

MODELLING THE TURKISH PERCEPTION OF
FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS:
WATER CONFLICT BETWEEN SYRIA AND TURKEY

A THESIS PRESENTED BY KAYNAK ACAR
TO
THE INSTITUTE OF
ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BILKENT UNIVERSITY
JULY, 1996

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
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.

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Asst. Prof. Dr. Serdar Güner



Abstract

This thesis is a study on modelling the Turkish perception of foreign policy options regarding the water conflict between Syria and Turkey. A game theoretical model is used to analyze the current situation of the water conflict. Assurance Game is used as a model to analyze the conflict in question. It is argued that, Turkey perceives the current situation as an assurance game. In this study, the analysis showed that, a cooperative policy for the resolution of the conflict from the Turkish perspective is in fact the source of the conflict for the Syrian side. The paradox inherent in the perception of the conflict by both parties to the conflict makes it hard to reach a resolution. The study showed that, resolution of the current conflict, from the Turkish perspective, is the cooperation of both states regarding the linkage established between the water conflict and the alleged Syrian support provided for PKK terrorism in Turkey.

Özet

Bu tez, Türkiye görüşüne göre, Türkiye ile Suriye arasındaki su sorununa ilişkin dış politika seçeneklerinin modellemesidir. Oyun teorik bir model güncel su sorununun incelenmesinde kullanılmıştır. Çalışmada sorunun Türkiye tarafından bir itimat oyunu olarak görüldüğü gösterilmiştir. Türkiye'nin görüşüne göre işbirliğine dayalı bir çözümün aslında Suriye tarafından sorunun kaynağı olduğu inceleme sonucunda gösterilmiştir. Çalışmada iki ülkenin sorunu görüşüne dayalı paradoksun çözüme ulaşılmasını zorlaştıran bir faktör olduğu belirlenmiştir. Türkiye'nin görüşüne göre, sorunun çözümü su sorunu ve Suriye'nin Türkiye'deki PKK terörizmine verdiği destek arasında kurulan bağlantı bazında işbirliği yapmaları ile mümkün olabilecektir.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank to a large number of people who have contributed to me at various stages of my life and my studies. However, my special thanks is for Dr. Nimet Beriker-Atiyas whose worthy guidance and encouragement contributed a great deal for the completion of this thesis. It was an opportunity for me to benefit of her advises.

I am also grateful to Dr. Tuna and Dr. Güner who read this thesis and gave their advises. I am thankful for all three of them and for those who have contributed for the completion of this study by any means.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The primary objective of this study, first, is to describe the way Turkish foreign policy makers perceive different foreign policy options as regards the water conflict between Syria and Turkey. A game theoretical model is used as a forum to analyze the logic behind the Turkish interpretation of the current situation as regards the water conflict and related alleged Syrian support for PKK terrorism in Turkey. A second aim, by using the model, is to explain the constraints attached to the attainment of a cooperative solution to the conflict.

The secondary goal of the study is to indicate the importance of a natural resource as a foreign policy item and to discuss the way states formulate their foreign policies by taking into account this new dimension.

The study does not aim to elaborate on possible conflict resolution options and does not analyze the Syrian interpretation of the conflict situation.

Before focusing on the scope and objective of the study, it is necessary to account for some preparatory dimensions which are essential for the conduct of the study itself and conclusions to be derived.

1.1 The Need for an Analysis of the Turkish Perspective on the Water Conflict Between Syria and Turkey from a Game Theoretical Perspective

The discipline of International Relations is founded on the notion that international politics is in essence state-centric and that the dominant mode of relations

between states is power politics. Both of these axioms are now under fierce challenge. With the end of the Cold War the world goes through various changes as regards the conduct of state affairs. The international relations paradigm is responsive to these changes as well.

Security is one of the major international relations concepts which required a revision. The established definition of security, which involves only military threat, is altered and began to encompass a wider spectrum of issues that threatens the national security of every single actor in the world.

Water is one of these new elements that began to dominate foreign policy agendas of states, and even began to turn out to be a natural resource threatening the international security. Water as an element of conflict in various parts of the world has its credit for a couple of decades. It has turned out to be an asset challenging the supremacy of oil as a source of dependence in the conduct of state relations. The most important problems have emerged, between Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan; Syria and Lebanon; Syria and Iraq; Egypt and Sudan; and Mexico and the US.

The conflict examined in this study is the water conflict between Turkey and Syria over the utilization of the waters of the Euphrates River. The very beginning of the conflict coincides with the Turkey's first attempt to build a dam on the Euphrates in the early 1970s, and then with the formulation of a huge water project- called the

GAP: The Southeastern Anatolia Project- that was to be actualized on the Rivers of Euphrates and Tigris. Since the linkage between the water conflict and the alleged Syrian support for terrorism in Turkey is assumed to be there, this study aims to model the Turkish perception of the water conflict by using the framework provided by game theory. The leading factor, in examining the Turkish perception of the water conflict between Syria and Turkey from a game theoretical angle, is the fact that the approach equips the analyst with a well-defined tool to understand foreign policy preferences of states.

Game theory can simply be defined as a rational behaviour theory based on the assumption that one party assumes that the other party will present a rational behaviour. The most prominent feature of a game theoretic approach lies in the fact that it allows one to simplify the factors involved in understanding the issue in consideration. The simplification provides the better understanding of the problem and the wielding of the preference orderings of both parties in the resolution of the issue. Rational behaviour, as mentioned above, is the essential feature in game theoretic approaches.

1.2 Scope and Objective

The study is conducted on the basis of the Turkish perception of the conflict by the Turkish state primarily on the difficulty of reaching a concord regarding perception.

Perceptual dispositions play a substantial role in the conduct of international relations. The perceiver's expectations and needs strongly influence the policy to be followed. Jervis argues that "even between close allies where much background information is shared and deceptions is not much feared, the two sides can easily end up living in different worlds."^{1,2} He also argues that, when dealing with an adversary, the state's ability to project the desired image- whether accurate or not- is even less. A necessary condition for doing so is an understanding of the other side's outlook and beliefs about the state.³ Therefore, the basic approach in this study stems from the importance of understanding parties perceptual frames in conflicting situation. For this purpose, a game theoretical model is used to analyze the Turkish perception of the current situation as regards the water conflict and related alleged Syrian support for PKK terrorism in Turkey. An account of how they have different perceptions in this conflict is given throughout the study.

Methodological importance of the study stems from the use of game theory in a way that is used by Snyder and Diesing⁴ in explaining the Turkish perception of the issue. Two main points are significant in *modelling* the current *perception* of the conflict in consideration by Turkey:

- it explains the logic behind Turkey's current foreign policy preferences;

- it allows us to understand the constraints attached to the attainment of a cooperative solution to the conflict.

This study shows that, the Turkish perception of the conflict, and the game theoretical exercise denotes that, the Turkish understanding of cooperation is in fact the source of the conflict for the Syrian side. This point indicates that there is a paradox in the entire standing of parties to the conflict: What constitutes the core of the conflict for Syria is the cooperative solution for the Turkish side which tries to attain to end the conflict. This means that Turkey tries to preserve the status quo, which in this case means the source of the conflict. The details of the way the above conclusion is reached can be found in the analysis and conclusion chapters.

While the core of the study is the modelling of the Turkish perception of the conflict, there are parts that have secondary implications in the entire study. These include, the examination of the expanding security understanding in the post-Cold War era; water as foreign policy item; and implications on the resolution of the conflict.

1.3 Outline of the Study

The study consists of seven chapters.

The first chapter is the introduction part.

The second chapter comprises review of literature on water conflict.

The third chapter is on the change in the international system; new concepts of security and the importance of water in this new international environment. In this chapter the question of how water has become an element in foreign policy making is discussed.

The forth chapter describes Turkish Foreign Policy and Syrian Foreign Policy particularly towards the Middle East. This chapter is a descriptive one which provides a general framework of foreign policies of both states with a special emphasis on the Turkish Syrian bilateral relations.

The fifth chapter particularly focuses on the water conflict between Turkey and Syria in which a descriptive account of the conflict is given.

Chapter six is the theoretical application part. In the first part of this chapter, the Turkish perception of the current situation as regards the water conflict is given. In the following part, the game used in explaining the Turkish perception of the issue, Assurance Game, is presented, and then the reason for why Turkey perceives the current situation as an assurance game is studied.

In the seventh chapter, the conclusions derived are examined.

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW ON WATER CONFLICT

This chapter presents an account of the studies carried out on the water conflict. It particularly focuses on the studies conducted on the conflict over the utilization of the waters of the Euphrates River.¹ The review is made in three categories: The first group consists of the studies that are more hydrological and geographical; the second category is composed of the general approach in international conferences held in Turkey; and the third group covers the studies that take into account the international relations dimension of the water issue.

As for the hydrological and geographical studies, which are important works particularly for the researchers who deal with the resolution of water conflicts, the following account shall be given.

The chief studies on the issue form a follow up set of studies prepared under the auspices of Associates for Middle East Research, (AMER),² a non-profit research group in Philadelphia, and has been directed by Professor Thomas Naff of the University of Pennsylvania. The project began in 1983 with a broad-based pilot survey which was published the following year under the title *Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation?*³ This earliest research identified the major issues and demonstrated the need for far more detailed analysis.

The follow up study has been the work titled *The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project* by John Kolars. In this project physical, political and socioeconomic factors are studied. The physical dimensions of the water problem have been identified with reference to its hydrologic basin, and the political economy of the states are examined. *The Future of the Euphrates River*⁴ is a study prepared in the same understanding by the same author.

Another specialized person who is primarily concerned with the sharing and price of water is Tony Allan of SOAS. His studies focus on the hydrological aspects; hydropolitics, and the political economy of water orientation make his studies to fit to a global line in sharing waters.⁵ An edited book by the same scholar also presents a multi-disciplinary approach to the issue, giving more emphasis on the pricing of water and commercial aspects.⁶

A geographical study by Peter Beaumont, Gerald Blake, and Malcolm Wagstaff is also an essential source of information written on the issue.⁷

The study of Peter Gleick on water resources is prepared in a multi-disciplinary fashion.⁸

Another work is conducted by Natasha Beschorner,⁹ whose study presents an overall analysis of the three Basins of the region from various dimensions. Similar works, that

are also essential in the water conflict literature are Joyce Starr and Daniel Stoll's.¹⁰

The study of John Waterbury of Princeton University also deserves attention as he studied the dynamics of cooperation in the utilization of the Euphrates.¹¹ Although the study is not much compact, it is one of the studies which provides an analytical approach.

Another such study is David LeMarquand's. His work although examines the international river basin from a geographical perspective, he examines cooperation from an international relations perspective. He utilizes the concepts of international relations in making his analysis for the issues between the US and Canada. He argues that, if there is empathy and shared perceptions of problems between countries, such as between Canada and the US, negotiations tend to be easier.¹²

In relation with these studies, Özden Bilen's studies, who is the Deputy Director General of DSİ- the General Directorate of State Water Works- are worth mentioning. His latest study focuses on the supply and demand balance of the basin, plus he utilizes technical and scientific approaches to serve as an objective guide in comprehending the issues.¹³

The common points in all mentioned studies are related to their orientation; all studies begin with the concealed assumption that, if a conflict is about a natural resource, then the work done should entirely be constructed upon the peculiar feature of the resource. Another common point,

they all provide technical data regarding the rivers in consideration. However, a close analysis of the works often presents inconsistencies in terms of data presented. Another aspect of these studies stems from the fact that they heavily emphasize technical dimension of the water conflict with no reference to the international relations and foreign policy element of the issue.

A second set of studies can be referred as the approaches adopted in the international conferences convened in Turkey.

Two conferences on the issue and a seminar were arranged in Ankara. The title of the first conference held at Bilkent University in 1991 is the "International Conference on Transboundary Waters in the Middle East: Prospects for Cooperation;" the second conference was held at Hacettepe University in 1993 and was titled as "Water as an Element of Cooperation and development in the Middle East;" and the seminar arranged at Bilkent University in 1994 was titled "Transboundary Water Courses." In all three analytical meetings scholars from different parts of the Middle East have contributed with their ideas ranging from economic development to legal dimension and to practical solution alternatives.

The third set of studies are the ones that take into account the international relations dimension of the issue.

The book titled *Su Sorunu, Türkiye ve Ortadoğu* (The Water Conflict, Turkey, and the Middle East) involves

chapters related to the topics in its title. However, within the confines of this study only one chapter deserves attention which examines the issue from a strategic concept perspective and elaborates on the issue within a theoretical framework. The author of the chapter¹⁴ says that, the strategic terminology would utilize the "water factor" as an item of leverage. The analytical discussion that the author presents is an important contribution to the literature.

When the analytical studies which are mainly international relations oriented are to be evaluated- which are rare as stated above- a couple of examples strikes attention. Of these studies, two are mainly game theory oriented, and they contributed to the analytical exercise literature on the water conflict. The first study carried out by Peter Rogers of Harvard University, who examined some rudimentary game models, and reached tentative conclusions based upon various game theory concepts of stability applied to the Ganges-Brahmaputra Basin.¹⁵ The other game theory application of the water conflict, between Turkey and Syria, is by Serdar Güner of Bilkent University, who utilized the game of the War of Attrition, which is a repeated game where cooperation is not binding but self-enforced.¹⁶

Another study carried out as a Ph.D. dissertation at Bilkent University is by Ayşegül Kibaroğlu. She argues that the tension over the allocation of the waters of the Euphrates can only be achieved via the establishment of institutionalized patterns of cooperation. She asserts

that, Turkey can act as a leader in the emergence of an international regime with its structural advantages and intellectual accumulation.¹⁷

A new international relations journal *Strateji* has also reserved one whole issue for water conflict last year. Along with some review of the conflict studies, a paper inspired from this thesis was developed by Kaynak Acar, titled as "Stratejik Açıdan Su Sorunu," (The Water Conflict From A Strategic Perspective).¹⁸

As seen from the above account there are limited studies that take into consideration the strategic importance of the resource and the international relations dimension of the conflict.

The following chapter, presents an account of the changes in the international system, and its impact on the definition of security. The aim of this chapter is to depict the way water has become an element in foreign policy making.

CHAPTER III: THE CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND IN THE DEFINITION OF SECURITY AND THEIR IMPACT ON FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

3.1 The Change in the International Context and the Need for the Inclusion of New Issues in Defining Security

The objective of this chapter is to address primarily the way water has become an element of foreign policy making particularly in the post-Cold War era. In order to do this, first, the change in the international system, second, the expanded concept of security is elaborated. Later, a framework for foreign policy making is elucidated by emphasizing on the way water has turned out to be an item in foreign policy making at the close of the cold war. Here, the importance of conflicts emerging out of water allocation problems, and the role of water in the preservation of international security are discussed.

The systemic transformation of international politics, that started with the turnaround in Soviet foreign policy in the late 1980s, has started a new era in international relations. The events of the 1989-91 period have moved the international system from bipolarity to multipolarity- although arguments still continue as regards the unipolarity or the multipolarity of the current system.¹ Parallel to this development the realist understanding of international relations has been under fierce challenge.

The realist view of international relations though it lacks the competence of providing a framework to match the altered or rather *expanding* range of security issues, it is

still not negligible that it remains somehow to be the only paradigm that purports to explain the insecure nature of the anarchic international environment and the behaviour of states within it.² The point that validates this argument can be met by many scholars' reasoning that nations have focused their foreign policies on the pursuit of military and territorial security. The major contribution of the realists has been their exclusive focus on nation states as both agents and objects of most significant occurrences in world politics. What the international relations scholars are faced at this stage is centered around a worry about state power; the 1990s in fact will be witnessing a redefinition of what constitutes *national security* and how states respond to this by understanding what is meant by power in the post-cold war era and the ability of different types of states to manage the new considerations. New definitions of security are of course due to a variety of new goals and issues.

Global developments now suggest the need for another analogous definition of national security to include resource, environmental, and demographic issues.³ The growth in interdependence and its importance for the maintenance of a sound economy have placed the economic relationships between nations in the forefront of the issues that are now at the core of foreign policy making. The focus on economics has had implications regarding foreign policy resources. As Sprout and Sprout⁴ have pointed out,

as regards the years from the 1970s on, most of the states have been in the process of modernization, which resulted in shortages of food, raw materials, and natural resources. So the uneven distribution of natural resources coupled with economic development which prepared the ground for population growth and industrialization have long-range international implications.

When the definition of national interests centers on protecting and controlling territory, people, and natural resources, the military is absolutely important and serves as the instrument of final resort. Although it was frank that the established definition of security, which took its essence from state-centric understanding of world politics was begun to be undermined, the end of the cold war paved the way for expanding the definition of security. The post- "realist" analysis shows that more often than not the opposite is true. It acknowledges a more inclusive definition of security and challenges to security encompassing but moving beyond the traditional notion of military threat and response. The newer concepts recognize the continuing problems associated with military conflict, but argue that other factors increasingly threaten the survivability and coherence of the state- and not the state alone.

Security challenges become more complex when one turns to those issues that may not directly challenge the viability of the state, in traditional terms, but they may

nevertheless undermine the sovereignty of the state, compromise its ability to control the penetrability of its borders, and exacerbate relations whether between groups within the polity or between states within the regional or global system.⁵ So, these emerging trends in international security must be addressed systematically.

Therefore, after remarking this approach, a more specific point shall be brought to the fore. Environmental changes that began to dominate state agendas slowly taking its place among the issues covered by the field of international relations. The main reason for this can be explained as such; although most of the issues related to environmental changes are supposed to be handled as foreign policy issues, the established frameworks do not allow foreign policy makers to perceive the developments as such. What this perception brings about is seen in the responses given by states to problems directly related to environment at different races. They are either viewed as a part of a more state oriented nature or just not paid any attention at all as a foreign policy matter. The *scarcities* of vital renewable resources such as soil, water, forests, the stratospheric ozone layer, and an equable climate constitutes the environmental changes.⁶ As the conflicts that began in many parts of the world due to environmental change, it is taken as a possibility to encounter wars over natural resources. So, environmental change and violent conflicts are issues that are to be closely related in the

forthcoming century. If an account of the causes of environmental scarcity is to be made the following figure is obtained.

Economic development has brought about intensely the use of natural resources. Human activities can both reduce the quantity and degrade the quality of resources *faster* than the resource is renewed. Another point is population growth, which can reduce the amount of a renewable resource available per person and leads to pollution.⁷ Pollution and reduction in the quantity comprises the basis for decline in food production, economic stagnation and other related issues, that threaten the survival of a certain group of people or a state *per se*. And these are really just reasons for states to wage wars on the basis of an entirely different factor that foreign policy makers never considered for a long time. It can be claimed that along with this argument that wars have been fought for natural resources in the past, i.e., the world is familiar to such an event—even wars have been fought with imperial objectives to gain the control of certain natural resources.⁸ However, the context is a little altered on the eve of the 21st century. That is to say, it was historically there suffering the scarcity of certain resources, but carrying it to the top of security consideration over the military and territorial ones is quite a new development that the states are faced to adjust. As mentioned above violent conflicts shall emerge over the scarcity of certain resources that are critical to human

survival and as they can be physically seized or controlled unlike climate change or the problems with the ozone layer. The point here is not to claim that, it is plausible to expect states to fight wars over scarcities, and that is the one and only solution to this problem. On the contrary, the point that is to be made here is to underline the importance of these scarcities and state that such issues have begun to carry such a value that can be comparable to the integrity of state. Scholars of international relations addressing the security implications of environmental scarcity usually emphasize the potential for interstate wars. In the mid-seventies one theory of war arising from resource scarcity is provided by Choucri and North.⁹

3.2 How Water Has Become an Element In Foreign Policy Making?

The patterns, that were used to be utilized for about forty-five years in regard to foreign policy making, regardless of in which part of the world a country is located, have been bewildered. The point that has to be highlighted here is that now states do face an enlarged range of issues to take into account while formulating their foreign policies. The prevailing international environment, which has been a bipolar world, of the post-war era had in a sense abated states' policy preferences regarding the outside world: States except for the United States and the Soviet Union were either bound to ally themselves with one of the mentioned powers due to their geopolitical

situations; they would not be able to escape from the threat emanating from the other superpower, which it did not consider itself to be closer at the policy formulation level, but was so geographically; or they preferred to ally themselves with one of the powers, which was the United States in this option, to be able to create a rudeness to resist the ideological threat emanating from the Soviet Union. Further the latter power's wish to create an alliance against the one formulated by the United States. The implication of these two alliances has been that of the derivation of a securer international system, which was labeled as the "bipolar world" in which both superpowers were considered to be the guarantors of security by providing the small powers upon which they have established their entire posture, and which is viewed as the "least prone to war international order"¹⁰ by most of international relations scholars. In addition, what shall be concluded from this type of a security system established was that, it enabled the small powers of either bloc to adjust their foreign policy goals in accordance with the rules of the cold war; their primary concern have come out to be the containment of communism and the prevention of the spread of capitalism regarding each bloc, establishment of close economic ties within each bloc to become qualified to create an image of robustness, and trying to get the support of the Third World states against the opposite bloc. The system established immediately after the Second World War has in a

sense made it easier for states to enumerate their foreign policy goals and objectives, to fix the limits of their power, and finally to define to which direction their foreign policies were oriented.¹¹

Nevertheless, the mentioned changes in the international system and in the definition of security now entails that foreign policy formulation of each state whether a small or great power has to face the new range of issues that were unable to rank among the chief issues of foreign policy agendas of states that were occupied first by military and then economic considerations for almost half a century. Some of these issues were in fact deteriorating some states relations with others for a very long period of time. What the end of the Cold War has furnished the international system shall be found with this viewpoint. This can be regarded as a ramification of the end of the cold war, yet, an international order raised solely upon exclusive threat perception does not only provide the ever securest system the world witnessed, but rather a system full of hidden conflicts that were unable to born apparently and complete their cycles. So, a system experienced, was not healthy at all, but was giving the image of the healthiest ever. The above enumerated points do not submerge the fact that the structure of the international system remains much the same, but as mentioned before the nature of the competition and the patterns of conflict within the system have shifted.

Therefore, it can be argued that closer attention must be devoted to understand the changing nature of interdependence and to compare the meanings of foreign policy in worlds where conflicts are mostly emerging on the basis of economic factors rather than military. After summing up the alterations that came to the fore at the international level it would be useful to dwell on foreign policy itself.

Foreign policy can be defined "as the output of the state into the global system."¹² As it is a set of guide to choices being made about people, and things beyond the boundaries of the state, and "involves the discovery of goals as much as it involves using decisions to achieve particular outcomes,"¹³ the environment within which a state functions has a far reaching impact on the formulation of foreign policy. When one considers how a policy is formulated, it instantly requires the elaboration of what can be named as the "foreign policy orientations" of states, which enables one to understand, what foreign policy making is by focusing on foreign policy objectives and the discovery of goals.¹⁴ A "foreign policy objective" is defined as an "image of a future state of affairs and future conditions that governments through individual policy makers aspire to bring about by wielding influence abroad and by changing or sustaining the behaviour of other states."¹⁵ Holsti presents a possible scheme for classifying the objectives of states, which produces three categories for

analyzing them:¹⁶ The "core objectives," to which governments commit their very existence and which must be achieved at all times; usually related to the survival of the state (territorial integrity, sovereignty); "middle-range objectives," that are less important to decision makers such as economic development and social welfare, and finally, "long-range objectives," that are of least immediacy to decision makers and include plans, and what is understood by orientation in the analysis of foreign policy making in this study can be given as such: "A state's general attitudes and commitments toward the external environment and its fundamental strategy for accomplishing its domestic and external objectives and for coping with persisting threats."¹⁷

The conceptual information on foreign policy enables one to locate water in the formulation of foreign policy. It is frank to note that, water may almost be characterized as a core objective when the an analysis is made for its significance vis-à-vis the survival of a state. It is also essential to understand the way this item as a core objective can influence and/or can take its place in the overall foreign policy orientation of a state. Water is one of the most decisive new issues in making foreign policy.

This new foreign policy item tends to be the source of conflicts that are most prominently identified by conflicts emanating from the allocation of the waters of international rivers.¹⁸

Water conflict, in this study, is simply defined as a conflict emerging from the problem of the allocation of the waters of a transboundary river. Although in many parts of the world water conflicts have been tried to be solved in one way or another, due to the fact that international politics is experiencing a time of change, its extent and degree of occupying foreign policy agenda has remarkably shifted. The conflicts between Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan; Syria and Lebanon; Syria and Iraq; Egypt and Sudan; and Mexico and the US are just some exemplifies of the conflict in the past. The mentioned conflicts were important for the countries involved, however, they were not constituting a threat for the national security of the states concerned due to the Cold War conditions. Still, the conflicts experienced portrayed that water as a natural resource has turned out to be an item of foreign policy. What the end of the Cold War has provided the international relations students is that this natural resource is to be handled either as a means of cooperation in the track to the resolution of conflicts, or their deadlock. This situation has attained it with a strategic importance. Therefore, if a relationship between states, based on the allocation of the waters of a river, is being regarded as a *conflict* and thus enables it to rank at the top of the national security agendas of states, strengthens the assumption that water should be viewed as a strategic asset and should be treated with this understanding in mind. Although it can well be an

element of cooperation, it tends to be perceived as an element of conflict. This reason for this approach shall be understood on grounds that each state is inclined to possess as much water as possible due to climatic factors- namely the unpredictable outcome of the greenhouse effect, and the increasing demand for water in the face of dramatic population increase in various parts of the world-. States, and in order to guarantee their future as regards the mentioned factors and to boost economic development, almost in every state through which a river passes, states either in consultation with one another or independent of each other carry out huge water projects mainly aiming agricultural development or energy production.

Another factor that intensifies water conflicts other than allocating its waters, this is peculiar to the case when the river in question constitutes a boundary between two states, is water diversion. What is meant by water diversion is the construction of huge dams to store waters, so as to utilize it either for irrigation of huge agricultural plains or hydroelectric projects. Of these of course the former objective tends to frighten the other riparian with the anxiety that what if it does not possess enough water for its survival. These points all needs further elaboration, but it is not within the framework of this chapter to dwell on the water conflict itself. However, these basic points indicate that, water as a term will be occupying- in fact it began to do so- foreign policy

agendas of particular states as it turns out to be one of the factors which determine foreign policy objectives in the changing international system.

In the following chapter, foreign policy principles of Syria and Turkey will be addressed in order to contextualize the water conflict within the complex web of interactions between the two states.

CHAPTER IV: FOREIGN POLICY FRAMEWORKS OF TURKEY AND SYRIA

This chapter addresses a historical account of foreign policy principles of Turkey and Syria, and aims to contextualize the conflict in consideration, particularly within the bounds of the bilateral relations.

In the first part of this chapter, Turkish foreign policy is analyzed. The focus of this part is on the formulation of the Turkish foreign policy, and its development until present time. However, while doing this Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East constitutes the core of the chapter as the water conflict with Syria arises in this region.

In the broadest and may be the most correct manner the term Middle East covers the subsystem of the Near East, North Africa, and the Gulf region. However, as Turkey is in closer contact with only a small part of the above indicated region, which makes up only the northern part of the Gulf region, within the framework of this study, the Middle East is used to mean only a couple states composing the northern and western line of the Gulf region. The states that fall into this category are Israel, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and apart from this four states Egypt. In fact, when even this particular region is taken into account what is met is *not* a policy developed for this region as a whole, but rather specific bilateral relations, and thus specific policies. Thus, if a comprehensive statement is to be made it is indisputable to state that Turkish foreign policy regarding

the Middle East is only aimed at the northern part of the Gulf region- covering only its southern neighbours plus Israel.

When a state's foreign policy vis-à-vis this region is in consideration a number of issues should be taken into account prior to a foreign policy review. The nature of the region may rank first, and the nature of the leaders of the states in the region. It is not deniable that even the name of the region in consideration is named by the Western states, further the region has been a stage for great power rivalry. Following the imperial contest over the region, the involvement perpetuated during the Cold War years, and no one can claim that it is over. As one scholar asserts the Middle East has become "the most penetrated international relations subsystem in today's world."¹ The decline of the European influence after 1945 resulted in a radical transformation in the internal and external development of the Middle East and in world politics. The new leaders who seized the reins of power in the 1950s were much more responsive to indigenous and nationalist sentiment than any philosophical creed.² They were determined to assert their interests and play an active role in regional and international affairs. Concurrently, in their search for allies and alliances, the superpowers of the post war era competed against each other to capture newly emancipated states. The Middle East was sucked into the arena of the superpower rivalry.³ The region has been puzzled by complex

and ambiguous relationships- both international and intra-regional. The dimensions shall be generalized namely, inter-Arab relationships, anti-Jewish relationships, and those of Arab-superpower.

4.1 Foreign Policy Framework of Turkey

In this part, an account of the formulation of the Turkish foreign policy from the establishment of the Turkish republic onwards is presented. As stated above, the scope of the analysis of Turkish foreign policy is limited within the framework of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East to be able to put forward the bilateral relations with Syria in the clearest manner.

The underpinning feature of the Turkish foreign policy until the break out of the Second World War was "neutralism."⁴ This type of foreign policy anticipates that the state will not commit its military capabilities and, sometimes, its diplomatic support to the purpose of another state.⁵ The primary reason for policy determination in this direction prior to the brink of the Second World War come forth both from international developments and from internal requirements. The establishment of the Turkish state under the command of Atatürk was determined to escape the nature of the state from its eastern outlook, and the reforms that were undertaken to carry out this was Western oriented in the essence.⁶ Further, as his reforms required economic recovery strongly to achieve modernization, the

state had to kept independent of any states' ambitions; what this meant immediately after the First World War was following a moderate foreign policy. As one expert states:

Atatürk's theory and practice of foreign policy and the conditions under which the new nation-state was born have been the most important factors shaping Turkish foreign policy over the last sixty years. In particular, Turkey's foreign policy has been influenced by the following principles laid down by Atatürk: the goal of establishing a nation-state of the nineteenth-century European model with a coinciding effort to create a favourable position for Turkey in the international system, the continuous observance and application of the principle of "peace at home and peace in the world."⁷

Turkey isolated itself from the European political affairs and refrained from dealing with Middle Eastern affairs, as they were once under the administration of the Ottoman Empire, which was in conformity with the principle of "peace at home and peace in the world." Turkey during the late 1930s had to make an alteration in its foreign policy vis-à-vis the European states. Apart from the Soviet threat emanating from its immediate northern border, the changes taking place in the external environment looked more threatening; developments in Italy and Germany resulted in the Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain in 1939⁸, this has been the end of the neutralist Turkish foreign policy and it tended to favour a pro-western foreign policy. As Turkey's primary objective has been not only keeping Turkey away from foreign involvements, but also strongly furnishing

economic development, adopting a pro-western foreign policy was profitable both on security terms and on getting economic assistance from the United States. Although Turkey's independence was in a sense was strictly limited, in one expert's terms: "There was a high degree of coincidence between Turkish and American security interests, the common objective being the deterrence of the Soviet threat and the containment of the Soviet expansion."⁹ The policy of creating an alliance with the West was also a direct outcome of what can be named as the impact of history on Turkish foreign policy; as the Russian Empire had always constituted an immediate threat to the Ottoman Empire, Turkey at the time viewed the Soviet Union from the same angle.^{10,11} Since the late 1930s and particularly with the mid-1940s Turkey could no longer remained isolated from the international developments; the features of its strategic location, and changes in international security resulted in a change in Turkey's foreign policy. The driving force for Turkey to be involved in an alliance can reasonably be understood by the definition provided by Holsti for "alliance construction" which is one of the foreign policy orientations that he has identified: "Governments that seek to construct permanent diplomatic coalitions or military alliances assume that they cannot achieve their objectives, defend their interests, or deter perceived threats by mobilizing their own capabilities."¹² Thus states facing similar external problems or sharing similar objectives

rely upon each other and make commitments. The United States was meeting the expectations of Turkey immediately after the war; Turkey had to be supported against the Soviet Union, which was the closest state to the Soviet Union that can be relied upon, and also it was the state who could guarantee Western interests in the Middle East as a stabilizer where both superpowers had conflicting interests. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 was the clearest sign of United States policy regarding Turkey that can be viewed as a declaration of the support of Turkey against the Soviet Union.¹³

In order to be able to grasp the founding principles of Turkish foreign policy one has to consider the country's situation in the light of many considerations, however, geographic location, perceptions of threat, national needs, and systemic characteristics may be the most important. Turkey's adoption of an exclusively Western oriented foreign policy had come to the fore when its admission into the NATO was materialized in the year 1952.^{14,15} Hence, by guaranteeing its status in such a conflictual and venturesome part of the world, as of 1952, military threats and burdens began to be shared within the framework of the alliance.

The international system emerged immediately after the Second World War was a bipolar system in which the two superpowers have been able to magnify the bipolarity of the global system by allying to themselves many small states

through NATO, which provided the security and foreign policy objective of the United States; that of keeping the Soviet Union within the confines of the Eastern Europe, and preventing the spread of communism to other parts of the world; the Warsaw Pact, formulated to execute just the opposite of what the NATO called for; and several other alliances. What the bipolar system has brought about to inter-state affairs has been characterized by a threat emanating from the Soviet Union: A pattern of adversarial politico-military pattern has been established on the axis of East-West relationship. What Turkey was expected to perform has been to deter any Soviet action in the Eastern Mediterranean; keeping it beyond the limits of the Middle East, which has been a region of instability and was best known with its entire posture as an anti-Western front. However, Turkish foreign policy of neutrality both in the affairs of Europe and the Middle East has been perplexed by the beginning of the post-war era. Turkish policy of trying to keep the Middle East from the Soviet influence has been criticized by all of the states of the region regardless of their approach to the policies of the Western bloc.¹⁶ The chief determinant of Turkish foreign policy has been that of formulating a security policy within the NATO alliance, which was regarded by the alliance members as a strategically important actor for the defense of Western security due to its geopolitical characteristics, and its position within the Middle East.¹⁷ However, apart from

formulating a foreign policy in conformity with the features of its faithful ally role, and orientation towards the United States and Western Europe, it lacked a concrete foreign policy vis-à-vis the closest region, which in fact Turkey has been a part at least on geographical terms, if not on political and international relations terms. The lack of a policy regarding such an unstable region made it easier for the Turkish foreign policy makers to comprehend any development within the confines defined by its alliance membership, and an extension of its policy vis-à-vis the West and containment of the Soviet threat. Certainly, the principles of Turkish foreign policy, which were formulated in the first half of the 1960s, refined it without leaving any skepticism that Turkey would not combine any of its policies by taking into account the Middle East, it would refrain. The principles of Turkish foreign policy, which are later named as the "traditional principles of Turkish foreign policy," has two essential points:¹⁸

- The first principle corresponded directly to the Middle East; Turkey would not interfere in the affairs of the Middle Eastern states with each other, which was to be carried out by the formerly established principle of non-interference of the affairs of them with Europe.
- The second principle made it clear that Turkey would be anxious concerning its role within the Western alliance and the role it played as a NATO member for the utmost care not to harm its relations with other regional actors.

The implication of the formulation of these two essential principles has been that of providing a refined outlook for the implementation of Atatürk's foreign policy, which has been formulated around the principle of "peace at home and peace in the world."¹⁹

The 1960s has witnessed a break in Turkish foreign policy as far as its firm collaboration with the Western bloc is considered. The dominating reasons for a novelty in its foreign policy have been the differences that came out between the United States and Turkey regarding their approaches to the Cyprus question, which has been a direct outcome of the struggle with Greece vis-à-vis the issue; further, to assemble the support of the Arab states which constituted the essence of the Middle East along with Israel. However, Turkey was aware of the problem that *it* recognized Israel as a state, and *it* was still an ally of the West. Still Turkey in demand to gather the common conviction that it was not acting against the Arab states, its behaviour was not in support of only Israel.²⁰ The reason for why Turkey could not follow a coherent foreign policy towards this region shall be grasped by emphasizing the main pillars which jeopardize the political structure of the region as a whole.

The instability in the region was based on the fact that there were internal problems within each Middle Eastern state, since they were able to gain their independence from the Western powers late in the 1940s or early in the 1950s,

apart from this their relations with one another and with Israel in general and with this state at the inter-state level was conflictual . What the major foreign policy goal of these states was the destruction of the state of Israel from the region. Hence, it was almost impossible for Turkey to follow a "future-oriented" and "stable foreign policy" towards the region. The essential factor that directed its foreign policy towards this region has been found in its unquestioning alignment with the West; it regarded the NATO alliance as an extension of the United States foreign policy, and likewise it regarded its Middle East policy as the policy that was to be carried out as an extension of its alignment with the West.

Therefore, the move from one dimensional foreign policy to the one which offered increased expedient options was recorded. The adjustment brought about by this new era in the Turkish foreign policy was prominently marked by not the deterioration of the a shift in its defense arrangements, but was prominently marked by an addition of diplomatic component. An expert's views concerning this period can be given as such:

Concluding that hostile relations, particularly with the Soviet Union, exacerbated mutual security concerns and delayed the development of mutual confidence, she reoriented her exclusively pro-Western foreign policy towards one which was more "multi-faceted," which meant above all the improvement of relations with neighbours and a more active interest in and an independent attitude towards world politics.²¹

What this new process has brought about is a move towards the reduction in the degree of its isolation in the Middle East. Turkey's confrontation with the Arab support for the Greeks on the Cyprus issue neither led to a rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states nor a cessation of relations with the West. Turkey has guaranteed its place on the international scene with the NATO and non-involvement of the affairs of the Middle Eastern states. As one expert states;

...although geography cannot be regarded as an absolute item in determining threatening sources, ...it turns out to be a formidable factor in perceiving threats. Turkey, though being a member of the Western alliance, has an important place in the Middle Eastern sub-system in terms of geography and historical background...²²

Turkey continued its relations with the Middle Eastern states on the accepted principles, however, being aware of its importance in the region, the leading medium of relations has turned out to be intense economic relations with the regional states.²³ Other than agreements on economic issues it continued to secure its interests in the region by the framework provided by the Western alliance, and reciprocally the alliance's interests are preserved in the region.

Until the end of the Gulf War the Turkish interests have coincided with those of the leading partner in the Western alliance. The collaboration with the United States during the Gulf War served the Turkish ends as well.

However, with the demise of the Soviet threat Turkey's security consideration has shifted from the one that was there for a couple of decades ago. What this entails is the fact that, at present Turkish national interests do not necessarily coincide with those of the NATO powers.²⁴ In this new era, Turkey has faced with new security considerations. The demise of a formidable enemy entails that this state should consider more seriously the new security questions in its doorstep, plus it should take its place in the new security formulations.

One significant point regarding Turkey's standing in the international system is closely related in its Western-oriented foreign policy framework, and in providing its security within a framework guaranteed with relation to Europe. The threats challenging the Atlantic Alliance in general have diversified in recent years. As on expert accounts on the problems faced by the Alliance have effects on Turkish security considerations.

The most likely contingencies are no longer those that occur between two opposing blocs, namely NATO versus the Warsaw Pact. Instead, the major area of conflict has shifted from Europe to the Third World, including the Middle East and southwest Asia. Paralleling this development, indirect strategies, low intensity operations, economic and ideological techniques of influence, and terrorism have become more prominent. ...-and eventually even the major roles- are likely to be played by local actors, and the conflicts may well depend on regional factors. In such a context, Western Europe has an undeniable interest in preventing instabilities in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.²⁵

When the security dimension of Turkey is considered, it is definite that Europe and the United States would like to see a stable Turkey and a stable Middle East. Turkey being a state with close relations with the European Union- which has become a member of the Customs Union- and thus becoming an element in European economic formulation, and being a neighbour state to the Middle East, the last European contact state to the region, it carries a role of preserving European interests in the region, and that of the only functioning democracy in the region. Therefore, Turkey still has a role within NATO as important as the Cold War years, however, apart from this dimension, it has to guarantee its security within a more diversified conflict sources by finding new alliances, and creating interdependence within the new strategic environment.

Current developments show that, Turkey's traditional policy towards the region cannot match the problems of the current as it has been a policy of non-involvement and providing security. Further, the lack of long-range goals makes it difficult to conduct relations with the states in the region. The only accountable relations with the regional states are those economic ones. However, the hostile formulations emanating in the region makes it imperative to get involved in the politics of the Middle East. Recently, Syria's approach towards Turkey has been considered by the Turkish decision makers a threat to its security and existence of the state of Turkey. Therefore,

the developments in the region indicate that Turkey will take a more relevant position vis-à-vis the region to impede any further contradictory formulations hurting its national security interests. The recent Israeli-Turkish Defense Accord shall be viewed from the regional dynamics angle as a step to achieve this. According to Turkish officials Syria damages the national security environments of both Israel and Turkey. The shelter provided by Syria to terrorist organizations working against the both states led in the formulation of one voice between the two states to confront the support of international terrorism. Although the Accord of 1996 is perceived by the Arab states as a source of division in the region and protested mainly by Syria and Egypt, the one and only goal is cooperation between the two states in military training. Of course, this cooperation disturbs primarily Syria, however, it shall be demonstrated by signing this Accord that, the support for separatist movements from this time on will be responded in a diplomatic manner. The support to the Turco-Israeli Accord received mainly from the United States show that, the security of both Turkey and Israel are vital for regional stability. Therefore, Syrian policy of supporting PKK activities in Turkey in search for connecting the water issue in a bargaining setting, and aiming to compel Turkey to sign a water sharing agreement, seems from this time on quite difficult to achieve. The reason for reaching this conclusion lies in the fact that, with this Accord-

particularly with Israel with which state Turkey finds itself isolated from the region, and shares a common threatening element- Turkey being a neutral state towards the region now turns out to be an active actor in regional affairs, and perceives a role to be played in securing its national interests.

4.2 Foreign Policy Framework of Syria

The foremost principle of Syrian foreign policy can be characterized as it has ultimately rooted in the historical frustration of Syrian nationalist aspirations by Western imperialism.²⁶

In the wake of the 1917 Arab revolt, Syrians expected the creation of an independent Arab state in *historic Syria*²⁷ linked to a wider Arab federation. Instead what they engaged in have been the dismemberment of historic Syria into four parts; Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine. Further, the establishment of the state of Israel was provided in Palestine.²⁸ What this dismemberment has brought about fixed the foreign policy agenda of the Syrian state, i.e., its separation from Jordan, Lebanon, and the Arab world proved irreversible; Israel became a formidable enemy on Syria's doorstep, and a permanent obstacle to its national aspirations, thus the resulting powerful brew of anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, pan-Arab, and pan-Syrian sentiment has imparted an enduring *revisionist* and *irredentist* thrust to Syrian foreign policy. This

revisionism reached a climax in the effort of the radical wing of the Baath party between 1966 and 1970 to make Damascus the bastion of a pan-Arab revolution and a war of liberation in Palestine. This, however, brought on the 1967 defeat and the Israeli occupation of new Arab lands, including the Golan Heights. This defeat generated intense new security fears in Syria, and gave new roots to revisionism, and further locked Syria into the conflict with Israel.

The 1967 defeat brought the high costs of messianic revisionism and provoked the rise to power of Hafiz Al-Assad, a leader who was prepared to chart a more realistic course matching Syrian objectives and means. He scaled down Syria's objectives²⁹ as follows:

- the recovery of the occupied territories;
- defense of the Syrian state;
- enhancement of its stature in the Arab world;
- upgradement of Syrian capabilities.

It is also essential to assess what type of a *role* the Syrian state has played with this core foreign policy objectives in mind has to be determined in understanding the forthcoming ones. A *national role* conception includes the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. In his analysis Holsti in

determining the Syrian role conception he enumerates five conceptions related to this state, namely, as an anti-imperialist agent; liberator-supporter; regional-subsystem collaborator; independent; and faithful ally.³⁰ What this classification reinforces also is that, Assad in scaling down the objectives of the state he has been determined to reach these goals. It is also a very well known fact that Assad as leader, turned out to be a landmark in Syrian foreign policy, and his personality plays a crucial role in attaining Syrian objectives.³¹ As mentioned above his and thus Syrian foreign policy's main thrust has been irredentism. According to one observer,³² Assad has pursued the goal of recovering the lost territories through a strategy of interchangeable alliances. Assad has a reputation in the region for "intricate maneuvers combining daring action with a desire to take minimal risks."³³ The primarily observed line that Assad followed is that he evidences an active-independent orientation to a large array of foreign policy problems, particularly those relating to Syria's role in the Middle East. He continually monitors his environment, checking where his position receive support, and generally choosing to act only when the environmental evidence reinforces his judgments or when there is a relatively low risk alternative available. Thus, although to outside observers Assad's behaviour often seems unpredictable, his actions become easier to understand if we juxtapose what we assume are Assad's positions with the

information from the environment at the moment. Although it is not a disregarded fact that the personality of Assad still plays a crucial role in Syria's standing on the world stage, Syria's failure to become a Soviet proxy³⁴ in the Middle East, by 1990, in the Gulf Crisis and War of 1990/1991, Syria's participation in the anti-Iraqi coalition reflected its generally pragmatic policy approach, leads one to assess the entire foreign policy standing as it is not as unyielding as it gives such an image.

After giving a general review of its foreign policy orientation which primarily focused on Israel, and the unification of historic Syria, it is also important to frame the bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria. Turkey for many years have not been central to foreign policy making in Syria, except for the Hatay dispute. Since Syria lacked an intense interaction with Turkey in its foreign policy formulation, relations do attract attention when it is only taken from a Turkish perspective. When the bilateral relations is examined it is frank that, Syrian-Turkish relations have long been corroded by this dispute. Hatay was awarded to Turkey by Franco-Turkish agreement and a plebiscite in 1939 but is still claimed by Syria as its rightful territory.³⁵ This issue being an element of a three-way dispute between the two countries continues to have a volume in the bilateral relations which has in fact been a part of the irredentist policy.

The second issue being the water issue itself requires no elaboration within this chapter as a chapter on the issue is following.

The third issue which affects the bilateral relations is the alleged support provided by Syria for terrorist activities in Turkey. According to the Turkish claims, as part of its general anti-western orientation, and specific grievances with Turkey in particular, Syria, for several decades, has supported political movements hostile to Ankara, including three of Turkey's most dangerous opponents: The Armenian Marxist terrorist organization ASALA, radical Kurdish groups, and Turkish leftist radicals. Turkish state have claimed that, all have had operational and training bases in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa valley in Lebanon, from which they have conducted anti-Turkish operations. Similarly, in this view, Syria has periodically used its support for the PKK in particular as a regular instrument of pressure against Turkey. Therefore, from the Turkish perspective, the relations between the two countries is tense not on due to clear-cut conflicts between the two countries, but rather utilization of certain issues as instruments of pressure against Ankara.

In the following chapter the dynamics of the water conflict is examined in detail. A descriptive account of the factors that contribute to the formulation of the conflict is given and the positions taken by the parties vis-à-vis the conflict are enumerated.

CHAPTER V: THE WATER CONFLICT BETWEEN SYRIA AND TURKEY

The objective of this chapter is to address the dynamics of the water conflict between Syria and Turkey. An account of the conflict; positions held by the parties; and the International Law dimension of the conflict are the three parts that form this section.

5.1 The Dynamics of the Water Conflict Between Syria and Turkey

The water conflict between Syria and Turkey, though have been on the agenda of both states since the mid-1970s, to top the foreign policy agendas of both states twenty years ago. Water being a natural resource and being a part of the geo-politics of a state, further being an environmental element, it indispensably turned out to be an issue threatening international security. It is not entirely a new issue in the security studies to include environmental factors to the studies of international conflict and cooperation and reserving local and global attention. Harold and Margaret Sprout identified the environment as one factor that influences a nation's foreign policy.¹ As mentioned earlier water has become an element of foreign policy making for both states. Moreover, water and peace are very much entangled among the states of the Middle East region.

The water conflict between Turkey and Syria stems from the development of an ambitious water supply scheme, called the GAP², by Turkey over the rivers of the Euphrates and

Tigris, and the Syrian anxieties for the rapid and vast development of Turkey in the realm of economics almost guaranteed by the realization of this project. Conflict, although being almost twenty years old, it does not capture international attention yet. The reason for this may be found in the fact that, no clear-cut shortages regarding the flow of the Euphrates are recorded, further, the two states involved in the issue do not come together to raise their points.

The conflict between the two states contains several dimensions:

- The conflict can be characterized as a new conflict when compared with other conflict over the utilization of waters of rivers: It flourished twenty years ago;
- the linkage established between the water conflict and the support provided by Syria to PKK terrorism in Turkey as argued by the Turkish authorities;
- the international law dimension carries a significant standing as it leaves Turkey to the conflict with full power while leaving Syria to dwell on some other insinuations of international law- attains it a different character in understanding the dynamics of the conflict.

5.2 A Brief Account of the Conflict and the Positions Held by the Parties

The background for the conflict can be summarized as such: The construction of the Keban Dam on the Euphrates in 1964 has begun, and completed in the mid-1970s. The

underpinning feature of this conflict can be found on this very development.

The underlying factor in the emergence of this conflict is the development of the GAP, which has been primarily launched to meet Turkey's growing energy consumption. Turkey, though since the late 1950s constructed hydroelectric dams on its major rivers, almost a quarter of Turkey's electricity production has until recently been dependent on imported fuel, further, from time to time Turkey has also had to import electricity from the Soviet Union and Bulgaria to compensate for the shortfalls in production.³ So, the Euphrates featured prominently to be the scene to produce the necessary electricity as pointed out in footnote 2. Following the Keban dam, the Karakaya dam was built between 1976 and 1987. Of course, the increase in the number of constructed dams, multiplied anxieties across the region: The number of dams which reaches to 22 when the entire project was completed, in fact, alarmed Syria and Iraq and so was the area that was to be irrigated. The magnitudes naturally lead both states to the idea that Turkey will leave them with very little water. These views intensified particularly when Turkey in 1990 completed the Atatürk Dam- the greatest dam of the entire project.⁴ The most highlighting problems emerged during the period when the reservoir of the dam was to be filled in the early 1990. This year has been the turning point in the entire cycle of the emergence of the conflict as the most

important concerns are raised during that period. Though Turkey informed both Syria and Iraq that it would divert the Euphrates between January 13 and February 13, 1990, both states utilized this procedure as a matter of maneuver in the Arab world just to gain international support for anti-GAP views and to present Turkey as if it was aiming an antagonistic approach. Syria was, in fact, quite successful in its anti-GAP campaign in the Arab world, in spite of the fact that, in calculation it received more water from the Euphrates if there had been no diversion at all: Syria would receive $120\text{m}^3/\text{sec}$ water from the tributaries below the dam during the impoundment, likewise in its notes Turkey not only explained the technical reasons for the move, but also what measures it would take to prevent any possible adverse effects on Syria and Iraq. Turkey stated that it would release $750\text{m}^3/\text{sec}$ water before the January 13 cutoff. However, Turkey raised the flow to $800\text{m}^3/\text{sec}$ and two weeks before the impoundment to $1000\text{m}^3/\text{sec}$, so as not to antagonize its neighbors.⁵

The impoundment of the reservoir of the Ataturk Dam has been the turning point in the evolution of this conflict. Syria felt insecure from that time on, regarded Turkey as a foe more than ever before. Each and every development on the project disturbed Syria, though technical committee meetings were planned to gather regularly and the meetings between the top officials of the two states are almost countless by the time being. At this stage of the

conflict, Syria prefers not to join the technical committee meetings, or any other conferences arranged to form a milieu to discuss the issue. The initiatives proposed by the Turkish state remained unanswered though they call for cooperation in many respects: The General Directorate of State Water Works has studied on the technical aspects of the Euphrates and Tigris basin in order to implement one of Turkish state's propositions to solve the water conflict.⁶

Another initiative by Turkey has been the Peace Water Project. A project developed for the carrying of water from the rivers of Seyhan and Ceyhan to the Persian Gulf States in the East, and to Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast in the West. The pipelines could supply water to Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Israel. But this time, except for Israel, the whole regional states objected to this on grounds that, none of them wanted to become dependent on neither to Turkey nor to Israel on such a vital resource as water.

The top level statesmen meetings are now countless, although these are made to stop Syrian support for terrorist activities in Turkey, water question has always been on the top of the agendas too. Further, what the Turkish officials continually repeated is that, from the Turkish perspective, water has not been regarded as a mater of leverage. Turkish perception of the issue is that, the conflict is a product of Syrian activities in the international scene to curb the accomplishment of the GAP. Iraq, prior to the Second Gulf War, was also disturbed by the GAP project and acted

harmoniously with Syria. While Syria since the very beginnings of the flourishing of this project- the construction of the Keban Dam- supported separatist movements in Turkey in order to be able to weaken the Turkish state both economically and politically; this situation is claimed by Turkey.

Syrian officials reject this situation, but also accept that there are infiltrations from the Syrian territories to that of Turkey and they cannot prevent it. However, Syria cannot also prevent to be enlisted among the states which support international terrorism. Syria being a supporter of international terrorism, according to Turkish claims, supported either leftist separatist organizations, or Armenian terrorist organizations, and finally the PKK activities in Turkey.

Apart from the objections it raises against the GAP, Syria itself exploits the waters of another river; the Orontes river. Although it is an international river passing through Lebanon, Syria, and finally Turkey, Syria utilizes all of its waters. In the recent years, it has been recorded that Turkey can no longer benefit from the waters of the Orontes. Turkey perceives this as a point to indicate what the Syrian intentions are in the essence.

Another friction point between Syria and Turkey is over the city of Hatay. Hatay, inhabited by Arabs and Turks, decided to unite with Turkey in 1939. However, the Syrians could never accept this secession, though the

inhabitants decided to unite with Turkey by themselves. Still, it is a fact that, on the Syrian maps Hatay is shown as a city of Syria, and they declare that the Turkish sovereignty over Hatay is illegitimate.

The main point that is underlined by the Turkish officials is that, Syria in fact, do not only deal with the Euphrates, but has been organizing a systematic deterioration policy vis-à-vis Turkey from many angles. The main premise of the Syrian policy has been to weaken Turkey, and prevent its rise as a regional power. The most clear indication of this project shall be found through the false-promises they have given since the mid-1980s to the top level government officials of Turkey regarding the infiltration of terrorists from the Syrian territories to Turkey. Although the Syrian government has guaranteed countless times that they will deport terrorist camps from their territory or from territories that are under Syrian control, these promises seem to be valid only for a very short period of time.

Turkey claims that it has showed all its benevolence to find a kind of solution to the water shortages of its southern neighbours, and all other Middle Eastern states, and presented all the possible cooperation tendencies. In Turkish view, in the last decade there have been 15 tripartite meetings to gather technical information and settle the issue on a reasonable ground. However, either of the parties (Syria and Iraq) were either not joining the

meetings or were not providing the necessary information. Turkey, knew that both states were using extremely backward methods for irrigation, thus wasting a great amount of water, and arranged those meetings to overcome such problems, but were not utilized as they ought to be.

5.3 International Law Dimension

International Law dimension can be regarded as another source of the conflict between the two countries. Along this line, one specific problematic issue is closely related to the way parties define the status of the Euphrates.

Turkey defines the Euphrates as a transboundary river since its sources are in Turkey, and 98% of the river is fed by the little streams in Turkey, but then flows to Syria, then Iraq. But, Syria defines the Euphrates as an international river.

Helsinki Rules on the uses of the waters of international rivers, and the UN/ILC's Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of international watercourses both state that "each basin state furnish relevant and reasonably available information to the other basin state concerning the waters of a drainage basin within its territory and its use of, and activities with respect to such waters."⁷ Although Syria claims that the Euphrates is an international river, according to Turkey, it never fulfills the requirements stated in the mentioned article even for technical consultation meetings. In addition, Helsinki

Rules also states that disputes should be resolved by negotiation.⁸

The ILC has no reference to the resolution of disputes, but states that states shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality. Both the ILC and Helsinki Rules take the sharing of the river in consideration as a basis which is certainly against the Turkish standing. Since there is no sanctions in the international law, and many points are not clear enough regarding this watercourses issue, each state in line with its own perception can identify a river as it requires. An international watercourse is defined in UN/ILC Law as "a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different states." And a watercourse means "a system of surface and underground waters constituting, by virtue of their physical relationship, a unitary whole and flowing into common terminus." Therefore, none of these statements are in fact binding, but in line with the general trend in international law, they give advises to states in consideration and underlines cooperation and consultation. These are points that are already have been the part of the Turkish policy regarding both Syria and Iraq. However, Turkish foreign policy regarding the status of the Euphrates and Tigris has been in a different track though not undermining the positions of the co-riparians, but just releasing itself from the condition of sharing the waters of these rivers.

Turkey as stated above, has described the Euphrates and the Tigris as transboundary rivers.⁹ In a transboundary river there is no recognition of the notion of co-ownership or common dominium of a transboundary river or a system by the riparian states. On the contrary, there is confirmation that each state maintains full sovereignty over the portion of the river situated in its own territory. In the transboundary case just like in the international river case, there is agreement that the exercise of such national sovereignty and consequently the unilateral utilization of water should be done in an equitable and reasonable manner, without, however, causing appreciable harm to other riparian states. The only difference comes about with regard to the sharing of the waters of the river.

Syrian main premise in resolving the water conflict has been to make Turkey to sign a water sharing agreement. However, Turkey by not accepting the Euphrates as an international river does not see it necessary to sign such an agreement on grounds that almost 100% of the waters of the river is from Turkey, and thus it does not gain an international river feature. It is a river of the Turkish territory, but flows into Syria, thus gains a transboundary river feature, and this is the official Turkish policy regarding this issue.

Turkey's standing on accepting this river as a transboundary one stems from the following: Water has turned out to be such a valuable asset that no state on the

Syria. The only friction point between the two countries is the signing of an agreement of sharing.

In the following chapter, the application of game theory to this conflict from the Turkish perception angle is made. However, first, the Turkish perception of the foreign policy options in the water conflict is analyzed, and then, the game used to model the Turkish perception of the water conflict is described with its setting. Following these parts, the application section with its implications is developed.

CHAPTER VI: AN APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY TO THE WATER CONFLICT BETWEEN TURKEY AND SYRIA FROM THE TURKISH PERCEPTION

6.1 Turkish Perception of the Current Situation

The objective, in this part, is to clarify the *Turkish perception* of the current situation as regards the water conflict. The account given in this part constitutes the core presentation of the conflict from the Turkish viewpoint so as to ease the way for the utilization of the game theoretical framework. The significance regarding this part stems from the fact that, the points discussed in this part are the factors that shape the formulation of the Turkish foreign policy regarding the issue.

The water conflict, from the Turkish perception, is mainly due to the different definitions of the status of the Euphrates river in terms of international law, and accordingly Turkey's unwillingness to sign a water *sharing* agreement with Syria. The entire foreign policy stance is built upon this factor, and the whole related issues are examined by focusing on this base.

The water conflict emerged almost twenty years ago, however, it can be argued that, it took its current nature by the year 1990, when the filling of the reservoir of the Ataturk Dam created a tension between the two states. Then, the conflict began to be perceived as such for the first time in its current meaning. However, any arguments related to the release of more water as claimed by Syria,¹ were not responded positively by Turkey. The medium of the

relationship between the two states from that time on has been on mutual allegations, which is based on the conflictual history of the bilateral relations. Turkey from 1990 on continued to underline that Syria supports terrorist activities in Turkey by providing them shelter on its territory or on territories under its control, and likewise, Syria underlined that, they would be suffering at the utmost level when the entire water project is completed by Turkey.

The current situation in the conflict as regards the foreign policy options of states from the Turkish perception can be summarized as such:

At the current situation Turkey perceives that, it acts in the most cooperative manner while Syria lacks such a tendency. According to the Turkish claims, Syria rather tries to weaken Turkey from the inside by providing shelter for PKK camps on territories under Syrian control.² Therefore, the Turkish perception of the issue is centered around the view that, Turkey fulfills its duty regarding the 1987 Protocol, which is a cooperative approach and the fair resolution of the issue. However, in response to such a cooperative approach Turkey perceives that Syria does not present a friendly approach by supporting terrorist activities in Turkey when combined with its standing regarding the Hatay dispute and the Orontes conflict.

The current situation in the conflict is perceived by Turkey as it fulfills its commitment to the 1987 Protocol, but such a cooperative approach is responded by the Syrian

support for PKK terrorism in Turkey. Turkish foreign policy on this issue faced a domestic questioning of its credibility vis-à-vis Syria. Turkey only receives an increase in PKK activities carried out in Turkey, and thus, major domestic instability is fortified by the Syrian policies. On the other hand, the Syrian position in the current situation is interpreted by Turkey as the achievement of Syrian hostile policies towards Turkey. This simplification can be elaborated as such: The hostile bilateral relations can be continued by such a policy by the Syrian side. It continues to follow a policy which weakens Turkey from the inside. Further, it continues to receive the agreed amount of water which deemed to be fair.

Although the Syrian policy for weakening Turkey and receiving water at the amount stated in the Protocol, are policies that seem to be a success for the Syrian ends, when the changes in the international system and the way international relations is conducted is taken into account, they do not match with the requirements of the international order of the late 1990s.

Supporting PKK terrorism in Turkey at the expense of Turkish compliance with the terms of the Protocol results in two major drawbacks for Syria as a member of the international system: First, it is enumerated among the states which support international terrorism, thus, continues to lose its international credibility. Second drawback is an aftermath of the first one, which might

result in the isolation of the state of Syria in the international arena. These points are significant determinants of the Turkish perception of the current situation and the following account elaborates it.

When Turkey considers itself in the new international system it concludes that, its standing in the international arena is definite and it receives no suspicion regarding its foreign policy orientation or at least as a member of the international system. From this perspective an account as regards the Syrian situation both in the Middle East, and in the international system can be given as such: It cannot be denied that, Turkey has lost its trusting among the Middle Eastern states following the second Gulf War. As one expert stated, Post-Persian Gulf War Iraq has an additional grievance against Turkey, i.e., the active Turkish contribution to the US-led coalition against Iraq. Though Syria has lost Iraq as an ally in the struggle against Turkey on the water issue, it is in a position to harm Turkish interests by indirect means in peacetime.³ Though Syria being almost lonely for a well-defined policy regarding the water issue, it as a neighbour of Turkey is in a major effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction, possibly including a qualitatively different nuclear weapons capability. Syria together with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia is counted among the states of the region which acquire unrestrained amounts of advanced weapons systems, and they are identified as perverting states of the regional

security.⁴ Syria has lost its major ally the Soviet Union by the beginning of the 1990s. This made Syria remain lonely for some time since it could not received neither economic nor military aid from the state to which Syria has established its both standing in the Middle East, and its entire foreign policy framework. Turkey perceives that, now, Syria has to set itself in the international system which has changed to great degree. The Syrian foreign policy has been formulated focusing mainly on the state of Israel. Both states contest over the same territories on the Greater Israel and Greater Syria grounds. As Syria's foreign policy fixed upon mostly on Israel, it developed its military capabilities in the same line with Israel. Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and developing chemical and biological capabilities, responded by the development of the arsenals in part as a response.⁵ Syria has been left isolated by other Middle Eastern states particularly due to its support for Iran. With its stance against Israel and sympathy for Iran, and its poor relations with Turkey- particularly due to the issue of Hatay, and certainly for the water dispute- left Syria isolated in the geographical region where it is located.

The points raised above altogether demonstrate that, though Syria acquired weapons of mass destruction being against Israel, it can use them as an item leverage against Turkey. However, it is not plausible for a state to use such a significant leverage against a state to whom its

existence is dependent. Water is such an item that a state cannot risk its scarcity.

Turkish perception of this situation of Syria is built upon the view that, Syria being almost an isolated state in the Middle East cannot continue its existence without water, and cannot survive without getting aid or at least a positive approach from either the US or the EU. With the lack of the Soviet economic aid, furthered with disputes with almost all of its neighbouring states, it has to find some moderate way to conduct its foreign relations. In fact, an improvement with the relations with the US was initiated before the Gulf War. This was a clear indication that a dramatic reversal of Syrian foreign policy was taking place.⁶ However, Syria only thought that, it needed the backing of a superpower in a region like the Middle East, though not calculating the fact that its major and secondary opponents were also backed by the same superpower. Turkey being an ally of the US and having support from the EU makes it difficult for Syria to get support for its own claims. Hence, Turkish understanding of this situation is that, Syria should have to find a moderate way in resolving its disputes with all its neighbours and should have its place among the democratic states of the world in the early 2000s.

On August 23, 1994, Syria participated on the foreign-minister level in a summit conference with Iran and Turkey in which the Kurdish question figured prominently. At this summit the Syrian side declared that Syria was adamantly

opposed to the fragmentation of Middle East countries.⁷ These declarations in fact mean very little as terrorist infiltrations still continue from Syria, and no severe step has been taken regarding this issue.

Following the analysis on the Syrian continuation of following a non-cooperative foreign policy, it is useful to consider, what would be the foreign policy options of Syria and Turkey, if the foreign policy setting would be just the vice-versa: The case is, Turkey does not release the amount agreed in the 1987 Protocol, but Syria stops providing shelter for PKK terrorism in Turkey. This case from the Syrian point of view constitutes a major drawback for one of its most significant domestic issues. If Turkey does not commit to the terms of the Protocol, then Syria would be facing many problems due to the severe water shortages that are to emerge. The use of water in the country- a domestic issue- turns out to be an issue of foreign policy. In various studies it is stated that, Syria utilizes extremely backward techniques for irrigation. These techniques both lead to the evaporation of water, and its waste. These points are determined by various researchers as mentioned before.⁸ Apart from these, water for daily use is also insufficient. An overall shortage of which primary reason can be indicated as the high birth rates almost threatens the survival of the state as a whole. Therefore, Syria is dependent on Turkey on this issue, but the Turkish failure to fulfill its duty is vital. However, if Turkey follows

such a foreign policy on this issue, then it becomes clear that, Turkey by taking into account the above mentioned capabilities of Syria calculates that, though being too promising, it is not plausible within the strategic environment to use the capabilities as a matter of threat, and the use of military power against Turkey is not promising at all. The primary reason for this stems from the fact that, even if Turkey does not release the amount stated, Syria cannot opt for the mentioned alternative as such a policy would leave Syria with floods and related disasters. From the Turkish perception, it may be argued that, Syria lacks hope for future change on the situation as it suffers at the most, if such a policy option is utilized.

Formulating such a foreign policy, can furnish Turkey with two positive and two negative results. Turkey can be regarded as having an advantageous position over Syria on grounds that, Turkey acquires a position that it starved; it furnishes that, the support provided for PKK terrorism is terminated. Accordingly, Turkey becomes able to have a step towards the furnishing of stability in domestic politics. However, Turkey suffers from a decline in the international scene, likewise the Syrian position in the *current* situation. By not releasing more than $500\text{m}^3/\text{sec}$ of water, Turkey violates the rules put forward by the International Law. This defection in fact stems from two issues: First, Turkey is bound to provide the downstream states with a certain amount of water, and also it has to fulfill its duty

emanating from the Protocol. The other international implication of this decline for Turkey is that, in the post-Cold War era with the more powerful trends of cooperation and integration, it will certainly be faced with a decrease in its credibility in the international arena. Such a foreign policy option would deteriorate its standing as an ally of the US, and becoming a part of the arrangements in the EU, thus would be isolated in global interactions. Further, it will not be saving its face in the Syrian cooperation, but it will be suffering at the greatest extent from its own defection.

Another policy option for this current situation is the case in which both parties to the conflict do not cooperate. In this case, Turkey, again does not provide Syria with the agreed amount of water, in response it is bound to resist the continued support for terrorism. Syria is affected by the decrease in the water received, but still continues to support terrorism in Turkey. This situation can be viewed as a case of balance of defection of both parties regarding the issue, and neither has an advantage over the other. Instead, they share a perfect non-cooperative foreign policy environment, which significantly indicate that, neither is better off, but both are in a condition which none of them desires. This may mean that, the stalemate faced by both parties in this option, may be altered by the Syrian support for terrorism. Since both parties do not cooperate, they have a stalemate situation.

But it may be argued that, both Turkey and Syria may retain a hope to change the balance of stalemate, by using water and PKK card respectively. What this case entails is that, Syria though receives less than 500m³/sec of water is not in a situation as bad as the case when it hinders the support for PKK terrorism in Turkey, but again receives the same amount of water. Therefore, from the Turkish perspective, Syria is in a better situation in this option, since it can still continue to support a terrorist organization operating in Turkey while receiving less water than the agreed amount.

One more foreign policy option for the case at hand, is that, both states cooperate to end the conflict. Turkey provides Syria with the agreed amount of water in the Protocol, and Syria ends the support provided for terrorism in Turkey. The implications of this option for Turkey are the realization of the end to which Turkey wants to achieve, and the furnishing of a contributing development for putting an end to the domestic instability. Another positive implication of this policy is that, Turkey increases its international credibility by complying with the terms of the Protocol, and accordingly respect to international law. A detailed account of this case can be given as such:

The most important security concern for Turkey particularly starting with the second half of the 1980s and throughout the entire decade of the 1990s is the deterioration emanating from the separatist terrorist organizations that operate within the country. It is not a

secret that these terrorist organizations receive support from the neighbouring countries. However, when the case is to terminate the support for PKK from Syria is considered it is not possible for Turkey to sign an agreement with Syria for the "sharing" of the waters of the Euphrates. Turkey considers that, determination of a policy in a cooperative manner both abates the resolution of the conflict and will prepare a reasonable base for the conduct of future relations. When this option is examined for the Syrian side, it becomes clear that, according to Turkey, Syria gets the fair amount in ending this conflict. In this option, the Turkish commitment to the terms of the 1987 Protocol deems to be conclusive.⁹ Turkish position on this option is mainly due to the consideration that releasing more than 500m³/sec is a fair agreement.¹⁰ Once more to highlight, is the Turkish commitment for the definitions of the international law, and thus, to regard the river as a transboundary one. The Turkish standing makes it impossible for any other alternatives to be formulated. Having itself guaranteed not to make any moves with the status-quo brought about by the international law, Turkish standing has centered around only one issue: Following a water policy in line with the terms of the 1987 Protocol. Turkey perceives that, the only viable reference for the issue is the agreement reached by signing this Protocol, which was primarily concluded on the principle of cooperation for many issues.

The implications of this option for Turkey are the realization of the end to which Turkey wants to achieve; the end of the domestic instability. Another positive implication of this policy is that, Turkey increases its international credibility by complying with the terms of the Protocol, and accordingly respect to international law.

Turkish view also underlines that, if Syria stops supporting terrorism in Turkey, then its isolation in the international arena will terminate, accordingly, its international credibility will increase.¹¹ In relation with this Turkish perception of just the support for terrorism issue, Turkey also perceives another development as conclusive for its Syrian policy: Syria's continued negotiation with Israel likewise with the United States; the desire to be involved in the Middle East peace process and become a creditable actor in this process. Though Syria wants to see Turkey as much as vitiated due to both the water claims and the Hatay problem, it began to realize that neither Europe nor the US want the destabilization of Turkey by any means. It is again worth noting that Syria does not want to remain outside the emerging trends and formulations of the post-Cold War era.

Another important point for the formulation of Turkish foreign policy regarding this issue is the Turkish perception that, Syria and Turkey have almost full information vis-à-vis each other and they have similar expectations in the resolution of this conflict when their

national security considerations are calculated together. Turkey perceives that they have full information in the sense that, both of these states' policy formulations are based on the knowledge that they share. Turkey perceives that, it has the knowledge regarding the water issue for Syria, i.e., Syria has serious problems regarding irrigation and use of the water, and needs not less than 500m³/sec of water to be released from the Euphrates. Turkey also assumes that, Syria supports terrorist activities in Turkey, and demands from the Syrian state to stop terrorist infiltrations into the Turkish territory.

Therefore, Turkey perceives that these two states know each other's top national security priorities: According to Turkish view, for Syria it is the release of water not less than 500m³/sec of water from the Euphrates; and for Turkey, it is the prevention of the alleged support provided for terrorist activities emanating from Syria. Therefore, from the Turkish perspective, whether it is true or not, both states have acquainted each other with information regarding their positions and give messages in this line. Further, according to Turkish perspective this calculation show that they have similar expectations, as regards the security considerations, vis-à-vis the linkage established between the two issues.

The meetings held between the top statesmen of Syria and Turkey are almost countless and are mostly occupied by the discussion of the water issue, and the alleged support

for terrorist activities in Turkey. The results arrived at are not much different to the Turkish policy makers: In all meetings Syria gives a guarantee that, it will not allow any separatist organizations on its territory, and promises to provide the security of Turkey. The number of security protocols have reached 25.¹²

The importance of this account stems from the *Turkish perception* that, both states share information on this issue, and the their expectations on providing security strengthens a drive for cooperation.

Further, in Turkish foreign policy circles it can be argued that, "full information" would provide each state with assurance about the other's policy options. Therefore, Turkish perception of the issue, independent of that of Syrian, that since they share the information regarding the conflict, they both are aware what the plausible policy actions can be. Turkey perceives such a milieu that, no alternative decisions shall be taken on this issue, as the Turkish insistence on following the terms of the 1987 Protocol, which it sees as a fair amount, and does not consider any other options for the resolution of the conflict as available. However, it should be noted that, this does not necessarily account for the Syrian side, but rather does so for the Turkish perception of what the Syrian assumptions can be on this issue.

Turkey signed several security protocols with Syria which document the issue of border security. The

international system of the post-Cold War era offering great opportunities to first to face many of the problems which could not come to the fore during the strict Cold War years, and secondly to resolve them in such cooperative ways that are almost unavoidable. The last point is important in the sense that, there are no more alliances that certain states can resist for certain things with support received from one of the superpowers, and it is not ignorable that, the states in the world are getting in close contact with one another.

Therefore, the Turkish perception of the issue is more centered around the view that, Turkey insists on not negotiating a water sharing agreement with Syria, on grounds that, it is committed to the rules of international law, and accordingly to the terms of the 1987 Protocol. It also is firm on the issue that, both parties to the conflict are well aware of their expectations sustained by the Turkish understanding that, Turkey and Syria have full information regarding their positions with respect to the conflict. Accordingly, Turkey insists that the only cooperative solution is the Turkish commitment to the terms of the 1987 Protocol and the Syrian attempt to put an end to the shelter provided to terrorist activities in Turkey- which is not in fact a cooperative solution for the Syrian side.

6.2 Assurance Game

Assurance game is a simple one-shot, two-by-two game with no dominant strategy.¹³ The matrix of the assurance game is as follows:^{14, 15}

		<i>Actor B</i>	
		B ₁	B ₂
		A ₁	4, 4
<i>Actor A</i>		A ₂	1, 3
		A ₂	3, 1
			2, 2

In this matrix, A and B are players; A₁, A₂, B₁, B₂ are alternative actions that can be made by players A and B. While A₁ and B₁ are strategies of Cooperation, A₂ and B₂ are that of Defection. The payoffs are reflected with numbers ranging from the least preferred to the most preferred: 1 to 4. In order to make the explanation clearer, a simplistic evaluation of the results of this game matrix is:

- (A₁, B₁) = Cooperation (C)
- (A₂, B₂) = Defection (D)

The features of this game can be explained as such: In Assurance Game, A prefers A₁ only if B chooses B₁, and B prefers B₁ only if A chooses A₁. The equilibrium¹⁶ outcome that emerges, A₁B₁, leaves both satisfied. There is, however, a second equilibrium outcome possible in this case, one that emerges from each actor's desire to maximize its minimum gain. Such a minimax¹⁷ rule would leave A to choose A₂ and B to choose B₂, the course of action that would ensure

that, at the very least, they avoid their worst outcomes. Yet the A_2B_2 outcome, although an equilibrium one, is mutually undesirable: Only A_1B_1 , however, is a "coordination equilibrium."¹⁸ The other equilibrium outcome, A_2B_2 , does not qualify as such because each actor can shift from it and make the other better off by doing so.¹⁹ Thus as long as each player is aware of the other's preferences, the two will converge on the A_1B_1 outcome that both most prefer. Elster considers this case as individually inaccessible²⁰, nonetheless, he expects convergence because the outcome is individually stable. Stein, on the other hand, as adopted in this study, considers this case to be individually accessible *precisely* because there are "convergent expectations."²¹ The "proffered information"²² would provide each player with assurance about the other's preferences, as would be necessary for expectations to converge on the one of the two equilibria that all prefer.

6.3 Using Assurance Game as a Model to Understand Turkish Perception of the Conflict Situation

In this part of the study the issue-linkage between the water conflict and the support for PKK terrorism is examined within the framework of the Assurance Game, so as to see how Turkish perception of the conflict can be modeled within this framework, and how Turkey perceives the issue as an assurance game. The original matrix of the game as explained above is:

<i>Actor B</i>		
	B_1 (C)	B_2 (D)
A_1 (C)	4, 4	1, 3
<i>Actor A</i>		
A_2 (D)	3, 1	2, 2

And the use of this game as a model in understanding the Turkish perception of the conflict is:

<i>Turkey</i>		
	$>500m^3/sec$	$<500m^3/sec$
PKK^o	4, 4	1, 3
<i>Syria</i>		
PKK	3, 1	2, 2

In Assurance Game *cooperation* for Turkey is providing Syria with the exact amount of water as agreed in the 1987 Protocol; that is $>500m^3/sec=B_1$, and for Syria- but this is, of course, what Turkey perceives as Syrian cooperation- it is to put an end to providing shelter to the PKK terrorists on its territory, so as to stop terrorist infiltration into Turkey: $PKK^o=A_1$ (stopping the shelter provided to PKK activities).

As for *defection*, it is releasing less than $500m^3/sec$ of water to Syria for Turkey; $<500m^3/sec=B_2$, and it is to continue to providing shelter to the PKK activities for Syria; $PKK=A_2$.

As the main features of the game are explained following the original matrix of the game, at this stage only the foreign policy alternatives available via the plausible outcomes are elaborated.

In this part once again to repeat all the examinations should be regarded as they are the Turkish perception of the issue.

First, the (4,4) coordination equilibrium outcome will be examined as to show how, from the Turkish perception of the situation, this outcome serves for both states ends and to demonstrate that coordination is largely significant for both parties. When this outcome is examined the following case is reached: This outcome demonstrates that two principle one being foreign and the other domestic policy objectives are satisfied. One of these is that,

- Cooperation for Turkey is perceived to be the case of willing to fulfill its duty by releasing >500m³/sec of water to Syria as guaranteed in the 1987 Protocol. Turkey by committing itself to this foreign policy decision, considers no other plausible policies.

- The other principal objective for Turkey in making cooperation with Syria is having the other party to terminate a policy that is leading to the increase of the degree of instability, which in turn deteriorates the economic development in Turkey. What one implicative side of achieving this is to become able to furnish stability through the cessation of one source of support to such a

terrorist organization, thus the recovery of a type of development that shall contribute to the peaceful internal organization of the Turkish state.

In this outcome, as a result of cooperation, by taking into account, their convergent expectations regarding the top national security issues, plus, proffered information, the following points are determined:

For Syria, it;

- receives the amount of water that is deemed to be fair by Turkey;
- gains international credibility by the termination of support provided for terrorist activities in a foreign country;
- prepares the ground for integration with the world, because, the above point guarantees that an end would be put for its isolation in the international arena.

For Turkey, it;

- likewise Syria would end up with the furnishing of its top national security concern. The Syrian support for terrorism in Turkey would be prevented, thus domestic stability can be provided;
- continues to release the amount of water as agreed in the Protocol, by respecting international law, and its credibility in the international arena is preserved.

The second outcome in the matrix is (2,2); the other equilibrium outcome, seems not preferable as it does not serve to Syrian ends at all. In this outcome, Syria

continues to support PKK terrorism in Turkey while being punished by Turkey in receiving less than $500\text{m}^3/\text{sec}$ of water. Since the Turkish approach will be to release $<500\text{m}^3/\text{sec}$ of water, which means the suffering of the Syrian state, it is not an acceptable outcome for both parties. Therefore, from the Turkish perspective and also from that of Syrian, it seems impossible for Syria to opt for this equilibrium outcome.

- this outcome may mean that, both states are in an urge to change this equilibrium stalemate.

The third outcome is (3,1): While Turkey cooperates, Syria defects, i.e., Turkey provides Syria with more than $500\text{m}^3/\text{sec}$ of water and Syria continues to support PKK terrorism in Turkey by providing shelter. According to Turkey, this reflects the current situation of the conflict: Turkey receives 1, which means that it gets the least value given outcome, and Syria gets 3, means that while continuing to deteriorate Turkey from the inside provides Syria with the enough water as agreed in the Protocol.

The leading positions in this outcome can be summarized as such:

For Turkey, it;

- suffers from a major domestic instability due to the continuing Syrian support for terrorism, thus domestic credibility of its foreign policy towards Syria receives a blow.

For Syria, it;

- seems furnished that, it has still the option to weaken Turkey from the inside;
- continues to receive the amount of water guaranteed in the 1987 Protocol, though it defects;
- faced with the decrease in its international credibility as it is enumerated among the states which support international terrorism;
- ends up with international isolation in the face of the new cooperative trends of the post-Cold War era.

The forth outcome obtained in the Assurance Game is (1,3), which corresponds to the case of Turkey's release of less than $500\text{m}^3/\text{sec}$ of water in the face of Syrian cooperation. This case is impossible as Turkey is bound to release at least $500\text{m}^3/\text{sec}$ of water and as such a case is not plausible at all for both parties to the conflict. Syria shall not yield by not supporting terrorism in Turkey if Turkey were to cut off the amount agreed in the Protocol.

In this outcome, for Syria, it;

- suffers from many problems which are directly related to survival of the state of Syria as it is, due to the decrease in the amount of water;
- knows that it is dependent on Turkey, therefore, the situation emerged in the face of its cooperation leads Syria to think that, it has no hope for future change of the situation;

For Turkey, it;

- provides the desired situation, as regards terrorism, for furnishing domestic stability;
- violates the international law, which results in the decrease of its credibility in the international arena. This reasoning can be viewed as the ultimate one in explaining the Turkish cooperation in the face of the Syrian.

At the theoretical level, in the very nature of this game the parties to a conflict are deemed to have each other assured in attaining cooperation. It is not the goal to cheat over one another in this game. The (4,4) outcome as seen in the matrix is individually stable. Further, this outcome is individually accessible precisely, because there are convergent expectations. This calculation yet based on the principle of providing information, i.e., the "proffered information" would provide each actor with assurance about the other's preferences. However, this evaluation can only be credited from the Turkish perception of the issue on grounds that, Turkey perceives this outcome as cooperative, and thinks that Syria would also consider it as cooperation if Syria wants to resolve the conflict. In fact, this is not the case from the Syrian perception of the issue, as its one and only alternative policy is the signing of a sharing agreement with Turkey. So, it should be kept in mind that, all the arguments in study are from the perception of the Turkish state of the issue.

considerable problem in evaluating and in understanding the Syrian perception and policy regarding the issue: Cooperation for Turkey does not -and in fact- mean cooperation for Syria. On the contrary, a cooperative solution for Turkey is the source of the current conflict itself. However, what Turkey regards as the Syrian perception is in fact its own thinking as regards the Syrian perception. The principal argument put forward by the Syrian government is signing of a water sharing agreement with Turkey. Therefore, the Turkish state is faced with a paradox with respect to the resolution of the conflict. The paradox is the case of the resolution of the conflict from the Turkish perception is the primary source of the conflict. This makes the negotiation positions of the parties carried to a stalemate.

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

The primary objective of this study was to describe the way Turkish foreign policy makers perceive foreign policy options as regards the water conflict between Syria and Turkey. A game theoretical model is used as a setting to understand the logic behind the Turkish interpretation of the current situation as regards the water conflict and related alleged Syrian support for PKK terrorism in Turkey. Another aim, by using the model, was to explain the constraints attached to the attainment of a cooperative solution to the conflict.

The secondary goal of the study was to indicate the importance of a natural resource as a foreign policy item and to discuss the way states formulate their foreign policies by taking into account this new dimension.

The study did not aim to elaborate on possible conflict resolution options and did not analyze the Syrian interpretation of the conflict situation.

This study, in the basic terms, was an exercise of a foreign policy issue within the framework provided by game theory.

In this study it is concluded that, from the Turkish perception of the issue, cooperation between the two states is the only acceptable outcome. The way Turkey perceives the issue and accordingly the matrix of the assurance game provided that convergent expectations are there, and cooperation is individually accessible exactly because there

are these expectations. The study showed that, Turkey perceives that the proffered information provides each player with assurance about the other's preferences, as would be necessary for expectations to converge on the one of the two equilibria that all prefer. As indicated in the application chapter, the main thrust in applying assurance game to model the Turkish perception of the conflict stemmed from the above underlined features of this strategic interaction case. The proffered information regarding one another's preferences seems to be decisive in this exercise. This game is peculiar with its standing more inclination towards international cooperation, and the features of the game as stated above resulted in a cooperative manner just for one party though it is the source of the conflict for the other party; but this is due to the misperception of the situation by Turkey, and the paradox that it has faced.

Turkey, in this study, firmly depended on two criteria in maintaining its position, which are mainly the source of the conflict and constitutes a limitation for the resolution or at least negotiation of the conflict: The first is the standing point for Turkey regarding the amount of water to be released from the Euphrates is international law. Turkey by defining the Euphrates as a transboundary river closes all the options for any discussion regarding sharing of the waters of the river or accepting any kinds of agreement related to this issue. The second criterion for Turkey is the Protocol signed in 1987. It does not see any failure

vis-à-vis its position as it fulfills its duty regarding the amount released to Syria.

Therefore, the exercise in this study, has been set up on *actual* foreign policy determinants of one of the states and is carried out on grounds that, how this state perceives the conflict and what the other party perceives regarding the issue. Modelling such a situation by using game theory enabled the researcher to see the Turkish perception of the basic structure of the conflict and the simplification brought about by the theory as a framework for understanding the issue from one state's perception eased the understanding of the conflict in the clearest manner.

Another significant point raised in this study is the way water turned out to be an asset that can be qualified as a matter of high politics, and an item in foreign policy making. It is pointed out that, with the inclusion of new items in defining security, water ranks among the top new issues that become a mediocre in international relations. This is the secondary objective of the study to argue the stance of a resource such as water in the new security framework of the post-Cold War environment, and foreign policy dimension of the issue.

Following these general conclusions, more specific conclusions should also be addressed.

Cooperation from the Syrian perception is Turkey's acceptance for the signing of water sharing agreement. However, as this can never be among the alternatives for the

Turkish foreign policy makers, a more accommodative solution can be the renewment of water releasing protocol. For example, a new protocol shall be prepared as a package, underlining the release of more water; certain conditions regarding the well-being of the downstream states; and combining this issue within a more security oriented framework so as to provide that, downstream states would not retain any inconveniences regarding the upstream. Therefore, three points as regards the actual conditions are determined:

- Full cooperation for Syria is the signing of a water sharing agreement with Turkey. However, this is irrelevant from the Turkish perspective.
- Cooperation for Turkey is to make it acceptable for Syria to return to the status-quo. However, this has been tried to be nullified by Syria, and perceived as the source of the conflict. This point is significant in understanding the dynamics of the Middle East region, and distinguishing the inconveniences of formulating foreign policy in this region.
- The one and only plausible alternative solution to this conflict can be preparation of a more promising protocol to satisfy both parties to the conflict.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

¹Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, Morningside Edition, 1989), xix.

²Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

³Jervis, The Logic of Images, ibid.

⁴Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

CHAPTER II

¹Elaborate studies are carried out for the conflict over the Jordan River, among them the significant ones are: J. Isaac and H. Shuval, eds., Water and Peace in the Middle East: Proceedings of the First Israeli-Palestinian International Academic Conference on Water, Zurich, 10-13 December 1992, (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V.- Studies in Environmental Science- 1994); and papers presented in other conferences are elaborate studies on the Jordan river conflict. Apart from them, chapters related to Israeli water conflicts are particularly important studies in; Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 1994); and Daniel Hillel Rivers of Eden: The Struggle for Water and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994)

²J. Kolars and W. A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), xxv.

³Thomas Naff and Ruth C. Matson, eds., Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation, (Boulder: Westview Replica Edition, 1984)

⁴Kolars, "The Future of the Euphrates River," submitted at the World Bank Conference titled International Workshop on Comprehensive Water Resources Management Policy, in Washington DC, 1991.

⁵T. Allan, "Irrigated Agriculture in the Middle East: The Future," in Peter Beaumont and Keith McLachlan, eds., Agricultural Development in the Middle East, (New York: John Wiley and Sons); "Water Resources in the Middle East: Economic and Strategic Issues," University of London, SOAS: Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Water Database, 1988; "The Euphrates Water: Current and Future Water Sharing," University of London, SOAS: Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Water Database, 1993; "Fortunately There are Substitutes for

Water: Otherwise Our Hydropolitical Future Would be Impossible," University of London, SOAS: Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Water Database, 1993; "Water in the Arab World: Overall Perspectives on Countries and Regions," University of London, SOAS: Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Water Database, 1994.

⁶Allan, and C. Mallat, eds., Water in the Middle East: Legal, Political and Commercial Implications, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1995)

⁷Peter Beaumont, Gerald Blake, and Malcolm Wagstaff, eds., The Middle East: A Geographical Study, (New York: Halsted Press, 1988)

⁸Peter H. Gleick, Water in Crisis: A Guide to World's Fresh Water Resources (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)

⁹N. Beschorner, "Water and Instability in the Middle East," Adelphi Paper, 273, (IISS, London: Brassey's, 1992)

¹⁰Joyce Starr and Daniel Stoll, US Foreign Policy on Water Resources in the Middle East (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1987); Starr and Stoll, eds., The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the Middle East, (Boulder: Westview, 1988)

¹¹John Waterbury, "Dynamics of Basin-Wide Cooperation in the Utilization of the Euphrates," paper prepared for the Conference: The Economic Development of Syria; Problems, Progress, and Prospects held at Damascus, January 6-7, 1990.

¹²David LeMarquand, "Politics of International River Basin Cooperation and Management," in Albert E. Utton and Ludwik Teclaff, eds., Water in a Developing World, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977)

¹³Özden Bilen, "Prospects for Technical Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin," in Asit Biswas, ed., The Water of the Middle East, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 95-116.

¹⁴Cengiz Okman, "Su Sorunu ve Ortadoğu'da Stratejik Durum," in Sabahattin Şen, ed., Su Sorunu, Türkiye ve Ortadoğu, (Bağlam Yayıncılık: 1993), 414.

¹⁵Peter Rogers, "The Value of Cooperation in Resolving International River Basin Disputes," Natural Resources Forum 17, 2 (1993).

¹⁶Serdar Güner, "Turkish-Syrian War of Attrition: The Water Dispute," unpublished paper.

¹⁷Aysegül Kibaroğlu, "Prospects for Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin," Working Paper no 42 of Amsterdam International Studies, February 1996.

¹Kaynak Acar, "Stratejik Açıdan Su Sorunu," Strateji 3 (1995).

CHAPTER III

- ²Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Studies Perspectives: Mindless Eclecticism or Creative Synthesis?" in Michael Clarke, ed., New Perspectives on Security, (London: Brassey's, 1993), 127
- ³Ethan B. Kapstein, "Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics," International Organization 49 (Autumn 1995), 770.
- ⁴Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "The Environmental and International Security," in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds., World Security: Challenges for a New Century, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 274.
- ⁵Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: Van Nostand Reinhold Company, 1971)
- ⁶David B. Dewitt, "Introduction: The New Global Order and the Challenges of International Security" in David Dewitt, David Haglung, and John Kirton, eds., Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security, (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1993), 9. See also Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," International Security 16, 2 (Fall 1991), 76-116.
- ⁷A renewable resource has both a *stock* and a *flow*. A *stock* is the quantity or quality of the resource that is available for consumption or that maintains a useful service; and a *flow* is the incremental addition to, or restoration of, the stock per unit of time. See David Pearce and Kerry Turner, Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 52-53; and David Wirth, "Climate Chaos," Foreign Policy 74 (Spring 1989), 10; World Resources: 1992-1993 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) and World Resources: 1990-1991 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); The State of the World 1989-1995 (New York: Norton, 1989-1995)
- ⁸Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup Conflict," in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, World Security: Challenges for a New Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 294; and Peter Gleick, "The Implications of Global Climatic Changes for International Security," Climatic Change 15-1,2 (October 1989), 309-325.
- ⁹Although this is not the point to be discussed in this study, oil was regarded as the real motive, being a natural

resource, behind the 1991 Gulf War can be given as the recent example for a war fought for the mentioned reason.

³Nazli Choucri and Robert North, Nations in Conflict (San Francisco: Freeman, 1975)

¹⁰Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice (New York: W. W. Freeman and Company, 1989), 186.

¹¹For a discussion of *What was Cold War?* to see how different scholars have defined the Cold War itself see Pierre Allan, "The End of the Cold War: The End of International Relations Theory?", in The End of the Cold War: Evaluating Theories of International Relations, Pierre Allan and Kjell Goldmann, eds., (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 228-229.

¹²Russet and Starr, 186.

¹³Paul A. Anderson, "What Do Decision Makers Do When They Make a Foreign Policy Decision?" in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, and James N. Rosenau, eds., New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, (Boston: Allan and Unwin, 1987), 290.

¹⁴See James Rosenau, "Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," in Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau. 1.

¹⁵Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), the quote is from p.119, citing the words of Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Spain, "Decision-Making as an Approach to International Politics," in Foreign Policy Decision-Making, Snyder, Bruck and Spain (New York: Free Press, 1962), 82.

¹⁶Holsti, 118-139.

¹⁷Holsti, 93.

¹⁸International rivers are defined as drainage basins shared by two or more states or constitute the boundary between them. The definition is taken from; Julio Barberis, "International Rivers," in R. Bernhardt, ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 9 (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1986), 193-216.

CHAPTER IV

¹L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules Dangerous Game (London: I. B. Tauris, 1984), 3.

²M. E. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War, Vol. II (London: Longman, 1991), 4.

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- ³Fawaz A. Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 2.
- ⁴Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, Turkey's Security Policies Adelphi Papers 164 (1981), 11.
- ⁵Holsti, International Politics, 96-101. Holsti states that unwillingness to commit military capabilities to others' purposes is the hallmark of non alignment as a foreign policy strategy.
- ⁶Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğu'na Karşı Politikası (1945-1970) (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1972), 6.
- ⁷Oral Sander, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity and Change," in Ahmet Evin, ed., Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change, (Opladen: Leske Verlag and Budrich GmbH, 1984), 115-130.
- ⁸Sezer, 12.
- ⁹Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Security Policy: Continuity and Change," in Douglas T. Stuart, ed., Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1988), 158.
- ¹⁰Sander, 116-118.
- ¹¹Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 31-33.
- ¹²Holsti, International Politics, 101.
- ¹³George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971 (Washington, DC.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972), 17-29.
- ¹⁴Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey and the Southern Flank: Domestic and External Contexts," in John Chipman, ed., NATO and Its Southern Allies: Domestic and External Challenges, (New York: Routledge, 1988), 295-300.
- ¹⁵Sezer, "Prospects for a Southern European Security: A Turkish Perspective," in Roberto Aliboni, ed., Southern European Security in the 1990s, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), 117-120.
- ¹⁶Aptülâhat Akşin, Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi (İstanbul: İnkılâp ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1966), 97, and Batu, 3, cited in Aykan, 25.
- ¹⁷In an attempt to probe the determinants of foreign policy making and the forces that direct the foreign policy outputs of Turkey at that period it is unavoidable to focus on the national role of Turkey on the international scene. National roles reflect the general and specific objectives governments pursue within regions or in the world as a

whole. Holsti, International Politics, 115-116. Holsti in his classification determines 3 roles perceived by Turkey, namely, active-independent, regional-subsystem collaborator and faithful ally. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," in Stephen Walker, ed., Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 16-17; 21-25. Because national role conceptions are closely related to orientations a profile of one of the role types that are highlighted by Holsti has to be given, which is "faithful ally." A faithful ally role conception is defined by Holsti as the "one in which the policy makers declare that they will support, with all means possible, their fraternal allies." It is the role played by a state which fulfills its alliance commitments made through mutual assistance and other types of treaties. Holsti, International Politics, 113, see also Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, 14 (1970), 233-309.

¹⁸Batu, 21-5, cited in Aykan.

¹⁹Aykan, ibid.

²⁰Kürkçüoğlu, 183-187.

²¹Sezer, "Turkey's Security," 30.

²²Karaosmanoğlu, "Savunma Politikamızı İncelemek," in Türkiye'nin Savunması (Ankara: Tisa Matbaacılık Sanayi, 1987).

²³Erol Manisalı, ed., Turkey: An Active Partner in Western-Middle Eastern Economic Relations- Seminar Papers, (İstanbul: ?, 1985).

²⁴James Wyllie, "Turkey- Renationalizing Foreign Policy," Jane's Intelligence Review, 7, 2 (1994), 74-75.

²⁵Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Defense Policy: Problems and Prospects," in Jeffrey Simon, ed., European Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989, (Washington: The National Defense University Press, 1991), 544.

²⁶Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Revisionist Dreams, Realist Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria," in Bahgat Korany and A. E. Hillal Dessoiki, eds., The Foreign Policy of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 374.

²⁷Historically, the name Syria, which is in fact a name given to the region by the Europeans, refers to a region far larger than the one presently contained by the state called Syria. Historic Syria comprises all of four states- Syria, Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon- as well as the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and substantial portions of southeastern Turkey. A detailed account of the use of term is given in

Greater Syria. Daniel Pipes, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 13-16.

²⁸A. L. Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria (London: Macmillan, 1969); Z. N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence (Beirut: Khayats, 1960) in Hinnebusch, "Revisionist Dreams, Realist Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria."

²⁹Hinnebusch, 375.

³⁰Holsti, "National Role," 16-17.

³¹Margaret G. Hermann, "Syria's Hafez Al-Assad," in Barbara Kellerman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds., Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East, (New York: Praeger, 1991), 70-95.

³²Karim Pakradouni, "Hafez al-Assad-The Arabs' Bismarck," Manchester Guardian Weekly 129 (December 11, 1983), 14, in Hermann, "Syria's Al-Assad," 78.

³³Robert G. Neumann, "Assad and the Future of the Middle East," Foreign Affairs 62 (Winter 1983/1984), 256.

³⁴Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Assad (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 5.

³⁵Kürkçüoğlu, 16-18.

CHAPTER V

¹For discussion of the principal points in the on-going debate, see Peter H. Gleick, "Environment, Resources, and International Security and Politics," in Eric Arnett, ed., Science and International Security: Responding to a Changing World (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1990), 501-523; Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resource and International Security," International Security 18, 1 (Summer 1993), 79-112; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs 68, 2 (Spring, 1989), 162-177; Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," International Security 8, 1, (Summer 1983), 129-153.

²GAP means in Turkish "Southeastern Anatolia Project," the abbreviation of Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi. The GAP consists of 22 dams- 19 of which hydroelectric power plants (HPP)- and the Şanlıurfa irrigation tunnels on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. GAP has 13 sub-projects, 7 of them for the Euphrates and 6 for the Tigris. It is estimated that 1-1.6 million hectares would be irrigated when the entire project is completed. The biggest part within the GAP is the Atatürk Dam and the HPP and Şanlıurfa irrigation tunnels. As the ninth largest dam in the world, the Atatürk HPP has a production capacity of 8.9 billion

kwh per year. The Şanlıurfa tunnels will transport the water accumulated in the Atatürk Dam to the city of Şanlıurfa and to the Harran, Ceylanpınar, Siverek, Hilvan, and Bozova irrigation systems. It consists of two parallel 26.4 km long, 8 meter diameter tunnels with an average flow rate of 328m³/sec. It is also estimated that when the GAP completed, irrigation production will be possible on 53% of the entire arable fields of the Southeast region, compared with the 3% before the project was launched in the early 1960s. Also, it is planned that 27 billion kwh of electric energy on an annual basis- 22% of Turkey's energy potential- will be generated by the HPPs within the project. Another estimation regarding employment is that when the project is completed, GAP is expected to provide jobs for three million people in the region. The information presented here to address the huge scale of the project is compiled from various parts of study prepared on the GAP *per se*. Ali İhsan Bağış, GAP: The Cradle of Civilization Regenerated (Ankara: Interbank, 1989)

³See John Kolars, "The Hydro Imperative of Turkey's Search for Energy," The Middle East Journal 40, 1 (Winter 1986).

⁴The artificial Atatürk Dam Lake formed behind the 83 million cubic meters of the dam's main body is 817 km²- now ranks the third largest lake in Turkey.

⁵Turkish Daily News December 11 and 23, 1989.

⁶For example, Three Staged Plan for Optimum, Equitable and Reasonable Utilization of the Transboundary Watercourses of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin. It has been a valuable Plan using the language accepted by International Law. The concepts adopted in the Plan are in conformity with the International Law and the technical principles. What the major contribution of the Plan would be to save substantial amount of water and consequently result in sufficiency of water to meet the requirements of the three countries. The Plan proposed "Inventory studies for water resources," which will cover; the exchange of the whole available data; to check that data; to measure jointly the discharges; to evaluate and correct measurement; to exchange and check data about the quality of water; and further similar arrangements were offered for land resources, i.e., the same procedures were to be actualized for soil. The third stage would cover the evaluation of the data obtained from the above two sections. The details are derived from the original text of the Three Staged Plan obtained from the General Directorate of State Water Works.

⁷Chapter 6: "Procedures for the Prevention and Settlement of Disputes," Article XXIX-1 of Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Waters.

⁸Ibid., Article XXX.

⁹In international law a transboundary river is defined as a body of watercourse which crosses the common political border between two or more countries. For a discussion of this issue see Hasret Çomak, "International Law Issues: Euphrates-Tigris Watercourse System," Foreign Policy 5, 3-4 (1990), 85-86.

¹⁰Sandra Postel, Last Oasis: Facing Water Scarcity (New York: W.W. Norton and Company), 87-88.

CHAPTER VI

¹Turkish Daily News January 15, 1990.

²News are continual regarding this issue, and the Turkish claims are not baseless, in fact, when they are evaluated together. More than this, when top statesmen of Turkey and Syria the preservation of security ranks at the top of the issues discussed, and the Syrian officials cannot deny that they do not allow terrorist infiltrations from their territory. "Suriye ve terör," Milliyet, 30 Ekim 1993, 15; "Şam'dan Apo'yu istedik," Milliyet, 21 Kasım 1993, 12; "Suriye cephesinde yeni birşey yok," Milliyet, 4 Aralık 1993, 21; "Apo artık Suriye'ye giremeyecek," Hürriyet, 7 Aralık 1993, 29; "Esad'a terör kiskacı," Milliyet, 16 Ocak 1994, 16.

³Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Turkey's New Security Environment, Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation," Comparative Strategy 14 (1995), 164.

⁴Gerald M. Steinberg, "Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security," Survival 36 (Spring, 1994), 139.

⁵Andrew Rathmell, "Syria's Insecurity," Jane's Intelligence Review 6 (September, 1994), 419.

⁶Hani A. Faris, "The Arab Political Order After the Gulf War," in Ibrahim Ibrahim, ed., The Gulf Crisis: Background and Consequences (Washington: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1992), 224-226.

⁷Hürriyet, August 23, 1994.

⁸Naff and Matson, 1984; Stoll and Starr, 1987; Kolars and Mitchell, 1991; Allan, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995.

⁹The 1987 Protocol is done and signed by Prime Ministers Özal and El-Kassem in Damascus on July 17, 1987, in two original copies in English. The title of the Protocol is: Protocol on Matters Pertaining to Economic Cooperation Between the Republic of Turkey and the Syrian Arab Republic. The Protocol covers the following subjects: Petroleum and Gas; Water; Electricity; Trade; Banking Cooperation; Transport and Telecommunication; Telecommunication Field; and Cattle Transit Transportation.

The section dealing with the Water issue is as follows: "During the filling up period of the Atatürk Dam reservoir and until the final allocation of the waters of the Euphrates among the three riparian countries, the Turkish Side undertakes to release a yearly average of more than 500m³/sec at the Turkish-Syrian border and in cases where the monthly flow falls below the level of 500m³/sec, the Turkish Side agrees to make up the difference during the following month. The two sides agreed to expedite the work of the Joint Technical Committee on regional waters." There are six more subsidiary articles in the water section of the Protocol which show that, the two parties are in principle agreed to cooperate. The underlining articles for the Turkish insistence on the current policy stems from the two mentioned articles.

¹⁰In fact, Turkey agreed to undertake to release a yearly average of more than 500m³/sec at the Turkish-Syrian border and in cases where the monthly flow falls below the level of 500m³/sec, the Turkish side agreed to make up the difference during the following month. This point is clarified in the Article 6 of the Protocol.

¹¹In fact, Turkey implied a couple of times that it would use water as a leverage, however, never attempted to do so. The serious imply was made by the Prime Minister of the time Çiller in 1993, by saying that, "...we shall not use water as a weapon. However, we do not make water a bargaining tool as well. We continue to release water, as long as our relationships are favorable with our neighbours." "Su kozu gerçekleşiyor." Hürriyet, 14 Kasım 1993, 25.

¹²However, the promises given by the Syrian state are only valid for a very short period of time, as the infiltrations continue following a short period of time the meeting of the time. "Turkey, Iran and Syria Block Kurdish Aspirations," Turkish Probe, 17 November 1992; "Ankara Summit Aftermath," "Making Turkey an Economic Base," Turkish Probe, 24 November 1992; "Security Still a Main Problem on Ankara's Agenda," Turkish Probe, 5 January 1993; "Syria: Diplomacy over Troubled Waters," Turkish Probe, 19 January 1993; "Terror: No Longer a Commodity in Syrian Hands," "New Inroads with Syria," Turkish Probe, 26 January, 1993; "Turkey's Kurdish Conflict," Jane's Intelligence Review, 7, 4, 172-174; "An Independent Kurdish State or the Stability of the Middle East," Turkish Probe, 6 July 1993; "Turkey Caught in the Devil's Triangle," Turkish Probe, August 3, 1993.

¹³A strategy is dominant if it is a best strategy (i.e., it maximizes a player's pay-off) regardless of the opposition's choice of strategy; see, Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, Game Theory: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 1995), 44.

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- ¹⁴Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 30-31.
- ¹⁵The features of the Assurance Game itself and its comparison with the Prisoners' Dilemma, Chicken, and Deadlock games are examined in detail in George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 61, 63, 65-67, 71, 72, 78, 87, 89-90, 91, 240.
- ¹⁶An outcome is an equilibrium if it is brought about by strategies that agents have good reason to follow; see Heap and Varoufakis, 43.
- ¹⁷In game theory a minimax value is attached to an outcome if a minimum gain is obtained at the maximum value; see Stein, 31.
- ¹⁸A "coordination equilibrium" is defined by David K. Lewis as an outcome from which neither actor can shift and make anyone better off; see Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), 14.
- ¹⁹For Lewis, this does not pose a coordination problem, which requires the existence of two or more coordination equilibria; see Convention, 24.
- ²⁰in Stein footnote 11. Jon Elster, Ulysses and Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 21.
- ²¹The existence of convergent expectations is the characteristic of this game, and means that, both players have such expectations in the issue in consideration that, at some point and for the final attainment of the goal their expectations are at least theoretically converge or almost intersecting; Stein, 32.
- ²²Proffered information is again specific for the assurance game, meaning that, both player in a strategic setting are well aware of their positions and retain the knowledge regarding what plausible actions can be taken by the opposite party. In sum, both players are informed by the opponent that, s/he would act in a certain way, and both know that what the limits of action are regarding to a certain issue- both players have full information regarding the opponent; see ibid.

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