

AN INSTITUTIONALIST ANALYSIS TO THE EU'S ENLARGEMENT
POLICIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLISH AND TURKISH
ACCESSION PROCESSES

A Ph. D. Dissertation

By

ESRA USLU KUTLUKAYA

Department of Political Science
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
January 2013

To Mahmut and Nisan Naz

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Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences

of

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by

ESRA USLU KUTLUKAYA

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ANKARA

January 2013

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

.....

Assist. Prof. Dr. H. Tolga Bölükbaşı
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

.....

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aylin Güney
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

.....

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

.....

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ali Tekin
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

.....

Assist. Prof. Dr. Başak İnce
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

.....

Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel
Director

ABSTRACT

AN INSTITUTIONALIST ANALYSIS TO THE EU'S ENLARGEMENT POLICIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLISH AND TURKISH ACCESSION PROCESSES

Uslu Kutlukaya, Esra

P.D., Department of Political Science

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. H. Tolga Bölükbaşı

January 2013

European Union (EU) enlargement has been somewhat neglected theoretically in studies of European integration despite its importance both for member states, applicant states and the EU itself. The main purpose of this dissertation is to make a theoretical contribution to the literature through applying an institutionalist analysis to the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states as expressed through their speeches. The major research question of this dissertation is: 'Which theory of institutionalism, rationalist or constructivist/sociological, better explains the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states towards deepening relations with Poland and Turkey?' In order to answer this question, the different stages of the EU's Eastern enlargement are analyzed through the case studies of Turkey and Poland. The results of this analysis

demonstrate that the logic of consequentialism rather than logic of appropriateness has prevailed in the formation of the attitudes of both European Commissioners and member states towards Poland and Turkey.

Keywords: Rationalist Institutionalism, Constructivist/Sociological Institutionalism, the European Commissioners, member states, Polish accession process, Turkish accession process, content analysis.

ÖZET

AB'NİN GENİŞLEME POLİTİKALARINA KURUMSALCI BİR BAKIŞ: POLONYA VE TÜRKİYE'NİN KATILIM SÜREÇLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMASI

Uslu Kutlukaya, Esra

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. H. Tolga Bölükbaşı

Ocak 2013

Avrupa Birliğinin genişlemesi, üye ülkeler, aday ülkeler ve Avrupa Birliği için önemine rağmen Avrupa entegrasyonunda teorik açıdan ihmal edilmiştir. Bu tezin temel amacı, AB Komisyonu üyelerinin ve üye devletlerin, yaptıkları konuşmalar vasıtasıyla, tutumlarını kurumsalcı bir analiz yöntemiyle inceleyerek yazına teorik bir katkıda bulunmaktır. Bu tezin ana araştırma sorusu şudur: rasyonel veya inşacı/sosyolojik kurumsalcı teorilerden hangisi AB Komisyonu üyelerinin ve üye devletlerin Polonya ve Türkiye ile ilişkilerin derinleşmesine ilişkin tutumlarını en iyi şekilde açıklamaktadır? Bu soruyu cevaplamak için AB'nin Doğu Avrupa genişlemesinin farklı aşamaları Polonya ve Türkiye vaka çalışmaları üzerinden analiz edilmiştir. Analiz sonuçları, AB Komisyonu üyelerinin ve üye devletlerin Polonya ve

Türkiye'ye karşı tutumlarının oluşmasında uygunluk mantığından çok sonuçsalcılık mantığının hâkim olduğunu göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rasyonalist Kurumsalcılık, İnşacı/Sosyolojik Kurumsalcılık, AB Komisyonu üyeleri, Üye ülkeler, Polonya'nın katılım süreci, Türkiye'nin katılım süreci, İçerik analizi.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It has been nearly 54 years since Turkish relations with the European Economic Community (EU)¹ began in 1959. Turkey first applied for membership in 1987, gained candidate status at the Helsinki European Council of 1999, before formal accession negotiations were launched on 3 October 2005. Turkey's candidacy is one example of the dual process followed by the EU of deepening and institutional transformation, simultaneous to widening or enlargement. Since its formation, the EU has completed six rounds of enlargement. Although Turkey's application took place before the Central and Eastern European Countries' (CEEC) applications, Turkey is still waiting to become a member of the EU while Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria,

¹ The name of the European Economic Community (ECC) altered in 1967 when the European Community (EC) became the new name. In 1992, with the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty, the name changed again to the European Union (EU). The name EU will be used in this dissertation to refer to all periods of the Community's history.

Hungary, the Cyprus Republic and Malta have all become members. The starting point for this dissertation is the quest to explain the slow progress of Turkish relations with the EU.

Analysis of the literature on European integration reveals that the EU's enlargement has been somewhat neglected theoretically in studies of European integration. The literature has considered Central and Eastern European enlargement as the most challenging and complicated round. Many questions arose during this round, for example as to why and when the EU decided to enlarge in this way; how the candidates were chosen; and which criteria were used. Due to this complicated character, the most prominent scholars of EU integration have conceptualized the EU's Eastern enlargement as a theoretical puzzle (Schimmelfennig 1999, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002). Specifically, this challenge has led to a new theoretical debate in the field between rationalist and sociological/constructivist institutionalism.

For rationalist institutionalists, players with decision-making and institutional power, such as the governments of EU member states in this case, are seen as the principal actors of enlargement, whereas for constructivist/sociological institutionalists, the principal actors are norm and principle entrepreneurs, such as the European Commission. The European Commission, among other supranational institutions of the EU, such as European Parliament or European Council, can be seen in this light due to its special role in the enlargement process. In particular, it monitors the compliance of candidate states with EU requirements with the help of progress reports, using these to advise the European Council about the preparedness of a candidate state for membership.

Considering how these actors reach policy decisions, rationalists argue that utility driven EU member states make use of strategic bargaining and negotiation about the costs and benefits of enlargement for their own national interests. In contrast, for constructivist/sociological institutionalists, decisions on enlargement policy are supposedly taken collectively by member states with the help of European Commission, in accordance with the constitutive norms, principals and shared identity of the Union. In short, the driving force behind the enlargement process is the logic of consequentiality for rationalist institutionalists and the logic of appropriateness for constructivists/sociological institutionalists.

This dissertation aims to explain the enlargement policies of member states and European Commissioners² by taking into account this rationalist-constructivist debate. With the help of the case studies of Turkey and Poland, different stages of EU enlargement are analyzed in order to determine the extent to which the European Commissioners and member states acted according to the logic of consequentialism or logic of appropriateness.

This dissertation posits five hypotheses to be answered through the case studies. The first is that ‘the support the European Commissioners’ offer for improving Polish and Turkish relations with the EU is nearly the same.’ The second hypothesis is that ‘the logic of appropriateness best explains the attitudes of the European Commissioners.’ The third hypothesis is that Poland’s EU candidacy has been prioritized over Turkey’s.’ Fourth, ‘France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain and Greece can be categorized as ‘drivers’ or ‘brakemen’, and that their positions do not change within the time periods studied.’ The final hypothesis is that ‘the logic of

² In the official documents of the EU, ‘European Commissioner’ and ‘Member of the European Commission’ were used interchangeably. From now on, ‘European Commissioner’ will be used in this dissertation.

consequentialism has prevailed in the attitudes of member states towards Poland and Turkey.’

1.1 Methodology

1.1.1 Research Question

The main research question of this dissertation is: Which theories of institutionalism, rationalist or constructivist, explains the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states towards Poland and Turkey? In order to answer this question, certain additional questions also have to be addressed: Are the levels of support of European Commissioners for improvement in EU relations with Poland and Turkey the same? Did member states make certain prioritizations amongst applicants in the enlargement process? Who have been the drivers and brakemen concerning Poland’s and Turkey’s European aspirations? Do the positions of member states change within the time periods studied? Is there a partisan effect in any change of positions? What were the fundamental determinants of member states’ preference formations? Did the European Commission decide to open accession negotiations with the candidate countries before making policy or institutional reforms? Which factors have had more impact on European Commissioners’ and member states’ decision to offer candidacy to Turkey and accept Poland as a member state?

The dependent variable that this dissertation aims to explain is the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states towards Poland’s and Turkey’s European aspirations. For rational institutionalists, the independent variables that

affect attitudes are material factors, such as economic interests, security interests and political interests, while for constructivist/sociological institutionalists, the independent variables that affect attitudes are ideational factors, such as collective identity and moral duty.

With respect to European studies, Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism is the best example of the application of rationalist institutionalism to the field of European integration. The Moravcsik's methodology, as he (1998:19) points out, is the "formulation of concrete and falsifiable hypotheses from competing theories, the disaggregation of case studies to multiply observations and reliance whenever possible on primary sources". When liberal intergovernmentalism is applied to the EU's enlargement policies, the main actors of enlargement are the member state governments because applicant countries are assumed to have a weak negotiating position with member states due to their desire to join the EU. Consequently, Moravcsik's rationalist framework, and its application to enlargement studies by Schimmelfennig is used in this dissertation to determine whether or not rationalist institutionalism can explain the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states.

In contrast, European enlargement studies assume that decisions on enlargement policy are taken collectively by EU member states with the help of European Commission. Thus, the latter has a special role in enlargement. Member states justify enlargement on the basis of the responsibilities and duties resulting from various factors: their shared (European) identity, culture and history; being a part of the same family (sense of kinship); and belonging to the EU. Constructivist/sociological institutionalists mainly use constructivist tools, such as discourse and content analysis, in their evaluation of such social identities, values

and norms (Sjursen and Romsle, 2006). The constructivist/sociological institutionalism and its application to enlargement studies by Fierke and Wiener, Schimmelfennig, Sjursen and Sedelmeier is used in this dissertation to find out whether or not constructivist/sociological institutionalism can clarify the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states.

1.1.2 Content Analysis

Content analysis is a research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text (Weber, quoted in Neuendorf, 2002:10) or for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context (Krippendorff, 1980:21). Content analysis is widely used in different academic fields, such as political science, sociology, cultural studies, marketing and media studies, literature and rhetoric. Content analysis includes analysis of the manifest and/or latent content of a text. Manifest content can be described as what is common to all, or what everyone can agree to (Krippendorff, 2004: 20), while latent content can be termed reading between the lines, or discovering hidden motivations (Krippendorff, 2004: 141).

According to Krippendorff, one of the tasks³ that content analysis is used for by researchers is problem-driven content analysis. Krippendorff (2004:340) describes this as “motivated by epistemic questions about currently inaccessible phenomena, events or processes that the analysts believe texts are able to answer.” In such content analyses, as Krippendorff explains, analysts begin with research questions and proceed to find analytical paths to their answers through the choice of suitable texts.

³ According to Krippendorff, the other two areas are text-driven content analyses and method-driven content analyses.

This dissertation uses problem-driven content analysis to answer the research question described earlier. That is, this study employs the content analysis of key documents to understand whether or not material factors, such as political, security or economic interests, or ideational factors, such as collective identity and moral duty, led the European Commissioners and member states to support Poland's membership and the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. These documents were selected from the FACTIVA database and the European Commissioners' speeches that were obtained from the RAPID database. RAPID⁴ is the official data base of the European Union. It includes EU press releases, memos, speeches, agendas, etc. released by the EU. The analysis aimed to reveal the documents' manifest content rather than latent content.

The attitude of a member state towards an applicant state is revealed both in the speeches of the political and bureaucratic officials of member states and through media analyses. The speeches made by politicians can be obtained through press releases. In the content analyses literature, Lexis-Nexis and FACTIVA are the two research databases usually used for such systematic media analyses. Regarding the availability of these databases, the libraries of Bilkent University and Middle East Technical University were consulted. Since Bilkent University library has access to FACTIVA⁵, this database was selected for this dissertation.

Using RAPID, the relevant speeches of Commissioners were captured by applying date and text filters. The selected speeches were then analyzed to identify which kind of institutionalism, rationalist institutionalism based on economic, security and/or political interests, or constructivist/sociological institutionalism,

⁴ The analysis from RAPID database was conducted since December 2011 using the internet site <http://europa.eu/rapid/search.htm>

⁵ The analysis from FACTIVA database was conducted since September 2011.

based on European identity and/or moral duty, better explains the attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland and Turkey. Regarding the relations of member states with Poland and Turkey, FACTIVA was used to search through newspapers, such as the Financial Times and Times, and newswires like Reuters, Agency Europe and Dow Jones. The relevant press releases found using date and text filters were then analyzed to identify whether or not EU member states backed Poland and/or Turkey in their EU membership bids. In other words, the analysis aimed to identify the drivers and brakemen for Poland and Turkey. In addition, the analysis aimed to reveal whether material or ideational factors dominate relations between particular member states and Poland and Turkey. Tables and graphs were used to demonstrate the results. Because significant numbers of relevant primary press releases were captured from FACTIVA, specifically for 1996-2004 and 2004-2012 for Turkey, it was also possible to conduct statistical tests on the data to support the study's qualitative findings. Statistical tests were also conducted using statistical software in order to determine the significance of attitudinal differences between successive governments within an EU member state or attitudinal changes resulting from domestic developments within member states. Although there may be other plausible ways to account for the attitudes of the European Commissioners or member states' towards EU enlargement to include Poland and Turkey, this study aimed to determine the most convincing explanation, based on the available empirical evidence and in terms of the theoretical framework of the dissertation.

As outlined above, the primary sources in this dissertation are selected speeches of European Commissioners captured from RAPID, and selected speeches of politicians from selected member states obtained from FACTIVA. Additionally, secondary sources were also used, including newspaper or newswire releases

selected from FACTIVE and other books and articles about the EU's Eastern enlargement and the accession processes of both Poland and Turkey.

Database searching was achieved by using filters such as date, subject and region. For the RAPID database, in the 'Search Options' section, 'Turkey' or 'Poland' was typed. In the 'Types' section, 'SPEECH: EC Speech' was chosen. In the 'Date Range' section, relevant dates were entered into the 'Choose a date range'. Using this filtering produced a list of candidate source speeches. The relevant speeches for this study were selected by reading them all.

With respect to FACTIVE, in order to analyze, for example, Poland's relations with Germany in the period 1994-1998, 'Poland and Germany' was first typed into the search builder. This search was then narrowed using 'Poland' as the 'Region' filter. Next, 'European Union' was entered into the 'Subject' filter. Finally, date was also filtered to select particular time periods. This process produced a list of 677 press releases for the period 1994-1998. Using a similar process to analyze Germany's relations with Turkey, FACTIVE listed 312 press releases for the period of 1990-1995.

Krippendorff (2004:113) suggests that when researchers analyze a sample of texts in place of a larger population of texts, they need a sampling plan to ensure that the textual units sampled do not bias answers to the research question. It is suggested (Frerichs, 2008: 3) that random sampling is a statistical sampling method where each unit remaining in the population has the same probability of being selected for the sample. In this study, the population was all the press releases available from FACTIVE for a single country, while the sample was the press releases chosen for analysis. In some periods, after using region and subject filters, enormous number of press releases appeared which were almost impossible to analyze without computer

software. In these cases, random sampling was used. Two main criteria were used for this sampling process. First, if the number of press releases produced from FACTIVA concerning a particular relationship was above 2,000, 50 percent were chosen for further analysis. Second, if the number of press releases was above 4,000, 20 percent were chosen. For instance, having applied the filters described above, FACTIVA listed 3,683 press releases regarding German-Turkish relations for the period 1996-2004, so according to the sampling criteria 1,841 were chosen for further analysis (i.e. Articles with even line numbers are chosen -press releases corresponds to the line 2, 4, 6, 8...-). For Turkish-Greek relations, for the period 1996-2004, 7,031 press releases appeared so 1,406 of them were randomly chosen for analysis (i.e. Every fifth article is chosen -press releases corresponds to the line 5,10,15,20...-) For German-Polish relations for 1998-2004, FACTIVA listed 4,419 press releases so 883 of them were randomly selected for the analysis by applying the above mentioned selection algorithm.

The selected press releases were each read, using the highlight function of the Word 2003 program to identify whether they were relevant to a specific relationship within the context of EU enlargement. This was necessary to exclude irrelevant press releases for tenders, OECD data, economic data or same press releases. For example, this process left 147 out of 677 press releases relevant press releases for German-Polish relations and 117 out of 312 press releases for German-Turkish relations.

In the content analysis literature, computer software programs such as NVivo, ATLAS.ti or MAXQDA are used for the systematic analysis of large numbers of texts. However, for this dissertation, the content of press releases and speeches needed to be analyzed individually by hand in order to reveal whether or not the member states or Commissioners supported the aspirations of Poland and Turkey,

and the reasons behind their support or reservation. The available computer software did not meet the needs of this study since it had to identify the specific tone of each document in order to avoid drawing false conclusions on the basis of a computerized analysis. However, when the number of press releases obtained from FACTIVA for a specific relationship exceeded 2,000, statistical random sampling methods are employed.

1.1.3 Codes

Krippendorff (2004:97) describes units as “wholes that analysts distinguish and treat as independent elements”. The units of analyses in this dissertation are individual press releases or ‘EC Speeches’. All the categories, themes and codes used in the analysis were derived from the rationalist institutionalist and sociological/constructivist institutionalist literature. Specific issues within the codes were derived from the analysis of the two kinds of units, namely ‘EC Speeches’ and press releases. The main categories identified were material factors and ideational factors. The themes falling under the category of material factors were political interest, security interest and economic interest, while the themes under the category of ideational factors were the EU’s collective identity and moral duties. The Codes are as follows

I-Material Factors:

1) Political Interest:

- **Political Reasons:** Whether or not political support or reservation is mentioned within the relevant text is searched. Political issues include, for Poland, the role of the EU in its transition to democracy and a

market economy, German unification, border claims, for Turkey, human rights, political reforms, Copenhagen Criteria, minority problems, the Cyprus problem, disputes in Aegean, ban of political parties, death penalty or for both Poland and Turkey, the own interests of the member state.

- **Geopolitical Reasons:** For Poland, a fear of German dominance in the EU, shift of EU's center of gravity, fear of a shift of the EU's interest from Mediterranean states, Poland's strategic importance; for Turkey, its strategic importance, role as a 'bridge' to the Muslim World, and a benchmark for democracy in the Muslim World, preventing Turkey from drifting towards Islamic fundamentalism.
- **Europhobia:** For texts involving Great Britain, the desire for a looser federation of states, a fear of further deepening of the EU.
- **Inefficiency of the EU's institutional system:** Reservations about enlargement, particularly regarding voting procedures, fears about the EU's absorption capacity and ability to assimilate and integrate new member states.
- **Deepening versus Widening:** the priority member states or the EU give to widening or deepening.

2) Security Interest:

- **European Security:** How much improved relations of Poland or Turkey with the EU contribute to European security, implications for EU energy security.
- **European Stability and Peace:** Contribution of improved relations to European stability and peace.

- **Immigration, Refugees, Illegal Drug trafficking:** Fear of illegal immigration, refugee flows, border control issues and illegal drug trafficking.

3) Economic Interest:

- **Expansion of Markets:** Support for the improved relations in order to expand markets.
- **Competition in the EU market:** Concern over sensitive sectors for member states, such as agriculture, coal, steel, etc.
- **Competition for EU funds:** Member states' fears of reduced shares of EU funds, or diversion of EU funds towards Turkey or Poland.
- **Unemployment:** Fear of rising of unemployment due to enlargement, specifically the free movement of Polish and Turkish workers into the EU.
- **Contribution to the EU budget:** Member states' fears of increased contributions to the EU budget to fund enlargement.

II-Ideational Factors

1) EU's Collective Identity

- **Common History:** The emphasis of common history is analyzed.
- **Sense of Kinship:** Kinship based analogies, such as being part of a family, cousin, sister, etc.
- **Common Values:** Common values, common culture, EU values, common norms.
- **Common Religion:** Phrases such as 'Christian Club', 'religious Berlin Wall', not sharing a common religion with Turkey.
- **Europeanness:** The 'Europeanness', or not, of Turkey or Poland.

2) Moral Duty

- **Special Responsibility:** Sense of responsibility towards Poland and Turkey, for Turkey, the phrase *Pacta Sunt Servanda* (agreements should be respected).
- **Overcoming the Division of Europe:** Phrases such as ‘overcoming the division of Europe’, ‘unification of the continent’.

Within the selected texts, the support or reservation of European Commissioners and member states for Poland’s or Turkey’s European aspirations, and the factors, material or ideational, behind this support or reservation were analyzed using these coding criteria. If both support and reservation were observed within the same text, it was considered as expressing ‘reservation’. To illustrate, a phrase like “Greece will support Turkey’s application for membership of the European Community if there is a satisfactory settlement of the Cyprus problem” was counted as expressing political reservation. Although non-compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria was coded as political reservation, a sentence like “We want to help Turkey along the road towards full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria” was not coded as political reservation.

As well as the specific codings described above, a general assessment section was also included in the content analysis of the documents. This allowed comparison of the relationship between each member state or European Commissioner and Poland or Turkey across different time periods. An EU member state was defined as a driver of enlargement if the content analysis revealed over 65 percent support for Poland or Turkey in primary documents and over 50 percent support in secondary documents. EU Commissioners were defined as drivers if the analysis revealed over 65 percent support in their speeches for Turkey’s or Poland’s candidacy. On the

other hand, an EU member state or EU Commissioner was defined as a brakeman if analysis of the primary and secondary press releases or speeches respectively showed less than 35 percent support for the candidates. EU member states or Commissioners whose statements were analyzed as falling between 35 and 65 percent support were called ‘no label’ as being neither a driver nor a brakeman.

1.1.4 Limitations of the Method

There are various limitations to the results that can be obtained by employing the methodology described above. The first one is language. The searches were done in English in both RAPID and FACTIVA. Therefore, speeches or press releases in other languages, such as French Spanish, Polish, German, Turkish, etc., could not be included in the study.

Secondly, it is not clear whether the speeches included in the RAPID database reflect the EU’s official public opinion or reflect the personal views of the speakers. However, this difference is not taken into account in this study, with all speeches being accepted as the official diplomatic opinion of the EU.

Thirdly, the research is limited to those press releases and speeches obtainable via FACTIVA and RAPID. Press releases that are accessible through other databases, or speeches that are not included in RAPID, were not analyzed.

1.1.5 Member State Selection

Although there were 12 members of the EU in the 1990s, following Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, only Germany, France, Great Britain and Spain were chosen for the analysis regarding Poland, and only Germany, France, Great Britain and Greece were chosen for the analysis regarding Turkey. Of these

countries, Germany and Great Britain are considered to be drivers of Eastern enlargement. Great Britain favors widening over deepening whereas Germany favors widening and deepening at the same time. France and Spain are the brakemen and favor deepening over widening. Regarding Turkey's candidacy, Great Britain has been a driver whereas Greece can be considered a brakeman, although its attitude has varied. Similarly, the attitudes of Germany and France have varied during Turkey's accession process.

According to the liberal intergovernmentalist literature, Germany is the main supporter of Poland's accession process because the Second World War left Poland and Germany with a legacy of common problems of minorities and boundaries. After the end of the Cold War, there was reconciliation in their relations and the problems of minorities and boundaries were solved peacefully. For instance, German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, as early as 1991, arranged the Weimar Triangle meetings between the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland in order to rebuild confidence between them following the end of the Cold War and German unification. These meetings allowed Poland have to gain privileged access to Germany and France, and to campaign for improvement of her European aspirations. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, as early as November 1988, visited Poland to show her support for Solidarity and Poland's transition to democracy, and Great Britain went on to become one of the main proponents of Poland's accession to the EU. Regarding the brakemen, France and Spain were specifically chosen because of their resistance to the Association Agreement with Poland. Although France, especially President Mitterrand, supported Poland's transition to democracy by encouraging Solidarity and offering economic help, France also emphasized that deepening should happen before widening, warning that "enlargement would take

tens and tens of years” (Mitterrand, quoted in Sjursen and Romsloe, 2006: 142). Economic interests also made it hard for France and Spain to reach generous trade and association agreements with Poland. Due to specific sectors in their countries, namely agriculture for France and steel for Spain, they engaged in hard bargaining over Poland’s association negotiations. However, having opposed enlargement to begin with, France and Spain later altered their opinions and accepted Poland and the other CEECs as EU members.

With respect to Turkey, Greece is known to be the main brakeman due to the Cyprus issue and other disputes in the Aegean. However, the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in 1999 were a positive turning point for Greek-Turkish relations, and this reconciliation led Greece not to veto Turkey’s candidacy at the Helsinki European Summit. Germany, especially Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl, who was in office between October 1982 and October 1998, on the other hand, had economic reservations over its fear of mass migration of Turkish workers into Germany. With the inauguration of Social Democrat Gerard Schroeder to the Chancellorship in October 1998, the attitude of Germany towards Turkey changed positively, before becoming more negative again since Christian Democrat Angela Merkel’s came to power in November 2005. This same partisan effect also applies to France. President Chirac who came to office in May 1995, for most of his presidency, supported Turkish accession, whereas President Sarkozy, who was in office between May 2007 and May 2012, strongly opposed full membership for Turkey. Thus, it can be seen that there are more drivers and brakemen in Polish and Turkish accession than expected, and that the attitudes of some member states towards Turkey in particular have varied with the changes of government or domestic developments.

1.1.6 Case Selection

With respect to case selection, a number of striking similarities between the Polish and Turkish cases make them valuable for comparative analysis. Both countries have strategic importance, large populations and large agricultural sectors, which are the main similarities that make Poland and Turkey important cases for comparison together with other similarities, such as their western orientation and the unconsolidated character of their democracies at the time of their membership applications. To start with the first similarity of strategic importance, Poland shares frontiers with Slovakia, Russia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Germany, and this central European location increases Poland's strategic significance. In particular, sharing a border with Germany contributed to Poland's EU membership bid in two ways. First, as Schimmelfennig (Schimmelfennig, 2004: 87) suggests, geographical proximity increases the chances of cross-border trade and capital movements. Secondly, in order to maximize her security interest, Germany made a readmission agreement with Poland to accept back immigrants mainly coming from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine that Germany expelled. That is, Poland's accession to the EU was in Germany's economic and security interest so this is one of the reasons why Germany became a driver of Poland's candidacy at the beginning of the 1990s. Turkey, meanwhile, is not only a bridge between Europe and Asia geographically but also a bridge between Europe and the Muslim world. As the only secular, western-oriented Islamic state, Turkey is acknowledged as being a pole of stability in its region. In the supportive releases and support speeches, this geostrategic importance is underlined.

The second similarity is having large populations. Poland is the largest CEEC with a population of 38.6 million (European Commission, 1997: 7), while Turkey's population was already 53 million in 1988, so that Turkey was expected to have a bigger population than any EU member state (European Commission, 1989:5). This is a constraint for both countries as large populations create a right to a larger number of seats in the EU parliament and greater voting weight in the European Council's decision mechanism. This created tensions during accession negotiations. For instance, although Spain and Poland have similar populations, in the negotiations for the Treaty of Nice, the French presidency tabled a proposal giving Poland 26 votes and Spain 28 votes on the European Council. Poland rejected this and in the end 27 votes were allocated to both countries, with 29 votes going to the more populous Germany and France. In the negotiations for the European Constitution, voting rights were also a problem. A more egalitarian approach in terms of population was proposed, but Spain and Poland did not want to lose their voting rights and blocked the European Constitution in the European Council of December 2003. For Turkey, Schimmelfennig (2008:1) suggests that "Although the EU's institutional rules reduce the effect of population size on political power, Turkey would rank among the big member states with regard to seats in the European Parliament and votes in the Council and could gain at least considerable blocking power." As well as voting implications, population size also affects the distribution of EU funds.

The existence of a large agricultural sector is a third similarity of Poland and Turkey which generates a problem for the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and creates a demand for high net payments from the structural funds. At the time of Turkish application, more than 50 percent of its labor force (European Commission, 1989: 6) was employed in agriculture, while in 1995, 26.9 percent of Poland's labor

force (European Commission, 1997: 22) was employed in agriculture. In the accession negotiations with Poland, due to economic reservations, France and Spain asked for a transition period for Poland before receiving the full benefits from the CAP. At the same time, Germany and Great Britain demanded changes in the CAP to decrease the size of their contributions to the EU budget. In addition, Poland's and Turkey's EU membership had the significant implications for labor migration towards the EU market. There were fears in EU public opinion about both Turkish and Polish workers⁶ migrating into the EU labor market and causing high unemployment in member states. Consequently, under Social Democrat Gerard Schroeder, Germany, together with Austria, asked for a seven-year transition period before allowing free movement of Polish workers after enlargement. Germany also raised similar concerns over possible mass immigration of Turkish workers following Turkey's EU membership application.

The fourth similarity is Poland's and Turkey's European orientation. Integration into Western political and security structures, namely Europeanization and westernization, have been the main foreign policy aims of successive Turkish and Polish governments since 1944 and 1989 respectively. In order to realize this aim, Turkey applied to the European Economic Community on 31 July 1959 in order to sign an association agreement. In 12 September 1963, Turkey became an associate member of the EU by signing an Association Agreement, the Ankara Agreement, which created the Association Council. In 14 April 1987, Turkey officially applied for full membership of the EU. Two years later, on 18 December 1989, the European Commission presented its opinion on Turkey's application, advising against starting accession negotiations due to various obstacles, size, population, economic

⁶ For Turkish workers, the name 'gastarbeiter' is used, for the Polish workers, the name 'Polish Plumbers' is used.

backwardness and democratic deficits, to Turkish accession. In contrast, diplomatic relations between the EU and Poland were established in 1988 and the association agreement, the Europe Agreement, was signed on 16 December 1991 and entered into force on 1 February 1994. This became the legal basis of Poland's relations with the EU in the early 1990s. On 5 April 1994, Poland presented its application for membership of the EU. In the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997, the EU decided the list of the candidate countries for membership according to the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 and Agenda 2000 proposals of the Commission. Poland, together with Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus, was declared to start accession negotiations in 1998. In that summit, Turkey was not accepted as a candidate country but Turkey's eligibility was again confirmed. Helsinki European Council was an important cornerstone of the EU-Turkey relations. At the Helsinki European Council of 1999, the European Council declared Turkey as a candidate state but the accession talks were not started. The change of government in Germany and change of attitude of Greece towards Turkey were the main developments that led to the positive Helsinki decision. In the European Council Summit on December 17, 2004, the European Council accepted that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen Political Criteria and decided to open accession talks on October 3, 2005. Turkey's accession process is still continuing since October 3, 2005.

The last similarity is the unconsolidated character of both Polish and Turkish democracy, which is important in terms of compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria. Although both countries had completed their transition to democracy by the time of application, neither of them could be labeled as consolidated democracies. In the democratization literature, it is widely acknowledged (Whitehead,2002; Schmitter, 1996; Pridham, 1991, 1994) that the prospect of EU membership has a

positive effect on the consolidation of democracy in an applicant state. In order to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria, especially democratic conditionality, both countries have made extensive reforms in their political structures. In addition to domestic reform processes, the EU also has given financial aid for democratic reforms.

In short, due to their similarities in terms of strategic importance, large population, large agricultural sector, western orientation and unconsolidated democracy at the time of their membership applications, Poland and Turkey were chosen as the two cases for this dissertation's analysis of EU enlargement decisions. More specifically, this study compares the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states towards Poland and Turkey through content analysis of key documents in order to see which factors, material or ideational, lie behind their support or reservation for each country's membership application.

1.2 Chapters

This dissertation is composed of five chapters. After introduction, the second chapter starts by analyzing the historical development of new institutionalism and its relationship with rationalist and constructivist/sociological institutionalism. After examining the basic premises of new institutionalism, rationalist institutionalism and constructivist/sociological institutionalism, the debate between rationalist institutionalism and constructivist/sociological institutionalism is analyzed in order to understand their approaches towards enlargement of the international institutions. Afterwards, the main hypothesis of liberal intergovernmentalism, which is an application of rationalist institutionalism to enlargement studies, is investigated, followed by the application of constructivist/sociological institutionalism. Finally,

the logics behind the two branches of institutionalism, consequentiality and appropriateness, are operationalized in order to shed light on the possible relevance of these theoretical approaches to explaining the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states towards Poland and Turkey's European aspirations.

The third chapter focuses on Polish accession to the EU. In this chapter, there are five sections. The first section, 'Road to PHARE', analyzes the EU's initial responses to the CEEC and, as a part of it, Poland's transition to democracy and market economy. This section shows how bilateral trade agreements and the assistance program, 'PHARE', were the EU's first tools for dealing with Poland, and that both the European Commissioners and member states supported Poland's transition to democracy and a market economy, although there was some hesitation about deepening Poland's relationship with the EU. The second section, 'Europe Agreements' explains how both the European Commissioners and member states decided to formulate Europe Agreements in order to further link Poland to the EU. The negotiations involved some hard bargaining as the economic interests of France and Spain were challenged by the Europe Agreements. The third section, 'Membership Application', reveals that the European Commissioners supported Poland's membership application in their public pronouncements, which highlighted the EU's political and security interests, together with the EU's responsibility towards unification of the continent. This section also shows that, among EU states, Poland's European aspirations were supported by Germany, Great Britain and France, under the Presidency of Chirac, while Spain had some economic reservations. However, under the Presidency of Mitterrand, France developed some political reservations. The fourth section, 'Accession Negotiations', reports on the

level of support suggested by the public pronouncements of European Commissioners for Poland's accession process, along with various political reservations, particularly the EU's increasing prioritization of institutional reform during this period. With respect to member states, the section shows that Germany, France and Spain had some economic and political reservations. The final section, 'General Assessment', makes a three-way quantitative content analysis of EU speeches selected from the RAPID database and press releases from FACTIVA regarding Poland's EU accession process: first, between each member state's attitudes as revealed in press releases at different periods; second, between the attitudes of European commissioners as revealed in their speeches at different periods; third, between the attitudes of different member states towards Poland.

The fourth chapter deals with Turkish accession process to the EU, using a similar structure to chapter two of five sections. The first section, 'Membership Application', shows that neither the European Commissioners nor member states were ready for Turkey's initial membership application. The second section, 'Customs Union', demonstrates that, although the European Commissioners supported Customs Union with Turkey, there were significant political reservations over the Cyprus issue, Turkey's human rights problems and the EU's priority of deepening internal relations. With respect to member states, Great Britain and France supported Customs Union whereas Germany and Greece had political reservations. The third section, 'From Helsinki Decision to Accession Negotiations', explains how the European Commissioners continued to voice their political reservations over the Cyprus issue, Turkey's human rights problems and its non-compliance with the EU's political criteria. Nevertheless, ideational arguments relating to the Europeanness of Turkey were also deployed in a number of supportive speeches. This section also

reports how, during this period, the attitudes of member states changed somewhat. For instance, while Germany's Christian Democrat Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, had some political reservations about Turkey's European bid, his successor, Social Democrat Gerhard Schroeder supported Turkey. Similarly, in contrast to Greece's previous political reservations, the *detente* that developed in 1999 meant that Greece did not veto Turkey's candidacy at the Helsinki European Summit. On the other hand, whereas President Chirac had supported Turkey's European bid, after the Justice and Development Party took power in Turkey, French politicians developed some doubts about Turkey's European orientation and secularism. The fourth section, 'Accession Negotiations', shows how European Commissioners not only reiterated their political reservations over the Cyprus issue and Turkey's human rights problems, but also start to emphasize the EU's 'absorption capacity.' On the other hand, for the first time, ideational arguments concerning the EU's moral duty of keeping promises previously given to Turkey became prominent. With respect to member states, that the section shows that Germany, France and Greece expressed political reservations, such as the Cyprus issue and Turkey's non-compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria, with only Great Britain clearly supporting Turkey's accession bid. The final section, 'General Assessment', reports the findings of a similar quantitative content analysis to that in the previous chapter on Poland, using the same three-way comparison of selected European Commissioners' speeches and member state press releases.

The final chapter contains two sections. The first section, 'Comparison of Polish and Turkish Accession Periods', provides a dual qualitative and quantitative comparative analysis of the attitudes of European commissioners and member states towards Poland and Turkey. The second subsection, 'Concluding Remarks', sets out

this study's responses to the hypotheses listed at the start of this dissertation, some comments on limitations and suggestions for further research.

1.3 Expected Contribution

EU enlargement has suffered from theoretical neglect in studies of European integration. This dissertation analyzes the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states within the framework of the debate between rationalist and constructivist/sociological institutionalists. By applying this debate to examining the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states, this study aims to make a novel theoretical contribution to the enlargement literature.

The literature on EU enlargement has generally been based on qualitative analysis. This study is a rare example of using both qualitative and quantitative content analysis of the most important relevant primary sources, namely the speeches of European Commissioners and presidents, prime ministers and other ministers of EU member states. The findings of this dissertation also open the way to conducting further research on the attitudes of the European Parliament and European Council.

Although there is already a large literature addressing Turkey's and Poland's accession process to the EU, there is a gap in the institutionalist literature on evaluating the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states towards Poland and Turkey. This study aims to make a significant contribution to filling this gap in the literature by demonstrating the value of applying the debate between rationalist and constructivist/sociological institutionalists to content analysis of

documents relating to the different phases of these two countries' accession processes.

As already outlined, Poland and Turkey have similarities in terms of population, unconsolidated democracy and large agricultural sectors requiring EU structural funds. By analyzing how Poland previously overcame these disadvantages during its accession process, this study shed light on Turkey's EU membership prospects and offer policy recommendations to Turkish decision makers on the basis of the study's findings.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON RATIONALIST INSTITUTIONALISM CONSTRUCTIVIST/ SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU

The conceptual framework of this dissertation is situated in the debate between rationalist and sociological/constructivist institutionalism. This debate not only provides the main central point of theorizing in international relations (Katzenstein et al 1999; Christiansen et al, 1999) and European Union Studies (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000; Checkel and Moravcsik, 2000) but also has repercussions for enlargement studies. Hypotheses of both approaches have been tested against each other, especially concerning explanations of the EU's eastern enlargement, considered to have been the most challenging and complicated round due to the number of candidates and the long duration of the enlargement process.

This round ended in May 1, 2004, when Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Malta, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Cyprus became EU members. Before moving to discuss Eastern enlargement, a brief analysis of the basic premises of new institutionalism and rationalist and constructivist/sociological institutionalism is needed.

2.1 The New Institutionalisms

The 1980s witnessed the emergence of a new approach to institutional analysis, namely new institutionalism. With their article 'New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', March and Olsen (1984) played a pioneering role in its development. This new approach developed in response to the behavioral perspectives of the 1960s and 1970s, which had earlier emerged in reaction to the tradition in which politics was identified with formal and legal institutional terms, specifically old institutionalism. Thus, in order to understand new institutionalism, it is necessary first to analyze the main assumptions of both old institutionalism and behavioralism.

To start with old institutionalism (Peters, 2005: 1-25), its key defining element was legalism: the view that political institutions and government could only be examined through the formation and application of laws, which were assumed to constitute the basic structure for relations between governments and citizens. A second element of old institutionalism was structuralism, which suggested that structures matter in that they determine behavior and leave no room for individual action in influencing the government. A third defining characteristic of old institutionalism was holism, requiring the analysis of whole systems, such as

presidential or parliamentary, rather than individual institutions, such as the judiciary. However, this concentration on whole political systems also had its drawbacks. As Peters (2005:10) notes, “it tended to make generalization, therefore theory construction, more difficult.” Normative analysis was a fourth characteristic of old institutionalism, with its tendency to be concerned with good governance and improvement of institutions. Comparison of the institutions of different countries was widely used method in old-institutionalism in order to discover good external examples to implicate in institutions to make them better.

The behavioral revolution, which occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, developed as a response to old institutionalism. The fundamental criticism that the behavioral approach was built on was its view that old institutionalism paid insufficient attention to individuals due to its extensive concern with formal legal institutions. In contrast, the behavioral approach is suggested (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991:2) to “interpret collective political and economic behavior as the aggregate consequence of individual choice.” In other words, the primary actors in political settings were individuals, so in order to conduct political analyses, political scientists needed to examine mainly individuals and their behaviors, taking into account psychological, social and cultural factors.

Immergut (1998:6) underlines that the emphasis on observable behavior was central to the behavioral approach. That is, rather than looking at political institutions, such as presidential or parliamentary systems, the main focus of political analysis was on individuals, such as voters, members of parliaments and citizens, because it was accepted that decisions are made by individuals within institutions. Unlike old institutionalists, who had concentrated on formal institutions, behavioralism is suggested (Peters, 2005: 15) to mainly concentrated on the inputs

from society into the political system, and how these inputs (such as voting or interest group activity) then affected outputs. The behaviors of political actors, considered as societal inputs, also had an effect on the government, so that in order to be re-elected, politicians needed to take these inputs seriously. Old institutionalism was further criticized (Lecours, 2005:3) by behavioralists for being descriptive and a-theoretical. Old institutionalists mainly analyzed formal-legal institutions to explain how they worked, without being interested in elucidating political outcomes. Together with being descriptive, old institutionalism's holism led it to become a-theoretical. By focusing on and merely describing whole political systems old institutionalism could not offer a method for theory development. On the other hand, it is suggested (Wu, 2009:107) that behavioralism's starting point was to make political science a true science, and for this aim, behavioralists studied political behavior in terms of various theories and methods, such as case analysis, experimental analysis, statistical analysis and system analysis. The behavioral approach also criticized old institutionalism for its normative implications. That is, in order to identify forms of supposedly good government, old institutionalists presented the world's industrialized democracies as model governments, which in turn led them to discriminate against other parts of the world. So, it was advocated (Wu, 2009:107) that "in transition from old institutionalism to new institutionalism, behaviorism acts as the important theoretical source."

New institutionalism has been identified (March and Olsen, 1984: 738) as bringing together elements of old institutionalism and behavioralism. Like behavioralists, new institutionalists also criticize old-institutionalism for being normative, descriptive, a-theoretical and holistic. Unlike old-institutionalists, however, who described institutions and analyzed how they work, new

institutionalists' main objective has been suggested (Lecours, 2005:14) to explain political outcomes and make attempts towards generalizations and building theory in order to study politics scientifically. Behavioralism's emphasis on observable behavior was the point of departure for new institutionalism. As Immergut (2008:6) points out, "The new institutionalists vehemently reject observed behavior as the basic datum of political analysis: they do not believe that behavior is a sufficient basis for explaining all of the phenomena of government." That is, behavioralism was mainly criticized for allowing no role for institutions in their analysis of social and political processes. They were also criticized (Dimaggio and Powel, 1991:2) for "their neglect of social context and the durability of institutions." New institutionalism therefore reversed this lack of institutions in social and political analysis. Accordingly, the crucial difference of new institutionalism from both behavioralism and old-institutionalism is suggested (March and Olsen, 1989: 17) to be not only its recognition of the importance of both the social context of politics and the motives of individual actors, but also its positing a more independent role for political institutions. For new institutionalists, as March and Olsen (1984: 738) indicates, institutions represent an autonomous force in politics that should be treated as political actors so a political scientist should mainly scrutinize the independent role of political institutions by taking into account the motives of actors. Thus, new institutionalism's main theoretical argument is that 'institutions affect action' and its central question is: 'How do institutions affect the behavior of individuals and corporate actors?'

New institutionalism has not, however, been a unified body of thought. Rather, there have been many new institutionalisms in economics, organization theory (Powell and Dimaggio, 1991), political science (Peters, 2005; Lecours, 2005),

history (Steinmo et al, 1992; Thelen, 1999; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002) and sociology (Finnemore, 1996), all of which agree that institutional arrangements and social processes matter. Some theorists (Bulmer, 1994) have divided these new institutionalisms into two major variants, namely rationalist and historical. However, it has been generally acknowledged (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001) that historical institutionalism, rationalist institutionalism and constructivist/sociological institutionalism are the main approaches within new institutionalism. Although all three share the basic assumption that institutions affect behavior and should be analyzed, they differ in their methodology for scrutinizing the role of institutions. This chapter compares rationalist institutionalism and constructivist/sociological institutionalism in terms of the origins and fundamental assumptions of the two approaches.

2 Rationalist Institutionalism

Rationalist institutionalism (rational choice institutionalism) emerged from the study of American congressional behavior (Pollack, 2004: 138; Hall and Taylor, 1996: 10-11; Powell and Dimaggio, 1991:5).⁷ For political scientists, the fact that there are stable legislative majorities in the US congress despite the multiple preference-orderings of legislators and the multidimensional character of issues seemed paradoxical. In order to understand this issue, institutional analysis came to the fore. Legislators need to reach a consensus and pass legislation in order to serve the electorate that they represent. However, clashes of interests and subsequent collective action problems have been frequently seen in congress. Thus, the

⁷ Powell and Dimaggio label rationalist institutionalism as positive theory of institutions.

institutions that structure US politics are suggested (Powell and Dimaggio, 1991:5) to be viewed “as responses to collective action problems, which arise precisely because the transaction costs of political exchange are high.” With their help, legislators not only have a chance to gain through cooperation but also to pass required legislation.

Rationalist institutionalists usually define institutions in a narrow manner, in terms of the formal rules, procedures or norms which shape and constrain individual behavior. For instance, according North (quoted in Shepsle, 2005:3), institutions are “rules of the game in a society or more formally ... the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” Shepsle (quoted in Dimaggio and Powell, 1991: 5) similarly describes political institutions comprehensively as “ex ante agreements about a structure of cooperation” that “economize on transaction costs, reduce opportunism and other forms of agency ‘slippage’ and thereby enhance the prospects of gains through cooperation.” For rationalists, institutions are the rules of the game which permit or prohibit actions of individuals or states in order to achieve collective action without free-rider problems among utility maximizing actors.

In order to find an answer to the problem of explaining how institutions affect individual action, rationalist institutionalists emphasize that institutions, by providing information and enforcement mechanisms, create stability and certainty, both in political life and human relations. Hall and Taylor (1996: 7) notify that institutions also influence the behaviors of other actors “by altering the expectations an actor has about the actions that others are likely to take in response to or simultaneously with his own action.” For instance, in consolidated democracies, political parties are aware that if they do not serve the interests of their electorate, they will not be

elected again, while other groups, such as the military and judiciary, know that there is no other way to change the government except through elections.

There is a variety of significantly differing rational choice perspectives on institutions. However, they also share some fundamental assumptions. To start with, the social ontology of rationalist institutionalism is methodological individualism and materialism, which are borrowed from neo-classical economics. According to methodological individualism, relations involve “strategic exchange among actors with pre-social givens” (Kratocwill and Ruggie quoted in Moravcsik and Checkel, 2000; 220). It assumes that humans are utility maximizers who behave strategically in order to attain a particular set of goals. Human action is thereby regarded as the cornerstone of any social scientific explanation. Thus, rationalist institutionalists posit a world of individuals or organizations seeking to maximize their material well-being. In this approach, it is pointed out (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 8) that “institutions are the products of human design, the outcomes of purposive actions by instrumentally oriented individuals.” In order to maximize their material well-being, rational actors consciously establish institutions and accept the constraints imposed by these institutions since they also constrain other actors and make their behavior more predictable.

Rationalist institutionalists believe that actors have a fixed set of preferences, or given interests, which are uninfluenced by institutions. An institution may offer the chance to its members to behave strategically; it may supply new information about strategies or it may change the advantages or disadvantages of various strategies. However, it does not modify the actors’ underlying motivations. Unlike sociological institutionalists, who assume that institutions shape the preferences of actors through a social learning process, in rationalist institutionalism, rational actors,

aware of their given interests, try to reach their goals with the help of institutions, while not allowing them to alter their preferences. In other words, institutions are assumed to be an intervening mechanism.

For rationalist institutionalists, the fundamental sources of human behavior are thought to come from outside the agent and her context. In other words, it is suggested (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000: 6) that institutions are often external-exogenous to the agent unless actors are engaged in the conscious creation of rules. Thus, due to the exogenous character of institutions, rationalist institutionalists (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999: 432) scrutinize how “institutions structure incentives, instantiate norms, define roles, prescribe or proscribe behavior, or procedurally channel politics so as to alter political outcomes relative to what would have occurred in the absence of (or under alternative) institutions.”

Rationalist institutionalism is strongly influenced by game theory, which analyses how individuals make decisions if they know that the ultimate outcome is also influenced by other actors. Thus, rationalist institutionalists (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 12) tend to see politics as a series of collective action dilemmas in which the action of one rational actor may produce an outcome that makes another actor worse off. In order to analyze the tension this creates between individual and social interests, metaphors such as ‘the Prisoners’ Dilemma’ or ‘the Centipede or the Chicken’ are used (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001). Rationalist institutionalists are interested in such games and their design: institutions are suggested (Steinmo, 2001:3) to be simply the rules of the games.

To explain the persistence of institutions, rationalist institutionalists point out that, as long as institutions make the behaviors of others more predictable and are efficient at solving collective action problems, actors realize that compliance with the

rules of such institutions is better than disobedience, which in turn increases the resilience of the institution. For rationalists, efficiency is a key term for explaining institutional persistence. As Williamson (quoted in DiMaggio and Powell, 1991:4) nicely put it, “competition eliminates institutions that have become inefficient.” In other words, the more efficient an institution is in performing the tasks at hand, especially in constraining actors by creating stability, the greater the likelihood is that it will endure for a long time.

Rationalist institutionalism embodies the ‘logic of consequentialism’ (logic of expected consequences). According to this logic (March and Olsen, 1989: 23; March and Olsen, 1998: 950), political order is achieved by negotiation among rational actors pursuing personal preferences or interests. While making a decision, a rational actor first takes into account the alternatives and his/her values, then considers the consequences of each alternative for his/her values before finally choosing the alternative that has the best consequences. In order to simplify problems of preference complexity, this logic understands politics by decomposing complex systems into relatively autonomous subsystems, most commonly by linking them hierarchically. For instance, in the nation state, the interests of political actors are more significant because the interests of nation states are derived from them. In international organizations, the interests of member states are essential for the interest of international organization itself. Therefore, in this perspective, politics is seen as aggregating individual preferences, be they those of a rational actor or rational state, into collective actions through certain procedures of bargaining, negotiation, coalition formation and exchange. The international system, according to this logic, is thus understood as consisting of autonomous, egoistic self-interested maximizers.

With respect to international organizations, according to the rationalist account, they are instrumental and regulatory associations established to facilitate rational states to pursue their interests with the help of intergovernmental negotiations. It is suggested (Abbott and Snidal, 1998: 9) that states prefer international organizations to alternative forms of institutionalization due to two functional characteristics: centralization and independence. Through their concrete and stable organizational structures and supportive administrative apparatus, international organizations centralize collective activities. Moreover, in certain spheres, such international organizations are independent, having the authority to act with a degree of autonomy and often with neutrality. Thus, as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002:509) indicate, by pooling activities, elaborating norms, performing as a neutral information supplier and granting stable negotiation forums, international organizations make collective action less complicated and more efficient. According to Dimaggio and Powell (1991:7), in an effort to realize shared goals, nations therefore agree to bind themselves to international organizations that subsequently limit their freedom of action; that is, states accept to be constrained by international organizations on the expectation that other states are similarly constrained, which improves the chances of gains through cooperation.

2.2.1 Rationalist Institutionalism and EU Enlargement

With respect to the enlargement of international organizations, rationalists assume that decisions on membership may be made according to criteria of instrumental rationality. According to Schimmelfennig (1999:4), these decisions “are based on exogenously given and stable egoistic preferences of both members and candidates for membership, and they reflect the material conditions of the

international system.” Accordingly, a country would apply for membership of an international organization as long as the benefits of being a member exceed the cost of obeying the terms and conditions of that organization. Likewise, member states of an international organization would only accept a country if they all agree that the applicant country contributes to the international organization and its membership of would not challenge the interests of any other member states. Regarding relationship of Poland and Turkey with the EU, Poland’s association agreements challenged the interests of France and Spain, so they negotiated and won concessions from Poland in return for signing the Europe Agreements. Greece has political reservations about Turkey, such as the Cyprus issue, so Greece has suggested that without the solution of the Cyprus issue, she will continue to block Turkish accession.

3 Constructivist/ Sociological Institutionalism

The roots of sociological institutionalism lie in the subfield of organizational theory (Hall and Taylor, 1996:13; Immergut, 1998:28; Finemore, 1996: 325). At the end of 1970s, some sociologists challenged the view that a modern organization requires only efficient institutional forms and procedures. They suggest that these forms and procedures should instead be explained in cultural terms specific to certain societies.

These sociological institutionalists tend to define institutions much more broadly than rationalists institutionalists do. They not only include formal rules, procedures or norms, but also symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates and routines. For example, Scott (quoted in Peters, 2005: 117) defines institutions as “consisting of cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that

provide stability and meaning to social behavior.” This way of defining institutions helps political scientists integrate culture within their analysis of institutions.

In clarifying how institutions affect individual action, sociological institutionalists (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 8) suggest that they not only affect actors’ choices by offering moral or cognitive patterns for interpretation and action but also influence the identities, self-images and preferences of the actors. In an institutional environment, the policies that are implemented become a system of beliefs over time, so that eventually these policies affect the preferences of actors within that organization. This shaping of the preferences of actors usually takes the form of a process of social learning. Unlike rationalist institutionalists, who assume that instrumental calculation is the main motivation behind action, sociological institutionalists emphasize that actors determine their actions through interpretation of situations.

To start with the basic assumptions of sociological institutionalism, its social ontology is both social and ideational, (Risse, 2004: 160) acknowledging that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings, namely culture in a broad sense. Humans are satisfiers, whose behaviors are affected by their worldview. In order to attain their purposes, humans set up familiar patterns of behavior. Human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones. Sociological institutionalists (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 16) emphasize that what an individual sees as ‘rational action’ is itself socially constituted, so they imagine a world of individuals or organizations trying to find out and express their identity in socially appropriate ways. According to this approach (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 8), while institutions are certainly the result of human activity, they are not necessarily the products of conscious design. In

other words, institutions are not established by instrumentally oriented individuals in order to serve their interests, they evolve within a society in order to respond to its social needs.

Sociological institutionalists challenge the rationalist assumption of exogenously given interests or fixed preferences. They try to reveal the underlying mechanisms behind preferences and interests. For them, preferences and interests are not fixed or given as assumed by rationalists; on the contrary, they are accepted as emerging from the interaction between actors and institutions in historically specific circumstances. Accordingly, social and cultural norms are (Fierke and Wiener, 1999:723) believed to shape actors' identities, behaviors and preferences; interests are, in turn, assumed to be affected by these cultural and social norms.

Unlike rationalist institutionalists, sociological institutionalists argue that institutions are not external to the agent; rather, they are endogenous. Institutions are suggested (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999:432) to shape an actor's preferences "directly (e.g. by specifying the outcomes to be desired) or indirectly (e.g. through effects on actors' identities)." Given this perspective, sociological institutionalists (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 14) try to explain why organizations take on specific sets of institutional forms, procedures or symbols, emphasizing how such practices are diffused through organizational fields or across nations. Institutions are believed to be a part of an actor's behavior, and actors mostly take for granted the effects of these institutions on their actions. That is, they are not aware that they usually act according to what these institutions necessitate, although in interpreting the given situation, they actually act according to what is most appropriate in that institutional environment.

With respect to the resiliency of institutions, sociological institutionalists propose that they cannot be transformed by individual actions since they are collective constructions. Unlike rationalist institutionalists, who explain the resiliency of institutions through efficiency, for sociological institutionalists (Hall and Taylor, 1996:8), institutions are persistent because they structure the very choices about reform that the individual is likely to make. Thus, institutions can become resistant to change through their effect on the preferences and identities of actors.

March and Olsen (1989:23, 1998: 951) suggest that sociological institutionalism draws on the 'logic of appropriateness', which emphasizes the role of identities, rules and institutions in shaping human behavior. In a way, actions are understood as rule-based in this logic. Before acting, the actor determines what the situation is and what role is being fulfilled then thinks about the obligations of the role in that situation, before finally doing what is most appropriate. Thus, political actors are (March and Olsen, 1998: 952) seen as "acting in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted." Thus, when making a decision, actors behave according to what they are expected to do. According to this logic, international society is viewed as a community of rule followers with distinctive socio-cultural ties, cultural connections, intersubjective understandings and senses of belonging.

Regarding international organizations, sociological institutionalists suggest that they have autonomy from their member states while helping the members to build a community on the grounds of shared identity. International organizations are suggested (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999:707) to "become autonomous sites of authority independent from the state 'principals' who may have created them,

because of power owing from at least two sources: (1) the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody, and (2) control over technical expertise and information.” Because the imposition of rational-legal authority requires impersonal rules, laws and procedures, states attribute legitimacy to international organizations and are, in turn, willing to submit to this kind of authority. International organizations also have control over technical knowledge and expertise, which helps them to be recognized as impersonal and neutral. Thus, unlike rationalist institutionalists, who suggest that international organizations are established to help rational states pursue their interests, for sociological institutionalists, they are assumed to have both autonomy from their members and the power to shape the preferences of member states.

2.3.1 Constructivist/Sociological Institutionalism and EU Enlargement

Concerning the enlargement of international organizations, sociological institutionalists (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002:513) emphasize that “enlargement politics will generally be shaped by ideational, cultural factors and studying enlargement consists in the analysis of social identities, values and norms not the material, distributional consequences of enlargement for individual actors.” In other words, in applying for membership of an international organization or accepting an applicant state, applicants and member states respectively do not make cost-benefit calculations; rather social identities, values and norms are the defining factors in decision making. Thus, according to Schimmelfennig (1999:11), sociological institutionalists predict that international organizations are more likely to admit those states that share the fundamental values of the international community and adhere to its basic norms. For instance, as early as 1957, in Article 237 of the

Treaty of Rome, the EU declared that any European country may become member. Moreover, during the different phases of enlargement, in addition to being a European country, the EU referred to the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for, and protection of, minorities as fundamental values of the organization. Finally, the EU explicitly declares that those countries that share these fundamental values, and promise to abide by these norms, can apply for membership.

Table 1: Comparison of Rationalist Institutionalism and Constructivist/Sociological Institutionalism

	Rationalist Institutionalism	Sociological/Constructivist Institutionalism
Definition of Institutions	Narrow-formal rules, Procedures or norms	Broad-formal rules, Procedures, norms, symbol systems, cognitive scripts, moral templates, routines
Social ontology	Methodological individualism	Social and ideational
Actors	Utility maximizers	Satisfiers
Role of Institutions for human action	Exogenous	Endogenous
Actors' preferences	Given and fixed preferences	Not fixed preferences shaped by social and cultural norms
Effect on individual action	By creating stability and certainty	By offering moral or cognitive pattern for interpretation and action
Logic	Logic of consequentialism	Logic of appropriateness

Source: Based on concepts developed in March and Olsen 1989,1998; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002 Sjusen, 2002; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003; Piedrafita and Torreblanca 2005

4 Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998) is an application of rationalist institutionalism to the field of European integration. Unlike neo-functionalism, which emphasizes that the EU necessitates a *sui generis* explanation, the first assumption of liberal intergovernmentalism is that European integration is a case of general international politics with the EU being an international organization that can be explained through an international relations perspective in which states are the central actors operating in a context of anarchy. As Moravcsik (1993: 480) states, “The EC is best seen as an international regime for policy co-ordination.” Secondly, liberal intergovernmentalism tries to explain state preferences and collective outcomes as a result of aggregated individual actions based on these preferences. Thus, as Schimmelfennig (2004: 77) underlines, it “seeks to explain the establishment and design of international institutions as a collective outcome of interdependent (strategic) rational state choices and intergovernmental negotiations in an anarchical context.”

More generally, European integration, as Moravcsik (1998:18) points out, can best be understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders. These choices are affected by constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in the international system, and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments. Liberal Intergovernmentalism puts forward a liberal theory of national preference formation, a bargaining theory of international negotiations, and a functional theory of institutional choice in order to explain the sequence of negotiation outcomes. Thus, Moravcsik’s rationalist framework suggests that international negotiation be disaggregated into a causal sequence of three stages:

national preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice. In order to explain different national preferences, he analyses geopolitical and economic interests as the sources of national preferences. According to Moravcsik (1993: 481), in the formation of foreign policy goals, national governments are “viewed as varying in response to shifting pressures from domestic social groups, whose preferences are aggregated through political institutions.” Thus, state preferences are not fixed or uniform, but can change across time, depending on the issue and according to the different domestic actors’ preferences. In the second stage, aware of domestically determined national preferences, state executives bargain at the EU level in order to provide their domestic social groups with the desired outcomes. In the final stage, the states choose institutional arrangements that maximize their individual utility.

2.4.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the Eastern Enlargement

Moravcsik and Vachudova have applied the bargaining theory of liberal intergovernmentalism to the EU’s Eastern enlargement. The CEEC’s desire to join the EU was widely accepted by EU members due to the CEEC’s expected benefits of full market access, incentives for foreign direct investment, budgetary receipts and having a voice in EU decision making. Therefore, CEECs consistently found themselves in a weak negotiating position vis-a-vis their EU partners, and accordingly (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003:44) “conceded much in exchange for membership.” That is, relations between the EU and the CEECs have been characterized by asymmetrical interdependence.

Schimmelfennig criticized Moravcsik and Vachudova by pointing out that the application of only the bargaining theory of liberal intergovernmentalism leads to a

partial analysis of Eastern enlargement. A complete liberal intergovernmentalist analysis, he argues, would necessitate explaining the enlargement preferences of EU members and the intra-organizational bargaining process.

The enlargement preferences of EU member states, which diverged both regarding the speed and the extent of EU enlargement, can be reasonably be explained by liberal intergovernmentalism. As Schimmelfennig (2004: 87) points out, “Whereas the ‘drivers’ advocated an early and firm commitment to Eastern enlargement, the ‘brakemen’ were reticent and tried to put off the decision and whereas one group of member states pushed for a limited (first) round of enlargement focusing on the central European states, others favored an inclusive approach for all ten candidates.”

Table 2: Member state enlargement preferences for CEECs

	Limited enlargement	Inclusive enlargement
Drivers	Germany	Great Britain
Brakemen	-	France, Greece, Spain

Source: Schimmelfennig, 2006: 211

Table 3: Member State Preferences on Turkish Accession

Member State	1997	1999	2004/2005	2006
Germany	-	+	+/-	-
France	+	+	+/-	-
Great Britain	+	+	+	+
Greece	-	+	-	-

Source: Schimmelfennig, 2008: 27

According to Schimmelfennig, for the accession of the CEEC's, the geographical location of existing member states plays a vital role in determining their enlargement preferences due to their chances of increased cross-border trade and capital movements. That is, international interdependence increases with geographical proximity, so the countries bordering Central and Eastern Europe became, excepting Greece, drivers of enlargement. Central European countries preferred limited enlargement because they shared borders with these candidate states and expected to increase economic relations with them. Geographical proximity also clarifies why southern states like France and Greece supported Bulgaria and Romania whereas northern states like Denmark and Sweden supported Baltic applicants.

In order to analyze why border states, such as Greece and Spain played the role of brakemen for the CEECs, one should also look at the potential losers from Eastern enlargement. As Schimmelfennig 2001: 51) notes, "the unequal distribution of these losses mainly results from differences in socio-economic structure among the EU member countries." It was expected that poorer, less highly developed and more agricultural EU members would be negatively influenced by eastern enlargement due to competition in trade and for EU funds. Moreover, most of the brakemen, especially Spain, were (Sjursen, 2002:498) suggested to have trade deficits with the East European States. Thus, these potential losers were expected to prefer association agreements with CEECs instead of enlargement because of their fear of losing EU structural funds and their share in EU markets.

In addition to geographical proximity, enlargement preferences are also influenced by geopolitical interests. For instance, France and Greece particularly feared German dominance in EU decision making because they expected that CEECs

would support Germany in most issues in return for Germany's support for their membership. According to Schimmelfennig (2001:53), British preferences cannot be explained geographically or economically for both CEECs and Turkey. The British enthusiasm for enlargement can rather be explained by the 'Europhobia' of conservative governments. Moreover, for Turkey, political issue of Cyprus shaped Greek preferences whereas opposition of Christian Democratic Party of Germany based on cultural grounds (Schimmelfennig, 2008:7). Thus, enlargement preferences across the EU diverged not only due to economic interests but also due to geopolitical or ideological interests. Moreover, with respect to Turkish case, Schimmelfennig (2008:8-10) also underlines that the attitudes of member states towards Turkish European bid changed in different periods due to the domestically induced changes in governments.

Eastern enlargement was also expected to create high financial costs for the EU itself. The CEECs and Turkey are suggested (Mattli and Plumber, 2002: 552) to be economically backward countries compared to EU member states meaning they would have to receive EU transfers and would be unable to make net payments to the common budget or a net positive contribution to the EU. Moreover, most CEECs and Turkey are agricultural states so Eastern enlargement would be expected (Schimmelfennig, 2001:52) to destabilize "the Common Agricultural Policy and the structural policies that together comprise around 80 percent of the Community budget." It was predicted that CEEC and Turkish farmers would benefit more from the CAP than existing member states, while their low income levels would lead CEECs to receive a greater share of EU structural funds. Thus, in both the short and medium terms, it is acknowledged (Sjursen, 2002:497) that in the existing EU states' opinion, "the economic costs of enlargement would outweigh the gains."

At the beginning of the 1990s, the EU proposed to conclude association agreements offering CEECs rapid and asymmetrical liberalization of trade in industrial products. However, in those sectors where CEEC economies were competitive, such as agriculture, textiles, coal and steel, the EU reserved protectionist anti-dumping and safeguard measures for itself. These asymmetries in bargaining power affected the substantive outcomes. As Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003:44) argue, the CEECs were not in a position to credibly threaten reluctant member states with alternative unilateral or multilateral policy options. The drivers, mainly Germany and Great Britain, were also in the same position. Subsequently, as it is indicated (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 521), this situation was, in game-theoretical language, a ‘suasion game’ in which “the CEECs and the proponents of enlargement had the dominant strategy to agree with whatever the ‘brakemen’ saw as in their best interest.”

Therefore, the association agreements represented the highest level of cooperation with the CEECs that member states could agree on in that potential winners might enhance their economic benefits in CEEC markets while potential losers, such as Spain, might be protected from trade and budget competition. On the side of the CEECs, Europe Agreements which brought about association were better than weaker trade agreements. Through this analysis, liberal intergovernmentalism offers a convincing explanation for the main sources of opposition to enlargement, the strong initial unwillingness among member states to offer membership prospects to CEECs, and the formulation of association agreements with CEECs without the promise of eventual membership.

The European Council, however, decided at its June 1993 Copenhagen Summit that the associated countries would eventually become EU members. Given

the analysis above, it is therefore a puzzle for liberal intergovernmentalism to explain why member state governments did not stop the enlargement process at this early stage, and why the EU accepted the CEECs as candidate states for membership.

5 Constructivist/Sociological Institutionalism and Eastern Enlargement

On the other side of the debate, sociological institutionalists argue that liberal intergovernmentalism fails to explain the EU's decision to go beyond association and offer full membership to CEECs despite suggested (Baldwin et al, 1997) substantial financial costs of enlargement (especially for existing member countries which need EU structural funds) and the new members' likely heavy impact on the efficiency of the EU's institutional system.

They argue that the EU's decision to enlarge can be explained by its constitutive norms, common standards of legitimacy and collective identity, according to which the EU could not reject the membership demands of CEECs because they emphasized European values such as democracy and free markets. In most sociological institutionalist studies, norms are considered vital in explaining the EU's Eastern enlargement, although there are nuances primarily concerning the nature of norms that are relevant in the enlargement process. The strategic use of norms and identities by applicant states and drivers in order to change the decision of brakemen in favor of enlargement has been addressed in several ways: Fierke and Wiener consider speech acts; Schimmelfennig employs rhetorical action. Meanwhile,

Sedelmeier and Sjørusen highlight the constituting characteristics of norms on identity.⁸ These four approaches are considered in more detail below.

2.5.1 Strategic Use of Norms and Identities

2.5.1.1 Speech Acts

Based on Wittgenstein's theories on the constitutive character of language, Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener (1999) refer to the power of 'speech acts' (Waeber, 1996) in explaining the paradox of the enlargement processes of both the EU and NATO, which do not seem to be in the material self-interest of member states.

During the Cold War, both organizations developed a specifically western identity, embedded in the construction of shared democratic norms. According to Fierke and Wiener, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe's 1975 Helsinki declaration is the speech act which entailed a 'promise' to encourage the spread of western democratic norms, such as free flow of information, people and goods, as well as respect for human rights, across the division of Europe. The CEECs were encouraged by the West and its institutions to act in accordance with these ideals in resisting totalitarianism.

With the end of the Cold War, however, Fierke and Wiener (1999: 725) propose that "the meaning of the Cold War 'promise' of Helsinki was transformed into a threat." In other words, Helsinki's promise created unintended effects, including commitments and moral obligations that were hard to get out of. This threat took the form of both potential instability in the East and also failure to fulfill the promise; exposure of this failure represented a threat to the identity of both

⁸ For a similar approach of Constructivist arguments, see Evrim Taşkın "Theoretical Approaches to Turkey's Accession to the European Union" unpublished Master of Science Thesis, Sabanci University, Istanbul 2006

organizations. Therefore, it is underlined that (Fierke and Wiener, 1999:736) in order to sustain their identity as victors in the Cold War, “western institutions had to act with some semblance of consistency with the normative ideals which they represented.” The CEECs drew on these normative ideals to pressure the West to keep their promises because the West, as the embodiment of the victory of liberal ideals in the Cold War, had a responsibility to assist them in achieving those ideals that the West had encouraged them to aspire to during the Cold War. As a result of this pressure, both the EU and NATO redefined their interests regarding expansion to conclude that the CEECs could not be excluded, over the long term, from western organizations.

2.5.1.2 Rhetorical Action

In elaborating on the EU’s decision to enlarge, Frank Schimmelfennig introduces a new mechanism, which he terms ‘rhetorical action’. He defines (1999:2) rhetorical action as the strategic use of norm-based arguments. In an intersubjectively structured institutional environment, “rational political actors need legitimacy and must take into account common values and norms but manipulate them through the strategic use of arguments.” In this way, these rational actors will be able to change collective outcomes.

Schimmelfennig claims that the EU is a community organization, characterized by a common ethos based on principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. For Schimmelfennig, this collective identity as a liberal community explains the EU’s enlargement puzzle to a large degree.

He argues that both the CEEC governments and EU member state drivers depended on the community ethos in order to compensate for their inferior bargaining power by shaming the reticent majority into acquiescence with enlargement. The CEECs portrayed themselves as part of the wider European liberal international community, sharing the norms and values of European culture and civilization. Advocates of enlargement presented it as an issue touching on the EU's very identity, which therefore ought not to be, decided according to national interest or material cost benefit calculations. As Schimmelfennig (2004:91) reports, "advocates accused the reticent EU member states of acting inconsistently and betraying the fundamental values and norms of their own community if they failed to commit themselves to enlargement." However, "the rhetorical action of the drivers did not change the basic enlargement preferences of the 'brakemen' but effectively silenced and prevented them from openly opposing the enlargement project and its gradual implementation." Thus, through rhetorical action, norms were able to function as constraints on reticent member states' behaviors. As Schimmelfennig (2008:22) acknowledges, for Poland, the brakemen were entrapped in accepting the membership prospect whereas for Turkey, due to the compliance of Turkey with the Copenhagen political criteria, the brakemen were entrapped in opening of accession negotiations.

2.5.2 Norms as Constituting Identity

2.5.2.1 Special Responsibility

Ulrich Sedelmeier (2000, 2005) also contributes to the debate from a sociological institutionalist perspective with his analysis of the role of social factors

in the EU's Eastern enlargement. His main argument is that EU's collective identity vis-à-vis the CEECs has been the key factor determining the EU's policy.

Since the late 1980s, as Sedelmeier (2005:9) asserts, "EU policy-makers have discursively constructed a particular role for the EU in its relations with the CEECs." This role assigns the EU a "special responsibility" towards them to support their political and economic reforms and integration with the EU. According to Sedelmeier (2005:29-50), both identity and the norms that define it have constitutive and regulative effects on actors. In the case of the constitutive effect of norms and identities, the actors internalize certain norms and identities, to the extent that this identity forms a large part of their social multiple identities and influences their preference formation and interest definition. Norms and identities can also play a purely regulative effect in merely affecting behavior by prescribing or proscribing appropriate ways of acting for a given role. With respect to Eastern enlargement, in its constitutive form, the EU's identity requires it to actively support transformations in the CEECs and their integration into the EU. In its regulative form, the EU identity is suggested (Sedelmeier, 2005: 9) to "silences opposition to taking account of the CEECs' preferences by de-legitimizing opposition that is purely motivated by the incumbents' narrow self interest."

The impact of EU identity, however, varies across EU policy makers. Those actors who identified most closely with the EU's identity, especially officials in the Commission responsible for relations with CEECs, acted as principled policy advocates for Eastern enlargement. For others, the role-specific collective identity of the EU acted primarily as a constraint on open opposition to enlargement, and raised the reputational cost of a veto. Thus, EU identity helped policy advocates to set the EU on a path towards further enlargement.

2.5.2.2 Kinship-based Arguments

Helene Sjursen's (2002, 2006) main concern is to examine "mobilizing arguments" in the EU's enlargement policy in order to provide a better understanding of prioritizations made. She (2002: 508) criticizes Schimmelfennig's use of norms for its instrumentalism: "Norms do not matter because it costs something not to comply with them but because they are ends in themselves." For Sjursen, norms constitute the identity of the actors by forming their worldviews and preferences.

Based on the Habermas's theory of communicative action, she makes an analytical distinction between three different types of argument that might be used to justify enlargement: pragmatic arguments, ethical-political arguments and moral arguments. The pragmatic approach is based on a means-ends type of rationality where actors are considered to take decisions from calculations of utility based on a given set of interests. Thus, in order to support the enlargement, actors should be convinced that they will gain utility from it. In an ethical-political approach, justification would rely on a particular conception of the collective 'us' and a particular idea of the values represented by the specific community. The justification for enlargement would then come from emphasizing the responsibilities and duties emerging as a result of belonging to that particular community. In a moral approach, the aim would be to find justifications that rely on universal standards of justice. According to Sjursen (2002: 494), the first approach has more in common with the logic of consequences, while second and third approaches are more closely related to the logic of appropriateness.

In the case of the EU, based on a distinction between rights-based and value-based normative justifications, Sjursen suggests that ethical-political factors, such as

sense of kinship, shared identity or common history, are the main driving forces behind the Eastern enlargement. Moreover, Sjursen underlines that a sense of “kinship-based duty” contributes to the explanation of prioritizations made.

6 Comparison of Two Institutionalisms’ Expectations and Hypothesis about Enlargement

When rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism are applied to the EU’s enlargement policies, we arrive at competing expectations and hypotheses. For rationalists, the players with decision-making and institutional power, namely member state governments, are seen as the principal actors of enlargement, whereas for sociological institutionalists the principal actors are norm and principle entrepreneurs, such as the European Commission (Torreblanca, 2002: 21). For rationalists, in developing enlargement policies, utility-driven EU member states make use of strategic bargaining and negotiation about the costs and benefits of enlargement in terms of their own national interests. In contrast, for sociological institutionalists, decisions on enlargement policy are believed to be taken collectively, with the help of the European Commission, in accordance with the constitutive norms, principles and shared identity of the Union.

Table 4: Comparison of Rationalist and Constructivist/Sociological Institutionalisms on EU Enlargement

	RATIONALIST INSTITUTIONALISM	CONSTRUCTIVIST/SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM
Logic	Logic of consequentiality -When making a decision, actors use procedures such as bargaining, negotiation, coalition formation and exchange to achieve what is best for them	Logic of appropriateness - When making a decision, actors behave in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted.
Purpose	To advance the interests and preferences of member states	To build a collective identity
Actors	Actors with decision-making and institutional power, such as influential EU member states - Germany, France, Great Britain	Norm and principle entrepreneurs, actors having widely recognized moral authority - European Commission
Independent variable	Material interests - economic, political and security interests	Collective identity, common rules and principles of the EU
Decision-making	Bargaining and negotiation processes	Socialization processes
Accession Criteria	Prejudiced and cost-oriented	Unbiased and principle-oriented
Timing	Enlargement continues gradually and/or in stages	Enlargement continues Speedily
Distribution of Costs	Candidates bear the costs	Member states accept the costs
Decision to enlarge	Contentious, hesitant and postponed	Consensual, willing and fast
Impact on enlargement policy	National interests succeed	Constitutive norms succeed

Source: Based on the tables prepared by Torreblanca 2002 and concepts developed in March and Olsen 1989, 1998; Schimmelfennig, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2006, Sedelmeier Sjurson, 2002; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003; Piedrafita and Torreblanca 2005

For rationalists, the key independent variables that affect the EU's enlargement decisions are material interests, whether economic, security or political. For sociological institutionalists, they are collective identity, and the common rules and principles of the EU. For rationalists, the purpose of enlargement is to advance the interests and preferences of member states, while for sociological institutionalists it is to build a collective identity (Piedrafita and Torreblanca, 2005: 37). Regarding the choice of accession criteria, rationalists support discriminatory and cost-driven criteria, while constructivists favor non-discriminatory, principled and norm-driven criteria. With regard to question of when to enlarge, rationalists wish to proceed slowly and in stages, whereas constructivists insist on a fast process. In sum, across these dimensions, the driving force behind the enlargement process is the logic of consequentiality for rationalists and the logic of appropriateness for constructivists. The distinctions between rationalist and sociological institutionalist expectations are summarized in Table 4.

7 Conclusion

In the enlargement literature, it is widely acknowledged that the EU's decision to sign association agreements without the promise of membership can be explained in terms of rationalist institutionalism. However, rationalist institutionalism fails to explain why the EU offered full membership to the CEECs despite the substantial financial costs of doing so. It is widely believed that sociological institutionalism, through concepts of collective identity, shared norms and principle, offers more explanatory power regarding this decision. This suggests that rationalist and constructivist theories of institutions can be seen as partially competing and partially complementary in different phases of EU enlargement.

Therefore, the main aim of this dissertation is to test the main hypotheses of institutionalist debate through comparatively examining the case studies of Poland and Turkey.

In the next chapter, Poland's accession process is analyzed analyzed in order to test whether a rationalist or constructivist institutionalism can explain the decisions of member states and the European Commissioners to accept Poland as a member state.

CHAPTER III

POLISH ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

In this chapter, Poland's accession to the European Union is scrutinized in order to find out which approach, rationalist or constructivist/sociological institutionalism, can better explain the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states.

This part of the dissertation analyzes four periods. First, the EU's PHARE program is examined, covering the period between 1 January 1988 and 31 December 1989. 1988 is important as the beginning of Polish transition and this year is chosen in order to find out whether or not the EU and other member states supported Poland in her transition to democracy. 31.12.1989 is important because PHARE was launched by the EU on December 4, 1989. The second period covers the signing of association agreement, or the Europe Agreements, covering the period between 1 January.1990 and 31 December 1993. 31 December 1993 is chosen because the ratification of the Europe Agreements by member states occurred in 1994, after

which Poland applied for EU membership in April 1994. The third period covers Poland's membership application between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1997. As Poland began accession negotiations in March 1998, 31 December 1997 marks the end of this period. Finally, the accession negotiations with Poland between 1 January 1998 and 1 May 2004 are investigated. Poland became an EU member on 1 May 2004, so this date marks the end of the final period of analysis.

In each period, the EU's relations with Poland are investigated in two ways. The first is to understand the EU's policies and the European Commissioner's policies towards the CEECs in general and towards Poland in particular. Secondly, the attitudes of particular member states, Germany, France, Great Britain and Spain, towards Poland are evaluated in order to find out whether or not they supported Poland in her bid for EU membership and to discover the real motivations, whether rationalist or constructivist/sociological, behind their support or non-support for Poland. Following Schimmelfennig, these states are chosen according to their position on enlargement. Specifically, according to the literature, while Germany and Great Britain were among the drivers of Eastern enlargement, France and Spain were among the brakemen. Germany had been the main supporter of Polish accession process because the Second World War had left Poland and Germany a legacy of common problems of minorities and boundaries, and after the end of the Cold War, reconciliation was seen in their relations that allowed problems of minorities and boundaries to be solved peacefully. British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, as early as November 1988, visited Poland to show her support for the Solidarity movement and Poland's transition to democracy. Great Britain went on to become one of the main proponents of Polish accession to the EU. France and Spain are especially chosen as brakemen because of their resistance to the association

agreement with Poland. Due to specific sectors in their countries, such as agriculture for France and steel for Spain, they engaged in hard bargaining during the association negotiations with Poland. Although these states had originally opposed enlargement, they finally accepted Poland, and other CEECs, as members. This chapter analyzes the reasons behind this change in attitude towards enlargement with the help of both rationalist institutionalist factors, such as economic interests, security interests and political interests, and constructivist/sociological institutionalists' factors, such as collective identity and moral duty.

In the General Assessment part, a quantitative content analysis of the documents found through the databases of RAPID and FACTIVA is made in order to examine attitudes of both European Commissioners and member states comparatively.

3.1 Road to PHARE

3.1.1 EU-Poland Relations

3.1.1.1 Historical Context of Poland's Transition from Communist Rule

At the beginning of the Second World War, in 1939, the Republic of Poland⁹ was partitioned and annexed by Germany and the Soviet Union, with the Nazis, establishing an extremely brutal regime for the next six years in their area. After the Second World War, Poland recovered its independence, although there was a lack of

⁹ The Republic of Poland was founded in 1918 and enjoyed only a short period of parliamentary democracy before a military coup was staged in 1926. A semblance of parliamentary democracy returned from 1935 to 1939.

consensus among the Great Powers at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 concerning Poland's western frontiers, which meant (Akşit, 2006: 127) Poland, had to rely increasingly on the Soviet Union for its survival. Stalin wished Poland to fall under the influence of Soviet foreign policy so he supported the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), by crushing the opposition,¹⁰ so , as Cordell (2000:2) asserts "by 1949, the process of Sovietisation was all but complete." However, most Poles, including workers, peasants, the Catholic Church and intellectuals, complained about the economic difficulties and political terror, and were involved in a series of uprisings in 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976 that the Polish people's disapproval of the Moscow imposed regime.

In the late 1970s, the Polish economy was bankrupt, the government was heavily in debt to the West (Akşit, 2006: 140) and it is argued (Mason, 1989: 43) that economic growth had leveled off or even declined. This led to increasing frustration among workers culminating, in the summer of 1980, with workers starting a protest in Gdansk against the government's decision to raise food prices. This workers movement led to the formation of Solidarity, a trade union movement headed by Lech Walesa. Solidarity, supported by the Catholic Church and the intelligentsia, helped to mobilize millions of Poles against Communist rule. Due to this popular support, Solidarity was suggested (Akşit, 2006: 142) to become powerful enough to threaten the communists' single-party hegemony, which in turn led the Soviet regime to pressure the Polish Communist Party to crush Solidarity. In December 1981, the Jaruzelski-led government declared martial law and suspended trade union activities by banning Solidarity; however, Solidarity carried on its activities by organizing illegal strikes and demonstrations. The declaration of martial law and the suppression

¹⁰ The Polish Workers Party and Polish Socialist Party merged in 1948 to form the Polish United Workers' Party

of Solidarity were condemned by many Western States, who froze relations with Poland.

Although Jaruzelski tried to institute political, social and economic reforms in order to solve Poland's deep socio-economic, crisis reform attempts failed to bring any significant changes in the lives of Poles. With foreign debt rising to \$39 billion, Poland applied for membership of the IMF in June 1986 and, in order to improve its image, the Jaruzelski government submitted its 1987 programme of price rises and promised democratization to a referendum in November 1987. However, as Francis (1999: 298) suggests, the government failed to win the support of the majority which led to a new wave of workers' strikes and protests organized by Solidarity in May 1988. At the same time, there was a dramatic change in the Moscow regime when Gorbachev introduced the policies of perestroika (restructuring of the economy) and glasnost (political liberalization). After two months of strikes, as Castle and Taras (2002: 66) state, Gorbachev visited Poland and declared that the Poles had the right to determine their own political destiny. In August 1988, Solidarity staged a second wave of strikes and in the light of Gorbachev's personal endorsement, the leader of the Communist Party, Jaruzelski, agreed to hold talks with Solidarity.

The Round Table negotiations began in 6 February 1989 between government representative and the opposition led by Solidarity. The Catholic Church was not officially part to the negotiations but it sent representatives to mediate and facilitate discussions. Although it declared its neutrality, when there was a stalemate, it is suggested (Castle and Taras, 2002: 73) that church representatives backed the positions advocated by Solidarity. The negotiations were concluded in 5 April 1989 and, according to the agreement, Solidarity's demand for legalization was confirmed, freedom of the press allowed, the president would be elected jointly by the Sejm, the

lower house, and the Senate in joint session and parliament would be bicameral with a freely elected Senate and a partly freely elected Sejm. The agreement, as Terry (2000: 9) states, was also intended to guarantee the country's continued loyalty to the Warsaw Pact by leaving formal control over foreign and security affairs in the hands of a presidency elected by the Sejm and Senate for a six-year term, a post designed expressly for Jaruzelski. Furthermore, the Communists tried to retain their dominant position by reserving 65 percent of the 460 seats in Sejm. However, as Francis (1999: 299) points out, in the elections of 4 June 1989, Solidarity won all 161 freely-contested seats in the Sejm and 99 of the 100 seats in the Senate. Jaruzelski was elected as president on July 19 1989 by the parliament and Sejm, as decided in the Round Table agreement. On September 12 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Solidarity activist, officially formed the first non-Communist government in Central and Eastern Europe since 1945, signaling the completion of the first negotiated transition of power from the communists. The end of communist rule in Poland presaged the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe during the 'velvet revolutions' of 1989.

3.1.1.2 The Non-Communist Government's First Policies

After the peaceful takeover of power from the communists, the new government needed to make two crucial decisions. The first related to foreign policy, and the second to the economy. According to Stawarska, (1999: 823) the slogan of the Polish Revolution, as declared by the first Solidarity Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was 'Return to Europe'. However, while trying to pursue this foreign policy aim, the new Polish government was also aware that they still needed to take into account the Soviet Union. After the revolution, negotiations with the EU for

trade and cooperation agreements continued, although, because of the influence of communists in Poland's foreign policy making, there were suggestions of alternatives to EU entry. For instance, President Jaruzelski, in January 1990, alluded to the hope that the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON) could transform itself into a genuine supranational organization. Prime Minister Mazowiecki also emphasized (Los-Nowak, 2000: 12), the continuing importance of the COMECON, albeit unwillingly, in order not to antagonize either the Soviet Union or its Polish allies, while Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski was suggested (Federowicz, 2007: 537) to be often criticized in Poland for his excessive caution in discussions with the Soviet Union. In short, the Polish government took any decisions during this period to improve relations with the EU in order to avoid antagonizing the Soviet Union.

With respect to the economic dimension of the revolution, the Polish economy was suggested (Hunter and Ryan, 2009: 35) to be in deep crisis when the first non-communist government came to power, overwhelmed by hyperinflation running at an annual rate of 639.6 percent, a foreign debt that had reached an alarming 64.8 percent of Polish GDP, and an economy that was literally verging on collapse. Mazowiecki appointed Leszek Balcerowicz as Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs in 8 September 1989, assigning him the task of developing a comprehensive program of economic reform. Walesa emphasized that in order to implement a neoliberal shock therapy strategy for economic reform, the government needed special powers. However, as Orenstein (2001: 32) states, Mazowiecki rejected Walesa's suggestion on the basis of principles of parliamentary democracy, which was the beginning of a major split within Solidarity. Balcerowicz introduced shock therapy in 1 January 1990. This neoliberal

institutional reform was suggested (Orenstein, 2001:33) to be based on stabilization, liberalization and privatization measures, aiming primarily at withdrawing the state from the economy and freeing up markets to adjust spontaneously to the new macro-economic conditions. As a result of this reform, as Los Nowak (2000:14) underlines, Balcerowicz believed that the Polish economy would become leaner, fitter and more capable of early EU membership. The Polish government, on the other hand, was also fearful that the transformation of the country's planned economy into a market economy would cause serious social hardship, so it asked (Binyon, 2011) for support, in the form of foreign financial assistance, from friendly governments.

3.1.1.3 The Inception of Polish- EU Relations

The EU's relations with communist Poland date back to the 1970s in the form of trade agreements, especially textile and agricultural products with individual COMECON countries. Negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement between the EU and COMECON began in 1977. However, these negotiations were broken off in 1980 by mutual agreement. Relations were resumed between the EU and COMECON in June 1985, when COMECON proposed the establishment of relations with the EU. In January 1986, the Commission confirmed its readiness to resume its dialogue with COMECON while specifying that the EU would also seek to establish bilateral relations with individual European member countries of COMECON. Within this framework, the Commission held exploratory contacts with Poland on establishing official relations with the EU. Relations between Poland and the EU (1988, June 25) formally commenced when a Joint Declaration was signed between the EU and COMECON. This aimed to establish official relations between the EU and COMECON and develop greater cooperation between the parties. After the Joint

Declaration had opened the way for official ties, as it is reported (“Poland asks”, 1988, July 22), Poland requested diplomatic relations with the EU in 22 July 1988, which were formally established in 16 September 1988.

After the commencement of Round Table negotiations, the EU welcomed the start of negotiations in the hope of bringing democratic reforms to Poland, and these developments were seen as an essential factor for future cooperation between Poland and the EU. Negotiations were concluded on April 5 1989, and right after the signing of the agreement, the European Commission (1989, April 6) welcomes

The announcement of the successful conclusion of the Round Table talks in Poland involving the legalization of previously banned trade unions and the decision to hold parliamentary elections in June. This constitutes a major step forward in the process of liberalization and constitutional reform in Poland. With this end in view, the first informal round of negotiations between the two parties took place on 22 March in Brussels and the Community looks forward to the early conclusion of a comprehensive agreement.

On May 22 1989, at the EU Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Brussels, the European Commission prepared a proposal to encourage Poland’s political reforms by lending EU finance to the deeply-indebted Poland. The proposal involved the Luxembourg-based European Investment Bank lending for the first time to a COMECON country. However, the proposal, which won backing from Germany and Denmark, ran into objections from the UK, France and Netherlands. Nevertheless, the Commission President, Jacques Delors (quoted in Buchan, 1989, May 23) said he hoped to raise the Polish debt issue at forthcoming summits of the EC and the Group of Seven.

3.1.1.4 The EU's First Response to Events in Central and Eastern Europe: Trade and Cooperation Agreements and PHARE

With the passing of the Single European Act in 1986, the EU engaged in an enormous internal reform process in order to reorganize its own structure. The Single European Act updated previous treaties by specifying new areas of Community competence, many of which were already being handled at Community level, such as monetary policy, protection of the environment, and industrial research and innovation. The Single European Act was also essential for the attainment of the EU's ambitious project to create a truly frontier-free EU market by the end of 1992. That is, the aim of the Single European Act was to prepare the ground for deepening Europe's integration process towards the eventual transformation of the European Communities into the European Union.

Due to the Cold War, and preoccupied with its own internal restructuring, the EU had no plan to establish relations with the CEECs. However, the dramatic political changes that took place in both the Soviet Union and the CEECs necessitated a redefinition of the EU's policies towards the CEECs. As Sedelmeier (2005: 407) points out, there was broad consensus among member states that, due to policy differences between the 12 member states towards the CEECs, the EU, especially the EU Commission, should play a central role in responding to the challenge of Eastern Europe. However, the main problem here was the definition of the role of the EU.

The Rhodes European Council (1988) emphasized the role of the EU in overcoming the division of Europe and promoting common values by declaring that

The European Council reaffirms its determination to act with renewed hope to overcome the division of our continent and to promote the Western values and principles which member states have in common.

We will strive to achieve the development of political dialogue with our Eastern neighbors.

Immediately after the transitions in the CEECs, the EU's first policy response focused on normalizing relations with these countries and providing technical aid for their economic transition. The procedure the EU formally followed was to use trade agreements, possibly providing for subsequent trade cooperation, as the first step in developing relations. The EU Commission therefore made bilateral trade and cooperation agreements with CEECs. It was reported ("Chance for", 1989) that these trade agreements could be seen as political in that the EU was selectively rewarding those East Europeans who tried to be more capitalist and democratic with more attractive treaties than their conservative neighbours signed. Although the EU, with good intentions, tried to support the dual transformation process of the CEECs financially through these agreements, as Beach (1997: 5) indicates, they did not give the CEECs' real access to EU markets in the sectors in which they were competitive, such as steel, textiles, clothing and agriculture.

With respect to relations with Poland, informal negotiations on the Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation Agreement with Poland commenced on 22 March 1989, in Brussels. With this agreement, it was expected that EU import quotas on Polish industrial and agricultural goods would be eased. During the negotiations, it is suggested ("EC Poland", 1989) that France, West Germany and the Netherlands were believed to have had some concerns over the timing and scope for easing quotas on Polish agricultural goods. However, these concerns were addressed so that the negotiations could be completed in July, allowing the signing of the agreement to take place in Warsaw on 19 September 1989. This was a non-preferential agreement providing reciprocal Most Favored Nation treatment, which necessitated the gradual

abolition of the quantitative restrictions applied by the EU on Polish imports over a five-year period. It is suggested (European Community, 1989, September 25) that the agreement allowed Poland to be included in the Generalized System of Preferences, meaning it could export industrial and agricultural goods to the EU free of customs duties and without imposition of ceilings or quotas, except for European Coal and Steel Community products and products covered by other sectoral agreements (textile and agricultural agreements). In 27 November 1989, the EU decided to temporarily grant Poland and Hungary special trade facilities in order to contribute towards solving their specific political and economic problems. The first EU-Poland Joint Committee under the Agreement on Trade, Commercial and Economic Cooperation was held on 4 and 5 December 1989 in Brussels.

The EU's second policy response was the Poland and Hungary assistance programme (PHARE¹¹). It was an initiative to provide technical assistance from the G-24 and EU, especially the European Commission. Jacques Delors raised the Polish debt issue at the G-7 Summit in Paris in July 1989. At this summit, it was emphasized that the reform processes of Hungary and Poland would be supported, and the interested countries and the EU Commission Community were asked to take the necessary initiatives in agreement with other EU member states and all interested countries to organize a meeting for this support. Consequently, the Paris Summit gave the EU Commission responsibility for coordinating economic assistance to Poland and Hungary. In taking on the coordination role, the EU Commission (quoted in "French Leader", 1989) stated that "The European Commission has the firm wish to fulfill the task entrusted to it, in order to contribute to an efficient cooperation

¹¹ PHARE (Pologne, Hongrie: aide a la restructuration economique) is the French acronym for Poland and Hungary Assistance to Economic Restructuring.

between Poland and those countries which want to play a role in the success of the economic reforms undertaken by the Polish people.”

After the Paris Summit, the European Commission took the necessary steps to get its “Operation PHARE” coordination plan underway. In response to an invitation from the Commission, 24 Western countries¹² met in Brussels on 1 August 1989 for the first coordination meeting to give effect to the Conclusions of the Paris Summit. At their first meeting, the Group of 24 identified the priority sectors for action coordinated by the Commission. These were supplying food products to Poland and using the resulting counterpart funds; investment, capital formation and joint ventures; management and management training; increased market access for Hungarian and Polish exports; and cooperation on environmental matters. On 26 September, the Group of 24 held their second meeting in Brussels at which Jacques Delors and Frans Andriessen, the EU’s External Affairs Commissioner, (Binyon, 1989, September 27) told donor representatives that Poles and Hungarians could well find their new freedoms threatened by economic disorder, and that such disorder could only be eased by rapid action. After this meeting, the Commission (1990, January 11) presented an action plan for Operation PHARE. The plan followed the directives the Commission had received from the Paris Summit, while also reflecting its determination to take the initiatives needed to implement certain specific operations. Action was to be focused on five areas: agriculture, supply and restructuring, access to markets, investment, vocational training and environment.

The Group of 24 also suggested at their meeting that Poland and Hungary should conclude agreements with the International Monetary Fund to set up effective

¹² The participants were as follows: the Group of Seven (United States, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom); the other Member States of the European Community; the EFTA member countries (Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden); Turkey, New Zealand and Australia

programmes for structural adjustment and reform, which would make external financing a lot easier. It was also suggested that such agreements would provide an appropriate framework for further assistance operations by the Group of 24 in those countries. The Commission's proposal for the establishment of a legal basis for economic aid to Poland and Hungary was transmitted to the Council on 25 October 1989 and accepted on 4 December 1989. In this way, the PHARE programme came to be launched before being later extended to most of the CEECs. The main aim of PHARE funding was to help CEECs in general, and Poland in particular, undertake the transition to democracy and a market economy. As Kramer (1993: 223) points out, the programme provided aid for economic transformation with an emphasis on agriculture (including food aid), industry, investments, energy, education, environmental protection, trade and services. Its main focus was the support and development of the private sector in these areas of economic activity.

PHARE funding, despite expectations, did not give the CEECs a preferential position regarding EU membership. There were also problems related to the funding, as Sedelmeier (2005:408) underlines, such as when consultants from Western Europe prevented funding reaching intended CEEC beneficiaries, and the relative lack of resources allocated to the management of the programme, which led to inefficiencies using the aid.

3.1.1.5 Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland

During this period, the public speeches and statements of members of the European Commission emphasized ideational arguments, such as the role of the EU in healing the division of Europe, the Europeanness of Poland and the promotion of liberal democracy and market economies. For instance, on the establishment of

diplomatic relations between the EU and five CEECs, Willy De Cleck (quoted in European Community, 1988, August 17) the Commissioner responsible for external relations and trade policy, announced that “It ... represented another step forward in the rapprochement between Europeans and signified that the irreplaceable role now played by the European Community had been recognized.”

Frans Andriessen (1989, June 8), the Commissioner responsible for trade, competition and agriculture, described the EU’s support for Eastern Europe’s transition in terms of European peace and security: “The Community is determined to mobilize the considerable policy instruments at its disposal in pursuit of these objectives, which are shared by all members of the western alliance, and so to make its contribution to strengthening the peace, security and well-being of all the inhabitants of our continent.”

The EU’s supposed moral duty to promote a market economy in the CEECs was also emphasized. According to Karel Van Miert (1989, January 13), the Commissioner responsible for transport, credit and investment, for example, “the European Community offers a mechanism for immediate common action to help the countries of Eastern Europe to build the competitive economies which are crucial if they are to sustain and develop their new political freedoms.”

3.1.2 Attitudes of Member States towards Poland

The member states of the EU were unable to act collectively to meet the challenges posed by the end of Cold war because their interests in the region differed, leading to inconsistent policy proposals for the appropriate course of action. Due to the demands of CEEC governments, the need to find a longer term framework for relations with the CEECs emerged. To the extent that a discussion did take place,

it was mainly framed by the conventional antithesis of ‘widening versus deepening’ and the new geopolitical balance within Europe. Some states favored deepening, suggesting that, although the EU should play a significant role in giving political and economic support for the transformation of CEECs, it should focus on its own transformation before embracing new members. On the other hand, other states favored widening as a policy measure to support the transformation of CEECs. The following section analyses member states’ politics to reveal the level of support or non-support for Poland’s transition to democracy and a market economy and the improvement of Polish relations with the EU.

3.1.2.1 Germany

To start with Germany, the Second World War had not only strained relations between Poland and West Germany but also left them with a legacy of common problems of minorities and boundaries. Starting from the early 1970s, Germany’s new foreign policy of the Social Democrat Party, Ostpolitik, towards Eastern Europe searched for the normalization of relations with Eastern Europe, and the German Democratic Republic in particular, and cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany and Eastern Europe. Within this framework, as Zaborowski (1999:7-8) indicates, bilateral normalization occurred in relations between Poland and West Germany, as seen by West Germany’s temporary recognition of the Oder-Neisse border and Poland’s consent for the departure of ethnic Germans from Poland. Zaborowski (2006: 106) suggests that, in the 1980s, the left wing of West Germany’s Social Democrat Party aimed to integrate Germany’s eastern environment with the EU. However, the Cold War environment prevented this idea becoming a reality.

Germany's rapid and positive response towards the CEECs in general and Poland in particular can be explained against this background. With the end of Cold War, Germany advocated (Kramer, 1993: 221; Sedelmeier, 2005:407) a strong and generous common policy on the part of the 12 towards the 'new East', particularly with the idea of re-establishing ties with the German Democratic Republic.

Due to tense relations related to the legacy of the Second World War and the Cold war, Germany's relations with Poland were mainly through the international institutions during this period, such as the EC and G-7. It is reported ("EC Cool", 1989, May 23) that, Germany's support to Poland was seen firstly in May 1989, when it backed the European Commission's proposal to encourage Poland's political reforms by providing EU finance a loans to the deeply-indebted Poland. Moreover, at the Paris Summit of G-7, Germany was among the states which urged providing aid for Poland.

Bilateral relations firstly commenced when West German Chancellor Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl visited Poland on 9 November 1989. During his visit, Kohl (quoted in Heritage, 1989, November 14) used ideational arguments, such as the Europeanness of Poland:

Germany needs Poland and Poland needs Germany. We belong together ... Europe needs understanding and reconciliation between our peoples. Europe is incomplete and inconceivable without Poland.

Kohl and Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki signed a joint declaration intended to launch a new era of Polish-West German relations. In the declaration, it was stated (Heinrich, 1989, November14) that

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Polish People's Republic are deeply convinced that the development of their relations mapped out in this Joint Declaration is of fundamental importance for peace, security and stability in Europe and for the positive development of

the East-West relationship as a whole ...The inviolability of borders as well as respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in Europe in their existing borders are a fundamental precondition for peace.

It is reported (“West Germany”, 1989) that the declaration also outlined German aid for the Polish economy and suggested that West Germany would press for a long-term rescheduling of Poland’s debts to the Paris Club of creditor nations to which Poland owed two-thirds of its 39 billion dollar debt. Kohl’s visit to Poland and the joint declaration led to reconciliation between Poland and West Germany. However, the border issue and minority problems were not solved during this period. On the other hand, this reconciliation appeared to form the basis for Germany’s later support of Poland in her bid to join the EU.

3.1.2.2 France

With the end of the Cold War, as Bozo (2008: 396-397) suggests, the foremost objective of French diplomacy became the pursuit of a European political structure, a vision of a pan-European architecture beyond ‘Yalta’, and its role was seen as pivotal for Europe at large. Therefore, closer economic links with the CEECs and financial aid were both supported by France. Vernet (1992: 658) underlines that, at the same time, the possibility of German unification and the possibility of a change in Europe’s balance of power in favour of Germany caused concern in France. For this reason, France was the most enthusiastic supporter of deepening the EU before widening membership to CEECs. By supporting deepening, Kramer (1993: 222) emphasizes, “France hoped to be able to preserve the EC in its present shape which, for Paris, [was] the best means of containing Germany.”

France froze relations with Poland when Communist leader Jaruzelski imposed martial law in 1981 to try to crush Solidarity and during Poland's transition to democracy, France continued to show its support to Solidarity. For example, it is reported ("Minister Says", 1988) that, Mitterrand invited Solidarity leader Walesa to visit France for the 40th anniversary celebrations of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. After the Round Table talks, as a sign of support for Poland's transition to democracy, France offered to help it tackle its economic crisis. French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas (quoted in "France Offers", 1999) suggested that "France will make herself Poland's advocate in institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Paris Club and the European Community (EC) to obtain a re-scheduling of its debt and to strengthen economic and commercial relations between the West and this country." With respect to relations with the EU, he (quoted in "France To", 1989) also emphasized that "France will also continue to be a spokesman for your country in current trade negotiations between Poland and the European Community." However, Buchan (1989, May 23) indicates that, France, together with some other EU countries, opposed the European Commission's proposal to encourage Poland's political reforms by providing EU loans to Poland because it believed that giving aid to Poland and other countries went beyond the EU's competence. After the partly free elections won by Solidarity, in June 1989, Mitterrand became the first Western leader to visit Poland. His three-day visit also closed the chapter of tense relations with Poland. Mitterrand had meetings with President Jaruzelski and Solidarity leader Walesa who asked for economic help. As Tagliabu (1989, June 17) reports, Solidarity officials also wanted Mitterrand to circulate the proposal among the governments of the seven industrialized nations scheduled to meet in Paris. Mitterrand duly confirmed an economic package for

Poland that included credit and debt rescheduling, (quoted in Sachs, 1989, June 15) claiming that the package was “a realistic and concrete support for the reforms that are under way.” France was also among the states which supported the provision of aid for Poland at the G-7’s Paris Summit, and French ministers also promoted Polish interests in various international forums. For instance, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas (“West Has”, 1989, September 15) used ideational arguments, such as the moral obligation of the western world, to help Poland:

The entire Western world called for changes in Poland. Today it’s not only a political but a moral obligation to find long term aid that responds more exactly to modern Poland’s needs ... The West must do more and better for Poland.

In addition to the French Foreign Minister, French Finance Minister Pierre Berezgouvoy (quoted in “France Urges”, 1989, September 26), in a speech to the opening session of the IMF annual meeting, highlighted that Poland and Hungary chose to undertake courageous programs of economic reform and “these countries deserve our support.” However, it is reported (“France Approves”, 1989, October 25) that Solidarity’s Lech Walesa, charged France and other nations of talking more than acting, and as a response to this accusation, the French government approved an emergency three-year aid plan for Poland worth almost four billion francs.

With respect to Poland’s relations with the EU, France was not as enthusiastic as she was over the aid issue. In a special EU meeting called by France, President Mitterrand (quoted in Riding, 1989, November 19) argued that the EU’s commitment to completing its own integration program meant that it would not be possible for new members to join the 12 before 1993, which concerned not only Turkey and Austria, who had already applied for membership, but also the countries of Eastern Europe. In this way, Mitterrand, as early as November 1989 declared France’s

preference for deepening before widening. Therefore, in this period, relations between Poland and France were based on French support for Poland's transition to democracy by agreeing to aid packages and promoting Polish interests in terms of aid in international forums. However, the French also emphasized that Poland and other CEECs could not develop institutional relations with the EU before the EU had completed its own process of deepening.

3.1.2.3 Great Britain

Because the end of Cold War, as Kramer (1993: 223) asserts, required Great Britain to support the newly emerging democracies of the CEECs by means of favoring widening, the British government regarded the new European situation as a welcome development for preventing the further deepening of EU integration.

There were historical ties between Great Britain and Poland due to their common struggles of the Second World War and the fleeing of the Polish Government to exile in London. However, when Communist leader Jaruzelski imposed martial law in 1981 to try to crush Solidarity, Great Britain, like other Western Governments, froze relations with Poland. Following the initiation of reform movements British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher came to Poland for a three day visit, as early as November 2 1988, while there were tense relations between Poland's communist government and Solidarity. During her visit, she had meetings with both government officials and leaders of the outlawed movement. Although she stressed that she did not intend to interfere in the domestic affairs of Poland, in her meeting with the Polish Prime Minister, which was devoted to Poland's economic problems, she also (quoted in Gregson, 1988, November 2) asserted that no communist-type, centrally-planned economy could ever succeed. She

(quoted in Oakley, 1988, November 4) also underlined that only political liberalization would open the door to broader economic and financial aid, in the form of support for an IMF program, debt rescheduling and support for private British investment in Poland. She also called on the Polish government to recognize the banned Solidarity, which she (quoted in Tagliabue, 1988, November 5) described as “the expression and focus of opposition in the country, and as such is a very, very important group of people.” She left Poland, claiming that she had received an assurance from Jaruzelski. As she reported (quoted in Diehl, 1988, November 5), he “assured me that the Polish government is very serious about the round-table talks and wanted to get them under way soon ... I’m very encouraged indeed that that is possible.”

Following the round table agreement, Great Britain promised to encourage other nations to help Poland on condition that the reform process continued. As Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe (quoted in “Jaruzelski To”, 1989, April 21) stated, “We believe Poland has taken a decisive step forward and so, in the weeks and month ahead, if that progress is sustained, we shall be identifying with our friends, allies and the various international bodies, the positive ways we can help.” After June’s partly free elections, Jaruzelski visited Great Britain on 10 June 1989 to talk with Prime Minister Thatcher about the Polish debt issue. After their meeting, Jaruzelski (quoted in Boulton, 1989, June 11) stated: “What I think particularly valuable [is that] she has pledged to support our position with the European Community and generally among other countries of the West.” A British aid package was also announced during his visit, and in September, Thatcher sent letters to Presidents George Bush and Francois Mitterrand, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, using ideational arguments such as references to common values by (quoted in

Dourian, 1989, September 6) highlighting that there was “an historic opportunity for the West to help Poland make a success of its reforms and demonstrate that the country can successfully make the transition from Communism to a market-based economy.” During Walesa’s visit to the UK to ask for economic cooperation, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd (quoted in Giles, 1989, November 30) told him that the Government would increase its aid package to Poland to 50 million pounds to help its transition to democracy and ensure economic stability.

In addition to supporting Poland in economic terms, Great Britain also favored long-term institutional relations between Poland and the EU, together with the other CEECs. For instance, in November 1989, the British government suggested that association agreements could be an appropriate framework for relations with the CEECs. That is, Great Britain chose widening of the EU as opposed to deepening, consequently supporting Poland in her transition to democracy. After Poland’s elections, the Great Britain provided economic aid to Poland. Margaret Thatcher also promoted Polish economic interests, asking for economic help from other western governments to deal with Poland’s debt problems. In addition, Great Britain also offered an association agreement for Poland (and Hungary) in order to link them to the EU.

3.1.2.4 Spain

The EU’s smaller member states feared that the unilateral activities of the larger member states would create tension within the EU. Due to their economic backwardness, they also feared that they might not be able to compete with the CEECs in the EU market. Spain, which had also experienced a transition to

democracy in 1975, supported the Polish transition, promoting common values of democracy and a market economy. After the formation of the first Solidarity-led government in Poland, King Juan Carlos of Spain made a three-day visit to Poland in October 1989. During this visit, the King (quoted in Boyes, 1989, October 4), in a declaration to the Polish people, expressed his country's support for the changes under way in Poland: "The Spanish people are watching the process of reform pursued in Poland with attention and friendliness." In the same vein, government spokeswoman Rosa Conde (quoted in "Spanish King", 1989, October 3) also underlined Spain's support in declaring that "It eloquently testifies to a great desire by Spaniards to support Poland's political and economic changes and it is to prove that our eyes are turned to Poland." As one of the less developed countries of the EU, Spain also was vigilant about the EU's and other western governments' attitudes towards Poland. For instance, it is reported (Auerbach, 1989, December 3) that Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland feared that many of the expected gains from the elimination of internal barriers within Western Europe would be diluted by the new interest of Germany and other European powers in Poland.

In short, although Poland's transition to democracy was welcomed by Spain, she was also cautious about Polish relations with the EU due to a fear of competition in the EU market.

3.2 Europe Agreements

3.2.1 EU-Poland Relations

3.2.1.1 The Way to Find a Solution to the CEECs' and Polish Demands: Europe (Association) Agreements with Poland

Because the early trade agreements and financial aid did not meet the expectations of the CEECs, the EU realized that a long-term framework for relations with the CEECs was needed in order to strengthen cooperation. As Bruce Millan (European Community, 1990, January 12), the European Commissioner for Regional Policies, suggested: “The changes we have seen in Eastern Europe since last summer require the development of a new form or new forms of relationship between the Community and those countries.”

The need for a longer-term framework was supported not only by Great Britain and the German governments but also by parts of the Commission. Thatcher (quoted in “Thatcher Calls”, 1989, November 13), emphasized association agreements as a valuable form of relations with the CEECs , suggesting that “We must stretch out the hand of cooperation, and develop new forms of association with the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe - Poland, Hungary, East Germany - and we hope others will follow.” This suggestion seemed to be accepted in the Strasbourg European Council (1989) which declared that the Community “will encourage the necessary economic reforms by all the means at its disposal, and will

continue its examination of the appropriate forms of association with the countries which are pursuing the path of economic and political reform.”

Kaluzynska (1990, February 2) reports that the idea of offering association was discussed between Commission president Delors and Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki during Mazowiecki's visit to Brussels. Before the Dublin European Council, EU President Delors (1990, April 26) emphasized the contribution of association agreements for helping Eastern European states feel European: “We present a second generation of association agreements which would make it possible for each of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to feel full members of the Greater Europe.” Afterwards, the Presidency Conclusion of The Dublin European Council of (1990) declared that

Discussions will start forthwith in the Council, on the basis of the Commission's communication, on Association Agreements with each of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which include an institutional framework for political dialogue. The Community will work to complete Association negotiations with these countries as soon as possible on the understanding that the basic conditions with regard to democratic principles and transition towards a market economy are fulfilled.

Following the encouragement it got from Dublin European Council, it is reported (“Poland Asks”, 1990, May 28) that Poland presented an official application to the EU for negotiations of an association agreement in order to take its relations with the EU a step beyond the trade and cooperation agreements and commence negotiations for the association agreements as soon as possible. As early as June 1990, Poland declared that it aimed to achieve full membership of the EU. It is reported (Kaluzynska, 1990, June 21) that Jerzy Makarczyk, Poland's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, presented Frans Andriessen a memorandum outlining Poland's view of how it could upgrade relations with the EU, announcing that “Poland's aim is to become a full member of the community eventually.” In

September 1990, Andriessen declared that, in order to establish a strong interconnection between the community and the CEECs, negotiations for Europe Agreements would begin the following month. However, regarding eventual EC membership, he (quoted in “EC Plans”, 1990, September 21) stressed that “If it is true that Poland needs the EC, the EC needs Poland in order to create the Europe we have in mind, perhaps not in two or three years, but Europe at the end of this or the beginning of the next century”. In October, Poland entered exploratory talks with the EU on association agreements. However, even before the commencement of these negotiations, it is reported (Nisbet, 1990, November 11) that EU officials made clear that the Europe Agreements would not automatically offer full EU membership.

The Rome European Council (1990) emphasized that “The Community hopes to conclude European Agreements as quickly as possible and these will mark a new stage in the Community policy of developing increasingly close relations with those countries.” On the basis of the negotiation directives adapted by the Council on 18 December 1990, the Commission (“EC Commission”, 1990, December 20), which was given the negotiation mandate, began negotiations on Europe Agreements with Poland (as well as Hungary and Czechoslovakia). On 26 January 1991, with the Council of Ministers Resolution 11/91, the office of the Government Plenipotentiary for European Integration and Foreign Assistance was established. The goal of this institution was, as Jasinski (2001) states, to prepare Polish governmental structures for changes relating to the establishment of a structured system of cooperation with the EU, and to run this process expertly. Based on the Council of Ministers Resolution 11/91, the Bureau for European Integration and the Bureau for Foreign Assistance were also set up within the Council of Ministers Office with a mission to support the work of the Government Plenipotentiary.

The second round of real negotiations was held in February 1991. On February 13, Poland presented a proposal for liberalization in the Common Agricultural Policy and threatened to leave the negotiations. Poland's chief negotiator, Jaroslaw Mulewicz (quoted in "EC Poland", February 14) recalled that they went through the most difficult problems point by point, and it had been very difficult that time.

The EU's insistence, as Guilford (1991, February 26) indicates, on Association Agreements not automatically offering EC membership continued even during the negotiations. During the third round, which took place March 19-20, the parties got tougher on sensitive products. In principle, the EU would give more concessions for the first five years of a ten-year deal to help Poland's reform process. However, Poland's chief trade negotiator Andrzej Olechowski (quoted in "Poland Says", 1991, March 19) criticized the EU for reversing this so-called 'asymmetry' for not agreeing to open EU markets to those products for which Poland had a comparative advantage, such as coal, steel, textiles and food, and also for taking a narrow technocratic approach. As puts it: "The object of our negotiations is not just another commercial agreement, but a treaty of historic importance." (quoted in Kaluzynska, 1991, March 20) adding that Poland's main priority would be (quoted in Broniatowski, 1991, March 21) to win better conditions for its foreign trade:

Our strategy should be based on growth of exports. We are not begging. It is the future of Europe which is at stake. Whether it is to be a unified and integrated Europe and whether the Poland-EC border is to be a border between poverty and prosperity.

Walesa (quoted in Nisbet, 1991, April 3) also expressed disapproval of the EU's foot-dragging on opening her markets to Polish goods: "We would not like the Iron Curtain to be replaced by a silver curtain between a rich west and a poor east".

He (quoted in “Walesa Says”, 1991, April 6) also criticized the EU for giving lessons to Poland in democracy while not letting Poland join the EU. In this way, as Schimmelfennig (1999: 36) suggests, Olechowski and Walesa had wisely started to emphasize ideational arguments by referring to European identity and the EU’s self-declared role in overcoming the division of Europe in order to get concessions from the EU in the negotiations. Schimmelfennig (1999: 36) points out that due to Poland’s insistence on an open commitment to eventual membership and opening of EU markets for their most important exports, the negotiations stalled (as they did with Hungary and Czechoslovakia). It is reported (Kaluzynska, 1991, April 21) that in order to continue the negotiations, at the EU Foreign Ministers’ meeting of April 15, the Council allowed the Commission a certain flexibility in its negotiation mandate, with ministers agreeing to include a reference to eventual EU membership in the association agreements, and to relax some of the technical trade restrictions, especially on the products for which Poland had a comparative advantage, such as food, steel and textiles.

In the fourth round of negotiations, which took place on April 22-23, Poland’s chief negotiator, Jaroslaw Mulewicz, emphasized that if experts from both sides could make progress in drafting an agreement, there would be a good chance of finalizing it in June, although difficult problems still remained over agriculture and textiles. With respect to agriculture in particular, the Polish negotiator Czyzowicz complained that delegates negotiating over Polish farm exports had become lost in the labyrinth of protectionism of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, He claimed that Polish farmers were for the first time putting strong pressure on their government to block EU farm imports. In addition, Mulewicz (quoted in Nisbet,

1991, April 23), suggested that the Commission should agree to mention in the text of the draft agreement Poland's ultimate aim of acceding to the EU.

Although the Commission decided to relax some technical trade restrictions for Poland, such as on food, there was still a contradiction between what had been promised by the EU and what was actually done. For example, Leszek Balcerowicz (quoted in "Polish Minister", 1991, May 15) criticized the EU and its member states over the contradiction between their actions and words, and for not opening the EU's market:

There is really little point in talking about unifying Europe across the great divide ... or about Poland's membership of the (European) Community by the year 2000, if in the meantime Poland and the other Central European countries are denied access to Community markets for some of their main industrial produces.

On June 11, the fifth round of talks considered the free movement of workers and services. Poland's cheaper costs created some problem for the services issue, but eventually both sides came close to agreement over the free movement of labor. However, agriculture was again the main problem in the negotiations. Farming lobbies in the EU feared that association agreements would give concessions to the partner countries that would further depress farm incomes. However, Polish Agricultural Minister Adam Tanski (quoted in Blackburn, 1991, July 2) argued that farm imports from Poland were very small for the EU but very important for Poland, so the EU should not fear them.

In the sixth round of talks, on July 9, it is reported ("Poland EC", 1991, July 12) that although EU negotiators agreed to lift import quotas on 80 per cent of Polish industrial goods, including steel, Poland maintained its disappointment about the EU's attitude in the negotiations regarding agriculture, textiles and financial cooperation, and wanted to see the Community commit itself to supporting the

reforms. As Polish negotiator Joroslaw Mulewicz (quoted in "Poland Hopes", 1991, July 15) put it, "We have gained political satisfaction because the preamble to the accord will include a formula on Poland's eventual membership of the EC, but this success is not reflected in the economic part of the accord." Andrzej Olechowski expected the Group of Seven summit, which would take place in July 15, to help break the deadlock caused by EU's refusal to open its markets to Polish agriculture, (quoted in "Poland Hopes", 1991, July 15) predicting that "If there is no G7 decision on lifting curbs on trade it will be difficult to reach a compromise on the association accord during the next round of negotiations." However, the G7 meeting did not end as Olechowski expected and Olechowski (quoted in Trevelyan, 1991, July 19) also warned that they would have a lot of difficulty in sitting down at the negotiation table again in September if a political decision from the EU to lower its barriers to Polish farm goods did not come. In the meeting of EU Foreign Ministers, no decision was taken to continue the negotiations so they decided to wait until the negotiations which would take place in September. Another problem was a split within the Polish delegation which prevented Poland from negotiating successfully. While Poland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to conclude the negotiations and sign an agreement rapidly, the Polish Council of Ministers focused on the quality of the agreement. As Friss (quoted in Beach, 22) underlines, aware of this split within the Polish delegation, the Commission was not impressed by Polish criticisms of the EU's position.

An unexpected event in 19-21 August 1991, however, changed the attitude of both the EU and member states towards Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. A coup attempt by hard-line members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to take over power from Gorbachev led the EU to hold emergency talks about the

Soviet crisis. During these talks, it is reported that (“EC Summit”, 1991, August 21) granting Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia better trade terms and pushing ahead with negotiations were discussed. At the meeting, the Commission President (quoted in Nelson and Du Bois, 1991, August 21) criticized the leaders of the member states:

You cannot on Sunday make speeches with tears in your eyes and during the week send your representatives, who refuse to make the smallest concessions ... You have to put your money where your mouth is.

Poland also took this opportunity to remind the EU of the importance of the accord for European stability in order to pressure the EU to speed up association negotiations. As Jan Kulakowski (quoted in Kaluzynska, 1991, August 22), Polish envoy to the EU, put it,

It took this drama to bring home to the Community how vital our link-up with the bloc is to the stability of Europe. It’s a shame it came to this, but I believe it could end up helping us ... The events in the Soviet Union should speed up our association accords, they should make EC ministers more flexible in meeting our aims.

The intense negotiations between Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the EU continued until December 1991. On 16 December 1991, the EU and Poland, Hungary and the Czechoslovakia signed the Europe Agreements. These agreements also needed ratification by member states so until the agreements came into force, as Zelof (1993, March 12) indicates, the EU entered into another interim agreement with Poland on 1 March 1992 in order to implement the provisions of the Europe Agreements on trade and trade related matters. The Association Council, the Association Committee and the Joint Parliamentary Committee, as indicated in the Europe Agreements, were also established in 1992.

Mayhew (2000: 5) assert that the dispute between the new democracies and the EU about the Preamble to the Agreements also showed that Poland’s goal of

accession had not been accepted by all member states. Therefore, as Sedelmeier (2005: 409) suggests, the decision to create Europe Agreements “reflected the preferences of most member states for deepening rather than widening” because, through the Europe Agreements and the concessions that they provided, the future enlargement of the EU was postponed.

3.2.1.1.1 Other Proposals

-European Confederation

In order to pursue post-Cold War French foreign policy, President François Mitterrand wanted to establish cooperative links with the CEECs. However, France, particularly Mitterrand, also supported the idea of deepening the EU before widening was also. In his opinion, CEEC EU membership would take a long time so an interim solution should be found. As an interim solution to link the CEECs to the rest of Europe, he came up with the idea of a European confederation with EU member states as its core element. In his speech made 31 December 1989, he (quoted in Sjursen and Romsle, 2006: 145) suggested that “Based on the agreements made in Helsinki I expect that we will see, during the 1990s, the birth of a European confederation, in the true sense of the term, which will bring together all the states of our continent in a joint and permanent organization of trade, peace and security”. By European Confederation, Mitterrand (quoted in Vernet, 1992: 660) meant “an institutional framework within which the various European entities would discover their *raison d’être*, where their functions would be complementary and sometimes overlapping, around a ‘stable centre’ represented by the European Community.”

In order to publicize the idea of a European Confederation, Mitterrand visited the CEECs in January 1990. He explained to the leaders of these countries that a confederation was needed as these countries could not enter the EU at that time due to its strict rules. He organized a Conference on a Future Confederation of Europe commenced on 12 June 1991 in Prague and lasted for three days. It is reported that (Kettle, 1991, June 14) the idea was criticized in the conference on the basis that organizations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO, the European Community and the Council of Europe already existed to unite the continent's nations and peoples, so there was no need for another confederation.

In order to convince the CEECs that the confederation would not be a substitute to enlargement but a first step towards it, Mitterrand (quoted in Sjurson and Romsloe, 2006: 146) in his speech to the Assembly of the Council of Europe stated that

To enlarge the Community without preparation and in dispersed order would mean assuming that the present net-contributors to the Community could do more than they are capable of. It would mean assuming that the candidate countries would bear the weight of harsh constraints represented by the Community standards without their authenticity disappearing and their resources being overhauled by foreign companies. We have to prepare. We have to organize in the coming years in order to find our path and to finally succeed in founding this Confederation which I truly desire.

Mitterrand, however, could not convince the CEECs leaders about the confederation idea. Consequently, because it was supported neither by the CEECs due to their desire to become full EU members nor by EU member states, Mitterrand's idea was not accepted as a European project.

-Affiliate Membership

Bearing in mind that the EU should act in order to achieve stability in the region without weakening its drive towards deepening, Frans Andriessen suggested a new form of relationship with the new democracies and long-standing partners of the Community: 'affiliate membership', a concept which was not in the Community treaties or Europe Agreements. According to Andriessen (1991, April 19),

Affiliate membership would provide membership rights and obligations in some areas, while excluding others at least for a transitional period. It would give the affiliate member a seat at the Council table on a par with full members in specified areas together with appropriate representation in other institutions, such as Parliament. Two areas in which affiliate members could become active at an early date are political cooperation and monetary affairs. As "like-minded countries", affiliate members could take part fully in foreign policy decisions coming within the Community sphere.

Andriessen claimed that, with this formula, a solution to the debate between deepening and widening could be found, allowing them to proceed simultaneously. This formula also would also permit each country to pursue integration according to its own capacities and needs, in other words a 'variable geometry'. Andriessen argued that this would mean that "Countries facing problems of adaptation would not be faced with the obligation to take on board all the Community's accomplishments, the *acquis communautaire*, when becoming affiliate members."

The demands of the countries seeking membership forced the EC to develop new proposals, instead of membership, in order to respond to them. However, it was believed that the process of European integration should be completed before enlarging to the new states. Therefore, Andriessen came up with the idea of affiliate membership, which, in his mind, would extend the process of European integration to the states seeking membership. However, Andriessen's

ambitious suggestion, despite an acceptance of its merits for resolving the dilemma between deepening and widening, was not supported by the CEECs.

3.2.1.2 Acceptance of the principle of CEECs' Membership

The European integration process gained momentum with the Maastricht European Council of December 1991, in which EU leaders agreed on the draft Treaty on European Union which revised the EU's founding treaties. This treaty envisaged closer economic, monetary and political ties within the Community, including a single currency, before the end of the decade, and a framework for a common foreign and security policy.

In this European Council, it was recalled that the Treaty on European Union provided that any European States whose systems of government were founded on the principle of democracy might apply to become members of the Union, and that negotiations on accession to the European Union on the basis of the Treaty could start as soon as the Community had terminated its negotiations on own resources and related issues in 1992. At this summit, the European Council also instructed the Commission to examine questions related to enlargement, including the implications for the Union's future development in time for the European Council in Lisbon. However, it is reported that ("EC To", 1991, December 3) the suggestion to first commission a study by the Commission was regarded with suspicion by those who wanted the Community to expand quickly, due to the fear that it could delay any new accession by raising the massive institutional problems that enlargement would bring.

Meanwhile, the Visegrad countries started to act collectively in their relations with the EU and other international organizations. After a Visegrad Triangle summit

in May 1992, the leaders of the three countries adopted a joint declaration on their relations with the EU, NATO and other international organizations.

In response to the request of the Maastricht European Council, the European Commission prepared a report entitled “Europe and the challenge of enlargement”, which was released on 24 June 1992. At the time of the preparation of the report, seven countries, including Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland, had applied for membership and others had announced their intention to apply. The report (1992: 9-10) highlighted the EU’s moral duty by suggesting that integration of new democracies into the European family presented a historic opportunity, so the EU, which had never been a closed club, could not refuse to take up this historic challenge to assume its continental responsibilities and contribute to the development of political and economic order for the whole of Europe. On the other hand, the report (1992: 10) reminded both member states and applicants that widening should not be at the expense of deepening, and should not lead to a dilution of the Community’s achievements.

The basic membership condition was stipulated in Article 237 of the Rome Treaty, and Article O of the Maastricht Treaty, which states that “any European State may apply to become a member.” In Article F of the Maastricht Treaty, the principles of democracy and the respect of fundamental human rights are listed as fundamental characteristics of the Union. However, the founding treaties did not state the comprehensive conditions or criteria related to membership. Therefore, the report (1992: 11-12) presented wide-ranging criteria for EU membership. Firstly, states had to satisfy the basic conditions of European identity: democratic status and respect for human rights. Secondly, States had to accept the Community system and have the capacity to implement it. To do this, a functioning and competitive market

economy, and an adequate legal and administrative framework in the public and private sectors were necessary. Thirdly, states should also accept and be able to implement the EU's common foreign and security policy. Finally, states had to accept the rights and obligations of the Community system and its institutional framework, the Community's *acquis*.

Regarding the EFTA states, the report suggested that, for certain countries whose state of preparation for membership was well advanced, negotiations for accession could be opened with the prospect of a satisfactory conclusion within a reasonable period of time, namely, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by EU member states. However, with regard to the CEECs, the report (1992: 17) warned that a period of preparation would be necessary before the possibility of membership could realistically be envisaged. Moreover, for these countries, the report also emphasized that the Community should use all available means, in particular its various forms of bilateral agreements, to promote their economic and social development in such a way as to facilitate their eventual integration into the Community.

For the states with whom Europe Agreements were concluded but which had not applied for membership and which were not in a position to accept the obligations of membership, namely Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Commission offered a new framework, the European Political Area, to guide relations between these states and the Community, midway between association and membership. The report proposed that the basis for these new relations should be the Europe Agreements. With their dynamic and evolutionary nature, it was emphasized that these agreements could be exploited and improved in the fields of the

development of administrative and legislative infrastructure, determining a calendar for adoption of the Community *acquis*, strengthening of economic cooperation, etc.

The Commission presented its report to the Lisbon European Council of 26-27 June 1992, and the report was added to the Conclusions of the European Council. As Michalski and Helen Wallace (1992, July 28) state, the meeting agreed that official negotiations with those EFTA countries that had already applied for membership could begin as soon as the Treaty on European Union was ratified by finding a solution to deal with Denmark's rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, and as soon as an agreement was concluded on the second package of structural and financial measures, namely the Delors II package, by which income, expenditure and cohesion-funding would increase.

The Presidency Conclusion of the Lisbon European Council (1992) declared that the European Council welcomed the progress made in the establishment and deepening of relations with the CEECs, and in particular the entry into force of the Intermediate Agreements to the European Agreements signed with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. The Community's will to develop its partnership with CEECs within the framework of the Europe agreements was also reaffirmed. Furthermore, the document promised that political dialogue would be intensified and extended to include meetings at the highest political level, and that cooperation would be focused systematically on assisting the CEECs efforts to prepare for their desired accession to the Union. In addition, the Commission was again given the duty to evaluate progress made and to report to the next European Council.

In response to a request of the Lisbon European Council and the European Commission (1992) prepared a report entitled 'Towards a Closer Association with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.' The report predicted that, in the coming

decade, Europe Agreements would be the principal framework for the Community's relations with the countries concerned. The main aim of the report was to find answers to the questions of "how partnership can be developed within the framework of the Europe Agreements and how this framework can, itself, be extended."

The report (1992: 3) recommended that "The European Council should now confirm that it accepts the goal of eventual membership in the European Union for the countries of central and Eastern Europe when they are able to satisfy the conditions required." The real motivation behind such a declaration was explained in the report as being the Community's need to provide encouragement to those CEECs pursuing reform by indicating that at the end of these economic and social processes of adjustment, the countries would become EU members.

The report (1992: 3) also specified the membership conditions of the EU, which formed the basis of the Copenhagen Criteria. These were as follows: "the capacity of the country concerned to assume the obligations of membership (the *acquis communautaire*); the stability of institutions in the candidate country guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy; the candidate's endorsement of the objectives of political, economic and monetary union; its capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union; the Community's capacity to absorb new members while maintaining the momentum of European integration".

The Commission's report was welcomed by the Edinburgh European Council, with the Europe Agreements being seen as the means by which the community intended to support and encourage political stability and economic growth in the CEECs. The most crucial result of the Edinburgh European Council for the associate

countries was the declaration that the European Council at its meeting in Copenhagen would reach decisions on the various components of the Commission's report in order to prepare the associate countries for accession to the Union. It is reported ("Poland Fears", 1993, March 31) that Poland, together with Hungary and Czechoslovakia, welcomed the report and the commitment to study it and take decisions at the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993.

Before the Copenhagen European Council, Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka sent a letter to the prime ministers of member states and Commission President Jacques Delors. In her letter, she (quoted in "Polish Premier", 1993, June 4) requested that the up-coming Copenhagen meeting make a political declaration on behalf of the EU, declaring that the EU wanted Poland and other associated countries to become future EU members. She also argued that it would have a positive impact on the process of reform if the Copenhagen meeting also confirmed and increased the EU's commitment for Poland and other parties to the European treaties.

The Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 was the most important European Council in meeting the demands of the associate countries by sending them a very explicit political message. In the Presidency Conclusion of the Copenhagen Summit, ideational arguments were used to express the support of member states for the efforts of associate countries to ensure their transition to a market economy and democracy. As the document (1993: 13) put it, "Peace and security in Europe depend on the success of those efforts." After this declaration, the EU accepted for the first time the principle of membership for the associate countries. It was (1993: 13) agreed by the European Council that "the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union" as soon as they satisfy the requisite political and economic conditions.

The membership criteria, which had been suggested in Commission reports about enlargement, were also confirmed at this European Council. It was (1993:13) pointed out that “Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.” These membership criteria were later named the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’, becoming the basis for relations between the EU and all candidate countries.

The Presidency Conclusion also noted that membership presupposed the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. However, the EU left room for itself over the decision to enlarge even if the candidate states complied with all the criteria by (1993: 13) suggesting that “The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.”

The Copenhagen Criteria can be seen as signaling the EU’s commitment to the prospect of accession for the CEECs. However, the Copenhagen Criteria can also be criticized for being over-general and hard to assess because they are open to interpretation, especially the political criteria. Bearing in mind that the CEECs were making a transition to democracy and the market economy, it was a real challenge for them not only to abide with the political and economic criteria but also to adopt the whole body of Community legislation, namely the *acquis*. Among other issues, the criteria did not mention a timetable for accession, and it failed to provide an outline, a pre-accession strategy, for the CEECs to comply with these criteria.

3.2.1.3 Attitudes of the European Commissioners towards

Poland

In the speeches of European Commissioners, ideational arguments were used frequently. For instance, Commission President Delors (1990, January 17) emphasized the EU's special responsibility towards Eastern Europe by suggesting that "we are duty-bound to help them as they embark on the unique experiment of moving from Communism towards a market". Likewise, Vice President of the European Commission Hennig Christophersen (1991, April 16) underlined the EU's responsibility towards Eastern Europe: "We in the Community and the Commission have for historical and geographical reasons felt this responsibility clearly."

The question of accepting Eastern European states as members, and the dilemma between enlargement and internal reinforcement, namely widening versus deepening, was also raised in this period. However, arguments supporting deepening were emphasized repeatedly. For instance, concerning the 1992 programme of economic and monetary union, Leon Britton (1990, January 19) declared that "It is part of our contribution towards the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe - and a very important part, at that - that we should complete the process we have started within the Community." Likewise Andriessen (1990, April 25) stated that

To my mind, priority must be given to internal reinforcement. This means the Single Market must be completed by the date agreed, a political decision must be taken on economic and monetary union and its gradual introduction; and a greater political dimension must be given to the European Community. Only then can further enlargement be considered.

The Soviet Coup attempt in August 1991, however, changed Andriessen's attitude in favor of widening. He (1991, October 18) suggested that "Appropriate means must be found to permit widening and deepening to proceed together, enabling the Community to preserve its autonomy and dynamism while reaching out to those for whom there is no alternative." As a result, he came up with the idea of 'affiliate membership', which tried to reconcile deepening and widening.

On the membership question, Leon Brittan (1992, April 24) , warned the new associate members who were preparing to apply for membership that "from helping them, a premature entry into the European Community would shatter their fragile economies which could not bear the full disciplines of the Single Market."

Hans Van den Broek (1993, March 3), emphasized the importance of the conditions for membership, noting that "if we are to build a lasting and fruitful relationship with the countries concerned, certain conditions as regards the rule of law, protection of human rights and the holding of free and fair elections will have to be met." Leon Brittan (1993, May 27) shared this view, saying that "when the countries in question are able to satisfy the conditions required they should be welcomed as full members of the European Union." In addition, Brittan saw the importance of the EU responding positively to the challenge of Eastern Europe, stressing the dimensions of economy, security and common values:

The prize is enormous: the addition to a unifying Europe of an area of enormous historical and cultural importance to us all, the creation of a zone of stability, rather than the risk of disorder and mass immigration, and ultimately the strengthening of the whole European economy, with new opportunities for trade and investment in both directions.

To sum up, although the European Commissioners used ideational arguments in their support speeches, they also underlined the need of institutional

reform of the EU before widening of the EU as well as unpreparedness of CEECs for EU membership.

3.2.2 Attitudes of Member States towards Poland

This section analyses the policies of Germany, France, Great Britain and Spain to reveal their support or non-support for Poland's association agreement and to EU enlargement.

3.2.2.1 Germany

The process that led to German unification was first viewed hesitantly in Poland as the Polish government watched cautiously, especially regarding common problems of minorities and boundaries. As early as 30 January 1990, Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki (quoted in Davidson, 1990, January 31) declared that Poland wanted guarantees for Poland's western frontier, arguing that the German question should be solved "with the agreement of all the interested parties, and in a manner which will guarantee the inviolability of the western frontier of Poland." Helmut Kohl (quoted in Alterman, 1990, March 5) on the other hand, asked that for Germany to recognize Poland's borders, Poland should give up any claims for war reparations. The Polish government sent Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski to the Paris 'two-plus-four'¹³ conference on the boundary problems between Germany and her neighbours in July 1990. At this conference, five principles applying to the final settlement of the territorial aspects of German unification were decided, which were

¹³ Diplomats from East and West Germany, the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Britain participated in this conference

later incorporated into the Moscow Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany concluded on 12 September 1990.

This process led to reconciliation between Poland and Germany, so that before German unification on 3 October 1990, Skubiszewski (quoted in Worsnip 1990, October 2) suggested that “Unification of Germany will become, we hope, a powerful factor of European stability and unification.” The united Germany and Poland signed the Treaty on the Confirmation of the Existing Border between Germany and Poland on 14 November 1990.

The association negotiations with Poland commenced in December 1990. Germany had mixed feelings about them. Mostly, they seemed to support Poland, although when Germany’s interests were at stake, she raised objections to Polish products due to the fears of domestic producers. For instance, in March, the suggestion to maintain the 1990 steel import quotas from Eastern Europe raised tensions between the European Commission and member states. Nisbet (1991, March 7) reports that Belgium, France, Italy and Spain had argued for a reduced quota compared to 1990 whereas other countries, including Germany, had highlighted the political importance of an adequate steel accord to support the struggling reform governments of Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Buchan (1991, April 19) reports that, in the April negotiations, Germany did not want Polish coal to be traded freely due to her own interest in a special regime for coal.

On the Polish side, it was acknowledged (“Poland Hurd”, 1991, May 8) that “The way to the EC leads through Germany which is Poland’s largest trade partner” which led Poland to sign a treaty with Germany elaborating economic, cultural and political relations between the two states, including the rights of Poland’s German minority. Following negotiations, the Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly

Cooperation was signed on 17 June 1991. It is reported that (Holman, 1991, June 18) the most important part of the treaty for the association negotiations of Poland was that the newly united Germany accepted the inclusion of a clause (Article 8) supporting Poland's accession to the EU as soon as the necessary preconditions were met.

On the way to the peaceful resolution of the minority and border problems, together with Article 8 of the Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Germany had started to show her support, though not full support, for Poland in the association negotiations. For instance, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, in a letter to Jacques Delors, advised the European Community to accelerate trade and membership talks with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, reminding him of the Dublin Summit's recommendation for an early conclusion to the association negotiations. Using ideational arguments, he (quoted in "Germany Urges", 1991, June 5) suggested that there must be no dividing line in Europe. However, Kaluzynska (1991, July 7) reports that two days after this letter, due to the fears of their domestic producers, France and Germany resisted allowing Poland to export farm products, mainly beef and cereals, freely into the EU.

The Soviet coup attempt reminded Germany that she should support Poland in the negotiations. Genscher emphasized that the negotiations on association treaties should accelerate in order to show Poland and Czechoslovakia encouragement. In addition, he (quoted in "Germany Wants", 1991, August 20) stated that "It would also make clear that we view the development towards democracy in Europe and independence as irreversible." Moreover, it is reported ("French German", 1991, August 30) that at the end of August, the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland agreed to meet once a year, adopting a joint resolution affirming that France

and Germany supported efforts aimed at bringing the Community closer to Poland and the new democracies of Eastern Europe.

In November 1991, a Commission proposal relating to steel exports from Poland, Hungary and the Czechoslovakia again became a problem for the negotiations, raising concerns in France and Spain. However, although Germany would be affected seriously by these exports, it was suggested (“Steel Exports”, 1991, November 4) that Germany supported the commission plan on political grounds, although before the signing of the Europe Agreements at the end of November, it appeared that Germany was worried about imports of geese from Poland.

After signing the Europe Agreements, German support for Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary continued. For instance, in February 1992, German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher (quoted in “Enlargement Imperative”, 1992, February 6) said that the central European troika of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary should become members of the European Community “as soon as possible”, suggesting that the fear of political instability on Germany’s borders lay behind this support. German President Richard von Weizsaecker (quoted in Soderlind, 1992, March 30) assured Walesa when he visited Germany that Bonn backed Poland’s bid to join the European Community. After the appointment of Waldemar Pawlak as the new Polish Prime Minister, Kohl (quoted in “Kohl Reaffirms”, 1993, October 27) assured him that Bonn would continue to support Warsaw’s bid for closer links with the EU and that his government would keep on backing both political and economic reform in Poland.

The German emphasis on its security interests was also seen in 1993. Immigration and the flow of refugees to Germany were also one of the main issues

between Poland and Germany. To limit refugees and immigration, Germany needed the support of Poland and the Czech Republic. As Benjamin (1993, February 25) states, according to the proposed amendment to the German constitution, declared in December 1992, the government would be allowed to return refugees to the countries from which they came into Germany if those countries were certified as safe, which meant that Poland and the Czech Republic, as safe countries, would be responsible for the refugees passing through their territory. It was suggested in the Polish media (Borger, 1993, February 16) that the German interior ministry had confirmed that closer ties with the EU depended on the steps that Poland took to limit immigration. Following these demands, as reported (“Single Market”, 1993, July 7; “Exporting Immigration”, 1993, July 14), Poland reached an agreement with Germany giving it financial assistance, 75 million USD for expenses, and eventually a visa-free border in exchange for acceptance of a maximum of 10,000 immigrants annually rejected for admission into Germany after having tried to enter through Poland. With this agreement, German-Polish cooperation intensified.

To sum up, Germany had some economic reservations in the negotiations of the Europe Agreements. Afterwards, however, Germany resisted to the domestic concerns and became a driver of Poland’s European aspirations.

3.2.2.2 France

French relations with Poland in this period were based on Mitterrand’s vision that EU membership for the CEECs would take a long time so an interim solution should be found. This solution was behind his idea of the European Confederation. However, as early as June 1991, Mitterrand realized that his ideas were not supported

by the CEECs or other member states. Despite its declared support for Poland in her transition to democracy, France did not show this in the association negotiations with Poland. It would not be wrong to describe France as one of the laggards in the negotiations, especially in the area of farm products, mainly due to the large size of the agricultural sector in both the French and Polish economies. For instance, it is reported (“French Polish”, 1991, July 8) that France, together with Germany, refused to accept free exports of Poland beef and cereals into the EU, arguing that “We have no problem opening our market to Polish industrial products, but for some farm products such an accord would be a real threat for our producers and we are not willing to make any concessions”.

During the Soviet crisis following the attempted coup, President Walesa (“Poland Says”, 1991, August 20) contacted Mitterrand to ask for French support for Poland’s efforts to accelerate its association with the EU, requesting Mitterrand to declare his support for closer cooperation of European nations. After the coup attempt, Mitterrand (Nelson, 1991, August 23) even reduced the time frame for CEEC membership from “tens and tens of years” to “years”.

However, French resistance to Polish farm products, particularly meat, continued even in September 1991. The Commission proposed some trade concessions for the three eastern European countries, including decreasing tariffs on their agricultural imports by 20 per cent annually over three years and raising the volume of imports by 10 per cent per year over five years. However, the French, thinking of their beef industry, and joined by Ireland and Belgium, opposed this proposal, stating (“EC Meat”, 1991, September 9) that “This would be catastrophic for our farmers.” Mitterrand declared that

We, citizens of France, we are examining the situation of imports of agricultural products from Eastern Europe. Let it be clearly said that

we are not hostile to the draft agreements envisaged between the Community, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. We are simply asking for guarantees. I believe that this problem will be settled this month, to everyone's satisfaction.

It is reported ("French Farmers", 1991, September 30) that over 200,000 French farmers marched through the streets of Paris to protest what they called their falling standards of living due to falling prices and competition from the East. The European Community foreign ministers finally agreed to offer Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia improved access to the EU market for their agricultural exports once France ("EC Agrees", 1991, September 30) dropped its objections after the guarantees she received for loading extra meat on the Soviet market, making checks on fraudulent exports from the three countries, and implementing sanitary controls.

At the beginning of November, France, Spain and Italy again were reported ("Steel Exports", 1991, November 4) to resist the Commission's proposal to phase out voluntary restraints on steel exports from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, asking for wording in the agreements that kept the concept of voluntary restraints. However, on November 6, the EU was suggested to ("EC Irons", 1991, November 6) found a compromise that included safeguard clauses removing the need for voluntary export restraints to ease French, Spanish and Italian concerns over steel exports from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

At the end of November 1991, the EU initiated the Europe Agreements, with France's economic interest being emphasized during the negotiation process, as (quoted in "France signs", 1991, November 22) indicated in the foreign ministry's statement that "These accords, negotiated with a view to preserving France's economic interests, are an essential element of the new European architecture". After the signing of the association agreements, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas

(quoted in “French Foreign”, 1992, January 18) confirmed France’s support for Poland’s bid to join the EU by the year 2000.

In September 1993, Mitterrand (quoted in Sjursen and Romsle, 2006: 147) openly referred to the economic interest of enlarging the EU:

The present member countries of the Community would not be able to carry this burden. There are only three countries out of twelve that are so-called net contributors, that is they give more to Europe than they receive. These are Germany, Great Britain and France. The burden is already quite heavy. One cannot expect these three countries to carry the costs of all that is left to be done in Poland, in Hungary, in the Czech Republic, in Slovakia and everywhere else.

Therefore, the Europe Agreements challenged French economic interest and in order to protect her farmers, France resisted giving concessions to Poland in agricultural products. As stated in the intergovernmentalist literature, this economic interest led France become a brakeman in this period.

3.2.2.3 Great Britain

In the period between 1990 and 1993, British support for the CEECs accession process to the EC was evident, and continued during John Major’s government. Major and Walesa signed a joint declaration (“Government Signs”, 1991, April 25) in which Great Britain undertook to encourage investment in Poland and expressed its support for Poland’s bid to become an associate member of the EU and EU member when ready.

During the association negotiations, the trade protectionism of some member states was highly criticized by Great Britain. For instance, British Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont (quoted in Carrington, 1991, July 19) suggested that “It’s nonsensical to give large amounts of aid to Eastern Europe and then deny them access to the markets of the (European) Community.” Likewise, Prime Minister John

Major (quoted in Sachs, 1991, September 12) also used ideological arguments, such as referring to artificial divisions:

There is no purpose in giving countries aid and denying them trade access. It would be absurd and potentially dangerous to preach the virtues of the free market but to practice old-fashioned protectionism ... We cannot allow one artificial division in Europe to be replaced by another. We in the EC cannot say: 'Here is our club. We have made the rules and we will make new rules regardless of your interests' ... I believe the Community should welcome them in as soon as they are ready politically and economically.

Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd (quoted in "Enlargement Imperative", 1992, February 6) stated that Great Britain's mission during its EU presidency in the second half of 1992 would be enlargement. In order to show British commitment to the idea of enlargement, the Prime Minister began a tour of Central Europe in May 1992. During his visit to Poland, he (quoted in Travis, 1992, May 27) declared that "Nothing would give me greater pleasure personally than to see Poland ready for full membership at the end of this decade ... I hope Poland and Great Britain will start the next century together at the heart of Europe". During its EU presidency, Great Britain also invited the associate states to a conference. At this conference, in order not to create expectations, Hurd (quoted in "EC Resists", 1992, October 5) emphasized that it was hard to envisage a timetable for them to join the EU but he (quoted in "Britain As", 1992, October 6) also suggested that they were working to improve the association agreements to create greater trade freedom, and highlighted the security threat of unstable countries: "We will pay a heavy price later in terms of unstable countries on our doorstep and unhappy crowds knocking on our door if we are not forthcoming now."

The prime ministers from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland also attended a special summit meeting arranged by John Major, and EU Commission President Jacques Delors in October 28. Ministers from the three countries underlined ("East

Europeans”, 1992, October 28) the importance of cementing ties for economic reasons and, with the turmoil in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in mind, their security. However, Major (quoted in “Distractions and Disappointments”, 1992, November 5) again did not mention a timetable, instead suggesting that “What I think is going to be much clearer are the criteria that are necessary for membership ... We should set out as clearly as possible what the criteria will be so that it is more possible [for the Central Europeans] to determine domestic policies and also assess progress towards full membership.”

Major continued to use European security arguments to justify his support for Polish accession. As he (quoted in “Poland In”, 1993, January 4) indicated, “There is no recession so severe, no problem of economic integration so serious, that cannot be overcome to achieve a degree of European unity that may prove essential for the peace, the development, and, eventually, the prosperity also of Europe as a whole.”

During her visit to Great Britain, Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka asked for British help over Poland’s EU membership bid. Major (Baker, 1993, March 4) confirmed that Great Britain wanted “to assist Poland to become a member and we hope we can take progressive steps towards that during the rest of this decade”, while reminding Poland that it needed to develop its economy before it could become a full member.

With respect to the debate between deepening versus widening, Great Britain mostly supported the wideners by promoting enlargement. For instance, Margaret Thatcher (quoted in Savill, 1990, September 22) said,

This is no time for the European Community to say that it is too concerned with its own development to take the longer view. Now that the Cold War is dead and the barriers down, we must not lose time. The European Community should declare unequivocally that it is ready to accept all the countries of Eastern Europe as members, if they

want to join, when their economies are strong enough and when democracy has taken root.

John Major (quoted in Travis, 1992, May 27) was said to have underlined “the importance he places on European enlargement at the expense of deeper EC integration by talking privately of the dangers of a rich man’s club which throws a girdle around itself”. However, in its political declarations, Great Britain tried to show that she both supported widening and deepening together. For example, after the Maastricht summit, Major (quoted in Nelson and Du Bois, 1991, December 12) was pleased that the EU had not had to choose between deepening versus widening, stating that “It means that we can do both of those things”.

To conclude, Europe Agreements did not challenge national interest of Great Britain. Great Britain continued to be a driver of Poland’s European aspirations in this period.

3.2.2.4 Spain

Spain was not as enthusiastic as Great Britain in support of the signing of association agreements or the accession process. Indeed, it is not wrong to say that Spain was the main brakeman in the association negotiations. Spain also raised concerns about the structural funds that would be paid to Poland due to the fear of a reduction in her funds.

Negotiations with the EU did not go as Poland expected due to the protectionism of member states over sensitive sectors for their producers. At the beginning of November 1991, Spain (“Steel Exports”, 1991, November 4) dragged her feet over steel exports from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and together with France, resisted the Commission’s proposal to phase out voluntary restraints.

Spain's resistance over steel imports continued till the last minute, due to the fear of disruption in its own market. Spain wanted a declaration about steel imports. Another issue which was important for Spain was citrus fruits ("EC To" 1991, November 22), for which she wanted better access to Poland's markets. However, in the end, Spain ("Association Agreements", 1991, November 22) did not stand in the way of signing the association agreement on 22 November 1991. However, it again fought till the last minute before the signing to win more protection for its steel producers. Spain's resistance was broken by a form of words allowing it to raise the alarm if it felt threatened by floods of steel imports. Finally, on 16 December 16 1991, the Europe Agreements were signed with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The transfer of EU funds to the CEECs also raised concerns in Spain. In May 1992, Spain ("Britain's Wider", 1992, May 27) emphasized that it would block all new members until it reached agreement on large cohesion subventions to help the poorer states to prepare for monetary union. Then, in November 1992, regarding the Maastricht Treaty, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales ("Maastricht John", 1992, November 5) threatened that if Spain did not obtain satisfaction at the Edinburgh Summit of December 1992, it could veto any enlargement of the Community. In addition, Great Britain made a proposal at the summit regarding the Delors II package, which dealt with future EC financing. The British proposal included cutting EU funding and reducing the cohesion fund for helping the poorer EU members, specifically Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland. However, Spain and Portugal (Brown, 1992, December 4) agreed to present a united front at the Edinburgh Summit and said that there could only be enlargement of the EU after both ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and approval of the Delors II package.

In the debate between deepening versus widening, Spain supported deepening. Facing the demands of the Visegrad states for a timetable and conditions for full EU membership, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez (quoted in "Spain Says", 1993, April 23) replied "Don't ask us the impossible, because the community must resolve its own most urgent problems ... At the same time be constant, do not lose the final goal because I am sure that it will not be long before the community can give to Poland and the other countries of the Visegrad group more concrete dates on the horizon of integration." Likewise, Spanish Minister Javier Solana (quoted in "Mr. Petersen", 1993, February 2) also insisted on ratification of Maastricht and the implementation of the full potential of the treaty, stressing that enlargement had to go hand in hand with a strengthening of the EU's institutions. After publishing the Commission Report, Towards a Closer Association with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, ministers avoid setting any timetable for enlargement. As one Spanish diplomat (quoted in "Ministers To", 1993, May 6) put it, "We support the objective of membership but only at the right time."

To sum up, Spain's economic interest was at stake in the negotiations of the Europe Agreements. Due to economic interest, Spain did not support Poland's improvement of relations with the EU and became a brakeman

3.3 Membership Application

3.3.1 The EU-Poland Relations

3.3.1.1 The Way to Limited Enlargement: From the Pre-Accession Strategy to Treaty of Amsterdam

3.3.1.1.1 The Pre-Accession Strategy

Europe Agreements, after ratification by all member states, entered into force in 1 February 1994 and the Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak officially presented Polish application for the EU membership in 5 April 1994. Shortly after the application, in June 1994, as Los-Nowak (2000:19) states, ‘Strategy for Poland’ was devised which formed a road map for the negotiation process including the specific issues of economic reform, agriculture, reducing the state subsidies to heavy industry, the reform of working practices and employment law, etc.

Although the accession conditions were declared, the Copenhagen European Council did not state a pre-accession strategy for the associate states. This strategy was developed by the following European Councils. In the Corfu European Council of 24-25 June 1994, the membership application of Hungary and Poland were welcomed and it was confirmed that Europe Agreements and the decisions taken in Copenhagen formed the framework for deepening. Moreover, the European Council also gave the Presidency and the Commission the duty of making specific proposal for the further implementation of the Europe Agreements and the decisions taken in Copenhagen and reporting the progress made on this basis.

As a response to the demand of the Corfu European Council, “The Report from the Council to the Essen European Council on a strategy to prepare for the accession of the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe” was prepared and put in the annex IV of Essen European Council of 9-10 December 1994. The main goal of this strategy was to prepare a road plan for the associated countries in order to integrate them into the internal market of the Union as they were preparing for accession and they needed to assume responsibilities of a member state. The strategy was highlighted to be realized through the measures of establishment of a ‘structured relationship’ between the associated states and the institutions of the European Union, as decided upon in Copenhagen and Europe Agreements and “preparation for the internal market.”

In addition to the pre-accession strategy, in the Essen European Council, the European Council also requested from the Commission to submit a White Paper, a detailed analysis of the effects of enlargement on Union’s current policies and their future development. As Mayhew (2000: 7) suggests, the associated countries generally reacted rapidly, preparing their own strategies for transposing and implementing the internal market *acquis*.

As a part of the pre-accession strategy, the White Paper named “Preparation of the Associate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union” as demanded by the Essen European Council was prepared by the Commission in 3 May 1995. The main purpose of the White Paper was declared to provide a guide to assist the associated countries in preparing themselves for operating under the requirements of the European Union's internal market by identifying the key measures in each sector of the internal market for the approximation of the legislation and to outline steps to be taken by the

Commission, the associated countries and the Member states. The Cannes European Council of 26-27 June 1995 welcomed the White Paper as a useful guide for the associate countries in the context of the process of reform already initiated and of the implementation of the Europe Agreements.

In order to adopt the *acquis* as mentioned by the White Paper, Poland had made intensive institutional restructuring. For instance, as Francis (1999: 307) states, the Council of Ministers charged the Government Plenipotentiary with producing a supplementary work schedule for all Ministers, an EU integration unit was established by each ministry and twenty-nine working groups were established to work on the pre-accession strategy.

Poland, together with other Visegrad countries demanded to know the date for the enlargement in order to continue the reform process in their countries. In September 1995, Sir Leon (1995, September 11) responded to this demand:

The issue of whether we should set an opening date should be one of the main items on the agenda of the European Council immediately following the IGC negotiations. We should not wait for the ratification of the IGC's conclusions.

As a response to the request of Essen European Council, the Commission prepared reports on the effects of enlargement on the policies of the EU, on alternative strategies in agriculture and on the progress of the pre-accession strategy for the associated countries and in the Madrid European Council of 15-16 December of 1995, the European Council took note of these reports. In this European Council, the Intergovernmental Conference on the needs of the EU for the next enlargement was decided to launch on 29 March 1996. Madrid European Council requested from the Commission to further evaluate the effects of enlargement on Community policies mainly with respect to agricultural and structural policies and to review the financial

aspect of the enlargement. Furthermore, in order to treat equally to applicant countries, the Commission was also asked to speed up preparations of its membership opinions to be forwarded to the Council after the Conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference. The Intergovernmental Conference began on 29 March 1996 as agreed. The questionnaires were sent to each of the applicant countries in April 1996 to be completed by the end of July 1996. The inquiry sheet included a series of questions totaling 170 pages and covering 23 different subject areas needed to be coordinated by Poland and as Los-Nowak (2000: 21) indicates, three months later the Polish government submitted its response. Bilateral meetings were also held with each of the applicant countries, which were given an opportunity to provide any further information concerning their preparations.

The preparation for the questionnaire showed that more coordination was needed in order to be ready for the EU accession. As a response to this coordination setback, under the act of 8 August 1996, the Committee for European Integration (Committee-KIE) was established. The Committee was a “supreme governmental administration body competent for programming and co-ordination of policy relating to Poland's integration with the European Union, programming and co-ordination of Poland's actions adjusting Poland to European standards as well as for co-ordination of state administration actions in the field of foreign assistance obtained.” The Committee was composed of chairman -the prime minister-, secretary and members who were ministers from the government. To support the tasks of the Committee, the Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE) was set up by a Regulation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of 2 October 1996. UKIE, which has continued the works previously conducted by the Bureau for European Integration and the Bureau for Foreign Assistance, had the duty of coordinating the works of all

ministers and institutions directly engaged in the process of Poland's integration with the EU. On 28 January 1997, Poland published a National Integration Strategy setting out a plan for preparing for accession to the EU and on 22 May, the document was adopted by the Parliament.

In Amsterdam European Council of 16-17 June of 1997, the intergovernmental conference was successfully concluded with full agreement on a draft Amsterdam treaty which would be declared to be signed in October 1997. The conclusion of the IGC was declared to open the way for launching the enlargement process in accordance with the conclusions of the Madrid European Council. Moreover, it was also emphasized that by mid July, the Commission would present its opinions on the accession applications, a comprehensive communication covering the development of Union policies with respect to enlargement, namely Agenda 2000 and future financial framework beyond 1999. Furthermore, the General Affairs Council was invited by the European Council to examine in detail the Commission's opinions as well as its Agenda 2000 and present an all-inclusive report to the European Council at its December meeting in Luxembourg.

In 16 July 1997, the Commission presented "Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union" which explained the policies of the Union, the challenge of enlargement and the new financial framework for the years 2000-2006. In this document, the policy of economic and social cohesion, common agricultural policy, growth, budgetary discipline and accession of new members were emphasized. Moreover, the Commission opinions on the accession applications of the ten countries of the Central and Eastern Europe were made public. In the part of 'Challenge of Enlargement', it was emphasized that the conclusions and the recommendations were based on the Copenhagen Criteria and having evaluated the

extent that candidates already met these criteria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus were recommended by the European Commission to start accession negotiations.

On 15 July 1997, the Commission released “Agenda 2000-Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the Union”. In the preparation of its opinion, the Commission used the Copenhagen Criteria. With respect to political criteria, it was emphasized (European Commission, 1997: 18) that Poland presented the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, however, in the document, certain limitations to freedom of press and implementation of a new law limiting access to public service for certain categories of persons were also criticized. As for the economic criteria, in the opinion, it was stressed that Poland can be regarded as a functioning market economy and Poland should be well able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term. Nevertheless, it was also acknowledged (European Commission, 1997: 35) that larger state owned companies were suggested to cause problems for the economy and agriculture needed to be modernized. When the ability of Poland to take on the obligations of membership was evaluated, it was suggested that if Poland continues its efforts on transposition of the *acquis* relating particularly to the single market, Poland should become able to participate fully in the single market in the medium term. However, it was also emphasized (European Commission, 1997: 114) that in the sectors of agriculture, environment and transport, further effort and investment would be needed and administrative reform would be indispensable to meet the *acquis*. Consequently, the Commission recommended that negotiations for accession should be opened with Poland.

In the Commission opinion, ideological arguments were also seen such as historic process and overcoming the division of the continent. For instance, it was underlined (European Commission, 1997: 5) that “Poland’s accession is to be seen as part of an historic process, in which the countries of Central and Eastern Europe overcome the division of the continent which has lasted for more than 40 years, and join the area of peace, stability and prosperity created by the Union.”

Poland’s formal response to Commission Opinion was approved by Council of Ministers in 14 October 1997. In December 1997, the European council adopted a strategy as proposed in Agenda 2000. The strategy’s objective was to provide Poland and other associate members with practical and financial assistance to implement reforms which are a prerequisite for full EU membership. Moreover, it was also decided that from the end of 1998, the Commission would make regular reports to the Council, reviewing the progress of each Central and East European Applicant State towards accession in the light of the Copenhagen criteria.

However, the relations with the EU did not continue smoothly as expected by Polish government. For instance, in the end of 1997, Prime Minister Jery Buzek faced with a potential trade dispute with the EU over reform of the country's steel industry and tariffs on EU steel which supposed to be cut from %9 to %3 in 1998 by Poland. According to Smith, (1997, November 28) EU officials feared that Poland may not implement the %3 tariff in 1998 and EU officials also warned that an unreformed steel industry might create a big obstacle to Poland's entry. On the Polish side, Prime Minister suggested that they would solve the problem. Moreover, in December 1997, as Walker (1997, December 5) reports, Polish dairy and milk exports to Europe were banned by the EU after EU inspectors found major hygiene and operational problems in half of Poland's dairies. According to Grodsky (quoted

in Francis, 1999: 312), the Polish government, argued that the ban was political and that competitors notably French could hardly be seen as dispassionate analysts of Poland's agricultural standards.

3.3.1.2 Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland

The Copenhagen Criteria is the main reservations for European Commissioners. For instance, Commissioner responsible for enlargement, Hans Van Den Broek (1994, March 17) emphasized the Copenhagen Criteria, as the basis for future membership of CEECs to the EU, however, concerning additional conditions for membership, he emphasized that

It would be counter-productive to support reforms with a view to membership in the Union while at the same time erecting new barriers. This could only lead to disenchantment with the Union in eastern Europe, to the benefit of nationalist and sectarian elements.

The Hans Van Den Broek, reiterated that applicant countries could not relax their reform efforts on the assumption that early membership would be guaranteed on political grounds and there would be derogations to the *acquis communautaire*. Instead he (1996, October 18) suggested that “new member states will be expected to accept the *acquis* of the Union, that is all the rights and obligations arising from the EU treaties and legislations, as a whole, from the date of accession....Partial membership is not envisaged by the Treaties and, quite rightly, no one would wish to be a second class member.”

The deepening of the EU was another reservation which emphasized frequently by the Commissioners. To illustrate, concerning the debate between widening versus deepening, Bruce Millan (1994, June 6) was in the side of deepening:

The long-term aim is of course that Poland should join the European Union, but neither Poland nor the Union is in a position to take this step in the near future. On the Union side we need to devise institutional arrangements which will allow decision-making to remain both effective and democratically controlled before we can contemplate further enlargement.

Similarly, Sir Leon Brittan (1994, November 23) suggested that “In the Union we must review our own policies and structures to see where they need to be adapted to allow accession to take place.”

In the second half of 1994, there was a debate about having an inner circle, a hard core of countries which would push forward with integration within the Union. Concerning this debate, Sir Leon Brittan (1994, September 16) underlined that “Any model which appears to place the nations of Central and Eastern Europe in a separate core, lane or speed must be avoided.” However, he also mentioned that some variability related to policies and actions could be held within the member states like the British opt-out from EMU and he offered to have flexibility, namely “variable geometry” in some policy areas in a European Union which would further be enlarged to the CEECs.

3.3.2. Attitudes of Member States towards Poland

3.3.2.1 Germany

Germany, in this period, became the main driver of the enlargement of the EU but her emphasis was on a two tiered enlargement in which Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic would be in the first wave.

Germany had used all the occasions to show her support to CEECs. For example, in Germany’s rotating presidency which began in July 1994, Helmut Kohl

(quoted in “Germany Wants”, 1994, July 19) suggested a proposal of inviting leaders of four Eastern European countries to EU summits. Moreover, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (quoted in Wolf, 1994, July 19) also emphasized that improving links with Eastern Europe is a key aim of Germany's EU presidency. In October 1994, as it is reported (“German Plan”, 1994, October 5), Germany also put forward a paper to set up joint meetings, like EU’s Council of Minister meetings, between EU ministers and their counterparts in six CEECs including Poland but five EU states, including France, Spain and Belgium, objected to regular meetings, and they said that it must be made clear that no decisions can be made at them. In addition, Kohl (quoted in “Kohl Links”, 1995, July 2) also underlined that

I am an advocate of the thesis that Poland should join the EU as quickly as possible. About when exactly this will happen, Poland must itself decide. The Poles themselves must say we are ready, we want to be in the Union.

Furthermore, Kohl (quoted in “Kohl Says”, 1995, July 8) also declared a timetable for the Polish accession to the EU by stressing that “I believe the major progress that Poland has made allows us to assume that Polish accession will take place by the end of this decade -- the 1990s.”

One of the reasons behind German support was security interests. For instance, Kohl (quoted in Streeb, 1994, January 14) emphasized that “the deepening and simultaneous expansion of the European Union are decisive for securing peace and freedom.” Moreover, Kohl (quoted in “EU Must”, 1994, January 27) also suggested that it would be intolerable if Germany's border with Poland remained the European Union's eastern frontier and underlined that “Such a frontier would have catastrophic consequences.” Furthermore, in his visit to Poland in July 1995, pledging support for Polish entry to the EU and NATO, Kohl (quoted in Barker,

1995, July 7) who wanted to draw Poland firmly into the group of stable prosperous European states, emphasized that “This is in the well-considered interests of Germany.” In addition to this, Walesa and Kohl were (quoted in “Germany Kohl”, 1995, July 7) suggested to agree that Poles and Germans could give Europe “peace, tranquility and prosperity.” Likewise Kohl (quoted in Jasser, 1995, July 9) highlighted that “Germany's benefit from Poland's entry into the European Union would be the strengthening of peace.” Before the Madrid European Council, Kohl (Barber, 1995, December 14) who thought that the first political priority for the EU should be to stabilize Germany’s eastern borders, suggested to have the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in the first wave of next round of enlargement.

Ideational argument such as Europeanness of Poland was also used by Germany in her support to Polish accession process. For example, Kohl (quoted in “Germany’s Kohl”, 1995, July 6), highlighted that Poland and Germany were a part of Europe and as Brzezinski (1995, July 7) reports, Poland needed Europe, but Europe also needed Poland, without Poland, Europe would be incomplete. Likewise, Kohl (quoted in “EU Decision”, 1995, December 7) underlined that “Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, to name just some, are just as much a part of Europe and embody its culture just as much as France or Italy, Germany or Spain.” Besides, German president Roman Herzog (quoted in “Herzog Assures”, 1996, January 9) stated that “In our view, Poland's return to Europe should be secured by your country becoming a full member of the European Union and NATO as soon as possible.” Ideational argument of overcoming the division of Europe, was used by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (quoted in Clayton, 1994, October 31) in the joint committee meeting of foreign ministers of eastern European states: “We must bring Europe together.” Moreover, special responsibility of Germany was

emphasized as well. For example, Kinkel (quoted in “Kinkel Says”, 1997, December 14) was underlined to suggest that Germany had a historical duty to promote the efforts of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia to gain entry to the EU and it would play the role of advocate in membership negotiations.

Germany, in this period became the real driver of Poland’s European aspirations. In German support, security interest was emphasized together with the ideational arguments of responsibility of Germany in overcoming the division of Europe.

3.3.2.2 France

The French attitude towards Poland can be analyzed with respect to the two different presidents because there was a significant difference of support between Mitterrand’s presidency and Chirac’s presidency.

In Mitterrand’s period, only support for Poland’s European bid was showed by French Prime Minister Balladur in his visit to Poland. He (quoted “Balladur Supports, 1994, July 5) suggested that France wanted “to welcome Poland within the European Union as soon as possible." On the other hand, the concern for the change of EU’s center of gravity was the main French reservation for enlargement in Mitterrand’s period. For instance, in November 1994, a game plan for eventually bringing Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia into the EU and giving aid for their preparation was agreed in a meeting of EU foreign ministers. However, France and Spain were worried that the move towards Eastern Europe would shift the bloc’s centre of gravity too away from them and they offered some proposals, which suggested holding a conference to discuss a similar program of aid and closer relations for future relations with the countries of the Mediterranean

region. As French Foreign Minister Allain Juppe (quoted in Gaunt, 1994, November 28) stated, “We simply want there to be balance with the Mediterranean.” German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (quoted in Goldsmith, 1994, November 1), on the other hand, responded to the criticisms that EU was focusing too much on Central and Eastern Europe by stating that the EU was “taking particular care to ensure a balanced approach” to the Mediterranean region.

After Jacques Chirac was elected as president of France, the emphasis on French support for Polish accession to EU and NATO increased. Regarding membership, French President Chirac (quoted in “Paris Reassures”, 1995, November 21) underlined that “you can be sure that in this great undertaking, your country can count on France's friendly support.” Moreover, in Chirac’s visit to Poland, Chirac was quoted (Barker, 1996, September 12) to express

The hope that in three or four years Poland will be a member of the European Union... and this will require efforts by all involved... We will do everything in our power for Poland's entry into the European Union to take place as fast as possible and on the best possible terms.

Furthermore, while speaking to a joint session of Polish parliament’s chambers, Chirac (quoted in “France’s Chirac”, 1996, September 12) also suggested that “I desire that, in the year 2000, Poland will join our Union” With respect to the date 2000, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine (quoted in “French Polish”, 1997, November 6) suggested that “it will be an excellent stimulant for EU and Polish negotiators to settle problems arising in the talks and conclude them as fast as possible.”

Kinship based arguments used by Chirac in his support for Polish accession to EU and NATO. For instance, he (quoted in Bobinski and Owen, 1996, September

13) underlined that, after the enlargement, “Poland will be France’s natural partner, its sister in the east.”

The main reservation of France in Eastern enlargement was protecting her farmers economically and she objected to the proposals for changing CAP and cuts in subsidies. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine (McEvoy, 1997, July 22) underlined that “We want to make sure that that European agriculture can continue to export and that our farmers' incomes are ensured.” On the other hand, with respect to the Polish integration to the CAP, France asked for changes in the CAP or derogations for Poland in order Poland not to benefit from CAP. For example, the French agriculture minister Philippe Vasseur (quoted in “France To”, 1996, September 27) suggested that France would support Poland to participate in the EU's CAP, but noted that the CAP would have to evolve to allow for new members. Moreover, it was underlined (“Cimoszewicz's Second”, 1997, January 31) that in French opinion Polish agriculture would have to remain under special EU supervision for at least ten years, during which time the problems of Poland's agricultural surpluses would have to be solved and its agriculture adjusted to EU's Common Agricultural Policy.

Another political reservation for France was the need for reform of institutional structure of the EU, namely deepening, before widening. For instance, in September 1996, Chirac (quoted in “France’s Chirac”, 1996, September 12) was emphasized to state that before admitting new members, the EU should first consolidate its monetary and foreign policies to become stronger. Likewise, in October 1997, France, Italy and Belgium (“World News”, 1997, October 25) issued a formal warning that they would halt the admission of any new member states until the EU decision-making structures are reorganized. Moreover, Chirac (“Spain-

France”, 1997, December 2) underlined that “We must be brave enough to reform EU structures before new countries are admitted into the union.”

Therefore, in Mitterrand’s period, France continued to be a brakeman by underlining the political reservation of concern for shift of balance towards Germany. However, brakeman position of France changed with President Chirac. Despite the political reservations of priority of deepening and economic reservation of opposition to reforms of CAP, French support overweighed the reservations and France became a driver of Poland’s European aspirations.

3.3.2.3 Great Britain

Great Britain continued to be the main driver of Polish bid to the EU and enlargement in general. For instance, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd (quoted in “Hurd Tells”, 1995, April 12) reiterated that “We in Great Britain are convinced that Poland will join as a full member of NATO and the European Union, that these are irresistible processes.” Likewise, in December 1997, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook was suggested (“Brittan Wants”, 1997, 1 December) to emphasize that “As a friend and partner of Poland we will strive to do everything for you to join us at the Brussels table as quickly as possible.”

Unlike Germany, Great Britain was in favor of all inclusive approach about Eastern enlargement. As Foreign Secretary Robin Cook (quoted in Black, 1997, November 27) underlined “Great Britain believes that the European Union should be open to the whole of Europe” and he also used ideational arguments in clarifying British support for enlargement such as overcoming the division of Europe by warning that the iron curtain should not be replaced by a velvet one and stated that

“Great Britain is determined that the message we send to the second wave of applicants should be as positive as the one we send to the first.”

Great Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II (quoted in Barker, 1996, March 25) used security arguments for explaining British support for enlargement:

We strongly support the enlargement of the European Union and NATO. We welcome your aspirations to join these institutions. There is a chance to build a secure, prosperous and undivided Europe, sharing values of democracy and freedom. We must not lose this historic chance. Poland and Britain must grasp it together as partners.

According to Schimmelfennig, another reason for British support for enlargement is the Europhobia or Euro-skepticism of Great Britain. Barber (1994, April 8) underlined that in British opinion, enlargement would loosen the centralized administration from Brussels or prevent the formation of a centralized European State.

The main reservation for Great Britain in enlargement was the Common Agricultural Policy and the subsidies that would be given to Eastern European farmers unless CAP would change. As Great Britain’s agricultural minister Douglas Hogg (quoted in Moskwa, 1995, 5 October) emphasized “CAP is bound to change before the next enlargement...The cost of applying the unchanged CAP after the accession of the Visegrad Four would be 17 billion pounds sterling (annually).”

To sum up, in British support, Europhobia was emphasized as well as security interest. However, Great Britain also raised concern about the British contributions to the CAP. Despite this reservation, Great Britain continued to be the driver of Poland’s European bid.

3.3.2.4 Spain

Unlike Germany which emphasized a two-tiered enlargement, Spain, (“EU’s Van”, 1997, November 11) preferred the idea of a *regatta*, to start at the same time with all ten applicants from Central and Eastern Europe. Spanish support for Polish membership was only seen in official visits of state officials to Spain or vice versa. For instance, in Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy’s visit to Madrid, it was underlined (“Spain’s Support”, 1995, September 27) that Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez affirmed his country's support for Poland's political reforms and its bid to join the European Union. Likewise, another Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Maria Aznar (quoted in “Jose Maria” 1997, June 9) stated that Poland was one of the leading candidates for NATO and in a few years Poland would “become also a perfect candidate for the European Union.”

For Spain, the main reservation for enlargement was the fear of diversion of EU’s funds. Spanish minister for Europe (quoted in Goldsmith, 1994, November 29) highlighted Spanish concern by suggesting that “Of course we will have to grant more money for the newcomers but not at the expense of the current member states.” Like France, the concern for the change of EU’s center of gravity towards Eastern Europe was another Spanish reservation for enlargement. For instance, in 1994, Spain offered some proposals including aid and closer relations for future relations with the countries of the Mediterranean region. In July 1995, in her presidency, Spain (Lazar, 1995, July 14) offered sun-belt strategy which aimed to preserve and promote political stability in the Mediterranean by means of EU aid flows. However, it could also be argued that the reason behind this proposal was to shift EU’s focus from Eastern Europe to Mediterranean region.

In April 1997, there was a clash between Spain and Poland about the VAT rate, 22 percent, that Poland charged for citrus fruits. Spain took the issue to the EU and the EU pressured on Poland to decrease the rate, however, Poland (“No Progress”, 1997, April 21) would expect the EU to make it easy for accession of Polish agricultural products to the EU in exchange for the reduction of the VAT rate. Moreover, If Polish side would not compromise to lower the VAT rate to 7 percent, Spain was argued to threaten to block the Poland-EU Association Council scheduled for April 30, nevertheless, Polish Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz (quoted in Cimoszewicz Rosati”, 1997, April 25) criticized that “The threat to block the Association Council meeting in Luxembourg is a rather controversial way of dealing with the problem” and emphasized that the controversy between Poland and Spain should not be used to threaten dialogue between Poland and the EU. In the end of April, Poland bowed to pressures from the EU and decreased the VAT to 7 percent, as demanded by Spain and the Association Council was held as agreed. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (quoted in “Polish Premier”, 1997, April 29) complained that “Unfortunately, some countries of the Union are playing on their advantage from this situation....The Spanish put forward demands concerning tax on imported citrus in a form that is hard to accept.”

Therefore, Poland’s accession to the EU challenged the economic interest of Spain with respect to agricultural products and EU funds together with the political reservation of concern for shift of balance towards Germany. So, Spain continued to be a brakeman of Poland’s European aspirations.

3.4 Accession Negotiations

3.4.1 The EU-Poland Relations

3.4.1.1 The Process of Accession Negotiations

In the beginning of 1998, some part of the Polish society, who blamed the EU for their social hardships started to have demonstrations. For instance, it is reported (Bowdler quoted in Francis, 1999: 313) that in February 1998, two thousands farmers rallied through Warsaw declaring that Poland's accession to the EU would take place "over their bodies". Francis (1999:313) stated that in March 1998, employees of the insolvent Tractor Factory burned the EU's blue and gold flag in order to show where they thought the blame lay. Poland appointed Jan Kulakowski, a 68-year-old lawyer and former secretary general of the International Labour Organisation, as its chief negotiator with the European Union. Accession process of Poland was formally launched on 31 March 1998 and screening process began on 3 April 1998. In May, Poland presented the first version of a National Programme for the Adoption of the *Acquis*.

In the presidency conclusion of the Cardiff European Council that took place in June 1998, it is suggested that the Union's priority was to maintain the enlargement process for the countries covered in the Luxembourg European Council conclusions. Moreover, it is also underlined that much would depend on the efforts made by the candidate countries themselves to meet the criteria. The progress report of the Commission that was released in the end of 1998, (European Commission, 1998) suggested that Poland continued to fulfill Copenhagen Criteria, it should be well able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in

the medium term; however, it was criticized that there were still gaps in institutional areas.

In order to enlarge the EU, the institutional issues which had not been settled in Amsterdam had to be resolved. The Cologne European Council of June 1999 and the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 emphasized the need for an intergovernmental conference to resolve the institutional problems. Following the opinion of the Commission, 'Adapting the institutions to make a success of enlargement' that was released on 26 January 2000; the intergovernmental conference was opened on 14 February 2000 and resulted with the Treaty of Nice. In the Nice European Council of December 2000, the Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities was agreed by heads of states or governments. The main aim of the Treaty was preparing the EU for enlargement by revising the Treaties in four key areas such as size and composition of the Commission; weighting of votes in the Council; extension of qualified-majority voting and enhanced cooperation. The Treaty was signed on 26 February 2001.

In the negotiations towards the Nice Treaty, the French Presidency offered that in the future Poland would have 26 votes in the EU council of ministers as opposed to 28 votes of Spain. However, it is reported ("Poland Unhappy", 2000, December 9) that Poland criticized this proposal by suggesting that Poland had the same demographic potential as Spain and did not accept being treated differently. As a result of support of other member states, Poland and Spain got 27 votes each. Despite the fact that Irish voters rejected the Nice Treaty in a referendum by 54-46 percent in June 2001, in the Gothenburg European Council of June, the commitment to enlarge the EU in 2004 was reaffirmed.

In the parliamentary elections that took place in September 2001, the center left alliance formed by Democratic Left Alliance and Labour Union won a land slide victory by getting %41 of votes. On 19 October 2001, Leszek Miller, leader of Democratic Left Alliance was appointed by President Aleksander Kwasniewski to form the government. The new government won the vote of confidence on 26 October 2001.

In 13 November 2001, the Commission released the document named 'Making a Success of Enlargement' in which Poland, together with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta were labeled as the countries that would be ready for membership in 2004.

For Poland, there were sensitive issues such as sale of Polish land to foreigners, free movement of Polish workers immediately after the enlargement, the Common Agricultural Policy and the share of EU funds that would be given to Poland in the accession negotiations. For the free movement of Polish workers, Germany and Austria demanded transition periods up to seven years. Due to fear of being a late comer in enlargement, in November, Poland's new government agreed to give some concessions such as scaling back to 12 years from 18 for the transition period of land sales and a two year transition periods for free movement of Polish workers. Poland's chief EU integrator Danuta Hubner (quoted in "Polish Govt", 2001, December 10) suggested that

We expect political closure on these two issues by the end of the year. We need to clear the table of these two emotionally and politically loaded issues, since next year we want to pursue our key demands in chapters of regional policy, budget and agriculture.

In the Laeken European Council of December 2001, in line with the Commission opinion, it was declared that ten countries would be ready to join the EU. In 24 December 2001, Poland completed the chapter of its EU accession

negotiations concerning free labor flow between member states. It is reported (“Free Labour”, 2001, December 24) that Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, and Denmark gave up all limitations upon the day of Poland's accession to the Union, Spain, Great Britain and France promised to liberalize the employment procedures for Poles 2 years after enlargement whereas for Germany and Austria, transition period was 7 years.

In the end of January 2002, the European Commission published recommendations that farmers from candidate countries could receive direct payments worth only 25 percent of what farmers in current member states obtained in the first year after enlargement which would rise to 100 percent over 10 years. The offer provoked angry reaction in candidate countries, but some EU states who wanted to reform farm policy say it was too generous. Polish Agriculture Minister Jaroslaw Kalinowski (quoted in Lein, 2002, January 29) reacted to the Commission proposal by suggesting that “The issue is to guarantee equal partnership conditions to Polish agriculture...If there aren't (equal conditions), our farmers will of course vote against Poland's membership in the referendum.”

The farm subsidy issue continued throughout the 2002. In the last quarter of 2002, Germany and France could not find a solution to the issue of CAP reform. Germany demanded to cut her contribution to the farm subsidies but France tried to retain them. Moreover, France also saw Poland as an ally in the CAP reform issue. The row between Germany and France was criticized by other member states for delaying enlargement. For instance, Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen (quoted in Jones, 2002, October 22) underlined that “France and Germany know better than any of us how important it is for us to reach a compromise which is necessary for the enlargement process”. Moreover, Poland's chief coordinator for EU accession

Danuta Hubner (quoted in Newman, 2002, October 23) suggested that “A delay will mean we can't stick to the road map for EU accession by 2004, or at the very least serious problems in negotiating a farm package without knowing the basic elements of EU's offer.” In 24 October 2002, Germany and France agreed on EU farm reform. In November 2002, Irish voters approved the ratification of Nice Treaty and paved the way for enlargement. Before the Copenhagen European Council, farm minister, Jaroslaw Kalinowski (quoted in Grice and Castle, 2002, December 12) warned that

You cannot describe recent relations between Poland and the EU as negotiations. I think the Commission is trying to force Poland to surrender totally to its demands. I gave the [Polish] cabinet certain negotiating minimums. If they are breached I will have to say `no' to European integration.

In 14 December 2002, the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen (quoted in Staunton, 2002, December 13) notified Poland that the EU was prepared to go ahead with enlargement without Poland unless a deal was reached and this week could delay Poland's entry to the EU by years. Finally, financial compromise was reached in December 14. This compromise led to the way to completion of EU's bigger enlargement which took place in May 1, 2004.

In 9 April 2003, as Brand (2003, April 9) reports, the European Union's Parliament endorsed the bloc's historic expansion eastward by separate votes for each of the 10 acceding nations scheduled for May 1, 2004. On 16 April 2003, the Accession Treaty was signed by 10 new members. McEvoy (2003, June 8) states that in the referendum for EU accession in June 6-7, the Polish people said yes to join the EU with 81.7 percent voting in favor. Finally, in May 1, 2004, Poland became a member of the EU together with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta.

3.4.1.2 Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland

With the launch of accession negotiations, it is seen that ideational arguments such as unification of European continent and moral duty are observed. For instance, Commissioner Franz Fischler (1998, June 5) underlined that “Following the completion of the internal market, the launching monetary union and the recent revisions of the European treaty, the Council has opened the path to a peaceful unification of our continent.” Moreover, Mario Monti (1999, May 18) underlined that “On the political front, we have a clear duty to cement and underpin the new democracies of Eastern Europe.”

Security interest in peace and stability of the continent is also underlined. Considering enlargement, Hans Van Den Broek (1998, October 13) suggested that “It is an investment in peace, stability and prosperity for the people of the whole European continent and beyond.” Moreover, Franz Fischler (1998, October 15) underlined that “For the Union of the Fifteen, the benefits will also be enormous, not only in terms of prosperity within a growing internal market, but also in terms of stability and security.”

The need of institutional reform is one of the reservations that are expressed by the Commissioners. Romano Prodi (2000, October 12) underlined that “The reforms I have just described are simply the minimum changes necessary - and I repeat necessary - before enlargement, to ensure that enlargement does not irreversibly undermine the European Union's ability to act.” Similarly, Anna Diamantopoulou (2001, January 9) suggested that “The most important thing it demands is that we make sure that European institutions are ready to welcome the new members, in a way that means the Union can function efficiently. For enlargement to succeed, the IGC must succeed.”

Compliance to the Copenhagen Criteria is also evaluated by the Commissioners. Although Poland continued to be ahead of others especially with respect to economic criteria, considering state aid controls, Han Van Den Broek (1998, November 5) underlined that “Greater progress has been made in adopting EU standards and certification rules, although a number of candidates (Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania and Bulgaria) have considerable work to accomplish in this area.” Franz Fischler (2000, June 8) also emphasized the implementation problem and suggested that “accepting the *acquis* wouldn't be enough. Poland as well as the other Candidates will need to incorporate the *acquis* into its legal order and ensure its effective implementation upon accession.” Economic reservations such as agriculture are also underlined. Franz Fischler (1999, May 25) pointed out that “Agriculture is an extremely sensitive area for most applicant countries.”

Political interest of EU is also underlined when there is a clash of interest between members and candidates. For the controversial free movement of labor issue, member states demanded transition periods after the enlargement. On the other hand, candidate states wanted to have this freedom immediately after the enlargement. It is seen that Commission sided with member states in this issue and in the commission proposal, transition periods were envisaged. In this issue Gunter Verheugen (2001, September 9) suggested that

The Commission's job is to defend the interests of the entire Union. It is in the interests of the entire Union that no Member State should bear more than it can bear. In its proposals the Commission also has to take account of what would not be bearable for the candidate countries and future member states.

3.4.2 Attitudes of Member States towards Poland

3.4.2.1 Germany

This period of Germany can be analyzed with respect to two chancellors. Chancellor Kohl continued to be the main supporter of Polish European aspirations. In February 1998, Kohl (quoted in Kirschbaum, 1998, February 21) suggested that “We want Poland in the EU as quickly as possible.” However, Social Democrat Gerard Schroder was blamed to be not as enthusiastic as Chancellor Kohl. The main issue was high unemployment in Schroeder’s election campaign and he declared his reservations towards movement of Polish workers before elections. After becoming chancellor in October 1998, he (quoted in Taylor, 1998, December 1), suggested that Germany would not be in a hurry for enlargement and underlined that “We do not think we can say now with any degree of precision when this process will be completed.”

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, however, had more conciliatory tone towards Poland. In order to soothe Polish fears about its entry into the European Union, he (quoted in “German Foreign”, 1999, January 6) suggested that “there was no alternative to enlarging the European Union to include former Warsaw Pact countries and that not doing so would be a historical failure of Europe.” Moreover, he (quoted in “Germany Poland”, 1999, August 31) underlined that “Political, economic and cultural relations between the two countries are closer than ever before.” Considering accession date, he (quoted in “German Foreign”, 2000, September 4) stated that “I hope that the first group, including Poland, will join the EU at the beginning of 2005 at the latest...But it is still possible that it will take place earlier than that.”

After the formation of new Polish government in October 2001, Schroeder (quoted in Moulson, 2001, October 24) underlined that “We can’t imagine (EU) expansion without Poland in the first wave... We agree that we still have a tough road ahead of us, but we’re optimistic that the new government can bring a new dynamic to the negotiations so that the goal can be reached.” Similarly, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (quoted in Busvine, 2001, November 8) suggested that “We cannot imagine that enlargement can take place without Poland.” In June 2002, Schroeder (quoted in (“EU Must”, 2002, June 19) tried to soothe Polish fears about enlargement:

We are certain that enlargement negotiations will end on schedule and Poland will be a member of the European Union before the 2004 European parliamentary elections...We are against any delays. Poland can count on us in support of this deadline.

Security interest in having close relations with Poland is underlined in the support releases. Schroeder (quoted in Tanner, 2001, August 14) suggested that “We have a chance to make a continent which survived such bloody wars over the past century into a place of long-term peace and prosperity.” On the other hand, ideational factors are emphasized as well. For instance, in May 2000 German Chancellor Schroeder (quoted in “Gniezno Summit”, 2000, May 2) suggested that the EU’s enlargement was a historical commitment and an act of solidarity with the Visegrad countries. Moreover, Fischer (quoted in “Germany’s Fischer) underlined that Germany had a historical obligation to make sure neighboring Poland was one of acceding countries. Furthermore, before the Nice Summit, Schroeder (quoted in Lein, 2000, December 6) pointed out that “Think of Europe, the nations of central and eastern Europe: Poland, Hungary and the Baltic states. We must succeed in the historical task of constructing a united Europe.” German politicians also emphasize economic interest in their support. Schroeder (quoted in “Polish German”, 2002,

June 19) suggested that “Germany is dependent on exports. We need new markets. We want the candidate countries to develop because in the future they will be purchasing goods made in Germany.”

The main reservation for Germany is fear of Polish workers pouring into German labor market. Schroeder (quoted in “Schroeder Says” 1998, June 17), even before his chancellorship, declared that there should be a transition period, after Poland joined the European Union, before Polish workers could freely seek jobs in Germany. Moreover, Gunter Verheugen (quoted in “German Foreign”, 1998, October 29), minister of State in the German Foreign ministry suggested that Poland and EU countries should agree on long transitional periods before allowing for a completely free flow of work forces between them due to the large salary differences between Poland and EU countries. However, Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek (quoted in “German Foreign”, 1998, October 29) stressed that German society had no reason to fear that EU’s enlargement would cause an inflow of Polish workers on the German market. Likewise, Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski (quoted in “Polish President”, 1998, November 18) underlined that “We are not interested in the outflow of qualified labor force from Poland.” In June 2001, Schroeder underlined the fear of cheap labor among the people living in the borders but Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek (quoted in “German Polish”, 2001, June 19) responded that “I can understand these fears on the German side...Though I don't share them, I respect them. But I expect our viewpoints will converge over time.”

Another economic reservation for Germany is her budget contribution especially related to the CAP subsidies. Schroeder (quoted in “German Chancellor”, 2002, June 18) suggested that “at present the union could not afford to subsidize the countries that were joining the community and other countries of the union had to

give up some of their agricultural subsidies which would let the new countries get at least such subsidies as will ensure that on entering the European Union they did not become net contributors.” Similarly, he (quoted in “EU Must”, 2002, June 19) pointed out that “The EU is based on rules and ideals of solidarity...This means rich countries share with poorer ones and this is why subsidies were created...It is also why current beneficiaries of CAP should share with applicant countries.” Moreover, about the CAP reform, he (quoted in “Schroeder Says”, 2002, July 20) also reminded that “We have always supported Poland's wish to join...This question is not a question between Poland and Germany.” In October 2002, a compromise was found between France and Germany about farm subsidies. It was agreed to open up farm subsidies to new EU member states beginning in 2004. Moreover, European leaders reached an agreement to provide another billion Euros to Poland over three years in order to clinch a deal on its EU membership. Schroeder (quoted in “Schroeder Says”, 2002, December 13) underlined that “We believe we have found the way to resolve the problem and achieve a breakthrough with Poland.”

Consequently, free movement of Polish workers and German contributions to the EU budget challenged German economic interest. So, as opposed to the literature, it is seen that Germany was not the driver of Polish European aspirations in the chancellorship of Gerard Schroeder.

3.4.2.2 France

This period is marked with French support for Poland especially in the primary releases. For instance, Jacques Chirac (quoted in Bobinski, 1999, July 16) showed his support for Poland by suggesting that the 15 member states of the EU wanted Poland to join as soon as possible and added that the EU should aim to allow

Poland to join in 2000. Likewise, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (quoted in “French Prime”, 1999, July 16) reiterated that “France expects Poland's speed accession.” As a response to the criticisms that France did not want a speedy accession, French Minister for European Affairs Pierre Moscovici (quoted in “France Wants”, 2000, August 2) suggested that “France loves Poland, France has interests in Poland, France wants Poland to join the European Union soon.” Moreover, Chirac (quoted in “France Assures”, 2000, September 19) underlined that “Generally, our friendship rests on an old basis....and which leads France during its presidency to do everything to support the accession of Poland according to the terms it desires.”

In the secondary releases, however, reservations dominated. France, in 1998, was reported to slow down enlargement due to her request from the Commission about full political assessment of enlargement negotiations. One Commissioner (quoted in Peel, 1998, September 30) criticized French move by suggesting that “The French want to use this document to say it would not be very smart to go ahead with the next phase.”

Agricultural sector in Poland is the one of the reservations for France but French politicians denied this reservation. For example, about the allegations that France did not want Poland in the CAP, French European Affairs Minister Pierre Moscovici (quoted in “French Min”, 2000, June 12) suggested that “I'd like to dispel all doubts: We won't oppose Poland's membership because of conflicts in agriculture...Just the opposite, because Poland is a big agricultural country we want it to join the E.U. as soon as possible.” However, French Finance Minister Laurant Fabius (quoted in Busvive, 2001, June 1) warned that “Poland's bloated agricultural sector may not be ready to face the music in the EU's single market.” Moreover, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine (quoted in Jones, 2002, February 10)

underlined that “We are open on the question of allocating direct payments (to farmers from the new member states), but we have a problem with the level of structural funds.” On the other hand, during a visit in Poland, Pierre Moscovici, France's Minister for European Affairs (quoted in “France Seeks”, 2002, February 15) underlined that “It cannot be that we conduct a brutal CAP reform and only then enlarge the European Union” and added that France and Poland would be the two biggest agricultural states in an enlarged EU and as such had a mutual interest in the future development of policy.” Considering the German proposal to reform CAP before enlargement, President Chirac (quoted in “France Germany”, 2002, October 22) suggested that France would not “call into doubt the common agricultural policy before 2006.” After meeting with President Chirac and heard about French offer to give extra cash for Polish farmers, President Kwasniewski (quoted in Grajewski and Taylor, 2002, December 3) underlined that “On the one hand, he wants there to be mechanisms within the EU supporting agriculture. On the other, he is perfectly aware that Polish agriculture is in competition with French farming.”

Before the Nice Summit, French presidency proposed that in the future Poland would have 26 votes in the EU council of ministers as opposed to 28 votes of Spain, however, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Minister for European integration, was quoted (“Poland Unhappy”, 2000, December 9) to suggest that “Poland has the same demographic potential as Spain and cannot accept being treated differently.”

Deepening of the Community, namely institutional reform, before enlargement is emphasized as a political reservation. For example, France's Minister for European Affairs (quoted in “French Minister”, 1999, February 9) underlined that the European Union must complete its internal reforms before aspiring members such as Poland can join up.

Dispute over Iraq, especially allegation of siding with the US, is another reservation for France. At an emergency European Union summit on Iraq held in Brussels, Chirac (quoted in “EU Candidates”, 2003, February 18) advised the candidates that “They should have kept quiet...They are on the one hand not very well brought up and a bit unaware of the dangers that a too-rapid alignment with the American position could bring with it.” Moreover, French Defence Minister Michele Alliot- Marie (quoted in “France Warns”, 2003, February 18) warned that “the entry into the EU has to be ratified...In the interest of these countries themselves I say take care that there will not be a reaction from citizens, saying these countries do not want peace inside the European family.” Poland's deputy foreign minister Adam Rotfeld (quoted in “Poland Rejects”, 2003, February 18) responded that

If it is believed that accepting new members is a great gesture on their part toward us, like Chirac said yesterday... then it is a great misunderstanding...We believe our entry into European Union is a great chance for us, but also a chance for the European Union...Poland and other countries have the right to decide what is good for them, and France should respect it.

Therefore, although France supported Polish European aspirations in the primary press releases, it is observed that in the secondary releases, reservations were highlighted. In this period, deepening of the EU, the reform of the CAP, competition in agriculture and Iraq war became the main reservations for France.

3.4.2.3 Great Britain

Britain continued to support Polish European relations in this period. Prime Minister Tony Blair (quoted in “Blair Arrives”, 2000, October 5) suggested that “I want Britain to be a champion of enlargement...to include countries like Poland was a vital part of the EU's future.” Moreover, as he (quoted in “Britain Wants”, 2000,

October 6) underlined, “Poland should join the European Union as soon as it is ready to join.” Considering negotiations, Blair (quoted in “British PM”, 2002, November 16) suggested that “I think that Poland will attain the best possible terms with the European Union...Britain remains absolutely committed to the entry of Poland in the European Union.” Moreover, he (quoted in “British Prime”, 2002, November 15) added that “The whole purpose of the negotiations is to make sure that no accession country is worse off as a result of the negotiation.”

Political interest in widening before deepening is constantly highlighted in the speeches. As one British diplomat (quoted in Rice-Oxley, 2000, October 5) suggested “They seem to want deepening before widening, and we want widening before deepening Britain is keen to style itself as the gateway into Europe for these countries.”

Political interest in being opposed to federal Europe, namely Europhobia, is emphasized as well. As Tony Blair (quoted in “Polish Premier”, 2001, November 2) pointed out “Both Britain and Poland believe in a Europe that moves closer together but does so firmly anchored in the nation and our nationhood of which we are proud.” Security interest is also underlined in the speeches. Tony Blair (quoted in Hamilton, 1998, March 12) underlined that “The whole objective...is creating a Europe which is stable, peaceful, secure and prosperous.” Similarly, he (quoted in Rice-Oxley, 2000, October 6) underlined that

Nobody who considers that the EU has underpinned peace and democracy in the reconstruction of postwar Western Europe can doubt the benefits that enlargement will bring post-Cold War Western Europe and the Balkans... Without enlargement, western Europe will always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict and mass migration on its borders.

British politicians also used ideational arguments such as overcoming the division of Europe in their speeches. For instance, Britain's Foreign Secretary Robin Cook (quoted in "EU Begins", 1998, 31 March) underlined that "We are finally overcoming the cruel and unnatural division of our continent."

One of the reservations for Great Britain in this period was Poland's compliance with the EU *acquis*. For instance, Robin Cook (quoted in "Geremek In", 1998, April 1) suggested that Poland would become a European Union member only after it agreed to accept the whole of the EU legislation and applied it in its legal practice. Another reservation for Great Britain was the need for CAP reform. As Grajewski (2002, February 11) reports, Britain, together with Germany and the Netherlands, wanted to reach an agreement on reforming the EU's costly CAP before enlargement.

To sum up, Britain continued to be the driver of the Polish European aspirations in this period as stated in the literature despite the reservations of the reform of the CAP and compliance of the *acquis*.

3.4.2.4 Spain

Spanish reservations toward Poland's accession continued in this period. Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, in his visit to Poland, signed a joint declaration on 'Spain's support for Polish membership and on intensifying political and economic ties' with Prime Minister Buzek and Aznar (quoted in "Spain Supports", 1998, January 20) warned that negotiations with the EU would be long and difficult but concerning the EU negotiations he suggested that they could make a direct use of Spain's experiences and he gave the assurance that Spain would take on its share of the responsibilities resulting from the enlargement of the union.

Moreover, in Buzek's visit to Spain in September 1999, Aznar (quoted in "Polish PM", 1999, September 19) reiterated that "Spain's desire is that Poland, which is already a NATO member, joins the EU as soon as possible...we have worked intensely to achieve it and we will continue to do it." In addition, when France, at the EU summit in Nice proposed that Poland should have 26 votes in the future EU Council of Ministers than Spain having 28 votes, which had a population the same size, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar (quoted in "Spain Germany", 2000, December 9) called Prime Minister Buzek and made sure that "Spain had nothing against having the same number of votes as Poland in an enlarged EU."

The main reservation for Spain, like the other periods, was the fear of losing funds from the EU as a result of enlargement. For instance, at an EU foreign ministers meeting, Prime Minister Jose-Maria Aznar was suggested to threaten to ruin the entry talks with Eastern European nations unless he got a guarantee that aid for Spain would not be cut and Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique (quoted in "Cheap Labor", 2001, May 5) emphasized that "We don't want to hinder or slow down enlargement but find a position of solidarity." Spain also sent a memorandum to the European Commission explaining its fears and making a direct link between the funds issue and the enlargement negotiations, however the Commission's enlargement spokesman, Jean-Christophe Filori (quoted in Jones, 2001, May 13) underlined that "The concerns of Spain are 100 percent legitimate and we are ready to talk about them, but only in an appropriate framework, not in the framework of the accession negotiations." Moreover, as Jones (2001, May 15) reports, Spain, asking for guarantees of continued access to EU regional funds after enlargement, did not want to compromise on the proposal of Germany and Austria which demanded to have a transition period up to seven years after enlargement about free movement of

Eastern European workers. Foreign Minister Josep Pique (quoted in “Spain Seeks”, 2001, May 16) after coming to Warsaw, suggested that Spain wanted to safeguard the continuity of regional policy beyond 2007, after which candidates like Poland would benefit and underlined that “Don't be mistaken. We, Spain and Poland, advocate the same thing.” Likewise, Spanish Prime Minister Aznar (quoted in “Spain Wants”, 2001, May 17), who stated that he supported enlargement without any reservations emphasized that “We don't wish to block anything. We want the political problem to be recognized...I sincerely believe there will be a logical solution as in all European Union problems.”

However, Spain is reported (“End of Spanish”, 2001, May 30) to drop her objection and accepted a much flexible proposal on the ban on free movement of Eastern European labor which suggested that Poles would be approved to take jobs freely in the majority of EU countries two years after accession, and Germany and Austria would wait another three years after accepting Poles to their work markets, but annulment of the restrictions in the two countries could be postponed for another two years. In December 2001, Poland completed the chapter of its EU accession negotiations concerning free labor flow between member states and Spain (“Free Labor”, 2001, December 24), together with Great Britain and France promised to liberalize the employment procedures for Poles 2 years after enlargement.

Concerning the fear of Spain's dragging on her feet on regional funds issue, in December 2001 in his visit to Warsaw, Aznar (quoted in “Spain Wows”, 2001, December 3) confirmed that “We will do all we can so that the timeline of European Union integration is kept” and he added that regional aid issue would be discussed after enlargement by suggesting that “I am sure that if Poland's access to the regional aid has a negative impact, there will be a positive solution to this.”

After the decision to enlargement of the EU was confirmed in the end of 2002, Poland and Spain started to become allies in different issues. For instance, in the beginning of 2003, it is reported (“Poland and Czech”, 2003, April 3) that Poland, together with Spain and Great Britain sided with the US in the Iraq war. Moreover, in the Nice Treaty, Poland and Spain was given 27 votes in the European Council. However, in the negotiations of the EU Constitution, it was proposed that the votes of Spain and Poland should be more proportional to their populations. As Eatwell (2003, December 12) states, Poland, together with Spain reacted to this proposal and in the Brussels European Council of December 2003, both vetoed the European constitution.

Therefore, the main economic reservation continued to be the fear of sharing of EU funds. This economic challenge led Spain, as stated in the literature, remain the brakeman of Polish European aspirations.

3.5 General Assessment

3.5.1 Comparison between Different Periods of Each Member State

3.5.1.1 Germany

Table 5: Comparison of Different Periods for Germany

	Total Press Releases	Press Releases Related to Poland's Improvement of Relations with the EC	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
1988-1989	52	4	0	4	0	0	0%	2	2	50%
1990-1993	78	41	1	40	0	1	0%	29	11	72%
1994-1997	147	130	9	121	7	2	78%	94	27	78%
1998-2004	610	220	8	212	4	4	50%	51	161	24%

In the period of 1988-1989, there are no primary press releases. In the secondary press releases, 50 percent (2 out of 4) support is seen. This support is related to improvement of Polish relations with the EU with respect to aid.

Between 1990 and 1993, there are no primary support releases and only one reservation release. This reservation is related to German border issue. 72 percent (29 out of 40) support is observed in the secondary press releases. 14 out of 29 support releases are related to Association Agreement whereas 15 out of 29 support releases is related to improvement of Polish relations with the EU.

In the period of 1994-1997, 78 percent (7 out of 9) of primary press releases and 78 percent (94 out of 121) of secondary releases include support for the improvement of relations of Poland with the EU. Therefore, it can be argued that there was noteworthy support in the period of Helmut Kohl's chancellorship. Consequently, the analysis shows that 1994-1997 was the period in which Germany's support for Polish membership bid was highest. As stated in the literature, in this period, Germany is the main driver of Polish European bid.

Between 1998 and 2004, 50 percent (4 out of 8) of primary press releases are support press releases. In the same period, 24 percent (51 out of 161) of secondary press releases are support press releases. In that period, the support for Polish bid was lowest. This period also coincides with Gerard Schroeder's chancellorship, the leader of Social Democratic Party of Germany whose main issue was to combat unemployment and for this aim, he asked for transition periods for Polish workers to work in Germany. Moreover, he had also concerns about the contribution of Germany to the costly CAP and he asked for changes in the CAP.

Consequently, when all the periods of related to Germany are taken into account, the analysis showed that support for Polish bid for EU membership changed with different chancellors coming from different parties. Support rate is highest in Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl period and lowest in Social Democrat Gerard Schroeder period. Polish accession to the EU, together with other 9 candidates became possible after the resolution of the problems related transition period for Polish workers and German contribution to the CAP in the way Germany demanded.




Figure 1: Support Rates in Primary and Secondary Press Releases for Germany

When the primary and secondary press releases are compared, it is seen that in the first two periods, there are no support releases. It is interesting to note that for the last period, the percentage of support in the primary press releases is significantly higher than percentage of support in the secondary press releases.

Table 6: Germany Primary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total	Percentage (Total Material/Total)	Percentage (Total Ideational/Total)
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1988-1989											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
Reservation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
1990-1993											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
Reservation	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100%	0%
1994-1997											
Support	0	1	0	1	3	0	3	3	7	14%	42%
Reservation	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	100%	0%
1998-2004											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	4	0%	25%
Reservation	1	0	3	4	0	0	0	0	4	100%	0%

In the period of 1988-1989, there are no primary support or reservation press releases that could be obtained. In the period of 1990-1993, there are no primary support releases whereas there is only one primary reservation press release. This political reservation is about German-Poland dispute about Polish borders. In the period of 1994-1997, 14 percent of primary support press releases (1 out of 7) indicate material arguments. This press release is about security interest in having cooperation with Poland.

On the other hand, in 42 percent of primary support releases (3 out of 7) the ideational factors and Europeanness of Poland are emphasized. In the remaining 3 out of 7 releases, no specific reason is mentioned regarding the support. 100 percent of all primary reservation press releases (2 out of 2) are referring to material factors referring to political reservations and emphasize institutional reform of the EU before widening.

In the period of 1998-2004, 25 percent of primary support press releases (1 out of 4) are about ideational arguments. It is emphasized that it was an historical obligation of Germany to help Poland in her bid to the EU. In 3 out of 4 support releases, the reason behind the support is not specified. 100 percent of primary reservation releases are referring to material factors. 3 out of 4 releases are about need for a transition period for Polish workers whereas 1 out of 4 releases is about political issue of institutional reform of the EU before widening.

Consequently, it is observed that from 1994 to 2004, the number of primary support ideational press releases is higher than the number of primary support material releases whereas the number of primary support releases indicating material factors is higher than the number of primary support releases indicating ideational factors for the period of 1990-1993. On the other hand, only material factors are observed in reservation press releases. German politicians used ideational arguments in four releases among 18 primary press releases. It is also observed that ideational factors are used only in the support releases.

Table 7: Germany Secondary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total		
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1988-1989											
Support	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	100%	0%
Reservation	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	2	100%	0%
1990-1993											
Support	10	3	0	13	0	2	2	14	29	45%	6%
Reservation	1	0	10	11	0	0	0	0	11	100%	0%
1994-1997											
Support	4	11	2	17	4	2	6	71	94	18%	6%
Reservation	8	1	16	25	0	0	0	2	27	92%	0%
1998-2004											
Support	7	2	0	9	1	4	5	37	51	17%	9%
Reservation	8	2	145	155	0	0	0	6	161	96%	0%

In the period of 1988-1989, 100 percent of secondary support press releases (2 out of 2) refer to material factors. All two releases are related to the EU aid to Poland in order to support transition to democracy. In the same period, 100 percent of reservation press releases (2 out of 2) are pointing to material factors. German economic interest in keeping quotas of steel and agriculture for Poland is underlined.

Between 1990 and 1993, 45 percent of secondary support press releases (13 out of 29) refer to material factors. In the 10 out of 13 support releases, political interest in Polish transition to democracy and accession to the EU is underlined. 6 percent of support releases (2 out of 29) refer to ideational factors. In all two releases, responsibility of Germany in the unification of Europe is highlighted. On the other hand, material factors are emphasized in 100 percent of secondary reservation releases (11 out of 11). 1 out of 11 releases is about a political reservation of border issue whereas 10 out of 11 releases are about economic reservations. In

these releases, sensitive issues for Germany such as agriculture and coal are underlined in the negotiations of the Association Agreement.

Between 1994 and 1997, 18 percent of secondary support press releases (17 out of 94) include material factors. 4 of these 17 support releases are showing political factors where geopolitical significance of Poland and national interest of Germany are highlighted. In 11 out of 17 support releases, security interest in stabilizing German-Polish border and European stability is underlined whereas in 2 out of 17, economic interest is pointed out. 6 percent of releases (6 out of 94) is about ideational arguments in which Europeanness of Poland and special responsibility in the unification of continent are highlighted. According to the analysis, remaining 71 releases do not include a specific reason.

In this period, 92 percent of secondary reservation press releases (25 out of 27) are about material arguments. 8 out of 25 reservation press releases contain political reservations such as Copenhagen Criteria and institutional reform of the EU. 1 out of 25 reservation releases indicate security reservations for tightening Polish borders. 16 out of 25 reservation press releases include economic reservations where mainly economic cost of Poland to the EU and contribution of Germany to the EU budget is specified. Finally, in the remaining 2 releases no reason is specified.

In the period of 1998-2004, 17 percent of secondary support press releases (9 out of 51) include material factors. 7 out of 9 releases include political arguments in which geopolitical significance of Poland and German interests in Polish accession to the EU are underlined. In 2 out of 9 releases, security interest is pointed out. 9 percent of releases (5 out of 51) include ideational factors. 1 out of 5 support releases is about Europeanness of Poland whereas 4 out of 5 releases are about moral duty of unification of the continent. In the remaining 37 releases, no reason is mentioned for

support. In this period, 96 percent of secondary reservation press releases (155 out of 161) are about material factors. Among 155 reservation press releases 145 of them are about economic interest of Germany having transition periods for Polish workers, contribution of Germany to the EU budget and the proposals of Germany for CAP reform in order to decrease the amount of farm subsidies. 8 out of 155 releases are about political reservation in which institutional reform and elections in Germany were underlined. 2 out of 155 releases are about security reservations.

To sum up, it is observed that in all periods, the number of press releases indicating material factors is higher than the number of press releases referring ideational factors. Ideational arguments are seen only in 13 press releases among 377 secondary press releases. It is also observed that ideational factors are used only in the support releases.

3.5.1.2 France

Table 8: Comparison of Different Periods for France

	Total Press Releases	Press Releases Related to Poland's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
1988-1989	52	12	3	9	3	0	100%	7	2	77%
1990-1993	107	98	9	89	3	6	33%	5	84	5%
1994-1997	87	77	2	75	2	0	100%	32	43	42%
1998-2004	946	282	11	271	10	1	91%	75	196	28%

Between 1988 and 1989, 100 percent support (3 out of 3) is observed in the primary press releases. In the secondary press releases, 77 percent (7 out of 9) support is seen. This support is mainly due to improvement of Polish relations with the EU with respect to aid.

When the period of 1990-1993 is analyzed, it is seen that 33 percent of (3 out of 9) primary releases supports Polish European aspirations whereas 5 percent of (5 out of 89) secondary releases supports Polish European aspirations. Most of the reservation releases are about Polish Association Agreement. This analysis indicates that 1990-1993 was the period in which France's support for Polish membership bid was lowest. As proposed in the literature, in this period, France is one of the brakeman of Polish European bid.

In the period of 1994-1997, 100 percent (2 out of 2) of primary press releases and 42 percent (32 out of 75) of secondary releases are supporting improvement of relations of Poland with the EU. All primary support releases are from Jacques Chirac's presidency. When the Mitterrand and Chirac's presidency is compared in this period, 16 percent support (4 out of 25) is seen in Mitterrand period where as 56 percent support (28 out of 50) is observed in Chirac period.¹⁴ Between 1998 and 2004, 91 percent (10 out of 11) of primary press releases are support press releases and 28 percent (75 out of 271) of secondary press releases are support press releases.

Therefore, when all the periods of France are compared, it is observed that France is one of the drivers of Polish European bid except for the period of 1990-1993 when the primary support releases are taken into account. However, according to secondary releases, there are French reservations towards Poland. Similar to Germany, support rate changes with different French governments.

¹⁴ This difference is significant at 99% confidence level (p-value: 0.001129).




Figure 2: Support Rates in Primary and Secondary Press Releases for France

Comparison of the primary and secondary press releases shows that, the percentage of support in the primary press releases is uniformly higher than percentage of support in the secondary press releases in all periods of the analysis.

Table 9: France Primary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total	Percentage (Total Material/Total)	Percentage (Total Ideational/Total)
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1988-1989											
Support	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	100%	0%
Reservation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
1990-1993											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0%	0%
Reservation	0	0	6	6	0	0	0	0	6	100%	0%
1994-1997											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0%	0%
Reservation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
1998-2004											
Support	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	7	10	10%	20%
Reservation	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	100%	0%

In the period of 1988-1989, 100 percent of primary releases (3 out of 3) indicate material factors. Political support of France is seen in this period and French politicians suggested that they would advocate Poland regarding the EU aid. On the other hand, there are no primary reservation press releases that could be obtained. Between 1990 and 1993, 3 primary support releases are detected but no reason is mentioned behind this support. 100 percent of reservation releases (6 out of 6) are economic reservations in which in the Association Agreement negotiations, French resistance to open her markets to Poland with respect to agricultural products is emphasized. In the period of 1994-1997, 2 primary support releases are found but no material or ideational factors are emphasized. In the period of 1998-2004, 10 percent of primary support press releases (1 out of 10) is about material factors where economic interest of France in Polish accession to the EU is underlined. 20 percent of support releases (2 out of 10) are about ideational factors. In one out of 2 releases, unification of Europe is emphasized whereas in the other one Europeanness of Poland is emphasized. In the remaining 7 releases, no factors are pointed out. 100 percent of primary reservation (1 out of 1) releases are referring to material factors. In that release French politicians warned Poland that she was putting her membership plans at risk by supporting the US on Iraq.

As a result, it is observed that only in 1998-2004, the number of primary support ideational press releases (2 out of 10) is higher than the number of primary support material releases (1 out of 10). On the other hand, material factors are emphasized in reservation press releases. French politicians used ideational arguments in two releases among 25 primary press releases. It is also observed that ideational factors are used in the support releases only.

Table 10: France Secondary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total	Percentage Material/Total	Percentage Ideational/Total
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational	Material+Ideational+other			
1988-1989											
Support	5	0	0	5	0	2	2	0	7	71%	29%
Reservation	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	100%	0%
1990-1993											
Support	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	5	40%	0%
Reservation	2	0	79	81	0	0	0	3	84	96%	0%
1994-1997											
Support	2	1	0	3	2	2	4	25	32	9%	13%
Reservation	31	0	9	40	0	0	0	3	43	93%	0%
1998-2004											
Support	6	0	19	25	0	1	1	49	75	33%	1%
Reservation	94	5	80	179	0	0	0	17	196	91%	0%

In the period of 1988-1989, 71 percent of secondary support press releases (5 out of 7) refer to material factors. All five releases are related to French support for the EU aid to Poland. 29 percent of support releases (2 out of 7) refer to ideational factors where moral duty of helping Poland is emphasized. In the same period, 100 percent of reservation press releases (2 out of 2) are pointing to material factors. Political reservation of deepening of the EU is emphasized before having relations with Poland.

Between 1990 and 1993, 40 percent of secondary support press releases (2 out of 5) refer to material factors. In all two releases, French political interest in supporting Poland is pointed out. In the remaining 3 releases, no reason is mentioned regarding support. On the other hand, in 96 percent of secondary reservation releases

(81 out of 84), material factors are emphasized. Among 81 secondary reservation releases, two releases are about political reservation of deepening of the EU and membership conditions for Poland whereas 79 releases are about economic reservations. In these releases, importance of agriculture and cars for France is underlined in the negotiations of the Association Agreement.

Between 1994 and 1997, 9 percent of secondary support press releases (3 out of 32) include material factors. 2 of these 3 support releases are indicating political factors whereas security is underlined in the other support release. 13 percent of releases (4 out of 32) is about ideational arguments in which kinship based arguments such as sister in the East and special responsibility in the unification of continent are highlighted. According to the analysis, remaining 25 releases do not include a specific reason.

In this period, 93 percent of secondary reservation press releases (40 out of 43) are about material arguments. 31 out of 40 reservation press releases contain political reservations such as fear of France in shift of center of gravity of the EU, lack of interest in the Mediterranean region and priority in institutional reform of the EU, namely deepening. 9 out of 40 reservation releases indicate economic reservations in which France opposed changes in the CAP. Finally, in the remaining 3 releases no reason is specified.

Between 1998 and 2004, 33 percent of secondary support press releases (25 out of 75) include material factors. 6 out of 25 releases include political arguments where French interests in Polish accession to the EU are underlined. In 19 out of 25 releases, economic interest is pointed out in which French resistance to the reform of the CAP is seen. Among 75 secondary support releases only one of them include ideational factors. In this release, unification of Europe is emphasized. In this period,

91 percent of secondary reservation press releases (179 out of 196) are about material factors. 80 out of 179 reservation releases are related to the resistance of France for CAP reform in order to protect her farmers. 94 out of 179 releases are about political reservations in which institutional reform and elections in France, priority of France for Bulgaria and Romania, non-compliance with the acquis were underlined. 5 out of 179 releases are about security reservations about porous Polish border which could not prevent immigration. In the remaining 17 reservations no specific reason is provided.

To conclude, it is observed that in all periods, except for the support releases of 1994-1997, the number of press releases indicating material factors is higher than the number of press releases ideational factors. Ideational arguments are observed only in 7 press releases among 344 secondary press releases. Additionally, it is also observed that ideational factors are used only in the support releases.

3.5.1.3 Great Britain

Table 11: Comparison of Different Periods for Great Britain

	Total Press Releases	Press Releases Related to Poland's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
1988-1989	46	5	0	5	0	0	0%	4	1	80%
1990-1993	76	41	4	37	4	0	100%	35	2	94%
1994-1997	78	41	4	37	4	0	100%	24	13	64%
1998-2004	557	107	8	99	8	0	100%	53	46	54%

Between 1988 and 1989, there are no primary press releases. In the secondary press releases, 80 percent (4 out of 5) support is seen. This support is about British support for Poland with respect to the EU aid. In the period of 1990-1993, 100 percent of support (4 out of 4) is seen in the primary releases whereas 94 percent of support is observed in the secondary releases. Great Britain underlined that in the Association Agreement negotiations, Poland should be supported because market access is emphasized to be better than aid. Thus, the analysis indicates that 1990-1993 was the period in which British support for Polish membership bid was highest.

In the period of 1994-1997, 100 percent (4 out of 4) of primary press releases and 64 percent (24 out of 37) of secondary releases are supporting improvement of relations of Poland with the EU. In the period of 1998-2004, %100 (8 out of 8) of primary press releases are support press releases. In the same period, 54 percent (53 out of 99) of secondary press releases are support press releases. In this period, the support for Polish bid was lowest in the secondary releases. British reservations such as reform of the CAP and contribution to the EU budget are emphasized.

Consequently, when all the periods of Great Britain are compared, the analysis showed that support for Polish bid for EU membership did not change with the different governments. In other words, unlike Germany and France, supporting enlargement is a state policy for Great Britain. Therefore, as proposed in the literature, Great Britain is the main driver of Polish accession to the EU in all periods.




Figure 3: Support Rates in Primary and Secondary Press Releases for Great Britain

Comparison of the primary and secondary press releases shows that, the percentage of support in the primary press releases is uniformly higher than percentage of support in the secondary press releases in all periods except for the period of 1988-1989 because there is no primary support releases in this period.

Table 12: Great Britain Primary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total		
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1988-1989											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
Reservation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
1990-1993											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	1	4	0%	75%
Reservation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
1994-1997											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	4	0%	25%
Reservation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
1998-2004											
Support	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	6	8	25%	0%
Reservation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-

In the period of 1988-1989, there are no primary support or reservation press releases that could be obtained. In the period of 1990-1993, 75 percent of releases (3 out of 4) indicate ideational factors. It is emphasized that supporting Poland is a moral duty for Great Britain due to the historical background of Poland and Great Britain. In the remaining one release, no reason is mentioned behind the support. There is no reservation release in this period. Between 1994 and 1997, 25 percent of primary support press releases (1 out of 4) indicate ideational argument. Historical importance of supporting Poland is emphasized. In the remaining 3 releases, there is no mention of reason behind the support. No reservation release is found.

In the period of 1998-2004, 25 percent of primary support press releases (2 out of 8) are about material arguments. In one out of 2 releases political support is

seen due to the Europhobia of Britain, namely fear of further deepening of the EU. In the other one, economic interest is Polish accession to the EU is underlined. There is no mention of reason in the remaining 6 releases. There is also no reservation release in this period.

Subsequently, it is observed that from 1990-1997, the number of primary support ideational press releases is higher than the number of primary support material releases. British politicians used four times ideational arguments among 16 primary press releases.

Table 13: Great Britain Secondary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total	Percentage (Total Material/Total)	Percentage (Total Ideational/Total)
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1988-1989											
Support	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4	100%	0%
Reservation	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	100%	0%
1990-1993											
Support	7	1	1	9	0	1	1	25	35	26%	3%
Reservation	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100%	0%
1994-1997											
Support	5	2	0	7	0	1	1	16	24	29%	4%
Reservation	3	0	10	13	0	0	0	0	13	100%	0%
1998-2004											
Support	17	3	4	24	0	1	1	28	53	45%	2%
Reservation	5	1	40	46	0	0	0	0	46	100%	0%

In the period of 1988-1989, 100 percent of secondary support press releases (4 out of 4) refer to material factors. All four releases are related to the British support for the EU aid to Poland. In the same period, 100 percent of reservation press

releases (1 out of 1) are pointing to material factors. The competence of the EU in dealing with Poland is questioned. Between 1990 and 1993, 26 percent of secondary support press releases (9 out of 35) refer to material factors. In the 7 out of 9 support releases, political interest in widening of the EU and Europhobia of Great Britain are emphasized. In one out of 9 support releases, security interest in having peace, stability in Europe is underlined whereas in the other press release, economic interest in having more trade with Poland is pointed out. 3 percent of support releases (1 out of 35) refer to ideational factors in which responsibility of Great Britain is underlined. In the remaining 25 releases, there is no mention of reason behind the support. On the other hand, in 100 percent of secondary reservation releases (2 out of 2), material factors are emphasized. In one release, economic reservation of Great Britain in textile sector is underlined whereas in the other economic backwardness of Poland is pointed out.

Between 1994 and 1997, 29 percent of secondary support press releases (7 out of 24) include material factors. 5 of these 7 support releases are showing political factors such as Europhobia of Great Britain. In 2 out of 7 support releases, security interest is underlined. 4 percent of releases (1 out of 24) are about ideational arguments in which historical importance of supporting Poland is pointed out. According to the analysis, remaining 16 releases do not include a specific reason. In this period, 100 percent of secondary reservation press releases (13 out of 13) are about material arguments. 3 out of 13 reservation press releases contain political reservations such as Copenhagen Criteria and institutional reform of the EU. 10 out of 13 reservation releases indicate economic reservations such as farm subsidies, economic backwardness of Poland and coal sector of Great Britain.

In the period of 1998-2004, 45 percent of secondary support press releases (24 out of 53) include material factors. 17 out of 24 releases include political arguments in which Europhobia or Euroscepticism of Great Britain as well as prioritization of enlargement to deepening are underlined. In 3 out of 24 releases, security interest is emphasized. 4 out of 24 releases pointed out economic interest in Polish accession to the EU. 2 percent of releases (1 out of 53) include ideational factors in which overcoming the division of the continent is pointed out. In the remaining 28 releases, no reason is mentioned for support. In this period, 100 percent of secondary reservation press releases (46 out of 46) are about material factors. 5 out of 46 reservation releases is about political reservation such as noncompliance to the *acquis* and need for institutional reform. 1 out of 46 releases is about security reservation related to borders of Poland. 40 out of 46 releases show economic reservation of Great Britain such as need for reform of the CAP, contribution of Great Britain to the EU budget, coal sector of Great Britain.

In short, it is observed that in all periods, the number of press releases indicating material factors is higher than the number of press releases showing ideational factors. Ideational arguments are seen only in 3 press releases among 178 secondary press releases. It is also observed that ideational factors are used only in the support releases.

3.5.1.4 Spain

Table 14: Comparison of Different Periods for Spain

	Total Press Releases	Press Releases Related to Poland's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
1988-1989	4	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	-
1990-1993	67	37	1	36	0	1	0%	3	33	8%
1994-1997	113	69	1	68	0	1	0%	5	63	7%
1998-2004	585	124	7	117	2	5	29%	21	96	18%

In the period of 1988-1989, there are no primary or secondary press releases. In the period of 1990-1993, there is no primary support release where as only one reservation release. 8 percent (3 out of 36) support is observed in the secondary press releases. All three of the releases are from 1993. In other words, in the period of Association Agreement negotiations, there is no support release. In the period of 1994-2007, 0 percent (0 out of 1) of primary press releases and 7 percent (5 out of 68) of are supporting improvement of relations of Poland with the EU.

In the period of 1998-2004, 29 percent (2 out of 7) of primary press releases are support press releases. In the same period, 18 percent (21 out of 117) of secondary press releases were support press releases. In this period, the support for Polish bid was highest compared to other periods but still reservations exceed support.

Consequently, when all the periods of Spain are compared, the analysis showed that support for Polish bid for EU membership did not change with the

different governments. As stated in the literature, Spain is the brakeman in all three periods.




Figure 4: Support Rates in Primary and Secondary Press Releases for Spain

There are only two primary support releases in the period of 1998-2004. In the other periods, there are no primary support releases. In the secondary releases, it is seen that support rate is highest in the period of 1998-2004.

Table 15: Spain Primary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total		
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1988-1989											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
Reservation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
1990-1993											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
Reservation	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	100%	0%
1994-1997											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
Reservation	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100%	0%
1998-2004											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0%	0%
Reservation	0	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	5	100%	0%

In the period of 1988-1989, there are no primary support or reservation press releases that could be obtained. In the period of 1990-1993, there is no primary support releases whereas there is only one primary reservation press release. This reservation is related to Polish being not ready for the EU. In the period of 1994-1997, there is also no primary support releases. 100 percent of primary support press releases (1 out of 1) indicate material arguments. This press release is about non-compliance of Poland to Copenhagen criteria. In the period of 1998-2004, there are only two primary support releases but there is no reason underlined behind the support. 100 percent of primary reservation releases are referring to material factors. In all five releases, economic reservation of sharing of EU funds with Poland is pointed out. Consequently, it is observed that from 1990-2004, no ideational arguments is used by Spanish politicians.

Table 16: Spain Secondary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total	Percentage (Total Material/Total)	Percentage (Total Ideational/Total)
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1988-1989											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
Reservation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
1990-1993											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0%	0%
Reservation	0	0	31	31	0	0	0	2	33	94%	0%
1994-1997											
Support	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	5	20%	0%
Reservation	10	0	51	61	0	0	0	2	63	97%	0%
1998-2004											
Support	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	20	21	5%	0%
Reservation	2	2	88	92	0	0	0	4	96	96%	0%

In the period of 1988-1989, there are no secondary support or reservation press releases. In the period of 1990-1993, there are only 3 support releases but no reason is specified in the releases. On the other hand, in 94 percent of secondary reservation releases (31 out of 33), material factors are emphasized. All 31 reservation releases are about material factors in which economic interest in having quotas for steel sector, agricultural sector are underlined. In the remaining two releases, no reason is pointed out.

Between 1994 and 1997, 20 percent of secondary support press releases (1 out of 5) include material factors. In this release, political interest of Spain in Polish accession to the EU is underlined. Remaining 4 releases do not include a specific reason. In this period, 97 percent of secondary reservation press releases (61 out of 63) are about material arguments. 10 out of 61 reservation press releases contain

political reservations such as fear of Spain in shift of center of gravity of the EU, lack of interest in the Mediterranean region. 51 out of 61 reservation press releases are economic reservations such as sharing of funds and vat tax of Poland for Spanish citrus fruits. Finally, in the remaining 2 releases no reason is specified.

In the period of 1998-2004, 5 percent of secondary support press releases (1 out of 21) include material factors. This release is about Spanish support for having same size of votes (27 votes) with Poland in the Nice Treaty. In the remaining 20 releases, no reason is mentioned for support. In this period, 96 percent of secondary reservation press releases (92 out of 96) are about material factors. 88 out of 92 reservation releases is about economic reservation of funds and opposition to the reform of the CAP. 2 out of 92 releases are about political reservation of non-compliance to Copenhagen Criteria 2 out of 82 releases are about security reservations of immigration. To sum up, it is observed that in all periods, ideational factors are not used.

3.5.2 Comparison between Different Periods of Commissioners Speeches

Table 17: Comparison between Different Periods of European Commissioners' Speeches

European Commissioners' Speeches	Total Speeches	EC Speeches Related to Poland's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Number of Support	Number of Reservation	Percentage of Support
1988-1989	14	8	7	1	88%
1990-1993	59	56	39	17	70%
1994-1997	46	43	24	19	55%
1998-2004	120	73	34	39	46%

When the period of 1988 and 1989 is examined, it is seen that, 88 percent of speeches (7 out of 8) indicates support for improvement of relations with Poland. When the period of 1990-1993 is investigated, it is observed that 70 percent of speeches indicate support for Poland's European aspirations, namely close cooperation and integration on the basis of Europe Agreements. In the period of 1994-1997, it is seen that 55 percent of speeches indicates support for Poland's European Union membership. Finally in the period of 1998-2004, 46 percent of support is observed for Poland.

Table 18: Poland-European Commissioners' Speeches-Material/Ideational Factors

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total	Percentage (Total Material/Total)	Percentage (Total Ideational/Total)
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1988-1989											
Support	3	2	0	5	0	2	2	0	7	71%	29%
Reservation	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	100%	0%
1990-1993											
Support	21	3	2	26	1	10	11	2	39	66%	28%
Reservation	15	0	1	16	0	0	0	1	17	94%	0%
1994-1997											
Support	6	4	0	10	0	4	4	10	24	41%	17%
Reservation	15	0	4	19	0	0	0	0	19	100%	0%
1998-2004											
Support	0	14	1	15	1	12	13	6	34	38%	25%
Reservation	27	0	12	39	0	0	0	0	0	100%	0%

Considering 1988-1989 period, 2 out of 7 speeches indicates security interest by linking improvement of relations with the internal stability in Europe

whereas, in 2 out of 7 speeches, ideational factors, such as moral duty and responsibility of the EC to help Poland are observed. Moreover, in 3 out of 7 speeches, political interest in helping Polish transition is emphasized. On the other hand, 12 percent of speeches (1 out of 8), political conditionality is emphasized in order to help transition.

With respect to the period of 1990-1993, in the support speeches, ideational factors such as responsibility and common culture are observed as well as material factors such as political interest in helping transition to democracy and market economy and widening and deepening of the Community at the same time; economic interest and security interest. Nevertheless, the percentage of speeches that refers to material factors is higher than percentages of speeches that refers to ideational factors. When the reservations in the speeches are analyzed, it is seen that political interest in deepening the EC before widening as well as the economic reservation of Polish economic backwardness are underlined.

With respect to factors in the speeches for the period of 1994-1997, it is seen that ideational factors such as responsibility of the EC and overcoming the division of Europe are emphasized. Material factors such as political interest in helping Polish transition and widening of the Community and security interest in stability in Europe with Polish accession are also observed. However, 10 out of 24 support speeches refer to material factors whereas 4 out of 24 speeches refer to ideational factors. With respect to reservations, it is seen that political interests in institutional reform before widening and Polish compliance to Copenhagen Criteria are emphasized. Moreover, economic reservations such as Polish agriculture and Polish economic backwardness are also underlined.

Considering factors in the speeches, for the period of 1998-2004, it is seen that material factors such as security interest in having stability, security and peace are emphasized. With respect to ideational factors, it is observed that the importance of unification of Europe is underlined. On the other hand, 15 out of 34 support speeches refer to material factors whereas 14 out of 35 speeches refer to ideational factors. With respect to reservations, it is seen that political interests in institutional reform before accession and Polish compliance to Copenhagen Criteria as well as implementation of the reforms are emphasized. Moreover, economic reservations such as handicaps of Polish agriculture and protectionism of Poland are also underlined.

3.5.3 Comparison of Member States' Attitudes towards Poland¹⁵

Table 19: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States between 1988 and 1989

Member States	Total Press Releases (1988-1989)	Press releases Related to Poland's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	52	4	0	4	0	0	0%	2	2	50%
France	52	12	3	9	3	0	100%	7	2	77%
Great Britain	46	5	0	5	0	0	0%	4	1	80%
Spain	4	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0%

Between the years 1988 and 1989, limited number of releases related to Poland's improvement of relations with the EU are found in Factiva database. Only 3 of press releases were from primary resources and all of them were supporting

¹⁵ Due to low number of primary press releases, statistical tests comparing support rates of member states are not conducted for Poland.

Poland's improvement of relations with the EC. In the secondary press releases, it is observed that support rate of France is 77 percent whereas support rate of Great Britain is 80 percent. Regarding Germany, 50 percent of releases are supporting improvement of Polish relations with the EU. On the other hand, there is no support or reservation releases emanating from Spain.

Therefore, in this period, main drivers for Poland's European bid were France and Great Britain. Despite the political reservations such as priority of deepening of the EU, France and Great Britain continued to support Poland. Germany has some economic reservations whereas there are no press releases regarding Spanish attitude.

Table 20: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States between 1990 and 1993

Member States	Total Press Releases (1990-1993)	Press Releases Related to Turkey's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	78	41	1	40	0	1	0%	29	11	72%
France	107	98	9	89	3	6	33%	5	84	5%
Great Britain	76	41	4	37	4	0	100%	35	2	94%
Spain	67	37	1	36	0	1	0%	3	33	8%

When the findings regarding the period 1990-1995 are analyzed, it is seen that there is significant increase in the number of press releases that could be obtained from the Factiva Database. Releases related to France are highest among other member states (similar to the 1988-1989 periods). In the primary resources, support releases of Great Britain are higher than other member states whereas reservation releases of France are higher than other member states. A similar result can be obtained for Great Britain in the secondary releases where around 94 percent of the releases are supportive whereas only 5 percent of releases of France are

supportive. Regarding Germany, 72 percent of releases shows support whereas for Spain, this percentage decreases to 8 percent.

Consequently, as stated in the literature, Great Britain and Germany are the drivers for Poland's improvement of relations with the EU whereas France and Spain are the brakemen for Polish relations with the EU.

Table 21: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States between 1994 and 1997

Member States	Total Press Releases (1994-1997)	Press Releases Related to Poland's Improvement of Relations with the EC	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	147	130	9	121	7	2	78%	94	27	78%
France	87	77	2	75	2	0	100%	32	43	42%
Great Britain	78	41	4	37	4	0	100%	24	13	64%
Spain	113	69	1	68	0	1	0%	5	63	7%

Between 1994 and 1997, in primary resources support rate was relatively low in Spain and France compared to Germany and Great Britain. According to primary releases, Germany, France and Great Britain support Polish European bid whereas support rate of Spain is 0 percent. In the secondary releases, support rate is highest in Germany with 78 percent. Great Britain is following Germany with 64 percent whereas 42 percent of releases show support for France. However, when a comparison is made between Mitterrand presidency and Chirac's presidency, it is seen that support rate of Polish European bid is increased from 16 percent to 56 percent in Chirac's period. Regarding Spain, only 7 percent of releases show support.

To sum up, as proposed in the literature, Great Britain and Germany are the drivers for Poland's improvement of relations. With respect to France, in the same line with literature, France is brakeman in the Mitterrand's presidency. However,

support rate increased to 100 percent in primary and 56 percent in secondary releases in Chirac's period. Therefore, France is no longer a brakeman in Chirac's period. In this period, Spain continues to be the brakeman for Polish relations with the EU.

Table 22: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States between 1998 and 2004

Member States	Total Press Releases (1998-2004)	Press Releases Related to Poland's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	610	220	8	212	4	4	50%	51	161	24%
France	946	282	11	271	10	1	91%	75	196	28%
Great Britain	557	107	8	99	8	0	100%	53	46	54%
Spain	585	124	7	117	2	5	29%	21	96	18%

In the last period that is analyzed in this study, it is again observed that the support rate is significantly higher regarding Great Britain compared to all other countries and the support rate related to Germany decreases drastically. On the other hand, support of Spain, when compared to other periods, slightly increased. The results of the analysis of secondary releases also support this assessment.

Therefore, it is observed that, as opposed to the literature, Germany is no longer a driver of Polish accession bid due to the economic reservations of free movement of Polish workers and contribution of Germany to the EU budget. As stated in the literature, Great Britain continues to be driver whereas Spain continues to be brakeman. Regarding France, according to primary releases, France is driver, however, according to secondary releases, support rate decreases to 28 percent due to the high number of releases related to French opposition the reform of the CAP.

Consequently, some general conclusions can be derived from this analysis. Firstly, Great Britain is the main driver for Poland's European aspirations in all

periods. So it can be argued that for Poland, the British support for enlargement of the EU is a state policy which does not change with changes in government.

Secondly, although in the literature, it is widely acknowledged that Germany is the main driver of Polish European aspirations, this study shows that Germany has reservations in some specific periods. For instance, in the association agreement negotiations, Germany has some economic reservations. After the signing of Europe Agreements, Germany, especially Helmut Kohl, became the main driver in the Polish relations with the EU. However, with the chancellorship of Gerard Schroeder, Germany again expressed economic reservations towards free movement of Polish workers because unemployment was the main priority for Schroeder government. Another reservation was German contribution to the EU budget with regard to the CAP.

Thirdly, it is seen that France, in all periods, prioritizes deepening of the Community. Moreover, French governments are sensitive about domestic concerns and emphasized economic reservations in order to protect French citizens from the effects of enlargement. For Poland, in the period of 1988-1989, the relations between Poland and France were based on French support to Polish transition to democracy by confirming aid packages and advocating Polish interests in terms of aid in the international forums. However, French also emphasized that Poland and other CEECs could not have institutional relations with the EC before deepening of the EC. On the other hand, in the period of 1990-1993, France became the brakemen due to economic reservations related to Association Agreement in order to protect her farmers. In the period of 1994-1997, especially after the election of Jacques Chirac as president of France, the emphasis on French support for Polish accession to the EU and NATO increased. Between 1998 and 2004, the main reservation for

France was proposals of other member states for changing Common Agricultural Policy and inclusion of Poland in CAP. In order to protect French farmers, France asked for transition periods for inclusion of Poland in the CAP.

Finally, Spain is the main brakeman for Poland. For the Association Agreement, the main economic reservation for Spain was its steel industry according to the secondary releases. Afterwards, the main Spanish economic reservations became the fear of losing funds from the EU as a result of enlargement and proposals for the change of the CAP. Spain even used this fund issue against the demands of Germany and Austria for a transition period of free movement of Polish workers after enlargement.

CHAPTER IV

TURKISH ACCESSION PROCESS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

This part of the dissertation deals with Turkish accession process to the EU. The main aim of this analysis is to understand whether rationalist or constructivist/sociological institutionalism can explain the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states to support Customs Union, accept Turkey as a candidate, open accession negotiations, but not yet accept Turkey as a member state.

There are four periods to consider. The first concerns Turkey's initial membership application between 1 January 1987 and 31 December 1989. 1987 is significant because Turkey applied for membership in April 1987. 31 December 1989 is important because the European Commission issued its opinion regarding Turkey's membership application. The second period examines the Customs Union negotiations between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 1995. 31 December 1995 is significant because it was agreed on March 1995 that Turkey would have Customs

Union with the EU, effective from January 1996. The third period covers Turkey's acceptance as a candidate in the Helsinki European Council and setting the date for the opening of accession negotiations between 1 January 1996 and 31 December 2004. 31 December 2004 was chosen because, in December 2004, Turkey was given the date of 3 October 2005 for the opening of formal accession negotiations. The final period includes these accession negotiations between 1 January 2005 and 31 July 2012. This final date is cut-off point for the database searches for this study.

In analyzing each period, this chapter first investigates the EU's relations with Turkey in order to understand the EU's policies and the European Commissioners policies towards Turkey, Secondly, it examines the attitudes of four member states, Germany, France, Great Britain and Greece, towards Turkey in order to determine whether or not they supported Turkey in her EU membership bid and to reveal the source of the motivation, rationalist or constructivist-sociological, behind their support or non-support to Turkey. That is, this chapter analyzes the reasons behind the attitude of these states towards enlargement in relation to rationalist institutionalist factors, such as economic, security and political interests, or constructivist/sociological institutionalist factors, such as collective identity and moral duty.

To the final part of the chapter reports on the content analysis of the documents selected from the RAPID and FACTIVE databases for analysis of the expressed attitudes of European Commissioners and member state politicians.

4.1 Membership Application

4.1.1 EU-Turkey Relations

4.1.1.1 Historical Context of Turkish Politics

In Turkey, democratization has been an important element of its modernization project. It was initiated in the late Ottoman period, especially by those officers and administrators who had been educated in Europe. For them, modernization was primarily understood and practiced as material westernization, with the implication that if the empire was to survive, it would have to modernize/westernize its structure according to western values, such as liberal democracy, secularism and capitalism. However, as Okyar (1984: 50) suggests, “The impulse towards change had to come from the top; it had to be imposed upon a largely indifferent and even unwilling population”. In other words, modernization was largely a state-imposed project, which was imposed without regard to social resistance. Although westernization took place, albeit slowly, within the military, the central and local administration, and the educational system, these attempts proved ineffective and could not ensure the Ottoman Empire’s survival. The First World War brought about its end. After the war, Turkey successfully fought against Western occupation in the War of Independence, and in 1923, the Turkish Republic was proclaimed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. His primary goal was a modernized, secular Turkey which could compete successfully with other states at the highest level of contemporary civilization. Landau (1984: 2) states that “Atatürk [was] successful in the creation of a modern republican state structure with a constitution, an elected parliament and other western type institutions; founding of a political

party as the chief agent of modernization which is Republican People's Party (RPP); creation of a modern bureaucracy; secularizing education and the courts and emancipation of women both politically and socially". These reforms were made in line with the Ataturk's western, secular, nationalist principles, called 'Kemalism'.¹⁶ Thus, it can be suggested that Ataturk shared the modernization and westernization understandings of the Ottoman elite and tried to raise the country to contemporary European levels through developing liberal democracy, secularism and the western institutions.

Ataturk did not want to rule the country as a one-party dictator, seeing democracy as the main component of his modernization project. Therefore, he briefly allowed the formation of an opposition party¹⁷ in 1924-25, and encouraged the formation of another¹⁸ in 1930. However, as Rustow (1988: 244) notes, "he soon called off these experiments when they gave rise to strong expressions of traditionalist Islamic and even separatist movements." Turkey's transition to democracy came with the initiation of multiparty politics in 1945. Ismet Inonu, Ataturk's successor, allowed a free press and the formation of opposition parties. The first multiparty elections took place in 1946, although the governing RPP's replacement by the Democratic Party, which was the main opposition party, only came in the second multiparty elections of 1950.

¹⁶ The six Kemalist principles of republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and reformism-revolutionarism, were incorporated into the RPP ideology in 1931, and into the Turkish constitution in 1937.

¹⁷ The Progressive and Republican Party was established in 1924 as the first opposition party. However, the Kurdish-led Sheik Said Rebellion broke out in Turkey's southeast. The introduction of emergency laws and tribunals in order to deal with the rebellion led the government to put an end to this first attempt at multiparty politics.

¹⁸ The Free Party was established in 1930 with the encouragement of Ataturk. However, the party became the centre of anti-regime elements. The party was compelled to close it down as a result of a religious rebellion called the 'Menemen Case'.

Turkish democracy has been interrupted three times by military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 and damaged severely by post modern coup in 1997 and e-memorandum in 2007) (Ahmad, 1997; Hale, 1988; Harris, 1988; Heper, 1988, Ozbudun 2000; Güney, 2002; Candar, 1999; Aydınli, 2011). According to Karaosmanoglu (1991, 160), “all military interventions had a civilian-oriented character, instead of the establishment of an authoritarian regime. They were regarded by the military as necessary to preserve, rather than abrogate, the country’s democratic institutions”. In other words, following all three interventions, the military tried to restore democracy and return the power to the civilians because they saw themselves as the guardians of the democratic regime and Kemalist reforms. However, as Ozbudun (2000:105) emphasizes, “on each occasion the military gained important exit guarantees that enhanced its role in the subsequent democratic regime.” The most important exit guarantee was the National Security Council (NSC), established after the 1960 coup and further enhanced after the 1980 coup. This was composed of the highest military and civilian leaders, meeting under the chairmanship of the president of the republic. With this institution, even after the transition to democracy, the military retained an important, albeit informal, role in Turkish politics, and Turkey has not been able to exert civilian control over the military because of the existence of this institution. This has led to criticism of Turkish democracy by EU because this institution has been seen as an obstacle for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.

4.1.1.2 Brief History of EU-Turkish Relations

Relations with the EU date back to 1959 when Turkey, together with Greece, applied for associate membership to the European Economic Community. It was obvious that the Turkish elite wanted Turkey to be a member of the EU, not only for its economic benefits, but also because they believed that membership would help Turkey continue its modernization and democratization process and fulfill its search for recognition as part of the European family. However, Greece's application was also an important factor. Even though there was a breakdown in democracy with the military coup of 1960, the military, immediately after the coup, stated that they would pursue Turkey's existing foreign policy. As Çalış (2008:86) states, "The first government that was established after the coup gave importance to relations with the EU because they saw the EU as an instrument in which they could explain their justness to the European states which are very sensitive about democracy". However, on the European side, the 1960 coup was not welcomed. Çınar (quoted in Çalış, 2008:97) reports that "The European Council, which was convened in September 26-27 1961, decided to postpone the negotiations about the association membership until there would be free elections in Turkey."

On September 1, 1963, Turkey became an associate member of the EU by signing an Association Agreement, the Ankara Treaty, which created the Association Council. Article 28 of the Ankara Treaty explicitly states that "As soon as the operation of the Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of accession of Turkey to the Community." Thus, the Ankara Treaty marks the first time that the EU

recognized Turkey's eligibility for EU membership. In December 1964, the treaty entered into force. There was also a financial cooperation side of the treaty which was renewed regularly through financial protocols. The first Financial Protocol (EU, 1989, December 12) concluded for a five-year period from December 1964, made 175 million units of account available to the Turkish authorities in the form of loans at reduced interest rates.

In 1970, the Association Agreement was supplemented by an Additional Protocol (EU, 1989, April 25) which laid down the steps for achieving the Customs Union and developing economic cooperation between the partners, including the accomplishment of free movement of goods, persons and services by the end of a period of 22 years. The second Financial Protocol (EU, 1989, December 12), covering the period 1973-76, made available ECU 195 million in the form of ordinary loans from the European Investment Bank, while the third Financial Protocol (1979-81) presented ECU 220 million in loans at reduced interest rates and ECU 90 million in EIB loans.

The Association Agreement (EU, 1989, April 25) was regenerated by the Association Council's decisions of June 1980, which set the timetable and conditions under which the EU would eliminate, by 1 January 1987, its customs duties on Turkish agricultural products, and also the principles governing the employment, freedom of movement and rights of Turkish workers and their families in the EU. In addition, this Council, owing to Turkey's difficult economic situation, also decided to provide ECU 75 million of special aid to bridge the gap between the third and fourth Financial Protocols. Finally, the Association Council (EU, 1989, December 12) also agreed to open negotiations on the fourth Financial Protocol, covering 1982-87.

Relations with the EU deteriorated again following Turkey's third military coup on 12 September 1980. The EU reacted cautiously to the military coup, declaring on 13 September, that it expected the return to civilian rule as soon as possible. Despite the coup, the Fourth Financial Protocol, making ECU 600 million available to the Turkish authorities, was negotiated and signed in June 1981. However, in 1981, the arrest of the leaders of several political parties led to criticisms from the EU, who responded by suspending the fourth Financial Protocol. In addition, in January 1982, the EU decided to officially suspend the Ankara Agreement and freeze its political relations with Turkey. Finally, the European Parliament decided not to renew the European wing of the Joint Parliamentary Committee until general elections were held and a parliament established in Turkey.

After elections were once again held in 1983, one of the most important aims of the first Ozal government was improving Turkey's relations with the EU and gaining EU membership. By 1986, democratic political developments in Turkey allowed the EU to move towards restoring normal relations. For example, on 17 February 1986, the Council (EU, 1988, April 22) agreed to the first meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council, which took place in September 1986.

4.1.1.3 Turkey's Application for EU Membership

On 14 April 1987, the Foreign Minister of Ozal's government, Ali Bozer, officially applied for full membership of the EU on the basis of Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, Article 98 of the ECSC Treaty and Article 205 of the EAEC Treaty. In order to increase Turkey's chances, the government, following a referendum in

September 1987, lifted the ban imposed after the 1980 coup on former political leaders, and an early general election was held in November 1987.

Turkey's application for full membership was not welcomed by the EU as the country was seen as unready for the membership because of its size, population, economic backwardness and democratic deficits. Moreover, the EU had just completed its Mediterranean enlargement and did not wish to continue enlargement with Turkey, while Greece also used her membership to influence Turkish-EU relations, such as by suggesting blocking financial aid for Turkey and opposing Turkey's membership before solution of Cyprus problem. Regarding Cyprus, the European Commissioner for Mediterranean Affairs, Claude Cheysson (quoted in McElroy, 1988, May 21) on a visit to the island, suggested that

Partition is clearly unacceptable in international terms ... Why Turkey should insist on keeping forces (in north Cyprus), should insist on being guilty in terms of international law, embarrassing all the countries with which they want to work ... I am delighted that at long last the European Parliament has understood the proper dimensions of the Cypriot problem ... For too long, they had taken it only as a technical problem. Now all political forces in Europe have understood that there is a fundamental political problem.

After a two-year decision period, the European Commission presented its opinion on Turkey's application on December 18, 1989. In the opinion, with respect to enlargement in general, it was emphasized that the Community was progressing in accordance with the objectives of the Single Act on the road towards economic and monetary union, and that the EU was improving the operation of its institutions and thereby reconciling enlargement and consolidation. The report (1989: 2-3) concluded that it would be unwise, therefore, with regard both to the candidate countries and to the member states, to envisage new accession negotiations before 1993 at the earliest, except in exceptional circumstances. Thus, the opinion emphasized the

importance of deepening of the Community over enlargement, and clearly underlined that the EU was not ready for further enlargement before the completion of economic and monetary union.

The document used a number of geopolitical arguments in referring to Turkey. It described Turkey as one of the member states' partners in the Atlantic alliance, occupying a strategically important geopolitical position. However, although the importance of Turkey's geopolitical position was indicated, the European Commission did not recommend starting accession negotiations due to various obstacles to Turkey's membership. First, the document (1989:4) noted structural problems: "Turkey is a large country - it has a greater geographical area and will eventually have a bigger population than any Community Member State - and its general level of development is substantially lower than the European average". Secondly, the report (1989: 5) noted four kinds of economic problems that Turkey needed to overcome: major structural disparities in both agriculture and industry; worsening macro-economic imbalances; high levels of industrial protectionism; and a low level of social protection.

With respect to the EU's political criteria, although the document (1989:7) acknowledged positive developments in Turkey's human rights situation and identity of minorities, it also warned that "these have not yet reached the level required in a democracy." Moreover, the report noted the "negative effects of the dispute between Turkey and one member state of the Community", namely Greece, and reference was also made to the "Situation in Cyprus".

Consequently, due to the Community's own problems and the economic and political situation in Turkey, the report (1989:8) concluded that "it would not be useful to open accession negotiations with Turkey straight away." Instead, under the

framework of the Association Agreement, the Commission suggested four measures to develop relations with Turkey. These were completion of the Customs Union in 1995, the resumption and intensification of financial cooperation, the promotion of industrial and technological cooperation, and the strengthening of political and cultural links.

4.1.1.4 Attitudes of the European Commissioners towards Turkey

Only five speeches by Commissioners appear in the RAPID database, of which two are relevant. First, Commissioner Van Miert's speech (1989, January 13) acknowledged the Association Agreement's aim to prepare for Turkey's future accession. Second, European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development Ray Mac Sharry (1989, May 19) used the ideational argument of Turkey's Europeanness, labeling it as a suitable candidate by suggesting that "Turkey, which is also a European country and a candidate for accession, comes under this area of the Community's relations." However, in both speeches, the Commissioners also suggested that deepening of the Community was more important than widening.

4.1.2 Attitudes of Member States towards Turkey

4.1.2.1 Germany

In Turkish-German relations between 1987 and 1989, the main issues were political reservations over human rights conditions in Turkey and economic reservations over Turkish migrant workers in Germany. Even before Turkey's

application for EU membership, Germany was reported (Peel, 1987, April 7) to oppose the request out of fear of the possibility of an increase in the number of Turkish workers, or Gastarbeiter, in Germany that could follow membership.

In the Association Council Meeting of 24 April 1988, Greece demanded the inclusion of a reference to Cyprus in the opening statement of the joint EU statement that West Germany wanted to present to the Turkish side. In response, the Turkish side left the meeting. Nevertheless, after the Council, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (quoted in Alterman, 1988, April 26) stated that “My assumption is that we will be able to overcome these problems”, and also suggested that “a new EU opening statement would be drafted for the next meeting, which he hoped to hold before West Germany hands over the rotating EU presidency to Greece on July 1.” However, it was (“West Germany”, 1988, May 21) announced by West Germany that it could not arrange another ministerial level meeting of the Turkey-EU Associated Council before its presidency expired in June. As Pope (1988, April 28) suggests, West Germany’s attitude led both Turkish and foreign commentators to conclude that EU states, including Germany, which had well known reservations about Turkish demands for free movement of labor in the EU, were hiding behind Greece and manipulating Greek-Turkish hostility in order to exclude Turkey.

During the official visit of Turkish President Kenan Evren to West Germany in October 1988, he asked for German support for the realization of full Turkish EU membership. However, Kohl (quoted in Heinrich, 1988, October 18) replied that, while West Germany would actively maintain expanded trade between the EU and Turkey, it could not openly lobby for Turkish membership. One West German diplomat (quoted in Ertugrul, 1989, October 31) suggested that “The main issue is

Turkish workers circulating freely in Europe. ... In West Germany there is already a strong backlash against Turkish immigration.”

Thus, Germany acted as a brakeman during this period regarding Turkey’s European bid due to its political reservations over Turkey’s human rights problems and economic reservations over the free movement of Turkish workers within the EU.

4.1.2.2 France

Like Germany, France also opposed Turkey’s membership application plan. Even before the application, France’s Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond (quoted in Peel, 1987, April 7) stressed that “It is difficult to react favorably to such a request.” Moreover, he also argued that the Community needed to digest the latest enlargement of membership that had included Spain and Portugal. However, in January 1988, in response to the request of Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz for French support in joining the Community, Jean-Bernard Raimond was quoted (“France Says”, 1988, January 12) as suggesting that France would not be against Turkey’s application. Likewise, during an official visit to France in November 1988, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal was notified by French President Francois Mitterrand (“President Says”, 1988, November 28) that France had no objections in principle to Turkey joining, but no new members would be allowed before 1993, namely before the introduction of the EU’s integrated market. In response, Ozal (quoted in “Ozal Hints”, 1988, November 29) suggested that “Turkey is aware of the priority problems in the Community. We also feel the need to prepare ourselves for membership.” Thus, France prioritized deepening of the EU in this period and reacted cautiously to Turkey’s membership application.

4.1.2.3 Great Britain

Great Britain also had hesitations about Turkey's application. Earlier, British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe (quoted in "The Foreign Secretary", 1987, April 15) had informed Turgut Ozal that full Turkish membership of the Community should be left to a later date, although Great Britain wanted a stronger Turkish Association Agreement with the EU. Howe (quoted in Dawkins, 1987, April 15) also warned that the Great Britain expected progress on human rights before it would back the Turkish application.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (quoted in Gregson, 1988, April 8) during a visit to Ankara in April 1988, compared Turkey's application for EU membership with Great Britain's twelve-year wait for entry, recommending that Turkey should not be too pessimistic about its chances of gaining membership. A Turkish foreign ministry spokesman, Inal Batu (quoted in "Turkey Seeking, 1988, April 7) emphasized the Turkish government's belief in British support, stating "We hope she will have a sympathetic ear to our arguments and when the time comes we will be able to count on (British) support." Turkish President Kenan Evren, during his visit to London in July 1988, also asked for British support for the Turkish bid. However, although Great Britain was believed to be one of the EU members most sympathetic to Turkey's European aspirations, Thatcher ("President Kenan", 1988, July 14) made no final commitment on the application. In short, this period was characterized by British uncertainty about Turkey's European bid due to political reservations over deepening of the EU and Turkey's human rights problems.

4.1.2.4 Greece

As early as April 1987, Greece made it clear that it would oppose Turkey's planned application for membership due to political reservations, such as the Cyprus Problem and territorial sovereignty in the Aegean. Greece also opposed giving financial assistance to Turkey under the Association Agreement. For instance, in January 1988, the European Commission decided to release ECU 10 million, which was the remaining part of an aid package approved before Greece's EU accession. It is reported ("Greece Is", 1988, January 21) that Greece, however, took this decision to the European Court of Justice over a claim of improper decision making and insufficient human rights conditions in Turkey. In response to this move, the Turkish government ("Athens Has", 1988, April 6) asked Greece to lift its objections on the release of funds, especially the fourth Financial Protocol, which would give Turkey ECU 600 million in development aid. Greece, however, wished to impose several conditions for the release of funds, including the complete withdrawal of Turkish occupation troops from Cyprus and the improvement of human rights conditions. In September 1988, the European Court of Justice ("Court Rejects", 1988, September 27) ruled that the correct decision making procedures had been followed in the release of ECU 10 million.

Greece also demanded the inclusion of a reference to the Turkish occupation of Cyprus in the joint EU statement that West Germany wanted to present to the Turkish side in the EU-Turkey Association Council that took place in April 25, 1988. Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mesut Yilmaz ("Rapprochement with Greece", 1988, May 6) refused to accept an opening statement from West Germany's Foreign Affairs Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that Cyprus affected the relationship between the Community and Turkey, so Genscher then suspended the meeting

indefinitely. In response, Greek Minister for EU Affairs Theodoros Pangalos (quoted in Alterman, 1988, April 26) suggested that

Turkey has difficulty understanding how we work in the community. It is not acceptable to say you will not listen. That is undemocratic. You can say you do not accept it, but you do not have the right to tell the other side what it can and cannot say ... This is something they must learn if they want to join the community.

Mesut Yilmaz responded by declaring that “We will talk about Cyprus but not at the Association Council”. Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal (Pope, 1988, April 28) commented that

Turkey cannot accept linkage (of Cyprus) to EC membership, (but) we must approach these critical periods with statesmen’s calmness ... Turkey must be patient and cautious about entering the EC. Turkey does not have to enter the EC at all costs and our last actions show this.

The Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou (quoted in “Greece Will”, 1988, May 21) also linked the Cyprus issue with Turkey’s accession to the EU, suggesting in May 1988 that Greece would back Turkey if the Cyprus issue was solved, and adding that “If the troops go, that for me would be sufficient.” In June 1988, Turkish President Ozal (quoted in “The Turkish Prime” 1988, June 14) during an official visit to Athens, reiterated Turkey’s position by warning that “There exists no Turkish policy to accede to the EU at all costs.” Ozal did not even mention Cyprus, while Greek Prime Minister Papandreou based his speech on Cyprus problem. Greek Foreign Minister Carolos Papoulias (quoted in “Greece Pledges”, 1988, July 5) also showed the importance given by the Greeks to the Cyprus problem by explicitly stating that “The (Greek) presidency aims to seek untiringly a solution to the Cypriot problem which will be based on the unity, independence and territorial integrity of the island.” With respect to Turkey’s application, he (quoted in Buchan,

1988, July 6) stressed that “in the immediate future there should be no discussion of, or action on, any further enlargement of the Community.”

4.2 Customs Union

4.2.1 EU-Turkey Relations

4.2.1.1. Customs Union Negotiations

The European Commission’s report about Turkey’s membership application was analyzed in the European Council at its meeting on 3 February 1990. On 5 February, the European Council asked the Commission to prepare more detailed proposals for strengthening cooperation with Turkey. In response, the Commission released a proposal on 6 June 1990, called the Matutes Package, containing four interdependent sections: bringing about a customs union by 1995; stepping up industrial and technological cooperation in a number of areas directly or indirectly connected with customs union; re-establishing financial cooperation; promoting political cooperation. In the section on re-establishing financial cooperation, the Commission asked the European Council and the European Parliament to approve the Fourth Protocol which had been negotiated in July 1981 but had not been given to Turkey for political reasons. However, due to Greece continuing its veto, it was still not possible to implement the package.

An international crisis also had an effect on relations of Turkey with the EU when Iraq occupied Kuwait in August 1990, and the frontline states, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey, suffered from the resulting embargo on Iraq. Therefore, in October

1990, European Council (EU, 1991, January 30) decided to give a financial aid package to these countries in order to alleviate the economic and social injury caused by the Gulf crisis. At the end of March 1991, the Iraq refugee crisis erupted, requiring the EU to finance further aid to help Turkey deal with the refugees on its border with Iraq. Further international aid was also organized by the EU (1991, April 13).

On 30 September 1991, the 32nd meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council was held. On the same day (EU, 1991, September 30), Commissioner Abel Mattutes and Turkish Foreign Minister Safa Giray signed agreements for financing two cooperation projects. In the European Commission report 'Europe and the challenge of enlargement', it was underlined that Turkey was experiencing serious difficulties in taking on the obligations resulting from adopting the EU's economic and social policies. Therefore, the report (1992: 7) recommended that the association agreements should be more actively applied. In advising further support for Turkey, the report noted its geopolitical significance: "Events have highlighted Turkey's geopolitical importance and the role which it can play as an ally and as a pole of stability in its region; the Community should take all appropriate steps to anchor it firmly within the future architecture of Europe." The Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council of June 1992 also commented on Turkey's role in the present European political situation, suggesting that, in line with the prospects laid down in the association agreement, cooperation should be intensified. On 8 November 1993, the 34th meeting of EU-Turkey Association Council was convened. In a resolution concerning the Customs Union, the document reiterated the determination of both parties to implement the decisions needed in sufficient time to enable the Customs Union to become operative by 1995.

One of the EU's main political reservations of the EU concerned the Kurdish Problem (Gunther 1988; Barkey, 1993). The EU repeatedly warned that reforms on the Kurdish issue were essential before Turkey could become an EU member. The Kurdish issue had also become a military problem since 1984 when the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya-Karkeran Kurdistan- PKK), established by Abdullah Ocalan, began fighting a war against Turkey. Turkish governments, however, always viewed the PKK as a terrorist and separatist organization. The security-liberalization dilemma also shows itself in this conflict in the way that, as Beriker-Atiyas (1997:441) puts it, "the measures taken to control the conflict act to impede the development of democracy in Turkey." Human rights issues such as torture and other mistreatment became common throughout the 1990s.

In the early 1990s, with the initiation of President Ozal,¹⁹ the Turkish government took some measures to improve the conditions of its Kurdish citizens. First, Ozal presented a language bill permitting Kurdish to be used in everyday conversation and folklore music recordings. Second, a general amnesty was granted that also applied to many Turkish Kurds. Following the 1991 elections, a Kurdish party, the People's Labour Party (HEP), gained representation in the parliament as a result of forming a coalition with the social democrats. However, such reforms were not seen as satisfactory, and the violence in the Southeast increased in 1992. In 1993, HEP was outlawed by the Constitutional Court because it was argued that the integrity and the unity of the Turkey had been violated by its relations with the PKK. In the same year, a new Kurdish party, the Democratic Party (DEP), was established. However, the summer of 1993 witnessed much more violence from the PKK, and while the conflict in the southeast became bloodier, it was argued that some DEP

¹⁹ Turgut Ozal was elected as the president of the Turkish Republic on October 9, 1989.

members made pro-PKK statements leading the Turkish parliament to lift the political immunity from prosecution of seven DEP parliamentarians in March 1994. In response, the EU (1994, March 31) issued a statement stating that “the fight against terrorism should be conducted within the law and with full respect for human rights.”

In the same year, the constitutional court closed DEP and its parliamentarians received prison sentences ranging from three to fifteen years. This action aroused harsh western criticism, both from the EU and individual western governments. The EU demanded the immediate release of the parliamentarians.

In the Presidency Conclusion of the Madrid European Council of December 1995, the European Parliament’s assent to Customs Union with Turkey was welcomed. However, the European Council also recalled the value it attached to respect for human rights, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, offering support to all those in Turkey endeavoring to put such reforms into practice.

4.2.1.2 Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Turkey

Commissioner Leon Brittan (1990, January 19) indicated in a speech the Association Agreement’s aim to prepare for Turkey’s future accession. In April 1990, European Commissioner Andriessen (1990, April 25) used the ideational argument of the Europeanness of Turkey in order to call Turkey a candidate by suggesting that “Turkey, which is also a European country and a candidate for accession, comes under this area of the Community’s relations.” However, both speeches also emphasized the EU’s political interest in deepening.

Commissioner Ray MacSharry (1992, July 27) stated that the relations would be based on the Association Agreement:

As regards Turkey, Malta and Cyprus, the Lisbon European Council concluded that relations with these countries should be strengthened on the basis of the existing association agreements, and that each application for membership should be looked at on its own merits.

Commissioner for External Political Relations Hans Van Den Broek (1993, May 13) talked about the Customs Union negotiations between the EU and Turkey, using geopolitical arguments to underline the importance of Turkey as a partner:

Turkey's strategic position, at the cross-roads between Europe and Asia, its creative and numerous population, its importance in the Black Sea region, its impressive economic performance and still more impressive potential, help to explain why Turkey is such an important partner for Europe.

He (1993, May 27) also described Turkey as an important partner, which was an example to other states in the region: "Turkey's importance stems from its strategic position ... and potential and, above all, its standing as a secular, market-oriented democracy, and the value of its example to other states in the region." He (1993, June 4) then described Turkey as "a secular Islamic state with a pivotal role in a highly sensitive area." Commissioner Leon Brittan (1994, February 10) similarly labeled Turkey as a partner, using geopolitical arguments: "In an increasingly interdependent world, Turkey draws increasing strength from its position as a bridge between developed and developing neighbours, a bridge between Asia and Europe, a bridge between the religions of Islam and Western Europe." Likewise, Commissioner Van Den Broek (1995, April 24) underlined that "it is also seeking to preserve the state's secular traditions, which are unique in the Moslem world and a model for the newly independent states in central Asia.

These speeches also deployed ideational arguments about Turkey's Europeanness of Turkey. For example, Van Den Broek (1993, May 27) indicated that "Turkey is a valued associate of the Community, whose European vocation is reflected in the Association Agreement and through the many links between us."

Security arguments were also used. Van Den Broek (1993, May 27) suggested that "The Community needs Turkey, as a pole of stability and prosperity in a particularly sensitive region." He (1993, September 16) also claimed that "the Union's security interests in the broad sense of the term also require us to give closer attention to our relations with Turkey, the Maghreb and the Middle East." In considering dialogue for foreign policy, Commissioner Leon Brittan (1992, February 10) argued that "Our common interest in the stability of our region and its hinterland is the essential basis for that dialogue." With respect to the Customs Union, he (1994, February 11) predicted that "one result will be the increasing ability of EU and Turkish businessmen to cooperate with each other and their governments not only to bring increased prosperity but also to bring increased stability to our region and the world." Commissioner Van Den Broek (1994, June 17) also commended "Turkey's constructive engagement in working with the European Union to make our continent and its surrounding regions a safer place."

Speeches also referred to the Cyprus issue as an important political issue for relations between the EU and Turkey. Van Den Broek (1993, May 13) urged Turkey to "play a full part in efforts to resolve this conflict which is one of the obstacles which must be overcome in bringing Turkey and the Community closer together." Commissioner Van Den Broek (1994, June 17) noted that the Cyprus problem "has complicated relations between the Union and Turkey."

Another political reservation of the EU regarding Turkey was human rights. For instance, Commissioner Van Den Broek (1993, May 13) declared: “The commitment of Turkey’s leaders to strengthening the respect for human rights is appreciated in the Community. But there is some concern that more action is needed to ensure that this commitment is implemented effectively.” He (1993, May 27) stressed that “as a friend of Turkey, I must express the Community’s hope of continuing improvements with regard to human rights abuses in Turkey, especially in police stations and detention centers, and in the south-east”. Commissioner Leon Brittan (1994, February 10) also warned that “More generally, a comfortable relationship between Turkey and the European Union depends on further progress in the development of human rights and the rule of law”. Commissioner Van Den Broek (1994, June 17) restated the EU’s concerns: “Turkey’s friends feel growing concern about a deterioration in the protection of certain human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

Economic issues were also a source of reservation. For example, Commissioner Van Den Broek (1993, May 13) said that “Turkey needs sustained non-inflationary growth in order to narrow the economic gap with the Community.”

In expressing reservation, several speeches used ideological arguments regarding religion, particularly following the election of mayors from the Islamic Welfare Party to metropolitan municipalities in local elections. These arguments were nuanced however, as can be seen from this speech by Commissioner Van Den Broek (1994, June 17):

Far from being an obstacle to participation in the process of European integration, Turkey’s Islamic culture is an asset in a continent which has always sought unity in diversity and which wishes to improve relations with the Moslem world. The election to public office of candidates from the Islamic Welfare Party is in itself no cause for alarm, provided that they accept the values upon which the Turkish

constitution and, indeed, the European Union and of the Atlantic Alliance are based.

4.2.2 Attitudes of Member States towards Turkey

4.2.2.1 Germany

During this period, Germany confirmed that Turkish membership was unlikely in the foreseeable future, but still tried to show her support for the moves that would bring Turkey closer to the EU. For example, in July 1992, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (quoted in “Germany Says”, 1993, July 13) declared that Germany would “do [its] best to bring Turkey closer to Europe through stronger association with the EU.” Moreover, in the Customs Union negotiations in 1995, Kinkel (“Kinkel Urges”, 1995, February 9) tried to persuade Greece to give up its resistance to the Customs Union agreement, while Kohl (quoted in “German Politicians”, 1995, December 5) supported Turkey by stating that the Customs Union would be “an important step toward Turkey and the European Union drawing closer together.”

In expressing this support, Germany used geopolitical arguments, such as the strategic and political importance of Turkey with respect to her relations with Turkey. For instance, Kinkel (quoted in Lyon, 1992, July, 12) commented that “World developments this year, especially in the Middle East, Europe, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, have unexpectedly increased Turkey’s strategic and political importance.” In, German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe (1993, September 9) described the geopolitical importance of Turkey as follows:

It is a strategic cornerstone, an island of stability in the crisis triangle of the Caucasus-Iran-Iraq region, and a bridge to the Islamic states of

Central Asia. As the only secular, Western-oriented and allied Islamic state, Turkey can serve as a stabilizing influence for the whole region. Turkey thus deserves the greatest possible degree of political and material support from the West.

Germany also used geopolitical arguments in her support of Customs Union with Turkey. For instance, Kinkel (quoted in “Germany continues”, 1995, January 12) warned that “If we don’t succeed in getting Turkey into the Customs Union, it will start to drift away” from its westward orientation and fall in the orbit of Islamic fundamentalism.

Germany’s main reservations over Turkey’s relationship with the EU involved political arguments, such as the human rights problems related to the PKK and Kurdish problems, and Germany constantly criticized Turkey for her human rights record related to the Kurdish issue. For instance, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on learning that Turkey might be using German supplied weapons against Kurds, warned to cut off military aid to Turkey if the news were true. In addition, he (quoted in “Bonn Urges”, 1992, March 27) warned that “We consider it necessary that beyond our protest the European Community present itself and that the issue be taken up by the CSCE (pan-European security conference).” He (quoted in “Germany Asks”, 1992, March 27) also demanded that the EU Council communicate a shared Community disapproval of Turkish military activities against its civil population, declaring that it was vital for Turkey to respect human and minority rights. However, Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin (quoted in Lyon, 1992, March 27) criticized Germany’s response:

We resent the fact that without first obtaining correct information via diplomatic channels, political figures of friendly and allied countries issue statements that do not conform with the truth or the historical understanding of friendship between our countries.

In January 1994, at a meeting between the foreign ministers of Turkey, Germany and Great Britain, Kinkel (quoted in Rugman, 1994, January 21) suggested that “Turkey should do some homework on its human rights record.” On the other hand, following the March 1994 detention of eight Turkish Kurdish parliamentarians, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (quoted in “Demirel Reacts”, 1994, March 14) informed Turkish President Demirel that misinformation and erroneous reports about the issue were circulating that were tarnishing Turkey’s image, adding that he had absolutely no intention of interfering in Turkey’s internal affairs, but only wanted to express certain ideas as a friend of Turkey and of the President. After parliamentarians were sentenced to up to 15 years imprisonment, a statement issued on behalf of the 12-nation group by Germany (quoted in “EU Voices”, 1994, December 9) declared that “The European Union regrets that the trial has ended with sentences condemning a number of the defendants to long-term imprisonment.” Linking these problems to the Customs Union, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (quoted in Bell, 1994, December 14) warned that “Turkey has got to give its contribution to the process, I’m thinking of human rights in particular ... about the sentences on Kurdish politicians. That has not really improved the situation, I must admit.” He (quoted in “Turkey’s Right”, 1994, December 19) also noted that “If Turkey wants to join Europe, it must not turn a cold shoulder to everything Europe stands for.” Following the subsequent Turkish court of Cassation’s verdict to uphold sentences on four of the Kurdish deputies on separatist charges, Kinkel (quoted in “Germany Criticizes”, 1995, October 27) declared that

Bearing in mind the (forthcoming) decision of the European Parliament on the creation of a customs union between the EU and Turkey, everything must be done on the Turkish side to create the appropriate conditions ...Yesterday’s verdict certainly did little to help in this respect.

With respect to Turkish incursions into Iraq in pursuit of PKK fighters, Kinkel (quoted in “Turkish Raids, 1995, March 23) stated that “Turkey’s actions in northern Iraq give rise to the greatest concern. The Kurdish problem must be solved in the first instance through political and legal means, not military means.” He (quoted in Sarioglu, 1995, March 23) also made the demand that “The Turkish armed forces must withdraw from northern Iraq”, and warned that “If it stays in the region for a long time the approval of the European Parliament for the customs union will become more difficult.” Finally, he (quoted in Christie, 1995, April 1) added:

I will tell my Turkish colleague Inonu that the ongoing military action in north Iraq is straining Turkey’s ties with the 15 Europeans and its NATO partners ... One must be able to tell one’s partners: You can't do that. Pull out of northern Iraq. Observe human rights and a sense of proportion and protect the civilian population.

Overall, analysis of these speeches indicates that Germany supported the EU’s Customs Union decision, despite Germany’s heavy political reservations regarding the use of German weapons against Turkish civilians, the imprisonment of DEP deputies, and human rights problems related to military operations within Turkey.

4.2.2.2 France

France was one of the main supporters of Turkey during this period for trying to integrate Turkey with the EU. French support was openly seen in negotiations over the Customs Union, when France occasionally used ideational arguments such as the Europeanness of Turkey. For instance, during a parliamentary debate about Turkey, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe (quoted in “France Links”, 1994, December 14) responded to the criticisms of an opposition deputy by saying: “You are making a serious political error by declaring that Turkey has no place in Europe.” France also used security arguments, such as the stability of Turkey, in expressing

French support for the Customs Union. As French Prime Minister Alain Juppe (quoted in Clayton, 1995, February 2) put it, “We attach a lot of importance to the stability of a prosperous and democratic Turkey and I think the conclusion of a customs union agreement would contribute toward this goal.” President Chirac (quoted in Goldsmith and Latour, 1995, July 12) appealed to the European Parliament to ratify Customs Union, using similar geopolitical arguments:

If we reject [Customs union] we run a twofold risk, strengthening fundamentalists in Turkey and encouraging Turkey to turn to other forms of cooperation which we may later regret ... Let us not fall into the hands of the fundamentalists in Turkey who are telling the Turkish people that Europe is rejecting them simply because they are Muslims.

France also spoke against postponing the Customs Union decision scheduled for December 1995. As French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette (quoted in “Don’t Delay”, 1995, November 22) argued,

Thinking that putting off the European Parliament’s decision on the customs agreement between the European Union and Turkey would be a middle way between a yes and a no vote would be a dangerous illusion ... Postponement would be seen as an extremely negative sign by the Turkish government and public opinion.

As the term president of the EU during this period, France can be seen as the state which worked hardest to persuade Greece to give up her resistance to the Customs Union deal. This support was also acknowledged by Turkish politicians, as Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalcin (quoted in “Turkey Says”, 1995, February 13) noted: “We are receiving considerable assistance from EU term president France.” When Greece raised four new conditions for accepting the Customs Union deal with Turkey, Alain Juppe (quoted in “EU Warns”, 1995, February 17) warned Greece that

There comes a moment when we will no longer be able to make counter-proposals. At that moment, it is take-it or leave-it. If the answer is ‘leave it’, then there will be no association council with

Turkey, but there will also be no association council with Cyprus. That must be clear.

Alain Juppe (quoted in “France Holds”, 1995, February 20) also stated that “We have gone a long way to accommodate Greece ... We are looking at ways of getting progress before March 6”, and he (quoted in “Turkey Says”, 1995, February 20) warned that he did not want to see “a horse-trading session” between EU members. Finally, with the help of French diplomacy, Greece finally lifted her veto on the Customs Union with Turkey. However, after the decision, following comments of Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalcin, Greece sent a letter of protest about Turkey to Alain Juppe. Juppe (quoted in Taylor, 1995, March 7) responded that

The Union of course would not accept a veto by anyone on the rapprochement between itself and the Republic of Cyprus. It is our decision and no one can interfere from outside in this decision. The threats which some people perceived in certain Turkish statements are thus from our point of view null and void. We could not accept from anyone the threat to partition Cyprus.

Like Germany, for France, the main reservations over deepening Turkey’s relations with the EU concerned human rights problems related to the Kurdish issue, which France expressed through political arguments. For example, Alain Juppe (quoted in “France Links”, 1994, December 14) stated that

There are political, economic and social forces in Turkey which have decided to move towards democracy and towards Europe. These forces must understand that this also involves the respect of the rights of the individual.

As for Turkish operations in Northern Iraq in pursuit of PKK fighters in March 1995, Alain Juppe visited Turkey with other EU foreign ministers and (quoted in Sarioglu, 1995, March 23) stressed that the operation had gone beyond “the right

of hot pursuit”, adding (quoted in “President Demirel”, 1995, March 30) a warning about possible effects on the Customs Union agreement:

We understand Turkey. However, we are raising questions about northern Iraq because we are concerned that if Turkey remains there a long time, this would have a negative effect on the European Parliament on the eve of the vote on the Customs Union.

Alain Juppe (quoted in Folloain, 1995, April 9) asked Turkey to end operations as soon as possible and, replying to a question about the EU would do if Turkey did not end operations, stated that “The European Parliament has scheduled a meeting to ratify a treaty on a customs union with Turkey. We have other diplomatic pressures and we will of course use them.”

France also emphasized the need for democratic reforms in Turkey in order to speed up ratification of the Customs Union. For instance, Alain Juppe (quoted in “France Urges”, 1995, June 20) declared that “I hope they will be achieved as soon as possible and will allow for in-depth democratization in order to allow for ratification of the Customs Union.”

In short, France was one of the drivers of the Customs Union negotiations by pressurizing Greece to lift her veto. At the same time, however, France also expressed its political reservations over human rights problems and Turkish military operations.

4.2.2.3 Great Britain

There was significant British support for Turkish-EU relations during this period. For instance, as early as 1992, British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd urged the EU to strengthen its links with Turkey, using geopolitical arguments to justify this support. According to one British official (quoted in Powel, 1992, May 1),

“Turkey’s role as a regional power is growing in importance ... It has increasing influence in the Turkic zones of the ex-Soviet Union.”

Great Britain also supported the Turkish Customs Union agreement with the EU. For instance, in February 1995, regarding the negotiations, Great Britain’s Minister for European Affairs (quoted in “EU Ministers”, 1995, February 7) noted: “We’re pleased with the progress. There’s momentum behind it”. Moreover, Foreign Secretary Malcom Rifkind (quoted in Binyon, 1995, September 7) promised that Great Britain would lobby the European Parliament for ratification of Turkey’s customs union with the European Union while, after meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, Prime Minister John Major (quoted in “Britain Backs”, 1995) November 22 declared:

I reiterated our support for a proper customs union agreement between the European Union and Turkey and I very much hope that that is the decision that the parliament will take in Europe in a few days’ time ... I think it's important for the European Union and I think it will be a very welcome decision for Turkey as well.

Like other EU member states, the main reservation for Great Britain in this period was the political problem of human rights related to the PKK and the Kurdish issue. For instance, about Turkish operations in Northern Iraq, Douglas Hurd (quoted in Binyon, 1995, March 29) warned that operations must be short and sharp and should not be directed against Kurdish civilians, making it clear that tolerance in Great Britain and NATO for Turkey’s intervention was wearing thin. Malcom Rifkind (quoted in Binyon, 1995, September 7) also stated that, while they understood Turkey’s right to protect its citizens, “We know, too, that the fight against terrorism can only be successful if it recognizes the human rights and legitimate concerns of the people caught up in it.” Thus, Britain can also be considered a driver of Turkey’s European bid during this period.

4.2.2.4 Greece

During the period leading up to Customs Union, the Cyprus problem was the top issue dividing Turkey and Greece. For instance, speaking about Turkey's bid for EU membership, Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis (quoted in "Greek Premier", 1990, June 5) underlined the importance of solution to the Cyprus problem:

Cyprus is the key to [Turkish-EU] relations. We don't want to totally block them. An improvement [in the situation in Cyprus] will be sufficient for us ... It would not be rational to say the dispute can be solved as long as Turkish soldiers remain on Cyprus ... Cyprus lies at the heart of Turkish-Greek ties. This is an inalienable condition for Greece.

When the 32nd session of the EU-Turkey Association Council met on 30 September 1991, for the first time since 1986, under Greek pressure, the meeting's concluding statement included a phrase ("EU-Turkey", 1991, October 4) noting that "The Cypriot problem did affect relations between Turkey and the Community." Greek European Union Affairs Minister Theodore Pangalos (quoted in Greece's Foreign", 1994, January 14) claimed that "Turkey is the only country in the world which occupies militarily the territory of an independent state."

In contrast to their reservations over the Cyprus dispute, Greek politicians, though rarely, also used geopolitical arguments to express support for strengthening Turkey's ties with Europe. For example, Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis (quoted in "Greek Premier", 1991, May 21) declared that "We have always said that we favor a pro-European orientation in Turkey. Turkey must be attracted to Europe so as not to fall under the influence of Islam. It is a great danger for all Europe and especially for us Greeks as we are (Turkey's) closest neighbours." Nevertheless, this did not stop Greece from trying to delay the Association Council due for 19

December 1994. Although she did not manage to postpone it, Greece successfully blocked the Customs Union deal between Turkey and EU due to the Cyprus problem and human rights conditions in Turkey. Greece's obstruction of a deal came though at a cost, as Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalçın (quoted in Sarıoğlu, 1994, December 20) pointed out:

Before the meeting Turkey was facing 15 [EU] countries. Now 15 countries including Turkey have turned against Greece ... Turkey took part in yesterday's talks to point out an injustice, to underline once again our legitimate rights born of agreements and to show that Greece hides behind the EU to abuse its membership rights ... We hope Greece will respond to our calls for solving bilateral problems without hiding behind the EU. If it wants to solve the issues, the address is Turkey, not the EU.

On 5 February 1995, European Union Foreign Ministers agreed on a deal which would lift Greece's veto on an EU-Turkey Customs Union in return for a timetable for Cyprus joining the European Union. As German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (quoted in Clayton, 1995, February 7) described it, "Greece has lifted its block ... on the understanding that six months after the end of the [1996] inter-governmental conference [on the Maastricht treaty], the European Union will open negotiations with Cyprus." The Greek government spokesman Evangelos Venizelos (quoted in Kyriakidou, 1995, February 7) responded cautiously that "The Greek government has reservations until it examines this deal assiduously", and on 9 February, he (quoted in "Greece Rejects", 1995, February 9) reported that "We studied the issue assiduously and the position of the Greek government is negative", adding that "Certain aspects are unbeneficial to the Greek side." In reaction to Greece's stance, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller (quoted in "Turkey's Çiller", 1995, February 13) warned that "Europe can't commit a historic error like keeping Turkey out of the customs union. If it does, history will judge it as a great mistake."

Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalçın (quoted in “Turkey Says” 1995, February 13) added

We are not of the opinion that the customs union should be achieved at all costs. We see it as an outcome of obligations carried under agreements Turkey and the EU have signed.

Evangelos Venizelos then announced that Athens would probably sign an EU-Turkey customs deal in Brussels on March 6, but only if four issues were resolved beforehand: Cyprus’ EU candidacy; Cyprus’ participation in dialogue with the EU on the same level as that between the EU and East European states; ratification by the European Parliament of financial aid to Turkey; and compensation for Greek textile producers. He (quoted in “Greece To”, 1995, February 13) emphasized that “Greece is only asking for minor and easy-to-make changes to the text under discussion.” Finally, on March 3, Greece (Barber, 1995, March 7) accepted the text and the common position on the EU-Turkey Customs Union, allowing the EU to sign the accord with Turkey on 6 March 1995 in return for the EU offering a timetable for Cyprus’ accession to the EU. According to Venizelos (quoted in “Greece Ready”, 1995, March 3) for Greece, the negotiations had been “especially successful, securing all of the important points”, while Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller (quoted in Clayton, 1995, March 7) stated that “Today is an historic moment not only for Turkey but for her partners as well. It is an important and vital milestone in our relations with the European Union.”

After the Customs Union deal had been signed, however, Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalçın reportedly warned that if the EU accepted Cyprus’ candidacy, Turkey would annex Northern Cyprus. In response, Venizelos (quoted in Kyriakidou, 1995, March 7) warned that “As long as the Turkish threat exists and it is expressed so provocatively then Greece can exercise a veto.” Turkish Foreign

Ministry spokesman Ferhat Ataman (quoted in Kyriakidou, 1995, March 7) then stated that Karayalçın had “never used the word annex, he never said that at all. But he has mentioned in the past the possibility of economic integration with northern Cyprus if the Greek Cypriot side is let into the EU”, and quoted Karayalçın as suggesting that “Turkey will continue to be against membership for all or part of Cyprus before it [Turkey] itself becomes a member of the EU.”

To sum up, Turkish customs union challenged the Greek political interest due to Cyprus problem and Greece continued to be a brakeman. However, after the negotiations, Customs Union turned out to be in Greek political interest because European Union Foreign Ministers agreed on a deal which would lift Greece’s veto on an EU-Turkey Customs Union in return for a timetable for Cyprus joining the European Union. Therefore, Greece consented to Turkish customs union for her political interest of Cyprus’s accession to the EU.

4.3 From Helsinki Decision to Accession Negotiations

4.3.1 EU-Turkey Relations

4.3.1.1 From Candidacy to Accession Negotiations

In this period, the relations between Turkey and the EU started with the tension between Greece and Turkey. The dispute in Aegean over Imia/Kardak islets caused concern in the EU. In the declaration which was released in 15 July 1996, it was stated that relations between Turkey and the European Union had to be based on a clear commitment to the principle of respect for international law and agreements, the relevant international practice, and the sovereignty and

the territorial integrity of the Member States and of Turkey and it was underlined (EU, 1996, July 15) that the cases of disputes created by territorial claims, such as the Imia Islet issue, should be submitted to the International Court of Justice.” In the presidency conclusion of Dublin European Council of December 1996, the political reservations of human rights, Aegean dispute and Cyprus issue were emphasized.

On 16 July 1997, the Commission presented “Agenda 2000: For A Stronger and Wider Union” which explained the policies of the Union, the challenge of enlargement and the new financial framework for the years 2000-2006. In the part of “Challenge of Enlargement”, it was emphasized that the conclusions and the recommendations were based on the Copenhagen Criteria and having evaluated the extent that candidates already met these criteria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus were recommended by the European Commission to start accession negotiations. However, with respect to Turkey, political reservations such as unconsolidated character of democracy, problems with Greece and Cyprus and economic reservations of financial instability were emphasized and Turkey was not proposed as a candidate state. Instead, the Association Agreement and the customs union were (European Commission, 1997: 56-57) suggested to be the foundations for building an increasingly close political and economic relationship with Turkey.

In the presidency conclusion of the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997, the Commission opinion about dividing applicants into two was accepted and the European Council decided to begin negotiations with Poland, Hungary, Cyprus, Estonia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Turkey was not accepted as a candidate state but Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the EU was confirmed. It was also underlined that strengthening Turkey's links with the EU

depended on Turkey's pursuit of the political and economic reforms including the alignment of human rights standards and practices on those in force in the European Union; respect for and protection of minorities; the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice; and support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

Turkey, especially Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz ("Turkey Accuses", 1998, March 7) reacted very harshly to the Luxembourg decision and blamed German Chancellor Helmut Kohl as discriminating Turkey. As a reaction, Turkey did not attend to the European Conference that was held in March 1998. Moreover, Turkey declared to suspend political dialogue with the Union and therefore no longer wished to discuss with it issues such as relations between Greece and Turkey, Cyprus or human rights. Furthermore, as Schimmelfennig (2008:15) emphasized, Turkey threatened to veto the use of NATO facilities for EU military missions.

In the first progress report of the Commission about Turkey's accession to the EU that was released in October 1998, Turkey's progress towards fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria was analyzed. Political reservations such as human rights, minority problems, civil control of military, peaceful settlement of disputes with neighboring countries were underlined as well as economic reservations such as need for macroeconomic stability and preventing regional development disparities.

The capture of Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999 triggered violent PKK demonstrations in some member states. As a response to these violent acts, the EU made a declaration in 22 February 1999 and in the declaration, the violent acts were condemned. However, it was also underlined (EU, 1999, March 9) that "The

European Union takes note of the assurance of the Turkish Government that Abdullah Ocalan will have a fair trial....It underlines once more its strict opposition to the death penalty.” On the other hand, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a day after, (quoted in European Commission, 1999: 6) responded that

Questioning the independence of courts in Turkey is unacceptable. The intention of the EU to send observers to the hearings is tantamount to accepting and encouraging the efforts to intervene in and influence the independent judiciary. This attitude which is against the principle of the rule of law is also unacceptable.

Ankara State Security Court began the trial of Abdullah Ocalan on 31 May 1999 and explained its verdict as death sentence on 29 June 1999. As a reaction, the presidency of the EU (1999, June 29) underlined “the hope that Turkey will follow what has invariably been the practice for the last fifteen years and not carry out the death sentence passed on Mr. Ocalan.”

In the progress report of the Commission that was released in October 1999, it was underlined that although basic features of democratic system existed in Turkey, it still did not meet the Copenhagen political criteria due to the political reservations of human rights, protection of minorities, role of national Security Council in political life and death sentence of Ocalan. Moreover, economic reservations also emphasized.

A historic decision to accept Turkey as a candidate state was held in the Helsinki European Council. In the presidency conclusion, recent positive developments in Turkey as well as its intention to continue its reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria were welcomed. It was emphasized that “Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession

strategy to stimulate and support its reforms.” Moreover, in this European Council, the two-tier approach was abandoned and Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria Latvia, Lithuania and Malta were invited to begin negotiations together.

Three significant developments were behind this decision. First of all, a change of government was seen in Germany. In October 1998, Gerhard Schroeder, leader of Social Democratic Party of Germany became the chancellor and he led the coalition government of Social Democratic Party and Green Party of Germany. As opposed to the Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl, Gerard Schroeder’s attitude towards Turkey is more conciliatory and he supported Turkish candidacy in Helsinki Summit. Secondly, as Heraclides (2010:144) explained, the change of attitude, namely the *détente*²⁰ in Turkish-Greek relations, due to the triggering event of Kosovo Crisis and catalyst of earthquakes of 1999, led Greece not veto Turkish candidacy in the Helsinki European Council. Finally, as Avcı (2003: 150) underlines, the US under the presidency of Clinton supported Turkish candidacy and lobbied for Turkey in the European capitals.

The EU prepared the Accession Partnership document for Turkey which was adopted on March 8, 2001. In particular the political reservation of the Copenhagen political criteria was stressed in this document. The document included political reservations of the issue of Cyprus, strengthening legal and constitutional guarantees relating to the freedom of expression, freedom for non-violent demonstrations and meetings, the fight against torture, support for the development of civil society, freedom of broadcasting for Turkish citizens in their mother tongues, and constitutional and legal arrangements relating to the abolition of the death penalty. It also pointed to economic criteria and changes to be made for legislative

²⁰ According to Heraclides, it is more correct the label the thaw in Greek-Turkish relations as *detente* due to the fact that the thaw was tangible and proved to be far from ephemeral.

harmonization. With this document, the EU presented an important roadmap to Turkey to satisfy the criteria for membership by setting out the short-and medium-term measures. In order to institutionalize the reforms asked for by the EU, Turkey established 'The Turkish National Programme for the adoption of the Acquis (NPAA)' in March 19, 2001, the first part of which dealt with the political criteria.

In October 2001, the Turkish Parliament initiated the reforms that were stated in the NPAA by passing a package of thirty four amendments to the constitution. Amendments were related to the articles affecting the freedoms of expression, organization and assembly, the use of minority languages, the partial abolition of the death penalty, and the role of the military in politics. For the role of the military in politics, structural reforms have been passes to curtail the NSC's powers by increasing the number of the civilians in the council. The reform process continued with the 'Harmonization Laws'(HLs)-The Democratization Packages- which were designed to translate the Constitutional Amendments into action as part of the process of bringing Turkish Law into line with the European Acquis. HLs were passed in 2002 and 2003 in seven reform packages. Two of the most controversial HLs were, the removal of death penalty, including for those convicted of terrorist activity and the broadcasting and education in Kurdish encountered, as Onis (2003:14) indicates, major opposition from the military and nationalist parties, especially, the ultranationalist Nationalist Action Party.²¹ However, despite the resistance, in the summer of August 2002, the parliament approved the removal of death penalty except for the crimes committed in cases of war, or the imminent threat of war. Moreover, the scope of freedom of expression was also broadened by

²¹ Nationalist Action Party was a key member of the incumbent coalition government and it has been playing a major role in terms of explicitly blocking some of the major political reforms needed to meet the EU's democratic norms in the post 1999 era.

permitting the use of local languages other than Turkish in radio and television broadcasting and their teaching by private language courses. With this law, the state television started to broadcast in Kurdish (in two dialects), Bosnian, Arabic and Circassian.

On 9 October 2002, in the progress report of the Commission, it is pointed out that although Turkey has made considerable progress in meeting the Copenhagen criteria through constitutional reform and a series of legislative packages, further reforms are needed for advancing Turkish candidacy. Therefore, it was not recommended to open accession negotiations with Turkey.

On November 3, 2002, the Justice and Development Party, led by Tayyip Erdogan won an overwhelming victory in parliamentary elections, returning Turkey, which were governed by coalition governments for the last fifteen years, to single-party rule. Contrary to the suspicions that he would oppose the EU membership because of his Islamist background, as Phillips (2004:90) suggests, “he appears to embrace without qualification Ataturk’s vision of Turkey as a secular democracy” and Erdogan government, with its majority in the parliament, has continued the reform process even more effectively than the previous government.

In the presidency conclusion of Copenhagen European Council of December 2002, the steps taken by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen Criteria, in particular through the recent legislative packages were welcomed. However, it was underlined (2002:5) that “If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.” Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul (quoted in

Andrews, 2002, December 13) reacted harshly to the result of the Summit and suggested that discrimination towards Turkey was made. Furthermore, the Commission was given the duty of preparing a revised accession partnership which was adopted by the Council in May 2003 and in July 2003; a revised National Programme for the Adoption of the *Acquis* was adopted. In order to comply with the *Acquis*, Erdogan government has pursued legislative and constitutional reforms liberalizing the political system and relaxing restrictions on freedom of the press, association, and expression. On 19 July 2003, the notorious Article 8 of the anti-terror law was abolished. On May 7, 2004, ten articles of the constitution have been amended. Among the most important amendments were related to death penalty and the role of the military in politics. As Ozbudun and Yazici (2004:22) emphasize, “the 2004 constitutional amendment totally abolished death penalty including the cases of war or the imminent threat of war, thereby removing the constitutional obstacle to the ratification by Turkey of the 13th Additional Protocol to the ECHR.” When the role of the military in politics is considered, state security courts were totally abolished and the military’s privilege of exclusion from the judicial control of the Court of Accounts was eliminated. It is argued (Ozbudun and Yazici, 2004:39) that, “These reforms not only contributed to the civilianization process of Turkey but also provided entire transparency for public expenditure.” In June, 2004, Leyla Zana and three other Kurdish parliamentarians, who were jailed after the closure of the DEP in 1994, were released which was recommended by the EU since their detention. Therefore, it can be argued that, Turkey has made extensive reforms to democratize its institutional structure in order to start accession talks on 17 December 2004.

With respect to Cyprus issue, in 24 April 2004, the Turkish Cypriots accepted the United Nations’ Annan plan for a peaceful reunification of Cyprus with 65 percent of

votes whereas Greek Cypriots rejected the proposal by 76 percent. As decided by the EU before the referendum, Cyprus became a member of the EU in May 1, 2004.

In the 2004 progress report of the European Commission, it was acknowledged that Turkey achieved noteworthy legislative progress in many areas, through further reform packages, constitutional changes and the adoption of a new Penal Code. However, it was highlighted that implementation of the political reforms needed to be further consolidated and broadened.

In the presidency conclusion of Brussels European Council, Turkish reform process was welcomed and it was expected that Turkey would actively pursue its efforts to bring into force the six specific items of legislation identified by the Commission. Moreover, the European Council invited the Commission to present to the Council a proposal for a framework for negotiations with Turkey and it requested the Council to agree on that framework with a view to opening negotiations on 3 October 2005.

4.3.1.2 Attitudes of Commissioners towards Turkey

In October 1999, the president of European Commission Romano Prodi (1999, October 27) underlined that “Turkey too is a candidate country.” Likewise, Commissioner Verheugen (1999, November 4) suggested that “Turkey should now be considered as a candidate.” In addition, Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou (2000, June 23) underlined “the importance the EU attaches to Turkey as a candidate country.

Commissioner Hans Van Den Broek (1997, February 27) labeled Turkey as partner by suggesting that “We want the closest possible relations with Turkey in all

areas: political, economic and commercial. We have shown this by creating a customs union with Turkey, one of the closest relationships the Union has with any partner country.” Geopolitical arguments were also used. As Commissioner Van Den Broek (1997, November 27) underlined:

Turkey's geo-strategic position and its steadfastness over decades as a secular Moslem country engaged in modernisation and economic development further reinforce its position as a valued neighbour in a sensitive region.

He (1998, April 17) also suggested that “there is no doubt in our minds that Turkey is a vital and strategic partner to the EU.” Commissioner Verheugen (2001, October 24) also asserted that “Its significance clearly goes beyond its geo-strategic position between the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, Central Asia and the Middle East.” Moreover, Olli Rehn (2004, December 12) underlined that “A Turkey where the rule of law is firmly rooted in its society and state will prove that, contrary to prejudices, European values can successfully coexist with a predominantly Muslim population. Such a Turkey will be a most valuable crossroads between civilizations.”

European Commissioners pointed out security interest in their speeches as well. For example, Romano Prodi (2004, January 15) suggested that “I am convinced that Turkey can bring a unique contribution to peace and regional stability at the beginning of this new century.”

For the first time in the speeches, ideational arguments are emphasized in the support speeches in 2004. Europeanness of Turkey is underlined though with reference to Association Agreement. Romano Prodi (2004, January 15) suggested that “The fact that Turkey belongs to Europe was recognized already in our Association Agreement of 1963.” Similarly, Olli Rehn (2004, October 5) underlined that

The question is often raised whether Turkey is in fact a European country. The European Community gave its answer to this question over forty years ago, in 1963, when the then President of the Commission, Walter Hallstein, said: *”La Turquie fait partie de l’Europe. Elle établit des rapports constitutionnels avec la Communauté européenne. Comme cette Communauté elle-même, ces rapports sont régis par l’idée d’évolution.”* [Turkey is part of Europe. It is forming constitutional ties with the European Community. Like the Community itself, those ties are intended to evolve.]

In most of the speeches, political arguments were used by Commissioners as reservations. For instance, Commissioner Hans Van Den Broek (1997, June 5) indicated that “The tense relations with its neighbor and EU member Greece, as well as its position on Cyprus and the issue of human rights in Turkey, influence the quality of Turkish relations with the European Union.” Moreover, he (1997, November 27) also stressed that “We are emphasizing the need for positive signals from Turkey in three areas: the protection of human rights, the improvement of relations with Greece and progress towards a settlement of the Cyprus question.” Furthermore, considering Copenhagen Criteria, he (1998, April 16) also underlined that “At this point in time it does not fulfill these criteria and the situation is further complicated by tensions over Cyprus but also by tensions in the Aegean.” Likewise, (2000, November 8) Verheugen also underlined that

We are still concerned about the inadequate respect for human rights and the rights of minorities as well as about the constitutionally enshrined role played by the armed forces in political life via the National Security Council. The situation of the Kurds has to be improved and the state of emergency still in effect in the 4 south-eastern provinces must be lifted.

Similarly, in 2002 Romano Prodi (2002, December 4) suggested that “It is in our interest that a great partner such as Turkey, whose role is enormously important strategically, politically and economically, should reinforce its institutions, improve the quality of its democratic life and commit itself to the values and principles we share.” He (2003, November 5) also stressed that “We will be watching further

developments closely in the areas where progress is still needed. This concerns both legislation and the actual implementation of the new rights and freedoms.” In addition, Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou (2003, November 4) suggested that “Before we can start negotiations, Turkey must undertake major reforms in its political system so as to ensure full control of the military by the political leadership and full operation of the rule of law in accordance with international agreements and international practice.” Gunter Verheugen (2004, June 16) also suggested that “The Copenhagen political criteria sets out the conditions that needs to be met. The sequence is clear. First meeting the political criteria and then negotiations. These criteria were not invented for Turkey, but apply equally to all candidates.”

Cyprus Problem, as a political reservation was also raised. For instance, Hans van den Broek (1997, November 14) underlined that

Tensions over Cyprus have slowed down Turkey's ever closer relations with the European Union. During my recent visit to Ankara, I brought the message that progress on Cyprus would greatly facilitate the development of our mutual relations.

Commissioner Verheugen (2001, October 17) suggested that “A solution will also greatly facilitate the development of EU - Turkey relations.” Moreover, Commissioner Verheugen (2003, March 4) also highlighted that

Turkey is also well advised to reflect over the consequence of a non-settlement for its EU-aspirations. After 1 May 2004 they would face a situation where Turkey does not recognize one of EUs member states. It is difficult to see how it would be possible to start accession negotiations under such circumstances.

Moreover, Prodi (2003, November 5) also underlined that “Reaching a settlement quickly is in Turkey's interest too, because this would prevent the Cyprus issue from becoming an obstacle to its own aspirations.”

On the hesitation towards Turkey in the public opinion, Commission President Romani Prodi (2004, January 15) suggests that

It is in my view important for the political leadership in the EU and in Turkey to recognise and manage this political reality. There are those who are concerned about the religious dimension. Others have raised issues such as the capacity of the Union to integrate a country of the size and with the demography of Turkey, the economic development of Turkey and Turkey's geographical situation. We need to reply to these concerns.

The Commissioners also mention political reservation of absorption capacity. Olli Rehn (2004, October 5) underlined that “We must also not lose sight of another important factor identified at Copenhagen: the EU’s capacity to absorb new members, if it is to keep up the impetus of European integration and serve its own and the candidate countries’ broader interests.”

4.3.2 Attitudes of Member State towards Turkey

4.3.2.1 Germany

In the period of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the relations between Germany and Turkey were tense due to the fact that Germany had reservations for Turkish accession. In the Prime Ministry of Necmettin Erbakan, relations with Germany strained more with the statements of Erbakan. German Foreign Minister Kinkel visited Turkey and during his visit, Erbakan (quoted in “Germany’s Kinkel”, 1997, March 27) criticized that “There will be a \$5 billion loss for Turkey because it has entered the customs union ... After they have done this they will bow their heads

when they talk with Turkey,” and as a response to Erbakan, Kinkel told that “No European will have to bow their head to Turkey in shame.”

Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz (quoted in “Yilmaz Says” 1997, September 29), in his visit to Germany underlined the strategic importance of Turkey by suggesting that “It would be unfair and a fatal, strategic mistake to exclude Turkey from the expansion plans of the EU... I will try to convince the German government to avoid making a mistake.” After the Luxembourg Summit, as a response to criticism about blocking Turkish accession, Helmut Kohl (quoted in “Kohl Denies”, 1997, December 13) suggested that

I do not know where you get the idea from that I or the German government are particularly nervous with respect to the question of the accession of Turkey. This is totally erroneous...Turkey has the same treatment as others.

However, Turkish diplomats declared explicitly the German blockage. Selim Yenel (quoted in Freeman, 1997, December 19), deputy head of Turkish mission to the EU in Brussels highlighted that “Great Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands have all supported us as a candidate...It was only German opposition and Greek opposition that stopped us.” Kinkel (quoted in Kirschbaum, 1997, December 20) protected Helmut Kohl by underlining that “No one has worked harder at European integration, and the integration of Turkey, than Chancellor Kohl.”

After the Luxembourg Summit Turkey declared not to attend the European Conference but German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and his French counterpart Hubert Vedrine (quoted in “France-Germany”, 1998, February 4) emphasized that “Germany and France have an intense interest on a lasting integration of Turkey in Europe.” Yilmaz however, made relations tenser by his sharp remarks. In an interview with Financial Times, Mesut Yilmaz charged the German government with

pursuing in Eastern Europe a policy of Lebensraum²² and made discrimination against Turkey. He (quoted in Barham, 1998, March 6) suggested that

The Germans continue the same strategy as before....They believe in Lebensraum. That means the central and eastern European countries are of strategic importance for Europe and for Germany as their backyard....Their final goal is to include these countries in Nato and the EU, and to divide Europe between Bulgaria and Turkey. Turkey should be a good neighbour for Europe, but not a member of the EU...If we attend the European conference, it would mean accepting the discrimination against us.

As a reaction to Yilmaz's remarks, Foreign Ministry spokesman Martin Erdmann (quoted in Boston, 1998, March 6) suggested that "If these statements are true then it is an inexcusable defamation of German policies....The German government does not want to add fuel to the fire." Moreover, Government spokesman Peter Hausmann (quoted in Boston, 1998, March 6) stated that Yilmaz's statements were in contrast to the "friendly relations" over decades between Bonn and Ankara and added that "We formally reject these statements." Yilmaz (quoted in "Turkey Accuses", 1998, March 7) continued to attack Germany by suggesting that "The decision in Luxembourg aimed to isolate Turkey and was influenced to a great extent by Germany." Kohl (quoted in Hamilton, 1998, March 12) responded to Yilmaz's comments about lebensraum by underlining that "At various times in the European process people need a bogeyman. The Germans are the genetically natural candidates because of their history." Kinkel (quoted in "Kinkel Urges", 1998, March 13) also suggested that "Yilmaz's remarks were not helpful. I have openly rejected his remarks. We now have to look ahead."

Yilmaz needed to make an explanation about his remarks about Germany. He (quoted in "Turkey's Yilmaz", 1998, March 14) suggested that "In no way did I want

²² Adolf Hitler's policy of aggressive expansion in the 1930s to create "living space" for the German people

to draw a direct comparison between the National Socialist (Nazi) dictatorship and the present...It is, however, important to make Germany's incorrect behavior clear.” Yilmaz (quoted in Thompson, 1998, April 25) also emphasized that “The decision not to include Turkey was unfair and constituted a historic and strategic mistake...I believe the German government has understood Turkey's position and that this mistake will be corrected in the near future.”

In May 1998, relations started to get warmer with the dialogue of foreign minister Ismail Cem and Klaus Kinkel. Kinkel (quoted in “Turkey Angry”, 1998, May 28) emphasized that “We have indeed been in heavy waters in recent months but partnership and friendship between Turkey and Germany are simply too important for us to ignore the fact that we must get out of these stormy seas.” However, Yilmaz suggested that the Cardiff Summit did not yield a progress and (quoted in “Turkish Premier”, 1998, July 29) emphasized that

On the one hand, they say: Europe needs Turkey, Turkey belongs to Europe, Turkey will become a full member of the EU - on the other, they are trying very carefully to keep Turkey away from all bodies and decision-making mechanisms of European cooperation.

In October 1998, Gerard Schroeder, even before becoming the chancellor of Germany, showed sign of a change of attitude in future German government towards Turkey. Although he mentioned the economic and human rights problems, he (quoted in “Schroeder Europe”, 1998, October 2) also underlined that “The European door for Turkey must remain open.” Likewise, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (quoted in “New German”, 1998, November 19) suggested “if Turkey wishes to walk the road of accession to the EU, then it is a candidate-country like all the others.” He (quoted in “Turkey Needs”, 1998, November 24) added that “We are expending effort on achieving a significant improvement in our relations with Turkey after they dramatically worsened through statements (by Helmut Kohl).” Similarly,

Fischer (quoted in Boulton, 1999, July 22) reiterated that “We want obstacles that have existed in the past, and that we regret, to be overcome and we want Turkey formally to become a candidate for entry to the European Union.”

After the devastating earthquake of August 1999, Chancellor Schroeder promised to help Turkey by inducing other governments’ objections by (quoted in “Schroeder German”, 1999, September 1) stating that “we are trying to explain to other countries that after the quake disaster Turkey faced, this country's process of approaching with the EU has to be speeded up.” Before the Helsinki Summit, after meeting with Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, Schroeder (quoted in “Germany’s Schroeder”, 1999, October 20) suggested that “Ideally we would like to give Turkey entry candidate status in Helsinki. Turkey knows a lot remains to be done, but the prospect of (joining) Europe should be there.” Similarly, although he reminded Copenhagen Criteria, Schroeder (quoted in “Schroeder Urges”, 1999, December 3) reiterated that “We want a European Turkey and therefore we want to open up for Turkey a credible prospect of Europe...The government strongly supports giving Turkey the status of membership candidate for the European Union.”

Germany continued to support Turkish bid of EU membership after the candidacy. In 2002, Turkey was expecting opening of accession talks. Before the EU summit in Copenhagen, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (“Germany To”, 2002, October 23) underlined that “As far as we are concerned, we are going to do all we can to get the most positive possible signal.” However, after the victory of Islamist based JDP, a hesitation was seen in Germany with respect to Turkey. For instance, Schroeder suggested that Turkey's future lay with the European Union, and (quoted in Germany’s Schroeder”, 2002, November 13) called on its new ruling party to continue the reform process and added that “Europe is keen that a country as

important as Turkey does not slide into Islamic fundamentalism.” Fischer (quoted in “UK Throws”, 2002, November 21) called for the Copenhagen summit to issue a ‘clear signal’ toward Ankara, but said “whether it will go as far as Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants, that I cannot tell you.” After meeting with Turkish President Sezer, Schroeder (quoted in “Turkish President”, 2002, November 27) underlined that “We have noted with great respect how much progress the reform process in Turkey has made...We believe this reform process will be pursued with great determination by the new leadership.” This reservation of Germany was also realized by Erdogan (quoted in Godoy, 2002, November 28) who underline that “only Germany is still hesitating, and all other leaders have expressed their support for Turkey.”

At the same time, Christian Democratic Union leader Angela Merkel also raised concern about Turkey. She (quoted in “German Conservatives”, 2002, December 3) suggested that Ankara should instead be offered a privileged partnership and added that “It would be a mistake to think that the prospect of a date for the start of talks ... would accelerate democratic and economic reforms in Turkey, still less cement them into place.”

Before the Copenhagen European Council, a date for the date of opening accession negotiations were proposed by Germany and France together and Erdogan (quoted in Keaten, 2002, December 5) criticized this proposal as follows:

I find this decision still disputable...This is not fair. This is unacceptable....To display such double standards against a country with such an interest, affection and determination (toward the EU) brings questions to our minds.

Fischer (quoted in “Turkey Should”, 2002, December 9) responded that “I will appeal that people use their common sense and look at the German-French proposal and so conclude that this is not a matter of prestige, but a strategic decision... I think that Turkey should realize what this means for the country and see

this as not a date in the far-off future but in a reasonable time-frame.” The Prime Minister Gul (quoted in “Turkey Rejects”, 2002, December 11) complained that “It is not possible to accept the 2005 date. We absolutely reject it...We insist on a date by the end of 2003.” In the same vein, Erdogan (quoted in Culpan, 2002, December 11) expressed his disappointment to learn that some countries still want to give Turkey a date for a date and suggested that “Unfortunately Germany was one of these countries. That really hurt us. We had especially expected Germany to stand by us.” Fischer (quoted in Utku, 2002, December 13) responded to the criticisms from Turkey

We worked so hard to get a date. Everybody understands that we are under strong pressure at home, we took some risk. But we were convinced it was a justified decision...It was really not easy to achieve this breakthrough and the breakthrough is the date. There is definitely a fixed date. We are not a Christian Club, we are a club of shared values.

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (quoted in “Turkey Unlikely, 2002, December 13) warned that it was too optimistic to predict that Turkey could join the European Union before 2010 and membership negotiations, which could start in 2005, “will last a very long time because there are very difficult questions to be settled.”

In the end of 2002, Turkey’s trial of members of several German non-governmental organizations, accused of undermining national security, was criticized by Interior Minister Otto Schily. He (quoted in “German Minister”, 2002, December 28) suggested that this trial prove to be “serious set-back on (Turkey’s) road toward European membership...I call on the Turkish government and judiciary to come to its senses. Germany is taking this event very, very seriously.”

In September 2003, Gerhard Schroeder (quoted in Williamson, 2003, September 2) suggested that he had “lots of respect for progress made by Turkey

under the leadership of Prime Minister (Recep Tayyip) Erdogan. I'm pretty sure this will be helpful in achieving Turkey's wish of joining the EU." As a response to the remarks of Angela Merkel, Schroeder (quoted in "(EU)/EU", 2003, September 4) also underlined that "Turkey's expectations and hopes for its future membership of the EU should not be disappointed. This lies also in Germany's interests."

After the suicidal attacks in Istanbul in November 2003, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (quoted in "Don't Slam", 2003, November 29) suggested that "For 40 years promises have been made to Turkey, and now that Turkey has undertaken a determined programme of reforms and that terrorism has caused hundreds of victims in Istanbul, we must keep open the gates to Europe for Turkey."

German Christian Democrat leader Angela Merkel (quoted in "Turkey Wows", 2004, February 5) reiterated that she was in favor of a 'specific partnership' with Turkey and (quoted in "Turkey Wows", 2004, February 5) added that "Over the past 40 years we have made mistakes. We have fueled hopes. It is better to be honest and to say what is achievable and what is not." Erdogan (quoted in "Turkish PM", 2004, February 16) responded that "An issue such as a special partnership is not on Turkey's agenda. Such a thing is out of the question."

In October 2004, Schroeder (quoted in "Erdogan-Schroeder", 2004, October 4) suggested that the Commission would publish a positive report on October 6th and "Germany will vote in a positive way regarding the start of entry talks with Turkey in December." Likewise, about the French objections, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul (quoted in "Turkey Counts", 2004, October 14) suggested that "Germany is among the countries who are the biggest supporters of Turkey." Fischer also (quoted in "Germany Will", 2004, October 18) suggested that "We will do everything in our power to ensure a positive decision in December."

For Turkish politicians, the main reason of German reservation was the fear of free movement of labor. After the entering into force of Customs Union agreement, Prime Minister Yilmaz (quoted in “Turkey’s Yilmaz”, 1996, 14 May) suggested that Germany was concerned about free movement of labor for Turks that EU membership would bring and underlined that “Our goal is Turkey's full membership in the EU. We hear everywhere that Germany's attitude is the biggest obstacle, not that of Greece.” Helmut Kohl (quoted in “Kohl Denies”, 1997, December 13) also accepted this fear and suggested that “A dramatic change in the number of Turks in Germany would not be tolerable to German public opinion nor to those in the rest of the European Union.”

The main reservation for Germany that was stated explicitly was the compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria. As early as 1997, Foreign Minister Kinkel (quoted in Barham, 1997, March 27) underlined that “Turkey has serious problems with the EU...Its EU membership will not come in the near future because of human rights problems, the Kurdish problem, problems with Greece and economic problems.” Similarly, Kinkel (quoted in “Kinkel Says”, 1997, September 9) pointed out that

Turkey has had a place reserved for it on the European train since 1963 but there is no chance of it getting on the train in the near future... (Turkey) has to do its domestic chores...The first of these are human rights, the Kurdish problem and economic problems.

German politicians mainly underlined human rights, as a part of Copenhagen Criteria. Kinkel (quoted in “EU Barred”, 1999, October 22) suggested that “Turkey knows that the route to Europe only follows a significant improvement in the human rights situation there.” However, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem (quoted in “Turkey Says”, 1997, October 23) criticized Kinkel by stating that

We must accelerate our improvement in some areas in Turkey ... but I tell them (European officials) Turkey's deficiencies have been exaggerated by some circles in the European Union for political reasons...I am opposed to putting this (human rights) issue on the agenda with the aim of delaying Turkey's entrance into the European Union.

After the Luxembourg European Council, Turkey criticized Germany for excluding Turkey for different reasons but Kinkel (quoted in Kirschbaum, 1997, December 20) responded that “Democracy is insufficient in Turkey and the relationship with Greece is insufficient. These are the reasons that Turkey is not being invited.” Kinkel (quoted in “Germany Urges”, 1998, April 19) also emphasized that high emotions and expectations of Luxembourg had led to disappointment of Turkey and suggested that “Turkey must deal with its problems, with the occupation of north Cyprus, the Kurdish question and human rights problems.” Schroeder (quoted in “Schroeder Urges”, 1999, December 3) reiterated that

Only when the political criteria of Copenhagen and Article Six of the EU treaty are met - that means safeguarding human rights and respect and protection for minorities as well as the stable rule of law - can the question of starting actual entry negotiations be raised....There can be no exceptions on this. Whoever wants to belong to Europe, to the European Union, must acknowledge its values.

In 2004, Fischer (quoted in “Germany Will”, 2004, October 18) suggested that the prospect of membership was a longer-term one that will still require great efforts and added that “From our point of view, it is clear that the reform process must be pushed forward energetically.”

German politicians also used geopolitical arguments such as strategic importance of Turkey, together with the reservations for accession. For instance, Kinkel (quoted in Barham, 1997, March 27) suggested that “Turkey is an important member of Nato. Turkey's strategic importance gives it responsibility, and Turkey

should show this responsibility over Nato's enlargement.” Likewise, Kinkel (quoted in “German FM”, 1997, June 30) highlighted that

Turkey serves as a very important bridge to the Islamic world, new Turkic states and Asia. Turkey for us is an indispensable ally that we cannot afford to lose. This country has also been a member of the Association Council with the EU since 1964, and nearly two million of Turkey's citizens live with us. All of this compiled together shows that Turkey is an indispensable ally. However, they have to solve the problems which they themselves know must be solved.

German Foreign Minister Fischer (quoted in 1998, December 15) also highlighted that “Her geopolitical significance is great and there is a Turkish minority in many EU countries which has a strong status.” Likewise, Schroeder (quoted in “Schroeder Warns”, 2002, December 19) also argued that “If its citizens so choose, Turkey can be an important, perhaps the most important, bridge between continental Europe and the eastern Mediterranean region.” Fisher (quoted in “Germany’s Fischer”, 2004, January 21) also underlined that “For us, for Europe, Turkey is a strategic partner... Turkey's strategic importance has become even more evident since September 11.” Before the EU summit in December 2004, Schroeder (quoted in “Schroeder Build”, 2004, November 26) suggested that the importance of accepting Turkey as follows:

It is not history, language or religion that make Europe unique...but political principles and cultural attitudes - standing up for peace, respect for the individual and tolerance in company with cultural diversity...Europe has the historic chance to build a bridge to the Islamic world.

Similarly, Fischer (quoted in “Turkey EU, 2004, December 15) also underlined that

If, as seems highly likely, EU leaders give the go-ahead on Friday... a new chapter will be written in the history of Europe...Turkey belongs to Europe. Seen from a historical point of view, Christianity and Western values have left their mark on Turkey just as much as Islam

and Oriental traditions...A tolerant, modern and moderately Islamic Turkey at the crossroads of Europe and the Middle East would have a big effect on the whole Islamic world...Slamming the door of the EU in Turkey's face would only strengthen those in Ankara who reject Europe and democratic traditions. No one can want that and no one has the right to want that.

Fear of Islamic fundamentalism was another geostrategic argument for Turkey. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (quoted in "German Fischer, 1999, September 16) suggested that "If the 15-nation EU did not give Turkey a realistic hope of joining it would ultimately lead to "self-isolation and strengthen Islamic forces there." Similarly, Schroeder (quoted in Cole, 2002, December 4) also suggested that "We have a national interest in making sure that Turkey does not drift into Islamic fundamentalism. That we have a national interest in Turkey having an ever closer bond to the West." Fisher (quoted in "German FM", 2004, January 21) underlined that "If Islam and democracy (in Turkey) can be brought together in an open and strong civil society that would be of tremendous importance...If we shut the door in Turkey's face we will pay a heavy price."

After the suicidal bombing in Istanbul in November 2003, security arguments were also used by German politicians. For instance, Schroeder (quoted in Kirschbaum, 2003, November 26) suggested that "From a political point of view it's a hugely interesting thought that we should fully examine: whether the security interests of Germany, and Europe, could be served if an experiment in Turkey succeeds and creates a link between the Islamic religion and values of freedom." Similarly, he (quoted in "Germany Renews", 2004, April 27) underlined that Turkey's 'non-aggressive' Muslim society would bring "an incredible security boost" to Europe when it joins. Moreover, he (quoted in "Germany's Schroeder", 2004, June 24) referred to stability by suggesting that "a Turkey which has started accession talks will play a greater role of stability in its region." Furthermore, he

(quoted in “Erdogan Schroeder”, 2004, October 4) underlined that “We all see how unstable the Middle East and front Asia are. Turkey has become a stability element in the region under the leadership of Erdogan.”

Although the problems of Turkey in the compliance with the Copenhagen criteria were emphasized, ideational arguments such as Europeanness of Turkey were also used by German politicians. For instance, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (quoted in Smith, 1996, November 6) underlined that “Turkey belongs to Europe. Europeans must do everything to show Turkey we want it with us.” After the disappointing Luxembourg European Council, Klaus Kinkel (quoted in “Focus-EU”, 1997, December 15) underlined that “We are not going to close the door on Turkey. Turkey belongs within Europe, we want it to be there with us.”

Ideational arguments such as not sharing common religion were also believed to be behind German opposition to Turkey. According to Yilmaz (quoted in John, 1997, December 19), Kohl told that EU was based on “Christian principles and there is no space for a country which doesn't share this cultural identity” and Yilmaz suggested that this clearly referred to predominantly Islamic Turkey and added that “Of course, the German government will deny it.” However, Kohl (quoted in “Kohl Denies”, 1997, December 13) denied that by suggesting

It is particularly wrong to say that we have an anti-Islamic position...Perhaps it would be interesting for a reporter...to do a comparative report seeing how many Christian churches are in Turkish cities.

Foreign Minister Kinkel was also in Kohl's side by (quoted in Kirschbaum, 1997, December 20) underlining that “The attacks that (Yilmaz) made against the chancellor are completely off target and inappropriate... You can accuse him of many things, but not that.” Likewise, he (quoted in Fleck, 1998, March 13) stated that

“Candidates for the EU are not judged on the basis of religion, the decisive thing is that they must fulfill the criteria.”

After the change of government, however, Guenter Verheugen (quoted in Gray, 1998, November 12), state secretary in the Foreign Ministry, criticized the previous German government's stance on possible Turkish EU membership by suggesting that

We reject the idea that the European Union cannot be open to a country because it does not belong to the Christian cultural sphere ... If we want Turkey to change, to become a country which meets Western democratic and constitutional standards, we must offer it a perspective.

Likewise, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (quoted in “New German”, 1998, November 19) suggested that his new government's position is that “The European Union is not a Christian community, but a community of values and interests...Turkey would implement these values within the country...It is a condition of membership which all candidate countries must fulfill.”

Before the EU summit in Copenhagen, the leader of JDP, Erdogan (quoted in “UK Throws”, 2002, November 21) warned that “We do not see the EU as a Christian club and we do not want it to be considered as such ... Turkey will be the best example of the compatibility between Islam and democracy.” Schroeder also (quoted in “Schroeder Warns”, 2002, December 19) warned Merkel about using Islam issue and suggested that

Those who want to use the topic of Turkish accession to instigate a new clash of civilizations along the lines of Christian Western Europe against Islam want to fool people that Muslims can be kept out of our culture and society...That is false and dangerous. Muslims belong to the obvious daily life of all European societies.

Consequently, Germany, under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, had political and ideational reservations towards Turkey and did not let Turkey become a candidate in

the Luxembourg European Council. However, Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz reacted harshly to this decision and did not attend the European Conference. In addition, he also froze Turkey's relations with the EU. So, Germany, in the period of Helmut Kohl was a brakeman in Turkey's European aspirations. On the other hand, with the Chancellorship of Gerard Schroeder, the German attitude towards Turkey changed dramatically. Hence, Germany, in the period of Schroeder became a driver of Turkey's European bid.

4.3.2.2 France

This period was marked with French support for Turkish bid for EU until the election of JDP in November 3, 2002. From this date on, due to the hesitations about Turkey's European orientation and secular character, public concern about Turkish accession to the EU came to the fore. Although government, especially Chirac, supported Turkish accession explicitly, it can be argued that reservations towards Turkish accession increased and there were reservation statements just for the sake of domestic politics.

After the Customs Union agreement, France continued to support Turkish bid to the EU. For instance, Chirac (quoted in "Chirac Says", 1996, July 9) emphasized that "I noted your government's programme with great interest and congratulate you on your desire to continue tightening links between Turkey and the European Union...France will support your efforts in this direction." In the way towards candidacy, France was supporting a financial protocol for Turkey so far blocked by Greece and Catherine Colonna, President Jacques Chirac's spokeswoman, quoted ("Chirac See", 1999, August 31) Chirac as telling Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem that "We must find a way for Turkey and the EU to collaborate. This tragedy

may in the end be a way to advance things.” Moreover, she (quoted in “France Says”, 1999, December 8) also pointed out that “We want the European Council meeting (of December 10-11) to recognize Turkey's candidacy with the same rights and obligations as other candidates.”

French support for Turkey continued after the candidacy. In 2000, European Affairs Minister Pierre Moscovici reminded the EU to respect the undertakings made regarding financial assistance to Turkey and also (quoted in “EP/Turkey”, 2000, November 16) warned that “we must refrain from imposing new or exorbitant conditions on Turkey's candidacy” and he added that “equal treatment for Turkey in relation to the other candidates” was needed. Minister of Foreign Affairs Dominique de Villepin of France (quoted in “De Villepin”, 2002, October 22) suggested that the EU should send an encouraging and clear message to Turkey during the summit to be held in Brussels between October 24 and 25, 2002 and added that “We will try to find a method to assess Turkey's efforts appropriately. We, as 15 members of the EU, should clearly tell Turkey that they have been progressing on the right way.”

The victory of JDP in November 2002 elections and coming to power of an Islam oriented government, however, caused hesitation in French politicians about Turkey's EU orientation and secularism. For instance, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin (quoted in Stokrotsky, 2002, November 9) suggested that there were no doubts that Turkey would remain a candidate for joining the European Union but added that “I believe that at the upcoming EU summit in Copenhagen Turkey will be informed about demands needed to join the European Union.” Moreover, Villepin (quoted in “Turkey's EU”, 2002, November 12) also pointed out that “We're ready to work with them in a demanding partnership, based on common European values presumably shared by Union members...It's on these common

values that the Turkish government's actions and its (EU) candidacy will be evaluated.” After talking to Recep Tayyip Erdogan about the date for opening of accession talks, Chirac's spokeswoman (quoted in Gehmlich, 2002, November 27) told that “France has not set its position yet because it is seeking a consensus across Europe (on the date) that is both acceptable and viable for Turkey.”

In December 2002, France and Germany came up with a proposal which necessitated the commission to compile a report in the second half of 2004 on Turkey's democratic reforms, and if the report was positive Turkey would be offered a start date of July 1, 2005. Chirac (quoted in “Chirac Confirms”, 2002, December 5) confirmed this proposal by suggesting that “If that were the case, then there could be negotiations from July 2005.” However, Recep Tayyip Erdogan (quoted in Keaten, 2002, December 5), the leader of the party of Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, criticized this proposal by underlining that “This is not fair. This is unacceptable...To display such double standards against a country with such an interest, affection and determination (toward the EU) brings questions to our minds.” French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin (quoted in “French Premier”, 2002, December 10) also expressed his concern about new government by warning that “In the name of France, I wish that a message of consensus may be expressed in Copenhagen, a message of openness but also of vigilance...We will judge the Turkish government only on its acts, and the Turkish people only on its capacity to adhere to our values.” On the eve of EU summit, Catherine Colonna (quoted in “Most EU”, 2002, December 11) Chirac's spokeswoman underlined that “This proposition has received majority support...Turkey is not ready.... We think the most simple and wise thing to do is to set a date in two years, at which to verify whether Turkey is respecting the Copenhagen criteria.” In the Council, it was

decided to give Turkey only a conditional date for entry talks after a review in 2004. Prime Minister Gul (quoted in “EU Stands”, 2002, December 13) referring to a report that Chirac stated in the EU meeting that the Turkey was blackmailing the EU, criticized Chirac by suggesting that “When there is no reaction against France from government and official circles I am very sad that Chirac influenced the meeting. The real blackmail is to take the meeting under his influence and try to change the direction of the meeting.” Moreover, he (quoted in Andrews, 2002, December 13) also underlined that “There is great discrimination here...There is prejudice against us, and there needs to be great efforts to correct this. Clear sentences should be put into the draft to remove uncertainty.”

Relations with France seemed to relax in April 2003, after Turkey declared that Turkey would not send forces to Iraq. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin (quoted in Kılıcarslan and Demirelli, 2003, April 24) congratulated Turkey on this decision by suggesting that “France greatly appreciated the restraint, the moderation and the maturity that Turkey showed” and showed his support to Turkish accession by underlining that

There are several arguments in favor of (Turkey's) candidacy, be they strategic, security related, economic or related to cultural diversity...We see Turkey's deep aspiration to join the union and France plans to stand by your side on this road, which is the road of democracy, economic development and social cohesion.

In 2004, the wind was reversed again towards Turkey. For example, Alain Juppe (quoted in “Turkish Leaders”, 2004, April 8), the leader of French President Jacques Chirac's centre-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), suggested that he was against Turkish membership and instead wanted ‘privileged partnership’ with Turkey but Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul responded that “Various exaggerated words can be said for reasons related to domestic politics.”

Foreign Minister Barnier (quoted in “Turkish EU”, 2004, April 21) underlined the distant prospect of Turkish membership by suggesting “There is no question of Turkey joining the EU today or tomorrow... We haven't started negotiations, and they could last 10 to 15 years.” Moreover, despite his declared position of favoring Turkey’s eventual accession, Chirac (quoted in “EU Enlargement, 2004, April 29) stressed that “I believe that Turkey has a European vocation. But the conditions for its entry are not fulfilled today.” He (quoted in “Chirac Foresees”, 2004, April 29) also said that “Let's be clear - if conditions allow the negotiations to start at the beginning of next year, we have to know these negotiations will be long, very long.” On the other hand, he (quoted in Marlowe, 2004, April 30) also acknowledged that “In the long term, it is in our interest that Turkey be stable, modern, and democratic.”

In June 2004, US President Bush asked from the European Union to fix a date for Turkey to start accession negotiations. However, President Chirac (quoted in Bretton, 2004, June 28) criticized Bush by suggesting that “If President Bush really said that the way I read it, well, not only did he go too far but he went into a domain which is not his own...It is like me trying to tell the United States how it should manage its relations with Mexico.”

After Erdogan’s visit to France in June, French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier (quoted in Boyle, 2004, July 20) suggested that “The road is still long, but it is on this path and has been making progress for some time.” In September, French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin (quoted in “French PM”, 2004, September 23) shared the skepticism of French citizens towards Turkey’s bid by suggesting that “We are not doubting that good faith of Mr. Erdogan, but to what extent can today's and tomorrow's governments make Turkish society embrace Europe's human rights

values...Do we want the river of Islam to enter the riverbed of secularism?" But he also gave some hope by stressing that "We don't think we should tell Turkey that the doors of Europe are forever closed to it."

In October, in order to show that he understood public concern about Turkish accession, President Chirac promised (quoted in Johnson, 2004, October 1) that France would hold a referendum in enlargements by pointing out that "The French people will have their say...It would be compulsory to ask the people via a referendum on this enlargement and other possible enlargements, and not via the parliamentary process." As a response to Chirac's referendum proposal, Erdogan suggested that the move by Chirac was unjust because none of the 10 EU members that joined the bloc in May had to win voter approval first and (quoted in "Update Turkey", 2004, October 6) added that "It will destroy the motivation of Turkey to stay the course on economic and political reforms to get into the E.U." Moreover, Prime Minister Raffarin (quoted in "French PM", 2004, October 14), in order to soothe widespread opposition to Turkey's eventual membership, suggested that "Neither Europe nor Turkey are ready for membership....Today, Turkey is very far from Europe politically, economically and socially....Let us not lie to the Turkish people. Let us confirm clearly that its membership in the European Union is not possible today, nor tomorrow nor in the next few years." Erdogan (quoted in Boyle, 2004, October 20) criticized these comments by suggesting that

It is difficult for me to understand the approach of our French friends on this subject...Why are people so afraid of the Turks and Turkey, why so many reservations? I don't think it makes any sense...Turkey, for its part, would bring to the EU its position in the Muslim world, which will also bring an important richness, because it will be an important partner.

He (quoted in Heritage and Gemlich, 2004, October 21) also asked to have "a declaration from my friend President Chirac which would put an end to all the

chatter...I am sure that he will manage this, because of his great genius. Isn't he one of the senior figures in politics?" Erdogan (quoted in Heritage and Gemlich, 2004, October 21) also argued that "France has always supported us. We saw that in previous summits. I am convinced that on December 17, at the EU summit, political will be expressed." President Chirac (quoted in "Germany France", 2004, October 26), after having talks with Chancellor Schroeder, underlined that "This decision (in December) is based on the recommendations of the European Commission, whose favorable conclusion we know and I agree with too" but reminded that there would be a long term process of negotiations.

In November, on the other hand, Chirac again changed his stance towards Turkey and started to talk about another form of relations instead of full membership. He (quoted in "Chirac Says", 2004, November 5) underlined that

Naturally one can't underestimate the possibility that in a few years' time we come to realize that ... the road that Turkey has to travel doesn't permit it to adopt all the values of Europe...In that case, what has to be found is a means to create a sufficiently strong link so that there is no separation between Europe and Turkey, without there being integration.

Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul commented that Chirac's remarks reflected French domestic politics and (quoted in "Chirac Says", 2004, November 5) added that "President Chirac is very wise, he's handled it very wisely, he's a great statesman. I think his statement should not be misread." In December, Chirac (quoted in Barkin, 2004, December 2) reiterated his call for an alternative option by suggesting that

If all the necessary conditions for entry are not fulfilled, of course negotiations will be interrupted...In that case we would have to look for a way of ensuring that this rupture did not lead to a form of separation between Turkey and Europe and we would look for ways of finding a sufficiently strong link between these two major political, economic and cultural bodies.

Foreign Minister Michel Barnier (quoted in “Turkish PM”, 2004, December 9), on the date of opening of accession talks, underlined that “We want the membership talks to be opened at the end of 2005 or the beginning of 2006” but (quoted in “Turkish PM”, 2004, December 10) warned that “It will be a rocky road.” After the compromise to start EU accession talks with Turkey in next October, Chirac (quoted in “Chirac Eyes”, 2004, December 17) reiterated that “The road will be long and difficult.” In order to respond to public concern, French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier (quoted in Heritage, 2004, December 20) underlined that negotiations would be long and decided by the French people added that “Once again I repeat that the way is open, it's conclusion is not written in advance, and many guarantees, precautions and safeguards will be there to ensure that Turkey will respect (the entry criteria) if it joins the European Union one day.” In addition, Nicolas Sarkozy (quoted in Boland, 2004, December 19), head of the governing UMP party and most vocal opponent of Turkish accession, underlined that “Europe already has difficulty functioning with 25 members. The more members Europe has, the less we will be integrated, the less we will share common values, and the more fragile we will be.”

Security related arguments were used by French politicians in their support for Turkish accession to the EU. For instance, French European Affairs Minister Michel Barnier (quoted in “France Criticizes”, 1997, March 10) suggested that “I think it is important for the stability of the Union, that is to say for the stability of the whole of Europe, that the Turks retain a European prospect, even if we know that membership would not be realistic in the short-term.” Moreover, President Chirac (quoted in “Roundup Turkey’s ”, 2004, October 1) also emphasized that “We have an interest in having Turkey with us...It opens the perspective of democracy and peace taking root on the whole of the European continent -- in the wider sense of the

term -- so that we avoid the mistakes and violence of the past.” Furthermore, despite the fact that negotiations with Turkey would last long, President Chirac (quoted in “Germany France”, 2004, October 2004) underlined that “The membership of Turkey would be in the interest of Turkey and in the interest of the stability and democracy of the world and our region.” In addition, Chirac (quoted in Benoit et al, 2004, December 16) stressed that “It is obvious that on the issue of security, stability, and peace, having this great nation at our door today is totally positive. Rejecting them would present a risk of instability and insecurity at our borders.”

Ideational arguments such as Europeanness of Turkey were also underlined. For example, French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette (quoted in “France’s De”, 1997, April 2) suggested that “France clearly believes that Turkey has potential to take part in the building of Europe...We are in agreement with you over the future of Europe.” Chirac (quoted in Ertan, 1998, February 19) also highlighted that “My conviction is that Turkey should come to the European Conference and be an active member because this conference is the family meeting of Europe.” After the Conference, he (quoted in “Turkey Says”, 1998, March 12) suggested that

This first meeting of the European family is a great political occasion. I have only one regret - the absence of Turkey...Turkey has a place among us...the EU must make concrete gestures of willingness to welcome it.

However, in 2002, after the JDP’s landslide victory in November 3 elections of Turkey, Europeanness of Turkey was questioned by former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing who was head of the Convention on the Future of Europe. He underlined that accession of Turkey to the EU would be the end of European Union and he (quoted in Taylor, 2002, November 8) suggested that Turkey had

A different culture, a different approach, a different way of life...Its capital is not in Europe, 95 percent of its population live outside

Europe, it is not a European country...In my opinion, it would be the end of the European Union.

As a response to d'Estaing, French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin (quoted in "French Prime", 2002, November 9) emphasized that "The position of Valery Giscard d'Estaing against Turkey's entry into the European Union is an old conviction, with arguments (behind it), but personal." In addition, Chirac (quoted in Wielaard, 2002, November 22) also refuted d'Estaing by underlining that "Turkey absolutely has its place in Europe...We cannot dispute this."

Geopolitical arguments were also used by French politicians. For instance, French Foreign minister (quoted in "Turkey EU", 2004, April 18) warned that "If we reject it (Turkey), if we slam the door in its face as some would like to do quite quickly, there is a risk that it will turn to another model...It would be better for it to be with us than for it to be alone and in poverty and under-developed."

Ideational argument of not sharing common religion was also raised during these period but French politicians refuted the argument that Turkey's Moslem religion was one of the reasons for keeping it outside the EU. For instance, French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette (quoted in Gaunt, 1997, March 16) emphasized that "Turkey has the right to join the EU and that right has to be confirmed forcefully...We can only judge the membership of a country on objective criteria, and certainly not on religious or ethnic criteria." Similarly, European Affairs Minister Pierre Moscovici (quoted in "Turkey Not", 1998, March 12) suggested that "Europe is not a Christian club. It is not on the basis of this criterion that Turkish membership of the European Union will be judged when the time comes, but on political and economic conditions." Moreover, Moscovici (quoted in Jones, 2002, November 14), the French government's representative on the European Convention,

reiterated that “Europe is not a Christian club....In the enlarged Europe that we are building, a Europe of 500 million people, there are and will be Muslims who will also have their place.” In 2004, President Chirac (quoted in Marlowe, 2004, April 30) emphasized that “For Europe to reject Turkey for ethnic or religious reasons could only play into the hands of those who advocate the clash of civilizations, who try to pit the West against Islam.” Erdogan (quoted in Boyle, 2004, October 20) also criticized people in France who suggested that Turkish culture was so different and it would change the nature of European Union and underlined that “Membership would signal a reconciliation between civilizations.”

The most important reservation of France in Turkish accession to the EU was the compliance to the Copenhagen Criteria. Turkey was asked to make reforms in the area of human rights, especially Kurdish problem and solve the problems related to territorial disputes and Cyprus. For instance, French Foreign Minister Herve De Charette (quoted in Holmes, 1997, January 29) suggested that there were no obstacles in principle to a future EU place for Turkey but that the outstanding issues naturally represent difficulties on the path to Turkey's possible membership. Likewise, European Affairs Minister Pierre Moscovici (quoted in “Turkey Not”, 1998, March 12) also underlined that “Some serious problems must be resolved first, such as the Kurdish problem, human rights or indeed the Cypriot question.” Even after Turkey becoming a candidate, Pierre Moscovici (quoted in “France Says”, 2001, April 10) pointed out that “Turkey must enact reforms and restructure its democratic institutions to meet European standards.” Moreover, French President Jacques Chirac (quoted in “Turkey Demands”, 2002, November 22) suggested that Turkey had a rightful place in Europe but that accession negotiations could not begin until Ankara had met key conditions, especially on improving human rights and

democracy. In addition, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin (quoted in “French FM”, 2002, December 2) also underlined that “The commitment made by the Europeans (to Turkey) should not be placed in doubt, though it must continue its efforts and satisfy the great democratic principle which are ours.” Furthermore, Foreign Minister Michel Barnier (quoted in Picot, 2004, April 7) underlined that “Turkey does not respect the conditions, even if it is preparing to do so” and added that there was no question of Turkey's joining the EU under current circumstances.

The huge population that Turkey had also became a reservation for French politicians. French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin (quoted in “Turkish EU”, 2004, December 12) suggested that “The entry of Turkey is, or rather can be if it is confirmed in the next few years, a new stage in the history of the European Union due, mostly, to its size...It would signify a substantial enlargement, equivalent in terms of population to the one which we just experienced on May 1, 2004.”

Another reservation for France was Armenian issue. Just one day before the European Council, Foreign Minister Michel Barnier (quoted in “France Wants”, 2004, December 13) suggested that “It is a request that France will make, to recognize the tragedy from the start of the century Turkey must carry out this task as a memorial.” However, he (quoted in “Armenian Genocide”, 2004, December 14) needed to explain his remarks and underlined that “France does not pose it (acknowledging the Armenian genocide) as a condition, notably not for opening negotiations (on EU accession)... Legally, that would not be possible.”

To sum up, President Chirac was a driver of Turkish European till November 2002. After the election of JDP, French politicians started to question Turkish European bid and secularism. Public opposition to Turkish membership also increased. In this condition, Turkish membership challenged the political interest of

France and Chirac, who was a driver of Turkish membership, became a brakeman in order to soothe public opposition. He started to talk about another way of dealing Turkey and he promised to have referendum on Turkish accession. Hence, France attitude towards Turkey changed after the election of the JDP from being a driver to being a brakeman.

4.3.2.3 Great Britain

Great Britain continued to support Turkey's relations with the EU in this period. In the beginning of 1997, British Foreign Secretary Mr. Rifkind (quoted in Holmes, 1997, January 29) criticized that Turkey's current relations with the EU was "unsatisfactory" and added that "We believe Turkey should be treated in the same way as other applicant countries." In November 1997, Great Britain planned to stage a grand 27-nation summit in March 1998, as a consolation prize for applicant who would not be included in the next wave of the EU's enlargement, and the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook (quoted in "Bonn Boosts", 1997, November 11) supported the idea of inviting Turkey to the conference and suggested that "We have always taken the view that it is important to encourage those in Turkey who see Turkey's vocation as European." In December 1997, in the Luxembourg Summit, Turkey was not declared as a candidate of the EU membership and the EU wants Turkey to improve its human rights record, protect the rights of its Kurdish minority and move to solve territorial disputes with Greece, including the future of the divided island of Cyprus. However, Prime Minister Blair (quoted in "Blair Appears", 1997, December 13), in order to show Turkey that the door was not closed, suggested that

People recognize that Turkey is a great power, Turkey is a great people. It is important for the future of Europe as well as for Turkey that we move closer together and that we envisage the day in which Turkey becomes a member of the European Union ... It is going to

require some work to get there and what I would plead with (Turkey) for is a positive response to what has been set out in the EU document...Europe is willing and wants to work with Turkey for the future...The criteria we apply in relation to Turkey are the same criteria we apply in relation to all countries... document makes it clear that we want to see Turkey both as a closer partner in Europe and be part of the European Conference that we will be holding in Great Britain next year.

Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, however, criticized the EU decision on Turkey and about the invitation to the conference, he (quoted in “Turkish PM”, 1997, December 14) underlined that

Turkey's attendance at the EU conference has been made dependent on the fulfillment of conditions. This invitation does not have any importance for us...We will not accept any conditions.

Elaborating on Yilmaz's comments, State Minister Sukru Sina Gurel (quoted in Goktas, 1997, December 14) told that “Turkey will not participate.” As a response, Tony Blair (quoted in “EU Tries”, 1997, December 15) told that

I understand Turkish disappointment at being treated in an apparently different way from others. But I continue to hope they will come to see the advantages for them of participation in the European Conference as a further step towards eventual membership.

In addition to Blair, the foreign secretary Robin Cook also (quoted Walker and Black, 1997, December 16) underlined that “I think Turkey was wrong to turn down the opportunity to have a new forum for political dialogue with Europe, and it remains to be seen whether they will stick with their refusal.” In April 1998, Robin Cook (quoted in “EU Reiterates”, 1998, April 2) also tried to improve the relations of the EU with Turkey and suggested that “The upcoming gathering of the Turkey-EU Association Council in May would provide a chance for the EU to display the importance it attributed to Turkey and a platform for some advance in solving the problems.” and in May he (quoted in “Cook Visits”, 1998, May 19) added that “I am looking forward to that meeting and I hope today we can agree on a basis that will

make it a successful meeting to put Europe and Turkey back on track for closer, successful relations.” However, Turkish Foreign Ministry, in a written statement, (quoted in “Foreign Ministry”, 1998, May 23) underlined that “it will be more appropriate to hold the Turkish-European Union (EU) Association Council meeting when the conditions are ripened by the EU” and indicated that Turkey is open to new proposals and expects Great Britain to continue her goodwill efforts.

In the Cardiff Summit, Great Britain was the most ardent supporter of the declaration of Turkey as a candidate state but Great Britain only got the phrase that “rules applying to other candidates also apply for Turkey.” This can be suggested to be the first, tough implicit, official designation of Turkey as a candidate. Blair (quoted in “EU Offers”, 1998, June 17) emphasized that “We have subjected the candidacy of Turkey more clearly than Luxembourg.” As seen in the words of Cook who suggested (quoted in “Britain To”, 1999, September 2) that “We will be arguing for that (candidate) status to be recognized...this weekend among foreign ministers.” Great Britain continued to work for the Turkish candidacy. After the Commission report that suggested candidacy for Turkey, Cook (quoted in “Britain Says”, 1999, October 14) underlined that “It is time to open a new chapter in the EU's relationship with Turkey... We agree with the Commission that the Helsinki Summit should confirm Turkey's status as a candidate for membership.” Likewise, Blair (quoted in McEvoy, 1999, October 16) stressed that “My own assessment of this situation is that there will be agreement in Helsinki that Turkey should be considered a candidate country, and we will certainly be supporting that position.”

After the candidacy, Great Britain continued to support Turkey’s bid to the EU membership. As a response to the reform package of Turkey in order to comply

with the Copenhagen Criteria, Blair (quoted in “Prime Minister”, 2002, September 10) suggested that

The reforms will be of great benefit to your citizens...I welcome them also as a boost for Turkey's EU candidature. ...I recalled the United Kingdom's strong political support for Turkey's application for the EU membership.

Similarly, Straw (quoted in “Peacock”, 2002, October 17) underlined that “Turkey has made significant progress in recent months towards meeting the political criteria necessary to start negotiations for membership.”

Great Britain continued to be the main supporter of Turkey in her bid for the EU. For instance, Straw (quoted in “British Turkish”, 2002, September 25) reiterated British position by suggesting that Great Britain was a “long-standing and strong supporter of Turkey's goal to join the EU.” Moreover, in the process towards the date for opening of accession negotiations, Straw (quoted in “Britain Urges”, 2002, December 3) pointed out that “What we want to see is... a firm date set for the beginning of Turkey’s negotiations towards accession of the EU.” Likewise, Blair (quoted in “Blair Backs”, 2002, December 12) also suggested that “I believe we have a historic opportunity to set a firm date of accession negotiations for Turkey.” As a response to a criticism that Great Britain supported Turkey due to Iraq war, Straw (quoted in “British Support”, 2002, December 13) underlined that

Our support for Turkey's membership of the European Union pre-dates any possibility of action against Iraq by about 20 years...We've been very actively supporting Turkey's application for membership, particularly since we came into Government in May 1997.

Security arguments related to Turkey were used by British politicians. For instance, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook (quoted in Shiels, 1997, November 27) stated that “If we are serious about tackling the drug problem in western Europe, for example, it is much more helpful to do it with Turkey present than with Turkey

absent.” Moreover, Cook (quoted in Taylor, 1998, June 4) underlined that “The big issue is whether the EU can forge a working relationship with Turkey...It is of immense importance for our stability and security.” Likewise, Straw (quoted in “Delaying Turkey”, 2002, December 5) also highlighted that “Accepting Turkey -- with its balance between a Muslim majority and a secular, democratic government -- would be a boon to European and global stability.”

Moreover, Blair used ideational arguments such as Europeanness of Turkey in showing British support to Turkey in her bid to the EU as well. For example, Blair (quoted in Buchan and Blitzs, 1998, January 9) emphasized that they would use intensive diplomacy to repair EU ties with Turkey, which should realize “The tremendous sense that we want Turkey to be part of the family of Europe.” Likewise, he (quoted in Sultan, 1998, January 10) reiterated that “I do not mind to repeat that we see Turkey as natural part of Europe and we will try to do everything so that it stays that way.” Furthermore, about the conference, he (quoted in Walker and Black, 1998, March 13) underlined that “I hope that Turkey understands the door remains open to them. We want them very much to be part of the people of Europe.” Similarly, Blair (quoted in “Blair Backs”, 2002, December 12) also suggested that the Copenhagen Summit, should “send the clearest possible signal that the European Union wants Turkey inside the European family as a full partner in the European Union...Certainly that is what Great Britain will be arguing for.” Furthermore, before the start of accession negotiations, Jack Straw (quoted in “Britain’s Straw”, 2004, August 31) also underlined that “Turkey is a European nation and part of Europe's history, it is entitled as a member of the Council of Europe and NATO to make an application for membership of the European Union and I hope a decision will be made in December for a start to negotiations.”

Ideational argument of not sharing common religion was used by Jack Straw (quoted in “Delaying Turkey”, 2002, December 5)

The most disreputable reason of all for feet-dragging on Turkey would be to treat it differently from other applicant states because the majority of the country's population was Muslim...We need to remember this, that so much of Europe's own history, written in blood, has arisen through violence and conflict defined by religious strife.

Straw (quoted in “UK Says”, 2004, March 23) also emphasized that “If we believe, as I strongly do, that Europe's strength lies not in a Judaeo-Christian club but in a diversity of traditions underpinned by common and universal values, then we must fulfill our engagements to Turkey.” In the same vein, Straw (quoted in “Turkey In”, 2004, December 15) pointed out that “But Turkey's European destiny is also important for wider reasons, because of the signal which a European Turkey would send to people everywhere of Europe's commitment to diversity and to truly universal values.”

Foreign Secretary Cook (quoted in “Robin Cook”, 1998, January 17) used geopolitical arguments related to Turkey by underlining that

Turkey matters as a longstanding ally and friend, and a major player in an important region. The European Union confirmed at its recent Luxembourg Summit that Turkey was eligible for accession to the European Union, and we set out a strategy to prepare Turkey for accession...We recognize [Turkey's] European vocation, and the need to involve Turkey in the process of European enlargement. ...Turkey's candidacy for membership of the EU will be judged by the same objective criteria as any other country.

Likewise, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (quoted in “Britain Backs”, 2002, October 17) also made similar comments by stressing that “Turkey is a key member of NATO and a vital ally in the campaign against terrorism. Its accession to the EU would be in the best interests of Great Britain and indeed Europe” Furthermore, about Iraq war, Straw (quoted in “Britain Backs”, 2002 November 20) suggested that

“In this, as so many issues, Turkey is a key strategic ally. We share a common determination to deal with this threat to regional security and have agreed to stay closely in touch.” In addition Straw (quoted in “UK Says”, 2004, March 23) also stressed that

The EU would benefit greatly from integrating a country with such enormous potential - a key NATO ally at the intersection of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. ...The example of an economically successful, democratic Turkey anchored in Europe would be an inspiration to many others in the Islamic world.

Similarly, before the opening of accession negotiations, Straw (quoted in “Britain’s Straw”, 2004, August 31) suggested that “I know that views differ on this but people need to think very carefully about the strategic implications of pushing Turkey away, of pushing Turkey to the east and to the south...I don't think that's in anybody's interests in Europe.”

The most significant British reservation of Turkish candidacy for EU was the Copenhagen Criteria and the pace of reform in the implementation of these criteria. For instance, British foreign secretary, Malcolm Rifkind (quoted in “Turkey Seeks”, 1997, January 30) suggested that there had been some improvement on human rights but “there was still room for more progress.” Moreover, with respect to Copenhagen Criteria, Cook (quoted in Taylor, 1998, June 4) underlined that “Those are the criteria which Turkey has to meet and I know from discussions with politicians in Turkey that they fully appreciate there's a lot of work to be done before Turkey can claim to be in conformity with these criteria.” After the positive commission report about Turkey’s candidacy status, Cook (quoted in “Britain Says”, 1999, October 14) underlined that “The next stage is a sustained effort by Turkey with the EU's support to meet the Copenhagen criteria for membership which would in time allow Turkey to move to accession negotiations with the Union.” In the process towards opening of

accession negotiations, Straw (quoted in “Britain’s Straw”, 2004, March 3) underlined that

December is an important opportunity for both Turkey and the EU...Turkey can continue to enjoy the support of EU countries by preserving its current momentum and implementing the reforms in order to meet all the EU conditions...The EU promise is clear - if Turkey does what it has to do, the EU will start negotiations without delay.

Likewise, Blair (quoted in Boland and Hall, 2004, May 17) also emphasized that “If it complies with the Copenhagen criteria, there can be no other obstacles to Turkey's membership of the EU.”

Therefore, British attitude towards Turkey did not change in this period and Britain continued to be a driver of Turkish European bid. The most significant reservation of Britain was compliance with Copenhagen Criteria.

4.3.2.4 Greece

After the Customs Union Agreement, Greece continued to block Turkish relations with the EU. The arguments of Greece that were used in this period were still political. These are the problems in the Aegean, continental shelf or Kardak crisis and Cyprus. However, 1999 became a breakpoint in Greek-Turkish relations and as Heraclides calls it, a *detente* in relations led Greece not veto Turkish candidacy at the Helsinki Summit. Therefore, in this period, a change of attitude was seen in Greece.

In December 1995, a Turkish cargo ship ran ashore on the Kardak/Imia islets and was needed to be rescued and this rescue operation led to a sovereignty crisis between Turkey and Greece which both raised their flags on the islets in the end. The immediate war was prevented with the help of US diplomacy. This crisis also

influenced Turkish relations with EU due to the Greek concerns. For instance, Prime Minister Coostas Simitis (quoted in "Greece Renews", 1996, February 22) threatened to disrupt Customs union with Turkey by suggesting that "One cannot expect us to cooperate on the customs union with Turkey until the Aegean issue is cleared up, at least until we have guarantees that no new problems will arise." As a response to the Greek blockage, Turkish foreign ministry recalled Turkish ambassador of Greece for consultations and (quoted in Erdem, 1996, February 22) declared that "We have seen a need for a wide-ranging assessment on our part after a series of hostile actions against Turkey's vital interests by Greece -- using the Kardak crisis as an excuse -- and by its moves aiming particularly to hurt Turkey-EU ties." Prime Minister Ciller (quoted in "Turkey Says", 1996, February 29) also highlighted that

Greece may be a European Union member. But using its European Union membership against Turkey will only restrict Turkey's contribution to the world as it restructures itself...It will be the EU's loss.

According to Foreign Minister Pangolas (quoted in Kambas, 1996, May 2), Greece would extend its veto on EU funds to Turkey and there would be no climate of trust between Greece and Turkey "as long as the Cyprus question is pending, as long as part of Cyprus remains under Turkish occupation and there are Turkish military forces in Cyprus."

Prime minister Yilmaz (quoted in Fox, 1996, June 5) criticized Greek attitude by highlighting that it was time to stop putting pressure on Turkey through the EU and suggested that "The majority of member nations -- maybe 14 -- are aware of the disadvantages of this for European unity and they are determined to overcome this obstacle."

In June 1996, Greece (Fox, 1996, July 16) finally agreed to lift its veto of an ambitious European Union trade and investment plan for the Mediterranean with the

help of the EU foreign ministers' resolution, mainly towards Turkey, that included calls for MEDA nations to respect democracy and also promote good neighborliness. As a response to the declaration, Ciller (quoted in "Foreign Minister", 1996, July 20) underlined that "We discussed the declaration because we wanted to find out if it was in any way related to, or a precondition to, the lifting of the veto, and we found out that it was not."

Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos (quoted in Giacomo, 1997, March 6), after talks with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright suggested that "Turkey certainly belongs to Europe. It's a big part of European history and Greece shall never change its mind about that because if Turkey is not a part of European history then Greece is not a part of European history." In February 1997, Great Britain and Germany pressed Greece to include Turkish Cypriots in accession talks however, Foreign Minister Pangalos (quoted in Paris, 1997, February 26) threatened to block EU's enlargement to the East whether they pushed further and suggested that "Mr. Kinkel and Mr. Rifkind gave a gift to Turkey. Now they must pay the bill." Greece continued to block EU aid to Turkey due to the dispute in the Aegean and Pangalos (quoted in "Greek Foreign", 1997, April 30) suggested that "We have repeatedly declared that we cannot accept Turkish behavior vis-a-vis our sovereignty." Turkish President Demirel (quoted in Paris, 1997, May 24) criticized Greek behavior and emphasized that "It could take years to solve our problems (with Greece) and Turkey should not be excluded from the EU for this reason."

The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem refused to bring Imia/Kardak dispute before the international court of justice in exchange for lifting of Greek veto on community financing. He (quoted in "EU Greece", 1997, September 9) suggested that financial aid to Turkey was a concrete commitment on

the part of the EU stemming from the Customs Union agreement and it was “meaningless that the EU adds a condition to its commitment which it has not yet fulfilled.”

Turkish relations with Greece got even more strained with the issue of Greek support to PKK. Prime Minister Yilmaz, in a written statement, accused Greece of adopting a strategic objective of undermining Turkey's development and its relations with the Western world, particularly the EU. Yilmaz (quoted in “Yilmaz Warns”, 1998, May 1) underlined that

Supporting the PKK, which challenges Turkey's territorial integrity and security, and keeping alive the tense atmosphere in Turco-Greek relations, are the primary methods which Greece implements [to achieve its objective]...Expressing concern over the state of human rights in Turkey, while the evidence of their support for the PKK is increasing, is a tragicomic contradiction, which can be expressed only by those whose antagonistic feelings have come to the level of fanaticism.

Turkey launched a diplomatic offensive to focus European Union scrutiny on Greece on the issue of Ocalan and Foreign Minister Cem (quoted in Bryant, 1999, February 21) suggested that “We expect the EU to seriously examine the case of one of its members which has violently opposed the organization’s charter, commitments and obligations.” It was understood that Ocalan was sheltered in Greek embassy in Nairobi and as a response, Cem was quoted (Hemming, 1999, March 5) to state that “Greek politicians with their incredible heartlessness, pitilessness and irresponsibility have made Greece a terrorist country...Turkey will not talk with Greece about the Aegean, Cyprus or any other important problem.”

In the mid of 1999, relations with Greece started to get warmer. According to Heraclides (2010:144), Kosovo Crisis and response of Turkey and Greece to this crisis is the reason behind this rapprochement. As he indicates, the dialogue,

intensified due to the devastating earthquakes in Turkey and Greece. In addition, Schimmelfennig (2008: 8) also underlies the change of Foreign Ministry from Pangolas to Papandreou as one of the reasons of these warmer relations. Therefore, 1999 became a breakpoint in Turkish Greek relations. Foreign Minister Ismail Cem (quoted in “British Turkish”, 1999, September 4) suggested that

There is a positive atmosphere between Turkey and Greece. The dialogue that Mr. Foreign Minister Yeoryios Papandreou and I started together has been continuing for nearly three months. We will continue the second round talks on six issues on 9th September and I am sure we will bring further the current level we reached. Although we have some differences of opinion in the issues like the Aegean, I am not pessimistic that at least the problems between Turkey and Greece can be solved if the issues are taken up with good will and if we understand our mutual concerns.

Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou (quoted in “Greece Signals”, 1999, September 5) also suggested that “We are in favor of Turkey becoming a member of the European Union...it is in its own interest to see Turkey move closer to Europe”, though he also emphasized that Greece and Turkey still needed to go far in settling long-standing differences, notably over Cyprus and Aegean Sea territorial disputes.

About Turkey’s becoming an EU candidate in the Helsinki European Council Papandreou (quoted in “Greece Offers”, 1999, September 5) emphasized that “Yes, certainly. We are not...in principle against, and we will be working constructively to see if we can make this happen.” After the earthquake in Greece, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit was quoted (Hemming, 1999, September 8) to state that “Just as Greece shared our pain and grief over our earthquake, we share the pain of the Greek people.” Earthquake diplomacy, had seemingly improved the relations between Turkey and Greece. For instance, Ambassador Loukas Tsilas (quoted in “Greek Diplomat”, 1999, October 1), the permanent representative of Greece to the EU

underlined that “Very important and high-ranking people in Greece defend that Turkey, which is a European country, has to be an EU member, it deserved it, and this is in favor of also Greece.” On the candidacy in October 1999, however, Papandreu (quoted in Hamilton, 1999, October 13) suggested that “Our vote is not a given...Regardless of how much we move forward on bilateral issues there cannot be substantial progress if there is no solution in Cyprus.” Likewise, in November, considering Cyprus and dispute in the Aegean, he stated that Greek position was still under consideration and quoted in Paris, 1999, November 23) added that “There is ongoing tough negotiation and it will all depend on the EU's final position on Turkey's candidacy.” As a response to Papandreu's remarks, Foreign minister Cem (quoted in “EU Membership”, 1999, November 30) issued a statement and highlighted that

Problems between Turkey and Greece should be resolved with peaceful methods... Turkey does not have any territorial ambitions from Greece...Turkey is absolutely opposed to evaluation of the relations with the EU within the context of Cyprus.

Prime Minister Costas Smitis had also reminded Greek reservations and used security arguments about Turkish accession. He (quoted in “Greece Wants”, 1999, December 3) underlined that

Greece does not wish to find itself tomorrow facing obstacles to Cyprus's accession prospects... (and) its sovereign rights being disputed, without clearly defined and accepted procedures by all on the most efficient way of resolving such disputes... We hope for an agreement in Helsinki but the participation of any country (in the EU) must guarantee development, peace and cooperation. If we don't achieve this framework, then we will say 'no' in Helsinki... It is to the benefit of Turkey, but also of Greece and the EU for Turkey to become part of this framework... We do not believe that Turkey's isolation is to Greece's benefit... Precisely because we do not believe in isolation, because we believe that the development of cooperation is necessary, we recently undertook a series of moves and initiatives to develop our relations. But Turkey's participation in the process of

European integration will lead to problems... if there are no clear positions on the outstanding differences...The guiding criterion for our position is the country's interest. The interest in peace, security, development".

Demirel (quoted in "Turkish President", 1999, December 6), before the Helsinki summit warned that "If Greece once again prevents Turkey's candidacy, the mild atmosphere that has been going for a while will disappear." Foreign Minister George Papandreu (quoted in "EU Foreign", 1999, September 5) told that they did not make up their mind and underlined that "We have not said yes, we have not said no. It depends very much on what the (EU) Council will decide."

According to the Helsinki European Council presidency conclusions, a political solution to reunite Cyprus would not be a precondition for an EU decision on Cyprus's accession and outstanding territorial disputes were called to be put to the International Court of Justice. These statements caused hesitation in Turkey. Prime Minister Simitis suggested that this text was decided upon and it stands for Greece and for Turkey, as long as they accept it and (quoted in "Greece Says", 1999, December 10) added that "We are not changing this text unless there are grammatical errors." EU special envoy Javier Solana flew to Ankara to try to overcome Turkish misgivings. After talking with Prime Minister Ecevit, Solana (quoted in "EU's Solana", 1999, December 11) told that "We have a yes." After Turkey became a candidate state, considering chronic disputes with Greece, Premier Costas Simitis (quoted in "Greek PM", 1999, December 14) suggested for the first time he saw realistic possibilities and added that "The road will be long and difficult, but now we see that it is achievable."

In April 2000, Papandreu (quoted in "Greek Foreign", 2000, April 11) stated that he saw Sunday's election victory of socialist PASOK as "confirmation of the foreign policy we have been following over our last term, and I think in particular the

important success we have seen in the change in relations between the EU and Turkey.”

Considering Turkish Cypriot troops advancement to a Greek Cypriot village and setting up a checkpoint on the road Greek Government spokesman Dimitris Reppas (quoted in Kyriakidou, 2000, July 4) underlined that “Turkey has another field where it is called to prove that it is ready to accept rules and behaviors that prevail in the European Union.”

Papandreu (quoted in “Turkey Needs”, 2000, October 2000) underlined that “We want the EU to contribute first of all to a European course for Turkey in the best possible way, with the necessary reforms that we think are in the interests of Turkey, and more broadly for the region.”

In the accession partnership program, an article was put urging Turkey to back UN efforts to settle the Cyprus conflict as a short-term objective and there was the possibility of inclusion of an article related to the resolution of its territorial disputes with its arch-rival, EU member Greece. As a response to these articles, Ecevit (quoted in “Ecevit Says”, 2000, November 22) underlined that

Both issues in question are of vital importance for Turkey and there are concessions that we will never make over them...The way to settlement does not go through bowing to Greece's caprices, but through encouraging Greece to engage in a civilized dialogue with Turkey.

The EU Commission report, released in October 2012, demanded EU leaders to include Cyprus and nine other countries in a major expansion eastward in 2004 but Turkey was left off the enlargement timetable. As a reaction to this report, although Papandreu highlighted Turkey took many important steps but still had some significant shortcomings and (quoted in “Greece Applauds”, 2002, October 9) added that Greece stresses “its support for Turkey's course toward Europe.” He also (quoted

in “Greece Urges”, 2002, October 10) underlined that “I believe a positive message must be given to Turkey in Copenhagen. (Whether) that could be a specific date or not, I think we must discuss with the other 14.” Similarly, considering a positive signal to Turkey, Prime Minister Simitis (quoted in “Greece Renews”, 2002, November 11) pointed out that

What this will look like depends significantly on developments in Turkey before the EU summit. A concrete date for the beginning of negotiations could come out of it, or at least a date for talks during which we can speak with Turkey about it moving closer to the EU.

Ideational arguments such as not sharing the same religion were also used by Greek politicians. For instance Prime Minister Simitis (quoted in “Greek Prime”, 2003, January 8) suggested that “The European identity can be viewed in several ways - geographical, political, economic. But I do not agree on there being a religious criteria.” Greek politician used geostrategic arguments as well. Prime minister Simitis (quoted in “Greek Prime”, 2003, January 8) underlined that

Turkey has been a great European power since the 16th century and the Ottoman Empire played a role in creating the Europe that exists today. It would be politically negative to exclude Turkey. It could be an important partner for Europe in the Middle East and central Asia.

In June 2003, there was a rise in dogfights in the Aegean between Turkish and Greek air forces, and as a response, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreu (quoted in “EU Greece”, 2003, June 18) warned that “The game of violation in the Aegean is senseless and dangerous.”

Prime Minister Karamanlis had a more conciliatory attitude towards Turkey. He (quoted in “Grohmann”, 2004, April 16) supported Turkey's drive to set a date to start European Union accession talks by pointing out that “The European route of Turkey must continue and the neighboring country will find us as its supporter in every effort...which brings it closer to Europe.”

Therefore, until 1999, Greece continued to be a brakeman in Turkey's European bid. However, with Kosovo Crisis, Earthquakes and change of Foreign Minister, a *detente* was seen in Turkish Greek relations which led to Turkish candidacy in the Helsinki Summit. But Greek political interest was also served in the Summit because it was stated that political solution would not be a precondition for Cyprus's accession. Hence, after 1999, Greece was no longer a brakeman in Turkish relations but due to Cyprus problem, Greece could not support Turkey as a driver.

4.4 Accession Negotiations

4.4.1 EU-Turkey Relations

4.4.1.1 Stalemate in Relations

Turkey has been facing challenges (Guney, 2008, 2009) in the accession process and it is not wrong to call the relations as being in stalemate. To start with the delay for the opening of accession talks led to public suspicion about the EU's intentions. After the Brussels Summit, the main assumption in Turkey was that no matter how much the country reforms, the EU would ultimately reject a Muslim candidate. Turkish public suspicion increased after the Referendum on the Constitution of the EU. The French people rejected the EU constitution in a referendum held on 29 May 2005. In Netherlands, the EU constitution was also rejected in a referendum held on 1 June 2005. The 'No Vote' reflects a variety of factors; one of which is, concerns at possible future membership of Turkey in the

EU. These votes also raised a debate in the EU about the speed and the content of the enlargement. In the mid of the June, another crisis erupted in the EU about the British EU rebate for the budget of the EU for the 2007 and 2013 period.

In 29 June 2005, following the request of the European Council, the Commission proposed to the EU Member States a rigorous negotiating framework for accession negotiations with Turkey. The Brussels European Council of December 2004 decided that talks could start with Turkey on 3 October 2005 provided it brought into force six outstanding pieces of legislation. In the Commission framework (EU, 2005, June 29), it was underlined that Turkey fulfilled this condition on 1 June 2005. However, it was also suggested that Turkey was expected, prior to the start of negotiations, to sign the protocol extending the Ankara Agreement to the ten new Member States. Another striking emphasis in the document was the explicit declaration that negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. Moreover, it was also pointed out that in case of a serious and persistent breach by Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union was founded, accession negotiations might be suspended. Therefore, as Schimmelfennig (2008:3) suggests the emphasis on open-ended negotiations and suspension of talks reflected the divisions among the member states.

The Ankara Protocol extends the customs union between Turkey and the EU to the 10 countries that joined the bloc in May 2004, including Cyprus. Turkey signed the protocol in 29 July 2005, but underlined that this signature did not mean recognition of Cyprus and Cypriot vessels would remain barred from Turkish facilities unless the EU honored its promise to ease trade restrictions on the Turkish

Republic of Northern Cyprus. Erdogan (quoted in “EU Talks”, 2006, October 5) suggested that “We are absolutely not in favor of opening our air and sea ports (to Cypriot use) if the isolation (of the TRNC) is not lifted.”

As a reaction to Turkish declaration, the EU adopted a counter declaration on 21 September 2005. In the declaration, it was emphasized that the declaration by Turkey was unilateral, did not form part of the Protocol and had no legal effect on Turkey’s obligations under the Protocol. Moreover, it was underlined (EU, 2005: September 21) that “The European Community and its Member States expect full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol, and the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport.”

After hard bargaining between Great Britain, France and Greece, negotiating framework was finally signed on October, 3 2005. Therefore, opening of accession negotiations on October 3, 2005 is a historic moment for Turkey-EU relations. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul (quoted in “EU Trumpets”, 2005, October 4) underlined that “What is important for us is that the prospect of full membership is very clear. There is no alternative such as a privileged partnership.”

The Revised Accession Partnership was adopted in January 2006. The negotiations on ‘Science and Research’ chapter was opened and provisionally closed in June 2006. In October, the first phase of accession process, screening, was completed.

With respect to domestic developments, terrorist attacks increased and as a response, in June 2006, amendments to the anti-terror law were adopted in which list of the issues that is labeled as terrorism was broadened. Moreover, a new reform

package related to the Copenhagen Criteria was also submitted by the government in June.

Criticisms towards non-implementation of Additional protocol with respect to Cyprus increased in the second half of 2006. There were many proposals such as freezing of accession negotiations for 18 months or freezing of some chapters. In response to the debate, in 29 November 2006, Commission presented its recommendation on the continuation of Turkey's accession negotiations. However, it was recommended that the Intergovernmental Conference on Accession with Turkey should not open negotiations on chapters²³ covering policy areas relevant to Turkey's restrictions as regards the Republic of Cyprus until the Commission confirmed that Turkey had fulfilled its commitments. Moreover, it was also recommended (EU, 2006, November 29) that no chapter would be provisionally closed until the Commission had confirmed that Turkey had fully implemented its commitments with respect to the Additional Protocol.

Turkey criticized the European Commission's recommendation to freeze Turkey's membership negotiations. Government spokesman Cemil Cicek (quoted in Hacaoğlu, 2006, December 4) underlined that "It is not possible for us to accept the recommendation of the Commission as objective and just...Turkey is expecting objective and just decisions and attitudes from the EU."

In the General Affairs and External Affairs meeting of December 11, 2006, the Council decided as recommended by the European Commission and suspend negotiations in 8 chapters. The European Council of December 2006 endorsed the conclusions adopted by the Council.

²³ These chapters are: Chapter 1 free movement of goods, Chapter 3 Right of establishment and freedom to provide services, Chapter 9 Financial services, Chapter 11 agriculture and rural development, Chapter 13 fisheries, Chapter 14 transport policy, Chapter 29 customs union, and Chapter 30 external relations .

With respect to developments in Turkey, a presidential and constitutional crisis was occurred with the expiration of the presidential term of President Sezer in May 2007. In the first round of elections, the only candidate, Abdullah Gul could not get the required two-thirds majority and on the same day, a memorandum (e-memorandum) was issued by the General Staff about the presidential candidate. In the other rounds, Abdullah Gul could not get the required vote and quit candidacy which led to early elections. In May 10, 2007, a constitutional reform was proposed by the government which asked for changes in election of presidency and terms of office and government's term of office. On 22 July 2007, parliamentary elections were held and the JDP got 46, 6 percent of the votes. In August, Abdullah Gul was elected as president by the new parliament. On September 5, the government formed by the JDP was approved by the Parliament. Constitutional reforms were adopted by a referendum on 21 October.

In the negotiations, five chapters were opened in 2007. The chapter on 'enterprise and industrial policy' was opened in 29 March 2002. The chapters on 'financial control' and 'statistics' were opened in 26 June 2007 whereas chapters on 'consumer and health production' and 'trans-European networks' were opened in 19 December 2007.

In February 18, 2008, the Council adopts revised Accession Partnership for Turkey. New chapters were also opened. The chapters on 'company law' and 'intellectual property rights' were opened in 17 June 2008 whereas chapters on 'free movement of capital' and 'information society and media' were opened in 19 December 2008. In 10 November 2008, the new National Programme of Turkey was accepted.

Turkey witnessed another political crisis in 2008 with the application of Chief Public Prosecutor to the Constitutional Court for the closure of the JDP and banning of 71 members of the JDP together with president and prime minister from politics for five years. The decision was made in favor of the JDP on 30 July 2008, however, it was (European Commission, 2008: 6) considered that the JDP had carried out activities against the secular principles of the Republic and ordered that 50 percent of the government funds to be cut off.

In January 10, 2009, Egemen Bagis -Minister of EU Affairs- was appointed as the Chief Negotiator of Turkey in full membership negotiations. In 30 June 2009, the chapter on ‘taxation’ and on 30 June 2010 the chapter on ‘food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy’ were opened.

Due to the stalemate in Turkey-EU relations, a new positive agenda was launched in 17 May 2012 by Commissioner Stefan Füle in order to bring fresh dynamic into EU-Turkey relations, keep Turkish accession process alive and put it back on track. Stefan Füle (quoted in EU, 2012, May17) emphasized that “the positive agenda is not to replace, but to complement and support the accession process of Turkey.” On 22 January 2013, Stefan Füle is quoted (“AB’den Türkiye’ye”, 2013, January 22) to suggest that “Member states demand to put Turkish accession on track by means of opening new chapters.”

To sum up, Turkey’s accession process continued with ups and downs. A new dynamic is needed, especially with regard to implementation of Additional Protocol in order to overcome the stalemate.

4.4.1.2 Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Turkey

The security interest in improving relations with Turkey is constantly emphasized by the Commissioners. For instance, Olli Rehn (2005, March 8) underlined that “As a combined result of its population, size, strategic location and economic potential, Turkey has the capacity to make a major contribution to regional and international stability.” Similarly, he (2008, September 18) underlines that “This has been underlined by Turkey's constructive role in the Caucasus crisis and its recent diplomatic activities in relation to Syria, Armenia and the Middle East. These have demonstrated Turkey's strategic importance for Europe in building stability in our common neighborhood.” Moreover, Turkey's role in energy security is also underlined. For instance, Olli Rehn (2007, June 30) emphasizes that “Turkey is also becoming more and more important partner for the EU in energy.”

European Commissioners use geopolitical arguments in their support speeches as well. Olli Rehn (2005, July 13) suggests that “Europe needs a stable, democratic and prosperous Turkey, which adopts and implements our values, our rule of law, our policies, our standards. It is in our own strategic interest.” Moreover, Olli Rehn (2006, March 9) underlines that “on issues as different as the energy crisis, Iran, Iraq or the cartoons crisis, Turkey appears as a key player which we absolutely need on our side or as a bridge and a moderator between civilizations.” Furthermore, Peter Mandelson (2006, September 15) points out that “Turkey is key for the overall stability of the Middle East, the dialogue with the Muslim world. Europe needs Turkey as much as Turkey needs the EU.”

Ideational argument of unification of European Continent is underlined for the first time with respect to Turkey. Olli Rehn (2005, March 8) underlines that “The

decision by the European Council to open negotiations with Turkey opens a new chapter in the historic process of peacefully unifying the European continent.”

European Commissioners also use ideational argument of commitments towards Turkey or keeping promises, *Pacta Sunt Servanda*, for the first time. Olli Rehn (2006, October 18) points out that “we should not lose sight of the progress accomplished in the last decade, nor of our commitment towards Turkey.” Similarly, he (2006, June 20) suggests that “the European Council reaffirmed that it will honour its existing commitments – *pacta sunt servanda*. Thus it confirmed the EU’s consolidated enlargement agenda, which covers South Eastern Europe: Bulgaria and Romania, Turkey and Croatia, and the other countries of the Western Balkans.”

One of the political reservations for Commissioners is compliance to Copenhagen Criteria and implementation of the reforms. For instance, Olli Rehn (2006, October 18) underlines that “Crucial areas are freedom of expression, freedom of religion and the problems faced in the country's South-east, which should be addressed in accordance with European values and standards.”

European Commissioners also raise the non-implementation of additional protocol. Peter Mandelson (2006, September 15) notifies that “The failure of Turkey to ratify and implement the Ankara protocol poses a serious risk for our negotiations. Your refusal to open your ports to vessels under EU flags plays into the hands of those who have reservations about Turkish accession as justification for pushing the whole membership process into a siding.” Likewise, Jose Manuel Barroso (2006, July 5) underlines “Turkey must fulfill its commitments, just as the EU must fulfill its commitments. Turkey’s commitments include respect for the Ankara protocol.”

Absorption capacity is continued to be raised. Olli Rehn (2006, October 3) suggests that “Absorption capacity is a factor important for both Turkey and the EU:

it is in your country's interest to ensure that you join a well functioning European Union – not a weak or a messy EU!”

4.4.2 Attitudes of Member States towards Turkey

4.4.2.1 Germany

This period also marked with change of attitude of Germany towards Turkey with the Chancellor Angela Merkel. To start with Schroeder, he showed his support for opening of accession talks with Turkey. He used all rational arguments to encourage Turkey to continue reform process. He (quoted in Krah and Elci, 2005, May 4) suggested that “For economic, political and strategic reasons we need to maintain the dynamic we developed last December - the dynamic of the reform process on one side and on the other the firm trust of the Turkish people that the negotiations will begin on time on Oct. 3.” Similarly, he (quoted in “Schroeder Urges”, 2005, August 27) emphasized that “My government believes Turkey has fulfilled every pledge it made, including those on Cyprus. I am sure the European Union will also keep its pledge.” Following opening of membership talks German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was delighted that a deal had been hammered out in Luxembourg and (quoted in “Schroeder Welcomes”, 2005, October 4) pointed out that “It is now up to Turkey to pursue its course of reforms so that the negotiations can be pursued through to their goal of Turkey joining the European Union.”

In January 2005, after talking with Sarkozy, the opposition leader Merkel (quoted in “French German”, 2005, January 8) reaffirmed its “commitment to the idea of a special partnership between the EU and Turkey.” Merkel (quoted in

“Germany’s Merkel”, 2005, August 26) highlighted that “We are firmly convinced that Turkey's accession would strain the EU politically, economically and socially, and endanger the European integration process.” However, on the issue of special partnership, Erdogan (quoted in “Turkish PM”, 2005, June 5) warned that

Turkey's aim is full membership of the E.U. -we are not prepared to accept anything else...A so-called privileged partnership goes against the spirit of relations between Turkey and the E.U... It also violates the commitments that the E.U. has undertaken toward Turkey.

Likewise, Foreign Minister Gul (quoted in “Turkish Minister”, 2005, August 31) argued that “I find such an offer illegitimate and immoral,” and added that this nullified Turkish common effort of half a century and had the potential to handicap the future of Turkish-EU relations.

Emphasis on Copenhagen Criteria was again the main reservation for Germany. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (quoted in “Germany’s Warns”, 2005, March 21) warned Turkey that “We are firmly committed to seeing Turkey fulfill the criteria, not only on paper but in reality.”

Security arguments were also used by German politicians. For instance, Chancellor Schroeder (quoted in “Turkey Moves”, 2005, September 27) highlighted that “An economically dynamic, socially modern Turkey that brings a commitment to Islam and enlightened European values into harmony -- such a Turkey would bring enormous gains in terms of stability and security for us all.”

German politicians also used geopolitical arguments. Before the European Council of December 2006, in which partial freeze of talks with Turkey would be discussed, German Foreign Minister (quoted in “German Foreign”, 2006, December 9) warned that “if Turkey were to turn away from Europe, that would be a serious strategic loss for the EU.”

After the 2005 elections in Germany, the leader of Christian Democratic Union Angela Merkel became the Chancellor of Germany in November 2005.²⁴ Prime Minister Erdogan visited Germany in order to talk about Merkel's opposition to Turkish accession and Merkel (quoted in "Germany's Merkel", 2005, November 27) stated that "We talked about the fact that 'pacta sunt servanda' (Latin for agreements must be respected) applies, and that things will develop well." Moreover, She (quoted in Moulson, 2006, May 26) underlined that "There are and were in my party certainly skeptical views on the question of full membership for Turkey....But we have always said that, as a government, we ... abide in continuity by what the previous government agreed." Furthermore, as a response to the comments of Christian Social Union leader Edmund Stoiber that Turkey was not a part of Europe, Foreign Minister Social Democrat Frank-Walter Steinmeier (quoted in "Germany Foreign", 2006, September 25) emphasized that "Turkey is entitled to fair entry negotiations...I would like us all to behave in a more responsible manner."

In October 2006, however, Merkel started to use the concept of privileged partnership again. She (quoted in "Germany Chancellor", 2006, October 6) underlined that her party still considered a privileged partnership with Turkey and she highlighted that the negotiations of the EU "expressly provide for an open-ended process...In the end, we will have to decide what the result is." Similarly, she (quoted in "Germany Leader", 2006, November 27) emphasized that "We are conducting negotiations with Turkey that are open in terms of results...But, as party chairwoman, I say that it is and was right to offer Turkey a privileged partnership with the European Union rather than full membership." In 2007, she (quoted in "Germany's Merkel", 2007, July 2) reiterated her position by underlining that "We

²⁴ Merkel led a grand coalition of Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union and Social Democratic Party

want a very close linkage of Turkey to the European Union; we favor the idea of a privileged partnership; we are loyal to agreements and so are participating in the membership negotiations, which have now been extended by two chapters.” After having talks with US President Barack Obama, Merkel (quoted in “Merkel Says”, 2009, April 5) underlined that “I believe that a close link between the Muslim world and in particular with Turkey is interesting for us all...In which manner and way that occurs, whether as a privileged partnership or a full (EU) member state, we're still talking about that.” Similarly, before the European elections of June 7, she (quoted in “Germany French”, 2009, May 10) emphasized that “We have to talk about the borders of this Europe...It is right that we say to people in the European election campaign ... our common position is: a privileged partnership for Turkey, but no full membership.”

Turkish president Abdullah Gul (quoted in “Turkey Blasts”, 2009, May 12) criticized these comments and pointed out that “Politicians come and go... They may say some things for various reasons -- and maybe because of a shortage of vision -- but we will not pay attention to that...Turkey will pursue the negotiation process with determination... The reforms will continue.” In the same vein, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (quoted in “Don’t Make”, 2009, May 14) called European Union Countries that “Please do not make the Turkish EU integration process a domestic issue of discussion.” Moreover, Erdogan (quoted in “Turkey Pushes”, 2009, June 26) also warned that “Our European friends unfortunately have a unilateral expectation which is rather populist and it saddens us. I hope we will overcome this.” Furthermore, he (quoted in Barber, 2009, June 26) underlined that

Turkey cannot accept the position that France and Germany have with regard to Turkey, because it is impossible for us to accept a type of membership that does not exist in the EU acquis...All the structural changes that have been done in Turkey have been done for the

purpose of full membership, and they will continue to be done for this purpose.

The Copenhagen Criteria was one of the reservations that Merkel government proposed. As Merkel (quoted in Moulson, 2006, May 26) suggested, “We will follow these membership talks in such a way that all criteria naturally must be fulfilled, and certainly there will be tough negotiations in some places, but these talks continue.”

Cyprus issue was another reservation for German government. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (quoted in “Germany Presses”, 2006, June 2) urged Ankara to ratify Ankara protocol by suggesting that “There is still no development regarding the protocol's ratification...We wish that this issue will be resolved by the end of the year, before Germany takes over the EU presidency.” Moreover, in Merkel's first visit to Turkey in October 2006, she (quoted in “EU Talks”, 2006, October 5) underlined that “The Ankara protocol must be implemented. It is standing before us as a pre-condition. This issue must be resolved for the continuation of (membership) talks.” However, Erdogan (quoted in “EU Talks”, 2006, October 5) responded that “We are absolutely not in favor of opening our air and sea ports (to Cypriot use) if the isolation (of the TRNC) is not lifted.” In November, concerning the implementation of Ankara Protocol, Merkel's tone became harsher and she (quoted in “Merkel Raises”, 2006, November 5) warned that “Otherwise we will have a very, very serious situation in terms of the continuation of accession talks...I call on Turkey to do everything not to get into this situation and not to lead the European Union into this situation.” As a response to Merkel's threats, Foreign Minister Steinmeier (quoted in “Germany Confident”, 2006, November 6) underlined that

I know and I maintain that the Ankara Protocol will be ratified...In the interests of Europe and of Turkey, I urge that we do not now jump to

hasty conclusions and that we let the Finnish presidency try to reach a political compromise that it has been working on for months.

In 29 November 2006, the European Commission recommended partial freeze on entry negotiations, 8 out of 33 chapters, due to the lack of progress in Ankara Protocol issue. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (quoted in “Barroso Says”, 2006, November 30) said later that “the commission had made an appropriate and responsible proposal” and added that “I am of the opinion that one should have another try -- without raising unrealistic expectations about further attempts at a compromise -- so long as we are still at a distance from decisive elections in the region, particularly the Turkish parliamentary elections.” Merkel welcomed the Commission proposal by suggesting (quoted in Watt, 2006, November 30) that “The commission proposal is a strong signal that the Ankara protocol [opening ports to Cyprus] has to be accepted by Turkey.” German Chancellor Angela Merkel (quoted in “Merkel To”, 2006, December 4) also proposed that the European Commission should set a deadline of 18 months to review this issue before deciding whether to resume full membership talks with Turkey. As a response to German proposal to set a deadline for Ankara, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he telephoned German Chancellor Angela Merkel and reminded her what the costs of a wrong step could be. Moreover, he (quoted in “Turkey Urges”, 2006, December 5) told her that “we hope such a historic mistake will not occur at the summit of EU leaders on December 14-15.” Furthermore, Erdogan (quoted in Ames, 2006, December 5) warned that “Turkey has nothing to lose. If anyone will lose it will be the EU.”

At a summit with French President German Jacques Chirac and Polish President Lech Kaczynski, Chancellor Angela Merkel softened her stance about 18

month deadline and came up with the idea of a progress report on Turkey's membership bid. She (quoted in "Turkey Awaits", 2006, December 6) suggested that "We will campaign for the European Commission to draft a report sometime between the elections in Turkey in autumn 2007 and the European elections in spring 2009." She (quoted in "Cyprus Positive", 2006, December 6) proposed that "We are not fixing a date but around that time we will see whether Turkey has adopted the Ankara accord" and she added that "We don't want to set any kind of ultimatums, but we want ... the commission to say to us what has been achieved and how we could proceed." Prime Minister Erdogan criticized this idea of having report and (quoted in Boland et al, 2006, December 6) suggested that "Turkey's EU membership is part of a global vision and the most important project of the 21st century... It cannot be sacrificed to small plans and daily domestic policies." He (quoted in "Erdogan Says", 2006, December 7) also emphasized that "We don't have any such understanding as halting our progress en route to the EU. Of course, we have a Plan B, a Plan C ... but first we must see the steps taken on Dec. 11 and on Dec. 14-15."

According to a spokesman of Finnish Presidency (quoted in "Turkey Agrees", 2006, December 7), "The Turks are going to open a port and an airport." However, Turkish foreign ministry refused to give details and a foreign ministry spokesman told that "Talks are still under way...For the safety of the talks, we will not share details with the media at this stage." German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (quoted in "Germany Says", 2006, December 7) commented that "If these proposals are constructive, they could be a positive element for the discussions of the European Council." Before the European Council, he (quoted in "German Foreign", 2006, December 9) also underlined that "I argue for the European reaction being marked by a sense of proportion and responsibility...We

must not overstrain things to the extent that the process of moving closer, which has taken many years, is brought down in one week.”

Another reservation was ‘Absorption Capacity’. Angela Merkel (quoted in Dombey et al, 2006, June 16) pointed out that “There are countries such as France, Germany and Austria, for whom this absorption capacity is very important and there are countries that tend to be more supportive of enlargement who sense this is an additional hurdle.”

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (quoted in “Politics EU”, 2006, December 12) highlighted Turkey’s political importance to the EU as follows: “Turkey’s rapprochement towards Europe, the integration of Turkey in the system of European values is a project of outstanding importance.” In the European Council, the EU leaders were expected to approve partially freezing Turkey's membership talks because of its refusal to implement a 2005 deal to open its ports to E.U.-member Cyprus and Merkel (quoted in “Germany’s Merkel, 2006, December 14) commented that

This is not a small matter -- it is about a matter of course, that candidates for membership and EU member states must recognize each other politically and diplomatically...The EU has reacted, in my opinion, in a way that is both resolute and prudent -- prudent in that it is always made clear to Turkey that it is worth it to continue working on reforms.

In 29 March 2007, during the German presidency, the chapter on Enterprise and Industrial policy was opened and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier welcomed the progress and (quoted in “EU Turkey”, 2007, March 29) suggested that “The talks with Turkey are back on the rails..The German presidency is trying to open several chapters in the negotiations with Turkey in the first half of the year.” Turkey was not invited to the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome in the end of March 2007 and Erdogan (quoted in “Turkey

Reproaches”, 2007, April 14) explicitly criticized this decision by suggesting that “Seriously, I expected more from Germany” and added that this had “overshadowed the German presidency.” He also pointed out that “We would like a clear idea of a date, a roadmap, a calendar for negotiations...if the EU doesn't want us, it should say so clearly now. If we are not wanted, the two sides need not continue wasting their time in talks.” After he talked with Chancellor Merkel, she (quoted in “Merkel Says” 2007, April 15) suggested that “Under the German presidency of the EU, two more chapters could probably be opened if things go well,” and she reminded that it was important that Turkey normalized ties with Cyprus and Erdogan commented that “One cannot attack a lady. We are on a long, narrow road and we have to be patient.”

In June 2007, Germany hoped to open economic and monetary policy chapter but it was pulled at the last minute when France threatened a veto. However, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (quoted in “Roundup Croatia”, 2007, June 26) appealed to European governments to treat Turkey fairly and suggested that “We hope Turkey stays on a European course.”

Ideational arguments such as Europeanness of Turkey were also highlighted. For instance, a draft of a revamped Christian Democratic Union party platform stated that “only European states can join the European Union.” Merkel (quoted in “Germany’s Merkel”, 2007, July 2) commented that “Turkey has at least a European element, and so the pure question of demarcation is certainly not the question of appraisal for Turkey.”

After the 2009 elections, Chancellor Angela Merkel formed a new centre-right government. Due to the concern in Ankara whether new government wanted to close the door to EU membership for Turkey, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle (quoted in “Germany Backs”, 2010, January 7) suggested that “Let me

state categorically that what has been agreed between the EU and Turkey is still valid. This German government will honor these undertakings. You have my word on that.” However, he also warned that “(Membership talks) are an open-ended process. They do not imply anything automatic. The outcome cannot be guaranteed at the outset.” Chief Negotiator, Egemen Bagis (quoted in “new Turkeys”, 2010, January 8) thanked Westerwelle's for his support to Turkey's EU membership bid and added that “Our prime minister, our foreign minister and I attach great importance to his support.” In September 2010, Westerwelle (quoted in “Turkey Westerwell”, 2010, September 13) reiterated his support for Turkey by proposing that

Turkey has a right to be treated fairly, with respect and on equal terms...We don't want to rashly promise something before the time comes, but nobody can rebuff and exclude such an important, obviously modernizing country...We encourage those forces in Turkey that are continuing this process of reform.

On the issue of integration of Turkish workers, Erdogan (quoted in “Turkey PM”, 2007, November 2) suggested that “German politicians do not acknowledge enough the integration of the three million Turks in Germany...Germany should do much more for Turkey's EU membership bid as this would massively support integration. Because we Turks regard Germany very positively, we feel very let down on this issue.”

In May 2012, foreign minister Guido Westerwelle (quoted in “Westerwelle EU”, 2012, May 15) suggested that EU-Turkey relations and accession negotiations must be re-dynamised and added that “For too long we have not opened a single chapter. For too long we have moved around in circles...I am optimistic to overcome the standstill.”

Copenhagen Criteria was also concern for this government, Foreign Minister Westerwelle (quoted in “Germany Urges”, 2010, January 7) suggested that “I would

like to express my respect and my deep respect to the Turkish government, parliament and the active Turkish civil society for making progress on EU reforms...I encourage you to press on” particularly in the areas of freedom of religion, expression and the press.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel insisted on ‘privileged partnership’ for Turkey instead of full EU membership. She was quoted (“Merkel Wants”, 2010, March 24) to suggest that “There are 35 chapters in the (membership) talks. I am confident that 27-28 of them can be taken up and this will really mean a privileged partnership...Some issues, like institutional integration, will be left out of the scope.” As a response to these comments, Erdogan (quoted in “Turkey Insists”, 2010, March 24) highlighted that “We are already conducting negotiations, and these are aimed at full membership. For us, there is no alternative.” Likewise, European Affairs Minister Egemen Bagis (quoted in “Turkey Snubs”, 2010, March 27) suggested that “The privileged partnership just does not exist...This does not have any legal basis in the European Union.”

According to Turkish politicians, fear of shift of EU’s center of gravity was one of the reservations for Germany. For instance, Babacan (quoted in “Turkey Says”, 2010, September 23) suggested that

When Turkey becomes a member of the EU, Turkey is not going to be in a secondary position and that's one of the reasons why countries like Germany and France are quite nervous about our membership...From day one we're going to be influential as Germany and France. It's not going to be a Germany and France axis EU, it's going to be a Germany, France and Turkey axis EU and we're not sure if they are ready to share that power with us.

Moreover, Babacan also underlined that “The relevance of the EU ... is decreasing very fast and especially after this economic and financial crisis...The

weight of the European economy in the world has shrunk and will continue to shrink and only with enlargement the EU will be able to protect its power and influence.”

Therefore, change of government affected German-Turkish relations. Germany, especially under the chancellorship of Christian Democrat Angela Merkel, became one of the brakeman of Turkish European bid. Instead of full membership, Chancellor Merkel asked for ‘privileged partnership’ for Turkey by emphasizing political reservations of burden of Turkey on European integration process, borders of Europe, and non-recognition of Cyprus and absorption capacity.

4.4.2.2 France

In this period, French attitude towards Turkish bid was negative due to the public opposition to Turkey’s accession. France rejected the new European Union constitution on 29 May 2005 and it was believed that fear of accession of Turkey was one of the reasons behind this French refusal. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul (quoted in “Turkey Says”, 2005, May 25) suggested that “It is not going to affect us because the decision to start negotiations with Turkey had already been taken. This referendum is on the constitution, not on Turkey's membership.”

In their support for Turkish membership, French politicians generally used geopolitical arguments. For instance, President Chirac (quoted in “Turkey Could”, 2005, October 2005) underlined that

If, on a whim or as a knee-jerk reaction, we say 'They're not European, they should go away,' who can say that this region won't tip into extremism?" You know the danger this represents. It's that in the whole Muslim world around Turkey, that represents 350 million people. Beyond Turkey, you realize the responsibility we'd shoulder if we said Non, there's nothing to see, keep going, we don't want you.

Likewise, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin (quoted in "Update 1, 2005, October 7) emphasized that "I am in favor of (Turkey's) accession....It is in Europe's geopolitical interest not to close the door to Turkey."

One of the main political reservations for France was Cyprus issue. French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin (quoted in Gehmlich, 2005, August 2) suggested that "It doesn't seem conceivable to me that a negotiation process of whatever kind can start with a country that does not recognize every member state of the European Union, in other words all 25 of them." As a response to the remarks, Prime Minister Erdogan (quoted in "Turkey Reproaches, 2005, August 4) argued that "It is out of the question for us to discuss or consider any new conditions with regard to Oct. 3...We are saddened by the statements of the French prime minister and of President (Jacques) Chirac." France continued to press Turkey in Cyprus issue. French President Jacques Chirac (quoted in "EU Says", 2005, August 29) suggested that "Following the unilateral declaration on Cyprus, Turkey should assure the 25 members of the Union that it is ready to fully respect its obligations." Similarly, French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy (quoted in Williard, 2005, August 30) asked Turkey to recognize Cyprus and added that France would "respect its commitments but expects Turkey and other candidate countries to respect theirs and satisfy the conditions for joining the Union." Moreover, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin (quoted in "France Maintains", 2005, September 4) reiterated that "What I want is for Turkey to get on the path of recognition of Cyprus as quickly as possible...It seems to me indispensable that every state starting an accession process should have a serene and calm relationship with all Europe." In the end of September, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin dropped objections to start of Turkey's entry talks by (quoted in Heritage, 2005, September 29) confirming that

“I am in favor of a process of engagement, provided the conditions are met so that accession can actually take place,” but he warned that “We have demanded that the whole process ... is dealt with carefully, is open and monitored, and the requirements are clear at each stage.”

French politicians carried on to have concerns about Cyprus. In November 2005, Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy acknowledged that Turkey did not respond to its obligation by not opening its ports and airports to Cypriot ships and planes and (quoted in “Turkey Risks”, 2006, November 8) warned that “If by the end of the year Turkey still does not recognize the 25 (EU) member states, including obviously Cyprus, then it seems to me necessary to review the membership timetable for Turkey into the European Union.” Likewise, French interior minister Sarkozy (quoted in “Sarkozy Says”, 2006, December 16) underlined that “If Turkey wants to come into Europe, and you know my reservations, it must first recognize Europe is 25 countries not 24.”

French politicians used political arguments as a reservation for Turkish membership and they called for ‘privileged partnership’. One of the main reservations for France in Turkish accession talks was French voters well known hostility to Turkey’s entry. For instance, just after the EU launched membership talks with Ankara on October 3, Prime Minister Villepin (quoted in “EU Partnership”, 2005, October 6) suggested that “No one can say today what the outcome of these negotiations will be and all options are open, including a privileged partnership.” However, Turkish politicians were also aware of the French public discontent with Turkish accession. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul told that he understood the domestic political concerns of the French leadership and thanked France by (quoted in “Turkey Holds”, 2005, October 7) underlining that “France is one of the

driving forces of the EU and if France had really said 'no' we would not have been able to start the negotiations.” Moreover, Prime Minister Villepin (quoted in “EU Cannot”, 2006, January 18) reiterated the open-endedness of the negotiations with Turkey and underlined the importance of public opinion by suggesting that “In France the last word will go to the French people via a referendum.” Furthermore, French Interior Minister Sarkozy (quoted in “Turkey’s EU”, 2006, October 5) suggested that if Turkey joined the European bloc, “It would be the end of political Europe” and he called for ‘privileged partnership’.

Ideational argument of Europeanness of Turkey was also questioned by French politicians. For example, French Interior Minister Sarkozy (quoted in “Turkey’s EU”, 2006, October 5) pointed out that “Turkey is in Asia Minor... I will not explain to little French school children that the frontiers of Europe are Iraq and Syria.” He (quoted in “French Pol”, 2006, December 1) also reiterated his position by stating that “The place of Turkey is not within the European Union...Europe is made for European states.” Concerning the Commission proposal of partial freeze of some chapters with Turkey, Sarkozy (quoted in “Sarkozy Says”, 2006, December 16) emphasized that “Angela Merkel, Jose-Manuel Barroso, Jean-Claude Juncker, Wilfried Martens -- we are all in agreement that we need a Europe with borders.”

Security arguments were also used by French politicians for their reservation. For instance, considering acceptance of Turkey, French interior minister Sarkozy (quoted in “Turkey’s EU”, 2006, October 5) underlined that “We will have made the Kurdish problem a European problem...Then Europe, which will become a sub-region of the United Nations, will no longer exist...If to stabilize Turkey we must destabilize Europe, I say that's a high price to pay.”

Sarkozy's opposition to full Turkish membership continued throughout his presidency. One of the main arguments of Sarkozy in his election campaign was his proposal for 'privileged partnership' for Turkey instead of full membership. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan (quoted in "Turkey Uneasy, 2007, May 7) expressed his wish for softening of Sarkozy's stance on Turkey by suggesting that "We hope we will not see in our bilateral relations from now on the same attitudes that Sarkozy displayed during his election campaign regarding our European Union (accession) process and Turkish-French ties." However, Sarkozy gave clues for not changing his position on Turkey by (quoted in "France's Sarkozy", 2007, May 23) underlining that "I couldn't have been a candidate for the presidency with one view and then changed it having become president."

In February 2007, before the presidential elections, Sarkozy came up with the idea of Mediterranean Union in which Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Cyprus would be members and this Union would have its own council of heads of state and a Mediterranean Council. This Union would have dialogue with Malta, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania and Sarkozy thought ("EU/Mediterranean", 2007, February 9) that Turkey, which was not European in his mind, would play a key role in the Mediterranean Union. In May 2007, he reiterated his position with Mediterranean Union and (quoted in "France's Sarkozy", 2007, May 28) underlined that "We must do in the Mediterranean region what we did in Europe 60 years ago." During the French presidency in 2008, Turkey was invited to a Paris summit for Union for the Mediterranean, but Jean-Maurice Ripert (quoted in "French Diplomat", 2008, July 1), permanent representative of France to the United Nations underlined that "We have never said that the Mediterranean Union was an alternative for Turkey's EU membership. However, as one of the biggest powers of the

Mediterranean, Turkey needs to be a part of this project.” After the Summit, Turkish Foreign Minister Babacan (quoted in “Turkey Asks”, 2008, July 12) suggested that “Turkey supports this initiative. We believe that it will promote peace, stability and development in the region.”

Before the European Council of June 2007, there were media reports (“Enlargement Anxiety”, 2007, June 14) about French intention to block the opening of talks between the EU and Turkey on economic and monetary policy - one of the three chapters set to be opened on the European Council. However, commenting on these reports, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner (quoted in “France Will”, 2007, June 15) suggested that “Brake or block? I think that neither of these terms will be used at next week's meeting.” On the other hand, in the European Council, the chapters on statistics and financial control were opened but France was argued to prevent the expansion of the negotiations to the more important economic and monetary policy. Ali Babacan, Turkey's top negotiator with the European Union expressed his reservation about French move by (quoted in Brandt, 2007, June 26) suggesting that “We are not satisfied with the technical justification that was given to us” and added that it was important for both sides to maintain confidence in making progress in the entry talks and otherwise not only Turkey but the EU would be damaged by this.

In August 2007, Sarkozy seemed to soften his opposition to Turkey on the condition of EU's launching of a committee of high-level experts to examine questions concerning the bloc's future but also expressed partnership instead of full membership. He (quoted in “France Will”, 2007, August 27) underlined that “If that vital reflection on the future of our union is launched ... France will not oppose new chapters of negotiations between the union and Turkey being opened in the months

and years to come” but added that “I’m not going to be a hypocrite. Everyone knows that I am only in favor of an association ... I think that the idea of an association will one day be recognized by everyone as being the most reasonable.” Likewise, he (quoted in “Turkey Does”, 2007, September 20) suggested that “What I wish to offer Turkey is a true partnership with Europe, it is not integration with Europe.”

In December 2007, France was argued (Barber, 2007, December 11) to persuade its EU partners to drop the word ‘accession’ in connection with Turkey’s talks with 27 nation bloc. EU Foreign Ministers used ‘intergovernmental conferences’ rather than ‘accession conferences’ with Croatia and Turkey in a statement on enlargement strategy. French attitude was criticized by Prime Minister Erdogan who was quoted (“Turkish PM”, 2007, December 12) to suggest that “Mr. Sarkozy says one thing in our bilateral meetings and says something else behind our back. This is not a becoming attitude in politics.” Moreover, in January 2008, Erdogan suggested that Turkey would have a trilateral meeting with Germany and France in Germany in May in order to learn the reason of current stalemate in EU-Turkey relations and (quoted in “Enlargement Turkey”, 2008, January 16) added that “The European Union has to explain in a scientific and intelligent way why they do not accept us in the EU. Up to now they have not done so.”

French National Assembly approved on 31 May 2008, a constitutional amendment which requires France to hold a referendum to approve the EU accession of any country whose population surpasses 5% of the EU's population - currently about 500 million people. Turkey reacted to this decision and on June 3, The Turkish Foreign Ministry (quoted in “Enlargement Turkey”, 2008, June 6)) suggested that it was “irked by efforts to enshrine such a discriminatory approach towards Turkey in the French constitution despite the fact that accession negotiations [between Turkey

and the EU] have started with France's consent.” Turkish remarks seemed to have an effect on France and it is reported (“France Scraps”, 2008, June 25) that French senate voted on 24 June to drop the constitutional amendment.

In May 2008, before the start of French presidency, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan told French Secretary of State for European Affairs Jean-Pierre Jouyet that Turkey expected that accession process would continue normally without problems during the French presidency and Jouyet (quoted in “France Pledges” 2008, May 6) responded that “France has no intention of breaking up Turkey's negotiation process...The French presidency will be impartial, fair and objective.” Similarly, in June 2008, Babacan (quoted in Brandt, 2008, June 17) reiterated that “We expect that the French presidency will be a fair, impartial and transparent presidency term. Turkey will expect to join the union as an equal partner with all the rights and obligations this would imply.” With the beginning of French presidency, French President Nicolas Sarkozy's adviser for European Union affairs Alain Lamassoure (quoted in “87”, 2008, July 2) suggested that French position against Turkey's full EU membership did not change but added that “Chapters linked to full membership will be blocked, but France will support opening all the chapters not linked to full membership.”

In April 2009, US President Obama asked EU leaders to anchor Turkey in Europe but EU leaders reacted harshly on his comments. French president suggested (quoted in Champion and Fassihi, 2009, April 16) that “I have been working hand in hand with President Obama, but when it comes to the European Union it's up to member states of the European Union to decide” and (quoted in Zain, 2009, April 7) added that

I have always opposed this membership and will continue to do so. I believe that the overwhelming majority of EU states support France's position...

Turkey is a very big country and an ally of NATO and of the US, and should remain a privileged partner. However, my position will not change.

In May 2009, he reiterated his position by (quoted in “Update Sarkozy”, 2009, May 5) suggesting that "There are countries, such as Turkey, which...should build with Europe a privileged relationship, which are bound to be associated to Europe as tightly as possible, but which should not become members (of the E.U.).” As a response to these comments, President Gul (quoted in “Turkey Blasts, 2009, May 12) suggested that “Politicians come and go... They may say some things for various reasons -- and maybe because of a shortage of vision -- but we will not pay attention to that....Turkey will pursue the negotiation process with determination... The reforms will continue.” Moreover, Prime Minister Erdogan (quoted in “Erdogan Criticizes”, 2009, June 26) also expressed his concern by stating that “Turkey cannot accept the position of Germany and France. A privileged partnership doesn't exist in (European law)...Our European friends unfortunately have a unilateral expectation which is rather populist and it saddens us. I hope we will overcome this.”

French President carried on his position about Turkey’s ‘privileged partnership’. Sarkozy (quoted in Nordstorm, 2009, July 3) pointed out that “France will not be against the opening of new chapters under Swedish chairmanship, but of course this chapter should allow that Turkey should be an associated member of Europe and not a full-fledged member.” Turkish foreign minister Davutoglu (quoted in “Turkey Urges”, 2009, November 6) argued that “No-one can force us to accept an option like a special partnership... The European Union's key selling point is its respect for agreements. It's thanks to that principle that the EU has become a draw. If it loses that, it loses all its legitimacy.”

In April 2010, after having talks with Prime Minister Erdogan, European Affairs Minister Pierre Lellouche (quoted in “France and Turkey”, 2010, April 7)

suggested that “We agree to disagree... Turkey has its project, that of integrating with the 27 (EU members). We respect this project but we have our own project, that of a big Europe, the 27 in a partnership with Russia and Turkey.”

Ideational argument of non-Europeanness of Turkey emphasized in this period. President Sarkozy (quoted in Mahony, 2007, May 24) reiterated that “I believe that Turkey does not have a place in the European Union. We are going to have this debate on Turkey - we cannot avoid it.” Similarly, he (quoted in “Turkey Does”, 2007, September 20) asserted that “I do not believe that Turkey belongs in Europe, and for a simple reason, which is that it is in Asia minor.” Sarkozy’s spokesman (quoted in “French President”, 2007, November 13) also reported that “He said Turkey was a country of 100 million inhabitants who were not in Europe but in Asia Minor, and that he wouldn't want to be the one who was going to explain to French pupils that Europe's borders were with Syria.”

Security arguments were also used by French politicians in the explanation of their reservations toward Turkey. For instance, Sarkozy (quoted in “Turkey Urges”, 2009, November 6) underlined that “We want Turkey to be a bridge between East and West ...I told President Obama that it's very important for Europe to have borders. For me, Europe is a force for stability in the world and I cannot allow that force for stabilization to be destroyed.”

To sum up, France under the presidency of Nicholas Sarkozy became one of the brakemen of Turkish accession to the EU. Like Chancellor Merkel, president Sarkozy also asked for privileged partnership instead of full membership by underlining the political reservation of Turkish nonrecognition of Cyprus and ideational reservation of non-Europeanness of Turkey.

4.4.2.3 Great Britain

British support for Turkey's membership bid continued in this period. On the eve of presidency, Blair (quoted in Grajewski, 2005, June 23) declared that "In our presidency, we will try to ... carry out the Union's obligation to those like Turkey and Croatia that wait in hope of a future as part of Europe." Similarly, Foreign Minister Jack Straw (quoted in "Britain Strongly", 2005, June 30) highlighted that "The British government remains strongly committed to Turkey joining the European Union." In September 2005, Cyprus was pressing for counter declaration for Turkey but fearing of a harsh response towards Turkey, Straw believed that negotiations should begin on time and (quoted in Kambas and Taylor, 2005, September 8) warned that "To do otherwise would not only compromise the credibility of the EU but might also endanger the considerable progress already made in Turkey." Commenting on a no to Turkey, Straw (quoted in "Britain Warns", 2005, September 28) notified that "It would now be a huge betrayal of the hopes and expectations of the Turkish people and of Prime Minister (Recep Tayyip) Erdogan's programme of reform if, at this crucial time, we turned our back on Turkey." With only hours to go before formal membership negotiations with Ankara were due to start, hard bargaining was seen between Great Britain and Austria, Straw (quoted in "Britain Uncertain, 2005, October 3) admitted that

What I know from negotiations is you get a sense fairly quickly whether there is a clear will to resolve matters by being imaginative about text, or whether one is simply going through the motions and there is a gulf in principle..That's the issue we've been trying to tease out with our Austrian colleagues.

He (quoted in "EU Fails", 2005, October 3) also added that "It's a frustrating situation, but I hope and pray that we may be able to reach an agreement." Finally, agreement was reached that negotiations on Turkey's accession to the European

Union could begin and Straw (quoted in Bowley, 2005, October 4) showed his enthusiasm by suggesting that “This is a truly historic day for Europe and for the whole of the international community.”

British support was also seen in the fourth quarter of 2006 in which partial freeze of talks with Turkey was discussed among member states and European Commission due to her refusal to open its ports to Greek Cypriot ships and aircraft. Blair (quoted in “Blair Warns”, 2006, November 29) warned that “Just at the moment to send an adverse signal to Turkey I think would be a serious mistake... The Council is the critical date. We have got to make sure that we allow Turkey's accession to proceed.”

Cyprus issue was one of the main stumbling blocks on the road to Turkey's accession but Great Britain supported Turkey. Although Labour governments supported Turkey in Cyprus issue, Great Britain's ministers for Europe had some reservations. For instance, in September 2006, Great Britain's Minister for Europe Geoff Hoon joined Greek foreign minister Dora Bakoyannis and (quoted in “Turkey Must”, 2006, September 12) underlined that “We want to see Turkey accept its obligations under the law of the European Union...it's very important that Turkey should satisfy its obligations.” After the Commission report about partial freeze of chapters, Hoon (quoted in “Turkey Urges”, 2006, November 8) underlined that “Turkey must implement its obligation to all (EU) member states. If it fails to do so, the EU must act in accordance with its declaration of 21 September, 2005.” Similarly, British Minister for Europe Chris Bryant suggested that

I urge the Turkish government to honour the commitments that it has already made. We would like to see the ports opened, we'd like to see them making that commitment again and seeing action rather than just words... We don't want (Turkey's accession process) to stop, we don't want to slam the door shut. We think it is really important that the

process towards EU accession of Turkey is maintained as a strong possibility.

In 11 December 2006, EU Foreign Ministers agreed to freeze 8 chapters. The Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett (quoted in Watt, 2006, December 12) suggested that “Train in fact still firmly on the track. Yes, eight chapters frozen but 27 out of 35 not and every prospect that work can continue steadily and effectively to make Turkey in the fullness of time a member of the EU.” After the European Summit, Prime Minister Tony Blair flew straight to Ankara and (quoted in Casert, 2006, December 15) underlined that “It is important that we continue the process of accession with Turkey, that we do not shut the door on Turkey's membership.” In March 2007, Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett (quoted in “Britain Backs”, 2007, March 27) renewed British support by suggesting that “We strive to be always (Turkey's) staunchest ally ... it will be to the advantage of the EU and to the advantage of Turkey when Turkey's membership application succeeds.”

Gordon Brown, after becoming prime minister continued British policy towards Turkey. Following talks with Prime Minister Erdogan, Prime Minister Brown (quoted in “Britain Eyes”, 2007, October 23) underlined that “We will support the Turkish accession negotiations to the European Union. We believe at the December council of the European Union we will be able to reach agreement on the next stage.”

In 2008, Sarkozy proposed an idea of Mediterranean Union and demanded to include Turkey in this framework. However, Foreign Minister Miliband (quoted in “Britain Says”, 2008, May 14) highlighted that “The Mediterranean Union can and should be a beneficial project for the European Union but it is not, repeat not, an alternative to enlargement of the EU to include Turkey.” In May 2009, Miliband

reiterated British support by (quoted in “Britain Seeks”, 2009, May 27) suggesting that “The UK remains strongly committed to the vision of Turkey as a full and equal member of the European Union. This is a top priority for the UK.” In November 2009, following talks with chief negotiator Egemen Bagis, Miliband was quoted to (“Turkish British”, 2009, November 4) told strong support Great Britain extended to Turkey’s EU negotiations and added that we could see the benefits of Turkey's EU membership in Turkey and Europe.

Geopolitical arguments were used by British politicians in their support to Turkey. For instance, Straw (quoted in “British FM”, 2005, September 8) underlined that “By welcoming Turkey we will demonstrate that Western and Islamic cultures can thrive together as partners in the modern world. The alternative is too terrible to contemplate.” Moreover, he (quoted in “Turkey Hints”, 2005, September 28) also pointed out that “Anchor Turkey in the West and we gain a beacon of democracy and modernity, a country with a Muslim majority, which will be a shining example across the whole of its neighboring region.” Likewise, Europe Minister Douglas Alexander (quoted in “Britain Tries”, 2005, September 30) highlighted that “Turkey is of enormous strategic importance to the EU... Successfully integrating Turkey in the EU we believe would help us tackle most of the many difficult problems that we face in the modern world.” Furthermore, Straw (quoted in “EU In”, 2005, October 2) stated that “We're concerned about this theological-political divide, which could open up even further down the boundary between so-called Christian-heritage states and those of Islamic heritage... We need to see Turkey in the European Union and not pushed the other way.” After the opening of membership talks with Turkey, Straw (quoted Bowley, 2005, October 4) suggested Turkey's entry into the EU, “will bring a strong secular state that happens to have a Muslim majority into the EU,

proof that we can live, work and prosper together.” Great Britain's Minister for Europe Geoff Hoon (quoted in “British Minister”, 2006, October 9) also underlined that “it is important to send the right message to a secular country, which looks to the West and wants to join the EU.” Blair (quoted in “Blair Warns”, 2006, November 29) also emphasized that “In Europe we face a division today between short-term political considerations... and the long-term strategic interest of Europe and the wider world which is to have Turkey inside the European Union.” Tony Blair was in favor of ‘arc of moderation’, which includes moderate Muslim countries such as Turkey and Blair’s official spokesman (quoted in Wat et al, 2006, December 15) told that it was “also an important reason why we support Turkish membership of the EU.” Foreign Secretary David Miliband (quoted in “Inclusion Of”, 2007, September 5) underlined that

In bridging the gap between Europe and Asia, in showing that common humanity overshadows religious differences, there is no more pivotal country than Turkey...If Turkey can play a role as a member of the European Union, engaged in shared projects, promoting shared values, the prize for Turkey, for Britain and for Europe as a whole is immense: to witness an age where the world is not only more connected, and more interdependent, but also more at ease with the different identities that Turkey bridges, and, as a result, more secure.

Moreover, in May 2009, Miliband (quoted in “Politics European”, 2009, May 28) reiterated that “Britain is more convinced than it has ever been that the strategic decision to support Turkey's accession to the European Union is the right one.”

British politicians also used political arguments. After the reelection of JDP, Great Britain's Foreign Secretary David Miliband (quoted in Brand, 2007, July 23) suggested that “It is very important that across Europe we reach out to the new government in Turkey when it is formed...A stable and secure political situation in

Turkey is massively in our interest and we will certainly want to be taking forward our links with this very, very important country.”

Compliance to Copenhagen Criteria was one of the reservations. Geoff Hoon (quoted in “Britain Urges”, 2006, November 8) stated that

I know that the Turkish Government is committed to reform and to providing its citizens with the quality of life they demand and deserve. I urge Turkey to reflect on just how much has been achieved in recent years and to be confident in continuing this process and taking the necessary steps forward.

Moreover, Foreign Minister David Miliband (quoted in “France Deals”, 2007, December 10) underlined that “we think it's important that the European Union fulfill its responsibilities towards Turkey, but also that Turkey continues the reform process that is an important part of its passage to the European Union.” British Prime Minister Gordon Brown's spokesman Michael Ellam (quoted in “Britain After”, 2009, April 6) also pointed out that “The technical negotiations which are part of Turkey's EU accession process have been, in the view of the British government, a major driver of reform to improve the way the country is governed, develop the economy, and address human rights issues.” Another reservation for Great Britain was Turkish controversial article 301 of penal code which was about insulting Turkish identity. Great Britain's European Affairs Minister, Geoff Hoon (quoted in “Government Hints”, 2007, January 25) has called for changes in the controversial article and suggested that the Turkish government must remove obstacles before freedom of expression.

Security interest was also emphasized by British politicians. For instance, Foreign Minister Miliband (quoted in Bruges, 2007, November 6) suggested that “Enlargement is by far our most powerful tool for extending stability and prosperity . . . If we fail to keep our promises to Turkey, it will signal a deep and dangerous

divide between east and west.” He (quoted in “Britain Says”, 2008, May 14) also underlined that “I hope our counter-terrorism relationship will both have practical measures to make our countries safer but also some of the deeper ideological and theological roots of terrorism that need to be tackled.”

The ideational argument of not sharing common religion was refuted by British politicians. For instance, Miliband (quoted in “Britain Reiterates”, 2007, September 7) said rejecting Turkey's bid to join the bloc would ‘give a very bad signal’ that the EU was a ‘closed Christian state’ but allowing the mainly Muslim country to enter would be ‘good for business’. Moreover, Justice Minister Jack Straw (quoted in “Britain Reaffirms”, 2007, November 23) suggested that Turkey was a primarily Muslim nation but he shared the view of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that the idea of an exclusively Christian Europe “belongs to the Medieval Ages and it should be left there.”

David Cameron (quoted in Bila, 2010, July 27) suggested that he would remain Turkey's “strongest possible advocate for EU membership.” British support for Turkey was also praised by Turkish politicians. In October 2010, chief negotiator Bagis (quoted in “Turkey Britain”, 2010, October 24) highlighted that “Britain is the country that would understand the best the ups and downs Turkey goes through in its accession process. Because Britain's accession talks was not without pain. Britain is a source of inspiration for us with its commitment to the EU integration.” Moreover, in November 2011, President Gul (quoted in “Turkish President”, 2011, November 20) suggested that “I will underline the importance of England's continued support in making sure negotiations are not blocked by artificial political obstacles.”

Security arguments were used. Conservative Prime Minister Cameron (quoted in Bila 2010, July 27) suggested that “When I think about what Turkey has

done to defend Europe as a NATO ally and what Turkey is doing now in Afghanistan alongside European allies, it makes me angry that your progress towards EU membership can be frustrated in the way it has been” and he underlined that “I believe it's just wrong to say Turkey can guard the camp but not be allowed to sit inside the tent.” Moreover, he (quoted in Grice, 2010, July 27) also pointed out that “A European Union without Turkey is not stronger but weaker, not more secure but less, not richer but poorer” and added that “We want you to be Turkey - because it's as Turkey that you can play the unique role I have described on building greater security and greater prosperity for all our citizens.”

Economic arguments were also used together with the security arguments. Cameron (quoted in “Britain Says”, 2011, March 31) suggested that “The case for Turkish membership of the European Union in my view is clearer than ever, for increased economic prosperity, for a bigger market for our goods and services, for more energy security and for real benefits for the EU's long term stability.

Geopolitical arguments also used. The British leader also turned on those who oppose Turkey's EU bid on the grounds of its Muslim majority population and (quoted in Bila, 2010, July 27) saw "the history of the world through the prism of a clash of civilizations....They think Turkey has to choose between East and West and that choosing both is not an option.”

Consequently, Great Britain continued to be the driver of Turkish accession to the EU. Although political reservations of Turkish nonrecognition of Cyprus and non-compliance to Copenhagen Criteria are underlined, political support arguments of geopolitical importance of Turkey and security interest in having closer relations with Turkey are emphasized more than reservations. Therefore, it is observed that

supporting enlargement of the EU is a state policy in Great Britain and this policy has not been affected with the changes in government.

4.4.2.4 Greece

Greek politicians used political arguments in their support for Turkey's accession to the EU. As Heraclides (2010:154) underlined, "Costas Karamanlis remained a firm supporter of Turkey's EU aspirations." For instance, Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis (quoted in "Greek and Luxembourg", 2005, March 17) suggested that "We support the European prospect of Turkey, because we expect that a Europeanized Turkey will be a much more compatible neighbor for Greece and the other countries." Similarly, he (quoted in "The EU's", 2005, May 26) underlined that "They should eventually be permitted to join the European Union. A Europeanized Turkey is in everybody's interest." Moreover, Greece also criticized France for the proposal of privileged partnership to Turkey. Karamanlis (quoted in "A European", 2005, September 23) warned that "The EU recognized Turkey as a candidate country in 1999 without expressing any such reservation. ...The EU must maintain its credibility...A European Turkey is in everyone's interest, particularly Greece." Following the opening of accession talks with Turkey, Greece's Foreign Minister Petros Molyviatis (quoted in "Greece Says", 2005, October 4) suggested that "It is really a very important agreement. An agreement that will not, immediately, tomorrow, but in its future course replace the bad past and bad name of our region. It is a start of a new era." In 2009, Foreign Minister Bakoyannis (quoted in "Miliband Meets", 2009, May 26) underlined that "We want to see a European Turkey on our borders, we believe that this is in the interests of both countries."

In Athens, Greek Foreign Minister Petros Moliviatis (quoted in “Spain No”, 2005, June 3) considering the decision of European Council in December 2004, suggested that “Turkey must continue its path to Europe as outlined in these decisions, and the position of Greece on this has not changed,” and added that “I don't see a connection between the Cyprus settlement and Oct. 3. This date does not have any relation with the re-starting of negotiations for a solution on Cyprus.”

Security arguments were also used by Greeks. Greek President Papoulias (quoted in “Papaoulias”, 2005, June 13) suggested that “Security and peace in the Balkans are conditions for security and peace in the whole of Europe” and added that “Turkey must have the way to Europe opened.” Prime Minister Karamanlis also (quoted in “Karamanlis Visits”, 2005, November 28) suggested that Greece supported European prospect of Turkey and added that “We believe that this will lead to new prospects of peace, good neighboring relations, cooperation, economic growth and prosperity for both countries.” In addition, Foreign Minister Bakoyannis (quoted in “Support For”, 2007, March 30) underlined that “We support the idea of European neighborliness. This strategy concerns all of SE Europe, including Turkey. We believe that in this way there will be peace, security and prosperity.”

Compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria was one of the reservations that Greece had in her relations with Turkey. For example, Karamanlis (quoted in “Greek And”, 2005, August 29) reminded that “But Turkey must meet all the criteria requested by the EU.” Likewise, he (quoted in “Karamanlis Visits”, 2005, November 28) underlined that “If Turkey indeed wants to access the EU, it ought to respond to the preconditions set by the EU, and of course to respect the principles and values of Europe and international law and of course this should be reflected in its behavior to its neighbours.” Moreover, President Papoulias (quoted in “Turkey Needs”, 2006,

April 23) underlined that the EU had a “responsibility to its citizens not to accept as members states that do not fully respect its values and principles.” Furthermore, Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis (quoted in “FM Bakoyannis”, 2006, December 11) emphasized that “The only safe way for Turkey's smooth accession course is its full compliance to European criteria and preconditions...“Our policy is summarized in 'complete fulfillment equals full accession.’”

Political arguments related to Cyprus continued to be the main reservation of Greece. Considering Turkey’s refusal to recognize Cyprus, Karamanlis suggested (quoted in “Greece Stands”, 2005, September 11) that “It isn't possible for a country which wants to start negotiations with the European Union to not respect the obligations to which it has previously engaged. They have to be respected....The EU must provide a solution to this problem.” Moreover, he (quoted in “A European”, 2005, September 23) underlined that “all obstacles created by Turkey in terms of the recognition of Cyprus would be a problem for the negotiation process.” He also (quoted in “Greek PM”, 2005, October 31) suggested that “Turkey can become an EU member when and if it fully meets EU rules and values...And these values are not compatible with (threats) and the occupation of European soil.” Furthermore, regarding opening of ports to Cyprus, Karamanlis (quoted in “Turkey Must”, 2006, September 10) underlined that “We back Turkey's move towards Europe... on the condition that it respects the rules and criteria bound to a European country” and added that “Turkey must fulfill its obligations.” Likewise, considering Ankara Protocol, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis (quoted in “Bakoyannis Rules””, 2006, November 2) warned that “Greece's position is clear: Turkey cannot progress on its European course without any repercussions or sanctions arising from its potential refusal to conform to its obligations.” As a response to the Commission

proposal to partial freeze of Turkish chapters, Deputy Greek Foreign Minister Yiannis Valynakis (quoted in “Greece Says”, 2006, November 8) underlined that “The commission notes a lack of tangible progress, specifying that Turkey's response to its European obligations is meager.” Karamanlis (quoted in “Greek and British”, 2006, November 21), considering Ankara Protocol, underlined that “We support (Turkey's) its European orientation on condition, of course, that it will adopt European values and principles, it will fully implement all criteria and prerequisites set by the European Union and will honour its commitments.” Following the collapse of Cyprus negotiations on 27 November, Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis (quoted in “EU/Turkey”, 2006, November 29) warned that “I have repeatedly said that Turkey should honor the obligations it has committed to. If Turkey does not do that, the European Union will have to have a certain answer. This will necessarily lead to certain European decisions.”

Instead of partial freeze of talks, Greece sought for tougher action against Turkey and came up with its own proposal for a time schedule of 18 months to review Turkish progress on Cyprus issue. Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis (quoted in “Greece Seeks”, 2006, December 10) suggested that “(Such a mechanism) would be based on a decision to freeze an important number of chapters linked with the implementation of the Ankara Protocol.” and (quoted in “RPT-Greece”, 2006, December 4) added that “such a timeframe would enable us to evaluate (Turkey's) real intentions and see the real progress that would be achieved.” However, in the European Council, instead of time frame proposal, 8 chapters were frozen but that Bakoyannis (quoted in “FM Bakoyannis”, 2006, December 11) suggested it was decided on a “mechanism of assessment and control of Turkey's compliance on the issue of the protocol which begins in 2007, with an emphasis given in 2008 and if

necessary in 2009, with a special reference to the European Commission's reports to the Council of Ministers.”

In March 2007, Bakoyannis (quoted in “Support For”, 2007, March 30) reiterated Greek position about Cyprus issue that “If Turkey carries out ...reforms, fulfils ...criteria and fully implements the Protocols with all EU member-states, then Turkey must join the EU as a full member. Fully meeting its contractual obligations must lead to full accession.” In January 2008, Karamanlis (quoted in Kyriakidou and Mesci, 2008, January 24) also underlined that “Provided Turkey continues on the reform path and meets criteria...Europe must accept it as a full member of the European family... It is necessary for Turkey to normalize its relations with Cyprus (for its EU bid).” Moreover, in January 2009, Karamanlis (quoted in “RPT-Update”, 2009, April 23) reiterated that “We have fully supported the full entry of Turkey to the European Union. But it is not possible to give our consent unless the Cyprus problem is solved, and Turkey meets all its obligations towards the European Union.” Furthermore, Bakoyannis (quoted in “Miliband Meets”, 2009, May 26) stressed that “This is the reason by we once again call on Turkey to fully implement the Ankara Protocol, a necessary condition in order to open eight chapters and allow the accession process to go forward, which is something that Greece supports.” In addition, Karamanlis (quoted in “RPT Interview”, 2009, March 30) emphasized that “The pace ... is not satisfactory. That is not only our evaluation but the general evaluation...Its record so far has not been particularly promising...Our policy towards Turkey is very clear and can be spelled out in four words -- full compliance, full membership.”

Illegal immigration from Turkey and signing of readmission agreement were also another reservation for Greece. Greek Interior Minister Pavlopoulos (quoted in

“Greece Cyprus”, 2007, December 3) suggested that illegal immigration was not only concern Greece and Cyprus but also all the EU countries and demanded that “We will seek from the EU to take seriously into consideration the fact that all the countries that wish to become EU members must assume their responsibilities, and chiefly to sign the readmission treaties.” The European Commissioner for immigration, Jacques Barrot (quoted in “EU/JHA”, 2009, July 1), also supported Greek stance on immigration and suggested that “We cannot continue to discuss with Turkey or to help it financially to keep its eastern borders if this EU candidate does not guarantee application of the re-entry agreement signed with Greece.”

Air space violations between Greece and Turkey were another reservation for Greece. In May 24, Turkish and Greek fighter jets crashed over the Aegean and Karamanlis (quoted in “Update1 Greece”, 2006, May 24) warned that “Yesterday's incident should be a signal ... to persuade Turkey to abandon such tactics which do not tally with its European perspectives,” and added that “All this is taken into consideration vis-a-vis the European perspectives of Turkey. All behaviors are taken into consideration.”

Greek minority in Turkey and opening of Halki (Heybeliada) seminary were another reservation for Greece. For instance, Prime Minister Karamanlis (quoted in Kyriakidou, 2008, January 24) emphasized the importance of re-opening of Halki seminary and underlined that “Protection of minority rights are among the most important criteria for joining the European Union.” As a response, Erdogan suggested that his government was trying to find a solution for reopening the seminary but he also reminded Greece's own obligations to protect its Turkish-speaking Muslim minority in northern Greece.

In Papandreu's period, Cyprus issue continued to be the main reservation of Greece. Prime Minister George Papandreu (quoted in "Turkey Must", 2009, October 19) warned that "It cannot be permitted for Turkey to have occupation troops in an EU member state, especially for a candidate country...I will always be sincere about problems that divide us and problems that we must solve, and a major problem is that there is still occupation in the Cyprus Republic." Moreover, Foreign Minister Dimitris Droutsas (quoted in "Greece Wants", 2010, November 22) pointed out that "Turkey cannot become a member of the EU as long as there are occupation forces on the island."

In November 2010, due to the stalemate in Turkey-EU-Cyprus relations, Greece proposed to have a summit on Turkey's EU membership bid. Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoris Delavekouras (quoted in "Greece Wants", 2010, November 24) suggested that "We want a membership procedure that is real and not virtual" and added that a summit would help clear and sincere dialogue in order to bring back momentum and have Turkey realize its commitment to implement internal reforms and recognize Cyprus.

On the Halki Seminary issue, Turkey's EU Minister and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis (quoted in "Bagis Reopening", 2012, March 27) suggested that "I don't see the re-opening of Halki Seminary on Heybeliada Island as a threat to Turkey. I believe that it will enrich Turkey", however, he also underlined that "It will be significant, if Greece also takes steps of good will" and added that the problems of both the Muslims living in western Thrace and the Orthodox citizens in Turkey would be solved immediately.

Hence, Greece continued to be one of the brakemen in this period. Although Karamanlis supported Turkish European aspirations by underlying that Europeanized

Turkey is in everyone's interest, political reservations of non-compliance of Turkey to Copenhagen Criteria and Cyprus issue emphasized frequently. Under the Papandreu government, the argument of Turkey as an occupier in Cyprus, which was emphasized in the 1990s, came back and used against Turkey. So, as long as no solution is found to the Cyprus problem, Greece continued to be the brakeman in Turkish European bid.

4.5 General Assessment

4.5.1 Comparison between Different Periods of Each Member State

4.5.1.1 Germany

Table 23: Comparison of Different Periods for Germany

	Total Press Releases	Press Releases Related to Turkey's Improvement of Relations with the EC	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
1987-1989	17	13	1	12	0	1	0%	0	12	0%
1990-1995	117	60	5	55	2	3	40%	14	41	25%
1996-2004	665	484	38	446	34	4	89%	216	230	48%
2005-2012	379	280	14	266	4	10	29%	56	210	21%

In the period of 1987-1989, out of 1 primary and 12 secondary press releases, there were no primary or secondary support press releases that can be obtained from Factiva database. Therefore, it can be argued that, in this period, Germany had reservations towards Turkish application for EU membership.

In the period of 1990-1995, 40 percent (2 out of 5) support is observed in the primary press releases whereas in the secondary press releases, percentage of support decreases to 25 percent (14 out of 55). One of the primary support press releases is from 1993; the other one is from 1995 related to the support of Germany regarding the Customs Union. Similarly, 10 out of 14 secondary support press releases are about support of Germany in the Customs Union negotiations.

In the period of 1996-2004, 89 percent (34 out of 38) of primary press releases were supporting improvement of relations of Turkey with the EU. Whereas percentage of support was 48 percent in the secondary press releases. 32 out of 34 primary support press releases are observed within the period of 1999-2004 and 174 out of 216 secondary support press releases are from the end of 1998 to 2004. Similarly, there are only four primary reservation press releases (11%). 101 out of 230 secondary reservation press releases are from the period of 1996 to October 1998. Therefore, it can be argued that there were significant reservations in the period of Helmut Kohl's chancellorship. Consequently, the analysis indicates that 1996-2004 was the period in which Germany's support for Turkish membership bid was highest. This period also coincided with Gerhard Schröder's chancellorship (October 1998-November 2005) who was the leader of Social Democratic Party of Germany and led the coalition government of Social Democratic Party and Green Party of Germany.

In the period of 2005-2012, %29 (4 out of 14) of primary press releases are support press releases. 3 out of 4 primary support press releases are observed in the period of Schroder's chancellorship and the other primary support press releases is observed in Merkel's chancellorship. However, the press release in the Merkel's chancellorship is from the speech of German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle who is the chairman of Free Democratic Party.

In the same period, 21 percent (56 out of 266) of secondary press releases were support press releases. 19 out of 56 secondary support releases are from the period of Schroeder's chancellorship. In this period, except for the period of 1987-1989, the support for Turkish bid was lowest. This period also coincided with Angela Merkel's chancellorship, the leader of Christian Democratic Union, who was favoring privileged partnership for Turkey instead of full membership. After the 2005 federal elections, she led the coalition government of Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union and Social Democratic Party of Germany. Moreover, after 2009 federal elections, she led the coalition government of Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union and Free Democratic Party.

Consequently, when all the periods of Germany are compared, the analysis indicated that support for Turkish bid for EU membership changed with the different chancellors coming from different parties. Support rate is highest in Social Democrat Gerard Schroeder period and lowest in Christian Democrat Angela Merkel period. Although Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl supported Turkish Customs Union, in the Luxembourg Summit, Helmut Kohl did not support Turkish candidacy. Consequently, it can be suggested that, Turkey should campaign more proactively during the chancellorship of a Social Democrat governments since those periods provide more favorable conditions for Turkey's full accession to the EU.




Figure 5: Comparison of Support Rate in Different Periods for Germany

Comparison of the primary and secondary press releases shows that, the percentage of support in the primary press releases is uniformly higher than percentage of support in the secondary press releases in all periods of the analysis.

Table 24: Germany Primary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total		
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1987-1989											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
Reservation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0%	0%
1990-1995											
Support	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	50%	0%
Reservation	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	100%	0%
1996-2004											
Support	8	2	0	10	1	0	1	23	34	29%	3%
Reservation	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	4	75%	0%
2005-2012											
Support	0	2	0	2	0	1	1	1	4	50%	25%
Reservation	6	0	0	6	0	0	0	4	10	60%	0%

In the period of 1987-1989, there are no primary support press releases that could be obtained. In the same period, there is only one primary reservation press release and neither material nor ideational reasons are mentioned of regarding this reservation. In the period of 1990-1995, 50 percent of primary support press releases (1 out of 2) indicate material arguments. This press release is about geopolitical argument (a subsection of political arguments) where it is suggested that Turkey should be supported by the West due to its strategic importance. 100 percent of all primary reservation press releases (3 out of 3) are referring to material factors (All of them are political reservations). 2 of these reservations are about the use of German weapons in the operations in the South East of Turkey whereas one of them is about court ruling of DEP deputies.

In the period of 1996-2004, 29 percent of primary support press releases (10 out of 34) are about material arguments. 8 out 10 support press releases indicate political arguments such as geopolitical arguments of preventing Turkey from drifting Islamic fundamentalism or political argument of Turkish bid to the EU is in German interest. 2 out of 10 primary support press releases are about security arguments which suggest that there would be enormous increase in security if Turkey were admitted. In the same period, %3 of primary support press releases (1 out of 34) point to ideational arguments and in this press release; Europeanness of Turkey is emphasized after the 1997 Luxembourg Summit where Turkey was not accepted as a candidate country. On the other hand, 75 percent of all primary reservation press releases (3 out of 4) are due to material factor. All three are political reservations and the issues are human rights, political reforms and Cyprus. The remaining one does not include any reason.

Between 2005 and 2012, 50 percent of support releases (2 out of 4) are about material arguments. Both of these support releases are containing security arguments in which Turkish accession would boost stability and security of Europe. Additionally, 25 percent of support press releases (1 out of 4) are about ideational arguments indicating moral duty. For example, German politicians suggest that the EU should keep promises to Turkey. In one of the releases no reason is inferred for the support. When the reservation releases are analyzed, it is observed that 60 percent of them (6 out of 10) are about material arguments. Among the 6 support releases 5 of them are about Cyprus issue and the remaining one is about the criticism toward fulfilling the criteria. Other 4 press releases do not specify a reason.

Consequently, it is observed that in all periods except the period of 1987-1989, the number of primary material press releases is higher than the number of primary ideational releases. German politicians used ideational arguments in two releases among 58 primary press releases. It is also observed that ideational factors are used only in the support releases.

Table 25: Germany Secondary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total		Total
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1987-1989											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
Reservation	1	0	10	11	0	0	0	1	12	92%	0%
1990-1995											
Support	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	11	14	21%	0%
Reservation	37	0	3	40	0	0	0	1	41	98%	0%
1996-2004											
Support	30	9	2	41	3	0	3	172	216	19%	1%
Reservation	111	6	12	129	4	0	4	97	230	56%	2%
2005-2012											
Support	11	5	0	16	0	3	3	37	56	29%	5%
Reservation	72	0	2	74	1	0	1	135	210	35%	0%

In the period of 1987-1989, there are no secondary support press releases. In the same period, 92 percent of reservation press releases (11 out of 12) are pointing to material factors. 10 out of 11 reservation press releases include economic interest; the fear of mass migration of Turkish workers to the EU market and especially to Germany. One out of 11 reservation press releases is a political reservation indicating human rights problems in Turkey.

In the period of 1990-1995, 21 percent of secondary support press releases (3 out of 14) are due to material factors. All three support press releases are about geopolitical arguments suggesting Turkey should be supported due to its strategic importance or to maintain its westward orientation or to prevent Turkey from drifting into the orbit of Islamic fundamentalism. In this period, 98 percent of secondary reservation press releases (40 out of 41) are about material factors. 37 out of 40 reservation press releases are political reservations pointing toward human right

problems, use of German origin weapons in the operations in the South East region of Turkey, Turkish operation in the Northern Iraq, Cyprus problem and imprisonment of DEP deputies. 3 out of 40 reservation press releases include economic reservations such as economic problems of Turkey and the threat of Turkish workers.

Between 1996 and 2004, 19 percent of secondary support press releases (41 out of 216) include material factors. 30 of these 41 support releases are showing political factors where geopolitical significance of Turkey and national interest of Germany are emphasized. In the remaining 9 security arguments and stability of region and Europe is underlined and the final 2 releases include economic arguments. 1 percent of releases (3 out of 216) are about ideational arguments in which Europeanness of Turkey and not sharing common religion are highlighted. According to the analysis, remaining 172 releases do not include a specific reason.

In this period, 56 percent of secondary reservation press releases (129 out of 230) are about material arguments. 111 out of 129 reservation press releases contain political reservations such as human right problems, Copenhagen Criteria, domestic pressure, Kurdish minority, ban of Welfare Party, death penalty, Cyprus problem. 6 of 129 reservation releases indicate security reservations and Kurdish immigration problem. 12 out of 129 reservation press releases are economic reservations which are economic bill of Turkey to the EU and the threat of Turkish workers. Moreover, only 2 percent of releases (4 out of 230) are about ideational arguments. European values, not having same religion and not Europeanness of Turkey is underlined in these releases. Finally, in the remaining 97 releases no reason is specified.

In the period of 2005-2012, 29 percent of secondary support press releases (16 out of 56) include material factors. 11 out of 16 releases include political

arguments whereas 5 out of 16 releases include security arguments. Geopolitical importance of Turkey as a bridge to Muslim world and national interest of Germany are emphasized in political support releases. Security interest of Germany is underlined in security related releases. 5 percent of releases (3 out of 56) include ideational factors. All of these three support press releases are about moral duty of respecting agreements with Turkey. In this period, 35 percent of secondary reservation press releases (74 out of 210) is about material factors where almost all of the reservation press releases (72 out of 74) are political reservations and the remaining 2 reservation press releases are economic reservations.

Consequently, it is seen that in all periods, the number of press releases indicating material factors are higher than the number of press releases ideational factors. Ideational arguments are seen only in 8 press releases among 779 secondary press releases. It is also observed that ideational factors are used both in the support and reservation releases.

4.5.1.2 France

Table 26: Comparison of Different Periods for France

	Total Press Releases	Press Releases Related to Turkey's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	% of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	% of Support in Secondary
1987-1989	7	4	0	4	0	0	0%	2	2	50%
1990-1995	106	68	9	59	7	2	78%	36	23	61%
1996-2004	432	292	20	272	7	13	35%	119	153	44%
2005-2012	749	580	31	549	5	26	16%	13	536	2%

Between 1987 and 1989, there are no primary press releases. In the secondary press releases, 50 percent support rate (2 out of 4) is observed. In two of the support press releases, it is stated that France would not be against Turkish application whereas in the reservation press releases, deepening of the EC was highlighted by suggesting that no new members should be allowed before the EC's integrated market was introduced in 1993. In the period of 1990-1995, 78 percent of primary press releases (7 out of 9) are supporting Customs Union and all of them are originating from 1995. Due to its role as the president of the EU in the first half of 1995, France is the country which tries most to persuade Greece to lift her veto against Turkish Customs Union. In that period, 61 percent (36 out of 59) of secondary press releases are support press releases and all of them are about Customs Union. 2 primary and 14 secondary press releases are reservations regarding Turkey's military operations in Northern Iraq against terrorist activities. The analysis indicates that 1990-1995 is the period in which French support for Turkish membership bid was highest.

In the period of 1996-2004, 35 percent of primary press releases (7 out of 20) are supporting improvement of relations where 6 out of 7 support press releases are from the period of 1996-1999. Only one out of 7 support press release is originating from 2004. When the secondary press releases are analyzed, it is observed that 44 percent of them (119 out of 272) can be considered as support releases. 92 out of 119 secondary support press releases are published before November 3, 2002.

In the same period 65 percent of primary press releases (13 out of 20) are reservation press releases. 56 percent of secondary press releases (153 out of 272) include reservations. Among these 153 secondary reservation press releases 145 of them are after November 3, 2002. To sum up, from 1996 to 3 November 2002, 66

percent of primary releases and 89 percent of secondary releases show support for Turkish European bid. After the election of Justice and Development Party, European orientation of Turkey was started to be questioned. 10 percent of primary releases and 16 percent of secondary releases show support for Turkish European aspirations.²⁵

Therefore, it can be suggested that after the election of JDP in November 2002, reservations towards Turkey increased significantly. When the secular character of French state is considered, it can be argued that hesitations towards Islamic credentials of JDP and JDP's European orientation could be one of the reasons behind this French attitude.

In the period of 2005-2012, 16 percent of primary press releases (5 out of 31) are supporting improvement of relations. Within these 5 support press releases 4 of them are from the period of September and October 2005 in which accession negotiations with Turkey began. Only one out of 5 support press releases belong to after 2008 period, from the period of Sarkozy's presidency. Only 2 percent of secondary press releases (13 out of 536) include support factors and 10 of them are from the year 2005. Moreover, 3 out of 13 support press releases are from French presidency. On the other hand, 84 percent of primary press releases (26 out of 31) is highlighting reservations and 14 of them are from 2005. When the secondary press releases are considered, it is observed that significant portion of them (i.e. 98 percent, 536 out of 549) is reservation press releases. In May 2007, Nicholas Sarkozy, the leader of Union for a Popular Movement, was elected as President of France and similar to Angela Merkel; he openly supports privileged partnership for Turkey

²⁵ This difference is significant at 99% confidence level (p-value: 2.2 e-06).

instead of full membership. Therefore, in this period, except for the period of 1987-1989, the support for Turkish bid was lowest.




Figure 6: Comparison of Support Rate in Different Periods for France

When the comparison of the primary and secondary press releases is made, it is seen that percentage of support in the primary press releases is uniformly higher than percentage of support in the secondary press releases in the periods of 1990-1995 and 2005-2012. There is no primary support in the period of 1987-1989. Between 1996 and 2004, the percentage of support in secondary releases is higher than percentage of support in primary releases.

Table 27: France Primary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total	Percentage (Total Material/Total)	Percentage (Total Ideational/Total)
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1987-1989											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
Reservation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
1990-1995											
Support	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	6	7	14%	0%
Reservation	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	100%	0%
1996-2004											
Support	1	1	0	2	2	0	2	3	7	29%	29%
Reservation	8	0	0	8	1	0	1	4	13	62%	8%
2005-2012											
Support	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	5	40%	0%
Reservation	13	0	0	13	1	0	1	12	26	50%	4%

In the period of 1987-1989, there are no primary support or reservation press releases. Whereas in the period of 1990-1995, 14 percent of primary support press releases (1 out of 7) is about material arguments indicating geopolitical factor of fear of Turkey's turning its back to the West. Remaining 6 primary support press releases are related to French support of Customs Union without mentioning of reason. On the other hand, all of the primary reservation press releases (2 out of 2) are pointing to material factors in which political reservations about Turkish military operations in Northern Iraq are stressed. In the period of 1996-2004, 29 percent of primary support press releases (2 out of 7) are related to material factors. One of two support press releases includes political factors -French admiration of Turkish reform about human rights-. Other press release is about security where relation between stability of Europe and Turkish accession is emphasized. Among the primary press releases 29 percent (2 out of 7) is about ideational arguments. These two releases are about

collective identity where Europeanness of Turkey is underlined. The remaining 3 primary support press releases are related to improvement of relations without mentioning of reason. Additionally, when the reservation press releases are analyzed, it is seen that 62 percent (8 out of 13) of reservations are specifying material factors where all of them are due to political factors such as fulfillment of Copenhagen Criteria and referendum in France about Turkish accession to soothe domestic concerns. 8 percent of primary reservation press releases (1 out of 13) include ideational arguments. This press release is about collective identity –on the expectation that Turkey might not adopt all the values of Europe-. In the remaining 4 out of 13 reservation press releases, no reason is mentioned for reservation.

Finally, in the period of 2005-2012, 40 percent of primary support press releases (2 out of 5) include material factors. One of the two press releases is about geopolitical support due to the active role of Turkey in the war of Georgia. The other one is about geopolitical support where the fear of Turkey's sliding to Islamic fundamentalism is highlighted. In other three support press releases no reason is specified. When the reservation press releases are analyzed it is observed that 50 percent of primary releases (13 out of 26) is due to material factors where in all 13 press releases political reservations such as Turkey's not recognition of Cyprus and nonfulfilment of reforms are criticized and referendum for the domestic concern is underlined. Only 4 percent of primary reservation press releases (1 out of 26) is about ideational arguments in which Europeanness of Turkey is questioned by referring Turkey as an Asia Minor country. In the remaining 12 press releases, there is no reason specifying reservation.

Table 28: France Secondary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total	Percentage (Total Material/Total)	Total Percentage (Total Ideational/Total)
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1987-1989											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0%	0%
Reservation	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	100%	0%
1990-1995											
Support	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	31	36	14%	0%
Reservation	23	0	0	23	0	0	0	0	23	100%	0%
1996-2004											
Support	10	2	0	12	4	0	4	103	119	10%	3%
Reservation	104	4	3	111	6	0	6	36	153	73%	4%
2005-2012											
Support	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	9	13	31%	0%
Reservation	186	2	3	191	20	0	20	328	539	35%	4%

Similar to primary press releases, in the period of 1987-1989 there are no ideational or material support press releases. In the two support press releases, no reference is given for the reason behind the French decision of not blocking Turkish application to the EC. Additionally both of the two secondary reservation press releases include material factors where political argument of deepening of the EC is emphasized.

In the period of 1990-1995, 14 percent of secondary support press releases (5 out of 36) is due to material arguments and all of which are including geopolitical arguments such as fear of Turkey's turning its back to the West or strategic importance of Turkey. Remaining 31 out of 36 secondary support press releases are related to French support of Customs Union without mentioning of the reason. In that period all the secondary reservation press releases (23 out of 23) include material factors, specifying political reservations about human rights, democratic reforms, Cyprus and Turkish military operations in Northern Iraq.

In the period of 1996-2004, only 10 percent of secondary support press releases (12 out of 119) is about material arguments. 10 of these 12 support releases include political arguments that are about strategic importance of Turkey, fear of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. Other 2 press releases are about security in which relation between stability of Europe and Turkish accession is underlined. 3 percent of secondary press releases (4 out of 119) is about ideational factors where all of them specify collective identity in which Europeanness of Turkey is underlined and it is stated that Turkey would not be evaluated on the basis of religious criteria. In that period, 103 out of 119 secondary support press releases are related to improvement of relations without mentioning of reason. Whereas, 73 percent of secondary reservation press releases (111 out of 153) is about material factors. Among them 104 are political reservations such as criticism towards fulfillment of Copenhagen Criteria, democratic reforms, human rights, Cyprus, French weights in the EU, fear of losing deepening or France having referendum about Turkish accession in order to soothe domestic concerns. 4 out of 111 reservations are about security factors like fear of Muslim immigration and 3 out of 111 reservations are about economic arguments which include economic competition in jobs and CAP subsidies. Only 4 percent of secondary reservation press releases (6 out of 153) contain ideational factors. These press releases are about values of Europe, Turkey not having same religion, Islam phobia, cultural differences, etc. In 36 out of 153 reservation press releases, no reason is specified for the reservation.

Finally, in the period of 2005-2012, 31 percent of secondary support press releases (4 out of 13) contain material factors. All four of these press releases are about geopolitical support (i.e. the role of Turkey as a bridge to Muslim world and fear of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey). Other 9 support press releases do not

include a specific reason. When the distribution of reservation press releases is analyzed it is seen that 35 percent of them (191 out of 539) includes material factors. Among them 186 are political reservations in which Cyprus issue, nonfulfilment of reforms, human rights, absorption capacity and Armenian issue are stressed and referendum for the domestic concern is underlined. Only 2 out of 191 are about security and 3 out of 191 are about economic factors. In that period 4 percent of primary reservation press releases (20 out of 539) is about ideational arguments in which Europeanness of Turkey is questioned by referring Turkey in the Asia Minor and indicating that Turkey is not sharing common religion or common culture. In the remaining 328 press releases, no explanation for the reservation can be found.

4.5.1.3 Great Britain

Table 29: Comparison of Different Periods for Great Britain

	Total Press Releases	Press Releases Related to Turkey's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	% of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	% of Support in Secondary
1987-1989	11	7	0	7	0	0	0%	4	3	57%
1990-1995	52	24	1	23	1	0	100%	14	9	61%
1996-2004	413	277	21	256	18	3	86%	235	21	92%
2005-2012	349	274	32	242	30	2	94%	238	4	98%

Between 1987 and 1989, no primary press releases could be obtained. In the secondary press releases, %57 support rate (4 out of 7) is observed. In four of these support press releases, it is clearly stated that Great Britain is supporting Turkey's European aspirations. Remaining 3 are reservation press releases.

In the period of 1990-1995, the only primary press releases that could be obtained through database search is a support press release regarding Customs Union. Whereas, 61 percent of secondary press releases (14 out of 23) are support press releases and 10 out of 14 support press releases are about British support for Customs Union. 39 percent of secondary press releases (9 out of 23) are reservation press releases where 7 of them are about military operations against PKK.

Between 1996 and 2004, 86 percent of primary press releases (18 out of 21) support improvement of relations. 7 out of 18 support press releases are observed after 1997 and 6 out of 18 press releases are observed after 2004. In that period only 14 percent of primary press releases (1 out 21) are indicating reservation. Similarly, 92 percent of secondary press releases (235 out of 256) include supportive references.

In the period of 2005-2012, majority of primary press releases (94%, 30 out of 32) is supporting improvement of Turkish relations with the EU. Only 6 percent of primary press releases (2 out of 32) include reservation. Likewise, 98 percent of secondary press releases (238 out of 242) can be considered as supportive and only 2 percent (4 out of 242) is reservation press releases.

To conclude, in all periods, (except primary release between 1990 and 1995 where there was only one release) percentage of support is increasing in both primary and secondary press releases and in the period of 2005-2012, the support for Turkish bid is highest. Consequently, from this analysis it is observed that Great Britain is the main driver of the Turkish accession and she is the only country which persistently supports Turkish European aspirations in all periods and it can be suggested that British support for Turkey is a state policy and do not change with governments.




Figure 7: Comparison of Support Rate in Different Periods for Great Britain

When the comparison of support rate in different periods is made, it is observed that percentage of support in the secondary press releases is uniformly higher than percentage of support in the primary press releases in the periods of 1996-2004 and 2005-2012. There is no primary support in the period of 1987-1989. Between 1990 and 1995, the percentage of support in primary releases is higher than percentage of support in secondary releases.

Table 30: Great Britain Primary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total			
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational					Material+Ideational+other
1987-1989												
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	
Reservation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	
1990-1995												
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0%	0%	
Reservation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	
1996-2004												
Support	5	1	0	6	1	0	1	11	18	33%	6%	
Reservation	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	100%	0%	
2005-2012												
Support	6	0	0	6	0	3	3	21	30	20%	10%	
Reservation	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	100%	0%	

Between 1987 and 1989, there are no primary support or reservation press releases related to Great Britain. In the period of 1990-1995, there is only one primary support release and there is no mention of reason behind the support. In the period of 1996-2004, 33 percent of primary support press releases (6 out of 18) are about material arguments. Among these 6 support press releases, 5 of them are related to geopolitical arguments. In those releases, it is stated that a democratic Turkey anchored in Europe would be an inspiration to other states in the Islamic world. The other press release is about security where regional security is underlined. Additionally, 6 percent of primary press releases (1 out of 6) are about ideational arguments. In that case, collective identity is mentioned through European vocation of Turkey. The remaining 11 primary support press releases point to improvement of relations without mentioning a specific reason. Moreover, 100 percent of primary

reservation press releases (3 out of 3) are related to material factors. All 3 reservations are due to political factors such as criticism towards fulfillment of Copenhagen Criteria, death penalty or ban of Welfare Party.

Finally, in the period of 2005-2012, 20 percent of primary support press releases (6 out of 30) include material factors. Among these support press releases 6 of them are about geopolitical arguments. Turkey is suggested to be a shining example to the neighbors and her strategic importance is emphasized. On the other hand, 10 percent of primary support press releases (3 out of 30) are about ideational arguments. In all of these releases moral duty of EU is emphasized. British politicians suggested that the EU should meet its obligations towards Turkey otherwise it would be a huge betrayal to Turkey. In the primary reservation releases (2 out of 2) only material factors could be observed. All of these press releases indicating political reservations where Turkey's not recognition of Cyprus is criticized.

Table 31: Great Britain Secondary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total	Percentage (Total Material/Total)	Percentage (Total Ideational/Total)
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1987-1989											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	0%	0%
Reservation	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	100%	0%
1990-1995											
Support	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	9	14	36%	0%
Reservation	9	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9	100%	0%
1996-2004											
Support	11	7	1	19	9	0	9	207	235	8%	4%
Reservation	20	0	1	21	0	0	0	0	21	100%	0%
2005-2012											
Support	13	1	0	14	0	0	0	224	238	6%	0%
Reservation	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4	100%	0%

In the period of 1987-1989, there are no ideational or material secondary support press releases related to Great Britain. In all the secondary support press releases that could be obtained for that period (4 press releases) it is observed that Great Britain is supporting Turkey's European vocation without any explicit reason that could be inferred from the releases. On the other hand, 100 percent of secondary reservation press releases (3 out of 3) is about material arguments in which political arguments of human rights, Cyprus and digesting Spain and Portugal are emphasized.

In the period of 1990-1995, 36 percent of secondary press releases (5 out of 14) are related to material arguments. Geopolitical arguments are identified in all five support press releases such as Turkey's being emerging power in Central Asia or having the role of bridge between west and Muslim world. In 9 out of 14 press releases, no specific reason is mentioned.

Between 1996 and 2004, 18 percent of secondary support press releases (19 out of 235) include material factors. Among them 11 out of 19 are about political support focusing on strategic importance of Turkey and the role of Turkey in reshaping Middle East. 7 out of 19 releases point to security arguments where illegal drug trafficking, Iraq war and role of Turkey in the fights against international terrorism are stressed. The remaining one press release is about economic argument and in this press release; Turkey is underlined to be an important market for Great Britain. Only 4 percent of secondary press releases (9 out of 235) are about ideational arguments. In these press releases Europeanness of Turkey is underlined and it is suggested that there should not be religious criteria or religious Berlin Wall in Turkish accession. 207 out of 235 primary support press releases are related to improvement of relations without explicit reasoning. With respect to secondary

reservation press releases, it is observed that 100 percent of them (21 out of 21) include material arguments. 20 out of 21 reservations are political which are about fulfillment of Copenhagen Criteria, democratic reforms, human rights, death penalty, Cyprus, adultery bill and ban of Welfare party. Remaining one press release includes an economic reservation.

In the final period of analysis, namely 2005-2012, only 6 percent of secondary support press releases (14 out of 238) specify material arguments. 13 out of 14 material press releases indicate geopolitical factors. In those releases it is stated that Turkish membership is British strategic priority and Great Britain wants to anchor Turkey in West with membership. There is only one support press release where security arguments are included. In that release, it is emphasized that Turkey is important for British national security. Other 224 support press releases do not include particular reasons that could be categorized under this research. On the other hand, all the secondary reservation press releases (4 out of 4) are due to material factors indicating political reservations. Among them 3 are about Cyprus and one is about criticism of freedom of expression.

4.5.1.4 Greece

Table 32: Comparison of Different Periods for Greece

GREECE	Total Press Releases	Press Releases Related to Turkey's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	% of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	% of Support in Secondary
1987-1989	46	41	2	39	0	2	0%	0	39	0%
1990-1995	289	242	6	236	0	6	0%	0	236	0%
1996-2004	641	532	40	492	16	24	40%	106	386	22%
2005-2012	312	221	57	164	5	52	9%	17	147	10%

Between 1987 and 1989, no support is observed in primary releases. In all of the primary press releases (2 out of 2) Greece is apparently against Turkish membership application. Similarly, no support is observed in the secondary press releases. All 39 secondary releases include reservations towards Turkish European aspirations. In the period of 1990-1995, similar to earlier period, there is no support releases in 6 primary releases. In those support press releases 4 of them are from the period of Customs Union negotiations. In the same way no support could be observed in secondary releases and all 236 releases there are reservations. Therefore, the analysis indicates that 1987-1990 and 1990-1995 are the periods in which there was no Greece support for Turkish membership at all. Due to the bilateral problems, exclusively Cyprus problem, Greece tried to veto any positive movement of EU or member states towards Turkey's improvement of relations with the EU.

On the contrary, in the period of 1996-2004, 40 percent of primary releases (16 out of 40) are supporting improvement of relations. All of the support releases are from the period of September 1999 to December 2002. Among the secondary press releases 22 percent (106 out of 492) can be categorized as support. 103 out of 106 secondary support releases are observed in the period following August 1999. %60 of primary press releases (24 out of 40) is reservation press releases and 9 out of 24 reservation press releases are for the period before August 2009. In that period, 78 percent of secondary press releases (386 out of 492) include reservation and 263 out of 386 secondary reservation press releases are before August 1999. Therefore, it is observed that Turkish and Greek Earthquakes, namely Earthquake diplomacy, had an impact in the improvement of relations between Greece and Turkey. Highest percentage of support in both primary and secondary releases is reached in this period. Nevertheless, strong Greek reservations still continues in that period.

In the period of 2005-2012, only 9 percent of primary press releases (5 out of 57) are supporting improvement of relations. Similarly, 10 percent of secondary press releases (17 out of 164) are support press releases.

It is observed that in all periods, except for August 1999-December 2004, Greece does not support Turkish membership bid to the EU. Therefore, it can be suggested that Greece is the main brakeman and the Cyprus problem should be resolved in order for Greece to support, or not veto Turkish relations with the EU.




Figure 8: Comparison of Support Rate in Different Periods for Greece

When the comparison of support rate in different periods is made, it is seen that percentage of support in the primary press releases is higher than percentage of support in the secondary press releases in the periods of 1996-2004. There is no primary support in the period of 1987-1989 and 1990-1995. Between 2005 and 2012, the percentage of support in secondary releases is higher than percentage of support in primary releases.

Table 33: Greece Primary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total	Material+Ideational+other	Percentage (Total Material/Total)	Total	Percentage (Total Ideational/Total)
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational						
1987-1989													
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-
Reservation	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	100%	0%	0%	0%
1990-1995													
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-
Reservation	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	1	6	83%	0%	0%	0%
1996-2004													
Support	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	14	16	13%	0%	0%	0%
Reservation	18	0	0	18	0	0	0	6	24	75%	0%	0%	0%
2005-2012													
Support	2	0	0	2	1	0	1	1	4	50%	25%	25%	25%
Reservation	47	4	0	51	0	0	0	1	52	98%	0%	0%	0%

As explained above in the period of 1987-1989, there are no primary support press releases whereas %100 of primary releases include reservations. In the period of 1990-1995, there are again no support releases. On the other hand, %83 of primary reservation press releases (5 out of 6) is about material arguments in which Greece vetoed Customs Union deal for Cyprus issue. In one out of 6 reservation press releases, reason for reservation is not specified. In the period of 1996-2004, 13 percent of primary support press releases (2 out of 16) are about material arguments. In all two support press releases, it is stated that closer Turkish relations with EU is in Greek interest. In the remaining 14 releases, there is no explicit reason is specified. Among the primary reservation press releases 75 percent (18 out of 24) is about material arguments including Kardak crisis, Ocalan crisis, criticism towards reform process and Cyprus problem. Only 8 percent of primary reservation press releases (1 out of 13) is about ideational arguments.

In the period of 2005-2012, %50 of primary support press releases (2 out of 4) contain material factors. In these articles, Greek interest is emphasized. One of

these press releases is about ideational arguments in which Europeanness of Turkey is emphasized. The remaining press release does not include a specific reason. Whereas 98 percent of primary reservation press releases (51 out of 52) include material factors. Among these 51 releases 47 contain political reservations where Cyprus issue and nonfulfilment of reforms are criticized. 4 out of 51 releases are about security arguments. In these press releases, Greece held Turkey responsible for not controlling illegal immigration and not accepting the immigrants that Greece refused. In the remaining one press release, no explanation is provided for the reservation.

Table 34: Greece Secondary Press Releases

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total	Percentage (Total Material/Total)	Percentage (Total Ideational/Total)
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1987-1989											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
Reservation	33	0	0	33	0	0	0	6	39	85%	0%
1990-1995											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
Reservation	213	1	0	214	0	0	0	22	236	91%	0%
1996-2004											
Support	5	0	0	5	2	0	2	99	106	5%	2%
Reservation	320	2	0	322	0	0	0	64	386	83%	0%
2005-2012											
Support	1	3	0	4	1	0	1	12	17	24%	6%
Reservation	133	12	0	145	0	0	0	2	147	99%	0%

As explained above in the period of 1987-1989, there are no support press releases. Whereas 85 percent of secondary reservation press releases (33 out of 39) is about material factors and all 33 press of them are about political reservations. The

main issues in that period were Turkey's restrictions on sale and transfer of property owned by Greek minority in Turkey, human rights, Cyprus problem and disputes in the Aegean. In 6 out of 29 releases, only Greek opposition to Turkish European aspirations is highlighted.

When the period of 1990 and 1995 is analyzed, it is observed that there are again no secondary support releases. Among secondary reservation press releases 91 percent (214 out of 236) is about material arguments. For instance, 213 out of 214 releases contain political reservations and the remaining one contains security reservation. The main issues are Cyprus problem and dispute in the Aegean. Additionally, human rights problems are also criticized. In the single press release about the security issue illegal immigration is highlighted. In the remaining 22 out of 236 releases, there is no reason behind Greek objections.

In the period of 1996-2004, only 5 percent of secondary support releases (5 out of 106) are about material factors. All of these five support releases are about political arguments in which improvement of Turkish relations with the EC is argued to be in Greek interest and it could help the solution of Cyprus problem. On the other hand, two percent of support press releases are about ideational arguments. In one of these releases, Europeanness of Turkey is emphasized whereas in the other, it is stated that religion should not be criterion for Turkish accession. Other 99 releases do not have any explicit arguments. In that period 83 percent of secondary reservation releases (322 out of 386) is about material factors. Among them 320 reservations are due to political factors which are related to Kardak crisis, Cyprus issue and other problems in the Aegean. 2 out of 322 reservations are about Greece's security concerns. In 64 out of 386 reservation press releases, there no specific reason is stated.

In the final period of analysis, i.e. between 2005 and 2012, 24 percent of secondary support releases (4 out of 17) include material arguments. 3 out of 4 releases are about security issue in which Greece suggested that Turkish accession is necessary for regional stability whereas 1 out of 4 releases are about political arguments in which it was emphasized that Europeanized Turkey is in everybody's interest. Only 6 percent of support releases (1 out of 17) is about ideational arguments where Europeanness of Turkey is emphasized. Other 12 support do not include reasoning. When the secondary reservation press releases are analyzed it is observed that almost all (99 percent, 145 out of 147) of them is about material factors. Among these releases 133 are political reservations in which Cyprus issue, airspace violations, nonfulfilment of criteria and territorial waters are emphasized. Whereas 12 out of 145 are related to security arguments in which illegal immigration is underlined. In the remaining 2 press releases, there is no explicit reason behind reservation.

4.5.2 Comparison between Different Periods of Commissioners Speeches

Table 35: Comparison between Different Periods of European Commissioners Speeches

European Commissioner Speeches	Total Speeches	EU Speeches Related to Turkey's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Number of Support	Number of Reservation	Percentage of Support
1987-1989	5	2	2	0	100%
1990-1995	27	14	8	6	57%
1996-2004	155	52	6	46	12%
2005-2012	308	145	51	94	35%

In the period of 1987-1989, there are no support speeches. In the second period, %40 of speeches shows support of improvement of relations with the EU, on the basis of Association Agreement which led to the Customs Union agreement. When the speeches that are made in the period of 1996-2004 are analyzed, it is seen that in only 12 percent of speeches, support is seen for Turkish membership. For the final period, in the speeches, 35 percent of Support is seen for Turkey.

Table 36: Turkey-European Commissioner’s Speeches-Material/Ideational Factors

	Material				Ideational			Other	Total		
	Political	Security	Economic	Total-Material	Collective Identity	Moral Duty	Total Ideational				
1987-1989											
Support	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-
Reservation	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	100 %	0%
1990-1995											
Support	1	2	0	3	0	0	0	3	6	50%	0%
Reservation	9	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9	100%	0%
1996-2004											
Support	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	4	6	33%	0%
Reservation	45	0	1	46	0	0	0	0	46	100%	0%
2005-2012											
Support	24	11	0	35	0	7	7	9	51	67%	13%
Reservation	94	0	0	94	0	0	0	0	94	100%	0%

In the period of 1987 and 1989, 100 percent of speeches (2 out of 2) have political reservations to Turkey’s improvement of relations with the EU. In both speeches, it is emphasized that priority must be given to deepening of the Community, namely to complete single market, rather than widening.

When the period of 1990-1995 is analyzed, in the support speeches, material factors such as political interest of having closer relations with geostrategically important Turkey and security interest of stability of region are observed. However, there is no speech indicating ideational factors. Considering reservations, it is observed that Commissioners have political reservations such as Cyprus issue, human rights problems and priority of deepening of the EC.

For the period of 1996-2004, in the support speeches, material factors such as political interest of having closer relations with geostrategically important Turkey are seen. Though, like the period of 1990-1995, there is no speech indicating ideational factors. For reservations, it is observed that Commissioners have political reservations such as Cyprus issue, human rights problems and non-compliance to political criteria.

For the last period, in the support speeches, material factors such as political interest of having closer relations with geostrategically important Turkey which fights against terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism are seen. Moreover, security interests in having secure and stable region and having secure energy channels is also underlined. For the first time, ideational arguments are used for Turkey. It is underlined that agreements should be respected and the EU needed to keep its promises and commitments towards Turkey. For reservations, it is observed that Commissioners have political reservations such as Additional Protocol for recognition of Cyprus, human rights problems and non-compliance to political criteria with respect to freedom of speech, freedom of press as well as the implementation of reforms.

4.5.3 Comparison of Member States' Attitudes towards Turkey

Table 37: Comparison of attitudes of Member States between 1987 and 1989

Member States	Total Press Releases (1987-1989)	Press Releases Related to Turkey's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	17	13	1	12	0	1	0%	0	12	0%
France	7	4	0	4	0	0	0%	2	2	50%
Great Britain	11	7	0	7	0	0	0%	4	3	57%
Greece	46	41	2	39	0	2	0%	0	39	0%

Between the years 1987 and 1989 only limited number of press releases can be obtained from the Factiva Database. Among these press releases only 3 of them were from primary resources and none of them were supporting Turkey's improvement of relations with the EC. However, when we compare the secondary resources there were higher number of press releases. In press releases regarding Germany and France around 50 percent of those releases were supportive. On the other hand, there were also no supportive releases emanating from Germany and Greece where the number of speeches was the highest among these countries.

Table 38: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States between 1990 and 1995

Member States	Total Press Releases (1990-1995)	Press Releases Related to Turkey's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	117	60	5	55	2	3	40%	14	41	25%
France	106	70	9	59	7	2	78%	36	23	61%
Great Britain	52	24	1	23	1	0	100%	14	9	61%
Greece	289	242	6	236	0	6	0%	0	236	0%

When we analyze the findings regarding the period 1990-1995 we observe that there was significant increase in the number of press releases that could be obtained from the Factiva Database. Highest number of speeches was obtained related to Greece (similar to the 1987-1989 period) and none of them were supporting Turkey's improvement of relations with the EU. In the primary resources there was important number/percentage of supportive releases in France (7 supportive releases comprising 78% of all releases). A similar result can be obtained for France in the secondary releases where around 60% of the releases obtained were supportive. Likewise, in press releases regarding Great Britain a 61% support rate is obtained. Whereas, for Germany this rate is significantly smaller when compared to France and Great Britain.

Table 39: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States between 1996 and 2004

Member States	Total Press Releases (1996-2004)	Press Releases Related to Turkey's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	665	484	38	446	34	4	89%	216	230	48%
France	432	292	20	272	7	13	35%	119	153	44%
Great Britain	413	277	21	256	18	3	86%	235	21	92%
Greece	641	532	40	492	16	24	40%	106	386	22%

Between 1996 and 2004 there were a huge number of press releases that can be obtained from Factiva Database. Among more than 2000 releases that was analyzed for this study, in press releases regarding Germany and Great Britain, support rate for Turkey's improvement of relations with the EU was very high reaching almost 90% levels. In that period in primary resources support rate was

relatively low in France and Greece compared to these two countries. In the secondary resources, a similar result can be obtained for the case of Great Britain.

Table 40: 1996-2004 - Statistical Tests for Comparing Support Rates in Primary Releases (p-values)

	France	Greece	Germany	Great Britain
France	-	-	-	-
Greece	0.4626	-	-	-
Germany	2.806e-05 *	7.919e-06 *	-	-
Great Britain	0.001318 *	0.0008331 *	0.4972	-

In order to decide whether or not there are significant differences in support rates for various countries, a two sided proportion test²⁶ is applied²⁷. In the table above the numbers in the table corresponds to the p value of the proportion test regarding the related countries. In that setting, the hypothesis tested is;

H_0 : The support rate is the same in both countries.

H_A : The support rate in one country is higher than the other one.

At the 99 percent confidence level the table above indicates the tests marked with (*) indicate that the difference in those countries support rates is significant (i.e. all the p-values are less than 0.01). Therefore, this result indicates that in the period 1996-2004 the support rate in the primary releases regarding Germany is

²⁶ All statistical tests are conducted with R statistical software package.

²⁷ No statistical test is applied for the period of 1987-1989 and 1990-1995 as in these periods number of primary press releases is very low.

significantly higher than the support rates in France and Greece. Similarly, the support rate in the primary releases regarding Great Britain is significantly higher than the support rates in France and Greece. However, no significant difference is observed when the support rates of Greece and France are compared. Same result applies to the comparison of Great Britain and Germany.

Table 41: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States between 2005 and 2012

Member States	Total Press Releases (2005-2012)	Press Releases Related to Turkey's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	379	280	14	266	4	10	29%	56	210	21%
France	749	580	31	549	5	26	16%	13	536	2%
Great Britain	349	274	32	242	30	2	94%	238	4	98%
Greece	312	221	57	164	5	52	9%	17	147	10%

In the latest period that was analyzed in this study, namely 2005-2012, it is again observed that the support rate is significantly higher regarding Great Britain compared to all other countries and the support rate related to France decreases to the level of support rate in Greece. The results of the analysis of secondary releases also support this assessment. It is interesting to note that out of 549 press releases only 13 were supportive in the secondary resources regarding France.

Table 42: 2005-2012 - Statistical Tests for Comparing Support Rates in Primary Releases (p-values)

	France	Greece	Germany	Great Britain
France	-	-	-	-
Greece	0.246	-	-	-
Germany	0.2865	0.06095	-	-
Great Britain	1.382e-09 (*)	1.009e-14 (*)	9.889e-06 (*)	-

Statistical tests indicate that in the period 2005-2012 the support rate in the primary releases regarding Great Britain is significantly higher than the support rates in France, Greece and Germany (at 99% confidence level). All the other tests show that no significant difference is observed when the support rates of Greece and France are compared. Same result applies to the comparison of France and Germany and Germany and Greece. To conclude, in the primary press releases, the support from Great Britain exceeds the support rates in all other countries that are considered in this study.

The analysis leads to some major conclusions. First of all, as stated in the literature, Great Britain is the main driver for Turkey for the period of 1990-2012. Turkish case also indicates that the British support for enlargement of the EU is a state policy which does not change with changes in government. Secondly, in the period of 1987-1989, Germany had economic reservations due to the fear of Turkish workers coming into Germany and therefore Germany did not support Turkish

membership application. However, in the Customs Union negotiations, some German support is observed together with reservations. But when the overall relations with Germany in Kohl's chancellorship are analyzed, it is observed that Kohl had reservations towards Turkey. On the other hand, unlike Poland, Gerhard Schröder supported Turkish European aspirations. In Angela Merkel's chancellorship, wind towards Turkey changed again and privileged partnership instead of full membership is offered. Therefore, like Poland, Turkish case also shows that German support for Turkish European relations changed with governments.

Thirdly, Turkish case also indicates that France, in all periods, prioritizes deepening of the Community. Moreover, French governments are sensitive about domestic concerns. Between 1988 and 1989, France did not oppose Turkish membership application. In the period of 1990-1995, due to its role as the president of the EU in the first half of 1995, France is the country which tried hardest to persuade Greece to lift her veto against Turkish Customs Union and the analysis indicates that 1990-1995 is the period in which French support for Turkish membership bid was highest. On the other hand, in the period of 1996-2004, the French, especially Chirac's support for Turkey is seen. However, it can be suggested that after the election of Justice and Development Party in November 2002, reservations towards Turkey increased significantly. When the secular character of French state is considered, it can be argued that hesitations towards Islamic credentials of Justice and Development Party and its European orientation could be one of the reasons behind this French attitude. After the French veto to the constitution of the EU, supporting accession of Turkey became even harder for French politicians due to the domestic opposition to Turkish accession. In May 2007,

Nicholas Sarkozy, the leader of Union for a Popular Movement, was elected as President of France and similar to Angela Merkel; he openly supports privileged partnership for Turkey instead of full membership. Therefore, in this period, the support for Turkish bid was lowest.

Finally, Greece is the main brakemen for Turkey. Solution to the Cyprus problem and bilateral disputes in the Aegean has been the main reservations in all periods. Although there was conciliation after the earthquakes in both Countries and this led Greece not to veto Turkish candidacy in Helsinki Summit, Cyprus problem continued to be the main reservation afterwards. In the period of 2005 onwards, Turkey did not recognize Cyprus and the EU froze negotiations in 8 chapters. In Papandreou period, the argument of Turkey as an occupier in Cyprus, which was used in 1990s, came back again.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

5.1. Comparison of the European Commissioners' and Member States' Attitudes towards Poland and Turkey

5.1.1 Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland and Turkey

European Commissioners have a special role in the EU's enlargement process. They monitor candidate states' compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria and report to the European Council their preparedness for membership. During the candidacy and accession negotiations, European Commissioners highlight problems in Poland and Turkey and, according to the approach that is used in this dissertation, such criticisms are labeled as reservations.

Table 43: Comparison of Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland and Turkey between 1987 and 1989

European Commissioner Speeches	Total EC Speeches	EC Speeches Related to Improvement of Relations with the EU	Number of Support	Number of Reservation	Percentage of Support
Poland- 1988-1989	14	8	7	1	88%
Turkey- 1987-1989	5	2	0	2	0%

European Commissioners have a special role in the EU's enlargement process. They monitor candidate states' compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria and report to the European Council their preparedness for membership. During the candidacy and accession negotiations, European Commissioners highlight problems in Poland and Turkey and, according to the approach that is used in this dissertation, such criticisms are labeled as reservations.

Comparison of the results for 1988-1989 for Poland and 1987-1989 for Turkey shows that European Commissioners supported the deepening of relations with Poland, but expressed only reservations regarding Turkey. More specifically, in all press releases regarding Turkey, they emphasized that deepening of the Community should be prioritized over widening through enlargement. In contrast, in the Polish case, they used phrases referring to the EU's 'moral duty' and 'responsibility' to help Poland's democratic and free market transition. These phrases signaled the involvement of ideational factors, as well as phrases referring to security and political interests implying the importance of material factors. Overall, the findings of this dissertation are that, for both Poland and Turkey, the number of supportive speeches referring to material factors is greater than the number referring to ideational factors. During the two periods, the only press release expressing reservation mentioned political conditionality for European aid. Thus, during 1988-

1989 for Poland and 1987-1989 for Turkey, European Commissioners can be labeled as drivers of the deepening of Poland's relations with the EU, on the basis of the high level of support expressed in their speeches. Regarding Turkey, however, a conclusion cannot be reached as it was not possible to obtain a sufficient number of speeches for the analysis.

Table 44: Comparison of Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland and Turkey between 1990 and 1995

European Commissioner Speeches	Total EU Speeches	EC Speeches Related to Improvement of Relations with the EU	Number of Support	Number of Reservation	Percentage of Support
Poland- 1990-1993	59	56	39	17	70%
Turkey- 1990-1995	27	15	6	9	40%

Comparing 1990-1993 for Poland and 1990-1995 shows that Poland's support rate was comparatively higher. In supportive speeches towards Poland, ideational factors like responsibility and common culture were observed, as well as material factors such as political interest in helping Poland's transition to democracy and a market economy, simultaneous widening and deepening of the Community, together with the EU's economic and security interests. The percentage of speeches referring to material factors was higher than that for ideational factors. Regarding reservations, the analysis showed that economic reservations about Poland's economic backwardness were expressed, in addition to political interest in deepening the EU before further widening.

With respect to Turkey, material factors, such as the political interest in having closer relations with a geostrategically important country and the security

interest of stability of Turkey's region, were observed in the supportive speeches. No speeches invoked ideational factors. Considering reservations, analysis of the speeches indicated that EU commissioners had various political reservations, such as the Cyprus issue, Turkey's human rights problems and prioritizing deepening of the EU. Thus, European commissioners can also be labeled as drivers of deepened relations with Poland, whereas their support rate for Turkey was neither high nor low enough to justify labeling them as either drivers or brakemen.

Table 45: Comparison of Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland and Turkey between 1994 and 2004

European Commissioner Speeches	Total EU Speeches	EC Speeches Related to Improvement of Relations with the EU	Number of Support	Number of Reservation	Percentage of Support
Poland- 1994-1997	46	43	24	19	55%
Turkey- 1996-2004	155	52	6	46	12%

Analysis of the speeches of the two periods shows that 55 percent of speeches indicated support for Poland's EU membership bid, but only 12 percent indicated support for Turkish membership.

With respect to the factors involved in the speeches, for Poland, ideational factors, such as the EU's responsibility towards Poland and overcoming the division of Europe were emphasized, although material factors, such as the EU's political interest in helping Poland's transition and widening the Community, and its security interest in increasing stability in Europe by accepting Poland, were also observed. Ten out of 24 support speeches referred to material factors whereas 4 out of 24 speeches referred to ideational factors. With respect to reservations, political interest

in EU institutional reform before widening and Poland's compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria were both found, and economic reservations over Poland's agriculture sector and its economic backwardness were also underlined.

For Turkey, in supportive speeches, material factors like the EU's political interest in having closer relations with a geostrategically important country were seen. As in 1990-1995, speeches indicated the use of ideational factors. Regarding reservations, European commissioners again included in their speeches political reservations over the Cyprus issue, Turkey's human rights problems and its non-compliance with the EU's political criteria. Overall, during these two periods, the EU's mixed or moderate level of support for Poland meant it was not possible to label the European Commissioners as either driver or brakeman. On the other hand, they can be labeled as the brakeman regarding the deepening of Turkey's EU relations due to the relatively high level of expressed reservations.

Table 46: Comparison of Attitudes of European Commissioners towards Poland and Turkey between 1998 and 2012

European Commissioner Speeches	Total EU Speeches	EC Speeches Related to Improvement of Relations with the EU	Number of Support	Number of Reservation	Percentage of Support
Poland- 1998-2004	120	73	34	39	46%
Turkey- 2005-2012	308	145	51	94	35%

Regarding the two periods, Poland received a 46 percent level of support in speeches made whereas Turkey received 35 percent. For Poland, material factors, such as the EU's security interest in having stability, security and peace were emphasized. With respect to ideational factors, the importance of the unification of

Europe was underlined. Fifteen out of 34 supportive speeches referred to material factors whereas 14 out of 35 speeches referred to ideational factors. With respect to reservations, the EU's political interest in institutional reform before accession and concerns about Polish compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria as well as implementation of the reforms were emphasized. Finally, speeches also included economic reservations as about problems in Polish agriculture and Poland's protectionism.

For Turkey, supportive speeches referred to material factors, such as the EU's political interest in having closer relations with a geostrategically important country that was fighting against terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, and security interests in ensuring a secure and stable region around Turkey and maintaining secure energy channels to Europe. During this period, ideational arguments were deployed in discussing Turkey for the first time. In such speeches, it was underlined that agreements should be respected and that the EU needed to keep its promises and commitments towards Turkey. Regarding reservations, the commissioners expressed similar reservations as before about an additional protocol for the recognition of Cyprus, Turkey's human rights problems and its non-compliance with EU political criteria with respect to freedom of speech and freedom of press, as well as implementation of EU-mandated reforms.

On 9 October 2002, the European Commission reported that Poland, along with nine other candidates, had fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria and recommended concluding the accession negotiations with all countries concerned by the end of 2002 with the aim of signing the Accession Treaty in spring 2003. Poland duly became a member of the EU on May 1, 2004. However, Turkey's accession negotiations are still continuing.

Overall, from the above analysis, it is possible to conclude that support rates for both Poland and Turkey were neither high enough nor low enough to label European commissioners as either driver or brakeman. The arguments in this comparison part are summarized in the table below.

Table 47: European Commissioners Enlargement Preferences for Poland and Turkey

	Period I.		Period II.		Period III.		Period IV.	
	<i>Poland</i>	<i>Turkey</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>Turkey</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>Turkey</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>Turkey</i>
	1988-1989	1987-1989	1990-1993	1990-1995	1994-1997	1996-2004	1998-May 2004	2005-2012
Driver	+		+					
Brakeman						-		
No Label		-		-	-		-	-

5.1.2 Attitudes of Member State's towards Poland and Turkey

According to rationalist institutionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, utility driven member states of the EU should only accept a country if they all agree that the applicant country contributes to the EU, and that its membership would not challenge the national interests, whether political, economic or security, of any other member states. Instead, the membership of the applicant country should advance the interests of member states. Moreover, according to the two approaches, leaders of member states make rational choices which are predominantly affected by the constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents.

In contrast, for Constructivist/Sociological institutionalism, in accepting an applicant state, member states do not make cost-benefit calculations. Instead, social identities, values and norms are the determining factors in decision making. For member states, justification for enlargement comes from emphasizing the responsibilities and duties emerging as a result of sharing (European) identity, culture and history, being a part of the same family (sense of kinship) and belonging to the EU.

Table 48: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Poland between 1988 and 1989

Member States	Total Press Releases (1988-1989)	Press Releases Related to Poland's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	52	4	0	4	0	0	0%	2	2	50%
France	52	12	3	9	3	0	100%	7	2	77%
Great Britain	46	5	0	5	0	0	0%	4	1	80%
Spain	4	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0%

Table 49: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Turkey between 1987 and 1989

Member States	Total Press Releases (1987-1989)	Press Releases Related to Turkey's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	17	13	1	12	0	1	0%	0	12	0%
France	7	4	0	4	0	0	0%	2	2	50%
Great Britain	11	7	0	7	0	0	0%	4	3	57%
Greece	46	41	2	39	0	2	0%	0	39	0%

Regarding the attitudes of member states in 1988-1989 for Poland and 1987-1989 for Turkey, the findings show that France and Great Britain supported deepening Poland's relations with the EU, especially by means of aid EU and bilateral agreements. Great Britain supported Poland for political reasons whereas ideational factors lay behind French support. The number of press releases involving material factors was higher than the number with ideational factors. Both countries also expressed political reservations over deepening the EU or rectifying the EU's institutional deficiencies in contrast to deepening Poland's relations with the EU. For Germany, 50 percent of press releases showed support, particularly through giving aid to Poland through EU channels. However, Germany also expressed some economic reservations over easing quotas for Poland in the agriculture and steel sectors. For Spain, there were no press releases regarding Spanish attitudes towards Poland.

On the other hand, when the Turkish case is analyzed, it shows that 50 percent of press releases from France showed support whereas 57 from Great Britain did. France had some political reservations over deepening the EU while Great Britain had some political reservations including Turkey's human rights record, the Cyprus issue and consolidation of previous EU enlargement with Spain and Portugal. Germany and Greece also expressed reservations towards Turkey. Germany referred to economic reservations of a fear of mass migration of Turkish workers to Germany and political reservations over human rights in Turkey. Greece's political reservations concerned Cyprus and Aegean, Turkey's restrictions on the sale and transfer of property owned by the Greek minority in Turkey and human rights.

Thus, the findings suggest that France and Great Britain were the main drivers of improving EU relations with Poland with respect to aid despite also

mentioning political reservations such as the priority of deepening the EU's internal relations first. Germany expressed some economic reservations whereas there are no press releases regarding Spanish attitude. Regarding Turkey, however, none of these countries were drivers, and Greece and Germany were actually brakemen. All of the member states mainly referred to political reservations, while only Germany expressed a significant number of economic reservations. For both Poland and Turkey, the number of press releases that included material factors were higher than the number of releases expressing ideational factors.

In terms of the arguments of rationalist institutionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, giving aid to support Poland's transition to democracy did not challenge the national interests, whether economic, security or political, of EU member states so France and Great Britain became drivers. On the other hand, Turkey's membership application challenged the economic interests of Germany and the political interests of Greece so Germany and Greece became brakemen.

Table 50: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Poland between 1990 and 1993

Member States	Total Press Releases (1990-1993)	Press Releases Related to Poland's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	78	41	1	40	0	1	0%	29	11	72%
France	107	98	9	89	3	6	33%	5	84	5%
Great Britain	76	41	4	37	4	0	100%	35	2	94%
Spain	67	37	1	36	0	1	0%	3	33	8%

Table 51: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Turkey between 1990 and 1995

Member States	Total Press Releases (1990-1995)	Press Releases Related to Turkey's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	117	60	5	55	2	3	40%	14	41	25%
France	106	70	9	59	7	2	78%	36	23	61%
Great Britain	52	24	1	23	1	0	100%	14	9	61%
Greece	289	242	6	236	0	6	0%	0	236	0%

During the period of 1990-1993 for Poland and 1990-1995 for Turkey, both Germany and Great Britain supported deepening Poland's relations with the EU, though Germany had some economic reservations during the negotiations of the Europe Agreements. In Germany's supportive press releases, material factors, political and security interests were more prominent than ideational factors. In the primary releases, Great Britain supported Poland for ideational reasons. British politicians suggested that they had the moral duty and responsibility towards Poland due to their common history of being allies in the Second World War and the fleeing of the Polish Government to exile in London. In secondary releases, material factors dominated, particularly the political interest in widening the EU and its security interest. During this period, British support for Poland's European aspirations was highest. In contrast, France and Spain were the brakemen in the negotiations of the Europe Agreements because their economic interests were at stake. For France, the main issues were Poland's agricultural exports, particularly beef, and car quotas whereas for Spain the main issues were steel and agricultural exports, but also the competition for EU funds. In the supportive press releases of France and Spain, there are no ideational factors. Regarding the Turkish case, 78 percent of French primary

releases and 61 percent of secondary releases indicated support whereas 100 percent of British primary releases and 61 percent of secondary releases showed support. Most of the support from these two countries was for the Customs Union negotiations. In both French and British support, material factors, Turkey's geopolitical importance and binding Turkey to west were emphasized. At the same time, however, France and Great Britain had some political reservations regarding Turkish military operations in Northern Iraq, human rights problems and the Cyprus issue. For Germany, political reservations over human rights and Turkish operations in Northern Iraq were emphasized. For Greece, political reservations over Cyprus and the Aegean and human rights were underlined. Greece finally consented to the Customs Union agreement for Turkey in return for a promise on Cyprus's accession to the EU.

Thus, from this analysis Great Britain emerges as the main driver for deepening both Poland's and Turkey's relations with the EU. France was the driver of the Turkish Customs Union deal, despite some political reservations, while Germany was the driver of Poland's European aspirations, despite some economic reservations. France and Spain were the brakemen over Polish relations with the EU while Greece and Germany were the brakemen over Turkish relations with the EU. For both Poland and Turkey, except for the primary supportive press releases from Great Britain for Poland, the number of releases involving material factors was greater than the number of releases for ideational factors.

negotiations over the Europe Agreements challenged the economic interests of both France and Spain. The powerful farm lobby in France and Spain's steel lobby affected the rational decision-making of French and Spanish governments. As Schimmelfennig suggested, the fear of losing EU funds created another economic

concern for Spain. Therefore, France and Spain became the brakemen. Although Germany also expressed some economic reservations during the Europe Agreement negotiations, these reservations did not affect the actions of German government in supporting Polish European aspirations. The Europe Agreements did not challenge national interest of Great Britain. Therefore, Germany and Great Britain became the drivers of Poland's European bid. In contrast, the Customs Union agreement did not challenge French and British interests so these two countries were the drivers of Turkish Customs Union despite some political reservations. Although Germany expressed some support in the Customs Union negotiations, this was outweighed by political reservations over human rights and Turkish operations in Iraq so Germany became the brakeman regarding Turkey's European bid. Due to the Cyprus problem and disputes in the Aegean, Turkey's Customs Union deal challenged Greek political interests. Therefore, Greece was the brakeman in the Turkish Customs Union decision. Nevertheless, Greece eventually consented to the Customs Union in return for the promise of Cyprus's accession to the EU. In other words, the Customs Union decision actually advanced Greece's interest with respect to Cyprus' membership.

Table 52: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Poland between 1994 and 1997

Member States	Total Press Releases (1994-1997)	Press Releases Related to Poland's Improvement of Relations with the EC	Press Primary Releases	Press Secondary Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	147	130	9	121	7	2	78%	94	27	78%
France	87	77	2	75	2	0	100%	32	43	42%
Great Britain	78	41	4	37	4	0	100%	24	13	64%
Spain	113	69	1	68	0	1	0%	5	63	7%

**Table 53: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Turkey between
1996 and 2004**

Member States	Total Press Releases (1996-2004)	Press Releases Related to Turkey's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Press Primary Releases	Press Secondary Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	665	484	38	446	34	4	89%	216	230	48%
France	432	292	20	272	7	13	35%	119	153	44%
Great Britain	413	277	21	256	18	3	86%	235	21	92%
Greece	641	532	40	492	16	24	40%	106	386	22%

For the period of 1994-1997 for Poland and 1996-2004 for Turkey, similarly to the previous period, Germany and Great Britain supported deepening Poland's relations with the EU. For Germany, support for Polish accession was highest during this period. In Germany's primary supportive press releases, material factors were emphasized less than ideational factors. In the secondary supportive press releases, material factors such as Poland's geopolitical significance, the security interest in stabilizing the German-Polish border and European stability and economic interests were emphasized, as well as ideational arguments about the Europeanness of Poland and Germany's special responsibility in the unification of continent. In the secondary supportive press releases, material factors were more prominent than ideational factors, while in the primary press releases, ideational arguments were expressed more than material arguments. In the secondary press releases, material factors dominated over ideational factors. The political interest in widening of the EU, Europhobia and enlargement as a means of forcing the EU to reform its institutional structure were included, as well as references to security interests.

With respect to France, this period can be divided into two periods: Mitterrand's presidency and Chirac's presidency. There was a statistically significant

difference between the attitudes of France in these two periods. During Mitterrand's presidency, there were no primary support or reservation press releases, whereas for secondary releases, there was 16 percent support for Poland's European aspirations. France's main reservations during Mitterrand's presidency were political: the fear of a change in the center of gravity of the EU and criticisms about a lack of interest in Mediterranean states. In contrast, during Chirac's presidency, 100 percent of primary releases (2 out of 2) and 56 percent of releases showed support for Poland's European aspirations (28 out of 50). In the primary press releases, no reasons were specified to justify this support. In the secondary releases, ideational arguments were more frequent than material arguments. Regarding ideational factors, a sense of kinship, 'our sister in the east' and unification of continent were emphasized, while for material factors, political and security interests were common. Considering reservations, the political reservation of giving priority to EU institutional reform before enlargement and economic reservations over changes the CAP and protecting French farmers were pointed out.

Spain continued to be the brakemen for Polish European aspirations. Competition for EU funds and Poland's tax on Spanish farm products were the main reasons for Spanish reservations during this period. Like France, Spain also expressed political reservations about the fear of a change in the center of gravity of the EU and criticisms about a lack of interest in Mediterranean states. No ideational arguments were made by Spanish politicians.

With respect to the Turkish case, Great Britain was the main supporter of Turkey's European bid. The number of supportive releases that emphasized material factors was greater than the number of supportive releases mentioning ideational factors. Expressions of Turkey's geopolitical importance and the security interest in

having closer relations with Turkey were common in this period. The political reservations of Great Britain were Turkey's human rights problems, the ban on the Welfare party, the Ocalan case and Turkey's non-compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria.

For Germany, this period can also be divided into two, for Chancellor Kohl's period and Chancellor Schroeder's period, because the differences between German attitudes changed significantly. During Kohl's chancellorship, the primary press releases expressed 66 percent support whereas the level of support was 24 percent in the secondary releases. The main material reservations of Germany during Kohl's chancellorship were political reservations about Turkey's human rights problems and the Cyprus issue, security reservations about immigration of Kurds. Economic reservations about a possible influx of Turkish workers were also highlighted. In contrast, during Schroeder's period, 91 percent support was observed in the primary press releases and 59 percent of support in secondary releases. In supportive press releases, Turkey's geopolitical importance, its role as a bridge to the Muslim world and German political interests were expressed as political factors and security interests. The main reservations were political reservations over Turkey's non-compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria and economic reservations over a possible influx of Turkish workers.

For France, this period can also be divided into two, but this time in reference to a change of government in Turkey. The difference is also supported statistically. From 1996 to 3 November 2002, 66 percent of primary press releases and 89 percent of secondary releases showed support for Turkey's European bid. Supportive press releases deployed geopolitical arguments about the fear of Turkey sliding into Islamic fundamentalism and the geopolitical importance of a secular Turkey.

Ideational factors, such as Turkey's Europeanness were also expressed. The main political reservations were Turkey's non-compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria, its human rights problems and the Cyprus issue. After the election of Justice and Development Party, however, French press releases began to question Turkey's European orientation. During this second period, only 10 percent of primary press releases and 16 percent of secondary releases showed support for Turkey's European aspirations. France's main political reservations were Turkey's non-compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria, the idea of having a French referendum on Turkish accession, the Armenian issue, and domestic opposition to Turkey. Ideational reservations of not sharing common values, a common religion and a common culture were also found in releases at this time.

For Greece, the earthquake in Turkey in 1999 was a turning point in Turkish-Greek relations. Between 1996 and July 1999, there were no primary supportive press releases although 1 percent of secondary releases showed support. The main political issues were the Imia/Kardak crisis in the Aegean, the Cyprus problem and the Ocalan affair. After August 1999, however, 55 percent of primary press releases and 46 percent of secondary releases showed support. The supportive releases emphasized that Greece supported Turkish European aspirations. However, the Cyprus issue and Greece's insistence on taking the Aegean disputes to international courts continued to represent the main reservation in this period.

Thus, Great Britain continued to be the main driver for both Poland's and Turkey's European aspirations. Under the presidency of Mitterrand, France was a brakeman for Poland's European aspirations. In contrast, Chirac supported Poland's European bid and France under Chirac became a driver. Until 3 November 2002, France can be labeled as a driver of Turkey's European aspirations, but after the

election of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, France can be labeled as a brakeman regarding Turkish European aspirations. Germany continued to be the driver of Poland's European bid while, under Kohl, acting as a brakeman over Turkey. However, under Schroeder, Germany became a driver for Turkey's European aspirations as Turkish workers in Germany gave electoral support to Schroeder. Spain continued to be brakeman for Poland's European aspirations while, until the start detente between Greece and Turkey, Greece was the brakeman for Turkey's European bid. However, after their reconciliation, Greece started to support Turkey's European aspirations, although its level of support was not high enough to call Greece a driver. For Turkey, except for France's primary supportive press releases, the number of releases involving material factors was greater than the number of releases indicating ideational factors. In contrast, for Poland, except for German and British primary supportive releases and French secondary supportive releases, the number of releases invoking material factors was higher than the number expressing ideational factors.

Deepening Poland's and Turkey's relations with the EU did not challenge British interests. Rather, as Schimmelfennig suggests, Europhobia and the need for reform of the EU's institutional structure were used to justify British support of Poland. In contrast, British support for Turkey was justified by its geopolitical importance, security interests and the ideational argument of the Europeanness of Turkey. Thus, Great Britain was the driver in this period. For France, during Mitterrand's presidency, deepening Polish relations with the EU challenged French political interests so France became a brakeman in that period. During Chirac's presidency, as Sjusen indicates, a sense of kinship was used to justify supporting Poland, as well as references to political and security interests. Thus, France became

a driver for Poland. With respect to Turkey, until the election of the Justice and Development Party, France was a driver of Turkish European aspirations. However, after the elections in Turkey, France started to have hesitations about Turkey's secular character and European orientation, while there was also increasing domestic opposition to Turkey's membership. That is, Turkish membership challenged French political interests so France became a brakeman in this period. For Germany, Poland's European bid was in Germany's political, security and economic interests. Hence, Germany was a driver for Poland's European aspirations.

During Christian Democrat Kohl's chancellorship, Germany had political reservations, security reservations and economic reservations about Turkey so it acted as a brakeman. However, after Social Democrat Schroeder took the presidency, Turkey's European bid no longer challenged Germany's interests. Hence, Germany became a driver of Turkey's European bid. For Spain, deepening Poland's relations with the EU challenged Spanish political and economic interests. Politically, enlargement would shift the EU's balances in favor of Germany. Economically, Spain feared that she would no longer be able to get EU funds. Therefore, Spain became a brakeman. In 1996, Greece and Turkey had been on the verge of war due to the Imia/Kardak crisis so Greek security interests were challenged by Turkey's EU bid, while political reservations over the Cyprus issue and the Ocalan case were also significant. Therefore, Greece was a brakeman in that period. However, after the earthquakes, although Cyprus issue remained unresolved, it was acknowledged that supporting Turkey was in Greece's political interest. Therefore, Greece did not veto Turkish candidacy and supported Turkey till 2004.

Table 54: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Poland between 1998 and 2004

Member States	Total Press Releases (1998-2004)	Press Releases Related to Poland's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	610	220	8	212	4	4	50%	51	161	24%
France	946	282	11	271	10	1	91%	75	196	28%
Great Britain	557	107	8	99	8	0	100%	53	46	54%
Spain	585	124	7	117	2	5	29%	21	96	18%

Table 55: Comparison of Attitudes of Member States towards Turkey between 2005 and 2012

Member States	Total Press Releases (2005-2012)	Press Releases Related to Turkey's Improvement of Relations with the EU	Primary Press Releases	Secondary Press Releases	Number of Support in Primary	Number of Reservation in Primary	Percentage of Support in Primary	Number of Support in Secondary	Number of Reservation in Secondary	Percentage of Support in Secondary
Germany	379	280	14	266	4	10	29%	56	210	21%
France	749	580	31	549	5	26	16%	13	536	2%
Great Britain	349	274	32	242	30	2	94%	238	4	98%
Greece	312	221	57	164	5	52	9%	17	147	10%

For the period of 1998-2004 for Poland and 2005-2012 for Turkey, only Great Britain supported Poland's desire to deepen relations with the EU, although this support was lower than at all other periods. British support depended on political arguments such as Europhobia, prioritizing enlargement over deepening, and security interests. Britain's main reservation was economic: the need for reform of the CAP and British contributions to the EU budget. In contrast to other periods under Chancellor Schroeder, Germany did not support Poland's European aspirations. The main economic reservations were the need for a transition period regarding free movement of Polish workers, EU institutional reforms before

widening, Germany's contribution to the EU budget and reform of the CAP. French primary press releases showed 91 percent of support but only 28 percent in secondary releases. The main French reservations were economic, specifically French resistance to reform of the CAP, but there were also political reservations including the need for EU institutional reform, elections in France, Poland's non-compliance with the Acquis and its support for the US in Iraq. Spain continued not to support Poland although its support rate increased compared to previous periods. Spain's main economic reservations were sharing of EU funds with Poland and opposition to the reform of the CAP.

With respect to Turkey, Great Britain continued to support its bid. In supportive press releases, Britain mentioned geopolitical interests as well as security interests. Germany, under the chancellorship of Christian Democrat Angela Merkel, did not support Turkey's European bid. Instead of full membership, Chancellor Merkel asked for a 'privileged partnership'. Germany's main political reservations were Turkey's non-recognition of Cyprus and its non-compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria, together with concerns over the EU's absorption capacity. France, under Nicholas Sarkozy, did not support Turkey either. Like Chancellor Merkel, President Sarkozy also supported a 'privileged partnership' instead of full membership. France's main political reservations were Turkey's non-recognition of Cyprus, its non-fulfillment of reforms, human rights issues, France's demand for a referendum over Turkey's accession, the Armenian issue and the EU's absorption capacity. Ideational arguments were also expressed in French reservation releases, which questioned Turkey's Europeanness. Greece reversed her previously positive stance in this period and no longer supported Turkish European aspirations. Greece's main political reservation was Turkey's non-recognition of Cyprus with the

additional protocol and its non-fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria. Security reservations over illegal immigration from Turkey were also expressed.

To sum up, Great Britain was again the main driver for both Poland's and Turkey's desire to deepen relations with the EU. Regarding Poland, France was not a driver but also was not a brakeman, but it was a brakeman for Turkish European aspirations. Unlike other periods, and as opposed to earlier findings in the literature, Germany was a brakeman for Poland's European bid. Germany was also a brakeman for Turkey. Spain continued to be a brakeman for Poland and Greece became a brakeman again for Turkey. For both Poland and Turkey, except for the German and French primary supportive press releases about Poland, the number of releases that involved material factors was higher than the number of releases including ideational factors.

Poland's membership bid challenged the economic interests of both Germany and Spain. In order to prevent Polish workers pouring into the German labor market, Germany demanded a seven-year transition period after Poland's accession. Germany also questioned her own contribution to the EU budget, especially to the CAP. Due to a fear of domestic resistance to German contributions to the EU budget, Germany did not want to negotiate on that issue before 2002 elections. After the elections, however, Germany and France were able to reach a deal on the CAP issue that paved way for the enlargement to proceed. For Spain, sharing of funds and opposition to the CAP reform were her main economic reservations. Therefore, due to the challenge that Poland's accession created to the economic interests of Germany and Spain, they both became the brakeman regarding Poland's European bid.

Turning to the Turkish case, Germany had political reservations as supporting Turkey challenged Germany's political interests. Hence, Germany became a brakeman under the chancellorship of Christian Democrat Angela Merkel. For France, Poland's accession challenged its economic interest with respect to the CAP but in its primary press releases France still supported Poland's accession. Therefore, France cannot be labeled as either driver or brakeman. France's veto over the EU constitution can also be understood as a reaction to enlargement with Turkey. Due to a fear of domestic opposition, France could not support Turkey's accession process. That is, Turkish membership challenged French political interests. Hence, France continued to be a brakeman. For Greece, Turkey's non-recognition of Cyprus challenged Greek political interests so Greece could not support Turkey's accession process either, and became a brakeman again. The arguments in this comparison part are summarized in the table below.

Table 56: Member State Enlargement Preferences

	Period I.		Period II.		Period III.						Period IV.		
	<i>Poland</i>	<i>Turkey</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>Turkey</i>	<i>Poland</i>		<i>Turkey</i>				<i>Poland</i>	<i>Turkey</i>	
	1988-1989	1987-1989	1990-1993	1990-1995	1994-May 1995	June 1995-1997	1996-Oct 1998	Nov 1998-June 1999	Aug 1999-Nov 2002	Dec 2002-2004	1998-Oct 1998	Nov 1998-May 2004	2005-2012
Driver	FR GB	-	GB GE	GB FR	GB GE	GB GE FR	GB FR	GB GE FR	GB GE FR	GB GE	GB GE	GB	GB
Brakeman	-	GE GR	SP FR	GE GR	SP FR	SP	GE GR	GR	-	FR	SP	GE SP	GE FR GR
No Label	GE SP	FR GB	-	-	-	-	-	-	GR	GR	FR	FR	-

FR: FRANCE, GB: GREAT BRITAIN, GE: GERMANY, SP: SPAIN, GR: GREECE

5.2 Concluding Remarks

This dissertation aimed to explain EU enlargement policies, specifically Eastern enlargement, within the framework of the rationalist-constructivist theoretical debate. With the help of the case studies of the EU application processes of Turkey and Poland, different stages of the enlargement process involving these two countries were analyzed in order to determine the extent to which European Commissioners' and member state politicians' attitudes reflected a 'logic of consequentialism' or a 'logic of appropriateness'.

From the perspective of rationalist institutionalism, member states are seen as the principal actors of enlargement, whereas for sociological institutionalists, the principal actors are norm and principle entrepreneurs, particularly the European Commission in this study. In order to understand whether or not material factors, such as political, security, or economic interests, or ideational factors, such as collective identity and moral duty, led European Commissioners and member states to support Poland in completing her accession process and support Turkey in opening her accession negotiations, this study employed content analysis of documents, press releases, selected from the FACTIVE database and speeches by European Commissioners obtained from the EU's RAPID database. All the categories, themes and coding units used in the content analysis of this study were derived from the rationalist institutionalist and sociological/constructivist institutionalist literature.

Considering case selection, due to their similarities in terms of having large populations, large agricultural sectors, geopolitical significance, western orientation and unconsolidated democracy, Poland and Turkey were chosen as the cases for the

analysis of attitudes towards the EU's enlargement process. Out of the 12 members of the EU in the 1990s, this study followed Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig in choosing Germany, France, Great Britain and Spain for the analysis regarding Poland, and Germany, France, Great Britain and Greece for the analysis regarding Turkey.

From a systematic reading of the selected press releases and speeches, it was possible to reveal the attitudes of European Commissioners and member states towards intensifying the EU's relations with Poland and Turkey. Following Schimmelfennig again, the analysis allowed each member state to be categorized as either a 'driver' or 'brakeman' according to their level of support for Turkey or Poland. Based on the content analysis, the factors behind their attitudes, namely material and ideational factors, were examined within the theoretical framework of this dissertation.

The first hypothesis of this dissertation, that 'European Commissioners' offer for improvement of Poland's and Turkey's relations with the EU is nearly same,' was disproved by the findings of this dissertation. In all the periods that were compared, European Commissioners' support for developing Poland's relations with the EU was consistently higher than their support for Turkey.




Figure 9: Comparison of Support Rates of European Commissioners towards Poland and Turkey

There were also additional findings about the attitudes of European Commissioners. First, except for 2005-2012, they did not use ideational arguments in speeches about Turkey, such as moral duty to integrate Turkey, ending the division of Europe, having common values and common culture. Only in 2005-2012 was there evidence in the Commissioners' speeches of ideational arguments about, the moral duty of *Pacta Sunt Servanda* (that agreements should be respected, or promises kept). Instead of ideational arguments, Commissioners generally used geopolitical arguments to express support, such as the strategic importance of Turkey as a moderate Muslim country struggling against Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, or security arguments about Turkey's contribution to regional and international stability and security.

Secondly, speeches expressing support for Poland were characterized by material arguments, such as the EU's political interest in supporting Poland's transition to democracy, and the security interest of maintaining internal stability and peace within Europe. On the other hand, speeches expressing reservation usually included political arguments about the need to deepen the Community, specifically

introducing institutional reforms proposed at intergovernmental conferences, before moving on with enlargement to the CEECs in general, and Poland in particular. During Poland's negotiation process, political reservations about Poland's non-compliance with the *acquis communautaire* were also emphasized, together with economic reservations about the problems of its agricultural sector. With respect to Turkey, supportive speeches deployed arguments about the EU's political interest in establishing closer relations with a geostrategically important country such as Turkey and the security interest in maintaining regional stability. Speeches expressing reservation focused on the Cyprus issue, Turkey's human rights problems, its non-compliance to the political criteria and the EU's need to prioritize deepening over widening. During Turkey's negotiation process, similar political reservations were also raised, including Turkey's non-compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, the Cyprus issue, human rights problems related to the Kurdish minority and the EU's absorption capacity.

The second hypothesis, that 'Logic of appropriateness best explains the attitudes of the European Commissioners', was also disproved by the findings of this dissertation. In all periods, it was observed that material factors were used more than ideational factors to express the support of the European Commissioners for intensifying both countries' relations with the EU. This indicates that the Commissioners' attitudes were based on the logic of consequentialism rather than the logic of appropriateness. As Gunter Verheugen put it, "The Commission's job is to defend the interests of the entire Union."

The third hypothesis that 'Poland's EU candidacy has been prioritized over Turkey's' was confirmed. Comparing attitudes in all four periods revealed that the number of drivers of Poland's accession to the EU was higher than the number of

drivers of Turkey's accession. Moreover, the percentages of support for Poland are also higher than for Turkey.

The fourth hypothesis, that 'France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain and Greece can be categorized as 'drivers' or 'brakemen' and that their positions do not change within the time periods studied' was confirmed for Great Britain and Spain, but disproved for France, Germany and Greece.

Great Britain was the main driver for Poland's European aspirations in all periods, and also the main driver for Turkey from the 1990s onwards. Statistical analysis shows that Great Britain's level of support for Turkey²⁸ was statistically higher than other member states' in both 1996-2004 and 2005-2012. With respect to the factors behind this support, the study's findings indicate that, for Poland, material factors such as Great Britain's political interest in widening the EU and its security interest in European stability were emphasized, as were ideational factors, such as the responsibility and moral duty of British politicians towards Poland. For Turkey, British support was expressed in terms of geopolitical and security interest, although Europeanness of Turkey was also mentioned. Thus, the findings demonstrate that British support for EU enlargement is a state policy that does not vary despite changes in government.

Despite the expectations of the literature on Eastern enlargement about Germany's being a driver for Polish EU membership, this study found that support for deepening either Polish or Turkish European relations changed with governments. For instance, in the Association Agreement negotiations, Germany had some economic reservations, whereas after the signing of the Europe Agreements, Germany, especially under Christian Democrat Chancellor Helmut Kohl, became the

²⁸ For Poland, due to the limited number of primary press releases, a statistical analysis could not be conducted.

main driver of Poland's application. Then, with the chancellorship of Social Democrat Gerard Schroeder, Germany again began to express economic reservations over issues like the free movement of Polish workers and Germany's contribution to the CAP, making Germany a brakeman in this period. Regarding Turkey, Germany had economic reservations from the beginning due to its fear of an influx of Turkish workers into Germany so it did not support Turkey's membership application, that is, as a brakeman. In the Customs Union negotiations, some German support was expressed through geopolitical arguments alongside the political reservations, although Germany continued to be a brakeman during this period. For example, Helmut Kohl acted as a brakeman at the Luxembourg summit of 1997. Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, in refusing to attend the European Conference, accused Helmut Kohl of pursuing a policy of *Lebensraum* in Eastern Europe and discriminating against Turkey. Gerard Schroeder, however, supported Turkey's European aspirations (in contrast to Germany's reservations about Poland) by emphasizing geopolitical and security interests. Germany then became a driver of Turkey's European aspirations. More recently, under Christian Democrat Angela Merkel's governance, Germany has once again become the main brakeman regarding Turkish relations with the EU, asking for the EU to offer merely a 'privileged partnership' instead of full membership, on the basis of political reservations over Turkey's non-implementation of the Additional Protocol, its non-compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria and the EU's absorption capacity. Thus, the findings of this study indicate that German support for deepening both Polish and Turkish European relations varied according to the ideology of successive German governments.

France is known for prioritizing, in all periods, deepening of the Community over enlargement. Moreover, French governments are sensitive about domestic concerns so economic reservations are emphasized in order to protect French citizens from the effects of enlargement. In 1988-1989, French-Polish relations were based on French support for Poland's transition to democracy, through confirming aid packages and advocating Polish interests in terms of aid in international forums. Thus, France was a driver of improving Poland's relations with the EU. On the other hand, in 1990-1993, France became a brakeman in order to protect her farmers due to economic reservations related to the Association Agreement. In 1994-1997, during the presidency of François Mitterrand, France continued to be a brakeman due to political reservations, such as its fear that Poland's membership could change the EU's center of gravity. After the election of Jacques Chirac as president, expressions of French support for Poland's accession to the EU and NATO increased and France became a driver. In the final period, during the accession negotiations, France's main reservation concerned the proposals of other member states for changing CAP to include Poland. In order to protect French farmers, France asked Poland to accept a transition period for its inclusion in CAP. Thus, France cannot be clearly categorized as either driver or brakeman during this period. Regarding Turkey, although France did not oppose its membership application in the first period, it cannot be categorized as driver or brakeman. In the second period, due to its role as the president of the EU in the first half of 1995, France was the country which tried most to persuade Greece to lift her veto against the Customs Union with Turkey. Thus, France became a driver for Turkey. On the other hand, in 1996-2004, up till the election in Turkey of the Justice and Development Party in November 2002, France continued to be a driver for Turkey. However, after the elections, French politicians started to raise

concerns about Turkey's European vocation and secularism. For instance, the Europeanness of Turkey was questioned by the head of the Convention on the Future of Europe, former French President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing on 8 November 2002, and in April 2004, Alain Juppe, leader of Chirac's Union for Popular Movement, started to ask for just a 'privileged partnership' for Turkey. President Chirac then promised French voters to hold a referendum on Turkey's accession to the EU. Hence, France became a brakeman. In the final period, following the French veto of the new EU constitution, it became even harder for French politicians to support Turkey's accession due to domestic opposition to Turkish membership. In May 2007, Nicholas Sarkozy, the leader of Union for a Popular Movement, was elected as President of France and, like Angela Merkel; he openly supported a 'privileged partnership' for Turkey instead of full membership. In this period, French support expressed in secondary press releases for Turkish accession (2%) was even lower than of the level in Greece (10%). That is, France continued to be a brakeman in this period. In short, the findings indicate that French support for advancing both Polish and Turkish European relations varied with different French governments.

With respect to Spain, the findings of this study were in line with the literature in demonstrating that Spain was the main brakeman for Poland in all periods. In the negotiations for the Europe Agreements, according to secondary press releases, the Spain's main economic reservation concerned the steel sector. Following this, the main economic reservation, in all periods, was Spain's fear of losing EU funding as a result of enlargement, as previously suggested by Schimmelfennig. Spain even used the funding issue to resist the demands of Germany and Austria for a transition period for the free movement of Polish workers

after enlargement. Overall, opposition to enlargement due to economic reservations was state policy for Spain and did not vary with changes of government.

Turning to Greece, the findings of this dissertation again confirmed previous studies that Greek attitudes towards Turkey vary with domestic developments, with the lack of a solution to the Cyprus and Aegean problems being the main political reservation in all periods. Until 1999, Greece was a brakeman, but then a period of *detente* developed as a result of the Kosovo Crisis, earthquakes in Turkey and Greece and a change in the foreign minister in Greece. After August 1999, although the Cyprus issue remained unresolved, it was nevertheless understood that supporting Turkey's EU membership bid was in Greece's interest. This was because a Europeanized Turkey would be a much more compatible neighbor for Greece, and Greece's security interest in the stability of Balkans would also be better served. Therefore, Greece did not veto Turkey's candidacy, thus becoming a driver. In the final period, however, when Turkey refused to recognize Cyprus as required by the Additional Protocol, Greece criticized Turkey's attitude and the EU froze eight chapters of the *acquis* related to the Cyprus issue. In 2009, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou began to use arguments about the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus, previously used in the 1990s, in his speeches. Hence, Greece became a brakeman again. However, looking across all periods shows that being a brakeman was not Greek state policy because Greece's position changed according to its own domestic developments.

The final hypothesis of this dissertation, that 'logic of consequentialism has prevailed in the attitudes of member states towards Poland and Turkey', was confirmed, although with some exceptions. For Britain, these exceptions were expressed in the primary supportive press releases concerning Poland for 1990-1993

and 1994-1997. Of these primary supportive press releases, 75 per cent (3 out of 4) expressed ideational factors and 25 per cent (1 out of 4) expressed material factors. For Germany, the exceptions were observed in primary supportive press releases for Poland in 1998-2004, when 25 per cent of primary releases (1 out of 4) included ideational factors. For France, ideational factors dominated in 13 per cent of the secondary supportive press releases (4 out of 32) concerning Poland in 1994-1997, and in 20 per cent of primary supportive press releases (2 out of 10) in 1998-2004.. However, taking the results of the content analysis as a whole, the number of material factors expressed in the press releases was higher than the number of ideational factors. This leads to the conclusion that the logic of consequentialism has prevailed in forming the attitudes of member states towards both Poland and Turkey.

With respect to Turkey's still incomplete accession process, an important lesson can be derived from Poland's experience. The findings of this dissertation imply that when the economic or political interests of an EU member state are at stake, a compromise is usually found that favors that member states. As liberal intergovernmentalism argues, applicant states are in the weaker negotiating position. For instance, in negotiations over the free movement of labor, Poland did not want to accept a transition period at first. However, the following Polish government softened its stance and asked for a two-year transition period following Polish accession, while Germany and Austria demanded seven years. In the end, a compromise was found in which Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden and Denmark gave up all restrictions on labor movement on the day of Poland's accession to the Union, while Spain, Great Britain and France promised to liberalize employment procedures for Poles within two years after enlargement, and Germany and Austria within seven

years. This example demonstrates how the bargaining power of candidate countries is low in such negotiations.

Consequently, Turkey is needed to respond to the reservations of European Commissioners and member states in order to continue with negotiations. In the light of enlargement fatigue and domestic opposition to enlargement in member states, after responding to the reservations, Turkey also need a grand coalition of drivers in the member states in order to realize her aim of being a full member.

The limitations of this dissertation can provide a starting point for future work. First, the content analysis performed in this study could also be carried out using press releases in other relevant languages, such as French, Spanish, Polish or German. Second, the same press release analysis could be done with different databases, such as Lexis-Nexis. Third, a comparison of the Turkish and Romanian accession processes could also be done together with a comparison to other candidate states. Finally, the analytical approach of this dissertation opens the way for further research into the attitudes of the European Council or European Parliament towards Poland and Turkey, or other candidate states.

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