

THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

UNPROFOR

A CASE STUDY FOR FUTURE PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

A THESIS PRESENTED BY ERTAN EFEGİL

TO

THE

INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

IN

PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BILKENT UNIVERSITY


JUNE 1994

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(UNPROFOR)  
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**ABSTRACT**

This study aims to analyze the institution of peace-keeping and tries to illustrate new requirements for peace-keeping operations in the post-Cold War era through the explanation and examination of the United Nations Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR).

Although Dag Hammarskjöld stated that the peace-keeping operations functioned within the framework of Chapter "six-and-half" of the UN Charter during the Cold War era, permanent members of the United Nations mainly used them to deal with local and regional conflicts rather than employing coercive measures within the framework of Chapter VII in order to cool off and localize the conflicts and to prevent third party involvement.

UNPROFOR has implied that the institution of peace-keeping should be transformed into a new structure in order to provide an answer to the requirements of the post-Cold War era. Because, the conflicts have become much more complicated than those during the Cold War era, and the parties have also become much more intricate. Thus, continuation of the traditional peace-keeping structure may not be sufficient to deal with the inter-ethnic and intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War era in order to maintain international peace and security.

## ÖZET

Bu çalışma, Eski Yugoslavya'da kurulmuş bulunan Birleşmiş Milletler Koruma Gücü'nü (UNPROFOR) izah ve tetkik etmeye çalışarak, Barış Gücü kurumunu analiz etmeyi ve soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde kurulacak olan Barış Güçlerinin yeni taleplerini karşılaştırmalı şekilde açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Her ne kadar, Birleşmiş Milletler Eski Genel Sekreteri Dag Hammarskjold, soğuk savaş döneminde kurulmuş olan Barış Güçlerinin Birleşmiş Milletler sözleşmesinin 6.5nci ünitesi çerçevesinde faaliyet gösterdiklerini belirtmişse de, görülen odur ki, Birleşmiş Milletler Daimi Üyeleri yerel ve bölgesel çatışmaları soğutmak, önlemek ve aynı zamanda üçüncü tarafların çatışmaları dahil olmasını engellemek amacıyla, Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesinin 7. ünitesi çerçevesinde zorlayıcı hükümleri kullanmaktan ziyade, Barış Güçlerinden istifade etmeyi tercih etmişlerdir.

UNPROFOR, Barış Gücü kurumunun, soğuk savaş sonrası dönemin gerektirdiği ihtiyaçlara cevap verebilmesi için, yeni bir yapıya doğru değişikliğe uğraması gerektiğini göstermiştir. Çünkü, yerel ve bölgesel çatışmalar, soğuk savaş dönemindekilerden daha karmaşık ve aynı zamanda taraflar daha belirsiz haldedir. Bu sebeplerden dolayı, geleneksel barış gücü yapısının devam etmesi, uluslararası barışı ve güvenliği korumak amacıyla, soğuk savaş sonrası dönemdeki etnik çatışmalar ile meşgul olmak için yeterli olmayabilir.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

A/	General Assembly/
B&H Command	Bosnia and Herzegovina Command
Batt.	Battalion
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EC	European Community
ECMM	European Community Monitoring Mission
Exp.	Expenditures
FACs	Forward Air Controllers
Fed.	Federation
GA/	General Assembly/
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union
Immig.	Immigration
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army
Kingd.	Kingdom
Mand.	Mandate
MCCC	Monitoring Coordination and Control Center
Med.	Mediterranean
Mid.	Middle
Mil. Obs.	Military Observers
Monit.	Monitoring
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Obs.	Observers
ONUC	United Nations Operation in Congo
Pen.	Peninsula
Per.	Personnel
Protc.	Protection



Reop. Sar. Air.	Reopening of Sarajevo Airport
S/	Security Council/
S/RES/	Security Council/Resolution/
SAOs	Serbian Autonomous Regions
SC/	Security Council/
SDA	Muslim Party for Democratic Action
SDP	Serbian Democratic Party
SDS	Serbian Democratic Party
SG/SM/	Secretary-General/Messages/
St.	State
ST/ADM/SER.B	Secretariat/Administration/Series.B
UN	United Nations
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force
UNEF II	Second United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMOs	United Nations Military Observers
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPAs	United Nations Protected Areas
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union

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## INTRODUCTION

During the Second World War, drafters of the UN Charter emphasized the need to prepare a UN Collective Security System based on the legal framework of the UN Charter (articles 43 and 47) to maintain international peace and security. But, after the end of the war, ideology and military bipolarity paralyzed the system. Hence, the effectiveness and the role of the UN in international affairs were jeopardized. In the meantime, local and regional conflicts emerged, endangering international peace and security. In spite of a paralyzed system, the organs of the UN initiated six peace-keeping operations during this era (1) in order to maintain international peace and security. (For further information about previous peace-keeping operations, see Appendix A)

In the course of time, the peace-keeping operations made many contributions to the institution of peace-keeping (2): successfully creating buffer zones between the concerned parties, localizing the conflicts, including the civilian components into its own structure, providing redeployment of military forces of the conflicting parties, observing the cease-fires, providing suitable ground for the peace-making efforts, supervising withdrawal of foreign forces from the areas of conflict, preventing involvement of third parties in the conflict, maintaining law and order, normalizing socio-political conditions within the areas of conflict, and distributing humanitarian assistance to the local people.(3) Although they provided a respectable image to the institution of peace-keeping with regard to their major contributions, they also carried some fundamental problems within their own structures that prevented them from successfully implementing their tasks: the tension between two ideological camps in international affairs which prevented the achievement of a common understanding among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, participation of contingents of the permanent members to the UN

peace-keeping force structure in which they became a target for the parties as a political bargaining chip, the financial crisis, un-cooperative attitudes of the concerned parties toward the operations, and the issue of use of force.(4)

After the end of the Cold War in 1989, the nationalistic and ethnic tensions among ethnic groups emerged in various regions. These tensions (5) endangered international peace and security. Therefore, the United Nations (UN) began to deal with such conflicts through deployment of peace-keeping forces, similar to its Cold War era practice. Today, they are operating in complicated ethnic conflicts, and at the same time, the number of directly concerned parties in an area of conflict have become much more intricate than those during the Cold War era. As a result, the role and function of these current forces in ethnic conflicts has been strengthened. These new situations have two consequences:

A)the role of the UN in maintaining international peace and security has been strengthened and it has become much more significant now than in the Cold War era,

B)peace-keeping operations have become a suitable instrument of the UN, especially the Security Council, in dealing with such ethnic conflicts due to their adopted criteria of impartiality, use of force only in self-defense, and refraining from jeopardizing claims of the parties concerned.

On the other hand, since 1987, many scholars have made proposals about future peace-keeping operations in the post-Cold War era. Their common ground is that **the concept of peace-keeping should be modified and redefined according to the needs of the changing international environment.** These proposals have been proven correct by the changing nature of such conflicts. Consequently, these changes in the international community and the ensuing proposals led to an analysis of UNPROFOR as a case study of peace-keeping operations in an ethnic conflict, with the intention of



showing that there should be a series of new requirements for peace-keeping operations.

In this study, the main focus is the contributions of the UNPROFOR to the structure and principles of the institution of peace-keeping and its inherent shortcomings within its structure. Therefore, in my attempt to explain and examine these topics, I will concentrate on the following elements:

In the first part, the legal basis, mandate, composition, organization and finances of the UNPROFOR have been examined in order to compare it with the previous operations.

In the second part, in order to highlight its contributions and shortcomings, UNPROFOR has been compared with the previous operations and proposals,--the interrelation of peace-keeping and peace-making mechanisms, involvement of regional organizations into the conflict, inclusion of air and naval forces into the UN Peace Force structure, extension of the mandate of peace-keeping operations, inclusion of police and civil administrators, use of contemporary technical equipment, enhancement of the role of the Secretary-General and the reorganization of the Secretariat, support of the Security Council and the participation of contingents of the Permanent Members, preventive deployment of the peace-keeping force, and enlargement of the concept of use of force.

In the conclusion, elements of transformation within the concept and institution of peace-keeping are explained on the basis of the Secretary-General report named An Agenda for Peace in order to show the effects of UNPROFOR to the process.

This thesis covers the course of conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. The research, analysis and interpretation of the thesis have been written through the use of United Nations documents which contain reports by the Secretary-General, Presidential statements, records of the meeting of the Council, resolutions of the Council, statements of the member states, the Secretary-General reports to the General Assembly, and books and articles examining the previous peace-keeping operations and the proposals discussed by many scholars--for instance, Belonogov (1990), Chan Chee (1991), Cuellar (1991), Diehl and Kumar (1991), Hagglund (1992), Alan (1987), Krepon and Tracey (1990), Liu (1992), and others.

## **PART ONE**

### **THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (UNPROFOR)**

#### **1 Events leading to the Creation of UNPROFOR**

##### **1.1 Croatia**

During the process of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and of the democratization in eastern Europe, two developments took place in the former Yugoslavia. The first was the discussions about the future administrative and constitutional structures of the former Yugoslavia started among the Republics. The second was multiparty elections held in 1990 in the republics. With the elections, a structural transformation from the socialist system to democracy began. During the discussions, Croatia and Slovenia supported the idea of "a looser confederation" in which the former Yugoslavia should be a loose association of sovereign republics with a common currency as well as coordinating defense and foreign policies.(1) Serbia strongly rejected the Croatian idea and advocated a "concept of recentralization" within the country.(2)

At the same time, in April/May 1990, multiparty elections were held, and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ-a nationalist party) came to power in Croatia. The HDZ adopted a new constitution in which the Serbs in Croatia were not mentioned. This action of the HDZ served only to escalate the situation. Therefore, the Serbs, organized under the roof of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP), rejected the new constitution (3), and they announced that they were setting up a Serbian autonomous region of Krajina by a plebiscite. Following this statement, they established five self-proclaimed autonomous

regions (Krajina, Knin, Baranja, Western Srem and Slavonia) in Croatia. However, the Croats did not recognize the establishment of these autonomous regions and they tried to re-establish their authority in the regions.(4)

While the discussions on the future structure of the former Yugoslavia did not produce any considerable results, the Croatian leadership made another unsuccessful and undesirable attempt toward the Serbs, adopting a "Resolution on the Procedure for the Separation of the Socialist Federal Republics of Yugoslavia and on a Possible Association in an Alliance of Sovereign Republics" in which the Croats would set up a Croatian national state in areas with a large Croatian population and contiguous to Croatia.(5) The Serbs openly rejected the resolution and they explicitly declared their intention of "not leaving from the former Yugoslavia". After that, those areas proclaimed their independence from Croatia and their unification with Serbia.(6) As a response to the Serbian proclamation, on May 19th 1991, the Croats staged a referendum on independence and voted overwhelmingly in favor of it. Thereafter, they declared their independence on June 25th 1991.(7) However, the declaration of independence intensified the tension between the Croats and the Serbs. The Serbs did not accept becoming a minority within the Republic of Croatia. Therefore, the Serbian irregulars, with overt assistance from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), began their destructive attempts against the Croatian forces.(8) Consequently, by the middle of September 1991, the Serbian forces occupied one-third of the Croatian territory.(9)

## **1.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina**

After the multiparty elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the nationalist-ethnic parties, which were the Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA), the Serbian Democratic Party

(SDS), and the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), gained seats in the Bosnia-Herzegovina parliament (10), and they followed policies in favor of the interests of their ethnic groups.

First of all, all ethnic groups advocated as a fundamental principle the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the Serbs and Croats supported the idea of establishment of "Swiss-style cantons" on the basis of ethnic lines within the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the contrary, the Muslims accepted the idea on the basis of equal citizenship. For the Serbs, if Bosnia-Herzegovina became an independent state, they would become a minority in the republic, which was not an acceptable result. Thus, they wanted to establish some "Swiss-styled cantons" based on ethnic lines in order to remain in the former Yugoslavia. This would unite them with Serbia and Montenegro.(11) The Croats, of course, never wanted to live under a Serb-dominated new Federal Yugoslavia. For that reason, if Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided into the cantons based on ethnic lines, they would need to establish direct relations with Croatia, and hence they would become "backyard" of Croatia. For the Muslims, the cantonization based on ethnic lines meant that they would have only a small territory or would become a part of Serb-dominated new Federal Yugoslavia. They also stated that the cantonization based on ethnic lines would lead to a partition of the Republic by Croatia and Serbia.(12) Thus, from the beginning, a disparity of views on the administrative structure of the Republic among the ethnic groups emerged.

Because of the unacceptability of any plan for the future structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbs and Croats wanted to put the idea of cantonization into practice in order to guarantee their fate. They began to establish autonomous regions since September 1991, and this meant "de facto partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina". The Serbs

unilaterally declared six autonomous regions within Bosnia-Herzegovina between mid-September and November 1991. These so-called Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAOs)--Boronska Krajina, Northern Bosnia, Romanija, (Eastern and Old) Herzegovina, Bihac and Sarajevo (expected to be founded)--stated that they would secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina if the Republic did not remain within a federal Yugoslavia. They held a referendum on the 9th and 10th of November 1991 to determine whether the Serbs in the region were in favor of Bosnia-Herzegovina's remaining as a part of a federal Yugoslavia. 98 % of the Serbs voted for an independent state within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Shortly after the referendum, the Croats set up three autonomous regions in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Croatian Community of the Bosnian Sava Valley (on 12 November), the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (on 18 November 1991), and Croatian Community of Middle Bosnia (on 27 January 1992). They agreed that they would respect the central government of Bosnia-Herzegovina as long as it would maintain its independence from any federal Yugoslavia.(13)

After that, the European Community formed an EC Arbitration Commission to prepare a report on the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent republic on January 15th 1992. The Commission prepared a report in which one condition was put forward to recognize it; a referendum should be held in Bosnia-Herzegovina for independence to be recognized. The reason for this condition, according to the report, was to understand the "will of people within Bosnia-Herzegovina".(14) Therefore, a debate among the ethnic groups started on the referendum. The Serbs openly rejected such a referendum and they declared that it meant a war in the republic. On the other hand, the Croats and Muslims approved a parliamentary measure calling for a referendum on the Republic's sovereignty and independence.(15) Thus, on the 29th of February -1st of March 1992, a referendum was held, and 63.4 % of the total population, most of whom

were Croats and Muslims, went to the polls. 62.68 % of them voted in favor of independence. The Serbs boycotted the referendum.(16) Afterwards, on the evening of March 1st 1992, Serbian militants set up road barricades in Sarajevo, cutting off the capital from the outside world. Thus, the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina started, and participation of the Croatian paramilitary units and the Serbian irregulars with the assistance of JNA deteriorated into war.

### **1.3 Macedonia**

Unlike Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Macedonian government demanded deployment of the UNPROFOR contingents in its own territory because of fears that a possible civil war would break out in its territory. According to the Macedonian government, if a conflict erupted in Kosovo, the fighting would be carried into Macedonia. Albania clearly stated that if a conflict occurred in Kosovo, it would intervene in the conflict. In order for Albanian forces to be activated to carry out its threat of intervention, they would have to go to Kosovo through Macedonia. Thus, Albanians living in Macedonia would join the fighting, and the western region of Macedonia would become a base for Albanian operations into Kosovo. Ethnic Albanians have formed a majority in the central and northern parts of the Macedonian-Albanian border, as well as in the western part of the border areas within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the same time, Albanian activities in Macedonia would provide a good reason for the JNA to enter Macedonia. Therefore, Macedonian authorities concluded that such developments would draw Macedonia into the conflict and lead to a wider Balkan war.(17)

When the JNA withdrew from Macedonia, it transferred all heavy weapons, aircraft and border-monitoring equipment to Serbia itself. Therefore, Macedonian borders became

particularly vulnerable toward any hostilities because the Macedonian army was very lightly armed and lacked the equipment to monitor its borders effectively. They were also concerned with a refugee flow from Kosovo into Macedonia as a result of a conflict in Kosovo. The refugee flow would have a destabilizing effect on Macedonia.(18) Consequently, as a result of these concerns, the Macedonian government demanded deployment of the UNPROFOR contingents into the Republic to monitor its borders.

## **2 Establishment of UNPROFOR**

### **2.1 Governmental Positions**

#### **2.1.1 Parties to the Conflict**

From the beginning of the discussions about the Yugoslav crisis and establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Operation in the former Yugoslavia, all of the concerned parties accepted the establishment of a UN Peace-keeping Force. But, they did have some objections with its deployment and with two other fundamental elements of the UN Peace Plan prepared by the Secretary-General.(19)

Although one of the fundamental elements of the UN Peace Plan was that "the existing local authorities and police would continue their functions, on an interim basis, under UN supervision, pending the achievement of an overall political solution to the crisis" (20), Croatia declared that "it could not accept any plan that did not provide for the immediate restoration of the full authority of the Republic of Croatia over the << United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) >> (21), in matters such as traffic, trade, banking and currency, maintenance of law and order, and return of refugees".(22) Thus, Croatia strongly insisted on the extension of its authority over the disputed areas.(23) On the other hand, two Serbian leaders, Milan Babic (President of the self-proclaimed Serbian



Republic of Krajina) and Goran Hadzic (leader of the Serbian Community in the region of Eastern Slavonia), openly rejected the UN Peace Plan's reference to the UNPAs as "being in Croatia". Their acceptance would have in effect handed over the Serbian regions to Croatian control and such action presupposed their political claims.(24)

Meanwhile, the Serbs objected to the withdrawal of the JNA forces from the UNPAs and the demilitarization of the UNPAs. However, this was another fundamental element of the UN Peace Plan. The Serbs stated that the JNA forces would not leave from the UNPAs unless the Croatian forces were withdrawn likewise.(25)

Lastly, they put forward different opinions on "how the UN Force would be deployed". While the Croatian government wanted the deployment of the Peace-keeping Force as a buffer at the international border of Croatia between itself and Serbia, the Serbs wanted it to be deployed between the Serbian areas in Croatia and Croatian forces as a buffer.(26)

## **2.1.2 Permanent Members of the Security Council**

### **2.1.2.1 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland**

The British government strongly supported the establishment of UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia since September 1991, and it stated that "any territorial gains through using force and demographic changes in areas of conflict could not and would not be acceptable". According to the British government, although the UNPROFOR would not provide a final solution to the Yugoslav issue itself, the deployment could make a real contribution to a peaceful solution in the former Yugoslavia. Finally, it stated that the UN and the European Community's actions on the issue were entirely complementary.(27)

### **2.1.2.2 France**

The French government declared the Yugoslav conflict as a threat to peace and security in Europe and for the entire international community. In September 1991, at the 3009th meeting of the Security Council on the Yugoslav issue, Roland Dumas, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, stated that the French government rejected any territorial gains through using force, and supported the idea of solving the conflict through peaceful means.(28) Therefore, it strongly advocated the idea of deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in the former Yugoslavia. It argued that "if the UN did not send a Peace-keeping Force, the European Community should take the initiative to use a << European show of arms >> in order to discourage a recurrence of warfare in the former Yugoslavia after a new cease-fire had gone into effect".(29)

### **2.1.2.3 The United States of America**

The US Administration argued that the conflict openly threatened international peace and security, and many parties in the former Yugoslavia contributed to the issue. The administration concluded that these unilateral acts carried out by warring parties foreclosed the options for peaceful negotiations among them, and made the tragic situation in the country even more difficult and complicated. It suggested that all parties must solve the issue through peaceful means, and proposed a cease-fire to be respected by all parties as a first step towards normalization of the region and shaping a new future.(30)

On one hand, the US administration openly blamed the JNA for the present problems. It accused the JNA of not serving as an impartial guarantor of a cease-fire in

Croatia, and that it had actively supported local Serbian irregular forces in violating the cease-fire. The JNA had also initiated military intervention against Croatia. On the other hand, the administration also accused the Serbian leadership of supporting and encouraging the use of force in Croatia by Serbian militants and the JNA. The apparent objective of the Serbian leadership and the JNA was to create a small Yugoslavia or greater Serbia based on a kind of repression and use of force to establish control over territories outside Serbia, the Administration reported. Therefore, it stated that the aggression within the former Yugoslavia represented a direct threat to international peace and security, and that the use of force to determine the future internal borders of the former Yugoslavia was not acceptable. It also called upon all parties to seize the opportunity to establish a genuine cease-fire and work towards a negotiated agreement on the former Yugoslavia's future. It strongly supported the efforts of the European Community and the establishment of a UN peace-keeping force in the former Yugoslavia.(31)

#### **2.1.2.4 The Former Soviet Union (The Russian Federation)**

The Russian government, in its joint draft proposal with Austria, Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, stated that the fighting in former Yugoslavia was causing a heavy loss of human life and material damage. It argued that the continuation of this situation constituted a threat to international peace and security. It encouraged the parties to settle their disputes peacefully and through negotiation at the Peace Conference on former Yugoslavia. Thus, it expressed its full support for the collective efforts for peace and dialogue in former Yugoslavia under the auspices of the member states of the European Community. It also supported deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in the former Yugoslavia.(32)

### **2.1.2.5 People's Republic of China**

The Chinese government also declared the crisis in the former Yugoslavia as a threat to stability and peace in Europe and the World as a whole. It advocated the settlement of all disputes through dialogue and negotiations, and opposed use of force or the threat of use of force. At the same time, it reiterated that "internal problems of states should be resolved by their own governments and the UN should in no way interfere or intervene in domestic jurisdiction of any state". It was suggesting that all efforts to secure peace in the former Yugoslavia should abide by the principle of respect for the domestic jurisdiction of the former Yugoslavia and non-interference in its internal affairs (33) and it stated that all other states should pursue a neutral policy toward the former Yugoslavia, like itself. As a result, while China strongly opposed the concept of use of force in the Yugoslav crisis, it supported the establishment of UNPROFOR, because of the Force's principle of "impartiality".

### **2.1.3 Other States Concerned (34)**

#### **2.1.3.1 Germany**

From the beginning of the crisis, the German government suggested that the concerned parties should solve their differences through peaceful means.(35) However, after the beginning of the civil war between the Croats and Serbs in Croatia, it hardened its attitude toward Serbia and began pressuring Serbia to recognize Croatia and Slovenia. According to the German government, the threat of recognition might force the federal authorities and the Serbs to be more amenable to peace talks and maintenance of cease-fires between the concerned parties in Croatia.(36) At the same time, it demanded creation of an international military force to push back the Serbs.(37) Concerning its

policies toward the crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, it followed such policies within the framework of the European Community. Its foreign policy was toned down to a moderate line and its attention began turning to its domestic issues. Nevertheless, it generally argued that "the acquisition of territory by force was unacceptable".(38) Because of this, it sought a UN mandate for a peace-keeping force to establish a "buffer zone" between the concerned parties in the former Yugoslavia.(39)

#### **2.1.3.2 Austria**

From the beginning, the Austrian government argued that "the armistice might be used by the parties to find a negotiated settlement". It supported all efforts of the EC to resolve the crisis. It stated that violence could not resolve the conflict. In 1991, Alois Monk, former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, stated that future relations of the people in the former Yugoslavia should be based on several principles. These principles included "non-use of force, recognition of the right to self-determination in conformity with the full aspirations of the people of the former Yugoslavia, renunciation of any alteration of borders by force between the former Yugoslav republics, full and complete application of the Paris Charter for new Europe, and obligatory agreements for the protection of all minorities".(40)

#### **2.1.3.3 Romania**

In September 1991, the Romanian government stated that the UN had to do everything in their power to help the parties to come to an agreement through peaceful means and that the vital interests of the former Yugoslavia could not be ignored in any UN effort toward that end.(41) Thus, it meant that any enforcement measures, including

the use of force—for instance, military intervention—, against the former Yugoslavia would not be acceptable. On the other hand, it declared that the issue should be solved through peaceful means.

#### **2.1.3.4 Bulgaria**

The Bulgarian government stated that the situation in the former Yugoslavia endangered peace and security in the region and international relations, concluding that there was a need to stop the fighting, and to find a mechanism for an overall solution to the complex problems of the Balkans. It expressed appreciation for the efforts of UNPROFOR towards ending the fighting, easing the suffering of the people, and ensuring the supply of humanitarian assistance. It was not in favor of any neighboring countries sending in military forces to the former Yugoslavia. Thus, it refrained from providing military personnel and equipment for the peace-keeping operation.(42)

#### **2.1.3.5 Hungary**

The Hungarian government considered the situation as a threat to international peace and security.(43) From the beginning, it supported possible UN enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter against Serbia. It implicated Serbia as the aggressor state in the civil war.

#### **2.1.3.6 Turkey**

Like all other countries, the Turkish government stated that the conflict endangered international peace and security and it supported all efforts to reach a peaceful

settlement.(44) At the same time, Hikmet Cetin, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, said that "relief measures alone were insufficient and Turkey favored armed intervention to stop the fighting".(45) Thus, Turkey, on the one hand, supported all EC efforts to find a peaceful settlement and supported the efforts of UNPROFOR to prepare the necessary ground work for the negotiations. On the other hand, it believed that without armed intervention, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a decisive solution to the Yugoslav crisis simply would not happen. According to the Turkish Government's thesis, the United Nations should take greater measures toward enforcement to resolve the Yugoslav crisis.(46)

### **3 Conclusion of the UN Peace Plan and the Creation of UNPROFOR**

Before the UN organs began to deal with the Yugoslav crisis, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and then the European Community (EC) began investigating the crisis to find a peaceful settlement. The CSCE took up the issue since July 1991. However, it sought to deal with the issue only through the use of adopting resolutions. These resolutions were neither respected by the parties nor did they reflect the perspectives of its member governments over the issue. Meanwhile, it did not activate the procedures for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Thus, the CSCE's inability to contain the conflict was well-understood by the member governments, therefore they turned to the EC to deal with the issue. The EC resorted to mediation techniques. It tried to end fighting between the parties and to seek a diplomatic solution to the civil war through organizing a Peace Conference between the concerned parties. Then, on September 19th 1991, at its ministerial meeting, the EC member states overtly demanded the support of the Security Council, acting under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.(47) This desire meant that the EC required deployment of a UN peace-keeping operation in the area of conflict, and legalization of its efforts by the Security Council within

the framework of Chapter VIII. In the end, it acted as a peace-making mechanism in the Yugoslav crisis. However, it understood that it could not by itself provide a solution to the crisis. Thus, it needed the legal and political assistance of the United Nations Security Council.

The United Nations, in particular the Security Council and the Secretary-General, became directly involved in the Yugoslav conflict, when the Council adopted its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 under the provisions of Chapter VII and VIII of the UN Charter. The Council recalled its primary responsibility under the UN Charter for maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, resolution 713 (1991) was adopted because the Council concluded that the crisis was indeed a threat to international peace and security on the basis of Article 39 of the Charter. Meanwhile, it encouraged direct negotiations between concerned parties to solve their disputes through peaceful means at a Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia, sponsored by the European Community on the basis of article 52, paragraph 3 of the Charter.(48) It also declared that "territorial gains or changes within the former Yugoslavia by violence could not be accepted". On the other hand, in the same resolution, it issued a general and complete arms embargo to the country under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter in order to prevent any third party military assistance to the warring parties which would delay or undermine the EC Peace Conference. Under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter, support for the collective efforts of the EC to bring about a peaceful settlement and dialogue in the former Yugoslavia was expressed.(49)

At the same time, it invited the Secretary-General (at that time, Javier Perez de Cuellar) to offer his assistance. On October 8th, 1991 he appointed Cyrus Vance, former United States Secretary of State, as his Personal Envoy to the former Yugoslavia. Since



then, Perez de Cuellar and Cyrus Vance maintained direct contact with the parties, the President of the EC, and governments directly involved with the issue in order to find a peaceful solution; to stop the fighting; and to deploy a United Nations peace-keeping force in the area of conflict.(50) In the end, on November 23rd, Cyrus Vance convened a meeting in Geneva which was attended by the Presidents of Serbia and Croatia, the Secretary of State for the National Defense of Yugoslavia, and Lord Carrington, Chairman of the EC Conference. After the meeting, the parties signed an agreement in which they accepted an immediate cease-fire. According to the agreement, JNA's military personnel and equipment would be withdrawn from Croatia, while Croatia would lift its blockade around JNA barracks and installations. Moreover, the Council indicated that acceptance of an immediate cease-fire would permit the establishment of a peace-keeping operation in the country. It also reiterated that all states and parties should refrain from any action that might undermine the implementation of the cease-fire.(51)

After that, the Council adopted resolution 721 (1991) of 27 November 1991. The resolution gave approval to the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, and it encouraged them to continue their contacts for the establishment of a UN Peace-keeping Force. At the same time, it expressly stated that full compliance of all directly concerned parties was necessary for the deployment.(52) Although the Secretary-General (presently, Boutros Boutros Ghali), in his report 23239, stated that all parties were accepting the deployment, he argued that the situation in the former Yugoslavia was not suitable for deployment of a UN peace-keeping force.(53) Because the parties had some objections about the fundamental principles of the UN Peace Plan. Meanwhile, in resolution 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991, the Council decided to send a small group of military officers, civilian police and the UN Secretariat Staff to carry out further preparations for possible deployment. In the same context, it emphasized that the

purpose of the deployment was to enable all parties to settle their disputes peacefully.(54)

After the adoption of resolution 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991, the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy directed their initiatives toward removing obstacles, such as acceptance of an unconditional cease-fire between the parties; and their consent for the deployment. The first obstacle was removed by inclusion of an "Implementing Accord" on the unconditional cease-fire between military representatives of Croatia and representatives of the JNA in Sarajevo on January 2nd, 1992.(55) In order to monitor the implementation of an unconditional cease-fire, the Council, acting on the basis of the Secretary-General's report 23363 of 5 January 1992, decided to send a group of up to 50 military liaison personnel to the country from existing peace-keeping operations, with the consent of the troop-contributing governments. They would be attached to the general headquarters of the JNA and the Croatian People's Guard, and to their field headquarters down to the corps level.(56)

In order to gain consent from the parties, the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy continued their contacts with them, and during the negotiations, attempted to put to rest the parties various concerns and worries through his reports. In the end, on February 6th 1992, the Croatian government formally approved the UN Peace Plan and it regarded the UN Force in Croatia's ethnic Serbian areas as temporary.(57) Following the Croatian government's consent, on February 9th, 1992, the Serbs also fully and unconditionally accepted the UN Peace Plan by a Parliamentary decision.(58) They viewed the UN presence as a mechanism to prevent the reoccurrence of civil war. The Croatian government knew that a recurrence of civil war in Croatia would result in redeployment of the JNA back into the disputed areas. For the Serbs, it meant that the UN presence would represent confirmation of the Krajina's separation, and freeze the current situation to the

advantage of the Serbian local authorities, because the so-called Serbian republics would be preserved under the supervision of the UN peace-keeping force.(59)

Afterwards, in his report (S/23592) of 15 February 1992, the Secretary-General concluded that all necessary conditions were met for an early deployment of the UN Force in the former Yugoslavia. Thus, the Security Council established a **United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)** as an interim arrangement for an initial period of twelve months to create the necessary conditions for peace and security. This interim arrangement was concluded necessary for negotiations of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis and therefore resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992 was adopted unanimously. It was adopted under article 25 and the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. It also recalled its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (article 1, paragraph 1 of the Charter). On the basis of article 25, the Security Council directly bound the concerned parties to carry out and obey its decisions. At the same time, by referencing article 52 within Chapter VIII of the Charter, it encouraged the development of pacific settlement of the Yugoslav conflict through the regional organizations, especially through EC mediation.(60) By use of the same resolution, the Secretary-General was immediately requested to deploy the Peace-keeping Force which would assist in developing the implementation plan for full deployment. It also argued that the Plan would help the Conference on the former Yugoslavia to reach a final solution.(61)

Within the framework of article 25 of the Charter, it demanded that all parties should take necessary measures to ensure safety of personnel sent by the UN and by the EC, and also required that all states should provide appropriate support to UNPROFOR, in particular to permit and facilitate the transit of its personnel and equipment. It

encouraged the parties to cooperate fully with the Conference to reach a peaceful settlement, and it reaffirmed that the UN Force was not intended to prejudge the terms of a political settlement.(62)

On April 2nd, 1992 the Secretary-General submitted an implementation plan for the Peace-keeping Force's deployment by mid-May 1992, while stating that "the danger that a UN peace-keeping operation would fail because of the lack of cooperation of the parties was less grievous than the danger that delay in its dispatch would lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire and to a new conflagration in the former Yugoslavia."(63) With the consideration of the Secretary-General's report, the Security Council adopted resolution 749 (1992) of 7 April 1992 in which it decided to authorize the earliest possible full deployment of the Peace-keeping Force, and simultaneously approved the Secretary-General's implementation program. Thus, UNPROFOR initially would create a buffer zone between the governmental forces of Croatia and the Serbian irregular forces in Croatia. It also urged all parties to take all the necessary actions to ensure complete freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and called upon them not to resort to violence, particularly in any area where UNPROFOR would be deployed.(64)

Following deployment of the UNPROFOR in Croatia, in April 1992, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina rapidly deteriorated into a civil war between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats on the one side and the Bosnian Serbs on the other side. In the early stages of the civil war, the European Community tried to initiate a cease-fire between the parties, and lay the necessary ground work for them to discuss their differences through negotiations within the framework of the EC Peace Conference. But, the parties did not accept such efforts and the fighting continued against each other. Thus, the UN Security Council and the Secretary-General, in close cooperation with the European Community,

began to deal with the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Secretary-General stated that the current situation was deteriorating, all parties were blaming each other, and violence was escalating.(65) Because of these developments, the President of the Council, alarmed by the Secretary-General's report on the rapid deterioration of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, urged the Secretary-General to immediately dispatch to the area his Personal Envoy to act in close cooperation with the representatives of the European Community. Following this, both the EC representatives and the Secretary-General Personal Envoy began initiating negotiations with the parties. After much negotiation, they secured a cease-fire agreement on April 12th, 1992.(66)

Following the cease-fire agreement, the Security Council adopted resolution 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992, which demanded that all parties immediately stop the fighting. It urged the parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina toward continuous participation in the EC Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia. Cessation of all forms of interference from outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly from units of the JNA and elements of the Croatian Army was demanded. It stated that units of the JNA and the Croatian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina should either be withdrawn or be subject to the authority of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Lastly, it emphasized the urgent need for humanitarian assistance, for the large number of refugees and displaced people. The resolution also urged the Secretary-General to make attempts for deployment of the UNPROFOR contingents into Bosnia-Herzegovina.(67) But, the Secretary-General did not accept deployment of the contingents of UNPROFOR into Bosnia-Herzegovina because he argued that the situation was "tragic, dangerous, violent and confused". He also stated that the conditions were not suitable for UNPROFOR to make any effective contribution.(68) He agreed to deployment of the UNPROFOR contingents only if the international community provided sufficient financial and logistical support.(69)

The Council adopted resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 on Bosnia-Herzegovina. It condemned the failure of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including the JNA, for not taking effective measures to fulfill the requirements of resolution 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992. The resolution demanded that all parties and the UN member states should immediately create the necessary conditions for an unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would necessitate the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport. It requested the Secretary-General to continue to use his good offices to achieve the objectives mentioned above, and to extend the mandate of UNPROFOR to Bosnia-Herzegovina.(70) On May 26th, the Secretary-General reported that "the devastation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was on and the displacement of the civilian population from its towns and villages was proceeding on a scale which had not been seen in Europe since the Second World War".(71) Because of this on May 28th, 1992 he stated ...that it might be necessary, as a last resort, to send military forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina to help get humanitarian aid to civilians in Sarajevo and elsewhere.

Later on the Secretary-General's report, on June 6th, 1992, the parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina signed an agreement to reopen Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes, under the authority of the United Nations and with the assistance of UNPROFOR. Thus, it meant that there was consent from the parties for the deployment of the UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Due to an agreement made by the parties and the reports of the Secretary-General, the Council adopted resolution 758 (1992) of 8 June 1992. In it, a decision was made to enlarge the mandate of UNPROFOR to Bosnia-Herzegovina and authorize the Secretary-General to deploy the military observers and related personnel and equipment required for this enlargement.(72) Thus, the Council accepted the additional elements to reopen the Sarajevo airport and to distribute

humanitarian aid.(73)

On November 11th 1992, the President of Macedonia conveyed to the Secretary-General a request for the deployment of UN observers in Macedonia due to the concerns of the Macedonian government, which were mentioned earlier.(74) Based on the Macedonian request, on November 25th 1992, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to send military, police and civilian personnel 'on an "exploratory mission" to Macedonia in order to prepare a report concerning possible deployment of the UNPROFOR contingents into Macedonia. Thus, under the authorization of the Secretary-General, this exploratory mission group visited the Republic from November 28th to December 3rd 1992. In their report, they recommended that a small UNPROFOR presence be established on the Macedonian side of that Republic's borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The functions of UNPROFOR would be to monitor and report any developments around the border areas which could undermine stability in Macedonia. Thus, it would have a preventive role. Along with this, it also recommended that a small group of United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) be deployed to produce a calming effect while monitoring the Macedonian borders.(75) Due to this report, the Secretary-General recommended an expansion of the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR to establish a United Nations presence on the Macedonian borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.(76)

Therefore, on the basis of the Secretary-General's recommendations, the Council adopted resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992 in which it authorized the Secretary-General to establish a presence of UNPROFOR in Macedonia. At the same time it requested the Secretary-General to deploy military observers, civil affairs and administrative personnel as well as police monitors immediately after receiving consent

from the government of Macedonia. Consent was given from Macedonia on December 19th, 1992 and UNPROFOR was deployed onto Macedonian borders.(77)

#### **4 Legal Basis of the UNPROFOR**

Related to the former Yugoslav issue, the Security Council adopted approximately thirty-seven resolutions from September 25th 1991 to June 18th 1993. These resolutions can be divided into four main categories: establishment and function of UNPROFOR, the embargo imposed, membership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and establishment of an International Tribunal.

The first category can be divided into two sub-categories: a) establishment of UNPROFOR in three republics of the former Yugoslavia, b) functions of UNPROFOR. Regarding the establishment of UNPROFOR, ten resolutions were adopted. These were as follows: for Croatia, resolutions 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991, 721 (1991) of 27 November 1991, 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991, 727 (1992) of 8 January 1992, 740 (1992) of 7 February 1992 and 749 (1992) of 7 April 1992; for Bosnia-Herzegovina, resolutions 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992, and 758 (1992) of June 1992; and for Macedonia, resolutions 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992 and 842 (1993) of 18 June 1993. The second sub-category is related to its functions. Twenty resolutions were adopted, which were resolutions 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, 761 (1992) of 29 June 1992, 762 (1992) of 30 June 1992, 764 (1992) of 13 July 1992, 769 (1992) of 7 August 1992, 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992, 776 (1992) of 14 September 1992, 779 (1992) of 6 October 1992, 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992, 786 (1992) of 10 November 1992, 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992, 798 (1992) of 18 December 1992, 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993, 807 (1993) of 19 February 1993, 815 (1993) of 31 March 1993, 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993, 824 (1993)



of 6 May 1993, 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, 838 (1993) of 10 June 1993 and 844 (1993) of 18 June 1993.

Related to the embargo imposed on the former Yugoslavia and the detention camps established in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the following resolutions were adopted: resolutions 760 (1992) of 18 June 1992, 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992, 771 (1992) of 13 August 1992 and 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992. About the membership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, resolutions 777 (1992) of 19 September 1992 and 821 (1993) of 28 April 1993 were adopted. For the establishment of the International Tribunal on the detention camps, resolutions 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 and 843 (1993) of 18 June 1993 were issued.

With regard to the voting schedule of the resolutions concerned, most of the resolutions were adopted unanimously. However, China, India and Zimbabwe abstained from voting on resolutions related to humanitarian assistance to the surrounded regions, free access to all detention camps, security of the UN and European Community personnel, no-fly zone, preventing any attack against the safe areas, the embargo and all measures mentioned within the context of resolution 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992 which were adopted within the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Considering the legal basis of UNPROFOR, the Security Council established UNPROFOR on the basis of article 29 of the UN Charter. Because the Force is a subsidiary organ of the Council.(78) The Security Council affirmed article 1, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter in which one of "the Purposes of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security." To realize this aim, the Security Council can take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for

the suppression of acts of aggression, or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means.(79) When the Security Council convened over the situation in the former Yugoslavia, it determined the situation as a threat to international peace and security under article 39 of the UN Charter. According to article 39, the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breachh of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make any recommendations to maintain or restore international peace and security. Therefore, the Council made recommendations, drafted and voted for resolutions within the framework of article 33, paragraphs 1 and 2 in the Chapter VI of the UN Charter(80). Thus, stating in its resolution, the Security Council recommended that "all parties should resolve their differences through peaceful means in the EC Peace Conference". But, these resolutions were not binding. It also referred to article 25 of the UN Charter within the context of the resolutions related to the establishment and deployment of the UNPROFOR contingents into the three republics.(81) The Security Council bound the member states and the concerned parties to abide by its decisions on the establishment and deployment of UNPROFOR. At the same time, the Security Council adopted other resolutions under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in order to encourage the settlement of local disputes through the regional arrangements or by regional agencies. But, such regional arrangements or agencies and their activities must be consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the UN.(82) Thus, the Council authorized the European Community to find a peaceful settlement to the Yugoslav crisis.

As far as security of the UNPROFOR and the EC personnel (Resolution 807 (1993) of 19 February 1993 and Resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993); security and stability throughout UNPAs and Pink Zones (Resolution 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993; Resolution 807 (1993) of 19 February 1993 and Resolution 815 (1993) of 30 March 1993); violations of International Humanitarian Law (like surrounding some towns--like

Srebrenica, Bihac, Tuzla; and pursuing the ethnic cleansing policy) --related resolutions are Resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992, Resolution 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992 and Resolution 815 (1993) of 30 March 1993-- ; the measures mentioned by resolution 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992; the no-fly zone (Resolution 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992, Resolution 786 (1992) of 10 November 1992 and Resolution 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993); access to all detention camps (Resolution 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993); distribution of humanitarian assistance (Resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992 and Resolution 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992); humanitarian flights (Resolution 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993); and safe areas (Resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993, Resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993, and Resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993) were concerned, the Security Council adopted resolutions under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which were binding decisions on the concerned parties, the member states and the related regional organizations to abide by the decisions. For instance, with resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992, the Security Council bound the regional organizations (NATO and WEU) to provide necessary personnel and equipment to inspect and verify the cargoes of ships. At the same time, with resolutions 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993 and 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, the Security Council also demanded the assistance of the regional organizations (NATO) to help UNPROFOR to implement the tasks of the no-fly zone and deterring attacks against the safe areas under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.(83)

The use of force is a difficult concept to define. Although the Security Council resolutions did not openly mention the concept of use of force, it can be argued that the UNPROFOR personnel were permitted to use force only if an armed attack occurred against them. In other words, they can use force only in the case of self-defense. Although UNPROFOR has been abiding by this rule as its fundamental principle, the

Security Council, at a minimum level, enlarged the context to implement the task of preventing the attacks against the safe areas by resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993. While the UNPROFOR personnel can use force only in the case of self-defense, during the implementation of their tasks, NATO and UNPROFOR can also use force if **an armed attack occurs against these areas by any of the parties.**(84) According to resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, "acting under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council authorized UNPROFOR, acting in self-defense, to take necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys".(85) This enlargement has not prejudged the claims of the parties and has not violated the UN peace-keeping institution's principle of "impartiality". (For a more detail, see sub-title of 1.10 Enlargement of the Concept of Use of Force)

## **5 Functions of UNPROFOR**

### **5.1 Croatia**

#### **5.1.1 Monitoring of the Pink Zones**

After an agreement was reached on July 9th 1992 between the Commander of UNPROFOR and the President of the Serbian Krajina Republic, the Security Council under resolution 762 (1992) authorized UNPROFOR to ensure avoidance of conflict and to stabilize the situation in the Pink Zones--areas of Croatia which were controlled by the JNA, and in which there was a substantial Serbian population, but which were outside the agreed boundaries of the UNPAs.(86) UNPROFOR was to enact its full responsibilities in the Northern and Southern Sectors and as soon as possible, while simultaneously

monitoring and patrolling functions in the Pink Zones. The immediate withdrawal of the Croatian Army, Territorial Defense Forces and any irregular units from the Pink Zones was to be done. No such elements were to re-enter the Pink Zones, and their withdrawal was to be verified by UNPROFOR. And any remaining JNA elements were to be withdrawn to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Finally, all heavy equipment to be withdrawn was placed into UNPROFOR custody until its removal could take place by the JNA.(87)

At the same time, the UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) would be deployed throughout the Pink Zones to monitor the maintenance of law and order by the existing police force, paying particular attention to the well-being of minority groups. UNCIVPOL would supervise the restoration of Croatian police authority and the re-establishment of the local police in proportion to the demographic structure of the areas prior to the conflict.(88) Finally, a "Joint Commission" was established under the Chairmanship of UNPROFOR including representatives of the Government of Croatia and the local authorities in the region, with the participation of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), to oversee and monitor the process of restoration of authority in the Pink Zones by the Government of Croatia.(89)

### **5.1.2 Border Control in the United Nations Protected Areas**

After the republics of the former Yugoslavia acquired an international legal personality and became member states of the United Nations, the borders of UNPAs became international borders. The Eastern Sector has shared borders with Hungary and Serbia, and three other sectors have shared borders with Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, the Croatian authorities repeatedly raised the issue of controlling the UNPA boundaries.

Two factors were considered by the Croatian authorities; the economic sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and any possible change in the demographic composition of the UNPAs "owing to the influx of Serb refugees". They also expressed their concerns about a possible movement of natural resources and the industrial infrastructure of Baranja and Eastern Slavonia into Serbia. Therefore, with resolution 769 (1992), the Security Council authorized UNPROFOR to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and gave it the powers to perform immigration and customs functions at the UNPA borders where these coincide with international frontiers.(90)

### **5.1.3 Protection of Muslim and Croat Prisoners**

UNPROFOR, on an exceptional basis, was authorized to use its existing resources to protect some 4,000 or more Muslim and Croat prisoners who were to be released from the Serb detention camps at Manjaca and Trnopolje in the Northern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to take them, "at their wish", to transit facilities in Croatia. The Croatian government gave its consent to that arrangement.(91)

### **5.1.4 Prevlaka Peninsula and Peruca Dam**

According to the UN Peace Plan, UNPROFOR was responsible from the withdrawal of the JNA units from the UNPAs. UNPROFOR fulfilled all of its responsibilities in all three UNPAs on July 2nd 1992. Nevertheless, the JNA was still at that time occupying areas close to Dubrovnik, despite UNPROFOR's continuous efforts to secure its withdrawal. The Belgrade authorities stated that in view of the strategic consideration, the Prevlaka peninsula controls the entrance to the Gulf of Kotor. Therefore, if it could be guaranteed that there were no Croatian heavy weapons in proximity to it, the JNA would

withdraw from this region. After that, the UNPROFOR Commander conducted negotiations with both sides to reach an agreement on this matter. In the end, a proposal was accepted by the Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army on September 12th 1992, and by the President of Croatia on September 15th 1992. Under this agreement, the JNA would withdraw completely from Croatia; the Prevlaka Peninsula would be demilitarized; and heavy weapons would be removed from the neighboring area of Croatia and Montenegro. Following the agreement, by adopting resolution 779 (1992), the Security Council authorized UNPROFOR to monitor the agreed arrangements, in close cooperation with the European Community Monitoring Mission.(92)

## **5.2 Bosnia-Herzegovina**

### **5.2.1 Reopening of the Sarajevo Airport**

On June 5th 1992, an agreement to reopen the Sarajevo airport was signed by all members of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and separately by a representative of the Bosnian Serbs under the supervision of the UNPROFOR Commander. Thus, within the framework of the Secretary-General's report of June 6th 1992, the Security Council authorized UNPROFOR to reopen the airport for the delivery of humanitarian supplies and related purposes, with exclusive authority given to it under resolution 758 (1992).(93)

With the same resolution, the Council authorized the Secretary-General to deploy: firstly, the military observers, who would supervise the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons, and the concentration of heavy weapons at agreed locations in order to create secure conditions for the reopening of the airport. It would supervise all combat aircraft, armor, artillery, mortars, rocket-launchers and other heavy weapons. For the supervision of heavy

weapons, another agreement was signed among leaders of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the President of the Serbian Democratic Party and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina on July 17th 1992. Hence, they agreed to place their heavy weapons under international supervision. After that, related technical personnel would be deployed to undertake an evaluation of the airport's service ability, the condition of its equipment and the measures required to control and receive aircraft, off-load stores and control the flow of humanitarian aid.(94) Finally, an infantry battalion would be deployed. With resolution 761 (1992) and resolution 764 (1992), the Security Council accepted the additional military requirements for this task.

### **5.2.2 Protection of Humanitarian Relief Convoys**

Within the framework of the Security Council resolution 776 (1992), UNPROFOR would support the efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian relief convoys throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Meanwhile, at the UNHCR's request, where and when such protection was considered necessary, UNPROFOR would provide protection for convoys going to UNHCR's regional centers and from there to local distribution points. UNPROFOR would also take responsibility for the protection of the United Nations facilities, including UNHCR storage centers, if requested.(95)

### **5.2.3 No-Fly Zone**

On September 30th 1992, a Joint Declaration was signed by the President of Croatia and the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They welcomed early stationing of international observers on airfields in their respective countries as a



confidence-building measure.(96) Following the Declaration, UNPROFOR concluded agreements with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on October 31st 1992 and those of Croatia on November 1st 1992 regarding operational arrangements for the deployment of the military observers on the airfields in those countries. A similar agreement was signed by UNPROFOR in Geneva on November 3rd 1992 with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These agreements provided, "inter alia, for access to the airfield flight control systems, and for the utilization of all relevant data, observation of preparations and performance of the flying missions of aircraft at the requested airfields, and inspection of all aircraft whose flights were authorized by UNPROFOR".(97)

Thus, due to the conclusion of these agreements, the Security Council decided to establish a "ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would not apply to UNPROFOR flights or to other flights in support of UN operations, including humanitarian assistance". In order to observe compliance with this, the Council requested UNPROFOR "to monitor compliance with the ban on military fields, including the placement of observers where necessary at air fields in the territory of the former Yugoslavia". The Council further requested UNPROFOR "to ensure, through an appropriate mechanism for approval and inspection, that the purpose of flights to and from Bosnia-Herzegovina other than those banned is consistent with the Security Council resolutions".(98)

Military observers would be deployed at selected airfields with information obtained from technical sources to implement this task. The observer teams would monitor all flight movements at the concerned airfields and inspect the arrival and departure of all aircraft whose flights into or out of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be approved

by UNPROFOR. They would also have a mobile component which could be deployed to other airfields if it was known that they were being used for unauthorized flights into or out of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The observers at Pula, Split and Varazdin would be provided by the European Community Monitoring Mission. At Zagreb and the airfields in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the task would be undertaken by the UNPROFOR military observers. A Monitoring Coordination and Control Center (MCCC), was established at the UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb and was responsible for all UNPROFOR activities. All flights, whether of fixed or rotary-wing aircraft, using Bosnia-Herzegovina airspace, would be required to obtain prior approval from MCCC.(99)

UNPROFOR established guidelines "as to what categories of non-military flights, other than those for humanitarian assistance, would be permitted to enter and exit the airspace in accordance with the provisions of resolution 781 (1992)".(100) The Secretary-General stated that the establishment of a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina constituted an essential element for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities.(101)

#### **5.2.4 Safe Areas and Related Tasks**

With the Security Council resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993, certain towns and their surrounding areas --Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Goradze, Tuzla and Zepa-- in Bosnia-Herzegovina were treated as safe areas. The Council affirmed that "these areas were a temporary measure and that the primary objective was to reverse the consequences of the use of force and to allow all displaced people to return their homes in peace".(102) Under resolution 836 (1993), the Council expanded the UNPROFOR

mandate to deter the attacks against these areas and authorized it, acting in self-defense, to take necessary measures, including the use of force in order to carry out the mandate.(103) Its other objectives would be to monitor the cease-fire; promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the areas; occupy key points; and protect humanitarian relief delivery and distribution.(104)

In order to establish the capacity to perform these tasks, UNPROFOR would be deployed within the safe areas, around their perimeters and at key points outside the safe areas. For implementing the tasks, mentioned above, it would "monitor and control access to the areas by means of check-points, where access roads would cross perimeters of these areas, and at other important points. It would also offer a response, if necessary and practicable, to attacks against the areas, against convoys to and from such areas, and against the UNPROFOR personnel. It would also monitor the areas for possible breaches of the cease-fire and discourage such breaches. It would monitor surrounding areas in order to detect current military actions and future intentions. Lastly, it would patrol and monitor the areas from which units might be withdrawn, so as to ensure that they would remain demilitarized".(105)

In order to realize these tasks, "the UNPROFOR forces needed to be equipped with both the necessary means for self-defense against any likely threat and the physical protection needed to perform essential tasks in relative units of protection, mobility and fire-power". But, it was assumed that the current UNPROFOR ground troops would not be sufficient to resist a concentrated assault on any of the areas. Because of this assumption, the Force Commander estimated that an additional 34,000 troops would be required to obtain sufficient deterrence. However, the Secretary-General selected a

"lighter option" envisaging a minimal troop requirement. This option was dependent on a threat of air action against any belligerents. However, it represented only an initial approach and it had "limited objectives". It was assumed that the consent and cooperation of the concerned parties would be taken, and thus a basic level of deterrence without increasing current levels of protection for humanitarian convoys would be provided. It also maintained provision for self-defense and would be a supplementary deterrent to attacks against the areas.(106)

Therefore, a particular emphasis was placed on having a credible air-strike capability provided for by the member states. This would require the deployment of **Forward Air Controllers (FACs)** in order that the Force multiplying characteristics of air power might be fully exploited if necessary. The Secretary-General asked NATO to prepare such plans for the provision of necessary air support, in close coordination with him and his Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia. On June 11th 1993, NATO confirmed its willingness to offer "protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR in the performance of its overall mandate, if it is requested".(107) Finally, after NATO declared its willingness, it was authorized to make necessary contributions to implement this task. With resolution 836 (1993), the Council decided that "Member states, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, may make, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate...".(108)

### 5.2.5 Border Monitoring

According to the Secretary-General's report S/25000 of 21 December 1992, the JNA withdrew completely from Bosnia-Herzegovina, but at the same time, it left behind some equipment to the Bosnian Serbs which contributed to the establishment of "an Army of the Serb Republic". At the same time, several brigades of the Croatian Army were also reported to be actively engaged in conflict.(109) Therefore, with resolution 787 (1992), the Security Council demanded that "all forms of interference from outside the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including infiltration into the country of irregular units and personnel, cease immediately, and it reaffirmed its determination to take measures against all parties and the others which failed to fulfill the requirements of resolution 752 (1992) and its other relevant resolutions, including the requirement that all forces, in particular elements of the Croatian Army, to be withdrawn, or to be subjected to the authority of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or to be disbanded or disarmed".(110) After adopting resolution 787 (1992), the Council followed this up by adopting resolution 820 (1993) which imposed a number of additional sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In paragraph 12 of the resolution, the Council decided that "import to, export from and transshipment through the UNPAs in Croatia and those areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina under control of the Bosnian Serb forces with the exception of humanitarian aid should be permitted only with proper authorization from the government of Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively".(111) These resolutions required the "border monitors" to concern themselves with all movement of regular and irregular military personnel, weapons and other military equipment and supplies as well as goods subject to the sanctions from neighboring countries destined for Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Serb-occupied areas of Croatia.(112)

Under resolution 838 (1993), the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit, as soon as possible, a plan for implementation of this task. According to the same resolution, the international monitors could be drawn from the UN and, if appropriate, from the member states acting nationally or through regional organizations and arrangements.(113) According to the Secretary-General's report (S/26018), the function was based on four assumptions: a)The border monitoring arrangements would require full cooperation from all parties concerned. It meant that the success of the mandate was dependent upon the cooperation of the parties; b)The border monitoring ideally would have to include all international borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with priority given to those with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, because the latter border was being controlled by the governmental agencies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the monitoring mandate should preferably be implemented from that side only. The same would be applied to the border with Croatia; c)It was impractical to control the borders completely, because of the nature of the terrain and the length of the borders. For that reason, only the major crossing points could be effectively monitored; d)Where applicable, UNPROFOR would focus its monitoring activity on the work of the national border control agencies.(114)

In the end, "the observer teams would not be in a position to check the nature of goods carried in and out of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, the effectiveness of the mandate would largely depend on the bona fide cooperation of Croatian and the Federal Yugoslav customs officers. In fact, the national agencies would continue to execute their border control functions but would be monitored by the UNPROFOR observers".(115) At the same time, the UNPROFOR observers would monitor all movements of regular or irregular military personnel, weapons and other equipment from neighboring countries into Bosnia-Herzegovina through check-points.(116) Regarding the use of personnel from

the European Community Monitoring Mission or other regional organizations and arrangements, they would monitor specific check points assigned to them. However, the UNPROFOR's headquarters would have to be clearly in command of the arrangement and act as the sole reporting agency to the Council.(117)

### **5.3 Macedonia**

#### **5.3.1 Border Monitoring**

Under the Security Council resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992, the UNPROFOR mandate was extended to the Republic of Macedonia. It would monitor the border areas and report any developments which could pose a threat to Macedonia to the Secretary-General through the Force Commander. By its presence, it was considered a deterrent to threats from any source, as well as a help to prevent clashes which could occur between external elements and Macedonian forces, thus helping to strengthen security and confidence in Macedonia. In other words, UNPROFOR would only monitor, not defend, the Macedonian borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and report all activities that might increase tension or threaten peace and stability in the region, and it would stand between forces that might clash.(118)

Nevertheless, a UNCIVPOL component would be deployed to monitor the work of the local border police and assist in calming any inter-ethnic tensions arising from perceptions of Macedonian police harassment or abuse against Albanians, mainly in the context of illegal border crossings.(119) Two Civil Affairs Officers would be deployed to perform liaison functions between UNPROFOR and the central and local authorities, and also to provide political advise to the Commander.(120)

## 6 Extensions of the UNPROFOR Mandate

The first extension of the mandate of UNPROFOR occurred with Security Council resolution 807 (1993) of 19 February 1993. According to the resolution, the Council extended its mandate for an interim period until March 31st 1993 to give sufficient time to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia to negotiate certain issues.(121) Another reason for the extension was to curtail any outbreak of renewed hostilities which the Secretary-General stated would happen upon the termination of the UNPROFOR presence in Croatia.(122) The second extension was made with resolution 815 (1993) of 30 March 1993. The content of the resolution declared that the situation continued to constitute a threat to peace and security in the region. Therefore, the Council decided to extend the UNPROFOR mandate for an additional interim period terminating on June 30th 1993.(123)

In order to make an extension of the UNPROFOR mandate until September 30th 1993, the Security Council required a report from the Secretary-General. Thus, he prepared a report (S/25777) about the developments related to the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia. In his report, he proposed three options for the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate

**a) To declare the mandate unworkable in view of Serb non-cooperation, and to withdraw the Peace-keeping Force:** The Secretary-General stated that if the Peace-keeping Force was withdrawn, the hostilities would restart;

**b) To accept the Croatian view and approve enforcement action to exact compliance from the Serbs:** This would put UNPROFOR at war with the Serbs in the UNPAs and "Pink Zones". He considered that the international community never wanted to become a party in the conflict, using military force to impose a solution on one side in an inter-ethnic conflict. The countries providing troops would not agree to put their soldiers at



risk for such a purpose. He also argued that the present size and armament of the Peace-keeping Force would, in any event, be inadequate for such a task with regard to these considerations; c) **To leave UNPROFOR in place with no change in the mandate but with limited enhancement of its military capacity:** UNPROFOR would try to limit the hostilities. In the long term, it was believed that the sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and mounting international pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, as well as intensified peace-making efforts by the Co-Chairmen, would strengthen UNPROFOR to implement its mandate. Nevertheless, UNPROFOR would remain on the same "peace-keeping" basis as at present and thus would require consent and cooperation of the concerned parties.(124)

Consequently, the Secretary-General recommended the third option for the future structure of UNPROFOR to the Council. He demanded enhancement for UNPROFOR in his report.(125) Thus, the mandate of UNPROFOR was extended until September 30th 1993 within the framework of the Secretary-General's recommendation.

## **7 The Composition of UNPROFOR**

Firstly, 50 military liaison officers were deployed in January 1992 to help consolidate the cease-fire. Later, that number of officers was increased to 75 in February 1992. After the UN Peace Plan was accepted, the composition of UNPROFOR became as follows: a) A military component would consist of twelve enlarged infantry battalions (10,400 all ranks) and headquarters, logistics, and other support elements totaling approximately 2,840 ranks, and 100 military observers; b) A police component would consist of approximately 530 police personnel; c) A 519-member civilian component was composed of existing United Nations Secretariat Staff; d) An air unit would consist of four

fixed-wing aircraft and 26 helicopters.(126) From early March through mid-April, some 8,300 members of UNPROFOR were sent to the area. By July 23rd 1992, nearly all of the 14,000 initial UNPROFOR military and civilian staff were completely deployed.(127) In addition to this, as of June 8th 1992, an infantry battalion of some 1,000 military officers, 60 military observers and 40 civilian police were deployed to the Sarajevo Sector headquarters.(128)

After signing the agreement on reopening the Sarajevo airport, the following additions were required to increase its strength: three infantry battalions of 400 troops each (1,200 all ranks); an air unit consisting of 139 personnel, 5 utility helicopters and 4 light observation helicopters; a 20-person artillery-mortar radar location unit; a 183-person headquarters company, including a medical unit, guard unit and signal unit; a 66-person airport headquarters company composed of air traffic control, air transit control, fire protection and technical maintenance; 60 military observers; and 40 civilian police to supervise the peaceful functioning of the airport.(129)

On November 5th 1992, the UNPROFOR's strength was increased to 75 military observers and four military officers for monitoring the Coordination and Control Center in Zagreb. Their purpose was to monitor the ban on military flights in Bosnia-Herzegovina. After that, 60 military observers and 120 civilian police were deployed throughout the Pink Zones in order to monitor the maintenance of law and order. To control the borders of the UNPAs, some 46 crossing points would be controlled by 184 civilian police, 276 immigration officers and 276 customs officers. Some 151 civilian personnel, including 11 civilian police monitors, 86 international staff and 54 local staff were deployed. At the same time, 320 additional military personnel for border control were deployed.(130)

With Security Council resolution 781 (1992), 75 military observers with air-force and/or air-defense experience, including 25 specialists with pilot and/or air traffic controller qualifications were added to the UNPROFOR structure of the Sarajevo airport. 30 military observers were temporarily deployed from existing peace-keeping operations.(131) Following this, in order to monitor the flights, 65 military observers were deployed in Pula, Split, Varazdin, Zagreb (Croatia), Banja Luka (two airfields), Cazin, Tuzla (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Batajnica, Podgorica, Surcin, Kraljevo and Pristina airfields (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).(132) At the end of December, the United States Administration also sent 25 observers to help fill the gap in airfield monitors.(133)

Under Security Council resolution 815 (1993), the UNPROFOR strength in Croatia was enhanced by an additional 400 troops and 50 military observers in May 1993. Nevertheless, the implementation of the cease-fire agreement in Croatia required 2,100 troops, including two mechanized infantry battalions numbering 1,800 strong, and two engineer companies numbering 300 strong as well as 50 military observers. At the same time, the strengthening of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo required an additional 150 troops. These requirements provided for a total of 2,650 additional troops and 100 additional military observers.(134)

Security Council resolution 836 (1993), pertaining to the safe areas, had a number of new requirements recommended by the Secretary-General in his report (S/25939). These requirements were one composite headquarters and headquarters company (250 all ranks), to strengthen the Command and Control capacity of the UNPROFOR's Bosnia and Herzegovina Command; five mechanized infantry battalions (two in the Sarajevo area, one in each of the Goradze and Tuzla areas, one to control the Metkovic-Mostar-Sarajevo routes (900 ranks each); one armored reconnaissance battalion

(450 all ranks, with four recon squadrons, 110 ranks each); one air unit (200 all ranks, with helicopters for air reconnaissance and casualty evacuation); one signals unit (150 all ranks); one logistics battalion (400 all ranks); one field battalion (300 all ranks, with two field engineer companies for mine clearance and construction and road maintenance and one logistic unit); and one medical unit (250 all ranks). This task included the reinforcement of the infantry battalions in Sarajevo by an additional 500 troops for each battalion in two cases and an additional 100 troops in the case of the third battalion, together with necessary equipment. Thus, the total additional requirement was 7,600 troops and 60 additional civilian personnel (20 international professional, 20 general service and 20 local staff). (135)

In order to monitor the borders between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 48 check points were established. In the meantime, to monitor the borders among the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 123 check points were created. Table 1 and 2 shows the additional military and civilian personnel deployed in July 1st 1993 for these functions.

**Table 1: Military and Civilian Personnel**

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Bosnia and Herzegovina (48 check points)			
Observers	Interpreters	Other Civilian Personnel	Total
410	240	132	782

**Source:** S/26018, 1 July 1993, par.7

**Table 2: Military and Civilian Personnel**

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Bosnia-Herzegovina/Croatia (123 check points)			
Observers	Interpreters	Other Civilian Personnel	Total
1,034	615	284	1,933

**Source:** S/26018, 1 July 1993, par.7

The Macedonian Command consisted of the following military, civilian and international personnel as of February 1993:

a) Military Component: one battalion of up to 700 persons, comprising three rifle companies, headquarters and logistics companies. (434-men were contributed by Finland, Norway and Sweden, the United States provided 300 troops); and 35 United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs),

b) UNCIVPOL component: 26 civilian police monitors (13 to monitor the northern border, 13 for the western border),

c) Civil Affairs component: four Professional staff members, two international general service staff and four local staff,

d) Administration: five professional staff members, 29 field service/general service (international staff), 11 local staff,

e) A number of local interpreters. (136)

Consequently, as of July 1993, Table 3 shows the total number of the military personnel of UNPROFOR according to the Command structures and Table 4 shows the total strength of the military observers, military and civilian personnel of UNPROFOR.

**Table 3:** The Military Personnel as of July 1993 according to the Command structures

	<b>Croatia</b>	<b>Bosnia-Herzegovina</b>	<b>Macedonia</b>
Military Personnel	15,289	15,345	734

**Table 4:** The Military and Civilian Personnel as of July 1993

	<b>Military Per.</b>	<b>Civilian Per.</b>	<b>Military Obs.</b>
Strength	31,368	1,093	525

## **8 The Organization of UNPROFOR**

### **8.1 Command and Control Structure of UNPROFOR**

UNPROFOR would be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security-Council. The overall command and control of the operation in the field would be exercised by the Force Commander. He would be assisted in the political aspects of his duties by a Senior Civilian Official designated as Director of Civil Affairs.(137)

How were the decisions made? When the decision-making process for UNPROFOR was followed, it was evident that all decisions were made by the Security Council as a sole authority, upon the suggestions of the Secretary-General. Although the Secretary-General prepared reports for the implementation of the resolutions and additional requirements in close coordination with the Force Commander within the

framework of the Yugoslav crisis, he can either take the Force Commander's recommendations into account or not. For instance, to implement the task of setting up and establishing units in the safe areas, the Force Commander recommended that 34,000 military personnel be required. However, the Secretary-General did not accept this recommendation and lowered the figure to an additional 7,600 personnel being enough for the task. However, deployment of the additional personnel and other issues in the field were completely decided by the Force Commander. Again, concerning field issues, the national contingents would not receive orders from their national authorities but from the Force Commander. Meanwhile, within the national contingents, the command and control would be national.(138)

Due to the extension of the mandate of UNPROFOR to Bosnia-Herzegovina, a "Bosnia and Herzegovina Command" within the structure of UNPROFOR was established at the two-star level. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Command would be responsible for all the peace-keeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, under the overall command of the UNPROFOR Force Commander.(139) After that, a "Macedonian Command" was added to the UNPROFOR's structure with its headquarters based in Skopje. The Commander would be a Brigadier-General accompanied by civilian personnel and an international staff, mainly for liaison purposes. He would be under the overall command of the UNPROFOR Force Commander.(140) (For the list of the Force Commanders and Sector Commanders, see Appendix B)

As of March 1993, the military and/or civilian personnel of UNPROFOR is provided by the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,

Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela. The civilian component of the Force consists of staff members of the United Nations and of locally recruited employees.(141)

## **8.2 Deployment of UNPROFOR**

The UNPROFOR headquarters was initially located in Sarajevo, with sub-offices in Belgrade and Zagreb, and a logistics base in Banja Luka. Due to the escalation of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, its headquarters moved from Sarajevo to Zagreb on the 16th and 17th of May 1992.(142) UNPROFOR was deployed into three United Nations Protected Areas --in Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina. For UN purposes, the UNPAs were divided into four sectors: Sector East (Eastern Slavonia, including areas of Baranja and Western Srem), Sector North (the northern part of the Krajina UNPA), Sector South (the southern part of the Krajina UNPA) and Sector West (Western Slavonia). Military observers would be deployed into certain parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina adjacent to Croatia.(143) Because of the extension of the mandate of UNPROFOR to Bosnia-Herzegovina, a fifth UNPROFOR sector was established in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its headquarters was in Sarajevo.(144)

Concerning deployment into Macedonia, the "Macedonia Command" headquarters was in Skopje. The Nordic battalion was deployed on the western border from Debar northward and on the northern border up to the border with Bulgaria. Its headquarters was in Kojlia. The Finnish company was deployed in the north-western part of the area of operations with its headquarters based in Tetovo. The Norwegian company was deployed in the center of the area of operations with its headquarters in George Petrov. The



Swedish company was deployed in the north-eastern part of the area of operations with its headquarters in Kumanovo. The United States contingent of 300 soldiers arrived in Macedonia in the first two weeks of July 1993. There were 19 UN Military Observers (UNMOs) in the area of operations. The western border area of south Debar was covered solely by the UNMOs. They had a small headquarters in Ohrid. The Civil Affairs and the Civilian Administration Staff consisted of four and five professionals respectively, and were located at the headquarters in Skopje.(145) (In order to obtain further information about the composition and number of the UNPROFOR troops separately in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, see Appendix C)

## **9 The Finance of UNPROFOR**

### **9.1 The Costs of UNPROFOR**

The UNPROFOR's initial cost was estimated at \$634 million for twelve months. \$275.7 million would be used for the military component, \$31.7 million for civilian police monitors and \$36.7 million for civilian personnel. The total cost for these components was \$344.1 million. The remaining (\$289.9 million) covered premises, vehicle and aircraft operations, communications, miscellaneous equipment, supplies and services, freight, support accounts for peace-keeping operations and staff assessment.(146) The General Assembly, under resolution A/46/233 of 19 March 1992, appropriated an amount of \$251,500,000 gross (\$250,000,000 net). The appropriated amount was believed to be adequate until October 1992.(147)

Due to the extension of the mandate of UNPROFOR, its costs increased. For the mission of reopening the Sarajevo airport, the cost was estimated at \$22,222,000 gross, (\$22,132,000 net) for the period from June 13th to October 14th 1992. The cost of

monitoring the Pink Zones was estimated at \$4,856,000 gross (\$4,846,000 net) for the period from July 15th to October 14th 1992. The total cost was \$27,078,000 gross (\$26,978,000 net) for these two missions. Due to the enlargement of the mandate relating to the immigration and customs functions, the cost was estimated to be \$30,893,000 (\$29,972,000 net) for the period from mid-August to mid-October 1992. In order to meet the most urgent requirements of this enlargement, the Secretary-General received \$10 million.(148)

Concerning protection of humanitarian convoys, it would have to be financed entirely by voluntary contributions. Contingent personnel and related logistical support would be provided by the troop-contributing governments at no cost to the United Nations. A "Trust Fund" was established to receive contributions for the expenses of UNPROFOR specifically for the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command. The Fund met the expenses of the "common costs" portion of the UNPROFOR Bosnia and Herzegovina Command and was managed by the UN in accordance with its "financial regulations and rules".(149)

For monitoring compliance with the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina (no-fly zone), the cost would amount to some \$4,485,000 for the six-month period starting from November 1st 1992 to April 30th 1993. Thereafter, the monthly cost was estimated at \$520,000.(150) Concerning the additional responsibilities related to the safe areas, the cost was estimated at some \$249.9 million for an initial six-month period, from June to November 1993. It was further estimated that the monthly costs thereafter would be approximately \$26 million.(151) Resolution 815 (1993) entailed some enhancements for UNPROFOR. Thus, the cost associated with these enhancements amounted to some \$91.2 million for an initial six-month period, from May to October 1993. These enhancements were explained in paragraph 22, 24 and 25 of the

Secretary-General's report S/25777 of 15 May 1993. The total cost was distributed as follows: for paragraph 22, \$22.2 million; for paragraph 24, \$65 million; and for paragraph 25, \$4 million. It was further estimated that the combined monthly cost thereafter would be approximately \$9.7 million.(152)

It was estimated that the cost associated with the additional responsibility to deploy military observers at 48 major crossing points in order to monitor the borders between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would amount to some \$41.2 million for an initial six-month period, from June to November 1993. It was further estimated that the monthly cost thereafter would be approximately \$3.6 million. Military observers would also be deployed at another 75 crossing points to monitor the borders between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The cost was estimated at \$53.6 million, from June to November 1993. Thereafter, the monthly cost would be about \$4.5 million. Thus, the total cost for this responsibility was \$94.8 million for a six-month period and \$8.1 million for each month thereafter.(153)

The cost for US deployment into Macedonia was estimated at \$10.5 million for an initial six-month period from July to December 1993. It was further estimated that the monthly cost thereafter would be approximately \$1.5 million.(154) Due to the extension of its mandate, for its general expenditures, the Secretary-General estimated its cost for the one-year period from February 21st 1993 to February 20th 1994 at an average monthly rate of \$48,112,350 gross (\$47,462,350 net). Thus, the total requirement for the period was estimated at \$577,348,200 gross (\$569,548,200 net).(155) The General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter commitments for the operation of UNPROFOR at a rate not to exceed \$47,064,525 gross (\$46,492,334 net) per month for the seven-month period from February 21st 1993 to September 20th 1993.(156) Thus, the

total cost for the seven-month period was \$329,051,675 gross (\$325,446,338 net).

## **9.2 Voluntary Contributions**

Within the framework of protecting humanitarian relief convoys, these voluntary contributions were made:

a) Air ambulance service was made available to UNPROFOR by Switzerland. It also provided forty trucks,

b) Germany provided 395 vehicles and trailers and 50 generators, (157)

c) The United States donated a field hospital to the operation to protect humanitarian convoys in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The services of the field hospital were available to UNPROFOR as a whole, (158)

d) The EC member states financed the humanitarian convoy protection operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the estimated cost of \$400 million. (159)

## **9.3 Financial System of UNPROFOR**

The costs of UNPROFOR have been financed in two ways: a) by virtue of article 17, paragraph 2 of the UN Charter, and b) through assessments levied on the member states. (For a more detail about the costs, see Appendix D)

### **9.3.1 Article 17, paragraph 2 of the UN Charter**

Some costs of UNPROFOR were considered an expense of the United Nations to be borne by the member states. These costs were financed by the United Nations' budget. (160)

### **9.3.2 Assessments levied on the member states**

Under resolution 47/210 of 22 December 1992, the General Assembly decided to "appropriate to the Special Account referred to in General Assembly resolution 46/233 an amount of 10,000,00 United States dollars authorized with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee under the terms of General Assembly resolution 46/187 of 20 December 1991, for the period from January 12th to October 14th 1992". By the same resolution, the General Assembly also decided to "appropriate to the Special Account an amount of 290,049,500 dollars gross (288,313,900 dollars net)..." for the period from October 15th 1992 to February 20th 1993.(161)

#### **9.3.2.1 Apportionment of the Costs of Peace-keeping Operations**

On 11 December 1973, the General Assembly adopted "resolution 3101 (XXVIII) on the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)". Under the resolution, the membership of the United Nations was divided into four groups: a)the permanent members of the Security Council; b)specifically named as economically-developed member states that are not permanent members of the Security Council --for instance, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Australia, Japan; c)economically less-developed member states --for instance, Albania, Brazil, Hungary, Jordan, Turkey; d)economically less developed member states that were specifically named --for instance, Niger, Angola, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Somalia. The resolution also specified the amounts of the total appropriation to be distributed among each of the four groups. The four amounts specified in the resolution were established by a methodology which would produce the following results: "the member states in group D would pay 10 per cent of the assessment rates established for the regular budget, those in group C would pay 20 per cent, those in group

B would pay 100 per cent and those in group A would pay 100 per cent plus the amounts\*. According to the terms of resolution 3101 (XXVIII), within each group, the appropriated amount was to be distributed among the group members "on the basis of the relative weight of each group member's regular rate of assessment in relation to the total rate for the group".(162)

Thus, the assessment of contributions of the member states levied by the United Nations for UNPROFOR for the period from January 12th 1992 to October 14th 1992 was \$10,000,000 and also for the period from October 15th 1992 to February 20th 1993 was \$290,049,500. Therefore, the total amount of assessment was \$300,049,500.(163)

## PART TWO

### A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF UNPROFOR

The drafters of the United Nations Charter, during the Second World War, decided to establish a UN Collective Security System in order to maintain international peace and security. But, during the Cold War era, the Collective Security System became unoperational because of the ideological differences and military bipolarity between the two superpowers. However, local and regional conflicts emerged and endangered international peace and security. Therefore, the Security Council and the General Assembly employed peace-keeping operations in order to deal with these conflicts. These peace-keeping operations allowed the participation of parties in conflict, albeit in limited numbers--in UNEF I and II, Egypt and Israel; in ONUC, the Congolese government and the Katangese secessionists (together with foreign advisors); in UNFICYP, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots; in UNDOF, Israel and Syria; in UNIFIL, Israel, Lebanon and the secessionist groups. They had very restricted functions, such as supervising troops withdrawal, preventing recurrence of internal conflict, averting outside intervention, providing a buffer zone between the parties, maintaining law and order, supervising cease-fire agreements, and disengaging the troops of the parties.

But, after the Cold War era, the nature of the conflicts changed because of the emergence of inter-ethnic conflicts, which are much more complicated. Moreover, the parties have become much more intricate than during the Cold War era. Therefore, many scholars--Belonogov (1990), Chan Chee (1991), Cuellar (1991), Diehl and Kumar (1991), Hagglund (1992), Alan (1987), Krepon and Tracey (1990), Liu (1992), Urquhart (1991/92), Malitza (1987), Blodgett (1991), Mackinlay (1989), and Luard (1992)--have argued that

there is a need for the transformation of the traditional peace-keeping operations into a new structure in order to provide an answer to the requirements of the post-Cold War era. Hence, they proposed some possible qualifications for peace-keeping operations in the future, such as including more civilian components into their structure, providing continuous support by the Security Council, redefining the concept of the use of force, enhancing the authority of the Secretary-General, reorganization of the Secretariat, including air and naval contingents into their structure, preventive deployment of peace-keeping forces. Thus, because UNPROFOR was established in the post-Cold War era, an examination of the contributions and shortcomings of UNPROFOR has become necessary to see whether any of these proposals have been put into practice how effectively, and to illustrate continuing problems.

## **1 Contributions of UNPROFOR**

### **1.1 Interrelated Peace-keeping and Peace-making Mechanisms**

Liu (1992) and Blodgett (1991) have stated that peace-making and peace-keeping mechanisms are complementary and interrelated. According to Liu and Blodgett, while the peace-keeping force attempts to limit and cool off the fighting and provide sufficient ground work for a peaceful settlement of the dispute, the peace-making mechanism tries to dissolve the differences between the parties through negotiations. Thus, the degree of progress that the peace-keeping force has, directly, effects the success of the peace-making mechanism and vice-versa. Therefore, they have an interrelated role within a conflict. At the same time, Malitza (1987) has argued that to make a peace-keeping operation efficient, parallel political initiatives are essential.(1)

UNPROFOR has been facilitated by the EC Peace Conference as a



peace-making mechanism. While the initial aim of UNPROFOR was to prevent the cessation of hostilities and to prepare the necessary ground work for the Peace Conference, the EC Peace Conference tried to provide an acceptable solution among the conflicting parties through continual direct negotiations in order to resolve the differences and bring an end to the conflict. During the Cold War era, UNEF II had been facilitated by the United States and the former Soviet Union through their bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts, which were not accepted as a peace-making mechanism. However, in UNPROFOR, the degree of progress of the EC Peace Conference has directly affected the degree of success of UNPROFOR as well as the cooperation achieved from the parties. So, these two mechanisms are directly proportional to each other.

## **1.2 Contributions of Regional Organizations**

Some scholars (2) have supported involvement of regional organizations into peace-keeping operations in order to facilitate their functions.

In the case of UNPROFOR, the regional arrangements or agencies have made remarkable contributions. The European Community sent its observers to assist the UNPROFOR tasks. For instance, some of these observers were deployed to airfields in order to observe military flights both to and from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Meanwhile, others were deployed at checkpoints on the Bosnia-Herzegovina borders. They also assisted the UNPROFOR military observers in the UNPAs. Finally, the EC sponsored and established a Peace Conference to find a final solution to the problems. Thus, the United Nations was helped by the EC to solve a regional conflict where the UN had no special information about the conflict in the area and the region as a whole. On the other hand, NATO did provide logistical and operational support to protect the safe areas against any attacks.

The member states, including Turkey, stationed their aircraft at a NATO base in Italy, and continued surveillance functions in the Bosnia-Herzegovina airspace. As mentioned earlier, according to the Secretary-General, the success of the task has been largely dependent on the NATO air force. Consequently, the regional organizations have not only contributed to the peace-making mechanism for a regional conflict but also contributed to the functions of the peace-keeping operations.

### **1.3 Inclusion of Air and Naval Forces**

For the success of peace-keeping operations in the future, the participation of air and naval forces has been concluded necessary because of their ability to enforce economic sanctions, protect neutral shipping, prevent attacks against specifically defined areas, and make surveillance missions to protect humanitarian convoys.(3)

As mentioned above, NATO aircraft have assisted UNPROFOR in the task of safe areas through air surveillance. At the same time, the warships of the Western European Union countries and of NATO member states under the command of Turkey separately participated in naval operations in order to enforce the economic and arms embargoes against the former Yugoslavia. They stopped and searched the ships bound for the former Yugoslavia. The United Nations would not have been able to implement this task by itself. Therefore, participation of Naval and Air elements emerged as a need in the structure of peace-keeping operations for the future.

### **1.4 Diversification of the Functions**

Scholars (4) have pointed out that after the end of the Cold War era,

peace-keeping operations might be used in a larger scope--such as, in verification of the armaments of the conflicting parties, for providing humanitarian assistance and preventing a possible surprise attack.

The functions of peace-keeping operations during the Cold War era were mainly to create a buffer zone between the conflicting parties, to assure withdrawal of the forces, to prevent recurrence of fighting, to supervise cease-fires and to avert third party involvement. Of course, under the provisions of the UN Peace Plan, UNPROFOR was also initially authorized to demilitarize the UNPAs and to secure the withdrawal of JNA from these regions, like all other previous operations. However, through various Security Council resolutions, its functions have been diversified. For instance, it was authorized to protect the humanitarian relief convoys, to monitor international borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, to perform customs and immigration functions, to transfer some people from the detention camps to required state(s), to monitor local police, to deter any attacks against the safe areas, and to maintain law and order in the UNPAs. Thus, present peace-keeping operations involve much more function than in the past.

### **1.5 Inclusion of Police and Civil Administrators**

Urquhart (1991/92) has pointed out that peace-keeping operations should become predominantly political, rather than military operations. Therefore, together with Perez de Cuellar (1991), he strongly argued for the wider use of civilians in the make up of peace-keeping missions. Alan (1987) has stated that a potential host state might be slightly more willing to accept a civilian observer over a military observer for the operations. And, Mackinlay (1989) indicated that they should be under the command of a

joint headquarters, acting out the same joint plan to achieve a common strategic purpose.(5)

Under the UN Peace Plan, UNPROFOR was composed of military, civilian and police components. Some tasks of UNPROFOR have been implemented by the civilian and police components--for instance, maintenance of law and order, monitoring the international borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, and monitoring the activities of local police forces was carried out by the police components. Only ONUC and UNFICYP had civilian components. In ONUC, the civilian component functioned only for public information services and distribution of humanitarian relief. However, these functions were considered to have only secondary importance. The functions of UNPROFOR civilian and police components have had primary and secondary importance. At the same time, UNFICYP had only 38 civilian police, while UNPROFOR had more than 1,000 men. Consequently, it can be argued that in the course of time, the civilian and police components have become a more important part of the UNPROFOR structure.

## **1.6 Using Contemporary Technical Equipment**

Mackinlay (1989) and Hagglund (1990) have concluded that contemporary technical equipment should be included in a peace-keeping operation because it will make the operation a more efficient one.(6) Before UNPROFOR, the peace-keeping forces had some radar and night observation devices, but they had no satellite observation or other contemporary equipment, at that time. UNPROFOR does have access to contemporary technical equipment. For instance, the UNPROFOR's communication link to all areas of operation has been provided by INMARSAT terminals. The satellite equipment was also connected to the UN Headquarters in New York. Other equipment consisted of electronic

data-processing equipment with both desk-top computers and laptop computers, servers and additional hardware and software, public information equipment--video cameras, TV/VCR satellite receptor-, electronic mine detectors and observation towers.(7)

### **1.7 Administrative Reform**

During the first years of the Cold War, the Secretary-General did not enjoy the use of executive powers.(8) Thus, such powers were very occasionally delegated to someone of distinction and known reliability--for example, Count Bernadotte or Dr. Bunche in the Middle East. At the same time, situations were normally handled by intergovernmental commissions set up by one of the organs of the United Nations.(9) In the end, while the Secretariat basically became a servicing staff which had little or no freedom of action of its own, the position of Secretary-General had largely lost its importance. When Dag Hammarskjold was in office, the Secretariat regained its importance and the Secretary-General could bring any matter which might threaten international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council. Due to the efforts of the Secretary-General, the Council established UNEF I. After Dag Hammarskjold's death, the Secretariat and the Secretary-General again lost their importance. However, after the end of the Cold War, many scholars (10) have supported the idea of reorganization of the Secretariat and enhancement of the role of the Secretary-General to maintain international peace and security. These intentions and proposals have been put into practice by UNPROFOR.

By its various resolutions, the Security Council converted UNPROFOR from a largely military operation into one with extensive military, civilian and diplomatic responsibilities in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

Montenegro and Macedonia. Thus, the mission has been managed at the Assistant Secretary-General level, under the name of the Secretary-General, while, during the Cold War era, the mission would normally have been headed up by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General at the Under-Secretary General level. At the same time, the unforeseen growth in the scope and complexity of the civilian aspects of the mandate of UNPROFOR has had a significant impact on the responsibility of the Director of Civil Affairs. Because of the inclusion of the civilian activities, and the complexity of the political and diplomatic issues handled by the Director of Civil Affairs, to encompass making negotiations at the highest political level, the Secretary-General decided that the post of the Director of Civil Affairs be upgraded to the Assistant Secretary-General level and renamed Deputy Chief of the Mission. Thus, he argued that "confirmation of the senior civilian post as that of second-in-command of UNPROFOR further reflects the importance acquired by the civilian functions of UNPROFOR in determining the overall effectiveness of the mission." (11)

The role of the Secretary-General in the case of UNPROFOR is concerned, the Secretary-General directly affected the decisions of the Security Council and used the executive powers of the Office as defined by articles 98 and 99 of the UN Charter. All the Council's resolutions were adopted within the framework of the Secretary-General's recommendations. For example, until the Secretary-General gave an affirmative recommendation about the deployment of UNPROFOR, the Security Council did not authorize its deployment. Consequently, it can be stated that the role of the Secretary-General in international affairs as well as in peace-keeping operations has gradually been enhanced. At the same time, the structure of Secretariat was reformed in order to give an answer to the conditions of the post-Cold War era as well as UNPROFOR.

## **1.8 Permanent Security Council Support and the Participation of Contingents of the Permanent Members**

Many scholars (12) have proposed a stronger and united Security Council to support the peace-keeping operations. They stated that this support could positively affect the operations with the result of obtaining a much better position to deal with the concerned parties. The support could also push the parties to comply with the Security Council resolutions and to cooperate with the peace-keeping operations by threatening to take enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. But, during the Cold War era, political antagonism in the Security Council made the political context of the operations extremely weak, and sometimes non-existent. These antagonisms also slowed down the actions of the Council dealing with the issues which had endangered international peace and security. The previous peace-keeping operations clearly illustrated the political antagonism. For instance, in UNEF I, the former Soviet Union supported the Egyptian socialist government, while the United States backed Israel. In ONUC, the Congolese guerrillas were supported by the USSR, which vetoed the resolution for the establishment of the Peace-keeping Force, and the United States defended the central government. (13) (For further information, see Appendix E)

Since the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the two superpowers has shifted from competition to cooperation. This situation is reflected in the case of UNPROFOR. The Security Council adopted resolutions for the security of UNPROFOR and ECMM personnel, establishing cooperation between the parties and the Peace-keeping Force, and assisting the regional organizations in protecting the safe areas and activating the no-fly zone within the framework of Chapter VII which were binding decisions. Although China abstained from voting for these resolutions, it did not veto the

resolutions, or in other words, it did not prevent the adoption of the resolutions. Therefore, the Security Council continued adopting resolutions pertaining to UNPROFOR and the Yugoslav crisis, and permanently kept the issue on its agenda.

In addition to this matter, some scholars (14) have advocated the idea of participation of contingents by the permanent members. According to these scholars, this might increase both organizational efficiency and upgrade the technical equipment for the operations. Before UNPROFOR, only two permanent members--the French in UNIFIL and the British in UNFICYP-- included their contingents into the peace-keeping operations. In UNIFIL, some problems broke out between the French troops and the concerned parties resulting in the French officials becoming targets. Whereas, the British contingents in UNFICYP did not create such problems. After that, the idea of non-inclusion of such contingents was strongly accepted. Despite this belief, UNPROFOR included the contingents of the permanent members-- British, French, Russian and the United States. Having the presence of the permanent member contingents has increased the efficiency of UNPROFOR in the areas of conflict. The Secretary-General stated in his report (S/24923) that the United States' deployment in Macedonia would further strengthen confidence and stability, and also underscore the message that "the international community would not accept any further widening of the tragic conflict in the region". It is hoped that the belligerents may consider that if they attack against those contingents, they will face greater conflict with these powerful countries directly. Thereby, the efficiency of the Peace-keeping Force is enhanced.

### **1.9 Preventive Deployment**

Diehl and Kumar (1991) have argued that the "new UN peace-keeping troops



could be preventative deployed against any surprise attack from either disputant. In this role, UN peace-keeping troops would be placed at or near a defined border area. The peace-keeping forces would monitor military movements in the area and serve as a mediator for any disputes that would arise. Any surprise attack would have to pass through the peace-keeping troops." (15) This same proposal has been put forward by other scholars.(16) UNPROFOR has brought the proposal to life by the deployment of troops in Macedonia. The battalions, deployed near the borders of Macedonia with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, have monitored movements of people and irregular forces, and reported their movements to the Force Commander. The aim of preventive deployment was to prevent an occurrence of conflict in Kosovo and Macedonia, and to deter the potential conflicting parties from launching a surprise attack. During the Cold war era, the task of the peace-keeping operation was to prevent a recurrence of conflict between the parties who were already in conflict. In other words, after providing a cease-fire, they were deployed in the area of conflict as a buffer to prevent re-emergence of the conflict.

#### **1.10 Enlargement of the Concept of Use of Force**

One of the fundamental principles for peace-keeping operations is no use of force except in the case of self-defense. It means that the personnel of the Peace-keeping Force could use force only if an armed attack occurred against them. This principle has been applied by all previous peace-keeping operations except in ONUC's second phase. ONUC was authorized to use force against Katangese guerrillas in order to maintain law and order within the country. However, it resulted in ONUC becoming a party in the conflict on the side of the Central government and this drew heavy criticism by the African states and the former Soviet Union. Therefore, after ONUC, the concept was transformed

to its original meaning.

But, after the end of the Cold War, some scholars argued that the meaning of the concept of use of force for peace-keeping operations might be extended.(17) UNPROFOR has extended the meaning of the concept while not jeopardizing the major principle of impartiality. Under the context of the initial mandate, UNPROFOR can use force only in the case of self-defense which means that it can use force only if an armed attack occurs against them. Whereas, after the Security Council adopted resolution 836 (1993), UNPROFOR was authorized to use force in order to prevent any attacks against the safe areas when an armed attack occurred against the areas. In other words, with the objective of protecting the safe areas, the UNPROFOR ground troops and NATO aircraft were authorized to use force against the parties, if the parties attack the areas (18). At the same time, this extension was not applied to its other functions. Finally, UNPROFOR successfully extended the concept because it neither became a party in the conflict, as ONUC did, nor jeopardized its impartiality principle.

## **2 Shortcomings of UNPROFOR**

Although UNPROFOR has made many contributions to the concept of peace-keeping, it also had some shortcomings within its own structure. These shortcomings have slowed down its momentum to implement its tasks and created some dissatisfaction among the states and in the United Nations. However, they have not come from the structure of UNPROFOR, but have been caused by the external factors--for instance, lack of cooperation of the parties and unpaid assessed contributions.

## **2.1 Lack of Public Information System**

Although the Force Commander of UNPROFOR has been able to maintain communication with the United Nations Headquarters in New York and with all national contingents in the field, an inadequate information system has made it difficult to reach the people of the region, because the information system in the former Yugoslavia is controlled and censored by the state. Therefore, UNPROFOR has not gained the necessary support of the civilian population. In order to gain the public's support, it must establish a Western type of public information system.(19)

## **2.2 Lack of Monitoring Mechanism**

According to Wahlgren, the former Force Commander, UNPROFOR has not established an effective way to control, and then to monitor a cease-fire on a continual basis. He described how an effective monitoring mechanism could be set up. He said that "firstly a beginning time for a cease-fire had to be set up. Then, distances had to be set for the separation of forces. Next, a period of a few hours had to be allotted for the withdrawal of heavy weapons. If there was a violation of the cease-fire, the parties to the conflict had to meet within a few hours at a pre-established spot. Meanwhile, the UN peace-keeping force had to be placed between the units in conflict so that they could report on << who, when and how >> the cease-fire had been broken. Consequently, he argued that this kind of mechanism had not been created in UNPROFOR".(20)

During the course of the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, the conflicting parties have violated more than fourteen cease-fires and UNPROFOR has not been able to effectively provide the control and monitoring needed for a lasting cease-fire.

Simultaneously, UNPROFOR has not proven "who violated the cease-fires, how and when they were violated". These facts showed that UNPROFOR did not establish the necessary monitoring mechanism in order to provide the continuation of the cease-fires in the area of conflict.

### 2.3 Financial Crisis

Like all other peace-keeping operations, UNPROFOR has been faced with a financial crisis. The member states have failed to pay their assessments to the Peace-keeping Force in full and on time. As at October 31st 1992, assessments totaling \$25,455,801 had been apportioned among the member states in respect of UNPROFOR. But, the contributions received for the same period amounted to \$186,975,292. Thus, the difference of \$63,480,509 was not received. In the course of time, the unpaid assessed contributions increased.(21) As of February 1993, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNPROFOR Special Account amounted to \$242.3 million.(22) As a result of this financial crisis, UNPROFOR has been unable to meet its obligations on a current basis to the troop-contributing countries. Therefore, according to the Secretary-General's report (S/25777), nine member states contributing infantry battalions to UNPROFOR have formally conveyed their dissatisfaction with the delayed reimbursement to the Secretariat. One state announced its intention to withdraw from the Peace-keeping Force, and two others, who thought about increasing their participation, indicated that they had serious financial problems in fulfilling the request. At the moment, therefore, the Secretary-General pointed out that "no member state is willing to contribute an infantry battalion to UNPROFOR, even if the cease-fire agreements become feasible".(23)

## 2.4 Lack of Cooperation of the Parties concerned

When former peace-keeping operations are analyzed, it can be seen that UNEF I, ONUC and UNIFIL are openly faced with the problem of lack of cooperation of the concerned parties, while with UNFICYP, UNDOF and UNEF II, the parties cooperated relatively well with the Peace-keeping Forces. The result was that the first three peace-keeping operations failed to implement their tasks, whereas the others successfully completed their missions.

It is true for UNPROFOR that it has been faced with the problem of a lack of cooperation among the parties concerned. For instance, the local Serbian authorities prevented UNPROFOR from achieving the demilitarization of the UNPAs and the disarmament of the Serbian Territorial Defense and irregular forces in the Krajina region and the "Pink Zones". As for the civilian side of UNPROFOR, it has not been fully successful due to an atmosphere of terror and intimidation which existed in many parts of the four Sectors. On January 22nd 1993, the Croatian Army launched an offensive toward Maslenica and other locations in the South Sector and adjacent "Pink Zones". After that, as another example of the Croatian non-cooperative attitude, on January 27th 1993, it attacked and captured the Peruca Dam. As a response to this attack, the Serbs broke into a number of storage areas.(24)

These examples can be multiplied in order to show the non-cooperative attitudes of the parties. These attitudes have restricted the UNPROFOR's freedom of movement and prevented it from implementing its task on time and successfully-- for instance, by closing the cross-points, the concerned parties have prevented the distribution of humanitarian relief convoys suitably and at the right time.(25) Another indicator of their

non-cooperation is the number of casualties. The UNPROFOR soldiers have increasingly been targeted by all sides. Thus, the Peace-keeping Force has incurred over 500 casualties, including 14 fatalities.(26) Thus, the lack of cooperation of the parties concerned has prevented UNPROFOR from implementing its tasks successfully. In addition, security of the UNPROFOR personnel has become one of the major concerns of both the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

### **3 Is UNPROFOR Successful?**

When the question of whether UNPROFOR has been and is being successful is asked, the answer is "yes". Although UNPROFOR has not completely solved the issue, (which is not its real function), it has managed to localize the fighting among three ethnic groups. The fighting has been contained in very limited areas--as of September 1993, only in the Mostar region. Due to UNPROFOR's presence, a recurrence of hostilities within a larger area has been prevented. Therefore, "UNPROFOR has provided a breathing-space for the continued efforts of the peace-makers". Otherwise a wider regional conflict could emerge. The three ethnic groups would intensify the fighting, and two or more blocks would emerge. Then regional states willingly or unwillingly would intervene in the course of the conflict resulting in a regional war, if the Peace-keepers were not present. Thus, UNPROFOR has prevented the occurrence of such a regional war.

In addition to this success, UNPROFOR has supported the provision of essential humanitarian assistance to the victims of the ongoing conflict. In many areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, people have been blockaded by irregular troops, and have thus been forced to starvation. Because of the distribution of humanitarian relief convoys under

UNPROFOR supervision, these people have been saved.

Consequently, UNPROFOR, being a peace-keeping operation, has tried to implement its mandate successfully. But, lack of cooperation of the directly concerned parties, its financial shortcomings, lack of a monitoring mechanism to provide the continuation of cease-fires and lack of a public information network to gain the support of public opinion slowed down its momentum to implement its tasks. Moreover, the localization of the dispute, distribution of humanitarian relief convoys and cooling off of the heated fighting, are in the interim important and vital actions for finding a permanent solution to the crisis. Otherwise a regional war in the Balkans could occur. The interests of the regional states and of other major powers--the United Kingdom, the United States, France, the Russian Federation and Germany-- are obvious. Thus, more alliances could be formed such as those during WW1. Therefore, it seems for now that UNPROFOR has been successful in preventing a wider war and in providing a measure of protection for the people in the region.

## CONCLUSION

UNPROFOR, together with the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), has caused a structural transformation in the institution of peace-keeping from a traditional meaning to a contemporary one, which may eventually provide an answer to the needs of the post-Cold War era. How has this transformation evolved? What kind of modifications have been made to the principles of the traditional concept? In the Secretary-General's report, which is named An Agenda for Peace (S/24111), it has been clearly illustrated and the modifications are obvious.(1)

In the first place, the principle of "consent of the concerned parties" has been redefined. At the end of the Cold War, conflicts have occurred within a state where a government has not been able to extensively exercise its authority over its own territory. Thus, the concept of "state sovereignty" has been questioned concerning the maintenance of international peace and security and the current international situation. Therefore, the Secretary-General stated that from now on with or without consent of "all parties", a peace-keeping operation under the authorization of the United Nations can be sent to an area of conflict, where international peace and security is endangered.(2) Before, the Secretary-General had to take the consent of all parties. Therefore, delayed deployment of a peace-keeping operation was inevitable.

Another fact is that "non-military components" have become more important than they were before. With UNPROFOR, the civilian component has played a vital role in the operation. Thus, they now have to include civilian police, information specialists, human



rights experts and even a significant number of political advisory staff.(3)

In his report (S/24111), the Secretary-General put forth his opinions about the establishment of a permanent peace-keeping force. Although Krylov (1991) has advocated the idea of permanent peace-keeping forces (4), the Secretary-General obviously has not supported the idea because of the problem of stand-by troops. According to him, it is much more difficult to forecast the troop requirements for future missions, and also much more expensive. This can not be paid for by the current UN budget. He did point out that "if availability of troops is to be guaranteed in the necessary time-scale, member states must formally agree with the UN to make troops available within an agreed response time".(5) He continued by stating that it is possible to paint a range of scenarios of varying complexity, each generating a need for a force structure of a particular size and capability. These force structures can be broken down into "standard building blocks" of operational capability, such as infantry battalions, medical companies, transport companies, and observer teams. Thus, each new mission requirement can be elaborated in terms of these standard building blocks, and requests could be made to contributing countries based on them.(6) The system of standard building blocks is much more rational than a permanent peace-keeping force, because the member states are not willing to allow their forces to be directed by the United Nations. Also, a permanent peace-keeping force would be more expensive, as costs would continuously be incurred.

Yet, concerning the design of the standard building blocks, according to the Secretary-General, "the objective will be to get the member states to commit themselves formally to provide one or more of such blocks, such as a battalion in a brigade-size force structure. From the point of view of the member states, it will be committing itself to

providing a known number of troops, in a known formation, to a known equipment need, and with a known time-scale".(7) Based on this reasoning, the member states will form a committed military force for a UN peace-keeping force. Thus, this force will be financed by the "defense budget" of the member states. It will be trained in UN peace-keeping operations as part of its normal annual training cycle and it will be better prepared than the units made available on an ad hoc basis.

In addition to the facts mentioned above, a growing role of the military is also recognized in the distribution of humanitarian assistance. A vote was made for the need of "military humanitarian support forces". According to the report (S/24111), "an aggressive behavior against civilians by governments or insurgents will no longer be tolerated".(8)

After the establishment of UNPROFOR, the Security Council tried to enhance cooperation with regional organizations and agencies through mediation of the Secretary-General. Thus, regional organizations and agencies were able to have a role in maintaining international peace and security. In accordance with the UN Charter, they may participate particularly in the areas of preventive diplomacy, including fact-finding, confidence-building, good offices, and even peace-keeping.(9) They would also be able to function as early-warning organizations through exchange of information and consultations with the Secretary-General.(10) Thus, in the future, regional organizations and agencies--like the EC, WEU, CSCE and NATO-- will be much more involved in conflicts, sometimes as a peace-making mechanism in close cooperation with the United Nations and at other times through providing the necessary resources to the peace-keeping operations.

The Secretary-General, in his report (S/24111), has proposed "a peace

enforcement unit" as a third type of peace-keeping operation, that could be established to deal with actual and/or potential crises when the set rules of engagement have no longer been sufficient. He also stressed that "the ready availability of armed forces on call can serve as a means of deterring breaches of the peace, since a potential aggressor will know that the Council has had at its disposal a means of response. While the armed force may never be large or sophisticated enough to face a major army, they will be useful...in meeting any threat posed by a military force of a lesser order." (11) Thus, if further authorization of the use of force is needed--for instance, for military intervention--, this force will be used. It will also enhance the concept of preventive diplomacy. So, while at other times when the peace-keeping operations have continued to use force only in the case of self-defense, "a peace enforcement unit" would have the competence to use force against any one of the parties.

Finally, regulations in the financial system of the peace-keeping operations have been proposed. The Secretary-General has tried to prepare a regular financial budget. He has proposed new financial resources to provide revenues for it. He has included a levy on international air travel which depends on international peace, general tax exemptions for contributions to the UN, and a levy on arms sales.(12)

As a result, although a legal basis for peace-keeping operations within the framework of UN Charter has not been provided, operations have become a suitable instrument of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. The experience gained during the Cold War era showed that the United Nations member states refrained from getting involved local and regional conflicts through employing coercive measures within the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus, it can be stated that while the concept of "peace-keeping" will continue to go through a

transformation period and as debate continues to define the characteristics of peace-keeping operations in the future, these will continue to be an essential instrument of the United Nations. Therefore, in the post-Cold War era, peace-keeping operations are expected to be widely used to deal with conflicts in close cooperation and coordination with regional organizations in order to maintain international peace and security.

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A

**Table 1: UN. Peace-keeping Operations during the Cold War era**

Mission	Date	Peak Force Size	Parties	Function
UNEF I	1956-57	6,000	The Suez Crisis between Israel and Egypt	Observe, supervise troop withdrawal and provide buffer between the parties
ONUC	1960-64	20,000	The Congolese government, the Belgian Advisors, the Katangese	maintain order, expel foreign forces, prevent secession, outside intervention
UNFICYP	1964-	6,500	The Cyprus Crisis between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots	prevent internal conflict, avert outside intervention
UNEF II	1973-79	4,000	The Second Suez Crisis between the Egyptian and Israeli forces	supervise cease-fire, troop disengagement, control buffer zone between the parties.
UNDOF	1974-	1,330	Crisis between Israeli and Syrian forces	patrol Syria and Israeli border
UNIFIL	1978-	6,000	The Lebanon Crisis between the Lebanese government, Israeli forces, PLO, and other internal forces	supervise Israeli troop withdrawal, maintain order, restore authority of Lebanese government.

**Source:** R.E. Riggs and J.C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics* (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988), p. 136.

**APPENDIX B**

**Table 1: List of the UNPROFOR Force Commanders and Sector Commanders**

<b>NAME</b>	<b>NATIONALITY</b>	<b>DURATION</b>
<b>Force Commanders</b>		
Liu.-Gen. Satish Nambiar	India	March 1992-March 1993
Liu.-Gen.Lars-Eric Wahlgren	Sweden	March 1993-July 1993
Gen.Jean Cot	France	July 1993-
<b>Sector Commanders</b>		
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina Command</b>		
Maj.Gen. Lewis Mackenzie	Canada	June 1992 - October 1992
Gen. Philippe Morillon	France	October 1992 - July 1993
Lt.Gen.Francis Briquemont	Belgium	July 1993 - February 1994
Gen.Michael Rose	Britain	February 1994 -
<b>Macedonia Command</b>		
Bri.-Gen.Finn Saermark- Thomsen	Denmark	January 1993-

## APPENDIX C

The tables have been provided in order to indicate the strength of the military and civilian components of UNPROFOR and their deployment according to its mandate, and sometimes to its headquarters, at different points in time.

**Table 1-**The Strength of military personnel and logistic support units are shown in two tables as of 15 October 1992.

Area of Deployment	Infantry	Support Units	Military Observers	Total
Original Mand.	10,400	2,840	100	13,340
Sarajevo	1,200	408	60	1,668
Pink Zones	-	-	60	60
Border Crossing	-	320	-	320
Prevlaka Pen.	-	-	14	14
No-Fly Zone	-	-	79	79
Convoy Proct.	-	-	80	80

**Source:** A/47/741, 2 December 1992, Annex V.

**Table 2: The Logistic Support Units as at 15 October 1992**

<u>The UNPAs</u>	
Headquarters personnel	140
Headquarters company	100
movement control unit	100
logistics	1,200
signals unit	300
engineer unit	350
construction engineer unit	300
medical unit	250
 <u>The Sarajevo Sector</u>	
air unit	139
artillery-mortar radar loc. unit	20
headquarters company	183
(including medical, guard and signals personnel)	
airport headquarters company	66
Border control personnel	320
 <b>Total-----</b>	 <b>3,468</b>

**Source:** A/47/741, 2 December 1992, Annex V.



**Table 3:** Distribution of civilian and military personnel by geographical location as of 13 November 1992

	Sar.	Zag.	S.W.	S.E.	S.N.	S.S.	L.B.	B&H	Oth.
Civilian staff	54	321	70	52	92	72	23	-	-
Military Obs.	54	17	13	12	43	49	1	14	32
Civilian Police	3	23	96	130	168	193	2	-	-
Other Military Personnel	1,496	1,417	3,723	1,656	2,786	2,410	441	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,607</b>	<b>1,778</b>	<b>3,902</b>	<b>1,853</b>	<b>3,089</b>	<b>2,724</b>	<b>467</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>32</b>

**Note:** 1-General total is 15,466  
 2-Sar. (Sarajevo), Zag. (Zagreb, headquarters), S.W. (Sector West), S.E. (Sector East), S.N. (Sector North), S.S. (Sector South), L.B. (Liaison Belgrade), B&H (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Oth. (others).

**Source:** A/47/741, Annex III.

**Table 4:** Civilian Police Monitors as of December 1992

<b>Location</b>	<b>Strength</b>
Original Mandate	518
Sarajevo	40
Pink Zones	120
Border Crossing	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>699</b>

**Source:** A/47/741, 2 December 1992, Annex V, par.3

**Table 5: UNPROFOR military and civilian police personnel strength as of 4 February 1993**

	<b>Unit</b>	<b>Strength</b>
<b>Force Commander and aide-de-camp</b>	2	2
<b>Sector East</b>		
Belgium/Luxembourg	688	
Russian Federation	878	1,566
<b>Sector West</b>		
Argentina	895	
Canada (1)	1,090*	
Jordan	882	
Nepal	901	3,768
<b>Sector North</b>		
Denmark	866	
Nigeria	886	
Poland	868	2,620
<b>Sector South</b>		
France (1)	922	
Czech Republic/ Slovak Republic		
Kenya	901	2,313
<b>Support units:</b>		
British Medical Battalion	242	
Canadian Engineer Battalion	177	
Finnish Construction Battalion	302	
France Logistics Battalion	1,215	
Netherlands Signals Battalion	404	
Norwegian Movement Control Unit	76	
Swedish Headquarters Company	104	2,520
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>12,789</b>
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina Command</b>		
<b>Sector Sarajevo</b>		
Egypt	416	
France (2)	667**	
Ukraine	398	

<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>1,481</b>
Bosnia-Herzegovina Headquarters	193	
Belgian Transport Company	129	
British Battalion Group	2,626 <sup>AAA</sup>	
Canadian Batt. Group (2)	829	
Danish Head. Company	214	
French Batt. Group (3)	1,842	
Netherlands Transport Batt.	515	
Netherlands Signals Unit	100	
Norwegian Engineer Platoon	36	
Spanish Battalion Group	758	
United States Hospital	353	
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>7,595</b>
<b>B&amp;H Command Total</b>		<b>9,076</b>
<b>Macedonia Command</b>		
Nordic Battalion	68	
Canadian Company	147 <sup>AAAA</sup>	
<b>Macedonia Command Total</b>		<b>215</b>
<b>Military Observers</b>		<b>390</b>
<b>Civilian Police Monitors</b>		<b>623</b>
<b>UNPROFOR total</b>		<b>23,093</b>

- Note:**
- <sup>\*</sup> Including 256 Canadian Support Elements.
  - <sup>\*\*</sup> Including 251 French Support Unit.
  - <sup>\*\*\*</sup> Including National Support Element.
  - <sup>\*\*\*\*</sup> Detached temporarily from Canadian battalion 2.

**Source:** S/25264, pp:14-15

## APPENDIX D

The tables provide an indication of the costs of UNPROFOR according to its mandate, and to illustrate the assessments of the member states until February 1993 within the framework of General Assembly resolution 3101 (XXVIII) of December 1973.

**Table 1:** The Balance of Finance of UNPROFOR in August 1993

<b>Functions</b>	<b>Period</b>	<b>Estimated Cost (net, \$)</b>
Initial Mandate	Feb.92-Feb.93	634,000,000
Reop. Sar. Air.	13 June-14 Oct.92	22,132,000
Monit. the Pink Zones	15 July-14 Oct.92	4,846,000
Immig. & Customs	15 Aug.-15 Oct.92	29,972,000
No-Fly Zone (A)	1 Nov.92-30 Apr.93	4,485,000
No-Fly Zone (B)	1 May-31 Aug.93	2,080,000
Safe Areas	June-November 93	249,900,000
Enhancements	May-October 93	91,200,000
Mil. Obs. (C)	June-November 93	41,200,000
Mil. Obs. (D)	June-November 93	53,600,000
Macedonia	July-December 93	10,500,000
General Exp.	21 Feb.-20 Sept.93	325,446,338
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1,469,361,338</b>

**Note:** A-Initial Cost, B-Estimated monthly cost C-Between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, D-Between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia

**Table 2:** Assessment of member states for the financing of UNPROFOR for the period 12 January to 14 October 1992

<b>Groups</b>	<b>Regular Budget Scale%</b>	<b>Gross Assessment (\$)</b>
<b>Group A</b>		.
China	0,77	94,109
France	6,00	733,319
Russian Fed.	9,41	1,150,088
United Kingdom	5,02	613,544
United States	25,00	3,055,495
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>46,20</b>	<b>5,646,555</b>
<b>Group B</b>	<b>40,88</b>	<b>4,109,782</b>
<b>Group C</b>	<b>11,85</b>	<b>238,263</b>
<b>Group D</b>	<b>0,54</b>	<b>5,400</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>99,47</b>	<b>10,000,000</b>

Source : ST/ADM/SER.B/397, pages.5-10

**Table 3:** Assessment of member states for period 15 October 1992 to 31 December 1992

<b>Group</b>	<b>Gross Assessment (\$)</b>	<b>Staff Assessment (\$)</b>	<b>Net Assessment (\$)</b>
<b>Group A</b>			
China	1,650,469	9,877	1,640,592
France	12,860,799	76,960	12,783,839
Russian Fed.	20,170,019	120,699	20,049,320
United Kingd.	10,760,201	64,390	10,695,811
United States	53,586,660	320,668	53,586,660
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>99,028,148</b>	<b>592,594</b>	<b>98,756,222</b>
<b>Group B</b>	72,076,847	431,294	71,645,553
<b>Group C</b>	4,178,624	25,004	4,153,620
<b>Group D</b>	95,148	540	94,608
<b>Total</b>	<b>175,378,767</b>	<b>1,049,432</b>	<b>174,650,003</b>

Source: ST/ADM/SER.B/397, pages.11-76

**Table 4: Assessment of member states for period 1 January-20 February 1993**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Gross Assessment (\$)</b>	<b>Staff Assessment (\$)</b>	<b>Net Assessment (\$)</b>
<b>Group A</b>			
China	1,120,963	6,708	1,114,255
France	8,734,779	52,266	8,682,513
Russian Fed.	9,768,394	58,451	9,709,943
United Kingd.	7,308,098	43,730	7,264,368
United States	36,394,912	217,777	36,394,912
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>63,327,146</b>	<b>378,932</b>	<b>63,165,991</b>
<b>Group B</b>	48,125,283	287,973	47,837,310
<b>Group C</b>	3,156,096	18,885	3,137,211
<b>Group D</b>	62,208	378	61,830
<b>Total</b>	<b>114,670,733</b>	<b>686,168</b>	<b>114,202,342</b>

Source: ST/ADM/SER.B/397, pages.17-22



**Table 5:** Assessment of new member states

<b>State</b>	<b>Assessments (\$)</b>
Armenia	84,876
Azerbaijan	148,637
Bosnia-Herzegovina	20,312
Croatia	66,015
Estonia	60,937
Georgia	76,170
Kazakhstan	228,513
Kyrgyzstan	39,174
Latvia	113,169
Lithuania	130,578
Moldova	97,934
San Marino	32,644
Slovenia	45,703
Tajikistan	32,644
Turkmenistan	39,174
Uzbekistan	169,753
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,381,233</b>

Source: ST/ADM/SER.B/397, pages.24-26

**Table 6:** Total Assessments of the member states as of February 1993

<b>Group</b>	<b>Gross Assessments (\$)</b>	<b>Staff Assessments (\$)</b>	<b>Net Assessments (\$)</b>
<b>Group A</b>	168,001,849	971,526	167,568,768
<b>Group B</b>	124,311,912	719,267	123,592,645
<b>Group C</b>	7,572,983	43,889	7,529,094
<b>Group D</b>	162,756	918	161,838
<b>New Members</b>	-	-	1,381,233
<b>Total</b>	<b>300,049,500</b>	<b>1,735,600</b>	<b>300,233,578</b>

## APPENDIX E

**Table A: United Nations Peace-keeping Operations-Political Aspects**

Operation	Region	Nature of Conflict		US/USSR vote in UN		Partisan Support	
		Inter St.	Intra St.	t	- AB	US	USSR
UNEF I	Middle East	X		US	USSR	X	X
ONUC	Africa	X	X	US	USSR	X	X
UNFICYP	Med.		X	Q			
UNEF II	Mid.East	X		Q		X	X
UNDOF	• •	X		Q		X	X
UNIFIL	• •	X	X	US	USSR	X	X

**Note :** Q: both US and USSR have voted for positively, t: positive vote, -: negative vote.

**Source:** Henry Wiseman, 'The United Nations and International Peacekeeping: A Comparative Analysis' in the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (ed.), The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), p.300

## MAPS

- The Balkan States
- The Former Yugoslavia and Its Neighbours
- The Former Yugoslav Republics
- The Former Yugoslav Republics and Autonomous Territories
- The Neighbours of Croatia
- Ethnic Composition of the Former Yugoslavia
- Ethnic Composition of Former Yugoslavia as of 1991
- Ethnic Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Conflict Areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina as of January 1994
- Conflict Areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Proposed Patrol Areas of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Including Dubrovnik Region)
- The Bosnian War Zone (Late July 1994)
- Deployment of UNPROFOR as of July 1992
- Deployment of UNPROFOR as of February 1993



**The Balkan States**

CONIC PROJECTION

SCALE OF MILES  
0 50 100 150 200

SCALE OF KILOMETERS  
0 50 100 150 200

Legend:  
 \* Capital Cities  
 - - - - - National Boundaries  
 - - - - - Internal Boundaries  
 - - - - - External Boundaries


Scale 1:6,150,000

REMARKS: GREECE are divided into counties and prefectures respectively. Because of the scale no attempt is made to delimit and name these subdivisions. Administrative centers have, however, been named in Greece as well known regions, without administrative function. The map consists of thirty-nine counties and regions of regional status, Bucharest, Constantia and Iasi. Scale does not permit delimiting these divisions. The map is divided into twenty-seven districts. Scale does not permit delimiting these divisions. The map includes an autonomous province and an autonomous region (Kosovo).

MEDITERRANEAN SEA



SOURCE: "BLOODY BOSNIA: A EUROPEAN TRAGEDY," (PUBLISHED BY THE GUARDIAN AND THE CHANNEL 4), UNITED KINGDOM: LONDON, 1993...



SOURCE: JOHN ZAMETICA, "THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT," ADELPHI PAPERS, NO.270, SUMMER 1992, p.5

# Map of Republics and autonomous territories of ex-Yugoslavia



- 1 Sarajevo
- 2 Slavonia
- 3 Medjmurje
- 4 Dalmatia

SOURCE: "THE ELIMINATION OF A HUNGARIAN MINORITY," PREPARED BY EUROPEAN COMMITTEE HUMAN RIGHTS HUNGARIAN CENTRAL-EUROPE (AMSTERDAM) FOR THE UN WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AUSTRIA/VIENNA, 14 TO 25 JUNE 1993





ONCE UPON A TIME THERE WAS A TOWN IN  
CROATIA.  
**ITS NAME WAS VUKOVAR.**

Before the war 44,639 inhabitants lived in the town:

Croatians	21,065	-	47.2%
Serbians	14,425	-	32.3%
Ruthenians	919	-	2.1%
Hungarians	694	-	1.6%
Yugoslavs	4,355	-	9.8%
Others	3,181	-	7.0%

The Vukovar municipality numbered 84,189 inhabitants.






5

SOURCE: JOHN ZAMETICA, "THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT,"  
 ADELPHI PAPERS, NO.270, SUMMER 1992, p.8


# ETHNIC YUGOSLAVIA 1991



SOURCE: "BLOODY BOSNIA: A EUROPEAN TRAGEDY," (PUBLISHED BY THE GUARDIAN AND THE CHANNEL 4), UNITED KINGDOM: LONDON, 1993, P.11

# BUGÜNKÜ BOSNA-HERSEK'İN ETNİK HARİTASI

1991 verilerine  
göre



Lejand

Çoğunluk

% 50'nin altında

% 50'nin üstünde



Müslümanlar



Sırp



Hırvatlar



Sayı bakımından, ikinci kalabalık nüfusu oluşturan Müslümanlar



SOURCE: FOREIGN REPORT, NO.2288, JANUARY 27TH 1994,  
P.2

Appendix A

Conflict areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina




SOURCE: S/24333, P.13

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
Appendix C

Proposed patrol areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina




Note: The Dubrovnik area is included in the Bosnia and Herzegovina task.

The Bosnian war zone (late July 1993)



SOURCE: "BLOODY BOSNIA: A EUROPEAN TRAGEDY," (PUBLISHED BY THE GUARDIAN AND THE CHANNEL 4), UNITED KINGDOM: LONDON, 1993, p.29





The boundaries shown here are for illustrative purposes only. Official boundaries are shown on maps published by the United Nations.

مناطق الحماية التابعة للأمم المتحدة  
联合国保护区  
United Nations Protected Areas  
Zones protégées par les Nations Unies  
Районы организации Организации Объединенных Наций  
Zonas Protegidas por las Naciones Unidas


وضع توة الحماية التابعة للأمم المتحدة  
في تموز/يوليه 1992  
1992年7月联合国部队的部署

UNPROFOR DEPLOYMENT AS OF JULY 1992  
DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FORPRONU AU MOIS DE JUILLET 1992  
РАЗВЕРТЫВАНИЕ СООНО ПО СОСТОЯНИЮ НА ИЮЛЬ 1992 ГОДА  
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNPROFOR EN JULIO DE 1992.

MAP NO. 3064 UNITED NATIONS  
JULY 1992



保队的部署  
 NT AS OF FEBRUARY 1993  
 ONU AU MOIS DE FÉVRIER 1993  
 СТОЯНИЮ НА ФЕВРАЛЬ 1993 ГОДА  
 OFOR EN FEBRERO DE 1993



توزيع قوة الأمم المتحدة للحماية في شباط/فبراير 1993  
 1993年2月联保部队的部署  
 UNPROFOR DEPLOYMENT AS OF FEBRUARY 1993  
 DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FORPRONU AU MOIS DE FÉVRIER 1993  
 РАЗВЕРТЫВАНИЕ СООНО ПО СОСТОЯНИЮ НА ФЕВРАЛЬ 1993 ГОДА  
 DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNPROFOR EN FEBRERO DE 1993



MAP NO. 3684 Rev. 2 UNITED NATIONS  
 FEBRUARY 1993

## NOTES

### INTRODUCTION

- 1 For further information on the previous peace-keeping operations, see Basic Facts about the United Nations (New York: The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1989), pp.32-38, 52-62 ; Everyone's United Nations (New York: The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1986), pp.105-121, 136-138 ; F.T. Liu, United Nations Peace-keeping and the Non-Use of Force (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp.17-28 ; John Q. Blodgett, "The Future of UN Peace-keeping," The Washington Quarterly, Vol.14, No.1, Winter 1991, p.208 ; The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1985), pp.43-151, 215-219, 281-309 ; Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the 'sheriff's posse'," Survival, Vol.XXXII, No.3, May/June 1990, pp.198-199 ; Brian Urquhart, 'United Nations Peace Forces and the Changing United Nations: An Institutional Perspective' in L.M. Goodrich and D.A. Kay (ed.), International Organizations: Politics and Process (USA: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), pp.230-233 ; Henry Wiseman, 'The United Nations and International Peacekeeping: A Comparative Analysis' in the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (ed.), The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), pp.273-297 ; R.E. Riggs and J.C. Plano, The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988), pp.138-142 ; United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990), pp.1, 4 ; Alan, James, 'The Politics of Peacekeeping' in Lincoln P. Bloomfield (ed.), The Management of Global Disorder (Boston: University Press of America, 1987),

p.255 ; John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson, Issues Before the 45th General Assembly of the United Nations (USA: Lexington Books, 1991), pp.20-21, 32 ; Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "The United Nations Force in Cyprus: A Functional Analysis in terms of the Conflict Theory," The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol.XII, 1972.

- 2 For further information on the definition and general characteristics of concept and institution of the peace-keeping, see United Nations Peace-keeping, pp.1, 6 ; Everyone's United Nations, p.98 ; John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peace-keeping Operations at the Arab-Israeli Interface (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p.1 ; Aleksander M. Belonogov, "Soviet peace-keeping proposals," Survival, Vol.XXXII, No.3, May/June 1990, p.207 ; Alan James, 'The Security Council: Paying for Peace-keeping' in David P. Forsythe (ed.), The United Nations in the World Political Economy (London: The MacMillan Press, 1989), pp.15-20 ; Henry Wiseman, op.cit., pp.263-264 ; The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990), p.19 ; Mircea Malitza, 'The Improvement of Effectiveness of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations' in United Nations Institute for Training and Research (ed.), The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Boston: Martinuss Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), pp.237-239 ; R.E. Riggs and J.C. Plano, op.cit., p.11, 18 ; Joachim Hutter, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," Aussen Politik Vol.36, No.3, 1985, pp.264, 269-70 ; Sydney D. Bailey, The United Nations (London: The MacMillan Press, 1989), p.53 ; Basic Facts about the United Nations, p.22
- 3 . Henry Wiseman, op.cit., p.283 ; Basic Facts about the United Nations, p.52 ; F.T. Liu, op.cit., pp.19, 24, 26 ; Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the 'sheriff's posse'," p.199 ;

Alan James, "The Politics of Peacekeeping," p.255 ; Joachim Hutter, *op.cit.*, p.269 ; R.E. Riggs and J.C. Plano, *op.cit.*, pp.139, 270 ; The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, p.277 ; Everyone's United Nations, p.118

- 4 F.T. Liu, *op.cit.*, pp.38, 18 ; Gustav Hagglund, "Peace-keeping in a modern war zone," Survival, Vol.XXXII, No.3, May/June 1990, p.236 ; C. Nelson, "The Initiation of Un Peacekeeping Forces: Problems and Reform Proposals," International Affairs, Vol.13, No.1, 1989, p.33 ; Henry Wiseman, *op.cit.*, pp.294, 301 ; John Tessitore and Susan Woolfson, *op.cit.*, p.21 ; Alan James, "The Security Council: Paying for Peace-keeping," p.18 ; R.E. Riggs and J.C. Plano, *op.cit.*, p.143

- 5 Some of the ethnic conflicts, emerged in the post-Cold War era, are the Yugoslav crisis firstly between the Serbs, together with the Yugoslav People's Army, and the Croatian government in Croatia, and then among the Bosnian Muslims, the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the Cambodian crisis between the Cambodian government and other internal forces; the Somalia crisis between the Somalian government and the revolutionist group; and the Nagorno-Karabagh issue between the Armenians and Azeris in Azerbaijan.

## PART ONE

- 1 F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans," International Security, Vol.15, No.3, Winter 1990/91, p.70 ; Christopher Cviic, "Implications of the Crisis in south-eastern Europe," Adelphi Papers, No.265, Winter 1991/92, p.90; Oya Akgonenc Mughisuddin, "Dagilan Yugoslavia: Bosna-Hersek ve Uluslararası Diplomasi (The Dissoluted

- Yugoslavia: Bosnia-Herzegovina and International Diplomacy)," *Dis Politika Bulteni*, Vol.IV, No.1, Fall 1992, p.25
- 2 Sabrina Petra Ramet, "War in the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71, No.4, Fall 1992, p.85 ; John Zametica, "The Yugoslav Conflict," *Adelphi Papers*, No.270, Summer 1992, p.40
- 3 Paul Lendvai, "The Balkan Blind," *European Affairs*, Vol.5, No.3, June/July 1991, p.261
- 4 Patrick Moore, "Yugoslavia: Ethnic Tension Erupts into Civil War," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.1, No.1, January 1992, p.71
- 5 Patrick Moore, "A New Phase in the Bosnian Crisis?," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.1, No.31, July 1992, p.2
- 6 Dennison Rusinow, "Yugoslavia: Balkan Breakup?," *Foreign Policy*, No.83, Summer 1991, p.152
- 7 John Zametica, *op.cit.*, p.18
- 8 The main forces included in the Yugoslav conflict were: The Croatian irregulars were Internal Affairs Ministry Special Units (MVPs), Croatian National Guard (ZNG), Wolves of Vukovar (renegade unit of ZNG), Zebras, Crna Legija (Black Legion) and Croatian Defense Union (HOS). The Serbian irregulars, including JNA, were Marticeve/Khihdze, Serbian Guard (SG), Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG), Serbian Chetnik Movement and Dusan Silni and Beli Orli. See James Gow, "Military-Political Affiliations in the Yugoslav Conflict," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.1, No.20, May 1992, p.18
- 9 Christopher Cviic, *op.cit.*, p.86 ; Sabrina Petra Ramet, *op.cit.*, p.86 ; Patrick Moore, "Yugoslavia: Ethnic Tension Erupts into Civil War," p.71
- 10 Milan Andrejevich, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Precarious Peace," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.1, No.9, February 1992, p.6

- 11 Patrick Moore, "The International Relations of the Yugoslav Area," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.1, No.18, May 1992, p.34
- 12 Milan Andrejevich, "More Guns, Less Butter in Bosnia and Herzegovina," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.1, No.11, March 1992, pp.10-11
- 13 Milan Andrejevich, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Precarious Peace," p.9
- 14 Ibid., p.12
- 15 Milan Andrejevich, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Precarious Peace," pp.12-13
- 16 Milan Andrejevich, "More Guns, Less Butter in Bosnia and Herzegovina," p.14
- 17 SC/5518, par.5 ; S/24923, par.8
- 18 S/24923, pars.9-10
- 19 The two fundamental elements of the United Nations Peace Plan were: a)the continuing functioning, on an interim basis, of the existing local authorities and police, under United Nations supervision, pending the achievement of an overall political solution to the crisis; b)the withdrawal of the JNA forces from all of Croatia and the demilitarization of the UNPAs in Croatia. See, The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia (United Nations: Department of Public Information, May 1993), p.3 ; for further information about the United Nations Peace Plan, see the Secretary-General report of 11 December 1991 (S/23280) ; S/RES/740 (1992), pars.5-6 ; S/RES/743 (1992), par.8
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 The United Nations Protected Areas are the areas in which the Serbs have been constituting a majority or a substantial minority of the population. The inter-communal tensions led to armed conflict in the recent past in these areas.
- 22 SC/5375, par.19
- 23 U.N. Chronicle, Vol.XXIX, No.2, June 1992, p.17



- 24 SC/5367, pars.13-15 ; BEE/RL Research Report, Vol.1, No.7, 14 February  
1992, p.81 ; U.N. Chronicle, Vol.XXIX, No.2, June 1992, p.18
- 25 James Gow, *op.cit.*, p.24 ; BEE/RL Research Report, Vol.1, No.7, 14 February  
1992, p.81
- 26 James E. Goodby, *op.cit.*, pp.159-160
- 27 U.N. Chronicle, Vol.XXIX, No.2, June 1992, p.18
- 28 SC/5309, par.5
- 29 James E. Goodby, *op.cit.*, p.158
- 30 SC/5309, pars.111-113
- 31 *Ibid.*, pars.114-120
- 32 U.N.Chronicle, Vol. XXVIII, No.4, December 1991, p.35; SC/5309 pars.104-106;  
S/23067, pars.1-3, 5
- 33 SC/5500, par.48 ; SC/5309, par.102
- 34 "Other States concerned" refers to the states which have had direct and/or  
indirect attention to the crisis because of their historial, cultural and economic  
relations.
- 35 John Zametica, *op.cit.*, p.63
- 36 Trevor C. Salmon, *op.cit.*, p.252
- 37 Sabrina Petra Ramet, *op.cit.*, p.95
- 38 SC/5500, par.74
- 39 James E. Goodby, *op.cit.*, p.159
- 40 SC/5309, pars.74-75, 77
- 41 SC/5309, par.95
- 42 GA/8327, par.55
- 43 SC/5309, par.15
- 44 SC/5500, par.50

45 Patrick Moore, "A New Phase in the Bosnian Crisis?," p.6

46 At the end of February 1994, the Turkish government proposed deployment of Turkish soldiers to the former Yugoslavia as a response to the deployment of Russian soldiers (400-men) around Sarajevo between the Serbs and Croats. Shortly after the expression of the proposal, the Secretary-General, Mr. Ghali, did not express a positive view to it. Because he argued that deployment of a regional state's troops in the area of conflict would create a tension among the regional states. But, the Turkish government, as a counter-argument to his argument, stated that the Russian soldiers and Greek military observers were in the region, and their deployment did not create a tension or did not intensify the conflict. After the diplomatic initiatives of the Turkish government, in mid-March, the Security Council accepted deployment of additional troops in the former Yugoslavia upon the request of the Secretary-General. Thus, with his notice, he required Turkish soldiers. Thus, the negotiations between the United Nations representatives and Turkish government on the military contributions of Turkey started. After the negotiations, they decided that the Turkish soldiers will be deployed in Central Bosnia and its initial strength will be an infantry battalion unit (1,000-men) and a logistics and engineering unit (500-men). After the initial deployment, Turkey will send an additional troops (a logistics and engineering unit--1,200 men) to the region. This force will be deployed at the end of June 1994. Its functions are to provide the re-construction of the region (for instance, constructing roads and brigades); to help the distribution of humanitarian assistance to the local people and to normalize the living conditions in the region. (Interview with the Officials at Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey)

47 SC/5309, par.71

48 According to the article 52, paragraph 3, "the Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council." Therefore, based on this provision, the Security Council encouraged the concerned parties to solve their disputes through negotiations at the EC Peace Conference.

49 SC/5309, pars.2-3, 24-25 ; S/RES/713 (1991)

50 The United Nations and the Situation in former Yugoslavia: 25 September 1991 - 30 October 1992 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1992), p.2

51 U.N. Chronicle, Vol.XXIX, No.1, March 1992, pp.72-73

52 S/RES/713 (1991), pars.1-2

53 Paul Shoup, "The UN Force: A New Actor in the Croatian-Serbian Crisis," REE/BL Research Report, Vol.1, No.13, March 1992, p.20

54 S/RES/724 (1991), pars.3-4

55 The United Nations and the Situation in former Yugoslavia: 25 September 1991 - 30 October 1992, p.3

56 U.N. Chronicle, Vol.XXIX, No.1, March 1992, pp.72-73 ; SC/5343, pars.2,4

57 REE/BL Research Report, Vol.1, No.8, 21 February 1992, p.75

58 Ibid., p.81

59 James Gow, op.cit., p.25 ; Paul Shoup, op.cit., p.20 ; Patrick Moore, "The International Relations of the Yugoslav Area," p.36

60 The EC efforts can be determined as a mediation. Because the mediator actively participates in the settlement itself. The mediator is expected to offer concrete proposals for settling substantive questions instead of merely contenting himself with making negotiation possible. Therefore, the mediator assists the parties

directly and may meet with the parties either jointly or separately. His functions come to an end when the dispute is settled or when one of the parties decides that proposals are not acceptable. The proposals submitted by a mediator represent nothing more than advice. Within the framework of this definition, the EC is obviously a mediator in the process of the peaceful settlement of dispute in the former Yugoslavia. For further information about the mediation and good offices, see Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law (London: Collier MacMillan Publishers, 1986), pp.523-526

- 61 S/RES/743 (1992), pars.1-5 ; SC/5375, pars.1-2
- 62 Ibid., pars.1-2 ; Ibid., pars.1,4
- 63 RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.1, No.9, 28 February 1992, p.85 ; U.N. Chronicle, Vol.XXIX, No.2, June 1992, p.15
- 64 S/RES/749 (1992), pars.4-5 ; RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.1, No.13, 27 March 1992, p.82 ; A/47/741, par.4
- 65 U.N. Chronicle, Vol.XXIX, No.3, September 1992, p.6
- 66 The United Nations and the Situation in the former Yugoslavia (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1993), p.51
- 67 U.N. Chronicle, Vol.XXIX, No.3, September 1992, p.8
- 68 Ibid.
- 69 RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.1, No.19, 8 May 1992, p.69
- 70 S/RES/757 (1992), pars.17-18
- 71 U.N. Chronicle, Vol.XXIX, No.3, September 1992, p.9
- 72 S/RES/758 (1992), pars.introduction, 2-3
- 73 RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.1, No.25, 19 June 1992, p.74
- 74 The United Nations and the Situation in the former Yugoslavia, p.9
- 75 S/24923, pars.1, 3-4

- 76 SC/5518, par.1
- 77 S/26099, pars.1-2
- 78 According to the article 29, "the Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions."
- 79 For further information, see Article 1, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter.
- 80 According to article 33, paragraph 2, "the Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means." These means have been expressed in the article 33, paragraph 1 which are negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. Thus, the Security Council recommended to the parties to solve their disputes through the negotiation. But, here, there is a connection with article 52, paragraph 3. Because, although the Security Council recommended the negotiation, it also encouraged the parties to solve their disputes through the EC Peace Conference.
- 81 According to article 25, "the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."
- 82 For full text of article 52, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, see Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1991), p.28
- 83 For the function of "ban on military flights", the Security Council authorized Member states, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. See S/RES/816

(1993), par.4. And for the intervention of NATO in the "safe areas" function, "the Security Council decided that Member states, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate." See S/RES/836 (1993), par.10. Although these decisions were taken under the provisions of the Chapter VII, the regional organizations were authorized under the article 53 of the Chapter VIII of the Charter. According to the article 53, paragraph 1, "the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority."

- 84 For further information, see S/RES/836 (1993), pars.9-10
- 85 S/25939, par.1 ; S/RES/836 (1993), par.9
- 86 REE/RL Research Report, Vol.1, No.30, 24 July 1992, p.79 ; A/47/741, par.32 ; SC/1938, par.4
- 87 A/47/741, par.32/b
- 88 U.N. Chronicle, Vol.XXIX, No.3, September 1992, p.12
- 89 A/47/741, par.32/a
- 90 *Ibid.*, pars.16-18
- 91 *Ibid.*, par.39
- 92 *Ibid.*, par.42
- 93 A/47/741, par.8
- 94 A/47/741, pars.8-9 ; SC/5441, pars.9-10
- 95 A/47/741, par.41
- 96 S/24767, pars.6

- 97 *Ibid.*, par.9
- 98 S/RES/781 (1992), pars. 1-3
- 99 S/24767, pars.3/a,b,d,e
- 100 *Ibid.*
- 101 SC/5498, par.19
- 102 S/RES/836 (1993), pars.introduction, 2
- 103 SC/5653, par.5 ; S/RES/836 (1993), par.9
- 104 S/25939, par.2 ; S/RES/836 (1993), par.5
- 105 S/25939, par.3
- 106 *Ibid.*, pars.5-6
- 107 *Ibid.*, par.4
- 108 *Ibid.*, par.10 ; S/RES/836 (1993), par.10
- 109 A/47/741, pars.10-11
- 110 *Ibid.*, par.14
- 111 S/26018, par.2
- 112 *Ibid.*
- 113 S/RES/838 (1993), par.1
- 114 S/26018, par.5
- 115 *Ibid.*, par.8
- 116 S/25000, par.3
- 117 S/26018, par.9
- 118 S/24923, par.17
- 119 SC/5518, par.2
- 120 S/24923, par.28
- 121 SC/5557, par.11
- 122 S/25470, par.4

- 123 S/RES/815 (1993), par.4
- 124 S/25777, pars.20-21
- 125 S/25777, pars.22, 24, 25
- 126 SC/5375, pars. 13-16
- 127 U.N. Chronicle, Vol.XXIX, No.3, September 1992, p.6
- 128 SC/5417, par.11
- 129 A/47/741, par.31
- 130 *Ibid.*, pars.26, 32/g, 33
- 131 SC/5498, pars.9-10
- 132 S/24767, par.5
- 133 S/25015, par.11
- 134 S/25777/Add.1, par.2
- 135 S/25939, par.6
- 136 S/24923, par.30
- 137 SC/5375, par.12 ; U.N. Chronicle, Vol.XXIX, No.2, June 1992, p.16
- 138 The United Nations and the Situation in former Yugoslavia: 25 September 1991 - 30 October 1992, p.3
- 139 A/47/741, par.37 ; S/24540, pars.1, 12 ; S/24848, par.3
- 140 S/24923, par.23
- 141 The United Nations and the Situation in the former Yugoslavia, p.17
- 142 SC/5375, par.11
- 143 The United Nations and the Situation in former Yugoslavia: 25 September - 30 October 1992, p.3 ; A/47/741, par.1
- 144 SC/5417, par.10
- 145 S/26099, pars.7-8, 10
- 146 SC/5375, par.24



- 147 A/47/741, par.5
- 148 *Ibid.*, pars.50, 52
- 149 *Ibid.*, par.54
- 150 S/24767/Add.1, par.3
- 151 S/25939/Add.1, par.3 ; SC/5653, par.6
- 152 S/25777/Add.1, par.3
- 153 S/26018/Add.1, par.3. For monitoring the crossing points on the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Secretary-General in his report S/25000/Add.1, estimated the cost related to this function at 694,125,000 million dollars for an initial six-month period. The report also pointed out that the monthly cost after that would be approximately 69,155,000 million dollars. But, this mission was not active until June 1993. Thus, the cost was not paid for the mission. At the same time, for the implementation of border monitoring, the Secretary-General prepared a new report (S/26018). Thus, he provided a new dimension for the implementation of this task. Therefore, cost was re-estimated. The re-estimated cost, determined in his report (S/26018/Add.1), is accepted as a real cost rather than that in S/25000/Add.1.
- 154 S/25954/Add.1, par.2
- 155 A/47/778, pars.9, 49
- 156 SC/5557, par.23
- 157 A/47/741, par.58
- 158 A/47/778, par.6
- 159 SC/5500, par.23
- 160 The article 17, paragraph 2 states that "the expenses of the Organizaiton shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly."
- 161 ST/ADM/SER.B/397, pars.1,3

162 *Ibid.*, pars.5-7

163 ST/ADM/SER.B/397, page.3

## PART TWO

- 1 F. T. Liu, *op.cit.*, p.37 ; John Q. Blodgett, *op.cit.*, p.208 ; Mircea Malitza, *op.cit.*, p.246
- 2 Brian Urquhart, 'International Peace and Security' in Lincoln P. Bloomfield (ed.), The Management of Global Disorder (Boston: University Press of America, 1987), p.165 ; Louis D. Huddleston, "Policing the New World Order: An Alternative Strategy," Comparative Strategy, Vol.11, No.1, 1992, p.5 ; Ambassador Chan Heng Chee, "The United Nations: From Peace-keeping to Peace-making?," Adelphi Papers, No.265, Winter 1991/92, p.38
- 3 Michael Krepon and Jeffrey P. Tracey, "'Open Skies' and UN Peace-keeping," Survival, Vol.XXXII, No.3, May/June 1990, p.252 ; Robert C. Johansen, "The Lessons for Collective Security," World Policy, Vol.VIII, No.3, Summer 1991, p.568 ; Paul F. Diehl and Chetan Kumar, "Mutual Benefits from International Intervention: New Roles for United Nations Peace-keeping Forces," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol.22, No.4, 1991, p.373 ; Gwyn Prins, "The United Nations and Peace-keeping in the Post-Cold-War World: The Case of Naval Power," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol.22, No.2, 1991, p.137
- 4 Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the 'sheriff's posse'," p.205 ; Paul F. Diehl and Chetan Kumar, *op.cit.*, pp.371-372
- 5 Alan James, "The Politics of Peacekeeping," p.253 ; John Mackinlay, *op.cit.*, p.248 ; Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the 'sheriff's posse'," p.204 ; John Q. Blodgett, *op.cit.*, p.216

- 6 John Mackinlay, *op.cit.*, p.248 ; Gustav Hagglund, *op.cit.*, p.235
- 7 A/47/741, Annex II and Annex V
- 8 Article 98 of the UN Charter: "The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trustee-ship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization."
- Article 99 of the UN Charter: "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."
- 9 Brian Urquhart, "United Nations Peace Forces and the Changing United Nations: An Institutional Perspective," p.226
- 10 Javier Perez de Cuellar, 'The Role of the UN Secretary-General' in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (ed.), United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p.63 ; Chan Heng Chee, *op.cit.*, pp.36-38 ; Brian Urquhart, "The United Nations: From Peace-keeping to a Collective System?," Adelphi Papers, No.265, Winter 1991/92, p.27 ; Evan Luard, 'The Contemporary Role of the United Nations' in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (ed.), United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p.211 ; Gene M. Lyons, "Strengthening United Nations," International Journal, Vol.XLV, No.4, Autumn 1990, pp.953-954 ; Brian Urquhart, "United Nations Peace Forces and the Changing United Nations: An Institutional Perspective," pp.225-226
- 11 A/47/741, Annex V, pars.28-30
- 12 Chan Heng Chee, *op.cit.*, p.33 ; F.T. Liu, *op.cit.*, pp.38-39 ; Brian Urquhart, "The

- United Nations: From Peace-keeping to a Collective System?," p.202 ; John Q. Blodgett, *op.cit.*, p.218
- 13 For the further information about the political aspects of the peace-keeping operations, see Appendix E
- 14 Gustav Hagglund, *op.cit.*, p.236 ; Brian Urquhart, "United Nations Peace Forces and the Changing United Nations: An Institutional Perspective," p.258 ; Alan James, 'The Enforcement Provisions of the United Nations' in United Nations Institute for the Training and Research (ed.), *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Boston:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), pp.233-234
- 15 Paul F. Diehl and Chetan Kumar, *op.cit.*, p.370
- 16 Brian Urquhart, "The United Nations: From Peace-keeping to a Collective System?," p.23 ; Gustav Hagglund, *op.cit.*, p.239
- 17 Gustav Hagglund, *op.cit.*, p.239 ; John Mackinlay, *op.cit.*, p.214 ; Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the 'sheriff's posse'," p.198
- 18 According to the Resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, paragraphs 9 and 10, acting in the self-defense, UNPROFOR and NATO can use force if any of the parties attack the safe areas.
- 19 See Press Briefing by Lieut.-Gen. Lars-Eric Wahlgren of Sweden, the former Force Commander, on 6 July 1993
- 20 *Ibid.*
- 21 A/47/741, par.57 ; A/47/778, par.7
- 22 S/25264, par.34
- 23 S/25777, par.26
- 24 S/25264, pars.12-14
- 25 S/25777, pars.13-16, 19 ; S/25993, par.2

## CONCLUSION

- 1 See, Ghali, Boutros Boutros, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations Department of Administration and Management, 1992)
- 2 Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," Survival, Vol.35, No.2, Summer 1993, p.21 ; Thomas G. Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing an Agenda for Peace," The Washington Quarterly, Vol.16, No.1, Winter 1993, p.60 ; Ghali, op.cit., p.18
- 3 Ghali, op.cit., p.30
- 4 Nikolai B. Krylov, "International Peacekeeping and Enforcement Actions after the Cold War" in Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer (ed.), Law and Force in the New International Order (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p.98
- 5 SG/SM/4920, p.8 ; Ghali, op.cit., p.30
- 6 Ibid., par.9 ; Ibid.
- 7 Ibid., par.11 ; Ibid.
- 8 Thomas G. Weiss, op.cit., p.64 ; Ghali, op.cit., pp.17-18
- 9 S/25996, par.1 ; Ghali, op.cit., pp.35-38
- 10 S/25996, par.1
- 11 Robert W. Schaaf, "United Nations Peacekeeping Efforts in Yugoslavia," Government Publications Review, Vol.19, No.5, 1992, p.541 ; Ghali, op.cit., pp.26-27
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RFE/RL Research Report, covers year of 1992, to have data on the progress of the crisis

U.N. Chronicle, covers years of 1991-92, to have data on the Force.

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