

BILKENT UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

"THE BOSNIAN PEACE PROCESS (1993 - 1995)"

BY

ALI BOZÇALIŞKAN

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SEPTEMBER 1998

ANKARA

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
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
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Approved by the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree on Master of International relations



Assistant Professor HASAN ÜNAL
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Professor NORMAN STONE

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree on Master of International relations



Assistant Professor GÜLGÜN TUNA

ABSTRACT

This study aims to give a broad outline of events during the Bosnian peace process. It subjects former Yugoslavia in its all aspects to a close examination. It unequivocally demonstrates how Serbian ambitions brought about the tragic break-up of the country. It presents a comprehensive analysis of the peace initiatives led by the EC/EU and how and why the US was reluctantly drawn into the conflict after the Europeans had shown their inability to solve it. It analyzes differences of opinions between the USA and EU in the approach to the conflict. The study also sheds light on the origins of the Dayton Accords and their implementation phase. It emphasizes the importance of the presence of US force to sustain peace in the region. Additionally, it points out that peace is only viable provided that the region gets sufficient financial aid from the world community.

ÖZET

Bu çalışma Bosna süreci aşamalarının geniş bir şemasını vermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu arada eski Yugoslavya'yı bütün yönleriyle mercek altına alıp, açık bir şekilde ülkenin bölünmesinden Sırp tarafının sorumlu olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Çalışma, AT/AB tarafından yürütülen barış girişimlerinin bir analizini yaparken, Birliğin beceriksizliğinin ABD'yi isteksizce nasıl ve niçin çatışma içine çektiğinin bir resmini çizmektedir. ABD'nin çatışmaya taraf olmasıyla AB ile arasında doğan görüş farklılıkları irdelenmektedir. Çalışma ayrıca Dayton Anlaşması'nın imzalanması ve uygulanması sürecine ışık tutup, bölgedeki ABD gücünün barışın sürekliliği için önemini vurgulamaktadır. Bunun yanında dünya kamuoyunun bölgede barışın devamı amacıyla gerekli ekonomik desteği vermesi gerektiğine işaret edilmektedir.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The events which led to the disintegration of former Yugoslavia have already been and will continue to be the subject of many dissertations. Like many great events of history, it is worth examining the break-up of a country which brought about significant changes to the regional security and political system.

After Serbian leadership unleashed a virulent nationalism in the late 1980s, it became obvious that it would not be easy for the Western world to prevent the approaching bloody break-up of Yugoslavia. Short of military intervention the international community tried to preserve the status quo meaning, continuation of Serbian domination within the boundaries of former Yugoslavia. However, this policy collapsed with the beginning of a violent war and the ensuing ethnic cleansing which the world had not seen since World War II. Europe, heading several peace attempts initially, could not prevent the outbreak of the war. Once broken out, it then tried to contain it within the country's boundaries on the basis of a flawed diagnosis. It declared all parties equally guilty. Thus, the credibility of all its subsequent plans melted down. The carnage in Bosnia was stopped only with the involvement of the US with its robust capabilities for peace.

The aim of this study is to demonstrate the actual reason of the war in former Yugoslavia, the peace process with its details including the question of why the Europeans failed whereas the US was successful, and lastly to discuss whether there is any room for another Dayton negotiations process or not.

The dissertation is composed of six chapters: The second chapter under the heading, "A Short History" deals with the genesis of the conflict, cohesive elements of Yugoslavia, outbreak of the war and the attitudes of the third parties to the conflict. The third chapter analyses the deepening of the conflict and the international mediation efforts, including three peace plans Cutiliero, Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg peace plans. The fourth chapter examines the attitudes of the parties and various diagnoses of the conflict, covering "ancient hatred" myth, civil war, and naked aggression on the side of the Serbs. The fifth chapter tackles the roots of the US involvement in the conflict and the origins of the Dayton Accords after long mediation efforts of Europe. It also presents an evaluation of the Agreement in detail.

CHAPTER II

A SHORT HISTORY

2. 1. Genesis of The Conflict

Any event is a by-product of culmination of the other events. The painstaking break-up of former Yugoslavia is no exception to this rule. History sheds light on today for us to understand the past in a sober-minded manner. In order to understand what happened in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s it would be a good idea to have a look at the history of former Yugoslavias.

The first Yugoslavia, called until 1929 the “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” was terminated by the invasion of German troops in the first years of World War II. It had been established in 1918 by the Great Powers. The new state gradually slipped into the hands of centralists Serbs. “Serbian centralists and Yugoslavist unitarists... brought about the centralistic Vidovdan Constitution of 1921.”¹ The Serbs’ determination to dominate others reached its peak on 6 January 1929 when “King Alexander suspended the constitution... and proclaimed his personal rule.”² and declared the establishment of Yugoslavia.

The second Yugoslavia under the tutelage of Marshall Josip Broz Tito, hereafter Tito, was carved out of the ashes of the great war. Tito’s forces - Partizans-

defeated both the Germans and Mihailovic's Chetniks. As being unifying power, Tito got all the reins into his hands and ruled the country until his death in 1980. Yugoslavia was comprised of six sundry units at the outset: Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina (shortly Bosnia), Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro. In due course, with softening regime Tito inserted two autonomous regions into the federal system - Kosovo/a and Vojvodina- with promulgation of 1974 constitution giving them almost republican status. From a political perspective the system worked well enough until Tito's death though sporadic uprisings shook its pillars. But, they were not powerful enough to knock it down.

2. 2. Cohesive Elements of former Yugoslavia

As one expert put it: "People can be a single entity only if it has a single national soul, a single national consciousness and a single will."³ It is hardly easy to find a common will among different nations to live on together. Yugoslavia cannot be excluded from this reality. Nevertheless, it continued its life for almost fifty years. Therefore, it definitely had certain cohesive elements which can be briefly summarized as follows:

- Tito

The founder of the second Yugoslavia ruled the country for decades. Under his repressive regime no one could find the chance to express himself. He interplayed

among differences.⁴ With pressure or not he united all around himself at least until his death.

- Yugoslav idea

Yugoslav meaning “South Slav” came to the forth in the late 19th century. It aimed at unifying all south Slavs under one umbrella, which was tried twice after World War I and World War II subsequently. In Titoist era covering people’s own nationality and replacing them with Yugoslav identity seems to have worked to some extent. In all censuses, people became some what to identify themselves as Yugoslav to a considerable degree.

- Economy

Economy was one of the cohesive elements because an outward, relatively prosperous economy provided for a feeling of togetherness. After the indicators of economic life got worse and worse within time, it was evident that people with different standards fell apart.

- Systemic factor (Non-alignment stance)

Between the two blocks of the Cold War, Tito searched for a third way. It has been called later “non-alignment movement” which was mostly headed by Yugoslavia,

India and Egypt. In world politics it never played an important role but in Yugoslavia Tito somehow managed to make a big capital out of this movement by offering his people the idea as a kind of leading role in world politics. It seems that in this way the non-aligned movement contributed to the Yugoslavia's unity.

It can be asked now why Yugoslavia fell apart. Some of the well-known and well-asserted reasons could be summarized as follows:

- Frustration of the Serbs

How did the political system satisfy different ethnic groups within the boundaries of the country? In order to find a compromise between the two largest nations, namely the Serbs and the Croats, Tito tried to draw a fine line among all. He staunchly opposed any nationalist upheaval to get more advantages over the others. He suppressed the "Croatian Spring" at the beginning of 1970s and then the Albanian movement in the mid-1970s. In another words, "In Titoist Yugoslavia the word dissident was virtually non-existent."⁵ Accordingly, the Serbs posthumously would claim that Tito had always ignored them, and that he did not allow them to dominate the structure of the system deliberately. Carrying on with this premise, the Serbs constructed a line of thought, targeting to tear down the federal system in the post-Tito era in a much more centralized way around Belgrade. Aggrieved sense of nationalism embraced by the Serbian leadership

particularly from late 1980s onwards was to greatly contribute to the destruction of Yugoslavia in the 1990s

- Fear of the Others

As a matter of fact Tito did not feel any pity for any opponents of his autocratic regime. This did not allow different ethnicities to speak for themselves, which gradually led to the development of suppressed feelings. This, in turn, contributed to the emergence of virulent nationalism in later stages. Due to the lack of comprehensive cohesive elements among different groups, an outbreak of conflict among them became a possibility since each one would be inclined to act independently, particularly after Tito's death. For instance, the Serbs who tried to dominate Yugoslavia were disliked by the others as they proceeded to increase their control on other nations. As a natural reflex, the others, in particular, the Croats and the Slovenes initially, attempted to form their own identity on a more solid basis and to define them differently from the Serbs.

Another factor which led to the disintegration was a crisis of confidence felt by the others towards the Serbs. On the other hand, aiming at more domination of the others, the Serbs designed a "Greater Serbia" whose borders would include other federal states' boundaries. Except Slovenia, all others were ethnically heterogeneous and the Serbs's design frightened them all not least because they

would lose their territory or all their sovereignty to the Serbs, should the Serbs try to put their project into practice.

- Economic Deficiencies

The Yugoslav economy in general during the Cold War did appear workable for a multiethnic society. Yugoslavia was duly popularized as being the most prosperous socialist state. Tito intelligently made use of the benefits of the two camps, keeping both blocks at a similar distance. Employing “self management system” and opening the land to the outside world, he provided cash for what it seemed to the outsiders a well-running economy. However, self-management system collapsed towards the end of his rule, and it became harder to find credit from the western world because of détente between the two poles. The post-Tito era rulers could not overcome these obstacles and could not put economy on its track again. Some units of the federal state began to feel that they were being exploited economically for the prosperity of the Serbs. Moreover, they were being put under pressure by their own money which was definitely used to equip the Yugoslav National Army ruled by the Serbs. They decided to cut off this flow of revenue into Serbia which would be utilized against their interests.

- The Systemic Factor: The End of the Cold War

Tito managed to rule the country with various nations and nationalities under the conditions of a bipolar system. As indicated, bipolarity presented him with an

unprecedented chance of usurping both sides. Belonging to the East camp by heart though Stalin excluded himself from communist world, he used cleverly the West's credits to develop his country and to offer his people a remarkable degree of welfare.

Squeezed between the two blocks under the threat of a Soviet invasion, the cult leader manipulated different souls and minds for an all Yugoslav ideology. Crushing nationalist tendencies right away was combined with the imminent threat of Soviet occupation of the country. And all this worked for some decades. However, as soon as the danger of that invasion disappeared, one of the cohesive elements which unified the land was lost. "Without the Soviet bogey, Yugoslavia lost its claim to the international importance."⁶ Furthermore, the West lost its interest to back Yugoslavia in financial terms. With no Western credits forthcoming to rescue Yugoslav economy, and with Tito's death who was the country's credit card for decades, the Yugoslav nation found it difficult to put the economy on the right track again, particularly in the second half of the 1980s.

2. 3. Yugoslavia in Flames

Since Serbia pressed ahead with an expansionist and exclusivist policy towards the other constituent republics, it became evident in the late 1980s that this "cocktail of nations" would not live longer together. A gravity for more centralization on the side of the Serbs, which was already determined in the "Memorandum of Serbian

Academy of Sciences” in 1986, had already been issued. “The main thesis of the Memorandum was that the Serbs, Yugoslavia’s largest nation with a 36 per cent share of the total population, had been politically discriminated and economically disadvantaged in the post-1945 under Tito.”⁷ The Memorandum also included a reference, which posed a serious threat to other republics because it made clear that, said “the integrity of (Serb) nation in Yugoslavia is the crucial issue of the existence.”⁸. Seeking for more Serb domination was rekindled with an augmenting nationalist rhetoric under the new leadership of Slobodan Milosevic. Slobodan meaning “freedom loving” in Serbian language would turn the others into captivity. While Milosevic beginning to put his project into execution, this became serious threat felt by others.

Milovan Djilas, once a close fellow then a famous dissident of Tito, was not in a fallacy as he uttered these words: “Our system was built only for Tito to manage. Now, Tito has gone and our economic situation becomes critical. There will be a natural tendency for greater centralization of power (*on the side of Serbs*). But this centralization will not succeed...This is how the Yugoslav system will begin to collapse.”⁹ Djilas’ crystal gazing was to be proved by the Serbian leader, nationalist-turned ex-communist, Slobodan Milosevic for the sake of “Greater Serbia”. He aimed to be the second Gavrilo Princip, “the initiator of liberty”¹⁰ to salvage his long oppressed people. “A new Napoleon was rising. He followed a well constructed plan which consisted of three steps : a) Building strength in Serbia b) Conquering the provinces c) Bringing down the constitution .”¹¹

Milosevic used nationalism leverage harshly to build his strength inside. Nationalism which was unfolded by various exhumations of great men especially on Serbian side, was used as a pretext for masking Serbia's expansionist objectives. Secondly, Milosevic increased Serb pressure on Kosovar Albanians, who constituted more than 90 per cent of the population in Kosovo/a. The main incentive was to arouse Serb nationalist feelings against Kosovo Albanians who are regarded as the principal threat to the Serbs. Soon after he embarked on his nationalistic campaign, he managed to conquer the hearts of his people in Kosovo/a and Vojvodina. The election of Franjo Tudjman from Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) in May 1990 to the Presidency of Croatia was another good opportunity for Milosevic. "Knowing that nationalism was mortal sin in the eyes of the West, Milosevic's agents painted a picture of Tudjman as a racist, neo-fascist regime leader"¹² This distrust mutually developed and Tudjman began to prepare Croatia against possible Serb aggressiveness. The more the Croats and the Slovenes resisted, the more Milosevic got irritated. Belgrade got what it wanted with an unraveling feeling of angry nationalism.

The turn was to deteriorate the structure of the federal system at the expense of others. It meant tearing down the constitution. Milosevic taking Montenegro on his side fought against Croat and Slovenian alliance after he had replaced autonomous regions' leaders with his men and neutralized the other two republics namely Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. He deliberately obstructed the then Croat

leader's term and dynamited the basis of the federal system. Milosevic's attitude was clear from his words : "The approach that Yugoslavia does not exist, that only republics exist.. is not acceptable to us... In our opinion, any division into several states that separate parts of the Serbian people and put them within separate sovereign states cannot be acceptable...In our opinion, a confederation is not a state."¹³

Slovenia and Croatia had been expecting all these developments and they had already determined their stance against Serbia. After the failure of many tours of negotiations so as to revive the patient around a new confederal system, they this declared independence one after the other. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were not, at this stage, favoring independence because they were duly afraid of their vulnerable position considering Serbia superiority in arms and their fragile ethnic structure. After the federal presidency came totally under the control of Milosevic, Slovenia was on the path of independence. On the 25th of June, 1991 Slovenia and Croatia announced their determination to be independent. After a few days Federal Army units started a war in Slovenia. Serbianized Yugoslav National Army tried to suppress Slovenian uprising. Surprisingly, the Slovenes were ready to fight. Indeed, within a short period, Yugoslav army units ran out of steam and without logistical support they had to withdraw to their bases in Croatia. The Serbs had to sign an agreement after a 10-day war (Brioni Declaration, July 8, 1991) which left the Slovenes free in search of an international recognition. In any case

“Slovenia was never thought of as a distinct part of Great Serbia.”¹⁴ in the minds of Serbian rulers.

The turn was Croatia's. The fights in Croatia were signaling a larger and more bitter war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was running towards the finals without realising the real aims of the Serbs. All this, it proved that “the essential cause of the war in former Yugoslavia has been extremist Serbian nationalism with an agenda of territorial expansion”.¹⁵ The conflict between Serbia and Croatia did not terminate so quickly because Croatia was not homogeneous like Slovenia. It included a large Serbian minority, and this minority was well-armed by Serbia proper. Besides, the minorities had proclaimed their autonomous regions. Of five of them the most famous ones were Krajina and Knin. The Croats declared that they would not permit any secessionist moves. A bloody war started and continued until the end of 1991. In that period the Serbs managed to capture Vukovar in Eastern Slavonia ; they besieged and shelled Dubrovnik on Dalmatian shores. By the end of the year, one third of Croatia was under Serbian occupation.

However, this was not the end of the conquests. Now the Serb forces with instruction from Belgrade would turn on Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was more vulnerable in the sense that it was impossible to draw a clear line among inter-mixed population. Although Bosnia remained silent to the events in Croatia, it felt that it could not live in a rump Yugoslavia which would be dominated by Serbia after Slovenia and Croatia got their independence. This would mean that they

would be reduced to the status of Kosovo/a Albanians without any rights of representation.

In mid-October the Bosnian Parliament held a session to discuss the question of sovereignty. 73 Serbian delegates walked out, declaring the session illegal. The remaining parliamentary deputies (Muslims and Croats) adopted a memorandum, preparing the way for secession and underlining that Bosnia would under no circumstances allow itself to be conjoined to either Croatia or Serbia. Izetbegovic, the elected President of Bosnia and Herzegovina leader of Bosnian Muslims commented: "There is no place for us in this Yugoslavia. Radovan Karadzic, the leader of Bosnian Serbs, told us that the memorandum set Bosnia on the same road to hell as Croatia and Slovenia." ¹⁶

At the beginning of 1992 as soon as the EC offered recognition to Slovenia and Croatia and declared that Bosnia and Macedonia might be recognized if they met the EU recognition criteria (whether a prospective new state had done enough to protect minorities on its territory, whether it was democratic, and its borders were not being changed by force) the Serbs' assaults in Bosnia intensified. However, Bosnia was determined to get independence by holding a referendum which was the most important condition of the EC to recognize its independence. Despite the non-participation of the Serbs, the referendum gave the ticket of recognition. After this, the world began to witness the most brutal and violent killings of a people *en masse* by the Serbs for the next three years. The Serb aggression and the

world's inactivity in the face of an ongoing genocide, Croatian leadership became eager to participate in genocidal practice of ethnic cleansing until the US came in 1994 and convinced the Croats to establish a confederation with Bosnian Muslims against the common enemy with the Washington Treaty.

2. 4. Attitudes of the Third Parties

2. 4. 1. US Attitude

The Cold War was about to wither away when drastic events occurred in former Yugoslavia. At the time, the US was mostly engaged in the collapse of the Soviets, since it was not certain what would happen after a total partition. It was highly possible from the US perspective that it would lead to a volatile atmosphere. The signs of Yugoslav dismemberment made Americans worried because it was a small scale example of the Soviets in the Balkans, a vital sub-region where all crossroads intersected and a plethora of nations lived side by side. The US authorities estimated that in case of a rapid break-up of Yugoslavia first, the country, then the Balkans would be embroiled in a bloody war.

All this reasoning dictated the US' future policies in the direction of preserving the status quo or a mild transformation of the federal system into a confederal one. The US diplomats in Belgrade tried to exert this policy upon the sides but once

the arrow was thrown, it would not be possible to halt it. This arrow was surely embodied in the aggressive Serbian nationalism.

The official position of the US was to discourage separatist republics and to convince them to remain part of a looser confederal structure. “American policy supported a united Yugoslavia...”¹⁷ As a global watcher of the world events, it did not want to act as the policeman in this instance. It recoiled from involving deeper in what it saw as the imbroglio of the Yugoslav salad, fearing from swamping like in Vietnam.

All these considerations naturally left the arena to the European powers, and they took the initiative which proved myopic in their various approaches to the conflict.

2. 4. 2. The EC/EU Attitude

With Yugoslavia in flames, “the hour of Europe” in the words of Jacques Pool Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, the EU’s rotating president had come. The hesitant US approach for the involvement in the third Balkan war made the EC/EU emerge as only actor which might handle the problem. However, its first and the following attempts proved to be ineffective. Because,

“The EC lacked an analytical consensus on the nature of the problem, and the consistency that through a policy, and the consistency that would have been essential to contain the crisis.”¹⁸

During ages the fate of the Balkans has been kept in the hands of foreign actors. Except sporadic national kingdoms a foreign hand used to rule this subregion. 1990s showed once more the country and the region as a whole would not be stabilized without an external factor. There was a seek for a potent power to halt all the atrocities and aggression.

The most appropriate candidate to play an external power role seemed to be the EC/EU, which was very eager to get involved in the conflict anyway. There were some reasons behind this eagerness: First of all, the EC/EU was ambitious to prove its cohesiveness among its members. While integrating in economic terms, a common foreign policy desire had been discussed occurred hypothetically. Secondly, the EC had to prove its maturity in handling a rather complex issue at its backyard to get rid of the US hegemony in directing the Community's foreign policy if it ever existed.

As a matter of fact the EC countries and the US did not want to see what they thought of as Pandora's box opened in former Yugoslavia. But, once the beads of thread were freed, they could not refrain from recognizing Slovenia's and

Croatia's independence under German pressure. It seemed that a friction arose among the members. In this diversion of foreign policies looking to the EU for leadership was obviously an exercise in wishful thinking.¹⁹ At this point it is interesting to note that German foreign policy was initially more active than others. But soon after the Germans, under criticism from other members fell back upon the same policy: The EU solidarity was much important a business than the war in the Balkans. The collaboration between Britain and France may have directed the Germans into passivity.

The EU exerted some pressure on the sides through negotiations process. However, this pressure was directed mostly onto the victim, not the aggressor. As one expert put it:

“The truth is that Western governments had decided from the start, back in 1991, to manage the Yugoslav crisis with minimum external involvement till it had burnt itself out. The mistake the governments and Owen - under such a captain that Balkan odyssey was from the start doomed to end in shipwreck- made was to conclude prematurely, i.e. appease the ostensible victor, the Serbs.”²⁰

2. 4. 3. Russian Attitude

The end of the Cold War -with the collapse of the Soviets- reduced Russian close interest in the Balkans. First of all, Russia was in no more territorial proximity owing to losing its satellites. Secondly, it could not follow an ideological policy in the region. Thirdly, economic drawbacks were preventing Russia in the way of being more active. Shortly, Russia was only trying to get rid of shock of the rapid break-up and thinking solely of itself. However, all these obstructions did not hinder a Russian sympathy for the Serbs, supposedly coming from the old ages.

Although former Ambassador of Russia to Ankara, Albert S. Chernishev states that “the political attitude of the Russian Federation can be clearly observed, especially in Moscow’s approach to the solving of the crisis in the ex-Yugoslav territories, that Moscow finds it in her interest to encourage cooperation and stable relations among these countries”²¹ Russia always sided with the Serbian cause in every forum. That was the same in peace conferences and also in implementing the arms embargo on all parties to the conflict. But, a bear without pawns also had to restrict itself. That restriction came from the victor of the cold war, the US.

Nonetheless, Russia was not excluded from handling the conflict. It sent troops under the framework of UNPROFOR operation. Later when it was replaced with NATO forces “Russia had been insisting that the UN run the Bosnian operation or failing that, Russia have an equal voice with North Atlantic Council. But, sheer

financial strain of having to pay for its own troops dictated that Russia could only play a minor role and provide a brigade of 1500 men and additional logistics troops. Russia made a military agreement with NATO, but they would report to an American general. Russia has only secured the power to complain, not to decide.”²² In other words “Russia has been marginalized as a player in the Balkan conflict.”²³

CHAPTER III

DEEPENING OF THE CONFLICT AND THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION EFFORTS

3. 1. EC/EU At the Forefront

Negotiations between parties even in the first three months of 1991 were continuing on how to restructure the political system in Yugoslavia. Croats were defending the idea that state sovereignty of Croatia in the community with other peoples of Yugoslavia could be ensured only on a confederal basis in a union of sovereign states (Confederal Model of the Yugoslav Community). Slovenia was supporting this line of argument. On 19 August of 1990 the Serbian people in Krajina region of Croatia at the referendum voted with more than 90 per cent in favor of autonomy of the region. It angered Croatian authorities. In response, the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia adopted the new constitution of the republic of Croatia, proclaiming the Republic of Croatia “the national state of Croats”, thus demoted status of a constituent nation to the status of national minority.

Serbian rulers who abolished the autonomy of Kosovo/a and Vojvodina on 28 September of 1990 in the way of centralizing more made out on the 19th January of 1991 the order of all irregular forces and delivering weapons illegally brought in the country to the nearest authorized institutions or units of the Yugoslav National

Army. As Croatia and Slovenia were running for the independence, it was declared by Macedonia and Bosnia that they were truly interested in preserving Yugoslavia within a modified structure.

Slovenia and Croatia declared independence unilaterally on 25th June of 1991. "The international community, as expected, did not rush to embrace them."²⁴ The US favoring a single state, refrained from recognizing either of them. Former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, serving as the UN Special envoy of the Yugoslav crisis, repeatedly advised the State Department to withhold recognition from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia, on the grounds that Washington should avoid *precipitous* moves. At the end of his visit to Yugoslavia the US Secretary of State James Baker stated that the US supported democratic and unified Yugoslavia, while its future should be decided through agreement. Baker also said that the US would not recognize *unilateral* secessionist moves. The US' concerns about recognition at the time may be summarized as follows:

- Fear of Soviet collapse which could be accelerated by the dismemberment of Yugoslavia: The US was well-aware that there would be a volatile situation if the Soviets and Yugoslavia collapsed without maintaining a new solid structure in their places. This is the reason for non-supporting secessionist states at the first instance.

- **Fear of swamping in the enigma of the Balkans:** Vietnam syndrome with a high death toll was always at the back of the minds of the US authorities.
- **Letting the ambitious Europeans go ahead at their backyard and proving their inability to solve it:** No other global power hypothetically existed at the time. The US proved that it was the only hegemon with the necessary capabilities. The US' early withdrawal from commitment to the peace in former Yugoslavia let the EC act on its own, which would lead to terrible results later.

3. 1. 1. What was the Europeans' Diagnosis?

General attitude which prevailed among European politicians has been handled in the previous chapter. In any case "many in the West were unconvinced that any western interests were at stake."²⁵ The wrong diagnosis was to think that all three warring sides were equally guilty; there was no open aggression and the conflict presented a civil war owing to the old enmities. This diagnosis brought about wrong medicine; handling the issue with only political means, that is, negotiations among the parties. All the efforts of the EC negotiators were devoted to bringing the parties together through diplomatic means. All this was obviously doomed to fail, since the negotiations did not offer equal or satisfactory terms to the sides. On the one side, there were Serbs gaining on the ground; on the other, the Bosnians were always losing. Another factor was that diplomatic activity aimed at resolving the crisis was based on the assumption that both parties were prepared to

negotiate in good faith.²⁶ However, it was disappointing to see how many times cease-fires were signed and broken.

3. 1. 2. Europeans' Eagerness

When the war spread, in a trice, Western diplomats, especially the Europeans tried to grasp the opportunity to demonstrate how they would solve the problem at their backyard. "It has been clearly and repeatedly expressed that conflict in the former Yugoslavia first and foremost is a European conflict, and the Europeans have to carry the major part of burden of solving it."²⁷ In the summer of 1991 it was proclaimed that "the hour of Europe has dawned that America should kindly leave this problem to Europeans."²⁸ Why the Europeans were so eager to handle the hot potato where the US displayed considerable reluctance to get involved is a question not easy to answer. However, some explanations may be offered:

- Establishment of its own security system at the wake of the cold war within the framework of a new world order : While the EC was institutionalizing, it aimed at founding its security architecture within the framework of Western European Union. It seems that the Europeans thought of using this conflict to prove particularly to the US their maturity. They were inclined to the view that open conflict in Yugoslavia presented them with a challenge to the integrative institutions of the new Europe -the European Community and the CSCE-.²⁹

- **To prove its maturity (emancipation from the US hug):** Bosnian case was a great chance for the Europeans to test their independence from the US. To respond to the conflicts rapidly in a coordinated manner by Europe would have been a great signal to the US authorities that the EU was now able to stand on its feet even on the face of an actual war.

- **Geographical proximity, public opinion pressure (inevitable involvement) :**
No state could ignore the atrocities, massacres and detention camps in its neighborhood.³⁰

- **Refugee problem :** People, who escaped from the assaults, rapes and killings forced the border controls. They simply wanted to take shelter in neighbouring countries. The war was increasingly being felt beyond the borders of what was once Yugoslavia. Austria and Hungary, Croatia's neighbors to the north took in about 50.000 refugees each. The number of refugees in Germany went up to 200.000 within a short period of time. Italian politicians, for example, feared a full-scale exodus if and when the war spread to the Albanian-populated Kosovo region of the former Yugoslavia.³¹ Obviously, the states which were faced with a large expenditure of this influx of people were duly worried about the financial cost.

3. 2. The Initial EC-EU Attempts

At the outset of the Yugoslav war, the EC had released a declaration on Yugoslavia in which it supported all efforts to solve the crisis through dialogue and called on all sides to refrain from the use of force. Expressing their conviction that the process of democratic reforms in Yugoslavia should be based on political dialogue of all sides, the EC considered that united and democratic Yugoslavia was the best chance of being harmoniously integrated in new Europe. After declarations of independence, the EC decided on 28 June of 1991 to send a peace mission (so-called troika) to Yugoslavia. The mission included three foreign ministers: Jacques Poos, Gianni de Michelis and Hans Van Den Broek respectively foreign ministers of Luxembourg, Italy, and the Netherlands. It also decided to freeze all economic assistance to Yugoslavia. After a short time under the auspices of the EC a meeting among all parties to the conflict took place in Brioni. The EC had already started to apply its principle, which was peace through diplomatic negotiations. However, the events on the ground unfolded at such a bewildering speed that all these efforts became futile since all this was basically lame without military backup. Brioni Declaration of the EU was adopted in the meantime on 7th July. The following principles were accepted for the peaceful solution of the crisis.

- Only the peoples of Yugoslavia can decide their own future,

- A new situation has developed in Yugoslavia which requires careful monitoring and negotiations among various sides,
- Negotiations must begin urgently,
- All sides will refrain from all unilateral steps, particularly from forcible acts,
- It was agreed to establish international monitoring missions in Yugoslavia, particularly in Slovenia and possibly in Croatia, consisting of 30 to 50 military and civilian persons,
- The decisions of Slovenia and Croatia to declare sovereignty and independence were suspended for a duration of three months.

Brioni had provided a short cease-fire but not peace. Meanwhile, their forced having been defeated by the Slovenian territorial units, the Serbs withdrew from Slovenia. The EC/EU took much of the credit for this withdrawal. However, as the following events, particularly the war in Croatia and then in Bosnia were to demonstrate Brioni was not an EC triumph. The agreement held because the Yugoslav National Army had lost interest in Slovenia.³² and the Serbs faced with a dilemma: either to carry on with a war in Slovenia which would bring in no gain in terms of the establishment of greater Serbia or to withdraw and to get ready to turn on Croatia. And the Serbs obviously went for the second and withdrew. But the EC/EU thought that the Serbs' withdrawal was a result of the EC/EU pressure. In fact, this moratorium failed later before the three months period elapsed because of distrust and aggressive tendencies of the Serbs. In addition, in talking with Milosevic the EC representatives failed to reach agreement on arrival of the

European forces. After this moratorium almost all options of the three communities had been shaped such as :

“Croats, the Croats favored a cantonized state, the Muslims a unitary one.

a) Bosnia as a sovereign state was really an option for most of the Muslims and some This option was not acceptable to Serbs

b)For the Serbs the greatest concession was the partition of Bosnia. Other options were more openly along the Greater Serbia line.

c)Partition was possible for the Croats and Serbs, but Muslims did not favor it at all.

d)The Muslim options were the least homogeneous, some of them were pro-Croat and some of them pro-Yugoslav (but not pro-Serbia). The most important fact is that none of the recorded options was supported by all three sides.”³³

On 27th August of 1991 in the Declaration on Yugoslavia the EC proposed convening a peace conference on Yugoslavia and the establishment of an Arbitration Commission, consisting of five members elected among representatives of constitutional courts of the EC member states. It announced and scheduled for 7 September a conference on Yugoslavia in the Hague and initiated at the same time arbitration procedure (Later called **Badinter Commission**). **Peter Carrington** was appointed the chairman of the conference. The conference would adopt a mechanism which would ensure a peaceful fulfillment of opposing aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples on the basis of following principles:

- No unilateral change of borders by use of force,

- Protection of rights of all in Yugoslavia,
- Full respect for all legitimate interests and aspirations.

After negotiations only a cease-fire, which would be broken soon, came out. From then onwards a two-pronged approach, alongside the EC's attempts with UN resolutions and a special envoy dealing with the case began. On 25 September 1991 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 713 on Yugoslavia. With this, the UN had also entered in the conflict diplomatically. The resolution noted that the development of the situation in Yugoslavia constituted a threat to peace and security in the world and extended support to the EC and CSCE in efforts to resolve the crisis. The council decided to enforce a general and complete embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia on the basis of Article 41 of the UN Charter.

Meanwhile, the second session of the Conference on Yugoslavia held in the Hague. The chairman of the conference, Carrington, submitted a draft declaration on Yugoslavia with proposals for the solution of the Yugoslav crisis. The essence of the proposal was awarding the sovereignty and independence to republics-former federal units, their international recognition as states, possibility for free association of sovereign states and the establishment of the mechanism for the protection of human rights of national and ethnic groups. So-called special status would be provided for territories where members of a national or ethnic group

constituted a majority population. The declaration specifically referred to Serbs in Croatia in connection with such status.

However, Milosevic refused the proposed solutions in the declaration, stating that they suspended the existing constitutional order and abolished Yugoslavia as the state which continuously existed for 70 years. On 23 October, Carrington offered a new EC proposal on the future of the Yugoslav state. The proposal was in essence a slightly modified text of the previous declaration. Changes involved deletion of the provision on validity of special status, particularly for the Serbs in Croatia, a more detailed definition of international control of special status enforcement and request of restitution of the status of old autonomous provinces as existed before 1990. Due to the objections, Carrington again offered a new (third) version of the document on the solution of the crisis.

Compared with version 2, the new one omitted the provision on restitution of the status of autonomous provinces to situation prior to 1990. In the section on special status for regions predominantly populated by ethnic minorities, a new proposal was added on their long term demilitarization. The idea on customs union evolved to the proposal on firmer economic cooperation on future sovereign republics. On 5 November the conference discussed the version 4 of the document. The possibility of creating common state by the republics that wished to remain within it was added to the main principles. An option was also provided for the

establishment of a single domestic market between republics which wanted that. However, all this was again rejected by Serbia and Montenegro.

On 9 November Presidency of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) sent a letter to the UN Security Council requesting urgently sending of UN peace forces to Croatia. In the mean time, the Serbs were shelling Vukovar and Dubrovnik with heavy artillery in Croatia. Cyrus Vance on 22 November, as being the special envoy of the UN Secretary General talked in Belgrade on possibilities for sending in the UN peace forces to Croatia. He later happened to be another co-chairman of the conference on Yugoslavia. On 27 November UN Security Council adopted the resolution 721, supporting, in principle, the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia. On the 5th December the SFRY President Croat Stjepan Mesic stated that Yugoslavia no longer existed. Indeed, on 14 October of the same year Assembly of Bosnia, without participation of Serb deputies, adopted a resolution to call for a referendum on the future status of Bosnia, which would lead to an independence decision in future. On 11 December the so-called *Vance Peace Plan* on the UN peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia was submitted to the UN Security Council whereby the UN forces would be deployed in Croatia. In the meantime, the Serb forces were carrying on with an extensive ethnic cleansing campaign, and by December 1991 they were in control of more than one third of Croatian territories.

On 23 December Germany officially recognized the independence and sovereignty of Slovenia and Croatia to become effective as from 15 January 1992. The EC/EU soon followed suit. This meant that the initial policy of keeping Yugoslavia intact was now over. Following this, and with a seemingly holding cease-fire brokered by Vance, the UN Security Council adopted on 9 January of 1992 Resolution 727, supporting the proposal of UN Secretary General to send to Yugoslavia 50 officers that would monitor cease-fire and make initial preparations for possible arrival of some 10000 blue helmets. On 21 February UN Security Council adopted Resolution 743 by which it was established a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia.

3. 2. 1. Cutiliero Plan

With the EU moving to recognize Croatia and Slovenia as independent states and with the US reining in this decision, it seemed to some, certainly to the EU leaders that a large part of the Yugoslav problem had been resolved. It also seemed to them that what brought about this result was the pressure of the EU on the Serbs. They now thought that if they offered Bosnia-Herzegovina recognition without any military back-up, this would deter the Serbs from ethnic cleansing once again. But it was clear that the Serbs had stopped in Croatia after they had conquered all those territories they had coveted, and now they were sending their forces from Croatia to Bosnia. But the EU preferred to ignore all these signs of the

approaching tragedy. On March 1 of 1992 a popular referendum on independence was held in Bosnia at the request of the EU. Of the electorate, except Serbs, 62.68 per cent opted for sovereign and independent Bosnia. Meanwhile, the fifth round of negotiations on Bosnia ended in Sarajevo after two-days' session. Leaders of three national parties (Muslims, Serbs, and Croats) signed a declaration on principles of a new constitutional order for Bosnia (known as the *Cutiliero Plan*). According to this document Bosnia would remain within the present borders as a single state with three constituent units based on the national principle. But, according to Cutiliero map the constituent units or cantons of particular ethnic community should comprise all the municipalities with a majority of that community without taking territorial aspects into account. Thus, Muslim unit would cover 43.7 per cent of territory, on which 82.4 per cent of the total Muslim population of Bosnia lived. The Serb unit would gain 43.8 per cent of the territory containing 50.1 of total Serb population. The remaining 12.5 per cent was proposed for the Croats, which contained 41.0 per cent of the total Croat population. For the Croats the proposal was acceptable in terms of constitutional provisions but unacceptable in terms of the map it produced. The map fell short of Serbian territorial claims as well. The Muslims were not in favor of any kind of cantonisation, fearing it to be simply a euphemism for partition. The plan was rejected by the Muslim side because it envisaged no living room for them and armed conflicts in Sarajevo, Mostar and other parts of the country had intensified.

On the diplomatic front, on 22 May at the plenary session of the UN General Assembly Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia were admitted by acclamation to the membership of the UN. At the Lisbon summit of the EU on 27 June 1992 the following decisions were adopted: the urgency of opening the Sarajevo airport was pointed out as well as the establishment of a humanitarian air bridge. It was assessed that all warring parties bore a part of responsibility for the present situation but the Serbian leadership and the Yugoslav National Army were most to blame. Macedonia would be recognized when it changed its name. It was also expected that the Serb leadership would stop the reprisals in Kosovo/a and establish a serious dialogue with the representatives of the Albanians from that province.

The Arbitrary Commission of the EU (Badinter Commission) published three opinions on the questions put in the letter of 18 May 1992 forwarded by Lord Carrington on Yugoslavia. In the Opinion No.8 the Commission considered that the process of dissolution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had come to an end and it should be recognized that SFRY did not exist any longer. In the opinion No.9 the Commission considered that states successors of SFRY should come to terms and by making agreement settle all issues related to succession. In the opinion No. 10 it was said that Serbia and Montenegro appeared as a new state which could not be considered the exclusive successor of SFRY and its possible recognition on the part of member countries would depend on fulfillment of terms provided by general international law. After Munich Summit

of Seven Most Industrialized Countries of the World (G 7), it was stated that the main responsibility for the Yugoslav crisis lied with the Serbian leadership and the Yugoslav Army. Again on 9 and 10 July of 1992 the CSCE summit took place in Helsinki. The most important decision it took was sending war ships, aircraft and helicopters towards the Adriatic and territorial waters of the former and present Yugoslavia by Western European and NATO. The CSCE decision was on an advisory nature, and it appealed to its member states, and particularly NATO and WEU to send their naval and air units to former Yugoslav territorial waters to enforce the arms embargo resolution adopted in September 1991 by the UN Security Council. One other aim of this operation was to ensure safe shipments of humanitarian assistance by air and land to civilians in Sarajevo. On 13 August UN Security Council adopted Resolution 770 reaffirming the need for respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The same day it adopted another Resolution 771 severely condemning any violation of international humanitarian law including “ethnic cleansing”.

On 25th August Lord Carrington, the Chairman of the EU Peace Conference on Yugoslavia said that he was going to withdraw from the post. On 26 and 27 August of 1992 the EU’s biggest peace attempt the *International Conference on Yugoslavia* took place in London. It was participated by representatives of more than thirty countries and organizations. A conference adopted 12 principles, the Action Program and Special Decisions. The Permanent Committee was set up for

whose Co-Chairmen were appointed **Cyrus Vance**, representing the UN, and **David Owen**, representing the EU. Thus the two-pronged peace attempts was now combined. It also set up six working groups for settlement of the crisis in former Yugoslavia, and a permanent secretariat was created. The seat of the bodies which had been set up would be Geneva. Special decisions on Bosnia were adopted by a separate document, requiring cessation of fire and any hostilities as soon as possible, establishment of international control over the heavy weapons and bringing under control of all paramilitary units of all warring parties and a ban for all flights of military aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia. The proposal on the statement of Serbia accusing it for aggression against Bosnia was not adopted as an official document of the conference since the delegation of Federal Yugoslavia (FY) decisively opposed it.

3. 2. 2. Shaping VANCE-OWEN PLAN: The First Concrete Peace Proposal by the Third Parties

In early January of 1993 at the Geneva Summit meeting of representatives of three parties in conflict in Bosnia Co-Chairmen of the conference on former Yugoslavia Vance and Owen submitted a draft agreement “ Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina” (So-called **Vance-Owen Peace Plan**) on cessation of hostilities, draft constitutional arrangement of Bosnia and a map, according to which Bosnia was to be divided into ten provinces. Lord Owen explains the details of the plan in his book:

“Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a decentralized state with guaranteed freedom of movement throughout the country. It would provide substantial autonomy to the provinces while denying them any international legal character. It would demilitarize Sarajevo, which would have a different status. Again it delineated a ten-province structure reconstituting Bosnia.”³⁴

The plan insisted on the return of refugees to their homes, set boundaries of the proposed in a such way that Serb-held territories could not be made into a single whole and joined to Serbia. But it based proposed cantons on ethnic boundaries.³⁵ “The core of the plan was to create a decentralized state of ten provinces.”³⁶ It also envisaged restoration of the shattered infrastructure, the opening of routes within the divided republic and separating opposing forces.³⁷

According to the constitutional framework Bosnia was envisaged as a decentralized state in which most governmental functions would be carried out at provincial level. However, the provinces would not hold sovereignty. A constitutional court, controlled by representatives of the international community, was proposed as a body responsible for disputes between provinces and central government. Each Bosnian community would provide three members to form the presidency or central government. With regard to provincial delimitation the provinces were said to be created according to ethnic, geographical, historical, transportation and economic principles. The Serbs would get 42.3 per cent

territory, Muslims would gain 32.3 per cent, and the Croats 25.4 per cent according to these criteria.

3. 2. 2. 1. Cons of the plan :

- The result gave the Serbs enough to make the Muslims feel that the Serbs were being rewarded for their actions and enough also for the Serbs to feel that if they continued their actions they could press for more.

- An immensely harmful feature of the plan was that an impression was given out that the precise boundaries on the map were not final yet. It incited competition between the Croat and Muslim forces for parts of central Bosnia where there had been a mixed Muslim-Croat population. It thus broke down a possible Croat-Muslim alliance which had been the only effective barrier to the Serbs. "The real result of the plan was the destruction of the Croat-Muslim alliance and the creation of three way conflict."³⁸

- The plan was stimulating ethnic cleansing. In order to get more territory the Serbs and Croats pressed more.

- The plan tried to combine the aspirations of the Muslims for a unitary state and desire of the Serbs and Croats to have ethnic component more pronounced in future relations between the nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The result was to be

the break-up of Bosnia into ten units, three groups of which would be dominated by each of the ethnic groups, with Sarajevo declared an open city.³⁹

- The central government of Bosnia would be concerned only with national defense and foreign affairs. This would cause a feeble and unviable state.

3. 2. 2. 2. Pros of the Plan:

- The plan denied Serbs their two cardinal war aims: ethnic purity and yet more important contiguous territories.⁴⁰

- It is significant because more than any other undertaking to secure peace, it offered an opportunity to bring the war in Bosnia to an end on terms which would combine peace with principle. Its demise was due to the international division.⁴¹

The Croats were satisfied and accepted the plan. “ The Serbs hesitated because fair delimitation was not their aim.”⁴² On the ground they had already cleansed larger areas than they would receive under this plan. The Muslims rejected the plan because they still adhered to the principle of centralized Bosnian state. Besides, they complained that the plan constituted an acceptance and endorsement of ethnic cleansing. The Serbs insisted on concessions over the corridor in Posavina. The co-chairmen allowed the adjustment. Croats soon clashed with Muslims. The Muslims and Croats after a while under enormous pressure agreed to sign the

agreement. Thus, finally Serbs were isolated. After defining and then isolating the aggressor, the military threats were not fulfilled. “A blind man can see that the plan is never going to be fulfilled.”⁴³ Instead of punishing the side which started the war and those on all sides responsible for atrocities, the world decided to wait and see which side was going to win and perhaps to recognize its victory afterwards.

3. 2. 2. 3. America says “no” to the plan. Why?

The US was criticized by the architects of the plan a lot for refraining from supporting its implementation. “The US deserved credit for its role, eventually, in leading the way to a settlement. But, Washington could not avoid the judgment that it was responsible for the failure to stop the war in 1993 and to implement the plan.”⁴⁴ Owen always accused the Americans of ditching his plan, since, let alone give it enough support, they even publicly announced that they were not backing up the plan. In his opinion the American administration appeared very unreasonable and even hostile to their peace package.⁴⁵ He also believed that the US encouraged the Muslims by declaring that they would not impose the plan on them. Thus, the Muslims pressed for a better deal. In Owen’s words ‘the plan was put off because American pessimism verging on hostility towards the plan: Whereas they had originally argued that the plan was too generous to the Serbs they were now saying it was unrealistic to expect the Serbs to give up so much territory.’⁴⁶

The coming to light of Vance-Owen plan coincided with the change in American administration and with a new US strategy which is known as “**lift and strike**”, recommending lifting the embargo on the Muslims and striking at Serbian targets. The US also came up with the safe heavens idea for hundreds of thousands of refugees, which, according to Owen, was another American device for killing his peace plan.⁴⁷ All this ended the viability of the plan to Owen’s chagrin. Thus, at the time, it seemed that the US somehow started to digress from the Europeans in handling the issue. According to the EU authorities, the US sabotaged the plans since it did not wish Europe to prove its virility on security issues and desired their dependence on her to be indispensable.

3. 2. 2. 4. Serb Rejection of the Plan

Deputies of the National Assembly in self-styled ‘Republika Srpska’ assessed that proposed maps and constitutional principles for Bosnia represented the initial material that needed further elaboration and that the Geneva conference should continue until a final solution was found. It already seemed that they were unenthusiastic about signing the agreement.

On 10-12 January, 1993 the conference on Bosnia continued in Geneva. Parties agreed with the constitutional principles for Bosnia. Delegation of the FR Yugoslavia endorsed the proposed constitutional principles, since they guaranteed

full equality to the Serbian people and consensus of the three peoples in Bosnia. After he first refused the proposal, Radovan Karadzic later endorsed the principles, provided the Assembly of Republika Srpska within seven days endorsed that agreement. On 20 January the assembly at the session in Pale adopted nine principles on constitutional arrangement of Bosnia proposed at the Conference on Former Yugoslavia in Geneva. The proposal was endorsed by 55 deputies, 15 voted against, while one deputy abstained. On 30 January 1993 at the negotiations in Geneva three parties in conflict in Bosnia failed to reach agreement on all points of the Vance-Owen plan for the solution to the Bosnian crisis. All three sides signed constitutional principles for the future Bosnia arrangement. Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban also signed the peace plan and the maps of the future provinces, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic signed the peace plan, but not the maps, while Izetbegovic signed neither the peace plan nor the maps. Co-Chairmen Owen and Vance, therefore decided that negotiations be continued in New York under the auspices of the UN Security Council. On 5 February 1993 the negotiations resumed in New York.

The US Secretary of State Warren Christopher reported that the US supported the negotiating process coordinated by Vance and Owen, and that the US intended to engage more actively in the solution of the Bosnian conflict. On 22 February the UN Security Council adopted resolution 808 on the establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious

violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.

On 25 March of 1993 Co-Chairmen of the conference presented a modified peace plan with minor corrections of provincial maps of provinces and an annex on interim arrangements and offered it to the delegations of parties for adoption. Mate Boban, representative of the Bosnian Croats and Alija Izetbegovic signed the complete Peace Plan. Karadzic refused to sign the plan since he considered the proposed maps unacceptable to the Serbs.

Later the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that it was not unlikely that some changes would be made in the text of the Vance-Owen Plan towards the demands of the Serbian side. However, if Serbs did not sign the plan, new steps in terms of pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, Serbia and Montenegro would be undertaken in consultation with the allies. In defiance, Bosnian Serb assembly did not accept part of the plan on maps, but supported the continuation of the peace process through direct negotiations and condemned the policy of pressures and punishment. The government of FRY stated that issues arising out of the maps need not jeopardize the peace process.

By the time the UN Security Council accepted Russia's proposal to postpone voting on introduction of stricter sanctions towards FRY, to give opportunity to the Bosnian Serbs to sign the peace plan for Bosnia. But, after a short while Russia

was not able to blockade the resolution 820 which expressed the will to put more severe economic sanctions on the Serbs if they did not cooperate with peace-makers.

Lord Owen talked with Karadzic in Belgrade; but, the latter again rejected the proposed changes to maps and establishment of corridors between the Serbian provinces and stated that the maps are so bad that they cannot be corrected, instead they must be changed. On 26 April Karadzic's assembly issued an appeal to the people, calling on them resolutely to stand guard of the homeland, close the ranks and bring struggle to the close. It also passed a decision to schedule a referendum at which the citizens of 'Republika Srpska' would have their say about the Vance-Owen Plan. Next day Russian President stated that Russia would not protect those who confronted the entire international community and that the party which refused to endorse the peace plan must assume the burden of responsibility.

On 30 April the US President after long consultations with political and military advisers decided on possible military engagement in Bosnia unless a peaceful solution to the crisis was reached. Secretary of State Warren was set out, on several days an "**ally enlisting**" mission for President's Plan. The trip included visits to London, Moscow, Paris, Madrid, Rome, Brussels and Bonn. At the end of his trip it was clear that Christopher had not persuaded European allies to use force against the Serbs; the whole mission only led to the implementation of the idea of safe areas. Thus, the lift and strike option was shelved for a long time.

Meanwhile, an international conference on the crisis was held in Athens on 1-2 May 1993. At the end of the meeting Karadzic signed the Vance-Owen Plan on condition that Assembly of Republika Srpska supported the decision of its delegate made in Athens. With this conference Co-Chairman of the conference Vance turned over his job to his newly appointed successor Swede **Thorvald Stoltenberg**. But on 5 May the assembly refused to Karadzic's signature on the plan and confirmed the decision once more on the referendum. The government of FRY was angry with this decision because under the embargo they were crashed. This was the first sign of upcoming disagreements between Belgrade authorities, namely, Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leadership.

The UN Security Council adopted resolution 824, declaring that the capital city of the Republic of Bosnia, Sarajevo, and other threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac as well as Srebrenica and their surroundings should be treated as *safe areas* by all the parties concerned and should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act, and the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb military units from these towns to a distance wherefrom they ceased to constitute a menace to their security and that of their inhabitants. But, the idea of creating safe areas did not promise anything not least because they represented a picture of a Muslim "Bantustan" guarded by UN troops whose mandate was to protect themselves⁴⁸. It did not work at all.

On 16-17 May 1993 a popular referendum on the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was held in Republika Srpska. According to the official report, 92 per cent of the registered voters went to the polls, of which 96 per cent voted against the plan. The same percentage 96 per cent of those who voted approved the independence and freedom of association of Republika Srpska with other states, which was the second question on the referendum. On 11 June at the session of foreign ministers of NATO and East European countries, a decision was passed, among other things, that NATO would provide air support to UNPROFOR after the UN demand. Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia were invited to stop the war and start negotiations. On 16 July Croatia signed the so-called **Erdut Agreement**. As provided for by this agreement Croatia should withdraw its troops from the territories of Republic of Srpska Krajina.

At the Geneva negotiations all three parties accepted the compromise proposal of the international mediators Owen and Stoltenberg on creation of the Union of three republics of Bosnia. The points at issue concerning the fixing of borders between the three republics were to be resolved afterwards. The military commanders of all three parties signed in Sarajevo the agreement on the urgent cease-fire on all fronts. After having separate meetings with the participants in the Geneva negotiations on Bosnia, the international mediators Owen and Stoltenberg submitted to the parties at war the draft *Global Peace Agreement* including the constitutional principles of the future Union of republics and the proposal concerning the maps of partition of Bosnia to three republics. It was proposed that

in the following ten days all three parties should make consultations with their parliaments and express their opinion on the proposal , and afterwards to hold the final meeting in Geneva. This plan was accepted by Serbs and Croats but the Muslim side rejected it.

In the mean time Muslims were struggling with each other. This gave a good chance for the non-interventionists who were claiming that there was “evidence that the war had been transformed into a total civil war, when Muslims began fighting Muslims.”⁴⁹ At the session of the newly established Constituent Assembly in Velika Kladusa 400 delegates unanimously made a decision on proclamation and establishment of the Muslims autonomous Province of Western Bosnia within the Union of Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Fikret Abdic was appointed President of the province. On 21 October Abdic and Mate Boban (President of Herseg-Bosnia) upon the invitation of Tudjman met in Zagreb. They signed the agreement on peace and cooperation between the two newly formed communities of the former Yugoslav republic Bosnia-Herzegovina. The next day Abdic upon the invitation of Milosevic met Karadzic in Belgrade. Both signed the declaration in which they solemnly concluded peace and announced the beginning of building of good neighborly relations and comprehensive cooperation in the political, economic, traffic, cultural, sport and other fields. The position of the Muslims were going from bad to worse.

4. 2. 3. The Owen - Stoltenberg Plan:

This plan tended towards confirmation of the de facto situation. Instead of insisting on integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, internal division based on pre-war demographic situation, and no-acceptance of war gains and ethnic cleansing. This plan envisaged the partitioning Bosnia into three ethnically homogeneous mini-states in a loose confederation. To achieve this aim Serbs should have been given contiguous areas. This plan envisaged giving Muslims 30 per cent (including Sarajevo) territory, the Serbs 53 per cent, and Croats 17 per cent. Since the proposed Muslim republic would be landlocked, they also claimed an exit to the sea at Neum where the majority of the population was Croat. They were dissatisfied with the offered free zones at the Croatian parts of Ploce and Rijeka. Thus, the Muslim side rejected the plan, but Abdic appeared to be supporting it.

With this plan a new constitutional principle was agreed which replaced the Vance-Owen Plan's decentralized state with a confederation ruled by a nine-member council with three representatives from each group and with key posts such as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister rotating. This plan was based on existing front lines and, therefore, served to legitimize territorial war gains.

4. 3. Continuation of the Peace Process

Vance-Owen Peace Plan and the subsequent Owen-Stoltenberg Plan failed because every party to the conflict could not compromise on them. International community, in general terms, was finding the Serbs guilty, since they were besieging Sarajevo and killing thousands of innocent people. On 11 January of 1994 16 NATO member countries adopted a communiqué dealing with Bosnia. It confirmed among other things, on the basis of the authorization given by the UN Security Council and in accordance with the decisions made by NATO previously its readiness to take air strikes in order to prevent strangulation of Sarajevo, safe zones and other endangered areas in Bosnia. Thus, NATO showed its determination of striking at Serb targets if the Serbs would go on in the same manner. With the explosion of a mortar shell fired at the Sarajevo market Markale which caused the death of 68 people, while almost 200 wounded, Boutros Boutros Ghali, the UN Secretary General asked NATO Secretary General to ensure as soon as possible the decision of authorizing the commander of NATO to, when requested by the UN, take air raids on the artillery and mortar positions of those responsible for the attacks on the civilian targets in Sarajevo. The North Atlantic Council decided to authorize the use of air force of NATO on the positions of Serb part unless within ten days period it withdrew all its heavy weapons at the distance of at least 20 kilometers from Sarajevo. The Serbs protested this decision and Russia supported the Serbs' protest, stating that it should have been consulted before initiating such kind of an action plan. In the meantime Tudjman and

Yeltsin offered their peace plans, but both were vetoed by the US owing to their inappropriateness.

The US, within the attempts of getting the two parties together, Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats, at the same front finally succeeded. On 18 March of 1994 at the solemn ceremony in the White House in Washington the agreement on the creation of the federation of Bosnian Croats and Muslims and the declaration on the principles of establishing possible confederal relations between the new federation and the Republic of Croatia was signed (Washington Treaty). As provided by the agreement there was also an open possibility for 'Republika Srpska' to join the federation. But, the Serbs would definitely not wish that option. In April NATO aircrafts carried out some attacks and bombarded the Serb forces in the region of Prejuca and Golivrh on the west of Gorazde because Serbs were shelling civilians in that city. But these were pinprick air attacks, far from frightening the Serbs.

In late April at the end of the talks held in London between the high diplomatic representatives of the US (Warren Christopher), Russia (Vitaly Churkin), Great Britain (Douglas Hurd), and France (Alain Juppe) a decision was taken. To revive the process of searching a comprehensive peaceful solution to the crisis a "**Contact Group**", to be consisted of representatives from the US, Russia, France, Britain and Germany would be established. The group would coordinate diplomatic actions and try to build a common peace platform for the crisis. The Contact Group completed its work on the project of constitutional arrangements

and maps of territorial division of Bosnia. The plan granted 51 per cent of the territory to Bosniac - Croat federation and 49 per cent to the Bosnian Serbs while Bosnia would remain a single state within its internationally recognized borders. The plan was submitted to the parties and wanted them to declare themselves for or against it. On 18 July of 1994 after a two-day discussion that was closed to the public the Assembly of Croatian-Muslim Federation accepted the plan of the Contact Group for Bosnia on territorial settlement. But, the Serbs again decided to hold a referendum on the plan. In the referendum it was asked whether the Serbs would accept the maps on territorial settlement in Bosnia proposed by the Contact Group. Among 90.86 per cent of the registered citizens 96.05 per cent voted were against the plan at the end.

Meanwhile, Muslims were building their army. The forces loyal to Izetbegovic took Velika Kladusa breaking down the resistance of Abdic forces, and Abdic lost ground totally. After the revised version of the plan collapsed as well, on 18-19 December former US president **Jimmy Carter** started his self-tailored mediation attempt in Bosnia, which would only bring about a short cease-fire. After losing his enthusiasm Lord Owen decided to resign from his duty. On 9 June of 1994 former Prime Minister of Sweden **Carl Bildt** was appointed new co-chairman of the international conference on former Yugoslavia as the representative of the EU. These were the days when the US decided to take the initiative itself and back it up with sufficient military power.

CHAPTER IV

THE BASIS OF ATTITUDES AND VARIOUS DIAGNOSES OF THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT

Noel Malcolm states that “ two basic failures of the West on the Bosnian issue become so closely entwined as to be almost inseparable. One is failure (largely, an absence) of policy. The other is failure of understanding”.⁵⁰ As a matter of fact, Balkans were left before understanding because prejudices played an important role. The war in Bosnia was perceived in different molds by various quarters. Simply there was a number of diagnoses for the illness. Most of these diagnoses took their sources from neglect, bias and clash of interests. To come up with the right diagnosis was bearing crucial importance at the outset, since the international community took its stance accordingly. There appeared mainly three diagnoses: a) Ancient hatred myth, b) A civil war, c) Naked aggression by the Serbs on Bosnia.

4. 1. Ancient Hatred Myth

Those who do not understand the real roots of the conflict in the ex-Yugoslav territories were stuck up in the ancient hatred myth. This approach was widespread even in the decision-making circles, whose decisions were always doomed to devise a healthy solution. According to this theory, inevitability of the conflict was a given fact. The reason for this unavoidable struggle lay in the fact that many

nations who have different religions, races and languages lived together and but in no age of history they did not refrain from strangling each other's throats. According to these people, "the Balkans were full of suspicions and hatreds"⁵¹ But another examination of Balkan history indicates that this theory does not hold water. The savagery, violence and massacres of the Balkan peoples during the Yugoslav wars which were used as examples and evidence of indifference "arose mainly from the most untypical episodes in Balkan history."⁵² Most of the massacres were committed within this century and when the external powers interfered with the events in the Balkans. "For most of the rest of the history of those lands, there are no records of Croats killing Serbs because they were Serbs, or vice versa."⁵³

The question to be asked is the following: What can be the reasons of creating such a myth then? To catch the actual fact one has to look out the interests. Whose interest lies in fostering the ancient hatred hypothesis? The first coming to mind is the politicians of the other side, who do not want their unjust actions to be popularized. In another words, a veil on their real aims was definitely essential. "The Bosnian war was not caused by ancient hatreds, it was caused by modern politicians notably Mr. Milosevic and Dr. Karadzic, with the help of the political controllers of Radio Television Belgrade. The politicians had to work very hard at their propaganda, political manipulation, mis-information, rumor-mongering and terrorizing in order to create active hatred where it did not exist before."⁵⁴ "Among Bosnia's three peoples, Bosnia from the Turkish conquest on was more at

peace than at war.”⁵⁵ However, Karadzic claims that “Serbs and Muslims are *instinctively hostile* to each other like cats and dogs.”⁵⁶

Indeed, it was very hard to speak about an active hatred which would cause people to go to war with each other after Tito’s death. That was saturated in the hands of Serbian apparatus of government. “There were ancient differences, certainly; but the idea that such differences should be a basis of hatred is historically, a recent innovation, brought in by intellectuals to impose the theory of the homogeneous national state on their very heterogeneous national state in their homelands.”⁵⁷ Thus, “the history may be ancient, but its deployment in the service of hatred is comparatively modern.”⁵⁸ Milosevic is the leading example of this manipulation: he “since 1988 by means of the take-over of the political machinery in Montenegro and the Vojvodina, the illegal suppression of the local government in Kosovo/a in 1989, the mobilization of nationalist feeling in Serbian public opinion, the slow-moving constitutional coup against the federal presidency, the Serbian economic blockade against Croatia and Slovenia in late 1990, the theft by Serbia that year of billions of dinars from the federal budget, thereby destroying the federal economic reform program, and the incitement and arming of Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia during 1990 and 1991.”⁵⁹ carried out ‘a systematic plan’.

The second reason for sticking to the idea of old loathing is that Western politicians found it a very convenient tool to hide their inability to solve the

conflict. What could they do if the parties are used to kill each other? The then British Prime Minister John Major is a leading example of these politicians. He stated that :

“The biggest single element behind what has happened in Bosnia is the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the discipline that that exerted over the ancient hatreds in the old Yugoslavia. Once that discipline had disappeared, those ancient hatreds reappeared, and we began to see their consequences when the fighting occurred.”⁶⁰

Again, British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, was soon describing the fighting in Bosnia as a civil war seething forever with ethnic hatreds.⁶¹ President Bush also described the war -incorrectly- as a “blood feud arising out of the ancient animosities”⁶²

The putative ancient hatred tale aimed for one thing: A justification of non-intervention on the West side. Hence, the Serbs could not be stopped and a bloodbath was witnessed at the threshold of the 21st century. Those who do not know-very well the history, dynamics and structure of societies of the Balkan lands have pit-falls to see that this myth is misleading. If this were an age-old war, Bosniacs and Croats could not join their power against the Serbs, who are another Christian people. A Serbian commander would not fight on the side of Muslims

and a great number of inter-mixed marriages would not exist. “ Ancient animosities were not the cause of the conflict. This was by then the third in a series of wars launched by Serbia, the powerful militarized state that emerged from the ruins of multi-national Yugoslavia. But, Serbia had harnessed the powerful military machine of the Yugoslav state to achieve the dream of its extreme nationalists: a greater Serbia.”⁶³ To interpret the war in this way gave an extraordinary leverage to the Serbs, since Europe sentimentally refrained from backing the real helpless people. In fact, Bosnia has never been at “fault line” as Huntington claimed. The fault line theory just fitted for the justification of Serbia aggression. As one expert put it: “there is no fault line in Bosnia on which various cultures, religions or races fight for ages due to ancient hatreds. This is a pretext which is made up by some not to intervene on behalf of the helpless Bosnia.”⁶⁴ On the contrary of fault line thesis Bosnia was the place where the two learned, over five centuries, to understand each other and to coexist, far from being a fatal frontier between the antiethical civilizations-Christendom and Islam- .⁶⁵

4. 2. A Civil War?

Defenders of this belief always repeated that in Bosnia the war was going on between the inter-mixed ethnicities. According to them this conflict is a typical Balkan convulsion which cannot be understood. Warren Zimmermann -a former ambassador of USA- condemns this attitude saying that :

“ Bosnia is a largely artificial creation, the product of long oppressions and hatreds. Although Yugoslav communism exerted a valuable discipline over these seething enmities, after the cold war era, they were unleashed again. Bosnia inevitably was dragged into a classical civil war deriving its dynamic from elements within Bosnia. While the Serbs bear considerable responsibility for the atrocities, the Croats and especially the Muslims deserve a large of the guilt. This is completely wrong.”⁶⁶

The description of the Yugoslav wars as ethnic conflict is most misleading, as a predictor of military activity. Military strategy in this case was not driven by ethnic hatred, class conflict or historical aspirations for territory, but by the geopolitical and institutional preconditions of sovereignty, obtaining the strategic and economic assets and borders of a secure future state, destroying those of one’s enemies and building the armies and a foreign alliances of a new defense.⁶⁷ Indeed, diversity was not the fuel of the hostilities at all.⁶⁸

A civil war can be described as one between different interest groups within the same country to grab the power to rule over the others. These groups may be affiliated with the external forces which might have interests in shaping the future of that country. Those external powers may provide their proxies inside with financial aid, weapons or morale just on the basis of ideological ground. In fact the

statement “this was not essentially a civil war, because while the combatants were all members of the same state, the fighting could never have begun in the first place without the arms and Greater Serbia ideology provided by Serbia proper”⁶⁹ does clearly demonstrates that that was not a civil war. In other words, the boundaries of an independent country recognized by the UN was encroached by the forces of another state, namely Serbia. After making first assaults they withdrew and started to abet their proxy, Bosnian Serbs, giving them every logistical support to sustain the war. In this case, that is why minds are confused to differentiate between a civil war or a naked aggression. David Owen - one of the co-chairmen of international peace conference on former Yugoslavia- being one of the confused ones confesses that “the fact that the wars in former Yugoslavia contained elements both of a war of secession and civil war only added to the difficulty of forming objective judgments.”⁷⁰

It would be a fallacy to think that each state with multi-confession, multi-language and multi-race one day fall into the trap of civil war, and they are all doomed to fall apart in search of domination of the weak groups. There may be a grave danger, but this is generally provoked by the outside forces. Otherwise, “If it were a civil war, it should first of all, have broken out in Macedonia where many different ethnicities live together.”⁷¹

4. 3. A Naked Aggression by the Serbs on Bosnia?

As Ivo Banac points out, the war in Bosnia was a war of aggression conducted by Serbia and Montenegro in tandem with the Yugoslav People's Army. It was clearly a war of aggression against an internationally recognized independent state with a democratic constitution that guaranteed rights to all its citizens, including Serbs.⁷² According to him, the Croatian war was regarded by international experts as a civil war within federal Yugoslavia so long as Croatia remained unrecognized. Once granted international recognition, it immediately became a Serbian war of aggression against the Croat state.⁷³ Because the UN Charter guarantees territorial integrity of independent and recognized states by the world. By the same token Bosnia was the victim of aggression, first from the Serbs and then from the Croats. "The war in Yugoslavia was a war of borders, statehood, identity and ideology."⁷⁴

Unfortunately, this correct diagnosis was not heeded by the big powers who would easily put a bulwark against Serbian attacks. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher even stated that "The US has no moral obligation to protect Bosnia's Muslims because all three sides are responsible for atrocities." It was accepted as an intra-state war, not as an inter-state war though there was clear evidence proving it. One of them was the continuous violation of Bosnian air space by Serbian aircraft. Secondly, all Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces were paid their wages by Serbia proper and the proxy army at the initial phases were reportedly

wearing official Serbian army uniforms. “Belgrade has assisted the Bosnian Serb Army with logistics, training, intelligence and most probably planning as well as significant numbers of officers and personnel on loan.”⁷⁵ All this was enough to establish that it was a clear aggression by the Serbs. However, the western capitals primarily led by the British reiterated an old mistake appeasing the Serbs, the aggressor, discarding the victim, the Bosnians.

CHAPTER V

ORIGINS OF DAYTON

5. 1. Steps Towards Peace

After the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and other subsequent plans were put aside, the US government came back with its “lift and strike” policy option for the resolution of the conflict. But, this time the Europeans were dead opposed to it, saying this was something a weak action plan because it avoided committing ground forces. It led to some criticism and counter-criticism between the Americans and the Europeans, but in the end, the US could not persuade the allies to lift the embargo, and strike at Serbian targets at the same time. This was, however, beginning of the end for the Europeans. For instance, as soon as Bosniac-Croat federation was brokered in 1994 with the Washington Treaty, the Europeans lost their all influence on the subject. They had openly floundered in Bosnia. Gradually, manipulation of negotiations was transferred to the US government. “Thus, the critical factor in resolution of the conflict would be continued engagement of the US.”⁷⁶

When the war in Bosnia was more than three years old in mid-1995, it tended to escalate rapidly. The Bosniacs and the Croats were moving together. This made

the Serbs frustrated, and they wanted to put more pressure on the Muslims around Sarajevo and the safe areas which were supposedly protected by UNPROFOR. “ In July 1995 Srebrenica - a Muslim-held town- fell tragically to Bosnian Serbs. It was one of the safe areas protected by UNPROFOR. This event stiffened Western determination to give a sharp reply to Serbs.”⁷⁷ In August the Croats seized back the Krajina region from the Serbs with a rapid assault. After Serbs’ mortar attack on Sarajevo in the same month, NATO’s massive air strike campaign (Operation Joint Endeavor) started. “ It was predominantly an American operation. Of the 3515 sorties during the campaign against Bosnian Serb targets, 2318 were flown by American aircraft.”⁷⁸ On 10th September the US started tomahawk missile strike and cumulative effects of all these attacks brought the sides to the bargaining table in Ohio. “ The US then brokered the Dayton agreement only by seeing the glass half empty.”⁷⁹ This indicated, in fact, a pessimism with a determination on the side of Americans.

Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in Ohio on 21st of November in 1995. Its architect was energetic diplomat Richard Holbrooke. He shuttled between the capitals and a structure for peace plan came into being: “First, an agreement in principle that a postwar Bosnia would be a sort of portmanteau state, a single country comprising two entities, a Muslim-Croat federation and Serb republic; second, a lifting of the siege of Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital; third, outlining of a political and a constitutional structure for post-war Bosnia; fourth, a general cease-fire and an agreement to hold direct talks among the leaders of Bosnia, Serbia and

Croatia.”⁸⁰ “ At Dayton the warring parties agreed to accept a single state. The parties, including Serbs, went further than vague rhetoric. They also accepted the key elements of a sovereign state: a single, clearly defined international border, an internationally recognized central government and UN membership, a three-person presidency chosen by direct, free and internationally supervised elections; a freely elected national assembly; a central bank and a single currency; compliance with the International War Crimes Tribunal; a supreme court; and joint commissions for such matters as railroads, national monuments and even human rights.”⁸¹

5. 2. Evaluation of the Accord

5. 2. 1. Critiques of the Dayton Peace

As soon as the accord was signed, a number of criticisms appeared: First, it is claimed that “ the agreement itself pulverizes the idea of the unitary Bosnia. It creates an exceedingly weak central state without even the basic mechanisms of control over its own territory such as a single integrated army.”⁸² Although the Bosnian central government was granted responsibility of foreign policy, trade, monetary and fiscal policy, transportation and migration, it had no control over Serb entity’s army.

Secondly, some said that this was nothing but ethnic partition because

it allowed “ Republica Srpska” to be a separate entity which got 49 per cent of territory and Bosnian- Croat federation got 51 per cent. “ The Dayton agreement recognized most of the new realities on the ground but, it had one thing in common with virtually all of the previous peace plans for the region. It divided what had been a multi-ethnic state into ethnically based districts. The result was that each ethnic group sought to make the areas assigned to its control ethnically pure. The peace plan thus contributed to ethnic cleansing and to the destruction of what remained of Bosnia’s multiethnic tradition.”⁸³ Dayton settlement is inherently contradictory: It accepts the status quo of ethnic territorial lines achieved by force, yet tries to protect and restore the multiethnic character of Bosnia. Dayton’s essential core was a single Bosnia with two entities. The interentity boundary line was designed to be similar to a boundary between two American states or Canadian provinces. But, as expected, the Serbs would try to turn the interentity boundary line into a complete separation.

Thirdly, despite ostensible loyalty of the Croats to the federation, the long term commitment of Croat leadership seems to be to greater Croatia. The Dayton was built on this shaky obligatory cooperation. “Croats are ostensibly partners in the entity. The long-term commitment of the Croat leadership is plainly not to strengthening Bosnia but to folding its territory into Greater Croatia.”⁸⁴ Indeed, a confederal arrangement - tending to undermine the new Bosnia from the start- is implied by the Dayton Accords’ formulation that the entities have the right to establish special parallel relations with neighboring states consistent with the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. All in all, on the Croat side, hard-liners have not given up their own “Herceg-Bosna”. On the other side, nationalist Serbs always construe it as an independent Republica Srpska.

Fourthly, the agreement was signed by Serbia proper president Milosevic and Croatian leader Tudjman, not by the leaders of the warring parties on the ground. Some critiques claim that the representatives of motherlands do not represent the interests of people of Bosnia. Therefore, during the implementation phase of the agreement some difficulties would arise up, and indeed, they did.

Fifthly, economically divided Bosnia is a non-starter. The Serb Republic in particular is in a hopeless position, depopulated and largely rural with a few educated people. Separated from the rest of Bosnia by its politicians, the entity’s economy makes little sense. Serbia itself in a bad position by the outer walls of sanctions cannot help its parastate. Bosnia and its neighbor, Serbia, cannot survive economically unless they revitalize the long-established integrated commercial and infrastructure systems that existed until the outbreak of the war. The economy of Bosnia and Serbia cannot be desegregated along ethnic lines.⁸⁵ Sixthly, with Dayton the international community got less than it might have two and half years before.⁸⁶ The Agreement has left some issues to the time to be resolved like Brcko and a common flag issue. Although flag matter was resolved with the intervention of High Representative, “the issue of Brcko - the width of the east-west Serb access corridor between Western and eastern Bosnia, and the Bosnian Muslim and Croat interest in a north-south access corridor- is susceptible to imaginative map

drawing and engineering.”⁸⁷ As a result of political cartography Brcko issue was always postponed to be handled by the International Arbitrator. It still stands there as a flash point.

5. 2. 2. Advocates of Dayton

On the contrary there are some positive opinions about the agreement. First of all, Dayton provided an urgent cease-fire which would give a chance for breathing of all sides, especially for Muslims. It stopped one of the bloodiest wars in Europe the history witnessed since the Second World War. It created an opportunity for a more durable outcome. Sarajevo was united under the Federation control and the contending military forces separated. Even though it is ‘centaurian peace, monstrous, half human’⁸⁸ in the words of Ivo Banac, it is better than an unending war.

Moreover, Dayton is based on a delicate balance of power concept. The Muslims were given weaponry to be on equal terms with others. “Train and Equip” program for Bosniac-Croat entity was started to balance the sides. International community will provide military assistance through the IFOR led by NATO, assistance in restoration of the functions of the state through the OSCE, and financial assistance through the EU and the World Bank. And with promised sufficient economic assistance, infrastructural construction help trade will flourish and this will link all three communities more tightly to each other.

Dayton worked where Vance-Owen failed because there was a willingness to use force and crucially because the US was behind the plan, rather than opposing it. As long as the US stands for Dayton, it will work it is more likely to work than not.

5. 3. The Dayton Accords in Practice: Problems and Prospects

The parties after twenty difficult days of negotiations put their signatures on Dayton. Under the first article beginning the parties promised to fully respect the sovereign equality of one another, shall settle disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from any action, by threat or use of force or otherwise against the territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other state.

At last, Serbs' resistance to sign the peace plan was broken by a credible threat and force. But, there was a much higher step to ascend now. It was the process of implementation. Before going into details of implementation, it is useful to note that the parties had different perspectives about Dayton: To the Serbs Dayton was a document legitimating a separate Serb entity that was carved out through ethnic cleansing. But, to the Bosnians it was an attempt to reintegrate Bosnia under a viable central government by the assistance of several international institutions. That is why the "Implementation of Dayton is perceived as a chess game. All sides try to gain more by manipulating the international community."⁸⁹ Since the struggle between the parties was now largely non-violent it was perceived that, the

“Implementation of Dayton was a tremendous gamble - not only for the parties directly involved but also for the international community.”⁹⁰ Dayton envisaged the implementation in two different but related aspects: Military and civilian aspects.

5. 3. 1. Implementation of military aspects

In general it can be claimed that the military measures which are called for in Dayton have been successfully applied on the ground. Here, “good mission planning has been the basis of good execution.”⁹¹ Combatant forces were withdrawn behind a zone of separation of approximately four kilometers within an agreed period. Heavy weapons were destationed to their barracks and IFOR (Implementation Force) later SFOR (Stabilization Force) under the command of NATO with a grant of authority of the UN started its mission. Arms control was applied effectively. Train and equip was put into operation, which was carried out under the US leadership though the European capitals put their reservations on the program. In addition, IFOR/SFOR secured sensitive areas, repaired bridges-railroads and facilitated greater freedom of movement and traffic with taking all other confidence building measures.

5. 3. 2. Implementation of Civilian Aspects

Civilian implementation would define the peace and would delineate Bosnia's future. Under the command and control of the High Representative civilian implementation comprised of two dimensions: Political and economical. Political dimension covered elections, constitutional arrangements, return of refugees and trial of war criminals. " Implementing the political parts of the agreement was bound to be just as difficult as negotiating them."⁹² The main tenet of aspect was based on the elections. Dayton called for free and fair, internationally supervised elections which would be conducted within six to nine months from the agreement's date of signature. The elections were held in mid-September of 1996 with the support of OSCE. Although process was smooth, it again led to some criticisms. First of all, its time was found very early. It was stated that necessary conditions or atmosphere were not around. Secondly, it could lead to new cleavages or sharpening the existing ones because, as most people predicted, nothing changed and old leaders or their puppets came to power. It is still doubtful that newly elected leaders especially Serbian and Croatian parties will comply with the articles of newly adopted constitution.

IFOR and later SFOR did their jobs magnificently with no casualties from hostile action. But, despite its enormous capabilities and excess capacity, it avoided most opportunities to support the civilian parts of the agreement, even when the risk was minimal. The most significant exception to this attitude was IFOR's impressive

nation-wide support of September 14, 1996, national elections, which was important in the conduct of those elections. On the other hand, its continuing refusal to arrest war criminals, particularly people like Karadzic has given strength to separatist cause.

Another important matter is the issue of refugees. Dayton envisaged that all displaced people would return safely home and regain lost property or to obtain just compensation. However, in due course grave pessimism came into being since a few people dared to go back to their homes. They were simply met with stones and bricks by the Serbs especially. The guarantee of returning home is one of the fundamentals of the Accords. But, tension with resettlement of refugees leaves the Agreement in vulnerable position.

The next important issue of civilian implementation is related to war crimes. Although Karadzic and Miladic, Serb commanders, were indicted for war criminals by the international tribunal, they were not arrested until now and were allowed to walk around freely. Only one positive development has occurred in that respect. That was the veto of Karadzic's candidacy for the presidency of the Serbian entity by the international community. He ostensibly withdrew from the political scene.

Implementation of civilian aspects includes not only political reconstruction but also economic revitalization. For economic dimension a great deal of money is

needed. At this point international community will have the chance to demonstrate how altruistic it is. In this field of implementation infrastructure was rehabilitated, agriculture was financed and commerce was given incentives largely with the World Bank funds.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

1990s witnessed tremendous changes in world politics. With the signals of the Soviet dismemberment, former Yugoslavia was already on the eve of a painful partition fueled by the nationalist and expansionist Serbian ruling apparatus. Under the leadership of Milosevic Serbia started to tear the federal structure limb from limb. The ensuing crisis in Yugoslavia was the first test for the international community to tackle. But, it seems that in many respects the international community failed or at best could not meet the challenge effectively. For instance, the EU intervened on behalf of the world society, but its attitude was biased and misinformed decision-makers put a wrong diagnosis to the conflict. This paved the way for an erroneous prescription which would damn them as clumsy doctors. The EU's division plans (Cutiliero and Vance-Owen plan) supporting cantonization of Bosnia and partition plans (Owen-Stoltenberg plan) had all failed with the subsequent peace plans.

The US falling out with the Europeans from 1994 onwards developed its strategy and solidified with a sufficient military force which was absent in the previous futile attempts by the EU. It is discussed whether the US brokered Dayton Agreement comports with the expectations. Surely it was not a trailblazing peace

attempt; but it ended the liquidation of the Bosnians, it destroyed the Serbian preposterous aims in the region. In a general outlook it reaffirmed American leadership; it determined the future relationship between the UN and NATO. The experiment of taking Russian troops functioning under the NATO umbrella is deemed as a success with long term benefits for NATO-Russian relations.

With the implementation process it has been met with both positive and negative elements. From the military perspective with the deployment of strong NATO troops a desired outcome has been reached. On the contrary civilian implementation did not go as smooth as expected. But, this does not precipitate a need for a second Dayton negotiation process. Dayton still has a chance, with a decisive civilian implementation combined with appropriate measures against those violating the agreement.

END NOTES

CHAPTER II

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