

THE EFFECT OF IDENTITY ON THE SUCCESS OF
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

A Master's Thesis

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THE EFFECT OF IDENTITY ON THE SUCCESS OF
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May 2013

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ABSTRACT

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Does identity affect the success of international military interventions? This thesis examines whether one of the factors determining the success of international military interventions is identity. Knowing identity is such a complex concept, what are the components of identity? Although there are multiple factors at play in the construction of one state's identity, the focus is on history, religion and language, for their conceptual clarity and overt influence on the decision-making process of governments and more importantly individuals. Therefore, the thesis will (a) develop a concept of identity regarding interventions and (b) provide a more thorough and reflexive understanding of the role and the importance of identity for the success of international military interventions. In order for such a study to take place, key concepts are explained and elaborated upon, to see whether identity is one of the defining elements of a successful international military intervention or not. If identity is found to have a significant impact, it could be expected to have an important effect on the way policy makers conceptualize and operationalize international interventions.

Key Words: International interventions, Identity, UNOSOM II, Somalia, British military intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil War, Russia–Georgia War of 2008

ÖZET

KİMLİĞİN ULUSLARARASI ASKERİ MÜDAHALELERİN BAŞARISINA ETKİSİ

Kavuk, Ömer F.

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Kimlik uluslararası askeri müdahalelerin başarısını etkiler mi? Bu tez uluslararası askeri müdahalelerin başarısını belirleyen etkenlerden birinin kimlik olup olmadığını inceler. Kimliğin karmaşık bir kavram olduğunu düşünürsek, kimliğin bileşenleri nelerdir? Bir ülkenin kimliğinin inşasında birden çok başka faktörler olsa da bu tezin kimlik kavramının odak noktası kavramsal berraklık ve bireylerin ve hükümetlerin karar verme süreçlerine olan etkisi nedeniyle tarih, din ve dil olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu nedenle bu tez (a) müdahalelerle alakalı bir kimlik kavramı geliştirecek ve (b) kimliğin uluslararası askeri müdahalelerin başarısına olan etkisi üzerine kapsamlı ve dönüşümsel bir anlayış sağlayacaktır. Böyle bir çalışmanın yürütülebilmesi için ve kimliğin başarılı bir uluslararası askeri müdahalenin temel taşlarından olup olmadığını saptamak için, esas kavramlar açıklanır ve bunların üstünde durulur. Eğer kimliğin müdahale üzerinde önemli etkisi olduğu bulunursa bunun yasa yapıcıların ve karar vericilerin uluslararası müdahaleleri kavramsallaştırma ve eyleme geçirme yollarında önemli etkisi olması beklenebilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Müdahaleler, Kimlik, UNOSOM II, Somali, Sierra Leone iç savaşına İngiliz askeri müdahalesi, 2008 Rusya-Gürcistan Savaşı

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of foreign intervention in civil conflicts has gained special attention in the field of international relations (Seybolt, 2007: 1) in the last 20 years. This can be explained by the fact that civil conflicts significantly increased following the end of the Cold War and produced a greater level of interstate violence (Carment and James, 1993).

It is not only this increase in military interventions that is significant. Recently the idea of state sovereignty has been turned on its head. When the state fails in its duty to protect its citizens, it is no longer left alone to deal with its internal affairs, a right previously ensured by norms of non-intervention (Seybolt, 2007: 1). In explaining this phenomenon, Teson (2001) employs a liberal stance to the analysis of state sovereignty and intervention, asserting that the primary role of the state is to protect its own citizens. This assertion is justified on the basis that “Tyranny and anarchy cause the moral collapse of sovereignty.” (Teson, 2001: 2)

1.1 The Problem

Once a state fails not only in the protection, but also the promotion, of basic human integrity rights, it allows other states to become involved in its internal affairs in order to end this tyranny and anarchy and restore the fundamental human rights to the citizens under such rule. As such, it seems that the international political community has entered a new paradigm, where the rights of the individual take precedence over the rights of states. Governments are faced with the dilemma of choosing to focus on traditional security issues or the newly defined human security issues (Seybolt, 2007: 1).

This has given rise to questions about when and how states should intervene. Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, the former Soviet Republics, and Cambodia are prime examples of international intervention efforts. However, it can be observed that some of these interventions have been more successful than others. While the international community can boast of a few successes, such as in Georgia and Sierra Leone, the failure of international intervention in, most notably, Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which lead to such horrific catastrophes, should push leading politicians and scholars to reflect upon the causes of successes and failures of these interventions.

It is now recognized that different interventions produce different kinds of outcomes (Regan and Aydin, 2006). A foreign policy decision maker's goal in an international intervention is for the intervention to succeed. Decision makers should therefore consider what makes an intervention yield the preferred outcome. Such reflection is a necessity for any future operations to be devised and implemented more effectively and in order to maximize the possibility of success and minimize

the possibility of failure. In accordance with the goals set before the intervention, the decision maker will choose if, when and how to intervene in order to reach the preferred goal. “Military intervention is a financially expensive, risky, and dangerous endeavor. Therefore, the states must balance the expected costs with their strategic interests, but also with possible ... benefits accruing from the intervention and the opportunities for success.” (Bove and Sekeris, 2011: 5)

Studies have only recently begun to investigate the factors and conditions involved in a successful military intervention by an international actor. While studies which explore how international actors can successfully intervene and end conflicts within a state do exist, research has not as yet systematically analyzed the elements which contribute to the success of international interventions. Understanding these elements of intervention is important to evaluate the possible success of future interventions.

1.2 Outline of the argument

This thesis will examine whether one of the primary factors determining the success of international interventions is identity. Constructivists have long argued that identity is a determinate factor in international relations (Reus-Smit, 1999). The identity of the sovereign state is important, because it shapes state interests, which in turn, shapes foreign policy decisions and actions (Wendt, 1994).

This thesis will define the primary factors included under the heading of state identity are as follows: history, religion and language. Although there are multiple other factors at play in the construction of state identity, this thesis will primarily

focus on these three for their conceptual clarity and overt influence on the decision making process. Therefore, the thesis will (a) develop a concept of identity regarding interventions and (b) will provide a more thorough and reflexive understanding of role and the importance of identity for the success of international interventions.

The thesis is a systematic study of the function of identity in international interventions. In order for such a study to take place key concepts must be explained and elaborated upon. Firstly, the concepts of “intervention”, “success” and “identity” will be analyzed and conceptualized.

This is an attempt to give a clear picture whether identity is one of the defining elements of a successful international intervention. If identity is found to have a significant impact, it could have significant implications for the way that policy makers conceptualize and operationalize international interventions.

1.3 Scope and limitations

Although focusing overtly on identity, this thesis will not dismiss the importance of other factors leading to the success of international interventions already examined by other scholars. Well-known and observed factors are military might, intervention strategies (Calkins, 2007) and characteristics of the conflict.

1.4 Other Success Related Arguments

1.4.1 Military Might

It cannot be denied that military capabilities and resources have an impact on the success of intervention. The stronger the military of the intervening state and the weaker the opposition, the more likely it is for the intervention to occur as well as for it to be successful (Bove and Sekeris, 2011), after all, states will intervene only when they calculate that success is a likely outcome because they face intervention costs. A strong military, alongside military and political will is also beneficial in the success of an intervention (Gent, 2008). It is assumed that military strength regarding interventions includes size and characteristics of the intervention and the military technology. An example of these factors at work can be seen in 2003 US intervention in Liberia:

Early recognition of operational demands was central to mission success. Experience in coordinating humanitarian operations allowed the European Command to appreciate the complexity of interagency processes in such contingencies. Coupled with advanced technology, this recognition contributed to the mission's success.... The operation achieved all identified mission objectives: the intervention abated the humanitarian crisis, supported ECOWAS in securing Monrovia and paved the way for UN peacekeeping forces, thus putting Liberia on the road to peace (Bliddal, 2010).

Therefore, the strength capacity of the country is an antecedent variable. Consequently, there are other variables which affect the dependent variable of my research question.

1.4.2 Intervention Techniques

Intervention techniques are also a variable which affect the success of an intervention. The actual essence of the conflict greatly determines the form of intervention and its effects. The conflict could be a civil war, an ethnic conflict, a genocide etc. All these conflicts are approached differently, using different military strategies to end the conflict and humanitarian strategies to alleviate the consequences of the conflict. “Assessing the impact of foreign military intervention is not as straight-forward as it might seem. Much depends on the size of the intervention and its purposes” (Pickering and Kisangani, 2006: 363). Although highly relevant to the operation and success of interventions, these factors, amongst others, have been discussed at length by Dixon (1996). As such, this thesis will focus on a completely neglected element of military interventions; identity.

The purpose is to broaden the understanding of all the aforementioned elements involved in the intervention process by investigating an unconventional factor, identity, and its relation to international interventions. Thus, rather than aiming at criticizing previous studies, this thesis instead aims to complement such studies, adding new depth and clarity to research on international interventions.

1.5 Research Question

The thesis will try to answer the following research question: does identity have an effect on success of international military interventions?

The thesis will try to argue that identity not only has an effect on the success of interventions, but that it has a considerable impact that cannot and should not be underestimated or ignored. The identity argument helped to explain the success of interventions in all three case studies; Russia's intervention in South Ossetia; the United States' intervention in Somalia; and the British intervention in Sierra Leone. The other arguments discussed above which focused on military might, intervention strategies and characteristics of conflict would fail to provide credible, valid and consistent explanations for these cases if used independently of identity analysis.

1.6 Hypothesis

The hypothesis is that the more similar the identity of the intervener and the intervened are the more likely the intervention will be successful. If the intervener and the intervened share a common history, religion and language, the intervention is more likely to succeed.

The thesis will also provide an extensive look into this identity argument and offers a self-designed theory which will be applied to related intervention cases.

Finally, it will provide a practical application for this theory, using three cases: Russia's intervention in South Ossetia; the United States' intervention in Somalia; and the British intervention in Sierra Leone. These cases will be extensively analyzed and the theory of the thesis will be applied to each case to see how relevant the theory is in practice. The three cases will not be compared but the application of theory in practice is an important aspect of this thesis as it will prove whether the theory holds.

CHAPTER 2

KEY TERMS IN THE LITERATURE

2.1 International Military Intervention Literature

Literature on international interventions has proliferated due to the increasing numbers of interventions in last fifty years: “between 1987 and 1992 there was a fourfold increase in the use of United Nations peacekeeping forces in intrastate conflicts around the globe” (Regan, 1996: 336). Hermann and Kegley (1996: 440) maintain that foreign military intervention is “arguably the most frequent type of military force in use and under debate today.” They can be categorized as ‘third party interventions’, ‘external intervention’, ‘humanitarian interventions’, ‘peacemaking’, ‘peacekeeping’, and ‘military interventions’. The media has played an agenda-setting role by broadcasting the horrors of conflicts from Somalia to Bosnia, eventually leading to different forms of unilateral or multilateral military interventions (Boettcher, 2004: 331)

However, since the research question is how identity affects international military interventions, the intervention description that we will investigate should be narrowed. That is why the intervention type we are looking at is ‘international military’.

2.2 Success Literature

Moreover, once the intervention type has been chosen, it is important to explore the concept of intervention success in international military interventions because it is a central aspect of the mentioned research question. Success is a relatively vague term. Scholars have rarely attempted to define 'success' and some scholars, such as Pickering and Kisangani do not use the term 'success' but rather 'impacts of intervention'. Therefore, in this part of the literature review I will be looking at a broad definition of the term 'success' and possible implications of international interventions.

Although some scholars did not look directly at the intervention success but rather at the results of an intervention and their implications for conflict resolution, there are still obvious implications of their studies for the topic of intervention success. In next section the implications of success and some other direct success definitions will be analyzed.

First of all, some scholars focus on the effect of the possibility of an intervention on a conflict. It is important to understand how the effect of an intervention or even the possibility of an intervention affects conflicts. Authors like Cetinyan (2002) argue that the possibility of an intervention has the effect of giving moral support to the rebellious party, which boosts their determination on an emotional level and provides them with encouragement.

Cetinyan (2002) claims that the possibility of a rebel-favored intervention will boost the rebel groups in terms of their self-perception. Moreover, some scholars consider the identity of intervener and rebel group, discussing the potential effect of a

country which has a similar identity to that of the rebel group in the intervened country (Jenne, 2004). She underlines that the interest of similar identity in the intervener country and the level of interest it is willing to pursue as factors which may help same-identity rebel group in intervened country to get organized and give them the courage needed to continue standing up to their government. Therefore, the success of intervention is contingent on the possibility of an intervention and support or intervention of a state with a similar identity. Although they do not use the word success, it is still possible to consider these outcomes as notions of success.

The second important impact of military interventions which might be component of the success is the length of the conflict. Licklider (1995) is one of the scholars who tried to identify the most efficient way to end a conflict. It can be argued that efficiency in ending a conflict may provide basis for the term success. If the length of the conflict is taken as a component of intervention success, then the importance of an absolute military victory and how it changes the results of an intervention as opposed to possible battles which result even between parties should be noted as a defining variable in the outcome of interventions (Toft, 2003; Fortna, 2004).

However Licklider (1995) claims that military success may make an intervention successful but it depends on type of the intervention. If the intervention is an ethnic one than a military success may elongate the length of the conflict. This is why it is important to investigate other components of intervention success rather than just military might. Military might does not always lead to a successful intervention.

Moreover, if the intervention supports the weaker side of the conflict then it is more likely the intervention will be longer because it will balance out the strengths of two conflicting parties (Regan, 2002; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2008). Also some scholars underline the importance of who intervenes, there are two different camps. Regan (1996) claims that intervention success will be higher if the intervener supports the government, while Krain (2005) argues that since the purpose of an intervention is to stop insurgencies then the intervener should oppose the government to stop the two parties killing each other.

At this point before we get in to direct definitions of intervention success, Saleyhan (2008) points out an important aspect of interventions and their success. Saleyhan claims that before an intervention is evaluated with any conditions, it must be considered that the third party is most likely to intervene when the government of the intervened country faces a strong rebel group since a government can handle a weak rebel group without external support. At the same, historically, the most successful rebel groups are the ones who received external support because of the organizational and institutional disadvantages of a rebel group compared to a government.

In the literature it is possible to find direct definitions of intervention success although they are few. Regan (1996) claims that the success of intervention is determined by the characteristics of the intervention strategy rather than the characteristics of the conflict. Regan's article is quite useful in terms of conceptualizing the intervention success. As it was mentioned in the literature it is common to talk about implications and results of an intervention instead of coming up with a definition of 'success'. Regan (1996) formulizes that "successful"

interventions are the ones that manage to end a conflict before there are thousand fatalities and bring an end to hostilities for the next six month period.

Although Regan's definition of success has a considerable amount of support from the key literature, it is not the only definition. Seybolt (2007) presents a different condition of success which is not about ending the conflict but about saving lives. He even offers a methodology for calculating how many lives are saved and how successful the intervention was.

Moreover, success can also depend on military capabilities. "The probability that a given group wins the conflict is a function of the military capabilities of the combatants" (Gent, 2008). Therefore, success is defined as the military capabilities of combatants and the party with the best military will be taken as successful.

As such, although discussed in a few core texts, literature is considerably limited regarding the success of intervention. Moreover, literature is more focused on the question of why do states decide to intervene, leaving the question of what makes an intervention successful far from being answered. Therefore, my definition of 'success' will take into account all the implications that are given previously in this section and I will try to come up with an encompassing and clear definition of success.

2.3 Identity Literature

The limited discussion of the core topic of this thesis, identity, can be attributed to the ongoing dominance of realism in IR, which would be against the impact of

identity on the intervention success. Since mainstream realist scholars emphasize the importance of power and take the state as the main actor, there is no room for identity (Morgenthau et al, 1985; Carr, 2001). Therefore, most realist literature can be taken as a rival argument to my hypothesis.

Since I am examining the possible relationship of identity and intervention success, the other literature that must be investigated for my research question is identity literature, which has proliferated since the third debate in IR and the emergence of more critical theories of International Relations. Identity literature is broad and the concept of identity has many aspects which are studied in different disciplines such as political science, psychology, sociology, anthropology and so on. Therefore, while investigating the identity literature, one should be careful about constricting the concept according to the related research question. The concept of identity in my research question is not individual identity but a social and political identity that people assign to their own social and political groups. While investigating identity literature I also analyzed scholarly articles written by psychologists in order not to miss a related and essential part of the identity literature.

While identity has been discussed in a variety of social-science disciplines they have neglected the related fields of psychology and social psychology, never incorporating their crucial research contributions into IR debates. This can broadly be attributed to International Relations' enduring state-centrism and theoretical isolation. Basically, identity is an element which can be observed when individuals engage with society. Assuming that individuals are different from each other, the

society which is formed by individuals is a sum of different identities and in this way a society represents commonalities between identities (Calhoun, 1994).

There are two main components of identity: cultural and natural environment. Natural environment is the physical world which covers individuals including geography, climate, and vegetation. Cultural identity includes different kinds of social interactions such as history, language, cultural norms and even stereotypes. Therefore, the identity of one individual is the net influence of that individual's natural and cultural environment. Since my research question is related to interventions and conflicts or war, which are social interactions of humans, I will investigate the cultural environment as the main source of identity, and focus on the 'social identity' instead of individual identity.

The distinction of social identity is essential to make while reviewing the literature because even the literature of social identity is very broad. The difference between social identity and individual identity lies in the relationship of social group memberships and their reflections on one's identity which is also called self-perception or self-concepts (Taylor et al, 1994; Shinnar, 2008).

Tajfel (1981) defines social identity as "part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his or her membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Taylor et al, 1994: 140). The main social groups in societies are ethnic or racial groups, religious groups, political groups, cultural groups etc. Social identity is shaped by the specific aspects of these groups which an individual feel as they belong to. Therefore, there is a direct relationship between social groups and self-perception (Tajfel, 1981; Taylor et al, 1994).

While I was building the theory on identity, I explored the social identity and in doing so, broadly separated the literature into two distinct themes. The first one is social cognition which claims that human beings categorize information and these categories form the individual's identity (Howard, 2000). The second one however, symbolic interaction, claims that individuals give different meanings to objects and events, and symbolize them. These symbols are transformed by the virtue of human interaction and form the social identity (Howard, 2000).

That is why for my theory, I added language while defining identity. It has been discussed that individuals evaluate objects and events according to the meaning assigned to them instead of by their real nature (Howard, 2000). Howard (2000) also claims that every individual has two aspects of identity: self and social. The aspect of self is focused on finding differences when reaching the definition of identity, while for the social aspect individuals are focused on the commonalities and their places in society.

The social aspect includes religion, ethnicity, social class and other broad categories. Thus, social categorization and the process of assigning symbols have the function of social positioning of an individual within the society with the help of these categorizations. An individual will decide on the actions he will take according to this placement (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). Therefore, this thesis will argue that an individual's or society's self-categorization (ethnicity, religion and common history) has an effect on the actions s/he takes which may alter a greater social transaction like a military intervention.

For Ashforth and Mael (1989) social identity means the leading features of a social group or groups reflected in a person. He defines the process of social

identification as the individual's identity based on how much s/he feels that s/he belongs to a specific group. My idea of taking different components of identity (ethnicity, religion and common history) is based on Ashforth and Mael's definition of social identity. They claim that an individual may identify him or herself to different social groups with differing degrees (Ashforth and Mael, 1989).

A common indication of one identifying him or herself with a group is the change in his/her emotions according to the said group (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). For instance, if a person who lives in Iraq feels sad, threatened, and insulted when the country he lives in is involved in a war with another country (assuming that war is upsetting, threatening and insulting) it may mean that this person identifies himself with Iraq.

Moreover, in the literature it is possible to find more specific articles on social identity and its components like nationalism or religion. National identity for example may be considered as a sub-branch of social identity but it has its own literature (Ellemers et al. 2002). National identity is one of the most investigated and written about topics in social identity literature. As mentioned above, one of the most important elements of identity is social groups. Nations are as one of the biggest and most influential groups amongst social groups. Charney (2003) noted the importance of the feeling of national belonging in sense of one's identity (Tamir, 1995) and defines nations as the group of individuals who accept that they have a common culture, heritage and most of the time religion, on a specific territory they live on.

In the literature it is also possible to see examples of how identity or in other words the components of social identity play an important role. Yosef and Margalit (1995) claim that identity conflicts lead to real conflicts between groups and even

nations when the political establishment does not recognize or suppresses the identities of different social groups (such as cultures and religions). It is because it clashes with an individual's self-perception and identification (Charney, 2003).

In terms of interventions, it is almost impossible for a country to intervene in another country which shares the same nationality with intervener. There are few examples of same nationality having two states like North Korea and South Korea. However, this is not common. Therefore, although the nationality has a huge effect on social identity, there is a need to change and broaden the concept of identity beyond simply looking at nationality, and instead approaching it with other more expansive components: religion, language and heritage. Since these components are able to establish such strong bonds and conflicts between people even though they do not form a nation in some cases, they should not be overlooked if they are similar between individuals. This is why I have chosen these three components of nationality, which are also considered as the components of social identity (Ashforth and Mael, 1989), as my theory's main three elements of identity.

CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

The research question states: does identity have an effect on success of international interventions? In order to establish if identity has an effect on success of international interventions the terms used in the research question must be clearly and extensively defined. “Identity”, “success”, and “international intervention” are the crucial terms that need defining before the theory could be laid down. The reader must understand the full significance of the terms. It must also be a definition that should be practical and useful for the systematic framework which will be presented in next chapter and which I intend to use it to analyze the cases. The definition of “identity” needs particular clarification, since its elements are disputed in current literature.

The definitions of these terms include analysis from the disciplines of political sciences and psychology. Incorporating such definitions will provoke a deeper understanding of the dynamics behind those terms. For identity, which is the central theme of the whole thesis, it will also be necessary to classify the sub-identities like religion, common history and languages. The thesis argues that all of these subcategories of identity are not only related to identity, they are essential components of it, further asserting that they have a causal effect on the success rate of international interventions. The scope of the individual impact of all of these

components does not fall under the scope of the thesis however; this issue is dealt with later on in the thesis.

An accurate and concise definition of “success” will be conceptualized in order for this thesis to be able to reach a conclusion to the research question. Without fully defining what is meant by “success”, we cannot determine the result of the intervention and furthermore cannot deduce the role identity plays in this interaction. Although success is already conceptualized by intervention scholars as it was mentioned in literature review section however definitions of success are not really operationalized therefore I will attempt to improve it this conceptualization through systematic theorization.

3.1 Identity

The term identity involves numerous components; however, for this thesis the core elements of identity are defined as common history, religion and language. These three components are agreed to be the most prominent aspects of socio-political identity (Calhoun, 1994; Taylor et al 1994; Tajfel, 1981; Howard, 2000; Ashforth 1989; Charney, 2003; Yosef and Margalit, 1995). Ethnicity is not included in this definition because since most of the states are based on ethnic identities, it would be a really rare case for a state with ethnicity x intervenes another states with same x ethnicity. Counter examples of these would be Arab states and however since the number of these examples are too few I choose to exclude ethnicity as an element of identity regarding international military interventions. Rather than ethnicity, self or personal identity is not related to the aim of this thesis. The type of identity that is

essential to examine and understand for this theory is that of socio-political identity, or rather national identity. In order to examine political identity, one should first look at how national identity is defined. Why is this necessary? Because national identity is rooted in social identity. Social identity is its basis.

3.1.1 Understanding Social and Political Identity

Social identity is about the identification of oneself with a specific group. That means that they feel a part of that group. This process of identification is about people's self-conception of belonging to a group (Hogg, 2000). People identify themselves and other people into social groups (Ashforth, 1989). These social groups include religion and language. The process of identification includes "incorporating the other into the self" (Brewer, 2001). This means that people adopt the language and incorporate it into their own identity.

Once people feel identified with a group they tend to share a big portion of the characteristics of that group. If a person feels identified with a religious affiliation such as Catholic they will tend to exhibit the characteristics that are usually shown by Catholics. They will share their ideas, values and will even accept same manners that they consider or know other members of that social group do. What this actually means is that members of a social group all tend to behave the same or similar way.

This produces a possibility of distinction from other social groups. A Catholic woman will believe in different norms and behave in different ways to a Muslim woman. An important aspect of social identification with a group is that it is

positively attributed (Huddy, 2002). A member of the social group will positively value being a member of the group and its value.

A crucial point that must be clarified is that the actual characteristics of the individuals or groups do not need to be real or created for the functioning of the group. This means that religious differences do not necessarily need to be stark for the differentiation to have meaning. The religious characteristics may be exaggerated, distorted or completely artificial.

The group identity becomes an important part of the individual identity. When individuals identify with the group, they adopt a collective identity. National identity is a collective identity of a group of people (a nation). The thesis does not focus on the role of national identity, because it is almost impossible to find nations who are similar enough for comparison of the success or failure of intervention between these. Therefore, I selected factors that contribute to identity which are comparable across states: using history, language and religion. Collective identities are about individuals understanding themselves as being part of a whole group or as a unit with commonly shared features (Brewer, 2001).

Social identity is useful for this study, because it produces the feeling of belonging to the “in-group”, distinguishing this group from the non-members who belong in the “out-group”. The members of the “in-group” have common features, such as language. Social identity theory looks at how the different social groups interact and are formed through these processes of inclusion and exclusion. Together, these individuals feel different from the members of the “out-group”. As stated above, the members of the “in-group” will evaluate their identity as being positive and the identity of the “out-group” as negative (Shinnar, 2008). Therefore, the French

will evaluate their language as something good, something to be proud of, although one can argue that French is not necessarily better than any other language.

Social political identity is how one's self perception in the social realm and society is shaped by historical understanding, religious beliefs and language. How all individuals in a specific region come together as a unified group is where the importance lies for this thesis. Through this cohesion, independent states are created with their own beliefs and languages and through common history. This unity between certain peoples can create alliances of similar groups, but also hostilities. It is crucial to analyze the relations within shared identity groups as well as between different identities.

3.2 History

In what way is history related to identity? History is a part of every individual, because it is engrained in their memory or perception of memory about their own identity, the identity of the community, nation, or region. History of an individual and one's identity are in a symbiotic relationship. They influence each other. They work together to create and maintain certain societal and personal truths, which are subjectively defined (Gillis, 1994).

In the way that an individual produces a self-concept, so can a society. They can also have a shared concept about other nations and societies. This is a crucial component of identity. History plays an important role in this self-definition of a social or political entity and in turn, its identity.

3.3 Religion

Religion is considered as another important element. “Religions often serve psychological basic human needs more comprehensively and potently than other repositories of cultural meaning that contribute to the construction and maintenance of individual and group identities” (Seul, 1999). Although it is difficult to measure who is religious and who is not, religion still appears as one of the most important components of identity for certain individuals and groups. It is also more binding in terms of acting collectively than language. History shows that religious identities tend to be the upper identity for individuals. Especially when it is compared to language, since religion offers a life style and set of rules, it seems like it is a more important identity component depending on the individual’s belief level.

3.4 Language

Language is related to individual perceptions. Herder and Bunge (1993) characterize language as the genius of a particular people, which means that language is connected to mentality or way of thinking. “Language imparts a certain way of seeing, feeling, and even, perhaps, behaving” (Gade, 2003: 430). Therefore, language and language systems may create different understanding and differences between identities (Edwards, 1985).

Since these components are able to establish such strong bonds and conflicts between people even though they are not enough to form a nation in some cases, they should not be overlooked in cases of international interventions if they are similar

between parties. This is why I have chosen these three components of identity as my theory's main three elements of identity.

3.5 International Military Intervention

For this thesis, international intervention is defined as “the deliberate act of a nation or a group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy” (Staff, 2006). What this quote means is that a state's foreign policy decision makers have an intention of becoming involved in a conflict that they were previously not involved in. The means of becoming involved are militaristic and strategic. The purpose of the intervention may be ceasing violence between two conflicted parties through militaristic tactics with the end goal of bringing stability, peace and order to the state/region or to make one side victorious by supporting this side in its fight against the other. This is predicated on the idea that a conflict had already been initiated between two or more parties within a state or region.

For the purpose of this thesis, only conflicts that occur within one state will be examined. This means that conflicts like wars which both of the states are attacking each other will not be observed. Small, Singer and Bennet (1982) classify intrastate conflicts based on three criteria: (a) that they take place within the internal boundaries of a state, (b) that one of the combatants be the government in power, and (c) that the opposition has the ability to offer sustained resistance (Regan, 1996: 338). The parties involved will therefore be different groups or factions existing within the state of conflict in the intervened state. One of these groups may be the ruling government with formal legal authority. It also has a monopoly over the

legitimate use of force. For whatever reason, those groups are no longer able to coexist and cooperate and that divides between them have widened to such an extent that a conflict arose.

Once an international actor has intervened, we can use these definitions to more easily identify whether the case-study is an intervention rather than a war. The distinction between war and intervention lies in the motives and involvement of the intervener actor. An intervention here can be defined as a third-party that has no direct involvement in the original conflict, be it interstate or intrastate conflict, but seeks to cease the violence of the conflict or change the situation for the favor of the party it wants and not necessarily resolve the underlying issues or become involved in it in a deeper sense. In other words, for an intervention there should be a conflicting situation for the intervened. A war can be distinguished by the third-party having direct involvement in the original conflict and is therefore a party in the original conflict. In a war, the involved party could be categorized as a second party involved in the conflict rather than a third.

3.5.1 Methods of Intervention

Intervention can be characterized by one or more of the following methods of intervention: economic, diplomatic and military. For this thesis, military intervention is the main intervention strategy examined. Reasons for this include direct contact, which identity can thus directly affect the success or failure of the intervention. Because of this direct contact, military intervention is the most extreme of the three

types of intervention stated above and therefore, argued by this thesis to be the fullest expression of the numerous elements of a third-party intervention.

This thesis realizes that the definition of military intervention can be nebulous and therefore identifies military presence as deploying soldiers, using aircrafts only, as in not physically on the ground, and sending military experts and training to one side's army. Thus, military intervention is the focus of this thesis due to the direct contact it facilitates within the conflicted region and therefore, its immediate effect, whether successful or unsuccessful.

The methods posed by the purpose of an intervention poses three methods can be achieved through military means. An international intervention aims to either support the government party, the rebel party or to create a buffer region to cease fighting from both sides (Regan, 1996). It is not necessary for the intervener to resolve the original problem for a successful intervention, but aims only to cease the violence in the conflicted region and/or turn the situation in favor of one party. This is the definition of third-party intervention that will be used for this thesis.

3.6 Success

The term "success" must also be defined properly for us to be able to measure the outcome of the intervention. This thesis adopts Regan's approach in his article which states that an international intervention aims to "bring an end to the violence associated with the underlying dispute" and "ensuring political stability in a specific region of the globe" (1996: 340).

This is a general definition for success that deals mostly with the motivations of the third party's intervention. These motivations, as stated by Regan are "territorial acquisition; regional stability; protection of the intervener's diplomatic, economic, or military interests; ideology; and the upholding of human rights have all been identified as goals of intervention" (Regan, 1996: 340). In this definition success is determined by the aim of the intervener. In this aspect of a successful intervention, if the intervener achieves its goals harbors its original motivations for the intervention, then it is a successful intervention.

I have chosen to define success in such a way as to make it easier to determine whether an intervention is successful or not. The objective measurement use is the number of casualties from the start of the intervention. An external international effort aims to cease the conflict and bring peace and stability. After the intervention begins, the number of casualties is expected to drop. If the death toll does not drop than it is hard to consider the intervening effort a success.

Within these aspects of intervention, whether military, political or economic intervention, success for this thesis is defined as the realization of goals for the intervening party as it correlates with its original motivations for intervening in the conflicted region.

The number of casualties should be under 1,000 from both sides if the intervention should be considered a success. The time period for this is from the start of the intervention until the time when intervener leaves. A number of deaths arising from the conflict should remain low for a long period of time. After all, interventions usually do not last years or decades. The intervening state incurs costs related to the intervention.

If the number of casualties is higher than 1,000 deaths arising from the conflict then the intervention cannot be considered successful (Regan, 1996: 341). Simply using common sense we can tell that such a high number could not possibly mean that the intervention pacified the conflicting states and brought peace, order and security. Regan also sets the goal of a military intervention as stopping the fighting “on terms favorable to the intervener and, in doing so, to bring stability to the region” (1996: 341). A number higher than 1,000 deaths means failure of the intervention as it could not correspond to bring stability to the region.

Aspects affecting the success of an intervention have already been mentioned in the thesis and are as follows; identity of the parties, military capabilities, economic and financial resources, intervention strategies and the nature of the conflict. One method for success for intervention is through military means, “by orchestrating a cease-fire or facilitating the defeat of the opposing group” (Regan, 1996: 340).

Success will be determined within the definition of this thesis if the intervener is able to achieve all of the original goals of his proposed intervention. Aside from this primary definition of success, the reader would do well to bear in mind the following important sub-factors of the intervention: the number of casualties involved; the duration of the conflict; and the ability to end the conflict. Therefore, a successful intervention should be expected to be one that achieves the goals of the intervener with relatively low casualties, and is able to put a stop to the conflict within approximately six months.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

The methodology used for this thesis is that of research and case-study. After an extensive research from scholarly journals, documentaries and current event news, this theory has developed an aim to decrease gaps in intervention literature. In order to apply this theory, a case-study methodology will be used to analyze the positive and negative outcomes. Useful aspects of a case-study provide data from real-life situations to provide context to this theory and give empirical data. Critics of this method question the reliability of one case-study rather than comparative data through multiple case-study research. As such, theory will be applied by three case-studies in order to increase the reliability of this theory and legitimize the conclusions drawn from the analysis of this theory.

A case-study is defined as an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin, 1992). This holds great importance when constructing theoretical works as well as testing them because it facilitates observable evidence from which conclusions can be drawn. Without real-life context, there can be no empirical data with which to apply a theoretical framework.

While the methodology provides great insight and understanding with a practical application, there are still shortcomings to this method. As stated above, this

theory will be applied to three cases. While these case-studies were specifically chosen for their apparent contrasts, there is still a great limitation when applying a theory to only three case-studies. Due to lack of time and resources, it must be acknowledged that flaws exist within the overall application and analysis used by this theory.

There are many different possible research methods which can be used to analyze my research question: how does the identity of intervener and intervened affect the success of an intervention. Case Study, process tracing, and historical analysis are the research methods which I will discuss their compatibilities with my research question.

4.1 Case Study Method

The case study method is a very detailed investigation of a historical event to test social explanations, which also can be applicable to other events as well. Using the case study method the thesis aims to see if the theory is applicable or not. Investigating all the aspects of these events will help to provide an arguable evidence of causal mechanisms. Therefore, the case study method will also provide a clear explanation of causal mechanism between my variables; the identity of intervened/intervener and the success of the intervention. To further the explanatory power of this theory, I will use the case study method.

4.2 Other Possible Research Methods

4.2.1 Historical Analysis

Historical analysis is simply based on reconstruction of past events and interactions between parties. It tries to explain these events with the widest range of information available at the present time, rather than at the time of the intervention. Besides a larger portion of information, we will also have hindsight regarding the interpretation of the meaning and significance of events after they have taken place.

In the historical analysis method, finding causality between past events, theory application to these events and investigating the reasons of past events are the main tools of any researcher. In other words, historical analysis method offers an understanding of reasons behind the occurrence of events. In my research I will not use historical analysis method in order to show the correlation between events because my hypothesis can be proved by other means which are more persuasive than historical research. The thesis is not looking for an understanding of why an event happened but the theory is designed to be applicable to various cases. My research question will be specifically focused on the three cases mentioned above; therefore, the historical events and a general understanding about these conflicts will be given as a historical background section. However, a detailed historical analysis is not necessary since I will be able to conduct an application of my theory on these conflicts without one on the basis I do not believe that historical analysis is a sufficient enough method to investigate my hypothesis.

4.2.2 Process Tracing

Process tracing is another possible method this thesis could employ. It is a method of analyzing causal processes. It provides a link between historical explanation and causal mechanism of the historical event. It is a good method to explain individual cases and moreover, it is good to analyze events and explore causal mechanisms. My research will be based on a case study which will allow me to apply the theory on three different examples and compare them in terms of my theory. Since the theory does not offer a holistic understanding on intervention success but a complementary one by only considering identity as a variable, during the research I expect to encounter other factors that influence the success of international intervention. Although I accept the effect of these components, this thesis will offer an alternative and complementary explanation. Which means it would be difficult to analyze the causal processes without including every factor that affect intervention factor. Therefore, case study will be a better method for this specific research in order to evaluate if identity has an effect on success or not, instead of process tracing.

4.2.3 Field Research

Field research is an efficient mean to collect data in order to test hypotheses and/or come up with a hypothesis to explain social political phenomena. If there is no data available for the research, field research might be the only way to provide evidence for any argument. Applying field research is neither necessary nor possible in this case. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, I do not have enough financial resources be able to visit the places. Secondly, there is enough available data to

provide an empirical basis for my argument in the literature and in other sources such as CIA fact book and Joshua Project. The third reason is, my hypothesis does not necessarily require field research since I will be looking at apparent identity traits such as religion, language and historical events.

4.2.4 Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is a way to analyze qualitative information about social phenomena. Analyzing the discourse helps to reveal the ideas and events which are socially created by the society. Simply, discourse analysis offers a technique of examining qualitative objects such as texts, speeches, and language in order to understand the meanings of social reality. A discourse analysis could be applied to the independent variable of my hypothesis. Identities and how people perceive each other could be investigated by examining speeches and texts produced by both intervener and intervened. This would deepen my argument, however, since it only involves my independent variable it will be employed as a complementary method, used in conjuncture with the case studies. With my limited time, it is better to apply a method which covers my argument as a whole, but in future if it is possible I would like to apply a content analysis to deepen the understanding of identity of my argument.

4.3 Selection of Case Studies

In order to address the research question, ‘How does the identity of the intervening actor and the identity of the actor affected by the intervention determine the intervention’s success,’ this thesis will examine three case studies. Based on the lack of current resources, it will only address three conflicts and the connected interventions. First, it will analyze the Russian intervention in South Ossetia. Secondly, this thesis will analyze the British intervention in Sierra Leone. Thirdly, the thesis will look into the UNOSOM II (US controlled and UN sanctioned forces and a unified Task force) in Somalia.

These cases have been deliberately chosen to shed light on the role of identity within the clearly defined and delimited scope of this thesis. Two of these interventions can be classified as success and one can be classified as a failure based on the aforementioned definition of a “successful” as follows. The thesis will attempt to analyze if identity played a significant role in this outcome, alongside other factors. Specifically, in the case of Somalia, the thesis will look into the aspects of the conflict and intervention to determine if identity was one of the reasons which lead to the failure of the intervention.

Furthermore these interventions have been chosen strategically. The thesis will be able to present two successes and a failure. Additionally, it allows me to introduce two successful interventions across continents (Europe and Africa). It will also permit me to conduct an analysis of two interventions occurring on the same continent (Sierra Leone and Somalia). I believe using cases from Africa is important because of Africa’s intervention prone nature. Results of this analysis may allow policy makers to conceptualize international interventions in a broader way. Also, the intervening forces between all three cases are different in their identities: Russia,

Britain and the US led UN force. This will give me an opportunity not only to look at how these three entities functioned as intervening forces, but also at each specific example they represent a different type of intervener.

4.4 Features of Interventions

Another important subsidiary research question is: what was the relationship between the intervening party and the parties in conflict? The intervention in Somalia, which was conducted by a UN force led by the US, had legitimacy due to both the USA's arguable position as global hegemon and by support from the international community and international organizations. As the force was sent by an international institution, the UN, the intervention had a normative advantage by international law which almost entirely focuses on UN participation as the only legitimate form of intervention. Britain on the other hand was once a colonizing state in Sierra Leone, while Russia had a history of dominance in its relation to Georgia. Thus, all the intervening forces under observation had a very different relationship with the state in conflict and this could prove crucial in the analysis of the case studies.

During application of the theory to cases it will be demonstrated that there is a linear relationship between similarities among actors (intervener and intervened) and the success of intervention (i.e the more similar two actors are the higher the success rate is). By comparing two of the most extreme examples within the spectrum of negative and positive interventions, this thesis will provide a better understanding of intervention and the theoretical framework necessary to explain this

concept and how it is applied. Within the case studies, all three categories of identity previously presented will be applied. These categories include common history, language and religion, and all of the applicable subset categories, such as previous alliances, shared or different alphabets and several other elements.

CHAPTER 5

THEORY

5.1 Common History

The first component of identity which will be analyzed is common history. As has been stated in the literature review section, historical events and mass memories are significant for social identity (Gillis, 1994). Considering that identity is an outcome of the relationship between individuals and society and how individuals perceive themselves in terms of their social environment (Ashforth, 1989), the components in this identification process such as collective memories, historical events and current context between countries and their citizens are directly related to the identity. In the next paragraphs all possible sub factors of the common history component will be investigated and related examples will be given.

5.1.1 Being under the Same Government

Common history can be conceptualized under five different subheadings. The first one is having been ruled under the same government. Related parties might have been under the same government before and this contributes to the feeling of having

a common history. Since a state does not necessarily imply a united identity for all of its citizens it is possible that people who live under a government may still feel the sentiment of belonging. This kind of situation may happen between majorities and minorities or any other group that perceives itself different than rest of the population in the country but that lives under a common government.

Moreover, the relations between different groups under one government can be equal or unequal. Empires are good examples of unequal relations in recent history. Almost all of the European empires had a ruling group, with the other portion of the population considered as subjects of the empire but not rulers of it. Since the relations were unequal, the subjects were in an inferior and subordinate societal position. Division between equal and unequal relations is not always easily definable. Different ethnic or religious groups under the same government might have different positions guaranteed by constitution or created naturally. Although there are exceptions which cannot be ignored, it is still possible to talk about privileged groups under empires. As an example, the English in Great Britain and Turks in the Ottoman Empire can be considered as privileged or ruling groups. From the outside these empires are identified with the national identity of the ruling groups.

There are also some other examples like French ethnic and cultural identities of different kingdoms fading away in the gradual process of state unification. Although individuals remember their heritage that are linked to the now provinces, it is hard to consider that citizens of France who live in the mainland and have same race and religion discriminating against each other in the same way or in the same intensity that they do with the individuals who are from their Empire, like the Algerians.

In the example of colonial empires, it is possible to mention another type of relation, which can be described as colonial relations. It is easy to discern the unequal patterns of relations in the governing bodies. Drawing from the French colonial example, it was difficult to envision a person from Ivory Coast becoming a state official in France not just because of identity obstacles, but also constitutional obstacles. Alternatively, other governments consciously tried to erode the significance of ethnicities, such as in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As such, being under same government may have had a positive effect on relationships between groups like Kazaks and Russians.

Obviously this does not indicate that under USSR, different ethnic identities had the same opportunities or that they did not clash with each other but the crucial difference between USSR and other governments should be underlined. The possibility of government type of USSR having a positive effect on relations between different ethnic, racial, and/ or social groups should not be ignored since in USSR government officials were from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds. Therefore, for this theory it is important to understand that groups under the same governments can have varied relations such as imperial or colonial, and these relations are causal in terms of identity formation. Basically, the nature of the relationship will determine the potential positive or negative effect of being under the same government on identity and therefore, on intervention.

This will specifically be observed under three case studies. The first is in the case of Russian intervention in South Ossetia and the second is British intervention in Sierra Leone, and US intervention to Somalia. The former will look at the relationship between nations living under the common government in USSR. The

latter will look at the colonial relationship between the colonizer and the colonized and the final will investigate the hegemon approved by international organizations intervening to a troubled African state.

5.1.2 Having an Alliance or a War

The second component of common history is having a shared alliance or war. Firstly, this thesis will examine war as a concept and a political activity. Wars are large scale social and political events which affect both society and individuals on a deep level. Wars may change the entire international and social landscape and alter identities completely. They also can cause social traumas which may last decades or centuries. An example of such extensive trauma was the anguish felt by the Germans after their defeat in the Great War. It leads to years of frustration and humiliation, which eventually provided an environment in which Nazism was able to blossom.

5.1.3 Having a War

Even single battles are imperative for the development of a cohesive self-perception in masses, as the example of the battle of Mohacs between Ottoman Empire and Hungary demonstrates. Given the limitations of this thesis, investigating how a war or battle influences identity is beyond the research scope. It would require completely separate research to find out if there is a direct relationship between war and identity formation. However, what this theory does develop upon is the idea that wars can remain in collective memory for a long time and may be used to mobilize

masses by arousing their nationalistic sentiments to either cooperate with or oppose a certain ally/enemy. Saddam Hussein just like many charismatic Arab leaders used past religious battles to provoke the intended anti-Iranian sentiments. This occurred in April, 1980, when he compared the Iranian rebellion in the Khuzestan province, which was being rapidly annexed by Iraq, to the 7th Century Battle of al Qadisiyyah in which Persia was defeated (Zweiri and Zahid, 2009). The use of historical narratives based on 'high culture' was crucial for Saddam's construction and perpetuation of the Iranian enemy (Adib-Moghaddam, 2007).

Thus, for wars to be utilized as a tool to mobilize masses they do not have to be directly related or current. Milošević used the story of Lazar of Serbia and the Battle of Kosovo in order to mobilize Serbs against Muslims during his Gazimestan speech in 1989 (Radovic, 2009).

5.1.4 Currency of the War

Under the topic of war the first thing to inquire into is how current the war is. The more current the war the easier it is to mobilize masses due to the fact that mass memories will be more accessible for a current war. It does not necessarily mean that old wars cannot be recalled but it is easier for current wars to be used as means of mobilization.

5.1.5 Results of the War

The second component of participating in a war is the consequence of the war. Consequences are really important in this sense because it can be observed in history that big defeats tend to occupy a very large and significant part of collective memory. In the First World War, Germany's defeat became a really important component of the German political discourse. After the war and it was successfully used to mobilize masses (Johnson and Tierney, 2006: 8). History is full of many examples like this.

Also, considering that wars are a prevalent characteristic of the international system (past and present) and some wars have found an important place in people's hearts and have gained an almost mythical status. In some of these wars countries incurred great losses and costs. The outcomes of wars are an important element of identity.

5.1.6 Being part of an Alliance

The second part of this component alliance/war component is being a part of an alliance. It is assumed that the alliance(s) of a country affects the self-perception of citizens. It is likely for citizens to develop a sort of trust towards the other country especially if they fought against a common enemy. An alliance basically implies that two countries have common interests. Therefore, it may be expected that in a possible intervention between two allied countries people's behavior towards the

other country may be more accepting than the one in which two countries have no or negative relations.

Alliances can be evaluated like wars with result and time indicators. Although current alliances are more likely to be able to mobilize people since their accessibility is higher, former alliances can also be renewed. In the Second World War, Germany distributed propaganda pamphlets trying to convince the Dutch not to join the English and French in the war due to 'old alliances'. One such propaganda pamphlet states: "Throw away your weapons and surrender! The German Peoples Army has the order not to shoot and to treat you as comrades and sons of a related brother nation". "We are your brothers and we want the same for you as we want for us. Freedom and peace!"¹

Some social and international events are important factors in the self-perception of countries or groups. Even some events can be considered the main issue for a group and determine a huge amount of their context.

5.1.7 Having a Past International Event

The third subtitle under the common history section is having a past international event or events such as holocausts, massacres, or any other type of economic, political, cultural conflict or crisis. It could also be positive experiences like: economic, diplomatic or cultural support. It does not matter how much an event

¹ <http://ww2propaganda.eu/dutch40.htm> (Last Access 22.01.2013)

affects a group's or a country's current situation in reality, it can have a great effect on people's perceptions and countries self-understanding.

Groups which experienced a holocaust are a good example of this. Holocausts are intense and unfortunate events which affect the society and individuals by destroying the society and the lives of many individuals. It is not difficult to understand that this kind of event can cause serious traumas on groups long-term. Besides, the event itself does not necessarily need to happen, but it can be categorized as such. Public discourse or the existence of the event can be taken as a problem between two countries. Still, even the idea of this kind of an event is enough to mobilize masses and keep them "rallying 'round the flag" (Baker and Oneal, 2001).

Continuing from the holocaust example, Jewish people from different ethnic backgrounds (the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim) have a common identity component of the holocaust experience. It appeared to be a very strong element of a Jewish identity after the Second World War. The Armenian example can also be used in this case. As Armenians spread out throughout many countries all over the world the idea of holocaust seems to keep their historical ties with their mother land alive even today.

More than that, the perception of some social and political events may be also positive. Economic support given by one country to another may have a positive effect. As an example, USA's support to Europe after the Second World War through the Marshall Plan can be considered as something which strengthened the relations between these states and brought great relief after the unfortunate great war. Thus, while investigating common history, the following components like wars, alliances,

former imperial relations and/or international events should be taken into consideration since they have similar effects on people's perception toward and against other groups and countries.

5.1.8 Artificial Similarities

The fourth subtitle under the common history section is artificial similarities. This section may seem different because it is a widely studied phenomenon in the neither psychology nor international relations literatures. It can be observed that some countries develop an artificial sense of affection towards other countries. By artificial, I mean affection that is not a direct result of any interaction between countries.

Certain countries develop affections towards other countries despite the fact that they are not neighboring countries, and they have never been in a war or any other significant international interaction. However, purely based on stereotypes (a common belief or assumption about a group's characteristics) an assumption of similarity can develop between people of two countries. In other words, the countries which were not involved in any serious form of interaction before have no reason to feel resentment, annoyance or hatred towards the other state and may in fact categorize them as a friendly nation.

Japan and Turkey are a good example of this. These two countries have never been in a war or any other serious international interaction. Moreover, even the religions they represent have never clashed or interacted before. It seems like there is no reason for Turkish people not to like Japanese people and vice versa. Contrarily,

some stereotypes or beliefs like certain nations may have brought the people of these two nations closer. The assumed national feature of being good warriors can be seen as common points between these two nations. Due to this assumed artificial or possible similarities it is widely speculated that the Japanese nation is close to the Turkish nation. It can be said that these two nations mutually and positively perceive each other. Thus, having no negative past interactions and also having so called similarities may increase the feelings of appreciation between two nations. As a result, it may make resistance and mobilization efforts more difficult. It can be assumed that people will not be eager to fight against a country that they perceive as similar to them in comparison to any other country which they have interacted with in the past.

While theorizing the perceptions of nations towards each other, these kinds of assumed similarities which are not based on any real interaction should not be ignored. However, in this thesis the reasons for these kinds of similarities will not be, but it will be merely assumed that they exist between some countries. Since the reasons are not going to be investigated here, one cannot be sure how these assumed artificial similarities develop.

The fact that there is no actual commonly shared history between them does not make this category irrelevant. However, this section is added because there are considerable amount of countries which do not have historical interactions but they as well do not have the perception of similarity between each other while some others have this perception. The fact that no tangible or observable event occurred to bring these states closer is inconsequential. The essence of this argument is that perceptions of truth and of similar identity matter. They influence the way people

think and act. Its power to influence behavior is significant. Thus, this subtitle is added to the common history section in order to present a better analysis regarding the relationship between intervention and identity.

5.1.9 Importance of the Location


The last component of the common history section is importance of the location. The place where parties engage in interventions may have significance in the common history sense, if the location has a historical background like a long lasting conflict or any other interaction which left a mark in memories of people. Places, cities and regions where one or more historical events happened or places mentioned in religious texts may change the context of the intervention. Important places may be described as holy cities which are mentioned in religious texts like Jerusalem, historical centers: cities which were historically capitals of big civilizations like Rome, places where a big or important conquests or battle happened like Istanbul, Vienna, and regions or cities which are contested over like Alsace Lorraine. Therefore, it will be meaningful to assume that mobilizing people against intervener may be easier if the story behind the place is resurrected.

Moreover, the reasons which make a place important for people's perceptions are very similar with the other subtitles under history section. For example, great wars, defeats, and so on are investigated under other sections and yet, people's perception of a war and the perception of an important place are different. A war happened between two nations and can become a positive or a negative memory, but

those memories are not necessarily associated with a place. A war can be massive and it might be connected with ideologies, governments, ideas and dates.

A place which is considered important for people is different than just the occurrence of an event in the history. The reasons that make a place significant for people are more complex than historical events. Cities like Jerusalem have a history that spans more than two thousand years based on both legends like stories and real events happened in past few centuries. Thus, an intervention in such a place would recall past memories and stories such as crusades, and religion-based promises of land. It can make mobilization efforts easier for local groups or leaders against interveners.

Figure 1: Schema of Common History



5.2 Language

The second main component of identity is language. It has been argued that language has an impact on social identity and even individual identity (Herder and Bunge, 1993). Also, it has been stated that language may be one of the mechanisms of personality (Edwards, 1985: 430). Therefore, language is studied under various disciplines from psychology, anthropology to political science. As the second component of identity in this theory, language and its effect on the success of intervention might be considered simpler than common history. There are three

subtitles of language: using a different or the same alphabet; speaking languages from the same language family; and having same language. These three subtitles of the language component can have a positive or negative effect on public opinion and mobilization efforts and thus have an effect on the success of intervention.

5.2.1 Alphabet

Alphabet types should be the least effective language factor under this title but it also should not go unnoticed. It has a certain effect on identity. The Mande language is a good example. The region where Mande is the original language is across from Gambia to Nigeria. Although, official languages of these countries are French and English, people speak Mande and use Arabic script for writing. However, the number of various Mande speakers who use N'ko alphabet (original Mande alphabet) has increased from the colonial through the independence periods. They state that the motivation to learn N'ko alphabet is pride in their culture (Oyler, 2005: 1-12). Besides logographic alphabets there are approximately eight alphabets such as Armenian, Cyrillic, Latin, and Arabic. It is possible to classify alphabets according to their phonetic features however, it is not necessary to do this here. Basically, a person who knows symbols of one alphabet would be able to read another language which is written by the same alphabet. Simply, a Bulgarian person, in case of any Russian intervention, would be able to read Russian texts although s/he does not understand the content (to a greater or lesser extent depending on the languages). However, a Georgian person would not necessarily be able to understand Russian texts if s/he does not speak Russian.

Alphabets are added here under the title of language because of two different intervention cases; in one of them the intervened can read what is written in different communication media and in the second one the texts brought, distributed and used by interveners cannot be understood by the intervened. It is possible a different alphabet will be seen as a difference between intervener and intervened. Moreover, this difference can be easily understood as intensifying the divisions between the interveners and the intervened. It can be seen as something which will not serve in favor of interveners. Therefore, under the language title, although as the least effective category -the alphabet- should be included as a factor which is related to the identity of people and can affect intervention success.

5.2.2 Language Family

Language family is the second factor which should be investigated under the language section. It might be accepted that most of the time languages of the same language family can be different and hard to understand. However, in some cases the languages in the same language family are similar enough to play a role in the relations between countries in general and in the success of interventions more specifically. Thus, there are two possible conditions: either languages of intervened and intervener belong to the same language family or not.

Two languages belonging to same language family will be assumed to be similar and to have a positive effect on intervention success. There are nearly thirty five different language families and some languages are very similar to each other while the other ones are not. Learning languages which belong to a same language

family might be easier. Moreover, it is expected that there are similar words and grammar systems between these types of languages.

As an example, for a person who speaks Spanish it would be easier for him/her to understand French, rather than a German. Since there is a difference in interaction process between two languages which belong to the same language family rather than a different one, this should be taken into consideration. There are two ways which language family affects the perception of intervened towards intervener. The first one is in practical use. It is going to be easier for the intervened to understand and even learn the language of intervener assuming that both parties will be in an interaction in many areas of the intervention. Intervened will feel less distance between them and the intervener simply because it will be easier to communicate with them.

The second one however, is about the perception of intervened. Considering the concept of language is essential for the essence of the nation or feeling a part of the community, it is possible for the intervened to feel this 'closeness' and sort of a kinship between the intervener, because of similar languages. Moreover, they can recall past memories (assumed or not) and perceive the intervening party as belonging to the same nation once in the past because of the language similarities. It is merely an example of how languages that belong to the same language family may affect the perception of intervened, and therefore the effect of language family should be accepted.

5.2.3 Common Language


The most effective factor for language section is sharing a common language with the intervener. Language is a very important component of identity (Edwards, 1985: 430). Nations are mainly described as a group of people who share common ethnicity, culture, history and of the most important is sharing the same language. Language is almost the essential part for the term nation. Therefore, for one's identity, language bears the meaning of being a part of a nation or community.

Since language is this important for one's social and political identity, it should be assumed that it will affect the intervened party's perception towards the intervener. There are two possible conditions under this subtitle: speaking the same language or not. In this theory it is assumed that groups who speak the same language may feel an affinity for each other which will undermine local actors efforts in mobilizing a resistance against interveners.

Having the same language may affect the understanding of the participants involved in the intervention in two ways: subjective perception of the other parties involved and being able to communicate in practical terms. In a scenario where both parties have the same language, individuals from both parties will be able to understand each other. An uneducated person from the intervened group would easily be able to communicate with someone from intervener group since it is his or her own language. Even, in the cases when individuals do not directly communicate, the perception may be formed by the fact that there is a similarity between two groups by virtue of indirect communication such as visual and auditory propaganda made by intervener.

At this point, it should be underlined that although this theory provides a schema for identity all of these assumptions like such as speaking the same language should be investigated in detail while applying it to an intervention case. This is because each case could have its own unique language dynamics between the intervened and interveners. Therefore, in some occasions similarities in languages may vary. For instance, the intervened party may have two official languages and their second language may be shared with interveners. In this case, while applying the theory these types of variations should be properly examined in order to avoid misinterpretations.

Figure 2: Schema of Language



5.3 Religion

The religion portion of the theory is more complicated than others. Religion plays a different role in one's identity than other aspects such as nationality or regional belonging (King, 2003). Religion sometimes can be even more instrumental in the shaping of identity than the national affiliation (Weissbrod, 1983). It depends on person's religious beliefs, values, commitments, as well as the temporal and spatial the context of the religion itself. In any case, religion should also be taken into consideration while investigating the identity in terms of success of intervention. Such an investigation should examine the intricacies of the religion.

The religion section can be separated into two main titles: having a different religion and having the same religion. Religion was something that kept people together and in some examples it provided people with the motivation to go to war

and in some other examples religion made it possible for different groups live together peacefully. It is known that religion has a great impact on people's mindsets, worldviews and norms.

Especially before the French Revolution religion was the main distinguishing element dividing people into groups. Religion has a dividing potential and as well as integrative one. It is also a good tool to mobilize people, which is perfectly depicted by the crusades or Jihads. In this theory by accepting the fact that every religion has a different characteristic and complex set of relations between religions formed during history, it is assumed that if both of the parties have the same religion, intervention is more likely to be successful.

5.3.1 Same Religion

As mentioned before this section on religion might be more complex than others therefore it is important to investigate it further. Under the title of 'same religion' there are two possibilities to be considered.

5.3.2 Sects

Firstly, the fact that engaging parties share a common religion does not necessarily lead to a positive effect. Parties may have same religion but they could belong to different sects which may be a serious source of conflict. In such a situation sects in the related case should be investigated closely to determine if there is a conflict between them. Their relations might be conflicting like in the example of Sunni and

Shiite Islam, or sects can also have neutral positions about each other. Therefore, in case, where the intervener and intervened share the same religion, sects should be taken into consideration.

5.3.3 Characteristics of the Religion

Secondly, if parties have the same religion and the same sect then the specialty of the religion should be examined: some religions may have a political and social aspect which could be used to mobilize masses. Religious scripts and practices vary. Although religion as a term can be defined generally, every religion has different aspects (Conkle, 1993). In this thesis, it is not going to be discussed which religion is more prone to mobilize people or create societal bonds but rather what is the difference between religions in terms of social and political implications. Moreover, it is possible for some countries to have large amounts of people who describe themselves non-religious. This should also be taken as a separate variable.

5.3.4 Different Religions

The second main possibility under the religion section is parties having a different religion. Intervener and intervened having a different religion is an important part of the theory. As has been stated in this thesis, religion has a power to integrate people and at the same time create conflicts. In mainstream religions people who practice other religions or people who do not share same beliefs are described using special terms like heathen or *gavur*. Religions tended to distinguish non-believers from

believers. Therefore, a social division between believers and non-believers was created over time.

The distinctions made between across religions are significant as people tend to describe themselves by drawing on differences from other religions. This stems from psychological research done on identity where “in groups” use “out groups” to build up and secure their identity. The tendency to emphasize differences across religions can be traced throughout history. The distinctions have been deployed as a way of mobilizing people and as well as a source of conflict. Any aggression directed by one religion towards another merely for religious reasons can be a good example of this.

5.3.5 Past Contact

While exploring the relations between different religions two important aspects should be examined. The first one is that the related or similar religions were in contact in the past. It is important to investigate related religions while applying the theory to a case because every religion has its own past and major historical events. Additionally, the contact between different religions may have caused for their believers to have different perceptions of each other due to these positive or negative interactions. Thus, Christianity and Islam have a different perception of each other than do Christianity and Buddhism because of their common past influencing the constantly changing perceptions between Muslims and Christians.

These perceptions shaped throughout history are still effective and can be resurrected by parties involved in the conflict or intervention. In a scenario where the

intervened and interveners have two different religions, any historical conflict can be recalled and strategically utilized. While common history can also be used to reawaken collective memories, religion plays a slightly different role, because there does not need to be a past event between the participating groups. A past event which happened between two other groups of states with the same religions as current conflicting and intervening groups can also be recalled.


As an example, crusades happened between different medieval European kingdoms and Muslim polities in the Middle East and some of them do not exist anymore (for example Mamluks). Therefore, it is not possible to recall a historical event which happened between Kingdom of England and Mamluks in the recent times. However, the religions that these medieval kingdoms represented can be associated with current countries and these events may be recalled in terms of religion. In a similar way, the Iraqi people were able to associate the crusades with the recent US attempt to overthrow the Saddam regime, even though that specific event did not occur between the warring Iraq and USA. This is why one must distinguish between the common history explanations from the religion-based explanation.

5.3.6 Current International Context

The second subtitle under the different religions section is the current international context. It is important to investigate the current international context separately from past events and the historical context of the related religions in which interventions take place. This is because although two religions were not in a conflict

before, a conflict or any other interaction might be happening in the current context. An example may be the tense relations between Israel and Arab countries surrounding it. It is a different situation than the one mentioned above because Judaism and Islam were not in a serious conflict until the start of mass immigration into Palestine and intensified with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Therefore, if only the historical context is investigated the current context is overlooked. As a result, if the intervener and the intervened have different religions both historical and current context should be investigated to analyze the effect of religion on success better.

Figure 3: Schema of Religion



5.4 Assumptions

5.4.1 Assumption of Scale and Obscurity of Values of Identities

Each concept previously described contains assumptions in which the effect can be higher or lower. There cannot be an assigned amount of effectiveness. Thus, in some applications, one of the elements of identity can be more effective while in another example it is not. The main aim is not to measure the success rate, but show that certain elements of identity have an effect while others do not. This thesis will thus investigate those elements as much as possible. Therefore, components of the theory may vary in terms of their efficiency on success of intervention. The differences and similarities of identity of the engaging parties are important in terms of creating public opinion and the possibility of mobilizing the masses.

5.4.2 Assumption of Relationship of Identity and Success.

Since the investigated aspect of intervention here is the relationship of identity and success, only that part of success which is related to identity should be studied. This part is directly related with public opinion. In other words, government is formed by small group of people and can be diverted easily moreover, a third party intervention is mostly ignoring the government of the territory. Thus, the relationship of identity and success is looking at the masses which are hard to control and their tendencies

can be seen as public opinion. The components of the theory are the ones which affect public opinion and therefore, international events which were happened between governments without any participation of public opinion should be ignored. As an example, any economic aid between governments if they are not announced are not subjects of this theory. Basically, the relationship between identity and success in this thesis is assumed as the ability of local groups and leader to mobilize people against intervening states. These local actors can be government personnel, religious leaders, military personnel, or any other people who represent an idea or a group. It is assumed that local actors have an ability to mobilize masses to different extents. This theory claims that the extent of mobilization -although there are other reasons- is affected by the identities of both sides intervening and intervener. Therefore, a mapping of possible identity interactions between parties will be useful to understand the effect of identity on mobilization of masses and therefore success of intervention.

5.4.3 Assumption of Relationship between Resistance Shown by Intervened and Success of Intervention

The more the locals show resistance the less the intervention is successful. Since the success is defined as stopping the fight at least for six months if intervened people resist against interveners then it is highly possible that they attack or take any action against intervening countries. Therefore, it can be assumed that for an intervention to be more successful, besides other components of intervention like military power and the type of intervention, identity is an important element. If the identity of intervener

and intervened are similar this is going to decrease the ability of mobilization for local actors and therefore, increase the success of intervention.

5.4.4 Assumption of the effect of identity on success

After an example is investigated by the virtues of this theory, estimations can be made on the success of the intervention however, the aim of this theory is not providing a measurement system but simply underlining that identity has an effect on the success of intervention. Moreover, this theory also does not provide a holistic interpretation of interventions but merely examines the identity and success connection. Thus, any estimation can only be made in terms of identity however; it will be impossible to present a certain prediction due to the obscurity of values of identity as it was mentioned in assumption of scale section.

5.4.5 Assumption of order of factors which affect intervention success

Intervention success depends on many factors including intervention strategy or motives. In this thesis, it is investigated that if identity is one of these factors which affect intervention success. Therefore, while investigating the effect of identity on the success of intervention firstly and mostly it should be assumed that intervention success depends on other factors such as the military and economic power of the intervening country, and intervention strategy. However, what is tried to be shown here is that the success is not merely depends on these but also identity. Although this is true that the range or amount of effectiveness of factors including identity cannot

be determined within this research, but nonetheless if it is effective or not can still be determined. Thus, an order between factors, the importance or strengths, which affects the success more, will not be provided. However, what will be presented is that there are some factors that affect success and identity might be one of them.

CHAPTER 6

APPLICATION

In this section all three cases will be analyzed using the theory explained in the previous chapters. Firstly, a background of the conflict will be given with historical facts, important actors including individuals, organizations and governments. Secondly, sections of the theory as it was mapped will be applied to the case in detail in order to make a connection between the success and identity.

6.1 Russian Intervention in Georgia

6.1.1 Background

Beginning of the year 1999, Russia intervened between the two warring regions of South Ossetia and Georgia. Although there are still minor aggressions between the two nations, the intervention is generally considered successful. By focusing on the series of events leading up to and during the Second Georgian war, one can understand how deeply rooted the relationships between the three nations is. As the

conflict drew to an end in 2008, South Ossetia gained independence with the successful support of the former Soviet Union.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia exploded when the small province of South Ossetia requested autonomy from Russia and Georgia in 1989 and looked to the Georgian Supreme Soviets to consider and resolve the issue (Niedermaier, 2008: 3). This was outright rejected by Georgia and caused fragmentation and disintegration of the country and the ethnic territories within it. In September 1990 South Ossetia declared itself to be a Soviet Democratic Republic within the USSR and in response, Georgia ambushed South Ossetia (Niedermaier, 2008: 13). Georgian violence forced South Ossetia to proclaim a “state of emergency” from hotbeds of ethnic conflict. After Zviad Gamsukhurdia came to power, he declared Georgian independence from the USSR, and blockaded Tskhinvali; the South Ossetian capital (Niedermaier, 2008: 24). Eighty thousand South Ossetian refugees poured into North Ossetia and began affecting Russian politics. President Yeltsin was forced to support South Ossetia to maintain support from the people.

During this time, Georgia began participating in Soviet elections. One hundred-thirty parties were contesting the election of the Georgian Parliament and were striving for independence. The Communist Party, attempting to hold onto power, was the most strident of these parties. Each party maintained its own paramilitary units who were not loyal to the state. Zviad Gamsukhurdia became the first president of Georgia because he spoke out against the USSR and earned respect as a national hero who told the truth. However, he soon came under siege by the

Georgian people because of his dictatorial behavior and was then replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze after a coup.

Although in June 1992, both Georgia and South Ossetia signed a ceasefire protocol specifying mutual agreements on ceasefire, both forces harbored aggression as Russia placed an economic blockade on the pipeline and military highway that pass through South Ossetia (Niedermaier, 2008: 43). This form of peace talks, amidst violence between the two regions, continued throughout the rest of the first war. A state of emergency was declared in South Ossetia from Sep. 30 1993 ... effect until Jan 31 1994 (Niedermaier, 2008: 55). Peace talks again occurred in 1994, but essentially were not helpful because although the first war ended after these talks and the state assumed its position of having a monopoly on violence, the second Georgian war broke out only four years later.

During this time of peace between Georgia and South Ossetia, Shavardnadze began thawing relations with the United States. On account of communist paranoia, the geopolitical policy of the U.S. was to prevent Russia from rebuilding the USSR. This could also give the U.S. an advantage because Georgia could be made a buffer state and also they could secure a pipeline to receive Caspian oil. In 1999 Georgia requested to join NATO, but was denied based on a requirement for all NATO members to have defined borders.

Also, in 2002 the South Ossetian president began expanding the army by organizing as many as 3,000 reservists and volunteers (Niedermaier, 2008: 101). While South Ossetia considered joining the Russian Federation, in 2003 Putin urged the new Georgian leaders to accept Russian terms of normalization.

In 2003 the Rose Revolution took place in Georgia, overthrowing Shevardnadze, after he rigged the elections. In 2004 Georgia elected the youngest European leader, 36-year-old Mikhail Saakashvili. He was a neo-liberal interested in privatizing the market and was a strident nationalist. He replaced the government flag with the flag of his party and also added a flag of the European Union. The new president encouraged further incorporation into NATO, but did not want to allow U.S. bases in Georgia. He promised to resolve the issue of autonomy with diplomatic talks, but continued military actions stating, he would never see the breakup of Georgia (Niedermaier, 2008: 135).

South Ossetia then joined forces with Abkhazia (another small Eastern territory under the attack by Georgia) in fighting against Georgia. Both regions have many commonalities including that both areas have a government based on smuggling and contraband, both have elections that are not recognized by Georgia, and both are trying to become autonomous and separate from Georgia. Kokoity was elected the South Ossetian president and demanded “compensation in the amount of \$30 billion” be made to the government for war casualties and damages (Niedermaier, 2008: 143). The Georgian government ignored this request and 150 Russian trucks filled with weapons entered the Tskhinvali area” (Niedermaier, 2008: 144). Colin Powell unofficially vowed to talk to Russia on behalf of the Georgian PM, after Georgian Ossetians seized troops. The Georgian/Russian conflict continued as Georgian troops confiscated missiles from Russian peacekeepers on their way to South Ossetia. Georgia also accused Russia of siding with South Ossetia during the conflict. This formal accusation had been a long time coming, considering Russian support.

Russia countered Georgian aggression with a blockade. Moscow also wrote to the Bush administration stating that no former USSR states should be allowed to join NATO so that therefore the U.S. could not station troops in Georgia or supply any military infrastructure. Both of these demands were broken within the next ten years. In 2006 Russia placed economic sanctions on Georgia. Before the sanction, Russia spent about \$216 million on Georgian exports (Niedermaier, 2008: 254). In July 2006, the Georgian police and security forces took control of the Kodori Valley, breaking the ceasefire agreement. Georgia also demanded for the earliest possible withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the area. Russia furthered its ties with South Ossetia by beginning the construction of a pipeline between North and South Ossetia. This pipelined created energy security for South Ossetia (Niedermaier, 2008: 259).

During this time Georgia and Russia also furthered this diplomatic war by establishing a *visa war*. Russia stopped ensuring *visas* to Georgian citizens. Hundreds of Georgians gathered at the Russian Embassy to show protest because they could not visit relatives in the north. Later, in 2007 Georgia responded to Russia's previously placed sanctions by establishing the Tangerine Embargo on South Ossetia. Georgians blocked the highway and "truck drivers transporting tangerines". The struggle and combat continued as Georgian police exploded a Russian bombshell and Georgia accused Russia of bombing their territory "just 56 kilometers west of the capital".

On November 6, 2007 thousands of Georgians peacefully rallied to overthrow Mikhail Saakashvili from his position as president (Niedermaier, 2008: 301). The citizens were angry about the prolific corruption within the government. The

Georgian government responded by violently suppressing the protesters “with billy clubs and tear gas” (Niedermaier, 2008: 305). President Saakashvili announced a compromise solution to hold early presidential elections in 2008. Although this is true, he still held a second term and continued his corrupt rule.

In 2008 the situation within Georgia began to cool down as Georgia semi-recognized Abkhazia and lifted economic sanctions, but this did not last long. Russians “[accounted] for a majority of the South Ossetian and Abkazian population” because Russia had moved in so many troops (Niedermaier, 2008: 338). Putin also decided to annex Georgian territory and as a response Georgia decided to hold back and refrain from taking any steps that may agitate Russia. Saakashvili continued relations with the U.N. and the E.U., by requesting their peacekeepers instead of Russian Peacekeepers, but Russia was prepared to protect Abkhazia and South Ossetia with arms. The situation continued to heat up with a propelled increase of armed combat and confrontation. Thousands of people were killed in Tskhinvali when Georgian troops raided the city. At this point, South Ossetia stated that they were at war with Georgia.

Commentary from Russian foreign policy elites and military experts states that they would continue to expand humanitarianism and cultural cooperation with all of the Transcaucus, after the 2008 crisis (Niedermaier, 2008: 423). They generally believe in the right of nations to decide their own fate and stated that Russian peacekeepers were generators of peace and calm and will not leave. Russia is also interested in Georgian peace through economic cooperation. They also reject American perusing objectives within reason and using conflict as an excuse to obtain

economic interests. The potential for an economic partnership may end or decrease the conflict within the region.

Currently, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have now established independent, as generally and functionally recognized, republics on an international level. Conversely, according to Georgia and the United States, the regions are temporary administrative units within Georgia. Although this is true, the intervention helped to resolve the conflict, and military aggression has tapered to an almost non-existent level. The outbreak of conflict was produced by the fall of the Soviet Union and the nullification of the 1921 treaty. This caused a slow disintegration that allowed for the South Ossetian people to gain independence as a nation from Russia and Georgia as controlling actors.

6.1.2 Analysis of the Russian intervention in Georgia

6.1.2.1 Common History

6.1.2.1.1 Same government

Georgia had been under the same government as Russia since it was annexed by Russia in 1810. In 1801 Paul I signed a contract which annexed East Georgia to Russia. This ended the independence of the Georgian kingdoms. Although many riots ensued, Georgians were finally protected from foreign attempts at conquest. Under Russian government, Georgians adopted a new system of taxation, education and Russian cultural norms. In fact ever since the early 19th century Georgia experienced a Russification of policy, which influenced every part of Georgian society.

Georgia was annexed again in 1921 by the Bolsheviks. It became the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and a process of Sovietization began in Georgia just as it had in other republics. Under the common Soviet government in Moscow Georgia underwent a process of industrialization and collectivization. It only gained its independence in 1991.

The fact that when Georgia was in the Soviet this Union could be seen as having a negative influence on the state. It was ruled harshly and many people were executed and purged under Stalin. A significant portion of its land was given to the Georgia's neighboring countries. This must have had led some people to grow resentful of Russian interference in Georgian affairs. When Georgians began to protest in favor of independence the "Soviet troops violently suppressed peaceful demonstrators ... resulting in 19 deaths".² The Georgians began to perceive the Soviet government as repressive and "coupled with demagogic politics on all sides, led to rising insecurities and perceptions of ethnic victimization" (Charap and Welt, 2011).

However, Soviet dominance also had a pacifying affect. During those years, there was very little ethnic strife. It was only in the late 1980s that Georgia began to push hard for independence while South Ossetians and Abkhazis preferred to stay in a reformed Soviet Union. It was only after Georgia's independence that problems began to emerge. It wasn't that these internal problems were hidden or not apparent on the surface, but rather carried very little significance in the context of the Soviet Union. Under the Soviet Union different nations were considered equal and it was only after Georgia gained its independence that "discriminatory nationalism" developed. Furthermore, under the Soviet Union all republics and nations were

² www.americanprogress.org/wp.../02/.../georgia_conflicts.pdf (Last Access 22.01.2013)

united under a strong and common ideology of Soviet socialism. This unifying force disappeared. This destabilized many societies and their political structures who were trying to develop their own voice and identity. These new state structures were weak and disorganized.


While Georgians grew to be anti-Soviet the South Ossetians and Abkhazis as pro-Soviet. “Georgia claims that Russia, which brutally suppressed its own separatist uprising in Chechnya, backed the Ossetian and Abkhazian rebels in order to keep Georgia weak and dependent upon Moscow.”³

Yet, it would be an exaggeration to say that Georgians view Georgian-Russian relations negatively. It was only after the 2008 war that the number of Georgians who viewed Georgian-Russian relations as “good” fell below 50% as can be seen in Table 1.0. Furthermore, “Georgians are still more likely to favor good relations with Russia at all ... This likely reflects the strength of Georgians' close cultural, historical, and economic ties to Russia.”⁴ Such a statement reflects that although there have been problems and even violent armed conflicts between the two countries, the two nations continue to have positive associations of each other due to their social and historical ties.

³ Russia-Gergia Conflict: Why both sides have valid points.
[http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2008/0819/p12s01-woeu.html/\(page\)/2](http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2008/0819/p12s01-woeu.html/(page)/2) (Last Access 22.01.2013)

⁴ Georgians' Attitudes Toward Russia Less Friendly Since War
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/122258/georgians-attitudes-toward-russia-less-friendly-war.aspx> (Last Access 22.01.2013)

There are different opinions on the relations of Georgia and Russia. Can you tell me with which of the following statements you agree most?



Asked of Georgian adults in May 2007, June 2008, May 2009

GALLUP POLL

Table 1.0 – Gallup’s Survey on Georgian public opinion on Russia⁵

We must also not ignore the fact that under the Soviet Union, Georgia was under a lot of influence from Moscow. The Russian intervention can be seen as just another example of Russia expanding its influence into its neighboring periphery. It is easy to argue that Russians found it hard to accept that it had lost control over the social-economic, political and security situation of the newly independent, former Soviet Republics.

6.1.2.1.2 Having an alliance or war

Since the Middle Ages onwards the Christian Georgian kingdoms had been caught between three major Empires: Ottoman, Russian and Persian. It tried to resist foreign

⁵ Georgians’ Attitudes Toward Russia Less Friendly Since War

<http://www.gallup.com/poll/122258/georgians-attitudes-toward-russia-less-friendly-war.aspx> (Last Access 22.01.2013)

influence, but it remained divided into spheres of influence of the three Empires. Eventually it developed ever closer ties with the Russian Empire. It faced many defeats while battling these stronger forces and sought Russian protection, which was not well assured or regular. A big breakthrough was the Treaty of Georgievsk of 1783, which made the eastern Georgian kingdom (Kartlinia-Kahetia) a protectorate of the Russian Empire. It was an alliance between the Georgian Kingdom and Catherine the Great. However, even with this treaty Russia did not follow through. It withdrew troops during the next Russo-Turkish war. This left Georgians vulnerable and they were defeated by the Iranians.

Although the Treaty of Georgievsk was the first major alliance between the two nations, the 20th century alliance under the USSR must have played a significant role in the development of identities of the two countries. After all, both lived under a common ideology, economic system and were ruled under a common and heavily centralized government. Under this alliance all Soviet republic shared the same friends and foes on the international level. It pulled Georgia into World War II. Georgia contributed soldiers of which 300,000 died. Although having a common enemy can be unifying, it can also be dividing.

6.1.2.2 Language

In Georgia the official language is Georgian and the majority of the population speaks it (approx. 70%). However there are many other languages, which are spoken in Georgia, including Russian (10 %), Armenian (7%) and others. Having a Russian minority within Georgia, which speaks Russian, brings the identities of the intervening and intervened countries closer. Russians may seem less foreign. Under Tsarist Russia, Georgia used Russian in school. This was abolished when Georgia

became a part of the Soviet Union. Having had a common history under the communist rule of the Soviet Union means that more than two decades ago Georgia was a bilingual state with Russian and Georgian as the official languages. It was in fact it was the national movement that brought back the Georgian language as the official language.

6.1.2.2.1 Language Family

Georgian is considered to be in the Kartvelian language family. This language family is very unique and is not considered to be related to any other language family. Some linguists say that there is no relation to the North Caucasian language family. Others argue that it belongs to the Ibero-Caucasian family, while others still argue that the Georgian language has some similarities to Indo-European language family. This may just be out of geographical proximity (intermingling of different languages and cultures) of these languages.

On the other hand Russian belongs to the family of Indo-European languages. More specifically it falls under the Balto-Slavic group of languages. It is an East Slavic language.

However, since the similarities are arguably small we can conclude that the two languages are part of very different language families. Although these two language families are not as foreign as two languages from very different parts of the world may be, the vague similarities may be considered insignificant in creating a common identity. They are simply not related enough to have any effect on the construction of a shared identity between the two states.

6.1.2.2 Alphabet

The Georgian alphabet is different to the Russian alphabet. The alphabet that has been in use since the 11th century is called Mkhedruli. On the other hand, Russian uses the Russian alphabet, which is a version of the Cyrillic script.

6.1.2.3 Religion

Russia is the home to believers of many different faiths (including Islam and Judaism), but the most predominant religion in Russia is Orthodox Christianity. It has the largest number of adherents. Just like in Russia, the majority of Georgians are practicing Orthodox Christians. A small part of that population is even a part of the Russian Orthodox Church (approximately 2%). Georgia also has Muslim and Jewish minority groups. A common religion can definitely be taken into account as one of the decisive factors contributing to a common identity.

6.1.3 Results of Russian Intervention in Georgia

Considering the definition of success provided in previous sections, Russian intervention to South Ossetia can be considered a successful one. First of all, Russia obtained its goal of liberating South Ossetia and Abkhazia or in other words, not preventing Georgia from dominating these regions. Secondly, Russia's casualties were 36 soldiers and Georgia's casualties were 171. Estimated civilian casualties were 162. In total, 369 people died on both sides. Although this number seems relatively high, the maximum number for an intervention to fail defined earlier was one thousand. Thirdly, military engagement during the conflict took 9 days, after

which the violence stopped. In the definition, it was decided that for an intervention to be considered successful, it should stop the conflict for six months. Consequently, Russia can be said to have achieved its goal by losing relatively few soldiers and civilians, bringing an end to the conflict in just 9 days and moreover, ensuring this was an enduring solution. Therefore, this military intervention is considered as successful.

6.2 British Intervention in Sierra Leone

6.2.1 Background

The reasons leading to Sierra Leone's civil war in the 1990's and later Great Britain's intervention in the year 2000 were largely due to elements held in the historical background of the region. Sierra Leone is a region that has been divided for many centuries by differing ethnic groups after over 2000 years of migratory peoples coming to the region. During the time of the civil war in Sierra Leone, the indigenous peoples consisted of at least fourteen ethno-linguistic groups. While the majority of these groups adhered to traditional parochial socio-economic systems governed by kinship rules, later it evolved into a paramount chief system (Hirsch, 2001: 22). These are elements that have divided the country and have therefore weakened it as well. Additional factors contributing to the diversity of the area include the coming of Islamic peoples in the thirteenth century through the seventeenth century as well as the coming of the British in the seventeenth century. The appearance of these

groups had inevitably affected the indigenous peoples as well as their way of life, stability and belief systems.

Fortunately for the indigenous peoples of Sierra Leone, the British took action in the late 1700s to block the immense slave trade to the Americas by other European countries and established Freetown for freed slaves. This was Britain's first involvement, later making Sierra Leone one of its colonies in 1808. However, Britain's efforts did not stop Portuguese involvement in the area. Portuguese influence mainly affected the indigenous people of Sierra Leone through intermarriage, a race later named Creole or Krio. Due to the European connections these people were despised by the indigenous again contributing to conflicts within Sierra Leone. Because of this European connection, the Krio population was appointed governmental positions later creating corruption. The British declared areas of Sierra Leone outside of Freetown as a protectorate in 1896 with aims to protect the region under its colonial rule.

The British granted independence to the whole of Sierra Leone in 1961 on the assumption that it was a healthy and prosperous state in the process of transforming into a modernized state. However, due to the great class separation and its past history, there was a great deal of resistance from the impoverished warrior class and inharmonious diversity leading up to the civil war of the 1900s. A lack of central government aided the resistance of smaller ethnic groups that indirectly ruled the protectorate. It was at this time that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels took advantage of the corrupt and decentralized government of Sierra Leone to invade the region in 1991 using tactics of shock and terror (Hirsch, 2001: 81). These elements are the causes of the decline of the state and the civil war of Sierra Leone.

In current times, Sierra Leone aims to rebuild and mollify the tragic decade-long war it has endured. However, even after the British intervention, there is still violence occurring characterizing a tenuous unrest.

6.2.2 Analysis of British Intervention in Sierra Leone

6.2.2.1 Common History

6.2.2.1.1 Same government

Sierra Leone was previously under the British rule. As was explained in the theory section colonial rule can also be counted as peoples being ruled by the same government, as it may produce the sentiment of belonging among all of its subjects, even if they are unequal in their status. An Empire might not unify all of its subjects under one identity and the British practiced 'indirect rule' in most of their colonies, so its influence is slightly less obvious. Even though the British ruled indirectly, the British officials and citizens living abroad (along with local sympathetic and cooperative citizens) were much more privileged than other local and indigenous people.

The British first became involved in Sierra Leone was in 1663 and they established a factory. The British presence in Sierra Leone was based on British interest for economic growth ever since. It was under British influence in 1826. The British military began to exert its will on tribal leaders. In 1896 it became official British soil with an official proclamation. So, did the British have a positive or negative effect on the relations between the British and the people of Sierra Leone?

Since 1807 the British made slavery and the slave trade illegal. This could have had a positive effect on the Sierra Leonean perception of the colonizers as they were able to see the worth and value of the people treating them with greater dignity than otherwise. Sierra Leone was termed “Province of Freedom”. Many Black slaves were brought to Sierra Leone to free them and although some eventually rebelled, this can be seen as a positive effect.

Until the 20th century Britain continued to gradually increase its involvement in Sierra Leonean affairs, slowly taking over control of the territory by ruling through tribal chiefs. They attempted to secure peace between the tribes in order to maintain a prosperous trade. They continued to collect financial sources, like customs duties from the tribes in exchange for maintaining peace and trade. The negative aspect of this colonization was that the tribal chiefs were forced into such unequal relations. Although nominally this relation appeared equal as contracts were signed between both equal and sovereign parties. This could have had a positive effect.

Whether the colonial rule was positive or negative is considered by this thesis as irrelevant. There are examples where imperial rule was very friendly and positive for the ruled populations and they will be viewed the rule negatively (for example the Ottoman in the Balkans). What is important is that the British rule was long and British colonial influence was present in Sierra Leone for a long period of time and might even be continuing.

One of the strongest pieces of evidence of ‘same government’ factors is that Sierra Leone became a Commonwealth state even after it gained its independence contributing to good relations with United Kingdom.

6.2.2.1.2 Alliance and War

The British protected their trading interests by defending the territory against the Dutch and French as well as pirates in the 17th and 18th century. While this could have brought the two peoples closer together by being positioned on the same side of conflicts and yet, the British also had to fight with local tribal groups and chiefs when they rebelled putting them on opposing sides of conflicts.

Then during World War II the British conscripted many Sierra Leonean soldiers and used the tribal chiefs as a mechanism of persuading local men to join the war effort. They fought alongside the British soldiers in Burma. They even distributed some propaganda showing the people of Sierra Leone what life under Nazism could be like. Such efforts must have created a closer tie between the two entities, because people with a common enemy tend to become closer even if they are very different.

6.2.2.1.3 International events

An important early event was the abolition of slavery and Britain's efforts to internationalize this anti-slavery movement. However, this event could be understood as irrelevant due to the fact that it is far from being current and may have no real effect on the mass memory of the Sierra Leonean people. Such a link would need to be investigated further.

One of the main events in Sierra Leone's history is its independence from Great Britain in 1961. The fact that the independence took place relatively easily and peacefully must have had a contributing impact on bringing the two nations closer together. Independence was negotiated in Britain between a Sierra Leonean

delegation and the British. Unlike other African states Sierra Leone did not have to fight a long and bloody battle. Such an independence process could have permanently scarred the relations between the two countries.

6.2.2.2 Language

The official language in Sierra Leone is English, and it is clearly an inheritance of British colonial rule. However, while we can state that Sierra Leone and Britain share a common language (and therefore also a language from the same family tree and alphabet) the thesis recognizes that the official language is only spoken by a literate minority and there are many languages spoken by the local people such as: Mende, Temne and Krio. These are the languages spoken by the majority of the population, while English is only used in small numbers.

What this all actually means is that we can claim that the two countries share a common language, but we must be aware of limited use of English and how this affects the common identity assumption. If only the educated elites of Sierra Leone speak English we can hypothesize whether they are more willing to feel closer to or identify themselves with the British. Its positive effect on identity may exist, but it is restricted.

6.2.2.3 Religion

Islam spread to Sierra Leone in the 19th century and remained a prominent religion ever since, even with the British occupation and all its cultural influences. Over 60% of the population is Muslim, while only 20-30% of the population subscribes to Christianity. While this may seem like a small number, I would argue that the number does provide Sierra Leone with an opportunity to coexist with this religious

affiliation, rather than view it as a distant, foreign and unknown belief system. There are also other religions present in Sierra Leone. The constitution of Sierra Leone provides for religious freedom. This provides Sierra Leone with an environment of religious tolerance rather than intolerance. The thesis therefore adopts the assumption that the British intervention was not viewed in terms of a religious crusade or as an example of Christian western interference.

6.2.3 Results of British Intervention in Sierra Leone

As has been demonstrated by the background section of the British intervention in Sierra Leone, the British intervention was successful, despite the initial US, British and French doubts over the outcome after “Black Hawk Down”. Britain started to deploy soldiers in May, mission was mostly completed by September. In five months, civil war was stopped which means that Britain achieved the original purpose of the intervention by suffering slightly small casualties both civilian and military. Considering all these, British intervention in Sierra Leone has been a successful one.

6.3 USA intervention in Somalia

6.3.1 Background

The Somali civil war is a current civil conflict, initiated by the defeat of the military government. In 1991 an alliance of clan-lords ousted the Siad Barre regime, resulting

in full governmental collapse. After this military government instantly dissolved, conflict and armed war broke out between multiple powerful clan-lords. In pursuit of territory and power, these clan-based armed opposition groups used ethnic mobilization to secure the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre's ruling socialist government. His regime lasted about 13 years after it was established in 1978, as a result of a *coup d'état* (Allard, 1995). The United Nations attempted at an intervention in 1992, but was unable to improve the countries situation and thus aborted the mission. The UN's ineffective operation left Somalia without relief or conclusion to the warfare. Currently, Somalia remains engaged in a costly Civil War, eliminating more citizen freedoms and contributing to a high death toll.

It is the general conception of most academics that the United Nations failed at a peacekeeping attempt. This is based on the fact that after the UN had an, "initial success in the summer of 1992 in restoring order and saving thousands of lives" but later, "American soldiers clashed with Somali forces and were withdrawn in the spring of 1994" (Allard, 1995). This failure gave way to a lack of central authority and created a power gap and an extensive rivalry between armed groups. Battles between clan lords struggling for influence in the region emerged from a power gap in central authority. An inevitable decentralization of power catalyzed the appearance of small territorial authorities. Many newly established authorities adopted several different forms of personal government, including old traditions and religious law such as Sharia Law.

In order to provide humanitarian relief and help restore order in Somalia, the United Nations commissioned the 'UNOSOM I' project to provide humanitarian relief. The council issued two resolutions: UN Security Council Resolution 773 and

UN Security Council Resolution 746. In addition, Resolution 794 sent United States led troops as the first troops assigned to land in Somalia territory. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was given the duty of guaranteeing the UN's humanitarian relief reached the Somali people, until the conflict stabilize. The first troops landed in 1993 under the operation name UNOSOM II. Chronologically speaking, the U.S. military forces went through three distinct phases during the period of providing humanitarian assistance (Allard, 1995). First, an airlift provided food relief and medical supplies to the citizens of Somalia who were in dire need; the causes of the need ranged from sickness to starvation. The second phase of the operation comprised of an intervention force that combined both continued humanitarian relief and better security forces intended to protect those providing the assistance. The final wave of US aid operation was essentially troops, providing the majority of combat power. This is an important undertaking historically, because it was the first "peace enforcement" operation conducted by the United Nations (Allard, 1995). All of these efforts proved to unsuccessful during and after the relief effort.

United States forces were not welcomed by civilians or local leaders and furthermore were perceived as a threat by clan lords and local leaders, who were struggling for power. Several battles took place between UN assigned US forces and Somalia militia, including the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993. With massive amounts of casualties on both sides and with the fact that the purpose of intervention could not achieved, UN troops withdrew from Somalia in 1995. Today there is a continuous conflict between the Transitional Federal Government, which is supported by Ethiopia and other multinational forces against Islamic Courts Union, which is formed by Islamic groups including some radical groups like Al-Shabaab.

Domestic and international military aid and force have been unable to put an end to this enduring conflict (Allard, 1995).

The impacts of the long lasting civil war were exceedingly destructive. The people of Somali are still struggling with drought and famine as well as violence resulting from the conflict. Moreover, the conflict drove large numbers of civilians from their homes to refugee camps in Somalia and other countries. Most of the recently displaced Somalis “have taken shelter in and around the Kenyan town of Mandera”.⁶ Although the United Nation’s attempted to achieve relief by sending humanitarian aid, most of the aid did not reach people. Clan lords instead seized the food, medicine, and other supplies. Many years under these harsh conditions brought crushing poverty, a continuously increasing death toll, and other forms of violence against and between the Somali people.

6.3.2 Analysis of USA intervention in Somalia

6.3.2.1 Common History

6.3.2.1.1 Same Government

Unlike the case of Britain and Sierra Leone, Somalia and USA have never had a shared history in colonial terms. Somalia was split into British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland and both Empires fought for power and influence. After World War II Britain established Somaliland as a protectorate. Italy was granted a trusteeship over

⁶ UNHCR Refugees Daily. 2011 “Somalia’s civil war” The Economist. <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef21123&id=4d9577495> (Last Access 22.01.2013)

Italian Somaliland by the UN. In the period leading up to its independence USA played no significant role in Somalia's history. From the period of 1969 to 1991 Somalia was a democratic communist regime. For approximately a decade since the establishment of Somali Democratic Republic it had good relations with the Soviet Union. Ideologically and historically the two states were far from having a common history or identity. In fact, they were on polar opposite sides during the Cold War.

The cooperation between Somali and Soviet Union did not last long, because of the Ogaden War. USA had always been interested in Somalia, because of its geostrategic significance at the horn of Africa as an entryway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. It received military support from the USA and became one of the most powerful armies on the African continent. However once the Somali civil war began in 1990 the US embassy in Somalia ceased its work without formally ending diplomatic relations with the country. Instead it continued its relations with the Somali state through humanitarian efforts. While the US supports the transitional government it encourages a sustainable peace process with the end result of a newly elected and representative parliament and the creation of a constitution.

6.3.2.2 Language

The USA and Somalia do not share a common language. The official Somali language is the Somali language. The majority of the population speaks this language. The Somali children who did/do attend school are also taught Arabic, English or Italian. Arabic is taught as a second language due to Islam being a predominant religion in the country. Many children attend Quranic schools. Italian is taught because Italian influences are a colonial left-over. English is taught because there are benefits to learning a language spoken by the majority of the world as a

second language and being able to integrate with the rest of the world. However, Arabic is preferred by the majority of the Somali population.

6.3.2.2.1 Alphabet

Somalia has a complicated background of different languages and different alphabets. Four different alphabets were used until 1961, when only two were used, one of them being the Latin alphabet. It was only in 1972 that the Latin alphabet was used. This means that Somalia and USA share the same alphabet. However, it is possible to argue that this contributes very little to a common or shared identity. A common alphabet is only a recent characteristic.

6.3.2.3 Religion

Somalia and USA do not share a common religion. Somalia is predominantly Sunni Muslim. The majority of Somali Muslims also subscribe to Shafi'i sect of Islamic law, while others agree with Shia law. Even the constitution of Somalia confirms that Islam is the national religion of the state of Somalia. It also states that Sharia law is the basic source of morality and legislation for the state of Somalia. Islam has been popular in Somalia during its very early stages and has been a very important societal and cultural force in the country. Christians in Somalia are only a minority, with less than 1,000 adherents and they came to Somalia only recently from the British Somaliland protectorate. There are also some animists.

On the other hand, USA is predominantly Christian at 76% of the population. The population of USA is divided into many different religious affiliations as well as levels of belief. Not all religious Americans put religion as a top preoccupation or priority in their life. Also, people in some parts of USA tend to be more religious than others. Western coastal states for example have a great number of people who

do not subscribe to any religious affiliation and do not believe in God, while people in the so-called 'Bible Belt' tend to be deeply religious Christians.

Apart from Christians and not-religious people, Jews and Muslims form a significant minority group. There are approximately two and a half million Muslims (about 0.8 % of the population). While the first Muslims came into the USA as African slaves and have generally been able to integrate into the multicultural state, since 9/11 Muslims have been stereotyped, stigmatized and marginalized in American society.

It is clear that the intervening and intervened state have very different religious affiliations, although they both belong to Abrahamic religions. It is possible to assume that the two societies have had very little contact with the other's religions at a national level as they are both minority religions.

6.3.3 Results of USA intervention in Somalia

The main participant in this intervention was clearly the USA backed up by the UN and states who contributed troops. The US played a major role in the intervention, that is why this thesis has focused on their identity the identity of the USA and Somalia. It was the USA that offered to create a multilateral body that would operate under its own leadership and finally provide Somalia with the humanitarian relief it needed from war, destruction and poverty. Once the plans were approved by the UN Security Council, the body was called the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The USA was in charge of commanding the troops during Operation Restore Hope along with troops from Australia, United Kingdom, Spain, France, Ireland, India, Turkey, New

Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Saudi Arabia and 12 other countries. However the majority of the troops were American (25,000 out of 37,000). UNITAF did not seem to reach the proposed goals and its mission was transformed by the UN into UNOSOM II. US troops were in Somalia for 2 years between 1992-1994 in order to ensure humanitarian aid went through insurgent groups to people in need. During these 2 years, the US suffered almost 20 casualties and there are estimated 1500 civilian casualties on the Somali side. Furthermore, when the US left Somalia, the original problem remained. This intervention took more than 6 months and could not stop civilian deaths, nor did the US did achieve its intervention objectives. During this operation, and estimated 1500 people died, which is much higher than the maximum casualty rate given in the definition of a successful intervention. Therefore, the US intervention to Somalia is considered as unsuccessful.

CHAPTER 7

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

All three intervention cases were analyzed using the theory in order to underline possible relationship between identity and success of interventions. The scope of the research does not include all other components of success of intervention, but only identity, as this research attempted to show that the identity of parties in an intervention may affect the success of intervention. Moreover, due to limited time and limited research capabilities the theory could not be applied to more than three cases. Ideally, every military intervention after the Second World War could be explored using this theory and such extensive research would strengthen the theory. The first intervention case analyzed was Russian military intervention to Georgia is considered as a successful intervention. Although it is unknown how effective the components of identity (history, religion, language) are compared to each other, it was the first example of successful intervention taking part between parties that have similar identities. The example of Britain's intervention in Sierra Leone was successful as well. Britain and Sierra Leone were more different in terms of similarities mentioned in this thesis comparing to Russia and Georgia's similarities. Britain's colonial relations are relatively more recent than Russia's for example. However, their identities were similar enough to stop the intervened resisting against intervener party. For the third example however, it is seen that both of the parties

have really different identities and no commonalities at all, making mobilization efforts against interveners easier for local political actors and power holders in Somalia. It is possible that the USA's loss of casualties was not too severe, but resistance against US operations was so powerful that US became dysfunctional and was forced to kill civilians to carry out basic operations. It is obvious that US forces in the region were alienated in the eyes of local people, as if they were there to invade their land or/and harm them.

The main argument of this thesis is that the similarity of identity between intervener and intervening parties reduces this alienation and allows intervening troops to carry out their operations in peace. All of the intervention cases analyzed in this thesis show that the more similar the identities are, the more successful the intervention is.

7.1 Future of the Research

There are three main research possibilities for future. The first one is, as aforementioned, the number of cases. Ideally, this theory should be applied to all of the military intervention cases which happened after the Second World War, in order to test the relationship between identity and success of intervention. This would provide better evidence for the theory and clear the way of extending the theory to other inter-identity encounter such as wars, immigration and refugee issues be considered as the second future research possibility.

Since the most basic element of a military intervention is an encounter between two different groups within a specific context, these encounters might be

varied. Refugee issues are one of them. It is a humanitarian issue and always difficult to handle for hosting states. Not every state accepts refugees from every other state. There are conditions for hosting refugees. The role of identity as one of these conditions could be considered by this theory in further research. Examples of encounters can be varied.

Thirdly, the theory itself can be extended in terms of components of identity. Right now there are three main components of identity including, common history, language and religion. However, ethnicity and political belongings might be added to the theory. Although political conflicts are not as common as they were during the Cold War. It is known as communism and was a major identity element which caused many conflicts between groups. Moreover, communism was the dominant identity element that neutralized religion and even common history for many people. Besides, if Sierra Leone example was analyzed including the political identity factor, I believe we might be able to trace effects of anti-colonialism on identities of people. Therefore, adding political identity as a factor could provide areas for further research and even more commonalities in the connection between identity and intervention success.

7.2 Conclusion

International military interventions might be the most frequently used method which involves weapon employment and causes loss of human life. Thus, it is a delicate matter and is studied further in order to minimize pecuniary loss and intangible damages by making it more successful. The factors which define the success of

military intervention are various. It is certain that these factors either are not investigated enough or ignored by policy makers. Either way, considering the current political situation where it is argued that civilizations clash with each other, identity should be taking into consideration. In this thesis, the concept of identity and intervention as inter-related groups is discussed, and a successful intervention was defined. The main purpose was to understand if there is a link between the identity element of intervener and intervened groups and more importantly, if this affects the success of intervention. In order to investigate this relationship, a framework of social-political identity that aims to reveal similarities and differences was created and applied to three different international military intervention cases. Application of this framework to cases shows that the more similar the identities of intervener and intervened are, intervention is more likely to be successful.

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