

BILKENT UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE US AND THE BOSNIAN WAR: AN ANALYTICAL SURVEY ON THE  
FORMULATION OF US POLICY FROM THE YUGOSLAV DISSOLUTION TO  
THE DAYTON ACCORDS, 1991 - 1995

BY  
DILEK ERYILMAZ

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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
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## ABSTRACT

Yugoslavia's collapse in the early 1990s was the first European post cold-war challenge for the West, the EU and the US, to meet. However, it is clear that, following from a slow and flawed start, the US did not provide the required leadership to which Europe had been accustomed, though it occasionally came up with meaningful policy options to stop the genocidal war in Bosnia, while the Europeans looked all-too-willing to accept the 'facts on the ground'. During the course of the three-and-half year long war, which claimed about two hundred thousands of lives, the US-EU split became quite visible, and at various times, it looked to many as if the US had changed its traditional policy of leadership for a much more reduced role in crises management on European soil, an assumption boastfully confirmed by the Europeans until the US came back to the scene in 1995.

The return of the US with long-sought leadership and resources put an end to the carnage in Bosnia and brought about the Dayton Accords. At the same time, it underlined the fact that the EU is unable to put things in order on its own continent, and that the US' traditional role is bound to continue in Europe. The dissertation is a short survey of the US' initial flawed diagnosis of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and then of Bosnia, the wrangling between the US and the EU which became more and more visible in the course of 1993 and 1994 and finally the US' policy of knocking heads together to achieve the Dayton Accords.

## ÖZET

1990'ların başlarında Yugoslavya'nın süratle dağılması AB ve ABD açısından soğuk savaş sonrasında meydana gelen ve dikkatle ele alınabilecek iddialı bir hadiseydi. Ancak hemen farkedildi ki, ABD, Bosna'daki soykırımı andıran savaşı durdurmak için aradabir mantıklı siyaset seçenekleri ortaya koymuş olmasına rağmen, genel manada düşünüldüğünde fazlaca etkili olamadı. Öte yandan Avrupalı devletler savaş alanında silahların belirlediği vaziyeti kabullenmeye oldukça istekli göründüler. Üç buçuk yıl süren ve 200.000 insanın hayatına mâlolan bu savaş sırasında ABD ile AB arasındaki görüş ve yaklaşım farklılıkları iyice belirgin hale geldi. 1995'te ABD'nin liderlik rolünü üstlenerek yeniden sahneye dönüşüne kadar geçen zaman zarfındaki genel vaziyet bir çok insana sanki ABD ile AB'nin Avrupa kıtasındaki krizlere yönelik politikalarını değiştirmiş oldukları intibamı vermişti.

ABD'nin Bosna işinde meseleye yeniden el atması ve uzunca bir zamandır özlemle beklenen liderlik ve bunun için lâzım gelen kaynakları temin etmesi Bosna'daki soykırımı son verdi ve Dayton Antlaşmalarının imzalanmasını sağladı. Aynı zamanda bu geri dönüş AB'nin Avrupa'daki bu tür işleri çözme konusundaki yetersizliğini ve Avrupa kıtasında ABD'nin rolünün mutlaka devam edeceği gerçeğinin de altını çizmiş oldu. Bu master tezi bütün bu olayların yani ABD'nin Yugoslavya'nın dağılması ve Bosna savaşının sebepleri konusundaki ilk hatalı analizi; bilhassa 1993 ve 1994 yıllarında belirgin hale gelen AB ile ABD arasındaki bütün tartışmalar ve anlaşmazlıklar ve son olarak da ABD'nin taraflara baskı yaparak Dayton Antlaşmaları'nın imzalanmasını sağlamak yolundaki çabalarının genel bir gözden geçirilmesi niteliğindedir.

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## CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The Yugoslav dissolution and the ensuing wars in Slovenia, Croatia and particularly in Bosnia, and all those terrible pictures which filled television screens daily for a long time, put the ability of the EU to the test. It also put to the test all those utterances made profusely about the 'new world order' and cooperation between various international actors, namely the EU, the US and Russia. The shocking net result left nothing to be desired: more than two hundred thousand dead and two million people forced out their homes, to say the least. A cursory look at the crisis and the international policy would suggest that much of that was due to a Europe that used ineptly the Yugoslav succession wars, particularly the one in Bosnia, as a guinea pig in its curious search for some sort of leadership role in Europe. European smooth-talkers appear to have acted under the impression that the way they mutter to each other in Europe would somehow persuade Balkan leaders like President Milosevic of Serbia to stop the war and make peace. The US, on the other hand, seemed happy to exchange its traditional role of leadership for an undecided, unclear one which at the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia amounted to appeasement. Continual talk by President Bush in 1992, professing powerlessness in the face of the allegedly invincible chieftains in Bosnia seemed to suggest that the US and Europe had swapped their roles.

Moreover, it looked as if the atrocities committed largely by Serbs and to a lesser extent by Croats in the course of the war in Bosnia created legends that problems of this nature are really endemic in a region where politicians and even ordinary people are inclined to torture and kill; 'after all, it is the Balkans'. According to these legends, the war in the 1990s is simply a

continuation of previous ethnic conflicts, and this one is not going to be the last one. Put in a nutshell, the war in Bosnia was caused by 'ancient hatred', and therefore, it is a civil war; the parties to that should be treated as more or less equally guilty, assumptions which do not seem to be borne out by historical research.

As this summary would indicate, the topic under review, namely, **The US and the Bosnian War: An Analytical Survey on the Formulation of US Policy from the Yugoslav Dissolution to the Dayton Accords**, would require research and analysis at three levels: first, it requires a careful study of the internal dynamics of the crisis, leading to the break-up Yugoslavia; second it involves the formulation of US policy towards the crisis and finally, it necessitates explanation of the US-EU split in approach to the war(s), a significant factor in shaping the US policy and also in worsening conditions on the ground in Bosnia. What attracted me to the present research is the fact that the Yugoslav dissolution and the bloody Bosnian war was one of the obvious cases which demonstrated differences between the US and Europe in approach to crises on European soil. Therefore, any such work would give me the opportunity to extend my knowledge of international relations on the US' general stance to world affairs after the end of the Cold War, as well as on the basic features of Balkan politics. The aim of this study is manifold: (i) to look into US foreign policy-making process in the 1990s within the context of the Bosnian war, (ii) to grasp the main inhibitions in US' approach to the crisis, (iii) to highlight EU-US differences, (iii) to examine the US internal debate about the conduct of foreign policy, US interpretation of multilateralism and the place of international organisations, in particular,

the UN and NATO in US foreign policy-making, (iv) to project into the future by employing the US attitude towards the Bosnian war.

The dissertation is composed of six chapters, four of which focus in depth on the events and the formulation of US policy, while the other two consist of the introduction and the conclusion. Following the introduction, the second chapter begins with a brief summary of events and incidents, leading to the outbreak of second Yugoslavia which the charismatic leader Tito established and led until his death in 1980. Some explanation about the cohesive elements which kept Yugoslavia together for more than three and a half decades is offered here and there, while a great chunk of the chapter concentrates on the dissolution process which started almost immediately after Tito's death. The first part of this lengthy chapter deals with the wars in Slovenia and Croatia, as well as the genocidal war in Bosnia from various perspectives. The second half is devoted to an analysis of all the factors which moulded the initial US response to the crisis and the ensuing wars.

The third chapter, though slightly shorter, is a crucially important one. It first sets out the situation on the ground in Bosnia at the beginning of 1994, and then deals with the peace plan which Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance pieced together. It explains at some length Clinton Administration's uneasiness about the plan and enumerates all the modifications which the US wished to be inserted in it. The second part of the chapter concentrates on the US' 'lift and strike' option after the Serbs refused to sign on to the Vance-Owen plan. The second part also

concentrates on 'Europeanisation' of US' 'lift and strike' option, while the last part focuses on vacillation of US policies throughout 1993.

The fourth chapter is also a significantly important one, in that, following the first part that sets out the worsening situation in Bosnia at the beginning of 1994, it devotes large space to the internal debate in the US, particularly between the Administration and the Congress, on Bosnia. It explains how the Congressional support for a robust stance against the Serbs and the Congressional criticism of the handling of the Europeans gradually moved the President and his team to a unilateral approach. The last part of this chapter sets out the US' role within the Contact Group of five nations.

The fifth chapter deals with the US' revision of policy options and the growing uneasiness within the Administration with the Europeans. It looks at how the American exasperation with the Europeans, whose mollycoddling of the Serbs in Bosnia was being severely criticised by the Congress, led the Administration to force the Serbs to accept the Contact Group peace plan through coercion. The last part of this chapter explains the main points of the Dayton Peace Accords in a critical way. The last chapter, the conclusion, is an assessment of US policy towards the Yugoslav crisis, in general, and the Bosnian war in particular.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **THE YUGOSLAV DISSOLUTION**

When the Yugoslav army tanks rolled into the newly declared Republic of Slovenia in late June 1991, international community was taken aback. Although there had been signs of uneasiness in former Yugoslavia, nobody was apparently expecting a war tearing the country apart.

In reality, dissolution process had started, since all the elements, which had kept post-1945 Yugoslavia together, began to crumble in the early 1980s. Josip Broz Tito, the masterful politician and the charismatic leader<sup>1</sup>, had died in 1980. For three and a half decades after the Second World War, Yugoslavia had been ruled by him at the head of a loyal communist party. Dedicated to an independent and unified Yugoslavia, he had managed to resist Soviet expansionism. He had also managed to somehow put all the many ethnic groups in Yugoslavia's various republics into one-body politic. His anti-Soviet stance had earned him the trust and support of the West which in turn contributed to Yugoslavia's economic prosperity. He had acted as the country's credit card from 1950s to 1970s, when the Yugoslav economy was booming through extensive borrowing from the West. His death put an abrupt

end to Western assistance, as well as seemingly harmonious relations among Yugoslavia's various nations, nationalities and minorities. The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Comintern by Stalin in 1948<sup>2</sup> had drawn closer all the Yugoslav peoples who maintained a kind of national unity in the face of an external danger. By the late 1980s, however, the 'Soviet danger' had eclipsed, and ultra-nationalism was on an upward trend with devastating consequences.<sup>3</sup>

Yugoslavia was composed of six republics, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia), Montenegro and two autonomous regions, Kosovo and Metohija ( hereafter Kosovo/a ) and the Vojvodina. Initially, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were recognized as nations, and gradually the same status was also granted to the Bosnians, Macedonians and Montenegrins. In addition, there were a number of ethnic groups who were treated as single minorities in all those republics. The Kosovar Albanians and the Vojvodina Hungarians constituted the biggest challenge in this respect. These problems were to be addressed through the constitutional amendments enacted in 1974.<sup>4</sup>

Since it was impossible for each minority to unite with their co-nationals within the frontiers of the same state, the Yugoslav constitution had provided

for provisions, declaring that national minorities could not have their own republics; instead, they were expected to become integrated into other republics. According to the amendments, enacted in 1974, Bosnians, Macedonians, and the Montenegrins were given political recognition as nations, as well as the two biggest national minorities, Albanians of Kosovo/a, and Hungarians of Vojvodina. Kosovo/a, with a 90 per cent Albanian majority, and Vojvodina, with a Serb majority but also a large Hungarian and a smaller Croat minority were granted in the 1974 constitution the status just below that of a full republic, which meant that each had its own courts, police and territorial defence and perhaps even more important an independent vote in Yugoslavia's collective presidency alongside the other six republics. By this way, Tito had aimed at a balance among different nationalities of Yugoslavia. These two provinces were not recently acquired. They had existed since the early days of the regime but it was only after 1974 that they were allowed direct participation in decision-making at the federal level, bypassing Serbia.<sup>5</sup>

After Tito, Yugoslavia was to be governed by a kind of 'collective presidency'. As soon as the unifying influence of Tito was gone, however, each republic began to reassert its individuality and independence. By the

middle of the 1980s, anti-Serbian unrest was growing steadily in Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo/a. Coupled with that, the country was confronted with severe economic problems. For instance, inflation reached a staggering 80 percent in 1984. Gasoline had to be rationed and housing was scarce and very expensive. The cost of basic necessities skyrocketed while luxuries, such as television sets, were almost completely out of reach for most people. There was little or no cooperation among republics. The desire of each republic to independently run its own affairs gravely disrupted the country's overall industry and transportation. The railroads, for example, were allegedly a national system. But the republics would not allow their own locomotives to be taken past their homeland boundaries. Each time a train crossed into another republic, the locomotive had to be changed. To make matters worse, Yugoslavia found international money-lenders very unwilling to extend credits, as they used to while Tito was alive. Western countries had now suspects against Yugoslavia, a country in the process of disintegration without a strong and able leader to keep it together.<sup>6</sup> Under these circumstances, the relatively richer northern republics like Slovenia and Croatia did not want to be 'exploited' by the poor south while nationalistic feelings were taking over in Serbia, the largest republic with the largest population.<sup>7</sup>

Nationalism was growing by leaps and bounds among Serbian intellectuals especially after the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy Of Arts and Sciences. This Memorandum demanded that a speedy end be put to what it called the federal government's discriminatory policies towards Serbia in the economic field. It claimed that the partition of Serbia into three parts under Tito's 1974 constitution was unfair, and it demanded that the allegedly anti-Serb policy pursued in Kosovo/a by Albanian separatists and irredentists (with support from non-Serb republics), which the authors blamed for the steady exodus of Serbs, be stopped. The Memorandum also dealt with the position of Serbs in Croatia (11.6 %) who were allegedly discriminated against and even subjected to genocide. The guiding principle of the 'strong Yugoslavia, weak Serbia' was, according to the Memorandum, the root cause for all the ills: the Memorandum called for its reversal, especially for the abolition of the 1974 constitution under which Kosovo/a and Vojvodina were allowed to evolve into de facto republics. It concluded that under Croat Tito, Serbs had been treated unfairly.<sup>8</sup>

The Memorandum was a modernised version of earlier plans for a Greater Serbia, taking in also Bosnia, the bulk of Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro. Nostalgia for the first royalist Yugoslavia was echoed in numerous articles

and books that followed the Memorandum's publication. The Greater Serbia program also had an economic dimension. Croatia loomed particularly large in those Great Serb plans because of its oil and gas in addition to its hard currency tourist earnings. Bosnia, though poorer than Croatia and Slovenia, was also important not least because it had some natural resources and also because much of Yugoslavia's huge arms industry was located on its territory.

The Memorandum was to prepare the ideological ground for Slobodan Milosevic's rise. When in 1987 a change in leadership in Serbia brought Milosevic to the fore, he successfully played the Serbian nationalist card. He made a point of speaking out on behalf of the Serbian and Montenegrin minorities in Kosovo/a, which earned him immediate popularity and legitimacy among the Serbian masses. The Serbs began to question whether the 'Croat' Tito was impartial in his attitude towards Serbia. Milosevic became a nationalist strong man after an incident in Kosovo/a in April 1987 - the centerpiece of Serbian historical legend, - now 90% Albanian. His popularity reached new heights when, in January 1989, Serbia extended its control over the tiny republic of Montenegro by means of a political coup under his leadership. So by this political control, Serbia got Montenegro's vote in Yugoslavia's collective federal presidency. The arbitrary abolition in

March 1989 of the autonomous status of the provinces of both Kosovo/a and Vojvodina which had been guaranteed by the amendments in Federal Constitution in 1974 was one of Milosevic's chauvinistic policies.<sup>9</sup> All of that had been closely watched with concern by all the non-Serb republics. Politicians in Slovenia and Croatia were now convinced that Milosevic posed a threat to the stability of the entire country. By the beginning of autumn 1989, Slovenia's patience was wearing thin: despite loud Serbian protests, the Slovenian Assembly passed a series of amendments to the Slovenian Constitution, claiming for Slovenia the unilateral right to secede, and the exclusive right to impose a state of emergency in the republic or to authorize the presence or movement of military formations within its borders.<sup>10</sup>

On the Serbian front, during 1990 Serbian nationalism under Milosevic was taking an ever more aggressive turn. No longer was it enough for Serbs living outside Serbia to have their rights protected. They also had to own and control the territory they inhabited, regardless of prior sovereignty. These Serbian claims had no consistent principals behind them. Where Serbs a minority, as in Kosovo/a, they asserted a historical, rather than a numerical, right to rule. Where no such historical right was possible, as in the Krajina area of Croatia, they claimed self-determination on the majority principal.<sup>11</sup>

According to the advocates of Greater Serbia, they were to insist that Serb territories extended to wherever a Serb lay buried. Vojislav Seselj, one such prominent advocate who appeared on the leading political scene in the late 1980s, argued that Serbia's territory covered the territory from the 'sanctuaries of the east to the tombs in the west', namely from the disputed province of Kosovo/a to the scenes of Croat fascist crimes during the Second World War.<sup>12</sup>

These openly-expressed views in favor of Serb hegemony in the region soon found its echo in the north-western republics, Croatia and Slovenia which gradually concluded that they had to break from Yugoslavia one way or the other. In March and April of 1990, Slovenia and Croatia held their first multi-party elections in almost fifty years. The communist reformers lost the elections to parties favoring national sovereignty within a reorganized Yugoslav confederation. By the end of 1990 Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia were no longer under communist governments, and Macedonia was under a coalition government in which the communists were a minority. Only in Serbia and Montenegro did the communists still hold on to power. Under these new conditions Milosevic's continuous talk of the need to recentralize the system was responded to by Slovenia and Croatia which argued that the

system needed to be fully confederalized, with the retention of only an economic union and coordination in foreign policy and military matters.<sup>13</sup>

On December 23, 1990, Slovenia held a plebiscite in which almost ninety percent of the eligible voters authorized the Slovenian parliament to declare independence if in six months the Slovenian government had not negotiated a new constitutional arrangement that would address the Slovenes' democratic aspiration for sovereignty. The last straw for the Slovenians and Croatians came when the Serbs and the Montenegrins, together with those bogus representatives of no longer existent Kosovo/a and Vojvodina, blocked the confirmation of the very moderate, rational and conciliatory Croatian Stipe Mesic as chairman of the Federal presidency. According to the post-Tito constitutional arrangement, the chairmanship of the Federal presidency, the highest executive body in the country, was to pass each year on to the representative of a different republic who was to be chosen by his republic's parliament. It was Croatia's turn to select the federal president and Stipe Mesic was the first non-communist ever to be nominated to head the federal presidency. That action accelerated the daily worsening slide into chaos. Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence but did not actually secede from Yugoslavia, saying they would wait to see if a new federation of

sovereign states could be arranged. Although talks and negotiations continued for the rest of the summer of 1991, no compromise was to be reached.

## **2.1. The wars in Slovenia and Croatia**

Following its proclamation of independence on 23 June 1991, Slovenia took control of its borders. Croatia followed suit a day later. Yugoslav Federal Army (hereafter JNA) used this as a formal excuse for unleashing an attack on Slovenia, which began on 25 June 1991. This was the start of the terrible and bloody war in Yugoslavia.

The war in Slovenia set the alarm bells ringing. Western leaders found themselves in a dilemma. They argued among themselves whether the conflict was an internal one or an aggression by one state against another. While they were talking, Serbia, with the overwhelmingly Serbianized JNA at its disposal, was freely working to make its 'Greater Serbia' dreams come true. However, following some initial success, the JNA ran out of steam when faced with a small but extremely well-organized resistance by the Slovenian territorial defence. With the JNA's failure in the face of this unexpected resistance by the Slovenian people, the Serbs' dream of Greater Serbia began

to crumble though it was to take President Milosevic and others, exponent of Greater Serbia, many years to grasp that.

While the war in Slovenia was in full-swing, President Tudjman of Croatia sat back and watched though he had promised President Kucan of Slovenia in December 1990 his military support and cooperation, should the neighboring break-away republic come under attack by the JNA. At a meeting of the Croatian National Security Council, President Tudjman said: ‘we shall not involve ourselves in this war (in Slovenia) in any way; it is in the interest of the Croatian nation to remain passive,’ a policy which became Croatia’s suicide or self-termination. Nevertheless, despite betrayal by Croatia, Slovenia did well and the JNA agreed to withdraw from this republic.

“This withdrawal was all that Slovenia needed: it was too far to the west for the JNA and Serbia to contemplate a protracted war. In this conflict, Slovenia gained about 200 tanks, 400 artillery pieces and mortars, many anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, and ammunition sufficient for a large army to wage an intensive war for one year.”<sup>14</sup>

On the face of it, by mid July, the Serbian and the Federal Army leaders had decided to let Slovenia go<sup>15</sup>; but they were now serious about Croatia: Croatia must be held at all costs. It was more suitable for subjugation, given its 11 % Serb population scattered in suitable enclaves and already secretly armed to

the teeth by Serbia with modern weapons. There had already been incidents and it did not take long for these skirmishes to turn into a full-blown war between well-armed Serb units and poorly armed Croatian territorial defence forces. And the Federal Army did not hesitate to intervene under the pretext of separating the warring sides. It soon became clear, however, that the JNA was in fact turning territory over to the Serbs. In September 1991, the Serb 'rebels' seized the Krajina region - Knin being the capital - by cleansing the Croats there. During this extensive ethnic cleansing campaign so many Croats were either killed or forced out of the region. The destruction visited on Eastern Slavonia was so harsh - even in the areas where so little Serb population existed - that experts thought that it was worse than what happened to European towns during World War II. The JNA also targeted Croatia's most famous tourist resorts, including Dubrovnik, and slaughtered thousands of Croats.

As the war grew in intensity through the summer of 1991, the European Community (hereafter EU) and the United Nations (hereafter UN) in order to achieve a cease-fire and agreement among all the Yugoslav republics initiated a joint effort. Special UN envoy Cyrus Vance and the EU negotiator Lord Peter Carrington were appointed to do the mediation. They both argued that

there should be no Western recognition of the independence of any Yugoslav republics until all had agreed on their mutual relationships.

However, towards the end of 1991, all the obstacles that prevented the recognition of the republics were coming to an end. In December the Maastricht process was over and the Soviet Union was dissolving fast. The US had already declared that it would recognise Ukraine as an independent state. Under these newly-created circumstances Germany argued that Slovenia and Croatia should be recognized while other members of the EU wavered. They were all busy in trade-offs in the closing sessions of Maastricht negotiations. But events in the Soviet Union and on the ground in Croatia gradually forced them to take action. When they finalized the Maastricht negotiations, they set up a special commission headed by the French Constitutional Expert Robert Badinter with the task of assessing which republics met the recognition requirements set by the EU, requirements like respect for territorial integrity, respect for minority rights and establishment of democratic institutions. Following recommendations from the Commission, on December 17, 1991 an EU summit decided to grant Slovenia and Croatia recognition. This was also official confirmation that Yugoslavia was no

longer in existence. In the meantime, the war had ended in late December 1991 after Serb forces had seized roughly a quarter of Croatian territory.<sup>16</sup>

## **2.2. The Dissolution Process and the US Policy**

There is no indication that the US had ever had any ‘indigenous interest in the Balkans’ until the end of the Second World War. In other words, “ the region had never been a major focal point for US policy. American interest emerged principally as a by-product of Washington’s overall interest in preventing the Soviet Union’s domination of Europe.”<sup>17</sup> This came about with Tito’s break with the Soviet Union. Although Tito was a true believer in communism, he opposed Moscow’s efforts to expand its influence in the Balkans. The Stalin-Tito break in 1948 provided opportunities, upon which America quickly seized, for US efforts to contain Soviet expansionism. The decision to give economic and military assistance to Yugoslavia in its struggle against Moscow was purely pragmatic and dictated by realpolitik.

In short, during the cold war Yugoslavia was a pawn between the US and the Soviet Union in the power struggle in the Balkans.

“The main US goal was to prevent Yugoslavia from falling under Soviet domination. Such a development, US policy makers believed, would tip the balance of power in the

Balkans and increase the pressure on Greece and Turkey, two key NATO allies, as well as reduce Romania's room for maneuver. Hence support for Yugoslavia's unity, independence and territorial integrity became a fundamental tenet of US policy toward the Balkans." 18

Although this assistance did not turn Yugoslavia into a fully-fledged ally, it ensured that Yugoslavia did not fall back into the Soviet orbit, and by the end of the 1970s, Moscow's position in the Balkans had seriously eroded.

The Yugoslav dissolution was the first post-cold war crisis that both the US and the Soviet Union had to tackle. Oddly enough, both were still guided by cold-war principles and inhibitions:

"Both Washington and Moscow were slow to comprehend the nature of this change in part because they were preoccupied with other issues, the United States with the Gulf war, and the USSR with its own internal problems. Hence, both misjudged the seriousness of the crisis and failed to appreciate its wider implications for European security." 19

At the outset, the US continued to follow cold war perspectives towards the crisis in Yugoslavia. According to the US, should Yugoslavia disintegrate, it might fall under Soviet influence. When Croatian representatives came to the US in the fall of 1990 to discuss a plan for a peaceful reorganization of Yugoslavia as a confederation, American Secretary of State James Baker, and

National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, simply rebuked them. The US was not interested in any plan likely to tear the country apart; if anything, the Bush administration favored the preservation of both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union as unified states, if necessary, by 'military force.'

When the Yugoslav crisis erupted into violence in the summer of 1991, the Bush administration's attention was focused on other issues like the Gulf War, the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the German unification. So, although in November 1990 a report by the CIA<sup>20</sup>, leaked to the press, had seriously warned that a war in Yugoslavia leading to the disintegration would be likely within 18 months, the US did not give the high-level policy attention the report deserved. Several factors influenced this initial US policy towards the crisis. American policy-makers were worried that any encouragement of separatist trends in Slovenia and Croatia would have a ripple effect elsewhere in Eastern Europe in general and the USSR, in particular, which the US vowed to keep together with Mr. Gorbachev at its head, encouraging a host of separatist and irredentist movements from the Baltics to Bessarabia and to Central Asia and the Caucasus. As a result, the US continued to insist on preserving Yugoslavia's unity.

The US insistence on the maintenance of the Yugoslav integrity contributed to the escalation of the conflict by encouraging President Milosevic and the JNA to believe that the US would not oppose the Federal Army's intervention to hold the country together, provided that this was to be done quickly and with a minimal loss of life. President Bush declared in early 1991 that the US 'would not reward' those who split off from Yugoslavia and this warning was to be reiterated in June the same year by James Baker who said that the US would not recognise any unilateral declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, and that American policy supported a democratic and united Yugoslavia. He argued that self-determination could be unilateral but that it must be pursued by dialogue and peaceful means.<sup>21</sup>

When Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, both republics hoped that this step would internationalize the crisis and prevent Milosevic from calling the upcoming aggression an 'internal matter'. However, even after the fighting in Slovenia in June 1991, the US continued to see it as a 'local conflict', and the Bush administration viewed it largely as a 'European problem' left to the Europeans to handle since it involved no broad US strategic interests.<sup>22</sup> It encouraged the EU which was engrossed in the approaching Maastricht negotiations to take the lead in managing the issue.

So the main vehicle for crisis management became the EU rather than NATO or the US.

Another factor which contributed to the US inhibition was the reluctance of the US military to get involved in the crisis. Named as 'Vietnam syndrome', this reluctance appears to have influenced many of the top US military officers who had served in Vietnam. Clearly, they were hesitant to get dragged into an unpopular land war without a clear exit strategy and viewed Yugoslavia as a potential quagmire. To some extent they were also mesmerized by the success of the Gulf War. The lessons they drew from this experience were that (i) if US troops were to be used, the US should go in, as it did in the Gulf, with overwhelming force in order to achieve a quick and decisive victory; (ii) there should be a clear political and military objective and (iii) there should be a clear endgame and exit strategy.<sup>23</sup> The most vocal and articulate advocate of this position was General Colin Powell, the then Chairman-of-the-Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff. His prestige and strong political standing with the Congress as a result of his role in directing the Gulf war gave him a considerable advantage and allowed him to largely dominate the internal debate within the Bush administration. Few officials were ready to challenge him, especially

since he had strong backing within the rest of the military establishment and in the Congress.

President Bush was also reluctant to get involved in an overseas conflict in an election year. There was criticism about the internal policies of the Bush Administration. So he wanted to be seen engaged in internal affairs rather than foreign policy issues especially one that might lead to large casualties. Many of his top political advisers supported this view because they were convinced that the American people would not support a war in Yugoslavia.<sup>24</sup>

During 1990 and early 1991 these were the key factors that formulated the initial US approach to the crisis. Warren Zimmerman, the last US Ambassador to former Yugoslavia explains the mood in the US policy-making circles during 1991:

“even without threatening force, the United States could have thrown more weight behind the effort to prevent greater violence. However, between July 1991 and March 1992, the United States was not a major factor in the Yugoslav crisis. In the fall of 1991, at a US ambassadors’ meeting in Berlin, a friend from the State Department’s European Bureau told me that Yugoslavia had become a tar baby in Washington, nobody wanted to touch it. With the American presidential election just a year away, it was seen as a loser.”<sup>25</sup>

### **2.3. The Bosnian War (1992-1993)**

Bosnia was by area third largest member of the Yugoslav federation, after Serbia and Croatia. According to the 1991 census, the population of Bosnia was 44 % Moslem/Bosniak, 31 % Serb, 17 % Croat and 8 % others, including 5 % Yugoslavs, most of whom were products of mixed marriages. Though percentages varied from one place to another, there was no significant urban center anywhere in Bosnia which did not have a large mixed population. It is against the background of these figures that one could judge the nature of Bosnia's ethnic pluralism or, by the same token, the implications of the policy of enforced ethnic separation, and the destruction of Bosnia's urban civilization. Bosnia represented a modern, pluralistic society in the Balkans. For years, the Bosnians had been living in peace and harmony. The Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims (It is important to note that the term Muslim with capital 'M' represents their political identity) had been used to living together as neighbors regardless of their differences even in the same apartments. The main reason which changed this order was the ultra-nationalistic Serbs and their aims in mind. "The Bosnian war was not caused by ancient hatreds; it was caused by modern politicians, notably Mr. Milosevic and Dr. Karadzic, with the help of the political controllers of Radio Television Belgrade."<sup>26</sup>

On 29 February and 1 March 1992 the Bosnian Government held, at the behest of the EU, a referendum on independence as a precondition for diplomatic recognition. This was boycotted by most of Bosnia's Serbs at the urging of Radovan Karadzic, who was the leader of the Serbian party (SDS) and an ally of President Milosevic. 99 per cent of the voters, who took part in the referendum, voted in favor of independence. Bosnia was recognized as an independent state by the EU on 6 April 1992 and the US followed suit. It became a member of the UN together with Slovenia and Croatia on 22 May.

It appears that the Bosnian war was the result of a pre-meditated plan of territorial conquest to be carried out jointly by the JNA and the Serb paramilitaries in order to achieve their 'Greater Serbia' goal. Planning for it had begun a long time ago in the autumn of 1991. Artillery positions had been set up around major cities, including Sarajevo in the winter of 1991-92.<sup>27</sup> In addition, the JNA units with artillery were being transformed into Bosnia from Croatia early in 1992 after the cease-fire had been achieved there. In May 1991, the Serb 'autonomous regions' had been proclaimed in Bosnia arbitrarily, and in October 1991 a Serb 'parliament' had been set up. All of this culminated in the proclamation of a Bosnian Serb republic on 27 March

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1992. That the Serbs' aim was to annex the whole of Bosnia now became an increasing probability.

On 30 March, following a series of incidents in various Bosnian cities, the JNA's chief declared that his troops were ready to 'protect' the Serbs of Bosnia. In April massacres on a large scale were carried out by the Serb paramilitary forces in close cooperation with the JNA in eastern Bosnia. Fighting soon spread to other areas. At this stage, the Croats in the south as well as those in the north fought successfully in alliance with the Moslems. But this Croat-Moslem alliance was to be short-lived. President Tudjman's opportunistic approach to divide Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia helped the Serbs a great deal in their policy of conquest. From the end of 1992 summer onwards, when it became clear that no foreign intervention would be forthcoming, the Croats under the leadership of Mate Boban and under Tudjman's supervision, began to 'clean' some areas in southern Bosnia from Muslims. According to Serb-Croat deal in 1992, Serbia would concede Croatian sovereignty in the Krajina, while the Croats would let Eastern Slavonia go to Serbia. Tudjman would be compensated for the loss of Croatian territory with a large piece of Bosnia with Serbia getting the rest.

When fighting broke out in Bosnia in April 1992, Belgrade authorities repeatedly stated - as they had done in Croatia in 1991- that the JNA was only acting as a peace-keeping force. But the reality on the ground was completely different. If anything, the JNA was conducting a war of aggression against a neighboring state which had just received world-wide diplomatic recognition. On 27 April the new Yugoslav State comprising Serbia and Montenegro was proclaimed, and in May an announcement was made to the effect that those JNA soldiers serving in Bosnia who were Bosnian Serbs would be transferred with their weapons to the new Serb republic in Bosnia while the rest would withdraw across the border into Serbia and Montenegro. General Ratko Mladic, commander of the JNA in Knin during the war in Croatia in 1991, was appointed head of the Bosnian Serb army. This calculated trick by President Milosevic gave a golden opportunity to many of the Western politicians, who were all too eager to avoid involvement, to call the conflict in Bosnia a 'civil war' that would not call for outside intervention.

At the beginning of May, while the Serbs tightened their grip on Bosnia the UN troops already stationed in Sarajevo were withdrawn at the order of the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on the grounds that those

troops had been earmarked for deployment in Croatia for peace-keeping purposes there. At this stage, the international community appeared very reluctant to take any tangible steps to stop the carnage in Bosnia. The US and Britain seemed overwhelmed with domestic problems, increasing economic depression in both, and the approaching US presidential elections, while the UN was engrossed in keeping the cease-fire between the Croats and the Serbs in Croatia. The only thing the US administration proposed to do was the imposition of a comprehensive package of sanctions on Serbia for its role in the war in Bosnia. However, when the US first floated the idea, the UN Security Council (hereafter UNSC) opposed it, while Britain and France argued against. But the events in Bosnia unfolded at a bewildering speed, filling television screens with horrors of Serbian atrocities, and in the end, the Powers which were unwilling to take any military measures, were forced to impose a trade embargo on Serbia, which came in the form of a UNSC resolution at the end of May. It banned all trade, including oil, with Serbia and Montenegro, required all countries to freeze overseas financial assets of Yugoslavia and called for a reduction in the size of Yugoslav diplomatic missions.<sup>28</sup>

Though well in place from June 1992 onwards, the embargo did very little to ease the situation in Bosnia where the Serb forces had embarked on their notorious ethnic cleansing campaign. In 1992 summer, the world was shaken with a refugee problem of an immense nature. The number of refugees was appallingly high. Perhaps two million inhabitants of the former Yugoslav republics had been displaced by fighting, more than a million from Bosnia alone. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereafter UNHCR) as well as a number of international observers were now convinced that Serbia was issuing passports and forcibly evicting people, especially Bosnians, as part of its 'ethnic cleansing' operation. Apparently, this was only the tip of the iceberg. Much worse was to come to light soon.

In August 1992 Western journalists and television reporters discovered a Serb detention camp in Central Bosnia for mainly Moslem civilian prisoners, which gave rise to speculation that a full-scale genocide of Moslems was underway. The public outcry became so strong after these revelations that the Western governments thought 'something must be done'. However, Britain and the US still firmly held on to their previous positions that any large-scale military intervention was out of the question. Since they insisted on their diagnosis that what was happening in Bosnia was, after all, a civil war, they turned a

blind eye to the Bosnian government's appeals for the lifting of the arms embargo unilaterally on Bosnian forces.<sup>29</sup> In order to justify their reluctance to do anything militarily, they made up legends about the invincibility of the Serbs. According to those stories, the terrain made the Serbs invincible, and the Serbs allegedly had pinned down a number of German divisions in Bosnia during the course of the Second World War, a claim which does not appear to have been born out by historical research. Under these circumstances, any military suggestion that the latest technology, particularly combat helicopters and surgical strike capability of air force would finish off the Serbs in a short period of time fell on deaf ears. Instead, Western governments were trying to find a solution to the conflict through negotiations which, in reality, was assisting the Serbs in their bid for a 'Greater Serbia' by providing them with extra time.<sup>30</sup>

In August 1992, a joint EU-UN conference was convened in London. The conference obtained a promise from Serb leaders to lift the sieges of Bosnian towns including Sarajevo and to withdraw their heavy weapons under UN supervision, declared a no-fly zone over Bosnia, decided on a tightening of UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and replaced Lord Carrington with Lord Owen as one of the chairmen of the EU-UN-sponsored conference

on the former Yugoslavia based in Geneva. But the London conference did not lead to an improvement of the situation on the ground. The Serb sieges in Bosnia remained while the no-fly zone continued to be openly flouted by the Serbs, the only party with an air force. In short, the London conference revealed the full extent of the impotent passivity of Western policy towards the Bosnian conflict. Though humanitarian efforts by governments and international agencies grew in volume and helped relieve local sufferings, the dispatch of UN peacekeeping troops made no change to the situation on the ground except for making outside intervention less likely due to the possibility that UN troops might, as a result, become hostages. In October 1992, Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, co-chairmen of the EU-UN conference on Yugoslavia, produced the first draft of what eventually, by January 1993, grew into a set of proposals for dividing Bosnia into a number of autonomous provinces - the Vance-Owen plan.

“Although the first version of the Vance-Owen plan, unveiled in October 1992, did contain some clauses about the safe return of refugees to their homes, the concessions it made to local powers in the system of ‘cantons’ it envisaged (even the police force would be locally, not centrally, controlled) made it impossible to imagine that ethnic cleansing would be reversed. The second version of the plan, released in January 1993, took a further, fateful step: it assigned ‘ethnic’ labels (Serb, Muslim, Croat) to the various cantons. This was an open endorsement of ethnic separation, and a major factor in the outbreak of serious fighting one month later in central Bosnia between Muslims and Croats, who wanted to secure ‘their’ respective territories.”<sup>31</sup>

## **2.4. Bosnian War and the US policy(1992-1993)**

From the very beginning of the Bosnian war, two basic failures of the West shaped the war's future: one was a failure of policy (largely of absence) ; the other was a failure of understanding. Once the diagnosis was made wrongly, then the cure would not heal the illness. Since many Western governments tended to regard it as a 'civil war' caused by the hatred supposedly endemic among Yugoslav peoples going back to 'thousands of years', the measures they tried to take were bound to be all ineffective. Because if it was a civil war, then all the parties to the conflict must be treated as equally bad and guilty. Therefore, there would be no victims or aggressors. Though in reality, the defender in the war was not just an ethnic group but a democratically-elected government, containing Muslims, Croats, and the Serbs, this was treated as an unfortunate detail by most Western policy-makers. The weird thing was that, though the international community had demanded that each former Yugoslav republic respected internal borders as one of the requirements for recognition, neither Washington nor any other Western government was now prepared to offer the legitimate government of Bosnia any support to defend its own.<sup>32</sup>

Given that Bosnia did not have an army, a military tradition or weapons, and that the international arms embargo on the whole of ex-Yugoslavia adopted by the UNSC on 25 September 1991, was resolutely adhered to by the West even after Bosnia became independent, the government in Sarajevo had little chance to build up its own forces as a deterrent to the violent secession of the Karadzic's forces.

Despite continuous press reports about 'ethnic cleansing' Western governments preferred to keep their silence.

“Military advisors told President Bush, a definitive response to the bloodshed in Bosnia, which would be completed before election day, was not available. So Bush struck a pose of indifference and remained aloof even when reality introduced. In August 1992, after Newsday published eyewitness accounts of systematized murder in Serb concentration camps, Bush expressed shock but went on to describe the war - incorrectly - as a blood feud arising from ancient animosities. To justify his inaction, Bush revised history 'Balkan politicians do it all the time'. At home his statements added confusion to the public debate, but in Belgrade, the Serbian capital, the sophisticated political operators managing the war got the message. George Bush was using their rhetoric.”<sup>33</sup>

Though almost impossible to ignore public reaction after television stations showed the reported Serb artillery attacks on city dwellers in a bakery queue,

President Bush was engrossed in upcoming elections. So the statements from the White House sometimes were in zigzags. For instance, James Baker said in London on May 23 1992 that, should political, diplomatic and economic sanctions against Serbia fail to halt the war, military measures could be considered.<sup>34</sup> Yet the State Department had held consistently that military intervention was not under considerations. Political analysts simply attributed this ‘undiplomatically sharp attack’ by James Baker to Boutros-Ghali’s statements a week before, saying that it was impractical for the UN to provide military escorts for aid convoys bound for Sarajevo. All of that was indication that the US policy - or lack of it - was fluctuating. The US administration appeared more concerned as to how to react to the continual flow of disquieting news streaming out of Bosnia rather than to react to the events on the ground.<sup>35</sup>

Therefore, appeasement became the order of the day in Washington as in London and various other capitals. On June 8, 1992, the UNSC unanimously agreed to send 1100 more UN troops to Yugoslavia to reopen Sarajevo airport and enable relief supplies to reach the city. But even this operation could have begun only when an effective cease-fire had been achieved. And in Washington, the White House spokesman, Martin Fitzwater, dismissed as

mere rumor reports circulating in the Bosnian media that the US and its allies were drawing up contingency plans to airlift food and medicine to Sarajevo, should the negotiations aimed at reopening the airport under UN control fail. Three days later, President Bush declared that the deployment of US troops in Bosnia was out of the question 'because we are not the world's policemen.'<sup>36</sup> He concluded that he was concerned about the situation in Yugoslavia; but he remained non-committal. He said his policy aim was to safeguard human life, and that he could work towards that end in a humanitarian way in cooperation with the UN.

His reluctance to use force in an election year was strongly backed by the Pentagon. His senior advisors in the National Security Council were also against military intervention, drawing a distinction between peace-keeping once a cease-fire was agreed between Serb and other forces on the ground and the much riskier business of making peace.<sup>37</sup>

It appears that towards the end of June, the arguments against intervention were as strong as ever. True, James Baker, described Serb attacks on Bosnian capital as 'an absolute outrage' and 'inhuman'; yet he still cautioned against intervention.<sup>38</sup> According to some press reports, in the last week of June,

the possibility of a US military strike in the Balkans was seriously considered after President Bush held the first top-level meeting of advisors at the White House to consider military intervention. In Washington, James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, Colin Powell and Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney,

“were among those who joined Bush to discuss what a White House source later described as the US’s broad range of ‘options for an expanded role’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the meeting, Baker and Scowcroft expressed enthusiasm for US military intervention but Cheney and Powell remained adamantly opposed.”<sup>39</sup>

In this top-level meeting, there was probably a long search within the Bush administration for a short and sharp US military engagement which could win back for Bush all the credit he gained temporarily after the Gulf war. But with Cheney and Powell opposing, any military engagement appeared too risky in an election year. As a top White House official put it: “there are currently no serious plans to put ‘any real number of Americans on the ground’ in the Yugoslav republics and that US efforts - in the immediate future, at least - will be confined to playing a major role in humanitarian relief.”<sup>40</sup> From this point onwards, the US policy-makers began to focus on the US role in a humanitarian intervention. And the military intervention of a real nature will go more and more into the background. For example, when on June 29, 1992

the UNSC ordered more than 1000 UN troops to secure Sarajevo airport for humanitarian flights, British Prime Minister John Major urged President Bush to be cautious in the use of military force. Taking this advise, the Bush administration said that the US would support military intervention only to relieve Sarajevo, should it become necessary. Marlin Fitzwater at the White House, sounded even more cautious when he said that the US role would probably be restricted to providing logistical support and equipment.<sup>41</sup>

Confusion among the policy-making circles in Washington even as to how to contribute to a humanitarian intervention appeared quite prevalent. On July 7 Brent Scowcroft said that it would be necessary to send ground convoys prepared to defend themselves if attacked, while the very next day, President Bush said that the US could do something, should NATO decide to act. But he ruled out committing US ground troops. Following those statement, James Baker told Milan Panic, the Prime Minister-designate of the rump Yugoslav state that the world still demanded ‘deeds from Yugoslavia not just words’ about halting the bloodshed in Bosnia. He demanded full compliance with UNSC resolutions requiring all forces fighting in Bosnia to submit to the authority of the Bosnian government and to surrender to international

observers of heavy weapons handed to the Serbs by the JNA.<sup>42</sup> In the absence of any credible threat, all these, however, were to remain empty words.

In August, the world public was shocked again, this time, by the death camps and the first television pictures of emaciated prisoners. The Acting Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger who had just replaced James Baker on 5 August 1992, said that the US was taking immediate action against Serbia for 'war crimes'; the action came in the form of a US call for an emergency meeting of the Geneva-based UN Human Rights Commission to act on reports that Bosnian civilians were being rounded up into concentration camps and executed.<sup>43</sup> At this stage, President Bush came under attack by his presidential rival, Mr. William Clinton who drew comparisons with the Second World War atrocities and said that "if the horrors of the holocaust taught us anything, it is the high cost of remaining silent and paralysed in the face of genocide. US may have to use military force. I would begin with air power against the Serbs to restore the basic conditions of humanity".<sup>44</sup>

Reports of brutality in concentration camps had now provoked an outcry in the US. All of that forced President Bush to do something at least outwardly. He demanded that UNSC adopts a resolution that would authorize the

international community to use force, if necessary, to deliver humanitarian relief supplies, a proposal resisted by Britain and France which underlined the US-Europe split on Bosnia. On August 7, President Bush summed up his position. He said that the genocide and concentration camps of the Second World War must not be repeated; but clinging to his argument, he said that “I do not want to see the US bogged down in anyway into some guerrilla warfare. There is a lot of voices out there in the US that say ‘use force’, but they do not have the responsibility for sending someone else’s son or daughter in harm’s way. I do.”<sup>45</sup> One other difficulty for President Bush to worry about now was that Republican leaders were publicly divided over what to do in Bosnia, with interventionists and isolationists united only in blaming the West Europeans for failing to stop the conflict.<sup>46</sup>

After losing the presidential elections to Arkansas governor William Clinton in November, the Bush Administration with just few weeks left in office began making efforts to contain the conflict in Bosnia.<sup>47</sup> It had now become increasingly determined to end Serbian violations of the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia by military aircraft. Therefore in mid-December, the US toughened its stance against Serbia and said that it would demand enforcement of a military ‘no-fly zone’ over Bosnia. William Clinton, the President-elect, may have

contributed to this sharpening of Bush's views. Towards the end of December 1992, the US made a shift in its policy vis-a-vis Bosnia, following a high-level strategic reappraisal by the State Department officials. Despite continuing resistance by the US military establishment to become involved in another war, both Bush administration officials and foreign policy representatives of President-elect Clinton now appeared convinced that the US must enter the conflict, and if necessary, join British, French and other UN peace-keeping troops there. In a dramatic turn-around from his previous cautious utterances, Lawrence Eagleburger even went as far as to accuse Serbian President Milosevic of being a war criminal who should face trial for 'crimes against humanity'.<sup>48</sup> This alarmed both the British and French governments who feared that because there was no US military presence in Bosnia, British and French troops might become targets in Serbian retaliations against the Americans.

1992 ended with all those question marks and no clear-cut policies. This, of course, affected the year 1993 which had a new US president and the same ongoing problems. "With the Bush administration the reluctance to consider force was anchored in Vietnam; with the Clinton team there was a general uneasiness about the use of military power as an instrument of policy".<sup>49</sup>

## **CHAPTER III**

### **CONTINUATION OF WAR IN BOSNIA AND THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, 1993.**

#### **3.1. The Situation on the Ground in Bosnia at the Beginning of 1993.**

1993 will probably be remembered as a year wasted in protracted and 'sophisticated' negotiations while the tragedy on the ground in Bosnia continued unabated. Europe now looked all too willing to turn a blind eye to the ongoing genocide while the US with a new government was in zigzags which disappointed the Bosnians and put them into a more difficult position. It seemed as if the world with its eyes closed was waiting a solution which would come about by a touch of magic. This, in practical terms, meant that a quick solution was acceptable. However, this could not be achieved by a magic touch, but rather by a quick Serb victory, overrunning the whole of Bosnia. It also seemed as if the international community, especially the European countries above all Britain was resigned to accept that ultimate solution to be dictated by Serb forces regardless of how inhuman and unjust it might be.<sup>1</sup>

The year 1993 started with the peace talks in Geneva regarded by the UN as the last chance to negotiate a halt to the war. The UN plan, prepared by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, proposed to divide Bosnia into ten self-governing provinces; Sarajevo would be an 'open city' in which all three ethnic groups would be represented, and although it preserved on paper a unified Bosnian state, it gave almost no power to the central government to keep the country together. There was little in the plan to stop the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats voting to join Serbia and Croatia proper, leaving the three small Muslim regions in an untenable position. According to the plan, The Serbs would have control over about half of the republic - much more than pre-war Serb population in Bosnia would warrant, but less than the Serb forces held at the time in 1993. It then divided the remainder between the Muslims and Croats. Freedom of movement was to be assured and UN troops would patrol 'corridors' linking various provinces and ethnic areas.<sup>2</sup>

Though the authors of the plan argued for long that the deal they drew was the only chance for peace, no-one in Bosnia, except the Croats, was prepared to sign on. The Serbs, in their heydays in the absence of any credible threat from the international community to stop them, tended to see it as a ruse to roll

back their 'conquests', since they were at the time in control of 70 percent of Bosnia. Therefore, Serb military urged its political leadership not to yield to diplomatic pressure. The Serb logic appeared simple: the international community would, one way or the other, have to swallow the facts on the ground that the Serbs had won the war. The Anglo-American split over the use of force in Bosnia with Britain sticking to a policy of appeasement of the aggressor certainly emboldened the Serbs in their resistance to the plan. Not that the Bosnians were satisfied with it. According to the Bosnian leadership, the Vance-Owen peace plan rewarded ethnic cleansing, threatening to wipe Bosnia out of the map. They pointed out with justice that such a plan, if insisted upon, would offer the break-away Serb and Croat units a golden opportunity to vote for union with 'mother states', Serbia and Croatia. And in such a contingency the Moslems together with urban Serbs and Croats who persistently expressed the wish to stay and even fight with their Moslem neighbors would be confined to isolated 'ghettos.' Bosnian leadership had, therefore, no other choice than to fight on under extremely difficult circumstances. The only party in Bosnia which seemed satisfied with the plan was the Bosnian Croats who were to have been given larger chunks of territories than their pre-war population in Bosnia would justify with the ultimate aim of uniting with Croatia proper.<sup>3</sup>

While the plan was presented as the last alternative to the use of Western military force, the presentation of it to the parties escalated the fighting. This was because of the fact that the plan envisaged 'ethnic' cantons, the most important defect of the whole plan. For instance, while the efforts were going on to persuade Karadzic to accept the Geneva plan, the war in Bosnia escalated as "Croatian forces stepped up a double-prolonged offensive to regain Serb-held territory in Southwest Croatia and capture fresh turfs from Muslims further east in Bosnia."<sup>4</sup> To implement it would have required considerable military forces and expertise. To link the regions with internationally supervised corridors meant a huge new deployment of UN troops, meaning, in turn, that the US should be persuaded to put in large number of ground troops.<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile the mediators were becoming uneasy about the US stand on the peace plan. They were worried that the Clinton administration was more and more serious about the use of force. The deeper concern was that the new US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher and his team appeared to be questioning the whole basis of the Vance-Owen plan.<sup>6</sup> US officials apparently argued with justice that the proposal to divide Bosnia into 10 semi-

autonomous provinces under a weak central government would lead to the gradual partition of the republic, thus meeting the central Serb and Croat war aims.<sup>7</sup> In addition, the US appeared to be frustrated with the way the international mediators were handling the Serbs.<sup>8</sup> While Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance were molly-coddling the Bosnian Serb leaders and President Milosevic, the Clinton administration seemed determined to prosecute those responsible for war crimes in former Yugoslavia, despite the misgivings of European allies such as Britain. In one of his first policy initiatives since taking office, Warren Christopher instructed senior State Department advisers to investigate how best to organize an international war crimes tribunal. In another sign of a tougher US approach, Warren Christopher submitted a report to the UN on human rights violations in Bosnia, based on information gathered by US intelligence agencies. The report was intended for use by a future tribunal. Under the US plan, President Milosevic and the Serbian leader in Bosnia, Karadzic, were among those who might face trial for war crimes. The US also appeared willing to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia. The Administration officials were even floating the idea of ending the arms embargo on Bosnia coupled with tightening of economic sanctions on Serbia. This was probably the first indication of what was in store:<sup>9</sup> the US could not

swallow the Vance-Owen plan; but it might perhaps warm up to it gradually if it was subjected to major modifications.

It soon became clear that the Clinton administration was moving towards support for a modified version of the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia. This in turn meant that the US had dropped plans for an independent US initiative to end the conflict. Though it continued to express opposition to the Vance-Owen plan as a whole, it seemed that the US was to ask for inclusion in the plan certain provisions for Bosnia's overall territorial integrity and tougher guarantees for the maintenance of that. Ironically, however, this US revision of the plan eliminated all the chances for military action as President Clinton, on the advice of his defence secretary, Les Aspin, and under pressure from London and Paris, backed away from various military options he had previously urged on his predecessor, George Bush. In practical terms, all this vacillation in the US amounted to ruling out an 'Operation Mountain Storm' in Bosnia. It also meant that the US had sort of conceded defeat at the hands of other NATO allies, France and Britain in particular, in its endeavors to use intensive bombing raids to halt Serb expansionism. Concerned that air strikes could endanger the safety of Western peace-keepers on the ground, the US disappointed the advocates of early and substantial bombing. It soon emerged

that those in the Pentagon and the Congress who had advocated a sweeping air offensive to take out every Serb gun emplacement around Sarajevo and the other Muslim 'safe areas' and to target Serb military and political leaders and their headquarters, had lost out to more moderate council.<sup>10</sup>

All of that left the Muslims with no illusions that the Americans could do a little more than exert pressure for some minor territorial revisions; but that they should not expect the US to roll back Serb gains altogether. Indeed, the EU and the US made it clear to Izzetbegovic that he would have to accept whatever was the result of the plan. Once Europe and America had decided against military intervention in Yugoslavia, it was inevitable that any peace plan would have to be largely on Serbian terms. Oddly enough, this plan was to be rejected by the Bosnian Serbs after it was accepted by the Bosnian government under considerable international pressure.

### **3.2. Formulation of 'Lift and Strike' by the US and Europeanization of US Policy**

The Serb rejection of the plan in April 1993, galvanized the US once more into action. Serb rejection called European arguments for non-intervention into question and gave credibility to President Clinton's arguments for intervention. At the same time, it made it clear that the Serbs would continue to defy the international community and refuse any settlement offered by the mediators until and unless the world was prepared to use force. The US policy of 'lift and strike' came about when the US concluded that alternatives to using force had run out.

The idea of the 'lift' was to exempt the Bosnian government from the arms embargo to enable them to acquire arms to even the balance. This would be carried out in the hope that they would be able to achieve a stalemate on the battlefield which would then induce the Serbs to negotiate with them seriously. The other element, the 'strike', was to hold out the threat of the use of air power, particularly against the Serbs, if they violated various UN resolutions. For instance, at the time the policy was formulated, the Serbs

were reportedly obstructing the delivery of relief convoys in Bosnia in violation of UNSC resolutions. The idea was that air power in particular might be applied against any forces that were to be used against relief convoys or the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) troops assigned with ensuring the delivery of relief supplies.<sup>11</sup>

The American plan for 'lift and strike' was unveiled by Warren Christopher during his trip to Europe in May 1993 after the Serbs' rejection of the Vance-Owen plan.<sup>12</sup> Christopher's intent was to convince the European capitals to join the US in lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian government and, if necessary, launching air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets during an interim period while the Bosnians integrated the weaponry to be given to them. To Christopher's dismay, however, the British and the French opposed lifting the arms embargo because they feared that more arms might lead to a larger war possibly by drawing the Yugoslav army, which had become the army of Serbia proper, into the conflict, and thereby expand it, engulfing Serbia and then Croatia into a larger war. It might also put the British and French forces on the ground in former Yugoslavia in considerable danger, and they might have to be evacuated beforehand. This would necessarily cut off any further deliveries of humanitarian aid. At this point, the multilateral

element came to the fore. All these arguments pertained to the air strikes. Air strikes against Serbian targets might lead the Serbs to retaliate against Western forces on the ground or turn these forces into hostages. This would bring about ground force involvement by the Western powers, either individually or by NATO or the UN in order to rescue the Western forces and thereby suck NATO and the UN into a full-scale undesirable ground war in Bosnia.<sup>13</sup>

The allied rejection of this plan was no doubt a serious set back for President Clinton and served no other purpose than to illustrate the deep divergence in approach between the US and its European allies over Bosnia.

“Yet some of the blame for the failure of the Christopher mission lay in the administration approach to the idea of allied consultations. Christopher went to Europe ‘in a listening mode’. Instead of forcefully presenting the American preference, he sought to solicit allied views. Had Christopher been more forceful and insisted in presenting the US position, the allies might have eventually grudgingly agreed to it. Instead he sought to solicit their views and test the water. Christopher was thus forced to return home empty-handed”.<sup>14</sup>

In summing up this ‘exchange of views’ with the Europeans allies, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard Perle stated, “it was an exchange all right: Warren Christopher went to Europe with an American policy and came back with a European one.”<sup>15</sup> The European rejection of ‘lift and strike’

significantly undercut Clinton's credibility, both domestically and internationally though it ironically provided a convenient excuse for inaction. "Having made allied support and participation an essential precondition for military action, which he knew would be unpopular and divisive," it allowed the President to essentially put the blame on the allies.<sup>16</sup>

Warren Christopher's failed mission of May, 1993, and continual pernicious effects of this failure were to constitute the defining crisis of American policy in Bosnia. From then onwards, rather than asserting its traditional leadership role and overcoming European objections to US policy proposals, the Clinton Administration began to capitulate to European views and redefine the conflict in terms that Europe found far more convenient. For instance, within only a few days of his return from Europe, Warren Christopher signed on to the European and Russian 'Joint Action Program'. Now what had been the Europeans' alternative proposals to 'lift and strike' - specifically, designating six remaining Bosnian enclaves as 'safe areas' subject to better UN protection - actually became the US policy. One month later, after intense lobbying by its Joint Action partners - Britain, France, Russia, and Spain (then in the UN Security Council presidency) - the US Administration agreed not to work for passage of a UNSC resolution to end the arms embargo, despite its vocal

public opposition to the weapons ban. While the administration itself voted to lift it, lack of active American leadership to obtain additional support doomed the measure to failure.<sup>17</sup>

The rejection of the lift and strike proposal by the allies in May, 1993, also led to a shift in the US approach to the negotiations. In effect the US adopted a policy of 'benign neglect' and decided to let the negotiations in Geneva play themselves out. At the same time, the Administration sought to downplay the importance of Bosnia and keep it out of the front burner. What had initially been touted as vital American interest in February 1993, now came to be described as a "human tragedy" about which the US could do very little.<sup>18</sup>

Meanwhile, following their rejection of the Vance-Owen plan, the Serbs became more and more defiant; co-chairman Cyrus Vance resigned and retired from the Balkan negotiations. Thorvald Stoltenberg, a former Norwegian Prime Minister, was appointed as the co-chairman of the Steering Committee and together with Lord Owen they prepared a second proposal. This new plan later became known as the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. According to that, the borders of Bosnia would remain, but the country would be divided among the Serbs, Muslims and Croats. The three ethnic regions would be tied together in

a very loose confederation. In effect, this meant partitioning of Bosnia. Negotiations over the Owen-Stoltenberg proposal consumed most of the second half of 1993.<sup>19</sup> If accepted, depending on how it was to be interpreted and implemented, the plan could serve only to ratify most of the Serbian territorial conquests and lead to Bosnia's demise as a unified multi-ethnic democracy. The Serbian dominated republic would receive 42 per cent of the territory and the Bosnian Muslim republic 31 per cent; and the Croatian republic 17 per cent. From this point onwards, this plan was to remain the world community's basic formula for resolution of the Bosnian conflict despite some minor modifications introduced in June 1994 by the Contact Group to be composed of representatives of the UN and the US, Russian, French, British, and German governments.<sup>20</sup>

When the Owen-Stoltenberg plan also failed through the Serbs' rejection, the next alternative was suggested by Lord Owen named as the global solution of the Bosnian question. In this plan, he approached all the factions and all the contending groups for a compromise. There was a promise of greater shares for each one of them if they cooperated in this global solution. He argued that instead of solving each problem individually, the conflict, dealt with globally, would produce a better and lasting solution. The net outcome of these new

efforts only helped to consolidate the Serbian gains and provided an advantage for Serbs. This approach also tended to legitimize the land acquisition through force and occupation in order to bring some resemblance of peace to the area. In time, different groups began to make new plans that were either within the framework of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan or Owen's 'global solution plan'. According to the new proposed plans, Bosnia was to be divided into three parts, of which two would join with Croatia and Serbia because of their population compositions.

While all these negotiations were going on, military situation on the ground in Bosnia remained largely unchanged during 1993. Fighting between the Muslims and the Croats broke out in central and southern Bosnia in the spring of 1993 and continued into early the following year. This fighting was marked by ethnic cleansing and atrocities similar to those that had taken place in areas seized by the Serbs.<sup>21</sup> The Serbs, on the other hand, consolidated their positions by widening the corridor linking Bosnian Krajina in the west and Semberija in the east, and by seizing the strategic town of Trnovo, which had linked Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia. In August of 1993, the Serbs also managed to push the Bosnian Muslims off Mt. Bjelasnica and Mt. Igman, raising fears that the siege of Sarajevo would be intensified. Earlier, in April,

Serb forces had launched an attack on the eastern enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa. A last minute agreement with the UN created a safe area around Srebrenica. This was to be followed by a UNSC resolution which established a total of six safe areas : Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Gorazde, Bihac and Zepa.

Towards the end of the year, it seemed as if the appeasement triumphed all over Europe, particularly in Britain. The mediators were all too eager to alter their peace plans in accordance with the wishes of the aggressor, and each alteration was to be hailed by Europeans as a last chance to stop the 'violence', a term which they used extensively to describe the war in Bosnia. The US came up with a comprehensive plan, 'lift and strike', which would have put things in order in Bosnia had it been put into practice; but the Clinton Administration gave in to the Europeans too easily and too quickly. From then onwards, the US policy was to drift up to late summer 1995. Nevertheless, the US never ruled out the use of force as the Europeans did during those two years.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **BEGINNING OF SERB REVERSES AND THE US POLICY, 1994.**

The beginning of 1994 did not offer much ground for optimism about the situation. The uncertainty was going on and the peace was still far away from grasp. The UN's mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg summed up the situation by saying that the atmosphere for peace talks was more negative than at any time since he accepted the post in the spring of 1993. Indeed, the fighting between the Croats and the Bosnians were continuing with no sign of abating. The situation between these former allies had almost reached a point of no-return by the end of 1993. Following some initial setbacks, the Bosnians got the upper hand in the battlefield against the Croats. Towards the end of the year 1993, the Croats' defeat by the Moslems had become almost a certainty; the Croatian President Tudjman began to threaten the Bosnians that Croatia would intervene in Bosnia in order to help the embattled Croat forces there.<sup>1</sup>

Serbia's President Milosevic had emerged from general elections as remaining by far the most powerful politician in former Yugoslavia, but his room for maneuver was narrowing. In Croatia, the rebel Serbian minority leadership had slipped out of his control. It was doubtful whether he was still able to

strike a deal with Croatian President Tudjman on the status of the Serbs in Croatia. Likewise in Bosnia, it was far from certain that he could get the Bosnian Serb leadership to make territorial concessions as required by the West as a prelude to a comprehensive peace. Inside Serbia, hyper-inflation had reached the highest in the world since the Weimar Republic. Economic collapse was almost total; mass poverty was spreading, and an alternative cast of populists and nationalists awaited President Milosevic's departure from the scene.<sup>2</sup>

Indecisive Western policies were going on. In January, a spokesman for Boutros-Ghali ruled out the threat of using NATO planes to force the Serbs to give the UN humanitarian access to the Muslim 'safe area' of Srebrenica and open Tuzla airport to international aid flights. Boutros-Ghali asked his political representative in Bosnia, Yasushi Akashi, to prepare a report on the feasibility of deploying NATO planes to force the Serbs to cooperate with the UN aid efforts. Meanwhile Lord Owen, the EU mediator, dismissed suggestions that the threat of airstrikes could force the Bosnian Serbs to be more flexible in the partition talks.<sup>3</sup>

“By the time of the NATO summit in Brussels in January, 1994, roles had become so utterly reversed that France was able to assume the mantle of leadership in NATO by calling

strike a deal with Croatian President Tudjman on the status of the Serbs in Croatia. Likewise in Bosnia, it was far from certain that he could get the Bosnian Serb leadership to make territorial concessions as required by the West as a prelude to a comprehensive peace. Inside Serbia, hyper-inflation had reached the highest in the world since the Weimar Republic. Economic collapse was almost total; mass poverty was spreading, and an alternative cast of populists and nationalists awaited President Milosevic's departure from the scene.<sup>2</sup>

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“By the time of the NATO summit in Brussels in January, 1994, roles had become so utterly reversed that France was able to assume the mantle of leadership in NATO by calling

for airstrikes to halt Serbian attacks around Sarajevo. The US administration followed France's lead. As always throughout the conflict, France's motivation in seeking this threat was not to promote a just peace by reversing or even halting Serbian aggression, but rather to obtain a quick settlement. Indeed, France had, until then, been a leading opponent of air action."<sup>4</sup>

Washington's policy of benign neglect had, in the meantime, provoked new strains with both France and Britain, who sought to get the US to play a more active diplomatic role in the peace process. The French and the British were particularly irked by the US refusal to put greater pressure on the Bosnian Muslims to accept the plans for partition, which they viewed as the main obstacle to a settlement. The US, in turn, felt that the Europeans were all too ready to accept 'peace at any price' and that their approach smacked of appeasement. Initially the US resisted this pressure, both on moral grounds that the Bosnian Muslims were victims and that any peace settlement had to be acceptable to them and out of concern for its relations with the Muslim world more broadly.<sup>5</sup>

But the mortar attack on the market place in Sarajevo in February 1994, killing sixty-eight people, led to a change in US' stance. The media attention was extremely high: this caused panic in the government and created the feeling that 'something must be done.'

The mortar attack had two prime results. First, it galvanized the US to get more actively involved in the peace negotiations and to throw its diplomatic weight behind a settlement. Second, it led to the ultimatum to the Serbs on February 10, threatening to use air strikes to prevent the Serb strangulation of Sarajevo. In effect, the ultimatum represented a tacit deal: the US would join the peace efforts in return for European - especially French and British - support for air strikes. Indeed, the ultimatum was largely attributable to French pressure and represented a fusion of French and American proposals. This threat of air strikes was very important in the sense that they came just after Lord Owen's statement of 'nobody but a fool wants air strikes', speaking in Belgrade ( 7 Feb. 1994) on one o'clock news, BBC.<sup>6</sup>

In the meantime the Bosnian Moslems had built up their army to nearly 200.000. They had acquired fresh military equipment despite the UN arms embargo and received financial backing from some Moslem states. In central Bosnia the Moslems had been making territorial gains, mostly against the Croats, to the extent that Croatia was risking UN sanctions by sending Croatian regular troops to bolster the Bosnian Croat forces.<sup>7</sup> Though many governments remained unconvinced that air strikes would contribute to peace

efforts in Bosnia, the wave of horrors that followed the shelling outrage in Sarajevo forced NATO to be seen to be taking action. Russia had in the meantime accused Boutros-Ghali of exceeding his mandate by calling for airstrikes, and argued that a full meeting of the UNSC should take place first. That would give Russia the opportunity to veto air strikes.<sup>8</sup>

Within this cloudy atmosphere, NATO planes bombed some Serbian targets. This was a limited military operation to warn the Serbs to comply with the international decisions and stop their aggression. However, this was not to be followed by further military actions, which in turn encouraged the Serbs to continue their attacks on Srebrenica and Gorazde.<sup>9</sup> Meanwhile, NATO had issued an ultimatum to the Serbs, demanding a NATO-defined heavy-weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo. This injected NATO and, by implication, the US directly into the conflict. From then onwards, American diplomacy undertook open advocacy for the Muslim-led Bosnian government.

President Clinton held a press conference on February 21 and said that:

“ we intend to remain vigilant. The UN and NATO will continue to conduct intensive reconnaissance and monitoring of the Sarajevo area. The NATO decision stands. We will continue to enforce the exclusion zone. Any shelling of Sarajevo or the appearance of heavy

weapons in the exclusion zone will bring a certain and swift response from the UN and NATO. Second, we are working to renew progress toward a negotiated solution among the parties. A workable, enforceable solution acceptable to all parties is the only way to ensure a lasting solution for Sarajevo and for all of Bosnia".<sup>10</sup>

#### **4.1 The US Efforts To Bring the Moslems and the Croats Together**

NATO's apparent success in forcing the withdrawal of heavy guns around Sarajevo constituted a breathing space which helped President Clinton to renew US efforts to achieve peace in Bosnia. The most important achievement in the Bosnian war account was one of the American initiative to bring the Moslems and the Croats together. This required heavy political pressure by the US on the Croatian Government of President Tudjman, threatening economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, should Zagreb reject it. The US also pressed Germany, the European ally closest to the Croats, to add its own weight to the campaign to push Croatia into talks. Given that Croatia always wanted to improve its position in the eyes of the Western countries, in particular Germany, and that from the very beginning of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, it wanted to be integrated to the West, this was a good opportunity for President Tudjman to reverse its bad image in the West.

These efforts were soon to bear fruit. On 18 March 1994 in Washington DC, a Croat-Moslem Federation was formed. The federation agreement was a highly successful step in the peace process. First of all, it ended the war between Bosnia's Croats and Muslims. It freed both parties from having to fight on two fronts. It turned the attention of the two warring factions against their common enemy, while winning formal commitments from them to constitutional arrangements to restore peace, promote interethnic coexistence, and inculcate democratic values and processes. Secondly it opened up the possibility for arms shipments to reach the Moslem forces via Croatian ports. For instance, in spring 1995, press reports were quoting the US Administration officials as confirming that the US had for sometime been ignoring shipments of arms from Iran bound for Croatia and being forwarded to Bosnia. Later the press also reported that the US had given Croatia an implicit green light to serve as a port of entry. It seems likely that these arms played a role in helping the Bosnian Muslim forces stem, and, later, turn, the tide in their war with the Bosnian Serbs.<sup>11</sup>

This federal plan differed in several important respects from the Owen-Stoltenberg partition. Though it provided for a high level of autonomy for each group, it was based on territorial unity, while, at the same time, retaining

a strong and viable central government. The plan contained the highest level of human rights guarantees, as well as provisions for the independence of the judiciary. Founded on a far more realistic and workable division of power between the groups, and between executive and legislative branches of the government on both the local and federal levels, it created a more workable framework within which all Bosnians could operate peacefully.

The quality and strength of the federation were discussed by a number of experts whether it was a perfect federation or not and whether it could last long. This is debatable. But what was crucial indeed was the operativeness of the plan in destroying Serbian war plans and forcing them to accept peace proposals. For instance, the agreement to halt the fighting in Mostar and other parts of Hercegovina between the Croats and Muslims was a blow to the Serbs, since Milosevic's strategy of divide and rule was thwarted.<sup>12</sup>

Despite all efforts, the Serbs did not alter their attitude and in the latter part of March 1994, they attacked Gorazde, a town supposedly one of the 'safe areas' under UN protection. This was a direct challenge by the Serbs to the UN forces. Renewed fighting in Gorazde in April led to a serious split between Britain and France on the one side, and the US on the other; there had been

limited NATO action to try to stop the Serbs closing in on the town, and the UN contingent there was more or less held hostage. The attacks on Gorazde intensified the debate in the US between those who advocated an intensive bombing of Serb positions and those, mostly in the Defense Department, who were skeptical about the ability of air power to play a decisive role in Bosnia. Many military commanders feared that the use of air power would drag the US into an open ended conflict that could not be won militarily, except by the introduction of ground troops, a commitment they opposed vehemently, and one which the Administration had repeatedly ruled out. Many civilian experts on the other hand, argued that air power could be used to achieve limited objectives and provide an incentive for the Serbs to return to the negotiating table. They pointed out that the Serbs, including the Yugoslav Army, generally feared, and avoided battle with US forces. For example, in spring 1993, when the prospects for US-led airstrikes appeared possible, the Serbs had backed off and agreed provisionally to the negotiation process. Then, as it became clear that a US military operation was not going to happen, they had got bolder. According to some observers, the fighting quality of the Serbian forces and the real military threat they could pose to outside forces had been exaggerated. That was not to say, however, that the air power alone would provide an outright military victory, since small artillery, such as mortars,

could be easily hidden, and heavy guns could be moved. Nevertheless, they argued with justice as the bombing campaign by NATO in 1995 clearly indicated air strikes could inflict substantial damage, which the Serbs would seek to avoid.

In addition, the Serb compliance with the February ultimatum initially seemed 'to vindicate the limited application of force' school and demonstrated that when faced with a credible threat of use of force the Serbs would back down. However, the shelling of Gorazde now called this assumption into question, rekindling the debate. Many Pentagon officials now expressed doubt that the success of Sarajevo could be extended to protecting other Moslem safe havens. Their argument was that the situation in Gorazde and other Moslem safe havens was quite different from that in Sarajevo, and therefore, did not lend itself to the use of air power. These utterances by the Pentagon did little to persuade many civilian officials who resolutely maintained that airpower could achieve limited goals and provide important diplomatic leverage. The problem in Gorazde, they argued, was not the use of airstrikes but that too little airpower was used too modestly.<sup>13</sup>

Administration officials were saying in March that the new Pentagon team of Mr. William Perry - Defense Secretary - and General John Shalikashvili - the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - was more flexible about using force for limited aims than their predecessors, Les Aspin and Colin Powell, and that the issue of expanding the use of air power to protect other Moslem enclaves was still open. But on April 5, General Shalikashvili said

“it did not make sense to employ air strikes to protect civilians in Gorazde. He cited the fact that in Sarajevo the Serbs were using heavy weapons that could be targeted by air strikes more closely than the small arms being employed around Gorazde. In addition, he said there were not enough UN peacekeepers to enforce any such ultimatum.”<sup>14</sup>

An analysis of the debate as to whether to use airstrikes against the Serbs in Gorazde appears to suggest that the civilian and the military within the US administration fought on two levels: substantive and tactical. At one level, the debate focused on what military actions the US might take with its allies. Apparently one idea was the establishment of a ‘no fire’ zone around Gorazde in which Serbian guns that had been pounding the town with impunity would be subject to retaliatory air strikes. This option was discussed between UNSC and the US State Department officials. However, General Shalikashvili nipped in the bud all such plans by saying at a news conference that using

airstrikes in the near future was out of the question. Beyond the debate over whether to use force, another level of disagreement came about: the wisdom of publicly playing down prospects for using force. In doing so, Pentagon officials were eager to point out they were just trying to clear with the Congress and the public about the limits of military power and avoid raising unrealistic expectations. But the State Department officials responded that Washington needed to keep open the possibility of air strikes to maintain leverage over the Serbs as the diplomats were trying to negotiate an end to the war. And public utterances ruling out the use of air force would serve no other purpose than encourage the Serbs to intensify their attacks. They also pointed out that the US and its allies had an obligation to protect the Bosnian towns that the UN has designated as safe areas. State Department officials pointed to an August 1993 resolution adopted by the NATO that threatened the use of airstrikes to lift the Bosnian Serbs' sieges not only of Sarajevo, but of other areas.

All these efforts were to be complicated by a lack of decision from the commander of the UN peacekeeping troops as to what military steps he deemed necessary to protect Gorazde. Therefore, when the Serbs intensified their attacks on Gorazde on April 10th, Warren Christopher was quick to say

that it was up to General Michael Rose to decide whether the situation on the ground warranted air strikes. And when the Serbs closed in on Gorazde, two US F-16s attacked the Serb forces acting for the first time on its long-standing threat to use air power to protect Bosnian towns designated as the UN safe havens. Officials at NATO headquarters in Brussels said that the operation brought an immediate halt to Serbian artillery fire.<sup>15</sup>

But It was very important to note that the air attacks brought a new realism to the Bosnian Serbs who had brazenly tested the will of the international community and exploited every sign of hesitation and departmental infighting among Western governments. And President Clinton's statements "while not committing the US to a broad role, left no doubt that US air power would be available if similar, narrowly defined attacks were requested in the future."<sup>16</sup>

Unfortunately those actions were still inadequate to stop the Serbian aggression. In late April, Bosnian Serbs shot down a British plane near Gorazde. Although the US made it clear to the UN and the NATO allies that Washington would continue to support the use of close air support and, if necessary, air strikes under current NATO authorization to protect peacekeepers in Gorazde, soon it came out that General Michael Rose had

decided not to request immediate retaliatory air strikes for the downing of the British plane and that the Washington supported that decision.

All of this was indication that the US was being drifted away by events, and that Serb attacks in Bosnia were fostering more discussion, leading to departmental infighting within the US administration. And there appeared no end to these discussions, the continuation of which served no other purpose than embolden the Serbs. There was also indication that the differences of opinion between the US and its European allies were becoming so wide that under these circumstances the US with no clear policy option would continue to fluctuate from the use of force to doing nothing as the following events showed clearly. For instance, France, which had joined US in February in leading NATO ultimatum to the Serbs around Sarajevo, now made clear to the Clinton Administration that it had no desire to ask for new NATO authority to punish the Serbs. Instead, France was seeking American support for a plan to revive a European initiative that envisioned the gradual lifting of sanctions against the Serbs and to put the US and Russia on 'an equal footing' in pressing for a negotiated settlement. Mr. Kozyrev, the Russian Foreign Minister, who was quick to endorse the French initiative offered to try to persuade the Serbs to accept a cease-fire in Bosnia and a resumption of the

talks in exchange for a pledge of a limited lifting of sanctions. Instead of rejecting it, the US State Department indicated that the US would be willing to discuss how sanctions could be progressively lifted after a cease-fire was achieved, while Warren Christopher was reportedly opposed to what he called the premature lifting of sanctions, arguing with justice that the Serbs should not be rewarded until there was a genuine peace.

#### **4.2. The Contact Group and the US**

After the Gorazde fiasco, the Western countries formed a 'Contact Group' composed of the representatives of the UN, the EU, the US and Russia. The Group was set up not to continue direct, multilateral negotiations among the parties themselves, and bilateral negotiations between mediators and the parties. Instead, it was to promote negotiations among representatives of the great powers to find a plan that all would be willing to impose on the parties. The peace plan which the Contact group put together was the famous partition with 51 percent going to the Muslim-Croat Federation and 49 percent to the Serbs. This plan was mostly prepared by the European members of the Contact Group, including Russia, and the US, however grudgingly, endorsed it.

The initial US plan was apparently different from that. As Professor Ivo Banac in his article in the National Review<sup>17</sup> underlines, on May 14, Clinton's pointman, Charles Redman, got the Moslems and Croats to agree on a map of Bosnian federation. According to this arrangement, Bosnian Moslems and Croats (jointly 55.31 per cent of Bosnia's population) would control 55 per cent of the land, to be divided into eight cantons (four Moslem, two Croat, and two joint), while the Bosnian Serbs ( 28.37 per cent of Bosnia's population) would get, whether they joined the federation or not, with control of 42 per cent of the land, located in four separate areas, two of them contiguous with Serbia or Montenegro. The Bosnian capital of Sarajevo would form a separate district with 3 per cent of Bosnia's territory. In short, the percentages were 58 to 42 against the Serbs. The map had the advantage of cutting out the Serb supply corridor at Brcko, without which the Serb domination of western Bosnia and the adjacent areas of Croatia could not be maintained. On May 13, the day before the agreement was signed, Warren Christopher effectively erased everything the US had accomplished in Vienna through the efforts of Charles Redman by accepting in Geneva the new plan of the so-called Contact Group which reduced the advantage of the Bosnian Croats' and Muslims' hold over the Bosnian Serbs to 51-49 and dangled the

possibility of a plebiscite for an “Anschluss” - Union - with Serbia within two years.<sup>18</sup>

The signals from the parties about the proposed partition plan; 51-49 percent were not heart-warming. The Serbs rejected it on the grounds that it made them give up too much conquered territory. By the same token, the Moslem-Croat federation declared that the plan let the Serbs keep too much. President Milosevic pressed Karadzic to accept the proposal because he was desperate to win favor with the international community and remove the crippling UN sanctions which had brought Serbia's economy to its knees. He went as far as to threaten to cut back the finance and weapons that kept Bosnian Serb rebels fighting if they rejected the plan. At this stage, in order to encourage all sides to accept the deal, the US expressed readiness to send a ‘significant number’ of troops to Bosnia if the peace plan won acceptance: US officials said that, if an agreement were to take hold, President Clinton would propose dispatching at least 15.000 US troops to make up about half a peacekeeping force.<sup>19</sup> At the same time, Washington also expressed readiness to accept an expanded military role in the event of renewed fighting. This was the first sign that the Administration was under strong pressure from the US Legislature to take a

more active stance on Bosnia perhaps beginning with the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian government.

### **4.3. The Congressional Support For Bosnia and the Clinton Administration**

In August 1994 there was concerted pressure on the Bosnian Serb leaders to accept the peace plan. President Milosevic in order to prevent the sanctions on his country from becoming toughened urged the Bosnian Serbs to accept it. He said otherwise Serbia proper would have to consider severing its political and economic ties with them. But in an escalating power struggle among the Serbs, the Bosnian Serbs' self-styled parliament in Pale rejected the plan, which put President Milosevic at odds with Karadzic and Mladic. President Milosevic even went as far as to accuse them of pursuing 'insane political ambitions' and of being motivated with 'greed'.<sup>20</sup>

It was in this confused atmosphere that President Clinton issued his threat to the Bosnian Serbs, warning them that the US might have defy the international arms embargo unilaterally on Bosnian Government despite objections from its European allies. Though the White House still reacted positively to Serbia's

announcement that it was cutting off all ties with the Bosnian Serbs, it warned that it was high time to see deeds not just words. All of this, however, fell on deaf ears and the US soon grasped that nothing was changing on the ground. This moved President Clinton to reverse his rejection of unilateralism from September and particularly October onwards and he threatened to lift the arms embargo after 15 October unless the Bosnian Serbs accepted the peace plan put forward by the Contact Group. It soon became clear that the US Congress was the most important factor in Clinton Administration's new unilateral approach. Therefore, it is imperative to have a look at the Congress' line during the process.

True, the disagreement between the Clinton administration and the Congress on policy towards Bosnia was turning to harsh criticisms by the Congress by the late 1993. But, as an analysis of the history of relations between Clinton Administration and the Congress would indicate, this disagreement was part of the general struggle for influence in policy-making between the Executive and the Legislature. For instance, although in late 1994 the Congress was pressing for unilateral actions by the US headed by the Senate republican leader Bob Dole; earlier in late 1993, the latter, then Senate minority leader of Kansas by an amendment wanted to limit the use of funds for military

operations in Haiti without advance authorization from the Congress. And another amendment, sponsored by Sens. Don Nickles (R) of Oklahoma and Thad Cochran (R) of Mississippi, required that the US troops in a UN operation should serve only under US command.<sup>21</sup>

In January 1994, Bob Dole in his article in the **The New York Times** explained the ‘peace powers act’ that he had just introduced which included principles like ‘prohibit US troops from serving under foreign command on UN operations’, ‘bar US forces from any standing UN army’, ‘ put congress in the loop...’. He conceded that his bill would not solve all the problems of ‘subcontracting US policy to an over-ambitious UN’. Nevertheless, by making the Congress a full partner in major decisions, the act would ensure that “US foreign policy interests, soldiers and tax payers are better protected.”<sup>22</sup> From May 1994 onwards the relation between the President and the Congress became strained on US policy towards Bosnia. On 12 May, the Senate demanded that the President breaks the UN embargo on arms supplies to Bosnia, even if that meant taking action alone. Though many of those who backed this change had been vocal opponents of sending US ground troops and even of authorizing US air strikes, they supported lifting the embargo so

that the Bosnians rather than the Americans could defend Bosnia. But President Clinton opposed the proposal vehemently.

The irony was that lifting the Bosnian arms embargo was President Clinton's preferred option all along only to be resisted and stopped in 1993 by strenuous British and French objections. At this new juncture, France, Britain and Russia viewed with alarm the prospect of the Senate forcing an American arms lift to the Bosnians. That, they maintained, would expose their troops to an intensified war. British officials were quick to emphasize that the Senate decision would not be binding on the President. Yet they conceded that it would increase pressure for far reaching change on the ground that might involve a withdrawal of all UN forces. France, the largest contributor to the UN Protection Force in Bosnia, subscribed to Britain's view. According to these European arguments, by listening to Mr. Dole President Clinton would trigger a confrontation with Russia.

There was now clear indication that the President's powers to stick to his 'Europeanized' policy on Bosnia had eroded. He had by then run out of explanations why he was doing nothing in the face of an ongoing genocide and why he still expected the Europeans to take appropriate measures to stop

the carnage when European implication in the whole war had been revealed by press reporting. Fearing that a Presidential veto would expose the President to similar charges, the US officials calculated that now was not the time for a confrontation with the Congress. Bob Dole in explaining his bill, proposing the lifting of the arms embargo by the US unilaterally said that:

“US action to lift this illegal and immoral arms embargo against Bosnia is long over due.<sup>23</sup> This is an opportunity to do what is morally right and to demonstrate the global leadership that only the US can provide. It is time for the US to stop hiding behind the failed policies of the UN and start doing the right thing. The embargo is illegal. It was imposed on Yugoslavia, a country which no longer exists. And it violates article 51 of the UN charter, which guarantees the right of member nations, including Bosnia, to self-defense.”<sup>24</sup>

The Bosnia pressure on Clinton grew when the bill was passed in the House of Representatives on June 9th. The House of Representatives voted to require the US to stop enforcing the UN arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia and to supply weapons to the Bosnian Moslem government. The vote, by 244 to 178, did not have the force of law but it was a clear warning to the Administration. There was fierce exchanges among members of the House: Congressman Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, warned that it would merely aggravate the conflict in Bosnia while Congressman Jerrold Nadler countered that the embargo was ‘the

handmaid of genocide'. The adopted bill required the President to terminate the US arms embargo on Bosnian government upon receipt from that government of a request for assistance in exercising its right of self defense. It authorized the President to provide 'appropriate military assistance' and the transfer of up to 200 million US dollars worth of military equipment and training services to the Bosnian government. Although the Senate had also passed a similar resolution, its language was different, and identical versions would have to be passed in both chambers before the measure could become law.<sup>25</sup>

Confronted with that, President Clinton said that he favored lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia but that he did not want to act unilaterally in defiance of the wishes of the European countries which provided the bulk of the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia. From then onwards the US policy began to fluctuate more from acting in collusion with the Europeans to an express support for the lifting of the arms embargo under pressure from the Congress. In fact, Russia, Western Europe and the US had agreed earlier in the summer of 1994 that they would consider lifting the embargo if Bosnia accepted the latest international peace plan and the Bosnian Serbs rejected it. But when that did in fact happen, Europe would not act on its promise, leading the US

Senate to vote, as the House already had, to demand that the Clinton administration try to get the embargo lifted in the UNSC.<sup>26</sup> President Clinton accordingly promised that unless the Serbs accepted peace terms by October 15, he would seek UNSC approval for an end to the UN arms embargo against Bosnia. “If he fails to win worldwide support by November 15, he has told Congress, he will break the embargo on his own.”<sup>27</sup>

In other words, as a well-known American Columnist put it,:

“Mr. Clinton’s impotence with American allies led the US Senate to propose an ultimatum with a deadline. ‘If the Bosnian Serbs have not accepted the Contact Group’s proposal of July 6, 94...by October 15, 94 the president should formally introduce and support a resolution in the UN Security Council to terminate the international arms embargo.’ If that proposal is vetoed, says the Senate, the president should submit a plan to lift the embargo unilaterally....This ultimatum was proposed because the world has learned that the way to make peace with the Bosnian Serbs is to put guns to their heads”.<sup>28</sup>

However, hopes for unilateral US action were to be dashed again in early October, when the last shreds of a separate US policy vanished: the Administration walked away from President Clinton’s earlier written pledge to the Congress to seek a UNSC vote to lift the arms embargo by October 15. The excuse was that Bosnia’s government was now willing to delay lifting the

embargo until spring 1995, provided that the UNSC took binding action on it immediately. Despite all, under continuing pressure from the Congress from November and especially December onwards the US began to make the world feel its weight more heavily on the Bosnian issue. The NATO-UN relationship on the ground was deteriorating fast and the credibility of NATO began to be questioned more widely than ever before.<sup>29</sup>

In November 1994 “under a congressional mandate, US ships which had been working alongside US-NATO allies and Western European Union contingents, were in effect told they should no longer interdict vessels carrying arms to the Bosnian Muslims nor would they be allowed to exchange intelligence information about such activities with US allies”<sup>30</sup>. This was an important step showing that the US was underlying its stance on the issue.

“ Shortly after this, a similar decision was taken by the Turkish government. However, this change in the position of two NATO members did not affect the other allies. Upon the US decision NATO Secretary General Willy Claes made clear that the alliance would continue to carry out ‘operation sharp guard and fully implement enforcement of all embargoes’.”<sup>31</sup>

All this deteriorating relationship between the UN and NATO and NATO’s inaction was severely criticized by the Republican leader in the Congress, Mr.

Dole from late November onwards. He expressed frustration with the UN's role and stated that "the UN should get off NATO's back and let NATO take care of Serbian aggression and tell them I do not see any reason for their existence if they have to take orders from the UN."<sup>32</sup>

In fact the UN position had become weird in Bosnia because the real aim of the UN peacekeepers was to protect the safe areas and the Bosnians from Serb attacks. But at the end of November 1994, up to 400 peacekeepers were being detained by the Bosnian Serbs. Faced with renewed criticisms, President Clinton was now prepared to commit up to 4000 American troops to help in evacuation of British and other UN forces from Bosnia should they be evacuated.<sup>33</sup>

Even at this stage, the US did not appear prepared to break with its European Allies. Therefore, in mid-December the US and France drew closer to find a solution. According to diplomats at NATO headquarters, each country had a hidden as well as an overt agenda. France was promoting a plan to regroup and reinforce the UN mission in Bosnia, which would have the happy side effect of making it much easier to withdraw should that become unavoidable. The US threw its weight behind the idea of a massive NATO operation to

provide “cover for an eventual UN pull-out from Bosnia. If it ever goes ahead, this operation would also have a side-effect: it would satisfy the long standing US demand for effective western intervention against the Serbs.<sup>34</sup> But it was obvious that all these talks were getting nowhere.

While those plans or tactics were being discussed, the former US president Jimmy Carter went to Bosnia with a sudden Balkan peace mission and in December 24th Bosnian Serbs and Muslims signed a country-wide interim cease-fire agreement.<sup>35</sup> This truce, in fact, gave the US time to make a quick reevaluation of its policy, the positive and negative impacts of the decisions, and maybe the parameters of a new and more independent foreign policy were determined during this break. Such a reevaluation was certainly necessary as the year 1994 clearly pointed to a confusion in US policy-making.

“Press reports during this period provide a kaleidoscope of shifting positions with senior US leaders cited as having no appetite for increasing military action one day and then wanting more military action days later. This uncertainty reflected the administration’s inability to develop a policy that would attain the results it wanted - a peaceful, harmonious, multiethnic and preferably unified Bosnia - while avoiding the introduction of US forces that would be required to impose such a policy assuming that it could be imposed”.<sup>36</sup>

## **CHAPTER V**

### **MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 1995 AND THE US POLICY:**

#### **5.1. The Situation on the Ground at the Beginning of 1995**

The year 1995 started with a four-month truce which had been worked out by ex-president Jimmy Carter. He worked out the broad lines of the cease-fire, but then it fell to the UN commander in Bosnia, to nail down the details. The Muslim-led government and the Bosnian Serbs had signed the truce but the Serbs from the Krajina region of Croatia, fighting in the northwest Bihac enclave, had not.

With a four-month cease-fire in place in Bosnia and broadly holding for now, it was thought that political negotiations could be pursued by the Contact Group. During this truce, officials from the five nations seeking peace in Bosnia, reached an outline agreement in February 1995 on a plan that would offer a further easing of sanctions on Serbia in exchange for its recognition of Bosnia and Croatia. The US agreed with these new proposals but it appeared that some differences persisted between France and the US over what degree of sanctions relief President Milosevic should be offered. The French favored

a complete suspension while the Clinton administration wanted to be more cautious by offering progressive relief. Under both countries' plans, sanctions were to be quickly reimposed if Milosevic were seen to be giving military aid to the Bosnian or Croatian Serbs. But it was not easy to lure the Serbs. For instance, President Milosevic found it difficult to recognise Bosnia and Croatia. At the time, about 70 per cent of Bosnia and close to a third of Croatia were held by Serbs whom he himself had created and supported. Thus, recognition of Bosnia and Croatia within their international borders would, in the eyes of many Serbs, amount to President Milosevic's formal betrayal of the Serbs' dream of uniting in a single state.<sup>1</sup>

The consent of the US to this proposal was shocking in many respects as Marshall Freeman Harris, a former US Bosnia desk officer in the State Department who had resigned in protest at US inaction explains in his article entitled 'Clinton's Debacle in Bosnia'<sup>2</sup>,

“ twenty months earlier the administration had decided to launch, albeit ineptly, a policy to halt Serbian aggression with airstrikes and a full weapons program for Milosevic's victims. Now it was prepared to take no action at all against Serbia if Milosevic would merely grant diplomatic recognition to his besieged neighbors. This capitulation brought Russia out of the cold and into open support of Serbia's demand for an unconditional suspensions of sanctions”.

Indeed the US policy was still drifting. The only good thing was that the Administration was still revising its policy, and this revision coupled with continuous pressure from the Congress led the US to a point where there was much less hesitancy about the use of force than ever before.

Meanwhile, the situation on the ground was moving. On March 6, Croatia formed a military alliance with the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia that added muscle to the anti-Serb front in both republics. The Croat-Bosnia Accord theoretically would permit Croatia to get officially involved in fighting in Bosnia, in those areas such as the north-western Bihac pocket on the Croatian border. With support from the Croatian Government, the Federation was now in a stronger position in the battlefield and eventually at the negotiating table against the Serbs. The US appeared to be pleased with this development while the UN expressed uneasiness. From May onwards, the Bosnian War started to be fastened and so did the US calculations on the future of it. First of all Croatia reoccupied Western Slavonia. This was a good sign of the Croatian military improvement against the Serbs. There were press reports citing that the US had given Croatia a green light to serve as a port of entry for the Iranian shipments of arms that would then be delivered to the Bosnian

army.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, the Serbian mortar attacks on Sarajevo were continuing and the fears for the future of safe areas were growing. These attacks continued to create an outcry.<sup>4</sup>

In particular, when the Bosnian Serbs took 350 UN peacekeepers hostage after a NATO bombing of an ammunition depot near their headquarters of Pale, this public anger began to be more noticeable, and President Clinton prodded the UN to order NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb positions. The goal of the new policy, as outlined by US officials, was “to use consistent force to oblige the Bosnian Serbs to respect UN resolutions and peacekeepers in Bosnia, thus reviving prospects for peace and preserving the embattled UN mission.”<sup>5</sup>

The scenes of UN soldiers taken as hostages by the Serbs were really humiliating. Western countries were pressing Milosevic to help release them. Britain and France decided to send in a rapid-reaction force to strengthen UN troops. But it soon turned out that the driving force behind this idea of sending in a rapid reaction force was these European countries' doubts over the NATO plan. Because the US believed it should be under full NATO (i.e. US) control during any temporary action, and that US commanders should in effect control all operations in Bosnia during this time, France repeated the

same old objections saying that this would jeopardize peace-keepers elsewhere in Bosnia, and that it would make it difficult to return to normal UN operations. Once more the European argument prevailed and the new rapid reaction force effectively sidelined the NATO version. Nevertheless, NATO continued to plan for its own force, and that it began to express doubts over the Anglo-French force's ability to fulfill the same functions. It was clear that under pressure from the Congress as well as the engaged US public, President's ability to resist involvement in Bosnia on a larger scale than it had been the case was being curtailed. He stated, for instance, in a speech at the US air force academy that "after consulting with the Congress, I believe we should be prepared to assist NATO if it decides to meet a request from the UN troops for help in a withdrawal, or a reconfiguration and strengthening of its forces".<sup>6</sup> The announcement was welcomed by the Europeans who took it at its face value. But it was swiftly decried by Republicans and Democrats at home. Robert Dole, the senate majority leader, challenged Clinton's policy by announcing that he would introduce legislation within a few days barring any use of American ground troops except to assist a total withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping force.<sup>7</sup>

In the second half of June, thousands of Bosnian Croat troops and regular Croatian troops, allied to the Bosnian government declared themselves ready to coordinate their efforts against the Serb separatists. The Bosnian government army launched one of the biggest offensive against the Serbs by breaking through their supply lines and opening up fronts all around the besieged capital of Sarajevo. Meanwhile, some US analysts and politicians were calling for a covert build-up of the Bosnian government army in accordance with the 'Reagan Doctrine'.

“In the 1980s President Reagan’s administration successfully countered the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and destabilized a pro-Soviet regime in Nicaragua by supplying local resistance fighters with sophisticated weapons. Arguing that US should apply the same principles to the Bosnian conflict, Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposed arming, training and resupplying the government army, giving it financial assistance, and sharing intelligence with it. The policy would not involve any US or foreign troops, but would actively engage America in support of the Bosnian Government”<sup>8</sup>

Though Britain and France, which had the largest contingents, threatened to pull their troops out of Bosnia if the embargo was to be lifted, advocates of covertly arming the Bosnians contended that the 'gradual erosion' of the arms embargo would not cause a UN withdrawal. Even if it did, the new weapons would help the Bosnians defeat an expected Serbian onslaught and enable

them to start winning back some of the seventy percent of Bosnia occupied by the Serbs.

These discussions taking place in the US led to a new row between the US and the Europeans. For instance, few days after this new NATO intelligence reports indicated that the Bosnian Serbs had been equipped by the Belgrade government with advanced ground-to-air missiles which had been locked into a sophisticated radar system used by the former Yugoslav Federal Army, France continued to accuse the US of arming the Muslims, arguing that the US backed military action by the Muslim Bosnians whereas the Europeans were neutral.

The French accusation underlined once again the continuing divisions over Bosnia between the US and its European Allies. The US believed that the Europeans' neutrality in the war had had the effect of consolidating Bosnian Serb gains, while the Europeans faulted the US for advocating support for the Muslims without regard to the possibility that this could spark a wider Balkan War.<sup>9</sup> The irony was that although the US had never ruled out using military force all along, the European Powers, Britain and France, managed to keep the US from moving along the line of military action. This was still the case on

the eve of one of the severest Serb onslaughts on the 'safe areas' in Eastern Bosnia.

## **5.2. The Fall of the Safe Areas and the US**

In July, the Serbs captured the two 'safe areas' in the east, Srebrenica and Zepa, leaving a third, Gorazde exposed to a Serb onslaught. This increased the uneasiness and humiliation of the Western powers. The UN's moral credibility was all but destroyed. It led to a NATO warning that any attacks on safe areas would incur massive air strikes while the then reported mass killings at Srebrenica raised the possibility of a disastrous, US assisted evacuation of UN forces. But clearly the Europeans' wavering was still going on. It was presumably at this stage that the Administration began to reassess its role.

Meanwhile, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic had been indicted by the UN War Crimes Tribunal. All this moved the US to conclude that it had to do something with or without the Allies. For one thing, any further inaction under the pretext that the Administration wished to act together with European allies was likely to stir enormous difficulties with the Congress. For another, with the election year looming ahead, the Administration could no longer

explain to the enraged American public its inaction in the face of an ongoing genocide which daily filled television screens. While the US reassessment was going on, the Croats took the offensive in the occupied Krajina, recovering the gateway to the Dalmatian coast, with its lucrative tourist industry, without having to give political autonomy to the region's Serbian population.<sup>10</sup>

The reaction of President Clinton and other US officials to the Croatian onslaught was to ask the Croats 'to exercise real restraint' and to suggest that it was 'animated by the Serbian attack on Bihac'. While reluctant to condemn the Croatian action, behind - the - scenes, the US involvement in the Croat offensive created a moral imperative for the US to work for an equitable settlement for all the parties to the conflict in Bosnia as well.<sup>11</sup> Croat victory in the Krajina not only exposed Serbs to further attacks in Bosnia but it also ended all those legends about the Serbs' invincibility. Now, for instance a joint Croat-Muslim offensive was underway against Bosnian Serb strongholds in Western Bosnia.

The US now felt the need to consider the use of force in order to further peace efforts. Indeed, the National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake's earlier efforts

had prepared the ground. The President now appointed Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, as his special envoy with the task of coordinating peace efforts and negotiating all details leading to a comprehensive settlement. No sooner had Richard Holbrooke embarked on his mission than the Serbs blundered again in Bosnia. They slammed another mortar shell into the market place in Sarajevo on August 28th, 1995, killing at least 37 people and wounding more than eighty others. This was the last straw: the US could no longer defer to London or Paris. Now, unilateralism prevailed. As Mr. Holbrooke put it “the attack angered President Clinton, and he told the UN and our NATO allies that we would wait no longer; it was time to ‘hit the Bosnian Serbs hard’. His determination led to the start of the massive NATO air campaign.”<sup>12</sup>

“It was at this point, on 29 August (before NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force bombing campaign even began), that Bosnian Serb president Karadzic obtained the agreement of the Bosnian Serb Assembly to form a joint negotiating team with Serbia, a procedure which was to facilitate the negotiations leading to Dayton Accords. Indeed, while the fighting continued for weeks, this procedure allowed Serbia’s President Milosevic to negotiate on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, marked the Bosnian Serbs’ acknowledgment that they were in danger of losing even more territory, and set the state for a negotiated outcome”.<sup>13</sup>

### **5.3. The US Intervention and the Beginning of Peace Process**

In response to the 28 August Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo, and in recognition that NATO's credibility would disappear if it did not carry out its threats to respond to further Serb attacks, on 30 August the US and its NATO allies launched a concerted air campaign against Serb forces. The bombing further weakened the Serbs' ability to repulse the Croat-Muslim groups and created an important factor in persuading the Serbs to accept and reach agreement at the peace talks.

While on the one hand the NATO operation was carried out, the US was trying to persuade the parties to 'its' peace plan with the efforts of Clinton's special envoy Holbrooke through shuttle diplomacy, on the other. There is no doubt that NATO bombing of Serbs was helping to narrow those differences. Though Russia, Serbia's main ally, started complaining loudly about the duration of the NATO bombing and even some NATO countries grew uneasy about it, this time the US was in no mood to yield immediately.

The Serbs' resistance was broken soon and they expressed their readiness to accept the US' proposed peace plan. This facilitated the peace process, and in

September, two agreements at meetings of foreign ministers of the three countries, Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia - the first in Geneva on September 8th and the second in New York on September 26th - were announced. Those agreements were hailed as ‘ an important milestone’ by Richard Holbrooke and ‘ a good first step’ by President Clinton towards an overall peace agreement in the Balkans. Those accords established a single Bosnian state consisting of two entities, one Serb with the name ‘Republica Srpska’, and the other, Moslem-Croat with the title Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Territorial proposal was left for adjustment by mutual agreement. Both entities were to have the right to establish parallel special relationships with neighboring countries, consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia. The provision would only allow the Serbs to have special links to Serbia, but it would let the Bosnian government maintain and develop its ties to Croatia without jeopardizing Bosnia’s border.<sup>14</sup>

Although there were some unresolved points - for example, there was no agreement on formal recognition of Bosnia by rump Yugoslavia - the accord was no doubt a very important achievement by the US. Within 30 days, Richard Holbrooke and his team visited 11 countries which shifted the momentum towards peace. Before October, Richard Holbrooke obtained the

lifting of the siege of Sarajevo in return for a recommendation to NATO to suspend the bombing.

Until November, there were still ups and downs in the peace process. But with intense US diplomatic efforts, the US managed to start peace talks in Dayton, Ohio. And, on November 21st, a peace deal was initialed by the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. The Accord's main points are as following: NATO troops were to supervise separation of forces; Bosnia would be an internationally recognized state within its present borders; that state was to be composed of a Bosnia Serb Republic and a Muslim-Croat Federation; the capital, Sarajevo would remain united under the Muslim-Croat Federation; the central government was to include a parliament, presidency and constitutional court; free democratic elections would take place under international supervision; refugees were to be allowed to return to their homes or seek equitable compensation; human rights would be monitored by an independent commission; people indicted for war crimes were to be excluded from political life.<sup>15</sup>

The US success in brokering the Bosnia peace accord caused remorse and embarrassment in the EU, shattering its superpower illusions and underscoring

its failure to achieve a cohesive security policy that could resolve conflicts in its own backyard.<sup>16</sup> European states in the Contact Group complained of being kept barely abreast of what was going on, while Balkan leaders said they were bullied. Apparently, everybody at some stage got shouted at. Warren Christopher conceded that pressure tactics were at times used to keep the participants talking. "I must say that from time to time we urged them to do that in fairly strong terms."<sup>17</sup>

Though the peace was achieved there was still a problem that President Clinton should cope with. He had to convince the Congress to approve the deployment of 20 000 US troops to Bosnia, a third of the NATO force that was to go in to keep the peace. In order to persuade the Congress, he said that without American troops in the NATO force ' the slaughter of innocents will begin again. In the choice between peace and war, America must choose peace.' This speech was viewed as perhaps President Clinton's most important speech on a foreign policy issue, one in which he heavily invested both America's credibility and his own political future. He tried to reassure the Congress by saying that 20 000 US troops to be sent would have the firepower and the authority both to enforce the peace and to protect themselves while carrying out a mission of clear scope and limited duration.

While many Republicans opposed the sending of US troops to Bosnia, the immediate response to the President's speech was reserved.<sup>18</sup> On 13 December - a day before signing of the accord reached in Dayton - the Senate voted for the deployment of American troops, 69 to 30, on the condition that the US leads an international effort to arm and train the Bosnian government army.

The NATO force would remain in Bosnia for at least one year to help implement the Agreement at the end of 1996; the duration of that force would be extended with a new multinational peacekeeping force aimed at bringing stability to the Balkans. That meant the continuation of the presence of the US troops in the Balkans which faced a republican opposition in the Congress. The Europeans' failure in Bosnia made this quite clear that NATO works as a "substitute for European unity because at key junctures the US compels the Europeans to make tough decisions. Without US leadership in NATO, therefore, negative economic consequences will eventually touch Americans' pocketbooks".<sup>19</sup>

## CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

When the Yugoslav dissolution erupted into violence in the summer of 1991, major European powers were taken aback. The US administration did not fare any better despite the CIA's earlier warnings that the war in Yugoslavia was forthcoming. At the time, Bush Administration's attention was still firmly focused on the Gulf War and its aftermath: the Kurdish exodus into Turkey and Iran, plans to set afoot 'provide comfort' to protect them inside Northern Iraq and all the related problems. The Administration in general, and the military in particular, still looked mesmerized with the victory in the Gulf when JNA tanks rolled into Slovenia.

The war in the Balkans was certainly a challenge for the US to meet in the post cold-war era. However, as outlined throughout, the US did not appear ready to provide the required leadership, and its policies fluctuated at best, or most of the time, the US did not seem to have a policy at all while the genocidal war was going on. Much of that may well be ascribed to a number of misconceptions and misjudgments within the US policy-making circles about the causes of the conflict in Yugoslavia. The US administrations, both Bush' and Clinton', did not seem clear about the US' role in the 1990s in world affairs and the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy.

For instance, the belief among key US officials when Yugoslav unity was challenged in 1991 that Yugoslavia would somehow muddle through molded the initial approach by the US to the war in Slovenia and Croatia. The irony was that though Bush Administration became a staunch supporter of preserving Yugoslavia, on the grounds that any encouragement to secessionist forces would lead to war, and that a Yugoslav break-up might rekindle aspirations by all ethnic groups to independence, unleashing a series of armed clashes and perhaps leading to the violent dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was its policy of preservation that accelerated the slide into armed conflict in Yugoslavia. The US apparently feared that, should Socialist Republics of Yugoslav Federation disintegrate and the break-away republics be recognized, this would set an awful precedent for the Soviet Union, which the West, above all the US, had vowed to keep together at all cost with Gorbachev at its head. Oddly, the Soviet Union went through a rather fast, bloodless and unexpected break-up while the Serbs with the JNA at their disposal were carrying on with 'ethnic cleansing' campaign on a scale unseen on European soil since the Second World War. But the US policy of preserving Yugoslavia remained largely unaffected by what happened in the Soviet Union.

While non-interventionists led by Colin Powell determined the debate inside the US policy-making circles and articulated all the reasons why the US should not get militarily involved in the Balkans, the European factor provided an undecided administration with an excuse for remaining aloof. The conflict was, after all,

taking place in Europe's backyard, and the Europeans should do more to contain it.

The war in Bosnia began in the midst of the US Presidential election campaign in 1992, and the incumbent president was under considerable attack from his Democrat rival to the effect that George Bush had acted like a US Secretary of State rather than a president, and that he had neglected American economy and domestic problems. These attacks forced President Bush to duck behind the European excuse so much that he remained unmoved when the news of Serbs' death camps broke in the summer of 1992, and even when his presidential rival began criticizing his inaction over Bosnia. He and his team appeared well-entrenched in the Vietnam syndrome.

Clinton Administration took office with a vow to help Bosnians militarily. However, his domestic agenda, economy and health care, with which he was elected, was to consume much of his time. Indeed after some initial rhetoric, his team began to regard Bosnia as a distraction from home affairs. True, the Clinton team formulated the right policy, 'lift and strike' in April-May 1993, the 'strike' part of which certainly worked in late summer of 1995, but the Administration gave in easily to European pressure. And some sort of multilateralism whose content fluctuated from the UN to the European allies began to determine policy discussions within the Administration. In addition, the military, the Pentagon,

remained skeptical at best about, or absolutely opposed to, the wisdom of any military action in Bosnia for so long after the resignation of Colin Powell. In other words, though he left, his departure did not change the mindset of the top US military leadership. His military doctrine, which refused any military involvement in Bosnia, stayed alive and well within the confines of the Pentagon.

Under these circumstances, the US Administration tried to downplay the importance of Bosnia, and its policy fluctuated. Basically, the whole business was left to the Europeans to handle though, one must acknowledge, the Americans never ruled out the option of using force in the form of air strikes and the lifting of the arms embargo unilaterally on the Bosnian government. However, all this was to be done multilaterally, namely in consultation and agreement with the Europeans which did their best every now and then to indicate that the use of force to achieve a peace was out of the question.

This new equation basically tied US' hands for quite some time, particularly, in 1993 and 1994 though the US pressure brought about the Moslem-Croat Federation in 1994, which gradually became a corner-stone in the ensuing peace negotiations. All of this inhibition came to an end in 1995, when the US Administration realized that it could not really put up a fight with the Congress which had long been asking for the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian government to be combined with air strikes against Serb positions. It was clear

that the Congress's patience was wearing thin in the face of growing Serb defiance and the ongoing genocide about which there came out compelling evidence in Western press. That Serb atrocities filled daily television screens and enraged the American public was the last straw which galvanized the Administration into action with or without European allies. With the Presidential elections looming the US Administration could no longer take 'sophisticated' European counsel.

The peace deal Richard Holbrooke struck was not an indigenous American plan, though. It was mostly based on previous attempts, all of which had smacked of appeasement. It gave rise to criticism that the US acted to enforce a European peace plan, and that its implementation would lead to the partition of Bosnia. This was not without foundation. Indeed, initial implementation appeared to cement the division between the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Moslem-Croat Federation. No attempt has been made to arrest the indicted war criminals, and the general elections held in mid-September 1996 strengthened nationalists' grip over the country. It seemed that Dayton Accords rewarded ethnic cleansing and, therefore, set a bad precedent in the region. Nevertheless, the only good thing is that following a year-long deployment of NATO implementation force, IFOR, to keep peace across the country, a new force was configured, SFOR, stabilization force, with the task of building peace in Bosnia for a period of 16 months. This demonstrated US' continuing interest in stability in Bosnia,

surely the most important factor to keep the peace and prevent the partitioning of the country.

## ENDNOTES

### Notes For Chapter II

<sup>1</sup> For Tito, and the country he set up, see, Stevan K. Pavlowitch, **Tito; Yugoslavia's Great Dictator: A Reassessment.** London: C. Hurst & Co., 1992; Stevan K. Pavlowitch, For all the events leading up to the establishment of second Yugoslavia headed by Tito, see, L. S. Stavrianos, **History of the Balkans since 1453.** New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Wilson, 1965, 771-784, 813-818. Also, see, Barbara Jelavich, **History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 384-403.

<sup>2</sup> For Tito's expulsion from the Comintern and his struggle for survival in the face of Stalin's threats, see, Ivo Banac, **With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism.** Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1988.

<sup>3</sup> There is a fairly large literature on the Yugoslav break-up. See, for instance, Branka Magas, **The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up, 1980 - 1992.** London: Verso, 1993. Also, see, Misha Glenny, **The Fall Of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War.** London: Penguin, 1992, particularly the first chapter, pp. 1-30. For another account of the collapse of Yugoslavia, especially from a social and political point of view, see, Sabrina P. Ramet, **Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture and Religion in Yugoslavia.** Colorado, Westview, 1992.

<sup>4</sup> For the general idea of federalism in Tito's Yugoslavia, see, Sabrina P. Ramet, **Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962- 1992.** Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. For the history and origins of the national problems in Yugoslavia, see, Ivo Banac, **The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics.** Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1993. (third printing).

<sup>5</sup> Christopher Cviic, **Remaking the Balkans.** London: IISS, 1991. For the Albanian vantage point on Kosovo/a, see, **The Truth On Kosova.** Tirana, 1993. (edited by The Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Albania, Institute of History), in particular chapter 6, pp 222 - 328. Also, see, Hugh Poulton, **The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict.** London: Minority Rights Publications, 1993, 57-74.

<sup>6</sup> See, for the Yugoslav self-management in the running of the economy, and its gradual impact on the dissolution, Harrold Lydall, **Yugoslavia in Crisis.** Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

<sup>7</sup> See, for details, Christopher Cviic, **An Awful Warning.** London: Center For Policy Studies, 1994, 7-10.

<sup>8</sup> Christopher Cviic, (1994), **op. cit.**, 9. Also, see, Norman Cigar, **Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of 'Ethnic Cleansing'.** College Station, Texas A & M University Press, 1995, 22-27.

- <sup>9</sup> Noel Malcolm, **Bosnia: A Short History**. London: Macmillan, 1994, 234-252.
- <sup>10</sup> Christopher Cviic, (1994), **op. cit.**, page. 7-12.
- <sup>11</sup> Warren Zimmerman, “**The Last Ambassador**,” **Foreign Affairs**, (March-April 1995), 8.
- <sup>12</sup> Mark Almond, **Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans**, (London: Mandarin, 1994), 4.
- <sup>13</sup> See, for all these discussions about the future of Yugoslavia, Alan Fogelquist, **Handbook of Facts on: the Break-Up of Yugoslavia, International Policy, and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina**. Los Angeles, California: AEIOU, 1993.5-8.
- <sup>14</sup> Martin Spegelj, “**The War in Ex-Yugoslavia and Its Resolution**” , **Bosnia Report**. Newsletter of the Alliance to defend Bosnia-Herzegovina, London, 12, July-October 1995, .1-3.
- <sup>15</sup> For the role of the military in Yugoslavia and the JNA’s conduct of the war, as well as the impact of the military intervention on the political future of Yugoslavia, see, James Gow, **Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis**. London: Pinter, 1992.
- <sup>16</sup> For the war in Slovenia and Croatia, see, Mark Almond, **op. cit.**, 213-232. Also, see, Norman Cigar, “**The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991**,” in **Genocide After Emotion: The Postemotional Balkan War**. ed. Stjepan G. Mestrovic, London, New York: Routledge, 1996, 51-90.
- <sup>17</sup> F. Stephen Larrabee, “**Washington, Moscow, and the Balkans: Strategic Retreatment or Reengagement?**,” **RAND**, (Reprinted from **The Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security After the Cold War**, F. Stephen Larrabee (ed.), Washington D.C.: American University Press, 1994), 202.
- <sup>18</sup> F. Stephen Larrabee, “**The Yugoslav Crisis and US-European Relations**,” **Rand Discussion Paper**, 1994, 1.
- <sup>19</sup> F. Stephen Larrabee, (1994), “**Washington, Moscow...**”, **op. cit.**, 208.
- <sup>20</sup> Christopher Cviic, (1994), **op.cit.**, 7.
- <sup>21</sup> Warren Zimmerman, in his memoir of the collapse of Yugoslavia, ( he was the last US Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1989 to 1992.) argues that Mr. Baker simply expressed the American hope that Yugoslavia would hold together behind the reformist Ante Markovic, who by then has been reduced to a figurehead. To Milosevic and (indirectly) the Federal Army, Baker made clear that the US strongly opposed any use of force that would block democratic change. Yugoslavia could not be held together at gunpoint. Zimmerman also says that “never was a green light given or implied to Milosevic or to the army to invade the seceding republics,...But was there a red light? not as such, because the United States had given no consideration to using force to stop a Serbian /JNA attack on Slovenia or Croatia. Nor, at that point, had a single member of

Congress, as far as I know, advocated the introduction of American military power...Baker said to Prime Minister Markovic, a conduit to the army, 'If you force the United States to choose between unity and democracy, we will always choose democracy.' Baker's message was the right one, but it came too late," Warren Zimmerman, 1995, op. cit., 12.

22 Warren Zimmerman, (March-April 1995), op.cit., 15.

23 Stephen Larrabee, "The Yugoslav Crisis and US-European Relations," Rand Discussion Paper, 1994, 3.

24 Stephen Larrabee, Ibid., 4.

25 Warren Zimmerman, "The Last Ambassador," Foreign Affairs, (March-April 1995), 15.

26 Noel Malcolm, "Seeing Ghosts," Book Review, The National Interest, no: 32, (Summer 93), 84.

27 But unfortunately "it is hard to think of a single speech by any British, American, or European politician which has discussed Serbian war aims at any length, or even used the term 'war aims' at all." Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure," The National Interest, (Spring 1995),6.

28 "Responding to the imposition of sanctions against Serbia, a top Serbian General warned that Belgrade was 'ringed with rockets', adding that the republic was ready for any attempt by foreign armed forces to intervene." Marcus Tanner, "Defiant Serbs Will Go To The End," The Independent, June 2, 1992. Also, see, Jonathan S. Landay, "Serbs Tough On UN Sanctions, Despite Protests," Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1992; also available on Internet <http://www.csmonitor.com/plweb.cgi/iopcode.pl>.

29 This arms embargo was the most damaging instrument of the western world's policy on Bosnia. The resolution introducing an arms embargo (no-713) was applied to the whole of Yugoslavia, in September 1991. At that time Bosnia was still part of the Yugoslav state. But even after Bosnia was recognized as a new state, independent and separate from Yugoslavia, and on May 22 was admitted as a member-state to the United Nations, still the embargo was applied. Many experts argued consistently that this was against the international law, in particular, article 51 of the UN Charter - the right to self defense. See, for a summary of these arguments and counter-arguments, Paul Williams's Article of 25 February, 1995 in The Tablet; Douglas Hurd, "The Long Hard Slog to a Bosnian Peace," The Tablet, April 1, 1995, 412-414, 457-459, Also, see, "The Crippling Of Bosnia: An Illegitimate Embargo," The Tablet, April 15-22, 1995, 498.

30 "What needs to be learned here is not some crude, updated version of the domino theory, the argument that if one lets Milosevic win then other fascist dictators will be encouraged." David Rieff, "The Lessons of Bosnia: Morality and Power," World Policy Journal, vol. XII, no:1, (Spring 1995), 76 - 85.

31 Noel Malcolm, (1995), op. cit., , 8.

32 “It is very important to note that militarily, Bosnia- Herzegovina could hardly have been worse-off. Bosnia's Muslims were mostly city dwellers , doctors, teachers..., not fierce mujaheddin warriors. And they viewed their religion as a national identity and saw themselves as secular Europeans first, Muslims second.” See, Roy Gutman, **A Witness To Genocide: The First Inside Account of the Horrors of ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ in Bosnia**, Element Publishers, UK., 1993, xxvii. “an important element in the Bosnian war was the revival of old antagonisms between town and country, literate and illiterate and educated and uneducated, which had been largely overlaid by twentieth-century developments.” Mark Almond, **op. cit.**, 269.

33 Roy Gutman, **op. cit.**, xxviii.

34 Hella Pick, Yigal Chazan, “UN Asked To Implement Oil Embargo Against Serbia,” **The Guardian**, May 23, 1992.

35 “..limited air intervention, plus further measures of economic and political reprisals against Serbia, and against Croatia if its intervention in Bosnia continues, would not itself halt aggression but would make the combat a more equal one on the ground, and would, as well, greatly change the political context of the struggle.” William Pfaff, “**The Democracies Can’t Let Serbia Do It**,” **International Herald Tribune**, May 25, 1992.

36 Marcus Tanner, “**Gunmen Fire On UN Forces In Bosnia**,” **The Independent**, June 12, 1992.

37 “But one option is being considered: using US and possibly NATO air powers to enforce an aerial embargo over Yugoslavia, in spite of the danger of NATO combat planes being drawn into strikes against ground-to-air missile and anti-aircraft sites.” Martin Walker , “ **Bush Insists No US Troops Will Be Sent to Bosnia**,” **The Guardian**, June 12, 1992.

38 “That is not yet the language of war. But it goes well beyond normal diplo-speak. This time last year Mr. Baker was insisting that Yugoslavia must stay together at all costs; now; however, it is Washington that wants to persuade its European allies to acknowledge that military action - however flawed - may be the only way to attempt to end Sarajevo's agony.” Steve Crawshaw, “ **West Wavering Over Yugoslav Intervention**,” **The Independent**, June 25, 1992. It should be noted that, meanwhile, John Major was making statements to the effect that outside military intervention could not end the fighting in Sarajevo.

39 Andrew Stephen, Dick Leonard & Colin Smith, “**France Acts As US Ponders Bosnian Move**,” **Observer**, June 28, 1992, 15. The Pentagon, on June 26, denied speculation that the US Mediterranean Sixth Fleet, had been ‘put on alert’ for intervention in Bosnia and said it never commented on the alert status of forces but the Sixth Fleet was on an exercise which had ‘been in the work for months’. The Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, said “it is difficult to imagine what an international force could do even if one was sent.” “ **Pentagon Denies Bosnia Alert**,” **The Independent**, June 27, 1992. “The Pentagon, in a classified internal memorandum, argued that the United States should not participate in any relief operation until a

permissive environment has been clearly framed by the Serb belligerents.” Martin Fletcher, “**Bush Ponders Sending US Forces,**” **The Times**, June 29, 1992. Also, see, Peter Grier, “**Washington Takes Leading Role in Seeking to Stem Yugoslav Strife,**” **The Christian Science Monitor**, June 2, 1992; Also available on Internet <http://www.csmonitor.com/plweb.cgi/iopcode.pl>.

40 Andrew Stephen, Dick Leonard & Colin Smith, “**France Acts As US Ponders Bosnian Move,**” **Observer**, June 28, 1992, 15. Also, see, David D. Newsom, **The US-A Reluctant Peace-Keeper In Troubled Regions,**” **The Christian Science Monitor**, July 22, 1992. ; Also available on Internet <http://www.csmonitor.com/plweb.cgi/iopcode.pl>.

41 At the time, there were conflicting reports: “US State Department Spokeswoman, Margaret Tutwiler said, in June 29, that Washington would support the use of force if other steps failed to ensure that food reached the starving city. For the first time she refused to rule out the involvement of US troops in any operation.” Mark Tran, “**UN Breaks Sarajevo Blockade,**” **The Guardian**, June 30, 1992. Also, see, Jonathan S. Landay, “**US Offer of Military Support Seen to Boast Pressure on Serbs,**” **The Christian Science Monitor**, July 2, 1992; Also available on Internet <http://www.csmonitor.com/plweb.cgi/iopcode.pl>. “The US edged closer to direct military intervention in the war saying it was ready to provide air and naval protection for UN efforts to get food and relief supplies to Sarajevo. According to the Pentagon spokesman, Pete Williams, the US has moved six ships of its Mediterranean fleet, carrying 2200 Marines and ‘plenty’ of attack and transport helicopters, into the Adriatic off the Yugoslav coast. Although Mr. Williams emphasized there were no plans to deploy US troops on the ground around Sarajevo, the new moves represent a significant weakening of Washington's reluctance to become involved in the crisis.” Rupert Cornwell & Phil Davison, “**US War Planes Set For Sarajevo,**” **The Independent**, July 1, 1992.

42 Hella Pick & Ian Traynor, “**Baker Tells Serbia to Give Up Arms As Blockade Tightens,**” **The Guardian**, July 11, 1992.

43 Leonard Doyle, Annika Savill, “**US Takes Action Over Serbian War Crimes,**” **The Guardian**, August 6, 1992.

44 Simon Tisdall, Mark Tran, Hella Pick, “**UN Reluctant To Support Use Of Force In Bosnia,**” **The Guardian**, August 6, 1992.

45 Martin Fitcher, “**Bush Inaction Revives the ‘Wimp Factor’,**” **The Times**, August 8, 1992. Also, see, George D. Moffett, “**Bush Dilemma in Balkan Crisis Sees Benefiting Rival Clinton,**” **The Christian Science Monitor**, August 10, 1992; Also available on Internet <http://www.csmonitor.com/plweb.cgi/iopcode.pl>.

46 Meanwhile Lady Thatcher recommended in her article that international military aid to Bosnia should take the form of air strikes and supplies of arms to Bosnian forces. According to **Newsweek** poll released at the weekend (8-9 August) showed 53 % of Americans supporting air strikes against Serbian positions. “Foreign policy is still the remaining jewel in Mr. Bush’s wobbly crown. If the fighting in the remnants of

Yugoslavia continues to spread, if more evidence of atrocities emerges, the point may come when the political dangers of committing US troops will be less than the political dangers of doing nothing." John Lichfield, "**Bush Feels the Pressure For Intervention,**" **The Independent**, August 8, 1992. Also, see, George D. Moffett, "**Bush Dilemma In Balkan Crisis Sees Benefiting Rival Clinton,**" **The Christian Science Monitor**, August 10, 1992; Also available on Internet <http://www.csmonitor.com/plweb.cgi/iopcode.pl>.

<sup>47</sup> American intelligence services were apparently becoming apprehensive about growing Serbian military activity in Kosovo/a. So Washington became increasingly worried that the conflict would spread to Kosovo/a and Macedonia which both have big Muslim population, threatening to drag Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey into war. See, Peter Grier, "**Washington Takes Leading Role In Seeking To Stem Yugoslav Strife,**" **The Christian Science Monitor**, June 2, 1992; Also available on Internet <http://www.csmonitor.com/plweb.cgi/iopcode.pl>.

<sup>48</sup> Andrew Stephen, "**US Turns Aggressive On Bosnian Suffering,**" **The Observer**, December 20, 1992.

<sup>49</sup> Warren Zimmermann, "**A Pavane for Bosnia,**" Book Review, **The National Interest**, Fall 1994, no: 37, 35 - 79.

### Notes For Chapter III

<sup>1</sup> At the time, The world's lack of intervention was being continuously criticized by a number of experts, former diplomats and well-known former politicians. For instance, the famous US strategist Albert Wohlstetter, who called western policy towards Bosnia "the worst performance of the democracies since world war II - and the most dangerous" was one of the leading critiques. For some of his criticism, see, Albert Wohlstetter, "**A Lesson in Shame: Threat of Genocide in Bosnia-Hercegovina,**" **Time**, August 2, 1993; "**Genocide By Mediation,**" **The Wall Street Journal**, March 3, 1994; "**Arms, Not Words, For Bosnia,**" **The Wall Street Journal**, May 9, 1994; "**Embargo the Aggressors, Not the victims,**" **The Wall Street Journal**, June 28, 1994; "**Genocide By Embargo,**" **The Wall Street Journal**, May 5, 1994; "**Bosnia: Air Power, Not Peace-Keepers,**" **The Wall Street Journal**, December 9, 1994; "**Chirac's Challenge on Bosnia,**" **The Wall Street Journal**, July 20, 1995; "**A Photo-Op Foreign Policy,**" **The Wall Street Journal**, August 23, 1996

<sup>2</sup> See, for details of the Vance-Owen plan, "**A New Balkan Game,**" **The Christian Science Monitor**, January 27, 1993; also available on Internet <http://www.csmonitor.com/plweb.cgi/iopcode.pl>, Editorial. Also, see, the memoirs of Lord Owen, **Balkan Odyssey**, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1996). 89-149. The plan was at the time and later on subjected to criticism of severe nature. For some this criticism, see, Noel Malcolm, (1994), **op. cit.**, 234-252; Hasan Unal, "**Trop de Zele,**" **The National Interest**, (Spring 1996), vol.43, 93-94.

<sup>3</sup> **Ibid.**.

<sup>4</sup> Ian Traynor, **"Balkans Closer To All-Out War,"** The Guardian, January 28, 1993.

<sup>5</sup> The deployment of the UN troops was very important because even if the plan was accepted no-one believed that the peace would come. "The UN said Sarajevo should be an 'open city' but the Bosnian Serbs would almost certainly try to create a Beirut-style green line, segmenting the capital according to crude ethnic criteria. The Muslims want to stop this at all costs." Roger Boyes, **"Bosnia Tries to Stave Off Pressure To Accept UN Deal,"** The Times, January 5, 1993. "The main sticking point is the Serbs' insistence on establishing a state within a state, a demand firmly rejected by Lord Owen and Mr. Vance. The issue dominated hours of closed talks between the co-chairman and the leader of the Bosnian Serbs and led to the Muslim-led government threatening to walk out.....Lord Owen said that Croats had signed documents approving the proposals, but had reservations on the map. As for Karadzic, he put an overall reserve on the whole agreement." Roger Boyes, **"British Artillery Readied For Bosnia Intervention,"** The Times, January 5, 1993.

<sup>6</sup> " ...Owen said that the US ambivalence was having a negative effect on the peace efforts since it encouraged Bosnia's Muslims in their hope that the new US administration might exempt them from the overall arms embargo on former Yugoslavia....." Ian Traynor & Mark Tran. **"US 'Impeding' Bosnia Peace,"** The Guardian, February 3, 1993. Also see Lucia Mouat, **"Tough Choices Face US, UN on Bosnia Peace Plan,"** The Christian Science Monitor, February 3, 1993; also available on Internet <http://www.csmonitor.com/plweb.cgi/iopcode.pl>, The World.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> "Mr. Clinton's main objection to the plan is that it rewards ethnic cleansing, and will involve the dissolution of the current Bosnian government, and its replacement by an arrangement that partitions Bosnia into 10 cantons. There would then be no real Bosnian government to support in the future. Clinton would like to see a modification of the Bosnian peace plan. ....The modifications being cited by White House Staff call for an international war crimes tribunal, tightened economic sanctions against Serbia, and a US statement committing it to defend Macedonia and opposing any extension of Serbian ethnic cleansing to Kosovo.....President Ozal's criticism of the Vance-Owen plan as ultimately not enforceable on the ground without a huge commitment of outside troops has sharpened Mr.Clinton's own doubts about committing US prestige behind the plan." Martin Walker, **"Reluctant Clinton To Accept Bosnia Plan,"** The Guardian, February 10, 1993.

<sup>9</sup> At the White House, spokesman George Stephanopoulos said Mr. Clinton was "very concerned about the abuses of human rights in Serbia and Bosnia and about ethnic cleansing. He wants to ensure, we enforce the no-fly zone, and he and his advisors are reviewing all of his options. Mr. Christopher has also asked aides to prepare option papers on the bombing of Serbian-held positions and airfields in Bosnia, as well as arming Bosnia's Muslims. Mr. Christopher's swift initiative was seen in Washington as a sign of the heightened importance the administration attaches to the Balkans - as promised by Mr. Clinton during the election campaign - and its skepticism that a successful, lasting resolution of the crisis will be achieved through the EC and UN

brokered peace talks. The administration is also considering ending the arms embargo on Bosnia and tightening economic sanctions on Serbia.” Simon Tisdall & Chris Stephen. “**US is Set On Prosecuting Yugoslav War Criminals,**” **The Guardian**, January 28, 1993. Also see “**A New Balkan Game,**” **The Christian Science Monitor**, February 27, 1993; also available on Internet [http:// www.csmonitor.com/ plweb.cgi/ iopcode.pl](http://www.csmonitor.com/plweb.cgi/iopcode.pl), Editorial.

10 Hella Pick, “**NATO Shoulds Down Hopes Of Huge Airstrikes To Halt Serb Aggression,**” **The Guardian**, August 10, 1993. Also see Peter Grier, “**US Gears Up for Airstrikes,**” **Christian Science Monitor**, August 9, 1993; also available on Internet <http://www.csmonitor.com/plweb.cgi/iopcode.pl>, The US, National.

11 **CRS Report For Congress**, July 28, 1993, 5.

12 Marshall Freeman Harris, “**Clinton’s ‘European’ Policies,**” Paper Presented to the International Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Organized by Bilkent University, Bilkent, Ankara-Turkey, 1995, 4.

13 **CRS Report For Congress**, July 28, 1993, 6.

14 Stephen Larrabee, (1994), **op. cit.**, 8.

15 Marshall Freeman Harris, “**Clinton’s Debacle in Bosnia,**” **Bosnia Report** , Newsletter of the Alliance to Defend Bosnia-Herzegovina, London: Issue 16, (July-October 1996), 2.

16 Stephen Larrabee,**op.cit.**, 9.

17 Marshall Freeman Harris, **op.cit.**, 2.

18 Stephen Larrabee, “**The Yugoslav Crisis,**” **op.cit.**, 10

19 Stephan Blank, “**Yugoslavia’s Wars: The Problem from Hell,**” **Strategic Studies Institute**, 1995, 9.

20 Alan Fogelquist, **op. cit.**, 8.

21 Stephen Blank, **op. cit.**, 9 - 10. Also, see, Martin Woollacott, “**A Pitiful Peace For Bosnia,**” **The Guardian**, August 23, 1993. Also see R. James Parsons, “**Proposed Plan For Bosnia Would End Multi-Ethnic State,**” **The Christian Science Monitor**, August 23, 1993; also available on Internet <http://www.csmonitor.com/plweb.cgi/iopcode.pl>, The World, International.

## Notes For Chapter IV

<sup>1</sup> These threats were uttered by Mrs. Madeleine Albright’s, US ambassador to the UN, that “Croatia could face international economic sanctions unless it stayed out of the Bosnia war.” Laura Silber, “**Croats are warned they face economic sanctions,**”

**Financial Times**, Jan 6, 1994. In Zagreb, president Tudjman was under attack as the architect of a Bosnian partition policy and recognized as disastrous to the Croatian national interest. Also see David B. Ottaway, "**Albright, In Croatia, Warns On sanctions,**" **International Herald Tribune**, Washington Post Service, January 6, 1994.

<sup>2</sup> For the details of the general economic situation of Serbia, see, Michael Ignatieff, **Observer**, January 3, 1993.

<sup>3</sup> Edward Luce, "**Bosnian Peace Prospects At Lowest Ebb,**" **The Guardian**, January 19, 1994.

<sup>4</sup> Marshall Freeman Harris, "**Clinton's 'European' Bosnia Policies,**" **Bosnia Report**, (July-October, 1996), Issue 16, 2.

<sup>5</sup> For instance, there was growing uneasiness about Bosnia in Turkey. See, Hasan Unal, "**Bosnia II: A Turkish Critique,**" **The World Today**, July 1995, vol. 51, no. 7, 128-129.

<sup>6</sup> BBC 7 February 1994.

<sup>7</sup> The position of Bosnian Muslims is described as 'they cannot win but they can set the terms for peace'. Ian Traynor, "**Izetbegovic Ready To Reject Carve-Up At Geneva Talks,**" **The Guardian**, January 3, 1994. Also, see, John Kifner, "**Zagreb Threatens Bosnia Intervention,**" **International Herald Tribune**, January 4, 1994

<sup>8</sup> In fact, at the beginning of 1994, the Bosnian government army was making gains not only against the Croats but also the Serbs. However, Serbian forces heavy weapons still dominated the battlefield despite the fact that Serb forces were short of man power, and that there were clear signs of weariness among the Serbs. Many experts at the time advocated the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnian forces on the belief that Bosnians could roll back Serb gains. See, for all these detailed discussions, Norman Cigar, **The Right to Defence: Thoughts on the Bosnian Arms embargo**, London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1995.

<sup>9</sup> At the time, there were rumors that the UN troops under command of British general Michael Rose were helping the Serbs with intelligence in order to thwart any successful NATO air raids, and to prove that the air force could not break the Serbs' resistance. Many of these rumors were to be confirmed by US intelligence sources' reports later which leaked to the press. See, in particular, Noel Malcolm, "**The Whole Lot Of Them Are Serbs,**" **The Spectator**, June 10, 1995, 14-18; Ed Vulliamy, "**Bosnia: The Secret War. How the CIA Intercepted SAS Signals,**" **The Guardian**, January 29, 1996.

<sup>10</sup> **Press Conference By the President Office of the Press Secretary, The Briefing Room, White House Government Publications Server**, February 21, 1994.

<sup>11</sup> Albeit useful in eventually bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table, these weapons were not, however, the key factor. US ties with Croatia continued to deepen during 1994. In March, the Croatians approached the US with a request for assistance in reforming and training their army. According to press reports, the Pentagon was

unwilling to do this directly, but it did suggest to the Croatians that they contact a group of retired US military officers who might be able to assist them. In reality the US, with assistance from suppliers of former Warsaw Pact military equipment to Croatia, was helping to create a 'surrogate' ground force that would be instrumental in bringing the warring parties to Dayton, Ohio, for intensive peace talks. (the effects of Croatian attacks on the Serbs will be discussed in the next chapter). For details, see, Maynard Glitman, op. cit., 74.

<sup>12</sup> Mark Almond, op.cit., (1994), 357

<sup>13</sup> For a summary of these discussions, see, Albert Wohlstetter, "A Photo-Op Foreign Policy," The Wall Street Journal, August 23, 1996; Norman Cigar, The Right to Defence: Thoughts on the Bosnian Arms Embargo, London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1995.

<sup>14</sup> Michael Gordon, "State Department Balks At Pentagon's Hands-Off View Force In Bosnia," The New York Times, April 6, 1994.

<sup>15</sup> However NATO said on April 22 that it would bomb Serbian positions near Gorazde if the Serbs failed to comply with an ultimatum to withdraw all its forces to beyond the zone. But at the end of April the situation was a real mess. First of all there was a dispute between NATO and the UN over strikes against the Serbs. Serbian forces used the confusion over the situation and attacked to begin repopulating Gorazde with Serbs to the north and south of the city center. The NATO ultimatum was violated quite openly by the Serbs but UN military force - concerned about becoming a combatant in the war and worried about the safety of its personnel - was reluctant to approve any NATO action. Moreover the UN command also declared that earlier accounts of the destruction in Gorazde were exaggerated, and led to NATO bombing which widened the conflict in the Balkans". Michael Gordon, "NATO and the UN in Dispute over Strikes Against the Serbs," The New York Times, April 24, 1994.

<sup>16</sup> See, Paul. F. Horvitz, International Herald Tribune, April 20, 1994.

<sup>17</sup> Ivo Banac, "Shall I Carve," The National Review, vol. 46, October 10, 1994, 27.

<sup>18</sup> The US joined the West Europeans and the Russians in recommending 51 percent as a reasonable basis; but it ruled out pressure on the Muslim-Croat side to accept it. "Although the US wants a negotiated settlement, it feels the Muslims are entitled to pursue the military option to try to recoup territorial losses. As on the territorial issue, the west Europeans and Russia are at odds with Washington on every other key point of Bosnia policy. The Americans want to lift the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian government. The others do not. The Americans want to keep up the UN sanctions on the Serbs, the others want to relax them. The Americans periodically argue for air strikes, the others resist. The Americans refuse to send ground troops to Bosnia, to the exasperation of the British, the French and the Russians, all with forces in Bosnia." Ian Traynor, "International 'Community' Finds Little in Common Over Bosnia," The Guardian, May 20, 1994. Also, see, Paul Lewis, "Mediators Invite Bosnia Factions To Talks," New York Times, May 22, 1994. In July, "for the first time, a direct carrot and stick approach to the warring factions is being implemented. A ladder of

inducements and threats envisages the arms embargo against the Muslims being lifted if the Bosnian Serbs reject the plan or a gradual lifting of sanctions if they accept it...But initial reactions from both camps were negative." Ian Mather, "**G7 Ultimatum to Bosnia Rivals**," The European, 8-14 July, 1994. Although this take-it-or-leave-it package was presented in a show of unity by the five governments, it kept the tensions remain between the US and the rest. For example Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev rejected any suggestion of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs by 'some of Russia's partners' meaning principally the US. He also warned that if there were a split between the Powers, a real danger of international confrontation would arise, up to a world war. Britain and France also made it clear that if the arms embargo were lifted they would withdraw their troops from UN peace-keeping force in Bosnia. Also, see, "**Bosnia Faces Ultimatum to Accept Peace Plan**," International Herald Tribune, July 6, 1994.

<sup>19</sup> Bruce Clark, "**US and NATO Likely to Expand Role in Bosnia**," Financial Times, July 19, 1994. Also, see, "**US Says Bosnian Serbs Reject Peace Partition**," International Herald Tribune, July 21, 1994.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Warren Christopher complained October 18, 1994 that "any provision which reconditions the ability of the president to use the armed forces is offensive to the constitution." See, for instance, Linda Feldmann, "**Congress vs President On US Foreign Policy**," The Christian Science Monitor, Representative Lee Hamilton(D) of Indiana stated that the Congress should authorize overseas deployment of US troops. That way the President and the Congress share the blame if things went wrong. It is a bit confusing to compare the attitudes of the members of the congress and the Clinton Administrations in 1993 and in 1994. A good explanation of the picture is made by Michael Kinsley in his article of "**War and Powers**," in The New Republic, Vol. 209, 11/08/93 page 6. Kinsley argued that "Dole' proposed legislation on Haiti and Bosnia is a far greater infringement: it would require congressional approval before Clinton could send troops at all....What Clinton should do instead is to embrace Dole's proposal.....For president Clinton, restoring Congress's war power would be good, self-interested politics. Why on earth should Clinton even want the ability to commit American soldiers abroad without protective cover for himself, as well as for them? A congressional debate and vote would give him that cover."

<sup>22</sup> See, "**Congress Should Oversee Peacekeeping**," International Herald Tribune, January 24, 1994.

<sup>23</sup> See, Paul Williams's article in The Tablet of February 25, 1995, for all those arguments about the illegality of the embargo.

<sup>24</sup> Martin Walker, "**West in Disarray as US Tries to Lift Bosnian Arms Ban**," The Guardian, May 12, 1994. Also, see, "**Senate Backs Lifting Of Bosnia Embargo**," The New York Times, May 13, 1994.

<sup>25</sup> George Graham, "**Bosnia Pressure on Clinton Grows**," Financial Times, June 10, 1994. Also, see, Paul F. Horvitz, "**House Demands Clinton Allow Arms For Bosnia**," International Herald Tribune, June 10, 1994.

26 **“Lift the Bosnia Embargo,” International Herald Tribune**, September 9, 1994.

27 Douglas Jehl, **“Bosnian Crisis Hangs Over Clinton Like a Darkening Cloud,” International Herald Tribune**, September 9, 1994. “Congress has it right. The White House should not be fighting to weaken its mandate, but citing congressional sentiment to persuade its European partners to keep their word. Lifting the embargo could be made more palatable to Britain, France and Russia by offering relief to Serbia at the same time, provided Belgrade agrees to monitoring. Lifting the arms embargo has its risks, but it is surely fairer than granting relief to Serbia alone. Linking the two step would tighten the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, who have always been the main aggressor and the main holdout against peace. The administration can try to shape its own deal now. Or it can be stuck with a less attractive one later.” **“Lift the Bosnia Embargo,” International Herald Tribune**, September 9, 1994.

28 William Safire, **“The Clock is Ticking on Bosnia,” International Herald Tribune**, September 19, 1994.

29 This US’ policy was being criticized as such: “Why then is Washington not pressing for such a binding vote? The administration knows that the Bosnians agreed to a delay only under intense European pressure. It also knows Bosnia hopes to win European acceptance of lifting the embargo in return. Yet the US has made no serious effort to rally European support. The administration did not even use its reluctant vote for Europe’s main security council goal, relief of sanctions on Serbia, to win European votes for ending the embargo. The result will be more Serbian military pressure on Bosnia diminished prospects that the Bosnian Serbs will accept the big power peace plan, and a larger risk that US troops will ultimately be sent on Bosnian peacekeeping duty. Congress, which adjourns this week, cannot do much now about Mr. Clinton’s broken pledge. But when it returns in January it could cut off funds for US enforcement of the Arms embargo”. **“Breaking a Vow on Bosnia;” International Herald Tribune**, October 4, 1994.

30 Maynard Glitmann, **op.cit.**,73.

31 Ali Karaosmanoglu, **“The UN-NATO Cooperation In The Former Yugoslavia,”** Paper presented to the International Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bilkent University, Ankara, 17-19 April, 1995, 7.

32 Bruce Clark, Laura Silber, Nancy Dunre, **“ UN Force on High Alert As Serbs Near Safe Area,” Financial Times**, November 21, 1994. Also, see, John Pomfret, **“UN On Alert As Tensions Rise In Bosnia,” International Herald Tribune**, November 21, 1994.

33 James Adams, **“US Troops Set For Bosnia,” The Sunday Times**, December 4, 1994. Also, see, **“US Would Assist UN Peace-Keeper In Bosnia Pullout,” International Herald Tribune**, Washington Post Service, December 2, 1994.

<sup>34</sup> Bruce Clark, **“France And US Raise the Stakes in Bosnia,”** Financial Times, December 16, 1994. Also, see, **“US And France Close Ranks On Reinforcing UN In Bosnia,”** International Herald Tribune, December 13, 1994.

<sup>35</sup> Mr. Carter deployed the twin weapons of charm and flattery as he engaged in a battle of wits with Mr. Karadzic. After visiting Pale, he said the Bosnian Serbs were unfairly getting a bad press and lauded their commitment to peace. The White House promptly distanced itself from his remarks, branding the Serbs the aggressor. Ian Traynor, **“Serbs ‘Agree to Restart Peace Talks’,”** The Guardian, December 20, 1994. Also, see, **“Serbs Agree To 4-Month Cease-Fire, Carter Says,”** International Herald Tribune, Washington Post Service, December 20, 1994. “The former US President’s announcement of the truce, in the presence of the Bosnian Serb leader, Karadzic, followed 24 hours of confusion and Balkan double talk. The Bosnian government meanwhile, agreed to an immediate four-month truce, going beyond its earlier insistence that any cease-fire could last only three months. Despite Mr. Carter’s claims, however, the signs were that Mr. Karadzic saw the cease-fire as valid for little more than a week unless he achieved his real aim—a formal agreement on a complete cessation of hostilities that would help him to tighten his hold on the 70 per cent of Bosnia under his forces. Mr. Carter’s main achievement was to inject an element of thaw into a situation that has been politically and diplomatically frozen since the summer”. Ian Traynor, **“Carter Breaks Stalemate to Win Bosnian Truce,”** The Guardian, December 21, 1994. Also, see, **“Jimmy Carter Again,”** The New York Times, December 22, 1994.

<sup>36</sup> Maynard, op.cit., 73.

## Notes For Chapter V

<sup>1</sup> Roger Cohen, **“Contact Group Plan Would Lift More Sanctions On Serbia,”** International Herald Tribune, February 15, 1995.

<sup>2</sup> Marshall Freeman Harris, (1996), op. cit., 3.

<sup>3</sup> Marnard Glitman, op. cit., page.

<sup>4</sup> Warren Zimmerman, **“Save Sarajevo, This Martyred Symbol of friendship and Diversity,”** International Herald Tribune, May 15, 1995. He was insisting that “the answer depends significantly on NATO and especially the US. Only resolute and, if necessary, continued NATO air strikes against Serbian artillery positions can end the siege and save the city. The one time the West credibly threatened air strikes in - February 1994 - the Serbs pulled back their guns. Now the guns are back and the West is again challenged.... only the US, through NATO can match Mr. Karadzic’s force with superior force”.

<sup>5</sup> Roger Cohen. **“A High-Risk Road, With No Return Trip”**, International Herald Tribune, May 27-28, 1995. Also Martin Walker from the Guardian wrote that “Welcome back to that familiar staple of international affairs, American leadership. After two years of mounting international concern about Clinton’s ability to lead the last superpower we have now heard the smack of firm American Government.... From the

moment at the Moscow summit on May 8, when he first told his national security adviser, Tony Lake, to start rounding up the allies for ‘ a more robust posture’ in Bosnia, the White House has acted like the old, self-confident America... Mr. Clinton has done so for two reasons of weakness. The first is that he is steadily losing control of foreign policy to the Republican majority in Congress. Their new foreign aid bill is stripping the funds and flesh from his traditional prerogative, and their deadline for breaching the UN arms embargo and arming the Bosnian Muslims directly is ominously poised to take. The second weakness is that his advisers have realized that whatever new course the Bosnian Tragedy now takes, it will involve US forces. If the UN and NATO are to increase air pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, that means air strikes. The dominance of the US air force in NATO would steadily increase the role of American air power..... Faced with greater US involvement, and monstrous political controversy at home, Mr. Clinton decided to push hard for a settlement with Milosevic in Belgrade, backed up by some salutary air strikes to stress NATO’s resolve”. Martin Walker, **“Smack of Weak Government as Disaster,” The Guardian**, May 21, 1995. Also, see, **“Clinton Can Start To Fight,” International Herald Tribune**, May 22, 1995.

<sup>6</sup> Martin Walker, **“US Troops to go into Bosnia,” The Guardian**, June 1, 1995. Also, see, David Rohde, **“West Backed Into Bosnia’s Corner,” The Christian Science Monitor**, June 2, 1995; also available on Internet <http://www.csmonitor.com/plweb.cgi/iopcode.pl>, The World.

<sup>7</sup> These incidents gave an impetus to the debate on Bosnia in the US. For instance, the Former President Jimmy Carter expressed frustration with president Clinton’s Bosnia policy. He offered his own views at a US Senate hearing on what should be done. He criticized the US and the other countries of the Contact Group for being unwilling to negotiate with both sides in the war, particularly the Bosnian Serbs. But at that time, Mr. Carter did not know that few weeks later angry NATO chiefs would be asking urgent clarification about whether the UN had given secret undertakings to the Bosnian Serbs that there would be no further use of air strikes against them. And NATO “ appears unconvinced by British Government’s denials that the UN reached any covert ‘understanding’ with the Bosnian Serbs when securing the recent release of the UN peacekeepers held hostage by them”. John Palmer, Julian Borger, **“NATO Anger at Hostage Trade-Off,” The Guardian**, June 23, 1995. Also, see, Joseph Fitchett, **“UN Hostage Deal Damaged Talks With Serbs,” International Herald Tribune**, June 24, 1995.

<sup>8</sup> Slobodan Lekic, **“ US Debates Covert Arms For Sarajevo,” The Guardian**, June 19, 1995. Also, see, **“US Not Advising Bosnian Forces, Officials Assert,” International Herald Tribune**, June 19, 1995.

<sup>9</sup> Tony Barber and David Osborne, **“ France Accuses US of Arming Muslims,” The Independent**, July 1, 1995. Also, see, Barry James, **“US and Allies Set On Collision Course Over Bosnia Policy,” International Herald Tribune**, July 1, 1995.

<sup>10</sup> Warren Zimmerman, **“ The Choice in the Balkans,” The New York Review**, September 21, 1995, 4 - 7.

<sup>11</sup> Maynard Glitman, **op. cit.**, 74.

12 Richard Holbrooke, "The Road to Sarajevo," The New Yorker, October 21-28, 1996, 88 - 104.

13 Maynard Glitman, op. cit., 75.

14 See, "Warring Factions in Bosnia Reach Accord on Key Issues," International Herald Tribune, Sept. 9-10, 1995.

15 See, Brian Knowlton, "Balkan Leaders Reach Peace Accord: The Accord's Main Points," International Herald Tribune, November 22, 1995.

16 William Drozdiak, "EU Absorbs Embarrassing Lessons in Bosnia Accord," International Herald Tribune, November 23, 1995.

17 See, "US Bullied, Envoys Say," International Herald Tribune, November 23, 1995.

18 See, Brian Knowlton, "Clinton Gets Cautious Support on Bosnia Plan," International Herald Tribune, November 29, 1995.

19 William E. Odom, "Endgame in Bosnia," Hudson Policy Bulletin, Number 16, November 1995. "Historians will debate whether an accord along the lines of Dayton could have been achieved earlier or whether the combination of actions and events which made it possible, particularly the remaking of the Croat army, simply required time." Maynard Glitman, op. cit., 75) Or they may also criticize the US Administration for undermining the Vance-Owen plan of 1993, which was less rewarding to the Serbs than the Dayton Agreement, at least, on paper. But, these two years provided the Bosnians the opportunity to build-up their own defense forces, falsified the myths of Serbian invincibility, and lifted their spirit giving them the long-sought self-esteem. "There was another difference between Vance-Owen circa 1993 and the Dayton Peace of late 1995, and it is an important one. This time the Americans are involved and clearly have become impatient with European 'sophistication'." (Hasan Unal, (1996), op. cit., 7).

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