

**THE WESTERNIZATION PARADIGMS OF THE COMMITTEE OF
UNION AND PROGRESS AND ATATÜRK:
RUPTURE OR CONTINUITY?**

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Ankara

February, 1998

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**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University**

by

ALİ RIZA GÜNEY

**In Partial Fulfillment Of The Degree Of
MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION**

in

**THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCES AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA**

February, 1998

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Thesis

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
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
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Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun
Supervisor

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
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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes the continuities and divergences between the Committee of Union and Progress and Atatürk concerning the westernization paradigm in the fields of economy, religion and nationalism. The thesis also covers the westernization paradigms of certain key figures and groups in the nineteenth century.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I feel a duty to express my deep appreciation and gratitudes for the guidance and enormous flexibility that Prof. Dr. Metin Heper, Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun, Assist. Prof. Ümit Cizre Sakallıođlu, Assist. Prof. Ayşe Kadiođlu, and Assist. Prof. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya has provided, to Assist. Prof. Ahmet İçduygu for his procedural contributions and last not but least to my sister, Aylin Güney Avcı, for her unforgettable assistance that she provided during the preparation of this thesis.

To
the brave man
my grandfather
Dursun akır

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I. INTRODUCTION

The forces of change which gained acceleration throughout the nineteenth century culminated in the establishment of the Turkish Republic in the beginning of the next century. Although the young Turkish Republic inherited many of the social, political, economic and cultural peculiarities of the centuries-long Ottoman past and in this way constitute a mere continuation of the Ottoman heritage according to some scholars, among some others, this systemic transformation is treated as a rupture from the Ottoman historical course.

The aim of this paper is to elaborate two timely distinct but historically related periods in terms of Westernization paradigms prevalent among the key actors.¹ The first of these periods is generally referred as the period of the Young Turks and their Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The second period can be termed as the Kemalist period by taking the very personality of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the basis and unit of analysis.

Westernization was in fact considered as one of the ways of modernization besides the Islamic way of reformation and purely nationalist path of modernization.² Modernization occurred according to the model which did not provide any freedom of choice. Because the path of modernization that the West had passed through became center of gravity for developing or underdeveloped countries.

Throughout the analysis, basic points of departure will be the similarities and differences between these two periods with regard to the steps taken in the field of secularization, economic modernization and the

evolution of the Turkish nationalism by decisive actors. Due to the fact that these periods do not occupy the same time interval but remain consecutively, the comparison will take a shape of finding out continuities and divergences in the process of Westernization in these fields.

At the outset, two areas of problematique with regard to the methodology of this analysis have to be cleared out. First one is related with the homogenous character of the CUP. Dwelling on 1876-1908 and 1908-1918 periods seperately focusing upon certain key actors or the CUP as a whole with their respective paradigms will be the style of handling the first period of analysis.

Second area of problematique is related with the possible incompatibility of words and deeds of the actors under examination. Naturally, there is not always a one-to-one correlation between the discourse and action of the key actors.

The modernization paradigm of a person or a group is shaped and differed from others by his/her or their respective perceptions of the causes necessitating the would-be reforms. Therefore, each wave of reform movement is a reflection of diagnosis/cure calculation of that person or group about the field whereby that reform attempt is made.

In the first part, before passing to the main theme, the understanding of modernization/westernization among the Sultans like Selim III and Mahmut II, Tanzimat bureaucrats and Pashas and the Young Ottomans is put forward to prepare a sound background. In this way, their respective Westernization paradigm will serve us to grasp the continuities and divergences through a longer continuum.

In the second part of the analysis, the Young Turks covering the period 1876-1908 and the CUP period of 1908-1918 will be separately handled. Preparing the ideological and paradigmatic basis of the CUP as a political body, the Young Turk period is examined along the leaders of the mainstream factions within the movement. Concerning the CUP era, the westernization paradigm of certain decisive actors particularly and the Committee as a whole, as a means of modernization process, is tried to be shed light upon.

The westernization paradigm of Atatürk and the reforms undertaken made during the Republican period which covers 1918-1938 due to the limitations of this analysis, constitute the anathema of the third chapter. As enumerating all the reforms surpass both the aim and limits of this work, essential reforms are selected in order to provide material to understand the paradigm of Atatürk. Therefore, this chapter mainly evolves around the very personality of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

II. THE WESTERNIZATION PARADIGMS OF THE SULTANS, TANZIMAT BUREAUCRATS AND THE YOUNG OTTOMANS

For centuries, the governing elite of the Ottoman Empire had defined their positions as a global power and this way of self-image had shaped the parameters of their conduct of international relations and domestic politics.

As the time went on, the defeats in front of the once-vanquished western armies and heavy territorial losses forced the Sultan and his team to question their military might. Along this paradigm, the first waves of modernization made itself felt in the military realm of the entire system. In other words, the reforms in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were implemented as a consequence of interpretations of the causes of defeats as the lack of technological superiority against the western armies.³

The need for modernization which started to be felt in the military realm stimulated a trend of Westernization and a sense of necessity for rapid and progressive change for the entire system. The most important single contribution of the early military reforms to political modernization turned out to be the establishment during the reigns of Selim III, Mahmud II, Abdülmecid, of a set of officers' training schools: a naval school (1773), an artillery school (1793), a military medical school (1826), and an army officers' school (1834) supplemented later by a general staff college (1849).⁴ It was obvious that military reforms would bring about additional reform attempts in the field of engineering, medical, finance and at last administration and law.⁵ As Inalcik puts it, for example, Selim III's main motive for reform was his determination to restore the military power of the

Empire (mainly to throw back the Russians). However, what was new and anti-traditional in his measures was the introduction not only of European weapons, but also of the sciences, training procedures and uniforms of Europe.⁶

Although the Ottoman Empire was involved Westernization by a pragmatic approach, the developments thereafter led the Empire to unexpected consequences. Especially since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Ottoman politicians tried to encounter the growing supremacy of European powers by a policy of Westernization which paved the way for the later cultural borrowings from the West.⁷ Davison argues that "...from the time of Mahmut II, political reform in Turkey was almost always modernization, and modernization was almost always Westernization." The policy of Westernization, in the initial stage, was actuated by two motives, both eventually aiming at the same goal: the restoration of Ottoman power. These two motives were: a genuine desire to make the administration of the Empire more efficient by the adoption of Western methods and institutions and a desire to please the European powers by implementing reforms on European lines and so to reduce the constant pressure exerted on the Empire by them.

First and foremost, these reforms mainly resulted in the strengthening of the state power i.e. centralization of authority in the hands of the Sultan.⁸ Second, the paradigm of Westernization attached to the autocracy and centralization continued through the Tanzimat period and gave a birth to a new segment of society which were known as Tanzimat bureaucrats.⁹ These officers in the Translation Office were in close contact with the Western

public life since the empire began to adopt international diplomatic norms and had to send permanent delegations instead of ad-hoc envoys to the major Western capitals. Zürcher describes this new class as more outward-looking and modern in their thinking.¹⁰ Nevertheless, he also adds that “they had also the sets of traditional values which had guided their predecessors and they had only a very superficial understanding of Western culture, elements of which they tried to introduce in the Empire. This made them often superficial and prone to follow fashions and fads.”¹¹

In the aftermath of *Hatt-i Serif* (The Edict of Tanzimat), which in fact, did not really constitute a coherent whole, but aimed at a greater efficiency and centralization of the state machinery, the infiltration of Western concepts and ideas into the society spilled-over and accelerated the process of reforms.¹² In this context, a new administrative class different from the Tanzimat men came into being.¹³ In the wake of these changes, civil bureaucracy became the central institution of the state and from its ranks emerged the members of the new intelligentsia later to be known as the Young Ottomans.¹⁴ However, the highly centralist and authoritarian system of government espoused by Resid and his followers became the particular target of this rising Ottoman-Turkish intelligentsia, who saw despotism harmful to the empire.¹⁵

This new generation came from relatively middle-class families and modern schools established by Tanzimat reformers.¹⁶ However, they were much more willing to initiate radical changes than the Tanzimat men due to their lack of bond with the old order.¹⁷ These young officers were discontent about 1838-type of economic privileges bestowed to foreign countries.¹⁸

Having been impressed by the slogans of the French Revolution; '*fraternité*', '*égalité*' and '*liberté*', their arguments for the introduction of Western democratic institutions were at first sight conservative.¹⁹ They argued that freedom and constitutionalism were the ultimate remedy for the ills of the rapidly declining empire and that the Islamic state had originally been a democratic, constitutional and that the tyranny of the rulers-and especially the policies of the Tanzimat statesmen-had changed it.²⁰ According to Inalcik, the Young Ottomans embraced the romantic nationalism then prevalent in Europe and advocated a constitutional regime which would introduce elements of Western civilization while preserving traditional Islamic-Turkish culture.²¹ In this struggle, they gave an absolute importance to the press as a means of creating a public opinion which symbolized the existence of at least a partial freedom.²²

The first reactions were exposed by a group of literary figures who were influenced by the French literature. The colony of leading exponents of this new trend in Turkish literature included Sinasi, Ziya Pasha, Namik Kemal, Ali Suavi and Mustafa Fazil Pasha. In fact, the ideas that they started to express were some words which were not really digested by them. For example, Namik Kemal, like most of the Young Ottomans, conceived of a government whose aims and interests were synonymous with those of the entire social body, but was hardly aware of the actual relations between society and government in the Western world which they took as a model. The intelligentsia regarded European civilization as an innovation created by skill and ingenuity rather than as a product of social forces. The concept of progress as social evolution was hardly detectable among them. Often they

judged Western institutions in the light of their own bureaucratic background and aspirations.²³ “The introduction of mass media in Turkey during the 19th century accelerated the development of political consciousness, involved diverse sections of the public in the process of modernization, and brought the exclusive and aristocratic Ottoman philosophy into collision with the individualistic liberal views of the West.”²⁴ Payaslıođlu adds to this point that “also the Young Ottomans disseminated their ideas in poems, plays and newspaper articles. In these works attempts to reconcile constitutionalism and freedom with traditional Islamic law were apparent. But there were also some hints of secularism and some conscious separation of political interest from religious.”²⁵

This line of reasoning was partly inspired by a genuine pride in their religion (all Young Ottomans were devout Muslims) and the wish to defend Islam against Western criticism by showing that the Western civilization really derived from Islam (or at least that the most desirable aspects of Western civilization had originally existed in Islam too).²⁶ At this very point, Shaw points out that most of those liberal intellectuals were more conservative on religion than were the Man of Tanzimat, feeling that the radical Western reforms introduced since 1839 had undermined the moral and ideological base of Ottoman society without providing a suitable substitute.²⁷ In other words, they became the first Muslim thinkers to try to reconcile Western political institutions with traditional Islamic and Ottoman theory and practice, seeking to promote the principle of representation by establishing historical precedent. Their emphasis was on the progressive rather than the conservative aspects of Islam.²⁸ According to Hanioglu, the

Young Ottomans were accused of being politically liberal and religiously conservative and attempting to capitalize on the Ottoman intellectuals' disgust for the new, super-westernized elite. Nevertheless, one may say that, except for their frequent appropriation of Islamic symbols, the Young Ottomans gravitated toward the modernist and pro-western Ottoman elite. What they objected to was the super-westernization and the annihilation of domestic culture, as thus described: 'In order to advance our civilization we shall try to obtain scientific and industrial progress from Europe. We do not want their street dances, amorality, and satanic afflictions, such as callousness toward people who are starving to death, or to view fairness and tenderness of hearth as outlandish notions.'²⁹

Shaw clearly defines the parameters of their understanding of Westernization in that, according to him, "there are at least three pillars on which they agreed: 'Constitution', 'Parliament', and 'Ottomanism'. First they wanted to limit the power of the bureaucracy through a constitution that all would have to obey regardless of rank and status in Ottoman Society. They maintained that no matter how benevolent the reformers, their rule was still autocratic and arbitrary and led to a more extensive tyranny than was possible under the traditional Ottoman system. There was nothing to restrain the sultan and the ruling class from undermining the Tanzimat reform program when they wished to do so. A constitution was needed to protect the individual from arbitrary government action and to ensure the permanence and continued success of reforms. Their second demand was for a representative, popularly elected parliament as the instrument of constitutional control, to make sure that all the administrators functioned

properly within the limits of law.³⁰ Their last but not least aim was to create a unity among people around the notion of 'being Ottoman'. In other words, the policy of 'Ottomanizing' would provide a social and political glue for the society.³¹

III. THE WESTERNIZATION PARADIGM OF THE YOUNG TURKS (1876-1908)

The Young Ottomans' struggle resulted in partial success by the proclamation of the First Constitution in 1876, in which the supreme authority remained to be the Sultan and the legislative body was put under his disposal.³² Through this Constitution, Ottomanism became the official policy of the empire, embodying the concept of equality contributed by the Tanzimat and endeavoring to eliminate the separatism of the *millet* system.³³

However, this successful attempt proved to be short of duration. A year later, Abdulhamit II dispersed the Parliament and shelved the Constitution for a period of thirty years of strict absolutism. This strict atmosphere naturally created an obstacle to analyze the intellectual and political ideas prevalent among key figures. Hanioglu adds to this point that 'works written about the Young Turk movement, whether by its members or their contemporaries, all confirm a particular point: the movement was a link in the historical chain of Ottoman Westernization and bureaucratic modernization and represented the modernist wing of the Ottoman intellegentsia and bureaucracy. However, it is difficult to find any evidence of these connections in relevant scholarly studies published since 1945. Nevertheless, the Young Turks and westernization movements were indisputably intertwined, and the latter, starting as early as the late eighteenth century, played an undeniable role in shaping the *Young Turk Weltanschaaung*.'³⁴

However, although many intellectuals among the Young Ottomans were sent to exile, the developments which had been underway for decades were giving a new momentum to the Second Constitutionalist Movement, but this time with a different team. Because of this atmosphere, a large number of progressive intellectuals who eschewed political activity in 1876 turned their attention to social and cultural issues. One of the consequences of Hamit's suppression of political preoccupations was to force the intellectuals to focus upon non-political, cultural questions that had been lost sight of during the constitutional controversies. By severing the cultural questions from the political-religious questions, the Hamidian regime unknowingly encouraged focusing upon cultural matters. The focusing was sharpened by factors stemming from the Western impact that the Hamidian suppression failed to prevent. Even for the committed Westernists who extolled the virtues of European civilization, the question of preserving the basic moral values of Turkish society became an important one.⁵⁵

The Sultan was obviously an antagonist to liberal ideas and perceiving them as a direct menace to his own authority, but he also understood that institutional modernization was necessary to achieve the consolidation of his position and strengthening of the Empire. "Therefore, the first 15-20 years of his reign was very active in reforms and change especially in the fields of law, administration and education."⁵⁶ Shaw argues on this point that Abdülhamit's schools were producing an increasing number of bureaucrats, officers and intellectuals who, unlike most of the Young Ottomans and Young Turks who preceded them, came from the lower classes, were not related to the existing Ruling Class establishment and were willing to change the system by force if

necessary to achieve their ends.³⁷ Especially after 1875, we observe extensive reforms in the field of education. Also, lots of high schools, universities were opened and many were improved. Both by the pressure of the imperialist countries and to maintain its position against highly-developed educational system of non-Muslims, Abdulhamit chose this way. He was very well aware of the fact that by means of such reforms he had chosen a very dangerous path for his political survival.

A by-product of his reforms was the eruption of a new social class who were different from the traditional elites and having interests contradicting with theirs. They had also a broad social basis in the Ottoman society. “The Young Turk movement, composed of all those who had joined forces in order to overthrow the Hamidian regime, was itself divided. While there were numerous factions, it is convenient to divide them into two principal groups: Liberals and Unionists.”³⁸ In Ahmad’s words, “although the representatives of this class were demanding liberalism, they were not limited solely by political change. They not only aimed at changing the political structure of the Empire but the social and economic dynamics to their advantage as well.”³⁹ Berkes draws the line between the Young Turks and other ‘young’ movements in Europe by arguing that, although the advocates of the ‘young’ movements in Europe were revolutionary, nationalist and liberal in character, the Young Turk movement had nothing to do with the first and second of these and they were supporting liberalism as long as it exceeds that of the Young Ottomans.⁴⁰

In 1889, *Ittihad-i Osmiani* the lineal ancestor of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), was formed.⁴¹ Their political views were fully in

concert with the former Young Ottomans with respect to preventing the dismemberment of the Empire against the mounting pressures exerted by the European powers. In general, they were aiming at westernization by means of which the interventions of the European powers into the internal affairs of the Empire would be kept at a minimum. For this reason, the 1876 Constitution had to be reactivated and in this way, the integrity among all citizens could be maintained. The remedy for all these ills was perceived to be constitutional and parliamentary government and this particular emphasis was the underlying motive of their reaction to the Sultan.⁴² Hanioglu argues that “for the Young Turks, the idea of a constitution became a romantic symbol of western modernity-the main object of so-called constitutionalism. Also a strong faction within the Young Turk movement-Ahmet Riza and his followers-still considered the constitution a useful tool in fending off the intervention of the Great Powers in Ottoman politics.”⁴³

‘Popular science and materialism’ were the main pillars of the Young Turk westernization paradigm. The Royal Medical Academy as the nucleus of the CUP, as well as the high number of the members who were medical doctors and students, constitute vital evidences to this view. “In comparison with the prior intellectual movements, likewise influenced by contemporary science and popular materialism, the Young Turk movement was avant-garde. Except for articles written for propaganda purposes, the Young Turks gave no credit to efforts to reconcile western civilization and science with Islam and traditional values.”⁴⁴ Their ideas about new science and the ensuing transformation of their society could undoubtedly play a significant role in their movement, just as the ideas of French revolutionaries on science had

figured in their revolution. “A ‘scientifically’ founded political theory was nevertheless needed, but ignorance of contemporary political movements, due to Abdülhamit II’s rigid censorship, left them with only the populist rhetoric of the Young Ottomans of the 1860s.”⁴⁵

Within the movement two factions appeared which would shape the future of not only the CUP but also the political spectrum of the Turkish Republic as well. The Congress held in 1902 was the date of the crystallization of these different factions of the Young Turk movement with different modernization paradigms.⁴⁶ The advocates of the first main faction was interventionist and represented by Prince Sabahattin and the second one was quasi-interventionist and headed by Ahmet Riza. Each of these prominent figures had his own view with respect to the question ‘how this state can be saved’⁴⁷

Prince Sabahaddin, being the representative of the interventionist wing, was of the opinion that if they established alliances with free, democratic countries, they could overcome any possible foreign intervention in case of a domestic turmoil.⁴⁸ He was under the influence of the school of *Le Play* which teaches that social development depends on decentralization and free enterprise opposite to what Ahmet Riza argued. According to his paradigm, the social character and dynamics of a country had to be deeply analyzed in order to formulate and implement progressive policies. He argued that despotism could not be attached to one or two people. On the contrary, he underlined the importance of the social conditions of despotism and argued that to erase despotism totally, there had to be an overall reform, a decentralized system and support for the private enterprise.⁴⁹

Ahmet Riza was the most conservative and moderate of the major leaders. He supported the Ottoman political and social systems more or less as they were, hoping simply to get the Sultan to democratize the administration and remove the corrupt bureaucrats. He used the word 'Ottoman' freely in connection with individual inhabitants of the Empire, Moslem and Christian, as did Sabahaddin, but in Riza's vocabulary the word did not connote so much on individual with supra-national citizenship. In other words, "like Sabahaddin, Riza envisioned the dynasty as the unifying force, and, again like Sabahaddin, he wanted the Sultan to be limited constitutionally, but, and here he differed sharply with Sabahaddin, he advocated a centralized government run by good 'Ottomans', by which he undoubtedly meant, in this case, good Turks" ⁵⁰

Ahmet Riza and his group mainly aimed at preventing the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and for this purpose, he gravitated towards centralization. From their perspective, a decentralized program would probably play a facilitating role for the dismemberment of the Empire. The Ottoman Turks were definitely and totally against a governmental organization which tended towards autonomy or semi-autonomy. For, they had closely observed that granting such an autonomy would lead to the separation of that autonomous portion from the entire body. Therefore, thesis in favor of decentralization were against their paradigmatic constructions.

"Ahmet Riza was under the influence of two main forces-the Positivistic philosophy of Auguste Comte and Turkish nationalism."⁵¹ Positivism emerged as the underlying force of Young Turk thought. Numerous Young Turks admitted that their knowledge was founded on

positivism. There are many reasons behind the popularity of positivism among the Young Turks. According to Hanioglu the most important is that positivism, which claimed to be a new religion, for that era was an ideology for which the Young Turks, who were trying to replace religion with science, were ripe. "Besides, as Ahmet Riza demonstrated it was easy to claim common elements between Islam and positivism on the subjects of property, family and government."⁵² Leading the movement intermittently from 1895 to 1908, he became a leader in the international positivist movement. He took a positivist posture while explaining social events and argued that social improvement could take place only in an order. He was also against revolutionary tendencies to attain development. "In one important respect Ahmet Riza differed sharply with the others: He was an evolutionist rather than a revolutionist. That is to say, Riza was at one with his co-workers in desiring to see Abdulhamit pass out of the picture in wanting to "Ottomanize" the population of the Turkish Empire, and in demanding the restitution of the Turkish Constitution of 1876, but he refused to sanction the use of violence to achieve these ends because of his utter devotion to Positivist doctrines which emphasized orderly progress"⁵³ This paradigm was coined as 'order' and 'progress'.

The main opposition to Ahmet Riza was voiced from the Islamic circles who were feeling that their Islamic sentiments were not respected. Nevertheless, Ahmet Riza and his associates were in agreement on one fundamental point: the necessity of Ottomanizing the inhabitants of the Empire and this point remained as the one unchanged agenda despite the opposition of certain elements.

Another prominent figure besides these two actors was Mizanci Murat. He, in contrast to Ahmet Riza, was extremely popular and his literary efforts had already given him a considerable following in the society. In his favor also was the fact that he was a pan-Islamist. His highest ambition was to see all Muslims rescued from foreign domination through the Caliphate and then to see this work crowned by the establishment of a great Islamic Empire. He dreamed constantly of setting the feet of the Padişah on the path to this goal. While many of the Young Turks prided themselves on being free thinkers, they could not help being fired by Murat's ardent talk, if for no other reason than that the hegemony in any such Empire as that envisaged by Murat would fall naturally to the Turks by virtue of the fact that the Ottoman Sultans were also the most widely recognized claimants to the position of Caliph. Thus his program offered an appeal on nationalist as well as on religious grounds.⁵⁴

The prominent figures in the Young Turk movement had an elitist posture in the self-definition of their role in the society. As Hanioglu puts forward, the elitist paradigm was a persistent strain running throughout the Young Turk publications. "The Young Turks drew upon Le Bon's theories when proposing solutions to various dilemmas facing Ottoman society."⁵⁵ They asserted that if a Parliament could be a 'national assembly to which people sent the most intelligent individuals', it might be valuable. Therefore, the task to which the Young Turks dedicated themselves was the creation of an elite.⁵⁶ Abdullah Cevdet, one of the members of the brain team of the CUP, was arguing that the existence in a society of many individuals with brains of heavier than average weight is a natural and suitable force to secure progress for that society.⁵⁷ In this way, he underlined the importance of the intellectual

aristocracy for the success of the Westernization process. Therefore, most of the Young Turk intellectuals and political actors had a sympathy to Le Bon's elitist theories. Hanioglu defines this paradigm simply as 'scientific, antireligious and elitist'.⁵⁸ In Hanioglu's words, "Le Bon's antipathy toward revolutions, especially the French Revolution, became intrinsic to the *Young Turk Weltanschauung*, which viewed 'the people' as a 'foule'. Early criticisms decried the people, whom they blamed for 'not appreciating the efforts of these distinguished individuals (the Young Turks). In their private papers 'people' were labeled 'senseless'. The inability of a crowd to reach correct decisions was contrasted with the value of superior individuals, culminating in a condemnation of the people. Eventually people were judged guilty: 'To whom does this guilt belong? To the people! Because every nation is worthy of the government that administrates it.'⁵⁹

The Young Turks' espoused aim was to reopen the Ottoman parliament. Second, a strong faction in the movement was praising revolutions, and from the onset of the movement, the French Revolution was given exemplary status. This dilemma was relatively easy to solve. They asserted that if a parliament could be a 'national assembly to which people sent the most intelligent individuals', it might be valuable. Therefore, the task to which the Young Turks dedicated themselves was the creation of an elite. This elite could guide the masses by imposing their ideas on them through constant repetition. The problem before them was described as the creation of the elite, because the masses, if guided wrongly, could bring unwished-for results. This undoubtedly describes the emergence of the Republican People Party's

populist platform 'for the people' but never 'by the people', as expressed in the mid-1920s and 1930s.

Hanioglu also contributes to the understanding of the dynamics of the Young Turk nationalism by arguing that during the period of 1889 to 1902, the Great Powers' economic penetration and political intervention in the Empire were catalytic forces that propelled the Young Turks' development of nationalism and were among the most frequently used themes in their publications. But an even more compelling force behind this development was the organizational structure of the CUP. "Since CUP branches within the Empire were short-lived because of the spy network, more regular branches were established in the Balkan countries, which had recently gained independence or autonomy from the Ottoman Empire. These branches had the further advantage of regularly corresponding with the CUP center in Europe and besides the branches, many people living in the Balkans, Cyprus, Crete, the Caucasus and Central Asia sent letters to the CUP center. The people in those lands identified themselves with an ethnic identity of Turkishness or Turkicness rather than with an extra-ethnic identity of Ottomans."⁶⁰ On this point, Shaw argues that "though Ottomanism promoted the idea of the motherland, with all subjects, regardless of religion and race, equal before law and loyal to the same Ottoman dynasty, the refusal of the minority nationalists to accept that equality, the success of national unity movements in Germany and Italy, and nationalist aspirations of non-Turkish Muslim groups in the Empire led to an increased awareness of the Turkish identity and almost forced the germination of Turkish nationalism."⁶¹

IV. THE WESTERNIZATION PARADIGM OF THE COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS (1908-1918)

The struggle of the Young Turks resulted in the proclamation of the Constitution on July 23, 1908. "This was a victory for the reformist-constitutionalist wing of the official bureaucratic elite organized in the underground Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which in time transformed itself into a political party."⁶² The CUP remained as an underground organization from the formation of its first nucleus in 1889 until the revolution of 1908.

In the wake of the 1908 revolution, the cadres of the Committee were inexperienced and lacking the necessary education to take over the power and more important than that, they did not have the social status necessary to make them accepted as leaders in such a traditional-conservative society.⁶³ They did not have an agreed upon idea concerning the usage of the power they assumed after the Revolution either.⁶⁴ The Committee enjoyed considerable support when it was struggling against the despotism of the Palace. But, once the despotism was destroyed, only the expectations of a very few were satisfied, and the dissatisfied elements went into opposition. There were the large number of opportunists who had supported the CUP in the hope that they would gain high positions when the Palace was toppled. Their ambitions were frustrated by the Committee's decision not to assume office in the government. The Committee was split into factions once it had achieved its basic aim; those members dedicated to the ideal reform and the

creation of a modern state was always in minority.⁶⁵ In Ahmad's words " in July 1908, the CUP had been faced with the problem of what to do with the power they had so suddenly acquired".⁶⁶

Although the CUP could not grasp the political power in full extent, they did not hand it over totally to the Pashas of the Second Constitutionalist period. The Unionists were essentially conservative and had no intention of destroying the existing governmental machinery. Therefore, they left the elder statesmen in power and set themselves up as guardians of the Constitution.⁶⁷ Abdülhamit remained on the throne until the counter-revolution of 1909 and the CUP members did remain behind-the-scene. They were determining which Pasha would be in the Cabinet and telling them what to do and not to do. As Aksin formulated, this was a kind of political power of controlling the agenda of the respective Pasha. He termed this capability as 'supervisional political power'.⁶⁸

In this context of relative autonomy, two major political groups emerged to fight for power. First, there was the CUP itself, which, while it did not actually form a party, issued a general manifesto of its policies and supported those candidates who promised to follow it, thus forming them into a group that came to be known as the Unionists (*İttihatçılar*). Including in their number were Ahmed Rıza (then President of the Chamber of Deputies), Talat, Enver, Abdullah Cevdet and Ahmet Muhtar, and others who campaigned in general support of modernization and westernization, though with some differences as to detail.⁶⁹ The basic CUP program at this time included political reforms, popular freedom, strengthened national sovereignty and unity, agricultural and industrial development and just taxation.

The main opposition came from the Ottoman Liberal Union Party (*Osmanli Ahrar Firkasi*), formed by Prince Sabahaddin as soon as he returned from Paris in September 1908.⁷⁰ The Istanbul newspaper *Ikdam* was the principal organ of this group, who included the grand vezir and others who supported decentralization and full equality for the minorities. The more conservative elements, representing the Islamic views previously favored by the sultan, did not actually form a group because they feared the CUP, but they did speak quiteely about the need to retain Islam as the basis of state and empire. The debate among these factions in the campaign proceeded mainly along the questions of westernization and modernization and centralization versus decentralization, with Islamism and Turkism as well as the minority aspirations being de-emphasized under the assumption that the new freedom and equality would satisfy all.

The program of the CUP proclaimed in the wake of the Revolution, drew the parameters of the westernization paradigm of the successors of the Young Turk movement. The financial structure, the ministeries, the army and the navy would be reorganized. the tax system would be reviewed, in trade, industry, agriculture, science and education, a program would be implemented to attain the development. The regime of capitulation would be abolished with the permission of Great Powers.⁷¹ The Unionists were also concerned with another problem which was the creation of a modern state. For this, it was essential to abolish the capitulations, long resented as a symbol of inferiority and subservience, and absolutely incompatible with the status of a modern state whose sovereignty they violated. This kind of bold and brave programs

had been proposed in the former stages of westernization of the past decades, but each time they had been doomed to failure.

In the fields of political and social organization, a positivist rationality, constitutional regime and populism were the main tenets of the Young Turk paradigm. In other words, to achieve progress and save the country a new order which is designed on rational grounds finding its expression in Western science and technology, a political system entailing constitutional and parliamentary government and the enlightening process of the masses by the educated people who know where the good is laid.⁷²

According to Mardin, the reason the Young Turks tried to establish parliamentary institutions was to maintain the control on the semi-aristocratic bureaucratic class. Instead of serving as a means for freedom, a parliamentary political regime was proposed to prevent the dismemberment of the Empire due to nationalist movements.⁷³ The content of the ideology of populism carried an elitist connotation rather than democratic and free aspect, in that the good of the educated elites has to be adopted by the masses as their goods.⁷⁴

However, the success in the process of revolution of 1908 was slowed down by the social strains and the very nature of the westernization paradigm of the actors in the CUP. As Ahmad argues "...they were (the Young Turks) by and large conservative in outlook with little or no interest in promoting social change. The importance of the 1908 coup d'etat is not that it was revolutionary in profession; it was not. Its aim was to restore a constitution which had been granted 32 years earlier and thereby save the state. The revolutionary nature of the movement emerged later partly as a result of the failure of its pragmatic policies, and partly as an outcome of incidental reform

and the social change this brought about. The CUP was a direct extension of the reform movement of the nineteenth century, especially the Young Ottomans, and like them it was concerned only with the problem of how to save the Empire.”⁷⁵

Mardin tried to find the dynamics of the modernization paradigm of the CUP members in their professions. “As they were mostly doctors, they associated the process of life with chemical, physical and biological changes.”⁷⁶ Hanioglu emphasizes this point with the analogy of statesmen/state relation with doctor/patient one. According to him, if the state was sick, the statesmen had to cure the state. Therefore, the Young Turks were in the role of social doctor.⁷⁷

The typical cadre of the advocates of this ideology was composed of a) Turks, b) Youngsters, c) Members of administrative classes, d) Educated people, e) People with a bourgeoisie mentality. Being educated was a decisive peculiarity of the Young Turk ideology. Accordingly, an educated person was cultivated in the Western contemporary schools and differed from the traditional administrators. Such a person had a European view of world affairs. He believed that Europe was superior in all realms and if the Ottoman Empire be saved it had to be like European states. He also argued that arbitrary orders of Pashas and Sultan had to be replaced by the administration of the educated people.⁷⁸

That the Young Turks reverted so easily to absolutism is not astonishing. Though they were not old-fashioned Ottomans themselves, they were trained in schools in which some of the old values were still conserved. During their ten years in power, they confronted a revolution and four wars,

all demanding strong centralized leadership. This leadership the Young Turks- themselves mainly soldiers and possessing an instinct for discipline- consented to supply. And their record, though poor overall, is not without achievements. They were the first rulers of the Ottoman Empire to issue industrial legislation and to recognize the political importance of economic considerations. And they made the all-important decision to abandon an Ottoman-Islamic approach to politics and adopted Turkish nationalism in its place.

SECULARIZATION

After attaining power in 1913, the CUP started a push toward secularization along the line of Westernization. Among the leading secular modernizers were Tevfik Fikret and Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932), one of the founders of the CUP. "To Cevdet, the only civilization of the modern world was that of Europe. The trouble with the Tanzimat, the Young Turks and Abdülhamit was that they had not gone far enough, they had left too much of the old for the new to work efficiently."⁷⁹ His ideal was to destroy the old system and replace it with European civilization, thus making the Ottoman Empire part of the West.⁸⁰ He had also an elitist posture in that, reform had to be imposed from on top and said that people had to be driven to modernize themselves.

In order to modernize the country, he reforms aiming at the separation the state from the religion which had started by the Tanzimat should be moved further. However, this way was closed by the product of the Young Turk ideology, the 1876 Constitution. Indeed, this Constitution had declared Islam as the official religion of the Empire and Abdülhamit's policies had

consolidated this phenomenon.⁸¹ Therefore, the westernization paradigm of the CUP turned to modernizing the institution of religion.

The CUP administration had realized many secular reforms in line with the ideas of Ziya Gökalp.⁸² These reforms can be regarded as the precedents of Kemalist reforms.⁸³ In 1913, the ulema and religious courts were put under the supervision of state, and they became subject to the authority of the non-religious courts of appeal. The Ministry of Justice started to supervise the religious courts and their cadres.⁸⁴ Also a medrese was opened under state administration where there was an exam to determine the eligibility of the candidates. Those medreses were also put under the supervision of state and related ministry sent administrators to them to make the necessary reforms in the education curriculum and the staff. In 1915, Ziya Gökalp proposed the complete secularization of the religious courts, schools and religious foundations and the limitation of the Seyhülislam to purely religious functions. This program was carried out by a series of measures enacted during the next two years. In late 1916, the Seyhülislam was removed from the cabinet and his office was changed from a ministry to a department.⁸⁵ On March 1915, all Seriat courts as well as those organized by the Ministry of Religious Foundations to care for properties belonging to foundations and orphans were transferred to the authority of the Ministry of Justice, with decisions of the religious courts being subject to review by the secular Appeals Court.⁸⁶ This was a great step on the way to secularization and was the result of the contemporary mind of the CUP elite.

Although among the Westernists, there was a push for reform in the religion, they lacked a solid and positive programme. According to Abdullah

Cevdet they had to dwell on the writings of the western intellectuals instead of viewing Islam from a radical angle.⁸⁷

The CUP throughout its remain in power, had held eight congress, the first of which is on November 1908, and the last of which is the one on October 1918 when the decision to dissolve the party was taken. In the seventh Congress, they questioned the administrative style and the ideology of the party. After this Congress, secularism entered the agenda of its political program as an essential item. The main question was posed as ‘can a state be both Islamic and modern?’ and they reached the conclusion that the Ottoman state can be both. They seriously criticized the views of the Tanzimat leaders regarding the “Caliphate” and “Sultanate” arguing that the religious world and the real world can not have separate heads.⁸⁸

In addition, there were improvements in women’s lives. Women had to enter the work life with the stimulative force of the CUP especially due to the necessities of the war. “Women had entered many schools and also to Darülfünun. In a metropolitan like Istanbul, although the garment and veil continued to exist, many women no longer put on their veils”.⁸⁹ In Ahmad’s words “though it was still too early to talk of feminism or women’s liberation, the Young Turk period did see the establishment of a women’s organization committed to their welfare. In short, the Young Turk movement, if considered to be one of the European bourgeoisie movement, had emphasized the status of women and their place in society.

Another bold reform example in the social life is the Decree of Family Law (*Hukuk-u Aile Kararnamesi*) which was enacted on November 7, 1917. The Decree was introducing a system that would cover the family law of the

Ottomans, being Muslims or non-Muslims. Another important change was the abolition of the 13-day difference between the Rumi calendar and the Miladi calendar with a decree enacted after long discussions in February. The Law on the Medrese-i Ilmiye (*Medrese-i Ilmiye Hakkında Kanun*) was enacted on April 2, 1917. According to this law and the related regulation they were trying to introduce a system where the medreses were to be covered into institutions where the medreses were to be covered into institutions where contemporary (modern) religious education takes place. In their curriculums would be introduced the positive and natural sciences and the Western languages.⁹⁰

ECONOMY

The understanding of the economy in the Young Turk ideology in general and among the CUP cadres in particular was shaped according to the evolution of the national consciousness in the Second Constitutionalist Period. The Young Turks, before 1908, had put forward the concept of 'a nation having a national economy'.⁹¹ The Unionists, as party and government undertook various measures to accomplish this goal.⁹²

The CUP in the wake of the revolution had arrived to a juncture in which they had to choose either the way of Prince Sabahaddin which was favoring private enterprise and decentralization or that of Cavid Bey and his followers which supported state's intervention to the economy. Deriving a lesson from the ineffect of the ideology of liberalism in keeping the Ottomans together, the CUP chose the second way in economic modernization and it went hand in hand with the evolution of the Turkish nationalism. Adopting the

understanding of German romantic nationalism which foresaw a unity between nationalism and state intervention to the economy, the CUP acted in accordance with the notion of 'state economy' or 'national economy'.

Along this line, the CUP members argued that the first initiator of the economic activities was the state. They organized the boycott against the Austrian and Greek goods in 1908-1909 and encouraged the consumption of local manufactures. They started to construct a network of roads and railways to integrate a national market and create a demand for rural products.⁹³

One of the principal aims of the CUP movement was to create a national economy with the stimulative force of a national bourgeoisie, also in order to be able to be independent from Europe. However, there appeared some problems in creating a group that would willingly play the entrepreneur role, when they tried to overcome the mentality which would impede the capitalist development. In a one party state, where the party and the state is in one hand and where the party is regarded as the personification of the nation, it was natural that the entrepreneurial groups would appear from the CUP's own cadres. When the Young Turks made the revolution, there was not even a Muslim entrepreneurial class, so all the commercial or industrial initiative came from the bureaucracy or from the CUP. The CUP took the practical step of fostering a Turkish entrepreneurial class by encouraging the formation of commercial companies. When the economic policy of statism defined, it was defined in such a way as to benefit this new class. The state accepted the task of undertaking economic activity which the individual could not or would not profit but which is vital for deepening for developing the infrastructure. In this context, the most important step that the CUP accomplished in creation of a

Turkish bourgeoisie was to create commercial and to a lesser extent, the industrial companies.

According to Ziya Gökalp, one of the factors that would cause Turks to acquire a national character and contribute to the formation of a Turkish culture is a national economy. The agricultural policy of the CUP was also aiming at strengthening the target for statism. They did not think of removing the sharing (*ortakçilik*) system by distributing land to landed or non-landed peasantry. On the contrary, they attempted at ending the small-scale peasantry and strengthen the big land ownership. The landowners were the allies of the CUP in the countryside and the CUP did not think of curbing their power.⁹⁴ Reform sufficient to break power of the landlords would have been popular among the peasants who constituted the majority of the population. This was clear to a minority in the CUP who therefore advocated such a policy. Despite the rhetoric of such Unionists, the Committee as a body never considered destroying the social, economic and political power of this class. The Unionists could have tried to alter this situation by distributing land and providing cheap credits to peasants thereby forcing landlords to mechanize and use modern methods to overcome the scarcity of labor. Instead, they continued the Tanzimat policy of strengthening the landlords by passing laws which extended their control over peasants.

Yusuf Akçura argued that 'if the Turks fail to produce among themselves a bourgeoisie class by profiting from European capitalism, the chance of survival of a society composed only peasants and civil servants will be very slim.'⁹⁵ He also noted that 'the foundation of the modern state is a bourgeoisie class. The contemporary prosperous state came into existence on the

shoulders of the bourgeoisie, of the businessmen and bankers. The national awakening in Turkey is the beginning of the genesis of the Turkish bourgeoisie and if the natural growth of the Turkish bourgeoisie continues without damage of interruption, we can say that the sound establishment of the Turkish state has been guaranteed.⁹⁶ The Young Turks began to plan and execute economic projects on a respectable scale. To stimulate economic enterprise, they passed in 1909, and revised in 1915, a Law for the Encouragement of Industry. In other words, the governmental machinery for economic planning and control-which became so important in the days of the republic-was perfected during the war years.

NATIONALISM

Regarding Turkish nationalism the seeds had already been sown before the CUP assumed power. In fact, 'during the westernization process that followed Tanimat, the inward-looking, self-searching period that were influenced by the ideas that were imported from the West had slowly started to shape the cultural and intellectual pillars of the Turkish nationalism'.⁹⁷

The delay of Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman State can be explained by the fact that there had been no Turkish bourgeoisie and until 1913 the CUP was a political organization that was trying to protect the Ottoman Empire. Until the counter-revolution in 1912, the CUP members had tried to reach the ideal of Ottomanism through communicating with the minorities. However, when this solution collapsed, they tried to reach their target through the Parliament. For that reason, in 1909, they started to bring proposals regarding the restriction of the political and cultural autonomy of

the minorities and the transfer of the control of some activities-education- to the state. In this way, the state would be able to create a common Ottoman culture at the schools. As Ahmad argues "it is too early to talk about a general consciousness of Turkism even among the CUP members. Such a tendency is seen only during the Balkan Wars."⁹⁸ Indeed, the development of Turkish nationalism corresponded the seizure of power in 1913 and after that the CUP declared a new political programme. In this period, Turkish nationalism started to put weight on the political life.

Ziya Gökalp became the mentor of Turkish nationalism. He argued that the population had the unconscious idea of Turkish national identity. These ideas should be brought to the light by the Young Turks so that they represented the ideas of the nation. The criticism of him was towards the means of the Tanzimat leaders, not towards their targets: to create the 'Ottoman nation' through Ottomanization without creating the Turkish national identity. The only ones who fell into this trap were the Turks.⁹⁹ Therefore, the problem was that the Turks lacked a national identity. According to Gökalp, if the Turks acquire a national identity, there would be a certain degree of cohesion between some segments. He gave the example of the United States of America as a model for Ottomanism. He rejected pan-Turkism putting forward that the Ottomans had tried to create a nation not with blood, but with the togetherness of the people who feel close to each other.¹⁰⁰ This idea of the Ottoman nation was so overwhelming that the Ottoman intellectuals would hardly leave it aside. Almost all of the Young Turks in Europe, who were engaged in activities against despotism had

adopted this view and they were regarding the national unity as a natural part of the development ¹⁰¹

As Turkism became an ideology from 1915 onwards, the CUP had enacted a law that the use of Turkish in all foreign institutions. The literature programs have been changed to include name of national literature, all the newspapers started to talk about the national consciousness.

Nationalism, which hoped to turn the multi-national Ottoman Empire into a cohesive national state, was promoted by *Türk Yurdu*. (Turkish Homeland) and other periodicals. The Westernists published *İçtihat*, which appears to have influenced Atatürk. The Young Turk era had served, nevertheless, as a period of political training and experience. Liberal ideas, borrowed from the West, were debated in the press, tried, and for the most part found unworkable. Then, when the Balkan War in 1913 ended in the loss of territories “sown with the bones of ancestors and nurtured with their blood,” there was a reaction against the West and an infusion of Turkish nationalism, which became the main theme in the modern-minded press. Nationalism, whatever its causes, had certain populist tendencies. In order to a national state it was necessary to develop new cultural bonds among the whole population. “Among the long-forgotten masses of Anatolia, the ‘real Turk’ was happily discovered, unaware that his language and customs, if not his person, were about to become a political asset. The intelligentsia was urged to learn the history, folklore, and traditions of the Turkish masses, and in return teach them the rudiments of civilization.”¹⁰²

"The movement of the Turks has maintained a constant direction for centuries.

We have always advanced from the East to the West." (Atatürk)

V. THE WESTERNIZATION PARADIGM OF MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATÜRK

At the end of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was in such a poverty that the modernization/westernization successes of almost a century and intensified efforts along this paradigm seemed to be failed. However, with the charismatic leadership of Atatürk, a nation state was founded from the ashes of a dismembered Empire and a radical transformation took place in every spheres of life.

Although having made a life or death war against the Western powers, Atatürk and his team did not give up the policy of Westernization.¹⁰³ This was a great controversy and the underlying emphasis given to this paradigm by Atatürk. In other words, he was able to make a sensitive distinction between the West against which they fought for independence and the western civilization. It was the latter that they aimed at adopting for the good of the newly-established Republic.

Having realized that there was very little chance of survival for a religious state, he acted in a way to secularize the country and base it on national grounds. Therefore, first two of his fundamental reforms were abolishing the Sultanate and the institution of Caliphate. By means of these reforms added to the principle of revolutionism, the parameters of the process of Westernizing reforms were determined.

Atatürk was also very well aware of the fact that a sound westernization could only be possible through deeply-infiltrated reforms combining the material and spiritual world making up the culture. To his understanding, the necessity of changing the culture of the masses was not only a mere development/modernization policy but also a matter of survival. This paradigm affected his definition of Eastern and Western civilizations as well. He associated the Eastern civilization with the Islamic world and the other with the contemporary and developed world. Therefore, the choice was not difficult to make.

After the War of Independence and the declaration of the Republic in 1923, Atatürk intensified his efforts to modernize the country. His reforms aimed at changing the whole economic, social and legal structure of the country.

A very important part of his reforms was related to the legal system of the country. Since the laws inherited from the last period of the Ottoman Empire ruled every aspect of the social, economic, cultural and commercial life, the legal reforms implemented in the first decades of the Republic aimed at changing the whole structure of the country. Atatürk, through his modernization efforts, and having been affected by the Renaissance, Reformation, the Age of Enlightenment and the French Revolution simultaneously, tried to realize all these historical occurrences in a brief time period.

Indeed, he did not want to rule Turkish society by means of traditions and social convictions and symbols. He preferred to create a new ideology and symbols which would permit Turkey to progress rapidly into the 20th century.

As he was not a conservative in his modernization paradigm, he feared neither secular modernism nor liberal democracy, though he viewed the latter as a brake to his own radicalism. As Ahmad argues, though he did not introduce them fully in his own life time, Kemal accepted the rationale of the liberal institutions, parties, trade unions, a free press and free speech.¹⁰⁴ The assumption of his regime was that these institutions would be introduced as soon as Turkish society had achieved the requisite state of development, but he failed to win over the conservatives to his program or convinced them of the need to abolish the Sultanate-Caliphate.¹⁰⁵

Atatürk had a modern state to create in his mind. In order to accomplish this target, he thought that the country itself had to be separated from its Ottoman past. As Heper put forward, one of Atatürk's frequent emphasis was that the Ottoman Empire was nothing but a personal belonging of the Sultan. In this way, the Empire did not even a patrimonial structure.¹⁰⁶

According to Atatürk, the decline of the Ottoman Empire and losing its entire freedom was a result of the personification of the administration and the consequent death of the state. In the first Economic Congress in Izmir, he argued that the state had turned to be a property of foreigners in collaboration with the Sultan. Therefore, he concluded that the state did not have a nation which held its own sovereign rights.¹⁰⁷

His basic ideas and policies developed in hundreds of speeches, programs and laws from the early days of the War of Independence to his death in 1938 have come to be known as Kemalism. The principles of this ideology were later made part of the political programs of the RPP which he created as his principal instrument to secure them. In February 1937, they

were brought together in six ideologies written in the Art. 2 of the Constitution: *Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Revolutionism, Secularism* and *Statism*. The first four principles reflected the ideological basis of the new political structuring, and the last two expressed the policies that were to provide a philosophical framework for reforms. The importance of the nature of the Kemalist principles were defined as their continuous impact in terms of shaping the new modern state.

Atatürk attached the necessities of establishing a new state with the salvage of the country after the demise of the Ottoman Empire to each other. The new state would be belonging to the nation itself, but not to a person or a group. The abrogation of Sultanate can be explained with this paradigm.

He envisaged two missions for the newly-established Republic. They were; to save the country and to bring it to the level of contemporary civilization. To attain this goal, he felt the necessity of stimulating the enormous potential of the Turkish people. However, like his predecessors, he and his aides had to enlighten the grassroot population. At this very point, his elitist approach towards the system of government became apparent in his overall modernization paradigm.

The fundamental principles of Kemalism was accepted by the Congress of the Republican People's Party in 1931 and after several amendments in the Party Program of 1935, survived as it was put into the 1937 *Law of Teskilat-i Esasiye*.

The economic ideology of Kemalism was formulated in 1931 in the Party Congress of the Republican People's Party (RPP). The economic pillar

of this ideology, *statism*, had direct roots in the previous period of the Young Turks.

STATISM

Atatürk and the Turkish governing elite understood the necessity of the social and economic reorganization both to modernize the political and cultural life of Anatolia and to gain the approval of the West to be a member of their world. In fact, this policy began as early as the unilateral abrogation of the capitulations in 1914. In this way, both during and after the war, the industrial and agricultural sectors could be protected. After the CUP, the Kemalists continued to attach importance to the notion of protectionism. In Ahmad's words, "they achieved a bourgeoisie revolution from above. It was achieved despite the unwillingness of the same class in a childhood stage which were seeking for a cooperation with foreigners. For, some local notables were not thinking in national terms, but were opportunistic enough to sell the other regions of the country for the sake of their profits. Bekir Sami Bey, in negotiations in London was a solid example for a state official thinking in pragmatic terms."¹⁰⁸

Although the new regime was under disposal of military and civil bureaucrats they were both trying to delegate it to a future-born bourgeoisie. However, they had a larger vision and trying to establish a national economy without any foreign intervention. The most clear pronouncement of the political economic designs of Kemalism could be seen in the Izmir Economic Congress held in February 1923.

Against this background, the Kemalists supported private initiative by the Law of Encouragement of Industry in 1925, but due to the economic depression in 1929, the statist economic policies started to be implemented vigorously. In fact, this kind of economic policies were not alien to the state, for it was conducted during the First World War under the label of state economy. The aim of this economic policy, having its roots in the years of the CUP were to take economic measures to improve the private sector. The 1935 Party Congress, in which fundamental economic principles were enumerated, highlighted the main philosophy of statism.

The experience of liberal economy until 1929 was interrupted by the Big Crash and the state had to intervene to the economy. However, it was not a novel thing for the Turks since the same policy was implemented under the title of 'state economy'. In 1930s this was known as 'statism'.¹⁰⁹

One of the basic objectives of the Kemalists was not to consider the Turkish Republic as a community composed of different classes but as a community which is divided according to division of labor necessary for its individual and social life. Farmers, artisans, laborers and workers, industrialists, tradesmen and state officials were the main working groups of the Turkish society. Each of the task these groups were attached were considered to be indispensable for the sake of social life. The RPP's aim was to realize social order and solidarity instead of class conflict. Although the private initiative and activity was considered to be the fundamental objective for the beginning the state would deal with economy in the fields where the high interests of the nation lied.

Under these circumstances, it was out of question for the Republicans to implement competitive policies in the field of economy. It would mean the destruction not only for a maturing infrastructure but also pose a threat to regime. Also, the status-quo coming from the era of the Young Ottomans in which the peasantry was a tool in the hands of landlord has not changed. In the republican period, the welfare of the peasantry was bettered in a very small amount. For example, the tax taken from them was canceled. However, there was not any structural change. In other words, a land reform, which was a necessary step for the well-being of the peasantry could not be realized. Ahmad argues that, if there had been a movement of the peasantry, then Atatürk could have been directed towards them instead of landlords.¹¹⁰

In the era of Atatürk, the modernization paradigm was understood not only as institutional reforms, but also a creation of capitalist economy which would be established only by a class of bourgeoisie. Yusuf Akcura argued that without this class, a society composed of solely by peasants and civil servants has a little chance to survive. In other words, both Turkish intellectuals and government elite had realized the necessity of organizing the new social and economic life around the pre-matured bourgeoisie. They were also very well aware of the fact that without economic independence, trying to attain political sovereignty would be a futile attempt. Therefore shortly, the basis of Atatürk's paradigm of economic modernization derived from capitalism and anti-imperialism.

To carry out the five-year plan, two great banks were established, which could best be described as state-owned holding companies. The *Sumerbank* which promoted industry was established in 1934 and *Etibank*,

the mining company in 1935. Together with the *Ziraat*, and *Is Banks*, the financial institutions became the executors of the state's economic plans. If we add up state monopolies (salt, tobacco, alcoholic products, matches and explosives) the government owned power plants and railroads and the forests which in 1937, the government's regulation of economy could be thoroughly seen.

REPUBLICANISM

In Shaw's words "Republicanism involved not only the replacement of Sultanate by the Republic but also elimination of the whole Ottoman social system through which a small ruling class governed and the mass of subjects supported. Atatürk's moves to abolish the Sultanate and Caliphate culminated the process by which the old Ottoman idea of reform had evolved from restoration of all the institutions to their destruction and replacement by new ones."¹¹¹ The men of Tanzimat and Abdülhamit II had applied this new concept mainly to the Empire's physical apparatus but had not really extended it to its social basis. Now the Sultanate, the Caliphate and the ruling class gave way to a Republic, manifesting and organizing the sovereignty of the people and their right to rule themselves for their own benefit. The new slogan was 'sovereignty belongs to the nation' (*Hakimiyet milletindir*).¹¹² The Republic was to be by and for the people. The people found out that their interests within the community were identical with those of the republic and that its continued existence and prosperity were essential for theirs.

NATIONALISM

“Nationalism and particularly Turkish nationalism were the essential motives behind the War of Independence and the Republic.¹¹³ ‘The doctrines of nationalism were expounded by the state through the press, the schools and various branches of government, through the RPP and through Turkish Heart Organization inherited from the Young Turks. The Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*) was founded in 1925 to show the Turks what they had done in history. Nationalist theories of language and history were expounded, such as the Sun-Language Theory, which maintained that Turkish was the first language on earth and that all other languages developed from it; that the Turks were the first people and that all human achievement had essentially Turkish origins; that there was an unbroken thread of Turkish history in Anatolia from the beginning of Mankind not merely from the eleventh century; and that they first appeared in history as Sumerians and Hittites.¹¹⁴

A very important element of Turkish nationalism was the increased Turkification of the language under the leadership of the Turkish Language Society (*Türk Dil Kurumu*) founded in 1926...Linguistic nationalism was followed both to make it easier for people to learn to read and also to cut Young Turks off from their Ottoman heritage and to replace the conservative mentality of the past with a modern and liberal one. Atatürk wanted thus to create a generation of Turks that would not only be proud of its race but would also regard reform and change according to the needs of the time as natural, rather than always looking back to the way things had been done in the ‘good old days’ as had so many Ottoman reformers in the past.¹¹⁵

Turkish nationalism provided a feeling of national solidarity in place of the discredited ideologies of Ottomanism and pan-Islamism. It supplied a real motive and the necessary tool to encourage the Turks to build their own land, without fostering aggressive, irredentist aspirations. Turkish nationalism was not imperialistic; it did not seek to achieve greatness by regaining lands once ruled by the Ottomans, even in the case of areas still inhabited by considerable Turkish minorities. The pan-Turkish emphasis of the Young Turks was ignored and suppressed. The emphasis now was on building a modern state for the Turks within the boundaries of the Republic created by the Treaty of Lausanne. The Republic's only aim regarding the lost territories was to make sure that the Turks living in them were treated fairly and justly.¹¹⁶

POPULISM

Closely connected with Turkish nationalism was the Kemalist doctrine of Populism, a corollary to Republicanism, that government was of the people, not the Ruling Class. This idea had various manifestations. One was that all citizens of the Republic were equal regardless of class, rank and religion or occupation. So it was that the 1924 Constitution specified that "the people of Turkey, regardless of religion and race are Turks as regards citizenship. (Art. 88) All Turks are equal before the law and are expected conscientiously abide by it. Every kind of group, class, family and individual special privilege is abolished and prohibited. (Art. 69) Every Turk regardless of origin was given the same right to practice the philosophical creed, religion or doctrine to which he may adhere (Art. 75)"

The second basic premise of populism involved by and for the people. Institutions had to be developed to enable the Republic's citizens to share in the process of rule. This was formally accomplished throughout the Grand National Assembly. Since its foundation, the Assembly had been given both legislative and executive powers, the latter carried out through the president of the Republic, elected by it, and the former through the Council of Ministers, chosen by and responsible to the president. Judicial functions were carried out in the name of the Assembly, in accordance with the law, by courts that were independent of it.

Mustafa Kemal's movement was based on the idea that national sovereignty was rooted in the popular will. It had also social goals, for Mustafa Kemal's first government came forth as the *halk hükümetleri* (people's governments), promising to find a remedy to economic and social ills and put an end to bureaucratic oppressions. He used all communication media intensively to win over the public. 'Indoctrination and information', in his view, was very important, as important as the question of army, and even more important than the army. In 1920 a General Directorate of Press and Information was established to direct communication and propaganda along with the Turkish News Agency, *Anadolu Ajansı*, established in the same year.

In view of widespread illiteracy, oral communication played a significant part in winning over the Anatolian population, some well-known people, such as Ziya Gökalp being sent to 'work among people' and convert them to the nationalist cause. Pamphlets and brochures, moreover, including epics, in the folk style glorifying the movement and Mustafa Kemal were printed and distributed to be read to the public in towns and villages. With the

consolidation of the Republican regime in 1923-1925, one creative period for the mass media was over, and they began to serve primarily the end of cultural education. As a conclusion, since the media were utilized to spread information about Western ways of life and political systems, the newspapers in particular were highly doctrinal. They envisaged the desired civilization or modernization first as consisting chiefly of political changes. Then they broadened their perspective to include social and economic reforms. By the same token, they appealed first to the enlightened urban groups, then to lower social strata, and finally to the villages.

REVOLUTIONISM

Another Kemalist doctrine reflecting the philosophical basis of change was Revolutionism. It involved a readiness, even zeal, to transform the traditional Ottoman society into a modern one by radical, forced measures aimed at achieving success within the span of a single generation. This method was dictated by the need to protect the nation against its enemies and also to justify the radical measures taken to establish the republic. Revolutionism basically involved the use of whatever was needed to make sure that the revolution begun in 1919 would achieve its aims. So it was that the RPP declared in 1935 that it did not consider itself and the conduct of the state to be limited to gradual, evolutionary steps of development. It committed itself to defending the principles that had been developed as part of revolutionism.

The modernism that was to be achieved through the institutions developed out of Republicanism and Populism-for the objectives of Nationalism, and through the techniques of Revolutionism-was supplemented

by two more Kemalist doctrines, which directed and defined the outlook and policies of the state: Secularism and Statism.

SECULARISM

Secularism involved not just separation of the state from the institutions of Islam but also liberation of the individual mind from restraints imposed by the traditional Islamic concepts and practices, and modernization of all aspects of state and society that had been molded by Islamic traditions and ways. Liberation of the state had to come first. Abolition of the Caliphate was followed by a series of reforms to end the union of state and religion that had characterized the Ottoman Empire, thus in turn ending the ability of the religious class to limit and control the state. The position and office of Seyhülislam and the Ministry of Religious Foundations were abolished and replaced by small departments for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Müdürlüğü*) and Religious Foundations (*Evkaf Müdürlüğü*). The entire system of religious schools also was eliminated, with the mekteps and medreses being incorporated into a unified system of national education under the direction of the Ministry of Education.

In 1925, the international time and calendar systems replaced the traditional Islamic ones, which already had been reduced to limited usage by the end of the nineteenth century (December 26, 1925). Six years later the metric system definitively replaced the old measures of weight and capacity (March 26, 1931). An indirect but most effective step toward breaking old traditions came in the area of language and its use.¹¹⁷

Though the secularism of the Republic was aimed at lessening the influence of the clergy and creating an environment in which the individual could follow his religious beliefs without having to embrace predetermined dogma and conform to strict rules, it did not intend to abandon Islam as some of its opponents have claimed. The secularist program never opposed religion as such.

Turkish historicism, except for a brief period in search of a new historical framework, conceived the classical Ottoman times through the prism of Ottoman historians. It was also proud of the Ottoman grandeur and attached it to the Turkish nationalism. However, these were not the ideas to which Kemalist regime respected. Atatürk, in conformity with the hatred he felt towards the Ottoman state, searched for a 'national identity' in the ancient civilizations. Also, in the Turkish independence struggle, a parallel line was tried to be established with the ancient Anatolian and mesopotamian civilizations. To support and facilitate the endeavors along this direction, some research institutes like *Türk Tarih Kurumu* and *Türk Dil Kurumu* were founded and generously financed.¹¹⁸

The proclamation of Republic in 1923 and the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 permanently altered the power structure of Turkish society. The contest between the secular modernists and the religious traditionalists was decisively won by the modernists. And to consolidate their initial victory, Atatürk and his aides proceeded virtually to obliterate the system of religious education which had fed traditionalism and to expand and improve the existing structure of secular, public schools. Education was still expressedly viewed as the key to modernization.

The Assembly, acting on Mustafa Kemal's request deposed the last caliph on March 3, 1924. The blow was softened by the retention of Islam as the state religion and of reorganized religious establishments. The office of Seyhülislam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs were replaced by a Religious Affairs Presidency and a Pious Foundation were entrusted to the General Directorate of pious foundations. All religious affairs so came under government control. In 1928, the concept of a state religion was stricken from the Constitution although not from the minds of the people. The religious revolution when it finally came, was much swifter than the political.

After 1924, the medreses were abolished and all other religious schools maintained by the religious organization were taken over by the Ministry of Education, the teaching of religion in the public schools was finally discontinued in 1935. The original 29 prayer leader and preacher schools set up by the Republican government dwindled to two, which were in turn, abolished in 1930 for lack of students.

The government further very positively undermined the influence of the traditional religion through other educational reforms. Most important of these were the prohibition of the teaching of Arabic and Persian in the lycees and the introduction of the Roman alphabet both of which measures acted to isolate the younger generation from the formal religious heritage.

Kemal himself reminded the teachers of Turkey that the new generation would be in a manner their handiwork. The new generation of village and high school teachers constituted with the people's party members a zealous cadre which spread Kemalist ideals and trained the minds of Turkish youth. Teachers became Kemal's most devoted propagandists.

The influence of the ulema could not be broken unless the Caliphate was abolished. Many of Kemal's own followers opposed such a move for reasons both religious and political. The government had committed itself to preserve the caliphate when it had expelled the Sultan .That institution, moreover, had enjoyed a virtually undiminished prestige during a century of change because it attracted the religious loyalty of the people.

VI. CONCLUSION

As it can be seen throughout the analysis, the Ottoman administrators had been involved in the process of modernization since the years of Selim III. Each reform step served a cumulative effect to build the pillars of its successors. The process of modernization in the form of westernization once started, was not easy to arrest, after a certain point, it probably became irreversible. They were briefly, implementation of several secular laws, guaranteeing the life and property by means of documents which were called 'Edicts of the Sultans', adoption of new judicial institutions which were more compatible with Islam and last but not least the opening of the new Western-type of schools. Nevertheless, due to the social and economic structure of the Empire and the composition of society, there were elements of discontent with regard to these reforms.

The Ottoman statesmen had grasped the importance of the idea of reformism in the beginning of the 19th century. However, the reforms put into effect in their respective era were to a limited extent, mainly associated with the transfer of technology.

The goals aimed at the very beginning which were to provide the basics to compete with the Western superiority revealed by the defeats in front of their armies, could not be entirely attained. However, this kind of modernization paradigm and its realization created an unintended conclusion which was emergence of a bureaucratic elite in a much more centralized system than before. The reform movement continued under the rule of Men of

Tanzimat but not went into deeper understanding of people and thus could not be rooted in the society.

However, modernization had brought with it something more than new uniforms, weapons, titles, techniques, and technology; it brought new ideas. Among the young bureaucrats, army officers and intellectuals who had learned European languages and received Western-style educations, ideas such as nationalism, constitutionalism, representative government, democracy, and progress began to find an enthusiastic acceptance.

The Young Ottomans' movement, a product of the reaction against the past paradigms of westernization mainly aimed at the survival of the Ottoman Empire. The idea of 'Ottomanism' was pronounced frequently to provide a social glue among the people. Another important characteristics of that era was in the continuing importance of Islam and considerable impact of it in the social relations.

The victory of the First Constitution in 1876 was immediately impeded by Abdulhamit's shelving it for 30 years through which he imposed an absolutist regime. However, the seeds of the CUP were already sown and the struggle for the Saecond Constitution had resulted in success. The cadres of the CUP were forced with the Turkish nationalism, statist economic policies, secular ideas, in short much more modern type of system. The promulgation of the Second Constitution of 1908 and the following period under the CUP rule was generally concieved as a laboratory of Turkish politics. In other words, the parameters of the modernization paradigm of the Kemalist period were shapd throughout this period.

Although the modernization understanding of the Kemalist period was a direct consequence of the Young Turks era, the Republican Turkey searched for a possible rupture from the Ottoman past. According to the historical evaluation during the Kemalist period, having been formed in the bosom of the Ottoman world, there was a great change with the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The reforms undertaken in the Republican period, therefore, was not only aiming at modernizing the country but also eliminating the remnants of the Ottoman past. It can also be said that this form of *Weltanschauung* was mainly coming from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

Concerning the process of secularization, the steps taken throughout the nineteenth century constituted the basis of future reforms in the Republican period. The separation of the institution of religion from the state affairs basically emerged from the westernization paradigms of the bureaucratic intelligentsia of the Tanzimat period and blossomed through the Young Turks. The CUP officially implemented reforms which underscored secular system. All these efforts were consolidated by Atatürk and his abolition of Caliphate and revising the Constitution of the Republic towards this paradigm.

The Young Turk's mentality of adopting a national and state-based economy was shared by the later reformers. This team harshly criticized the economic policies under the name of reforms because of their openness to concessions. Along the nationalist paradigm, the Young Turks and the CUP aimed at developing a nation-state economy based on statism. Atatürk, though first initiated a liberal approach, had to turn back to statist version due to certain necessities prevailed in the world economy.

Turkish nationalism undeniably has its roots in the period of the Young Turks. Several intellectuals seemed to have a nationalist discourse before, but their vision was restricted to the creation of a Ottoman nationalism order to save the Empire. However, as can be seen from the economic measures of the CUP, a notion of Turkish nationalism developed before 1923. However, Atatürk presented a body to the vague terms pronounced till his days.

As a conclusion, Atatürk, as a personality coming from the cadres of the CUP, had an undeniable connection with the Young Turk westernization paradigm. However, he was able to build on the already-established basis and create a totally different picture in a totally different environment.

NOTES:

¹ A person and/or a group who have a decisive effect on the outcome of policies can be referred as "key actors". For obvious reasons, throughout the analysis, determination of the key actors is subject to the personal criteria of the writer.

² Peter. Sugar, *Political Modernization in Japan and in Turkey* (Princeton University Press, 1964), 148. 'Modernization as a historical concept includes such specific aspects of change as industrialization of the economy or secularization of ideas, but it is not limited to these. It involves a marked increase in geographic and social mobility, a spread of secular, scientific, and technical education, a transition from ascribed to achieved status, an increase in material standards of living, and many related subsidiary phenomena'. Dankwart Rustow and Robert Ward 'Introduction' *Ibid.*, p.3-4.

³ "After the Ottoman's humiliating defeats by western powers, self-doubt and questioning became the order of the day. Initially, Ottoman intellectuals promoted their conclusion that they had been overcome by 'infidels' who had mastered the 'new technology'... the only purpose of Westernization became the attainment of superiority over the West through the adoption of western technology. Thus interaction with western Europe was initially undertaken solely as a means for importing superior technology." Sükrü Hanioglu. *The Young Turks in Opposition* (Oxford University Press, 1995), 7-8. Inalcik argues along this line that "a program of modernization was first adopted by the state as a measure of self-defense against an aggressive and imperialistic Europe. Halil Inalcik *Political Modernization...*, 62.

⁴ Dankwart Rustow. *Ibid.*, 359. "Later civilian schools also were founded and by the end of the 19th century these higher schools had produced a new elite of officers and officials to whom Europeanizing reform was no longer an occasional expedient for preserving tradition but an instrument for transforming tradition itself." *Ibid.*, p.359. "In the late 18th century there began that long development of a secular, modern education which remade Turkish society, and that it began in the area of military instruction, among an element already most strategically located within the power structure of Ottoman society." Frederick Frey. *Ibid.*, 212.

⁵ "Though Mahmud II himself had no experience of the West and knew no western language, he presided over the period in which Turkish institutions were genuinely started on the path of Westernization." Inalcik. *Ibid.*, 96.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 49

⁷ Davison. *Ibid.*, 94). "Beyond the fairly mechanical aspect of administration, Europe supplied philosophical concepts of far-reaching significance. One of these was the concept of the secular state. The realization of this concept involved abandonment of any official state religion and a shift in the legal basis for individual rights and personal status." *Ibid.*, 106.

⁸ Especially after the reign of the Sultan Mahmut II (1808-1809), a centralization of the political power was being observed. As Lewis argued "in Mahmut II's view, with which many subsequent observers have agreed, no real progress toward reform would be possible until all power other than that emanating from him had been eliminated and the Sultan's will be made the sole source of authority in the provinces as well as in the capital." Bernard Lewis *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (1968), 78.

⁹ "It seems that the leading members of the Tanzimat bureaucracy made their careers by serving both in the Embassies in Europe and the Translation Office" Eric J. Zürcher *The Rise of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish Nationalist Movement 1905-1926* (Leiden-E. J. Brill, 1984), 4. Inalcik argues that the diplomatic establishment may be counted the first concrete step toward modernization in Ottoman political organization. Inalcik. *Ibid.*, 54-55. Rustow adds that "the mid-19th century reforms were carried out largely by diplomats and officials self-taught in the ways of the Westernization." Rustow. *Ibid.*, 359.

¹⁰ Zürcher, *The Rise.....*2.

¹¹ Ibid., 2 The most important evidence that the Ottoman Empire was not ready to Westernization in the theoretical level laid in the slow pace of change in the field of history, philosophy and literature. The people who did not hesitate to adopt French Civil Code were not so keen on French historicism, and European philosophy.

¹² "The expanding bureaucracy became increasingly centralized, its power being wielded by a steadily diminishing number of persons within it." Sugar, *Political Modernization...*, 157. With regard to this spill-over effect, Zürcher stresses "Though the reforms of the Tanzimat period were often rather ineffectual and stopped far short of the proclaimed aims, the accumulation of the changes it produced brought about a lasting transformation of the administrative, judicial and educational structure of the empire." Zürcher, *The Rise...* 3.

¹³ The results of the reform movements which had been underway since the end of the 18th century are summarized by Stanford Shaw as an emergence of autocratic system and of a new administrative class. Levent Köker *Modernleşme, Kemalizm, Demokrasi* (İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1993), 128 cited from Stanford Shaw "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the 19th century Ottoman Reformers in W.R. Polk and R.L. Chambers (ed.) *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East* (1968), 29.

¹⁴ One of the best study about the Young Ottomans is Serif Mardin's "The Genesis of the Young Ottoman Thought". Also for a concise history of the Young Ottomans, see Tevfik Çavdar *İttihat ve Terakki* (İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1991).

¹⁵ Inalcik *Political...*, 62

¹⁶ Civil Service Academy (*Mülkiye*), War Academy (*Harbiye*), Naval Academy (*Bahriye*) and Military Medical Academy (*Tıbbiye Askeriye*) were staffed with teachers with a modern Western-type education and among these people there was a considerable number of supporters of the Young Ottomans.

¹⁷ Köker *Modernleşme*, 129. The movement started among a narrow intellectual group in İstanbul called '*Edebiyat-ı Cedide*'. The prominent figures of the movement were İbrahim Sinasi (1826-1878), Ziya Pasha (1825-1880), Namik Kemal (1840-1888) and Ali Suavi (1839-1878).

¹⁸ In Lewis' words, "...in introducing a foreign form of government under foreign pressure or advice, the men of Tanzimat had thrown the country wide open to foreign influence and interference of every kind... To domestic tyranny, the men of the Tanzimat had added foreign exploitation." Lewis *The Emergence...*, 171-172.

¹⁹ Sinasi converted them into 'nation', 'freedom' and 'public opinion'. Namik Kemal was also stressing the notions of 'nation', 'freedom' and 'country'. Naturally, as Aydemir commented that the notion of nation was not in the same meaning as it would be perceived in later stages which was depending purely on Turkish nationalism. Sevkettin Süreyya Aydemir *Enver pasha Cilt I* (Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1983), 32

²⁰ The Young Ottomans, especially, severely opposed the paradigm of reform represented by Ali and Fuat Pasha (Tanzimat Pashas) and replacement of them and always searched for ways of preventing the loss of the independence and disintegration of the Empire.

²¹ Inalcik *Political...*, 62. He goes on stating that "...for the first time we find group of progressives acting independently of the government and opposing the official reform program. (They) were the real forerunners of the nationalist and democratic movement in Turkey" Ibid...62

²² For the importance they attached to the press, see Lewis *The Emergence...*, 146-150. Karpas argues that "throughout the process of modernization, literature served as a political and social laboratory where new ideas were concretely tried out." Karpas, *Political...*, 266. "Constitutionalism", "fatherland" and "parliamentary rule" were the ideas propounded in newspapers and periodicals and in the plays performed in the new theaters. Ahmet Evin *Origins and Development of the Turkish Novel* (Bibliotheca Islamica, Minneapolis, 1993), 48: See also Ernest Edmonson Ramsaur *The Young Turks, Prelude to the Revolution and Republic* (Khayat Booksellers and Publishers, Beirut, 1965) 3-7 After citing several of the newspapers published by various intellectuals among the Young Ottomans, Karpas argues that "...these papers, though united against the oppressive rule at home, variously embraced populist-Islamist-nationalism, revolutionary socialism, and a special brand of elite Ottoman nationalism." Karpas, *Political...*, 260.

²³Ibid., 261.

²⁴Ibid., 255.

²⁵ Arif Payaslioglu *Political...*, 414.

²⁶ On the other hand, according to Zürcher, this understanding can also be explained as partly by a tactical consideration, that these revolutionary ideas would be much more acceptable to a Muslim public, if they could be shown to be fundamentally compatible with Islam." Zürcher *The Rise...*, 6.

²⁷ Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol II. Reform, Revolution and Republic* (Cambridge University Press, 1977), 132

²⁸ Hanioglu *The Young Turks...*, 14 cited from Resad, "Frenklerde Bir Telas" *Ibret*, no:13 (July 1, 1872), 1. As Evin argues, they searched for a solution that would neatly synthesize the ethical values of Islamic culture with the material virtues of progress as observed in the West. Evin *Origins*, 189.

²⁹ Ibid., 14.

³⁰ Shaw, *History...*, 132.

³¹ For a comprehensive analysis of the Ottoman identity, see Taner Timur, *Osmanlı: Kimliği* (Hil Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1986), 33-84

³² "Not even the most liberal member of the Commission suggested the establishment of a republic or any basic diminution in the sovereign rights of the Sultan... Abdülhamit II remained as powerful as his predecessors." Shaw, *History*, 175.

³³ Ibid., 177. Article 8 of the Constitution states that "All subjects of the Empire are, with distinction, called Ottomans whatever religion they profess" and Article 17 "All Ottomans are equal in the eyes of the law. They have the same rights and duties toward the country without prejudice regarding religion." Ibid., 177.

³⁴ Hanioglu, *The Young Turks...*, 7.

³⁵ Evin, *Origins*, 80 cited from Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), 289. There were three sources of opposition to Abdülhamit's regime; hidden organizations in the universities, hidden juntas in the army (also having members out of the army) and intellectual groupings in Paris, Geneva and Cairo... It became common to term all of them as Young Turks coming from the French word '*Jeune Turc*'. Ibid., 382.

³⁶ Lewis, *The Emergence...* 174-175. "Even in the autocratic years of Abdülhamit's rule, the institutions of legislation and administration established by the Tanzimat and reinvigorated during Abdülhamit's early years continued to pour out and apply an enormous number of laws and regulations that gradually completed the work of modernizing the Ottoman system." Shaw, *History...*, 221. For a comprehensive analysis of Abdülhamit's reforms, see Ibid., 221-251. Shaw also argues that it would be a mistake to assume that Abdülhamit II came to throne with the intention of establishing his autocracy and that he worked to undermine the Parliament right from the outset... His turn toward autocracy was determined by the events and conditions he witnessed following his accession. Ibid., 212.

³⁷ Ibid., 264.

³⁸ Ibid., 255. "Consisting of many protest groups under the different names in and out of the empire during much of Abdülhamit's reign, these liberals gradually came together in a loosely formed coalition called the Young Turks throughout Europe" Ibid., 255.

³⁹ Feroz Ahmad, *İttihâççilikten Kemalizme*. (Kaynak Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1986), 11.

⁴⁰ Berkes, *Türkiye'de...*, 382.

⁴¹ Four student at the Military Medical College in Gülhane founded this Committee. Their name later was changed into 'the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress' in 1892.

⁴² Zürcher comments that "...the ideas they advocated were Western liberal ideas: Constitutionalism and parliamentary government. But it were not these ideas in themselves that appealed to them, but these ideas as a means to strengthen and eventually to save the Ottoman state." Zürcher, *The Rise...*, 22.

⁴³ Hanioglu, *The Young Turks...*, 31.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 18.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 18.

⁴⁶ All the opposition groups to the Sultan participated at the First Young Turk Congress. In this Congress which was held on February 4, 1902, the decisions taken were as: (Art. 2) Three aims for which an effort will be paid are as follows: (1) The territorial integrity and indivisibility of the Empire. (2) Maintaining internal peace and order for development, (3) restoring respect at fundamental laws especially at 1876 Constitution. Sina Aksin. *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki* (Remzi Kitabevi. Istanbul. 1992), 44. After this Congress, a total break-up between the group of Prince Sabahattin and Ahmet Riza occurred.

⁴⁷ By the time the reformation paradigm which was shaped by the question 'how this state has come to this point' in the beginning of modernization movement was changed into the question 'how this state can be saved' of bureaucratic intelligentsia. the radicals of the Young Turks had already emerged. Köker. *Modernleşme...*, 129

⁴⁸ These states were Great Britain and France.

⁴⁹ For the scientific principles of Prince Sabahattin, see Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, *İnkılap Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler, (Tan Matbaası, İstanbul, 1945)*, 290-293. Prince Sabahaâdin founded 'League of Administrative Decentralization and Private Initiative' in 1906. According to Kuran. He not only opposed the paradigm of administration and modernization, but also gave no concession regarding the interests of the country. Therefore the distinction made between these two factions did not necessarily mean a difference between their adherence to promote the interests of the country. *Ibid.*, 153 The term 'decentralization' had been put in the 1876 Constitution by Mithat Pasha.

⁵⁰ Ramsaur, *The Young Turks...* 91-92

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, .90.

⁵² Hanioglu, *The Young Turks...*, 203.

⁵³ Ramsaur, *The Young Turks...*, 38.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁵⁵ Hanioglu, *The Young Turks...*, 206. "From Ahmet Riza to Hoca Muhittin, and from the nationalist faction of the Young Turks to the official organs of the CUP, Le Bon's ideas were regularly cited... Le Bon's antipathy toward revolutions, especially the French Revolution became intrinsic to the Young Turk *Weltanschauung* which viewed 'the people' as a 'foule'. Early criticisms decried the people whom they blamed for 'not appreciating the efforts of these distinguished individuals (the Young Turks). In their private papers, people were labeled 'senseless'. The inability of crowd to reach correct decisions was contrasted with the value of superior individuals, culminating in a condemnation of the people. Eventually, people were judged guilty: 'to whom does this guilt belong?' 'to the people!' because every nation is worthy of the government that administrates it. *Ibid.*, 206 cited from "Niyet ve Maksudumuz". *İstikbal* (2) No. 1. (1901). 2.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 206. "An examination of the Young Turk *Weltanschauung*-although expressed not in political ideas but rather in great sociological theories that had political ramifications-provides a picture diametrically opposed to the declared aims of the CUP, namely the reopening of the parliament and re-proclamation of the Constitution. However, these were only devices to obscure their true agenda: a strong government, the dominant role played by an intellectual elite, anti-imperialism, a society in which Islam would play no governing role, and a Turkish nationalism that would bloom later." *Ibid.*, 212

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, .23.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 206.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 210.

⁶¹ Shaw, *History*, 260

⁶² Ergun Özbudun. *Perspectives on Turkish Democracy*, 8. Chambers argues on this point that the Revolution signalled the triumph of the new generation of liberal reformers, young army officers, and intellectuals and the acceleration of the modernizing program. Chambers, *Political...*, 302. In 1907 the name of the consolidated opposition, the Ottoman Society for Progress and Union was later changed to the society for Union and Progress as commonly translated, the Committee of Union and Progress." Rustow. *Ibid.*, p.361.

⁶³ Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969), 12-13. As Arai argues, they were very well aware of this lacking of cultivation and that the society would not accept them as the leaders of the day. Masami Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği*, (İletisim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1991) 54.

⁶⁴ "One group among them was in favor of using this power to its limits whereas the majority was reluctant to go beyond the political stage. In the struggle against the Palace, this majority group had supported the Committee but after the revolution, they thought that the struggle was over and the CUP had reached its aim." Ahmad, *İttihatçilikten Kemalizme* (Cem Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1991), 12-13.

⁶⁵ Ahmad, *The Young...*, 42.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 50 "The CUP itself, therefore, never had drawn up a real political program beyond the restoration of Parliament. Nor was there any unity on the question of what to do with the sultan. Few of the liberals had gone as far as to advocate his overthrow, let alone the destruction of the dynasty. And whatever sentiment there had been to replace him was largely overwhelmed by the mass gratitude to him for restoring the Constitution.

⁶⁷ "The CUP, despite its easy and resounding victory, at first remained in the background. The most unpopular of the sultan's ministers were dismissed and his network of spies disbanded. But the government was carried on by cabinets composed of the customary assortment of aging officials, now responsible to a popularly elected legislature." Rustow, *Political...*, 362.

⁶⁸ Aksin, *Jön Türkler ve...*, 87.

⁶⁹ "The CUP was not monolithic. It was a conglomerate of groups and factions with different backgrounds, loyalties and leaders. The revolution of 1908 had been brought about largely by the activities of the young officers in the CUP, the captains and majors in the Third Army... While the actual government was left in the hands of the older and more experienced administrators of the 'Ancien Regime' the civilian group around Talat watched over political developments and tried to steer the government and parliament alike. This state of affairs lasted until the Committee was ousted from power in 1912." Zürcher, *The Rise...*, 50.

⁷⁰ The Liberals were generally among the rich and conservative families and they socially were from a higher segment than that of the Unionists.

⁷¹ Knowing that they were not powerful enough to abrogate the capitulatory rights of foreigners unilaterally, the Unionists tried to overcome this by legislation. By introducing sound legislation, they hoped to make the administration of the Empire efficient so that foreigners would no longer need to claim their special privileges. At the same time, the new laws would violate the capitulations in such a discreet way that the great powers would either be forced to ignore the violation or they would not be able to intervene effectively. Ahmad, *The Young Turks...*, 62.

⁷² Köker, *Modernleşme*, 130.

⁷³ Serif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908*, 35. İletisim Yayınları, İstanbul.

⁷⁴ Köker, *Modernleşme*, 11.

⁷⁵ Ahmad, *The Young...*, 15-16 "Fundamentally, the Young Turks provided the same answer as the Young Ottomans of the 1860's and 1870's to introduce constitutional government, thereby curbing the power of the Sultan, and at the same time satisfying the aspirations of the minorities by giving them equal rights within the law." Ibid., p.16

⁷⁶ Mardin, *Jön Türklerin...*, 16-17.

⁷⁷ Sükrü Hanioglu, *Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük*, p.17.

⁷⁸ Aksin, *Jön Türkler*, 78-80.

⁷⁹ Shaw, *History*, 305.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 305.

⁸¹ Berkes, *Türkiye 'de...*, 420.

⁸² The most important brainwork concerning secularization came from the supporters of Turkism and especially Ziya Gökalp. As it was impossible to free the state from religion at that time, he tried the opposite. Ibid., 432.

⁸³ Berkes argues that although it was contrary to what Atatürk tried later, it paved the way for the developments in his era. Ibid., 432.

- ⁸⁴ Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi*..., 141. For detailed information about reforms regarding secularization, see Shaw. *History*, 305-310.
- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*...306-7.
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 307 Naturally, these reforms were the fundamental steps on the way of secularization. However, in the "Islamic Journal" (İslam Mecmuası), the writers, who had also close links with the CUP, perceived these policies as steps taken against Islam. They were of the opinion that, the CUP had to clean Islam from dogmatic thoughts and save the Islam from foreign elements. Therefore, the policy should have been Islamism instead of secularization. Arai, *Jön Türk*., 141-142.
- ⁸⁷ Berkes, *Türkiye 'de*...432..
- ⁸⁸ İttihat ve Terraki'nin Son Yillari (1916 Kongre Zabıtlari), Nehir Yayınları, İstanbul, 1982. p.7-8.
- ⁸⁹ Aksin, *Jön Türkler*...,302-303.
- ⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, .95.
- ⁹¹ Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (Routledge, London, 1993) , 42.
- ⁹² For an overall evaluation of economic westernization paradigm and reforms in this field, see Zefer Toprak, *Milli İktisat 1908-1918*, (Yurt Yayınları, Ankara, 1987.
- ⁹³ Ahmad, *The Making*.....44.
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, .74.
- ⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, .44.
- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, .44.
- ⁹⁷ Ali Engin Oba, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğusu* (İmge Yayınları, Ankara, 1995). 12. Namık Kemal for instance, for the first time, had given the concept of 'vatan' a content that great masses could comprehend it. In this way, the Turkish nationalism had started to take shape with Tanzimat.
- ⁹⁸ Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan*..., 132-133. In his book, he also quotes Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın as saying 'the new regime suppressed Turkishism in order to develop Ottomanism.' *Ibid* p.133.
- ⁹⁹ Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi*..., 79.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 99. Contrary to the Ottomans who regarded Turkish nationalism as a means to continue Ottomanism, Yusuf Akçura regarded Ottomanism as a means of protecting the interests of the Turks.
- ¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, .18.
- ¹⁰² Karpat, *Political*..., 270.
- ¹⁰³ In the Turkish national anthem, the West is referred as ' monster with a single tooth left'.
- ¹⁰⁴ The names Mustafa Kemal, Kemal, Atatürk will be used interchangeably throughout the text according to the context.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ahmad, *The Making* , p.47.
- ¹⁰⁶ Metin Heper, *Çağdas Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk*, (Dr. Nejat Eczacıbaşı Yayınları, İstanbul, 1986), 218.
- ¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.219.
- ¹⁰⁸ Ahmad, *The Making*...53.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan*... p.259.
- ¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, .255. He goes on by arguing that also this peasantry was divided due to ethnic and religious affiliations and for that reason they were totally bound to those landlords to survive.
- ¹¹¹ Shaw, *History*..., 374- 375.
- ¹¹² *Ibid.*, .374-375.
- ¹¹³ For a comprehensive analysis of the Weltanschauung of the Turkish Nationalism of Atatürk, see Turan Feyzioglu, *Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik*, (Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük Dizisi:1 Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 1987.)
- ¹¹⁴ Shaw, *History*..., 375-376.
- ¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 376.
- ¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, .376
- ¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 386
- ¹¹⁸ Taner Timur, *Osmanlı Mirası*, Irvin Cemil Schick/Ertugrul Tonak, eds. (Belge Yayınları, İstanbul, 1987. 15-16.

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