

THE EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC POLITICS
IN TURKEY ALONG THE MSP - PP LINE:
CHANGE OR CONTINUITY?

A Thesis

Submitted to the Department of
Political Science

and

Public Administration
of Bilkent University

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement
for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by

Alper Akın

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I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the present study is to describe changes and continuities in the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, NSP)-Prosperity Party (Refah Partisi, PP) line in the period through 1970 to 1990 at the level of ideological posture, political discourse and electoral support base.

In doing this, I tried to emphasize,—taking the great political and economic changes Turkish society experienced in the 1980 decade and the way these changes were reflected in and accommodated by the NSP-PP line as the starting point,—that since the NSP-PP line has based itself on cultural cleavages,—mainly religious-based,—obtaining within Turkish society, its ideological posture in its essentials has remained outside the scope of changes resulted from functional (economic) cleavages, although the sources of its political appeal as well as its political discourse have undergone contextual accommodations.

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye'deki İslamî Hareket'in Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP)-Refah Partisi (RP) çizgisi etrafında cisimleşen oluşumunun 1970'ten 1990'a uzanan zaman kesiti içinde yaşadığı değişim ve sürekliliği ideoloji, söylem ve siyasî destek tabanı açısından incelemektir.

Bunu yaparken, 1980 sonrasında Türkiye'de siyaset hayatının ve ekonomik düzenin yaşadığı köklü dönüşümün ve bunun toplumsal yansımalarının RP'nin ideolojik konumunu ve programını etkileyiş şeklini temel alarak, Türkiye toplumundaki kültürel bölünmelere,—esas olarak dine, göre tavır alan seçmen tabanının oluşturduğu kesime seslenen MSP-RP çizgisinin fonksiyonel (ekonomik) bölünmelerin dikte ettiği değişimlerden ancak bağlamsal düzeyde etkilendiğini, ideolojik yöneliminin bu değişimlerin kapsamı dışında kaldığını ortaya koymaya çalıştım.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to express my acknowledgements to especially Assoc. Prof. Jeremy Salt for his valuable stimulation and encouragements at the start of the process. I am also grateful to Prof. Metin Heper, Dr. Omer Faruk Genckaya and Dr. Muberra Yuksel, the members of my thesis commitee.

I would also like to thank my friend, Muhammed Ozdemir, who patiently typed my handwritings.

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INTRODUCTION

Great changes have occurred in the socio-economic conditions and cultural as well as political life of Turkey throughout the 1980s. While state-society relations have undergone an authoritarian restructuring in line with the view that “Turkey’s recent political ills are not those of repression, but of excess of expression”⁽¹⁾, the transition to an outward-oriented growth strategy with an heavy emphasis on the “self-help” ideology of the classical liberalism has transformed the traditional social fabric such that economic issues were entrenched on top of the agenda of the “man in the street”. As a counter-reaction to the pre-1980 hyperpoliticisation of society, the rhetoric of law and order, on the other hand, has dominated the political scene and proved to be quite influential in the depoliticisation of the masses.

Another very important development in this decade was the implementation of the official Islamization policies in order to take the activism of the Islamic movement under state control. The challenge of the increasing visibility of Islam at every level of individual and social existence was met with the “diluted” and “secularized” Islam of the state. In this context, the ruling Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, MP), which incorporated many ex-members of the defunct National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, NSP), including the prime minister Turgut Özal himself, successfully coopted the cadres and the clientele of the NSP.

Against this background, the socio-political stand of the Prosperity Party (Refah Partisi, PP), the apparent heir to the NSP, may have been influenced from the above-mentioned developments. At least, the characteristic features of its political appeal may have assumed a new colouration. In a political atmosphere in which the most rigid and orthodox ideological parties of the Marxist left in Turkey have experienced drastic transformations,—the Turkish United Communist Party is a case in point, the Islamic politics of the NSP-PP line, too, might feel the need to adopt itself to the new socio-political setting of the 1980s. As one of the leading figures of the PP observed:

“To be sure, the present society is different from that of the past. The world has entered a new era of technology... If that is the case, then the present-day parties, too, must be differ-

ent from those of the past. For the party is an organization created by those people who commit themselves to the provision of all social needs. It is not possible for the Prosperity Party, to be a replica of the past parties... Yet, we can not isolate ourselves from the past, either."⁽²⁾

Thus, to trace the evolution of the NSP-PP line in terms of the unfolding of its ideological posture as well as its political cadres and electoral base may show the extent to which the socio-economic changes have been reflected and internalized by it. The present thesis will dwell on the assertion that since the NSP-PP line is basically a political reflection of the cultural cleavages centered around the elite-mass dichotomy in Turkish society, a primary restructurization along the functional cleavages is not possible for it as long as the cultural ones endure. Yet, the functional cleavages, too, have been incorporated into the political discourse of the NSP-PP line as far as they are in consonant with its ideological orientation.

In the political literature concerned, the various aspects of the NSP has been analyzed by a number of the students of Turkish politics. Some of the questions dealt within the context of the NSP in these studies were: 1) What is the role of religion in the political behaviour of the Turkish electorate? Does the religious appeal by itself is enough for a political party to survive the electoral competition?⁽³⁾; 2) Is a political party aiming at the establishment of an Islamic state incompatible with democratic practices? Was the NSP a threat to Turkish democracy? Can an Islamic Party such as the NSP create serious problems for Turkish democracy in the future?⁽⁴⁾; 3) The NSP is both for industrialization and traditional Islamic values. To what extent are these two aims compatible with each other?⁽⁵⁾. Yet, none specifically has dealt with the question of political change in terms of Islamic politics of the NSP-PP line. How is political change understood in the Islamic context? How did the PP react to the above-mentioned post-1980 developments in Turkish politics, mainly the authoritarian reconstruction of state-society relations, transition to free market economy and the implementation of official Islamisation policies. In view of the PP's stance toward these developments, can one say that it is an exact replica of the NSP or not? If so, why? If not, why not? Thus, this study aims at forging an overall political landscape of Islamic politics organized at the level of political party in Turkey, with spe-

cial reference to the commonalities and differences in the NSP-PP line regarding its ideological posture, party programme, political discourse and electoral support base.

The first chapter deals with the making of Islamic politics in post-1980 Turkey, which was, to an important extent, characterized by the main parameters upon which the NSP-PP line has evolved. In this context, the major characteristics of the post-1980 Islamic movement, its sources and power base alongside the prospects for “political Islam”⁽⁶⁾ in Turkey were searched.

The second chapter dwells upon the interaction between the NSP-PP line and the other conservative and radical Islamic formations. Specifically, it focuses on the evolution of the political competition between the NSP-PP line and the center-right parties,—Justice Party of the 1970s and the Motherland Party of the 1980s, respectively, the impact of the rise of the “revolutionary” Islam on the relatively moderate stand of the NSP-PP line and its increasing Islamic universalism.

The last chapter tackles the ideological stand of the NSP-PP line called the “National Outlook”. While focusing on this it, at the same time, compares the electoral performance of the NSP and the PP. But, since the PP has not managed to enter the National Assembly yet, the governmental performance of the NSP-PP line remains outside the scope of this study.

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- (2) Tanıl Bora, Interview with Hasan Aksay, *Yeni Gündem*, (July 16-31, 1985), p. 14.
- (3) Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981) chapter V.
- (4) Türker Alkan, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey", in Metin Heper and Raphael Disraeli, eds., *Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1984), pp. 79-102.
- (5) Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Türkiye'de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası: MSP Örnek Olayı* (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1985).
- (6) The terms "political" or "radical" Islam used throughout the thesis denote only a difference in the degree of Islamic consciousness among Muslims. Otherwise, the view espoused in this thesis regarding the use of these labels is in agreement with the following observation: "The terms fundamentalist or radical used by orientalists to isolate the groups aiming to establish an Islamic way of life with an all-inclusive socio-political system, from the ordinary Muslim population can not explain the increasing Islamic response to the Western way of thought and life". See Ahmed Davudoğlu, *The Impacts of Alternative Weltanschauungs on Political Theories: A Comparison of Tawhid and Ontological Proximity* Unp. Ph.D. Dissertation (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University, 1990), p. 2. In line with this observation, the term "Islamic reassertion" was used in this study to refer to the phenomenon of the "increasing visibility of Islam" instead of "Islamic resurgence" or "Islamic revival".

"It is strongly possible that not in a too distant future, Islam would become the only ideal, the only ideology of our people. Ataturkism, laicism, and nationalism would possibly become ineffective against Islamic activism and the ideologies dominating the current parties would vanish under the pressure of the Islamic ideology."

—Talat S. Halman
Milliyet, June 22, 1987.

1. THE MAKING OF ISLAMIC POLITICS IN POST-1980 TURKEY

In order to have a fuller grasp of the commonalities and the differences between the Islamic politics of the defunct NSP of the 1970s and the apparent heir to it, the PP of the 1980s, their sources of appeal, their power base and their successes and failures, one need to trace the evolution of the Turkish political system, particularly in the last two decades that witnessed the emergence of political Islam in the form of a political party strictly operating within the legal-secular framework of the party politics. Such an historical approach would shed some lights on the continuities in the NSP-PP line and at the same time show to what extent its ideological posture and social programme have reflected the socio-political, cultural and economic changes Turkish society underwent throughout those years. With this purpose in mind, let us now briefly sketch the political and ideological environment within which Turkey found itself in the last decades, starting first with the post-1980 era, which was characterized by the rise of Islam in politics not only in Turkey, but also all over the Muslim world.

A. Growing Influence of Islam

The agenda of Turkish politics in the 1980s was partially characterized by increasing manifestations of radical Islam⁽¹⁾ in almost every levels of society: from the newly-born Muslim bourgeoisie comprising mostly lower and middle level traders and industri-

alists and intelligentsia to the bureaucracy and mass media apart from the increasing observance of Quranic injunctions at the personal level. In a way, like in the 1950s, Turkey witnessed the return of Islam, “the invisible cloth worn by people”⁽²⁾, once again, but this time with a “novel and original challenge”⁽³⁾, presenting itself as an alternative system to the secular ideologies of both the left and the right, which clearly reflected the changing balance of political forces and ideologies, the most important of which being the exhaustion of the state-sponsored Kemalism⁽⁴⁾. Atatürk’s vision of modern science performing the function of a “civic religion” and of secular nationalism based on ethnic and linguistic loyalties could not be a substitute for Islam. As Mardin observed:

“The inability of Atatürk’s educational reform to reach the rural masses left a blank in their understanding of social reality, which became critical as social change mobilized large numbers of them. Kemalism neither had an extensive explanation of how social justice was to be achieved nor did it provide a more general ethical underpinning of society by drawing its social principles out of a credible ideology. The republic created this ethical vacuum in a society where religious and ethical commands had been important. The inability of Kemalism to provide a social ethos that appealed to the heart as well as to the mind was more disorienting than would appear at first sight”⁽⁵⁾.

The substitution of secular nationalism for Islam led to the dislocation of traditional code of behaviour providing individuals with a “map of world” in which they knew how to behave or what to do in various instances of their everyday life., e.g., in cases of birth, death, marriage and the like. This state of affairs created an ethical vacuum which was filled in by folk Islam in the countryside while leading to the “crises of culture” among the educated⁽⁶⁾. Being aware of this ethical vacuum prevailing in the conduct of the personal behaviour, the ruling Kemalist military junta of the 1980-1983 period made extensive use of Islamic symbolism with the purpose of showing how much modern, open to progress Islam was. Thus the leader of the junta,—later the president of Turkey (1982-1989), Kenan Evren, at times cited verses from the Quran so as to justify the points he made when he addressed people with the intention of making Islam functional in the integration as well as modernization of society without compromising his secular stance⁽⁷⁾. To assess the military’s stance toward Islam—which would be taken up in more details later on, in the con-

text of the present strength of radical Islam, it is important to outline some of the major achievements of political Islam in the social and political life of Turkey in the 1980s.

During the last decade, radical⁽⁸⁾ Islamic activities in Turkey have discernibly increased in political, social, economic and intellectual spheres. The observance of Islamic practices such as mosque attendance and participation in the pilgrimage to Mecca increased to the extent that Turkey ranked third in 1982 in the number of pilgrims⁽⁹⁾. Likewise, it can safely be observed that fasting during Ramadan has become more widespread than before. Despite the official ban dating back to the early years of the Republic on their existence, the membership and organizational activities of sufi orders and religious groups expanded, and thanks to their increasing publicity in recent years, gained a somewhat precarious status of *dé facto* semi-legality. The circulation of Islamic literature, different in content and more in number than before as well as the dissemination of Islamic views through the products of modern technology, such as audio-visual cassettes—a radical departure from face-to-face communication within *tarikats* organizations, has increased. Also, noteworthy that while the number of religious publications increased by more than two times in the years between 1978-1987, the number of philosophical publications, decreased by half⁽¹⁰⁾. It seems, as if the secular versus religious duality of *Tanzimat* era in education has made a comeback. Thus one can suggest that a parallel and alternative network of political socialization has been formed through the unofficial as well as the official centers of Islamic education, the prime examples of which being Imam-Hatip Schools (Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools) and Quran schools scattered all over Turkey, alongside the introduction of compulsory religious courses in primary and secondary schools thanks to the article 24 of the new Constitution of 1982⁽¹¹⁾. The prohibition of the wearing of headscarf by female Muslim students, who consider *tesettür* (religious wearing) to be an absolute and definite command of God in the Quran to the believers, endured during the decade and led to a small-scale political crisis in 1989 following mass demonstrations protesting the annulment of the bill by the Constitutional Court rendering the wearing of headscarf legal in the universities on the ground that it represented a political symbol challenging the secular foundations of the state and therefore breaking the public order. The crisis situation caused rumours about the possibility of a new military

coup in the secular press. To be sure, the whole event clearly revealed the activism of the Islamic opposition in Turkey⁽¹²⁾.

Besides the social and cultural manifestations of the Islamic reassertion, there has been increasing visibility of Islam in the political and economic life of Turkey. The primary form of Islamic activism in politics appeared to be the “infiltration” efforts of various Islamic groups in state institutions. As it became evident, the Islamists have held important positions of power especially in the Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Interior⁽¹³⁾. In the intrusion of Islamic groups to the bureaucracy, the NSP’s participation in government as a minor but important coalition partner between 1974-1978 had a prime role. The ministries at the disposal of the NSP were filled with the sympathizers of the party. In the 1980s, the same phenomenon continued under the auspices of the Islamic faction within the ruling MP⁽¹⁴⁾. As a result of these developments, today there is a wide network of pro-Islamists in the bureaucracy, a phenomenon largely responsible for the fragmentation and pluralization of the old political center and hence, to some extent, erosion of the power base of the bureaucratic elitism. The only exception to this pattern, however, is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The observance of strict admission conditions as well as the fact that it has never been under the disposal of a religiously-minded person largely account for the endurance of that situation.

Another indication of the growing influence of Islam in the post-1980 Turkish politics was the composition of the governments of Turgut Özal. For the first time in the Turkish parliament a party in which Islamists well-represented has remained in power without interruption since 1983. Headed by Mehmet Keçeciler, the pre-1980 mayor of Konya province under the ticket of the NSP, Islamists obtained a majority in the Central Administrative Body of the MP in the General Congress of 1988, despite the opposition of the then prime minister, Turgut Özal. The Islamic faction within the MP carried out pro-Islamic practices in many fields. For instance, the theory of Creation was put in the curriculum of biology courses in secondary and high schools as the alternative explanation to Darwin’s theory of natural selection regarding the evolution of human species. The prohibition of beer advertisements on state radio and television was another example⁽¹⁵⁾. The previous center-right parties, the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) and the Jus-

tice Party (Adalet Partisi, JP) respectively, incorporated Islamists within their ranks as well. But the overall power of the Islamic faction within the governing MP is much larger than that within the ranks of the defunct DP and JP.

The emergence of a new and dynamic sector in the Turkish economy, part of which held by Islamists was still another important element in the so-called “Islamic reassertion” of the 1980s. Benefitting from economic liberalization policies and taking advantage of having close connections with the ruling MP governments, the growing Islamic sector in the economy found its real embodiment in the emergence of a Muslim Anatolian bourgeoisie well-represented in the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and Stock Exchange, a very influential body of the Turkish private sector rival to the powerful Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) as well as in the establishment of interest-free banking after Özal came to power in 1983. It is estimated that the Islamic banks in Turkey would collect a tenth of the all-domestic deposits until 1993⁽¹⁶⁾.

For a country that has gone through a period of “religious sterility”⁽¹⁷⁾ during its nation-building phase and become the most westernized society in the Muslim world politically as well as culturalwise, the increasing manifestations of Islam as a religio-political movement point to a remarkable change⁽¹⁸⁾. Never having taken the form of a political ideology in the hands of opposition groups during the Ottoman-Turkish history, increasing visibility of Islam in the Turkish political life today represents “the victory of obscurantism over science” in the eyes of the Kemalist secularists who tend “to interpret any display of religiousness as an example of obscurantist advance”⁽¹⁹⁾. To be sure, for Sunni Muslims, the rise of political Islam is “a means of establishing social control over the community”⁽²⁰⁾. At this point, however, without going into the details of various conceptions of the Islamic reassertion by different segments of society, one need better to appreciate “the challenge of radical Islam” in terms of its organizational patterns.

B. Organizational Patterns of Political Islam

Islamist forces in contemporary Turkey express themselves in a variety of ways. Among these are Islamist parties, sufi orders, economic organizations, the institutions of

Islamic education, student organizations and the publication industry. Political Islam, however, is organized primarily on two levels alongside the political party formation, which found its main expression in the “National Outlook” of the NSP-PP line: 1) The level of *tarikats* which dates back to the early Ottoman times; 2) the level of an independent radical movement critical of party politics as well as both the tradition of the sunni Islam and the practices of folk Islam characterized by different interpretations of various orders, not to mention the state-controlled Islam of the Presidency of the Religious Affairs attached to the office of the Prime Minister⁽²¹⁾.

Leaving aside the expression of organized Islam at the level of political party for the moment, it would be appropriate to examine the place of folk Islam and its most important expressions, *sufi* orders, within the Islamic movement in post-1980 Turkey. Its contours being determined not by *ulema*, but by *tarikats* leaders, i.e. *seikhs*, the folk Islam—as a popular interpretation of Islam, has been the prime mover behind the recent rise of Islam. In the Ottoman period, compared to the orthodox and pro-state Islam of the *Ulema* at the center, *sufi* orders—the most important and long-lasting expressions of the folk Islam, were locally-based, extremely diverse and at times, outside the mainstream of the classical Islam at the periphery. This was resulted from the abstract and authentic nature of Sunni Islam which did not allow the emergence of an environment conducive for the perpetuation of the old beliefs and customs under an Islamic disguise of nomadic tribes that newly converted into Islam. This was also true for Turkish tribes who had deeply-rooted and long-lasting Shamanistic traditions. This state of affairs led to the adoption of the *sufi* form of Islam which was characterized by the personal interpretations and hence apt to the continuation of the pre-Islamic beliefs and habits especially among the segments of those tribes who established themselves in the countryside. To cite an example, the personality cult formed around the ruler among the Shamanist Turks found a proper ground to flourish in the hierarchical structure of *sufi* orders based on the spiritual influence of *sheikhs*. In other words, unlike sunni Islam of the cities, *sufism* formed the most important appearance of Islam at the popular level in the countryside. Yet, although folk Islam was heavily influenced by *sufi* orders, it did not reflect an exact view of *sufism*, which, in time, gained a dominant sunni character in theological terms.

During the foundation period of the Ottoman Empire, there emerged a struggle between the sunni center and the various appearances of folk Islam. Over time, however, sufism established itself in the social hierarchy of the Empire and became the most important intermediary structure for social mobility. Against the “excesses” of the ruling class, the reaya took refuge in sufi orders such that they provided a justification ground for the Celali uprisings of the late seventeenth century⁽²²⁾. The same activist line continued during the 19th century and the second half of that century witnessed the revitalization movements in the Ottoman lands organized by sufi orders, sometimes assuming a political character reflecting the anti-imperialist feelings of the masses against the western intrusion. They played important roles in the implementation of the pan-Islamist policies of the Sultan Abdulhamid II. It is a well-known fact that during the war of the independence (1919-1922), Mustafa Kemal, the then Commander in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, established important connections with the leaders of some orders in order to secure their support for the national struggle.

After the establishment of the Republic, however, the orders were outlawed by the new regime on the ground that they had become the sources of superstitions and religious fanaticism and therefore responsible for the backwardness of the country. In fact, the more important reason for the ban on their existence was their radical opposition to the founder of the Republic, Ataturk, and to the radical nature of his secular reforms.

Despite the legal ban, however, the orders continued to operate in the countryside and later established themselves in the cities as well. Upon transition to multi-party politics, the orders increased their political activities with some degree of publicity. They have made their voice heard in politics and increasingly become the “reserve force” of the center right parties, first against the jacobin secularism of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, RPP) and then against “the rising communist threat” facing the country⁽²³⁾. They also actively participated in the formation of an independent Islamic political stand. In the establishment of the first independently organized Islamist political party, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, NOP) and following its closing down by the Constitutional Court, in the NSP, both the Nakşibendis and Nurcus were very active. In the last decade, notwithstanding their still uncertain legal status, they ma-

naged to legitimize their existence thanks to the emergence of a nascent civil society which has created a more tolerant political atmosphere.

Thus in that period, they have become the semi-legal component of the Islamic opposition alongside the Islamic parties operating within the legal boundaries. The increasing activities of the orders and Islamic groups, among which the prominent ones are Nakşibendis, Qadiris, Suleymancis and Nurcus, give some clues about the extent of the Islamic reassertion in post-1980 Turkey. To illustrate, it is generally speculated that many leading politicians and government authorities are members of the orders. Although the tarikat-politician connection is well-publicized in the Turkish secular press, no politician has dared to declare openly its tarikat membership so far⁽²⁴⁾. Last but not the least, orders and religious groups are the most important power base of the Islamic movement aiming at changing social and political institutions in a peaceful way by “infiltrating” them⁽²⁵⁾. This became evident especially in the case of the Turkish Armed Forces chosen as a target of prime importance for “infiltration” efforts⁽²⁶⁾. In fact, in practical grounds, it seems that the “infiltration” functions as a two-way process. As Ruşen Çakır aptly points out, the strategy of infiltration is not a sheer success on the part of Islamists in that while they have tried to “capture” the state from within, those who infiltrated the state institutions were coopted by the state and have undergone a “process of rationalization” which has resulted in increasing individualization and the breaking or at least, the loosening of ties with the orders⁽²⁷⁾.

Apart from the various orders which have chosen to operate within the present system, there is a “radical”, militantly anti-systemic wing of the Islamic movement which increased its assertiveness particularly after the Iranian revolution in 1979. Influenced by the revolution, the radical wing of the Islamic movement refuses to engage in party politics, is against “infiltration” efforts as a means to the ultimate end because it necessitates compromise on the side of Muslims, and views Islam as a revolutionary anti-imperialist force. Contrary to the traditionalist wing of the movement, they advocate the immediate establishment of an Islamic state and then to use the state power in order to establish an Islamic society. Their strategy requires immediate political action rather than cultural and social change⁽²⁸⁾. In fact, the key to the examination of the last ten years of the Islamic

movement in Turkey, to a great extent, lies in the conflict and contradictions between the two opposing wings, the radicals who are marginal in numbers and the traditionalists who constitute the majority. The radicals tried to transform Islam into a revolutionary ideology by dismantling its historically shaped “protective belt” of the tradition without much success, however. Against the radical wing organized mainly around some publication houses, and becoming increasingly marginal with their more or less “secularized” understanding of Islam⁽²⁹⁾, the traditionalists have more “moderate” ideological tendencies in terms of their strategy for attaining political power. They believe that in a country like Turkey where Muslims constitute an overwhelming majority, the Islamic sharia should be implemented. They see the Quran and the Prophet’s sunna as the only proper guideline for individual and collective acts. They vehemently reject westernisation in cultural life and behavioral patterns but ready to accept western science and technology as a constituent component of an Islamic polity⁽³⁰⁾.

In the context of this conflict, the existence of the newly-born Muslim intellectuals deserves special attention. They are not the representative of the traditional Ulema, nor have they stuck to the orthodox formulations of the classical schools of the Islamic law. Since they do not see violence as a legitimate means, they can be considered within the ranks of the traditionalists. They produce comprehensive studies reinterpreting the role of Islam in history, politics, economics and state. They write on highly diverse issues, ranging from the discussions around the philosophy of science to the contemporary strategic issues between the United States and the USSR. These works are largely written in a popular and modern language and, in the last analysis, addressed to those searching for answers to their questions related to “the problem of the meaning”. Some Muslim intellectuals like Ismet Özel, Ali Bulaç, Rasim Özdenören and Abdurrahman Dilipak are very popular and widely read in the Islamic circles⁽³¹⁾.

C. Major Characteristics of the Post-1980 Islamic Movement

Having outlined briefly the organizational basis of the political Islam, the imperative task confronting us is to delineate the major characteristics of the post-1980 Islamic

movement. In the first place, the term “Islamism” must be operationalized. As İsmail Kara observed, the concept of Islamism can be defined as follows:

“... a movement, beginning with the nineteenth century, embodying the totality of intellectual and scientific works, searches, suggestions and solutions aiming at making Islam prevail in social life in its entirety—covering faith, prayers, ethics, philosophy, politics, education and so on, once again; at preserving the Muslim world from western domination, despotic rulers, captivity, imitation and superstitions for the sake of civilization, unity and development with an activist, modernist and eclectic stand”⁽³²⁾.

Drawing upon the above conceptualization, the Islamic movement can be defined as the sum of all sorts of activities aiming at guiding society to live in accordance with Islamic teachings. Although the Islamic movement was conceived as an opposition movement characterized especially by political actions in recent years, it, in fact, denotes an anti-systemic challenge at the social and intellectual as well as political levels. On the other hand, because the word “movement” implies the aspect of thought that materializes at the behavioral level, the Islamic movement must not be understood only as a totality of actions. There is at the same time another side to it, which is the formation of the inner process of the movement. The intellectual contribution of the Islamist thinkers at the beginning of this century is striking in this respect.

Given the definition above, however, a potential question to be raised at this point is: Does the Islamic movement in Turkey point to the existence of a broad-based movement with clearly-defined centres of authority and leadership through a unified structure of decision-making? It is evident that the term “Islamic movement” is not a well-defined construct, for it refers to a multi-dimensional formation including political parties, sufi orders, the revolutionary radicals and “independent” Muslim intellectuals. It does not have a monolithic structure with a clearly-drawn hierarchy. Instead of a monolithic umbrella organization acting in accordance with a single programme, what is seen in Turkey, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, resembles more of a broad coalition aiming at the development of common Islamic values and, in the final analysis, the establishment of a community of believers under an Islamic state. The movement sees the western secular culture

as being extremely degenerate compared to the Islamic one. Sexual permissiveness, materialism and individualism of the westernized elites are considered as the syndroms of “westoxication”⁽³³⁾. It asserts that the contemporary problems of the Turkish polity and its perpetual dependency to the western industrial countries are caused by the imposition of the strictly secular policies—so alien to the traditional fabric of Turkish society and opposite to its great historical past, a thesis central to the ‘National Outlook’ of the NSP-PP line.

Though the Islamists share the same aims with regard to the “final solution”, i.e., the establishment of an Islamic order, there is a profound disparity in their views regarding the ideology and strategy of the movement to be followed. As referred to before, one can classify the divisions within the Islamic movement under the rubrics of “traditionalists” and “radicals”. While the traditionalists have espoused evolutionary means and are for the continuation of the “classical wisdom”, the radicals have adopted a more revolutionary posture in instrumental terms and heavily questioned the appearances of “historical Islam” carried into the modern world. Accordingly, the amorphous nature of the Islamic movement in Turkey further shows itself in the fact that there is no single leader followed by all the factions. In this regard, it differs from those elsewhere in the Muslim world. It has not managed to produce the leaders having the power and status of such people as Hasan al-Benna and Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ayatollah Khoimeini in Iran. Also, contrary to the Iranian case, the ulema does not have a vanguard position within the ranks of the Islamic movement in Turkey where the prominent Islamists work in “lay” professions due to the erasion of the power base of the *ilmiyye* class during the introduction of the secular reforms in the 1920s.

Up to the 1980s, few Turkish observers have seen the activities of the Islamist groups as a religio-political movement. The primary characteristics of the post-1980 Islam, however is that it has been “ideologized”. “Islam as culture” extended itself to the political level and turned into “Islam as politics”. This is because Islam does not distinguish between public and private realms. It is both a normative system and a political ideology. The rejection of the separation of the sacred and the secular is a natural corollary of the Islamic principle of “tawhid”. In this regard, Islam is in an alternative position to the

political process itself⁽³⁴⁾. This, in turn, has given rise to the challenge of Islam as a “political ideology” alternative to “secular religions”. It came increasingly to be a revolutionary political movement espousing evolutionary means⁽³⁵⁾. All in all, despite divisions the Islamic movement suffers from within, it has successfully established itself as an active political ideology in opposition⁽³⁶⁾ to the fundamental tenets of the secular regime, operating within a relatively Islamized cultural environment and constituting a vigorous and dynamic element of the newly-emerging civil society.

D. Sources of the Post-1980 Islamic Reassertion: “Islam Versus Islamization”

Reaction to the militant secularism of the Kemalist period reflecting itself as a new soul-searching by those who see Islam as a complete way of life is an important dimension of the greater visibility of Islam in Turkish politics and society since the transition to multi-party politics in 1946. The introduction of a multi-party system and consequent competition for votes led to “a kind of rediscovery of the continuing attachment of the peasant majority to the traditional Islamic values and rituals”⁽³⁷⁾. This rediscovery by politicians of the strength of Islam among masses created an increasingly expanding space of liberty for Islamic activities and took a greater momentum especially in the 1980s. In this context, a question pertinent to the “achievements” of political Islam particularly in the 1980-1990 decade, needs to be examined: what conditions in the last decade have been conducive to a pattern of politics imbued with Islamic colouration? Those who feel uneasy due to the entrenchment of Islam into the agenda of Turkey in the 1980s tend to relate the rise of Islam to the policies pursued by the post-1980 military regime and the following Motherland Party governments, which made extensive use of Islam in the reformulation of the state ideology and hence tried to implement a controlled Islamization policy in the social life and political structure of the country. What this approach overlooks, however, is that the vigor and dynamism of the Islamic movement owe more to societal dynamics than to the official Islamization policies. In fact, the phenomenon of the so-called “Islamic reassertion” is too complicated and multi-dimensional to be explained

by a single variable, i.e., the official Islamization policies⁽³⁸⁾. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to see the Islamic reassertion of the 1980s as a result of both the maturation of the efforts and dynamism of the activities of the Islamic groups and orders at various levels in the past as well as the new stance adopted by the post-1980 military administration with regard to the role of religion in society.

In this context, another question is: “why has Islam as a religious and social phenomenon received unprecedented recognition since 1980?”⁽³⁹⁾ The post-1980 period witnessed a new process of interpretation and a new phase of the relations between Islam, secularism and modernization on the part of the state elites. To begin with, the disappearance of the old cultural cleavage of the center and the periphery turned Kemalism into an anachronic entity in a society which has increasingly become urbanized and differentiated. As the self-perceived guardian of the state, the military administration (1980-1983) tried to fill the ideological vacuum created with the “exhaustion of Kemalism”⁽⁴⁰⁾ by giving up what Heper calls the “bureaucratized” version of Atatürkism conceived to be the source of all public policies. In order to put an end to what Frederick Frey described as “the politics of the absurd”⁽⁴¹⁾, i.e., the lack of an integrative fabric for society, the military regarded Atatürkism as an *weltanschauung*—i.e., an outlook, which offers a rational and scientific way to modernity rather than a political manifesto, as is the case with “cosmogonic” ideologies, like Marxism. Thus the militant secularism of the single party period (1923-1946) was given a new context whereby it became possible to make use of Islam for developing a new pattern of normative civil ethos which would be functional in commanding personal loyalties and in the integration of society⁽⁴²⁾.

But this state of affairs alone can not explain the highly pragmatic attitude of the military regarding the role of religion in Turkish society. Islam was also thought to be a bulwark against anti-status quo ideologies, particularly against the Marxist left, which was the main ideological threat to the state in the pre-1980 years. As an Islamist writer succinctly observed:

“Islam was used as an antidote against the communist threat. But Islam, too, was equally, even more dangerous than communism in the eyes of the military. Hence the preemption of

Islam was imperative. This task could best be done through Islam only in the absence of rival ideologies. Thus, the military administration tried to preempt Islam through şibih-Islam, (nominal or alleged Islam). That is, if they had become successful in erecting the şibih-Islam throughout the country, they would have preempted not only the communist but also the so-called Islamic threat⁽⁴³⁾.

As Asaf Hüseyin aptly observed, the preemption of political Islam by the official Islamization policies, in fact, points to a general strategy adopted by the non-Islamic regimes all over the Muslim world after the Iranian Revolution of 1979⁽⁴⁴⁾. Through Islamization policies, the secular ruling elites tried to project an Islamic image into the eyes of religious masses. Thus Islam has been given a pacifistic and ritualistic function. While emphasizing through the pacifistic aspect, the need to separate the “sacred religious feelings”,—their proper place thought to be in the conscious of the individual, from politics, i.e, the mundane issues, they reduced Islam into the performance of the five pillars of ibadah by the ritualistic aspect ascribed to it. Seemingly, the Islamization policies were substituted for the process of secularization. The primary aim intended with Islamization, however, was to coopt the Islamic groups into the system on the one hand, and to provide Islamic legitimacy to the prevailing regimes, on the other⁽⁴⁵⁾. Although providing Islamic legitimacy to the system is of great importance, especially in the Arab Middle East, this is not the case in Turkey owing to the political legitimacy conferred on the relatively well-established democratic process in the eyes of people.

What were the other factors that prompted the military to adopt such a line, then? True enough, the impacts of the pre-1980 environment of severe violence and terrorism led the military administration to the conclusion that Islam can be used as the integrative cement of society against ideological “extremes”. At the same time, Islam was conceived to be the antidote of sunni radicalism and hence to lend support to the “moderated” Islam under government control could provide the military with an efficient and subtle way of counteracting the rise of political Islam. Thus, a new state ideology was created under the rubric of “the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”⁽⁴⁶⁾. Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the secular Turkish Republic, was portrayed as a believing-president. Religious themes were expressed through an “Ataturkist mode of presentation”. Yet there were some other func-

tions expected to be performed by Islam, the most important of which, was to lower the expectation of the masses for better economic conditions and furnish them with an ethos of sacrifice against the rising economic hardships for the general welfare of society to be attained in future⁽⁴⁷⁾. Alongside the exclusion of the popular sector from political process, the adaptation of an outward-oriented economic growth strategy doubled the hardships faced by people who already had no say in the policy-making process because of the economic stabilization measures, such as the compression of wages, the curtailment of social rights and the enforcement of lesser consumption, and the like. The promotion of religion with the purpose of using it as a security valve for the authoritarian reconstruction of state-society relations and of the new liberal economic order, however, turned out to be a catalyst for the rise of the Islamic movement outside the state control, which had remained latent for years and now could find a ripe ground to manifest itself. Thus, it seems to be essential to analyse the relationship between state and religion in Turkish political life from an historical perspective not only to better understand the Islamic reassertion of the post-1980s, but also given the fact Islam has always been part of the national identity and played different roles in different periods of the history.

In the Ottoman Empire, Islam played primarily a politically stabilizing role⁽⁴⁸⁾. The political centre represented Sunni Islam and derived its legitimacy from it. Though the essence of legitimacy, the religion receded the state in importance in that the preservation of Islam is alleged to be bound to the endurance of the state, a philosophy summarized in the maxim “devlet ü ebed müddet”, a “state intended for eternity”. The ulema was attached to the ruling Askeri class who were exempted from taxing and had no independent formation vis-a-vis the state. As noted before, against the conservative, pro-state Islam of the center, the periphery’s Islam, i.e., the folk Islam had sufi leanings and was quite heterodox. It was not state-controlled and hence functioned as the locus of the opposition from time to time⁽⁴⁹⁾.

The Republic’s secular regime saw the two arms of the organized Islam, tarikat and the ulema, as the biggest threat to state power and authority and accordingly, created new bureaucratic and constitutional restraints against the Islamic activities of both the ulema and tarikat. Kemalist policies against religion were in essence characterized by a strict

state control over religion rather than the separation of the sacred and the profane and the exclusion of the believers from the political process, amounting to no less than a state of “religious sterility”. Since the Islamic forces were pushed to underground, there was no legal ground for the opposition. Therefore, the political reaction of Islam in this period showed itself in the sporadic uprisings of various orders, the most important of which was the sheikh Said rebellion of 1925. The rebellion had religious as well as ethnic (Kurdish) overtones and was harshly repressed.

Following the Second World War, certain Kemalist restrictions on the expression of Islam was removed in line with the introduction of multi-party system. In the 1947 General Congress of the RPP, the introduction of religion courses on voluntary basis in primary and secondary schools was accepted and for the conduct of the religious services, Imam-Hatip Courses were introduced in order to educate religious functionaries. These and the following developments along the same line in the 1950s were interpreted as the “revival of Islam” by the western observers of the Turkish politics at the time⁽⁵⁰⁾. In fact, it can safely be noted that as the democratization process got accelerated, so did the Islamization. Beginning with the DP period, (1950-1960) religious demands found their way into the political decision-making process. Despite its public commitment to secularism, the popular leader of the DP and the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes did not show any hesitation in distinguishing between the reforms that has received popular acceptance and the reforms that could not have gained the content of the people, notably the militant secularism of the RPP. Thus, the call to prayer was again in Arabic. The recital of the Quran was introduced on the Turkish state radio. But, in general, there was no radical departure from the secular tenets, though the DP increasingly resorted to the use of Islamic symbolism in the late 1950s. Overall, during the decade, however, the religious demands were still not very different in content from those of the single party era. Yet, the discovery of “political party” by the Islamic groups and orders proved to be instrumental in the achievement of “relegitimacy”⁽⁵¹⁾ to religion.

Turkey entered the 1960s with a newly-ratified Constitution accepted in a popular referendum after the 1960 military coup, which delegated important powers to the bureaucratic-intellectual elites and simultaneously liberalizing the Turkish political system in a

drastic way through the introduction of the basic rights and liberties. Thus, despite the mixed nature of the new Constitution, reflected in the creation of a Constitutional Court as well as other bureaucratic restraints over political elites, like the establishment of the State Planning Organization, in the liberal political atmosphere created by it, the ideologies of both the left and the right managed to establish themselves in the political spectrum. The Islamists for the first time organized around an independent political party, the NOP, founded by Necmettin Erbakan and later participated in the coalition governments from 1974 to 1978 through the NSP, again under the leadership of Erbakan and thus succeeded to legitimize the existence of an Islamic political party.

While Turkey underwent a rapid socio-economic modernization during the decade, the old cleavage of the secular progressivism of the center vs. the religious traditionalism of the periphery began to give way to a left-right division with corresponding set of ideologies. To be sure, all of these had a direct bearing on the form and substance of the articulation of “religious concerns”⁽⁵²⁾.

In the 1970s, both the political center and the periphery underwent radical changes. The old centre lost its cohesiveness and wholeness. The bureaucracy fragmented and the intelligentsia divided along ideological lines⁽⁵³⁾. Above all, the RPP gave up its pro-state posture and adopted a social democratic line toward the late 1960s and early 1970s. It lost its status of being a natural ally of the military. Parallel with all these, societal forces increasingly penetrated into the state machine, particularly through the formation of clientelistic relations, with political parties. Thus, the age-old insulation of state from society came to an end. The state’s responsive character was now to be more manifest⁽⁵⁴⁾.

The periphery, too, underwent differentiation with the emergence of the cross-cutting cleavages in which economic ones increasingly took ascendancy. Since the traditional loyalties did not cease to exist, as was once incorrectly assumed by the modernization theory, there emerged the co-existence of the new economic cleavages with the traditional behavioral patterns⁽⁵⁵⁾. This coexistence facilitated the emergence of a group of frustrated people caught in the counter pressure of tradition and modernity⁽⁵⁶⁾, which provided a ripe ground for the flourishing of religious movements. The insecurity caused by

the detachment from collective entities creates an acute need for “belonging”, a manifestation of what Peter Berger calls “feeling of homelessness”⁽⁵⁷⁾. Thus, religious movements offer security and a brand of identity in the midst of rapid change for those who feel lost among the uncomprehensible complexities of mass society.

Toward the end of the 1970s, the increasing fragmentation and polarization around the ideological lines of the left and the right led to the most severe political instability Turkey faced during the Republican era. Ideological violence and terrorism, fueled by the “most anti-Kemalist and anti-systemic expressions of discontent by various groups”⁽⁵⁸⁾ reached unprecedented levels. Islamic politics too was influenced by this state of affairs. Islamist political organizations increasingly turned against the secular regime. The Islamist NSP, for example, was giving the signs of turning into an anti-systemic opposition movement. The last instance revealing this development was a mass demonstration held in Konya province in which both the leadership and the militants of the NSP shouted anti-secular slogans and called for Sharia⁽⁵⁹⁾. Six days after the demonstration, the military intervened in politics and a new era of political restoration began in September 12, 1980.

E. Political Fortune of Islam in Present-Day Turkey

Given the increasing visibility of Islam in Turkish politics in the last decade, the fortune of the political Islam in the remoulding of the present system is of immediate concern for the secular political circles. It is evident that coming into power through the electoral process in Turkey is extremely difficult for the Islamists—if not impossible, except through participation in coalition governments. For one thing, the Turkish Constitution, the Law for the Organization of the Parties and several other laws forbid the advocacy of the establishment of an Islamic state⁽⁶⁰⁾ and as long as this state of affairs endures⁽⁶¹⁾, the hope of Islamists to attain their ultimate aims would remain very limited. On the other hand, it does not seem probable at all that the military would permit the establishment of an Islamic state, as its self-perceived role of being the ultimate guardian of the state and the power of last resort for the secularists remains intact.

As the secular way of life made great headways in establishing itself in Turkish so-

ciety, the Islamists have increasingly become divided. Because of the lack of a common leadership, various sufi orders, though securing considerable mass support, are in competition with one another. They are not represented by the same single political party and for the moment, there is no indication of such a political unification. The Islamists are also deprived of the leadership of the ulema⁽⁶²⁾ because of their elimination from the political process during the single party period. Furthermore, the Islamists are not the only political force that proposes radical alternatives to the present political system. Nationalist and socialist ideologies may always become the powerful competitors to the “Islamic alternative”. On top of that, the fortune of the Islamists is closely tied to the persistence of the democratic process, as seen with the close down of the NSP in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup. And ironically enough, as long as the democratic regime survives, they would participate in the system with the “inevitable” consequence of compromise and pragmatism on their part. Finally, the future of the Turkish economy would have critical effects on the realization of the aspirations of the Islamists. Until now, the liberalization of the economy under the MP governments has served to strengthen their economic power. The economic sectors under the management of the Islamists have expanded and a new Islamist small bourgeoisie has come into existence. On the other hand, as the distribution of income has been increasingly concentrated in fewer hands due to “the growth-first” economic strategies, the poor desperately searching for social justice may turn to Islam as a form of protest⁽⁶³⁾.

The post-1980 years in Turkish political life witnessed the transition from Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) to the outward-oriented growth strategy without paying due regard to the social condition, alongside the imposition of a “forced consensus” on society. While Turkish society has become subject to a heavy wave of “consumerism”, the ideological conflicts remained minimal. In the meantime, despite the continuous attempts to keep religion under state control, a tradition dating back to the Ottoman period, the role of Islam in society and politics followed its own course and set, to an important extent, the discourse of Turkish politics. In this context, the expression of political Islam at the level of party organization, the PP of Prof. Necmettin Erbakan gradually has made its intrusion into the political life. To see how the content, the goals and the political discourse of the NSP-PP line were affected by the above described constraints and opportunities for Islamic politics in Turkey, it is imperative to look first at the restructurization and unfolding of Turkish politics over the last two decade with special reference to the NSP-PP line.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- (1) The term “radical Islam”, as is used here, refers to the Islamic movement of the 1980s as a whole revealing its anti-systemic stance without differentiating between the pro and anti-state Islamic groups.
- (2) *Köprü* (a monthly Islamic periodical), August 1987, p.3.
- (3) Ümit Cizre, “Kemalism, Islam and Hypernationalism”, Unp. paper, Middle East Technical University, p. 6.
- (4) Metin Heper, *State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington, England: Eothen Press, 1985), p.90.
- (5) Şerif Mardin, “Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey”, in James P. Piscatory, ed., *Islam in the Political Process* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1984), pp. 155-156. See also Metin Heper, *State Tradition in Turkey*, pp. 146-147.
- (6) Şerif Mardin, *Din ve İdeoloji* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1986), p. 112.
- (7) In one occasion, for instance, Evren said: “Wasting is prohibited in our religion. Now, in the market conditions, you can buy three pairs of shoes with the money paid for one pair of boots. (Therefore), women should wear shoes instead of boots...”, see *PANEL* (An Islamic monthly), 15 June-15 July 1989, p. 55.
- (8) See the first footnote above.
- (9) John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984), p. 98.
- (10) *Cumhuriyet*, 21 Jan., 1987.
- (11) The religious instruction in primary and secondary schools is not intended to be an “applied” course and therefore does not include the observance of religious prayers and rituals. This is why, it is considered to be “nonislamic” by Islamists. For a critic of the “compulsory” religious education prescribed by the 1982 Constitution from the Islamic vantage point, see Abdurrahman Dilipak, *Bu Din Benim Dinim Değil (This Religion is not My Religion)* (Istanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1990).
- (12) For the coverage of the series of the events leading to a small-scale political crisis see *Milliyet* March 14-21, 1989.
- (13-14) Binnaz Toprak, “The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey”, in Ahmet Evin and Metin Heper eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 1988), pp. 131-132 and Sabri Sayarı, *Türkiye’de İslamcı Akımlar*, tr. (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları: 1990), pp. 67-68.

- (15) Ruşen Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan: Türkiye’de İslamî Oluşumlar* (The Verse and the Slogan: The Islamic Formations in Turkey) (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990), p. 276. Also see Binnaz Toprak, “The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey”, pp. 131-133. According to Mardin however, the pro-Islamic practices of Ozal governments are exaggerated by the secularist circles in Turkey in that “the MP did not lend very much support to religion in a direct way. This can be seen in the inventory of the laws passed to support Islam by the government... The attitude of the present government is not at the point of the determination of the socio-ethical life by religion”. See Şerif Mardin, “2000’e Doğru Kültür ve Din” tr., *Türkiye Günlüğü*, Winter 1990, p. 9.
- (16) Clement Henry Moore, “Islamic Banks and Competitive Politics in the Arab World and Turkey”, the report submitted to the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Beverly Hills, Nov. 1988, p.7.
- (17) The phrase is borrowed from Charles F. Gallagher, “Contemporary Islam: The Straits of Secularism”, *AUFS Fieldstaff Reports*, XV, 3, 1966 and cited by Sabri Sayarı in “Politicization of Islamic Re-Traditionalism: Some Preliminary Notes”, in Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, eds., *Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 125.
- (18) Gencay Şaylan, *İslamiyet ve Siyaset: Türkiye Örneği* (Islam and Politics: The Turkish Case) (Ankara: V Yayınları, 1987), p. 76.
- (19) Toprak, “State, Politics and Religion”, p. 133.
- (20) On the conception of the Islamic revival from various different standpoints, see especially Şerif Mardin, “Religion in Modern Turkey” *International Social Science Journal*, 24(1977).
- (21) Ümit Cizre, “Kemalizm, İslam and Hypernationalism in Turkey”, unpublished paper, Department of Public Administration, Middle East Technical University, p. 25.
- (22) On the role of folk Islam in the Ottoman Empire and the Republican Turkey, see Şerif Mardin, *Din ve İdeoloji* (Religion and Ideology), (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları: 1986), pp. 70-75 and 107-117.
- (23) Şaylan, p. 105.
- (24) A notable exception is Eyüp Aşık, a member of the MP in the Parliament, who openly stated that he is a Nakshi. See *Cumhuriyet* January 12, 1987.
- (25) Sayarı, *İslamcı Akımlar*, tr., (Istanbul: Beyan Yayınları: 1990), pp.67-68.
- (26) *Ibid.*, p.45.
- (27) Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, p.297.

- (28) Sayarı, *İslamcı Akımlar*, p.68.
- (29) Çakır, p.255.
- (30) As a representative of these views, see Ali Bulaç, *İslam Dünyasında Düşünce Sorunları* (Problems of Thought in the Muslim World) (Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları: 1985).
- (31) On Muslim intellectuals in Turkey, see Sayarı, *İslamcı Akımlar*, pp.15-16 and 46.
- (32) İsmail Kara, *Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi: Metinler-Kişiler* (The Islamic Thought in Turkey: Texts-Persons) (Istanbul: Risale Yayınları, 1987), introduction.
- (33) Jalal Ali Ahmed, *Occidentosis: A Plague From the West* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1984).
- (34) Şaylan, pp.18-19 and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, “Türkiye’de Siyasal Modernleşme ve İslam” *Toplum ve Bilim*, Spring 1985, p.51.
- (35) Sayarı, *İslamcı Akımlar*, pp.65-66.
- (36) On the present strength of political Islam in Turkey, see Cizre, p.40.
- (37) John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, p.99.
- (38) Şaylan, pp.22-23.
- (39) Cizre, p. 28.
- (40-41) Heper, *State Tradition*, p.90.
- (42) Ibid., Passim.
- (43) Yaşar Kaplan, *Demokrasi Risalesi* (A Treatise on Democracy) (Ankara: Aylık Dergi Yayınları, 1985), p. 64.
- (44) Asaf Hüseyin, “Yirminci Yüzyılda İslami Uyanış”, tr., *Dünya ve İslam*, (Winter, 1990), p.153.
- (45) Ibid., p.154.
- (46) On the ideology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, see Binnaz Toprak, “Religion As State Ideology in a Secular State: The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”, the report submitted at the Annual Conference on the Middle East Studies, Leeds University, England, July 1988 and Gencay Şaylan, *İslamiyet ve Siyaset*, pp.66-69.
- (47) Cizre, p.31.
- (48) On state and religion in the Ottoman Empire see Metin Heper, “The State and Religion in the Ottoman Turkish Polity”, paper submitted at the Third International Symposium on “The Intellectual Life in the Arab Provinces in the Ottoman Empire”, Zajhovan-Hammamet, Tunisia, 15-20 March 1988.

- (49) Bernard Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu* (The Emergence of Modern Turkey) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1984), p.15.
- (50) See, among others, Bernard Lewis, "The Islamic Revival in Turkey", *International Affairs*, Jan. 1952, pp.38-48, and Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey", *The Middle East Journal*, Summer 1954, pp.267-282.
- (51) Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics", in Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor, eds. *Political Participation in Turkey* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1975), p.29.
- (52) Cizre, p.19.
- (53) According to Heper, these developments point to the end of a monocentrist polity together with its "ideological limits set by the bureaucratic-intellectual elites". See Metin Heper, "Recent Instability in Turkish Politics: End of a Monocentrist Polity?", paper delivered at the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association of North America, New York, Nov. 10-12, 1977.
- (54) İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey", *Government and Opposition*, 18 (1983), p.435.
- (55) Ibid, p.434.
- (56) Mümtaz'er Türköne, "İslamlaşma, Laiklik ve Demokrasi", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, (winter 1990), p. 41.
- (57) Cited by Toprak, in "State, Politics and Religion", p.135.
- (58) Cizre, p.20.
- (59) Sayarı, *İslamcı Akımlar*, p.24.
- (60) On the constitutional and other legal restraints, see Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey", pp.147-149.
- (61) The article 163 of the Turkish Criminal Code was abolished with the Law for the Struggle Against Terror, passed in April 12, 1991. The same law also annulled the articles 141-142 of the same code penalizing the establishment of political parties based on the Marxist notion of class struggle. Nevertheless, since other laws prohibiting the advocacy of the establishment of an Islamic or Marxian state remain intact, the legal ban is still in effect, as seen in the closing down of the Turkish United Communist Party by the Court of the Constitution in July 1991.
- (62) Mardin, "Religion and Politics", p. 149
- (63) On the prospects for the Islamists in Turkish politics see Sayarı, *İslamcı Akımlar*, passim, and Mardin, "İkibine Doğru Kültür ve Din", p.12.

"Muslims in Turkey engage in politics with the aim of forging their stand at the level of the ultimate state that politics should assume. Therefore, rather than to come up with new theses to incorporate changes in the political environment, the relevant question for Muslims is to struggle for the recognition of their rights in accordance with the entirety of their beliefs."

—İsmet Özel

—Görüş, April 1988

2. SEARCH FOR A DISTINCT ISLAMIC POLITICAL IDENTITY

A. Twenty Years of the NSP-PP Line

A meeting was held in Ankara on January 21, 1990 in order to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the first political party of the National Outlook, the NOP. According to Necmettin Erbakan, the founding father of the NSP-PP line, National Outlook is the Turkish nation's own view, who established a great civilization and brought justice and progress to humanity in history over a millennium. Likewise, it is the only solution to the contemporary problems of Turkish society.⁽¹⁾

All the political parties which came into power after the transition to multi-party politics since 1946, according to Erbakan, have been the blind imitators of either socialist or capitalist ideologies produced in the West. These parties could not provide solutions for the pressing problems of the nation and brought it to the present situation of helplessness and incapability. Those who saw this state of affairs and believed in the indigenous National Outlook, with the aim of founding "Great Turkey once again", forged an independent line on the political spectrum through the establishment of the NOP on January 24, 1970. The NOP was followed by the formation of the NSP on October 11, 1972. And with the establishment of the PP in July 19, 1983, the National Outlook has reasserted itself with more vigor and dynamism than ever at the end of its twenty years⁽²⁾.

The main question of the National Outlook is a reflection of the intellectual agenda of the nineteenth century Islamists, which finds its expression in the "Islam versus the West" predicament. The dilemma was to find an explanation for the rising fortune of the West in view of the continuously declining power of the Ottoman Empire, or more properly, the whole Muslim world. For Muslim intellectuals at the time, the West owed its powerful position vis-a-vis the East to the scientific and technological developments which concretized in the industrial revolution and military superiority. Thanks to this "irresistible" military-economic power, the Western World gradually took Muslim lands under its hegemony and put an humiliating end to the Muslim World supremacy which was represented by the Ottomans till the end of the eighteenth century. The relative decline of the Muslim umma was interpreted as being caused by the lack of commitment to the strict observance of the Islamic precepts which were the underlying progressive drive behind the Muslim consciousness for the betterment of life both in spiritual and material terms. Hence, to face the Western challenge, it was imperative to take Western science and technology on the one hand, and to retain the indigenous cultural dynamics formed throughout centuries with its contours and spirit being shaped and determined within an Islamic socio-economic environment, which Prof. Necmettin Erbakan called the "National Outlook", on the other.

The reception of Western science and technology coupled with the rejection of Western philosophical thought and culture rooted in the Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian traditions constituted the mainstream of the Islamic response inherited by the Islamic movements all over the Muslim World throughout the twentieth century. In Turkey, it was not this conception, however, that found political backing and that was translated into public policies. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic (1923), the view that Islam was responsible for the decline and backwardness of the nation and that there was only one civilization, i.e., the Western civilization and therefore the wholesale acceptance of the Western science and culture was imperative, received official recognition. Thus, Islam ceased to be the state religion and the basic means of organizing individual and collective human activities as before. The vision of a "protestantinized Islam" was espoused. Islam relegated to the conscious of the individual and steps taken to ensure its total privatization.

The reaction in the form of organized efforts and at political party level to the modernization policies pursued by the Kemalist state along the Western patterns, came only after the introduction of democratic system after the World War II. If the regulations and programmes of the 9 out of 24 parties founded between 1946-1950 are analyzed, it will be seen that Islamic themes received important emphasis⁽³⁾. Of these parties, only the Nation Party (Millet Partisi-NP),—a splinter of the first opposition party in Turkey, was relatively long-lived. Yet the NP could not acquire a steady following. In the 1950 elections it sent only one representative to the Assembly and was closed down in 1954 on the ground that it contradicted the secular tenets of the Republic. In the post-1960 atmosphere of ideological proliferation came the establishment of the first overtly sectarian-oriented political party, the Unity Party (Birlik Partisi, UP) headed by Mustafa Timisi, which represented basically the Alevi sect in Turkey. Despite the politicisation of the sectarian cleavages by so doing, the Alevi community in Turkey did not challenge Kemalist conception of secularism and has been no rival to it.

It was in this context that the “political party” was added into the organizational patterns of the Islamic movement as well, in the beginning of the early 1970. In fact, Islamic political parties turned out to be the most important legal formation of the Islamic movement in Turkey. In the 1950s and 1960s there was no outright religious party. Thus, the NOP founded by Necmettin Erbakan was the first Islamist political party with strongly Sunni orientation.

The word “national” in the name of the NOP has nothing to do with the modern notion of nation in that it takes its meaning from the universal semantics of Islam, which can be substituted for the word “religion” as used in the revealed book of Islam, the Quran. Accordingly, the “National Order” connotes the universal Islamic Order, i.e., the pax Islamica.

In the years preceding his founding of the NOP, Erbakan had been a supporter of the JP,—a center-right party carrying with it the legacy of the DP. As secretary general of the Union of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry in 1968, he clashed with the then prime minister Süleyman Demirel and was removed from that post through the

governmental initiative. In 1969, Erbakan ran as an independent candidate from the province of Konya and elected to the Assembly. In January 1970, he and his seventeen associates established the NOP, its name being coined by a leading Islamist, Eşref Edip. The NOP put Islam at the center of its ideological posture and in occasion showed its backing of Islamic law and legalism. Since the Party derived its legitimacy from the Islamic precepts despite its lip service to the Kemalist understanding of secularism, after the 1971 coup by memorandum, it was closed down by the Constitutional Court on the ground that it violated the constitutional provisions regarding secularism.

Though the NOP was short-lived, nevertheless it set an example that such a party can be established on the legal grounds⁽⁴⁾. One year later, on October 11, 1972, the NSP was set up by the same cadre who founded the NOP with latent support of Erbakan⁽⁵⁾. Though it was publicly identified to be the continuation of the NOP in all but name, in view of the closing down of the NOP, the NSP's founders were careful to avoid claiming any connection between the two. When asked whether the NSP is heir to the NOP, Erbakan asserted that "the NSP is only one of the parties set up so far. It does not make sense to establish any connection between them"⁽⁶⁾.

That the leadership of the NSP was the same as that of the NOP was a clear indication of the fact that it was the continuation of the NSP under a different name. At first, Erbakan refrained from any involvement with the NSP. He did not even join the party until May, 1973. The President of the NSP until after the October 1973 election was Süleyman A. Emre.

The NSP played an important role in Turkish political life between 1973-1980. The elections of 1973 was a notable success for such a party, contesting for power for the first time, as the NSP. It received 11.8 per cent of the total vote and gained 48 seats in the parliament and became the third strongest party after the RPP (186 seats) and the JP (150 seats). Despite its low electoral support, due to the inability of the two big political parties, the RPP and the JP, to form a majority government, it became the key to the formation of coalition governments, as symbolized in the emblem of the party, which was a key.

In 1974, it entered the coalition with the social democratic RPP. The populist aspect of the NSP programme was the reason for this “historical compromise” on the part of RPP.⁽⁷⁾ Being in power, on the other hand, provided legitimization for the NSP and secured its existence against being closed down⁽⁸⁾. But the uneasy coalition did not survive for long and was dissolved by the RPP following the Cyprus crisis of 1974. What followed was the formation of the first National Front government including the JP, the NSP, the Nationalist Action Party (Milletçi Hareket Partisi, NAP) and the Reliance Party (Güven Partisi, RP). Again, what was important for the NSP was to stay in power. It pursued a very active line in the coalition and got political concessions unproportional to its electoral success⁽⁹⁾.

In the June 1977 election, the NSP received 8.5 per cent of the vote and gained 24 seats. But, the absolute number of votes cast for the NSP remained almost the same around 1.25 million. Due to the several reasons, which will be elaborated in the following chapter, the NSP’s parliamentary representation fell by half. The following one-year National Front government under the leadership of Demirel and with the participation of the NSP and the NAP did not register any success in coping with the exacerbating problems of terror and high rate of inflation and was replaced by the RPP government in January 1978, with the support of some former JP members.

Under this administration, terrorism and inflation persisted and reached ‘unbearable’ levels. After the 1979 by-elections, which was a clear victory for the JP, the RPP left the power. A minority JP government was formed with the outside support of the NSP and the NAP. A new economic stabilization program was initiated by the government and some success was gained against inflation. Yet, terror continued. In the end, the persisting political instability was followed by a military intervention.

The NSP was closed down along with other political parties after the military coup of 12 September, 1980. The military administration was determined to restructure the rule of political game in line with Kemalist principles and accordingly, Erbakan and thirty three members of the NSP’s General Administrative Board were arrested in April 1981 and charged with working for the overthrow of the secular state to be replaced by an Is-

lamic one and specifically, violating the article 163 of the Penal Code⁽¹⁰⁾. As Toprak aptly points out, despite the non-involvement of the NSP in the pre-1980 civil strife, due to the “open-ended nature of existing laws”⁽¹¹⁾ penalizing the use of religion for political purposes, it was not difficult to gather enough evidence to that effect. In February 1983, Erbakan was sentenced to four years of imprisonment and twenty-two other members of the NSP received prison sentences ranging from two to three years⁽¹²⁾. In September 1985, however both he and his associates were acquitted.

After the assumption of political power by the military, all political activities in Turkey were suspended. In 1981, all political parties which existed at the time of intervention were abolished. The military junta continuously emphasized the temporary character of its rule and promised the restoration of democratic life after the establishment of a new legal-institutional framework for politics, which would protect the state and increase its governing capability vis-a-vis the “excesses” of civil society which were thought to be caused mainly by the highly liberal Constitution of 1961.

According to the National Security Council, comprising the junta members, in the absence of clearly drawn boundaries between state and society, the widened scope of democratic rights and liberties had turned out to be a major catalyst in the hyperpoliticization of ideological cleavages and state institutions which had led to fragmentation of the state apparatus along ideological divisions including the police force and a deadlock in political governance which further precipitated the anarchy and terror. Thus, the aim was to create a new politico-legal framework in order to prevent the emergence of the pre-1980 hyperpoliticisation of societal forces which ended up with the breakdown of democratic governance. Reaction to the problematical aspects of party politics as the military leaders understood it was basic to their efforts in restructuring Turkish political life. Hence, through the newly-drafted Constitution, they placed the requirements of the preservation of law and order before individual rights and liberties, which could be suspended in case of emergency or a threat challenging the public order. Extensive limitations were put on the organizational patterns and scope of activities of political parties and interest groups. Political parties were barred from establishing women, youth or any other organization affiliated with them. They also were isolated from interest group associations and vice

versa. Labor unions, too, were forbidden to engage in politics. State-society relations were restructured in such a way that the scope of activities envisaged to be within the sphere of civil society came under virtual control of political society, i.e., the state. The channels of interest articulation and interest aggregation were heavily narrowed down.

Apart from the constitutional regulations, the Election Law, too, was changed so as to prevent the recurrence of a characteristic feature of the pre-1980 period, namely the lack of political governance caused by coalition or minority governments. Thus, in order for a party to be represented in the Assembly, it has to receive 10 percent of the total vote as well as to exceed the barrage at the district level in order to gain a seat in a given electoral district. The barrage at the district level was determined according to the number found by the division of the valid votes with the number of representatives to be elected from that district⁽¹³⁾. All these arrangements aimed at the prevention of the representation of the small parties thought to be the major cause of governmental instability in the pre-1980 period, particularly the Islamist NSP and the Turkist National Action Party. It clearly favored the big parties in the electoral competition, with the aim of establishing a two-party system, freed from coalition governments.

The 1983 Political Parties Law⁽¹⁴⁾ banned the top administrative cadres of the pre-1980 political parties comprising some hundred people, from associating with political parties for ten years. The limitation for the members of the pre-1980 Assembly was five years. Also, the newly-established parties were prohibited from using those emblems and images that would be considered by the public opinion as the indications of being the continuation of the former political parties.

The legal regulations of the post-1980 period was envisaged in line with the authoritarian reconstruction of state and civil society with a view of using all the means fostering depoliticisation at the individual and public level in order to create a new pattern of politics which would forge sensitivity toward the protection of general interest as well as sectional ones⁽¹⁵⁾.

When the start was given for the multi-party politics in 1983 once again, it soon became evident that much of the social engineering of the military administration is doomed

to failure in that it has found virtually no counterpart in society. The results of the 1983 general election and 1984 municipal election showed that much remained the same in politics. This sameness was reflected especially in the continuation of the political spectrum structured along the right-left axis⁽¹⁶⁾. In other words, there was no critical realignment of the electorate, for as "the mists were getting clearer", all the parties, except the MP, related themselves in one way or another to the past and actively supported by the pre-1980 leaders. Yet, "each included new members, new ideas such that none could rightly be called an exact replica of the pre-1980 parties"⁽¹⁷⁾.

Against this background, a new Islamist party, the PP was founded in 1983 to fill the gap after the closing down of the NSP, by a group of ex-NSP members. The Party could not participate in the 1983 election despite its completion of legal requirements due to the series of vetoes of its founding members by the National Security Council⁽¹⁸⁾. It participated in the municipal elections of March 25, 1984, however, and received 4.8 percent of the total votes. Also its candidates were elected in the provinces of Urfa and Van.

The First General Congress of the Party was held in Ankara on 30 June, 1985. Ahmet Tekdal was re-elected as the party leader⁽¹⁹⁾.

Due to the political ban on the pre-1980 political leaders, the new parties who related themselves to the previous parties were using many symbols and slogans which referred to their past predecessors. Thus, the PP was known as the "Party of the Hodja", or the "Party of Erbakan"⁽²⁰⁾. The underlying reason for such a popular diagnosis was the political identity of the party's founders as well as the slogans used by the party. The PP, like the NSP, was the proponent of the "National Outlook" and its spokesmen repeatedly talked of the "Heavy Industry Effort", again one of the main mottos of the NSP.

A composition comprising an ear and crescent was chosen as the party's symbol. According to the party programme, the Crescent represents the honourable struggle in the World War I, the war of Dardanelles (Çanakkale Savaşı) and the war of Independence, which paved the way for the foundation of the Republic. The ear symbolizes prosperity, abundance and peace. It is, at the same time, the symbol of the will and determination of the Turkish nation to surpass the present level of the contemporary civilization.⁽²¹⁾ In

short, it is the co-articulation of the spiritual and material development, which was the basic tenet of the defunct NSP.

In the environment of the rising opposition against the political bans, a referendum was held so as to reach a popular decision about the removal of them on 6 September, 1987. All the political parties except the ruling MP, actively supported the removal of the bans. At the end of the referendum, with a very slight majority, the ex-politicians were given the right to engage in politics. Immediately following the referendum, Necmettin Erbakan, the ex-leader of the NSP, took the leadership of the PP.

Given this background, it is important to analyze the politics of the PP in the context of the post-1980 Islamization policies, the cooptation of the former NSP electorate into the MP, the increasing universalization in line with the political atmosphere created by the rising Islamic fundamentalism all over the Muslim world as well as the changing nature of the power equation between Sufi orders and the Islamic groups including the most radical wings and the NSP-PP line.

B. The NSP-PP Line and the Center-Right Parties

The NSP emerged as an important rival to the center-right JP with its political appeal to the same electoral base in the 1970s. Until the appearance of the NSP in the political scene, the “religious vote” i.e., the segment of electorate who determines its political preferences according to the dictates of Islamic teachings, had an important role in carrying the JP to power. When the NSP appeared in the political arena with an independent Muslim identity and rallying the religious vote behind it, it stroke a heavy blow to the JP’s electoral support base. Thus, in 1973 elections, the JP’s vote fell to 29.8 percent from 46.5 percent of the 1969 election, the NSP being one of the major beneficiaries of that situation. A fierce competition and rivalry characterized the relations between the two party throughout the 1970s. The JP accused the NSP of dividing the rightist votes and hence causing the left to get strengthened. To cite an example, in the 1977 election campaign, Demirel criticized the NSP in the following terms:

“... the NSP is not nationalist. (For Demirel, Turkish politics at the time was divided along nationalist-leftist lines.) It is not clear what it is. The National Outlook, as they call it, is nothing but nonsense. The votes casted for the NSP can be considered as casted for the RPP”⁽²²⁾.

Against these accusations, Erbakan responded by calling the JP as a colourless party, meaning lacking any stable ideological commitment. It shared the same mentality, claimed Erbakan, with the leftist RPP. For him, the JP was just on the capitalist side of the emulators of the West. There was a slight difference of appearance with respect to their stance toward Westernization and hence the negation of the National Outlook. The competition between the JP and NSP for the religious vote resulted in “drifting” increasingly to the right on the side of the JP, while the NSP incorporated the developmentalist theses of the JP into its discourse. The NSP stood on the same ground with the JP regarding the creation of “Great Turkey”, — a famous motto of the JP, but modified it as “Great Turkey once again” in line with its strong sense of history. Also, it shared the same views with the conservative wing of the JP with respect to its cultural orientation.

In fact, one can safely suggest that the establishment of the NSP provided the conservative wing of the JP with an active and determinative political platform. In other words, they managed to have their parties whereby they can easily articulate and if possible, implement their programmes independently. Politics for them became more comfortable in ethical terms. The same feeling of easiness was shared by those Muslims who participated in politics through casting their votes in the elections.

This differentiation from the JP was materialized particularly in the anti-Westernist discourse of the NSP articulated with traditional Islamic terminology against the secular-Westernist discourse of the political regime for the first time in Republican history. The NSP did not face much difficulty with its distinctly Islamic stand in securing the support of the masses who were overwhelmed under the suppression of the secularist front and managed to establish for itself a steady following. As Kongar suggests, this state of affairs points to the fact that a political party can not take into account only the demands of its political support base and ignore the constraints imposed by the socio-political structure within which it has to operate. Similarly, it can not continue to exist as a “counter-

reaction only”⁽²³⁾. This was especially true in the case of the NSP because its religious symbolism was appropriated by all the parties at the centre right of the political spectrum and used successfully in the elections, as seen in 1977, which registered a relative failure for the NSP. Yet, relatively speaking, there was no major competitor to the NSP for the religious vote throughout 1970s.

Following 12 September military coup of 1980, however, the political discourse of the NSP, with its tradition of intra-system opposition, which got radicalized from time to time, faced directly with the competition of the state, reflecting itself in the official Islamization policies such that an Islamist writer concluded that nothing left for the PP to capitalize upon other than the conversion of St. Sophia into the status of mosque⁽²⁴⁾ once again as the focal point of religious concerns dominating the agenda of the religious circles since the 1950s. Some of the Islamic motives were carefully articulated into the official discourse provided that it did not reach the level of eroding the secular foundation of the state. Moreover, under the first MP government, the channels of political participation for the sufi orders and other religious groups were given a semi-legality. This state of affairs caused the loss of mass support to the PP on the one hand, and led it into an ideological impasse, on the other⁽²⁵⁾.

The radical changes in the state policy toward the Islamic movement and de facto legalization of sufi orders resulted in the cooptation of the most of the NSP cadres and electorate into the MP and also ensured the support of the majority of the Nurcus, the streamline of Nakşibendi Order and Suleymancıs, thus depriving the PP of mass support to an important extent.

As seen in the 1984 municipal elections, the PP fared poorly because it could not regain the support of its ex-followers who had voted for the MP in 1983. It was only after March 1989 municipal elections that the PP obtained 9.8 % of the votes, and thus the religious vote made a comeback to the PP.

As a student of Turkish politics, Mümtaz Soysal, points out, compared to the MP, the PP proved to be much more consistent and successful in articulating Islamic values as the underlying framework for its political discourse. The sharp contrast between the neo-

conservative economic policies and self-help ideology regarding the social solidarity and welfare measures adopted by the ruling MP on the one hand, and its much-talked Islamism on the other, led to the irreconcilable conflicts, even within the MP itself⁽²⁶⁾.

Using religion as a means of securing obedience and self-sacrifice for the masses while fostering "consumerism" appeared to be self-defeating for the MP and immensely contributed in the erosion of its image as a totally new party which was responsive to the sensitivities and interests of the religious segments of society.

The PP, however, had an Islamic discourse rejecting the introduction of the consumption patterns of capitalist societies and prescribing a just distribution of income and wealth through redistributive social policies as well as the promotion of economic growth in consonant with these policies.

At the end of a long and difficult process, the PP emerged as the main candidate for the religious vote. Although adopted a nationalist-conservative posture, which determined the contours of its ideological commitment as expressed in its party programme, the MP was portrayed as a 'materialist' party, acting in accordance with the dictates of material interests. As the secretary-general of the PP, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, commented:

"... If the MP was a conservative-spiritualist party, it would not destroy the morals of the Turkish nation to such an extent. Bribery, corruption, and the moral decadence have become the routine part of every day life. Prostitution has come to embrace all parts of society. Under the MP governments, the state's resources and properties were plundered... While the MP governments destroyed all the moral and spiritual values of society, we still see some orders propagating the view that 'we perform our prayers and other religious duties without any government interference'. It is sheer deception to say 'may God be pleased with them (i.e. the leadership cadre of the MP) in that we have a prime minister in charge of administration who is a practicing Muslim'"⁽²⁷⁾.

In fact, Turgut Özal had contested under the NSP ticket in 1977 general elections from Izmir province and actively participated in the NSP's election campaign. Therefore, he was a familiar and reliable political figure for the ex-NSP supporters when he emerged

as the leader of the MP in 1983, and accordingly managed to secure their “loyalties”. But, with the end of official Islamization policies in the late 1980s and the increasing “economization” of political discourse, coupled with a strongly pro-Western foreign policy, which culminated in Turkey’s application to the European Community for full membership accelerated the alienation of the religious vote from the MP. As the analysis of the March 1989 municipal elections clearly demonstrated, the PP took its votes back from the MP.

In the context of the PP-MP competition for the religious vote, it must be noted that the MP was identified as being the practical ‘reincarnation’ of the Kemalist ideology. As one of the frequent contributors to the PP’s semi-official daily, *Milli Gazete*, İsmet Özel asserted, the MP, in the final analysis, shares the same aims with the Kemalist line regarding the total submission of Turkey to the world capitalist system. Thus, the policies of the MP must be seen in this light. Against the submissive and dependent relations characteristic of the Kemalist line vis-a-vis the world system, the PP represents the counter tendency which rejects any compromise, even under the most disadvantaged conditions, with that system. Espousing a foreign policy independent of Western interests and opposing Turkey’s entering the European Community, this stand of the PP in the diluted political environment of Turkey points to its avoidance of breaking the credibility of its attitude regarding the negation of being identified with the established order in exchange of votes⁽²⁸⁾.

C. The NSP-PP Line And The Islamic Groups

The NSP was established on the consensus of a large segment of the Nurus and the Nakşibendi Order. This is a clear indication of the primary role played by the sufi orders and religious groups in the repoliticization of Islam in Turkey. The political socialization of the many leading members of the NSP had been effected through the organizational networks of the orders. To cite a few examples, people like Necmettin Erbakan, Hasan Aksay and Korkut Özal were the disciples of the late Nakşibendi Sheikh Mehmed Efendi while A. Tevfik Paksu, Gündüz Sevilgen and H. Akmumcu were the followers of Said Nursi, the founder of the Risale-i Nur movement in Turkey⁽²⁹⁾.

In fact, the orders provide an important network for gathering votes by assuming the role of the intermediary linkage structures in societies where traditional power structures are still in operation despite the introduction of modern institutions such as political parties, as has been the case in Turkey⁽³⁰⁾. The NSP as a modern and secular type of organization which operated within the legal limits set by the Constitution was subject to the constraints imposed by the secular political framework which restricted its scope of activities and area of mobilization. This is why, the NSP was secondary in importance compared to the orders within the body politics of the Islamic movement in the beginning of the 1970s. The orders and religious groups who supported the NSP were functioning as the bodies of supervision over its activities and political maneuvers because of the fact that the NSP was running the risk of integration with the system. The interpretation of the “NSP affair” in Turkish politics by the Nakşibendi Sheikh Mehmed Zahid Efendi is striking in this respect: According to him,

“It was a mistake for Muslims to participate in politics. Under the present conditions in Turkey any attempt aiming at the restoration of the Islamic political authority is doomed to failure and would lead to a bloody confrontation with the secular forces. Instead, a more appropriate orientation would be the establishment of Islamic society in an informal way, which inevitably would end up with the emergence of the Islamic state. At any rate, the NSP,—at least in its first state, with its implied Islamic reference of political ideas, can be considered to be a secondary political component of this social process”⁽³¹⁾.

Despite mobilizing the covert backing of some orders, the NSP could not manage to get the support of all the constituent parts of the organized Islam. The streamline of Nurus, Süleymançis and some other orders continued to give their support to the JP. Behind this support was the recognition of the fact that in order to continue their activities without the state’s interference as well as to obtain material benefits for their clientele, they needed the support of JP. In other words, they placed the exigencies of “political pragmatism” before highly-valued moral ideals⁽³²⁾.

The participation of the NSP in government as a coalition partner with the RPP, representative of the Kemalist reforms and identified with ‘communism’ in the eyes of re-

ligious masses in 1974, evoked a great opposition within the Party, especially from those members who had a Nurcu background. Later, the statements and actions of the leadership of the NSP in the direction of making Islam the exclusive doctrine of the party and threatening of those Muslims who did not vote for the NSP with losing their place within the Muslim community, i.e., being considered non-Muslim, further alienated the Nurcu group within the Party. Prior to the 1977 elections, the Nurcu members resigned from the NSP. Some of them participated in the establishment of the Order Party (Nizam Partisi, NP),—not to be confused with the NOP, as the alternative to the NSP. Basic to the Nurcu's criticisms of the NSP was that it has turned out to be a “manometer keeping the tension of the Islamic movement at the desired point”. For instance, one of the leaders of this group, A. Tevfik Paksu criticized the NSP along the following lines:

“The foundation of the NSP must have assumed the role of a school. And the party organization must have been educated as to how to evaluate the present events and develop a proper line of action toward them alongside the teaching of the Islamic principles. Rather than insisting on the attainment of the end result, it must have been taught that our duty is to persevere in the right way and only inform people about the Islamic truths; not to expect them to come to espouse those truths. It must have been known that the main purpose in all doings was to obey God and to act in accordance with his consent. All these were not observed thoroughly and properly... The NSP has been made a victim. The mistakes and improper actions were ascribed to Islam in the person of the NSP such that the public image of Islam and Muslims have been adversely affected”⁽³³⁾.

As Mardin pointed out, the Nurcu's criticism of the NSP had its roots in the history of Islam and is a reflection of the desire for the Nizam-i İslami (the Islamic Order). The Nurcus put the realization of the moral aspects of Islam before the exigencies of the immediate political context and hence emphasizes the need to avoid ascribing Islam an instrumental role in the attainment of political goals⁽³⁴⁾.

What the Nakşibendis and Nurcus share in common in their criticisms of the NSP is that the NSP's opposition to the “system” has been passive and it has increasingly become part of that “system”. Also noteworthy that the NSP could not formulate suffi-

ciently concrete solutions to the complex problems brought about by the modernization process due to its “adoration for the glorious past”⁽³⁵⁾, though it has developed relatively detailed suggestions regarding economic problems.

Throughout the first years of its establishment following 1983, the PP claimed to be the inheritor of the NSP on all accounts, while it gradually put an end to its secondary role vis-a-vis the orders within the Islamic movement, unlike the NSP and as it has widened its political support base, by establishing a place at the center of the Islamic movement for itself. Erbakan and his associates made the distinction between what is religious and what is political clearer and accordingly ascribed the religious and social functions to the orders while they retained politics within their sphere of authority. But, in time, Erbakan took all the initiative and tried to relegate the orders to a subordinate position vis-a-vis the party. This generated a direct confrontation between Erbakan and the present Nakşibendi Sheikh Esad Coşan. Coşan heavily criticized Erbakan in public for saying that “those who do not blend their allegiance to me, must look for a new religion” and increasingly came to question the fundamental premises of the organized sufism⁽³⁶⁾. This new stance was confirmed by Oğuzhan Asiltürk, the the secretary-general of the PP as follows:

“We, the leaders of the PP, do not belong to any order. As a matter of fact, all the orders have equal standing in our eyes. The mystical affiliation of those who support our party is not a matter of interest for us provided that they participate in our struggle within our ranks”⁽³⁷⁾.

The PP increasingly tend to adopt an all-embracing stand toward the orders such that no order now constitutes its backbone of political support by itself. The PP, unlike the NSP, is said to espouse a new approach in order to be the focal point of the common political will of all the orders in Turkey and accordingly envisages to establish no special ties with any order, which would furnish them with the exclusive control and supervision over the party cadres and policies. Though still lend their support, to a large extent, to the PP, it seems that the Nakşibendis have lost their exceptional status within the ranks of the PP. In addition, the Muslims who vote for parties other than the PP are no longer

severely accused of serving the interests of the infidels, at least at the leadership level, as it was the case during the 1970s. Yet, the orders are not ready to accept such a pattern of relationship that runs the risk of losing their distinct identity and merging with the party. In fact, one of the underlying reasons for the orders's support of the centre-right parties has been the appropriate political ground provided by those parties whereby they can assert their distinct religious identity without any risk of "assimilation" in lending their support to them. Thus, a Muslim writer sympathetic to the PP, Ömer Hatipoğlu, suggests that if the PP should go beyond the parochial loyalties of sectarian kind and not turn into a political party "order", it has strictly to avoid catering to only the interests of some orders while ignoring those of others. This, he points out, is, in fact, expressed by Necmettin Erbakan too, when he declared that the "PP is the party of all the believers and of the oppressed. It is ready to embrace everybody regardless of his past political preferences."⁽³⁸⁾

An important factor which may radically transform the present nature of the relationship between the PP and orders is the former's increasingly strengthened possibility of enlarging its electoral support which would provide it with the parliamentary representation. Building an image of continuously growing party may accelerate the return of the "volatile" segment of the "religious vote" to the PP, or at least, neutralizing the counter attitudes of the orders supporting liberal-conservative rightist parties against the PP. This is bound to what extent the PP would catch up with the new axis reflecting the common will of the Islamic power base in Turkey⁽³⁹⁾.

If the PP succeeds to get the support of those sufi orders back which have been the loyal supporters of the MP so far and now, after the last General Congress of the MP in 1991, in which the Muslim faction within it was virtually excluded from the leadership ranks, it may get the chance of being represented in the National Assembly with most probability by further eroding the political support base of the MP. In short, the NSP-PP line with its leading role in the politicisation of the religious masses was and is the main candidate for the religious vote en masse.

D. The NSP-PP Line And The Islamic Radicalism

As noted before, the radical wing of the Turkish Islamic movement, which was further activated in line with the overall Islamic “perestroika” experienced in the Muslim world and gained a new and strong dynamism with the political successes of the Iranian Islamic revolution, succeeded in forging an anti-systemic strategy of struggle against the secular regime and hence increasingly directed its criticisms to the “pro-state” Islamic orders and to the political line represented by the NOP, the NSP and the PP, respectively, which do not propose a drastically different perspective from that of the Islamic faction within the MP.

With its actively militant stand, the Muslim radicals have come up with a “new tradition” of waging struggle against the anti-Islamic establishment and managed to create an intellectual circle around themselves. Though marginal in number, this intellectual dynamism furnished them with a power potential to successfully challenge the leadership of the PP, which appeared to be incapable of internalizing that challenge because of its relatively insufficient and intellectually wanting ideological and pragmatic dispositions⁽⁴⁰⁾.

For the radicals, party politics, being an institution of the secular democracies and having no Islamic roots, does not possess Islamic legitimacy, and hence there can not be an Islamic political party which articulates its ideology and political discourse in line with the democratic rules of political game. For a party to represent a political ideology, there should be clear references in that party’s programme to the ideology it espouses and accordingly, the road to power should be in consonant with the methodological principles defined by that ideology.

Taking this conceptualization as the starting point, one can conclude that if a political party claims to represent the Islamic ideology,—publicly or covertly, it can not adopt a secular-democratic or Marxist type of strategy in the road to political power, for that would be self-defeating. Because, Islam teaches that the Islamic legitimate ends can only be attained through legitimate means. Anything contrary to this prescription leads to the loss of Islamic legitimacy and doing away from the ultimate purpose of attaining God’s consent. The idea that “the end justifies the means” has no equivalent in Islam. Because,

such a stand would inevitably end up with the violation of Islamic principles of justice and mercy in the road to power. This state of affairs requires the postponement of the observance of the divine injunctions and prohibitions,—something that leads to the suspension of the sovereignty of God.

In view of all these, a leading representative of the Muslim radicals, Ercüment Özkan, asserts that an Islamic party can not aspire for the running of the secular-democratic regimes and hence can not contest for power in the elections,—be it general or local. For him, the main mission of an Islamic party, which organized in a non-Islamic political society, is to aim at the total change at the systemic level. According to Özkan, being against the unbelief requires to avoid any intermingling with or adopting an eclectic stand toward it. Therefore, Muslims must not get involved in any ways or means in the socio-political framework suggested by the secular regimes ascribing the sovereignty of God to people. For the restriction of the sovereignty to God is an absolute corollary of the principle of Tawhid, i.e., the oneness of God, as prescribed in the Quran. The absolute sovereignty of God confers absolute certainty and truthness to the Islamic dogmas, which are in sheer contrast to the democratic conception of life. Drawing upon the agnostic prescription of the impossibility of attaining the truths that would be shared by all humanity, democracies prefer to solve the conflicts and determine the tentative truths by counting the heads, i.e., by the majority rule.

Therefore, espousing an Islamic political stand, on the one hand, and conferring legitimacy to the political democracies on the other, would lead to enter compromise with those regimes and to give up the binding Islamic rules regulating and guiding the right ways and means of the Islamic struggle. In this context, it is not enough for a political party, which is under the leadership of practising Muslims, to be an Islamic one unless its programme and regulation are prepared with an Islamic outlook. The underlying reason behind the misconception of the Nation Party and the following the NOP-NSP-PP line by the religious masses is their inability of drawing the proper distinction line between the “real Islam” of the Quran and the “the official Islam” of the state offered for mass consumption⁽⁴¹⁾.

For Muslim radicals, the focal point of the discussions centering around the Islamic character of the political line represented through political party formation is to develop an holistic approach as to how to deal with the problems emerged in a Muslim society governed by a secular state. According to this analysis, any movement presenting its mission to be the best alternative option providing a packet of concrete solutions for the present socio-economic problems generated within a secular socio-economic milieu carries a reformist tendency within it. Such movements are expected to reschedule and revise their programmes and political positions in harmony with the changing conditions. This state of affairs, in turn, leads to the adoption of an intra-systemic posture while giving up the struggle located at the anti-systemic level. In terms of the present stand of the PP, it is not clear whether the understanding that “to the problems not generated by the Islamic society, Islamic solutions can not be offered” is valid or not. To take social and economic conditions as “given” and trying to produce concrete solutions accordingly, ends up with reformism, which is in sharp contrast to the line preached in the authentic sources of Islam⁽⁴²⁾. Aiming at the total transformation of society at the systemic level, on the other hand, necessitates the adoption of a radical posture, in which case, it would not be possible to secure a legal existence given the present constitutional restraints. Although Erbakan persistently declares that the National Outlook has an “axiomatic certitude”⁽⁴³⁾ implying that it is a perfect articulation of the Islamic ideology under the present conditions and thus adopting a rigid stand with respect to the ideological change, nevertheless his party, in the final analysis, carries within it the potential for turning into an European type Christian DP, which accepts the secularism as the bedrock of political society, while maintaining its pro-religion political posture⁽⁴⁴⁾. The validity of this tentative suggestion, of course, remains to be seen. For the present, as the carrier of the Islamic identity in the democratic platform, the PP seems to be an effective means for Muslims to obtain relative gains rather than to aspire for a radical transformation of society.

In order to better analyze the relationship between party politics and change from an Islamic vantage point, one must, in the first place, identify the position of the PP against the opposition of the radical wing of the Islamic movement to party politics. According to Ahmet Tekdal, the leader of the PP until Erbakan assumed the leadership in 1987, politics

is the only way for Muslims to rule over the system. In his speech in the first General Congress of the PP, he concluded that

“Those who are against politics or remain apathetic to it can go no where through engaging in science and intellectual pursuits or following an extemporaneous way of life. Under the present conditions, to live an honored and free life in accordance with what our belief system dictates would be possible only when the cadres of the PP come into power”⁽⁴⁵⁾.

The great efforts spent in order to persuade the believers into the necessity of engaging in politics were explained by the party’s chairman of the Istanbul branch as an attempt to unravel and frustrate a plot of the World Zionism:

“Just as Zionists discouraged Muslims from engaging in commerce by saying ‘leave the balance, go to the pilgrimage’ in the past, so now they are striving for procuring the non-involvement of Muslims in politics. Through the policy of depoliticisation of the Muslim masses, they tried to determine the direction of Turkish politics during the military rule of 1980-1983”⁽⁴⁶⁾.

According to the proponents of party politics, Muslims have to live within the system and act in line with the framework determined by the decisions taken on behalf of them-whether they take part in the making of those decisions or not. They are forced to go to the underground so as not to recognise their legal rights when need be and live under the psychological as well as ideological pressures of an organized and wealthy minority. Against all these constraints set for the subordination of the Muslims, to be able to get and use the democratic rights and liberties which would provide Muslims with a say in decision-making process, it is necessary to organize around a political party, the most important intermediary structures in democracies for interest aggregation and articulation⁽⁴⁷⁾. The democratic system based on free and competitive elections tend to open the valves blocking the road for Muslims to the political power. Because this fact is very well understood by the guardians of the system, the democratic process was suspended three times in the last thirty years.

From an historical point of view, the representation of religious concerns in the democratic process through a political party organisation is a unique experience for Mus-

lims. Contrary to the periods when the religion was under the protection of the state, now for the first time, Muslims, are in a position to undertake the function of supervision and control over state. Similarly, it is alien to the Muslim tradition to address the ordinary people through mass media. A tradition enrooted in informal gatherings in the mosques, seminars and dervish lodges now has to go beyond the networks of communication characterized by face to face relations and revolutionize its patterns of communication in order to reach the large groups of people. This can best be achieved through organizations such as associations, trade unions and most important of all, political parties. The NSP-PP line successfully adopted itself to requirements brought about by the transition from communal to societal patterns of social relations⁽⁴⁸⁾.

In fact, alongside their opposition to party politics, the Muslim radicals seem to exert important pressure over the leadership of the PP regarding their tradition of intra-system opposition with its relatively moderate tone of political discourse. In this regard, like the NSP, the PP, too, in occasions, can take a radical stand over some issues, as seen in the frontal attack of its mayor of Urfa province toward secularism and Atatürkism in 1989⁽⁴⁹⁾. Until now, however, the manifestations of the Islamic reassertion of the recent years in the NSP-PP line have remained limited to the recreation of an Islamic socio-cultural environment, free of Western influences⁽⁵⁰⁾.

As Mardin observed, the most crucial steps in the secularization process were taken in the field of the legal system. As such, “the re-islamization of Turkish life” can, in the last analysis, be effected through changes in the legal system. Yet, the NSP-PP line, in line with its “tradition” of extreme caution regarding the avoidance of the direct confrontation with the state, has not capitalized on that issue and dwelled upon the cultural and economic aspects of de-islamization process⁽⁵¹⁾. Thus, it can be suggested that if the PP can not internalize or manage the radical tendencies within and outside the Party through providing an effective leadership and reformulation of its ideological posture or, at least, its political discourse, it may lose that initiative to the Nationalist Work Party (Milletçi Çalışma Partisi, NWP), which has incorporated much more radical tendencies, and under the impact of Islamic reassertion in the 1980s adopted a more Islamic posture⁽⁵²⁾.

It is interesting to note that in recent years, there has emerged an anti-modernist discourse which questions Western science and technology and tries to provide an Islamic alternative against modern way of life, particularly among the new generation of Muslim intellectuals. Ironically, this line of thought had been spurred by an intellectual who has shared the same views with the NSP-PP line with respect to party politics⁽⁵³⁾. Seeing the problems generated by the technology-dominated modern way of life as the indications of the contradiction between man's desire for power and his ethical ideals, an alternative and rightful "way out" is envisaged by drawing upon an Islamic socio-political milieu. This is clearly in sharp contrast to the NSP-PP's modernist line, which puts great emphasis on industrialization and yet inspired by the same sources as the young Muslim radicals regarding de-westernization. It sees the realization of economic growth as the basic means of breaking the "chains of the World Capitalist System" and thereby creating "Great Turkey once again"⁽⁵⁴⁾. Because the notion of "development"—both material and spiritual, is so central to the National Outlook, it is hardly possible that the anti-modernist stand of the young radicals would have any effect on the policy-makers of the NSP-PP line.

E. The NSP-PP Line and the Islamic Universalism

Muslims in Turkey could not articulate their views under the Islamic rubrics owing to the persistence of the "militant" conception of secularism until the 1970s. In the 1950s, Muslims were on the "reactionary" side of the political spectrum while secularists comprised the progressive side. Islamic symbols and values were defended and propagated under the ticket of nationalism. There was no mention of Islamism. The name given to the first important party with religious orientation, i.e., the NP, is a clear indication of that. The Turkish nationalists and "Islamists" so to speak, were using the same political jargon. One can even include the liberal-conservatives into the same category given their rhetoric of "communist threat."

To be sure, the identification of Islam with nationalism in those years is not without good reason. The Ottoman Empire was a ghazi state preserving the unity and interests of the Muslim umma against the Christian West such that the word "Turk" has come to be

identified with the word “Muslim”⁽⁵⁵⁾. This interchangeability between the two distinct forms of identity can best be observed in the Muslim-populated provinces of the Balkan peninsula where “Turk” still means “Muslim”.

In any case, there was no differentiation at the level of political discourse between Islamists and nationalists until 1970s. Both groups were represented in the conservative-center right parties, the DP and the JP, respectively. The 1960s witnessed the emergence of ideological proliferation both in the left and right of the political spectrum thanks to the liberalization of politics brought about by the 1961 Constitution. In the process of transition from nationalism to overt Islamism⁽⁵⁶⁾, the NOP was founded by Necmettin Erbakan.

Interestingly enough, Erbakan explained the underlying reason for the establishment of the NOP as the need to fill in the ideological vacuum created by the “JP’s drift to the left”⁽⁵⁷⁾. The NSP too, represented the continuation of nationalist-conservative line at the time of its establishment. In time, however, the NSP distanced itself from the nationalist political discourse and began to use a more universal one under the impact of internal as well as external political conjuncture. The political response generated by the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 in the Muslim World as well as the active politico-military support given to Israel by the Western World paved the way for the deeply-rooted anti-Western feelings of the masses to turn into concrete politico-economic sanctions in the form of using the oil “weapon” of the OPEC by the Arab members of the Organization against the West. The oil price hikes provided the Arab states for the first time with important political leverage to be used against the oil-importing industrial countries. This state of affairs restored the Muslim self-confidence and feeling of pride, which had been subject to the continuous western insults over three hundred years⁽⁵⁸⁾ and hardly remained in existence. Thus, Erbakan came up with the proposal of an Islamic Common Market as the alternative equivalent of the European Common Market which represents Christian interests. The desire to channel the Arab financial capital from Western banks to the financial institutions under the control of the Muslim countries as well as to distinguish his anti-westernism from that of the leftist anti-imperialism were the main factors leading Erbakan to adopt a more “Islamized” political discourse.

While these changes occurred as a consequence of external circumstances, another domestic development had contributed in the making of the universalization process, namely, the establishment of the NAP as the representative of the Turkish nationalism distinct from the nationalism of the JP. Thus, the ideological posture of the NSP came to be based on a more universal line without, however, any important contribution of the NSP's leadership. The followers of the NSP, accepted this new line without opposition. Yet, the universalization was more in appearance than in reality. The leadership of the Party was reluctant to establish ties with the Islamic movements in the Arab Middle East and Indian sub-continent at the ideological level, let alone collaboration at the action level⁽⁵⁹⁾.

Toward the 1980s, under the impact of the Islamic reassertion witnessed all over the Muslim World as well as in Turkey, the NSP increasingly changed its nationalist orientation and put more emphasis on the Islamic internationalism. The term "Muslims of Turkey" gained currency only in the late 1970s. To be sure, the NSP's nationalism was drastically different from that of the NAP in the 1970s and had no ethnic or linguistic reference. As seen in the articulation of the NSP's ideology under the rubric of the "National Outlook", the NSP's nationalism was distinctly Islamic and, in practical grounds, manifested itself in the rejection of the Western cultural values and economic domination as well as a great nostalgia felt for the "glorious" imperial past. This new line was reflected in the NSP's stand toward the 1979 revolution in Iran and the Islamization programme initiated in Pakistan after the military takeover of 1977 led by the general Ziya-ül Hak. The NSP welcomed the Islamic revolution in Iran and praised the steps taken toward the Islamisation of social life in Pakistan⁽⁶⁰⁾. It seems that the PP has a much clearer understanding of the Islamization policies pursued in various parts of the Muslim World under different regimes, notably in the Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Accordingly, Erbakan expressed his views as follows:

"In some countries, certain steps were taken in behalf of Islam, and some aspects of the Islamic law were put into effect. Numeiri came to power in the Sudan and initiated an Islamization program by introducing some sentences of the Islamic penal code. However, Islam does not consist of some three articles of the penal code. If any state wishes to implement Islam, it should do this with a view of Islamization of every aspect of life. The implemen-

tation of some articles of the Islamic penal code within a socio-political environment subject to exploitation and the “order of slavery” can not be construed as the implementation of Islam. This is what has been happening in the Sudan and Pakistan. In our conviction, today there is no country in the world where Islam in its entirety prevails and is in effect⁽⁶¹⁾.

Unlike the NSP, the PP and its leaders are well-known in the Muslim World thanks to the ties they have established with the other Islamic movements outside Turkey. This was clearly demonstrated in the PP’s Third General Congress held on October 7, 1990, in which Erbakan re-elected as the chairman of the party. Many leading members and representatives of the Islamic orders and parties outside Turkey were invited to the Congress. Among them were Abbas al-Medeni, the leader of the National Salvation Front in Algeria, Gulbeddin Hikmetyar and Burhaneddin Rabbani, two leaders of the Afghan mujahidin groups, the secretary-general of the Islamic Council, representatives of Cemaat-i Islami in Pakistan and the Federation of the World Muslim Students’ Organization alongside the leader of the Islamic Party in Yugoslavia,—now, the president of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ali İzzet Begovic. The Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine (HAMAS), and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt also were represented in the Congress. Thus in a way, the PP’s Congress turned into a kind of the “Islamic International” where the representatives of virtually all the Islamic movements in the World came together and established horizontal ties with one another⁽⁶²⁾.

Erbakan’s efforts for peace prior to the Gulf war and his mediation for the resolution of the conflicts between various Afghan Islamic factions represented in the interim Afghan government in exile earned him respect in the eyes of the members of the Islamic movements outside Turkey.

In the context of the new mission acquired by the PP, it has been suggested in the Islamic circles sympathetic to the PP that an Islamic International, similar to the Socialist International, must be founded in order to provide coordination and collaboration between the Islamic movements in the World⁽⁶³⁾. Thus, the first-hand flow of information would be realized among them and the dialog between the Islamic parties all over the Muslim world would be achieved at the highest level.

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- (53) See İsmet Özel, *Üç Mesele: Teknik, Medeniyet, Yabancılaşma* (Three Questions: Technology, Civilization, Alienation) (Istanbul: Çıdam Yayınları, 1988). The book appeared first in 1978.
- (54) Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, p. 224.
- (55) Erol Güngör, *İslam'ın Bugünkü Meseleleri* (Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 1983), pp. 182-183 and 243. Also see by the same author, *Türk Kültürü ve Milliyetçilik* (Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 1986), pp. 105-106.
- (56) Sadık Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Hayatında MSP Olayı* (Istanbul: Araştırma Yayınları, 1989), p. 56.
- (57) İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey", *Government and Opposition*, 18(1982), p. 432.
- (58) The process of westernization is generally traced to two or three centuries back. Berkes, for instance, dates the development process of secularization back to the early seventeenth century. See Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* (Istanbul: Doğu-Batı Yayınları, n.d.), p. 9.
- (59) See Ahmed S. Ertürk, "Türkiye'de İslamî Hareketin Gelişim Süreci: 60 ve 70'li Yıllar", p. 125.
- (60) Binnaz Toprak, "Politicisation of Islam in a Secular State", p. 127.
- (61) Şaylan, Interview with Erbakan, *Cumhuriyet*, June 9, 1991.
- (62) İsmail Köse, "RP'de Vitrin Değişikliği", *Panel*, (October-November 1990), p. 9.
- (63) See Ömer V. Hatipoğlu, "Erbakan ve RP'den Beklenen", *Panel*, (October-November, 1990), pp. 36-37.

"We see politics as the totality of principles suggested as well as the method followed by a world-view in order to reach the status of the common values of humanity... Politics is the presentation of ideas. Its purpose is to carry those ideas into power. It aims at shaping not only the present but also the future. It is not determined and shaped according to the changing conditions. On the contrary, it tries to create an environment conducive for turning its world-view into the common values of humanity while simultaneously incorporating the exigencies of 'change'."

—Ömer V. Hatipoğlu

—Panel, (May-June, 1989)

3. "ISLAMIC MODERNISM" IN ACTION

A. The Ideological Posture of the NSP-PP Line

The PP, among the post-1983 parties in Turkey, is distinguished by its almost total sameness with its predecessor, the NSP, in terms of its ideological posture. The changes observed in its ideological line largely remained particular to the contextual level, far from being essential.

As noted in the last chapter, the PP is trying to establish more comprehensive ties, compared to the NSP, with the other Islamic formations in Turkey. The appearance of many periodicals, not political in content, proved to be influential in creating an intellectual environment in which the PP received closer recognition. This "opening" and the concomitant cultural diversity provided the PP with the opportunity to transcend its relatively isolated position and to form an intellectual power base around itself. Parallel with that there has been an increasing concern for the avoidance of certain symbols, which had adversely affected the image of the party, particularly in the eyes of those segments of the electorate who determine their voting behaviour independently of religious concerns. The need for a new-image building which would not estrange the "non-religious vote", necessitates the avoidance of the past mistakes responsible for the loss of confidence for the NSP which is expressed by a leading member of the PP as "the mobilisation for a new

mission of self-expression and communication to people”⁽¹⁾. The islamic reassertion of the 1980s, on the other hand, reflected itself in the increasing replacement of the party's posts by the younger generations, which may be a factor to further radicalize the Party's conciliatory stand⁽²⁾.

Yet, it may safely be suggested that much remains the same in the ideological posture of the NSP-PP line, though one can observe a shift of emphasis in the political discourse of the PP as a consequence of the re-making of politics and the adoption of market economy after 1980 as well as the increasing manifestations of Islam in society, which brought the problems caused by the violation of human rights and a rising concern for the basic rights and liberties as well as the economic difficulties experienced by a large section of society and worsening distribution of income⁽³⁾ to the forefront.

I. Question of Ideological Change

To a question if the “National Outlook” would be revised given the post-1980 re-structurization of politics, Necmettin Erbakan replied:

“The National Outlook mentality is based on the basic principles. As a matter of fact, these basic principles are determined in accordance with human rights. They refer to the basic rights of state and citizen. In other words, they are incorporated both in the old and new Constitutions. The National Outlook has always remained the same in terms of its fundamental principles. Its adoption to the changing conditions, in this way or another, is out of question, because these are the principles Turkey will always need and can be applied regardless of time and place”⁽⁴⁾.

Thus, “change” in ideological line has nothing to do with the essentials of the National Outlook, to which “axiomatic certitude”⁽⁵⁾ is ascribed. This resistance to change can be better understood when looked at from the vantage point of the primary source out of which the basic principles of the National Outlook are drawn, i.e., Islam. The National Outlook is a specific articulation of Islam by Necmettin Erbakan and his associates justified on the secular grounds because of the secular legal framework in which party politics

has to operate. Yet, as the secretary-general of the PP, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, pointed out, the PP is clearer than the NSP in terms of the unfolding of the National Outlook thanks to the more conducive political atmosphere of the 1980s generated by the Islamic reassertion in society⁽⁶⁾. The NSP was extremely cautious in its stand toward the politico-legal system in Turkey due to the continuous fear of being closed down. Therefore, it constantly emphasized its commitment to the Constitution and espoused a highly cautious political discourse. The programme of the NSP was a clear reflection of that stand. While including detailed suggestions and analysis with respect to such fields as economic problems, international relations, Turkish foreign policy, social justice and morals, it had rather general formulations regarding the political question⁽⁷⁾. This duality in approach, i.e., emphasis of commitment and loyalty to the system at the rhetorical level while tending to adopt an anti-systemic stand in practical grounds became a major feature of the NSP.

The increasing radicalization of the NSP in the late 1970s, though sporadic in its manifestations, is a clear indication of the fact that the NSP's allegiance to the system is due to "tactical" reasons adopted to secure a safe and legitimate place within the system for itself. To be sure, the NSP's radicalisation, in the final analysis, was with reference to the total rejection of the secular system rather than to the adoption of an ideological line cultivating the use of violence against the established order. In other words, the NSP was radical in its end, not in its means leading to that end.

The PP is not different from the NSP in paying lip service to the Constitution. Its programme embodies the claim that the PP is the only political party which represents the essence of the Constitution truly and properly⁽⁸⁾. This stand of the NSP-PP line is well-expressed in the following statement:

"We have no party and should not have any. The law forbids the organization of Muslims around a political party. To act in accordance with laws is our motto. The laws can be criticized yet can not be violated. It is forbidden to establish a political party based on Islam. Then, in order to make the spiritual character of the Turkish nation reigning, we need to proceed from center to periphery, not vice versa"⁽⁹⁾.

In other words, the party politics for the NSP-PP line is a means for the expression

of the National Outlook within the framework of legal constraints through a party programme in order to attain political power. As a matter of fact, what is important for the NSP-PP line is to be in power. In the 1970s, the NSP had joined the RPP government of 1974 as well as the following two National Front governments as one of the coalition partners. Wielding political power in those years furnished the NSP—a political party deriving its legitimacy from religion, which the Kemalist reforms had aimed at relegating to private realm, with political legitimacy, alongside the intrusion into the bureaucracy to form a centre of power to be used for long term gains. It does not make any difference for the NSP-PP line to enter into coalition with the parties of the centre-right or centre-left⁽¹⁰⁾. This “thirst for power” is well-captured in the First National Convention of the PP in 1985 in the motto “At any rate, power!” As Hasan Aksay, the editor-in-chief of *Milli Gazete*—the semi-official daily of the PP, put it “It is imperative for the PP to come into power in order to put an end to evils, profiteering and plundering...”⁽¹¹⁾. Thus there is no point in remaining in opposition for the PP.

In the course of the modernization process in Turkey, the NSP represents a counter breakthrough in the making of the religious opposition with its independent socio-economic power base as well as the political elites, which formed “a second centre”⁽¹²⁾ against the secular intellectual-bureaucratic elites for the first time in the history of the Republic. With this new intra-elite cleavage, the NSP managed to garner the votes of those segments of society which have been alienated by the Kemalist center in social as well as political terms⁽¹³⁾.

An important novelty brought about by the NSP-PP line in this respect is to forge an equation between the religious identity of Muslims and their political preferences. To establish such a parallel between the Muslim faith and voting behaviour oriented the Muslims who had voted for the centre right parties until the establishment of the NSP toward voting along the lines (allegedly) consistent with their Islamic identity⁽¹⁴⁾. In this context, it must be noted that one of the basic aims of the official Islamisation policies pursued under the military administration of 1980-1983 and the following MP government was to disconnect the relationship between political preferences and religious convictions, i.e., the “politicisation of religion.”

II. Ideological Basis of the National Outlook

As to the ideology of the NSP-PP line, named the National outlook, it embodies “a mixture of religious and non-religious themes”⁽¹⁵⁾. It is a combination of Islamic tradition and modernism. Its developmentalist orientation reflects the heavy influence of progressivist-developmental philosophy of the Enlightenment such that its discourse regarding cultural and spiritual matters is expressed through the developmentalist jargon, as reflected in the motto of “spiritual development”. Interestingly enough, the name of the present party of the National Outlook, the PP, again is borrowed from the conceptual framework of the developmentalist ideology⁽¹⁶⁾.

Erbakan and his associates had engaged in politics within the JP and other rightist parties and organisations. Their mental sources and material connections moulded their mind into an interesting synthesis of the traditional sunni-based Islamic culture and sufi world-view embedded within a developmentalist discourse. From the beginning, their political party programme, presented as the “National Outlook”, were marked by a sense of historical heroism, or better “the adoration for the glorious past” as Algar put it,⁽¹⁷⁾ a nationalist-conservative socio-political attitude and a pro-industrialization economic philosophy.

The ideological theses of the NSP-PP line are a product of the combination of a traditionalist discourse and rationalist-positivist conception of science and technology. The programs and platforms of both the NSP and PP contain views and evaluations to the effect that the Turkish nation has undergone a deep-rooted degeneration moralwise due to the emulation of the western way of life, that the reason for the decline of the Ottoman Empire was this mockery, that to regain our historical greatness is bound to attach proper importance to “spiritual development”, that the interest-based and consumption-oriented understanding of industrialization dictated by what one can call “cola-colanization”, speaking through the third world jargon, has paralyzed the national economy and that the road to economic growth passes through the realization of the “Heavy Industry Effort”.

This conceptualization is the reminiscent of the ideological posture of the Islamists in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, which espoused an eclectic attitude toward the

West such that they advocated the reception of the western science and technology while preserving the indigeneous cultural roots and civilization in order to close the developmental gap between the West and the Ottoman Empire. As Toprak observed, the protection of society against immoral and decadent insults of the West is a common theme to be found in all nationalist-conservative formulations of modernization⁽¹⁸⁾.

Thus, according to the NSP-PP line, westernization is the western model of modernity. It is based on and shaped by the interests and cultural patterns of the West. Accordingly, one can talk of Soviet or Chinese models of modernity. In other words, modernization process is culture-specific and hence the modernization experience of a certain nation can not be generalized over other nations. While distinguishing modernisation from westernisation and accepting the necessity of the creation of modernity along national lines, the NSP-PP line sees the exploitation and domination of the Muslim world by western industrial powers as the main cause of the economic backwardness of the Muslim umma. It sees industrialization in line with the dependency perspective as the only way to break the chains of the international division of labor imposed by the world capitalist system and to gain politico-economic independence⁽¹⁹⁾. Again, the import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy is conceived to be a counter revolutionary strategy of economic growth which would end the dependency of the third world and naturally, in NSP-PP case, of the Muslim world. The famous “Heavy Industry Effort” of the NSP when it was in power in the 1970s was a manifestation of this line of thought. In order to better understand the commitment of the NSP-PP line to industrialization “almost with a religious zeal”⁽²⁰⁾, one need to analyze the context in which it is taken up as well as policies suggested for the solution of the problem.

III. The National Outlook and the Question of Industrialization

According to the National Outlook, industrialization is a “matter of life and death” It is the major factor in gaining economic independence and political superiority. This is why the non-industrialized, “less developed” countries of the third world have been subject to the domination of the industrialized countries⁽²¹⁾.

In this context, for the NSP-PP line, the question of industrialization is a matter with both material and spiritual dimensions. Because man is created with material as well as spiritual dispositions and because he occupies a central place in every human effort, an industrialization process without a spiritual dimension is incomplete. Accordingly, the realization of industrialization with a human side, according to the National Outlook, is closely related to the type of economic order adopted. In this respect, both capitalism and communism are inhumane strategies of economic growth. Both are the same in nature. They compartmentalize the human existence into two separate world, material and spiritual. Both are materialist and consider exploitation legitimate in terms of their cultures and interests⁽²²⁾.

According to Erbakan, humanity has been and is under the oppression of the western civilisation for three centuries, which takes to the view that “might is right”. This oppression is enforced through the two tools of the World Zionism: capitalism and communism. Both of these views are based on the mentality which considers power superior to right and justice. Therefore, both are the orders of the “oppressed and the oppressor”. The only difference between them is that the oppressor in communist order is the state itself while in capitalist order it is the capitalist class. Both of them foster material development at the expense of spiritual satisfaction⁽²³⁾.

Then, all the models of economic growth which does not take to the motto “First morals and spirituality” is wrong. Islam, however, has its own unique economic order distinct from both capitalism and communism. It takes the needs of both society and individual into consideration. It envisages a “man of morals” rather than “homo economics” of the liberal ideology. The balanced mentality of Islam considers private ownership and profit legitimate while charging Muslims with the responsibility of being productive. There is no room for wasting and interest, as is the case in capitalism. In short, Islam is free from the weaknesses of both system⁽²⁴⁾.

IV. The “Just Economic Order” of the PP

In the 1980s, it seems that the policy-makers of the PP elaborated on the economic ideology of the National Outlook and turned it into a more comprehensive and coherent

economic programme, called the “Just Economic Order.” The emphasis on justice reflects both the party's sensitivity to the worsening socio-economic conditions of the popular sector, comprising lower and lower-middle classes, and at the same time its conception of “right”, which refuses the western conception of “might is right”.

According to Erbakan and other leaders of the party, in the western context, “power”, “majority principle”, “privilege” and “interest” are the four sources leading to the emergence of “rights”. This understanding fosters the perpetuation of oppression in the world. In the order which would bring happiness to humanity, “right” is thought to emerge in the following cases : 1) The basic rights granted to man by birth: These are the right to live; the right to believe, the right to property and the right to protect one's own intellect, belief and family; 2) The rights caused by labour, 3) The rights emerged from voluntary contracts, and 4) The rights necessitated by the sense of justice. It is essential for the peace and happiness of humanity to rule in accordance with the understanding favoring the prevalence of “right” and justice⁽²⁵⁾.

According to the economic model of the National Outlook, industrialization is only the material side of the Just Economic Order. In other words, industrialization and material development refer to the same phenomenon. In this respect, in order to attain a satisfactory level of industrialization, the Just Economic Order suggests a number of basic principles. In the first place, wasting should be ended. The wrong economic priorities, such as the channeling of resources to tourism sector is included in the definition of wasting. All the taxes and funds are to be abolished. State should finance its expenditures through revenues obtained from its active contribution to production process. Policies with respect to taxes were increasingly given a radical nature such that in the 1970s, the NSP advocated the arrangement of taxes in accordance with the principle of equity. Thus, taxes should be imposed on capital and wealth, not on profits. But now, it is for the total abolishment of taxes and governmental funds. The credit system in the Just Economic Order would be restructured so as to prevent the injustices in the distribution of credits which presently favors the rich over the poor. There would be no such thing as the “compression” of the popular sector and unjust income differentials caused by the high interest rates and improper distribution of credits. Most important of all, the interest would be abolished,

which makes the rich richer and the poor poorer and hence gives rise to socio-political unrest.

As is seen, the most radical measure deemed to be essential in the Just Economic Order is the abolishment of interest. According to the National Outlook this is the key to the social peace and justice⁽²⁶⁾. Interest-free banking based on “profit-sharing” is suggested as the alternative to the present banking system. Yet, Erbakan sees the financial institutions presently operating on interest-free principles in Turkey as only the first step toward the realization of the interest-free banking system of the Just Economic Order⁽²⁷⁾.

The Just Economic Order aims at social justice and increasing prosperity. It claims to be the alternative to the usurious capitalist system, which destroys the economy and superexploites the people through its five “microbes”: interest, unjust taxes, the issuance of money not matched in production, floating exchange rate system and credit system. All these “microbes” work against workers, farmers, civil servants, artisans and other lower income groups. They serve only the interests of a very small “collaborationist” minority. Inflation, unemployment, heavy costs of living and all the rest of it, coupled with the bad income distribution drag the country into the atmosphere of social and political unrest. Besides, this “Economic Order of Slavery”, as Erbakan put it, accelerates moral decadence on the part of both the rich and the poor.

In the present “Economic Order of Slavery”, the 92 percent of what one earns is taken away from him and only 8 percent stays with him. In the Just Economic Order, however, every person will earn twelve times more than one earns now. How? In the present order, one third of the cost of production is accounted by interest. Another one third consist of government taxes. Thus, when interest and taxes are removed from the costs of the production, the prices would fall into one-third of the present level. In other words, with the same working capital, the production would increase more than three times and this would create three-fold employment capacity than before. This is the solution envisaged for the unemployment question. Because there would be no tax and interest among the cost items, the cost of production will get cheaper and this would lead to an export boom, in the real sense of the word. Also, the market question for the export

goods would be resolved through the establishment of a common market with the Muslim countries⁽²⁸⁾.

The new Just Economic Order can be analyzed at five levels :

1. General Principles:

These principles define the general features of the order. The first one is the “horizontal etatism”. That is, the role of state in economy would be to prepare macro plans and guide the general course of the economy. The state would be responsible for infrastructure and not involved actively in the production process. It would secure the coordination between economic enterprises. The second principle is the conduct of economic activities in the production and distribution process through private sector. The “diffused private sector” conceived as a joint-stock company having at least one hundred shareholders, each of whom holding no more than 5 per cent of the total shares and supported by the interest-free loans of the state would be instrumental in the realization of “national”, “powerful”, “rapid” and “widespread” industrialization⁽²⁹⁾. In this context, the driving force in the development efforts would not be the “happy minority” of liberal capitalism or the state as suggested by the leftist view. This role would be undertaken by the “Regional Development Companies”⁽³⁰⁾.

The determination of prices in the market as well as the ascription of the main economic activities to the private sector brings with it the question if the “Just Economic Order” (JEO) of the National Outlook is different from capitalism in its essentials. According to Erbakan, you can play both chess and draught on the same board. That board can be converted into a chess or draught-board in line with the prescribed rules of the game. The difference is in the changing rules of the game. Similarly, free market can operate both in accordance with capitalism and the Just Economic Order⁽³¹⁾. In other words, the “invisible hand of the market” is equally responsive to both. To take “free market” as the “given variable” has nothing to do with liberal capitalism.

2. Monetary Policy:

The so-called “economic question” is the enormous gap between the productive capacity of man and his infinite wishes and desires. Thus, what is to be done is to forge a

balance between production and consumption through restricting the “right to consume” according to one's contribution to the economic production. In the JEO, money is the measure of the exchange value between production and consumption. It is not a good in itself. It is a unit of measurement. It shows how much one can consume in accordance with the value of one's contribution to production. Therefore, in the JEO, the amount of money issued is equal to the amount of goods and services produced in economy. The extra-issuance of money is only for the renewal of the worn-out paper monies.

Interest on money would be abolished, for this is the recognition of consumption right unjustly to those who do not contribute in the production process. It is a means of exploitation and hence unless it is abolished, the Just Economic Order can not be established. In the last analysis, interest is a Zionist tax levied by the Zionist banks, which sustains the present “Economic Order of Slavery”.

The policy of fixed exchange rate would be adapted, and because under the JEO there would be no issuance of money exceeding the production limits, inflation would disappear without any difficulty⁽³²⁾.

3. Credit Policy:

Banks would be owned by the state. Yet, private banks can be established as well. In the new JEO, banks would provide seven kind of credits free of interest needed by entrepreneurs among which are, credit resources created through the joining of capital on the basis of profit-sharing the credits based on the acquired rights principle, credits in exchange of labour, investment credits and the like⁽³³⁾.

4. Fiscal Policy:

The state can not levy any tax on unilateral basis. In order to levy taxes, the state should produce the equivalent amount of goods or services. In the new JEO, all taxes would be abolished and the state can not tax any person or any company. The share of the state in the production under the JEO would be one-fifth of the total. The state revenues would be obtained from the state's contribution to the general production. The right to tax is related to one of the basic rights of man, i.e., the right to property. Therefore, no politi-

cal body, including the National Assembly can not set taxes. The tax limits should be determined by the Constitution⁽³⁴⁾.

5. Social Security Policy:

The Just Economic Order would ensure universal social security funded by government resources. In fact, social solidarity is a natural corollary of the type of relations that the National Outlook aspires, i.e., the warm and humane atmosphere of “communitarian” social existence, which would end the atomization brought about by “mass society”. The altruistic character of human relations would create a work ethics and communal responsibility such that it would trigger economic development which is essential in regaining historical greatness⁽³⁵⁾.

V. The National Outlook and the Education System

To be sure, in the creation of an industrial society with “pre-modern” values, the adoption of a creative educational policy is crucial. The education policy should emphasize the national-moral values on the one hand, and give priority to creative works rather than the imitation of western culture and technology,⁽³⁶⁾ on the other. Regarding educational policy, the PP suggests the “Just Order of Science” and the “Just Order of Morals”⁽³⁷⁾.

Thus, the creation of an appropriate socio-cultural milieu for the spiritual and material development of children is imperative in raising the new generations free from the “imitative mentality” of the former generations⁽³⁸⁾. In this regard, the western cultural permissiveness inculcated into the youth through education is responsible for the moral decadence and corruptness of Turkish society, manifested in the western style of wearing, TV, movie and theatre programs detrimental to the national values and the increasingly weakening family ties⁽³⁹⁾. According to the National Outlook, dedication to moral values and to the supremacy of just rule in the sense of the Islamic conception of what is right, are the central concepts around which society should be restructured.

VI. The NSP-PP Line and the Turkish Political System

The renewal of “nomenclatura” in the political discourse of the PP can be observed in its approach to the present political regime as well. According to PP, an Economic Order of Slavery has been implemented in Turkey through “modern imperialism” by the world imperialist and Zionist powers. The persistence of this “Order of Slavery” has been made possible through the enforcement of a regime of “repression and deception”. The deceptive character of the political regime is an inevitable corollary of the “Economic Order of Slavery”.

According to Erbakan, there is no overlapping between the rights and liberties as recognized in the Constitution and in their manner of implementation in practice. The whole political business is just another case of “everybody is equal, but some are more equal” situation⁽⁴⁰⁾. Although the Constitution prescribes that Turkey is a democratic state, the practical appearance of this is a “guided democracy”. Again, according to the Constitution, Turkey is a secular state. In practice, however, this is understood as the “right to oppress Muslims”. Political independence is one of the basic principles laid down in the Constitution. Yet, Turkey's application to the European Community for full membership will lead to the suspension of that principle.

In short, the present political regime, in line with the requirements of the present economic order, is a regime of deception. And, as long as Turkey remains in the western sphere of influence, the possibility of the establishment of a “real” democratic order will not be materialized. In order to sustain this state of affairs, many articles in violation of basic human rights are inserted into the Political Parties Law, Election Law and the like⁽⁴¹⁾.

The PP suggests the “Just Political Order” as the “cure” for the prevailing “regime of deception.” Thus, in the first place, a national Constitution should be made free from “outside influences”, which would eliminate the obstacles to the freedom of belief and thought and at the same time would represent a valid social contract among different groups in society. As Erbakan put it “In our Just Political Order, everybody has the right to live in accordance with his beliefs”⁽⁴²⁾. In case that no compromise is arrived at among

societal forces, Erbakan asserts that everyone should be given the right to live as he sees proper. This “anarchical stand” connotes the idea of “distinct islands of social existence“, which is not too different from civil society discourse, particularly regarding the role of state.

According to Erbakan, democracy is not an end but a means. The end is the establishment of a just and prosperous order. If the democratic process in practice turns into a tyrannical order, it will lose its egalitarian spirit. Therefore, in the Just Political Order, every alternative, including those espoused by the imitators of the “Western Club”, would be presented under equal conditions to the masses. The Constitution would preserve the human rights as well as restrict the political power so as to prevent the oppression by the state. A peaceful environment of political as well as cultural pluralism would secure the coexistence of different ways of life. Although there is not much clarity about the extent of the pluralism envisaged to prevail in the Just Political Order of the PP, Erbakan sees no problem in placing his approach beside that of the “civil society project”, which has gained increasing recognition in certain secular intellectual circles in recent years⁽⁴³⁾.

For the NSP-PP line, the political spectrum in Turkey consists of two poles: The National Outlook and other views espoused by what Erbakan once called the “members of the Western Club“. The National outlook is being represented by the PP, while the views derivative of “Western Outlook“ are presently represented by the MP, the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, TPP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SDPP)⁽⁴⁴⁾. The PP rejects the right-left cleavage on the ground that it is a reflection of functional and ideological cleavages into the political spectrum, which are given birth to in the materialist societies, and therefore sees itself outside this classification. As a matter of fact, the so-called leftist or rightist parties are the representative of the different versions of the capitalist order. They are the creations of a seemingly pluralist understanding, based on western cultural monism. Thanks to various social and psychological factors, the parties which are the close replica of one another in terms of their aims and programmes are presented as different political formations. A nation, which has never been materialist throughout its history, can not be casted in these terms. Therefore, the PP considers the prevalence of the “National Outlook” as its primary goal⁽⁴⁵⁾.

The views and policies formulated by Erbakan under the rubrics of “national-spiritual development” and the National Outlook,—given the legal and constitutional restraints which force the NSP-PP line to enter a “symbolic dialogue”⁽⁴⁶⁾ with its political clienteles, is generally understood as the only way out to represent the Islamic ideology within the legal framework in the eyes of its followers. Therefore, the removal of those articles scattered in different laws which forbid the politicisation of religion and especially the article 163 of the penal code were of prime importance to the NSP. The same emphasis continued with the PP. Yet, when the article 163 of the Penal Code was abolished by the Law for Struggle Against Terror in April 1991, this has not brought about any change in the PP’s political discourse. The “duality in approach” inherited from the NSP has lingered on. When asked if there would occur any change in the programme of the PP given the abolishment of the article 163, Erbakan stated that since the Law on the Organisation of Political Parties remains intact, an Islamist Party can not be founded on legal grounds and claimed that the freedom of thought and conscious can not be fully recognized by the western-oriented present political parties, for, in that case, the imperialism, which dictates its commands to those parties, can not sustain its exploitation secured by the present Economic Order of Slavery⁽⁴⁷⁾. This state of affairs is also a clear indication of “deceptive and repressive“ character of the present political order. What all this amounts to is that the elimination of the “order of exploitation” and the recognition of the freedom of thought and conscious can only be possible when the PP come into power.

Accordingly, it can be suggested that the PP will continue to justify itself on the secular grounds, as the NSP did, because it prefers playing the political game according to the rules determined outside its will to withdrawing from it at the expense of the disruption of its political discourse. This pragmatism, however, is counteracted by a rigid stand toward change in ideological lines⁽⁴⁸⁾.

The NSP-PP line has avoided to take a clear stance with regard to “problematic” issues and deemed those issues as if inexistant. Of course, the main reason for the adoption of such a line is that the NSP-PP line operates within the system without being identified with it because of its allegiance to cautiously disguised Islamic justification ground. Regarding the issue of Ataturkism, for example, the PP keeps silent and put itself outside

the discussions concerned at the level of its official discourse. Asiltürk, the secretary-general of the PP, explains this stance as follows:

“Everybody is Ataturkist in Turkey... All the groups who hold opposite views to Ataturkism have disguised their actual ideological orientation by pretending to be the real Ataturkist. In this connection, we are resolved not to exploit Ataturkism and hence determine our position accordingly”⁽⁴⁹⁾.

Although, in 1989 the PP's mayor of Urfa province publicly declared that “I'm neither secular nor Ataturkist”, an indication of the potential for radicalization particularly strong among the lower ranks of the party, nevertheless, this does not denote a departure from the traditional cautious line and remained at the level of “personal explosion”.

VII. The NSP-PP Line and the Turkish Foreign Policy

Contrary to the pragmatic and moderate orientation dominating its official rhetoric, the NSP-PP line is quite vocal and, in a way, rather radical in its grasp of Turkish Foreign Policy within the international context. The conceptualization of the relations between the Muslim World and the West and, in that connection, the making of Turkish Foreign Policy, centre around the idea of the “zionist plot for the world domination”. According to Erbakan, in the World Zionist Congress of 1897 in Basel, a three-phase strategy was adopted. The first phase was the founding of an independent Jewish state in Palestine. This aim was materialized with the establishment of Israel in 1948. The second phase was the realization of the Great Israel extending from the Nile river to the South-East Anatolia. The occupation of Arab lands and the rendering of the holy Jerusalem the eternal capital city of Israel point to this aspiration. Turkey's entrance into the European Community (EC) is another important step of this phase. This would incorporate Turkey to Israel in that Israel too would be a full member of the EC following Turkey's membership. The third phase is the Zionist World domination through the elimination of Islam from all over the world⁽⁵⁰⁾.

The Zionist connection shed lights on the westernization process of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. By means of westernization, the National Outlook has

been taken away from our nation and its creative mind was replaced by an “imitative spirit”. The scientists and the learned man of a nation can not produce original works by wasting time with the translations of foreign works. The industrialization efforts are confined to the production of light consumer goods. This was the first phase of the estrangement of the Turkish nation from the National Outlook. The second phase was that of exploitation. In this phase, economic and cultural imperialism have been intensified. The third phase will end up with the loss of independence, which corresponds to Turkey's entrance into the EC. The fourth and last phase, is the disappearance from the international scene of national existence⁽⁵¹⁾.

Beginning with the 1970s, the NSP vehemently criticized Turkey's efforts toward integration with European Common Market (EEC), mainly because of the above-described ideological and political reasons. Unlike some leftist circles who opposed Turkey's entrance into the Common Market due to economical reasons, the main factors in the NSP's opposition to the EEC were cultural and ideological ones.

In the political context of the 1980s, the leaders of the PP found a direct connection between the Islamic reassertion in Turkey and Turkey's application to the European Community for the full membership in 1987. To the PP, Turkey's application in question is an attempt by the West to take the Islamic reassertion in Turkey and the world under its control⁽⁵²⁾. The NSP-PP line sees the membership to the EC as submission to the crusaders by way of forming a joint government, a collective army, a common unit of currency and a joint assembly under a joint political leadership⁽⁵³⁾. In this sense, membership to the EC represents a betrayal against our historical mission, conception of civilization and culture as well as our independence. It is the last chain of the westernization process and the denial of our Muslim identity. The *weltanschauung* underlying the “Christian club” called the EC and the National Outlook are drastically opposite. Therefore, the coexistence of them is out of question.

Yet, despite the strong opposition to Turkey's full membership to the EC, the NSP-PP line is not against collaboration with the West. Unless they do not take the form of “master-servant” type relation, all sorts of commercial, military or otherwise connections

with the West embody no risks and are to the mutual benefits of the parties concerned⁽⁵⁴⁾.

At a more general level, according to the National Outlook, the basic ends of the Turkish Foreign Policy should be 1) “an honourable foreign policy”; 2) “the preservation of the national rights and”, 3) “Turkey being a leader state, not a satellite!” In the changing conjuncture of the international environment caused by the dissolution of the communist world, humanity is after a new system, which can only be met by the Just Order offered by the National Outlook. To achieve this, the Just Order first should be established in Turkey. In the process, all sorts of ties should be forged with the Muslim countries in the world at all levels. In this context, a Muslim United Nation, as an alternative to the UN, which is under the western domination, a Muslim Economic Community (instead of the EC), with an Islamic Dinar as a common unit of currency, and a Muslim version of the NATO and of UNESCO must be created⁽⁵⁵⁾. This would put the Muslim world in a powerful position against World Zionism and imperialism. Because the Just Order would constitute the mainstay of this new formation, its purpose would be to secure the happiness of all humanity, not exploitation. Therefore, the relations between the Muslim world and the industrialized western countries as well as the “developing” countries would be characterized by mutual friendship and understanding. Incidentally, while the NSP approved Turkey's NATO membership in the context of the cold war, the PP's attitude toward NATO seems to be getting negative after the breakdown of the Warsaw pact, as reflected in the party's opposition to Turkey's involvement in the Gulf war⁽⁵⁶⁾.

According to Erbakan, in the new international context emerged after the dissolution of the communist system and the inability of capitalism to remedy the social problems caused by it, the agenda of Turkey should be made up of the following matters: 1) to stop the devastation caused by the political parties caught up with the “imitative spirit” since the transition to multi-party system. The most important and large-scale harm has been done in the fields of morals and spirituality; 2) to produce solutions to such problems as inflation, unemployment, and increasing concentration of income brought about by the present Economic Order of Slavery; 3) to replace the present political regime of “repression and deception”, which is the main barrier before the freedom of thought and conscience, with the Just Political Order of the National Outlook; 4) to prevent the “Common Market disaster”, for it will end up with the loss of independence of Turkey⁽⁵⁷⁾.

B. Political Discourse of the NSP-PP Line

Drawing upon the press conferences of Erbakan held during 1990, it can be claimed that the political discourse of the PP has not drastically changed compared to that of the NSP. In a content analysis of the Party's semi-official daily, *Milli Gazete*, Alkan found that "while strictly religious subjects became less prominent in Erbakan's speeches between 1973 and 1980, non-religious ones gained increasing importance"⁽⁵⁸⁾. Of the eight subjects that received less attention, according to Alkan, only two ('Industrialization and Social Policy') do not seem to be connected with religion. While the categories "Religion"; "Moral Development, Morals, Spiritual Beliefs"; and "Secularism" are directly related to religion, the remaining three are only indirectly related: "Liberties, Human Rights, Democracy"; "Cultural, Historical and Ethnoconetric Issues"; and "Education". By contrast, none of the seven categories showing increased importance are directly related to religion. These categories are: "Foreign Policy"; "Economy in General"; "Terrorism"; "High Cost of living"; "Anti-Semitism, "Zionism"; "Westernization, Western Club, Cultural Alienation"; and "Bureaucracy, Public Administration". Out of these seven categories, only two of them "Anti-Semitism, Zionism"; and "Westernization, Western Club, Cultural Alienation" plus one subcategory of "Foreign Policy" ("Relations with Muslim Countries") are indirectly related⁽⁵⁹⁾. The other subcategories of Foreign Policy in Erbakan's Speeches are composed of "Foreign Policy in General"; "Cyprus"; and "Common Market". As Alkan observed:

"The decreasing importance of religion in Erbakan's rethoric does not necessarily indicate that less significance was given to religion in his or party's ideology. ... (In fact) religious militancy became more pronounced over time... the emphasis on religion in 1973 may have emerged from a need to delineate the ideological identity of the NSP. Once this has been achieved, however, day-to-day politics apparently pushed religious issues to the background"⁽⁶⁰⁾.

Among the issues dominating the political rhetoric of Erbakan in the 1980s, however, "religious ones", as Alkan put it, have received increasing emphasis in line with the overall more "Islamized" political context⁽⁶¹⁾. Such issues categorized in Alkan's study as

“Liberties, Human rights and Democracy”,—in this respect the party dwelled upon the abolishment of the article 163, and though somewhat reluctantly, the articles 141-142 of the Penal Code, the ban on wearing of headscarf by female Muslim students alongside the “sporadic” dismissal of Islamists from the ranks of the civil-military bureaucracy; “Anti-Zionism”; “Westernization”; and above all, the political developments in the Muslim world and Turkey’s relations with Muslim countries may be considered as the indications of this.

The press conferences of Erbakan held during 1990 generally composed of two sections: 1) The Developments in the World; 2) The Developments at Home. Under the section of the “Developments in the World”, Erbakan treated exclusively the political problems faced by the Muslims all over the world: from the Moro muslims struggling for political independence in Philippine to the Indian Muslims in Kashmir struggling for the same aim; from the Muslims in Ethiopia to the Palestine and Afghanistan questions. The developments outside the Muslim World, to Erbakan, consists of the systemic vacuum emerged with the breakdown of the communist World which points to the urgent need for a new paradigm at the systemic level, i.e., “the Just Order” of the National Outlook.

The “Developments at Home” section was composed of the evaluation of the election results and if there was no election, the issues regarding Turkish Foreign Policy in general, the relations with the European Community and Muslim countries plus the USA. The “standard agenda” comprised the issues related to the political freedoms of the Muslims—a theme that was touched upon in all of those conferences⁽⁶²⁾.

Yet, the emphasis on religion by the PP has been overwhelmed by the party’s appeal for social welfare and social justice⁽⁶³⁾. The 1980s have been the years, for the popular sector, of the increasingly worsening living conditions. The share of that sector in the total GNP was badly affected from the measures taken to reorient the economy toward the world markets. Unemployment persisted. Industrialization came to a standstill. The inflation drastically increased the costs of living. For the first time in the Republican history, a rentier class was created. Accordingly, while the share of wage earners in the GNP decreased, those of profit, interest and rent reached unprecedented levels. Besides, the bar-

gaining power of the trade unions was severely limited by the labor laws enacted during the military rule of 1980-1983. All these exacerbated the alienation of large sections of the popular class from the ruling MP, which has been the champion of “neo-liberalism”.

Against this background, a corresponding shift of emphasis has taken place in the PP's discourse. In one of the party's pamphlet, titled “Türkiye'nin Gerçek Durumu: Sebep-leri Teşhis” (The Real Situation of Turkey: The Diagnosis of The Causes), the “symptoms” of the illnesses suffered by the “man in the street” were suggested to be “high costs of living, poverty, misery, hunger, unemployment, bribery, inequality of opportunity, backwardness in terms of living conditions, the unjust distribution of income, exploitation, oppression, injustices, inflation, the increasing worsening of day-to-day living conditions and moral decadence manifested in the increase in the number of mentally-afflicted patients, divorce and suicide”⁽⁶⁴⁾. In view of such an “unjust” situation, the PP has come up with its alternative economic programme called the Just Economic Order promising justice and prosperity. Thus, one can see a parallel shift in the slogans and agitation motifs of the PP such as “Prices are on the European standards; the wages a tenth of it” and “A Turkey working and earning, not sitting and silenced”.

The changing profile of the PP in contrast to the NSP in terms of its political discourse and agitation motifs led some observers of the Turkish politics to conclude that this state of affairs may well be the signs of a probable shift in the electoral base of the PP, which now is attempting to reach civil servants and workers as potential party supporters⁽⁶⁵⁾. In the absence of survey data, it is difficult to substantiate this thesis. Yet, it can be concluded that if there has been such a change in the profile of the PP's support base, this points to the fact that the small merchants, traders, shopkeepers and artisans, which generally thought to constitute the core of the defunct NSP's power base by the students of Turkish politics, despite the absence of any survey data indicating such a connection, are no longer the backbone of the clientele of the NSP-PP line⁽⁶⁶⁾.

To conclude, at the end of its twenty years, the basic contours of the ideological orientation of the NSP-PP line seems to have remained the same. Nevertheless, because it has been casted within a highly populist and pragmatic discourse, the new dynamics and formations brought about by the changing socio-political environment of the 1980s have been, to some extent, articulated into the political discourse of the PP.

C. The NSP-PP Line and the Electoral Competition

I. Organizational Network of the NSP-PP Line

The organizational network of the PP, like its predecessor, NSP, is an important factor in the party's political appeal. Alongside the official party branches organized along vertical lines, there are also a number of organizations that the PP has horizontal, though informal, ties. Although the party does not have the equivalent of the pre-1980 youth organization (Akıncılar), which was the action-oriented arms of the NSP, it has managed to socialize part of the youth into the National Outlook through the branches of the Foundation of the National Youth (Milli Gençlik Vakfı), scattered all over the country. Since the Law for the Organisation of Party Politics passed in 1983 has banned for the political parties to establish youth and women branches as well as any organizational ties with other interest group associations, there emerged an informal network of organizations that has close ties with political parties. Accordingly, the PP too has established indirect contacts with the Association of the Voice of Women (Hanımların Sesi Derneği), unlike the NSP which did not have any women's association. The Hak-İş Confederation,—a trade union affiliated with the NSP, which founded in 1976, has been the only union alongside the Turk-İş Confederation that continued its activities after the military coup of the September 12, 1980. The Association of the Basic Rights and Liberties (Temel Haklar ve Hürriyetler Derneği) and The Writer's Union of Turkey (Türkiye Yazarlar Birliği) can be cited, among others, as the associations affiliated with the PP. The migrant Turkish workers in Germany who are members of the Organisations of the National Outlook in Germany (Milli Görüş Almanya Teşkilatları) has provided the PP with financial help as well as volunteers who visited Turkey during elections in order to propagate the party's views in the campaign.⁽⁶⁷⁾

II. Electoral Support Base of the NSP

It is generally alleged that the NSP has been supported mainly by the marginal groups in Turkish society. Mardin, for instance, argued that the groups who are unassimilated into the modernist center and hence alienated by the Kemalist “cultural revolution” probably tended to support the NSP more than other groups in society: Because of the anti-capitalist rhetoric of the NSP and its emphasis on populist social justice, it is suggested that it aimed to draw support from the “men of the bazaar”, i.e., Turkish provincial

craft groups, known as “Esnaf”⁽⁶⁸⁾. Although there is no firm evidence of “Esnaf” support of the NSP, the relative strength of the NSP in Turkish provincial towns is considered to be the indication of such a link⁽⁶⁹⁾. This may explain the reason for the NSP’s relatively powerful position in not the most underdeveloped areas but in relatively less developed areas of Turkey, particularly in the conservative segment of the provincial towns⁽⁷⁰⁾.

According to Özbudun, the decline of the socio-economic mobility of the “Anatolian petty bourgeoisie” found its voice in the anti-Western, anti-big business, anti capitalist and anti-socialist stance of the NSP⁽⁷¹⁾. Yet, if the NSP indeed was the party of the small merchants and artisans, it would be more appropriate to see this support more as the reflection of the Islamic conservatism of those groups⁽⁷²⁾ rather than a mere “reflection of the association between social mobility and political participation”⁽⁷³⁾. For, it is difficult to forge a rational link between the NSP’s plea for the establishment of heavy industry and the total abolishment of interest and the artisan-shopkeepers’ support for it under the protectionist economic policies followed in the late 1960s, which provided the industrialists with cheap credit resources under low rate of inflation and secured them from outside competition. Such a link is more plausible in competitive market economies where high inflation and high interest rates on credits cause great difficulties for the small industrialists and merchants.

III. Social Characteristics of the NSP-PP Parliamentary Leadership

Despite the alleged relationship between the NSP and the small bourgeoisie, this was not reflected in the occupational breakdown of the NSP parliamentary candidates. Taking Toprak’s figures as a basis for comparison with the PP, one finds that the main difference between the NSP parliamentary candidates in 1973 election and those of the PP in 1987 election is the sharp increase in the number of those classified under “Free Professions” category which rose from 155 (33.7 %) in 1973 to 226 (50.2 %) in 1987. Yet, in both elections those who belonged to free professions outnumbered the members of “Government service” (19.2 %; 17.7 %) and of “Industry and commerce” (21.2 %; 13.3 %) respectively, as seen in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1: Professions of NSP Candidates, 1973 Election

Profession	Number	Percentage %
Free Professions	155	33.7
Engineers	64	14.2
Lawyers	31	6.8
Economists	21	4.6
Accountants-Financial Consultants	10	1.8
Technicians	17	3.7
Doctor-Pharmacists	12	2.6
Government Service	87	19.2
Teachers	40	8.8
Retired Officers	28	6.2
Bureaucrats	19	4.2
Industry and Commerce	96	21.2
Farmers	20	4.4
Clerics	13	2.8
Trade Unionists	10	1.8
Other	69	15.3

Source: Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (Leiden : E.J.Brill, 1981), p. 106.

Table 2: Professions of PP Candidates, 1987 Election

Profession	Number	Percentage %
Free Professions	226	50.2
Engineers	72	16.0
Lawyers	40	8.8
Economists	17	3.7
Accountants-Financial Consultants	22	4.8
Technicians	10	2.2
Doctor-Pharmacists	31	6.8
Architects	5	1.1
Shoopkeepers-Artisans	9	2.0
Contractors	13	2.8
Journalists	7	1.5
Government Service	80	17.7
Teachers	48	10.6
Retired Officers	12	2.6
Bureaucrats	20	4.4
Industry and Commerce	60	13.3
Farmers	10	2.2
Clerics	11	2.4
Trade Unionists	3	0.6
Other	58	12.8

Compiled from : *Resmi Gazete*, 22 Kasım 1987, Pazar, Sayı : 19642.

Like the NSP, PP too,—though the proportion of religious functionaries is not too high (2.4%) compared to other categories, has many candidates with a religious background, e.g., theologians among teachers being more than 56,2 percent. While the proportion of government officials (19.2; 17.7) remained more or less the same, that of the business and commerce dropped more than one third (21.2; 13.3). In terms of education, a continuum between the NSP and PP can be observed. While almost two thirds (65.2 per cent) of NSP parliamentarians in 1973 were university graduates⁽⁷⁴⁾ this figure was more or less the same (62.4 percent) in the PP's parliamentary candidates in 1987 (calculated from *Resmi Gazete*, 22 Kasım 1987, Pazar).

The professional and educational characteristics of the parliamentarians or parliamentary candidates of the NSP-PP line point to the fact that

“(They)... are, on the whole, well educated, professionally successful, presumably of middle or upper-middle class income, and relatively young. They do not fit the image of the stereotype religious fanatic. Neither do they fit the category of men who have been adversely affected by modernization and turned to religion as a means of registering their discontent”⁽⁷⁵⁾.

IV. Characteristics of the NSP-PP Voters

Alongside the social background of the parliamentary leadership of the NSP and PP, the characteristics of the voters of those parties need to be analyzed, though within a tentative framework due to the absence of sufficient survey data, which makes it difficult to reach firm conclusions in this regard. According to a survey conducted by the daily *Milliyet* prior to the 1973 elections, the NSP was supported mainly due to its ideological orientation which was overtly religious. The NSP was the “least preferable party” among the majority of the young people (21-30 category)⁽⁷⁶⁾.

According to a public opinion polls conducted in 1989, the age profile of the PP seems to have changed compared to the NSP. Today, unlike the NSP, the PP is not the “least preferable party” among the youth. As Table 4 clearly shows, 13.6 per cent of those who are in the category of 21-24 age identified themselves with spiritualist-Islamist tendencies, an ideological category most prone to the PP. The reason for voting for the PP, however, has remained the same given the fact that the majority of those who considered themselves either spiritualist-Islamist or traditionalist-conservative preferred to cast their votes for the PP. (see Table 3).

Table 3: Voter Types By Age

AGE	Centerist-Liberal	Social Democrat	Traditionalist-Conservative	Spiritualist-Islamist
21-24	11.5	22.3	12.1	13.6
25-34	25.1	29.5	27.9	28.2
35-44	31.9	25.9	20.0	14.5
45-54	12.6	13.7	19.4	24.5
55 and above	18.8	8.6	20.6	19.1
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: PROFİL TÜRKİYE 1989: Değerler, Tutumlar, Davranışlar, (Turkey 1989: Values, Attitudes, Behaviours), PIAR-SIAR, p. 132.

Table 4: The Voting Preferences By Different Voter Types

	Centerist-Liberal	Social Democrat	Traditionalist-Conservative	Spiritualist-Islamist
Motherland Party	25.1	6.5	18.2	6.4
True Path Party	23.6	9.4	13.3	25.5
Social Democratic Populist Party	19.4	42.4	2.4	8.2
Democratic Left Party	14.7	29.5	8.5	8.2
Prosperity Party	3.1	—	24.2	34.5
Nationalist Work Party	2.1	2.2	10.3	4.5
Reformist Democratic Party	0.5	—	6.7	0.9
Don't know	9.9	7.9	12.1	8.2
No answer	1.6	2.2	4.2	3.6

Source: PROFİL TÜRKİYE 1989: Değerler Tutumlar, Davranışlar, (Turkey 1989: Values, Attitudes, Behaviours), PIAR-SIAR, p. 130.

It should be noted that there is not much difference between traditionalist-conservatives and spiritualist Islamists in terms of electoral behaviour.

The religious character of the NSP and PP voter has been confirmed by the present secretary-general of the PP, Oğuzhan Asultürk, as follows:

“Our support base is composed generally of people who are committed to their moral and spiritual values. They can not be described as the “theocratist (dinci) section”. Those who cast their votes for us belong to lower and lower-middle income people aspiring for both the spiritual and material development of Turkey. Almost all of them want their beliefs to be respected. They are practicing Muslims. But, those who vote for us are not confined to that

section. For example, in 1987 elections, we took votes both from the left and the right... This is why, our economic views address such sections of society as workers, civil servants, artisans, farmers and the retired, who are badly affected from the present economic policies (77).

Despite Asiltürk's emphasis that the PP has managed to get votes from wage earners, it is not possible to substantiate this observation given the absence of survey data.

V. Voting Profile of the NSP-PP Line

As to the characteristics of the NSP and PP vote, one can trace its evolution in the general elections of 1973 and 1977, respectively, with special reference to its geographical profile. The NSP got 11.8 per cent of all the votes cast and sent 48 deputies to the National Assembly in 1973 election. It has received the highest percentage of its votes from the relatively less developed administrative districts of the country, most of which are located in the Eastern Anatolian region, as seen in Table 5, and have low levels of urbanization. Thus, one can conclude that the NSP's strength was greater in the less developed and less urbanized districts of Turkey (78).

Table 5: *The Ten Administrative Districts with the Highest Percentage of NSP Votes in 1973 Election*

Administrative District	Per cent of Votes Received%	Region where the District is Located
1. Erzurum	29.5	East Anatolia
2. Elazığ	27.8	East Anatolia
3. Kahraman Maraş	26.7	East Anatolia
4. Sivas	25.7	Central Anatolia
5. Bingöl	25.5	East Anatolia
6. Gümüşhane	24.9	East Anatolia
7. Adıyaman	22.1	East Anatolia
8. Rize	21.9	Black Anatolia
9. Çorum	21.7	Central Anatolia
10. Yozgat	21.5	Central Anatolia

Source: Binnaz Toprak: *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), p. 115.

As clearly seen in Table 5, the NSP succeeded most in the Eastern Anatolia, while faired poorly in the economically well-developed regions compared to its national average.

In the three largest cities, namely Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, the NSP again performed rather poorly. The party's average percentage of votes in these three metropolitan centers was 8.1⁽⁷⁹⁾. The party's relative failure in the cities of the more developed regions points to the fact that it could not appeal to wage-earners and urban professionals⁽⁸⁰⁾.

Needless to say, the relationship between the NSP vote and the indices of socio-economic development was negative. Yet, it is not clear what accounts for the relative strength of the NSP in the less developed eastern regions. According to Toprak, the NSP's appeal in these regions can be explained by its reproduction of traditional social and economic relationships⁽⁸¹⁾.

The NSP's voting profile experienced significant changes in the 1977 election. It has increased its votes 4.147 and got 1.269.918, which corresponded to 3.2 percent decline in its share of total vote: 8.4 %. Yet, its number of representatives sent to the Assembly decreased by half: 24. At the sametime, the distribution of its votes marked that it become outrightly a regional party. While the NSP underwent losses in western and central Turkey and in the Black Sea region⁽⁸²⁾ it polled the highest percentage of its votes from administrative districts of the Eastern Anatolia, the least developed region in the country, as seen in Table 7. The negative relationship between urbanization and the NSP's electoral strength continued to hold true in the 1977 election⁽⁸³⁾.

Table 6: *The Ten Administrative Districts with the Highest Percentage of NSP Votes, 1977 Election*

Administrative District	Per cent of Votes Received %	Region where the District is Located
Bingöl	25.4	East Anatolia
Bitlis	27.3	East Anatolia
Malatya	20.4	East Anatolia
Mardin	23.2	East Anatolia
Siirt	22.0	East Anatolia
Van	20.5	East Anatolia
Adiyaman	19.2	East Anatolia
Urfa	19.5	East Anatolia
Hakkari	18.5	East Anatolia
Konya	19.8	Central Anatolia

Source: Binnaz Toprak: *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), p. 120.

In spite of the fact that the NSP fared poorly in 1977 elections, it continued to be the third most strongest party in the Assembly. The NSP's regional character showed that the Party's electoral strength is not so decisive as to shape the contours of Turkish politics. Its lower performance in the areas where Alevi-sunni cleavage is important caused by the politicisation of the sectarian cleavage by the NAP, which was the main beneficiary of the Sunni votes in these regions, which went to the NSP in 1973 election. In short,

“the NSP was not able to override the sectoral, class, ethnic, sectarian and religious differences and forge a unified movement with national appeal. Its electoral support, therefore, was confined to the relatively old, Sunni, provincial town electorate, largely concentrated in the eastern and central regions of Anatolia”⁽⁸⁴⁾.

Following the re-transition to competitive politics in 1983 after the political restructuring under the military rule (1980-1983), the first general election was held with the participation of only three party which was allowed by the National Security Council to compete in the election. The PP alongside the Social Democratic Party (Sosyal Demokrat Parti, SDP) and the TPP could not participate in the elections due to the political restraints imposed by the National Security Council comprising the members of the junta who made the coup of September 12, 1980. The PP competed in the 1984 local elections and got 4.4 per cent of the total vote. Its former voters had been coopted by the ruling MP. Yet, the PP gradually increased its votes. In the early general election of November 29, 1987, the MP sent 292 representatives to the Assembly thanks to the advantages stemming from the Election Law, which favored the big parties. While the SDP and the TPP sent 99 and 59 representatives to the Assembly, respectively, the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DLP) and the PP could not exceed the 10 per cent national barrage and remained outside the Parliament together with some other minor parties. In this election, the PP was able to get back a large part of its former votes which had gone to the MP and received 7.1 per cent of the total vote⁽⁸⁵⁾. According to one calculation, if the pre-1980 Election Law had been in effect in that election, the PP could have sent 21 representatives to

the Assembly⁽⁸⁶⁾. The fact that the PP and the DLP have exceeded the regional barrage in many districts and yet could not surpass the national one is a clear indication of the disruption of “representation” in favor of “stability”, which led to the emergence of an “uncontrolled political power”, caused by the election system⁽⁸⁷⁾.

Although the PP could not send any representative to the Assembly in 1987 election due to the 10 per cent national barrage, it exceeded that barrage in 20 provinces (Table 8), and it ranked the second party in four provinces: Diyarbakır, Siirt, Bitlis and Van.

Table 7: The Twenty Administrative Districts where the PP Exceeded the National Barrage, 1987 Election

Administrative District	Per cent of Votes Received %	Region where the District is Located
Diyarbakır	24.5	South-East Anatolia
Siirt	24.0	South-East Anatolia
Bingöl	22.1	Eastern Anatolia
Bitlis	21.1	Eastern Anatolia
Elazığ	17.6	Eastern Anatolia
Van	17.3	Eastern Anatolia
Mardin	16.9	South-East Anatolia
Konya	15.0	Central Anatolia
Rize	14.2	Northeast Black Sea
Ağrı	14.0	Eastern Anatolia
K. Maraş	13.7	Eastern Anatolia
Muş	13.6	South-East Anatolia
Gümüşhane	13.2	Eastern Anatolia
Kocaeli	13.1	Marmara
Giresun	12.6	Black Sea
Sivas	11.9	Eastern Anatolia
Şanlıurfa	11.6	South-East Anatolia
Adıyaman	11.4	Eastern Anatolia
Trabzon	11.1	Black Sea
Nevşehir	10.6	Central Anatolia

Source: *Resmi Gazete*, 9 Aralık 1987.

As Table 7 clearly indicates, the PP, like the NSP, is still a regional party, which is relatively powerful in the less developed regions of Eastern and South-East Anatolia. The Central Anatolia and the Northeast Black Sea regions are other areas where the PP drew its votes. It seems that the PP have important difficulties in appealing to the socially-

differentiated sections of society, which was clearly reflected in its relatively poor electoral performance in the three big cities, namely İstanbul (6.8 %), Ankara (4.2 %) and İzmir (2.2 %) in 1987 election.

The PP increased its votes to 9.8 percent of the total vote in the 1989 local election⁽⁸⁸⁾ and gained the municipalities in five provinces. This may be an indication of its potential power base to exceed the national barrage in the next general election. Particularly in the Eastern and South-East regions, the PP appears to be the major contender for the votes, given the unpopularity of other parties including the “leftist ones”⁽⁸⁹⁾ in those areas because of their “conservative” stand regarding the so-called “Kurdish question”. On the other hand, if it can benefit from the Islamization tendencies among the former nationalist youth, it may, once again, gain the Sunni votes in the Alevi-populated areas⁽⁹⁰⁾.

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- (4) Hilmi Bengi, Interview with Necmettin Erbakan, *Yankı*, (November 18, 1985), cited in *Türkiye'nin Temel Meseleleri*, p. 124.
- (5) Gencay Şaylan, Interview with Necmettin Erbakan, *Cumhuriyet*, June 9, 1991.
- (6) Personal interview with Oğuzhan Asiltürk, May 1991.
- (7) Gencay Şaylan, *İslamiyet ve Siyaset: Türkiye Örneği* (Ankara: V Yayınları, 1987), p. 108.
- (8) See *The Programme of the Prosperity Party* (Ankara: 1983), p. 1. In fact, the party programme is of no importance to the PP whatsoever such that I could not find any copy of it in the central branch of the Party in Ankara. It seems that it is written only for the sake of complying with the legal requirements prescribed by the Law on the Organization of Political Parties.
- (9) The excerpt is taken from the election platform written by Necip Fazıl, a famous Islamist poet, of the National Order Party. See Tufan Çorumlu, *Büyük Türkiye'ye Doğru: Erbakan Olayı* (İstanbul: 1974), pp. 138-139.
- (10) *Türkiye*, May 22, 1991. Also see Gencay Şaylan's interview with Erbakan, *Cumhuriyet*, June 9, 1991.
- (11) Tanıl Bora, Interview with Hasan Aksay, *Yeni Gündem*, (July 16-31, 1985), p. 14.
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- (21) Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Görüş* (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1975), p. 222.
- (22) *Ibid.*, p. 136.
- (23) *Türkiye*, July 18, 1991.
- (24) Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, pp. 149-150.
- (25) Necmettin Erbakan, Üçüncü Olağan Büyük Kongre Konuşması (The Opening Speech of the Third National Convention), October 7, 1990.
- (26) Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, p. 153. See also M. Jacob Landau, “The National Salvation Party in Turkey”, *Asian and African Studies*, 11(1976), pp. 13-14.
- (27) Necmettin Erbakan, Mülkiyeliler Birliği Konuşması, December 31, 1989.
- (28) *Türkiye*, July 17, 1991.
- (29) Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, pp. 119-121.
- (30) *Ibid.*, p. 122.
- (31) Erbakan, Mülkiyeliler Birliği Konuşması, December 31, 1989.
- (32) *Ibid.* See also *Türkiye’nin Gerçek Durumu: Sebepleri TEŞHİS*, a publication of the Prosperity Party, 1989.
- (33) For the details, see *TEDAVİ*, a publication of the Prosperity Party, 1989.
- (34) *Ibid.*
- (35) Binnaz Toprak, “Politicisation of Islam in a Secular State: “The National Salvation Party in Turkey”, in Said Arjoman, ed., *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam* (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 126.

- (36) Toprak, *Islam and Political Development*, p. 103.
- (37) *Türkiye*, July 25, 1991, p. 13.
- (38) *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- (39) Toprak, *Islam and Political Development*, p. 101 and Şerif Mardin, “Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey”, in James P. Piscatory, ed., *Islam in the Political Process* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 152.
- (40) Erbakan, *Türkiye'nin Temel Meseleleri*, p. 39.
- (41) See *Türkiye*, July 15, 1991.
- (42) Şaylan, Interview with Erbakan, *Cumhuriyet*, June 9, 1991.
- (43) On the party's views regarding the present political system and “civil society project” see, Şaylan, Interview with Erbakan, *Cumhuriyet*, June 9, 1991; *Türkiye*, July 25, 1991, and Emin Çölaşan's interview with Oğuzhan Asiltürk, *Hürriyet*, March 5, 1989.
- (44) See Uğur Mumcu, “Erbakan'la Siyaset Üzerine Bir Söyleşi”, *Cumhuriyet*, April 24, 1989. In the 1970s, the supporter of the seemingly different versions of capitalist system, according to Erbakan, were the Justice Party (JP) and the Republican People's Party (RPP). See Landau, “The National Salvation Party in Turkey”, p. 10.
- (45) Ahmet Tekdal, Refah Partisi Birinci Büyük Kongresini Açış Konuşması, June 30, 1985.
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- (48) *Ibid.*
- (49) Çölaşan, Interview with Oğuzhan Asiltürk, *Hürriyet*, March 5, 1989. On the NSP's approach to Atatürkism, see, “MSP; Atatürk, Şeriat, Komünizm”, *Yankı*, (March 7-13, 1977), cited by Sarıbay in, *Türkiye'de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası*, p. 117.
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- (53) Ibid., pp. 15-55.
- (54) Ibid., p. 188.
- (55) *Türkiye*, July 25, 1991 and Toprak, *Islam and Political Development*, p. 104.
- (56) See Erbakan, Refah Partisi Üçüncü Olağan Büyük Kongresini Açış Konuşması, October 7, 1990.
- (57) *Türkiye*, July 19, 1991.
- (58) Türker Alkan, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey", in Metin Heper and Raphael Disraeli, eds., *Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East* (New York: St Martin Press, 1984), p. 87. It should be noted that "religious-nonreligious" categorization of issues is not so meaningful in the Islamic context. Since Islam is total in its coverage of the relations between man, nature and God, in the final analysis, the so-called "non-religious" subjects, too, have, ontological references. This is because Islam does not distinguish between the sacred and the profane contrary to Christianity, which separates the temporal and spiritual realms in accordance with the Biblical injunction: "render unto Caesar that which belongs to Caesar, and unto God that which belongs to God". As Toprak succinctly put it, "(Islam) has a theological insistence on incorporating the political within the religious realm". See Toprak, "The Religious Right", in Irvin Schick and Ahmet Tonak, eds., *Turkey in Transition* (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 219. In this regard, Alkan's categorization can be seen only as a convenience used for the analytical description of issues touched upon in Erbakan's speeches. On the "total" character of Islam in terms of its coverage of every aspect of public as well as individual existence, see Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1968).
- (59) Ibid., p. 87.
- (60) Ibid., p. 88.
- (61) Ruşen Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan: Türkiye'de İslamî Oluşumlar* (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990), p. 224.
- (62) For the monthly press conferences of Erbakan, see the summary bulletins published by the Prosperity Party, dated January 24, 1990; March 01, 1990; April 06, 1990; June 08, 1990; August 27, 1990, October 07, 1990, and November 06, 1990, respectively.

- (63) Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey" in Metin Heper and Ahmet evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 129.
- (64) See *TEŞHİS*, a publication of the Prosperity Party, 1989.
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- (76) *Ibid.*, p. 108.
- (77) Emin Çölaşan's, Interview with Oğuzhan Asiltürk, *Hürriyet*, March 5, 1989, p.11.
- (78) Toprak, *Islam and Political Development*, pp. 114-116.
- (79) Özbudun, "Islam and Politics in Modern Turkey", p. 151.

- (80) Ibid., p. 152.
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- (83) Toprak, *Islam and Political Development*, p. 115.
- (84) İlkey Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey", *Government and Opposition*, 18(1983), p. 440.
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CONCLUSION

During the one party era, Islamic politics was confined to the tarikat activities, which were forced to remain underground. Accordingly, the form and content of Islamic politics could not go beyond the sporadic and abortive uprisings of various sufi orders. When the centralist elites introduced “democracy from above”, the nascent Islamic formations lent their support to the anti-bureaucratic and periphery-oriented DP. From then on, they constituted the mainstay of the political support base of the populist, center-right parties. In the 1960s, the JP garnered the religious vote. Thus, first against the militant secularism of the RPP, and later against the leftism of the same party, the religious vote became the “reserve force” of the rightist parties. In the beginning of the 1970s, thanks to the ideological proliferation of the 1960s, the first independent Islamic political Party, the National Order Party (NOP) was established by Necmettin Erbakan and his associates. The NOP played a prime role in the repoliticisation of Islam in Turkey. It accelerated the participation of the Muslims in the political process⁽¹⁾. In this regard, it contributed to the resolution of the “participation crisis”⁽²⁾.

Following the closing down of the NOP, the National Salvation Party was founded. The NSP emerged as the representative of the groups adversely affected by the rapid course of the modernization process, namely, the small bourgeoisie, as a reaction to the ‘privileged’ position of the big bourgeoisie in exploiting economic resources. It occupied a distinct place among the peripheral forces against the center. It was largely based on cultural cleavages. Yet, it had a functional dimension as well. The party appeared to be an Islamic protest movement representing the grievances of those sections of society which felt insecure against the socio-economic changes Turkey experienced in the late 1960s and 1970s.

The claim that “the center-periphery” cleavage is being replaced by the functional cleavage as the new basis of the party system⁽³⁾ is wanting on the empirical grounds. In a society in which even the ideological cleavages of the left and right assumed a cultural dimension rather than being a mere reflection of functional cleavages, it is difficult to talk of the primacy of those cleavages. Although the NSP’s programme included many socio-

economic suggestions, this was more the result of an ideological stance determined by negative attitude against westernization and the yearn for the glorious past than being the articulation of mere economic grievances. In fact, the overlapping of the cleavages in the NSP-PP line points to the fact that functional cleavages were articulated in accordance with the requirements of de-westernisation as the NSP perceived it. In the same vein, the emphasis on the problems and demands of the popular sector by the PP in the 1980s can be connected to the fact that this sector has been the most adversely affected group from the new economic policies pursued under the military rule and the following Özal governments. Yet, the basic orientation of the PP along ideological lines has remained the same. This indicates that the changing dimension of the NSP-PP line is the reflection of the changing nature of the functional cleavages. Similarly, the continuities can be attested to their involvement in the cultural-ideological cleavages. All in all, one can conclude that

“the specific characteristics of Islamic politics in Turkey are closely bound up with the state-dominant nature of Turkish political culture and society. More specifically, changes in the nature of Islamic politics and movements, their organization, aims and strategies, have been in large part shaped by the changing structure and ideology of the state and the centralist elites”⁽⁴⁾.

Accordingly, one can discern some basic features of the NSP-PP line as follows:

● The political identity of the parties of the National Outlook has not been put forward in clear lines. This is mainly due to the legal constraints over the freedom of expression and organizations which prohibit the politicisation of religion. This has forced the NSP-PP to forge a symbolic dialog with its followers and pursue a dual approach in a number of issues such as secularism and Atatürkism. This state of affairs also explains the avoidance of radicalism by the NSP-PP line, which is the legacy of the Islamic movement that has been shaped by its experiences evolved in the context of the Kemalist restructurization of the Republic. The avoidance of radicalism both at the level of rhetoric and to some extent, of action overlaps with the pro-state posture of the sufi orders that have considered the cooperation with rightist political parties as the main strategy to enlarge their “living space”⁽⁵⁾. Yet, the challenge of the strengthening radical Islam in line

with the overall trend in the Muslim World has remained unmet by the leadership of the NSP-PP line⁽⁶⁾. Although the increasingly worsening economic conditions coupled with the increasing visibility of Islam ensured self-confidence on the side of the PP, it could not radicalize its political discourse.

● The Islamic values have a central place in the ideology of the National Outlook. Yet, there is an extreme caution regarding the justification of those values on secular grounds. Despite the abolishment of the article 163 of the Penal Code, there is no tendency toward assuming an overtly Islamist political identity due to the lingering uncertainties in the laws concerned.

● The National Outlook is the specific articulation of Islam by Necmettin Erbakan and other leaders of the party. It does not have a doctrinal character. Its populist and pragmatic dimension is more dominant. Therefore, it does not go much beyond the reaction to the current questions⁽⁷⁾. In this respect, one can discern its unfolding over time with more clarity.

● The NSP's pragmatic attitude might, in the long run, turn it into a sort of "Muslim Democrat Party." It has been claimed that "the NSP could have become a 'practically secular' party, retaining its religious rhetoric, on the one hand, and trying to cope with daily secular political life on the other."⁽⁸⁾ Yet, this prediction ignores the fact that the NSP-PP line derives its legitimacy from Islam, not the political system in which it operates. In this regard, contrary to the Christian Democrat Parties in Europe, which identify themselves with the system, the NSP-PP line tends to be more radical, in the final analysis, with its anti-systemic character⁽⁹⁾.

● In terms of its electoral performance, the PP is not too different from the NSP. It is, like the NSP, powerful in the East and South-East Anatolia. In fact, its role in the Kurdish question, in this regard, may appear to be crucial given the relatively weak political support of the other parties in the region. It seems that it has stabilized its votes around more or less 10 per cent. It has difficulty in securing support in the big cities, like the NSP. The most important power base of the NSP-PP line is the provincial towns where the Islamic movements find a ripe ground to flourish.

Yet, the PP has to undertake a number of predicaments it inherited from the NSP:

- 1) The main predicament of the PP is that it can not transform itself along the line of mass parties. In ideological terms, it presents the image of a rigid party. It does not have a well-articulated and sophisticated doctrine, though. This makes very difficult for the NSP-PP line to reach the non-religious masses. On top of that it can not transmit its message to a large section of the electorate because it is overlooked by the secular mass media. Thus, it is almost impossible for the PP to come into power through the democratic process⁽¹⁰⁾. Yet, because the power is so central to the realization of, at least, partial gains, the NSP-PP line may participate in all sorts of coalition governments.
- 2) Another important problem to be handled is the “leadership oligarchy” in the NSP-PP line. Except the interim periods caused by the military interventions, the NSP and PP have been under the leadership of the same cadre. There has been no tradition of intra-party democracy in the NSP-PP line⁽¹¹⁾. In fact, Necmettin Erbakan has come to be regarded as the “natural leader of the Islamist movement in the democratic platform.”⁽¹²⁾ This, of course, may adversely affect the electoral performance of the party, because it leads to the waning of dynamism in the lower ranks of the party due to their total exclusion from the decision making process within the party.
- 3) Last, but not the least, the PP has to formulate its ideology in a more comprehensive and coherent fashion such that it can present the public with a new social project different from those of capitalism and socialism. The slogan that “Islam is the solution to all the problems of life” is not very meaningful and appealing for non-religious masses. As an Islamist writer sympathetic to the PP observed, in order to avoid giving the impression that the PP has reached the natural limits of its electoral strength, the popular articulation of the concrete solutions suggested by the PP to economic problems needs to be given the characteristics of an alternative strategy of growth⁽¹³⁾.

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