

**THE IDEOLOGY AND TEXTBOOKS: "TURKISH REPUBLIC  
HISTORY OF RENOVATION AND ATATURKISM"  
TEXTBOOKS (1980-1990)**

by

**IŞIK GÜRLEYEN**

**The Department of Political Science and Public Administration**

**Bilkent University**

**ANKARA**

**August, 1998**

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**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences  
of  
Bilkent University**

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**IŐIK GÜRLEYEN**

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*IŐik Gürleyen*

*Barofondan kopyalanmıştır*

Thesis

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
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
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
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
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Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences



Prof. Dr. Ali Karaosmanoğlu

## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE IDEOLOGY AND TEXTBOOKS: "TURKISH REPUBLIC HISTORY OF RENOVATION AND ATATURKISM" TEXTBOOKS (1980-1990)**

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**Department of Political Science and Public Administration**

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**August, 1998**

This study aims to analyze the specific understanding of history in the 1980s in Turkey. It is argued that this particular historical understanding is ideologically shaped by Kemalism and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse. These two contradictory and complementary views exist together in the "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" textbooks, which are used as a tool to convey the regime's ideological stance to the high-school students. In this context, these textbooks are examined in terms of their contents with regard to an identity formation characterized by nationalist, statist, religious but secular values.

**Keywords: Kemalism, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, history, textbooks, citizenship, ideology.**

## ÖZET

### İDEOLOJİ VE DERS KİTAPLARI: “TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ İNKILAP TARİHİ VE ATATÜRKÇÜLÜK“ DERS KİTAPLARI (1980-1990)

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Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de 1980’lerde görülen belirli bir tarih anlayışını incelemektedir. Çalışmada, bu tarih anlayışının ideolojik açıdan Kemalizm ve Türk-İslam Sentezi söylemi tarafından şekillendirildiği iddia edilmektedir. Bu iki görüş, rejimin ideolojik tercihini lise öğrencilerine iletmek üzere kullanılan “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük” ders kitaplarında birarada ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu bağlamda sözkonusu kitapların içeriği, milliyetçi, devletçi, İslami fakat laik değerler açısından incelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kemalizm, Türk İslam Sentezi, tarih, ders kitapları, yurttaşlık, ideoloji.

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

*In the papers, at schools, always the same official history is seen.  
Since the young people read the same story continuously, this  
bore them.  
They hate the most interesting, the most important period of  
Turkey.  
Also at the universities this same stereotyped, old ideological  
history is taught.<sup>1</sup>*

Erich Jan Zürcher

In Turkey there is a particular understanding of Turkish history. The main determinant in this particular understanding is Kemalism which is the dominant ideology since the establishment of the Republic. Although there have always been rival ideologies, Kemalism since 1930s succeeded in surviving in a way that almost all of the political arguments need to reconcile its views with Kemalism some how.

Following the 1980 Military Coup D'état social, political and economic transformations in the 1980s re-strengthened Kemalist ideology. Also in this period another significant development was the rise of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse. The relation between Kemalism and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is both

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<sup>1</sup>Quoted in Mithat Baydur, in "*İnkılap Tarihi*" *Dersleri Nasıl Okutulmalı*, Zafer Toprak, Halil Berktaş, Bülent Tanör (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1997), 98.

contradictory and complementary. It is complementary because the 1980 Military Regime emphasized both Kemalist and Islamic values as its ideological bases. Besides because of the dominance of Kemalism as the official ideology supporters of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis decided to reconcile their views with the former. On the other hand they are contradictory because of Kemalism's militant secularism. As a result in the 1980s these two views exist in school textbooks together.

Just as many other regimes the Republican Regime has used education as a tool for ideological justification among other tools. In this context "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" courses appear to be a special case. Having changed many names these courses have been used since the early years of 1930s to justify the policies of Republican Regime. The particular understanding of citizenship and history of the regime appears clearly in the textbooks of this course. In the 1980s in these textbooks Kemalism and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse shape the specific citizenship and history understanding in accordance with the 1980 Military Regime's political perception.

The 1980 Military Regime came to power determined to find a lasting solution to the economic, social and political crisis that Turkey was facing at the time. In the officers' opinion the worst thing that could happen to a society was the fragmentation of society and weakening of the state authority. So they interpreted the crisis of the time in these terms and they suggested special

projects in order to prevent the recurrence of such a crisis in Turkey. In these specific projects, education had an important role. The Military Regime made good use of education system to establish the natural guardians of Turkish state and society. The regime tried to reshape the minds of a new generation so that the society's unity would not be threatened again. The question of whether they have been successful or not in achieving this specific purpose is subject of another debate. It suffices to say that they not only targeted potential regime opponents among professors, but also made certain curriculum changes and modified the content of the textbooks. Although in 1983 they transferred power to the civilian regime the policies of Generals continued to effect the education system.

While implementing the above mentioned policies officers, consciously or unconsciously, introduced the ideas of a certain group, that is the Intellectuals' Hearth, into the textbooks. This group supported the 1980 military intervention wholeheartedly. Although they did not share power with the officers, their views were widely welcomed by the Military Regime. To put it in another way the ideology of the officers corresponded the ideas defended by this group. Their version of longly discussed Turkish-Islamic(-Western) Synthesis was especially effective in rewriting the textbooks for Turkish History of Renovation courses at high schools in a new mentality. The key concepts of this discourse were the exaltation of state authority and the superiority of Turkish

nation. These concepts were echoed in the education policy of the 1980 Military Regime. It can be argued that these are helpful in understanding this policy.

Since the main objective of this study is to understand the specific citizenship position given in "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" courses, first it is necessary to examine Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, Kemalism and the relation between them. In doing this the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse is analyzed to highlight the process of introducing a particular understanding of state and the role of individual vis-à-vis the state. Second, the relation between history education and ideology both in general and in the Turkish case have to be analyzed. In this context the 1980 Military Regime's education policy and its effects on the process of shaping the mind of the new generations by the help of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis of the time will be analyzed. Then, after giving brief information about the laws, rules and regulations of the 1980 Military Regime with regard to education, the policy implications of these in the compulsory courses of "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" textbooks are going to be analyzed. In these textbooks it is going to be looked whether there is a specific emphasis on the main themes of Turkish Islamic Synthesis. To put it other way whether there is a clear attempt to bring Turkish nationalism, Islam and Kemalism together in the content of these textbooks is going to be analyzed.



## CHAPTER II

### IDEOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT OF 1980-1990

#### 2.1. The 1980 Military Regime

The year 1980 marks in many ways a crucial turning point in Turkey's political, social and economic life. The first important factor to highlight concerns the role of the military in the post-1980 context. The achievements of 1980 Military Regime can be regarded as a reaction<sup>2</sup> to the economic and political instability in late 1970s' Turkey. During 1970s Turkey faced what was perhaps the worst political and socio-economic crises of its republican history; social unrest, political violence, paralysis of the state bureaucracy and other institutions, On the economic front, there was a stagnation and deeply rooted instability. On the political front, a succession of weak coalition governments further contributed to economic instability by postponing the adjustment process and were unable to check the proliferation of terrorism and urban violence,

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<sup>2</sup> General Evren, the leader of the Military Regime, stated in his various speeches that "12 September was an obligation" for instance see *Kenan Evren'in Anıları*, vol:3, (Milliyet Yayınları, 1991), 251.

threatening the security and everyday existence of the average citizen. In such an environment, it was not surprising that the military intervened for the third time, leading to the termination of civilian regime, albeit on a temporary basis.<sup>3</sup>

Military rule lasted from September 1980 up to the elections of November 1983 that marked the return to parliamentary democracy, albeit in a restricted form. Yet the comparatively short period of military rule embodied some far-reaching consequences for the future course of the democratic regime. Unlike the previous ones, the 1980 military takeover ambitiously aimed at inducing societal transformations which also can also be viewed as an attempt to establish a new hegemony.<sup>4</sup> In making these transformations the reference point of the Military Regime was Kemalism. Copeaux call this re-surgence of Kemalism as neo-Kemalism.<sup>5</sup> The objective of the military was to inject a substantial measure of stability into the political system which was thought to be a necessary requirement for the re-establishment of democracy. The measures taken were designed to introduce considerable elements of stability into the system and to help de-politicize the market and society.

The key element in the strategy of the military was to weaken the political power of the left, which they regarded as the major source of potential

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<sup>3</sup> Atilla Eralp and et al. *The Political and Socio-economic transformation of Turkey* (Westport: Praeger, 1993), 1, 5.

<sup>4</sup> Muharrem Tünay, "New Right's Attempt at Hegemony" in *The Political and Socio-economic transformation of Turkey*, Atilla Eralp and et al (Westport: Praeger, 1993), 19.

<sup>5</sup> Etienne Copeaux, *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993), Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk İslam Sentezine* (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), 56.

conflict and disorder in the post-1980 context. They regard any rival ideology to Kemalism, especially the leftist ones as the reasons of Turkey's crisis in those years. On the first anniversary of the 1980 coup d'état General Kenan Evren stated that:

*Principal characteristics of our Republic such as devotion to Atatürk and his principals and basic characteristics of our national unity were degenerated especially among youth, there was an attempt to destroy our State and divide our country... the vacuum, which was created mistakenly by distancing from Atatürk's principles, was tried to be filled by astray ideologies...*<sup>6</sup>

Hence, rather surprisingly, Islam was employed by the military as an instrument for consolidating and institutionalizing the post-1980 regime. In concrete terms, the steps taken in this direction in Turkey involved the introduction of religious education in primary schools as well as an increase in the powers of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the key state institution responsible for the administration of religious affairs in an otherwise secular state. This was done by increasing the financial resources available to it. The introduction of compulsory religious education clearly represented a retreat from the basic principles of militant secularism.<sup>7</sup>

As a result of these and other similar policies, the relationship between the Military Regime and Islam became subject of many discussions. In this context Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and Intellectuals' Hearth were frequently

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<sup>6</sup> Evren, *Kenan Evren'in*, Vol:2, 383-384.

<sup>7</sup> Ziya Öniş, "The political economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey: the rise of the Welfare Party in perspective" *Third World Quarterly*. 18 (1997), 749-751.

expressed phrases in such political debates. There have been many different viewpoints with regard to the role and influence of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as put forward by the Intellectuals' Hearth, on the 1980 Military Regime. There is of course the division between pro-synthesis people and its opponents.<sup>8</sup>

Especially the opponents of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis perceived the synthesis and the Hearth as the bases of the social, cultural policies of the 1980 Military Regime and the civilian regime following it. In other words many people argued that the changes in Turkish political, social and cultural life made by the 1980 Military Regime were at least in accordance with the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse of Intellectuals' Hearth. According to many authors the ideology of Intellectuals' Hearth is officialized after 1983.<sup>9</sup> In this respect it is also argued that the changes in the contents of the high school history textbooks after 1980 can be explained by the effectiveness of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in the education policies of the regimes in 1980s. On the other hand there is the view rejecting the role of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as against to the argument that it was used as a basis for ideological legitimization by the military regime in

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<sup>8</sup> Although the opponents may have some different reasons they seem to have consensus on the view that "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis damages the secularist character of the Republic" The Cumhuriyet daily has been the center of this kind of expressions. But there are also many academics such as Bozkurt Güvenç, Vecihi Timuroğlu, state that Islam tendency of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is a threat to secularism principle. For instance, Taha Parla argues that "Turkey, after 1980, lagged behind 1920s in terms of secularism. Religion was risen again by the state in the 1980 Constitution. After 1980 coup d'etat there have been a conscious political-ideological intervention in order to strengthen the position of religion in the state and society. There is a social project and political plan." Taha Parla, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Rejimi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yay., 1995), 217.

<sup>9</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 59.

the 1980s. The Intellectuals' Hearth tried to insert the Islam factor into the official ideology, which is Kemalism.

In the 1980s Turkey was not a monolithic country in ideological and cultural terms.<sup>10</sup> However this does not mean that the political power did not have a particular understanding of history. In this respect official ideology and history understanding of Kemalists have been dominant in Turkish history writing.<sup>11</sup> An evolution which advances gradually from the death of Atatürk till today has led to the formation of a history writing which covers Islamic values and past more. Whereas the official ideology, which is established on Kemalist values, was not examined overtly as the semi-official ideologies. This culmination produces an odd discourse mess which can also be seen in the school textbooks.<sup>12</sup> In order to understand the mess hidden under the apparently monotonous Kemalism, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis has to be analyzed. Thus this chapter aims to clarify the blurred meaning, characteristics, role and functions of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse put forward by Intellectuals' Hearth in the early 1970s, in relation to the ties established with the 1980 military regime.

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<sup>10</sup> Halil Berktaş. "Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Tarihçiliğin Durumu ve 'Dilinin Evrenselleşmesi' Üzerine Düşünceler" in *Tarih Öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları*, ed. Salih Özbaran, (İstanbul: Dokuz Eylül Yay. 1998), 80.

<sup>11</sup> Here and after the term "official ideology" is used in a limited sense, meaning Kemalist understanding which is expressed systematically in the "Great Speech" of Mustafa Kemal. See *ibid*, 79-80.

<sup>12</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 54.



## 2.2. Intellectuals' Hearth

The Intellectuals' Hearth is a right-wing elitist political association established in 1970. Most of the constituent members are academics and scientists. Here are some remarkable names: *İbrahim Kafesoğlu*, the founder of the Hearth and one of the most famous theoretician of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis put forward by the Hearth, is a historian. Among other important figures there is *Muharrem Ergin*, who is an expert on the Orhun inscriptions, a philologist and a historian; *Nevzat Yalçıntaş*, the economist, who was brought to the directorate of the Hearth and was one of the responsible figures of nationalist daily *Türkiye* for a few years; *Ahmet Kabaklı*, a columnist for the same daily. The hearth members define the Intellectuals' Hearth as “an association defending Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, and taking sides with the state under any condition”.<sup>13</sup> They do not give much importance to increasing the number of the Hearth members. For the founders it is more valuable to bring together politically important persons, technocrats, bureaucrats and academics and to emphasize the intellectual development of Turkish-nationalist views in right wing politics.<sup>14</sup>

When the general profile of the members of the hearth is examined, it is seen that they are pro-status quo. They are unconditionally on the side of state.

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<sup>13</sup> Vecihi Timuroğlu, *Türk İslam Sentezi*, (Ankara: Başak Yay., 1991), 138.

<sup>14</sup> Tanıl Bora/ Kemal Can, *Devlet, Ocak, Dergah: 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket* (İstanbul: İletişim Y., 1994), 147.

They are addicted to “strong state” notion to which they give a great importance in correlating with Turkish history and mythology. Thus they are Turkish nationalists. Anti-Communism and the blessing of the state authority are two of the important factors in identifying them. They also reduced Islam’s role to an instrumental one, at least during the initial years. In their perspective religion is only one of the elements that form a nation. So it can be argued that the Intellectuals' Hearth has maintained a secular, conservative understanding in its general characteristics.<sup>15</sup>

The Hearth targets to see the events and problems calmly and to find long term solutions despite the very tensioned political atmosphere. Article 2 of the Charter of Intellectuals' Hearth states that the purpose of the association is “to spread Turkish nationalist ideas by developing national culture and consciousness, to survive and strengthen the elements that form national existence by struggling against the ideological crisis and the anarchy concept which upset our national structure.”<sup>16</sup>

In order to explain the motives behind the establishment of Intellectuals' Hearth, the xenophobia and fear psychology of the founders should also be mentioned. This psychology was strengthened by the Cold War environment. The source of the fears was the anxiety of rightist intellectuals with regard to the

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<sup>15</sup> *ibid*, 156.

<sup>16</sup> Charter of Intellectuals' Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı Tüzüğü).

break up of the power block of right wing politics and the masses.<sup>17</sup> In the late 1960s the Justice Party (JP) was losing its character as the “great right wing federation”. Newly established parties such as the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and the Nationalist Salvation Party (NSP), were the manifestation of this social division in the political arena. With these new political actors coming onto the scene, JP’s anti-Communist, conservative Islamic and nationalist discourse started to fragment. So the danger of permanent division of the rightists came to the surface. Of course, the rightist intellectuals were among the ones who saw this process as a danger. Looking at a picture, in which the Republican People’s Party (RRP) was more moving towards a Social Democratic line, the leftist revolutionary movement was gaining more power, and they believed, at a time when the right was weak there is a real Communist danger.<sup>18</sup> The members of the hearth were arguing for a powerful state. In relation to their fears, they believed a weak state would bring the destruction of Turkish society, so they wanted unity.

In order to overcome this danger and strengthen the rightist power block, the intellectuals, academics and writers who founded the Hearth believed in the necessity of a common rightist rhetoric. In order to form this they were in contact not only with the NAP but with other right wing political parties.<sup>19</sup> They

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<sup>17</sup> Bozkurt Güvenç and et al. *Türk-Islam Sentezi*. (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi. Eylül 1994), 155.

<sup>18</sup> Bora Tanıl/ Kemal Can, *Devlet*, 147.

<sup>19</sup> However, as Tanıl Bora argues, “the Turkist-nationalist pasts of first president İbrahim Kafesoğlu and Muharrem Ergin, the political representative of the hearth made it, a bridge between JP and NAP at least in the initial years of foundation” *ibid*, 147.

wanted to strengthen and increase the common views between the JP, the NAP and the NSP. They strongly supported the idea that “Turkish nationalism cannot be a matter of any individual party; on the contrary, Turkish nationalists should work hard in making their views predominant in all other parties”.<sup>20</sup> For them the NAP was just first among the equals. In accordance with this argument they supported the National Front governments in the 1970s. They also supported the military regime and the Motherland Party in 1980s in accordance with the same perspective.

In those years, when the stability in Turkey seemed to be in danger, the Hearth helped nationalists and Islamists to unite their views around Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, which they see as “the source of personality and even the existence of Turkish people and Turkish nation<sup>21</sup>”. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis version which was developed by the founders of the hearth, forms the basis of their understanding of Turkish politics. In this sense the hearth publishes books and periodicals to spread the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse and in their opinion this helps the intellectual development of the right. Muharrem Ergin’s *Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri*, İbrahim Kafesoğlu’s *Türk İslam Sentezi* are the most known books. In addition to these, many periodicals are published such as *Ocak Araştırma ve İnceleme Dergisi*, *Aydınlar Ocağı Bülteni*. *Tercüman* and *Ortadoğu* are the most known dailies which give support to

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<sup>20</sup> Timuroğlu, *Türk*, 140.

<sup>21</sup> Güvenç and et al. *Türk-Islam*, 189.

Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and Intellectuals' Hearth in the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>22</sup> It can be argued that it was influential in constructing rightist public opinion by organizing conferences, meetings, seminars, congresses, colloquiums on various subjects of Turkish politics and by publishing books and periodicals.

In terms of the relation between the Hearth and the 1980 Military Regime, they supported the latter unconditionally by stressing Turkey's characteristics as being a military-nation and they made a special effort to have good relations with the army. In 1982 when it was prohibited to propose any plan on behalf of institutions, they had the privilege to give hearth's constitutional draft to the National Security Council. The Intellectuals' Hearth's founders later claimed that 75-80 % of the 1982 Constitution was the same as their draft.<sup>23</sup>

In order to understand the place and importance of the Hearth, it is necessary to see the main arguments of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis version which made the Intellectuals' Hearth famous.

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<sup>22</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 58.

<sup>23</sup> Güvenç and et al, *Türk-Islam*, 154.



### 2.3. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis

From the 1980s onwards the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse,<sup>24</sup> which was put forward by the Intellectuals' Hearth, became the main instrument and symbol of the hearth and of right-wing intellectuals. It is important to that the attempt to form a synthesis between Turkish, Islamic and Western values goes back to the times of Ottoman Empire. Ziya Gökalp, for instance, is accepted as the father of such views. Kemalism is also accepted as a synthesis effort since the roots of its nationalism premises in the arguments of Ziya Gökalp. Taha Parla puts the difference between the various syntheses as the stress on either factor and/or their order. For example in Kemalism the Islam factor is minimized, while others -namely Turkish and the West- are valued more.<sup>25</sup>

After the 1970s Turkish-Islamic Synthesis would be dominant besides the ideology shaped during 1930s, there would be a move from one discourse to other. Since the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis does not belong to a certain political group or party it is not easy to examine this political current. Its discourse is produced by different belongings which differ from each other in terms of

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<sup>24</sup> It is called a discourse because it didn't provide a deep analysis for bringing different synthesis versions together, it only formed ideological identity bases and a political argument. Bora characterizes the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as an eclectic and vulgar discourse rather than a coherent theory. See Bora, Tanıl/ Kemal Can, *Devlet*, 161.

<sup>25</sup> Parla, *Türkiye'nin*, 217.

referring Kemalism or Islam more or less as their sources. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is evidently expressed in many books, newspapers or cultural magazines, but its ideas are only expressed in a veiled way in the educational or academic history discourse. Their relations with the political power was not clear neither. Although it is not possible to argue that it became a state ideology it can be argued that it penetrated to the discourses produced by some state institutions.

Turkish-Islamic Synthesis can be defined partly as an anti-Western reaction. Although there is an emphasis on Islam, instead of limiting itself with the values in the Koran, it aims to turn back to the “national culture” which is seen as a synthesis of Turks own past and Islam. According to these views Islam is senior than Turkish culture and without it Turkish culture could not live. On the other hand, Turkish culture protected and strengthened Islam, if Turkish culture was not there Islam would become atrophied. In accordance with this approach, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse is heavily based on history and especially on the history of periods and places Turks and Islam came face to face namely Aral-Caspian region, Iran-Afghanistan plateau, 9-11 century Anatolia.<sup>26</sup>

In order to understand the version put forward by Intellectuals' Hearth, it would be beneficial to see their reaction to group called “humanists”. After the death of Atatürk we witness the rise of a history writing called “humanist” and

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<sup>26</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 56.

which oppose Kemalist history writing (but without denying Kemalism) and turns its face to the West. The nationalist opposition to the humanists criticized their Westernism and created Turkish-Islamic Synthesis version based on the Asian and Muslim characteristics of Turkish history.<sup>27</sup> The “humanist” movement continue its presence in some of the school textbooks until the end of 1986, then it leaves its place to the new history perspective which forms a synthesis between Kemalism, nationalism and Islam.

So it is a nationalist ideology which defines Turkish personality through Islam which is a religious, ethic and identity based source. However supporters of this synthesis do not want to establish a theocratic power.<sup>28</sup> The theoreticians of the “synthesis” agree fully with Kemalism in giving back the belief to Turkish personality, but their attitude towards “humanist” period is rigid. According to them these are the lost years in which Western view (that is made official by RPP) became dominant.

Turkish-Islamic Synthesis of the Hearth is seen as an attempt to form a common platform between the NAP’s and the NSP’s versions and the official synthesis. Its success stems from the fact that authoritarian regime design it presented on the basis of this discourse corresponds to the military regime’s ideological support and legitimization needs. In other words the Turkish-Islamic

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<sup>27</sup> *ibid*, 54.

<sup>28</sup> “Just as in Europe Christian values formed the bases of some conservative currents, here Islam also is integrated to the politics.” *ibid*, 57.

Synthesis discourse in any case emerged as an alternative to the existing ideology, namely Kemalism. It is not against Kemalism, on the contrary it accepts all the principles of Atatürk.

*Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü* (Research Institute for Turkish Culture) and its publication *Türk Kültürü* played an important role in the dissemination of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse.<sup>29</sup> But main arguments of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis can be found in the book, *Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Meseleleri* (The Problems of Turkey Today) written by Muharrem Ergin. In this book Ergin identifies Turkey's problems under the following headings: survival, political tranquillity, economic development, the dominance of reason and science, and national education. The last one is the most important because of its implications for all other problems. In his opinion, since the national education has been ruined the dominance of reason and science can not be established, so economic development can not be achieved; since the problem of economic development is not solved there is no political tranquillity and stability; and because of the absence of political stability, Turkey now faces the danger of vanishing.<sup>30</sup>

Ergin continues by claiming that the reason for the crisis of national education in Turkey, which is the cause of the economic and political crisis

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<sup>29</sup> *ibid*, 55.

<sup>30</sup> Muharrem Ergin, *Türkiye'nin Bugünkü Meseleleri*, (İstanbul:Aydınlar Ocağı Yayınları, 1973), 388.

generally, is “the spoilt intellectuals<sup>31</sup>”. The solution is the nationalization of education, which mean teaching students the features of national culture intensively. He lists the elements in the nationalization of education as being the Turkish language, customs and traditions, a nationalist world view, religion, art and history.<sup>32</sup> The worldview should cover various subjects ranging from loyalty to the state and the military. Students have to be taught that individuals can only live under the authority of a state and obedience to state authority is a virtue.<sup>33</sup>

He emphasizes that Turkish nation is a military nation and military should live in the best conditions, even though the civilian population is living in worse conditions, because the army is united with the Turkish nation. Every individual should take pains to ensure that there is no single opposition between army and the nation.<sup>34</sup>

On the subject of religion Ergin states that, as a vital element of national culture, religion should be protected from every attack and abuse and it should be penetrated into every individual’s mind.<sup>35</sup> This is one of the points of differentiation between Kemalism and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. In the former there is no mention of there is any mention of religion in constituting of national identity. Mustafa Kemal explains the absence of religion in the concept of

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<sup>31</sup>By “spoilt intellectuals” Turkish-Islamic Synthesis supporters mean either the leftist or humanist intellectuals. See İbrahim Kafesoğlu, *Türk İslam Sentezi* (İstanbul: Aydınlar Ocağı, 1985), 53.

<sup>32</sup> Ergin, *Türkiye'nin*, 389.

<sup>33</sup> Kafesoğlu, *Türk İslam*, 53.

<sup>34</sup> Ergin, *Türkiye'nin*, 390.

<sup>35</sup> *ibid*, 388-400.



culture as follows: “Turks were a great nation also before they accepted Islam as their religion. After they did so, ... it caused to loosen the national bonds of Turkish people, it also diminished their national feelings and excitements.”<sup>36</sup>

On the other hand according to the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, Islam is the best suiting religion to the Turkish nation and this is why Turks accepted Islam, as if they had found the religion they had been looking for. However, Islam is only one of the elements of Turkish national culture. Another important figure in the Intellectuals' Hearth, İbrahim Kafesoğlu emphasizes Turks superior characteristic as being the first law making nation, the power to administer the whole world and gives another reason for Turks being integrated with Islam as the need of Islamic world for them. In his book *Turkish Islamic Synthesis* Kafesoğlu argues that Islam had been re-strengthened by the power of Turks at a time of weakness because of divisions among Muslims. Turks not only saved Islam but also developed it. Kafesoğlu claims that the practice of secularism is first seen in Turkish history and they carried this secularism into Islam.<sup>37</sup> Muharrem Ergin states another main feature of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse as Turkish history should be taught from the very beginning as a proof of advanced Turkish national culture.<sup>38</sup> According to this understanding teaching only the national history is adequate for history education.

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<sup>36</sup> Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları, 1993), 152-153.

<sup>37</sup> Kafesoğlu, *Türk İslam*, 176-182, 193, 198.

<sup>38</sup> Ergin, *Türkiye 'nin*, 401-402.

As to the function of religion in this synthesis, Süleyman Seyfi Ögün argues that as in the case of Kemalism it is clear religion would help Kemalism as a second ideological tool in the ideological homogenization of citizens, in the de-politicization of society and in the prevention of pluralistic politics. Kemalism and Islam, two worldviews that are impossible to reconcile, can still be used functionally as the bases of an authoritarian state.<sup>39</sup>

All these efforts to reconcile Islam and Kemalism are the signs of the desire of founders to prove that they are not against Kemalism. According to Ergin, the most important characteristic of Atatürk's period was the praise of "national culture". But later on "cosmopolitan intellectuals" replaced it with humanism. The very reason for the crisis of pre-12 September is that the national cultural policies were not followed, which meant that the condition for being a nation state was not fulfilled. Ergin sees the 1980 intervention as an opportunity, which may not occur again and argues that it is the turning point in order to, re-establish the dominance of the national culture and achieve the Second Renaissance after Atatürk's Renaissance in Turkey.<sup>40</sup>

In order to achieve this Turkish Renaissance and to form the basis for the solution of urgent problems "political tranquillity" has to be achieved. In this discourse, although there was full political tranquillity during Atatürk's period, it was destroyed because democracy in Turkey was practiced wrongly. In this

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<sup>39</sup> S. Seyfi Ögün, *Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türkiye*, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yay.,1995), 188.

<sup>40</sup> Ergin, *Türkiye'nin*, 213.

failure the national culture's loss of hegemonic position has an important place. For Ergin, democracy means the national will and national will means national culture. Thus in order to say that a government or a regime as democratic national culture must stand at the center of politics.<sup>41</sup> In this sense according to Ergin 1980 coup d'état was an intervention to re-establish a democracy on the basis of national culture. There are also some other factors for the wrong practice of democracy. Bora argues that these factors and the regime design based on these factors are completely legitimizing the political regime that military regime tried to institutionalize.<sup>42</sup>

The leading figures of the Intellectuals' Hearth supported even the mostly criticized characteristic of 1982 Constitution, which is limiting the civil and political liberties of the citizens. In Muharrem Ergin's opinion;

*In Turkey there is the problem of freedom. The fight for freedom, which emerged as a threat freedom against state, authority and social order is only an affectation poisoning democracy. Turkey has suffered not from the absence of freedom but from its abuse.*<sup>43</sup>

Ergin claims that the 1982 Constitution satisfies Turkey's all needs for a century. According to Ergin and other ideologues of Intellectuals' Hearth, every individual country has a unique political practice that suits its society. The existence of a parliament and the change of government through free elections are a sufficient condition to prove the existence of democracy. In terms of the

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<sup>41</sup> *ibid.* 230.

<sup>42</sup> Bora Tanıl/ Kemal Can, *Devlet*, 165.

<sup>43</sup> Ergin, *Türkiye'nin*, 220.

West part of the synthesis, hearth members suggest to take the technology and civilization in the light of reason and logic. Accordingly they argue for “true Kemalism” in which nationalism is the core. Ziya Gökalp is accepted as the father of Atatürk’s “Turkish cultural nationalism”. They isolate civilization and culture concepts on the basis of Gökalp’s differentiation<sup>44</sup> and disregard the relations and activation between them.

In short, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse’s practical meaning doesn’t rest in the comprehensiveness of its uniting the three factors but rather in uniting the synthesis efforts with an authoritarian rhetoric and with the famous fear theme of 12 September regime and of military officers generally that “Turkey is surrounded with enemies from all directions.” Among these enemies even the Asian-African countries and United Nations organization are listed.<sup>45</sup> İbrahim Kafesoğlu says “Turks, who are facing substantial dangers, need a courageous development and a movement based on conviction.”<sup>46</sup>

This emphasis on ‘enemies’ is consistent with the chauvinistic understanding of being Turkish and the conception of national culture as the motor of history. Turkish culture is “one of the few great cultures that exist on earth, and it created a form of society which gives direction to world history. According to Muharrem Ergin the most important characteristic of Turkish

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<sup>44</sup> Taha Parla, *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye’de Korporatizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993), 54-72.

<sup>45</sup> Ergin, *Türkiye’nin*. 74-76.

<sup>46</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 57.

culture is its success in establishing a state, which he perceives as the most important activity of human societies. He argues that this characteristic is sufficient for proving the universal superiority of Turkish national culture. Turks had established more than one hundred states, more than any other nations in history, and they are the only nation who succeeded in having a state for two thousand years uninterruptedly.<sup>47</sup> According to this view since the history of humanity is a struggle of national cultures, all political and social developments are perceived within the framework of the war of national cultures to affect and to resist each other. In this sense culture is the national security concern of a nation, which comes before anything else.<sup>48</sup>

For the supporters of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, because education plays a vital role in the development of a nation, it is obvious that Turkey's development and rise can be achieved first by solving the problems of national education and its reformation. There has to be a national cultural policy along with the economic policy pursued by Turkey. Thus there is a need for a national culture policy which will evaluate, determine and preserve national integrity and unity in Turkey where there is cultural imperialism in which the national and spiritual value judgments are wanted to be destroyed by fanatic ideologies.

The main problem is accepted as the need to make national education and cultural policies the instruments of Turkey's development in the economic

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<sup>47</sup> Ergin, *Türkiye'nin*. 27-28.

<sup>48</sup> *ibid.*, 33; Bora Tanıl/ Kemal Can, *Devlet*, 163.

and social spheres. The desired development has to be based on a policy in which economic and cultural elements complete each other. The magical power that allows nations to survive and develop stems from the mix and combination of national and spiritual values in the same basket. In this sense healthy, positive and efficient national education and cultural policies are necessary for national survival. Education represents the values that make one nation different from others.

Accordingly if the Turkish nation is left in the hands of a generation that is deprived of national consciousness and national culture, admirer of imperialism and various ideologies (i.e. Communism, Socialism), it would become a society that is open to every threat of destruction. Turkey's future existence will be in secure hands if young people are aware of the national culture and the national history.<sup>49</sup>

#### **2.4. Neo-Kemalism and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis**

Intellectuals' Hearth sees the reason of crisis of the 1970s as having material, moral and spiritual causes. As mentioned above according to the Hearth members, every national education relies on a national culture. Thus the

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<sup>49</sup> İsmet Binark, "Milli Eğitim ve Kültür Politikamız Üzerine Düşünceler", **Ankara Aydınlar Ocağı Bülteni**. Sayı 3-4, (Temmuz-Aralık 1987), 6-8.

point of support for Turkey naturally has to be Turkish culture. One of the basic foundations of Turkish culture and its moral essence is the Muslim faith. If there is not this element in our worldview that would direct all of our affairs and national education, then there is no possibility of counting that view as a national one.<sup>50</sup> Culture that is the basis of state also requires obedience.<sup>51</sup>

The state understanding of the Intellectuals' Hearth as “being pious but not religious” was institutionalized during the 1980 military regime and Motherland Party governments while the members of the National Security Council was still in power although it was transformed into the Council of Presidency. In other words the influence of the discourse framed within the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was strengthened over the official rhetoric while the officers were still in power though behind the curtains. However this should not lead us to conclude that the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis had permanent ideological hegemony in Turkish politics in the 1980s. The military’s tendency was to utilize some of its elements rather than depend solely on it.

On the other hand the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis did not achieve the initial purpose of integrating the two extreme points of Turkish rightist political discourse, which was the *raison d’être* of the Intellectuals' Hearth. It could not bring together the political traditions on ideological grounds that it claimed to

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<sup>50</sup> S. Gökdemir, “Ahlak Dersleri”, *Ocak Araştırma ve İnceleme Dergisi*. Sayı 10, (Nisan 1974), 12-14.

<sup>51</sup> Şükrü Er, “Milli Kültür ve Milli Birlik Üzerine” *Ankara Aydınlar Ocağı Bülteni*. Sayı 2, (Haziran 1987), 3-6.

compose in the same box neither tied them politically. Ideologically its high eclecticism was an obstacle while politically the reason was that their highly reliance on military regime created a reaction among people. Therefore the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis couldn't become a ground for political unification of NSP/WP's Islamic movement and NAP/NWP's nationalist movement.

In short this "ideology" emphasizes joining Turkish nationalism and Islam as the only viable channel for creating a strong Turkey. In addition, the Synthesis identifies various enemies of social culture who need to be eliminated. These are atheists, separatists and Western humanists, members of other religions, those who blame Islam for the collapse of Ottoman Empire, and leftist, elitist and etatist intellectuals. The synthesis envisions a coalition of with the military.<sup>52</sup>

According to the followers of the Hearth, the Westernization of the Turkish culture was realized by some cultural institutions the national education, radio-television and Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Institution). For this reason they demanded from state a tougher control over these institutions in May 1980.<sup>53</sup> 1980 Military Coup D'état did not damage Intellectuals' Hearth, on the contrary their accomplishments were appreciated by the new regime which officialized religion's place in the society by strengthening Kemalist on the one

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<sup>52</sup>Birol Yeşilada, "Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East" in *The Political and Socio-economic transformation of Turkey*, Atilla Eralp and et al (Westport: Praeger, 1993), 177.

<sup>53</sup> Güvenç and et al, *Türk-Islam*, 187-194.



hand, by making religious lessons compulsory at every level of schools on the other hand. In 1983, State Planning Organization (SPO) proposed a “national culture report” in order to increase and make continuous the state control over cultural policy. On the other hand in 1986 *Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu* (Atatürk Culture, Language and History Higher Institution, established by 1982 Constitution) followed a policy which was interpreted as the acceptance of the ideas of Intellectuals' Hearth by the media of the time.<sup>54</sup>

The military in Turkey have always been one of the central institutions of the Republican elite and a traditional and uncompromising stronghold of secular and territorial nationalism. With the turbulent experience of the 1970s at the back of their minds, however, the military elite conceived Islam as a major instrument for promoting social and political stability. Consequently, they favored legislation within the broad framework of what is known as the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis”, a mixture of nationalism and Islam, as a firm barrier against potential sources of instability.<sup>55</sup>

It is generally accepted that there is a positive relation between Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and the 1980 military regime. At least there are many similarities between the policies of officers and the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. As Tanıl Bora has argued, a positive relationship between the hearth and the

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<sup>54</sup> The text of the 1983 National Culture Report can be seen in the Güvenç and et al, *Türk-Islam*, 48-68; the report accepted by the AKDITYK is also in the same book, 69-111.

<sup>55</sup> Öniş, “The political”, 747.

military regime can not be explained only by the argument that the former is “using Kemalism as a tool”.<sup>56</sup> According to the Intellectuals’ Hearth members, Atatürk’s period is the time of happiness. They argue that Atatürk was the greatest Turkish nationalist, a strong anti-Communist and a realist Turanist. Their support for Atatürk and his period is based on the idea of “Atatürk as the best Turkish nationalist” and the belief that “during his period the state took national culture as its basis,<sup>57</sup> as opposed to leftists. According to the Hearth members the “proxy authority”, that shapes and sets a course for social structure and process, takes its legitimacy from being in accordance with national culture. This is the motor of history, and thus devotion to national culture is a sufficient condition for political authority to be legitimate. Thus Kemalist authoritarianism, which identifies people’s will with the nation and the nation’s will with the state, materializing language, history and cultural unity in itself,<sup>58</sup> has common ideological factors with this argument.<sup>59</sup>

#### 2.4.1. *Ideological Rhetoric*

Bora claims that, the most practical benefit that the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis provided to the 12 September regime was its articulation of Islam as

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<sup>56</sup> Bora, Tanıl / K. Can, *Devlet*, 161.

<sup>57</sup> Ergin, *Türkiye ’nin*, 24-25; Bora, Tanıl/ Kemal Can, *Devlet*, 154.

<sup>58</sup> Köker, *Modernleşme*, 115-117.

<sup>59</sup> Bora, Tanıl/ Kemal Can, *Devlet*, 156.

part of the official ideology. Since it proposes a synthesis without decreasing the importance of Turkish and West factors, its convergence with official ideology was made easier. The meaning of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse according to Intellectuals' Hearth is a Turkish-Islamic-Western synthesis. It doesn't eliminate the West, to the extent that the technological, economic, political and military alliances are not disregarded. It is also stated that Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is a new formula in terms of its installation rather than its elements. Neither can it be regarded as new in terms of serving the purpose of legitimizing and strengthening the various elements of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state tradition.<sup>60</sup> In this sense Abdurrahman Dilipak defines this synthesis as "Kemalism-Islam synthesis."<sup>61</sup>

After 1980 almost all parts of the political spectrum, except for revolutionary socialists and radical Muslims, tried to bring forward the points that can reconcile Islam with Kemalist ideology and they even tried to be the dominant one in the designation of official interpretation of Kemalism.<sup>62</sup> Thus, the domination of Kemalism over social, political and cultural life in Turkey, which reached a totalitarian level during the officers regime in 1980. However there were various versions of Kemalism and changes in these versions. Because the version that army adopted, deprived military regime of an integrated and

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<sup>60</sup> *ibid*, 161.

<sup>61</sup> Quoted in *ibid*, 161-162.

<sup>62</sup> *ibid*, 149.

coherent doctrinal equipment, there occurred a necessity to use Kemalism in conformity with the new regime's needs. Along this necessity an authoritarian-extreme rightist version of Kemalism emerged. However since Kemalism was a "cold" official ideology which became identical with the state authority, its ability to form the ideological ground for a civilian-social agreement was very limited. The rapid politicization and ideological struggle of the 1960-80 period in Turkey created an accumulation that made the obtaining of ideological hegemony difficult.<sup>63</sup>

It is also true that as a negative factor, this hegemony crisis, together with the de-politicization and social weariness on the eve of 12 September, was in favor of military regime. Whereas military regime lacked a positive factor that would form a popular ideological activism and communication tool, the organic support of a civilian institutional or social power. This weakness signified the absence of a massive and popular ideological consent as well as the inability of officers to establish an ideological hegemony. Military regime removed this obstacle by including religion in the official ideological equipment. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse of Intellectuals' Hearth, which had acquired the greatest harmony with military regime, was effective in terms of satisfying this need.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> *ibid*, 147.

<sup>64</sup> *ibid*, 148.

In one of his speeches for promoting the new Constitution General Evren stated his ideas on the secularism principle as follows:

*One of the main principles of our republic founded by Atatürk is secularism. Secularism is not religious enmity. (Before 1980) Turkish children could not have any information about the religion of Turkish nation, their families, their parents. This religious information can not be taught at home. If parents try this is not a proper action. Because parents may teach wrong, defect things or they can teach only their understanding of religion... We made religious courses compulsory at schools.*<sup>65</sup>

He believes that by introducing compulsory religious courses at primary schools he is contributing to secularism. Because according to him “secularism does not mean to deprive Turkish youth, Turkish citizens of religious knowledge and leave them (weak against abuses) to be deceived and misled.”<sup>66</sup> But according to General Evren the “true” religious education can be given only by state. These views are in conformity with the Islam understanding of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.

#### 2.4.2. Education

The officers came to the power with the claim that Turkey was in a political, social and economic crisis which was not being dealt with properly by

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<sup>65</sup>Evren, *Kenan Evren'in*, vol:3, 309

<sup>66</sup>ibid, 309-310.

the civilian authorities. İnal argues that the officers believed the pre-1980 social and political crisis resulted from Western democratic values.<sup>67</sup> His argument is true in the sense that the officers' regime either suspended or destroyed many democratic institutions with the claim of bringing social order. There has been given a large place to conservative values intensively against the democratic values and structures.<sup>68</sup> These are all similar to the arguments of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse.

Kemal İnal states that after 12 September 1980, education as an institution in general and textbooks specifically were attributed the ideological reproduction instrument role.<sup>69</sup>

The Intellectuals' Hearth argued for compulsory religious lessons in the secondary schools and also in the prisons, in the army and factories in 1981.<sup>70</sup> The officers adopted an approach that valued religion as a factor providing unity and entirety for the society. This fact is symbolized by the Constitutional guarantee for compulsory religious lessons in secondary schools and by the frequent references to the Koran in the public appearances of the head of the National Security Council. The preamble of the 1982 Constitution refers to the

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<sup>67</sup> Kemal İnal, *Eğitimde İdeolojik Boyut*, (Ankara: Doruk Yay., 1996), 22.

<sup>68</sup> Timuroğlu, *Türk*, 138-140.

<sup>69</sup> İnal, *Eğitimde*, 118.

<sup>70</sup> Bolay, S. Hayri, quoted in Bora, Tanıl/ Kemal Can, *Devlet*, 174.

expression of “holly religious feelings”. Such expressions are the reflections of the influence of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is in the constitution.

### 2.4.3. *Cultural Policy*

Güvenç examines a case important for showing the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse’s assimilation into the official ideology and its acceptance by the army, perceiving itself as the guarantor of official ideology. In the above mentioned report, accepted by the Atatürk, Language and History High Council, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was proposed as the framework for the official national cultural policy and religion was accepted as the uniting factor of the nation.<sup>71</sup> Bora notes that while it is not possible to argue that this proposal was accepted at all levels of Kemalist civilian and military bureaucracy, it is important even as an attempt. He also points to the influence of US-NATO political strategy in thinking of integrating Islam and the official ideology. This strategy valued moderate Islam as a weapon against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East in late 1970s.<sup>72</sup>

The report on national culture prepared by the State Planning Office in 1983 also reflected this Islamic policy. It emphasized Atatürk’s directive that the

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<sup>71</sup> Güvenç and et al, *Türk-Islam*, 69.

<sup>72</sup> Bora, Tanıl/ Kemal Can, *Devlet*, 177-178.

“Turkish nation should be pious”.<sup>73</sup> On the other hand Ögün argues that this report had a collective characteristics, just as the report prepared by the RRP government in 1979 did. He points out that while the former aims at preserving national, spiritual and holy values, the latter aims at the modernization of Turkish society. However, in the last instance both reports wanted to be a guide and orientated the culture rather than leaving it into the hands of society.<sup>74</sup>

#### 2.4.4. Evaluation

The perspectives on relations between the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis of Intellectuals' Hearth and the ideology of the 1980 military regime can be divided into components. One argues that religion was used as a tool by the officers to reach their ends and so political Islam was strengthened. The other viewpoint argues that this process was not a novelty on the contrary, it was a continuation of traditional state-religion relations in Turkey.

Taha Parla's argument is an example of the first group. According to Parla the military regime's policies such as compulsory religion courses damaged the secular character of the Turkish state. Accordingly Turkey, after 1980,

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<sup>73</sup> Güvenç and et al., *Türk-Islam*, 147.

<sup>74</sup> Ögün, *Modernleşme*, 188.



lagged behind the 1920s in terms of secularism. Religion was elevated again by the state in the 1980 Constitution. After the 1980 coup d'état there was a conscious political-ideological intervention in order to strengthen the position of religion in the state and society. According to Parla there is a social project and political plan for this. He claims that, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is not a real nationalist pro-independence movement nor it represents a fundamentalist Islamist stance against the Western camp like NSP, but is in fact a Turkish-Islamic-NATO Synthesis designed to stop democratic and leftist developments in Turkey.<sup>75</sup> In this view the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is known as the formulation of a movement which aims to give intellectual, ideological and institutional support to the 1980 Military Regime.

On the other hand, although Ögün accepts the positive relation between the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and military regime he opposes the presentation of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, as a conspiracy theory. He argues that the criticisms of the Intellectuals' Hearth and its Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse go beyond the ideological support given to the military coups and is carried to another platform such as “the distortion of Kemalism”. Again within the same argument it is claimed that Kemalism’s secularism principle was damaged by the Intellectuals' Hearth and discourse. Ögün prefers to explain the historical background of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and to discuss it within the limits of

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<sup>75</sup> Parla, *Türkiye'nin*, 217-221.

Turkish culture. He thinks that this synthesis is an eclecticism between nationalism and religion. This eclecticism can be found in other Muslim countries as well as Christian countries such as Poland.<sup>76</sup>

Ögün states that the historical background of the synthesis is goes back to thinkers and authors such as Ziya Gökalp and Peyami Safa. However the literature on Turkish nationalism, which includes the coincidence of religion and nationalism, is a rich one. He claims that in essence Kemalist modernist policies are based on a very traditionalist method: the control of religion by state.<sup>77</sup> It can be claimed that Kemalism continued many Ottoman traditions in general. The Ottomans used official Islam as a legitimization power, similarly Kemalism used the Directorate of Religious Affairs under its control in the modernization affairs. Here religious control should be treated in a wider perspective as being directed towards the control of “individual wills”. Starting from the 1940s the state’s view on religion became more moderate; sometimes covertly and sometimes openly the process of Islamization began. An inseparable dimension of this process is the Islamization of Kemalism.

Starting out from the idea that “Kemalism was understood wrongly” the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis claims that Kemalism, in essence, tolerated Islam and even argues that Mustafa Kemal was a good Muslim believer. The efforts of Evren during the military regime to base Kemalism on Islam was not original.

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<sup>76</sup> Ögün, *Modernleşme*, 178.

<sup>77</sup> *ibid*, 181.

These themes can be seen even during the DP government. What the Intellectuals' Hearth did was to sustain this populism of the DP. The Intellectuals' Hearth is the statist right wing group which wanted to popularize Jacobean Kemalism by using Islam. These can be called legal rights populists. Their ideological bases of Turkism go back to the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. The struggle against the Tanzimat's "extreme pro-Westernism" is now directed by pro-synthesis people against Kemalist Westernism. In addition to this, the pro-synthesis intellectuals' intensive opposition to Communism during the Cold War was articulated on the Pan-Slavism fears inherited from Turkists. The relationship that they established between nationalism and religion is not very different from the relation established by Turkists. Their legitimization bases are intense statism and the Islamic and militarist interpretations of Kemalism.<sup>78</sup>

When it is seen from this perspective it can be claimed that the Intellectuals' Hearth and its activities are not strange to Turkish politics' cultural reality, the bases of which can be found in the Ottoman Empire and which acquired continuity in the republican policies. Then one can ask what the difference is. According to Ögün, the difference is between Jacobinism and populism and way of expression. When it is seen in terms of instruments it would be seen that both policies are coinciding. This point of coincidence is guardianship and imposition from top against the individual initiatives.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Timuroğlu, *Türk*, 138-140; Ögün, *Modernleşme*, 186-187.

<sup>79</sup> Ögün, *Modernleşme*, 188.

Jacobean Kemalists keep the pro-synthesis groups on the agenda. They defined themselves as being in an ideological-cultural war with them.<sup>80</sup> Religion is one of the points of sharp debates between the two Kemalist groups. The Jacobean Kemalist elite sees religion as the very reason of social backwardness while populist elite see it as the focus and source of national culture.<sup>81</sup>

The fear psychology of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is explained above. In Ögün's opinion, in Turkey fear has an important place in the *raison d'être* of most of the political perspectives. This is also true for the two groups mentioned above. Jacobean Kemalists' fears focus on the pro-synthesis intellectuals. Populist Kemalists' fears are focused on the neo-Byzantians. These fears are based on conspiracy theories.<sup>82</sup> These fears also explain the xenophobia of Intellectuals' Hearth.

## 2.5. Conclusion

The September 12, 1980 coup d'état altered not only the Turkish economy and societal structure but the political system and external relations as well. The meanings of right and left, of modernity and backwardness, and of Turkishness were completely revised.

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<sup>80</sup> *ibid*, 192.

<sup>81</sup> *ibid*, 189.

The grand strategy of the military regime, despite its all rhetoric about the maintenance and further development of the secular Kemalist ideology, was to counterbalance the revolutionary leftist forces by providing support to Islamist views. Of course this operation was not overt but carried out insidiously with the idea that a right-wing social force, outside the boundaries of the state, had to be activated to provide a secure basis for conservative forces in the long run.<sup>83</sup> The military regime did not target Islamic forces, but on the contrary it tolerated them.

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<sup>82</sup> *ibid*, 191.

<sup>83</sup> Tünay, "New Right's", 20.

## CHAPTER III

### THE RELATION BETWEEN THE IDEOLOGY AND EDUCATION

#### POLICY

*History is a field of war. People who rebel against the authority and the ones who try to suppress this revolt try to have the support of history with them...Today the dominant history interpretation of the political power penetrates everywhere through textbooks, media and television.<sup>84</sup>*

*John Tosh*

#### 3.1. The History Education and Ideology In General

If scholastic knowledge is examined as a social product, it suggests a great deal about the society that produces and uses it. It reveals which groups have power and demonstrates that the views of these groups are expressed and legitimized in the school curriculum. It can also identify social groups that are not empowered by the economic and social patterns in society and do not have their views, activities, and priorities represented in the school curriculum. Omissions, stereotypes, and distortions that remain in “updated” social studies textbook accounts of such groups reflect the relative powerlessness of these

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<sup>84</sup> John Tosh. *Tarihin Peşinde*, (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1997), 11.

groups.<sup>85</sup> Despite many changes in curriculum content, an underlying concern for the perspectives of the dominant groups generally remains. In other words the basic ideology is not been altered for so many years. Thus one can talk about a continuity over generations of students.

The school curriculum contributes to the formation of attitudes that make it easier for powerful groups, those whose knowledge is legitimized by school studies, to manage and control society. Textbooks not only express the dominant groups' ideologies, but also help to form attitudes in support of their social position. Indeed the importance of ideology to the power of dominant groups increases as the use of overt social coercion declines. In the twentieth century, the authority of tradition and the legitimacy of visible methods of control, such as force, have diminished. Governments and other powerful groups increasingly justify their activities by appeals to 'reason', to the logic of evidence, and to the consent of populations, the public is ostensibly called upon to make intelligent choices.

Inasmuch as social choices are likely to be made on the basis of social knowledge and symbolic meanings that are available, what one knows about social groups and processes is central to one's decisions. The perceived legitimacy of certain ideas increases their acceptance and utilization. Social agencies, such as the schools, the media, and government, whose functions

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<sup>85</sup> Jean Anyon. "Ideology and United States History Textbooks" in *Conflict of Interests: The Politics of American Education* (New York and London: Longman, 1988), 32

include the dissemination of information are major sources of knowledge that is both available and socially approved. If the views embedded in the information disseminated by these agencies predispose people to accept some values and not others, and exclude some choices as unacceptable, then they provide invisible intellectual, internalized, and perhaps unconscious boundaries to social choice. These boundaries are a basis for social management and control.

On the other hand political history deals with all the social factors that are related to the official power structure. The establishment here refers to the “state”. Political history includes the institutional organization of state, the struggle between factions and parties for taking the control of state, the policies imposed by state and the relations between states. For many people these titles form all of the domain of the discipline called as history.

Historically, state is also interested in history writing. On the one hand, the political power or the people struggling for it, resorted to the old times to see how they can best achieve their objectives. At the same time political elites thought that it is to their interest to present a history version which would legitimize their position to masses, they did this either by articulating their past successes or by revealing how old that the institutional structure on which their power is based. The rise and fall of statesmen or nations and empires are the subjects dealt and explained in an impressive and dramatical way.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Tosh, *Tarihin*, 74-75.



History textbook illustrates one way of imposing beliefs and constraining choice. Textbooks offer concrete examples and thus substantive instruction in past ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in social, economic and political matters. Governmental reforms are characterized as successful methods of social recourse, whereas confrontation and opposition are depicted as failures. Evidence of what constitutes success or failure, whether or not it coincides with actual fact, provides a compelling guide for making choices today.<sup>87</sup>

Social meanings in school history can contribute to management and control by the imposition of ideological boundaries, by predisposing some choices and not others, legitimating some ideas, activities and groups not others. The conceptual legitimacy conferred by school knowledge on powerful social groups is metabolized into power that is real when members of society in their everyday decisions support -or fail to challenge- prevailing hierarchies. The idea that these groups have legitimate social power leads to the expectation that these groups deserve our support and contending ones do not.

State, political party in the power or any kind of suppression way whether it is ideological or religious may compel a certain interpretation of the past. It is very rare that the textbooks are left outside of any control mechanism. Even in the countries where the education is not done on a national scale,

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<sup>87</sup> Anyon. “Ideology”, 33.

education is so much important that state never gives up concerning about the contents of the textbooks.<sup>88</sup>

Besides, textbooks are the most read books and they reflect not only the ideas of their authors' views but also official, semi-official views or at least a perspective on which there is a consensus. Textbooks don't go beyond the borders separating the states. The world description in the textbooks does not only belong to a state, in general they are for the young people in that state. They are widespread; but not much translated to other languages and for this reason a discourse that does not have a concern of "how it will reflect the country where it is printed." Reader is young and open to different views and they do not have a critical stand to accompany these readings. On the contrary the rightness of the written material is accepted a priori.<sup>89</sup>

As mentioned above textbook materials are only one of the many conveyors of a discourse that can use some other ways such as television. A school textbook is a result of a dual discourse: Scientific and social. In terms of history, social content has importance because history is one of the courses that convey identity discourse. On the other hand its scientific content is formed by the reflection of the dominant currents of history writing. So a history textbook can be analyzed in terms of these two sides: scientific and social/ideological. In terms of its ideological function again there are two main ways of looking at a

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<sup>88</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 1.

<sup>89</sup> *ibid*, 3.

textbook: External and internal analysis. External analysis is the examination of the production conditions of the textbook discourse. It shows the formation of official discourse passing through various channels; through which law and regulation the ideology is conveyed, how the authors reflect the ideology to the textbooks. On the other hand the internal analysis examines the discourse of the textbooks.<sup>90</sup>

This approach, highlighting the ideological characteristics of what schools teach, suggests that political power has had its perspectives legitimized and indicates that school curricula can lay a subjective basis for social control. Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from the point of view expressed here is that the school curriculum as a major contributor to social and political attitudes can be used to change those attitudes. To argue that ideologies influence behavior is to accord real power to symbols and symbolic forms in education. Just as the school curriculum has hitherto supported patterns of power and domination, so it can be used to foster autonomy and social change.

Social change is intimately connected with changes in available cultural symbols and meanings. Although it is true that ideological shifts in the curriculum are ultimately a reflection of shifts in social and political power, it is

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<sup>90</sup> *ibid*, 5-6.

also true that the availability of ideological alternatives increases the likelihood of power shifts and changes.

### 3.2. The History Education and Ideology In Turkey In 1980s

In Turkey history is used in the process of education for the purpose of devising material in daily politics and designing history concordant with these.<sup>91</sup> Orhan Kolođlu talks about the “presentism” in Turkish history education. According to him presentism, meaning writing history for today, writing it as a justification/legitimization for today’s policies, leads only to political polarization.<sup>92</sup> The decade of the 1980s has witnessed approaches which try to realize the history education in an authoritative way and the historical research in a hierarchical order. The influence of this process can still be observed.<sup>93</sup>

Neumann thinks that there is a big gap between history courses given at schools and the scientific history. After examining “The Purposes of Turkish National Education” and “The Principles of Turkish National Education” which are defined in the Basic Law of National Education and Decree Having The

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<sup>91</sup> Salih Özbaran, *Tarih, Tarihçi ve Toplum*, (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1997), 4.

<sup>92</sup> Orhan Kolođlu, “Tarih Öğretiminde Bugüncülük/Presentism, Yanılsamalar ve Sonuçları”, in *Tarih Öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları*, ed. Salih Özbaran, (İstanbul: Dokuz Eylül Yay. 1998), 96.

<sup>93</sup> Özbaran, *Tarih, Tarihçi*, 98.

Force of Law on the Organization and Duties of Ministry of National Education,<sup>94</sup> Neumann concludes that existing situation which is subject to many criticisms is not contradictory with these officially set objectives. According to these laws, the main purpose of the national education is to create individuals who are concordant with social norms and who realize their duties and responsibilities to the nation. He calls our attention to the fact that the objective to “bring up individuals who have the capacity to think freely and scientifically” is only secondary in the Basic Law (Article 2.2) while it is not even mentioned in the Decree. Both of the laws state that the essential target of education is to “bring up citizens who are faithful to Atatürk’s renovations and principles and to Atatürk’s nationalism..., who adopt, protect and develop national, moral, humane, spiritual and cultural values of Turkish nation, who love his/her family, motherland and nation and who are aware of his/her duties and responsibilities to the Turkish Republic ...”<sup>95</sup>

In this context, Neumann talks about Nietzsche’s three different kinds of history writing: monumentalist, antiquaries, critical history. He finds many similarities between monumentalist and Turkish history writing at secondary schools. The old belief in permanency of greatness and reasons for a great nation still remains valid in such a way that the people and periods that were perceived

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<sup>94</sup> Milli Eğitim Kanunu, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığının Teşkilat ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararname.

<sup>95</sup> Cristoph Neumann, “Tarihin Yararı ve Zararı Olarak Türk Kimliği: Bir Akademik Deneme”, in Tarih Öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları, ed. Salih Özbaran, (İstanbul: Dokuz Eylül Yay. 1998), 106-107.

as glorious are still talked about as the subject of history courses in the present. Since the reasons for greatness are not mentioned monumentalist history is open to political manipulation.<sup>96</sup>

Why is there a similarity between Nietzsche's monumentalist history and Turkish history education? The reason for this is the common characteristics of these texts, which is the assumption that there is one to one correspondence between individuals and people and between people and state.

The Basic Law of National Education advocates a kind of individual that is completely in accordance with society and state living for these. According to the law even the talents and abilities which are peculiar to the individual would be presented to the society's advantage directly. When the fundamental individual image has such a characteristics, an individual's life is determined by the fate of the state and the nation. Individual's identity is hidden in the identity of nation and state. In such an environment the history can only have one function: to bestow the identity of nation.<sup>97</sup>

Neumann proposes a three-phased periodization for the analysis of the history discourse in Turkish identity search: Late Ottoman, early Republican, and late Republican periods. According to Neumann during the first period the aim of the regime was to preserve the existence of state, while during the second period it was to find an identity for the newly established Republic. This was a

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<sup>96</sup> *ibid.*, 108.

<sup>97</sup> *ibid.*, 109.

non-Ottoman identity. The young Republic which was following a typical nation building project applied to the method of Hobsbawm's "invention of tradition" and rejected Ottoman period completely. Instead of Ottoman period, Turkish Central Asian and general history is put forward.

Third period is still continuing. An important component of Turkish History Thesis is its perception of Turkish history as a peculiar one, which can not be compared to any other nation. In this period the paradigm of history thesis is opened to discussion. But no paradigm that is valid everywhere was created. A group feeling close to Islamic values created Turkish-Islamic Synthesis arguing "Turkish history is peculiar" rehabilitated Selchuk and Ottoman periods which were neglected before. This is quite clear in the history courses under the control of Ministry of National Education.<sup>98</sup>

History textbooks stand indecisively between Turkish History Thesis' modern version and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. In general the radical arguments of these two schools of thought do not take place in textbooks. The historical reasons of Turkey's contemporary problems are not mentioned and this is natural in the history understanding which is coded for creating and making Turkish identity great.<sup>99</sup>

It is true that a political culture can not be created by decrees, but it can be manipulated and directed by governmental policies. Our century is full of

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<sup>98</sup> *ibid*, 110.

<sup>99</sup> *ibid*, 111.

cases of “social engineering” aimed at a “legitimization” or “de-legitimization” of political systems. Political struggles of ideology and legitimization, in the long run and in the large measure boils down to the manipulation of the political socialization process.<sup>100</sup> Besides there is ample evidence that not only textbooks, but other aspects of education as well, have served as the legitimization tool of state. But still the textbooks appear as one of the major tools for ideological legitimization of the existing political power, especially when their writing or selection among the written ones is done under the control of political power. In this respect the textbooks of the "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" courses have a special importance. Because this course has been made compulsory at universities for four years under the 1980 Military Regime. It was already a required course at secondary and high schools all around Turkey. So Turkish students learn the contemporary Turkish history (i.e. Republican period) again and again from secondary school till the end of either high school or his/her university education. In other words for many of the students, especially for the secondary and high school students the history textbooks they read are likely to be their major source of information concerning contemporary Turkish history. It is needless to say that this information would have an important affect on their understanding/perception of the Turkish politics. In other words the content of these textbooks has a tremendous effect

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<sup>100</sup> Türker Alkan, *The Political Integration of Europe*, (Ankara: ODTÜ, 1982), 2.



on shaping the political preferences of the future voters. This is especially important in terms of Islam and Kurdish issues.

Apart from the usual rhetorical clichés, there has not been much explicit, comprehensive and authoritative statement on the ideology behind the national education policy implemented during the 1980s when the military was an influential factor in politics. This is hardly surprising since the educational ideology is directly related to, and dependent upon, nationally dominant ideology. As a result one can almost only rely on official texts and statements regarding particular aspects of education, and on indirect indications, in an attempt to establish the essence of the educational ideology which was in effect through measures implemented during 1980-1983.

The issue is particularly important in the case of Turkey because by well-established tradition the alternatives to the official national ideology are quite limited. Since the establishment of the Republic there is a special course which explains and legitimizes the Republican regime's policies. In this context the 1980 Military Regime also made use of education policies in order to spread its own perception of Turkish politics.

In 1980s many changes happened that affect Turkish history writing. After the 1980 military coup d'état the establishment of Higher Education

Council, merge of Turkish History Institution and Turkish Language Institution under Atatürk, Language and History High Council are some of them.<sup>101</sup>

In Turkish history writing, one of the mostly debated subjects is that whether there is a continuity or broken off between the two periods before and after First World War. In the dominant discourse these periods are divided into two as “Ottoman Empire” and “Turkish Republic”.<sup>102</sup> Kemalism is outstanding in the dominant history understanding in the sense that Turkish history writing is limited by this ideological framework. In the dominant discourse the emphasis is always on a clear rupture with the establishment of Republic by Atatürk. The year 1923 is important not only in political sense but also in social and economic senses. According to this understanding politically a completely new and different regime is established, while economically outside interference was stopped and an “independent” development was achieved.<sup>103</sup>

Either the ones perceive a continuity or rupture take the year 1923 as the basic differentiation point. Kansu argues that this is because of the dominant effect of the Kemalist ideology on the works of Turkish history. In other words he observes that even the researches who criticize the established interpretations of the Turkish history can not escape the patterns of Kemalist ideology.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Özbaran, *Tarih, Tarihçi*, 101.

<sup>102</sup> Aykut Kansu, *1908 Devrimi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995). 4.

<sup>103</sup> *ibid.*, 5.

<sup>104</sup> *ibid.*, 7-8.

Etienne Copeaux indicates another characteristics of Turkish history writing by arguing that “in Turkey an ethnic group’s -Turks- history is taught, not the history of daily life or social life. There are contradictions and tensions among the history of Turks, history of Turkey, history of Anatolia and the history of dominant religion.”<sup>105</sup>

Before analyzing the reflection of the ideology of the 1980 Military Regime on the content of "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" textbooks it will be fruitful to give brief information about the laws, rules and regulations implemented by the military regime.

The officers as part of their general social policy were determined to “clear up” the national educational system from people whom they perceive as detrimental to the future of Turkey. Teachers got their share from these practices. First of all with the decree no 1402 thousands of professors and teachers were sacked. In addition to other political organizations of teachers, the Teachers Union is also closed down by the decree of the Ankara Martial Law Headquarters’ 3. Law Court on 25.12. 1981.<sup>106</sup> Besides teachers have to follow the Ministry’s regulations as in all countries where education is a state duty.

Turkish had become a compulsory course for all university students.<sup>107</sup> On the other hand Head of the state and Military Regime General Kenan Evren stated that his regime would give importance to national values in the national

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<sup>105</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 7.

<sup>106</sup> Milliyet, 26.12.1981.

education.<sup>108</sup> "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" courses were also began to be taught as a compulsory course at the universities.<sup>109</sup> The Minister of National Education of the Military Regime, Hasan Sağlam stated that textbooks was going to be written again and in the new books the knowledge about Turkey would take precedence.<sup>110</sup> In another speech the Minister stated that at secondary and high schools and the universities every student would read at least one book about Atatürk and tell it in the classroom.<sup>111</sup> On 20th of October 1982 the Minister of National Education Hasan Sağlam explained the achievements of the Ministry of Education from the 12 September 1980 until that day at a press conference. He stated that before 12 September 1980 the Turkish youth was educated in accordance with the untrue ideologies and with the aim of educate them in direction of Atatürk's principles eight laws and more than 200 regulations were enacted; 4669 teacher had been sacked. With regard to the history textbooks which were being written again, the Minister said that the content would be related to Turkey with 80 %.<sup>112</sup>

In a statement from the Ministry of National Education it is stated that from that time on in every textbook there will be the Atatürk's speech to youth,

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<sup>107</sup> Cumhuriyet, 10.10.1982.

<sup>108</sup> Milliyet, 4.11. 1982.

<sup>109</sup> Cumhuriyet, 29.01.1982.

<sup>110</sup> The course programs for "Turkish History of Renovation" taught at higher education institutions and "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" taught at secondary and high schools is implemented by the decision of Training and Education Council dated 27.04.1981 and no:76 (Tebliğler Dergisi no:2087). For the changes made in the charts of these courses see MEB Tebliğler Dergisi vol:44, 14.09.1981, no: 2095; 28.09.1981, no: 2096.

<sup>111</sup> Hürriyet, 28.01.1982.

<sup>112</sup> Cumhuriyet, 21. 10.1982.

the Turkish National Anthem, the teachers' anthem and a Turkish map will take place.<sup>113</sup> The effects of this decision began to be seen since mid-1980s. At the beginnings and ends of many textbooks there is a non-textual group of symbols, independent from the content of the book, does not vary much from one book to another, forms the framework in which the discourse is settled and totality is in accordance with the ideological criteria. This group of symbols is what Copeaux called as "Kemalist mechanism".<sup>114</sup> In total this "Kemalist mechanism" contains seven elements: At the beginning of the book there should be National Anthem, Turkish flag, a picture of Atatürk, and his speech for Turkish youth (Gençliğe Hitabe). At the end of the book Teachers Anthem, Turkish map with geographical regions, "World of Turks" map (Central Asian Turkic Republics) since 1993. In addition no textbook can be taught at schools without the approval of the Teaching and Training Committee, even it is supplementary.<sup>115</sup> Teaching and Training Council (Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu), which decides whether school textbooks are in accordance with the programs and state's ideology, is the primary continuity factor in Turkish education system since 1924.

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<sup>113</sup> Güneş, 19.09.1982; Besides by the decision of Teaching and Training Council, dated 26 April 1993 and no: 2381, a "World of Turks" (Central Asian Turkic Republics) map was added to this mechanism. This can be interpreted as the addition of the Turco-phone world to the elements that official discourse used to constitute an identity.

<sup>114</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 779

<sup>115</sup> Cumhuriyet, 2.10.1982

In general, since 1924, textbooks that do not have the permission of Teaching and Training Council cannot be taught in any school under the control of the state. This permission covers the atlases, reading books, general books and it is also effective in religious schools (İmam Hatip Liseleri) under the control of state. This permission also means an important commercial value because of the size of the market. Thus it is to the benefit of both the author and the publisher to obey the rules. This official constraint is so heavy that titles and sub-titles in these textbooks are all the same. This uniformity in school discourse becomes evident in the history textbooks, despite the fact that there are many authors.<sup>116</sup>

In Turkey there is still the need to legitimize every policy by Kemalist principles. The use of Atatürkist thought instead of Kemalism designates the personality of the founder more than the ideology itself. This reference/designation has a formal characteristics, because it is not needed any more to prove that the policy is in accordance with the ideology, just referring to the name of the founder is sufficient. Atatürk, his personality and principles can not be dismissed, but although it seems contradictory, there is another ideology being shaped.

Turkish-Islamic Synthesis appears in "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" textbooks only as a secondary ideology. Because this course was fundamentally designed as a regime legitimization course and

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<sup>116</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 779-80.

because one of the major characteristics of the Military Regime's ideology has been the exaltation of Atatürk and his period, in these textbooks Atatürk is seen as the dominant national character. He appears to be the national hero who did everything that is good for Turkish Nation. Although Kemalism is the dominant ideology and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is only secondary and implicit ideology in these textbooks the latter appears to be the dominant discourse in all other history textbooks.<sup>117</sup> Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was designed against the Marxist effect in Turkey. After the dissolution of USSR and the independence of Turcophone Republics the Hearth and its sympathizers realized a new activity area and they started to increase the cultural effectiveness of Turkey in this region. As mentioned above there are various views on the real effect of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, that is difficult to measure. But since it is established in the academic circles, its role in the production of school discourse is important.<sup>118</sup> In other words after 1980 in school textbooks a multi expositions of discourses can be observed, namely Kemalism and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.<sup>119</sup>

In the introduction parts of history textbooks of the last decade these cultural goals show themselves: culture under the service of state and nationalism; seeing even the higher education as a patriotic school; organizing the cultural explanation in a chauvinistic and ethnic way; encouraging Turks

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<sup>117</sup> For the analysis of the history textbooks used at Turkish secondary and high schools in terms of the dominant discourse they contain see *ibid*.

<sup>118</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 77.

<sup>119</sup> *ibid*, 61-62.

living in Europe not to break off their ties from their pasts; lastly, Turkish state's care for Turks "living outside Turkey" by strengthening the idea of having the same Turkish roots more than being a citizen of a country (at least in cultural terms). All of these indicates making Turks' history an expression of straight lined approach, an expression of the reluctance to consider the cultural changes in history: As if Turkish people stayed the same as they were in the early times and they were ready to accept Islam which suits them very well.

### **3.3. The Case Study (Ideology in the "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" textbooks)**

The textbooks are analyzed in terms of ideological criticism by looking at the reflections of official history thesis, the governmental interventions, the political engagements reflected in the school curriculum.<sup>120</sup>

Today the names of history textbooks in Turkey are "National History", "General Turkish History", "History", "History of Islam", "Ottoman History", "Science History" and "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism". As can be understood from the names of the courses, "TR History of Renovation and Atatürkism" textbooks are detached from other history

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<sup>120</sup>Neumann, "Tarihin Yararı", 106.



textbooks<sup>121</sup>. The absence of an intermediary period result in a mental cut off. Besides this separation, on the one hand, tries to put Atatürkism to in a non-political arena, on the other hand it places Ottoman Empire into a dual situation: Taking Ottoman Empire as a Turkish state which is predecessor of Turkish Republic and secondly seeing Ottoman Empire in a completely original state and ignoring the continuity.<sup>122</sup>

The history of Turkish Republic is inevitably a nation-state history. The Republic is established on the basis of ethnic majority that is Turk but also on the citizenship notion. The explanation of this period (1923-1995) should cover a totality of a society that has certain political boundaries<sup>123</sup> and so it should reflect all social, economic, cultural and political diversities, problems and developments. However the Turkish history books do not mention the diversity living in the society and culture although they talk about the rich and colorful culture of Anatolia, only the archeological and architectural diversity is referred. Neither various ethnic groups, nor different belief systems, nor different value judgments and organization forms is mentioned in history books.

The textbooks of "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" vary little from publisher to publisher and from year to year. Although there are some differences in terms of content all books cover a

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<sup>121</sup> *MEB Tarih 1 ve 2* (Ministry of National Education, History 1 and 2).

<sup>122</sup> Büşra Behar Eranlı, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de "Resmi Tarih" Tezinin Oluşumu, 1929-1937*, (İstanbul: Afa Yayıncılık, 1996), 228.

<sup>123</sup> *ibid*, 227.

considerable number of the same persons, places, and events in Turkish history. All use a common descriptive vocabulary when they discuss political leaders, institutions, and social events. Finally the judgments they make as to what constitute social problems and solutions are also remarkably similar.

In the present form of Republican history understanding every event whenever it happened has to be compared to the Kemalist period's success and because of this it is in a situation where regret is emphasized more than the realities. Just as the periodization of the Ottoman Empire, the period between 1923 and 1945 is dealt with as a rising period and the following periods are treated as if they are standstill and recession periods which have to be hidden. Since the times after 1945 are not explained to the students the comparison is impossible.

In the "History of Renovation" textbooks the Atatürk period is evaluated completely as if it is over politics. As a result of this, the continuity required by the history conscious can not be conveyed to the students. "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" textbooks are about almost completely Atatürk, Independence War and Atatürkism. In these textbooks neither the history of opposition is seen nor the historical background of the concepts such as nation-state, constitution and republic is ever mentioned. The comparison of this formation with the synchronous collapse of some other empires is never made. It is tried to put all the developments into a frame peculiar to "us" and "extraordinary".

Another characteristics of Republican history is that it talks about “threat” on every occasion.<sup>124</sup> As anyone can guess this threat cult encourages the hostilities to the outside world. Ersanlı argues that the notions of ‘threat’ and ‘enemy’ referred in the textbooks are outdated because these textbooks cover the time period between 1908-1940.<sup>125</sup> Even if the aim is to warn the young Turkish people against the ‘possible enemies’ under the rapidly changing conditions of the international politics one can not expect that the ‘enemies’ of 1930s to be the same in 1980s.

### 3.3.1. *Background of "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" courses*

"Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" courses emerged as an instrument of the project of adopting and spreading the newly established regime's<sup>126</sup> ideology to the Turkish society. In order to guarantee that the new generations adopt the new regime “History of Revolution” course that

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<sup>124</sup> *ibid*, 230.

<sup>125</sup> *ibid*, 231.

<sup>126</sup> Here it should be mentioned that one of the main arguments of the Kemalist ideology is that it is completely a different Turkish state. Kemalism rejects any continuation and relation between its regime and the previous regime. Thus as a result Kemalists maintains the view that in 1920s a completely different Turkish state is established. Although it is true that the Turkish state has tremendously different characteristics there has been a continuation in terms of elites.

explains Turkish Revolution and its ideology in comparison with other national revolutions and contemporary political movements was began to be taught at the last year of all higher education institutions.<sup>127</sup> After the death of Atatürk the phases of Turkish Revolution became the center of gravity and the degree of comparisons was decreased. Until the end of the Single Party rule the same book was used as the textbook.<sup>128</sup> Besides since the contents of the lectures at universities were the same as the ones at secondary schools, the same subjects were repeated until the end of the higher education.

With the transition to the multi-party period authors other than Enver Ziya Karal had the chance to write textbooks for these courses. However after the beginning of multi-party period most of the textbooks had changed their expressions according to the political power's perspective of Turkish Republic and the revolution.<sup>129</sup> The effects of the civilian or military regimes on the "History of Revolution" lessons and their textbooks were apparent also during the periods after 12 March 1971 and 12 September 1980. Although after 12 March 1971 there was a significant increase in the number of different textbooks of "History of Revolution" lessons, in terms of their contents there was not much difference. Except for insignificant differences of perspective a

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<sup>127</sup> Toprak, Zafer, "*İnkılap Tarihi*" *Dersleri Nasıl Okutulmalı*, eds. Z. Toprak, H. Berktaş, B. Tanör (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1997), 16; Erdal Aslan, *Devrim Tarihi Ders Kitapları*, in *Tarih Öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları*, ed. Salih Özbaran, (İstanbul: Dokuz Eylül Yay. 1998), 306 .

<sup>128</sup> This book was written by Enver Ziya Karal, *Tarih 4: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*.

<sup>129</sup> For instance during the DP government while Celal Bayar was praised İsmet İnönü was criticized; on the other hand after May 27th 1960 the DP government was criticized strongly in these textbooks. Aslan, *Devrim*, 308.

chronological event explanation was dominant in all of the textbooks. After the 1980 coup d'état in 1983 a new program was put on the agenda and it changed the content of the history courses towards a Turkist and Muslim direction clearly. The changes made between 1938 and 1983 result from the hesitation process on the weight of three different pasts of Turks, according to political and cultural relations: Asian Turk ethnic past, East Mediterranean and Near East past, lastly the Islamic past.<sup>130</sup>

When the textbooks are analyzed, since 1930s the most significant change in the content of the "Turkish History of Revolution" courses is seen after the 12 September 1980 coup d'état. Erdal Aslan argues that these courses were re-organized in a very different understanding after the coup, Atatürkism was the frame drawn with the current worries.<sup>131</sup> The military leaders of the time see one of the most important reason of the crisis in Turkey as Kemalism's not being known sufficiently.<sup>132</sup> Thus they saw the solution in turning back to Atatürkism and explaining it to the Turkish youth. For this aim these courses are made compulsory from the third year of secondary schools till the end of the university education.<sup>133</sup> The name of the course was changed into "Turkish Republic History

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<sup>130</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 83.

<sup>131</sup> Aslan, *Devrim*, 309.

<sup>132</sup> Cumhuriyet, 17 Mart 1981.

<sup>133</sup> In this respect it should be mentioned that the 1980 Military Regime decided that "in all of the courses Atatürkism should be explained. Thus with the new regulation in Turkish, Sociology, Mathematics and other courses at secondary and high schools the principles of Atatürk was mentioned in some way." See TC Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Tebliğler Dergisi, vol:44, 14 September 1981, no:2095 and 18 January 1982, no: 2104.

of Renovation and Atatürkism". Some authors such as Erdal Aslan see these development positive as Atatürk's Principles were some way incorporated to the curriculum, while they also accept that the situation caused an antipathy and boredom among young people.<sup>134</sup>

After explaining the historical development of the "History of Revolution" courses which have been seen as a regime course from the beginning, now we can turn to the contents of the textbooks which are read at the secondary schools. How these textbooks perceive the Turkish history, what kind of citizenship is targeted, how Kemalism is treated would be analyzed in this section.

### 3.3.2. *Content analysis*

This part examines high school "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" textbooks that appear on board of education lists of "Books Approved for Use" at high schools throughout Turkey. The Teaching and Training Council selected the book written by Mükerrerem Su and Ahmet Mumcu as the textbook to be used for this course in high schools in the 1980s.<sup>135</sup> Although this book was published several times throughout 1980s the content remained the same.

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<sup>134</sup> Aslan, *Devrim*, 310.

<sup>135</sup> For the third edition the decree no is 7819, dated 9.12.1982.

The content areas of the history textbooks to be analyzed are social and political developments during the period of rapid change from the war of resistance and to Second World War. It covers the period of many social and political transformations such as from empire to nation-state, from monarch to republic, and the like. These developments involved substantial conflict of interest and struggle for social and political power.<sup>136</sup>

In Turkish society the perspectives and debates on the Kemalist Revolution, the establishment of Republic are still on the agenda. These perspectives on the National Independence War, the foundation of the Republic and the Turkish nation state as well as its ideology are all subject to debate among the power holders in the society. In this respect, Halil Berktaş argues that “right now in Turkey Kemalist Revolution, Mustafa Kemal, Republic, are not seen as objects of historical inquiry. Thus ‘History of Renovation’ courses are taught as a current, continuing political shield’s themes.”<sup>137</sup> However there have been a clear attempt to de-politicize not only the contents of these courses, but the education as a whole by the 1980 Military Regime. This argument sounds contradictory at first. How can “a very political subject” be de-politicized? De-politicization in the sense of prohibiting any kind of alternative explanation to the Kemalist understanding; limiting the subject area of history books as dated as possible (for

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<sup>136</sup> Aslan, *Devrim*, 310.

<sup>137</sup> Halil Berktaş, in “*İnkılap Tarihi*” *Dersleri Nasıl Okutulmalı*, eds. Z. Toprak, H. Berktaş, B. Tanör (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1997), 27.

instance contemporary Turkish History end in 1940s); imposition on teachers one kind of textbook, trying to eliminate everything that would lead to a different view, or discussions.<sup>138</sup>

The analysis of the way these textbooks describe the critical issues of contemporary Turkish political history demonstrates that the story told is not neutral vis-à-vis the perspectives of the various groups involved, namely Kurdish people and Islamist. A whole range of curriculum selections favors the military's perspective with regard to the social and political events. Although presented as unbiased, the historical interpretations provide ideological justification for the activities and prerogatives of the military itself, explain the events with the dominant ideology and do not mention the points of views and priorities of other groups. None of the textbooks indicate that the so-called religious uprisings against the republican regime were supported by any other groups in Turkish society, or whether there were any opposition other than religious one to the Kemalist regime is not mentioned.

The contents of these books cover the history of wars extensively. Approximately 28 % of the total pages is reserved for explanations of wars waged during and after First World War. Both the political developments between 1919

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<sup>138</sup> *ibid*, 26.



and 1938 and the policies of Atatürk period (renovations and foreign policy) fills 23 %. While the life story and principles of Atatürk takes up 19 %, other texts cover 10 % of the whole book.

Today's "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" textbooks on most of the subjects keep the 1930s' perspective on. Since the late 1970s it no more reflects the contemporary history. The book named "History of Turkish Republic (1918-1965)" illustrates the country history until the end of 1965. However today's books end at 1945.<sup>139</sup> For instance in these textbooks despite the democratic movements during the Ottoman times are explained the democratic movements of the Republic is not mentioned. These textbooks express an aspiration for the political power of 1920s and 1930s. It will be proper to call this as the history of "one power". Because this history does not cover social structure, economic developments, political parties, opposition perception and international relations. The establishments of *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* in 1924 and *Serbest Fırka* in 1930 are evaluated only as examples of the abuse of Mustafa Kemal's personal democracy quest.<sup>140</sup>

Şeyh Sait Rebellion is seen as a revolt directly organized by the secret agents entered into the party structure and it is said that "they are punished as they deserve". Again the establishment of the *Serbest Fırka* is seen as the result

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<sup>139</sup> See, Mükerrerem K. Su ve Ahmet Mumcu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük* (Ankara: MEB Yayınları, 1983; 1987).

<sup>140</sup> See *ibid*, 186-189.

of M. Kemal's desire for a transition to democracy. In this understanding due to religious infiltration in the party this experience harmed the country. Therefore, in those times "the two experiences show that the democratic environment has not come into existence yet".<sup>141</sup>

These textbooks do not approach the country's economic and political developments with an objective perspective. By not taking up the period after 1940 it gives the impression that after the death of Atatürk Republic had lost its meaning. Besides in these textbooks The First and Second World Wars are shown as the major international relations subject that designate the destiny of Turkish Republic. They do not establish any relation among Turkey's later alliances, social structure, political and economic transformations.

On the other hand under the subtitle "Uprisings of Minorities" the nationalist movements which are against the Turkish resistance movement are presented as a threat to the unity of Turkish motherland, the rebels are presented as opportunists making it difficult to wage war against occupying forces.<sup>142</sup>

These textbooks combine Kemalist ideology with a discourse based on Turkish nation and an Islamic community which aim to construct an understanding of society as a social whole with conservative values. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis has been the name of the new social unification and identity policy.

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<sup>141</sup> Büşra, *İktidar*, 229.

<sup>142</sup> Su/Mumcu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, (1983), 104.

It is emphasized that Turkish nation has sui generis characteristics with a mythological language. In these textbooks the word nation, which is the most frequently used one, is always mentioned together with certain adjectives/words such as state, army, hero, honor, honesty, war, religion,<sup>143</sup>

Etienne Copeaux contrasts the principles of education set by state in 1948 and in 1987 and finds many similarities. In Copeaux' opinion this reflects the ideological continuity dominant since the birth of Kemalism. He puts forward that the discourse about the greatness of the nation and its history and the being proud of this, is still the same. Kemalism preserves its place in the form of quotations and the respect to the universality of Atatürk's discourse. However there are also differences. The references to history thesis are not there any more: Turkish nation established great civilizations, but its geographical expansion or its determining effect on other cultures are not mentioned any more. Various times country's integrity in terms of motherland and nation is mentioned.

Kemalist ideology appears in three forms in the textbooks, although sometimes they appear in different combinations. The non-textual symbols, the passages independent from the historical events such as introduction and reading passages, and quotations from or references to Atatürk. The most visible form the non-textual symbols of Republic. Copeaux sees the source of the emergence

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<sup>143</sup> İnal, *Eğitimde*, 22-23, 27.

of the above mentioned symbols the 1980 coup d'état and its strong neo-Kemalist reaction. This was first seen in the textbooks published by state in 1985; Atatürk's picture started to be put on the covers. Henceforth the textbooks with or without these symbols were seen together. In the initial editions of the "History of Renovation" textbooks these symbols are not organized as in the case of "Kemalist mechanism". The national anthem and Atatürk's speech for youth are dispersed throughout the book in the reading passages. Teachers anthem and Turkish map does not appear in these books.

Copeaux interprets the above mentioned "Kemalist mechanism" appearing in the textbooks as follows: National anthem refers to the nation and the independence war and thus Kemalist Revolution; they all come together under the flag which is the symbol of nation's success. The picture of Atatürk links the basic-event and the establishment of the regime; Atatürk is both the military leader who won the war, the founding father and the "great leader". He impersonates the 20th Century Turkey in his personality. Since his "Speech for Youth" is written in old Turkish students do not understand it. Maybe because of this it has an effect which might not be the case if it was translated into modern Turkish. The Turkish used during early 20th century gives it the function of a holy book. Turkey's map symbolizes the holy motherland for

which many people died and so it is holy.<sup>144</sup>

The photographs contained in these books are also interesting in terms of their symbolic meanings:

<b>The photograph</b>	<b>Frequency</b>
Atatürk's photograph	36
Atatürk's father	1
Atatürk's mother	1
The house where he was born	1
His friends during the wars	5
Anıtkabir (the mausoleum built in his name after his death)	1
Dolmabahçe Palace (The palace where he died)	1
Atatürk's funeral	1
Ottoman Sultans	4
Famous characters such as Çerkes Ethem, Tevfik Paşa, Mehmet Akif	4
Other	30
Total number of photographs in the book	86

More than half of the photographs in the "other" category is somehow related to Mustafa Kemal. For instance the factories established during his presidency, a hospital, a dam, Atatürk is not just an analysis subject like other heroes. He is also a reason that confirm the historical analysis, he is both the subject and the object; he is the author and the actor; he is the Turkish history. These photographs together with textual emphasis placed on Atatürk is a product of the view which argue that only Atatürk and his close associates are responsible for all modernization efforts in Turkey. In historical analysis Atatürk's political anticipation and his personal will are stressed. Praising of

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<sup>144</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 97.

Atatürk as a hero leads to the idea that modern Turkey owes its existence completely to him. The emphasis on Atatürk brings these textbooks closer to “rupture thesis”. It is emphasized that every modern characteristics of Turkey emerged after 1923.<sup>145</sup>

However, it is not easy to construe this change in the ideological outer frame of the textbooks because it coincides with a time when Kemalism’s expression became weak in the society and the political power supports religious education. On the one hand, there was a limit to Kemalism which is seen as a blocking factor and this showed itself in indirect way in the increasing interest in the Ottoman history. On the other hand, there were influential Kemalist jumps as in the case of the assassination of Uğur Mumcu, columnist of *Cumhuriyet* daily.<sup>146</sup>

Kemalist history understanding was rejected increasingly and clearly. Some people regard the symbols in the textbooks as a barrier necessary for the rise of anti-secular movements; others regard them as exasperating remainders of an old-fashioned and unnecessary ideology. Copeaux calls our attention to the similarity between the “Kemalist mechanism” and a practice during the late Ottoman period: Especially during the reign of Abdülhamit II all of the textbooks had to begin with the phrase “In God’s name” and the praises for the

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<sup>145</sup> Su/ Mumcu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, (1983), 264-266.

<sup>146</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 98-99.

sultan. He asks whether the Kemalist mechanism can not be only a return to an old tradition.<sup>147</sup>

The second form that ideology shows itself is the passages independent from the historical events such as introduction and reading passages. Introduction passages express the official instructions; they are prepared for guiding the students in the history interpretation. Together with the Kemalist covers, introduction texts form the parts where the ideology appears independent from any historical theme. Since 1931 the ideological and identity themes which form the axis of the courses in general take place in these short and genuine texts. However they may not appear clearly always in the introduction parts. We have witnessed the strengthening of the ideological inputs during 1980s. These are texts that call for preservation of Kemalist values, for being alert against the enemies inside and outside.<sup>148</sup> For example in the introduction of the " History of Renovation" textbooks in explaining "why to learn that course" authors argue that in order to preserve and exalt the beautiful and rich motherland Turkish youth have to know about the enemies of the country and the victories won against those enemies. It is also stated that for this aim the best guide is the principles of Atatürk. The existence of the ideology in textbooks is strengthened after the 1980 coup d'état. Turkey in the period 1980-1990 is between two dangerous events: The past decade's anarchy and terror

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<sup>147</sup> *ibid*, 99.

<sup>148</sup> *ibid*, 99.

brought about a discourse which calls for unity and cooperation. This necessitates order, discipline, pride, trust both in individual and state. Second danger is the Kurdish problem after a decade long struggle. This also helps to strengthen brotherhood discourse, besides to cursing the separative forces and their foreign supporters. Thus these introduction texts reflect the anxiety against these threats.

Solutions against these threats turn around three main points: The defensive one calls for being alert against the threat; second one talks about the Turkish pride, belief in the greatness of the Turkish nation; third one following Kemalist thought. The usage of these themes is not limited to the introduction parts. These expressions can be found throughout the texts.

*In order to understand the present problems and find vigorous solutions for them we have to understand what Atatürk's starting point was, what he did to save the country, how he struggled with the internal and external enemies, what was the mystery of his success. We have to understand that we must work in the direction of his principles. For this reason we have to learn about our contemporary history, what Atatürk had done and his principles.<sup>149</sup>*

“Greatness, pride, honor” these are among the main themes of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.<sup>150</sup> Every Turk should be proud of her/his nation’s past. The analysis of the history results in a national conscious; it shows the oldness of Turkish culture. The pride feeling is clearly seen in introductory part. “Turkish

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<sup>149</sup> Su/Mumcu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, XI-XII.

<sup>150</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 101.



nation has always had a superior place in the history.”<sup>151</sup> In short one of the ideological bases of post-Kemalist state, is that “all Turks belong to the same culture” and the rejection of any type of difference between Turks show themselves beginning from the introductory parts.

Another issue is the ability of Turks to form political organizations and the geographical expansion of Turks on three continents. State and empire are the key words which are used regularly.<sup>152</sup> The chapter titled Turkish Army and National Defense is also significant in terms of the ideological influence of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in these textbooks. The Turkish Army is seen identical with the nation. Characteristics of Turks as being a militaristic nation makes them superior to any other nation.

*Among Turkish Nation’s characteristics military as a profession and its superior ability in the military art are very famous. Turks created the regular, disciplined, strong and professional army notion in the 14<sup>th</sup> Century. Turks military and army traditions are older and deep-seated than any other nation. When it is commanded and equipped well it is impossible to defeat Turkish Army.*<sup>153</sup>

These sentences remind Ergin and Kafesoglu’s admiration of the army. At least it can be argued that the authors of these sentences are in conformity on the idea Turkish army is great and must be respected by everyone. According to them Turkish Army not only protects and defends the motherland it is also the best and biggest educator of the country.

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<sup>151</sup> Su/Mumcu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, XII.

<sup>152</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 103.

<sup>153</sup> Su/Mumcu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, 235.

*Atatürk has seen the guarantee of the renovations in the army: Our army which is always progressive and the symbol of national unity, makes preparations in order to prevent the dangers coming from outside the country and it saves our nation from dreadful crisis.*<sup>154</sup>

The officialization of political design based on the idea that “Turkey would not be religious but rather pious eternally” can also be seen in the contents of textbooks of "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" lessons, compulsory in both secondary and higher education programs. In the textbook chosen by the National Education Ministry's Teaching and Training Council for this course it is expressed that “Atatürk was in no way atheistic” and that “there has been no period of history when more mosques were built in Anatolia than the Republican period”.<sup>155</sup> The content of textbooks used for religion lessons was no different from these history textbooks.

Conservative nationalist and religious values were used as norms in textbooks. In the textbooks of this period a kind of nationalism close to racism, extreme nationalist values and symbols such as warrior heroism, renovation, authoritarian state, honor and self-respect, holiness, flag, national anthem, a secularism understanding under the service of religion, military-nation are used supplementary to the religious values. During this period democratic values were seen as the reasons for the social/political disintegration and polarization and

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<sup>154</sup> *ibid*, 235-238.

<sup>155</sup> *ibid*, 264-266.

weakening or breaking up of collective identity. And for a new and strong collective identity (for Muslim-Turkish individual) two basic ideologies - nationalism and religion- were accepted as appropriate.<sup>156</sup>

In the textbooks used after 1980 besides the six basic principles of Atatürkism seven complementary principles were added. The basic principles are stated as Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Secularism, Statism, Renovationism; while the complementary principles are National Sovereignty, National Unity and Cooperation and Country's Integrity, Freedom and Independence, Peace at Home Peace in the World, Rationalism and Scientificism, Modernism and Westernization, Human and Love of Humanity. Authors list the principle conditions for establishing a great state as a nation which is Republicanist, statist, and renovationist based on nationalism and secularism.<sup>157</sup>

In the explanation of the secularism principle there is a clear attempt to prove that Atatürk was not against religion. Thus it is an attempt to reconcile the secularism principle with Islam:

*Maybe Atatürk returned Islam to its brilliant age, by changing the laws that does not fit to the present times and secularized the state. But he never touched upon the Islamic rules that are based on belief and worship. Atatürk was not a godless person definitely. Is it possible to say that Atatürk, who had said the following, was a godless person? "God is one, great. ... The one who make the laws of the material world is God.*

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<sup>156</sup> Kabasakal, Öner "Dünden Bugüne Üniversite ve İdari Yapı Değişiklikleri" Türkiye Günlüğü Sayı: 6, (Eylül 1989) 25-32.

<sup>157</sup> Su/Mumcu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, 280.

*I believe this like I believe in my religion and the reality itself.” Atatürk had said many such things.<sup>158</sup>*

This is the most clear point of convergence of Kemalism and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. It is an attempt both to incorporate Islam as a tool against leftist ideas and against radical Islam. In this context the arguments of the supporters of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis on the subject of religion become useful for the Military Regime.

*Turkish State has taken upon itself the duty of giving worship services of Muslims. It established institutions that give religious education. Here the education of Atatürkist, intellectual, rationalist, secular religious man was stressed. In Anatolia there were no other period that more than Republican period that so many mosques were built.<sup>159</sup> Turkish nation and State may continue its existence only with freedom of belief and by adopting secularism. It is impossible to turn back. Such an attitude would be not keeping up with the present times, being behind the contemporary age.”<sup>160</sup>*

Lastly, it can be said that the reading passages at the end of each chapter emphasizes the same nationalist themes. The military successes of Mustafa Kemal, the stories about the heroes of the war time period, Atatürk’s speeches on the abolishment of sultanate, on the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Republic and for the youth, and İnönü’s speech for the death of Atatürk are some examples for these readings passages.

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<sup>158</sup> *ibid*, 264.

<sup>159</sup> *emphasis added*.

<sup>160</sup> Su/Mumcu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, 263-265.

Third and last appearance of ideology is making direct quotations from or referring to Atatürk in the texts. There are innumerable quotations from Atatürk basically in two forms: Quotations in the text and a reading about Atatürk. Open or covert reference to Atatürk. The open references to Atatürk has three benefits: In terms of history writing, it gives us an opportunity to understand how the image of Mustafa Kemal sustained in school life and how his name became identical with Turkish history (the perception that Republic is the peak of the deep and old Turkish history and Republic is meaningful with the name of Mustafa Kemal). Secondly in terms of politics, it shows in which time period the neo-Kemalist ideology resulting from the 1980 coup d'état was included in the textbooks and because this time period coincided a time when the influence of expression of the mentioned ideology began to decrease. This can be interpreted as Özal's negative attitude towards Atatürk and Kemalist bureaucracy's reaction to this attitude. Thirdly in methodological terms the clear expression of Kemalist ideology helps to differentiate the events and periods that are especially important easily.

In this context it can be argued that the content of these textbooks both before and after the 1980 Military Regime are based on Atatürk's "Speech", which is political document, a document that has the characteristic of a politician's getting even with his opponents.<sup>161</sup> Thus these textbooks has a characteristic that

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<sup>161</sup> Ozan Erözden, in "*İnkılap Tarihi*" *Dersleri Nasıl Okutulmalı*, eds. Z. Toprak, H. Berktaş, B. Tanör (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1997), 51.

by them the Kemalist Revolution and ideology is tried to be legitimized and its rightness is defended. In other words even if there is no clear ideological sign, by transmitting the common memory structure to the reader, identity function is preserved. Although it is stated that Kemalism increasingly shares its sphere of influence with Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and we have to keep in mind that even in 1930s these two exist together in the school textbooks.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> Copeaux, *Tarih*, 114-115.

## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSION

In this thesis it is argued that in Turkey, high-school students are exposed to a particular interpretation of history. This particular historical understanding which came about in the 1980s is ideologically shaped by Kemalism and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse. Kemalism, being the dominant ideology of the Republican Regime since 1930s is still prevalent in the school textbooks as the official ideology. An arrogant Turkish nationalism, which has its roots in the historical developments, is preserved in the school textbooks. However, one can also note the influence of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse in the school textbooks. It is especially interesting to see its effects in the "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" textbooks used after the 1980 Military Coup D'état. Because these courses are originally designed to convey the official ideology that is Kemalism to the students since 1930s.

The increase in the influence of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis on the history textbooks can be evaluated in various ways. However the most important factor in this respect appears to be the ideological stance of the 1980 Military Regime. The generals saw the leftist political movements as a threat to

the existence and unity of Turkish society. In this respect they used Islam as a counter-balancing factor against the power of left in the society. The perception of the Military Regime and the supporters of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis coincided. The Military Regime used and tolerated Islamist arguments of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discourse put forward by the Intellectuals' Hearth as long as they committed to the secularism principle of Republic and Atatürkism. On the other hand, the supporters of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, just as other political discourses occur in Turkey, felt they are obliged to reconcile their views with Kemalism somehow.

As can be understood from the content analysis of "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" textbooks used between 1980 and 1990, there is a convergence between these two "contradictory" ideologies. Kemalism is still the dominant ideology and one of its major disseminating tool is "Turkish Republic History of Renovation and Atatürkism" courses and textbooks. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, on the other hand increases the role of Islam in the official discourse. Most of the themes of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, such as the "threat" notion, being proud of nation and history of the nation, the army are stressed in these textbooks regularly.

All the chapters in these textbooks that pertained to the period after the establishment of republican regime advocates a symbiotic relationship between a good citizen and Kemalist ideology. The early Republican years constituted a crucial period in the formation of Turkish nation and establishment of the



republican regime. The notions related to those times are still in the political agenda. Thus these books by providing description of the activities and the intentions of the Kemalist regime, of which the military sees itself as the protector legitimizes a political stance. All of the textbooks describe the laws and the period itself in terms of reform and progress. The products of the Republican regime are presented as holy values that should be protected for the survival of the nation. Students are taught to be Turkish nationalist, loyal to a history composed of a great nationhood, a brave army and a strong state tradition, following Atatürk's principles and secular. But the type of secularism promoted in the textbooks does not exclude Islam. In this understanding individual is seen as identical with people, and people is identical with the state. Thus in the last analysis the will of individual must be in conformity with the state. Accordingly the good citizen is the one who gives importance to the nationalist, religious but secular and statist values.

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