

SEARCH FOR AN ETHNO-SECULAR DELIMITATION OF TURKISH
NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE KEMALIST ERA (1924-1938) WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE ETHNICIST CONCEPTION OF
KEMALIST NATIONALISM

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

SEARCH FOR AN ETHNO-SECULAR DELIMITATION OF TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE KEMALIST ERA (1924-1938) WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE ETHNICIST CONCEPTION OF KEMALIST NATIONALISM

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May 1998

This study deals with the search for the creation of an ethno-secular Turkish national identity with particular reference to the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism espoused by a group of bureaucratic-intellectual elites over three distinct periods in the years between 1919-1938 with an historical perspective.

In the period of 1919-1924, nationality was defined by religion, and hence, Turkish national identity had a predominantly religious character. As a reflection of this state of "forced" pluralism, official political discourse considered ethnic diversity as a given social condition.

In the second period (1924-1929), a radical rupture from the religious definition occurred with the adoption of Republicanism

consisting of legal and political components. The legal component of the republican definition was overwhelmed by its political component, however. The motto of this definition was the "unity in language, culture and ideal"

The third period (1929-1938) of the delimitation of Turkish national identity in the Kemalist era was characterised by the efforts of a group of bureaucratic-intellectual elites who adopted the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism to articulate racial motives, which defined national community at the basis of Turkish *ethnie* and structured around the sense of common origin, into the republican definition. The symbolic reflection of this articulation was the motto of the "unity in language, culture and blood"

The emergent definition of "ethno-secular Turkish man" within the evolution of the parameters of Turkish national identity during the Kemalist era(1924-1938) was that the complete, genuine, or pure Turk was the one who embraced the cause of the Republican ideal, devoted to Westernised Turkish culture, spoke Turkish and descended from Turkish origin. Those who lacked any of the said parameters had to be compensated for. Aloofness to religiosity, the adoption of Turkish not only as official language but also as the mother-tongue, devotion to the monolithically defined Westernised Turkish culture intermixed with the political ideal preached by the new Republic, and the attainment of purity and strength of race were the suggested "compensators."

Ethnicism and Turkification policies were the two natural corollaries of the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism. Being constituted as such, the "other" of this nationalism involved religious Turks, non-Turkish Muslim ethnies, and non-Muslim minorities.

Keywords: Ethnic Nationalism, Nationalism, National Identity, Kemalism, Secularism.

ÖZET

KEMALİST DÖNEMDE (1924-1938) TÜRK ULUSAL KİMLİĞİ İÇİN ETNO-SEKÜLER BİR TANIM ARAYIŞI VE KEMALİST ULUSÇULUĞUN ETNİSİST KAVRANIŞI

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Bu çalışmada, Türk ulusal kimliğinin etno-seküler bir temelde inşasını hedefleyen bir arayış, Kemalist ulusçuluğun etnisist kavrayışını benimseyen bir grup bürokrat-entellektüele atıfla, tarihsel bir yaklaşımla ele alınmış ve 1919-1938 yıllarını kaplayan üç ayrı dönem içinde incelenmiştir.

1919-1924 döneminde Türk ulusal kimliği, baskın bir dinî karaktere sahip olmuş, milliyet Müslümanlıkla tanımlanmış, reelpolitiğin bir yansımıası olarak, resmî politik söylem etnik çoğulculuğu veri olarak almıştır.

1924-1929 döneminde dinî tanımdan radikal bir kopuş gerçekleşmiş, çoğulcu söylem terkedilmiş, Türk ulusal kimliğinin Cumhuriyetçi karakteri temel tanımlayıcı olmuştur. Dinin hem siyasi hem de sosyal görünürüğünün yok edilerek bir "mabed dini" halini almasını öngören

militan bir sekülerizm, Cumhuriyetçi tanıma asıl rengini vermiştir. Bu tanımın şıarı, "dilde, kültürde ve ülküde birlik"ti.

Hukukî-siyasî bir mahiyet arzeden Cumhuriyetçi tanımın politik muhtevası hukukî muhtevasına kıyasla çok daha belirleyici bir öneme sahip olmuştur. Bu tanıma göre, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı olan ve Türkçe konuşan, Türk kültürüyle yetişmiş ve Cumhuriyet ülküsüne sadık herkes, Türk olarak kabul edilmektedir.

Türk ulusal kimliğinin Kemalist dönemdeki inşa sürecinde üçüncü safhayı (1929-1938), ulusal topluluğu etniklik ekseninde tanımlayan ve ortak köken duygusunu temel alan etnik-ırkî motiflerin Cumhuriyetçi tanıma eklenmesi çabaları oluşturmıştır. Bunun sembolik düzeydeki yansımıası, "dilde, ekim (kültür)de, kanda birlik"in yeni ulusal şıarı oluşturmasıdır. Cumhuriyet ülküsünün cezbedici bir ideal olarak zayıflığı, ortak köken duygusunu ortak payda olarak alan, mitik ve sözde-bilimsel bir söyleme dayalı ırkî süreklilik tezinin Türk ulusal kimliği içinde yapısal bir değer kazanmasına yol açmıştır.

Kemalist dönemde(1924-1938), Türkliğin söz konusu edilen sınırlarının gelişim sürecinde ortaya çıkan bütüncül tanım şu olmuştur: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı olup Cumhuriyet ülküsünü benimsemiş, Batılılaştırılmış Türk kültürüne bağlı, Türkçe konuşan ve köken itibariyle Türk olan herkes, kamil, hakiki ya da öz Türk'tür. Bu parametreleri tam karşılamayanlar, ırkî bakımdan güçlenmek ve aralık kazanmak, Türkçeyi ana dili olarak sahiplenmek, yekpare bir karaktere sahip Batılılaştırılmış Türk kültürünü Cumhuriyet ülküsü ile birlikte benimsemek ve dinî değerlerden arınmış olmak gibi telafi edici araçlara başvurmak zorundadırlar.

Türk ulusal kimliğinin etno-seküler karakteri, etnisizmin ve Türkleştirme politikalarının ulusal bütünleşmenin temel araçları olarak kullanılmasına yol açmıştır. Son tahlilde, dindar Türkler, ana dili Türkçe olmayan Müslüman unsurlar ve gayr-i Muslim azınlıklar bu etnoseküler ulusçuluğun "diğer" tanımı içinde yer almışlardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Etnik Ulusçuluk, Ulusçuluk, Ulusal Kimlik, Sekülarizm, Kemalizm.

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INTRODUCTION

This study is an attempt at clarification of the constitutive components of the Kemalist endeavor for the creation of Turkish national identity, with particular reference to the ethnic-genealogical conception of Kemalist nationalism developed by a group of state elites in the close circle of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the Kemalist era¹. It adopts an historical perspective, and accordingly, rejects the commonly-held meta-historical narrations of Kemalist nationalism. Its fundamental assumption is that the so-called Kemalist national project did not have the vision of a purely political, ethnic-free national identity.

Hence, in this study, I will distinguish three constitutive pillars of the Kemalist endeavor for the creation of a Turkish national identity: legal, political(secular) and ethnic-genealogical. The conjunctural interactions between these three pillars determined the dominant face of this identity. Legal Turkishness, that is, citizenship was necessarily accompanied and complemented by ethno-secular Turkishness. Therefore, despite its equal citizenship approach premised on assimilation to Turkish identity (**assimilationist equality**), Kemalist

¹The ideological bases of Kemalism were laid down during the National Struggle and evolved over the following years. It achieved a radical rupture in political and ideological terms in 1924 and well crystallised in the 1930s. Therefore, Kemalist nationalism will be analysed with an historical perspective over three distinct periods, the last two of which form the Kemalist era: 1) 1919-1924: The Period of the National Struggle; 2) 1924-1929: the dominance of the Republican definition; 3) 1929-1938: the dominance of ethnic/genealogical definition.

nationalism² has failed to eradicate ethnic and linguistic demands from non-assimilating ethnic groups. Due to the failure of striking a proper balance between what is private and what is public, coupled with the mobilisational weakness of Kemalist political ideal, i.e., the ideal of ethno-secular Turkish Republic, at the popular level, the Kemalist definition of citizenship as the locus of political identity could not absorb dissident sub-identities.

Citizenship in the ethnicist conception of Kemalist practice has been expressed and realised around the ethno-secular identity of the largest ethnic group (Turks) founding the Republic and hence was/is something more than a contractual/legal relationship between the individual and the state. Just as Chinese and Indian nationalisms are no different from Han and Hindu nationalisms respectively, so Turkish

²The Republican People's Party(RPP) called its basic principles as "Kemalist principles" during the Presidency of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The 1935 programme of the RPP states that "The main lines of our projects (*tasarı*) covering not only the next few years but the future are written down here as a whole. All these fundamentals the Party follows are the principles of Kemalism." See *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı* (Programme of the Republican People's Party) (Ankara: Ulus Basimevi, 1935). Drawing upon this definition, it becomes evident that Kemalism is an indicative programme of action and an ideology involving the six arrows (*altı ok*). Nevertheless, Kemalism was not defined in an overt, officially sanctified way. The principles of Kemalism and their interrelations were not defined conclusively in the life of Atatürk.

Atatürk had no objection as to the appellation of "Kemalism" adopted by his party, RPP. Conversely, he played an active role in the determination of the content of the "six arrows" Therefore, Kemalism during the life span of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was no different from Atatürkism, and hence any study dealing with Kemalism has to take into consideration His Speeches and Statements, as was done in the present study. The appellation "Kemalist nationalism", in this regard, is related with this description of Kemalism. Ethnicist conception of Kemalist rationalism, as is used in this study, refers to the views developed by a group of bureaucratic-intellectual elites during the Kemalist era, particularly in the 1930s.

nationalism, as defined by ethnicist Kemalists, was in fact the nationalism of the larger ethnic group (Turks) excluding the other(s).

Nevertheless, contrary to those who argue that Kemalist nationalism is racist, this study argues that the Kemalist definition of Turkish identity is essentially not racist but overtly **ethnicist**, i.e., it discriminates against those who insist to remain different in ethno-secular terms. As such, Kemalist nationalism noticed the ethnic divisions within society, but it preferred to assume their non-existence and refused to recognise them. It tried to establish the legitimacy of the state without any regard to ethno-cultural differences and the resulting claims. The success of this model was bound to the achievement of the national homogenisation through a massive layout of political engineering. That is why ethnic management strategies (assimilation, deportation and the like) have functioned as the driving force of the process of Kemalist national integration.

To define national community as an ethnic community, i.e., the equation of nation with ethnies is basic to the ethnicist understanding of Kemalist nationalism. Therefore the present study rejects the thesis that authoritarian-racial tendencies in Kemalist nationalism reflect the impact of the conjuncture only.

The usage of the term "racial" in this study is informed by Van den Berghe's definition of a "racial" group as

a human group that defines itself and/or is defined by other groups as different from other groups by virtue of innate and immutable characteristics. These physical characteristics are in turn believed to be intrinsically related to moral, intellectual, and other non-physical attributes or abilities.³

³Pierre L. Van den Berghe, *Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), 9.

For him, race is "a group that is *socially* defined but on the basis of *physical* criteria,"⁴ which refers to the culturalisation of racism, such as "lazy Negroes" or "savage Kurds". The biological/physical elements in this usage are mostly fictive and need not be real. It serves as the necessary foundation for discriminative stereotypes targeting "damned", "unwanted social groups, in this case, ethnies. Accordingly, in the present study, I will distinguish the term "racial" from racism in that the first refers to social determination of racial features and their culturalisation. The latter, however, in its pristine sense, expresses the determination of socio-political organisation on the basis of biological criteria. In this regard I will put forward that racialism is an essential attribute of Kemalist nationalism while racism as a state policy had a sporadic relevance only.

Because Kemalist nationalism tried to substitute secular nationalism in place of Islam as the new civic religion of country and cement of society, and as a corollary of the integrating and mobilising mission ascribed to secular Turkishness, it did not permit those ethnic groups other than the main one (*unsur-u aslı*) to express themselves in socio-cultural and political terms. Kemalist nationalism was homogenising, standardising and unitarian.

The vacuum created by the disestablishment of Islam from state and social life was attempted to be filled through nationalism that has been sacralized, which led to the exclusionary policies toward non-Muslim minorities and non-assimilating Muslim ethnies the result of which being a perpetual crisis of national integration"

⁴Ibid.

In the present study, Walker Connor's conception of national identity, which sees "nation as a self-aware ethnic group"⁵ and regards the national identity as a modern manifestation of a phenomenon that has existed throughout history and across the world, i.e., the phenomenon of ethnicity, will be taken as a founding stone of the analytical framework. But more importantly, Anthony D. Smith's understanding of national identity would constitute the main analytical tools. According to Smith, national identity comprises both civic, i.e., conceiving nations as modern political entities, and ethnic, i.e., conceiving nations as communities bound by ethnocultural solidarity, elements. In other words, "the nation has come to blend two sets of dimensions, the one civic and territorial, the other ethnic and genealogical in varying degrees and proportions in particular cases."⁶ The multidimensionality of national identity acknowledges both ethnicity, the consciousness of sharing, and nationhood, implying political demands legitimated by the doctrine of nationalism which declares that "cultural and political boundaries should be congruent."⁷

To be sure, the civic and ethnic boundaries of the national identity are not fixed; they are intermixed and overlaps, and therefore subject to change. What I will deal with here is the crystallisation of these two sets of national identity with particular emphasis on ethnic boundary within a specific period of time (1924-1938) characterised by a revolutionary

⁵Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation is a State is an Ethnic Group Is a...," in Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest For Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 89-118.

⁶Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin, 1991), 14-15.

⁷Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 1.

ideology, Kemalist nationalism. I will try to identify ethnic-genealogical parameters of Turkishness as developed by a group of state elites who considered themselves as Kemalist with the view of finding a meaningful answer to the question "What does it mean to be Turkish" as well as the corresponding implications of the inclusivity and/or exclusivity of the ethnic-racial parameters of Turkishness within the specified historical context. The cultural boundary of Turkishness is very much diffused and does not need separate treatment. Therefore I will consider it as the accompaniment of both civic-political and ethnic-racial parameters of Turkishness.

The ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism which defines allegiance to Turkish nation as allegiance to Turkish ethnies is considerably different from both the imperial nationalism of the Hamidian period as well as Gökçalp's cultural nationalism. These differences are apparent in the outer manifestations of the would-be Kemalist nationalism as a world view, particularly in official publications and the speeches and statements of the leading political/state elites who saw themselves as Kemalist. In probing the nature of Turkish ethno-secular nationalism, the speeches of Kemalist elites, particularly the speeches and statements of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, conceived by Kemalists as a constitutive principle of Turkish nationalism, and the pamphlets, and other documents of ethnonationalist character are fruitful sources to be used given that the period under study is a one leader-one party period.⁸

⁸Mete Tunçay, "Atatürk'e Nasıl Bakmak"(How to Consider Atatürk), *Toplum ve Bilim*, 4(Winter 1978), 86.

In this period, no autonomous organisation was allowed to function. The press was under severe censorship thanks to the newly legislated Press Law. No private economic initiative was possible unless The Department of Planning of the Ministry of Industry permitted. All

The study of the institutions of the Kemalist era, *de jure* and *de facto* working of legal-political process and important laws, policies and reforms form other sources of reference in delineating the ethno-secular character of the Kemalist nationalism. In this regard, the speeches and statements of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and other leading Kemalists, the legislation, the minutes of RPP's party conventions, the Registers of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and memoirs of the leading figures of Kemalist nationalism are among the primary sources used in this study. The establishment of a nation state and the ensuing structure of political power, i.e., the politico-historical background, formed another aspect of the study. Under the light of this historical and partly textual analysis, questions that "What kind of a regime may an ideology like Kemalism lead to ?" or "What kind of an ideology may such a regime reflect ?" ⁹ may be tackled with a better insight.

In this study, I dwelt upon the crystallisation of the Kemalist process of the formation of the ethno-secular Turkish national identity and tried to delineate various aspects of that identity with an historical perspective. I took up this process of identity construction in its temporal

bills in the National Assembly were approved unanimously without any debate whatsoever. See Mahmut Goloğlu, *Tek Partili Cumhuriyet* (Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınları, 1974), 77. The government was the executive organ of the party policies. As Recep Peker aptly described in 1935: "Turkish republic is a party state." Ibid., 189. Atatürk was the immutable chief of both the state and the party. The Programmes of the Republican People's party were like the programme of the state order rather than a party programme, a kind of second constitution, more binding than the formal one. With the merger of the state with the party in 1936, the Republic turned into no-political party system. From that time on, for Atatürk, only the title of "chief" was used. For the general highlights of the one party period, see Goloğlu, ibid., 189-220.

⁹Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürü'nün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku* (The Official Sources of Political Culture in Turkey: Kemalist One Party Ideology and the Six Arrows of RPP), vol. 3 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 9.

context, starting from the war of independence (1919-1922) to the Kemalist era (1924-1938).

Chapter I deals with definitional clarification around such concepts as nation, nationalism, typologies of nationalism, ethnonationalism, ethnicity and their interrelations and aspects of divergence as well as convergence. The common tendency of the use of concepts in a rather loose and imprecise fashion, even in the academic vocabulary, is one of the most pressing questions. Thus people, including academics, in Turkey may say that Kemalist nationalism is racist while referring to its ethnic core. Likewise, many Turkish academics describe Kemalist nationalism as a cultural nationalism in order to argue that it is not an ethnic nationalism. Conversely, some equate cultural nationalism with ethnic nationalism.

Therefore, the question of appellation and imprecision in the use of vocabulary of nation and nationalism emerge as the major determinants in the endurance of the ambiguity surrounding nationalism. Lack of an holistic insight to the phenomenon of nationalism and failing to admit that nationalism is a "phenomenon that can rationally be inquired but not explained" due to its intangible character put "symptoms" in place of "causes" and disrupt our understanding. Hence, distinguishing this set of concepts from one another presents an urgent task, which is held in this chapter.

Chapter II deals with the historical background of Kemalist nationalism in terms of the introduction and evolution of the idea of nation and nationalism in the Ottoman Empire.

In the classical Ottoman system of social stratification (*the millet system*) based on *hierarchical differentiation* rather than *assimilationist equality*, all non-Muslim communities such as Orthodox Christians,

Armenians and the Jews, were considered a *millet* each. Muslims were considered as only one millet regardless of ethnolinguistic differences. The secularisation of the term millet transcending religious affiliation came only in the second half of the nineteenth century; yet it remained only in the journalistic vocabulary with no extension in the popular thinking.

Tanzimat introduced the notion of Ottomanism prescribing Muslim-non-Muslim equality (*müsâvat*), which ended the supremacy of the Muslim millet (*millet-i hâkime*). The aim of Ottomanism was to unite various ethnolinguistic communities and to create a feeling of common belonging, that is a “policy of diversity within unity”. Nevertheless, the inability of Ottoman Empire to nativise and reconcile the nationalist principle was partly responsible for its ultimate disintegration. This was because the official nationalism, i.e., Ottomanism could not succeed in creating social cohesion and loyalty to the state vis a vis the attractiveness of ethnolinguistic nationalism emphasising loyalty to the community one belongs rather than loyalty to the state.

Ottoman intellectuals engineered several projects to meet the challenges of nation-state. This politico-engineering projects formed a trio: first the policy of *ittihad-i Osmanî* (Ottomanism), then *ittihad-i Islam* (pan-Islamism), and finally *ittihad-i Etrak* (pan-Turkism). The first articulation of these “Three Ways of Policy” (*Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*) was by Yusuf Akçura, the first thinker spelling Turkism as a political project and a prominent figure of pan-Turkism, a political movement aiming at uniting Turkish peoples of Russia and China under Ottoman umbrella.

As an extension of the historical background of Kemalist nationalism, Chapter III tackles with the position of *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) vis a vis the

unfolding of "three ways of policy", i.e., Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism.

The period of post-1908 Revolution exhibited the same problematic which dominated the last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire: the question of the immortality of state. All parties, societies, thinkers and men of politics locked their efforts and programme of actions to the question of "saving the state" Three ways of allegiance were all starting from this question and represented different claims caused by internal social dynamism and varying attitudes towards the western-originated formulas.

The CUP cherished the ideals of Turkish unity and lent its support to Turkism through the efforts for the development of a national economy based on solidarism and the spread of Turkish education. Yet, due to the continuous state of war from 1911 to 1918 accompanied by ongoing internal revolts, and the necessity of maintaining the ideological postures of Ottomanism as well as Islamism, the CUP could not transform Turkism into a comprehensive programme of action as the founders of the Turkish Republic did.

The main problematic of the last decade of the Empire (1908-1918), apart from the question of political survival, was the formulation of a new identity in view of changing socio-political conditions, the direction of which was toward a culture-based national state instead of a multi-cultural, religiously-legitimated Empire. Against this nationalist challenge, Ziya Gökalp, the chief theoretician of the CUP, suggested a new matrix of identity with three faces: Turkism, Islamism and Modernism. He offered a new synthesis between Turkish national culture, Islam and modernisation where each of them came together to form an aspect of the new Turkish identity.

Kemalist nationalism inherited Gökalp's ideal of a homogeneous Turkish nation through seclusion of non-Muslim minorities by keeping them within the social fabric as a non-harmful element and applying a fierce assimilation to the non-assimilating Muslim ethnies other than Turks, particularly Kurdish-speaking people.

Chapter IV takes up the political backdrop of the Kemalist nationalism and examines the process of the breakdown of the Ottoman politico-religious mind. A revolutionary transformation took shape during the period of the *National Struggle* (1919-1922) and after, which shifted the locus of the political allegiance from the sultan-caliph to the Republic and from the Muslim *umma* to the nation as a well-defined territorial vision.

In the political discourse prevailing during the years of National Struggle, the phrases of Turkishness and Turkish identity were not overtly emphasised. The national community was defined in such traditional criteria as being Ottoman and Muslim. Moreover, this national community was not conceived of as a monolithic block, but as composed of various ethnic brands. The uniting bond among these ethnies were expressed as "pure fraternity," "mutual respect and feeling of sacrifice," "complete partnership both in happiness and calamity," and the willingness of "sharing the same destiny." The documents like the Declarations of Erzurum and Sivas Congresses and the National Pact, stated that "racial and social rights" of the ethnic elements and their "environmental conditions" would be respected, though with vague indication of the content of "racial and social rights" ¹⁰

¹⁰For the Declarations of Erzurum and Sivas Congresses see Mahmut Goloğlu, *Erzurum Kongresi* (Erzurum Congress) (Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınları, 1968), 109-111; and Mahmut Goloğlu, *Sivas Kongresi* (Sivas Congress) (Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınları, 1969), Appendix 1, 219-226.

The substitution of national sovereignty for dynastic one implied a momentous change. Yet the emergence of the modern Turkish state and Kemalist nationalism cannot be properly analysed and explained without duly taking into account the elements of continuity. This does not negate the fact that Kemalism represents a radical break from the past, which transformed Turkey from a military-religious empire into a modern nation-state in which the nationalist doctrine replaced Islam as the cultural foundation and overall ideology of the polity. In the last analysis, Kemalism must be considered as the last response to the age-old question of the Ottoman-Turkish elites: how can this state be saved?

Against this historical and political background, Chapter V dwells upon the crystallisation of the secular aspect of the new Turkish national identity in making. Kemalist westernising reforms which opted for the total secularisation of polity by cleansing every aspects of life, private as well as public, from "the dictates of religion" were, according to Mardin, based on the following "social findings": 1) Passing to a new conception of national honour based on rules and laws rather than ascription and personal authority as was the case in the ancient regime; 2) Transition from Islamic transcendentalism to the materialism of positive sciences in the comprehension of the human existence and the universal order; 3) Transition from a communitarian social organisation composed of the high (*havas*) and the low(*avam*) to an homogenous society of a demotic ethnie; 4) Transition from a religious community to a national society and state.¹¹

¹¹Serif Mardin, "Yenileşme Dinamiğinin Temelleri _ve Atatürk" (The Foundations of the Dynamics of Renovation and Atatürk), in *Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk* (İstanbul: Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1983), 24. The spring of the dynamics of Kemalist nationalism was this understanding of the new collectivity founded on the conception of the "new honour."

Anything Ottoman/Islamic represented the ancient regime for the Kemalists. All the Kemalist reforms attempted to provide the new Turkish man with a new world view freed from Islam and Islamic culture. Kemalism created a new Turkish nationalism located within the western international, a reflection of the equation of civilisationism with westernism and civilisation with the west.

The parameters of Turkish national identity evolved over three distinct periods from predominantly religious toward a predominantly ethnic definition. The first definition, which dominated the period between the years 1919 and 1924, was predominantly determined by the Islamic boundary of Turkishness suggesting that "the Muslim peoples of Anatolia and Thrace are Turk".¹² Following the promulgation of the Republic(1923), the political definition of Turkishness, which considered everybody being citizen of Turkish Republic and embracing Turkish language, culture and the Kemalist national creed as Turk became more pronounced. Toward the end of the 1920s, the ethnic-genealogical boundary became increasingly dominant in the Kemalist definition of national identity, based on the claim of racial continuity among peoples inhabiting the Anatolian peninsula throughout history (1929-1938).

Chapter VI studies the delimitation of the ethnic-genealogical aspect of the formation of Turkish national identity by a particular group of state elites in the close circle of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who espoused a racial/ethnic understanding of nation, which defined Turkishness as having common Turkish ancestry or "blood", and as a matter of culture,

¹²See the Regulation of Anatolian and Rumelian Society for the Defence of Rights in Mazhar Müfit Kansu, *Erzurum'dan Ölümüne Kadar Atatürk'le Beraber* (Together with Atatürk from Erzurum to his Death) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1966), 221-230.

i.e., values or life style to which one adheres, defined on the basis of Turkish ethnicity.

The ethnic-genealogical boundary of this ethnicist interpretation of Kemalist nationalism, composed of Turkic legends, symbols, myths, heroes, and sacred places, was derived from the pre-Islamic Turkish golden past. It was qualified by a strict territorialism structured on the rejection of pan-Turkist leanings of politico-territorial visions, however. Its main premises can be summarised as follows: The Turkish race is the superior race and the father of the present European civilisation. All civilisations in history are formed either directly or indirectly by Turkish race, or the races who lived under Turkish domination and benefited from the supreme attributes of Turks. Language is the most vital feature of Turkish race. A genuine Turk necessarily speaks Turkish. The most distinguished example of the genuine Turkish race is Atatürk himself.

The racial character of this conception of Kemalist nationalism are discerned through the observations of its leading ideologues, namely Recep Peker, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Afet İnan and Vasfi Raşid Seviğ. These four political-academic people here would be taken as contributors to the formation of a racial/ethnic view of Kemalist nationalism.

Chapter VII describes the manifestations of the ethnicist practices of the Kemalist making of "unity in people" i.e., its handling with the two essential questions of fundamental importance challenging its ethno-secular credentials of national identity, the resolution of the question of the so-called "Şark"(East) and Turkification of minorities.

CHAPTER I

CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IN ETHNONATIONALISM

1.1. Introduction

Post-World War II political literature was dominated by the suggested optimism of a relatively older version of Fukuyama's messianic "end of history" thesis¹² regarding ethnonationalism as a political determinant. Political development theory, the dominant paradigm of the day, led to scholarly indifference to ethnonationalism and the questions posed by the ethnic heterogeneity of the socio-political make-up of the so-called "nation-states". The result was an increasingly widening gap between the dominant conceptual framework provided by "nation-building" theory and the actual reality. This was because the self-proclaimed axiomatic certitude of the theory could not have predicted the upsurge of ethnonationalism as a global phenomenon, and failed to diagnose its manifestations.¹

In nation-building theory, ethnicity was conceived of as something of the past and irrelevant of the present. Among the reasons contributing to the fallacious description of and indifference to ethnonationalism, and problems arising from ethnic heterogeneity were the equation of

¹This state of affairs can best be exemplified by the total neglect of the term ethnicity and nationalism in the works of the major theoretician of the political development school, Gabriel Almond. See Gabriel Almond, "The Development of Political Development," in Myron Wiener and Samuel Huntington, eds., *Understanding Political Development* (Boston, 1987), 437-490.

nationalism with patriotism (loyalty to the state); failure to appreciate the ethnic *geist* of nationalism due to the reduction of ethnonationalism to its tangible aspects, namely language, religion and customs; the acceptance of material drives as the main determinants of human behaviour, and therefore viewing ethnicity as the epiphenomenon of economic inequalities which stemmed from the convergence of industrialised societies; the improvements in the fields of communication, transportation and standardisation of the patterns of production and consumption expected to eradicate ethnic affiliations and create a unidirectional, irreversible process of assimilation purporting to end up with homogeneous nation states; taking up the process of assimilation thoroughly from the perspective of socio-political engineering; the portraying of the Western Europe as consisting of wholly integrated nation states; believing that the "rest" would follow the "West" as the exemplar; and upon all these, the generalisations derived from particular western cases.²

Dismissal and misunderstanding of nationalism as something that will wither away in the progressive process of modernisation, coupled with the indifferent attitude of the academic community, were put aside by the mid-1970s when the study of ethnonationalism and related issues had won the day owing to the apparent falsification of developmentalist assumptions with the revival of the ethnic bond and upsurge of ethnic movements all over the World, including "developed" western countries. Thus ethnicity was relinked with politics and became the subject of thousands of scholarly articles, books and doctoral dissertations,

²Walker Connor cites a long though not exhaustive list accounting for the reasons for the discrepancy between theory (nation building) and practice. See Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest For Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 69-71.

apart from conferences, panels and symposiums held by professional organisations. Some journals wholly dedicated themselves to the issue, such as *Ethnic and Racial Studies*³ and *Nations and Nationalism*.⁴ This quantitative upsurge in the literature of ethnonationalism has contributed much to the theory of nationalism. It did not, however, amount to the level of a universal theory of nationalism. There is no unified theory that may guide empirical research.⁵ What we see instead is a variety of competing perspectives and partial theories that intend to explain the origin and nature of ethnonationalism and means for the accommodation of ethnic heterogeneity. Connor attests this marked lack of consensus in the literature of ethnonationalism to the way the phenomenon itself grasped:

In this Alice-in Wonderland world in which nation usually means state, in which nation-state usually means multination-state, in which nationalism means loyalty to the state, and in which ethnicity, primordialism, pluralism, tribalism, regionalism, communalism, parochialism and subnationalism usually mean loyalty to the nation, it should come as no surprise that the nature of nationalism remains essentially unprobed.⁶

The question of appellation and imprecision in the use of vocabulary of nation and nationalism emerge as the major determinants in the endurance of the ambiguity surrounding nationalism. Lack of an

³The journal *Ethnic and Racial Studies* is being published since 1978. It has become quarterly since 1992 . It deals with issues pertaining to race relations and ethnic groups.

⁴A quarterly journal of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism(ASEN). Its editor in chief is Anthony D. Smith.

⁵Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism," in *Ethnonationalism: The Quest For Understanding*, 72; and Milton Esman and Itamar Rabinowitz, "The Study of Ethnic Politics in the Middle East," in *Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East*, eds., Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), 12.

⁶Connor, "Ethnonationalism," 73.

holistic insight to the phenomenon of nationalism and failing to admit that nationalism is a "phenomenon that can rationally be inquired but not explained" due to its intangible character put "symptoms" in place of "causes" and disrupted our understanding.⁷ According to Connor, the fact that "the national bond is subconscious and emotional rather than conscious and rational"⁸ must be acknowledged. Recognition of the phenomenon as such is the essential prerequisite to a greater understanding of nationalism.⁹ Donald Horowitz,¹⁰ Anthony D. Smith¹¹ and Pierre Van den Berghe¹² are among the scholars who describe the ethnonation as a kinship group, and hence distinguish national consciousness from nonkinship identities, e.g., religious or class-based identities, and pay greater attention to the emotional, nonrational

⁷Connor points to the intellectuals' discomfort with the non-rational, and their search for quantifiable, and hence tangible explanations and their ignorance of the distinction between fact and perception of fact, i.e., what is and what people believe is. See Connor, "Ethnonationalism," 74. In the definition of nation as an ancestrally related group of people, common ancestry need not be a fact. It is a subjectively held belief with behavioural consequences.

⁸Walker Connor, "Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond," in Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest For Understanding* 204.

⁹Walker Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a...," in *Ethnonationalism: The Quest For Understanding* 113.

¹⁰Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

¹¹Anthony D. Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford:Blackwell, 1989).

¹² Berghe, "Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective," 401-411.

dimension of nationalism that other types of human groupings do not enjoy.¹³

Today we live in a political environment in which ethnicity has become legitimate in many polities, particularly the "western" ones. Ethnic identity has gained publicity without being officially banned. This is often the case when ethnic identity is viewed as the search for roots only. When it functioned as a springboard for the restructuring of the public realm, the conflict occurs. Modern nation state is essentially unitarist and therefore its basis of legitimacy is strictly national, i.e., assumes the overlapping of the political domain only with the claims of one nation, however diverse it be. Ethnies aspiring to be nation within a nation state is conceived as a challenge to the national sovereignty and integrity. Therefore ethnic claims are relegated to the private sphere at best or heavily suppressed at worst. As Hall aptly maintain, ethnic conflict is basically a political conflict in the context of territorial state in terms of coexistence among two or more ethnic groups themselves and the state.¹⁴

The fact that there is no general theory of nationalism does not necessitate the treatment of national histories as the unit of analysis. Middle range theories based on various ideal types of nationalism can be discerned, which does not rule out the suggestion of a unitary definition of nation and nationalism.¹⁵

¹³ Connor, "Ethnonationalism," 74.

¹⁴John A. Hall, "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained," in *Notions of Nationalism*, ed., Sukuwar Periwal (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), 8.

¹⁵Ibid., 9.

The novelty of nations, the widening of nationalism through the diffusion of the nationalist ideology which first became dominant in Western Europe and later reached to other regions the importance of factors other than structural (material) ones in the explanation of national identity are widely held points of consensus in the present state of the theory of nationalism, which shows that the developmental model, that is, the examination of nations and nationalism as historical processes still constitutes the dominant theoretical model.¹⁶

What follows is an attempt at definitional clarification around such concepts as nation, nationalism, ethnonationalism and ethnicity. Before trying to discern the predominantly ethno-secular character of Kemalist nationalism, which borrows much from what Hayes calls "integral" nationalisms attesting to nation an absolute value, such a conceptual clarification is essential.

1. 2. Nation: Pseudo-*Gemeinschaft* of Modernity

The Latin-rooted word nation is derived from the past participle of the verb *nasci*, meaning "to be born." The Latin noun *nationem* connotes breed or race. In this pristine sense the idea of nation conveyed the idea of common blood ties. Due to the literary license however, the pristine meaning of nation lost its sight. In the medieval universities, a student's *nationem* was the sector of the country from where he came. But in the late thirteenth century usage of the word, *nationem* reassumed its pristine meaning in English, which referred to a blood

¹⁶For a general consideration of the points of consensus and dissensus in the literature on nations and nationalism see John Armstrong, "Towards A Theory of Nationalism," in *Notions of Nationalism*, ed., Sukuwar Periwal (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), 34-43.

related group. By the early seventeenth century however, nation was also being used to describe the inhabitants of a country, regardless of its ethnonational make-up. In this sense, it became a substitute for less specific human categories such as the people or the citizenry.¹⁷ The present usage still holds multiple layers of meaning. Moreover, there is a wide propensity to employ the term nation as a substitute for the state, a tendency dating back to the late seventeenth century when the doctrine of popular sovereignty in its Lockean formulation gained rapid spread.¹⁸ Therefore, to draw up a demarcation line between nation and its pseudo substitutes, namely people, citizenry and state is necessary.¹⁹

According to Hugh Seton-Watson, one of the leading scholars of modern nationalism, the members of a nation must feel that they are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture and a national consciousness. For Seton-Watson, a nation exists if "a significant number

¹⁷National identity, which is social and psychological, and citizenship, which is politico-legal, should be differentiated. The regulations in this regard exhibits a diverse practice. In Great Britain, the rights of British subjects and of the citizens of the United Kingdom differ. Having the status of British subject does not confer the right to settle in the United Kingdom. In the United States not all "nationals" are citizens. See Gidon Gottlieb, "Nations Without States," *Foreign Affairs*, 3 (May-June 1994), 109-110. In fact, the crucial distinction between the notion of *jus soli* (the principle of defining citizenship by the place of birth, as in France) and *jus sanguinis* (operating on the principle that nationality is a matter of inheritance and refusing to distinguish nationality from citizenship, as in Germany) needs to be emphasised due to the importance of its practical impact because the French-born North Africans can reside anywhere in Europe but German-born Turks cannot. See Myron Weiner, "Peoples and States in a New Ethnic Order?" *Third World Quarterly*, 13:2 (1992), 329.

¹⁸For the Locke's conception of popular sovereignty, see George H. Sabine & Thomas L. Thorson, *A History of Political Theory*, 4th ed. (Tokyo: Dryden Press, 1981), 483-498.

¹⁹Walker Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a...," 94-95.

of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one." ²⁰ He does not spell out what the significant number is for a nation to be viable, however. Also, he is of the opinion that a precise scientific definition of the nation is not possible.²¹

Until recent times, the mainstream definitional tendency has avoided explicitly to confess that the notion of the shared blood is a defining component of the term nation. To conceive of nation as a kinship group was refused on the ground that there is no pure nation in genetical terms. This is simply irrelevant. The so-called objective characteristics of nation were deemed scientific because they were amenable to quantification. This positivistic inclination barred many scholars to perceive the fact that what matters in socio-political terms is not what is (fact) but what people believe is (perception of fact).

What scholars ignored was fully apprehended by politicians, however. With hardly any exception, we may find references of politicians to the glorious past and noble blood of the nation. Belief in the separate origin and nationhood and in the existence of exclusively national *Adams* and *Eves* is basic to the popular conception of national psychology. The *national man* identifies himself not only with present co-nationals but with all co-nationals and their glory throughout time.²²

As referred to above, as a self-defined group, it is not important for a nation to be composed of various genetic brands. To take an example, despite the fact that the Anatolian peninsula has been on the way of

²⁰Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), 5.

²¹Ibid.

²²Walker Connor, "The Nation and its Myth," in *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, ed., Anthony D. Smith (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), 48-49.

major migration routes in history, present-day Turks would believe that they are evolved from a single origin²³ and have remained unadulterated so far. As it is evident, this belief cannot be justified on factual grounds; it is only a matter of intuition and attitude. The national psychology based on such intuitive convictions portrays nation as an extended family.²⁴

In line with Connor's kinship-based definition that "nation is a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related,"²⁵ Dunn defines nation as a group of people who belong together by birth genetically and through familiarly inherited language and culture. According to Dunn, nation is both a community of birth and choice.²⁶

Smith also considers commonly held ethnic markers such as genealogical legends, collective historical memory, and the sense of distinction as the *sine qua non* of nationhood.²⁷ Kellas' definition reflects the mainstream tendency combining objective and subjective dimensions. To him, nation is a group of people who feel themselves to be a community bound together by ties of history, culture and common ancestry. Nations may have objective characteristics which may include a

²³There are many legends that attests to the origin of Turks, namely, The *Ergenekon* and *Oguz Kagan* Legends. A legendary figure, *Bozkurt*, —the grey wolf— was used as the national rigging in the early republican period.

²⁴Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation...," 93-94.

²⁵Connor, "Man is a National Animal," in Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest For Understanding* 202.

²⁶The familial discourse of father, mother, brother, sister and children characterises all nationalist symbolisms. See John Dunn, "Introduction: The Crisis of the Nation-State?" in John Dunn, ed., *Contemporary Crisis of the Nation-State* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 1.

²⁷Anthony D. Smith, *Milli Kimlik* (National Identity), trans. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), 115.

territory, a language, or a religion, and subjective characteristics i.e., national awareness and the supreme loyalty felt to the nation, the ultimate appearance of which may be readiness to die for the national cause.²⁸

As a matter of fact, the defining feature of nation, its essence, is its "intangible, subconscious, nonrational" subjective dimension, which constitutes the sense of uniqueness. "Tangible and rational," objective markers of cultural distinctiveness make sense to the extent that they contribute to this sense of uniqueness. The fact that a culturally fully assimilated Irish or Kurd still may feel that he is an Irish or Kurd evidences that cultural markers of nation do not have primary existence but complimentary to the subjective aspect of nationhood. Conversely, feeling loyalty to a single nation may transcend the divisions caused by differentiation in cultural terms, as is the case with the multilingual Switzerland and Germany transcending its Lutheran-Catholic divide. Hence, what is crucial in determining the vitality of a nation is not the tangible characteristics, but rather is the self-view of the national self. Changes in tangible markers such as language, religion or economic status do not cause the national allegiance to appear. Due to the emotional, non-rational character of the intangible-subjective side of nationhood, the national man tends to express his identity through identifiable attributes, that is, tangible symbols.²⁹ In fact, the

²⁸James J. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (Houndsmill: Macmillan, 1991), 2.

²⁹Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying," in Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest For Understanding* 43-44.

distinguishing line between the nation and the ethnic group is that the former is self-defined while the latter is other-defined.³⁰

1. 3. Nationalism: The Modern Janus

Nationalism is one of the most ambiguous concepts in the political vocabulary. The programme of an insurgent movement in the Balkans in the nineteenth century or in Africa in the twentieth century can be classified under the category of nationalism as may the oppression of one people by another.³¹ It has been part of both imperialist and anti-imperialist discourses. It can be associated with movement of emancipation and independence as well as with those whose goal is oppression.³²

The term nationalism, whose earliest mention can be found in the 1774 work of German philosopher Johann Gotfried Herder,³³ entered into the general linguistic usage in the mid-nineteenth century. Today, there is no generally agreed upon definition of nationalism. In essence the range of definitions that have been offered merely reflect the

³⁰Ibid., 44.

³¹Peter Alter, *Nationalism*, trans. (London: Edward Arnold, 1991), 4. For definitional problems regarding nationalism, also see Alexander J. Motyl, "The Modernity of Nationalism: Nations, States and Nation-States in the Contemporary World," *Journal Of International Affairs*, 45:2 (Winter 1992), 307-323.

³²Alter, *Nationalism*, 5.

³³According to Herder, humanity is composed of nations, the natural creations of God's hand. Language is the distinguishing marker of this grouping, and the main criterion for deserving the right to possess a state. For Herder's views, see Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 56-57; For its Turkish translation, see Elie Kedourie, *Avrupa'da Milliyetçilik*, trans. (Ankara: Devlet Kitapları, 1971), 55-57.

multiformity that nationalism has assumed in historical and political reality since the late eighteenth century. Nevertheless, we may discern a common base observed in all the definitions with varying degrees of emphasis on the elements of national uniqueness.

As a convenient justification for such a complexity, nationalism conceals within itself opposites and contradictions. It is a repository of both "dangers" and "opportunities" Janus-faced nationalism has so many different forms and variations that it is difficult to accommodate this diversity under one umbrella. Only with reference to a concrete historical context that the term assumes its intended meaning. Despite these variations, still we may speak of commonalities of all nationalisms, however.³⁴

A comprehensive definition must embrace all the forms of nationalism, both the nationalisms of nations with a state, and nations without a state. Peter Alter, therefore, defines nationalism both as an ideology and a political movement, which holds the nation and the sovereign nation-state to be crucial in dwelling values and managing to mobilise the political will of a people or a large section of a population. It is a dynamic principle capable of engendering hopes, emotions and action; it is a vehicle for activating human beings and creating political solidarity among them for the purposes of achieving a common goal.³⁵

³⁴Alter, *Nationalism*, 6.

³⁵Ibid., 8-9. Proposing the same definition, Kellas asserts that the ideology of nationalism builds on the awareness of the members of a nation to give a set of attitudes and a programme of action. These may be cultural, economic or political. In all cases, national self-determination is the least common denominator. Also as a form of political behaviour, nationalism is based on the feeling of belonging to a community which is the nation. Those who do not belong to the nation are seen as different, foreigners or aliens, with loyalties to their own nations. See Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 3-4.

Nationalism is the belief in the primacy of a particular nation, real or constructed; which tend to move from cultural to political forms and to entail popular mobilisation.³⁶

Conceiving nationalism as a doctrine, Kedourie distinguishes three basic premises: 1) humanity is divided into separate nations; 2) these nations have the right to establish their own sovereign states; 3) members of a nation could attain freedom and fulfilment by developing the qualities of their nations by merging their personality into the greater whole of the nation.³⁷ In relation to this core doctrine of nationalism, Smith asserts that nationalism is essentially an ideology about nation, not state. The idea that prescribes each nation a state cannot necessarily be justified by drawing on the core doctrine of nationalism. As a political ideology based on cultural uniqueness, nationalism purports for a nation to attain and maintain autonomy, unity and identity.³⁸

³⁶John A. Hall, "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained," in *Notions of Nationalism*, ed., Sukumar Periwal, 9. For a similar definition of nationalism from the same vantage point, see Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," *Survival*, 35:1(Spring 1993), 5-26.

³⁷Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 67 and *Avrupa'da Milliyetçilik*, 65. In a sense, Smith reexpresses Kedourie in his formulation of the core doctrine of nationalism. To Smith, the core doctrine of nationalism consists of the following premises:

- 1) The world is divided into nations each of which having its own uniqueness, history and fate.
- 2) Nation is the source of all political power, and national allegiance is above all other foci of loyalties.
- 3) It is necessary for those who want to be free and achieve self-actualisation to identify with a nation.
- 4) If there will be peace and justice in the world, nations should be free and secure. See Smith, *Milli Kimlik*, 121.

³⁸Smith, *ibid.*, 121-122.

1. 3. 1. Nationalism vs Ethnonationalism

Connor's contribution in terms of the relationship between nationalism and ethnonationalism is most striking. To him, in their pure sense, there is no difference between nationalism and ethnonationalism. Nation in its pristine sense connotes a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related. Nationalism connotes identification with and loyalty to one's nation as just defined. In view of this, it is clear that the word "ethno" in the term ethnonationalism is redundant.³⁹ That is, *all nationalisms are, in varying degrees, inherently ethnic.* ⁴⁰

1.4. Classifying Nationalisms

Many typologies have been suggested for classifying nationalisms, beginning with Carlton Hayes' categories of humanitarian, Jacobean, aristocratic, cultural, democratic, integral and economic nationalism. Similarly, Hans Kohn differentiated between Western associational and Eastern organic types. These "founding fathers" evaluated nations and nationalist movements using such value-laden terms as "optimistic" and "paranoiac" based on the declared slogans of the movements.

In line with the historical approach of the two "founding fathers", Kedourie identifies two varieties of nationalist doctrine: the first (republican), deriving from Kant and associated with political nationalism, which conceives of the political community as a body of

³⁹Walker Connor, "Introduction," in *Ethnonationalism: The Quest For Understanding*, xi.

⁴⁰Eriksen holds the same view: "Nationalism and ethnicity are kindred concepts, and the majority of nationalisms are ethnic in character." See Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspective* (London: Pluto Press, 1993), 118.

individuals who have signified their will regarding the manner of government; and the second (organic), deriving from Herder, that perceives the nation as a natural solidarity endowed with unique cultural characteristics. In their practical manifestations, however, he argues the convergence of the two conceptions.⁴¹ German and French ideal typical variations of nationalism correspond essentially to the same dichotomy.⁴² Below I am going to take up the most widely acknowledged typologies of nationalism whose premises differ essentially in nominal terms.

1.5.4.1 Ethnic vs Territorial Nationalism

Espousing a dichotomous approach, Smith distinguishes between ethnic and territorial nationalisms as ideal types. According to him, nationality may be defined either by ethnic (birth-based) or civic-territorial (choice-based) criteria. Ethnic nationality is based on the consciousness of a shared identity within a group, rooted in a shared culture and a belief in common ancestry. By contrast, civic-territorial nationality is inclusive within a territory. Membership in the national group is generally open to everyone who is born or permanently resident within the national territory, irrespective of language, culture or ancestry.⁴³

⁴¹Kedourie, *Nationalism* , 65-67.

⁴²For a comparative treatment of the German and French nationalisms, see Pierre Birnbaum, "Nationalism: A Comparison Between France and Germany," *International Social Science Journal*, 133(1992), 375-384.

⁴³Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nations* , 21-46.

1. 4. 1.1. Ethnic Nationalism

Smith defines ethnic nationalism as an ideological movement on behalf of the autonomy, unity and identity of a human population conceived by its members as an actual or potential nation, which is defined in terms of a myth of common ancestry and historic culture. Ethnic nationalisms define the unity of aspirations less in terms of a territory or polity than by reference to the myths, memories and symbols that comprise an existing or putative ethnic culture, i.e., a culture of ascribed descent.⁴⁴

Smith identifies the following elements in ethnic nationalisms:

a) Common Descent: It is the defining feature of ethnic nationalism. Nation is conceived of in genealogical terms as a putative "higher family." Through identifying a national Adam and Eve, nation as an historical continuity is expressed through familial symbolism.

b) Demotic Aspect: People is the object of nationalist aspirations and the final recourse of rhetoric. Acts and actions of nationalist leadership are justified only by recourse to the popular will, which transcends "divisive" subgroupings through ethnic imagination.

c) Native Culture: Native culture, namely language and customs, plays the role of law in territorial model. This is why grammarians and linguists have had played a very central role in the early phases of nationalisms in Eastern Europe and Asia. Through crystallisation of myths and historical and linguistic traditions, their works proved extremely functional in arousing the popular national consciousness.

⁴⁴A. D. Smith, "Ethnic Nationalism," in *Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions*, ed. Vernon Bogdanor (Oxford:Blackwell, 1987), 208.

Genealogy, putative ties of descent and mobilisation of people reflects the route of national formation based on the ethnic conception of nation evolved in Eastern Europe and Asia.⁴⁵

The aims of ethnonational movements, according to Smith, are the formation of a high culture, the creation of a homogenous, organic nation in cultural terms, the provision of a homeland and preferably an independent state for the people, and the transformation of the passive ethnies into an active ethnopolitical community, thereby making the ethnies the "subject of history."⁴⁶

1. 4.1. 2. Territorial Nationalism

Territorial type of nationalism conceives nation as a territorial *patrie*. It involves the following elements:

a) Historical Land: Nations must possess their own historical land, which they could identify. The land as the place of the historical memory and its associations, is a place where saints, scholars, and heroes lived, worked, prayed and fought, which makes it unique. It is a sacred geography with its seas, rivers, lakes, mountains, and cities. Only those who possess national consciousness could conceive of the inner meaning of the land. The policy of autarchy and the protection of national economy are the extension of this notion.⁴⁷

b) Legal-Political Community: The second element of territorial nationalism is the *patrie*, i.e., a community possessing a common will

⁴⁵Smith, *Milli Kimlik* , 28-31.

⁴⁶Ibid., 195-196.

⁴⁷Ibid., 25-26.

formed through laws and institutions, and expressed around centralised, unitarian institutions going beyond local identities.⁴⁸

c) Citizenship (Legal-Political Equality of Members of Nation): The notion of legal equality expresses types of citizenship including civil-legal, socio-economic and political rights and duties

d) Common Politico-Civic Culture: Legal equality assumes the existence of common values and traditions among members of the same nation. Nations must possess a common understanding, hopes, emotions and ideas comprising a common creed and culture, which serves to hold members of the nation together. This provision of a common public and mass culture assumed by popular mobilisation refers basically to the public education and mass media.⁴⁹ In this model of nationalism, members of nation are tied to one another through common historical memories , myths, symbols and traditions but not homogeneous cultural groupings.⁵⁰

All nationalisms involve, in various degrees and different forms, civil and ethnic constitutive elements. In some, territorial elements dominate the ethnic ones, and vice versa. French nationalism in the Jacobean period was essentially civil-territorial; it devised the fraternity of all French citizens and unity of republican patriots within a politico-legal community. At the same time there was a linguistic nationalism reflecting the proud of the purity of the hegemonic French culture and its civilising mission.⁵¹ Even if these two conceptions clash with each other,

⁴⁸Ibid., 26-27.

⁴⁹Ibid., 27.

⁵⁰For the elaboration of the constitutive elements of territorial nationalism see ibid., 182-185.

⁵¹Ibid., 30.

still they have a common national discourse uniting them. Both republicans and monarchists upheld the view of the French "natural and historical lands." Likewise, they agreed to teach national ideals and history, excluding its Catholic dimension, through mass public education. The loyalty felt to the French language was also a general point of agreement. While they shared the uniqueness of the French and France, the historical content and the lessons to be drawn from this uniqueness were subject of dispute.⁵²

National identity takes different forms in different social circumstances. Civic-territorial nationalism normally appears in well institutionalised democracies. Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, appears spontaneously when an institutional vacuum occurs. By its nature, nationalism based on equal and universal citizenship rights within a territory depends on a supporting framework of laws to guarantee these rights, as well as effective institutions to allow citizens to give voice to their views. Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, depends not on institutions but on ethnically defined culture. Therefore ethnic nationalism is the default option: it predominates when institutions collapse, when existing institutions are not fulfilling people's basic needs and when satisfactory alternative structures are not readily available. This is the reason, according to Gellner, that ethnic nationalism has been so prominent in the wake of the collapse of post-Soviet state.⁵³

In pre-independence periods, territorial nationalisms are basically anti-imperialist; they aim to dispose the alien rulers and to establish a state-nation. Post-independence territorial nationalisms are integrative.

⁵²Ibid., 31.

⁵³Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," 12.

They try to integrate ethnically diverse population within a new political community and to form a new territorial nation.

Pre-independence ethnic nationalisms are either secessionist or work for the founding of a new political ethnonation. These are secessionist and Diaspora nationalisms. Post-independence ethnonational movements are irredentist and pan nationalisms.⁵⁴

This typology is not conclusive; it ignores protectionist economic and fascist-racist nationalisms. However, while it ensures more general accounts of nationalisms, it makes possible the comparison of nationalisms within each category and location of them within similar contexts.

1. 4. 2. Political vs Cultural Nationalism

The distinction between cultural nation (*kulturnation*) and political nation (*staatsnation*) is one of the most famous contributions to inquiries into the nation and nationalism. The two terms gained acceptance in the scholarly field thanks to the German historian Friedrich Meinecke.⁵⁵

1.4.2.1. Political Nationalism

In this way of "nation-building", the political nation is structured on the idea of individual and collective self-determination and derives from the individual free will and subjective commitment to the nation. E. Renan's notion that the "nation is a daily plebiscite" reflects the

⁵⁴Smith, *Milli Kimlik*, 133-135.

⁵⁵Friedrich Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State* (Princeton, 1970). The original German edition appeared in 1907.

political/subjective definition of nation centred on the will of the individual.⁵⁶

The concept of political nation has its concrete historical referents in France, England and the United states. In these three states, a process of domestic political transformation generated the nation as a community of politically aware citizens equal before the law irrespective of their social and economic status , ethnic origin and religious beliefs.⁵⁷

The objective of political nationalism is to achieve an autonomous state based on common citizenship that will enable the community to participate as equals in the modern world. Political nationalists tend to organise on legal-rational lines, forming nationalised apparatuses that pose as a centre-state to the existing state and seek to mobilise the different interests of the nation to a unitary end.⁵⁸

1.4.2.2. Cultural Nationalism

In this route, the cultural nation is founded upon seemingly objective criteria such as common historical heritage and language, a distinct area of settlement, religion, customs and history, and does not need to be mediated by a national state or other political form. Consciousness of unity, the sense of belonging together develop independent of the state. The pre-political cultural nation can overarch existing particularistic state forms, such as in early nineteenth century Germany and Italy. It leaves individuals little scope to choose to which

⁵⁶Alter, *Nationalism*, 14.

⁵⁷Ibid., 15.

⁵⁸John Hutchinson, "Moral Innovators and the Politics of Regeneration: The Distinctive Role of Cultural Nationalists in Nation-Building," in *Ethnicity and Nationalism* , ed., A. D. Smith, 101.

nation they belong. It was hence quite logical that movements for national unity, which began to emerge in the nineteenth century, regarded the nation as an entity preceding the state and resting upon common historical or cultural values or social ties. The first step towards transition to a political nation are taken when a cultural nation is politicised , and statist ideas take root within it.⁵⁹

The cultural nation principle , which emphasises common heritage and language, is the characteristic of the emergence of nations in Central Europe, Italy and, with certain qualifications, East-Central Europe.⁶⁰

The aim of the cultural nationalists is the moral regeneration of the "way of life" of a unique historical community. Nation as a spontaneous social order cannot be constructed like a state from above. It can only be revitalised from the bottom up in a manner that pays respect to the natural diversities (regional, occupational, religious and so forth) within the nation. They are above all educational movements seeking to rebind the different constituents to a presumed common essence, forming decentralised clusters of historical and language societies, dramatic groups, publishing centres and political parties in order to do so. Among the techniques by which a national identity is constructed are evoking the name of the nation, organising collective "pilgrimages" to sacred national sites and engaging in invidious comparison with the culture of other.⁶¹ Cultural nationalism tends to develop from cultural to a political movement, but its goals and techniques differ from those of political nationalism.⁶²

⁵⁹Alter, *Nationalism*, 14.

⁶⁰Ibid., 15.

⁶¹Hutchinson, "Moral Innovators," 104-105.

In practice, it is often difficult to distinguish between cultural and political nationalists, for both put forward what, since the eighteenth century, has been in many contexts a revolutionary doctrine: that sovereignty is located ultimately in the people , and that the world is divided into distinct nations each with unique homelands.

In conclusion, the political concept of nation cannot simply be reserved for Western Europe, and its cultural counterpart for East-Central and South-East Europe. In fact, political and cultural nationalisms are intermixed. The strong convergence between them is resulted from the fact that there is always cultural elements underlying the concept of political nation, just as all cultural nationalist movements tend to assume a political character.⁶³

1.5. Understanding Ethnicity

Typologies of nationalism based on a combination of moral, geographical and class categories, which will be considered more thoroughly in the next chapter, leave too many exceptions and are in any case too subjective to be valid. Irish nationalism was more akin to the

⁶²Hutchinson tries to refute the three widespread "fallacies" in the general literature on nationalism as regards to the importance of cultural nationalism in the formation of modern nations:

- 1)it can be conflated with political nationalism.
- 2) It is a regressive response to modernisation.
- 3) It is a transient phenomenon bound to fade with full modernisation.

Hutchinson argues that cultural nationalism deserves attention as a separate movement, distinct from political nationalism, with its own aims and politics. In his words "Although it is backward-looking, it is not regressive; rather it evokes a golden age as a critique of the present, with the hope of propelling the community to ever higher stages of development. Indeed cultural nationalists act as moral innovators and are a recurring force, regularly crystallising at times of crisis generated by the modernisation process with the aim of providing alternative models of progress." See Hutchinson, "Moral Innovators," 101.

⁶³Alter, *Nationalism*, 16-18.

eastern-cultural than the western European-political variety; Czech nationalism , which were rational and pragmatic, broke from the East European model.⁶⁴

Nationalism can be treated as an undifferentiated whole with its ideology, core doctrine and symbolism. Nevertheless, nationalist movements show obvious diversities in terms of their aims. The depth and extent of this diversity may evoke the tendency to refrain from theorising about nationalism.

Nationalism is chameleonic; it takes its colour from its context. To talk of nationalism in general is to avoid accounting for the nationalist ideas and feelings within their unique context. To treat nationalism only within its particular context, which what most historians do, on the other hand, is to reject to locate it within a general comparative perspective of which it is a part. Contextualist approach tends to ignore the typologies of nationalist ideologies/movements. These typologies, however, provide us with the opportunity of making general comparisons without sacrificing the importance of the contextual differences. Typologies conceive of nationalism as unities within diversities.⁶⁵

1. 5.1. Ethnicity and Ethnic Group

As a political concept, ethnicity seems to be a new term. Its first usage is attributed to the American sociologist David Riesman in 1953. As a controversial concept sparking intense debate among social scientists, ethnicity (identity with one's ethnic group) is derived from *ethnos* , the

⁶⁴Hedva Ben-Israel, "Nationalism in Historical Perspective," *Journal of International Affairs*, 45: 2(Winter 1992), 386-387.

⁶⁵Smith, *Milli Kimlik*, 129-131.

Greek word for nation in the latter's original sense of a group characterised by common descent.⁶⁶ None of the founding fathers of sociology and social anthropology —with the partial exception of Weber— granted ethnicity much attention. Since the 1960s, the words ethnic group and ethnicity gained wide currency in the Anglophone world. But with this came the rather arbitrary usage of the term, which has contributed very much to the present conceptual confusion.

Consonant with the etymological derivation, there developed a general agreement that an ethnic group referred to a basic human category, not a subgroup. The use of ethnic group in the sense of "a group with a common cultural tradition and a sense of identity which exists as a subgroup of a larger society", particularly by American sociologists, equates it with minority.⁶⁷ As a matter of fact, majorities and dominant peoples are no less "ethnic" than minorities. An ethnic group need not be a subordinate group of a larger polity but may be the dominant element within a state, e.g., Turks in Turkey or Germans in Germany. Yet the indiscriminate application of the ethnic group to a variety of group types obscures vital distinctions between different forms of identity, which exerts a damaging influence on the study of nationalism. Employing ethnic group in relationship to several types of identities blur the relationship between the ethnic group and the nation.⁶⁸

It is necessary therefore to provide a minimum working definition of ethnic group, because the term is used rather loosely in the literature, and there is no general consensus regarding it. Dyke defines ethnic group

⁶⁶Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation...," 100-101.

⁶⁷Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 3-4.

⁶⁸Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation...," 102-103.

as "a group of persons, predominantly of common descent, who think of themselves as collectively possessing a separate identity based on race or on shared cultural characteristics, usually language or religion."⁶⁹ Such a definition raises more questions than it answers, however. Ethnic groups so defined may also be considered as peoples, nations, nationalities, minorities, tribes or communities according to different contexts and circumstances.

Smith emphasises in his description of the *ethnie* that what is important is the belief or myth of common ancestry, not genetic heritage. The important thing is not the "reality" of physical descent but the belief in itself. Ethnicity is not about blood or genes as such, but about myths and common origins. Appeal to common blood and metaphors of family are common currency for ethnic nationalists. For them, the *ethnie* is a "super-family", extended in space and time to distant relatives over many generations, including yet unborn.⁷⁰

According to Horowitz, "ethnicity is connected to birth and blood, but not absolutely so."⁷¹ Due to its ascriptive character, ethnic identity hardly changes.⁷² Ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate.⁷³ Kinship and notion of distinctiveness, including selection by God, appear as key

⁶⁹Vernon Van Dyke, "The Individual, The State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory," *World Politics*, 29 :3 (1977), 344.

⁷⁰A. D. Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," *Survival*, 35:1(Spring 1993), 50.

⁷¹Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* , 51.

⁷²Ibid., 52.

⁷³Mustafa Kemal Pasha's "*Onuncu Yıl Nutku*" (Tenth Year Speech) (1933) is a graphic example of this theme in relation to the attributes ascribed to Turkish nation.

determinants of ethnicity. Unlike kinship, ethnic membership transcends face to face relations, however. As conceived by Horowitz, ethnicity embraces groups that are differentiated by colour, language and religion; it covers tribes, races, nationalities and castes alike.⁷⁴ Taken as a variable rather than a constant, ethnicity is a complex phenomenon that often consists of many components including language, religion and common histories. It can rarely be reduced to a single factor.⁷⁵

In conclusion, the notion of ethnicity eludes a clear definition partly because a wide variety of attributes are invoked to describe it. It is therefore necessary to specify the essential features of ethnicity because it is so much conflated with nationality by many social scientists.

1. 5. 2. Distinguishing Ethnicity

How can we differentiate ethnic groups from other human groupings, namely nation, cultural groups and race? Why is it that social classes or the members of a science-fiction association are not considered ethnic groups while the Pashtuns, the Kurds, or the Germans are?

1. 5.2.1. Ethnicity vs Nationality

Many scholars distinguish nationality from ethnicity with the coextensiveness of territory and culture. T. K. Oommen suggests that a nation is the homeland of a people who shares a common culture. In cases of the dissociation of culture from territory, there exists ethnicity. Hence the content of both ethnicity and nationality cannot be defined in terms of cultural markers. In order to avoid the conflation of these two

⁷⁴Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 53.

⁷⁵Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (London: Duckworth, 1983), 181.

collectivities, we need to recognise their specificity. "If the nation is a **cultural** collectivity with its legitimate claim over a territory, an ethnie is a **cultural** collectivity existing away from its ancestral homeland."⁷⁶ This **definition** views the ethnic groups as nations without states. The **distinguishing** element is the territory/state. This is an highly inadequate **and** partial understanding restricted to the modern dimension of **chronological** time.

Smith agrees with Connor who sees the ethnic group as an other-defined group, unconscious of its uniqueness and distinctiveness. In Smith's definition of nation,⁷⁷ which combines ethnic and civic elements, the main divide between the nation and the ethnie(ethnic group) is that the ethnie's claim to territory may have only a symbolic relevance while that of the nation is real and physical, though the territorial element is heavily blended with common myths and memories. At this point, the nation and the ethnie collide with each other. Nevertheless, ethnies are deprived of many features of nations. They may not reside in their homeland or do not have a common division of labour and economic union as well as common legal codes.⁷⁸ Without an ethnic origin however, the process of nation formation would remain incomplete, because those nations which do not possess a common ethnic root try to forge an ethnic origin through the use of

⁷⁶T. K. Oommen, "Race, Ethnicity and Class: An Analysis of Interrelations," *International Social Science Journal* 139(February 1994), 89-90.

⁷⁷According to Smith, nation is "a named human community with a myth of common ancestry, historical memories and standardised mass culture, which possesses a single territory , division of labour and legal rights for all members." See Smith, *Milli Kimlik*, 70.

⁷⁸Ibid., 71.

mythology and national symbolism as a precondition for the national unity and survival.⁷⁹

1. 5. 2. 2. Ethnic Groups vs Cultural Groups

The widely held position that equates ethnic groups with "cultural groups" is difficult to justify. The sharing of cultural traits (language, religion, customs, etc.) frequently crosses group boundaries. The fact is that people do not always share all their cultural traits with the same group of people. An ethnic Kurd, for example, may feel himself closer to ethnic Turks than to the members of his co-ethnies. Conversely, a culturally fully assimilated Kurd into Turkishness still may feel himself as being Kurd.

Cultural boundaries are not clear-cut, nor do they necessarily correspond to ethnic boundaries. As Eugene Roosens remarks: "There is more chance that the Flemish in Brussels, who always have to speak French, will become more "consciously" Flemish than their ethnic brothers and sisters in the rather isolated rural areas of West Flanders or Limburg?"⁸⁰ Thus, if a setting is wholly mono-ethnic, there is effectively no ethnicity, since there is nobody to communicate cultural difference.⁸¹

The constitutive elements of ethnicity, therefore, are not constant. To state that ethnic groups are marked by shared cultural traits makes hardly any sense. There is no agreement among anthropologists regarding the markers maintaining the boundaries between ethnic groups and other "non-ethnic" groups, e.g., economic classes. Definitions which

⁷⁹Ibid., 73.

⁸⁰Eugene Roosens, *Creating Ethnicity: The Process of Ethnogenesis* (London: Sage Publications, 1982), 12.

⁸¹Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 34.

denote a number of so-called objective, tangible criteria for ethnicity have been radically challenged. Contrary to a widespread common view, cultural differences among human groupings are not the decisive feature of ethnicity. In contrast to the assertion that ethnicity is the character or quality of an ethnic group, some culturally similar groups may not have stable inter-ethnic relations between them. The bloody confrontation between Serbs and Croats, a two culturally highly similar group, following the break-up of Yugoslavia is a case in point. Only in so far as cultural differences are perceived as being important, and are made socially relevant, do social relationships have an ethnic element.⁸² Other than its relational dimension, ethnicity can also be defined as a social identity (based on contrast vis a vis others) characterised by metaphoric, or fictive kinship. Notion of shared descent is a universal element in ethnic ideologies.⁸³ All ethnic groups favour endogamy with varying degrees of practical importance.

The application of systematic distinctions between Us and Them is an essential aspect of ethnicity. If no such principle exists there can be no ethnicity, since ethnicity presupposes an institutionalised relationship between delineated categories whose members consider each other to be culturally distinctive.⁸⁴ It would be misleading, therefore, to state simply that ethnic groups are identical with cultural groups, and that shared culture is the basis of ethnicity. It follows that ethnic groups must be defined from within, from the perspective of their members. Instead of listing traits of "objective culture" which members often share with non-

⁸²Ibid., 12.

⁸³Ibid., 68.

⁸⁴Ibid., 18.

members anyway, ethnicity may be seen as categorical inscriptions which classify individuals in terms of their core identity.

In the last analysis, Connor proves right: an ethnic group is an other-defined community having self or perceived common origin.⁸⁵ Some ethnic groups use notions of "race" or "blood" while some others may use criteria of cultural competence. Nevertheless, ethnic identities are not totally created by historical circumstances. In a series of books on nationalism, A. D. Smith⁸⁶ argues that modern ethnic ideologies, notably nationalisms, have identifiable "objective" cultural roots. He claims that although nations and ethnic movements are modern creations, they use ethno-cultural elements of the past.⁸⁷ Yet, it would be misleading to suggest that there is an unbroken continuity from the pre-modern communities to the national ones. Popular customs and other national symbols take on very different meanings in the modern context from their original being, as the Norwegian example shows.⁸⁸

1. 5.2.3. *Ethnicity vs Racism*

Science-based racism arose in the late eighteenth century, largely as a response to calls for the abolition of slavery. Darwin's theories of "natural selection" and "survival of the fittest" provided the pseudo-scientific justification for the racist ideology. Although most scientists had abandoned the concept of race by the 1920s, cultural notions of race continue to exist in popular imagery. Personality traits and cultural

⁸⁵ Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying," 42.

⁸⁶See particularly his book, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).

⁸⁷Smith, "Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," 51-52.

⁸⁸Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 107.

distinctiveness are in many societies still attributed to people on the basis of race and it is in this way that races may become ethnic categories. The physical appearance of a person may in this sort of society serve as a convenient shorthand way of telling other members of the society what kind of person he is. In fact, such categorisations and their accompanying stereotypes are no more natural than the ethnic distinctions differentiating, for example, Finns from Swedes.⁸⁹

Unlike race (an unsound biological category) and racism (claim to racial superiority), the content of ethnicity is essentially the communication of cultural distinctiveness in relational context, and this does not necessarily imply superiority or inferiority. Nevertheless, it is not unusual for certain ethnicities to define themselves as superior and perceive the distinctions of others as inferior. This state of affairs can be described as *ethnicism*, i.e., discrimination based on ethnic markers.⁹⁰ In contrast to the positive associations of ethnicity viewed as an identity marker and a search for roots, ethnicism is a wholly negative conceptualisation in relation to ethnic groups.

The matching of certain cultural characteristics with a certain race is the racism in disguise of culture, or rather the *culturalisation of racism*.⁹¹ The racial stereotypes of the blacks as uncivilised, barbarian, ugly, dirty and stupid has been partly replaced by cultural beliefs portraying them as lazy and aggressive. The shift of racism from

⁸⁹Ibid., 52.

⁹⁰The term "ethnicism" is used by A. Bacal in his *Ethnicity in the Social Sciences* (Coventry: Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations-University of Warwick, 1991).

⁹¹S. Steinberg, *The Ethnic Myth* (Boston-Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1981).

biological to cultural rationalisations has been named, particularly in the American context, ethnicity.

Presently, the term race has no scientific content. Modern genetics does not accept such a category due to the interbreeding between human population, which has made meaningless to talk of fixed boundaries between races. Also, the distribution of hereditary physical traits does not follow clear boundaries. In other words, there is often great variation within a racial group than there is systematic variation between two groups.

The question is not however, if the term race has any scientific justification, because the concept of race exists as a power informing people's actions. Racism builds on the assumption that personality is somehow linked with hereditary characteristics which differ systematically between races, and in this way race may assume sociological importance even it has no "objective" existence.⁹²

Ideas of race may or may not form part of ethnic ideologies, and their presence or absence does not seem to be a decisive factor in inter ethnic relations. However, ethnicity may assume many forms, and since ethnic ideologies tend to stress common descent among their members, the distinctions between race and ethnicity is a problematic one. Discrimination on ethnic grounds is spoken of as "racism" in one context, and "communalism" in another context. But the forms of imputed discrimination can be nearly identical. For groups different from the dominating one(s), it can be difficult to escape from their ethnic identity if they wish so. This is so for minority groups with an inadequate

⁹²Oommen, "Race, Ethnicity and Class: An Analysis of Interrelations," 84.

command of the dominant language. In such cases, the ethnic identity becomes an ascribed status hardly escapable.⁹³

To cut it short, race is distinguished from nation and ethnie mainly because races are discussed in predominantly biological terms, with particular emphasis on "phenotypical" distinctions such as cephalic index, texture of hair, blood groups, skin colour, stature etc., and presumed genetic distinctions. Racism matches nationalism as an ideology and type of behaviour, and is related to race rather than to nation or ethnie.⁹⁴

1.6. Approaches to Ethnicity: Primordialism vs Instrumentalism

One of the main controversies around ethnicity or the nature of ethnic bond in current theoretical debate is between "primordialists" and "instrumentalists." Primordialism puts emphasis on the psychological and cultural dimensions in order to understand the emotional intensity that the ethnic attachment breeds. The affective dimension of ethnic behaviour cannot be explained by the instrumental use of ethnicity for the attainment of other goals. The primordial root of ethnicity "derives from a cultural interpretation of descent."⁹⁵ The primordialists⁹⁶ argue that ethnicity is a primordial bond between the members of a "natural"

⁹³Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 5-6.

⁹⁴Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 5.

⁹⁵Charles F. Keyes, ed., *Ethnic Change* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), 5; quoted by Crawford Young, "The Dialectics of Cultural Pluralism: Concept and Reality," in *The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation State at Bay?* ed., Crawford Young (USA: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 23.

⁹⁶Clifford Geertz and Edward Shills are among the leading adherents of primordialism.

community which precedes modern nation-states and deeply rooted in historical experience. They preach that the loyalty ethnicity evokes and the social structures it causes should be regarded as stable permanent realities. Ethnic identity is a permanent feature of group life, though at times , it may be repressed or exists latently. The aim and function of ethnic movements is to awaken "the sleeping beauty"(the ethnie) and build up collective awareness about it, thereby, to paraphrase Marx, to transform an "ethnie-by-itself" into an "ethnie-for-itself." ⁹⁷

In its extreme version, primordialism grows into socio-biology, which holds that ethnic consciousness is imprinted in the genetic code, as a product of thousands of years of prehistorical existence, which necessitated the kindred affinity for survival, an idea based thoroughly on the Darwinian notion of mutational change. For the primordialists, ethnic bond represents historical continuity and should be considered an objective "given" for the purposes of socio-political analysis. They see ethnies and nations as permanent if not perennial.

Ethnic cultures in their view are durable repositories of human experience and memory. Many ethnies hold this approach. The Basques, Tamils, Kurds and many others would certainly maintain that their ethnic identity existed prior to, and transcends, the current conflicts in which they are involved.

As to the instrumentalists, ⁹⁸ they see political functioning as the sole *raison d'etre* of ethnicity. To them, ethnicity needs no historical or

⁹⁷Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Ethnic Conflicts and Their Impact on International Society," *International Social Science Journal*, 127(February 1991), 123.

⁹⁸Among the prominent representatives of instrumentalism are Crawford Young, Cynthia H. Enloe, Joseph Rothschild and Nathan Glazer.

cultural explanation. Ethnicity arises entirely from social conditions. They regard ethnies and nations as political means to be created, used, manipulated or discarded according to political expediency. Ethnic perception and national sentiment are contingent or situational; the boundaries of belonging and opposition vary with the situation of the perceiver. The task of analysis is to identify political factors that might activate ethnic affinity, to discover the architects of its doctrinal and instrumental exploiters.⁹⁹ Ethnic identity is an instrument for mobilising group emotions on behalf of causes used by political elites in their competition for power and wealth. Ethnic ties can be adjusted to meet the material, security and status needs of their members. When other collective identities (e.g., class, occupation) better serve practical needs, the ethnic bond may disappear. The identity of Palestinians, the Sikhs, the Eritreans, the Saharans and many other groups around the World who appeal to ethnic identity in order to declare their political messages can all be considered fairly recent phenomena. Many instrumentalists see nations and nationalism as products of a secular, industrial modernity of bourgeois capitalism.¹⁰⁰ Structural-functionalists, neo-Marxists and the rational choice theorists all embrace instrumentalist framework.

The distinction between primordialist and instrumentalist conceptions of ethnicity can be useful chiefly because it highlights a crucial duality in ethnicity. Primordialism in a sense completes instrumentalism by explaining the force of "affective tie" through which

⁹⁹Young, "The Dialectics of Cultural Pluralism: Concept and Reality," 22.

¹⁰⁰For a general consideration of the primordialist-instrumentalist debate see A.D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* 9-13; Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*, 54-58; Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Ethnic Conflicts," 123-124; and Milton Esman and Itamar Rabinowitz, "The Study of Ethnic Politics," 12-13.

"rational" interest is instrumentally pursued. Without making any generalisation, it is likely that most ethnic conflicts today contain a mixture of both ingredients: ethnic identity probably has its historical roots in the popular consciousness, but it is also used intentionally by militant elites to mobilise support for political action. Criticising both approaches, Smith asserts that there are difficulties with both views because as an ideological movement nationalism is clearly dates from the eighteenth century, but ethnies appear frequently in ancient sources. He links modern phenomenon of ethnonationalism with the much older phenomenon of the ethnies.¹⁰¹

1.7.Theories of Ethnic Conflict

At the theoretical level, ethnic conflicts are not the focus of studies in the usual analytical models of conflict studies or the sociology of change and development. For decades, the so-called modernisation paradigm dominated thinking in the social sciences, prescribing the direction of change as from the traditional to the modern, from the simple to the complex. In this framework, ethnic issues are thought to pertain to the pre-modern world that will be swept aside by the modernisation process. If they do arise, they are seen as obstacles to change or as stemming from incomplete modernisation. In line with this view, theories of nation-building emphasise the comprehensive nature of the transformation of subnational units and loyalties into a wider polity. In this context, ethnic issues become stumbling blocks in a more general process of change.

¹⁰¹See, among others, his "Nationalism and the Historians," in *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, ed., Anthony D. Smith (Leiden:E. J. Brill, 1992), 73-75.

Class-based analysis relates ethnic conflicts to economic interests in which the group actors tend to be social classes defined in terms of their position in the system of production. Needless to say, in the class-based characterisation of power relationships in intra and inter state system, ethnic issues appear in secondary importance.

A third approach which Horowitz calls theory of cultural pluralism sees ethnic conflicts as cultural conflicts claiming that cultural differences are the main divide between ethnic groups.¹⁰²

Generally speaking, modernisation-based (liberal-functional) and Marxist approaches to conflict and development, which would be discussed separately in the next chapter, have neglected the importance of ethnic issues and conflicts. Consequently there are few helpful theoretical models available to guide research in the study of ethnic conflicts.

It is apparent that theories used to explain ethnic conflict are premised on opposite assumptions. Where the theory of cultural pluralism conceives of ethnic conflict as the clash of incompatible values, modernisation and economic interest theories conceive of conflict as the struggle for resources and opportunities that are valued in common. Where the theory of cultural pluralism stresses the separation and isolation of the groups, and hence divergence and dissensus, modernisation and economic interest theories stress contact and competition , and hence convergence and consensus.

Theories with such different premises also focus on different features of ethnic conflict. Modernisation and economic interest perspectives are useful in highlighting the role of elites in conflict. Cultural pluralists neglect the role of elites, particularly elites with convergent goals and aspirations. On the other hand, modernisation and

¹⁰²Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 135.

materialist theories encounter difficulty in explaining why non-elites take part in the conflict at all.

All these theories imply that ethnic conflict will be persistent and difficult to manage. For the modernisers and materialists, this is because people are becoming more alike and tangible interests are increasingly in conflict. For the pluralists, it is because nation-states are inherently vulnerable to dissolution or to the domination of one group. None of the theories however, addresses the significance of symbolic issues in ethnic conflict. None deals with the important role of ethnic group anxiety and apprehension. None treats the intensity and violent character of ethnic conflict as specially worthy of explanation. Horowitz suggests that attention needs to be paid to developing theory that links elite and mass concerns and answers the causes underlying the mass ethnic appeal. The role of apprehension and group psychology needs specification, as does the importance of symbolic controversies in ethnic conflict. Because "a bloody phenomenon cannot be explained by a bloodless theory."¹⁰³

1. 8. Ethnic Management Strategies

All the elements generally associated with ethnic conflict are present to a greater or lesser degree in majority of cases. Needless to say, not all elements are present in all cases: e.g., the problem of the unequal distribution of economic and political power; the issue of control over land and territory (the discourse of the "real owners of the country"); the conflict over language; the religious identification of the parties; the question of collective identity and self-esteem; the problem of boundary maintenance; the stereotyping of the adversary; the anxiety and fear of

¹⁰³Ibid., 140.

the 'other' generated by different perceptions of the issues at stake; the use and role of mobilising myths and symbols etc.

This tangible characterisation of ethnic conflict predicated upon language, religion, customs, economic inequity etc. is in fact too often superficial. What is fundamentally involved in such a conflict is the divergence of basic identity which manifests itself in the "us-them" syndrome. The ultimate answer to the question if a person is one of us or one of them, is seldom related to adherence to overt cultural elements.¹⁰⁴

The state can be regarded either as the neutral manager of public affairs, as in American pluralist doctrine, or as the instrument of a dominant group, as in Marxist and structuralist paradigm. In pluralistic theory, ethnic groups, like other organised interests, have access to government to promote their demands. Governments attempt to force the rules of the polity impartially and to accommodate competing demands from society. Because they enjoy access, ethnic groups are likely to use political means to impress their needs on the agencies of government; government, in turn, emphasises measures of accommodation, employing coercive measures only as a last resort.

¹⁰⁴This issue has been at the core of the Israeli governments' ongoing attempt to define a Jew. In politico-legal terms, the government may demand adherence to one of the denominations of Judaism as a test of Jewishness. But there are many self-proclaimed agnostics, atheists and converts to other faiths who are Jewish. Likewise, there are practising members of the Judaic faith who are not ethnically Jewish. Judaism has been an important element of Jewish nationalism, as Catholicism and Irish nationalism are related. But an individual stripped of the overt cultural attributes ascribed to his ethnic group still can maintain his fundamental identity as a member of that nation. "Cultural assimilation need not mean psychological assimilation". See Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" 46.

When the state represents and acts in the interests of a hegemonic (dominant) ethnic group, it may employ a set of policies ranging from assimilation involving nonrecognition or discrimination against subordinate groups to patterns of exclusion against minorities, denying their members equal access to economic opportunities and public services and consigning them to inferior social, cultural and political status. Such atrocious measures as enslavement, genocide and expulsion have been practised by governments against subordinate ethnic groups. States that enforce hegemonic control on behalf of one ethnic group are inclined to employ repressive measures against challenges to the ethnic *status quo* or to specific practices.

A review of some contemporary deeply divided societies shows a great diversity of modes of conflict regulation consisting of variations of partition, violence, domination and accommodation.¹⁰⁵ This wide range of alternatives suggest that unilateral or violent management of ethnic conflicts is not inescapable.

Coakley considers the range of possible ethnic management strategies within the context of mechanisms for procuring conformity between state boundaries and ethnic minorities. Drawing upon and qualifying the Rokkan-Urwin model which sees the tension between the hegemonic state dominated by an ethnic group and an ethnic minority

¹⁰⁵For example, Smooha and Hanf qualify the case of Turkey as a case of "stable domination" where Turkish numerical and political domination was consolidated through partial expulsion and mass killing of Armenian minority during the World War I. They argue that present-day Turkey has non-assimilating minorities, namely Kurds, Alavites and the Syrian Christians subject to pressures to assimilate. See Sammy Smooha and Theodof Hanf, "The Diverse Modes of Conflict in Deeply Divided Societies," in *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, ed., Anthony D. Smith, 29. Of course, this observation ignores other types of ethnic management strategies that are applied, to a great extent, successfully in the republican period.

within the framework of the centre-periphery relations, he classifies strategies for ethnic conflict resolution in terms of the following four dimensions: **I. Physical**: conflict between the dominant and minority ethnies for physical survival; **II. Territorial**: conflict between state boundaries and the frontiers of ethnic minority; **III. Cultural**: conflict between the culture (and especially language) institutions and symbols of the state and those of the ethnic minority; **IV. Political**: conflict between the objectives of the state and the ethnic group in terms of the overall programme for ethnic conflict resolution. The usefulness of this approach lies not in its capacity to explain but rather in its function of seeking to simplify and to identify uniformities in this complexity.¹⁰⁶

Coakley suggests eight ways and means of "ethnic management":

I. Indigeneization: It refers to involuntary state policies of cultivation of ethnic minorities in general. Most instances of this policy are to be found where multinational states are faced with serious problems of ethnic unrest, with certain groups demanding autonomy or independence. In these circumstances, the state may yield to more extreme demands by offering a degree of autonomy, but the consequences of such autonomy are undermined by the simultaneous imposition of autonomy on certain other groups where the demand for it is weak or non-existent. The regionalisation of Spain in post-Franco period where autonomy is conferred not only to the ethnically "sensitive" regions of the Basque Province or Catalonia but to seventeen regions countrywide, well exemplifies indigeneization approach.

II. Accommodation: In this strategy, the political centre may respond to the demands from the ethnic minority by changing its own

¹⁰⁶John Coakley, "The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Typology," *International Political Science Review*, 13:4(1992), 344-345.

structure to provide formal recognition of the ethnic diversity of the state. The location of power (the extent to which power remains concentrated in the centre rather than being devolved to the ethnic minority) and the domain in which concessions are made, political or cultural, are the determining factors, which produces the following not mutually exclusive or exhaustive typology:

	<u>Domain</u>	
	<u>Political</u>	<u>Cultural</u>
Location	Centralised	Consociation
of Power	Decentralised	Federalism
		Cultural Autonomy

A Typology of Accommodationist Ethnic Management Strategies.¹⁰⁷

III. Assimilation: This is the best-known and most widely practised of all ethnic management strategies. Expressions such as "one state, one nation, one language" is the motto of this strategy. In many parts of Europe there has been a powerful momentum towards the forced assimilation of ethnic minorities, typically by denying them access to political and cultural self-expression and by limiting the availability of educational facilities. The examples are abound. The strongly assimilative policies have been followed in many different contexts in France, Bulgaria and Romania in recent times.

The language in which assimilationist strategies are cloaked may sometimes appear particularly benevolent. Its advocates may argue that the withholding of recognition from groups within society is in the name of the principle of individual human equality, and it is true that

¹⁰⁷For the elaboration of the each of the four accommodationist strategy, see ibid., 347-349.

classic formulation of individual human rights of the eighteenth century, as embodied in many contemporary state constitutions, do not include the right to education through the medium of one's own language. But the refusal of the category of "group rights" in classical liberal theory in the name of universal individual rights is a major pitfall given the present state of the socio-political landscape, and there are serious theorising in order to meet this challenge.¹⁰⁸ "Non-recognition of ethnicity" may be included within the strategy of assimilation.¹⁰⁹

IV. Acculturation: Acculturation is a process of steady disappearance of cultural distinctiveness as a consequence of unforced assimilation. In many cases, this is the terminal stage of a process that in earlier stages had an explicitly assimilative form. In Ireland, for example, the Irish language continues to disappear despite a strong supportive official attitude, as it is the case with speakers of Gaelic and Welsh.¹¹⁰

V. Population Transfers: It is a sharper way of ensuring conformity between the boundaries of ethnic communities and states than waiting for assimilation to take its slow effect. There are several approaches to the redrawn of the ethnic frontier for its matching with the state boundary, all of them involving some kind of population transfer:

a) Expulsion: The expulsion of millions of Germans from various Central and East European states immediately after World War II is a case in point. The departure of some three million Germans from Czechoslovakia and of much larger number from Poland transformed the

¹⁰⁸Dyke, "The Individual, The State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory," 343-363.

¹⁰⁹Coakley, "The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Typology," 349.

¹¹⁰Ibid., 350.

ethnic structure of these countries and greatly reinforced the cultural supremacy of the dominant ethnic groups.

b) Exchange: In this variant, two or more states agree to "exchange" populations in such a way that each is rendered more ethnically homogeneous. Among examples of this involuntary process from the vantage point of the minorities in question, the Balkan states feature prominently, most notably in the 1920s when Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria engaged in population exchanges.

c) Settlement Policy: Especially in traditional states, rulers have been prepared to move populations from one area to another or to invite colonists from outside with a view to changing the ethnic balance by means of some kind of settlement policy. For example, the deliberate settlement of Russians in various non-Russian Republics of the former Soviet Union (most notably Estonia and Lithuania) caused fundamental changes in their ethnic structure.

d) Repatriation: It is a process that in many ways the reverse of the expulsion in that the ethnic minority moves allegedly not because it is unwelcome in its old home but because it is welcome in its new one. The mass migration of the Jews to Israel after 1948 is a case in point.¹¹¹

VI. Frontier Adjustment: In some cases an ethnic minority may be sufficiently strong or its external allies may be sufficiently powerful to secure the redrawing of state frontiers to provide either for the birth of a new state or for the transfer of the dissident ethnic minority to an adjacent state. There are many examples of successful separatist nationalism. The transfer of South Tyrol from Austria to Italy, or of Transylvania from Hungary to Romania after the First World War are two cases in point.¹¹²

¹¹¹Ibid., 351-352

¹¹²Ibid., 351.

VII. Genocide: This is the most brutal of all ethnic management devices. The most notorious example is the extermination of millions of Jews during the Second World War, a policy that left a permanent mark on the ethnic structure of Poland, Lithuania and other states.

VIII. Ethnic Suicide: This option is fundamentally irrational and has been retained by Coakley only to maintain logical consistency.¹¹³

In regard to the circumstances associated with the adoption of particular ethnic management strategies, Coakley distinguishes between characteristics of the subordinate ethnic community itself and certain characteristics of the state. The most significant features of the subordinate ethnic group appears to be: 1) the type of group in terms of the factors that distinguish it from the dominant group, the nature of differentiation being racial, linguistic, religious or cultural, and the depth of this differentiation; 2) the demographic characteristics of the group, including its relative and absolute size, its growth rate, and its settlement pattern; and 3) the group's location in any cultural division of labour. To these may be added two characteristics of the political system: 1) the state tradition in terms of the relationship between individual and group rights; and 2) the state's autonomy in the interstate system.¹¹⁴

¹¹³Ibid. Regarding the conflict eliminating or reducing strategies in ethnically divided societies, also see Vojislav Stanovic, "Problems and Options in Institutionalising Ethnic Relations," *International Political Science Review*, 13:4 (1992), 359-379; for the structural techniques and distributive policies regarding conflict regulation in ethnically divided societies see Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 563-680.

¹¹⁴Coakley, "The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Typology," 352-354.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE INTRODUCTION AND EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF NATION AND NATIONALISM IN THE OTTOMAN STATE

2.1. Contours of Ottoman Polity: Socio-Political Organisation

2.1.1. *Introduction*

Unlike modern “national” societies predominantly characterised by secular socio-economic identities, the contours of socio-political organisation in the Middle ages were moulded by ethnoreligious identity. An ontological approach to socio-political identification was basic to the organisation of polities as religious communities centred on the absolute loyalty to ruling dynasties conceived, in popular imagination, as the possessor of the whole populace. Ottoman polity was no exception to this general socio-political condition.

As a “traditional” polity, Ottoman Empire was modelled on the so-called “oriental maxim” prevailed in the near eastern state conception to which justice is the key. According to this concept of statecraft, “to control the state requires a large army. To support the troops require great wealth. To obtain this wealth, the people must be prosperous. For the people to be prosperous, the laws must be just. If any one of these is neglected, the state will collapse.”¹ As the cornerstone of this state

¹Halil İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600*, trans. (Great Britain: George Weidenfeld and Nicholson Ltd, 1973), 66.

understanding was to establish and maintain the power and authority of the sovereign, justice defined as the protection of subjects from abuses of the representatives of state, most important of which being illegal taxation, was the foundation of state. Ottoman *ghazi* tradition was a typical reflection of this.² Islamisation of this near-eastern state tradition did not cause any change in practical grounds. But in the official rhetoric, authority and power ceased to be an end in itself and were replaced by the realisation of the ideals that *şeriat* (the Islamic law) teaches.

Ottoman polity was vertically divided into two classes in Weberian sense in accordance with the near-eastern state conception: First, the *askerî* (ruling) class composed of *ilmiyye* (the learned), *kalemiyye* (bureaucrats) and *seyfiyye* (army), who did not pay any taxes. Second, *reaya* (flock) class, subdivided into farmers, merchants and artisans, was producers and hence tax-payers. The askeri class held political power and owed their very existence directly to the person of the sultan. To protect this division of the ruler and the ruled was the basis of *nizam* (order and balance).

This hierarchically arranged and pyramidal stratified polity of "orders" were characterised by non-equality and differentiation according to ethnoreligious identifications and politico-economical functions sanctified by the divine authority and held together by the temporal ruler and his administrative, military and judicial staff.³ Alongside the differentiation by economic functions as the *askerî* and *reaya* classes, there was another cross-cutting ethnoreligious line of social division predicated on the ontological approaches of human groupings before

²Ibid.

³Niyazi Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Canada: McGill University Press, 1964), 10.

Allah. This division too was dichotomical: Muslims conceived as a monolithic and amorphous community without any regard to ethnic differences and non-Muslims with a variety of ethnic and denominational differences were called *millets*.

The conclusion to be drawn from these two different lines of division—one was basically politico-economic and the other religious—is that Ottoman polity had a unique structure “designed” to attain the ideal of “*devlet-i ebed müddet*”—(eternal state) on the basis of justice and order which was nothing but to keep the ruler and the ruled as they are without any merger and articulation between and among them. As Berkes succinctly notes, traditionalism, i.e., the preservation of the established order as it was (*nizam*), prevention of any change or shift that may affect the balance among various communities and hence keeping them apart, the discouraging of vertical social mobility, the use of *kul* (slave) staff, who have no root in native society, for the sovereign’s service, and thus putting a demarcation line between the ruler and the ruled, and the maintenance of order and the distribution of rights according to values preached by moral and religious inventions were all the ruling principles underlying Ottoman view of polity.⁴

The main distinguishing mark of Ottoman polity from secular Turkey was that it was not a national but religious community. There were no distinct individual identities. All collective identifications were religious. There were Muslims, Jews, Christians, heretics and the like. Ethnic identities were never politicised and therefore were taken for granted. The ostensibly ethnic terms like *Turk*, *Rum* or *Franc* all had religious connotations: *Turk* meant “infidel” in the Christian European usage. *Rum* denoted Greek Orthodox Christians and *Franc* Latin, or

⁴Ibid., 11-13.

Western European Christians. Thus there were only two communities in the Ottoman polity: Muslims and non-Muslims.⁵

As Benedict Anderson aptly clarifies, there are two foci of loyalty in traditional societies: One is dynastic and the other religious. In the Ottoman polity the first and basic focus of loyalty was religious and oriented toward the Muslim community called *ümmet*. In fact, the basic unit of political organisation was the religious community. The next and more comprehensive allegiance was political and directed toward the ruling dynasty. The House of *Osman*, the ruling dynasty, throughout the centuries has firmly established its right to the legitimate rule and enjoyed the loyalties of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects alike.⁶ In their efforts to consolidate the Muslim community, the Ottomans always stressed religious instead of kinship ties. This instrumental use of Islam aimed at the legitimisation of the temporal rule of the sultans.⁷

According to Karpat, the Ottoman religious-based socio-political system took its visible shape during the reign of *Mehmed II* (1451-1481) and evolved over a long period of time in three distinct phases.⁸ During the period from 1413 to 1839, Ottomans "made the principles of ethnoreligious identity and community the foundation of the political organisation and the constitutional foundation for a state political system" which was a unique one. This socio-political system was called

⁵Ibid., 9.

⁶Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London:Oxford University Press, 1961), 324.

⁷Kemal Karpat, "Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East," in *Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East*, eds., Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 39.

⁸Ibid., 36.

the millet system. In the period from 1839 to 1865, the millet system, under various pressures both structural-conjunctural and internal as well as external, underwent a reorganisation. And in the final phase Ottoman state was transformed along territorial lines and was replaced by a national-secular state, Turkey.⁹ Thus the millet system ceased to exist. In order to better understand all these, we turn to a pre-modern form of socio-political organisation, that is, the *millet* system and its evolution over time.

2.1. 2. *The Millet System: A General Overview*

Social integration is an inevitable prerequisite of life in social sense, which is an inherent quality of human existence. Unlike from national societies integrated through basically either assimilation or plurality of cultural behavioural "codes", Ottoman policy of integration in pre-*Tanzimat* period reflected a "tacit social contract"¹⁰ between the ruler(s) and the ruled and was geographico-political in the sense that it involved unconditional loyalty to the ruling dynasty and the overall control of politico-religious groups by the state. It was not assimilationist in that it did not force the whole population to speak the same language, receive standardised and centralised education and follow the same way of life. On the contrary, *hierarchical differentiation* instead of *assimilationist equality* was basic to socio-political stratification. The unique institutional expression of this way of socio-political integration was the Ottoman millet system.¹¹

⁹Ibid., 36-37.

¹⁰See Şerif Mardin, "Freedom in an Ottoman Perspective," in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, eds., Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 26-27.

The way the Ottoman state governed the communities under its sovereignty along the religious or denominational lines is called the millet system. This system is a direct consequence of the organisation of communities on the basis of religious affiliations corresponding at the same time to civil laws. The Ottomans drew on both Islamic and Byzantine legacies as well as local traditions in developing the *millet system* as the main mechanism for regulating the relationship between the state and the governed communities, Muslims as well as non-Muslims.

As a Muslim state, successor to the tradition of the great Muslim empires, e.g., *Abbasids* and *Seljukis*, in the Ottoman Empire, membership to the ruling class was open to Sunni Muslims who possessed the “Ottoman way” called *âdâb*, i.e. the Ottoman elite culture. The large non-Muslim groups—Greek Orthodoxes, Armenian Christians and Jews were organised in formal millets. This offered a considerable degree of autonomy, which compensated for the absence of political rights and equal status. Other groups such as heterodox Muslims, were not formally recognised as millets but in practice lived under similar conditions.

In the Ottoman polity characterised by religious affiliation and solidarity, ethnic identities played a very marginal role.¹² An Ottoman subject conceived of himself and also conceived by his neighbours first as

¹¹See Bilal Eryılmaz, *Osmâni Devletinde Millet Sistemi* (İstanbul: Ağaç Yayıncılık, 1992), 75-76. For the difference between the Ottoman millet system and the socio-political organisation obtained in the West at the time, see Arnold Toynbee, *Türkiye: Bir Devletin Yeniden Doğuşu* (The Re-emergence of a State), trans. (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayıncılık, 1971), 43-48.

¹²Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich, “The Study of Ethnic Politics in the Middle East,” in *Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East*, eds., Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 5.

a Muslim, Greek Orthodox, Jew, Catholic or Protestant before he was a Turk, an Arab or a Greek or a Bulgar. This religious affiliation can not be preceded by the allegiance to Ottoman ruling dynasty, or sense of Ottoman citizenship. Accordingly, until the late nineteenth century, the terms "Arab" and "Turk" designated in most cases "Bedouin or Turkoman" as opposed to the sedentary population. Only at the turn of the last century, ethnic affiliation and solidarity became an important factor in the political life of Ottoman empire when nationalism—Turkish, Arab and various non-Muslim nationalisms—, appeared on the political scene.

The governing of such a heterogeneous empire as the Ottoman state in a time when religion was the identifying mark of personal and social existence was facilitated by the fact that each major religious group was also a community in civil laws. All Muslims defined as "millet-i hâkime" (the (ruling nation) as members of the same *ümmet* regardless of ethnic or denominational differences were subject to the Islamic law, şeriat. The non-Muslims were organised along various millets, which owned their own civil laws regulating personal status—marriage, divorce and property inheritance. This non-Muslim millets—basically various Christian sects and Jews—enjoyed a partial autonomy through which the clergymen which governed the millets, supervised not only religious and educational affairs of their community but also regulated the matters of personal status and even collected certain taxes to be sent to the central government. The millet chiefs as the civil head of their communities were directly responsible to the central authority in Istanbul. The subjects of the millets could establish contact with the central administration only through the millet organisation to which he/she is a member. The personal rather than territorial character of civil laws was extremely

functional in the creation of such a mosaic pattern as the millet system in which people from different religious affiliations lived side by side in the same state under the same sovereign.

A more focused description of the millet system requires a close look at the ethnic and religious composition of the Ottoman Empire. In the sixteenth century, there were Hungarians, Serbs, Croats, Romanians, Bulgarians, Albanians, Greeks and Turks in the European part of the Empire. In the Asian and African parts, there were Turks, Greeks, Lazes, Armenians, Kurds, Circassians, Arabs and Berbers, apart from other smaller groups. The empire exhibited a wide variety of languages and religious sects. When all Muslims considered together, they were in majority. The largest Christian church was Greek Orthodox followed by the Armenian Patriarchate. Jews were much less numerous and more scattered.¹³

Under the Ottoman sovereignty, there were the following millets: Greek Orthodox, Armenian Christians, Catholics, Jews and Protestants. In 1870, the Bulgars left the Greek Orthodox Church and established a separate Bulgarian Church recognised as a distinct millet. The same status had been applied to the Armenians converted into Catholic faith under the French influence in 1831. The reason Armenians were recognised as an independent millet was that they had a separate church and different religious faith in contrast to the Ortodoxes and Catholics. Finally, under the pressure of British and Prussian ambassadors to Istanbul, Protestants which numbered only fifty thousand was granted the millet status in 1850.¹⁴

¹³Roderick H. Davison, "The Turks in History" in Roderic H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923* (USA: University of Texas Press, 1990), 11.

The Ottoman millet system was based on the Islamic categorisation of human groupings as Muslims and non-Muslims.¹⁵ Christian and Jewish non-Muslims were classified as “the peoples of the Book” Non-Muslims who are permanent residents in a Muslim state were considered as people under the protection of Muslims (*ehl-i zimmet*) and called “reaya” in the Ottoman Empire. Although the term “reaya” had been used as a designation for all the subjects of the empire regardless of their religious affiliations, it referred to only non-Muslims later on.¹⁶

As a political and legal tie between state and persons,¹⁷ all Ottoman subjects were considered citizens who have different rights and obligations on the basis of their religious standing. This was because Muslims had the status of “host” and the non-Muslims that of “guest” Hence, their rights and obligations differed accordingly.

Unlike Muslims, non-Muslims did not have compulsory military obligation. They had their own laws and courts in relation to such private matters as family, marriage, divorce and property inheritance. Their life and properties are protected and guaranteed by the state. Except for some

¹⁴Eryılmaz, *Osmانlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi*, 46-47.

¹⁵For detailed description of this categorisation see Ahmet Özel, *Islam Hukukunda Ülke Kavramı: Dar’ül Islam, Dar’ül Harp* (The Concept of Territory in the Islamic Law: The Dominion of Islam and The Dominion of War) (İstanbul: Marifet Yayınları, 1988). Also for the status of non-Muslims in the Islamic law (*şeriat*) see Mümtaz’er Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılıkın Gelişimi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 62-63.

¹⁶Eryılmaz, *Osmانlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi*, 14.

¹⁷In the Ottoman-Muslim context, we can mention “individual” only in the sense of “person”. The “individual” of the Enlightenment is thoroughly alien to the Ottoman-Muslim thought. Also, one must remember that the classical Islamic law does not recognise “the concept of “legal entity”, an abstraction stemming from the mechanical conceptualisation of social relations developed by the Enlightenment thought.

offices of highest importance e.g., Grand Vizirate and chief of army, non-Muslims could take administrative responsibility, even become minister. They are autonomous in their communal affairs and educational organisation, and had complete religious freedom.

In return to these rights, non-Muslims had to pay a security tax called *cizye* (capitation tax). This is a kind of tax levied in exchange for the exemption of military service. The equivalent of Muslim *ösr* in zhimmis was a tax called *haraç* (poll-tax).

In regard to the way of clothing, non-Muslims could wear anything provided that they do not resemble the Muslims. They had to be different and had some restrictions in this regard. To some, this was not a requisite any more.

In addition to these obligations, they were obliged to obey the Muslim laws not contradicting their faith and to respect them. They were not prohibited from eating pork and drinking alcohol if their religion permits so.¹⁸

Given all this system of rights and obligations, a question puts itself: Were the Muslims the ruling and hence oppressive party with exclusive control of power in the Ottoman state? According to Karpat, this contention is thoroughly fictitious "deriving in part from Western ignorance of the Ottoman government system and in even greater part from Christian misrepresentations designed to excite the sympathy of the Europeans."¹⁹ It is true that the Ottoman state took its legitimacy from Islam and enforced the Islamic law partially, but it did not identify itself in direct way with Islam until the nineteenth century. The power ranks held exclusively by Muslims who committed themselves to a code of

¹⁸Eryılmaz, *Millet Sistemi*, 15-18.

¹⁹Karpat, "Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy," 44.

behaviour and way of life that the Anatolian Turkoman peasants called *Osmanli*. The ruling class was not closer to Muslims than to non-Muslims. The rulers were Muslim, but the Muslim reaya had little power in state apparatus. The identification of Ottoman state with Islam came only in the nineteenth century under the pressure of Western imperial intrusion.²⁰

2.1. 3. Historical Evolution of the Millet System

2.1.3.1. A Note On The Concept of Millet

The Arabic word *millet* is used in the Quran in the sense of religion. It refers to the religions of Jews and Christians (Quran; 2:120) as well as the true religion (2:128; 2:135). It never used to denote an ethnic or linguistic grouping. Rather, it expressed a religious community.²¹

In the Ottoman Empire, all non-Muslim communities such as Orthodox Christians, Armenians and the Jews, were considered a millet each. Plural form of millet (*milel*) was applied only to non-Muslims. Muslims regardless of ethnolinguistic differences were considered as only one millet. The secularisation of the term millet transcending religious affiliation came only in the second half of the nineteenth century; yet it remained only in the journalistic vocabulary without any extension in popular thinking.²²

The first use of the millet in the sense of the western concept of "nation" was by *Ibrahim Şinasi* (1824-71), a secular writer and journalist from the Young Ottoman generation.²³

²⁰Ibid., 45.

²¹Eryılmaz, *Millet Sistemi*, 11.

²²Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 329.

In the Ottoman Turkish many words could be found that can be equivalent of the word nation: Among these were *cins*, *kawim*, *ümmet*, *millet* and *ahali*. Ahmet Cevdet Pasha and Kanipashazâde Rifat Bey translated nation into Ottoman Turkish as *kawim*, while Ali Suavi translated the article of nation from Webster's Dictionary as *ümmet*. It reads as following: "a people gathered through being under the administration of his sovereign or government or being resident in a country. This people, composed of various kinds (*ecnas-i muhtelife*) is an *ümmet*." The purpose of Suavi by adopting such a definition was to call the Ottoman people a nation. "In political terms, the residents of the known country is called *ümmet-i Osmaniye*".²⁴ From this time on, the word ummet has taken root as the equivalent of nation.

According to Namık Kemal, the most outstanding figure of the Young Ottomans, millet "is a word referring to the state of a people with regard to the political allegiances",²⁵ while the term *ümmet* is used to express "the whole of the civilised community".²⁶ It seems that a confusion prevails regarding the usage of millet and *ümmet*. Yet, it is the

²³Şinasi was also made up the Ottoman-Turkish equivalents for such concepts as citizen's rights, freedom of expression, public opinion, liberal ideas, national consciousness, constitutional government, liberty and natural rights of the people. See Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey* 197- 198.

²⁴Ali Suavi, "Türk," *Muhbir*, 38 (12 June 1868); quoted by Türköne, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu*, 258.

²⁵Namık Kemal, "Herkesin Maksudu Bir Amma Rivayet Muhtelif" (The Purpose of All is the Same But Narratives are Different), *İbret*, (3 July, 1872); quoted by Türköne, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu* , 260.

²⁶Naınik Kemal, "Bazı Mülahaza-i Devlet ve Millet" (A Thought on State and Nation), *İbret*, (7 Şaban 1289) (13 October 1872); quoted by Türköne, ibid., 261. See also İhsan Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar" (Tanzimat and the New Ottomans), in *Tanzimat* (İstanbul:Maarif Vekaleti, 1940), 847, footnote no: 103.

word ümmet preferred to meet the sense of nation. Millet is used as a word denoting the religious community. The purpose of the Ottoman intellectuals, however, was to meet nation with millet. According to them, the main basis homogenising a community and providing it with the feeling of common interest and common past is the religious allegiance. The prestigious word in the vocabulary of these intellectuals was also the word millet. For these reasons, Ottoman intellectuals expressed the qualities homogeneising a community with the word millet. Ümmet is used as a secondary word used for the common political ties that are to be created. The transformation of the concept of the "Islamic millet" into "Turkish millet" in the late nineteenth century can be seen as a change in content, not in the focus of loyalty that the concept refers to.²⁷

The most important dictionary of the Ottoman Turkish, *Kamus-ı Türkî*, uses the words *din* and millet interchangeably and emphasises that the terms millet and ümmet are two different concepts. According to the article of millet in the *Kamus-ı Türkî*, it is wrong to use millet as the equivalent of *cins* (race) or *kawim* (ethnicity). Millet is the common name representing various races and ethnolinguistic groups belonging to the same religion, e.g., Islamic millet.²⁸ Unlike millet, ümmet is used to express different communities which may or may not embrace the same religion, and hence corresponding to the western concept of "nation", e.g., Turkish ümmet.²⁹ Another point of importance according to the

²⁷Türköne, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu*, 261.

²⁸Şemseddin Sami, *Kamus-ı Türkî*, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Tercüman, 1986), 881-882.

²⁹Ibid., 1420. Likewise, Ali Suavi, one of the leading members of the Young Ottomans, translates the word nation into Turkish as *ümmet*. See Türköne, Ibid., 258.

Kamus-ı Türkî is that the concept of the Islamic millet should be used instead of Islamic millets (*milel-i İslâmiye*) and Islamic ümmets in place of the Islamic ümmet.

As a consequence of the secularising efforts following the *Tanzimat* period (1839-1876), the concept of millet was secularised and replaced the word ümmet while keeping its meaning whereby the word millet took currency in the sense of ümmet and hence nation.

There is no equivalent of the Ottoman "millet" in western languages. Communities covered by the word millet lived in various parts of the empire and spoke different languages. The only point of convergence among them was their common religious and denominational affiliations.

Likewise, the concept of millet differs from the Church which denotes a separate identity apart from state, because Ottoman millets were part of the Ottoman politico-administrative structure and internal to it. The *millet* leaders were also state officials.³⁰

2.1.3. 2. The Establishment and Institutionalisation of the Millet System

The main pillar of the Ottoman statecraft was the importance attached to the realisation of justice. The mind behind this was the classical Islamic notion expressed by such administrators and wise men as *Nizam-ülmülk* and *Yusuf Has Hacip* that "government based on *kufr* (infidelity) can continue but government based on *zulm* (oppression) cannot."³¹ The practical manifestations of this ruling principle of the

³⁰Eryılmaz, *Millet Sistemi*, 13.

³¹See Nizamülmülk, *Siyasetname* (Political Letter) (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1981), 32.

Ottoman statecraft was extremely attractive to non-Muslims under religious oppression in the Balkan peninsula and led to the adoption of Ottoman rule by these communities without much hesitation and resistance as exemplified by the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1466.

Emerged as a ghazi state³², “intended not to destroy but to subdue the infidel world,”³³ the Ottomans treated non-Muslims in the frame of traditional Islamic practice in regard to the status of non-Muslims, but at the outset did not institutionalise them in the hierarchical structure of the administrative body of the state.

The structurisation of non-Muslims in the form of millets within the administrative hierarchy took place during the rule of the Mehmet II, the conqueror of Constantinople. After the conquest of Constantinople —the capital city of Byzantine Empire— in 1453, Mehmed II declared himself as the protector of his non-Muslim peoples and gave the people living in Galata a written pact, *ahdname*. The pact stated that they would enjoy full freedom of religion, not to be forced to become Muslim, their properties, children, women, slaves and ships be inviolable, have freedom of travel and commercial transactions, go on paying customs duties according to their old customary way, and elect someone from among themselves as their *kethüda* (chief of their communal affairs).³⁴

Mehmed II gave a fresh life to the waning Orthodox Church by having a new Patriarch elected in accord with the traditions of Orthodox Church and issued an imperial edict regulating its rights. According to

³²İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 3.

³³Ibid., 7.

³⁴Eryılmaz, *Millet Sistemi*, 19-20.

the edict, the Orthodox Christians would be autonomous in matters of private law. The Patriarch assumed the title of “chief of the Orthodox millet”, thus merged the religious and temporal authority in his office. The Patriarch considered as the official of the state and was given the title of “Ottoman pasha” whereby he was exalted in the bureaucratic ranks of the state. As the religious and administrative leader of all the Orthodoxes in the Empire, he had a say in the Ottoman *Divan-ı Hümayun*. Thus Mehmet II introduced a new dimension to the Muslim zhimmi law by incorporating the regulation of state-non-Muslim relations into the administrative structure through millet organisations.

The rights conferred to the Orthodox Christians were generalised to Armenians and Jews as well. These two communities were organised as autonomous millet organisations chiefs of which being responsible before the central administration in any of the matters regarding these communities.³⁵

2.1.3.3. Tanzimat Period: Breakdown of the Traditional Order

The nineteenth century was a century of continuos “reform” and pursuance of “balance politics” for the Ottoman Empire. The traditional Ottoman political system based on the groupings of ethnoreligious identifications through millet organisations under the central authority had undergone drastic changes. The most important dynamics of change was the introduction of the idea of nationalism into the Ottoman Empire and the adoption of this idea by the non-Muslim millets aspiring to be nations.

Apart from the short-lived weakening of the central authority and the move toward *de facto* decentralisation dictated by the local magnates

³⁵Ibid., 20-24.

(*a'yan*) to the new Sultan Mahmut II, which was epitomised in a written document called the *Sened-i İttifak* (Deed of Alliance)(1808), the transformation of the Ottoman domestic market into an open market for European goods and as a consequence of that, the breakdown of Ottoman handicraft industry, the rise of a new merchant and intellectual class among non-Muslims, and on top of these, the Western economic, political and military supremacy over the Ottoman state caused a drastic transformation in the identity of non-Muslims, particularly Christians. Especially, the 1821 Greek uprising, which broke the unity of the Orthodox millet and undermined the authority of the Patriarch, became a turning point both for the Ottoman government and the millet system itself. While Ottoman government from that time on held suspicions over the loyalty of its Christian subjects toward the state, the Christians were indoctrinated by the premises of the newly-born nationalist ideology.³⁶

As a matter of fact, the changes in the Ottoman socio-political system in the nineteenth century can be followed in the light of two developments: 1) Reform efforts initiated in the late eighteenth century and accelerated in the nineteenth century broke down the traditional foundations of Ottoman polity based on the notion of "balanced and just order" Under Mahmut II (1808-1837), the concepts of *şeriat* (Islamic law), *kanun* (law) and *adalet* (justice), three pillars of the traditional order, underwent transformation. The introduction of the policy of Muslim-non-Muslim equality and the recognition of a new source of legislation apart from Allah and the sultan, i.e., the newly established institutions like the *Divan-i Ahkam-i Adliye*, required a new conception of society.³⁷ Such measures and policies adopted for restructurisations as the

³⁶Karpat, "Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy," 46.

³⁷Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 94-95.

introduction of new bureaucratic institutions and legal codes as well as the emergence of the idea of an Ottoman state composed of diverse nationalities and religions together with the idea of the sultan not as the defender of the Muslims but as the temporal ruler of all Ottomans predicated on the concept of citizenship in the reform period initiated by Mahmut II became aborted due to the emergence of nationalism among the millet communities coming under the protection of the foreign powers.³⁸ The secular orientation of reform measures diluted the determining Islamic colour of the Ottoman polity and provoked the reaction of Muslims. 2) Another important development in this century was the colonisation of Muslim lands by the western powers, leading to the demands of help by the representatives of these colonised peoples from Istanbul, which formed a starting point for the development of the idea of Muslim unity, i.e., *ittihad-i Islam*.³⁹

1839 is a turning point in the history of Ottoman State. Political developments in the three decades preceding that date had created a pessimistic atmosphere for the future. In this hopeless situation, the promulgation of the *Tanzimat Edict* in 3 November, 1839 represented an effort toward "saving the country". In the Tanzimat period, the state and social life for the first time were opened to the Western influence through official policies.

In the main, men of Tanzimat followed two basic policies for "saving the country": the first was to develop reform programs in the military, administrative, legal, political, financial and educational fields. The second was to find a secure place within the European power balance

³⁸Ibid., 95.

³⁹For an evaluation of these two developments, see Türköne, *İslamcılığın Gelişimi*, 50-51.

as a check against the imminent Russian threat, which the Empire alone could not face. The inevitable price for providing the Ottoman state a place in the European inter-state system was the European intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman state by assuming the role of the protectors of the Christian subjects of the Empire. This overlapping of "reform" and "balance politics" policies led to a situation where the reform policies were imposed and dictated by the logic of "balance politics" instead of the inner and self-determined policy priorities of the Empire itself.⁴⁰

Besides the requirements of "reform" and "balance" policies, men of Tanzimat had two aims: 'terakki (progress) along the European lines and a focus of loyalty which would create socio-political cohesion out of ethno-national diversity, i.e., *ittihad* (union). Tanpinar, an eminent poet and writer of the new Turkish literature notes that the main ideological crystallisation in the Tanzimat period took place around the concept of *medeniyyet* (civilisation),⁴¹ summary expression of which being "union and progress" These two aims corresponded to the two main concerns of Ottoman statesmen: to progress , at whatever cost, and catch up with the standards of European civilisation and to meet the challenges of the national imperative in evolution in Europe. The demands of national self-determination preached by the doctrine of nationalism, which in Hans Kohn's terms, made the nineteenth century the "age of nationalism" The states composed of diverse ethno-linguistic groups were under the challenge or rather the threat of disintegration due to the

⁴⁰Ibid., 52.

⁴¹Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar, 19. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi (The 19th Century History of Turkish Literature) (Istanbul: Çağlayan Kitabevi, 1988), 152.

demands of certain ethnic groups to statehood. Greece and Serbia had already left the Empire. Hence, there was a pressing need for a new social cement which would renew the solidarity among the Empire's Muslim and non-Muslim ethnolinguistic groups. The Ottomanism of Tanzimat was developed as an urgent response to fill the vacuum emerged with the process of the disestablishment of the traditional millet system.⁴²

Tanzimat brought the notion of Muslim-non-Muslim equality (*müsâvat*). It substituted the equality of "*ehl-i Islam and millet-i saire*" (Muslim peoples and the others) instead of the millet system based on the ontological/religious stratification of peoples. The supremacy of the Muslim millet (*millet-i hâkime*) was ended.⁴³

Tanzimat in a sense was a new interpretation of the millet system. The traditional fabric of the millet system began to change with Tanzimat. Tanzimat developed the doctrine of *Osmannılık* (Ottomaness) in order to unite various ethnolinguistic communities and to create a feeling of common belonging, that is a "policy of diversity within unity" The doctrine of Ottomanism became the official policy of

⁴²Türköne, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu*, 52.

⁴³Fuat Pasha, one of the ruling trio of the Tanzimat period states that the Ottoman State was built on the four pillars: The Islamic millet, Turkish state, Ottoman Sultanate and the capital city of İstanbul. Now, with the end of the principle of Muslim supremacy, a radical rupture was achieved from the traditional Ottoman order, which the Ottoman chroniclers referred to as "*kanun-u kadim*" (old order). See Eryılmaz, *Millet Sistemi*, 67. In fact, with the ending of Islam as the mainstay of Ottoman sovereignty, the new regime prescribed by the Tanzimat reform created a vacuum of genuine social substratum for sovereignty. The new locus of the Ottoman sovereignty was not one sustained by a Turkish "nation" or by a social class. Thus the relocation of sovereignty became one of the major problem of the Tanzimat reformists and was finalised by the creation of a limited constitutional regime, which was the institutional embodiment of the politico-cultural doctrine of Ottomanism. See Berkes, *Development of secularism in Turkey*, 201-202.

the Empire sanctified by the legal texts and remained in force until the beginning of the First World War.⁴⁴

Islahat Fermani, the Reform Edict of 1856, was the second major move under the foreign pressure toward the achievement of Muslim-non-Muslim equality. This edict, prepared by a commission composed of the representatives of England, France, Austria and Ottoman state was in the main, covered the issues regarding the rights of non-Muslims. The edict was a kind of manifesto of the demands of non-Muslim peoples of the Empire for the national independence and the beginning of their constitutional development. It laid down the equality in law which meant also equality in duties.

With the new order of rights prescribed by the edict, Muslims and non-Muslims became equal in several fields of law. One of the requirements of the policy of equality was the conscription of the non-Muslims for the military service like Muslims. The obligation of military service could be done either through active service or by paying an exemption fee. In 1857 a traditional tax, *cizye* was abolished and instead a new tax called *bedel-i askeri* (a tax of exemption from the military service) was imposed. The requirement of the military service for non-Muslims caused various problems as to how to incorporate them into the structure of a thoroughly Muslim army. In practical terms, the active military service for non-Muslims was never realised though the *bedel-i askeri* later was removed and military service was made compulsory regardless

⁴⁴For example, in his opening speech of the first Ottoman Parliament, *Meclis-i Mebusan*, Abdulhamid II, defines the Ottomanism as such: "From now on, the whole of our subject, as the children of the fatherland all of whom living under the same laws would be named by the name of our reigning dynasty (Osmanli), which has been the little of our dynasty for 600 years and has recorded in the pages of history by the brilliant and glorious works" See Eryilmaz, *Millet Sistemi*, 76.

of religious and denominational differences following the promulgation of the *Second Meşrutiyet*.

The Reform edict after emphasising that the rights conferred to non-Muslims since the time of Mehmet II stressed the reorganisation of these rights in view of changing needs. For this purpose, all millets would establish commissions to propose new legislation to the *Bab-i Ali* (Sublime Porte). With the approval of the Sublime Port, new regulations for the non-Muslim communities would come into force.

These regulations were a kind of constitution for the non-Muslim communities. Many of the authorities held by the millet leaders until that time were transferred to the newly-formed councils. The millet leaders could no longer make decisions on their own. In this regard, the new regulations had a decentralising view of organising internal affairs of the communities.⁴⁵

2.1.3.4. Policy of Equality

Apart from reform measures, the period of Tanzimat was a period characterised by the question of **equality**. The establishment of equality between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Empire was vital for the preservation of the integrity of the state basically for two reasons: in the first place, the banner of the newly emerged separatist “nationalist” movements in the Empire was the absence of equality between the subjects of the Empire affiliated with different religions. For Tanzimat statesmen, to adopt a policy of equality so as to prevent the separatist tendencies and keep the integrity of the imperial ethnolinguistic mosaic intact was an “inevitable imperative”, which did not reflect a readily

⁴⁵For the new order of rights and duties brought about by the Reform Edict of 1856, see Eryılmaz, *ibid.*, 62-82.

chosen policy option On the other hand, as referred to above, Ottoman state had to balance the imminent Russian threat by securing for itself a place within European power balance. Yet there was a price charged for this: intervention of the European powers into the internal affairs of the Empire in such a way that all non-Muslim communities came under the protection of one of the European states. This was because the rising European power was considered to be the rising of Christian civilisation *visa vis* the “backward and regressive” Islamic civilisation. To put it shortly, the civilising (read colonising) mission was “white man’s burden”, to use Kipling’s famous phrase. Once the Ottoman Empire had to obtain its security through the help of European Christian states, it could no longer sustain the status of its Christian subjects as “Millet-i Mahkume”. This had to be changed.⁴⁶ Thus, the preservation of the unity of Empire required the European security umbrella which involved the reorganisation of the Ottoman socio-political formation, which in turn dictated its imperatives on the direction of the reform measures aiming at “modernisation”, that is to say, given the contextual conditions of the time, “westernisation”

The contextually inherent incompatibility between the ideals of “progress” and “union” resulting from the fact that the securing of the imperial union was bound to the European security umbrella caused deviations in the line of reforms, which was external to the native frame of Ottoman socio-political fabric. This “deviated frame of progress”, led the Tanzimat statesmen to transgress the limits of Şeriat as

⁴⁶The inescapable reasons leading the Tanzimat statesmen to adopt the policy of equality are elaborated in Türköne, *Islamcılığın Doğuşu*, 60-62; See also R.H. Davison, “Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century,” in Roderick H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923* (USA: University of Texas Press, 1990), 113-114.

understood at the time, which prescribed Muslim and non-Muslim differentiation in terms of rights and duties. The application of the policy of Muslim-non-Muslim equality was a clear reflection of this incompatibility. Thus secularisation came as a consequence of the practical imperatives rather than deliberately engineered reform programs. Therefore, we can say that the secular policies of Tanzimat was a direct corollary of the “question of equality”

The transformation of the penalty of death for the apostasy into the penalty of exile, the abolition of taxes of cizye and haraç, the consideration of the non-Muslims as deficient for witnessing, the denial of access for non-Muslims to the state offices and compartmentalisation of education according to religions were all abolished by the Reform Edict of 1856.⁴⁷ The translation of this edict in the popular imagery found its expression in the saying “*Artık, gavura gavur denmeyecek*” (infidels would no longer be called infidel)⁴⁸ and created a strong popular conservative reaction, the intellectual echo of which being found in the writings of New Ottomans and the codification of the *muamelat* (a subcategory of Islamic law) epitomised in the *Mecelle* prepared by a commission of Muslim jurists headed by Ahmet Cevdet Pasha.⁴⁹

Despite the secularising spirit of the Tanzimat’s reforms, all the secularising policies still were tried to be legitimised through *delils* (justifications) taken from the Islamic law. With the impacts of secularising reforms, the socio-political divisions overlapping with religious divisions in the old system (*kanun-ı kadim*) were gradually

⁴⁷Davison, “Turkish Attitudes,” 114.

⁴⁸Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi, *Tarih Musahabeleri* (History Conversations) (Ankara, 1985), 59.

⁴⁹Türköne, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu*, 64-65.

replaced by the political identity of Ottomanism as the common bondage of citizenship at least on official level, though in practice the ideal of Ottoman citizenship could not be achieved.⁵⁰

The policy of equality as the official doctrine of the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century became the cornerstone of “saving” the empire through a new egalitarian notion of citizenship based on Ottomanism (Osmanlilik) .involving patriotism (watan) equated to fatherland by shifting its native meaning from “home” or “native place” to *patrie*. With the declaration of Ottoman citizenship in the 1876 constitution, religious affiliations were relegated to the secondary position and political loyalty to the state and to the ruling dynasty became the main allegiance. Henceforth, there were only “imperial subjects”, “subjects of the sultanate” or “subjects of the Exalted State” conveying Ottoman citizenship defined individually regardless of ethno-linguistic and religious boundaries. Transition from the ethno-religious to the territorial concept of citizenship put a major blow to the demarcation lines among the traditional millets.⁵¹

According to Davison, despite the vehement efforts of Tanzimat statesmen, the policy of equality could not be successful and in the end, instead of the equality of Christians and Muslims within a heterogeneous empire based on “fusion” and “brotherhood”, “there emerged (...) the corporate equality of competing national sovereign states”⁵² due to the Ottoman-Turkish mind conditioned for the Muslim dominance over centuries and hence not ready to accept the notion of equality and the

⁵⁰For the secularising effects of the policy of equality see Türköne, *Ibid.*, 71-72.

⁵¹Davison, “Turkish Attitudes,” 118.

⁵²*Ibid.*, 128.

attitude of Christians in search of autonomy and sovereignty rather than equality.⁵³

As mentioned above, the changes introduced by the Reform Edict of 1856 brought about a reorganisation of the original three millets. The newly established councils of the Orthodox and Armenian millets now included a number of merchants and craftsmen elected by the respective communities and became functioning as the ruling councils, and the Patriarchs' authority was basically confined to the religious affairs. Because of the same identification of the Jews, the laymen and the Rabbi alike, the Jewish millet was not affected much by the new changes. While the number of millets recognised reached nine, the term millet now expressed narrowly defined confessional groups with ethnic overtones rather than broad ethnoreligious communities. Despite the increase in the number of millets in the second half of the nineteenth century, still the classical three millets, the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian and the Jewish millets were the main ones.⁵⁴

1876 Constitution was a major move toward redefinition of the millet system. The establishment of a representative council, *Meclis-i Umumi*, the determination of deputies through election rather than appointment, the definition of electoral districts of individual members as Ottoman-wide and the proportional representation of Muslims and non-Muslims alike as underscored in the new Constitution which called all Ottoman subjects "Osmanli" and prescribed to be equal before law and equally admissible to public offices and hence almost lifting the millet distinctions were the forerunners of the transition in the representation

⁵³Ibid., 127.

⁵⁴Karpat, "Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy," 46-47.

style from a corporate (millet) to a personal base.⁵⁵ The following provisions in the 1876 Constitution (Kanun-i Esasi) were clear indications of change in the traditional conception of “citizenship” “All individuals under Ottoman rule of whatever religion or sect without any distinction are called “Osmanli” (Article 8). “All Ottomans posses individual freedoms and are obliged not to transgress the rights of others” (Article 9). “All Ottomans except for religious and sectarian matters are equal in terms of their rights and duties (Article 17). The validity of these individual rights is inclusive of all Ottomans. The Ottoman peoples are considered equal in terms of political rights and therefore we can say that with these provisions the concept of “Osmanli” took conclusively the place of the dichotomy of “millet-i hakime” and “millet-i mahkume” (ruling and ruled millets). As the ultimate document of Ottomanism on official level, the Constitution reflected the aspirations and ideals of Tanzimat statesmen as the response to Western-originated challenge of nationalist wave of separatism.

Interestingly enough, the *Treaty of Lausanne* (24 July, 1923) did not abolish the millet system in a conclusive way. Instead it narrowed its comprehensiveness. The Treaty uses the term *ekalliyet* (minorities) instead of non-Muslim millets and excludes Muslims of whatever ethnic origin from *ekalliyet*. Ottoman millet system was based on the religious stratification, recognised religio-cultural differences, and ultimately based on the authority sanctified by Allah and Sultan. Although non-Muslims were in subordinated position vis a vis Muslims, the state was not heavily involved in daily life. Therefore, there was a large space of liberty

⁵⁵Roderic H. Davison, “The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire,” in Roderic H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923* (USA: University of Texas Press, 1990), 106.

in the circulation of values characterising daily life. The term *ekalliyet* however, denoted to a national frame of reference, whose basis of authority was people, and due to the homogenising-standardising nationalist teachings , those ethnoreligious groups that do not share the culture of the dominant nation were put into a subordinated position by the centralised, interfering state. In case of ethnicisation of culture, the position of subordination tends to be fixed. In the nationalist frame of reference, the demarcation line of social stratification is not religion but culture, which is secular at least in its origin This change from millet to *ekalliyet* brought about by the Lausanne Treaty was of more contextual than content-based in that the content of the more or less secular concept of *ekalliyet* was still characterised by the elements of religion and sect.⁵⁶

As Kedourie succinctly notes, the introduction of the principle of nationality in the Middle East in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries caused the destruction of the millet system and finally the transformation of millets into minorities in the Muslim polities, which cannot be considered to be an improvement in the standards of human condition.⁵⁷

The millet system was a non-assimilating system due to its character perpetuating the separate existences of different communities and therefore was instrumental in the arousal of nationalist feelings and aspirations in the non-Muslim millets. Almost all of these millets had established foreign political relations against the Ottoman state and were

⁵⁶Bilal Eryılmaz, “Osmanlı Millet Sistemi” (Ottoman Millet System), *Bilgi ve Hikmet* 5(Winter 1994), 97.

⁵⁷Elie Kedourie, “Ethnicity, Majority and Minority in the Middle East,” in *Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East*, eds., Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 26-27.

involved in constant struggle and rivalry among themselves. This state of affairs led the nationalist reformers to conclude that the millet system should be abolished and created feelings of animosity toward it. Inheriting this animosity, the Kemalist nationalist movement saw the abolishment of the millet system essential for securing the unity of the people of Anatolian peninsula and as a consequence of this nationalist aspiration, the nationalists insistently demanded its abolishment. They succeeded in doing so at least in formal terms.⁵⁸

2. 2. Nationalism and the Ottoman Empire

2.2.1. The Nationalist Challenge

The nationalist imperative in the nineteenth century created an enormous challenge to the dynastic political systems in that it proposed a new source of sovereignty and legitimacy for socio-political organisation. With its liberal-in the nineteenth century sense of the word-, secular character and popular basis of legitimacy, nationalism both as a doctrine and a political movement forced the restructuration of dynastically-ruled ethno-communal systems. Ottoman Empire, one of those states forced to meet the challenge of nationalism, in view of the imperatives of territoriality and ethnonationalism, adopted what is variously called “western, territorial nationalism” prescribing loyalty to fatherland and state in the form of Ottomanism based on the equality of its citizens regardless of ethno-religious differences on official level and incorporated this understanding into its first constitution dated 1876.

Yet, the inability of Ottoman Empire to accept and reconcile the nationalist principle was partly responsible for its ultimate disintegration.

⁵⁸For the abolishment of the millet system, see Toynbee, *Bir Devletin Yeniden Doğuşu*, 170-171.

This was because the official nationalism, i.e., Ottomanism could not succeed in creating social cohesion and loyalty to the state vis a vis the attractiveness of ethnolinguistic nationalism emphasising loyalty to the community one belongs rather than loyalty to the state. The nationalist temptation seemed irresistible, particularly for the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire that first felt the pull of national existence and urged for ethnic separatism by their European protectors.

The relatively easy adoption of ethnolinguistic nationalism by non-Muslim subjects of the empire was due to the fact that the basic unit of the millet system was ethno-religious community defined in larger, more universal terms. Ethnic nationalism corresponded to the communal basis of the millet system although it radically narrowed down the borders of ethno-religious community along the newly defined objective as well as subjective criteria of nationality paralleling such instinctive and non-national criteria of the past polities as faith and kinship.⁵⁹

Interestingly enough, one of the consequences of the intrusion of the nationalism into the Ottoman Empire as Kedourie strongly emphasised was the transformation of millets into minorities over time, due to the change in the basis of authority which prescribed popular rather than divine sovereignty.⁶⁰ In the case of Ottomans, nationalist ideology first spread among the non-Muslim millets and later to the ruling Muslim groups. As the Rum millet turned into the Greek nation, Ottomans too began to look at themselves as Turks, although not at mass but elite level. The ethnic mobilisation of Greeks, Serbians, Armenians and the Kurds nourished the separatist tendencies and in the end led to

⁵⁹Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 338.

⁶⁰Kedourie, "Ethnicity, Majority and Minority," 26-27.

the down fall of the Empire.⁶¹ There was no effective breakwater against the waves of the nationalist imperative.

2.2.2. Ethnic Nationalism and Ottoman Intellectuals: Search for a "National Society"

Nations are created through artificial constructions more than through the discovery of hidden and unknown greatness of the so-called "eternal national past" Both intellectuals and professionals are very influential in the formulation and dissemination of nationalist ideas and consciousness. This was so in the case of Ottoman intellectuals when they met with the idea of nation and nationalist movements in Europe. When assumed the mission of forming a nation, Ottoman intellectuals did so by way of both "invention" and "discovery" The nation ready for discovery was the "Islamic nation" and the nation to be created as the contextual imperative was the "Ottoman nation".⁶² The idea of Turkish nation would appear on the political scene in much later dates when the native forms of nationhood developed in Ottoman polity were articulated with the Western/modern idea of "nation" *The question of reconciliation of Islam and Turkism* which have affected in various tones the idea of Turkish nationalism up until now stems from the idea of the Islamic nation and one of the essential component of the present Turkish nationalism, *love of the country*, is again the remnant of the efforts to build up an Ottoman nation.

The efforts of Ottoman intellectuals to form a "nation" in the first place emanated from their need to acquire a firm foundation for democratic ideas they propounded. Beginning with the Young Ottomans,

⁶¹Ibid., 30.

⁶²Türköne, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu*, 252.

Ottoman intellectuals advocated national sovereignty against absolute monarchy. The following quotation from one of the dailies of the time makes clear their position which suggests national will instead of dynastic authority. "The happiness of humanity comes from the rights this age confer on him. The reason for this is that a person cannot change and transform the state of a nation according to his arbitrary will. The time when countries were considered the patrimony of the sovereigns has become part of the past; countries nowadays are considered to be the properties (*mülk*) of the nation. The age in which we live has reduced the highly exalted status of sovereigns to the level of the servants of the nation".⁶³ In other words, moral loyalty to nation replaced loyalty to the sovereign. This was a direct corollary of the principle of national self-determination substituted for communal and dynastic allegiances by the rising tide of nationalism in Europe.

The spread of nationalism, particularly ethnic nationalism became an imminent threat for multi-ethnic imperial states, such Russia, Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire. The transition from dynastic to national allegiance removed the basis of political legitimacy in this highly heterogeneous, multi-ethnic empires. Therefore, in order to cope with the increasing danger of nationalism, the imperial states resorted to the military measures on the one hand and tried instinctively to develop an imperial ideology, on the other. Thus, in Russia, Austria-Hungary and Ottoman states, ideologies to hold different ethno-linguistic communities together were formulated. The striking point in this development was that the efforts of forming imperial ideologies were gone hand in hand with the nationalism of the ruling ethnic group. Such nationalisms were

⁶³M. Kaya Bilgegil, *Yakınçağ Türk Kültür ve Edebiyatı Üzerine Araştırmalar I: Yeni Osmanlılar* (Studies on the Recent Turkish Culture and Literature I: New Ottomans) (Ankara, 1976), 112.

at times intermixed with religious elements. Russia depended on the Orthodox Church in proposing Slav nationalism while Austrians got refuge in Catholic Church against German nationalism. With similar motives, Ottoman intellectuals while trying to create an imperial ideology (Ottomanism) did so with parallel efforts of formulating Islamism addressing the core ruling group(s).⁶⁴

Ottoman intellectual and bureaucratic elites were in need of both establishing a base for their democratic demands like popular sovereignty, constitutionalism, elections, and parliamentarism (*hakimiyet-i milliye, meşrutiyet, biat and şura*) and creating an ideal of nation by way of forming a nationalist ideology. The things looked for was to keep diverse ethnic communities of the Empire together from the viewpoint of “political fraternity” (*uhuvvet-i siyasiyye*). As a result of this pressing need, Ottoman intellectuals turned the policies of ethnic groups living in harmony (*imtizac-i akvam*) and unity (*ittihad-i anasır*), devised at political level by the Tanzimat bureaucrat-politicians, into a nationalist ideology. Nevertheless, the idea of creating an Ottoman nation required difficult and distressing efforts. Against this, the ideal of Islamic fraternity (*uhuvvet-i İslamiyye*), which assured the political fraternity at the past, had a challenging appeal for the Ottoman intellectuals. Therefore, when they tried to develop the idea of nation and an ideology of nationalism, they tried to do both.

Before dwelling upon the way the Ottoman and Islamic nationalisms were developed, it must be noted that Ottoman intellectuals refused the ethnic nationalism of the nineteenth century Europe in a

⁶⁴Türköne, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu*, 254.

radical way and considered this type of nationalism, which was based on race, language or culture in various ways, unsuitable for their polity.⁶⁵

2. 3. Search for a Nationalist Reorganisation of the Ottoman Empire

2.3.1. *İttihad-i Osmanî: Ottoman Patriotism vs Ethnic Nationalism*

Ottomanism was a political and ideological movement aiming at preventing various secessionist independence movements from the empire which had become the major preoccupation of Ottoman statesmen particularly after the arrival of the impacts of the French Revolution in the empire in the form of nationalism through the creation of the notion of Ottomanness as an umbrella concept superseding variety of ethnic nationalisms.

As discussed before, two main factors created major difficulties in the maintenance of the millet system: In the first place, spread of nationalism in the Balkan peninsula of the Empire led to the successful

⁶⁵For example, Namık Kemal refuses ethnic nationalism (cins ittihadı) by erecting Islam against it. "The Fatherland does not consist of imaginary lines drawn on a map by the sword of conqueror or the pen of a scribe. It is a sacred idea, sprung from the union of many lefty sentiments, such as nation, freedom, welfare, brotherhood, property, sovereignty, respect for ancestors, love of family, memory of youth..." Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 332. In the same way, Ali Suavi rejects ethnic nationalism from the Islamic point of view. According to him, Europeans are mistaken in their comparison of the East (*Şark*) with the West (*Garb*):

"It must be known that there is big difference between the East and the West regarding this issue. In Europe, there is a cause of ethnicity (cinslik davası). For instance, a French cannot be a minister in British government. Likewise, an Algerian Arab cannot acquire French citizenship. Now, in the East, there is no cause of ethnicity." The evidences are Ottoman viziers of Croat, French or Albanian origins. Thus adds Suavi, "A Turkish nation emerged but not paying homage to the cause of ethnicity. It took into its service those who fit for office without any regard to their ethnic origin", and concludes: "Yet, there is the cause of unity instead of the cause of ethnicity in the East. That is, what prevails is not Turkishness but Islam." See Ali Suavi, "Türk," *Muhbir*, 38(12 June 1868); quoted by Türköne, *ibid.*, 267.

Greek revolt (1821-1829) and secession which triggered and inspired other ethnic nationalisms. Secondly, the centralising measures of Tanzimat administrations caused great troubles and led some of the ethno-communal groups accustomed to the regime of partial autonomy and non-intervention by the state to enter into opposition against the Ottoman centre.⁶⁶ Added to this was the general Ottoman weakness and inability to cope with external as well as internal challenges.

It was in this context that Ottomanism as a supra-national identity aiming at transformation of ethnonational identities into citizenship came into existence. The underlying motives of the “project” of Ottomanism was to create an Ottoman individual (*Osmancı ferdi*). The most solid remedy prescribed for the coexistence of diverse nationalities within the same polity was “reconciliation.”

As a project of political engineering, Ottomanism was among one of the first political doctrines. It had two premises. One was loyalty to the sultan, which founded its tidy formulation in Ahmed Mithat’s, one of the important writers of the late nineteenth century, book *Üss-i İnkilap* (Basis of Transformation). This understanding considers Ottomanism as political fraternity.⁶⁷ The second and more mobilising constitutive element of Ottomanism was the ideal of *watan* (patriotism). The word “watan” is a term put into Turkish political vocabulary exclusively by Ottomanism.

Essentially, Ottomanism was built on the ideal of *watan*. The following lines from one of the dailies of the New Ottomans, *İttihad*,

⁶⁶See Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Osmanlıcılık” (Ottomanism)*Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 5 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 1390 and Türköne, ibid., 263.

⁶⁷Tanpınar, 19. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi, 153.

clearly exemplify this “Every person inside this community, whatever his religion be, is obliged to love and protect his country.”⁶⁸ Along the same lines, *Inkilap*, another Young Ottoman paper, describes the idea of Ottoman nation as follows: “This watan is a bloody inheritance from our ancestors to us. And its every piece has been watered with their blood. It is this country that is our manifest property and whoever resident in this land and fulfil his duties is our compatriots, brothers”.⁶⁹ The aim is to establish the unity of diverse nationalities. Thus, the notion of being the children of the fatherland is defined as a tie making Muslims and Christians brother. As Lewis notes, the Ottomanist idea of watan resembles the territorial nationalisms prevailing in Britain and France which refers to the residence of the common lands ruled by the common sovereign.⁷⁰ With its new meaning, the word watan corresponded to the French word patrie. i.e., fatherland. Inspired by the French patriotism, Ottoman ideal of watan is an accultural element received from the west. In the Ottoman-Muslim tradition, there was no usage of watan in the sense of patrie. In the classical Arab-Ottoman usage watan meant the place of birth or residence. It might refer to a country, a province, a town or a village without having any political significance.⁷¹ In its old usage, it

⁶⁸Quoted by Bilgegil, *Yakın Çağ Türk Kültür ve Edebiyatı Üzerine Araştırmalar I*, 121.

⁶⁹Ibid., 190.

⁷⁰Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 328.

⁷¹Ibid., 329. For the birth of the concept of watan and the shifts in its meaning and the present usage of it as a detailed coverage of the history of the word watan in the Muslim and Western worlds see Bernard Lewis, “Watan,” in *The Impact of Western Nationalisms* eds., Jehuda Reinharz and George L. Mosse (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 169-179.

essentially meant home. With its new usage however, it came to mean the whole of political geography, that is fatherland.

By the mid-nineteenth century, watan in this new sense was in common use in the Turkish press. Of course, given the intermix of Ottomanism and Islamism in the Young Ottoman thought, the borders of watan was defined in Islamic terms.⁷²

Ironically, the most comprehensive and authoritative embodiment of the policy of Ottomanism is developed by the radical critics of the Tanzimat regime, the initiator of the policy, the so-called Young Ottomans. The Young Ottoman movement emerged as a spontaneous opposition to the indifferent and somewhat arbitrary rule of the sultan *Abdulaziz* (1861-1876) and had as its aim the general reformation of the socio-political system along representative, constitutionalist, patriotic and Islamic lines. Funded by the Egyptian prince *Mustafa Fazil Pasha*, they demanded the acceptance of the constitutional monarchy. The distribution of a pamphlet authored by Pasha and its appearance on the newspaper *Tasvir-i Efkar* which requested the promulgation of the constitutional monarchy in an highly respectful mode of presentation led the leading figures of the Young Ottoman thought, Ziya Pasha and Namik Kemal to flee Paris in 17 May, 1867. With the joining of Ali Suavi to this group of thinkers, they published first the newspaper *Muhbir* in London and later *Hürriyet* on behalf of the Young Ottoman Society. Young Ottomans in Europe were called Young Turks.⁷³

⁷²For example, for Namık Kemal's views on watan see Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 330-331.

⁷³Ahmet Bedevî Kuran, *Inkilâp Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler* (Our Renovation History and Young Turks) (İstanbul:Tan Matbaası,1945), 10-12. With regard to the appellation "Young Turk", İhsan Sungu notes the following: "It is understood that the title Jeune-Turk has been adopted through the imitation of the titles of certain secret societies formed by

Young Ottoman movement is the first revolutionary-democratic intellectual movement of the history of the Ottoman reformation. The roots of many argumentations characterising the present-day political scene go back to the Young Ottomans. Yet, Young Ottoman thought is far from being homogeneous and coherent. The inexperiences of Young Ottomans, political intrigues in which they involved and the fact that they were first in advocating those ideas explain, to a certain extent, the incoherences and contradictions found in the Young Ottoman thought.⁷⁴ This is why various brands of thought can be discerned in the persons of Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi or Kâni Paşazade Rıfat Bey.

Despite this, we can identify certain common characteristics which make the appellation Young Ottoman thought correct. Advocacy of representative government⁷⁵ and freedom is the primary one. The second characteristic is the development of Ottoman-Islamic patriotism. The main question of Young Ottomans was the same with that of Tanzimat statesmen: how to save the Ottoman state? Reforms and the creation of a horizontal allegiance devoted to the sovereign and state based on the principle of political fraternity and equality were their common denominators. Nevertheless, they radically differed in terms of what will constitute the basis of political fraternity. Instead of monarchy which the bureaucrats of the Sublime Port espoused, Young Ottomans

some extremists in politics and literature such as *Jeune-Franc* in France, *Jeune-Italie* in Italy and *Jeune-Allemagne* in Germany" See İhsan Sungu, "Tanzimat ve Yeni Osmanlılar" (*Tanzimat* and the New Ottomans), in *Tanzimat* (İstanbul: Maarif Vekaleti, 1940), 777.

⁷⁴Türköne, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu* , 97-99.

⁷⁵They supported the doctrine of popular sovereignty and national assembly (*Meclis-i Şura-i Ümmet*). See Davison, "The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire," 105.

proposed the ideas of Ottoman and Islamic nations as the foci of new popular allegiance. The reason for the advocacy of both Ottomanism and Islamism was to make use of the solidifying power of the nationalist movements epitomised in the successful national unification processes in Italy and Germany. Thus apart from the idea of popular sovereignty, Young Ottomans put special emphasis on this co-operative spirit generated by the nationalist zeal.⁷⁶

Ottoman constitutionalism aimed at preventing secessions from the empire on the basis of absolute equality among the Ottoman subjects within a parliamentary structure rather than the representation of people and the limitation of governmental power. Yet the outcomes of the policy of equality was a matter of argumentation among intellectuals: Could the policy of equality become successful in regaining the allegiance of the Ottoman subjects holding separatist tendencies or provide a better environment for such tendencies?

In fact, in the final analysis, only the dominant ethnic group, Turks, adopted Ottomanism and postponed their nationalism(s) for the salvation of the state. The Constitution of 1876 is the peak of the Ottoman nationalism. From 1878 on, however, Ottomanism was relegated to a secondary position by the Sultan *Abdulhamid II*(1876-1909)'s policy of *ittihad-i Islam* (Union of Muslim Peoples)). Ottomanism was the mainstay of Young Turk opposition against Abdulhamid II rule at home and abroad. Nevertheless, the Christian subjects opted for separation rather than citizenship under the impact of ethnic nationalism. Ottomanism as a supra-national identity remained only a political myth for them. They considered it as a misleading effort by the state against their ethno-national identity. In contrast to Islam, Ottomanism was not a

⁷⁶Ibid., 97.

very meaningful bond for non-Turk Muslim subjects. The end result was only a story of failure. Therefore, Ottoman patriotism was easily defeated by ethnic nationalism.⁷⁷

2.3.2. *İttihad-i Islam: The Ottoman-Muslim Nation*

As an expression of gaining the old supremacy of Muslims in the past order, Islamism or the policy of Islamic unity (*İttihad-i Islam*) emerged as a reaction to the Ottomanism's policy of equality toward the end of 1860s. Yet, because of the practical political necessities backing and justifying Ottomanism, it was not an easy thing to challenge it. The appeal of an "imaginary" force uniting 250 million Muslim people to the Ottoman state however, was irresistible for the Ottoman intellectuals. The dilemma was this: Ottomanism was inevitable for the preservation of the political status quo while Islamism meant "new horizons". Thus a dual discourse imposed itself on the thinking of Ottoman intellectuals and caused the transformation of Ottomanism along the Islamic precepts, i.e., the Islamic justification of Ottomanism.⁷⁸

Ottoman intellectuals looked at the Islamic community as a modern nation. Islam for them was the starting point both for the justification of their democratising demands and as a national ideal for the restructurisation of the Ottoman state. While nationalism developed as a secular ideology in the West, religion (Islam) was turned into a nationalist ideology by the Ottoman intellectuals, a process which can be explained by the fact that Ottoman polity did not experience a radical philosophical rupture from the old weltanschauung like the Enlightenment thought in Europe. The early period of Islam, i.e., the

⁷⁷Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 333.

⁷⁸Türköne, *İslamcılığın Doğuşu* , 238-240.

period of the Prophet and the four caliphs functioned as the underlying point of reference in reception of western institutions considered as things that can be separated from their original socio-political contexts and re-erected in a new "soil" without much difficulty. In this process, western secular institutions, by reference to not historical but original Islam, could be easily justified, which compensated for the lack of the tradition of philosophical thinking in the Ottoman Empire. Thus Ottoman intellectuals found in Islam the social basis they looked for and took the advantage of the Islamic solidarity which deeply rooted in Ottoman polity.⁷⁹ Therefore, western type of nationalism was not suitable for the Young Ottomans because they needed a more comprehensive ideology than Ottomanism, which was Islam. At least in the Durkheimian sense of forming social cohesion, Islamic imperative was accepted. When they were in Europe, the Young Ottomans faced with nationalist and liberal democratic movements and were in contact with republicans, liberal-nationalists and socialists. Out of this ideological circle, they only selected two elements: the ideas of democracy and progress.⁸⁰ Apart from being the justifying source for the question of social identity and ideal of liberty, Islam was the only force of social cohesion which had a popular basis. The remaining task was to elaborate a theory of political struggle founded on *ittihad-i Islam*.

The first article using the term "*ittihad-i Islam*" was appeared in the newspaper *Hürriyet*, in 10 May, 1869. According to this article, 1) the only way to prevent the foreign domination over Muslims is unity (*ittihad*). The centre of this unity is the Ottoman state; 2) This unity could be achieved through a popular movement as Italians did in their build-up

⁷⁹Ibid., 267-269.

⁸⁰Ibid., 89.

of national unity; 3) The precondition for such a unity to come into existence is the dissolution of the autocratic rule and the establishment of constitutionalism based on popular sovereignty. Only then, the Ottoman state could become the centre of unity.⁸¹

The turning point in the idea of *ittihad-i Islam* is the article by Ahmed Mithat published in *Basiret*, 9 April 1872 (29 Muharrem 1289) titled “*Devlet-i Aliyye ve Avusturya*” (Ottoman State and Austria). A vivid debate around the idea of *ittihad-i Islam* followed this article between *İbret*, *Hakaik’ül Vekayi*, *Hadika*, *Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis*, *Devir* and *Bedir* newspapers. Mithat sees a balancing power in the idea of *ittihad-i Islam* against pan-slavism of Russia, hence a security valve for the Ottoman Empire against this “eternal” threat. The article had an important drawback, the naive idea that Europe as a whole would support such a project. The author’s view of European landscape was limited to Russia and Austria ignoring France, Holland and Britain.⁸²

Ittihad-i Islam was immediately turned into a cause of Muslim enlightenment for progress and received a warm welcome and a very strong support from Muslim public opinion and hence gained a mobilising mission for reaching modernity. In Namık Kemal, the leading spokesman of the Young Ottomans, the political and educational causes were merged and constitutionalism as well as educational mobilisation were brought together as the two sides of the same coin.⁸³

The use of Islam to develop a culturally homogeneous Muslim community having a religious identity superseding ethno-linguistic

⁸¹Ibid., 199-207.

⁸²Ibid., 214-217.

⁸³Ibid., 220-225.

loyalties turned the Ottoman state into a predominantly Muslim state given the mass migrations to the Ottoman state and the formation of **new** nations in the Balkan peninsula in the second half of the nineteenth century. The new Ottoman Muslim state was a territorial state characterised by the bonds of Islamic solidarity.

The shift of individual allegiance from the sultan to the impersonal national Muslim state and the deep Islamic revival experienced following the activities of revitalised Sufi orders in the second half of the nineteenth century, more particularly Nakşibendis, were coupled with the redefinition of the position of the non-Muslims. The autonomous millet communities now had become minority groups (*ekalliyet*).⁸⁴ The extent of secularisation was getting increasingly enlarged.

Accordingly, the adoption of the policy of *ittihad-i Islam* as a political ideal under Abdulhamid II reflected itself in the official policies in education, administration and finance. The Caliphate assumed a new political vitality and the new Ottoman Muslim state became the ideological focus of recourse for Muslims in terms of socio-political power vis a vis the Christian Europe.

This political undertaking precipitated by the European world domination resulted in the European counterpart of nation-state in formal terms. While Turkish became the official language of the new state in politico-cultural sense, Islam underlined the main contours of state policies inside as well as outside.⁸⁵

⁸⁴Karpat, "Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy," 48-49.

⁸⁵Ibid., 50-51.

2. 3. 3. Turkish Nation: An Artificial Construct

Ottoman intellectuals engineered several projects to meet the challenges of the new socio-political organisation in making imposed by the inner dynamics of industrial society, that is nation-state. This politico-engineering projects formed a trio: first the policy of *ittihad-i Osmanî*, then *ittihad-i Islam*, and finally *ittihad-i Etrak* or Turkish nationalism. The delay in Turkish nationalism in official terms was due to the fact that Turks were the core element of the Empire and felt responsibility for the preservation of the integrity of the Empire. When Turkish nationalism received official recognition not only policywise but also in overt political rhetoric, Ottoman state had lost almost all its "foreign" possessions including the Arabian peninsula. This does not mean that the Turkish nationalism imposed itself just as a political inevitability. Rather it was a consciously made political choice which in fact played a role in the arousal of Arab nationalism and the Arab nationalist uprising that occurred in 1916 during the World War I. The persecution of Arab people in Syria-Palestine region by the famous Cemal Pasha of *İttihat* and *Terakki* is a case in point.⁸⁶

The spread of nationalism from Europe to the Ottoman Empire found a ready acceptance in the non-Muslim communities but did not remain limited to them. Muslim communities too produced their nationalist elites and nationalist movements asserted their demands in socio-political terms. Albanian, Arab and Turkish nationalisms took different directions, all in the final analysis detrimental for the existence

⁸⁶The local Arab people called Cemal Pasha "*Cemal-i Haccac*", by forging a parallel between him and the famous Umeyyed governor "*Haccac-i zalm*" (the oppressor Haccac). For the oppressive measures of SUP in Arab provinces during the First World War , see Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, *Ziya Gökalp'in Tenkidi* (The Criticism of Ziya Gökalp) (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1989), 85.

of the Ottoman state. Although Turkish nationalism came later due to the fact that Turks—meaning Turkish political elites—were the main founding element of the state, it expressed itself as an alternative to the Ottoman and Islamic nationalism.

Turkish nationalism found its eloquent and systematic expression, especially in the period following the promulgation of the Second Meşrutiyet (1908), in Turkism.⁸⁷ Before going into the constitution of Ottoman-Turkish identity, a note on the concepts of “Turk” and “Turkey” would be useful.

The first use of the word “Turk” can be found in the *Orhun inscriptions* near lake Baykal. But, it was not yet clear whether the word referred to one tribe or a group of tribes. When the Muslim Arabs came into contact with this tribal groups, they called them “Turks” The desperation of the word *Turk* as a collective name can be brought back to the eighth century A.D.. This designation, of course, was primarily linguistic.⁸⁸

In the Ottoman times, the word Turk was used only as a tribal name and term of contempt. It referred to the nomads or peasants of Anatolia

⁸⁷Hanioğlu, “Türkçülük” (Turkism), in *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 5 (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 1394.

⁸⁸ Davison, “The Turks in History,” 1. It is well-known that the famous Arab thinker el-Cahiz wrote a book titled “*Fazailü'l-Etrak*” (Virtues of Turks) in the 9th century. Lewis too agrees with the view that the generalised use of the word Turk as a collective name for a whole group was born with Islam. This is why the term Turk never applied to non-Muslim Turks like Christian Gagawuz or the Christian and Jewish citizens of the present-day Turkey. See Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 8. Another interesting indication of the Islamicity of the name Turk is its interchangeable use with the word Islam particularly in the Balkan Peninsula and in the pre-Enlightenment European usage. For instance, Serbs still consider Bosnian Muslims as “Turk” See Erol Güngör, *İslamın Bugünkü Meseleleri* (Current Problems of Islam) (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 1983), 182-183 and 243.

and had the connotation of “rude and ignorant” A dialogue in the novel *Yaban* exhibits the tribal sense of the Turk in popular usage even during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922). The enemy aircrafts are flying over a village near the city of Eskişehir. The villagers are against Mustafa Kemal and his supporters in the war with the enemy. The main character of the novel, *Ahmet Celal*, talks to Bekir Çavuş before the enemy forces came to the village:

Bekir Çavuş:

- I know my sir (*bey*), you are also from them(supporters of Mustafa Kemal)but...
- Who are they?
- Those sided with Mustafa Kemal...
- How can one simultaneously be a Turk and not side with Mustafa Kemal?
- My sir, we are not Turk.
- Well, who are you?
- Thanks to Allah, we are Muslim... Those whom you talk about live in Haymana.⁸⁹

Those who lived in Haymana were *Yürüks* (Turcomans).

The first use of the word Turk as a national designation was by the nationalist poet Mehmet Emin in his *Türkçe Şiirler* (Turkish Poems) published during the Greco-Ottoman war of 1897. The poet proudly

⁸⁹Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Yaban* (The Stranger), 25th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989), 181. The popular perception of “Turk” as a pejorative word can be identified in the following dialogue between an Ottoman commander (Şevket Süreyya himself) and his soldiers during the World War I in the Caucasian front: The commander, in one of his lectures to the soldiers composed of Anatolian peasants asked them: “To which nation do we belong?” Every body voiced a different opinion. Then the commander tried to confirm: “Are we all not Turk?” The soldiers immediately replied: “God forbid!” This peasant-soldiers, according to Aydemir, considered Turkishness as being a person of loose morals and therefore rejected it. See Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam* (The Man Looking for Water) (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1979), 103-104. Ottoman historiographies too refers to those tribes called Turk as “*Etrak-i nâpâk*” (Filthy Turks) and “*Etrak-i bî idrak*” (Dull-witted Turks). To an Ottoman élite a Turk was “an uneducated, rather boorish and peasant-like fellow who spoke common Turkish and was illiterate.” See Davison, “The Turks in History,” 15.

declare himself a Turk: "Ben bir Türküm, dinim cinsim uludur" (I am a Turk, my faith and my race are mighty). Thus, Turkishness was considered as a source of pride and adopted by Turkists as a collective national designation for Turkish-speaking Ottoman Muslims.⁹⁰

As to the name Turkey, it has been given by the Europeans to Turkish-speaking Anatolia since its conquest in the eleventh century by the Seljuks.⁹¹ In the Ottoman writings however, it is not used until the middle of the nineteenth century. The name "Turkey" is a sheer European term used by European Christians to describe Turkish speaking Anatolia which the Ottomans called *Diyar-i Rum* (the land of Rum). The Young Ottomans coined the word *Turkistan*—a Persian word meaning the "land of Turks". But because this term was appropriated for the Central Asia before, it was replaced by *Türkiye*,— the adaptation of the European name Turkey—which in 1923 gained official recognition.⁹² In fact, 1921 Constitution already called the new state "Turkey" for the first time. As a result, before the promulgation of the Republic, the name Turkey received official recognition.

Having identified the historical evolution of the terms Turk and Turkey, now we may attempt to acquire an insight into the formation of the Ottoman-Turkish identity.

The changes brought about by the introduction of Turks into Islam was profound. The whole communal imagery was up side-down. Almost every aspect of social life changed while personal identities totally turned into religio-communal identity. The fusion of Turkish tribal identity

⁹⁰Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 337.

⁹¹Ibid., 1.

⁹²Ibid., 326-327.

with Islam had no parallel even in the case of Muslim Arabs. Though the pre-Islamic traditions and legends were preserved among villagers and tribesmen, Ottoman high (palace) culture after the second half of the fifteenth century were almost freed from the pre-Islamic ethnic memories due to the newly assumed imperial missions and the cause of religious Gazha.

Before the conquest of Constantinople, Ottoman state was not an empire and as a cognate of this, it was predominantly an “ethnic Turkish entity”.⁹³ With the inclusion of diverse religious groups in the second half of the fifteenth century, the millet system emerged which took the religious community as the unit of administrative organisation reflected in the establishment of the Christian Orthodox, the Armenian and the Jewish millets. The fact that the religious community was conferred legal status as the main unit of socio-political organisation marked the transition from the predominantly ethnic Turkish entity “into an imperial state”.⁹⁴ Over time under the imperial and Islamic traditions prescribing struggle against the Christian world and religious heresy, the proto-national sense of Turkishness was effaced and transformed. Lewis describes the replacement of nascent feeling of Turkishness by Islam to the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the rise of Shiite-Turkic Safavid dynasty in Iran and the assumption of the Caliphate after the inclusion of Syria and Egypt into the Ottoman state, which led to the inheritance of the imperial mission from the Byzantine Empire, the cut of relations with the eastern Turkish world and the leadership of the Muslim World, respectively.⁹⁵

⁹³Karpat, "Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy," 39.

⁹⁴Ibid., 40.

The transformation of ethno-communities based on the notion of lineage, which was extremely important in the Turkish ethnic identification, into a supratribal identity was the heritage of the Mongol Empire demanding personal loyalty to the central political rule to the Ottomans. It was not so difficult to turn this sense of ethnicity maintained by weak genealogical traditions into a larger religious community forming the basic unit of Ottoman polity.⁹⁶

The Ottoman historiography and customs tariffs are clear-cut examples of the merger of Turkishness with Islam. Ottoman historiography starts with the rise of Islam and the period extending to the end of the first four Caliph, then jumps to the House of Osman and the Ottoman state. These two starting points were linked to each other through Seljukian states first in Persia, then in Anatolia. History of non-Muslim groups under the Ottoman rule is covered as far as it relates to the Ottoman history. The pro-Islamic past of Turks are totally ignored. What makes sense was only the Islamic times for the Ottoman historians and hence sultans.⁹⁷ The variability of rates of customs tariffs according to the classical Islamic classification of the believer community, the hostile infidel community, (*harbis*) and the subject infidel community (*zhimmi*), the highest being for the *harbis* and the lowest for the Muslims, is another indication of the fact that only religious differences mattered to the Ottomans. Ethnic and other social categories had no political bearings whatsoever.⁹⁸

⁹⁵Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 326.

⁹⁶Karpat, "Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy," 37-39.

⁹⁷Mükrimin Halil Yinanç, "Tanzimattan Meşrutiyete Kadar Bizde Tarihçilik" (Our Historiography from *Tanzimat* to *Meşrutiyet*), in *Tanzimat* (İstanbul: Maarif Vekaleti, 1940), 585.

⁹⁸Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 323-324.

Despite the Islamicity of Ottoman ethnic construction, the emergence of Mongol threat under the leadership of Timur, the new ruler of Central Asia, which challenged the legitimacy of the rule of the House of Osman on the basis of noble genealogical lines claiming an inferior status for the Ottoman dynasty led for a short period of time to a Turkic revival in the first half of the fifteenth century epitomised in the emphasis laid down on the pre-Islamic Turkish history, Central Asian Turkish legends, the famous of which being Ergenekon legend presenting the House of Osman as descending from the legendary hero Oguz Khan in the Ottoman official historiography⁹⁹, and in the tendency to use a more purified, simple Turkish. Yet, return to Turkish roots were stopped and ended under the imperatives of the newly-assumed imperial mission and the Islamic tradition during the reign of Mehmed II, though the Oguz legend continued to be part of the official history until the end of the Empire.¹⁰⁰ To interpret these elements of proto-nationalism is an indication of sheer anachronism, to carry a thoroughly modern formations with historical roots back, which what many nationalist historians do.¹⁰¹

2.4. "Three Ways of Policy"

In connection to these three projects of political engineering proposed as the solution *only* for saving the country, the newspaper

⁹⁹The History of Rashid al-Din is the first among its kind written during the reign of Murad II.

¹⁰⁰Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 325-26.

¹⁰¹For such an anachronistic approach which talks about Turkish nationalism in the Kök-Türk state of the sixth century , see Aydin Taneri, *Türk Kavramının Gelişmesi* (The Development of the Concept of Turk) (Ankara: Ocak Yayınları, 1993).

Turk - appeared in Cairo-, published a number of articles discussing these projects of Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism. The first articulation of "the three ways of policy" was by Yusuf Akçura, a prominent figure of pan-Turkism.

2.4.1. Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)

Yusuf Akçura, the author of *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Ways of Policy), a nationalist manifesto for Turkist movement in the Ottoman Empire,¹⁰² is the first thinker spelling Turkism as a political project. Akçura was a Kazan Tatar from Russia. Turks in Russia in the late nineteenth century were subject to the policy of Russification and as a reaction developed a national resistance against forced assimilation, and hence were able to create national consciousness. This Tatar nationalism and later Young Turk "libertarianism" formed two main ideological drives framing Akçura's youthful thought.

As Francois Georgeon clarifies, the impact of Tatar reformism (*cedidism*) on the political socialisation of Akçura was decisive. In order to protect their "national" existence against the policy of Russification and Pan-Slavism, Tatars first introduced new sciences (*fünun-i cedide*) into their *madrases*, and tried to remove the discrepancy between written and oral form of their language. Against Russian threat of capturing central Asian "markets", Tartar bourgeois class assumed a pioneering role

¹⁰²According to Charles Warren Hostler, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* played a similar role in Turkist movement to that of 1848 Communist Manifesto in Marxist movement. See Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets* ((London, 1957), 45; cited by Ercüment Kur'an, "Yusuf Akçura'nın Tarihçiliği" (The Historianship of Yusuf Akçura), in *Ölümünün Ellinci Yılında Yusuf Akçura Sempozyumu; Ankara, 11-12 Mart 1985* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1987), 46.

and propagated the tenets of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism among Russian Muslims.¹⁰³

Under the impact of the reconciliation developed in Tatar modernism between Islam and the dictates of "progress", Akçura rejected all reform initiatives excluding religious institutions, particularly madrases. This attitude radically changed during the Kemalist period.

Cultural Turkism limited to the areas of language and history was instrumental in Akçura's appropriation of Turkism.¹⁰⁴ His interest in the way the old Turkish traditions (*töre*) articulated with Şeriat was inspired by the works of cultural Turkists. Akçura put forward the idea that history have been evolving along the lines of nationalism and democracy. Given this irresistible march of history, his task was to unite Turkish history with the great movements of the universal history. The universalisation of history through its nationalisation was a striking paradox and would be adopted by the Kemalist history thesis. In the deterministic evolution of history, Islam was no different from other actualities and to adapt itself by becoming secularised.¹⁰⁵

Unlike Gökalp who sought the origins of Turkism in the Oriental studies of Turcology,¹⁰⁶ Akçura did not accept the diffusionist thesis. Instead he saw Turkism in its "pan" form and attested its origin to the socio-economic changes in the areas inhabited by Turks, a result of which

¹⁰³Francois Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri-Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)* (The Origins of Turkish Nationalism-Yusuf Akçura, 1876-1935), trans. (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986), 16.

¹⁰⁴Yusuf Akçura, *Türk Yılı 1928* (Turkish Yearbook 1928) (Istanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1928), 396.

¹⁰⁵Georgeon, *Yusuf Akçura*, 66.

¹⁰⁶Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (The Principles of Turkism) (Istanbul: MEB Yayınları, 1990), 1-11.

was the emergence of nationalism. According to Akçura, the emergence of bourgeoisie aspiring to protect the national markets against the European domination ended up with the rise of nationalist bourgeoisie. This was especially so in the case of Tatar bourgeoisie.¹⁰⁷ As to the Ottoman Empire, the breakdown of Ottoman economy and its transformation into an open market for European goods put the Levantines in a privileged position, which in turn strengthened the nationalist sentiment.

Akçura was of the opinion that Turkishness emerged as an ethnopolitical concept must correspond to a new conception of history Ottoman imperial-religious vision of history must be replaced by a national perspective. The geography of this history would consist of Central Asia, North European plains, Caucasia, and Anatolian and Balkan peninsulas. He offered a new periodisation of Turkish history, which was thoroughly secular: **1) Old Era:** Ancient Turkish civilisations until Mongol invasion; **2) Middle Era:** The unification of Turkish peoples under the rule of Jenghiz Khan and his successors. **3) New Era:** The states emerged after the dissolution of Jenghiz Empire. **4) Modern Era:** The historical awakening of Turks in the modern era. The turning point in this periodisation was not the acceptance of Islam by Turkish peoples but the rise of Jenghiz Khan in history. This was because Akçura accepted Leon Cahun's view that Jenghiz Khan had the "national" mission of unifying all Turkish and Mongol peoples.¹⁰⁸ Ottoman imperial vision was totally neglected in Akçura's sketch of Turkish history. Turkism preceded both Islam and Ottoman dynasty in his thinking.

¹⁰⁷Georgeon, *Yusuf Akçura*, 67. Akçura categorically emphasises socio-economic instead of politico-religious factors in his speculations.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 68-70.

The social Darwinist thesis of "struggle for life" was key to the Akçura's history and he considered the opposition of Russian Turks to Russification and the revolts of Ottoman minorities as the manifestation of this inner urge for survival, which was a natural law like the law of gravitation. The theme of "power and progress" was a corollary of social Darwinism. In this regard, nationalism was the political system which could provide Turks with the power to resist against European hegemony and therefore the prevailing force in inter-human relations was not and must not be ethical considerations but sheer power.¹⁰⁹

Akçura adopts the conception of "existing" (actual) nation (*millet-i vaki*) rather than that of "voluntary" nation (*millet-i iradi*). His nation was not a planned but an actual one. Taking the actual state of affairs as the point of departure he defines nation as follows: "People inhabiting a country and forming a society, which united in their origin, language, body structure, feelings, interests and the common laws they are subject."¹¹⁰

Akçura is the real pioneer of the idea of Pan-Turkism,¹¹¹ a political movement aiming at uniting Turkish peoples of Russia and China under

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 31-32.

¹¹⁰Yusuf Akçura, *Muasır Avrupa'da Siyasi ve İctimai Fikir Cereyanları* (Political and Social Currents of Ideas in contemporary Europe) (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1926); quoted by Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* (The History of Modern Thought in Turkey) vol.2 (Istanbul: Selçuk Yayıncılığı, 1966), 648.

¹¹¹Although he was an ardent supporter of pan-Turkism, Akçura never turned to Turanism like other immigrant nationalist thinkers from Russia. He approached Turanism, the political movement advocating the unity of Ural-Altay and Finnish-Magyar peoples developed in Hungary as a reaction to Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism not from an ethnic viewpoint but from a political perspective suggesting the formation of the alliance of Turks and Magyars vis a vis the Pan-Slavist threat. His approach was rational rather than being emotional.

Ottoman umbrella. According to this political scheme, the Ottoman Empire would assume the role Japan performed in the realm of "yellow race" and hence would rule the Turkish world. The adoption of Pan-Turkism in the Ottoman Empire as an official policy however, would lead to a series of land and population losses. These losses could be compensated for, according to Akçura, through assimilation of some ethnic groups which did not experience a national revival such as Kurds, Lazes, Circassians, etc., into Turkishness.¹¹² Later he gave up his suggestion of assimilation and put forward that the era of assimilation has passed and thus Turkification is a vain effort.¹¹³ Instead, Akçura insistently supported the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a political federation of nationalities. He wrote in 1914: "It is one of essential ideas of Turkish nationalism not to attempt to hinder the natural evolution of those ethnic groups which could form a nationality provided that this is not contrary to the unity of the Ottoman Empire."¹¹⁴

See Georgeon, Yusuf Akçura, 45. Among the champions of Turanist vision were Ziya Gökalp, Tekin Alp, Ömer Seyfedin and Hüseyinzade Ali. After *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* appeared in the newspaper *Türk* in 1904, Hüseyinzade wrote a letter to Akçura revealing his ideas upon the article and expressed his Turanist feelings in poetic fashion, some couplets of which were as follows:

"Sizlersiniz ey kavm-i Macar bizlere ihvan
Ecdadımızın müşterek menşei Turan...
Bir dindeyiz biz hepimiz hakperestân
Mümkün mü ayırsın bizi İncil ile Kur'an?
Cengizleri titretti şu afâki serâser,
Timurları hükmetti şehenşahlara yekser
Fatihlerine geçti bütün kişiye-i Kayser." See Yusuf Akçura, *Türkçülük* (Turkism) (Istanbul: Türk Kültür Yayınevi, 1978), 183.

¹¹²Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Ways of Policy) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınevi, 1987), 28.

¹¹³Yusuf Akçura, "İttihad-ı Anasır Meselesi" (The Question of the Unification of Elements), *Sırat-ı Müstakim*, 5:121(January 1911), 280-83; cited by Georgeon, Yusuf Akçura, 44.

He believed that the centrifugal tendencies of ethnic minorities could be neutralised and Ottoman unity be preserved only through an ethno-political decentralisation.

This stance was the axis of his ideological opposition to the CUP's official policy of Ottomanism. Following the Balkan Wars however, the CUP increased its ties with Turkist circles around the journal of *Türk Yurdu* and the association of *Türk Ocakları*, founded in 1913 and adopted the Turkist thesis of "national economy" and a reformed Islam in the service of Turkishness. After this rapprochement , Akçura relieved its opposition to the CUP but did not become a member of it despite persistent invitations from the CUP. That is why unlike Ziya Gökalp, who was the member of the CUP's Central Committee, Kemalists would embrace him without hesitation .¹¹⁵

After the Bolshevik revolution, Akçura left the Pan-Turkist ideals and narrowed down the borders of his nationalism by making a differentiation between democratic and imperialist Turkism and focusing on Ottoman Turks.¹¹⁶

In the Kemalist period, Akçura's theses regarding the importance of Central Asian Turkish history, the nature of Turkish nationalism and secular conception of history inspired Mustafa Kemal's reform efforts. In 1931, he was appointed as the head of the Association of the Study of Turkish History (*Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti*). He lent full support to

¹¹⁴"1329 Türk Dünyası" (1329 Turkish World), *Türk Yurdu*, 6:5(1914), 2168; cited by Georgeon, ibid., 45.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 55-57.

¹¹⁶ See Yusuf Akçura, "Cihan Harbine İştirakımız ve İstikbalımız" (Our Participation to the World War and Our Future), *Siyaset ve İktisat Hakkında Birkaç Hitabe ve Makale*, 16 Eylül 1335-23 Nisan 1340 (İstanbul, 1924), 15-18; Georgeon, 107.

the Mustafa Kemal's thesis of Turkish history.¹¹⁷ In the final analysis however, Kemalist revolution did not exactly correspond to the Akçura's longing because he thought that the development of Turkish culture and language were bound to the strengthening of Turkish economy, which required in the first place a land reform. This was not possible for Mustafa Kemal because he relied on the political support of landlords and therefore did not dare such a reform. Akçura's nationalism had a clear, non-Marxian socialistic tendencies.¹¹⁸

2.4. 2 *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*

The innovative side of his nationalist manifesto *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* was the classification it developed for the first time by identifying "three ways of politics" in the Ottoman Empire to follow: Ottomanism, the purpose of which was to build an Ottoman nation; Islamism, aiming at a state based on Islam; and Turkism, aiming to create a Turkish nation based on race.

Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset is a utilitarian text discussing the merits and demerits of these three political programme, by using the criteria of usefulness and applicability as reflected in the political vocabulary he used: interest, profit, danger, loss, damage, eases, difficulties, etc. Dwelling upon the advantages and disadvantages of each policy, he speculates on which way is most feasible and therefore advisable to follow.

¹¹⁷Kuran, "Yusuf Akçura'nın Tarihçiliği," 49.

¹¹⁸Samet Ağaoğlu, *Babamın Arkadaşları* (Friends of My Father) (Istanbul, 1969), 69. Akçura's socialistic leanings and conception of history are the main reasons of his neglect by the intellectuals of present-day Turkist movement. See Kuran , "Yusuf Akçura'nın Tarihçiliği," 48-49.

According to Akçura, starting during the reign of Mahmud II, Ottomanism was a kind of liberal nationalism formed around the concept of common fatherland aiming to prevent the dissolution of the empire and protect its political boundaries. Yet it could not cope with the racist understanding of nationalism which became dominant in Europe in the wake of 1870-71 Franco-Prussian war while admitting that Ottomanism is a useful policy. Nevertheless the author sees its realisation as impossible due to the following reasons: Protection of the boundaries is not an adequate goal: the formation of an Ottoman nation would cause the assimilation of ethnic Turks. Besides, the Ottoman ethno-religious communities would not be full of will to integrate with one another. Russia because of sectarian reasons and a part of Europe due to religious causes would oppose such a policy. The concluding remark is: "In my opinion, to struggle for the creation of an Ottoman nation is a useless wariness."¹¹⁹

As to Islamism, the author considers it as a great project. Like Ottomanism, this project too is of European origin according to him. Gaining strength especially in social life, education, foreign policy during the reign of Abdulhamid II, the drawbacks of Islamism are as follows: the abolition of Muslim-non-Muslim equality could arouse enmities among Ottoman subjects, and increase even among Turks themselves religious quarrels. Other big Muslim states may want to prevent this policy.¹²⁰ Yet, this policy would provide for a centre of Muslim unity around the Ottoman Caliphate. Besides, the unity of religion and state in Islam, the consideration of Qur'an in the Muslim world as the fundamental law, the use of Arabic both in religious and scientific language were factors

¹¹⁹Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* , 31.

¹²⁰Ibid., 21-23.

enhancing the implementation of Islamist policy. However, the fact that all this requires a long time to be realised, Akçura denies priority to the Islamic school of politics.¹²¹

The last part of the treatise deals with Turkism or as Akçura puts it *Tevhid-i Etrak* (the unity of Turks) or *Türk Milliyet-i Siyasiyesi* (Turkish political nationality). According to this school of politics, the inculcation of national consciousness to Turks and Turkified peoples would be finalised through the political unity of all Turks all over the world.¹²²

Akçura suggests a political Turkish nationalism based on *ırk*. The word *ırk* is Arabic and means origin. Today in common usage it expresses the purity of blood and descent. With the preference of the word *ırk* instead of *kavim* or *cins*, which were used to differentiate ethnic elements from each other in the Ottoman millet system, Akçura tried to define an ethnic totality of Turks without resort to the definitive value Islam held for it. Thus, while *cins* or *kavim* defined Turks within the unity of Islamic *ümmet*, the word *ırk* referred to an independent existence. In this sense, his *ırk* corresponded more to the word *ethnos* (*budun* or *uruk* in ancient Turkish) referring human collectivities united in ethnic descent, language and cultural heritage independent of political conditions they live in¹²³ than to the word race which expressed human collectivities with the same physical features. This usage shows that Akçura's nationalism is purely secular. In fact, one of the striking features of Akçura's argumentation was that it did not justify its thesis on the ground of *Şeriat*. Rather, it preferred secular-rational reasoning.

¹²¹Ibid., 31-33.

¹²²Ibid., 23.

¹²³Şemseddin Sami, *Kamus-i Türkî*, vol. 3 (İstanbul, Tercüman Yayıncıları, 1986). See also Kur'an, "Yusuf Akçura'nın Tarihçiliği," 47.

Unlike Turkists like Ziya Gökalp and Ahmed Agayef who resorted to the Islamic justification of nationalism, Akçura was of the opinion that Islam has to accept nationalism and internalise it, because this was an historical necessity. The same has happened to Christianity and Islam was no exception. Moreover, Islam should enter into the service of "ırks."¹²⁴ Pan-Turkism should make use of the ties of unity and solidarity provided by the Islamic brotherhood. In this way nationalism would revive Muslim peoples facing European imperialism.¹²⁵

The author concludes his speculations on "three ways of policy" as follows:

The creation of Ottoman nation which embraces some benefits is impossible. The policies inclined to Muslim or Turkish unity have the same advantages and disadvantages for the Ottoman state. This is so in terms of their practical applicability as well. In such a situation, which policies among from Islamism and Turkism should be carried out?¹²⁶

The treatise ends up with this unanswered question. From a general reading of the article and the author's later preoccupation with Turkism however, we can safely conclude that Akçura's preference is Turkism.

In the same newspaper Ali Kemal and Ahmet Ferit rejoined the ideas suggested by Akçura. In the article carrying the title of "Mektup", Ahmet Ferit criticised the view that Ottomanism is bound to fail while Islamism and Turkism based on race, though both have various drawbacks, could be tried. According to Ferit, because Ottomanism would perform a unifying function though limited, it would be a real mistake to

¹²⁴Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, 30. "Freedom of the conscious is taking the place of the unity of religion in societies. Religions (...) turn into a personal relationship between God and man. Therefore, religions could keep their social and political importance only through uniting with and being helper, even server, of races(ırks)." Ibid., 34.

¹²⁵Georgeon, *Yusuf Akçura*, 42-43.

¹²⁶Ibid., 35-36.

follow a different policy other than that. This view has been shared by most of the Ottoman intellectuals on the ground that the idea of Turkish nationalism was too radical and provocative for other nationalisms which would enhance the dissolution of the empire.

The opponents of Abdulhamid II advocated the view that if the representation of Ottoman subjects was secured, the problem of politico-social integration could be resolved. When the constitutional government re-established in 1908 and the national assembly was reopened, the idea of Ottomanism gained a new vitality for a very short time around the ideals of equality, liberty and fraternity. In reality, however, non-Muslim groups used the parliamentary ground for their ethnonationalisms.

The failure of Ottomanism to preempt and then to prevent non-Muslim nationalisms provoked Turkish nationalism. Although in the beginning, the programme of the Society of Union and Progress provided for Ottomanism, following the Japanese victory of 1904 over a presumed European power, Tsarist Russia, which destructed the widely held pseudo-scientific racist myth relegating the Asian communities to the bottom ladder of humanity, the Unionists (*İttihatçılar*) made their ideological choice decisively on behalf of ethnic Turkish nationalism.¹²⁷ With the loss of Balkan wars (1912-1913), which ended up with the secession of all non-Muslim communities of the Empire, the Young Turk government adopted policy of Turkism officially under the impact of his nationalist ideologue, Ziya Gökalp. Although Ottomanism appealed to the Muslim groups of the Empire, later nationalism triumphed over them too and first Albanians (1911), then Arabs (1916) seceded. During the

¹²⁷Ahmet Riza, a leading figure of the unionists, was already insistingly using the term *Turk* instead of *Osmanli*

First World War, the ideal of Ottomanism was totally given up and Turkish nationalism took the upper hand together with the limited and pragmatic use of Islamism.¹²⁸

¹²⁸For the more detailed account of the evolution of the policy of Ottomanism, see Hanioğlu, "Osmanlıcılık," 1391-1393.

CHAPTER III

COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS (CUP) AND "ÜÇ TARZ-I SİYASET"

3. 1. Unfolding of CUP's Ideological Trio

3.1.1. *Introduction*

The dissolution of the traditional *millet* system during the nineteenth century created a perpetual political crisis, perceived by the Ottoman ruling class as the question of securing the “immortality of the state.” For centuries, the key underlying Ottoman socio-political system had been the understanding of the so-called “paternal state” (*baba devlet*). The emergence of ethnic-based decentralising movements accompanied by the absence of a supranational political identity produced different ideological postures. All of these postures, however, dwelt upon the same question which reflected the main concern of traditional Ottoman statecraft considering state building as the most creative political activity: how to save the state?

This crisis of the immortality of the state was the starting drive for the first organised opposition movement in the Ottoman Empire, the Young Ottomans and later Young Turks as well as the ruling political cadres. It was this question which might explain, to an important extent, why Ottoman reformist intellectuals including those studied in Europe did not embrace ideologies like ethnic nationalism or Marxism, despite the fact that they had found the opportunity to develop close ties with the

intellectual circles involved in those ideologies. Particularly, the Young Turks abroad had direct personal contacts with the "vanguard elites" of both revolutionary Marxism and minority secessionist groups. But unlike patriotism and non-ethnic political nationalism, these ideological positions were not fitting to the communal collectivism of the Ottoman socio-economic fabric, which was the framing background of the Young Turks in their receptions from the Western "collections of ideologies".¹

In this context, we can mention only two founding principles which accounts for the theoretical poverty of the Young Turk's political programme. One is the collectivism absorbing any kind of individuality and the other is political centralism prescribing the control over the whole polity in political terms.² Since there was no tradition of philosophical speculation in the Ottoman Empire, as Mardin aptly observed, the Young Turks had no interest in theoretical speculation. The beginning and end of their whole concern and purpose was to "save" the state.³ Everything has to be evaluated from the point of view of the "high interests of the state" Instead of neatly woven theoretical speculations, short-run and pragmatic prescriptions had always precedence. They had a "magical" solution for salvation: the replacement of the oppressive rule of the Abdulhamit II with the enlightened despotism —of course, this is unspelled— of constitutional monarchy. In this regard, their programme of action was more ideological than utopian in the Mannheimian

¹Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908* (The Political Ideas of Young Turks, 1895-1908) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983), 307-308.

²Feroz Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914* (Union and Progress 1908-1914) trans. (İstanbul: Sander Yayınları, 1971), 233.

³Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 14-15.

sense.⁴ Therefore the Young Turk's thought was conservative rather than change-oriented. Only Abdullah Cevdet, a radically westernist Young Turk, objected to this position and pointed to the fact that they had to elaborate a programme of action instead of constantly repeating the need to remove the sultan and confining their efforts to that "negative" aim.⁵

A short review of the Young Turk movement may reveal the evolution of their thoughts and programme the cornerstones of which were social Darwinism (popular elitism), political centralism, instrumental use of Islam and Turkish nationalism.⁶ All this centred around one purpose connoting the famous motto of Italian fascism: "Everything for the state; nothing against the state; nothing outside the state".⁷

3.1.2. Evolution of the Young Turks' Ideological Posture (1876-1908)

The Hamidian period (1876-1909) was a period of severe political censorship.⁸ Political oppression went hand in hand with modernisation

⁴Mannheim calls the works aiming at preserving the status of those who hold key positions in social stratification and hence, the existing status quo providing for such a stratification, *ideology*. He calls the theories instrumental for those who do not hold these key positions but want to capture those strategic positions in society, *utopia*. See Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London, 1960).

⁵Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 304.

⁶See Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklik* (Ottoman Society of Union and Profress as a Political Organisation and Young Turkism) (İstanbul:İletişim Yayıncılığı, 1986), 613-619.

⁷George H. Sabine&Thomas L. Thorson, *A History of Political Theory*, 4th ed. (Tokyo: Dryden Press, 1981), 818.

⁸This censorship was particularly directed to the press. The following anecdote may give a clue about its extent. A French journalist working in Istanbul finally goes to the censor director Rıfat Bey upon

efforts in education system and bureaucracy. Islamism, or the unity of world Muslims, emerged as the new political base for the sultan, side by side with official policy of Ottomanism. The sultan was successful in slowing down the dissolution of the Empire. During this period, Turkism entered into the Ottoman intellectual agenda although in cultural terms. The works of orientalists in Turkish history and language⁹ were the main source of inspiration in the discussions of cultural Turkism. The language and history discussions soon turned into an outlet for political partiality formed around the question of "right identity" The identities of "Turk", "Muslim" and "Ottoman" had already

continuos censorship of his articles. Rifat Bey replies to the French journalist's question "what would we talk about?" as "We can talk about whatever subject you want!"

"On every subject?"

"Yes. On every subject, that is, except for princess, foreign governments, nihilism, socialism, revolution, strikes, anarchy, liberty, human rights, foreign policy, home affairs, religion, churches, mosques, Mohammed, Jesus, Moses, prophets, irreligion, free thinking, state officials, woman rights, *harem*, motherland, nation, nationalism, republic, senate members, deputies, coups, bombs, Mithat Pasha, Kemal Bey, Sultan Murat, the crescent, the cross, Macedonia, Armenia, reforms, locusts, August, and subjects related to all this.

"Oh, my God, what is left?"

"What is left? Everything. Rain, good weather provided that you do not talk about rain or moonlight in August. As far as you do not suggest their annihilation, you can mention street dogs as well. Likewise, you may praise our excellency (Sultan Abdulhamid). In short, you may talk on whatever you deem appropriate." See Comte Am. de Persignac, "Les Gaites de la Censure en Turquie", *La Revue* LXVIII (April 1907), 390; quoted by Ernest E. Ramsaur, *Jön Türkler ve 1908 İhtilali* (Young Turks and the 1908 Revolution) trans. (İstanbul: Sander Yayınları, 1982), 123-124.

⁹The prominents of these works were Arthur Lumley Davids' *Grammar of the Turkish Language* (1832), Leon Cahun's *the Introduction al'histoire de l'Asie* (1896) and most important of all, the works of the Hungarian Turcologist Arminius Vambery(1832-1913). See Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 340-342.

come into existence, and the controversy was over the place of any one of these in the new trio of collective identity.¹⁰

Against the oppressive character of the political regime, a constitutionalist opposition had begun in the second half of the nineteenth century. Although waned in the 1870s, it took a new momentum in the 1880s and in 1889 Society of the Union of Ottomans (*İttihad-i Osmanî Cemiyeti*) was established by the five students of the Academy of Military Medicine, namely Ibrahim Temo, Ishak Sukutî, Abdullah Cevdet, Mehmet Reşit and Hikmet Emin.¹¹ Among the founders, Temo was Albâian, Sukûtî and Cevdet Kurdish, Reşit Circassian and Hikmet Emin Turkish. These ethnic plurality could come together for the salvation of the country only around the purpose of removing Sultan Abdulhamid II from power.¹² They had no alternative political model to the absolutism of Abdulhamid as well as no sincere respect to parliamentarism. On the contrary, under the impact of positivism and social Darwinism, they believed in political elitism and the creation of a national elite through education. Yet, because they inherited the opposition to the Sultan under the banner of "freedom and constitution" they had to pay lip service to these ideals. As stated before,

¹⁰David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908* (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 61-62.

¹¹Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* (Dr. Abdullah Cevdet as a Political Thinker and His Period) (Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981), 5.

According to Hanioglu, the reason why such a formation was achieved by military medical students stemmed from the fact that these students were indoctrinated by patriotism, populism and biological materialism prescribing for the replacement of religion by science in order to progress. See *ibid.*, 5-26.

¹²"See Abdülhamid Ölüyor! Declaration published by Comité Ottoman d'Union et Progress (Paris, 1906); cited by Hanioglu, *ibid.*, 195.

the main concern of Young Turks was not liberty or the recommencing of the parliament but to stop the disintegration of the empire, i.e., the securing of the immortality of the state.¹³

According to Mardin, Young Turks were prompted by factors deeper than material-based i.e., structural causes. One of these factors was the value conflict between the ideal society they envisaged and the society present during the reign of Abdulhamid. Yet, this conflict was due to the difference between the personalist character of society (present one) and the mechanical, blocked, impersonal society which was brought about not by the ideas borrowed but by the new daily life values accompanied by the new institutions adopted from the West. The proto-nationalism of Young Turks, according to Mardin, could only emerge in an environment where all provincial administration was reorganised and new communication channels develop. Mardin lay emphasis on the importance of structural changes rather than the "power of ideas," for example, the impacts of such thinkers as Mazzini or Fichte as the main prompter of the Young Turk opposition.¹⁴ Unlike Mardin however, Hanioğlu, confesses the importance of this structural shift from community to society but drives our attention to the impact of the doctrine of biological materialism on the social imagination of the Young Turks, who conceived themselves as "the social doctor" and saw human society as a natural society subject to the same laws, and hence could be planned and programmed.¹⁵ A linear, static understanding of change was

¹³Şükrü Hanioğlu, Interview by Şahin Alpay, *Milliyet*, 31 July, 1995, 18. For the motives of Young Turks opposition, see also Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, 401.

¹⁴See Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 17-18.

¹⁵Ahmet Rıza, one of the leading figures of Young Turks, state this position in a concise fashion: " Society is a corporate body subject to

basic to this conception of society. Thus came the motto of "union and progress" (*İttihat ve Terakki*). According to August Comte, the process of development could be triggered only after the establishment of the order providing for such a process. This was to him the starting point in evaluating the performance of a government. In fact, progress is the development of order because every society is founded on the unity in thought of its members. Therefore, the existence of differing views within a society is detrimental to a coherent social union the result of which is social chaos. Conceiving the history of mankind as the history of universal intellect in constant evolution toward positive society results necessarily in the history of mankind as the history of one people. This evolution is historically determined, though Comte ascribes to human action a catalysing function in the process of the development of social facts the certitude of which is the same with that of natural facts.¹⁶

The name of Society of the Union of Ottomans (*İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti*) was changed into the Ottoman Society of Union and Progress (*Osmalı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) in 1895 after the correspondences

natural laws. This body has some circular illnesses. In order to diagnose the illness, we have patient spoken, and make known the problems, needs, and state of health of people to the doctors of nation. Without knowing poison, one cannot find antidote..." cited by Hanioglu, *Osmalı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türk'lük* 604.

¹⁶See Raymond Aron, *Sosyolojik Düşüncenin Evreleri* (The Stages of Sociological Thought) trans. (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1986), 77-140. The tolerance of positivism towards religion because it considered human progress as the sum total of various peoples and beliefs, and hence its rejection of discriminatory appellations of the eastern countries including the Ottoman Empire by the industrialised western imperialist powers , its authoritarian political elitism despite its rhetoric of "progressive people" and its universalism disliking all sorts of local movements including ethno-national ones were decisive in the embracing of positivism by the leading members of the Society of Union and Progress, e.g., Ahmet Rıza and Abdullah Cevdet. See Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 183-185 and 218-219.

between the Istanbul centre and the Paris branch headed by Ahmed Rıza. After arriving in Paris (1889), Ahmet Rıza joined the lessons of Pierre Lafitte, the head of French positivists and adhered to positivism. The motto of positivism was "order and progress" (*intizam ve terakki*). Under the inculcation of Ahmet Rıza, this motto was partly adopted and "progress" (terakki) was united with "union" (ittihad). The neglect of "order" referred to the refusal of revolutionary means in the road to political power while the adoption of "union" referred to the policy of Ottomanism (ittihad-ı anasır).¹⁷ From their insistence on "union", one can easily draw the conclusion that the main purpose in the establishment of the Society of the Union and Progress (CUP) was the prevention of the dissolution of the Empire rather than preserving "liberty".¹⁸

¹⁷Sina Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki* (Young Turks and Union and Progress) (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1987), 23-24. The journal *Meşveret* together with the positivist periodical *Order and Progress* was issued in French by Ahmet Rıza in Paris, beginning from 1895. It used positivist calendar and ignored the lunar one altogether. The positivist motto appeared in *Meşveret* dated 27 Frederick 107 was as follows: "Our motto is order and progress, we are horrified by the privileges obtained through violence." The starting year of the positivist calendar was 1 January 1789. See Ramsaur, *Jön Türkler ve 1908 İhtilali*, 40.

¹⁸Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 74. In the political programme of the Society of Union and Progress, the connection between "Union" and "Progress" are explained as follows: "Union and progress are the necessary corollaries of each other. If we want to progress, we should unite; if we unite, we can progress. Not to side with union and progress is not to love the country. Union and progress is that state of affairs described in the first article of our fundamental law, which is the spirit of the state." See "İttihat ve Terakkinin Siyasi Programı" (The Political Programme of the Union and Progress), *Sura-yı Ümmet* 140(1324), 2-3; cited by Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, 1859-1952 (Political Parties in Turkey, 1859-1952) (Istanbul, 1952), 175, footnote 2.

The opposition period of the Young Turk movement (1889-1908) is particularly important in that the ideological matrix which dominated the CUP's years in power (1908-1918) and the early period of the Republic was crystallised in this period. Political elitism which treated people as ineligible for governance and hence justifying the rule of a vanguard party and substitution of the role of religion in society with science were reminiscent of this ideological crystallisation.

With the aim of forming a common opposition front, all opponents of the Abdulhamid regime including representatives of such ethnic groups as Armenians, Albanians, Arabs, Greeks and Kurds held a congress in Paris in 1902. All the leading figures of the Young Turk movements were present: Ahmet Rıza, Prince Sabahattin, Ismail Kemal, Ibrahim Temo, and so on. The question of foreign intervention divided the participants into two groups: the first group, which was in majority, advocated the foreign intervention, if necessary, in order to bring back the constitutional regime. The second group, which was in minority, strongly opposed to the idea of intervention.¹⁹ The common point of allegiance was the support given to the ideal of Ottomanism expressed as follows: "We aim to bring about a unity among various peoples of the Empire which would secure the equal application of rights and duties guaranteed by the imperial decrees and interstate treaties. Through this unity, all peoples would participate in the rule of the country, assume equal rights and duties. Feeling of allegiance to the Ottoman dynasty, the unique common denominator of this unity, would be aroused."²⁰

The Congress was held with the purpose of arriving a common "libertarian" platform, but the conclusion was the division into two

¹⁹Hanioglu, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi, 44-46.

²⁰ Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 44.

opposing groups. The first group, which advocated the intervention thesis, was led by Prince Sabahattin. According to the proponents of this thesis, in order to dethrone Sultan Abdulhamid, if need be, the help of the great European powers should be searched out. Sabahattin was influenced by the French sociologist Le Play and Edmond Demolins from Le Play school of sociological thought. Taking the Anglo-Saxon model of progress as a universally applicable route of modernisation, Sabahattin did not limit the “question” with the re-establishment of a constitutional regime. According to him, Hamidian despotism was just a reflection of conditions prevailing in the society at large. In order to eradicate despotism, measures ensuring administrative decentralisation at the political level and individual initiative at the personal level had to be taken. Needles to say, the view of administrative decentralisation was welcomed by ethnic minorities and received their support. In a conjuncture where wave of ethnic separatism was powerful, Sabahattin saw administrative decentralisation as a check against secessions though this approach might embody just the opposite option.²¹ The followers of the Prince founded the Society for Individual Initiative and Decentralisation (*Teşebbüs-ü Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti*) in 1906. The internal division in the Young Turk movement was thus ossified.

The second group, which was opposing the foreign intervention thesis, was led by Ahmet Rıza.²² Although they remained in minority in

²¹For Prince Sabahattin's views see Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* (History of Modern Thought in Turkey), vol. 2 (İstanbul: Selçuk Yayınları, 1966), 544-560; and Hanoğlu, *Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, 201.

²²For Ahmet Rıza, see Ramsaur, *Jön Türkler ve 1908 İhtilali*, 39-40; and Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 31-33.

the Congress, in fact they acted as if their views were in ascendancy because they had the "power of majority" in terms of their sphere of influence. This group was an extension of the Society of Union and Progress. The group had a firm belief in political centralisation. Its ultimate goal was to transform the Empire into a nation-state based on Turkish *ethnie*.²³ This could be possible only through the suppression of anti-central, local forces, which had an ethnic character at the same time. The means for this aim were technological improvements and education. In the absence of technological capability, which was the case in the Empire, the means at hand was ideology, as seen in 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia. Pan-Islamism was such an ideology used by Abdulhamid II. Ahmet Rıza and his friends would try to do the same through an enthusiastic Turkish in guise of Ottoman nationalism.²⁴ This adherence to Ottoman nationalism, at least in rhetoric, continued until the Balkan wars. The programme published in the first issue of their new daily, *Şura-yı Ümmet*, openly emphasised to elevate Ottomans to the level of contemporary civilised nations and preserve the rule of the Ottoman dynasty which was necessary for the integrity of the country.²⁵

²³Anthony D. Smith prefers using the French word *ethnie* in the sense of ethnic community to the loose and ambiguous term "people" and its derivatives. According to Smith, the word *ethnie* "unites an emphasis upon cultural differences with the sense of an historical community. It is this sense of history and the perception of cultural uniqueness and individuality which differentiates populations from each other and which endows a given population with a definite identity, both in their own eyes and in those of outsiders." See Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 21-22.

²⁴Hanioğlu, *Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, 200.

²⁵Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 186-7; and Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 55.

In the meantime, two important events deeply influenced the Young Turks and the Ottoman public opinion. These were the Russian-Japanese war (1904) and the promulgation of constitutional monarchy in Russia (1905). The Japanese victory over Russian armies aroused great interest in the Ottoman and Asian public opinions. In the first place, it was an Asian country which defeated a European power. This was enough to destroy the European myth produced by the orientalist image of the East that the fate of non-Europeans was to be colonised by Europeans. The Japanese victory proved that the non-Aryan, non-European peoples too are capable of progress while keeping their traditional values, which reassured collective self-confidence of the non-European peoples. The confirmation of the idea that change and continuity could go hand in hand²⁶ created a great interest towards Japan and it was considered as a model state to be imitated in the road to modernisation by Asian countries including the Ottoman Empire.²⁷

The Russian defeat resulted in the transition to the constitutional regime in Russia in 30 October, 1905. No absolutist state remained in Europe. In Iran too constitutional regime was declared in 5 August, 1906. Japan already had a constitutional regime. These two developments greatly strengthened the national self-confidence of the Young Turks and gave them sufficient energy to fuel their efforts for a national Turkish state.

Under the impact of the Russian revolution of 1905 and transition to constitutional monarchy in Iran (1906), new opposition formations

²⁶This was expressed by Tanpınar as "Temadi ederek değişimek, değişirken temadi etmek." See Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, 19. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi (İstanbul: Çağlayan Kitabevi, 1988).

²⁷Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 51-52.

crystallised in Rumelia, the European part of the Ottoman Empire. A new society called Ottoman Freedom Society (*Osmalı Hürriyet Cemiyeti*) was formed in Salonica with the participation of both civil and military figures in 1906. These peoples were young, belonged to the ruling class, educated and bourgeois-minded.²⁸ They were all Turk and full of national spirit. Organised along the Masonic ways, the society quickly spread among the second and third armies of the Empire. Such leading military figures as İsmet (İnönü) and Kazım (Karabekir) were among members.

In 1907, the Society of Progress and Union joined the Ottoman Freedom Society after the resistance of Ahmet Rıza against the use of violence as a legitimate means was broken down.²⁹ Ahmed Rıza was a sincere positivist. According to the positivist teaching, progress and development occur within an historically determined organic balance. The use of all kinds of violent means could disturb that balance. Therefore, revolutionary uprisings were not among legitimate means in order to assume political power.³⁰ Thus, Rıza made a concession from his positivist creed by accepting the use of violence as a legitimate means.

This fusion turned the new Society of Progress and Union(SPU) into a nationalist-revolutionary society and renewed it both in terms of cadre and ideology in a radical way. In the process, the Turkish character of SPU would become increasingly manifest vis a vis its Islamist and

²⁸Akşin, ibid., 60-61 and 78-80.

²⁹ Ramsaur, *Jön Türkler ve 1908 İhtilali*, 140-143. The new society continued to publish *Şura-yı Ümmet* (in Turkish) and *Meşveret* (in French).

³⁰Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 200-201.

Ottomans faces, and it took the name of Society of Union and Progress once again.

The decisions taken in the second Young Turk Congress (1907) in Paris were in line with the new orientation of the society. The Congress was widely participated by two factions of the Young Turks and some Armenian revolutionary groups. The only concrete result of the Congress was the decision to topple the Ottoman government by use of every means, if necessary through violence and within the possible shortest time.³¹ The Congress achieved a superficial unity among Young Turk factions and minority nationalist groups. It showed that the intellectuals like Ahmed Rıza, who was against revolutionary means, was no longer influential in the society. Instead people with revolutionary inclinations, like Bahattin Şakir and Dr. Nazım, had the upperhand.³²

An important point to be noted while studying the process of the formation of the Society of Union and Progress is that there was no ideological continuation between it and the Society of Ottoman Union (*İttihad-i Osmaniye Cemiyeti*) which took the name of Ottoman Society of Union and Progress in 1895. This ideological rupture became manifest especially after 1906. The Society of Ottoman Union was a student organisation influenced from biological materialism and the idea of patriotism while the new Society of Union and Progress was totally a

³¹Ramsaur, *Jön Türkler ve 1908 İhtilali*, 144-146.

³²İbrahim Temo, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyetinin Teşekkülü ve Hidem-i Vataniye ve İnkılab-ı Millîye Dair Hatıratım* (My Memoirs About the Formation of the Society of Union and Progress, Patriotic Services and the National Revolution) (Istanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1987) (First edition, 1939), 171-72; and Hanoğlu, *Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, 58-59.

political organisation lacking a philosophical dimension.³³ This can be seen in its treatment of the first founders of the movement.³⁴

Following the 1908 revolution, the end result of which was the re proclamation of 1876 constitution, every ethnic group organised along “clubs” and published their political programmes openly. In this conjunction, the Society of the Union and Progress emerged as the sole party of “Turks” due to the failure of other parties, basically the *Ahrar* (Liberal) *Party* representing the views of Prince Sabahattin, in parliamentary elections of 1908. The CUP presented itself as the savior of the country (*müncî-i vatanı*) and hence accused its opponents with treason. Patriotism, the idea of progress and constitution were as if under its monopoly. It has emerged as a “holy society”. It was conservative, liberal, radical, democrat, socialist, in short, everything.³⁵

3. 1.3. *CUP's Congresses and Its Political Programme*

We can best follow the unfolding of the ideological position of the CUP through its programmes declared in its successive Congresses. Tunaya, in his memorial work Political Parties in Turkey (*Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*), observes that the evolution of the society took place over

³³Hanioglu, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi, 26-27.

³⁴The number one founder of the Society of Ottoman Union, İbrahim Temo describes his disappointment when SUP came into power as follows: (Temo congratulates the leading figures of the SUP in a friendly talk including Cemal Pasha and Mithat Şükrü): “While I was talking about the achievement of our society with enthusiasm, Cemal Bey asked me: Mr. Doctor, which society are you talking about? Our society is not your society you worked for abroad. This society is the product of Manastır and Salonica.” See İbrahim Temo, *Hatıratım*, 185.

³⁵Serif Pasha, *Bir Muhalifin Hatıraları: İttihat ve Terakkiye Muhalefeti* (The Memoirs of an Opponent: Opposition to the Union and Progress)(Istanbul: Nehir Yayınlari, 1990), 23 and 30.

three lines: 1) Transition from an illegal society to a state of political party. 2) Preference of a one-party system instead of multiparty politics. 3) The transformation of the Ottomanist doctrine and programme based on the policy of *ittihad-i anasır* (union of ethnies) into a nationalist-Turkist and secular character, particularly after 1327 (the Congress of 1911). These main lines became increasingly more apparent from that time onwards.³⁶

The first political programme of the CUP was published in *Şura-yı Ümmet* in 6 October, 1908. The programme emphasised that the official language would remain as Turkish and that all official correspondence would be done in Turkish (Art. 7). It confirmed the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims in terms of both their rights and duties. Turkish would be compulsory in primary education and state schools would be open to all ethnic groups (Art. 17). The programme was severely against administrative decentralisation while it accepted devolution. Its aim was to strengthen the principle of national sovereignty and to fortify the national union.³⁷

The political programme of 1908 was modified in 1909. According to these modifications, which are more Ottomanist in nature, in primary schools every ethnic minority could use their own language as the language of instruction but the teaching of Turkish would be compulsory. In secondary and high schools, Turkish would be the language of instruction. Local languages, however, would be thought.³⁸

³⁶Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, 189.

³⁷For the 1908 political programme of the SUP, see Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, *Siyasal Anılar* (Political Memoirs)(Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1976), 50; "İttihat ve Terakki'nin Siyasi Programı (1908)"(The Political Programme of the Union and Progress), *Şura-yı Ümmet*, 23 September 1324 (6 October 1908), cited by Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasî Partiler*, 181, and Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 103-105.

The 1911 Congress confirmed the official adherence of the CUP to Ottomanism and refused the religious, denominational and ethnic interests to supersede the general interests of Ottoman society.³⁹

The 1912 Congress could not be held due to war conditions.

The 1913 Congress accepted a programme which introduced new measures of fiscal and administrative decentralisation.⁴⁰ The programme provided for the use of local languages as the means of instruction in secondary as well as primary schools while keeping the clause of the teaching of Turkish as a *lingua franca* compulsory.⁴¹

With the loss of Balkan peninsula (Rumelia) following the Balkan wars (1912-13), Ottoman state turned predominantly into a Turkish-Arab Empire. As a matter of fact, there were serious speculations regarding the establishment of such an Empire.⁴² Yet, the most concrete result of the

³⁸Tanin, 30 May, 1325(1909); cited in Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 211-12.

³⁹Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 212-13. It is interesting to note that despite this official adherence to Ottomanism, Turkist face of the SUP began to be more pronounced during and after the Balkan wars. For instance, the first official use of the word *milli* (literally means national) came with the establishment of the Society for National Defence (*Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*) at the start of the Balkan wars. This society aimed at the replacement of the old concepts of Ottomanness and Islamdom with the word *millet* (nation) though this word still did not mean "Turk" See Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki*, 239.

⁴⁰For the programme accepted in 1913 SUP Congress, see Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 217-18.

⁴¹See Masami Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği* (Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Period) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), 78 and Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 256.

⁴²For speculations of an Turco-Arab Empire similar to that of Austria-Hungary in the desperate political climate following the Balkan Wars see Yalçın, *Siyasal Anılar*, 208. For Gökalp's suggestion of the establishment of a bi-national state (Turco-Arab State) under the caliphatic rule of Ottoman dynasty see Uriel Heyd, *The Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London, 1950), 131; and Ziya Gökalp, *Türkleşmek, İslamlamak, Muasırlaşmak*

war in the official policies of the CUP was a shift toward the policy of Islamization in order to appease the nationalist aspirations of the Arab nationalists given that Muslims now were in great majority in the Ottoman lands. Among measures of Islamization were the appearance of *Islam Mecmuası* (Islamic Review) in 1914 and the formation of a reformed Islamist line supported by the establishment of state-financed and state-supervised madrases. These measures seems to be measures aiming at secularisation through reforming Islam. But such an interpretation disregards the fact that these measures did not contradict the “orthodox” (*kitabi*) understanding of Islam and hence could be considered as measures refining the worldly dimension of *de facto* Islam.⁴³

In 1916, after two years following the entrance of the Ottoman state into the general war , the CUP Congress was held again. At that time, the CUP was the only political power in the country. Its doctrine and program at last have revealed its real colour and shifted from Ottomanism to Turkism neglecting Islamism due to the ongoing Arab revolt (1916).⁴⁴ The CUP felt itself no longer bounded with Şeriat, and did not refrain openly from transgressing the limits introduced by it. The attachment of religious courts to the Ministry of Justice instead of to the office of *Seyhül*

(Turkification, Islamization, Modernisation) (Istanbul:Türk Kültür Yayınu, 1977), 68-69.

⁴³See Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 141-42.

⁴⁴For the programme changes introduced in the 1916 Congress, see Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 225-26. For a detailed analysis of these new measures and the minutes of the Congress see *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Son Yılları: 1916 Kongresi Zabıtları* (Last Years of the Union and Progress: The Minutes of 1916 Congress)(Istanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1992). This book is compiled from the articles published in *Tanin*, which was considered as the unofficial gazette of the SUP, dated 26 September , 1916; 7 October , 1916; 10 October , 1916; 11 October, 1916; 12 October , 1912 and 14 October , 1916.

Islam was such a radical move.⁴⁵ The dictatorship of the CUP against all indications of opposition became increasingly overt: the Islamist weekly *Sebilürreşat*, in publication since the Hamidian period was closed down for two years. Days and months of Roman calendar (*Rumi*) was identified with the Gregorian calendar (*Miladî*), beginning from 1 March, 1917. Failed efforts to introduce the Latin alphabet,⁴⁶ the active participation of women to public life due to the necessities of war and their public appearance without veil were all indications of religious heedlessness in these years.

Thus far, the national self-confidence obtained after the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, the merger of the CUP with Ottoman Freedom Society, the emergence of the CUP as the sole party of Turks following the Second Meşrutiyet, the loss of non-Muslim minorities with the exception of a small number of Armenians and Greeks following the Balkan wars , and the CUP's 1913 Congress all contributed to the CUP's Turkist face to come out in the open. But, the most important development which caused the Turkist identity of the CUP to reveal itself was the withdrawal of Russia from the war due to the Bolshevik Revolution (1917). The

⁴⁵Ali Fuat Türk geldi (The Chief Private Secretary of the Sultan Mehmed V) in his memoirs tells us that in an unofficial meeting of the Council of Ministers which occurred in Çit Köşkü due to the medical operation made to the Sultan, Enver Pasha said to the Şeyhülislam (Chief Mufti) that instead of engaging in judicial matters, his office should confine its preoccupation to the glorification of Islam. Upon this consideration, the Şeyhülislam Hayri Efendi angrily responded to the Pasha: "This idea is all the consequence of the instigations of Turkists." See Ali Fuat Türk geldi, *Görüp İşittiklerim*, 3rd ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınevi, 1984), 118-119.

⁴⁶When Talat Pasha offered him to join the new Council of Ministers after the "resignation" of the cabinet of the grand vizier Said Halim Pasha as Minister of Education, Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) accepted this offer provided that the Latin alphabet would be introduced. Of course, Talat Pasha could not dare that. See Yalçın, *Siyasal Anılar*, 242.

temporary independence of “Turkic” peoples of Russia following the revolution brought new and hopeful horizons for Pan-Turkist aspirations.⁴⁷ Yet, when the Ottoman Empire had to sign the Mondros Armistice (30 October 1918), the Ottoman public opinion felt a great disappointment. The CUP leaders escaped from Turkey. A new, anti-CUP government was established. The post-armistice period witnessed a hunt of CUP members while ethnic minority groups like Kurds, Armenians and Arabs were after their separate state. The Empire was in a state of dissolution. The government formed by the members of the Party of Freedom and Conciliation (*Hürriyet ve İtilaf Partisi*)⁴⁸ was under the influence of English interests and saw the independence movement in the making in Anatolia as the extension of the CUP's reorganisation activities and hence vehemently opposed it. But gradually, the Anatolian resistance movement became the major force in Anatolia and forced the occupying forces to withdraw. This was a full stop for separatist tendencies. A nationalist era was at the threshold.

3. 2. Three Foci of Identity: Discursive vs Actual Reality

As referred to above, the period of post-1908 Revolution exhibited the same problematic which dominated the last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire: the question of the immortality of state. All parties, societies, thinkers and men of politics locked their efforts and programme of actions to the question of “saving the state” Three ways of allegiance which crystallised as Ottomanism (legal-political), Islamism (religious) and Turkism (national) were all starting from the same question and

⁴⁷ Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 304.

⁴⁸For this party, see Ali Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası* (The Party of Liberty and Reconciliation)(Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1990).

represented different claims caused by internal social dynamism and varying attitudes towards the western-originated formulas. Overall, both the Young Ottoman and Young Turk movements had essentially a bourgeois character observed in the development of capitalist mode of production. Despite the lip service they paid to Ottomanism and Islamism, in actuality, they adhered to the cause of Turkish nationalism, which was essentially a bourgeois ideology but in the absence of a bourgeois class, represented by intellectuals and civil-military bureaucrats.

In the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman intellectuals embraced three different foci of loyalty. In the words of an *İkdam* (A Turkist daily) writer, "by religion (diyanet) we are Muslims, by social order (heyet-i içtimaiye) we are Ottomans, by nationality (kavmiyet) we are Turks".⁴⁹ The overlappings and tensions between these three loyalties impelled the CUP to exploit the potentials provided for the maintenance of the integrity of state by each brand of thought based on these loyalties. Thus, Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism, expressed by Akçura as "Three ways of policy" emerged as the CUP's policies in varying intervals of the 1908-1918 period.

Ottomanism was the official policy of state since Tanzimat period and was opposed openly by no one. Yet, because it had just a legal-political character and remained deprived of an emotional, poetic and hence motivating dimension, its overall embracement was nominal and remained on paper. The CUP, from the time of its establishment as a secret society in Salonica, attributed importance to the idea of Ottomanism. Known as *ittihad-i anasır* (union of ethnies), Ottomanism

⁴⁹"Terbiye"(Education), *İkdam*, 727(27 July, 1896); quoted by Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, 25.

aimed at preventing the separatist tendencies within the Empire. From the first days of the Second Constitutional period however, Greek, Bulgar, Armenian and even Albanian ethnic nationalisms came to the fore as more powerful movements. In the 1908 elections, ethnic minorities conducted nationalist political campaigns and issued their separate election platforms, a development which provoked the reaction of Turkish nationalist circles.⁵⁰ The policy of the union of all Ottomans remained as the dominant official policy until the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. Despite all the unifying frames formulated by the CUP, ethnic separatist tendencies got strengthened. The Turkist character of the CUP asserted itself overtly for the first time during the Balkan wars and Ottomanism was buried into the pages of history while keeping its existence at legal level.

A second focus of allegiance was Islamism, which got official recognition during the reign of Abdulhamit II. The assuming of the title of the Caliphate by Abdulhamit provided a legitimate ideological ground for setting Islamic ties against the imperialist policies of England as a barrier. The alliance of the CUP leaders with Germany during the first general war brought the German support to the CUP's policy of pan-Islamism in terms of their near eastern policies. Because of secular-nationalist tendencies within CUP however, Islamist circles did not lend their full support to the CUP. The opposition within Parliament continuously criticised CUP as being against Şeriat. Especially after the takeover of the grand vizirate by Talat Pasha from Said Halim Pasha, a renown Islamist, in 1917, certain radical measures were legislated, some of which were opposed by Islamists. In fact, CUP's Islamist face can be put

⁵⁰For example, see Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Millet-i Hakime" (The Dominant Nation), *Tanin*, 24 October 1324(1908); also Yalçın, *Siyasal Anılar*, 47. For the full text of the article, see Appendix B.

into the framework of the renowned motto of its ideologue, Ziya Gökalp: "I belong to Turkish nation, to Western civilisation, and to Islamic ummet."

The main ideological position of the CUP was Turkish nationalism. The Balkan wars and the enduring protection of Christian minorities by the "great states" (*düvel-i muazzama*) precipitated the overt expression of Turkish nationalism. The main formulation of CUP's nationalism was made by the ideologue of the party, Ziya Gökalp. Also the founders of the Turkish Hearts (*Türk Ocakları*), and among them especially Yusuf Akçura was influential in the CUP's formulation of Turkish nationalism. The Turkist theses were developed in such journals as *Türk Yurdu*, *Yeni Mecmua* and *Islam Mecmuası*. The "rediscovery" of the national-self, surpassing the inferiority complex vis a vis the Eurocentric values and institutions, and reformulation of the relation between Islam and politics were the main concerns of Turkists. The New Life (*Yeni Hayat*) proposed by Ziya Gökalp was a style of life under the supervision of the national ideas, and was based on the Turkist principles that the formulated.

Young Turks and the CUP for a long time advocated Ottomanism complemented by Islamism. Their turn to Turkism occurred, according to Hanioğlu, in 1906 with the merger of the CUP with Ottoman Freedom Society members of which having strong nationalist tendencies. In fact, as Hanioğlu suggests, we can discern three different clients that the programme of the CUP targeted. The Ottoman polity was the first group of clients. The second appearance of programme targeted the Western public opinion. The third face was its own real programme and principles of actions which remained covert for a long time. The duality resulting from this diversification of "clients" in CUP's discourse while

handling native and Western public opinions is quite understandable in that the expectations of these two sections were radically different. While the West demanded the establishment of a liberal regime ensuring the balance between various Ethno-religious communities, the native public opinion had nationalist aspirations. The secrecy of the CUP until 1912 made easier the endurance of a dual discourse and the pursuance of policies contradicting this discourse. For example, when the CUP leaned towards Turkist policies, it continuously emphasised Ottomanism in its rhetoric.⁵¹

3. 2.1. *CUP and its Ottomanist Pillar*

Ottomanism, a kind of official nationalism in B. Anderson's term,⁵² was a unique experience in the way of the formation of nationalisms in the Muslim world. It necessitated the secularisation of the state, which led to the emergence of a secular tradition inherited by the Turkish Republic. The understanding of nationalism as Ottomanism, according to Ahmet Midhat, the Ottoman writer and journalist, differed from all other types of nationalism because it consisted of three separate bonds accompanied by Islam and the Caliphate. The first bond was ethnicity going back to the Kayı Khan tribe, the tribe which established

⁵¹See Hanioglu, *Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türkler*, 7. Also see Hanioglu, Interview by Şahin Alpay, *Milliyet*, 31 July, 1995, 18. Akşin holds the same view that the secrecy provided SUP with the ability to keep a discrepancy between its official Ottomanism and hidden Turkism. For instance there was not any non-Turkish member in the central committee of the SUP. See Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 156.

⁵²Anderson defines 'official nationalism' as "willed merger of nation and dynastic empire" developed in reaction to the popular national movements in Europe since the beginning of the nineteenth century. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), 86.

the Ottoman State. Turkism including Turks living in Anatolia before the Ottomans was the second. The third bond was that of the common homeland and state (*Osmanlılık*). Neither faith nor ethnicity could prevent anyone to be Ottoman. Thus while Turks could readily identify with all three bonds, non-Turks and non-Muslims could feel loyalty at least to one bond out of three. Clearly this view held that somehow Turks are more identified with state.⁵³

The liberal-territorial character of the Ottoman nationalism in the first sight seems very egalitarian. But given the fact that the French motto of "liberty, equality, fraternity" was translated into Ottoman Turkish as "liberty, equality and fraternity" (read nationalism)⁵⁴, the equality provided by Ottomanism was assimilationist as regards to ethno-religious minorities. This was again because of the question of survival of state. The very short time span in which the process of nation-building was tried to be realised created many difficulties and problems, some of which were insoluble. The Turkish ethnic dimension of Ottomanism led to the formulation of assimilation policies. A letter dated 30 August , 1878 of one of the prominent figures of the Young Ottomans, Namık Kemal, is very instructive in this regard. While commenting on the adoption of the Latin script instead of Arabic one, Namık Kemal speculates: "While, we are obliged to destroy all languages present in our country other than Turkish, if we can, should we provide Albanians, Lazes and Kurds with a spiritual weapon for strife through assigning an alphabet to them each? Language is a firmer barrier than even faith in order to prevent the transformation of one ethnies (kavim) to another."⁵⁵ In another letter, he

⁵³Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, 40.

⁴³⁵Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey* , 54.

is more uncovered: "The fact is that we cannot generalise our language to Greeks and Bulgars; but it is very possible to generalise it to Albanians and Lazes, i.e., to Muslims. If the schools were established and properly ruled there, and even the provisions of our deficient education regulation were implemented, the and Albanian languages would be totally forgotten twenty years later."⁵⁶ This policy of assimilation of Muslim minorities suggested by Kemal was inherited by the CUP and later, by the founders of the Republic literally. The realisation of the ethno-religious homogenisation of Anatolia paved the way for the assimilation of essentially Kurdish minority. As we shall see, one of the defining parameters of the nationality policy of the CUP and later that of Kemalist nationalism was the creation of ethno-religious homogeneity.

The "revolution", or rather the "coup" of 1908 was a victory for Ottomanism. It was an Ottomanist step, at least, in appearance.⁵⁷

⁵⁵Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, ed. *Namık Kemal'in Hususi Mektupları* (The Private Letters of Namık Kemal), vol.2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1967), 231; cited by Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 18.

⁵⁶Tansel, *Namık Kemal'in Mektupları*, 244; cited by Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 18.

⁵⁷William Miller describes the 1908 revolution as follows: "For a time, as if Macedonia had become a utopia. Enver Bey, the enthusiastic leader of the revolution, was telling that 'the arbitrary rule was ended. From now on, we are all brothers. There are no longer Bulgars, Greeks, Romans, Jews, Muslims. We are all equal under the same blue sky. We are proud of being Ottoman.' In Serez, the chief of the Bulgar committee was embracing the Greek archbishop. In Drama, officers were jailing a Turk insulting a Christian. Turks and Armenians in an Armenian graveyard were listening the prayers of their men of religion for the spirits of those murdered in the Armenian massacre. In Samsun Turks were saluting a Greek bishop respectfully. In Trablus Turks and Arabs together were doing thanksgiving prayer to Allah. Bulgar brigades were surrendering." See William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, 1861-1927 with an Appendix, 1927-1936* (Cambridge, 1936), 476; cited by Ramsaur, *Jön Türkler ve 1908 İhtilali*, 156. From this

Immediately after the revolution, the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and the declaration of independence by Bulgaria revealed the importance of the consolidation of the internal unity of the Ottoman Empire. There was one and only means for the realisation of such an aspiration: common loyalty of all citizens, regardless of race and religion, to the Ottoman dynasty and Ottoman homeland, i.e., Ottomanism. Yet, due to their self-defined mission of "social engineering", the Young Turks were very late for discovering the political nature of the question of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, they confessed the existence of a question of nationalities unwillingly. During the election campaign of the 1908 elections however, the minority groups put emphasis to their right to national self-determination and hence independence. This attitude provoked a Turkish reaction and the campaign turned around this debate. CUP kept its commitment to Ottomanism because there was no other feasible option to follow. Its main ideologue, Ziya Gökalp, considered the United States as a model for the Ottoman Empire in two respects: the unity of Ottomans, and progress along the route of civilisation. According to Gökalp, whatever their ethnic origins, all Americans were considering themselves as American.⁵⁸

The suggestion of Ottoman patriotism as the remedy was crystallised in two different understandings of Ottomanism. According to the first understanding, the political ideal of Ottomanism embracing all ethno-religious groups could be the means for the salvation of the Empire within a liberal, undespotic order. In this way, without description we can readily reach the conclusion that 10 July , 1908 was a holiday for Ottomanism.

⁵⁸Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, vol. 2, 496. Akçura refuses such a depiction of United States in his *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* , 19.

interfering in ethnic identities, every Ottoman citizen could have both his own ethno-religious identity as a sub-identity and Ottoman identity as the supra-identity. All the founders of the Society of Ottoman Union did reveal and use both of their identities without any hesitation. "I am a Kurd and an Ottoman" was a valid motto. The writings of one of the founders of the society and a radical westernist Abdullah Cevdet is illuminating in this regard. In Cevdet's words, "Look, I am a Kurd. I love Kurds and Kurdishness. But, as I am an equal citizen of Türkiye in terms of rights and obligations, I am before everything a Turk. The fact that I am Shii-Sunni, believer-free thinker, or belong to white or yellow race is a private matter and technical thing."⁵⁹ This approach was the only way to prevent the nationalist aspirations of ethno-religious minorities and to provide them with an integrating political identity. The publication organ of the Geneva wing of the Young Turks, *Osmanlı* responded to a letter sent from Albania which considered the CUP as a Turkish society along this Ottomanist line:

... In the first place, we must express that the writer of the letter does not have the right to qualify us as Turkish. Our society today has more than ten thousand members. Among these are Arabs, Kurds, Turks, Albanians, Armenians, Lazes, Greeks, Jews, Druzes and so on. Even our editorial board includes non-Turks. (...) Our purpose in demanding to live under the banner of union is not to attack the denomination and language of any nationality.⁶⁰

This understanding of Ottomanism did not find a wide support. The problem was that if the participation of nationalities into the governmental system could enhance the separatist tendencies of those

⁵⁹See Bir Kurd-Türk, "Mekatip: 20 Mart 1906, Şura-yı Osmanî Gazetesi Müdirine" (Schools: 20 March 1906, To the Director of the Şura-yı Osmani), *İttihad*, 3 (November 1907), 255; cited by Hanioglu, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türkler*, 217, footnote 23.

⁶⁰"Bir Arnavut Mektubuna Cevap" (Reply to an Albanian's Letter) *Osmanlı*, 76(15 January 1901); cited by Hanioglu, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türkler*, 629.

ethno-religious groups who are decidedly embraced the teachings of nationalist ideology. The majoritarian view among the Young Turks until 1902 had a firm belief in the fact that inclusion of nationalities within the political system by providing them with political rights had an integrative effect.

The second view among the Young Turks had a Turkish-dominant understanding of Ottomanism. "The theme of the principal ethnie"⁶¹, or the necessity of the predominance of an ethnie in all multi-ethnic political systems were the indications of this approach. An ultra-Turkish nationalism was prohibited by the fact that the Europeans considered Turks as belonging to an inferior race (yellow race) not to the superior one (white race). Otherwise, the social Darwinist outlook of Young Turks could easily precipitate a chauvinistic Turkish nationalism. The holders of this approach were emphasising the uniqueness of Turks vis a vis other nations. "Nobility peculiar to Turks", or "the national dignity Turks have" were frequent expressions used in their correspondence with each other.⁶²

Tunalı Hilmi, a fervent Young Turk activist, is a striking example of the shift from the first to the second understanding of Ottomanism over time. Tunalı Hilmi eventually stopped at the idea that "Turkishness and Ottomanism are the same."⁶³ Because his ethnic belonging was not so decisive for him, he was easily inclined to

⁶¹The above-mentioned article of Hüseyin Cahit is a case in point.

⁶²Hanioğlu, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türkler*, 631.

⁶³For the elaboration of this theme in Tunalı Hilmi's writings see his following lecture: "Türklük, Osmanlılık Bence Birdir...", in *Peşte'de Reşit Efendi İle* (Cenevre, 1317), 96. Also see Tunalı Hilmi, *Onbirinci Hutbe. Türkiyalilik Osmanlıllıktır: Osmanlıllık Türkiyalılıktır* (Cenevre, 1318).

Ottomanism defined around Turkishness. Despite the priority attributed to Turkish⁶⁴ and the recognition of advantages to Turks in bureaucratic recruitments, he was trying to make use of Ottomanism as a means of "national socialisation."⁶⁵ Akçura considers these writings of Tunalı Hilmi as the first products of Turkish nationalism.⁶⁶

The publication organ of the nationalist wing of Young Turks, *Şura-yı Ümmet*, in an article titled "*Küstahlık*" (Effrontery) declared that what we mean by Ottomans is especially Turks and Muslims. Because everybody knows that the reform in Ottoman government is bound to not the uprising of a handful of Armenians or Bulgars but to the revolt of Turks forming the principal part (element)..."⁶⁷ According to these circles, Ottomanism was a kind of Turkism under the religious guise, which considered Muslims together with Turks as the real owner of the empire. This tendency became dominant in the ranks of the Young Turks only after 1906, with the merger of CUP with the Ottoman Freedom Society

The point of convergence between the two understandings however was a familiar theme: the salvation of state.

In this regard, Abdullah Cevdet's position in relation to these two understandings deserve more attention because, although he was close to the first understanding, nevertheless he was the only influential figure

⁶⁴"Every Ottoman must be able to read what a Turk wrote. The genuine Ottomans are Turks. Turkish means Ottoman language." See Tunalı Hilmi, *Murat: Şehit Arkadaşlarından Doktor Yenişehirli Edhem'in, Giritli Şefik'in ve Tatar İzzet'in Ruhlarına, Mezarlarına Bir Armağandır* (n.p., 1317), 101.

⁶⁵Ibid., 99.

⁶⁶See Yusuf Akçura, *Türk Yılı 1928* (Turkish Yearbook 1928) (Istanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1928), 394-95.

⁶⁷"*Küstahlık*" (Effrontery), *Şura-yı Ümmet*, 75(30 May 1905), 1; quoted by Hanioğlu, *Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, 212.

vehemently criticising the appellation “Ottomanism” He suggested “Türkiya” instead of “Ottoman Empire” This was not because of the importance he attributed to Turks but because he thought that the Ottoman dynasty is not necessary for the ideal of union (ittihad). According to him the “Ottoman nation” meant the “slaves of Ottoman” There was no nation or state that carried the name of a ruling dynasty. The fact that the Ottoman dynasty named the people of Türkiya as “Ottoman nation” and “Türkiya” as “the Ottoman dominions” was a clear indication of its consideration of people as “nothing”.⁶⁸ Cevdet believed that only peoples given birth by free parents could preserve themselves from decadence. Because the Ottoman sultans were children of concubines, the Ottoman dynasty was decadent. His belief in political elitism was another factor in his rejection of Ottoman dynasty and all appellations related to it.⁶⁹

⁶⁸Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 249-50.

⁶⁹Hanioglu, *Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, 219-222.

The following excerpt from Cevdet is revealing in terms of understanding of his interest in the question of appellation:

“I ask the Armenian: Who are you?

“Ottoman”

“Where does this name come from?”

“It is the name given by the Ottoman dynasty to Türkiya and subjects of Türkiya in relation to the ancestor of our sultans, Osman I”

“Dear citizen, then let me ask you: You know the word Türkiya, don’t you?”

“Yes.”

“Where does this word come from?”

“From the fact that there were only Turks in the establishment of the government of Türkiya.”

“Then, my dear citizen, instead of holding the name of such a despotic and immoral dynasty, is not it better to carry the names of Türkiya and Turkishness that you have just described? You are “Armenian and I am Kurd. But in the parliament of Türkiya both you and me could be representative of the nation. Is not Türkiya the common homeland of us all?” See ibid., 219.

Although the 1908 revolution was ostensibly a victory for Ottomanism, in fact Turkish nationalism were gradually coming into ascendancy. The Balkan wars witnessed the enhancement of the process of the transformation of Ottomanism into Turkism. The rhetoric of the “dominant nation” and “the right of conquest” was running the day.

3. 2. 2. The CUP's Policy of Nationalities

The CUP tried to make use of nationalism, the dominant ideology of the last two centuries, by the construction of a nationalist ideology through the idea of Ottomanism. But its diagnosis of separatist movements was very superficial. In the pre-1908 period, CUP's policies were locked to the idea that the despotism of Abdulhamid was the cause of all calamities, and of course, of separatist movements. In the words of Şerafeddin Mağmumi, a renown Young Turk, “It was Abdulhamid who sowed the seeds of disunion among Ottomans. The barrier to union and fraternity was Abdulhamid himself.”⁷⁰ Against the thesis of “injustices of the sultan” as the cause of all separatist movements, there was some who suggested structural-ideological reasons, among them were Prince Sabahattin and Abdullah Cevdet. According to the latter, separatist movements were fuelled by the nationalist ideology itself: Whatever being said and done, the present era is the era of the dominance of nation (*hakimiyet-i ümmet*)” and “there is no possibility to postpone this dominance”.⁷¹ Even when the impact of nationalism as the source of

⁶⁹“Ne idik, Ne olduk?” (What were We, What are We?), *Meşveret*, 19(27 March 1314), 4; cited by Hanioglu, *Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, 224, footnote 47.

⁷⁰Vittorio Alfieri, *Hükümdar ve Edebiyat* (The Monarch and Literature), trans. Abdullah Cevdet (Cenevre: Matbaa-i İctihat, 1905); cited by Hanioglu, *Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, 216, footnote 19.

ethnic separatism was confessed, the Unionists' approach was to have minority groups accept the Ottoman nationalism. The adoption and internalisation of Ottoman identity was the final and essential remedy. The magic of Ottomanism, according to Ahmet Rıza, would also prevent foreign interferences. The portraying of Ottomanism as a barrier to western imperialism was their other theme.⁷²

3.2.2.1. Ottomanism as a Political Umbrella

From the beginning embracing Ottomanism as its dominant ideology, the CUP was against all minority organisations struggling for independence. Ottomanism must be considered by every minority group as self-satisfying because through it they would be able to assert and keep their ethno-religious identities. Interestingly enough, the only exception to this stance was the tolerance conferred to the Kurdish opposition. The Young Turk newspaper *Osmanlı* received important financial support from the nationalist Kurdish aristocratic family, *Bedirhans*. The newspaper *Kurdistan* was printed in the same printing house with *Osmanlı* and had its overt support.⁷³ As we shall see below, the Young Turks shared the same view with Abdulhamid regarding the use of Kurds as a balancing force against Armenian separatism, a policy which was put into practice through the establishment of *Hamidian regiments* in 1890.⁷⁴ As a matter of fact, the CUP had adopted the idea of universal

⁷²For the various views expressed in this regard see, Hanioglu, ibid., 215.

⁷³Malmisanij, *Yüz Yılın Başlarında Kürt Milliyetçiliği ve Dr. Abdullah Cevdet* (Kurdish Nationalism at the Beginning of the Century and Dr. Abdullah Cevdet) (Uppsala:Jina NuYayınları, 1986), 16.

⁷⁴See Naci Kutlay, *İttihat Terakki ve Kürtler* (Union and Progress and Kurds) (Istanbul: Koral Yayınevi, 1991), 66-67; Malmisanij, *Yüz Yılın Başlarında Kürt Milliyetçiliği*, 10.

order under the influence of Ahmet Rıza's positivism, and therefore considered respect for ethno-national differentiation as outmoded and unnecessary.⁷⁵ The inevitable corollary of this conception was forced assimilation of minorities and it was this policy that CUP favoured when it came to power.

The identification of the 1908 revolution with Ottomanism created an inescapable dilemma for the CUP. Ottomanism was seen as the unifying cement of such diverse groups as Turks, Arabs, Albanians, Kurds, Circassians, Greeks, Armenians, Bulgars and Jews. Ottoman Empire was a real mosaic of nationalities. When we look at the ethnic composition of the Empire in 1908, we see that Muslims numbered more than twenty million out of thirty million of the whole population.⁷⁶

The ethnic composition of the post-1908 three parliaments was as follows:⁷⁷

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Turkish</u>	<u>Arab</u>	<u>Albanian</u>	<u>Greek</u>	<u>Armenian</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Slavs</u>
1908	288	147	60	27	26	14	4	10
1912	284	157	68	18	15	13	4	9
1914	259	144	84	—	13	14	4	—

In the 1908 parliament, all ethnic groups were represented in proportion to their population. In the 1912 parliament however, the number of Greek representatives were decreased because they were in opposition to the CUP. The vacuum created by their low representation was filled by Turkish (from 147 to 157) and Arab (from 60 to 68)

⁷⁵Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasî Fikirleri*, 203-5.

⁷⁶The figures are taken from *Tanin*, 102(12 November 1324), 4; and Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 164-65. According to the same census, the population of Greeks were more than two millions, Armenians more than one million and Jews were more than 700.000.

⁷⁷Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki*, 229.

representatives. In 1914 parliament, the CUP's policy of appeasement toward Arabs was reflected as further increase in the number of Arab representatives.⁷⁸

The CUP's modernisation programme as an answer to the question of "how to save the country" disturbed all traditional groups cross cutting ethno-religious divisions. The CUP considered the millet system and its plurality of law as a ripe ground for disunion and separatism and hence introduced measures of standardisation and homogenisation regardless of the traditional heritage of that system.⁷⁹ The Republicans would inherit the same line.

3.2.2.2. Reaction of Minority Nationalisms

While the CUP covertly envisaged an Ottoman unity through more or less Turkification of ethnic minorities, all ethnic groups excluding Turks were well organised and active in the efforts for independence. They totally surrendered to the teachings of ethno-nationalism. The most well-organised group was Armenians. The killings during their revolt of 1894 and their raid on the Ottoman Bank in 1895 asserted their powerful existence, especially through *Hinchak* and *Tashnak* societies. They published a fortnightly called *Pro-Armenian*.

Albanian nationalists were against the Young Turks and lent their support to Sultan Abdulhamid. Their aim was more autonomy within the borders of Albania and they had a publication organ carrying the same name, *Albania*.

⁷⁸Ibid., 229-30.

⁷⁹Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 185, and Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki*, 231-32.

Kurdish nationalists were publishing the newspaper *Kürdistan* in London and making financial contribution to the Young Turks' newspaper *Osmanlı*. Many Kurds including Ishak Sükûti and Abdullah Cevdet were among the ranks of the Young Turks. But they considered themselves more Ottoman than Kurdish. Nationalism affected Muslim minorities very late in contrast to Christian minorities.

The only activities to be noted regarding the nationalist activism among Arabs was the Turkish-Syrian Reform Committee. Its aim was to make reform within the Empire. It did not have any nationalistic concerns.⁸⁰

Against this landscape of ethnic activism, only the Turks did not organise and lacked a protector. "There were only Turks who could not gain the sympathy of anyone "as the Young Turks claimed. The government considered them as "the worthless reaya" In the eyes of foreigners they were the power behind the defects of the Ottoman government.

3.2.2.3. CUP's *Inescapable Dilemma*

On the one hand, the CUP had to enter into a secretly conducted struggle against these minority formations. On the other hand, it had to behave in line with the principles of the constitutional regime. According to Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), the chief writer of *Tanin*, it could not dare openly to declare that "I have to do so in order to protect Turks and the Empire." Therefore, it resorted to suppress the opposition. And once this

⁸⁰For the nationalist organisations of ethnic minorities in the Ottoman Empire see Ramsaur, *Jön Türkler ve 1908 İhtilali*, 80-82 and Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 41-44.

option was chosen, there was no recognised limit to arbitrary rule. The CUP emerged as a dictatorial power.⁸¹

The temporary enthusiasm which led to the "embracement of opposites" proved to be impossible to continue. Ottomanism was not a valid project because no ethnic group gave up its nationalist aspirations for the sake of a constitutional regime. On the contrary, they considered political representation provided by *Meşrutiyet* as a new means toward the aim of independence. The new government of numbers could jeopardise the dominance of Turks in the Empire. According to Hüseyin Cahit, "the history of Meşrutiyet is the history of the Turks' efforts not to be drown in the flood of ethnic groups."⁸²

The Greeks did not want Ottoman citizenship because they tried to achieve their Greek ideals under the protection of the umbrella provided by the traditional communal privileges granted to them in the millet system. Ottomanism for them was just a springboard. A provision of the 1878 Berlin Treaty prescribed the protection of Armenians against Kurds and Circassians and reform in accordance with local needs. After the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungarian Empire and the secession of Bulgaria, the "Western concert" speculated the nullification of this provision, which aroused a strong Armenian reaction. Against this state of affairs, the CUP as the party of Turks opted for overt Turkish nationalism.⁸³

⁸¹Yalçın, *Siyasal Anılar*, 129.

⁸²ibid., 42.

⁸³See ibid., 43-44.

3.2.2.4. A Vicious Circle: Appeasement vs Assertion

In fact, the 1908 political programme of the CUP considered education as the means for Turkification of non-Turks. In private schools, all themes and elements contrary to Ottomanism-Turkism would be cleaned and instead Turkifying themes would be included under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. In the primary schools of non-Turks, the instruction of Turkish would be compulsory. Except for religious institutions, in public high schools and universities the means of instruction would be Turkish, but in secondary schools local languages would be taught.⁸⁴ According to Akşin, the fact that the programme of the CUP was silent regarding private secondary and high schools was an indication that without being educated in public schools, to become a state official would be difficult for non-Turks and hence "becoming Turk" would be deemed attractive.⁸⁵

After the Balkan wars (1912-13), the Ottoman Empire lost the great bulk of its Greek, Albanian and Slav minorities. Therefore, the state did not have to take these groups into consideration. The new task was to appease Armenians and Arabs. While the CUP's ideological trinity was valid, nevertheless the proportions in the whole mixture changed. Now, Turks were the biggest ethnic group in the Empire. Hence, Turkism assumed the status of a defining ideology. On the other hand, Islam was enough for the appeasement of Arabs. Ottomanism would have the function of resolving conflicts within the ideological trinity.⁸⁶

⁸⁴Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 215.

⁸⁵Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 103.

⁸⁶Ahınad, *İttihat ve Terakki*, 227-28.

The 1913 Congress made the CUP's tendency for a Turkist doctrine and programme of action open.⁸⁷ The CUP's open nationalism triggered by the Balkan wars could lead to the reaction of Arab nationalism. Therefore, CUP put to the fore Islamism as its first pillar in its official rhetoric. During the world war, however, the relative failure of the declaration of the holy war (*cihad-i ekber*) by the CUP, the Arab revolt of 1916 and the breakdown of Tsarism in Russia triggered Pan-Turanist and Pan-Turkist tendencies into dominance and even uniqueness within the CUP's ideological trio.⁸⁸ The CUP cherished the ideals of Turkish unity, and lent its support to Turkism through the efforts for the development of a national economy based on solidarism,⁸⁹ the spread of education and through which the diffusion of Turkish among the non-Turkish populace. Yet, due to the continuos state of war from 1911 to 1918 accompanied by ongoing internal revolts, and the necessity of maintaining the ideological postures of Ottomanism as well as Islamism, the CUP could not transform Turkism into a comprehensive programme of action as the founders of the Turkish Republic did.⁹⁰

3.2.2.5. CUP's Turkification Policies

This does not mean however that the CUP did not have a Turkist programme of action for economic, social and legal "reforms" On the

⁸⁷Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 189 and 193.

⁸⁸Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 304.

⁸⁹For the economic solidarism of the SUP and its ideologue Ziya Gökalp, see Taha Parla, *Kemalizm, Ziya Gökalp ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm* (Kemalism, Ziya Gökalp and Corporatism in Turkey) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989).

⁹⁰Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, 101.

contrary, a nationalist programme of action in which the process of secularism was immanent were put into action from 1913 onwards. In social-cultural realm, the acceptance of women to the Istanbul University and the autonomy given to that university, the confining of the area of the responsibility of the Academy of Islamic Sciences (*Dar-ül Hikmet-ül İslamiye*) to the religious issues reveal the westernist-secularist character of the CUP's nationalism to a certain extent. The establishment of various organisations carrying the title of "millî" such as *Millî Kütüphane* (National Library), *Millî Hazine-i Evrak* (National Archives), *Millî Musiki* (National Musics), *Millî Filmcilik* (National Cinema), *Millî Coğrafya Cemiyeti* (Association of National Geography) shows the increasingly nationalised content of the word "millî", which is essentially a concept expressing religious allegiance. The enumeration of nationalism alongside other purposes in the regulations of sport associations might give an idea about the comprehensive extent of the CUP's nationalism.⁹¹

The close interrelationship between the CUP and the Turkish Hearts established in the person of Ziya Gökalp , who was a member of both organisations, made the CUP open to the continuos influence of Turkist thinkers. The societies of aid, centres of free treatment and vaccination established by the CUP's clubs widened the popular basis of national mobilisation.

⁹¹For example, Tunaya quotes from the general regulation of a sport association, *Türk Gücü* (Turkish Power): "Today, Turkish race is drifted toward a terrible abyss both in qualitative and quantitative terms.(...) The salvation of Turks and the protection of their fatherland, law, honour, and glories are possible only through the creation of a Turkish generation relying upon its own power." See *Türk Gücü'nün Umumi Nizamı* (İstanbul, 1329), 5-6; cited by Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, 203.

The abolition of capitulations coupled with the policy of national economy (*millî iktisat*) based on liberal teachings but assigning the motor role to the state initiative in the creation of a national bourgeoisie and economic accumulation, the establishment of The Bank of National Prestige (*İtibar-ı Millî Bankası*), the support lent to the private enterprises, the emphasis put on the use of domestic goods,⁹² and the development of independent professions, including agricultural, industrial and commercial enterprises which the Muslim segment of the Ottoman population traditionally refrained to engage were all measures of CUP's economic nationalism.⁹³

The dominant position of Turkism in the CUP's ideological trio led to the policies of Turkification through such means as assimilation, deportation and extermination. In fact, these policies were real necessities for a programme of Turkism to be implemented given the multi-national character of the Empire. Akçura was the first to identify the costs of following a Turkist policy. According to him, this policy would lead to the loss of a series of lands and peoples. But this loss could be compensated for through the Turkification of non-Turkish Muslim minorities (Kurds, Lazes, Circassians, etc.).⁹⁴

In fact, we may discern two lines in the establishment of ethnic homogeneity around Turkishness in the Empire. The policy toward non-Turkish Muslims was basically assimilation through compulsory Turkish education, internal deportation, measures aiming at destroying the signs

⁹²This emphasis was inherited by the Republican regime and even today public primary schools continue to celebrate a holiday called *Yerli Malları Haftası* (The Week of Domestic Goods).

⁹³Ibid., 205.

⁹⁴See Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Ways of Policy) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1987).

contributing to national collective memoirs, such as changing of local names into Turkish and the prohibition of the use of local languages in public realm. The second policy was directed to the non-Muslim—non-Turkish minorities, which involved harsher measures given the fact that their assimilation into Turkishness was much more difficult. The fear of separatism was an adequate justification for the pursuance of Turkification policy.⁹⁵

The provision of the compulsory teaching of Turkish in the CUP's 1908 programme caused particularly the reaction of non-Muslims. None of them wanted to accept Turkish as the official language. The Greeks, for example, wanted to open their high schools and universities depending upon their denominational privileges and refused the supervision of state over these schools.⁹⁶

The territorial losses made the Empire basically a combination of Anatolian and Arab peninsulas. The Arab peninsula hosted Arabs. Only Anatolia could be transformed into a pure Turkish homeland, and that was possible only through resolving the question of minorities in Anatolia. In this regard, Armenians were the greatest obstacle. According to Kutlay, in order to implement its policies regarding Armenians and Kurds, the CUP established the General Directorate of Tribes and

⁹⁵In his memoirs, Talat Pasha expresses this fear as follows: "Because the Ottoman Empire consisted of several different nationalities like Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgars, and Serbs, the acceptance of the recognition of political autonomy to Armenians according to the Armenian programme would require the recognition of the same right to other nationalities. This option would not only destroy unity but through demolishing the foundations on which the Empire was based for six centuries may lead to the dissolution of the Empire itself..." See Alpay Kabacalı, comp., *Talat Paşa'nın Anıları* (The Memoirs of Talat Pasha) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), 57.

⁹⁶See Yalçın, *Siyasal Anılar*, 145.

Immigrants (*Aşair ve Muhacirun Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi*). The purpose of this directorate was, in popular language, the assimilation of those saying "zo" (Armenians) and "lo" (Kurds).⁹⁷

After the invasion of Eastern Anatolia by Russian forces in 1915, the Armenians there revolted against the Ottoman state in order to help the Russian troops. Against this state of affairs, the CUP decided to deport the Armenians from the regions which may affect the course of war negatively, particularly Eastern Anatolia and Mersin-İskenderun region, to the hinterland of Iraq and Syria. A law issued in 27 May 1915 empowered the army with deportation. And the 30 May parliamentary decision extended this authorisation with no time limitation.⁹⁸ In this way, the Armenians were discarded from Anatolia.

During the war, the assimilation policy reached its peak. The name of the province of Kurdistan, which was coined in 1847 as the name of an administrative division consisting of six cities (*vilayat-i sitte*), was changed into *Vilayat-i Şarkiye* (Eastern Provinces). Interestingly, the deportation policy was used about Kurds as well. The twelfth article of

⁹⁷Kutlay, *İttihat ve Terakki ve Kürtler*, 52-53. Yamleki ascribes these words to Nurettin Pasha, the chief of the military operation conducted against the Alevite Kurds of Dersim area in 1921. See A. Yamleki, *Kurdistan ve Kurt İhtilalleri* (Kurdistan and Kurdish Uprisings)(Bağdat, 1946), 73; cited by Martin Van Bruinessen, "Osmanlıcılıkten Ayrılıkçılığa: Şeyh Sait Ayaklanması'nın Dini ve Etnik Arka Planı"(From Ottomanism to Separatism: Religious and Ethnic Background of the Sheikh Sait Rebellion), in *Kurdistan Üzerine Yazilar*, Martin Van Brueinessen, trans. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992),153.

⁹⁸During the deportation, thousands of Armenians died due to clashes with local Ottoman forces, revenge, bad conditions of hunger, weather and illness. The number of Armenians killed was near one million according to the nationalist Armenian sources. According to Shaws, the number is two hundred thousands. See Stanford Shaw-Ezel Kuran Shaw, *Osmancı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye* (Ottoman Empire and the Modern Turkey) vol. 2., trans. (İstanbul: E Yayınları, 1983), 315-6.

directions prepared by the General Directorate of Tribes and Immigrants read as follows: "Kurds would be divided into small tribes, and disarmed and to be sent to different regions where they would form not more than five percent of the population."⁹⁹ Alongside Armenians, Kurds were deported to central Anatolia, especially to Yozgat and Ankara during the war. Although the CUP shared the same goal with Abdulhamid in its assimilation policies, it differed from him in that it used modern, forced means while Abdulhamid followed the policy of the co-optation of Kurdish leaders through which he aimed to use them against Russians as well as Armenians.¹⁰⁰

One of the underlying reasons for the events which ended up with secession of Albania from Ottoman Empire (1911) was the CUP's policy of Turkification. The CUP envisaged that being one of the most loyal subjects of the Empire and unclung to the nationalist impulse, the Muslim Albanians could be Turkified. Thus, in Albanian schools Turkish was made compulsory as the means of instruction. This and similar policies provoked Albanian nationalism and led to the continuos uprisings finalised in the secession of Albania.¹⁰¹ This caused a shocking impact in the CUP's nationalist circles. The result was the acceleration of ethnic Turkish nationalism, assuming the form of Pan-Turanism in the beginning and Pan-Turkism¹⁰² later on. Both movements assumed

⁹⁹Malmisanij, *Yüz Yılın Başlarında Kürt Milliyetçiliği*, 65. The deported Kurdish local leaders (aghas and sheikhs) would be prevented to enter any connection with deported Kurds in the regions they were sent and be kept under the supervision of government. See *ibid.*

¹⁰⁰Sultan Abdulhamit, *Siyasi Hatıratım* (My Political Memoirs), 4th ed. (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1984), 73-75.

¹⁰¹Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 206.

Turkish leadership in the Empire. The seeds of Turkish nationalism formed around Anatolian Turks were thus sowed.¹⁰³

One of the important ethnic groups who showed great reaction against the CUP's Turkism was Arabs.¹⁰⁴ This was clear in the reform bill accepted by Beirut Provincial Council in 3 January, 1913, which demanded the recognition of Arabic as the official language, acceptance of the principle of performing military service locally and decentralisation at large. The CUP government immediately refused these demands. But, upon the events of passive resistance, the CUP government first recognised a limited financial autonomy, and then made the Arabic as

¹⁰²Pan-Turkism is a movement striving for cultural and/or physical union among all peoples of Turkic origin (proven or alleged), both inside and outside the Ottoman Empire/Turkey. Pan-Turanism is a movement aiming at the union among all peoples of Turanian origin, an undefined area in the steppes of Central Asia, the borders of which extends to China in the east, Tibet, India and Iran in the South and the desert of Dash-i in the north. Thus, Pan-Turanism is a far broader concept than Pan-Turkism , embracing such peoples as the Hungarians, Finns and Estonians. See Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 1.

¹⁰³Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki*, 228-29.

¹⁰⁴See Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, *Ziya Gökalp'in Tenkidi* (The Criticism of Ziya Gökalp) (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınlari, 1989), 85. In his political memoirs, Hüseyin Cahit mentions a case of the eruption of Arab nationalism. Elected to the 1908 parliament as the SUP candidate from Fizan, the membership of Cami Bey was objected by an Arab deputy claiming that "Cami Bey is an officer and sent to Fizan as a state official. He is not from local people; therefore his membership cannot be accepted." Another Arab deputy, Abdulhamid Zehravi, intervened and warned: "Consider the safety of the country!" The election of a Turkish officer from an Arab city was considered as detrimental to the interests of state. In this way, Arab nationalism asserted its power in the parliament. See Yalçın, *Siyasal Anılar*, 144-45. Atay notes that Cemal Pasha, the Ottoman commander in Syria and Palestine during the World War I, was seen as the commander of an occupying army by the native Arab residents due to his harsh security measures and execution of leading Arab notables. See Falih Rıfki Atay, *Zeytindağı* (Istanbul: MEB Yayınlari, 1987), 41.

the main language in schools in the Arab regions except for some lessons such as history and geography. In the Arabic speaking regions, the Arabic could be used in courts. The performance of military service locally followed these measures. But they were not enough to satisfy Arab nationalist circles although part of Arab public opinion was persuaded.¹⁰⁵

During the war, after the resignation of Süleyman al-Bustami, no non-Turkish minister could become minister. In 1-2 June, 1916, the governor of Mecca Şerif Hüseyin revolted against the Ottoman Empire and seized Mecca. Arabs chose their way. Once again, it became evident that the CUP was the representative of Turkish nationalism and now there remained no internal obstacle to which Akçura referred before the realisation of a Turkist programme.¹⁰⁶

The nationalist policies of the CUP faced severe criticisms of the political opposition. According to Şerif Pasha, one of the leading figures of the post-1908 period, the CUP collided with every race and ethnical one by one. By ascribing separatist and revolutionary goals to this and that without any ground however, it offended all ethnies, from Greeks to Armenians, from Arabs to Albanians respectively, and turned them into its enemies.¹⁰⁷

According to Abdullah Cevdet, the real equality for all ethnies comprising the union must be recognised: "Citizens! Turkiya belongs to those from Turkiya. Turkish citizens have definitely the same rights and liberties. No ethnies, for example Arabs over Turks, Turks over Arabs, Arabs over Albanians, have supremacy over another one."¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 257-258.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 287 and 289.

¹⁰⁷ Şerif Pasha, *Bir Muhalifin Hatıraları*, 22.

Moreover, nations and ethnies comprising the Ottoman union could develop their own cultures and take into account their national interests. Cevdet's position seems to be in the middle of those who were inclined to Turkish nationalism and those lending support to minority nationalism. Cevdet was a real Ottoman Kurd.¹⁰⁹

The criticisms levelled against the CUP's policy of nationalities were replied by Hüseyin Cahit, in his article titled "Türklük-Müslümanlık- Osmanlılık"¹¹⁰ in 1909. According to the article, the CUP gave up its enthusiastic embracement of Ottomanism and had no other way except Turkism to follow. If the Turks would remain in the rule of the Ottoman Empire, then Turkism was the only option to prefer. Because of ethnic separatist movements, the CUP was strongly against the measures of decentralisation. According to Cahit, decentralisation meant "to throw Midilli, Sakız and other islands to the embrace of Greeks."¹¹¹

3.3. CUP and Its Turkish Pillar

The disintegration of the millet system accompanied by the secularisation of the concept of millet with the introduction of a new division of labour based on abstract and segmented crystallisation of human relations prepared a ripe socio-economic and intellectual ground for the rise of Turkish nationalism.

The nineteenth century was essentially the age of minority nationalism for the Ottoman Empire: The permanently increasing trend

¹⁰⁸Cited by Hanioğlu, *Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, 217.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 218.

¹¹⁰Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), "Türklük-Müslümanlık-Osmanlılık" (Turkishness-Muslimness-Ottomaness)*Tanin*, 16 September 1909 (1325). For the full text of the article, see Appendix A.

¹¹¹Ibid.

of the development of minority nationalism beginning with the secession of Greece from the Empire in 1829, the military clashes caused by the internal nationalist uprisings and as a consequence the nationalist socialisation the Ottoman-Turkish officers experienced during their counter efforts against minority nationalisms, particularly in Macedonia, and the nationalist awareness created by the studies of orientalist scholars on the history, folklore and language of ethnic Turks at the elite level.¹¹²

With the emergence of a nationalist Turkish elite, the content of the concept "Turk" assumed a new character. The newspapers used frequently the expressions like "the noble Turkish nation" Yet the appearance of "Turk" as a "noble" concept and the locus of a new identity was making sense alongside Ottomanism and Islamism only Turkishness was secondary with respect to Ottomanism and Islamism.¹¹³ But not all Young Turk intellectuals and activists shared this view. For example, the leading positivist Young Turk Abdullah Cevdet considered religion as a setback before the development of the national consciousness.¹¹⁴

¹¹²For the orientalist studies on ethnic Turks in nineteenth century see Şükrü Hanioglu, "Türkçülük"(Turkism), *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.5 (İstanbul:İletişim Yayıncılıarı, 1985), 1396; and Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, 107-110.

¹¹³This interrelationship was expressed by Mizancı Murat, an outstanding figure of the Young Turk Movement in the newspaper *Saadet* as follows: "*Saadet* is an Ottoman newspaper. Ottoman means Turkish. The concepts of "Turk" and "Ottoman" are not alien to "Islam" in view of those who hold these identities." Cited by Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 113.

¹¹⁴"Today, Turkish soldiers do not understand anything from nationality. Because it was forbidden for them to understand that until near times. This prohibition was valid even for the Sultan himself. In musics, pieces exciting Turkishness and nationality were prohibited. God willing, from now on, they will learn and understand. Yet, today the Turkish soldier who does not understand anything from nationality, is

In the grasp of nationalism by Ottoman intellectuals we observe the overt effects of Ottoman political structure, i.e., state tradition. Because Ottomans considered state formation as the most important political action, the preservation of the “eternity of state” was seen as the most important political activity. This is why the Young Turks held the same view with Abdulhamid, their arch enemy regarding Turkism. They adopted Ottomanism as the main political frame and ascribing Turkishness a place only within it. They could envisage the feasibility of the inculcation of the idea of Ottomanism in order to protect the integrity of the Empire.¹¹⁵ Accordingly, ethnic nationalisms of all kinds were refused.¹¹⁶

During the Hamidian period, the secularising impact of Turkist studies was reflected essentially in cultural realm. Due to severe political censorship however, positions taken around literary questions sometimes reflected political tendencies.¹¹⁷ Overall, questions of history

fairly loyal to his religion which he does not know its true nature.” In order to remove the lack of consciousness in society, the national consciousness should be awarded through deliberate efforts including the instrumental use of religion for this purpose. See Hanioglu, *Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, 340.

¹¹⁵Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 305-306.

¹¹⁶See Niyazi Berkes, *Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 321.

¹¹⁷The following quotation from Şemsettin Sami, a leading Turkist intellectual is an clear-cut example of the state of “making politics through linguistics”: “What is and where does the language we speak originate from?

We don't see the expression “Ottoman language”, because this is a title given to the state established by the first of Ottoman Sultans. Whereas, language and race (*cinsiyet*) are older than the rise of this state. The name of the nation (*kavim*) speaking this language is Turk and their language is called Turkish. Considered as blameworthy in the opinion of the ignorant people and used to refer only to Anatolian peasants, this name is the name of a nation (*millet*) which gives honour to those

and language were as Berkes proposes, not “nationalistic question(s), but (...) an aspect of the trend of enlightenment.”¹¹⁸ Alongside censorship, the interest of Turkist writers for the integrity of state led to the confinement of Turkism into its cultural aspects.¹¹⁹

Despite Ottomanism, and hence the refusal of recognition to Turkishness a political status, the promotion of Turkish ethnies (*kavmiyet*) in terms of its separate existence led to a new cultural drive in studies of Turkish history, geography, and literature.¹²⁰ The establishment of the concept of an independent Turkish language instead of Ottoman language and the creation of an intellectual climate conducive for language reforms were the achievements of this cultural drive.¹²¹

The increasing signs of the dissolution of the Empire, e.g., the Macedonia question, and the Japanese victory over Russians (1904), which dealt an heavy blow to the European hierarchy of races considering Turks within non-Aryan, yellow, i.e., inferior race created a national self confidence which reflected itself first in Yusuf Akçura’s *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*. Ahmet Rıza’s use of "Turk" instead of "Osmanlı" was another indication of this nationalist mood. The theory of the racial supremacy of Europeans and the European imperialism led the Young Turks toward a strong anti-western position. Nevertheless, the Young Turks were influenced from a

feeling allegiance to it”, Şemsettin Sami, *Hafta*, No: 2; cited by Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 114.

¹¹⁸Berkes, *Development of Secularism*, 321.

¹¹⁹Kushner, *Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, 98 and Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri* 62.

¹²⁰Kushner, *Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, 26.

¹²¹Ibid., 80.

theory such that a positivist like Ahmet Rıza could mention "purity of blood" and "the nobility of character".¹²² Akçura's description of "Turkish nationalism based on race" reflects the same effect.

With the merger of CUP with Ottoman Freedom Society as mentioned above, ethnic nationalism based on the dominance of Turks within the CUP took its decisive form and became the defining component of the CUP's ideological trio.¹²³ In a letter dated 2 June, 1906 written from the central branch of the CUP to its Kızanlık branch in Bulgaria, the following remarks are noteworthy: "We can accept non-Muslims to our Society only under certain conditions", and then the final remark comes: "Our society is a pure Turkish society".¹²⁴

In pre-1908 revolution, nationalism had became a ground of justification both for Turkists, and some Islamists and Westernists. The transformation of the concept of "Turk" into a source of proud, the establishment of Turkish speaking peoples outside the Ottoman Empire as brothers in race, and the fixing of Turkish language and Turkish history as the bases of nationality were developments majority of the educated elites embraced. When the CUP came into power, it intensified the process of the transformation of cultural Turkism into political one.

The period CUP remained in power (1908-1918) was marked by continuos wars and rebellions. At the end of the First World War, Ottoman Empire was basically confined into the Anatolian peninsula with the addition of a small part of Thrace. On the other hand, during this period, CUP faced incessantly with demands for decentralisation and

¹²²Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 208-9.

¹²³ Hanioglu, Interview by Şahin Alpay, *Milliyet*, 31 July 1995, 18.

¹²⁴Quoted by Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihad ve Terakki*, 57 and 78.

self-rule by ethno-religious minorities. When accompanied with demands for sharing political power, these demands greatly contributed to the increasing sense of isolation in the Turkish nationalist elites and hence accelerated the CUP's drift toward the manifest Turkish nationalism as its official policy.¹²⁵

It was Hüseyin Cahit who first declared this position in an article titled "Millet-i Hakime" (The Dominant Nation) in *Tanin*.¹²⁶ "No" said Cahit, "this country would be the country of Turks. We all would unite under the name of Ottoman. But the form of state never would change except (required by) the special interests of Turkish nation." Because, "the dominant nation in this country is Turks and would be Turks".¹²⁷ The fact that the CUP was the organisation of Turks vis a vis the organisations of ethnic minorities invited no doubt. The possibility of falling under the dominance of non-Turkish peoples marked the nationalism of the CUP. That is why it did not comply with the constitutional rules of the game and suspended the representative system of politics. But it could not confess this state of affairs and hence oscillated between the requirements of *Meşrutiyet*, which it could not give up, and that of Turkish nationalism, to which it felt strong loyalty.

Until the Balkan wars there was no nationalist refusing the idea of Ottoman nation except for Yusuf Akçura. A Turkist journal *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens), appeared in Salonica in 1911, advocated linguistic nationalism, offered many suggestions for language reform but kept

¹²⁵Kushner, *Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, 97-99.

¹²⁶Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), "Millet-i Hakime" (The Dominant Nation), *Tanin*, 25 November 1324(1908). For the full text of this article, see Appendix B.

¹²⁷Ibid.

emphasis on the Ottoman union. Its purpose, in fact, was to contribute to the efforts for “saving the country” It had no interest in outside Turks.¹²⁸ Another Turkist publication *Türk Derneği* (Turkish Society) (1908) was full of articles reflecting the idea of Ottoman patriotism. In the contributions of writers from Russia, however, the signs of Pan-Turkism can be identified.¹²⁹

The real Turkist platform turned out to be *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland) (1911), a fortnightly journal. Among the contributors were Ziya Gökalp, the member of CUP’s central committee, Yusuf Akçura, Ahmed Agayef, Mehmet Fuat and Hüseyinzâde Ali. It emerged as the publication organ of *Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti* (Society of Turkish Homeland), founded in 31 August , 1911. The programme of the *Cemiyet* adopted the policy of *Tevhid-i Etrak* (Turkish union) proposed by Yusuf Akçura in Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset.

Unlike *Türk Derneği* and *Genç Kalemler*, in *Türk Yurdu* only two articles dealing with Ottoman Empire and Ottoman Turks appeared, and none of these articles did touch upon the question of the Ottoman integrity. These qualities turned *Türk Yurdu* into a non-Ottomanist, Pan-Turkist journal providing a common platform for the theoretical issues of political as well as cultural Turkism.¹³⁰

Türk Yurdu tried to create a national identity for Turks besides Ottomanism. Its main purpose was to make Turks gain national

¹²⁸For *Yeni Lisan* (New Language) thesis of *Genç Kalemler* , see Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 49-79.

¹²⁹ Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey A Study of Irredentism* , 38-39. For *Türk Derneği*, also see Arai, *Jön Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 47-48; and Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 343-44.

¹³⁰Arai, *Jön Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 85 and Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 344.

consciousness, "who lived an unconscious life under the Ottoman flag." Therefore, it attempted to examine pre-Ottoman Turkish history, traditions and states. According to the intellectual circles around Turk Yurdu, Ottomanism was not a national identity because nation formation was a natural fact. This was, of course, valid for Turks as well. All these efforts in this line were described as "the discovery of a new race"

Balkan wars strengthened Turkist position because Ottomanism was buried at the end of the war with the loss of all non-Muslim minorities except Armenians and a small number of Greeks (Rum). Ottomanism lost its *raison detre*. For Arabs, of course, pan-Islamism seemed enough. In this conditions, cultural Turkism rapidly assumed a political dimension and turned into a political movement aiming at the arousal of a national consciousness among the Ottoman Turks and securing the unity of all Turks (Pan-Turkism). The final aim was to unite the world Turks under one political organisation around a common language and culture (*hars*).

There was two views about this organisation regarding the borders and the nations it covers: The first view was the idea of Pan-Turanism, expressing the unity of all Turanian peoples including Turks, Mongols, Magyars, Bulgars and others.¹³¹ The second view envisaged only the

¹³¹For pan-Turanism see Kushner, *Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, 43-44, and Jacob Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey A Study of Irredentism* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981).

Ömer Seyfettin, a Turkist-Turanist storian and one of the contributors of the Turkist literary magazine *Genç Kalemler*, in one of his stories entitled "*Primo Türk Çocuğu Nasıl Doğdu, Nasıl Öldü?*" (Primo, the Turkish Child, How was He Born, How did He Die?) narrates the tale of a young person whose father is Turk and mother Italian, considering himself Italian and not knowing any Turkish. The story is about Primo's turning toward himself, i.e. Turkisness, which was deemed as "backwardness" and "blockheadness" in foreign and high society circles in a time when Trablis was occupied by Italy.

unity of Turkish peoples (Pan-Turkism). it covered Ottoman, Russian and Chinese Turks. These organisations could be created after the formation of national consciousness and hence national existence. The main proponents of these ideas were Ziya Gökalp, Ömer Seyfettin and Tekin Alp.

The political programmes of Pan- Turanism and Pan-Turkism did not gain much support unlike its socio-cultural and literary aspects. During the World War I, however Turkism became the official ideology of the CUP and the Bolshevik Revolution revived the Pan-Turkist visions and created an enthusiastic mood in Turkish circles, which led to Enver Pasha's invasion of Transcaucasia in 1918 and his later military struggle against Bolshevik forces in Central Asia.

With the conclusion of Mondros Armistice (1918), all hopes for Pan-Turkism turned into wishful thinking. Turkism, from then on,

The dialogue occurred between Primo and his father while he was choosing a Turkish name for himself gives some credits to Süleyman Nazif's accusation of "Jenghiz illness" levelled against Turkists. Primo readily accepts his father's suggestion of selecting a Turkish name for himself and lists some names: Enver and Niyazi. These names are refused by his fathers due to the fact that they are of Arabic origin. Upon this, the following dialogue takes place between them:

Father: "Are the Turkish names different?"

Father: "Yes."

Primo: "Like what?"

Father: "For example, Oğuz, Turhan, Orhan, Cengiz, Turgut, Alp and so on."

Father: "Oh, Oğuz, Oğuz... Lets name you Oğuz"

Primo: "Is that the name of a great man?"

Father: "The name of the greatest Turk."

Primo: "Is it a Pasha?"

Father: "No, he is the first khan of Turks." See Ömer Seyfettin, "Primo Türk Çocuğu Nasıl Doğdu, Nasıl Oldu?" in *Türklük Ülküsü* (The Turkish Ideal)(Istanbul: Toker Yayınlari, 1990), 120-121.

From then on, the little Oğuz starts reading the book "Gök Bayrak" given to him by his father and dreams of the armies of Cebe Noyan, a famous commander of Jenghiz, and palaces of Jenghiz Khan. See Ömer Seyfettin, *ibid.*, 87-130.

would survive within the Anatolian independence movement. But the new nationalism in Anatolia focused only to Anatolian geography. Nevertheless, as Arai aptly observed, it inherited from Turkism the ideal of creating a national community proud of being Turk.¹³²

3.4. CUP's Third Pillar: Instrumental Islamism

Developed essentially by the Young Ottomans and reactivated by Abdulhamid II in coalition with the representatives of folk Islam, i.e., *tarikats*, and particularly the Nakşibendis, as an anti-imperialist movement against Western domination, Pan-Islamism as a reactive formation prescribing Islamic modernisation as well as the unity of Muslim peoples¹³³ was a common ground of justification shared also by Young Turks as well as the state as the main component of its official ideology.

The Young Turks were socialised with positivist-progressivist theses of the nineteenth century. Therefore they categorically refused the revelational side of all religions and believed that the socio economic backwardness was essentially caused by religious teachings. Accordingly, the positivist suggestion was the substitution of religion with a scientific world view. The criterion for truth was scientific "laws" Another point of emphasis was the melting of individual within society. The society envisaged by positivism was a "programmed society" and hence the direction of social evolution could be predicted and be taken under control through "social physics", i.e., sociology. The mottoes of "progress"

¹³²Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 146.

¹³³For pan-Islamism and its process of emergence, the following source is an excellent one: Mümtaz'er Türköne, *Siyasi Bir İdeoloji Olarak Islamcılıkın Doğuşu* (The Emergence of Islamism as a Political Ideology) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1991).

and "order" were two keys corresponding to the diagnoses of the Young Turks with regard to the problems of Ottoman Empire. Besides, as a non-Christian Western philosophy, the dominance of positivism could become an integrative factor with the western world.¹³⁴

The main determining factor shaping the attitude of Young Turks toward Islam was thus positivist teaching. Although they believed that Islam was the real cause of socio-economic backwardness, nevertheless, as a political movement struggling against the autocracy of Abdulhamid II, they had to find a way of temporary cohabitation with Islam due to the fact that the basis of the justification of the Ottoman rule in Muslim-populated areas was Islam and that Abdulhamid was co-operating with religious orders, particularly Nakşibendis, in his pan-Islamist leanings. Given this state of affairs, the Young Turks could not take an anti-Islamist position. On the contrary, given the solidaristic ties created by the consciousness of belonging to the same religious community and being the only legitimate popular communication channel which could mobilise "masses" as an opposition force against Abdulhamid's rule, Islam was the most appropriate means of popular legitimacy and political opposition.¹³⁵

Thus, an Islamic position was extremely meaningful in terms of realising the ideals of "liberty", "union" and "progress", which the CUP adopted as its motto. On the other hand, Islam was useful in the introduction of modernist/westernist "reforms". The presentation of non or even anti-Islamic changes on the ground of Islamic teachings rather than positivist credentials based on biological materialism could

¹³⁴Hanioglu, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türkler*, 619-21.

¹³⁵Hanioglu, *ibid.*, 141-157.

neutralise popular opposition to the products of Ottoman modernisation.¹³⁶

The 1906 was a turning point in the ideological evolution of the CUP. With its merger with *Osmancı Hürriyet Cemiyeti*, the CUP gave up its emphasis on Islamism and shifted to Ottoman (read Turkish) nationalism. The precedence of Ottomanism over Islamism found a clear reflection in the elimination of the CUP's Cairo branch, which, unlike the central branch, was under the control of the *ulema*. The coalition of the CUP with *ulema* was, to an important extent, dissolved.

The anarchical climate of the post-1908 Revolution removed the necessity of presenting modern-secular views through the Islamic filtration.¹³⁷ In the first days of the revolution, the hero of Meşrutiyet, Enver Pasha explicitly stated that "there is no place in their program for Pan-Islamism."¹³⁸ This did not mean that the policy of making use of Islam for the attainment of the ideals of CUP was totally abandoned, however. Islam always remained as a reserve power for the CUP.

¹³⁶For example, in terms of the use of Islamic teachings for the propagation of biological materialism, the position of Abdullah Cevdet is most illuminating. Cevdet is of the opinion that nothing originated from Christian West could be introduced in Ottoman polity due to the popular contempt felt against the Christian world. The thing to be done is to carefully abstain from violating religious sentiments of people and present western institutions and way of life through covering them in an Islamic garment. This was a temporary but essential strategy in the evolutionary transition to scientific society. See Hanioglu, *Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, 130-140. This attitude was exactly imitated by Mustafa Kemal during the Anatolian war of independence in his resort to the support of *ulema* and sheikhs as a transitional tactic.

¹³⁷Abdullah Cevdet could translate and openly publish *The History of Islam* written by the Flemish orientalist Reinhard Dozy, which Muslims found insulting and pejorative.

¹³⁸Hanioglu, *Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, 157.

The continuing force of Islam at popular level and the transformation of Ottoman Empire into a *de facto* Turkish-Arab state however, caused the CUP leaders to be sensitive to the Islamic feelings. After the Arab revolt of 1916 however, the CUP freed itself of Islamic restraints more easily. Nevertheless it tried to form its own conception of reformed Islam, which resulted in the issuance of the *Islam Mecmuası* (Islamic Review) in 1914. The journal tried to develop a Turkish version of Islam under the motto of "A life with religion, and a religion with life."¹³⁹

Overall, one can safely suggest that the CUP pursued a policy of reformed Islamization circumscribed by the principles of Turkish nationalism developed basically by its main theoretician and at the same time ideologue, Ziya Gökalp.¹⁴⁰

3.5. Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924)

Ziya Gökalp¹⁴¹, the main theoretician of the Young Turk movement, joined the CUP in 1909 and was elected to its Central Committee in 1910. He fulfilled the same duty until 1918. While he was

¹³⁹For a detailed evaluation of *Islam Mecmuası* see Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 127-143.

¹⁴⁰Arai's suggestion that Turkish nationalists did not always adhere to secular policies and that they were after a way of modernisation other than westernisation which would allow Islamization could be seen from this perspective of "Turkified Islam" of the SUP. See Arai, *ibid.*, 147.

¹⁴¹The original name of Ziya Gökalp is Mehmet Ziya. He used the nickname "Gökalp" in his writings and poems published in *Genç Kalemler* during 1912. See Rohat, *Ziya Gökalp'in Büyük Çilesi Kurtler* (İstanbul:Fırat Yayınları, 1992), 59-60. For his short life story see Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilisation*, trans. Niyazi Berkes (New York: Colombia University Press, 1959), 35-45, and Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, 19-40. Also see Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, vol. 2 , 493-543 and 584-614.

leading the Turkist movement intellectually, in his capacity as the member of the CUP's Central Committee he exerted great influence in giving a Turkist character to the policy-making process as it became manifest during the 1916 CUP Congress where he formulated public policy suggestions discussed during the debates there.¹⁴²

The main problematic of the last decade of the Empire (1908-1918), apart from the question of political survival, was the formulation of a new identity in view of changing socio-political conditions, the direction of which was toward a culture-based national state instead of a multi-cultural, religiously-legitimated Empire. Against this nationalist challenge, Gökalp suggested a new matrix of identity with three faces: Turkism, Islamism and Modernism. The main dynamic of this ideological trinity resulted from the fact that religion has lost its total hold over society both at national and international level. In structurally-differentiated modern societies, religion could only be one among many determinants of human condition. Culture at national level and science at international level assumed the functions previously held by religion.¹⁴³ Thus, he offered a new synthesis between Turkish national culture, Islam and modernisation where each of them came together to form an aspect of the new Turkish identity.

¹⁴²These policy suggestions included the removal of the highest Islamic official of the Empire, the *Şeyh-ül Islam*, from the cabinet, the transfer of the religious courts to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and the transfer of the religious colleges (*madrases*) to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. Apart from all this, he suggested the termination of the financial and administrative autonomy of religious foundations (*evkaf*), including the Christian ones. See Andrew Davison, "Secularisation and Modernisation in Turkey The Ideas of Ziya Gökalp," *Economy and Society*, 24:2(May 1995), 196-197; Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, 35-36, and Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 142.

¹⁴³Davison, "Secularisation and Modernisation in Turkey," 202.

Like other Unionists, in the beginning of his political-intellectual career, Gökalp favoured Ottomanism vis à vis Islamist and Turkist visions of polity. This was in a way an inevitable choice "imposed" by the practical reality of political survival. The Turkish elements under Ottomanist guise in Gökalp's ideas however, gradually displaced Ottomanism to a secondary position, as it became manifest in his famous poem *Turan* (1911), which Gökalp himself considered it as an expression of outright Turkism.

Following the waning of Ottomanist enthusiasm of the first days of the 1908 revolution after Balkan and the First World War provoked by secessionist as well as imperialist nationalisms, Gökalp observed that multinational empires are doomed to extinction and due to the necessity of forming a homogeneous national society in accordance with the nationalist creed only people embracing the same culture can have allegiance to the same fatherland and hence there exists no way but Turkism for the restructurisation of the Ottoman Empire as a national state.¹⁴⁴ The "forced" hypocrisy of the CUP hiding its Turkism under Ottoman cloak was thus come to an end.¹⁴⁵

The Ottomanism of the CUP, according to Gökalp, delayed the development of Turkish nationalism and accelerated the secessionist tendencies of minority nationalisms including Muslim ones because the march of history was toward national communities from ethno-religious ones, a view shared also by Abdullah Cevdet. The imminent task facing the Turkish national elites was to develop a comprehensive Turkist programme in order to create national consciousness among the Turkish people.

¹⁴⁴Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 43-45.

¹⁴⁵Gökalp, *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, 58.

Shifting Durkheimian observations at the social level to the level of nation,¹⁴⁶ Gökalp emphasised the importance of the unravelling of ideals immanent in the national spirit, which would form the basis of national culture. In the process of rediscovery of "ideals" immanent in the national subconscious (*ma'seri vicdan*),¹⁴⁷ the nationalist elites would have the leading role. National education would socialise people into the national ideals through which a purified and living cultural tradition would be built up. In order to develop Turkish culture, a two-tier policy should be followed: the inquiries into the history of the non-Muslim ancient Turks and studies of popular culture protecting its original character vis a vis external influences.¹⁴⁸ Gökalp considers the preservation of Turkish national culture as essential in the context of modernisation in that it is culture that makes a nation peculiar to itself. The reproduction of culture through living native institutions is one of his primary concerns, which he expressed as follows: "The culture of a nation is not something to be imposed or instituted."¹⁴⁹

According to Gökalp, "the ideal of modernity necessitates only the acceptance of the theoretical and practical sciences and techniques from Europe."¹⁵⁰ As a positivist sociologist, for him, modern civilisation meant the civilisation common to the nations of Europe, but not

¹⁴⁶For Gökalp's sociological idealism and his way of adoption of Durkheim's concept of society into nation see "Historical Materialism and Sociological Idealism," in Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism*, 104-109.

¹⁴⁷Ibid.

¹⁴⁸Ibid., 15-17 and 61-62.

¹⁴⁹Gökalp, "Manifestations of National Ethos," in *Turkish Nationalism*, 166.

¹⁵⁰Gökalp, "National Education," in *Turkish Nationalism*, 245.

reducible to their cultures owing to his belief that modern civilisation was non-religious (lâ-dinî).

Unlike Durkheim, he made a distinction between culture and civilisation. Culture, according to him, have a subjective and emotional character and covers the totality of feelings, judgements and ideals particular to a certain nation. Civilisation, on the other hand, is objective and intellectual and involves the intersectional set of spiritual and material values common to different nations.¹⁵¹ Objective and scientific nature of modern civilisation created a new, true internationality, which could be shared by all nations embracing different cultures.¹⁵²

Drawing upon this differentiation of culture from civilisation, Gökalp believes that with the embracement of manners and customs of the ancient Turks,¹⁵³ and the examining of various aspects of living popular culture such as Turkish folklore, ethnography, archaeology and popular literature, the elite-mass dichotomy would be resolved and a strong national culture would emerge both of which instrumental in absorbing the spread of values stemming from the presently dominant Western civilisation within the exclusive domain of national culture. In

¹⁵¹Gökalp, "Towards Western Civilisation "in *Turkish Nationalism*, 269. See also Gökalp, "Culture and Civilisation ,"*ibid.*, 104-109.

¹⁵²Gökalp, "Three Currents of Thought," in *Turkish Nationalism*, 76-77.

¹⁵³According to Gökalp, ancient Turks had all "good" qualities for daily life. They were open-minded, modest, faithful, free from fanaticism, courageous, respectful of women, inclined to social equality and dedicated to the principle of consultation in the conduct of their common affairs. See Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, 113-114. It seems that this naive description of the ancient Turks, which was shared by Kemalist nationalism, have a thoroughly anachronistic character. For a criticism of the over-sublimation of the collective attributes of ancient Turks, see Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, *Ziya Gökalp'in Tenkidi* , 109-111.

that way, civilisation conceived as techno-scientific methods would become easily assimilated into the fabric of national culture.¹⁵⁴

The main reason why Gökalp put such an emphasis on the dichotomy of culture and civilisation lies in his understanding of nation and nationalism. According to Gökalp, nation is a society consisting of people who speak the same language, have had the same education and embraced the same religion, and moral and aesthetic ideals, in short, those who participate in a common culture (*terbiye*)".¹⁵⁵

Gökalp's understanding of culture-civilisation as a conceptual frame for modernity is a positivist answer within the context of social evolution which diagnoses nationalism and science as the new building powers of human identities, and accordingly, considering the place of religion in this new matrix of identity as not private but "necessarily social", yet at the same time non-political. Criticising the views that considering Gökalp's position regarding the place and significance of

¹⁵⁴Gökalp rejects the reception of spiritual values from other nations. According to him, these values should be derived from the religious and national heritage. See Gökalp, *Türkleşmek, İslamlasmak, Muasırlaşmak*, 16 and 35-36. Also for Gökalp's consideration of religion as part of national culture see Gökalp, "Is Turkey a Modern Nation?" in *Turkish Nationalism*, 142-144. According to Gökalp, "There are three main points to be considered in discussing the culture of a people: social structure, religion and language. These are the criteria indicating to which social species a society belongs." (...) "Turkish culture (...) is based on a social structure which is democratic, and on a religion which is modern," ibid., 43.

¹⁵⁵Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (The Principles of Turkism), 22; and "Culture and Refinement," in *Turkish Nationalism*, 281. This definition was adopted for the first time in the 1931 programme of the Republican People's Party, with the exclusion of the religious element: "The nation is a political and social body composed of citizens who are bound together by unity of language, culture and ideal." See Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması(1923-1931)* (The Establishment of One Party State in Turkey, 1923-1931), 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989), 447.

religion in modern world as secular,¹⁵⁶ radically secular¹⁵⁷, not enough **secular**¹⁵⁸ or more religious than secular,¹⁵⁹ Davison asserts that there is **no** conclusive definition of secularity and hence what these authors **engaged** is an example of "norm-setting". To Davison, Gökalp did not **aimed** to provide a secular vision of human evolution. Instead under **changing** conditions of modern life, he prescribed a semi-public, non-**private**, non-political social role as a legitimate and necessary component of Turkish culture.¹⁶⁰ This position is in total agreement with that of Durkheim who accepts the enduring significance of religion in modern life. With the conditions that if required, *nass* (conclusive injunctions of Islam) should be interpreted according to *örf* (customary law), and that it becomes non-political, Gökalp considers Islam as part of Turkish identity and as a living institution of the Turkish national ethos.¹⁶¹

Gökalp's demarcation between culture and civilisation was refused altogether by Kemalist nationalism which suggested that there is only one civilisation, that is, the western civilisation. There can be no independent space for culture distinct from civilisation.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁶See Niyazi Berkes, "Translator's Introduction," in *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilisation*, Ziya Gökalp, 57-58 and 88-92.

¹⁵⁷Parla, Ziya Gökalp, *Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm*, 47-50.

¹⁵⁸Dodd, C. H., *Democracy and Development in Turkey* (North Humberside: Ethoen Press, 1979).

¹⁵⁹Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 145-147.

¹⁶⁰Davison, "Secularisation and Modernisation in Turkey," 190-191.

¹⁶¹Ibid., 212.

¹⁶²Although Kemalist nationalism refused Gökalp's culture-distinction, it accepted its glorification of ancient Turks, an indication of which was the names given to two government banks: *Sümer Bank*

Gökalp adopts the Durkheimian scheme of the historical evolution of human polity which suggests four main stages humanity has passed: tribal society (*aşiret*), kinship society (*kavim*), religious community (*ümmet*) and national society (*millet*).¹⁶³ Here millet represents the climax of social development with its corollary of democratic and independent state. Though he does not conceive millet as the final and ideal form of society, nevertheless he attributes all the divine attributes to it in that according to him, millet is the source of all ideals and hence what national society wills is morally good: nationalism assumes a religious character as seen in the writings of the Italian nationalist thinker Giovanni Mazzini.¹⁶⁴

Gökalp rejects all definitions of nationality based on solely race, language, religion, ethnicity, territory, political identity and volition.¹⁶⁵ Contrary to common fallacies common in Turkey regarding Gökalp's nationalism, he does not relate national character to racial origins. According to Gökalp, no nation can be racially homogeneous. Turks are one of the most heterogeneous nations in racial terms. Those from different origins but socialised into the same culture (Turkish culture)—Arabs, Albanians, etc.—should be regarded as Turks.¹⁶⁶ Otherwise,

(Bank of the Sumerians) and *Eti Bank* (Bank of the Hittites). See Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, 112-3.

¹⁶³ Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, 57-60. In his manifesto of Turkism, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (Principles of Turkism), which offers a detailed programme of reform, he mentions only three stages: *cemia* (*aşiret*), *cemaat* (*ümmet*) and *cemiyet* (*millet*). See Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 81-84, and Gökalp, *Türkleşmek, İslamlamak, Muasırlaşmak*, 113.

¹⁶⁴ Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, 59.

¹⁶⁵ Gökalp, "What is a Nation?" in *Turkish Nationalism*, 134-138.

¹⁶⁶ Rehat, from a Kurdish nationalist view point, suggests that Gökalp's denial of ethnic origin as a basis of nationality is related to his

many intellectuals and thinkers would have to be sacrificed,¹⁶⁷ including the poet of the National Anthem Mehmed Akif, an Albanian in ethnic terms.

For Gökalp, education (*terbiye*) and ideals (*mefkure*) are essentials of nationality: "Men want to live together, not with those who carry the same blood in their veins, but with those who share the same language and the same faith."¹⁶⁸ Religion makes sense to the extent that it contributes positively to the formation of national ideals. What matters is not ontological-legal dimension of religion. Only the social value of religion has relevance in this regard. To Gökalp, "all ideals connected with ethnic unit, religion, state, national home, family, class, corporation, etc., are auxiliary to the national ideals."¹⁶⁹ And it is these national ideals (*hars*) which make Turks superior to the western nations dominating all over the world through their civilisational power. According to Gökalp, a nation with supreme culture and weak civilisation is more powerful than those with an higher civilisation but weak culture, which corresponded to the situation Turks live in.¹⁷⁰ This position is a clear

Kurdish origin. The dispute between Gökalp and an Ottomanist journalist Ali Kemal is the case in point. By referring to his Kurdish origin, Ali Kemal asks how a person from a different ethnic background can assume the intellectual leadership of Turkism. In his reply to Ali Kemal in poetic style, Gökalp cries: "Ben Türküm diyorsun, sen... Türk değilsin! / İslamım diyorsan değilsin İslam! / Ben, ne ırkım için senden vesika,/ Ne de dinim için istedim i'lam. (...) Türkük hem mefkurem, hem de kanımdır;/ Sırtımdan alınmaz çunkü kürk değil!/ Türkük hadimine Türk değil diyen,/ Soyca Türk olsa da, ...tir, Türk değil!" See Rohat, *Ziya Gökalp'in Büyük Çilesi*, 73-77.

¹⁶⁷Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 23.

¹⁶⁸Gökalp, "What is a Nation?" in *Turkish Nationalism* 137.

¹⁶⁹Gökalp, "Nation and Fatherland," in *Turkish Nationalism*, 82.

¹⁷⁰Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, 63-64.

indication of the fact that Gökalp's thought was conditioned more by the need to find remedies for actual problems of society and less by theoretical interests, which may explain its vicissitudes and contradictions.¹⁷¹

Gökalp's "one state, one language and one culture"¹⁷² has found an analytical framework of justification in Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism matching industrial state with a mono-culture. Gellner suggests that nation is a social formation peculiar to modern era. Nationalism, according to him, is the cultural reflection of standardising and homogenising dynamics of industrial society. This is a reformulation of Gökalp's theory of *hars* (culture) involving the totality of religious, moral, legal, intellectual, aesthetic, linguistic, economic and scientific lives of a nation.¹⁷³

The borders of Gökalp's nationalism underwent changes over time. In the first year of the 1908 revolution, under the impact of immigrant political nationalists like Ahmet Agayef, Hüseyinzade Ali and Yusuf Akçura, Gökalp was inclined first to the ideal of Turan. In 1911, he wrote a poem called "Turan", a couplet of which was:

The country of the Turks is not Turkey, nor yet Turkistan,
Their country is a broad and ever-lasting land, Turan.

On the ground of common cultural ties, Gökalp dreamt of a union of Turkish peoples as realised in the days of Attila, Jenghiz Khan and Timur. After the 1918 armistice of Mondros, however, Turanist aspirations waned due to the impossibility of achieving the Turan ideal under Ottoman leadership, and accordingly, he narrowed down his political programme to include only Oghuz Turks, while keeping his

¹⁷¹For a personal evaluation of Gökalp's formation of views in continuous evolution, see Yalçın, *Siyasal Anılar*, 123.

¹⁷²Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 105.

¹⁷³Ibid., 30.

Turanist vision as a distant ideal. In his last writings, Gökalp makes a three-level categorisation of Turkism: 1) Turkism confined to Turkey. 2) Turkism covering Oghuz Turks living in Harezm, Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkey. 3) Turanism involving all Turanian peoples comprising all the Turks and Turkic peoples. The third category represented the distant ideal of *Kızıl Elma* (the legendary Turkish land in Central Asia) of Turkists.¹⁷⁴

Gökalp's speculations in his capacity as a theoretician and party ideologue constituted one of the main links between the ideology of the CUP and the Kemalist regime. Though Kemalist nationalism differed from Gökalp's nationalism in many respects, nevertheless it inherited some of its main credentials from it. Gökalp's Turkified and reformed religion,¹⁷⁵ his suggestions regarding family law and family names, glorification of the ancient Turkish past, principles of republicanism, nationalism and laicism¹⁷⁶ and his solidarist conception of political economy formed the founding stones of the Kemalist world view. It must be noted however that Kemalist nationalism was incomparably radical in its approach to everything remembering the ancient regime (Ottoman socio-political order). Kemalist reforms in religion¹⁷⁷ and language¹⁷⁸ is most revealing in this respect.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., 28-29; Kushner, *Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, 100-101; and Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, 126-130.

¹⁷⁵According to Gökalp, "Turkism in religion simply means having religious scriptures, sermons and preaching all in Turkish" (...) "In order to ensure to our religious life a greater enjoyment and stimulation, it is necessary to have the Quran —except during the recitals, the litanies, the supplications that are read after prayers— and the sermons read in Turkish." See Gökalp, "Religion," in *Turkish Nationalism*, 301.

¹⁷⁶Parla, Ziya Gökalp, *Kemalism ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm*, 82-83.

¹⁷⁷While Kemalist nationalism put a deadly blow to the Arabic script and the Caliphate, Gökalp lent support to both, with a qualification

Regarding the constitution of ethnic homogeneity, Gökalp distinguished between Muslim and non-Muslim minorities. The starting point for him was the assumption that Turkish nation should be composed of Turkish-speaking Muslims only. Non-Muslim minorities, that is, Greeks, Armenians and Jews who lived in Turkey were Turks only in respect of citizenship, not of nationality. Being alien to Turkish culture, they could enjoy at most a highly limited cultural autonomy in contrast to the privileges provided by the Ottoman millet system. Gökalp's attitude regarding Muslim minorities, basically Kurds, is their assimilation into Turkishness.¹⁷⁹

Kemalist nationalism inherited Gökalp's ideal of a homogeneous Turkish nation through seclusion of non-Muslim minorities by keeping them within the social fabric as a non-harmful element and applying a fierce assimilation policy to Kurdish-speaking people.

emphasising the non-political character of the Caliphate as a symbolic force of Islamic unity.

¹⁷⁸Kemalist reforms in language excluded every words of Arabic or Persian from Turkish because of their common Islamic roots and instead introduced new words derived from non-used ancient Turkish dialects. Gökalp, however, suggests the modernisation of language in respect of notions, Islamization in respect of scientific terms, and Turkification in respect of all other words, and of grammar, syntax and orthography." See Gökalp, *Türkleşmek, İslamlamak, Muasırlaşmak*, 21; and *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 132-139.

¹⁷⁹Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, 132.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL BACKDROP: TOWARD THE BREAKDOWN OF THE POLITICO-RELIGIOUS MIND

4.1. Introduction

The dichotomy of the subject(ruled) and the sovereign(ruler) and the crystallisation of the main social cleavage around this dichotomy was the main social space in which political legitimacy and authority were located in the Ottoman politico-religious community. Throughout the Ottoman history, sultans were removed from their post from time to time; but the patrimonial legitimacy of the ruling Ottoman dynasty was never questioned. The Ottoman *örf-i sultani* (sultanic laws) and the Ottoman version of *sharia* (the Islamic law) were two basic determiners of the political framework.

Allegiance to the sultan-caliph was the only comprehensive, cross-cutting political identity for the ordinary people before and after the *millet* system. To shift, therefore, the locus of the political allegiance from the sultan-caliph to the Republic and from the Muslim *umma* to the nation as a well-defined territorial vision, was revolutionary indeed. And it was this revolutionary transformation that took shape during the period of the *National Struggle* (1919-1922) and after.

There was only one source of appeal that could transcend the religio-dynastic bond: the people itself. The Rousseauian understanding of popular sovereignty found strong echoes in the last decades of the

Ottoman Empire, and particularly in the Kemalist practice of "halk hükümeti" (people's government).¹ The mobilisation of people around the idea of the popular sovereignty accompanied by its Rousseauian complementary, "wise legislator," i.e., military-civilian intelligentsia, and later on, "Büyük Reis" (the Great Chief),² was the channel of transformation from the empire to the republic, from *umma* to nation, and from "subject- citizen" to "participant-individual citizen."

According to Anthony D. Smith, this model of national identity involved popular participation more than civic-political rights; populist organisational patterns rather than political parties; the interventionist nation-state instead of the protection of the rights of individuals and minorities against state interventions; and upon all this, the creation of newly formed ethno-political nation out of pre-modern demotic ethnies.³

Ottoman Empire in the last years of the second decade of the twentieth century was at the threshold of such a total transformation. The general landscape of the Empire exhibited a profound disarray. The *Treaty of Sevr* (10 August, 1920) was the epitomisation of the imperial political disintegration, which involved ethnicization of territoriality at the micro level. It was in this situation of popular helplessness and indifference at

¹The phrase "*Türkiye Halk Hükümeti*" (People's Republic of Turkey) was used officially for the first time in the article 8 of the declaration of the government submitted by Mustafa Kemal as the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly to the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly in 18. 09. 1920. See *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi* (Registers of the Grand National Assembly), vol.4, 180.

²As an example of the official use of this title see, Afet İnan, *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları* (The Main Lines of Turkish History), 2nd ed.(Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1996), 72.

³Anthony D. Smith, *Milli Kimlik* (National Identity), trans. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), 202.

the socio-political level that the "The National Resistance Movement" in Anatolia took a fresh start.

4.2. Road to the Republic: Political Developments

National Struggle was a struggle aiming at inculcating national consciousness into a community of peasants devoid of any national sense through transforming the popular determination against the insult of "Christians", particularly the Armenians and the Greeks, into the sense of *patrie* (*vatan*) and nation (*millet*). Its basis level was nationalism revealing its ethnosecular Turkish character during the period of radical reforms in the aftermath of the so-called "National Liberation War."

The realisation of the national ideal and the achievement of the main goal of *ittihat ve terakki* (union and progress) -this unionist ideal was thoroughly inherited by the Kemalist nationalism -necessitated a pragmatic, tactically-motivated approach. In Mustafa Kemal's own words,

It was incumbent upon me to develop our entire social organisation, step by step, until it corresponded to the great capability of progress which I perceived in the soul and future of the nation and which I kept to myself in my own consciousness as a national secret.⁴

This step by step approach to the unfolding of the Cevdetian dream of "*Pek Uyanık Bir Uyku*" (A Very Wakeful Sleep) was a clear manifestation of Kemalist Machiavellism justifying the maxim that "the goal justifies the means". The transformation of popular determination to stand against the "Christian" invasion into the national zeal first, and to "guided national will and sovereignty" later is a short and concise story of the period of the National Struggle. The National Pact (28 January, 1920), the opening of the Grand National Assembly (23 April, 1920), the final defeat of the invasion forces (30 August, 1922), and the

⁴Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 1927* trans. (Istanbul: Ministry of Education Printing Plant, 1963), 9-10.

promulgation of the Turkish Republic (29 October, 1923) are all the milestones of the unfolding of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's "national secret"

The occupation of İzmir by Greece (15 May 1919) in violation of the provisions of the Mudros Treaty (30 October 1918) engendered popular resentment and triggered the resistance movements in the form of separate *Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri* (Societies for the Defence of Rights) in Anatolia. The will to resist against the Greek invasion was the first manifestation of the rising Turkish national consciousness embedded in Islamic enthusiasm. The invasion turned to be the driving force of the Turkish National Movement and nurtured further the Turkish age-old *beka* (survival) syndrome. As in many other cases of the national formation, war functioned as the cradle of the newly emerging national identity.

The Turkish nationalist elites strove to organise a national resistance in Anatolia under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. They had to fight both the internal (the Istanbul government under the tutelage of the invasion forces)⁵ as well as external attackers (the allied forces of occupation). With the purpose of organising a national resistance movement, they held a number of meetings and congresses in

⁵There were many declarations of the Ankara government to the Anatolian people that it is loyal to the sultan-caliph and that they should not let themselves to be seduced by the propagandists of the Istanbul government and the allied forces. As examples, see "BMM'nin Açılması Üzerine Padişaha Telgrafla Gönderilen Sadakat Arızası" (The Letter of Loyalty Sent to the Sultan-Caliph upon the Opening of the Grand National Assembly), with the directive of the Grand National Assembly and signed by Mustafa Kemal, dated 27. 04. 1922. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri* (Atatürk's Circular Letters, Telegraphs and Declarations) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), vol. IV, 320-322; and "Düşman Propagandasına İnanılmaması İçin BMM'nin Memlekete Beyannamesi" (The Declaration of the Grand National Assembly to the People for Avoidance from the Enemy's Propaganda) with the directive of the Grand National Assembly and signed by Mustafa Kemal, dated 25. 04. 1920, ibid., 317.

Amasya (19 June 1919), Erzurum (23 July 1919), and Sivas (4 September 1919), at which they outlined the *sine qua nons* of the framework on which the resistance movement would be built, which later took the form of the *Misak-i Milli* (National Pact) and expressed their determination to use the *Kuvay-i Milliye* (National Forces) through various *Müdafaa-i Hukuk-i Milliye Cemiyetleri* (Societies for the Defence of National Rights) at first, followed by the *Heyet-i Temsiliye* (Representative Committee) after the Erzurum Congress, and then through *Büyük Millet Meclisi* (Grand National Assembly) as from 23 April 1920.⁶

The National Pact, which reflected basically the provisions alluded to in the Circular Letter of Amasya, and the congresses held in Erzurum and Sivas, laid the foundation for the complete independence of the country. It delimited the boundaries of new Turkey, inhabited by a Muslim majority and united in religion and culture. It became a rallying point for the national resistance movement and a basis for nationalist diplomacy. The National Pact prescribed the retainment of the Ottoman State with its sultan-caliph and the constitution.⁷ To Mustafa Kemal Pasha, however, the Pact was just a step forward toward a new state and a new regime he has kept in his mind as a "national secret"⁸

The invasion forces of the allies countered the declaration of the National Pact by making their invasion of Istanbul official (16 March

⁶For the general highlights of the evolution of the Turkish national resistance movement see Salahi R. Sonyel, *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire* (Ankara: Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History Publications of Turkish Historical Society, 1993), 332-333.

⁷For the full text of the National Pact see Appendix C.

⁸Suna Kili, *Kemalism* (Istanbul: Menteş Matbaası, 1969), 19.

1920) and by arresting and deporting many deputies to the island of Malta. The dismantling of the Ottoman parliament necessitated the establishment of a legitimate basis of action in order to face local risings, the forces provoked by the Istanbul government and the Greeks. Following the official occupation of the capital city of the Empire, Istanbul, and the closing down of the Parliament, the Turkish nationalists retaliated on 23 April, 1920 by establishing their own parliament, the Grand National Assembly (GNA) and government in Ankara, and declared to the whole world that they refused categorically to accept "the foreign slavery" imposed upon the Turkish nation by the entente powers and that they were determined to strive for self-determination and "istiklal-i tam" (full independence).⁹

The programme of new revolutionary government tried in theory for the liberation of the sultan-caliph, a captive in the hands of the entente powers in Istanbul, to whom the nationalists professed loyalty, and who would take his place within the legal framework to be determined by the GNA as soon as he was emancipated from all pressures and coercion. Furthermore, it struggled to save 'the homeland and the nation' from the dictate of "imperialism and capitalism" and to restore "complete sovereignty and independence" of the people. To that effect the deputies had already taken an oath.¹⁰

Meanwhile, the Supreme Council of the allied powers met at San Remo on 19 April to give the peace terms its final shape which were to be

⁹*Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabit Ceridesi* (The Registers of the Grand National Assembly), vol. 1, 2.

¹⁰The introductory section of the government's programme submitted to the GNA by Mustafa Kemal, and read out on 18. 09.1920. See *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, vol. 4, 179-180. See also Section 1 of Law No. 18 passed on 05. 09. 1920 and issued in *Ceride-i Resmiye* (Official Gazette), No: 3, 21 February 1337.

imposed on Ottoman Turkey. The main provisions of the draft treaty, among others, included: Turkey would accept, in advance, a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas, the people of which could appeal for independence to the council of the League of Nations. The Turkish government would transfer to the Greek government the sovereign rights over a special area around the city of Izmir. Turkey would renounce in favour of Greece her rights over Turkish territory in Europe, and over the islands in Aegean Sea. She would recognise Armenia as a free and independent state, and would agree to accept the arbitration of the president of the USA upon the question of frontiers between Turkey and Armenia in provinces of Erzurum, Trabzon, Van and Bitlis, and upon Armenia's access to the sea.¹¹

The treaty also included special provisions for the protection of the minorities in Turkey. The capitulatory regime would continue, and the pre-war concessions of the allies in Turkey would be safeguarded.¹² The Istanbul government was compelled to sign the treaty on 10 August, without the final ratification of the sultan however. This was a treaty of war, not peace, and the Turkish nationalists had already expressed their determination in order to avert its realisation. Their alternative to this treaty was the National Pact.

The treaty, never ratified by imperial or republican Turkey, had satisfied nobody except Greeks, the British, the Armenian leaders and a few Kurdish chieftains. The French and Italians were against it. The efforts to revise the treaty failed and the allied pressure on the Ottoman government to ratify the treaty equally met with no success.

¹¹Sonyel, *ibid.*, 335.

¹²Ibid.

In the London Conference of February 1921, the suggested proposals were rejected by both Ankara government and the Greeks.

On 11 March, Bekir Sami, the foreign minister of the Ankara government, which was of Circassian origin, signed a secret agreement with Aristide Briand, the French foreign minister, which conflicted with the provisions of the National Pact, and therefore was not approved by the GNA. In particular, Mustafa Kemal Pasha rejected the clause proposed by the French about the "protection of racial minorities" as distinct from "religious minorities", which meant the protection of the Armenians as a political ethnie with the object of increasing their number in the region.¹³

The Ankara Accord, signed between the Ankara government and France in 24 September 1921, achieved peace and confirmed the rights of minorities as recognised in the National Pact, upon the same basis as the minority clauses of European peace treaties.¹⁴

In January 1922 the allies, now disunited, embarked upon a policy of mediation between nationalist Turkey and Constantinist Greece, but they met with the Greek's opposition. Nonetheless, the Greeks finally suffered an overwhelming defeat in September 1922 and had to leave Anatolia. The battlefield victory was concluded with a peace treaty on 24 July 1923 when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed between Turkey and the allied powers, including Greece.

According to the Lausanne Treaty, the Turkish frontier on Thrace would be established on the Meriç river, and Greece would return the

¹³Atatürk, *A Speech*, 497-499. This sensitivity of Mustafa Kemal to "racial rights" would surface in the republican period in the form of various ethnic management strategies to be insistingly pursued by the state.

¹⁴Sonyel, *ibid.*, 338.

islands of İmroz and Bozcaada. A compulsory exchange of populations would be arranged, as a result of which an estimated number of Greeks would leave Turkey in return for a number of Turks living in Greek-held territories. The question of Mosul would be left to the League of Nations, which, in 1925, recommended its retention by Iraq. The treaty also provided for the apportionment of "*Duyun-i Umumiye*" (the Ottoman Public Debts), for the gradual abolition of the capitulations (Turkey regained its tariff autonomy in 1929), and for an international regime for the straits.¹⁵

İsmet Pasha, the chief representative of the GNA in Lausanne deliberations, describes the consequence of the Treaty for Turkey in the following terms: "A homogeneous, unified homeland; within it, freedom from the obligations imposed by foreigners, and from privileges of a nature creating a state within a state; freedom from imposed financial obligations; a free, rich homeland, with a recognised absolute right of self-defence."¹⁶

4.3. Two Bases of the National Struggle

The two basic principles upon which the national resistance was based were "istiklal-i tam" (complete independence) and "bilakayd ü şart hakimiyet-i milliye" (national sovereignty without reservation and condition).¹⁷ The embodiment of the first principle was *Misak-ı Milli* (National Pact). The manifestation of the second and more important

¹⁵ Ibid., 339.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Söylev ve Demeçler* (Atatürk's Speeches and Statements) , Vol. II, 16. 01. 1923 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989), 61-62 and the first article of 20 January 1921 constitution.

principle was *Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu* (The Fundamental Law)¹⁸ The basis of the legitimacy of the National Resistance (1919-1922) was national sovereignty. The only locus of legitimacy of the struggle against the Armenian rebellion and the Greek invasion was people itself. But this people was tired of war and did not want to join the army. Besides, it was too much for it to think a country without a sultan and a caliph. On account of religious and traditional ties, it was loyal to the throne and its incumbent. Those who conceived of the possibility of the removal of the sultan-caliph could be only men without faith and patriotism in the eyes of people.¹⁹ "Dealing with each problem at the right time" was Mustafa Kemal Pasha's "practical and safe way to success".²⁰ He was therefore extremely cautious in his steps in the transitional period from religious to the national basis of collective legitimacy. Thus when he had to talk of "enemies of religion" he was saying "enemies of religion and nation" or "sultan and nation" instead of mere "sultan".²¹ To reach the objective of an unconditionally independent Turkish state, based on the idea of "hakimiyet-i milliye" (national sovereignty), was his main goal, declared in the first days of the National Struggle, to be achieved at all events.²²

¹⁸For the full text of 20 January 1921 Constitution see Suna Kili-A. Şeref Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri. Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze* (Turkish Constitutional Documents from the Deed of Alliance up to the Present) (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985), 91-93.

¹⁹Atatürk, *A Speech*, 8.

²⁰Ibid., 11.

²¹Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği. Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme* (Atatürk Nationalism: A Study Outside the Official Ideology) (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 1988), 108.

²²Mazhar Müfit Kansu, *Erzurumdan Ölümüne Kadar Atatürkle Beraber* (Together with Atatürk from Erzurum to his Death), vol.1, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986), 32. Likewise, a daily

The first article of 20 January 1921 constitution was the reflection of this ideal.²³ As a matter of fact, the motto of national sovereignty was only a means, not an end. It was used just as a functional symbol and when the "right time" came, this idea was transformed into a tutelary understanding of national sovereignty. The speeches made and the attitude revealed in the occasions of the extension of the period of being in force of the Law of Commander-in-Chief and of the abolition of the sultanate are two graphic examples of this tutelary understanding.²⁴ Following the proclamation of the republic, the Rousseauian notion of "wise legislator" appeared in the political scene and the national sovereignty became identified with the person of the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself. The National Assembly, previously popularly elected, now was chosen by Mustafa Kemal and his close associates.²⁵

newspaper *İrade-i Milliye* (National Will) began to issue at the time of Sivas Congress which changed its name into *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (National Sovereignty) as the movement transferred its headquarter to Ankara. See Dankwart A. Rustow, "Atatürk as an Institution-Building," in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern Nation State* eds., Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun özbudun (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 70.

²³The first article of 20 January, 1921 constitution reads: "The sovereignty is vested in nation without reservation and condition. The system of administration is based on the principle that the people guide their own destiny." See Kili and Gözübüyük, *ibid.*, 91.

²⁴According to Heper, Kemalism took away the sovereignty from the sultan, but despite its official rhetoric of populism, did not transfer it to the people. See Metin Heper, *State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington: The Eothen Press, 1985), 51. For this required the maturation of the collective conscience the time of which to be decided by the Kemalist elites, a reflection of the civilising mission of Kemalism.

²⁵Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği*, 110.

4.4. Declared Goal of the National Struggle

The declared goal of the national resistance movement was expressed in various official documents. The purpose of the commencement of the Grand National Assembly is overtly set in the "Declaration of the Grand National Assembly", dated 18. 11. 1336 (1920), as follows: "Grand National Assembly is formed with the purpose of preservation of the independence of Muslim majority within the national frontiers, and the salvation of the posts of the caliphate and sultanate. Therefore, it is of the opinion that it would reach its purpose through making the people of Turkey to own her will and sovereignty by freeing itself from the oppression and darkness of imperialism and capitalism, which it considers its sole and holy aspiration."²⁶

Likewise, the law no. 18, dated 05.09.1336(1920), and titled "Nisab-ı Müzakere Kanunu" (the Law of Quorum), states the goal of the Grand National Assembly as "the attainment of the salvation and independence of the caliphate and sultanate, of fatherland and nation."²⁷

The same purpose is confirmed in the words of Mustafa Kemal Pasha as follows: "The Ottoman state is not formed around the temporal power of the ruler like any other state. Our ruler, being caliph as well as sultan, is at the same time the head of the Muslim people. The first goal of our *mücahede* (holy fighting) is to show those who advocate the separation of the post of sultanate from caliphate that the national will does not fit to that, and to save the authority of the rulers (*ulu'l emr*)

²⁶TBMM *Zabit Ceridesi*, vol. 5, 371. The phrase of "Muslim majority within the national frontiers" is added by the *Encümen-i Mahsusə* (Special Commission) in order to preempt wrong interpretations. The rapporteur of the Commission, İsmail Suphi Bey, clarifies the meaning of the term "national frontiers" as the frontiers drawn by the National Pact passed by the Ottoman Assembly in Istanbul.

²⁷Kili and Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri*, 89.

from the threats and impositions of the enemy by liberating those sacred posts from the captivity of the foreigners."²⁸

4.5. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's Power Instinct: The Limits of Political Expediency

The main question before Mustafa Kemal Pasha was to find a secure popular basis for the national resistance movement while paying lip service to the authority of the sultan-caliph. His position vis a vis the idea of national sovereignty and dynastic allegiance was crystallised by his power instincts, practical imperatives and prophetic ideals unravelled openly in the days of Erzurum Congress but kept as "a national secret" until the end of the National Struggle.²⁹ As a matter of fact, this

²⁸Atatürk, *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 24 April 1920, 62. The same views repeated time and again. See for instance, *Söylev ve Demeçler*, vol. I, 1 March 1921, 176 and ibid., 1 March 1922, 243.

²⁹In his memoirs, Mazhar Müfit, a person belonging to the close circle of Atatürk, tells us that Atatürk's decision to shift to the republican regime was given before the convening of the Erzurum Congress. See Kansu, *Erzurumdan Ölümüne Kadar Atatürkle Beraber*, vol.1, 72 and 74. Mustafa Kemal openly criticised reform efforts in the Ottoman Empire, such as the reception of European laws and regulations, and ways of clothing on the basis of their imitative and therefore non-national character, as was done in Russia under Peter I the Great. The following "radically conservative" words belong to him: "We have taken European dress. But, badness, happiness and disaster depend upon a nation's way of understanding. A thing considered to be good by a nation may cause a disaster for another nation. Therefore, a nation could attain her purpose when she was able to subtract from her spirit the ways and means she would exploit in order to reach the thing she considered to be good. But since that "good" could become "bad" for another nation, when you exploit its ways and means the point you would reach would be disastrous although it is good for that nation. Yes, dress was taken from Europe. Look, trousers in below and stout jacket above. Jacket in above and shalwar below. it has somehow not been digested and continuing to be so. Even Peter I the Great attempted to better his nation through imitation. He had a genius in imitation indeed. But never he had an original genius capable of creation from nothingness. Therefore, while he was trying to "reform" his nation as Russian, he was using German and English means. Whereas, it was impossible for a Russian to be

positional tactic worked very well. He was successful in getting the support of the poor, war-tired and helpless Anatolian masses on the one hand, and continued its vision of a loyal leader to the sultan-caliph in the eyes of the majority of the people, on the other.

Mustafa Kemal was a master of step by step approach in his political strategy.³⁰ According to Parla, his Nutuk is the story and defence of the application of a certain military-political project over time.³¹ He also skilfully guised the novelty of institutions he was building. As Rustow observed, he was careful in presenting the representative committee formed after the Sivas Congress as "the nation's agency for communication," not as a provisional government. His assembly was a transient, extraordinary one, not a constituent assembly, which in fact

German, and therefore in the end, he has lost his identity, failed to be what he aimed to be. The result was the emergence of a perplexed creature." See Atatürk, *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 1 December 1921, 219. This speech seems to be extremely ironic given the "imitative", symbolic features of subsequent Kemalist reforms, such as the adoption of hat as the new national headgear, the removal of *tesettür*, change of alphabet and the total reception of western laws, based on the notion that the western route to civilisation is the universal one, and hence rejecting the existence of different national selfhoods.

³⁰The content of Atatürk's renovational introductions is radically reformist, not revolutionary; its discourse and manner incrementalist and ameliorist. The completion of reforms took 15 years (1923-1938). Atatürk himself describes his renovations as "radical reform" See "İkinci Dönem Dördüncü Toplanma Yılıni Açarken" (Opening the Fourth Meeting Year of the Second Period), *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 1 November 1926, 362. Radicalism in content, incrementalism in the means and ways of realisation characterises the Kemalist method of "choosing right time and right place". See M. Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk* (Speech), vol.1 (Ankara: Atatürk'ün Doğumunun 100. Yılıni Kutlama Koordinasyon Kurulu, 1987), 10-11. Also see Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*(1923-1931) (The Establishment of One Party State in Turkey), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 198, 85; Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürüün Resmi Kaynakları: Atatürk'ün Nutuku* (The Official Sources of Political Culture in Turkey: The Speech of Atatürk), vol.1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991) 9-11 and 37.

³¹Parla, *Atatürk'ün Nutuku*, 11.

was. Even the national make-up of the Grand National Assembly left open to debate.³²

Nevertheless, all the terms and appellations used during the National Resistance are related to "nation" and "nationalism", containing a vague content though. As Safa observed, Ankara represented Turkish nationalism under the guise of liberating the sultan-caliph. The expressions "Milli mücadele," (national struggle), "milli istiklal" (national independence), "milli hareket" (national movement), "kuvay-i milliye" (national forces), "milli zafer" (national victory), "hakimiyet-i milliye" (national sovereignty) and "Büyük Millet Meclisi" (Grand National Assembly), all signified the nationalist discourse of the cause of liberation, the gist of which was to be "national".³³ Due to the dual content of the word "milli" which originally meant "related to what is religious" but has undergone a shift of meaning in the nationalist discourse of the late nineteenth century Turkist intellectuals and later came to be identified with "what is national", the mottoes of the national resistance movement provided an easy transition for a nationalist

³²Rustow, "Atatürk as an Institution-BUILDER," 57-77. The deliberately cautious stance of Mustafa Kemal regarding the "national" character of the Resistance Movement was illustrated by an incident in May 1920. One of the members of the de facto cabinet, the commissioner of health, had emphatically referred to the Anatolian movement as a Turkish movement, and this drew a strong protest from a delegate of Circassian background. Mustafa Kemal, as the presiding officer, intervened to say: "Gentlemen, with the request that this matter should not come up again, let me point out that what is intended here, which comprises your high council are not composed of only Turks, of only Kurds, of only Lazs. But it is the Muslim elements comprising all of these, a sincere community." Atatürk, "Türk Milletini Teşkil Eden Müslüman Öğeler Hakkında" (About Muslim Elements Comprising Turkish Nation), *Söylen ve Demeçler I*, 1 May , 1920, 74

³³Peyami Safa, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* (Glances at Turkish Renovation) (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1990) 81-82.

restructuring, at least in conceptual terms, through the exploitation of that duality.

Camouflage first, and rapid surprise moves later: This adaptation of military tactics to the political arena testified to Kemal's keen power instincts. In a setting where organised opposition could readily have overwhelmed his radical program, his public statements suggested first that opposition was unnecessary and later that it would be hopeless. Thus at all times he kept in full control of both the direction and the pace of events.³⁴

Hence major innovations came as *fait accomplis*. When the Ankara Assembly on 1 November 1922 abolished the monarchy, it did so upon a motion that declared that the sultanate had ceased to exist on 16 March 1920, the day of the official British occupation of Istanbul. The sultanate was not declared abolished until after the nationalist military victory had been confirmed by the armistice of Mudanya on 11 October 1922. Similarly, the most drastic measures breaking with the past—the proclamation of the Republic (29 October 1923) and the abolition of the caliphate (3 March 1924) were delayed until well after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923).

The matching of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's "national secret" with the unfolding of events were complete and conclusive.

4.6. The Forced Pluralism of the Period of the National Struggle

In the political discourse prevailing during the years of national resistance, the phrases of Turkishness and Turkish identity were not overtly spelled out. Both in the Circular Letter of Amasya (Amasya Tamimi), and in the decisions taken in Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, as well as in the National Pact, the national community were defined in such traditional criteria as being Ottoman and Muslim. Moreover, this national community was not conceived of as a monolithic block, but of

³⁴Rustow, "Atatürk as an Institution-Building," 71.

composed of various ethnic brands. The uniting ties among these ethnies were expressed as "pure fraternity", "mutual respect and feeling of sacrifice", "complete partnership both in happiness and calamity", and the willingness of "sharing the same destiny". All of these documents stated that "racial and social rights" of the ethnic elements and their "environmental conditions" would be respected, though with vague indication of the content of "racial and social rights". Despite this vagueness, it is clear that in legal-cultural plain, the ethnic rights would be recognised and respected within the framework of "unity in variety."³⁵

According to Özbudun, this strict avoidance of the nationalist discourse could be explained with the political imperatives of the day. This imperative forced the nationalist cadre who founded the Republic into alliances which they would not continue after the consolidation of the new regime. These alliances were made with conservative-Islamist groups and Muslim ethnic groups other than Turks.³⁶

The spirit of this pluralist approach to the national unity can be grasped from the following statement of Mustafa Kemal Pasha:

Within these boundaries (drawn up by the National Pact) no one must imagine that there is only one type of nation among Muslim elements. Within these boundaries, there are Turks, there are Circassians and other Muslim elements. These boundaries are the national boundaries of brother nations united in their all aims and living in a mixed state. The privileges peculiar to the social environments, customs and races of the Muslim elements living within the boundaries of this homeland were sincerely and mutually acknowledged and confirmed. Of course, there are no details as regards to this in that now it is not time to deal with the details. God willing, they will be resolved among brothers after the

³⁵The National Pact and the Declarations of Erzurum and Sivas Congresses lend emphasis to this point. See Kili, *Kemalism*, 11-14

³⁶Ergun Özbudun, *Millî Mücadele ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu* (The Question of Citizenship and Identity in the Official Documents of the National Struggle and the Republic), Unp. Paper (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1996).

deliberation of our existence and therefore the details are neglected.³⁷

Oran shares the same view with Özbudun as regards why the policy of a pluralist conception of national unity was pursued during the period of National Resistance.³⁸ In this period, due to the general conditions prevailing in Anatolia -difficulties in communication and transportation, the dire lack of money and arms, internal uprisings, the competition of rival ideologies-, it was extremely difficult to conduct a national resistance movement. This state of affairs led to the adoption of a pluralist approach by the nationalist elites. Instead of Jacobeanist means, a democratic-pluralist approach based on compromise with ethno-religious communities of the time was adopted so that to make use of their ideas and resources to the extent the need arised for them, and thus obtaining the popular backing. The fact that people were loyal to the sultan-caliph and hence were far away from lending support to a military-dominated movement against the Istanbul government and the need for a popular basis of legitimacy for the nationalist leadership in the struggle against the Istanbul government and the allied powers, made this approach a practical necessity. Moreover, having a popular backing was an essential supremacy for Mustafa Kemal Pasha vis a vis other senior military officers, who were potential candidates for political leadership. ³⁹

³⁷ Atatürk, "Mütarekeden Meclisin Açılmasına Kadar Geçen Zaman Zarfında Cereyan Eden Siyasi Olaylar Hakkında" (About Political Event Occurred in the Period Between the Armistice and the Opening of the Assembly), *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 24 April, 1920, 30. According to Mustafa Kemal, this understanding forms the basis of the national policy, together with the principle of national sovereignty. See ibid.

³⁸ Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği*, 92-97.

³⁹ Ibid.

In this "forced" pluralism, the Circassian revolt in Bolu and Marmara regions (1920) was suppressed by the forces of another Circassian military commander, Ethem Bey. In this contingency, Kurds besides Circassians received particular attention. When Mustafa Kemal Pasha was in Samsun, he sent lots of telegrams to various places in Anatolia in order to assure and persuade that Turks and Kurds were co-partners in the same struggle.

I had the zeal and determination to unite the Kurds and even the whole nation as genuine brothers around the same point and to show this to the world through the Societies for the Defence of National Rights (Müdafâ-i Hukuk-u Millîye Cemiyetleri).⁴⁰

The themes emphasised by Mustafa Kemal in his telegrams to the Kurdish tribal and religious leaders during the National Struggle were two: the insult of the infidels against the high posts of the caliphate and sultanate, and the occupation of the holy fatherland by Armenians. Islam and the Armenian peril emerged as the common denominators of the Turkish-Kurdish unity. In this respect, the careful use of the phrase "*Türkiye milleti*" (the nation of Turkey) instead of "*Türk milleti*" (Turkish nation) was a deliberate choice by Mustafa Kemal during the years of the National Resistance.⁴¹

4.7. Kemalist Way to Modernity: Aspects of Continuity and Change

4.7.1. Pragmatic, Non-doctrinal Character of Kemalist Nationalism

Kemalist tradition contains a deep commitment to westernisation in the nineteenth century sense of the term, meaning values and

⁴⁰Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, "15. Kolorduya Çektiği Telgraf" (The Telegram (Mustafa Kemal Pasha) Sent to the 15th Army Corps), in *Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri*, vol. IV, 34.

⁴¹Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği*, 101.

institutions believed at the time to contain the secret of western economic and military power.

Modernisationist-developmentalist ideology of Kemalism is not a compact package of predetermined principles and projects, which distinguished Turkey from other countries trying to modernise under the banner of various brands of Marxism.⁴² However deep is the commitment to modernisation, Kemalism is not based on an elaborate and well-expressed doctrine.⁴³ Yet, in Gellner's words, "No doubt there is

⁴²According to Atatürk, the programme of the Republican People's Party constitutes the main guiding principles of government and politics. "But these principles must not be considered the same with the dogmas of the books thought to be revealed. We have taken our inspiration directly from life, not from the heaven and the unknown." See "Beşinci Dönem Üçüncü Toplantı Yılıni Açıarken" (Opening the Third Meeting Year of the Fifth Period), *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 01. 11. 1937, 423. This empiricist position preaching practicalism without theories is adopted also by Mussolini whose motto was "There is no need for dogma; discipline suffices." See George H. Sabine&Thomas L. Thorson, *A History of Political Theory*, 4th ed. (Tokyo: Dryden Press, 1981), 799. In an article in 1924, Mussolini declared: " We Fascists have had the courage to discard all traditional political theories.... It is sufficient to have a single fixed point: the nation. The rest is obvious." Ibid., 800. Kemalist position seems to be no different.

⁴³This point is emphatically expressed by many "disciples" of Atatürk. For example, Şükrü Kaya, the Ministry of the Interior, asserts that " The essence of the regime and its principles devised by the Turkish Republic is not constructed to adopt it to the abstract concepts made up by the philosophers of the past. They are the essentials taken from the new conditions , pains and necessities of history. they are the practice of a walking based on reality." see *TBMM Zabit Cəridesi*, period V, vol. 16, 70-71. Maintaining the same point, Başar argues that the main principles cannot keep the eternal status of dogma and therefore must be amenable changes in life; because they are derived from life, and not vice versa. "To be against all kinds of dogmas is a leading feature of Kemalism." Ahmet Hamdi Başar, "Atatürk'ün İdeolojisi" (The Ideology of Atatürk), *Cumhuriyet*, 7 November 1937, 2. This view is also shared by İsmet İnönü. See "Ankara İnkılap Kürsüsünün Açılışı Münasebetiyle Başvekil İsmet Paşa Hazretleri İlk Dersi Verdi" (İsmet Pasha Gave the First Lecture on the Occasion of the Opening of the Department of Renovation at

a corpus of Kemalist *hadith*, but it is not specific enough to prejudge too many options in the Turkish path of development."⁴⁴ RPP's programmes, as Atatürk himself acknowledges, are in fact form a political doctrine, which is called "Kamâlizm" in 1935 programme,⁴⁵ and "Kemalizm" in 1939 programme. The fact that it is pragmatic and pays close attention to the "imperatives of life" does not put it outside the set of ideologies; it only shows that it belongs to the pragmatist family of ideologies.⁴⁶

According to Gellner, Kemalism, like its predecessors' commitment to state-centric modernisation, had a state-based legitimization.⁴⁷ As Paul Stirling pointed out, during the early decades of its existence, the Kemalist republic had transformed the upper levels of

Ankara University), *Ayın Tarihi*, 4(April 1934), 36. As Safa observed, "Life is superior to doctrine." Safa, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar*, 194.

⁴⁴Ernest Gellner, "Kemalism," in Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism*. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 83.

⁴⁵According to the 1935 programme, "All these principles(the six arrows) followed by the Party is the principles of Kamâlism." See *CHP Programı* (The Programme of RPP) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935), 2.

⁴⁶For this reason, Parla maintains that the argument that Kemalism was turned into an ideology after the death of Atatürk under the impact of the political conjuncture prevailing in Europe is out of basis. Because the Kemalist ideology was well crystallised in the 1935 RPP programme and its roots go back to 1920s. The 1935 programme is no different from that of 1931 and this date precedes the assuming of political power by the Nazis in Germany(1933). Therefore the distinction between Kemalism and Atatürkism is only a nominal one. See Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürü'nün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku* (The Official Sources of Political Culture in Turkey: Kemalist One Party Ideology and the Six Arrows of RPP), vol. 3. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 19-24. For a view by Kazım Nami Duru, a deputy from Manisa, considering Kemalism as a social and political philosophy and the creed of the Turks, see *CHP Beşinci Büyük Kurultayı Zabıtları* (The Minutes of the Fifth General Congress of the Republican People's Party) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1939), 86-87.

⁴⁷Gellner, "Kemalism," 83.

society, the state and the higher intellectual or ideological institutions, but left the mass of the peasantry largely untouched.⁴⁸ The efforts for creating popular mobilisation through the establishment of People's Houses (Halk Evleri) and People's Rooms (Halk Odaları) in the 1930s did not register any considerable success.

Distinctively based on secularism and the state, and relatively free of rigid commitments to a predetermined doctrine, Kemalism was capable of pragmatic development, without having to worry about doctrinal prescriptions.⁴⁹

4. 7. 2. "Historical" vs "Invented" Tradition: The Originality of Kemalist Nationalism vs Its Contextual Historicity

The extent of the novelty of Kemalist nationalism and its roots or rootlessness in history is a much discussed but less clarified question. Yet this is awfully important in the diagnose of the "historically created" or "invented" character of the ethnic elements in the make-up of the Kemalist nationalism. Those who are inclined to glorify the person and ideas of Mustafa Kemal tend to stress its novelty more. On the other hand, those who point to the contextual crystallisation and historical roots of Kemalist nationalism put emphasis on the fact that it does not represent a starting point. Rather, it is a concluding point in the westernisation current going back to the *Tanzimat* (Reform) period, and therefore, should be considered from an historical perspective.

⁴⁸Paul Stirling, "Cumhuriyet Türkiyesinde Toplumsal Değişme ve Toplumsal Denetim" (Social Change and Social Control in Republican Turkey), in *Bildiriler ve Tartışmalar: Uluslararası Atatürk Sempozyumu* (Papers and Discussions: International Symposium on Atatürk) (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1983), 556-562.

⁴⁹Gellner, "Kemalism," 90-91.

According to Yakup Kadri, a fervent Kemalist journalist and novelist and Atatürk's long time advisor and spokesman,⁵⁰ there is no link between Kemalist nationalist regime and the Ottoman constitutionalist movement. The works of a handful of Turkists, like Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp, in the period of the Society for Union and Progress(1908-1918) cannot be said to have inspired Mustafa Kemal. Turkish Republic is a completely new and original entity. It is a total novelty and has pioneered many regimes appeared during the post-world war political crisis.⁵¹

In diametrical opposition to this "*tabula rasa*" thesis of Kemalist modernisation in terms of both context and content, Mardin asserts that "social thought never starts with a clean slate. The contributions of social

⁵⁰Sabri M. Akurgal, "Kemalist Views on Social Change," in *Atatürk and the Modernisation of Turkey*, ed., Jacob M. Landau (Boulder-Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 130.

⁵¹Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Atatürk: Bir Tahlil Denemesi* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1971), 72. While forwarding his thesis of complete novelty, Karaosmanoğlu admits that Lenin's "Soviets system" is as original as Mustafa Kemal's system of "*tevhid-i kuvva*" (concentration of powers), with a remark of exception: "The Turkist reformist was not the disciple of a revolutionary master like Karl Marx; nor did he has principles empowered by the technical force of Marxist dialectics of half-century year old under his hands. He was a solitary man among the problems and needs of a nation still unidentified and unclassified. He himself would put the diagnose, process the raw realities and create their synthesis out of his mind." Ibid., 73. In opposition to Karaosmanoğlu's thesis of "complete novelty," Mahmut Esat, a leading ideologue of Kemalism, suggests that the Kemalists have their intellectual predecessors in the Ottoman Empire. The Kemalist Revolution rested on an centennial culture. There is no doubt that Tanzimat thinking and the two constitutional periods nurtured in ideological and institutional terms the Republican Revolution. In its easy adaptation to the new institutions this centennial culture played a key role. The revolution was based on the past economic, political and social causes, and takes its meaning from the historical destiny. See Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali* (Atatürk Revolution) (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yaymevi, 1967), 374-380.

innovators, therefore, become fully meaningful only when their **proposals** are set in the framework of their institutional and intellectual **inheritance.**"⁵² This holds true for a series of reforms which were carried **out** in Turkey in the 1920s and the 1930s. Saying that Kemalist reforms **can** be better understood when seen from historical-contextual **perspective** makes our understanding of identifying where Kemalism **stands** in the meeting of the so-called East and West better. Taking into account "the cultural background" both in terms of events and traditional as well as institutional arrangements provides us with a more clear picture of Kemalist reforms in historical context.

In this respect, Mardin suggests that there are at least two antecedents of Kemalist secularising reforms in the Ottoman history, namely Kemalist position as to the function of religion in society and the methods which it used to translate its teaching into policy. Its position on religion reflects empiricist thought prevailed in the secular administration of the Ottoman Empire. The method of legislation it used to implement its teaching had its forerunners in the policies of the nineteenth century Ottoman modernising statesmen.⁵³ Parla seems to share the same view with a lesser emphasis on the elements of continuity when he suggests that Kemalism is essentially not a product of Ottoman political culture but a new synthesis of the westernism making use of the Ottoman political culture and borrowing certain elements from it. In this sense, Kemalism is determinative and pioneering.⁵⁴

⁵²Serif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey," in *Atatürk Founder of a Modern State* , eds., Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 191.

⁵³Ibid., 192.

⁵⁴Parla, *Atatürk'ün Nutku* 173-175.

Rustow, on the other hand, puts emphasis on the revolutionary character of Kemalist institutional reforms, namely the proclamation of the Republic, the abolition of the Caliphate, and the adoption of the Swiss civil code. These innovations brought about a drastic change of direction from the Ottoman and Islamic past such that implementation of the programme of nationalism and *integral* westernisation would have seemed visionary only a decade before.⁵⁵ Despite this radical change in ideological and institutional orientation, there was not any break in institutional continuity, however. The durability of the new institutions was essentially caused by their preparation and testing beforehand.

The substitution of national for dynastic sovereignty implied a momentous change; yet in at least two basic respects, Kemalist modernisation carried the inheritance of the Ottoman tradition. The Ottoman polity was a *ghazi* and hence a military-centred polity. But the continuous waves of military defeats caused an irreparable loss of legitimacy. Mustafa Kemal had asserted the new principle of national

⁵⁵ Rustow, "Atatürk As an Institution-Builder," 71. One must remember that Abdullah Cevdet presented his programme of radical westernisation as a utopian dream in his periodical *İctihad* in 1912: "Pek Uyanık Bir Uyku" (A Very Wakeful Sleep). In his vision of the future, the fez would be abolished and a new headgear adopted. Women would dress as they pleased without the obligation of the Quranic injunction of *tesettür*. Polygamy would be abolished. Convents and *tekkes* would be closed down. Turban, cloak and so on, would be limited to certificated professional men of religion and forbidden to others. Vows and offerings to the saints would be prohibited and the money saved in that way devoted to national defence. Popular misconceptions of Islam would be corrected. A purified Ottoman-Turkish dictionary and grammar would be established by a committee of philologists and men of letters. Starting with the land *evkaf* laws, the whole legal system would be reformed. See Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 231-232. For the full text of "Pek Uyanık Bir Uyku" see Safa, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar*, 57-61. This utopian vision of the most radical and uncompromised westernist was nearly completely realised during the Kemalist era (1924-1938).

sovereignty in a series of military victories as the Ottoman state did. His' shift, following the victory, to educational reforms was equally true to the original Ottoman spirit: the palace schools (*enderun* and *birun*) in which the military and civil servants(kuls) of sultans were trained had been among the most characteristic Ottoman institutions from the beginning.⁵⁶

In line with Mardin, Davison lends emphasis to the aspects of continuity. According to him, "the new state could not be created out of thin air."⁵⁷ Human, cultural and economic resources possessed by the Empire were all inherited by the Republic. This was also to a large extent true of political resources: governmental institutions, administrative practices and political concepts.⁵⁸ Despite the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and the removal of the sultan-caliph, much of the imperial body politic remained, being reflected in the denunciation of the sultan but the acceptance of the heritages of political concepts and institutions from the Ottoman Empire without any condemnation: constitution, cabinet, parliament, elections, deputies, *vilayet*, *vali*, *mutasarrif*.

What the Republic took over from the Empire came mostly from the Tanzimat period, though certain elements came from the Hamidian and Second Constitutional Periods. The Tanzimat period in broad terms is a seed-time in which ideas and institutions which later came to fruition under the Republic first took root.

⁵⁶Ibid., 72.

⁵⁷Roderic H. Davison, "Atatürk's Reforms: Back to the Roots," in Roderic H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923. The Impact of the West* (USA: University of Texas Press, 1990), 243.

⁵⁸Ibid.

According to Davison, the Republican inheritance of the Ottoman concepts and institutions have had a wide coverage indeed. Among these are the concept of the state as the fatherland of its people, the concept that sovereignty should be complete and unfringed, and the concept of state as an indivisible territorial unit, which are concerned with the nature of the state as a whole.⁵⁹ The concept of people as individual citizens of a state, not as members of a religious community from which they derive their civil status, the concept of the equality of all citizens before the law and the concept of guaranteed individual rights and civil liberties are concerned with the position of the individual within the state.⁶⁰ The concept of the right of the people to governmental representation, the concept of a written constitution along western models, the concept of the popular control of the government, the concept of responsible government and the concept of separation of powers focus on the question of who is to control the government.⁶¹ The last two concepts inherited by Kemalism without any reservation are the concept of an expanded sphere of governmental activity and responsibility (positive state),⁶² which relates to the scope of governmental activity.

Against this background, it is an established fact that many aspects of Kemalism go back to the Ottoman past, the most prominent of which being a modified version of Turkist nationalism.⁶³ Kemalism

⁵⁹Ibid., 244-246.

⁶⁰Ibid., 246-249.

⁶¹Ibid., 249- 255.

⁶²Ibid., 256-260.

⁶³Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "The Ideology and Politics of the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey," C.E.M.O.T.I, 13(January-May 1992), 41-142. See also Orhan Türkdoğan, *Atatürk'te Milli Devlet Anlayışı*

constituted a continuum with the Tanzimat, Young Ottomans and Young Turks, as far as its major concern was the state considered as the main source of legitimacy in the society. It also had to rely on the officials, legitimating symbols and certain traditional values of the former regime, until it could impose a newly-defined legitimacy. The fact that 93 percent of the Empire's staff officers and 85 percent of its civil servants retained their positions in the republic⁶⁴ shows the extent of "bureaucratic continuity" between the old and the new regimes. In building the modern state however, Kemalists were successful in narrowing the gap between the political centre and the periphery and in mobilising societal resources, which created the alliance between status elites and economically active social groups. This interest to periphery, unlike from Ottoman patrimonialism, was associated with the identification of saving the state with the nation.⁶⁵

The economic nationalism of the Young Turks based on positivist solidarism and implemented through a national economic policy constituted the economic pillar of the Kemalist state. The political economy of the Young Turk regime was the forerunner of that of the Kemalist republic, which regarded economic sovereignty as the basis of political independence. The assertion that state elites should serve as guides to the nation in every fields including economics was a common denominator of Young Turks and Kemalists.

(Atatürk's Nation-State Understanding) (Istanbul: Türk Dünyasını Araştırma Vakfı, 1981), 113.

⁶⁴Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Military: Turkey" in *Political Modernisation in Japan and Turkey*, eds., Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 338.

⁶⁵Ali Kazancigil, "The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalism," in *Atatürk: Founder of A Modern State*, eds., Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 49.

Ideologically, Mustafa Kemal held a position close to westernist and positivist Young Turks. He firmly believed in progress and science, and was an heir to nationalist, secularist and populist trends. His nationalism was territorial in scope and carried a strong content of racial-ethnic elements.⁶⁶ His secularism was the extension of the Cevdetian conception of the place of Islam in daily life. It was Mustafa Kemal who transformed Cevdet's socio-political utopia into a reality,⁶⁷ the mainstay of which was the claim that "there is no second civilisation; civilisation means European civilisation, and it must be imported with its roses and thorns"⁶⁸ His populism used as an ideological instrument in forging the alliance of the state elites and the civil elites had a changing content according to changing political circumstances. The final definition which was contained in the 1931 programme of the RPP reflected an elitist, "for the people, with or without the people" kind of populism.⁶⁹

The Kemalist state could best be characterised as Jacobean. With its positivist, secularist and nationalist ideology, it was a "paradigmatic revolution"⁷⁰ which distinguished Young Turks and Kemalists from the

⁶⁶The claims that "Atatürk did not have any racial prejudice" reflects a superficial bias rather than a critical opinion, as would be substantiated later. See, for example, Akurgal, "Kemalist Views on Social Change," 131.

⁶⁷Dankwart A. Rustow, *The Founding of a Nation-State: Atatürk's Historic Achievement* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1981), 15.

⁶⁸Quoted by Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 231.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 51.

⁷⁰This phrase is borrowed from İlkyay Sunar, "Anthropologie politique et économique: l'Empire Ottoman et sa transformation," *Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 35: 3-4 (May-Aug. 1980), 571; quoted by Kazancigil, "The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalism," 48.

previous traditional Ottoman elites. The Kemalist movement, following the Young Turk regime, brought about drastic changes into the Turkish polity. As a "revolution from above" however, it was not a social revolution. There were no insurrections in the cities or rural areas and it was commoners who participated in the Kemalist movement as soldiers and not as revolutionaries.⁷¹

Against this background one can legitimately claim that the Kemalist republic was radically different from the Ottoman Empire of classical as well as modern periods. Nevertheless, the idea that the concepts and doctrines such as progress, laicism, nationalism, Comtean positivism and solidarism are imported from the French Revolution and nineteenth century scientism by Kemalism does not reflect the whole reality in that, as it is seen, in many instances Kemalism inherited them from the intellectual wealth accumulated by several generations of Ottoman-Turkish reformers and nationalists.

Kemalism, building on the reform movements in the Ottoman Empire of the last two centuries, led them to their ultimate consequence: the creation of a modern Turkish state. Therefore, the emergence of the modern Turkish state and Kemalist nationalism cannot be properly analysed and explained without duly taking into account these elements of continuity.⁷² This does not negate the fact that Kemalism represents a radical break from the past, which transformed Turkey from a military-religious empire into a modern nation-state in which the secular nationalist doctrine replaced Islam as the cultural foundation and overall

⁷¹Kazancıgil, *ibid.*

⁷²For a parallel view see Nora Şeni, "Anti-Kemalistlere Kötü Haber" (Bad News to Anti-Kemalists), Interview by Nilüfer Kuyaş, *Milliyet*, Entellektüel Bakış, 17 June 1996, 18.

ideology of the polity. In the last analysis, Kemalism must be considered as the last response to the age-old question of the Ottoman-Turkish elites: how can this state be saved? ⁷³

As Einstadt observed, from the view point of discontinuities, Kemalism first realised a shift in the basis of political legitimization and the symbols of the political community, together with the redefinition of the boundaries of the collectivity. Due to the nationalist and anti-religious character of the Kemalist ideology,⁷⁴ the redefinition of political community took place in a unique way: the society withdrew from the Islamic framework into that of the newly-defined Turkish nation. This process involved the negation of a universal framework: Islam. Thus, the Kemalist revolution

rejected completely the religious basis of legitimization and attempted instead to develop a secular national one, as the major ideological parameter of the new collectivity, with very little emphasis on the social components of ideologies. This shift was connected with an almost total displacement of the former ruling class-political as well as religious- by the members of the secondary (bureaucratic and intellectual) elites.⁷⁵

Secularism emerged as the bedrock of Kemalist nationalism such that whatever might constitute a potential or real impediment on the way of creating the new "secular Turkish man" was overwhelmed by the state, namely, Islam, ethnicity, sectarianism, social class, and even liberalism.

⁷³Bülent Daver, "Atatürk ve Sosyo-Politik Sistem Görüşü" (Atatürk and His View of Socio-Political System), in *Çağdaş Düşüncenin İşığında Atatürk* (İstanbul: Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayıncılık, 1983), 247.

⁷⁴S. N. Einstadt, "The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Perspective," in *Atatürk: Founder of A Modern State*, eds., Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 138.

⁷⁵Ibid.,135.

4. 8. The General Landscape of Turkey in 1923 from the Kemalist Vantage Point

At first glance, the general landscape of Turkey at the outset of the republic exhibited the characteristics of a situation of "total nothingness." All commercial and industrial enterprises were owned by the British, French and German companies. There was hardly any industry. Farming methods were entirely traditional. There was no mechanisation whatsoever. Custom protection for domestic products was not possible due to the provision of the Lausanne Treaty fixing tariffs until 1929. Budget deficit was a usual thing, which was tried to be balanced through the foreign debts taken with high rates of interest (around 70 percent). *Duyun-ı Umumiye* (Public Debt Administration) have held reserves on state revenues. In socio-economic terms, Turkey was still characterised by tribal relations, despite the continuous efforts of the reformist state to widen its authority.⁷⁶

According to the Church records of the pre-World war I, the proportion of non-Turk and non-Muslim population to the whole population in Anatolia was approximately 40 percent.⁷⁷ Interestingly enough, the Kemalist republic brought about a "Turkey without Christians." This was not the consequence of "a tragedy of bigotry," however. The Armenian calamity was due to their collaboration with

⁷⁶Ali Kemal Meram, *Türkçülük ve Türkçülük Mücadeleleri Tarihi* (Turkism and The History of Turkist Struggles) (Istanbul: Kültür Kitabevi, 1969), 195. Meram's book is a study in "scientific Turkism", i.e., Kemalism, and in its general highlights, it is a sheer praise of westernist Turkism.

⁷⁷Falih Rıfki Atay, *Çankaya: Atatürk'ün Doğumundan Ölümüne Kadar* (Çankaya. From the Birth of Atatürk to His Death) (Istanbul, 1969), 449. Church records are reliable because their population registers formed the official basis of taxation for administrations of the Christian millets

the Russian invasion forces. It is a pity that it was this tragedy that fuelled the movement of Kuvay-i Milliye. The victorious states had the aim of establishing an Armenian state extending from Caucasian borders to Cilicia. The Western Anatolia had come under the Greek invasion after the Treaty of Mudros (30 October, 1918). The basis of this Greek domination was the Greek population living in western Anatolia and the Black Sea coasts. The War of Independence ended up with the clearing of Armenian and Greek populations from Anatolia. For the first time in the history of Anatolia, it has purely become the homeland of Muslim Turks except a small proportion of non-Muslim minorities within the inner spheres of Istanbul walls.

The clearing of Anatolia and Thrace from Christian population had its cost as well. The foundations of the national economy were shaken. Because Turks were involved in administrative and military affairs only, most of commercial, agricultural and industrial activities were carried out by the non-Muslims. In their absence, large lands remained uncultivated, and handicrafts, foreign trade and industrial enterprises nearly ceased to exist.

Anatolia and Thrace were burned and ruined in successive, continuous wars. Thus, everything had to be reconstructed with native resources. Yet, the budget of the new state was only 12 million pounds.⁷⁸

Decolonisation/nationalisation of railways and the liquidation of foreign debts were imminent questions to be tackled. In the absence of national bourgeoisie, only state could undertake such an imperative. Therefore, etatism in new Turkey necessarily meant nationalism. The foreign companies in Turkey did not employ Turks and use Turkish in their workings. The prescribed task of Kemalists therefore was to

⁷⁸Ibid., 449-451.

eradicate the racist fixation that "Turks cannot do!"⁷⁹ Thus came the motto of *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene!* (How fortunate is he who says I am a Turk) in order to create "happy Turkish man"

4. 9. "Pan" Politico-Cultural Systems and Kemalist Nationalism

4.9.1. The Rise of Milli Siyaset(National Policy)

In contrast to the multinational Ottoman Empire hosting such ethno-religious communities as Muslims, Christians, Jews, Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Greeks, Armenians, Serbs, and Bulgarians, the newly proclaimed Turkish Republic was ethnically homogeneous in the wide sense of the term. Over 90 percent of its population spoke Turkish as their mother-tongue, and over 98 percent of its population accepted Islam as their religion.⁸⁰

The transition from the empire to the republic terminated all kinds of "international brotherhood" dreams, namely Ottomanism, international communism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. The "retractionist" character of Kemalist nationalism in territorial terms was pre-emptive for all kinds of irredentist intentions. Specifically, the boundaries drawn by the National Pact, which confirmed the lines drawn by the peace treaty of 1913 at the end of the Balkan wars, and by the

⁷⁹The mood of the period is well reflected when the Turkish government attempted to buy the shares of a foreign bank. The answer the government received was "Turks cannot do banking. If you leave money to us, we would manage it and provide you with its interest" Waging a successful war of liberation but being unable to do banking was a reflection of western imperial bias as to the inner inability of Turks to create change with its own internal dynamics, a classic view of the nineteenth century orientalism. See Atay, Çankaya, 452-453.

⁸⁰Rustow, "Atatürk as an Institution-Building," 59. Of course, these figures are official, and therefore, based on the deliberate acceptance of the ethnic homogeneity of the population of Turkey.

armistice of 1918 at the end of the First World War, became the irreducible territory of the new Turkish Republic. This territorialism had no Islamic reference whatsoever due to the disestablishment of Islam as the frame of political legitimacy. The more universal boundaries suggested by Turkic and Islamic frames of references thus were negated in view of the national imperative as construed by Mustafa Kemal.

During the National Struggle, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his associates had an accommodationist approach contrary to their future stance. The speeches and statements of Mustafa Kemal Pasha between 1919-1924 are full of religious themes. In this period, the Ottoman trend of secularisation experienced a heavy blow, the clear reflection of which was the ban put on the consumption and production of alcoholic beverages through the law entitled *Men-i Müskirat Kanunu* (The Law for the Prohibition of Alcoholic Beverages).⁸¹

In contrast to the near absence of the national consciousness, the religious allegiance and the feeling of solidarity formed around the idea of *umma* were very powerful at the popular level. Instead of being stamped by the people as "freemason" meaning irreligious, it was contingently more "rational" to make instrumental use of religion in deterring the opposition forces of both Pan-Turkists and Pan-Islamists. The forbiddance of non-Muslims to participate in the elections for the new National Assembly due to their general state of "rebellion against the state" in collaboration with the invasion forces, and accordingly, the use of "anti-crusade" discourse in the mobilisation of war-tired peasants formed the ideological basis of the ethnic coalition between Muslim

⁸¹TBMM Kavanin Mecmuası (Turkish Grand National Assembly Journal of Laws), vol. 1, Law No: 22, 14 September 1336 (1920), 23.

elements, namely Turks, Kurds, Lazes and Circassians. In other words, the Islamic allegiance was the driving force of the National Struggle.⁸²

Apart from Islam, the Kemalist cadre had an accommodationist approach towards international communism as well. This stance basically stemmed from the practical imperatives of the day. The urgent need for the Soviet support made a necessity for the national government to tolerate the existence of a pseudo-communist party of Turkey. But the decision in the Third International to support national liberation movements all over the world without any distinction made unnecessary to stay seemingly close to Bolshevism in order to obtain Soviet help. To be against the capitalist world was considered adequate, and almost all national liberation movements were in struggle against capitalist imperialism.⁸³

⁸²On the floor walls of the National Assembly there was a verse from the Qur'an , which read: "Their works among them are through consultation."See A. Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Quran* (Beirut: Dar Al Arabiya, 19687, Sura XLII, Shura, the Verse 38, 1317. Pointing to this verse, a deputy from Kastamonu, Ahmet Mahir Efendi, underlined the fact that it was the spirit of this verse that gave life to the Muslim ethnic coalition including Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Lazes, Georgians and Albanians formed around the goal of the independence of the country. See *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, vol. 14, 213, dated 21. 02. 1341(1924).

⁸³The position of Mustafa Kemal Pasha as regards to Bolshevism may be grasped from his following statements: "The new Turkey has no relationship with the old one. The Ottoman government remained in the past. Now, a new Turkey has emerged, though the nation has not changed. The same Turkish element comprise this nation. But the way of government has changed... One should not forget that this way of government is not that of Bolshevism. Because we are neither Bolshevik nor communist." Atatürk, "Petit Parisien Muhabirine Verilen Demeç" (The Statement to the Correspondent of *Petit Parisien*),*Söylev ve Demeçler III* , 2 November 1922, 72.

After the War of Independence, Kemalists ended their war-time tactical alliance with Islam and Islamic forces. Already they had ended their putative link with Bolsheviks.⁸⁴

Creation of a totally · homogeneous Turkey without resorting to racial or religious-based irredentism, and through commitment to the idea of secular progress basically by use of such means as legislation and education apart from the exploitation of sheer power and *de facto* administrative measures, the common manifestations of socio-political engineering, have been the qualifying characteristics of the Kemalist ethno-secular nationalism. As referred before, Kemalist nationalism represents a radical and relatively successful response to the age-old question of "how to save the state? "By attempting to create a new collective identity, it tried to do this mainly through "a revolution of national honour" and hence emphasised the virtues, sometimes of inner character, of being Turkish. Kemalist historical answer regarding the state of "the state" can be better grasped in comparative view of other self-sufficient ideological programmes preceding the Republican era

In the period of the Second Constitution (1908-1918) there were three discernible ideological currents in the Ottoman Empire: Islamism, Westernism and Turkism. The programme of Islamists was dedicated to Pan-Islamism (the politico-cultural union of all Muslims). Its main argument had a defensive-apologetic character: Islam is not an impediment to material progress. Rather, it encourages and even necessitates material growth. In doing this, it differentiated between technology, considered to be universal not western, and culture seen as inherently western and therefore "alien" Since Islam considered to be

⁸⁴Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği* , 107.

the source of all perfections, the Islamic law could be codified to cope with the problems posed by the intrusion of "modernity" into the Empire.⁸⁵

The westernist programme is concisely worded in Abdullah Cevdet's renown article "A Very Wakeful Sleep" (*Pek Uyanık Bir Uyku*), summary of which was noted before.⁸⁶

The Turkist programme reflected a conciliation to some extent between the Islamist and westernist programmes; but it had also its distinct character. It emphasised the great unity of all Turks (Pan-Turkism). Its conception of history was not limited to Islamic times; but extended back to the pre-islamic period. Simplification and purification were two major aspects of their proposed language reform. Turkish unity was considered as a subset of Islamic unity. In fact, it had the trio of "Türkleşmek, Islamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak" (Turkification, Islamization, Modernisation) as its motto. Yet the position of Islam in this trio was secondary and instrumental. National economy (millî iktisat) and national literature (millî edebiyat) were other points of importance.⁸⁷ In fact, Turkism formed the driving forces of westernisation in this period with its emphasis on the construction of a new, simple language, the development of a Turkist interpretation of Islam and the participation of women in public life.⁸⁸

Out of these three rival ideological programmes, Kemalist ideology was influenced by the westernist programme most, and Islamist

⁸⁵For the programme of Islamists, see Safa, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* 62-67.

⁸⁶Ibid., 57-61.

⁸⁷Ibid., 52-56.

⁸⁸Hans Kohn, *Türk Milliyetçiliği* (Turkish Nationalism), trans. (Ankara, 1944), 38.

programme least. Important steps had already been taken for the implementation of the westernist programme in the Ottoman Empire. Particularly, the participation of women in public life both in work and education, the abolition of polygamy, discreet experiences for the use of Latin alphabet and the introduction of secular laws and courts took place well before the occurrence of a Kemalist revolution.⁸⁹

What Mustafa Kemal did was to radically change the basis of the legitimacy of the political system by creating a new power space. Its reception of the West was total, with its "rose and thorn." It viewed westernisation not as a means but an end, and identified with it through making "a revolution based on symbols." Kemalism was an effort of "westernisation through Turkification".⁹⁰

It is difficult to dissociate the establishment of the Turkish national state from the War of Independence in the process of the making of the Kemalist nationalism. The adoption of the idea of national sovereignty and its embodiment through the opening of the Grand National Assembly were in fact a *de facto* change of political regime. A national government pursuing a national policy was a direct remnant of the period of National Struggle.

⁸⁹For a thesis stressing the fact that Kemalist ideology is the continuation of *Tanzimat* and the period of the Second Constitution(1908-1918), see Aykut Kansu, *The Elusive Transformation: The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997). For the Turkish translation of the same study see Aykut Kansu, *1908 Devrimi* trans. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılığı, 1995).

⁹⁰"His (Mustafa Kemal's) life and experiences had him to believe that we cannot save ourselves unless we become a westernised nation and western state." See Atay, Çankaya 369-370.

4.9.2. Kemalist Nationalism and Milli Siyaset (The National Policy)

It is a self-evident fact that Kemalist nationalism openly rejected the "three ways of policy", namely Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism as a solution for saving the state. It embraced a well-defined territorialism imbued with ethnic elements of a Turkic character, symbolised in the name of *Turk*.⁹¹

The fourth point in a telegram sent to the province of Sivas and the Central Committee by Mustafa Kemal Pasha entitled "Basının Dikkate Alacağı Hususlar" (Points to be Noticed by the Press) recommended to the pro-national press to avoid in their publications about the Muslim World from Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist propaganda, and to declare that national movements in Asia are simply movements aiming at the achievement of the cause of independence by Muslim nations within their boundaries.⁹²

The National Policy cleared of Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist inclinations found its best expression in the words of Mustafa Kemal Pasha:

...It is an unrealisable aim to attempt to unite in one tribe all the Turks existing on the earth, thereby abolishing all boundaries. There is nothing in history to show how the policy of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism could have succeeded or how they could have found a basis for their realisation on this earth. As regards the result of the ambition to organise a state which should be governed by the idea of world-supremacy and include the whole of humanity without distinction of race, history does not afford examples of this. For us, there can be no question of the lust of conquest. On the other hand, the theory which aims at founding an "humanitarian" state which shall embrace all mankind in perfect equality and brotherhood and at bringing it to the point of

⁹¹Afet İnan, *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ten Yazdıklarım* (What I Have written Down From Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1971), 121.

⁹²Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri* 251.

forgetting separatist sentiments and inclinations of every kind is subject to conditions which are peculiar to itself.

The political system which we regard as clear and fully realisable is national policy. In view of the general conditions obtaining in the world at present and the truths which in the course of centuries have rooted themselves in the minds of and have formed the characters of mankind, no greater mistake could be made than that of being utopian. This is borne out in history and is the expression science, reason and common sense.

In order that our nation be able to live a happy, strenuous and permanent life, it is necessary that the State pursue an exclusively national policy and that this policy be in perfect agreement with our internal organisation and be based on it. When I speak of national policy, I mean it in this sense: To work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare of the nation and the country by, above all, relying on our own strength in order to retain our existence. We must not lead the people to follow fictitious aims, of whatever nature, which can only bring them misfortune, we expect from the civilised world a civilised human treatment, friendship based on mutuality.⁹³

These words are a concise expression of non-imperialist, non-expansionist, anti-irredentist aspect of Kemalist nationalism. They are an outright reflection of territorial nationalism based not on ethnic bond or race but on collective sense of belonging and culture.⁹⁴ However, ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism includes racial/ethnicist elements going well beyond the defensive nature of the "liberation nationalisms" and this makes a hidden shadow on the territorial/political character of Kemalist nationalism. Taken the ethnic hegemony of Turks as given, the ethnicist grasp of Kemalist nationalism has had an understanding of national character considered to be natural, fixed and superior rather than formed in socio-historical contingencies. The cult of personality formed around Mustafa Kemal, "Büyük Reis

⁹³Atatürk, *A Speech* , 379-380.

⁹⁴Parla, *Atatürk'ün Nutku* , 76.

(the Great Chief), is another important manifestation of an atavistic political culture⁹⁵ to be dealt with in the following section.

4.9.3. Question of Appellation: The Idea of an Anatolian Homeland versus Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist Universalism

In the first decade of the twentieth century the name of Turkey was not either a political or a geographic concept in the Ottoman political vocabulary. It was rather a European misnomer for the Ottoman Empire.⁹⁶ In the process of the transformation of religious communities into political groupings, the word of *Turk* still carried over its pejorative meaning of illiterate, poor peasants of Islamic faith. Since the Empire known as the "Ottoman," when the Kemalist Republic decided to change its name it had to adopt the Turkish version of the Italian word "Turchia" due to the absence of a Turkish counterpart for Turkey.⁹⁷

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Anatolia emerged as the homeland of the newly rising Turkish national state. The idea of Turkish nation-state seemed something natural to the educated class only. Yet, for the Pan-Turkist intellectual circles, the idea of a new Pan-Turkish Empire appeared more attractive. Mustafa Kemal categorically opposed to such options on the ground that no new adventure could be afforded by the nation.

⁹⁵Parla, *Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku* 210-211.

⁹⁶Rustow, *The Founding of A Nation-State: Atatürk's Historic Achievement*, 1.

⁹⁷Kohn, *Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 29. For an elaborate treatment of the origin of the name of Turkey, see İsmail Hami Danişment, *Türklük Meseleleri* (Questions of Turkishness) (Istanbul: İstanbul Kitabevi, 1983), 154-159.

Other than the option of "Turkish Republic" that the Kemalists espoused, there were basically two suggestions as regards the name of the new state: "Anatolian Republic" proposed by the Pan-Turkists and "Islamic Republic of Turkey" suggested by the so-called "Islamists". Since Islam was thought to have no place whatsoever in the "living space" of the new regime, nothing could have the chance of life that made reference to Islam.

Those who proposed the name of the Republic of Anatolia criticised the appellation of the national history in relation to a dynasty, like the appellations of Seljukian or Ottoman Turks.⁹⁸ Because in every case the same nation was renamed differently, while the changing thing was the dynasties only.⁹⁹ Therefore, our national history should be understood as covering all Turkish ethnies establishing states in Azerbaijan, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Russia, Horasan, India, Turkistan, Mongolia and China. Hence the name of Turkey cannot be the peculiar name of our national history. The right name, accordingly, could be history of Anatolian Turks or just history of Anatolia.¹⁰⁰ Thus, the appellation of "Turkish Republic" should be avoided. The suggestion was the Turkish Republic of Anatolia.

However, the new regime was both anti-Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. Mustafa Kemal's choice, Turkey, reflected the anti-dynastic(non-Ottoman), non-Islamic and territorially limited Turkishness with an ethnoterritorial connotation, the main parameters of Kemalist

⁹⁸See Mükrimin Halil Yinanç, "Milli Tarihizin Adı"(The Name of Our National History), in *Milli Tarihizin Adı* (İstanbul: Hareket Yayınları, 1969), 13-14.

⁹⁹Ibid., 16.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 18.

nationalism.¹⁰¹ The term *vatan* experienced a shift of meaning and was relieved of its Islamic content that "the fatherland of a Muslim is the place where the Şeriat prevails". The new idea of Turkish fatherland replaced pan-Islamic and pan-Turkist appeals and a new loyalty to Turkish homeland was inculcated through the Kemalist thesis of history.¹⁰²

4.9.4. National Humanitarianism of Kemalist Nationalism

Unlike its contemporaries in Germany , Italy and USSR, Kemalist one-party state was essentially pacific, which nourished no territorial or political ambitions at the expense of other countries. Policy of peaceful coexistence under the motto of "Peace at home and peace abroad," were Mustafa Kemal's catchword. The Kemalist nationalist elites were determined in joining the race of progress together with the "civilised" nations and having their place in their sides. Kemalist nationalism did not conceal any intention of reconquest or revision of frontiers. "Of all the dictatorial regimes that of Turkey had been alone in basing itself on a policy not of expansion but retraction."¹⁰³

Kemalist nationalism in its outer face was not parochial. Empires were something of the past and the day of nations had arrived. But this has not negated the fact that the welfare of nations was interdependent. As Mustafa Kemal observed,

¹⁰¹Bozkurt Güvenç, *Türk Kimliği: Kültür Tarihinin Ana Kaynakları* (Turkish Identity: The Main Sources of Cultural History) (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1996), 227.

¹⁰²Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* , 352-353.

¹⁰³Lord Kinross, *Atatürk: The Rebirth of A Nation* (London: Widenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), 458.

We must think of the whole mankind as being a single body and of each nation as constituting a part of that body.... We must not say, "If there is sickness in a certain place in the world, what does that matter to me?... If there is such sickness, we must be just as much concerned with as though it happened right in our midst. This way of thinking liberates peoples, nations and governments from selfishness.¹⁰⁴

According to him, the world nations were the residents of an apartment building, interests of which being interrelated.¹⁰⁵

Kemalist nationalism recognises the imperatives of nation-state system as equal for all nations and refuses national ego-centrism in this regard.¹⁰⁶ It demands the recognition of the right of national self-determination for all nations as a universal principle.¹⁰⁷ The national humanism of Kemalist nationalism values national existence as the highest political value. In this context, the "normal entity" for Kemalist nationalism is a nation state united with a special political consciousness being visible in the national unity and uniformity. Any formation outside this normality is considered to constitute a permanent threat to the world peace. By assuring the national homogeneity through the application of national principle, a state can become a founding stone for

¹⁰⁴"Romanya Dışişleri Bakanı Antonescu İle Konuşma" (Talk with The Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonescu), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 17 March 1937, 326. See also *Ulus*, 20 March 1937.

¹⁰⁵"Yeni Vaziyet"(The New Situation), *Söylev ve Demeçler III*, 21 June 1935, 138.

¹⁰⁶"Erzurum Milletvekili Durak ve Arkadaşlarının, Şark Cephesi Kuvvetlerinin Mütecavizlere Karşı Mukabele Etmemeleri Sebeplerinin Bildirilmesi Hakkındaki Sual Takrirî Üzerine,"(On the Interpellation of Erzurum Deputy Durak and His Friends Regarding the Reporting of the Causes of the Failing to Retaliate Against Aggressors by the Forces in the Eastern Front), *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 14 August 1920, 102.

¹⁰⁷"Üçüncü Toplanma Yılıını Açarken"(Opening The Third Meeting Year), *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 1 March 1922, 251.

the peaceful coexistence of interstate system. Kemalism has achieved this state thanks to its "national humanism" based on the national consciousness rather than the individual reason as was the case in the old conception of humanism.¹⁰⁸

In terms of the relevance of three ways of policy to Kemalist national policy, cultural Pan-Turkism was particularly relevant, which shared many commonalities with Kemalist nationalism.

4.9.5. Pan-Turkism and Kemalist Nationalism

The distinguishing feature of Pan-Turkism is its ethnic based irredentism. Irredentism is an ideological or organisational expression of emotional interest in the well-being of an ethnic minority living outside the boundaries of the state inhabited by the same ethnic group. Its moderate version is related to the prevention of discrimination or assimilation of the kindred group. The extreme version of irredentism aims at annexing the territories that the group inhabits.¹⁰⁹

The main exponent of irredentism in the late Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic was the adherents of Pan-Turkist ideology, the objective of which was to strive for cultural and/or political union among Turkic peoples living within and outside the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently of the Turkish Republic.

Pan-Turkism differs from Pan-Turanism in terms of its ethnic coverage. Pan-Turanism aims at union of all Turanic peoples embracing Mongols, Hungarians, Finns as well as all peoples of Turkic origin. Thus,

¹⁰⁸Yavuz Abadan, *Hukukçu Gözü ile Milliyetçilik ve Halkçılık* (Nationalism and Populism in a Jurist's View) (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Yayınu, 1938), 11-12.

¹⁰⁹Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey. A Study of Irredentism* ((London: C. Hurst &Co., 1981), 1.

it has a wider coverage than Pan-Turkism limited to Turkic peoples. In proportion to its wide coverage, Pan-Turanism had a lesser appeal in comparison to Pan-Turkism. Pan-Turkism had a strong appeal in intellectual circles and was adopted by the CUP as the dominant aspect of its ideological position.

Pan-Turkism began as Diaspora nationalism in Tsarist Russia in the late nineteenth century as a reaction to Russification and Pan-Slavism. It aimed at the revival of an ancient culture, as part of its search for common roots. In this regard, the prominence was accorded to language, history and literature, three pivots of nationalism. For many Pan-Turkists, the existence of a "common language" served as sufficient proof that all its speakers were members of one and the same nation.

In addition to language, Pan-Turkists perceived several other cultural characteristics in history, literature, culture and mythology, which was suitable for creating an ethnically homogeneous nation and differentiating it from others. Although less pronounced in comparison to Pan-Turanism to which ethnicity was central, Pan-Turkism also had a strong emphasis on ethnic bond and the notion of common origin. The racist writings of the 1930s stressing the superiority of Turkish race and linking common physical attributes with mental abilities were the exaggerated continuation of Pan-Turkist doctrine viewing language, culture, race and territory as inseparable elements of first a cultural and subsequently, political union.¹¹⁰

Contrary to other types of "Pan" ideologies, religion (Islam) had a low profile in Pan-Turkism. Pan-Turkists saw Pan-Islamism as a rival ideology and for doctrinaire and tactical reasons kept Islam outside their

¹¹⁰Karpat argues that racist ideas penetrated into Turkey after 1935 under Nazi influence. See Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: Transition to a Multiparty System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 263.

ideological formulations, which was based on the refusal of politicisation of religion, that is it was in political sense secular.¹¹¹ They perceived that only a secular movement might avoid taking sides in the *Sunni-Shiî* rivalry.¹¹²

Irredentism is a vital component of Pan-Turkism and the main element differentiating it from Kemalist Turkish nationalism. Kemalism displaced Pan-Turkism as the official state ideology and focused on the nation-state's narrower interests, renouncing the overriding concern for the Outside Turks, which had been the core of Pan-Turkism. While Kemalism was polycentric in character, Pan-Turkism was essentially an ethnocentric ideology and movement. Under the firm guidance of Kemalist nationalism, the new Turkey sought to join other nations on equal footing in the mainstream of world civilisation. Pan-Turkists, however, have consistently emphasised the special attributes of all Turks with a view to uniting them, demonstrating much less concern for modernisation or world civilisation. Despite Pan-Turkists' claim that there was no real conflict between these two approaches to nationalism and that their own policies were bound to serve the interests of the

¹¹¹In fact nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, basically Pan-Turkism, was imported to a setting where Islam was still the main source of legitimacy. In the western experience, however, nationalism was a corollary of secularisation process. Thus, Islam was inescapably influenced the native teaching of nationalism such that being Turk in the popular imagery was meant being Muslim, particularly in the Balkans. Therefore the secularism of Turkists was not the same with that of Kemalist nationalism according religion a living space only in the hearths of its faithful. See Etyen Mahcupyan, "Laik Kesim ve Bastırılmış Irkçılık" (*Laic Segment and the Latent Racism*)*Yeni Yüzyıl*, 16. 09. 1995, 14.

¹¹²Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey* 181.

Turkish nation-state,¹¹³ Kemalists remained watchful of them and their activities.¹¹⁴

The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire discredited the main political ideologies which had been prevalent during its later years. Ottomanism had lost its very *raison d'être* — Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism registered a great failure in saving the imperial state. The determination of the future of Turkey within its own borders came out in a way as a practical imperative. With the establishment of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal put its personal stamp on the determination of the conception of ethno-secular, strictly territorial conception of new Turkish nationalism.

Evidently, many ideas of Young Turks, particularly those of Ziya Gökalp, carried over into the Republic. Several elements of Turkism and Pan-Turkism of the late Ottoman Empire passed to the Kemalist nationalism. Nevertheless, Kemalist nationalism had an essentially different orientation. As early as 1921, during the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal, speaking at Eskişehir, declared:

Neither Pan-Islamism, nor Turanism may constitute a doctrine, or logical policy for us. Henceforth the government policy of the new Turkey is to consist in living independently, relying on Turkey's own sovereignty within her national frontiers.¹¹⁵

The new approach regarded the national (internal) interests of the new Republic as the most important of all considerations. Mustafa Kemal

¹¹³Hikmet Tanyu, *Atatürk ve Türk Milliyetçiliği* (Atatürk and Turkish Nationalism) (Ankara: Orkun Yayınları, 1961). For the differences between Kemalist nationalism and Pan-Turkism see Hamza Eroğlu, "Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik" (Atatürk and Nationalism), in *Atatürkçü Düşünce* (Ankara: Atatürk Dil Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 1992), 366-367.

¹¹⁴Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey* 183.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 72.

repeated this view in several occasions, including his six day-speech in 1927. This was not only because of allegiance attested to the patriotic ascendancy in view of the failure of other ideologies; but also because Turkey, badly ravaged by war, needed to concentrate its efforts on its own construction. Turkey was now a smaller and fairly homogeneous state as compared to the huge multinational Ottoman Empire; hence the retractionist option appeared more feasible. A self-centred policy would also prove advantageous in foreign relations, as the renouncing of Pan-Turkist ideals would assist in the normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union.

With very few exceptions, such as in the case of Syrian district of Alexandratta annexed by Turkey in 1939 and renamed Hatay, political Pan-Turkism, particularly its irredentist element, was officially discarded. One may even say that the wave of secularising reforms in Turkey raised a barrier between Turks of Turkey and Outside Turks, the most prominent one of which was in cultural terms being the change of alphabet from Arabic to the Latin script. Interest shown in the areas inhabited by Turkic groups was always minimal and discreet at the official level. While the Turkish authorities did encourage Turks from other countries, particularly from Cyprus and Balkans, to emigrate to Turkey during the 1920s and 1930s, this policy has nothing to do with Pan-Turkist drives. Rather it represented a desire to restore the loss in population sustained during the First World War and the War of Independence. During the 1930s, the Turkish government did officially not give any support to associations and informal groups with Pan-Turkist leanings active outside and inside Turkey. On the contrary, the governmental position expressed reservations about Pan-Turkist manifestations.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶Ibid., 73.

As a matter of fact, as an inescapable consequent of the Kemalist thesis of history, Kemalist nationalism preserved only a cultural interest with outside Turks. Unlike some Pan-Turkists, the ending point for Atatürk was Anatolia starting from Central Asia, and not vice versa. His interest in outside Turks was purely historical-cultural and contained no political implication:

We take the cause of Turkishness within a positive capacity. We attest importance to the great Turkish history, the sources of Turkish language, its rich dialects, and the ancient Turkish remains. We do not ignore even the language and culture of the Yakut Turks beyond the lake of Baikal.¹¹⁷

Kemalist nationalism displayed considerable talent in assimilating the immediate past and shaping a new future. Whenever possible, its proponents eliminated potential rivals, accommodated existing institutions and absorbed diverse ideological elements, including those of Pan-Turkism. Several Pan-Turkist elements can be discerned that are absorbed by Kemalist nationalism

4.9.5.1. *The Cooption of Pan-Turkist Writers By Kemalist Nationalism*

Most of Pan-Turkist intellectuals were easily coopted by the Kemalist regime due to either change in their Pan-Turkist persuasion or the "policy of carrot and stick" of the Kemalist Republic. Among the prominent of these intellectuals were Halide Edip, an ardent Pan-Turanist novelist and journalist, whose novel *Yeni Turan* (The New Turan) had deeply inspired the Pan-Turkists. Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul), the poet of "Ben Bir Türküm" (I am a Turk) reedited some of his poems to read *vatan* (homeland) instead of *Turan* (the legendary land where

¹¹⁷Utkan Kocatürk, *Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri* (The Ideas and Thoughts of Atatürk) (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1984), 186.

Turanic peoples resided). The renown Pan-Turkist journalist Ahmet Ağaoğlu accepted the official position of Director of The Press Bureau in Ankara in 1921. As early as 1923, Ağaoğlu impressed a French journalist interviewing him with his devotion to Mustafa Kemal and made clear his new ideological position: "Ankara is nationalist, renouncing the pretensions of the old Ottoman Empire: It wishes to establish a modest Turkish national home, restricted to the ethnographic Turkish frontiers... for that she needs peace."¹¹⁸

In 1928, Yusuf Akçura, one of the leading figures of Pan-Turkism in the late Ottoman era, proclaimed that the Republic of Turkey was the embodiment of all Pan-Turkist ideals.¹¹⁹ In fact, Akçura became the main contributor to the formation of the new line of nationalism. Tekin Alp and many other Pan-Turkists had also become fervent adherents of Kemalist nationalism. In particular, Tekin Alp became a theoretician of Kemalist nationalism and the author of a standard work on Kemalism.¹²⁰

4.9.5. 2. Türk Ocakları (Turkish Hearts) and Kemalist Nationalism

A rather similar process of co-optation occurred with respect to *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearts), the only effective organisation that Pan-Turkists had established in Istanbul in 1912. It had participated in the war efforts through the dissemination of political propaganda within the Empire and had set up branches in the Caucuses and Turkistan. In 1917, the emissaries of the organisation spread Pan-Turk propaganda in the

¹¹⁸Landau, *ibid.*, 74.

¹¹⁹Yusuf Akçura, *Türkçülük* (Turkism) (Istanbul: Türk Kültür Yayınu, 1978), 221-23.

¹²⁰See Tekin Alp, *Kemalizm* (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1936). For its French translation, see Tekin Alp, *Le Kemalisme* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1937).

Arabian peninsula, particularly in Syria which caused a strong anti-Turkish feeling among the local people. In March 1919, many members of the organisation met in Istanbul and adopted unanimously a resolution which was later presented as a petition to the British High Commissioner protesting the projected dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. In April 1920, the organisation reaffirmed its support for Azerbaijan's struggle for independence and for closer ties with Turkey. In the subsequent years, however, its activities were frozen. It reopened in 1924.

In this second period, many leading Turkists assumed senior official positions in the new bureaucracy. Turkism, however qualified by Kemalist nationalism, was the major source of inspiration for the Kemalist reforms. Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of the Interior, made this relationship clear with his following statement: "Turkism for us is both a basis and a purpose."¹²¹

Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) was the President of *Türk Ocakları* from the beginning. As a famous orator, he was acceptable to the Pan-Turkists although he had never been a leading Pan-Turkist. It would not be too difficult for him in the political climate of Kemalist incomplete totalitarianism to persuade *Türk Ocakları*, from the mid-1920s on, to adopt Kemalist nationalism that had become the official state doctrine. At the first congress of the new Hearths, convened in Ankara in 1924, Tanrıöver determined that the main objective of *Türk Ocakları* was to preserve Turkish culture and defend Kemalist reforms. The organisation did indeed concentrate its efforts increasingly on cooperating with the ruling Republican People's Party, in both larger and smaller population centres. It assumed a vanguard position in public dissemination of the

¹²¹Cumhuriyet, 2 August 1929, 3.

features of the new archetype of ethnosecular Turkish man introduced by the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism. For Türk Ocakları, this involved an intensive westernisation campaign, expressed in terms of westernised education, the establishment of reading rooms and libraries with Turkish, French and English journals and books as well as the introduction of western music, theatrical performances and sports activities.

Despite its commitment to Kemalist nationalism, Pan-Turkist tendencies continued to manifest themselves in the organisation. In consequence, the organisation's constitution was amended in 1927, limiting "the field of operations of Türk Ocakları to the frontiers of the Turkish Republic."¹²²

¹²²In the congress held in 23 April 1927, the constitution of the Turkish Hearts was amended. The following are the articles included in the "fundamentals" of its constitution.

"Article 2: The aim of Türk Ocağı is to strive for the strengthening of the national consciousness, to provide for the civic and hygienic evolution and the growth of national economy.

The field of operations of Türk Ocakları is limited to the frontiers of the Turkish Republic.

Article 3: Türk Ocağı; pursuing the ideals of republic, nationality, contemporary civilisation and populism, is together with the Republican People's Party, which has been realising these ideals, in state policy. Türk Ocağı strives and endeavours for promulgating and inculcating these ideals in the fields of science, culture and social sciences. ...

Article 6: Every woman and man who are of Turkish origin or nurturing entirely sense of Turkishness and language through culture, and have proved their allegiance to Turkishness through their past can be a member of Türk Ocağı. " See *Türk Ocakları Yasası* (The Regulation of Turkish Hearts) (*Türk Ocakları Merkez Heyeti Matbaası*, 1927), 3-4. These fundamentals are shared and confirmed by Mustafa Kemal as well: " Turkish Hearths is the cultural branch of the Republican People's Party. The party would educate the nation and make leadership in all cultural fields such as science, economy, politics and fine arts in order to bring up the citizens. Members of the Hearts would do their basic duty and fulfil the greatest service to their ideals by explaining the programme of the RPP to people. This aspect is overtly expressed in the third article of your constitution." See Atatürk, "Aydın Türk Ocağında Bir Konuşma" (A

Nevertheless Pan-Turk demands continued to be voiced among its members. As late as 1930, there were requests from Turkic groups in Azerbaijan, Turkistan and Bulgaria to set up the branches of Türk Ocakları in their areas. Coupled with other reasons, related basically with the concerns of internal politics, the organisation was dissolved in March 1931 and replaced by the *Halk Evleri* (People' Houses), completely committed to Kemalist nationalism and its propagation.¹²³ But the dissolution of Turkish Hearts resulted only with the purge of certain Turkists only. Turkism continued to exert its previous influence upon the RPP. Thus, the question was related more to who would hold the power rather than an ideological conflict. The development of language and history thesis and the removal of the Turkish classical music from

Speech in Aydin Turkish Heart), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 4 November 1931, 300.

¹²³Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 380. In fact, Turkish Hearts was the only independent organisation from the ruling Republican People's Party (RPP) which continued its existence. With its vanguard position in dissemination of the Republican ideal, it has assumed a considerable strength. The question of eliminating this organisationally independent entity became a real one before the Kemalist power elites when the Ocak members openly sided with the newly established Serbest Fırka, at the cost of violating its non-political character. Also, Atatürk has noticed the higher quality of Ocak members all over the country in contrast to the stagnant and poor quality membership of the ruling RPP. The potential of opposition the Ocak embodied and the desire of Mustafa Kemal to make use of this potential for the RPP signalled its end. See Kenan Akyüz, *Türk Ocakları* (Ankara: Türk Yurdu Neşriyatı, 1983), 116-124. The first theme of emphasis was that there was no need for two separate organisations that espoused the same goals. See Falih Rıfkı, "The Editorial", *Hakimiyet-i Millîye*, 21. 03. 1931, 1. Upon the request of Mustafa Kemal that "Forces of the same kind should be united" (Cumhuriyet, 25.03. 1931), the Congress of the Turkish Hearts decided to join the RPP and its head, Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver), was sent to Bucharest as ambassador. According to junior Ağaoğlu, the assumption of the name "Turkey" by the new state and the adoption of nationalism as a constitutional principle left no need for a distinction called "Türküler"(Turkists) and it was because of this that the Turkish Hearths were closed down. See Samet Ağaoğlu, *Demokrat Partinin Doğuş ve Yükseliş Sebepleri:Bir Soru* (The Causes of the Rise and Fall of Democrat Party: A Question) (İstanbul, 1972), 73-74.

the state radio were after the closing of the Turkish Hearts, all of which were Turkist policies in nature.

4.9.5.3. Intersection of Pan-Turkism and Kemalist Nationalism

Pan-Turkism is a type of Turkish nationalism taking the racial-ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism to its extreme. It differs from Kemalist nationalism basically in its definition of the scope of *vatan* (homeland). But in terms of their organic understanding of society they have only a difference in degree rather than a difference of essence. The conception of history based on the imagery of the eternal national existence and the idea of "national religion" are the two main points of intersection between Pan-Turkism and Kemalist nationalism.¹²⁴

Kemalists, like the Turkists of the two preceding generations, studied the "glorious" past of the Turks since their pre-islamic origins by concentrating upon language, history, literature and geography. It was hoped that the new Turkish nation would be provided with a national past of its own, of which it could be proud. Accordingly, the new image of the future would be derived from the newly-crystallised past in accordance with the ideological preferences of the new regime. Purification of the Turkish language and rewriting of history are two prominent examples. In language policy, systematic elimination of Arabic and Persian words was interpreted by the Pan-Turkists as a step in the direction of creating a language common to Turks in Turkey and abroad. The new thesis of history provided the Kemalists with the pseudo-scientific tools that Turks spread civilisation to the whole world when

¹²⁴Tanıl Bora, "Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Söylemleri: Melez Bir Dilin Kalın ve Düzensiz Lügati" (Nationalist Discourses in Turkey: The Thick and Untidy Vocabulary of an Hybrid Language), *Birikim*, 67(November 1994), 20.

they had to emigrate from their homeland in Central Asia. Thus came the Kemalist proposition that westernisation is in fact a process of returning back to native roots and hence it is the rediscovery of the forgotten national selfhood.

Kemalist historians and academicians continued the pre-war tradition of demonstrating the historical unity of all Turks. The most relevant work in this regard was the new, four volume history textbooks for secondary schools prepared by *Türk Tarih Kurumu* (Turkish Society of History) upon the request of the Ministry of National Education. The first volume printed in 1932, put forth observations which may have had Pan-Turk connotations including the claim that the ancient Turks had already possessed the idea of nationality; the concept of "Turkish race" and so forth.¹²⁵ Such ideas occasionally penetrated the journal *Ülkü* (The Ideal), the officially-inspired monthly of the Peoples' Houses began to publish since February 1933, although this is hardly an indication of Pan-Turkist feelings; rather it provides additional evidence of the absorption of Pan-Turkism into Kemalist nationalism.¹²⁶ The earlier confusion between Turkism and Pan-Turkism seemed to be resolving itself by the fusion of the latter into the former. Even the official policy of encouraging the Turkic-speaking minorities in Bulgaria and Greece to emigrate to Turkey was regarded in the light of the interests of the Republic of Turkey. Similarly, Law No: 2550, passed in 1934, provided the

¹²⁵For details and examples see Danişment, *Türklük Meseleleri* esp. 7-8, and 190-195.

¹²⁶An irregular check of the first volumes of *Ülkü*, the publication organ of the Ankara Halk Evi, is an indication of this. The term "Turan" does appear in an article on sports in Turkish history (6 July 1933, 477), but only as information about the Turan-Iran. A rare exception is an article by Reşit Galip (9 October 1933, 164-167), but even this is chiefly relate to the refutation of "foreign misconceptions"

means for assimilating Turkish nationals of non-Turkish culture into Turkishness and for absorbing and settling immigrants of Turkish culture arriving from abroad.

In sum, certain elements of Pan-Turkism were incorporated into Kemalist nationalism with particular exclusion of the *leitmotif* of irredentism. That is why the credentials of Pan-Turkism did not become the criteria of policy decision making in the Kemalist era.¹²⁷

¹²⁷Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey* 76.

CHAPTER V

DELIMITATION OF THE SECULAR BOUNDARY OF TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY

5.1. Total Westernisation

Kemalist Turkification by way of westernisation¹ was the self-assimilation of the new "Turkish society" with the view of a total change

¹Musṭafa Kemal feels no difficulty in presenting what is western as Turkish. To illustrate, regarding the acceptance of the Latin alphabet, he points out: "Citizens, these notes of mine are written by original, genuine Turkish words, Turkish letters....Our harmonious, rich language will reveal itself with the new Turkish letters." "Türk Yazı İnkılabı Hakkında Konuşma" (Speech About Turkish Alphabet Change), Atatürk'ün *Söylev ve Demeçleri II* (The Speechs and Statements of Atatürk II) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi; 1989), 9/10. 08. 1928, 272. Accordingly, he asks: "Is our general appearance and dress national? (the voices of 'no') Is our dress civilised and international? (voices of 'no, no') I agree with you. Forgive my expression. A dress which can be qualified as smoothbore below and fitled above is neither national, nor international. Therefore, can there be a nation without a dress, friends? (voices of 'no, no, never!')... Friends, there is no need to explore and revive the Turanian dress. Civilised and international dress for us is very precious and appropriate for our nation. We will wear that." "İnebolu'da Bir Konuşma"(A Speech in İnebolu), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 28. 08. 1925, 220. He sees no contradiction between the national ideal and the reception from the West. According to him, this is because "the modern principle of nationality has got international recognition. We too endeavour for preserving our Turkishness with great care. Turks are noble in civilisation. We are trying to prove that we were the original nation resided around İzmir before the Greeks came there." "Atatürk ve İnkılap" (Atatürk and Renovation),*Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri III* (The Speechs and Statements of Atatürk III) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 30. 11. 1929, 128.

through a continuos socio-cultural and political revolution into the western sphere of modern secularity. The dialectic of political independence from the West and the cultural dependence to its secularised Judeo-Christian cultural tradition of Enlightenment constitutes the main frame of the Kemalist endeavour for modernisation.² Kohn attests this "self-imposed" voluntarism of Kemalist endeavour for total westernisation to the lack of an old, great tradition of civilisation particular to the Turks,³ which is indeed the real *leitmotif* of Kemalist reasoning.

Kemalist nationalism was the first example of national liberation movements. The attainment of political independence accompanied by socio-political and cultural westernisation, and the creation of a new, "unique" national identity in order to restore the damaged collective honour characterises this liberationist nationalism. In other words, political independence (the National Struggle and the promulgation of the Republic), modernisation (nation-state and secularising reforms),

As a matter of fact, by "Turk", Kemalists mean "*Garblı Türk*" (westernised Turk). See Tekin Alp, *Türkleştirme* (Turkification) (Istanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1928), 21. The expression belongs to Falih Rıfkı, a renown Kemalist journalist and a close associate of Atatürk.

²Ali Mazrui, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Atatürk Mirası Açısından Afrika: Siyasal Kültürde Yerellik ve Evrensellik"(Africa in Terms of Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman Heritage: Locality and Universality in Political Culture), in *Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk* (Istanbul: Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1983), 579-580.

³Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1944), 5. The translator of the Kohn work, the original of which is *A History of Nationalism in the East*, Ali Çetinkaya, then deputy from Afyon, and formerly the head of Ankara Independence Tribunal makes a quick criticism of Kohn's argument by asserting that the new scientific researches have demonstrated that the Turks had their own civilisation in very old times, drawing upon the pseudo-scientific history thesis of Kemalism. See ibid. This objection catches the gist of Kemalist will to westernisation and its defensive narcissm resulting from the mood that "We Turks are capable of being modern ."

and a new collectivity of national form (the new Turkish man) have been translated into actuality by the Kemalist nationalism. The potential crisis of collective identity on the part of Kemalist political elites was aimed to be resolved through the argument that all civilisations and languages are of Turkic origin, and that Turkey is a western country uniting the western and Turkic poles of identity in herself.⁴

Kemalist westernising reforms which opted for the total secularisation of polity in the Berkesian sense, i.e., the cleansing of every aspects of life, private as well as public from "the dictates of religion"⁵ were, according to Mardin, based on the following "social findings": 1) Passing to a new conception of national honour based on rules and laws

⁴Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme* (Atatürk Nationalism: A Study Outside the Official Ideology), 80.

⁵According to Berkes, "Kemalist secularism was nothing but rejection of the ideology of Islamic polity." Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Canada: McGill University Press, 1964), 499. It aimed at "liberating individual from the yoke of tradition," ibid., 412. For the Berkesian interpretation of Kemalist secularism see, ibid., 479-503. Enver Ziya Karal, an official historian, points to the same thing when he asserts that Kemalist secularism not only prescribes the "liberation" of three branches of powers from Islam but also it rejects all the popular customs, traditions and styles of life prevailing in social, individual and family level that may have any relevance with Islam. See Enver Ziya Karal, "The Principles of Kemalism," in *Atatürk: Founder of A Modern State*, eds., Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 29. Levonian interpretation of Kemalist secularism in this respect is striking: "at bottom there is a materialistic interpretation of human life, and a quite false understanding of religion. They are in revolt against Islam, because Islam is Arabistan.... They are in revolt against all religions because they think religion and science, faith and knowledge cannot agree; they are essentially opposed to one another... religious creeds, teachings, and books are unreliable. Religion is for primitive-minded people. "See Lütfi Levonian, *Moslem Mentality* (London, 1928), 141; quoted by Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 58.

rather than ascription and personal authority as was the case in the ancient regime; 2) Transition from Islamic transcendentalism to the materialism of positive sciences in the comprehension of the human existence and the universal order; 3) Transition from a communitarian social organisation composed of the high (*havas*) and the low(*avam*) to an homogenous society of a demotic ethnies; 4) Transition from a religious community to a national society and state.⁶

The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire secured the establishment of a national state inhabited almost thoroughly by Muslim ethnies. The territorial boundaries of this state had a consensual definition as prescribed by the National Pact. But the definition of the boundaries of the national identity was a problematic one. While the territorial definition was basic to the French definition of national identity, it was culture defined along ethnic lines that constituted the German boundary of national identity. The Anglo-Saxon tradition, on the other hand, basically, defined the boundary of national identity around citizenship only. The two ends of the boundarial continuum were rested

⁶Serif Mardin, "Yenileşme Dinamiğinin Temelleri ve Atatürk" (The Foundations of the Dynamics of Renovation and Atatürk), in *Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk* (İstanbul: Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1983), 24. The spring of the dynamics of Kemalist ethnosecular nationalism was this understanding of the new collectivity founded on the conception of the "new honour." Needless to say, Kemalist conception of positive science was entirely materialistic and based on the refutation of the religious description of the universe. One of the main *leitmotifs* of the Kemalist history thesis was to inculcate the materialistic conception of life and universe through the teaching of the credentials of the nineteenth century naive positivism. See Afet İnan, *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları* (The Main Lines of Turkish History), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1996), preface. The first edition was in 1930. Also see Türk Tarihini Tetkik cemiyeti, *Tarih I* (History I), (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931), 1-8. For the Kemalist notion of demotic ethnies based on the rejection of class conflict, see Taha Parla, *Kemalizm, Ziya Gökalp ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm* (Kemalism, Ziya Gökalp and Corporatism in Turkey) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989).

on the criteria of **choice** and **birth** respectively. The French tradition was in the middle: it represented the mixture of birth and choice principles.

In this regard, Mustafa Kemal's definition of national boundary approximated Gökalp's definition of national identity based on **shared culture**, with the essential difference of Kemalist derivation of this culture from the non-Islamic past, and thereby rejecting Islam, in present or past, as a source of cultural formation.⁷ Anything Islamic represented the ancient regime for the Kemalists. Therefore the locus of the new "national identity developer" would be the later Kemalist thesis of history.⁸

Kemalist nationalism secularised the past in order to create a secular present. As such, cleared of Islamic influences and "enriched" by the selectively reconstructed elements of the pre-Islamic Turkish past, Kemalist nationalism was the basic frame on which the Republican polity was structured. It was the supreme force which informed all socio-political activities. With the crystallisation of the contours of Kemalist definition of national identity, the Republic started a new,

⁷Although some writers see Gökalp as the intellectual architect of the Kemalist revolution, this is an unsubstantiated claim. Mustafa Kemal entirely rejects Gökalp's distinction between culture and civilisation. They have radically different views as regards positivism, nationalism, populism, secularism, purification of language, pan-Turkism, and conception of history. It is not Gökalp's Turkism that became the nationalism principle of the Republican People's Party. Mustafa Kemal differs from Gökalp in his consideration of the elements that comprise a nation. Unlike Gökalp, Mustafa Kemal does not accept religion as a constituent element of Turkish nation. For Gökalp, religion is "necessarily social." To Mustafa Kemal, religion may be an intimate feeling in the heart of individuals only. See Taha Akyol, "Ulusal Devlet" (Nation-State), *Milliyet*, 14 September 1995, 15; and Şerafettin Turan, *Atatürk'ün Düşünce Yapısını Etkileyen Olaylar, Düşünürler, Kitaplar* (Incidents, Thinkers and Books That Affected the Structure of the Thought of Atatürk) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1982), 18-20.

⁸Mardin, "Yenileşme Dinamiğinin Temelleri ve Atatürk," 46.

"fresh" life of its own. History functioned as the motor force of destroying the remaining of the Ottoman-Islamic past and their substitution by the purely Turkish elements with the view of restoring Turkish national self-respect badly undermined by the western anti-Turkish biases.⁹

⁹Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 251. One of the inner drives of Mustafa Kemal was to gain European respect and admiration through his secularising reforms. This fact had become his "subconscious", to use a Freudian concept. His experiences of European's treatment of Ottomans with scorn and mockery made a decisive impact on his personality. To cite an example, when he was going to Paris in 1910 to join the Picardie manoeuvres, in the Belgrade train station his colleague, major Selahattin, was ridiculed by a peddler due to his *fes* on his head, which constituted the spring of his determination to replace it with hat as the national headgear. See Turan, *Atatürk'ün Düşünce Yapısını Etkileyen Olaylar, Düşünürler, Kitaplar*, 4. His evaluation of the new form of the traditional *zeybek* dance reflects the same mood "Ladies and gentlemen! Mr. Selim Sirri gave a civilised form to the *zeybek* dance while reviving it. ...From now on, we may say to the Europeans that 'we too possess a perfect dance.'" "İzmir Kız Öğretmen Okulunda Bir Konuşma" (A Speech in Izmir School of Female Teachers) *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 13. 10. 1925, 240. His presentation of hat as a sign of civilisation is another reflection of his defensive mood: "Within a short duration of time the dervishes and hodjas will have become pleased from wearing hat, which is a nice headgear. Intelligent and clever man lose their personal and scientific worth under a non-civilised garment. Therefore they must wear civilised costumes in order to protect their honoured positions.

We had considered ourselves different from the civilised world with a distinct sign on our head. Today we have weared hat. Many foreigners would must be happy because of that for they have assumed more privileges than us due to the hat on their heads."

Upon a question, *Ghazi* responded:

"Ladies too should wear hat as men. It is not possible to act otherwise. Here is an example for you: with this type of headcover (the reference is to the old one), a civilised lady cannot appear in the European social environments." "Bursa Türkocağı'nda Bir Konuşma" (A Speech in Bursa Turkish Hearts), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 23.09. 1925, 229. According to Falih Rıfkı, a journalist and close associate of Kemal Atatürk, the acceptance of hat as the new national headgear distinguishes Kemalist secularising reforms from the Ottoman reformism with its uncompromised character. "Because Mustafa Kemal did not believe in the legend of mermaid. For him, there is either fish or man. There is either the East or the West.... The hat was not only a headgear but the symbol of the revolution in the way of thinking." Falih Rıfkı Atay, Çankaya: *Atatürk'ün Doğumundan Ölümüne Kadar*

On practical ground, however, nationalism in Turkey followed a path different from the anticipated one. It has taken a shape more in accordance with the prevailing political and cultural conditions rather than deliberately forged utopian ideals of Kemalism.¹⁰

Kemalist Republic was born from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire and devised nationalism as its reference ideology to replace the broader constructs of Islamism, Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism.¹¹ According to

(Çankaya. From the Birth of Atatürk to His Death) (Istanbul, 1969) 442. The introduction of hat was a revolutionary step indeed. Because Muslims called good Christians "makul kefere" (reasonable unbelievers), the bad ones "gavur" (infidel) and the worse ones "şapkali gavur" (infidel with hat). See ibid., 430.

Given that there was a widespread bias in the "European circles" considering Turks as a Mongoloid, inferior race that does not deserve self-rule, as Clemenceau, the French delegate in the Paris Conference (1919) emphatically expressed, this defensive mood might gain an empathic understanding. For Clemenceau's speech see M. Cemil Bilsel, *Lozan*, vol.1 (Istanbul: Ahmet İhsan Matbaası, 1933), 236.

¹⁰Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 252.

¹¹Mustafa Kemal's personal notes to Ruşenî Barkur (a deputy from Samsun)'s book "*Din Yok, Milliyet Var*" (There is No Religion But Nationality) are the overt reflection of his consideration of nationalism as a kind of the "official religion" of the new regime. To Barkur's assertion that "Our holy book is our nationality , which protects knowledge, carries the existence, embraces the happiness, exalts the Turkishness and unites all the Turks. Thus, in our philosophy, the exact correspondent to the word "religion" is "nationality". The one who loves and glorifies his nation, and relying upon it is always a powerful, honest and honoured man", he makes the following comment: "Bravo! Congratulations. "See Gürbüz Tüfekçi, *Atatürk'ün Okuduğu Kitaplar Eski ve Yeni Yazılı Türkçe Kitaplar* - (The Books Read By Atatürk-Turkish Books with Old and New Turkish) (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1983), 170-71. His another comment to Barkur's "Does which nation's greatness go back to the unknown deepness of history as much as that of Turks? And, at last, does which nation have resurrected while dying through killing Azrael? Is there a superior honour more than being a Turk in the World? And is there a religion as much as being a Turk?" is "Bravo, bravo!" According to Mustafa Kemal, "individuals are wily nilly mortal;but nations, if they wish, may become immortal," an indication of the classical nationalist myth regarding the ahistorical character of national existence. Ibid., 172-73. Barkuri's book was written in 18 October

Feyzioğlu, a Kemalist politician-academician, Kemalist nationalism attests great importance to national unity and territorial integrity.¹² It rejects racism and has nothing to do with the fictional idea of superior race. It is civilising as well as modernising. It is secular, and therefore, disproves sectarian discriminations. It preaches social justice and national solidarity, and as a consequence, rejects class conflicts. Its has a definite limited territorial boundary linked to the notion of patriotism. Its interests with outside Turks is purely cultural and does not relate to politics. Based upon the idea of popular sovereignty, it rejects the dynastic and theocratic rule.¹³ It is humanitarian and peaceful and against

1926 and is located in the Presidential Library in Çankaya. Regarding the fact that Kemalism substituted nationalism for Islam and considered it as a kind of secular religion see, Orhan Türkdoğan, *Atatürk'te Milli Devlet Anlayışı* (Atatürk's Nation-State Understanding) (Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1981), 113-114; Kohn, *Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 74; Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması* (The Establishment of One Party State in Turkey) (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989), 213-215; 220;323-25; 327-28. For a view considering Kemalism as "yaşamak dini" (the religion of living), see Şeref Aykut, *Kamâlîzm(C.H. Partisinin Programının İzahı)* (Kemalism: The Explanation of the Programme of the Republican People's Party) (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitabevi, 1936).

Interestingly enough, in criticising "tarikat" (the sufi orders), Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of the Interior, asserts that "the only rightful path and *tarikat* for Turks is nationalism based on positive sciences. To follow this path is the greatest strength for the material and spiritual life of the Turk." See *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, period V, vol.16, 1937, 61. Another deputy, Muhittin Baha Pars (Ordu), calls the six arrows "the holy book" of Turks. See ibid., 69.

¹²Turhan Feyzioğlu, "Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik" (Atatürk and Nationalism), in *Atatürkçü Düşünce* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1992), 297-300.

¹³In a comparison of the Ottoman past and the Republican present, Mustafa Kemal argued: "Today we are more powerful than the past. Today we have a greater capability and power of living (certainly). What has caused this supremacy?.. The genuine reasons for this are inherent in the two principles. The first principle is the National Pact, the second one is our Fundamental Law, which ascribes sovereignty to the nation with no reservation and condition(acclamations).... The value and importance

of the decision of 1 November 1992(the decision as regards the abolition of the sultanate) is no different from the National Pact. Just as the National Pact is an holy rule determining the state and place of the homeland vis a vis the external enemy, the decision of 1 November 1922 is an holy weapon directed to the personal rule, which has been, for centuries, the protector of ignorance and corruption, the source of misfortune and evils, and an evil way of government represented by it (strong accusations). Those who dared to surrender an homeland which has become a place of manifestation for a brave and heroic zeal for centuries and centuries, have found that boldness only in the spirit, form and nature of that government (the voices of 'very true'). ...Turkish National Assembly and its form of government are not and cannot be limited with time." "Dördüncü Toplanma Yılıni Açarken"(Opening the Fourth Meeting Year), *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 1 March 1923, 325-326. From the eyes of a certain Ramazan agha, Mustafa Kemal attests the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire to the sultanate and its evil way of government: "The old Ottoman government held the stick. We worked, they took our products from us. We have seen the stick only. There was no hearing office. We heard some people own palaces, concubines, on their head a sultan. Our all belongings were owned by them. And all the while, it was those palaces and sultans who deprived us of everything." "Adana Çiftçileriyle Konuşma"(Talk with Adana Farmers), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 16. 03. 1923, 125. And the concluding evaluation: "Gentlemen, for centuries, those who have ruled Turkey have thought about many things; but they did not consider one thing only: Turkey. We may compensate the damages the Turkish homeland and the Turkish nation have been afflicted due to this heedlessness only in one way: Not to take into consideration anything other than Turkey in Turkey." "Dumlupınar'da Konuşma" (Speech in Dumlupınar), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 30.08.1924, 186. For other exemplary opinions of Mustafa Kemal regarding the delegitimisation of the ancient way of government, i.e., the sultanate, see "Tevfik Paşa İle Muhaberati Hakkında" (About His Correspondence with Tevfik Pasha), *Söylev ve Demeçler*, 29.01.1921, 159, and "İkinci Dönemi Açarken" (Opening the Second Period), ibid., 1 April 1923, 338-39.

The delegitimisation of the past was also made through the criticism of the institution of the caliphate. According to Mustafa Kemal, "The caliphate, which was a dream of the past, had no *raison d'être* in our time. Tunisians, Egyptians Indians and the other Muslims are in fact either under the British oppression or are French subjects." Upon this remarks, the French journalist madam Titaniya asks him: "But at any rate, Turkey should definitely have cut her ties with her religious past and begin to work free of all kinds of obstacles. Your understanding is a great thing." To this, Mustafa Kemal replies: "Yes, you are one of the rare persons who have sensed about that." "Maten Gazetesi Yazarı Madam Titaniya 'ya Demeç" (Statement to the Madam Titaniya, a Writer to the Newspaper Maten), *Söylev ve Demeçler III*, 25.11.1924, 105.

territorial expansionism.¹⁴ This national humanism is expressed by Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of the Interior at the time, during the deliberations of the inclusion of the principle of nationalism into the constitution in 1937 as follows:

To be national is our necessary watchword. But our national motto is not parochial and restrictive. Our national partisanship, within the civilised humanity and as its essential part, is directed to the exaltation of humanity and make the whole world to live within happiness and welfare.¹⁵

According to Feyzioğlu, Kemalist nationalism is rational, modern, civic, progressive, democratic, unifying, honouring, humanitarian and non-aggressive. It cannot therefore be reconciled with racism, fascism, communism and theocratic regimes.¹⁶ Mainstream Kemalist writers insistingly emphasise that Kemalist nationalism is thoroughly a civic-

¹⁴Ibid., 300-320. This mainstream account of Kemalist nationalism is supported by Abadan's view that "in the Turkish regime nation is a socio-political integrity composed of citizens. The binding ties among citizens are language, culture and unity of ideal." Yavuz Abadan, *Hukukçu Gözü ile Milliyetçilik ve Halkçılık* (Nationalism and Populism in a Jurist's View) (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Yayınu, 1938), 10. To Abadan, this conception is not the same with the mythological understanding of nation searching for microbiological features in the blood , which suggests the relation of these features to the intellectual and spiritual quality. On the contrary, Kemalist idea of nation is positivist. But since it attests importance to not only material and economic ties of nation, but more than that, to the intellectual and spiritual needs, it is not materialist but can be described as idealist positivist. Kemalism derives its idealism from its faith to the national ideal, and positivist aspect from its comprehension of the national self-hood. See, ibid., 11.

¹⁵TBMM *Zabit Ceridesi*, Period V, vol. 16, 5 February 1937, 60.

¹⁶Feyzioğlu, "Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik," 293. Another adherent of Kemalist nationalism, Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, hints the incorporation of the theory of national character into Kemalist nationalism. According to him, Kemalist nationalism is based on the national character and considers national culture as its essential. See Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, "Atatürk'ün Milliyetçiliği" (Atatürk Nationalism), in *Atatürkü Düşünce* (Ankara: Atatürk Dil Tarih Kültür Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1992), 332.

political nationalism and does not have an ethnic-genealogical component.¹⁷ They disregard the ethnicist/racial outlook of Kemalist nationalism.

This stance might be motivated by the prevailing domestic political conditions as well as by the belief that the recognition of such a thing can be detrimental to the public image of Kemalism. Their adherence of Kemalism is total and reflects a religious type of allegiance, which may not admit anything that may seem as unwanted and bad. Everything they considered good should have been covered by their belief system, i.e., Kemalism.

The ethnicist conception of Kemalism prescribed ethnosecular Turkishness as a necessary condition of being a Turk, which was radically different from being a Turkish citizen. The use of citizenship rights were inevitably linked to the meeting of the newly defined conditions of being Turk, despite the claim that "the people who established the Republic of Turkey is the Turkish nation." Accordingly, religious Muslims, non-

¹⁷See, among others, Toktamış Ateş, *Türk Devrim Tarihi* (History of Turkish Renovation) (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1984), 278-79. According to Ateş, "Kemalist nationalism is not chauvinistic, nor is it based on the bases of language, race and religion. It is a nationalism based on the principle of territory. It embraces all citizens living in the territory of Turkish Republic and consider them as Turk regardless of language, race and religion and tries to melt them within the same pot of culture." See Toktamış Ateş, *Biz Devrimi Çok Seviyoruz. Atatürkçülük ve Sosyal Demokrasi Üzerine Düşünceler* (We Love the Revolution Too Much. Thoughts on Atatürk and Social Democracy) (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1992), 61-62, and Ateş, "Nasıl Bir Milliyetçilik"(What Type of a Nationalism?) *Milliyet*, 10 March 1993, 17. Also see Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, *Atatürk'e Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz Hafifliği* (The Unbearable Lightness of Attacking Atatürk), 10th ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1996), 57. According to Kışlalı, Kemalist nationalism is a non-racist, pluralist nationalism. *Ibid.*

Turkish Muslim ethnies, and non-Muslim minorities emerged as the ones discriminated against.¹⁸

¹⁸Karpat claims that "one's religiosity, as long as it was not imposed on others, never became a hindrance to acquiring position in the Republic. The Grand National Assembly had over a dozen well-known clericals throughout the years from 1920 to 1950. Marshal Çakmak, who was very pious and pro-Islamist as proven during his chairmanship of the *Millet Partisi* (Nation Party) in 1948-50, remained as Chief of Staff throughout Atatürk's lifetime.(...) Throughout the Republic mosques remained open, and the two religious holidays (*Bayrams*) were officially recognised. (...) "The Republic did not want to depart from Islam and accept a new faith but wished to rid of Islam of those features thought, rightly or wrongly, to contradict the modernistic view of the new regime; that is dogmatism, exclusiveness, primiteveness. The Republic sought a purified, reformed Islam which was both modern and Turkish." Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 60.

The First Assembly was not under the personal control of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The election of deputies were held under "extraordinary" (war) conditions. There was an important opposition group called "*İkinci Group*" (Second Group) headed by a liberal, Hüseyin Avni (Ulaş), deputy from Erzurum, against "*Birinci Group*" (the First Group) headed by Mustafa Kemal. The main reason to hold new elections in 1923 was this independent, non-controlled character of the First Assembly(1920-1923). In the Second Assembly(1923-1927), however, there were only negligible numbers of the opponents of Mustafa Kemal and his political programme. In the following Assemblies., there occurred no ideological-political discussion on the bills of law submitted by the government, and all votes were taken unanimously. There remained no "clericals" in the assemblies of one party years except for those who underwent a radical transformation to the degree of being the fierce advocate of Kemalist Revolution and rejecting their Islamic faith and way of life, such as Şemsettin Günaltay, Rasih Kaplan, Rifat Börekçi, and many others. The Kemalist novelist Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu makes a striking satirising of such "clericals", which Karpat refers to, symbolised in the character of Skheih Emin in his novel *Ankara*. See Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Ankara* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1964). Therefore, Karpat's claim that religiosity was no obstacle to "acquiring position in the Republic" is totally without ground given the ideological character of the Kemalist state, which was totally monolithic in nature.

Marsinal Çakmak's case is an exception which proves the rule. İsmet İnönü and Marshal were two key figures in preserving the Kemalist cadre in power. As the only person other than Mustafa Kemal who had the title of "Marshal", Çakmak guaranteed the support of the army to the Kemalist Revolution. He made no objection to any of the secularising reforms of Atatürk. And he was a real hard-liner as regards the "Kurdish question." The personal piety of Çakmak, which remained

5. 2. Two Roots of Kemalism: Nationalism and Civilisationism

Kemalist nation-building came after a long period of dynastic state-building followed by the period of the development of bureaucratic/state elites.¹⁹ The process of nation-building is an overall continuous process of social and political integration directed at socio-political groups under the engineering of bureaucratic-intellectual elites.²⁰ Its aim is to integrate divided sections of a people in social, regional or political terms. Shaped by politico-historical conditions, as an ideology and political movement nationalism itself forms a significant part of the nation-building process. Its success depends primarily on the establishment of a consciousness that

particular to him, makes no sense in teleological terms in this regard. This case seems to be thoroughly related with power concerns rather than ideological prescriptions. The retention of *Bayrams* together with no legal ban on veiling (*tesettür*) can be explained with Mustafa Kemal's strategy of "doing right things at right times" that he expressed in his renowned *Speech*. Given that Atatürk rejects religion as a component of Turkish national identity thoroughly, one cannot assume that the toleration of such religious symbols (*seair-i İslamiyye*) can be related to an ideological position. Rather, these are considered as things that are to be resolved in time. What is in question is not an ideological but power-based approach. Thus there was no person who performed pilgrimage to Mecca with official permission in this period, for example. The position of Kemalist Revolution vis a vis Islam can best be evaluated from both an ideological and powerwise perspective. This was well identified by Allen: "The truth of the matter seems to be that (the state policy) is distinctively opportunist in its attitude: that it is favourable to whatever in Islam is consistent with the republican ideals, relentlessly opposed to anything which might endanger Kemalist success, and, for the rest, more or less neutral." see Henry E. Allen, *The Turkish Transformation* (Chicago, 1935); quoted by Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 61.

¹⁹For the general highlights of the Kemalist nation-state founding see Dankwart A. Rustow, *The Founding of A Nation-State: Atatürk's Historic Achievement* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1981). Kemalist nation-building is based, first and foremost, on the delegitimisation of religious and dynastic past.

²⁰Peter Alter, *Nationalism* trans. (London: Edward Arnold, 1991), 21.

can bind a cluster of exalted values or political cause to a specific nation and define its uniqueness as the substance of a national ideology.²¹

Theoreticians of nation-building process, due to their developmentalist biases, generally tend either to ignore the question of ethnic identity or to treat it merely as a minor impediment to national integration. However, no particular multiethnic state has proven immune to the divisive impact of ethnicity, in view of the increasing ethnic consciousness all over the world, regardless of the form of government or the level of economic development. Despite the fact that the increased social mobilisation and communication catalysed ethnic tensions , the leading theoreticians of the nation building could not admit that until recent times.²² Because nation-building is directed at the achievement of national integration, it is necessarily biased toward "ethnic demands".

The creation of political power structures claiming sovereignty over communities of ethnically distinct people and the formation of cultural identity expressed in shared culture constitute part and parcel of the process of nation-building. Nation-building process is always time and place bound, however. Each process possesses its own peculiarities. Consequently, various models of nation-building can be identified, most of which are structured on the European historical experience. ²³

²¹Ibid., 22.

²²Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying," in Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 29-39.

²³For this models see, for example, Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Kemalism and the Models of Nation-Building," in *I. Uluslararası Atatürk Sempozyumu (Açılış Konuşmaları-Bildiriler) 21-23 Eylül 1987* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1994), 568-572. Wiatr's taxonomy identifies six models of nation-building: the West

All nations are formed out of historical heritage accumulated over centuries. No nation-building begins with an empty record of past development. Yet , all patterns of nation-building own their specific road of evolution. In this regard, Kemalist model of nation building, as Wiatre observed, represents a synthesis of nation-building models. ²⁴

In the case of Kemalist nation-building, the most important historical determiner was the novelty of national identity and its slow pace of development. The slowness of national development brings the Kemalist nation-building process close to the model of a retarded nation building. Given that it was a process occurred after the War of Independence, it approximates the national liberation model. Because it is structured on the premise of total westernisation with emphasis on secularism and idealist positivism, it includes some elements from Western European bourgeois democratic model, particularly in its political-territorial aspect.

To be sure, the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nation-building shares certain resemblances with integral nationalisms of the 1930s. Finally, there are some elements of the transformation of the old culture model in the Kemalist national endeavour. It was, however, a transformation in which emphasis put on discontinuity rather than continuity. In their creation of the ethnosecular boundaries of the new

European bourgeois democratic model (France, England), the model of retarded nation-building (Italy, Germany, Russia), national liberation model (East-Central European states, Poland, Ireland, Greece, etc.) , the settlers nation model (USA, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Israel), the transformation of old culture model (China, Japan, India), and finally the post-colonial development model (Sub-Saharan Africa). See also Rustow, *The Founding of A Nation-State*, 21-23.

²⁴Wiatre, ibid., 573.

Turkish national identity; Kemalist bureaucratic-intellectual elites stressed the deepness of their break with the Ottoman-Islamic past.²⁵

The most fundamental achievement of Kemalism is the building of a modern nation-state. As Eisentadt observed,

In one generation, not only the Turkish intellectual elite but a great part of the society at large has become national in the western meaning of this term.... The redefinition of the political community took place in a unique way the society withdrew from the Islamic framework into that of the newly defined Turkish nation. While this process appears similar to the path followed by the European nation-states, it in fact involved the negation of a universal framework: Islam.²⁶

This negation had two roots: "*milliyetçilik*"(nationalism) and "*medeniyetçilik*"(civilisationism). In other words, there were(are) two basic premises of Kemalist revolution: the will to nationalism, and the will to civilisationism. The premise of civilisation leads to the European

²⁵Ibid., 572-573. According to Wiatr, the way Kemal Atatürk succeeded in building a modern nation deserves special attention for at least three reasons: 1) It demonstrated for the first time the possibility of alternative models of nation-building , influenced by the earlier European experience but not identical with it; 2) It showed the importance of political and ideological factors in nation-building, relatively more important in the Turkish case than the long run socio-economic factors; 3) It showed that, although nation-building stems from the accumulated heritage of the past , it can constitute a qualitative jump See ibid., 568.

²⁶S. N. Eisentadt, "The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Perspective," in *Atatürk Founder of a Modern State* , eds., Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun (London: Hurst & Co. 1981), 135. Mardin has the same observation that in the make up of the new national identity Islam was denied a role. Sharing the Berkesian view regarding Kemalist secularisation, he asserts that the aim of Kemalist secularising reforms was "to liberate the individual from the idiocy of traditional, community oriented life." See Mardin "Religion and Secularism," In *Atatürk Founder of a Modern State*, eds., Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 213. For Mardin, the consistency in Kemalist secularising reforms can be explained by the fact that "these secularising reforms are linked by the underlying common denominator of the liberation of the individual from the collective constraints of the Muslim community." Ibid.

way of life and western thought. The premise of nationalism, on the other hand, makes an avenue to the Central Asian origin of the Turks, and the unity in terms of history and language. Any attempt at analysing Kemalist revolution needs to take into consideration these two premises.²⁷

Islamism and Turkism crystallised in accordance with the Ottoman imperial imperative were thrown away into the dustbin of history , and instead, the premises of nationalism and civilisationism were substituted in the making of the boundaries of the new individual and collective identity. ²⁸According to Safa, all the Kemalist reforms were emanated from these two premises. The establishment of national sovereignty and the setting up of the Grand National Assembly, the abolition of the sultanate and caliphate, the policy of national economy, the extension of Turkish history into its origins in Central Asia with the exclusion of the Ottoman-Islamic past, the Sun-Language Theory and the Law of Family Names, the Turkification of the call to prayer (*ezan*) were all sprung from the Kemalist principle of nationalism. ²⁹

The Kemalist reforms stemming from the premise of civilisationism on the other hand were the ones related to the mission of secularisation, i.e., the separation of life from religion, namely, the abolition of the office of Sheikhülislam, the closing of the religious courts and colleges, the prohibition of *dervish* lodges and *sufi* orders, the lifting of the religious courses from school curriculums, the abolition of the religious laws and the reception of the European laws instead , the

²⁷Peyami Safa, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* (Glances at Turkish Renovation) (Istanbul : Ötüken Yayıncılık, 1990), 91.

²⁸Ibid., 97-98.

²⁹Ibid., 98.

abolition of veil and polygamy the acceptance of hat as the national headgear, the reception of the Latin alphabet, the prohibition of the teaching and playing of *alâ turca* music in public, the encouraging of opera, ballet, western polyphonic music and western style painting, the erection of the statutes of Kemal Atatürk, the acceptance of the western Christian calendar and the officialisation of the western clothes and manners.³⁰

All the Kemalist reforms fall within either of the aforementioned two premises intended to provide the new Turkish man with a new world view freed from Islam and Islamic culture. Kemalism created a new Turkish nationalism located within the western/Christian international, a reflection of the equation of civilisationism with westernism and civilisation with the west.³¹

5.3. Kemalist Determinants of Individual and Collective Identity

Kemalist redefinition of the new Turkish individuality and collectivity is more striking than its ability to bring about westernising reforms.³² As a radical reorganisation of the remnant of the Ottoman Empire, the watershed in the Kemalist revolution is the making of a non-existent, hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, a genuine one, with the assumption that a Turkish nation has already existed.³³

In formulating a means of creating social consciousness and devising a new principle of social cohesion, Islam was thoroughly

³⁰Ibid., 99.

³¹Ibid., 101.

³²Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey," 208.

³³This assumption is the clear manifestation of utopian, change-oriented character of Kemalist thinking See Mardin, ibid., 209.

rejected. The consciousness of the new Turkish man was to be rooted in positive science, i.e., western civilisation, a recurrent theme of Kemalism preaching science as the source of all valid knowledge and behaviour.³⁴ Yet, consciousness raising for the creation of the new Kemalist national man required the adoption of a new set of values and ideals necessary for the building of the new national identity to which science could afford nothing. Values, ethical prescriptions and emotional stimuli cannot be derived from scientific formulas of any kind, and therefore, the emergence of the new individual and social identity was bounded to a new axiology conditioned by the Kemalist epistemology of scientific dogmatism and absolutism. The increasing use of ethnic-genealogical and racial themes in the 1930s, the manifestation of which were Turkish history thesis and the sun language theory was the recognition of the helplessness of science in the building of national identity

According to Mardin, in the Kemalist nation building, solidarism, the official ideology of the French Third Republic, alongside Turkish history thesis and the sun language theory, was the most important

³⁴According to Mustafa Kemal, "The most genuine guide for everything in the world, for civilisation, for life, for success is science. To look for a guide other than science is heedlessness, ignorance, going astray." "Samsun Öğretmenleriyle Konuşma" (Talk with Teachers in Samsun), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 22. 09. 1924, 202. The conformity of social life to the needs and modern requirements is the gist of this crude scientism. See "Öğretmenlere" (To Teachers), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 27. 10. 1922, 48. The equation of science and civilisation with the West is another classical reflection of the "native" orientalism. For Mustafa Kemal, "Countries are many but civilisation is one. It is necessary for a nation to join this single civilisation in order to progress.... We want to modernise our country. Our all efforts are for bringing about a modern therefore western government in Turkey. Which nation is it who aspired for joining the civilisation but did not turn its face towards the West?" "Kültür Hakkında" (About Culture), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 29.10. 1923, 90-91.

foundation.³⁵ Kemalist solidarism prescribed a non-conflictual and at the same time redistributive scheme of society. ³⁶

The elimination of traditional-Islamic social milieu, the embodiment of which was *mahalle* ³⁷, and thus lifting the folk control over individual was the essential point of action in order to create a new society based on a new conception of honour, i.e., a society based on rules and regulations rather than a network of personalistic ties, the concrete embodiment of which was the new co-educational system. ³⁸ The devaluation of *mahalle* and its replacement with the secular school environment paved the way to the emergence of a new focus of individual's loyalty: "*cemiyet-i beşeriye*" (society). ³⁹ Considered by

³⁵Mardin, "Religion and Secularism," 211. The solidarist theory prescribed that there was no necessary conflict between classes, conceived as functionally complimentary professional groupings, in modern society. The social equilibrium could be achieved through a social ethics of duty (*vazife ahlakı*) founded on the individual and group contributions to society. "Kemalist education propounded a theory of citizenship based on these principles. It was the businessman, the schoolmaster and the politician who, working together under the shield of solidaristic redistribution, were to make up an integrated Turkish nation." Ibid., 212.

³⁶The total conformism of Kemalism is well expressed in the following line of "*Onuncu Yıl Marşı*"(the Tenth Year March) by Behçet Kemal Çağlar and Faruk Nafiz Çamlıbel: "İmtiyazsız, sınıfısız kaynaşmış bir kitleyiz" (We are an integrated block with no privileges and classes). See Dursun Yaşa, *Kahramanlık Şiirlerimizden Bir Demet* (A Bundle of Our Heroic Poems) (Ankara: Güneş Matbaacılık , 1972), 306.

³⁷The smallest community unit in the Ottoman Empire, within which the ordinary Ottoman expended his life.

³⁸Mardin, "Religion and Secularism," 214; Karpat, Turkey's Politics , 59-60. Mustafa Kemal insistingly emphasised that the new education should be national because only a national education (*millî terbiye*) could arouse national consciousness. Here "national education" connotes the cleansing of education from religion. See "Samsun Öğretmenleriyle Konuşma," *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 22.09.1924, 206-207.

Kemalism as the antidote of *mahalle*, in which final legitimacy had to be obtained from Islam, society took its legitimacy from science and therefore was considered to be inventive. Kemalist secularising reforms aiming at both nationalisation and civilisation were the means enabling the individual to escape from the moral constraints of the folk culture perceived as not amenable to creativity.

The formation of a new collective conscience and the liberation of individual from the constraints of the *mahalle* ethos to forge a new national identity also required a strong "sensory component"⁴⁰ with the ability to arouse feelings. But the symbols of Kemalism assumed this function only for a limited number of Turks. Due to the negation of Islam in the building of national identity, Kemalism could not provide the ontological security insured by Islam to the man's existence in this world, and hence could not be successful in creating psychological drives around its symbols.⁴¹

Kemalist nationalism has changed the collective as well as the individual boundaries of personal identity, and consequently, substituted the bond of secular Turkish nationality for the old religious and denominational allegiances.⁴² The ultimate frame of legitimacy would no longer be religion but the mundane imperatives.⁴³ The characteristic

³⁹Mardin, "Religion and Secularism," 215.

⁴⁰Victor Turner, *The Forest of Symbols* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), 28; quoted by Mardin, *ibid.*, 218.

⁴¹Mardin, "Religion and Secularism," 218.

⁴²"Ankara Hukuk Fakültesinin Açılışında" (At the Opening of the Law Faculty), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 05.11.1925, 249.

⁴³"Gentlemen, the nation has considered upon the necessary consequence of transformations and renovations which I have enumerated that the general administration and all the laws should only spring from the worldly needs and a secular mind of governance based

features of this *sui generis* nationalism were rationalism, secularism and materialism. Yet, the popular imagery of nationalism has always remained twin with religion.⁴⁴

The determination of a group of the Kemalist bureaucratic-intellectual elites who professed adherence to the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism to crystallise the new state as an ethnosecular Turkish national state in which the Turkish ethnie would assume the hegemonic position(*unsur-u aslı*) did not correspond to a real situation in the popular imagery. Because the markers of the collective identity of the Muslim residents of Anatolia and Thrace including the Turkish ethnie did not have a nationalistic component. The axis of both their collective and personal identity was purely religious and tribalistic. Being Turkish did not mean much to them, apart from its pejorative and pastoral connotations in the popular usage. Consequently, the Kemalist crusade of building an ethnosecular national identity could not find a popular basis of backing and legitimacy. The people of Turkey during the Kemalist era described herself Turkish only as an outer expression of identity vis a vis other national societies around rather than against other non-Turk Muslim ethnies of Turkey.⁴⁵

on the continuos change in accordance with the needs continuously changing end evolving as a vital requirement." Ibid.

⁴⁴Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 254.

⁴⁵Ömer Laçiner, "Introduction," in Taner Akçam, *Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu* (Turkish National Identity and the Armenian Question) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 14. For the historical evolution of the meanings of the name of "Turk" and its etymology, see Bozkurt Güvenç, *Türk Kimliği: Kültür Tarihinin Ana Kaynakları* (Turkish Identity: The Main Sources of Cultural History), 4th ed. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1996), 22.

5.4. Transition to the Genuine Political Discourse of Kemalist Nationalism

Although we cannot identify an exact date of transition from the pluralist political discourse of the period of the National Struggle to the homogenising-unitarian discourse of Kemalist nationalism, we can duly suggest that Turkish nationalism was increasingly emphasised as the new regime was consolidated.⁴⁶

Kemalist parameters of national identity evolved over three distinct periods from predominantly religious toward a predominantly ethnic definition. Those who argue that Kemalist nationalism is purely a civic-territorial nationalism essentially ignore its overtly recognised ethnic-genealogical aspect due to their conception of Kemalism as a dogmatic, close system of thought, i.e., an all-inclusive ideology incorporating "all good things".

Between 1919-1938 Mustafa Kemal ascribed three distinct meanings to Turkishness with varying degrees of emphasis, which can be discerned with an analytical perception. The first definition, which dominated the period between the years 1919 and 1924, was predominantly determined by the Islamic boundary of Turkishness suggesting that "the Muslim peoples of Anatolia and Thrace are Turk".⁴⁷

⁴⁶Ergun Özbudun, "Milli Mücadelede ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu" (The Question of Citizenship and Identity in the Official Documents of the National Struggle and the Republic), Unpublished Paper (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1996), 5.

⁴⁷The statements acknowledging ethnic and cultural pluralism in the Declarations of Erzurum and Sivas Congresses are the evident manifestation of the religious boundary of Turkishness. The first article of the Declaration of the Congress of Erzurum (7 August 1919) reads: "The province of Trabzon and the city (sancak) of Canik, together with Erzurum, Sivas, Diyarbekir, Mamuretülaziz, Van, Bitlis, which are called

Following the promulgation of the republic(1923) and especially "the year of destruction" (1924),⁴⁸ the political definition of Turkishness, which considered everybody being citizen of Turkish Republic and embracing Turkish language, culture and the Kemalist national creed as Turk became more pronounced. Toward the end of the 1920s, the ethnic-genealogical boundary became increasingly dominant in the Kemalist

Vilayat-i Şarkiye (Eastern Provinces), and *elviye-i müstakille* (Kars, Ardahan, Batum) within this region is a whole which cannot be conceived to be separated from one another and from the Ottoman Community. They accept to fully share happiness and calamity, and espouse the same goal as regards their destiny. All the Muslim elements living in the said territories are genuine brothers filled with mutual sentiments of sacrifice and respectful for their social and racial conditions "The article 9 stipulates the conditions of membership to the *Şarkî Anadolu Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti* (Eastern Anatolian Society for the Defence of Rights) and limits it with Muslims: "... All Muslim citizens are natural members of our Society." These provisions are reiterated in The Regulation of the Society. For the text of the Declaration and the Regulation see Mazhar Müfit Kansu, *Erzurum'dan Ölümüne Kadar Atatürk'le Beraber* (Together with Atatürk from Erzurum to His Death) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1966), 113-125; also see Mahmut Goloğlu, *Erzurum Kongresi* (Erzurum Congress) (Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınları, 1968), 109-111. The 1st and 9th articles of the Declaration of the Congress of Sivas (9 September 1919), which covers not only the Eastern Anatolia but all of the Anatolia and Thrace, repeats the same points. Likewise, the same provisions included within the Regulation of Anatolian and Rumelian Society for the Defence of Rights. See Kansu, *ibid.*, 221-230, and Mahmut Goloğlu, *Sivas Kongresi* (Sivas Congress) (Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınları, 1969), Appendix 1, 219-226.

⁴⁸In one of his article titled "*Türkiye'nin Siyasi Tarihi*" (Political History of Turkey), M. Zekeriya (Sertel), the Director of the Press and Information at the time, asserts that "The past 1924 has been a year of destruction for Turkey. In order to complete the revolution which began with the battle of Sakarya two years ago , the last year was expended with the demolishing of the old institutions inherited from the former era. Our fundamental law was pulled down. Educational, judicial and familial institutions were demolished. In short, the established order of the society was routed from bottom to the top....Within a week the country witnessed an enormous revolution. All institutions that can be considered religious were overthrown within one week" ; quoted by Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*(1923-1931) (The Establishment of One Party State in Turkey, 1923-1931), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989), 121-122.

definition of national identity, which stated that the native people of the Central Asia is Turkish (1929-1938).

The religious definition was the inescapable consequence of the National Struggle because this struggle was justified as an holy war and the people were rallied around the cause of liberating the sultan-caliph from the captivity of the Christian invaders. The political definition therefore represented a radical rupture in ideological terms. The third definition, inspired by the urge to disprove the bad image of Turks in the western historiography, and crystallised by the historical studies in which Mustafa Kemal himself and his close associates were personally involved, was officially sanctified in the 1932 Turkish History Congress. As a matter of fact, racial views were present since the outset of the Republic, at least in the form of preoccupation with eugenics, but its transformation into the dominant determiner of Turkishness in the public discourse took place in the 1930s, with the continuing efforts to reconcile the racial and political boundaries.⁴⁹

5.5. The Religious Boundary of Turkish National Identity (1919 1924)

The subject of the National Struggle was the Muslim people of Anatolia and Thrace. The basic charter of the National Struggle, the Declaration of the National Pact, defines the indivisible territory as those parts of the Empire inhabited by the Ottoman-Muslim majority except for the parts populated by the Arabs, due to their former secession.⁵⁰ The

⁴⁹ Sevan Nişanyan, "Kemalist Düşüncede Türk Milleti Kavramı" (The Concept of Turkish Nation in Kemalist Thought), *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 33(March-April 1995), 130.

⁵⁰For the full text of the National Pact, see Appendix C.

leitmotif of Muslims as 'the "unsur-u asli"' (the principal ethnies) provided the determining framework of the Pact. Non-expression of the appellation "Turk" in it is striking in this regard. The definition of national boundaries on the basis of religious affiliation with the exclusion of ethnic appellations is the core formulation of this period.

The regulation of the organisational core of the National Struggle, the Society for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, is no different in its definition of national boundaries from the National Pact: "Muslim elements loaded to one another with mutual respect and feeling of sacrifice, and respectful of their racial, social and environmental conditions are genuine brothers and constitute an indivisible whole."⁵¹

The Ottoman notion of the Muslims as the principal ethnies (*unsur-u asli*), which was fervently embraced by the Young Turks as well, was the dominant current also in the First National Assembly. The later proponents of the Kemalist nationalism were among those deputies who passionately propounded this notion.⁵² The nation spelled out in the

⁵¹ See the first article of "Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti Program ve Nizamnamesi" (The Programme and Regulation of Anatolia and Rumelia Defence of Rights Society), in Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952* (Istanbul, 1952), 514. The third paragraph of the seventh article titled "*Teşkilat*" (organisation), accordingly, states that "all the Muslim citizens are the natural members of the organisation." See ibid., 516. Nevertheless, the second article of the regulation has no objection to the co-living with "the all non-Muslim elements that we have lived heretofore" but makes clear that they are not covered by the boundaries of the same national identity. Ibid., 514.

⁵² During the floor debates over the fourth article of the 1921 constitution, which regulated professional representation, Mahmut Esat, deputy from Izmir, answered the worries that professional representation may yield to the representation of non-Muslims collaborating with the invasion forces as follows: "Maybe it might not be proper to speak against Christians in the Ottoman Parliament. But I do not suppose myself to be in the Ottoman Parliament in the old sense, and speak in the capacity of a

Circular Letter of Amasya,⁵³ the communiqué about the election of the new Assembly,⁵⁴ and all the laws and regulations passed in this period is the Muslim nation of the Ottoman Empire with the exclusion of Arabs.⁵⁵

In fact, the period of the National Struggle reversed the process of secularisation in progress since the *Tanzimat* (Reform Edict). Thus for the first time there was no non-Muslim parliament in the First National Assembly. Islamic nationalism was directed at the Christian insult against the Muslim denizens of Anatolia and Thrace. Islam was considered as the basic frame of the political legitimacy and of social cohesion. The common denominator of such diverse ethnies as Turks, Arabs, Kurds,

person who hold that there is no right of the Christian stratum over this country. They (Christians) have resigned from the citizenship of this country . They are ungrateful children of the Ottoman history, and there is no right left for them over this country. In this country striving for the defence of her rights, they are the spies of imperialism and the treacherous children of this homeland. There is no room for them in this Assembly, gentlemen." *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, vol. 5, 99th meeting, 3rd session, 18.11. 1336(1920), 390.

⁵³For the Circular Letter of Amasya see Suna Kili, *Kemalism* (İstanbul: Menteş matbaası, 1969), 11-12.

⁵⁴The communiqué prescribes the exclusion of the Christian subjects to participate in the elections for the new Assembly. See "Ankara'dan Derhal Bir Meclisin Toplanmasına Dair"(About the Immediate Sitting of an Assembly in Ankara), Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri*, IV (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1991),18 March 1920, 272-274.

⁵⁵The same definition acknowledging the religious unity on the basis of the recognition of ethnic diversity was reiterated in various occasions by Mustafa Kemal as well. To illustrate, see "Mütarekeden Meclisin Açılmasına Kadar Geçen Zaman Zarfında Cereyan Eden Siyasi Olaylar Hakkında" (About the Political Events in the Period Between the Armistice and the Opening of the Assembly), *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçler I* (The Speech and Statements of Atatürk, I) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 24 April 1920, 30. Also see "Türk Milletini Teşkil Eden Müslüman Öğeler Hakkında"(About the Muslim Elements Comprising the Turkish Nation), *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 1 May 1920, 74-75.

Circassians and Lazes was Islam.⁵⁶ No legislation contradicting Islamic injunctions was passed in this period.

What is striking in this period is the duality observed in the political discourse of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. As of the Opening Speech of the Erzurum Congress (23 July 1919)⁵⁷, he founded his public discourse on the themes of "homeland" (*vatan*), "nation" (*millet*) and "national" (*milli*). The key words of this discourse were "*millet*" (nation), "*millettaş*" (co-national), "*dinduş*" (coreligionist), "*metalib-i milliye*" (national demands), "*kuvay-i milliye*" (national forces), "*milli meclis*" (national assembly), "*milli kader*" (national destiny), "*irade-i milliye*" (national will), "*hakimiyet-i milliye*" (national sovereignty), and *hudud-u milli*" (national boundary).⁵⁸

Mustafa Kemal continuously used both the term "Turkey" and "Turks" more or less interchangeably with the view that these terms incorporates all other Muslim elements.⁵⁹ Especially in his speeches

⁵⁶Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetimi*, 212.

⁵⁷"Erzurum Kongresini Açarken" (In the Opening of Erzurum Congress), *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 23 July 1919, 1-5.

⁵⁸See *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, passim.

⁵⁹For the interchangeable use of the terms "*Türkiye milleti*" (nation of Turkey) and "*Türk milleti*" (Turkish nation), the following is a good example: "The acquisition of the nation of Turkey of the rights of independence and life in administrative, financial and economic terms is an eternally acquired right harmful to no nation (voices of "no doubt"). It is adequate for the world peace to accept such a natural reality. But, as is the case for the years, whatever the result of the insistence to reject its right of existence by closing it in any form in spiritual and de facto terms in the present state of the world, Turkish nation does not accept and will not accept such a result with peace of mind and ease of conscience." "Dördüncü Toplanma Yılıni Açarken" (Opening the Fourth Year of Meeting), *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 1 March 1923, 319. His use of the terms "*Türkiye halkı*" (people of Turkey) and "*Turk*" the following quotations may give some idea: "Gentlemen , the people of Turkey are the children

delivered on the occasion of Third Year of the Opening of the Assembly, Mustafa Kemal underlined the religious basis of nationality and the respect for ethnic heterogeneity, which seems to be a minimal definition of nation including the recognition of the rights of non-Muslim minorities on the basis of bilateral agreements provided that the same rights be given to the Muslim minorities elsewhere.⁶⁰

The Islamic-national public discourse in the period of the National Struggle is a clear rupture from the ideal of Ottoman nation. The conversion of the term "Turk" into an expression of common national identity and solidarity based on the Islamic allegiance from a mere ethnographic, linguistic and historical fact became realised during this period. As stated before, the appellations of both "Turk" and "Turkey" are of European origin. Turkey was the name given to the parts of Anatolia and Thrace under Muslim rule by the Europeans since the 11th century. The secession of Arabs from the Empire during the First World War made the need to name non-Arab Muslim elements urgent, the result of which was the coining of the name "Turk."

In February 1920, three weeks after the declaration of the National Pact, a floor debate occurred in the last Ottoman Parliament on the occasion of the approval of the draft text of the Assembly's Reply(*Ariza-i Cevabıyye*) to the Sultan's Speech (*Nutk-u Hümayun*) of the opening of the National Assembly (*Meclis-i Mebusan*) regarding what is meant by the terms "Türk" and "millet". Abdulaziz Mecdi Efendi, a deputy from

of a brave ethnie , which has lived free and independent, and viewed independence as a corollary of life.... "the nobility and innocence of Turks." "Claude Farrere Şerefine Verilen Çay Ziyafetinde" (Tea Party Given for the Honour of Claude Farrere), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 18. 06.1922, 38 and 39-40. For the separate use of these terms also see *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 168, 200 and 344-346.

⁶⁰"Üçüncü Toplanma Yılıni Açarken" (Opening the Third Year of Meeting)*Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 1 March 1922, 236-37.

Karesi, demanded the clarification of the meaning ascribed to the term "Turk" in that it causes misunderstandings

Abdulaziz Mecdi Efendi (Deputy from Karesi): "...What is meant by Turk is various Muslim elements like Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Lazes. Is that so? If this is not meant by the name "Turk", then I request that instead of the term "Turk", the orators should use the term "*anasır-i İslamiye*" (Muslim elements).

Rıza Nur Bey (Deputy from Sinop): It is so.

Hüseyin Bey (Deputy from Erzurum): Even Jews are included.

Abdulaziz Mecdi Efendi(going on): Those who consider themselves as Kurd would no longer misunderstand it after this way of the interpretation of the word "Turk" by the Assembly, which made it public. Or, in order to avoid putting dust to their consideration, let us use such terms as Turk, Kurd, Lazes, Circassians or Muslim elements (*anasır-i İslamiye*).

Tunalı Hilmi Bey (Deputy from Bolu): Muslim Ottomans.⁶¹

Upon this, Abdulaziz Mecdi Bey's another motion as regards the adoption of the term "*Millet-i Osmaniye*" instead of the term "*millet*" in that the country hosts Christian elements (*anasır-i Hristiyaniyye*) as well was readily approved by the Assembly.⁶²

Another interesting motion in this regard was taken up in the first session of the 35th meeting of the Second Legislative Period in 12.01.1341(1924): The report of the Constitutional Committee regarding the motion of Mustafa Fehmi Efendi (deputy from Bursa), and his friends concerning the determination of whom the term "*Türkiyeli*" (those from Turkey) would be used, and the decision that there is no place for any proceeding

Speaker- It (the motion) will be read out.

"To the High Presidency

The motion, dated 22 September 1339 (1923), and given by Mustafa Fehmi Efendi and his friends concerning the determination of whom the term "*Türkiyeli*" (those from Turkey) would be used,

⁶¹*Meclisi-i Mebusan Zabit Cəridesi, İctima-i Fevkalade* The Journal of Register of Meclis-i Mebusan, Extraordinary Session), vol. 1, 12th meeting, 2nd session, 19 February 1336(1920), 171. For the all discussions on the issue see, ibid., 170-172.

⁶²Ibid., 172.

which was referred to our commission by the High Presidency was discussed and negotiated. Since it has been determined of whom the term "Türkiyeli" would be used by 88th article of the (1924) Constitution, there is no need to take any other decision on this matter. Therefore, it was unanimously agreed to the returning of the motion to the Presidency."⁶³

The term Turkey appeared in the official documents for the first time in the 1921 Constitution. The declaration of Mustafa Kemal about the Great Victory in 1 September 1922 addressed for the first time "the noble Turkish nation,"⁶⁴ but the dual content of the term persisted. In the second principle of the declaration of the "Dokuz Umde" (Nine Principles), which hinted the establishment of "*Halk Firkası*" (People's Party), the term "*Türkiye halkı*" (People of Turkey) is used.⁶⁵ This wavering between the terms "*Türkiye halkı*" and "*Türk*"⁶⁶ was finally resolved on behalf of "*Türk*" and "*Türk milleti*" in conclusive terms with the 1924 constitution.

⁶³TBMM Zabit Ceridesi, period II, vol. 12, session 2, 89. The report of the committee was approved by the National Assembly.

⁶⁴The phrased used in the beginning of the declaration is "the great, noble Turkish nation." See Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, "Dumlupınar Zaferi Üzerine Türk Milletine Beyanname"(Declaration to Turkish Nation upon the Victory of Dumlupınar), *Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri*, IV 1 September 1922, 474.

⁶⁵Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 580. For the full text of the declaration of "Dokuz Umde," dated 8 April 1339(1923), see ibid., 580-82.

⁶⁶In the decision of the Council of Ministers as regards the fact that TGNA is the genuine representative of the right of sovereignty, dated 1/2. 11. 1338(1922), the terms "*Türkiye halkı*" and "*Türk milleti*" were used together. This was the indication of the persistence of ambivalence and the need to know the direction the new regime would take.

5.5.1 The Religious Boundary and Exchange of Population

The Convention of 30 January 1923 Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations is part of the peace settlement signed between Turkey and the allied powers at the Lausanne Conference. It consists of nineteen articles. The first article lays down the principle of compulsory exchange: "As from the first May 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Muslim religion established in Greek territory."⁶⁷

The Convention defined in its first article the persons to be subjected to the compulsory exchange as stated above. In the following articles the two populations to be exchanged are shortly defined as the "Greeks" and "the Muslims", which stand for the terms "of the Greek orthodox religion" and "of the Muslim religion." The clear implication of this appellation in the first view is that religion was seen as a safe criterion in that racial and linguistic criteria simply did not apply.^{68A}

⁶⁷Stephen P. Ladas, *Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), 345. Article 2 defined the persons not to be included in the exchange. These were the Muslims of Western Thrace and the Greeks of Istanbul. Population exchange between Turkey and Greece took place between October 1923 and the end of 1924. In this period, 130 000 Greek orthodox Turkish nationals emigrated to Greece while 384 000 Muslim Greek nationals came to Turkey and acquired citizenship in accordance with the article 7 of the Convention. Ibid., 711. See also Hicri Fişek, *Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku* (Turkish Law of Citizenship) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları, 1959), 108.

⁶⁸During the debates in the Sub-Committee of the Minorities, the second Turkish delegate to the Lausanne Conference, Rıza Nur, refused the use of the terms "racial and linguistic minorities" in a determined way, and put forward that there is no racial minority in Turkey. Linguistic minorities could be ignored, and therefore the term minority in the Turkish context could mean only religious, i.e., non-Muslim minorities. In the end, the Turkish suggestion was accepted by the Greek

very large majority of the Muslims in Greece spoke Greek and racially had nothing in common with the Muslims of Turkey. Likewise, the Greeks of many parts of Turkey spoke Turkish and did not belong to a single ethnic origin.

The criterion of the determination of those who would be subject to the population exchange was thoroughly religious-based, which was the most important step in the formation of the new national identity on practical grounds. The religious criterion is so much overt that Turkish speaking orthodox population in Karaman and Pontus, who were writing in Turkish with the Greek alphabet and making their prayer in Turkish, was considered as orthodox Greek, and therefore, subjected to the forced exchange process despite their protests. Accordingly, the Muslim people of Crete island and Rumelia was considered "Turk" irregardless of their ethnic origin by the Turkish government and was accepted into citizenship.

The implication of the criterion of religion was different to the respective parties, however. When the case of the Arabians of Cilicia of the Greek Orthodox religion arose, the Turkish delegate in the Mixed Commission set up for the monitoring of the emigration process contended that the term of "the Greek Orthodox religion" in the Convention referred only to religion, and not to nationality, and that it comprised all those who shared the faith of the Greek Orthodox religion. The Greek delegation, on the other hand, asserted that in order a person to be included in the exchange, he/she should be Greek as well as Orthodox. Against these opposing views, which motivated by the urge to expel all adherents of the Orthodox religion who may not have an Hellenistic consciousness whatsoever to Greece on the side of the

delegate, Venizelos. See Mahmut Goloğlu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 1923* (Turkish Republic 1923) (Ankara: Beşnur Matbaası, 1971), 24.

Turkish government, and to embrace only Orthodox adherents of Greek consciousness on the side of the Greek government, the Mixed Commission adopted two decisions on 31 May 1927. First, that the terms "Greek Orthodox religion" should be interpreted and applied as they have been with regard to Muslims in Greece, without regard to race, i.e., the ethnic origin. Secondly, that the term "Greek orthodox religion" of the article 1 of the Convention should not be applied to all the Eastern Orthodox religions.

At a later meeting, in December 1927, the Commission decided, over the protests of the Turkish delegation, that the term "Greek orthodox religion" could not be applied to 1) the Patriarchates other than the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Phanar; 2) the autocephalous churches, such as the Church of Cyprus, the Serbian Church, the Rumanian Church, the Russian Church, the Albanian Church, and the Exarchist Church of Bulgaria. Hence, with the exclusion of the Patriarchates of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria, the Orthodox Arabs were exempted from the exchange, who had nothing in common with the Greeks of Greece. Naturally, Greeks of Protestant and Catholic religions also were excluded.⁶⁹

The intended purpose in compulsory population exchange for Turkish government was the elimination of the threat of Greek irredentism in Turkey, which was the case during the National Struggle.

⁶⁹For the problems and the opposing views as regards the criteria of exchangeability see Ladas, *Exchange of Minorities*, 377-384. It should be noted that Muslims in Greece of whatever origin (with the exception of Albanians) had an Islamic-Turkish consciousness, whereas the same was not true of all followers of the Orthodox religion in Turkey. This makes the logic behind the immigration policy of the Kemalist regime clear, which combined religion and ability and willingness to be assimilated into Turkishness. Despite the exclusion of religion from the national identity, it was religion proper that became a mainstay for the making of it.

But in the meantime this purpose was accompanied by the need to host the new population, due to the lack of population in proportion to the land owned, who are Muslim and ready to accept the new Turkish identity. As a result of exchange both Turkey and Greece acquired an ethnical homogeneity, a genuine source of strength and stability to them.⁷⁰

According to Lewis, the Greco-Turkish population exchange is a reflection of the confusion in terms of basic loyalties in the early Republican era because it was the religion that conditioned the exchange. What took place was not an exchange of Greeks and Turks, but rather an exchange of Greek Orthodox Christians and Ottoman Muslims.⁷¹

Interestingly enough, despite the total exclusion of religion from the make-up of the national identity later, religion still remained as a means of promoting nationalistic goals. To be sure, this policy was not sanctified in *de jure* terms; it was just stemmed from practical considerations and reflected a *de jure* logic. The striking example of this relates to the emigration policy of the Kemalist regime. Thus, the Turkish speaking Christian Gagauzes were not accepted as the émigré (*muhacir*) *en masse*. Despite Hamdullah Suphi's insistent efforts to accept Gagauzes to Turkey, only a number of individual Gagauzes were able to come to Turkey under a scholarship program during the 1930s. On the other hand, Bosnians and Bulgarian Pomaks who spoke no Turkish and were not ethnic Turks, migrated freely to Turkey, for they were Ottoman Muslims,

⁷⁰For an evaluation of the results of population exchange from the Greek viewpoint, which put the blame on the Ottoman Empire, see Ladas, *Exchange of Minorities*, 726-728.

⁷¹ Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey* , 348-49.

and unlike Albanian Muslims who rebelled against the Empire, had remained loyal ⁷²

5.5.2. *The Religious Boundary and the Definition of Minorities in Turkey*

The religious affiliation was taken as a basic criterion in the definition of the legal status of minorities in Turkey as prescribed by the Lausanne Treaty.⁷³ Thus, while Anatolian Armenians whose mother tongue were Turkish were considered belonging to the Armenian minority in Turkey, the Muslim Hemshinians who spoke Armenian were accepted as Turk. Being Turkish citizen did not automatically secure being Turk because, despite the radically secular nationalism of Kemalist regime, the older idea that Muslim equals Turk, and non-Muslim equals non-Turk persisted, particularly in the public consciousness. Religion and denomination went on appearing on identity cards and other official documents, and the designation Turk in popular usage was restricted to Muslims. Non-Muslim minorities were "constitutional Turks" (*Kanun-i Esasi Türkülügü*), not "genuine Turks," (*hakiki Türklük*) as they were called in the national press of the time.⁷⁴

⁷²Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 62-63.

⁷³The Third Section of the Lausanne Peace Treaty titled "The Protection of Minorities" (Art. 37-45) consistently uses the term "non-Muslim minorities" when it mentions the minorities in Turkey. See İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Anlaşmaları 1920-1945* (The Political Treaties of Turkey), vol.1. (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1989), 95-98.

⁷⁴ According to Necmettin Sadık, the writer of the sociology textbooks in the Kemalist era and also journalist, the minorities " have to integrate into the society they live, or they have to leave the country. In the case of failing to meet either of these alternatives , the urge of "preserving life" may lead them to treason, to very dangerous interminglings. Therefore, it is not enough for the minorities living

The religious definition which was dominant in the early years of the Republic did not lose its hold in the national consciousness at popular level even after the secularising reforms of 1924 and after. Non-Muslim Turks still are not considered Turk despite the official rhetoric of Turkishness independent of religion. Similarly, Muslim Bosnians and Circassians could easily be absorbed into native Turkish society despite their aloofness to Turkishness in terms of descent and language. The fact that political participation of minorities decreased almost to none in comparison to their status in the Ottoman Empire and their almost total exclusion from public sphere together with their inexistence in civil and military bureaucracy, are related, to some extent, with this popular imagery of Turk as being necessarily Muslim. Kemalist nationalism could not escape from this historical imperative.

5.6. Republican Definition: Rejection of What is Religious

A unitarist-monolithic conception of Turkishness based on the politico-legal definition that "everyone tied to the Turkish Republic via

within the Turkish society to hold only the Turkish citizenship officially. If they wish to live in this country, they have to be genuinely Turk." See Tekin Alp, *Türkleştirme*, 79-80. Another press comment is more instructive in this regard:

"No oppressive measures have been taken for the minority groups in the Turkish Republic. But it is up to them to assume the natural privileges stemming from being embraced by the Turkish majority through joining to that majority as a pure citizen. A man which do not think and feel like me may be a person that I observe his rights, but how can such a person be my citizen in its full sense?..." The genuine citizenship is composed of citizenship involving unity in language, ideal and interest. Uniting in everything, and differing while going to temples, is not something that may cause foreignness and separation in civilised societies." See "Evamir-i Aşere" (Ten Commandments), *Milliyet*, 15 March 1928. These interpretations regarding the nature of Turkish citizenship reveals that the political component of the Republican definition of Turkishness is much more powerful than its legal component, and that legal component by itself does not make sense.

citizenship, and embraced Turkish language, culture and the national ideal is Turk" constituted the dominant aspect of the Republican definition of the Turkish national identity. The Republican definition as a rupture from the old religious definition came to the fore basically after the radical reforms of the 1924, which abolished the Caliphate, the old institutions of education, *sufi* orders and the Ministry of *Şer'iyye* (Religious Affairs) and *Evkaf* (Religious Foundations). The disestablishment of Islam from the new Turkish polity paved the way for the redrawn of the boundaries of Turkishness, and hence Islam ceased to be the state religion in 10 April 1928.⁷⁵

The Republican definition of the Turkish national identity had two components: legal (objective) and political (subjective). The political component was determinative, and in a sense embodied the Kemalist creed. The legal component was purely *legal* and essentially secondary to the political component. The official expression of the legal component of the Turkish national identity was the article 88 of the 1924 constitution: "Everyone who is tied to the Turkish Republic via citizenship is Turk."

The prevailing definition in the Kemalist literature however, is political and the distinction between the two components is of vital importance in the construction of the Kemalist ethno-secular Turkish identity. The legal aspect of Turkishness is to a certain extent the consequence of a "forced" condition. It is a necessary corollary of the Lausanne Treaty (1924) obliging the Turkish Republic to protect the rights of its non-Muslim minorities. That is why, as we shall see, Kemalist policies of assimilation(*temsil*) in many cases were administered through

⁷⁵See TBMM *Zabit Ceridesi*, period III, session 1, vol. 3, 09. 04. 1928, 115.

administrative and *de facto* measures rather than formal legal regulations.

Republican definition never considered the legal component as an adequate basis for being *Turk*.⁷⁶ As a result, those citizens whose mother tongues were not Turkish were forced to speak Turkish in private as well as in public usage. Such campaigns as "*Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş !*"(1927) (Citizens, Speak Turkish!) was officially supported. During the late 1920s and 30s, the generalisation of Turkish (*Türkçenin Umumiliği*) was an important public concern. Those who do not speak Turkish in public became the subject of public harassment. The coining of pure Turkish names for children apart from speaking Turkish was considered a vital indication of the allegiance to the Kemalist creed.

Strikingly interesting, as will be elaborated later, the law no. 2510 titled "*İskan Kanunu*" (The Law of Settlement) (1934) overtly made a distinction between "Turks that are not Turkish citizen" and "Turkish citizens that are not Turk." It prescribed discrimination between emigrants and refugees of Turkish stock and the ones that are not of Turkish stock in terms of acquiring citizenship. In the recruitment of public employees, civil as well as military, the established distinction was between being Turk and being Turkish citizen. There has never been a one-to-one correspondence between Turkish citizenship and Turkish national identity. Therefore, Turkish citizenship could not constitute a

⁷⁶Yet, it must be admitted that non-Muslims (including Jews, Greeks and Armenians) faced no difficulty in acquiring or losing the Turkish citizenship when they demanded so. The 1935 decisions of the Council of Ministers as regards the acquisition and loss of Turkish citizenship present an apparent manifestation of this fact. For these decisions, see *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), No: 2922, 05. 02. 1935; ibid., No: 2942, 28.02. 1935; ibid., No: 2962, 27. 03. 1935; ibid., No:2969, 04. 04. 1935; ibid., No: 2971, 07. 04. 1935; ibid., No: 2979, 16. 04. 1935; ibid., No: 3051, 11. 07. 1935; ibid., No: 3105, 13. 09. 1935; ibid., No: 3107, 16.09. 1935; and ibid., No: 3105, 13. 09. 1935.

sound basis for a unifying national identity, unlike American or French citizenship.⁷⁷

5.6.1 Political Component

In many of the official and political documents in the post-1924 period, many markers of Turkishness were underlined in addition to citizenship. In view of these markers, while part of Turkish citizens considered as "Turk" or "*öz-Türk*" (pure, genuine Turk), other citizens were qualified either as "*Kanun-i Esasî Türkleri*" (constitutional Turks) (non-Muslim minorities) or simply nonexistent (Muslim ethnies other than Turks, particularly Kurds) in rhetorical-legal terms. The political will expressed in the form of loyalty to the Republican cause replaced the "*kelime-i şahadet*" (Islamic confession of faith) of the Ottoman times.⁷⁸

⁷⁷Nişanyan, "Kemalist Düşüncede Türk Kavramı," 128. According to Nişanyan, both in the European and Anglo-Saxon countries, the correspondence between citizenship and national identity is one-to-one and conclusive. Once you acquire citizenship, no one can question your national identity. In the American case, the maxim that "Those who are not American citizen is not American" is thoroughly valid. But in the European context, this may not necessarily be so. As a matter of fact, there are Germans or Frenchs that are not German or French citizen. Nevertheless, in no case one can point to a situation in which one's rights of citizenship are denied due to his/her refusal to adopt the dominant/state language, culture or national ideal. The assimilation policies of the states never reach to the point of the denial of citizenship rights of those citizens who refuse to integrate into the national creed. See *ibid.*, 129. In the Kemalist conception of national identity, no citizen could use the rights and liberties stemming from citizenship unless he/she adopt the ethno-secular Turkish identity

⁷⁸Entrance to Turkishness was bounded to the confession of a political credo titled "*Türk'ün Yeni Amentüsü*" (The New Credo of the Turk) in word as well as in deed: "I believe in Mustafa Kemal, who is the symbol of heroism and the creator of the independence of the fatherland, in his warrior army , his high laws, his combatant mothers , and the fact that there is no day of resurrection for Turkey. I confess with my all purity of heart that both the good and the bad spring from men; that my great nation will attain the best position in the civilised world, and bear

The political component of the Republican definition of Turkishness is best expressed in the programmes of the Republican People's Party.⁷⁹ The article 5 of the 1927 Statute lays down the unity in language and feeling among citizens as the most important ties and therefore lends emphasis on the promotion of Turkish language and culture. According to the 1931 programme, "nation is a political and social community (*heyet*) comprised by the citizens united in language, culture and ideal."⁸⁰ This definition remained the same in 1935 and 1939 party programmes.⁸¹ In general, party programmes testify to the view of nation as the unity of will and feeling and hence reflects a solidarist authoritarianism. Purely ethnic elements do not have any reference.

The conditions of membership to the RPP in this context may give us some important clues. According to the article 3 of 1923 Statute of the RPP, "every Turk and every person emigrated to Turkey and accepted

witness to the unity of the mighty Turkish army, which filled the history with its heroism, and to the fact that Ghazi (Mustafa Kemal) is the best servant of Allah" This credo appeared in 1928 in a book titled "*Türkün Yeni Amentüsü*" This credo well reflects the ethno-secular character of Turkishness. See Abdurrahman Dilipak, comp., *Cumhuriyetin Şeref Kitabı* (The Honour Book of the Republic) (İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 1993), 5.

⁷⁹Qualifying the 1931 programme as the ideology of the Turkish Revolution, Alaattin Bey(deputy from Kütahya) calls it as "*İnkılabın Amentüsü*" (the credo of the Revolution). See *CHF Üçüncü Büyük Kongre Zabıtları* (10-18 May 1931) (The Minutes of the Third General Congress of the Republican People's Party) (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931), 229.

⁸⁰Tunçay, *T.C.'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması* (1923-1931), 447.

⁸¹For the definition of nation in the 1935 programme, see *CHP Programı* (The Programme of RPP) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, May 1935), 3. For the definition in 1939 programme, see *CHP Programı* (The Programme of RPP) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1939), 4.

Turkish nationality and culture can join the People's Party."⁸² This is a clear reflection of the politico-legal Turkishness. The article 8 of the 1927 Regulation of the RPP stipulates the embracement of Turkish culture and all the principle of the Party as conditions for membership.⁸³ The 1931 regulation stipulates the speaking of Turkish an additional condition.⁸⁴ The 1935 and 1939 programmes are the same with that of 1931.⁸⁵

⁸²Tunçay, ibid., 362. See also Parla, *Kemalist Tek Parti*, 25.

⁸³*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Nizamnamesi* (The Regulation of the Republican People's Party) (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1927); cited by Tunçay, ibid., 383. The paragraph D of the article 8 of the Regulation carrying the title of "Firkaya Suret-i Kabul" (Form of Acceptance to the Party) is as follows: "Every Turkish citizen can join the Party provided that he accept the Turkish culture and all the principles of the party." A debate occurred in the Second General Congress of the RPP in 1927 over this paragraph.

"Talat Bey (Çankırı): Does the intended meaning by the phrase "every Turkish citizen" refer only to Turks? Are non-Muslims (anasırı saire) included in this phrase? Are women included?

Celal Nuri Bey (Tekirdağ): Talat Bey asked: What is meant by the phrase "Turkish citizenship?" This has been registered in the Constitution (Voices of "true").

Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey (Kars): In my opinion, the party is a national party. It is a party inclusive of all the government and all the country. Therefore, the first thing to be devised as a principle is that everybody holding the attribute of Turkish citizenship (*Türk hemşehrilik sıfati*) can join the party (noises). It can be said that so and so are excluded after having devised the rule." See *CHF İkinci Büyük Kongresi* (The Second General Congress of the Republican People's Party) (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1927) 11-12.

⁸⁵*CHF Nizamnamesi* (The Regulation of RPP) (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1931), cited by Tunçay, ibid., 429-430. In the Third General Congress of the RPP held in 1931, Alaattin Bey, a deputy from Kütahya vehemently opposed to the article regulating the conditions of the entrance to the RPP on the ground that the party is a revolutionary party undertaking the mission of civilising the nation. Hence, it has to exclude the religious people from among its ranks in that although they joined the national struggle together, this was a normal occurrence because it was a matter of honour (namus) for those who carry the Turkish blood in their veins. However, the revolution (inkılap) was a matter of ideology, and therefore they should not have any say in the present and future of the country. According to him, no one could claim that those who

The principle of nationalism is reflected in many articles of the 1931 and the following programmes. The education policy of the Kemalist regime is one of them. The raising of "strongly republican, nationalist and *laic* citizens" is considered as the most important, compulsory point of interest in every stage of education. The elevation of the national character as inspired by "the long Turkish history" is considered as a "big aspiration" The Party attests great importance to the teaching of "the long Turkish history" Because that knowledge is "an holy substance nurturing the capability and power of the Turk, his self-confidence and will to resist against all the movements that may be harmful to the national existence."⁸⁶ The use of history as one of the constitutive element of the new Turkish national identity, as is clear from the preceding prescriptions, is always founded on the ethnocultural themes as can be inferred from the reference to the notion of an immutable, natural construct "national character" (*seciye-i millî*) and "the capability and power of the Turk" (*Türk'ün kabiliyet ve kudreti*).⁸⁷

voluntarily died for the Turkish fatherland can do the same thing for the Turkish Revolution (*Türk İnkılabı*). See *CHF Üçüncü Büyük Kongre Zabıtları* (8-10 May 1931) , 229-233. This understanding shows that the phrase "Turkish culture" have essentially an ideological character, and thus the cultural content of Turkishness consists of adherence to the principles of the Kemalist revolution. As a corollary of this, religious Muslims, though held the status of citizenship and therefore were legally considered Turk, were not seen as Turk in the political sense, the result of which was the denial of basic rights and liberties that may spring from the status of citizenship.

⁸⁵For the Regulation of 1935 see *CHP Tüzüğü* (The Regulation of RPP) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935). For 1939 programme see *CHP Nizamnamesi* (The Regulation of RPP) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1939).

⁸⁶Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetimi*, 451-452.

⁸⁷Parla, *Tek Parti İdeolojisi*, 79-80. Speaking about the 1931 programme, Akçuraoğlu Yusuf Bey (deputy from Istanbul)," after praising the pragmatic, a posterior character of the programme, expresses his particular admiration for the definition of the homeland (*vatan*) in

The six arrows of the RPP entered for the first time into the 1931 programme as the main features of the RPP. The second section of the programme lists these principles and their definition. The first paragraph of the first article of this section points out that "The Republican People's Party is republican, nationalist, populist, etatist, *laic* and revolutionary."⁸⁸ The 1935 and 1939 programmes incorporated the same principles.⁸⁹ The six arrows are the concise formulation of the RPP's political ideology.

the programme: "The homeland is a country within the present boundaries on which Turkish nation lives with its old and high history and traces (*eserler*) preserving their existence in the depth of its lands." See CHF Üçüncü Büyük Kongre Zabitları, 25. For the definition of "vatan" in the RPP programme see 1931 RPP's programme. Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetimi*, 447. One of the striking points in this definition is that unlike Ziya Gökalp, which saw the Central Asia as the native homeland of Turks, Mustafa Kemal sees Anatolia as the native Turkish homeland since pre-history times. Therefore, Kemalist conception of history considers all the ethnies living in Anatolia and their remainings as Turkish. The dire need for identifying a secular national root thus became fairly easy. Atatürk's consideration of the western dressing as Turkish and therefore pointing that there is no need for "Turan" way of dressing reflects this escape to the discourse of the Turkishness of Anatolian civilisations together with that of the West. The corollary of this way of reasoning is that Turks is a great blessing for the mankind. "Without Turks, there might not be history and there would not be civilisation. An history without Turks would be dark and chaotic." See Şükrü Kaya's Speech on the incorporation of the RPP's six arrows into the constitution, *TBMM Zabit Credis*, period V, meeting 2, vol. 16, 1937, 59. The corollaries of this understanding may be this: without Turk, there would not be any history, and without Atatürk(Father of Turks) there would be no Turks. Thus Atatürk becomes the constitutive cause of Turkishness. Adherence to his Principle is identified with allegiance to the Turkish national identity. the principles preached by Atatürk are Turkist and Turkish, i.e., they are the manifestations of the national character. Therefore the incorporation of his six arrows from the RPP's programme into the Constitution becomes an expression of national loyalty. See ibid., 60. Kaya do not decline to add that their nationalism is not parochial and that it aims at being an integral part of the civilised world in order to contribute to the happiness of the whole humanity. Ibid.

⁸⁸Tunçay, ibid., 448.

⁸⁹See 1935 *CHP Programı*, 6-12, and 1939 *CHP Programı*, 5-8.

These principles were in fact in evolution since the National Struggle. Many of them were expressed before, though with important differences, by many Young Turk ideologues, particularly by Ziya Gökalp.⁹⁰

In these programmes nationalism emerges as a defensive and modernising principle. It prescribes the preservation of the special attributes of the Turkish nation on the one hand, and being in harmony with other nations in the path of progress and development with other nations in the international arena, on the other.⁹¹ This approach is a clear manifestation of the political (subjective) boundary of Turkishness crystallised after 1924.

To be sure, all remnants of the religious definition were tried to be eliminated in this period. The removal of the caliphate was a clear expression of the denial of any role to Islam even as an instrumental means of social cohesion. The caliphate could be a means of social cohesion as was the case during the period of the National Struggle given the existence of other Muslim ethnies, namely Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, Georgians, Lazis, Bosnians, Albanians, etc. In the eyes of these ethnies, Islam and hence the caliphate was the most important source of socio-political legitimacy. But aspiring for total westernisation, Mustafa Kemal made an ideological choice, and ascribed the function of creating social cohesion to the new ethnosecularism.⁹²

The widely-held assertion of the Kemalist writers that Kemalist nationalism is a cultural nationalism, in fact, refers to the political component of the Republican definition, and expresses the claim that it

⁹⁰Parla, *Tek Parti İdeolojisi*, 39-40.

⁹¹See the second paragraph of the first article of the Second Section of the 1931 RPP programme, cited by Tunçay, *ibid.*, 448.

⁹²Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetimi*, 69-71.

has no relation with race. As a matter of fact, one can distinguish three aspects of the political component as defined above:

a) Linguistic Aspect: This aspect is an important indication of the Kemalist definition of the public realm as including private realm, or its rejection of the distinction between the public and private. As a total ideology, the linguistic aspect of the Kemalist nationalism requires the adoption of Turkish as mother tongue as well as official language. It is necessary to speak Turkish not only in official and public places but also at home in order to achieve the genuine Turkishness.⁹³ The compulsory measures taken for the encouragement of speaking Turkish aiming at non-Muslim minorities contrary to the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty regarding the protection of the minorities and non-Turkish Muslim ethnies by way of administrative and *de facto* measures must be seen from this perspective.⁹⁴

b) Cultural Aspect: It is not clear what is meant by culture when its most important popular element, Islam and hence traditions related with it, were excluded from its content. Overall, however, given the rejection of all the popular cultural elements from musics to the way of dressing, it can be said that culture connoted purely "standard" secularised western

⁹³As Mustafa Kemal observed, The scholars who do not accept language as the basis for race are not totally inexistent in the contemporary world of science. This basis(i.e., the rejection of the consideration of language as the basis of race) may be true for some communities, but never for Turks."Afet İnan, *Atatürk Hakkında Hatıralar ve Belgeler* (Memoirs and Documents About Atatürk) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınevi, 1968), 210-211. Apart from the racial circumference used for national identity, it is clear that Turkishness necessarily demands the speaking of Turkish as the mother tongue. Ethnicisation of culture is a characteristic feature of Kemalist nationalism, and therefore culture by itself is not a determinative variable.

⁹⁴For these measures, see Chapter VIII.

culture other than coining names of Turkic origin and speaking Turkish which was thoroughly secularised via the so-called "process of purification."

c) **The Aspect of Ideal(*Ülkü*):** The manifest ideal is a political one the concrete embodiment of which being the Turkish Republic. The key concept of the Republican credo is the concept of ideal. The ideal is assumed to be the main source of inspiration for people to learn Turkish and serve the Republican cause with enthusiasm. In this regard, the ideal embodies the linguistic and cultural aspects of the political component as well. The reference point covering all these elements of the national identity has become crystallised as the Turkish Republic itself.

The key expression in the definition of Mustafa Kemal that "the Turkish people who founded the Turkish Republic is called Turkish nation"⁹⁵ is the phrase "who founded". He did not use such terms as "residents within the frontiers of the Turkish Republic," or citizens. Because non-Muslim minorities, except for Jews, participated the War of Independence in alliance with the invasion forces. Therefore they are excluded from this definition. They are not the co-founder of the Turkish Republic and hence are not considered part of "Turkish nation" Nation, according to Mustafa Kemal, is not a randomly gathered community residing within a certain boundary. On the contrary, it is "a unity of will and ideal." It is a special entity united first and foremost in aspiration. The fundamentals of this unity for Turks are the ideal of political independence, solidarism, nationalism, secularism, contemporary civilisation etc., epitomised in the Turkish Republic and its founder, Mustafa Kemal as the constitutive principle.

⁹⁵Afet İnan, *Medenî Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazılıları* (Civics and the Handwritings of M. Kemal Atatürk) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1969), 18.

As a matter of fact, all the constitutive concepts and symbols of Turkishness, e.g., the National Struggle, Turkish Grand National Assembly, Ankara, Sakarya, Dumlupınar, the victorious army, 19 May, 23 April, 30 August, 9 September, 29 October, the abolition of the sultanate, and caliphate, the acquisition of the Latin alphabet, secularism etc., have a common historical subject: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. According to Nişanyan, it is not coincidental that he has been called "Atatürk" (Father of Turks) instead of, for example, "*Ulu Türk*" (the Grand Turk) "*Yüçetürk*" (the Great Turk), or "*Kahraman Türk*" (the Heroic Turk). The founder of the Republic is considered not only the leader, the guide, the greatest of Turks: he is an active principle constituting the Turkish nation. The amorphous embryo in the womb of Anatolia came into existence thanks to his action. Therefore, Turkish nation deserves existence to the extent it obeys him and the principles devised by him.⁹⁶

Everybody who adopts the ideal of Republic and its corollaries, i.e., Turkish language and culture, regardless of religion and descent, could call himself/herself Turk. Mustafa Kemal's famous saying that "Ne mutlu Türk'üm diyene!" (How fortunate is he who declares I am a Turk) can be viewed in this context. Those who wilfully accept the Kemalist credo may acquire Turkishness without any obstacle. A Turk by definition has to be Kemalist. Non-Kemalists could acquire only legal Turkishness without any real correspondence in terms of basic rights and liberties, however.

The proximity of the concept of "Atatürk" as the "*Büyük Şef*" (the Great Chief)⁹⁷ to the fascist-corporatist theories of nation, widely-held in

⁹⁶Nişanyan, ibid., 133.

the 1920s and 30s is striking. The political movements crystallised around *Duce* in Italy with the symbolism of the Roman Empire, the crown of St. Isztvan in Hungary, *Esta do Nove* in Portugal, *Falanges* in Spain and *Action Francaise* in France, and of course *Führer* in Germany were all sprung from the notion of nation fulfilling its historical mission united around a State and its Leader ornamented with mystical faculties. The life-breather of nation is the Leader himself. The esteemed member of nation are those who fully submitted themselves to the Leader. Owing to this mystical identification of the Leader and nation, the Jews in Italy could occupy the highest positions in the Fascist state organisation. The racist dimension of this understanding was not the dominant element.

Given the spiritual crisis all over the World in the wake of the First World War, it does not seem too odd that this theory gathered so wide sympathy. The structural weakness of the theory was that if the condition of belonging to a nation is to embrace a national ideal and the political alternatives identified with that ideal, then those refusing that ideal acquire automatically the status of "traitor" or lose their rights of citizenship. Because the basic rights of citizenship are tied to the condition of loyalty felt to a certain political ideal and the preacher of that ideal. However flexible the boundaries of the national ideal to be drawn, everybody whose loyalty to the ideal and the Leader is under suspect, in the last analysis, is subject to the accusation of "treason"

5.6.2. *Legal Component*

The term "nationality" denotes the affiliation of both the real and legal persons to state. Citizenship refers only the attachment of real

⁹⁷For the use of this title see, for example, *İkinci Türk Dil Kurultayı Müzakere Zabıtları, Tezler* (Discussion Minutes and Theses of the Second Turkish Language Congress) (Ankara; 1934), 10.

persons to state and their political rights.⁹⁸ In the present nation-state system, the right of nationality is determined by states. In these determination, states in general resort to two criteria: 1) the principle of *birth place* (territory/*jus soli*); 2) the principle of *genealogy* (blood/*jus sanguinis*).

In the criterion of birth place, the acquiring of citizenship is tied to the birth place of the father and mother or either of them of the person concerned. What is important is the place of birth. Independent of the nationality of parents, the person assumes the citizenship of the state in which he was born. The United States is the most classical example of this principle.

In the blood principle, citizenship is acquired through genealogy. The person assumes the nationality of his/her parents or either of them regardless of his/her birth place. According to the article 88 of the 1924 Constitution, the children springing from the loins of Turkish father, are considered Turkish citizen regardless of the birth place.

Most of states use both principles in the acquisition of the original citizenship, i.e., citizenship gained through birth or circumstances related to birth, due to the difficulties of the total rejection of the either principles. Yet, states that host emigrants place emphasis to the principle of territory, while the states that send emigrants give priority to the blood principle. In the Turkish legal system in the Kemalist era, the acquisition of original citizenship was done in accordance with both principles. Nevertheless, the main rule in this regard was the preference of blood

⁹⁸Hicri Fişek, *Anayasa ve Vatandaşlık* (The Constitution and Citizenship) (Ankara: Ankara Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınevi, 1961), 1. In time, however, with the development of the ideas of nation, national sovereignty and nation state, the term nationality acquired the same meaning with citizenship. See ibid., 2.

principle to that of territory. The principle of territory was applied in exceptional situations only.⁹⁹

Acquired citizenship, unlike from original citizenship, is the acquisition of citizenship through various reasons and legal regulations other than circumstances related to birth.¹⁰⁰

5.6.2.1 The Legal Frame of Citizenship in Turkey

A general scrutiny of the historical background and evolution of the legal framework of citizenship in the Ottoman-Turkish context is essential for the comprehension of Kemalist crystallisation of the legal Turkishness.

5.6.2 1.1 The 1878 Fundamental Law(Kanun-i Esasi)

According to the article 8 of the 1878 Constitution, All persons being under the nationality of the Ottoman State, regardless of their religion and denomination, are called, with no exception, Ottoman. The attribute of "being Ottoman" are acquired and removed in accordance with circumstances specified by the law.¹⁰¹ This article rejects all the religious distinctions among the subjects of the Ottoman State in the acquisition of citizenship, but does not specify which principle it adopts

⁹⁹Ibid., 23-24.

¹⁰⁰The acquired citizenship occurs sometimes on the demand of a certain person to acquire the citizenship of a certain state (*telsik*), and in some occasions owing to the situations related the civil(marital) status of the persons concerned. Ibid., 5.

¹⁰¹Suna Kili and A. Şeref Gözübüyük, *Sened-i İttifak'tan Günümüze Türk Anayasası Metinleri* (Turkish Constitutional Documents From the Deed of Alliance up to the Present) (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985), 32.

in the ascription of citizenship. This had been done by the law "*Tabiiyyeti-i Osmaniye Kanunnamesi*" (Ottoman Citizenship Law) dated 23 January 1869. The acquisition of the original citizenship through the principle of blood is basic to this law. But in certain, quite limited, circumstances, the principle of birth was also acknowledged.¹⁰²

The 20 January 1921 Fundamental law is an incomplete constitution. It is the product of a transient period in which Ottoman State still was not replaced by a new state. Its most important feature was the legal expression of the principle of national sovereignty. But the principle of nationalism still did not find a clear expression.¹⁰³ Therefore, it can be assumed that the regulations devised by the 1878 Constitution and 1869 Law of Ottoman Citizenship were in force.

5.6.2.1.2 1924 Fundamental Law

The constitution of the new Republic brought about new regulations as regards citizenship. The renown article 88 introduces novelties differing from the article 8 of the 1878 constitution regulating the Ottoman citizenship. The article 88 reads: "The Turkish people, regardless of religion and race, is called *Turk* as regards citizenship."¹⁰⁴ The most important element in the article, other than the principle of birth place and blood in the acquisition of original and acquired citizenship, pertains to the question of naming citizens.

1878 constitution calls the Ottoman subjects as "Ottoman." The 1924 constitution introduces the name "Turk" for the citizens.¹⁰⁵ It was

¹⁰²Nihal Uluocak, *Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku* (Turkish Law of Citizenship) (Istanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1984), 20.

¹⁰³Eroğlu, "Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik," 368.

¹⁰⁴Kili and Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasası Metinleri*, 111.

this question of naming that aroused the most heated discussions during the debates regarding the new constitution in the National Assembly. The starting point for the objections raised was the naming of non-Turkish Muslim ethnies and non-Muslims as "Turk." Some deputies like Ahmet Hamdi and Hamdullah Suphi) argued that the term "Turk" may be used to express only nationality, not citizenship. Hamdullah Suphi claimed that it would be dangerous to call minorities "*Turk*" in religion and race.¹⁰⁶ Upon the agreement of the Commission, the motion of Hamdullah Suphi Bey's was approved.¹⁰⁷ In this way, the Turkishness of minorities was reduced to legal Turkishness (*Kanun-i Esasî Türkülügü*) only.

¹⁰⁵The statement of reasons for the article 88 reads: Since the Ottoman Empire had been obliterated and perished, the members of the nation could no longer be called "Ottoman". National self-honour cannot accept belonging to a dynasty. Our state is a national state, not an international or supra-national one. The state can recognise no nation other than the *Turk*. It is not proper to consider racial differences as an obstacle to nationality since there are peoples of different origins in the country who possess equal rights. Likewise, since the freedom of conscious is certified, religion has not been considered as an hindrance to nationality as well. Turkish nation too, like all the new nationalities, could embody peoples of different races. But it is the community of the Turks(*Türklük camiası*) that has the capability of bringing together all the races. " See *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, period II, meeting 2, vol. 7, 09. 03.1340(1924), 216.

¹⁰⁶In this regard, the following suggestions were made:

- Ahmet Hamdi Bey (Deputy from Yozgat): Those who belong to Turkish people and accept the Turkish culture (*hars*) are called "Turk"
- Feridun Fikri Bey (Deputy from Dersim): The Turkish people is called "Turk" as regards citizenship irregardless of religion and race."
- Naim Hazım Bey (Deputy from Konya): Turkish people is called "*Türkiyeli*"(those from Turkey) without difference of religion and race.
- Hamdullah Suphi Bey (Deputy from Istanbul): Turkish people is called "Turk" as regards citizenship with no distinction of religion and race." See, *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, period II, meeting 2, vol. 8/1, 911; also Fişek, *Anayasa ve Vatandaşlık* , 22-23.

¹⁰⁷For the discussions on the article 88 of the 1924 Constitution, see *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, period II, meeting 2, vol. 8/1, 908-911.

These discussions make clear that Turkishness as citizenship was considered thoroughly different from Turkishness as nationality. A clear demarcation line was drawn between being Turk and Turkish citizen. Later, this state of affairs would lead to the limiting of the use of citizenship rights to those who accepted to enter into "Turkish nationality."

The 1924 constitution accepts the principle of blood for the original citizenship.¹⁰⁸ As to the acquired citizenship, it implies the principle of territory. But this provision would be violated by the 1928 Citizenship Law.

It is interesting to note that the 1924 constitution uses insistingly the term "Turk" instead of such possible terms as "fert" (individual), "kişi" (person) or "vatandaş" (citizen). To illustrate, "Every Turk has the right to elect deputies" (Art. 10). "Every Turk may be elected as deputy" (Art. 11). The title of the Fifth Section is "*Türklerin Hukuk-u Ammesi*" (The Public Rights of Turks): "Every Turk is born as free"(Art. 68). "Every Turk is legally equal" (Art. 69). Many other examples can be added to this illustration. According to Abadan, despite the fact that all Turkish citizens are legally equal, the constitution's preference of the term "Turk" aims to confirm the fact that equality in democratic rights and duties is due to Turkishness and citizenship. Equality based on citizenship is a corollary of the Kemalist principle of populism.¹⁰⁹ Because "Turkish individual is the essence of the Turkish people; Turkish nation is the whole of Turkish citizenship."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸Fışek, *Anayasa ve Vatandaşlık*, 27.

¹⁰⁹Abadan, *Milliyetçilik ve Halkçılık*, 8.

¹¹⁰Ibid., 10.

The crucial distinction between citizenship and nationality remains, however. In the daily usage and some writings , the definition of Turkishness by religion and race , despite the contrary provision of the 1924 constitution, has remained. Thus one may talk of Bulgars who are Turkish citizen, or Muslim emigrants from Balkan states, particularly from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were called "Turk" owing to their adherence to Islam as religion, and sometimes due to their Turkic origin.¹¹¹ Despite, the politico-legal rhetoric that Turkishness is free of religious and racial distinctions, this has not been so in practice. ¹¹²

The final regulation regarding the legal aspect of Turkishness was the Turkish Law of Citizenship (1928)¹¹³ replacing that of 1869. The bill was legislated in 23 May 1928 after important changes made in the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Justice Commissions, and was put into force in 1 January 1929. The law incorporated no statement of reasons and no discussion was made in the Floor on it. Therefore the underlying motives of the law are not possible to identify. The most important novelty it brought is the elaboration of the principle of birth place. ¹¹⁴

¹¹¹Fışek, *Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku* 11-12.

¹¹²Kemalist refusal of recognising the public-private distinction makes its conception of citizenship unsuitable for the recognition of ethnic identities other than the Turkish one under the unifying umbrella of Turkish citizenship, which is an apparent demonstration of the ethnic character of Kemalist construction of Turkish national identity. For a parallel view, see Nora Seni, "Kin ve Dışlama Hala Mevcut"(Hatred and Exclusion Still Persist), Interview by Şahin Alpay, *Milliyet*, 20 February, 1995, 20.

¹¹³In 27 November 1926, Tevfik Kamil (Koperler), deputy from Istanbul, presented a bill of law to the Presidency of The National Assembly on the ground that "the law dated 24 January 1969 did not pay due attention to the principle of birth place in the acquisition of the original citizenship". See TBMM Zabit Ceridesi, 3rd period, 1st meeting, session 80, vol. IV, Sequence Number (*Sıra Sayısı*), 185.

Turkish Law of Citizenship introduces special measures for exceptional citizenship in order to ease those who want to acquire Turkish citizenship. According to the law, among those who may take the advantage of this provision, those who are of Turkish origin, their mates and adult children are included. (Art. 7/c). This is not particular to Turkey. Most states provide similar easy circumstances in acquiring people who are of the same descent, language of culture into citizenship. Thus "to be of Turkish descent" is accepted as a reason for inclusion to the status of "exceptional citizenship". Both the Law of Citizenship and The Law of Settlement(*İskan Kanunu*)¹¹⁵ embody such a clause. But the Law of Settlement differs from the Law of Turkish Citizenship in that it makes distinction between "those from Turkish origin" and "those who are adherent of Turkish culture" and calls them "*muhacir*" (immigrant).¹¹⁶

There is no clarity, however, in the laws as regards according to which bases the attachment to Turkish culture and being from Turkish origin (descent) would be determined. The Law of Settlement states that

¹¹⁴The third article of the law in which the conditions to be fulfilled in order to acquire Turkish citizenship for reasons other than those related with birth are stated, violates the article 88 of the Constitution in that it puts forth that those people who are born in Turkey from foreign parents and residing in Turkey can demand to acquire Turkish citizenship provided that the Council of Ministers decides so within three years after their age of puberty. The constitution considers the personal application adequate, however. See Fişek, *Anayasa ve Vatandaşlık*, 35.

¹¹⁵*Resmi Gazete*, 21. 06. 1934/2733. The law no. 2510 and it is dated 14 June 1934.

¹¹⁶Since the article 4 of the same law stipulates the condition of being adherent of Turkish culture in order to be accepted to Turkey as immigrant, unlike, the Turkish Law of citizenship, in the Turkish legal doctrine, it was accepted those who meet both conditions can make use of the Law of Settlement. See Uluocak, *Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku*, 58, footnote, 129.

whom and people of which countries would be considered as devoted to Turkish culture would be determined by the decision of the Council of Ministers (Art. 3)2).¹¹⁷

The following statement of Mustafa Kemal is the concise statement of the politico-legal components of Turkish national identity:

We are directly patriots (milliyetperver) and Turkish nationalists. The basis of our Republic is the Turkish Community (*Türk Camiası*). However much the members of this community is saturated with Turkish culture, the Republic would be so much powerful.¹¹⁸

As Üstel succinctly concluded, drawing upon the textbooks used in civic education during the Kemalist era, the Kemalist official conception of citizenship does not make any distinction between public and private realms. It is based on a specific life style called "modern"(*asrı*) and sharing of a paternally-defined common good. Ethnocultural sense of belonging characterises the social ties between individuals.¹¹⁹ Thus the ethnic/racial elements characterising the ethnicist conception of Turkish

¹¹⁷Accordingly, "Pomaks and those settled Muslims who are from the peoples of the countries seceded from the Ottoman Empire and did not have their separate, independent states, and speaking Turkish" are considered as being of Turkish descent. See "*İskanlı ve Serbest Göçmen Kabiliüne Dair Talimatname*," in İlhan Unat, *Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Metinler, Mahkeme Kararları)* (Turkish Citizenship Law: Texts, Court Decisions) (Ankara, 1960), 159. The inescapable imperative of the Ottoman past seems to be one of the main qualifier of the Kemalist creed in despite the fierce rhetoric that Kemalism cut all the ties with the Ottoman-Islamic past. As it is seen, common history, religion and language emerge as the main markers of Turkish descent according to this decision. Another striking point is the definition of descent in terms of concrete cultural markers instead of biological features.

¹¹⁸"Türk Ocakları Delegelerine" (To the Delegates of Turkish Hearts), *Söylev ve Demeçler III*, 26. 04. 1926, 118. According to Mustafa Kemal "Turkey is for Turks," the common motto of all nationalists. See "Türkiye Türklerindir" (Turkey is for Turks), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, August 1921, 38.

¹¹⁹Füsün Üstel, "Cumhuriyetin Yurttaş Profili" (The Citizen Profile of the Republic), *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 24 April, 1994, 18.

national identity in the Kemalist era now may be analysed through a closer scrutiny.

CHAPTER VI

SEARCH FOR THE DELIMITATION OF THE ETHNIC BOUNDARY OF TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY

6.1. Introduction

The political component of the Republican definition shaped essentially the secular contours of Turkishness. The last decade of the Kemalist era (1929-1938) witnessed the crystallisation of the ethnic aspect of Turkishness in addition to its already formed secular nature.

As mentioned before, only the name of the new Turkish state had an ethnic connotation among the states established in the Middle East in the wake of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore the idea of Turkishness was not only the name of a political ideal but also that of an ethnic construct. The distinction between the ethnic and political senses was not clear-cut however, and it was this vagueness that was deliberately exploited by the Kemalist nationalist elites according to the requirements of the political expediency. A graphic example of this usage can be seen from the following words of İsmet İnönü, the long time prime minister of the Kemalist era:

We will crush those who do not respect the Turk and Turkishness. The first and foremost thing we will require from those who want to serve the country is to be Turk and Turkist.¹

¹Bilal Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye'de "Kürt Sorunu"* 1924-1938: *Seyh Sait, Ağrı ve Dersim Ayaklanması* ("Kurdish Question" in the English Documents 1924-1938: The Revolts of Sheikh Said, Ağrı and Dersim) (Ankara, 1975), 56. The speech was made in the headquarter of the Turkish Hearts in 27 April 1925.

Given that this speech was made in the wake of the Sheikh Said rebellion, it seems that it has an ethnic reference to the non-Turkish ethnies, in this case Kurds. Therefore, as would be substantiated in what follows, we may rightly conclude that the boundaries of the Turkish national identity are determined not only by legal-political, or to adopt the Smithian appellation, civic-territorial component combining citizenship and loyalty to the Republican cause as the criteria of nationality, but also by an ethnic-genealogical aspect including the racial-ethnic boundary, which defines Turkishness as having common Turkish ancestry or "blood", and as a matter of culture, i.e., values or life style to which one adheres, defined on the basis of Turkish ethnicity.

According to Atatürk, "culture is the basis of the Turkish Republic."² Defined by him in the ordinary sense of daily usage,³ culture here in fact implies the political component of the Republican definition of Turkishness. The fact that this "culture" was overwhelmingly racialised and ethnicised in the last decade of the Kemalist era (1929-1938) is generally unnoticed or rejected in the Kemalist literature.⁴ For the

²Utkan Kocatürk, *Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri* (The Ideas and Opinions of Atatürk) 3rd ed. (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1984), 112.

³Ibid. Apart from this meaning, culture is identified with civilisation, defined as the totality of the things done in political, intellectual fields, i.e., positive and social sciences and fine arts, and in economic life, i.e., agriculture, artisanship, commerce and transportation. See ibid., 64.

⁴Meta-historical perspectives and conceptual vagueness rather than Kemalist inclinations may yield to the same conclusion. See, for example, Süleyman Seyfi Öğün, "Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Hakim Millet Kodunun Dönüşümü" (The Transformation of the Code of the Dominant Nation in Turkish Nationalism), in *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik* (Republic, Democracy and Identity), ed., Nuri Bilgin (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1997), 207-230; and Metin Heper, "Devlet Kürtlerin Haklarını Tanımıştır" (The State Has Recognised the Rights of Kurds), *Milliyet*, 7 February 1995.

Kemalists, the Turkification, i.e., westernisation, of the whole polity including Islam and Kurds on the one hand, and every day life on the other, cannot be considered as ethnicisation of culture. This is partly because of the fact that to the term "ethnic/racial" was ascribed a pejorative, "reactionary" meaning *ex post facto* by them in the present political usage. The construction of Turkish ethnicity without incorporating anything that may denote "difference" from Kemalist way of life and style of thinking, particularly, religion and markers of the existence of ethnies other than Turks is basic to the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism, however.

As Cizre concisely observed, taking the construction of a nation-state and national identity as its primary goal, Kemalist nationalism refused to confer any recognition to "Islam, sectarianism, social classes, and to a lesser extent, ethnicity."⁵ In Cizre's own words:

Islam was thought of as an impediment to the modernisation of the country on Western lines. Sectarianism was ruled out for its divisive impact on the populace which was predominantly of Sunni sect but had lived for centuries side by side with the minority sect of Alevi's of both Turkish and Kurdish stock. In line with and under the influence of the solidarist and corporatist doctrines of Italian fascism, the Kemalist populism denied class conflict and conceived the nation as "the people," the RPP as "the people's party.(...)the Kemalist ideology of nationalism, in its effort to create a new national consciousness in place of Ottomanism, did assign a central role to Turkish ethnicity.⁶

The gap of romanticism, the need for a new mainstay of social cohesion to replace Islam, and the programme of militant secularisation which opted for the complete non-visibility of religious allegiances

⁵Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "The Ideology and Politics of the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey,"*C.E.M.O.T.I.* 13 (January-May 1992), 142.

⁶Ibid., 143.

constituted the justification for the encouragement of ethnic nationalism in the eyes of Kemalist bureaucratic-intellectual elites.⁷

6. 2. Shift to the Latent Racialism/Ethnicism

One of the leading ideologues of the Kemalist nationalism, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, after having emphasised the nationalist priority of the Kemalist nationalism to Islam and humanity,⁸ points to the respect of Kemalist nationalism to the principle of national self-determination for every nation in the world and its rejection of imperialism.⁹ When comparing Kemalist and Nazi nationalisms, he makes a crucial point as regards the racial character of Kemalist nationalism. According to him, "both regimes are nationalist with a minor difference between them: National Socialism is racist while Turkish regime is not. The Turkish regime attests more importance to culture and language than to blood. Nevertheless, Atatürk in his Great Speech (*Büyük Nutuk*) pointed out that 'do not believe in those who are not of your blood.' *This recommendation, in practice, took the form of culture and language unity.*"¹⁰

Bozkurt lends emphasis on the non-imperialist character of Kemalist nationalism when he compares it with two other contemporary ideologies, namely Nazism and Fascism. What can be inferred from these

⁷Ibid. Nevertheless, Cizre-Sakallioğlu is cautious to emphasise that "the priority placed by the RPP elite on promoting a Turkish identity and unity primarily aimed at nation-building, but not on chauvinism." Ibid., 143.

⁸Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali* (Atatürk Revolution), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1967), 298.

⁹Ibid., 299.

¹⁰Ibid., 300. (Emphasis added).

observations is that despite the racial character of Kemalist nationalism, racism did not take the form of a systematic state policy in practice, as far as "the blood criterion" is concerned. Interestingly enough, however, Kemalist racialism expressed itself particularly in the fields of culture and language, i.e., it took the form of ethnicism—the discrimination based on linguistic and cultural distinctions — the practical manifestations of which will be dealt with below.

In this chapter, I shall try to emphasise that the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism had a strong racial/ethnic colouring, the major manifestation of which being the racialisation/ethnicisation of objective as well as subjective cultural markers. This state of affairs did not lead to the adoption of a systematic policy of racism, however. Nevertheless, the ethnicisation of culture took a sporadically racist dimension under the influence of racist movement in Turkey and abroad, and Kemalist nationalism's own inner ideological dynamics.

The underlying causes of drifting to a racial understanding of Turkishness are revealing in terms of the better recognition of the structural nature of the Kemalist nationalism. As Kadioğlu observed, by 1930s, the Kemalist elites noticed the imminent need for further "reforms" in order to stabilise the Kemalist revolution by creating a new Turkish identity, through a process of engineering, which gave the emerging Turkish identity a wholly manufactured character.¹¹ Kemalist nationalism rested on the new space of secular legitimacy. The failure of Kemalist secularism proper to form a comprehensive basis of individual as well as collective identity led the Kemalist nationalism to assume a racial colouring.

¹¹Ayşe Kadioğlu, "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32:2(April 1996), 188.

The secularists in Turkey were the advocate of militant laicism inside but had "Muslim instincts" against the "Christian West" outside. Kemalist laicists conceived of the West as being the representative of modernity/secularity inside, and the Christianity outside. Owing to the weakness of Kemalist secularism and the Turkish Republic as a political ideal to fix a new collective identity at popular level, Kemalist nationalism with its bifurcate, Janus-faced character, drifted toward a defensive, latently racist position in the 1930s.¹² As Bozkurt observed, telling the people "be republican and love the revolution" was not enough. It was necessary to provide a new ideal which could compete with the ideal of *Şeriat* and replace it. Only then the republic could be said to be in the safe hands.¹³

Thus emerged the ideal of supreme Turkish race being the mother of all civilisations in the late 1920s and early 1930s, with the development of Turkish History Thesis and the Sun-Language Theory. According to Sevan Nişanyan, the causes of this drift from the Republican political ideal to that of racial/ ethnic one can be explained at two planes: ideological and political.¹⁴

6. 2.1. *Ideological Causes of the Drift to the Racial Ideal*

The ideal of the Republic as a unifying as well as mobilising political ideal failed to be so at popular level due to its weak emotive and

¹²Etyen Mahcupyan, "Laik Kesim ve Bastırılmış Irkçılık"(*Laic Segment and the Latent Racism*), *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 16 September 1995, 14.

¹³Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, "Mefkure İhtiyacı"(The Need for an Ideal), *Milliyet*, Editorial, 14 February 1931, 1-2.

¹⁴Sevan Nişanyan, "Kemalist Düşüncede Türk Milleti Kavramı"(The Concept of Turkish Nation in the Kemalist Thought), *Türkiye Günüluğu*, 33(March-April 1995), 137.

spiritual content vis a vis the perennial power of folk Islam. It lacked the comprehensiveness, emotional depth and political flexibility of Islam it tried to replace as a new basis of fraternity and solidarity among co-nationals, hence the inexistence of the sense of "ourness" formed around that ideal. As a project of political engineering, it could not provide a map of ethical guidance for everyday conduct except such "cold" official ceremonies such as the ones held in official holidays. Due to the cut of ties with the war-time basis of legitimacy, i.e., Islam, Kemalist nationalism was in severe need of a new ideal that could win over Islam at popular as well as intellectual level.

As Nişanyan observed, the ideal of the republic was based on the glorification of Mustafa Kemal and the principles devised by him.¹⁵ Since Kemalist nationalism could not make a bridge between the National Struggle and the Kemalist republic due to its rejection of Islam as the main frame of legitimacy, the republic had to remain as a self-referential ideal.¹⁶

The most concrete change that the Republic brought about was the claim that "We are Turk. Therefore, we should be governed by Turks," the main political premise of the nationalist doctrine. But the word "Turk" had no positive connotation and appeal at the mass level. It made positive sense only to the ruling bureaucratic intelligentsia. It is difficult to argue that the cult of personality formed around Mustafa Kemal, the most concrete embodiment of which being the ascription of the appellation "Atatürk" (father of the Turks) to him, pleased traditionally religious masses, which would not readily embrace such a kind of secular

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., 138.

glorification. In the popular image, the founder of the republic was not "Atatürk" but "Mustafa Kemal Pasha."¹⁷

The resistance to the language policy of the Kemalist national ideal is striking in this respect. The Kurdish ethnies insisted in refusing to change its mother tongue and considered the efforts directed to that aim as "*gavura reva görülen eziyet*" (suffering that may be deemed suitable only to the infidels). What is more revealing in this respect was the rejection of the non-Muslim minorities to adopt Turkish as their mother tongue despite the fact that those who have emigrated to, for example, United States, readily accepted English as their mother tongue, a matter of constant complaint for Kemalists. These emigrants were more akin to the Turkish way of life rather than that of Anglo-American, which implies that this preference was related to the weakness of the political ideal that forced them to change their language rather than cultural sympathy/antipathy. Likewise, the Kurdish and religious series of rebellions were the apparent manifestations of dissatisfaction with the republican definition of the "happy Turkishness."

Kemalist bureaucratic-intellectual elites met this dissatisfaction, among others, with the inauguration of a new unfolding of the Turkish national identity. Apparently, there could be no possibility of returning to the old, Islamic definition. Thus the most reasonable option to establish national feeling of solidarity and fraternity for Kemalists emerged as the racial/ethnic theory which suggested that Turks are a super-family on the

¹⁷The hero of the people in the popular songs (*türkü*) is Mustafa Kemal Pasha, not Atatürk. See, for example, a *türkü* from Kars, "Hoş Gelişler Ola/Mustafa Kemal Paşa." For a good example of this distinctive appellation, see Ali Kırca, "Kemalo," *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 28 November 1997, 3. Conversely, the state institutions and intelligentsia have always preferred "Atatürk" to "Mustafa Kemal Pasha". For example, A. Adnan Saygun's vocal work "Atatürk ve Anadolu'ya Destan" is a case in point.

basis of kinship ties. In their view, such a theory might be more successful at least in gathering the support of the "the dominant ethnies" (Turks) at the popular level against the unassimilated "threats".

6. 2. 2. Political Causes of the Drift to the Racial Ideal

The closing down of the Turkish Hearts and its joining to the RPP is a parallel development to the change in the political discourse and political cadre necessitated by the republican ideological impasse.¹⁸ The task of developing the new theory of Turkish History Thesis was assumed by *Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti* (The Society for the Study of Turkish History), a committee already formed within the central organisation of the Turkish Hearts. The history textbooks and the History Congresses of 1932 and 1937 were prepared by this Society, nearly all the members of which consisted of the former members of the defunct Turkish Hearts. The key political figures of the period 1931-1936, in which the one party state completed its establishment, were the ex-members of the Hearts including Recep Peker, the Secretary General of the RPP, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, the Minister of Justice, Dr. Reşit Galip, the first head of the People's Houses, Samih Rifat, Sadri Maksudi Arsal, Yusuf Akçura, Yusuf Ziya Özer, M. Fuat Köprülü, Şemsettin Günaltay, Sükrü Saraçoğlu, Vasif Çınar, and many others.¹⁹

¹⁸The Turkish Hearts were the only organisation that kept open alongside the RPP in the one party period. It was a Turkist organisation founded in 1912, which adopted itself to the Kemalist nationalism after the Republic. It was nominally closed down but its cadre and organisational branches were kept intact under the new name of "*Halk Evleri*" (People's Houses) and was organically linked to the RPP. For the reasons for the closing down of Turkish Hearts, see Chapter V, footnote 123.

¹⁹Nişanyan, ibid., 139-141.

There were basically two underlying reasons of the official adoption of the new racial "Turkish History Thesis," the aim of which was to compensate for the inherent weakness of the republican ideal. These were to gain Turkish national self-confidence and respect, and the fixing of Anatolia as the Turkish national homeland. The question of gaining national self-respect was crucially important. The word "Turk" was a term of abuse in the English dictionaries together with the Jew and Welshman. The European travellers characterised the Turks in their writings as barbarian, cruel and ignorant.²⁰ The Kemalist revolution could not change this "negative image". The passing of the Empire and the coming of the militantly secular nationalism proved to be no healing, however. The Turks still were viewed by most westerners as a barbarian, uncivilised and mongoloid race incapable of anything "good" and "progressive," a reflection of the racist image of the East. Thus emerged the use of race as an instrument of self-defence by Kemalist nationalism.

In the nineteenth century dominated by the premises of scientific racism, Western European historians and geographers classified Turks within secondary class (yellow) race. It might be possible to change this judgement by limiting it to the Ottoman Turks after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.²¹ Thus the thesis that Turkish nation is brachycephalic

²⁰ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 353-54.

²¹Saint-Exupery's *Küçük Prens* (Little Prince) is a striking example of this extremely biased image of the Turks in the West. A Turkish astronomer discovers a meteor named B-612 in 1909 and presents his finding in the International Congress of Astronomy. But he was not deemed as reliable due to his style of dressing. Fortunately, an absolute Turkish ruler appears and force his people to embrace the European style of dressing by threatening them with death. Only then, the discovery of the Turkish astronomer dressed in the new style was

and belong to the race which had built great civilisations in Egypt, Anatolia and Mesopotamia was put forward. New generations would be indoctrinated with this thesis as a source of inspiration and strength. It was a national and historical duty to conduct historical researches with the purpose of contributing to the formation of national consciousness. The creation of a strong feeling of national consciousness through leaning on the pre-Ottoman times, and to present the backbone of this consciousness as "laws of nature", such as archaeology and anthropology were two goals prescribed for the history teaching in the First History Congress (1932).²²

In this vacuum of national self-confidence, Kemalist nationalism assumed a defensive character. Atatürk's such sayings as "the noble blood flowing in the veins", "how fortunate is he who says I am a Turk", "intelligent and hard-working nation," the sequence followed in "Turk! be proud of yourself-work-trust"²³ can be accounted for with the aim of refreshment of collective self-confidence rather than naive chauvinism.²⁴ Atatürk spent great effort for making Turkishness a thing to be proud of: "My sole honour and wealth in life is nothing else than being Turk."²⁵

unanimously approved in the Congress held in 1920. See Antoine De Saint-Exupery, *Küçük Prens*, trans. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1988), 18-20.

²²Büşra Ersanlı-Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih. Türkiye'de Resmi Tarih Tezinin Oluşumu*(1929-1937) [Power and History: The Formation Of The Official History Thesis in Turkey (1929-1937)](Istanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1992), 12.

²³Afet İnan, *Atatürk'ten Hatıralar ve Belgeler* (Memoirs and Documents from Atatürk), 2nd ed. (Ankara, 1968), 318; Kocatürk, *Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri*, 168.

²⁴Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürü'nün Resmi Kaynakları: Atatürk'ün Nutku* (The Official Sources of Political Culture in Turkey: The Speech of Atatürk), vol.1. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), 49.

²⁵Kocatürk, *Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri*, 168.

History and language theses were the concrete epitomisation of his undertaking to change the "backward, rude and barbarous" image of the Turks held by most westerners and even some Turkish intellectuals. According to Atatürk, "the Turkish nation who founded the Republic is civilised. She is civilised in history and in reality." ²⁶ "We lack nothing from other nations: we are brave, intelligent, hard-working and know to die for the higher goals."²⁷ The conclusion is the peak of irrational national proud: "*Bir Türk dünyaya bedeldir!*"(A Turk is worth the whole world)²⁸

To repair the negative image of the Turks in the eyes of Europeans and to demonstrate that the historical legacy of the Turks to the World is not composed of conquests only, that their traces in history carry also the signs of civilisation all over the World, including Europe, constituted the mainstay of the Kemalist nationalist endeavour. ²⁹

²⁶ *Atatürkçülük I. Atatürk'ün Görüş ve Direktifleri* (Atatürkism I. The Views and Directives of Atatürk) (Ankara, 1983), 51.

²⁷ Kocatürk, *Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri*, 170.

²⁸ Ibid., 168. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, an ardent Kemalist novelist and journalist, points to this irrational praise of the national ego by Kemalist nationalism when he qualifies it as "an infinite pride, an infinite self-respect." See Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Atatürk: Bir Tahsil Denemesi* (Atatürk: An Attempt of Analysis), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1971), 87.

²⁹ Karaosmanoğlu, *Atatürk*, 91. Karaosmanoğlu asserts that Mustafa Kemal, through history thesis, "wanted to make a comprehensive account of the Kemalist revolution to the deepest layer of the soil on which we live and to prove the nobility of the Turkish nation with an authentic pedigree(...) The fact that Turkish nation, whose nobility, virtue, morality, intelligence, capability and energy he considered to be greater than the spiritual values of all other nations, was not among the leading states of the world has determined his all thoughts." Ibid., 92 and 94. Karaosmanoğlu wonders if Atatürk ever thought of turning his nationalism into a sect or religion. "Even if not," he says, "We know that he loved Turkishness and everything that are Turkish with a religious

6.3. Racial/Ethnicist Definition of Turkishness

In the late nineteenth century, a period when the pseudo-scientific claims that civilisations are particular to the white-brachycephalic Arian communities, and the Turks were despised as "barbarians," in line with Gobineau's renown work *Essays on the Inequality of Races* were prevalent, the efforts to prove that Turks are belong to the "supreme" race became a major concern for such Turkists as Mustafa Celaleddin and Ali Suavi. Mustafa Celaleddin in his book *Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes* (1870) linked Turks to the Arian race. In the newspapers *Muhbir* and *Ulum* Ali Suavi wrote that Turks are not a military community only; on the contrary, they are a race having served the World civilisation, and that some ethnies in history were of Turkic origin.³⁰

The idea of scientific racism was espoused as a state policy in the 1930s in Germany, Japan and Italy, with varying degrees of emphasis on the purity of race. This state of affairs had a part in the formation of the Turkish History thesis, apart from predominantly internal causes. The question of race and related issues were the main focus of the papers presented in the First Turkish History Congress (1932).³¹

zeal, and are certain that when he closed his eyes to the World he had the belief in melting into the eternity of the noble descent." Ibid., 100. For the inculcation of the leitmotif of national self-confidence, which characterises the whole Kemalist era, in the War College (*Harbiye*) in the early years of the Republic, see Cemal Madanoğlu, *Anılar* (Memoirs), vol.1. (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayıncılık, 1982), 40.

³⁰Şerafettin Turan, *Atatürk'ün Düşünce Yapısını Etkileyen Olaylar, Düşünürler, Kitaplar* (Incidents, Thinkers and Books That Affected the Structure of the Thought of Atatürk) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayıncılık, 1982), 43.

³¹See particularly the papers of Dr. Reşit Galip, "Türk İrk ve Medeniyet Tarihine Umumi Bir Bakış"(A General Glimpse to the History of Turkish Race and Civilisation), T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi Konferanslar Müzakere Zabıtları* (First Turkish History

In this regards, among the books read and commented by Atatürk, J. A. Gobineau's *Essai sur l'inégalité des Races Humaines*, A. C. Haddon's *Les Races Humaines* and Edward Pittard's *Les Races et l'Histoire* are striking. Atatürk espoused Pittard's views as regards the question of race, which considered race as a physical type of continuity setting natural dispositions connected to blood kinship, and the artificial classifications like nationality, language and tradition, not as an anthropological concept. The adulteration of the Turkish race through such means as mixed marriages was considered by Pittard as 'a few drops to a big vase' Therefore he refused Gobineau's assertion that Turkish blood was adulterated during Seljukî and Ottoman times.³²

In view of Pittard's conception of race and Mahmut Esat Bozkurt's observation regarding the racial/ethnicist character of Kemalist nationalism, one can say that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's discourse of race incorporated a duality which described race both as a set of physical attributes and a feature ascribed to peoples who share a common culture and language. In other words, in Atatürk's discourse, race expresses both physical attributes and the idea of national character.³³

Congress: Conferences, Discussion Minutes), 99-165; Şevket Aziz (Kansu), "Türklerin Antropolojisi"(The Anthropology of Turks), ibid., 271-278, and Sadri Maksudi Arsal, "Tarihin Amilleri"(The Agents of History), ibid., 339-364.

³²Turan, *Atatürk'ün Düşünce Yapısını Etkileyen Olaylar, Düşünürler, Kitaplar*, 46-47.

³³The same point is revealed by Necip Ali, a deputy from Denizli and a member of Atatürk's close circle, in his speech in Ankara Halkevi "Although we appreciate the great importance of race as regards *milli seciye* (national character) and *milli kudret* (national strength), in our conception of education and culture, we consider man as a social creature, and nationality as *hars birliği* (unity of culture)." See "Denizli Mebusu Necip Ali Beyin Ankara Halkevinde Söylediği Nutuk"(The Speech Delivered by Necip Ali Bey, Deputy from Denizli, at Ankara People's House), *Ayın Tarihi*, 3(March 1934), 24-25.

How can the racial/ethnicist aspect of Kemalist nationalism be identified? As discussed before, the RPP's programmes do not mention race among the components of Turkish national identity. In his definition of nation, however, Atatürk cites "the unity of race and origin" among the natural and historical elements contributing to the formation of Turkish nation.³⁴

The supporters of racist movement in Turkey argued that Kemalist nationalism is racist by drawing upon the literal reading of the various speeches of Atatürk. They claimed that racism in the sense of linking the causes of social events to anthropological foundations could be discerned in Atatürk's six-day Speech of 1927 (*Nutuk*), which declared that "The Turkish Youth!... The strength that you will need for this is mighty in the blood which flows in your veins".³⁵ The prevention of the entry of those who are not of Turkish stock into the military schools in the 1930s constitutes the apparent manifestation of the Kemalist racism in the

³⁴İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazılıları*, 371-372; Kocatürk, *Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri*, 183. Atatürk notes that race might be a secondary factor in the formation of other national identities. Ibid.

³⁵According to Karpat, the racists make use of such statements of Atatürk without due regard to its contextual background. Thus, the word "kan" (blood) Atatürk uses, in every day language denotes that one has good upbringing and comes from a good family. In his appeal to the youth, Atatürk tries to stir emotion and nourish their national pride and confidence. See Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 262-63. Karpat's interpretation seems to be too sympathetic with Kemalism and appears *ex post facto*, however. But, Karpat rightly points out that "At no stage did Turkey have a well-formed theory of racialism, except for German racialist ideas which penetrated the country in one way or another after 1935." Ibid.

sense of the exclusion of those who are not of Turkish stock from state positions, according to Turkish racists.³⁶

Atatürk's saying that "A Turk is worth the whole world" is considered by them a clear-cut example of the conception of the Turkish racial supremacy. For Turkish racists, it was Mustafa Kemal himself who claimed the Turkishness of many famous people whose origins are not certain, as revealed in Günaltay's paper presented in the First History Congress.³⁷ The emphasis on the high capability of Turkish people to form civilisation, a recurrent theme in the textbooks of the era, refers to the same idea of racial supremacy.³⁸

The position of Turkish racists cannot be said to be wholly unjustified. RPP's conferences as regards the importance of race and heredity, and many translated articles concerning eugenics in *Ülkü*, the publication organ of the *Ankara Halkevleri*, are the apparent examples

³⁶Yalçın Toker, *Milliyetçiliğin Yasal Kaynakları* (The Legal Sources of Nationalism)(Istanbul: Toker Yayınları, 1979), 383.

³⁷See Şemsettin Günaltay "İslam Medeniyetinde Türklerin Mevkii"(The Place of Turks in Islamic Civilisation), in *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi, Konferanslar, Müzakere Zabıtları* (Ankara, 1933), 289-306.

³⁸For these and many other arguments put forward by the adherents of the racist movement in Turkey, see Hocaoglu S. Ertürk, "İrkçi-Turancı Atatürk"(Racist-Turanist Atatürk) *Orkun* , No. 41, 13 July 1951, 3-5. The magazine *Orkun* , the publication organ of the racists in Turkey at the time makes an interesting addition to Ertürk's article by calling attention to the studies conducted about Turkish racial condition in the Atatürk era, including that by Afet İnan. Many of these studies were presented in the History Congresses. To cite a few example: Prof. Dr. Şevket Aziz Kansu, *Kız ve Erkek Çocukları Üzerinde Antropometrik Araştırmalar* (Anthropometrical Studies on Girls and Boys) (Ankara: Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Türk Antropolojisi ve Etnoloji Enstitüsü Neşriyatı, 1939); Şevket Aziz Kansu, *Anadolu'nun İrk Tarihi Üzerinde Antropolojik Bir Tetkik* (An Anthropological Study on the Race History of Anatolia) (Ankara: Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Türk Antropolojisi ve Etnoloji Enstitüsü Neşriyatı, 1939); Assoc. Dr. Nermin Aygen, *Türk Beyinleri Üzerinde ilk Antropolojik Araştırma* (First Anthropological Study on Turkish Brains) (Ankara: İdeal Basımevi, 1941).

of the impact of the theory of race on the Kemalist elites. In particular, the impact of the thesis of national eugenics was so powerful that many books, articles and scientific conferences were held in order to develop the national policies of eugenics with the aim of having an healthy and high quality Turkish population.³⁹

The 1938 *Law of Physical Education* is in some respects the policywise reflection of eugenics. In their papers presented in the First History Congress, Afet İnan, Fuat Köprülü and Şevket Aziz Kansu emphasised the beauty of Turkish race, an eugenic-based consideration.

³⁹See, for example, Prof. Dr. Ali Esat Birol, *Yedinci Milli Türk Tıp Kurultayı Öjenik Tatbikatı* (The Eugenical Practice of The Seventh National Turkish Medical Congress) (Ankara, 1938). Also see the following articles as illustration dealing with the issue of eugenics in the official periodical *Ayın Tarihi* (The History of the Month): "Oswald Spengler ve Hitler"(Oswald Spengler and Hitler), *Ayın Tarihi*, 1(January 1934), 305-309; and "Hitlerin Fransız Üstadı: Vacher de Lapoge"(The French Master of Hitler: Vacher de Lapoge), *Ibid.*, 309-310. Eugenics, i.e., the policies of the betterment of race aims at creating more perfect and superior human beings. The protection of the purity and strength of race through such policies as sterilisation, sexual intercourse between selective people and the discouraging of marriages with foreigners is the essential feature of eugenics. It should be remembered that eugenics was considered to be a science and those who had allegiance to science as the source of absolute truth, a naive premise of "rude" positivism, believed also in eugenics as a corollary of their belief in science as they conceived. Because a thing could not at the same time be scientifically true and ethically wrong. That is why Marxist socialists who considered themselves to represent the political wing of science were all ardent adherents of eugenics as a scientific fact, including Fabian socialists. This was true for Atatürk as well. Because he was a firm believer of science and biological materialism, and therefore could not remain outside the "scientific prescriptions" of eugenics. He observed, for example, that "Nature created human beings and have them to worship to itself." See "Havacılık Hakkında Konuşma," *Söylev ve Demeçler II* (The Speechs and Statements of Atatürk, II) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 3 May 1935, 322. Therefore, there could be no escape from the laws of nature, including those related to eugenics. For a good evaluation of eugenics, see Jonathan Freedland, "İrk İslahı Fikri Londra'da Doğu"(The Idea of Eugenics Emerged in London) trans. *Milliyet*, 24 September 1997. The original article is published in *Guardian* , 30 August 1997.

Accordingly, Mustafa Kemal's assertion that "Turkish race is the most beautiful race in the World", which pointed to the "noble beauty of Turkish race", and advising the protection of this beauty "in scientific manner" (*fenni tarzda*) upon the occasion of the selection of a Turkish girl, Keriman Halis, as the world's most beautiful girl also reflects the official espousal of eugenics.⁴⁰

6.4. Pseudo-Scientific Justification of "Humanist-Inclusionary Racism"

The discovery and development of national identity through the use of historical studies manifested both an anti-historicist, the consideration of the Ottoman past as a dark period, and historicist/scientific character by relegating history to the very ancient roots, "real" and "perceived."⁴¹ The Turkish history thesis, which evolved as the twin of the idea of nationalism, was aimed to be the most important means of forming Turkish national self-hood and a glorious ideal in the eyes of future generations.⁴²

⁴⁰"Keriman Halis'in Dünya Güzeli Seçilmesi"(The Selection of Keriman Halis as the world's Queen) *Söylev ve Demeçler III* (The Speechs and Statements of Atatürk, III) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 3 August 1932, 132-133. Özbudun argues that such statements of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is too "marginal" to conclude that Kemalist nationalism is racist. See Ergun Özbudun, "Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu"(The Question of Citizenship and Identity in the Official Documents of the National Struggle and the Republic), Unp. Paper (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1996), 14, footnote, 18. It is true that all this may not denote the existence of a systematic conception of racist nationalism; but it definitely denote the sporadic existence of racialism in the policies and discourse of Kemalist nationalism.

⁴¹Ersanlı-Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih* , 158.

⁴²Ibid., 89.

The main purpose of the history thesis was to disclose the pre-historical remnants of the Turks in Anatolia by using archaeological findings, and thus to reach the conclusion that Turks as a nation possessed a great civilisation. Turks were considered as the main race of humanity and the Adam and Eve of all the races worthy of note. To widespread this "scientific" belief by means of education and thus to identify the Turkish national self-respect with the pre-historical remnants of Turks in Anatolian lands confined nationalism both as a concept and a reality of the republic to Turks of Turkey.⁴³

As a matter of fact, what Mustafa Kemal and Kemalist bureaucratic-intellectual elites intended to do with the history thesis was to fill in the vacuum created by the denial of religion any part in the construction of the national identity. As Başar aptly observed, Atatürk wanted to strengthen nationalism with Turkism in order to remove the empty space left by religion in socio-political life.⁴⁴ According to Başar, the Turkism of Ghazi was not parochial and disintegrative but widening and inclusive. That is why he argued that Arabs, Syriacs, Kurds, and so on, are Turks that have forgotten their Turkishness due to miscellaneous events.⁴⁵

⁴³Ibid., 192-93.

⁴⁴Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Atatürk'le Üç Ay ve 1930'dan Sonra Türkiye* (Three Months with Atatürk and Turkey After 1930), 2nd ed. (Ankara: İktisadi Ticari İlimler Akademisi Yayınları, 1981), 113.

⁴⁵A paragraph underlined by Mustafa Kemal in Mustafa Celaleddin's *Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes* (1870) refers to the same point: "With some exceptions, all the Christian and Muslim population in Turkey are of Arian stock, and most of them, or nearly all of them are of Turkic origin." See Gürbüz Tüfekçi, *Atatürk'ün Okuduğu Kitaplar – Yabancı Dillerdeki Kitaplar*— (Books Read By Atatürk-Books in Foreign Languages) (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985), 264. Celaleddin's book rejected the idea that Turks are a non-civilised ethnies. Turks had a higher standard of life than that of Arabs at the time of Latin crusades. See Turan, *Atatürk'ün Düşünce Yapısı*, 25-27.

To bring the people together around a common idea, to save not only the materiality but also spirituality of the nation was an evident necessity. Ghazi attested the priority to this point and claimed the ancientness and strengthfullness of Turkism and Turkish history.

... For the tendency to unite the nation with the strength emanating from its self-hood and history, there is need for the knowledge of history. To be a glorious nation which is the builder of civilisations is an honourable thing. But we must avoid going extreme in this. When I expressed my doubt to Ghazi in an occasion in the travel, he warned me that 'the understanding which presents Turks to the World as a backward nation has entered among us as well. The Turks in the imperial time had the same conception by starting the history of an empire and nation from a nomadic tribe of four hundred tents.⁴⁶

In the first place we must teach the nation that she is a noble nation, that she is the children of a nation that are the mother of all civilisations.⁴⁷

The observations of Başar, an intellectual bureaucrat of the time, written after Mustafa Kemal's country-wide travel of 1930 for disclosing the general state of the nation in the wake of the closing down of the growing opposition party, *Serbest Fırka* (Free Party) well discerns the Kemalist drift toward ethnic nationalism. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk rejected the possibility that the Turkic character of Kemalist nationalism

⁴⁶This phrase is a key one explaining the underlying leitmotif the history thesis. Accordingly, "The present-day Turkish children who exposed their mind and conscious to the newest flashes of progress, know and would make known that they are a nation of high capability originated from a ten thousand year Arian, civilised supreme race, not from a tribe of four hundred tents(continuos cheers).

We must also know that the ancient Hitits, our fathers, are the first and autoctonous (native) inhabitants and owners of our present homeland. They have made this place a genuine land a thousand years ago. They carried the centres of Turkishness from Altays to Anatolia-Thrace. The unshakeable foundations of Turkish republic lies in the rocks of this genuine land (*öz yurt*). "Yılbaşı Gecesi Bir Konuşma" (A Speech in the New Year's Day), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 01. 01. 1933, 308. This is in fact a quotation from Afet inan, "Tarihten Evvel ve Tarihin Fecrinde" (In Pre-History and Dawn of History), in *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi, Konferanslar, Müzakere Zabıtları* (Ankara:T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, 1933), 41.

⁴⁷Başar, *Atatürk'le Üç Ay*, 114.

may "go extreme", i.e., pan-Turkism and made his goal clear, which is strictly territorial.⁴⁸

The rewriting of history "to enhance Turkishness and to minimise Ottoman and Islamic identity"⁴⁹ created the oppressive impact of an ethnic hegemony; but more importantly, it provided legitimacy for a conception of history confined with political power. Historians were considered as nation-builders during the Republic,⁵⁰ and therefore their political missions have always had priority to their scientific concerns.⁵¹

The intellectual roots of the Turkish history thesis goes back to the 19th century Turkism. Gökalp's writings incorporates the traces of the thesis. When it was spelled out for the first time in the press of one party

⁴⁸In fact, the first seeds of the history thesis emerged in 1928 when Afet (Inan), the adopted girl of Mustafa Kemal and an important contributor to the crystallisation of Kemalist nationalism, by showing to Mustafa Kemal a French book claiming that Turks belong to yellow (mongoloid) race and therefore are second class human beings, asked him, "Is that true?" Mustafa Kemal replied: "No, there can be no such thing, we must dwell upon this. You work!" See Afet İnan, "Atatürk ve Tarih Tezi" (Atatürk and the History Thesis), *Belleten*, vol. III, 1 April 1939, 243. Upon this directive, *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları* (The Main Lines of Turkish History) was written in 1930, which spelled out for the first time the Turkish history thesis. See Ersanlı-Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih*, 126. For the underlying causes of the drift to racial/ethnicist nationalism through the formulation of the pseudo-scientific Turkish history thesis, see Peyami Safa, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* (Glances at Turkish Revolution) (Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 1990), 209; Mahmut Goloğlu, *Tek Partili Cumhuriyet (1931-1938)* (One Party Republic) (Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınları, 1974), 69-70; and, "Ankara Tarih ve Dil Fakültesi Atatürk'ün Huzuru İle Dün Açıldı," (The Speech by the Ministry of Culture, Saffet Arıkan), *Cumhuriyet*, 10 January 1936.

⁴⁹Cizre-Sakallioğlu, "The Ideology and Politics of the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey," 143.

⁵⁰For the role of historians as nation builders, see Anthony D. Smith, "Nationalism and The Historians," in *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, ed. Anthony D. Smith (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), 58-80.

⁵¹Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih*, 13.

period by Yusuf Ziya Özer, the main premises of the later history thesis, it was ridiculed by the majority of the press writers, including M. Fuat Köprülü, a scholar of Turkology who actively involved in the studies of the Turkish history thesis later on.⁵²

The history thesis was the product of an "historical reconstruction." Its main premises were immuned against any serious criticism, as happened in the First History Congress. The criticism that may be levelled against it was considered as objection to the gods of era, i.e., science and nationalism. Therefore all the criticisms had to be "constructive" and in apologetical style.⁵³

The thesis incorporated all the essential premises of cultural pan-Turkism. The core argument was that peoples who have lived in Anatolia throughout history were of Turkish origin because Turks coming from the Central Asia were the first dwellers of Anatolia. Thus all the peoples of Anatolia, from Hittites to Romans were considered as the descendants of the first comers, i.e., Turks. The Turkification of Anatolian homeland throughout history thus served the purpose of rejecting any non-Turkish claim over Anatolia on the basis of "historical rights" Anatolia was Turkish from the time immemorial. The first settlers of Anatolia brought with them the essential techniques and innovations which gave birth to the present level of European civilisation. Therefore,

⁵²For the press discussions as regards the core formulation of the later history thesis, see Mete Tunçay, *T.C.'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923-1931*) (The Establishment of One Party State in Turkey, 1923-1931), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989), 302. The history thesis crystallised between 1929 and 1932. In order to officially publicise the Turkish history thesis, a congress was held in 2-11 July 1932 with the support of the Ministry of Education. For the Congress, see Goloğlu, *Tek Partili Cumhuriyet*, 1974, 67.

⁵³Ersanlı-Behar, *ibid.*, 122.

Turks were alleged to be a race with an high capability for civilisation, not a second class, mongoloid race.⁵⁴ The use of inclusionary racism as an integrative element and territorialism defined with the frontiers of the present Turkey were the two qualifying features of the thesis.⁵⁵

6.4.1. Turkish History Congresses and Inclusionary Racism

The First Turkish History Congress (2-11 July 1932) made apparent that the Kemalist leadership decided to base the national identity on racial elements, including the notion of language linked to race. Although Gobineau's theory of race was criticised, the studies of certain anthropologues, particularly those of Edward Pittard were considered as the saver of the Turkish national identity defined by racial/ethnic criteria. Pittard's anthropometry and studies of skull strengthened the distinction of brachycephalic and dolichcephalic races, the first representing the superior one. What the Turkish men of science did was to bring together pieces of the views of these anthropologues together to draw a "scientific" framework for the national history thesis.⁵⁶

All papers and conferences in the Congress dwelled upon the question of race as the determining factor of history and emphasised with an explorer's zeal the supremacy and distinction of Turkish race and its high capability of forming new civilisations. The features of Turkish race and the matters related to biological and spiritual heredity were particularly dealt with. Afet (Inan), for example, put forward the question

⁵⁴Ibid., 89, footnote 2. Also see Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver), *Günebakan* (The Sunflower) (Ankara: Türk Ocakları İlim ve Sanat Heyeti Neşriyatından, 1929), 192-194.

⁵⁵Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetimi*, 300.

⁵⁶Ersanlı-Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih*, 159-160.

"Who is the authochthonous (native) people of Anatolia?" in her paper "Tarihten Evvel ve Tarihin Fecrinde" (Before History and at the Dawn of History). She tried to refute the thesis that Turkish race is mongoloid and belongs to the category of yellow race. According to her, When Turkish race attained a high cultural level in its homeland, the peoples in Europe endured a thoroughly wild, ignorant life.⁵⁷ In their discussion of İnan's paper, both Şevket Aziz Kansu and M. Fuat Köprülü expressed their gratitude and lent emphasis on the beauty of Turkish race, free from any kind of ugliness.⁵⁸

The lengthy paper of Dr. Reşit Galip, the Secretary General of the Society for the Study of Turkish History, carried the title of "*Türk Irk ve Medeniyet Tarihine Umumi Bir Bakış*" (A General Look at the History of Turkish Race and Civilisation). In parallel to the İnan's paper, Galip tried to refute the European allegations about Turkish race. He described the racial features of a characteristic Turk as having long height, long-white face, flat or girdled nose, tidy lips, predominantly blue eyes and horizontal opening eyelids. With these features, the Turkish race is "one of the most beautiful examples of the white race".⁵⁹ His concluding remarks reflected the ardent zeal of an absolute believer in Turkish racial superiority, however culturalised it be:

Dear, distinguished teachers of universities, teacher schools and secondary schools! The truth is apparent in your and our opinions. Those who carry the Turkish blood ... can feel no doubt about this. Our cause is to make our truth the truth of all humanity. The

⁵⁷Afet (İnan), "Tarihten Evvel ve Tarihin Fecrinde," 41.

⁵⁸T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi. Konferanslar, Müzakere Zabıtları* (Ankara, 1933), 47.

⁵⁹Dr. Reşit Galip, "Türk Irk ve Medeniyet Tarihine Umumi Bir Bakış," (A General Look at The History of Turkish Race and Civilisation), in *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi. Konferanslar, Müzakere Zabıtları* (Ankara, 1933), 159.

lightnings of knowledge and enlightenment of yours and the international authorities of Turkish history that you would bring up would break into pieces the native and foreign clouds of bigotry raining tar into Turkish history for centuries. From *Ergenekon*⁶⁰ would emerge Turkish history. That will be the victory of not only our history but also that of the eternal 'truth'.⁶¹

The Turkish history thesis was rediscussed in the Second Turkish History Congress held in 20-25 September 1937. The majority of the participants composed of university professors. Unlike the first one, it was international. Archaeology, linguistic and anthropology were the main subjects of discussion. The time period to be studied was determined as the period of pre-history. The conception of "history of civilisation" was the underlying study approach. No discussion, however, occurred on the papers submitted. The Congress ended with the declaration of the confirmation of the conclusive truthness of the Turkish history thesis.⁶²

⁶⁰The legendary story of the appearance of *Kök Turks* in the scene of history.

⁶¹Dr. Reşit Galip, "Türk İrk ve Medeniyet Tarihine Umumi Bir Bakış," 161. Other papers submitted in the Congress basically dealt with the core premises of the Turkish history and language thesis. Among these are Samih Rifat, "Türkçe ve Diğer Lisanlar Arasında İrtibatlar"(Linkages Between Turkish and Other Languages), in *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi. Konferanslar, Müzakere Zabıtları*, 52-78; Hasan Cemil Bey, "Ege Medeniyetinin Menseine Umumi Bir Bakış"(A General Look at the Origin of the Aegean Civilisation), ibid., 199-214; Yusuf Ziya (Özer), "Mısır Din ve İlahlarının Türklikle Alakası"(The Connection of Egyptian Religion and Gods with Turkishness), ibid., 243-260; Dr. Şevket Aziz (Kansu), "Türklerin Antropolojisi"(The Anthoropology of Turks), ibid., 271-278; Prof. Şemsettin Günaltay, "İslam Medeniyetinde Türklerin Mevkii" (The Place of Turks in Islamic Civilisation), ibid., 289-306.

⁶²For the Second History Congress, see T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi. Kongrenin Çalışmaları ve Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler* (Second Turkish History Congresses: The Activities of the Congress and Papers Submitted in the Congress) (Istanbul, 1943).

Many papers presented in the Congress focused on Turkish race and genealogy. For example, Hasan Reşit Tankut, in his paper "Dil ve İrk Münasebetleri Hakkında" (On the Linkages Between Language and Race), linked language to race in order to draw Turkish language thesis from the history thesis. To Tankut, Turkic languages were the products of the Turkic races.⁶³

Dr. Nurettin Onur's paper, "*Kan Grupları Bakımından Türk Irkının Menşei Hakkında bir Etüd*"(A Study on the Origin of Turkish Race As Regards Blood Groups) suggested a new classification as regards the relation between races and blood groups. According to this classification, the distribution of O, A and B blood groups all over the World was as follows: 1) The percentage of blood group O was high among primitive ethnies living in the limited regions of the World without intermingling with other ethnies. Its percentage among American Indians was %91, and among Yukateks in Mexico %97. 2) The rate of blood group A increased from the middles of Asia toward Europe and reached %47 in Norway , %52 in Portugal , and %56 in Central Asia. 3) The percentage of the blood group B reaches its peak in India and Southern China: it is %28 in Indochina, and %40 in Birmania.⁶⁴

According to Onur, it can be assumed that in the primitive period of mankind when only Asia was populated, there were only two blood

⁶³Hasan Reşit Tankut, "Dil ve İrk Münasebetleri Hakkında," ibid., 223. Tankut was one of the regular participants of the Atatürk's renown Çankaya Sofrası(Dining Table of Çankaya) and the most important contributor to the Sun-Language Theory.

⁶⁴Dr. Nurettin Onur, "*Kan Grupları Bakımından Türk Irkının Menşei Hakkında Bir Etüd*" (A Study on the Origin of Turkish Race in Terms of Blood Groups), in *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi. Kongrenin Çalışmaları, Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler* (İstanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1943), 849.

groups, A and B. Those who lived in the North and inhabited Europe belonged to the group A while those who lived in the South called "Negro" belonged to the group B.⁶⁵ This meant that the original blood group of white race was A while that of coloured race was B. The present-day mixed races emerged through interminglings by such reasons as migrations over long periods of history. According to Onur's findings, the percentage of the blood group A among Turks was 46, revealing the dominance of this blood group among Turks. Conversely, the percentage of the blood group B among Turks was only 17.2, which showed the scarcity of this group among Turkish population. The percentage of the group A increases from Anatolia(%40) toward Thrace (%41) as was the case from Asia toward Europe. Onur's concluding remark was: "The Turkish race is the main root bringing the blood group A to Europe", a finding wholly coherent with the core premise of the Turkish history thesis.⁶⁶

Similarly, Eugene Pittard's paper, "Neolitik Devirde Küçük Asya ile Avrupa Arasında Antropolojik Münasebetler," (Anthropological Relations Between Asia Minor and Europe in the Neolithic Age) provided a pseudo-anthropological basis for the Turkish history thesis. Pittard asserted that Turks belonged to the brachycephalic Homo-Alpinus race who emigrated to Europe from Central Asia through the route of Bosphorus and Danube. It was these emigrants that taught European dwellers to seam wheat and to domesticate animals.⁶⁷

⁶⁵Ibid., 850.

⁶⁶Ibid., 851.

⁶⁷See Eugene Pittard, "Neolitik Devirde Küçük Asya ile Avrupa Arasında Antropolojik Münasebetler" (Anthropological Relations Between the Asia Minor and Europe in the Neolithic Age), *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi*, 65-84. Among other papers presented in the Congress

Atatürk attested great importance to the identification of the features of Turkish race but personally dwelled upon particularly such issues as national education, national culture, language and history with a racial/ethnic perspective.⁶⁸ In ideal terms, his racialism/ethnicism is

were Sadri Maksudi Arsal, "Beşeriyyet Tarihinde Devlet ve Hukuk Mefhumu ve Müesseselerinin İnkişafında Türk Irkının Rolü"(The Role of Turkish Race in the Development of the Concepts and Institutions of State and Law in Human History), *ibid.*, 1062-1093; İbrahim Necmi Dilmen, "Türk Tarih Tezinde Güneş-Dil Teorisinin Yeri ve Değeri"(The Place and Value of Sun-Language Theory in the Turkish History Thesis), *ibid.*, 85-98; Sadi Irmak, "Türk Irkının Biyolojisine Dair Araştırmalar: Kan Grupları ve Parmak İzleri" (Studies Concerning the Biology of Turkish Race: Blood Groups and Fingerprints), *ibid.*, 841-845. In his paper, Irmak relates blood groups with races and concludes that "According to the general state of the blood groups, there is resemblance between Turks and races called Northern type. Southern races exhibit an entirely different configuration." *Ibid.*, 844. Both in terms of fingerprints and blood groups, "our nation differs from southern and eastern Asian nations, and exhibits resemblance to the Northern type nations." *Ibid.*, 845. The paper of W. Koppers strikes attention with its title "Halk Bilgisi ve Cihanşümül Tarih Tetkiki Karşısında Öz Türkük ve Öz Indo-Germenlik"(Pure Turkishness and Pure Indo-Germaness in View of Folklore and World History Studies), *ibid.*, 645-665. It must be noted that all papers presented in the Congress were read by Atatürk beforehand and got his appreciation. See *ibid.*, xxxviii. Marguerite Dellenbach's paper, "Türklerin Antropolojik Tarihlerine Dair Vesikalar"(Documents As to the Anthropological History of Turks) defended the thesis that Turks belong to brachycephalic race. Şevket Aziz Kansu argued in his paper that in terms of racial features, past ethnies lived in Anatolia shows continuity and claimed that Turkish race has preserved its purity in Anatolia. According to Kansu, "Seljukis belonged to the Alpin subgroup of white race in terms of their physical features. Alpins who are of central Asian origin are proto-Turks." See, Şevket Aziz Kansu, "Selçuklu Türkleri Hakkında Antropolojik Bir İlk Tetkik ve Neticeleri" (A Preliminary Anthropological Study About Seljuk Turks and its Conclusions),*ibid.*, 440-456.

⁶⁸Atatürk's adherence to the racial/ethnic perspective is exemplified in his many speeches. The following is only a representative example: "One should not forget that however differ Balkan nations from one another in socio-political terms, they possess a common grandfather having the same blood and close lineage extending back to the Central Asia.

Human masses following one after another successively for thousands years via the northern and southern routes of the Black sea

defined by affection and confidence to one's race and lineage, i.e., racialisation/ethnicisation of culture in the wide/loose sense.

Despite the great support lent by the state to the Turkish history thesis, it proved short-lived. According to Behar, this was due to the prevalence of a revolutionary and impatient political climate, the non-use of primary resources when it was necessary, and the fact that the conceptual integrity of the thesis required a more comprehensive explanation. The history thesis did not have a consistent time continuum from the pre-history to the present. The manipulation and supervision of historiography by politicians, and the absence of scientific autonomy were the underlying causes of the pseudo-scientific character of the thesis.⁶⁹

6.4.2. Sun-Language Theory

Another aspect of the cooption of Pan-Turkist elements into Kemalist nationalism was the Turkification of language.⁷⁰ The Latinisation of the alphabet, Turkification of the language of prayer, including the call to prayer (*ezan*), and the expelling of the words of

like sea waves are in fact brother ethnies springing from the same cradle. In their veins circulates the same blood, though they carry different names.

As you see, the Balkan nations can be connected to one another with unbroken steel links of distant and deep past rather than the near past. We entered into a new humane period in which it would be indispensable and useful to revive the real ties which are made forgotten and diminished in the past due to all kinds of human greeds, religious differences, and cross traces caused by historical events." See "Balkan Konferansı Üyeleriyle Konuşma"(Talk with the Members of the Balkan Conference), *Söylen ve Demeçler II*, 25. 10. 1931, 272-73. To interpret the word "blood" here in non-biological sense appears to be a "forced" one.

⁶⁹Ersanlı-Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih*, 107.

⁷⁰For a short description of the Kemalist language reform, see Goloğlu, *Tek Partili Cumhuriyet*, 139-142.

Arabic and Persian origin from Turkish were the most important aspects of this reform, legitimised on the ground of the corollaries of "the national ideal".⁷¹ The Turkification of language was considered by the Kemalist elites as a matter of vital importance for the protection of the future of Turkish race.⁷²

As part of the process of "Turkification via Westernisation", a language congress was held in 23 September 1932, called the *First Language Congress*. In this Congress, a theory entitled the Sun-Language Theory was proposed which suggested that Turkish is the mother of all languages in the World as a corollary of the Turkish history thesis on the basis of pseudo-scientific findings. In the Third Language Congress held in August 1936, this theory was officially sanctified.⁷³ According to this theory, the first man worshipped the Sun. Therefore the first language should have originated from a main root related to the Sun. It views the Sun as the main root concept and attaches the emergence of all other concepts to that. Needless to say, this root language was proto-Turkish. All other languages are considered to be the derivatives of the primitive

⁷¹During the floor debates on the Law of Settlement (*İskan Kanunu*), Şeref Bey, a deputy from Edirne, declared that "The children of a nation whose history started with glory and who brought civilisation to the whole world cannot use the words of Arabs and Persians which have fixed and arrested us in the same place. Turkish nation have expelled these words, these languages, which intruded as far as our religion, our faith..." See *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, legislative period 4, session 1, vol. 23, 07. 06. 1934, 72. This image of "backward and ignorant Arabs and Persians" still dominate the perception of the Kemalist elites.

⁷²See Sadri Maksudi Bey (a deputy from Şebin Karahisar)'s speech in the same session referred to in the preceding footnote. *Ibid.*, 71.

⁷³For the Sun-Language Theory, see Prof. Hasan Reşit Tankut, "Dil ve İrk Münasebetleri Hakkında"(About the Relations Between Language and Race), in *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi. Kongrenin Tebliğleri, Kongreye Sunulan Çalışmalar* (İstanbul, 1943), 221-223.

root language. In accordance with such premises, many "scientific" articles were issued to show the Turkishness of Arabic, Persian, French, and so on, words.⁷⁴

This materialistically constructed language thesis had the same goal with the history thesis: to regain the national confidence and self-respect. The claim that all languages are the metamorphic versions of the root Turkish incorporated a tautological logic.⁷⁵ By Turkifying all languages, it ascribed Turkish the status of being the owner of all languages of civilisation including French and English, alongside Arabic and Persian.⁷⁶

The other basic component of the language reform alongside the Sun-Language Theory, the purification of Turkish through the derivation of new Turkish words to substitute for Arabic and Persian ones, was geared toward the goal of diminishing the language differences between elites and masses, and hence, contributing to the national integration. The removal of the Arabic-Persian words also provided for the elimination of the Ottoman-Islamic politico-cultural tradition.

⁷⁴See Prof. İbrahim Necmi Dilmen, "Türk Tarih Tezinde Güneş Dil Teorisinin Yeri ve Değeri,"(The Place and Importance of Sun-Language Theory in Turkish History Thesis), in *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi. Kongrenin Tebliğleri, Kongreye Sunulan Çalışmalar* (İstanbul:Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1943), 87. Ironically, this theory reversed the process of the purification of Turkish via the expelling of Arabic and Persian words in that many of such words were accepted to be Turkish for the sake of consistency.

⁷⁵For the Atatürk's views as to this subject, see Orhan Türkdoğan, *Atatürk'te Milli Devlet Anlayışı* (Atatürk's Nation-State Understanding) (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1981), 90-91.

⁷⁶The Sun-Language Theory served the claim that Turkish is a civilisation language like French, Arabic and English. See Atay, Çankaya *Atatürk 'ün Doğumundan Ölümüne Kadar* (Çankaya. From the Birth of Atatürk to His Death) (İstanbul, 1969), 468-69.

Overall, the Latinisation of the alphabet, the purification of language and the Sun-Language Theory formed the main contours of the language reform, considered to be a pillar of the new national identity, as Mustafa Kemal observed:

One of the very manifest attributes of a nation is language. A man who says that I am from Turkish nation, in the first place, should absolutely speak Turkish. It is not true to believe in a man's claim, who does not speak Turkish, that he/she is loyal to the Turkish culture and society.⁷⁷

6.5. The Leitmotif of National Character as Part of Kemalist Racialism

Contrary to Ernest Renan's renown definition that "a nation is a daily plebiscite", nation may also be defined through "national character". According to this approach, a nation is an ethnie possessing a common character particular to itself thanks to an high and unique culture. This character is transmitted from one generation to the next over a wide territory.⁷⁸ This view is wholly embodied in Kemalist nationalism.

The problem with this definition relates to the question of the existence of the so-called "national character" (*millî seciye*), an equivalent of the notion of the common will (*ma'seri vicdan*). Nevertheless, it proves useful in discerning the dual faces of national life, both as an ideal and a reality. According to the national character approach to the national identity, a nation can be free to the extent that it acts in accordance with its national character. The duty of national man is the realisation of national character in his/her life. The national allegiance assumes the meaning of

⁷⁷Kocatürk, *Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri*, 193.

⁷⁸Mehmet İzzet, *Milliyet Nazariyeleri ve Millî Hayat* (Theories of Nationalism and National Life), 3rd ed. (Istanbul: Ötüken Yayıncılık, 1981), 148.

the sentimental and practical affiliation and loyalty to the national character. Hence, national character is a thing which exists in relation to a nation and the national man. The nationalist endeavour aims to create it at individual level as well. The realisation of what is national occurs through the translation of what exists to what should exist, which accounts for the differences among nations.

The belief in the existence of national character was preached by the philosophers of law in the first half of the nineteenth century. To these philosophers, the legal-political institutions of every nation were the product of a unique national character common to all the members of a nation, and therefore cannot be received or imitated by another nation.⁷⁹ The presumption of the national character requires to answer many questions. In the first place, it is not the consequence of historical coincidences. It explains and therefore creates the history, living conditions and material-spiritual life of a nation.

The national character is thoroughly personal and subjective. It does not reflect the reality of national existence but demonstrates the fancies of national pride. Yet, it is usual to ascribe a nation such (generally positive) attributes as hospitality, heroism, compassion, modesty, self-sacrifice, and so on. However, such attributes are not particular to any nation, nor are they shared by every member of a nation. Moreover, they may not remain secular throughout history. The opinions of western travellers as regards the attributes of Ottoman "Turks" before and after nineteenth century are diametrically opposite to one another.⁸⁰ The differences between peoples of southern and northern parts of Italy are another graphic example. Contrary to the South's emotional, passionate

⁷⁹Ibid., 148.

⁸⁰Ibid., 157.

and dreamy character, the northerners are more prone to rationalism and positivism which shows that national unity and the unity of national character are two different things.

The national character thesis suggests that every nation reveals its own national character. Accordingly, every nation has the genius of its own, which constitutes its unity and strength. The breakdown of this genius leads to the demolition of a nation; its revitalisation causes its progress, a recurrent theme of the speeches of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

The national character approach explains national differences through differences of national character. Thus, a French is assumed to be fond of social life, friendly, revealing his/her inner feelings and easily motivated. He/She is brave, prone to criticism and irony and enjoys simple ideas. Despite his/her brevity, he/she is neither steadfast nor determined. An English, on the other hand, is believed to be seemingly indifferent, independent, original and possessing self-control. He/she trusts only his/her power and looks after his/her interest with determination. He/she pays importance to the substance rather than appearance of things. He/she likes comfort and lends importance to empirical observations instead of philosophical speculations. He/she is a utilitarian. In short, the characters of nations are held to be the real determiners of the material and spiritual products of their national life.⁸¹

As a matter of fact, the idea of national character has functioned as an instrument of national ambitions and political interests. For example, the Frenchs claimed that the inhabitants of Ren Lander were akin to "delicate Frenchs" rather than "rude Germans" in terms of their dispositions in order to legitimise their holding of the region.⁸²

⁸¹Ibid., 171.

⁸²Ibid., 160-61.

The question to be asked here is what are the distinguishing, immutable markers of national character if it is the predominant determiner of national history, the main basis of national feeling, and the essence of national differences? The perspective of the "average type" constitutes the mainstream view in this regard. According to this view, the character of a social group should be sought in the common attributes of individuals forming the group. There is a qualitative difference between a genius and an average man, however. If national character is the average of the attributes of the members of a nation, then the genius members must be left outside the scope of the national boundary of that nation. If a claim is put forward that nations reveal their genuine character through the geniuses it has, then the majority have to be sacrificed for the minority.

The national character is the product, not the cause of national life. If it was the motor force of history, it should not undergo any change and possess an uninterrupted continuity. Social conditions, customs and habits however, may overwhelm "this character". It is not proper to explain the life, history and ideal of a nation with the national character approach. We infer the constituent elements of national character from history as much as possible. Historical development is not the consequence of an hereditary national character. One cannot accept that enduring customs and ways of life, which history attests to their existence, each by itself can dominate the national life as the essential substance given the imperative of continuous changes and alterations.⁸³

Before dwelling upon the Kemalist conception of Turkish national character as part of the racial/ethnic character of Kemalist nationalism, it would be illuminating to have a short look at the conceptualisation of

⁸³Ibid., 165.

Turkish national character as having evolved since the nineteenth century. Taking national identity as the forming element of the process of nation-state building, Akçam identifies the features of Turkish national identity as follows:

1. The late development of Turkish national identity, and as a consequence, the aggressiveness caused by the urge closing the gap emerged;⁸⁴

2. A reaction against continuos degradation: The inner aspect of this degradation was the use of the word "Turk" in the pejorative sense of rude and ignorant nomad in the Ottoman polity. The Ottoman ruling class considered the use of the name "Turk" for themselves as an insult.⁸⁵ This pejorative use dominated the European historiography both in the middle and new ages. Turks were described as "barbarian and aggressive creatures" by the European travellers of the 19th century, which suggested the expelling of Turks from the civilised Europe.

This negative imagery of "Turk" in the Ottoman and European historiography led to the emergence of defensive Turkist literature, the pioneering study of which was Necip Asım's *Türk Tarihi* emphasising the great victories of Turks as well as their civilised capability. Young Turks inherited the same defensive mood. Likewise, one of the underlying leitmotif of the National Struggle was to present it as a reply to anti-Turkish biases. Hence Mustafa Kemal stated,

It is claimed that our nation in general is devoid of any capability. Therefore, whenever she entered places full of gardens, she turned

⁸⁴Taner Akçam, *Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu* (Turkish National Identity and the Armenian Question) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1992), 36-43.

⁸⁵Ibid., 43-46.

them into places full of ruins. The first claim ascribes cruelty to the nation; the second one , incapability. Both are sheer slander.⁸⁶

The accompanying themes of this reaction to degradation is the syndrome of being misunderstood and psychology of loneliness. ⁸⁷

3. Turks conceived as the nation created for ruling; ⁸⁸

4. The fear of perishing, the concern for survival (*beka*); ⁸⁹

5. Enmity felt against Christians; ⁹⁰

6. The feeling of revenge caused by the massacres of Muslims and losses of territory;⁹¹

7. The pressure felt owing to being left between a glorious past and degradation of the national-self; ⁹²

⁸⁶Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılap Tarihi* (Turkish Renovation History), vol. 2, part IV. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983), 329-330; quoted by Akçam, ibid., 49.

⁸⁷Ibid., 46-49.

⁸⁸Ibid., 51-54. The notion of Turkish nation as the dominant nation (*millet-i hakime*), which is also shared by Kemalist nationalism, is the reflection of this belief. For an overt statement of this idea, see Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Millet-i Hakime" (The Dominant Nation), *Tanin*, 25 October 1324(1908).

⁸⁹Ibid., 55-58.

⁹⁰Ibid., 58-68. This was mainly because of the joining of the Ottoman Armenian and Greek subjects to the War of Independence on the side of invasion forces against the National Forces (*Kuvay-i Milliye*)

⁹¹Ibid., 76. Mustafa Kemal expresses this feeling of nostalgia for the lost territories and people left there (*Evlad-i Fatihan*) in the 1931 as follows: "The emigrees are the national memories of our lost territories." Bilal Şimşir, *Rumeli'den Türk Geçişleri. Belgeler*, (Turkish Passages Through Rumelia. Documents), vol.1 (Ankara, 1970), cover page; quoted by Akçam, ibid., 77.

⁹²Ibid., 75.

8. Spiritual unity and togetherness against internal and external enemies.⁹³

Against this historical background of Turkish national identity, Kemalist conception of the idea of national character may better be located to its proper context.

National character, according to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, is the *sine qua non* of the set of elements forming the nation:

It is not adequate for a nation to posses sciences in order to acquire an honest entity and respectful position. It should own a property above all sciences and above everything. That property is the possession of a specific and positive national character. Individuals who do not have such a standing and nations consisting of such individuals can never constitute a genuine state. Such nations become den of mischief.⁹⁴

He is eager to claim that "the new state of Turkey has united all the characters of Turkishness, i.e., its vigorous, resolute, virtuous motives, in herself."⁹⁵

Atatürk reflects his belief in the hereditary national character of Turkishness when he refers to the "national genius" (*dehay-i milli*)⁹⁶

⁹³Ibid., 90-91. Living under the danger of continuos threat made the creation of common spiritual values and mood to keep nation in unity and coherence a continuos motif of the rhetoric of the ruling intelligentsia.

⁹⁴"Konya Gençleriyle Konuşma"(Talks with Konya Youth), *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II* (The Speech and Statements of Atatürk, I-II-III). Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 20 March 1923, 146. Atatürk points out that "the elevation of the national character, which our history inspires us, to the higher levels is one of the great aspirations we have pursued with enthusiasm." Kocatürk, *Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri*, 184.

⁹⁵"Tarsus'ta Gençlerle Konuşma" (Talk with the Young in Tarsus),*Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 18 March 1923, 137.

⁹⁶"Öğretmenlere" (To the Teachers),*Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 27 October 1922, 49.

and observes that " Turks are joyous and gay by birth."⁹⁷ His belief in the highness of Turkishness is very emphatic: "This nation is created to feel proud, not to be ashamed."⁹⁸ His "*Onuncu Yıl Nutku*" (Tenth Year Speech) is the concise expression of his views as to the nature of the Turkish national character:

The character of Turkish nation is high. ... It is our national ideal to develop the high character of our nation, her hard-workingness, her natural intelligence, her attachment to science, her love for fine arts, her feeling of national unity through nurturing them in continuos way and by every means and measures.⁹⁹

In the road leading to development, these features, i.e., the natural/national capabilities of Turkish nation, constituted the main instruments alongside positive sciences. The underlying basis of this rhetoric is structured by the premises of the theory of hereditary national character. It reflects the discourse of the league of "superior nation", apparently well beyond the limits of defensive mood of self-confidence. It tends more to the theme of comparative national supremacy. ¹⁰⁰

Atatürk's embracing of the theory of national character has sociobiological connotations in that he is of the opinion that social attributes may genetically be inherited:

The programme pursued by our party is etatist from the economic viewpoint. Because our nation is etatist by birth, she considers

⁹⁷"Türk Yazı İnkılabı Hakkında Konuşma" (Speech About Turkish Alphabet Change),*Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 9/10 August 1928, 273.

⁹⁸Ibid., 274.

⁹⁹"Onuncu Yıl Nutku" (The Tenth Year Speech), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 29 August 1933, 318.

¹⁰⁰Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürüün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku* (The Official Sources of Political Culture in Turkey: Kemalist One Party Ideology and the Six Arrows of RPP), vol.3 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), 172-174. "The forgotten great civic capability of the Turks" is a key conception of Kemalist modernisation project.

addressing her demands to the state as a right. In this regard, there is a full correspondence between natural dispositions of our nation and the programme of our party.¹⁰¹

A famous pan-Turkist, and later, an important Kemalist figure, Tekin Alp, considers the existence of the national character as a reality and views it as the differentiator of nations from one another: "Like the hair colour of bland or dark nations, all nations possess certain peculiar attributes the differentiating role of which cannot be denied, and it can be comprehended by everybody."¹⁰² According to him, "the national spirit (...) is more than the genius, the essence, even the culture of a nation. It cannot be touched by hands and cannot be explained with our present experience and knowledge. It is a thing which exists in the blood, or more correctly, in race."¹⁰³

The consideration of the existence of the national spirit as a genuine entity does not amount to the level of adopting racism, however. One may believe in the existence of the national spirit without acknowledging racial determinism.¹⁰⁴ The embracement of culture as the main determiner of nationality in Kemalist ideology, on the other hand, does not mean that a Turkish national spirit extending back to the Oğuz, considered to be the legendary *Adam* of the Turks, times does not exist. National spirit exists in the blood, and as long as it is not adulterated wholly, the remainings of the lives of fathers survive with it. But its

¹⁰¹"İzmir'de Fırka Kongresinde Konuşma" (Speech in the Party Congress in İzmir), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 27 January 1931, 295.

¹⁰²Tekin Alp, *Türk Ruhu* (Turkish Spirit) (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1944), 14.

¹⁰³Ibid., 25.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 25-26.

manifestations change in accordance with the impacts of environment, culture and education.¹⁰⁵

National spirit as a transcendental and instinctive entity crystallised over centuries expresses hereditary tendencies outside the will. The instinctive aspect independent of time, environment and education is the main dimension of Turkish national spirit.¹⁰⁶ To Tekin Alp, "although the new nationalism of Turkey is not a full reflection of the spirit of the fathers, it is an undoubted fact that nationalism as understood by Kemalism corresponds to the unconscious nationalism of the old Turks, which prescribed authority, discipline, and law and order (*töre* and *yasa*) as the leading instinctive tendencies, the epitomisation of which being the god-chief as the national symbol.¹⁰⁷ This atavism is well

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 27.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 28-29.

¹⁰⁷According to Tekin Alp, dynamism, self-sacrifice, heroism, respect to tradition, and the blood circulating in the veins are other hereditary Turkic features See ibid., 282-283. *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları*, (The Main Lines of Turkish History), the book which expressed the Turkish history thesis for the first time, states that "Turks do not like disorder; they want to establish law and order instead." See Ersanlı-Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih*, 105. According to the authors of the book , including Afet (İnan), "The Turkish nation has revealed and shown her power and capability for civilisationism and etatism for the past 50-60 centuries." Ibid., 106. Arsal gives us a "more complete" list of Turkic features: the power of obedience and command, power of security, feeling of legality and justice. According to him, the power of race to form state is the manifestation of a characteristic spiritual feature of Turkish individual. See Prof. Sadri Maksudi Arsal, "Beşeriyyet Tarihinde Devlet ve Hukuk Mefhumu ve Müesseselerinin İnkişafında Türk Irkının Rolü"(The Role of Turkish Race in the Development of the Concepts and Institutions of State and Law in Human History), *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi. Kongrenin Çalışmaları, Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler* (İstanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1943), 1078. For another official opinion considering the state formation as the natural capability of Turks, see Şemsettin Günaltay, *Tarih I* (History I) (Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti Yayınları, 1939), 29. The most passionate emphasis of this point with sociobiological implications is made by Karaosmanoğlu: "To form states is one of the most national

reflected in Mustafa Kemal's titles of "Atatürk," (Father of Turks) "Bozkurt," (Grey Wolf) and "Başbuğ" (Chief).

This conception of the national character theory led Atatürk to adopt the cultural continuity approach in his understanding of history in which he assumes that Turks inherited the attribute of state forming from their grand fathers. As a result, Turkish history is conceived as the cultural pattern of the Turkish national character. This sociobiological approach, i.e., genealogical method of inquiring history assumes to explain the present through the past.¹⁰⁸

6. 6. Kemalist Racialism/Ethnicism and "Outside Influences"

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk emphasises the uniqueness of Kemalist ideology by emphasising its distance to democracy, socialism and other ideologies and political systems on the ground that "We resemble ourselves!"¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, Kemalist nationalism is the product of the

functions of Turks. Just as termites builds their nest, bees make their beehive, so Turks establish state. This peculiarity of them is a God-given faculty, a second nature, an instinct." See Karaosmanoğlu, *Atatürk: Bir Tahlil Denemesi*, 69. For the ascription of the perceived attributes of the national character to the blood by İsmet İnönü, then the President, see "İsmet İnönü'nün Siyasal Bilgiler Okulunun 84'üncü Yıldönümü Münasebetiyle Siyasal Bilgiler Okulunda Yapılan Kutlama Töreninde Mülkiyelilere Yaptığı Konuşma," in Kadri Kemal Kop, comp., *Milli Şefin Söylev Demeç ve Mesajları* (The Speeches, Statements and Messages of the National Chief) (Ankara: Akay Kitabevi, 1945), 81. The speech is made in 04 December 1940.

¹⁰⁸Türkdoğan, *Atatürk'te Milli Devlet Anlayışı* , 110-111.

¹⁰⁹"Bakanlar Kurulunun Görev ve Yetkisini Belirten Kanun Teklifi Münasebetiyle" (On the Occasion of the Bill of Law Ascertaining the Duty and Power of the Council of Ministers), 1 December 1921, *Söylev ve Demeçler I* , 212. Parla describes the Kemalist ideology as a corporatism located between solidarism and Fascism. See Taha Parla, *Kemalizm, Ziya Gökalp ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılığı, 1989), 123. Kışlalı points to the fact that the Kemalist principles of laicism, nationalism and republicanism were borrowed from the 1789 French Revolution while the

post-war political environment. It emerged in the cannibalistic period of imperialism. It took the advantage of refraction within the blocks of imperialism: Germany, USSR vs France and Britain. Making use of the conflict between Soviet socialism and British capitalism, Kemalists registered a success in the game of shifting alliances through isolating the French and Italians from the British during the National Struggle and by getting political and economic support of the Soviets.¹¹⁰

Kemalist nationalism was part of the process of the breakdown of the multinational empires and the emergence of nation states in Europe. As one of the nationalist movements appeared after the First World War political geography of Europe composed of nearly entirely nation states, Kemalist nationalism could best be understood in relation to Italian and German nationalisms due to their common integral characters.

In the 1930s, the authoritarian Kemalist regime became well established. In the period 1933-1939 the RPP declared itself as the party of the state. All manifestations of opposition of every kind were suppressed. The 1937 constitutional amendments made the RPP's six arrows the underlying principles of the state. Although the traditional character of state-society relations, i.e., the elitist and paternalist grasp of society by state obtained in the Ottoman Empire continued, the Kemalist regime tried to give the image of being the architect of a radical transformation by qualifying the regime as based on national sovereignty. ¹¹¹

principles of Populism, revolutionarism and etatism were inspired by the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Thus Kemalism in fact is a synthesis of liberalism and socialism. See Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, *Atatürk'e Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz Hafifliği* (The Unbearable Lightness of Attacking Atatürk), 10th ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1996), 228-29.

¹¹⁰Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği. Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme* (Atatürk Nationalism: A Study Outside the Official Ideology) (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 1988), 15.

The nationalisms of Nazi and Fascist regimes formed a source of legitimacy for the one party regime.¹¹² The article 50 of the RPP's 1935 programme is the expression of the admiration for the Nazi political organisation:

The Turkish youth will be attached to a national organisation which would gather it around a clean morality, an high love of homeland and revolution. The branches of the youth organization, which will be created, in universities, schools, institutes, People's Houses, factories and organisations that use workers in aggregate and working and administration unions in accordance with above-mentioned purposes will be organised. The continuity would be taken into account in the physical and revolutionary education and sport affairs in the country.¹¹³

During the 1930s, the Republican elites combined conflicting attitudes in themselves: they adhered both the nineteenth century conception of naive positivism and German mysticism and state fetishism. Kohn states that Turkish nationalism as such assumed a fascist character, and by relieving itself from the constraints of parliament and democracy adopted itself to the course of European nation states.¹¹⁴

State capitalism instead of economic liberalism and an homogenising, authoritarian political regime instead of accommodationist political liberalism were the two key features of Nazism-Fascism adapted also by Kemalist nationalism, especially in the 1930s, which explains the

¹¹¹Ersanlı-Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih*, 161-163.

¹¹²Recep Peker's *Inkilap Tarihi Ders Notları* (Lecture Notes of Renovation History) (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1935); Tekin Alp's *Kemalism* (Istanbul, 1936); Şeref Aykut's *Kâmalizm* (Kemalism)(Istanbul, 1936) and Mahmut Esat Bozkurt's *Atatürk İhtilali* (Atatürk Revolution) (Istanbul, 1940) are inspired, to varying degrees, by Italian and German nationalisms of 1930s.

¹¹³*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı* (The Programme of the Republican People's Party) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935).

¹¹⁴Hans Kohn, *Türk Milliyetçiliği*, trans. (Istanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1944), 76.

well-known mottoes of the period, such as "one state," "one nation," "one culture," "one leader," "one doctrine," and "one party." Kemalist nationalism therefore was not born into an empty space. As Karpat points out, the Republican People's Party (RPP)'s conception of social organisation was shaped under the influence of National Socialism.¹¹⁵ A parallel observation is put forward by a leading ideologue of the Kemalism, Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt):

A contemporary German historian suggests that 'national socialism and fascism are not things other than slightly different versions of the regime introduced by Mustafa Kemal,' which is true.¹¹⁶

Likewise, in terms of political history, Kemalist nationalism belongs to the group of revisionist states "unjustly treated" in their peace treaties after the First World War by the victorious allied powers. Nevertheless, there are important points of differentiation between Kemalist nationalism, Nazism and Fascism. In the first place, Kemalist state is the first national state emerged from a multinational empire that was not irredentist. It has evolved as an anti-imperialist nationalism contrary to other post-war nationalisms of imperialist type.

Unlike other nationalist regimes of bourgeois dictatorships, Kemalist nationalism aimed at nationhood through preventing the formation of a class-based society. Although it is a bourgeois revolution like other European nationalist regimes, it kept the bourgeoisie under

¹¹⁵Kemal Karpat,*Türk Demokrasi Tarihi* (History of Turkish Democracy) (Istanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996), 265.

¹¹⁶Bozkurt. *Atatürk İhtilali*, 137. In the opening ceremony of the central building of *Türk Ocakları* (the Turkish Hearts), Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, the president of the Turkish Hearts, emphasised the degree of the resemblance between Turkish revolution, i.e., Kemalism, and fascism before a "distinguished" audience including the Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, ministers, deputies and ambassadors. See *Türk Yurdu*, 4-24:29-223(May 1930), 10; cited by Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği*, 16.

the supervision of state intellectuals. The fact that it did not resort to the paramilitary means is another point of distinction. The control of the party in power by the state rather than vice versa makes Kemalism different, particularly from Nazism.¹¹⁷

6. 7. Ideologues of Ethnicist Conception of Kemalist Nationalism

The Turkish Revolution is defined by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a revolution which destroyed the institutions responsible for the Turkish nation to remain backward in the last centuries and to replace them with the new ones, which would secure the progress of the nation in accordance with the highest requirements of civilisation. According to him, the revolution is made through making the nation and social environment ready for it. The point to be noticed in revolutionary movement is to have human societies to embrace the novelties introduced after diagnosing their aspirations and ideas.¹¹⁸ He calls the 1922-38 period as the Turkish Revolution.¹¹⁹ In what follows, I am going to discern the racial character of the Kemalist revolution through the observations of its leading ideologues alongside the "chief ideologue",

¹¹⁷For an overall evaluation of the similarities and differences in theory and rhetoric as well as legal-institutional changes between Kemalist nationalism and Nazism-Fascism see Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği*, 16-19. Also see Walker Connor, "Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond," in Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 196-209. The comparison of Mussolini's approach to ethnic plurality with that of Atatürk might be particularly interesting.

¹¹⁸Afet İnan, *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ten Yazdıklarım* (What I Have Written Down From M. Kemal Atatürk) (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayımları, 1971), 35.

¹¹⁹Ibid, 119.

Atatürk, namely Recep Peker, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Afet İnan and Vasfi Raşid Seviğ.

In order to explain and indoctrinate the educated elites with the revolutionary teaching, *Courses of Renovation History* were introduced in the Istanbul and Ankara Universities in 1934. The courses were composed of four headings: **1. The military and internal (domestic) aspect of the revolution:** The lecturer of this aspect was Recep Peker, then the Secretary General of the RPP, presented as "one of the leading figures of the Ghazi's Revolution."¹²⁰ The course notes of Recep Peker was later published in 1935 under the title of "*Inkılâp Dersleri*".¹²¹ In these notes, Peker emphasised the purity of blood and race as an element of nationality; **2. The legal aspect of the revolution:** The lecturer was Mahmut Esat Bozkurt. The substantial portion of the legal aspect of the revolution had occurred during his Ministry of Justice. The course notes of Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, which dealt with the legal aspect of the Turkish Renovation was published in 1940 with the title of "*Atatürk İhtilali*".¹²² In these notes Bozkurt emerges as a ardent proponent of biological racism; **3. The foreign affairs aspect of the revolution:** The Lecturer was Hikmet Bayur, then the Ministry of Education which had spent long times in the Diplomatic Mission of the revolution; **4. The economic aspect of the revolution:** The lecturer was Yusuf Kemal Tengirşen, who had a strong affinity with the economic aspect of the revolution. The aim

¹²⁰See *Ayın Tarihi* (History of the Month), 4(April 1934), 71.

¹²¹See Recep Peker, *İnkılâp Dersleri* (The Renovation Lectures) (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1935. Reprint. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984).

¹²²See Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali*.

was to explore one of the greatest events of the history, the Turkish renovation.¹²³

Afet İnan, the third figure that I will study, is an historian and the most important contributor to the Turkish History Thesis.¹²⁴ She is the adapted child of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and one of the closest people to him and his ideas. She conducted a field research on the anthropological character of Turkish people with the encouragement of Mustafa Kemal and the support of State Statistics Institute. That is, she may be considered the most authentic source as regards the views of Mustafa Kemal.

Lastly, Vasfi Raşid Seviğ is chosen because he is the least noticed but one of the most important observer of Kemalist nationalism as a scholar of law. His *Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Hukuku* (The Constitutional Law) composed of lecture notes given in the High Institute of Police, reflects a striking evaluation and manifestation of the racial/ethnicist aspect of Kemalist nationalism.

The above-mentioned four political-academic people here would be taken as contributors to the racial/ethnic view of Kemalist nationalism.

¹²³Ibid.

¹²⁴Aktar's claim that Afet İnan's studies did not make an important contribution to the formation of the Turkish History Thesis is not a fair and "correct" judgement in that İnan is the main figure together with Atatürk in the first formulation of the basic premise of the Turkish History Thesis. The scientific value of her studies is not the issue of my consideration because the theory in question itself is a pseudo-scientific one. For Aktar's view, see Ayhan Aktar, "Trakya Yahudi Olaylarını 'Doğru' Yorumlamak"(To Interpret the Thrace Jewish Incidents 'Correctly') *Tarih ve Toplum*, 155(November 1996), 56, footnote 33.

6.7.1. Recep Peker (1888-1950)¹²⁵

Recep Peker held the office of the Secretary General of the Republican People's Party during the period of 1931-1936, one of the most important posts of the one-party regime. As such, he was empowered to speak on behalf of the permanent chief of the party, i.e., Mustafa Kemal.¹²⁶ He was one of the leading ideologues of the RPP and Kemalism, and the third member of the *Genbaşkur*,¹²⁷ the Body of General Presidency together with Atatürk, permanent chief, and vice president, İsmet İnönü, the top decision making organ of the RPP, during

¹²⁵As an Ottoman officer, Peker participated in the First World War and the War of Independence. His first official duty was the Secretary General of Turkish Grand National Assembly(TGNA). He was elected as deputy from Kütahya in the second legislative period of TGNA and was appointed as the Secretary General of the RPP. He was the Ministry of Interior in the cabinet of Fethi Okyar. He condemned the "soft" attitude of the Okyar's government toward the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925) and resigned. Subsequently, he became minister in various ministries. When he became the Secretary General of the RPP for the third time (1931-1936), he attempted to reorganise the party. He advocated the party-state identity and ensured the principles of revolutionarism and etatism to enter the RPP programme. He had a pioneering role in the introduction of the courses of History of Kemalist Renovation in universities and military schools. He became prime minister in 1946 but had to resign upon the reaction of the opposition (DP) and a group from his party due to his harsh way of governance. He died in 1950. For Peker, see Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, 318-322.

¹²⁶The second article of the 1931 RPP Regulation reads: "The permanent general chief of the Republican People's Party is *Gazi Mustafa Kemal Hazretleri*, the founder of the Party." And the article 23 states that "The Secretary General fulfils his duty on behalf of the general chief." See *CHF Nizamnamesi ve Programı* (The Regulation and Programme of the Republican People's Party) (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1931), 3.

¹²⁷For the Body of General Presidency see Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, 429-446. As stated above, according to the art. 23 of Party Regulation, the Secretary General fulfils his duty on behalf of the General President. Art. 22 points out that the decisions of the Body of General Presidency (*Umumi Reislik Divanı/Genbaşkur*) are binding for the party members without any reserve and condition. See ibid., 431.

this period. He was the chief spokesman for the 1931 and 1935 party programmes, and a loyal representative of Kemalism. According to Parla, just as there can be no difference between Atatürk's views and RPP's programmes, so there can be no difference between Peker's program explanations and the letter of the ideology espoused in the RPP's programmes.¹²⁸

Peker identifies three types of nationalism:

1. Territorial Nationalism: This type of nationalism, the graphic example of which being French nationalism, is inclusive of all citizens equal to one another. Nationality is identified with citizenship. History, race and blood are not included among the factors determining nationality.¹²⁹

2. Race and Blood Nationalism: It is racist and irredentist. The graphic example is Nazi Germany. Racist nationalism does not accept to recognise the same rights, dignity and culture for the minorities who are not from the same blood. No one can be German unless he/she carries German blood.¹³⁰

3. Antisemitism: It is related to some extent to blood nationalism.¹³¹

In his explanation of the principle of nationalism as embodied in the 1931 RPP programme, Peker refers to nationalism as the most important mainstay of Turkey for progress and permanence and lends emphasis to its humanitarian, co-operative face by rejecting national ego-centrism. Although internationally-oriented movements, particularly

¹²⁸Parla, *Kemalist Tek Parti*, 150.

¹²⁹Peker, *İnkılâp Dersleri*, 73.

¹³⁰Ibid., 74.

¹³¹Ibid.

communism, were definitely rejected, this was only for the preservation of the special identity of the nation. The insertion of the principle of nationalism into the part concerning workers reflects this avoidance. The emphasis put on indoctrination through national history relates to the same purpose.¹³²

According to Peker, as embodied in the definition of nationalism adopted in the programme, Turkish nationalism is politico-legal and absolutely territorial. Outside Turks only is a matter of affectional interest for us. The kinship of blood and history that we share with them is outside the scope of our political concerns, because our nationalism covers only people who share the same political destiny. By referring to unity in language, culture and ideal in the definition, Peker points out that unity in culture expresses attachment to a common past and sharing rich and common memoirs of history. In addition, to have a sincere will and desire for living together form the aspects of ideal.¹³³

When this definition applied to the present state of Turkish nation, Peker notes that he considers those citizens who have become subject to such inculcations as Kurd, Cirsassian, even Laze and Pomak, included within the socio-political community of Turkish nation. He views this state as a remnant of the past periods of dark oppression, and a consequence of long historical transformations. It is the duty of the party and state to settle this state of affairs from the viewpoint of the idea of pure nationality because the scientific facts of the day indicated that communities of five-ten thousands, a few hundred thousands, and even

¹³²Recep Peker, *CHF Programının İzahı Mevzuu Üzerinde Bir Konferans* (A Conference on the Explanation of the RPP's Programme) (Ankara: Hakimiyet-i Milliye Matbaası, 1931); quoted by Parla, *Kemalist Tek Parti*, 107.

¹³³Ibid, 108.

one million cannot form a separate nationality. This is the renown liberal criterion of "national viability" which was a dominant idea in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century.¹³⁴

In his views as to other groups who have different ethnic origins (Kurds, Circassian, Laze, Pomak) Peker makes his ethnic understanding of nation and nationalism apparent. While politico-legal rights are recognised, differences of ethnic origin and hence ethnocultural plurality are rejected. In the first place, these appellations were considered as outside indoctrinations and therefore do not have any reality and legitimacy. As a matter of fact the definition of national culture leaves no space for ethnocultural differences because it espouses a monolithic identity of nation-people-culture-ethnie, which turns Turkish cultural nationalism into an exclusionary-monist ethnic Turkish nationalism. That is, hegemonic understanding of ethnic culture based on absolute unity and oneness prevails over the understanding of unity in variety.¹³⁵

As to the Christian and Jewish citizens, Peker points out that provided that they participate in the unity in language and ideal, the RPP would consider them as wholly Turkish. Thus, the RPP rejects both the policy of *umma* as well as the mentality of *reaya*. He also adds that this understanding is not the same with the artificial manifestations of citizenship in the last years of the constitutional period. That is, it is not limited only to citizenship in legal sense.¹³⁶ This statement is in fact the clear testimony of the wide discrepancy observed in the Kemalist era

¹³⁴Ibid, 110.

¹³⁵Parla, *Kemalist Tek Parti*, 119-120.

¹³⁶Ibid.

between what is said and what is done. As made apparent before, the Turkishness of non-Muslim minorities was limited to Turkishness in citizenship, i.e., "*kanun-i esasî Türkülügü*" as they call it.

Nationalism forms the spirit of the programme, and diffuses to its every part from instruction and education to capital and labour. It constitutes a total ideology for the RPP.¹³⁷ This understanding of nationalism as embodied in 1931 RPP programme and explained by Recep Peker seems to be wholly assimilationist, strictly territorial and against autarchy and chauvinism.

In his explanation of the principle of nationalism as embodied in 1935 RPP's programme, Peker dwells upon the necessity of turning nationalism into a principle of state not only that of party. Just as a non-republican Turkey cannot be conceived, so a non-nationalist Turkey cannot be thought. They are equally important for the security of the progressive way of life. He emphasises the integrative character of nationalism for Turkey against the insult of such ideologies as anarchism, Marxism, fascism, caliphatism and internationalism. The nationalist key to close the gates of Turkey to such ideologies and movements in order to protect the people of Turkey must be embraced by the state as well as the party. The nationalism for Peker must be the faith of both the party and the state.¹³⁸

¹³⁷Ibid, 111.

¹³⁸CHP Genel Sekreteri Recep Peker'in Söylevleri (The Speeches of the Secretary General of the RPP Recep Peker) (Ankara: Ulus Basimevi, 1935), 10; From the explanations of Peker's 1935 programme one can readily conclude that Kemalism was authoritarian in the sense of dominating the realm of politics and totalitarian in the sense of oppressively intervening in all social realms epitomised in the conception of "state as organised nation." "To be organised nationally," alongside state organisations, with the aim of strengthening the internal integrity, to be in the vicinity of the state in order to support it are the

According to Peker, "the bases of the regime of the nationalist Turkey have assumed the state of dogma in the programme of the Republican People's Party."¹³⁹ Peker does not clarify the origin of the principle of the Kemalist transformation defined by "renovation" and "independence" He refuses the Ottoman past and refers to Turkish history only by making reference to the "highness of Turkish nation in her blood" Thus he suggests an ahistorical nationalism. The paradoxical attitude of Peker which seems not to attest importance to blood nationalism while continuously emphasising the purity and highness of the blood of Turkish nation makes apparent that he considers the blood unity as an important element in the formation of nation. To him, within the stagnation in the last period of the Ottoman Empire,

...only one thing, the Turkish blood has remained clean among all those troubles. The western Turks have protected and maintained the purity of their blood within that debris. The highness of the Ottoman army which showed the world the example of brevity, despite the badness of the state administration, stemmed from the

main motifs emphasised by Peker. See Peker, *CHP Genel Sekreteri Recep Peker'in Söylevleri*, 18-19. The deification of Atatürk, -see for example the written document of respect to the "Great Chief" accepted at the end of the Third General Congress of the RPP in *CHF Üçüncü Büyüük Kongre Zabıtları* (10-18 May 1931) (The Minutes of the Third General Congress of the Republican People's Party) (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931), 283-284; the consideration of the elimination of socio-political, ideological and economic opposition as a national mission,-see Ersanlı-Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih*, 91; one party regime as the special form of political party system adopted to dictatorship- see Maurice Duverger, *Siyasi Partiler* (Political Parties), trans. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1974), 335; the conception of one party embracing all citizens within its cadre, either as a member or potential member,- see "Konya'da Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasında Bir Konuşma"(A Speech in Konya at the Republican People's Party), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 28 February 1931, 303; are all apparent manifestations of the totalitarian character of the Kemalist one party regime. Karaosmanoğlu well admits this: "Turkish Republic is a dynamic and totalitarian regime in spirit." See Karaosmanoğlu, *Atatürk :Bir Tahsil Denemesi*, 77.

¹³⁹Peker, *İnkılâp Dersleri*, 73.

highness in the blood of the "bay" (rich) Turkish nation which created these armies.¹⁴⁰

Among the factors that differentiate the English Revolution from the French one, Peker cites "the difference of blood between the two nations," among others.¹⁴¹ Likewise he cites the "condition of blood," among others, as a determining factor which could explain the rise of the Turkish nation out of the debris of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴²

In his article entitled "Uluslararası-Devletleşme,"(Nation and State Building)¹⁴³ which appeared in the German magazine *Europischer Revue* with the title of "Volke und Stat Werdung", he observes that I want the blood nationalism to leave aside. It is not necessary to be pro or against racist-irredentist nationalism in order to write what I want to say. Active and passive irredentism manifesting itself in the form of expansionism outside and purification inside is a matter of daily politics. The real question is the togetherness and integrity of those living within a frontier. We have swept out all essential elements breaking this togetherness in Turkey and removed them from our life out together with the type of state that had given birth to them. ¹⁴⁴

In this respect, "the boundaries of the conception of religion cannot exceed the skin of the body of citizens". Similarly, "class conflicts and class privileges are rejected" As regards the nation, he repeats the definition of the RPP programme and adds:

We consider the national integrity in the new sense as to be one and powerful from within... In order to secure this, we attest an

¹⁴⁰Ibid., 16.

¹⁴¹Ibid., 31.

¹⁴²Ibid., 56.

¹⁴³See Recep Peker, "Uluslararası-Devletleşme" (State-Building-Nation-Building), *Cumhuriyet*, 4-5 July 1936. The excerpts are taken from the part appeared in 4 July. In the time of the writing of the article Peker was no longer the Secretary General of the RPP.

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

essential place and importance to the racial quality, and especially to having dealt successfully with big difficulties in history, though educative and methodical working have an important role to play.¹⁴⁵

During the floor debates over the bill introducing the RPP's six arrows into the constitution, Peker again mentions active and passive manifestations of race/blood nationalism and differentiates Kemalist nationalism from it and other types of nationalism as it is defined in the principles of the RPP, which rejects all internationalist movements, be it communism or Nazism.¹⁴⁶ Peker's hesitant attitude as regards blood nationalism well reflects the shy racialism of Kemalist nationalism. They reject racism on the one hand, but fail to decline to make references to racial elements in the construction of Turkish national identity, on the other.

6. 7. 2. *Mahmut Esat Bozkurt*(1892-1943)¹⁴⁷

While Atatürk was alive, there emerged a need for an ideological doctrine, however pragmatic it might be. For that purpose, an "*İnkılap Enstitüsü*" (Institute of Renovation) was set up the duty of which was to

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ TBMM Zabit Cəridesi, period V, vol. 16, 66; also see Goloğlu, *Tek Partili Cumhuriyet (1931-38)*, 215.

¹⁴⁷ Mahmut Esat is a doctor of Law. He joined the National Struggle in the Kuşadası-Selçuk region and at the same time published fervent articles in the Ankara newspapers, particularly the official "*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*" (National Sovereignty). He became the deputy of İzmir in the First National Assembly. He was appointed as the Ministry of Economics at his very young age and assumed the post of Ministry of Justice in the second legislative period (1924). He had a pioneering place among those who contributed to the establishment of a new legal order. He was professor of law in Ankara Law Faculty and of History of Renovation in İstanbul University. He died in 21 December 1943. See "Mahmut Esat Bozkurt," *Türk Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 8 (Ankara: Maarif Basımevi, 1956), 10.

make a *doctrinaire* formulation of Kemalism.¹⁴⁸ Mahmut Esat Bozkurt was one of these formulators of *doctrinaire Kemalism*. His book "*Atatürk İhtilali*," (The Atatürk Revolution) is compiled from his lectures given upon the directive of Atatürk in this Institute. It is the first attempt to systematise Kemalism.

Atatürk İhtilali is particularly important in terms of the fact that the ideas embodied in the book were being approved by Atatürk.¹⁴⁹ According to Bozkurt, the doctrine of Kemalism is being formed through the reception of the best aspects of all doctrines. The centre of the gravity of this doctrine is National Socialism.¹⁵⁰ He does not consider Kemalism as a frozen, static doctrine, however. As Tanyol points out, Bozkurt is the first theoretician of Kemalism in this sense.¹⁵¹

According to Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, one of the regular visitors of Atatürk's Çankaya Dining Table (*Sofra*) and long-time Minister of Justice and professor of the History of Turkish Renovation,

If a revolution is done on behalf of a nation, it must be done by the genuine children of that nation and must remain in their hands. For example, the Turkish Revolution must stay in the hands of genuine Turks (*Öz-Türks*) with no reserve and condition.¹⁵²

This is because "The worst of Turks is better than the best of non-Turks. In the past, the ill-fortune of the Ottoman Empire in most cases resulted from the fact that it was ruled by non-Turks."¹⁵³

¹⁴⁸ Cahit Tanyol, "The Preface", in Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali*, 3.

¹⁴⁹Ibid., 4.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., 5.

¹⁵¹Ibid., 6.

¹⁵²Ibid., 215.

¹⁵³Ibid., 216.

By referring to the efforts of Bekir Sami (Kunduh) for a Circassian state in the Caucasia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ankara Government during the War of Independence as the representative of Ankara government in London Conference, Bozkurt asserts that, "we have to build Turkish independence. We must not refer the affairs of Turkish state to non-Turks. Only genuine Turks should manage the affairs of Turkish state."¹⁵⁴ "We would not trust in anyone other than Turks."¹⁵⁵

When he addressed his voters in Ödemiş in 1931, he explained why he is a member of the RPP by pointing out that

I am from the Republican People's Party. Because this party restored the position of Turkish nation, which is in essence "*efendi*" (master), with the things it has done so far. My idea and opinion is this, which both the friend and the enemy should listen to: The master of this country is Turks. The non-Turks have only one right in the Turkish homeland, which is to be servant, to be slave. We are in the most free country in the world. They call it Turkey.¹⁵⁶

Thus those who are not genuine Turks are implied to be Turks in citizenship only. Genuine Turks are considered to be Turks in language, culture, ideal and blood.

The term "*Öz-Türk*" (genuine Turk) is adopted by Atatürk too. In his speech to the artisans in Adana, for example, he elaborated the historical evolution of the Turkic character of Adana region and emphasised that the Turks are the "*sahib-i aslı*" (original owners) of this region. Therefore, he declared, "Armenians and so on, have no right over there. These fertile lands are the country of genuine Turks (*koyu ve öz Türk memleketi*)."¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴Ibid., 353.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., 354.

¹⁵⁶See "Mahmut Esat Bey'in Ödemiş Nutku" (The Ödemiş Speech of Mahmut Esat Bey), *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 19 September 1930, 3.

The racial elements in the discourse of Atatürk may have not negatively influenced the foreign policy of Turkey. As it is seen, to be Turkish in the Republican Turkey incorporated Turkish ethnic hegemony and homogeneity around ethnic Turkishness and the motif of the real owner of the country (*unsur-u aslı, sahib-i aslı*). This speech is the clear indication of the fact that only genuine Turks could make use of the blessings of this land, and others could do so only when they were assimilated into Turkishness, in terms of language, culture and ideal.

Mahmut Esat Bozkurt's opinion as regards the genuine Turkishness makes this hidden, racial/ethnic aspect of Kemalist nationalism apparent and certain. It is true that anti-semitism or a similar ideology or politics never dominated the Republican Turkey in official terms. Equally true is, however, that the decrease in the Christian population and the wave of the "Kurdish uprisings" were closely related with the exclusionary face of Kemalist nationalism in internal politics in ethnic terms. Despite exceptions which were connected with the party, state and capital, minorities were always seen as foreign elements not from us, and as "restricted citizens."¹⁵⁸

The use of the term "*öz-Türk*" by Atatürk is not coincidental or conjunctural. In 1936, he observes, for example, that "In this moment, the leading big question that makes our nation busy for night and day is the destiny of Iskenderun-Antakya and its neighbourhoods, the real owners of which are genuine Turks (*öz-Türk*)."¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷"Adana Esnaflarıyla Konuşma"(Talk with Adana Artisans), *Söylev ve Demeçler II*, 16 March 1923, 130. According to Mustafa Kemal, "This land was Turk in history, is Turk now, and would eternally remain so." Ibid. The fact that this speech was made in the predominantly religious period of the Kemalist nationalism shows that in different periods, different elements got predominantly determinant position while simultaneously involving other elements in secondary positions. In this regard, this study has a purely historical approach to the nature of Kemalist nationalism.

¹⁵⁸Parla, *Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi*, 207-209.

In his comparison of Kemalism with German National Socialism, Bozkurt argues that both are nationalist but German Nazism is racist while Kemalism is not racist. "Nevertheless" he asserts, "Atatürk said in his great Speech that 'do not believe in anyone other than the ones who carry your blood.' But this advice emerged in practice as unity in culture and language."¹⁶⁰ In addition, National Socialism is imperialist while Kemalist regime considers such tendencies as crime.¹⁶¹ For the Turkish revolution recognises the right of independence for all nations, and accept the principle of national self-determination.¹⁶² The nationalism of Kemalism prescribes the priority of Turkish nation to every thing. Islamic and humanitarian concerns could only follow the national concerns behind.¹⁶³

Last but not the least, according to Bozkurt, national socialism and fascism are the revised versions of the Kemalist regime.¹⁶⁴ Because, "Kemalism is an authoritarian democracy the roots of which lie in the people. The Turkish nation resembles a pyramid. At the bottom there is people, at the top a head springing from the people, which we call chief. The chief takes its authority from people. And democracy is not something other than this."¹⁶⁵

¹⁵⁹"Beşinci Dönem İkinci Toplanma Yılıını Açarken" (Opening the Second Meeting Year of the Fifth Period), *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 1 November 1936, 410.

¹⁶⁰Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali*, 300.

¹⁶¹Ibid.

¹⁶²Ibid., 299.

¹⁶³Ibid., 298.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., 137. Yet, Bozkurt rejects any similarity between Kemalist and fascist regimes because "fascism is a backward regime. It is the regime of the middle ages." See ibid., 301. This is a clear and sharp contradiction because he considers fascism to be a version of Kemalism as well.

6. 7. 3. Afet İnan (1908-1985)¹⁶⁶

According to Afet İnan, Atatürk did not adopt racism. He always avoided to inculcate the theory of superior race. He only wanted to identify the factual situation when he demanded the determination of the racial attributes of Turkish nation via scientific methods. He considered all nations worth of respect. Nevertheless, he had the goal of the recognition of the real worth of the nation to which he belongs. This policy was called the national policy (*milli siyaset*).¹⁶⁷

Taking the question of "what are the morphological and descriptive attributes of the present Anatolian people?" as the starting point, in her study *Türkiye Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri ve Türkiye Tarihi*, İnan presents her "findings" as regards the short history of Turkey and Turkish race and tries to identify the racial attributes of the Turkish nation through anthropological approach. In order to confirm the claim

¹⁶⁵Ibid. These observations are clear manifestations of what Parla calls the circular logic equating the chief with the nation and the nation with the chief, remembering the Rousseau's equation of the general will with the will of the "wise legislator". For the concept of circular logic, see Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürüün Resmi Kaynakları: Atatürk'ün Nutku* (The Official Sources of Political Culture in Turkey: The Speech of Atatürk), vol.1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991).

¹⁶⁶Afet İnan was a professor of history and the adopted child of Mustafa Kemal. She was the first member of The Society for the Study of Turkish History and the author of pioneering works concerning the Turkish History Thesis. Her main concern was to reveal the continuity between Anatolian Peoples in racial terms and to prove their Turkishness as such. Her pioneering study in this regard was *Türkiye Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri ve Türkiye Tarihi (Recherches sur les caractères Anthropologiques des population de la Turquie)* (1939). *Türk İrkinin Ülkesi Olan Anadolu* (The Land of Turkish Race, Dear Anatolia) (1941); *Atatürk'ten Hatıralar* (Memoirs from Atatürk) (1950); *Atatürk Hakkında Hatıralar ve Belgeler* (Memoirs and Documents About Atatürk) are among her other studies. See *Türk Ansiklopedisi* (Turkish Encyclopaedia), vol. 20 (Ankara: MEB Basimevi, 1972), 121.

¹⁶⁷İnan, M. Kemal Atatürk'ten Yazlıklarım , 112.

that the Turkish nation is the autoctonous people of Anatolian homeland (*unsur-u aslı*) and its real owner (*sahib-i aslı*), the determination of the racial continuity between peoples inhabiting Anatolia under different names throughout history and presently is considered to be the principal task.¹⁶⁸

This study was conducted upon the directive of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.¹⁶⁹ It was a big field research covering 64.000 subjects in Anatolia and Thrace. Every index included 38 registers. In sum, there was 2,432,000 registers. These indexes were pertaining to the descriptions of height, indices of skeleton, head and nose, and attributes related to the shapes of skin, hairs, eyes, nose and head profile.

The starting point of İnan's thesis was to demonstrate that the brachisephalic European man, considered to be the founder of the European civilisation, came to Europe from Central Asia through the route of Anatolia. This man introduced Europe the cultivation of the land and domestication of animals in the Neolithic period. The provisions and domesticated animals he used show that this brachisephalic man who radically transformed Europe came from central-western Asia in the beginning of the Neolithic age. Without him, the Europe could not pass from the period of nomadic hunting to that of farming. This anthropological, morphological and descriptive similarities

¹⁶⁸Afet İnan, *Türkiye Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri ve Türkiye Tarihi: Türk İrkinin Vatani Anadolu (64.000 Kişi Üzerinde Anket)* [A Study on the Anthropological Characteristics of Turkish People and History of Turkey: The Homeland of Turkish Race, Anatolia(Survey Covering 64. 000 People)] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1947), preface.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., 9.

between this man and people lived in Anatolia throughout history demonstrate that both belong to the brachisephalic Arian race.¹⁷⁰

The interest of Atatürk to archaeological and anthropological studies aiming to reveal the above-mentioned connection is described by the Swiss anthropologue Edward Pittard as follows: "The strong desire of Atatürk for better recognition of the origin of the Turkish nation to the extent it is possible encouraged the chief of the nation to be involved in ethnic and racial questions".¹⁷¹ İnan points out that Atatürk did not consider such anthropological studies only from the racial viewpoint, however. He also took into consideration the benefit of schools, factories, army and sports to be derived from these studies. Thus, for example, schoolboys would sit down in classrooms according to their size of skeleton, not to the size of their height, and sport teams be organised in accordance with anthropological rationality. The military divisions would be determined in the form of natural groups to maximise the productivity of soldiers through reducing wasted energy.¹⁷²

The real inspiration behind İnan's this study is her reaction to the books of geography and history which considered the Turkish race among the yellow race, not because she deemed it inferior but because he did not believe it to be true.¹⁷³ In order to show the high position of the Turkish race in the history, with the encouragement of Atatürk and the support of the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü (1931) and later Celal Bayar (1937), she

¹⁷⁰Ibid., 7-9.

¹⁷¹Ibid., 10.

¹⁷²Ibid.

¹⁷³Ibid., 67.

conducted such a large field survey in 1937.¹⁷⁴ According to İnan, "this survey is one of the great works of the Atatürk period."¹⁷⁵

Hesitating about if race is a physical feature or an attribute ascribed to people who have a common culture and language in her paper submitted in the First Turkish History Congress,¹⁷⁶ İnan later concluded that a race is a human grouping came into existence with the overlapping of physical similarities and blood unity.¹⁷⁷ Every man is under the impact of his distant grandfathers, i.e., his race, not only the hereditary influence of his parents. Human societies live under the guidance of their racial characters. Racial attributes denote the hereditary attributes in an human society. Nevertheless, customs and spiritual factors constitute the essence of a nation. It is this national spirit and unity that demonstrate the racial attributes during the course of history. A man is under the impact of certain ideas and feelings while he was born. This means the crystallisation of the spiritual power of that society. This state, although invisible, is in fact a powerful force guiding and governing that human group. Therefore, the study of psychological factors and the determination of anthropological characters which constitute the racial power make the positive explanations of civilisations in history possible, through examining the indexes of racial attributes over living and past skeletons, which İnan tried to do.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴Ibid., 69.

¹⁷⁵Ibid., 78.

¹⁷⁶Afet (İnan), "Tarihten Evvel ve Tarih Fecrinde" (In Pre-History and Dawn of History), 40-41.

¹⁷⁷Ibid., 62.

¹⁷⁸Ibid., 61.

In her survey, İnan tries to delineate by way of measurement and observation under which political names and what kind of cultures people inhabiting Anatolia has lived. Her conclusion is that the Turkish homeland was inhabited by a people coming from Central Asia in various periods and embracing the same racial attributes since the Bronze Age. The political appellations changed but the ethnic character, with minor differences, most of time remained the same.¹⁷⁹ The richness of historical monuments inherited from the grandfathers attest to the high position of ancestors in the field of civilisation.

The historical continuity in racial terms between peoples inhabiting Anatolia throughout history and in the present refers to the racial unity of Anatolia. Therefore such names as Kurd or Laze are used in İnan's study as denoting two Turkish tribal ethnies rather than referring to the existence of non-Turkish ethnies. Because it is assumed that there is complete racial unity in Turkey.¹⁸⁰

The racial attributes of the Turks are summarised by İnan as follows: Their height is longer than the average. They belong to the group of macro skeleton mostly. Majority is brachyseplatic and leptorrhinen. Their colours of eyes and hair are generally medium. The great majority as Turks belong to the white European race called *Homo-Alpinus*.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹Ibid., 56. Thus such ethnies as Hittites, Phrygians, Persians, Romans, Greeks, Seljukis and Ottomans inhabiting Anatolia in successive periods were all considered as Turkic peoples, separated from one another due to various political, economical and social reasons. According to İnan, this point, i.e., the fact that all these ethnies belong to the same race is very important because, by quoting Camille Jullien, "the question of race, however it is resolved, is the most important question of the history of nations." See ibid., 58.

¹⁸⁰Ibid., 181.

¹⁸¹For the racial attributes of Turks see İnan, ibid., 178-86.

The percentage of the brachycephalic types is the highest in the Central Anatolia and least in the Eastern Anatolia.¹⁸² The fact that Central Anatolia is the most homogeneous region in racial terms shows that this region is the racial center of Turkey. Other regions have been subject to more racial influences from outside. But even in western and eastern regions, the percentage of brachysephals is higher than that of dolichosephals, which is the evident proof of the fact that Turks have had a great capacity to assimilate. According to İnan, by choosing Ankara, a central Anatolian town, as the capital city of Turkey, as if Atatürk felt the racial unity in this region beforehand.¹⁸³

6. 7. 4. *Vasfi Raşid Seviğ (1887-1971)*¹⁸⁴

According to Vasfi Raşid Seviğ, The Turkish Revolution is a revolution of being proud of the Turkish race and history. The great things could be achieved by great nations, and for the Turks this was so even in the disintegration period of the Ottoman Empire. The World civilisations owe much to the Turks' achievements in the course of history. As Atatürk observed, of whom Seviğ claims that he sees everything truly, "A Turk is worth the world."¹⁸⁵ The exchange of

¹⁸²Ibid., 124; 127.

¹⁸³Ibid., 134.

¹⁸⁴Vasfi Raşid Seviğ is one of the leading jurists of the Kemalist era. He was elected deputy in 1930 and 1934 legislative periods. Among his works are *Ticaret Kanunu Şerhi* (An Explanation of Trade Law), 3 vols., 1934-36; *Devletler Hususi Hukuku* (International Private Law), 1937-42); *Askerî Adalet* (Military Justice), 2 vols., 1955-56. His lectures in the High Police Institute in 1938 which comprised his 2 volumes book *Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Hukuku* (The Constitutional Law) is one of the most important source in comprehending the racial-ethnicist character of Kemalist nationalism. For Seviğ, see *Türk Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 28 (Ankara: MEB Basimevi, 1980), 475.

population between Turkey and Greece(1923) and the voluntary abandonment of the rights by the minorities guaranteed in the Lausanne Treaty were decisive in securing racial and linguistic unity in Turkey, according to him.

Seviğ identifies the unity of people (*halk birliği*) and chiefship system as the fundamentals of the new Turkish political order. The unity of people constitutes the starting point of the political order. Every other element springs from the “unity of people” In this phrase there are two elements: 1. people; 2. unity.

1. People: It was not possible for Atatürk to consider the Anatolian people as a legal construct only. Separatist Kurds and rebellious Greeks and Armenians as well as Muslims who were pro-Sultan-Caliph could not be considered within the boundary of the people. Therefore, the concept of people could not be a legal one. What was the mainstay of the integrity of people in intellectual and moral unity, then? Since the term “united people” was the manifestation of the union in language, culture and ideal, it expressed in the first place who felt themselves Turk. After purification of people by the forced exchange of Greek orthodoxes who did not consider themselves Turk and were not considered by Muslim Turks so, Mustafa Kemal still kept the racial/ethnic elements as a legal concept because for Atatürk, the concept of legality did not form a separate thing from the racial concept. The alien elements living in Anatolia could gain a position within the concept of legality as equally important as the unity in race provided that they united their all aspirations with the Turks. Until the attainment of this level of completion, not to increase the number of minorities, i.e., those who

¹⁸⁵Vasfi Raşid Seviğ, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Esas Teşkilat Hukuku* (The Constitutional Law of the Turkish Republic), vol. 1 (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1930), 325-327.

considered themselves different from Turks in terms of language, culture and ideal, and for that purpose, to accept the demands of non-Muslims to acquire Turkish citizenship only in exceptional situations constitutes the basic idea of Turkish internal politics. In Germany and Italy however, even Christian Jews were not included within the unity of people.¹⁸⁶

According to Seviğ, people in Kemalism is a political unity defined around the unity in language, culture and ideal irregardless of religion and race. As a legal concept,¹⁸⁷ the will to form a common political entity is as important as the blood unity in constituting the unity of the people.¹⁸⁸ "We consider sufficient to feel sincere love with a deep feeling of fraternity and wish their prosperity and development."¹⁸⁹

2. Unity: This concept, added to that of people, expresses the making of people as a monolithic unity. Unlike Germany which considers race to be the basis of this unity, Kemalism justifies it on the Roussolian notion of the collective conscious (*ma'serî vicdan*). According to Atatürk, all societies absolutely have a collective conscious even if this has not been tangibly observed all the time, because it exists *de facto*.¹⁹⁰

The state of unity expresses two things: 1. the aggregation of the members of a nation; 2. the coalescence of members of a nation to form a monolithic existence. The first type of unity refers to the legal unity (*hukuk birligi*). This unity, as was the case in the late Ottoman periods, is a unity formed around laws by peoples of different languages, cultures

¹⁸⁶Ibid., 201-203.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., 4-5. (The concept of people in public law is not racial at all.) The Nazi Germany however, sees the people not of their race as the second class citizens.

¹⁸⁸Ibid., 204.

¹⁸⁹Turk Tarihini Tetkik Cemiyeti, *Tarih IV, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti* (History IV, The Turkish Republic) (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934), 183.

¹⁹⁰Seviğ, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Esas Teşkilat Hukuku*, 204.

and aspirations. The Ottoman nation as a legal entity did not exhibit a monolithic unity. It expressed only an aggregation of citizens, a legal unity. The concrete embodiment of this legal unity between the subjects of the Ottoman Empire was the participation into elections. But neither being citizen nor being voters do render people into a monolithic union; both are personal/individual states. It stems from the fact that the state is a legal person and hence nation consists of individuals called subject or citizen. The article 88 of the 1924 Constitution expresses the state of legal unity. In such nations individuals have priority against states in the capacity of being citizen.¹⁹¹

The second kind of unity is the unity of people (*halk birligi*). In this type of unity, individuals are coalesced into one another. Their thinking is not individually-oriented but socially oriented. Unity in aspiration encourages people to solidarity, co-operation, and hence forms an orderly integration. People have collective existence, devoid of individuality. They are geared toward the same ideal. This ideal is assumed to be penetrated into every individuals. The friendship in the shelter is the example of this type of unity. The partisans melting within the Republican People's Party, this political soldiership, is the example of the unity of people. Every person within the unity of people is the mainstay of the common aspirations of people.¹⁹²

What can bind the legal unity to the unity in people? Can a people possessing legal unity also acquire unity in people? If so, how? Does the unity in people require the racial and religious unity, or only either of them? The religious unity was the trade mark of the Ottoman Empire. Nationalism, i.e., unity in language, culture and ideal is the trade mark of

¹⁹¹Ibid., 205.

¹⁹²Ibid.

the Kemalist state. Seviğ acknowledges that great national causes remove the conflicts and differences and confers the appearance of unity in people to the society rallied around the national unity. All this, however, may necessitate the removal of democracy because democracy accepts differences of thought, belief and way of life which give rise to different political parties.¹⁹³

Difficult causes could be won only through unity in people. The unity in people was the first thing Mustafa Kemal tried to create during the National Struggle. The party-state identification put into force since 1936 is a step in the same direction. Germany could get rid of the chains of Versailles thanks to the strength it got through giving up the legal unity and making the unity in people the permanent state of German society.¹⁹⁴

Seviğ evaluates Atatürk's saying that "The mighty you need flows in the noble blood in your veins" as expressing the fact that Atatürk do not refer to genius or science but to the character and will as the source of power.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³Ibid., 206. Thus Seviğ quotes the sayings of Atatürk which puts emphasis on the notion of the collective national conscious: " The nation in any case would be successful if it pursues the common goal through common efforts." " What a nation need to have is the prevalence of the common will of the nation in its every member" " See Ibid.

¹⁹⁴Ibid., 207.

¹⁹⁵Ibid., 178-179. As regards to the unity in blood Atatürk asserts, "(Turkish nation) should not decline to well discern the essential substance in the blood, in the conscious of men whom she would bring up from among her breast and put into the ranks of government." *Nutuk II* (The Speech II) (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1984),124; ibid., 179.

İsmet İnönü, the longest time prime minister of the Kemalist era, makes similar emphasis on the motifs of race and blood: "In my opinion heroism is the first condition to be in the first rank among nations. Heroism originates from the mighty that blood possesses at birth." (Speech in Gaziantep Halkevi , 26 September 1932); "Friends, the Turkish nation in her capability of being ruler (domination) and her authority which is natural is one of the greatest nations that history and the present

6. 8. Concluding Reflections

"*Medenî Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazılıları*" (Civic Learnings and the Manuscripts of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk)¹⁹⁶ is a valuable source in terms of comprehending Atatürk's conception of nation and nationalism. Atatürk defines nation as "a political and social community composed of citizens tied to one another through language, culture and unity of ideal."¹⁹⁷ According to him, "the people of Turkey who founded the Republic of Turkey is called a Turkish nation."¹⁹⁸ Apparently, this definition excludes the Greek and Armenian minorities from the Turkish nation in that they were not among the co-founding peoples due to their armed collaboration with the occupying forces

world have ever seen. This capability is characteristics of Turkish nation." (Speech in Ankara Hukuk Fakültesi, 20 November 1932).

"In a period in which nations are very competitive and fierce, I repeat that we await from the friends who would be raised so as to rule the high and brilliant future of Turkey great services and very high attributes. You own these attributes, they are in your blood. For our nation is the greatest and most dignified nation." (Speech in Ankara Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1940). See Dr. Hikmet Tanyu, *Atatürk ve Türk Milliyetçiliği* (Atatürk and Turkish Nationalism) (Ankara: Orkun Yayınları, 1961), 46-47.

The Second Prime Minister of M. Kemal, Celal Bayar refers to the same point as follow: "Our great history demonstrates that our great nation has brought up the greatest men in every field of specialisation. This blood of capability is in our veins." See "I. Bayar Hükümetinin Programı(8.11.1937)Hükümetler ve Programları(1920-1960)" (Governments and Their Programmes, 1920-1960), vol. 1 (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1988), 79.

¹⁹⁶ Afet İnan, *Medenî Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazılıları* (Civics and the Handwritings of M. Kemal Atatürk) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1969). It was first appeared in 1930 and approved as a textbook for secondary schools. The book was written under the close scrutiny of Atatürk, and some parts were written by him, including section pertaining to nations and nationalism.

¹⁹⁷Ibid., 18.

¹⁹⁸Ibid.

against the National Forces comprised by the Muslim ethnies of Anatolia and Rumelia during the War of Independence.¹⁹⁹

In his description of the origin of the Turks, Mustafa Kemal made his conception of the Turkish nation as a super family clear by pointing out that the physical dissimilarities observed within the Turkish community resulted from the intermingling of Turks with peoples of the "old World." Therefore, there is nothing unusual in the non-resemblances of physical nature observed among the members of such a huge society; after all even the children of the same family may exhibit dissimilarities.²⁰⁰

The morality of Turks is more or less akin to one another. The place of morality in the formation of nations is fundamental. Mustafa Kemal's conception of morality is pragmatic and utilitarian.²⁰¹ Nationality is the criterion of what is moral. This morality is independent of and above individuals, and is the source of inspiration for the national man. As the expression of the common will (*ma'serî vicdan*), morality is holy as such and immanent in society, which is considered to be national deity. He rejects the unity of religion as a constituting element of Turkish

¹⁹⁹As Kohn observes, the secessionist nationalism of Anatolian-Rumelian Greeks was a major spark arousing the Turkish nationalism. See Kohn, *Türk Milliyetciliği*, trans. 46. In fact the de-Islamisation was the leitmotif of western Christian insult against the Ottoman Turkey. The Christian West never forgave the pushing back of the Crusades by Muslim Turks. See Salahi R. Sonyel, *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Publications, 1993), 343 and 434. Therefore, the major factor in the War of Independence was religious. Atatürk's aforementioned definition draws the boundaries of Turkishness, by definition, from the religious viewpoint. The republican and racial boundaries of Turkishness to be drawn later would reincorporate non-Muslim minorities into Turkishness

²⁰⁰Inan, *Medeni Bilgiler*, 19-20.

²⁰¹Ibid., 20.

nationality and blames Islam to cause the weakening of national ties due to its universalist character. The greatness of Turkish nation is independent of religion, according to him.²⁰²

The natural and historical elements influential in the formation of Turkish nation, according to Mustafa Kemal, are unity in political existence, language, homeland, race and origin as well as historical and moral affinity. But all these factors may not be obtained in the formation of other nations. Each nation has to be treated separately in this respect. For example, contemporary French and English nations are the product of cross-breeding of various races. There are peoples who reject territory as a determining factor of national formation.²⁰³

As regards the nature and boundary of Turkish national formation, Mustafa Kemal observes three concluding premises. 1. The existence of Turkish communities who share the same language, race and origin, and moral and historical affinity with the Turks of Turkey but live under different political units is only a painful memory for the Turkish nation; 2. Within the present political and social community of Turkish nation there are citizens and co-nationals who have been subject to the inculcations of the ideas of Kurdishness, Circassianism, even Laze and Bosnian. Such appellations which are the product of the oppressive periods of history, did inflict only sorrow to Turkish people except for a few enemy instrument and stupid reactionaries. Because the members of this nation, like the general Turkish community, possess the same past, history, morality and law; 3. No one can view non-Muslim citizens as

²⁰²Ibid., 21.

²⁰³Ibid., 22.

alien provided that they tie their fate and destiny to the Turkish nationality with their volition.²⁰⁴

Nation as a cultural community is basic to his definition,²⁰⁵ the unfolding of which incorporating the three component of Turkish identity. Thus Mustafa Kemal rejects pan-Turkism and the existence of Muslim ethnies other than Turks. He has the desire of coopting minorities into Turkishness with the use of a particular rhetoric of Turkish national character through assimilation.

Apart from his particular definition of Turkishness, Mustafa Kemal gives also a general definition of a nation as a community that has a rich heritage of memoirs, and the will regarding the maintenance of the preservation of the historical heritage possessed, and is sincere in the common desire and consensus for living together.²⁰⁶ In this definition, the unity of race and origin is ignored due to the fact that he considers it as a non-universal element. But this is true for the general definition. The unity of race and origin is a primary, not secondary, element of Turkishness.²⁰⁷

He defines the principle of nationality as involving the possession of a particular national character, inborn or acquired, constituting a unique national organism and distinct but parallel efforts among nations

²⁰⁴Ibid., 23.

²⁰⁵Ibid., 24.

²⁰⁶Ibid.

²⁰⁷Therefore, Özbudun's claim that Atatürk views race in secondary importance in the constitution of Turkish nation is without ground. See Ergun Özbudun, "Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu" (The Question of Citizenship and Identity in the Official Documents of the National Struggle and the Republic), Unpublished Paper (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1996), 9-10.

for national development.²⁰⁸ This definition overtly discards territorial expansionism but place emphasis on the inborn or acquired national character as the distinguishing marker of national self-hood.

It is evident that Kemalist racialism defining the Turks as a race of Central Asian origin cannot be reconciled with the religious and Republican definitions of Turkishness. Accordingly, from a purely theoretical viewpoint, someone who cannot prove his/her Central Asian origin cannot be accepted as Turk. Likewise, those who do not belong to the Muslims of Anatolia-Rumelia (religious criterion) or Turkish citizens who do not share the ideal of the Republic (republican criterion) cannot be considered Turk, although they are Turk according to the racial definition.

The main premises of the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism can be summarised as follows: The Turkish race is the superior race and the father of the present European civilisation. All civilisations in history are formed either directly or indirectly by the Turkish race, or the races who lived under Turkish domination and benefited from the supreme attributes of Turks. Language is the most vital feature of Turkish race. A genuine Turk necessarily speaks Turkish. The most distinguished example of the genuine Turkish race is Atatürk himself. During the presentation of his paper in the First History Congress (1932), Şevket Aziz (Kansu), a professor of anthropology, introduced to the Congress a blond parents and their son from the village of Bağlum located in the north of Ankara as the example of the genuine Turkish race and greeted *the Ghazi* with a great enthusiasm as the leader and concise embodiment of this perfect race.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁸Inan, *Medeni Bilgiler*, ibid.

A basic corollary of this summary is that all Turkish people is of Central Asian origin and therefore may be Turk in race as well as in terms of political ideal. It is evident that to consider all Anatolian ethnies as of Turkic origin do not have any scientific substance. In fact, Kemalist racialism is tautological and therefore in the final analysis nearly all peoples of the World are considered of Turkic origin, which makes Turkishness an empty and meaningless category. Ironically, however, if those Turks who speak Turkish and more loyal to Turkish customs are considered more Turkish, i.e., "öz Türk" (genuine/pure Turk) then the efforts to define the people of Turkey as one race fails. The very existence of race thesis denotes that Kemalist nationalism makes a distinction between Turkish citizens in terms of their ethnic origin, which can be expressed as "Everybody in Turkey is Turkish; but some is more Turkish."

According to Oran, there is "a fairly unstable and delicate boundary"²¹⁰ between Kemalist nationalism and racism. Although the Kemalist regime never became racist in a systematic sense, it is "nonsense" to argue that Atatürk was not involved in the racist climate dominating Turkey during the 1930.²¹¹

Similarly, Parla points out that there is a "dark" face of Kemalist nationalism in domestic politics alongside its politico-legal and humanitarian dimension. This darkness embodies ethnic hegemony of the large ethnies (ethnic Turks) and oneness and sameness in ethnic

²⁰⁹See Şevket Aziz (Kansu), "Türklerin Antropolojisi," in *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi*, 277-78. For an account of Turkish race theory, see Nişanyan, "Kemalist Düşüncede 'Türk Milleti' Kavramı," 135.

²¹⁰Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği*, 157.

²¹¹Ibid., 158.

terms. It also involves an exclusionary dimension as regards minorities in Turkey.²¹²

As regards the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism, Özbudun observes that a political discourse might undergo changes and embody internal contradictions due to changing political conditions. This also happened to Kemalist nationalist discourse. Therefore, in a period when all central and eastern European regimes, except Czhekoslovakia, dominated by the racist doctrine, the reducing of the impact of racism into sporadic manifestations must be seen as temporary and secondary deviations of Kemalist nationalism, the dominant aspect of which is its legal and cultural component. The question, therefore, is not the racism of Kemalist nationalism but the monolithic construction of Turkish culture which go much beyond the limits of citizenship and loyalty to state in that it does not let the recognition of subcultures and their legal protection.²¹³

Özbudun's perspective well grasps the gist of the question. Nevertheless, the fact that racialism did not form the mainstream orientation of Kemalist nationalism may not lead to the conclusion that the racial/ethnic character of Kemalist nationalism was a transient component only.

After all, exclusionary policies need not be justified on racial grounds. Although in the final analysis, Kemalist nationalism was assimilationist and hence inclusionary, the preconditions of assimilation in practice yielded to discriminatory policies. Kemalist policies as regards the "non-existent" Muslim ethnies and non-Muslim minorities, and

²¹²Parla, *Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi*, 207-211.

²¹³Özbudun, "Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu," 12.

racial-based state policies, which would form the subject of the following chapter, well exemplify this point.

CHAPTER VII

KEMALIST NATIONALISM IN ACTION: THE MAKING OF THE "UNITY IN PEOPLE"

7.1. Introduction

Conceiving the securing of unity in people as its mainstay, Kemalist nationalism used racial motives as the constitutive elements of Turkish national identity. Together with its already formed secular credentials, Kemalist nationalism took on the form of an all-out blueprint for both public and private "conduct" of life. In this conception of unity as oneness, there was no room left for the visibility of anything diverged from the national ideal. To make this national state of "one mind, one heart" complete, Kemalist nationalism had to resolve two essential questions of fundamental importance challenging its ethno-secular credentials of national identity:

1. The resolution of the question of the so-called "Şark"(East);
2. Turkification of minorities.

Before dwelling upon how Kemalist nationalism coped with these issues, however, to demonstrate the manifestations of Kemalist racialism/ethnicism in state policies is necessary in order to better comprehend the particular national logic behind the way it approached to the question of eradicating all distinctive symbols of non-Turkish elements, be it Muslim or non-Muslim.

7. 2. Racism/Ethnicism as a State Policy

Racism was an alien concept to the Muslim World. Racist practices of the West had no place in the Ottoman Empire. In the Republic, the same attitude was preserved to a great extent through the rejection of political pan-Turanism, which incorporated manifest racial elements. This anti-racist attitude did not undergo a radical change when the impact of Fascism and Nazism could become felt in Turkey in the 1930s.

Although racism did not become a systematic policy of state, it exerted important influences on various state policies. All these policies were mixed with Turkification policies, ostensibly, a counter position of racism. This paradoxical combination of racism and Turkification will be inquired below.

Already, the racial themes in the speeches of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk were revealed. Also, it was shown that the theory of race constituted the backbone of official History and Language Theses. Therefore, in what follows, various manifestations of sporadic racism as state policy will be searched out.

7.2.1. Racial Themes in Education

Racialism/ethnicism in the secular national education of the 1930s formed an important element of Kemalist nationalism.¹

¹Tunçay makes this judgement by drawing upon Richard E. Maynas' unpublished Ph.D. dissertation covering the curriculums of Turkish high schools in 1961. See Adras M. Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966) 221; cited by Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*(1923-1931) (The Establishment of One Party State in Turkey), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989), 238. Kazamias stresses the monolithic character of Kemalist nationalism in its way of coverage in education on the ground that "to criticise the national heroes, the Kemalist ideology and nationalism is considered to be the refutation of Turkey itself and as a thing akin to treason". Kazamias, *Ibid.*, 222; cited by Tunçay, *ibid.*, 238.

To begin with, charged by Mustafa Kemal with the task of working on Turkish history, Afet İnan, then an high school history teacher, endeavoured for the creation of a “civic” consciousness through the use of history, and hence, forge a new Turkish national identity², which led to the emergence of Turkish History Thesis based on “inclusionary racism”, i.e., the claiming of the Turkishness of all ethnies living in Turkey on racial grounds as the justification for the policies of Turkification.

Historiography was considered to be the most fertile ground for the use of nationalism as a base for political power. This can be followed through observing the transformations in the history textbooks of 1924-1932.

Used as a textbook in the third grade of secondary schools between 1924 and 1929, Hamid and Muhsin's *Türkiye Tarihi* had an Ottoman-centred view. It stated that Turks lived in tribes before they became Muslims, the counter thesis of the later History Thesis, which put forward that Turks had state organisations before Islam. It did not incline to racial-ethnic elements for inculcating Turkish nationalism.³

The rupture from this view occurred when *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları* (The Main Lines of Turkish History)⁴ appeared. This book was written by authors which later formed the member of *Türk Tarihini Tetkik Cemiyeti* (TTTC) (The Society for the Study of Turkish History) upon the directive of Mustafa Kemal. It was written with the view of using it as the history textbook in secondary schools but failed to be

²Büşra Ersanlı-Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih. Türkiye'de Resmi Tarih Tezinin Oluşumu*(1929-1937) [Power and History: The Formation of The Official History Thesis in Turkey (1929-1937)], 126-130.

³Ibid., 100-102.

⁴Afet (İnan) and et all. *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları* (The Main Lines of Turkish History) (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930).

registered so, because Mustafa Kemal did not consider it to be adequate for that purpose. The book embodied the core formulation of Turkish History Thesis as its main focus but did not have a systematic methodology. It assigned only 50 pages to the Ottoman history, while it assigned 100 pages to the Turkish roots of “non-Turkish” Anatolian civilisations. The purpose of the book was stated as to emphasise the greatness of Turks in the World history and to reveal the secrets of “Turkish genius and character” by showing that “the national development of Turks is bounded to the deep racial roots”.⁵ The book differed from the previous *Türkiye Tarihi* with its focus on the racial features of Turks. While the raise of Ottomans was explained with their affiliation with Turkishness, their breakdown was attached to their preference of Ottomanism to Turkishness. The establishment of a new state out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire was attested to the racial solidarity that the remaining Turks exhibited.⁶

The main formulation of the new conception of Turkish history came to the fore with the four volume book, *Tarih* (History).⁷ *Tarih* was prepared as a textbook for high schools. It was entirely based on the

⁵Ersanlı-Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih*, 105.

⁶Ibid., 102-107. The same theme repeated in the preface to the four volume history textbooks. See for example, "Birinci Basılışın Mukaddimesi" (Preface to the First Edition), *Tarih IV, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti* (History IV, Turkish Republic) (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934).

⁷1. Türk Tarihini Tetkik Cemiyeti (TTTC), *Tarih I (First Ages, Pre-history)* (Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti, 1931).
2. TTTC, *Tarih II (Middle Ages)* (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1933).
3. TTTC, *Tarih III (Ottoman Turkish History in New and Recent Ages)*, (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931).
4. TTTC, *Tarih IV (Turkish Republic)* (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934).

glorification of Turks as a "race" and emphasised that Turkish civilisation has been the mother of all other civilisations. What was important was the pre-Ottoman Turkish existence rather than the post-Islamic Ottoman times in the consolidation of the Turkish race throughout history. Thus, while the fourth volume dealing with the Turkish Republic, and other volumes included more than 400 pages each, the third volume covering Ottoman history was consisted of only 200 pages.

In History I, the study of human history is equated with the study of the racial and linguistic features of human societies. The underlying outlook as regards the universe, history and human societies were shaped by the basic premises of the Darwinian theory of evolution. While race was defined as a peculiarity owned by people of the same blood and resembling physical features,⁸ Eugene Pittard's classification of races according to the index of skull was preferred to Gobineau's taxonomy of races based on colour.⁹ Turkish was considered as the most important World language in the linguistic classification. It presented Turkish nation as a "supreme race". The following statements reflect the notion of the purity of Turkish race and its racial-cultural supremacy:

Turkish race, who has created the most important currents of the World, is a race who has protected its identity most. Nevertheless, she intermingled with other races in the countries and frontiers she conquered both in the periods of pre-history and history. But in most cases, the physical and manifest features of Turkish race remained unaltered, and hence the Turkish race has not lost her peculiarities.

....The Turkish race, who always exhibited a striking unity in history, is a big human community to be called nation (*budun*) today and was so in the past with her manifest physical features, common language and the culture transmitted with that language, and common historical memoirs. ¹⁰

⁸*Tarih I*, 18.

⁹*Ibid.*, 16-17.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 20.

On the contrary, Ottoman empire was presented as a “foreign state” which did not have any ties with Turks. A powerful pseudo-scientific link was established between the Turkish Republic and Central Asia while the Ottoman empire was considered to occupy no place in the history of Turkish nation. The core argument was that the historical successes of Turks were related to their practical and linguistic strength, and long-time tradition of state-forming. Racial features caused Chinese, Egyptian, Indians, Persians and Greeks to lag behind Turks due to the supreme cultural authority of Turks based on their solidarity around state, race and language.¹¹

The pseudo-scientific inquiries about Turkish history did not remain limited to history textbooks. It was reflected in other textbooks, including biology. In secondary school textbook of *Biyoloji ve İnsan Hayatı* (Biology and Human Life),¹² science of eugenics dealing with the racial improvement of human populations was assigned a separate title. The title of 182nd topic was “*Irk İslahi*” (the improvement of race). It began with the observation that “the idea of the improvement of race is a very old one” and defined it as “the science of studying factors that have the peculiarity of improving or degenerating the racial attributes of future generations in physical and spiritual terms, which are under social control.”¹³

¹¹Ersanlı-Behar, *ibid.*, 111.

¹²*Biyoloji ve İnsan Hayatı II* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934). The book is the translation of Benjamin G. Gruenberg’s *Biology and Human Life*. The 23rd section entitled “*İnsanlar ve Arz*” (Men and the Earth) that I refer to here is not included in the original and was added to it in the Turkish translation.

¹³*Ibid.*, 316. This definition is in fact belong to the founder of the eugenics, Francis Galton.

While it treated the heredity in human attributes under four genealogical trees,¹⁴ it emphasised the hereditary nature of "good descent" (*iyi soy*): "Valuable attributes and features in family are transmitted from generation to generation. When the genealogical trees of peoples who have distinguished positions in society thanks to their high virtues are studied, it is seen that these virtues are shared by many members of that family. Some families conferred society with scholars, some with politicians, some with artists from generation to generation".¹⁵ Regarding the "bad descent" (*kötü soy*), it pointed out that "most criminal types are defected with an hereditary mental illness or brought up in bad environments."¹⁶

The segregation of people with hereditary illnesses from society and their sterilisation is considered as a desirable measure for an healthy society¹⁷, which is the most characteristic policy suggestion of science of eugenics. As regards the "control of the future," it stated:

The Turkish race of which we are proud to be a member has a distinguished position among the best, the healthiest, the most intelligent and the most capable races in the world. The duty of us all is to protect the essential attributes and virtues of Turkish race and to prove with our every manners that we are worthy of belonging to it. That is why it is one of our fundamental national duties to well protect ourselves, to avoid things harmful to our health, to make a principle of life for ourselves to live meritoriously in bodily and spiritually terms through applying biological information that we have learnt to our life. Because, the future of Turkey would depend on the Turkish generations of high value to be brought up in families to be formed in future by the young peoples living such a life today.¹⁸

¹⁴Ibid., 318.

¹⁵Ibid., 319.

¹⁶Ibid., 320

¹⁷Ibid., 321.

The book accepts the thesis that spiritual attributes and emotional tendencies are subject to heredity like bodily features as a scientifically acknowledged fact on the grounds that spiritual and emotional attributes are the product of bodily existence, a widely-held materialistic assumption.¹⁹

7. 2. 2. Use of Mythical-Legendary Motives in the Built-up of Turkish Ethnicity

Use of legendary symbols in the official discourse is another aspect of the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism. Mustafa Kemal's reference to *Ergenekon*, the Turkish legends of appearance (*türeyiş*) is a clear reflection of the culturalisation of Turkish ethnicity.²⁰ Likewise Mustafa Kemal was named *Bozkurt* (Grey Wolf) after a Turkish legendary figure. In the beginning, Bozkurt was seen as god by Turks. Parallel to socio-cultural evolution, Turks popularly believed that the great khan (*Hakan*)s were descended from the wolf. It was used as a symbol figure in the flag of *Kök-Türks*. Later it became a title given to the khans and commanders who saved the nation from dangers. Such legendary names

¹⁸Ibid., 321. Among the questions to be inquired as regards the subject of eugenics asked in the book, the question 9 is striking: "What are the high virtues of Turkish race? In terms of which virtues are the Turkish race superior to other nations?" Ibid., 323. For the eugenic manifestations in legislation, see, for example, *Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu* (Law of Physical Education), *TBMM Kavanın Mecmuası*, period 4, vol. 18, 1 November 1938, 1160-1164. For the floor debates of the same law, see *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, period 4, vol. 26, 29 June 1938, 484-492.

¹⁹Ibid., 318-19.

²⁰"The Turkish nation who would make use of railways will be proud of showcasing its first craftsmanship in its origin, the work of blacksmith's profession." See "Malatya'da Bir Konuşma" (A Speech in Malatya), *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II* (The Speech and Statements of Atatürk, II) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 15 February 1931, 301.

as *Kurt*, *Kurtbay*, *Bozkurt*, *Asena*, *Börteçine*, all meaning wolf, were coined for children. Atatürk readily accepted to be called Bozkurt.²¹ Beginning with 1922, the Bozkurt figure was used on the stamps.²² It was also used on the first side of Turkish money.²³

The emblem of *Millî Türk Talebe Birliği* (National Union of Turkish Students)²⁴ was grey wolf and crescent. Over the hats of university students there was the figure of grey wolf. In many official buildings there were pictures of grey wolf. In the entrance gate of Ankara railway station there were two big grey wolves emblem. On the four sides of the base of Atatürk's statute in *Ulus* public square there were relieves of the grey wolf head. Boyscout organisation of primary schools were called "yavrukurt" (the young wolf).²⁵ One of the marches of the time declared:

Bozkurtlara örnektir, dernektir gazimiz

Karanlıktan kurtulduk biz, aydınlığa azmimiz 26

²¹Tahsin Ünal, *Türklüğün Sembolü Bozkurt* (Grey Wolf: The Symbol of Turkishness) (Konya: Millî Ülkü Yayınları, 1977), 51-52.

²²*Türk Pulları Katalogu* (The Catalogue of Turkish Stamps) (Ankara: Pul Tüccarları Derneği, 1983), 9-14; Ünal, ibid., 95.

²³Ünal, *Türklüğün Sembolü Bozkurt* 97

²⁴The only association that kept its separate, though nominal, existence after 1931 with the conclusive establishment of one-party-state.

²⁵See "Bozkurt"(Grey Wolf), in *Yeni Türk Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 2, (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 1985), 483-485; *Türk Ansiklopedisi*, "Bozkurt", vol. 7 (Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti, 1956), 8-9.

²⁶"Bozkurt Marşı"(The March of Grey Wolf), in Ethem Üngör, *Türk Marşları* (Turkish Marches) (Ankara: Türk Kültürünu Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1965), 232. Marches were used as one of the main means of igniting popular emotions for goals conceived to be national in the Kemalist era. Many of them carried a strong emphasis on Turkish race. The following are some examples from the various marches of the period:

8.2.3. Racial Tendencies in Laws

7. 2.3.1. The 1934 Law of Family Names (Soyadı Kanunu)

Surnames point to the sense of kinship among members of a nation and therefore may be the principal marker of national identity. That is why, those who assume a new national identity often do that by changing their surname. As Connor observed, changes of surname may be forced on an ethnic minority as a means of assimilation because a surname can be a constant reminder that one's ancestry is distinct from that of the state's dominant group and that the consequent feeling of alienation can weaken the sense of loyalty to the state.²⁷

*"Yıldırımlar yaratan bir ırkın ahfadıyız
Tufanları gösteren tarihlerin yadiyiz."*

[*Harb Okulu Marşı*(The March of the War College) ,1928]

*Ne mutlu Türk yaratıldım. .
Türk demek cesaret, doğruluk demek.
Tarihe ün saldı adım
Türk doğdum, hür doğdum zafer bana gerek."*

[From the march "Ne Mutlu Türk Yaratıldım,"(What a Happiness that I was Created as a Turk] .

*Türk genciyiz ögünelim kanımızla
Ünümüze inanımızla
(...)
Biz dört yanı kaplayan bir çağlayanız
Oğuz hanın yüreğinde vuran kanız.
Yepyeni bir Ergenekon oldu yurtta
Varol dedi buna, Bozkurt da.*
([From "Gençlik Marşı"(The Youth March)]

*Türküz bütün başlardan üstün olan başlarız.
Tarihten önce vardık, tarihten sonra varız.
[From "Onuncu Yıl Marşı"(Tenth Year March)*

²⁷A recent case of this was offered by the Bulgarian government which insisted that all Turks and other Muslim groups within Bulgaria legally adopt Bulgarian surnames. See Walker Connor, "The Nation and Its Myth," In *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, ed., Anthony D. Smith (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), 52-53.

The statement of the reasons for the Bill of the Family Names (*Soyadı Kanunu Layihesi*) emphasised that surname is a marker of national identity and considered the existence of family names as a sign of civilisation.²⁸ During the floor debates, the most emphasised point was the consideration of family names as the conjuncture of Turkishness such that Ali Rıza Bey, a deputy from Kastamonu, asserted that "Our family name is Turk".²⁹ The subject in the text of the law was expressed with such phrases as "every Turkish citizen" in the motion of government, and "every Turk" in the modified text of the Interior and Justice commissions.³⁰

The Law made it compulsory for every Turk to have a family name and prohibited the use of surnames denoting to rank, official post, tribe and foreign race. The Regulation Concerning Family Names (*Soyadı Nizamnamesi*) issued by the Council of Ministers³¹ stipulated that surnames denoting another nationality such as *Arnavutoğlu*, *Kürdoğlu*, expressing affiliation with another nationality e.g., *Çerkes Hasanoğlu*, *Boşnak İbrahimoglu* cannot be used. Likewise, such foreign tags as "*yan, of, ef, viç, iç, is, dis, pulos, aki, zâde, mahdumu, veled* and *bin*" also are prohibited. Newly assumed surnames have to be taken from Turkish.³²

²⁸TBMM *Zabit Ceridesi*, vol. 23, Sequence No: 203.

²⁹Nuri Bey, the deputy who presented the bill, also argued that religion and race no longer exerted influence on family names. Turks in Russia were a case in point. *Ibid.*

³⁰TBMM *Zabit Ceridesi*, vol. 23, 16.06.1934, 202.

³¹"Soyadı Nizamnamesi" (The Regulation of the Family Names), *Resmi Gazete*, No: 2805, 20 December 1934.

³²See *ibid*, articles 5, 7, and 8. For the evolution of the bill of family names before and after its legislation, see Mahmut Goloğlu, *Tek Partili Cumhuriyet* (One Party Republic) (Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınları, 1974), 130-132.

The focus of the law was to strengthen the national integration through the eradication of differences reflected in the surnames, which claimed to be imaginary, not real.³³ As a matter of fact, against the view that those who want to carry the surnames of foreign races must let to do so in order to distinguish their real tendencies,³⁴ the Minister of Interior put emphasis on the importance of assimilation for securing national integration and called attention to the comprehensive assimilation capacity of the Turkish element.³⁵

7.2.3.2. *The 1938 Law of Physical Education (Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu)*

This law is an apparent embodiment of the official eugenic tendencies. It is devised for the regulation of games, gymnastics and sports activities which would secure the improvement of physical and moral capabilities of the citizens in accordance with national and revolutionary purposes under the total control of the state.³⁶

The article 3 of the law stipulated that it is compulsory for the young to join (sport) clubs and attend physical education in their spare times. It considered the "obligation of physical education" as a national duty like the military obligation. Accordingly, it prescribed that in villages, towns, cities and separate districts except schools and military garrisons, which

³³See the speech of Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of Interior, *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, vol. 23, 21 June 1934, 246.

³⁴See the speech of Refet Bey, a deputy from Bursa, on the article 3 of the Law of Family Names. *Ibid.*, 249.

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶See the first article of *Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu* (The Law of Physical Education), *TBMM Kavanin Mecmuasi*, vol. 18, 1 November 1938, 1160.

inhabit 50 and more people who are of the age of obligation of physical education, clubs; in places inhabiting fewer than 50, sport groups would be set up. Factories, commercial firms and other organisations who have more than 500 staff have to set up gymnastic halls, sport spaces, swimming pools, and so on, and hire expert teachers of physical education upon the suggestion of the General Directorate of Physical Education and the decision of the Council of Ministers. (Art. 21)

During the floor debates of the law, the Minister of the Interior, Sükrü Kaya, explained the rationale underlying the law. According to him, physical education is an essential pillar of national education. Its aim is to strengthen, to embellish body and prepare the youth for the life struggle. Nevertheless, he emphasised the importance of raising the young as beneficial both for their nations and for all humanity. As was the case in every other field, the republic has to take the physical education and sport under control and discipline.³⁷

In order not to be perished, we need to be powerful. And it was necessary for the state to govern this organisation (of physical education) to endure a firm and healthy life.³⁸

Kaya pointed out that

every regime has its own type of citizen. The man of Kemalist regime is a man donated with a beautiful body, firm thinking, brevity and dignity. He defends his rights everywhere. He is merry and serious. It is this that we look for. The aimed goal of physical education is intellectual, moral and character education.³⁹

He concludes his statement by blurring the line of distinction between public and private, a characteristic feature of one party rule: "We

³⁷TBMM *Zabit Ceridesi*, vol. 26, 29 June 1938, 484.

³⁸The speech of Dr. Osman Şevki Uludağ , a deputy from Konya, ibid., 487.

³⁹TBMM *Zabit Ceridesi*, vol. 26, 29 June 1938, 484.

want to see our people serious and dignified in their private as well as public life.”⁴⁰

7.3. Kemalist Nationalism and the So-called "Eastern Question"

Kemalist nationalism tried to form a national society through the ideological as well as power apparatuses of the national state. Yet, the success of the Kemalist ideological crusade to build the Turkish national identity through the history and language theses remained quite limited. This state of affairs made the use of the sheer military power unavoidable for national integration. This, in turn, proved to be counterproductive and gave rise to the emergence of ethnic protest movements, particularly Kurdish nationalism.

Kemalist centralising-unitarian nation and state making dealt an heavy blow to its goal of an ethnically homogeneous nation-state.⁴¹ Kemalist nationalism could not preempt the formation of a Kurdish national consciousness due to the continuos wave of rebellions and its inability to incorporate the Kurdish populated regions into the national market. The rigidity of the Kemalist ideological crusade, which envisaged nation in the image of ethnie, led to the denial of Kurdish collective identity. The reactions caused by the Law of Settlement (1934) enhanced the crystallisation of a class of Kurdish nationalist intellectuals, the main bearers of national movements in general.⁴²

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği. Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme* (Atatürk Nationalism: A Study Outside the Official Ideology). Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 1988), 175.

⁴²Ibid., 172-73.

In the wake of the War of Independence, the new Turkey incorporated three major Muslim ethnic elements: Kurds, Circassians and Lazes. Circassians and Lazes, distinct from each other in ethnic origin and language, readily integrated with the larger Turkish community and the national market by relegating voluntarily their ethnic identity into the private realm with "full privacy". This was not the case with the Kurds.

Ethnic Kurds had a relative autonomy during the Ottoman Empire, and hence, they had their sense of distinction in terms of all ethnic markers, including sense of origin and language. They joined the National Struggle together with Turks against Armenians, "the common peril" Mustafa Kemal Pasha's policy of alliance including, among others, the Muslim ethnic groups was a major factor in that.⁴³ It must be noted that the Declarations of the National Pact, and of Erzurum and Sivas Congresses recognised the racial, i.e., ethnic rights of all Muslim ethnies.⁴⁴ Likewise, Mustafa Kemal referred to the same point in one of

⁴³Ibid., 161.

⁴⁴Given the activities of the Kurdish separatist movement led by *Kürt Teali Cemiyeti* (The Association of Kurdish Sublimation), Mustafa Kemal inserted into the secret and nonsigned fourth protocol of Amasya Talks(20-22 October 1919) an article prescribing "the termination of the activities of associations and the publication of newspapers bought by foreigners". This article 7 of the secret fourth protocol would secure the closing down of the *Kürt Teali Cemiyeti* and Kurdist magazines *Jin* and *Kurdistan* on the ground that they were under the management of the English. See Abdurrahman Arslan, *Samsun'dan Lozan'a Mustafa Kemal ve Kürtler(1919-1923)* [Mustafa Kemal and Kurds: From Samsun to Lausanne (1919-1923)] (Ankara: Doz Yayınları, 1991), 91-105.

In fact the first article of the second protocol ratified in the Amasya Talks involved the prevention of the evils intended ostensibly to be realised under the goal of "Kurdish independence" For this article and the five protocols -three of which ratified, and two unratified and secret-of the Amasya Talks, see Mahmut Goloğlu, *Sivas Kongresi* (The Sivas Congress) (Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınları, 1969), 183-189.

his speeches entitled "*Türk Milletini Teşkil Eden Ögeler Hakkında*" (About The Elements Constituting the Turkish Nation).⁴⁵ Apart from the "common peril", the saving of the caliphate from the captivity of the infidels was the last but not the least important factor in the joining of the Kurds into the National Struggle.⁴⁶

The delegates representing the Ankara government in the *Lausanne Conference* declared that they represented both Turks and Kurds and pointed out that Kurds cannot be deemed as a minority because they were Muslim. ⁴⁷ In short, Mustafa Kemal's position as

⁴⁵According to Mustafa Kemal, "The nation we strive for its protection and defence does not naturally consist of only one element. It is composed of various Muslim elements." After repeating the relevant articles of the declarations of National Pact and of Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, he concludes: "The unity we are striving for is not that of only Turks , only Circassians but of the Islamic element incorporating all." See "*Türk Milletini Teşkil Eden Müslüman Ögeler Hakkında*" (About Elements Comprising Turkish Nation), *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I* (The Speechs and Statements of Atatürk, I) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989), 1 May 1920, 74-75.

⁴⁶Oran, *ibid.*, 161. For Mustafa Kemal's views reflecting his pluralist position in ethnic terms see, among others, "Milli Mücadelede Kürtler" (Kurds in the National Struggle), *Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri V* (Atatürk's Circular Letters, Telegrammes and Statements) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1991), 17 June 1919, 36-37; and "Kürtlerle Türklerin Beraber Çalıştıkları Hakkında" (About the Fact That Kurds and Turks Worked Together), *ibid.*, 15. 09. 1919, 71. The latter telegram points to the Turkish-Kurdish fraternity and celebrates their co-struggle for the saving of the caliphate against "the enemy". *Ibid.*

⁴⁷İsmet Pasha, the Turkish delegate in the Conference, stated that "the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly is the government of Kurds as much as that of Turks. Because the real and legitimate representatives of the Kurds entered the National Assembly." See Mahmut Goloğlu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 1923* (Turkish Republic 1923) (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1971), 71. But the only Kurdish member of the delegation composed of six parliaments, Zülfü (Tigrel) Bey, the only Kurdish member from Diyarbekir, became all of a sudden "sick" when the Kurdish question was taken up in the Sub-commission of the

regards the so-called "Kurdish question" was conjuncturally formed and essentially accomodationist during the period of 1919-1924.

The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after World War I and the emergence of new Turkey gradually led to an era of intense mono-ethnic Turkish nationalism. The post-World War I Treaties of Sevr and Lausanne deepened the concern of Kemalist elites for the national survival (*beka*) and political integrity, which were expressed as the suppression of all non-Turkish ethnic identities, predominantly, of course, the eradication of Kurdish ethnic identity.⁴⁸

The abolition of the caliphate in 1924 undermined the old Ottoman concept of the Muslim umma and allowed the Kemalist secular notion of a Turkish nation to emerge. Because Kurdish religious and tribal leaders had derived their authority from the twin institutions of the sultanate and caliphate, the abolition of these institutions removed the temporal and spiritual bases of their legitimacy, which led the Turkish republic to outlaw all public manifestations of Kurdish identity.⁴⁹

Conference for the Minorities and could not join these deliberations. The discussions over the criteria to be used in defining minorities, the religious criterion instead of language or descent criteria was finally accepted upon the insistence of the Turkish delegation, particularly that of Rıza Nur. See Goloğlu, *ibid.*, 23-24 For a view evaluating developments before and after the Lausanne Conference from the vantage point of the formation of a separate Kurdish state, see Othman Ali, "The Kurds and the Lausanne Peace Negotiations," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 33, No., 3, July 1997, 521-534. The view that the delegations of Ankara government represented both Turks and Kurds was also expressed in London Conference (26 February 1921) by Ankara delegation, Bekir Sami Bey. See *Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası (1919-1923)* (The Foreign Policy of Atatürk, 1919-1923), vol. 1 (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981), 294.

⁴⁸Nader Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 81.

⁴⁹Bruinessen observes that "In Turkey, after the great Kurdish nationalist revolts... a systematic policy aiming at detribalisation and assimilation of the Kurds was adopted. ...Everything that recalled a separate Kurdish identity was to be abolished: language, clothing, names."

The caliphate and the institutions of folk Islam, i.e., sheikhs, tarikats and *tekyes* had all been the constitutive elements of Kurdishness. When it was abolished, the caliphate was still important in maintaining the unity of the remaining Muslim elements on Ottoman territory. As Mesut Yegen aptly observed:

The Caliphate was an institution which guaranteed that the bond between the Ottoman political centre and the Muslim elements of the 'periphery' was to be a loose one, so as to tolerate the ethnic plurality of the 'periphery'. This was particularly important for the Kurds who for centuries enjoyed an autonomous administration. The removal of the caliphate in 1924, meant the substitution of this loose bond between the centre and the periphery with the tyranny of the centre imposed on the (ethnic, cultural, economic, administrative, political elements of) the periphery.⁵⁰

The measures aiming at the eradication of the constitutive elements of the Kurdish ethnonational identity by the use of all means of ethnic homogenisation on the official plane severed the ties of ethnic Kurds with the new Turkish national state and paved the way to a series of rebellions, the most important of which were the revolt of Sheikh Said of Piran, Ağrı rebellion led by İhsan Nuri Pasha, a former officer in the Ottoman army (1929-30) and Sheikh Sayyed Reza's rebellion in Dersim (1937-38).⁵¹

See M. Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Skhaikh and State: On the Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan* (Utrecht-the Netherlands: Ryksuniversiteit, 1978), 242. In line with Bruinessen Entessar points out that "the repression following the revolt in Dersim was extensive. Entire villages were depopulated or massacred. The Turkish government sought to erase the memory of this bloody episode by replacing the name Dersim with Tunceli and putting the area under a total state of siege until 1950. The use of the words "Kurdistan" and "Kurds" was banned and references to them were removed from Turkish history books and publications". Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, 87.

⁵⁰Mesut Yegen, "The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32:2(April 1996), 220.

⁵¹Ibid. For another view pertaining to the impact of the abolition of the caliphate on the so-called "Kurdish question", see Kazım Karabekir, *Kürt Meselesi* (The Kurdish Question) (Istanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1994),

7.3.1. Policies of Kurdish Ethnic Management

As elaborated in the preceding sections, the Kemalist regime overtly rejected religion in public realm and replaced it by the new ethnosecular Turkish nationality. In this endeavour, it used race as the underlying framework of national integration by claiming the Turkishness of all Muslim ethnies. Accordingly, especially after the Law of the Restoration of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*) (14 March 1925), the thesis which argued the Turkishness of all non-Turk Muslim ethnies was increasingly propagated. Thus one of the Kemalist writers observed: "There is no Kurdish race. The 95 percent of the tribes considered to be Kurdish and Arab is pure Turkish(öz-Türk)".⁵² In this context, Lazes and

147-48. For these rebellions, see Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, 83-87. According to a book published by the Turkish General Staff, 18 uprisings occurred in Turkey in the period 1924-1938, 17 of which were in the regions populated by the Kurds. See *Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Ayaklanmalar (1924-1938)* (Uprisings in the Turkish Republic, 1924-1938) (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basimevi, 1972). Among these uprisings, İhsan Nuri's rebellion was the first predominantly secular one led by a secular Kurdish organization "*Khoybun*" (Independence). See Entessar, *ibid.*, 85.

⁵²See Avni Ali Çandar, *Doğu Anadolu'da Kürt Sanılan Türkler. Bir Kürt İrki Yoktur. Kürt ve Arap Telakki Edilen Kabilelerin Yüzde 95'i Öz Türkür* (Turks in the Eastern Anatolia whom Supposed to be Kurd. There is no Kurdish Race. The 95 Percent of the Tribes Supposed to be Kurd and Arab is the Genuine Turk) (Ankara, 1936); quoted by Mehmet Bayrak, ed. *Açık-Gizli, Resmi-Gayr-i Resmî Kürdoloji Belgeleri* (Open-Secret, Official-non-Official Kurdology Documents) (Ankara: Özge Yayınları, 1994), 195-96. The same view is manifested in the speech of Şükrü Kaya, the Ministry of Interior, in Adana People's House in 9 March 1937. Half of the audience in the auditorium was formed by the Arab Alevites living around Çukurova and Hatay. In this speech, Kaya pointed out that in the country there are citizens different in religion, though not in ideal. Therefore this state was not a matter of concern for him. But the state of races and citizens who are Turkish in race, history and culture but speak a foreign language under the impact of continuos interaction with foreigners and the sectarian causes is a matter of serious concern . Among these come Alevites in Çukurova. According to Kaya, due to their sect, these people have been excluded from the majority Turkish population. The history, however, testifies the pure Turkishness of Alevites in Hatay and Çukurova. Kaya blames the Empire for this state

other non-Turk ethnies also were claimed to be Turk.⁵³ On the occasion of his adoption of the honorary fellow citizenship of Diyarbakır, a province in the south-east, Atatürk well summarised this racial-ethnic position:

I am from an heroic corner of the Turkish country. Unfortunately, they call it the land of *Bekir*. But in essence, it was a Turkish land. *Bekir* later on had become the symbol for it. But we know what our genuine land is. Our land is the special halting place (*konak*) of Oghuz Turks, and we are the children of this high halting place. Since we halted here we have tried to point out what we are and we have been saying that the Turkish land is great, and only she is great on the face of the earth. It is the Turk who fill everywhere, and every side is illuminated by her face.

Those from Diyarbekir, Van, Erzurum, Trabzon, Istanbul, Thrace and Macedonia are all the children of one race and the veins of the same substance.⁵⁴

of separateness. In order to remove these differences, the following decision was taken: "Completely special active teams would be established under the continuos and influential backing of our party and Peoples' Houses in order to elevate the Turks which speak a language other than their mother tongue, Turkish, into the civic and cultural position of their brothers who have spoken only Turkish language." See "Alevi Türkler Kötü Bir Zihniyete Mahkum Edildi: Çukurovadaki Aleviler de Öz Türk Neslidir" (Alevite Turks have been Condemned into a Bad Mind: Alevites are the Genuine Turks), *Tan*, 10 March 1937, 1 and 10. On the same issue, see also Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Türk Alevilerin Yarası" (The Wound of Turkish Alavites), *Tan*, 11 March 1937, 1 and 10.

⁵³For example, a journalist of the time wrote that the only difference of Lazes from Turks is that they have a special language. See İhsan Ferit, "Karadeniz Halkı" (The Black Sea People) *Cumhuriyet*, 17. 01. 1933. This claim was so generalised that even the Turkishness of Persians in race was declared by Atatürk on the occasion of his reception of the new Turkish ambassador to Tehran: "The rulers of the present Turkish republic is of the opinion that Turks are co-racial with the people of Iran..." See "Gazi Hazretleri Yeni Tahran Elçimize Pek Mühim Bir Beyanatta Bulundular" (Ghazi (Mustafa Kemal) made an Important Statement to Our New Ambassador to Tehran), *Cumhuriyet*, 26 August 1930, 1-2.

⁵⁴Diyarbekir Gazetesi, 26 September 1932; also see Kadri Kemal Kop, *Atatürk Diyarbakır'da* (Atatürk in Diyarbakır), 4; quoted by Hamza Eroğlu, "Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik" (Atatürk and Nationalism), in *Atatürkçü Düşünce* (Ankara: Atatürk Dil Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1992), 378-390.

Thus the existence of Muslim ethnies namely, Kurds, Arabs and Circassians living within the frontiers of Turkey were rejected at the official level, and the pseudo-scientific Turkish History Thesis was forged in order to claim that they are Turk in terms of their ethnic origin. In practice, however, recognising their diverse ethnic origins, various ethnic management strategies were applied in order to Turkify them, ranging from forced deportation and settlement to forced assimilation, and sporadic manifestations of physical elimination.

Kemalist bureaucratic-intellectual elites tried to put the existence of non-Turkish Muslim ethnies to the dustbin of history. For those who felt the need to belong to those ethnies had to be both Turk and feel as Turk in order to be a full citizen, i.e., not to be discriminated against by the state. A prominent Turkish poet, Yahya Kemal, had answered the question "Who is Turk?" as "Those who consider themselves to be so" According to the Turkish sociologist Mehmet İzzet, this answer was true but incomplete. It was not adequate for anybody to consider himself/herself as Turk. It was also necessary to be so in terms of the objective markers of Turkishness.⁵⁵This is why pseudo-scientific theses were developed as regards the ethnic Turkishness of Kurds, unlike citizens who belonged to minority groups. The Turkishness of the latter was a necessary consequence of their living within Turkish community, i.e., of the fact that they were citizens of the Turkish republic, and not more.

⁵⁵Mehmet İzzet, *Milliyet Nazariyeleri ve Milli Hayat* (Theories of Nationalism and National Life) (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 1981), 23.

7. 3.1.1. Reconstitution of Kurdishness

According to Yeğen, the Turkish state discourse does not conceal the exclusion of Kurdish identity; rather it enunciates it, though it does not literally spell out the Kurdishness of the "Kurdish question". In Turkish state discourse, the Kurdish question was identified with the components of the socio-political space wherein Kurdishness was constituted: the tension between the past(Islam) and the present (the republican regime); between tradition (tribal politics) and modernity (central republican politics); and between the political and economic resistance of periphery(smuggling and resistance to taxation and military recruitment) and the national integration (an integrated national market economy). Therefore, in the last analysis, the politics of Islam, the autonomous political structures of tradition, and the resistance of the 'periphery' to an integrated national economy were all about Kurdish politics.⁵⁶

Thus when the Kurdish question was identified with reactionary politics, tribal resistance and smuggling, the Turkish state was enunciating an attack on the social space wherein Kurdishness was constituted. In other words, the pressure on Islam, tribes and the periphery had the effect of excluding the possibility of Kurdish identity and the Turkish state discourse was the enunciation of this pressure.

Kemalist literature is full of texts which manifest the reconstitution of the Kurdish question as an epiphenomenon of the question of reactionary politics, of tribal resistance, and of regional backwardness. The constitutive components of Kemalist nationalism were thus the discourses of Turkish ethnicity, secularism and modernisation conceived as westernisation.

⁵⁶Yeğen, "The Turkish State Discourse," 225-229.

The name of the so-called "Kurdish question" in the Kemalist discourse is the question of reformation in the eastern provinces.⁵⁷ The "eastern question" is considered in the context of the problematic of progress and civilisation. The backward and reactionary character of the eastern provinces would be reformed through the introduction of the blessings of the republic, which would put an end to the tribal-reactionary character of the socio-economic structure there.

It must be noted that for the Kemalists, the so-called "Kurdish question" was first and foremost a question of law and order. According to the prime minister İnönü, the question was to suppress the successive revolts occurred in the eastern provinces and restore order, and not more.⁵⁸

The civilising (*temdin*) mission was another intrinsic theme of the Kemalist discourse of the reconstitution of the "Kurdish question", expressed as the benefit to be derived from the blessings of the republic by "all the children of the fatherland".⁵⁹ Following the *Ağrı* Rebellion (1930), the semi-official newspaper *Cumhuriyet* described the rebels as follows:

These men who mix uncooked meat with some boiled and pounded wheat, and eat so do not have any difference from the savages and cannibals of Africa.⁶⁰

⁵⁷See "Şükrü Kaya'nın Dahiliye Vekaleti Bütçesi Üzerinde Yaptığı Konuşma"(The Speech of Şükrü Kaya on the Budget of the Ministry of Interior), *Cumhuriyet*, 28 June 1932.

⁵⁸See İsmet İnönü *Hatıralar* (Memoirs), vol.2. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987), 202-203 and 257-258.

⁵⁹"Beşinci Dönem Dördüncü Toplantı Yılının Açılışında Atatürk Adına Başvekil Celal Bayar Tarafından Okunan Söylev" (The Speech read by the Prime Minister Celal Bayar on Behalf of Atatürk in the Opening of the Fourth Meeting Year of the Fifth Period), *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 1 November 1938, 424. This speech is full of references to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as "Şef" (the Chief).

A journalist, Yusuf Mazhar, in a serial of articles entitled "Ararat Eteklerinde," (On the Foots of the Mount Ağrı) written after a field trip to the region of the Ağrı uprising observed that

Kurds are deceitful and devoid of any aesthetical and civilised tendencies. They have become a calamity over our race for centuries. These creatures do not really deserve civic rights.⁶¹

His condemnation of Kurds reveals a racist conception:

They(Kurds) are creatures who spread on the soil which they wrap like couch grass but inflict damage to the place they stand on.⁶² These Kurds do not know grind grain in the mill. ... In them feelings of independence and freedom are totally absent and their spirit is stripped of self-respect. ... They are not able to express their intentions and purposes with the simplest logical comparisons or ordinary examples.... I am of the opinion that it is not possible to eradicate the dark spirit, the rude feelings, the cruel tendencies in these Kurdish masses. To expect this from a long evolution will cause government to become busy with them by sometimes causing such uprisings or breaking down the order or robbing and lead people to continuously suffer.⁶³

7.3.1.2. *The Eastern Reform Reports (Şark Islahat Raporları)*

Kemalist policies of Kurdish ethnic management have essentially an assimilationist (inclusionary racist) character. In order to secure assimilation(*temsil*), Kemalists did not decline to pursue the policy of elimination via isolation, the indication of which being the policies of education and development applied in the east.

The aim of Kemalist policies as to Kurds is considered by Celal Bayar, Atatürk's prime minister after İnönü, to be a state secret transmitted from one mind to another only, not to be kept even in the

⁶⁰Cumhuriyet, 13. 08. 1930, 1.

⁶¹Yusuf Mazhar, "Ararat Eteklerinde"(On the Foot of Ararat), Cumhuriyet, 18 August 1930, 3.

⁶²Ibid., 19. 08. 1930, 3.

⁶³Ibid., 20. 08. 1930, 3.

most protected box" This "state secret" is transmitted from one government to another in the form of non-written, confidential state practices.⁶⁴ Secret eastern reform reports are a case in point.

Following the Sheikh·Said rebellion, a serious need felt by the Kemalist government to resolve the "eastern question". With this purpose, various official reports were prepared, the most important of which were:

1. The report of Abdulhalik Renda, the Speaker of the National Assembly and Çankırı deputy, entitled "*Ayaklanma Din Perdesi Altında Tamamiyle Milli Bir Harekettir*" (The Rebellion is a National Action Under the Guise of Religion)(14 September 1341(1925): The report included observations regarding the population and ethnic situation of the region, the spiritual state of the populace living in the region and the drawbacks of the administrative organisation there, and suggested various reform measures incorporating assimilation and settlement policies to be applied under martial law.⁶⁵

2. The Report of Cemil (Uybadın), the Minister of Interior, entitled "*Kurdistan Umumî Valilikle ve Müstemleke Usulu İdare Edilmelidir*" (Kurdistan Should Be Ruled in a Colonial Manner Under General Governorship)(1925): Uybadın proposed the policies of settlement and deportation for the Turkification of the region to be ruled colonially under an Inspectorate General.⁶⁶

⁶⁴Cited by Mustafa Remzi Bucak, *Bir Kurt Aydınınandan İsmet İnönü'ye Mektup* (Letter from a Kurdish Intellectual to İsmet İnönü) (İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1991), 68.

⁶⁵For the text of the report see Mehmet Bayrak, ed., *Kürtler ve Ulusal Demokratik Mücadeleri Üstüne Gizli Belgeler-Araştırmalar-Notlar* (Secret Documents, Studies and Notes on Kurds and Their National Democratic Struggle) (Ankara: Özge Yayınları, 1993), 452-466.

3. The Report prepared by the Turkish General Staff (1925).⁶⁷

The Prime Ministry formed a committee composed of the Minister of Interior Cemil (Uybadın), the Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), Çankırı deputy Abdulhalik (Renda), and the Second Chief of the Turkish General Staff Kazım (Orbay) in order to compile and prepare a report out of the three reports suggested. This committee, named "*Şark İslahat Encümeni*" (Eastern Reform Committee,) met in accordance with the confidential decision of the Council of Ministers⁶⁸ and prepared a reform report to be submitted to the Council of Ministers. The Report proposed, among others, that

- the eastern provinces should be governed under martial law until the end of the application of the reform program;
- Turkey should be divided into five regions of Inspectorate General and the fifth one would incorporate the provinces Hakkari, Van, Muş, Bitlis, Siirt, Genç, Diyarbekir, Mardin- Urfa, Siverek, Elaziz, Dersim, Malatya, Ergani, Bayezit and the districts Pülümür, Kiğı, and Hinis. The Inspectorate General would be responsible for carrying out the reform program;
- there would be no civil and military judge in the courts with native origin;
- the emmigrees from Caucasia and Balkan states and the people living in Rize, Trabzon and the north-eastern districts of Erzurum, i.e., Lazes and Georgians, if wish so, would be settled in the East and their expenses would be met by the government. The Kurds who occupied the

⁶⁶Bayrak, *Açık-Gizli, Resmî-Gayr-i Resmî Kürdoloji Belgeleri* , 256-257.

⁶⁷Ibid., 257.

⁶⁸The number of the decision is 2536 and its date is 8 September 1341(1925). Ibid., 258.

lands left by the Armenians either would go back to their old residences or be deported to the West;

- no native people of Kurdish origin would be appointed to the governmental offices in the East, even of secondary importance;
- those who speak a language other than Turkish in government and municipal offices and other institutions and organisations, in shopping districts and *bazaars* in Malatya, Elaziz, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, Van, Muş, Urfa, Ergani, Hozat, Erciş, Adilcevaz, Ahlat, Palu, Çarsancak, Çemişkezek, Ovacık, Hisnimansur, Behisni, Arga, Hekimhan, Birecik and Çermik provinces and town centers would be punished for committing the crime of resisting against the orders of government and municipalities;
- in places which are originally Turkish but are on the eve of assimilating into Kurdishness, and in Siirt, Mardin and Savur the people of which speaking Arabic, the branches of Turkish Hearts and schools, particularly girl schools should be established. In the first place, Dersim must be saved from assimilating into Kurdishness by immediately establishing boarding primary schools;
- in the provinces western of Fırat river, Kurds should be prevented from speaking Kurdish and by attesting importance to girl schools, women should be secured to speak Turkish.⁶⁹

According to Avni Doğan, the First Inspectorate General between 1943 and 1946, these measures were either not applied or could not become successful. For example, the settlement of the eight thousand Balkan emigrants in the newly established 17 villages in Diyarbekir resulted in an heavy failure. Due to various reasons, out of eight

⁶⁹For the whole text of the report, see Bayrak, *Kürtler ve Ulusal Demokratik Mücadeleleri* 481-489.

thousand, remained only 3560 emigrants in 1943. Therefore, argues Doğan, there is an imminent need for a long-term plan of assimilation to be pursued steadfastly without, however, resorting any means of violence in that violence is counterproductive.⁷⁰

In fact, over time, all these suggestions without exception were put into practice with varying degrees of success. Among these measures, settlement and deportation policies and special regional governance are particularly important.

7.3.1.2.1. The Policy of Settlement and Deportation

The policy of settlement refers essentially to the settlement of Caucasian and Balkan emigrants to the traditionally Kurdish regions.⁷¹ The underlying legal framework of this policy was the Law of Settlement (*İskan Kanunu*), dated 10 June 1934.

The Law of Settlement⁷² is a law disclosing the racial/ethnic dimension of Kemalist nationalism expressed around the concepts of race, blood and descent. Its apparent aim is to secure the unity in "language, culture and blood" The trio of Kemalist nationalism, unity in "language, culture and ideal" for the first time turned into the motto of unity in "language, culture and blood" This law is the apparent confirmation of Mahmut Esat Bozkurt's observation that Kemalist racism

⁷⁰For the 1943 report of Avni Doğan entitled "*Kürt Raporu*"(Kurdish Report), see Bayrak, *Açık-Gizli, Resmî-Gayrî Resmî Kürdoloji Belgeleri* , 233-270.

⁷¹See, for example, the observations of Yusuf Mazhar, "Ararat Eteklerinde," *Cumhuriyet*, 18 August 1930, 3.

⁷²"*İskan Kanunu*," Law No. 2510, published in *Resmi Gazete*, No: 2633, 21 June 1935 .

was expressed through the policies of language and culture with the addition of outright emphasis on the axis of “blood”

The law is basically a law of assimilation, taking “adherence to Turkish culture” and “speaking Turkish as mother tongue” starting points, geared particularly toward non-Turkish Muslim ethnies, namely Kurds and Arabs.⁷³ Another point of emphasis in the law is the regulation of the conditions of the admission of emigrants into Turkishness which spells out the criteria of being of “Turkish descent” and devotee of “Turkish culture” for the definition of emigrant .⁷⁴

⁷³The first and second articles stating the regions of settlement make the targeted groups evident. The first article authorises the Ministry of Interior for the organisation of the location of population with respect to adherence to Turkish culture in Turkey. Accordingly, the second article specifies three regions of settlement. The number one region of settlement is defined as places where the population with Turkish culture is desired to concentrate., i.e., South and East Anatolia. Number two region consists of places assigned for the population to be assimilated into Turkish culture, i.e., central and western Anatolia. The number three region includes places to be evacuated and prohibited for the settlement and residence for reasons of geography, health, economics, culture, military and discipline. During the floor debates on the law, Reşit Bey, a deputy from Gaziantep, demanded the clarification of these three regions. As a reply, Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of the Interior, claimed that this is accounted for in the second article. Upon the deputies' insistence that there is no specification as to where those regions are, Mehmet Bey, a deputy from Kütahya, responded: “These regions are three: one is the prohibited military regions (referring to Number three region), the other is places excepting the East (referring to the number two region). The boundaries of these regions would be determined by the government through a map.” See, *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, period 4, vol. 23, 14 June 1934, 147-148.

⁷⁴The article 3 spells out: “Settled or nomad people and tribes of Turkish descent and settled people devoted to Turkish culture who want to settle in Turkey in person or in group are accepted with the directive of the Ministry of Interior in accordance with the provisions of this law. These people are called emigree (*muhacir*). Whom and the people of which countries would be considered as devoted to Turkish culture should be determined through the decision of the Council of Ministers.” See *TBMM Kavanin Mecmuasi*, vol. 13, 781. Thus the law introduced a distinction between “those who are of Turkish descent” and “those

In this regard, *İskan Muafiyetleri Nizamnamesi* (The Regulation Concerning Settlement Exemptions) brings different conditions for those who are from Turkish race and those who have allegiance to Turkish culture but are not of Turkish descent.⁷⁵ Article 7 of the Law of Settlement makes the same distinction between those who are of Turkish race and other emigrants in terms of the conditions they have to fulfil in

devoted to Turkish culture." Thus, according to *İskânlı ve Serbest Göçmen Kabulüne Dair Talimatname* (The Regulation Concerning the Admission of the Settled or Free Emigrants), "Pomak and Muslims who are from the peoples of the countries seceded from the Ottoman Empire, and not having formed an independent state of their own, speaking Turkish and being non-nomad" were considered as belonging to "Turkish descent" See İlhan Unat, *Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku (Metinler, Mahkeme Kararları)* (Turkish Citizenship Law: Texts, Court Decisions) (Ankara, 1960), 159. This definition is the clear manifestation of the culturalisation of race. The acceptance of "Ottoman and Islamic" features as the criteria for the definition of "Turkish descent" reveals the inner flows of Kemalist nationalism which could not escape from the "imperative of the history". But during the floor discussions on the twelfth article, the term "soy" (descent) in the law was changed into "ırk" (race) upon the claims that "soy" may denote familial past and hence may cause confusion. In accordance with the Turkish History Thesis, Hasan Reşit Bey, a deputy from Muş, considered emigrants to Turkey who may not be attached to Turkish culture as Turks in race, which in fact makes racial criterion irrelevant. See *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, vol. 23, 14 June 1934, 144-145.

⁷⁵According to the article 3 of the Regulation, Turkish consulates could give emigrant visa without the prior consent of the Ministry of Interior to those who are from Turkish race which want to settle in Turkey without demanding any governmental aid. But those who have allegiance to Turkish culture but are not of Turkish descent cannot be given emigrant visa without taking the prior consent of the Ministry of Interior and identifying the place they would settle, even they undertake the burden of settlement by themselves without claiming any governmental aid. See *İskân Muafiyetleri Nizamnamesi*, accepted by the Council of Ministers in 27.12.1934, and issued in the *Resmi Gazete*, 5 January 1935. Also see Unat, *Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku*, 163. In fact , the article 16 of the Regulation confirms the Regulation Concerning the Admission of the Settled or Free Emigrants regarding the definition of whom and the peoples of which countries would be considered as being of Turkish descent, which reflects the same historical and religio-cultural considerations around which Turkish descent was defined. See, Ibid.

order to be admitted to Turkish citizenship. Needless to say, the conditions of admission for emigrants who are considered to be of Turkish race are relatively less strict.⁷⁶

The mentality underlying the Law of Settlement may be better grasped through examining the statement of the reasons of the law, the statement of the reasons of the Report of the Temporary Commission for the Law of Settlement and the floor debates.

The resettlement of the population with the aim of assimilation of non-Turkish elements into Turkishness emerges as the main goal of the law. In this context, to increase native population via the admission of emigrants from Turkish race as well as the concentration of native population in the territorially wide regions in order to strengthen the Turkish race, policy consequence of the belief in eugenics, are particularly emphasised in the statement of the reasons of the settlement law.⁷⁷

The Report of the Temporary Commission for the Law of Settlement is extremely revealing in disclosing the intention of the law-makers. The report, resting on the pseudo-scientific premises of the Turkish History Thesis (1932), claims that in the historical march from the Central Asia toward the west of the Turkish race, one thing was kept absolutely intact: "to live as master!" (*Efendi yaşamak*). "This is vested in the pure and rooted nature of the Turkish race."⁷⁸ Not to be captive of others and live under domination are considered to be the two essential attributes of the

⁷⁶See article 7 of *Iskan Kanunu* (the Settlement Law), TBMM Kavanın Mecmuası, vol. 13, 21 June 1934, 782.

⁷⁷TBMM Zabit Ceridesi, Sequence No. (Sıra Sayısı)189, vol. 23, 1-4.

⁷⁸The Report of the Temporary Commission for the Law of Settlement, 27 May 1934, TBMM Zabit Ceridesi, Sequence No. 189, vol., 23, 5.

Turkish race. The Turkish race is in the state of permanent movement in order to carry the light of civilisation to all the places she goes.⁷⁹

According to the Report, The Turkish republic made an ideal for herself to exalt Turks whom she considers to be the children of the same race who are united in mind, heart and language. Therefore those who remained aloof to Turkish culture should be forced to adopt it.

Because the Turkish Republic could not deem appropriate for them the Turkish citizenship and the use of the rights derived from that given that they have not had allegiance to the Turkish flag. That is why this law delineates the ways of melting such peoples in Turkish culture. In the Turkish Republic, the Turkishness of everybody who says that I am Turkish must be evident and open for the state.⁸⁰

The state of those who make use of citizenship rights and appear as if they do not have Turkish feelings cannot be deemed appropriate by the state. This law aims to create a unity of fraternity and citizenship in the melting pot of the great Turkish self-hood.⁸¹

As to the article 11 of the law⁸², according to the Report, its purpose is to secure unity in “language, culture and blood” (*dil, ekim, kan birliği*)

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid., 8.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²The article 11 of the Law of Settlement reads: “A: It is prohibited for those whose mother tongues are not Turkish to collectively form new villages and wards, worker and artist groups or to restrict a village, ward, work or art to their co-racials only.

B: The Ministry of Interior, upon the decision of the Council of Ministers, have to take necessary measures for the cultural, military, political, social and disciplinary reasons about those who do not have allegiance to Turkish culture or those who have allegiance to Turkish culture but speak a language other than Turkish. Provided that it is not done wholesale, deportation to other places and dismissing from citizenship are included among these measures.

C: The number of foreigners who settled in towns and cities cannot exceed the ten percent of the whole population within the municipal

in the country. The principal duty among the affairs of country is considered to be the provision of the unity in "language, culture, and blood" over and above everything.⁸³ The repeated stress on the unity in language, culture and blood is striking.⁸⁴

The law of settlement, which is considered to be one of the principal laws of the Kemalist revolution by Naşit Hakkı Bey, a deputy from Kütahya,⁸⁵ according to the Minister of Interior, Şükrü Kaya, aims at civilising the internal social structure. It covers population policy, emigration, nomadic tribes (*aşiret*) and reform of agrarian relations of working (labour) and would make Turkey a country speaking with one language, thinking along the same lines and carrying the same feelings.⁸⁶

Deportation was the other coin of the policy of forced settlement. The Sheikh Said rebellion led to the reorganisation of the region apart from the military and judicial measures taken. Also, persons and groups who thought to have the propensity to create trouble were deported elsewhere and in their place Turkish emigrants were settled. In accordance with the Art. 1 of the law entitled "*Bazi Eşhasın Şark*

boundaries, and they cannot form separate wards." See *TBMM Kavanin Mecmuası*, vol. 13, 21.06.1934, 783.

⁸³The Report of the Temporary Commission for the Law of Settlement, 27 May 1934, *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, Sequence No. 189, vol., 23, 12. Such measures as the prohibition of the use of language in public places, and gradually, in private places as well, the prohibition of different dresses, folk songs, in short, everything denoting to the difference in those districts in which people who speak different languages, or have allegiance to other cultures are rejected by the commission on the ground that it may not suit to all districts in the same way and that the aim is to assimilate them into Turkishness, not to exclude. *Ibid*, 11.

⁸⁴See, *ibid.*, 19 and 20.

⁸⁵See *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, vol. 23, 07 June 1934, 67.

⁸⁶*TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, vol. 23, 14 June 1934, 140-141.

Menatikindan Garp Vilayetlerine Nakillerine Dair Kanun"(The Law Concerning the Transport of Certain Persons from the Eastern Districts to the Western Provinces),⁸⁷ 1400 people and their families in addition to the family of 180 rebels and convicts of indictable offences in the eastern martial law region and the province of Bayezid were made subject to deportation.⁸⁸

The forced deportation of Kurds was essentially secured through the 1934 Law of Settlement and 1935 "*Tunceli Vilayeti Hakkında Kanun*"(Law Concerning Tunceli Province), however.

Due to the heavy burden the deportation placed on the state budget and the resistance of Kurds to assimilation into Turkishness and their capacity to assimilate the emigrants into Kurdishness caused the Kemalist government to stop the policy of deportation and settlement, however. This policy was not particular to non-Turkish Muslim ethnies. It also involved the non-Muslim minorities, particularly, Armenians, and Jews. Before the passing of the Law of Settlement, Armenians living in the rural areas of the Central Anatolia were made subject to deportation and forced to settle in Istanbul, the province thought to be the centre of concentration for the minorities.⁸⁹ But the most important incidence in this regard was the deportation of the Thrace Jews to Istanbul.

⁸⁷*TBMM Kavanin Mecmuası*, Law No. 1097, period 2, vol. 5, 19 June 1927, 431-432; *Resmi Gazete*, No: 624, 4 July 1927.

⁸⁸*Tunçay, Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, 173. For some news as regards the deportation of Kurdish families to the East after the Ağrı rebellion of 1930, see *Cumhuriyet*, 31. 07. 1930; 16. 10. 1931; 18. 11. 1931 and 16. 08. 1932. The goal of these deportations were expressed as "Turkey would be the country of the honest citizens free from mischief and gathered around a single system ." See *Cumhuriyet*, 31. 07. 1930.

⁸⁹This deportation was peacefully and quietly realised. Only Armenians living in Roxbury in Massachusetts issued a protest and called the League of Nations to take preventive measures in 15 April 1934. See

7.3.1.2.1. 1. A Case of Forced Deportation: The 1934 Thrace Incident

The 1934 incident in Thrace was a clear consequence of the application of the Law of Settlement. According to the Article 2 of the law, those who did not adhere to the Turkish culture had to settle in the second region assigned for the population to be assimilated into Turkish culture. Accordingly, Armenians, Greeks and Jews could settle in the second region only. According to the paragraph A of the Article 11, those citizens whose mother tongues were not Turkish could not set up in the communion a village, a quarter, a group or association of workers or artisans. In other words, there would be no village, quarter or association of workers or artisans that are wholly composed of people whose native language was not Turkish. This meant that minorities' settlements in Izmir, Istanbul, Ankara and Thrace would be dissolved and dispersed.

According to the paragraph B of the same article, the Ministry of Interior were empowered to deport and resettle those citizens whose mother tongues were not Turkish due to cultural, political, military, social and security reasons. According to the third paragraph of the Article 13, it was obligatory to deport and disperse those who did not belong to the Turkish race in separate villages and quarters in which they would remain in minority.

Prior to the legislation of this law, Italy's fascist leader Benito Mussolini had made a speech in 18 March 1934. In this speech, Mussolini identified Asia and Africa as regions of expansion for Italy and talked of the Mediterranean Sea as "*mare nostrum*" (our sea). This speech

the *Report of the US Ambassador to Ankara*, Robert P. Skinner, 2 March 1934, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1930-1944, from the US Ambassador Robert P. Skinner to US Foreign Ministry, 867.4016 Armenians/11; cited by Ayhan Aktar, "Trakya Yahudi Olaylarını 'Doğru' Yorumlamak" ((To Interpret Thrace Jewish Incidents 'Correctly'), *Tarih ve Toplum*, 155(November 1996), 52.

conclusively convinced the Ankara government that Turkey is under a serious threat stemming from Italy. In fact, in the last decade of the Kemalist era, Italy emerged as the major threat to Turkey. Therefore, Turkey's foreign policy choices reflected this threat of identification.

Upon this speech, the Ankara government took some measures in expectation of a war with Italy, which would make the Bosphorus region and Thrace a war place. Therefore, Thrace region was remilitarised and the Jews in Thrace were decided to be deported to Istanbul. The newly legislated Law of Settlement provided the government with a legal basis. The views which ascribe the purification of Thrace region from undesirable elements (Jews) to the impact of the wave of antisemitism originating from Nazi Germany has nothing to do with the reality.⁹⁰

⁹⁰The following sources attest the expelling of Jews from Thrace in 1934 to the impact of Nazi Antisemitism: Haluk Karabatak, "1934 Trakya Olayları ve Yahudiler" (The 1934 Thrace Incidents and the Jews), *Tarih ve Toplum*, 146 (February 1996), 4-16; Avner Levi, "1934 Trakya Yahudi Olayları ve Alınamayan Ders" (The 1934 Thrace Incidents and the Untaken Lesson), *Tarih ve Toplum*, 151(July 1996), 10-17; and Zafer Toprak, "1934 Trakya Olaylarında Hükümetin ve CHF'nin Sorumluluğu" (The Responsibility of the Government and RPP in the 1934 Thrace Incidents), *Toplumsal Tarih*, 34(October 1996), 19-25. But Ayhan Aktar shows that the incident was related with the conflictuary character of Turkish-Italian relations in 1934 by drawing upon the report of the British ambassador to Ankara, Percy Loraine, dated 22 July 1934, which reveals that it was the Turkish government who decided to purify the Thrace region from the Jews and do that through incremental harrasments and commercial boycotts. But this order was leaked by the local authorities and the resultant plunders, rapes and torture occurred. As a result, some 5000 Jews left their homes. For the text of the report, see Ayhan Aktar, "Trakya Yahudi Olaylarını 'Doğru' Yorumlamak," 49. Aktar definitely refuses the claim that the impact of Cevat Rıfat Attıihan's pro-Nazi magazine *Milli İnkılâp* (The National Revolution) caused the incidents in that in a country where the Ministry of Interior could go from Ankara to Kırklareli in two days by using governmental means, it is impossible that such a fortnightly magazine the circulation and form of distribution of which were not known could cause such pre-planned massive events. See Aktar, *ibid.*, 49-52.

The government gave verbal commands to the local authorities for the gradual evacuation of the Jews from the region. But due to the idle talks of the local authorities, the command lost its secrecy, and under the initiative of the local party rulers and members of some sport clubs, the Jews became subject to the various forms of torture. In 21 June, some Jews were beaten and their houses were sacked in Çanakkale. In 24 June, the leading figures of the Jewish community in Çanakkale received threat letters. As a result, some 1500 Jews left Çanakkale and sought refuge in Istanbul. In 3 July, two leading representatives of the Jewish community, Mişon Ventura and God Franko met with president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and complained of the situation.

In the same day, the Jews in Kırklareli were attacked. They left their houses and went to Istanbul via railway. In July 5, Prime Minister İnönü referred to the incidents in Thrace, stressed its anti-semitic character, and made clear that those who were responsible for the events would be penalised. In 6 July, the Minister of Interior, Şükrü Kaya, went to the region to investigate the incident. The mayor, the chief of police and the president of the Chamber of Commerce were arrested. The Council of Ministers made an official declaration condemning the incident.⁹¹

⁹¹See *Ayın Tarihi*, 8(August 1934), 52-54. For the chronology of events, see Aktar, "Trakya Yahudi Olayları," 46-47. The Kemalist press lent support to the official declaration. Yunus Nadi pointed to the fact that the executive power belongs to the government not to the crowds, but maintained that due to the usurious habits of the Jews, their insistence not to speak Turkish and the fact that the security concerns felt for a region which is demilitarised made the ground ripe for the events. His style is apologetic. See Yunus Nadi, "Trakya Musevilerine Karşı Yapılan Hareket Hakkında"(About the Action Made Against Thrace Jews), *Cumhuriyet*, 16 July 1934. For another comment stressing the "outside roots" of the incident see, Sadri Etem, "Hükümetin Beyannamesi ve Yahudi Meselesi" (The Declaration of Government and the Jewish Question), *Vakit*, 18 July 1934. The official discourse reaffirmed its adherence to the protection of all the citizens without discrimination.

Cevat Rifat Attilhan's racist and pro-Nazi magazine *Milli İnkılap* was closed by the decision of the Council of Ministers.⁹² Probably, with a view to rectify its international image so as not to be blamed as anti-semitic, Turkey admitted a large number of Jewish professors escaping from Nazi Germany to Turkey.⁹³

7.3.1.2.2. Politico-Administrative Means: Special Regional Governance

Special regional governance was based on a purely military rationale through the establishment of the First Inspectorate General in 1927, as suggested in the secret Eastern Plan, and the continuous state of Marshall law.

First Inspectorate General: The System of the Inspectorate General (*Birinci Umumi Mütettişlik*) that was suggested in the Eastern Reform Plan was introduced first in the East in 1927. Its restriction to the southeastern provinces for a long time was explained, by Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of Interior, after five years with the lack of money and personnel.⁹⁴ According to Kaya, the establishment of the First Inspectorate General was a matter related to the general administration

See the statement of Kazım (Orbay), the Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, to the newspaper *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 8 July 1934.

⁹²Ayın Tarihi, 8(August 1934), 8. The magazine *Orkun* published by the renown racist Nihal Atsız was also closed.

⁹³Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 268. For the view of a German journalist residing in Turkey arguing that there is no question of race (minority) in Turkey, see Margaret Künkel, "Türkiye'de Ekalliyet Meselesi Yoktur!" (There is no Minority Question in Turkey), *Cumhuriyet*, 26 January 1937, 5.

⁹⁴See *Cumhuriyet*, 26 June 1932.

and the imperatives of security.⁹⁵ The provision of law and order in the East was the intended goal with the First Inspectorate General.

The First Inspectorate General included the 17 provinces of the East and South-East Anatolia. It was an undeclared state of martial law. The Law entitled *Umumi Müfettişlik Teşkiline Dair Kanun*, No. 1164, was legislated in 26 June 1927. It divided Turkey into five Inspectorates General. The system was akin to the provincial system. The main task of the Inspectorates General was to secure law and order in their spheres of responsibility. What prompted the law was the envisaged need for filling the authority vacuum emerged after the termination of the martial law in the region in 23 October 1927. Ibrahim Tali (Öngören) was appointed as the First General Inspector. Later on, with the consideration that this system is an administrative regulation that may be used in other regions, the first one named the First Inspectorate General.⁹⁶ In fact, out of five Inspectorate General, the four did not come into existence and later were abolished; but the First Inspectorate General continued its existence until 1947.⁹⁷

In this region, all the municipalities were governed by the *kaymakams* (the local heads of bureaucracy) except for some provincial municipalities kept under the control of the political centre. In the western regions, however, It was the governors who were mayors. In fact,

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, 175. Apart from the General Inspectorate, an organisation of peasant militia was formed after 1930 in the Eastern provinces. See "Şark Vilayetlerinde Milis Teşkilatı" (The Organisation of *Militia* in the eastern Provinces),*Cumhuriyet*, 24. 10. 1930.

⁹⁷Bayrak, *Açık-Gizli, Resmî-Gayr-i Resmî Kürdoloji Belgeleri*, 258.

the existence of the local administration was nominal.⁹⁸ This distinction stemmed from the security concerns felt for the East.

Another example of the special regional governance was the law entitled "*Tunceli Vilayetinin İdaresi Hakkında Kanun*,"⁹⁹ aimed at removing the tribal organisation in Dersim and put it under the personal rule of a governor-commander at the cost of violating the constitution with a civilising (*temdin*) and assimilationist (*temsil*) viewpoint. The Article 32 of the law read:

The governor-commander is authorised to postpone the persecution about any person and to delay penalties. This postponement and delaying do not stop the passing of prescription.

The Art. 33 stated that "the sentences of capital punishment are executed provided that the governor-commander do not see any reason for delay" These two articles violated the articles 26 and 103 of the 1924 constitution, however.¹⁰⁰ Article 26 of the constitution put the right of the postponement of the persecution and execution or delay of the sentences of capital punishment under the jurisdiction of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Art. 103 pointed out that any law violating the constitution was null. When expressed during the floor debates, these objections found no satisfactory answer.¹⁰¹ As stated in the statement of the reasons for the law, the law aimed to take the "poor"

⁹⁸For news reporting that the municipalities of certain towns in the East would be assumed by *kaymakams*, see *Cumhuriyet*, 17 November 1930.

⁹⁹*Resmi Gazete*, No: 3195, 02 January 1936. The law date was 25. December 1935 and its no. 2884 .

¹⁰⁰Hüsnü Kitapçı, a deputy from Muğla, pointed to this violation. See *TBMM Zabit Cəridesi*, vol. 7, 178.

¹⁰¹See the speech of Raif Karadeniz, deputy from Trabzon, *Ibid.*, 178-180.

people of Dersim under the close scrutiny and protection of the government by eradicating the tribal ties and organisation.¹⁰²

The law authorised the governor-commander also with the power to deport anybody from the region under his command. The stages of persecution were completely subject to the administrative will. Moreover, the provisions of the law would be valid retrospectively, the violation of a basic tenet of the rule of law.¹⁰³

Continuos State of Martial Law: Immediately following the Sheikh Said rebellion, the state of martial law was declared by the Council of Ministers in 25 February 1925 in Elaziz, Genç, Muş, Ergani, Dersim, Diyarbekir, Mardin, Urfa, Siverek, Siirt, Bitlis, Van, Hakkari, Malatya, Kığı and Hinis.¹⁰⁴ The state of martial law in this region continued until the end of 1927 when the region was put under the administration of the First Inspectorate General, which was an undeclared state of martial law ended in 1947. Thus the south-eastern region was ruled through martial law during the whole one party period, an indication of the fact that Kemalist nationalism conceived the question of the "east" in purely law and order terms.

¹⁰²See *TBMM Zabit Ceridesi*, Sequence Number(*Sıra Sayısı*) 58, vol. 7, 25 December 1935.

¹⁰³See "Tunceli Kanunu Özeti"(The Summary of Tunceli Law), *Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Ayaklanmalar (1924-1938)* (Uprisings in the Turkish Republic, 1924-1938) (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1972), 489-490. The law remained in force until 1946.

¹⁰⁴See "Şark Vilayetlerinin Bir Kısmında (Elaziz, Genç, Muş, Ergani, Dersim, Diyarbekir, Mardin, Urfa, Siverek, Siirt, Bitlis, Van, Hakkari, Malatya, Kığı and Hinis) İdare-i Örfiye İlânına Mütedair Karar" (The Decision As Regards the Declaration of Martial Law in Certain Eastern Provinces), No: 114, *Resmi Gazete*, No:85, 25 February 1925.

7.3.1.3. Exclusionary Face of Assimilation

As stated before, Eastern Reform Plan included many exclusionary measures, among which was the ban put on the employment of native people in state organisations in the south-east. Assimilationist policies took the form of coercive and exclusionary character when faced with resistance. In this regard, the position represented by the Marshall Fevzi Çakmak, the Chief of the General Staff who considered the "Kurdish question" purely as an issue of law and order which disrupted the national security, was the sharpest one.

Marshall's position prescribed the containment of the provinces populated predominantly by the ethnic Kurds in economic, cultural, educational as well as socio-political terms. Marshall prevented any kind of state investment in the East. No factory and road could be established there without his prior permission, and in no case this permission was given.¹⁰⁵ This paranoid state of security led the Marshal to conclude that educational facilities would create a Kurdish class of intelligentsia who would bolster Kurdish separatism. That is why, despite the heavy emphasis of Kemalism on educational reform, the number of schools in the south-eastern provinces was decreased as compared to the imperial period.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵See Cemal Madanoğlu, *Anılar* (Memoirs), vol.1 (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayıncılık, 1982), 135. Nearly all regions of Turkey embodied "forbidden zones" determined by the Marshall. That is why an iron-steel factory was built in Karabük, a non-coastal town, upon his insistence. His concern of national security was of obsessive nature. See Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Çankaya: Atatürk 'ün Doğumundan Ölümüne Kadar* (Çankaya. From the Birth of Atatürk to His Death) (İstanbul, 1969), 209-210.

¹⁰⁶Samet Ağaoğlu, *Demokrat Partinin Yükseliş ve Düşüsü: Bir Soru* (The Causes of the Rise and Fall of Democrat Party: A Question) (İstanbul, 1972), 159. A Kurdish nationalist politician notes that all the high schools inherited from the imperial period were closed down in 1926 contrary to the Kemalist educational mobilisation. This policy was

In one of his editorials in the daily *Milliyet* Mahmut Esat Bozkurt pointed to this issue and argued that "to leave the people of the south-east without education cannot be a characteristic of the Ghazi's Turkey."¹⁰⁷ Esat complained about the fact that such slanders among the people of eastern and southern provinces were quite common. This implied that the government was against the illumination of the Kurds and the desire to leave them in darkness crystallised in the non-opening of high schools, all of which being the indication of the intention of the government to rule that region in a colonial manner. These forgeries could not be true, according to Esat, because

the government does not have any secret and special policy for the people of that region. For the government, the Turkish homeland was a whole. To deal with the citizens differently did not fit to the

well clarified in the following words of Mustafa Necati, the Minister of Education of the time, addressed to Mardin deputy Necip Bey: "Would we erect the armed Kurds of today before our children as the literate intellectuals of tomorrow?" See Bucak, *Bir Kurt Aydinindan İsmet İnönü'ye Mektup*, 66. Bucak was a deputy of the ruling Democrat Party in the 1950-1960 decade. Likewise, the railway network in the South-Eastern Anatolia reflected more the understanding of *chemin-de-guerre* (route of war) rather than that of *chemin-de-ferre* (railway). Ibid., 64. The following statement of İnönü made during the opening ceremony of the Sivas railway station is the manifest indication of this understanding of ethnic containment: "The need of the national state for *chemin-de-ferre* (railway) is a question of national unity, national defence and national politics. It is a question of the protection of the national independence, the product of the centuries." Therefore, according to İnönü, with the reach of railway to the eastern frontiers, no mischief could exert influence inside. He sees the "eastern question" as "a question the root of which being outside". His concluding remark reflects the Kemalist position of the notion of "*Millet-i Hakime*": "There is no majority in this country which can rightly claim a national existence other than Turkish nation and Turkish community." See *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 31 August 1930, 1-4.

¹⁰⁷ Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), "Şark ve Cenup Vilayetlerimizi Hususi Bir İdareye mi Tabi Tutuyoruz?" (Are we Making Our East and South Provinces Subject to a Special Governance?), *Milliyet*, 21 December 1931, 1.

mottoes of the republican rule. As a matter of fact, there was no reason for such a route to follow.¹⁰⁸

That was because all the people living in Turkey were assumed to belong to the Turkish race. Esat asserted that the republic willed and had to carry the Turkish culture to this region and therefore open new schools. But the budgetary constraints were the major drawback in the inability of meeting the need of mass schooling.¹⁰⁹

In fact, education was a basic means of Kemalist policy of assimilation. Evidently, there might be no reason to preempt the Kemalist regime to open new schools in the south-east through which the Kemalist indoctrination of the populace could be possible. But the fact was apparent: "According to the latest statistics the least developed districts in terms of education are Diyarbakır and Erzurum provinces."¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, the fear of the possibility of the backing of Kurdish separatism by raising the Kurdish nationalist consciousness through education prevented the schooling in the Kurdish populated areas. The secession of Albania from the Ottoman Empire was a tried example in view of the Kemalist elites.

An interesting indication of this exclusionary mind can be seen in the objection of Kazım Karabekir Pasha during the period of the National Struggle to the compulsory military recruitment of Kurds, a point also referred to in the Eastern Reform Plan, on the ground that this would provide Kurds with better training and equipment, and hence increase the Kurdish threat. The thing to be done, according to Karabekir, was the usual policies of assimilation, e.g., generalisation of schooling,

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰*Cumhuriyet*, 8 October 1930.

establishment of new roads and factories, and rationalisation of the local bureaucracy. The containment of the Kurdish populated areas with the Turkish population lines circumfering these areas was Karabekir's another suggestion for the solution of the so-called "Kurdish question," again conceived as a matter of security and backwardness.¹¹¹ Therefore, in the Kemalist era, people recruited from the south-eastern region for fulfilling their military obligation were kept unarmed and worked mostly in road construction.

Heavy taxes, such as road and land taxes, the inproportionality of government investments between the regions,¹¹² and the patterns of primary consumption and investment goods constituted different faces of this exclusionary stance.¹¹³

Sporadic instances of physical elimination were another dimension of the exclusionary stance. To illustrate, the Kemalist press was full of news and articles demanding the total annihilation of the populace in the region of rebellion after the Ağrı revolt. This demand covered the rebels

¹¹¹All these suggestions are stated in an investigation report submitted to the Ministry of Defence in 1923. See Karabekir, *Kürt Meselesi*, 46-49. Later, Karabekir's suggestions became official policies, such as the continuos inculcation of the Turkishness of the Kurds, the establishment of the First Inspectorate and the Law of Settlement(Işkan Kanunu). See ibid., 181. According to Karabekir, "Kurds are Hittites, the first residents of Anatolia" and hence Turkish. Ibid., 234.

¹¹²I already noted that Marshall Çakmak did not permit any economic investment in the Kurdish populated areas. To illustrate, the road investments in the three provinces of the west were much more than those in the 15 provinces of the east. See Dr. Hikmet Kivilcimli, *İhtiyat Kuvvet: Milliyet (Şark)* (The Reserve Force: Nationality (The East) (Istanbul: Yol Yayınevi, 1979), 120-125. The book was written in 1933 when the author was in Elazığ prison due to his communist activism. Heckter's thesis of internal colonialism is overtly obtained in the economic development levels of the Kurdish populated regions of Turkey and the rest in the Kemalist period.

¹¹³Ibid., 110.

as well as the people living in that region. Thus the semi-official daily, *Cumhuriyet* declared: "Four villages on the foot of Ağrı joining the rebels were demolished."¹¹⁴ The communiqés issued by Salih Pasha, the commander of the forces suppressing the rebellion, incorporated such statements as "the complete annihilation of the reactionary rebels and the destruction of their houses, the extermination of the rebels such that no one could survive, etc."¹¹⁵

Mustafa Remzi Bucak, a Democrat Party deputy in the 1950-60 decade and Kurdish nationalist, argues that since the Kemalists could not dare to do the operation of the total annihilation of Kurds overtly, they used rebellions as proper occasions of achieving that. Kemalist policy in the aftermath of the İhsan Nuri rebellion emphasised the mass deportation of Kurdish villagers, the exiling of Kurdish sheikhs and aghas, and the forceful recruitment of young Kurds into the Turkish army. The government also pardoned acts of vigilantism against the Kurds during this period of repression, and in some cases legally sanctioned such behaviour. For example, Article 1 of Law No. 1850 entitled "*İsyancılıkta İşlenen Eş'alin Suç Sayılmayacağı Hakkında Kanun*" (The Law Concerning the Non-Consideration as Crime of Actions Committed in the Region of the Rebellion) read:

Murders and other actions committed individually or collectively, from the 20th of June 1930 to the 10th of December 1930, by the representatives of the state or the province, by the military or civil authorities, by the local authorities, by guards or militiamen, or any civilian having helped the above or acted on their behalf, during the pursuit and extermination of the revolts which broke out in Erciş, Zilan, Ağrı Dağı and the surrounding areas, including

¹¹⁴*Cumhuriyet*, 15 July 1930.

¹¹⁵*Cumhuriyet*, 15 September 1930. In his visit to the region of military operation, Marshal Çakmak asks the commander Abdullah Pasha "Was it these poor people who fought you?" by pointing to the corps of children, women and the old. Bucak, ibid., 76.

Pülümür in Erzincan province and the area of First Inspectorate, will not be considered as crimes.¹¹⁶

The passage of this law was instrumental in the "pacification" of the area of the First Inspectorate, including the major Kurdish areas of Diyarbakır, Bitlis, Hakkari and Mardin. According to Bucak, the non-application of a similar law in the other regions of rebellion like Yozgat, Konya and Menemen, and its restriction to the East is the sign of the policy of delimited elimination.¹¹⁷

As exemplified by the Tunceli Law referred to above, the personal character of both crime and penalty was widely violated. The retainment of the family and relatives of a rebel or guilty in order to force the rebel or guilty to surrender was a usual practice.¹¹⁸

Overall, assimilation was the mainstream umbrella of the Kemalist ethnic management strategies. They involved, however, exclusionary and eliminatory faces as well, not as the ultimate goal, but as a means of attaining it. Among other means of Kemalist ethnic management strategies were population exchange and settlement policies. Such strategies as indigeneization and accomodation based on the formal recognition of the ethnic diversity of the state, acculturation,¹¹⁹ and, needless to say, genocide were not among the Kemalist options

¹¹⁶See the Law entitled "İsyancılıkta İşlenen Eşyalı Suç Sayılmayacağı Hakkında Kanun" (The Law Concerning the Non-Consideration as Crime of Actions Committed in the Region of the Rebellion), *Resmi Gazete*, No: 1859, 29 July 1931.

¹¹⁷Bucak, *Bir Kürt Aydinından İsmet İnönü'ye Mektup*, 77.

¹¹⁸Kivilcimli, *İhtiyat Kuvvet: Milliyet*, 149-151.

¹¹⁹The continous use of the Imperial money instead of the newly issued "banknotes" in the Republican period among the people of the East and Southeast, and the non-integration of this region into the national market, an obvious indication of which was smuggling, reveals

7. 4. Turkification of Non-Muslims

Kemalist regime recognised the existence of non-Muslim minorities and determined its policy of assimilation accordingly. The use of citizenship rights by the minorities, the existence and rights of which were guaranteed by the Lausanne Treaty (1923), was linked to the condition of their embracement of Turkishness. Since religion was excluded from the definition of Turkishness, this was thought to be a possible project. Nevertheless because of the international umbrella of legal protection the minorities had, they were made subject only to assimilation policies aiming at Turkification in terms of language and ideal, still in violation of the Lausanne Treaty. That is why Turkification policies basically targeted the Jews conceived as having no clear-cut language and culture peculiar to themselves, unlike Greek and Armenian communities who owned their well-rooted languages and cultures as well as nation states of their coethnies outside the borders, which made their Turkification very difficult in comparative terms.

Turkification policies were a corollary of the assimilationist(inclusionary) and ethnicist(exclusionary) character of Kemalist nationalism, the aim of which was "to make at any rate those who live in this country *Turk*."¹²⁰ Despite their assimilationist leaning, that voluntary assimilation was out of question for the people in the said region during the Kemalist era. See ibid., 46-55.

¹²⁰The Speech of Ismet İnönü in the Turkish Hearts(1927); cited by Tekin Alp, *Türkleştirme* (Turkification) (Istanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1928), 7. Rasih Kaplan, a deputy from Antalya, describes the need for Turkification as follows in his oral question addressed to the Minister of Interior: "Some Turkish citizens do not speak Turkish language communally. There are masses in group in many places which do not speak Turkish language. For example, quarters are being formed in Ankara, which speaks Kurdish or Albanian. ... Will Turkish still not find its proper place in the center of the Republic? Friends, we must overtly express. The Spaniards expelled the Jews, we embraced them. They still however speak the language of the nation expelling them as their

these policies were at the same time anti-minority and exclusionary policies. They reflected the deep insecurity felt against non-Turks in every field of life such that according to the Law of Public Employees (*Memurin Kanunu*), a Turk married with a foreigner could not become a public employee.

Several measures, including laws, were introduced to assure the forced Turkification, the most important aspect of which was the generalisation of Turkish as the mother tongue because "to speak the same mother tongue is to a great extent to think in the same way. The ethnies who want to be genuinely Turkish have to embrace Turkish not as official but as mother tongue."¹²¹ To be genuinely Turk meant to embrace Turkish culture alongside the Turkish language as the mother tongue. According to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,

Those who say that I am from the Turkish nation, first and foremost, should speak Turkish. It is not true to believe in the loyalty of a person who does not speak Turkish but claim to adhere to Turkish culture and community.¹²²

These words reveal the clear leitmotif behind the campaign "Citizens, speak Turkish!"

Turkification policies denoted the securing of the ethnic Turkification the coverage of which ranged from everyday language, education, industrial and commercial life to the public personnel regime, private law and population settlement. Of course, the crystallisation of

national language but not that of the country embracing them. Is it not time to take measures for this situation?... citizens living together with us have to speak our language." See *CHP Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı Görüşmeleri Tutalgası* (9-16 May 1935) (The Minutes of the Fourth General Congress of the Republican People's Party, 9-16 May 1935) (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935), 149.

¹²¹Tekin Alp, *Türkleştirme*, 54.

¹²²Utkan Kocatürk, *Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri* (The Ideas and Thoughts of Atatürk) (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1984), 182.

Kemalist nationalism as a political ideology, the adoption of this ideology by the majority of the ruling elites, the conduciveness of international conjuncture, and the Lausanne treaty were the determinants setting the limits of the application of these policies.

The Kemalist constitution of "us" incorporated non-Turkish Muslims provided that they speak Turkish as the mother tongue and, of course, adhere to the republican ideal. Since the Turkification of non-Muslims, particularly Greeks and Armenians, was structurally "impossible" due to essentially religious and historical reasons, Turkification policies pursued against them assumed an anti-minority, discriminatory, exclusionary character, and hence they intrinsically formed part of the "other" of the Kemalist regime.¹²³

Due to the religious-Islamic colouring that nationalism, a wholly secular ideology in its origin, had assumed in the non-secular Ottoman polity, Turkishness came to involve an Islamic nature as an intrinsic character. Therefore being Turkish came to mean necessarily to be Muslim. This state of affairs gave an anti-Christian feature to the Kemalist nationalism in the republican period, which contradicted the secular credentials of the state and the institution of the citizenship of the Turkish republic.¹²⁴ The thing to be noted is that this Islamic colouring did not lead to any restriction on the part of the state against non-Muslims while in the republican period it did, which shows that it was

¹²³Ayhan Aktar, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları"(Turkification Policies Applied in the First Years of the Republic), *Tarih ve Toplum*, 156(December 1996), 4.

¹²⁴Etyen Mahcupyan, "Laik Kesim ve Bastırılmış Irkçılık"(Laic Segment and Latent Racism), *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 16 June 1995, 14.

not Islam but the Kemalist nationalist logic that caused non-Muslims to remain as "half-citizen" in the Kemalist one party period.¹²⁵

In this regard, Islam in fact assumed a dual function in the Kemalist Turkification zeal. While the absence of religion among the components of Turkish national identity made the assimilation of non-Muslim minorities into Turkishness easier, it played a preventive role in the Turkification of Muslim ethnies. It rendered difficult the accommodation of these ethnies into Turkishness, and in the case of Kurds, it led to the politicisation of Kurdish ethnicity and hence the emergence of Kurdish nationalist movements.¹²⁶

Despite the constitutional prescription of complete equality for all citizens, this equality was a formal one and applied intra-groups rather than intergroups, which was inspired by the well-established notion that Muslim equals Turk and vice versa. As Lewis pointed out, in comparative terms, despite the elevation of their legal status under the Republic, the participation of minorities in the public realm decreased. The fulfilment of the military obligation by the minorities as unarmed and uncommissioned, their almost complete disappearance in the civil service¹²⁷ and political life¹²⁸, and travel restrictions put for Greeks and

¹²⁵Ibid.

¹²⁶Tekin Alp argued that religious unity will make easier the Turkification of Kurds and other Muslim ethnies. See Tekin Alp, *Türkleştirme*, 40. But he forgets that Kemalist nationalism do not confer any recognition to religion among its credentials, which was crucial in its failure to assimilate Kurds.

¹²⁷Unlike the late Ottoman times, there was no public employee belonging minority communities.

¹²⁸Only in the elections of fifth legislative period held in 8 February 1935, four Christians were elected as deputies, all of whom rejecting their ethnic distinctions. 1. Berk Türker (from Afyon): A Turkist Armenian banker; 2. Dr. Taptas Nikola (from Ankara): The Greek doctor signing the

Armenians in Istanbul¹²⁹ constituted some aspects of the Republican discrimination against the minorities.¹³⁰ Although this was to some extent related with the self-isolation of the minorities from socio-cultural milieu of Turks, according to Lewis, "nationalist republic could offer little to those who either would not or could not join the dominant group."¹³¹ Religion continued to appear on identity cards and other official documents. In daily usage, the appellation Turk was restricted to

election platform by uttering that I am representing the Turkish nation, not a minority"; 3. İstamat Zihni Özdamar (from Eskişehir): A lawyer who claimed that the origin of Greeks was Turkish. His election as deputy angered the Greeks ; 4. Abravaya Marmaralı (from Niğde): a Greek doctor and a close associate of Atatürk. See Goloğlu, *Tek Partili Cumhuriyet (1931-1938)*, 115. Also see Süleyman Yeşilyurt, *Atatürk, İnönü, Menderes, Gürsel Dönemlerinin Ermeni, Yahudi, Rum Milletvekilleri* (The Armenian, Jewish and Greek Deputies of the Periods of Atatürk, İnönü, Menderes and Gürsel) (Ankara, 1995). Serbest Fırka showed candidates belonging to the minorities in the general municipal elections held in 6 October 1930 and faced severe criticisms from the pro-RPP press on the ground that the loyalty of minorities cannot be taken for granted. The reply of Fethi Okyar, the leader of *Serbest Fırka* (Free Party), was that The republic's laws do not make any distinction between its citizens in term of race and religion. For the discussions around this issue, see Rifat N. Bali, "1930 Yılı Belediye Seçimleri ve Serbest Fırkanın Azınlık Adayları" (The 1930 Municipal Elections and the Minority Candidates of the Free Party), *Tarih ve Toplum*, 167(November 1997), 25-34.

¹²⁹"Günün Meraklı Meselesi: Yahudiler Niçin Rumlardan ve Ermenilerden Ziyade Gayrimemnun?" (The Curios Matter of the Day: Why are Jews More Unsatisfied than Greeks and Armenians?) *Vakit*, 17 October, 1930; cited by Bali, "1930 Yılı Belediye Seçimleri ve Serbest Fırkanın Azınlık Adayları," 30.

¹³⁰Education system too had its share from Turkification policies. Many Greek schools were closed down and the education in the schools remaining open was either rendered difficult by the lack of financial resources or had to be made mostly in Turkish language. Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), 192.

¹³¹Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 350.

Muslims. Therefore minorities were known as Turkish citizens rather than Turks in accordance with the Art. 88 of the 1924 constitution.¹³²

Non-Muslim minorities were faced with a variety of popular feelings. Hatred emerged in the last decade of the Empire reached its peak after the 1918 Armistice. Many Ottoman Christians made their gladness evident with the allied occupation of Istanbul and parts of Anatolia. Some of them played an important role in attempts to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Their purpose involved the dissolution of the Empire to be replaced by the proxy Christian states, subservient to the big powers of the time, Britain and France.¹³³ On the whole, the Ottoman Jews remained loyal, however.¹³⁴

After the War of Independence, as the memories of the occupation receded into the past, relations between Muslims and non-Muslims incrementally improved. Although the non-Muslim minorities gained equal status via citizenship with Muslim elements, they remained separate and distinct, extruded from the body of the nation.¹³⁵

7.4.1. Legal Turkification

Mustafa Kemal Pasha emphatically stated during the National Struggle that non-Muslims would enjoy the same rights with Muslim

¹³²Ibid., 351. Minority hating was manifested in various ways. Members of minorities could serve only as privates, regardless of whether or not they met the requirements for commission. See Karpat, *Turkey Politics*, 258.

¹³³Salahi R. Sonyel, *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire* (Ankara: Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History Publications of Turkish Historical Society, 1993), 450-51.

¹³⁴Ibid., 452.

¹³⁵Ibid., 452.

citizens.¹³⁶ The legal embodiment of this commitment reflected in the article 88 of the 1924 constitution, which provided for the complete equality of citizens without distinctions of race and religion.

In addition, the Lausanne Treaty guaranteeing the rights of minorities in Turkey had been accepted before the adoption of the constitution of the Turkish republic (23 July 1923). Section III of the Lausanne Treaty (24 July 1923)¹³⁷ between Turkey and the allied powers,

¹³⁶See "Mütarekeden Meclisin Açılmasına Kadar Geçen Zaman Zarfında Cereyan Eden Siyasi Olaylar Hakkında" (About Political Events Occurred in the Period Between the Armistice and the Opening of the Assembly), *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, 24 April 1920, 31.

¹³⁷The regulation of the rights of minorities in the Lausanne Treaty is full of protections as regards the civil rights. Articles 38 and 39 contain provisions guaranteeing the rights of minorities in Turkey as inhabitants of the country.

Article 38 reads: "The Turkish government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty, to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinctions of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or in private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals."

The guarantees given to the minorities as inhabitants of the country were the full and complete protection of life and liberty and equality before the law. Article 39, Paragraph II reads: "All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law." As national of their respective countries the minorities are guaranteed civil and political rights. Article 38 provides: "Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Muslims. Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employment, functions and honours or the exercise of professions and industries."

In all other minority treaties all citizens are given the right to enjoy equal civil and political rights; in the Lausanne Treaty these rights were given only to non-Muslim minorities. The minutes of the Conference show that this stipulation was due to the declaration of the Turkish delegation that Muslim minorities, i.e., Arabs and Kurds, were completely satisfied with their status in the Turkish system and were not demanding protection.

i.e., Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania and Serb-Croat-Slovene state, (articles 37 to 45), guaranteed the status and rights of the non-Muslim minorities remaining in Turkey and of the Muslim minority in Greece. Through the Lausanne Treaty, all judicial capitulations and privileges of minorities except those related to private law were removed, and all legal affairs of them were included within the general Turkish law system in agreement to the promise of Turkish delegation to prepare a

The rights accorded to the members of minorities grouped under the name of "Rights for the Maintenance of Distinct Character" were:

Free use of language: The fourth and fifth paragraphs of art. 39 guarantees this right as follows: "No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings. Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the courts."

The right to instruction and education: The first paragraph of the article 41 provides for public instruction to minorities in their own language in the primary schools. Private instruction is provided with the stipulations of Art. 40.

Article 41 reads: As regards public instruction, the Turkish government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Muslim nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. The provision will not prevent the Turkish government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools."

Religious Freedoms: Freedom of conscience is guaranteed to non-Muslim minorities by Art. 43, which reads: "Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious observances and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest."

For the articles 37-45 concerning the protection of minorities, see Yılmaz Altuğ, *Minorities in Turkey* (Istanbul: Extrait des Annales de la Faculté de Droit d'Istanbul, 1957), 103-107; also see Reha Parla, ed., *Belgelerle Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin Uluslararası Temelleri Lozan, Montrö* (The International Foundations of Turkish Republic with Documents: Lausanne and Montro) (Lefkoşa, 1987), 10-13. It must be noted that Art. 37 prescribes that Turkey shall be obliged to recognise the articles 38-44 as a basic law, and no law, regulation and official act would violate these provisions. See, Parla, ibid., 10.

new civil code relieved of Islamic influences.¹³⁸ The new civil code (*Medenî Kanun*), which came into force in 4 April 1926, ended the ancient legal system based on religious community laws. Through this code, the new regime was able to regulate the issues of the private law and secured the legal Turkification of minorities by incorporating them into the legal sphere of the power container of Kemalist nation-state.

The right of minorities to settle matters concerning family law and personal status according to their own customs was guaranteed by Art. 42 and its application was put under special commissions "composed of representatives of the Turkish government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number" It reads: "The Turkish government undertakes to take, as regards non-Muslim minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities."¹³⁹

Upon the adoption of the Turkish civil code, the non-Muslim minorities were forced to renounce the special privileges of maintaining their own law on family and inheritance matters guaranteed by the article 42 of the Lausanne Treaty, and hence all international legal protections they held lost its pertinence.¹⁴⁰ The legal Turkification was complete.

¹³⁸See "Lozan Konferansı Hakkında Ankara'ya Avdet Etmış Bulunan Konferans Azasından Trabzon Mebusu Hasan Saka Beyin İzahatı" (The Explanation of Hasan Saka Bey About the Lausanne Conference, Trabzon Deputy and Member of the Lausanne Delegation, Who Returned Ankara) *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, period 1, vol. 3, 1 January 1923 (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1985), 1173.

¹³⁹See Seha Meray, comp., *Lozan Barış Konferansı-Tutanaklar, Belgeler* (Lausanne Peace Conference-Minutes and Documents), vol. 2 (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayıncı, 1970), 13.

7. 4. 2. Turkification of State Bureaucracy

It is a well-known fact that non-Muslims faced no restriction in their entrance into public service in the Ottoman Empire after the Tanzimat period. They served in state bureaucracy in complete equality with their Muslim counterparts. Even the secessionist movements among the minorities did not change this state of equality of opportunity.¹⁴¹

In the one-party period dominated by the Kemalist nationalist logic, the recruitment of non-Muslims into public bureaucracy was stopped first in *de facto*, and later in *de jure* terms. According to the article 4 of the Law entitled "*Memurin Kanunu*" (Law of Public Employees), "to be Turk" was a precondition for becoming a public employee.¹⁴² Given the crucial distinction between the identifications Turk and Turkish citizen, as explained before, to be Turkish citizen was not adequate to acquire the right to work as public employee.¹⁴³ This clause restricted to be public employee to the ethnic Turks or Muslim ethnies liable to Turkification, namely, Lazes, Circassians, Kurds with some reservations, etc. As such, this law was overtly exclusionary and ascriptive because regardless of merit, it closed the doors of state to the non-Muslim minorities as public employees owing to the fact that they cannot be Turkified in ethnic terms.

¹⁴⁰Ayhan Aktar, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları" (Turkification Policies Applied in the First Years of the Republic), *Tarih ve Toplum*, 156(December 1996), 8-9. Also see Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 15.

¹⁴¹Aktar, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları," 10-11.

¹⁴²TBMM *Kavanın Mecmuası*, Law No: 788, vol. 4, 509-521; *Resmi Gazete*, No: 336, 31 March 1926.

¹⁴³This state of affair was changed by the article 48 of the "*Devlet Memurları Kanunu*" (The Law for Public Employees), *Resmi Gazete*, No: 12056, 23 July 1965.

A striking manifestation of the ethnicist conception of Kemalist nationalism as reflected in public notices was the conditions of admission stipulated for the public school and state bureaucracy. The first conclusion to be derived from these notices is the fact that racism, however unsystematic, founded a place for itself in state policies. Drawing upon the scrutiny of these notices issued between 1936-1938, I categorised them in five groups:

1. Notices that did not mention the terms of nationality and citizenship.¹⁴⁴
2. Notices that mentioned the term citizenship only: In a notice entitled "*Sıhhat ve İctimai Muavenet Vekaletinden*",¹⁴⁵ after announcing that "the conditions of admission to the Boarding Medical Student Dormitory this year are as follows", it stipulates in the paragraph A that the presentation of national identity card (*Nüfus Hüviyet Cüzdanı*) which signifies his/her Turkish citizenship is a must. The same condition was set in the first article of the notice entitled "*Bursa Tarım Okulu Talebe Kayıt ve Kabul Şartları*".¹⁴⁶ The common feature of these notices are that they are concerned with the admission of students to the schools attached to state ministries.

¹⁴⁴See "Maliye Münfettiş Muavinliği İmtihanı" (The Examination of the Assistant Financial Inspector), *Cumhuriyet*, 22.06.1937, 9; and "İnhisarlı Umum Müdürlüğünden: İmtihanla Amir ve Memur Alınacaktır" (From the General Directory of Monopolies: Chiefs and Employees would be Recruited), *Cumhuriyet*, 23.07.1938, 6.

¹⁴⁵*Cumhuriyet*, 23.06.1937.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., 7 July 1938. For other notices of the same kind, see "Sıhhat ve İctimai Muavenet Vekaletinden: Çorum Leylî ve İstanbul Neharî Küçük Sıhhat Memurları Mekteplerine Alınma Şartları Şunlardır," *Cumhuriyet*, 15 July 1938; "T.C. Orman Umum Müdürlüğünden: Bursa ve Bolu Orman Mekteplerine Alınacak Talebenin Kayıt ve Kabul Şartları," *Cumhuriyet*, 4 September 1938.

3. Notices that mentioned only nationality: All of this category stipulated the condition of admission as to be Turk, a narrower category than that of the Turkish citizen.¹⁴⁷

4. Notices that mentioned the terms race and descent.¹⁴⁸

İsmet Tümtürk, a pan-Turkist and the child of a renown poet, Cenap Şehabettin, points out that at the time of Atatürk non-Turks in descent and blood were deprived of some rights by referring to the condition of being of pure Turkish descent (*öz-Türk soyu*) in the admission of students to the military schools. There were departments in the branches of *Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü* (the General Security

¹⁴⁷Here are some examples: "Avrupa'ya Talebe Gönderiliyor: Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Genel Müdürlüğünden," *Cumhuriyet*, 04 February 1937; "Kültür Bakanlığından: Ortaokullarda Türkçe, Tarih, Coğrafya, Riyaziye, Tabiiyye, Fransızca, Almanca ve İngilizce Öğretmeni Olmak İsteyenler İçin Bu Yıl Sınav Yapılacaktır," *Cumhuriyet*, 07 June 1937; "Hava Okulu Komutanlığından: Hava Okulu Gedikli Kismına Girme Şartları Sunlardır: A. Türk Olacak," *Cumhuriyet*, 14 July 1937; "Milli Müdafaası Vekâleti Hava Müsteşarlığından: Hava Müsteşarlığında Göstereceği Yerde Çalıştırılmak Üzere 210-165 Lira Ücretle Bir Mimar Alınacaktır," *Cumhuriyet*, 07 May 1938; "Sümerbank Umumi Müdürlüğünden: Lise ve Ticaret Mektepleri Mezunu (50) Memur Alınacaktır," *Cumhuriyet*, 07 May 1938; "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankasından: İstanbul Şubesi için Müsabaka ile 75 Lira Maaşlı 10 Memur Alınacaktır," *Cumhuriyet*, 1July 1938.

¹⁴⁸In all the following notices , being of Turkish race or descent is stipulated as a main condition of admission, in some occasions together with the condition of being Turkish citizen: "Ankara Askerî Baytar Mektebine Talebe Kayıt ve Kabulü," *Cumhuriyet*, 24 July 1937. The conditions of admission is to be of Turkish race as well as Turkish citizen. The notice of "Askerî Veteriner Okuluna Talebe Kayit ve Kabulü" cites the same condition. *Cumhuriyet*, 2 July 1938. "Türk Kuşu Genel Direktörlüğünden: Türkkuşu Teşkilatında Motorlu ve Motorsuz Tayyareler Üzerinde Öğretmen Olarak Çalışmak Maksadıyla Yetiştirilecek 15 Gence İhtiyaç Vardır: Aranan Belli Başlı Şartlar Sunlardır: 1. Türk soylu olmak." This notice mentions only descent and ignores citizenship. *Cumhuriyet*, 06 July 1938.

Directorate) which were responsible for identifying the bloods of the applicants if they were of pure Turkish descent.¹⁴⁹

5. Notices that mentioned both nationality and citizenship.¹⁵⁰

In the same period, private sector notices revealed the same confusion as regards the identification of the people it wanted to recruit. To illustrate, a notice was entitled "*Türk Genci Aranıyor*".¹⁵¹ In another notice entitled "*Daktilo Aranıyor*", being Turk both in nationality and citizenship were the conditions to be met.¹⁵² Being Turk or Turkish citizen were the set conditions in an another notice entitled "*Memur Aranıyor*".¹⁵³

The language of these notices signifies the hesitant and confused character of the state of mind prevailed in the Kemalist era. Overall, the certain thing in all these notices is the Turkishness of the people in ethnic terms to be employed or admitted as student. To be Turkish citizen did not suffice for admission. It was also required to be Turkish in ethnic terms.

¹⁴⁹"Dava Arkadaşlarr Atsız'ı Anlatıyor" (His Friends Describes Atsız), *Boğaziçi*, 42(December 1985), 32. For the confirmation of the practice of "blood inspection", also see Kivilcimli, *İhtiyat Kuvvet: Milliyet(Şark)* , 41.

¹⁵⁰See *Cumhuriyet* , 27 February 1937. For a notice of the same kind, see ibid., 12 July 1937.

¹⁵¹*Cumhuriyet*, 4 March 1937.

¹⁵²"Makine Ticaretiyle Meşgul Bir Ecnebi Müessesesinin Türkçe Muhaberatta ve Makine ile Yazı İşlerinde İstihdam Edilmek Üzere Daimî ve Genç Bir Memur Alınacaktır,"*Cumhuriyet*, 1 October 1937.

¹⁵³*Cumhuriyet*, 25 January 1938. In another notice entitled "*Harb Akademisi Komutanlığından*" (From the Commandership of War Academy), it was stipulated that "two men dactylographers who were Turkish citizen and Turkish" will be recruited, which meant that non-Muslim minorities who were Turkish citizen but not Turk could not apply. See ibid.

7.4.3. Turkification of Capital and Labour

Kemalist nationalist elites pursued the same line of policy with the Unionists as regards "*milli iktisat*" (National economy). This policy crystallised as the Turkification of both capital and labour markets. It mainly covered foreign companies working in Turkey and their foreign and non-Muslim personnel. The aim of this policy was the nationalisation of the enterprises owned by foreign companies and the securing of the employment of Muslim Turkish citizens in these enterprises. Through practical and verbal measures, foreign companies were forced to ensure that at least 75% of their personnel to be composed of Muslim Turks.¹⁵⁴ This distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim Turks, which would dramatically reemerge in 1942 with the practice of "*Varlık Vergisi*" (Wealth Tax), has an apparent discriminatory character, and ironically, despite the militant secularist discourse of Kemalist nationalism, it denotes the inherent definition of Turk as Muslim and equates nationalisation unavoidably with Muslimisation.

Another aspect of economic Turkification obliged all companies in Turkey to make all their transactions, contracts and communication in Turkish in accordance with the law entitled "*İktisadi Müesseselerde Mecburi Türkçe Kullanılması Hakkında Kanun*" (Law Concerning the Compulsory Use of Turkish in Economic Enterprises).¹⁵⁵ They also have to keep their accounts and account books in Turkish. Foreign companies had to use Turkish in their communication with Turkish citizens and in

¹⁵⁴For the various instances of the forced Turkification of the personnel composition of foreign companies in the one party period, see Aktar, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları," 9-10.

¹⁵⁵See *TBMM Kavanın Mecmuası*, Law No: 805, period 2, vol., 4, 556; *Resmi Gazete*, No: 353, 22 April 1926.

their official account books. This law was the replica of a similar law adopted during the rule of the Unionists. The aim was to force the employment of Muslim Turks in increasing numbers in foreign companies in Turkey, not the learning of Turkish by foreigners.¹⁵⁶

7.4.4. Generalisation of Turkish and the Campaign "Citizens, Speak Turkish!"

Generalisation of Turkish was the most important policy measure of Turkification endeavour. In this regard, the year of 1928 was a year in which the movement of Turkification assumed a new momentum and came up with the demand of speaking Turkish in public places and ensuring the mother tongue of minorities and their names to be Turkish. The reception of the Latin alphabet (1928), the current of the purification of Turkish and the Law of Family Names(1934) were the political reflections of these demands.

The Kemalist press launched a discussion started in 1928, which reached its peak in 1937 and continued until the death of Atatürk, the epitomisation of which was the campaign "*Vatandaş, Türkçe Konuş!*" (Citizens, Speak Turkish!), targeting not only non-Muslim minorities but also non-Turk Muslim ethnies, particularly Kurds.

Avram Galanti, a Turkish citizen of Jewish origin, published a study entitled *Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş Yahut Türkçenin Tamimi Meselesi-Tarihi, İctimai, Siyasi Tetkik* (Citizen, Speak Turkish or the Question of

¹⁵⁶Another aspect of economic Turkification was the exclusive allocation of certain crafts and professions to Turkish citizens, the aim of which was the exclusion of some 15 thousand Greek *etablis* from the economic sector and hence to force them to immigrate to Greece. See the law "*Türkiye'de Türk Vatandaşlarına Tahsis Edilen Sanat ve Hizmetler Hakkında Kanun*"(Law Concerning the Crafts and Services Allocated to Turkish Citizens in Turkey), *TBMM Kavanın Mecmuası*, Law No: 2007, period 4, vol., 11, 11 June 1932, 537-538; *Resmi Gazete*, No: 2126, 16 June 1932.

the Generalisation of Turkish-An Historical, Social and Political Study) in 1928.¹⁵⁷ In this study he tried to discern and examine the historical, social and political causes of why some non-Turkish elements speak Turkish while others do not speak and to demonstrate the ways and means to be used for the generalisation of Turkish.¹⁵⁸ The only way of linguistic assimilation, according to Galanti, was to make Turkish the language of instruction in all schools, including minority schools.¹⁵⁹

The mother tongue of part of Greeks in Turkey was Turkish.¹⁶⁰ Likewise, nearly all Armenians could speak Turkish. Some of them spoke only Turkish, while some were bilingual.¹⁶¹ The Jews in Turkey, however, spoke a "bad" Spanish.¹⁶² The efforts to generalise Turkish to minorities went back to the nineteenth century. The minorities tried to acquire the skill of speaking Turkish in order to better benefit from the new regime prescribed by the Tanzimat Edict.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁷ Avram Galanti, *Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş Yahut Türkçenin Tamimi Meselesi-Tarihi, İçtimai, Siyasi Tetkik* (Citizen, Speak Turkish or the Question of the Generalisation of Turkish-An Historical, Social and Political Study)(Istanbul: Hüsnü Tabiat Matbaası, 1928). In the cover page, Galanti is introduced as "Professor of Istanbul University and Member of Portugal Academy of Science" In the Introduction, Galanti states that "The Student Association of Istanbul Law Faculty demanded from the people to speak Turkish by considering the question of the generalisation of Turkish and determined that demand with the motto "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" See Ibid., 3.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., 3.

¹⁵⁹Ibid., 8.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., 15.

¹⁶¹Ibid., 26.

¹⁶²Ibid., 35.

¹⁶³Ibid., 62.

The generalisation of Turkish as a governmental policy began with the reception of non-Muslim students in secondary schools in 1867.¹⁶⁴ The claim of Greece in 1894 to annex Yanya on the ground that its populace spoke Greek enhanced Turkification efforts. New regulations were devised involving the compulsory instruction of Turkish in the Christian schools.¹⁶⁵ In the period of the Society of Union and Progress (CUP), in addition to the instruction of Turkish, some courses such as Turkish history and geography were required to be given in Turkish. This state of affairs continued until the foundation of the republic.

In the republican period, taking Turkification of minorities as a national goal, the new regime added courses of social and natural sciences into the group of courses to be instructed in Turkish.¹⁶⁶ According to Galanti, for the achievement of the goal of making Turkish to be spoken at home, Turkish must be made the medium of instruction in minority schools, and in general, minorities must be encouraged to join state schools rather than schools of minorities.¹⁶⁷

In the Kemalist crusade for the generalisation of Turkish, a secret circular issued by the Ministry of Interior in 1930 deserves particular attention. The circular considered among the jurisdiction of the provincial governors to incorporate the "Turks with foreign dialects" into

¹⁶⁴Ibid., 63.

¹⁶⁵Galanti cites the texts of two government reminders (*tezkire*) as an indication of this. Ibid., 64-65.

¹⁶⁶Ibid., 65.

¹⁶⁷Ibid., 65-66. *Millî Türk Talebe Birliği* (The National League of Turkish Students) actively involved in the encouragement of the policy of the generalisation of Turkish and even made a meeting with the purpose of warning the minorities as regards speaking Turkish. See Goloğlu, *Tek Partili Cumhuriyet*, 92-93.

the Turkish community through making Turkish their mother tongue. The governors were obliged to find out the most feasible ways and means for achieving this purpose. The common points of such a policy should include the following:

- determination of the names and population of villages speaking foreign dialects;
- to disperse the population of such villages into Turkish villages;
- to prohibit the reestablishment of villages and quarters with foreign dialects;
- to recruit the officials in these places from among Turks who do not speak the dialects of those places;
- to demonstrate that to speak Turkish and to belong to pure Turkishness (*som Türklik*) is beneficial not only spiritually but also materially;
- to encourage Turkish girls to marry Turks who do not speak Turkish;
- to disapprove and blame their clothing, songs, dances, wedding feasts and other customs, markers of nationality and race, to Turkify the names of their individuals and families and never to call them as Bosnian, Circassian, Laze, Kurd, Abhazian, Georgian, Turkmen, Tatar, Pomak; to change the name of villages in that dialect; to force them to speak Turkish with one another and have them to accept Turkishness by heart. In short, to make their language, customs and wishes Turk and to tie them to Turkish history and destiny is an important national duty for every Turk.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸"*İskana Tabi Tutulanların 'Türkleştirilmesi' Uygulamasına İlişkin Gizli Genelge,*" (The Secret Circular As Regards the Turkification of Those Who were Settled)No: 1/28 , (Ankara, 1930); cited by Bayrak, *Kürtler ve Ulusal Demokratik Mücadeleleri*, 506-509.

7.4.4.1. Generalisation of Turkish and the Turkification of the Jews

Unlike Christian minorities, particularly Armenians and Greeks, the Jews always remained loyal to the Ottoman state. During the First World War, they joined the Ottoman army and formed voluntary units from non-Ottoman Jews. They contributed to the war expenses. As a result, in the Eastern front, the Russian forces massacred Jews alongside Turks in 1915; the Greeks burned the Jewish quarter in Salonica in 1917.¹⁶⁹

During the period of the Armistice (post-1918), the Jews wholly sided with the Ottoman state both at the personal level and in community. Some Jews even joined the armed struggle against the invading forces.¹⁷⁰ Unlike the Greeks and Armenians, the Jews did not boycott the 1919 general elections. In the 1923 election, the Jewish community supported the Kemalist candidates.¹⁷¹ Overall, they proved that they consider the places they lived in as their homeland.¹⁷²

Although the secular character of the republic led to an identity crisis in the religious Jewish community,¹⁷³ the Jews were least harmed

¹⁶⁹Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye'nin Devlet Yaşamında Yahudiler* (The Jews in the State Life of Turkey) (İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1992), 169.

¹⁷⁰Ibid., 176-77.

¹⁷¹Ibid., 195.

¹⁷²For the loyal position of the Jews in the late ottoman and early republican era, see Sonyel, *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire*, 440-41.

¹⁷³The prohibition of the teaching of the classical Hebrew, was a major blow to the Jewish community. See Moshe Sevilla-Sharon, *Türkiye Yahudileri* (The Jews of Turkey) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992) 101-102.

by the reactive Kemalist nationalism, and ironically they lent support to it as seen in the case of Tekin Alp (Moiz Cohen).¹⁷⁴

The inability or unwillingness of the Jews to speak Turkish properly led to the exclusion of the Jews from the body politics. The question of language was the major obstacle before the integration of the Jews with the larger society. In view of this, the Jewish intellectuals spent great effort to generalise the speaking of Turkish within the Jewish community and set up several associations, one of them being "*Türkçe Konuşturma Birliği*" founded in Muğla in 1931.¹⁷⁵

In order to establish national integration, in the first place minorities had to be assimilated into Turkish creed, mind and language. According to Tekin Alp(1883-1961),¹⁷⁶ Turkification was a vital task for strengthening the Turkish society and preserving the Turkish culture and

¹⁷⁴ Yetkin, *Türkiye'nin Devlet Yaşamında Yahudiler* , 241.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 243.

¹⁷⁶ Tekin Alp is a renown pan-Turkist intellectual of Jewish origin. His Jewish name is Moiz Cohen. He was actively involved in the activities of the Society of Union and Progress (SUP)in Salonica between 1908-1912. He participated in the currents of Pan-Turkism, New Life (*Yeni Hayat*) and New Language (*Yeni Lisan*) guided by Ziya Gökalp. During this period, he publicised his ideas of pan -Turkism. Upon the fall of Salonica(1912), he settled in Istanbul. Inspired by Ziya Gökalp, worked as a unionist journalist of *Büyük Mecmua*. He theorised on national economy (*milli iktisat*) and wrote in periodicals *Türk Derneği* and *Türk Yurdu*, published with the assistance of the cultural division of the SUP.

In 1914 he wrote a book in German entitled *Türkismus and Pantürkismus*, considered at the time to be the bible of contemporary Turkish nationalism by the French historian René Pinon. In 1928, he published a book entitled *Türkleştirme* (Turkification)involving the Turkification of all peoples living in Turkey. Last but not the least, he published the most important and single book on the new regime entitled *Kemalizm*, published simultaneously in Turkish and French. The Turkish edition enjoyed great favour in Turkey, while the French one gained wide appreciation in Europe and America. See Jacob M. Landau, *Tekin Alp, Turkish Patriot 1883-1961* (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Arcacheologisch Institut, 1984), 287-88.

awareness.¹⁷⁷ The period when Turks were a parasite in political terms and non-Muslims in economic terms came to an end. In the new period of Turkishness the parasitic state of minorities, i.e., their non-assimilation could not be accepted. Now both the state of being *reaya* (tax-payers) and of parasitism are abolished. The aim of Turkification is to make Turk those citizens who are not Turk in terms of race and origin but possess the potential of transformation into a complementary part of national organism. ¹⁷⁸

The policy of "persuasion and pleasing" is proved to be more influential for nationalisation rather than force and violence, according to Tekin Alp.¹⁷⁹ The Turkish revolution turning "Ottoman" into "idealist Turk", "*kadi*" into "modern judge" and religious colleges and dervish lodges into "schools" is capable of making Turk those citizens whose material and spiritual benefits are tied to the homeland through the means of "persuasion and pleasing".¹⁸⁰

According to Tekin Alp, the determination of what distinguishes non-Turkish elements from the genuine Turks would reveal the methods to be used for national integration. In this regard, the removal of differences stemming from the components of culture, i.e., social environment, ethics, law, intellectual and aesthetical understanding, and scientific and economic considerations would ensure the unity of culture (*hars*), and hence national integration. The exclusion of religion from the make up of Turkishness resolved the question of religious distinction.

¹⁷⁷Tekin Alp, *Türkleştirme* , 16.

¹⁷⁸Ibid., 20.

¹⁷⁹Ibid., 10-11.

¹⁸⁰Ibid., 9.

The remaining most important element was the generalisation of Turkish.¹⁸¹

Viewing assimilation of minorities into Turkishness as the only means of preventing the domination of majority over minority, Tekin Alp asserts that those citizens belonging to minority groups had to be Turk in creed and culture as they were so in legal terms. Apart from the very recent past, there was no obstacle before their assimilation, and this was inescapable for those who did not want to remain as alien in this country.¹⁸² Tekin Alp refused race and origin as elements of Turkishness.¹⁸³ He argued that anyone who declared himself Turk should be accepted as such.¹⁸⁴

Tekin Alp set down the following ten imperatives for the Turkification of minorities by adopting the renown Jewish "ten commandments": 1. Turkify personal names! 2. Speak Turkish! 3. Pray (at least partly) in Turkish! 4. Turkify your schools! 5. Send your children to state schools! 6. Become involved in state affairs! 7. Mingle with Turks! 8. Uproot the spirit of separation! 9. Do your share for the national economy! 10. Know your rights!¹⁸⁵

Pointing to the difficulty of Turkifying the Christian minorities in Turkey, particularly due to the bad memories of the recent past, the religious bigotry dominating especially the Christians living in south-

¹⁸¹Ibid., 52-53.

¹⁸²Ibid., 29-32.

¹⁸³Ibid., 22-23. But he returned back to the theory of race in his book entitled *Türk Ruhu* (Turkish Spirit) published in 1944.

¹⁸⁴Ibid., 25.

¹⁸⁵Ibid., 65.

eastern Anatolia and the adoption by the Greeks of the "megalo idea"(big ideal), Fuat Köprülü, a Turkist historian and politician, pointed out that the only minority group that can really be Turkified is the Jews.¹⁸⁶Therefore the policy of Turkification during the Kemalist era basically targeted the Jewish community.

The decision of some municipalities in 1937 to ban the speaking of a language other than Turkish within their frontiers led to a public discussion in the newspaper *Tan* between the chief-editor Ahmet Emin Yalman and the chief rabbi of the Jewish Community, Marsel Franko, as regards the generalisation of Turkish and the Turkification of the Jews. The discussion revealed how part of the members of the "other" of Kemalist nationalism perceived the situation in which they lived.

In his editorial entitled "*Umumi Yerlerde Türkçe*"(Turkish in Public Places),¹⁸⁷ Yalman pointed to the ban put on the use of languages other than Turkish in public places by several municipalities,¹⁸⁸ and expressed

¹⁸⁶Ibid., 87.

¹⁸⁷Ahmet Emin Yalman, "*Umumi Yerlerde Türkçe*"(Turkish in the Public Places), *Tan*, 4 March 1937.

¹⁸⁸See, for example, a news pointing out that no language other than Turkish would be allowed to be spoken in public places in Dörtyol town: "Dörtyol'da Türkçe'den Başka Lisan Konuşulmayacak" (No Language will be Allowed to be Spoken Other than Turkish in the Town of Dörtyol), *Son Posta*, 23 September 1932. It must be remembered that part of the Dörtyol dwellers was composed of Arabic-speaking people. According to another news report, despite the fact that Mardin was a pure Turkish city, its people spoke Arabic in public places. To prevent this, the governor of the city banned to speak Arabic in public buildings. But in daily life Arabic still prevails. This unpleasant state should immediately be ended through various measures of punishment, according to the reporter. See "Uğraşılacak Bir Mesele: Türk Mardin Niçin Arapça Konuşuyor?"(A Matter to be Dealt With: Why Does Turkish Mardin Speak Arabic?)*Cumhuriyet*, 27 November 1937.

The two motions of Sabri Toprak, a deputy from Manisa, as regards the prohibition of migration of Jews to Turkey and penalising those who

his support for this action, though this issue was not among the jurisdiction of municipalities. He asserted that emigrants to Turkey continue to use languages they used in the countries they left (Greek, Bosnian, Circassian, etc.), which disrupted the socio-political unity of the country, and therefore had to be prevented. However, the situation in Istanbul was strikingly different, according to Yalman.

The homogeniesation secured through population exchange could not be valid for Istanbul, a cosmopolitan commercial centre. The speaking of a language other than Turkish by those whose mother tongue were not Turkish concerned these people only. It was beneficial to discern who willed to integrate with the larger society and who wanted to remain as an alien entity. In this regard, the state of the Jews was unique. All over the world, the Jews spoke the language of the society in which they lived, except Turkey. It was normal therefore to consider this state as an anomaly. As regards Armenians and Greeks, there was nothing to do.

Instead of *de facto* individual interventions against those who did not speak Turkish in public places, the policy of carrot and stick should be

do not speak Turkish are refused in the Internal Affairs Commission (*Dahiliye Encümeni*) on the ground that the legislation as regards the exclusive use of Turkish was adequate and therefore there was no need for a new law. As to the other motion given by the same deputy in 1936 demanding the prohibition of migration of Jews to Turkey the commission decided that this issue was related to the governmental authority and outside its jurisdiction. See "Türkçe Konuşma Teklifi Encümenlerde Reddedildi" (The Motion of Speaking Turkish was Rejected in the Commission), *Cumhuriyet*, 11 January 1938. As a matter of fact any legalisation of the compulsory use of Turkish in private life would necessarily violate the Lausanne Treaty. Knowing that, the Kemalist elites chose the way of implementing this policy through *de facto* administrative measures rather than legal means, an indication of political expediency on the part of Kemalist elites given that Kemalism is in fact a revolution by law. The rejection of the motion demanding the prohibition of migration of Jews to Turkey shows that Antisemitism never has found any recognition either in imperial or republican tradition.

pursued. Accordingly, the means for the free teaching of Turkish should be made available and the learning of Turkish by non-Turk elements should be encouraged while those who did not comply should be condemned. ¹⁸⁹

Yalman's article essentially dealt with the question of the assimilation (*intibak*) of the Jews in the context of the use of Turkish in public places. Marsel Franko, the chief rabbi of the Istanbul Jewish community, in his open letter to Yalman, discussed the instruments of the Jewish assimilation into Turkish culture.¹⁹⁰ According to him, "the question of language was only one aspect of the cause of *intibak* (assimilation)." "The essential thing was not to speak Turkish but to think and feel like Turk." There was no hindrance stemming from the state or the Jewish community before the assimilation of the Jews. Moreover, assimilation was a desirable thing for the Jews, because "these citizens whose spirits were suffering quietly due to the sense of spiritual exile were right in their expectations to reach spiritual citizenship by freeing themselves from half citizenship(*yarım vatandaşlık*), from being guest (*misafirlilik*) and from being Turk in terms of civil code only(*kanun-i medeni Türkliği*). In order to attain this goal, *intibak* (assimilation) must be seen as a state policy involving no coercion whatsoever. Marcel expressed his expectation from the state as follows: "State should treat assimilated individuals as genuine Turks so that hesitating ones should

¹⁸⁹A news in the same date pointed out that no order was given as regards the question of speaking with languages other than Turkish in public places in Istanbul. See "Umumi Yerlerde Türkçe İçin Henüz Emir Yok" (No Order Has been Issued Yet as to the Speaking of Turkish in Public Places), *Tan*, 04. 03. 1937.

¹⁹⁰"Dil ve Kültür Davası. Musevi Cemaati Başkanı Diyor ki" (The Cause of Language and Culture: The Chief Rabbi of the Jewish Community Says That), *Tan*, 6 March 1937.

understand that the right way, the way to salvation is the road leading to Turkishness."¹⁹¹

7.5. Concluding Remarks

Turkey experienced a severe experiment of socio-political engineering under Kemalist leadership throughout the lifetime of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the leader of the so-called "Turkish revolution". A new state and a new society, i.e., a nation-state was the end-product of this engineering process. All dissident claims to the public realm were suppressed, and when possible, eliminated. The maxim was

¹⁹¹Ibid. In an interview with him upon the open letter of Marsel Franko, Tekin Alp criticises Franko on the ground that the Jews are not a minority. Because if they were viewed so, then the state cannot attempt to assimilate Jews given the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty concerning the protection of minorities as distinct entities. The Jews do not constitute a minority either in Turkey or elsewhere in the World because they do not have a separate language, a culture or an ideal peculiar to themselves. Therefore they cannot be included within the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty concerned. To apply these provisions to the Jews means to deprive them from having a language, a culture and an ideal, which cannot be the intention of the politicians who made the Lausanne Treaty. See "Tekinalp: 'Türk Musevileri bir Azlık Değildir' Diyör"(Tekin Alp Says: Turkish Jews Are not a Minority), *Tan*, 9 March 1937, 1 and 10.

Reader letters to *Tan* respecting Franko's letter reveals striking opinions. Hasip Özyurt, a lawyer, was of the opinion that Jews cannot be remoulded as genuine Turks because their selfhood was kneaded with Judaism and hence it was not possible for them to acquire genuine Turkish (*öz Türk*) feelings. Conversely, a retired captain stressed his belief in the possibility of the Turkification of the Jews and complained of the fact that whenever the issue of speaking Turkish came into agenda, the question of advancing by degrees were being put forward. Another reader, M. A. Coşar, shared the same view with the retired captain and asserted that "I saw such Jews in France and England that they were no different from a French and an English in terms of language, feeling and culture." See "Türkçeleşme İşi Üzerinde Marsel Franko'ya Cevap"(Reply to Marsel Franko on the Matter of Speaking Turkish), *Tan* , 6 March 1937, 2; and "Bay Franko'nun. Mektubu. Karşısında Okuyucularımızın Düşünceleri" (The Opinions of Our Readers upon the Letter of Mr. Franko), *Tan* , 11 March 1937, 5.

that "Turkey is for Turks", because there were only Turks in Turkey. There was no such thing as "non-Turkish Muslim ethnies" As to non-Muslim Turkish citizens, they had to be Turk if they wanted to be "full citizens".

The Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, after returning from a travel to the eastern provinces in the end of 1932, made a speech in the Parliament. This speech concisely summarises Kemalist position as to the nature of Turkish national identity:

The order and security of the country, the trust of the citizens, the application of the laws as they are written,¹⁹² and the consideration of being warm and coalescent of the whole country on the Turkish nation, Turkish state is becoming year by year increasingly visible and powerful(cheers). This year I travelled in many places of the eastern provinces. The attachment of the citizens to Turkish nationality and Turkish state, and the power of Turkish state to apply the Turkish laws in every corner of the country are overtly striking the eyes. This country is Turkey. Turks living there, the Turkish patriotism and Turkish nationalism are effective and dominant in the administration of this country. We do not demand anything abnormal from any person living in this country in order to be Turkish nationalist and Turkish citizen. It is adequate for acquiring all the rights springing from being a member of Turkish nationality to love being Turk and accept being Turk (Bravo, cheers). Legal state is this. In our internal face, our sincere opinion too is the same. (Voices of 'bravo', cheers). When I travelled in the East and the West, I did not allow the concern of loosing any rights that every Turk obtains for any citizen who considers himself as Turk and acknowledges so. I assured all that a citizen who accepts to be Turk by heart as a distinction to be proud of and working as such possesses all the reasons for acquiring every right like me, like my all rights.¹⁹³

¹⁹²In fact, a characteristic feature of the one party period is the discrepancy observed between what is written and what is applied, as it is seen in the case of Turkification policies.

¹⁹³"İsmet Paşa Hazretlerinin Mühim Nutkunun Metni" (The text of the Important Speech of His Excellency, İsmet Pasha), *Cumhuriyet*, 21. 11. 1932.

This position differentiates Turkish citizenship from Turkish nationality defined in the image of Turkish ethnies, from a civilising perspective.

CONCLUSION

The primary goal of the Kemalist modernisation was "to reach and surpass the level of contemporary civilisation" through a monolithically conceived western model of development which was considered to be universally applicable regardless of the uniqueness of diverse cultural environments. The equation of modernisation with westernisation was in the final analysis an ideological preference of the western paradigm over "eastern"(read Islamic) way of life.

The "Euro-centric outlook" formulated by the Enlightenment thought assumed an inherent duality in the "development" trend of the East and the West. As such, the West is viewed to form part of the world history characterised by change and development, and the East unchanging, therefore the ahistorical part. This understanding portrayed western domination as a necessary stimulus to the "production" of change in the otherwise "inherently" stagnant East. This ahistorical mode of analysis describes the East and the West as contrasting ideal types: dynamic, rational, democratic West versus static, irrational, authoritarian East. This Euro-centric world-view finds its concrete expression in the nineteenth century orientalist tradition as regards the role of religion(Islam) in the "decline" of the Ottoman Empire. This decline was essentially ascribed to the flaws perceived to be inherent in the cultural environment that was predominantly Islamic in the incapability of the

production of change, i.e., "weak historicity", as Nilüfer Göle put it, of the Ottoman polity.¹

This conception of Islam as an obstacle to "development" was thoroughly in line with the assumptions of the Kemalist tradition. Kemalist secularism aimed at "liberating the individual from the 'oppressive' constraints of Islam-as-culture in his own community, thereby creating "a new national man"² Relegation of Islam into the consciousness of the individual at least and its total privatisation with no socio-political visibility at most were the mainstay of Kemalist secularism. Despite the difficulties of applying secularism in a predominantly Muslim country, the overall view of political landscape in the Kemalist era was impressive in this regard. As Lewis observed, Turkey in those years resembled a "positivist mausoleum".³

Kemalist nationalism was the first example of national liberation movements. The attainment of political independence accompanied by socio-political and cultural westernisation, and the creation of a new, "unique" national identity in order to restore the damaged collective honour characterise this liberationist nationalism. In other words, political independence (the National Struggle and the promulgation of the Republic), modernisation (nation-state and secularising reforms), and a new collectivity of national form (the new, ethno-secularly defined Turkish man) have been translated into actuality by the Kemalist

¹Nilüfer Göle, *Mühendisler ve İdeoloji* (Engineers and Ideology) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1986), 10.

²Serif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey" in *Islam in the Political Process*, ed., John L. Piscatory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 217.

³Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 480.

nationalism. The potential crisis of collective identity on the part of Kemalist bureaucratic-intellectual elites was expected to be resolved through the argument that all civilisations and languages are of Turkic origin, and that Turkey is a western country uniting the western and Turkic poles of identity in herself.

The most essential aspect of the Kemalist project of society has been the creation of a national community based on a common sense of "Turkishness" as the defining focus of individual loyalties out of a religious community. The socio-cultural aspect of Kemalist nationalism was based on the denial of socio-cultural and economic differentiation, stemming from religious, ethnic or class-based cleavages in line with the Kemalist vision of a society based on the positivist conceptualisation of modern science where the manifestations of religious life are confined to the privacy of the individual consciousness and populist social solidarity which rejected any division along ethnic or class lines. Given this, Levent Köker rightly concludes that although Kemalism could not be totalitarian in action, it was so in its vision of transforming society as a whole⁴ prescribing the total eradication of the remainings of the Ottoman-Islamic past. What was important for the Kemalist elites was the securing of "unity in people".

By adopting a national policy (*millî siyaset*), Kemalist nationalism openly rejected the "three ways of policy", namely Ottomanism, pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism as a solution for saving the state. It embraced a well-defined territorialism imbued with ethnic elements of Turkic character, symbolised in the name of *Turk*. This rejection of three "pan" systems reveals the non-expansionist, and strictly territorial nature of

⁴Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi* (Modernisation, Kemalism and Democracy) (Istanbul: İletişim, 1990), 112.

Kemalist nationalism. Accordingly, Kemalist nationalism preserved only a cultural interest with outside Turks, which contained no political implication.

This territorially defined nationalism was basically related to the foreign policy, however. Particularly, in its ethnicist conception, Kemalist nationalism embodied racial/ethnicist elements going well beyond the defensive nature of the "liberation nationalisms". Since the ethnic hegemony of Turks was considered given, the ethnicist face of Kemalist nationalism has had an understanding of national character as natural, fixed and superior rather than formed in socio-historical contingencies. In this context, ethno-secularism emerged as the bedrock of Kemalist nationalism.

There has been an intrinsic tension between the civic-territorial(legal-political) character of Kemalist nationalism and its ethnicist conception.⁵ This tension was not resolved conclusively, though one may say that the latter was instrumental and secondary in relation to the first in terms of the rationalist-civilisationist core of the teleological orientation of Kemalist nationalism prescribing "total westernisation".

In devising a new principle of social cohesion, Islam was thoroughly rejected in the Kemalist attempt at creating a Turkish national identity. The consciousness of the new Turkish man was to be rooted in positive science, i.e., western civilisation, a recurrent theme of Kemalist nationalism preaching science as the source of all valid knowledge and behaviour. This crude scientism led to the emergence of a "gap of romanticism" which brought about the increasing use of ethnic-

⁵Tanıl Bora,"Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Söylemleri: Melez Bir Dilin Kalın ve Düzensiz Lügati" (Nationalist Discourses in Turkey: The Thick and Untidy Vocabulary of an Hybrid Language).*Birikim*, 67(November 1994), 12.

genealogical and racial themes in the 1930s, a sign of the recognition of the helplessness of radical rationalism in the building of the national identity

In the Kemalist search for delimiting the ethnic-genealogical boundary of Turkish national identity, race was used as a constitutive element. Kemalist nationalism was not racist, however. In the first place, there has been no means for making racism part of the official state ideology in Turkey. Racism needs an anthropological and philosophical tradition of thought to rest on in order to become a state policy. There was no racist intellectual tradition powerful enough to nurture such a policy in Turkey. Moreover, no overlapping existed between religious and racial distinctions in the Ottoman empire. No racist breakdown ever happened in the Empire.

Apart from all this, racism is a totalitarian ideology and requires a totalitarian state, which can be the case only in modern industrial societies. Technologically highly developed states can afford to be totalitarian. Ottoman Empire and Turkey were at the periphery of the world economic system and had all the characteristics of a "backward" agricultural society. Coupled with the shortage of a qualified population the new Turkey faced, the adoption of racism which required the elimination of the "foreign elements", emerges as an extremely non-rational option. In view of the diverse ethnic composition of the polity, Kemalists preferred assimilationism as the state policy instead of systematic racism, an apparent indication of incomplete totalitarianism.

Kemalist nationalism defined belonging to Turkish community on the basis of the equation of nation with ethnies. At this point, the argument that all Anatolian peoples are Turk served the purpose of widening the extent of ethnically defined "us". In fact, ethnicity is an

inescapable necessity which resulted from the negation of religion as the focus of individual and collective allegiance. Therefore, in the definition of Kemalistically defined Turkish national identity, ethnicity is a secondary determinant. The main determinant is militant secularism based on the radical rationalism of the Enlightenment

The consideration of race as the constitutive element of ethnic Turkish identity may be viewed as the recourse of the Republican cause to the racial leitmotif due to the need of sparking mass mobilisation and emotive content which remained empty with the exit of religion from the popular imagery. This need was a structural one. The open conflict of Kemalist nationalism with the elements of traditional popular identity confined the republican cause to the Kemalist nationalist elites. Hence, the political component of Kemalist nationalism could not become the focus of popular allegiance. The crystallisation of ethnic Turkish identity on the axis of race, on the other hand, made the conflict between official and civil realms total. Use of citizenship rights were automatically tied to the adoption of an ethnosecular Turkish identity. In a way, in Turkey of ethnosecularist Turks, everybody had to be the children of *Bozkurt*(Grey Wolf).

The equation of nation with ethnies led to the rejection of ethnic differences in that recognition of ethnic diversity meant by definition the recognition of different nations. Therefore everybody in Turkey, including non-Muslim minorities, had to be ethnically Turk at the cost of violating the Lausanne Treaty.

It may at first sight seem paradoxical that Kemalist nationalism, which considers "social race" as the constitutive element of ethnic identity, is more assimilationist than being exclusionary in its dealing with existing different ethnic identities. Of course, this does not mean

that Kemalist nationalism does not possess an exclusionary dimension. The Turkish history thesis developed as part of the Kemalist nation building project may explain this seemingly paradoxical situation. This thesis assumed a kinship-based historical continuity between successive Anatolian peoples considered them all to be Turk. The suggested common denominator between these peoples assumed to be the racial continuity.

The ethnicist understanding of Kemalist nationalism turned nation-building process into an ethnic project determined by the notion of shared ancestry, and accordingly, tried to Turkify the self-proclaimed Turks, i.e., non-Turkish Muslim elements and non-Muslim minorities, in ethno-secular terms. This ethnosecular process of the delimitation of national identity identified cultural identity with ethnic identity. Ascription of pure Turkishness (*öz Türk*) to people whose mother tongue were Arabic or Kurdish clarifies this ethnocultural identification based on the notion of shared ancestry.

The components of the boundaries of Turkish national identity as determined by Kemalism is not thoroughly consistent with each other. It is evident that Kemalist racialism defining the Turks as a race of Central Asian origin cannot be reconciled with the religious and republican definitions of Turkishness. Accordingly, from a purely theoretical viewpoint, someone who cannot prove his/her Central Asian origin cannot be accepted as Turk. Likewise, those who do not belong to the Muslims of Anatolia-Rumelia (religious criterion) or Turkish citizens who do not share the ideal of the Republic (republican criterion) cannot be considered Turk, although they are Turk according to the racial definition.

All in all, there has never been a one-to-one correspondence between Turkish citizenship and Turkish national identity. The existence of Muslim ethnies namely, Kurds, Arabs and Circassians living within the frontiers of Turkey were rejected at the official level. The pseudo-scientific Turkish History Thesis was forged in order to claim that these ethnies are Turk in terms of their ethnic origin. In practice, however, recognising their diverse ethnic origins, various ethnic management strategies were applied in order to Turkify them, ranging from forced deportation and settlement to forced assimilation, and sporadic manifestations of physical elimination.

As to the Turkishness of the non-Muslim minorities, their Turkishness was a necessary consequence of their living within the Turkish community, i.e., of the fact that they were the citizens of the Turkish republic, and not more. Kemalist regime determined its policy of assimilation accordingly. The use of citizenship rights by the minorities, the existence and rights of which were guaranteed by the Lausanne Treaty (1923), was linked to the condition of their embracement of Turkishness. Since religion was excluded from the definition of Turkishness, this was thought to be a possible project.

Nevertheless because of the international umbrella of legal protection the minorities had, apart from the policy of settlement, they were made subject to assimilation policies only aiming at Turkification in terms of language and ideal, still in violation of the Lausanne Treaty. That is why Turkification policies basically targeted the Jews conceived as having no clear-cut language and culture peculiar to themselves, unlike Greek and Armenian communities who owned their well-rooted languages and cultures as well as nation states of their co-ethnies outside

the borders, which made their Turkification very difficult in comparative terms.

Thus, the Kemalist constitution of "us" incorporated the non-Turkish Muslims provided that they speak Turkish as the mother tongue and, of course, adhere to the republican ideal. Since the Turkification of non-Muslims, particularly Greeks and Armenians, was structurally "impossible" due to essentially religious and historical reasons, Turkification policies pursued against them assumed an anti-minority, discriminatory, exclusionary character, and hence they intrinsically formed part of the "other" of the Kemalist regime.⁶

Nonetheless, Kemalist elites envisaged an ethno-secular society melted in Turkishness, not a society based on ethnic stratification, at the top of which being Turks, though there were some bureaucrats and intellectuals who advocated this view among them.

Overall, the emergent Kemalist definition of Turkishness within the evolution of the parameters of Turkish national identity during the Kemalist era was that the complete, genuine, or pure Turk was the one who embraced the cause of the Republican ideal, devoted to Turkified western culture, spoke Turkish and descended from Turkish origin. Needless to say, the bond of citizenship was only officially acknowledged and had relevance only to the extent the aforementioned elements existed. Those who lacked any of the said parameters, i.e., politico-cultural and ethnic-racial ones, had to be compensated for. Consequently, the attainment of purity and strength of race, the adoption of Turkish not only as official language but also as the mother-tongue, devotion to the monolithically defined Turkish culture intermixed with the political ideal preached by the new Republic were the suggested "compensators."

⁶ Ayhan Aktar, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları" (Turkification Policies Applied in the First Years of the Republic), *Tarih ve Toplum* 156(December 1996), 4.

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APPENDIX A

TÜRKLÜK, MÜSLÜMANLIK, OSMANLILIK

Times gazetesi son nüshalarından birinde, memleketimizin ahval-i dahiliyesinden bahsettiği sırada, Ramazanın hulülü bir devre-i sükün gibi telakki ederek, ıslahat ve tecdidat hususunda takip ettiğimiz meslekin şimdiye kadar hasil ettiği muvaffakiyetleri bir lisan-ı takdir ile yad eyliyor.

Türkiye ahval-i dahiliyesinin, Türkiye remamdaran umurunun niyyet ve mesleklerini böyle hakkıla anlaşılmış görmek, bizi pek ziyade memnun edecek bir haldir. Çünkü Avrupa'nın cidden medeni, hür, alıcı-nap ve bîtaraf efkâr-ı umumiyesini kendi lehimize celb edebilmek için yegane muhtaç olduğumuz şey, kendimizi anlatmak, meslekimizin, âmâlimizin mahiyeti hakkında alem-i medeniyete bir fikr-i sahîh verebilmektir. Fikrimizi, kalbimizi anladıkta sonra Avrupa'nın bizi sevmemesi, bizi teşvik ve teşci etmemesi kabil değildir zannederiz.

İzaha lüzum bile görmeyiz ki, bahsettiğimiz efkâr-ı umumiye ve Avrupa, şark ahvalini bir fikr-i mahsus'a tab'an, kendi istedikleri şekilde görmek ve herkese o surette bildirmek meslekinde bulunan bazı alakadarın değildir. Biz hüsn-i niyyet sahibi, münevver'ül fikir Avrupa efkâr-ı umumiyesinden, yani alem-i medeniyetin ekseriyet-i azimesinden bahsediyoruz.

Times gazetesinin bir aralık hakkımızdaki mütalaati bizi rencide edebilecek bir mahiyeti haiz iken, şimdi böyle hakgûyane bir şekil alması, bittabi' nazar-ı dikkatte tutulacak bir vakiadır. Şu tâhvîl ve takdir lisanını ancak son ayarda gösterdiğimiz icraata ve fiiliyata medyunuz. Demek oluyor ki, alem-i medeniyet ve insaniyetin celb-i muhabbetine ve bu suretle vatanımızın tezyid-i kuvvet ve temin-i istikbaline cidden hâhişkâr ise, lakırkıdı, nazariyatı, mübahesatı biraz ihmâl edelim, biraz işe bakalım. Memlekette göz ile görülebilir, maddeten kabil-i takdir yenilikler, iyilikler yapmak için çalışalım.

Kemal-i teessürle itiraf etmeliyiz ki, biz ciddi surette çalışmağa ancak 31 Mart ihtilal-i mürtecianesinden sonra başladık. Bugün tecdid ve terakki namına ortaya çıkarmaya başladığımız âsar, ancak dört-beş aylık bir gayretin mahsülüdür. Meydanda maddi asar-ı teceddüt pek çok olmasa da hükümetin halinde, heyet-i mecmuasında.....görülen yenilik ve iyilik cidden mucib-i memnuniyet bir terakki-i maneviye delalet eder. Çünkü bütün dünya görüyor ki, genç Türkiye günden güne kuvvet buluyor, Genç Türkiye'nin dine, vatana, namus ve haysiyete fevkâlade irtibat-ı kavisi bulunması, sözünün eri olması, memletette rehber-i hare-

ket olarak adalet ve müsavat esaslarından başka bir şey tanımaması, hakkımızda hiss-i emniyet uyandırıyor. Şu halde, hükümet adamlarımızdan başlayarak, en aciz bir firkaya varıncaya kadar her hamiyetli Osmanlıya terettüp eden vazife, bu hiss-i emniyeti arttıracak, kuvvetlendirecek yolda müttehiden çalışmak ve çalışırken yegane hattı hareket olarak müsavat ve adalet esaslarından başka bir şey tanımamaktır.

Hiçbir zaman akıldan çıkarmamalıdır ki, 10 Temmuzdan 31 Marta varıncaya kadar geçen zamanda, bizi faideli surette çalışmaktan menden sebeplerden en mühimi ittihatsızlık idi. Bugün, şimdi zihinlerimize ve sinirlerimize gelen sükun ve selamet ile o eski günleri düşünecek olursak, adeta bir kabus hayatı yaşamış olduğumuzu teslimde tereddüt etmeyiz. O yaşayış, çalışış değildi. Bir didinme, bir boğuşma idi ki, hergün geçikçe tepindiğimiz yerde zemin alçalıyor ve ayaklarımızın altında bizi bütün mahv ve ifna edecek bir felaket uçurumu büyüyor.

Bu gafletin, bu birbirimize düşmenin acısını kanlı bir surette çekti. Fakat o felaket bize istikbal için bir ders teşkil edebilirse, yine bir nokta-i teselli bulunmuş sayılabilir.

Bu şehrin muhitinden, ikliminden midir, tarihin pek eski zamanlarına doğru irca-i nazar edilse, şu köhne Bizans'ın havasını, hep kardeş olan vatandaşların iki firkaya ayrılmış mübarizlari tarafından izhar edilen nida-yı mücadalât ile meşbu' buluruz, Bizanslar, eski Rumlar, bize siyasi düşman firkalara ayrılan bu şehrin, şu münazaalar neticesinde ne elim felaketlere, hatta ecnebi istilalarına uğramış olduğunu, acı tecrübe-lerle nakl ve hikaye ederler.

Birçok asırlar sonra hayat-ı siyasiyeye yeni doğan Osmanlıların da eski Bizans münazaat-ı mühlikesini taklit edercesine dahili nifak ve mübarezata girişmeleri, hakikaten ibretamız bir tehlike idi. Cereyan-ı tarihiyenin kanun-ı bîemanı, adeta istisna kabul etmez bir katiyet-i riyaziye ile gafilleri cezaya çarpar. İşte biz de bu dahili, bu bîlüzum gürültülerden, kardeş kardeşçe açtığımız harbden mahv ve harabîye, ecnebi istilasına maruz bir hale gelivermiştik. Bir mucize Türkiye'yi kurtardı. Kalbimizde buna karşı bir vazife-i şükran hessediyorsak, vatanımız uğrunda fedakarlık etmek lüzumunu takdir eyliyorsak, bunu ufak tefek, bîsesas, sîrf şahsi ve azamet ve nahvet cereyanlarından mütevellit iğbirarlara esir olmak, birbirimizi sevmek suretiyle ifa edelim. Unutmayalım ki, memleketimiz bir takım sadmelere göğüs gerebilmek için kuvvetli bulunmağa muhtaçtır. Bu kuvveti ancak ittihad husule getirebilir. Memleketimizin her türlü tehlikeden masun kalacak surette takviyesi, sine-i vatanدا ancak üç türlü bir ittihat kuveti vücuda getirmekle kabil olacağını zannederiz. Arzu ettigimiz ittihatlar bir kere Türk sıfatıyla, sonra İslam sıfatıyla, en nihayet Osmanlı sıfatıyla gittikçe büyümek, gittikçe daire-i nüfuzunu artırmak ve gaye-i kemale varmak suretiyle vücuda gelebilir.

Memleketi mahv ve harabiyetten kurtaran İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyetinin gaye-i emeli olan bu ittihad-ı umumiye-i anasıı ancak böyle sıkı, esaslı temeller üzerine kurulmak şartıyla ve senelerce gayretle, fedakarlıkla çalışmak sayesinde kabil olabilecektir. Böyle olduğu halde ortaya "cemiyet" ve "ahrar" namiyle, az kaldı ebedi olmak tehlikesini iktisab edebilecek bir münaferetin tohumları atılmıştı. Cemiyetin muhafaza-i

Meşrutiyet ve temin-i selamet-i vatan cümleleri altında hülsa edilebilecek olan gaye-i maksudu bütün Türkleri, İslamları, gayr-i müslimleri aynı nokta-i ittihat etrafında toplayabilecek ve aynı zamanda hiçbir kimesnenin kanaat-i zatiye ve vicdaniyesini rencide etmeyecek dercede väsi' iken, tefsirinde her taraftan vukua gelen kusurlar neticesinde bu geniş düstur pek dar gibi geldi. O zaman hüsn-ü niyyetlerinde, namuslarında fedakarlıklarında, hamiyetlerinde zerre kadar tereddüt edilemeyecek vatandaşlar birbirlerine düşman vaziyeti aldılar. Bundan memlekette birkaç mürteci, birkaç entrikacı müstefid oluyordu. Fakat işin içine hissiyat o kadar karışmış idi ki, o gürültüde salim bir fikir ile muhakeme ederek bekleyen netice-i mühlîke-yi temyiz edebilmek gayr-i kabil idi. Fakat bugün itidal-i dem ile, basiret ile işi muhakeme edip de bizim aramızdaki nifakın vatanı mahvetmekten başka bir netice tevlid etmeyeceğini görmeyecek olursak, bir hiyanet işlemış oluruz.

Erimiş bir madde tebellür edebilmek için bir nokta-i istinat arar. Meşrutiyet ateşiyle eriyen bütün muhtelif kabiliyetlerin, milliyetlerin tebellürüne nokta-i istidat olacak anasır ise Türk unsurudur. Türk unsurunu bu büyük vazife-i vataniyeyi ifa edebilmek için behemehal son derece müttehit ve müttefik olmağa mecburdur. Türkler kendi aralarında birbirlerine düşman-ı can gibi bir vaziyet-i mukabele alırlarsa diğer unsurları nasıl daire-i ittihada davet edebilirler! Memlekette cemiyet ve ahrar tarftarı yoktur. Memlekette erbab-ı namus ve haysiyet, erbab-ı gayret ve hamiyet ile namussuzlar ve entrikacılardır. Emin olalım ki, bu ikinci kısmın miktarı pek mahduttur. Birinci sınıf, ekseriyet-i azimeyi teşkil eder. Hüsn-i niyet ve namus ve hamiyet sahiplerinin birbirleriyle anlaşmamaları için ise hiçbir sebep tasavvur edilemez. Cemiyete mensup olup olmamak, bu bütün bütün başka bir meseledir. Bunu, selamet-i vatan uğrunda birleşmek meselesinde ortaya çıkarmayalım. Hepimizin arasında namus, hamiyet, fedakarlık ve fikr-i terakki pek kuvvetli bir rabita-i ittihat vücuda getirebilir.

Türk olmak itibariyle böyle birleştiğimiz gibi, İslam olmak itibariyle de diğer vatandaşlarımız arasında ilelebed bozulması gayr-i kabil bir rabitanın, bir mecburiyet-i diniye olarak mevcut olduğunu düşünmeli ve birbirimizi daha iyi anlayarak bu rabitayı sıklaştırmaya çalışmalıyız. Bu vazifemizi hakkıyla ifa edecek olursak, yalnız şarkta değil, bütün dünyada İslamiyetin muhafaza ve i'la-yı şan ve şerefini temin etmiş oluruz.

Gayr-i müslim vatandaşlarımıza, kardeşlerimize karşı olan vazifemizi de, aynı fikr-i hakkaniyet ve müsavat dairesinde, kemal-i samimiyet ile tatbik ve icra etmek bizim için bir borçtur. Muhtelif ırka, dine mensup olmak, bizi bir vatandaş sıfatıyla tesis-i rabita-yı uhuvvete izhar-i muvafakattan men etmez. Bilakis buna sevk eyler.

İşte bu üzçüzlü ittihat, arzu ettiğimiz vechile saha-i husule vasil olduğu gün, biz de gaye-i emelimize varmış olacağız. İhtimal ki, bu gaye henüz pek uzaktır. Fakat necip ve ulvi bir maksada vakf-ı hayat ederek şu mevcudiyet-i sefilemizi yükseltmeyecek olduktan sonra, yaşamamanın ne zevk-i manevisi vardır?

Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), *Tanin*, 16 September 1325(1909).

APPENDIX B

MİLLET-İ HÂKİME

İngiltere'de Unionist Fırkasının vasıta-i neşr-i efkârı olup, ayda bir kere intişar eden ceraid-i siyasiye içinde pek ziyade haiz-i ehemmiyet ve ve itibar olan "Nasyonal Ruhu" Müdürü Sermaks cenaplarından bir mektup aldık. Bunda İngiliz ve Türk kavimlerinin kendi aralarını bozmak isteyenlerin meydana attıkları şayialara karşı müteyakkız bulunmaları lüzumundan bahsedildikten sonra, İngiltere'de idare-i meşruta-i Osmaniyeye karşı son derecede eser-i bahs ve ve irtibat mevcut olduğu ve bugün Türkiye hakkında kavaid-i adaletin icabat-ı dairesinde hareket edilmesini talip bulunan seyr-i edvarda Girit politikasına karşı umum İngiliz milletinin müttefikan ve müttehiden irae ettikleri eser-i tasvip ve müzaheretin, hiçbir mesele-i hariciyede misli görülmemiş olduğu söyleniyor ve risalenin bazı makalatı hakkında Tanın'ın bilhassa nazarı dikkati celb ediliyor.

Mecmuanın havi olduğu makalat-ı mühimmeden birkaçı, memleketimize aittir. Bu meyanda "Türkiye'de İslahat Teşebbüsati" ünvanı altındaki makalenin sonlarına doğru okuduğumuz satırlar, bugün bizi "millet-i hâkime" meselesi hakkında bazı mütalaatta bulunmağa sevk etti. Kendi mütalaalarımızı söylemeden evvel makalenin bazı fikralarını nakledelim:

"Bugün Türkiye'nin maruz bulunacağı müşkilat-ı hariciyeden birçogunda ittihaz edilecek meslek, Türkiye Hristiyanlarının takip edecekleri hatt-ı harekete bağlıdır. Türkiye'de yaşayan Hristiyanlar şunu anlamalıdır ki, hürriyet, müsavat ve uhuvvet avazları, el-yevm Türkiye'de millet-i hâkimenin yalnız Sultan Osman ile birlikte memleketi zapt etmiş olan cengaverlerin evlat ve ahfadından ibaret bulunmasını ve Türk imparatorluğu payidar oldukça böyle olması lazım geleceğini ihlal etmez.

Millet-i hâkime olan Türkler, bütün tebaları için cins ve mezhep hususunda hürriyet-i tamme bahş ve ita ve bunu taahhüt etmekle kendi mevcudiyet-i hayatıyelerini bile tehlikeye koymuşlardır. Türk parlamentosunda Müslüman unsurunun tefevvukunu arzu etmek, Türkler için pek muhik ve adilane bir emeldir ve Türkiye'nin saadet ve selameti için birinci derecede lazım olan müesserettandır.

Müslümanlar yeni parlamentoda kendi azalarının adetçe Hristiyan azalardan dün olduğunu görecek olurlarsa, neticesi behemehal Meşrutiyet idaresinin sonu olur.

Bu suretle tevvellüt edecek heyecan ve buhran üzerine Türkler, ehven-i şerri tercih kabilinden olmak üzere istibdad-ı idareye taraftar kesileceklerdir. Sonra, Hristiyanlara karşı muamele-i hasmane gösterilmeye başlanacak, bunun seyyiesiyle hem Türkler hem Hristiyanlar mahvolacaklardır."

İngiltereli dostlarımızın şu dûr-endişane sözleri, gerek Müslüman gerek gayr-ı Müslüman unsurlar tarafından kemal-i dikkatle nazar-ı ehemmiyete alınarak uzun uzun düşünülecek mesailidendir.

İstanbul'da anasır-ı Osmaniyenin muhadenet ve ittihadi, ne kadar kuvvetli ümitler beslersek besleyelim, bugün bir vakia-i hakikiye şeklinde binlerce misali delaili ile gözlerimizin önünde durduğu için, muhakkak olarak biliyoruz ki, bu devletin bekasını Müslüman unsuru kadar isteyen ve çalışan yoktur. Bugün şu devleti, kendisine yalnız Müslüman unsuru mal ediyor, "Benim hükümetim!" diyor. Anasır-ı saire az-çok hep bir emel arkasındadır. Bunlar muhtelif mahreklerde deveran eden ecram-ı semaviyeye benzer. Hepsı başka bir merkeze tabidir.

Eğer hüküm ve nüfuzu biz bugün anasır-ı gayr-ı Müslimeye tevdi edecek olursak, hiç şüphe yok ki, bunların icraat ve harekatında yegane rehber menfaat-ı Osmaniye endişesi olmayacaktır.

Demek oluyor ki, biz Müslüman unsur, memleketin şu halinde hayatımı kutarmak istersek, huküm ve nüfuzu kendi elimizde tutmalıyız ve anasır-ı saireye bunu kaptırmamalıyız.

Şimdi Meşrutiyet hükümetini ilan ve kabul ettik. Medeni milletlere layık usul-i idare altında yaşayacağız. Binaenaleyh, "hüküm ve nüfuzu kendi elimizde tutalım" demek, "anasır-ı gayr-ı Müslimeyi kendimizle müsavi addetmeyelim, onlara hukuk-u siyasiye vermeyelim, canımızın istedığını icra ederek, gayr-ı Müslümanların haklarına tecavüz edelim" manasıyla tefsir edilmemelidir. Mugayir-i hak ve adalet olan bu harekat, yirminci asr-ı medeniyede gayr-ı kabil-i tatbiktir. Bu hakikati takdir edemediğimiz için devletimizin birçok parçasını elimizden kaçırdık ve az kaldı mevcudiyetimizi de kaybediyorduk.

Meşrutiyet usulü ile idare olunan memleketimizde, huküm ve nüfuz parlamentodadır. Parlamentoda huküm ve nüfuz ise ekseriyetle temin edilir. Onun için bugün parlamentoda ekseriyeti kazanmak, Türkler için hayat ve memat meselesidir. Parlamentoda ekseriyeti kazanmak da, intihabat kanununu işimize geldiği surette tatbik suretiyle istihsal edilmez. Kanun haricinde en ufak bir hareketin vukuuna artık cevaz veremeyiz. Onun için ekseriyeti, kanunun tecviz ettiği vesaite müraaatla kazanmalıdır.

Memalik-i Osmaniye'de ekseriyet ahali-i Müslimedede olduğu cihetle mebusanın ekseriyeti de Müslümanlarda bulunacağına emin yaşamak ve gözü bağlı durmak, sonra pek acı bir uyanma ile netice verir. Teessüfle görüyoruz ki Müslüman unsura mensup çoğu, intihabatın ehemmiyetini takdir etmiyor, rey vermeğe gelmiyor. Rey verenler ittihat edemedikleri için, ellerinde bulunan iktidar ile mütenasip mebus çıkaramıyorlar. Namzetlerin takarrurunda müzakereler edilirken menafi-i ulviye-i vatan mülahazasıyla fedakârlıklar pek ihtiyar olunmuyor. Parlamentoda ekseriyet Müslüman unsurda olsa bile, bunlardan menafi-i hakikiye-i va-

tana muvafik icraat südürü edebilmek için aralarında fırkalar vücut bulmamak, ırk mülahazaları meydan almamak iktiza eder. Böyle ufak tefek mübayanetler, "temin-i selamet-i vatan" endişesinden ibaret olan menfaat-ı müstereke karşısında zail olmak iktiza eder. Hakiki vatanperverlik birçok ahvalde fedakarlık kelimesiyle müteradiftir. Bugün uhde-i hayatı yemeye düşen şu vazife-i vatanperveraneyi hakkıyla yapmayıp da birbirimize düşecek olursak, o zaman İngiltereli dostlarımızın korktukları akibetin tahakkukundan biz de korkmaliyiz.

Filhakika, parlamentoda gayr-ı Müslüman unsurlar gerek adeden ve gerek adeden olmayip da bizim aramızdaki tefrikaya nisbeten bize faik zuhur edecek olurlarsa ne yapacağız? Yapacakları kanunlar, kabil değil millet-i hâkimenin menfaatine olmayacaktır. Buna karşı ne yapacağız? Meclis-i Mebusan'ı mı dağıtacağız? Gelecek Meclis-i Mebusan'da, temini galebe edeceğimize nereden emin olacağiz? Hem Meclis-i Mebusanı dağıtmak tedbiri tehlikeli bir silaha benzer. Onun için pek nadir ahvalde, bir zaruret-i fevkaladeye mebni yapılmalıdır. Görülüyor ki, Müslüman unsur için düşünülecek başlıca noktalar bunlardır. Bu fikradan biraz evvel söylediğimiz vechile, gayr-ı Müslüman unsurlar da büyük bir hisse-i intibah alabilirler. Şimdiye kadar kendileri bu memlekette ne idiler?

İslahat fermanlarına, Tanzimat hatlarına rağmen, hukuk-u siyasiye nokta-i nazarından bir mahkum, bir hiç idiler. Vakıa, millet-i hâkime denilen Türkler kendilerine nisbetle daha ziyade esir bulunuyorlardı. Türklerin hiç hamisi olmadığı halde, akvam-ı Hristiyaniyenin arkasında koca bir Avrupa vardı ki, idare-i müstebidenin haysiyetsizliğinden istifade ederel; her vesile ile umur-u dahiliyemize müdahale ederdi.

Onun için Hristiyanlar mevkilerinin acılığını ihtimaldir ki, o kadar hissetmiyorlardı. Bugün Genç Türkler, gayr-ı Müslüman vatandaşlarına da Müslüman unsuru kadar hukuk-u siyasiye temin ediyorlar. Kanun nazarında suret-i katiyede müsavat kaidesine riayet edilmesini, mesleklerinin birinci şerait-i cümlesinden olarak ileriye sürüyorlar.

Fakat gayr-ı Müslümanlar de Müslümanlar kadar hukuka nail olacaklardır demek, acaba bu memleket, Rum memleketi yahut Ermeni memleketi yahut Bulgar memleketi olacak demek midir? Hayır, bu memleket Türk memleketi olacaktır. Osmanlı namı altında hepimiz birleşeceğiz. Fakat devletin şekli hiçbir zaman Türk milletinin menfaat-ı mahsusası haricinde tahavvüle uğramayacak, Müslüman unsurun menafi-i hayatıyesi hilafında hareket olunamayacaktır.

Rum gazetelerinden biri, "madem ki Tanın hep birden şu vatan-ı müsterekin selametine çalışıcağız diyordu. O halde neden, Rumlardan fazla mebus çıkacak diye endişe ediyor?" sualını irad etmekde idi. Buna işte şimdi kendiliğinden cevap veriliyor. Çünkü bir Müslüman unsurun menfaatinin diğer ellerde hakkıyla müdafaa edilemeyeceğini biliyoruz. Karşımızdaki unsurların da bize bu suretle mukabele edebilmeleri, yani Müslüman unsurun da "gayr-ı Müslüman unsurun menafiini muhafaza meşkuktur," yolunda söz söylemeleri yanlış olur. Muhafaza edilecek hukuk yalnız emniyet ve asayıf, adalet gibi hukuk-u zaruriyeden olsa idi, o zaman hiç endişe etmeyebilirdik. Meclis-i Mebusan'da ekseriyet-i azime Rumlarda da, Ermenilerde de olsa, mahkemeler de Türklerin aleyhine

hüküm verilsin, Türkler zulmedilsin şeklinde bir kanun yapılmaz. Fakat farzedelim ki, Osmanlı parlamentosunda ekseriyet-i mutlaka Rumlarda bulunsun ve Girit'in Yunanistan'a ilhaki meselesi müzakereye konulsun. Bunu tecavüz etmeyecek, hatta Yanya taraflarından da arazi terk etmeye kalkmayacak Rum mebuslarının miktarı, insaf edilsin, acaba kaça balığ olur? Ekseriyeti Bulgar mebuslardan müteşekkil bir Osmanlı parlamentosunun, Makedonya hakkında vereceği karar da şüphe götürmez zannederiz.

Bu memleketi Türkler zaptetti. Fethetmek için yaptıkları fedakarlıklar tarihin en hayretbahş sahifelerini, en parlak mefahirini teşkil eder. Su-i idareyle Türklerin kuvetine halel gelince, memleketin büyük kısmını elliinden kaybettiler. Fakat geride kalan en ufak bir parçayı bile kanları pahasına hifz eylediler. Türklerin el-yevm zır-i idarelerinde bulunan memalikde asırlardan beri devam etmiş hukuk-u tarihiyeleri, hukuk-u fatihaneleri var. Bu memleketi, anasır-ı gayr-ı Müslümanenin hiçbirinin menafi-i mahsusasına baziçe yapamazlar. Osmanlı namı altında yaşayan Musevilere, Ermenilere, Rumlara, Bulgarlara, hasılı bütün anasır-ı gayr-ı Müslümaneye dahi müsavat, adalet, hürriyet kaideleri dairesinde muamele-i uhuvvetkârane gösterirler, fakat hiçbir zaman kendilerini unutmazlar. Osmanlılık namı altında memlekete muzır âmâl beslenmesine kail olamazlar. Bugün Müslüman unsurla kardeş gibi geçinmek isteyen gayr-ı Müslüman vatandaşlarımız, vicdanlarıyla evvela uzun bir hasbihalde bulunmalıdırular. Türküyü yıkacak, hükümetin rengini Türk ve Müslüman hükümeti olmaktan çıkaracak emelleri, kalplerinden -eğer varsa- silmeye kendilerinde cesaret görmeli, ondan sonra bizim aüş-u muhadetimize bila-havf ve endişe atılmalıdır. Bizden korkacakları yoktur. Yalnız, onlar bizi muhaleset-i kalbiyelerine inandırmalıdırular. Çünkü ne denirse densin, memlekette millet-i hâkime Türklerdir ve Türkler olacaktır.

Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), *Tanin*, 25 October 1324(1908).

APPENDIX C

THE NATIONAL PACT

Translation of the Turkish text of the National Pact, as printed in the Proceedings of the Turkish Chamber of Deputies (*Meclis-i Meb'usan*) of the 17th February 1920.

The Members of the Ottoman chamber of Deputies recognize and affirm that the independence of the State and the future of the Nation can be assured by complete respect for the following principles, which represent the maximum of sacrifice which can be undertaken in order to achieve a just and lasting peace, and that the continued existence of a stable Ottoman Sultanate and society is impossible outside of the said principles:

First Article— Inasmuch as it is necessary that the destinies of the portions of the Turkish Empire which are populated exclusively by an arab majority, and which on the conclusion of the armistice of the 30th October 1918 were in the occupation of enemy forces, should be determined in accordance with the votes which shall be freely given by the inhabitants, the whole of those parts whether within or outside the said armistice line which are inhabited by an Ottoman muslim majority, united in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for each other's racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance.

Second Article— We accept that, in the case of the three Sanjaks which united themselves by a general vote to the mother country when they first were free, recourse should again be had, if necessary, to a free popular vote.

Third Article— The determination of the juridical status of western Thrace also, which has been made dependent on the Turkish peace, must be effected in accordance with the votes which shall be given by the inhabitants in complete freedom.

Fourth Article— The security of the city of Constantinople, which is the seat of the Caliphate of Islam, the capital of the Sultanate, and the headquarters of the Ottoman Government, and of the Sea of Marmara must be protected from every danger. Provided this principle is maintained, wha-

tever decision may be arrived at jointly by us and all other Governments concerned, regarding the opening of the Bosphorus to the commerce and traffic of the world, is valid.

Fifth Article— The rights of minorities as defined in the treaties concluded between the Entente Powers and their enemies and certain of their associates shall be confirmed and assured by us- in reliance on the belief that the moslem minorities in neighboring countries also will have the benefit of the same rights.

Sixth Article— It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development should be renderedpossible and that it should be possible to conduct affairs in the form of a more up-to,date regular adminibtration.

For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in political, judicial, financial and other matters.

The conditions of settlement of our proved debts shall likewise not be contrary to these principles.

From Lord Kinross, *Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson,1964), 531-532; taken from Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* (London, 1922).

APPENDIX D

TÜRK MİLLETİNİ TEŞKİL EDEN MÜSLÜMAN ÖĞELER HAKKINDA

Efendiler, meselenin bir daha tekerrür etmemesi ricasıyla bir iki noktayı arzetmek isterim: Burada maksut olan ve Meclis-i âlinizi teşkil eden zevat yalnız Türk değildir, yalnız Çerkes değildir, yalnız Kürt değildir, yalnız Lâz değildir. Fakat hepsinden mürekkep anasır-ı İslamiyedir, samimi bir mecmuadır. Binaenaleyh bu heyet-i âliyenin temsil ettiği, hukukunu, hayatını, şeref ve şanını kurtarmak için azmettiğimiz emeller, yalnız bir unsur-u islama münhasır değildir. Anasır-ı İslamiyeden mürekkep bir kütleye aittir. Bunun böyle olduğunu hepimiz biliriz.. Hep kabul ettiğimiz esaslardan birisi ve belki birincisi olan, hudut meselesi tayin ve tesbit edilirken, hudud-u millimiz İskenderun'un cenubundan geçer, şarka doğru uzanarak Musul'u, Süleymaniye'yi, Kerkük'ü ihtiva eder. İşte hudud-u millimiz budur dedik! Halbuki Kerkük şimalinde Türk olduğu gibi Kürt de vardır. Biz onları tefrik etmedik. Binaenaleyh muhafaza ve müdafasıyla iştigal ettiğimiz millet bitti bir unsurdan ibaret değildir. Muhtelif anasır-ı İslamiyeden mürekkeptir. Bu mecmuayı teşkil eden herbir unsur-u islam, bizim kardeşimiz ve menafii tamaamıyla müsterek olan vatandaşımızdır ve yine kabul ettiğimiz esasatin ilk satırlarında bu muhtelif anasır-ı İslamiye ki: Vatandaşlıklar, yekdiğerine karşı hürmet-i mütekabile ile riayetkârdırlar ve yekdiğerinin her türlü hukukuna, ırkı, içtimâî, coğrafi hukukuna daima riayetkâr olduğunu tekrar ve teyid ettik ve cümlemiz bugün samimiyle kabul ettik. Binaenaleyh menafiimiz müsterektir. Tahsiline azmettiğimiz vahdet, yalnız Türk, yalnız Çerkes değil hepsinden memzuç bir unsur-u İslamdır. Bunun böyle telakkisini ve su-i tefehhümata meydan verilmemesini rica ediyorum (alkışlar).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Söylev ve Demeçler I*, Mayıs 1920, 74-75.

APPENDIX E

TÜRK MİLLETİNİN MÜTALAASI

Din birliğinin de bir millet teşkilinde müessir olduğunu söyleyenler vardır. Fakat biz, bizim gözüümüz önündeki Türk milleti tablosunda bunun aksini görmekteyiz.

Türkler İslam dinini kabul etmeden evvel de büyük bir millet idi. Bu dini kabul ettikten sonra, bu din, ne Arapların, ne aynı dinde bulunan Acemlerin ve ne de vesairenin Türklerle birleşip bir millet teşkil etmelerine tesir etmedi. Bilakis, Türk milletinin milli bağlarını gevşetti; milli hislerini, milli heyecanını uyuşturdu. Bu pek tabii idi. Çünkü Muhammed'in kurduğu dinin gayesi, bütün milliyetlerin fevkinde, şamil bir ümmet siyaseti idi.

Millet neye derler? Bugün Türk Cumhuriyetini kurmuş olan Türk milleti'ni mütalaa ederken bulduğumuz şartları tekrar gözden geçirelim:

a) Siyasi varlığımızın haricinde, başka ellerde, başka siyasi zümlerle, isteyerek veya istemeyerek teşrik-i mukadderat etmiş, bizimle dil, ırk, menşe birliğine malik ve hatta yakın uzak tarih ve ahlak yakınlığı görülen Türk cemaatleri vardır. Tarihin bir hadisesinin neticesi olan bu hal, Türk milleti için elim bir hatırladır, fakat Türk milletinin tarihen ve ilmen teşekkürükündeki asaleti, tesanüdü asla haleldar edemez.

b) Bugünkü Türk milleti siyasi ve içtimai camiası içinde kendilere Kürtlük fikri, Çerkeslik fikri, ve hatta Lazlık fikri veya Boşnaklık fikri propaganda edilmek istenmiş vatandaş ve millettaşlarımız vardır. Fakat mazinin istibdat devirleri mahsülü olan bu yanlış tevsimler, birkaç düşman aleti, mürteci beyinsizden maada hiçbir millet ferdi üzerinde teellümden başka bir tesir hasıl edememiştir. Çünkü, bu millet efradı da umum Türk camiası gibi aynı müşterek maziye, tarihe, ahlaka, hukuka sahip bulunuyorlar.

c) Bugün içimizde bulunan Hristiyan, Musevi vatandaşlar, mukadderat ve talihlerini Türk milliyetine vicdani arzularıyla raptettikten sonra kendilerine yan gözle yabancı nazariyle bakılmak, medeni Türk milletinin asıl ahlakından beklenebilir mi?...

Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazılıları* (Civics and Handwritings of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1969), 21-23.

APPENDIX F

NOTICES AS REGARDS THE CONDITION OF ADMISSION TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Avrupaya talebe gönderiliyor

Maden Tetkik ve Arama Ensti- tüsü Genel Direktörlüğünden:

Müsabaka günleri uzatılmıştır.

Taliblerin dikkat nazarlarına

1 — «20» Maden mühendisi ve «10» Jeolog yetiştirmek üzere müsabaka ile Avrupaya «30» talebe tahsilé gönderilecektir. İsteklerin aşçıdaki şartları hez olmasız läzimdir.

A — Türk obraz,

B — Maden okullarında çalışabilecek kabiliyette ve subhatı tam olmak «Sıhhi muayene Ankara» yapılacektir.»

C — Lise mezunu olup fransızca, almanca, ingilizce dillerinden birisini okuyup yazabilmek,

D — Yaşı 18 den aşağı ve 25 ten yukarı olmamak.

2 — Maden mühendiliği için müsabaka imtihanı: 26 şubat 1937 ve Jeologluk için 2 mart 1937 günlerinde Ankara M. T. A. Enstitüsünde yapılacaktır.

Açılacak müsabaka imtihanlarında kazanmış olmakla beraber gönderilecek talebelerin İhrac ettileri derece itibarıle Maden mühendiliği için «20» ve Jeologluk için «10» arasında bulunmak şarttır.

3 — Maden mühendiliği için imtihan: Hesab, hedefse, cebir, mihenlik, fizik, kimya ve yukarıda yazılı dillerden birinden,

4 — Jeologluk için imtihan: Riyaziye «Hedefse, cebir», hayvanat, nebatat, jeoloji, fizik, kimya ve yukarıda yazılı dillerden birinden yapılacaktır.

5 — Tahsilé gönderilecek olanlar, ileride tahsil müddetleri kadar mecburi hizmete tabi olduklarıdan, bu hususta mükellefiyetlerini tıpkı etnak üzere bir taahhütname verecekler ve bunun içün de mutsuz kefîl göstereceklərdir.

6 — Maden mühendiliği için:

Son müracaat 20 şubat 1937 cumartesi öğleye kadar.

Sıhhi muayene 26 şubat 1937 cuma,

İmtihan 27 şubat 1937 cumartesi

Jeologluk için: Son müracaat 27 şubat 1937 cumartesi öğleye kadar.

Sıhhi muayene 1 mart 1937 pazartesi,

İmtihan 2 mart 1937 salı

günleri olarak teşbit edilmişdir.

Taliblerin nüfus hüviyet cüzdanını, büneñbal varakasını, mekteb şəhadətnamesini veya bùmların təsdiqli birer suretlerini 4 kıl'a fotografla və dilekçelerini son müracaat tarixlərinə kadar Ankara M. T. A. Enstitüsü Genel Direktörlüğünə göndərməli və sıhhi muayeneleri içün de təyin edilmiş olan günlerde ögleden evvel Bay Hasan Apartmanındaki Enstitü Dairesində bulvurulması ilan olmur.

Sıhhat ve İctimai

Muavenet Vekâletinden:

Bu yıl Leyli Tib Talebe Yurduna alınacak tâcbezin kabul şartları şunlardır:

1 — a) P. C. N. sınıf için: Tam devrelli liselerden veya lise derecesinde olduğu Kültür Bakanlığı tarafından tasdik edilmiş mekteplerden pekiyi ve iyi derecede mezun olmak, algunluk veya bakalarya istihzanız vermek olmak.

b) Diğer sınıflar için: Bulunduğu sınıf iyi derece ile geçmiş olmak.

2 — İsteklerin 30 eylül 1937 tarihine kadar doğrudan doğrusa Sıhhat ve İctimai Muavenet Vekâletine müraciat eylemeleri ve dilekçelerle birlikte aşağıdaki evrakı tamamen göndereceklerini läzmdir:

A) Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tebaasından olduğumu bildiren nüfus hüviyet carianı ash.

B) Mekteb tehadetnamesinin aslı (istihzanı tamamen bitirdikleri halde tehadetnamelerinin tasdik muamelesi gereklisi olanlar mekteb müdürü 16. günün - syni zamanda meşnûyet derecesini de gösteren - fotoğrafı ve resmi mührürlü bir realikanın gönderecekleridir.)

C) Okudukları mekteplerden alınan bismülâhî varâz.

D) Mütesseseleri tam bir hastane beyetinden, hâlinin şenegine uygun ve üstünde tasdikli fotoğrafı bulunan bir mühâş raporu. (Bu rapor hastane oğrısbiblikleri zarfî olarak tutulup mühâşîyecek ve istekli tarafından mührürlü zarf halinde olarak gönderilecektir.)

İbu müzeyeneler : Ankara, Sivas, Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Haydarpaşa Nümune hastaneleri, İstanbul Çocuk hastanesi; İzmir, Bursa, Konya, Adana, Samsun Memleket hastanelerinde yapılacak ve buralarda müsene olunmak için bu hastanelerin bulunduğu vilâyetlerin Sıhhat ve İctimai Muavenet Müdürlüklerine istekiller bizzat umrâcast edeceklerdir.

E) Örneği aşağıda gösterilen noterlikçe tasdikli bir taahhûd senedi (Bu sened istekli tarafından ayne tanzim ve imza edilecek ve altı, şenefinde görüldüğü vechile, kefili tarafından keza ayne ve tamamen yazarak imzalanacaktır.)

F) 4.5 X 6 boyunda dört tane fotoğraf.

3 — Yaşları yirmi ikisi geçkin bulunanlar ve Yurdâa okunmağa ve fie ride mecburi hizmetlerini yapmakla engel olacak bir hastalığı ve arızalar kabul edilmeler.

4 — İstekllerin gönderdiği dilekçe ve vesikalarm, Vekâletce, alındığı adreslerine bildirilecegi gibi bunlara göre kabul edilip edilmeyikleri de genel adreslerine ayrıca bildirilecektir. (3397)

TAAHHÜD SENEDİ ÖRNEĞİ

Leyli Tib Talebe Yurduna kabul edilerek herhangi bir Tib Fakültesi - den tabib olarak çıktıgunda, 2000 sayılı kanun mührâbince, Yurdâa geçirdığım zamanın saatiller de dahil, Üçte ikisi kadar bir müddetle Sıhhat ve İctimai Muavenet Vekâletinin lüzum gereceği mahallerde hizmet ifâsanı kabul et - medigim veya kabul edip de muayyen müddeti bitirmeden hizmeti terkey - ledigim takdirde Yurdâa benim için sarfolunan parantu üç katını ödemeli ve tabihîlîlerini terkettiğim veya sahîl sebepler düşında Fakülteden daimî olarak çıkarıldığım veya hâdî Yurdâa bir seneden az bir müddet kalarak terkeylediğim takdirde benim için sarfedilmiş olan parayı tamamen ödemeli ve bu taahhûd senedi mührâbince benden istenilecek paralar için ödemek mecburiyetinde olduğum tarihten itibaren % 9 faiz vârlutulmasını ve 2000 sayılı kanunun diğer cezai hükümlerinin de hâkkında tatbikini kabul ve taahhûd eylemim.

Sahîl ikametgâh adresi

Yukarıda adres ve hüviyeli yazılı in bu taahhûdname mührâbince faizle birlikte ödemek mecburiyetinde bulunduğu her ders yılı için üç yüz lira olaik üzere bütün tahsil müddeti için emâan 1800 liraya, ve üç katını ödemek mecburiyeti hâmi olduğu takdirde 3.000 liraya kadar parayı borçlu ile birlikte müteselsîl kefili ve müsterek müteselsîl borçlu nifâtiye ödiyeceğim.

Kefiliin adresi

Cumhuriyet, 23 June 1937, 8.

Hava Okulu Komutanlığından:

Hava okulları talmadınum 86 nci maddesinde yazılı şartları hizip istek iller:

Dilek kâğıda ve vesikalardır temiz baslangıçından ağustos sonuna kadar okula başvururlar. Okulun bulunduğu yerin dışında bulunanlar dilek kâğıdalarını posta ile okula gönderirler ve alacakları karşılığında hareket ederler.

Madde 86 — Hava okulu gedikli kumma girmen şartları şunlardır:

A — Türk olacak.

B — Orta mekteb lise sekizinci sınıfı tahallini bitirmiş en az 17 ve en çok 20 yaşında olmak.

C — Sıhhi vaziyeti uşuculukta ve uçuş işlerinde kullanılmasına elverişli olduğuna dair mütehassıslar tarafından bir hastanede sıhhat heyeti rapor olmak. Boy 1.65 ten aşağı olmamışacaktır.

Düşarids bulunanlar:

Bulundukları yerin askerlik subjesine müracaatla muayeneye gönderilirler. Tam teşkilatlı sıhhi heyet bulunan yerlerde o yerin en büyük kumananın müracaatla muayeneye gönderilirler.

D — Ahılık saflamı olduktan ve hiçbir surette suçlu ve mahkûm olmadıkça dair bulunduğu yerin Emniyet Müdürlüğü'nden veya polis Amirliği'nden tasdikli vesika göstermek.

E — Mektebe alınacak okuyucular, gedikli erbaşlar hakkındaki 2305 sayılı kanun uyarınca muamele görecelerini, mektebi bitirdiklerinde 12 yıl müddetle hava gedikli erbaş olarak vazife görecelerini taşihid etmek.

F — Mektebe yapılacak seçme imtihanda kazanmak.

H — İstekli adedî çok veya imtihanı kazananlar almacak nüktelerden fazla olursa bunları içinden riyaziye bilgileri daha iyi ve yabancı dil bilenler yenirler. Hava mektepleri okuyucuları Askeri liseler okuyucular gibi对待irler ve giydirilir. Kitab ve diğer ders için lazımlı olanlar para锥 verilir.

V — Hava okullarına kabul edilenlerden birinci sınıfı muvaffakiyetle bitirenler arasında, kabiliyetlerine göre, uşucu, makinist, teleiz, fotografcı atış ve bombardımançılığı ayrırlırlar.

(4056)

Cumhuriyet, 14 July 1937, 9.

Ankara Askerî Baytar Mektebine Talebe Kayid ve Kabulü

1 — Ankarada Askerî Baytar okuluna bu yıl sivil tam devreli liseler - den 1937 de pek iyi ve iyi derecede mezun olan ve olgunluk imtihanlarını vermiş olnak şart ile talebe kabul edilecektir. İstekillerin aşağıdaki vasıf ve şartları hizâ olmasi läzimdir.

- A — Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tebaasından ve Türk ırkından olmak.
- B — Yan 18 - 21 olmak.
- C — Beden teşekkülerini ve sahhati orduda ve her ikilinde faal hizmete müsaadî olmak (dili rekâketi olanlar alınmaz).
- D — Kusursuz, vazi, tavır, ahlâk ve seçiye sahibi olmak.
- E — Ailesinin hiçbir fena hal ve göhereti olmamak (zabıta vesikası).
- 2 — İstekillerin müracaat istidalarına su vesikalaların başlanması läzimdir:

 - A — Nüfus cüzdanı veya müsaddak sureti.
 - B — Sahhati hakkında tam teşekkülü askerî hastane raporu ve apı kâğıdu.
 - C — Lise mezuniyet ve olgunluk şehadetnamesi veya tasdikli sureti.
 - D — Okulu aldığı takdirde askeri kanun, nizam ve talimatları kabul ettiği hakkında velisinin ve kendisinin noterlikten tasdikli taşhîhud senedi.
 - E — Sarai, uyurken gezen, sidikli, bayılma ve matanz çırpanımıza müptelâ olsadığı hakkında velilerinin noteslikten tasdikli taşhîhudnamesi (bu gibi hastalıklardan birile okula girmezed envel malül oldukları sonradan anlaşılanlar okuldan çıkarılır ve bu müddete aid hükümet manzûfi velilerine ödettilir.)

- 3 — İstekiller bulundukları mahallerdeki askerlik şubelerine istifa ile müracaat edecekler ve şubelerce 2 nci maddede bildirilen evrakı ictimal ettirdikten sonra İstanbul ve yakını illerden istekillerin Hardarpaşa Askerî Baytar Tatbikat Okulu Direktörlüğünne, Ankara ve ona yakın iller istekillerinin de Ankarada Ziraat Enstitüsü Baytar Fakültesi Askerî Talebe Amirliğine gönderilecektir.
- 4 — Müracaat müddeti eylülün ilk haftasına kadardır. Ondan sonra kabul edilmez.
- 5 — Kabul duhul imtihanına bağlı dekildir. Şehadetname derecelerine ve müracaat sırasına göredir. İstekli adedi tamam olunca kayid işleri kepanır ve kabul edilenlere müracaat ettikleri Askerî şubelerle tebliğat yapılır.

Cumhuriyet, 24 July 1937, 8.

(433)

Harb Akademisi Komutanlığından:

Hava Harb Akademisi için 80 ile 100 lira ücretli iki erkek daktilo alınacaktır.

Sartlar :

- 1 — Türkçe Cumhuriyeti təbaasından ve Türk olmak.
 - 2 — Otur yapından yukarı olunur.
 - 3 — En az orta təhsili bitmiş olmak.
 - 4 — Çabuk ve iyi daktilo edebilmek ve daktilo imtihanında muvaffak olmak.
 - 5 — En az üç yıl hizmet teahhüt etmek, bir yabancı dil bileyenler tercih edilecektir.
- İsteklilerin ikinciklərin sonuna kadar Yıldızda Harb Akademisi Komutanlığına müraciətləri.

(332)

Cumhuriyet, 25 January 1938, 8.

Askerî Veteriner Okuluna Talebe Kayıd ve Kabülü

1 — Ankarada Askerî Veteriner okuluna bu yıl tam devreli devlet silsilelerinden 1938 de pek iyi derecede mezun olan ve elgülük imtihanlarını vermiş olan aşağıda yazılı ve şeritli haiz 30, 35 talebe alınacaktır.

- A — Türkîe Cumhuriyeti tebâasından ve Türk ırkından olmak.
- B — Yaşı yirmi bir yaşımlı asılmış olmamak.
- C — Beden ve teşekkülerî ve sahhatî orduya ve her iklimde hizmete elverişli olmak. Dil rekâketi olanlar alınmaz.
- D — Kusursuz vazî tavır, ahlâk ve seciye sahibi olmak.
- E — Ailesinin hiç bir ferâ bâli ve fena çöhreti olmamak.
- «Zabıta vesikası», «ordu mensubu ve devlet memurlarile emekçilerin çocukları için vesika aranmas».
- 2 — İsteklilerin müracaat istidalarına su vesikalaların bağlanması: İzinlidir:
- A: Nüfus cüzdâni veya müseddak sureti «Kabulde aslinin İbrazi şarttır».
- B: Suhhatî hakkında tam teşekkülü Askerî hastane fotoğrafı: raporu ve anî kâğıdı.
- C: Lise mezuniyet ve olgunluk şehadetnamesi veya tasdikli sureti «kabulde aslinin İbrazi şarttır».
- D: Okula alındığı takdirde halen merî ve bundan böyle çıkışacak kanun, nizam ve talimatnameleri kabul ettiği hakkında velisinin ve kendisini noterlikten tasdikli taahhûd senedi.
- E: Sarâli, uyurken gezen, sıdikli, bayılma ve marazi çırpmamaya müptelâ olmadığı hâzırda noterlikten tasdikli taahhûdnamesi bu gibi hastalıklardan birile okula girnezedن envel malûl oldukları sonradan anlaşanlar okuldân çıkışırlar ve bu müddete âid hükümet masrafı velillerine ödettilirler.
- 3 — İstekliler bulundukları yerlerdeki Askerî subesine istîda ile müracaat edecekler ve şubelerce 2 ncî maddejeki evrakî ikmal ettirildikten sonra İstanbul ve civarından olanları Haydarpaşa Askerî Veteriner Tatbîkeât Okulu Müdürlüğüne, Ankara ve civar yerlerdekilerin Ankrâ Fakültesi Askerî Talebe Amirliğine gönderilecektir.
- 4 — Müracaat müddeti: Eylülün on besine kadardır.
- 5 — Kabul dihnî imtihanına tabî değildir. Şehadetname derecelerine ve müracaat sırasına göredir. İstekli adedi tamam oluncâ kayıd işleri kapanır ve kabul edilenlere müracaat ettikleri Askerî şubelerle tebligat yapılır.

« 64 » (4132)

Cumhuriyet, 2 July 1938, 10.

T. C. Orman Umum

Müdürlüğünden :

Bursa ve Bolu Orman Mekteplerine

Ahnacak Talebenin Kayıt ve Kabul Şartları

Bu sene Bursa ve Bolu Orman mekteplerine müsabaka ile parazit ya-
tılı ellişer talebe alınacaktır. Mekteplerin tıhsil müddetleri üç senedir.
Mezunları (Orman Mühendis Muavini) unvanile meslekte kullanılır.
İstekçilerden aşağıda yazılı şartlar aranır:

- 1 — Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tobaacından olmak.
 - 2 — Yaşı 20 den yukarı olmamak.
 - 3 — Sağlıklı durumu normal derecede, yani dil, göz, kulak ve vücu-
dunda árıza ve noksanlık bulunmamak, anızlı ve disgik yerlerde yürüyüp,
gezmeğe hayvana binmeye bünye teşekkülü müsait ve dayanıklı olmak.
 - 4 — İyi ahlaklı, hüsnühal sahibi ve geçmiş mahkümiyeti olmamak.
 - 5 — Orta mektebi bitirmiş bulunmak.
 - 6 — Bu şartları taşıyan olanlar Bursa ve Boluda Mekteb Müdüriükle-
rini, diğer yerler için 7inci maddede isimleri yazılı Orman Başmühendis-
liklerine verecekleri dilekçelere:
- A — Nüfus cüzdanı, asıl veya tasdikli sureti,
B — Üçüncü maddede yazılı sağlık durumlarını bildiren tam teşek-
külli hastanelerden veya bu hastanelerle bulunmadıkları yerlerde Hükü-
met doktorlarından alacakları tasdikli raporu (tam teşekkülü hastane
olmayan yerlerden kabul edilecek isteklerin kayıtları imtihanı kazandık-
dan sonra mektepce yaptırılacak musyene neticesine kadar esastırılmaz
ve bu muayenede yazılı evnas kendisinde bulunmuyanlar mektebe alınmaz.)
- C — Çiçek ağısı vesikası,
- D — Dördüncü maddedeki yazuya göre Belediye veya Polis merkezleri
tarafından tanzim ve tasdik edilecek hüsnühal mazbatası.
- E — Orta mekteb şehadetnamesinin asıl veya tasdikli örneği.
- F — 6 X 9 eb'adında 6 fotoğraf,
bağlantımalıdır.
- 7 — Müsabaka imtihanuna gireceklerin namzelik kayıtları 15 ağustos
1938 tarihinden başlayarak 15 eylül 1938 akşamına kadar Bursa ve Bolu için
Orman mekteplerinde, diğer yerler için Ankara, İstanbul, Edirne, İzmir,
Antalya, Adana, Diyarbakır, Elâzığ, Kars, Trabzon, Samsun, Kastamonu,
Konya, Eskişehir Orman Başmühendisliklerinde yapılacaktır.
- Noksan evrak getiren ve gönderenlere müvraat etmemiş nazarele bakılır.
- 8 — İmtihan 16 eylül 1938 cuma günü Bursa ve Bolu Orman mek-
telerile 7inci maddede isimleri yazılı vilayetlerde saat 14 ile 18 e kadar
devam etmek üzere orta mekteplerde okutulan riyaziye ve bioloji ders-
lerinden yapılacaktır.
- Musyenin gün ve saatte imtihananda bulunmuyanlar müsabaka harici
burakılır.
- 9 — Yukarda yazılı şartları taşıyan olanlar, müsabaka imtihanı netice-
sında muvaffak olarak mektebe alındıkları takdirde tıhsil esnasında mek-
teli terketikleri veya bitirdikten sonra tayin olundukları vazifeye gitme-
dikleri halde mektebin yapmış olduğu masrafları ödeyeceklerine dair ken-
dilerine verilecek nümuneye göre noterlikten tasdikli bir taahhüd senedi
vereceklerdir. Bu senedi getirmeyenlerin mektebe devamlarına müssade
edilmez.
- 10 — İmtihan neticesi Bursa Orman Mektebi Müdüriüğü tarafından
30 eylül 1938 tarihinde Ulu, Cumhuriyet, Tan, Akşam, Son Posta gazete-
lerile ilan edilecek ve ayrıca imtihan yapılacak vilayetlere de bildirile-
cektir.

(5242)

Cumhuriyet, 4 September 1938, 10.

Türkkuşu Genel Direktörlüğünden:

Türkkuşu teşkilatında motörülü ve motörsüz tayyareler üzerinde öğretmen olarak çalışmak maksadile yetişirilecek 15 gence ihtiyaç vardır.

Aranan belli başlı şartlar şunlardır:

- 1 — Türk soyundan olmak
- 2 — İyi hali ve şöhret sahibi bulunmak
- 3 — Sağlıklı durumu tayyareci olmaya elverişli olmak
- 4 — Boyu 1.58 den aşağı olmaması
- 5 — En az lisenin sonucu sınıfını bitirmiş olmak
- 6 — En az 18. en çok 22 yaşında olmak
- 7 — İki vesika fotoğrafı fibra etmek

Öğretmen任命 edilmesi gereken fizik şartları almak üzere Türkkuşu teşkilatında uyguluk şırenmiş bulunan planörcülük B veya C brövelerle işe başladıkları tarihten, hiç ugnamış bulunmamaya da planörcülük B brövesi alındıkları tarihten itibaren alınamamış mühimnöce yattırmak, yemek ve giyim masrafı; Türkkuşuna adı olmak fizik syuda lise 10 takılımlı görmüşlere 25. liseyi bitirmiş olanlara 30 lira ücret verilecektir.

Gelecek seneler içinde uyguluk kademelerinin artı derecelerine göre görecikleri zamanlar busut bir talimatla işbit edilmiş bulunmaktadır. Türkkuşuna bu suretle seçileceklerin öğretmen muavini olmaya kadar, normal olarak bay sene evlenmemeyi ve busut bir taahhüdnamayı inza ederek Türkkuşunun vereceği vazifeleri on sene müddetle görmeli kabul ve teşhüd etmesi şarttır.

Bu hususlar hakkında fazla tafsilit almaktan istiyenler Türkkuşu Talim Terbiye Bürosu Direktörlüğüne doğrudan doğruya şubeden veya yazı ile müracaat edebilirler.

Kayıtlı muamelezine Cumhuriyet Bayramına kadar devam olunacağından müracatların bu tarihe kadar yapılması şarttır. (6134)

Cumhuriyet, 6 September 1938, 8.