ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AND THE ISLAMIC
INTELLECTUALS IN THE 1980; THE CASE
OF ALİ BULAÇ

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

OF

BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REGUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

BY

NEŞE ÖZTİMUR

SEPTEMBER 1992

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AND THE ISLAMIC

INTELLECTUALS IN THE 1980S;   THE CASE

OF ALİ BULAÇ

A Thesis

Submitted to the Department of
Political Science and Public Administration

of

Bilkent University
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by

NEŞE ÖZTİMUR

tarafından bağışlanmıştır.

September 1992

Table of Contents

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

Assistant Prof. Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

Assistant Prof. Jeremy Salt

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

Assistant Prof. Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

Professor Ali Karaosmanoğlu

i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ÖZET

1980 li yıllarda tüm dünya ülkeleri, yerleşik değerlerin, normların yıkılmaya yüz tutup yerlerine yenilerinin inşa edilmeye başlandığı bir döneme şahit olmuşlardır. Bu yıllar içerisinde Türkiye örneğinde en radikal rüzgarın Islami kesim yönünden estiği kabul edilebilir. Nicelik ve nitelik açısından '80 li yıllarda yükselişe geçen İslami entellektüeller ise bu rüzgarı estiren en önemli kaynak olarak nitelendirilebilirler.

Bu çalışmada 1980 li yıllar Türkiye'sinde İslami hareketin yükselişinin muhtelif sebepleri üzerinde durularak bu sebeplerin geçerliliği, yine bu dönemde yükselişe geçmiş olan İslami entellektüel Ali Bulaç'ın söylemi ele alınarak analiz edilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Bu bağlam içerisinde Ali Bulaç'ın ele alınmasının en temel sebebi; Bulaç'ın nitelik olarak diğer 'İslami entellektüellerden' farklılık göstermesi ve kendine içkin bir söylem geliştirmiş olmasıdır.

ABSTRACT

In the 1980s all of the world has witnessed great structural changes at the socio-political, cultural and economic levels of many countries. This decade is the era of challenging the settled values, norms, world-views and of attempting to construct new ones. In this decade, in Turkey. It can be accepted that the most radical wind was blowed by the Islamic side. Additionally the Islamic intellectuals with their quentitative and qualitative appreciation can be taken in to accent as the major source of this popularity.

In this study, the possible causes of Islamic revivalism in Turkey during 1980s is examined and than the validity of this causes is analized with considering the one of the Islamic intellectuals (Ali Bulaç's) discourse; who gained his popularity again in this period. The main reason that why Ali Bulaç was chosen in the context of this study is his qualified differences from other Islamic intellectuals and his immanent discourse.

INTRODUCTION

The 1980s witnessed great structural changes at the socio-political, cultural and economic levels of many countries. In this decade and early 1990s the shape of the world changed drastically. The break-up of the eastern bloc and the transition to a free market economy, the emergence of an economic crisis, a deepening social problems in the US and the Iranian revolution of 1978, are among the crucial events in the past decade. So the 1980s and early 1990s are the era of challenging the status-quo, settled values, life styles, world views and of attempting to construct new ones.

In Turkey the most radical challenges were represented by Islamic movements and trends. In the 1980s Islamic trends continued to spread, representing a crucial aspect of Turkish political, economic and socio cultural life.

It can be observed vividly in Turkey during the 1980s that although Islamic movements and trends were fragmented and different in their rhetoric, many of them represented a reaction to the west and modernism.

Islamic intellectuals, in their radical response to the West and modernism, have occupied a certain place in the public and cultural life of Turkey today. Most of this group of

intellectuals, writers and journalists, did not recieve their education in religious institutions but rather secular universities. Although their ideology is shaped by suspicion and hostility towards western culture, many of them are familiar with western culture.[1]

Additionally, "compared with earlier Islamic intellectuals, contemporary Islamic thinkers show marked differences in the language of their discourses which is no longer formulated in terms of Islam-versus-the West but in terms of a conflict between the Islamic conception of society and the nature of the modern technocratic industrial civilization."[2]

In the rhetoric of many of the Islamic intellectuals of contemporary Turkey, modern society and modern societal relationships are strongly criticized. Many of them refuse to accept the constructedness of modern society.[3] Constructedness is a sociological concept used by Meeker in referring to identity in modern life. The transition from pre-industrial to industrial society, or a shift from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft, means a shift from society based on structure to culture.[4]

Modernity and a 'constructed' identity within modern life cause according to many of these Islamic intellectuals, feelings of ambivalence and abstractedness among many individuals. The only remedy is a return to the divine revelation of Allah and the

guidance of Quran and Sunna to solve the problems of individuals

and satisfy their needs.[5]

From this point of view Islamic revivalism and the rise of

an Islamic intelligentsia in Turkey in the 1980s can be evaluated

by considering their criticism and rejection of modernism and

westernism.

In my thesis,   due to the difficulty in dealing with all of

these Islamic intellectuals I have chosen only one,   Ali Bulaç,

and have evaluated his writings in the above mentioned framework.

I have chosen Bulaç,   because he is one among the most

popular intellectuals of Turkish cultural life and among the most

popular members of the Islamic fundamentalest movement.   His

writings reflect the rejection of 'constructedness' of identity

in modern city life,   and a desire for pure Islamic society based

on the elimination of modernism in its technological, industrial

and cultural aspects.

He has both a theological and secular university education.

Bulaç graduated from İstanbul University's department of

sociology,   a background which gives him originality and

distinguishes him from other Islamic intellectuals.   Bulaç

explains and discusses social phenomena with sociological

concepts.

In this study my general thesis is that Ali Bulaç,   one of

the representatives of the Turkish Islamic fundamentalist

3

movement in the 1980s, is actually under the influence of the modernist mentality which he rejects and is trying to alter. He is not successful in negating modernism in his rhetoric.

In this scope I will deal with the following themes; the place of Islamic ideology in the rhetoric of Ali Bulaç; his arguments against the West as the enemy of Islam; the alternatives he proposes in place of the unacceptable and rejected Western world.

In the first chapter I will concentrate on some forms and mechanisms of Islamic revivalism in Turkey in the post 1980 era. In the second chapter I will deal with the theoretical framework of Islamic revivalism. I will try to make a categorization of different Islamic trends according to their response to the West and modernism. Also in this chapter I will try to evaluate some theoretical causes of Islamic revivalism. The thought of Ali Bulaç represents the third chapter. In this part Bulaç's writings will be evaluated in the light of his response to west and modernism.

NOTES AND REFERENCES:

(1) Toprak Binnaz, "Islamist Intellectuals; Revolt Against Industry and Technology", typescript, p. 321.

(2) ibid., p. 322.

(3) ibid., p. 328.

(4) Meeker E. Michael, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey", in ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY, ed. (London and N.Y.: I.B. Tauris publishers, 1991), p. 197, see also Aslıtürk Zeliha, "The Development of an Islamic Intellectual career in Turkey: the case of Ali Bulaç", unpublished master's thesis, METU, Ankara 1990. In this thesis writer mainly deal with the development of Muslim intellectual career, by making a comparison among Ali Bulaç, Ali Shariati and Seyyid Hüseyin Nasr.

(5) Özdalga Elisabeth, "East and West as symbols of Good and Evil, the Turkish Muslim Intellectuals Facing with Modernity." typescript, p.6.

(6) ibid., p.8.

(7) Bulaç Ali, "Dinlerin Meydan Okuyuşu: Entegrizm ve Fundamentalizm", BİRİKİM, (may) 1992: 17-29, p. 19.

CHAPTER ONE

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM IN THE 1980S

In Islamic countries, especially Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Sudan and Turkey a wave of religious feeling began to rise during the 1970s. In Iran this religious movement turned into revolution. By many journalists and politicians the same turn of events was expected in other countries. This did not happen in Turkey but Islamic movements and trends have occupied an important place in the public and cultural life of the country.

I- PERIODS OF ISLAMIC REVIVALISM IN TURKEY:

Since the beginning of the republican period in Turkey, three periods can be specified in terms of Islamic revivalism. The Şeyh Sait rebellion at 1925 can also be evaluated as a religious fundamentalist uprising due to its reaction to the abolition of the caliphate by the new secular regime of Atatürk. Şeyh Sait was a very influential figure in the Nakşibendi order. The rebellion lies in its ethnic and religious charecter. It was a Kurdish rebellion which affected eastern and southeastern Turkey, and ended with the killing of more than 30,000 people, soldiers, rebels and civilians.[1] After the suppression of the rebellion, its leaders were executed or sent into internal exile. Thereafter all tarikat activities were banned in Turkey.

6

There are still some debates about the Şeyh Sait rebellion; whether in essence is it a Kurdish ethnic rebellion or a religious one.

Apart from the Şeyh Sait rebellion three periods can be taken as an indicative of Islamic revivalism in Turkey: 1. The early 1950s, characterized as "a period of decompression of Islam in which for the first time in Republican history, peripherial folk Islam in the absence of rival orthodox tradition, became a participant in Turkish politics."[2] 2. The 1970s, with the establishment of the National Salvation party and its consolidation as a major political force, have witnessed the Islamic uprising.[3] The liberal 1961 constitution and the opening of the system to ideological politics had altered the central role of religion as a belief system and religion as a political movement gained greater legitimacy in this period.[4] Also in the more pluralistic 1970s the country was shaped by many associations, parties and institutions, of which the Islamic version was one.[5]

Although the pluralistic outlook of the 1970s was disrupted by the military coup in 1980, the "islamization process was supported by government elites, political elites and even by the coup leaders. 3. In this third wave of Islamic revivalism the chaning outlook towards Islam at the level of political elites became important. This point is crucial since "the changes in

the nature of Islamic politics and movements, their organizations, aims and strategies have been in large part shaped by the changing structure and ideology of the state and the centralist elites."[6]

II- THE ROLE OF THE COUP AND BUREAUCRATIC CADRES IN THE ISLAMIC REVIVALISM OF THE 1980S;

The role of the political elites in the Islamic revivalism of the 1980s can be explained by some occurences that emerged after the 1980 coup. The major tendency of the coup generals after the 1980 was to depoliticize Turkish society because of their view that the street violence and political instability of the 1970s resulted from the high degree of mass politicization encouraged by the 1961 constitution. Therefore the new constitution (1982) was constructed with the aim of restricting freedom of association and political activity: on the other hand islamization was encouraged in order to prevent ideological conflicts that led to the anarchy of the 1970s.[7]

Thus the 1982 constitution made reference to Turkish moral and historical values. "This was a fundamental deviation from the original Atatürkian approach, according to which the consciousness of the new Turk was to be rooted in science. The military regime had resort to Atatürkian thought but this time for discovering Turkish historical and moral values."[8]

8

Moreover, these policies were picked up by the Motherland Party (ANAP) after it came to power. The role of ANAP in the rise of Islamic movements and the tarikat organizations should not be overlooked. Many ANAP parliamentarians were at least sympathetic to Islam, while at a higher level some were members of the different tarikats. The prime minister and ANAP leader Turgut Özal's brother Korkut Özal and their mother Hafize Özal aroused public opinion in the 1980s because of their tarikat (Nakşibendi) membership. Additionally an ANAP deputy from Trabzon, Eyüp Aşık declared his membership of the Nakşibendi order (İskender Paşa Dergahı).[9] The İstanbul province president of ANAP, Eymen Topbaş is a leading member of the Erenköy cemaat-i, one of the most powerfull tarikats, as well as being the publisher of the Altınoluk periodical which has an Islamic outlook although not so radical as to propose a pure Islamic society based on the Quran and Sunna.

Moreover some members of ANAP were participating in the activities of various tarikats although they were not active members of them. For instance Mustafa Taşar, a representative of the nationalist wing of ANAP made a speech at one meeting of the Kadiri order while Hafize Özal has taken the kind of prize from 'icmal' periodical due to her contribution to the tarikat activities, published by the same tarikat.[10]

The sympathizers of Islam have also acquired important positions in government Ministeries, especially National

Education and inferior.[11]   This strength of religious groups within Özal's government has an undeniable role in the growing popularity of Islamic movements and trends at the public level. Having a 'muslim identity' has been used by many people in order to find to job and to get economic interest especially at the state institutions.[12]

Additionally there was a strengthening of the political importance of the so-called Turk-Islam synthesis, formulated by a group of intellectuals who founded a club called the Intellectuals' Hearth. These intellectuals represented the new ideology which attempted to integrate Islamists and Nationalists.[13]   Bora and Can[14] call this Turk-Islam synthesis as the official ideology of the 12th September coup and government. Though, they argue that, some overlaps and conjuctions existing in the ideology of the Intellectuals'. Hearth and in the military civil bureaucracy made their communication more easier than the supposed ones.[15]   According to these two writers the effectiveness of the intellectuals' Hearth in the 12th September period and the post 1980s era can be related to its role on the reconstitution of official ideology at this period.[16]

III- THE ISLAMIC PRESS;

There has been a salient increase in Islamic publishing activities reflected in the production of intellectual treaties,

tarikat journals and popular prayer manuals in the 1980s. However, Islamic groups do not have a consistent and coherent response to what they are rejecting. The fragmentation of Islamic groups can be observed in Islamic publications, each representing a distinct Islamic trend. Many Islamic organizations (tarikat's) coordinate their political activities with these newspapers and periodicals. Approximately 25 magazines and journals are mentioned by Şaylan[17] as an example of Islamic journals. In addition to these many books and handbooks have been published and edited by the various Islamic publishing organizations. Some are the writings of Turkish Islamic intellectuals while others are translated into Turkish from other languages.

Moreover, an increase in the number of imam-hatip schools has attracted attention in this period. "In the 1977-78 academic year, when the Justice Party, National Salvation Party, and National Action Party were in a coalition government, the number of middle-level imam-hatip schools jumped to 334. There were 376 middle level and 341 lycee level, with a total of 134,517 students. In 1987-88 there were 376 middle level and 314 lycee level imam-hatip schools, with approximately 240.000 students. In the academic year 1985-86 there were 4400 official, secular, general middle level schools and 1206 lycees, with approximately 2.4 million enrolled students. The ratio of imam-hatip school students reached the level of one to ten in the academic year 1985-6, from the ratio of one to 37 in the academic year 1965-

6".[18] Beyond the increased number of its students the other crucial matter for imam-hatip schools is that; some of its graduates have entered the university exams and won the different faculties of secular universities. Also, they are among the readers ·as well as writers of the radical Islamic journals and periodicals that were published during the 1980s.

Moreover, it can be said that, technology and modern education have aften been used to reinforce rather than undermine Islamic belief and practice.[19] The message of Islam is no longer mediated only through local religious leaders. Islamic teachings are transmitted now through the mass-media, cassettes, books and journals. Thanks to mass-media and modern technology, the Islamic influence is not restricted to local areas. Muslim in villages, towns and cities are no longer simply dependent on local imams and ulema or the state-run media for their understanding of Islam.[20] So, I can say that, at the Islamic revivalism of 1980s, the using of technology and modern methods have significant contribution, with enabling the easy communication among Islamic masses, on the spreading of diversity of interpretations.

As a reflection of the diversification of Islamic organizations, there is an increase in the number of Islamic journals and periodicals at this period. Among them the journal of 'Islam' that published monthly represents the Nakşibendi outlook, namely the periodical 'Altınoluk', the Nurcus journal 'Sızıntı', the Kadiri 'İcmal' and 'Örgüt'.

Many university educated Muslim women also participated in media activities in order to raise their voices. 'Mektep', 'Bizim Aile' and 'Kadın ve Aile' represented the outlook of some Muslim women and its audiance is also represented by Muslim women. The main attack of these journals is against the secular feminists, and they are inviting enery women to return to the true path of the Islam. "Despite differences in style and content, all three Islamic journals aim basically at creating and/or increasing the Islamic consciousness of Turkish women through the development of an alternative culture of Islam in Turkey. To this end opposition to the norms of secular culture constitute the main banner of all three magazines."[21]

Additionally, it is visible that the protest movement by veiled women constituted the most radical political participation within civil society in the 1980s. "The prohibition against the wearing of headscart of female Muslim students who consider 'tesettür' to be an obsolute and definite command of God in the Quran, endured during the decade and led to a small scale political crisis in 1989 following mass demonstrations protesting the annulment of the bill by the Constitutional Court rendering the wearning of 'tesettür' legal in the universities on the ground that it represented apolitical symbol challenging the secular foundations of the state and therefore breaking the public order."[22]

In Sum considering all this mechanisms, it can he said that during the 1980s Islam has developed as a significant dimension of civil society and its revivalism was encouraged by the state elites. So How the theoretical framework of Islamic revivalism can be analized?

NOTES AND REFERENCES:

(1)   Heckmann Lale Yalçın, "Ethnic Islam and Nationalism among
       the Kurds in Turkey", in ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY, Richard
       L. Topper (eds.). (London and N.Y.: I.B. Tauris Publishers,
       1991) p. 103.

(2)   Sunar İlkay, Toprak Binnaz, "Islam in Politics,"
       GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, (18) 1993: 419-436, p. 420.

(3)   Güneş Ayata Ayşe, "Pluralism versus authoritarianism:
       Political Ideas in two Islamic Publications" in ISLAM IN
       MODERN TURKEY, Richard L. Topper, (eds) (London and N.Y.:
       I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1991) p. 254.

(4)   Toprak   Binnaz,   "Islamist   Intellectuals: Revolt   Against
       Industry and Technology", Ankara, 1992, Typescript p. 321.

(5)   Toprak Binnaz, "Dinci Sağ", in GEÇİŞ SÜRECİNDE TÜRKİYE, Cemil
       Erwin Schink and Ahmet Ertuğrul, (eds.) (Istanbul: Belge
       Publishig, 1987), p. 254.

(6)   İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, 1993, p. 421.

(7)   Toprak   Binnaz,   "The Reception of Iranian Revolution   by   the
       Muslim Press in Turkey", in THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND MUSLIM
       WORLD, David Menashri, eds. (Colorado: 1990) p. 254.

(8)   Heper Metin, "The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish
       Case in Contemporary Perspective", BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE
       EASTERN STUDIES, (1) 1991: 38-51, p. 50.

(9)   Çakır Ruşen, ed., AYET VE SLOGAN, TÜRKİYE'DE ISLAMİ OLUŞUMLAR,
       (İstanbul: 1990, Metiş Publishing), p. 45.

15

(10) Ibid., p. 74.

(11) Yıldız Ahmet, "The Evolution of Islamic Politics in Turkey along the NSP-PP line with special reference to changes and continuties", Unpublished master's thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, 1991, p.6.

(12) Milliyet, 11st, March, 1988, p.3.

(13) Toprak, 1990, p. 254.

(14) Bora Tanıl, Can Ahmet, "12 Eylül'ün Resmi İdeolojisi, Faşist Entelejensiya ve 'Türk-Islam' sentezi," BİRİKİM (Ekim) 1990: p. 26.

(15) Ibid., p. 27.

(16) Yıldız, 1991, p. 7.

(17) Şaylan Gencay, ed., İSLAMİYETİN VE SİYASET, TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ (İstanbul: Verso, 1987), p. 89.

(18) Akşit Bahattin, "Islamic Education in Turkey: Medrese Reform in Late Ottoman Times and Imam-Hatip Schools in the Republic", in Richard Tapper, ed., ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY (London and I.B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 145-171, p. 147.

(19) Meeker, p. 194.

(20) Yıldız, p. 17.

(21) Esposito John, ed., ISLAM THE STRAIGHT PATH (New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 197.

(22) Acar Feride, "Women in the ideology of Islamic Revivalism in Turkey: Three Islamic Women's Journals" in Richard Tapper, ed., ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY (London and N.Y.: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p. 280-304, p. 299.

CHAPTER TWO

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ISLAMIC REVIVALISM

I- DIFFERENT ISLAMIC TRENDS AND THEIR LABELLINGS

Radical Islamic politico-social movements have resulted in revolution in Iran and have grown into powerful forces of opposition in many Muslim countries and among Muslim ethnic groups in Western societies. This reassertion of Islam in both the personal and the public lives of Muslim societies is often described as the Islamic resurgence, Islamic revivalism or Islamic fundamentalism.[1]

The revival in the late 1970s and early 1980s has brought about a noticeable increase in the emphasis on religious identity and practice in individual and corporate life. Islamic revivalism is reflected in an increased emphasis on religious observances - mosque attendance, fasting during Ramadan - a new vitality in Sufism, the increase of religious literature, media programs and audiocasettes, the growth of new Islamic associations committed to socioreligious reform and the reassertion of Islam in Muslim politics.[2]

More significantly, "many revivalist trends in the 1970-80 period emphasized the need for greater self reliance, and a desire to reclaim the accomplishments of the post and root individual and national self identity more indigenously in an

Islamic tradition that had once been a dominant world power and civilization."[3]

While there are fragmented and differentiated groups and trends within it, the general or common framework of Islamic revivalism of 20th century is characterized by Esposito as following;[4] firstly, by many trends Islam is taken as a total and comprehensive way of life, religion being integral to politics, law and society; secondly the belief that the failure of Islam is caused by the departure from the 'straight poth' of Islam and by following a Western secular path with its materialistic ideologies and values; thirdly, the renewal of society requires a return to Islam, drawing its inspiration from the Quran and from the first great Islamic movement led by the Muhammed; fourthly, among some Islamic movements, altough the westernization is condemned, science and technology are accepted, but they are to be subordinated to Islamic beliefs and values; finally, to restore God's rule and inaugurate a true Islamic social order, Western - inspired civil codes must be replaced by Islamic law which is the only acceptable blueprint of Muslim society.[5]

Although there are common features of Islamic movements, they do not constitute a monolithic body: there is a considerable fragmentation and diversity among Islamic groups and trends. Therefore Islamic ideology is not homogeneous. Neither the acceptance of the Quran and Sunna as the basic sources, nor the common wish to construct an Islamic social and political order are sufficient to consider Muslims as having a homogeneous

18

body of principles.[6]

Haddad distinquishes three categories in order to explain the political ideologies of the Middle Eastern Islamic groups. First are the Muslim 'acculturationists'; those secularists, socialists and nationalists, who seek to be relevant to the modern world and are therefore open to appropriating western technology. Second are the Muslim 'normativists' who evaluate religion as being not only the central part of life but the totality of life from which all of reality proceeds and has its meaning. The 'normativists' find the authority of the post valid for the present and for the future. They refuse any compramise with technology and on the question of identity. Although 'acculturationists' perceive religion as being something that deals with the spiritual aspects of life, and as such must not be intricately involved in the shaping of the social order, 'normativists' assert that Islam is a total system, constantly moulding and shaping all aspects of life to conform to divine guidance.[7] Third are the 'neonormativist' Muslims "who have consciously assumed the guest for an Islamic world view that is relevant to the modern world. In their attempt to revitalize and modernize their societies they are insisted that Islam must be the norm which all aspects of life are to be measured. Their ultimate goal is the reconstitution of a vibrant Islamic society."[8] The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Society movements are evaluated by Haddad in this neo-normativists category.

19

It can be said that the crux of the differences among these various labelled Islamic trends is their differences over the understanding and use of Islamic history and tradition as well as the nature and the degree of change they advocate.[9]

As distinct from Haddad, Esposito has divided these Islamic trends into two broad categories, traditionalists and reformists while recognizing that such categorization is arbitray and that individuals and groups may overlop from one category to another.

In the category of traditionalists there are sub-divisions; conservatives, neo-traditionalists (or neo-fundamentalists) and the sub-divisions of reformers are modernists, westernists and secularists.

"The conservative position is presented by the majority of the ulama, for whom Islam is expressed quite adequately and .completely in the classical formulation of Islam, developed by the law schools during the early Islamic centuries and embodied and preserved in the manuals and commentaries an Islamic law."[10] Though, for the conservatives Islam is a closed cultural system, fully articulated in the past, so there is little need to go back directly to the Quran and Sunna to develop new answers. The interpretation of Islam, they say, governed the Muslim community down through centuries and remains valid for today and for alages.[11] Therefore 'conservatives' emphasize the necessity of following past tradition (taqlid), the restoration of

traditional law to remedy for the problems of Muslim societies.

On the other hand, neo-traditionalists, for Esposito, advocate a return to Islam and Sharia. They propose to go back to the fundamental sources of Islam in order to go back to contemporary needs and conditions. According to Esposito movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i Islam represent this approach. Although Westernization is rejected by neo-traditionalists (with its law, social institutions) selective modernization is not.

According to them science and technology are cautiously appropriated and 'Islamized' that is, subordinated to Islamic values and purposes.[12]

On the other hand, for Esposito, reformers insist that while much of the post law and practice may be useful; new circumstances require new solutions. While critical of the West, reformers tend to be less anti-Western and polemical in their rhetoric and approach.[13]

Briefly, I can say that variations among the Islamic groups were mainly based on their understanding and use of Islamic history and tradition and by their response to western culture, technology and industry.

Based on Haddad and Esposito's arguments. I can say that Turkish intellectuals fit into the 'normativists' category in

Haddad's view and partially fit into the 'neotraditionalist' category of Esposito.

It should be noted that the Turkish case should be regarded differently from other Middle Eastern countries when evaluating the characteristics of Turkish Islamic movements. There are reasons for this. First of all, the westernization and modernization processes in Ottoman - Turkish Islamic context was based on choices and preferences of a native reformers in the Ottoman empire and not due to colonization. Rather, since the 18th Century 'westernization' and 'modernization' attempts have existed as a preference of Ottoman Empire. Turkey was never colonized as other countries of the Middle East. Secondly, the theme of Islam did not represent the ideology of independence war as in other Muslim societies. Thirdly and importantly, in the Ottoman Empire there was a differentiation of popular Islam and official Islam as the one dimension of the center-periphery cleavage.[14] "At the center it appeared as a scripturalist, Sharia-minded, ulama governed orthodoxy: at the social periphery as a primordially embedded heterodoxy permeated by 'sects', 'religious orders' (tarikats), 'saints' (Şeyh) with supernatural powers, and as lotiduanism to today, some 'mysticism' (tasavvuf)."[15] With regards to today, some orders (tarikats) have taken their legitimacy from the extension of old orders and sects of the Ottoman time.[16]

The fourth important differentiation point of Turkey from other Muslim countries is the state tradition in Turkish context. According to Heper. "Islam enjoined the unity of the State and Muslim community. Religion and the state were considered one and the some entity."[17] However, in the Ottoman-Turkish context, as Heper has indicated, the state was distinctly saperated from society." The state model in that polity essentially came from the military: in fact the members of the military established the state... The Ottoman sultans could easily issue laws and regulations which did not derive from Islamic precedents."[18] Heper also talks about the 'adab' tradition in the Ottoman context that was the state oriented tradition. For Heper, "the idea of a state power independent of religion never lost its salience in Ottoman-Turkish context."[19]

In the scope of my thesis I will not deal any further with the varying characteristics of Turkish and Middle Eastern Muslim societies. However, in the future project this differences can be used as an analytical tool to make a comparison among Islamic society of Turkish context and other Muslim countries.

Additionally, I will divide the Islamic groups into three categories, considering their responses to West and modernism. The first group is the modernists who are proposing the acceptance of westernization both with its culture and technology.

The second group are mainly 'traditionalists' who have a strong sense of resistance to the cultural side of westernization but have a positive outlook to modern technology: They accept the technology and industry of the west but reject the adaptation of its culture. Moreover traditionalists give attention not only to the Quran and Sunna but the lived traditions and experiences through the history of Islam.

The third group are the fundamentalists who reject the west and modernism totally, both its culture and technology. They propose a reinterpretation of the Quran and Sunna to rebuild Islam as a distinct and integrated system. The fundamentalists give attention to the written word of the Quran rather than to traditional practices and spiritual leaders. Many of the Islamic intellectuals of 1980 period can be taken as the representatives of this group. Ali Bulaç, the subject of this thesis, is the representator of this group.

Up to this point I have tried to evaluate the different versions of Islamic trends and movements. The crux of their differences lies in variations related to their response to the West and modernism. So in the second part of this chapter, within Turkish context, I will try to analyse the possible reasons of Islamic revivalism and the rise of Islamic intellectuals, asking in what ways the west and modernism have been refulted.

II- MODERNIZATION ATTEMPTS AND ISLAMIC REVIVALISM:

Radical Islamic politico-social movements have been powerful forces of opposition in many Muslim countries and among the Muslim ethnic groups of Western societies.

By the term Muslim country I mainly mean countries in which the majority of population is Muslim (whether Shi'a or Sunni), without taking into consideration the nature of their regimes. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Libya have the highest density of Muslim population among Middle - Eastern countries. Sudan has the lowest. (Saudi Arabia 100%, Turkey 99%, Iran 98%, Iraq 97%, Libya 97%, Egypt 90%, Jordon 92%, Syria 86% and Sudan 73%)[20]

In the last decade Islamic revivalism has occurred in many Muslim countries as an opposing ideology to industrialization, Westernization and modernism, generally in terms of technology, industry and culture. It can be said that Islamic movements were not content to resist the industrialization process. Furthermore many of them have emphasized problems related to socio-cultural values, norms and human relations. Some of the fundamentalists are demanding a pure Islamic society in which every sphere will be regulated by Islamic principles.[21]

This phenomenon is full of puzzles for the secular approach which regards religion as an ideology that belongs to the pre-capitalist period. According to this view, with the development

of capitalist relations and the rise of technology, industry and science in daily life, religious ideology and its socio-cultural sanctions should become ineffective.[22]

On the other hand, the debate about Islamic revivalism has suggested that if the desires of Islamic countries to Industrialize and catch up with western countries since the second half of the 19th century had been succesful, Islamic ideology would not have reached its present degree of intensity[23] as the Turkish example shows.

The origin of the modernization of Turkish society lies in its Ottoman past but within the limits of this thesis it is sufficient to start with the republican period.

The Kemalist regime initiated revolutionary projects aiming at creating a new Turkish society that would eventually reach the level of the 'civilized nations'. The main aim of the Kemalist cadres, while structuring the cultural revolution with new value systems, was to replace the functions of religion at the socio-cultural and political levels with a new ideology. "The Turkish revolution was in essence a cultural revolution which radically changed the Islamic legitimizing system and replaced it with a secular, nationalist republic."[24] In other words, it was aimed at replace religion as a means of social identity and source of political ideology by a secular political ideology.[25]

26

The issue of religion became politicized in Turkey following the secular reforms of the early republican era. "Positivism replaced faith as the dominant, indeed the official outlook with the secular discourse of the Kemalist elite denying any legitimacy to Islam in public life. The process of Westernization not only in terms of institutions but also interms of cultural identity - was in no other Muslim country, as radical."[26]

The Kemalist outlook supported the ideology of westernization against Islam and used its power to destroy the symbols of the later.[27] However, it did not succeeded totally in becoming a rival ideology to religious.

According to Mardin, this resulted from two major weaknesses of Kemalism. The first was "the inability of Atatürk's educational attempts to reach the rural masses, leaving a blank in their understanding of social reality, which became critical as social change mobilized large numbers of them. Kemalism neither had an extensive explanation of how social justice was to be achieved nor did it provide a more general ethical underpinning of society by drawing its social principles out of a credible ideology. The republic created this ethical vacumn in a society where religious and ethical command had been important. The inability of Kemalism to provide a social ethos that appealed to the hearths as well as to the mind was more

disorienting than would appear at first sight."[28]   So the
replacement of religion (Islam) by the secular worldview of
Kemalism caused some emptiness and puzzles at the level of
individuals in terms of their daily life.   By the revolution of
Republican period,   even daily rituals such as marriage
ceremonies,   death,   birth, etc. were taking new forms.
According to Mardin,   in the countryside this emptiness was
filled by forms of folk Islam.[29]

According to Mardin,   the second weakness of Kemalism was
that;   Kemalism would not permit the existence of ideologies that
would be a rival to it.[30] For Mardin,   if the ideology of
private enterprise had been allowed to develop by itself,   it
could have penetrated fomilial relationships and replaced the
function of religion and become the strict ideology at least for
one strata of society.   From his point of view this bourgeois
ideology with its attention to individualism could be the rival
for Islam based on an 'ummah' (community) outlook.[31]

However,   Islamic revivalism in Turkey can not be explained
only by the weaknesses of Kemalism.   The whole process of
'modernization' and its effects should be taken into account to
suggest a remarkable analysis.

'Modernization' as a historical concept includes such
specific aspects of change as industrialization of the economy or
secularization of ideas,   but it is not limited to these.   It

involves a marked increase in geographic and social mobility, a spread of secular, scientific and technical education, a transition from ascribed to achived status, an increase in material standards of living, and many related and subsidiary phenomena.[32]

As understood by above mentioned quotation, modernization can be described as the transition from pre-industrial to industrial society or in sociological concepts, a shift from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft. Gemeinschaft refers to a community which consists of face-to-face relationships with known persons, many of whom are related through blood or marriage. Gemeinschaftlich relationships were intimate, enduring and based upon a clear understanding of each individuals" position in society. There was also very little mobility, either geographically or socially. On the other side gesellschaft refers to the large scale, impersonal, calculative and contractual relationships.[33] In gesellschaft there are organizations, associations and arrangements which are based on formal institutions, legal statuses, contracts, legal fictions; it is not morally given but is subject to revision, revocation or transition.[34]

Gemenschaft is experienced as enduring and constraining while society as gesellschaft which has a more or less temporary and provisional dimension, is experienced as 'constructed'.[35]

If we are saying that modernization can be described as the shift from gerneinschaft to gesellschaft we can also say that this shift or transition means the society which is based on structure is replaced by one which is based on culture. "In modern society roles and positions are not well defined and stable therefore not as crucial as they used to be in traditional society. As a consequence, the relative importance of culture (and ideology) has increased."[36]

In such a social setting a personal identity is defined more in terms of culture than structure; this brings to modern society a feeling of 'consttructedness'.[37] In traditional society, the identity of the individual is given rather than chosen. The status of the individual is determined by his/her blood ties. However, in modern society personal identity is given by culture. The identity of individuals depends on not "who are they?" but on "what are they doing". So in such a society culture is more remarkable than structure in the determination of an individuals' identities. "A feeling of constructedness which takes place as a result of the transition from a society based on structure to one based on culture has increased in modern society."[38]

In Turkey rapid urbanization has continued since the 1950s. This represented a shift from society as gemeinschaft to gesellschaft. Rapid social change has eroded the tradational bonds and tie which in the short run could not be replaced with

new-ones. With urbanization and im-migration from country to big cities, traditional bonds were carried to the cities. But what is lived there, by many of migrants, is neither the traditional life nor the modern one. The slum areas of big cities are the places that the tradition of gemeinschaft is stronger than the culture of gesellschaft. Through rural-urban migration many people in Turkey are efaced with the culture of gesellschaft although they have traditional bonds. "In particular young people who moved from provincial or metropolitan areas and acquired some higher education increasingly found themselves in a constructed social environment that had less definite normative foundations than they were accustomed to. In contrast to their experience of a given personal identity in a morall community, they were faced with choosing who to be, with whom to associate, what to think, even with choosing how to dress, what to eat; all matters that were more orless socially given in Anatolian villages and towns."[39]

So, the ideologization of experience is lived by these young people within the cities. They were faced with the truth of finding for themselves a new form of personal identity.[40]

The modernization process has changed the social structure of Islamic societies. It has abolished traditional structures and values which it has not been totally successful in replacing. The modernization process and its relative failure has resulted in both economic and social deprivation. Economic deprivation has resulted in the failure to satisfy material expectations. Social deprivation, on the other hand, has caused uncertainty

31

of aims, ambivalence of behaviour criteria and the growth of conflictual expectations and feelings.[41] This social deprivation mostly can be observed among young people moving from rural to metropolitan areas and, acquiring some higher education, increasingly finding themselves in a constructed social environment in where there were less definite normative foundations than those they were accustomed to. Their experience than those they were accustomed to. Their experience of society as gesellschaft brings with it a sense that identities and relationships are artificial and obstract and hence meaningless and inconsequential.[42]

On the other side, it should be kept in mind that the major aim of ideologies being to supply identity and moral satisfaction to their supporters. Islamic ideology can enable individuals to express themselves and it supplies them with a sense that they are a part of the whole, which results in a moral satisfaction.[43]

Islam, in general, is a holistic religion. It determines every sphere of life. It is both a normative system and a political ideology.[44] From the private life to jorisprundence, political and economic spheres, it has regulations. So it has two ideological frameworks. At the individual level it gives meaning to life and in the political arena it regulates the collective life and gives legality to politics.[45]

This two-dimensional ideological function of Islam (especially normative Islam) is related to its structure depending on an "ümmet" (community) base which has a very significant to rise the morale of the masses.

The sufi brotherhoods (tarikats) can also give moral satisfaction to their members. In the post 1980s era the increased number of tarikats have drawn attention. According to Şaylan "Rapid urbanization, industrialization and mass rural-urban migration between 1950-80 in Turkey created widespread rootlessness, anomie, enstrongement and identity crises which created grounds for the reemergence of repressed orders (such as Nakşibendilik, Kadirilik, etc.), the reconstitution of neo-orders (such as Nurculuk, Süleymancılık) and the proliferation of supra order groups around some journals".[46]

In Sum, the strains and conflicts of modernisation policies in Turkey has caused a sense of deprivation and identity crises. Because of the insufficiency of counter-religious ideologies to solve their problems, Islam has appeared as an alternative for people to solve their problems.[47]

Briefly, I can say that the revivalism of Islam in the Turkish context can not be explained only by one reason. There is a conjuction of many incidents in this process. The weaknesses of Kemalism, rapid urbanization movements, identity crises, insufficiency of counter religious ideologies, the influence of the Iranian revolution, the policies of state

33

elites and socio-economic problems of individuals can be taken as some parameters of Islamic revivalism.

III- THE RISE OF ISLAMIC INTELLECTUALS;

In Turkey a new phenomenon occured in the 1980s. This is the rise of an Islamic intelligentsia. Compared with earlier Islamic intellectuals, contemporary Islamic thinkers show marked differences in the language of their discourse, which is no longer formulated in terms of a conflict between the Islamic conception of society and the nature of the modern technocratic - industrial civilization.[48]

Many Islamic intellectuals reject the constructedness of social identity and relationships. "For the Muslim intellectuals, Islam is a social discourse which represents an alternative to the Western and secular gesellschaft of contemporary Turkey, one which would be free of the emptiness and justice that they attribute to modern society."[49]

Furthermore, Islamist thinkers who rose through the 1980s in Turkey are the products of a secular education, so their discourses reflect the logical sequence of secular thought based on reason and a systematic presentation of ideas.[50]

By many of these Islamic intellectuals Western culture is criticized because of its role on the deprivation of traditional values and norms: what is taken as traditional values are not Turkish customs but real Islamic values.

In general, Islamic society is perceived by many of these Islamic intellectuals as an alternative to modernity. But their use of Islam as an alternative to modernism does not refer to traditional beliefs and practices in the Turkish context; rather they imply an Islam which was never perfectly realized in Turkey, one that is based on divine revelation and orthodox practice, not on post customary practices in the Ottoman or any other Islamic empire.[51]

This huge attention to this conflictual situation arises from the arguments about the social setting. The conception of social setting is important to these Islamic thinkers because according to them the Islamic assumption of mankind is one of being servants of Allah to actualize his system on earth.[52] In this schema society is a mean by which this end is reached. In their arguments, therefore, the standing of society is crucial for reaching the ideal Islamic society. In general, for many of them the desire to revitalize the Golden Age of Islam and eliminate deviations is paramount. The force of elimination is formulated as modernism, furthermore, many Islamists believe that Westernization trends in Muslim countries are highly effective in decaying the indigenous cultures.

Following this theoretical framework, in the next chapter I will try to evaluate the writings of one of the Islamic intellectual, Ali Bulaç, a significant member of the Islamic

fundamentalist movement of 1980 era. His writings reflect the rejection of 'constructedness' of modern society. Bulaç criticizes modernism and westernism projects and he proposes a pure Islamic society that takes its legitimacy from the Quran and the Sunna.

NOTES AND REFERENCES:

(1) John L. Esposito, ed., ISLAM THE STRAIGHT PATH (Oxford and N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 117.

(2) Ibid., p. 167.

(3) Ibid., p. 168.

(4) Ibid., p. 155.

(5) Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, ed., CONTEMPORARY ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF HISTORY (Albany N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1982), p. 91.

(6) Oya Açıkalın, "Modernism/Westernism versus Fundamentalism/ Islamism an analysis of two Islamic periodicals of Turkey", unpublished masters's thesis, METU, Ankara, 1986, p. 12.

(7) Haddad, p. 19.

(8) (9) (10); (11) Ibid., pp. 3-32.

(12) Esposito, p. 201.

(13) Ibid., p. 204.

(14) Ibid., p. 203.

(15) Ilkay Sunar, Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics", GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, 1983, vol. 18, p. 426.

(16) Ibid., p. 428.

(17) Metin Heper, "pluralism"

(18) Ibid., p.

(19) Ibid., p.

(20) Munson, p. 2.

(21) Ömer Laçiner, "Dini Akimların Yükselişi ve Türkiye'de Islami Hareket", BİRİKİM, Ekim (1989): 6-15, p. 6.

(22) Ibid., p. 7.

(23) Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, ed., TÜRKİYE'DE MODERNLEŞME DİN VE PARTİ POLİTİKASI (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1985), p. 67.

(24) İlkay Sunar, Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics" in GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION. (vol. 18) 1983, p. 426.

(25) Sarıbay, 1985, p. 77.

(26) Binnaz Toprak, "Islamist Intellectuals; Revolt Against Industry and Techonology", Ankara, 1992, Typescript, p. 317.

(27) Ibid., p. 318.

(28) Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey", in James P. Piscatory, ed., ISLAM IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 156.

(29) Şerif Mardin, ed., DİN VE IDEOLOJİ (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990), p. 112.

(30) Ibid., p. 112.

(31) Ibid., p. 113.

(32) Rustow A Dankwart and Robert E. Ward, ed., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 3-4.

(33) Peter Worsley, ed., THE NEW INTRODUCING SOCIOLOGY (Canada: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 242.

(34) Michael Meeker, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey" in Richard Tapper, ed., ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY (London and N.Y.: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p. 217.

(35) Ibid., p. 195.

(36) Ibid., p. 196.

(37) Ibid., p. 197.

(38) Elisabeth Özdalga, "East and West As The Symbols of Good and Evil, Turkism Muslim Intellectuals Facing Modernity", typescript, p. 8.

(39) Ibid., p. 7.

(40) Ibid., p.9.

(41) Laçiner, p. 11.

(42) Laçiner, p. 12.

(43) Laçiner, p. 11.

(44) Zeliha Aslıtürk, "The Development of an Islamic Intellectual Career in Turkey; the Case of Ali Bulaç", unpublished master's thesis, METU, Ankara, 1990, pp. 21-28.

(45) Laçiner, p. 9.

(46) Gencay Şaylan, ed., İSLAMİYET VE SİYASET (Istanbul: Verso publishing, 1987), p. 49.

(47) Oya Açıkalın, p. 18.

(48) Binnaz Toprak, typescript, p. 323.

(49) Meeker, p. 196.

(50) Toprak, typescript, p. 328.

(51) Richard Tapper, ed., ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY (London and New York: I.B. Tauris publishers, 1991), p. 17.

(52) Oya Açıkalın, p. 12.

CHAPTER THREE

ONE OF THE TURKISH ISLAMIC INTELLECTUAL: ALİ BULAÇ

I- BIOGRAPHY OF BULAÇ;

Ali Bulaç was born in 1951 in Mardin where he attended primary and secondary school. Then he moved to Istanbul where he graduated from the Istanbul higher Islamic institute in 1975. Among the many Islamic thinkers, Ali Bulaç is distinguished by having had an Islamic and a secular education. After his graduation from the Islamic and a secular, he attended the Sociology Department of the Faculty of Art and Science at Istanbul University. I think that Bulaç's importance in the Islamic fundamentalist movement of the 1980s in large part has been caused by his sociology background: in his writings and discussions he makes general use of sociological concepts and analytical tools.

From the middle of the 1970s Bulaç has been active as a writer and editor in connection with different journals, newspapers and publishing houses. In 1976, the journal of 'Düşünce' and at 1984 the 'insan' publishing house were established by him. In 1987 he helped to publish the journal 'Zaman'. He has published articles in various magazines such as 'Hareket', 'Düşünce', 'İlim ve Sanat', 'Girişim' and has writen columns in various newspapers, including 'Yeni Devir', 'Milli Gazete' and 'Zaman'.

Additionally, in 1983 he won the prize of 'Fikir' by the association of Turkish writers Nowadays, Bulaç is the director of 'Kitap' and 'Endülüs' publishing houses.

His published books include; <u>The Turkish Meaning of the Quran</u> (third edition, 1990); <u>The Ideas on Quran and Sunna</u> (third edition, 1985); <u>Intellectual Issues in the Islamic World</u> (second edition, 1985); <u>Social Change in the Islamic World</u> (second edition, 1991); <u>Concepts and Orders of Our Time</u> (first edition 1976 and eleventh edition in 1991); <u>Religion and Modernism</u> (first edition, 1990); <u>The Reality of the Middle East</u> (first edition, 1988).

Beyond these books, he is a regular columnist in the 'Kitap' magazine. Also in May and June 1992, his debates with some leftist writers were published in 'Birikim', the monthly socialist-cultural periodical.

II- ALİ BULAÇ's THOUGHT;

Bulaç's importance arises from his popularity and appeal to Islamic youth, many of them university and high school students. Although he knows Arabic and is familiar with the classical Islamic sources, his books and articles are quite different from writings of the tarikat Şeyhs and other leaders of fundamentalist flourishes from classical Islamic sources. Bulaç writes in a

41

form that represents a system of secular thought, within the boundaries of scientific methods, using footnotes, citing references, statistical summaries etc.

With his university education in the sociology department, this secular discourse has equipped him well with the knowledge of foreign languages, western social and political thought and contemporary critical thinking in the West.[1] Also, with his sociological background, he knows the West well and this knowledge resounds through the themas advanced in his critiques of Western capitalism and consumer society.

I think all of these factors are relevant to his popularity and the wide reading of his books. The newly emerging Islamic youth is composed not only of theological school students, but mainly university educated people. The popularity of Islamic publications amongst the majority of university -educated Islamic youth is an important phenomenon of Turkish context.

Although in his books the main thema is the critique of modernism, many other issues are taken into account by him. In his latest book, "Religion and Modernism", he argues about all the issues that have taken the attention of public opinion in the 1980s and the early 1990s, such as homosexuality, lesbianism, feminism, post-modernism, environmental problems, atheism, problems of consumer society and communication systems. He is very critical of modern society; for him the only solution for te psychological and cultural well-being of individuals is the

pure Islamic society resting on the implementation of the Quran and Sunna.

From this point of view, first of all I will try to evaluate his writings in terms of the rejection of 'constructedness'. Almost all of his books and writings in periodicals reflect the rejection of constructedness by which is meant an identity which is chosen rather than given.[3]

From this perspective initially I am going to try to evaluate Bulaç's views on modernism and westernism.

A) BULAÇ's UNDERSTANDING OF MODERNISM AND WESTERNISM

In almost all of his writings Ali Bulaç emphasizes the cultural decay of third world countries and especially the Muslim world following the application of Westernization and modernization. He mostly deals with the cultural side of westernization, which he interests as an assqult on traditional Islamic values.

According to Bulaç, modernization and westernization to a degree refer to the same thing. Westernization was mostly used during the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century. But this concept, after the 1960s, was replaced by modernization which is mostly used by western sientists, politicians, as well as third world politicians and scientists.

For Bulaç modernization is the newest dimension of western imperialism and colonialism.[4] Western countries desire to reduce the world to one mosaic culture in order to be hegemonic.[5] In order to reach this desire the consumption patterns, life styles and life expectations of the west, are exported to the third world and Muslim world in the name of modernization. This process requires dependency and the 'underdeveloped' positions of third world countries will never end since terms such as undeveloped, developing or third world country are imposed by the West to maintain this dependency and exploitation. Furthermore, for Bulaç, the term modernism is related to the level of culture and human conssiousness. The dependency on Western countries is not in essence technological, industrial or political but exists mainly at the level of culture and consiousness.[6] For Bulaç, modernism keeps us far from our own consumpiton patterns, daily ceremonies and values. So culture takes the most harmful blow in this process.

In other words, for Bulaç modernization is a kind of ideology produced by western scholars and politicians in order to impose their technology, industry and in essence their culture on countries that are not western. Bulaç, evaluates modernism mostly in terms of its cultural imposition and its destructive effects on the indigenous cultures and moral structures of non-western /Muslim countries.

Moreover, in Bulaç's view, modernism is based on the positivist and nationalist principles that are opposed to religious knowledge, which is acquired with the relevation of God.

I think that Bulaç's critism starts with the rejection of individualism and the worldly orientation of modernism. For him modernism elevates the individual against the God, <u>rejects</u> the divine revelation and causes man to worship technology and industry.

Bulaç rejects modernism totally in its cultural, technological and industrial aspects. The culture of modernism is based on a desire for endless consumption that is opposed to the divine rule of controlling inordinate appetites 'nefs' in order to resist worldly materialism. Bulaç rejects technology and industry due to their effect on the destruction of community relationships and because they feed the consumptionist spirit. Insted of using technological and industrial commodities, he proposes the methods of old centuries that has not been shaped by technological innovations, to the daily needs.

Moreover, the high degree of division of labour and specialization in industry is criticized by Bulaç due to the isolation and atomization of individuals in this process.

According to Bulaç, modernism and westernism are two sides of the same coin. Bulaç are imposed by Western countries on non-Western in the name of development and industrialization. Furthermore, he adds 'imperialism' to the framework of Westernism and modernism as a derivative of these ideologies. He gives attention to the cultural side of imperialism rather than its economic character and stresses its opposition to divinity and hegemony of God in the universe. Bulaç thinks about imperialism not as the highest stage of capitalism as Lenin did, but evaluates it as the feature of both capitalism and socialist systems. At the heart of imperialism lies exploitation and domination. The relatively developed countries have dominated the underdeveloped ones in the name of development. But for Bulaç this is opposed to Islamic thinking in which the only domination and sovereignty belongs to God. Imperialism is one derivation of modernism which requires the superiority of some countries over the others in terms of technological and industrial development.

Briefly I can say that Bulaç is against modernism in all its aspects. The evolutionary, progressive, individualistic, rational and materialistic features of modernism are all highly criticized by him . Although he is against the technological and industrial sides of modernism, he gives most of his attention to its destructive effects on the indigenous cultures of Muslim countries.

Bulaç's rejection and criticism of modernism close to the definition of modernisation by Wilbert Moore as "a total transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social politically stable nations of the Western world".[7] What Bulaç criticizes is, this evolutionary pattern of modernism, taking the West as the 'modal' and imitating it slavishly.

In the justification of his views and arguments, in some cases Bulaç borrows the concepts and perspective of dependency school arguments. Dependency-school is a variation of Marxist thought, arising in the late 1960s in response to the theories of the modernisation school. Modernisation school theorists talk about stages of growth and seek the cause of underdevelopment within the internal factors of countries. They also assume that development follows essentially the same pattern in all societies.[8]

These features common to all modernisation theories arise from the combination of evolutionism functionalism and positivism. These features are summed of by Tony Barnett as follows: "Development takes place from within a society – external events such as colonialism and cultural influences are not particularly important; development follows essentially the same pattern in all societies; the end result of development is prosperity and relative political stability; the scientific study of history and society will enable us to identify patterns

47

from the past experience of some countries, such as the United States and Britain and use this knowledge to bring about the same results in the developing or undeveloped ones".[9]

On the other hand the dependency school argument begin with the assertion that underdevelopment is not a stage which precedes development, rather it is the end result of imperialism and colonialism. According to dependency theorists, the development of part of the world arised because of exploitation by the developed countries. Both, however "were only parts of a single social system in which the colonized and now the neo-colonial countries - the periphery- were not simply 'underdeveloped', but had been underdeveloped by other countries which together constituted the centre of this world system'.[10] According to Andre Gunter Frank, an influential representative of the dependency school, the only significant development in Latin America occured whenever the power of the West was temporarily interrupted, notably during the depression of the 1930s and during the second world war. However for him there could be no permanent development in the periphery until the strangehold of the centre was broken.[11]

The only aspect of dependency theory which Bulaç agrees with is his view that the underdeveloped position of the non-Western countries is caused by Western ones in order to exploit and dominate them. Additionally, according to Bulaç, with modernisation and westernization policies the world has been divided into two main classes, the exploiters and exploiteds;

the exploiters are the western countries and those exploited are rest of the world.

However, as distinct the dependency school, Bulaç has given more attention to the 'cultural' exploitation of non-Western countries than the econimic. Moreover, dependency school has questionized the possible ways of industrialization and development of third world countries, i.e. in Latin America wherees Bulaç strongly rejet technological and industrial development altogether. Bulaç's desire is not a developed, industrialized society but a pure Islamic society that will give the immaterial and spiritual satisfaction to its people.

In sum, I can say that, although in some cases Bulaç borrows the concepts and phrases of dependency theory and Marxist tradition, i.e. alienation, exploitation class struggle, in essence he is against the materialism of these schools. In some cases he has written as the loyal Dependency school theorist especially in the discussion of the exploitation of third world countries by the Western ones. However, his anti-materialistic, world view differentiates him from this Marxist tradition. Additionally Bulaç criticizes Marxism in his writings and evaluates it within the 'modern systems' that take their base not from the knowledge of divine message, but from worldly views. The only intersecion among Bulaç's view and dependency school has in the criticism and in some degree rejection of

modernisation theories and Western policies by both of them, due to their role in the exploitation of non-Western countries.

Henceforth, the evaluation and progressive worldview of modernisation and than modernizm as an ideology are rejected and criticized by Bulaç due to their antithethical character to the Islamist world view, which is not evolutionary. Islam is a universal religion, standing above historical conditions, time and space. It is divinely given and immutable. For him only Islam, standing outside history, is eternal and divinely given so for him all of western social systems and Christianity can not solve the cosmological, spiritual and existential mystery. In these western social systems, either in capitalism or in socialism, the identity crisis of individuals is not resolved. Only Islam can solve cosmological, spiritual and existential problems of individuals and only it can solve the identity crisis.[12]

According to Bulaç, big cities are centers of modernism and they were constructed for this purpose by the Westernist politicians and governors of third world countries.[13] Their main aim was the transformation of traditions and the imposition of modern values and norms. For Bulaç, the arabesque culture existed in the big cities where tradition and modern life style have intersected. For Bulaç, the Islamic revival of exists between the arabesque culture and the modernism of official

society. The difference of this new phenomenon from the arabesque culture is its manner versus modernity and tradition. So for Bulaç, this is the fundamental character of Islamic revivalism in the 1980s.

According to Bulaç this Islamic revivalism has found its voice mainly in cities because they are concentrated spaces where individuals are alienated because of the rational and absolute functional identity of cities.[14] Therefore Bulaç criticizes the constructedness of modern society due to individuals becoming atomized and losing their community ties and identities in modern big cities.

At this point I can say that Bulaç criticizes city life due to its role in the atomization of persons and the destruction of community feeling. In Bulaç's view the perfect society is based not atomized and isolated from each other. (So Bulaç criticizes the constructedness of modern city life because its induces on identity crises in individuals and destroys the feeling of community.)

According to Bulaç, in order to break the hallmarks of modernism and to escape its destructive outcomes the only way at the individual level is to turn to God and at the societal level, to apply the divine order with the guidance of Quran and Sunna.[15]

B)   FORMAL AND CIVIL ISLAM;

Bulaç discusses four main trends in Muslim societies. The first trend is mainly defended by laic fundamentalists. Bulaç include Atatürk in this trend. The second is the modernization of Islam. This policy is mainly directed by formal State institutions, such as the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey. The third is the Islamization of modernity. Bulaç has included the Fazlur Rahman and religious organizations (tarikats) in this trend. The last is the rejection of modernity by Islam, a view which suggests a rupture from traditional Islam as well as the modern world.

After this formulation Bulaç talks about two ways of the Islamization process. These are from top down and the reverse one; from bottom up. The first is called political Islam by some writers and the latter as cultural Islam. Bulaç uses the phrase formal Islam to refer to political Islam and civil Islam to cultural Islam.[16]

According to Bulaç's point of view, formal Islam is the Tanzimat tradition resting on the political power at the centre and expressed through state policy. In formal Islam, change and Islamization process is realized through political power in the state mechanisms. For Bulaç, in formal Islam the Islamization process can be controlled from above.

On the other hand, civil Islam takes its legitimacy from society. In civil Islam the 'ummah' is more important than the state. The cultural and social side is predominant over political and military power in the civil Islam.[17] In civil Islam the islamization process is realized by movements from below; the peripheral forces are more crucial than the centre. According to Bulaç, up to the middle Abbas period civil Islam was realized, ensuring the continuity of Islam for centuries.[18]

Bulaç puts the Refah (Prosperity) Party in Turkey within the category of formal Islam and criticizes the projects and promises of RP concerning industrialization and development of Turkey. Because of its desire for development it is accustomed to modernism. However in civil Islam, the force behind the islamization process is based on human and social dynamics. Civil Islam appears alongside the universal 'ummah' idea versus the homogenous universal state of modernism.

In Bulaç's view, civil Islam represents the idea that proposes an epistemological rupture from the modern West and change of direction towards the Quran and Sunna as the main sources of a pure Islamic society. So civil Islam, for Bulaç is the answer to the expectations and problems of the Muslim world.

Bulaç is the defender of civil Islam or cultural Islam in Göle's term.[19] Bulaç mostly deals with the cultural side of the

transformation of Islamic identity. The transformation within the individuals' inner world is more crucial in the islamization process than political actions. The transformation of and concsiousness at individual and social-cultural levels is more important for Bulaç than the political organization to reach the desired end of an Islamic society. To reach the pure Islamic society the transformation should be realized at the level of consciousness. Bulaç thinks that politicization causes an impowerishment of Islam and questions the tensions between Islam and politics, tradition and modernism, religion and the worldly, belief and rationalist positivism in a new dynamic that presents the opposition of Islam and West.[20]

I think Bulaç's concentration on the identity crisis and ambivalance of desires and expectations in city life can also be connected with his views of civil Islam. From his early writings it can be suggested that Bulaç is also a supporter of civil society. By political society he means the state, political institutions, governments that have political power and intellectuals who used modernism as the official ideology. On the other side by civil society, he means large masses or people who have migrated from rural areas and have a tendency to accept Islamic thought.[21]

In the realising of Islamic society Bulaç defends the Islamization process evolving from below to above. He is against

54

the political party struggle method, modernism and its destructive impositions can not be passed over. So Bulaç's rhetoric is full of civil societal elements that will be the source of Islamization process and the legitimacy of pure Islamic society.

C) THE REJECTION OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

The question of science and technology occupies a central position in Bulaç's discourse. Modern mentality, according to Bulaç, is supported by two main paradigms. The first is the belief that science is continously developing. The second is the belief of progress of technology in a linear way. Science and technology are dependent on each other and abstract processes.[23]

According to Bulaç, the feeling of progress arises from the individual's inner sense. These are the desire to attain spiritual perfection and have a sense of 'certainty' ('yakın olmak' and 'kemale ermek'). But with modern science this sense of the individual cannot be satisfied. The development of science and technology in the West is now questioned by Bulaç in terms of the very validity of the principles on which Western science is based.[24] Also, Bulaç criticizes modern science, contrasting the secular outlook in science as developed in the West with the Renaissance and the enlightenment with the Islamic concept of "Vahy" (God's revelation to Prophet Muhammed).[25]

The other reason for Bulaç's criticism of modern science is based on his view that a universities help the state to control society and individuals.   The modern state controls individuals by using science and scientific knowledge.[26]

Secular and profane modern Western thought has changed the world separating the universe from divine truth and causing a worship of science.   Furthermore, Bulaç criticizes science, asserting that science in the modern world serves as a new idol.[27]   Just as primitive men worshipped the moon and the sun, modern men in the Western countries worship the science. However,   for Bulaç, knowledge should originate from revelation of God which is written down in the Quran and the Sunna.   The duty of every Muslim is to understand what it means to be a Muslim and accept his subjection to God.[28]

On the other hand, Bulaç has given special importance to the intellectual search to reach consistent and well-off society. According to him,   in today's Islamic societies,   two groups of intellectuals have emerged.   On the one hand there   are westernized intellectuals who have been alienated from the history,   culture and the people of their country.   They have merely imitated the western philosophy and science, thus failing to produce original works.[29]

On the other hand, the Islamist intellectuals have accepted history and tradition without questioning and have failed to produce new views, causing the poverty of Islamic thought.[30]

Bulaç gives great attention to intellectuals because according to him, in the future intellectuals will be administrators who will deal with government issues and will also enlighten the Muslim peoples. So the most important goal for Islamist thinkers of the new generation is to eliminate Western influences on intellectual life and to replace them with the Quran and the Sunna. Because they have the responsibility to act as the carriers of a cultural transformation which will lead to internelization of the Islamic world view by the masses.[31]

As well as the criticism of science, in Bulaç's writing there is a critique of technology and industrial growth. Bulaç has criticized technology and industry from two points of view. Firstly, he sees technology as the major cause of modern men withdrawing from religion and secondly, techology is found responsible for the destruction in modern societies.

According to Bulaç, techonology, whereever it has existed and penetrated social dynamics, demolishes local cultures and imposes Western values. Also high technology and industry has caused an increase of consumption spirit. For him, people in western countries live for consumption. There is no meaning of life and unconsiusness covers all actions of individuals.[32]

Therefore, for Bulaç, the duty of the Muslim is to reject any formula for the advance of technology and industry. Both technology and industry are imposed as desirable foods on the non- Western world through the imperialism of the West. For Bulaç, this process has caused the economic exploitation of natural resources and the cultural exploitation of natural resources and the cultural exploitation of non-Western peoples.[33] Furthermore, for Bulaç, technology and industry have led the Western countries themselves into a spiritual crisis. He says that the marginal groups of Western countries are aware of this spiritual crisis and the impact of a technological and industrial age on human happiness.[34]

D) WHY DOES BULAÇ CRITICIZE THE CAPITALISM, FASCISM AND SOCIALISM?

In his writings Bulaç criticizes and rejects Capitalism, fascism and Socialism due to the fact that they are not based on divine orders and depend on worldly explanations.

According to Bulaç, it is God's unity (Tevhid) which brings the goodness, maturity and peace between nature and self existence. Islam recognizes God's unity. Monotheism means the oneness of God and the power of God to create all the universe human and natural life. God determines definitely all universe, only god's unity and revelation can express the rules of the universe.

Capitalism, fascism and socialism are all in essence based on polytheism. The universe and rules of human nature are explained not through God's unity and creating power, but by worldly explanations.

Additionally for Bulaç, in Islam there is a consciousness of being a worshipper of God. The major indicator of being a servant of God is always worshipping. In Islamic society this worshipping is realized within the boundaries of the ummah. Acccording to Bulaç, the pure Islamic society is classless and there is no hegemony of any class and individual within the society. In the Quran there is a differentiation of rich and poor peoples but it is not fixed into Marxist class concept.[36]

According to Bulaç, capitalism symbolizes property and power. Class struggle is the determining charactaristics of capitalism. Although a small section of society profits from property and prosperity, workers have only labour power. Trade unions do not really defend natural and legal right of the workers.[37] According to Bulaç workers who have lost their own revolutionary activities have integrated into the system through the trade unions in which they are organized. Furthermore in capitalism money and capital are over emphasized. Capitalism and technological civilization has risen on the shoulder of the exploited, and killed peoples of the world.

For Bulaç, finally, the bourgeoisie and proletariat are the mainand opposing classes of capitalist society. But with modernism, involving imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, the world is divided into two main classes: on the one side prosperous countries of the West and on the other side undeveloped or developing countries that are facing with poverty.[38]

Moreover, Bulaç talks about two main destructive tendencies of capitalist relations. The first is the exploitation of workers and secondly the destruction of social relations, moral structure and value systems. The capitalist world view, idealizing money and capital, has violated and destroyed moral values. On this point. Bulaç refers to the deterioration of the position of women in society and the destruction of familial relationships.

In considering fascism, Bulaç says fascism has three essential principles: nationalism depending on race theory, statism dominating over social and economic sphere and war aiming at expansion and domination over the world.[39]

Bulaç evaluates the emergence of fascism with the weakness of the liberal state and against the danger of, communist powers. According to Bulaç, fascism depends on the totalitarian state idea and rejects democracy and parliamentary regime. It

supports absolute and pure statism; in fascism, monopolies and ologopolies and trade unions are under the state rule.

On the other hand, in socialist and communist countries a kind of state capitalism is dominant. For Bulaç socialist and communist countries can not remove class conflict. The pressure of the state has increased in these systems. For Bulaç socialism and communism are systems of pressure and exploitation -which militate against self esteem, honour of the human being. These systems, for Bulaç, legitimise social injustice.

Briefly for Bulaç all these systems, capitalism, fascism and socialism do not involve the universal justice, high moral values and do not satify human well-being products of a certain history and culture can not be a source of happiness peace for humanity due to their philosophical and inner features.[40] At the core of these three systems, there are injustice, exploitation, alienation and tyranny. Moreover, all these systems have exported their crises to all world with its culture, commodities and politics. Henceforth there is no benefit from communism, capitalism and fascism to humanity and to the world. Bulaç indicates the necessity of a new worldview, moral value system and new life style for the well-being of individuals and societies. For Bulaç this 'new' worldview is Islam with its divine order, and monotheism. Only Islam can be the remedy for the crises of systems, societies and individuals, with its divine order and nonmundane base.

According to Bulaç, what differentiates Islam from other systems is that it is based on the recognition of God's unity. It is not a mundane order which has been constituted as a result of historical development. Islam has required a different social order, economic organization, different culture and civilization.[41]

Moreover Bulaç makes the differentiation of two side of men. The first side of men is the mundane side which symbolizes greed, mercilessness, weakness and egoism. However the human side of men has pain, love, nostalgia. In this human side, although he lives in this world, he knows that he is alien to this world.[42] In Bulaç's view, the west symbolizes the mundane side and Islam represents the human side of men.

Additionally, according to Bulaç, in Islamic culture the hearth is at the cantre of the human organization not the brain. This thinking is opposing to rationalism and positivism which puts scientific thinking and knowledge at the center of human activities.[43]

Bulaç is against the humanist worldview. Humanism for Bulaç requires the freedom of individuals and their sovereignty in the world. So for thim humanism is against the divine order of God which requires the oneness of and deity of God.[44]

E) BULAÇ'S UNDERSTANDING OF CULTURAL AUTHENTICTY AND NATIVISM;

One important feature of Bulaç's writings is the emphasis on nativism. In some cases, it is indicated that the appeal of Islamic movements lies in the desire for cultural authenticity and the rejection of westernization as a kind of cultural imperialism tied to the economic and political domination of the Islamic world by the west.[45] "By a nativist movement, anthropologists usually mean a movement that seeks to revive the ostensibly traditional culture of a dominated society so as to overcome at least some aspects of the domination to which the society in question has been subjected. Such movements typically occur when people feel that their cultural identity as well as their economic and political autonomy is threatened by the domination of an alien society."[46]

According to Munson nativistic movements are ostensibly intended to revive tradition, the culture of preceding generations. However, in fact, they always involve the reconstruction of tradition in novel (or modern) ways that reflect the influence of the dominant culture they are designed to reject.[47]

Therefore, according to Munson there are two main features of nativistic movements in general. The first is the desire to return to their authentic [Islamic] identity. The second is

their tendency to reinterpret the traditional culture they seek to revive in terms of the dominant culture they seek to reject.[48]

From this point of view Ali Bulaç's wrirtings can be analyzed. According to Bulaç a truly Islamic society existed only in the period extending from the advent of Islam through the rule of the first four caliphs.[49] Bulaç has invited the Muslims to return to their authentic Islamic identity. But this Islamic identity was not involving purely at the Ottoman period. He talks about the period of the Golden Age (Asr-i Saadet).

However on the other hand, as in the second feature of nativistic movement, Bulaç in some cases condemns Marxism as a materialistic product of the decadent west.[50] He interprets history as a continuous struggle between God's unity and polytheism and reconstructs history in a novel (modern) way by using dialectical Marxist terminology.

F)   ALI BULAÇ'S ISLAMIC MODEL;

In Bulaç's wrirings although there are some indications about the pure Islamic society, there is not enough and satisfactory explanation of the possible ways of resching this Islamic society.

According to Bulaç's, in an ideal Islamic society there will be no classes. While recognising differences in status,

wealth, and tribal origin, the Quran teaches the ultimate
transnational unity and equality of all believers before God. In
the Quran there is a differentiation of rich and poor peoples but
they do not represent any class or government power. However,
although there will be an economic differentiation, all men will
be equal before the Islamic law.[51] In Bulaç's model
intellectuals are crucial in the organization and enlightenment
of the society.

Intellectuals, for Bulaç, will guide their societies and
will be the administrators of Islamic society, because they will
know Islam, Quran and Sunna perfectly and will transmit their
knowledge to other peoples.[52]

Bulaç's model of Islamic society is based on the 'ummah'
view. For him, individuals are mortal. However absolute
happiness is eternal. So individuals who are mortal, are
meaningful in the ummah society.

In Bulaç's view ummah is more important than state, as
states can change while the ummah has continuity. For Bulaç,
ummah is not the only community of peoples that have same belief,
and it is not constituted by only Muslims. 'Ummah' is a social
structure that consists of different peoples and communities who
have various beliefs but have the desire to unifi and live
together.[53]

The divine law is above the ummah and state which takes its legitimacy from Islamic law.

In this respect I want to discuss the views of Bulaç about the state structure of Muslim societies. According to him recent states of the third world countries of many Islamic societies are the puppets of Western bloc. But he did not give much attention to the state structure of current Muslim countries.

For him in societies where civil dynamics have weaknesses against the political society, the state has the hegemony over all civil dynamics. In these type of societies the acquisition of the state means the acqusition of the whole society.

"In a western societies the activities and hegemony of politics are limited by the civil societal elements and institutions, but in Eastern societies, especially within the last three centuries, political society has become powerful against the civil societal elements (tarikats, educational institutions, mosque Quran courses...) and become the unique determinant within the society."[54]

According to Bulaç, the Golden Age period of Muslim history represented a pure civil period; it lasted until middle of the Abbasid period. After this period, the state had a more dominant role over the civil elements and this has continued up to now.[55]

From this point of view, for Bulaç, the signs of above mentioned ummah and civil societal elements can be observed in the 'Madina Doctrine' in which Jews, Muslims and other peoples agreed to live in consensus. So the state could not have definite formal ideology because of the pluralistic structure of the ummah.

Bulaç, with these views, gives his attention to the principles of civil societal elements and rejects the formal state ideology above the society. Nevertheless his explanations about the base of the state at 'Madina doctrine' gives rise to some weaknesses in his views about the pluralistic ummah society.

For this view, in the Madina doctrine there are two legitimate bases of the state. The first is the divine message and the other is the voluntary agreement. However, it can be seen that these two bases are in contradiction to each other. On the one side is the divine message based on the 'tevhid' (oneness) principle and on the other side various communities and peoples who have different belief systems.

I think Bulaç makes very crucial contributions to the arguments of civil society and ideal ummah based on Islamic society. Neverthless his arguments are not sufficient and powerful enough to show us the pluralism or non-traditionalism of this pure ideal Islamic society, because Bulaç proposes a society that will take its legitimacy and base from the absolute

truth (divine message of God). Therefore I think that Bulaç's view is in contradiction with itself since a society that will take its legitimacy and base from the absolute and one truth, as Bulaç proposes, can not involve in itself the toleration of plurality.

Moreover, although Bulaç thinks radically, criticizes modern systems and proposes the return to the period of 'Asr-i Saadet', he does not sufficiently show the possible ways to reach a such society.

Bulaç does not support the political party struggle to reach Islamic society, he evaluates the political party struggle as an adaptation to the system. For Bulaç, if Muslims are rejecting the status-quo in the name of Islam they have to show the real goals to the masses. The support of western discourses with Islamic concepts and phrases can not show the real light to Muslim masses.[56] Bulaç criticizes the Refah Party in Turkey because of its goals of development, industrialization and to reach social welfare. However for Bulaç the aim is not to reach welfare but salvation (Felah). Additionally, the discourse of many Islamic intellectuals and the views of Islamic university youth about technology and industry are not in agreement with the Refah Party's industrialization projects. The view of the National Outlook (Milli-Görüş) formulated by National Salvation Party and 'Refah Party' line - sees the realization of economic

growth as the basic means of breaking the chains of the world capitalist system and creating the great Turkey.[57] According to the 'National outlook' of RP, industrialisation is a matter of life and death. It is the major factor in gaining economic independence and usperiority. Moreover, because of their non-industrialized positions, less developed countries of the third world have been subject to the domination of the industrialized countries.[58] However for Bulaç the liberty of Muslim societies can only be realized by totally abondening the technology and industry, of the West. But he does not indicate how this will be realized.

G) UNIVERSAL REVIVALISM OF RELIGION AND ISLAM;

In the last years not only in Islamic societies that are not-industrialized or developed but also in the industrialized western countries there is an existence of movements to protest the recent systems and to propose the solving of problems within the religious perspective.[59] Among many secular intellectual this phenomenon was argued and debated in the 1980s. Bulaç also gives great attention to the revivalism of Islam an a universal scale.

According to Bulaç, in the next decades all political and social trends will be religious. The ideologies, philosophies and doctrines that constitute the base of modern society will

lose their relevance, because modern society has caused the psychological, cultural and social destruction of the individual. For Bulaç, individuals who ave become isolated and frustrated because of industrialisation will experience the mysticism and inner self satisfaction-that is the introversion of individuals to search for some meaning to life and society. Individuals are acquiring the cosmic spiritual side of religion without being aware of it. The plurality of institutions, high degree of division of labour and specialisation has caused the division of human mind and consciousness which are the two main realities of personality. So, for Bulaç in the modern society individuals feel themselves as lonely anomic and homeless.

Moreover, protest movements are marginal activities in Western countries, and the evaluated by Bulaç as the outcome of this modern life style. All the marginal groups protest at the regular and definite structure of modern society. For Bulaç, they demand identity and freedom from their anomic position. In Bulaç's view although it is seen as pluralist, modern society is not suitable for socio-cultural diversities. Therefore, individuals within modern society are not happy and satisfied as is shown. The only possible way to escape the hallmarks of modernism is the universal message of religion; with religion lost identity is regained. With kinship and neighborhood relations men can feel himself as in his home. In the framework of the religious message there is a feeling of identity and belonging to somewhere.

For Bulaç,   Islam has a greater chance to affect the large masses.   Because it is suitable for the principles of 'Tevhid' (oneness and unity of God) and justice.[60]

Lastly,   for Bulaç in many Islamic countries the revivalism of Islam is lived;   the hallmarks of modernism are broker with the universal message of Islam that based on divine revelation of God to prophet Muhammed.

III. CONCLUSION

It could be said that Bulaç is a defender of civil Islam. Instead of   a political party struggle to reach pure Islamic society,   he supports the view of civil struggle.   Individuals with their consciousness will start to live and desire the pure Islamic society.   As I conclude from his writings Islamization will be acquired from below to above.   It is realized in human thought and behaviour by the endeavors of the human themselves. Here the common point is the assumption which foresees a change that depends on change in consiousness.   So for him this consiousness will be start with the quest for inner spiritual satisfaction.   But Bulaç has no satisfactory explanation as to how this transformation will be achieved.

Moreover,   from all of his writings Bulaç emerges as a strong supporter and defender of 'civil society'.   In Bulaç's

71

ideal Islamic society civil elements will be dominant as in the period of the four caliphs and up to mid Abbasid time. According to him the Madina doctrine has shown us the possibility of construction Islamic society in which various ethnic and religious groups can live together.

However in some cases he is in conflict with himself. On the one hand, the divine message will be the source of law and knowledge and this divine message represents the revelation of God to the prophet Muhammad. On the other side he is talking about the pluralistic Islamic society that will be based on contractual relationships between different groups. I think that the question can be asked to Bulaç that is there a really possibility of pluralism and civil societal elements in such a society where the sacred truth will be accepted only as the divine revelation to prophet Muhammad.

However, although they have some internal weaknesses and conflicts, Bulaç's writings are still significant. He deals with broad scale points. Modernism is his main interest but he also writes about the christianity, capitalism, fascism, Marxism.... So it is reasonable to accept his importance within the intellectual life of the post 1980s. His books and publichings are among the best sellers and are read by both secular peoples and Islamic youth and environments.

NOTES AND REFERENCES;

1)   Binnaz Toprak, "Islamist Intellectuals; Revolt Against
     Industry and Techonology", Ankara, 1992, <u>Typescript</u>, p.
     324.

2)   Ömer Laçiner, "Dini Akımların Yükselişi ve Türkiye'de
     Islami Hareket" <u>BİRİKİM</u>, Ekim (1989): 6-15, p. 6 and also
     see Topral, typescript, p. 325.

3)   Michaell E. Meeker "The new Muslim Intellectuals in the
     Republic of Turkey", in <u>ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY</u>, Richard
     Tapper, ed. (London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers,
     1991), p. 217 and also see Elisabeth Özdalga, "East and West
     as Symbols of Good and Evil, Turkish Muslim Intellectuals
     Facing Modernity", <u>typescript</u>, p. 6.

4)   Ali Bulaç, ed., <u>ISLAM DÜNYASINDA DÜŞÜNCE SORUNLARI</u>
     (Istanbul; İşaret publishing, 1988), p. 172.

5)   Ibid., p. 172.

6)   Ali Bulaç, <u>DİN VE MODERNİZM</u> (Istanbul: Endülüs Yayınları,
     1991), p. 44.

7)   Tonny Barnett, ed., <u>SOCIOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT</u> (London,
     Melbourne; Hutchinson Publishing, 1988), p. 26.

8)   'Modernization refers to a type of social change since the
     18th century, which consists in the economic or political
     advance of some pioneering society and subsequent changes in
     follower societies'. Richard Bendix, "Tradition and
     Modernity Reconsidered", vol: IX, no. 3, April 1967 and also

73

see Wilbert E. Moore, ed., SOCIAL CHANGE (New Jersey, Printice Hall; 1964), p. 89.

9) Barnett, p. 26.

10) Peter Worsley, ed., THE NEW INTRODUCING SOCIOLOGY (Canada; Penguin Books, 1987), p. 242.

11) Barnett, p. 32.

12) Bulaç, 1988, p. 185.

13) Ali Bulaç, "Dinlerin Meydan Okuyuşu; Entegrizm ve Fundamentalizm" BİRİKİM, may (1992): 17-29, p. 19.

14) Bulaç, 1991, p. 162.

15) Bulaç, 1992 (May), p. 21.

16) Ibid., p. 26.

17) Bulaç, 1988, p. 27.

18) Bulaç, 1992 (May), p. 27.

19) Nilüfer Göle, ed. MODERN MAHREM, MEDENİYET VE ÖRTÜNME (Istanbul: Metiş Publishing, 1991), p. 109.

20) Ibid., 107.

21) Bulaç, 1988, p. 72.

22) Göle, 1991, p. 109.

23) Ali Bulaç, ed. İNSANIN ÖZGÜRLÜK ARAYIŞI (Istanbul: Endülüs Publishing, 1991), p. 41.

24) Toprak, typescript, p. 326.

25) Ibid., p. 326.

26) Bulaç, 1988, p. 76.

27) Ali Bulaç, ed. ÇAĞDAŞ KAVRAMLAR VE DÜZENLER, (Istanbul; Endülüs Publishing, 1992b), p. 65.

28) Bulaç, 1991 (b), p. 48.

29) Bulaç, 1992(b) p. 193.

30) Bulaç, 1991 (a), p. 56.

31) Bulaç, 1988, p. 88.

32) Bulaç, 1991(a), p. 63.

33) Bulaç, 1992 (a), p. 26.

34) Ibid., p. 27.

35) Bulaç, 1988, p. 46.

36) Bulaç, 1992 (b), p. 167.

37) Ibid., p, 35-160, p. 146.

38) Ibid., p. 145.

39) Zeliha Aslıtürk, "the Development of an Islamic Intellectual career in Turkey; The case of Ali Bulaç", unpublished master's thesis, METU, Ankara, 1990, p. 59.

40) Bulaç, 1992 (b), p. 162.

41) Bulaç, 1988, p. 19.

42) Bulaç, 1991 (b), p. 60.

43) Ibid., p. 63.

44) Bulaç, 1988, p. 202.

45) Henry JR. Munson, ed., ISLAM AND REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST (New Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1988), p. 119.

46. Ibid., p. 311.

47) Ibid., p. 312.

48) Ibid., p. 311.

49) Toprak, ibid., p. 332.

50) Munson, 1988, p. 111.

51) Bulaç, 1992 (b), p. 250.

52) Bulaç, 1988, p. 116.

53) Ibid., p. 106.

54) Bulaç, 1992 (b), p. 80.

55) Ibid., p. 84.

56) Ibid., p. 270.

57) Ruşen Çakır, <u>AYET VE SLOGAN, TÜRKİYE'DE İSLAMİ OLUŞUMLAR</u> (Istanbul; Metiş Publishing, 1990), p. 224.

58) Ahmet Yıldız, "The evolution of Islamic Politics in Turkey along the NSP-PP line with special reference to changes and continuities, unpublished master's thesis, 1990, Ankara, Bilkent University, p. 62.

59) Laçiner, 1989, p. 6.

60) Bulaç, 1992 (b), p. 271-272.

CONCLUSION

The main aim of this study was to examine how and why the contemporary Islamic thinkers of Turkey, respond to the problematic of modernizm and westernizm.

My major point is that the desire to return to Islam as an indigenous culture and political framework is sourced by indigenous dynamics and by multi dimensional external pressures. It is a response to the national crises that has been in large part shaped by the impact of Westernization and modernization processes which are also related to the western colonialism and imperialism.

Modernization in general is defined as the replacement of the old by the new or more specifically it is the process that implies industrialization, urbanization, expansion of secular education, greater public participation in government and the dimunition of the legal and social role of the ethnic, religious, and other primordial identities.[1] In other words, modernization is described as the transition from pre-industrial to industrial society, or in sociological concepts, shift from 'gemeinschaft' to 'gesellschaft'.

The Islamic intellectuals with their fundamentalist outlook have brought a new expression to the Islamic movements in Turkey during 1980s. Their fundamentalist discourse is full of different responses to West and modernism; what many of them are proposing instead of the modern society is an ideal Islamic society that would take its legitimacy from the knowledge of Quran and Sunnah.

Ali Bulaç is one example of the Islamic response to the rapid modernization and westernization process of Turkey. In Bulaç's rhetoric, the wish to return to Islam as an indigenous culture and a political framework appears as a response to the national crises caused by modernisation. In general, what Bulaç understands from modernizm is its cultural and individual levels.

According to him with the modern cities which are the places of formal state ideologies, the gemeinschaftlich relationships are destroyed and individuals are isolated from each other. Within modern cities, huge industry, division of labour and specialization has caused an atomization of individuals and their feeling of homolessness and identity crises.

Bulaç strongly supports the community life. For him the ideal Islamic society is based on an ummah consisting of various peoples and communities who have different beliefs but have a desire to live together.

In Bulaç's view identity should be acquired with kinship and neghborhood, mutual aid and solidarity that will construct the bases of society.

From this framework, I can say that, Bulaç's grievances lie with social modernization rather than his opposition to technological and economic modernization. He mostly deals with the changes of consumption patterns, values, norms, life styles and relationships of individuals. In this sense modernization implies more than just the replacement of the old by the new. It implies a shift from a society in which peoples social and legal status is largely determined by characteristics they are usually born with, to one in which social and legal status is largely determined by what people achieve by their own efforts.[2] In sum Bulaç rejects the modern identity and modern societal relationships.

However, Bulaç is a product of modern society. His own modern identity shaped by a secular university education, could not give him the chance to break these ties totally. He uses secular scientific methods; footnotes, references, statistical summaries and bibliographical lists in his writings. He dresses like a modern man and his method of writing reflects the signs of secular thought. Therefore Ali Bulaç can not break the chains of modernizm beyond his rejection of it. He is a part of the current system, that has inevitable effects on his discourse.

Despite his radicalism he did not escape from the effects of modernizm.

Aditionally, the writings of Bulaç proposes the radical tlransformation of society. This radicalism aims at the establishment of a new world based on the principles of the Quran and the Sunnah. However "no blueprint for this transformation is offered; there is talk of a political struggle, but exactly ho this struggle will be carried out remains unclear; there is to be a transformation in the course of which modern technology and industry will be destroyed, but what precisely is to replace them is not discussed; the reduction of the relationships of a relatively complex society to their simpler forms is advocated, but there is no analysis of how this process is to be undertaken."[3]

Therefore, Ali Bulaç's social model is a kind of Utopia. In all utopias, it involves an abstraction of time and locale which is supposed to be valid for all times and places.

The utopia of Bulaç is an ideal Islamic society that is to be established as was established by the prophet Muhammad and four calips periods of the Golden Age in which full submission to God resulted in "absolute justice", "equality" and "brotherhood". The principles of this Islamic society will be based on Quran and Sunnah with full submission to God.[4] However there is a weaknesses due to his comparison of the Ideal Islamic

society and current Islamic societies. This is a full of abstractions because the utopic ideal Islamic society and current ıslamic societies (take their legitimacy from the Islamic rule i.e. Iran, Saudi Arabia...) are not fixe to each other. Bulaç is continuously making the critics of Western societies but he does not evaluate current Islamic societies in terms of their political and social contradictions to the ideal Islamic society.

Moreover, Bulaç attempts to substitute a more activist response to west and modernization than the notion of passive endurance that is especially common among the poorest and least educated strata of Islamic societies.[5] Munson indicates that "one of the Quranic verses commonly cited in the fundamentalist literature is 'God does not change the condition of a people until people change themselves.' This, contrast between fundamentalist activism and popular fatalism is one of the most striking differences between fundamentalist Islamic ideology and popular Islam."[6]

Almost all of his writings reflects the breaking of this fatalism and he proposes the struggle to modernism to reach a pure Islamic society. But this is not a political struggle. He does not have any political program. Bulaç proposes that Islamization process is realized in human tought that Islamization process is realized in human tought and behaviour by the endavors of the Muslim themselves. Here the main point is

81

the assumption which foresees a change that depends on a change in consciousness.

As I guess from his writings, these consciousness transformation be realized by propaganda and education. This required education will be given by Islamic thinkers to the Muslim believers with using media and communication systems. In this point, I want to indicate that, contemporary Islamic thinkers in Turkey at 1980's caused to emergence of 'elitism' among Islamic groups. On the one hand large Muslim believers on the other hand Islamic thinkers who are writing on various periodicals to make Muslim masses aware about world events and Islamic knowledge. Thus, these Islamic thinkers including Ali Bulaç became the 'ideolouges' of Muslim believers.

Regardless of their programs for the future, many of Islamic thinker consider Islam an indigenous culture, a divine belief system and a political ideology which can be used as a means to break away from the west. But as seen in Bulaç's writings they do not have a coherent and consistent response what they reject. Islamic ideology does not seem to be as original, perfect and radical as Bulaç's rhetoric assert.

Additionally this study showed that; the crises of modernist ideologies existing in the Muslim countries have forced Islam to challenge these ideologies which could not sufficiently fulfill the needs of the masses. Nevertheless, as far as, it

was observed from the writings of Bulaç, Islam is not a proper situation to handle this historical chance. It has become this worldly as an alternative ideology.

On the other hand, although they have internal weaknesses and conflicts, Bulaç's writings are still significant. He deals with broad scale points. Modernism is his main interest but he also writes about christianity, poltheism, capitalism, fascism, marxism, civil-society, military cops...etc. So it is reasonable to accept his importance within the intellectual life of the post 1980's. His books and publications are among the best sellers and are read by both secular and Islamic youth. His writing style is praised by many secular intellectual. Therefore Bulaç has gained special place among the Islamic and secular intellectuals of 1980s.

This point also reminds us of the cruciality of the 1980's in terms of the rise of consensus among various polar rhetorics. The respectable debates are realized among Islamists, rightists and leftists in this decade. The Islamic intellectuals have represented the one wing of this debate. But they could not go further from their writings. As in the case of Ali Bulaç, they are part of the current system and it seems that their 'radical' rhetoric is far away from program for change. However they are the part of the democratization process of Turkish society. Islamic peoples represents the one polar of Turkish society and

as other polars they have a right to make heard their voices within the boundaries of liberal democratic society.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1) Henry Jr. Munson, ed. <u>ISLAM</u> <u>AND</u> <u>REVOLUTION</u> <u>IN</u> <u>THE</u> <u>MIDDLE</u> <u>EAST</u> (New Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1988), p. 108.

2) Ibid., p. 112.

3) Binnaz Toprak, "Islamist Intellectuals; Revolt Against Industry and Technology", Ankara, 1992, <u>Typescript</u>, p. 324.

4) Ali Bulaç, "Dinlerin Meydan Okuyuşu; Entegrizm ve Fundamentalizm", <u>BİRİKİM</u>, May (1992): 17-29, p. 19.

5) Munson, p. 14.

6) Ibid., p. 109.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AÇIKALIN Oya, "Modernism/westernism versus Fundamentalism / Islamism an analysis of two Islamic periodicals of Turkey" unpublished masters's thesis, METU, Ankara, 1986.

ACAR Feride, "Women in the Ideology of Islamic Revivalism in Turkey: Three Islamic Women's Journals" in Richard L. Tapper ed., ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY, (London and N.Y.: I.B. Tauris, 1991).

AKŞİT Bahattin, "Islamic Education in Turkey, Medrese Reform in late Ottoman Times and Imam-Hatip Schools in the Republic" in Richard L. Tapper, ed., ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY (London and N.Y.: I.B. Tauris).

AKTAY Yasin, "Modernlik Durumumuza Dair", TEZKİRE, (3) 1992: 15-40.

ASLITÜRK Zeliha, "The Development of an Intellectual career in Turkey; The case of Ali Bulaç", unpublished masters's thesis, METU, Ankara 1990.

BARNETT Tony, ed., SOCIOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT (London, Melbourne; Hutchinson Publishing, 1988).

BERKES Niyazi, Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma (İstanbul, Doğu - Batı Yayınları, n.d.).

BORA Tanıl Ahmet CAN, "12 Eylül'ün Resmi Ideolojisi, Fasişt Entelejensiya ve Türk-İslam Sentezi", BİRİKİM, Ekim 1990.

BULAÇ Ali, ed., İNSANIN ÖZGÜRLÜK ARAYIŞI (İstanbul, Endülüs).

--------, İSLAM DÜNYASINDA DÜŞÜNCE SORUNLARI (İstanbul; Endülüs
        Yayınları, 1992)

--------, DİN VE MODERNİZM (İstanbul; Endülüs Publishing, 1981).

--------, ÇAĞDAŞ KAVRAMLAR VE DÜZENLEK (İstanbul; Endülüs
        Publishing, 1992).

--------, "Dinlerin   Meydan   Okuyuşu;   Entegrizm   ve
        Fundamentalizm", BİRİKİM, (May) 1992: 17-29.

ÇAKIR, Ruşen, ed., AYET VE SLOGAN, TÜRKİYE'DE İSLAMİ OLUŞUMLAR
        (Istanbul; Metiş Yayınları, 1990).

ESPOSITO L. John, ed., ISLAM THE STRAIGHT PATH (Oxford and N.Y.:
        Oxford University Press, 1988).

GELLENER Ernest, "Post-Traditional Forms in Islam: The Turk and
        Trade, and Votes and Peanuts", Deadalus, (102) pp. 191-
        206.

GÜNEŞ-AYATA Ayşe, "Pluralism versus Authoritarianism; Political
        Ideasn in two Islamic Publications" in Richard L.
        Tapper, ed., ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY, (London and N.Y.:
        I.B. Tauris, 1991).

GÖLE Nilüfer, ed., MODERN MAHREM, MEDENİYET VE ÖRTÜNME (Istanbul:
        Metiş publishing, 1991).

----------, "Towards an Automisation of Politics and Civil
        Society in Turkey", Ankara, Typescript, 1992.

EVİN, Ahmet, "Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After
        1980", in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., State
        Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s
        (Berlin - New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988).

HADDAD, Yvonne Yazbeck, ed., CONTEMPORARY ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE
        OF HISTORY (Albany N.Y.: State University of N.Y.
        Publishing, 1992).

HECKMANN Lale Yalçın, "Ethnic Islam and Nationalism among the
        Kurds in Turkey" in Richard L. Tapper, ed., ISLAM IN
        MODERN TURKEY (London and N.Y.: I.B. Tauris, 1991).

HEPER Metin, "The State Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case
        in Contemporary Perspective", BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE
        EASTERN STUDIES, (1) 1991: 38-51.

KEDDIE R. Nikki, "Intellectuals in the Modern Middle East: A
        Brief Historical Consideration", Deadalu 101, pp. 39-
        51.

LAÇİNER, Ömer, "Dini Akımların Yükselişi ve Türkiye'de İslami
        Hareket", BİRİKİM, Ekim (1989): 6-15.

MUNSON Jr. Henry, ed., ISLAM AND REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
        (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988).

MARDİN Şerif, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey", in
        James P. Piscatory ed., ISLAM IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
        (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

----------, ed., RELIGION and IDEOLOGY (İstanbul, İletişim
        Yayınları, 1990).

MEEKER, Michael, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey" in Richard L. Tapper ed., ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY (London and N.Y.: I.B. Tauris, 1991).

ÖZDALGA Elisabeth, "East and West as the Symbols of Good and Evil, Turkish Muslim Intellectuals Facing Modernity", Typescript.

SUNAR, İlkay and Toprak Binnaz, "Islam in Politics", GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, 1993, vol. 18.

TOPRAK, Binnaz, "Islamist Intellectuals; Revolt against Industry and Technology", Ankara, 1992, Typescript.

----------, "Dinci Sağ", in Cemil Erwin Schink and Ahmet Ertuğrul, GEÇUŞ SÜRECİNDE TÜRKİYE (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987).

----------, "The Reception of Iranian Revolution by The Muslim Press in Turkey", in David Menashri, THE MAN ON REVOLUTION AND MUSLIM WORLD (Colorado: 1990).

SARIBAY, Ali Yaşar, ed., TÜRKİYE'DE MODERNLEŞME DİN VE PARTİ POLİTİKASI (İstanbul: Alan Publishing, 1985).

----------, "Türkiye'de Siyasal Modernleşme ve Islam", Toplum ve Bilim (Winter Summer 1985) pp. 45-64.

SAYLAN Gencay, ed., İSLAMİYET VE SİYASET (Istanbul: Verso Publishing, 1987).