

ANALYZING TURKEY'S INTERACTIONS WITH
GREECE AND SYRIA IN THE POST- COLD WAR ERA

A Master's Thesis

by

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DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BILKENT UNIVERSITY

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**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University**

by

Reşat Bayer

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
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ABSTRACT

ANALYZING TURKEY'S INTERACTIONS WITH GREECE AND SYRIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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The aim of this study is to analyze foreign policy patterns of Turkey within the context of Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Syrian relations. The interactions between Turkey and its neighbors are analyzed for the period between 1990 and 1998 on a scale ranging from cooperation to hostility. Content analysis and, more particularly, events data are applied. The issues analyzed are those pertaining to the Aegean Sea, Cyprus, security and water. The premise, which argues that Turkey has adopted a dynamic foreign policy in the 1990s, was investigated and the results generally support it. Turkey is found to be the most active country in the study whose average behavior was usually more assertive than the rest. The use of content analysis enabled the systematic study of Turkish foreign policy. The theoretical, methodological and practical implications are further discussed in this study.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE'NİN SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI DÖNEMDE YUNANİSTAN VE SURİYE İLE ETKİLEŞİMİNİN ANALİZİ

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Bu çalışmanın amacı Türk dış politikasının eğilimlerini Türk-Yunan ve Türk-Suriye ilişkileri çerçevesinde incelemektir. Türkiye ile komşuları arasındaki etkileşim 1990 ila 1998 dönemini kapsayacak şekilde işbirliğinden husumete kadar yayılan bir yelpaze içinde analiz edilmiştir. İçerik çözümlemesi ve daha özlü olarak, olay verileri kullanılmıştır. Ege, Kıbrıs, güvenlik ve suya ilişkin konular incelenmiştir. 1990'lı yıllarda Türkiye'nin daha dinamik bir dış politika benimsediği tezi araştırılmış ve varılan sonuçlar genelde bu tezi desteklemiştir. Bu çalışmada ele alınan ülkeler arasında Türkiye, en aktif ve diğerlerinden daha belirleyici bir davranışa sahip ülke olarak saptanmıştır. İçerik çözümlemesinin kullanılması, Türk dış politikasının sistematik tarzda belirlenmiş görünümünü çıkartmaya yardımcı olmuştur. Teorik, metodolojik ve pratik yansımalar çalışmada daha ayrıntılı şekilde tartışılmaktadır.

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This work was made possible by the support rendered to me by many people who are too numerous to list here. My gratitude is extended to all of them.

Dr. Serdar Güner was of crucial importance during the conduct of this study. Conversations with him opened new gateways for me and I consider myself fortunate for having worked with him.

The original catalyst behind this work was Dr. Nimet Beriker-Atiyas. This piece is indebted to some of her ideas and I am particularly grateful for her support.

Dr. Scott Pegg and Dr. Gülgün Tuna kindly reviewed this work and provided insightful criticisms. I am much obliged to Dr. Daniel Druckman for having brought the coding system that he and Moorad Mooradian developed to my attention.

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And lastly my parents, Tomur and Yeşim Bayer, deserve much of the praise for this work. This work is the result of all the effort that they put into their son over twenty-odd years. I dedicate this thesis to my father on his fiftieth birthday.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
BCOW	Behavioral Correlates of War
BPA	Bargaining Process Analysis
COPDAB	Conflict and Peace Data Bank
CREON	Comparative Research on the Events of Nations project
DON	Dimensionality of Nations project
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
GAP	Southeastern Anatolian Project
GEDS	Global Event Data System
KEDS	Kansas Event Data System
MIC	Managing Interstate Conflict
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPA	Negotiation Process Analysis
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party
SAFED	South African Foreign Events Data
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UN	United Nations
UNFICYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
WEIS	World Events Interaction Survey

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

An era of uncertainty has clouded the international arena following the alteration of the international environment as a result of post-1989 events. The breaking up of the Soviet Union and the diminishing of Russian power signaled the end of the Cold War. Just like many other actors, Turkey experienced an element of change in its international environment. This situation was, however, not unique to Turkey. Countries throughout the world were experiencing the same situation.

However, whereas many members of the US-led alliance against the USSR felt more secure with the end of the Cold War, Turkey did not (Müftü, 1998: 33). Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey is one of the two countries that did not experience peace dividends.¹ Former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Şükrü Elekdağ's article, "2 ½ War Strategy" (1996) clearly shows that Turkey was still expecting aggression: Fighting on two fronts consecutively and matching an internal enemy had to be anticipated. The threat from the north no longer existed (for the time being) but Turkey was fearing for the worst from others. The two explicitly mentioned countries are Greece and Syria.

Turkey's interactions with Greece and Syria constitute an interesting subject-matter. Amongst Turkey's neighbors, these countries are arguably the two that Turkey has the most strained relations with. In fact, it is known that Turkish strategy

¹ The other country being Greece.

makers believe that these two countries are deeply hostile as seen in Elekdağ's article (see also Müftü, 1998: 34-36). The "Sevres syndrome" (a belief that the world is trying to break up Turkey) lies at the foundation of this perception (Kinzer, 1998b: 6).

In this study, Turkey's interactions with Greece and Syria in the post-Cold War era will be analyzed through the use of content analysis in order to grasp Turkey's foreign policy patterns on a number of issues of importance for Turkey. These issues are the Aegean Sea and Cyprus with Greece and security and water with Syria. This study measures cooperation and conflict in bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria and Turkey and Greece. The cooperativeness and hostility of the actors, and, particularly, Turkey will be one of the focal points of attention. The impact of external events on foreign policy patterns undergo scrutiny. It will be maintained that one external event had little effect (Richard Holbrooke's mediation) while another external event had an effect (Turkish-Israeli rapprochement). Turkish foreign policy will be examined primarily for the activism in its external relations during the 1990s, it has demonstrated in the issue as well as for its general approach to the issue (i.e., one espousing cooperation or hostility).

The use of content analysis, and events data in particular, enables a systematic approach to foreign policy. It is imperative that formal approaches be conducted so as to arrive at a fuller understanding of Turkey's external relations. During this process, the issues also experience the same methodical application. A coding process encompassing cooperative and hostile actions was used on Reuters news wires dispatched between January 1990 and December 1998. Events were coded on a scale ranging from significant peaceful moves (+3) to overt hostile moves (-3).

A. Foreign Policy Patterns

Studies on Turkish foreign policy have usually underlined similar factors: caution and support for international order and peace. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that Turkey's foreign policy is based on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's principle of 'Peace at Home and Peace in the World' (1998a: 3). According to Oral Sander, Turkish foreign policy has been influenced by Atatürk's goals of creation of a nation-state based on a nineteenth-century European model, Turkey's occupation of a commendable position in the international arena while practicing the principle of 'Peace at Home and Peace in the World', and promotion of Turks to the level of 'contemporary civilization' (1993: 34). Sharing a border with the former Soviet Union and the volatile nature of the Middle East impelling Turkey to look towards the West are suggested as some of the factors that shaped Turkish foreign policy (Sander, 1993). However, Turkey started to become more self reliant during the 1980s as a result of differences of opinion with the West and improvement of its own capabilities (Sander, 1993: 43). In a study from the turn of the decade, Philip Robins says that Turkey's policy towards the Middle East is largely based on non-interference (1991: 65-67). The fundamental problem with the creation of Republican Turkish foreign policy, according to Selim Deringil, was "readjustment to secondary power status from an Imperial past" (1992: 1). This factor coupled with the Turkish identity crisis has made it virtually impossible for the establishment of a Turkish foreign policy. This situation propelled Turkey to support the status quo ante as well being anti-revisionist.

In a detailed study, Malik Müftü (1998) assesses the current security environment and the various factors which have shaped Turkish policy orientation. He maintains that while Greeks and Syrians are 'enemies,' ('natural allies' against Turkey according to Elekdağ, 1996) Russians and Iranians are 'rivals.' He points out

that Turkish foreign policy is witnessing a debate between those supporting caution and those advocating boldness (or 'daring') with the civilian and military bureaucracies falling behind the first category (Müftü, 1998: 48).

Many works maintain that Turkey is becoming increasingly active in its foreign policy in the 1990s. Stephen Kinzer writes, "But despite . . . domestic uncertainty [lack of a stable government since the 1995 elections], Turkish foreign policy has become tougher and more forceful than ever" (1999a: 5). According to Kemal Kirişçi, Turkey met the challenge of the post-Cold War by becoming more active and assertive (1994: 407). Former French Ambassador to Turkey, Eric Rouleau uses the qualification "remarkable dynamism" to describe Turkish diplomacy in the post-Cold War era (1993: 113). Morton I. Abramowitz, a former US ambassador to Turkey, wrote that President Turgut Özal's death (on April 17, 1993) would alter Turkey's political process and that Turkish citizens realize that a certain amount of international clout surrounds them (1993: 164). Yet, there have been voices which have been against Turkey taking a more active role in its region. For example, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu believes that the citizens of Turkey have nothing to gain at the moment from Turkish involvement in regional affairs (1994: 414). Şule Kut says that Turkey has become much more active in the international arena (including interventionist, multidirectional) but is still cautious and following a realist policy (1998: 58). Şadi Ergüvenç indicates that Turks realized that "Turkey looked bigger from outside than it did to them from inside. Freed from the constraints of the Cold War era, Turkey seemed to have a better chance of playing bigger and different roles" (1998: 38). Alan Makovsky, in an article entitled, "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy," points towards the post-Gulf War era during which Turkey broke from its shell and became more dynamic (1999: 92-113). Ziya Öniş maintains that Turkey is moving from "passive neutrality" to becoming an

important regional actor (1995: 50). Taking such declarations into account, we find it instructive to pose the following questions: Is this really the case? Is it possible to say that Turkey has become more active and assertive since the beginning of this decade?

The end of the Cold War is by and large taken as a turning point in international affairs as many have noted (Fukuyama, 1989; Mearsheimer, 1990; and Huntington, 1993). This manner of thinking is also in line with the notion that middle-range powers and regional great powers will find themselves as being more influential in the post-Cold War era (as opposed to the previous era during which their roles were relatively constrained and subordinate).² Research on middle powers indicate that they will find it easier to maneuver in a time of uncertainty and when the relations between middle and great powers are not intense (Müftüler and Yüksel, 1997: 184-196).³ It is maintained in this research that Turkey became increasingly more active and assertive in the era of uncertainty marking the international arena since the end of the Cold War. Activity in foreign policy is evaluated in this study through the number of initiations and actions taken on an issue by an actor.

It is tentatively proposed that Turkey has become increasingly more active throughout the 1990s. Based on this assumption, Turkey should have undertaken more actions in the late 1990s, e.g., 1998, than in the early 1990s, e.g., 1990. Although this research could have been conducted by reviewing the number of new international organizations that Turkey has spearheaded in the 1990s such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Developing Eight, the viability (let alone

² Middle-range powers are countries committed to the maintenance of international order and security. Regional great powers must, at least, be part of a region and a key player in regional affairs.

³ For more on middle powers and regional powers, see Cooper, 1997; Neumann, 1992; Lake and Morgan, 1998; and Ayoob, 1989-1990.

utility) of these formations is still suspect and relevant data for a systematic approach is limited.

On the issues studied, the overall pattern of interactions for the 1990s will be determined. This will be done so as to understand Turkey's general approach to the issues and to obtain a picture of its negotiation style. It will also be possible to understand how Turkey's actions differ with those of the other sides. The questions that will be answered here are, "what has Turkey's approach been in the 1990s and how does it compare with those of the other actors (primarily Greece and Syria) as well as the other issues studied?" The positions of the actors will be approached from the point of how much cooperation and hostility they demonstrated.⁴

There have also been external inputs into these interactions. Certain external events could have influenced the happenings and changed the course of events. One interesting type of external intervention is mediation. There have been numerous mediation efforts on Turkish-Greek relations, especially over the Cyprus issue. The United Nations (UN) has been conducting them for decades. However, as this research is on Turkey in the 1990s, it was more appropriate to examine a newer, purely 1990s mediation effort. This and other reasons led to the selection of US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke's mission. This mission is a confirmation of the important place this topic occupies for the United States as indicated by researchers (Mirbagheri, 1998). Secondly, Holbrooke said at the outset of his mission to Cyprus in March 1995 that he was aspiring for a repeat of the "historic breakthrough that (French) General (Charles) de Gaulle and (German Chancellor) Konrad Adenauer effected between France and Germany in the late 50s

⁴ Following Robert Keohane, international cooperation is defined as occurring "when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination" (1984: 51) while hostility is taken as implying "goal-seeking behavior that strives to reduce the gains available to others or to impede their want-satisfaction" (Milner, 1992: 468).

and early 60s . . . an historic change in the map of Europe" and Washington was hopeful that the "big push" towards peace on the island would occur (Giacomo, 1995). An attempt will be made here to see whether he achieved this goal. It is believed that Holbrooke's ongoing missions have had little positive impact. Bearing in mind that he "declared 1996 as being 'the year of Cyprus'", this year is going to be investigated ("Cyprus," 1996).

Bilateral relations are also affected by the relationships between one of the actors and a third actor. Syria maintains that their relations with Turkey have been negatively influenced by Israel's increasing amount of cooperation with Turkey. States in the region look upon this pact uneasily despite Turkish and Israeli official attempts to portray this pact as not being directed against others. The Syrian assertion, thus, merits attention. Although this relationship has been steadily building up throughout the 1990s, it has gained much momentum after the signing of a military accord between Turkey and Syria in 1996. The Syrians were especially rattled when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the "main axis of a regional security arrangement" shortly before Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz's visit to Israel in 1997 (Hamza, 1998). Despite denials to the contrary, it is believed that the increasing ties with Israel altered Turkey's stance towards Syria. Thus, there should be a change in the Turkish position before 1996 and that after.

These questions have not been significantly dealt with but are important as they will say much about Turkish foreign policy in general. However, it is evident that as there are few countries in this research, there will only be a partial understanding. Yet, the importance of these countries for Turkey should not be underestimated. The issues that are being examined are certainly significant for Turkey and in answering these questions it will be possible to see Turkish foreign policy patterns.

B. Issues of Aegean Sea, Cyprus, Security and Water

There are a number of issues that separate these countries. In the Turkish-Greek case, the Cyprus conflict and claims over the Aegean Sea are the two main issues. In the Turkish-Syrian case, the primary problems can be cited as being over security and water. The term 'security' covers terrorism, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking. Evidence of Syrian support rendered to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is directly covered under this term. As this paper is on Turkish foreign policy, Syrian security anxiety arising from Israel is not covered here. The water issue concerns the amount of water that Turkey and Syria are bargaining over. Iraq is also a partner to these negotiations as it also uses the Euphrates River but it was not included in this study. This is because the repercussions of the Gulf War following its operation in Kuwait have meant that it was quite muted about this topic.

The Aegean Sea is taken from a holistic perspective in this research to include all sub-issues in the Aegean Sea between the two countries. While Greece believes that the only real problem between Turkey and Greece is the continental shelf and everything else is Turkish aggression, such an examination would have meant that there would be little to analyze.⁵

In this study, the issue of Cyprus includes all relevant moves of the Cypriot governments, Greece, and Turkey. Most of the moves deal with security matters and the relationship between the communities. In the issues of Cyprus and Aegean Sea, matters concerning the European Union (EU) were only included if they were relevant to the issue. For example, Turkish North Cyprus's refusal to join the

⁵ Greece says that the only issue is the continental shelf. Other Aegean disputes "consist exclusively of arbitrary claims against Greek sovereignty put forth by Turkey in defiance of international law and agreements" and "Turkey has 'discovered' problems" for the goal of continental shelf. Greece gives the continental shelf such a status because of the rulings of the International Court of Justice. See Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998.

accession talks with the EU was included for the message that it sent the Greek side and not from a Turkish-EU perspective.

At certain times, other issues have occupied the center stage, e.g., minority treatment in Greece and Greece's stance in the EU towards Turkey. Importantly, these countries also enjoy good understandings on certain issues, e.g., the Turkish-Syrian stance on discussions over Iraqi dismemberment and the Turkish-Greek joint intervention to Albania in April 1997.

Yet, these have been sporadic and not the key elements in determining the relations between the countries. The data available from Reuters confirms the importance of the chosen issues: A simple word count conducted for relations between Turkey and Greece from 1990 onwards shows that the word 'Cyprus' appeared more than 1,500 times and the word 'Aegean' appeared more than 750 times. In the case of relations with Syria, while Syrian claims on the Turkish province of Hatay (Sandjak of Alexandretta) are important, it is hard to pinpoint direct examples of it whereas security and water matters are easier.

Although this research investigates Turkey's relations with Syria and Greece, other actors also had to be included in the study of certain issues, such as the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and Lebanon. Both Cypriot communities have many agreements (political, military, and economical) with the 'motherlands.' There is much synchronization between the sides, as seen in the military cooperation agreement signed between the Greek parties in 1993 and the Turkish security guarantee given to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1997. In the case of Lebanon, it should be remembered that the Bekaa Valley (which used to be a training ground for various terrorist groups) is officially part of Lebanon but Syria has much say in its administration (Harik, 1997). Although it is true that adding these actors does change somewhat the scope of the study, not including them would

have resulted in a partial understanding of the matter. This is because these issues could not have been studied without the inclusion of these actors.

C. Findings

The results indicate that Turkey was the more assertive and active country in the issues studied for the nine years under examination. Turkey was the relatively more cooperative actor only in the Aegean Sea issue. The premise of Turkey becoming more active over the 1990s is supported but with the qualification that it is not an ever-increasing (as attested through the fluctuations) or ubiquitous (as seen in the water issue) dynamism. A significant change in pattern is observed after 1995 with Turkey becoming both more assertive and active in the period between 1995 and 1998. The findings present Holbrooke's mediation in the Cyprus problem as ineffective but rather give support to the view that mediation efforts by themselves are not enough to alter the course of events. Also, the increasing Turkish-Israeli cooperation influenced Turkey's relations with Syria negatively. The use of content analysis (and events data) helped in obtaining an image of Turkish foreign policy that is systematically derived.

D. Method: Content Analysis

Content analysis is a scientific method for going beyond the data and arriving at the crux of the message. It has been described as a technique of measurement, description, and inference. Krippendorff describes it as a "research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context" (1980: 21). Similarly, Holsti said that it is "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages" (1968: 14). Shapiro and Markoff define it as "any methodical measurement applied to text (or

other symbolic material) for social science purpose" (1997: 14). "A research methodology that utilizes a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text" is Weber's definition (1985: 9). The text can be any medium of communication. After breaking the various definitions of content analysis into their components, Shapiro and Markoff come up with the following plausible definition for content analysis, "any systematic reduction of a flow of text (or other symbols) to a standard set of statistically manipulable symbols representing the presence, the intensity or the frequency of some characteristics relevant to social science" (1997: 14).

In a nutshell, content analysis simplifies the process of collecting and analyzing the content of text (Neuman, 1997: 272): "A central idea in content analysis is that many words of the text are classified into much fewer content categories" (Weber, 1985: 12). Such a technique is obviously useful in international affairs where large volumes of data are created daily. In international affairs, content analysis is used in foreign policy analysis where it appears in the form of events data.

Events data is a process of content analysis which involves three steps: identifying the news sources, developing a coding system or using an existing one, and training coders (Schrodt, 1995: 148-149). This process captures individual foreign policy behaviors of actors into categories through the examination of public documents and assigns codes to the reported interaction. They "are a formal method of measuring the phenomena that contribute to foreign policy perceptions" (Schrodt, 1995: 146). The aim of events data is to see if a pattern emerges and one subject that has often been inspected is the amount of international cooperation and conflict (Hastedt and Knickrehm, 1991: 57).

Measuring international conflicts in a scientific fashion has a recent history. Lewis Fry Richardson is accepted as the founder of scientific research on conflict

and research; other important early contributors were Quincy Wright and Pitirim A. Sorokin (Cioffi-Revilla, 1990: 2-3). Charles McClelland is given credit for having woven the traditional method of diplomatic history with the quantitative analysis of the behavioral school in the 1960s as events data (Schrodt, 1995: 151). "Riding the behavioral wave that swept the post-war generation of social sciences, the event-data movement has sought to advance the theory and practice of international politics" (Duffy, 1994: 147).

Merritt says that there are two dimensions in the current attention to events: the approach and the unit of analysis (1994: 5-6). For the unit of analysis, the question involves what actors to use: state-actors or others. The approaches are also two-fold: A generic-behavior approach takes into consideration all events while an event specific approach starts from the outcome and works backwards. Schrodt expresses similar views when he says that there are two approaches: actor-oriented data sets and episode-oriented sets (1995: 152).

The major events data projects are Rudolph J. Rummel's Dimensionality of Nations (DON) project, Charles A. McClelland's World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS); Edward E. Azar's Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), Charles F. Hermann's Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project, Ernst B. Haas *et al.*'s Managing Interstate Conflict (MIC), and Russell J. Leng's Behavioral Correlates of War (BCOW).

WEIS, COPDAB and CREON are actor-oriented data sets. BCOW is a major episode-oriented data set. However, these are not the only data sets available. There are various smaller data sets available (Schrodt, 1995: 152-56). The South African Foreign Events Data (SAFED) of Koos van Wyk and Sarah Radloff is one

such example.⁶ While most of the major projects have been around since the Cold War, there are also newer projects, e.g., the Global Event Data System (GEDS) and Kansas Event Data System (KEDS), which rely on computers for coding.

An event has been defined in similar fashion by the different projects. The least common denominator being an issue, action, and actors (sender and targets) (Merritt, 1994: 22). In a similar fashion, we define event as an action from one actor (sender) to others (target/targets) on a specified issue that is deemed to be newsworthy. We code each event by four variables: time (i.e., date), sender (i.e., initiator), target (i.e., recipient), and event classification on a six-score scale ranging from extremely cooperative moves to overt hostile moves.

Events data has been extensively used in the study of foreign policy analysis (see Schrod, 1995: 156-160). It has been utilized for the study of superpower interactions (Goldstein and Freeman, 1990), influence strategies in interstate conflicts (Leng, 1993; Leng, 1998), crisis early warning capabilities (Schrod and Gerner, 1997), and environmental change and conflict (Savaiano and Schrod, 1997). This piece studying Turkey's interactions with Greece and Syria through events data adds to the ever-growing list of topics studied by events data and demonstrates that events data is useful for the analysis of Turkish foreign policy.

E. Outline

The next chapter pinpoints important work pertaining to our study. We will investigate the state of Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Syrian literature with an emphasis on recent works relevant to the issues under investigation. We also discuss works utilizing (or not) content analysis in Turkish foreign policy. An attempt will be

⁶ For demonstration of the data-set as well as its utility in the study of South African foreign policy see van Wyk and Radloff, 1993.

made to show that systematic studies are lacking.

The third chapter presents the research design. It includes information about the data used, unit of analysis, pilot test, coding system, coding process, reliability, and the types of measurement.

The fourth chapter offers the findings. In a nutshell, the questions inspect Turkish foreign policy activity in the 1990s and its approaches to the issues (Aegean Sea, Cyprus, Security and Water). Two other problems that will be investigated are case-specific topics: The effects of Holbrooke's mediation in 1996 on Cyprus problem and the effects of increased Turkish-Israeli relations since 1996 on Turkish-Syrian relations. The value of content analysis for the study of Turkish foreign policy will be determined. A general overview of relations in the 1990s between the actors will be presented as seen from the data.

In the fifth chapter, a summary and comparison of the findings along with the implications of this study will be offered.

The final chapter delineates future areas of study.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

From the point of Turkish foreign policy literature, the issues with Greece have been studied more than other issues. Turkish-Greek relations have received more attention than Turkish-Syrian relations. The importance of Aegean Sea and Cyprus is clearly shown in a publication of the Ministry of National Defense: *White Paper Defense 1998* deals with both issues under a separate chapter (1998). However, no mention of Syria occurs while matters of internal security, international terrorism, and PKK are discussed.

Of the view that Greece occupies more attention than it deserves in Turkish foreign policy is Bilge (1996) who bases this situation on Greece's constant attempts to hurt Turkey. He maintains the differences are due to the fact that the Greeks base their foreign policy on the 'Great Idea' or *Megali Idea* (which can be defined as the establishment of a Greek empire or the resurrection of the Byzantium empire) while the Turks base it on the dictum associated to Atatürk, 'Peace at Home and Peace in the World' which is openly espoused by different Turkish ministries including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense. Another author who believes that Greek policies on Cyprus are of an aggressive nature while those of the Turks are of a peaceful nature is Gürkan (retired General) (1994: 140). This view is clearly articulated in his article (1994) on how the decision to use force in Cyprus was reached by Turkish decision-makers and the military application of the decision.

Yet, Greek authors also point to the aggressiveness of Turkish policies as seen in Platias's work, "Greece's Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence" (1991). Veremis says that Greeks support the territorial status quo in the Aegean Sea while the Turks are challenging it (1998: 10). Along the same line, Prodromou (1998) depicts Turkey as the main cause for the failure of reintegration talks in Cyprus. Not to be outdone, Greek hostility is mentioned by Ergüvenç who also points out the relevance of the adage, "If you want peace, you should be prepared for war" which sums up the important role played by the military in guarding Turkey's vital interests (1998: 40, 37). Ergüvenç also says that it is Turkey's geography which gives Turkey its special significance (1998: 41-42). Adding the finishing touch to this debate on aggressiveness, Ayman's application of cognitive theory in the Aegean dispute demonstrates that the actors only take account of the other's hostile actions (1998: 301-319). She says that Turkey's Aegean policy is based on two factors: deterrence and negotiations. The first is reinforced through its declarations of *casus belli* and the second is seen in its demands for a package deal.

In the beginning of the 1990s, it was expected that as in the previous decade, the shared continental shelf of the two countries would be the main point of discussion in the relations between Turkey and Greece. Bölükbaşı in "The Turco-Greek Disputes: Issues, Policies and Prospects" goes so far as to suggest that the territorial sea dispute was playing second fiddle to the continental shelf dispute (1992: 38). Following a review of the problems, he concludes that the disputants view the content of the disputes and the means to solve them differently (Bölükbaşı, 1992: 49). Hickok (1998), in a detailed review, shows that the Kardak crisis demonstrated in 1996 that an islet in the Aegean Sea could strain Turkish-Greek relations to the utmost. He says that it was not American intervention but Turkish

military projection that decided the flow of events (Hickok, 1998: 134). The Turkish side fears that changes will result in the Aegean Sea becoming a Greek lake and this fear receives much impetus from the increased armament of the Greek islands which the Turkish side believes is against the Lausanne Agreement and many other treaties signed by the two parties.

A number of authors have suggested that external threats bring the two countries together and without a hostile overlooming presence, an improvement will not occur (Clogg, 1991; and Birand, 1991). Veremis also points towards external measures, such as the constraints caused by the Cold War and external threats, and adds domestic priorities, such as economic reform, that could lead toward *détente* (1998: 17). Couloumbis and Klarevas use a level of analysis approach in order to come up with proposals and find that reduction in tensions is possible (1997).

Dealing with the *détente* between the Soviets and Americans, Evangelista (1991) pointed out that the atmosphere would not contribute positively to the relations between Turks and Greeks. However, he does say that international dialogue that pushes for common-security thinking instead of the current zero-sum thinking would be more useful (Evangelista, 1991: 152).

A year before the declaration of independence of TRNC, Rauf Denktaş correctly emphasized the importance of Cyprus in Turkish-Greek relations by uttering, "Cyprus continues to be the fulcrum on which the Turkey-Cyprus-Greece triangle is delicately balanced" (1982: 108). Since the 1950s, Deringil says that the issue of Cyprus is the most problematic one (1992: 5). This is a view also put forward by Stearns (1992) and Lesser (1993). As the situation was bad enough in 1964 to warrant the placement of United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Turkish side portrays the era between 1963 and 1974 as a period of captivity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998b: 6), these views are warranted. However, Henze

is of the opinion that as all the actors favor the current structure, Cyprus has become a politically marginal issue (1993: 12). Veremis qualifies that view by saying that the Turks are happy with the situation prevalent in Cyprus but the Greek Cypriots want unity (1998: 10).

An important publication is Tozun Bahcheli's *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955*. He says that the most important issues, in respective order, are Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. He sums up the history of the relationship as being one of "grievance and mistrust" (Bahcheli, 1990: 189). On the issue of Cyprus, he points out that the Cypriots are not as subordinate to the mainlanders as believed. In the Aegean Sea dispute, he says that it is the conflicting national interests which lie at the core.

While intercommunal gatherings between the Cypriots regularly took place in the aftermath of Turkey's 1974 intervention in Cyprus, following an attempted *coup d'état* by Greece against Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios (because the Junta ruling in Greece perceived him as being anti-Junta and socialist), problems over ties to the mainlands, the three freedoms (of movement, settlement, and ownership of property) and government types for Cyprus resulted in dead-locks. The Turks worrying about marginalization (which were augmented by Greek demands for full implementation of the three freedoms, loose relations to the mainlands, and a central, strong government) wanted close ties with the mainlands and a weak, central government as well as partial implementation of three freedoms at most. The need for security is not properly addressed.

Among others, Sir David Hannay and Richard Holbrooke attempted to mediate between the sides but usually to no avail. The Greek Cypriot government's decision in the mid-1990s to buy S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia resulted in Turkish threats to destroy them. The atmosphere somewhat calmed down when the Greek Cypriots decided not to place them on Cyprus.

The amount of articles on the peace initiatives between Turks and Greeks, especially on the Cyprus conflict, are numerous. Bölükbaşı looks at the Cyprus initiatives in two articles. In an article covering UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's 1992 initiative, besides pointing out that Boutros-Ghali was too optimistic, he says that differences of opinion between the two communities on what constitutes an acceptable solution resulted in failure of the talks (Bölükbaşı, 1995: 461, 479). Insecurity and mistrust constituting the key elements. In a more extensive article, Bölükbaşı (1998) covers the UN involvement in the period between 1954 and 1996 and says that mutual suspicion lies at the heart of the matter. He says that while the UN has generally maintained tranquillity on the island, it has not been able to cajole the parties to a peaceful settlement and the issue is not any "riper" than before (Bölükbaşı, 1998: 429-430).

Coulombis and Klarevas look upon Cyprus as being the most prickly issue between Turks and Greeks but say that the problem is "ripe" (1997: 53) meaning that the parties want to reach a settlement. This is in contrast to Sir Hannay, UK Special Representative for Cyprus, who has said, "The sad truth is that in Cyprus today there is a lack of trust and confidence in the good faith of the other side which undermines the best intentioned efforts to reach agreement" (1997: 35). Prodromou (1998) maintains that Turkey must be engaged more decisively by the EU and the US if the impasse in Cyprus is to be overcome. Keashly and Fisher (1990) develop a contingency approach to third party intervention in regional conflicts and illustrate the conceptual analysis through Cyprus. They point to the shortcomings of the various efforts and point specifically to lack of coordination and inappropriate timing (Keashly and Fisher, 1990: 452-453). Evriviades and Bourantonis also indicate the deficiencies of the peace methods utilized in Cyprus (1994). Ünal (1997), in a policy paper, indicates that while most of the peace efforts have concentrated on the

issue of Cyprus, the Aegean Sea issue cannot be ignored and that it has actually caused more crises. He says that the sides should address each other's security worries and calls for more NATO involvement (Ünal, 1997).

A study, using cointegration and causality tests, examines Greek-Turkish arms procurement and concludes that an arms race between the NATO members exists (Kollias and Makrydakis, 1997: 355-379). The volatility of the relations has resulted in a number of works calling upon NATO to become a catalyst in the resolution. Greece and Turkey have been for almost half a century within the same camp and alliance. While alliances also function to sort out differences within the members, this was not the case for the Turks and Greeks. Participation in one of the most important collective defense organizations in history has not done enough to smooth out differences. Stearns (1992) in a policy-oriented research suggests that a non-aggression pact guaranteed by NATO could be the answer. He reaches this view because of the emphasis put on territorial security in the official propaganda of the two countries and goes on to suggest that the United States should do more to curb the arms race (Stearns, 1992: 103, 151). In a similar research, Brown (1991) also says that the North Atlantic Alliance could play a major role in the solution. Brown points out that NATO was not designed for solving problems between members but that the incident of March 1987, when Greeks and Turks came closest to confrontation since 1974, was an indication of the omnipresence of friction between the two allies (1991: 16, 127, 162). Pisiotis in "L'OTAN et la persistance du conflit gréco-turc" besides uttering the familiar claim that the parties will only unite against a common aggressor, also makes an interesting remark that stipulates that as the Turks want to be European and the Aegean Sea is European, Turks want the Aegean Sea (1993-1994: 914, 908). Haass (1988) and McDonald (1988) under the same volume describe Turkey and Greece's importance in the Alliance as well as

the disputes of the countries but suggest that NATO should be cautious. Unlike most authors, Krebs (1999) believes that NATO has also contributed to the tensions between the sides by eliminating the immediate Soviet threat, providing arms, and altering the balance of power between the parties and allowing them to concentrate on regional interests. However, Krebs also concedes that the fact that war never broke out is also due to NATO (1999: 369).

Laipson (1991), reviewing the policies of US administrations on Greek-Turkish relations in the post-1974 era, says that there is no consensus within the US and predicts that if the countries are seen as insignificant, their supporters will face a harder time in influencing and engaging US institutions. Carley (1997) somewhat overestimates the importance of Cyprus for US foreign policy by maintaining that the US was always interested in it. In *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*, Mirbagheri says that the United States has shifted "out of its sluggish bottom gear" and the appointment of Richard Holbrooke to Cyprus was a strong indication of their search for an end to the Cyprus problem (1998: 153). He also says that talks over Cyprus's accession to the EU have resulted in more peacemaking efforts but he points out the importance of Turkey on the island as being the main outside power (Mirbagheri, 1998: 152, 161). While the EU and NATO are mentioned as third-parties for Cyprus, only the UN is a possibility according to Carley (1997: 19).

There are also a number of authors who examine the role of the European Community/European Union (EC/EU) in the Cyprus conflict. Pushing for international dialogue under the auspices of the EC/EU is Meinardus (1991) who wants a more active and constructive role. However, Stephanou and Tsardanides say that the EC/EU cannot mediate because one of the disputants is a member (1991). In their work on the EC factor, they maintain that the domestic political situation in Turkey following the *coup d'état* is to blame for Turkish-EC relations and not

Greece (Stephanou and Tsardanides, 1991: 211) but also assert that the Greek role could become more decisive when other barriers are solved. Inspecting the ethnic conflict between the parties on Cyprus, Joseph points to the polarizing effect of ethnopolitics in Cyprus and is of the view that the accession of Cyprus to the EU is an excellent opportunity (1997: 129, 137). Kramer (1997) looks at the precarious position of the European Union in the events leading up to the Greek Cypriot government's accession talks and mentions the positions of the main actors involved in the Cyprus problem. However, his call for EU accession negotiations not to be concluded before a solution is found to the Cyprus problem has been largely ignored (Kramer, 1997: 30). Following an examination of whether EU expansion into Cyprus would be good for the island, Firak (1998) concludes negatively. She also says that Turkey has had no real policy on Cyprus and that the relations between the Turks is closer than the relations between the Greeks which poses questions on the sovereignty of TRNC (Firat, 1998: 279-81). Following the Luxembourg summit (of December 1997), Jenkins says that the EU cannot imagine that Turkey views them as impartial and that Turkey became more defensive and less conciliatory, especially towards Greece, following international setbacks (1998: 13).

Following a year (1996) marked by confrontation Bahcheli and Rizopoulous (1996-1997) examine possible options. They say that any consent will necessitate the approval of the majority of the two communities. According to them, the Turkish Cypriots are willing to give up territory for a deal with the EU and as the majority of Greek Cypriots recognize that they have to share the island, a positive outcome could follow for the island (Bahcheli and Rizopoulous, 1996-1997: 29-39).

Domestic factors have also played an important role in the relations as the findings in this work also maintain. Turkish Prime Minister Özal maintained that greater cooperation was prevented through the bureaucracy in both countries

(Birand, 1991: 34). A work examining the domestic influences is Pridham's "Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish *Rapprochement*" (1991) in which the author approaches the post-1987 relationship through linkage politics theory. He concludes that domestic pressures (particularly on Greek Prime Minister Papandreou) hindered greater cooperation (Pridham, 1991: 86). Keridis (1998), in a study on Greek domestic politics, tries to show how they affect relations between Turkey and Greece. He clearly shows that domestic politics influences relations when he says that though Prime Minister Simitis wants accommodation, he is constrained by personal factors and party politics (Keridis, 1998: 17). Keridis believes that Greece has been unable to create and implement policies but since 1995 he says that Greek foreign policy has become more flexible and 'mature' which is contradicted by recent Greek actions in support of Abdullah Öcalan ('Avenger') and the PKK (1998: 23-24). Showing the precarious nature of Turkish politics and the national consensus on Turkish foreign policy, Kramer (after his examination of Greece's position in broader Turkish foreign policy) maintains that Turkish governments would need considerable tradeoffs for concessions (1991). Coufoudakis, following his comparison of the foreign policies of Greece's two major parties, asserts that there is continuity in Greek foreign policy and says that in the foreseeable future, the cycle of 'confrontation-negotiation-confrontation' will continue (1991: 54). This element of continuity has been also expressed in discussions of Turkish foreign policy on matters concerning Greece, as can be see in Former Greek Ambassador to Ankara, Nezeretis's declarations (1999: A8).

At a Conference on Aegean issues in Turkey, the participants concluded that any settlement had to include the political elements surrounding the Aegean Sea as well as its uniqueness and gave a position of secondary importance to the evolving, ambiguous international law on maritime boundaries (Taşhan, 1995). At the

Conference, Aquarone came right to the point when she said, "The Challenge is now to move beyond legal correctness: to overcome stereotypes and define a new relationship which would incorporate the two countries' wider concerns and provide them with space to move into" (1995: 56). Elsewhere, Keridis (1998) also says that while international law is important, actors should be prepared to go beyond it.

This is not to say that there are no other disputes between the Greeks and Turks. For the Turks, the Turkish minority of Western Thrace constitutes another topic as can be seen in Oran's publication (1996).

From this literature review on Turkish-Greek relations, some conclusions can be made: Greece and Turkey both see the other as threatening and aggressive. Domestic politics in both countries affect the relations between the countries. More international attention was paid to Cyprus than to the Aegean Sea. Mediation efforts between the sides have been inconclusive. The EU is no longer a serious contender for the role of mediation. The UN will continue to be the major player in Cyprus; NATO has to assume a greater role in matters concerning Greece and Turkey. The absence of an external threat resulted in the sides becoming more antagonistic towards each other. The Cypriot communities are not the lackeys of the mainland countries. The relations between the sides can be characterized as one of hostility with the occasional positive or negative factor thrown in. Most of these conclusions emerge from publications of similar nature: policy, opinion papers. Content analysis is lacking and while systematic studies exist, they are few. The general lack of systematic approaches, such as content analysis, can also be seen in the literature on Turkish-Syrian relations.

An overview of Turkish-Syrian relations indicates that there have been few studies solely on this subject. Rather, this relationship was mainly covered within the context of Turkey's relationships with the Middle Eastern countries or as part of a

study on a subject such as water in the Middle East. As the examples given below show water and security matters are generally tied. Almost no work fails to mention them both. Another discussion matter, Hatay, has received less attention because Syrian capabilities limit any possibility of change. Syria has not reconciled itself to the loss of Hatay which chose to become part of Turkey in 1939 following a plebiscite. Syria refuses to accept this situation and portrays it as a Syrian province.

Dalacoura's article, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1980s," examines the internal and external factors that have influenced Turkish-Middle Eastern relations (1990). She concludes that while Turkey became more involved in the region, its interest in the region did not greatly increase. Altunışık (1998) says a key factor for greater Turkish involvement in the Middle East has been the redefinition of the national security problem which has resulted in the end of the division between internal and external politics: The external threat comes from the south and the internal threats of Islamic fundamentalism and the PKK receive support from the Middle East or the south (1998: 350). The increasing military involvement in Turkish foreign policy has been pointed out by Ülman (1998). For him this is because the military sees foreign policy as too important to be left to the politicians. In the Turkish-Syrian showdown in October 1998, the military was the key player.

In one of the few studies devoted to relations among Israel, Syria and Turkey, Gresh (1998) points out that it is not regional cooperation but *realpolitik* that is the order of the day in the Middle East. He describes the relations between the non-Arabs as one of military axis and Damascus's attempts to counter this movement as unsuccessful (Gresh, 1998: 202-203). Waxman, in a policy paper, is correct in pointing out that Turkey and Israel share many reasons why they should be close but his usage of the term, 'balance of power' is misplaced as these countries do not need each other to deter Syria (1999: 25-32).

Muslih maintains that Syria perceives Turkey as the lackey of the West and the United States in particular (1996: 113-130). This view, he believes, can be improved as a consequence of the amelioration of relations among Syria, Israel, and the United States. This contradicts the Turkish opinion that such a situation would lead Syria to become more hostile. Olson's article, "Turkey-Syria Relations Since the Gulf War: Kurds and Water" is one of the few works entirely on the relations between the two neighbors (1997). Following a comprehensive review of relations since the Gulf War, he points to 1996 as the year when relations hit a new low and this was despite the presence of (the pro-Arab) Welfare government in Ankara. Yet, he says that Turkey needs Syrian (and Iranian) cooperation to combat PKK terrorism (Olson, 1997: 189). Bayazıt (1998), a retired General, points to the external forces behind the Kurdish question and says this is done so as to subdue Turkey. In the same volume, Kirişçi accepts the reality of the Kurdish question, and says that besides making Turkey appear aggressive, it also influences Turkish foreign policy (1998: 73, 77).

Robins (1991) mentions that Turkish decision-makers look upon Syria as being the most problematic of its neighbors. However, he points out that while Syria is using illegal groups against Turkey to gain leverage on the water issue, Turkey is still unaffected by Syrian (and Iraqi) concerns about its water policies (Robins, 1991: 51, 95). On many occasions, charges of sponsoring terrorism have been leveled at Syria. Turkey has been accusing Syria of giving support to illegal groups within Turkey for decades. This is withstanding the fact that agreements exist between them calling for the extradition of criminals. Direct Syrian support to terror was witnessed in 1982 when the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) members arriving from Syria caused havoc and bloodshed at Ankara's Esenboğa Airport. However, it was only in 1983 that Turkish officials publicly

denounced Syria. The reason was Syrian permission to terrorists to establish bases in Syria and parts of Lebanon under Syrian control (Bölükbaşı, 1993: 17).

The PKK occupies a central role in Turkey's relations with Syria. The PKK is unique among the Kurdish groups in the Middle East in that it was Pan-Kurdish, was based on ideology (and not tribalism) from its inception, and demanded complete independence for much of its existence (Fuller, 1993a: 115-116). Abdullah Öcalan headed the organization from the beginning (usually from his residence in Damascus). He has acknowledged Syrian support many times. In fact, the Syrians openly told Prime Minister Özal during his visit in 1987 (which resulted in a Mutual Security Accord⁷ being signed) that Öcalan was a political refugee.

Many authors point out that the PKK card is used for the Euphrates problem. Bölükbaşı (1993) points towards this view following his examination of the relations between Syria and Turkey. However, he also adds Hatay and the anti-Turkishness of the Syrian regime as two other issues that have to be addressed and summarizes Syrian policy as one based on supporting terrorism, revising borders, and believing that time is on their side (Bölükbaşı, 1993: 32, 17). Fuller (1993b) in "Turkey's New Eastern Orientation" takes the view that the Syrians are using the Kurds as an instrument and that if Syrian negative images towards Turkey changes, a future amelioration in the relations could take place. Fuller also illuminates the intricate differences between the Turks and Arabs and how history, culture and social factors have meant that the two peoples have followed different lines (1993b: 49-51).

One article of particular interest to emerge from a book which examines the effects of the Kurdish question on Turkey is Olson's "The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Foreign Policy Toward Syria, Iran, Russia and Iraq since the Gulf War" in

⁷ In one protocol, Syria promises to cut its support to terrorist organizations operating against Turkey. In the other protocol, Turkey pledges a minimum of 500 cubic meters per second of water from the Euphrates River.

which he maintains that Turkey concluded a series of security agreements with its neighbors when it faced the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq from 1993 onwards (1996: 86). On the section on Turkish-Syrian relations, besides offering the recent history of the relations, he explores the Turkish decision not to take moves which would have shown its displeasure with Syrian assistance to PKK in 1995 and 1996. His two-fold answer (not attacking an Arab state which was improving its relations with Israel and the possibilities of failure) does not tell the whole story as it ignores the fact that Turkish foreign policy has generally shied away from entanglements in the Middle East (Olson, 1996: 92-93).

Of the opinion that the Kurdish issue is the most important national challenge facing Turkey is Rouleau (1993: 122). Taking a larger perspective, Fuller says it is "central for the Middle East in the new world order" (1993a: 121). Following an examination of the status of the Kurds, which he maintains is the best in Turkey but still not satisfactory, Fuller (1993a) says that the options (including repression and federation) will all have dramatic consequences for the Middle East. In a study on the future choices for Turkey, Tunander (1995) reviews what the breakup of the Soviet Union meant for Turkey, and says that Turkey can choose to become a 'national fortress' or an 'Euro-Asian Centre.' Comparing the Czechoslovak breakup with Turkey, he says that Turkey has much more reason than even the Czechs to "amputate" South-East Anatolia (Tunander, 1995: 422-423). His assertion that Turkey would thus be ridding itself of its difficulties with the Syrians and Iraqis is far-fetched. Moreover, Pegg (1999) indicates that what happened between the Czechs and the Slovaks should be taken not as the rule but as the exception and that as the example of Greek Cypriots doing their utmost to stop the Turkish Cypriots from becoming recognized internationally shows, the decisions are not based on economics (1999: 145-146).

Öniş (1995), in an article examining the key elements in Turkey's relationships, says that Turkish endeavors to assume the position of regional leader in the Middle East are risky. He also points out that Turkey is tied to Syria (and Iraq) through the issues of water and the Kurds (Öniş, 1995: 61). In a similar article, Müftüler-Bac (1996) shows that Turkey is using the Middle East (as an instrument) for its goal of acceptance to Europe. According to her, water and Kurdish insurgency are two of the elements that will be determining Turkey's futures (Müftüler-Bac, 1996: 265).

The first water debate between Turkey and Syria was not over the Euphrates River but over a Syrian dam project on the Orontes (Asi) River which enters the Turkish province of Hatay from Syria in the 1950s. Turkey unilaterally announced that it would supply the others with 500 cubic meters per second of water in 1979 and reiterated that amount in the Protocol of Economic Cooperation of 1987 with Syria. The massive GAP project (the Turkish acronym for Southeastern Anatolia Project which aims to play a major role in social, educational, and economical development of the southeastern and eastern parts of Turkey) commenced in 1983. Atatürk Dam occupies an important position in GAP. This was also the period when Syrian support to terrorism against Turkey was increasing. In January 1990, Turkey started to fill the Atatürk Dam's Reservoir. Despite prior announcements and increasing the flow to the downstream countries, this move caused great uproar in the downstream countries (especially in Iraq which called for trilateral agreements). It is expected that GAP will result in Syria receiving 11 cubic kilometers per year less water and that the flow of the Tigris will reduce by 6 cubic kilometers per year (Beschoner, 1992: 31). The downstream countries are also concerned about a deterioration in water quality. Syrian and Iraqi demands for higher quotas (around 700 cubic meters per second) have not been accepted by Turkey who advocates

water efficiency. Turkey's initiatives such as 'Three Staged Plan for Optimum, Equitable, Reasonable Utilization of Waters of Tigris and Euphrates Basin' and Peace pipelines have not been taken seriously by others because of mistrust and the costs involved. It is unlikely that Syria will follow the calls for rational, optimal and fair use of water as well as to cooperate on information exchange as called upon by Turkey and the "Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational uses of International Water courses." This Convention by providing for a regulatory institution can constrain Turkey's ability to maneuver and Turkey was one of three countries which voted against it: downstream users were given privilege over the upstream countries and upstream countries' obligation to not take actions which could harm downstream countries was reiterated.

Jouejati believes that an examination of the origins of the water crisis between Syria, Turkey and Iraq can pinpoint the hindrances and possible solutions. Political conflict and a lack of trust are two major obstacles; according to Jouejati (1996: 131-146). Also on water, Ohlsson (1995) in "The Role of Water and the Origins of Conflict" says that there are many problematic water issues throughout the world. The subject of dispute in the Euphrates Rivers Basin is over dams, reduced water flows, and salinization (Ohlsson, 1995: 1-28).

In a detailed study entitled "GAP and the Water Conflict," Çarkoğlu and Eder say that the debate is between water rights (downstream riparians position) and water management (Turkish position) and that domestic political economies along with delays in fulfillment of goals restrict solutions to the dispute (1998: 65, 68-69). Following a study of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, Bağış (1997) maintains that while Turkey looks upon the GAP project as an economic issue, the downstream countries view it as a political issue. This has resulted in Turkey's 'Three Stage Plan' being rejected. Kut underscores the importance of water for Turkey's Middle-East politics

(1994: 229). The paradox of Turkey is also demonstrated as Kut (1994) maintains that Turkey wanted to become important in the region but did not want to turn its water into a bargaining tool.

Lowi (1995a), while comparing riparian disputes, comes to the conclusion that Turkey enjoys relative power in the Euphrates basin. This is not only because of its military capabilities but also because of its upstream riparian position. Thus, according to Lowi, Turkey has no incentive to discuss water quotas but the other riparian countries could manage to obtain concessions if Turkey came to the table (1995a: 59, 73-74). However, this last assertion seems quite unrealistic (a feat that Lowi accepts). In another publication, "Rivers of Conflict, Rivers of Peace," she again discusses the Euphrates River basin and examines how the Middle East process affects the water issues (1995b). Lowi says that Turkey has an absolute advantage (militarily and riparian position-wise) but still stipulates a basin-wide detailed agreement as being the ideal solution (1995b: 127). Nonetheless, she says that the solutions to the political conflicts will have to come first. In "Bridging the Divide," Lowi (1993) considers the linkage between low and high politics in the case of the Israeli need for West Bank water. Lowi suggests that in cases where countries are foes in high politics, they are not likely to cooperate in low politics (1993: 135). In the case of Turkish-Syrian problem, such an assertion seems to be plausible.

In a broad study covering all the major water disputes of the Middle East, Beschorner (1992) analyses what conditions can lead to conflict. She says that water disputes between Turkey, Syria and Iraq will not extend beyond verbal protests and that high politic issues will be more important (as mentioned also by Lowi).

Gleick (1993) demonstrates the links between water and conflict. He says that water confrontations will probably not result in violent conflict but in political confrontations and maintains that scarcity, sharing of water supply between actors,

the relative power of actors, and the availability of alternative water sources determine how much water will result in strategic rivalry (Gleick, 1993: 84-85, 112). In a comprehensive study on water and peace in the Middle East, Hillel concludes that water has been politicized in the Middle East (1994).

Looking at the water issue from a 'low politics' perspective, and particularly food security policy, Mazlum (1998) concludes that it is out of the question for Turkey to be the initiator of a conflict in this situation because everything is in its favor. He shows that the Arabs have not been forthcoming on Turkey's initiatives partly because of the way that they used oil in the 1970s which is making them feel uneasy over giving the control of water to another actor (Mazlum, 1998: 398).

In a case study on 'the Euphrates and Tigris hydro-political security complex' Schulz (1995) says that while there is enough water for Turkey, Syria and Iraq, problems of management and political disputes cause tensions. Yet, ecological interdependence could be crucial for regional cooperation as well as to show the importance of the water dimension in security studies (Schulz, 1995: 120-121). Following an examination of hydro-politics and hydro-diplomacy of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, Kut concludes that the problems of insecurity, instability and mistrust resulted in an impasse in water negotiations but that Turkey seems to have shelved the Three-Stage Plan for a silent but aggressive approach (1993: 14).

In a policy paper that was published before the unrealized Middle East Water Summit planned for Istanbul in 1991, Starr points towards its importance and says that peace could perhaps be obtained through water cooperation (1991: 36). Bilal (1993) offers a perspective analysis of the Euphrates-Tigris basin and methods to improve irrigation in GAP and suggests that well-mediated technical approaches could be the solution.

Theoretical works on water conflict have been few. Two works utilizing game theory by Güner are of interest. Güner uses a simple two person signalling game where he says that an agreement over the Euphrates is impossible and that Turkey's policy is unaffected by long-term and short-term balances, while Syria is affected (1998: 204, 203). In another article on water and terrorism, Güner (1997) analyses issue linkage through game theory and challenges such common assumptions as Turkey being more powerful just because of its geographical position. Analyzing the unilateral concessions that could be made, his results indicate that while Turkish costs are higher, Syrian impatience over future benefits are higher and that it wants an agreement (Güner, 1997: 115).

Based on the existing literature, certain conclusions can be made about Turkish-Syrian relations. Turkey has for a long time wanted to keep out of Middle Eastern affairs and even when it became more involved, it was a half-hearted effort. Turkey believes that Syrian support for terrorism directed at Turkey is crucial for the terrorists and that it needs Syrian cooperation to wipe out terrorism. The water issue has become deeply politicized. The countries will not fight over water but problems over water can further disrupt relations. The sides are at odds over how water should be used. While Turkey has many advantages in the water issue, this does not mean that Syria has no cards of its own. It is unlikely that the countries will cooperate in low or high politics. Unless social cohesion occurs in Turkey, its adversaries will have ample opportunities to use Turkish internal matters as a means for their own ends, as demonstrated by the Syrian support extended to separatist Kurds. There is clearly an issue linkage between water and terrorism. While cooperation in low politics is believed to lead to cooperation in high politics, cooperation even in low politics is not considered possible. Most of the methodologies applied here have been similar. Many articles provide detailed histories and proposals for various

actors. Articles utilizing content analysis are lacking but unlike in the Turkish-Greek case, there seems to be a greater variety in the methodologies used, e.g., game theory, which has led to a more diverse range of findings.

As seen above in the sections reviewing the literature on Turkish-Greek relations and Turkish-Syrian relations, a lack of systematic studies exists. Turkish foreign policy's literature is mostly based on policy and opinion pieces. Empirical and theoretical studies are underutilized. This is not to say that there are no such studies: Kollias and Stelios's "Is there a Greek-Turkish Arms Race?: Evidence from Cointegration and Causality Tests" (1997) and Sezgin's "Country Survey X: Defence Spending in Turkey" (1997) are two such recently published articles.

It is clear that while academics have researched, analyzed and published many works on Turkey, most of these articles are not radically different in their methodologies or in their findings (see Aydin and Alkan, 1997). It is vital that different methods be used even if the findings are the same. If nothing else, these findings will be more conclusive.

However, the findings of under-used methodologies have certainly brought some interesting results. This is the case with Volkan and Itzkowitz's work, *Greeks and Turks* where the authors (1994) provide a psychological analysis of the relations between the countries. The aim of Volkan and Itzkowitz is to "analyze Turkish-Greek relations in order to illuminate their psychological foundations and to explain irrational attitudes while differentiating fantasy and unconscious phenomena from reality" (1994: xvii). They maintain that the Greeks have suffered a continuous series of traumas such as the devastating loss of Constantinople which lies at the heart of the *Megali Idea* (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1994: 37).

The application of content analysis to Turkey's external relations is almost non-existent. Kotzageorgis's "Armed Forces Intervention in Post-War Turkey: A

Methodological Approach of Greek Newspapers Through Political Analyses" (1992) and Çaplı's "Newsweek and Time Coverage of the 1974 Cyprus" (1988) are two of the examples that come close. These articles have a limited scope. Therefore, it is not wrong to conclude that some methodologies have been underutilized and even when used have had extremely limited scopes.

Inspecting the literature which utilizes events data for the study of Turkey's foreign policy reveals that the use of events data for analyzing Turkish foreign policy has not occurred. While events data have been applied on Turkey for some of the disputes it was involved in, those works (e.g., BCOW) were not studying Turkish foreign policy. Rather, Turkey's interactions were one of many interactions studied for the purpose of understanding such topics as the outbreak of crises and success of negotiation and mediation efforts. In a recent study using KEDS data sets, Turkey's interactions within the context of the Yugoslavia civil war are being included. However, Turkey is not the country under the spotlight.

As the various works mentioned above have shown, events data were used in numerous different manners for different purposes. The South African Event Data set (SAFED) also demonstrates that its usage is not limited to the United States of America. A similar set can be created for Turkey.

A study of Turkey's negotiating style through the usage of content analysis has not taken place. Beriker and Druckman (1996) used the Bargaining Process Analysis (as well as simulations) in a study on power asymmetries in bargaining involving Turkey during the Lausanne Peace Conference of 1923.

It is clear that a greater amount of empirical and theoretical studies are necessary. This study applies content analysis, a systematic approach, to issues occupying a central role in Turkish foreign policy.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

A. Data

Content analysis comprises of three activities: design, execution, and report (Krippendorff, 1980: 169). This chapter discusses the research design and execution. The news source, coding process, limitations and delimitations compromise some of the subjects explained here.

In events data, the source of information plays an important role. International news wire services offer a more comprehensive coverage of world interactions than newspapers sources (which suffer from problems of limited space and resource) (Davies and McDaniel, 1994: 64). Reuters is one of the leaders in this service. Reuters has journalists throughout the world and these journalists are usually local reporters who also work for local news sources (Davies and McDaniel, 1994: 64). It has been used by many projects. GEDS and KEDS depend on it extensively. Philip Schrodt has used it in numerous occasions with Deborah J. Gerner in "Empirical Indicators of Crisis Phase in the Middle East, 1979-1995" (1997) and with Scott Sanaiano in "Environmental Change and Conflict: Analyzing the Ethiopian Famine of 1984-1985" (1997). Consequently, articles from Reuters were chosen as the data set for this work.

The Boolean search terms were respectively 'Greece and Turkey' and 'Syria and Turkey' for the period between the beginning of 1990 and the end of 1998.

These queries retrieved all the articles on Turkey's relations with Greece and Syria. So as to minimize repetition only articles of Reuters origin were retrieved. This also reduced the workload and eliminated technical problems as to whether articles from non-Reuters origin could be used with those of Reuters origin.

Articles from Reuters were obtained and copies were made of them on disk (for backup purposes) and paper (for actual use). However, the population was further limited because not every article was relevant to the issue being studied. Therefore, the fact that an article contained references to both Turkey and one of the actors being studied did not immediately bring it under the spotlight. For example, an article could be on pollution and be making references to Turkey and Greece or an article could be relevant for the issue of Cyprus and not the issue of Aegean Sea, e.g., periodic UN mediation efforts between the Cypriot communities. For a sentence to be coded, thus, the litmus test was relevance to the issue being studied.

B. Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis is the event. Information supplied by Reuters on a relevant international event constitutes each event coding. As mentioned previously, an event coding is made up of four variables: date, initiator, recipient and coding category. Utilizing an article in its entirety was not practical. Since the first sentence of a news article contains the main idea in most types of journalistic types of writing, attention was concentrated on it. An examination of journalistic writing shows that much repetition takes place. This is usually done to give background information to the reader who might not be knowledgeable on the subject-matter. For example, in the Turkish-Greek case over Aegean Sea, many articles make reference to historic events such as the 1987 crisis and the 1974 events. So a phrase such as, "Relations between Greece and Turkey have been dogged for decades by

political enmities over Cyprus and rights in the Aegean Sea," would not be coded ("Turkey: Turkey Appeals To U.N. Over Ethnic Turks In Greece," 1990). However, so as to avoid missing other important points mentioned in the articles, quotations (direct or indirect) were also taken; the qualifying element being that the statement must be of a different nature from that of the lead sentence.

To summarize, for a sentence to be deemed codable, it has to be relevant to the issue, and present in the lead sentence or in a quotation (providing that the opening sentence did not already cover its subject). In cases where there were two articles or sentences of identical nature, they were either both discarded (if not relevant) or only one was coded so as to avoid coding the same event twice. The moves of private citizens are not included unless they are supported by their respective states.

C. Pilot Test

A pilot test was conducted on Turkish-Greek relations over the Cyprus issue for the years from 1996 onwards. This test supported the view that an examination could be conducted from a content analysis approach. Up to this point, it seemed that Terrence P. Hopmann's Negotiation Process Analysis (NPA) was to be used for the coding.⁸ However, following the test, NPA was abandoned for a coding scale ranging from plus three to minus three. The main reason for this change was that Hopmann's typology was designed for verbatim transcripts. The difference in the types of text available was the deciding factor. A test conducted over the same subject again with events data showed that the new system was more suitable for the

⁸ Coming two decades after the BPA (Bargaining Process Analysis), the NPA added new categories such as problem-solving behavior and procedural behavior. The original BPA system contained four categories of behavior: substantive behavior, strategic behavior, task behavior and affective behavior. Thomas Schelling's work being the idea behind the first two behaviors.

task. The final coding sheet contained columns to indicate the actors (from and to), the date, and the numerical score.

D. Coding System

Numerical weights were assigned to measure the direction and intensity of an event. The scale's range runs from the most peaceful (+3) to the most violent (-3) excluding 0⁹:

Plus 3: A significant action towards peace is placed under this code.

One example is an agreement between two states;

Plus 2: This score captures less dramatic actions. Examples of this are movements of troops away from confrontation situations, meetings with the opposing side or with mediators, or "gestures that could be construed as a peace feeler" (Mooradian and Druckman, forthcoming: 7);

Plus 1: Only verbal action of peaceful and positive nature is included under this code. Statements could be of the sort that praise the other side, acknowledge a common bond, declarations that the issue has to be solved and clarify the situation.¹⁰

Minus 1: Only verbal action of a violent and negative nature is included under this code. Comments that are threatening, derogatory and accusatory are all included;

Minus 2: Dramatic actions that are hostile in nature to the other side or just short of violence are captured in this score. Not appearing at talks, moving

⁹ The coding process used here is based on Moorad Mooradian and Daniel Druckman's "Hurting Stalemate or Mediation? The Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh, 1990-1995," forthcoming: 6-7.

¹⁰ As zero scores would indicate no event, they were not included. It would complicate analysis and distort the statistics. Also, while a '0' score means no event, it is possible that an event occurred but data were not available. The availability of data determined which events were to be analyzed in this study. See Mooradian and Druckman, forthcoming: 22.

troops in the form of military exercises, demonstrations of military capabilities, or bringing additional units into a crisis zone are some of the examples;

Minus 3: This score captures acts of violence against the adversary. Some examples are actions causing direct physical harm to the other side and using military capabilities against the other side.

The following Reuters sentences make up the data set and demonstrate the coding mechanism:

April 17, 1992. Syria, accused by Ankara of supporting rebel Turkish Kurds, signed an anti-terrorism protocol with Turkey on Friday, Anatolian news agency said. *(This sentence would be coded as plus 3 for both sides because there is an agreement between the parties).*

April 21, 1993. The prime ministers of Turkey and Greece held talks on Wednesday aimed at improving the often-strained relations between the two countries and both described the meeting as sincere. *(This is an example of plus 2 as the sides met).*

June 2, 1995. Turkish ships prepared on Friday to put to sea for a military exercise in the Aegean Sea as tension wound down with Greece over its ratification of a treaty giving it the right to double its territorial waters. *(Military exercises and demonstrations of forces are treated as minus 2. As Turkey is the only country, according to this sentence conducting the military exercise, it is the sender and Greece is the target).*

February 14, 1996. Turkish Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal, striking a conciliatory tone after last month's military standoff with Greece in the Aegean Sea, called on Wednesday for direct negotiations to settle territorial disputes with Athens. *(This is an example of positive rhetoric and Turkey as the party sending the message receives a plus 1 score).*

April 22, 1996. A Greek coastguard vessel opened fire on a Turkish fishing boat off Turkey's southern coast on Monday, in the latest maritime incident between the two feuding NATO allies. *(Using military capabilities against another results in a minus 3).*

June 19, 1996. Turkey said on Wednesday that improving strained ties with neighbor Syria depended on Damascus withdrawing alleged support for Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) rebels fighting a separatist campaign in southeast Turkey. *(This is an example of negative rhetoric, i.e., minus 1, emerging from the Turkish side).*

December 13, 1996. "It's about time that Turkey and Greece, Greece and Turkey sit down and talk about their differences and see which we can resolve and what we can not," she [Tansu Çiller] said. *(The message transmitted is*

quite cooperative and displays problem-solving. This would be coded as plus 1 for Turkey).

October 14, 1997. Turkish fighter planes have begun flying over Cyprus armed with live ammunition for the first time in 10 months because of tension with neighbor Greece, the Turkish press said on Tuesday. (*Demonstration of military capabilities receives a minus 2 score*).

October 15, 1997. Turkey's powerful military chief said in comments published on Wednesday that concern about a possible clash between Turkish and Greek forces over Cyprus was unfounded. (*Such a sentence is considered as plus 1 because it clarifies the atmosphere*).

October 1, 1998. President Suleyman Demirel said on Thursday that Turkey reserved the right to retaliate against neighbor Syria for its alleged support of Turkish Kurd rebels. (*This phrase of Turkey threatens Syria and is thus coded as minus 1*).

E. Coding Process

The important concept in this study is that the codings are part of the same issue. What is coded here is not pure interaction as two subsequent codes might not be related. As has been mentioned, just because a sentence referred to Turkish-Greek or Turkish-Syrian relations did not mean that it was automatically coded.

Perception also plays its part. If an actor accused the other of hostility, this led the accuser to be coded but not the other party. This is because it is illogical to code the behavior of a country based solely on the perception of the other. However, if the actor accused the other of something more concrete such as border violation then the other would be coded accordingly.

On the matter of Cyprus, one finds four actors or two sides (Turks and Greeks). So as to understand the behaviors of all four actors, they were all coded. In light of the fair amount of synchronization exhibited between the Turkish parties on the one side and the Greek parties on the other side, it makes sense to group the findings for the two sides together. If all four actors had not been included then only a partial understanding of the issue would have been achieved. An asterisk was added to the scores to demonstrate those of Cypriot origin.

PKK activities in the Bekaa Valley are also coded. This is because of Syria's *ius generis* rule over the Valley and special role in the administration of Lebanon. However, to demonstrate this situation, events which are reported from the Lebanese or in Lebanon are coded for Syria but with an asterisk to indicate the difference of origins. All terrorist activities reported specifically as being near the Syrian border were taken as demonstrating Syrian laxity on this issue and, therefore, Syria was coded negatively.

Once all the relevant data were coded on paper by a human coder, they were copied onto the computer. Although other programs could have been used, for the purposes of simplicity, Microsoft's Excel was used for storage purposes. Measurements were performed on the computer. Measurement is, following Shapiro and Markoff also, defined in this research as the "assignment of symbols to objects or events according to rules" (1997: 17). This process was carried out with the research issues at mind. Measurements included observing the frequency of a code for a given year (so as to capture the yearly changes); obtaining the overall average for an actor in an issue for the entire time-span (in order to obtain the actor's orientation towards the issue); and the yearly average or mean of an actor for a year on an issue (so as to visualize the yearly acting behavior). The mean was chosen because it is the most common measure of central tendency and is the sum of the scores divided by the total number of cases.

Counting was done with the assumption that higher counts demonstrate higher attention, importance or emphasis to the category (Weber, 1985: 56; Krippendorff, 1980: 40). The lack of cases in some of the years resulted in this study not reporting percentages. The frequency was counted on the basis of a 'Total' and an individual actor. 'Total' included all the actions of the actors for a given year on an issue and it is assumed that it reflects the overall balance of relations. The

individual actor only included the actions of that actor for a given year on an issue. However, on the issue of Cyprus, a frequency count was also made for the 'Turks' and 'Greeks' which combined the actions of TRNC and Turkey on one side while a similar practice was carried out for the Greeks as well. The actions originating from Lebanon were few and they were added to Syria's totals. Frequency histograms were created for each of the years so as to better see the data as well as to spot any potential recording errors.

Another application of the data was to combine all of the actions together so as to find out the average (or mean) of an actor's actions for all of the years under study. This was done to capture the general pattern of an actor for the nine year time period. The resulting number was compared with those of the other actors to see how it stood. The total number of actions and the total scores for each category are offered next to this average mean for the actors so as to make it easier to understand the nine year period.

In order to see if a trend over the years emerged, the findings over the years had to be compared. Thus, the mean had to be obtained for each year. Here as well a mean for all the actors (i.e., 'Total'), for individual actors (i.e., 'Turkey'), and where necessary for a combination of two parties (i.e., 'Turks') were found.

F. Limitations and Delimitations

Conducting an analysis in this fashion is not without its problems.¹¹ There is a certain amount of doubt associated with the sample. While Reuters was deliberately chosen as the sole data in this work, this causes a dilemma. Reuters, as mentioned above, is a leader in its own field. However, most events data specialists urge using more than one news source so as to increase validity and reliability. In

this case, this would have resulted in too much information. Yet, here, the reverse has happened with certain years receiving few codings. Although it is unlikely that another news agency would have unraveled anything more, this still leaves a certain amount of doubt. Clearly, this work suffers from a sample problem. It also confirms that using more than one source of data is better (at least in theory) even if it increases the chances of repetition with it. For those years where there was too little (or no) coding, the work indicates these years.

Formal studies which pride themselves of their systematic approaches have also received criticism. Such approaches have been criticized for not coming up with new findings (and even when coming up with new findings, for not better connecting them), lacking creativity (in theories and hypotheses) and logical consistency, and for laxity in testing (Walt, 1999: 5-48; Dessler, 1991: 340). While not oblivious to these claims, it is believed that the general lack of systematic approaches to the study of Turkish foreign policy make formal studies necessary if for nothing else then for the sake of diversity (Walt, 1999: 48).

In fact, events data is criticized for the data that it utilizes which is seen as being of low quality (noisy) and missing certain types of interactions (Goldstein and Freeman, 1990: 39). While these criticisms are more valid for data originating from newspapers and periodicals, it also holds true (to a lesser degree) for data provided from news wires. Another discussion is whether it is possible to have a scale including cooperation and conflict (Goldstein and Freeman, 1990: 39).¹² However, these criticisms are not of a crucial nature: All other methods also make use of the same type of data and the study of international affairs is full of different approaches. Goldstein and Freeman reach the crux of the matter: Analysis is not

¹¹ A number of articles deal with the criticisms directed at events data projects (for example, Davies and McDaniel, 1995: 55-60).

¹² For a study on cooperation-hostility scale, see Goldstein, 1992.

hindered by the nature of the data but one should realize that the data on the activities of countries do not necessarily reflect the true amount of relationships between countries (Goldstein and Freeman, 1990: 41). As long as one is aware of this situation and acts accordingly, there should not be major problems.

Human coding was used in this study. There was not a choice here about whether computer coding or human coding should be used. However, it does mean that human errors, such as assigning wrong scores and giving wrong information or orders to the computer, could have occurred.¹³ Even after the numerous checks that were carried out, it is still possible that a certain amount of error exists.

G. Reliability

The capacity of a measure to bear consistent results is known as reliability. The reliability of the method used in this study has been tested in three ways.

Intercoder reliability is the common procedure in such cases. A graduate student coded three randomly chosen years. A session was organized with this student where the method was explained and examples were given. The results for intercoder reliability can be compared from two angles. In cases where both coders coded the same event, there was some amount of similarity (81 %). However, the coder was less prone to find things to code than the author (26 to 48 codings). This could be because the process was not clearly explained or because of the result of the differences in the characters of the coders.

The two other reliability test were conducted within the study itself. The first one involved known crisis years and the second one dealt with verbal behavior. Working from the assumption that a year in which a known crisis occurred between actors should produce more codings than other years, it was deduced that crisis years

¹³ Savaiano and Schrodtt (1997) demonstrate the advantages of automated coding.

should be captured as eventful years. Although, this might seem obvious, it also tests the method used. If the coding process cannot capture the crisis years as being eventful years then, obviously, there is something wrong with it.

It is also assumed that a disproportionate amount of international relations is conducted through speeches and verbal communication. Therefore, another reliability test conducted within the study involves checking for comments. It seems in order to assume that the process has to capture more verbal behavior than other sorts of expression. If the coding process cannot capture more verbal behavior than other types of behavior, then it seems correct to conclude that the system is misconstructured. This means that there has to be more plus and minus ones than the rest of the scores.

The results for these tests were also encouraging. As was expected the crisis years witnessed more codings. The findings show that the external crisis years for Turkey of 1992 and 1998 (both with Syria over security), 1990 (with Syria over water), 1996 (with Greece over Aegean Sea), and 1997 (with the Greeks over Cyprus) are captured. This finding and the high number of codings for the rhetoric categories (i.e., plus and minus one categories) show that the coding process was working reasonably well. The findings show that in all of the issues, more verbal behavior was captured than the other types of behavior.


The results for the reliability tests are encouraging. Therefore, the findings for the issues presented in the next chapter can be accepted with some amount of confidence. In each of the issues, findings on whether Turkish behavior increased over the time period are shared first, followed by the average behavior of the countries for the time period and a study of the yearly behavior. A recap of the findings and comparisons are offered in the interpretations chapter.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

A. Aegean Sea

In the Aegean Sea issue, it was found that the Turks were more active in the latter part of the decade. As can be seen from Figure 1, there were only 4 actions for Turkey in 1990 but 18 in 1998. However, the increase in Turkish activity was not continuous. While it is not unnatural to find that after a particularly eventful year (i.e., Kardak crisis of 1996), a decrease occurred in the next two years, the same cannot be said for 1992 and 1993 when there was less action than both 1990 and 1991. After a decline in detected cases in 1992, it was only in 1995 that there was a net increase and Turkish activity picked up after 1995. Therefore, the findings on the Aegean issue over increased Turkish activity is satisfied but with qualifications.



Turkey was the more active party in this dispute. Turkish activities for the period under study were 102 while that of Greece were 67 as shown in Table 1. As can be seen, the most amount of action for both parties is in the minus one category (42 for Turkey; 27 for Greece). As this category captures negative rhetoric, this situation is understandable. The Turkish side is more prone to make positive rhetoric than the Greeks as seen in the plus one category (25 to 8) but as mentioned above Turkey also utilizes much more negative rhetoric. An examination shows that the combined rhetoric categories (i.e., minus 1 and plus 1) were used more than the others and this indicates that the coding method is working reasonably well.

	Mean	No.	(+3)	(+2)	(+1)	(-1)	(-2)	(-3)
Turkey	-0.08	102	3	16	25	42	16	0
Greece	-0.30	67	3	13	8	27	12	4
Total	-0.17	169	6	29	33	69	28	4

Table 1 also indicates (in the mean column) that Turkey's average behavior was more positive than the Greek side for the nine year period. Yet, this should be borne in mind along with the fact that the numbers are close and that the attitudes of both sides for the time span are in the negative range. Nevertheless, the relatively more peaceful Turkish mean and the fact that Greece is seen as perpetuating violence (minus 3), seems to indicate that Turkey is the more peaceful of the two. Both parties committed almost equal amounts of minus 2. Besides the minus 3s recorded solely for Greece, Turkey outperformed Greece in all other scores; the difference being the greatest in the minus 1 score, i.e., negative rhetoric.

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Total No.	7	11	4	2	9	17	47	42	30
Total Mean	1.86	-0.55	1	2	-0.33	-0.82	-0.26	0	-0.47
Turkey's No.	4	7	2	1	7	11	26	28	18
Turkey's Mean	1.75	-0.57	1	2	-0.29	-0.73	0.19	-0.15	-0.33
Greece's No.	3	4	2	1	2	6	21	16	12
Greece's Mean	2	-0.5	1	2	-0.5	-1	-0.81	0.25	-0.67

A yearly summary of Turkish events (presented in Table 2) shows that Turkish activity has been mainly in the negative zone. Two years definitely suffer from sample problems: In both 1992 and 1993, the means obtained are too 'positive' (respectively 1 and 2) and this is based on the fact that there were too few cases in those years. The first year of the sample, 1990, also suffers from the same problem though to a lesser extent. Still, it seems that the earlier years of the decade were less eventful and more positive.

In fact, generally, the more eventful years (i.e., the latter years) also resulted in negative means for the actors. This was an unexpected finding and indicates that the actors felt the necessity to signal their anger, disappointment, or hostility more than once. Nonetheless, the most eventful year, 1996, is shown as a positive year for Turkey ($M=0.19$). For Greece, 1996 was the year in which it recorded its most amount of behavior and its second most negative mean ($M=-0.81$). Bearing in mind that there were efforts, such as mediations, to defuse the 1996 crisis once it broke out, it can be said that Turkey was more positive towards them and that it was more satisfied than the Greek side over the Kardak crisis outcome. The year preceding that crisis is the year, 1995, in which the most negative means was recorded for both parties involved ($M=-0.73$ for Turkey and $M=-1$ for Greece). It was in 1995 that the Greek parliament unanimously ratified the Law of the Sea Convention. Schrodt and Gerner (1997) had suggested the early warning crisis possibilities of events data.

The most amount of events were recorded in a crisis year, 1996, thus increasing the reliability of the coding process.

The relations between Turkey and Greece started to deteriorate in 1994 (total $M=-0.33$). It should be remembered that 1994 was the year when Law of the Sea Convention came into force. Greece is a party to this international treaty and maintains that it has the right to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles. As such a move would turn much of the international waters into Greek waters and, in effect, make the Aegean Sea a Greek lake, Turkey expressed its discontent. The navies of both countries were put on alert.


Both countries increased their activities at the same time, as can be seen from Table 2. In fact, besides 1996 and 1997, the average behavior of the countries is also of the same type, i.e., cooperative or hostile (as demonstrated by the study of the yearly means). Therefore, it seems in order to say that there was some amount of reciprocity between the countries.¹⁴ A causal examination of the yearly means of the actors shows that the countries were moving in accordance with each other and the countries considered the other's activities (past and current) while planning and reacting.

To summarize the findings for the Aegean Sea dispute, Turkey was relatively more active and positive than Greece. Turkey was more active in 1998 than in 1990 but the increase was not continuous. Both Turkey and Greece displayed a fair amount of reciprocity.

B. Cyprus

In this conflict, Turkey was more active in 1998 than in 1990: While there were only 5 cases in 1990, the number was 29 in 1998. However, following 1992, there was a decline of cases coded for Turkey and this decline continued up to 1996. Thus, four years were below 1990 (and also 1991). While, it is true that after 1996, there was a net increase over 1990 and 1991, this does not change that there was a decline in recorded events for a long time span. It can be said that since 1995 Turkish activity has been increasing as demonstrated by Figure 2.

The greatest amount of events were coded for 1997 followed by 1998. It should be borne in mind that 1997 was a crisis year (over S-300 missiles). In fact, if the codings for 1997 had not been so numerous then it would have shown that there was some problem with the coding process.



As can be seen from Table 3, Turkey is the most active actor (95) followed respectively by South Cyprus (37), Greece (35) and North Cyprus (29). The lack of

¹⁴ In negotiation, behavior of a reciprocal nature is taken to mean responding by similar types of behavior.

events coded for Greece is the surprising element here. This could be taken as an indication that Greece is more confident than Turkey that their kinsfolk can take care of themselves. Demonstratively, the means for the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey are both conflictive and close to each other.

	Mean	No.	(+3)	(+2)	(+1)	(-1)	(-2)	(-3)
Turkey	-0.32	95	1	16	15	46	17	0
Greece	0.06	35	1	11	3	14	6	0
North Cyprus	-0.24	29	0	8	2	15	2	2
South Cyprus	-0.05	37	0	9	9	11	6	2
Total	-0.19	196	2	44	29	86	31	4
Greeks	0	72	1	20	12	25	12	2
Turks	-0.3	124	1	24	17	61	19	2

The average behavior of Athens for the time period demonstrates the most amount of cooperative spirit among the four parties. The relative silence of Greece probably contributed to this result but it also indicates that decision-makers in Athens believe that Greek Cypriots can take care of themselves to a great extent. It should also be noted that while the numbers obtained for Greece and Greek Cypriots are of different nature, they are not extremely far from each other (respectively, $M=0.06$ and $M=-0.05$).

Turkey's mean for the period is the most conflictive ($M=-0.31579$). It can be said that Turkey's pattern of actions on the island have been more hostile than those of the others. Interestingly, the most positive side is seen as being Greece followed by the Greek Cypriots. TRNC is only second to Turkey on hostility. Therefore, when the actions of Turks and Greeks are compared, the Turks are seen as being the more negative and more active camp. Turkey's negative approach is probably due to two contradictory conditions. Turkey altruistically feels obliged to protect the Turkish Cypriots, i.e., Turkey is the *anavatan* (motherland) while the TRNC is

portrayed as the *yavruvatan* (infant nation). At the same time, from a more selfish point of view, so as to feel more secure and less encircled, Turkey needs to ensure the presence of a friendly power on the island.

Therefore, an interesting finding emerges: one of the patrons is cooperative while the other is antagonistic. Also, the average behaviors for the nine year period between the camps are similar. This demonstrates a certain amount of coordination.

Table 3 indicates that most of the actions follow under the negative rhetoric (86) with Turkey contributing the most to it (46). There are more counts of plus 2 than plus 1 which is also an attestation to the amount of peacemaking attempts on the island. However, the rhetoric categories combined are dominant in this issue as well and indicate that the coding process works reasonably well. This was also the issue where the greatest number of codings occurred (196).

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Total No.	10	10	12	6	2	5	32	60	52
Total Mean	0.9	0.5	1.5	0.67	2	-1	-0.75	-0.65	-0.15
Turkey's No.	5	8	3	3	1	2	11	30	29
Turkey's Mean	1.2	0.5	1	0.67	2	-1	-0.27	-0.85	-0.48
Greece's No.	4	1	2	2	1	1	3	10	11
Greece's Mean	1	2	2	1.5	2	-1	-1.67	-0.5	-0.18
North Cyprus's No.	1	1	3	1	0	0	8	5	10
North Cyprus's Mean	-1	-1	2	-1	0	0	-0.35	-0.6	0.3
South Cyprus's No.	0	0	4	0	0	2	10	12	9
South Cyprus's Mean	0	0	1.25	0	0	-1	-0.4	-0.25	0.44
Turks' No.	6	9	6	4	1	2	19	38	39
Turks' Mean	0.83	0.33	1.5	0.25	2	-1	-0.68	-0.82	-0.28
Greeks' No.	4	1	6	2	1	3	13	22	20
Greeks' Mean	1	2	1.5	1.5	2	-1	-0.85	-0.36	0.1

As has been mentioned previously, many of the years suffered from sample difficulties and this is reflected in the numbers obtained for some of the years: 1993-1995. The years where Turkey was more active coincided with those that it was

more aggressive as seen above in Table 4. After 1995 (which suffers from too few codings and is thus suspect), the most negative year for Turkey is seen as being 1997. That was the year when the greatest amount of debate over the introduction of S-300 missiles to Cyprus took place. The year prior, 1996, shows that Turkey had a negative mean but that the Greeks already were seeing red is shown through the fact that Greece's most negative mean ($M=-1.67$) was witnessed. Yet, in 1997, following their attempted *fait accompli*, the Greek side was more positive and this is also witnessed in 1998. This could partly be due to the increased international outcry against the Greek decision to bring in the missiles and Greek attempts to better project themselves in the international arena. Instead, it was the Turkish side which became increasingly more negative.

A yearly comparison of the Turkish and Greek camps confirms that the latter was more positive except for one year. Only in 1996 was the Turkish behavior more cooperative than the Greeks (even though the mean of both sides were actually in negative digits). Besides one year, namely 1995, the Turkish camp was more active. An examination of the means of Greece and Turkey reveals that a certain amount of reciprocity occurred, as both countries exhibited conflictive and cooperative behaviors in the same years. This feature is also viewed when the findings of the sides are grouped under Greeks and Turks: Besides 1998, which was a year when the behavior of the Turks was negative while that of the Greeks was positive, the sides also acted cooperatively or not at the same time. Approaching the issue of reciprocity from the point of Cypriot communities one finds out that when both sides acted, they acted similarly. Otherwise their behaviors did not follow a pattern. Both of the Cypriots became more active in the post-1995 era. Therefore, an amount of reciprocity is exhibited.

A causal picture of coordination within the camps can be obtained through a study of the yearly averages obtained. In cases where both mainlander and islander Greeks acted, their actions were by and large of the same type (positive or negative) except in 1998 when the Greek Cypriots ($M=0.44$) were depicted as being cooperative while Athens was not ($M=-0.18$). The findings for the Turkish camp are more controversial. While in the years before 1995, Turkey was more cooperative than TRNC, this situation changed in 1995. Turkish behavior was recorded as being hostile from 1995 onwards. The TRNC's behavior did not greatly alter until 1998 when its behavior became more peaceful. These series of findings seem to show that Turkey's average policy approached that of the islanders and that the TRNC is not the puppet of Ankara.


To sum up, Turkey was the most active actor as well as being the actor whose actions were in general more of a negative nature. This behavior resulted in more conflictive behavior emerging from the Turkish grouping than from the Greeks. The sides demonstrated reciprocity in their behavior to a great extent.

C. Holbrooke's mediation in 1996

An examination of Holbrooke's prophecy that 1996 would be the year of Cyprus results in a mixed picture. As the mean for the total of all interactions, shown above in Table 4, in 1995 ($M=-1$) was relatively less hostile in 1996 ($M=-0.75$), a somewhat favorable picture emerges. On top of this, Turkey's behavior certainly became more positive ($M=-0.27273$ in 1996 compared with $M=-1$ in 1995). Yet, this can certainly not be taken as the great historic breakthrough that he was conjuring up in 1995. The positive effects, if any, of this mediation effort were short-lived as Turkey's average behavior tilted towards more hostility in 1997 ($M=-0.85$). Also, it should not be forgotten that 1995 is one of the years that seems to

suffer from a sample error caused by the fact that there was not a great amount of coded cases. Thus, a comparison with 1995 does not seem to be the right answer. Comparing the mean for 1996 with that of the total time span (1990-1998 including 1996) would show that this was a much more negative year than average. All in all, it is hard to see a great breakthrough.

Figure 3 depicts what the average behavior of the Turkish and Greek sides were in the period under study. As can be seen, while Holbrooke's input might have improved relations in 1996 when compared to 1995, the change is not great and Turkish conduct actually became more hostile in 1997. An amelioration took place in 1998 but basing that solely on Holbrooke's effort would be an injustice to other events, including NATO mediation in 1997 and the S-300 crisis.




To be fair to Holbrooke, 1996 witnessed a worsening of Greek-Turkish relations as a result of the Kardak crisis in the Aegean Sea and he spent at least some of the time mediating not the Cyprus problem but the islet crisis. Following the Kardak crisis, he cooled down his rhetoric but the damage was done.

Also, Holbrooke did not make the Cypriots feel any more secure as seen by the fact that the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997 saw the announcement of a

deal between the Greek Cypriot government and Russia over S-300 missiles. As a result, the Turkish sides became more hostile whereas the others became more cooperative following their attempts to increase their security through the procurement of arms. The last year of the study, 1998, saw also a general improvement in interactions between the sides: Turkey was more positive than in 1997 but less than in 1996. However, to place this improvement solely on Holbrooke's shoulders is wrong. If nothing else, there was also a NATO involvement starting in July 1997. This NATO involvement also seems to confirm the fact that international expectations of a Holbrooke success in Cyprus had diminished enough to start a second front.

D. Security

Within the context of Turkish-Syrian relations, 1998 was much more eventful than 1990 in the issue of security, as shown in Figure 4. This would seem to support the view that Turkey has become more active in the years following the end of the Cold War. Up to 1992, a crisis year, there was an increase in reported activity but the next three years show a decrease in events.



The fact that those years did not even surpass 1991 in number of activity reveals that the view of a continuous increase in Turkish activity since the end of the Cold War is unfounded. As both 1992 and 1998 were crisis years in Turkish-Syrian relations, the high number of actions recorded for those years does not show that Turkey became increasingly more active. Nonetheless, in the period following 1995 Turkey became more active in this issue. While 1996 shows an increase in the amount of actions, 1997 was a silent year from the point of Turkey. Yet, this was the silence before the storm as 1998 was the year when Turkey was the most active and assertive in the period under study.

	Mean	No.	(+3)	(+2)	(+1)	(-1)	(-2)	(-3)
Turkey	0.37	60	3	15	14	25	3	0
Syria	0.50	60	3	21	12	15	9	0
Total	0.43	120	6	36	26	40	12	0

A study of the entire time period shows that the sides in general approached each quite cooperatively as can be seen from Table 5. Somewhat interestingly, Syria was as active as Turkey on a matter of great internal importance to Turkey, e.g., combating terrorism. As pointed out above, most researches believe that Syria is using terrorism for its own ends. Syria appears cooperative in normal diplomatic interactions so as to ward off Turkish and (to a lesser degree) international criticisms. However, the high number of minus 2s for Syria captures their negative behavior (without actually causing direct violence by themselves). In order to offset the high number of minus 2s, Syria also has a high number of plus 2s. In fact, it is only in the rhetoric categories that Turkey outplays Syria. This difference in selections of moves by the two sides shows also the differences in the two countries: Turkey's behavior is in tune with a majority of countries which believe that

discussions can solve matters while Syria, which is seen as a rogue or even terrorist-sponsoring state by some, is more prone to act, instead of discussing.

The positive means for the time period is surprising. These numbers show that while thousands of people died in Turkey by Syrian-supported insurgency, the relations between the two countries were not allowed to worsen.

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Total No.	3	8	18	2	6	7	19	2	55
Total Mean	1.00	0.63	1.50	3.00	1.67	-1.29	-0.63	0.00	0.40
Turkey's No.	2	4	7	1	4	3	10	0	29
Turkey's Mean	0.50	1.25	1.43	3.00	1.75	-0.33	-0.70	0.00	0.14
Syria's No.	1	4	11	1	2	4	9	2	26
Syria's Mean	2.00	0.00	1.55	3.00	1.50	-2.00	-0.56	0.00	0.69

As seen in Table 6, a certain degree of reciprocity is witnessed in the activities of the countries as demonstrated by the fact that the parties to the dispute acted antagonistically or not at the same time. In the early part of the decade, the sides undertook fewer actions but were more prone to acting in a cooperative manner. However, it should be remembered that many of the years in this issue suffer from too few cases. Both countries displayed the maximum amount of cooperative spirit in 1993 (following the 1992 crisis over Syrian support to PKK): in 1993, the two neighbors signed a security protocol in which the PKK was labeled a terrorist organization and the Syrian state minister for security, Nasir Kaddur, announced on Syrian television that President Hafiz al-Asad had banned the PKK (Olson, 1996: 86). This explains why the relations between the countries were perceived as being good. However, this honeymoon was short-lived as they both scored negative averages in 1995 and 1996. Following the 1998 crisis, the parties espoused more cooperative moves towards each other for the first time in a long time. The Syrians recorded their worst behavior in 1995: Syrian support to PKK

operations in Hatay had increased to the chagrin of Turkey (as shown in Olson, 1996: 86-92). These findings (for 1993 and 1995) show that just because a year has few codings does not mean it should be ignored, especially if they can receive support from other sources.

The silence in 1997 was actually misleading and when Turkey's ensuing actions took place, it proved that Turkey was not happy with the Syrians in the recent past. The year when Turkey was the most hostile was reported as being 1996 and not 1998. The main reasons are that once the confrontation started in the October of 1998, mediation (mainly from Egypt and Iran) and Syrian back down resulted in an improvement in the relations. The highest recordings were for 1998 and this shows that the coding process was working well enough to grasp this situation. Failure to capture this crisis year would have resulted in doubts about its reliability.

Here as well, the years with less reported actions were those during which better relations took place. While both countries were equally active in this issue, Syria was more positive than Turkey. Turkey was more active at the end of the nine year period than at the beginning. A certain amount of reciprocity took place as demonstrated through the similar acting behaviors during corresponding periods.

E. Effects of Turkish-Israeli Cooperation on Turkish-Syrian Relations


Turkish-Israeli relations obviously did not reach their high point in one day. The relations have been building throughout the 1990s. However, it seems correct to say that the military agreements of 1996 demonstrated that a new zenith in the cooperation between the sides had been reached.¹⁵ While both parties have on many

¹⁵ There were three major agreements signed between Israel and Turkey in 1996. The most controversial was a military training and cooperation agreement (from which the sides derive the

occasions maintained that it is not directed against any other country and that Turkey has similar agreements with other countries, Syria (and the Islamic world in general) disapproves of the relations.

Inspecting the year prior to the agreements demonstrates that, in 1995, Turkey and Syria were acting in a highly conflictive manner against each other. Syria recorded its most conflictive behavior in that year and while it was relatively more positive in 1996, the damage was done. Conflictive behavior emerging from the Syrians in 1995 ($M=-2$) towards Turkey contributed to the military agreements of 1996. As has been mentioned above, 1996 is the year when the mean for Turkey ($M=-0.70$) was the most hostile for the time period under study. Discussions over the Golan Heights were also taking place between Israel and Syria in 1996 and it seemed possible that the relations between the two countries might improve. It has been mentioned elsewhere that Turkish decision-makers expected Syria to turn its attention towards Turkey (and the Hatay province in particular) once the Golan Heights problem was solved. Thus, it is relatively easy to speculate that Turkey, so as to hinder progress, could have chosen to increase its relations with Israel thus reducing the Israeli incentive to make concessions (solely to overcome its feeling of encirclement): an Israel on amicable terms with Turkey would be an even more potent force. However, this would be ignoring the fact that Israel had started to push for increased cooperation with Turkey from 1994 onwards: the relations between Turkey and Syria became increasingly worse from that period onwards. This situation is also demonstrated by Figure 5. Following a year which can be described as one of 'unnatural silence,' Turkey in 1998 showed its disapproval of Syrian conduct.

right to use each other's air space for training). The other agreements were on defense industrial cooperation and on free-trade.




While, it might be wrong to say that Turkish-Syrian relations have been negatively affected only by the Israeli factor (as the Syrians maintain), the results obtained through content analysis indicate that Turkey became more assertive against Syria following increased cooperation with Israel. Israeli overtures followed by Syrian hostility in 1995 resulted in the 1996 agreements which led to the Turkish-Syrian confrontation in 1998. The Syrian comportment in 1995 played an important role (but not the only one) in Turkey's decision to augment relations with Israel which resulted in the aggravation of Turkish-Syrian relations.

F. Water

As can be seen in Figure 6, Turkey was much more active in the beginning of the time period than at the end. It is hard to even say that Turkey became more active after 1995 because only in 1996 did Turkey commit a fair amount of actions. Turkey is depicted as becoming less active during the 1990s on this issue.

Figure 6: Turkish Actions in the Water Issue



Therefore, the estimation that Turkey has become increasingly active in the 1990s is refuted here. The reasons for this are probably numerous. For one thing, it seems in order to say that the beginning of the decade witnessed more important developments on the water issue. For example, the filling of the Atatürk Dam's Reservoir in 1990 caused resentment from the downstream riparians. Iraq was also ostracized by its invasion of Kuwait in the international community. Therefore, Turkey for much of the period did not have to worry about an Iraqi-Syrian alliance causing problems. At the individual level, the death of President Özal, in 1993 has meant that some of the initiatives that he had personally backed during his lifetime, such as the peace pipeline project, if not discarded, were no longer as enthusiastically supported as they once were. The increasing realization that Syria had no chance whatsoever versus the Turkish side militarily also contributed to Turkish abstinence.

This was also the issue where the least amount of events were coded. The relative silence on the part of Turkey is understandable as it is in a far more advantageous position than Syria. Syrian inaction is more interesting (which with 18 actions is less than Turkey's 28 actions). Syria has more than on one occasion said that the Euphrates is vital for its survival as shown by the fact that they have a

Minister for the Euphrates Dam (Schulz, 1995: 93). This position might be partially illuminated when one remembers the issue linkage between water and terrorism: In the issue of security discussed previously, there were as many actions recorded for Syria as there were for Turkey. Therefore, Syria, believing that it cannot obtain any concessions from Turkey by dealing with the water issue alone, is conducting a two-headed policy of water and security negotiations.

This issue also confirms Turkey's position as a regional power because its silence pushed the Syrians to silence as well. In three different years, there were no reported activities for the Turkish side. Somewhat interestingly, the two years where high amounts of activity were reported for Turkey in this issue (i.e., 1992 and 1998) coincide with crisis years between Turkey and Syria over security concerns. The amount of activity reported for Turkey in 1992 was not reached, let alone surpassed, up to 1998.

	Mean	No.	(+3)	(+2)	(+1)	(-1)	(-2)	(-3)
Turkey	0.32	28	0	8	7	12	1	0
Syria	0.83	18	0	7	6	5	0	0
Total	0.52	46	0	15	13	17	1	0

As can be seen from Table 7, the total interactions between the sides is relatively positive. The Syrian side's approach is much more positive than the Turkish side. As has been mentioned elsewhere, the two sides are not likely to fight over water and the positive outlook for the time period under study can be taken as its vindication.

The presence of plus 2s show that the sides tried to solve their grievances but to no avail. In this issue as well, the rhetoric categories were detected more than the others. Turkey scored more highly than Syria on all categories. As this is also true

for the minus 1 and minus 2 categories, Turkey's relatively more negative side than Syria is understandable. Turkey's relatively less cooperative orientation is not bizarre when one remembers that Turkey perceives few incentives to be cooperative.

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Total No.	13	5	13	0	0	2	10	0	3
Total Mean	0.31	1.6	1.15	0	0	1.5	-0.6	0	0
Turkey No.	9	3	5	0	0	2	7	0	2
Turkey's Mean	0.22	1.67	1.2	0	0	1.5	-0.7	0	-1
Syrian No.	4	2	8	0	0	0	3	0	1
Syria's Mean	0.5	1.5	1.13	0	0	0	-0.3	0	2

A yearly comparison of the patterns has to be approached carefully for this issue because of the relatively few number of events coded. The year when Turkey was the most negative was 1998 (with $M=-1$) followed by 1996 (with $M=-0.71429$). It should be noted that 1996 was the worst for the security issue. Most of the other years were positive in outlook. The years in which the parties were more hostile or more positive usually coincided with each other. Here as well, the parties, especially Turkey, became more hostile as the years progressed. Some amount of reciprocity seems to have taken place in this issue.

Turkey was the more active and less cooperative of the sides. However, Turkey acted more in the beginning of the decade than at the end and, thus, increased Turkish activity is not witnessed in this issue. From the point of negotiating styles, reciprocity seems to have occurred in this issue as well.

The following chapter offers a summary and comparison of the findings as well as the implications of these findings.

CHAPTER V

INTERPRETATIONS

A. Summary and Comparison of Findings

The findings indicate that Turkey's foreign policy demonstrated an increased amount of activity and assertiveness during the course of the 1990s. Turkey was also more active and aggressive when compared with Greece and Syria. In the issues of Aegean Sea and Cyprus with the Greeks and security with the Syrians, the view that Turkey has become more active during the 1990s is supported. The only issue that comes against the general trend is the water issue. Even within the cases where the premise of increased Turkish activity is supported, this dynamism receives only a qualified approval because the increase is not continuous and fluctuates greatly. In three out of four issues, Turkey is also the relatively more conflictive side. In only the Aegean Sea dispute with Greece is it somewhat more positive. However, while other actors might cause direct violence, Turkey refrains from such behavior (as witnessed by the lack of any minus 3 scores for Turkey in any of the four issues under study). In all issues, Turkey recorded its most negative means in 1995 or afterwards.

Compared to the other actors, Turkey is also the more active side in three out of four issues under discussion. Only in the security issue is the other actor, Syria, as active as Turkey. A comparison of the cases would confirm that Turkey was more active in both issues with Greece than with the issues involving Syria. The ordering

of importance for Turkey solely based on the number of actions committed for Turkey would be: Aegean Sea, Cyprus, security and water.

A great deal of reciprocity also occurs between the actors in the issues under study. Reciprocal behavior includes responding to both hostile and cooperative actions in a similar fashion. The yearly types of and amounts of behaviors for the various actors shows that the sides acted similarly for most of the time. Causally comparing the findings for the two issues between Turkey and Greece shows that Turkey acted similarly in both issues for the period between 1990 and 1998. A yearly comparison of Turkish conduct in the issues of Cyprus and Aegean Sea would show that, besides 1993 and 1994, Turkish activity increased and decreased at the same time. However, a causal observation of the averages for the two issues obtained would lead one to maintain that changes in behavior did not take place at the same time. The comparison of the findings for the issues between Syria and Turkey indicates that Turkish behavior in both issues shows similar conduct. Yet, analyzing whether Turkey is cooperative or hostile at the same time in both issues does not lead to conclusive data as the amount of cases in the water issue is too few.

External events have mixed effects on foreign policy patterns. Regional alignment clearly influenced the relations. Turkish-Syrian relations were at least partially influenced by improved Turkish-Israeli relations. Ankara certainly became more assertive against Syria as it increased its cooperation with Tel Aviv in the aftermath of the 1996 agreements. Mediation efforts had less effect. Holbrooke's mediation of the Cyprus conflict never realized the success that either he, the actors involved, or the international community envisaged. Subsequent events illustrated this fact: Holbrooke cooled down his rhetoric, there was not a feeling of enhanced security among the actors involved in the conflict (e.g., Greek Cypriot attempts to place more arms on the island), and the international community started to look

elsewhere for breakthroughs, e.g., NATO involvement in July 1997 seems to have been more fruitful.

From the point of methodology, approaching Turkey's foreign policy through the study of content analysis, and events data in particular, offers a systematic perspective. A thorough examination of Turkish foreign policy must be conducted through this method. It has its limits but increased use will result in the improvement of the analytical tool. A coding range from plus 3 to minus 3 is useful for its simplicity. Although its few categories and disregard of details leave it open to criticism, that is also the reason why it is such a powerful tool for analysis.

An unexpected result of this study was witnessing early warning crisis capabilities. In those years where there are enough codings, the average negative behavior by one or more actors can be used to identify the possibility of crises in the near future. For example, the Kardak Crisis in 1996 was preceded by a negative mean (in the range of $M=-0.7$) in 1995 on the part of Turkey and a similar Turkish mean in 1996 with Syria on the issue of security was a forewarning of events to occur in the first next year of coding, 1998. The early warning capabilities of quantitative sciences had been mentioned by Schrodt and Gerner (1997) and this work also exhibits this feat. Early warning is not limited to Turkey in this study. A careful examination of the Greek camp in 1996 shows that the 1997 crisis over the Greek Cypriot desire to acquire S-300 missiles could have been foreseen.

Relying on one news source, while practical, brings its own problems as mentioned in the chapter on methodology. Using more than one source could have decreased the sample problems, such as too few codings, as well increasing reliability and validity. However, the fact that findings from some years where there were few codings have been substantiated by other sources, i.e., journal articles, is reassuring, e.g., the findings for 1995 in the security issue.

B. Implications

Turkish foreign policy has become much more active over the 1990s. This is confirmed not only by Turkish actions in the issues under examination but also by other factors such as increased Turkish involvement in international organizations and by the role played by Turkey in the creation of international organizations. Participation in peacekeeping activities is a sound indicator of increased Turkish military cooperation at the international level. Another important factor is that in out of the four issues, Turkey is the most active actor in three and as active in the fourth. Therefore, it can be concluded that Turkey is publicly more active than both Greece and Syria which are perceived by Turkey as being the main centers of threat.

Findings from this study confirm Turkey's position as a regional power. Its relative silence in the water issue shows that Turkey is regionally capable enough to thwart any unfavorable attempts to change the status quo (a situation also confirmed by Greek restraint in increasing its territorial waters to 12 miles). More crucially, it shows that if Turkey does not cooperate on an issue, the other sides have little possibility of achieving a favorable outcome by themselves. This realization probably causes these countries to become hostile towards Turkey, as shown by Greek and Syrian support to terrorist organizations and individuals such as Abdullah Öcalan. Also, Turkish capability extends enough in the vicinity of its region to stop others from taking certain actions, e.g., the Greek Cypriot back down over S-300 missiles. This is not to say that increased Turkish behavior displays increased sagacity, e.g., the S-300 missiles are now to be placed on Crete, arguably in a more strategic position.

The relatively more positive Turkish approach to the Aegean Sea highlights the fact that Greeks see the Turkish position as one of aggrandizement at their expense as well as an attack on their need of security. As the Greeks do not believe

that they have anything to gain from bilateral negotiations and everything to lose, it is understandable why Greeks abstain from such meetings and maintain their intransigent positions. The somewhat more positive Turkish stance on this issue shows that the Turkish side wants to solve this problem cooperatively, if only slightly more. Bearing in mind that Turkey's approach (i.e., mean) is also negative and close to Greece's, Turkey is cautious about opening a Pandora's box. The fact that both numbers are quite close and in the negative range reveals that there is a certain amount of reciprocity in the relationship. Turkish proposals to discuss all matters of contention with Greece are rejected. Turkey can overcome this intransigence through the international community, e.g., in the Aegean Sea, the International Court of Justice's rulings on the continental shelf compelled the Greeks to accept it as a matter of discussion.

Any proposed solution to Cyprus has to take the behaviors of the patrons, i.e., mainlanders, into account. The findings show that Turkey is more hostile than all other parties and Greece is the most peaceful. As Turkish Cypriots are more dependent than the Greek Cypriots on their mainlander patrons, it seems in order to maintain that any solution to the island has to be primarily agreeable to the Cypriots and to Turkey. This is not to downplay the relationships between the Greek Cypriots and Greece. The decision to base the S-300 missiles on Crete shows that when duty calls, Athens also feels compelled to come to the assistance of the islanders. The difference in the approaches of the patrons is that Turkey believes that it has to be involved to a greater extent in Cyprus. Prodromou (1998) correctly points out the importance of Turkey but she does this at the expense of making other actors seem superfluous, i.e., the findings show that the Cypriots do not merely follow their patron thus revealing their importance for any possible solution.

In both issues with Syria, the countries are seen as maintaining cordial relations (with Syria as the more positive side). This is despite the importance of the issues for the two countries. Syria has indicated the salience of the water issue many times and Turkey's struggle for internal security is evident. The deterioration in the relations between Turkey and Syria following the increasing amount of cooperation between Turkey and Israel shows that an actor (in this case, Turkey) will try to alter the course of events when it believes that its position might be affected by an improvement between two other actors (one of which is seen as being deeply hostile, e.g., Syria). It is notable that Turkey and Israel increased their relations in 1996. That was also the year when improvements were attempted between Syria and Israel in their relations. Taking into account that Turkey was worried about the possible repercussions of such a move (Kohen, 1996), it does not take much imagination to suggest that Turkey pushed for greater ties so as to influence ensuing events. Implying that Turkey and Israel only improved their relations so as encircle the Syrians would be exaggerating because the countries also have other reasons to increase their relations. These can be counted as relatively similar regimes, similar positions in the region, favorable historical relationship, increasing economic ties, and the endorsement of the United States.

It is not reasonable to believe that Turkey and Israel would ally themselves against Syria as the latter is inferior in capabilities (economically and militarily) to both of them. Syria cannot go beyond supporting internal disaffection within Turkey and occasionally obtaining condemnations of Turkey in the international arena (i.e., mostly from the Arab organizations). Nonetheless, in order to deter Damascus from attempting the unexpected, Turks and Israelis saw numerous benefits in increased cooperation. More importantly, Syria is one actor that threatens them both. Thus, the findings indicate more a case of balancing against threat instead of balancing

against power.¹⁶ The existence of this Syrian problem cajoled them into increased relations which resulted in worsening of relations between Turkey and Syria.

Following Öcalan's departure from Damascus in 1998, relations between Syria and Turkey improved. The findings show that in the aftermath of the 1992 crisis, the relations also improved but not for long as Syria gradually increased its support to terrorists which resulted in Turkish patience declining until the crisis in October 1998 occurred. Syria's demands over water have not been met by the Turkish side. Water is shown as the key reason why Syria supports the Kurds (Kinzer, 1999b: 5). This linkage between water and security exists because of the importance of water to Syria and the high costs that Turkey suffers from Syrian support to terrorism.

Turkey delayed discussions on various issues with Syria until the security issue was solved. This was clearly shown by Turkish moves in the Damascus summit of August 1994. Furthermore, in 1995, Turkish decision-makers identified Syrian assistance to the PKK as the primary criterion (Gresh, 1998: 193) on which the relations between the countries would rest. Also, Syria confronts its more powerful rivals by carrying out unconventional tactics (see Harik, 1997). Territorial disenchantment and the history between the sides further disrupts the relations.

However, Syria extradited Öcalan in 1998 and Turkish security officials are on record as having said that Syria is complying with the Adana agreement of October 1998 (which apparently brought an end to Syria's support for PKK terrorism) ("Ankara," 1999: A3). Furthermore, Turkey is not against using water as a means to improve its regional security as long as it is on its own terms.¹⁷ Much can

¹⁶ Walt (1987) differentiates the two by saying that in balance of threat theory, the threat factor will be the determining element whereas in the more traditional balance of power theory, states will balance against power imbalances.

¹⁷ Studies on means of transporting water to Israel from Turkey have been carried out and discussions were conducted on whether water transferred to Northern Cyprus from Turkey could be sold to the Greek Cypriots (Kinzer, 1999b: 5).

be said for negotiating from a position of strength (and goodwill) and Turkey seems well-advised to seize the day.¹⁸ After all, success that is obtained through coercion is temporary (Patchen, 1988: 330). Current Turkish attempts to improve economic ties might achieve a soothing effect only if the benefits that Syria receives economically outweigh its need for more water. It is unlikely that increased economic ties can lead to much improvement in the relations as Syria's economy is in bad shape and Syria is reportedly experiencing its worst drought in decades.¹⁹

The failure of Holbrooke's mediation reinforces the view that mediators are by themselves not enough and that hurting stalemates are a necessity for the success of a mediation effort (see also Mooradian and Druckman, forthcoming). None of the sides for the years between 1990 and 1998 were suffering enough from the situation on Cyprus to make serious concessions. The patrons, i.e., the mainland countries, cannot appear to abandon the islanders, mostly because of domestic repercussions (and in the case of Turkey, security concerns), and thus it is improbable that they will coerce their sides to make serious concessions. For much of the nine year period, their hands were effectively 'tied.' This means that the island communities will be the main reason for any kind of change in the relationships. Neither of the two deplored the current situation on the island enough to attempt to break the ice. Occasional proposals do not go far enough to meet the needs and demands of the sides. Nor does it seem as if all of these ideas are seriously supported by their sponsors. For example, President Denktaş proposed the idea of a confederation in mid-1998 but by early 1999, his support seemed to have faded away ("Denktaş,"

¹⁸ Damascus's attempts to improve its military position through the acquirement of long-range missiles and receiving information on the production of advanced chemical weapons from Russians can have repercussions for Ankara. See Marcus, 1999; and Evans, 1999.

¹⁹ Syria's economy has been distraught by low oil prices and lack of rain ("Syria," 1999: 44).

1999: A3). A serious deterioration in the conditions of the actors can constitute the hurting stalemate.

Among the countries in this study, Turkey is stronger on many areas, e.g., GDP, armed forces, and population, than the others. Morgan and Palmer's assertion that stronger countries will by and large initiate more disputes seems to apply for Turkey as well (1997: 241). Turkey was involved in numerous crises in the 1990s and, although it was not solely responsible for them, it was not backing away from them. Turkey also started to dispute Greece's blanket claim on the islets of the Aegean Sea more forcibly than ever before. Although, there have been ample occasions in the 1990s for a militarized conflicts to occur between Turkey and its neighbors, this has not happened. Hensel and Diehl show that a number of reasons could be behind this situation (1994: 479-506).

The primary reason that Hensel and Diehl (1994) offer is that an issue might not be salient enough. Yet, this does not seem to be the case in the issues under-examination, especially with Greece. A case can be made that President Asad of Syria did not believe enough in the 'Kurdish cause' to go to war with Ankara over Öcalan. Another offered reason is that if the initiator did not actually use military force then the target will also not respond by using military means. In the case of the issues under study here, Turkey's hostile actions never went beyond threats and demonstration of capabilities. Since Turkey is accepted as having commenced the confrontations in the 1990s, and it did not resort to actual use of force, this would help explain why Syria and Greece also refrained from using military capabilities during the crises. The fact that Turkey did not commit direct violence (i.e., lack of minus 3 score for Turkey) against its rivals seems to be the reason why all of the crises were defused. Another contributory factor is that both of its rivals are

relatively weaker in capabilities. As Turkey and Syria have avoided militarized options in the past, this 'historic factor' also plays a role.

The effects of domestic politics on Turkish foreign policy are quite visible. It seems that internal reasons and not international reasons played the determining role in the dynamism exhibited in Turkish foreign policy. A greater amount of activity was witnessed following 1995 elections (1995-1998) than in the immediate period following of the Cold War (1990-1994). Turkey's foreign policy also turned towards greater assertiveness in the same period. International relations literature generally tends to expect that systemic-level factors should have precedence in such cases (see Grieco, 1990: 24). Yet the reverse is witnessed here.

The scapegoat theory applies to Turkey's actions following the post-1995 election era which the findings (from the Aegean Sea, Cyprus and security issues) depict as being the period in which Turkish dynamism took flight. The findings for 1996, 1997, and 1998 confirm that actors are more likely to become entangled in external problems when there is an internal problem.²⁰ While Turkey was not solely responsible for the crises with Greece and Syria (among others), it was no longer turning a blind eye to the adverse actions of others. Turkish foreign policy was adversely affected by the succession of weak coalition governments and regime discussions. 'Peace at Home and Peace in the World' became 'Crisis at Home and Crisis in the World.' Although such an adage seems to be an exaggeration, it is evident that Turkey experienced crises both externally and internally from 1995 onwards and the findings show that Turkish foreign policy generally became more antagonistic and active. Furthermore, the relative openness of Turkish society means

²⁰ It should be remembered that following the 1995 general elections in Turkey, there were many internal problems. Each year of the post-1995 era witnessed an external crisis with one of the numerous neighbors of Turkey: In 1996, there was the Kardak crisis. The next year witnessed the S-300s crisis in Cyprus. In 1998, there was the confrontation over Syrian support to terrorism.

that certain societal characteristics could have had some amount of influence on Turkish foreign policy. The findings show that a move towards nationalism and chauvinism in Turkish domestic politics (mid-1990s onwards) coincides with a period of increasing assertiveness in Turkish foreign policy.

The findings suggest that two individuals, one in the beginning and one at the end, pushed for increased activity externally for Turkey. The early 1990s saw the Özal period in Turkey. President Özal had grandiose projects for Turkey as witnessed by his flirtation with the idea of occupying Mosul. He even said, "It is my conviction that Turkey should leave its former passive and hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy" (Robins, 1992: 70). Following Özal's death in 1993, it can be said that Turkish foreign policy (on the basis of the issues studied here) 'quietened down.' Later, Foreign Minister Cem (14 July 1997 onwards) is in charge and in his *21. Yüzyıl, Türkiye ve Dünya*, he clearly wants Turkish foreign policy to become more active (see also Kinzer, 1998a: 5). Thus, the findings indicate that certain individuals left their mark on Turkish foreign policy as well as backing up the assumption that individuals play a vital role in the foreign policy process.

Morgan and Palmer's general theory of foreign policy is parsimonious as states are expected to pursue two goals (security and proaction) (1997: 225-244). Examining the four issues here on the basis of security seeking (maintaining the favorable aspects of status quo) or proaction seeking (changing the status quo in acceptable ways) helps in obtaining a picture of the positions of the actors. On the water issue, Turkey supports the maintenance of the status quo while the Syrians want to change the status quo as shown by their demand for more water. On the issue of security, Turkey showed in 1998 (and to a lesser degree in 1992) that it wanted changes. Turkey was successful but the fact that it had to be successful twice

indicates that its achievement was limited. Thus, Turkey was a proactive country in one case (i.e., security) and resisted change in the issue of water.

The issues with the Greeks are less clear-cut. In the Aegean Sea, Turkey says that a change in the status quo of the territorial waters would constitute a *casus belli*. This would show the Turkish side as being the security seeking side but Veremis (1998) says that while Greece is for territorial status quo on the Aegean Sea, Turkey is challenging it. The Greek claim that Turks are challenging their territorial integrity and disrupting the status quo is contradictory with the fact that Turkish foreign policy avoids territorial aggrandizement at the expense of others (the only exception was Hatay). Rather, Turkey is saying that the status of some of the islands or islets is not clear. In the Cyprus issue, it is maintained by Veremis (1998) that the Turkish side is satisfied with the status quo on the island but that the Greeks are not. The high number of Turkish Cypriots leaving the island would dispute this claim. It seems outlandish to say that only Greeks want change. In the Aegean Sea, a case can be made that both countries believe themselves as to be seeking status quo. The fact that no progress has been made in Cyprus for decades seems to indicate that none of the sides are pushing hard enough for change. However, the Greek Cypriot attempt to install missiles so as to alter the balance of power on the island shows them as seeking change more than the rest. Yet, it should not be forgotten that the Greek Cypriots were hoping to use these missiles so as to obtain concessions from the Turkish side. In the issues between Turkey and Greece, it seems that each sees itself as being for the status quo and perceives the status quo differently.

Turkish foreign policy, as has been mentioned above, is traditionally thought of as being one based on caution and support for international order and peace. The findings in this study show that on a number of key issues, Turkish foreign policy increasingly became more dynamic during the course of the 1990s. Thus, the

question that has to be posed is, "Do these findings show that a fundamental change has occurred in Turkish foreign policy?" Although the number of issues under study are too few and the time period rather limited to really answer this question with a great amount of certitude, a number of important factors lead one to answer the question in the negative. As the application of Morgan and Palmer's general theory of foreign policy (1997) above has shown, Turkey believes itself as being security seeking on three of the issues (security issue being the only one where it clearly wanted changes). Thus, Turkey's supposed new-found activism could be more an indication of Turkey continuing the traditional tenets of its foreign policy than a shift from the norm. Also, the dynamism and the assertive approaches to the issues were not dramatic enough. Other events such as Turkish restraint during crises such as Chechnya, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova, its increasing participation in peacekeeping, and its role in the creation of organizations do not lead one to detect a change in its support of international order. The answer to this question seems to be that Turkey has decided that its maintenance of its fundamental tenets of foreign policy required a greater amount of activity (and/or assertiveness) on its part.

An examination of the findings in this study shows Fearon's stipulation of two types of costly signals that leaders use to show their foreign policy interests to other countries holds in the case of Turkey (1997: 68-90). The first type of signal, tying hands, involves the leader showing that if they do not follow through with their threats or commitments then the audience costs that had been created, i.e., tied hands, will take effect. The second type of signal, sunk costs, are fixed costs that the state suffers no matter what happens but have no effect on future actions, e.g., military expenditures. Turkish decision-makers use both signals. An example of sunk costs for Turkey would be Turkey's huge rate of military exercises which are used to send messages to Greece. Turkish decision-makers have many times made

statements in which they had effectively tied their hands, e.g., Tansu Çiller's statement, "We can't let a foreign flag fly on Turkish soil. The flag will come down" ("Turkey: Turkey Tells Greece to Withdraw Forces," 1996). Turkish officials seem satisfied with the manner that crises conclude but should note that the tied hands strategy is the more successful, yet more risky, strategy (Fearon, 1997: 87).

The lack of an external threat for much of the 1990s meant that Turkey and Greece were able to focus on issues dividing them and they were not constrained by external threats (e.g., the USSR during the Cold War). This would help to explain why the relations demonstrated more hostility than cooperation in the 1990s. Yet, despite the lack of an external threat which has been mentioned as a crucial factor in bringing Turkey and Greece together, it is noteworthy that the relations did not deteriorate greatly. The presence of reciprocity seems to have contributed favorably.

Reciprocity has been shown in all of the issues to varying degrees. It seems correct to say that the actors committed similar behaviors at similar times. Russel J. Leng has shown on numerous occasions (1993; and 1998) that reciprocating strategy leads more to acceptable and peaceful solutions as well as cooperation than other strategies such as bullying and trail-and-error strategies. An inspection of the issues here shows that the countries tended to reciprocate to hostile or cooperative actions in kind as well as in the amount of actions. Bearing in mind that crises occurred in the nine year period without escalating to direct violence leads one to conclude that the reciprocity norm also had a soothing effect for Turkey as well as the other actors.

The amount of reciprocity displayed by the various actors leads one to be hopeful that relations can improve. Osgood's original GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction) has been revamped by Goldstein and Freeman's 'super-GRIT:' 'Super-GRIT' has been explained as a permanent extended-GRIT strategy which is made up of three rules that incorporate using sustainable

cooperative initiatives, strengthening reciprocity, and valuing long-term future and seeking to change psychological images and expectations (Goldstein and Freeman, 1990: 14-22, 153).²¹ Although, there have unilateral initiatives by the various sides, (for example by Turkey in the Aegean Sea) it was not incorporated as a long-term strategy. Remembering that images do not change quickly, it is necessary that if a GRIT strategy is to be used then it has to be used for a long-time before any sizable gains in the relations can be witnessed.

Greater cooperation might also be achieved through international organizations. Abbot and Snidal (1998) show that the key properties of organizations are centralization (providing a structure for collective activities) and independence (acting with a degree of autonomy in certain fields). This is not the place to suggest potential areas of cooperation made possible by organizations. Suffice it to say that there are various topics that the actors need to act upon (for example, in the sphere of environment) and since costs from unilateral actions are high, there is a huge need for collective action. Also, while countries might not be able to carry out certain issues face to face, international organizations provide a helpful arena. The limitations of such formations are clear. The fact that there is no real regional organization incorporating Syria and Turkey renders the possibilities for cooperation through such organizations difficult. Yet, remembering that despite the Turkish and Greek presence in numerous organizations, there is a lack of cooperation in the salient issues of Aegean Sea and Cyprus leads one to have doubts. Nonetheless, NATO's initiatives in the recent past are encouraging. Following a

²¹ In the GRIT strategy, Charles Osgood called for unilateral de-escalation coupled with reciprocal behavior to the actions of the other. He was assuming that the traits of an arms race, e.g., reciprocity and unilateral behavior, could be used to defuse crises (Goldstein and Freeman, 1997: 14-22).

non-aggression agreement signed in 1997 during the NATO summit in Madrid between Turkey and Greece, Javier Solana, NATO Secretary-General, reported in June 1998 that the two members had agreed upon a series of confidence-building measures in the Aegean Sea. This underlines the vital role that NATO can play in de-escalation of tensions.

Turkey's foreign policy is one based on negotiation and deterrence with the emphasis on the latter (Ayman, 1998). In recent history, e.g., the Cyprus intervention, Turkey has shown that it will not shy away from a confrontation. In fact, it can be said that Turkey is still using the credits from that crisis because the other sides remembering that Turkey will fight, back down first. However, it is unreasonable to assume that this situation will go on forever. If applied correctly, deterrence is an effective policy. Yet, an over-emphasis on a show of force can embroil Turkey in unwanted conditions. Also, there is no guarantee that the other side will continuously back down. Turkey demonstrated that it does not want war (and there were numerous occasions in the 1990s when it could have occurred as a result of domestic and international conditions). Assuming that Turkey will not want a war in the future, its continued reliance on demonstration of capabilities can result in an escalation into a situation in which Turkey might have to fight.

What is being advocated here is not that Turkey should only follow a policy based on cooperation. It is obvious that such a policy could lead Turkey to being exploited. Rather, the correct policy should incorporate a sufficient dose of flexibility and firmness. It has been shown elsewhere that such a policy will lead to success (Patchen, 1988: 342). Turkey's general policy must be flexible and creative yet firm. Turkey must identify its core needs. On these matters, it must be firm. However, being firm does not mean that Turkey should automatically reject all opposing views or needs. It must actively listen and try to understand the other's

point of view. Misunderstanding can result in deadlocks. Listening to the other side does not mean that one accepts their view. Turkey should not be forthcoming with concessions on issues of vital importance. Making concessions hastily does not necessarily better relations but angers the constituencies, causes the other side to feel that they have to do nothing, draws charges of appeasement upon oneself, and hinders creation of a durable relationship.

Turkey, as the party which has the greater resources, must be more flexible and creative. In issues of secondary importance, Turkey can afford to be flexible and must creatively use them to improve its external relations. Therefore, Turkey must identify what are issues of primary importance and issues of secondary importance. Decision-makers and opinion-makers have to reach some conclusions on these issues. They have to come to an agreement on what Turkey's needs and vital interests are. They must rank the different issues and be more flexible with issues of lesser importance. While it is true that these issues are generally interconnected and that they might be debated together, that does not mean that Turkey cannot be more forthcoming on certain issues of secondary importance, if it means that it will obtain a concession in an issue that is of primary importance.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Applying content analysis to Turkey's relations with Greece and Syria revealed Turkey as being the more active and assertive country in the issues of Aegean Sea, Cyprus, security and water. The premise of increasing dynamism in Turkish foreign policy was supported. The findings in this study require further work in two different areas. Firstly, other issues occupying a central role in Turkey's foreign policy should be studied. Analyzing more issues will result in a more thorough understanding of Turkish foreign policy. Issues requiring further study emerge out of Turkey's relations with Russia, Iran, Central Asia and EU. These issues of importance to Turkey can be better studied if the method used was further enhanced. Thus, proposals to increase reliability and validity will be subsequently offered.

Turkey's interactions with Russia and Iran deserve further study. Although these countries do not conjure up the same feelings and thoughts as Greece and Syria do, they are still considered as 'rivals' (Müftü, 1998). Russia and Iran have seen that it is in their geopolitical interests to curb Turkish aggrandizement (backed by the United States) in areas of importance to them, e.g., Central Asia.

Studying the interactions between the Central Asian republics and Turkey would be high revealing for a number of reasons. An examination of the relations between the Central Asian countries and Turkey through events data can show the

true degree and quality of relations. This is an especially important issue that deserves further attention due to the contradicting opinions on the nature of relations as well as the general lack of systematic studies on this field. It would also indicate whether the independence of these countries has meant a change in Turkish foreign policy's western orientation.

As a major part of Turkish foreign policy is assumed to be conducted with the EU over the issue of European integration, the importance of studying the interactions between Turkey and the EU are clear. Besides the obvious relevance for Turkey, examining this relationship will also have policy implications for other countries aiming to join international organizations.

However, the findings from the issues mentioned above would be approached with more confidence if the reliability and validity of the method were higher. An improvement can be achieved in validity by comparing the information provided in one news source with another. Therefore, news from Reuters could be compared with news provided by Agence France-Presse, United Press International, or Associated Press. A high degree of similarity in the type and amount of reporting will lead to higher degrees of confidence in validity.

The qualified activism that was witnessed for Turkish foreign policy in this study needs to further undergo more studies. It is possible that the activism in the data in the post-1995 period was not due to greater amount of activity on the part of Turkey but rather to Reuters itself. Although this is quite unlikely, a study that controls for the Reuters factor could solve this problem. However, the fact that this question has to be asked leads one to conclude that ensuing studies using events data should utilize more than one news source. This would increase both the reliability and validity.

Reliability would be improved through more refined measures. Better constructed measures will result in more specific information being captured (Neuman, 1997: 140). What is called for is not solely a quantitative increase in the number of categories but rather better defined categories. No matter what the number of categories is, imprecise categories will be detrimental to the reliability.

All of the above recommendations can be conducted easier if a SAFED-type set for Turkey existed. A 'Turkish Foreign Events Data' set can start by focusing on Turkey's immediate neighborhood and later include interactions with actors of importance to Turkey. Although the creation of such a set is not easy, it is certainly not impossible and it will facilitate the systematic study of Turkey's external interactions.

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