

Mapping the Body:
Major Conceptions of Human Embodiment
from the West

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
GRAPHIC DESIGN
AND THE INSTITUTE OF FINE ARTS
OF BILKENT UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF FINE ARTS

by
Ahmet Murat Ayas
May, 1998

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
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
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ABSTRACT

Mapping the Body: Major Conceptions of Human Embodiment from the West

Ahmet Murat Ayaş

M.F.A. in Graphical Arts

Supervisor: Assist.Prof.Dr. Mahmut Mutman

May, 1998

Within the humanistic and social sciences of western world, the human body, the state of being embodied, and the indelible interrelatedness of mind and the body have long been neglected in favour of the mind that is supposedly self-contained. The major reasons for that are claimed to be the philosophy of Cartesianism and mainstream Structuralism that foster the hegemony of dichotomous thought, which asserts that mind and the body are clearly distinct. Deconstructionist tools, however, have showed the impossibility of such an unequivocal distinction as well as pure totality and isolated presence. The main theme of this study is to map the major western conceptions that either implicitly or explicitly have developed notions of the body and embodiment which are in various fashions away from the constraints which have opposed the body to mind or which have considered the body as closed, universal, nonhistorical biological entity. The notions that are developed in that way have the capacity to show that the body, as much as the psyche and the subject, is both cultural and historical product bearing peculiar natural qualities that position it as both an object and subject with powers of being affected and to affect the others. The study concludes with a discussion on the significance and importance of the need to develop an adequate understanding of the body that eventually would enrich the ethical and political actions as well as the approach to art, design and architecture.

Keywords: Body, Embodiment, Dichotomy, Deconstruction, Western Philosophy

ÖZET

Bedenin Haritasını çıkarmak: İnsan Bedenselliği Üzerine Batıdan Başlıca Görüşler

Ahmet Murat Ayaş
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü
Yüksek Lisans

Tez Yöneticisi: Yard.Doç.Dr. Mahmut Mutman
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Batının insan ve sosyal bilimlerinin gelişiminden bu yana beden, bedenselliğin nitelikleri ve akıl ile beden ayrılmaz ve gerekli ilişkisi güya-kendine-yeterli-aklı tek yanlı olarak öne çıkaracak şekilde ihmal edilmiştir. Bu durumun, akıl ve beden kesin ve temiz ayrımını iddia eden ikili karşıtlıklar düşüncesinin egemenlik oluşturmasına önyak olan Kartezyenizm ve Yapısalcılık felsefesinden kaynaklandığı öne sürülmektedir. Parçala(n)ma düşüncesi ise böylesine tartışılmaz bir ayrımın, aynen saf bütünlük ve yalıtılmış mevcudiyet gibi, mümkün olamayacağını göstermiştir. Bu çalışmanın ana konusu, batının bu kısıtlamalardan uzaklaşarak akıl ile beden karşıtlığına ve bedenin salt kapalı, evrensel, ve tarihsellsiz bir biyolojik varlık olduğu görüşüne aykırı olarak gelişen başlıca görüşlerinin haritasını çıkarmaktır. Bu yönde gelişen görüşlerde bedenin, tıpkı ruh ve özne gibi, özellikli doğal nitelikleri ile hem nesne ve hem de özne olarak tesir etme ve edilme kudretine sahip bir kültürel ve tarihsel sonuç olduğu fikri bir gizilgüç olarak bulunmaktadır. Çalışmanın sonuç bölümünde beden hakkında uygun bir anlayışın geliştirilmesine olan gereksinimin önemi ve manası tartışılarak bu anlayışın nihayetinde sanat, tasarım ve mimarlıkta olduğu kadar etik ve politik hareketlerdeki olası zenginleştiriciliği de ima edilmiştir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Beden, Bedensellik, İkili karşıtlıklar, Parçala(n)ma (Dekonstrüksiyon), Batı Felsefesi.

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Dedicated to Mübeccel Tekin and Ömer Faruk Tekin, my parents.

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Introduction

The body is *the* keyword, on which a variety of most stimulating, heated debates hinge; yet at the same time, which, astonishing as it may be, is still the bearer of the most obviously taken for granted “constituent” of human being in certain fields of knowledges. The body, in the first instance, may seem to imply an undeniable, genuine, trustworthy “reality” (be it a conceptual or physical one) which has concerted unity, entirety, wholeness, and oneness. However, as the expanding debates on it demonstrate, and as the rigorous studies on the body claim, this is an illusory “reality”; there is neither a totality nor a harmony pertaining to the conception, and the physical or psychical peculiarities of the body. It is an enigmatic, puzzling, elaborate compound that never ceases moving, doing, and becoming. It is slippery as much as it is concrete. It is among the most complex, complicated, multifaceted “subject matters” of any institutionalized discipline or any cultural-social discourse, that the further the “inquiries” on it, the more indeterminable, indefinable, unknown, and even, the more unfamiliar, obscure, mysterious the body is to “us”¹.

¹ Bryan Turner, being one of the most productive and among the earliest scholars that has written and drawn attention on various aspects of the human embodiment, body-image, and the body since the 1980s, “admits” in the introduction of his latest publication that “In

The body, when taken as a keyword can lead one to extensive quantity of theoretical and practical works and researches which have been conducted within a variety of disciplines. Regardless of whether these disciplines may fall under the domain of natural/positive sciences (medicine, biology, psychology, biochemistry, etc.), or humanistic/social sciences (philosophy, sociology, anthropology, geography, history, etc.), one common point that is noticed immediately and inevitably is the *diversity of the conceptions* in respect to the body. This is regarded as a natural consequence of the distinction of the knowledges into *specific, defined, and distinct* areas that emerged after the Enlightenment and crystallized after nineteenth century. Thereupon, in most of the recent works focused on various aspects of the body, the production of fragmentary knowledges on the body as such is generally criticized for being an impediment to a more comprehensive and richer understanding of the body in its full *complexity* (Elliott 1992, Shilling 1993, Falk 1994, Grosz 1994, 1995, Pile and Thrift 1995, Pile 1996, Gatens 1996, Turner 1992, 1994, 1996).

The diversity and variety in the construction of the conceptions, approaches, frameworks, boundaries, and priorities –in short, any methodological and contextual determinant that one can think of– those of the works even within the same discipline is striking. This diversity is particularly noteworthy considering the studies that are related to the body of the “established fields of knowledges” (the disciplines) that fall under the realm of humanities and social sciences.

writing this study on the body, I have become increasingly less sure of what the body is” (1996: 42).

However, it would not be fair to claim that this is true solely in this peculiar subject matter, i.e. the body. There are other closely related and intensively used “keywords” or “concepts” adhered to the body, which exhibit the very same fate of being the source of diverse offshoots, and being subjected to varied approaches. Most remarkable of them are self, person, subject(ivity), representation, and identity. Then comes a set of contexts: space, time, sex, gender, technology, difference, and alike, which are somehow at one point, always connected with the body, embodiment, and (situated) corporeality.

The fuzziness of the boundaries, and merging of the problem fields of the social sciences are generally considered as a consequence of the pluralistic view of (post)modernity. In accordance to that, notably since the 1980s there have emerged an increasing number of new fields of knowledge that are self-appointed and self-ruling with self-formulated problems rather than being an annex to the territory of the institutionalised disciplines. Cultural studies, feminist studies, queer studies, gender studies, women studies, media studies, contemporary studies, and alike can be claimed to be of this kind, which have definitely gained greater acceleration with the thrust of the twentieth century philosophy and its epidemic, yet mostly implicit, ramifications. It is, in these studies, which are mainly concerned with the contemporary culture and the problematic fields within it, that we encounter, most explicitly and boldly, with the questions of the body. Body piercing, gym, rave dancing, fashion, health food, etc. as the signs of the acknowledgment of the body in popular culture are examined in these studies which are always contextual (Grossberg et al. 1992: 1-22). I will refer to the impact of these studies in chapter one, but will not follow their contextual approach, as this study’s approach is from a more general

and philosophical view. Yet, in terms of methodology, it is somewhat similar to that of cultural studies; it is “alchemical”.

Scope, Objective, and Ethics

Within the given context and boundaries of this work (spatial-temporal and practical-theoretical), the scope and objective have been restricted to a portion of what I have intended initially. However, apart from the mentioned boundaries, the primary factor that has limited my appetite, has stemmed from the unanticipated vastness, vagueness and multi-facetedness of the subject matter. Initially I attempted to work on the body, as it is situated in urban space and experiencing sequence of spaces and connections at various dimensions and levels within the city. However, as the theories and critiques of the conceptions on the body have gaps and unexplored territories in its relatively short history, the grounds that a study can be founded on is remarkably slippery. Therefore, as I gradually understand it, any study that takes the body in a specific context requires a conscientious work solely on the body before going beyond it.

An attempt to accomplish a theoretical study on the human body, embodiment and/or situatedness of the corporeality is not an easy task: even if it is anthological as this work tries to be one. The task of theorizing the body has peculiar complications that are emanated from the historical and philosophical inadequacies. Such a task would bring along its paradoxical, hermetic nodes, and black holes as one would carry it forward and carry it through, and it certainly would be full of hardship.

The complexity of the human body, in addition to its omni-presence and/or omni-absence (or perhaps absent presence) in the theoretical and practical fields of established knowledges, which has significant inadequacies, has forced me to make decisions, or precisely more passively, make choices in the beginning of the study.

The first choice is made on the “type” of the body that will be studied as being the basic determinant of the scope. The “type” of the human body in this study will, inevitably, be taken in its “most contemporary-basic”, yet broadest form. The body I envisage, and I believe it can be broadly defined, is a body “of” a “modern”, self-reflexive “subject” that lives in a capitalist-consumer-communication-technological environment. None the less, this is definitely not for the sake of advocating any form of essentialist, reductionist stance, nor to defy the possibility of the multiplicity of the bodies, but for the sake of practicality. The peculiarities of the “other types of bodies”; those of men, women, queer, white, black, brown, teenager, elder, urban, rural, anti-capitalist, anti-consuming, pathological and so on, were not denied. However, it is accepted as all the “types of the bodies” are having common natural and socio-cultural aspects, at least at a certain period of their lives. I am aware that this assumption may inhere, unpreventably, a series of intrinsic/inscribed presumptions, or may not avoid the possibility of the body that is studied becomes the body that may bear some discrete qualities (those of man’s body, or white-man’s, or capitalist-white-man’s, and so on). The study is not historical as well, although some of the accounts on the body that I refer have been assumed to take their places in history e.g., Spinoza, Nietzsche. As being a novice to the “subject matter”, which itself is in fact considered as “untouched”, this awareness triggered the second inevitable choice.

Second choice has resulted or rather crystallized in the “field of knowledge” that is employed in the study, which will shape the theoretical framework and the objective. In the first instance, the subject matter, adhered to the notions mentioned above, implies that it should be better studied within the realm of social sciences, particularly anthropology and/or sociology. Yet, such a choice requires a more or less defined context that brings along additional concepts and limitations within its discourse which this study can not cover due to its limitations. Since I strive to explore the conceptions of the human body in a scope as broad as possible in the first place, I have come to an understanding that it requires employing philosophical tools and models. I believe for a study as such, philosophical tools would supply the most appropriate and effective method. Therefore, to conduct a research on the significance and role of the body in relation to self, to society, and to culture, in an anthological approach that comprises the major and most influential philosophical conceptions of the body is the objective of this study. The nature of this research is not that of a comparative sort, although in certain points some comparisons are made. Only the philosophical conceptions of the west are studied within a methodology that is described in the next subsection.

Although the format of the text closely follows the MLA handbook, there are deviations from the restrictions posed by it: the use of language, punctuation, and mechanics of writing in a personal style is unavoidable, which hopefully would not be disruptive. In order to avoid sexism, the feminine pronoun is used instead of masculine pronoun, sometimes the pronoun “it” is used for substituting “the subject”, “human being”, “the body”. Words or word groups are italicized when a particular need for accentuation is aroused. Double inverted commas, apart from the ones used for incorporated quotations, are used for emphasizing a certain meaning of

the word as well as a certain shift in the meaning. Footnotes are generally used for two purposes: i) in order to convey additional information that is not necessarily to be incorporated with the main text, or to draw attention and to guide the reader to a connection and affinity with another source and idea. ii) In a more personal manner, in order to comment on the offshoots that the idea or concept at that specific point has evoked.

Methodological Framework

What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields, the removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum opening of bodies without organs onto a plane of consistency. It is itself a part of the rhizome. The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 12)

Yet, still, mapping the human body and all the adherent notions to it (such as corporeality, subject, self, person, identity) is not easy. The difficulty arises from the fact that the body neither does have precise boundaries, nor stable form and position through time and space. The body is literally and culturally moving, changing. It is transforming and it transforms since it is both the agency and active part of the structure. The body acts and performs, it establish linkages, connections in time and space, when it is located or moving, it always and already encountering, feeling, being, and doing.

However, mapping has certain qualities that are relatively more appropriate in comparison to tracing of or giving definitions to the body. In contra to the Enlightenment idea that assumes everything can be surveyed and pinned down, in mapping, if taken as a wayfinding, the unclear boundaries and changing relations and connections of the body can be considered as ever-occurring, and thus no specific objective should be anticipated that is aimed for fixed definitions, but for possibilities. Mapping as an activity requires one to cover certain positions that constitute the field rather than looking down at it from a transcendental position high in the sky.

A map, as Deleuze and Guattari says, is “an experimentation in contact with the real”, and this study should be considered as such as well. Despite the anthological nature it bears, which is more apparent through the first three chapters, it is always possible to detect the attempts of experimentation (which sometimes are made quite idiosyncratically) throughout the study, and particularly in the “conclusion” chapter. In such a spirit and tone, the study tries to demonstrate the “landmarks” within the territory. It does not intend to show everything, but what the cartographer has seen during his travel and has chosen to show. There can be always different maps that (when read as separate layers) may show various qualities and quantities of the territory. Maps also may vary through time. Yet, all these maps can be read as not being opposed to each other but as transparent layers that can be complementary when put on each other, they then constitute an “atlas”. Nevertheless, I am not claiming to be an “Atlas” that bears the whole range of

questions regarding the body for the time being². My map, hopefully, will be one of my personal major maps within the atlas of the body that I am intended to gather up in the future.

A map of a territory may show discrete and apparent geographical topographies (cf. psychical topographies of Freud and Lacan), another one may be for social-political-administrative boundaries that show the distribution and effects of power (cf. works of Nietzsche and Foucault), another one may be for underground resources, caves, and movement of underground rivers and their connections (cf. Deleuze and Guattari's *Body*). A map, it must be noted, by definition, can not cover and convey everything, and certainly can not represent fully the "real territory" in its plenitude and complexity. Nevertheless, it can always be used as a guide before and during a journey, and as a source that helps one to "imagine" that territory. To claim otherwise, as in Borges's story, leads one to a paradoxical mapping that eventually produces a map that would be one-to-one scale.

A map may show the qualities of territories, connections and relations between the regions, areas, fields, in terms of proximity, affinity and gap. It, more importantly, implies circumstances and possibilities. In accordance to that, my question is not, "what is the body?", as the body as a "sign" or "trace" have escaped and will always escape that question (see Derrida *Deconstructing*)³.

² Atlas (not atlas) is a Titan, condemned by Zeus to support the sky on his shoulders, a person who supports a heavy burden; mainstay.

³ Derrida says, "the sign is that ill-named thing, the only one that escapes the instituting question of philosophy: 'what is . . .?'" (1976: 19).

I am, now, intending to embark a journey in order to draw this initial map that will guide me to find my way by drawing attention to landmarks, circumstances and possibilities. I hope I will be able to use it as a map, as a layer of a broader atlas that I wish to start studying on in the near future.

This prospective map/layer will have (re)marks (on) of the connections of the body that is situated in a context of striated/smooth space, particularly architecturally constructed urban space.

1 The Body

There has been an accelerated, or rather unprecedented attention and concern –in terms of its epidemic influence–, in the human body since the 1980s. There has been a growing interest in rethinking and theorizing the human body particularly within the scholarly disciplines of humanistic and social sciences, which have evolved hand in hand with the acknowledgment of the body within the popular realm and everyday life of the capitalist-(post)modern culture.

In the beginning –that was in 1980s–, “it was possible to argue that the body was a topic which had been systematically and seriously neglected in the social sciences” (Turner 1994: vii). However, straightaway, the number of articles on the body-related issues that were published in a variety of social science journals and in those of that emerged as the extension of the British cultural studies has increased at an unforeseen rate. Thereupon, the contexts of the debated issues in those articles that were heated as they hinged on the popular-social realm, to the body and bodily matters have begun to be crystallized. Broadly, the issues of the body were contextualized as follows: the feminist, women, and queer studies; the complex legal and ethical questions of the new medical technologies; the development of the virtual reality techniques and the epidemic of the user friendly PC; the overwhelming visual environment created by the media and telecommunications; the increasing use of cybernetic organisms for industrial and military purposes; and the development of an aesthetics of the narcissistic body in consumer culture (Turner 1994: vii).

The emergence of the books on the body and bodily matters, then, has followed these sporadic articles as the concentrated outcome of their intellectual accumulation¹. These books were, in general, largely influenced by the re-reading of the works of Baruch Spinoza, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty along with the impetus of the growing criticism of the Cartesian view in philosophy initiated by Edmund Husserl's studies and by Martin Heidegger's critique of metaphysics (Turner 1994: viii) and elaborated by philosophers, most prominently, by Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze.

These books' main concerns, one must note as it is the point I make here, were condensed around the *contexts* that I mentioned in the previous paragraphs. Yet, it would not be just to claim that there had been no works *related* to the bodies prior to them. What is new and significant about these works, however, is their context: it is the situated corporeality of the (post)modern subject; the conditions and reality of the embodiment of the human being in its sociality; the representation of the narcissistic carnality; the implicit conceptions of science, industry, and media on the body. The concepts that are largely questioned in these studies in addition to the body include primarily the self, person, identity, and subject(ivity). The earlier studies of the pre-1980s period, which had *referred* to the body, were predominantly questioning the predetermined problematic nodes *within* their institutionalized disciplines and the body has always remained as a potential site from where the

¹ Major studies on the body that have published in this period were: David Armstrong's The Political Anatomy of the Body (1983), Don Johnson's Body (1983), Bryan Turner's The Body and The Society (1984), Francis Baker's The Tremulous Private Body (1984), John O'Neill's Five Bodies (1985) and The Communicative Body (1989), Emily Martin's The Woman in the Body (1987).

examples could be drawn (such as anthropology and ethnography of the “uncivilized” societies, sociology of religion, etc.)². Most of the recent approaches concerning the body which created a wide spread effect with their relatively “alchemical” methodology (that usually combines philosophy with its own discourse) are from a “broader” and different “area” of interest, precisely from that of cultural studies that has emerged in mid 1960s at the Center for Contemporary Studies at Birmingham. However, the conventional indirect approach to the body in a way has not been significantly challenged as these studies are more focused on certain problematic nodes in *specific* contexts (feminism, power of the state, subordination of the other, etc.). There are extremely few figures that consistently try to write on exclusively the body in a *variety* of fields. The formation of the body itself *and* the formation of the conceptions on the body *both* in its natural and cultural aspects are yet to be questioned³.

Fragments for a History of the Human Body edited by Michel Feher *et al.* in 1989 is the compilation made up of three large volumes that demonstrates the quality and divergence of the studies on the body has reached far beyond than it was anticipated. This voluminous study can be considered as the precursor and sign of the forthcoming works which have either strived to concentrate on the corporeal “reality” of the human being in a certain socially problematic context or endeavoured

² Such as Mary Douglas’s Purity and Danger (1966), and Natural Symbols (1970), and before that, the works of Claude Lévi-Strauss, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss and Robert Hertz (Turner 1994: viii).

³ Perhaps the most significant among them is Elizabeth Grosz although she is usually categorized as being only a feminist writer. She writes, however, on the body in a great

to map the philosophical, psychoanalytical and/or social notions and conceptions of the body⁴. Hence, today, it is not possible to persist with Turner's claim ("it was possible to argue that the body was a topic which had been systematically and seriously neglected in the social sciences") any longer. Nevertheless to the same degree, it is not either possible to claim that we have a coherent and comprehensive theory of the body which would address the huge range of problems relating to the issue of human embodiment, the body, and the body image⁵.

This is definitely true even if one can assert that, following Hwa Yol Jung, "writing the body has become rather modish and proliferated in recent years" (1996: 16). However, Jung himself immediately admits that: "the philosophical question of the body still remains fragmentary and escapes any systematic inquiry" (1996: 17). Therefore, I suggest to proceed with exploring the points in western philosophy from which this inadequacy stemmed: i.e., Cartesianism and mainstream structuralism, as they are largely claimed to be the two major *raison d'être* of the accelerated debates on the body.

diversity, her contextual concerns have a variety that shifts from architecture to science, from technology to sex, from feminism to psychoanalysis.

⁴ See the Selected Bibliography.

⁵ This is perhaps the only point that everyone unequivocally shares and puts forth among who writes on and around the bodily issues. The authors of the books that I have consulted or scanned (not only the ones I cited) touch this point as "lack" and/or "neglect", thus propose her own way of proceeding accordingly. I will refer to the sources of this lack by giving examples in the following paragraphs.

1.1 Disembodied Descartes

*Cogito ergo sum*⁶.

Why was there an apparent absence of sociological interest in the body until very recently? Why has there been this recent development of interest in the subject, an interest by no means confined to sociological writings but to be found across a wide spectrum of social science disciplines? (Scott and Morgan 1993: 1)

Scott and Morgan asked these questions in 1993 while they were trying to map the recent sociological concern for human body. One year prior to that, on the back cover of Bryan Turner's book Regulating Bodies: Essays in Medical Sociology there was a similar question: "Why has sociology systematically neglected the most elementary fact of human existence, our embodiment?" (1992). "The mystery of the body is not solved by any biological or physiological knowledge –which is in fact only one mode of objectivizing the body in a certain epistemic discourse" writes Pasi Falk to show the inadequacy of the natural sciences in understanding the body (1994: 1). Falk, yet points out the social sciences have also been ignorant to the body through its abstraction of the human being as a mere agent or actor: "turning the body into a blind-spot, is characteristic of the sociological tradition, from the classics onwards" (1994:2). Chris Shilling makes a similar point: he states that sociology "has adapted a disembodied approach towards its subject matter" because bodies were regarded as "both natural and individual possessions which lay outside of the legitimate social concerns of the discipline" (1993: 19). Bryan Turner, accepting this inadequacy, coins

⁶ René Descartes in Discourse on Method. *Cogito ergo sum*: I think therefore I exist.

the term “somatic society” and proposes a research agenda in order to describe how the body in modern social systems has become “the principal field of political and cultural activity” (1992: 12,162). He believes that the contemporary (western) society is a society “within which major political and personal problems are problematized in the body and expressed through it” (1996: 1). It is possible to quote much more comments from numerous sources, which emphasize the neglected issues of the body and which bring forward the importance of theorizing on the body. I believe, at this moment it is not necessary to do so since both the importance and subordination of the body will be tried to be delineated in the following sections and chapters throughout, and from various perspectives and philosophies.

As it can be understood via the quotations cited above, social sciences and particularly sociology is the major, yet remained implicit, concern in this study⁷. Sociology as being the science or study of the development, organization, and functioning of human society; the science of the fundamental laws of social relations, institutions, is *the* “discipline” that the problematic situation of the body comes forth most clearly. Yet, as we shall soon see that, although gradually, what lies underneath the problem is basically the inadequacy of the *philosophical approach* of the western-analytical thought, which has effected –or perhaps has infected– in its

⁷ Having said that, I would like to remind the reader that the boundary and field of knowledge and interests particularly of the social sciences has demonstrated a constantly shifting, changing, expanding profile, starting from the beginning. It is inherent in the definition of the “social” science *per se*. As the “social” is an ever-changing dynamic “being”, a living thing, the social sciences have no other chance but to follow it in an ever-expanding, ever-changing fashion.

particular history, not only the social sciences, but any activity that is based on its particular “rationality”.

Scott and Morgan assert that there are contradictions within sociological point of view regarding the body and bodily matter (1993: 5). Although sociology has always demonstrated a tendency to criticize reductionist explanations, sociologists have tended to let, for instance, biology and biological base to stay outside the realm of sociological analysis. As the importance of biology is minimized and extra emphasis is placed on the “social”, social/natural dichotomy along with mind/body binary opposition is maintained. Scott and Morgan criticize this particular inadequacy of sociology in the field:

We would suggest that by not challenging biological understandings directly, sociology has left them intact rather than displaying them as cultural constructions, and that sociology’s past failure to lay claim to the body has effectively left the way open for the increasing influence of sociobiology, which takes ideological understandings of the natural inevitability of certain bodily processes and practices and presents them back to us cocooned in scientific language. We would agree with Connel that ‘bodies grow, work, flourish and decay in social situations that produce bodily effects’ (1987:86) and consider that these processes are relatively under theorized. (Scott and Morgan 1993: 5)

In order to develop a better understanding of the social place of the body and of the ways in which we experience ourselves as embodied, it is recommended that the biology must be located *historically* and *culturally* (Scott and Morgan 1993: 6). Biomedicine, only by itself, is not enough and adequate to cover the body issue. Sociology has recognized body as a social and cultural construction but has long neglected to take into account that common bodily activities also require an organic foundation. Cartesian mind that fosters clear distinctions between the pairs of “binary oppositions”, is claimed to bear the responsibility of the situation.

As it is broadly exemplified in Turner's (1992) account, social sciences have in general accepted the Cartesian legacy that brings forth *dualism*, *reductionism* and *positivism*. Since Cartesianism sees the world as such, a principal assumption has been developed concerning mind and the body. For Cartesianism, always a clear distinction could be drawn between the ordered, the controlled and the abstract on the one end, and the disordered, the uncontrolled and the concrete and on the other,. Believing there is no significant interaction in between the pair, these two realms can be addressed by separate and distinctive disciplines. Therefore, the body became the subject of natural sciences including medicine, whereas the mind became the topic of humanities or cultural sciences. Scott and Morgan suggest that sociology must open the biological-natural "package" and insert history and culture. By doing this, they assert that "an understanding of the relationship between the social and biological as one of practical relevance rather than causation" could be developed (Scott and Morgan 1993: 6).

Throughout the course of history, we see the relative importance of mind and body varies historically and culturally. In medicine for instance, prior to nineteenth century in Europe there was no clear conception of mental illness; such symptoms were either the result of the sin or possession, the product of physical excess or imbalances, or simply the result of birth defects. Actually, this conception was a result of the exaltation of "the absolute" and "the transcendental" against "the concrete". Whereas with the rise of psychoanalysis, the *mind* became an important province in its own right as a producer of symptoms and physical illness. The concept of "psychosomatic" illness, as Turner points out, considers some illness as they actually "does not exist because it is only in the mind" (1992: 32). Psycho and somatic are thought as clearly distinct and thus they should be examined by strictly

separate and distinct disciplines. Yet, surprising as it may be, the body contradictorily remains to be a very strong element within the psychoanalytic theory, and particularly within the Freudian and Lacanian theories of the formation of the ego (see sections 3.1 and 3.2). Nevertheless, as David Krueger points out, although Freud recognized the body as the foundation for subsequent ego development, “the body and its evolving mental representations have largely been omitted from developmental and psychoanalytic theory” (1989: ix).

“The Cartesian revolution” states Turner, “gave a privileged status to mind as the definition of the person (‘I think, therefore I am’) and an underprivileged status to the body which was simply a machine” (1996: 74). In another order of words, “Descartes’s ‘epistemocracy’ or his epistemological regime of philosophy in pursuit of the *cogito* is marked by disembodiment, egocentricity, and ocularcentricity. For in it the mind becomes transcendentalized from rather than immanentized in the body” (Jung 1996: 3). “The mind/body opposition”, moreover and more importantly, “has always been correlated a number of other oppositional pairs”: reason and passion, sense and sensibility, outside and inside, self and other, depth and surface, reality and appearance, mechanism and vitalism, transcendence and immanence, temporality and spatiality, psychology and physiology, form and matter (Grosz 1994:3).

However, a reservation should be clearly made here. Descartes’s view has been, in fact, *disembodied* within the evolutionary process of the western (natural and social/humanistic) sciences and philosophy⁸. It is not actually, Descartes himself that

⁸ That should clarify the choice of the title of this section as Disembodied Descartes and not, for instance, as Descartes Disembodies.

should bear the responsibility for the dualism, reductionism, and positivism that gained such a strength to become hegemonic, but the “mentality” that is constructed under the generic term “Cartesianism”, after him:

It is clear from a reading of Descartes’s *The Discourse on Method* that he believed that there was in fact a significant interaction between the body and mind and that disease was the outcome of any disturbance in this interaction. Descartes’s dualistic interactionism eventually came to evolve in the natural sciences into a unitary and positivistic perspective of materialism in which the disciplines that attempt to develop an understanding of events in nature and society, body and mind were both isolated and specialized. (Turner 1996: 9)

1.2 Derrida Deconstructing

*The center is not the center*⁹.

Jacques Derrida has introduced the deconstructionist criticism on the foundations of the western “metaphysics”, on the structuralist way of thinking and the presumptuous logocentric methodology that western culture has been exerting in every field of reasoning. Therefore, it is well worth to discuss his contribution as it is related with the issues put forth in the previous section. Although, the problematic neglecting of the body within the western philosophy has largely been attributed to Descartes and his dualistic approach, it is the mainstream structuralist vision that has

⁹ Jacques Derrida in *Writing and Difference*.

firmly established the systematic thinking with dichotomous terms at the “foundations” of the western disciplines. In order to understand adequately the “inherent” contradictions that have emerged from this particular discourse, I submit, it is inevitable to refer to Deconstruction and to its hosts¹⁰.

Derrida has pointed out the inadequacy of the methodology and consequences of western reasoning by disclosing the very kernel of the western thought and vision through re-reading of texts “within a discourse”. In order to elucidate the essence of the criticism that Derrida has developed via his *sui generis* methodology I suggest to begin with reviewing the premise of structuralist linguistics and of structuralist anthropology. The premise of Saussurian linguistics served as a general model for many prominent names in their most influential works. Some of the well-known personalities and their fields are Lévi-Strauss in anthropology, Lacan in psychoanalysis, and Althusser in political theory. One must be thankful to these diverse studies as Derrida himself admits that without the way paved by structuralism, deconstructionist approach could not have been achieved, at least, at that time (Norris 1987: 24)¹¹.

¹⁰ Since deconstruction is not a philosophy but a critical tool, a cautious approach, it needs an exteriority for it to operate. It is usually referred as having qualities of a virus! Virus: metabolically *inert*, infectious agent that replicates *only* within the cells of living “hosts”. The host being here is basically the dichotomous thought, the bipolar opposition with an hegemonic pole. I believe the concept of “writing” of Derrida is one of the most “suitable” processes of his deconstructionist approach in our case, as western dichotomous thought is claimed to be the major impediment for the body to liberate itself from being subordinated.

¹¹ Norris writes that Derrida makes this point clear, but he does not refer to a specific instance.

1.2.1 Structuralist Bipolarity in Linguistic “Writing”

In the Course in General Linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure says, “Writing, though unrelated to its inner system, is used continually to represent language. We cannot simply disregard it. We must be acquainted with its usefulness, shortcomings and dangers” (Saussure 1974:84)¹². This description of writing can be taken as a token of Saussure’s attitude to the priority of spoken as opposed to written in his analysis of language system, which is implicitly manifesting the subordination of the concrete to the transcendental in general, and of the body to the mind in our case.

The priority of spoken language to written, however, is not the only manifestation of the struggle between the binary concepts that Saussure had consistently introduced and strived to demonstrate the superiority of one concept to the other. Saussure, on his way to “construct” modern linguistics, used a series of examples of dualist vision¹³. His theoretical construction based on the pairs of concepts that he defined and these always imply a whole that is conceived as bisected; a “unity” made of two parts sequenced in a hierarchical manner: central/peripheral, primary/secondary, internal/external, reality/image and so on. Saussure’s *phonocentric* vision, also, brings forth hierarchy along with a conception of perverted, and then,

¹² Saussure continues, “Writing veils the appearance of language; it is not a guise for language but a disguise”. I have used the verb “says” as this book is a compilation of Saussure’s lecture notes by his students. It is noteworthy that Saussure himself did not write a book!

¹³ The pairs he utilized are scattered all through the rationale of his linguistics and used in every stage of it: signifier-signified, langue-parole, synchronic-diachronic, paradigm-syntagm.

expelled elements, which in fact, are intrinsic to it. He consequently claims that writing is “external”, “foreign”, “from outside”, i.e. it is perverse, directed away from the “origin”, from what is “right”, from what is “good”.

Since there is a tradition in western philosophical thinking that the good is whatever is going along with the reason, spirit or soul, hence for Saussure, writing becomes evil (Norris 1987: 88). Saussure, here, primarily conceives writing in the narrow sense as the marks and graphic inscriptions on a page. I shall soon discuss how Derrida argues writing in a broader sense and demonstrates how it is attached to the mainstream western thought and to the logocentrism innate to it. As a preparation to that, however, I must elaborate more on Saussure’s thoughts on writing as he thinks it is *outside* of the “natural bond” between sound and sense, in other words alien to the “natural bond” between speech and *self-present thought*.

As Saussure wants to insulate “natural” language against all the detrimental effects that he believed caused by writing he strived to exclude it. For Saussure, writing is a sign of a sign, which consequently places writing in a state defined as a supplementary inscription, and thus it is eliminated from, removed from origins and truth even twice (Norris 1987: 85). This, I believe, clarifies the metaphysical belief in Saussure’s conception that writing always operates from “outside”. It is believed to be an agent that corrupts the *purity* of speech, which is the “true” and “good” constituent of language. As the speech implies the “presence”, the outsider –writing– assaults to the self-presence, to the self present thought, to the speaker. Writing is an *image*, Saussure contemplates, therefore how can it replace or be as important or essential as the *reality*, i.e. speech? What is not present can not be reliable. However, since language is a differential system, meaning of a sign –thus of a signifier– can

only be achieved through the *difference* it acquires through the relation to others, since there is no self-identical elements.

Here, at this point and on the contrary to Saussure's conception, it can be said that differential theory of meaning, by definition, needs the relations defined or grasped by "images" in order to be operative. The differences between signs –images, representations of the reality– can only be achieved again via images.

1.2.2 Structuralist Bipolarity in Anthropological "Writing"

In The Raw and the Cooked, Claude Lévi-Strauss writes, "Either structural analysis succeeds in exhausting all the concrete modalities of its subject or we lose the right to apply it to one of the modalities" (1969: 147). Lévi-Strauss strongly believed that the powerful tools and explanations that had been brought forth by structural linguistics could also be used in other fields. His anthropological insight, along with the mainstream philosophical trends of his time, caused him to perceive his main subject matter as "languages" or signifying systems. He has envisaged certain codes that are to be disclosed within certain societies and basically within primitive societies as they are his main concern. Myth and ritual being his primary fields of interest, Lévi-Strauss has a conviction that by analyzing myths and rituals it is possible to achieve a revelation of the patterns of development. Consequently, for Lévi-Strauss, this achievement is supposed to reveal the similarities and distinctions between cultures. This approach implies a deterministic and positivistic vision, i.e. every problem that is formulated can be explained by unambiguous, unequivocal reasoning on the basis of "clear-cut" cause-effect relationship.

Lévi-Strauss's project, consequently in order to be complete, requires defining distinctions as a prerequisite. That is how Lévi-Strauss introduced the dichotomy of nature/culture in the realm of his structural anthropology. There are similarities between Lévi-Strauss's *ethnocentric* approach and of Saussure's *phonocentric* approach, both approaches being different forms of western *logocentrism*. In addition, "nature" is conceived by Lévi-Strauss in Rousseauesque manner, a unified, complete whole and as a "pure, unmediated speech" (Norris 1982: 40). Lévi-Strauss, in his book Tristes Tropiques (published in English in 1966, the year that Derrida has delivered his critique on it) concentrates how writing, as a foreign, evil agent of a degenerated "culture", did changed the "natural" lives of a primitive society. A chapter called "The Writing Lesson" in the book is dedicated to Lévi-Strauss's ambivalent feelings of guilt and fascination on this subject matter. He encountered an Amerindian tribe, the Nambikvara, that does not know writing –in the sense that using graphic marks representing spoken language. Lévi-Strauss was struck by the fact that, as he introduced writing to the "natural" lives of the tribe, it was their leader that grasp the possible implications of it most clearly and quickly. Lévi-Strauss's comment on that what the leader actually grasped is "how writing could be used in the interests of maintaining an unequal distribution of knowledge and power" (Norris 1987: 130).

Lévi-Strauss concludes that by the introduction of himself (his presence) and of writing the bad and evil hegemony of western *culture*, has dominated the tribe which had been in a pure and innocent face-to-face *natural* contact (spoken language, speech) up until that time.

1.2.3 Derrida's "Writing"

Derrida's choice of Saussure is said to be strategic and for two reasons (Critchley 1992: 34). First reason is Saussure's structural linguistics stimulated hegemony of a certain vision –of what Derrida calls structuralism in general– in the human sciences at that time. Second reason is the fact that Saussure's discourse can be made use of to achieve a more general notion. This understanding, for Derrida, is crucial. This is an understanding, which would reveal that all "discourse" is of imperative sort since the framework of discourse constructed in such a way to "exclude" any vision that can transgress itself. That is to say ". . . all discourse is strategic, because no transcendental truth or point of reference is present outside the field of discourse which would govern that field" (Critchley 1992: 35). This is an essential point in Derrida's way to elucidate how "writing" is repressed as, for Derrida, Saussure failed to realize the dilemma engendered by its own "mode of discourse".

Saussure thinks that there is a "natural bond" only between sound and sense, between speech and self-present thought although the bond between the signifier and signified remains arbitrary. Saussure, consequently, conceives the writing as a dangerous supplement to speech, as a mere representation, a mere image of speech, thus, as a derivative and secondary form of the primary reality, of the primary presence; the presence of a speaker. This is to declare *subordination*. The subordination of writing to speech is again a consequence of the "constructed" struggle between the constituents of a dichotomy. Placing one of the constituents in the center would cause the other one to become blurred and to be placed under the dominance of the one in the center. Saussure made a "clear" distinction between

speech and writing and speech became the governing central concept. Derrida opposes to this limitation:

External/internal, image/reality, representation/presence, such is the old grid to which is given the task of outlining the domain of a science. And of what science? Of a science that can no longer answer to the classical concept of the *epistémè* because the originality of its field—an originality that it inaugurates—is that the opening of the “image” within it appears as the condition of “reality;” a relationship that can no longer be thought within the simple difference and the uncompromising exteriority of “image” and “reality”, of “outside” and “inside”, of “appearance” and “essence”, with the entire system of oppositions which necessarily follows from it. (Derrida 1976: 33)

Saussure says that the natural bond, the only true bond is the bond of sound, and writing does not have this “natural” peculiarity. We have seen that for Saussure writing is a “sign of a sign”, i.e. an image of, a representation of the signifier, and it is twice removed from origins and truth. Derrida expounds proficiently that since language is “already” a system of differential signs it means the meaning lies “in various structures of relationship and *not* in some ideal correspondence between sound and sense” (Norris 1987: 85). This means the classical definition of writing would apply to *every form of language* whatsoever.

Derrida, therefore, here means that “meaning” is always the “sign of a sign” and consequently “writing” is *supplementary*, though *essential*, to language. This is simply because of the fact that thought can not avoid this logic of endless *supplementarity*. Saussure, according to Derrida, by introducing the concept of arbitrariness of the sign actually puts the opposition between speech and writing in a vague situation, which in the end brings the whole dichotomy at stake.

Saussure excluded writing from language and chased it to its outer fringes because he considered it to be only an exterior reflection of the reality of language, that is, nothing but an image, a

representation or a figuration. The thesis of arbitrariness, according to Derrida, “successfully accounts for a conventional relationship between the phoneme and the grapheme . . . [and] by the same token it forbids that the latter be an ‘image’ of the former” (OG, p.45). (Gasché 1994: 44)¹⁴

Hence, the very basic *modus operandi* of the western thought has been disturbed by Derrida’s (deconstructionist) re-reading of Saussure’s and numerous texts those of western philosophers. That of Saussure’s being one of the most important among them not only as it is apt to demonstrate the superficiality of binary oppositions, but also for the fact that it has been influential for the *modus operandi* of many works in various fields that have succeeded also.

“Writing” both as a token and as a crucial “reality” has been used in Deconstruction to show the “complexity of references” to which Derrida draws our attention. It helps us to conceive the predetermined, discursive, teleological commitment to “unity” of structuralist vision. Deconstruction proves that western metaphysical thought, which is conceived as a page with two “distinct and separated” sides, is actually an illusion. The reality that deconstruction observes is more like a Möbius strip. A one sided surface actually formed by turning over one end of a page by 180° and attaching the opposite corners to each other. Although there is always an “other” side, one would experience that it has, in effect, a *virtual* “continuity”, which

¹⁴ Actually this book of Rodolpho Gasché’s claims to be “A deconstruction of the criticism that goes by deconstruction’s name, this book reveals the true philosophical nature of Derrida’s thought, its debt to the tradition it engages, and its misuse by some of its most fervent admirers . . . explodes the current myth of Derrida’s singularity and sets in its place a finely informed sense of the philosopher’s genuine accomplishment.” However, Gasché does not try to diminish neither Derrida’s contribution nor the importance of the Deconstructionist thinking, but to develop a deeper understanding of it. See Gasché 1987: 3-20.

is not broken or disrupted, which does not allow you to decide “clearly” which side you are travelling at a certain moment. Since you are (thinking, reading, experiencing, living) in continuous movement, no side would be more superior to the other. For one moment, you are “inside”, which you can comprehend, understand, experience only with reference to the essential supplementarity of the other side, the next moment, you are “outside”. The issue is, however, it is totally undecidable to determine *perpetually* which side is inside and which side is outside; what is up and what is down, where is the beginning and where is the end, but perhaps, *momentarily*.

To proceed with the other major structuralist vision is necessary in terms of demonstrating Derrida’s contribution more clearly. Lévi-Strauss comprehends that the primitive society he has examined as living in an “idyll of undisturbed primitive peace”(Norris 1987: 129). The basic premise behind this, for Lévi-Strauss, is that they do not have the knowledge of writing. Writing penetrated into Nambikvara tribe as the graphic representation of the spoken language in the beginning, yet Lévi-Strauss claims it is then actually shifted into a metonymical level. Writing, therefore, now stands for the ethnocentric belief in the superiority of European culture with all the corruption adhered to it. He admires the less “advanced” people living close to “nature” (see Rousseauesque “nature” in next subsection).

Lévi-Strauss dislikes the tight dependence of western culture on the historical progress and technological development, which he thinks is the main reason for the corruption of the social system. He also finds himself responsible for the negative change in the social structure of Nambikvara tribe, and deduces that it is his *presence* is the primary cause for this change for the worse along with the *writing* he introduced. However, as opposed to what Lévi-Strauss conjures the tribe have “already” been living in a social order somehow similar to that of more “advanced”

cultures. There are already hierarchy, ranking and inequality between different social groups. That is why the leader –leadership is the “highest rank” granted for the capabilities of the bearer– grasped the power and implications of writing so quickly.

Derrida shows that Lévi-Strauss’s discourse, similar to that of Saussure’s, reveals the deep convictions and presumptions that he cannot purge no matter how he tries. “What Lévi-Strauss actually *writes* and what he would have us believe are two very different things” (Norris 1987: 130). Although Lévi-Strauss feels sympathy for Nambikvara and their “natural” life, still his approach is ethnocentric. In other words, he accepts the difference between people with writing and people without writing, but he implicitly uses standard concepts of speech and writing when it comes to categorize people-without-writing in terms of “their” cultural and historical values. His approach is ethnocentric because he excludes the writing –writing in broader sense– since he envisages it only as the privileged model of phonetic writing. “Lévi-Strauss has strong presumptions in the form of distinctions between historical societies and societies without history remain solely dependent on the concept of writing” (Derrida 1976: 121). This is how he develops his “epigenetic” idea of writing as the exclusive and sudden cause for the degeneration of the Nambikvara that only had pure and innocent spoken language up until that time.

Although Lévi-Strauss tries to avoid ethnocentrism, by the very fact that using a sharp distinction between speech and writing, his ideas fall prey back to it. Moreover, this ethnocentrism is even the source of Lévi-Strauss’s accusation of the western culture: “It supports an ethico-political accusation: man’s exploitation by man is the fact of writing cultures of the Western type. Communities of innocent and unoppressive speech are free from this accusation” (Derrida 1976: 121).

I have tried to show, though briefly and as concise as possible, the basic premises of structuralist linguistics and of structural anthropology. I have also tried to furnish it with Derrida's re-reading of the texts and discourses of Saussure's and of Lévi-Strauss's. Now the time has come for to concentrate more on the Derrida's "notion" of *writing*, which is one of the important constituents of his deconstructionist vision.

As John Sallis summarizes, "deconstruction would announce the liberation of writing from the repression enforced by/as metaphysics, its release from subordination to speech and thereby, finally, to presence" (Sallis 1987: xii). "Writing" in western culture, for Derrida, is actually beyond every kind of graphic sign. It lies in the "complexity of references". It is what is expelled. It is what is in the blindspot, in-between. It is the silence in-between. It *is* what is *not* present. It is the absent; yet its "absent presence" is an essential supplementarity.

"Writing" is what is conceived as evil. It is, even, death:

What writing itself, in its non-phonetic movement, betrays is life. It menaces at once the breath, the spirit, and history as the spirit's relationship with itself. It is their end, their finitude, their paralysis.
(Derrida 1976: 25)

"Writing" is supplementary, but its supplementarity is essential, vital and constitutive. It is the whole supplementary elements in western thought and culture that is repressed in the name of clarity, for the sake of being lined up on the side of good and right. It is what is cursed for being perverted. It is the oscillations in meaning. It is the other; it is what makes our "essential" tie with the other unavoidable, that is *inevitable* for us to become "ourselves", as David Wood observes:

Writing is the death of presence in that it inscribes any meaning in a play or economy of signification, which essentially disperses any

sense –immediate or mediated- of self-presence, of absolute interiority, or self-relatedness. (1987: 155)

“Writing”, even in the sense of graphical representation is beyond the alphabetical marks. It is in the silence between the marks, between the letters. Writing, even, is inbetween the spoken words; it is a constituent of the speech. It is the condition and effect of the undecidable, undetermined movement of the “references”. This movement is like an “undecidable” orbital movement. A “metaphor¹⁵” of the movement of electron around the nucleus can be made here, I suggest. It is impossible, at least for today, to determine the position (or speed) of it without disturbing the speed (or position) of it. If you manage to determine one of them (speed or position) you disturb and miss the other. One of the constituents of it must be “absent” for the other to be “present”. It is simply because you have to use an electron microscope to “see” the electron. Thinking is a similar process: your tool becomes your subject that you want to explore and disclose; it shifts to another position, to another reference as you strive to grasp it.

What Derrida says, or writes, is not that writing dominates speech, or what is repressed governs the one supposedly placed in the origin, in the center as there can be no fixed center. The continuum of the deferral-and-difference in the meaning that is emanated from the complexity of references has always been and will always be

¹⁵ I am not sure, though, that this remains to be a mere metaphor: thinking is possible only at the molecular level, there are electrically charged molecules and impulses travelling around all through the central nervous system which includes the brain. “The nervous system contains immense numbers of distinct nerve cells, which make close contact with each other at synapses. An impulse, when it reaches a synapse, has to stimulate the next nerve cell. . . . An impulse can promote or inhibit numerous other activities, according to the state of other parts of the nervous system. Very complicated co-ordination is, therefore, possible with suitably complex connections.” (Abercrombie, et al. 1981)

existing through the struggle in the process of comprehending, experiencing, and giving meaning to the world we live in.

1.2.4 The Body and Deconstruction of the Dichotomous “Mind”

Whether they be implicit or explicit, dichotomies have long been the main analytical and systematic constituting tools of western thought. It is by now, well known that with the introduction of Deconstructionist tools that suggest to change the “habits of our minds” that had been constructed since the Enlightenment (by using the very same faculties of mind), the basic organizing principles have been shattered. As the logocentric thought ascribed a center, which was the organizing principle in the structural systems, it ordered our philosophical thinking and the whole western episteme. Serpil Tunc Oppermann epitomizes Jacques Derrida’s contribution succinctly:

Derrida attacked this assumption lying behind the whole tradition of Western metaphysics, and rejected the dominance of the key concepts, such as God, nature, reason, meaning, self, origin, truth, etc., because they have become self-presencing and signs of Being; the signifiers that turn into transcendental signifieds (any sort of final meaning). (Oppermann 1991: 34)

Although Derrida has never directly contemplates on the body in length and its place within the binary oppositions, as Turner points out, in contemporary social theory as a consequence of Derrida’s approach, the body is regarded as a constructed issue through discourses such as medical, moral, artistic, and commercial (1992: 8). I presume, whilst tracing Derrida’s deconstruction of the dichotomous habit of thinking it would be highly interesting to give instances related to the conceptions of

the body when we conceive it as a text and try to read it in a Derridian way of thinking. I believe, the body can be conceived as text because, in the first place, it always refers to an external reference. Since deconstruction is viral, it requires a discursive textuality for it to operate: the Cartesian distinction of mind and body is very convenient one in terms of forming a illusory hegemonic relationship of the terms of the pair which are actually essential supplements to each other.

Derrida's careful analysis of the sign and of the Saussurian idea of difference leads to several important, indeed far-reaching insights. To describe the structure of the sign, which he sees as always already marked by both *deferring* and *differing*, Derrida coins the term *différance* (both meanings occur in the French verb *différer*). Douglas Atkins draws our attention to the notion of *différance* that Derrida defines in Positions as:

“. . . the systematic play of differences, of the traces of the differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive (the *a* of *différance* indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which cannot be governed by or distributed between the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals without which the “full” terms would not signify, would not function”. The possibility of the sign, substituting for the thing in a system of differences, thus depends upon deferral, that is, putting off into the future any grasping of the “thing itself”. (Atkins 1983: 17)

In the movement of thought, elements are never fully present because they must always already refer to something other than “themselves”, or, to change perspectives, if perception of objects depends upon perception of their differences, each “present” element *must* refer to an element *other* than “itself”. Gayatri Spivak, accordingly, calls the “trace” as “the part played by the radically other within the structure of difference that is the sign” and proceeds to term it “the mark of the

absence of a presence, an always already absent present, of the lack at the origin that is condition of thought and experience” (Spivak 1976: xvii).

Here, though briefly, it is possible to mention Mikhail Bakhtin for the simple fact that in his book Art and Answerability he envisages mind and the body not as oppositions but as differing stages of a *continuum* (Bakhtin 1990: xxxiv). In Bakhtin’s writings, it is possible to trace the roots of same conception of dynamics; non-static, non-stopped, intertwined journey of break and flow or cause and effect cycles (cf. Deleuze-and-Guattari’s *Body*). Bakhtin’s “grotesque body”, for instance, “degrades” the human form in a positive way whilst not confining itself within the restrictions of one side of the binary opposition. Obviously this point of view is closer to that of Derrida’s who states the impossibility of static unity as well as its undecidability, which stems from the fact that signifier-signified cycle is in constant motion.

Sally Banes quotes from Bakhtin’s Rabelais and His World:

Degradation here means coming down to earth, the contact with earth as an element that swallows up and gives birth at the same time. To degrade is to bury, to sow, and to kill simultaneously, in order to bring forth something more and better. To degrade also means to concern oneself with the lower stratum of the body, the life of the belly and the reproductive organs; it therefore relates to acts of defecation and copulation, conception, pregnancy and birth. (Banes 1993: 284n11)

That is to say, as Banes puts it in a laconic way: “bringing its subjects down to earth, it reembodies what official culture had disembodied, or etherealized” (1993: 193). The body here is emphasized as the “absent present” in the official culture and modern society. Bakhtin has tried to demonstrate “it” via emphasizing the subordinated, expelled activities of the body.

Derrida asserts that, because the structure of the sign is determined by the “trace” or track of that other which is forever absent, the word “sign” must be placed “under erasure.” Without, of course, establishing absence in its place, the “trace” destroys the idea of simple presence, the desire which, Derrida claims in Of Grammatology, characterizes western metaphysics:

Without the possibility of differance, the desire of presence as such would not find its breathing space. That means similarly that this desire carries in itself the destiny of its non-satisfaction. Differance produces what it forbids, makes possible the very thing that it makes impossible. (Derrida 1976: 19)

The “idea of origin” is similarly destroyed, for origin is always other than “itself”, the idea of origin depending upon the production of temporal and spatial difference that must precede any origin. Denied, too, are those other central oppositions of metaphysics not only, truth/error, presence/absence, identity/difference and speech/writing, but also, nature/culture, mind/body, soul/matter, man/woman, being/nothingness, life/death, good/evil, and master/slave, self/other, and so on.

Obviously, as Spivak observes, Derrida is asking us “to change certain habits of mind: . . . the origin is a trace; contradicting logic, we must learn to use and erase our language at the same time” (Spivak 1976: xviii). Always criticism and analysis, in the “classical” sense, strive to decide the meaning, the *closure* of the text. Criticism has become a desire of presence. But “meaning” as a privileged term refers to something outside textuality, outside the system of differences: a text’s meaning is the truth that is present “behind” or “under” its textual surface that criticism makes fully present placing it before us. Nevertheless, the “trace”, of course, makes meaning so conceived –like truth and presence– impossible. To repeat, there is no originating,

privileged signified outside the system of differences and so no fixed “meaning” (cf. Nietzsche’s Body).

Taking Derrida’s conception of “writing” –which is the writing in the broadest sense, intertwined with everyday life– it can be said that writing is any experience that appears as an inscription on the body as well as in unconscious. If, we accept the idea of “body as a text” (which comprises writing) then Derrida’s ideas on sign, difference, origin and meaning seem like opening the gates of a new understanding in the “process of defining” the embodied self, person, or subject which offers promising horizons much more wider than those of dichotomies. Then it would be possible not to be strangled with the idea of pinning down and thus fixing the embodied self or corporeal subject, which never ceases changing, making connections, moving, and becoming and which is always positioned only with reference to the “trace” (perhaps, the other bodies, subjects and objects). The body in our “minds” is struggling inbetween the essential-mutual-supplementarity of the mind/body, soul/matter, inside/outside of the fractured self (cf. Deleuze and Guattari’s Body).

Derrida’s objection to the opposition of nature and culture (that separated with a clear distinction) is well worth to mention. While “reading” Jacques Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Language Derrida deconstructs the implicit dichotomous thought and its hierarchical order by demonstrating the inevitable supplementarity. In Rousseau’s opinion, man living in nature in a happy state realizes the need for a society. During the transformation into society from nature, culture becomes a state of happiness for man. This means, for Rousseau, that culture “supplemented” nature. He, accordingly, thinks that education is a supplement to nature. Nature is “complete” in principle and education becomes a subordinated external addition to

it. Obviously, as Jonathan Culler puts it, this need for a “supplementarity” discloses an inherent lack or incompleteness in the nature as it must be completed for meeting the requirements of man for man’s human nature to be emerged “as it truly is” (1983: 104):

The logic of [Rousseau] supplementarity thus makes nature the prior term, a plenitude that there is at the start, but reveals an inherent lack or absence within it, so that education, the additional extra, also becomes an essential condition of that which it supplements. (Culler 1983: 104)

It has been well known, for instance, as a central example that sex and gender understood as clearly distinct categories, although they are “embodied” within the very same body of an individual and exhibiting a “supplementary” characteristic for each other in everyday life, everywhere, all the time within a constant Derridian motion. Sex is taken to refer to *biological* differences (natural) whereas gender, considered as the real subject matter of *sociology*, is taken as a construction that is formed socially (cultural). This can be regarded, I suggest, as a result of the deeply rooted nature/culture distinction that is fostered by the Cartesian rationality of Modernism that is invested by the hegemonic bipolarity.

Rationalities in Cartesian fashion, as I have mentioned earlier, have tended to open distinctions between the ordered, the controlled and the abstract on the one end, and the disordered, the uncontrolled and the concrete on the other. In our case, the latter end, which is always implicitly discredited, covers body and bodily matters. In recent years, with the rise in cultural studies, re-reading of Nietzsche and by the impact of massive and widespread influence of Foucault along with the deep questioning of modernity, the central narratives which separate mind and body and the social sciences and physical sciences were seriously called into question (Scott and Morgan 1993: 4). In addition to that since the last decade the ever growing impact, I

presume, of Deconstructionist “tools and habits” of thinking, in spite of the fact that not being referred directly by most of the bibliographic sources within these fields, should be added to those stated above.

In addition to the mainstream modernist rationale, which is based on the distinctions drawn by an understanding of the concept of dichotomy, what has strengthened the western philosophical tradition of metaphysics is the mainstream *modus operandi* of the science. As an outcome of the systematic, ordered approach that has operated within the cause-effect cycles of the essentialist, determinist and reductionist thinking in Newtonian science, the body has mostly been regarded as a subordination to mind (Grosz 1995: 83-101). Bryan Turner in his book Regulating Bodies: Essays in Medical Sociology delineates the situation by stressing that this state of the subordination of the body has been achieved “under an ethic world of mastery” (1992: 32). Today the mainstream view in the society is that the scientific is aligned with the truth and good, and that scientific postulates are indisputable. They are always on the side of the ethical, for the well being of the people, the society, the humanity. Science is the source of master knowledge and is the trailblazer of the human being that would not be bounded to, or limited with the nature anymore. Science and technology being the major practical components of this mastery and western civilization, and being both the outcome and driving force of the modern rationalist view that stems from the obsession of innovation and progress, caused the problematic distinction of mind/body. However, this is the general “anomaly” that the technological improvements impinge on the conception of the body. In the two subsections below (1.3.1 and 1.3.2) I will try to demonstrate the impact of the various technologies by concentrating on the medical and computer technologies in order to exhibit the specific “illusory” powers they have. These sections should be

considered as two offshoots; essays that aimed to demonstrate the facets of the above-mentioned mastery. However before that, I wish to discuss briefly how law and bureaucracy, the two practical tools of (political) “power” that our bodies are subjected, envisage the body.

1.3 Everyday Body

What has begun to emerge, as we dive into the depths of the western conception of body, is that we do not only have the restricted opposition of mind and body, but a cluster of such dichotomies. As a variation of part/whole distinction or to that of agency/structure, there is a separation between the individual and society.

It is obvious that in every field of power that “regulates” and dominates our everyday lives, we are confined, restricted, guided, and controlled by set of rules and codes. Law being the most powerful one of these codes has certainly a hold on our bodies and all aspects adhered to it. “There is no law that is not inscribed on bodies. Every law has a hold on the body” (de Certeau 1984: 139). Rationale of the state and bureaucracy, therefore, is to do with the surveillance and control of the bodies (cf. Foucault’s Body). Apparently, the bureaucracies are all about the human body, dealing ultimately with the control of the bodies in time and space (Scott and Morgan 1993: 16). On the other hand, strange that as it may be, patterns of bureaucratic recruitment, the conduct of our everyday life and the way in which it is structured by system of rules and a clearly defined hierarchy, actually, represent a radical denial of the body. “Formally”, the bureaucracy is indifferent to shapes and sizes of bodies,

and issues of health and disability only arise where these are conceived relevant to the successful performance of the tasks.

Turner and also Scott and Morgan emphasize the need for a more concerned view of “everyday life” in sociology, which has been sacrificed for the sake of the “transcendental signified”. “Moving away from narrowly defined scientific knowledge, we may concern ourselves with everyday knowledge” (Scott and Morgan 1993: 13). Turner establishes a relationship –just like an “essential supplement” in Derridian fashion:

In order to comprehend this everyday world, or life-world, it appears to me that a sociology of the body is a necessary condition for understanding everyday routines, conditions and requirements. Everyday life is the production and reproduction of bodies; we have to grasp this elementary fact before we can go on to talk about the production of ‘the person’. (1992: 3)

Turner also points out that in order to understand social action, we need the conception of “social actor” to be defined by taking into account the definition of “the person” in the first place. The body, therefore, as a representation of fundamental features of society, should be envisaged as being a “lived body” (1992: 4)¹⁶.

We are embodied creatures and our bodies inevitably constructed socially. Socially constructed body means that culture is a major force in this process and

¹⁶ What Turner implies here with the term “lived body” is different from the conception of the “lived body” that is discussed in chapter 3. Turner emphasizes or reminds the person as being the “agency” as well as being a part of the “structure”. He tries to think of the biological facet of the body rather than advocating psychoanalytical and phenomenological theories of the formation and self-reflexivity of the self. For a discussion of the person as the agency *and* active part of the structure, see Pile and Thrift (1995).

cultural context, thus, is a factor of utmost importance. Therefore, in the development of the self and in the constitution of the “I”, body and bodily matters have deserved to occupy a larger space than what has been thought before (cf. Freud’s Body and Lacan’s Body). Because in the identification of the social agents, the identification process depends fundamentally on their embodiment. As Turner has pointed out, our biological bodies are the primary means for our survival, not in the wilderness of the nature, but in the complexities of practical social interactions. “Gestures, handshakes, winks, salutes, attention, bending, walking” as *body techniques*¹⁷ “are essential for the social life. Only through successful presenting, monitoring and interpreting of bodies, a social life could be read and be lived through” (Turner 1992: 15).

1.3.1 Eternalizing the Vanishing Body

Jung states that the Cartesian metaphysics whose center is the *cogito* is identifiable with the hegemony of vision (1996). Since the Cartesian mind is isolated and sovereign, it is the philosophy of reflection that identifies the thinking substance:

It is reflexive narcissism *par excellence* . . . there is an identity between the ‘I’ and the ‘eye’. As the mind’s I is the mind’s eye, so the *cogito* is *video ergo sum*. The cogito is a scopic regime, a visual machine. (Jung 1996: 4)

¹⁷ The term coined by Marcel Mauss. See Mauss (1979) for an early anthropological work that puts forth the idea of the body as a set of social practices within which the individual is trained, disciplined and socialized.

In the present day, employment of high technology, that mostly “represents” reality in digital environments and in the format of transformed images that can be manipulated and mediated, promotes the propagation of the image of *fragmented* body. Through the visualizing technologies of medicine, for instance, we become obsessed in *knowing* our bodies:

Medical authorities encourage us to monitor consumption of sugar, caffeine, salt, fat, cholesterol, nicotine, alcohol, steroids, sunlight, narcotics through the use of such devices as electronic scales, home pregnancy kits, diabetes tests, blood pressure machines and fat calipers. (Balsamo 1995: 216)

All these devices function as a set of visualizing techniques that contribute to the perception of the body as fragmented into separate organs, fluids. We are accustomed to see various representations of our bodies in different formats; our bones, glands, teeth and internal organs on x-ray films and through the screen of ultrasound machine, our heartbeats on the graphical paper as the sinusoidal waves, our brain as colourful images on the screen of the Magnetic Resonance Imaging machine, and so forth. This is, I suspect, an uncanny experience.

All our organs, fluids, and the state of our body, that we neither can see nor detect easily, is visually represented before us. Although they are *ours* (they are actually “*us*”) we really do not have any direct means of control on their way of functioning. Yet by the help of technology make their images visible to us, we develop this

strange, uncanny feeling of *they* are no more “out of sight” from our knowledge thus, *we* have the power to control and check on them.¹⁸

We all know now, how are we going to look like in the later stages of the disease if we got AIDS, although only few of us acquire information on the mechanism of the disease. The trope of medical diagnosis techniques continues as follows: if the technology make possible to see what we can not see with our naked eyes, it might make us know the remedies. Body, therefore, should be left totally to the capable hands of technology for being healthy, for enhancement, for being *fully* functional. The biotechnology is advocated as the only possible source that might find the remedy for the diseases like AIDS. Hence, the new biotechnologies are promoted as life-enhancing, and even life-saving. A human being backed by technology is stronger than the human being that maintains to live “naturally”.

Cyborgs for instance, represented as almost invincible in the fiction films, are accelerating the acceptance of technological prostheses incorporated with our bodies. After all, the concept of prosthesis is not an alien one altogether. We use glasses, hearing aids, crutches that are not incorporated with our bodies but are just accessories. However, on the other hand we also might have implanted teeth, added-on artificial limbs, transplanted organs, screwed in platinum joints, and even an implanted heart, which is artificial.

¹⁸Know-your-own-body obsession manifests itself in contemporary culture in a variety of different but yet inter-connected ways. Practices of personal hygiene, ultimate care taken during (and before) having sex, precautions taken for not contaminated by diseases (ranging from flu to AIDS) all are taken as the signifiers of a certain culture which indicates an established, yet not static and ever-improving, point of view towards the body (a

It is the *natural* material of the human being that is made more stronger by introducing “more robust” and “more durable” technological implants. Biological and technological “merge” into one another. The organic/natural and technological/cultural could now be merged relying on the reconceptualization of the human body as a *boundary* figure belonging simultaneously to both of the systems (Balsamo 1995: 215).

There is a crucial twist here, at this very point of the trope, fostered by know-your-body obsession: the material body is *objectified* and it is *subjected* to the discipline of normative gaze. Moreover, to draw a boundary could well be defined as a structuralist approach that eventually establishes a hierarchical relationship between culture and nature. It is the generator of the dream that human being would prevail in its encounters with nature: “techno-bodies” are healthy, fully functional and enhanced, they are more real than the real, just like to be in a cyberreal environment being *more* satisfying and pleasurable than experiencing real life.

In medicine, technologies do not only convey information about the current or past states of our bodies as medical diagnostics do, but, they might also offer images of ourselves in the future as it is the case in cosmetic surgery. The surgeon, by using high-tech video imaging programs, manipulates your digitized image on screen in order to illustrate possible surgical transformations. Your material body reconfigured as an electronic image is manipulated technologically on the screen before it is manipulated surgically in the operating room.

contaminated body then, for such a view, points the cultural identity of its bearer: an HIV positive person is regarded either as an homosexual or drug user, or both).

The body is promised to be eternalized by technology, the more we rely on the scientific and technological products, it is imposed on us, the more chance and power we have in controlling our vanishing, weak, poor bodies.

1.3.2 Abandoning the Vanishing Body

The fascinating, magical –and also invading and compelling– realm of cyberreal could only be experienced personally and almost fully, apart from other electronic and digital equipment, via what is generally called computer, i.e. PC (Personal Computers). The concept and also the physical materiality of the “PC” – although sometimes maintain a discrete profile– is the *sine qua non* element in the whole debate hinges on the discourse dealing with all concepts and states defined with a prefix cyber.¹⁹

In contemporary western societies majority of people relies on various forms of technology during their everyday lives. As Deborah Lupton states, many of the technological artefacts are used to “construct a sense of subjectivity and differentiation from others (the car being an obvious example)” (1995: 98). Nevertheless, the relation with the PC has peculiarities that put it apart from the many other technological artefacts we employ. For a growing number of people, PCs are in a way “special” artefacts to which they feel strong “dependency” and reliance. We employ PCs for work, entertainment or communication purposes with constantly

¹⁹ Cyber is from Greek *kubernan*, which means to steer, to guide, and to govern.

increasing hours and frequency of use. Instances like network breakdowns or system deficiencies demonstrate how closely and intensely we are dependent on PCs; we usually react with expressions and exclamations of shock and panic as if we have injured badly or, more strikingly, lost an organ or limb of our bodies. Despite the dependency, many people who use their PCs almost everyday have very little knowledge of how these “marvellous” machines work. Hence, the unquestioned, unequivocal trust and dependency are combined with mystique. Michael Heim commented on our relation with PCs as follows:

Our love affair with computers, computer graphics, and computer networks runs deeper than aesthetic fascination and deeper than the play of senses. We are searching for a home for the mind and the heart. Our fascination with computers is more erotic than sensuous, more deeply spiritual than utilitarian. (1991: 61)

There is no other technological artefact, it seems for today, that is loaded with cultural meanings and anthropomorphism like PC. Although some technological products –like cars– are often referred as human-like by investing them emotional and personality attributes, PCs are represented as “friends”, work “companions” and even “lovers” (Lupton 1995: 98). PCs are more than an “object”, yet not internalized fully by the “subject” as an organ either. Lupton, by referring to Grosz, asserts that:

. . . rather than the computer/human dyad being a simple matter of self versus other, there is, for many people, a blurring of the boundaries between the embodied self and the PC. (1995: 99)

When an inanimate tool, Lupton asserts, is used too long, touched and on the body for long enough, they become extensions of the body image and sensation. However, they are not internalized by the person no matter even if they are psychically invested into the self. They become an interface, an intermediate, a “midway between the inanimate and the bodily” to quote Grosz (1994: 81). Thus,

users employ technological artefacts symbiotically as contributing to their own images, as their selves and their bodies.

The mind/body dichotomy fostered by the “idealised” state of cyber worth to mention at this point. Cyberpunk literature, for instance, often implies, and sometimes explicitly promotes, the possibility of being liberated from the body (Featherstone and Burrows 1995: 10). Needless to mention, this is offered by computers. In cyberwriting the human body is referred as the “meat”, the burden that surrounds the mind, slows down the limitless capabilities of it, obstructs its freedom and mobility, its proper functioning by which the “authentic” self could be reached (Lupton 1995: 100). The (post)modernized version of Descartes’s view “the body as machine” which comes forth as the metaphor of “human as computer” has an important part here. The irrationality of embodiment is denied. Human brains are described as “organic computers” which represents the human thought as rational, intentional, “suppressing other cultural meanings around thought processes and unconscious” (Featherstone and Burrows 1995: 11). It is to declare rejection of the mental processes like dreaming, wishing, joking and even speech.

A “cyberfan” and/or a computer nerd would ask: Why one should be compelled by *a body* (earthly, weak, irrational, passive, dirty) with limited capacity in terms of satisfying the needs of the *mind* (spiritual, rational, abstract, active, clean)? The body, for the nerd disrupts the *user* every now and then with its demands to be fulfilled; it needs nourishment, cleaning, resting, maintenance and so on (Lupton 1995: 100-1). The human being, in various ways in “cyberwriting”, is considered as an organic entity that ultimately must leave the “meat” behind and reach the state where its idealized virtual body does not eat, drink, urinate, get tired, become ill, even it does not die (Lupton 1995: 111).

The body of stereotypical cyborg that has been represented in the world of cyberpunk almost exemplifies the state of the body, which a stereotypical cyberfan would *die* to have. A cyborg (*cybernetic organism*) is where the biological and technological merges, or to be more precise where the computer technology and the human flesh melds together. The body of cyborgs such as the ones represented in the movies Blade Runner, Terminator, Robocop depict the body of the cyborg as far stronger than the human body, far “less susceptible to injury or pain” (Featherstone and Burrows 1995: 4). They could even repair themselves and remain not effected – neither emotionally nor physically– by the surgery, thus they are almost un-intimidateable. The cyborg body is super and admirable; the boundaries of its body are clean; it is hard, its form is tight: it is invulnerable.

The mythology of the bodies that are “addicted” to PCs has certain convictions according to Lupton. In contrast to the cyborg body which is uncontaminated, clean and with well defined boundaries of “inside” and “outside” (which is to say the feeling of abjection could be avoided in a cyborgian body), the computer nerd’s body has characteristics which is “absolutely unattractive, and even, disgusting” (Lupton 1995: 103). On the other hand, hackers and computer nerds are generally represented as “computer whizzes” who are admired for their intellectual capacities and abilities (that is, for their “brain” or ability of deciphering software)²⁰. They are represented in popular culture as predominantly male, in their early adulthood and portrayed as social misfits. Lupton observes that their physical

²⁰ The meaning *and* pronunciation of the term “whiz” is somehow similar to that of the word “wiz” which is derived from *Wizard of Oz*. A description which is very apt for the image of the computer world; magical, miraculous, mysterious and mystical.

appearance is usually depicted as pale, overweighted, wearing thick glasses, dressed in a poor fashion sense and in dirty clothes. Their bodies are “soft” and evoke abjection (i.e., degraded, and despicable, contemptible). They are represented as incapable of communicating with other people in face-to-face contact²¹: they are *obsessed* with computer because of their asocial attitudes and physical unattractiveness. They are regarded as computer-addicts as if they are some kind of drug-addicts.

Thus they lack control over their bodies and its desires, it is definitely the opposite of the cyborgian body that is rationalized and contained. They do not want to eternalize their body as it is offered by the medical technologies, but instead, they want to abandon the body that is uncontrollable and unordered as it is again, vanishing, weak, and poor.

1.4 The “Two” Sides of the Möbius Strip

Within the theoretical field of twentieth century’s terrain of thought, according to recent studies, there have been two kinds of broad approach to the body, which can be named as the lived body and the inscriptive body in a generalizing attempt, or, as the British mostly prefer to name them, the naturalistic body and the socially constructed body (Levin 1989, Shilling 1993, Grosz 1994, 1995, Turner 1992, 1994, 1996).

²¹ Face-to-face contact = speech. Perhaps they represent one of the facets of the subordinated “writing” within the society.

However, Nick Crossley (1996) opposes to the idea that such a division is forming in the social theory of the body, and tries to exemplify his view in his study in which he compares the views of Foucault to those of Merleau-Ponty's. I believe on the one hand, he is right in saying that the two views are mutually informing and complementary, yet on the other he is not, in asserting that the two views are propagated by the above-mentioned authors as in *opposition* to one another. Elizabeth Grosz, for instance, states clearly that she "doubts that the two models are reconcilable" (1994: 27). Yet, by that she does not mean only one of the models can bear the potential of being valid for a whole range of problems concerning the human embodiment, and the body. Grosz, moreover, being well aware of the binary oppositions and their limited and illusory effects, asserts that somehow a theory of the body should be achieved –and she tries to explore a new path focusing on the sexual difference. All throughout her studies she demonstrates both the strong and weak points of each model and she looks for another way that may utilize certain views from *each* of them. The other authors mentioned above have shared similar affirmative views throughout their studies in which they have chosen to accentuate various facets of the human embodiment.

The lived body and inscriptive body "models" are named relatively: according to their relative point of view toward the human body. I will follow Grosz's approach, primarily for the sake of practicality and without being uncautious. Firstly, as grouping would help us to understand the premise of the approaches with an affinity more clearly. Secondly, as the views that are brought together in a certain model exhibit a valid degree of coherence up to an extent, which is relatively stronger with respect to the other views in the other model, it is possible to detect the major forces effecting the bodies through generalizing. Although this has its own risks, as

someone new in the field it is a must for me to start from the more general in order to proceed to the more refined with conviction.

Firstly, I will attempt to depict both of the models with respect to their broader concerns, and then, exemplify them in greater detail by conveying the conceptions of some of the prominent figures, as they are usually referred as the major contributors within these fields. Secondly, in the conclusion chapter, I will modestly, yet in an implicit and freer fashion, attempt to reconcile the conceptions and approaches from both of the philosophies via some concepts of deconstruction that I have tried to convey up to here, since I believe the two models are nothing but the two different lines drawn on the Möbius strip which has not two separate surfaces, but one.

The two broad approaches that I will separately discuss below, therefore, should not be considered as opposed to each other, but rather as a shift in the emphasis in two “different” directions with the focal point remained same. They are grouped only with reference to the relative positioning, relative point of view of their approach to the body. It is always possible to detect the “traces” of the “opposite” approach in each other.

Lastly, I feel an itchy urgency to explain a point regarding the Möbius strip metaphor I have used earlier while discussing deconstruction. I have conceived it on my own in a paper in 1996, and at that time I was totally unaware of the fact that it has already been employed as a metaphor by well known scholars such as Lacan, Lyotard, and particularly Grosz (surprisingly in her writings on the body). This creates an ambivalence feeling: I am both flattered and discouraged.

Nevertheless, the this-has-been-done-before situation is not something new in the academia (as well as in art, science and philosophy). However, having explained my reasons, I feel quite free to employ it in my own way without referring to someone else.

2 The Body from within Outside

The body that is conceived as to evolve “from within outside” implies a direction as well as a process. Yet, neither the process nor the direction of the evolution is that simple and uniform, or unidirectional and unilateral. The process can only be “completed”, or be ready for “regeneration” when it returns to its starting phase. This evolution cycle, hence, may only occur when the progressive direction of it circles back. The direction is, initially, away from outside toward inside, from exterior to interior. Nevertheless, it is eventually reflected back –yet, perhaps partially– as to complete the cycle. It is *the relative* standing point (of view), therefore, of the advocates of this model that provoke them to emphasize the starting point, i.e., the outside of the body. It seems to me there is no *decidable* starting point for the cause-effect relationship (like a chain-reaction) of the segments of a topologically closed cycle. That is why the title of this subsection is “from within outside”, and not simply “from outside” or “from exterior to interior” as these imply a termination, a one-way journey. The title, I believe, implies more aptly the complexity of cycling motion, the partiality of it within the Möbius strip, the relativity of the starting point.

The initial direction of the evolution of the body as such is from its outer surface to its inner depths. This is due to the set of forces that are capable of shaping and forming the body, and the subject. The body as such has a “skin”; an outer surface, which is a sensitive target for the forces, primarily exerted from outer sources. The conception of such a body as the “surface of inscription”

predominantly stems from a prevailing concern with the sociopolitical issues and problems. The body that is analyzed within this view is a “social” body, the body that is subjected to social norms, legislative laws, moral and cultural values. It is the body within the public, among the other “bodies”; the body that is primarily and constantly exposed to external “forces”¹. These forces, and particularly when they are emitted by the sources of power, simultaneously exert concrete and imaginary constraints and sanctions on the body and, henceforth consequently, on the conception of the body. That is meant to say, they both exercise on the materiality, the physicality, and the “surface” of the body, and –as a subsequence of this incision according to the rationale of this approach– the psyche, and the “interiority” of the body. The outer surface of the body that is inscribed by the exterior “forces” generates the interiority. The body’s surface as such folds back on itself and produces, shapes the interior depth and core, i.e., the subject. Grosz comments on the principal engagement of the inscriptive approach as follows:

The inscriptive model is more concerned [than that of the “lived body” model] with the processes by which the subject is marked, scarred, transformed, and written upon or constructed by the various regimes of institutional, discursive, and nondiscursive power as a particular kind of body (Grosz 1995: 33).

We are, encountered here with the subject conceived as a “surface phenomenon”. It is the inseparable surface of human corporeality (and whatever is

¹ Actually, these forces are not always necessarily to be understood as radiated by Foucauldian *crystallized* sources of *power*, as for among them are the “other” bodies and objects which may exercise on the body “positively” as much possibly as “negatively”. Foucauldian power, whereas, always “acts” as an agent of oppression, and is generated by the discourses that consider, eventually, the masses: the society. Please refer to the subsection below titled as Foucault’s Body.

“written upon” it); the carnal and earthly existence of the “natural” human being which is conceived as a target, and which is considered somewhat as pliable and docile; that draws the boundaries of subjectivity². The advocates of this model accept that the body as such is not only shaped and constrained, but even invented by the society also. The common point within the internal varieties of this model is that the social forces impinge upon the body: yet, there are diverse views on the formulation of these forces and on the question of how they affect the body.

The susceptible, receptive subject as such, thus apparently, is not “living” alone. The subject’s body has a “sensitive skin”. It contacts, through its “surface”, with other “bodies” and surfaces. Its body, is “a series of linkages (or possibly activities) which form superficial or provisional connections with other objects and processes” (Grosz 1995: 116).

The metaphor of body-as-surface, within this particular discourse, advocates the use of a series of others. The body as a *tabula rasa*, a page, a flat-plane, a material surface; which is inscribed, marked, scarred, written upon by instruments such as stylus, laser beam, clothing, accessory, diet, exercise; can, therefore, also be read and interpreted. The body becomes a text, a book, an emblem, a badge which becomes the bearer of messages, signs, meanings; and a medium which can transmit them as well as receive them (Grosz 1994: 115-21). The embodied subjectivity as such, thus, is

² For an epitomized and well-represented discussion on the body and its relation with the subjectivity, see The Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, and Space, Time, and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies, both by Elizabeth Grosz. Full bibliographic details are given in the Works Cited section. These two works, being very “inspirational” for me, actually guided my thoughts whilst constituting the theoretical framework of this part of the study.

theorized not with the questions of what/how it “feels”, but rather with the questions of what it “does”, and how it “acts”.

In order to map the conceptualization of the human body as a social construction, as a surface incised and inscribed by the social forces, the situation of the embodied subject, in this respect, within the society should be examined. The situated subject as such has been a serious concern, in varying modes and degrees, for the figures whom I have taken as the major representatives of this model, namely, Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze-and-Felix Guattari. Surprising as it may be, none of them actually has a coherent theory of the body. Yet, in their works there is considerable, and useful, theoretical reflections on the body, which have been referred frequently by the scholars writing on the body and related issues. All of the accounts briefly and broadly touched below share a common ground; they are all opposed to the notion that the body is only a closed, object-like, physiological system.

Needless to say, it is not possible for me to exhibit their reflections and conceptions of the body in full, nor in relation to the depths of the specific philosophical accounts of each of them. I will try, however even if briefly and occasionally, to mention their general philosophical “characteristic” and the points that they are said to either share or break apart. Since my aim in this part of the work is to trace the philosophical conceptions on the body (that have influenced the recent social theories), I believe, a subsection devoted to each of these figures will be appropriate in terms of illustrating the most remarkable points of this approach.

2.1 Nietzsche's Body

Body I am entirely and nothing else: the soul is only a word for something about the body³.

The body, for Nietzsche, is a battlefield. Yet, the combats that take place in this field, rather than being destructive, are productive and positive⁴. The body, which Nietzsche conceives, in the first instance, is chaotic, energetic, mercurial, tactile, wild and demanding. As such it is, for being the nest and target for multiple forces. More than that, it, verily, *is* made up of this multiplicity of forces; again for it is not only the *site* of these ever-conflicting and ever-contesting forces which never cease to clash, but also the *source* of them.

Before plunging into the delineation of these forces and of how they relate to the body, however, I infer that it would be appropriate to enter upon Nietzsche's incessant quest –of will, knowledge, power, and truth– and critique of modernity. Appropriate it would be, for the reason that his quest, as I tend to see, is discerning, not only with regard to the issues related to the body, but, correlatively in a larger

³ Friedrich Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

⁴ In the majority of the works cited in this thesis, Nietzsche is always among the references with which one would fairly, yet consistently encounter. Despite some unfavourable views, the prevailing final account on his conception of the body --and also on his philosophy in general -- is that it is affirmative and enhancing, be that as he may be rigorous and disparaging on certain aspects of modern culture (see Grosz 1994 and 1995, Hughes 1996, Lash 1991).

scale, connected with the general discourses of knowledge and truth of the western modernity⁵, also.

In his rigorous critique of the modern culture and thought of his times (i.e., nineteenth century), Nietzsche's primary concerns are, if I should generalize following Bill Hughes, "the idols of modernity" (Hughes 1996: 33). What are these idols for which Nietzsche manifests his contempt so vigorously? He condemns whatever he sees as an illusory idol –which is always authoritarian and governing: despotic laws, suppressive Christian morality, absolute reason and mind, sheer consciousness, de-somatized philosophy, tamed desire and will, codified customs, and alike. Nietzsche, in short, is against, I propose, whatever *bisects*, and for, in all the diverse meanings of the word, the *just*, concerning the human being/life that he conceives as a complex set of multiple interactions. His endeavour, thus, is to resuscitate the subordinated terms that are suffocated within the abyss of dichotomous thought. Yet, his is not a vulgar, reductionist approach nor a simple attempt to reverse the hierarchy of the pairs of the dualism. He is after a more "natural", balanced and fair view of the human "culture" and the world. Within this context of his philosophical condemnation of modernity, Nietzsche's major issues in which he employs questions of the body⁶ evolve around two main axes, or contexts;

⁵ Nietzsche has remarkably been cited in various critical works on western culture in which post-Cartesian (be it poststructuralist, postmodernist, postcolonialist, deconstructionist) epistemology and methodologies are employed. For some, thus, he is the trailblazer of the detour to the dichotomous mode of thought. Hughes claims, for instance, that Foucault, Bataille, Deleuze, Derrida "owe a debt to Nietzsche" (Hughes 1996: 43n2).

⁶ Nietzsche never specifically worked on a theory of the body. He has no such coherent theory in terms of the body, although the body and the closely related issues to it always inscribed on "almost every page he has written."

the theory of knowledge (epistemology), and power (particularly the will to power). In the paragraphs below, the reader will find Nietzsche's underlying, intricate critique of social inhibitions which, not only inscribe the body, but, strive to impair its will to overcome itself, its movement of becoming, also.

Nietzsche sees the body as the long-neglected, overlooked (even repressed and, thus, forgotten in a more "conscious" manner⁷) "reality". He believes affects, passion and desire in particular, that are mainly emanated from the body must be revived, reinstated in opposition to the metaphysically magnified conceptions of reason, mind, truth, and consciousness⁸.

Ideas are rooted in interests and desire, which have their location in our physiological selves. Ideas, concepts, knowledge, truth are simply, essentially, a consequence of our need to know, a rhetorical canopy that we wrap around ourselves to create a place of safety in a confusing and harsh world. (Hughes 1996: 34)

Desire to know and will to power, for Nietzsche, are the primary motivations for us to operate and rely on, what we call our reason and mind. We consider the mind as superior because we "feel" better and safe, i.e., "powerful", as we believe that we acquire more "knowledge" by using the faculties of mind, which supposedly reveals the "truth". For Nietzsche, this sequence does not prove the principality of

⁷ The Nietzschean definition of epistemology always strive to balance the "mind" (reason, conscious) and the "body" (organic): "The body, as feeling, passion, pain, love, laughter, and contempt is hammered on to the anvil of intellect and the intellect is given its place in life alongside -not above- the faculties and capacities of the organism" (Hughes 1996: 32).

⁸ He is, for sure, not against reason, knowledge, truth and consciousness categorically. "For Nietzsche, consciousness is a belief, an illusion: . . . [yet] useful for life, a convenient fiction . . ." (Grosz 1994: 124). For Nietzsche, ". . . knowledge has survival value, rather than truth value" (127). He wrote ". . . truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live. The value for life is ultimately decisive" (Quoted in Grosz 1994: 127).

mind, but, on the contrary, the principality of the bodily *desire*; that of will, and eventually, that of the *will to power*.

The movement of the body's forces; the body's struggle to overcome itself, to grow; its will of self-expansion, self-overcoming, all are due to affects and desires of the body. Accordingly what we call mistakenly as intellectual knowledge –that is supposedly acquired solely by mind and reason– is only a consequence of this will to power that is primarily corporeal. “Bodies construct systems of belief, knowledge, as a consequence of the impulses of their organs and processes” (Grosz 1994: 126).

Truth, on the other hand, for Nietzsche, as the privileged object of the knowledges, is ultimately dependent on the language, and thus, it is not only dynamic and dependent on the multiplicity of perspectives, but also, just a set of illusory metaphors: “What is truth but a mobile army of metaphors?” writes Nietzsche (quoted in Grosz 1994: 126). For Nietzsche the human body is the site where “the organic is rising yet to higher levels” (quoted in Grosz 1994: 128). The multiplicity of forces on/of it does not allow the subject to remain as singular and unified. The body is in a constant stage and struggle of becoming. Therewith the subject is incapable to grasp all; the corporeal subject cannot comprehend anything in its totality. There is, therefore Grosz points out, no fixed truth but perspectives: “The body itself . . . comes to have a perspective and position, one among a number of competing, or complementary, perspectives vying for ascendancy” (1994: 129).

Nietzsche brings forth, desire, will, passion, instinct, and, hence, as they all emanate from it, the body; the energies, forces of the carnality and corporeality of human being. Nietzsche embraces the human life (and philosophy) as comprising the whole; with all feelings, instincts, passions, and desires –in short, the *affects*– adhered to it. Thus, to know is not for the sake of mind, but for the welfare of the bodily,

earthly desires. “Our lust for knowledge of nature is a means through which the body desires to perfect itself,” wrote Nietzsche (quoted in Hughes 1996: 37).

He has developed a “naturalistic epistemology” in which the body, and the forces, energies, movements of becoming, on/of it are vital. It is by the effect of these forces that the body is constructed, and the limits of the subjectivity are drawn. The body, truly, is made up of these forces, yet, the question of “how” remains.

In order to be able to answer the above-mentioned question, for Nietzsche, one should focus on, again, the body itself and the multiple forces of incision on/of it. The body simultaneously encloses conflicting, competing, and contradictory forces, i.e., *active* and *reactive* forces. It, also, textualizes the tangible and the intangible; the earthly and the heavenly; the ethereal and the palpable. Yet, the affects that are imprisoned and inhibited by the modern culture –Nietzsche has already defined his times as “the decadence”–, by the constraints of social norms and rules, are the *raison d’être* of the struggle between major forces:

Indeed, for Nietzsche, all of inner psychological life is essentially an excursus, a cultural product of the inhibited body, the body turned inward against itself, the body denied creative space and the possibility for self-overcoming through constitutive activity. The products of contemplation –beliefs, values, moral systems, knowledge, (so-called) truths, soul– are the outcomes of the multiple inhibitions which structure social space and ameliorate desire. (Hughes 1996: 37)

The forces, are the affects of the body which produces and emits them; which forms, *per se*, the social values and meanings via them; and then, they are reflected, bounced back onto the body, by the social inhibitions; yet in “mutated” forms and clash with the affects. This is the crux of Nietzsche’s philosophical account on the body; the body, hence the subjectivity as such, is an indecisive

singularity, is a constant movement of becoming: the subject in limbo, which Nietzsche strives to pull to the terrain of “superhumanity”.

Nietzsche divides the chaotic forces on/of the body that impose a perspective (or perspectives) into two: dominant, active forces, and subordinated, reactive forces. Active forces concern for their well being and expansion, whereas the main concern of reactive forces is active forces which they try to “internalize” or “domesticize” by denying and converting them against themselves. Gilles Deleuze, in his book Nietzsche and Philosophy, expounds the characteristics of these forces by describing what they “do”:

. . . reactive force is: 1) utilitarian force of adaptation and partial limitation; 2) force which separates active force from what it can do, which denies active force . . . ; 3) force separated from what it can do, which denies or turns against itself. . . . And, analogously, active force is: 1) plastic, dominant and subjugating force; 2) force which goes to the limit of what it can do; 3) force which affirms its difference, which makes its difference an object of enjoyment and affirmation. Forces are only concretely and completely determined if these three pairs of characteristics are taken into account simultaneously. (Deleuze 1983: 57)

For Nietzsche, accordingly, consciousness, de-somatized philosophy, truths valid for all, beliefs of unity and origin, unequivocal self-reflexive reason, absolute knowledge of mind, all are the effects of the reactive forces, which strive to govern the body and the active forces on/of it that are self-expansive, self-overcoming⁹. The

⁹ Nietzsche believes that if philosophy –knowledge of knowledges– can see this constant dynamic struggle between these forces, then and only then it is possible for it to develop an affirmative, “vigorous, free, joyful activity”, since philosophy is not “a reflection on things . . . from a transcendent position; it is a practice that does things, legitimatizing and challenging other practices, enabling things to happen or preventing them from occurring” (Grosz 1994: 126).

impulse of these forces –the noble impulse of the active force, and the slavish impulse of the reactive force– can be detected by focusing on certain figures within the society. Grosz points out that Nietzsche, thus, has gone far enough to personify these forces “through the figures of the aristocratic noble and the base slave” (1994: 129). Yet these impulses are, for him, equally possible to be exhibited by all individuals regardless of their social class and stratum. The noble impulse is disconnected, independent, looks only to the future, without fear, forgetful, dynamic, celebratory; whereas the slavish impulse is reactive, resentful, revengeful, full of hatred, only looks to the past, not tolerant to difference or to other, against to what is “not itself”, devious, deceptive, indirect, bounded by the limits of the memory (Grosz 1994: 130). The noble impulse, therefore, is best illustrated by “the artist, the noble, and the sovereign individual”, whereas the best examples for the slavish impulse are, “the priest, the nihilist, and the philosopher”.

Since to comprehend Nietzsche on this subject matter is crucial, as it forms an historical-conceptual base for the following approaches mentioned below, I have tried to keep this subsection as concise yet as dense as possible. In the succeeding section, I will refer to the Nietzschean conception of the body along with further details of it. I now intend to proceed to Michel Foucault who has focused on the body as an investment site of the “power”.

2.2 Foucault's Body

*The soul is the prison of the body*¹⁰.

Foucault's interest is more heavily focused on the sociopolitical, sociohistorical issues, and their effects on the corporeality, on the body. Foucault is much less concerned in the questions of the subject's psychological interior, or in the composition and constitution of the internal functioning, or the phenomenology of the body. For Foucault, the task of his genealogical studies, in terms of the body, is "to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the processes of history's destruction of the body" (quoted in Grosz 1994: 146).

Foucault has chosen a different route from that of Nietzsche's, although he has followed Nietzsche's genealogical procedure¹¹ and kept on elaborating some of the latter's major concerns which are, in our case, knowledge, power, and the body¹², on them which he has developed and used a different set of conceptions. Since, even

¹⁰ Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison.

¹¹ "Genealogy is a history of events, here understood as discrete, disparate, often randomly connected material conjunctions of things or processes. Genealogy makes no presumptions about the metaphysical origins of things, their final teleology, the continuity or discontinuity of temporally contiguous elements, or the casual, explanatory connections between events. Instead, genealogy can be seen as the study of elements insofar as they are already interpreted, a study aimed at unsettling established models of knowledge and epistemological presumptions involved in the production of history, philosophy, and morality" (Grosz 1994: 145).

¹² As it is usually emphasized, for one, when trying to extract Foucault's understanding of the body from his works, it is a *sine qua non* to study his conceptions of knowledge and power, as his construction of these concepts are tightly intertwined with the human body and subjectivity. He has likewise Nietzsche, no specific and coherent theory of the body, yet, he is referring the body from further away than Nietzsche. He is rather merely "using" the body as a tool in his works, in which he theorizes on the issues of sociohistorical accounts.

if concisely, I have tried to delineate Nietzsche's philosophy on these conceptions, I believe, for the sake of practicality and economy, it would be appropriate to try to expound those of Foucault's with respect to the former.

For Foucault, the body is more like the object, target, and instrument of power, and, certainly more passive, docile and pliable in comparison to that of Nietzsche's. Foucault's body is the privileged site of investment(s) of power. Power utilizes the subject's (thus, the body's) desires and pleasures to create knowledges and truths. It does not only passively utilize them, but actually also, *produces* them. These knowledges and truths are, in their turn as Grosz puts it, used within a vicious circle to develop more "refined, improved, and efficient techniques for the surveillance and control of the bodies" (1994: 146).

For Nietzsche, the knowledges, which are developed as illusions (i.e., they have a survival value rather than truth value), and their formation, are due to the repressed, forgotten desires of the body; they are the *product* of the body, whereas for Foucault the knowledge-body relation is significantly different. Foucault's body is, despite being the plantation field of them, primarily a site on which knowledges and powers are exercised, and through which they function. Thus, although being resistant up to some extent, Foucault's body is more like an *investment site* of the knowledges and powers. This is so, for the fact that Foucault sees knowledge as a social product, in contra to Nietzsche's "naturalistic epistemology" which has its roots nowhere else, but in the body and in its "forgetfulness". For the former, "knowledge and truth are what a particular culture counts as true, what functions as

true” (Grosz 1994: 147). The knowledge and truth, moreover, are always accompanied by institutions that develop and propagate their discourses. Therefore, I believe, Foucault’s concerns –of knowledge, power¹³, the body– are more pragmatic and sociohistorical, rather than ontological. In accordance to that, his understanding of the body differs significantly from that of Nietzsche’s. His conception of the functioning of the body is close to that of a “black box”. He is not, in fact, much interested in the consciousness and the Nietzschean forces (active-reactive) that are somehow adhered to the subject’s “natural” corporeality. The resistance of the body; for Nietzsche, is due to its “internal” energies, intensities, and the impetus of its forces; whereas for Foucault, it is rather due to its recalcitrance stemmed from its location and context with respect to the discourses. The definition of the *resistant* body in Foucault is as much problematic as his conception of the bodily pleasures and desires, since he never provided an explicit theoretical delineation of them. This is said to be for the reasons that Foucault actually reproduced the hegemonic-dualistic approach by overemphasizing “discourses” as to diminish the fact of the phenomenological body. For him, the powers of the body seem to be limited to those invested in them by discourses. Similarly, “he cannot say what it is about the body that resists” (Shilling 1993: 81). There is considerable critique of Foucault revolving

¹³ For Foucault, power is not something, which can simply be defined and detected. It must be understood “as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens or reverses them; as the support these force relations find in another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies” (Foucault 1978: 92).

around the weaknesses of him on the above mentioned points (see, Falk 1994, Shilling 1993, Turner 1996).

Power and knowledge, in Foucauldian view, are synergetic. Power produces knowledge for the sake of revealing the truth that, in its turn, exalts knowledge to an indisputable, unequivocal position, in order to enable the power to use it as a tool to seize hold of the bodies. Foucault posits the body within the dynamic nexus of power-knowledge as follows:

The body is moulded by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances Nothing in man –not even his body– is sufficiently stable to serve as a basis of self-recognition or for understanding other men. (Quoted in Grosz 1994: 148)

Power, therefore, constructs an “efficient”, “predictable”, “controllable” subject through its body, that is moulded to produce a susceptible, docile, and thus, obedient subject. Yet, the gist of the matter is that the body as such is not stable and recognizable for the subject, but for the powers of the discourses. The subject as such has a *determinate* body, “with particular features, skills, and attributes.” This is why the epigram in the beginning of this subsection, I believe, exemplifies at best Foucault’s conception of the body in the way that it is determined in modernity. Power produces a subject with a “soul”, interiority through the incised, inscribed body, which, consequently, becomes the “prison” of the body. The subject, in accordance to that, is shaped and moulded, not by coercive, brutal methodologies, but through discourses via its body that is then considered (in modernity) as the “mindful body”. Chris Shilling, yet, points out that the body is not “simply a focus of discourse”, but it constitutes “*the* link between daily practices on the one hand and the large scale organization of power on the other” (Shilling 1993: 75). The power,

writes Foucault, thus, operates “through progressively finer channels, gaining access to individuals themselves, to their bodies, their gestures and all their daily actions” (quoted in Shilling 1993: 75).

Foucault employed the issues of the body, in a great extent, in his works on the disciplinary systems and the history of sexuality. He has traced the individual’s trajectory, within a transition from traditional to modern society, and in the context of its construction as the embodied subject connected to institutions. What seems, to me, as the most significant change in this transition is the shift in the conception of the body; the “fleshy body” is replaced by the “mindful body” which is conceived as the –(ab)usable, pliable– site of a multiplicity of intentions, desires, and “consciousness” by the Foucauldian power..

Foucault’s famous analysis of Benthamite Panopticon constitutes a convenient example in terms of displaying the relations of the body-knowledge to the space that is dominated by discourses of power¹⁴. The Panopticonist philosophy is concerned not only with observation and with surveillance, but also, with the individuation and the stimulation of desires. “Individuation is a set of practices by which individuals are identified and separated by marks, numbers, signs and codes which are derived from knowledge of the population and related to the establishment of norms” (Shilling 1993: 78). The scope of control, accordingly, has been changed as to be exerted over much larger areas of society since it is divided into classified, standardized groups.

As the philosophy of the Panopticon model was applied to most of the institutions¹⁵ where the power is most crystallized; two major shifts occurred in terms of control mechanism. The first is the shift from the control of a centralized authority to a mechanism of *self-control*. The awareness of surveillance, knowing that an overseer exists, becomes the source of an exerted stimulation for subjects to develop self-control over their bodies and behaviour. The second shift, which is symbiotic with and complementary to the first one, is about the means of controlling. The repressive, restrictive means of controlling, is largely replaced with “an increased focus on maintaining control through the stimulation of *desires*” (Shilling 1993: 80).

¹⁴ “The Panopticon was a circular building of cells where prisoners were always available for surveillance from a central watchtower. . . . under the constant gaze of an overseer. . . .” (Shilling 1993: 75).

¹⁵ It is the Panoptic model today, the model of the modern prison, which is extended, not only, into institutions like schools, army barracks, hospitals, as Foucault observed, but, I believe, into the characteristic spaces of the capitalist discourse, also; work places, hotel lobbies, shopping malls.

2.3 Deleuze-and-Guattari's Body

*The BwO is never yours or mine. It is always a body.*¹⁶

Gilles Deleuze, like Nietzsche and Foucault, did not specifically work to develop a theory of the body. The questions of the body, particularly those posited by Spinoza, which influenced Deleuze in his early works¹⁷ have evolved to give rise to some of the major concepts that he delivered with Félix Guattari in later works. The premises of that Deleuze (with Guattari) is included in this section (i.e., The Body from within Outside) differs from those of Nietzsche's and/or Foucault's. Deleuze's philosophy has a peculiar trajectory, which can be broadly described as to evolve from the realm of ontology towards ethics and to politics (Hardt 1993: xx). The conception of the body of Deleuze and Guattari, accordingly, has offshoots from and toward each of these fields: It travels back and forth; it is in between and in relation both to the ontology, the ethics, and the politics of the body or bodies.

I will primarily conceive this subsection from their last co-works. I am going to be highly selective in terms of using their concepts and approaches which most of them will be from the volumes of their co-authored work Capitalism and Schizophrenia, that are, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus¹⁸.

¹⁶ Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus.

¹⁷ See Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy by Michael Hardt, particularly chapter 3.

¹⁸ All of the authors that I have cited or read for this subsection have practiced and recommended a "different/patient/freer" way of reading –and also using– Deleuze's thoughts. See Hardt (xvii-xxi), Grosz (1994: 165-66), Massumi (7-8). See also Deleuze and

In the first chapter, I have tried to convey Derrida's revelation of the contradictions, restrictions and inadequacies of the western metaphysical philosophy that operates with dichotomous tools. The metaphor of Möbius strip that I have used in that chapter can be refined further here. Momentarily, Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy can be regarded as the inversion section at the crucial twist of the Möbius strip. The twisted circle becomes a continuously flowing one "surface"¹⁹. The two surfaces become one (yet, perhaps imminently): In Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical accounts, there is no more bipolarity *or* dialectical relation of the distinct pairs with a hegemonic pole. The either clearly or supplementarily separated pairs of inside/outside, exteriority/interiority, subject/object, natural/cultural merge into *one* ontological status of "the plane of consistency".

There is even no more essential supplementarity (cf. Derrida Deconstructing). It is, hence, even impossible to employ the one-and-two sided (twone!) metaphor of the Möbius strip, as it would not be that consistent. One should regard, instead, Von Koch's curve –more than a line less than a surface–, and

Guattari (1987: 22 ff.) for the advises of the authors on reading their book as well as the information on how they wrote it. Although Grosz warns us somehow to avoid "a jargonized, sloganized" reading (1994: 225n5), yet the authors themselves seem to feel (and also aim to make us feel) more relaxed: ". . . write with slogans: Make rhizomes, not roots, never plant! Don't sow, grow offshoots! . . . Have short-term ideas. Make maps, not photos or drawings" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 24-5).

¹⁹ I believe Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical position is crucial as they emphasize the *inversion* of the strip that the western thought bears inherently and discretely. However, that is not all that. They show the strip's transformation to the four and more (and less) dimensional realms, and its capacity in connecting with other complex "geometricals". In addition to that, Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze are not philosophically disparate in terms of their initial and major concerns and critiques. Therefore, I believe and hope that the three subsections will be somehow coherent and complimentary. Spinoza's philosophy, on the other hand is not only inspirational to Deleuze, but considered "as the precursor of Nietzsche", as well (Gatens 1996: 100ff).

Sierpensky's sponge –more than surface, less than a volume– (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 474-500). Hierarchical organizations, ordered organisms, centrality of the subject, “relations between subject and object, substance, matter, corporeality” are all problematized by their challenging approach (Grosz 1994: 164). Moreover, their process of problematization, I believe, has the potential even to pave the way to a multi-territorial realm that is perhaps beyond the “dichotomy” between dichotomous and nondichotomous thought!

Deleuze and Guattari are connected “firmly” to the world (yet, they are at the fringes, at the extremes), to the land and sky, to the life, to other people and bodies, to day-to-day life, to the political. They are not for metaphysics but for physics; not Newtonian kind, but subatomic/astrophysics kind. They drive from quantum physics, chemistry, biology, and mathematics: From the shortest life span of subatomic particles, and the indeterminable movement of electron; from molecular bonds and connections, and molar structures and reactions; from the smallest molecule that is alive, and the pervious membrane of the cell; from smooth and striated spaces, and fractals and chaos theory.

Deleuze and Guattari do not reject the immanency of the body or the interiority of the subjectivity neither categorically nor for the sake of emphasizing the ethical, social and implicitly political issues. Grosz points out that their notion of the human body, following Spinoza's monistic model, is neither a “locus for a consciousness nor an organically determined entity”:

Their notion of the body as a discontinuous, nontotalizable series of processes, organs, flows, energies, corporeal substances and incorporeal events, speeds and durations, may be of great value . . . to reconceive bodies outside the binary oppositions imposed on the body by the mind/body, nature/culture, subject/object and interior/exterior oppositions. They provide an altogether different

way of understanding the body in its connections with other bodies, both human and inhuman, animate and inanimate, linking organs and biological processes to material objects and social practices while refusing to subordinate the body to a unity or a homogeneity of the kind provided by the body's subordination to consciousness or to biological organization (1994: 164-65).

The body, for them, can be understood definitely in terms of what it can *do*. The body *performs*; it establishes linkages with other bodies. Its capacities and boundaries are not stable or knowable in advance; what the body can *do* is unpredictable. Therefore, the conception of the body of Deleuze and Guattari does not focus on what the body lacks or what it seeks teleologically (cf. Freud's Body and Lacan's Body). They rather posit an affirmative understanding of the body that is not based on and bounded by the "lack". Their body is a one that does, connects, becomes; the body that is alive in *temporarily stable singularities* in "its" world, yet which is the cause and effect of living in *constantly unstable multiplicities* among other bodies on "the" Earth.

Their notion of desire, accordingly, is different from that of psychoanalysis. Desire is not a longing or craving, but an actualization, "a series of practices, bringing things together or separating them, making machines, making reality" (Grosz 1994: 165). Desire, for them, moves and does directionally, not intentionally: it looks for its self-expansion and proliferation; it does not seek to attain a particular object. Accordingly, desire is everywhere, in every direction, and it is at work in its machinic connections: "It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks" (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 1). Desire produces, and is produced within, desiring machines, which are "inherently connective in nature: 'and . . .' 'and then . . .'" (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 5). Desiring-machines are always coupled with another –and within this linearly

couplings of “production of production”— they break the flow of the machine they connect, yet the current continues to flow:

Everywhere *it* is machines—real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections. An organ-machine is plugged into an energy-source-machine: the one produces a flow that the other interrupts. The breast is a machine that produces milk, and the mouth a machine coupled to it. The mouth of the anorexic wavers between several functions: its possessor is uncertain as to whether it is an eating-machine, an anal-machine, a talking-machine, or a breathing-machine (asthma attacks). Hence we are all handymen: each with his little machines. For every organ-machine, an energy-machine: all the time, flows and interruptions. . . . Something is produced: the effects of a machine, not mere metaphors. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 1-2)

The above-mentioned understanding brings forth the questions related to the limits and boundaries of subject and object which, for Deleuze and Guattari, can not be clearly demarcated, can not be defined in terms of distinct boundaries. *The* questions have already been evoked: What else a mouth (or breast) *does*? *Whose* is it? What else *can* it coupled to? (Thus; the limits of the “unified” subject are shattered). What does milk *do* that is produced by the breast-machine when it flows *into* the mouth-machine? *Whose* milk it is? (Thus the “distinct” object is fractured)²⁰.

This self is not alone But it is no exaggeration to say that on this level the breast is as much a part of the baby’s body as it is of the mother’s. It is infolded in the infant brain. The human body as supermolecule has no determinate boundaries. (Massumi 1992: 73)

This is to say all things, material or psychical, animate or inanimate, can not be simply understood as “discrete entities or binary opposites”. However, this does

²⁰ See Massumi 1992: 70ff.

not mean that they should be regarded as united, holistic, or singular. They are more regarded as “series of flows, energies, movements, strata, segments, organs, intensities” (Grosz 1994: 167). What these nouns signify is a series of fragments, *phases* or *modes* of the bodies (of the subject and of the object) that are ever dynamic, ever voyaging, transforming and transformed²¹. They are intersecting, and affecting and being affected; connected by the others they “touch” in the process of becoming. Identities (if there is any, as defined by its limits), therefore, can not be stable and static as long as bodies –whether animate or inanimate– encounter with other bodies. Deleuze and Guattari comments on this “essential” and “constitutive” relationship within the context of technological tools as follows:

Tools are inseparable from symbioses or amalgamations defining a Nature-Society machinic assemblage. . . . There is a primacy of the machinic assemblage of bodies over tools and goods, a primacy of the collective assemblage of enunciation over language and words. . . . That is why a social field is defined less by its conflicts and contradictions than by the lines of flight running through it. An assemblage has neither base nor superstructure, neither deep structure nor superficial structure; it flattens all of its dimensions onto a single plane of consistency upon which reciprocal presuppositions and mutual insertions play themselves out. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 90)

²¹ This specific –yet “constant”– *phase* or *mode* of the bodies, I submit, is very much like the fourth state of the matter: *plasma*, (e.g. the flame). It is neither a solid, nor a liquid, nor a gas; its permanence is not that of a substance, but that of a process. It requires a solid or a liquid that is flammable along with the oxygen in order to keep its phase. Its boundaries are not determinable, it is affected and it affects; it is not in a stable state. It transforms continuously both itself and what it burns. It produces gas and solid that are different from what they were initially, before it is connected to them. It is self-expansive: always looking for (not intentionally) other substances to be connected, to be transformed. Its boundaries (limits of identity) do not depend on itself, but the other bodies that it can reach, connect. It is not simply consuming but transforming in a constant exchange. It is constituted in the middle;

Yet, the machinic assemblage of bodies has nothing to do with the Descartes's mechanistic view of the body, which is still dominant within the many established knowledges and disciplines. Descartes envisaged the body via the metaphor of machine in which the body is regarded as an object, an instrument, or a medium that is highly criticized for being separated from, and subordinated to mind²² (see Descartes Disembodied and Derrida Deconstructing). Whereas in Deleuze and Guattari's conception there is no central or hierarchical order or organization of being: human, animal, plant, inanimate things, all have the same ontological status²³. Moreover, disparate status of ideas and things, mind and matter is of no importance, after all, within the plane of consistency²⁴. Ideas, things, bodies, all are series of fragments or elements capable of being linked together or detached apart in

the transformation process reconstitutes its "material". Its "material" is different from the previous and following ones.

²² Cartesianism has caused the body to be investigated in distinct fields, rather than in its full complexity or "expansibility". It is regarded as an object for the natural sciences and humanities. For the former, the body is an organic system of interrelated parts of a merely physical and extended object that is functional. For the latter, it functions as an instrument for the disparately examined emotions, attitudes, experiences, or for cultural variations, or for the ontological status. The body, for psychoanalysis is a signifying medium, a vehicle of expression, and a conduit between the self and the society. It is rather like the nest of what is uncontrollable, unknown to the subject: the body as a means of expression of an otherwise incommunicable psyche.

²³ Yet, this does not mean that the world is without strata. The hierarchies are simply not due to substances or their nature, but the result "of modes of organization of disparate substances. They are composed of lines, of movements, speeds, and intensities, rather than of things and their relations. Assemblages or multiplicities, then, because they are essentially in movement, in action, are always *made*, not found. They are the consequences of a practice" (emphasis added) (Grosz 1994: 167-68).

²⁴ "The plane of consistency or of composition (planomenon) is opposed to the plane of organization and development. Organization and development concern form and substance. . . . But the plane of consistency knows nothing of substance and form: haecceities, which are inscribed on this plane, are precisely modes of individuation proceeding neither by form nor by the subject" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 506-7).

potentially infinite ways. Machines and assemblages are provisional linkages and conjunctions (a plus b plus c . . .) or breaks and disjunctions of fragments of bodies, fragments of objects (i.e., flows, energies, movements, strata, segments, organs, intensities).

Machines and assemblages, hence, create provisional and temporary *multiplicities*. If they are the consequences of a practice, then they are inevitably limited and bounded by the *space* and *time*. They are not standard, not teleological, not following application principles: they are territorial, contextual, and hence finite in space and time. Assemblages, thereupon, are opposed to mechanism. They “always have an outside; they do not, or need not, belong to a higher-order machine . . . They are the condition as well as the effect of any making, any producing” (Grosz 1994: 168).

Having mentioned desire and machinic assemblages, one must recur –or proceed further– to the concept of “desiring machine” since it is where the Deleuze-and-Guattari’s body conception becomes more complex. Flows and intensities of a desiring machine compose the body and these flows and intensities themselves are composed of a series of desiring machines. There is no unity or oneness in a desiring machine. The elements and discontinuities that constitute it do not belong to a totality that is supposed to be completed –it is opposed to the psychoanalytical concept of “lack”. They do not re-present the real, for their function is not a signifying one: they produce and they themselves are real. The nomadic, unpredictable, creative desiring machine always experiments, by establishing linkages, connections, “making things”.

Deleuze and Guattari conceived of the relation of desiring machine and the body that is responsive and nonresisting to its flows and intensities as to form the

“Body without Organs” (BwO), since the body, for them, is neither “a unified and unifying organism, an organism centered either biologically or psychically”, nor it is “cohesive through its intentionality or its capacity for reflection and self-reflection” (Grosz 1994: 168):

Whenever someone makes love, really makes love, that person constitutes a body without organs, alone and with the other person or people. A body without organs is not an empty body stripped of organs, but a body upon which that which serves as organs. . . . Thus the body without organs is opposed less to organs as such than to the organization of the organs insofar as it composes an organism. The body without organs is not a dead body but a living body all the more alive and teeming once it has blown apart the organism and its organization. . . . The full body without organs is a body populated by multiplicities. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 30)

The BwO is a “denaturalized” human body, which is in direct relation with the flows, intensities, and energies of other bodies, regardless of being animate or inanimate. The BwO is the body that is *before* the body is moulded into a regulated, stratified, ordered structure or organization: It is just like “the full egg before the extension of the organism, and the organization of the organs” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 153). The BwO, thus, is opposed to the organized organism, and not to the organs²⁵.

²⁵ One must note that Deleuze and Guattari conceived the notion of BwO (from Antonin Artaud) initially in their *Anti-Oedipus* (published in the French in 1972) primarily in order to criticise Freud’s and Lacan’s psychoanalytic theories, along with to examine capitalism. Their use of the notion, thus, in this work is largely in negative terms. It is in their second volume of the *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (i.e., *A Thousand Plateaus*, published in the French in 1980) they have developed and used this notion in a much more extended context and in more affirmative terms: “We come to the gradual realization that the BwO is not at all the opposite of the organs. The organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism” (158). They have elaborated, then, the notion by describing two types of the BwO: the empty BwO,

Thereupon, the BwO invokes a conception of the body that is opposed to that of psychoanalysis: the BwO is not –can not be– invested with “fantasies, images, projections, representations”. Yet, the BwO is not a body without a psychical interiority at all, but it is, primarily and simply, a surface that allows and produces different and various movements of intensities rather than being the locus for constant longings and cravings. It is the surface of speeds, intensities, and flows *before* they blend and unite into meaningful, organized “totalities constituting the unity of the subject and of signification” (Grosz 1994: 170). At this point, one must be cautious about the extended notion of the BwO for the fact that this term actually refers indiscernibly not only to human, animal bodies, but, to “textual, sociocultural, and physical bodies” also (Grosz 1994: 169)²⁶.

The human body that is conceived of by Deleuze and Guattari is close to that of Spinoza’s monistic approach. For Spinoza, the body is not part of “passive nature ruled over by an active mind but rather the body is the ground of human action” (Gatens 1996: 57). Spinoza states that the mind is constituted by the embodiment: reason can be active only by the affirmation of a *particular* body, triggered by the actual existence of that body.

Therefore, the body is not merely a *machine that is dominated* by the –absolute– mental activity for the simple fact that it is dependent the manner and the context in

and the full BwO toward which I do not proceed as I consider the part that I refer should be satisfactory, even if it is not “complete”.

²⁶ That is exactly the reason that I have chosen to refer to the BwO just briefly, since the notion is scattered everywhere in the A Thousand Plateaus, and in various contexts –state, war, capitalism. I think, within the given limits of this study, it would suffice to mention the BwO within the extent that it is more directly related to the human body.

which the body recreates itself. On that occasion, its identity can never be viewed as a final or finished product, its limits, boundaries, singularities are not stable and can not be known:

The Spinozist account of the body is of a productive and creative body which can not be definitely 'known' since it is not identical with itself across time. The body does not have a 'truth' or a 'true' nature since it is a process and its meaning and capacities will vary according to its context. We do not know the limits of this body or the powers that it is capable of attaining. These limits and capacities can only be revealed by the ongoing interactions of the body and its environment. (Gatens 1996: 57)

The embodied subject as it is conventionally assumed to be identical to itself, and being the center of its stable and unshakeable identity, thus, can not be²⁷.

²⁷ For a discussion of the validity and consequences of the question "who comes after the subject?" as well as the situatedness of the subject, see Doel 1995: 226-40.

3 The Body from within Inside

The body is alive; that is also to say, it is a body that is “lived”. Its “interiority and inside” as well as its “exteriority and outside” is lived and experienced by the body. The inside constitutes and accepts itself as an outside; it experiences itself and structures gives meaning to the ways it is lived. The meaning and significance of the body and its parts are internalized in such a way that it constitutes the subject’s psychical interior: a process of *introjection*. On the other hand, in the aftermath the limits of the body are composed, experienced, and lived through *projection*. The projection constitutes the boundary and limit of subjectivity, which demarcates the subject from other subjects and from other objects. Thus the body is conceived as such is the body constituted from within inside.

The body is alive, yet, not only as a *biological* entity but also as a *psychical* entity. That is to say, for the premises of this model, the body does not “live” as an organism all by itself, but instead, the body is “lived” by the subject who (or perhaps, which) has acquired a cohesive *body-image*. The activity of the body, its functioning, and responsiveness emanate from the body-image, and the psychical interior of the subject. The body’s exteriority constituted as such, thus, is considered as the manifestation of the psychical interiority of the individual. Yet, as I have mentioned in the previous paragraph, the interiority of the subject is a function of the *internalization* of the lived exteriority: a twist in the circular cycle, again. The standing point of the advocates of the lived body conception is at the opposite “side” of that

of the figures discussed in the previous chapter (i.e., The Body from within Outside). Yet, since the loop is that of a Möbius strip type, they can be contemplated eventually as being on the same “side”. Yet, they both may miss the inevitable trace that the “others” left behind.

Although I have discussed elsewhere, I feel the necessity of expounding my rather frequent use of the “opposite terms” such as the lived-body/the-body-as-surface, natural-body/socially-constructed body, interiority/exteriority, inside/outside, and psychical/physical. I do not intend, by any means, to invoke a bipolar or dualistic approach, which is characterized by having a hegemonic pole. Instead, as I have tried to discuss by the Möbius metaphor earlier, the “opposite terms” are used for the sake of practicality; as “means” rather than “ends”: They merely refer to the relative positioning, relative point of view –hence the shift in the emphasis– of the two major approaches, which are broadly categorized and brought together due to their “relative” proximity. It is always possible to detect the traces of the “opposite” approach in each other. I do not claim that the *elements* of the two models are conceived as opposed to each other, despite the fact that the *models* themselves may be developed as opposed to each other. This issue, however, have been and will be discussed throughout the text wherever it is appropriate to do so and thus it will not be discussed explicitly in the “conclusion” chapter.

Deleuze and Guattari, for instance, never reject the “interiority” of the subject, yet they criticise rigorously the “model of interiority” as Freud puts it forth. The same can be asserted for the different views within the “same” model. Lacan, for example, has accepted and even elaborated further the major concepts of Freud. However, he has developed another model, for instance, for the formation of the ego and effects of the unconscious. In short, some models and views may be regarded as

antithetical; nevertheless the point is, they are not always compatible for comparison with their full extent and context as they have different perspectives in the first place and as none of them has a primary objective as theorizing the body in its full complexity, but rather, more importantly, they “use” the body and the conceptions they developed on it in their particular formulations.

My position here is just to map the major and varying conceptions neither by acting as a referee nor an advocate of a certain view. My intention is to explore the possibilities, by travelling through the territories of different models, which may lead us to an understanding that is more “adequate” in considering the complexity of the human body.

The body, as it is understood here, is not the surface of inscription but is “the site of the intermingling of mind and culture” (Grosz 1994: 116). The body as the surface of inscription, as I have discussed, is primarily marked, scarred, and written upon by laws, moral codes, social constraints and requirements: by exteriority, by forces of the others. Whereas, the lived body is considered as composed and invested by *its own* psychical, cerebral, and “spiritual” interiority. The interiority as such is impressed and coded by the pleasures, sensations, and experiences of the subject. Nevertheless, the lived body is also a social body, living among other bodies, and objects. The social and the external world, therefore, are *incorporated* into and *absorbed* by the subject through mediation and internalization rather than being directly *inscribed* upon. Yet, the notion of inscription is what persists in both of the models one from inside out, the other from outside in, in the beginning and as the driving force.

It is, in the final analysis, the “social” inscription that establishes psychical interior and body-image *or* forces, powers, energies, and intensities. In either case, the

starting point, i.e. the social encounters with *others*, and the final destination, i.e. the body that is constituted and shaped, are same; however, since the paths are detoured separately, the perspectives differ accordingly. All of the followings, I submit, can be considered as the outcome and product of “social encounters with others”: Nietzschean restrictions of the moral values and social norms, Foucauldian power and control mechanisms, and Deleuzian machinic connections are all encounters with the *others as other than the self*, which have effects on the evolution and the conception of the body. On the other hand, Freudian libidinal investment, Lacanian mirror stage and imaginary anatomy, Merleau-Ponty’s double sensation, relations, and perception are all formed through social encounters with the others, in which the *self functions as the other* in the first place.

The lived body model is much more concerned with the questions of the body in terms of what it *feels* like rather than what it *does*. Yet, that does not mean that the two are separated, obviously the two has intertwined inseparably, and operate in fast oscillations (the twone surface of the Möbius). It takes the detour that passes through the body-subject’s labyrinth-like interior (psychical terms) searching the depths for what is hidden, discrete, and lacking. While on the contrary, the other model follows the body-subject’s winding exterior path (corporeal terms) examining the surface for the cavities or convexities formed by its connections and contacts. Grosz starts from the well-known instance of nursing infant to illustrate the difference:

The child’s lips, for example, form connections (or in Deleuzian terms, machines, assemblages) with the breast or bottle, possibly accompanied by hand in conjunction with an ear, each system in perpetual motion and in mutual interrelation. Instead of seeing the obsessional person’s desire for impenetrability as a yearning for what is absent and lost (a staving off of the castration threat and

the expression of the desire to occupy the position of the symbolic father), the obsessional person's toes can be seen to make machinic connections with sand, with rocks, with grass, such that these "external objects" can no longer be considered either an internalized part of the subject or an expelled external residue of the subject. (Grosz 1994: 116)

Psychoanalysis and phenomenology are the two major fields of knowledges that are concerned with the conception of the body as such. Psychoanalytic theory and its methods differ from those of biology and psychology, although it derived a lot from them. Whereas phenomenology approaches to the problems of perception and reflection from the inside while it seeks to avoid the antinomies that throw idealism and realism (or accordingly any other of the dichotomous pairs) into opposition. Below, I will discuss and depict briefly the conceptions of the body that vary within the specific theories developed by Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Although effected and shaped by the social encounters, still the lived body is considered as somehow pre-social, and furnished with a strong biological base that has the priority. The self and the relations with the society are supposed to be founded on this base. The complexities of social relationships and those of any other "exterior" force must be internalized by the individual, by the subject in the first place. Then through the complexity of inner mechanism and self-reflexivity it constitutes not only the self, but its relation with the others, as well –the process of the body-as-surface- inscription model is turned in a way upside down. The body in this process has a crucial role. It is the medium of communication to the subject that it can transfer information and meaning both from and to itself and from and to the others. Yet, also the body is the screen of the inner world on which the subject can

trace what has happened to itself as a consequence of its connections with the outer world.

3.1 Freud's Body

The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface¹.

Sigmund Freud has achieved a coherent theory of psychoanalysis after long and arduous studies on various neurological and psychical mechanisms in which he primarily questioned the relations between perception, thought, and consciousness. He did not start with an intention to define the formation of *the ego* or the *psychical topographies* (unconscious-preconscious-conscious). Rather he started from a series of works in which he initially aimed to establish a sound relation between biology, neurology, and psychology. It is said that this initial drive seems to explain why he returns in his psychological writings frequently to the points where biology and psychology, for him, meets, and why he relied on the models and metaphors derived from biology (Elliott 1992, Krueger 1989). In accordance to that, his notions of energy, libido, drive, and force are borrowed from biological models.

In due course of his initial studies on *perception*, he has concerned with theorizing the interface between soma and psyche. Therefore, in his theory, although

¹ Sigmund Freud in The Ego and the Id.

being mostly implicit, there is always an emphasis on the body and the body parts (along with their mental or psychic representations), which have remained rather undeveloped in further theoretical studies by his successors. Similarly, the further developments concerning the clinical practice have shared the same fate, despite psychoanalysis was intended as a mode of practice within the psychotherapeutic method, which includes the therapy of bodily disorders². David Krueger claims that the body and its evolving mental representation have been largely omitted from developmental and psychoanalytic theory, and consequently the “body self” has been subordinated to the “psychological self” particularly within the clinical practice of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis³ (1989: ix).

Freud, in the course of developing his theory of psychoanalysis, has recognized the body as the foundation for *the ego formation*. The ego, in Freudian theory, “is given representation since it identifies, through an interplay of projection and introjection, with the surfaces of the body” (Elliott 1992: 33). The embodiment, for Freud, is the *a priori* element that constitutes the ego, which establishes subjectivity through a complex mechanism that involves dynamic effects of the

² Such as, anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, sadism, masochism, narcissism, transvestism, voyeurism, exhibitionism, hypochondria, and also, homosexuality, hysteria, obsessive-compulsive disorder, manic depression, paranoia, and schizophrenia. Whether these are considered as *merely manifestation* of a psychological, mental, or a psychiatric illness is remained a question; the intertwined source and location of the pathology are always dynamic and complex: Is it the body or the mind? Is it the brain or the conflict between the body and the body-image?

³ The following sources seem to be useful in this respect: Schilder 1964, Lingis 1989, Krueger 1989, Elliott 1992, Grosz 1994, 1995, and Anzieu 1989.

unconscious. Moreover, the first reality that the infant⁴ “perceives” is the reality of the body and, hence, the “bodily experiences and sensations, internal and surface, form the core around which the ego develops” (Krueger 1989: 4).

The given priority of the embodiment, yet, in Freudian theory does not mean the biological, organic structure of the body suffices for the formation of the ego. Freud is not for biological reductionism since his theories of perception and subjectivity have shown that there can not be a biological or neurological foundation or master plan that determines psychological processes. Freud asserts that biology must be understood as psychologically pliable up to an extent. On the contrary to the reductionist view, “a two-way determination, or overdetermination, a clear interaction of the biological and the psychological, is forged in his writings” (Grosz 1994: 28). Furthermore, by demonstrating the role of anatomically indeterminable and unstable unconscious in the formation of subjectivity, he has demolished the Cartesian understanding of the ego as fixed, indivisible, permanent whole. The Cartesian cogito, the rational and knowledgeable subject, whose first truth is, “I think, therefore I am”, has been devastated by the introduction of the *unconscious* (Elliott 1992, Grosz 1994, 1995):

Freud argues that consciousness is *discontinuous*, being overdetermined and dislocated by unconscious processes. On this

⁴ Although various terms such as the infant, baby, child are used in different sources for the human being who is at the early stages of its life, I prefer to use particularly, following Lacan, the term “infant”. For the reason that not only it refers to, etymologically a baby before it can walk, and one unable to talk, but, to a beginner, as in experience or learning, and anything in the first stage of existence or progress, also. (Random House Webster’s Electronic Dictionary and Thesaurus’s definition: 1350-1400; ME enfaunt < AF < L infanem, acc. infans small child, lit., one unable to speak = in- IN -3 + fans, prp. of fari to speak).

view, the essence of being lies not in cogito, but in the vicissitudes of desire. . . there is no stable ground at the level of unconscious. Broadly conceived, the unconscious is an incessant irruption of representational forms, drives and affects, which as meaning and force continually displace one another. And it is precisely from this concern with the representational activity of the unconscious that Freud will theorize the subject's development of a relation to the self, the body, others, and culture itself. (Elliott 1992: 29)

I prefer here not to dive into the depths of Freudian understanding of psychical topographies and their relation with the pleasure principle, sexual drive and desire. However, I suggest proceeding with his theory of the ego as corporeal projection and its relation with perception⁵.

The ego, for Freud, is a consequence of a perceptual surface; its formation, evolution, production is relative to this surface. Before the ego, the infant has no control either over its organic structure or over its relations with other objects and subjects. Although it may respond to them, it simply can not behave as an agency. It is with the narcissist formation of the ego the monadic world of the infant is split and fractured, and the vast and overwhelming diversity of perceptions are brought into a unity (Elliott 1992: 18-33).

⁵ It may be useful, at this point, to give the definitions of some of the important concepts. *Unconscious*: The part of the psyche that is rarely accessible to awareness but that has a pronounced influence on behaviour. *Id*: The part of the psyche that is the source of unconscious and instinctive impulses that seek satisfaction in accordance with the pleasure principle. *Libido*: All of the instinctual energies and desires that are derived from the id. *Ego*: The conscious, rational component of the psyche that experiences and reacts to the outside world and mediates between the demands of the id and superego. *Superego*: The part of the personality representing the conscience, formed in early life by internalization of the standards of parents and other models of behaviour. *Cathexis*: The investment of emotional significance in an activity, object, or idea.

Since the mother (and her breast) is repeatedly disconnected from it, the infant seeks to recapture its libidinal plenitude: a process, which ends in its own body. The libidinal drives round back upon the ego, making it an object of investment in just the same manner as “external” objects. Elliott quotes from Freud regarding the narcissistic stage:

There comes a time [!]⁶ in the development of the individual at which he unifies his sexual drives (which have hitherto been engaged in auto-erotic activities) in order to obtain a love-object; and he begins to take his own body as his love-object, and only subsequently proceeds from this to the choice of some person other than himself. (1992: 31)

The psychological action, which Freud has called “primary narcissism” (similar to, yet different from the Lacanian mirror stage⁷), thus is a process of stabilization of the circulation of libido in the infant’s body that is rigorously at work at this stage. This split in relation to the self and the other is crucial to psychological organization and the development of the self and self-identity. By experiencing primary narcissism, the division between subject and object –and even the subject’s capacity to take itself as

⁶ The evolution of Freud’s theory has a trajectory that can be characterized by exhibiting constant revisions of his previous writings. Taken into account the vast amount of them, however, it seems to me one must be extremely cautious when utilizing his specific ideas, since there is always a risk to use a superseded (by himself) conception of his. Also the partiality of his thoughts within his “progressive” track may cause one to get lost in different contexts while searching the finalized revision of a particular notion of Freud’s. As for the concept of primary narcissism, for instance, I have failed to find a satisfactory explanation concerning its initiation and termination. I am not sure, though, whether this is due to the secondary literature I have used, or due to the vagueness or incompleteness of Freud’s theorization. However, I want to draw the attention of the reader to the vague phrase Freud has used in the quotation above: “there comes a time . . .”! Lacan seems to notice this point as he developed a theory (mirror stage) that refines the circumstances of this moment more clearly. See the section: Lacan’s Body.

an object– becomes possible for the first time. Since the body is libidinally invested “the subject can not remain neutral or indifferent to its own body and body parts” (Grosz 1994: 32).

The subject, commencing from this stage of its life, always maintains a relation of love and/or hate toward its own body and bodily parts. Thus, the role of the body, here, is that of a surface with libidinal intensities of which the ego constructs a psychological map. The ego, thereupon, is shaped not by the anatomical body, but by the degree of libidinal cathexis of the body. The interior and exterior of the body as such is perceived as having zones of varying intensities of libido –which may shift in time, and thus does not necessarily overlap with the “natural” erotogenic zones. The perception through the skin, the exterior surface of the body, however, has a priority over the interiority due to its “natural advantage”:

The information provided by the surface of the skin is both endogenous and exogenous, active and passive, receptive and expressive, the only sense able to provide the “double sensation.” Double sensations are those in which the subject utilizes one part of the body to touch another, thus exhibiting the interchangeability of active and passive sensations, of those positions of subject and object, mind and body. (Grosz 1994: 35-6)

The surface of the body is both where the internalization process begins and where the projection mechanism ends primarily at this stage of the subject’s life. It is where the subject “meets” with the rest of the world (Krueger 1989: 9). This confrontation with “reality” initiates a gradual process of differentiation in which the ego emerges from out of the id. This is made possible only through the impact of

⁷ For a short comparison between Freud’s primary narcissism and Lacan’s mirror stage, see

perceptual stimuli on the surface of the organism. Grosz writes that Freud explained that “the ego is something like a ‘psychical callous’ formed through the use of the body, and particularly its surface” (1994: 37).

The ego, then also, is like a “screen” on which the images of the body’s outer surface is projected, *and* also a mapping of the body’s inner surface, the surface of sensations, intensities, and affects –which are the subjective experience of bodily sensations and experiences. The ego is derived, as a representation, as an outline, from these surfaces since they provide the content of what the body perceives. The body, hence, functions as a perceptual surface for the ego in the process of the ego formation. Perception as such is a term “that requires a transgression of the binarism of the mind/body split” (Grosz 1994: 28). Being the psychological registration of the impacts of external *and* internal stimuli, it “exists” in between the mind and the body. It shows the irreducible dependence of the inside and outside, mind and matter, on each other.

Although they have different concerns in examining and using the Freudian theory, Krueger, Elliott, and Grosz state the question, “How is consciousness of our own thoughts possible?” that Freud has asked, was one of the problematic nodes that guided him to theorize the formation of the ego. Freud has concluded that if internal processes such as thinking are to become conscious, they must first function like *external* perceptions. For him, the organism receives two kinds of messages when it is stimulated by the perception of the facts. One from receptive senses of the nervous system, and one from consciousness, which confirms the veracity of the first, and

next subsection.

only by then, we can have thoughts that have any “reality”. In another words, only then our “thoughts can have stability, longevity, or identity” (Grosz 1994: 30). This, actually, shows that the language functions (concepts) as an external stimulus for us to perceive our own thoughts:

The part played by word-presentations now becomes perfectly clear. By their interposition, internal thought processes are made into perceptions. It is like a demonstration of the theorem that all knowledge has its origin in external perception. When a hypercathexis of the process of thinking takes place, thoughts are *actually* perceived –as if they came from without– and are consequently held to be true. (Quoted in Grosz 1994: 30, from Freud’s The Ego and the Id)

Krueger’s succinct explanation of the stages of the formation of the ego epitomizes the role of the body; he starts from Lacanian “Real”, and proceeding through primary narcissism, self-awareness, and the longevity of the subjectivity towards acquisition of identity:

First, the body self is the *function* of another. Next, it is immediate, felt *experience*: the emerging extension experience of unsatisfied need. Next the body self is *form*, objectively distinct patterns of behaviour, as well as the subjective and systematic experience of reality. Finally, it is *concept*, a relatively enduring frame of reference, comprised bodily and emotional images, concepts, and experiences. The quality of relative stability over time constitutes the aspect of identity. The metaphors that characterize everything from style to defense, as well as metaconcepts such as “self,” are aspects of the self concept. As a concept, the self is a fiction, but not a myth. (1989: 13-14)

3.2 Lacan's Body

The mirror stage is a drama . . . the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality . . . which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development⁸.

Jacques Lacan, following Freud, has claimed that the ego has to be constituted. Since it is not present at birth, it is to be formed, shaped through the early stages of human life. For Lacan, the ego comes into being in the mirror stage. It is within this stage that a radical and painful change of *order* occurs in the life of the infant. This shift or rather sudden leap of order triggers a crucial split that the division between the infant's body from the other's bodies and surrounding objects is realized by itself –for the first time. By intensely focusing on the formation of the “I”, Lacan brings forth concepts of the imaginary, symbolic and real orders that define the peculiarities of the stages within the formation process. What Freud seems to leave in a blurred state when theorizing the primary narcissism, thus, appears to be more adequately delineated in Lacan's mirror stage⁹.

I am led to regard the function of the mirror-stage as a particular case of the function of the *imago*, which is to establish a

⁸ Jacques Lacan in Écrits: A Selection.

⁹ What Lacan strives to explain, I believe, is the mechanism that occurs at exactly the moment for which Freud has vaguely used the phrase “there comes a time.” Although Freud implies the moment in which the libidinal drives round back upon the ego for the first time, Lacan follows a different path.

relation between the organism and its reality —or, as they say,
between the *Innenwelt* and the *Umwelt*¹⁰. (Lacan 1977: 4)

Since *Imago* is an idealized concept of a loved one, therefore for Lacan, the infant is fascinated by an image, not that of *any* body's, but primarily that of *its own body's*. Lacan, accordingly, describes “the formative effect” of the mirror stage on “infant's” ego as an “introjection of an (externalized) image of its own body” (Grosz 1994: 39). Taking Freud's comments about the ego being a bodily extension or projection very seriously, Lacan elaborated Freud's views. He envisaged the ego as not a projection of the real anatomical and physiological body but as an imaginary projection of the body, the body insofar as it is imagined and represented for the subject by the image of others. The term “image of the others” implies, in Lacan, the image of the infant itself, since it first encounters with its image as an image of an *other*. In order to understand the mirror stage as an *identification* process, however, one must stress the centrality of the Lacanian concepts of the real, imaginary, and symbolic orders (Lacan 1977, 1979).

The real order, for Lacan, can only become available to interpretation through its effects (Lacan 1979: Chapter 5)¹¹. The first six months of human life, the pre-mirror period, is the realm of the Real. The Real is the plenitude, the continuous

¹⁰ *Imago*: an idealized concept of a loved one, formed in childhood and retained unaltered in adult life (L. imago IMAGE: the adult being perceived as the true exemplar of the species, as opposed to the larva “ghost” and pupa “doll.”). *Innenwelt* and *Umwelt*, more or less, correspond to the inner life, interiority and outer world, exteriority respectively.

¹¹ For this section, in addition to Lacan's book The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, I have consulted the notes of the graduate course “GRA 541: Graphic and Visual Representation”, given by Assoc. Prof. Mahmut Mutman, in the fall semester of 1996 at Bilkent University School of Fine Arts, Design and Architecture.

flux of intensities and energy. It is when and where the body is in bits and pieces. The infant does not have a corporeal boundary sense in the Real. It is not possible to sense the Real, or describe it when one is in it; it is a state that one can not be self-reflexive, thus there is no “one” in it, but everything. It is a realm of impossibility; there is no way to experience this stage of human life either when one lives in it or when one strives to compensate the lack of it by trying to recuperate the plenitude she has lost at the later stages of her life. There is not only no distinction or hierarchy in the Real, but no differentiation also. It can only be described retroactively; after its order is broken.

The body in this period is “experienced as a series of fragmented needs, organs, and part-objects” (Elliott 1992: 129). Lacan has introduced the notion of the *objet petit a* (small lacking objects) at this point. He has developed the notion to refer to objects that can not be mirrored or symbolized (such as gaze, lips, voice, and so on, but not as breast, penis, faeces, and so on). These objects or bodily parts continuously play a constituting role in the formation of the ego. These body parts cause the introjection of certain primordial images and signs, which always escape the knowledge of the subject. As Elliott states “Structured by the inescapable lack and destitution of the real order,” the crucial point for Lacan, “is that such zones of the body always escape the imaginary and symbolic capacities of the subject” (1992: 129).

Lacan writes:

These objects have one common feature in my elaboration of them –they have no specular images, or in other words alterity . . . It is what enables them to be the ‘stuffing’ or rather the lining, though not in any sense the reverse, of the very subject that one takes to be the subject of consciousness. (Lacan 1977: 315)

In short, the *objet petit a* provides a particular subjective perspective on the foundations of psychical reality. That is meant to say, the *objet petit a* is the first step

that creates the differentiation of people as they construct particular unities, meanings, and identities. By the introduction of the imaginary and symbolic orders, the subject has to follow its own way that exhibits uniqueness, although the stages remain the same for everyone. The objet petit a represents the object of desire, it “represents that *lost* part of the self which the ‘subject of the unconscious’ forever tries to recapture through phantasies of wholeness” (Elliott 1992: 143). It is, for Lacan, in effect, the essential lack that structures the desire of the human subject.

The imaginary order is what comes after the Real, yet it is a realm of being in which the division between the subject and object still does not exist clearly. “The imaginary order,” for Lacan, is “rather a world of distorted illusions. It comprises images and delusions that are constituted through a reflecting surface, a mirror” (Elliott 1992: 124). Moreover its from this imaginary merging of self and other, subject and object, it is possible to reformulate the genesis of the ego. What enables the formation of the ego as such is a primordial *alienation* that constitutes an eternal “lack” which will structure all self and other relations¹². The reflected image of the infant is profoundly “imaginary” for Lacan since the pleasing image of the body that is in “unity” is actually in direct contrast to the fragmentary state of the infant’s real body. The “jubilant cry” that the infant utters and the narcissism that the infant derives from its image can not be, thus, regarded as a positive sign. On the contrary,

¹² For Lacan, the concept of the human subject is very complex, as it comprises the three orders of the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. Although the narcissistic phantasies are originally evolved from the pre-Oedipal imaginary stage, they continue “to exert profound influence over all subsequent self and other relations” (Elliott 1992: 124ff). Also cf. Krueger 1989, and Grosz 1994.

the capture of the "I" by the reflection is inseparable from a *misrecognition*¹³ of the gap between the fragmented subject and its unified image of itself:

For the split between the subject's real body and its specular image means that the ego is painfully cut off from others; others who might possibly have acted as an emotional basis for the development of mutuality and intersubjectivity. The mirror stage thus requires the subject to relinquish any such hope of mutual dependency and experience. . . . The Lacanian self is thus located from the beginning within a damaging *imaginary* space, inserted into a radical split, between an illusory sense of selfhood and something profoundly other. (Elliott 1992: 128)

Lacan's imaginary exists, contrary to Freud's conception, *before* the unconscious is brought into existence by the symbolic order. The infant experiences the symbolic order *after* it enters the realm of the language. Words come to "stand in" for the loss of imaginary desires and loves, as the baby (not "infant" anymore) seeks to overcome *lack* through symbolic expression. The introduction of the language is the *raison d'être* of the unconscious. Yet, for Lacan the symbolization can never nullify that fundamental and irreducible *lack* which *is* the subject. Yet, the subject constituted as such experiences lack and lives alienating effects of the three orders interchangeably all through its life course:

Through an inmixing of body, desire, and signifiers the *objet a* inscribes a particular subjective style and *causes* certain imaginary phantasies that "cover over" or "suture" that gap which is taken by Lacan to be at the center of human subjectivity. Accordingly, it is because the human subject first experiences its body *as* fragmentation, lack, and loss that is forever prevented from establishing itself as "complete" or "whole". For Lacan, this is the

¹³ Lacan uses the term *méconnaissance* in the *Écrits: A Selection*, yet Elliott and Grosz use *misrecognition*.

fundamental trajectory that desire will follow in all human social relationships. (Elliott 1992: 130)

The crux of Lacan's theory of the formation of the ego lies in the fragile and fractured process known as the mirror stage that is tightly dependent on the corporeal terms. For Lacan, the ego is imaginary, a "drama", in the sense of the misrecognition which the reflected image of its body generates. In contra to Freud's theory of the body as the site of the libidinal investments in the primary narcissism, Lacan's ego has no self-reflective capacities as such. The narcissistic illusions of the subject, for Lacan, can only lead to an infinite retrogression. Although in both theories, the identification process is the psychological basis for the formation of the ego, the moments that it commences differ. In Freud's account, it arises from the primary unconscious with the repression of the Oedipus complex. Whereas in Lacan, the primary identification with the self is before the unconscious (before the language), it starts through the reflections of the body in the mirror stage.

3.3 Merleau-Ponty's Body

I am always on the same side of my body¹⁴.

Merleau-Ponty's body is a phenomenon, or a series of phenomena, which is lived by an embodied consciousness. Although the body, for Merleau-Ponty, is both

¹⁴ Maurice Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible.

object (for others) and a lived reality (for the subject), it is neither simply an object nor simply a subject. The related, interconnected, and simultaneous experiences of having an embodied consciousness and of being embodied can eventually be expressed only as “I both have and am a body” (Turner 1996: 80). Neither nature nor consciousness is given priority in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account. He believes mind is embodied, is incarnated into the “flesh”.

The body has to be lived (Merleau-Ponty 1992: viii). It is only through the lived body, that one establishes a *relation* with the other things; it is qua embodied that complex relations are made possible. A subject, thus, can achieve consciousness and knowledge (reflection) and can develop perception and behaviour only by living the body (Pile 1996: 50-3). Therefore, it also requires a folding on itself; one can access to knowledge of its own body only by living it. Objects (including other subjects) in the environment, in this sense, provide a medium on which the subject can reflect upon itself. The body, thus, and its position among the objects becomes the instrument for the generation of meaning and knowledge (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 90-4).

Merleau-Ponty’s body is not a passive one that just “answers” the world, but an active body that is capable of “authoring” the world. The body as such is not just a medium of receptacle, a mere receiver of external stimuli, but an active body that makes connections, establishes relations with objects in a continuous, ever-changing process of mutual definition.

The body is the condition and context through which one is able to have *relation* to other objects and other subjects. Phenomenological reflection on the body discloses that the subject is not disparate or separated from neither space, matter, and time, nor from other subjects. Human behaviour, for Merleau-Ponty, through

embodied action, is intelligent, purposive, and skilful. Yet, “its purpose and intelligent, etc. are not derived from a specific (mental) act of intellection, etc. which is prior to or separate from it” (Crossley 1996: 100).

For Merleau-Ponty, perception precedes conception: the perceived world is the always presupposed foundation of all knowledge as well as all action since the body is the lived field of perception. Perception is the birth place, the nest of the thought, the word. The conception of perception that Merleau-Ponty developed is notably, yet surprisingly similar to Derrida’s supplementary readings of dichotomies. Perception, for Merleau-Ponty, is in the space *in-between* inside and outside, mind and body, it is an oscillation, a perpetual motion. It is not containable in either side as it is “midway between mind and body and requires the functioning of both” (Grosz 1994: 94). Perception, in effect, is not linked to the “privileged” locus of consciousness. Perception, moreover for Merleau-Ponty, requires an understanding of the senses as functioning in mutual synergy (O’Neill 1989: 37-9). Senses are translatable into each other, and yet can not be separated from each other. They are communicable to each other: they can even enrich each other by providing confirmations, or sometimes struggle to overcome the contradictions caused by themselves. Merleau-Ponty conceives the senses as the sign of the “intellect and intentionality” of the body and connects it with the synthesis of senses among themselves:

It is not the epistemological subject who brings about the synthesis, but the body, when it escapes from dispersion, pulls itself together and tends by all means of its power towards one single goal of its activity, and when one single intention is formed in it through the phenomenon of synergy. We withdraw this synthesis from the objective body only to transfer it to the phenomenal body, the body, that is, in so far as it projects a certain ‘setting’ round itself, in so far as its ‘parts’ are dynamically acquainted with each other, and its receptors are so arranged as to make possible, through their synergy, the perception of the object. What is meant by saying that this

intentionality is not thought is that it does not come into being through the transparency of any consciousness, but takes for granted all the latent knowledge of itself that my body possesses. (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 232-3)

Thus in short, for Merleau-Ponty in this sense, the “body is the fabric into which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the perceived world, the general instrument of my ‘comprehension’ ” (1962: 235).

The term *flesh* that Merleau-Ponty has conceived is well worth to mention here. The flesh, in accordance with his understanding of perception as being inbetween, is the principle of difference; it designates the noncoincidence and divergence of the being, it is being’s most elementary level (O’Neill 1989: 18-22, Grosz 1994: 100-3). The flesh is being’s reversibility and reflexivity. Merleau-Ponty elucidates it with the example of “double sensation”. Objectivity and subjectivity, in his terms, can be sensed partially and reversibly: when a hand of a person touches its own body, when a person sees itself, hears itself, smells and tastes itself. Feeling (sensing) as a subject, and being felt (being sensed) as an object are the continuous ambiguity we already always experience. We have/are both, thus, phenomenal and objectual body. Grosz exemplifies it through “touch” and compare it to the supposedly dominant “seeing”:

The example of touch is in fact far more convincing, for the gulf between subject and object is never so distant as in vision, where the crossing of the subject into the object is more easily recognizable because access to either the inside or the outside is simply a matter of shifting focus rather than literally changing positions. Merleau-Ponty wishes to apply the same principles of folding back or invagination that mark his discussion of the double sensation. While it is clear that in the case of touch, the toucher is always touched, in traditional understandings of vision, the seer sees at a distance and is implicated in what is seen. But for Merleau-Ponty the seer’s visibility conditions vision itself, is the ground seer

shares with the visible, the condition of any relation between them.
(Grosz 1994: 101)

Therefore, it is our ambiguous feeling of “being always on the same side of our body” that makes actually possible for us to experience and realize the connections and relations we establish with other bodies –objects and/or subjects– and with ourselves as well as our source of acquiring “authorization” on the world through the mutual interrelatedness of the “intellect” of our body and mind. It is through the lived body we perceive, and somehow reflect unto ourselves, the ambiguity and tension of being (feeling as) an object (both for others and for ourselves) and a subject (always for ourselves) simultaneously. It is the “flesh” as difference, or as trace, that makes this doubling back on itself possible. The perceiving subject has the capacity “to turn the world back on itself”. Perception, thus, involves both to understand the outside and the inside, yet, not in a relation of simple dualism, but through the “difference”, the “flesh”. Thereupon, the body/the subject is no more a closed nucleus of identity, nor an empty receptacle, and, the world/the object is no more a pure materiality nor an accumulation of sensations. No more clearly distinct categories, but the “flesh”, that is the difference.

Merleau-Ponty’s premise is a non-Cartesian type from the beginning. He envisages a necessary interrelatedness between and being-togetherness of the mind and the body. In his phenomenological approach –which he sees as a ceaseless interrogation–, he accepts the ambivalence, ambiguity and complexity of perception, of being embodied, and of interiority and exteriority: that is, in short, of being-in-the-world. The body, thereupon, is a thing that is related to not only its parts and the mind, but to other things in the world: it is a style of being. According to Merleau-Ponty:

[The body as] flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. To designate it, we should need the old term 'element', in the sense it was used to speak water, air, earth, and fire, that is in the sense of a *general thing*, midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being. The flesh is in this sense an 'element' of Being. Not a fact of or a sum of facts, and yet adherent to *location* and the *now*. (1968: 139-40)

We are therefore bounded by space and time, and thus as we are in a continuous movement and in mutual relation in the process of defining and giving meaning, we are unavoidably connected to the others within the environment, within the *socius*¹⁵. Thereupon, we primarily exist as body, as flesh, and not as a mere *res cogitans*, a thinking substance as Descartes had envisaged.

Cartesian subject exists only as mind since *cogito ergo sum* (I think therefore I exist) is the motto, which gives birth to the mind/body distinction that disembodies the subject, and which eventually caused it to be regarded as existing in an independent, isolated situation from other bodies, and even from other minds (O'Neill 1989: 101-2). In Cartesian dualism, the clear and distinct oppositions of mind and the body has implied an asocial subject: "as a thinking substance, the mind is independent from the body (*res extensa*); it needs nothing more than itself to exist (Jung 1996 3-4). Cartesian model has promoted an "objective" modality of *having* a

¹⁵ Social is characterized by friendly companionship, a relationship, living or disposed to live in companionship with others or in a community, rather than in isolation: L. socialis = soci (us) partner, comrade.

body, whereas in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology the body of mine is a "subjective" modality of *being*, yet such a being does not and can not live alone, it *is* a social body.

Turner is missing the point of being embodied "in the world" when he thinks that phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty is asocial. Turner critiques the phenomenological account as being too individualistic as the embodiment is, he claims, "taken from the point of view of the subject; it is consequently an account largely devoid of historical and sociological content" (1996: 78). Turner adds that from a sociological point of view, "the body" is socially constructed and socially experienced. However, I believe Merleau-Ponty has no objection to that. On the contrary to Turner's critical review of phenomenological body, for Merleau-Ponty the body is the "umbilical cord" to the social (Jung 1996: 5). To be social is first and foremost to be *intercorporeal* yet the body is not claimed to be the fixed origin of that:

Only because of the body are we said to be visible and capable of relating ourselves first to other bodies and then to other minds. The body is our *social placement* in the world. With the synergetic interplay of its senses, the body *attunes* us to the world. The world, as Merleau-Ponty has it, is made of the same stuff as the body presumably because we relate ourselves to the world by the medium of the body which is the lived field of perception. Since we are always already social, the body cannot be the 'origin' but, more properly, of the ambient medium of the social. (Jung 1996: 5)

Moreover, as Nick Crossley puts it, Merleau-Ponty "identifies the historical and social bases" of the embodied actions (1996: 100-1). Merleau-Ponty argues that embodied actions are based in "habit", that is acquired skills, schemas and techniques drawn *from* a social stock. Merleau-Ponty's body is also historical as he implicitly states it: "feelings and passional conduct are invented like words", thus, it is situated and obviously it is not isolated from the historical (1962: 189). Yet, his work functions in different temporal frame than the understanding of a classical

historicism. Merleau-Ponty is more concerned “with stability [of the body-subject] on an hour-by-hour, day-to-day basis” (Crossley 1996: 103).

The body, obviously, is an organism that is related to other bodies, as it is a “part”, or an “element” of the physical environment. The mind whereas, contrary to the statement of Descartes, is related to the world not directly but rather through its particular body, because it is related to one body only. The mind, thus, becomes a *relatum* only because the body is populated in the world with other bodies. It is necessary to be corporeal in order to be social, to be ethical, and to be political, or more radically, in order to *be*, in the first place.

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach and views on the body stand at the intersection of many other preceding and succeeding major conceptions in which the body has played an important role. Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenology of Perception, for instance, speaks of the body as “a work of art” whilst he formulates the process of synthesis of one’s own body (1962: 150). His is said to be a Tantric approach (Jung 1996: 2). In Tantrism, the body is not something that human being has, but human being *is* its body, and in that respect Merleau-Ponty is echoing “Tantric” Nietzsche.

We know that Merleau-Ponty has followed up the rather undeveloped notions of Freud where Freud initiates the idea of the importance of the other’s body in the formation of self (Gatens 1996: 33). It is only after Merleau-Ponty’s accounts on the perception and “the visible and the invisible”; Lacan has developed much further his “mirror stage” in its full complexity (Pile 1996: 124n3).

We also know that Merleau-Ponty has used Bergson’s philosophical accounts whilst putting forth the body’s interrelatedness with time and space. Husserl’s

phenomenology, thus, has its full impact with Merleau-Ponty's contributions, and can be claimed that helped significantly to pave the way for Derrida (Grosz 1994: 94) to develop deconstruction. His views on the mind that it is necessarily and inevitably embodied is close to that of Spinoza's monistic view. Spinoza states that the mind is constituted by the embodiment: reason can be active only by the affirmation of a *particular* body, triggered by the actual existence of that body (cf. Deleuze-and-Guattari's Body).

Merleau-Ponty's writings on and around the body and embodiment, therefore, have a peculiar historical position, for the fact that he has formed a twist that binds the mind and the body in a tightly intertwined way; similar to the double helix of DNA. He has used and re-theorized what have been said before him, and thus formed a cornerstone in the history of conceptions of the relation of the body and mind, I believe, the contributions made by Derrida and Deleuze owe a debt to Merleau-Ponty and his understandings.

To insert a play as the last word in order to remind the Möbius: If one replaces all the "phenomenology"s, written in next page, with "the body" rather than "the mind", fundamentally there seems to be nothing that does not fit to the situation of being embodied in the world as human beings.

1. Phenomenology provided a people centered form of knowledge based in human awareness, experience, and understanding. Thus, “phenomenology is founded upon a conflict tension rather than upon a preestablished harmony” (O’Neill 1989: 26). Hwa Yol Jung asserts that, as a “*movement*, phenomenology is neither a school of thought nor a fixed set of dogmas. Its true vitality is preserved and resides in its capacity to transform itself” (1996: 1). Merleau-Ponty himself promotes phenomenology as a “pure interrogation” and not as a “rigorous science” (Jung 1996: 2). Therefore, *phenomenology* does not search for a fixed truth or a final meaning and rather instead, it is ready to confront ambiguity and plurality in the very order of things in the world. Therefore, *phenomenology*(!), perhaps, is a “good” way to approach to *the* body, and to understand the approach of *a* body:

2. The body provided a people centered form of knowledge based in human awareness, experience, and understanding. Thus, “the body is founded upon a conflict tension rather than upon a preestablished harmony” (-----). Hwa Yol Jung asserts that, as a “*movement*, the body is neither a school of thought nor a fixed set of dogmas. Its true vitality is preserved and resides in its capacity to transform itself” (-----). Merleau-Ponty himself promotes the body as a “pure interrogation” and not as a “rigorous science” (-----). Therefore, *the body* does not search for a fixed truth or a final meaning and rather instead, it is ready to confront ambiguity and plurality in the very order of things in the world. Therefore, *the body*(!), perhaps, is a “good” way to approach to *the* body, and to understand the approach of *a* body:

The body is a *phenomenon* with and without *logos*. It is what occurs¹⁶.

¹⁶ To occur: 1. to happen; take place; come to pass. 2. to be met with or found; present itself; appear: 3. to suggest itself in thought; come to mind (usu. fol. by to). [1520-30; < L occurrere to run to meet, arrive, come to mind = oc- OC - + currere to run].

4 Conclusion: The Möbius Strip with no Closure

I¹

On point, to point out, and to make a point:

We do not have much time, so I will limit myself to some points. I will make some points, as you say in the language that remains foreign to me and to which I remain foreign. But, in any case, how can one make a point? And as I try to say something on the subject of the point and the point of the subject, I must also ask something of the stranger and the foreigner. What do strange and foreign mean?

The first point: At this conference, the point is the subject. Traditionally, the point is very determined, marking the one, the unity, the identity, the singularity. At the same time, however, the point is the least determined unity, identity, or singularity, that one can represent.

One can present a point of view. There is as well a point of departure—a point of departure for a line, which is also the point of departure for a surface, for a volume, and ultimately for time. . . (Derrida 1991: 39-45)

On “book”, closure, and rhizome:

The good writing has therefore always been *comprehended* . . . within a totality, and enveloped in a volume or in a book. The idea of a book is the idea of totality, finite or infinite, of the signifier; this totality of the signifier cannot be a totality, unless a totality constituted by

¹ I believe it is better to give a clue about the tone and style of this conclusion chapter in the very beginning of it: Zero does not exist in Roman numerals. It is an Arabic concept. It < ML zephirum < Ar sifr CIPHER. Yet, the cipher, Zephyr, is a west wind. Blowing from the Romans, the first moderns, toward the Other, the Arabs.

the signified preexists it, supervises its inscriptions and its signs.
And is independent of it in its ideality. (Derrida 1976: 18)

In nature, roots are taproots with a more multiple, lateral, and circular system of ramification, rather than a dichotomous one. . . . Even the book as a natural reality is a taproot, with its pivotal spine and surrounding leaves. . . . The pivotal taproot provides no better understanding of multiplicity than the dichotomous root. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 5)

The book has never comprehended the outside. . . . Write to the n th power, the $n - 1$ power, write with slogans: Make rhizomes, not roots, never plant! Don't be one or multiple, be multiplicities! Run lines never plot a point! Speed turns the point into a line! Be quick, even when standing still! . . . A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, *intermeszzo*. The tree is filiation but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes verb "to be," but fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, "and . . . and . . . and" This conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb "to be." (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 24-5)

Therefore, I will run lines, not make a point. I will be quick, yet I will be standing still. We do not have much time, and so, contrary to what I have said above, I will limit myself to some points. I will not ask, "what is . . .?" The Möbius strip has no beginning or end. No closure². We are, now, on the nomad land in our journey that is intended for mapping the conceptions of the body and Deleuze has said mapping is an experimentation in contact with the real (see Introduction chapter).

² Closure is the property of *being closed* with respect to a particular operation. Closure is the tendency to see an entire figure even though the picture of it is incomplete. A sense of certainty or completeness: a need for closure. This chapter will not be a conclusion in terms of a closure, or a termination of this "book". This conclusion will not be a closure. Yet, it will try to be adequate in the sense Spinoza makes: it will try to be affirmative and pregnant to expansion giving rise to always greater expression. It will be idiosyncratic moreover occasionally schizophrenic.

II

What is the point of this study? One might still ask. If the point is taken as the “essential” point of the study that would take one to a final destination or to a last stop, there is no explicit point as such in this study. This study is about something that it does not explicitly discuss. It is about the missing points, about the essential supplementarity of the body. This is a journey intended for mapping and a map has no conclusion, but marks and remarks. There are always gaps and unexplored territories and geometry in a map: not the lakes or mountains but fractals of shores and rocks, not the forests but the trees and leaves³. The point of a map is also to show what we do not have in it, what we do not know. Or in other words what we know that we do not know. Therefore, the “point” is not what we have or know, but what we do not have or do not know. We have seen in the previous chapters how a body is formed either from inside out, or from outside in (actually from both ways). We have seen how and by what a body is driven, moved, influenced, or harmed.

Yet, we do not know what a body can do.

We do not have an (or a series of) “understanding” *on the body*. What I mean by “understanding” is neither closure or closed totality, nor merely bodily experience

³ The double sensation shows, for Merleau-Ponty, the human body as a “being of two leaves” (one of which is an object in a world of other objects, the other of which is a perceiver of these objects). The flesh, moreover, is composed of the “leaves” of the body interspersed with the “leaves” of the world.

or mental comprehension, but an “adequate⁴ state” of the interrelated ontological, epistemological, and phenomenological realms (since the world has been virtually divided into realms as such), which can help us to “locate, connect, and relate” ourselves as embodied beings in and to *this* world *here*. This is necessary before we strive to relate and then connect ourselves to transcendental otherworldly realms as we feel the urge of believing that we will be located in *there* eventually. A rhizomatic “understanding of the body” can replace the so-deeply-rooted negation of this world and the body in favour of the promised heaven and the eternal soul (mind). Such an understanding will be ethical and political as they are first and foremost worldly, corporeal, intercorporeal. Ethical and political are for the future and from the past (as they have always already been occurring in the “present” time⁵). Ethical and political are about circumstances and possibilities as “we” are living not “alone” (in both of the senses; not as an isolated mind deprived of the body, and not as an individual independent from the social) but among *and* in-between what constitutes “us” (in both of the senses; among and in-between the mind and the body as much as the self and the other, it is the multiplicity that constitutes “us”). The other and the body are

⁴ See Hardt 1993, esp. the chapter on Spinoza’s influence on Deleuze. For Spinoza, adequate is neither supplies satisfaction nor it is static, it is not linearly progressive, it is pregnant. It is the transformation of the epistemological toward the ethical. “Adequacy is infectious, giving rise to always greater expression . . . Just like an adequate action of the mind, an adequate action of the body is expressive in that it explains or envelops its cause. The adequate is that which discloses the productive dynamic of being” (90-1). So, adequate is expansion, expansion to cover the other.

⁵ See Zeno’s paradox below for the impossibility of the “present” time, but as Derrida states the present time can be conceivable only insofar as every instant is marked with the traces of past and future. It is a product of the relations between past and future

both the product and the creator of circumstances and possibilities⁶. Circumstances and possibilities are, again, as they are “present”, from the past and for the future. Circumstances are the state of affairs surrounding and affecting “us” (the other and the body). And we do not know a body’s power to be affected. Possibilities are what may or can exist, happen, and may or can be done, be used by “us” (the other and the body). And we do not know what a body can do. Therefore, I am not asking, “what is the body?”, but trying to embark a rhizomatic journey toward an adequate “understanding”, that would only occur by asking “what a body may or can do?” What the body is able to do to/for “us” (for the other)? We do not know.

III

We do not know what a body can do. We do not have a history of affections, senses, sensations, feelings. We do not have a model of practice, a map of bodily techniques, encounters, relations, connections. We do not have a practical means to reconcile the accumulated experiences and knowledges on the body acquired in practice and theory, which until now have remained “clearly” distinct. Cartesianism should supply an adequate answer to the question: How can “clearly” distinct realms establish connections, when they encounter, if they do encounter at all? We do not have adequate means to guide us in the complexity of encountering of two and more bodies. We do not have a technique neither for affirming and enriching the

⁶ I would like to give credit to my supervisor, Prof. Mutman, for being the source of my awareness of this fact as he raised the issue of the “other” in a very inspirational fashion (in terms of my purposes) during his speech he delivered on May 1, 1998, at Architects Association, Ankara.

compatibility of encountering bodies, nor for overcoming the conflicts of the encounter. It has been said that we also do not have a coherent theory of the body that would address the huge range of problems relating to the issue of being embodied and the body. I do not believe we can ever achieve such a theory, insofar as what is meant by that is only another metaphysical view on, stare at the body from a transcendental position “high in the sky”. I also do not believe that we need such a “theory”. What we need is physical, not metaphysical, tactile not visual, worldly not otherworldly. What we need is the ethical and political possibilities of techniques, paths, and connections for the ceaseless activities of the body. The body is active and affirmative, it establishes alliances. It makes the world firm enough to stand on⁷. Its existence is the affirmation of the world, the life, the other; its existence is alliance with the world, the life, the other. Yet, the affirmative body is not self-reflexive, as the mind supposedly is. The mind is, as it is said, alone, hence it is monologic, it has to rely on (*cogito*) “itself”, hence it is split (in order to turn on itself). It is schizophrenic, yet it does not admit it. The body is indelibly dialogic; thus it is not merely a substance, but a *relatum*. If one should make a comparison, it is the mind that sleeps, not the body. The body is continually aware, yet not self-aware as it is oriented outside, to others seeking for dialogue, for connection. It is too close to “us”. Too close to perceive. Too close that it is forgotten. The body is like air and water, too ordinary, too common, too near that; it escapes from our attention. It is only with its embodiment (the inseparability of mind and body, of both being a subject and an object) the human being can be an element in this world: perhaps, the fifth element.

⁷ See the below for the etymological roots of “to stand”, and its relation “to exist”, “to

The body is not an object among others. The body is not “belong” to a subject either. Embodied human being says “I am my body”, not “I have a body” as the possessive, epicentric, and lonely mind says “to itself”. There is already enough discreet potential of becoming in the body, in its power to be affected. We do not know what a body can do.

IV

In this study the Möbius strip is employed in three different metaphorical fashion in spite of the fact that it has apparent limitations –however, any metaphor would have.

First use is about the deconstruction of the dichotomous thought, in order to illustrate the illusory act of bisecting a unified, closed whole into clearly distinct pairs with hegemonic and subordinated poles of the dualism. The undecidability of the continually oscillating one-and-two surface(s) (twone) of the Möbius strip is considered as having visual qualities that help one in understanding the deconstructionist tools such as, essential supplementarity, trace, *différance*. Obviously, by employing the deconstructionist tools into certain (phonocentric and ethnocentric) discourses that relies on logos as its epicentre, Derrida has thereupon shattered the mind and body opposition among others derived from it. One point is worth to mention here: the opposition of writing and speech actually had *not* preceded the mind and body dichotomy, although it later has functioned catalytically for its propagation. As Derrida says:

understand”.

Writing, the letter, the sensible inscription, has always been considered by Western tradition as the body and matter external to spirit, to breath, to speech, and to the logos [yet] the problem of body and soul is no doubt derived from the problem of writing from which it seems to borrow its metaphors. (1976: 35)

The problem with the dichotomous thought actually is not an inherent problem of the pair, of the two. It is not the dominance of the pair, but only of *one* of them makes it problematic. The *one* wants to act as the primary term always all the time. It does not let the other to establish a dialogue and does not tolerate the other to become the *one*. The one wants to retain its *oneness*, thus always strive to draw clean boundaries around itself. Therefore it does not matter how many would be excluded, it does not have to be another one or a cluster of them. As long as there is *one* and the *other* side (only the other one or many ones) the dichotomy is established. Therefore, to introduce a third term would not solve the dichotomy. That is why a closed (regular) strip can exemplify the dichotomous thought (one line on one side, one or many on the other side) and the Möbius strip can constitute a good example for the nondichotomous thought (any line that is drawn on “one side” has to cover the “other side” as it proceeds, and it has to proceed to be a line –of thought, action, etc.).

V

Second use of the Möbius metaphor is about the two broadly, yet not distinctly, grouped conceptions of the body, which are named as, for analytical and practical purposes, the lived-body model and the inscribed-body model. The lived-body model fosters the primacy of the “interiority” as the body in the first place must be psychically constituted, represented, and lived in order for the subject acquire a sense of selfhood, and thus can relate itself to the world, to the others. The

inscribed-body model, on the other hand, emphasizes the “exteriority” as the body is the site of the subject’s social production, Throughout the study the I have tried to show that the views in the two approaches are not developed as to oppose to each other. Obviously, as none of the figures I have presented has a primary goal of developing a coherent theory of the body, and consequently they are rather using the body in order to exemplify their assertions. Their contexts as well as their priorities may differ significantly. Yet, one common point is that they all have rejected the predetermined hegemonic relation of the binary oppositions and somehow contributed to the development of the conception of embodiment as a reconciliation and interrelatedness of the mind and body, yet in varying degree and emphasis. That is an affinity already strong enough to consider them as sharing the same “grounds” and hence exhibiting not seriously opposed but diverse views. Nietzsche, for instance, primarily critiques the idealized (idolized) values of the modernity: the metaphysically magnified conceptions of reason, mind, truth, and consciousness. For him, these are the sources of the reactive forces that are emanated from social inhibitions on the body which itself and its inherent forces have long been forgotten. He is for a more balanced epistemology: the reconciliation of the mind and the body (embodiment). Foucault, in the same fashion has primarily tried to show the emergence of the power/knowledge relations –in a transition period of the western society (from traditional to modern)– which are used as a control mechanism and he demonstrate effects of this process on both the physical body and the bodily desires. Deleuze and Guattari has emphasized a deep respect for all the objects in the world and, similarly to the figures mentioned above, they have investigated the rules and forces that effects the relations, connections. They have tried to show the place of the subject, of the human being among other objects by asserting the ontological sameness, which

may have influences in the ethical and political realm. The body as it is recklessly structured and shaped by the State and the system is the token for them in showing the primacy of (ethical, political) action, and the indelibility, inevitability of the relations and connections with others. For Freud, the body is the foundation for the ego formation, for the formation of the self. The body and the subject are always in relation, for him, and this happens particularly as the subject's libido is invested on the body and its parts, and as the image of the body shapes the ego. The body, for Freud, is the means of communication of the otherwise incommunicable psyche. Similarly, Lacan's account on the body is primarily focused on its role in the process of ego formation. The body's image that the infant encounters constitutes the first other that caused the realm, she has been living in, to split and fracture, from which the realization of the ego stems. Facets of the embodiment such as gaze and voice, which can not be mirrored and symbolized, produces the eternal lack the subject seeks for throughout her life. In Merleau-Ponty's case the body is put forth as a phenomenon which can only be experienced and lived by the embodied subject. The body is an in-between medium that is both an object (for others), and a lived reality (for the subject). The environment provides a medium on which the subject can reflect upon itself. The body is active and capable of authoring the world; it generates meaning and knowledge by positioning itself among other objects and by establishing relations with them. This body has to be ethical and political. The Möbius strip metaphor takes effect when one considers the starting point of the views summarized above: they meet at the crucial twist of the strip. At the inversion point. Yet, in the final analysis, all of these views above take the body as the "essential" tie to this world, to others, and to us: they start from the opposite sides, however they

eventually meet, or cover the same ground (the body that is formed, shaped, and driven) as there is no opposite side in a Möbius strip.

VI

Thirdly, the metaphor of the Möbius strip is used within the structuration of the study. We started from the Descartes where we think we are the only one (line in the regular strip). Derrida has pointed out the crucial inversion, the twist of the strip where the strip is realized as having a continuous one surface. Then we proceed to draw a line from a certain point in the strip (the body from within outside), passed through the twist and joined another point in the way (the body from within inside), and by completing the cycle we are here (the Möbius strip with no closure). Obviously the strip has accomplished its mission as a metaphor now. Yet, there may be one more step (or rather leap) to go in order to complete the experimentation with this metaphor. That is a journey, a schizophrenic one that would take place at the brims of the strip, leaping from one to other brim imminently.

This work can be considered as completed here with this point. The rational, self-reflexive, formally and officially correct part is terminated here. The next section is what can be considered as a highly idiosyncratic, schizophrenic journey, *it may be skipped*⁸. (To remind the metaphor of the Möbius strip the last sentence must be the first one). Thus after all, The body is *the* keyword.

⁸ Deleuze and Guattari says (about reading *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*) that you read it as you would listen to a record. “You don’t approach a record as a closed book that you have to take or leave. There are always cuts that leave you cold. So you skip them” (Massumi 1996: 7).

VII

At the same time, the point is so undetermined, so anonymous, so unnamable, that it lends itself immediately to substitution- even sacrificial substitution. A point-en vaut un autre, I would say in French-is equivalent to another, is exchangeable [sic] for another, and is worth another. Likewise, the subject, the self, the signature, and man, to the extent that they are representable by points, are at one and the same time calculable and replaceable, determined and undetermined. As such, each defines a necessary, though not sufficient, condition of the access of the individual (the individual as indivisible resembles a point) to law, to rights, to equality, to electoral democracy, to parliamentary regimes, to individual property, and, therefore, to capitalism. Il faut du point-one of all these institutions. First, that the point is indivisible and, therefore, does not relate to itself, the relation to self (without which there is no self) supposing internal difference- fold, reflection, division-even if it is notself-consciousness. This implies, then, that a point can be one but on the condition of not being a self (selfsame).

Second, to the extent that it remains absolutely undetermined in its determination, the point has no singularity, no simple unicity. It is replaceable; it cannot constitute a signature, even less a work or an event. It cannot have a proper name. And what is true of the point is true of a multiplicity of points, of ones as points. (Derrida 1991: 39-45)

Descartes's epistemocracy –his epistemological regime of philosophy– has not been limited to only western philosophy, but dispersed to dominate all the epistemological formulations and processes. The modern legacy of Cartesian regime of epistemology exhibits itself with disembodiment, and egocentricity. (Jung 1996). Under the name of humanism the privileged atomic individual has been overrated as being the center of the universe as a conscious agency furnished by unequivocal self-knowledge (Pile 1995). Christianity has contributed largely for the body to be regarded as an ephemeral and perishable commodity in favour of incorporeal immortality (Turner 1996). The mind has been detached from the body, and exalted to a transcendental position rather than taken as an immanent aspect of the human

embodiment. The Cartesian *cogito* is inherently egocentric, because it is the act of the mind as the “thinking substance” (*res cogitans*) which always and necessarily says, “I think” (*ego cogito*). The “thinking substance” (mind) does not need the body (*res extensa*: exterior substance) for its existence, it is isolated and disembodied; it does not need an exteriority. Yet, the word ex/istence (*ex*:- out, *sister*: stand) discloses that it is in effect the “eccentricity” (*ex*:- out, *centrum*: stick) of the self toward the others, and not the centrality of it that “agitates” the *cogito* (*co*-, *agitare*: to drive). Cartesian theory (*theoria*: observing, looking at), within an hegemonic hierarchy of structuration, has bisected the world into clearly distinct realms of *subjectus* (*sub*-, *jacere*: to throw or place beneath), and *objectus* (*ob*-, *jacere*: to throw against or put before). The *subjectus* is hidden beneath in the beginning, until it is hit by the *objectus*:

What is thrown, placed beneath the earth (subject) in isolation, needs to be agitated, driven (*cogito*) by the sticks of other’s (its own eccentricity) that they throw from outside (objects, or other subjects), for it to stand on the earth (exist) and to observe (theorize)⁹.

This “stick of other’s” that is mutually thrown continuously is what makes the difference possible. The difference is at the ambiguous “double sensation” of the “flesh” (of Merleau-Ponty), is what the “struggle” between “active and reactive

⁹ The *subjectus* is *sub*-, *jacere*: to throw or place beneath. Beneath: bef. 900; ME benethe, OE beneoþan = be- BE - + neoþan, below, akin to OHG *nidana*. See NETHER. Nether: lying or believed to lie beneath the earth's surface; *infernal*.

forces” produces (of Nietzsche), is where the “zone of indiscernibility” is proper to “becoming” (of Deleuze and Guattari)¹⁰.

It is not only the difference made possible by the “stick of other’s” that give birth to the subject, but it is the difference of the absence (*ab-esse*: to be away), and presence (*præ-esse*: to be), also. Absence is just a javelin’s (*ob-jacare*, *sub-jacare*) throw away from the presence¹¹. The javelin, the stick (*centrum*) is not fixed to the ground. “In the smooth space of Zen, the arrow does not go from one point to another but is taken up at any point, to be sent to any other point, and tends to permute with the archer and the target” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 377)¹². Difference (etymologically as well) implies to carry, to hold, to support, to bear, and to give birth. Difference is not, and can not be a negative term; difference actually is not what isolates, but what connects, ties, bounds, and establishes relations. Difference, actually in the beginning, was already same with Derrida’s *différance*¹³: *di-phérein*: to bear, to carry, to hold. Yet,

¹⁰ Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 448.

¹¹ Zeno’s paradox of the flight of an arrow. Its motion is never present at any moment of presence. Derrida says “think the present starting from/in relation to time as difference, differing, and deferral.” See Culler 1987: 89-110.

¹² They also write, contra to the “smooth space of Zen”: “A ‘method’ is the striated space of the *cogitatio universalis* and draws a path that must be followed from one point to another. But the form of exteriority situates thought in a smooth space that it must occupy without counting, and for which there is no possible method, no conceivable reproduction, but only relays, intermezzos, resurgences. Thought is like the Vampire; it has no image either to constitute a model of or to copy. In the smooth space of Zen . . .” (1987: 377).

¹³ Derrida writes on *différance* in *Positions* : “ the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the *spacing* by means of which elements are related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive (the a of *différance* indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which can not be governed by or distributed between the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals without which the ‘full’ terms would not signify, would not function” (1981 :27).

difference also defers; delays and carries away, but it, too, holds and bears. Difference is what refers (*re-phérein*: to bring back), what makes reference possible:

What is away (absent), what is carried away (by difference) is always brought back (by reference) in order to drive thought (*cogito*) to be (presence) itself¹⁴.

The 'schizophrenia' Deleuze and Guattari embrace is not a pathological condition . . . Schizophrenia as a positive process is inventive connection, expansion rather than withdrawal. Its twoness is a relay to multiplicity. From one to another (and another . . .). From one noun or book or author to another (and another . . .). Not aimlessly. Experimentally.¹⁵

¹⁴ Derrida says, "without the possibility of difference, the desire of presence as such would not find its breathing-space. That means by the same token that this desire carries in itself the destiny of its non-satisfaction. Difference produces what it forbids, makes possible the very thing that it makes impossible" (1976: 143).

¹⁵ Massumi 1996: 1, also see schizoanalysis in Deleuze and Guattari 1987. This schizophrenic movement also suits this thesis, particularly this chapter, and certainly this section.

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