

PATRIMONIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH
PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY IN THE ÖZAL ERA

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Ankara

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IN THE ÖZAL ERA**

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

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by

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

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Buğra Özer

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Supervisor: Assistant Professor. E. Fuat Keyman

January 1998

This thesis analyzes patrimonial characteristics of Turkish public bureaucracy in the era between 1983-1993. Patrimonial taints within the structure of public bureaucracy will be elucidated from a diachronic perspective. The thesis will elaborate the revitalization of patrimonialism in the first half of 1980s signified with Motherland Party's seizure of power in 1983. The study shall exclusively cover major policy changes targeting a societal change by New Right policies and transaction between New Right policies and transformation of bureaucracy. It shall also assert that patrimonial figures were revitalized by the New Right Policies' applications.

Keywords: Patrimonialism, Public Bureaucracy, New Right, Özal

ÖZET

ÖZAL DÖNEMİ TÜRK KAMU BÜROKRASİSİNDEKİ PATRİMONYAL ÖZELLİKLER

Buğra Özer

Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç.Dr.E.Fuat Keyman
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Bu tez 1983-1993 yılları arasındaki, Özal dönemi Türk Kamu Bürokrasisinin patrimonyal özelliklerini incelemiştir. Türk Kamu Bürokrasisindeki patrimonyal özellikler tarihsel bir çerçeve içerisinde çalışılmıştır. İşbu çalışma 1980'lerde Anavatan Partisi'nin iktidara gelmesiyle bürokratik yapı dahilinde güçlenmeye başlayan patrimonyal eğilimleri temel öge olarak incelemiştir. Bu çalışma aynı zamanda 1980'lerde Yeni Sağ politikalarıyla hedeflenen temel siyasi değişimlerini ve bu süreçte söz konusu politikalar dahilinde bürokrasisinin dönüşümünü işlemiştir. Aynı zamanda çalışmanın bir diğer hedefi de bürokratik yapıdaki patrimonyal eğilimlerin Yeni Sağ politikalar sürecinde güçlenmiş olduğunu göstermektir

Anahtar Sözcükler: Patrimonyalizm, Kamu Bürokrasisi, Yeni Sağ, Özal

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER II: EXPLANATORY NOTES ON THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS	9
2.1 GENERAL DEFINITION OF BUREAUCRACY IN THE WEBERIAN PERSPECTIVE.....	9
2.2. MAIN TYPES OF BUREAUCRATIC MODELS IN THE WEBERIAN AND POST- WEBERIAN PERSPECTIVE	11
2.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF PATRIMONIALISM.....	16
2.4. TURKISH CONTEXT AND PATRIMONIALISM.....	20
CHAPTER III. PATRIMONIALISM IN TURKISH PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY	22
3.1. HISTORICAL LEGACY OF THE OTTOMAN ERA	22
3.2. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND PATRIMONIAL TAINTS OF BUREAUCRACY IN THE REPUBLICAN ERA	30
CHAPTER IV: PATRIMONIAL TAINTS OF TURKISH PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY IN THE ÖZAL ERA	33
4.1. NEW RIGHT MOVEMENT AND PATRIMONIALISM IN THE PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY OF THE ÖZAL ERA (1983-1993).....	33
4.2. NEW RIGHT AND STRUCTURAL REARRANGEMENTS IN PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY ENLIVENING PATRIMONIAL TAINTS.....	38
4.2.1. <i>General Outlook at the Transformation of Public Bureaucracy in the pre-1983s Era</i>	38
4.2.2. <i>Creation of Alternative Bureaucracy and Changes within the Prime Ministry of Özal.</i>	41
4.2.3. <i>Prime Ministry of Özal (1983-1989)</i>	43
4.2.4. <i>Legal Basis of Structural Arrangement within Public Bureaucracy</i>	45
4.2.5. <i>Politicization of Public Bureaucracy</i>	47
4.2.6. <i>Domination of A Single Individual within Turkish Public Bureaucracy</i>	49
4.2.7. <i>Global Support for the Structural Rearrangements within Turkish Public Bureaucracy</i>	50
4.2.8. <i>Presidency of Özal</i>	50
4.3. EVALUATION OF THE MAIN PILLARS OF TURKISH PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY IN ÖZAL ERA IN THE CONTEXT OF PATRIMONIALISM.....	51
4.3.1. <i>Division of Work</i>	53
4.3.2. <i>Impersonality of the Public Bureaucracy Between 1983 and 1993</i>	56
4.3.3. <i>Application of Merit Principle and Promotion Systems</i>	57
4.3.4. <i>Recruitment Process and Appraisal Process</i>	58
4.3.5. <i>Remaking of the Public Personnel Administration</i>	59
4.3.6. <i>Irrevocability of Administrative Posts and Administrative Discretion</i>	62
CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION	64
5.1 PRACTICAL INSIGHTS INTO THE PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY ABOUT THE RELATED ERA	64
5.1.1. <i>Methodology of the Study</i>	64
5.1.2. <i>General Elaboration on the Study</i>	64
5.2. CONCLUSION.....	68
BIBLIOGRAPHY	71

*Patrimonial Characteristics of Turkish Public Bureaucracy¹ in
the Özal Era*

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The objective of this study is to analyze the patrimonial characteristics of Turkish public bureaucracy in the light of New Right Policies in Turkey. This study focuses the Özal Era, from the first free elections held up in 1983 after the coup carried out in 1980 to the death of Özal in his presidency in 1993. This era is vitally important in the sense that the New Right policies were integrated into the whole state structure. Public bureaucracy in this era unintendedly revitalized patrimonial tendencies in its structure due to the effects of New Right policies. Unlike its contemporaries, Turkish public bureaucracy responded to the structural changes in itself with intensifying cadrization and patronage. The thesis makes the point that the applications brought and initiated by the New Right policies strengthened the patrimonial taints in Turkish public bureaucracy in an unwanted way, which led to the present situation of Turkish public bureaucracy characterised by politicization and patronage. In the first instance, I will draw the political setting following the 1980 coup.

1980 military intervention in Turkey occurred in the wake of a complete polarization and fragmentation of politics.² The coup d'etat of September 12, 1980 carried out by Turkish Military Forces commenced a new era in Turkish Politics. The political impasse in 1970s when conjoined with drawbacks in functioning of economy

¹ The word bureaucracy will be interchangeably used through the work both in the of organization sense and public bureaucracy

² Metin Heper, 'State Democracy and Bureaucracy in Turkey', (Metin Heper ed., *The State and*

had already signalled likelihood of necessary structural changes in Turkish politics. Many high level bureaucrats and top politicians tried hard and attempted to assert structural transformation programs to overcome crisis, such as the Economic Decisions of January 24, 1980. However, these reforms did not yield the outcomes to get rid of the social, political and economic chaos from which Turkey was suffering. Rather, Turkey attempted to get rid of the chaotic atmosphere of political and economic impasse by abeyance of democratic multi party system. In fact, Turkish political system was going through a very difficult and overwhelmingly arduous stage, which required the preparation of a new constitution.

The generals, the heads of the militarial administration alleged that a new constitution had to be prepared to avoid the drawbacks of 1961 Constitution, such as polarization and immobilisme within the political system. The 1982 Constitution was craven for a strong executive, which concentrated power in the hands of the president both symbolically and effectively.³

Besides all these constitutional changes, in the eyes of the post-1980 military neither the politicians nor the bureaucratic intelligentsia of the 1960s and the 1970s enjoyed high esteem. The militarial elites opted for a government that would avoid acting fallaciously and would comply with the letter and the spirit of the new constitution 1982. On the other hand, the military junta of 1980 coup d'etat denounced those in the civil bureaucratic ranks and politicians as those who had long subscribed to 'reactionary ideas' and 'perverted ideologies.'⁴ Actually the militarial administration banned active political involvement of former political cadres. The reintroduction of elections and the restarting of democratic process would exclude all

Public Bureaucracies, New York and London: Greenwood Press, 1987), p,135

³ Metin Heper, *ibid.*,p.135

the former politicians except those who had harmonious relations with the military regime. Despite the fact that most of its members were not much favoured by the militarial administration, the Motherland Party got the majority of the votes in the 1983 elections. The Motherland Party's pursuit for power was blended by promises targeting new changes in the econo-political system. This became a major force for attracting a great deal of votes from the majority of electorates.

The post-1980 era in Turkish politics has also been unique on the ground that the political setting following the coup, re-allocated roles on the stage of Turkish politics. The dominance of New Right policies and the demise of the Welfare State paradigm were two main factors that led to the remaking of stage for Turkish politics in the 1980s' conjecture of the country. Turkey's continuing economical and political stress has intensified particularly after 1980 due to the interplay of various factors. The shift to an export promotion development strategy, then reconstitution of law and order, the progressively worsening income distribution, the emergence of a new type of individualism, and above all, the formation of a New Right movement were (are) among the striking developments leading to the new equilibrium.⁵ The new government of Motherland party came onto the stage with promising initiating a so-called 'Great Transformation Program' in every field of society. What the new status quo oriented to create was a new order, which would be distinguished by liberal-competitive, individualistic characteristics. In line with the New Right policies the Motherland Party drastically initiated the application of export substitution policies instead of import substitution policies that had been in effect since the establishment

⁴ Metin Heper, *ibid.*, p.136

⁵Muharrem Tünay , 'The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony', *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey* (Muharrem Tünay, Atila Eralp and Birol Yeşilada ed., Westport, Conn: Praeger,1993), pp.

of the Republican Era to foster the development of national economy and to aid the development of national bourgeoisie. ⁶

The Motherland Party also perceived the state in a different way within all its policies applied in the 1980s. Since they were complying with the dictates of the science of economics, the State would have to be drawn to the sphere where it was supposed to function. According to the cadres of Motherland Party, there was an overload in economical and social affairs under the jurisdiction area of the state. They believed in the necessity of remaking of the 'state' notion. The new state, according to the Motherland Party, would in no way intervene in the economic sphere; rather it would be preserved as a referee in the economic sphere. The sphere for them would regulate itself within its market system. They also asserted that 'Despite free functioning of the market mechanisms, this model obviously rested upon the state direction of those which were ready for international competition'.⁷ This anti-statist notion is expressed '... antistatism, in this sense, is the elimination of the notorious bureaucratic red tape while continuing state intervention in the economy as before except for a change in its direction.'⁸

Through this *promising sounding* program, Özal laid emphasis on the restructuring of public bureaucracy in line with the prerequisite of the new setting. According to Özal, public bureaucracy was being a burden for the state. The bulk for Özal was both in the economical and political sense. The bureaucracy was forming one of the sources of budget deficits and politically bureaucracy was curbing the attempts of politicians to restructure the political and economic system.

⁶ Çağlar Keyder, *Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1993)

⁷ Muharrem Tünay, *ibid.*,

⁸ Atila Eralp, *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, (Muharrem Tünay, Atila Eralp and Birol Yesilada ed., Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1993)

The target for Özal was the minimisation of public sector. His view was that the public sector referred to all those fields in which state dominated economically and socially. When it is the case for public bureaucracy, he and his milieu thought that the departure point was to transform the legal rational model of bureaucracy into rational productive. Hence their aim was to palliate the functioning of bureaucracy according to the prerequisite of rational productive model. What the Motherland Party cadres failed to consider were patrimonialist figures embedded in the structuring of public bureaucracy.⁹

In the post-1980s Turkey, an attempt was made to render this politicised bureaucracy that evinced strong signs of patrimonialism, into a rational productive model. Some key agencies were selected as critical for the formulation and effective implementation of the structural adjustment program launched by the Motherland party governments. However the efforts made to render this process by means of bringing outsiders to the top echelons of the key agencies, turned out to undermine the efforts to transform the bureaucracy in the desired direction. The personal acquaintance, which played a significant role in the selection of the outsiders, contributed to the unsuccessful performance and even corruption on the part of outsiders. It was a complete fallacious process, which tried to realise the transformation of bureaucracy into the desired direction.¹⁰

Within the perspective drawn, this work will mainly cover the changes in the Turkish Public Bureaucracy within the era of Turgut Özal in terms of patrimonial figures within the structure of bureaucracy. The era in question will include both the prime ministry and the presidency of Özal. I will identify main characteristics of the

⁹ Metin Heper and Selçuk Sancar, *The Post-1983 Productive Model: The Case of Patrimonial Rational Productivity*, a typescript, 1996.

public bureaucracy of the Özal Era and elucidate the repercussions of these patrimonial figures on the present structuring and functioning of public bureaucracy. The findings at the theoretical level will be backed up by results of in depth interviews carried out with a number of high level and middle level bureaucrats in the State Planning Organization (SPO) and the Undersecretariat for the Treasury (UFTT). The relations within public bureaucracy will be envisaged by changes on the main parameters of bureaucracy including authority, merit, delegation of power, and distance between the subordinate level and the high level bureaucrats.

In the initial stage, the present work will present theoretical framework which will handle the transformation of bureaucracy within the Weberian perspective. I will also devote myself to the succinct explanation of Weberian evaluation of bureaucratic theory. In this a historical framework will be presented relating to that of the development of bureaucracy. I will also explain the main Weberian types of bureaucratic models such as, the patrimonial model and legal-rational model. The last model that I will concentrate on is rational productive model, which is a post-Weberian theoretical framework to deal with the changing roles and structuring bureaucracy in the second half of the twentieth century. An explanation of types of rationality will also be presented to enable the understanding of the inner dynamics of bureaucratic models. In the evaluation of these models, I will define their main characteristics of these models.

In line with this theoretical framework, I will elucidate over bureaucratic development in Turkish polity within the types of bureaucracy which I have juxtaposed in the second chapter. I will put emphasis over the patrimonialism whose taints affected the development of Turkish bureaucracy in an overall context. The

¹⁰ Metin Heper and Selçuk Sancar, *ibid.*, p.33

patrimonial taints have been omnipotent in every stage of bureaucratic development. The patrimonial taints within Turkish bureaucratic development persisted in such a dogged way that it curbed the attempts to transform Turkish bureaucratic structure into the legal rational model.

The third chapter will concentrate on attempts both in the structural and inner organisational sense to transform Turkish bureaucracy into legal rational model. These attempts, which cumulated in the Republican Era, were unyielding due to the fact that patrimonial taints de-emphasized the formation and development of the legal dimension of bureaucratic development. On the other hand, one other incident that reinforces this argument is that bureaucratic development in Turkey was not accompanied by a balanced social development.

Turkish bureaucracy opposed these structural and organisational reforms to transform the bureaucracy into the legal rational model on the basis of legacy of the bureaucratic ruling tradition. In the other parts of the work, I will elaborate over the change of political setting in Turkey due to the effects of the New Right policies and coup d'etat carried out in 1980. These two changes have also inevitable effects on the structuring of bureaucratic development. The first change is that bureaucracy was no longer perceived as an active element of the structuring of a society. Actually, bureaucracy became a subsisted to be transformed in line with the target of New Right policies which was declared as the minimisation of the state. The second change is the attempts to render the bureaucracy into the rational-productive model, which turned out to be in vain due to the persistent effects of patrimonialism. I will also put forth that the New Right Policies which were trying to restructure bureaucracy in line with its targets, revitalized and accelerated patrimonial taints. In fact the transformation of bureaucracy had several complex dimensions which failed due to patrimonialism.

In the concluding episode, I will reflect these points with a qualitative analysis carried out in the UFTT, and SPO. I will also assert that the New Right policies within the concerned era revitalised the patrimonial taints within Turkish bureaucracy and curbed the transformation of bureaucracy into the rational productive model.

Given the fact that many efforts were put forth in the field of bureaucracy, this work is a felicitous quest to define the characteristics of Turkish Public Bureaucracy within the Özal Era, which germinated many radical transformations in Turkish political system.

CHAPTER II: EXPLANATORY NOTES ON THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter will highlight the main concepts throughout the thesis. Although there are variety of ways to define bureaucracy, the Weberian perspective will be utilised to understand the patrimonialism inherent in Turkish Public Bureaucracy. Drawing the general framework, a general definition of patrimonialism will be made, being accompanied with the characteristics of the term. Consequently, there will be another subtitle dealing with patrimonialism and the authority dimension in bureaucracy. The final point about theoretical framework is the brief application of bureaucracy into the setting of Turkey.

2.1 General Definition of Bureaucracy in the Weberian Perspective

Bureaucracy as an entity will be explained in the initial stage within Weberian perspective. Because of its similarity to the word ‘democracy’, which refers to a political system dominated by the rule of people, ‘bureaucracy’ has acquired a meaning of domination of a system held by people in bureaus.¹¹ The word also extends to another sense of a system where bureaucrats play significant roles in structuring society. These people holding the power in bureaus claim that they stand for public good. Weber asserts the point that this public good notion denotes general interest.¹²

Weber tries to envisage bureaucracy as a result of capitalist development in the Western European context. The kings tried to increase their power at the expense of power held by feudal lords in the medieval ages. With the emergence of bourgeoisie,

¹¹Metin Heper, ‘Bürokrasi’, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984), vol. II, p.293

¹²Metin Heper, ‘Bürokrasi’, *ibid.*, vol. II, p.293

the rulers started giving their support to this newly emerging class to concentrate their power in the centre.

According to Weber one may talk about four vitally important developments on the way to capitalism. The first one was the concentration of political power at the centre on the behalf of kings. The second development is the drastic increases in tax revenues, which led to the enrichment of the central authority. In connection with this, one more happening was that rulers started advocating mercantilist policies throughout the country. The main headline about mercantilist policies were the construction of new roads enabling trade activities throughout the country, more emphasis put on restriction of raw materials from abroad and reliance upon purchases of goods produced within the country. The fourth development was the support for bourgeoisie, which required the preparation of a new set of legislations to be applied by a increasingly complex bureaucratic structure.¹³

This is not to say that there was not a corresponding structure similar to bureaucracy, rather a body called *Curia Regis* did exist on the behalf of kings in medieval ages. This body which used to function as an advisory council to kings who shared power with feudal lords transformed itself to a body of aristocracy and servants of state. These elements of *Curia Regis* were charged with protection of the property of the king, defending the privileges of the king versus the Church and aristocratic elements, and the maintenance of order in the country. Hence this transformation of *Curia Regis* into this special body signifies a prototype of bureaucratic organization in itself.

¹³Metin Heper, 'Bürokrasi', *ibid.*, vol. II, p.293

2.2. Main Types of Bureaucratic Models in the Weberian and Post- Weberian Perspective

In fact, there is one more ingredient in the Weberian perspective. Organization of bureaucracy is shaped according to the authority type dominant in the political system. The first type of bureaucratic organization is the patrimonial type of bureaucracy. In this type of bureaucracy the authority type is patrimonialism. Patrimonialism legitimates itself on the basis of both traditions and charisma of the leader. The second defining characteristic of patrimonial system is the perception of people and property in the country as those of the ruler's household.

The bureaucratic organization transforms itself into a complete chain of hierarchy in which the *absolute loyalty* is overemphasised in the patrimonial system. The criterion for determination of procedure and substance of any activity in this type of bureaucracy is the *tradition*. The criterion '*tradition*' also prepares legitimacy ground for the orders of rulers or any superior within bureaucracy. There is a great deal of ambiguity over rules and regulations for different jurisdiction areas. Notwithstanding the fact that there is simple division of work, no determined criterion rules these fields.

The second bureaucratic model that Weber develops is the *legal rational model*. Weber traces this model's genesis back to the Industrial Revolution. On the other hand Sartori's main point about the *legal rational* type of bureaucracy is of relation to the concept of general interest. The general interest is a result of historical transformation process. It is a reflection of the evolutionary process from the understanding of 'L'etat c'est moi' to the notion of general interest commonly accepted as *common good*. In the first phase of socio-economic development, it is accepted that the general interest can be determined by a number of political and

bureaucratic elites who do not favour the demands of newly emerging and developing classes in society, namely the bourgeoisie. As this transformation goes on, the middle classes compulse these bureaucratic elites and political elites to turn an ear to their demands. It is because of the fact that this new class wants to envisage a mechanism complex enough to arrange the bourgeoisie's activities and enable the bourgeoisie more facilities about trade activities. On the other hand, this process requires the reorganisation of bureaucracy in the desired direction of the demands of the bourgeoisie.¹⁴ Abadan-Unat also states that the development of middle class is a prerequisite to exert influence upon bureaucracy in line with the prerequisites of accumulation process.¹⁵

The *legal-rational* model of bureaucracy has a clear and determined set of rules and regulations. It clearly stipulates the duties and responsibilities of both superiors and subordinates in comparison to the patrimonial type of bureaucracy, which has a complete ambiguity on these issues. The main legitimisation of authority derives its potential from the written and clear rules and regulations and legislation. It has extensively determined the borders of jurisdiction areas of superiors. The recruitment and appraisal processes have been clearly defined according to distinct criteria. By the same token, in contrast to patrimonial type of bureaucracy which grants great deal of discretionary power to superiors, the *legal rational* type distinguishes itself with restricted discretionary power. Weber signifies this in his own words:

'...The reduction of modern office management to rule is deeply embedded in its very nature. The theory of the modern public administration for instance assumes

¹⁴ Giovanni Sartori, 'Representational Systems' in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Mc Millan and Free Press, 1968), vol. 3, pp. 59-60

¹⁵ Nermin Abadan Unat *Bürokrasi* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1974)

*that the authority to order certain matters by decree which has been legally granted to an agency doesn't entitle the agency to regulate the matter by individual commands given for each case, not to regulate the matter abstractly.'*¹⁶

Apart from these characteristics, more Weberian concepts will aid us to understand the functioning of these types of bureaucracy. Two concepts are of high importance in relation to rationality types, namely the substantial rationality and the instrumental rationality. The former overemphasises 'getting an objective accomplished'. In the accomplishment of this objective, the bureaucratic system relies upon the aims of political elites. The latter emphasizes how the objectives are accomplished.¹⁷

One extra model developed in a post-Weberian way is the *rational productive* model. Technological developments and complexization of administrative affairs in the second half of the twentieth century caused the *legal rational* model cease to be assertive and to function in proper way.¹⁸ Ilchmann asserts this model into the literature of bureaucracy. Ilchmann states that within these technological developments, bureaucracy needs to be re-organised. He proposes that in era of high-technology bureaucracy needs to flexibilize, and it should lay more emphasis on productivity. In his conception the *rational productive* model should be more and more substantive rationality oriented in contrast to the *legal rational* model, which relies upon instrumental rationality.¹⁹ Some of the scholars like Friedrich assert that the *rational productive* model is the ideal type of *legal rational* model according to

¹⁶ Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich ed., 2 vols., Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978), vol. I, p.

¹⁷ Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait*, (New York: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1962), pp. 368-369

¹⁸ David Silverman, *The Theory of the Organisations: A Sociological Perspective* (London: Heinemann, 1970), p. 74

¹⁹ Warren Ilchmann, 'Productivity, Administrative Reform and Anti-politics: Dilemmas for Developing States', (Brabianti ed., *Political and Administrative Development*, 1969), p. 476

Weber's original framework. Ilchmann opposes this claim on the ground that Weber did not use the term productivity to define the *rational productivity* as the ideal type of legal rational model. The second ground for this is that the *legal rational* model relies upon the instrumental rationality in contrast to the *rational productive* model, which emphasizes substantial rationality. The development of the *rational productive* model is due to the nourishment of specialised knowledge and the high professionalization in the second half of the twentieth century.²⁰

The *rational productive* model preserves the basic pillars of *legal rational* model. Here it should be noted that there are some structural changes in the structuring of bureaucratic model. The first characteristic is that this model tries to minimize hierarchy. In fact, deconcentration of authority is exercised in its extreme dimension. The *rational productive* model also proposes that there should be an effective coordination among units. It also brings the prerequisite that more emphasis be laid upon staff units in comparison to the *legal rational* model, which emphasizes line units. Again in contrast to the *legal rational* model relying upon seniority and experience in the practice of recruitment and appraisal process, the *rational productive* model de-emphasizes these pillars.²¹ The rational-productive model also suggests that devolution of authority²² be often utilised.²³

There is an evolutionary type of development that the *legal rational* model is a prerequisite type to go through the *rational productive* model of bureaucracy. There is

²⁰ Harold Wilensky, 'Professionalization for Everyone', *American Journal of Sociology*, September 1969, p.149

²¹Metin Heper, *Türk Kamu Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme : Siyaset Sosyolojisi Açısından Bir İnceleme*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1977)

²²The deconcentration of authority and the devolution of authority are two different technical terms, which have to be distinguished. The first one is that you delegate the authority to a subordinate for the routine activities and the responsibility still is at the superior who has delegated the authority. In comparison to the delegation of authority, the devolution of authority refers to the incident that a superior delegates the authority and the responsibility belongs to the subordinate to whom the authority

some kind of alliance between these patterns despite the structural changes such as the emphasis laid upon the efficiency to carry out policies formulated with minimum cost in comparison to the *rational productive* model which targets the effectiveness to carry out policies. This alliance is realised in the way that the political responsiveness of legal-rational model is moderated by the anti-politics of the *rational productive* model. The second step is that the objective assessment of merit and the impersonal order of the *legal rational* model avoid the possible abuse of patrimonial taints which might infringe upon the essence of conditions required to maintain the framework of the *rational productive* model.²⁴

This study will apply this evolutionary development of bureaucracy into the context of Turkey. Rather an attempt will be made to cover this bureaucratic development under the dominance of patrimonial taints with exclusive scope on the Özal Era. Preceding this core, patrimonialism will be elucidated over with the persistence of patrimonialism in this bureaucratic development. The patrimonial type of bureaucratic model will be elaborated with its characteristics such as authority dimension, merit dimension, and division of work, delegation of authority, appraisal and recruitment process.

Turkish public bureaucracy finds itself in a dilemma. In other words it neither has been able to realise transformation from the *legal rational* model to the *rational productive* model nor it could experience a balanced socio-economic development. This becomes more and more concrete in the post 1983 public bureaucracy with starving attempts to transform bureaucracy to the *rational productive* model, being

has been delegated for the thing done.

²³Oğuz Onaran, 'Yetki Göçerimi', *Amne İdaresi Dergisi*, (June 1974), p. 18

²⁴Metin Heper and Selçuk Sancar, *The Post-1983 Productive Model: The Case of Patrimonial Rational Productivity*, a typescript, 1996, p.14

given short shrifts by the patrimonial figures inherent in the nature of bureaucracy.

2.3. Characteristics of Patrimonialism

One of the main pillars of the patrimonial authority is the traditional authority. The traditional authority in its simplest form is gerontocracy²⁵ and patriarchy. In both of the cases, the leader or the patriarch has to take under consideration the interests of individual members within group. Those who hold authority within patrimonial order do not have such a complex tool of administration. Mutual and all common activities are ruled according to the *reciprocity* principle. The patriarch or the leader of group, tribe or any community in which the tradition becomes motor of legitimisation for the collectivity, is concerned with coordination of activities.²⁶

Rather than formality principle of *legal rational* model, there is *informality* principle in the rules which regulate the relations between superiors and subordinates. Consequently, since there is no formality²⁷ which defines rules and regulations between superiors and subordinates, loyalty becomes an emphasized factor. Due to the fact that traditional authority has no integrative characteristic, informality becomes the defining characteristic of the patriarchal order.²⁸ Bureaucracy in this interconnected chain of loyalty is no longer a chain of hierarchy, by the same token, it is a set of mutual loyalty system. According to Weber it is only the patrimonialist system where it includes not free individuals.²⁹ In his ideal type of legal rational system, individuals are free and bureaucracy is their life time career.

²⁵Gerontocracy refers to the rule of the old

²⁶Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich ed., 2 vols., Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978), vol. I, p.231

²⁷The formality refers to the standardisation of relations between people and there comes the need to govern and regulate these relations on the basis of the so should-be appropriate action. On the other hand the informality refers to a system where these relations have not been able to be standardised.

²⁸Weber, *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 221

²⁹Weber, *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 227

The patrimonial bureaucracies have one distinct characteristic. The loyalty is to a person who stands traditionally rather than to an elected figure. The patriarch or the leader's orders are legitimated on the basis of traditions. It is the traditions which legitimate the whip of leader and determine the content and boundaries of these orders. These orders are legitimate only if traditional leaders give these orders on the basis of traditions. The patrimonial leaders have unlimited discretionary power. This power may be utilised freely without subscription to any set of written rules. The principles which draw limits for these orders are morality, good will, and equality in abstract sense.³⁰ Weber concretizes these concepts by presenting the sultanates and such forms of bureaucracy servile to these authority types as extreme forms of patrimonialism. This extreme form of patrimonial type of bureaucracies is a system in which the Sultan and or any administrator relies upon his personal discretionary power rather than tradition.³¹ Due to the limited institutionalisation in the patrimonial bureaucracies, there appears a conflict between different units of bureaucracy about powers and duties of different sections of society. The ambiguous boundaries within these powers and duties of bureaucratic units may vary according to the will and whip of administrator.

About the recruitment process the ambiguity in the patrimonial system still proceeds. In order to be recruited into ranks of bureaucracy, the prerequisite becomes the fact the incumbents should come from a certain status group. It comes in contrast to the qualifications explicitly and exclusively sought for by the legal *rational* type of bureaucracy. So people who are to be recruited into ranks of bureaucracy need not be having exclusive characteristics determined on the basis of written rules. Since there is

³⁰Weber, *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 227

³¹Weber, *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 231-232

no job specification and there is no job classification, the recruitment is realised procedurally for the sake of institutionalisation of the subjective goal of the leader.³²

In patrimonial types of bureaucracies there are no clear boundaries specifying duties and responsibilities of superiors and subordinates. Moreover there is a little differentiation among roles, which means that a subordinate should be loyal to his superior.³³ The ambiguity over job specification leads to another incidence that neither superior nor subordinates know each other well. It is also of high note that a subordinate doesn't really know to whom h/she is responsible. It is not generally clear whether a subordinate will be responsible to the superior or h/she will be responsible to the people appointed by the superior.

The leader of the group personally makes job specification and job definition in a patrimonial system. Instead of a job definition and a job specification made on the basis of objective criteria, patrimonial bureaucracy has a 'from day to day changing' criterion, in other words, adhocly formed organizationally.

Social status becomes a determining factor in the recruitment process, rather than the qualifications held by subordinates. On the other hand status affects such kinds of intra-organisational settings such as space between superiors and subordinates, delegation of authority and recruitment and appraisal process. Of relation to the social distance between superiors and subordinates, the main cleavage becomes the social status. At times when patrimonial bureaucracy starts to play very important political roles, those of higher echelons of bureaucracy will form political elites. Social distance between the superiors and subordinates avoids development of the use of delegation of authority. In fact it will be true to say that in a context of

³²Weber, *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 229-230

³³Weber, *ibid.*, vol. I, p.1026, p.1028

organization in which there is a dearth of job specification and definition, there will not be an effective delegation of authority. In other words a subordinate will not have enough autonomy in the process of decision making.

In terms of merit, recruitment and appraisal process for bureaucratic organization are also affected by social status factor. Appointments to bureaucratic posts are made on basis of kinship and monopoly of a special cadre dominating bureaucracy. The persistence of traditional norms and rules dominating bureaucracy have understated the importance of personal qualifications and substituted personal loyalty instead of it.

This has been a brief account juxtaposing the significant characteristics of patrimonialism. My study will not put forth the claim that Turkish Public Bureaucracy is patrimonial in its purest form. It would be convenient to say that there were really hard attempts to unchain these characteristics of bureaucracy tainted by patrimonialism. In fact the transformation attempts to render bureaucracy legal rational model commence with modernisation movement started at the institutional level in the Ottoman Era. Findley asserts the fact that the shift from traditional to rational legal authority remained incomplete largely because the processes of rationalisation and regulation were often subverted to serve the ends of patrimonial discretionism.³⁴

³⁴ Carter Vaughn Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989)

2.4. Turkish Context and Patrimonialism

This study will view Turkish public bureaucracy as a typical example coming from a patrimonial past. In fact, the bureaucratic apparatus of Ottoman Empire was belonging to a more inclusive level as a patriarchal monarchy, that is, a state conceived of the model of a vastly extended household having really a long background tracing back to *gazi* traditions. Despite the attempts to transform patrimonial structure into a *legal rational* model, these attempts gained nothing than to change the formal procedures. In fact, the attempts to eliminate patrimonial figures were utilised to assert neo-patrimonialism by the reformers whether it be in the Republican era or whether it be in the Ottoman era. Findley makes the point of the Ottoman Era that ‘Yet in proportion, as Ottoman reformers began deliberately changing inherited patterns defined by tradition, they had no choice but to use reason to develop their plans and then, if they were to project their plans effectively, to embody them in laws and regulations.’³⁵

Even though the Republican era claimed that they were not inheriting any legacy of Ottoman era, they continued to preserve institutions having patrimonial features. The Republican era sought for high loyalty to the regime since its establishment. Nevertheless as Faroz Ahmad asserted that Republic of Turkey did not rise out of the ashes of Ottoman Empire like a phoenix³⁶, the Republican regime preferred to educate its new elite cadre in its new schools. These new cadres were to be loyal to the republican regime. That was why the republican regime attempted to eliminate public bureaucracy of the former regime by heavy-handed politics³⁷, though

³⁵Findley, *ibid.*, p.9

³⁶Faroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), p.

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³⁷Metin Heper, ‘Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Turkish Polity’ in *Handbook of Bureaucracy*, (Ali Farazmand ed., New York: M.Narcel Dekker, 1994), pp. 659-674

Atatürk tried to regain their confidence in the further instance.³⁸ In the following years of the republican era, public bureaucracy came to mission themselves as the guardian of the basic pillars of the republic. This also did signify that they were more instrumental rationality oriented. This attitude of bureaucracy continued in the multi party regime which was introduced in the real sense since 1950s. The political elites also desired to envisage a bureaucracy completely servile to the mandator in the Weberian sense. The bureaucratic elites reacted to this happening with measures, which tried to curb the power of political elites. The bureaucratic elites sabotaged the policies formulated by the political elites and used negative politics versus the political elites. However, the political elites preferred a completely servile bureaucracy. The most important criterion for the political elites became *loyalty*.

³⁸ Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni, Dün, Bugün, Yarın* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1969)

CHAPTER III. PATRIMONIALISM IN TURKISH PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY

3.1. Historical Legacy of the Ottoman Era

The main factors for patrimonial type of bureaucracy were omnipresent in the Ottoman polity such as the sharp cleavage between centre and periphery³⁹, perception of the country as the household of the ruler and the traditional bases of political power as a motor of legitimisation. To say that Ottoman Legacy of bureaucratic ruling tradition is completely in purest form patrimonial is difficult in Weberian theoretical framework. The difficulty arises from the fact that Weber identified this concept as an ideal type but never drew the boundaries of this system in a determinate way.⁴⁰ The term has been analysed to be a contra model versus the *legal rational* model of bureaucracy.

İnsel asserts that in order to comprehend Ottoman Bureaucracy, patrimonialism must be deemed to be a political and social setting.⁴¹ There are two important characteristics related to this political and social system. The first one is that state has total control and regulation power over the economy. Meanwhile the state has the right to expropriate property under the motto '*Devlet mülktür*' denoting that all the property is the state's household.⁴² The second dimension is that state conceives society a totality of autonomous gemeinschafts.⁴³

Since our scope is to deal with patrimonial characteristics of public

³⁹ Şerif Mardin ' Centre and Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics' *Daedalus*, 102(1973): 169-190

⁴⁰Max, Weber, *ibid.*, vol. I, P.238

⁴¹Ahmet İnsel, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları), p. 29

⁴² İlkay Sunar, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development*, (Ankara, 1974) and the issue is dealt in more details in works of Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, (İstanbul,1972), 1. Cilt, pp. 60-61 and Taner Timur, *Osmanlı Toplumsal Düzeni*, Ankara ,1979), p. 219

⁴³Ahmet İnsel, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları), p. 33

bureaucracy, this work will limit itself to the characteristics of bureaucracy. This will analyze the basic dimensions of bureaucracy. This short account has been given in order to understand in what kind of context the bureaucratic apparatus was consolidated in the Ottoman era. There formed a bureaucratic ruling tradition in which the ruler assumed an unconditional loyalty to himself. In the following centuries, institutions with which the emperor shared power assumed absolute loyalty from the subordinates serving for the state. The Sultan enjoyed his absolute power over the institutions in the Ottoman bureaucratic structure. By the same token, the ruler rarely practiced the principle of delegation of authority. The authority is not institutionalised.⁴⁴ Within the intraorganizational setting in the Ottoman bureaucracy no superior knows how many people work for a subunit on the ground that there is no determined division of work. As time went by, the Ottoman Administration did begin, in a ragged way often clearer in concept than implementation, to take on the traits of a modern bureaucracy, as opposed to those of the earlier scribal corps.⁴⁵

Firstly it is a necessity that these characteristics of modern bureaucracy should be mentioned. Weber identifies these officials personally free. The second point is that offices should be hierarchically organised. It means that each office should have distinct and specific functions, that the officials' obligations should be contractually limited (as opposed to the patrimonial officials' unconditional personal dependence on the sovereign), that officials should be recruited on the basis of their qualifications realised by examinations. On the other hand they should be compensated by salary. The office must be their sole or at least primary occupation, that there should be a

⁴⁴ Şerif Mardin, 'Power , Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 11 (1969): 258-281

⁴⁵Carter Vaughn Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 8

definite career pattern with promotion by seniority and merit.⁴⁶ By the same token officials would acquire no proprietary right in their posts or in the resources that went with them. Officials should be subject to a unified system of disciplinary control in the conduct of their duties.⁴⁷

Contrary to these characteristics, the whip of the ruler plays a significant role and bureaucracy puts emphasis on procedural grounds in the Ottoman bureaucracy. The recruitment criteria are absolute loyalty to the Sultan, being a man of Islam and knowledge of Ottoman traditions. These are socialised through bureaucracy on the basis of education. Moreover people being recruited for bureaucratic posts are selected among known surroundings of former bureaucrats. These offsprings and relatives of the former bureaucrats inherit these posts.

The basis of this inheritance is realised on the ground that Ottoman Emperor could not pay for salaries for a long time to bureaucrats due to the bottlenecks of Ottoman economy starting with the seventeenth century. These so known relatives of former bureaucrats gain these posts with proof of these debts of the state to bureaucrat's family.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, contrary to the legal rational model most of these bureaucrats did not conceive bureaucracy as a lifetime career. It was most of the time a second source of income.

Despite starving attempts to transform bureaucracy into *legal rational* model, there were reasons that curbed this process. The first reason was that Ottomans added new elements into the system but they always failed to consider that they had to abolish old traditions and parts. The outcome was a complex hierarchical bureaucratic

⁴⁶Martin Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, (London: Mc Millan, 1970),

⁴⁷Max Weber *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, (ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 vols., Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978), vol. I, pp. 220-221,

⁴⁸ Carter Vaughn Findley 'The Legacy of tradition to reform: Origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry' *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, III (1972)

system. The Ottomans did not also realise the place of bureaucracy in relation to society. The second reason is that Ottomans preferred to create new institutions as alternative to those institutions which were resisting new changes and they never considered bureaucracy as an institution totally to reform.

The centre, which extended its strong influence until the republican era, did appoint members of elected assemblies of municipalities. Rather than formality, informality had been a persisting factor at bureaucracy of 1800s. Even in the Reformation era signified with *Tanzimat*, the reformers relied upon this principle. Loyalty to the existing regime was overemphasised which traced back to the era of Abdülhamid II.

In this bureaucratic structure, of relation to merit system, the reformers never practiced this principle. The loyalty factor was always dominant in Ottoman era. In recruitment and appraisal process, there neither existed effective measures and techniques nor there were legal and formal notification of examinations by which the possible incumbents could be informed. Even examinations which were held in order to test candidates for bureaucratic posts had nothing to do with the job specification. The space setting of bureaucratic organization was a space, which was in a state of chaos. The relations between superiors and subordinates resembled of that between an apprentice and a master. This meant that there was no inner house education system, which enabled bureaucrats to learn how activities of bureaucracy were carried out in the Ottoman Era. The bureaucrats rather learned how to become loyal agents of their superior echelons.

In the republican era, one can also observe the fact that these tendencies were continued in the republican Era in the same patterns. The reformation movement for rendering bureaucracy to the *legal rational* model did not yield much on the ground

that reforms were carried out with the same mentality of those carried out in the Ottoman era. Even Atatürk did not even think that reformation would have to be accompanied by a compatible change in socioeconomic system of Turkey. According to Bent, when Kemalist reforms were being consolidated in society, people were being recruited into bureaucratic posts on the basis of loyalty factor.⁴⁹ Those who wouldn't react to the reforms were the most suitable ones for high levels of bureaucracy. On the other hand Republican regime did not do anything to change the obstinate and reactionary lower echelons of bureaucracy who were not complying with the mentality of the new regime. One exception to this thing was the October 1,1922 legislation. By means of this legislation, many bureaucrats of lower echelons were dismissed and different agencies of bureaucracy were granted the right to substitute these cadres emptied by those who were dismissed.⁵⁰ In other words, it was a way of arranging the bureaucracy on the basis of loyalty.

The bureaucracy of republican regime appointed itself as a consolidator and guardian of Kemalist reforms in society. They had a different notion of general interest, which they thought could only be determined by them. Turkish Bureaucracy persisted on the stand that they had to be guardian of the so-called pillars of the Republic.

1961 Constitution was on the behalf of bureaucracy and gave bureaucratic elites constitutional legality in their struggle with political elites. On the other 1971 military takeover supported them more. The bureaucratic elites developed a worldview of state capitalism whereas the political elites and the surroundings

⁴⁹ Frederick T.Bent ' The Turkish Bureaucracy as an Agent of Change' *Journal of Comparative Administration* (May , 1969)

⁵⁰ Metin Heper, *Türk Kamu Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme: Siyaset Sosyolojisi Açısından Bir İnceleme*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1977)

advocating political elites and the political elites failed to develop a totally coherent and exclusive worldview.⁵¹

The intraorganizational characteristics of Turkish Bureaucracy may be juxtaposed as follows. Loyalty to leaders to leader such as Atatürk ‘the great leader’, İnönü ‘the National Chef’ was overemphasised. Many of the echelons of public bureaucracy were surpassed in order to get objectives accomplished. Even when Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey (1950-1960) faced a severe political crisis, Council of Ministers had to resign except the premier figure, which he realised by a decree in the force of law.⁵²

One other evidence for patrimonialism in Turkish bureaucracy is that there were no homogeneous job classifications and job specifications within bureaucratic organization. There was an inflation of different titles. The promotions were made on the basis of personal will accompanied with great difficulty in coordination.

This lack of formality on job specification, job classification etc. leads to unreliability on subordinates and dominance of superiors. The dominance of superiors required loyalty in an unconditional way.⁵³ This became concrete in the Report prepared by Martin and Cush for the Ministry of Finance. This also supports our finding that financial matters once evaluated within local authorities were transferred to the jurisdiction area of central authority in 1920s. It was because of the fact that the local authorities caused corruption. These developments gave way to the perception of bureaucracy by legislative and executive as if bureaucracy were to deviate from

⁵¹ Nezih Tevfik, ‘The Middle Classes in Turkey’, *Social Change and Politics in Turkey* (Netherlands: E.J. Brill, Leiden), pp.123-151

⁵²Cem Erođlu, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970) (Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayını, No 294).

⁵³Maurice Chaillox Dantel ‘ *Türkiye’de Devlet Personel Teşkilatı Hakkında Bir Araştırma*’ (T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Personel Dairesi, Hükümete Sunulan Yabancı Raporları), p. 118

policies formulated anytime.⁵⁴

Turkish public bureaucracy never emphasized merit principle properly about recruitment process. In the recruitment appraisal process, there were not proper appraisal methods and techniques of examination. Mihçioğlu asserted that juries from a certain echelon like Mülkiye (Ankara University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration) were not neutral at the evaluation of candidates from Mülkiye at the recruitment process. About promotion and demotion policies, principle of seniority was not only applied. Moreover examinations were not formally and publicly notified. In cases where seniority condition was the same for bureaucrats, merit principle came onto the stage.⁵⁵ In fact demotion policies were never applied on the basis of unsuccess but on the personal criterion. The two important criteria were, personal will and to which political cadre a bureaucrat belonged to, on promotion and demotion policies. In the organisational sense to be able to measure merit principle a system has to have clarity about job definition and job specification.

Here one also should mention about backgrounds where bureaucrats are recruited. Between 1860-1949 the dominance of bureaucrats from Marmara Region fell from 46% to 38% meaning that graduates recruited in bureaucracy were coming from a large and varied geography from Aegean, Black Sea, Mediterranean Region. The cadres were mostly composed of middle class families with the exception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which included high-class families. It was interesting that those recruited into bureaucratic posts were those whose fathers were bureaucrats in the same institution which goes in line with the Ottoman legacy.

⁵⁴ James Martinand Frank E. Cush, *Administration of the Turkish Ministry of Finance*, (Ankara: Ministry of Finance, 1951)

⁵⁵ Cemal Mihçioğlu, 'Türkiye'de Memuriyete Girişte Liyakat Meselesi' *Ankara Üniversitesi S.B.F. Dergisi*, (Mart, 1958) and 'Development of Senior Administrators in Turkey', *Ankara Üniversitesi S.B.F. Dergisi*, (Eylül, 1968)

The reformation movement went on in the Republican era in order to restructure bureaucracy. Foreign scholars prepared different reform programs. Several attempts such as the preparation of MEHTAP (Plan for the Reformation of Institutional Structuring of the Centralized Government), establishment of the State Planning Organization, State Personnel Department to design direction of administrative reform and manipulate it.⁵⁶The reform programs did not yield much. There were three reasons for this incident. The first one is that no serious research had been done to cover issue. The second one is that qualified people were not recruited to continue called reformation movement. The final point is that programs definitely failed to prepare the framework of assertive measures. This was also asserted that by Tutum that political authority never showed eagerness to carry out measures of the Reform programs.⁵⁷

⁵⁶Kenan Sürgit, *Türkiye'de İdari Reform*, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1972), p.72

⁵⁷Cahit Tutum, 'Türkiye'de Personel Reformu Üzerine Düşünceler', *Amne İdaresi Dergisi*, (Haziran ,1968), Devlet Memurları Kanununun Genel Bir Eleştirisi', *Amne İdaresi Dergisi*, (Aralık, 1974), 'Gerçekleştirilmeyen Reform: Personel Reformu', *Amne İdaresi Dergisi*, (Eylül, 1973)

3.2. Political Developments and Patrimonial Taints of Bureaucracy in the Republican Era

This subtitle will make a brief account of the political and bureaucratic development in the Republican era. The study will analyze developments in three time intervals namely the first, second, and the third republic. The first republic extends from the promulgation of the republic (October 29,1923) to the coup d'etat of 1960(May 27,1960), the second republic area extends to the landmark of the coup d'etat in1980 (September 12,1980).

The First Republic mostly involved the attempts to transform society from above, being accompanied by the attempts turn bureaucracy into the *legal rational* model. The new model would have to be the most suitable one for the regime and the transformation trying to change society from above.⁵⁸ Since many of the bureaucratic elites did not support the National Independence War, Atatürk used heavy-handed politics to eliminate bureaucracy's reaction to the regime. Despite the fact that the Republican regime tried to regain their confidence, this did not yield much. To eliminate these cadres, the new regime created new institutions to recruit new elites of bureaucracy. The new bureaucratic elements soon came to be guardians of the new republican regime's pillars, such as nationalism, secularism, etatism etc. Reformism soon came to mean preserving and safeguarding these principles. The institutional transformations became ends when they should only have been means.⁵⁹

In Kemalist conception, bureaucracy was a "structure organised on the basis of strict hierarchy which would act by the letter of law with the staffing of civil servants

⁵⁸ Metin Heper, *Türk Kamu Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme : Siyaset Sosyolojisi Açısından Bir İnceleme*, (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1977), p.96

⁵⁹Şerif Mardin, 'Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution', *International Journal of*

on the basis of merit". This conception depicts that the target was the legal-rational model.⁶⁰

Meanwhile, the clash between the political and bureaucratic elites traced back to the making of 1921 Constitution. Despite the fact that liberal surroundings such as notables and big landowners attempted to curb the power of bureaucratic elites, they preferred to remain silent at the last instance.⁶¹ 1950s severed this clash. The bureaucratic elites deemed Kemalism as a type of ideology and they came to be ambitious and ardent advocates of Kemalism, which may be deemed to be a worldview (*Weltanschauung*) in Weberian terms. The bureaucrats did not think that society had the potential to develop itself in stead of that that they preferred continuous struggle to change society in an imposed way from above.⁶²

The political elites opposed to the etatist policies. They expressed the reason for this standpoint that they thought that it was about time capitalist transformation process under the domination of the state were thought over and criticised. They, however, contributed to this state capitalism with the development of State Economic Enterprises in quantity. The bureaucratic elites opposed to these policies of political elites.

This developmental approach had repercussions on the restructuring of bureaucracy in two ways, one of which was the recruitment of bureaucrats of high specialisation and expertise, especially from engineers.⁶³ The second development

Middle East Studies, II, 3, 1971, pp. 197-211

⁶⁰Metin Heper, Atatürk and the Civil Bureaucracy in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, (Landlau ed., Colorado: Westview Press,1984), pp. 89-97

⁶¹Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası 1919-1946* (Ankara: Doğan Yayınları), pp.41-42

⁶² Metin Heper, 'State Democracy and Bureaucracy in Turkey', (Metin Heper ed., *The State and Public Bureaucracies*, New York and London: Greenwood Press, 1987), p,135

⁶³Gencay Şaylan, "Bürokrasi", *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları,1984), vol. II, p. 303

was the reorganisation of public administration on the basis of “regions of service”.⁶⁴ These regional organisations were recruited with new types of bureaucrats who later on broke up with the traditional bureaucrats. The reason was that the political elites tried to pacify bureaucracy in terms of salaries and discouraged people to go through bureaucracy. They showed apathy to the advisory statements of bureaucracy. The last measure was the creation of alternative subsections within bureaucracy. They discriminated those technocratic elites against traditional bureaucratic elites by means of giving higher salaries to them. 1961 Constitution which gave constitutional legality to the bureaucracy in Turkey also established agencies to curb power of political elites such as the establishment of State Planning Organization and the Constitutional Court. In the post 1960s the political elites tried to politicise bureaucracy which was granted large veto powers. The second measure was that they subscribed to negative politics wherein they became less willing and showed less eagerness to participate and sabotaged policies.⁶⁵

This has been a brief account of political development and bureaucratic change till 1980s. Since our scope is the post-1980 stage for public bureaucracy, this chapter has been limited and the post 1980 will be dealt in more details as a separate chapter.

⁶⁴Şeref Gözübüyük, *İdare Hukukuna Giriş*, (Ankara: Turhan Kitapevi, 1995)

⁶⁵Metin Heper, ‘Negative Bureaucratic Politics in a Modernizing Context: The Turkish Case’, *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 1(1977) :65-84

CHAPTER IV: PATRIMONIAL TAINTS OF TURKISH PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY IN THE ÖZAL ERA

4.1. New Right Movement and Patrimonialism in the Public Bureaucracy of the Özal Era⁶⁶ (1983-1993)

This chapter elaborates the patrimonial taints of Turkish public bureaucracy extending from the premiership of Özal in 1983 elections to the death of Turgut Özal in his era of presidency in 1993. The main effort throughout the work is to initially analyze the role of public bureaucracy and perception of public bureaucracy within this certain period of time then to follow this by the interrogation of changes on intra-organisational pillars. Lastly, my study will highlight my findings of the qualitative analysis carried out in the concerning public bureaucracies in question.

The first section evaluates and elaborates on the changes in the bureaucracy within the New Right policies and patrimonialism. The study will also demonstrate the fact that the New Right policies, in pursuit of the re-making of the state, revitalized the lingering taints of patrimonialism on the bureaucracy.⁶⁷ This point of view relies upon the position that New Right policies worsened patrimonial tendencies of public bureaucracy. The essence of this study is rather to put forth the patrimonial figures of public bureaucracy. However, this work will inevitably bear the influence of New Right policies upon bureaucracy.⁶⁸

I would like to mention the role of the state as a prelude figure, the

⁶⁶ I will name the era between 1983 and 1993 as Özal Era. The use of the 'Motherland Party governments' throughout some sections of the work for this era denotes the time period from 1983 to 1991 where MP lost the power to the coalition between the coalition of True Path Party and Social Democrat Populist Party. But Özal era is extending to his presidency which terminates by his passing away in April 1993.

⁶⁷ Birgül Ayman Güler. *Yeni Sağ ve Devletin Değişimi Yapısal Uyarılama Politikaları* (Ankara: Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amne İdaresi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1996), pp. 14-43, pp.43-71.

⁶⁸ Metin Heper and Selçuk Sancar. *The Post 1983 Turkish Bureaucracy: A Patrimonial Rational Productive Model*, a typescript, 1996. The point that these authors make is that all patrimonialism is a result of bureaucratic ruling tradition, however in this work I will evaluate the relation between structural changes bureaucracy and patrimonialism.

transformation process being targeted by the New Right policies. Though this study tries to envisage the attempts to transform public bureaucracy into rational-productive model within Weberian perspective, The New Right policies have evident influence upon transformation of public bureaucracy. This work feels responsible for infringing into the reformation of the term 'state' and the link between the state and public bureaucracy.

First, I will extrapolate this link in relation to the patrimonialism in bureaucracy within the context of Turkey. Özal and the Motherland Party (MP) governments had been the avant-garde figures to apply the New Right policies in Turkey. The very applications within the transformation of bureaucracy will be shedding light on comprehending how 1980s governments in Turkey perceived public bureaucracy.

As a departure point I will summarise the transformation of the remaking of 'state' in the New Right policies. The very approach brought by the New Right policies illuminates the transformation attempts of administrative reforms in a different way.⁶⁹ This is why the term 'state' was redefined in the 1980s in line with the global changes in the world. The prerogatives of the New Right became the main criteria for the reformulation process. The restructuring of the state, also in this sense, denotes the reformation of a new social order.⁷⁰

These superficial headlines require a more complex explanation. However, since the concerning theme is public bureaucracy, this work will confine its limits to the emphasis laid over bureaucracy in the new social transformation.

⁶⁹ Şinasi Aksoy, 'Yeni Sağ ve Kamu Yönetimi', *Kamu Yönetimi Disiplini Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, Vol. II, TODAIE UYBE-TUS Publications, Ankara, 1995.

⁷⁰ Cahit Tutum, *Kamu Yönetiminde Yeniden Yapılanma*. (Ankara: TESAV Publications, 1993)

The previous chapters have intensively dealt with the reform attempts to transform Turkish public bureaucracy into the desired form of pattern. The New Right programs also asserted to change the perception of bureaucracy in a peculiarly different way. That is to say that reform attempts, which have dealt with so called 'administrative reform' have limited themselves to equating this jargon with the amelioration of bureaucratic structure. The New Right replaced the developmental approach by bringing in completely new approach to the perception of the role of bureaucracy. The developmental approach, which equates administrative reform with bureaucracy, was substituted with an overall assault in the pursuit of transformation of the state structure.⁷¹ The New Right's discourse was targeting the change of the complete state. These were labelled as 'transformation of public sector' and 'transformation of state'. One of its most important repercussions was the jargon utilised by the Motherland Party. Turgut Özal was mentioning the transformation program, which they initiated under the overblown name: 'Great Structural Transformation Program.' (*Büyük Yapısal Değişim*)⁷²

Consequently main objective of New Right policies became to change the whole structuring and general jurisdiction areas of the state. The kernel role of bureaucracy in the developmental approaches, within administrative reform programs, deteriorated in the 1980s. Bureaucracy was transforming itself into a sub-system to be minimised like the whole state structure.⁷³ The other half of this overall assault on the state was a societal change in which the state was withdrawing itself from its regulating spheres. The New Right's argumentation was that the state would have to

⁷¹ Gencay Şaylan, 'Bir Yapısal Değişim Sorunu Olarak İdari Reform', *Kemal Fikret Arık'a Armağan*, SBF-TODAIE Joint Publications, Ankara, 1973), pp. 492-514. In fact changes within bureaucracy have got to do with structural changes in the system

⁷² Cahit Tutum, *ibid.*,

⁷³ Gencay Şaylan, *ibid.*

withdraw from spheres in which it intervened. These were being united under the discourse of common interests of conservatism and neo-liberal circles. The state as an overall structure was to be re-made and re-defined.⁷⁴ The neo-liberal argument opposed the extensive role of the state on the economic sphere; meanwhile, the conservative argument remarked its critique on its extensive role in the regulation of private sphere. In this sense the motor engine role of bureaucracy in the remaking of state was de-emphasized.⁷⁵

In this sense, the state was conceived as a regulator, which would in no way intervene in the economic sphere, and maintain itself as an arbitrator. The most important tool to transform the state was bureaucracy in itself. The formulation of the state also means the reformulation of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy was deemed as a burden on the restructuring of state.⁷⁶ The discourse of the New Right movement on the minimisation of the state was set off for this process with the minimisation of bureaucracy. The very reason why bureaucracy was conceived, as a burden was the emphasis laid over such concepts as efficiency and effectiveness. As a source of employment and finance to charge infrastructural development, in the economical sense, bureaucracy was becoming an overload for the whole system. Bureaucracy in this sense would have to be minimised. It would have to stop being a burden on the whole structure.⁷⁷ It meant that minimisation of bureaucracy would inevitably accompany minimisation of state. Here, minimisation of the state becomes enigmatic in that minimisation of state does not actually imply minimisation of state in social

⁷⁴ Birkan Uysal Sezer, 'Büyük Devlet-Küçük Devlet Tartışması' *Amne İdaresi Dergisi*, Vol. 25, issue. 4 (December 1992), pp. 17-20

⁷⁵ Birgül Ayman Güler. *Yeni Sağ ve Devletin Değişimi Yapısal Uyarılama Politikaları* (Ankara: Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amne İdaresi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1996), pp. 14-43

⁷⁶ Birgül Ayman Güler, *ibid.*, and Şinasi Aksoy, *ibid.*

⁷⁷ Mehmet Barlas. *Turgut Özal'ın Anıları* (İstanbul: Sabah Yayıncılık ve Matbaacılık, 2nd edition, 1994), p.285

sphere.⁷⁸

This also has vitally important repercussions on the role of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy became highly critical issue as a pivotal figure to inspire the minimisation of state in its general sense⁷⁹. The transformation of bureaucracy was obstructed by patrimonialism embedded in the structure within this specific era. Attempts to minimise public sector ironically enlarged bureaucracy.

Having examined the New Right, now I will turn my attention to the inner structuring of bureaucracy. The present study will deal with the taints of patrimonialism on the basis of different criteria. These will be the division of work, the presence of job specification and job definition, delegation of authority, appraisal, recruitment processes, and promotion policies applied within public bureaucracy. These elements will be exclusively dealt with the New Right policies and patrimonialism. These intra-organisational elements were influenced by the remaking of public bureaucracy in line with the prerequisites of the New Right policies.

The study will show how the transformation of bureaucracy into rational productive model was blocked by patrimonial taints. These intra organisational criteria will depict the way in which bureaucracy turned into a patrimonially functioning one. The third section will project these insights by means of interviews carried out in the Undersecretariat for the Foreign Trade and State Planning Organization. These interviews which will aid us in the comprehension of patrimonialism inherent in Turkish public bureaucracy, were carried out in 1996 within the relevant organisations. The concerning practical insights will be evaluated

⁷⁸ Noel Sullivan 'The New Right: The Quest for a Civil Philosophy in Europe and America', *The Nature of the Right European and American Politics and Political Thought since 1789* (Roger Eatwell and Noel Sullivan ed., London: Pinter Publications, 1992)

⁷⁹ Donald C. Rowan., *Gelişmiş ve Gelişmekte Olan Ülkelerde Bürokrasilerin Karşılaştırılması- İstatiki Bir Analiz*,(translated into Turkish by Çiçek Refik), (Ankara: State Personnel Administration

in a rather briefly to understand patrimonial taints within bureaucracy. The interviews are methodologically qualitative analyses that were carried out about specification of different themes of bureaucracy.

4.2. New Right and Structural Rearrangements in Public Bureaucracy enlivening Patrimonial Taints

4.2.1. General Outlook at the Transformation of Public Bureaucracy in the pre-1983s Era

This section will deal with the institutional arrangements of the New Right policies within public bureaucracy. These institutional rearrangements for the structural transformation turned out to accelerate and intensify patrimonial taints in public bureaucracy. I will deal with the structural changes in the economy bureaucracy. Public bureaucracy was assuming an absolute control over the economic affairs until the first half of 1980s.⁸⁰ In order to liberalise the setting in the 1980s, for the New Right policies which had already got started in the second half of 1970s, the main target was the economy bureaucracy so that it would enable to transform the societal change desired by the total New Right policies. The New Right Policies cannot be confined to Turgut Özal's era.⁸¹

I will firstly be concerned with the institutional arrangements of these policies. These changes concretized themselves in the 24th of January Economic Decisions in 1980. Actually, the bureaucrats who prepared these programs came to be the leading cadres to apply these policies in the first half of the 1980s. In fact, these applications may be conceived to be the institutionally arrangements for the patrimonialism. These were being facilitated by the fiscal and monetary adjustment accompanied with

Directorate, September 1991).

⁸⁰ Ahmet Evin. 'Bureaucrats in Turkish Politics' *Private View*, 1 (Spring-Summer, 1996) and see also Gencay Şaylan, 'Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Bürokrasisi', *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984), vol. 2, p.303

commercial and foreign currency adjustments.⁸²

The trend until the mid-1970s was the state's support for the development of financial sector and industrialisation.⁸³ Public bureaucracy was realizing the regulation over these sectors. In the second half of 1970s there emerged a shift to the liberalization of the financial sector in order to mobilise domestic resources and to overcome the difficulties faced in getting foreign loans. The political elites initiated a number of structural adjustments to synchronize these regulations to conform to the global economic changes within the sphere of economics.⁸⁴

To realize this, Turkey made stand-by agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) four times, and the governments held up contracts of Sectoral Adjustment Programs five times with the same institution to regulate the transformation of sectoral development such as energy, agriculture, finance, tourism. These rearrangements done with the same global institutions required the remaking of bureaucracy in the same sense.⁸⁵ Here one fact is that these institutional rearrangements didnot happen all of a sudden. There was some kind of economic transformation all over the world making all these institutional arrangements obligatory in peripheral countries such as Turkey.⁸⁶

As well as these changes, there appeared an evitable obligation for the transformation of public bureaucracy. In the beginning of 1980s the institutional arrangements started. The significant arrangement took the form of the creation of an

⁸¹ Birgöl Ayman Güler, op. cit., pp.57-70

⁸² Metin Heper and Selçuk Sancar. *The Post 1983 Turkish Bureaucracy: A Patrimonial Rational Productive Model*, a typescript, 1996

⁸³ Haldun Günalp, *Gelişme Stratejileri ve Gelişme İdeolojileri*, (İstanbul, Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1987)

⁸⁴ Korkut Boratav and Taner Berksoy, *Türkiye'de Kamu Maliyesi, Finansal Yapı ve Politikalar*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Publications, 1993), pp. 119-120

⁸⁵ To elaborate on the structural rearrangements see the Stephen Haggard and Steven B. Webb, *Voting for Reform, Democracy, Political Liberalization, Economic Adjustment*, A World Bank Book,

alternative bureaucracy. The political elites of the time realized that the institutional arrangements that they were in pursuit of could not be carried out with the existing public bureaucracy. Since their aim was to change the economy bureaucracy that would enable economic transformation of economic system, it became a matter of domination of public bureaucracy and substituting it with the new one which would function patrimonially.⁸⁷ The institutional arrangements showed the high remark that these were encouraging the patrimonial taints inherent within the structure.

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)

⁸⁶Korkut Boratav and Taner Berksoy, *op. cit.*, p. 122

⁸⁷Metin Heper and Selçuk Sancar, *ibid.*

4.2.2. Creation of Alternative Bureaucracy and Changes within the Prime Ministry of Özal.

In the beginnings of the 1980s, there was a Coordination Council (*Koordinasyon Kurulu*) set up in order to regulate the balance between imports and exports, and relatedly the balance of wages. The institution established subsequently was the Monetary and Credits Council to determine the fiscal and monetary policies. The duties of the Coordination Council were juxtaposed as determination of basic principles in the import and export policies, providing coordination in foreign economic affairs and also advising the Higher Planning Council (*Yüksek Planlama Kurulu*), need be. On the other hand, the duties of Monetary and Credit Council (*Para ve Kredi Kurulu*) were established to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies, to advise about the subsidiary prices, and to control the balance of wages and to overcome the difficulties envisaged in the distribution of credits and finance.⁸⁸

These developments reflect the point that the state in order to pacify the other traditional bureaucratic posts reacting to these institutional rearrangements tried hard to pacify and to offset the influence of the concerned posts. It is also a repercussional point that New Right's outlook in the economic sphere activated patrimonialism within public bureaucracy. The newly set up organizations superseded the bureaucracy's traditional functioning, which was interrupted by a number of ways. The first tactic was depriving the right to regulate several affairs in their jurisdiction areas. The second was creating a dual or an alternative organization area which would supersede the traditional bureaucracy's roles.⁸⁹

⁸⁸Kamu Yönetimi Araştırması, *Mali ve Ekonomik Kuruluşlar Araştırma Grubu Raporu*, TODAİE Publications Number: 248, (Ankara, 1992), p. 192 and from the same research page 112

⁸⁹In fact these structural rearrangements were being supported by the business circles especially

In fact, the institutional rearrangements in the 1980s infringed upon original jurisdiction areas of traditional bureaucracy. These things in question became some form of barricading in the fulfillment of their services. One other dimension of the patrimonial taints within the bureaucracy was that these alternative organizations were led up by political figures. There was a great deal of politicization of cadres within bureaucracy. The head of the organizations became politicians. The political elites went beyond this politicization to the extent that they formed an inner cabinet at the apex of bureaucracy over which they could assume an absolute control. The zone of movement for traditional bureaucracy was being confined more and more⁹⁰.

These development which took place in early 1980s meant an absolute break of the bureaucratic chain. Motherland Party's governments abused jurisdiction areas of traditional bureaucracy. The elements of traditional bureaucracy were not being permitted to participate in the application of policies. This has been a short account of how the structural adjustment programs were asserted.

I will now present developments within Özal era commencing with the first elections held up in 1983.

by TÜSİAD (Association of Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists), it is of high note that there was great deal laudatory announcement in the formal periodical of this institution. In this paper, they appreciated these efforts and supported them by heart, TÜSİAD, *Kamu Yönetimi Bürokrasisi*, TÜSİAD Publications, T/83.10.78. (İstanbul, October 1983), p. 45

⁹⁰Birgül Ayman Güler, op. cit., p.61

4.2.3. Prime Ministry of Özal (1983-1989)

The institutional arrangements initiated pre-1983 got permanent in the post-1983 era which signified the power of MP. Many of the jurisdiction areas of Monetary and Credits Council were enlarged by the MP government in contrast to the confinement of the jurisdiction areas of the High Coordination Council which once used to have an overwhelming influence over economy bureaucracy. Many of the jurisdiction areas and powers of such institutions were transferred to the newly developed alternative bureaucratic organizations.

It was an important strategy that political power to adjust to the New Right Policies transferred so many spheres of jurisdiction to the alternative bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the political elites kept an absolute control over these alternative institutions. The most distinct new created alternative bureaucratic agency was the Undersecretariat for the Foreign Trade and the Treasury. (UFTT) (*Hazine Dış Ticaret Müstesarlığı*) It appropriated authority already granted to the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Industry.⁹¹ The creation of the UFTT was an important reflection of the policies for the activation of patrimonial tendencies in the bureaucracy.

It was also of high note that UFTT was directly connected to the prime ministry. Under the leadership of Özal the top figures of MP were so indulgent and industrious in this process that transformation all over bureaucracy became very swift. The complete alternative bureaucracy was under the personal control of the political power, namely the Prime Minister. One could easily observe the deterioration of

⁹¹This institution was established with the DFL Number: 118, dated with December 12th, 1983 and legislation numbered 3274 and Birgül Ayman Güler, op. cit., pp. 61-62

power granted to the State Planning Organization. (SPO) (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*)

The acceleration of the omnipotence of patrimonialism, and the revitalization of this tendency gave to the way that the newly created organisations superseded etatist (conceived to be so) traditional bureaucratic posts. These circles were being conceived etatist and conservative in their tune. The MP cadres considered the posts of traditional bureaucracy as those that curbed transformation within bureaucracy and were likely to sabotage the process.⁹² There was some kind of regulation and control system created by the political elites in order to sustain the rearrangements within organization of bureaucracy. A process of revitalization of patrimonialism emerged whereby the whim of political elites became evident and dominant. There were even advisory statements of the World Bank about the sine quo non-elimination of influence of traditional bureaucratic posts. The World Bank also wanted these cadres to accelerate the process of rearrangement of bureaucratic organization. However there still remained the question of the leadership of these alternative organisations. By whom these organisations would be led was an important question.⁹³

The 'imported' princes who were interestingly young and American educated would lead the newly created organisations. Preferably these new paramount figures should have worked in the prominent international financial centres such as IMF; World Bank, United Nations concerned units in United States of America.⁹⁴

The second dimension of institutional arrangements was the use of funds directly by the ministry. In the modern sense relating to nation states one of the most

⁹²For the quasi formulations, see Metin Heper 'The State and De-bureaucratization: The Case of Turkey', *International Social Science Journal*, 126 (November 1990), pp. 605-615

⁹³Metin Heper and Selçuk Sancar. *The Post 1983 Turkish Bureaucracy: A Patrimonial Rational Productive Model*, a typescript, 1996 and see also the, Ahmet Evin. 'Bureaucrats in Turkish Politics' *Private View*, 1 (Spring-Summer, 1996)

⁹⁴Birgül Ayman Güler, op. cit., p.61

important duties of the public bureaucracy is the efficient use of public resources.⁹⁵ In this era a fund system was created and these funds were directly used by these new institutions of bureaucracy under the incentive of the Prime Minister. The budgetary concerns were given to the Prime Minister, offsetting the concerned agencies such as the Ministry of Finance and High Coordination Council⁹⁶. The MP saw the budgetary process as an obstacle to the reforms that they were trying to carry out. The influence of concerned agencies superseded traditional bureaucracy's powers in these budgetary concerns by means of funds.

One of the researches done on the use of funds by alternative bureaucracy was asserting the fact that the funds used by the MP governments were not subject to judicial review. The alternative bureaucracy could handle these funds rather easily and under the incentive of the Prime Minister.⁹⁷

4.2.4. Legal Basis of Structural Arrangement within Public Bureaucracy

One may wonder how these structural arrangements were arranged and on what legal basis. The legal bases of these structural arrangements were not realised and legitimated on the basis of laws and the other necessary legislations. The political elites of the time rather preferred to pass decrees in the force of law (*Kanun Hükmünde Kararname*) (DFL). Actually political elites in the concerned era deemed decrees in the force of law as practical means that they could legitimate these structural arrangements within public bureaucracy. Legislating a decree in the force of law was referring to the rationale that political elites would not bother themselves with

⁹⁵Kamu Yönetimi Araştırması- *Mali ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Grubu Raporu* and Boratav and Berksoy, *ibid.*, p. 123

⁹⁶ Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, *1980'den 1990'a kadar Makro Ekonomik Politikalar: Türkiye Ekonomisindeki Gelişmelerin Analizleri ve Bazı Değerlendirmeler* (Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Basın ve Yayın Birimi, 1990), p. 35

⁹⁷Kamu Yönetimi Araştırması- *Mali ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Grubu Raporu*, p.139

drawbacks in passing legislation. These drawbacks would be the negative politics utilised by the bureaucratic elites. The constitution granted this right to pass decrees in the force of law on the condition that this practice would be utilised in the emergency matters.⁹⁸ On of the researches carried over this era puts forth the fact that there were 91DFLs passed in 1983,46 DFLs passed in 1984 in comparison to the interval between 1972-1978 which witnessed only 17 DFLs passing.⁹⁹

I will also elaborate on the scopes of these DFLs. The scope of DFLs is studied over three fields of rearrangement within public bureaucracy. The first was the institutional rearrangement within all public bureaucracy. The second theme of DFLs scope was personnel administration regime. The third point was the rearrangement of administrative practices within public bureaucracy. As soon as MP governments came to the power, they started to apply these changes by reorganisation of public bureaucracy and re-arrangement of public personnel regime.¹⁰⁰ In February 1984, the MP government passed a DFL unifying all regulations of administrative practices. These practices were also reflected into the local administrations in the very way leading to the establishment of Metropolitan Municipality Administration¹⁰¹

I will derive two concluding remarks on the legal basis of these structural rearrangements. The first high note is that there was not a total approach brought by the political power in grasping the rearrangement of public bureaucracy. The Motherland Party remised preparing the legal basis of these structural rearrangements. That is to say that they encouraged enlivening the patrimonial taints in the public bureaucracy. The use of DFLs in the very legitimisation of these structural

⁹⁸Birgöl Ayman Güler, op. cit., p.63

⁹⁹Ministry of Finance, *Decrees in the force of law*, Vol: 3, (Ankara: 1990), p. 16.

¹⁰⁰Birgöl Ayman Güler, op. cit., p.63

¹⁰¹Kamu Yönetimi Uzmanları Derneği, *Kamu Yönetiminde Yeniden Düzenlenme*, Publication Number:1, (Ankara: February,1993)

rearrangements was an important factor that disturbed the harmonious functioning of public bureaucracy. The resultant of all these arrangements was what some authors say the *dual bureaucracy* or the *alternative bureaucracy* interchangeably. The second derived conclusion may be the dissolution of present bureaucracy. In this process rather than emphasising and reinforcement the legality element in Turkish public bureaucracy, to turn the bureaucracy into the model of rational productive model, they superseded the legality dimension. This process was curbed by potential patrimonialism within the public bureaucracy.

4.2.5. Politicization of Public Bureaucracy

The political power tried to politicise public bureaucracy by means of miscellaneous ways. The MP governments considered bureaucracy as some kind of institution completely servile to the political power. What they firstly tried to carry out was the over politicization of bureaucratic cadres. The cadres within the MP were consolidated within the public bureaucracy. Since the Motherland Party was not a party involving single tendency, different segments of bureaucracy were shared among the different tendencies of Motherland Party. Especially there was a great deal of dispute in the consolidation of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*) cadres and former Nationalist Salvation Party (NSP) (*Milli Selamet Partisi*) cadres. The target institutions were the State Planning Organization, (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*) Turkish Radio Television Broadcasting Corporation (*TRT-Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu*) and Ministry of National Education, (*MEB-Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı*). The other fields, that such kinds of patrimonial figures tainted, were the administrative units engaged in the recruitment of sub-governors and the other administrative posts. The preference was surely favourable for the cadres

mentioned.¹⁰²

The cadres being recruited into the economy bureaucracy were from the stereotypical bureaucrats of economy bureaucracy in Turkey of 1980s. These young bureaucrats were mostly liberal and more contemporary figures than the ones recruited into the other side of public bureaucracy such as TRT and MEB. In fact the cadres at the economic liberalization were oriented to give a more contemporary outlook rather than the cadres at the other segments of public bureaucracy renowned for its over-tuned conservative nationalist tendencies. More liberal oriented people were selected to give the impression that they were the fitting stereotypes into these ranks. The cadres of ultra-nationalists and militants of nationalist conservatives were dominating the other side of bureaucracy in the 1980s. This dual situation between present administration in the economy bureaucracy and other sections of public bureaucracy was signifying the heyday of patrimonialism in Turkish public bureaucracy. The monopoly of patrimonialism dominating the bureaucracy was being held by the conservative nationalist surroundings.¹⁰³

The New Right policies were based upon the classical liberalism in its basic sense. But the thing was that the New Right policies were not in its total reflected to the administrative system. Given the fact that there was a great deal of politicization of public bureaucracy, one could easily observe over blending of patrimonialism. This over blend of patrimonialism within Özal era gave some kind of idea that the bureaucracy lost its *raison d'être*. The policies to realise general interest did not mean anything to bureaucracy. It was because of the fact that bureaucracy became a simple tool in which many groups struggled for power and cadrization.

¹⁰²Metin Heper ' The State and De-bureaucratization: The Case of Turkey', *International Social Science Journal*, 126 (November 1990), pp. 605-615

4.2.6. Domination of A Single Individual within Turkish Public Bureaucracy

There was the domination of a single person in the public bureaucracy in this era. The leading cadre of the Motherland Party became influential in this era. This development was subsequented by centralisation of Turkish public bureaucracy. There were two dominant tendencies within Turkish public bureaucracy. The first one was the dominance of a single individual figure. The second one was the centralisation of power vested in one person. Actually one of the things that facilitated these developments was the overemphasis put on the executive means by 1982 Constitution. One of the basic underlying philosophies of 1982 Constitution was targeting the reorganisation of the administrative system in this Centralized manner implicitly. All the powers granted to public bureaucracy were delegated to the top names in bureaucracy.¹⁰⁴

One fitting example might be given to the incident that administrations of State Economic Enterprises were given to the Higher Planning Council and the managers of these institutions. Some scholars put forth the fact that ‘the tendencies to centralise Turkish public bureaucracy approximated itself to the hegemony of personality within bureaucratic structure’. The main pillars of bureaucracy formality, institution, rules and regulations, administrative discretion, public good, merit career were all neglected and remised’ Having neglected all these pillars, the structural rearrangements of the New Right policies reinforced and activated patrimonialism inherent¹⁰⁵.

4.2.7. Global Support for the Structural Rearrangements within Turkish Public

¹⁰³Birgöl Ayman Güler, op. cit., p.65

¹⁰⁴Sit Grand, ‘İktidar ve Kamu Yönetimi Bağlamında İdarede Merkezileşme Olgusu’, *Amne İdaresi Dergisi*, Vol:22, p. 4, (December, 1989), p.17

¹⁰⁵Birgöl Ayman Güler, op. cit., p.65

Bureaucracy

Global financial centres such as the World Bank supported the initiation of structural rearrangements within public bureaucracy. The World Bank continually asserted that ‘The reformers have got to curb the power of bureaucracy.’ On the other hand, the World Bank was renouncing the reformers to carry out these structural rearrangements with a great deal of determinism. There were master programs prepared by these global financial institutions about the privatization schemes and related administrative reforms continuously. These programs were prepared in order to get Turkey’s administrative system perfectly adapted to the global structural rearrangements.¹⁰⁶

4.2.8. Presidency of Özal

One other dimension of these structural gained an another important dimension when Turgut Özal became the president in 1989. Özal wanted to keep an absolute eye on the public bureaucracy. The jurisdiction areas of the alternative bureaucracy were delegated to the state ministries. It was because of the fact that Özal could influence these figures having the title of state ministers. In stead of relegating these powers of alternative bureaucracy to those institutions, which these already belonged to, Özal delegated these powers to the state ministries. State Economic Enterprises were given to the jurisdiction area of state ministries. The influence of single individual figures maintained in the form of former-prime minister and newly president control. State Ministries jurisdiction occupied importance on the basis that distribution of state ministries was based upon the whim of politicians. In fact, the rise

¹⁰⁶Stephen Haggard and Steven B. Webb, *Voting for Reform, Democracy, Political Liberalization, Economic Adjustment*, A World Bank Book, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.15 and also for such kinds of prescription the Leila Frischtak and İzak Atiyas ed. *Governance, Leadership, and Communication: Building Constituencies for Economic Reform* (Washington DC. :The

of number of state ministries was important in order to be able to depict rise of patrimonialism in this era. This kind of approach also gave way to a great deal of flexibilization within bureaucratic posts and offsetting power of traditional bureaucracy in the era of presidency of Özal.¹⁰⁷

I have demonstrated the changes within public bureaucracy that took place within the context of structural arrangements in Özal Era. The main point that the study wants to make out is that these structural rearrangements carried out fevered potential patrimonial taints embedded in Turkish public bureaucracy. The dissolution process which already started at the bureaucracy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and economy bureaucracy spreaded other segments of public bureaucracy¹⁰⁸. To which extent the rise of patrimonialism was deliberately supported is vague. It was rather an unwanted outcome, which brought about disruption of bureaucracy. The newly created alternative bureaucracy completely superseded the traditional bureaucracy's powers.

What the study tries to discover is not the patrimonial taints in its purest sense but patrimonial tendencies that curbed the transformation to a rational-productive model type of bureaucracy. Meanwhile, rational productive model type of bureaucracy in this study's sense is an exact fitting model to the New Right's structural arrangements into the administrative system.

4.3. Evaluation of the Main Pillars of Turkish Public Bureaucracy in Özal Era in the Context of Patrimonialism

The structural rearrangements within bureaucracy itself also reflected

World Bank, 1996), p.304

¹⁰⁷Sit Grand, *ibid.*, p.19 and see also the Tacettin Karaer, '12 Eylül ve Türk Kamu Yönetiminin Yeniden Düzenlenmesi', *Amne İdaresi Dergisi*, Vol:23, Issue:2, (September, 1987), pp. 29-54 and 'Türk Kamu Yönetiminde Devlet Bakanlığı Sorunu', *Amne İdaresi Dergisi*, Vol:23, Issue: 2, (June, 1990), pp.44-74

¹⁰⁸Burcu Bostanoğlu, 'Dışişleri Bakanlığının Uluslararası Politik Sistemdeki Değişime Uyum Sorunu', *Amne İdaresi Dergisi*, vol:23, issue:1, (March,1990), pp. 39-47

themselves onto the main pillars of public bureaucracy. The main pillars that this study will be covering upon are rules and regulations, irrevocability of bureaucracy, public good, delegation of authority, administrative discretion, social security, and also the legality of bureaucratic administration. These changes were oriented to the minimisation of public bureaucracy. Consequently, the oriented structure was completely a new one to transform and regulate the structural rearrangement. The target modeling for public bureaucracy was the rational productive model. Since the rational productive model is highly based upon the development and maturation of the legal rational model, the efforts to transform public bureaucracy did not appear to be working perfectly. As it can be seen in the Turkish context, the legal side of public bureaucracy was not strong enough to be able to yield up to rational productive model. The very reason weakening the legal side was patrimonialism embedded in the structure of bureaucracy.

On the other hand, Turkish public bureaucracy was overemphasising instrumental rationality, which meant that bureaucracy was overemphasising the means, rather the ends. The political elites tried to pacify the bureaucratic elites on the reason that they were becoming more and more instrumental rationaled especially, after 1950s. In fact, the structural rearrangements that one could observe were orienting the final shot on bureaucratic elites¹⁰⁹. Since these reformative and reformulative attempts in the Özal era were emphasising on ‘getting things done’ (in Özal’s terminology: ‘*işbitiricilik*’¹¹⁰), the substantive rationality was the type of rationality in which the public bureaucracy was supposed to function¹¹¹. This finding

¹⁰⁹Metin Heper, ‘The State, Democracy and Bureaucracy in Turkey’, the State and Public bureaucracies, (Metin Heper ed., New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), p.29

¹¹⁰Mehmet Barlas, *ibid.*

¹¹¹Metin Heper and Selçuk Sancar, *ibid.*

may be backed up by the finding that as soon the MP came to power, they immediately passed a number of decrees in the force of law to change the basic pillars of public bureaucracy.¹¹² The very creation of alternative bureaucracy was an evidence of this substantial rationality on the commonly held reason that the MP governments could not keep up with the present public bureaucracy. However one point lacking at these applications was that they were neglecting preparation of all exclusive legislations on which these structural rearrangements could be legitimised. The legality of public bureaucracy was already being disrupted in order to provide and sustain the circumstances in which alternative bureaucracy could develop itself. At this point, patrimonial practices were pioneering to dominate public bureaucracy. Although the political elites in 1980s at the time faced up obstacles put by the decisions of the Constitutional Court, they were making use of loopholes in the legislations.

Having asserted this precluding information, the intra-organisational pillars of public bureaucracy need to be elaborated over. My aim is to project these patrimonial taints in bureaucracy within these micro units.

4.3.1. Division of Work

The division of work within Turkish public bureaucracy was not a clearly defined one. There were many loopholes within the definition of the work. As a historical legacy of the bureaucratic ruling tradition, the principle of division of work was not resting upon very strong tenets¹¹³. The concerning subpillars of job specification and job definition were mostly underestimated terms. Despite the fact that the reform attempts within Turkish public bureaucracy tried to assert a number of

¹¹²Birgöl Ayman Güler, op. cit., p.64

¹¹³Metin Heper, *Türk Kamu Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme: Siyaset Sosyolojisi*

proposals to redefine these terms, they were not yielding. The fact to be stated is that before 1980s job definitions and term were pretty vague, though they seemed to be all-exclusive. There were continuous and constantly emerging loopholes regarding the job specification and job definitions. The MP was abused these loopholes. The definitions and job specifications were made more and more flexible and subjected to continuous changes. Given the fact that there were no strict job specification and definition, many people were recruited into the bureaucratic posts regardless of their qualifications, because of the cadrization inherent in the MP. This flexibility within the practices of job specification and job definition eased the attempts of cadrization of the Motherland Part in the concerned agencies.

The job definitions and job specifications were not explicitly stated. The terms were applied as if sustained in the air. On the other hand, job definitions and job specifications were based upon an enlargement of the criteria put by political power, which was able to sustain the overwhelming cadrization in line with the attempts to concentration the target units of public bureaucracy. There were great turnovers in the bureaucracy which were realised by this overwhelming flexibilization.

However the job definitions and job specification were important in the very selection of the cadres present in the economy bureaucracy. The criteria were put in order to create the milieu to direct the transformational rearrangements in bureaucracy. The cadres' recruitment into the economy bureaucracy was being processed to which extent these cadres were indulgent and industrious in the fulfillment of these rearrangements. Especially in the Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade and Treasury, the job definitions had to be all-exclusive. Because extensive knowledge and information in political science were required of the cadres who meant to realise structural

rearrangements. Moreover, these cadres were given an intensive inner house education by means of master and doctoral programs in the American universities.

The very remaking of economy bureaucracy also signified an other radical change. The changes in the knowledge and skills necessary for the posts of economy bureaucracy were changing the stereotype bureaucrats¹¹⁴. Bias towards the graduates of Ankara University Department of Political Science and Public Administration known as *Mülkiye* shifted to those of universities having an Anglo-Saxon type of education such as Middle East Technical University (METU) (*Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi*) and Bosphorous University (*Boğaziçi Üniversitesi*). That was also targeting some aiming to break the chain of domination held up over bureaucracy by *Mülkiye*.

On the other hand, in the other sections of public bureaucracy there was a great deal of flexibilization in both the job definitions and job specifications. The political power flexibilized these terms in order to create the atmosphere for cadrization. Non existence of job specifications and job definitions gave way to the resultant political power used patronage to fill these cadres in order to distribute the tendencies within the Motherland Party¹¹⁵. Sections of bureaucracy, other than those of economy, were chosen to be flexibilized in terms of job definitions and job specifications. This was because of the fact that these segments of public bureaucracy were not demanding too many sophisticated qualifications. Since the cadres of the Motherland Party wanted to back up the cadres at these other segments with substantial rationality, they emphasized personality rather than impersonality in the selection of cadres in the other segments of bureaucracy. The very transformation that the Motherland Party was

¹¹⁴Nilüfer Göle, *Mühendisler ve İdeoloji: Öncü Devrimden Yenilikçi Seçkinlere*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1986), and p.86 ff.

pursuing, in the direction of rational productive model was curbed by means of complete ambiguity in the job specifications and job definitions. The political power had a dual point of view. In the economy bureaucracy, more exclusive definitions were brought to sustain the recruitment of the cadres needed to manage the structural rearrangements, whereas in the other segments of public bureaucracy they sought to flexibilize the other posts.

In what follows, I will deal with the impersonality of the public bureaucracy highlighting in what sense the bureaucratic experiences were carried out in accordance with legal bases and what kind of criteria were sought to provide the legal side of public bureaucracy.

4.3.2. Impersonality of the Public Bureaucracy Between 1983 and 1993

In the Özal era, the political power sought to decrease the impersonal order within public bureaucracy. Impersonality was de-emphasized to sustain the structural rearrangements in the bureaucracy. The very reflection of this personal order was due to the dominance of the political power over bureaucracy. The impersonality had several dimensions.

The first dimension was the unclarity of the legal bases of regulations. The legislation, to provide the legal background, was ignored. The fact that legal base of the structural rearrangements was de-emphasized, gave way to the domination of public bureaucracy by the cadres of the Motherland Party. This is not to say that, there were no legal bases for the structural rearrangements but that they abused the essence of legal bases by infringing upon the essence of decrees in the force of law. In fact most of the DFLs were in accordance with the spirit of the 1982 Constitution. The implicit underlying philosophy was that they were demanding the bureaucracy to be

¹¹⁵ *Kamu Yönetimi Araştırması Genel Rapor*, TODAİE, Ankara 1991

dominated by substantial rationality. Most of the administrative applications were declared invalid by the Constitutional Court.¹¹⁶ Despite this happening, the political power proceeded very confidently.

The intra-organisational dimensions were carried out without subscribing to the laws. The first pillar was the merit principle. In this era, the very principle of merit was de-emphasized in favour of the technocratic skills. The underlying pillar of this philosophy was the rational productive model emphasising the substantive rationality in the targeting of getting things done in the desired direction by political power. The concrete example was the import of “princes” to the economy bureaucracy. There were bureaucrats consolidated in the economy bureaucracy who would act with the letter of the Motherland Party.

The merit dimension was also de-emphasized at the other segments of public bureaucracy. The cadres of the Motherland Party tried to pacify the people deserving to be promoted and bring the people who would work harmoniously with them. My point is not judgmental but I think that what the bureaucratic applications were lacking were the impersonality and the dominance of legal means in these intra-organisational criteria.

4.3.3. Application of Merit Principle and Promotion Systems

In line with the patrimonial situation within the bureaucratic system, the bureaucracy suffered from the abuse of merit principle. The point was that the criteria to be considered were not important in the application of merit principle, because merit principle was barricading the applications of these structural rearrangements.

The promotion policies also suffered these policies on the basis that whim of the political power emerged to promote the cadres in line with their ideology and

¹¹⁶Tacettin Karaer, *ibid.*

outlook of the outlook of Motherland Party. The promotion policies were really applied on the behalf of these benign cadres in line of the policies, applied by the Motherland Party. Especially those Motherland Party cadres in the economy bureaucracy were supported in terms of the power that they held up. On the other hand, they were increasingly reinforced in also terms of the financial means that they got. More financial incentives were given to those of UFTT bureaucrats and the environment of economy in which bureaucrats were working was made more competitive. These applications also aided in the creation of a difference between the posts of traditional bureaucracy and economy bureaucracy. On the other hand, the other agencies of public bureaucracy were pacified and given less financial incentives. On the other hand, many of the jurisdiction areas that they were holding were transferred to the new agencies of the alternative bureaucracy. The most important of these was the transfer of the powers held by the SPO to the UFTT.

4.3.4. Recruitment Process and Appraisal Process

The preference of the Motherland Party dominated by the single individual figure of Özal in the recruitment of bureaucrats reflected itself in the economy bureaucracy. They preferred to recruit bureaucrats on the basis of the technocratic skills held by the incumbents. As already been put forth, mostly graduates of METU and the similar universities were preferred. In fact Özal blamed the graduates of Mülkiye on the basis that they were more and more instrumentally rationaled. The graduates of Mülkiye emphasized idealistic approaches to the making of bureaucracy/ Özal's point was that these structural rearrangements could not proceed with the existing cadres of the *Mülkiye*. These cadres would have to be substituted by the cadres having more technocratic skills, educated in the technical universities. The preferred cadres would be engineers who would facilitate the social engineering

especially by the restructuring policies¹¹⁷. The qualifying examinations were based upon the testing of these technocratic skills.

On the other hand, patronage became an important factor determining who would be recruited into bureaucracy in other segments of bureaucracy. Although the job notifications were supposed to be publicly, jobs were only advertised in limited circles chosen by the political power.

The appraisal methods were not all exclusive. They were rather based upon the whim of political power. The ones who were working in the economy bureaucracy were given more emphasis on the process of economy bureaucracy. More methods were involved in line with the development of their technocratic skills than the traditional bureaucracy in the traditional sense. The technocratic skills were developed with the inner-house education programs (*Hizmetiçi Eğitim Programı*). Patronage dominated the other sphere of bureaucracy. Since the ultimate objective was the cadrization of the MP, they did not feel the necessity to develop the techniques of the appraisal process. The main criterion became the whim of the superior unit.¹¹⁸

4.3.5. Remaking of the Public Personnel Administration

The remaking of the public personnel administration was significant in the consolidation of the patronage system in the rearrangement of the public personnel administration. There were three important assaults on the three pillars of the public personnel administration. The first was the promotion policies; the second one was the wage system and the type of employment.¹¹⁹

The remaking of the public personnel administration involves the promotion

¹¹⁷Nilüfer Göle, *ibid.*, p.86 ff.

¹¹⁸Sit Grand, 'İktidar ve Kamu Yönetimi Bağlamında İdarede Merkezileşme Olgusu', *Amne İdaresi Dergisi*, Vol:22, p. 4, (December, 1989), p.19

¹¹⁹Birgül Ayman Güler, *op. cit.*, p.65

policies pursued by the structural rearrangements. The first radical change was the promotion of a bureaucrat by three levels through a single appraisal. This flexibilization also superseded the cadres' confidence of their promotion and offset secure promotion policies. This is to say that a bureaucrat was promoted by three steps in the personnel system. It was a simple tool to offset the cadres not wanted by the MP governments.

The second point on the public personnel was the wage system. The differentiation in the wage system had upset all of the wage systems. There after all was a great deal of imbalance within the bureaucratic posts doing similar things. This application has also eroded impartial side of bureaucracy on the basis of wage system. These applications were supported and legitimized by the laws in the force of decree. The unequal distribution was legitimated with substantial rationality gotten in terms of effectiveness. One such DFL was annulled by the Constitutional Court on the ground that the reasons for this legislation did not come out to be reliable. Despite the attempts to pass a legislation that would grant more responsibilities to the government, The Constitutional Court again annulled the legislation. The Constitutional Court annulled this legislation, because matters regarding the personnel matters could not be evaluated within the frameworks of mentality of effectiveness.¹²⁰

Although there were a large of number of attempts for legislation for the reconstruction of the personnel system, The Constitutional Court became the institution curbing the process. The MP governments tried to reorganise the personnel administration by means of DFLs. In fact these attempts of DFLs tried to disintegrate the total public personnel administration.

¹²⁰*Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararları*, (Ankara:TODAİE Publications, 1995)

One other tactic was the spread of the contractual personnel application in the employment into the public bureaucracy. The application of the contractual personnel was aimed to ease the privatisation process of the State Economic Enterprises. Actually, the contractual personnel already had already existed in the jurisdiction of the personnel administration of public bureaucracy. However, the legislation passed in 1984 made the contractual personnel status in the employment of bureaucrats a separate entity of status¹²¹. The very underlying target was offsetting the obstacles on the way to the privatisation. The second target was the minimisation of the cadres of civil servants, and secondly the cadres of the labourers.¹²²

In fact this goes in line with the minimisation of the state. This is to say that public bureaucracy was to be minimised in line with prerequisites of the era. But the very way to actualise these changes was not based on the impersonality. Political whim was regulating the total process under the leadership of the Motherland Party.

There in fact appears a point whether the very rational productive model goes hand in hand with the minimisation of the state. My answer through in this work is that it does go concurrently with the rational productive model.

On the other hand the jurisdiction area held up by the Ministry of Finance in the wage system was directly connected to the jurisdiction area of the Prime Ministry. One other finding is the deterioration of the social security system by means of the remaking of the personnel status system. The Motherland Party encouraged the remaking of these statuses. They in this sense did not want to envisage a social opposition on the behalf of worker unions. In the DFLs they were explicitly stating that the state was becoming the paragon figure to renew the contract of personnel not

¹²¹Maliye ve Gümrük Bakanlığı, *Kanun Hükmünde Karanamerler*, Vol:3, Ankara, 1990

¹²²Birgül Ayman Güler, op. cit., p.66-67

much giving much chance to the other parties such as the workers unions and personnel. The New Right mentality in this sense is clear that it doesn't want to bother itself with such sorts of social opposition in the forms of syndicates, social pressure groups. Given the strength of the state structure in Turkey, the arrangements, which were dealt patrimonially, would offset the barricades, which would possibly curb the overall minimisation of the state. On the other hand the patrimonial rearrangements confronted the Constitutional Court. However one concluding remark is that all these rearrangements gave a way to the total disruption of the system.

These findings on the remaking of the public personnel show the heyday of patrimonial activities in line of the mentality of the Motherland Party. I have tried in this section to delineate the highlighting changes within public bureaucracy on the ground of intra organisational criteria. The following section will analyze these findings with the points made by bureaucrats interviewed in the SPO and UFTT.

4.3.6. Irrevocability of Administrative Posts and Administrative Discretion

In this era one of the basic pillars of bureaucracy, irrevocability was disrupted. The Motherland Party cadres created a great deal of disruption and caused overwhelmingly high turnover rates in the bureaucracy. Actually within bureaucracy, when one application disrupts the promotion and connected schemes, the other parts are easily disrupted. The bureaucrats were appointed to the posts that had nothing to do with the qualifications.

The administrative discretion was not practiced in the way that the rational productive model required to. Meanwhile, the intimate atmosphere wanted to be brought by the rational productive model was abused and the discretionary power was only granted to those who had parallel points of view with the Motherland Party. The Motherland Party cadres just delegated the authority to sign to the other cadres in

public bureaucracy. But the tutelage powers were granted to the bureaucrats who were working harmoniously with the political power.¹²³

¹²³Kamu Yönetiminin Yeniden Düzenlenmesi, *Kamu Kuruluşları İstihdam Politikası- Kamu Personeli Problemleri Yön Eylem Araştırması*, (with the courtesy of Mr. Yaman Şahin) (Bureaucrat's copy), 1982.

CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION

5.1 Practical Insights into the Public Bureaucracy about the Related Era

In the present section, I will present the results of the qualitative analysis carried out in the State Planning Organization and the Undersecretariat for the Foreign Trade and Treasury to inquire about patrimonial taints. The themes in the study are the authority dimension and the merit dimension, which were asserted by a number of scholars who already studied on the issue¹²⁴. I have added the dimension of their perception of bureaucracy. The fourth dimension, are the personal views on bureaucracy's autonomy

5.1.1. Methodology of the Study

The tool that I have used is the qualitative analysis. This tool enabled to get more insights about the bureaucrats' opinions about the concerned era in question to minimise the red tape concerning getting permissions. To confess the reality, for this study bureaucrats were found patrimonially by means of liaisons in the SPO and UFTT. One other point is also regarding the stereotype of bureaucrats in the concerned agencies. The State planning Organization recruits more graduates of Mülkiye and The Undersecretariat recruits those from the universities having more competitive environments and having technocratic skills.

5.1.2. General Elaboration on the Study

Most of the interviewees put the point that the MP government first tried to offset the State Planning Organization by means of main pillars of rational productive model of bureaucracy. They tried to establish system of domination of people who had

¹²⁴Metin Heper, *Türk Kamu Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme: Siyaset Sosyolojisi Açısından Bir İnceleme*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1977)

more technocratic skills rather than the ones who had more merit. In fact, the relations between superior and subordinate were de-formalized. The intimacy that the rational productive model intended to create was put into such a form that they wanted to establish a system of patrimonialism and patronage within the public bureaucracy. But according to the statements of bureaucrats in the SPO, the establishment of such a system did not work in the SPO rather these were the main pillars consolidated in the new structuring of the Secretariat. In fact, the bureaucrats in the Undersecretariat were happy with this environment of intimate despite the abuse of this to de-formalise the context of public bureaucracy. The administrative discretion, which is different from the authority to sign, is delegated to those who have more technocratic skills rather than those with merit. Especially in the State Planning Organization, in the name of the rational productive model, the administrative discretion was granted to those bureaucrats who were working more harmoniously with the Motherland Party. The bureaucrats in the Undersecretariat did not mention about such conflict in the concerned organization. It is because of the fact that the very formation of this institution was recruited with the stereotypical bureaucrats to work with Motherland Party's governments more properly. On the other hand, within public bureaucracy, the rational productive model's autonomy given to the line units was a disturbing factor for the ones in the SPO. In contrast to the SPO, the Undersecretariat's bureaucrats saw it as very normal concern for the sake of functioning of bureaucracy.

The bureaucrats also opposed the extreme dimension of merit that when the superior doesn't have to be involved for the simple activities. Actually what the bureaucrats in the SPO asserted that the very applications within public bureaucracy caused only disruption. Actually the Motherland Party abused dimensions of rational productive model. They made use of these dimension for the sake of cadrization in the

relevant agencies. But the bureaucrats in the Treasury deemed this incident as extraordinary happening. There were such kinds of approaches to themes of bureaucracy. Compared to those of the SPO in their evaluation about Özal's era the bureaucrats in the UFTT were more conformist

In the following theme, I will highlight the merit dimension, The first point made by the rational productive model is that although any superior uses novel techniques, and even if he fails, the official can not be held responsible for this thing. At the merit dimension this was rarely practiced. It is one of the characteristics of the public bureaucracy that it absolutely wanted to keep an eye on the bureaucracy. Although this principle was wanted to be used, the bureaucracy used regulation system over the bureaucracy.

In fact within this era the bureaucrats elaborated repercussions of an another principle. This was the principle stating that political power could employ anybody they thought appropriate. These may be concretized by the paragon names of the Undersecretariat. The bureaucrats in the SPO seemed to have been complaining about these bureaucrats. In fact the SPO bureaucrats stated that this principle caused a great turnover rate within the public bureaucracy. The Undersecretariat's bureaucrats found this happening normal. They also asserted that it would enable bureaucracy to function much better.

The bureaucrats of both organisations favoured the inner house education and pre-service training within bureaucracy. The pre-service training is one of the achievements of the rational productive model. Especially after 1980s, public bureaucracy made use of this. The fact is that the incumbents in this education program are given technocratic skills. Bureaucrats in both of the coincided the point that it was benevolent for public bureaucracy. In fact, this became one of the catch

phrase to adjust bureaucrats to the structural rearrangements in 1980s.

One other theme is that a bureaucrat coined the rational productive model's development of skills of bureaucrats. But bureaucrats of SPO stated that the applications were tainted with patrimonialism. Bureaucrats all agreed on the point that a structural change was needed for public bureaucracy. The political power abused the applications to transform the bureaucracy into the desired form.

The bureaucrats all deemed bureaucracy's transformation in the restructuring of state. They also sympathised that this transformation phase had to be managed well. They also asserted that those holding the political power in the concerned era made serious mistakes. All the milieus of bureaucrats interviewed acceded the point that the mistakes made on the way to transform the bureaucracy into the form A, or form B/ created the impasse from which bureaucracy is suffering today. The impasses may be elaborated such as the great turnover rate and many more. The bureaucrats emphasized that bureaucracy had to gain a dimension on the application policies rather than barricading the application of policies.

5.2. CONCLUSION

This study has highlighted patrimonial taints within Turkish public bureaucracy under the management of the political cadres of the Motherland party. Pursuit of transformation of public bureaucracy into the rational productive model was curbed by the potential taints within the bureaucratic structure. When the study names this potential patrimonialism, it does not directly refer to patrimonialism in its purest sense.

The first dimension of patrimonialism is the historical legacy of bureaucratic ruling tradition. The genealogy of bureaucracy in Turkish context has always suffered from this patrimonial tendency. The applications of the Republican era to transform the bureaucracy into the rational legal model turned out to be working not well. They were offset by the instrumental-rationality dominating Republican bureaucracy especially starting from the second half of 1930s.

The second dimension of this patrimonialism is the structural rearrangements in the 1980s in accordance with global changes all over the world. The structural rearrangements of 1980s gave way to an unintended revitalization the potential patrimonialism in the bureaucratic structure. When all these along the desire of the political power to radically change the bureaucracy, this yielded to a number of impasses in the bureaucratic structure. The activated patrimonialism started to dominate the whole structure. The Motherland Party tried to make public bureaucracy servile to the political power.

The process being administered by Motherland Party was so harsh that they ignored the preparation of the legal basis of changes for the bureaucracy. The MP governments not only neglected the legality dimension but also disrupted the whole functioning of bureaucracy. The perception of bureaucracy as a simple tool in the eyes

of Motherland Party's cadres also disrupted bureaucracy's traditional functioning. The target became a hide and seeks play for the cadres of the Motherland Party. Except for the economy bureaucracy, the public bureaucracy became a field for the maximisation of cadrization. In the economy bureaucracy, they laid much emphasis on the consolidation of fitting cadres into these ranks of the newly created organization such as the UFTT. Like most of the reform attempts in Turkish bureaucracy the state's perception bureaucracy was not totally grasped. The state either added some structures into bureaucracy or offset the improperly functioning sections of bureaucracy

New Right was not the actual reason for patrimonialism. The Motherland Party was in the pursuit of under the leadership of Turgut Özal, revitalized the patrimonialism. It also gave a weapon to the political elites of the time to offset the bureaucracy in many fields. In fact, the struggle going on from 1950s to the present time ended with the disruption of the total public bureaucracy.

On the other hand, New Right policies were taken as reference points for the political elites to legitimate the changes. Since the main mentality in the New Right policies was to minimize the total state bureaucracy became something to be minimised in parallel with the same process in the state structure. This also brought the emergency of taking measures in the minimisation of bureaucracy. The legal side lacking at the rational legal model of bureaucracy was totally eliminated. Though the changes were legitimated by superficial legal means, the Constitutional Court and the related judicial institutions annulled these legal means on the ground that they did not meet the prerequisites demanded by the constitution. The rational productive model's applications became nothing but superficial means to disrupt the general functioning of bureaucracy.

Though the study is in the awareness that there was so much work asserted in the fields of bureaucracy, this effort has been able to contribute the remark that New Right policies aiming the total transformation of the state also disrupted the general functioning of public bureaucracy in Turkey. It has also been able to depict the point that the legal side of public bureaucracy will have to be subjected to further development in the determination of the rules of the game for the jurisdiction of bureaucracy.

Within the light of these developments, I analysed the patrimonial characteristics of Turkish public bureaucracy. I also demonstrated that the New Right policies had inevitable effects on the resurrection of patrimonial taints in bureaucratic structure. Turkish public bureaucracy awaits more serious evaluation. I also suggest that bureaucratic reforms be evaluated miscellaneously and public bureaucracy be handled more seriously to reform and organize.

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