

*Authoritarianism and Democracy:
Policy Management and Regimes in
Azerbaijan*

*A Thesis Presentation by Sharon Kehnemul
Submitted to*

*The Faculty of Economic, Administrative
and Social Sciences
in Partial Fulfillment for the Degree of
Master of Arts in International Relations*

*Bilkent University
March 1993*

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
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


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Abstract

Democratic and authoritarian regimes govern using very different methods. While the rulers of the various regimes often orate similar political philosophies, their governing tactics reveal startlingly different methods of inclusion, persuasion and/or coercion of their populations. In policy formulation, in particular, governors attempt to manage using means which exemplify their willingness to include or specifically exclude the masses and which express their commitment to the contending philosophies.

In this essay, the application of these political philosophies through government and societal institutions in Azerbaijan will be reviewed to determine if Azerbaijan is really embarking on a democratic venture or if it is continuing past practices of authoritarianism which have been learned over more than 150 years of imperial and Soviet rule. After the theoretical framework for democracy is grounded, the implementation of democratic principles in the newly-independent Azerbaijan will be discussed in the areas of socio-political, foreign and economic policy.

It is the attempt of this thesis to show that while authoritarian philosophies can be used to manage the politico-legal institutions and population in Azerbaijan, the long-term development and "health" of Azerbaijan and its people will rely on the implementation of democratic institutions and transparent decision-making.

Chapter I: Introduction

Azerbaijan is located at the geopolitical crossroads of the world. It is a nation striving to combine Occidental modernism with Oriental traditionalism to forge a hybrid state in which it can utilize its past experiences in order to develop a sound basis for political and economic growth in the future. The Azerbaijani nation of today has emerged from subjugation to governments of massive foreign empires which held tight reins in order to limit the freedoms of their subjects. Azerbaijan has evolved incorporating many of the most forceful influences of these empires' characteristics into its cultural and social frameworks. At the same time, the nation is trying to shake off the antediluvian political structures handed down by these empires and to develop a governmental system that will best encourage and assist the creation of a state that will inspire the methods to achieve the aspirations of an independent nation.

These aspirations include a greater impact of individual choice and preference on the activities of politicians by developing mechanisms which will increase participation by the public in political decision-making and higher levels of responsiveness and representativeness by the political leaders. The goals also include an end to the external conflicts and threats and strong cultural, security and economic ties with foreign nations. Another goal encourages improvement in the economic indicators of the nation's economy which reflects higher standards of living, the freedom to choose personal investments and enterprises which will increase efficiency and welfare. These individual initiatives will assist Azerbaijan in acquiring greater national capital accumulation and this capital leverage will allow an effort to emerge by the state to provide services which will guarantee the health, sustainability and vitality of the nation and its populace.

Because of the conflicting elements in Azerbaijan's history, which through time have been deeply rooted into the social outlook, Azerbaijan may suffer from unsteady progress and unplanned setbacks in its attempt to institute forms and structures suitable to advance national and individual goals. Because of its repeated subjugation to authoritarian management of all the republic's affairs, public and private, Azerbaijan is facing difficulties in establishing a platform to provide the formula which would best promote the possibilities of achieving the goals mentioned above. An open system based on democratic principles will benefit Azerbaijan in reconstructing the nation because democracy encourages the development of the very goals the nation is attempting to achieve.

The purpose of this paper is to assert that an ideal working democracy will best support a new Azerbaijan. There are several reasons to assert this claim. For one, "ideal" refers to two aspects of democracy. Democracy as an ideal suggests that democracy is the best governmental system to have been conceived in the world thus far. Democracy has shown to be more resilient than other forms of government and has several self-saving mechanisms. Until a better system emerges, democracy will continue to be perceived as the normative standard. This is the first contention of this paper. Secondly, an "ideal democracy" is one in which cooperation and participation are used to everyone's best benefit. In a democracy which functions ideally, there also exists a symmetry between the leaders and the followers within the system. Unlike socialism, where no leaders are meant to exist, or authoritarianism, in which only one or a few persons manage the affairs of the entire state and the public is left without a role in society, democracy attempts to create a holistic balance. The reciprocity in the relationship of leaders to followers is essential to a stable democracy. This should be elaborated. Several other aspects of an "ideal" democracy should also be discussed here in greater detail.

The relationship of the leaders and followers in a democracy can be elaborated according to the notion of sovereignty. Sovereignty is accepted because it represents the will of the people. In a democratic system, the citizens of a state elect and support the ways in which the state exercises its sovereignty and arrives at decisions. To take the notion of sovereignty one step further, one of the basic understandings in a democratic regime follows the logic that if the rulers of the state no longer represent the will of the people in exercising sovereignty over them, the people can always change the rulers, and, hence, the methods of rule. This principle takes for granted that the opportunity for making the change will be conducted according to commonly accepted rules, using the institutions established for this purpose, and will occur within a framework that promotes the peaceful transfer of power. In a properly functioning democracy, the leader who is elected and given the power to govern has arisen to his or her position using the same institutional methods as retired the previous governors.

In this situation, the governors of a democratic nation consent to rule according to institutional standards and the populace consents to be ruled by agreements it has created and/or endorsed. Furthermore, the agreement stipulates that those candidates vying for power and not gaining it can continue to compete in later contests.

Another element which underlines all democratic foundations rests on the presumption that the constitution is the ultimate body of laws to be respected. Observing the laws and principles that ground the society in them is the basis of a constitutional arrangement. As former Sorbonne University professor Raymond Aron describes in his book, *Democracy and Totalitarianism*, a constitutional arrangement validates a working government. The constitution fixes precise rules in which the competition for the exercise of power is organized. In a constitutional system, law-making requires certain measures and mechanisms for intervention as defined by the

constitution. The constitution is nonpartisan and not judicial. It allows that those who require the redress of justice have the opportunity to get it, that those who are injured by law-making can appeal to a court in which the constitutionality of the law is considered and that bodies which can deal with the problems between the state and the individual exist (1). In other words, "individual rights deserve explicit protection". Constitutional government insists that a system of checks and balances exist so as to limit authority and to legalize due process and equality in the execution of rules.

A political democracy exists when certain other criteria are met. The criteria enumerated by preeminent democratic theoretician Robert A. Dahl seems to be the most oft quoted and comprehensive list to date in describing the elements of a political democracy. The characteristics of a political democracy include the freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, access to alternative forms of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies depend on voting and other expressions of preference (2).

Under these conditions, organizations with conflicting interests are recognized as permanent features of the democratic system, they obey certain rules, specifically avoid certain strategies for achieving their goals (this, author Guillermo O'Donnell says, creates stability within a democratic regime), and when these organizations are defeated, they still breathe to argue their positions again another day.

Other elements may be added and could be considered essential to the foundations of an ideal democracy. A free press, the right for opposition organizations to voice their dissatisfaction and the ability of special interest groups to lobby their causes are also credited as fundamental elements of a political democracy. Other characteristics of

political democracy include the absence of discrimination based on sex, race, religion, income, property, or political party. In a political democracy, as embodied in the constitution, majority rule does not limit minority rights to due process under the law and minorities can seek redress in the legal system.

Some other considerations such as voting procedures designed to eliminate grievances, electoral representation explicitly providing a mandate for the representatives or majoritarianism being the summary form by which interests prevail have also been mentioned as criteria for the establishment of political democracy. These variations express the procedural choices by which a populace decides to be ruled, and may vary from democracy to democracy without impinging on the central tenets of the ideal.

Party politics has become the main form of representation in modern democracies. Any number of parties may exist in a nation and be strong and effective at the same time. Democratic functioning is based on a multiple party foundation in which groups organize in order to be politically active and foster the nature of pluralism.

Raymond Aron came up with a definition of parties and their place in society. He says parties are "voluntary groups, some more organized and some less, which claim in the name of a certain idea of the common interest and of society to assume, alone or in coalition, the functions of government (3)". Parties are groups which serve the functions of government and try to earn the maximum number of members in congressional structures. The voluntary nature of the party is meant to establish the constitutional rights of individuals.

Democratic government is enacted through the periodic vote of individuals who associate their beliefs with the representatives they entrust to make decisions for them. One catchy phrase denotes party associations as providing "consumer sovereignty", in other words, individuals can shop around for the representatives that best concur with their interests and who can best fulfill and meet an individual's goals. When the representative is found, he or she is given the express support of the voter to be the sovereign leader for as long as the representative continues to maintain the voter's confidence.

Critics of electoral parties complain that parties cause pigeon-holing of issues, placing them in a single-answer paralysis and giving the voter the choice of all or none. Partisanship is said to reduce the quality of political debate and promotes an adversarial element to this debate. These criticisms may be accurate, but the benefit of the party system is to allow opposition to be heard within the governmental hierarchy and to establish an organization which can articulate the needs and goals of a distinct and explicit segment of society. A final note on party formation reveals that it makes the manner of voting easier and more efficient, if not more representative of less vocal or less organized members of society.

Voting, then, also has become one of the core themes which defines democratic nations. Voting systems have been widely debated to find the best method for allowing all opinions to be represented in government (4). An overall consensus exists that voting systems should be based on the idea of "one person, one vote". This system is seen as protecting all citizens as they can remove a leader who does not meet democratic expectations. As rarely an absolute majority is ever reached in a pluralistic society, equally weighted voting allows every view an expression in official circles.

With these democratic ideals in mind, the objective of this thesis is to illuminate the mechanisms, reasons and goals behind the move toward democracy in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, this thesis will relate these preferences and actions in relationship to Azerbaijan's institutional structures, foreign and economic policy options. The citizens of Azerbaijan have expressed their desire to move the government toward a democratic formula. This requires an intense effort by the administration. The final purpose of this thesis will be to discuss how the presidents of this emerging nation have responded to the calls for democracy, what kind of restrictions, both personal and political, they are facing, and to what degree the presidents have succeeded in contributing to the establishment of a democratic nation. The thesis reviews chronologically and systematically the activities of these presidents and the effect of their activities on the public and the democratic process.

It is unrealistic to hope for an "ideal" democracy in Azerbaijan after only two and a half years of independence. It is also doubtful that Azerbaijan will ever become a paradigm for democracy. No pure democracy exists so far in this world and there are some aspects of an ideal democracy which appear to be unworkable. But the statement of the desire by the public to try to achieve a stable democracy, the rejection of Azerbaijan's authoritarian past and the need to establish a sound government in Azerbaijan make the search for democracy worthwhile and makes the study of democracy in this republic a concrete and meaningful task.

The methods of the Azerbaijani people and administration will be reviewed and critiqued in this thesis to weigh the commitment to democracy and analyze the means employed to reach a stated but unclear end. The following chapter of this essay will evaluate the historical trends and the goals aimed at for instituting democracy and creating the structures which allow its smooth operation. The third chapter will review

foreign policy decisions in the light of democratically-based diplomacy and will critique the activities of presidents as they try to attract interest and favors from members of the international community for immediate benefit. In the fourth chapter, the economic policies which have been adopted to lead Azerbaijan to greater prosperity and agreeable standards of living will be reviewed. Policy options will be related to democratic prescriptions for economic recovery. Overall, the balance between goal acquisition and adherence to democratic principles will be compared and rated.

Before discussing the current trends in Azerbaijan, it is necessary to rediscover Azerbaijani history. A clear recollection of the past will allow an understanding of the region and the people to unfold so that recent events can be better evaluated to measure the success of the latest efforts toward reform. It will also allow a greater comprehension of the social and economic barriers posing an obstacle to democratic initiative and the psychological factors which allow regressions away from democracy. The past is the place to begin in order to understand the journey upon which the nation is embarking.

Historical Background of Transcaucasia

The Azerbaijani people are a curious mixture of predominantly Persian and Turkish descendency. The indigenous population which had settled in the Caucasus mountains had been subjects of most notably the Arabic Shirvanshah, Turkish Seljuk and Safavid dynasties. As inheritances from these dynasties, the Azerbaijani people adopted Shia Islam as their religion and Turkish as their literary language. The Azerbaijani people showed remarkable talents in architecture, poetry and science. The people were very adept at trading and the area produced marvelous raw silk. The region was also rich in iron ore, copper, marble and oil.

In the sixteenth century, as other influences in the region retreated and as the Safavid dynasty became increasingly powerful, the Ottoman Turks attempted to gain control over the region. The Ottoman-Iranian wars of the 16th and 17th centuries led to the occupation of the Caucasus by the Ottomans from 1578 to 1603. After continuous warfare, the region then passed back to the Safavid state and wars lasted until 1639 after which the Ottomans were soon joined by the Russian Empire for control over the Caucasus (1). Peter the Great took control of the Caspian coast for the first two decades of the 18th century, but the lands returned to the control of the Safavids in the 1730s. The Safavid dynasty was in decline by the mid 18th-century, however, and the local khanates assumed partial sovereignty under the feudal control of the Iranian shahs which had replaced the deceased Safavid lineage in 1747.

Again in a bid to gain greater territories for the Russian empire, the Russians fought for the Caspian coast and the Caucasus. The Christian Georgian population which

inhabited the eastern and northern portions of the Caucasus appealed to Catherine the Great for protection and voluntarily joined Russia in 1801. Several of the khanates in Eastern Caucasia also requested Russian protection from the Iranian shahs and the Ottoman Sultans.

In the Russo-Iranian War of 1804-1813, Russia gained control of many of the khanates of Northern Azerbaijan, East Georgia and Daghestan in the Treaty of Gulistan. Again in 1826, the two sides went to war and the Russians acquired the rest of the Caucasus above the Arax River in the Treaty of Turkmanchai of 1828 (2).

Under direct Russian tsarist military rule, the khanates were turned into provinces of the Russian empire. From the 1840s until the Russian civil war which began in 1918 Russian civil and criminal law functioned in the Caucasus. The Muslim Azerbaijanis, however, were repressed as subjects of tsarist rule because of their non-Christian status. Religious courts had little juridical function and Muslim religious publications were censored. Furthermore, Azerbaijani majorities in several provinces were extremely underrepresented in local administrations. The Russian political system under tsarist rule allowed power concentration in the hands of the landowning gentry and the royal family. Matters of national importance were left to small groups of officials with highly-decentralized power. The Russian regime, favoring the Armenians who were seen as being more akin to Russian cultural conformities, handed the Armenians extensive decision-making powers in Baku on behalf of the tsarist family. This authority was compounded by the absence of elected assemblies or town meetings. The Azerbaijanis in rural regions, however, did maintain their traditional lifestyle, which was indicative of Muslim culture, and the Azeri Turkic dialect continued to be used in the region by the Azerbaijani people.

When vast amounts of oil were discovered in Baku in the 1870s, many Russians and Armenians migrated there to gain riches, thus tipping the demographic balance in favor of nonnative elements. This caused resentment among the native population since they viewed their region as again being invaded by foreigners and subjected to further foreign regulations and domination. There was no attempt to dispel the foreign elements from the Eastern Caucasian region, however, as the strength of the Russian military forces would not permit it and as the foreigners' toils began to amass wealth for the city of Baku.

While oil provided a profitable career for many nonnatives, Azerbaijanis were pushed into the working class and did not participate in reaping the benefits of the oil industry even though, on the whole, the residual effects of this industry were contributing to modernizing the city. Along with modernization came greater intellectual pursuits among society, and an Azerbaijani intelligentsia emerged alongside the increasing number of educated elites. Furthermore, Azerbaijanis were able to find some wealth in the refinery business and in traditional industries such as cotton production and other agricultural pursuits.

By 1901, Baku became the world's leading oil manufacturer. As fortunes were amassed, most of the net profits were going to Armenians and foreign companies, while Azerbaijanis were identified distinctly as the working class. The Russian central administration, finding the Armenians as either more competent or simply more to their liking, were increasingly placing Armenians in administrative positions. The Azerbaijanis, the largest indigent population in Baku, were effectively eliminated from being able to express discontent in official circles. Competition among the business classes began to take on a distinctly nationalist tone, and the labor class, composed mainly of Azerbaijanis, began to voice their discontent rigorously about the demanding

requirements of their work. Violence in the rural regions began in 1905 over complaints about the levels of taxation and the limited availability of water and land for the peasants. Rural areas exhibited distinct ethnic expressions as villages started to separate themselves along ethnic lines. In the cities, labor unrest manifested itself in strikes and violence. Intellectual elites began to form political organizations to represent and redress the grievances of the labor organization. These labor groups were most visible in the oil, textile and semi-skilled sectors, and the composition of several of these organizations took on a distinctly Azerbaijani flavor.

Oil industrialists attempted to address the issues of the workers in 1905 by appealing to government officials to grant increased rights to workers, and after martial law was imposed in Baku in 1906, events returned basically to normal. In this instance, normal meant the continuation of exploitative activities against the Azerbaijani and labor groups and the continued overrepresentation of Armenians in administration coupled with extensive underrepresentation or total nonrepresentation of Azerbaijanis. Normal at this time also could be defined by the suppression of religious freedom. Muslim leaders had to be loyal to the state first when exercising their duties as clerics. This required sermons on the law of the tsars rather than the law of Allah. Normal also meant that secondary education was to be in Russian, and those who were taught in their native language were not prepared for the rigors of higher education or work in the state apparatus (that is, had the opportunity presented itself).

Workers again revolted in 1913 in response to the overextended working day, their lack of days of rest and the decline in real wages. Despite company agreements, dissatisfaction continued until World War One, when worker grievances took a secondary place of concern among the industrial bosses. Azerbaijanis were exempted from the war because they were Muslim and the oil industry continued to conduct its

business throughout the war, producing oil to be provided to the Russian army.

Before the conclusion of the war, the Russian tsarist system was dissolved. The breakdown of the administrative structure of the state was hastened by the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The civil war in Russia resulted in battles between White Russian forces and Red Bolshevik forces. While the battle raged in Russia proper, chaos exploded in the Caucasus. Russian and Armenian Bolsheviks, incorporating Azerbaijani Socialists, established a Baku Soviet and assumed control of the country's most populous and industrialized city. Azerbaijani and other minority pro-nationalist organizations moved their headquarters to Genje. Elections in Azerbaijan had been held in 1917 after the tsar abdicated his throne in St. Petersburg. The elections were conducted in order to create a new-fangled Constituent Assembly to greater promote Azerbaijan's interests, but before it convened, a Transcaucasian Diet or Chamber was established as a temporary administration over the entire Caucasus region. When Ottoman forces crossed into the Caucasus to secure the territory it had regained in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 1918, the forces agreed only to deal with the representatives of independent states and not some provisional committee. The nationalist Musavat Party, which had been gaining popularity since its founding in 1911, used an anti-colonial, sovereign-state platform to gain support for independence from Russia, and increased its influence in Azerbaijan.. As opposed to being seconded by the prevalent Baku Commune, which had been comprised of Muslim Bolsheviks who had gained popularity among the industrial lower class in Baku, the Nationalists declared independence from Russia.

It should be noted that nationalism among the Musavatists was not a repudiation of industrial socialism. While it was in opposition to the Social-Democratic parties of the era, it supported a platform which equated all peoples of various social standing,

educational background, religion and the like. It was based on a populist platform, in fact, but it differed from the Hümme't, the socialist party based in Baku, because it valued sovereign rights for the Azerbaijani people and independence from Russian colonial influence. For the nationalist Musavat, nationalism meant the recognition that the Azerbaijani people, "while a part of a larger family of Turkic peoples, constituted a nation of their own" (3). Ironically, they relied heavily on British forces to create a secure environment for the nationalists to rule themselves.

The nationalist leader, Khan Khoiskii, became the prime minister of the newly-independent Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) and he formed his cabinet in Genje on May 28, 1918. Baku was still dominated by the Baku Commune and its leaders, but was reincorporated as the government headquarters after British troops and the Army of Islam, comprised of an Ottoman unit and Azerbaijani and Daghestani volunteers, forced the retreat of the Red Army out of the city, effectively eliminating Communist control. The Ottoman troops then evacuated Transcaucasia after the Mudros Armistice was signed between the Allied and Entente Powers in October 1918. In 1919, British Prime Minister David Lloyd-George decided not to commit more resources to the Russian civil war and removed the British troops from Azerbaijan. The British remained in Transcaucasia, however, debating until 1921 which area in Asia would serve as the strongest buffer zone to protect India from Entente or Russian advances (4).

The withdrawal from Azerbaijan would prove to be a fatal move for the Azerbaijanis. Racked by failing coalition governments, unable to control expanding sympathies for Communism, stuck in a territorial battle with the Armenians for land (including Nagorno-Karabakh), not having gained recognition of their independence from the international community, and lacking any kind of unified, strong army, the

Azerbaijani forces were unable to hold off the Armenians on the West and the Bolshevik army on the North. The Bolsheviks entered Baku in April 1920 and demanded the surrender of the Musavat-led coalition government. The Communists met with little resistance and the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee declared an independent Soviet Republic. The Reds finished their takeover of the nation by seizing industry and communication links. Resistance by villagers in the countryside were ineffective.

After the fall of Armenia and Georgia to the Bolshevik armies, the three nations were incorporated into the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (TSFSR), and became members of Vladimir Ilich Lenin's 1922 Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Soviet Union: Between Totalitarianism and Authoritarianism

The Soviet Union which was to emerge was built on the foundations of Communism without having fully appreciated the failings of the Communist doctrine. The Soviet Union ended up becoming a strict authoritarian state.

In authoritarianism, ideology plays a strong role in guaranteeing the reproduction of the system. Ideology promotes the state as the unifying institution for protecting the population against the "corruptible" elements associated with diversity. It acts as a stabilizing force among the classes, and against extremist propaganda, and promotes the state as the only mechanism for modernization and development. Authoritarian regimes want to integrate society into the state to make it more productive and to give the state ultimate control over the people. Order and stability are seen as desirable goals to prevent cleavages and a breakdown in the concentration of power belonging to the state.

Authoritarian regimes use ideology to mobilize the masses toward a common goal, the state's goal. It induces the population to become part of the newly-formed organization created by the state to benefit society. The ideology of communism became the tool by which the leaders of the Soviet Union strengthened and protected their power, adhering to an antibourgeois doctrine. They criticized the contemptuous lifestyle of the bourgeoisie and an economic system which they claimed did nothing for the masses and was totally fraudulent. The authorities claimed that they could direct society to a system in which all members would equally benefit from their labor and would be included in directing the goals of society. When this equality to the access of the means of production was achieved, the central authorities would no longer be required and society could function based on the tenets of fairness and exactitude. The ideology, seemingly egalitarian, could not be effected, and the leaders realized that in order to maintain their leadership over society, enforcement mechanisms were needed which would bind society to the ideology, even though that ideology would prove itself to be unable to address economic and social grievances. The most outstanding feature used to enforce ideology was through the secret police force. The Cheka force, later renamed the KGB, functioned as the iron fist of the political rulers. Such a mechanism, called an "auxiliary structure" in political science circles, served as a maintenance mechanism for power and was the administration's means for manipulating the masses into subservience. Official police investigations could be avoided and "unofficial" police activity gained free reign to protect the state from subversive or other potential enemies. Arrests of dissidents, executions, assassinations, and attacks on perceived opposition groups occurred covertly. In the authoritarian regime the activities of the secret police did not face any investigative questions as individuals did not wish to become the targets or victims of this auxiliary structure. The KGB's strength in the Soviet Union, along with the official ideology, created a formidable obstacle to

opposition to the Soviet cadres.

In the USSR, the one-party system was also a tactic by which the authoritarian leaders maintained control over the masses. The lack of competing interests associated with a multi-party system eliminated political opinions from being expressed in legitimate fora. The party-state apparatus, using institutionalized political structures maintained through a highly-centralized and bureaucratized system, attempted to seize support and incorporate the public into the one-party organization. The party's preoccupation was to implement ideology and modernize the state through mobilizing mass popular support of the party's methods for development. The party, whose ideology conflicted with its actual existence, ended up acting merely as a symbol of state power and lacked any real influence in mobilizing the public. Party members often found better jobs in society, but the political interests of the public rarely coincided with the party's actions and functions. Through the use of propaganda, the Communist party in the Soviet Union continued to enjoy a role in the Soviet system's authoritarian profile.

Ideology, the one party system and auxiliary structures are the main methods for authoritarian systems to project the will of the leader on his or her subjects. Institutionalized methods of repression and guarantees for the perpetuation of the population in their social roles, along with centralized economic processes and restricted access to the modes of production, aimed to increase the strength of the state and concentrate power in the hands of a few. While the authoritarian state was strong on ideology and enforced commitment to the party and the General Secretary, it neglected to find sufficient means for recovering from several economic and social crises and preordained its downfall. The lack of contributing actors and decentralized management, combined with no expectations of accountability on the part of the rulers,

caused a system in which complete stasis in economics and control over social relations preceded total collapse of the system. Democracy, unlike this system, attempts to create an environment of accountability, decentralization and contribution in order to avoid stasis and domination and to prevent a breakdown of the system.

In addition to these control mechanisms, the central authorities in the USSR employed other tactics to forge a nominally cohesive union. They sought to eliminate any local distinctions which distinguished various identities from other identities in the Soviet Union. The attempts to dismantle the peculiar qualities of the people led to central control over all aspects of life. Characteristic differences of literature and language were degraded, which caused divisiveness rather than unity, and territorial boundaries were redrawn in an attempt to integrate all members of the Soviet Society, to blur the concentrations of "peoples" in any given region. The long-fought for region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which Armenia had attempted to annex to expand its borders and unite the Armenian population there with the Armenians in the Armenian Republic, and which had been part of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, was again "awarded" to the Azerbaijan Republic in 1924. This move, which came as a reversal to an earlier decision to hand over the area to the Armenian Republic fed fuel to the fire which had been burning between the Azerbaijani and Armenian people since the Russian take-over of the Caucasus.

Josef Stalin's 1936 constitution abolished the TSFSR and made the three previous members of the Federation distinctive Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) of the USSR. It also elevated Khazakhstan and Kirghizistan to Soviet Socialist Republic status. The effect of the changes aggrandized central control and destroyed horizontal communications, that is, all communications functioned from party to republic and little or no republic to republic communication existed. The constitution reaffirmed the

division of territorial and national territorial districts. These distinctions were made to guarantee smaller ethnic minorities' representation in the Politburo, but it only served to enhance ethnic feuds. The territorial divisions were arbitrary and dozens of ethnic groups were left without any representation in the national legislature. Many more were excluded from the Supreme Soviet, the central governing body of the USSR.

The division of the union into 15 union republics, with smaller administrative units amounting to hundreds of tiny territories was Stalin's means of dividing and conquering the ethnic divisions in the USSR. It also created difficulties later in trying to separate grievances that spread among the Union between legitimate and illegitimate claims for secession. The whole concept behind the union has been succinctly surmised. Stalin's entire political system "was based on politicizing and then repressing nationality so that the only cross-cutting institutions were the party, the secret police and the army institutions he believed the center could always control (5)". This was an unusual means of maintaining his authority and led to many of the problems which have emerged in Azerbaijan and other former Soviet Union Republics today.

In addition to this, Stalin embarked on a great purge to rid the Union of remaining bourgeoisie and nationalist elements. His purges, forced deportations and alienation of past leaders are incomparable in history. The numbers of victims of Stalin's purges can not be given a fixed figure. Azerbaijan did not receive a reprieve from Stalin's purges. Peasants in the countryside were victimized, intellectual elites were liquidated, threats were even hoisted against the émigré community. The purges included not only people but works of art and literature. Stalin's faithful Azerbaijani first secretary of the Communist Party, Mir Jafar Baghirov, continued the purification of Azerbaijani society even after the second world war. Although the number of missing bodies was reduced, Baghirov promoted campaigns which would reduce the elements of nationalism,

religious doctrine and literary treasures. Even the revered *Dede Korkut*, the famous epic poem of ancient Azerbaijani civilization, was denounced by Baghirov. Soon after this event, however, Stalin died and Baghirov was put on trial in Azerbaijan for crimes of anti-Soviet aims against Azerbaijan. He was executed.

During Nikita Khrushchev's tenure as Communist party general secretary, a "thaw" occurred in all regions of the USSR. Prominent figures from the past were rehabilitated and equality of the Soviet nationalities was endorsed as official policy. The Republics were given greater control over the distribution of wages and income, but Khrushchev continued past policy practices in seeking greater control over the republics from Moscow. Khrushchev also implemented institutional reorganizations and shifted his personnel around these institutions, alienating many of his clients and allies, in an attempt to enhance his authority.

At this time, a Khrushchev crony, Imam Mustafayev took the reigns of the Azerbaijani communist party secretaryship. Neither Khrushchev nor Mustafayev would last very long. Mustafayev was suspect for his apparent nationalist sympathies - he brought several ethnic Azerbaijanis to Baku in order to tip the balance of the local population toward the native group. He was removed on the pretext of corruption, and was replaced by Veli I. Akhundov.

Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, who replaced Khrushchev was a very powerful leader of the USSR and his tenure as general secretary lasted for 18 years. He had a strong clientelistic model and his expansive patronage network allowed several policy changes to be speedily and unquestioningly invoked. Despite Brezhnev's personality cult, and the apparent strength of the Union during these years, Brezhnev's era of Soviet history has been characterized as the era of stagnation. Brezhnev created a combined corporatist

and welfare state which relied on developing heavy industry and applying scientific techniques to improving agricultural needs, including the increased production of mineral resources for fertilizers. In 1977, Brezhnev created a new constitution which defined the rights of the union and the separate functions of the republics. The constitution stated that the union had the right to interfere in all republican matters if it appeared that they were of all-union importance. The federation had no distinct separation of powers even though the constitution stated that the republics had the right to raise their own revenue. Even with this proviso, the republics were left dependent on financing allocated by the union budget which defined the targets of budget allocations. The primacy of the central authorities over the territories was reinforced. The advantage of this system laid in the ability of the central authorities to directly control all aspects of republic administration.

Collective activities and movements were kept in check and directed from the center. As a response to the creeping stagnation and the strict budgeting, the national territories attempted to advance their self-interests and the integrative pattern of the Soviet ideology, faced a major breakdown. The republic authorities tried to maximize their take from the all-union budget while minimizing their contributions to the Union.

The slowdown in the Soviet economy has been crystallized by its declining growth rates. While official figures appeared to prove that everything was normal and propaganda bolstered this opinion, the slowdown can be attributed to increased military spending and the growing expenditures on personal consumption in the 1960s and 1970s.

In Azerbaijan, the stagnation of the Brezhnev period was evident. Azerbaijan's production of oil and its refineries continued to contribute more to the all-Union needs

than it received in return. Akhundov's regime in Azerbaijan for the decade 1959 to 1969 has been classified "unexceptional". His rise, linked to his effort to revive the economy, was also the cause of his downfall. Production rates in the Azerbaijan SSR were minimal (6). Price undercutting for products which would have sold on the world market for much higher sums also contributed to Azerbaijan's poor growth levels. From 1945 to 1969, the Azerbaijan SSR had the lowest rate of industrial growth of all the Union republics. Real per capita income nearly doubled in Azerbaijan between 1950 and 1970, but still fell below the all-union average. At the same time, Akhundov's removal, while officially linked to corruption, can also be traced to his "inability to temper" the nationalism that was growing among party rank and file. Coupled with this nationalism was increasing outmigration of nonAzerbaijani nationals from the republic. Only in Nagorno-Karabakh did the number of nonnatives (Armenian) in the Azerbaijan SSR population grow. Criticism of Akhundov, though, was directed at his failures, matters of party discipline, problems of "localism" in recruiting party members, placement and cadres functioning, and cronyism.

Akhundov was replaced with Azerbaijan KGB chief Haydar Aliyev in 1969. Aliyev was well-liked by authorities in Moscow because of his long standing membership in the party and his intransigence toward corruption. Aliyev's promotion to first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party suggested that profound changes would occur.

Aliyev, a favored protégé of Brezhnev, was actually quite successful in turning the economic situation of the republic around (7) even though, overall, the Soviet Union could not recover from its endemic economic problems. Even so, he doubled industrial production and increased agricultural output by nearly 100 percent during his stay as Azerbaijan's Communist Party first secretary.

Politically, Aliyev was adept at rotating the placement of his protégés into various positions. His tenure began with a purge of most of Akhundov's cohorts. He filled his ranks with Azerbaijanis and technocrats and created a strong coalition at the top of the Azerbaijan Communist Party hierarchy. He appeared extremely sympathetic to Azerbaijani nationalist sentiments, but balanced his act with Moscow by promoting Russian studies and "atheistic education". He was also popular with General Secretary Yuri Andropov, who succeeded Brezhnev, and in 1982 Aliyev was promoted to the Politburo and moved to Moscow.

Kamran Baghirov, who had worked as the party secretary responsible for propaganda and agitation under Aliyev, was moved into Aliyev's position in Baku. Despite the improvements in the economy during Aliyev's tenure, the Azerbaijan SSR was suffering from a shortage of food supplies and rationing began in 1984. This shortage revealed to all the extent of the breakdown of the USSR's economy. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Central Committee it was becoming clear that the Soviet Union was nearing economic collapse. The republics were racked by shortages of all commodities and a second economy had emerged which rerouted goods from their destination points to locations where the profit margin was higher. By the late 1980s, the past repression of nationalities had finally experienced a backlash of unleashed prejudices and rejection of forced Russification in several republics. From this, growing resentments between the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations intensified. The corroded lid which had capped these tensions for several decades was beginning to loosen as Gorbachev allowed greater freedom of expression and dialogue became heated.

Besides these troubles, the work ethic had deteriorated to the point that workers did not care about earning money because they had nothing on which to spend their wages

and no results of their labors were visible. On the official level, employees were regarded as deficient in meeting the aims of a technologically-advanced society and the goals of socialist development. Employees were characterized as possessing low levels of productivity and labor discipline, indifference, and inertness. Despite the criticisms, employee productivity in illicit production and distribution, distortion of data and independent "under the table" initiative revealed extremely high levels of activity.

The whole logic of production in the 1980s had taken on a new twist which numbered the days of the Soviet Union's existence. The greatest amount of waste was included in production targets for fear of not being able to acquire raw materials in the future. Hospitals were keeping recovered patients in bed for fear of not meeting quotas. Women bearing children remained in hospital beds for an average of 14 days. Office jobs were considered disparaging work and business materials were in short supply. Useless goods remained in warehouses as stocks of low quality products increased to the 5 to 15 percent range. Prices were artificial. The Soviet Union prided itself on supplying housing for all citizens, yet in 1983, one fifth of all families shared common rooms in their homes with other families and minimum standards of health had only reached 1928 targets (8).

In the midst of this confusion, Gorbachev introduced *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (opening) in the Soviet Union in an attempt to produce changes away from the stagnant system he had inherited. At this time, Gorbachev was by no means thinking that a breakdown of the Soviet system was imminent. It can be suggested that his policy changes were made in order to locate some untapped creative input to resolve the severe economic crisis which had emerged in the 1980s out of several decades of mismanagement.

Additionally, new scientific-industrial technology required more worker participation including information processing and conducting nonstandard operations, which used technological skills and not just mechanics. Active involvement of the entire population was required to resolve the very serious problems plaguing the Soviet economy.

This *perestroika*, however, led to the emergence of thought based on individual and compact group needs. The ideology of the Communist Party had broken down. Collectivist interests were not a primary concern for most individuals. As they began to fear the institutions of the party less, many voices were raised in protest of the entire system. Accompanied by this was Gorbachev's acknowledgment that economic problems could not be solved within the structure of the system within which he was operating. At the same time, though, he knew that replacing the system would produce greater hardships on the public. In the newly opening environment, public discontent was capable of creating a corrosive impact on the leader's authority. The plurality of political demands undermined his authority and the rationale for the one-party system.

Despite reform measures that had been undertaken, Gorbachev continued to assert his leadership as the stalwart of the Communist Party, the economy continued to deteriorate, no visible results could be seen in his attempt to expand consumer goods and services, the structure of state and society's relationship toward central planning had not evolved, pricing and supply allowed for state domination over fees and output, political battles detracted from planning, and no vision for the Soviet future had been created. On top of this, energy production was declining and unemployment was rising. Gorbachev had only ceded limited opportunities for private ownership in areas where the state sector was not working effectively, but bureaucratic procedures barred or postponed most chances for privatization.

By the end of the 1980s, three elements of Soviet thought had emerged among reformists. They have been defined by Sovietologist Murray Yanowitch of Hofstra University in Hempstead, New York. Yanowitch says the values of economic, political and social freedom had gained primacy, private ownership of property needed to become the material foundation for political democracy and an efficient economy, and the minimalist state, "subordinate to the principles of liberalism", was largely confined to the responsibility for the enforcement of law (9).

In the meantime in Azerbaijan, Baghirov had been assuming the old party-politics and taking no initiative on his own. Baghirov never addressed *perestroika* or *glasnost* and reform had not touched any areas of Azerbaijan society. Conservative partisans in Moscow could be proud of Baghirov as they continued to encourage him and other Communist leaders to limit the implementation of the partial reforms and *glasnost*.

While economically and politically little had changed in Azerbaijan, socially, many old sentiments were expressing themselves anew. In 1988, nationalist tensions came to a head between Armenia and Azerbaijan when Armenia demanded the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to the administration of Armenia. Moscow had agreed to review the status of the autonomous oblast (district) and this angered many Azerbaijanis who felt their territory was going to be taken from them. Additionally, two Azerbaijanis were said to have been killed in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and many in the population of Azerbaijan responded with retaliatory violence. The Azerbaijani city of Sumgait experienced a pogrom which expelled many Armenians from their homes. As punishment for the violence pursued by radical nationalists, Baghirov was ousted from his position as Azerbaijan's first secretary and replaced by Abdulrahman Vezirov. Moscow then decided Nagorno-Karabakh should remain in Azerbaijan, and the central authority promised to implement economic and social reforms in the Nagorno-Karabakh

Autonomous Oblast (NKAO).

The NKAO unilaterally seceded from the Azerbaijani Republic in early July 1988 in defiance of the Soviet Constitution. By the constitution's decree, the Republic Azerbaijan, in which the NKAO is a territory, needed to consent to this move. Leaders in Azerbaijan attacked the move as illegal. The Supreme Soviet later that month established the Volskii Commission, headed by Arkadii Volskii, to review the feasibility of a territorial transfer of the NKAO. In 1989, Moscow took over administrative control of Nagorno-Karabakh from January until November of that year on the advice of the Volskii Commission. This administration transfer further worried the Azerbaijani public of the security of their territorial integrity. Simultaneously, in the USSR as a whole, social pressures were overriding the gradual pace of reforms. Informal organizations had arisen which led to the realization that formal social organizations could not respond to workers' grievances. Officialdom could not answer complaints of low wages and increasing unemployment.

During this period as well, revived and new legal political organizations were springing up from the intelligentsia. These popular fronts had no clearly defined political goals at first, but formed the first real opposition to the unitary party in the Soviet Union. Media accelerated this politicization of the masses as independent newspapers were created alongside the state mouthpieces.

The variations in the level and pace of reforms across regions and ethnic groups created a platform on which fronts could raise the consciousness of the varying nationalities. Resentment toward the past forced Russification, imposed industrial techniques which squandered resources, and suppressed national tendencies created the first basis on which republics could demand national independence.

While most of these demands were coming from high-level authorities of the party ranks within various republics, Azerbaijan's Vezirov continued to use party palliatives to appease the republic's citizens. He reiterated Moscow's claim that ethnic problems were created by past leaders' inability to improve the economy and reduce corruption. He was very slow in addressing *glasnost* and democratization and he resisted the increasing calls for reform.

When the Nagorno-Karabakh issue again caused heavy tensions between the neighboring republics, Vezirov was powerless to control them. In January of 1990, Azerbaijanis responded to pent-up frustrations caused by Vezirov's mismanagement of the crisis and Armenia's declaration of its annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh by rallying in Baku. The leading political organization in Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijan Popular Front (PFA) which had come into existence the year before, had organized the rally. Immediately after the rally, however, the unrelieved frustrations manifested themselves through more violence. In response to aggravations which had been brewing over the increasing number of Azerbaijani refugees in Baku who had congregated there after being expelled in 1988 from the Armenian Republic, radical nationalists began rioting and evicting Armenians from their homes in Baku. Before the end of 1990 virtually no Azerbaijanis lived in Armenia and no Armenians lived in Azerbaijan outside of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Red Army responded to the violence in Baku. Although the fighting had already quieted down before the army's arrival, the forces used excessive violence against the Azerbaijanis, resulting in 200 dead and 700 wounded in Baku (10). The month came to be known as "Black January". Moscow's response to the upheaval was the removal of Vezirov from power and his replacement with Ayaz Mutalibov. Mutalibov would briefly politically survive in Azerbaijan after the country gained independence. He was

elected president of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan in a one-candidate contest.

Just after Black January, the Third Congress of People's Deputies convened in Moscow and Lithuania claimed its independence, while at the same time Gorbachev was proclaimed the president and was conferred excessive powers to rule the dying union. While wrapped in the rhetoric of reform and democratization, Gorbachev was handed ultimate powers as president including the power to declare a state of emergency, to appoint and dismiss senior armed services officers, to authorize a vote of confidence, to take measures for the defense of the Union's sovereignty and the sovereignty of the union republics, to veto Supreme Soviet decisions and more. These powers effectively gave Gorbachev far-reaching mechanisms to deal with the crises that were mounting. Nonetheless, Gorbachev continued to lose his legitimacy as the union's leader as the Gross National Product (GNP) of the Soviet Union steadily dropped and artificial prices could not support the falling output and decline of productivity.

Tensions continued to grow and violence in the Nagorno-Karabakh region mounted as Armenia adopted plans to increase its influence in the area and remove Azerbaijan's power. In August 1991, after the *coup* attempt to overthrow Gorbachev, of which Mutalibov is said to have at first supported and then, after its failure, rejected, Azerbaijan claimed its independence under the 1977 constitution's article granting republics the right to secede. It was recognized by Turkey in the coming weeks followed by several other nations, and became a full member of the United Nations in February 1992. The remaining republics of the Soviet Union soon capitulated to centrifugal forces in the end of 1991 and the Soviet Union ceased to exist as a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Residual Effects of Soviet Rule

It is apparent that Soviet controls over the population at large and the republic state apparatuses were many. The Central Committee created institutions which safeguarded and elevated its members into positions of prestige and privilege. The members of the Committee manipulated the levers which made the state function using the party as its bulwark and imposing communist ideology on the masses. For a union the size of the former USSR, this ideology was bound to win over several converts through the use of propaganda.

Communist ideology took on many forms in order for the authorities to perpetuate it and, thereby, their own control. These forms of ideology can be cited as anti-Semitism, anti-nationalism, anti-bourgeoisism and anti-liberalism. The ideology remained a very cohesive concept throughout the Soviet authoritarian regime. Those who behaved in an inimical manner to the state, i.e. those who behaved in their own self-interest or those who valued independent beliefs and cultural autonomy, were enemies of the state. The penalties for being an enemy persuaded several citizens to adopt the official line.

For those with whom propaganda did not make headway, the Soviet leaders could enforce "allegiance" to the ideology through the use of auxiliary structures, most notably, the KGB. Society was demobilized and the KGB prolonged this reduction of individual activity in society through forceful methods. It followed its orders which were molded around the idea that the only framework for social integration remained along the lines of Stalin's divide and conquer policy.

When it appeared from the mid-1970s onward that the system was experiencing a breakdown, economically, and in turn ideologically, the auxiliary structures erected increasing numbers of barriers against elements which threatened the continuity of the system. However, when *perestroika* broke loose from the party's central controls and became a force of its own among the populace, the party's props used for control lost their might and the institutions began to breakdown.

The breakdown of the authoritarian institutions was provoked by crises which could not be avoided. Gorbachev realized it was impossible to solve all the crises without some form of "interactive" policy formulation. This interaction needed to be extended beyond the brittle and corrupted party members and their decrepit institutions and required direct input from the demobilized and disenfranchised public.

Such were the events that gave birth to popular support for democratic institutions among the members of the USSR's nationalities. The first manifestation of popular will in policy management was the widespread support for more open discussion and rejection of the prevailing system by the public. This notion did not at first embody the idea of multi-party elections, and other concepts of freedom and choice are still slow to emerge in the former Soviet Union. It has been observed that the interpretations of democracy among the public before the USSR's dissolution was limited to abstract notions of limited political rights for the opposition associated with low levels of tolerance by the public for those in separate ideological camps, and continued respect for central authority over aspects of life such as public order (11). Overall, however, the population favored such guarantees as personal safety, freedom of speech and consciousness, cultural autonomy, equality before the law and rights to privacy. The demand for the delivery of human rights, which had been replaced by collectivist rights such as the right to work, right to education and health, and the right to social insurance

and housing, was a major catalyst in undermining the authoritarian system. These demands compounded with the emerging opportunities to engineer economic reform and free and fair elections contributed to the breakdown of the old system and revealed consent for a system based on individualism within an organized and coherent society.

The future of the Republic of Azerbaijan will be marked by assorted complexities and an indeterminate political forecast. Azerbaijan, created on foundations which reveal a mixed political orientation and stop-and-go development patterns, presents a curious record for evaluation and consideration. Azerbaijan is blessed with abundant natural resources and a strategic location, but is also plagued by internecine ethnic conflicts and obscure political programs. Azerbaijan's current political dynamics and civil society are built from a long history of imperial subjugation, a brief but frenetic jaunt with independence and a Soviet past characterized by compliance with unjust republican and federalist policies.

Emerging from all these conflicting inputs, Azerbaijani society is attempting to erect a state constructed on democratic principles, but is restricted by conflicting elements. While Azerbaijan has officially promoted democratic principles in theory, it has faced excessive obstacles in practice that have revealed a disquieting tendency to revert to obeisance in times of distress. As there does not appear to be any alleviation to this distress in the short-term, Azerbaijan may suffer some unfortunate consequences by bowing to authoritarian inclinations, however much popular intentions are sympathetic to democratic nonpareils.

The public in Azerbaijan, which may now be free to practice Islam and to reform their alphabet, may also be limited in their future endeavors toward forming organizations and embarking on commercial ventures. The low perceptions or value of

widespread participation and public contestation in multi-party elections, concrete symbols of democracy, and the continued acceptance of a subordinate/superordinate relationship between the nation's leader and his or her constituents may act in the end to deny the Azerbaijani public of its basic human rights. It appears that a system which uses nondemocratic methods in order to pave the way for future democracy is emerging. This is a continuing setback for all nascent democracies, Azerbaijan is no exception in this case. However, by allowing authoritarian behavior by the nation's leaders, Azerbaijan is creating a risk which may prevent or exceedingly delay democracy's arrival. These setbacks are apparent in the public's acceptance of weak political institutions and unplanned administrative turnovers. The infrequency of democracy in use in Azerbaijan is also apparent in the conduct of the nation's leaders in establishing and implementing foreign and economic policies.

Regime Change and Institutionalized Forms of Democracy

The first characteristic of a democratically-elected government, as was stated in the first chapter, is the nature of sovereignty which is irrefutably accepted among the members of the nation. The national government's preeminence as representative of the citizens of the state is unquestioned. In democracy, also, the relationship of the head of state and the citizens is also a highly-valued and symmetrical affair. Mutual respect for the system of governance and the powers and confinements of the people involved is meant to be very secure and understood. In Azerbaijan, however, the minor instances of adherence to the established rules and standards of practice reveal a disquieting tendency to reject or merely disregard democratic principles. It will be necessary for the uninterrupted practice of democracy to continue before Azerbaijanis can fully utilize and take advantage of the system.

This lack of commitment to democracy thus far reveals two inferences as to the potential future nature of politics in Azerbaijan. The first inference which can be made is that the level of various and extensive crises in Azerbaijan will limit the survivability of the regimes as the leaders' legitimacy is undermined by forces difficult to control and direct. This can be seen by the loss of respect and position once prominent leaders experienced after they were unable to resolve deep and prolonged crises. Hasty and uncareful actions will undermine democratic functioning and will increase the likelihood of haphazard and ill-conceived solutions.

Another inference which can be surmised is that Azerbaijan is a long way away from developing the institutions which will make it a stable democracy. This can be concluded by reviewing the institutions and laws which have been passed in legislation and either rescinded or merely never executed. Much of the stasis is due to the rapid turnover of administrations, which correspondingly reject the previous administration's proposals for resolving the many problems in Azerbaijan. The lack of organizational processes and disinterest in smooth implementation of agreed plans shows a considerable level of passivity toward consultative acts and long-term goal achievements.

These assumptions are firstly apparent in the method of regime change. In a democratic formula, heads of state are elected, serve their terms, and either run for office again or retire from office at the end of their term. Very rarely do leaders in stable democracies leave their posts before their terms of office are complete. Unusual events may force heads of state out of office. These events may include death, parliamentary votes of no confidence (which are conducted according to a strict constitutional framework which provides for this method of defeat), or impeachment (which also is conducted according to a prescribed constitutional system and only when the president

has been accused of grave offenses against the nation's integrity and security).

In stable democratic systems, the "overthrow" of a government occurs through peaceful elections which are coordinated according to established laws using accepted rules of conduct and which follow a timetable clearly scheduled in advance and never rescheduled according to the intensity of the political climate. In democratic systems, the change of government is decided by electoral techniques which serve to reject the government and call for a peaceful transition and replacement when so willed by the public.

The first factor challenging Azerbaijan's future as a stable democracy is the questionable practice of the recent alterations of regimes through overthrows. In Azerbaijan, overthrow of the existing regime has been the primary means in which new leaders are brought to the political fore. There have been three presidents and two overthrows in Azerbaijan's history since independence. The overthrow rarely follows the methods of power transfer described above. After an overthrow has been completed, leaders then use nominally democratic methods to legitimize their ascension. It should be noted, however, that overthrow of the existing regimes in Azerbaijan has not occurred in total absence of popular support, but this support does not reveal itself through any established mechanisms.

When Mutalibov became the first president of the independent republic, he was voted into power through popular elections. These elections were preceded by the republic's assertion of independence in August of 1991 after the *coup* plotters in Moscow failed to overthrow Gorbachev. At this time, the public supported independence and manifested its support by declaring its intent to secede from the union and electing its choice for head of state. At this time, no mechanisms had been

established for transitions to democracy. Despite the popular revolt and rejection of the Soviet Union's authoritarian rule, Mutalibov ran unopposed for the presidency as the opposition candidates refused to run. The opposition, particularly the PFA, asserted that the very nature of the elections was not democratic in that the opposition had no time to organize since that had been prevented from meeting under the rules of martial law which had been in place prior to secession. They rejected the election, saying that there had not existed an opportunity for an even-handed campaign to emerge. Mutalibov won over 98 percent of the vote in an 85.7 percent voter turnout. His first accomplishment as the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan was to dissolve the Communist Party. He also lifted the martial law.

Mutalibov did not remain very long in the presidency and mass demonstrations catalyzed his ouster. He was accused of not preventing the massacre of Azerbaijanis in the hands of the Armenians over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in February 1992. The conflict had been steadily growing and by the time Mutalibov was ousted, it had reached the degree of an undeclared war. His inability to form an army out of the remains of the Azerbaijani veterans of the Soviet army caused many to be disenchanted with his performance. He continued to relish the idea that the Russians would support the republic, and left with this delusion, he became unresponsive and lost any semblance of popular support.

Members of the opposition parties who had emerged out of the Communist reformers and had retained their influence in the Parliament demanded Mutalibov's resignation in March 1992. The PFA, which had been reasserting its strength since the end of martial law, organized rallies outside the Parliament building and on March 6, 1992, Mutalibov caved in to pressure and resigned. He was temporarily replaced by the Speaker of the Parliament, Yakub Mamedov.

Unnerved by the growing war with Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, Mutalibov was brought back to power in May 1992 by a Parliament acting without a quorum. Mutalibov imposed a state of emergency on his return. In response to Parliament's actions, the Popular Front opposition stormed the government buildings and captured the airport and broadcasting centers. They refused to leave until Mutalibov was again ousted. Communist members of the government agreed finally to remove Mutalibov from power. Parliament then dissolved itself and erected a 50-member National Council composed mostly of PFA members. The PFA leaders rewarded the Communists by granting them seats in the Council, but the PFA took over the Interior and National Security Ministries. They also rescinded Mutalibov's state of emergency (12).

Newspaper reports quoted members of the public participating in the demonstrations as saying they had been freed of a dictatorship. The Popular Front claimed it did not want to change one totalitarian system for another, and promised a coalition government which would represent a variety of interests.

Popular Front leader President Ebulfaz Elchibey also became a victim of an overthrow the following year. Public support for the change of regimes was not as enthusiastic the following year when Elchibey, who had been elected President with 59 percent of the votes in a 73 percent turnout of registered voters during the previous year's elections, handed over power to former first secretary Haydar Aliyev in June 1993.

The take-over of authority was sparked by a rebel commander, Surat Husseinov, who had been controlling a militia in the city of Genje. Husseinov, who had been an army commander during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, demanded the resignation of the

prime minister, Isa Gambar, and after Elchibey had ordered troops to tackle him, he then demanded the resignation of the president. Husseinov could have become the new dictator had Elchibey not requested Aliyev's assistance. At the time Aliyev was the chair of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic's chairperson. Aliyev, who took over as Parliament speaker after the resignation of Gambar, promised to bring peace and prosperity. At the same time, Husseinov was bringing his troops closer to Baku and Elchibey fled to his native Nakhichevan. A week later, after refusing to return to Baku, Elchibey would appeal to the public on independent television to support him as president. But, it was too late. Parliament had already stripped him of his powers and entrusted Aliyev with his functions. Aliyev, in turn, while first rejecting Husseinov for his violations of "the constitution and democracy" would nominate Husseinov as prime minister the following week. Husseinov was elected to the post by a 36-1 vote in Parliament. He was also entrusted with the Defense, Security and Interior Ministries, clearly revealing a break in the concept of separating powers and creating a system of checks and balances. With a portfolio of this magnitude, it would appear that Husseinov would have made a formidable autocrat.

However, Aliyev was to become the charismatic figure in Azerbaijan, resurrected as a democratically-oriented nationalist out of his communist past. Aliyev suddenly had seemed to have experienced a metamorphosis. As recently as 1990, it appeared that he was still a Communist. He confirmed this image by revealing his dismay at the changes introduced by Gorbachev. He was quoted as saying that "No one imagined Gorbachev was such a reformer...I absolutely believed in him, that he would be an effective leader of our party. And so I voted for him. No one knew there would be such *perestroika* and *glasnost*" (13).

As a nationalist, Aliyev successfully prevented Husseinov's rise in power by offering him a powerful position in government and then neutralizing his power by dismantling his army and reducing the effectiveness of the political position.

At this time, there were no street demonstrations. Only one man, Husseinov, had demanded Elchibey's resignation, and he was backed by the only effective army in Azerbaijan. Elchibey had been losing popular support. It was claimed that he ruled autocratically, that his government was corrupt, that he had failed to put together an army, and that he was inexperienced in government and therefore ineffective. To support these accusations of lost popularity, his national guard units refused to fight against Husseinov's forces when they were ordered to do so. It was under these conditions that Azerbaijanis refused to protest the undemocratic transition of power.

Aliyev's return was actually silently welcomed, as the Azerbaijanis neglected to remember the worst elements of his authoritarian style, including his neutralization of opponents, and preferred to recall how Aliyev had restored the economy. They also hoped that his solid posture toward the war with Armenia would speed up its termination.

Aliyev attempted to act according to democratic prescriptions for a while. He defended his assumption of power by claiming that he used constitutional methods for the transition of political power. He was questioned so furiously by the Parliament that he retracted his statement (14). Under his nationalist guise and for the benefit of the international community, Aliyev would use seemingly democratic methods to legitimize his power. He called for a public referendum to assess Elchibey's popularity. The vote put the Elchibey reign to bed, although, some Elchibey supporters maintain that the referendum was illegal because only the legally-elected president can call the

referendum, and the Parliament's stripping Elchibey of his authorities was unconstitutional. On top of that the PFA chairman on referenda claimed the procedures for conducting the referendum were invalid. Regardless, the rejection of Elchibey opened the way for Aliyev to conduct new presidential elections. In the meantime, he had declared another state of emergency in the republic and had adopted his old methods of demobilizing the opposition. In the October 1993 election, he competed against two virtually unknown candidates, each of whom received less than 20,000 votes of the total 92 percent turnout. Aliyev was elected with 97 percent on October 3, 1993. There were claims that the elections were rigged, but independent monitors did not file any objections. Elchibey also complained that physical and moral pressures were placed on electoral commissions to falsify results and that during televised reports voters could be seen stuffing ballot boxes.

Though it may seem that resignations are a perfectly legitimate way for a leader to step down from office, it is apparent that the resignation of Mutalibov was forced through popular discontent and the demise of Elchibey's presidency was due to a military threat which could have cost more than Elchibey's life. In democracies, resignation of office is a limited occurrence. Mutalibov's ouster did not follow any standard procedures. Furthermore, public perceptions of threats to national integrity concluded Elchibey's term but not through any democratic method.

Surat Husseinov's role, under Aliyev's command, has also been reduced. He maintains his position as prime minister, which further reinforces the contention that political labels are meaningless, but his army has been disbanded and its members have joined the war in Karabakh or have been "liquidated". With a system which sees regime change occurring through forced resignations, overthrows and illegal referenda, it is difficult to see where the value of democratic principles is placed. If voting continues to

be a method for leaders to manipulate in legalizing their unconstitutional ascensions to power, it is unclear when this process will ever be considered a useful instrument in demonstrating democracy.

As previously mentioned, Mutalibov's first legal matter revolved around the abolition of the Communist Party, a nondemocratic start for the republic and the ex-Communist leader, as banning political parties openly reveals authoritarian behavior. Communism as a theory is not authoritarian but the practice has proved to be so. To prevent the spread of the potentially revived popularity of this system, Mutalibov used an undemocratic method of reducing a threat to democracy. Mutalibov did help to inaugurate some institutions which would set the state on sound footing to begin their democratic revival. These first maneuvers included the creation of a government divided among the legislative, executive and judicial branches, typically found in several stable democracies. The legislative branch is responsible for passing laws and its functions are conducted by the *Milli Majlis*, or Parliament, which was originally composed of 365 members, even before the nation's independence, but has since been reduced to 50 members. The executive power has been entrusted to the President, who serves as head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

The judiciary is independent of the other two branches. The Supreme Court, which is similar to the U.S. Supreme Court, is the highest court in the land and has the authority of judicial review, judging the constitutionality of laws. The lower courts are responsible for determining the outcomes of criminal and civil cases. Though the constitution separates religion from the state, Mutalibov, in an attempt to gain economic assistance and trade opportunities with Iran, called for a "spiritual revival" in Azerbaijan, which included the invitation of the Iranian state prosecutor in November 1991 to brief the judiciary on Iran's criminal system and its relation to Islamic law.

Mutalibov again seems to be enacting measures which are contradictory to the tenets of democracy and the people's will but which appear to be useful in serving immediate goals. Iran has granted economic assistance since this ploy, and despite the officials' visit, the judiciary remains purely secular.

Party politics also began to unfold under Mutalibov. In the constitution, all citizens were given the right to form and join political parties, and to do so free of government interference. There are several political parties in the Republic of Azerbaijan, but under Mutalibov, and then again under Elchibey and Aliyev, these parties have been hindered from partaking in the political process, from holding rallies or demonstrations and from organizing meetings.

Some of the other democratic institutions which have been promoted by constitutional guarantees include access to platforms to enjoy the freedom of expression, a legally defined system for candidature associated with the right to run for public office in competitive free and fair elections, a mechanism by which representatives can respond to public concerns, access to a judiciary which promotes the right to due process of law and a free and open press. While some of these are peripheral to building a political democracy, they can all be assigned as elements of a stable democracy. Regardless of the constitutionality of the guarantees, the constitution is often foresaken in Azerbaijan.

Elchibey seemed to embrace the principles guiding the establishment of these institutions more than the other two leaders which have ruled over Azerbaijan. Elchibey issued a decree, in the midst of an ethnic war, guaranteeing the rights of minorities to cultural autonomy and he decentralized government to allow regions to determine their social policies. This was not enough, however, to satisfy the Nagorno-Karabakh

Armenians who want total severance of their relations with Azerbaijan.

Regardless of these pluses, the purveyor of democracy in Azerbaijan can be cited for neglecting to abide by democratic principles. He even stated that an "evolutionary" approach to transforming Azerbaijan was difficult to continue under the threat of economic collapse and growing political tensions. On top of this, it was reported in March 1993 that Azerbaijani riot police were responsible for the deaths of six protesters demonstrating against Lezgin ethnic minority conscription to fight the Armenian-Azerbaijani war during a rally in the northern Azerbaijani city of Kusary. The interior ministry denied the charge, but in April Elchibey declared a state of emergency throughout the country for a two-month period. Under war conditions, the state of emergency justified banning political party activities. Mobilized groups supporting the integrity of the nation had their activities suspended. The move further suggests that the requirements of this new state precede the actions which would help to create a more sound political environment.

In addition to the state of emergency, when Elchibey was confronted with Husseinov's insurrection in Genje he said military force would be used against the rebels even if it meant civil war. Before this, Elchibey had instructed his army chief-of-staff to rid the country of Husseinov, but he refused and was fired. Then Elchibey sent a three-man negotiating team to Genje to arrest Husseinov, but they were captured by rebel soldiers. Finally, Elchibey said, "The legitimately-elected government of Azerbaijan has the right to defend the country from falling into the control of criminals and bandits" (15). This is true but what he didn't realize is that the military forces would refuse to fight on behalf of the legitimately-elected government, revealing that the government had ceased to be very legitimate. The mere fact that the military commanders refused to take orders and did not face reprisal suggests that the

foundations of the government institutions are amiss.

As Elchibey was running out of options, he turned to Aliyev. Aliyev refused to accept the position of prime minister that had been vacated and Elchibey decreed to him several powers, after providing Aliyev the chair of the Parliament Speaker. This granting of powers left Elchibey little opportunity with which to reassert his strength as president later.

Aliyev would soon have room to move at his discretion as the Parliament voted to strip Elchibey of his powers as President. The Parliament, however, let Elchibey remain in office while Parliament decided whether to bring criminal charges against him for deserting his post. The Parliament ended up stripping Elchibey of his powers as president.

Aliyev's first act was to make the rebel commander the prime minister. He then continued to dictate in his usual authoritarian manner, refusing to make collective political decisions or share collective responsibilities with the government. Aliyev preaches that he is endeared to democracy but makes no attempts to utilize democratic methods. The difference, however, between Aliyev and the other presidents lies in the fact that they consider unilateral actions necessary to develop democracy, whereas Aliyev appears apathetic or even against the end result if it decreases his personal power. In democracy, though, a central theme exists that reciprocity between leaders and followers enhances the prestige and position of a fair leader.

By the time Aliyev removed the state of emergency on the eve of the presidential elections, he had managed to accumulate power in his own hands by decreeing major personnel changes in his cabinet and installing many of his former cohorts in positions

over which he could guarantee control. Aliyev has also refused to cede his chair in the Nakhichevan Parliament. He preached democratic virtues when he first attained power in the government, but effectively neutralized his political opponents. One of his methods for reducing political opposition was through a presidential decree which transferred the Azerbaijan Publications House to the jurisdiction of the department of the president. The publishing house then claimed that it lacked printing plates, making it impossible to print any newspaper other than the president's "official mouthpiece", Azerbaijan. Newspapers such as Musavat Party's Musavat ceased publication after the announcement. It has been suggested that the claim of lack of materials was a response to the Parliament's voting down an amendment which would have allowed authorities to close down publications without acquiring a court order. The amendment, which was rejected 23-15, was one of the few fully-debated issues by the Parliament since Aliyev's assumption of power. Aliyev managed to implement his will in the end, however.

In addition to these acts, Aliyev admitted that the obligations of the nation during a state of war pre-empted implementing democratic guarantees including the safeguarding of human rights, freedom of conscience and equal rights for all citizens. He said that under the conditions of war, "The application of democracy and democratic principles is in conflict with the republic's work at the present time (16)." These comments and actions do not bode well for the future of democracy in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Aliyev, it must be remembered, emerged during the days of Brezhnev from a KGB chief to a Communist Party first secretary. Regardless of the promises and rhetoric of change, it is unlikely that Aliyev's philosophies have altered. It was difficult enough for a proponent of democracy such as Elchibey to abide by its principles. Under the direction of Aliyev, it seems far-fetched to assume that the institutions and legal procedures embodied in democratic systems can be applied during his tenure and that the continuing war can be used as a pretense to prevent any type of democratization in

Azerbaijan. The constraints of the war and the inheritance of seventy years of Communist rule seem to preclude the emergence of genuine democracy in Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, democracy has so far failed to prevent war. This appears to be a primary failure of the system and necessarily forces the placement of the values of open society secondary to conducting a successful war to preserve the state. One ray of hope for democracy can be considered, though. As long as Azerbaijan continues to pretend to abide by democratic formulae, the principles may eventually sink into the Azerbaijani psyche.

Chapter III: Democracy and Foreign Policy in Azerbaijan

Foreign Policy Goals and Precautions

Alexis de Tocqueville, a founding father of democracy, was quick to point out the relationship between democracy and the success of a nation's foreign relations. He said that the virtues of decentralization and participation as well as the attention to freedom and community responsibility would create a condition favorable to propelling the power and prestige of the nation on an international level. The willingness to defend the interests of the nation and the love of country associated with the freedom inherited from democracy would strengthen the basis of foreign policy, would enhance the democratic order of the nation and would produce benefits to internal affairs. Under the assumption that democracy is the ideal system of government, as a democracy Azerbaijan can assert itself as a cohesive, united nation in which other nations could trust as stable. Nations would then prefer to associate and cooperate with Azerbaijan in developing foreign policy in developing trade, cultural and security guarantees to promote mutual and regional interests.

However, in developing foreign policy, Azerbaijan must consider the anarchical nature of the international system. The array of possible alternatives in developing foreign policy can easily lead to conflicting interests among nations and between foreign and domestic policy. Several mechanisms can be useful in developing sound policies which can bind effectively foreign and domestic concerns. These mechanisms include a strong organizational process among ministries, a clearly defined and delineated bureaucratic process, the constant and applied use of feedback processes and a continuing evaluation between goals and policy agreements taking advantage of private sector expert opinion.

The conduct of foreign policy will play a central force in the development of Azerbaijan's government in the coming years. In relating foreign policy to democratic societies, it is essential to remember that in a democracy, as de Tocqueville said, participation is a primary tenet. Members of the public are supposed to be included in all policy decisions that will affect them. Azerbaijan's foreign policy inclinations will have a direct impact on the public at large. In the case of Russia, for instance, adhering to that sphere of influence will force the Azerbaijani people to accept policies that enhance Russia's position in the country. This would imply that whatever happens to The Russian Federation will create a spillover effect in Azerbaijan. Members of the public need to be included in the debate over whether what is good for the Russian nation is good for Azerbaijan. In the case of Turkey, cultural and educational policies which try to forge an ethnic alliance with Azerbaijan will affect Azerbaijanis perceptions of themselves. In the case of Iran, most of the aid that reaches the population has been a gift from the Iranian nation. Azerbaijanis may wish to forge closer ties to Iran if they see those ties directly benefiting the welfare of the individual. In these examples, the public's inclusion in foreign policy decisions may assist the nation's leaders in acquiring the greatest benefits from the cultural, economic and security ties with other nations. The public's opinion can also be sought to assist leaders in defining the foreign relations which will overwhelm personal growth among Azerbaijanis or will inspire disillusionment or unrest among society. Public sentiment can be used to distinguish between positive and negative outcomes of policy formation.

In instances of cultural, welfare and political policy, the ties to other countries are apparent. In addition, these ties are creating an overlap between foreign and domestic policy. More will be discussed in the next chapter on the types of democracies that exist, however, it should be mentioned here that in liberal democracy, the people must be included in policy making which will affect their welfare. This means, for instance,

creating favorable trade policies that support the economic infrastructure. In a democracy based on conservative philosophies, the inclusion of the public in policy making is again essential for the reason that inclusion will guarantee policies which do not prohibit personal financial and social development. In a conservative democratic system this means allowing private direct investment from which people can benefit from free enterprise and competition. In a democracy of this nature, the public must be allowed to make contacts with foreign companies on their own initiative and to pursue external markets. If a government, based on either liberal or conservative economic philosophies, wishes to create a viable system by which individuals can cooperate with foreign entities, an open environment in the creation of foreign policy will suit this goal. An open environment will allow individuals and business professionals to lobby for policies which will assist them in attaining their personal aims.

Furthermore, carefully debated foreign policy can avoid secondary, unintended troubles which may arise from affiliative constraints. Leaders which see the benefit of allying their nation with powerful nations in the global community may overlook the disadvantages of such arrangements. For instance, security guarantees which allow the placement of foreign troops on a nation's soil to protect members of a regional community may not perceive the risks at the time the treaty is signed. An example of this can be seen in Turkey's Provide Comfort Operation. The goal of the agreement among the United States, France, Britain and Turkey was to provide humanitarian assistance to Northern Iraqi refugees from bases in Turkey. The leaders in Turkey did not expect that the traffic on the border would increase the way it did. Now, it has become difficult to monitor entrants to Turkey from that region. Refugees and militants have both been able to sneak across the border. Likewise, some of the aid packages being air dropped to the refugees is ending up in the hands of terrorist organizations. The humanitarian goal of the operation is being overwhelmed by the unforeseen

drawbacks which hinder Turkey's fight against terrorism. Like the Turkish example, Azerbaijan, too, can be victimized by foreign policies which injure domestic interests. Careful deliberation on policy considerations among several actors can prevent most unexpected outcomes.

War seems to be the most difficult obstacle to achieving ideal democracies outside theories. Studies have revealed that democracies fight wars as often as nondemocratic nations, but it is also significant that democracies do not generally fight wars with other democracies (1). In a democratic system such as the United States, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces is also the president. He can decide to go to war, but like all the constraints he faces, he must receive the approval of Congress. Likewise, Congress must decide when a war is finished. This requires evaluating the sentiments of the population at large and determining how the population would respond in a situation of heightened national security controls. It would be hard for legislators to canvass their constituents when war necessarily requires a tactful and quiet administration in order to be conducted successfully. War also requires a quick response from leaders who do not have time to learn several opinions. The valued relationship between the leader of a nation and its citizens is at its most significant height during war. Often leaders can take advantage of the trust of the public to conduct war, or conclude other policies for the wrong reason. In the Falkland Islands War, which Britain fought with Argentina in 1982, the public supported war because national pride disallowed an Argentine invasion on British territory. The government supported the war knowing that victory would spell popularity points in the next election. The British victory in the war resulted in excessive costs to the nation for the maintenance of a territory the nation had been planning to abandon in its long-term policy goals.

Foreign policy initiatives of the various regimes in Azerbaijan as it relates to their struggle to attain some semblance of democracy will require public consensus. The Azerbaijani leaders have regarded the public only peripherally in their foreign policy conduct. This is not surprising as democracy has failed to remedy the exclusionary activity associated with the adoption of foreign policies. In fact, the essential failure of the democratic process has been its inability to conduct foreign policy in a transparent decision-making setting. Democracy has also been unable to avoid war with nondemocratic nations. Azerbaijan is experiencing a severe crisis in its relations (or lack of) with Armenia. It will be interesting to see how Azerbaijan's regimes have tried to attract support for its foreign policies and its war effort, and work to achieve democracy. It appears that the two endeavors will be mutually exclusive.

The Ties that Bind

Azerbaijan has been looking outward in its new independent orientation. It has been seeking bilateral agreements with several nations and membership in several international organizations, including NATO, the United Nations and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Similarly, nations are discovering interests in Azerbaijan. Representatives from several countries have sought to involve themselves and profit from Azerbaijan's rich oil reserves. Still others are trying to impress the Azerbaijani authorities in other economic spheres, and other nations are hoping to revive their mutual cultural ties and become strong allies with Azerbaijan. The reasons for the interest in Azerbaijan are two-fold - economics and geopolitics.

On one level, nations want to associate themselves with Azerbaijan for economic reasons, namely to benefit from Azerbaijan's natural resources. The United States and Turkey, among others, are active in this area. Other nations like Iran wish to swing the

spheres of influence toward the direction of their ideological and geopolitical interests. Conversely, Armenia wishes to destabilize the nation in order to earn concessions from Azerbaijan, either of an economic or a territorial nature or both. While intentions and actions of these nations may appear contrasting and even conflicting, Azerbaijan may be able to create a delicate balance in which it will benefit the most. As the country possesses many valued products, it has several bargaining chips to sell to the highest bidder. However, if Azerbaijan's authorities do not carefully weigh the options, their decisions may inject turmoil into their nation's domestic policies.

This risk is especially acute if the conduct of foreign policy is assumed under a veil of secrecy and irrespective of popular opinion, as the dangers of secretive foreign policy planning have been discussed above. This risk is accelerated particularly in a time of tense economic strain which will affect the nation for decades to come. For this reason, policy in Azerbaijan could benefit from measuring the temperature of the public and gauging their support for foreign policy initiatives. When the internal community's stance is considered, this only increases the components which contribute to realizing rational and beneficial decisions for the nation.

Azerbaijan's leaders since independence reveal a mixed record in their adopting rational decisions when formulating policy. This is especially true for the reason that Azerbaijan is dealing with many nations which are much more experienced in the conduct of foreign affairs, more developed, and which likely have experienced the worst pitfalls of an emerging nation. These nations know how to gain concessions while the policy makers in Azerbaijan are new members of the bargaining table. Even Russia, which is in the throes of modernization and new political formations, starts off on a stronger foot than Azerbaijan because of its prestige, (partially determined by its nuclear-power status), its size and its influence in the CIS and the other nations of

Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The nations which have had the most influence so far in Azerbaijan's development are undoubtedly Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Armenia. On a less influential but still meaningful level is the United States.

Conscious of the array of players with which they are negotiating in the international field, Azerbaijani leaders can use their understanding of their counterparts' experience to consider carefully how they wish to ally the country, what effect this will have on its emergence and appearance in the global community and what the nation should hope to achieve for itself internationally and on the domestic level.

Mutalibov, as a former Communist leader, pledged his support for continuing close bonds with Russia and the nations of the former Soviet Union after Azerbaijan gained its independence. Before Azerbaijanis reaffirmed their devotion to independence in the December 1990 referendum, Mutalibov and the remaining Communist members of Parliament supported adherence to the State Council of the USSR. After total independence was achieved, Mutalibov signed the CIS agreement, but it was not ratified by the Parliament, reflecting the opposition's aversion to Russia and its potential strength in affecting decisions. While Mutalibov was supportive of Russia throughout his tenure, upon his demise as president he blamed Russia for playing a role in the Khojaly assault by Armenian troops of February 25-26 1992. In Khojaly, over 1,000 Azerbaijanis were reported dead by the hands of Armenian militants who were said to be preceded by former Soviet troops. He said that survivors said the city continued to be under siege with tank and artillery attacks by the troops of the former Soviet Union. Moscow denied the reports (2). One reason Mutalibov was ousted was his failure to respond to events in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. He had not made provisions to create an army to fight the Armenians, thinking that Moscow would assist him in this field.

Despite Mutalibov's inclinations to continue ties with Russia, he wasn't totally dependent on Moscow. As was stated before, he courted Iran for assistance and received aid. He also requested increased trade with Turkey and in the fall of 1991, Turkey began shipping its sale of one million tons of wheat and 100,000 tons of flour. It also provided US\$250 million in trade credits.

Though Turkey was the first nation to recognize Azerbaijan's independence, it has stepped cautiously in its approach toward Azerbaijan in order to preserve its bonds with Russia. Russia, despite its current economic weakness, still remains an important figure in the region and a strong trade partner with Turkey. Turkish trade with Russia in 1991 equaled \$1.6 billion. Also, thousands of Turkish engineers and construction workers are employed in Russia and a Turkish construction company, GAMA, has a \$35 million subcontract to build homes for former Soviet soldiers in the Russian Federation (3). Russia maintains that Azerbaijan is within its sphere of influence and is wary of Turkey for fear of pulling Azerbaijan away from that sphere.

Throughout Mutalibov's presidency Azerbaijan was in its developmental stages and few businesses inside Azerbaijan could reveal their international orientations. However, non-governmental organizations outside Azerbaijan were examining the nation to evaluate its investment potential. Azerbaijan's domestic politics were already beginning to be affected by future international agreements.

Before the Popular Front's leader was elected to power, Azerbaijan's foreign policy as an independent nation was still in the embryonic stages. But, Elchibey had several definite ideas about foreign policy initiatives. Most notable among his policies was his rejection of the CIS. He claimed that he wanted ties to all the nations of the former Soviet Union but that he wanted those ties to be of a bilateral nature. The effect of his

rejection of the CIS was vivid. The former Soviet troops remained in Armenia and helped Armenia to create a regular national army. The Russian defense units in Azerbaijan were removed. Nonetheless, over the next year Russia and Azerbaijan signed 20 bilateral agreements. One of these agreements, signed in July 1992, arranged for Russia's participation in protecting the border between Azerbaijan and Iran and Azerbaijan and Turkey. This included Russian control over air defense systems, reconnaissance and early missile warnings. Army personnel would have been trained by Russian specialists. None of the agreements so far have been executed.

Despite Elchibey's resentment toward Russia, he was not unaware of the fact that the country needed Russian security ties and assistance in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia's main role in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, however, was to play a mediating role. It co-sponsored with Turkey and the United States the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe's plan which called for the return of lands captured by Armenia between 1992 and 1993. In April 1993, it again called for an immediate cease fire and the introduction of observers in the territory. Russian President Boris Yeltsin continued his support for peace talks by calling both sides to come to the negotiating table. It is clear, however, that as long as Azerbaijan refused to join the CIS, Russia would be of little assistance to the nation in its war effort. It wasn't until Aliyev joined Azerbaijan to the CIS in September of 1993 that Russia began to adopt a more accommodating tone toward Azerbaijan. Public opinion polls in August 1993 suggested that the population was supporting the proposal to join the CIS, likely because Russia was seen as the only country which might assist in fighting the Armenians. Russian troops have agreed to enter the region as a peace-keeping force.

Elchibey's repudiation of Iranian Islamic fundamentalism likely reflects the current trend among the Azerbaijani Republic. Though Iran has sent clerics to work in the

religious schools in Azerbaijan, its attempts to impose its brand of Islam has been rejected by the state. The rejection was a concerted move by the Azerbaijani government under Elchibey, as fundamentalist tendencies would undermine the regime. This was already evident in the Talysh ethnic minority in Southwest Azerbaijan activities. Leaders of the region attempted to separate from the Republic and join in an independent republic with their ethnic kinsmen, the Mugan, in Iran. Furthermore, the rejection may have stemmed from Elchibey's resentment towards Iran's alleged supplying of goods and weapons to Armenia to undermine Azerbaijani gains in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh (4). Elchibey's fierce nationalism called for the reunification of Northern Iranian Azerbaijanis with the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Iranians in turn said that Elchibey "lacks the insight needed for resolving the major problems besetting the country" (5). The disenchantment between Iran and Azerbaijan was viewed favorably in Washington, however, as the United States and Iran are opponents seeking influence in third nations. Washington sees Iran's influence as inimical to U.S. policy goals.

Elchibey's pro-Turkey stance was welcomed heartily by Turkey. As they are linguistically and culturally related countries, Turkey looked very favorably to Azerbaijan's turning to Turkey for assistance. Turkey has granted mass credits to Azerbaijan through its Ex/Im Bank and has supplied much needed food to the nation as Azerbaijan struggles with its growing refugee population. In addition, Turkey began exporting its television broadcasts to Azerbaijan to further unify the culture and language of the two nations. Also, Turkish businesses have been trying to set up shop in Azerbaijan since Elchibey's arrival in power. Turkey opened direct transportation links through airline flights between Baku and Istanbul and installed an elaborate telecommunications system in Azerbaijan.

Of course, Turkey's interest is not purely philanthropic. Turkey needs another trading partner in which to distribute its surplus exports. Azerbaijan, and Central Asia, are the most attractive candidates, as the European Union (EU) continues to reject Turkey's full membership. Furthermore, in order to reach Central Asia where it hopes to increase relations, Turkey must traverse Azerbaijan. Turkey can benefit from Azerbaijan's relations with Central Asia to promote its interests there. Turkey is also vying for the much prized oil pipeline, hoping that a link to Azerbaijan's vast oil reserves will provide Turkey with prestige as well as bargain prices. Furthermore, with Azerbaijan as a trade and philosophical ally, it will be the first ally in the region as Turkey is surrounded on all sides by hostile neighbors. This alliance is further being cultivated by the fact both nations are adversarial toward Armenia. However, Turkey's resources are limited by its own troubled economy and growing inflation. As its shortcomings become more evident, Azerbaijan will continue to establish direct links with the West and to reduce Turkey's influence as a negotiator.

The United States has been viewed warmly but cautiously by the Azerbaijani government under Elchibey. The 1992 Freedom Support Act, which the U.S. Congress passed as a means of showing its attentiveness to the former Soviet republics, specifically excluded Azerbaijan. The aid guarantee that was embodied in the Act was not extended to Azerbaijan as punishment for its economic blockade of Armenia. This lack of support, according to one observer, has hurt the democratic process in Azerbaijan (6). The United States, while purporting its support for a peaceful conclusion to the war and the continuation of democratic development, is mainly interested in allowing its corporations access to the Azerbaijani oil market. This is their central interest in the region.

The United States rejected Aliyev's ascension to power and the removal of Elchibey, saying that it was not a legitimate move. It nevertheless did not take any action toward restoring Elchibey, in the manner that it tried to resurrect Haiti's Aristide. This inaction, perhaps is due to the fact that Azerbaijan is not in the United States' backyard, and its administrative changes, regardless of how irregular, are not a priority concern. The United States has been playing a mediating role in the Nagorno- Karabakh crisis, and finally, in the past year, did condemn the Armenian government for its seizure of Azerbaijani territory.

Such were the events that had unfolded by the time Aliyev had come to power. Whether they were democratic or not is difficult to assess. Public opinion toward most actors was not visible, although it is fair to say that the Azerbaijani public is less concerned with ideological alliances and welcomes immediate assistance from wherever it arrives. One democratic aspect of foreign policy decisions is seen in that all the contracts and agreements that were signed had to pass through Parliament for ratification, signaling some kind of democratic venture took place in Azerbaijan last year.

But while several agreements were ratified by Parliament, many were not implemented. To make matters worse, several of the agreements were rescinded under Aliyev as he claimed he (personally) needed to re-evaluate the proposals. In addition, he announced that all the private contracts with foreign corporations, particularly those involving oil, would be assessed and reaffirmed according to the levels of support that the corporations' motherlands had lent to Azerbaijan. In other words, if there was no help to Azerbaijan coming from various nations' governments, those nations' corporations would get no business deal from Azerbaijan. The suggestion was meant to encourage nations to lend greater support to Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia, but it is

a frivolous tactic as no nation wishes to involve itself beyond moral and mediative support and Aliyev should not expect assistance outside these methods, especially as it can not boast of mutual security guarantees. Azerbaijan could not provide a guarantee for other nations even if it wanted and can hardly expect any nation to ratify a security guarantee with a nation at war. The resistance of Aliyev to consult others or to objectively weigh these considerations suggest that pluralist forms of decision-making in Azerbaijan's foreign policy will not occur during Aliyev's tenure.

Immediately, Aliyev began to negate most of the foreign policy initiatives which had begun under Elchibey. It appeared at first that Azerbaijan would retain its position toward the CIS. This was affirmed in the summer of 1993 by the Deputy Press-Secretary to the President (acting President), who maintained that the CIS was regarded as an "amorphous organization". Aliyev soon turned the tables and began engaging in setting out feelers to Russia to gauge its reaction to Azerbaijan's joining the CIS. Ironically, opinion polls in Baku among the public and the Parliament revealed that under the current situation, a rapprochement with Russia was desired at the time. Part of this decision was inspired by the fact that Russian troops had continued to assist the Armenians as the Russian 7th army remained in Armenia and the Russian Defense Minister announced that two Russian military bases would be placed in Armenia.

This renegotiating of the Russian position was reconfirmed when the decision to withdraw from the ruble zone, a decision made by Parliament under Elchibey, was rescinded. Aliyev, then, a week before the presidential elections, attended a CIS meeting and signed an agreement adhering Azerbaijan to the organization. Later, the decision was again made to withdraw the ruble from circulation, which has helped to slow the quickly rising inflation rate.

Russia immediately attempted to consolidate its position in the region by advancing a joint communiqué, suggesting that the Transcaucasian borders were transparent, Russian forces could be returned to Transcaucasia, and restoration of all transportation links was to begin. The communiqué was rejected on the grounds that it limited the nations' sovereignty, but Russia continued to dig into the region when Russian Energy Minister Yuri Shafranik revealed that the Russian oil company, Lukoil, would be given a stake in the oil deal which had been agreed upon with the Western oil consortium in the beginning of November 1993. The minister also suggested that the oil pipeline, whose route was being decided and which Turkey had been hoping to acquire, should be diverted to Russia using pipes which were already in existence. The Azerbaijani authorities confirmed the report that oil would be given to Russia and the pipeline's route was being reconsidered to include the possibility of sending oil through Russian territory to Europe and beyond, but made no comment to discredit the assertion that the agreement was linked to Russian contributions of forces to assist Azerbaijan in the Nagorno- Karabakh war. In December, the Azerbaijani administration called for the conditional approval of a Russian peace force in the Caucasus. Other nations, including Turkey, will also lend troops to the force.

Opposition members in Azerbaijan claimed that Moscow wished to destabilize the political situation to keep control over Azerbaijan and guarantee its interests in the region. It claimed that anti-Yeltsin forces managed to accomplish this destabilization by backing Husseinov's anti-Elchibey military offensive. Simultaneously, the Russian military was vacillating in its support for Armenia and Azerbaijan. The criticism by the opposition was hushed when the government took over the publications house less than a month later.

Despite Aliyev's rapprochement with Russia, he did not dismiss relations with the other regional actors. Refusing an opportunity would not be characteristic of Aliyev's actions, said one observer, as Aliyev is too shrewd, too "pro-everybody" to alienate any potential clients (7). However, Turkey began to take a more cautious approach toward Azerbaijan. No longer considered the primary protagonist for Azerbaijani causes, Turkey continued to consolidate ties, as was evidenced by Turkish Prime Minister Ciller's meeting with Aliyev during her visit to Moscow in September 1993. However, Turkey remained reluctant to accept Aliyev's return to power, and the Turkish government clearly indicated its opposition to a unilateral Russian peace force in Azerbaijan.

At the same time, Turkey continued to laud the Minsk conference's inactivity. The conference, which had been set up in 1992 as part of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to create a framework for peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, had been making steady headway in creating several agreements. The process, however, was seen to be creating a more "trusting" environment in which to negotiate. Turkey, pinned its hopes on the Minsk process although the agreement has no enforcement mechanism to guarantee compliance to the terms of peace.

In the meantime, Aliyev continued to maintain relations with Turkey by sending an envoy to Ankara to reassure the Turkish administration of its guaranteed stake in the oil deal and Baku's preference for the pipeline construction through Turkey. This was before the Russian energy minister informed the world of the new arrangements that were being negotiated. The envoy also told officials in Ankara that closer relations between Baku and Moscow and Baku and Tehran would not harm bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey. Aliyev himself pronounced that he had worked "night

and day" to build a bridge between Nakhichevan and Turkey. As Nakhichevan was cut off from the rest of Azerbaijan due to the blockade of the region by Armenia, it was necessary to build these bridges with Turkey and Iran, whose contiguous borders with Nakhichevan make them the easiest suppliers of necessary goods. Again it is possible to locate Aliyev's pragmatism in his actions. This was revealed in his latest visit to Ankara where he lauded the country's relationship as being built on "friendship" and "fraternity".

In addition, Aliyev requested from Turkish President Suleyman Demirel the dispatch of arms, ammunition and volunteers to the Azerbaijan war front. The request was followed by the suggestion that Turkey's humanitarian assistance be distributed by government officials in Azerbaijan rather than by Turkey's relief organization, the Red Crescent. Ankara rejected both ideas (8).

Turkey, despite its official links with Baku, seems to be the place where most disenfranchised opposition members come to express their discontent. While opposition members claim Aliyev is losing support and imprisoning his opponents, they have earned little response from Turkey which would suggest Turkey's willingness to investigate the accusations before the situation becomes apparent. Aliyev's relations with Turkey, while based on slight skepticism, will not worsen, as Turkey continues to consolidate its investments and private enterprises in the state.

It has become apparent since Aliyev took power that he values relations with Iran more than Turkey. This is not due to any overwhelming affection for radical Islam but due to the fact that Iran is rich and has lent concrete assistance in times of dire stress, despite Iran's simultaneous assistance to Armenia. Even when Aliyev was the chair of the regional Parliament in Nakhichevan in 1991, he was courting Iran in an attempt to get

assistance for his tiny autonomous republic. Now the affair has grown and, in contrast to Elchibey's policy, Iran has greatly expanded its role in the country.

This expansion is reflected in the increased travel between the two nations by government officials as well as the assistance Azerbaijan has been receiving from Iran.. It is also reflected by the increasing hostilities Iran has felt toward Armenia as Armenian forces encroach the Iranian border. In fact, Iranian newspapers have suggested that Armenia has crossed the figurative and literal line and that they should expect retribution should their actions not be halted soon. The Iranian government's tolerance was further weakened when Armenian forces, after having captured the towns of Fizuli and Dzhebrail in southeast Azerbaijan, began to loot technical and engineering goods which Iran had provided when construction of a dam and its electrical generation began in 1991. Iranian troops have agreed to protect the equipment and the area around the project.

In addition, thousands of Azerbaijani refugees have crowded the border between Iran and Azerbaijan and are attempting to cross into Iranian territory. Iran, in response to the growing needs of the refugee population in Azerbaijan, began building tent cities to accommodate 100,000 displaced persons. The Iranian Red Crescent provided the refugees in the border vicinities with nearly 15,000 tents, 8,000 floor coverings, 6,000 kilograms of nylon, over 70,000 blankets and huge amounts of other goods (4). Iran, in November 1993, also supplied Nakhichevan with 80,000 tons of fuel valued at \$25 million and warm clothing. It was paid for in local goods.

After Aliyev told all the oil companies interested in Azerbaijan's vast reserves that he would have to review the policy arrangements between the nations of the companies, the United States quickly sent a mission affirming U.S. support for Azerbaijan and has

said that it sees Aliyev as attempting to institute democracy. They expressed their hope that he would continue the democratic process started before his tenure began. To further ingratiate themselves, the United States, despite the Freedom Support Act which prohibited direct aid from The United States to Azerbaijan, has sent humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan through the International Red Cross and the U.N. High Commission for Refugees. As Azerbaijan's leader increasingly makes promises to Russia, and the oil contracts have remained static, it remains to be seen whether the West can extract any promises from the Aliyev administration. However, as Azerbaijan continues to lose money and does not succeed in reaching oil production targets, Aliyev or future administrations may opt to grant the oil deals as soon as possible to the Western companies, as they are prepared and capable of extracting, delivering and paying for the oil immediately. An assessment of the requirements for an economic turn-around in Azerbaijan may cause the administration to re-evaluate its methods for awarding contracts. The continuing policy changes may injure Azerbaijan's interests in the long term if it keeps breaking its negotiations at the last moment. Decision-making will require preliminary evaluations before promises are made. Democracy, as well, will better function in a thorough and cautious environment.

Finally, in the war against Armenia, Aliyev has shown little more success than his predecessors. Little progress has been made in resolving the war. Aliyev has rejected the Minsk Conference's latest proposals, claiming that they do not fully incorporate all of Azerbaijan's lands into Armenia's schedule for withdrawal. Armenia, which has a history of rejecting Minsk proposals, signed the resolution. In the meantime, Armenian forces have succeeded in displacing around 1.1 million Azerbaijanis from their homes and Armenia now controls 25 percent of Azerbaijani lands. An agreement is needed which will end armed hostilities and restore order. Refugees will then be able to return to their homes and become economically active, and Azerbaijan can begin its

restoration and democratic experience.

Armenia has also been accused of swapping mental institution patients rather than hostages in a November 1993 exchange of war prisoners. Further, Armenia was also accused of extracting organs from Azerbaijani prisoners of war and selling them to Asian and African markets. This was first reported in the Hong Kong Chronicle and has since been discussed in the international news media (10).

On top of this, while the U.N. Security Council has passed four resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Armenian forces and a cessation of hostilities, the United Nations has resolved little. Azerbaijan's requests were also poorly received in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council's meeting in December 1993. The Azerbaijani delegation proposed that the Cooperation adopt a resolution declaring the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, but the Armenian delegation effectively blocked it.

The introduction of the Armenian currency in Nagorno-Karabakh suggests that Armenia, which has denied direct involvement in the war, has effectively eliminated all Azerbaijan efforts to function in the region. In addition to that, Azerbaijani residents in Nagorno-Karabakh have been removed and the Armenian forces have begun a campaign to remove monuments and graves of Azerbaijan's predecessors in the region in order to cover up any claims that Azerbaijan has a right to the territory. In the face of these tactics, it seems impossible that a compromise can be found. Aliyev has had little effect on reconciling the two sides' interests.

The foreign policy of Azerbaijan has revealed some distinctly convoluted philosophies, and the presence of an authoritarian or a democrat as the national leader does not preclude the fact that little of Azerbaijan's interests can be served under the present state of war. Until this crisis can be overcome, Azerbaijan's policies will

continue to flounder as no effective policy makers have been discovered, as Aliyev continues to assume primary responsibility for all policy without pluralistic discussion, and as nations manipulate the events of the war to achieve policies most favorable to themselves and most detrimental to Azerbaijan. The future viability of Azerbaijan's policy is dependent on the turn of the war's events and the immediate implementation of the stipulations of successfully-completed oil contracts which will bring much-needed revenue to the nation without harming Azerbaijani interests regionally or domestically.

Foreign policy formulation in the future will depend on coordinating domestic policy goals with external influences which can be used to their advantage. The interests of non-governmental organizations which are not directly subject to political authority, will play a role in policy formulation, as well, as leaders work alongside corporations and businesses to prevent contradictory elements from arising between public and private goals. Finally, mechanisms which provide feed-back to leaders about sectoral interests and concerns can be used to adjust policy accordingly as completed contracts are implemented and their results unfold.

Chapter IV: Democracy and Economic Policy in Azerbaijan

Economic Policy Choices in Democratic Systems

Azerbaijan can follow two routes in pursuing its economic policy in a democratic manner. These options are divided by the titles liberal and conservative democracies. Liberal democracy, as derived from liberalism, has taken many shapes since various elements were articulated by thinkers such as de Tocqueville. The beginnings of liberal democracy stressed the dissolution of the aristocratic class and what Thomas Paine believed would be limited government in which rules were subject to popular control. Here, religious freedom, free speech, the abolition of slavery, and the confinement of government functioning to strictly political affairs all embodied Paine's liberal thought. Paine said that the dissolution of the aristocratic class and the positive effects of laissez-faire would provide a "harmony of interests" in which little government intervention was needed. Early liberalism believed in competition and derided efforts toward egalitarian policies, and it received some praise from socialist strands which supported liberalism's advocacy for redistributing income.

Liberalism, however, changed its stripes in the late 19th century when private enterprise was revealing its inability to share the wealth. Liberalism took shape along philosopher John Stuart Mill's theory that the government should induce the moral regeneration of the underclasses and should repair some of the worst effects of free enterprise. Common welfare was seen as an area in which the government should be functioning if it were to represent the entire will of the people. Progressive social trends should become policy. When the government intervened in these areas of social and welfare policy, then liberty would be pursued and a collective approach to increasing participation in the nation's endeavors would be sought.

Participation became a central focus in modern liberal democracies. The role of social groups defining the common good has expanded, providing the grounds for pluralism, in which interest groups compete to achieve their goals. The belief that the population knows just as much as the representative in what is good for the community has prevailed and social groupings have organized themselves to ensure their interests are voiced and receive responses. University of Bremen Professors Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss summed up the role of the public in liberal democracies by saying,

"the role of actors within civil society, both collective and individual, assumes increasing strategic significance for the solution of societal problems. As justice is no longer something that can be implemented through legislation alone, the rule of law must be complemented at the micro-level of the principled action of conscientious citizens (1)."

Offe and Preuss are restating that the role of the citizens in assuming their own future is the central goal of a democracy and the citizen, through participation and not merely representation, should be given primary responsibility. Distributive justice is no longer seen as accommodating every individual complaint and the role of law should be extended to bring every citizen under the umbrella of social, economic and legal reform. When participation is fully appreciated by the government, economic policy can be pursued in a manner that best provides security for each individual in the community.

In contrast to liberal democracy comes a form of governance called conservative democracy. While liberal democracy rests on the belief that all members of a nation should be involved in the political and legislative processes and the goals of these processes should be to ignite mechanisms for social reform and increased welfare, conservative democracy associates itself with economic reform and government noninterference. Conservative democrats claim that government intervention, particularly in the economic field, should be minimal, or that government should provide legislation which deregulates or encourages laissez-faire competition. Both strands of theory rely on the individual but conservatism calls for the individual to act independently of the government while liberalism desires individuals to contrive government actions to increase personal prosperity.

Conservatism traces its historical roots as far back as liberalism, that is, to the post-Enlightenment period of 19th century England. During this era of Enlightenment, the belief was born that people could be liberated from the old order of society's unjust distribution of wealth and moral resources. However, conservatism functioned as a retort to the Enlightened belief that human are equal in personal abilities. Conservatives believed in the established institutions of government and the symbols associated with the greatness of the state, but also believed in limiting the role government should play in administering to the human condition.

In the liberal strand of thinking, people are entrusted with determining their own destinies while encouraging government to institute social reforms. Citizens are also encouraged to play an informed role in government decision-making. Conversely, from the conservative perspective, citizens are encouraged to fend for themselves without the assistance of government institutions or through institutions which encourage personal endeavor. Economic reform should be an individual pursuit. Government interference is

meant to be rolled-backed in order to revive private enterprise. As far as social reform is concerned, conservatives believe that a hierarchical society should exist as people are naturally unequal and to try to equalize them is a mischievous ploy against human nature. Equating the masses with the distinct, talented and privileged minority will deprive everyone of the benefits of the toils of the talented. Allowing the minority room to pursue its own endeavors will allow the most ambitious and capable to rise to leadership to assist in creating a sound economy and a limited constructive government.

Conservatism is not an elitist interpretation of democracy. On the contrary, a central tenet of conservatism is rooted in the philosophy of independence and self-help. People are encouraged to embark on endeavors that will give them greater material comforts as well as intellectual stimuli. Conservatism is very much rooted in the philosophy of the improvement of humankind. It merely states that citizens should channel their energies into improving their lot rather than channeling energy into convincing the government to improve it for them.

In modern conservative doctrine, collectivism is seen as a path which "cramps individual choice and stifles initiative". A conservative democracy will allow free market forces to make the choices on which way society will move. The government's role is to simply curb inflation and keep an eye on the supply of money and the stability of currency. Government also should enforce the law and maintain order against potential social disruptions. In a final role, government should protect the citizens and should encourage behavior (such as free enterprise) which will make the citizen healthy and the nation prosperous and united.

While the two variations of democracy include all aspects of society in their philosophies, it is clear that they consider economics a primary factor in a nation's

development. For a nation to develop according to democratic principles, the variants make clear that all eventualities can be accounted for so as to promote the strength of democracy in any given situation and to satisfy all tastes. The belief that the government can take control over the economy does not mean, however, that the government can exclude the public in creating fiscal instruments for controlled growth. The very notion behind government interaction in economic affairs suggests that the government should provide mechanisms to support the public in trying times, and to create avenues by which the public will benefit from capital accumulation. At no time does liberalism suggest that the government should be the only benefactor to income or should be rewarded for the work the public has performed. In Azerbaijan, a market-based system will not interfere in or limit the earning potentials of the individual and will accelerate the drive away from the past and bring standards by which the largest percentage of society can benefit on their own initiative. After a comfortable standard is reached the government can institute practices which will benefit the disadvantaged members of the community such as the disabled, indigent unemployables and orphans. Azerbaijan can boast of enough resources and human talent that government interference is not required to direct money-making activities and that its role in personal investment and financial expenditure can be reduced.

Opportunities and Choices

One of the strongest sources inducing Azerbaijan's economic revival is its oil production sector. The latest oil contracts with Western oil companies reveal that three of Azerbaijan's main oil wells have the capacity to produce 3 billion barrels of oil. Beside this, Azerbaijan has barely tapped its off-shore oil reserves and has not completed exploration of the Caspian Sea's potential reserves. In addition, one oil well that was not included in the recent oil contracts has a capacity to produce another billion

barrels.

Besides oil, Azerbaijan has several other mineral deposits as well as natural gas. Azerbaijan also has a rich array of temperature zones and climatic conditions which make possible the cultivation of a variety of agricultural products. Azerbaijan also has plenty of room for other industrial and commercial ventures, as it was deprived of developing several markets during the Soviet era.

It is clear that in Azerbaijan today there does not exist a suitable environment for creating sound markets. The macro-economic situation does not look good for the time being. It can be characterized as suffering from a decline in production, soaring inflation, foreign trade problems, the lowering of real wages, financial instability, few enterprise laws and an environmental disaster area. Despite the not so rosy picture, Azerbaijan has great potential. It has a well-developed infrastructure, a highly- educated work force, which is reflective of the nation's 98 percent literacy rate, a diversified agricultural base, considerable oil reserves and a number of viable industries.

The World Bank suggests that the road to reform and a market- based economy will rely on prudent monetary and fiscal policies, the establishment and application of a legal and institutional framework for regulating markets, private sector development, an appropriate trade policy which will support output, the restructuring of enterprises through corporatization and marketization, the establishment of a social safety net and the immediate exploitation of the oil and agricultural sectors (2). Azerbaijan's competitiveness in the world market will rely on its ability to attract foreign investment and capital. This also requires upgrading their banking and financial methods.

Little can be said of Mutalibov's reform process. Economically, Azerbaijan was still tied to the former USSR during his presidency and his inability to orient Azerbaijan toward external sources of trade and attract foreign investment hindered the development of market-based reforms.

However, by maintaining his ties to Russia, Mutalibov was able to extract allocations from the all-union budget totaling five percent of Azerbaijan's 1991 GNP. This caused a surplus of funds in Azerbaijan for that year. Also, Mutalibov, while not creating any legal guarantees for private enterprise can boast of the personal initiative of his constituents. By June 1, 1992, nearly 3,500 private enterprises had registered for licenses. It was under these circumstances that Elchibey began his tenure.

During Elchibey's presidential term, actual reforms started to take place, even though the process was a slow one. The first budget reforms in Azerbaijan were logically enough reforms in the tax structure. His Parliament passed a tax reform which created a 20 percent value-added tax (VAT). An excise tax replaced sales and turnover taxes, a tax on the "physical" person replaced the individual income tax. Several other taxes were implemented until taxes reached 43 percent of the payroll. Taxes were adjusted to inflation. It seemed that these taxes would have generated a lot of revenue for the state to redistribute but Parliament voted to create several exemptions, including a tax exemption for corporations. Even so, the VAT collection totaled 11 percent of gross domestic product in 1992.

In line with Elchibey's anti-Russian position, Azerbaijan attempted to break away from Russia's hold on Azerbaijan's pursuits. Trade with the former Soviet Union republics was halved from 1991 to 1992. Part of this was not due to any policy changes or maneuvering by the Azerbaijani administration at all. Interrepublic payment difficulties,

cuts in energy links and general disarray caused a decrease in trade. The break-up of the Soviet Union also caused shortages in paper, wire, cardboard, foil and other industrial supplies. The disruption was especially detrimental to the supply of bottles and containers, as there are no glass works manufacturers in the republic. Despite these cuts, Azerbaijan's industries still import 70-80 percent of its raw materials from the former USSR. Azerbaijan's markets also import 60-70 percent for consumer supplies and 80-90 percent of manufactured goods (3).

The shortages of glass are not a good sign for Azerbaijan's wine industry. Already struck by several problems such as a limited external market and the uprooting of 70,000 hectares of grapes in the mid-1980s after Gorbachev instituted his anti-alcohol campaign, the wine industry will continue to suffer despite the government's attempts to increase output and attract foreign investment. The grape production has also been severely hindered due to recent gains of Azerbaijani territory by Armenian forces. The wine-producing regions in the southwest can not now be harvested.

Though Azerbaijan continues to export large amounts of fruit, vegetables and flowers to Russia, the agricultural industry is suffering from a decline in real value terms. Yields and quality are below the par of developed nations with similar physical features. An inappropriate economic system and farm manufacturing structures are diverting farmers from focusing their interests on the end product. Outdated farming equipment and the absence of modern technology combined with excessive administration has caused a loss in quantity and value of much of the harvested goods. The World Bank suggests that the Agricultural Ministry needs to be redefined to cater to a market-based economy. The ministry lacks regulatory policies on the grades and standards of merchandise. It also has not developed any pricing and marketing guidelines. Public policy is required to give the ministry a service-orientation and

proper posture for supplying goods to the world market.

Industry, also, is lacking in several of these aspects. Azerbaijan has over 1,000 state-owned enterprises that are over-staffed, employing an average of 430 workers per enterprise.

On the positive side, Azerbaijani industry is very diverse with a portfolio that reveals works in metallurgy, building materials, forest products, woodworking, chemical products and machine construction. It also can boast of a light industry in textiles, carpets and leather. The state enterprises have suffered from a decline in output accompanied by an increasing surplus of goods. Azerbaijan production dropped 10 percent in the first six months of 1993 and had earned 19 billion rubles less than the year before by June 1993. Managers participating in speculation, high inflation, frequent price jumps and the negative real cost of financing can be blamed for the hoarding of products. Reform is still needed in restricting the larger enterprises to make them competitive. This includes changing the legal structure, financing, staffing, technologies and assets of the enterprises.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union left several people and organizations vying for ownership rights. One of the most important reforms that the Elchibey government attempted was the creation of a meaningful land law and a privatization law. Elchibey's government had begun to pass laws regarding privatization. In January 1993, it passed a privatization law which gave the State Property Committee (SPC) the authority to transfer ownership of property. The SPC recommended to Parliament the prices and properties to be privatized, the order and sequence of privatization, the terms for foreign investment in the state properties, the methods to effect the transformations of properties and the use of the funds that are collected from the sales. Auctions of smaller

state enterprises had begun under Elchibey and his administration had wanted to complete privatization by 1996 (4). In addition to privatizing corporations, the government had begun debate on housing privatization, which would allow residents to own the homes in which they lived free of charge. The resolution was defeated and homeowners were allowed to purchase the residences in which they lived. However, the debate signified very democratic undertakings and a concern for reasonable market values of property.

The purchase of housing, however, is easier said than done. The average monthly wage in December 1992 increased 18-fold over the previous December, while the retail price index increased 21.9 fold. Additionally, the amount of currency in circulation increased by more than two-fold while retail prices rose 15-fold (5). The government, facing a severe cash shortage in which to pay salaries, introduced the country's new currency, the manat, in August of 1992. The manat circulation had increased to more than 10 times the ruble circulation by 1993 and was supposed to become the only currency in circulation by August of 1993, but Aliyev rescinded the decision after assuming power and deciding to join the CIS. The finance minister had objected to the decision and was promptly fired in November.

Despite the currency fluctuations, the banking system was facing an extreme overhaul during Elchibey's tenure. The National Bank of Azerbaijan was structuring itself as the Central Bank and was reorganizing itself to end its preoccupation as bookkeeper for the republic and to establish policies to deal with inflation, interest rates and establishing an exchange stabilization fund. Several smaller private banks had opened up and were taking deposits of domestic consumer incomes. Laws had also been passed to establish minimum liquidity requirements.

Although several laws in employment, privatization and foreign investment had been legislated, the Elchibey government had not developed a comprehensive energy policy. Oil deals were made on a first-come first-serve basis and no Energy or Petroleum Ministry existed. The state-owned oil company's status was not legislated and the utilities sector lacked any organization. This may have been the reason Aliyev chose to personally read the impending oil contracts.

Much of the population will suffer in the short term if market reforms are really to stick. In the first six months of 1993, the national income had dropped by 13 percent in comparison to the previous year. The social safety net had shrunk due to inflation from 15 percent to 9 percent from 1991 to 1992. Unemployment, which had been running at 18 percent in mid-July, can be overcome once private enterprises are protected and in place. Despite unemployment figures, 6,000 vacancies were available in Baku in the summer of 1993, as people stalled in taking job offers, possibly waiting for the right opportunities to come along.

Along with Aliyev's promises of democratic initiative and nationalism, he also promised to continue the road to free market-enterprise. Such has not been the case. Firstly, Aliyev postponed the signing of the oil contracts and replaced the president of SOCAR. Then, he claimed that amateurs were responsible for the decline in oil production. Afterward, he said that oil is a state enterprise and there was no room for commercial interests. He later softened his tone as he signed a \$7.5 billion oil deal with the Western consortium led by American oil company Amoco. The consortium agreed to pay \$250 million when Parliament ratified the deal and another \$250 million when the pipeline route is decided. Azerbaijan was expected to earn \$94 billion from the deal. Aliyev, as previously stated, then linked the continuation of the contract with the relationships between companies' nation-states.

Under Aliyev, the government instructed bread producers to design a method to balance the price of bread. Bread, which had been subsidized by the state, was being sold at a lower cost than it was being produced. Aliyev remedied this by raising the price of bread 800 times. He raised the price through a decree which said the previous subsidies were not "in the interests of the economic use of bread by the population". In the same breath, he decreed an increase in the price of fuel by 650 percent, and increases in electric power and natural gas prices for the population.

The economic situation for the public at large continued to decline under Aliyev, while he continued to retain the reigns of industry in his hands. To soften the blow of the bread increases, Aliyev raised salaries by 80 percent. Before the raise, the average salary in June and July had been R20,000 while the minimum consumer budget was averaged at R24,000-25,000. The poverty line was marked at R5,000.

The state also could not afford to pay government worker salaries as it lacked the available cash. To remedy the salary debt crisis, the Azeri International Bank began to sell U.S. dollars for 400 manats to the dollar in the end of November. The price had been 210 manats to the dollar a week before. The National Bank soon undertook the same method in order to increase its supply of manats.

As the economic situation worsened in Azerbaijan under Aliyev's tenure, he declared by decree in December that the administration of the foreign currency reserve would be handled by the republic's Cabinet of Ministers, the group chaired by the head of state, in other words, Aliyev. Aliyev said the measure was taken to make more effective use of the country's export potential and foreign currency reserves. He then announced that the manat would become the only currency of the nation by January 1, 1994, reversing his earlier decision.

During these events, the State Adviser on Economic Policy Issues announced in December that the budget deficit had reached R200 billion or R80 billion more than had been set by Parliament for 1993. The larger than planned deficit was attributed to the inflation rate which had not been calculated into the projected deficit. The adviser blamed the deficit as a whole and inflation in particular on the war with Armenia (6).

In December, the Azerbaijan Trade Union Council announced that the average monthly wage had reached R25,000 or just over half of the average consumer's monthly expenses. Inflation was registered by the council at 32 percent in October and 70 percent in November (7). An opinion poll suggested that Azerbaijanis were more concerned about the war than food supplies, but as the situation worsens, discontent over Aliyev's war conduct is increasing.

Besides the obvious worsening of economic conditions, which started under Elchibey due to the war, many of the laws passed on privatization have been frozen under Aliyev. One informed observer says that Aliyev's freezing these laws may have to do with his fear of higher prices and growing unemployment. This would suggest that Aliyev is concerned about public opinion. Almost certainly he realizes that people power does exist among the public. Entrepreneurs who claimed that Elchibey's appointees were asking for bribes still complain of racketeering among the police, bribery and corruption in the Aliyev regime.

As if Azerbaijan's problems were not enough, there exists another problem which all regimes have failed to remedy and which will take years to overcome. The environment continues to be degraded by industrial waste and neglect. In 1989, the first secretary of the Azerbaijan Writers' Union said that air pollution in Baku was 12 times higher than any other Soviet city, that morbidity levels were rising, and that the Caspian

Sea is receiving untreated sewage and oil sediment that is being discharged by petroleum industries in Baku and Sumgait. The Minister of Health at that time said an average 40kgs of pesticide was being used on each hectare of cotton and vegetable lands and an average 183kgs per hectare was being applied in grape-producing regions. Anemia rates for children under 14 were 2.5 times the average rate for the Soviet Union and 40 percent of women in Sumgait between the ages of 20 and 34 are reported sterile (8).

In Sumgait, petroleum products and phenols being dumped into the Caspian Sea were respectively 7-10 and 14-17 times higher than maximum permissible levels authorized by the Azerbaijan State Commission for Ecology. One in four children in Sumgait is born with abnormalities and the child mortality rate exceeds the republic average by 20-25 percent. Damage done in the past 40 years was estimated at R35 million in 1990 prices (9). Inflation since then has averaged 800-1,300 percent a year.

The PFA in 1989 pledged its commitment to cleaning up the environment and during Elchibey's term several laws were passed on protecting the environment and enforcing penalties against violators. The Committee for the Ecology has developed monitoring systems and has been updating environmental impact assessments, but the picture is bleak for the short term and it would be fatal to interrupt the beginning clean-up process. A market-based economy may have a positive impact on the environment if prices for natural resources reflect the cost of their extraction using "clean" methods.

It appears from the previous discussion that Azerbaijan has a very clear path to follow if it wishes to restore its economy, provide a better life and environment for its citizens and increase its influence in the world market. The World Bank and IMF proposals will not work under a command economy. As long as Russia continues to

liberalize, Azerbaijan too will be forced to liberalize as its economy for the time being is totally structurally dependent on Russia's. If reform laws can be implemented which give Azerbaijan stable ground on which to open its trade with other markets, it will be well on the road to recovery. This must be accompanied by a well-managed fiscal policy that coherently and systematically controls inflation through the sale of enterprises. Enterprises must first become competitive through restructuring and eliminating waste. In addition, strong and clearly-defined liberalization, ownership and privatization laws will allow citizen initiative in opening businesses. All of this, however, is preceded by the need for foreign investment as the country can not receive direct loans. The World Bank estimates that an immediate \$50 million investment is necessary for technical assistance to design an effective reform program. The World Bank has prescribed the reforms. If these reforms are faithfully pursued, the International Monetary Fund will develop a loan and grant system with which to conduct reform. The point is, if Azerbaijan wishes to benefit from these institutions, it must reform, and orient economic policies toward a market-based system. Aliyev's recent conduct does not indicate a positive and democratically-oriented future for Azerbaijan's economy, as he refuses to release control by the state over most enterprises and limits potential earnings through this monopolization of resources.

Chapter V: Conclusions

In Azerbaijan, several policy-management crises exist, namely political-institutional confusion, economic downturn and war. The Azerbaijani administrations have developed four mechanisms to deal with these crises, namely the replacement of regimes, the adoption of nominal institutional and legal instruments, the affiliation and alliance with foreign nations and the revamping of economic policies.

None of these mechanisms have succeeded in making use of public input. Only in the attempt at overthrowing President Mutalibov has public initiative been actively sought.

During the Mutalibov regime, we see adherence to the old political system, that of the one belonging to the Soviet Union. Mutalibov did little to respond to public desires, except the extraordinary task of allowing the government to secede from the Soviet Union. This task was inevitable, however, as the Soviet Union was already collapsing under its own weight. He was also guaranteed a future political career in the emerging system. In the realm of institutional restructuring, Mutalibov's Parliament continued to be based on a Communist structure that predated independence. Furthermore, while a democratic constitution was devised during his tenure, (of which we can offer him little credit) he was elected President in a less than democratic one-person contest. The refusal of the opposition to participate suggests two things. The first is that Mutalibov was amiable to that situation. No protest from him against the anti-democratic nature of the election was heard. The second assumption is that the public, and in particular the opposition parties, have not really learned what democracy means. Instead of performing a grass-roots level campaign, using methods such as door-to-door and telephone campaigns, much in the way the Chilean opposition did to defeat Pinochet,

the Azerbaijani opposition merely remained silent and waited. Participation and mobilization of the masses are not high priorities or necessarily understood concepts. It appears that mobilization must be a self-propelled phenomenon.

If this is the case, it can be assumed that political parties are not really accountable for the mass demonstrations that occurred to oust Mutalibov, although they may have lent an impetus. It was more likely the public's mass disaffection with Mutalibov's administration over the pace of economic reform, his softness toward the war and his adherence to Russia and the conservative, outdated method of governing which forced public reaction. The contention that political parties have little impact over mobilizing the masses is reaffirmed when the way in which Aliyev was restored to power is observed. When Elchibey was being threatened by a military overthrow, the public looked the other way to express their dissatisfaction at the current regime. Their inaction reveals the very limited understanding of democratic movements and behavior. Aliyev's appearance as a supporter of democratic values, portrayed in his staging a referendum and a "free and fair" election, merely reaffirmed his de facto assumption of power. The election was likely more for the international democratic community's benefit than for any promotion of democracy at home.

If it is assumed that the population will respond when it feels its interests are greatly threatened, we can suggest that there is a place in their schema for democracy. As it stands, however, it appears that the public places democracy secondary to welfare on their priority list, as they act only when their personal welfare is jeopardized. Of course, this is "normal". We can expect that basic needs must be met before people partake in higher pursuits such as philosophical expressions on the nature of politics. The only fear that should exist in this situation is that by allowing authoritarianism to exist in society, it is possible that the population's welfare will never improve, as addressing mass

interests and redistributing the wealth is inimical to authoritarian control.

Furthermore, the institutions which favor democracy are limited in Azerbaijan. The latest election can be cited as evidence to this fact. After the last election, Aliyev promised to hold new parliamentary elections. The elections have not yet been conducted. Furthermore, Aliyev's replacing ministers, deciding bread prices, and instituting currency conversion by decree do not suggest that the Parliament is functioning correctly. Above and beyond this, the elimination of the opposition press through the placing of the publishing house under presidential control further suggests that democratic institutions in the country are lacking. This is compounded by the fact that several opposition party officials have been arrested on questionable or spurious charges. It will take quite an overhaul of the system to institute mechanisms associated with democratic society during the Aliyev regime.

Granted Azerbaijan is in a state of war, but this did not prevent the emergence of a free press under Elchibey, the discreet but continuous functioning of the Parliament. At the same time, the delegation of several committees to review and revise laws and create proposals for alleviating some of the major catastrophes of the Azerbaijan economy and ecology continued unhindered. In the June 7, 1992, elections that brought Elchibey to power, the Parliament was also elected, which reveals that the public was interested in obtaining some form of representation in the legislature. It has yet to be seen if Aliyev will allow the public to reaffirm or redesignate its choice of representatives.

The major drawback of democracy is a problem that is also familiar in Azerbaijan. Little evidence can be found to support the idea that democracy exists in the conduct of foreign policy. Mutalibov's alliance with Russia was obviously antithetical to the

popular will of the time as the country had just split with the Soviet Union's republics. Yet Mutalibov continued to support the ties between the two emerging nations.

Elchibey, too can be questioned for his approach to foreign policy. While it was clear that the Azerbaijanis carry warm thoughts for their Turkish neighbor, it seems that many members of the population favored creating ties with Iran. Iran, which shares a common religion and which contains a huge Azerbaijani minority, would logically be a welcome ally. Although Azerbaijan is composed of a fairly secular body-politic, whereas Iran is led by fundamentalist forces, the two nations would seem to be likely friends. Yet Elchibey expressed much resentment toward Iran.

Aliyev adopted a pro-Russian position at the same time the population made a pragmatic decision that it needed Russia as a lever against Armenia. However, this is more likely coincidental than any plan by Aliyev to use pluralistic measures to adopt policy or to formulate foreign policy according to an express consensus. It is not clear whether he was aware of public sentiment at the time he made the decision.

Finally, in the economic sphere, we can detect that Mutalibov was at least slightly considerate of the public mood in allowing the emergence of private enterprise. However, there is little record of policy making which confirms that he was a supporter of economic reform to benefit the public's interest.

Elchibey was definitely interest-oriented in creating a conscientious economic policy. His consultations with committees and creation of privatization, housing, civil service and environmental laws, none of which were created by decree, reveal an honest commitment to his nation. Clearly, these actions reflect the closest links to a democratic philosophy of which Azerbaijan can claim. The trend toward creating market reforms

was commendable, but the war overshadowed the progressive reforms which had been passed in Parliament.

By all indications, President Aliyev is not a proponent of market-based economies and as he aggregates and consolidates his power in the nation, Azerbaijan's growth, it appears, will be stunted. Abolishing subsidies, controlling the monetary policy initiatives, and wavering on oil policies, coupled with freezing the privatization policies passed during Elchibey's tenure reveal that Aliyev wishes to acquire as much control over the properties, resources and wealth of the state. His monopolizing control over the major industries and ministries suggests a backlash against the economic reforms and a worsening situation for the Azerbaijani public. In the meantime, he is not planning solid reforms with the aim of assisting the public or improving welfare.

Aliyev was the republic's dictator for 13 years. There is no reason to believe that just because he has said that he has changed, that he really has changed. It would be difficult for a perfect child of the Soviet system to reject that system, even in the light of *glasnost*.

The war, above all, continues to remain the pre-eminent crisis. Whether a peaceful settlement can be found will help to decide the direction of the present and future regimes. Numbers of soldiers have deserted their posts. Aliyev has decreed strong punishment for those deserters. He has also called up the drafting of men as old as fifty. While this is a young age in peace, in a war, the physical restrictions are obvious. The action reveals that the situation in Azerbaijan is desperate. All the U.N. resolutions and mediation in the world do not appear to be finding a solution. It is obvious that Azerbaijan should not give up its claim. First of all, it would signal a lack of sovereignty to pass over land to any nation which wants to stake a claim. Secondly, Azerbaijan has a

legal and historical right to that region. Armenia's desire to create a "Greater Armenia", perhaps to make up for all the lost years of being a nation without a state, is ill-conceived. It can not just impose its will on other countries and expect to be rewarded. Other states are trying to realize their interests in Azerbaijan but they know that overt force is not the proper mechanism. Azerbaijan has also only acted in defense of its territory and that is all it can do for if it attempts to attack Armenian territory, it will lose its status as the injured party which it is using to gain assistance. The situation begs a solution, which can only be regarded as the withdrawal of Armenian troops. However, Armenian objections to withdrawal are proving a formidable obstacle.

In any event, the Republic of Azerbaijan needs a powerful government to cope with the crisis. This does not require, however, an authoritarian government. If Azerbaijanis value democracy, they will prevent this from occurring. Aliyev is consolidating his power, but he is losing popularity. Electricity is lacking, housing is limited and the problem is growing because of the number of refugees flooding the urban centers. People in Azerbaijan have begun to assess their situation and make comparisons between the two latest regimes. It is likely that an organized opposition like the PFA in 1989 could win the next election. A peaceful transition could be possible if elections are held. This is not likely, although the issue of Parliamentary elections will be put on the agenda in the spring. If a new, stronger, cohesive Parliament comes to power, it could turn Aliyev's hand and force him to cooperate with the legislature. If not, Aliyev will continue to amass power.

It appears that any successful government in the future will have to be based on a coalition of parties and interests. If it does not cause a deadlock, a coalition will be the only way for a consensus and a democratic government to emerge under these very trying times. Azerbaijan is dominated by local clan or "mafia" organizations in which

power is left in the hands of a few individuals. This has to be overcome through a power-sharing agreement. The government must direct the way by providing an example as well as enforcement.

Finally, if Azerbaijan is going to find a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, it will rely on the administration granting a high degree of local autonomy and self-rule. This plan will need decentralization as well as economic and political freedom to occur. Decentralization and economic and political freedom are democratic by nature. This would suggest that a solution to the war could also become a solution to the many other crises which exist in Azerbaijan. For now, however, the presidents and the public in Azerbaijan are willing to resort to nondemocratic methods to achieve their goals. This can easily provide the opportunity for a return to institutionalized authoritarianism, but can be avoided by a concerted effort to increase individual respect for democracy's principles. Democracy can also be encouraged through the granting of greater freedoms to the individual and enhanced communication and organization among several competing but conciliatory actors.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE:

1. Constitutions may exist in nondemocratic countries as well, but their creation is often arbitrary and a means to justify and legalize the indiscriminate acts of authoritarian leaders. Raymond Aron, Democracy & Totalitarianism (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 234-235.
2. Georg Sorenson, Democracy and Democratization: Dilemmas in Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 12.
3. Raymond Aron, Democracy & Totalitarianism (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 71-72.
4. For a more comprehensive discussion on voting processes and outcomes, an exhaustive discussion has been written by Iain McLean. Iain McLean, "Forms of Representation and Voting Systems" in Political Theory Today, ed. David Held (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 172-196.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO:

1. "Azerbaijan: A Profile," Central Asia And The Caucasus In World Affairs 8, (August 1993): 3. The Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, The Republic of Azerbaijan (Washington, D.C.: The Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1993), 7. For a more comprehensive history of the Azerbaijanis under dynastic rule, see Audrey L. Alstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity Under Russian Rule (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1992), 1-7.
2. "Azerbaijan: A Profile," Central Asia and the Caucasus in World Affairs 8, (August 1993): 4. The Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, The Republic of Azerbaijan (Washington, D.C.: The Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1993), 7.
3. Tadseuz Swietochowski, Russia and a Divided Azerbaijan (forthcoming), 101.
4. Audrey L. Alstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1992), 96, 105-107.
5. Paul A. Goble, "Nationalism, Movement Groups and Party Formation," in Perestroika From Below: Movements in the Soviet Union, eds. Judith B. Sedaitis and Jim Butterfield (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 165-174.
6. During Akhundov's 10-year rule, industrial labor productivity, overall industrial production and growth of "national" income ranked twelfth, fourteenth and twelfth respectively in all-union figures. Expansion was also limited by meeting technological needs for gaining highly-trained personnel. Between 1950 and 1978 the annual gross industrial output rose 7.4 percent in Azerbaijan, a figure below Georgia and Armenia and lagging behind the all-Union figures based on per-capita gains. Private agriculture, on the other hand, exceeded the all-union levels so that 28 percent of Azerbaijan's total agricultural output and two-fifths of its employment in this sector were provided by the cooperative farms. John P. Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 193-194. Robert L. Nichols, "Transcaucasia and the Nationality Question" in The Soviet Union & The Challenge of the Future, Vol. 3, Ideology, Culture and Nationality, eds. Alexander Shtromas and Morton A. Kaplan (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 509-526.
7. In the first five years of Aliyev's tenure, the industrial labor productivity, overall industrial production and the growth of "national" income rates rose to the fourth, sixth

and fourth rankings among all the union republics. Aliyev focused on labor and agricultural production and drew attention to the weak service sector and the underutilized materials and resources. Azerbaijan became the major grape producer of the region and Baku received its first air-conditioning plant, among other developments. John P. Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 214-215. Audrey L. Alstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1992), 180-181.

8. Luckily, Soviet citizens only spent one third of their wages on household expenses during this time as rent and utilities were state subsidized. Also, in 1980, one tenth of Soviet families owned cars and 80 percent of Muscovites owned telephones, which was the largest ratio of phones to people in the union. See G.E. Schroeder, "Soviet Living Standards in Comparative Perspective" in Quality of Life in the Soviet Union, ed. Horst Herlemann (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 13-30.

9. Murray Yanowitch, Controversies In Soviet Socialist Thought: Democratization, Social Justice and the Erosion of Official Ideology (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1991), 137.

10. Nur Bilge-Criss, "Dynamics of Conflict: Armenia-Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast" Paper Presentation at the First European Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution, Antalya, Turkey, April 24-27, 1992.

11. Ada W. Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change," American Political Science Review 86 (4), 1992, 857-874.

12. "Azerbaijanis Protest President's Restoration," The New York Times, 17 May 1992, p. 8. "Azerbaijan Communists Yield to Nationalists," The New York Times International, 20 May 1992, sec. A p. 12.

13. David Remmek, "The *Perestroika* Pariah," The Washington Post, 17 February 1990, pp. 1, 7, 8.

14. "Ex-K.G.B. Aide Grabs Helm in Baku," The New York Times, 19 June 1993, sec. A p. 3.

15. "Azerbaijan Chief Fights Rebellion," The New York Times International, 15 June 1993, sec. A p. 9.

16. "President Aliyev Discusses Karabakh War with Opposition Parties", BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, Former USSR, 22 November 1993, sec. SU/1852 p. F1.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE:

1. Melvin Small and J. David Singer's discovery that democracies fight as often as nondemocracies refuted the widely-held belief forwarded by Joseph Schumpeter and supported by R.J. Rummel. These scholars held that the more libertarian a state, the less inclined the population is in supporting a war which only benefits a minority of the members of that society. The observation first made by Dean Babst in 1964 reaffirmed Schumpeter's and Rummel's assertion. He emphasized that "Constitutionally secure liberal states" do not fight wars with one another. See Georg Sorenson, Democracy and Democratization: Dilemmas in Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 92-93. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Globalism, Pluralism, 2d ed. (New York, MacMillan Publishing Company, 1992), 263-266.

2. "Angry Azerbaijanis Impel Chief to Quit," New York Times International, 7 March 1992, sec. L p. 3.
3. Theodore Karasik, Azerbaijan, Central Asia and the Future Persian Gulf Security (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1993), 26.
4. Daniel Sneider, "Warming Azeri-Turkish Relations Pose Challenge to Russia and Iran," The Christian Science Monitor, 11 June 1992, pp. 1,4.
5. Daniel Sneider, "Warming Azeri-Turkish Relations Pose Challenge to Russia and Iran," The Christian Science Monitor, 11 June 1992, pp. 1, 4.
6. Jaihun Mollazade, Interview by Sharon Kehnemui, 6 January 1994, Virginia-Ankara, Turkey.
7. Zeynep Taymas, Interview by Sharon Kehnemui, 6 September 1993, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
8. "Azerbaijani President Requests Weapons and Volunteers from Turkey," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 December 1993, sec. SU/1869 p. F1.
9. Iran also provided to the refugees 8,200 lanterns, 8,000 sets of utensils, 40,000 rolls of garments, 14 tankers of drinking water, 1,136,000 kg of foodstuffs and 53,000 kg of soap, shampoo and detergents. "Iranian Agency Gives Details of Iranian Aid to Azerbaijani Refugees," BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts: Former USSR, 30 November 1993, sec. SU/1859 p. F7.
10. "Azerbaijani POW Organs Sold in Asia," Star-TV, Channel 8, 25 November 1993, Ankara, Turkey

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR:

1. Offe Claus and Ulrich K. Preuss, "Democratic Institutions and Moral Resources," in Political Theory Today, ed. David Held (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 165-166.
2. All these prescriptions are based on the assumption that Azerbaijan will overcome the Nagorno-Karabakh war. When it does, and in turn, political stability can prevail, then it will become creditworthy enough to borrow. (Zeynep Taymas, ed.), Azerbaijan Country Economic Memorandum: From Crisis to Sustained Growth (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1993), 19.
3. "Azerbaijan," Central Asia and the Caucasus in World Affairs 7, (July 1993): 8, 11.
4. (Zeynep Taymas, ed.), Azerbaijan Country Economic Memorandum: From Crisis to Sustained Growth (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1993), 50.
5. (Zeynep Taymas, ed.), Azerbaijan Country Economic Memorandum: From Crisis to Sustained Growth (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1993), 6.
6. "Azerbaijani Deficit Reaches R200 bn," BBC World Monitoring Service, Former USSR, 11 December 1993, sec. SU/1869 p. F1.
7. "Azerbaijanis More Concerned About Defense Than Economic Problems," BBC World Monitoring Service, Former USSR, 21 December 1993, sec. SU/1877, p. F1.
8. Ziegler, C.E., "Environmental Politics and Policy Under Perestroika," in Perestroika From Below: Movements in the Soviet Union, eds. Judith B. Sedaitis and Jim Butterfield (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 113-132.
9. "Azerbaijan," Central Asia and the Caucasus in World Affairs 7, (July 1993): 10.

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