990s.[115] The party made a Third-Worldist emphasis, favoured an economic model of 'just order', criticised the traditional definition of secularism and claimed to be 'truly secular', and employed an Islamic version of nationalism, portraying Turkey as the leader of the Islamic world. The party's ability "to differentiate itself sharply from the established parties of the political order", and to appear as an alternative "at a time when, as part of global trends, the sharp divisions between centre-right and social-democratic parties have largely been blurred", contributed largely to its electoral success.[116]

Further more, the party's organisational strength was also an important factor of its rise. The party employed "grassroots organisations and face-to-face contact" and established closed, personalised relations with the electorate.[117] Women's participation was crucial in forming such relations as they campaigned from home to home and hence "mobilised women's realm,

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[115] For an evaluation of the dynamics behind the rise of Welfare Party and the party's basic features, see Ruşen Çakır, Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi, Refah Partisini Anlamak, (İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 1994)

[116] Ziya Öniş, "The Political Economy," 755

[117] Ibid., 755

the interior, a space totally dismissed by the secular centrist parties."[118] Such a strategy of personalised relations was important in the increasing support of the party, especially at a time when the atomised individuals facing the flux of globalization, were in search for new sources of solidarity. Another source of electoral strength of the Welfare Party was Southeast Anatolia, where the Kurdish population was dense. One of the main reasons behind the appeal of Welfare Party to Kurdish population was, as noted by A.Y. Sarıbay,[119] the rise of religious nationalism which represented the shift from the ethnic group towards the religious community as the base of nationalism.

To sum up, apart from the internal factors, the rise of the political Islam in Turkey in the post-1980 period was to an important extent determined by transformations in social, cultural and economic sphere that took place as a result of the globalization process. Those transformations brought forth the dynamics of resurgence of Islamic identity in the public sphere and carried Islam from periphery to the centre.

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[118] Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism," 30

[119] Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve İslam*, 206

3.3.3 The Rise of Kurdish Nationalism:

The second development that challenged the unifying and homogeneous conceptualisation of national identity was the rise of Kurdish identity and nationalist movement. The Kurdish issue was not a new phenomenon in Turkey, and in fact had some of its roots in the Ottoman Empire and the early years of republic.[120] However, the developments that took place after the 1980 military coup, and the following social and cultural transformations initiated by the process of globalization gave new dynamics to the issue and contributed to the emergence of Kurdish question as a question of identity. The challenges to Kemalist national identity, the resurgence of local identities as a result of the dislocations caused by globalization and the cultural encounters through the communication networks, as in the case of the rise of Islamic identity, also acted as some of dynamics behind the rise of Kurdish nationalism.

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[120] Murat Belge, *Türkler ve Kürtler: Nereden Nereye?*, 1995; p.384-386

However, there was an important difference between the two cases. The employment of Islam and growing tolerance for it did not comply with the attitude taken towards the Kurdish question by the military regime. The "new tolerance for Islam…was not extended to the Kurdish cultural community for fear of national disintegration."[121] On the contrary, the military, as a reaction to the fragmentation of national unity prior to the 1980 take-over, employed a very intolerant attitude towards the issue, based on the denial of Kurdish existence as a distinct ethnic. Parallel to this, no expressions of Kurdish identity were allowed, and an effort was made to make the public believe that the Kurds were true Turks. Even a theory was formulated claiming that Kurds were mountain Turks, and their name has come from the sound of snow under their footsteps. Besides, the ban on Kurdish language was implemented strictly. Meanwhile, PKK was increasing its strength in the region, where all possible legal Kurdish opposition was suppressed by the military regime.

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[121] Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "Historicizing the Present and Problematizing the Future of the Kurdish Problem: A Critique of the TOBB Report on the Eastern Question." *New Perspectives on Turkey.* 14 (Spring 1996), 11

The first signal of a change in this denial approach came from the General Chief of Military when he explained why the solution of the problem in South East was taking a long time with its similarity with the Basque question in Spain or IRA in Ireland.[122] In 1991 Özal announced that laws would be amended to make the use of Kurdish possible and he himself initiated a debate about the possibility of federalism. He "seemed to look at Islam as a unifying identity over and above ethnic differences."[123]

A new step in the approach towards the Kurdish question was the publication of a report, "Eastern Question-Diagnoses and Facts" by Doğu Ergil under the sponsorship of an influential interest group, the Union of Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB).[124] The report combined "empirical and conceptual data to explain the roots and consequences of Kurdish nationalism" and tried "to portray Kurds in their own

[122] Murat Belge, *Türkler ve Kürtler*, 393

[123] Kevin Robins, "Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe" in Questions of Cultural Identity, ed. S. Hall and P. Du Gay, (London, Sage, 1996), 75

[124] Doğu Ergil, *Eastern Question-Diagnoses and Facts*, TOBB Report, July 1995

environment, speaking for themselves about their identity and present social reality." [125]

According to the report, the ethnic notion of Turkish nationalism, envisaging a homogeneous national identity, contributed to the rise of Kurdish nationalism. The Eastern question was put forward as a problem of identity, with a 40% population in the region referring to Kurdish ethnicity as the basis of their identity according to the report.[126] The rise of Kurdish nationalism was explained by the structural inequalities between east and west, as a result of uneven development.

However, the impact of globalization and the social and economic transformations accompanying it were neglected by the report. The new ideas of cultural difference and diversity accelerated by those processes, as well as the increasing contact of Kurds with both other parts of Turkey and the world as a result of migrations and communication networks contributed the emergence and recognition of the Kurdish question as an identity problem. As Sakallıoğlu

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[125] Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, " Historicizing the Present and Problematizing the Future," 3

[126] Ibid., 14

claims, "Kurdish nationalism is largely the product of

new ideas on the value of identity which a changing

global infrastructure has made available."[127]

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[127] Ibid., 15

CHAPTER IV

THE RISE OF NATIONALIST DISCOURSE

The developments that Turkey experienced in the post-1980 period with its articulation with global capitalism had important and far-reaching social and cultural outcomes. As a result of the dynamics of globalization which have promoted a cultural flux and uncertainty, a resurgence of identities like the Islamic and the Kurdish identity was witnessed. On the other hand, these developments challenged Kemalism's ability to reproduce its hegemony; Kemalist principles and definition of national identity were questioned by different groups in society. People started to "publicly debate and criticise the Kemalist doctrine as a patriarchal and anti-democratic imposition from above that has negated the historical and cultural experience of the people in Turkey. In a hitherto unprecedented tone, the Kemalist path of modernisation, far from being an exemplary success story, is declared a historical failure that undermined the normative order

Ottoman-Turkish society."[128] The Kemalist definition of
the nation as a homogeneous whole was no longer as
widely accepted as it used to be, and different groups
started to claim recognition for their differences. The
concept of "identity crisis" has become a popular tool
in explaining the post-1980 situation in Turkey. Hence,
one feature of the post-1980 period in Turkey was that
the religious and ethnic identities that were limited
to the private domain in order not to be a barrier in
front of the national identity building process of
Kemalism, have gained representation and visibility in
the public sphere and started to struggle for political
participation.[129]

However, all these developments did not point to a
decline or disappearance of Turkish nationalism. To the
contrary, the post-1980 period, marked with the rise of
identities, was also a period of rise for Turkish
nationalism. Globalization, not paradoxically,
encouraged and provoked nationalist tendencies.[130] As
noted earlier, these tendencies were partly the result

[128] S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba eds, *Rethinking Modernity and
National Identity in Turkey*, (Seattle, University of Washington
Press, 1997),4

[129] Sevda Alankuş Kural, "Türkiye'de Alternatif Kamular/Cemaatler,"
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[130] Tanıl Bora, "Melez Bir Dilin Kalın ve Düzensiz Lugatı," 10

of the cultural dislocation caused by globalization and partly a response to the 'rise of identities'. The phobia of dissolution and separation has, from the beginning, been a constitutive element of Turkish nationalism. As Nilüfer Göle puts it,

> The shared aversion of the intelligentsia and the army to the autonomization of civil society in politics- whether expressed through Islamism, Kurdish identity, leftist ideology or liberalism- shaped Kemalism, the ideology underpinning the Turkish mode of Westernisation. Throughout Republican history, these four phobias -whose relative importance varied with the conjuncture- constituted the ideological rationale for political authoritarianism.[131]

Now, with the rise of different identities, this phobia has turned into paranoia, perceiving any demand for political representation and participation from these groups as a challenge to the unity of the nation, a process which in turn, further accelerated the nationalist tendencies.

Further more, the nationalist elites are not willing to share their power with any other authority neither from belove or from above. The elites in the nation-states like Turkey, which formed their national integrity with the second wave of nationalism, could only constituted their power quite recently and could not enjoy its adventeges fully yet. Therefore, they do

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[131] Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism," 20

not want to share it with another authority. Under these circumstances, the cultural demands of local identities and their struggle to exist in the public sphere with their differences is perceived by the nationalist elites as a threat and provocation.[132]

Although the current situation involves a challenge to the nationalist discourse, it also accommodates new opportunities. As Can Kozanoğlu rightly claims, the loose structure of the language of nationalism enables it to articulate with almost all the different conceptualisations of identity.[133] As a result of this loose structure, both the Islamic discourse and the Kurdish movement employ nationalist elements in different degrees. Therefore, the nationalist discourse, either in its Kemalist version or in a new form, has an opportunity to reassure its hegemony by articulating with these different conceptualisations of identity. In this struggle for hegemony, there are different versions of nationalism competing with each other. Here, the classification

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[132] Sevda Alankuş Kural, "Yeni Hayali Kimlikler," 92

[133] Can Kozanoğlu, *Pop Çağı Ateşi*, (İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 1995)

made by Tanıl Bora will be followed to examine these different versions of nationalism.[134]

The first version of nationalism is the official nationalism. The official nationalism is marked by a tension between its civic elements and ethnic/cultural elements. The nationalist rituals have a vital importance. In spite of this, the official nationalist discourse has an artificial, cold impression and is not very attractive to the masses. With the 1990s, a spread and popularisation of the symbols of official nationalism, like Turkish flag, map, Turkish national anthem and Atatürk portraits, was witnessed. This was partly due to the rise of Welfare Party and the attitudes of some of its members against Atatürk and partly to the growing nationalist tendency against Kurdish question. Despite this popularisation of symbols, state-centred nationalism preserves its coldness and can not evolve into a mode of mass participation and motivation. However, official nationalism continues to be a source of legitimation and hence to legitimise itself- especially through its

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[134] Tanıl Bora, "Melez Bir Dilin Kalın ve Düzensiz Lugatı," 12-22

relation with more popular and exciting versions of nationalism.[135]

A second version of nationalism is offered by the left. Although there were serious challenges to Kemalism from the social democratic intelligentsia during the 1980s, it regained its strength in 1990s among left. This was a reaction against the New-Right hegemony, the rise of Islam and the anti-Kemalist attitudes. This new Kemalists claimed that Kemalism was excluded by the military rule after 1980 coup, and was no longer the official ideology. Secularism was the key element of the demand for a Kemalist restructuring against religious revival. In fact, nationalism was functional for making secularism more popular and for forming a basis of cooperation with the state and army against the rising religious threat. Hence, nationalism has been a tool to articulate neo-Kemalism with the official one.[136]

The third version is the liberal neo-nationalism of the post 1980 period. It defines national identity on the basis of the motivation and potential for Westernisation. Its basis is the will for civilisation

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[135] Ibid., 12-14

[136] Ibid., 14,15

and economic development. The supporters of the liberal nationalism are especially among the media, liberal and conservative intelligentsia, the new urban middle-classes, and the sector of capitalists that have articulated with international capital. Economy has a privileged place in this discourse. Economic dynamism is the main source of national pride. However, the main measure of this dynamism is the level of approximation with world markets in terms of consumption. The measure of civilisation and compliance with universal culture becomes the consumption habits. The most emphasised figure of this Euro-Turkish nationalism is the youth-especially urban upper or middle class youth. Even the physical outlook of the young urban population becomes a material for liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalism, while taking consumption as the indicator of modernisation, at the same time replaces high culture with popular culture. Hence, it carries the nationalist tendency to the domain of popular culture. In this way it distances itself, on the one hand, from the coldness of official nationalism and on the other, from the extremity of ethnic nationalism. Besides, with its appeal through media, its popularity and its yet loose structure, it carries the opportunity to

articulate with other nationalisms and to become the dominant version.[137]

The radical Turkish nationalism offers the fourth version of nationalist discourse. It rests on an ahistorical perception of the nation. It is mainly represented by National Movement Party and *Ülkücü* Movement. In the 1980s, parallel to the developments after the military coup, Islam was emphasised as a constitutive element of national identity by radical nationalism. In 1990s, the stress on Islam diminished and ethnical elements rised again as a result of the growing reaction Kurdish movement and the rise of pan-Turkism, which became more rational due to the external developments. On the basis of pan-Turkism and the support to the state against Kurdish nationalism, radical nationalism rehabilitated its relation with official nationalism. In this way, it came closer to both the state and the political centre and at the same time increased its popularity. Hence, it softened its extremist impression, and normalised. *Ülkücü* movement started to gain support among the urban upper and

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[137] Ibid., 16-20

middle class youth. The symbols of radical nationalism popularised and the movement modernised itself.[138]

It can be said that a fifth version of nationalism is offered by the Islamic movement and the Welfare party. In spite of the internationalist tendencies embedded in Islam, the party makes significant nationalist references. The basis of this nationalist reference is that Turkey is seen as the potential leader of Muslim world. However, the internationalism of Islam weakens the position of the party in the race of nationalism. However, this very characteristic of the party, namely its religious nationalism contributes to its appeal to Kurdish population.[139]

In this multiplicity of nationalist discourses, there emerges new hybrid languages, coalitions between the traditionally contradictory world-views and the boundaries between left and right become even more blurred. In the struggle for hegemony, the new nationalism of post-1980 period, what Tanıl Bora calls liberal nationalism, seems to have more chance than the other versions of nationalism, with its loose structure and appeal to the masses.[140] This appeal is crystallised

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[138] Ibid., 20,21

[139] Ibid., 22

[140] Ibid., 16-20

in the popularisation of nationalist symbols in the related period, such as the Turkish flags and Atatürk portraits. On the other hand, the official and radical nationalisms have the advantage of a more holistic discourse and a more developed response against the challenge of Kurdish movement. The growing fear of *Sharia*, further more, dresses the nationalist discourses employing secularism as a basic principle with a growing strength. Besides, it is quite difficult to predict the way in which religious nationalism will evolve at the moment.

To sum up, Turkey in the 1990s is experiencing a struggle for hegemony among different nationalist discourses. As a result of the process globalization, what is at stake is a process of articulation that will result in a new hegemony whose form is impossible to predict at the moment.[141]

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[141] Sevda Alankuş Kural, "Yeni Hayali Kimlikler," 87

CONCLUSION

Globalization, although not a totally new phenomenon, has been a process that had significant transforming influences on many aspects of life in the last decades. It is a twofold process, including both dynamics of cultural homogenisation and cultural heterogenisation. As a result of this contradictory dynamics, globalization has far-reaching effects on nation-states and the national identities on which they were built. Globalization, on the one hand, has challenged the sovereignty claim of nation-states in a world shaped by international dynamics to an important point. On the other hand, it has let to a fragmentation of the homogeneous cultures of nation-states and the re-emergence of local identities. Hence, the nation-state and the national identity through which it was legitimised were challenged from two different dimensions, from above through international dynamics and cultural homogenisation, and from below through the resurgence of local identities with their fragmenting effect on the homogeneous national identity.

In Turkey, Kemalism, as the main carrier of Turkish modernisation, was also based on such a

definition of national identity as a homogeneous, integrated entity. Built within the general framework of Western positivism and Enlightenment, national identity was defined as a homogenious, monolithic entity. Ethnic and class based differences were ignored and the population was seen from the point of sameness. Religion was not employed as a defining element of national identity and it was limited to the private sphere.

Defined on these grounds, Kemalist national identity is challenged by different dynamics today. First of all, its claim to modernisation and the state's role as the agent of that modernisation has been loosing its credibility. The claim to homogeneity has been questioned by different groups. As the Kurdish and Islamic movements accelerate and become more and more visible in the public sphere; we become more aware that we are not a homogenious whole as we used to think. We realise our differences and alternative definitions of collective identity are on the scene, competing with each other to become dominant.

The emergence of such challenges and alternative definitions of national identity were mainly a development of the post 1980 period in Turkey. The developments that Turkey experienced in the post-1980

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period and its articulation with global capitalism had important and far-reaching social and cultural outcomes. As a result of the dynamics of globalization which have promoted a cultural flux and uncertainty, a resurgence of identities like the Islamic and the Kurdish identity was witnessed. On the other hand, the developments challenged Kemalism's ability to reproduce its hegemony and the Kemalist principles and definition of national identity were questioned by different groups in society.

Consequently, as mentioned throughout the thesis, "identity crisis" as a prominent concept has become one of the major topics in the political agenda in the last two decades. Hence, one peculiarity of the post-1980 period was that the religious and ethnic identities that were limited to the private domain started to claim recognition for their differences and representation in the public sphere. However, all these developments did not point to a decline or disappearance of Turkish nationalism. To the contrary, the post-1980 period, marked with the rise of identities, was also a period of rise for Turkish nationalism. Globalization, not paradoxically,

encouraged and provoked nationalist tendencies.[142]

Besides, the loose structure of nationalist discourse

enabled it to articulate with different definitions of

collective identity. Both the Islamic discourse and the

Kurdish movement appear to employ nationalist elements

in different degrees. Hence, the nationalist discourse,

either in its Kemalist version or in a new form, has

gained a new opportunity to reassure its hegemony by

articulating with these different conceptualisations of

identity.

To sum up, as a result of the dislocations and

relocations caused by the process globalization, Turkey

in the 1990s, is experiencing a process of articulation

that will result in a new hegemony whose form is

impossible to predict at the moment. The national

identities are in a process of transformation and

redefiniton both in the world and in Turkey. Such a

process may result in a widening of democratic

principles and a new definition of national identity

that can cope up with the represantation of differences

in the public sphere. However, the opportunity may also

turn into a misfortune. Keeping in mind that those

ethnic or religious groups, which struggle for

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[142] Tanıl Bora, "Melez Bir Dilin Kalın ve Düzensiz Lugatı," 10

representation, do impose a pressure of homogenisation upon their own members, it would be misleading to expect that democracy will be the inevitable outcome of the recognition of differences.

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