

BILKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

ANTECEDENTS OF CONFLICT TERMINATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
EGYPTIAN ISRAELI (1970-1978) and SYRIAN-ISRAELI (1992-1995)
CONFLICTS

BY
ZEYNEP SELCUK

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Antecedents of Pre-Negotiation: An Analysis of Egyptian-Israeli (1970-1978) and Syrian-Israeli (1992-1995) Conflict

**by
Zeynep Selcuk**

Pre-negotiation is a first step towards conflict termination. There are certain factors which either facilitate or hinder the pre-negotiation phase towards conflict termination. For this purpose two cases, Pre-Camp David Phase of Egyptian-Israeli and Post Cold War period of the Syrian-Israeli conflicts are analyzed. Variables borrowed from the negotiation literature are used as analytical tools to investigate the cases.

The variables are provided with an operational definition and a proposition, on which the cases are investigated. First, the presence of these variables are tested on the cases and then if they are present their effects are coded, based on the inferences from the two conflicts, as whether being a facilitator or a hinderance towards conflict termination. Finally in the conclusion part whether these results are in accordance with the initial propositions are discussed.

The Syrian-Israeli case had a frequency of more facilitating factors. The major difference in the two cases is that despite its low frequency in facilitating factors, the Egyptian Israeli conflict ended in a formal agreement whereas the Syrian-Israeli conflict did not. This contradictory outcome is dwelled upon in the conclusion. The major inferences that can be accumulated from the research are discussed in the conclusion.

Key Words: Pre-negotiation, conflict termination, conflict resolution, Models of Timing, Hurting Stalemate Model, Imminent Mutual Catastrophe Model, Enticing Opportunity Model, Entrapment Model.

ÖZ

Mısır-İsrail (1970-1978) ve Suriye-İsrail (1992-1995) Anlaşmazlıklarında

Müzakere Öncesi Analizi

Zeynep Selçuk

Müzakere öncesi süreç, resmi müzakerelere doğru atılan ilk adımdır. Bu süreci anlaşmaya doğru götüren veya anlaşmayı engelleyen bazı faktörler bulunmaktadır. Camp David Öncesi Mısır-İsrail ve Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Suriye-İsrail anlaşmazlığı bu analizin tabanını oluşturmaktadır. Faktörlerin analizi bu iki anlaşmazlıktan yararlanılarak yapılmıştır.

Faktörler önce araştırma içinde kullanılan tanımlarıyla belirtilmiş olup, birer varsayım önerisiyle birlikte verilmiştir. Eğer anlaşmazlık içinde faktörlere rastlandıysa, etkileri verilmiştir. Sonuç bölümünde, etkilerin varsayımlara uygunluğu tartışılmıştır.

Yapılan araştırmada Suriye-İsrail anlaşmazlığı, anlaşmaya götüren faktörler açısından daha zengindir. İki anlaşmazlık arasındaki en büyük fark, ilk anlaşmazlığın (anlaşma sağlayan faktörler açısından yüksek oranda desteklenmemesine rağmen) resmi bir anlaşmayla noktalanmış olmasıdır. Bu konuda ikilem gibi gözükken bulgu, sonuç bölümünde açıklanmıştır.

Genel çıkarımlar, sonuç bölümünde özet olarak verilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler ; Müzakere öncesi, anlaşmazlık sonu, anlaşmazlık çözümü, Zamanlama Modelleri.

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of
Prof. Dr. Oral Sander

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To the inspiration that is **Always** within me, with me and from me.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to investigate the factors which impregnate or halt the process of conflict termination. For this purpose, pre-negotiation phase of two cases , Pre-Camp David phase of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict and the Syrian- Israeli conflict in the Post Cold War period are examined. Variables borrowed from the negotiation literature constitute the analytical tools of this study.

1. 1 LITERATURE REVIEW

Pre-negotiation is a new research topic to many social scientists who concentrate on negotiation. A current debate in the negotiation field is, whether pre-negotiation is a prelude to negotiation or part of it¹. Number of researchers have identified pre-negotiation as an important element of the overall process of conflict termination but few have elaborated on this concept².

1.1.1 MODELS OF TIMING

1.1.1.1 THE HURTING STALEMATE MODEL

Mitchell ³ puts forward the view that conflicts are susceptible to termination only at the appropriate moment - or more appropriately when the appropriate set of circumstances - arrives⁴. For this purpose he introduces four models which categorize the different set of circumstances that may be necessary in arriving at conflict termination, either from a point of deadlock or an on going act of coercion.

These models are: the hurting stalemate, the entrapment, the imminent mutual catastrophe and the enticing opportunity model.

This model was initially suggested by Zartman⁵ and later developed by Stedman⁶ and Haass⁷. It originated from Zartman's model which emphasizes the importance of the "ripe moment, that denotes to the proper time or fertile environment, to move towards conflict termination⁸. The argument that Zartman puts forward is that the adversaries will most likely consider a negotiated settlement, at the prognostication of a long period of costly action and low probability of achieving goals, at the threshold of a looming disaster.

The main argument of the hurting stalemate model is that parties will seek a negotiation only when they are convinced that continuing current strategies will not result in the most desired outcome. What will stimulate the parties to move towards conflict termination is (or at least to the greatest degree) extended pain. Mitchell⁹ points out that, leaders will only reconsider their policies of coercion, only at the pain of loss (expended resources) and damage. This model may imply that leaders learn through being in a stalemate that hurts but this may not be the only circumstance that motivates the leader into taking cooperative measures. Mitchell also makes a reference to increase in costs and absence of benefits of victory in *The Structure of International Conflict*¹⁰. He depicts that, at times continued opportunity costs may be effective and at others, absence of benefits of victory may push the leader towards conflict termination.

1.1.1.2 THE ENTRAPMENT MODEL

This model is pioneered by Edmead¹¹ and Teger¹². The entrapment model stresses the fact that the key decision maker sees herself trapped within the framework of the conflict. The leader has too much invested to quit. Even if there is no promise of attaining the policy goals, past sufferings trigger the leader to continue coercion since no other alternative is presented. The leader feels trapped and there appears to be no way of breaking the vicious circle of coercion.

Despite the hurting stalemate model, the entrapment model suggests that hurts and costs can become reasons for continuing rather than abandoning a coercive strategy¹³.

1.1.3.2 THE IMMINENT CATASTROPHE MODEL

Zartman¹⁴ is the proponent of this model. Differing from his hurting stalemate scheme, he does not view a stalemate as the only ingredient for conflict termination. In the imminent disaster model, an overwhelming disaster threatens the adversaries whether or not there is a stalemate. At this juncture the results are more drastic, if the leader was unwilling to change her current policies, a disaster that will effect both of the adversaries will stimulate change. The losses have to be great and has to be experienced mutually. If one side suffers more than the other, cooperation will either be delayed or not reached at all.

1.1.1.4 THE ENTICING OPPORTUNITY MODEL

The proponents of this model are Mitchell¹⁵ and Crocker¹⁶. In this model the emphasis is on leaders and their options. Leaders concentrate on benefits of

cooperating rather than losses of coercion. They see a better way of achieving goals rather than slogging with struggle¹⁷.

From the above review three important categories that have an impact on conflict termination, evolve. These are the role of international context, domestic circumstance and the leader.

1.1.2 LEVELS OF CONFLICT TERMINATION

1.1.2.1 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

This category is highly emphasized by Hopmann¹⁸. In analysing conditions for the resolution of international conflicts, he focuses on the patterns of cooperative and disruptive behaviors of the adversaries as well as the network of governmental and non-governmental organizations within which these adversaries function¹⁹. Rikhye²⁰ stresses the importance of efforts of the UN and the Secretary General's attempts at peace which emphasizes the importance of intermediaries that guide the adversaries toward negotiation. Diedring²¹ analyzes superpower strategies in conflict termination especially in the Beirut Case between the years 1982-84. In his article *We Need A Larger Theory of Pre-Negotiation*²², Saunders intermingles the importance of international context with domestic consensus and the "soundness" of the decision maker towards the decision to terminate conflict.

1.1.2.1 THE DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE

Jo L. Husbands in *Domestic Factors and De-Escalation Initiatives*²³ pays particular attention to domestic factors such as public opinion and non-governmental organizations in preparing the ground for conflict termination. Louis Kriesberg in his

book *International Conflict Resolution*²⁴ examines the Arab- Israeli conflict and pays particular attention to intra-party disputes. According to this study lack of party consensus delays the peace attempts.

1.1.2.3 THE LEADER

The proponents of enticing opportunity model, Mitchell²⁵ and Crocker²⁶ view the leader in an optimistic fashion; the leader can gain more by quitting while ahead. She can change priorities or see there is more to gain by cooperating and therefore would contribute to moving towards negotiations. Rubin²⁷ pays particular attention to leadership styles of different decision makers in *Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East*. He analyzes different leaders in the region and their styles in handling negotiating attempts. King²⁸ depicts that a change in leader may promote a change in leadership style and therefore this alone might contribute to moving towards negotiation.

1.2 THE OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

As noted before, the aim of this study is to investigate the factors which impregnate or halt the process of conflict termination. For this purpose, pre-negotiation phase of two cases, Pre-Camp David phase of the Egyptian- Israeli conflict and the Syrian- Israeli conflict in the Post Cold War period are examined.

Based on the above literature review, the following variables are identified and used as tools to analyze the two cases: a)the role of allies; b)the role of the intermediary; c)systemic change; d)the effect of intra-party disputes; e)the role of public opinion; f)role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), g)threat of a

looming disaster, h)change in leader/ leadership style, i)costs outweighing benefits, and j)change in priority. These variables are grouped under three main categories; the international Context, the domestic circumstance and the leader.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ANALYTICAL TOOLS

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT	DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE	THE LEADER
Role of Allies	Effect of Intra-Party Dispute	Fear of Looming Disaster
Role of Intermediary	Role of Public Opinion	Leader Change / Leadership Style
Systemic Change	Role of NGO	Costs Outweighing Benefits
		Change In Priority

Again, these variables are used as research tools to analyze the two cases. At the first stage of the analysis the presence or absence of the variables are individually identified for each conflicting party in each case i.e Egypt and Israel, Syria and Israel. At the second stage, if they are present, their impact on the pre-negotiating phase is investigated.

1.3 THE ANALYTICAL TOOLS

1.3.1 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The international context in this research denotes to the entities that are external to the state. The variables that will be investigated within the framework of this category are: role of allies , role of the intermediary and systemic change.

1.3.1.1 THE ROLE OF ALLIES

In this research allies are defined as states that provide economic, military and political support to the conflicting parties. The ally does not have to be a superpower, can be a neighbor, member of the same organization or take part in the same ideological or religious pact. It is usually assumed that allies provide the extra confidence that a state desires in the event of an ambivalence of whether quitting coercion or continuing. If the ally has some (economic, political or social) influence over the party and if peace is not within the interest of the ally, then the party will not be channeled into cooperation.

1.3.1.2 THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY

An intermediary is a go between the conflicting parties. It can be an organization, a state, or an individual. It can take the role of a facilitator where the intermediary works on the communication between the parties. It can also provide resources or has the leverage to mould the parties toward conflict termination. The intermediary brings in extra sources so that cooperation is more desirable and it facilitates communication.

It is usually assumed that the intermediary that brings in desirable extra sources, such as new information, financial assistance and political support will contribute to facilitation of the pre-negotiation process towards negotiation.

1.3.1.3 THE SYSTEMIC CHANGE

The systemic change pertains to the end of the Cold War. The absence of the Soviet Union created reconfigurations and ramifications in the tightly knit bi-polar alliance structures. The bi-polar system changed to a multi-polar system. It is usually assumed that a systemic change, namely end of a bi-polar international system will contribute to peace and cooperation since the parties of the regional conflicts are not backed by superpowers.

1.3.2 THE DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE

Domestic Circumstance denotes to all the political, social and economic changes that take place within a state. These changes can be in an entity or a group like a non-governmental organization (NGO) or public opinion. It can also be an event like an on going intra-party dispute. The variables within the framework of domestic circumstance are : effect of intra-party dispute, role of public opinion, and role of NGO's :

1.3.2.1 THE EFFECT OF INTRA-PARTY DISPUTE

Intra-party cohesion is vital in implementing any domestic or international policy. Intra-party dispute can be defined as the party of the leader having a difficult time adjusting to the policies concerning the initiative for peace. The leader must have strong support from her party so that her policies or initiatives receive acceptance

both domestically and internationally. In the cases that will be examined, the leader either overcomes her intra-party disputes or does not take them into consideration.

1.3.2.2 THE ROLE of PUBLIC OPINION

Public opinion plays an important role in domestic circumstance. Public opinion denotes to informed and reactive (whether for or against the decision) groups within the state's domestic hierarchy. This is possible only when the public is able to express its reactions, if they are under suppression because of the regime or the leader, then this entity will be ineffective. It is usually assumed that a public that supports the efforts toward cooperation is a facilitator towards negotiation.

1.3.2.3 THE ROLE OF NGO's

Non-governmental organizations are one of the components of the domestic system. It can be defined as a group that has gathered around a certain idea (i.e environment, women's rights etc.) or a message (i.e religious, social) to propagate their views under the auspices of democracy. In ideal democratic regimes NGO's have impact on the decision making process. They are not linked to the government and usually operate independently. They can support or oppose government policies. It is usually assumed that if NGO's have an impact on the decision making process and support the policies for peace, then it will have a facilitating effect on the pre-negotiating phase towards conflict termination.

1.3.3 THE LEADER

The leader is the one who decides on the continuation or the termination of the war. For that reason it is important to dwell upon the factors which effect this

decision. The factors that will be focused on are: looming disaster, leader change/ leadership style, costs outweighing benefits and change in priorities.

1.3.3.1 THE PERCEIVED THREAT OF LOOMING DISASTER

Looming disaster variable denotes to leaders prognosticating a disaster that will be costly. It may be an unanticipated surprise attack, or a social unrest that may result in the overthrow of the government or more radically, result in an upheaval. When the outcomes are as pessimistic as the proposed ones, the leader may be forced into revising her current policies of coercion. It is usually assumed that a growing threat of a looming disaster will channel the leader towards conflict termination strategies.

1.3.3.2 CHANGE IN LEADER/ LEADERSHIP STYLE

Change in leader denotes to a change in policies towards peace. A leader who is entrapped within her policies of coercion will not be able to change strategies. When a new leader takes the lead she may not be entrapped as the previous leader and may have the opportunity to alter the policies of coercion. It is usually assumed that a change in leader, from one that feels entrapped to one that does not, will facilitate the pre-negotiation attempt towards negotiations.

Leadership style, on the other hand denotes to the way that each leader handles the conflict. The styles of confronting or resolving the conflict is unique to the leader itself. It is usually assumed that a leader who is desiring peace will facilitate the pre-negotiation efforts toward conflict termination.

1.3.3.3 COSTS OUTWEIGHING BENEFITS

Costs to a leader can be economic such as military expenditures causing fluctuations in the economy. It can also be social, where the people may believe that the public is sacrificing (i.e fighting, suffering and even dying) for a cause they may not care for. Finally the costs may be political, since the dictum for Post-Cold War international relations is pacific settlement of disputes, coercion may disperse the allies from the state and furthermore it may push the state towards isolation in international or regional organizations. It is assumed that rising costs and minimized benefits are a reason to quit coercion. In some other cases if the party believes that it has invested too much to quit, then it will not back down, instead it will try to recover its losses by continuing.

1.3.3.4 CHANGE IN PRIORITY

This variable is usually the by-product of previous variables in this category. A threatened (i.e looming disaster, rising costs) leader after viewing the situation as no win, may decide to revise her policies of coercion. Instead of giving priority to destroying the adversary, may modify her priority by turning towards cooperation due to economic and political costs. This change in priority, whether inflicted upon or voluntary may contribute to peace attempts. It is usually assumed that a change in priority that is tilted towards cooperation will usually facilitate the pre-negotiation process towards negotiations.

Table 2 presents a summary of the propositions that are suggested for the analytical tools.

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSITIONS

PROPOSITION I	It is usually assumed that allies that support cooperation will facilitate the pre-negotiation phase towards conflict termination.
PROPOSITION II	It is usually assumed that an intermediary that brings in extra desirable sources will facilitate the process towards conflict termination.
PROPOSITION III	It is usually assumed that a systemic change, will contribute to peace and cooperation since the parties are not backed by superpowers.
PROPOSITION IV	It is usually assumed that intra-party disputes hinder the pre-negotiation phase towards conflict termination.
PROPOSITION V	It is usually assumed that a public that supports the efforts toward cooperation will facilitate the pre-negotiation phase towards conflict termination.
PROPOSITION VI	It is usually assumed that if the NGO's have the policies for peace, then it will have a facilitating effect on the pre-negotiation phase towards conflict termination.
PROPOSITION VII	It is usually assumed that a growing threat of looming disaster will channel the leader towards conflict termination strategies.
PROPOSITION VIII	It is usually assumed that a leader who is desiring peace will facilitate the pre-negotiation efforts toward conflict termination.
PROPOSITION IX	It is assumed that rising costs and minimized benefits are a reason to quit coercion.
PROPOSITION X	It is assumed that a change in priority will facilitate the pre-negotiation phase towards conflict termination.

As noted before, in this research the above variables and their propositions are used in analyzing the pre-negotiation phase of the two cases. Therefore the following chapter involves the analysis of the Pre-Camp David phase of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict.

Chapter 3 focuses on the analysis of the Syrian- Israeli conflict in the Post Cold War period.

The conclusion chapter introduces the major findings of this study.

CHAPTER II

2.1 EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The conflict between Egypt and Israel started, when Israel declared its War of independence in 1948 and continued up until 1949. Egypt acting in unison with; Transjordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon invaded Palestine and attacked Israel. In February, Egypt signed an armistice with Israel and the others followed respectively.

The second Arab-Israeli war took place in the Fall of 1956. Egyptian President Nasser asked for Soviet military assistance to nationalize the Suez Canal upon which both the British and the French acted severely. In a few months the British and the French forces secured the control of the Canal enhanced by airstrikes originating from Israel. The Israeli troops withdrew due to pressure coming from Washington. The United Nations (UN) got involved in the dispute and sent a multi-national force to stabilize the area. The war did not solve the problem, it only changed the balances in the region.

In 1967 fearing an imminent attack, Israel decided to strike first. The Six Day War resulted in Israel's victory, Israel captured; in the north the Golan Heights, all of Jordanian territory west of Jordan River, the Sinai, East Jerusalem and Gaza. Israel unlike the 1956 war, was in a position of strength. Armistice was signed between the two states and a stalemate continued until 1973 under the framework of no-war-no-peace proposals

After Sadat's take over in 1970, his insistence on receiving a generous financial aid package from the Soviet Union, backfired. The answer was a clear no. Sadat had

to adopt different policies . In 1972 he ousted the Soviet military officials out of Egypt . The Soviets boycotted the move severely.

In October 1973 another Arab-Israeli war took place. Egypt and Syria, in order to recapture the lands lost in 1967, attacked Israel. Israel retaliated against the surprise attack and triumphed over both Egypt and Syria. The 1973 October War resulted in an US intervention. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy ushered in the First and Second Sinai Accords. The two accords suggested disengagement and in order to stabilize the region the Sinai was to be under the control of a multinational force.

By 1976 Sadat refined his policies . He played with the image of Egypt as a moderate Arab state. He desired peace and he made it public. Apart from his personal commitment, secret meetings took place. The most important was the meeting between the two state officials, namely Dayan and Tuhamy, in Morocco. Moshe Dayan presented the Israeli view in stating that Sadat needed to convince the Israeli public that his offer of peace was genuine. Tuhamy stated that he could not make promises for his President but, he would let Sadat know what the Israelis desired. Begin and Sadat made separate trips to Washington but no progress was made. At the time of the imminent impasse the Soviet Union and the US publicized a joint communique pledging to take part and cooperate in the Middle-East Peace Process. The communique translated into the fact that the superpowers would settle the Arab- Israeli conflict amongst themselves. Alarmed Sadat organized a trip to Jerusalem, which included making a speech in the Knesset in November 1977. The Jerusalem initiative would be an indicator of showing his goodwill and commitment to peace.

The Jerusalem initiative paved the way to the opening of communication channels. The two leaders made separate trips to Washington but an agreement could not be reached. President Jimmy Carter invited the two leaders, this time at the same time, to Camp David. After numerous meetings and the US insistence, an accord was signed in September 1978. The final agreement, which had already been outlined by the Accord, was signed in March 26, 1979.

2.2 ANALYSIS

In this section Pre-Camp David phase of the Egyptian- Israeli conflict will be analyzed. The previously outlined variables are used as analytical tools to investigate whether these variables contribute or halt the pre-negotiation process towards conflict termination.

2.2.1 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The International Context category consists of three variables : role of Allies, role of intermediary and finally systemic change.

2.2.1.1 ROLE OF ALLIES

EGYPT

Egypt being the leader of the most Arab countries, had no difficulty in finding allies amongst the Arab states. During Nasser's rule, Pan-Arabism and Arab solidarity towered over any other policy. Nasser also supported the Soviet- Egyptian cooperation in international forums.

Sadat's takeover in 1970 due to Nasser's death, did not please the Soviet Union. Sadat known for his mild policies towards the West, troubled the Soviet counterpart. There were doubts that he would adhere to Soviet recommendations but if that occurred, then aid could be cut and Sadat would come to his senses. No one suspected

that Sadat would make the drastic changes of preparing the base for a free market economy, promotion of foreign investment, friendlier relations with the US and expulsion of Soviet military advisers from Egypt¹. Sadat knew that his changes would not be received well by his already entrenched rural population. He made promises of improving living conditions and the budget that was set for arms would cascade into development and improvement. While doing this he would need to be in better relations with previously pushed aside moderate Arab states. New allies meant new resources and his policy fine-tuning needed both domestic and international support. Some Arab states particularly the rejectionists, would force Egypt towards isolation.

The rift between Egypt and the Soviet Union was a golden opportunity for the US. As the importance of Soviet help declined, due to the nature of the Cold War era the US supported the attempts of overthrowing Soviet influence and compensated Egypt financially. Moscow on the other hand, excluded by Kissinger in 1973 from the Middle-East peace moves desperately tried to hold on to the region. Soviet Union viewed the Middle- East region as a water borne access to the West and a natural buffer against hostile neighbors². Soviet controlled oil fields would put pressure on Western Europe and US which would contribute to Soviet advantage over the Capitalist West.

Saudi Arabia supported Egypt's drift from the Soviet Union. It was against communism filtering through borders especially via Libya. It provided military aid to Egypt, to replace worn out Soviet equipment³.

Sudan was a treaty ally of Egypt . It also feared transfers of communism through borders . Chad also joined this group since the Soviet threats to its government via Libyan provocations was a major concern.

Egypt's first revisionist policy in changing poles, due to the nature of the Cold-War, resulted in loss of some allies but what created a havoc was the next move which resulted in an uproar amongst the Arab and Non-Arab states. Sadat desired peace between Israel and Egypt which was totally unacceptable to the Islamic world. Both rejectionist and moderate Arab states supported the Palestinians and waging war against the "artificially created " state of Israel was viewed as being just and almost holy⁴.

Morocco supported the secret meetings that went on between the two arch enemies and Iran did not commit itself to the rapprochement but applauded Sadat privately.

The rejectionist states were Algeria, Libya, Syria, and South Yemen. Iraq decided to freeze relations with Egypt. Sadat knowing that he could not retract from his commitment, reacted vehemently by throwing out their officials out of Egypt.

US supported Egypt from the first point on, change in policies could create a never before chance, this chance might result in peace, if both parties were channeled into the process. The second concern was that, curbing communist tendencies and suffocating Soviet Union in its counter strategies of controlling the oil fields. This move would give a hard blow to the superpower and it may not be able to recuperate.

Sadat's change of policy changed the distribution of the allies. The moderate Arab states supported Egypt's change of heart towards communism but when it came down to reaching an agreement with Israel especially over the Palestinian issue, they were negligent in contributing to the peace efforts. After Sadat signed the Camp

had resources which Europe depended on, and an untimely boycott would result in a regional crisis which could entrap the West by cutting supplies.

The Jewish Lobby which was extremely influential both in the House of Representatives and the Congress cleared the way to aides and assistance and due to the presumptuous Jewish population, the US always backed Israel in international forums.

Apart from the Jewish population, the US interest in the region based itself on two pillars: balancing the spread Soviet influence in the region and having access to natural resources which were vital to its existence. With such grave interests in the region the US had to back Israel in the Arab- Israeli conflict.

The US was a natural ally to Israel and almost 70% of the Israeli economy based itself on US aid⁷. It was apparent to the Israelis that aid and political assistance would result in pressure when it came to making peace. The Likud government rejected any kind of pressure which would threaten Israeli security for the sake of peace.

Israel although an independent state in the middle of Arab states, needed constant and continuous support from the US in order to survive in the region. It was a state that was not recognized by its neighbors and therefore its territorial integrity was constantly assaulted. Without the economic and political backing of the US, the state of Israel might have perished after its creation. The Likud government and therefore Begin resisted peace efforts that was first ushered in by the US and then by Sadat. Nonetheless, the risks were too great to drift away from a foster parent in a region where the precarious balance could change at any moment towards Israel's disadvantage.

The US push towards peace is certainly a facilitator for Israel to loosen the tight grip of Likud foreign policy maneuvers towards Egypt. Begin unlike Sadat did not have much allies to lose but loss of a partner could pose drastic effects on Israel.

2.2.1.2 ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY

EGYPT

The UN is the first intermediary that takes part in the conflict. It loses its credibility when Israel denounces its resolutions as being one sided .

The US is the major intermediary that took the role as a state. Its leverage and therefore extensive bargaining power (politically and financially) with the parties was copious.

Sadat hoped that pressure coming from the US would force Begin to compromise, so he preferred not to appear in the limelight and waited until Begin yielded⁸. Begin on the other hand, had a commitment to his people, he promised them the Biblical lands of Judea and Samaria, and under in no circumstance they could be surrendered. Peace with the Arab states was to be viewed sceptically. Sadat's conciliatory gestures would have to convince the Israelis that he was willing to recognize Israel and would do anything in his power to normalize the relations between the two states.

The American policy in the Middle-East had four objectives: ensuring the security of Israel, achieving an Arab -Israeli peace settlement, maintaining US and Western access to Middle Eastern oil and blocking Soviet expansionism in the region. The

US enjoyed being the stabilizer and filled the role of mediator⁹. In spite of its close ties with Israel it maintained relations with nearly all Arab countries and US diplomats gained access throughout the region¹⁰.

By 1977 it was widely accepted that the US was the key player outside the participants in the Middle-East conflict. "The U.S holds 99 percent of the cards" Sadat said repeatedly¹¹. In 1977 the Arabs initiated a major diplomatic effort to persuade the US that the Arabs no longer resisted the existence of Israel but only condemned the 1967 occupation of Arab lands and its refusal to recognize "Palestinian Rights"¹².

The US starting from the "No-war, no-peace" stalemate tried to be a go between the parties but in October 1973, Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack on Israel. The Israelis knowing that if the first blow came from their offensive troops the U.S would not offer assistance. Despite the surprise attack Israel recovered and in order to avoid further defeat and humiliation of the Arabs the US and the Soviet Union pressed for a cease fire. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger shuttled between the two parties and negotiated a cease fire agreement in December 1973. Afterwards Sinai I and II accords were signed.

The United States due to its outlined interests in the region, displayed concern over the Arab-Israeli dispute. The heedful tactic of segregating Soviet Union from the region yet not alarming it by extending an invitation for the Geneva Negotiations proved that the US was manipulating the process and the region. With Kissinger's efforts, the US maintained its role as an honest broker and improved its relations with the Arab world as a result¹³.

The commitment to peace in exchange for financial compensation was the facilitating factor for the US in achieving its commitment . Its indisputable leverage containing both political and economic assistance made risks more appealing to both parties. The intermediary facilitated the process leading to formal negotiations.

ISRAEL

Israel never accepted the UN resolutions so right from the start the idea of UN as an intermediary was rejected. It also rejected international conferences and preferred one to one talks with the US which would strengthen the Israeli position that they would not appear as giving major concessions to an adversary but as working with a partner to solve a problem. The Biblical lands, Judea and Samaria (West Bank and Gaza) are part of the “Promised Lands” and they can never be negotiated over¹⁴. With this in mind, Israel’s peace offer would include a bi-national state but not a separate state of Palestine. The Golan Heights and Sinai could be discussed but Gaza and the West Bank were out of question¹⁵.

The US had a very delicate role to play. At one side there was a new ally which had to be protected, at the other a recalcitrant state which refused to have talks with the Arab states. The US also had to worry about the Soviet Union which was becoming more and more influential in the region. The Arab states already irritated by the generosity towards Israel, preferred to see the Soviet Union as an ally.

The US facilitated the process towards negotiations. Israel would be making peace with an Arab state which was the leader in the region, recognition from the leader would create the cascading effect for the remaining states, which might be persuaded into coming to peaceful terms with Israel. It would receive political

opportunities, compensations of aid, intelligence and these gains would sustain the criticism arising from the opposition and the public.

2.2.1.3 SYSTEMIC CHANGE

The global system that dominated the international arena at the time of the dispute was the bi-polar system, where the allies were glued to one another in a give and take relationship. The status quo hardly changed and rarely there were movements from one block to the other. There are no drastic changes between the relationship of the two major states. There were regional disputes which ran the risk of inviting nuclear confrontation. Each superpower gave support to one party and the remaining states grouped around one or the other.

In the Arab-Israeli conflict; the Soviet Union appeared to promise war at the cost of achieving freedom, therefore supported the Arab thesis of liberation of the Palestinians at the cost of Israeli destruction and form a state of Palestine.

The US believed in achieving peace while putting an end to Soviet advancement in the Middle East, which undoubtedly resulted in supporting the newly fostered state of Israel. This meant unpopularity for the US in the region because it was to back an isolated state which was charged with grabbing land and assimilating the non-Israelis. It was to be one against a whole region and Soviet Union which was backed up by the regional states and their organizations.

The Soviet pressure to take part in the Geneva conference proved that they did not want to be excluded from the process. Any attempt of US taking part meant that the Soviets had to be there too. Israel had already rejected to take part in an international conference because nothing would change. It would involve the same issues, and same views, more than enough participants, each pressing for their own interest, and

therefore nothing would be solved. Joint American Soviet communique paved the way towards peace since none of the parties could have enough backing from its superpower counterpart if the superpowers collaborated. It was the right time to act for Sadat before it was too late.

The bi-polar system made it almost impossible to have a decent dialogue between the conflicting parties. It was extremely difficult to regionalize a conflict without making it an international issue.

The systemic change variable was not applicable for neither Egypt nor Israel.

2.2.2 DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE

As noted in the previous chapter the variables that will be investigated under domestic circumstance are effect of intra-party disputes, role of public opinion and role of NGO's. It is needless to say that intra-party disputes will tower over the rest. Public opinion is not extinct but dormant under the suppression of the Sadat regime especially after the revival of the fundamentalist groups. Finally in this restraining climate it is hard to notice non-governmental organizations.

The Egyptian decision making process revolved around the leader or the president. He appeared to be surrounded by other institutions such as the parliament, army and the public itself but what was essential was that the president had the privilege of acting alone despite constituencies and supervision mechanisms.

Israeli domestic policies were no different than its Egyptian counterpart. The Israeli government was less restraining than the Sadat government . The two parties Likud and Labor represented two different layers of the society. The Likud had elements from the Herut party in which Menachem Begin was the leader. Herut was the party that represented the older generation, the early settlers and promotion of

Zionism. In a way Herut represented the commitment to religion and solidarity of all Jews in the world, it was the extreme right within the right. The Labor party travelled in a more acquiescent political line. It was made up by Jews who had come to Israel from Europe after World War II . They believed that peace was possible through compromise .

The Likud had no intention of giving up the Biblical lands such as Gaza Strip and the West Bank . The Golan Heights and the Sinai peninsula were strategically important land marks but both Gaza and West Bank were irreplaceable.

Labor, due to its more secular mandate, adhered to principles like social justice and equal distribution of wealth which meant nothing was indisputable and to them, Israel could not continue to be the isolated victim of the Middle-East. Peace had to be achieved may be not with every state that was in a dispute with Israel, but at least with the ones that were willing to cooperate.

It is worthwhile to note that the peace seeds were planted during the Labor party government, but sowed when the Likud was in power. Begin's surprise victory during the May elections in 1977 gave signals of retraction on the peace process. The intra-party disputes were immense when the US started to put pressure on Israel. There is no viable evidence that NGO's were present . Finally public opinion seemed to be divided between the two parties. There was no consensus on whether or not peace was desired.

2.2.2.1 INTRA- PARTY DISPUTE

EGYPT

Sadat's desire for peace did not find many supporters, particularly vice-president Mubarak who opposed it continuously. For Sadat it was bad enough that he had to

overcome public pressure and he knew that without the backing from his party his revolutionary principles would not go far from being viewed as a dream. He had to overcome recalcitrant Foreign Affairs advisers¹⁶. What appeared to be a dead lock was that Sadat rarely got a glimpse of what the populace demanded in terms of absorbing peace with Israel. His aides supported his decisions at the risk of not losing their positions due to some unhappy experiences. Mubarak screened out the public demands and only transmitted the views that were in accordance with his own¹⁷.

The intra-party or more appropriately, the interpersonal dispute between Sadat and Mubarak is a hinderance towards the formal negotiations. Egypt's decision making mechanism revolved around Sadat, therefore he did not have to change his policies due to growing opposition.

ISRAEL

Begin came to power in 1977 with promises of continuing the Zionist crusade and reclaiming the longtime trampled Israeli honor. When Sadat started to send his peace feelers around, he knew that he might end up empty handed, but to his surprise he perceived that if both parties gave proposals for their view of peace then similarities could be drawn and this could be a starting point.

The secret meeting between Dayan and Tuhamy took place in December 1977. Deputy Prime Minister Tuhamy and Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan met in Morocco where the two officials exchanged views. Tuhamy insisted that withdrawal from the occupied territories was essential and PLO terrorism can be curbed only if Soviet Union was kept out of the process. The West Bank could be linked to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Dayan listened to the proposals but was negligent in committing himself¹⁸.

Begin rejected the land-for-peace proposals from the start. His insistency never diminished. He did not want to lose face at home so he approved of the pre-negotiation being secret and requested from his partner that details of such meetings to be screened from the press.

The mellowness in Begin's policy did not appear at its own will. The US pressure, after Sadat's willingness to compromise, had increased. He also knew that if the setting was right a treaty with Sadat would be beneficial to Israel. Egypt was the leader of the Arab states and if Sadat chose to make peace, then other states would follow in his footsteps. A peace loving and peaceful Israel would satisfy the US and the international arena, would have to accept Israel as a partner. A peace agreement with Egypt would mean recognition to Israel and direct breach to the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 which prohibited Israel's existence in the Middle-East¹⁹. Letting go of the Sinai would insure West Bank and the Gaza, afterall it would appear as though Israel had broken its recalcitrant attitude and the rest would be up to the other states. Israel would complete its part of the deal.

For Begin, the war was just beginning. He had to convince the cracked voices that were already causing echoes in the Knesset. He was still adamant on the territorial integrity of Israel, condeming a seperate state of Palestine but flexible on issues like water, economic cooperation and political partnership. That was the best offer he could give, both to his party and to Egypt.

The intra-party dispute that was experienced during the peace attemp was definitely a hinder towards achieving the peace. It limited the flexibility of Begin when the actual bargaining took place at Camp David. At a certain point when a

deadlock was reached the aides, ministers and deputy ministers went through tit for tat process.

2.2.2.2 ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

EGYPT

In 1977 the Islamic Brotherhood tried to overthrow the Sadat government, Sadat replied by hunting down anti-government supporters. Socially he also faced a down hill turn when he wanted to implement the Infitah which was a policy to encourage free enterprise but it did not provide the economic progress that it had promised . This error gave rise to the growth of the Islamic Fundamentalist movement²⁰. The rural poor was being irritated by the urban aristocracy and unavoidably they started to support the Islamic fundamentalists. The military, while supporting Sadat was also cautious of the uneasy gestures of the populace they may have been silent but they reacted by clinging on their religion in the most radical way. A peace with Israel would only mean defiance of belief and treason to the nation. With the fundamentalist movement creeping up from behind, Sadat had no option but to find an antidote against fundamentalism. This meant rejuvenating the Wafd party which was known to be one of the ultra nationalistic parties which ironically was silenced by Sadat²¹.

Sadat was more successful in attaining peace with Israel than prosperity for Egypt²². Despite the social unrest Sadat achieved his goal. When he encountered opposition, like Nasser, he adopted oppressive measures. Public opinion was a hinderance towards peace because the public felt betrayed in the sense that they had sacrificed but their gains were not perceivable. The public could not express their distress since political liberation meant disagreeing to policies put forward by Sadat.

ISRAEL

The Israeli public opinion was more informed and active about the changes toward the peace. The Likud takeover was a surprise but this did not guarantee a total support for the party. After the elections, Likud formed coalition with Democratic Movement for Change, which fostered extensive nationalistic tendencies, and some ultra religious parties. Begin at first point had to appease the rightest section of Likud (the Herut faction) and then work on the coalition so that his decisions would be backed after all a peace without a ratification meant no peace at all.

The one sure thing about the public opinion was that no one desired war anymore but at the same time giving up the occupied territories was unthinkable. For Begin it was a balancing act, the armistice signed in 1973 had to be finalized but in a way that did not harm Israeli security or his political future. Gush Eminent (Bloc of the Faithful) Orthodox religious pressure group reminded him of his commitment to Zionism²³.

The effect of public opinion was neither a help nor a hinderance towards peace because there was no strong reaction for or against peace. It is evaluated as being neutral. It may have caused some difficulties for Begin to implement some of his policies smoothly but nonetheless, it did not create obstacles as the intra-party disputes that took place.

2.2.2.3 ROLE OF NGO'S

EGYPT

There are no apparent signs of NGO's or pressure groups that may have taken part during the dispute. Whether or not there was a need for an NGO is doubtful .

Due to the nature of the political stratum, it is apparent that even if there were NGO's, they could not function under the rule of Sadat. His drastic changes required indisputable adherence to the new policies, deviations were to be punished.

International NGO's may have been involved but again due to the closely knit structure of one-man-one- rule structure of Egyptian politics they may have not been welcomed.

ISRAEL

There is no evidence that there were NGO's taking role during the dispute, pre-negotiation and during the agreement. Even if they were present they may have not been actively involved. The only difference from the Egyptian case is that these kinds of establishments were not suppressed but perhaps the public did not give them the support that they needed to flourish in.

The international NGO's also appear to be dormant during the time period of the dispute up to the point when the accords were signed. It may be inferred that the NGO's had no effect on the facilitation or the hinderance of the negotiation reaching an agreement.

2.2.3 THE LEADER

In this category the four variables that are investigated are; the threat of looming disaster, leader change / leadership style, costs outweighing benefits and change in priority. This category gives a closer look at why the leaders themselves decided to pursue for peace rather than wage war.

2.2.3.1 THREAT OF LOOMING DISASTER

Threat of looming disaster variable denotes to a leader prognosticating that a disaster such as; an unanticipated surprise attack or a social unrest which may result in the overthrow of the government.

EGYPT

There is no evidence that threat of looming disaster variable was present in this conflict. Therefore this variable was not applicable in the Egyptian case.

ISRAEL

There is no indicator that this variable was present in the Israeli case either. Again this variable was not applicable.

2.2.3.2 LEADER CHANGE / LEADERSHIP STYLE

EGYPT

Sadat's takeover from Nasser meant a drift from the Soviet Union. He also did not believe that Egypt should be the leader of the Arab world. He believed in Egyptian interests rather than the grand strategy of leading the way to the Arab states. He saw the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as being important but it was not an impediment in reaching an agreement between Egypt and Israel. The US and Saudi Arabia, being one of the more moderate Arab states, provided the assistance that Soviet Union had declined. Sadat did not plan to make a drastic change in his relations with the Arab states, he only turned to the more moderate states and tried to keep the rejectionists at a certain distance.

Sadat tookover an economy which gave signals of bankruptcy due to the war with Israel. Since every investment was funneled into the military and industry, social

reforms never took place. Infitah had been presented as a savior, free enterprise promised welfare and prosperity. The result was chaos, the aristocracy in the urban areas particularly in Cairo seemed to benefit from the changes but the rural poor remained poor and seemed more desperate than ever. Under the circumstance the decision to continue to fight, which was what the Soviet Union was dictating to its compatriots, involved incalculable risks. The US on the other hand urged the parties to overcome their differences, if not accentuate, the common points and reach an agreement .

The social unrest and the financial incapability to cope with stagnation made peace a better deal for Sadat. This was to insure his political future as a president, although there were attempts of overthrowing his government, and on cutting down costs while receiving enticing compensation from the US.

Sadat was a definite plus towards formal negotiations. Change in leader and his leadership style were one of the major turning points in coming towards the Camp David summit.

ISRAEL

Begin chosen for his uncompromising nature and commitment to Zionism looked as if though the peace process would be disturbed. The previous government had been much more permissive towards its neighbors and to an extent to its enemies. He committed himself to his public's wish, not to surrender territory at any cost. In order to reach this goal he would keep away from all kinds of peace moves and blame the

US for pressuring Israel²⁴. With this kind of an outlook the neighbors were in a despair. The long awaited peace would never arrive.

What was appealing to Begin was that after the secret meeting between the two states he found Egypt cooperative and predisposed. If Egypt wanted the peace then Sadat would be prepared to exchange it for something else. Recognition was what Israel had been after and if Egypt recognized Israel, being the leader of the Arab states and the Middle-East, perhaps others would follow. Furthermore Israel would strip away from its uncompromising and snatching land identity.

Change in policy did not mean change in principle or mandate. Begin looked as if he was contributing to the peace but peace had to have a price for Sadat . The Israeli public would demand an explanation and the answer would be given.

There would be no change in the status of West Bank or Gaza and a separate state for the Palestinians would be out of the agenda. Furthermore Israel would decide on what to negotiate and what not to. The peace attempt would limit the agenda for a comprehensive Middle-East peace but for the time being it would have to be only offered or accepted for Egypt.

The leader change was a positive variable towards peace despite Begin's commitment towards the conservatives. He saw peace as an opportunity to achieve national goals in a more cooperative way. Peace did not pertain to concessions, it meant opening channels of communication and at the same time getting a glimpse of what the adversary was preparing for.

2.2.3.3 COSTS OUTWEIGHING BENEFITS

EGYPT

After the 1973 war, it was apparent that any assault against Israel would be punished severely. The Sinai had already been lost and because of this, the military had its weakspot, any land movement from the Sinai could threaten Cairo unexpectedly. The Egyptian army was on alert for pre-emptive attacks from the Sinai.

Even if one thought of the best outcome, which would be to get the Sinai back, to annihilate Israel was not as easy as once believed. Getting the Sinai back by fighting required financial assistance and the Soviet Union was already becoming ungenerous towards Egypt ever since Nasser's death. Sinai had to be taken back if this was not achieved the future of the Sadat government would be indefinite.

Even if the Sinai was taken back, with the inflation rate racing to the top, it would be a Pyrric victory. The costs of winning back the Sinai would definitely outweigh the benefits. A crippled economy and an unstable political arena would signal to Israel that Cairo is not too far away from Jerusalem. Sinai had to be under Egyptian rule but not by war, by peace. Sadat could not afford to lose time or money in this matter. He had to act quick and at once.

The costs of going to war definitely outweighed the benefits. For that reason, it was a facilitator towards deciding to cooperate.

ISRAEL

Begin's decision to have talks would be kept a secret. The Israeli public opinion showed variations towards peace but firm on one point, no territory was to be handed over. After the 1967 and the 1973 wars Israel had occupied lands that had both strategic and moral value to its adversaries and to an extent to the US. It proved that if the armistice had not been made, Cairo would not have been too far away from

Jerusalem. Even under the pressure of the neighboring Arab states and the Soviet Union, Israel could pursue the goals that was set by its founding fathers.

The costs would not outweigh the benefits at this juncture since Israel had a better position and therefore more bargaining power than its adversary. This variable might not have facilitated the peace pre-negotiation attempts toward a peace agreement. The only obstacle was that the status quo was more costly to Israel because it was difficult for Begin to return the Sinai in installments²⁵.

The costs of continuing coercion were too great to bare, considering the fact that there were many too fight and only one to cooperate. If coercion continued then, the Israeli population would cease to be. It was a definite facilitator towards formal negotiations.

2.2.3.4 CHANGE IN PRIORITIES

EGYPT

For Egypt, with the policy change due to the social and financial instabilities, the priorities had also changed. It was to get out of the war puzzle with no damage and achieve peace which would bring some positive outcomes so that the public can be satisfied.

The peace between Israel and Egypt did not have to include other Arab states their participation may create obstacles for Egypt both internationally and domestically. The PLO issue would be mentioned but Sadat knew that a comprehensive agreement for an Arab-Israeli conflict would be premature. This would only be a first step towards reaching an agreement with the long time enemy. It would show that peace is possible through negotiations.

Change in priorities linked to costs outweighing benefits was a facilitator towards negotiations.

ISRAEL

Begin saw concession, as being plausible. This would be the insurance policy against the Arab world not recognizing Israel. The international organizations would no longer condemn it for being hostile and uncompromising and finally the step towards peace, would disentangle the US aid that would be blocked in the Senate²⁶.

War against the Arab states was not beneficial for Israel. Afterall Israel was surrounded by unfriendly neighbors and no matter how much aid was provided or what military victory was gained, it would still be the same equation, one against many.

If Israel was to cooperate, then this would mean assistance for compensation. The US being the biggest shareholder in this peace attempt, would not be frugal while distributing aid. Economic assistance followed by military intelligence exchange would be a motivation force for Israel. The political assistance would secure the implementation of any peace attempt since the US would be there to protect its artifact. As a result, assistance for concessions would be desirable for both sides.

The variable of change in priorities is a definite facilitator towards an agreement. Financial assistance becomes more desirable than adherence to party mandates and election promises. Concession will be rewarded so the leader is not viewed as a traitor but a skillful negotiator. Israel's security is not at risk since military aid and intelligence exchange will be provided.

2.3 CONCLUSION

In this section an overview of the outcomes of the variables of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict is given. A summary of the effect of the variables on the Pre-Camp David phase of the Egyptian- Israeli conflict is presented in Table 3.

As an overview it can be inferred that the category which contributed most to facilitation of pre-negotiation attempts towards conflict termination was the leader. Its three variables out of the four acted as definite facilitators. The category which was a hinder was the domestic circumstance.

EGYPT

The leader category with, leader change/ leadership style, costs outweighing benefits and change in priorities, contributed to the Egyptian- Israeli conflict as facilitators towards conflict termination. The threat of looming disaster variable was not applicable for Egypt.

The domestic circumstance category was a hinder towards conflict termination. Intra-party dispute and public opinion variables were hinderances toward conflict termination. The variable of NGO's was not applicable.

The international context is placed as being neutral because while the variable of role of allies functions as a hinderance, the intermediary variable is a facilitator. Systemic change is not applicable.

In total Egypt came in contact with four facilitating, three hindering, and three not applicable results from the analysis. Since there is no great difference in the result of facilitators and the hinderances, it can be inferred that Egypt did not arrive at peace in a consensus.

ISRAEL

The category that contributed to facilitation of conflict termination is the category of the leader. The three variables leader change/ leadership style, costs outweighing benefits, change in priorities contributed as facilitators. The threat of looming disaster variable was not applicable.

The hindering category appears to be the domestic circumstance because this is the only point where a hindering effect presents itself. The intra-party dispute is a hinderance. The public opinion is neutral. The NGO variable is not applicable.

As a total, Israel came in contact with five facilitating and one hindering variable. There were three not applicable variables and one variable was neutral. There is a definite difference between the facilitating and opposing variables, therefore it can be inferred that Israel was supportive of the peace attempts more adamantly than Egypt.

The following chapter will present an analysis of the Post Cold War period of the Syrian-Israeli conflict.

TABLE 3 : THE EFFECTS OF VARIABLES ON THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

	ROLE of ALLIES	ROLE of INTERMEDIARY	SYSTEMIC CHANGE
EGYPT	-	+	N/A
ISRAEL	+	+	N/A

DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE

	EFFECT of INTRA-Party DISPUTE	ROLE of PUBLIC OPINION	ROLE of NGO's
EGYPT	-	-	N/A
ISRAEL	-	0	N/A

LEADER

	THREAT of LOOMING DISASTER	LEADER CHANGE\ LEADERSHIP STYLE	COSTS OUTWEIGHING BENEFITS	CHANGE IN PRIORITY
EGYPT	N/A	+	+	+
ISRAEL	N/A	+	+	+

+ : Facilitating effect
 - : Hindering effect
 0 : Neutral
 N/A : Not Applicable.

CHAPTER III

3.1 SYRIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The case for Syria and Israel had a different dimension from the conflict between Egypt and Israel. The conflict between Syria and Israel may have started almost about the same period and same reason, reclaiming a captured territory, but it has not finalized in an agreement as in the case of Egyptian- Israeli dispute. The solutions or attempts of resolving the conflict, if at all is possible, lie between the leaders and their willingness to cooperate, without their determination, the Syrian track of the Arab- Israeli conflict will remain a callus that will threaten the region's stability over and over again.

The relations between Syria and Israel had never been good. Syria like its compatriots viewed Israel as an enemy orbit which was a puppet of Western exploiters and it was a serious threat toward Arab solidarity and regional stability.

In June 1967 Israel took hold of the Occupied lands which included the Golan Heights. In 1973 the fighting continued, the Syrians could not regain the Golan Heights but they believed that "they fought courageously"¹

After Assad's takeover, Syria posed more of an isolationist policy towards its radical Moslem brothers, fearing rejuvenation of repressed Sunni majority. The Soviet Union supported Syria and any state in the Middle East which posed an interest in the Palestinian issue. The Arab- Israeli conflict was the key to the region both of

the superpowers took great interest in the confrontation but none was interested in resolving it.

In 1975 a civil war broke out in Lebanon between the rightist Christians and leftist Moslem and Palestinian guerillas. This war paved the way to American supported Israeli intervention in 1976². Two years later Israel invaded southern Lebanon which had sheltered the Palestinian guerillas. Israel claimed that the intervention was necessary to curb the infiltrating terrorists from Lebanon. Syria claimed that it was an invasion and sent a force to the troubled region few weeks after the Israeli invasion. In June 1976 a contingent force sent by the UN came to Lebanon, Israeli forces returned back. In June 1982 Israel invaded southern Lebanon once again to clean out the Palestinians in the region. The UN forces left Lebanon in 1984 but the Israeli army remained firm. Syrian forces left in May 1991 after the signing of an agreement between the two states.

The end of the Iran- Iraq war changed the dynamics in the region. Saddam who had been supported by the US reigned as the leader who could pose a future threat to the region since he came out as the victor. Iran especially after Humeyni's takeover had been supported by the Soviet Union and therefore Syria also placed itself in this block. During the war Syria and Israel faced each other, not militarily but from different blocks.

Superpower configurations signalled challenges at the end of 1980's. The Soviet Union was having a difficult time adapting to Gorbachev's revolutionary policies. It collapsed, leaving the Kremlinologists in shock who could have never predicted such an end.

In August 1990 Saddam, making use of the window of opportunity at the time, invaded Kuwait. Every state was interested in what went wrong in the Soviet Empire, no one took notice of the changes taking place in the Middle-East. The invasion posed a direct threat to Israel and an indirect threat to every state that was in the region. Saddam's military capacity could not be calculated. The air raids to Israel signalled the US government to take charge.

Syria without the Soviet support was weak and had the risk of being attacked since it had supported Iran during the previous war. Assad also posed a threat to Saddam because he too had the substantial to be the leader of the Arab world. Assad chose to be with the Allied powers and for the first time he was in the same block as Israel.

Saddam's defeat was a precaution to the US some sort of a peace had to be reached in order to prevent future Saddams. The Arab-Israeli conflict had to be dealt with in order to have a stable region which met the US foreign policy criteria.

US president Bush and Secretary of State Baker launched a peace attempt which came to life with Baker's shuttle diplomacy. An international conference was held in Madrid 1991. For the first time all of the concerned parties faced each other. Rather than taking the conflict as a whole it was separated into tracks and every track consisted of only two parties.

The Syrians left the talks claiming that this conference was not held under the auspices of the UN (there was only a representative from the UN) but of the US. The precondition of Israeli withdrawal from the golan Heights was not met and finally Security Council Resolutions of 242 and 338 were also breached since this withdrawal did not come to life.

The newly elected Rabin government gave priority to “land for peace” rather than “peace for peace”. Israel could compromise as long as Assad defined peace and showed some good will towards cooperation. Land can be exchanged for peace only if security needs were coupled with diplomatic breakthroughs (formal recognition, opening of embassies, trade relations).

The negotiations continued until 1994. Israel proposed a normalization period and a gradual withdrawal period. Syria accepted the proposal but they could not agree on the time table and the extent of demilitarization.

Rabin’s assassination in November 1995 and Labor defeat in the June 1996 early elections slowed down the process of negotiations toward an agreement

3.2 ANALYSIS

3.2.1 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The international context in which the Syrian-Israeli case took place was much more challenging than the previous one, challenging in the sense that the Cold Peace had replaced the Cold War but this transition did not guarantee a polar’less(from bi-polarity to multi-polarity) international system. The second Gulf War against Iraq shaped the structure of tightly knit patchwork of allies. Syria had to revise its policies .

It is obvious that in the category of international context the overarching variables are the allies and the systemic change but it is worth mentioning that the intermediary, namely the US also played an important role. Clinton’s tactics of alternating carrots and sticks were effective on both of the stubborn leaders. The Intermediary preserved

its interest in the region and exercised its irreplaceable political and economic influence over the parties.

3.2.1.1 ROLE OF ALLIES

SYRIA

Syria, after the demise of the Soviet Union, had to invest in new allies. Its previous allies had been the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries and most Arab states. As the Soviet assistance in both political and economic arenas declined, Syria preferred close relations with Washington and Cairo. It is ironic that the same state had dislegitimized the Camp David Accords, opposed making peace with Israel and pushed Egypt into isolation. Syria being a secular and a sectarian state did not have the backing of conservative Arab states, this was the time to gain their support too³. The residual relationship with the Soviet Union had to be kept and the alliance with Iran could be cultivated. Assad had no intention of becoming an orbit of the US and joining forces with the Gulf States some precautions had to be taken and Iran was part of this act⁴. Assad supported Iran and the Hizballa in Lebanon and several other militant groups against Israel⁵ during the first Gulf War. In 1989 Syria renewed diplomatic relations with Egypt and sensed that a dialogue with Washington depended on a milder view towards the Arab-Israeli dispute⁶. The only concern would be that the largest proportion of Syria's external finance originated from its oil-rich Arab neighbors⁷. Syria's economic dependence on high levels of grant aid and oil imported from Iran has had important consequences for its economic performance. After the

intervention in Lebanon the grants dropped, due to its dependence Assad had to rely on its oil rich allies and its stance on the proposed Arab-Israeli peace was severe⁸. For Syria to act without the guarantee of the US would be suicide, therefore compensations had to be high. In 1980's Assad decided to revise Ba'thist policies of isolationism in the region with the declining rate of grants and aids, forming alliances was the most pragmatic solution to economic worries.

The end of the first Gulf War signalled that Iraq and Saddam were becoming dominant in the region. This irritated the oil rich countries of the Gulf, Saddam questioned their legitimacy and their positions toward Iraq. His policy towards Syria was to eliminate it and become the sole power in the Middle-East. The tool for this objective was to galvanize the dormant Syrian opposition towards the government.

Syria chose to stand tall against Saddam with giving support to the allies. Assad predicted that his move of cooperation and his new image of collaborating with the international actors would be rewarded generously. The US would no longer attack Syria as being incooperative and unwilling to be flexible towards a peace agreement. The Gulf states would also be thankful since Saddam posed a great threat to their very existence. Assad lost the support of most of the Arab states since he ordered to fight against an Arab state but the Gulf states and the US compensated his loss as he had hoped⁹. The second Gulf War created new opportunities for Assad and it ended his isolation in the region. It formed the basis for a Egyptian-Syrian alliance and participation in talks for new security arrangements led to over two billion dollars worth of aid from Saudi Arabia¹⁰. Apparently despite the fact of siding with his arch enemy during the Gulf War, Assad came out with a better hand than when he had joined with the Allied powers¹¹.

Good relations with the US would place Syria in a stronger position since the Bush administration did not believe in the superiority of the Israeli policies in the region. With proper backing from the US, Israel would be pushed to a corner and therefore would be forced to make peace with Syria on Syrian terms.

The allies or most effectively the US facilitated Syria into thinking more seriously about peace with Israel. Peace did not denote to giving concessions, instead it pretained to cooperation on issues receiving the benefits of looking through the same hour glass. If Syria's Cold War allies had not been replaced by the US, then they may have hindered the process towards negotiations. The Arab argument was that formation of Palestine was crucial but only at the cost of destructing the state of Israel. Syria's departure from this dictum irritated the rapprochement with Jordan. Nevertheless support from the US and better relations with Israel could promote the revival of Greater Syria . Role of allies, since US is the most prominent ally after the Cold War, contributed as a facilitator towards conflict termination.

ISRAEL

The state of Israel, ever since its early years, benefitted from being a natural ally to the US. The only times when the relations deteriorated was when the Likud was in charge. Likud propogated that over-dependence to the US would take the Israelis away from their adherence to Zionism¹². The change in the international system did not cause turbulances in the delicate relationship between the allies but domestic politics and mandate differences amongst parties, at times caused some disturbances. This toppled with the Bush administration's non-favoring or neutral policy towards Isreal resulted in agitations between the two governments.

After the second Gulf War the Bush administration pushed Israel towards attending an international conference under the sponsorship of the US to discuss issues of dispute amongst the states in the Middle East. Shamir preferred to take each track separately and slowly, the precedent did not have to be the Palestinian issue, it could be Syria.

Jordan, though King Hussein never committed himself to formal agreements appeared to be in good relations with Israel¹³. Israel in return viewed the Hashemite family as a natural buffer against the radical Islamist states¹⁴. More importantly Hussein had the potential to agree to Shamir on most terms since this track was one of the less stony paths towards peace.

The Bush government pushed Israel towards a comprehensive peace but the Clinton administration was not as subsistent in urging Israel for peace. The agenda for talks was prepared by the US in accordance with the other parties but the neutral policies towards Israel had come to an end. As in the Syrian case the role of allies facilitated the move towards negotiations.

The Bush administration had put the relations between the two states on freeze and may be for the first time in years Israel's insecurity towards its foster brother grew. The Clinton administration on the other hand, tried to replenish what had been lost.

The role of allies especially that of the US, after the Clinton takeover enriched with Labor victory with Rabin eased the tension between the two states. The US proposal of peace was not rejected nor viewed as conspiracy against the Israelis. This in turn facilitated the move towards negotiations.

3.2.1.2 ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY

SYRIA

The preferred intermediary for Syria during the Cold War was undoubtedly the Soviet Union. More precisely during the Cold War due to Soviet backing, Assad did not think about making peace with Israel .

After the Cold War, US being the only power left to dominate the international arena, was the most appealing candidate for settling disputes; through negotiations, and enforcing the peace once the agreement was reached. President Bush's appointment of James Baker to the settlement of disputes and convening an international conference proved that the US was also interested in taking part, if not to sponsor the peace attempts. Peace was to be rewarded; by territory, by financial gains and by political endorsement from the US.

Assad, due to the systemic change, regional turbulences and domestic instabilities could not invest on coercion anymore¹⁵. His first concern was, would the already stratified Syrian public digest the new foreign policy objectives. His second concern centered around whether he would be able corner Israel and get the best possible deal without losing face or giving unacceptable (to the Syrians) concessions.

The second Gulf War was the chance that Assad was hoping to get, the collapsed Soviet Union would be of no help and years of isolationist policy had weekend the ties between its Arab brothers. Israel was still a threat and with the Golan invaded in 1967 and annexed in 1981, strategically any move towards Syria would ensure fall of Damascus but making peace would fasten the first tier of security. Peace with US would place the Israelis on the corner. Indirectly, relations with Israel would ease and

this alone would be an investment towards a pre-emptive attack from the other side. The US would do its best to stop confrontations, furthermore economic and political compensations would be the reward for being mild.

The intermediary factor facilitated the policy towards negotiations. In order to secure a place in the “New World Order”, Assad wanted to achieve peace with minimum loss.

ISRAEL

Rabin’s takeover in spring 1992 signalled winds of change towards peace. The uncompromising attitude of the Likud government would tilt towards the Labor “land for peace” proposition.

The Likud led coalition government had strained its ties with the US. There was no consensus on avoiding the US but Likud government toppled with neutral Bush administration resulted in an impasse.

Luckily for Rabin few months after his election, Clinton became the newly elected president. He stressed that the US desired peace and stability in the region but not at the cost of neglecting the security needs of Israel.

A tilt towards a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace would need a guarantor to start the discussions and later monitor the implementation of the agreement’s (if it is reached) mandatory procedures. The U.S would fit perfectly to this role. With the support of the Clinton administration Rabin predicted that he would not be cajoled into an environment where only Israeli concessions would shape the outcome. The US could compensate Israel in terms of intelligence, economic aid and as before political support.

Unlike Assad's case, Rabin was not forced into moving towards an agreement. He had not lost any allies, Israel did not experience the regional instabilities due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the grants kept on rolling because although the Bush administration had slowed down the pace of the economic aid, it did not halt it completely.

Rabin knew that he needed his population to have a state and a coercive Israel would mean more losses both in lives and in investment. Peace feelers had cautioned him of Assad's changing foreign policy and his turn towards Washington. Rabin knew he had to act fast and at once.

The effect of US being the most desirable intermediary increased the chances of the two conflicting parties to come together. The intermediary and its vast resources made peace more appealing, especially to Syria. This variable was a facilitator towards negotiation in the sense that the communication channels between the two parties were open and both were willing to cooperate in order not to disinherit the intermediary to the other party.

3.2.1.3 SYSTEMIC CHANGE

The systemic change that came in effect was the repercussions of the Soviet Union's collapse. This was a major event which ended the bi-polar balances and welcomed multi-polarity into the international arena. In the Middle East, Soviet supporters lost their most valuable ally and their future remained bleak. Due to social tensions and questioning of ideologies ushered in extreme nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism¹⁶. The fall of Saddam after the second Gulf War signalled a new era of regional alliances since Saddam was the victor of the first Gulf War and had been defeated only by Allied forces and cooperating with the interest preserver US.

Regional alliances could continue, but to question US presence in the region brought with it unbearable consequences.

Syria benefitted greatly from the systemic changes. By changing sides, it prized the US as a friend, mild strategies toward the Arab-Israeli dispute deterred any attack coming from Israel, after all Rabin would not take the risk of attacking a cooperative Arab state. The milder strategies of Assad was an amalgam of issuing carrots and sticks. He would permit Syrian Jews to travel to Israel and give hand over, locating a captured Israeli pilot. At the same time, he would threaten to use sticks by tightening an Arab boycott of Israeli goods and unleashing Hezbollah and Palestinian groups¹⁷.

Supporting the Allied powers during the second Gulf War was a carefully planned move by Assad with this move he would ensure his break from the Arab Nationalism movement and present Syria as a state which condemned coercion against vulnerable states such as Kuwait.

The only backfall would be upsetting Arab brothers and giving the premise for fundamentalist movements fostered by those states. Assad's iron clenched domestic policies and Ba'ath party's suppressing acts would keep such movements bottled for a time.

Therefore the systemic change was a facilitator towards negotiations. It can not be predicted whether or not Assad had peace in mind when he chose the US as an ally. Assad predicted that, he would not need to go any further than giving support to the Allies, but having the US support had a price and that price was to relax the tension between Syria and Israel instead of condemning the state of Israel and threatening to wipe it out of the Middle-East.

ISRAEL

The end of the Cold War promised a more secure future since the states that received Soviet help would be cut short. Less help would denote less military investments. It was perceived as the Arab-Israeli conflict would continue but the Arabs would have to find a different sponsor.

The second Gulf War reminded the states in the Middle-East an old tradition. Whenever the power vacuum in the region was left unattended some state or some leader would make the most radical return. Saddam threatened the region and even the international arena, despite all US attempts. Once again Israel was at the threshold of being invaded or attacked vehemently.

These two events may not have facilitated the move towards negotiations if the Labor government had not won the elections. The Israelis saw peace as the best outcome. Their view depended on exchanging land for peace. There were also residual beliefs from the Shamir government which viewed depending on the US as treachery and giving up land, especially the Biblical lands, as sin.

The systemic change in itself is not either a facilitator nor a hinderance. It is an indicator that peace may be more profitable in the region since there are too many to handle and an ally across the ocean can not always pre-empt missile attacks.

3.2.2 THE DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE

The domestic circumstance in both states was not ripe for a peace settlement in 1992. Rabin's arch opposition came from his "kitchen cabinet". Peres rejected drastic changes in policy. Peace could be discussed with every leader except Assad. His word could not be taken as a deed.

Assad had the similar problem but his methods of resolving opposition were much more effective. He chose to silence the ones who opposed him, whether they

were his advisors or his people. He would have to convince the Israelis just like Sadat, that he could be trusted¹⁸. At the same time he would have to convince his 70% majority of a peace treaty with Israel would be to the advantage of Syria.

In this category the effect of intra-party dispute, role of the public opinion and non-governmental organizations take place. Israel experiences these factors more severely since policies of oppression are not hand .

3.2.2.1 THE EFFECT OF INTRA-PARTY DISPUTE

SYRIA

The Intra-party dispute in Syria, even if it was experienced, would never reach the top decision maker. If there was opposition, it would be oppressed by all means. Assad's council formed of loyal friends and family members offered advice but it was only recommendatory.

Assad did not have a party to dispute him. He had a concentric circle of power points in which he was the radius. He had very close and loyal family members around him. Circling them were loyal members of military, some advisers and councils which directly reported to Assad¹⁹. This larger circle was enveloped by formal institutions of army, party and state. The system was also coated by a constitution, legislative assembly and a coalition with other "progressive " parties²⁰. Decisions made by Assad and the inner core were transmitted through the informal network for execution by organs of the army, state or party²¹. The make up of the state pertained that of to a democratic one but pragmatically they were institutions which were impotent against Assad's unlimited power.

There was also an establishment of People's Assembly, in which there were disproportionate representations of the public and the National Front which provided opposition. Again everything appeared to be legitimate after all who would inspect the state whether or not the concerned institutions were functioning properly and prepare a report claiming that the system was not like what it seemed.

The seeds of Alawite takeover was planted by Assad. He mollified the urban Sunni population not because of attempting to disguise his regime but by creating a new era of so called openness. He would moderate the social and economic policies of the Ba'ath. He hoped that economic well-being would transform his dissatisfied Sunni population to manageability. Assad also performed charades of revision and change in his policies. The strategy was reminiscent of the 1970's takeover: some political and and economic liberalization, a series of measures offering greater participation and representation, without actually affecting the regime's core, structure and degree of control²².

Everything in Syria appeared to be under control but the desire for peace did not go through the proper channels of legislation or to that extent, it was not the genius of the Ba'ath policies nor the military pressure.

The intra-party dispute was not something that was present in Syria. The major party did not have a rule over Assad and the other stage-set parties were there to complete a Western oriented state picture. The Ba'ath even if it had criticisms of Assad could not hold out for long.

The intra-party dispute had no effect on the eventual outcome of the negotiations. Assad could over-rule any decision he chose to and the only party, the only legislation

organ and to an extent the not so public opinion was Assad and his inner circle of advisers.

ISRAEL

In contrast to the Syrian political environment the Israelis enjoyed a more flexible state system. There were a number of parties ranging from the left, center left, center right, right and religious or far right parties. The members of the Knesset were elected by the public and their distribution depended on the votes that they received. The Israeli votes usually configured around two major parties the Likud and Labor. In 1992 after a decade of Likud domination Labor party won the elections. This gave signs of change from one dominant party system into the two-block system²³. Likud represented the right end of the political spectrum with nationalistic and at times, religious tendencies. Whereas Labor was more to the left and it was further away from ultra religious currents. There was a change of power shifting from right to the left what declined to change was the participation of the religious parties in the coalition government. Power sharing between the religious and secular parties would remain unchanged²⁴.

Most Likud members believed in Israel retaining the occupied territories whereas Labor members were more flexible in at least negotiating over some rather than keeping all. Likud stands for maintaining the status quo in the occupied territories, asserting its strategic importance to the survival of Israel and historical linkages could not be denied. They appear to oppose concessions believing that concessions will encourage further Arab demands²⁵. Whereas Labor placed Palestinian/ national security issues at its central platform, overarching domestic issues of social and

economic policies²⁶. It proposed voluntary concessions which planned to withdraw from the West Bank.

As encountered in every political party, there was no consensus on exactly how much land could be negotiated for peace without deflecting its security. Apart from the consensus issue the main anxiety within the party was between Rabin and Peres.

The greatest obstacle that Rabin had to overcome was with Peres. Rabin was security minded but a centrist, he was not the leftist that Peres was. Rabin lacked support from his party, most of the time he was blamed for “being too soft on the adversaries”²⁷. He derived his power from the public. Rabin did not mention territorial compromise. He stressed self-rule for the Palestinians without yielding the West Bank. He did not favor a bi-national Israel²⁸. Security of the disputed lands had to be provided by the Israeli security forces.

Rabin announced that he did not view Palestinian terror as a threat to the country but a personal issue which could be enhanced by striking a deal instead of combat²⁹. Rabin’s aides and advisers especially Saguy³⁰, Shahak and Barak stressed the importance of Syria³¹. They insisted that instead of dealing with the Palestinian dispute, Syrian track could be handled first and then resolve the callus. Rabin on the other hand ingeniously decided to use one track against the other to attain favorable outcomes. Whenever one track reached an impasse (i.e Palestinian) he would concentrate on the other (i.e Syrian). Therefore he would be the master manipulator and he would try to put pressure on the parties by changing tracks. He knew that none of the parties could afford to be left behind.

Israeli decision making apparatus intensified around Rabin. He was the prime minister and the defence minister at the same time. Since he also held the defence

minister position he had more authority in the history of Israel than any other prime minister³². Every portfolio or every issue in any department went directly to Rabin. Foreign Relations and its objectives concentrated on two issues. The first issue was to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict at all dimensions and tracks. The second issue was maintaining and cultivating US-Israeli relations. Since none of the Arab states, except Egypt, had recognized Israel, it did not have embassies and consulates to transmit information from the Arab world. For that reason military surpassed foreign relations since the military concerned itself with the mandates of Ministry of Foreign Affairs³³. In the decisions that were made, the cabinet was not as effective as Rabin himself.

The Intra-party dispute that took place within Labor was a hindrance towards negotiations. Rabin was not popular in his party, his ideas could be opposed easily, and he knew that without the support from his party, he would not have the credibility to influence the Israeli public opinion.

3.2.2.2 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

The public opinion in Syria and Israel differed. In general no one seemed to continue to fight but the way in which they could express their views produced a paradox. A contradiction to Assad could result in detention or imprisonment whereas the Israelis could protest and express their discontent.

The grand design of Assad was to get the Golan Heights back and to be cooperative was one of the more credible means of getting it back. There was no threat in convincing his 70% minority..

Rabin on the other hand faced the dilemma of convincing Likud and ultra religious supporters of peace at the cost of what. No one wanted to be a victim of a

terrorist attack and no one wanted to be abhorred by aggressive neighbors. Israel's security could not be neglected.

SYRIA

The Syrians had their way of expressing their unapproval . They may not have been as loud as the Israelis but it was pronounced nonetheless. When Assad drifted his policy from following the Soviet Union to cooperating with the US, the criticisms were voiced in several forms-graffiti, leaflets and conversations with foreign correspondents³⁴. The same event repeated when Saddam was portrayed as a vicious aggressor. Many Syrians listened to Baghdad's radio station, they expressed sympathy for Saddam and displeasure with their own governments conduct³⁵.

The 70% sunni population may appear to be in disharmony with Assad's policies but this may not be the issue. After the Alawite takeover in 1970 the Muslim Brotherhood tried to gain supporters from the Sunni population. The Sunnis were secular in nature therefore rejected calls to unifying for Arab solidarity and in reality, for Islamic fundamentalism under cover³⁶.

The Ba'ath party had the goal of forming a united Arab socialist society. Its ideology emphasized pan-Arabism and socialism and its motto was "unity, freedom and socialism". The Arab people in order to achieve this objective must "struggle against colonialism, Zionism and provincial and separatist trends" and be involved in a "revolution against domination and exploitation³⁷". The party also tried to improve the quality of life in the countryside which was populated by the Sunnis. In a way this was a safety valve against a Sunni outburst. They would be kept satisfied first, if confrontations occurred, then they would be oppressed³⁸.

The Sunni's had no reason to contradict the party or Assad as long as they were kept happy. Furthermore Assad's superior intelligence service, would detect any acts of unifying against the government abort it before it gave birth to trouble. The public opinion was in harmony with the government so this entity did not put pressure on the leader nor its policies at the same time it was not a force that blocked the flexibility of the leader to take initiations.

ISRAEL

In 1976 the CIA reported that:

“There is no willingness of the Israeli public to go along with a formal Arab-Israeli peace which entailed the return of most territories captured in 1967. The Israelis insisted the territories should be retained. East Jerusalem, some parts of West Bank, the Golan Heights and Sharm el-Sheikh could not be negotiated. The public also backs military and civilian leaders' insistence on holding positions which would discourage or impede any conventional or guerrilla Arab attack”³⁹.

During the 1980's Israel strived for a political settlement according to its terms, meaning cooperation was not the first choice. Up until 1992, Israel preserved its status quo policy regarding the Golan. There was a certain relaxing of relations from; we shall never surrender the Golan Heights to, talks can be held but no miracle should be expected⁴⁰.

Israeli society as of today is not fully formed. The weight of the immigrant population is still felt. The passing of nearly two generations since the founding of the state and succession of important events have created a new consciousness that is expressed for the negotiations⁴¹. The generational change in Israel is a key influence in the support for the negotiations. This new generation had first shown political independence in the 1992 elections. Most removed their support from the Likud and some returned to Labor or scattered into the Sephardi Orthodox party. The new

generation was aware of issues and problems and therefore saw the captured lands as a liability rather than an asset⁴². The continuation of conflict translated to an inordinately high price without guaranteeing any assurance of a payoff.

The Israeli public rallied for the Declaration of Principles. Although the initial agreement aroused excitement the public support remained highly unstable. At the first announcement of an upcoming peace agreement the public support was about 45%, by the time of the signing in Washington rising to 65%, two months later it declined to 39% with a large undecided vote and an unfortunate increase in those opposed to 45%⁴³. Public support which is necessary for full implementation of agreements depends on the leadership of both sides in providing satisfaction for their publics and security.

Agreements can be signed but if they are not implemented, then the public will feel insecure and the agreement will not be binding to them since their lives would be at risk on the street not Rabin's (ironically even his). It appears as though the road to peace started off on a positive note but due to its non-implementation it soured and declined.

Public Opinion helped Rabin plant the seeds of peace. If the public had not turned more flexible then, Rabin may not have ended the Likud saga. This in itself was an indicator that the Shamir government's tough stance towards peace and clashing with the US was not favored. Public opinion facilitated the way towards negotiation.

3.2.2.3 ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

As witnessed in the first case there are no signs of NGO's taking place during the conflict. There may have been some in Israel since its social structure and power

distribution was more flexible than that of Syria. In Syria, there is a very low probability of such a formation. Again if they were present they did not play an active role, therefore did not have an affect on the outcome.

3.2.3 THE LEADER

The leader in both of the societies contributed to the decision making apparatus to the greatest extent. In Syria Assad was the sole power and in Israel, Rabin with his role as the prime-minister and the defence minister had most of the power encircling him more than any other leader in Israeli history.

The leader category consists of threat of looming disaster, leader change/leadership style, costs outweighing benefits and change in priority variables. It is needless to say that the systemic change and the regional reconfigurations elbowed the leaders toward the table but what was astonishing was the unique way that each chose to pursue.

3.2.3.1 THREAT OF LOOMING DISASTER

SYRIA

There is no implication that Assad chose to cooperate, due to a threat of looming disaster. Therefore this variable is not applicable for Syria.

ISRAEL

There is no evidence that Rabin procrastinated a looming disaster. One can not be sure whether or not this variable was present. Therefore this variable is not applicable for Israel.

3.2.3.2 CHANGE IN LEADER / LEADERSHIP STYLE

This category functions in two ways. If there is no change in leader as in the case of Syria then the leadership style will be dominant. Whereas in the Israeli case both of the variables are active. There is a leader change from Shamir to Rabin and his style is also an effective element towards negotiations.

SYRIA

Assad is a dichotomy of the Ba'ath and military. His beliefs grew out of his party background and authority came from his military background. As he climbed the ladders towards power he tried to achieve the goals of the Ba'ath party while being head of the Syrian army.

Assad's aim of Arab solidarity is a struggle against Syria's zero-sum battle with forces of imperialism, Zionism and exploitation. Embedded in this view is the notion of "Greater Syria"⁴⁴. He became particularly interested in this idea after the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement. Since 1975 Syria has been involved in the Palestinian causes and making Syria indispensable in Lebanon. He joined with Jordan's King Hussein, when Hussein was against Israel. Syria became belligerent when negotiations between Jordan and Israel began. Daniel Dishon suggests that Assad "wants to produce a situation in which Damascus is the place to which both Jordan and Lebanon as well as the PLO have to turn, in order to clear major decisions"⁴⁵. In short any attempt to by-pass Syria from the peace negotiations would backfire. Any peace that is reached without Syria would be meaningless.

Assad also had a "devil image" of Israel an inherent bad-faith image of the enemy. Israel could not do anything right, one must always be suspicious of the motives of its leadership⁴⁶. Israel can not act on its own but its actions are programmed by some other state. He believes Syria and Israel have a basic conflict of

interest-both want the same land and both believe that their countries have innate leadership rights over this territory.

Assad's political style has the following qualities: behind the scenes maneuvering, broad consultation, control of information and attention to detail, use of incentives, pragmatism and patience⁴⁷.

With-up-to date information and a sense of who is interested in what, Assad knows where to apply the carrot and the stick. "To his mind everything has a price, but it is up to him to fix it. He does not bother with limits and boundaries set by others⁴⁸. Assad also has patience and sense of political timing. He is said to have built his power stone by stone, he never rushes⁴⁹. He makes a move, then stops and assess the effect and considers the new situation and players before he makes his next move. His policy is coined as "decibel politics" by the US officials. He heightens tensions for a few days, then lowers it. This behavior gives him the flexibility to test the limits of his opponent.

Assad has built his regime around three institutions: the Ba'ath party, the military and the governmental bureaucracy. He heads all three of these institutions. His power and authority is a unitary patron-client structure with him as the chief patron⁵⁰. He carefully examines the leadership positions in these institutions. Assad restricts the roles of these individuals and shuffles his cabinet periodically. It is a paranoid world, Assad appears to have the most loyal around him and yet he even doubts them.

The Syrian leader uses two techniques to deal with opposition in the society: deflection and repression. Israel, Iraq, Moslem Brotherhood and United States are scapegoats on which he deflects internal problems claiming that they are the enemy and responsible for Syria's troubles⁵¹. If he is unable to overcome the opposition in

the society, then he will resort to repressive tactics. The uprising can be crushed ruthlessly as witnessed in the 1970's.

When Assad decided to change sides during the second Gulf War he knew that the Arab-Israeli conflict would take a different turn and that Syria would be involved and taken into consideration at last. It was not that conflict worried him but any means of getting the Golan would be justifiable. After the war Assad's minimum goal was to keep the peace process going and avoid being blamed for any breakdown; he wanted to see if an acceptable agreement could be reached while avoiding one that appeared to settle for much less than full Israeli withdrawal⁵². He would appear with the US be cooperative and wait for its consequences. Israel would have the next move.

With the Bush administration in charge, the Syrians would not have much to worry. The US policy makers noted that peace needed sacrifices from both sides not just from Syrians alone. The support from the US and their pressure on Israel, would place the adversary in such a position, that they would have to accept peace on Syrian terms.

Assad's main challenge was to deter Israel and the US from any temptation to leave Syria out of the peace process, without appearing to act as a spoiler⁵³. He still had his cards to play if things did not go as he had planned, he could always stir up the rejectionist Palestinians and revive the Hizballah in Lebanon if Syrian interests were ignored.

The Syrian leader once said that "Syria is the core of the problem and the key to the Middle East solution"⁵⁴. So that Assad and Syria will not be left out of any negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, he will either play the role of a

spoiler or a leader of peace process depending whether or not Syria is included in the process.

Henry Kissinger is reported to have said about the Middle East that “No war is possible without Egypt and no peace is possible without Syria”⁵⁵. Assad is aware of the fact that he is needed in the peace process and he is trying to come out of it with the best deal.

The fairy tale state structure of Syria adds up to one conclusion, it is the leader who is at the apex of both the decision making apparatus and power. If the decision to go on with the peace negotiations had not been accepted by Assad it may have never come to life.

The leader was a definite facilitator towards negotiations.

ISRAEL

Rabin came to power through democratic means. This was the second time that he had taken office in the government. The first time was over-shadowed by propositions of impropriety which left his wife Lea under suspicion but his public trusted him and therefore elected Labor over Likud ending a long time domination.

The main difference between the previous government and the Labor government was the definition of peace. The former defined it as “peace for peace” the latter as “land for peace”. The peace for peace proposal asked for full diplomatic, economic, cultural relations with Syria without withdrawing from the Golan. Rabin argued that peace needed compromise on both sides. He concluded in saying that he believed that UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 did apply on the Golan and stated that Israel could withdraw on (if not from) the Golan in return for a peace accord.

In spring 1992 Syria announced as a goodwill gesture that the remaining Jews in Syria would be free to travel, but later in the year the government slowed down the process. Assad announced that he was willing to take the initiative for the peace of the brave which would hasten both Jordan and PLO thinking that Syria would reach an agreement and get the best deal.

Rabin at this point would first separate the conflict into tracks and try to strike a deal with each one. He would start off with the PLO, if that track reached an impasse, he would immediately switch to the other track. This would create competition for the two tracks and they would be more willing to cooperate⁵⁶. Before making his last move at Oslo, Rabin pointed that the lack of movement from the Syrian side eased his way towards the PLO in Oslo. He had started concentrating on the Syrian track but their unacceptable pre-condition of withdrawal from the Golan first and then agreement made him say “When I decided to go all the way (with the Palestinians, it was because the Syrians) still demanded total withdrawal (from the Golan Heights), uprooting of the Israeli settlements (there), and were not even ready for full-fledged peace⁵⁷. Peres also confirms that a major factor in Rabin’s decision to deal with the PLO was the realization after Christopher’s trip in August, that there was no “Syrian Option”.

Rabin felt that international and regional changes offered Israel a short term “window of opportunity” to resolve the core conflict with Israel’s Arab neighbors. He sensed that if a full scale confrontation took place, then Israel could be strategically impaired. An already insurgent Iran and a rapidly recovering Iraq worried him⁵⁸.

Also on Rabin’s mind was the threat of Hamas. One can not overestimate the importance of the rise of Hamas in persuading Israel and Rabin in particular to

pursue the opportunity that Oslo presented⁵⁹. Despite the setbacks, Israel would pursue the peace process as if there was no terrorism and fight terrorism as if there was no peace.

Rabin was the only leader in the Israeli politics who was capable of seizing the opportunity to make peace at Oslo. The Likud leader Netanyahu had the credibility but not the will to make territorial concessions and recognize the PLO, Peres had the will but lacked the credibility. If it was not Rabin the peace process may not have been successful⁶⁰.

In Israel, the decision making apparatus was highly personalized. It did not have an institution like the National Security Council nor a powerful inner cabinet. The prime ministers usually had two items on their agenda of foreign affairs: the Arab-Israeli conflict and the US Israeli relations. The Israeli government is usually made up of coalitions so the fractions also create impediments for a consensus on policy. The Israeli Defense Force plays an important role in shaping national security issues, the interagency system is relatively weak in Israel. Every institution such as the army works on its own and in its field rather than a collaborative project.

As the Oslo process and the Israeli-Jordan agreement shifted to implementation, the last aim of Rabin was to revive the Syrian track. The formal negotiations which began in Madrid (1991) were suspended in February 1994 after the Hebron massacre. In the summer of 1994, fruitful talks began between the ambassadors to Washington and US officials in the same room. They remained separated on four issues: the extent of Israel's withdrawal from Golan, the degree of peace and normalization (i.e diplomatic relations, trade, tourism etc.) that Syria will offer in return, the timetable and the security arrangements that will be needed to maintain the peace. It depended

on Assad to provide a precise definition of peace and whether this definition was compatible with that of Israel. In Rabin's words the "depth of withdrawal is parallel to the depth of peace"⁶¹.

Rabin tried to reach a common point until his assassination in November 1995. US officials offered sending the region a contingent force and Rabin agreed to this by suggesting that the land forces concentrating on the Golan could be reduced if there were plans of de-militarizing the region. Assad made attempts of cooperating but when he felt that he was not getting what he deserved, he would push back the process for couple of months.

Rabin was a facilitator towards negotiations. He was criticized by Netanyahu for being too soft on the Arabs and the terrorists. Ironically like Sadat what he had started could not be finished because of some radical young man who did not share his passion for peace.

3.2.3.3 COSTS OUTWEIGHING BENEFITS

When costs, whether economic, political or social, start to overshadow the benefits, the leaders review their coercive methods and usually decide to cooperate. It is assumed that once costs start outweighing the benefits, this usually results in leaders moving towards negotiations.

SYRIA

Assad due to the systemic change, had to revise his coercive tactics. He still wanted the Golan back and the Greater Syria idea lingered on. What changed was the means of attaining it. After the Gulf War, Bush administration decided it was the right time to launch a peace initiative which would bring the parties of the conflict together under the auspices of the United States. This was the first time that all of the

concerned parties faced each other in 1991 in Madrid. Bush and Christopher urged the parties to concentrate on the commonalities rather than the differences. The conflicts were divided into tracks and each track met with its concerned parties. The Syrian track collapsed with the statement “law of international rule must be obeyed not the law of the jungle”. Syrians claimed that the conference was not in harmony with international law⁶².

The Syrian leader noticed the fact that he must cooperate to achieve his goal but this did not prevent him from creating obstacles so that minute details delayed the process while Assad calculated his next move according to the Israeli reaction. Peace would be beneficial because with the Soviet fountain all dried up, the banker and the gun-dealer left Syria all by itself. Too much investment on arms had already widened the disparity between economic and social development⁶³. Since the investment was not bringing any profit, the policies had to be revised. This would translate to, Assad investing in social welfare rather than arms which would keep the dissident Sunnis satisfied, therefore peace would have an appealing package and no one would think of opposing, since money would be rolling. Charles King suggests that as potential benefits begin to decline due to rising costs, usually this produces rise to dissidents both in the society and in the political party that is in power⁶⁴.

An isolated Syria would not be of use to anyone. Politically, with the Soviets dealing with their domestic problems, the Syrians had to find new friends in the international arena and no one would support a coercive and uncompromising country. Plus he always had the Hizballah card to play. If things did not go as planned or further negotiation was not desired, the indirect intervention of the

Hizballah may change the course of events. Syria had nothing to lose but could gain, if Assad was patient enough.

Syria wanted to be part of the “New Order” and this order dictated compromise. It is not surprising to see that Assad interpreted peace differently than Rabin. It was his peace and his rules compromise was not sought .

Despite the reasons why Assad may have resorted to peace, due to the changes taking place in the international arena costs of coercion would very high. It might have resulted in economic fluctuation due to continued investment in arms. It might have resulted in social instability with rising costs and less investment in social welfare and finally it may put Syria back to isolation in a “New World Order” . New World to the sense that the US dominated the arena.

Costs outweighing benefits was a facilitator towards negotiations. It involved Assad calculating costs in return for Golan if the aggressiveness continued. Only peace would be beneficial.

ISRAEL

The 1967 Six Day War was a turning point in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Under the command of then the Chief of Staff, General Yitzhak Rabin, the Israel Defense Force captured the Golan Heights, Sinai Peninsula, West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip. Although the war provided Israel with greater strategic depth and more defensible borders, it also made Israel responsible for the security and well-being of the more than 1 million Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories and created another 200,000 refugees⁶⁵.

During the election rallies Rabin did not mention swapping land for peace, eventhough the Labor platform called for compromise, Rabin did his best to avoid

turning Israel into a bi-national state. He also pledged that Israel “would not come down from the Golan”. He believed that Palestinian terror did not constitute a threat to Israel but rather it was an issue of personal security, combating them was not the solution but striking a deal might be. This controversial policy was debated in the Labor party.

After the elections, Rabin decided that Israel had to separate itself from the Palestinians if it wanted to be safe, he said, autonomy would mean fewer Gazan workers in Israel and thus fewer attacks on the Israelis⁶⁶. Gaza and West Bank were poor areas and had the potential of housing fundamentalist tendencies which would directly threaten the Israeli government.

Three advisers of Rabin namely: Barak, Shahak and Saguy were known to favor progress on the Syrian track. This was necessary in order to alter the region’s strategic equation. Saguy insisted on the Syria first settlement, and he stated as early as 1990 that “Israel had to make peace with Damascus”⁶⁷. In September 1992 he told reporters that there was a yearning for peace among the Syrian people⁶⁸. The intelligence reports confirmed that Damascus was serious about negotiating with Israel.

Rabin started his peace attempts by focusing at bi-lateral rather than multiple and simultaneous tracks. He could easily play one track against the other⁶⁹. Plus the Israeli public would find one agreement to be more digestible.

The costs were high in the sense that Israel was surrounded by Arab neighbors and the Camp David Agreement had not produced the effect that was planned by the Israeli officials at the time of the signing. Barak suggested that having a dialogue with the PLO would put a hold on terrorism since it was constantly infiltrating from

Libya and Iran⁷⁰. One could not fight all. Due to economic burdens the occupied lands were becoming hunchbacks to Israel's growth. The Golan Heights had water resources, so there might be further trouble in letting it go. For the time being, the Israelis would concentrate on the negotiations, switch tracks if necessary but would not shut down the channels of communication due to Syrian pre-conditions of total withdrawal.

Costs did outweigh the benefits therefore it was a facilitator towards negotiations.

3.2.3.4 CHANGE IN PRIORITY

Change in priority is an unavoidable result of costs outweighing benefits. As things start to decline, policy modifications had to be made. It is usually assumed that change in priorities is a facilitator towards negotiation.

SYRIA

Syria's change in priority came as a result of systemic changes and regional alterations in alliance structures. If one views the situation more closely, it can be inferred that the desire for Golan Heights had not subsided only this time the credible way of attaining it was through peaceful means. Concessions were not thought of, after all Israel invaded the occupied territories and they were to return which was not theirs. Syria had nothing to give up. It was the victim of Israeli aggression and according to international law aggressors were to be punished.

All Assad had to do was go along with the peace process and change the image of Syria the terrorist state, to Syria the integral part of the peace process. The Hizballah activities had to be curbed for a while. It could always be used as wild card in times of trouble. Syria would insure itself at no cost.

Change in priority was a facilitator towards negotiations.

ISRAEL

Rabin changed the priority of combating all the Arab states to making peace one by one. Reviving the Camp David spirit was discussed. First he made a choice of choosing between the Syrian and the PLO track. Due to Assad's intransigence the PLO was favored over Syria. He was smart enough to use the Syrian track whenever there was an impasse at the PLO negotiations. The pressured PLO would fear to be left out of the process and it would try to attract Israel's attention again, by breaking the impasse⁷¹. None of the parties wanted to be left behind apart from wanting, they could not afford to be left behind. Syria had the same hunch, no one could prevent Syria from the benefits of a peace treaty. When Israeli-Jordanian treaty was signed, Assad condemned the whole thing. The Declaration of principles and the Oslo Accords were just as disturbing. Assad was falling behind every concerned party was getting some compensation for contributing to peace, but Syria was being ignored.

Syria desired a Camp David like Agreement, which translated into, full withdrawal. Rabin argued that, in order to reach a similar agreement, parties had to trust each other. Sadat had to come to Jerusalem and make a speech at the Knesset, trying to convey the message that, Egypt was serious about negotiating. Assad would have to convince the Israelis that he could be trusted⁷². Egypt in return for the Sinai, had initiated diplomatic relations with Israel pledging recognition and commitment to normalization of relations. Assad without taking these factors into consideration pressed for a Camp David.

Hamas was a factor which also contributed to peace efforts. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians needed their population in order to have a state. Terrorist attacks

produced loss on both sides and at this point both the PLO and the Israelis wanted to attain peace.

Any third party intervention needed to have clear cut benefits for Israel. Military aid, arms for peace (deterrent capability) and satellite launchers would be suggested to the US, after all Rabin did not want to come out of the deal empty handed⁷³. Gulf Cooperation Council could provide low-level recognition in the form of opening a liaison office and the economic boycott may be lifted.

The resources will be shifted from settlements into improved infrastructure which would total up to 1 million dollars annually. It was already evident that the occupied territories were backdrafting the growth of Israel. As the social unrest climbed, any hopes of reaching an agreement would be lost forever. For that reason in order to keep the Israelis happy cooperation had to be reached.

Change in priority was a facilitator toward peace. It created other options like a prosperous fiscal year, increase in aid from the US government and a quasi-safe region.

3.3 CONCLUSION

In this section the results of analytical investigation of the Syrian- Israeli conflict will be given. A summary of the effect of the variables on the Post Cold War period of the Syrian-Israeli conflict is given in Table 4.

SYRIA

According to Table 4, for Syria, the most facilitating category was the leader. Looming disaster variable was not present. The remaining variables of change in leader/ leadership style, costs outweighing benefits and change in priority contributed positively towards negotiation. Assad and his policy making towards the Israelis was the pushing force towards negotiations.

The domestic circumstance category was almost not applicable for Syria. Out of the three variables; the effect of intra-party disputes, role of public opinion and the role of NGO's, none had a facilitating nor a hindering effect. This result can be interpreted as Assad's oppressive measures suffocating domestic constituencies and this may be reason why the previous category operated smoothly.

Finally, the international context perhaps due to the systemic change, was also a facilitating category towards negotiations. From the three variables of role of allies, role of intermediary and systemic change all had positive effects on the Syrian case. The systemic change and prerequisites of taking part in the "New World Order", demanded cooperation therefore Syria yielded to the demands.

ISRAEL

According to Table 4, for Israel, the overarching facilitating category was the leader. The looming disaster variable was not applicable. The remaining three variables; leader change/ leadership style, costs outweighing benefits and change in priority contributed positively towards negotiations. Rabin was the major driving force which pushed Israel for conflict termination.

The domestic circumstance category had three different results. Role of public opinion variable had a positive effect on the outcome. The effect of the intra-party dispute was negative and finally the role of public opinion was not applicable. Since

the Israeli domestic constituencies were not oppressed the variations can be regarded as being essential for a democratic regime.

Finally, the international context category was also decisive in moving towards conflict termination. The systemic change category was neutral, since nothing much changed for Israel. The remaining two categories role of allies and role of intermediary were facilitating variables. The international context for Israel denoted to the US and its insistence for peace and stability in the Middle-East.

As an overview, the leader category was the most facilitating. The looming disaster category was not applicable to both states. The variables of leader change/ leadership style, costs outweighing benefits and change in priority were positive effects towards negotiation. Out of the four variables one was not applicable while the remaining three were positive.

The domestic circumstance category was highly ambivalent. As a total; there were four not applicables, one facilitating and one hindering effect. The results present that the domestic circumstance and its variables were almost impotent.

Finally the second most facilitating category was the international context. In total the results were five facilitating and one neutral.

The following chapter is a conclusion to the research. In this section the results from the Egyptian-Israeli and the Syrian-Israeli conflicts will be compared.

TABLE 4: THE EFFECTS OF VARIABLES ON THE SYRIAN- ISRAELI CONFLICT

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

	ROLE OF ALLIES	ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY	SYSTEMIC CHANGE
SYRIA	+	+	+
ISRAEL	+	+	0

DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE

	EFFECT OF INTRA PARTY DIPUTE	ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION	ROLE OF NGO'S
SYRIA	N/A	N/A	N/A
ISRAEL	-	+	N/A

LEADER

	LOOMING DISASTER	LEADER CHANGE/ STYLE	COSTS OUTWEIGING BENEFITS	CHANGE IN PRIORITY
SYRIA	N/A	+	+	+
ISRAEL	N/A	+	+	+

+ : Facilitating Effect Towards Conflict Termination

- : Hindering Effect Towards Conflict Termination

0 : Neutral

N/A : Not Applicable

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The aim of this study was to investigate the factors which impregnate or halt the process of conflict termination. For this purpose, pre-negotiation phase of two cases, Pre- Camp David phase of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict and the Syrian-Israeli conflict in the Post Cold War period were examined.

In this section first, a summary account of the findings, and their relevance with the initial propositions are presented. Second, major conclusions concerning the results of the research are reported. A summary of the findings are shown in Table 5.

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

ROLE OF ALLIES

As stated in Chapter I, it is usually assumed that allies, states that provide economic, military and political support to the conflicting party, is a facilitator towards negotiations if they have political or economic interests in the conflict and cooperation is to their benefit.

EGYPT& ISRAEL

In the Egypt-Israeli case, for Egypt it was a hinderance since all of the Arab states and the Soviet Union viewed coercion as the ultimate mean in attaining the Sinai peninsula. For Israel since the US was the only ally their support for peace would

have effects on the Israeli decision making process therefore the role of allies was a facilitator towards negotiations.

SYRIA& ISRAEL

In the Syria-Israel case, Assad made modifications in his allies. Cold War allies were neglected and the US was chosen as the new ally to take part in the “New World Order”. Therefore, US as a new ally facilitated the pre-negotiation process towards negotiations. The US support continued for Israel in the Syrian-Israeli conflict particularly after the Labor victory over Likud. Therefore, role of allies was a definite facilitator.

The results were in accordance with **Proposition I**, since the US was an ally to both of the conflicting parties and it desired peace in the region, it facilitated the process.

THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY

It is usually assumed that if the intermediary is a state with political and economic credibility it is predicted it will be the guiding force in pushing parties towards negotiation.

EGYPT & ISRAEL

The Egyptian-Israeli conflict had the US as the intermediary. Egypt views the intermediary as a facilitator towards negotiation. There may be political and even economic pressure from the Arab states but these can be compensated by the US. Israel also has the same plans plus it is destined to go along with the US even if it has some reservations. It is also a facilitator for Israel.

SYRIA& ISRAEL

The Syrian - Israeli case also welcomed the US as the intermediary. Assad viewed the situation as changing the makeup of foreign relations but attaining the same goals. The US could pressure Israel to give up the Golan. It was a facilitator for Syria. Rabin perceived the situation as any third party intervention should have clear-cut gains for Israel. The intermediary was a facilitator towards negotiations as long as Israel got its share.

The findings were in accordance with **Proposition II**. The intermediary with its immense political and economic credibility facilitated the process towards conflict termination.

SYSTEMIC CHANGE

It is usually assumed that a systemic change, in this case from a bi-polar system to a multi-polar system, is a facilitator for the pre-negotiation process toward negotiations.

EGYPT & ISRAEL

In the Egyptian-Israeli case neither of the parties appear to be affected by the systemic change. There is no change but the bi-polar world has no effect in pushing the parties toward negotiation. The systemic change variable is not applicable in this case.

SYRIA& ISRAEL

In the Syrian -Israeli case both of the parties are effected by the systemic change. For Syria it is a facilitator towards negotiations because the era of coercion has come to an end, the absence of Soviet Union contributed to Assad's change of policy

towards peace. Israel has not been effected since it still had the same ally but the same problem of non-recognition. This variable is neutral towards negotiations.

Proposition III could not be tested on the Egyptian-Israeli case since there was no systemic change. In the second case, the same proposition was supported for Syria and Israel. For Syria it is a facilitator whereas in the case of Israel, the impact of the variable is detected but since the US remained as an ally, the alliance structures did not change.

DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE

EFFECT OF INTRA-PARTY DISPUTE

It is usually assumed that the intra-party dispute that is encountered within the domain of domestic circumstance can handicap the decision making apparatus from operating properly therefore it can be said to hinder the process toward negotiations.

EGYPT& ISRAEL

In the Egyptian-Israeli case, Sadat has great difficulty in convincing his advisers and his party that peace is beneficial to Egypt. Vice-president Mubarak never criticizes him openly but poses the greatest threat to his legitimacy. For Egypt it is a hindrance. Begin on the hand is not easily convinced therefore his attempts of convincing Likud are not genuine. Israel also experiences the intra-party variable as a hindrance.

SYRIA& ISRAEL

The Syrian-Israeli case is somewhat different because Assad's iron-clench rule does not permit any entity to doubt him. Therefore even if Ba'ath contradicts him this will not be expressed severely, as long as Assad is convinced that peace is more appealing there wont be any institution that could stop him from attaining it. The

intra-party variable has no effect in moving towards negotiations, it is not applicable. Israel experiences this variable to the highest extent. Rabin is not a popular man in his party and Peres, just like Sadat's case, is not easily convinced. Labor goes through phases of full support for Rabin to not supporting him, especially after terrorist attacks. Therefore the intra-party variable is a hinderance toward negotiations.

The Egyptian-Israeli case is in accordance with **Proposition IV**. It can be contradicted that Sadat may have overcome his intra-party disputes with similar measures used by Assad, but in any case, there were people who could contradict him they could not be pacified as easily as in Syria. The Syrian-Israeli case is partly in accordance with the same proposition, in the sense that Israel experiences it as a hinderance whereas Syria experiences it but it is hard to detect whether it is experienced and repressed or not experienced at all. In Syria Assad dominates the domestic arena. It would be naive to search for channels of discontent towards Assad's policies.

ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

It is usually assumed that a public opinion that is pro peace will facilitate the process towards negotiations. If they contradict their leader it is ambiguous whether their view will be taken into account. In the two cases even if the public completely contradicted the leader it is unlikely that the policies would change.

EGYPT& ISRAEL

In the Egyptian-Israeli case, Sadat's decisions were not effected by his public, the climbing ~~inflation~~ gave rise to domestic instabilities which found shelter in Islamic ~~fundamentalism~~ that was crushed by Sadat by his support for extreme nationalists.

The public did not give full support to making peace with Israel since they were more concerned about finding food to eat. The public opinion variable was a hinderance. Israel also had the same problem, the public opinion was torn between peace, some believed in not surrendering to any Arab state whereas some thought that making peace with one could open the channels. Begin government could not press for peace, since their party mandates were restrictive towards making peace with the Arabs. Therefore this variable was neutral towards negotiations.

SYRIA& ISRAEL

The Syrian-Israeli case had a different dimension. Due to Assad's repressive policies the existence of the public opinion is in doubt. Even if it is present whether or not it had a will of its own is doubtful. The variable of public opinion was not applicable in the Syrian case. Rabin was the key to the public opinion. He was elected over Likud and his policies were milder than his predecessor. He might not have had his party's support but he had his public's support. The variable of public opinion was a facilitator towards negotiations.

In both of the cases only Israel in the Syrian case was in accordance with **Proposition V**. Both of the Arab states due to their repressive policies did not depend on public opinion.

ROLE OF NGO'S

It is usually assumed that the role of NGO's have a facilitating effect on the process towards negotiations. In the two conflicts that have been touched upon previously, this variable could not be detected in order to be analyzed. It is ambiguous whether they were present but dormant or not present at all. Due to insufficient

information **Proposition VI** could not be tested. The role of NGO's variable is not applicable for the two cases.

LEADER

THREAT OF LOOMING DISASTER

It is usually assumed that a growing threat of a looming disaster will channel the leader towards conflict termination strategies. This variable was not applicable in any of the conflicts. Therefore, **Proposition VII** could not be tested.

LEADER CHANGE/ LEADERSHIP STYLE

It is usually assumed that if a leader is entrapped in her coercive policies, then a change in leader will facilitate the process towards negotiations. If there is no leader change such as in the case of Assad, then the leadership style may be effective. If the leader is willing to cooperate then it is a definite facilitator towards negotiations.

EGYPT& ISRAEL

In the Egyptian-Israeli case, Sadat's takeover after Nasser's death was a drastic change with Sadat's obvious tendencies towards the West. Apart from the leader change the leadership style is also a facilitator towards negotiations. Sadat's commitment to peace and his sincerity in convincing the Israeli public are all his style of attaining the Sinai through peaceful means. Begin on the other hand, had a lot lose if peace was to be discussed his religious Herut sect within Likud still held on the ideals of the early settlers, a Greater Israel had to be achieved. This ideal could not be achieved by promising the Sinai to the Egyptians, the others might follow. The leader change/ leadership style was a facilitator towards negotiations, despite Begin's commitment to the conservatives. He saw peace as an opportunity to achieve national goals in a more cooperative way.

SYRIA & ISRAEL

The Syrian-Israeli case took a different turn. Assad wanted to secure his place in the “New World Order”, therefore peace would both cut political and economic costs and at the same instant it would provide him sufficient time to design a strategy of getting the Golan back through peaceful means. Assad was a facilitator towards negotiations. Rabin with his proposals of land for peace was a definite facilitator towards negotiations. The change of government was a sign that the public supported him and peace. His leadership style was unique in the sense that he was ready to take initiatives.

The two cases fit well with **Proposition VIII**. In the states that was discussed the leader towers over any theoretical institution that is present but its powers are limited. Begin’s intransigence limited his space for maneuver. Even at Camp David his refusal to accept the last item on the agreement almost destroyed the peace initiative.

COSTS OUTWEIGHING BENEFITS

It is usually assumed that once costs, whether political (pressure from the international arena, government losing support), economic (embargo, inflation rate increasing) or social(domestic instabilities, riots) start to outweigh the benefits (getting a territory back, responding to a threat), leaders revise their policies and decide to put coercive measures aside. Costs outweighing benefits variable is usually a facilitator towards negotiations.

EGYPT& ISRAEL

In the Egyptian-Israeli case, Sadat viewed the costs as being great, a conflict with Israel would continue to be a burden on the Egyptian economy. Over investment in arms resulted in decrease in social welfare reforms which created an ungratified public that threatened his legitimacy. Costs was a facilitator towards negotiations. Begin saw the costs as losing his population in wars, a small population could become extinct if precautions were not taken. If "Eretz Israel"(Greater Israel) was desired, then in order to have a state, the population was vital plus investments could be channeled into social reforms. Costs was a definite facilitator towards negotiations even if Begin was not too happy with cooperating with Sadat.

SYRIA& ISRAEL

In the Syrian-Israeli case, Assad identified the costs as being high and decided to pursue a different policy without giving up the idea of getting the Golan. Costs, mostly being political and economic, forced him into revising his strategies. It was a facilitator towards negotiations. Rabin identified the costs as the occupied lands backdrafting Israel's growth and striking a deal with one of the Arab leaders (Sadat had taken the initiative but Camp David had not been absorbed by any of the neighboring states and Egypt had been pushed towards isolation) would open the way to others. The costs variable was a facilitator towards negotiations.

The results of the analysis for the costs outweighing benefits was in accordance with **Proposition IX**. In states where the leader is more dominant than the set institutions, once the leader decides to cooperate it is usually an uninterrupted process.

CHANGE IN PRIORITY

It is usually assumed that change in priority, the decision to quit coercion and take cooperation as a policy is a facilitator towards negotiations.

EGYPT& ISRAEL

In the Egyptian-Israeli case, Sadat had to change his priority (from attacking Israel to cooperating). It was more beneficial to Egypt just as in the previous variable, what had been lost in military build up could be gained back by negotiating. To Sadat his decision to change policies was a facilitator towards negotiations. Begin also wanted to benefit from his mild policies toward Egypt. His benefits would be assisted by the US. It was also a facilitator towards negotiations.

SYRIA& ISRAEL

In the Syrian-Israeli case, Assad changed his priority of coercion but not the desire to get Golan Heights back. Since peace appeared to be more beneficial, some modifications had to be made. Change in priority was a facilitator towards negotiations. Rabin also changed the priority that was set by the previous Likud government. Since peace was at hand coercive methods could not be relied upon. Therefore change in priority variable was a facilitator. The findings were in accordance with **Proposition X**. The decision to quit coercion and take cooperation as a policy was a move that both Assad and Rabin had made and this facilitated the pre-negotiation process towards conflict termination.

The first major conclusion of the study is that most of the initial propositions were supported. It shows that due to structural differences (i.e change from bipolarity to multi-polarity) and constraints in the domestic political system some variables were not applicable.

The comparison of the two cases put forward the finding that the variable which appeared most frequently was under the leader category. Out of the four variables three (leader change/ leadership style, costs outweighing benefits, change in priority) were facilitators and one (threat of looming disaster) was not applicable. As a grand total 12 out of 16 was a facilitator when the two cases were combined.

The second most frequently mentioned category was the international context. There were eight facilitators (different variables for different states) out of 12, one hinderance (allies for Egypt), one neutral and two not applicables.

Finally, the category which was a hinderance toward negotiations was the domestic circumstance. There was only one facilitator (public opinion for Israel in the Syrian-Israeli conflict) out of 12, four hinderances, one neutral (public opinion for Israel in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict) and four not applicables.

A bold comparison of the facilitating factors between the two cases shows that, the second case “The Syrian-Israeli” case contains a greater amount of facilitating factors.

As a total the Syrian-Israeli case has 12 facilitating, four hindering variables. There are also six not applicable and one neutral variable. Compared to nine facilitators, four hinderance, six not applicables and one neutral variables of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, the former case towers over the latter. The not applicable and neutral variables are same in number. Facilitating and hindering variables differ. According to these results the Syrian-Israeli conflict contains more facilitating variables than the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. However, it is worthwhile to note that the most significant difference between the two cases is that, the Egyptian-Israeli conflict ended, resulting in an agreement, whereas the Syrian-Israeli conflict lingers

on. Although this may sound contradictory with the above results, three major inferences can be made based upon the findings.

First of all the fact that the second case has more facilitating factors can be a sign for a possible agreement in the future for Syria and Israel.

Second, the fact that the first case terminated with an agreement despite its low frequency in facilitating variables, may denote that the simple frequency count of the variables does not determine the outcome of the pre-negotiation phase. The “quality” of the variables is as important as their number of appearance in each case. In other words, the impact of the variables may differ. For example the role of the intermediary in the Egyptian- Israeli case is more of a “Big Brother” where Egypt is supported like a state that is a member of the capitalist block. Whereas in the Syrian- Israeli case, the US takes on the role of a mediator, where Syria is not protected as intensely as Egypt. The effect of the variable may be the same, being a facilitator in both cases, but its impact is distinct to each particular conflict.

Finally it can be inferred that pre-negotiation phase can not be determinate all by itself. Pre-negotiation phase of conflict termination is an important first step towards an agreement but what is decisive is the total process of negotiation.

The findings and the inferences of this study could prepare a fertile ground for researchers. Elaboration and further analysis of the research can contribute to the field of conflict resolution and hopefully open new frontiers towards attaining peace.

TABLE 5 : COMBINED RESULTS FOR THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AND SYRIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICTS

	I	N	T.	D	O	M.	L	E	A	D.
	RA	RI	SC	IPD	RPO	RNGO	TLD	CL/LS	COB	CP
Facilitating Effect	3	4	1	0	1	4	0	4	4	4
Hindering Effect	1	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0
Neutral	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Not Applicable	0	0	2	1	1	0	4	0	0	0

INT. International Context

DOM. Domestic Circumstance

LEAD. Leader

RA: Role of Allies

RL : Role of Intermediary

SC : Systemic Change

IPD: Intra-Party Dispute

RPO: Role of Public Opinion

RNGO:Role of NGO's

TLD: Threat of Looming Disaster

CL/LS:Change in Leader/ Leadership Style

COB: Costs Outweighing Benefits

CP : Change In Priority.

NOTES

Notes for Chapter I

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⁴ Ibid., 1

⁵ Zartman, above cit. , 232

⁶ Stephen Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War : International Mediation in Zimbabwe 1974-1980 (Boulder : Lynne Rienner, 1991) , 23.

⁷ Richard Haass, Conflicts Unending : The United States and Regional Disputes, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 42.

⁸ Ibid.

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