

CELAL BAYAR AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, 1937-1960

A Ph.D Dissertation

by

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CELAL BAYAR AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, 1937-1960

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ABSTRACT

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January 2013

This dissertation sets its objective as studying Celal Bayar's leadership from 1937 to 1960 in order to present the portrait of Bayar as a political leader. The interactive approach is employed to structure this analysis. In line with this approach, external and internal resources of Bayar's leadership are defined. External resources are considered with regard to institutional and non-institutional aspects. The non-institutional resources referred to are the main characteristics of economy, of international relations and of political regime in 1937-1960. Institutional aspect of Bayar's leadership in 1937-1960 is studied with regard to executive offices he held. With regard to the internal resources of leadership, the effects of certain life experiences on Bayar's politics and his understanding of major political concepts such as democracy and secularism are discussed. Primary and secondary resources, as well as interviews with his close circle provide the material for this study. In the conclusion part, the impact of certain internal

resources on his leadership, such as his commitment to the main principles of the Republican regime is acknowledged but it is pointed out that external resources, such as Atatürk's trust in him, had a greater impact on his leadership. It is also observed that the portrait of Bayar as a political leader falls in a category in between a state elite and a political elite. Regarding the interactive approach, it is concluded that under non-institutionalized regimes, the institutional offices lose their defining characteristics on leadership and that other resources such as the leader's relations with other leaders and his/her interpretation of political office gains extra emphasis.

Keywords: Political leadership, Celal Bayar, the Democrat Party, the Interactive Approach

ÖZET

CELAL BAYAR VE SİYASİ LİDERLİK, 1937-1960

Yiğit, Ahu

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Metin Heper

Ocak 2013

Bu çalışma 1937-1960 yılları için Celal Bayar'ın liderliğini incelemekte ve bir siyasi lider olarak Celal Bayar'ın portresini çizmektedir. Bu analizin çerçevesini interaktif yaklaşım belirlemektedir. Bu yaklaşımın ışığında Bayar'ın liderlik kaynakları içsel ve dışsal etkenler olarak incelenmekte ve bu etkenlerin Bayar'ın liderliği üzerindeki etkileri tartışılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada dışsal etkenler kurumsal ve kurumsal olmayan özelliklerine göre değerlendirilmiştir. Ele alınan kurumsal olmayan dışsal etkenler arasında 1937-1960 yılları için ekonominin durumu, uluslararası ilişkiler ve siyasi rejim yer almaktadır. Bayar'ın liderliğini etkileyen kurumsal dışsal etkenler olarak da başbakanlık ve cumhurbaşkanlığı ele alınmıştır. Çalışmada değinilen içsel liderlik etkenleri arasında Bayar'da iz bırakan hayat ve siyaset tecrübeleriyle demokrasi ve laiklik gibi belirli başlı siyasal kavramları yorumlaması yer almaktadır. Bu çalışma için Bayar'ın yakınlarıyla görüşmeler de dahil olmak üzere birincil ve ikincil kaynaklar

kullanılmıştır. Çalışmanın sonuç kısmında, Bayar'ın belirli içsel kaynaklarının liderliği üzerindeki önemine dikkat çekilmekte ancak netice itibariyle bazı dışsal etkenlerin Bayar'ın siyasi hayatı açısından daha belirleyici olduğu sonucuna varılmaktadır. Bunun yanısıra, bir siyasetçi olarak Bayar'ın devlet seçkinleriyle siyasi seçkinler arasında bir yerde bulunduğuna dikkat çekilmektedir. İnteraktif yaklaşım açınsındansa, kurumsallaşmamış rejimlerde liderlik pozisyonlarının pratikte önemlerini bir ölçüde yitirdikleri ve bu pozisyonların yerine incelenen liderin sistemdeki diğer liderlerle ilişkileri ve kendi pozisyonunu yorumlaması gibi başka etkenlerin önem kazandıkları gözlenmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Siyasi liderlik, Celal Bayar, Demokrat Parti, İnteraktif Yaklaşım

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 An Introduction to the Study of Political Leadership

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the third president of the Turkish Republic Celal Bayar's (1883-1986) political leadership (leadership from here onwards) from 1937 to 1960 according to a categorization of external and internal resources of leadership. Bayar was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası-İTC*)¹ from 1907 until its dissolution at the end of the First World War and a member of the short-lived last Ottoman Parliament (1920) as a deputy from the Saruhan (currently Manisa) region. He was influential in the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922), during which he joined the Aegean brigades fighting against Greek occupation in 1919. In 1920, he joined the national independence movement in Ankara. After that, Bayar occupied several executive leadership positions. He served as Minister of Economics (1921-1922, 1932-1937) and as Minister of Population Exchange, Settlement and Development (1924). In 1937, Bayar replaced İsmet İnönü as Prime Minister on

¹ The İTC was a political movement initiated mostly by *JeuneTurcs* who were a group of intellectuals reacting against Sultan Abdülhamit II's (1842-1918) authoritarian way of governing the state. This group established the Association for the Union of Ottomans in 1889, which later evolved into the Committee of Union and Progress. The Committee established itself as a political party in 1909 (Heper and Criss, 2009: 337). It should be noted that not all the İTC members were former *JeuneTurcs*.

President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's wishes and served in this post until 1939. In 1946, Bayar resigned from his duties as deputy of İzmir and shortly after from the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP*). In 1945-1946, he played a leading role in the establishment of the opposition party, the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti-DP*) and served as its chairman between 1946 and 1950.

In 1950, Bayar was elected president of the Republic and remained in this office until the 1960 military intervention. This decade forms the most controversial part of Bayar's political career. He was accused of neglecting his constitutional role as president and failing to contain political tensions by facilitating negotiation between political parties especially after 1957 (Harris, 2002: 56). It has also been claimed that he breached his constitutional role when he openly supported the DP on a number of political matters and thus undermined the chances of the development of a healthy democracy during that time (Harris, 2002:57). After 1960, Bayar did not take any executive leadership positions but he remained an important and respected political figure.

Out of this long political career, the years from 1937 to 1960 are chosen as the main focus of this dissertation. The rationale for this focus draws upon the definition of leadership adopted here. There is an ongoing debate on the definition and types of political leadership. In this debate leadership is understood in a broad sense, ranging from executive office holders to civil society leaders or even to opinion leaders.² For the purposes of this dissertation, leadership is defined with reference to executive offices. According to the Turkish constitutions of 1924, 1961 and 1982, the executive consists of president and government. Bayar's terms

² In his study *Handbook of Leadership*, Bass mentions 221 definitions of leadership derived from 587 academic publications (2008: 15).

as Minister of Economics and Minister of Population Exchange, Settlement and Development are less important for the purposes of this analysis, because in the Turkish context government ministers have considerably less influence than prime ministers and presidents, thus making these positions less relevant for an assessment of leadership.

1.2 Objectives of the Study and the Theoretical Backdrop

The motivation for this dissertation is the lack of any comprehensive scholarly study in political science literature on this seminal Turkish leader that takes into account his external and internal leadership resources respectively. So far studies on Bayar prioritized one set of resources, for instance his personality at the expense of others, such as the characteristics of executive offices he held. In an attempt to fill this gap, the main research objective in this dissertation is the study of Celal Bayar's leadership according to the interactive approach in the study of leadership, detailed below.

It should be underlined that this dissertation does not offer a comprehensive biography nor explore all the details of Bayar's political life and views, but focuses instead on pursuing four complementary aims:

- (1) Identifying the external and internal resources of Bayar's leadership in 1937-1960,
- (2) Evaluating whether and to what extent the external or the internal resources had been more influential on Bayar's leadership,

- (3) Depending on the first and second aims, adopting a comprehensive approach to Bayar's leadership and introducing Bayar as a political leader.
- (4) Discussing whether and how the findings of this study would provide a fresh perspective to the interactive approach, the methodology adopted in this dissertation.

It has been suggested that leadership is the outcome of the interplay of external and internal resources on a leader's activities (Cole, 1994a, 1994b; Gaffney, 2010; Elgie, 1995). External resources refer to a combination of the political regime, political history, the constitution, institutions and political circumstances of the period under study. Internal resources include a leader's socialization, biography, interpretation of his/her significant political ideas and political goals. It has also been suggested that the study of these two domains are key to the analysis of leadership and leaders in political science (Elgie 1995; Cole, 1994a, 1994b). Elgie calls this approach the interactive approach in the analysis of leadership. The interactive approach does not offer a ready set of rules concerning the interaction of these resources, but requires that each case be considered *sui generis*. (Yiğit, 2012: 84).

Several studies utilizing this categorization were conducted. Alistair Cole based his studies on French President François Mitterrand (1916-1996) on the categorization of external and internal resources (1994a, 1994b). Another similar analysis was pursued by John Gaffney in his *Political Leadership in France* (2010). In this study Gaffney looks into the leadership practices during the Fifth Republic (1958 onwards) and discusses how personal leadership resources of French presidents interact with the French political context starting with Charles de Gaulle, president in 1958-1969 and ending with Nicolas Sarkozy, president in

2007-2012. Mariana Llanos and Ana Margheritis explore the Argentinean leadership from the perspective of such a divide for Fernando de la Rúa, president between 1998-2001 (Llanos and Margheritis, 2006: 98). In his book *Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies* Robert Elgie (1995) discusses the leadership patterns for liberal democracies, including France, Britain, Germany, Japan and the United States, and introduces an analysis of internal and external resources of leadership.

This perspective of internal and external resources of leadership is also valuable for the study of Turkish politics mainly because Turkish politics is often leader/leadership oriented. There has always been a tradition of powerful leaders in Turkey. Although the 1924 Turkish Constitution was very much concerned with limiting the powers of individuals, powerful leaders such as President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923-1938) and President İsmet İnönü (1938-1950) emerged during the first few decades of the Republic. This tradition of powerful leaders continued later on.

Turkish leaders have been enjoying extensive formal and informal power in their executive leadership positions. Most important policy decisions tend to be taken by leaders on their own with a few favorite ministers being included (Özbudun, 1996: 136). The terms of Adnan Menderes as Prime Minister (1950-1960), Turgut Özal as Prime Minister (1983-1989) and President (1989-1991), and Tansu Çiller as Prime Minister (1993-1995) are examples of powerful leadership pattern (Özbudun, 1996: 136).

Turkish political party structures also enhance powerful leadership. Leaders typically have absolute control over their party organizations. They

control the nominations of candidates for elections and have the power to abolish local party units that oppose party headquarters. A high level party discipline is coupled with a lack of intraparty democracy, which in turn makes the decision-making process in political parties further personalized (Cizre, 1997: 145).

Despite their significance, Turkish leaders and Turkish leadership patterns have not drawn much attention of political scientists. An exception is the Metin Heper-Sabri Sayarı edited volume *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey* (2002).³ Although this volume is not based on the categorization introduced above, it does offer a systematic analysis of a number of Turkish political leaders. Nevertheless, considering their importance to Turkish politics, Turkish leaders should be studied more comprehensively. The dissertation at hand is a step in addressing this deficiency from the perspective of one specific political leader in Turkey.

1.3 Literature Review

Celal Bayar has been a topic of several scholarly and popular studies but as mentioned earlier, a study that takes into account the external and internal resources of his leadership on a broad scale to cover his executive leadership positions have not so far been undertaken. This is not necessarily a fault of the studies that are mentioned below. The studies in question focused either on

³ Here the following unpublished PhD dissertations should also be alluded to: Ozan Örmeci's "Portrait of a Turkish Social Democrat: Ismail Cem" (2011), Güliz Sütçü's "Democratic Party and Democracy in Turkey: With Special Reference to Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes" (2011), Zeynep Çağlayan İçener's "Presidents, the State and Democracy in Turkey: The Ideas and Praxis of Süleyman Demirel" (2010), (Bilkent University, Political Science Department). Although these studies are not necessarily written with a leadership perspective, they provide extensive information on the leaders that are taken up.

internal resources, for instance on personal characteristics without considering the external resources such as political context and institutions or took the opposite approach and presented Bayar as an outcome of the political context, without taking into account his personal leadership resources. Those fail to provide a comprehensive account of Bayar's leadership from the leadership perspective.

The following studies are among those, which focus mainly on Bayar's internal resources of leadership: İsmet Bozdağ's *Zaferlerle ve Şereflerle Dolu Bir Hayat: Celal Bayar* (A Lifetime of Victories and Honorable Deeds: Celal Bayar) (1986) and *Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle Celal Bayar: Türk Milletine Vasiyet* (Celal Bayar and His Unknown Aspects: Will to the Turkish Nation) (2005), Cemal Kutay's *Bayar'ın Yazmadığı, Yazamadığı Üç Devirden Hakikatler* (Facts from the Three Decades that Bayar Could Not and Did Not Write About) (1982) and *Celal Bayar: Bir Türk'ün Biyografisi* (Celal Bayar: The Biography of a Turk) (1950). Bayar himself contributed to these studies by granting interviews. Both Bozdağ and Kutay give detailed accounts of Bayar's political experiences and they overemphasize, often positively, internal resources of Bayar's leadership, such as his patriotism or determination.

Erkan Şenşekerci's study *Türk Devriminde Celal Bayar: 1918-1960* (Celal Bayar and the Turkish Revolution: 1918-1960) (2000) explores Bayar's role in the critical turning points of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic in 1918-1960, a period that the author refers to as the Turkish Revolution. Written mainly from an historical perspective with an emphasis on mostly internal resources for Bayar's leadership, institutional structures and political culture are often neglected in this otherwise engaging study.

Cihad Baban's *Politika Galerisi: Büstler ve Portreler* (Gallery of Politics: Busts and Portraits) (1970) is a collection of the author's observations about a number of political figures with whom he worked. Baban (1911-1984), a prominent journalist and a deputy in Parliament from the DP slate in 1946-1956, allocated a chapter of this volume to Bayar where he shares insights to Bayar's internal leadership resources. Şafak Altun's *Atatürk, İnönü, Bayar'ın İktisat Kavgası* (The Economy Dispute between Atatürk, İnönü and Bayar) and İsmet Bozdağ's *Siyasal Kıyamet, Bitmeyen Devlet Kavgası: Atatürk-İnönü, İnönü-Bayar* (Political Apocalypse, Never-Ending State Dispute: Atatürk-İnönü, İnönü-Bayar) (2007) are accounts of the political disputes between the leaders mentioned. Although the relations between executive office holders are a part of external resources of leadership, not enough attention is paid in these studies to the institutional aspects of the relationships among the mentioned leaders. The disputes are analyzed through a discussion of differences among these leader's internal resources, such as the differences in their understanding of the economy. In her article "Civic Nationalism in Turkey: A Study on the Political Profile of Celal Bayar" (2007) Şule Toktaş discusses Bayar's interpretation of Turkish nationalism based on primary resources but ends up neglecting the background of the issues Bayar commented upon.

The following resources should be mentioned among those that focus mainly on external impacts on Bayar's leadership. Nurşen Mazıcı's *Celal Bayar Başbakanlık Dönemi: 1937-1939* (Celal Bayar's Prime Ministry: 1937-1939) (1996) is a comprehensive analysis of Bayar's eighteen months as prime minister. In this study Mazıcı gives a comprehensive account of the institutional

perspective of Bayar's leadership in 1937-1930. The scope in this book does not extend beyond Bayar's prime ministry.

Rifat Bali's article "Azınlıkların Demokrat Parti Sevdası: Celal Bayar'ın Amerika Ziyareti" (Minorities' Crush on the Democrat Party: Celal Bayar's Visit to the United States) (2004) is an account of Bayar's long visit to the United States in 1954 which lasted one and a half months and the warm welcome he received from the American citizens previously living in Ottoman or Turkish lands. This piece also fails to provide any comprehensive analysis for motivations behind Bayar's visit and mainly focuses on how well he was received by these communities.

George Harris's chapter "Celal Bayar: Conspiratorial Democrat" (2002) in *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey* volume should be mentioned as an exception in this literature review. In this article a considerable attempt is made to provide a discussion of external and internal resources of Bayar's leadership. However, being an article, this piece has a narrower scope and although certain internal and external resources are referred to throughout the discussion, they are not categorized as internal or external resources of leadership and thus this article does not make use of political science literature on leadership. Harris is a scholar of history and it would be unfair to expect him contribute to the field of political science.

1.4 Resources and Methodology

In this study the interactive method, shortly introduced above, is employed in order to identify the external and internal resources of Bayar's leadership and assess the weight of these resources. The interactive methodology obliges each study to come up with its own categories of external and internal resources as it does not provide a set of fixed categories for the study of leaders. General conclusions without reference to case studies are considered artificial (Cole, 1994a: 466) because each case study is likely to bear its own categories of external and internal resources.

The interactive method also does not give out any guidelines on how to establish whether external or internal resources have been more influential on the leader under focus. Each study undertaken with this methodology has to develop its own framework on this question as well. For instance, Elgie concludes that for the liberal democratic systems he studied (1995), political context, i.e. an external resource, seems to be more influential in the exercise of leadership than the internal resources of leaders. Nevertheless, he still highlights the importance of leaders themselves, and arrives at the conclusion that leaders do make a difference. Gaffney, in his analysis of French presidents since 1958, indicates that the fifth Republic paved the way for a strong presidency. The political context drew the limits for the exercise of leadership; however according to him, personal resources and political skills of the leaders have been central to the direction and form of the Republic since 1958 (Gaffney, 2010: 206). For instance in his study of François Mitterrand, Cole arrives at the conclusion that Mitterrand's personal charisma and skills shaped his presidency, but even then it is arguable to what extent Mitterrand shaped the political circumstances - he owed a considerable

share of his success to developments beyond his control such as the economic and the international restraints that called for innovative leadership solutions (Cole, 1994a: 467). For the Argentinean case, the authors suggest that the political context determined by the presidential system calls for a strong leadership trait which in turn emphasizes the importance of personal resources (Llanos and Margheritis, 2006: 97-98). Although internal resources are more prominent in their discussion, the importance of the political context is also acknowledged. In the current dissertation, an original framework of external and internal resources for the study of Bayar's leadership will be introduced and the discussion on the weight of these resources will depend on this framework.

Throughout this dissertation, primary and secondary resources will be used for the analysis of Bayar's leadership. Primary resources include the volumes Bayar himself wrote on a number of issues ranging from his relationship with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to his admiration for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his involvement in the Turkish War of Independence. Bayar's speeches, delivered on several different occasions, such as election campaigns, were professionally compiled and these will also be used as primary resources in this dissertation. The parliamentary proceedings in 1937-1960 are also among the primary resources that were surveyed. Primary sources provide an important contribution especially for the analysis of Bayar's internal leadership resources. Nevertheless, they may also include valuable insights into certain external resources.

Secondary resources used for this dissertation come in a number of categories. The first category is the press. Newspapers, monthly and weekly magazines listed in detail at the end of this dissertation have been surveyed for the years 1937-1960 in the archives of the Istanbul-based History Foundation of

Turkey (*Türk Tarih Vakfı*) and of the Ankara-based National Library (*Milli Kütüphane*). Also, a complementary research has been conducted on the website of the Ankara-based Directorate General of Press and Information (*Basın Yayın Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü*). This institution has been compiling news printed in the main newspapers monthly since 1920 and opened its resources to public on its website.

The second category consists of memoirs that refer to Bayar extensively and are written by certain important figures of the period under study. The following books are among the memoirs consulted for this dissertation: Samet Ağaoğlu's *Demokrat Parti'nin Doğuş ve Yükseliş Sebepleri: Bir Soru* (The Reasons for the Birth and the Rise of the Democrat Party: A Question) (1972), *Marmara'da Bir Ada* (An Island in the Marmara Sea) (2011) and *Arkadaşım Menderes* (My Friend Menderes) (2011). The author was a member of the DP governments and a close associate of Celal Bayar. Rıfki Salim Burçak and Tekin Erer are two other prominent DP affiliates who shared their observations on the DP and Bayar in their memoirs. Burçak (1913-1998) was a member of Parliament from Erzurum, minister for customs in 1951 and minister for education from 1953 to 1954. He wrote his memoirs in the following volumes: *On Yılın Anıları: 1950-1960* (Memoirs of A Decade: 1950-1960) (1998), *İdamların İçyüzü: Adnan Menderes, Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, Hasan Polatkan* (An Insight to the Executions: Adnan Menderes, Fatih Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan) (1997) and *Yassıada ve Öncesi* (Yassıada and Earlier Years) (1976). Tekin Erer (1921-1997), a journalist close to the DP and a member of Parliament from the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi-AP*) between 1965-1973 also shared his memoirs in the following volumes: *10 Yılın Mücadelesi* (A Decade-Long Strives) (1964) and *Yassıada ve*

Sonrası (Yassıada and its Aftermath) (1965). Haldun Derin's *Çankaya Özel Kalemimi Anımsarken: 1933-1951* (Remembering the Private Secretariat of President at Çankaya: 1933-1951) (1995) is another example. Derin spent the years from 1933 to 1951 first with İnönü and then with Bayar as presidents. Although most of the anecdotes are from the years Derin worked for President İnönü, he also shared his observations about Bayar. Metin Toker's volumes *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşalı Yılları* (Our Democracy during İsmet Pasha Times), especially volumes from one to five (consecutively 1998, 1991, 1991, 1992, 1998) that explore the years 1944-1961 are among resources based on memoirs. İsmet İnönü's collected memoirs *Defterler: 1919-1973* (Notebooks: 1919-1973) (2008) is another important resource for this dissertation as İnönü mentions certain circumstances where Bayar and İnönü faced each other as political rivals. Turhan Dilligil's *Bayar-İnönü Yakınlaşması* (The Rapprochement between Bayar and İnönü) (1969) is an account of the reconciliation between Bayar and İnönü brought about by the author (1920-1997) who was a journalist close to the DP and a member of the Parliament from the AP in 1965-1969.

Memoirs provide useful insights both for Bayar's internal and to some extent external leadership resources. Yet here it should also be acknowledged that memoirs may often be biased in favor of or against Bayar. To avoid any mistakes that can result from using memoirs without caution, a critical selection is pursued: relying on the judgmental or excessively favorable parts of the memoirs on Bayar as the main resource for information is avoided.

Third, a number of interviews were conducted with certain acquaintances of Bayar who worked with him or were close to him through family ties. Mehmet Arif Demirer, an author of several books on the DP and the son of Minister of

Transportation Arif Demirer (1955-1957), Üner Kırdar, a Turkish career diplomat and the son of Lütfü Kırdar, Minister of Health (1957-1960), Tülay Duran, a historian and Celal Bayar's assistant and Demirtaş Bayar, Celal Bayar's grandson were interviewed. Another close acquaintance of Bayar who prefers to remain anonymous was also interviewed. These interviews have been useful especially for their contribution to the analysis of Bayar's internal leadership resources.

Fourth, the political science literature on the DP period was extensively used, mainly for the analysis of the external resources in 1937-1960. The following should be mentioned among many such resources: Mustafa Albayrak's *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti: 1946-1960* (The Democrat Party in Turkish Political History) (2004) is an extensive study of the DP from its establishment to its downfall. Cem Eroğul's *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* (The Democrat Party: Its History and Ideology) (1970) is an attempt to study the ideological background of the DP. İlkey Sunay's article "Populism and Patronage: The Democrat Party and Its Legacy in Turkey" (2004) is an analysis of the DP populism which the author considers having started a new pattern of populism in Turkey. Feroz Ahmad's *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975* (1977), Kemal Karpat's *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi: Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller* (Turkish History of Democracy: Social, Economic and Cultural Foundations) (2007), Cemil Koçak's "Siyasal Tarih (1923-1950)" (Political History 1923-1950) and Mete Tunçay's "Siyasal Tarih (1950-1960)" (Political History 1950-1960) chapters in *Türkiye Tarihi 4: Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980* (History of Turkey: Modern Turkey 1908-1980) edited by Sina Akşin (1990) and Mehmet Ali Birand, Bülent Çaplı and Can Dündar's *Demirkırat: Bir*

Demokrasinin Dođuşu (The Iron Horse: Birth of a Democracy) (2006) were also consulted.

Fifth, certain resources mentioned above in the literature review will also be used. In that respect studies by Bozdađ and Kutay should be repeated here. Neither of these authors are scholars and their writings on Bayar are often biased in favor of him. Nevertheless both authors had frequent access to Bayar and they were able to interview him for their studies several times. Thus, Bozdađ's and Kutay's books will also be used throughout this dissertation. However these books will be relied upon only for biographical details about Bayar's life and Bayar's own statements that come out throughout the text.

1.5 Organization of the Study

This study comprises of six chapters including this Introduction. In the second chapter, first the interactive approach employed throughout this dissertation is detailed. Second, an account of the political context in 1923-1960 from the perspective of certain issues such as the nature of the political regime, the role of the armed forces in political affairs, international affairs and the economic background is provided. In this dissertation these are referred to as non-institutional resources of Bayar's leadership.

The timeframe for this analysis in Chapter II is the period from 1923 to 1960. Although Bayar did not take any executive leadership position in 1939-1950, this period is also included in the political context analysis because political history had an important impact on the formation of the political context that

Bayar operated in during 1950-1960. Besides, it would be unreliable to provide two separate analyses of the political context in 1937-1939 and 1950-1960 and ignore the interim phase, because political issues have a great deal of continuity. Matters taken up in this chapter do not constitute a comprehensive account of that period, neither are they confined to the political circumstances that Bayar had been a part of. These topics were preferred because they are the major political issues that dominated the years from 1937 to 1960.

In Chapter III, Bayar's personal leadership resources will be taken up. This will be done first with regard to his life experience, earned through certain key moments that he himself defined as crucial. These moments were influential on the way that his politics evolved later. For instance, his experience as a young banker had an impact on his later role as one of the macro-economic planners. Likewise the ITC experience endowed him with a specific understanding of politics and the Turkish War of Independence further contributed to establish him as a Turkish nationalist. Second, Bayar's understanding of certain major political concepts, such as democracy and nationalism will be clarified in this chapter.

In Chapter IV and V, the institutional dimension of Bayar's leadership will be examined. In Chapter IV, Bayar's role as prime minister in 1937-1939 will be taken up. For this purpose, first the background for the prime minister will be explored. The prime minister's powers and authority according to the 1924 Constitution will be taken up and a short assessment of the office of prime minister until Bayar's term will be provided. Second, in this chapter it will be shown how Bayar perceived his position in 1937-1939. In order to conduct this analysis, Bayar's acts as prime minister and his role in the political circumstances

will be discussed. Among other matters, Bayar's relations with the President of the Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk will also be examined in this chapter.

In Chapter V, Bayar's presidency in 1950-1960 will be taken up. Similar to the categorization in the Chapter IV, first the authority and powers of the president under the 1924 Constitution will be explored and an assessment of the president's position since the establishment of the Republic will be presented. Second, Bayar's perception of this office in 1950-1960 will be outlined through an analysis of his actions as president. Matters such as his role in the repression of the opposition, restriction of the freedom of the press, ascending political tension and foreign policy will be explored. His relations with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and the head of the main opposition party İsmet İnönü will also be considered in this chapter.

In the concluding chapter, first the primary findings of the previous chapters will be summarized and evaluated. Second, the extent to which external as opposed to internal resources influenced Bayar's leadership will be analyzed. Third, the question what kind of a leader profile Bayar provides will be put into context and an answer will be provided. Fourth, the interactive approach will be reconsidered according to the findings of this dissertation on Bayar's leadership. Last, follow-up questions for further studies will be introduced.

CHAPTER II

THE INTERACTIVE APPROACH IN THE STUDY OF LEADERSHIP AND THE NON-INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES OF LEADERSHIP IN 1923-1960

2.1. Interactive Approach in the Study of Leadership

This study is concerned with executive political leadership (here onwards leadership) in the Turkish context; which according to the constitutions of 1924, 1961 and 1982 consists of the president and the government. Executive leadership is only one form of political leadership as all political leaders are not necessarily executive office holders (Helms, 2005: 3). Adopting this definition in the current study is useful firstly because it does not indulge in the extensive discussions of what political leadership is.⁴ Secondly, the study of executive political leadership is not necessarily confined to “democratic forms of leadership” or “leadership in democratic regimes” (Helms, 2005: 3). This

⁴ Elgie mentions “thousands of competing definitions of leadership” (Elgie, 1995:2). Various definitions have been grouped under nine categories and some of these categories overlap and repeat each other (Blondel, 1987:2). In another resource, 221 definitions are mentioned (Bass, 2008: 15).

is an important perspective for this dissertation, as Celal Bayar had been an executive leader during the single party period, which can hardly be categorized as democratic and his time in office as prime minister is included in this study.

Under the academic discipline of political science, individual leaders are often studied with regard to the resources of political leadership. Resources of leadership have been categorized under two titles: external and internal. This is an essential categorization because leaders act against the backgrounds set by the political environment, i.e. the historical context and existing institutions (Hargrove, 2004: 580; Llanos and Margheritis, 2006: 86).

External and internal resources of leadership are not static or predetermined (Elgie, 1995: 8; Helms, 2005: 20). Leaders change their political environment and they themselves change due to their interaction with the political environment. Thus although external factors may constrain the leaders in many ways and partially determine the political issues to be addressed by them, leaders are not hostages to their environment (Helms, 2005: 20).

This perspective, which takes into account external and internal resources of leadership is referred to as the interactive approach (Elgie, 1995: 8; Helms, 2005: 19-20). Although executive leadership positions and political institutions are different in presidential and parliamentary

systems, this approach has been embraced by scholars who work on either of these different political systems.⁵

The current dissertation also depends on the external and internal resources of leadership categorization for the study of Celal Bayar's leadership. The proper definitions of internal and external resources on the exercise of leadership change according to the leader, the country and the period studied. None of the contemporary scholars working on the questions of leadership have attempted to provide a universal scheme of external and internal resources that can be applied to the study of leaders. It has been noted that "it would be artificial to discriminate in an abstract manner between personal characteristics, positional context and environmental constraints without reference to specific cases" (Cole, 1994a: 467). Each leadership study that uses the interactive method has to identify the external and internal resources that have an impact on the leader under focus.

Thus, this study also does not depend on a predetermined categorization of internal and external resources. However, below, a framework to study Bayar's leadership from the perspective of the interactive approach is introduced. This methodological approach is applied throughout the dissertation. This framework is inspired by previous studies on several leaders and the theoretical contributions of scholars. These contributions have been selectively incorporated taking into account Turkey's political context in 1937-1960, as well as Celal

⁵ For the employment of this approach in parliamentary systems see Cole, 1994a; Cole, 1994b and Gaffney, 2003. For the presidential interpretation, see Barber, 2008 and Llano and Margheritis, 2006.

Bayar's leadership. This framework should not be interpreted as an ideal guide to study other Turkish leaders.

2.1.1 External Resources

The external resources of leadership have been conceptualized in a number of different ways. For instance, the concept of structure has been employed to refer to the factors, which do not derive from leaders themselves.⁶ However, the term structure has been found limiting as it fails to include the non-institutional aspects of external resources. Thus, other conceptualizations such as leadership environment (Elgie, 1995: 191), context (Hargrove, 1994: 583), environment (Blondel, 1987: 25) and environmental constraints (Moskop, 1996: 622; Cole, 1994a: 467-468) were developed to expand the scope of the factors that are studied as part of the external resources of leadership. Here, in order to provide a clear expression for many different categories introduced to the study of Bayar's leadership, the umbrella conceptualization of external resources was preferred.

The external resources that are influential in the exercise of leadership can be broadly defined as the wider "historical context, including ideas, politics and social currents within which leaders operate and within which they are subsumed" (Hargrove, 2004: 622). This formulation, embodies both institutional aspects of leadership such as the nature of the executive offices as dictated by the constitution, and non-

⁶ For instance see Jones, 1989: 4.

institutional aspects such as political culture and political context shaped by contemporary challenges faced by leaders.

External resources are important for leaders in a few different ways. Firstly, they often determine the limits of the leader's agenda and political goals. For instance, the different combination of external resources in Egypt and Germany present dramatically different agendas for executive leaders in these countries respectively. While the German leaders, in 2012, are occupied with the European Union's fiscal crisis or further development of a green economy in their country, Egyptian leaders are faced with the difficulties of institution-building. Thus, Egyptian leaders are less likely, at this moment, to work on developing green development schemes whereas German leaders are not concerned with the installment of basic democratic institutions.

Secondly, external resources limit a leader's activities and legally frame the scope for their activities. Thus the most powerful leaders will be likely to be found in political systems where the laws give them the most powers. However, this observation only applies to the contexts where the political regime is regulated through laws and the rule of law is respected.

A discussion of the external resources of leadership is vital for the analyses of leaders. However studies that overemphasize these resources underestimate the leaders' impact on the political environment (Imbroscio, 1999: 47) and fail to analyze the constraints on the political context (Cole, 1994a:466). In this study, this one-dimensional focus was

avoided by including a chapter on the internal resources of Bayar's leadership during 1937-1960. On the other hand, the impact of external resources was acknowledged and an extensive analysis of these factors was included for the period from 1923 to 1960. Below the channels through which external resources of leadership are operationalized are described.

2.1.1.1 The Institutional Aspect of the External Leadership Resources

As far as this dissertation is concerned, it is the institutions that may transform individuals into leaders. Thus, they are given a great deal of attention in this study. Institutions define the "rules of the political game" for leaders in office (Elgie, 1995:204). The characteristics of the institutions studied depend largely on the political systems under focus. Different political systems provide similar executive positions with different powers and responsibilities. Yet in leadership studies irrespective of different characteristics of political systems and regimes, the institutional dimension is often taken up in a study of following categories.

2.1.1.1.1 Characteristics of the Executive Position

The most significant questions in the study of executive leadership in institutional terms are, firstly, the ones related to the constitutional and technical characteristics of the office in question as opposed to the practice. Simply put, the greater the power given to an

executive office, the more effective the leader holding this office will be while implementing his/her policies (Elgie, 1995:15). However, it should again be highlighted that this observation applies to the political regimes and systems where the rule of law is observed.

Secondly, the system of election, whether the leader is for example elected through universal suffrage or indirectly by the parliament, affects the leader's activities in practice and power because the method also determines whom the leader will be dependent on for his/her re-election (Elgie, 1995: 15).

Thirdly, the tenure of the leader should be brought up as a part of institutional analyses. There are often restrictions on the re-election of the head of state in contemporary political systems (Blondel, 1987: 159). For instance, due to the constitutional arrangements, the French and American presidents cannot be elected for more than two consecutive terms. The fixed tenure has an impact on the leader's activities in office as it may encourage leaders to focus on short and medium term political goals instead of investing in long-term agendas, which will deliver results in a longer time frame (Blondel, 1987: 162). The prime ministers in parliamentary systems, on the other hand, might be re-elected as often as their electoral success permits them except for the cases when political parties impose restrictions on themselves.

2.1.1.1.2 The Leader's Relations with Other Executive Leaders and the Legislative Body

The interactive approach places emphasis on the constitutional arrangements that regulate relations between different executive offices. As the relationship already takes place in a constitutional setting and is thus defined by law this depends on how the constitution defines the hierarchy between these executive offices such as prime ministry and presidency. In certain regimes, the potential for tension between the prime minister and the president is built into the political structure. For instance in France, in cases of cohabitation, where the president and the prime minister are from different political parties, the initiative passes to the prime minister in most policy issues. Under those circumstances the president takes the role of an arbitrator of political conflict (Cole, 1994a: 460).

Executive's relations with the legislative should also be taken into consideration in this respect. The degree of an executive leader's control over the parliament and the parliament's influence on the executive depends on a combination of factors ranging from the characteristics of political parties, constitutional regulations and political culture (Elgie, 1995: 14). Political parties often provide one of the more significant resources of a leader's powers (Elgie, 1995:19).

In cases where the leader is also the head of the party, s/he is likely to hold more power than leaders who are not party leaders. Leaders who have a strong hold over their parties and over their parties' parliamentary group have a higher amount of influence. Under such conditions, prime

ministers can focus on implementing their own policy agendas rather than addressing challenges to their leadership deriving from the party

In other cases, there may be more room for tension within the party group and the prime minister might have to engage in a continuous negotiation with his/her party in order to stay in power (Elgie, 1995: 14). For instance, after its 1950 electoral victory, the Democrat Party's first few years in the government were marked by intra-party conflicts. The DP Parliamentary Group remained a strong political influence until the second half of the 1950s. In other words, it took some time for Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to establish his control over the party and concentrate more fully on governmental issues. A leader's relations with his/her political party and the support s/he gets from the political party are thus, important (Helms, 2005: 21).

2.1.1.1.3 Relations with the Non-executive Branches of the State

Relations between the non-executive branches of the state and the executive leaders also influence the leader's agenda and capacities in different ways. For instance, higher courts have influence over executive leadership in varying degrees. While the existence of strong higher courts place constraints on the exercise of political leadership, their non-existence or weakness provides leaders with more room and less boundaries (Elgie, 1995: 17). The latter was the case in Turkey until the introduction of the Constitutional Court in 1961. Since its foundation, the

Court closed down several political parties and banned their leaders from participating in active politics for certain periods of time.⁷

In certain other political systems, high courts limit the leaders' activities in less dramatic ways. For example, in the United States the Supreme Court often uses its power to say the last word on issues upon which the Congress and the President disagree (Elgie, 1995: 128) and this essentially determines the leader's powers and capabilities concerning those issues (Elgie, 1995: 130).

2.1.1.2 Non-institutional Aspects of External Resources of Leadership

2.1.1.2.1 The Historical Context

The historical experiences of a nation affect the leader's agenda, priorities and goals. Firstly, democracies that have experienced authoritarian regimes in the proximate past are more likely to place formal limits on the exercise of executive leadership (Elgie, 1995:21). Likewise, regimes that replace monarchies tend to place more emphasis on limiting the powers of executive office holders. For instance in the Turkish case most of the discussions that took place in the Parliament on the draft of the 1924 Constitution concerned powers of the president. The memories of the Ottoman monarchy affected the formulation of the 1924 Constitution and the concentration of power in the office of the president was avoided in the text (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 13).

⁷ These restrictions on leaders and parties were loosened with the 2011 Constitutional changes and the grip of the Court on leaders is less these days.

In democracies that have recently suffered from unstable governments, political leaders may benefit from reforms that have been pursued to decrease such instability (Elgie, 1995: 21). For instance, the 1958 French Constitution facilitated strong leadership (Baumgartner, 1989: 124) and limited the powers of the legislative body, i.e. the Parliament, in order to avoid instabilities caused by a strong legislature. Likewise, the 1982 Turkish Constitution strengthened the position of the president and transformed this post from a ceremonial to an active position by granting the president important political and appointment functions.

Secondly, the effects of historical experiences are not necessarily only manifested through institutional and constitutional regulations. In some cases, the practices and political traditions of former regimes leave a strong mark on the leaders who continue politics under new arrangements. If the previous system had been based on authoritarian ruling practices, leaders might have a tendency to continue using the political methods they are familiar with from their earlier political experiences.

2.1.1.2.2 International Context and Economic Background

The two other non-institutional components of external resources of leadership are the international context and the economic background. The impact of the international context on leaders was often stressed in

theoretical debates and case studies.⁸ The international context consists of a combination of factors, such as the country's geopolitical position, major issues of conflict or dispute in the foreign policy agenda and membership in international institutions.

The international context's impact on leadership mainly derives from the fact that it identifies an important part of the challenges that the leader faces or is likely to face during his/her term of office. For example, the presidents of the Swiss Federal Council are not very likely to undertake major foreign policy operations (Blondel 1987: 29). The international context does not only pose challenges. It presents opportunities to the leaders to display their leadership skills and divert public attention from failures in the domestic realm to their achievements in the international arena. Such achievements contribute to the creation of national unity and pride (Blondel, 1987: 196). In certain international crisis contexts, leaders might even be able to push forward certain policy goals, which would not be welcomed in normal times (Blondel, 1987: 30). In such instances, the international environment enhances the leader's capacity to realize his/her own agenda. For instance, Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990, gained considerable popularity after the Falkland War in 1983 (Blondel, 1987: 77).

Similar to the international context, economics also predetermines an important part of a leader's agenda and activities (Elgie, 1995: 8, 16; Jones, 1989: 3). For instance, the executive leaders of a developing

⁸ For example, see Blondel 1987: 100 and Cole, 1994a: 468.

country suffering from fiscal failure are not likely to carry out major industrial investment schemes in their country (Blondel 1987: 29-30). Likewise, if there is a fiscal crisis in the economy, leaders will be likely to address this issue and may have to undertake dramatic austerity measures, which will often decrease their popularity in elections. In such cases leaders are disempowered by the economic context (Elgie, 1995: 23). In other words the economic background affects the leader's agenda and his/her chances to be re-elected.

2.1.2 Internal Resources

Defining elements of the internal resources of leadership is easier than defining the external resources. However, the study of internal resources of leadership is much more challenging than study of external resources. This difficulty stems from the complexity of these internal resources and the lack of political science's methodological tools that can be employed in such inquiries.

The internal resources that are referred to in this study are a combination of political worldview and experience in politics (McDermott, 2004: 227; Llanos and Margheritis, 2006: 85). In specific, this approach first refers to the study of a leader's understanding of basic political concepts. The study of these basic concepts makes it possible to identify traits that the leader consistently displays in his/her acts over the years. Changes in a leader's political worldview should also be taken into account in these analyses.

Second, the study of the leader's internal resources also includes a discussion of leader's goals. Some leaders are more ambitious in their agenda and goals in comparison to other leaders (Elgie, 1995: 10). Similar to the leader's interpretation of major political concepts, the leader's goals also are not static and they change over time (Blondel, 1987: 82). Thus, the (in) consistency of goals over time may also be observed within the scope of the internal resources of leadership. Third, a leader's political activities and involvement in political matters at earlier phases of his/her life also matter as these formative years have a major impact on a leader's understanding of politics (Helms, 2005: 21).

Importance of personality for leadership studies was also noted.⁹ However, studies that focus on personality are often taken up in the field of political psychology. Political science does not have the tools and methods to thoroughly discuss personality and the impact of personality on the leader's actions (Blondel, 1987: 147). Thus questions of personality are not brought up within the scope of this study. However, the portrait of Celal Bayar provided here will certainly give the reader a background from which to consider Bayar's personality.

Studies that are only concerned with the internal resources of leadership, such as personality, a leader's life story, experiences and his/her interpretation of major political concepts are criticized for ignoring the role of the political context (Seligman, 1950: 912). In contrast, this study aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the

⁹ See Greenstein, 1992.

external and internal resources that affected the leadership of Celal Bayar.

2.2 Non-Institutional External Resources in 1923-1960

In this section, the non-institutional external resources of Celal Bayar's leadership are taken up through the study of a number of sub-categories. These sub-categories are non-institutional in the sense that they do not refer to executive leadership positions and the powers that these positions give to leaders and, in this case to Bayar. Non-institutional external resources of Bayar's leadership from 1923 to 1960 are interpreted with regard to the nature of the political regime, international affairs, economic background and the role of the armed forces in political affairs. Institutional external resources are covered in the next chapters of this study.

A study of the categories introduced here does not necessarily cover all the political dynamics of Turkey at that time. Nor are the political, historical and intellectual development of these categories taken up at length. Lastly, Bayar's role in these categories is not evaluated in this section. Such evaluation is raised elsewhere in this study. These categories are brought up in order to present the political and historical background of Bayar's leadership. A focus on these matters gives the reader the possibility to consider the external resources of Bayar's political leadership.

The specific focus on the phase 1923-1960 should also be justified. Analysis of Bayar's executive positions in this study starts from 1937 onwards. However, as the preceding section on the methodology of leadership studies should have made clear, the study of the external resources of political leadership is not limited to the study of the politics of the leadership phase itself. Historical background should also be brought up. Including the study of the relevant historical background is important for two reasons. First, it has a substantial impact on building the political context of the period under focus. Second, the historical background forms certain traditions and political behavior patterns that pass to the next generation of leaders. Thus, the historical background of certain issues, such as international relations, opposition in politics, the constitutional context and economic policies are included in the narration below.

2.2.1. The Political Regime According to the Constitution

Although constitutions are not the only legal documents that work for this purpose, they, in part, define the basic characteristics of political regimes. They identify the distribution of political power and form the legal and normative framework for political structures (Bilgin, 2007: 123). Turkish constitutions are no exception to this observation. This section presents the regime under the 1924 Turkish Constitution. For a discussion of the political regime according to the constitution, two categories are introduced: (1) political power, checks and balances and (2) the six principles of Kemalism.

2.2.1.1. Political Power and Checks and Balances

After the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, a new constitution was drafted, debated and legislated in 1924 to replace the 1921 Constitution. The main characteristic of the 1924 Constitution was its emphasis on national sovereignty. This principle was initially introduced in the 1921 Constitution and it formed an integral part of the Turkish political regime later on (Ahmad, 2008: 135). In the 1924 Constitution the priority of national sovereignty was expressed through an emphasis placed on the legislative. Parliament was described as the supreme state organ (Özbudun, 2000: 52-53; Karpat, 1967: 123-124; Dodd, 1992: 20).

Yet, due to the impact of strong executive leaders and single party discipline, the parliament's supremacy merely remained on paper as it was instead the executive body that dominated politics during the single party period (1925-1946) (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 11). As the executive became the main state authority in practice, consequently the Parliament's powers were rendered insignificant during the single party phase (Karpat, 1973: 59-60). Due to this arrangement, the CHP could, for instance, control the nominations of candidates to the Parliament, whose "supreme powers came to be exercised by the party leadership and the executive" (Özbudun, 2000: 52-53).

The 1924 Constitution maintained a democratic spirit but in effect it represented a majoritarian interpretation of democracy which lacked a system of checks and balances (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 13; Tanör, 2011: 328; Karpat, 1967: 123-124). This majoritarian understanding was

manifested through the lack of guarantees for the basic rights and freedoms of citizens, the unavailability of channels to provide judiciary review of the constitutionality of laws and the independence of the judiciary (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 11; Dodd, 1992: 20).

In line with this majoritarian tone, the 1924 Constitution did not provide channels for the representation of groups and ideologies that were not in power. This state of affairs did not pose any major problems for the political regime during the single party years. It was, after all, a single party regime mostly controlled by the charismatic leader Atatürk and the lack of checks and balances was not really problematized by the political actors of the time on a major scale.

This state of affairs changed with the transition to multiparty politics. The transition to multiparty politics was not accompanied by major structural changes in the system. For instance, the 1924 Constitution was not changed or amended. It was thought that there was no technical need to amend the Constitution as the notions of political parties or a single party regime were not explicit in the text (Karpat, 1967: 384; Koçak, 1990: 96-97).

The only official changes were the ones introduced in the election, press and association codes (Özbudun, 2000: 53). In 1947, there were also some minor and insufficient amendments to the internal regulations of the Parliament (*içtüzük*) to provide ground for the inclusion of different political parties to the Parliamentary organs. However these changes were not enough for the well-functioning of a multiparty system. The unavailability

of the notion of political parties in the key legal documents, combined with the lack of mechanisms of checks and balances posed serious problems. The vague position of the 1924 Constitution on the questions of a multiparty regime in general gave a free hand to the prime ministers and the governments to act as it pleased them.

It can be said that the insufficiency of the legal framework left room for the authoritarian tendencies of the DP, the victorious party of 1950, 1954 and 1957 national elections to surface. Such tendencies were actualized especially after the first half of the 1950s. In the absence of the “judicial review of the constitutionality of laws”, the DP governments enacted a number of laws, which were restrictive of the opposition’s rights and in effect marginalized the opposition (Özbudun, 2000:53). This, in return, created frustration for opposition parties and caused several political confrontations between governments and opposition parties.¹⁰

2.2.1.2 Kemalism and the Six Principles of the Republic

The discussion of Kemalism includes two dimensions: the rhetoric, which was evident in the legal texts, including the CHP documents produced during Atatürk’s lifetime and the practice, which comprises the political acts done in the name of Kemalism during and after his lifetime.

¹⁰ During the decade, the CHP remained the main opposition party. The other major political parties that took seats in Parliament in 1950-1960 were the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*) (1955-1958), the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*) (1950-1953) and the Republican Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi*) (1954-1958).

The Kemalist policy practice did not always follow the rhetoric. For instance the Republic was constitutionally divorced from Islam when the article stating Islam as the religion of the country was removed from the Constitution in 1928 and when the principle of secularism was inserted to the Constitution in 1937. Yet in practice Turkish secularism did not refer to the state's withdrawal from affairs related to religion. The state undertook the task of regulating religious activity through its control of, for instance, "education of religious professionals and their assignment to mosques, the content of religious education and the wearing of religious symbols and clothing in public space" (White, 2008: 357).

However, this mismatch was not in all cases a sign of a contradiction between principles and actual policies. It derived from the flexible nature of Kemalism. Kemalism, in contrast to some of the rigid European ideologies of the 1930s, was a flexible way of thinking, open to different interpretations according to the needs of different times and circumstances (Findley, 2010: 258). Kemalism was not an ideology in the sense of being strictly defined. It was rather a worldview advising Turkish people on certain fundamental principles such as "how to think" (Heper, 2012). Thus, it was an approach to interpret political conditions rather than a universal recipe for solving political conflicts.

A discussion of both Kemalist political discourse and Kemalist practice exceeds the purposes of this section. For this reason, only the rhetorical aspect of Kemalism is examined here through a focus on its six central principles (republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, and

reformism). These principles are taken up under the constitution section because they were integrated into the constitution.

The principles, which were referred to as Kemalism as early as 1936, reveal the conceptual background of Kemalism as they became a source of reference for most of the programs developed by Atatürk and his successors (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 375; Ahmad, 2003: 63; Karpat, 1991: 52).¹¹ The six principles were launched in the 1931 CHP congress and they were integrated into the 1924 Constitution in 1937 all together and at once (Ahmad, 2003: 63). The public's reaction to these principles was diverse. Certain principles were discussed more and raised more controversy than the others. For instance nationalism and secularism raised more controversy in the society and/or among the policy-makers than republicanism or reformism. Below, these principles are briefly discussed.

Republicanism referred to the abolishment of the monarchy and the establishment of a republican regime. In practice, this change was expressed through the slogan "sovereignty belongs to the people" (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 375). The understanding of republicanism did not change over time and the Democrat Party did not interpret it differently. The republican nature of the regime rarely became a major topic of debate.

The same observation can also be made for populism (Ahmad, 2003: 63). During the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923), populism was defined as a search for governance "for the people by the people". Later it was thought that this expression could be used to justify a Bolshevik-style

¹¹ It should be noted that Atatürk himself did not use the term of Kemalism. It became widespread only after his death (Heper, 2012; Karpat, 1991: 52).

regime or the restoration of the monarchy and the caliphate as people might prefer these paths to a democratic system (Karpas, 1991: 55). Thus, populism was redefined as meaning a classless society, and equality before the law with a strong emphasis on national unity (Karpas, 1991: 55). In practice, populism meant that the parliament held legislative and executive functions and that universal suffrage was extended to all citizens above eighteen, including women in 1934. The DP did not challenge the principle of populism. The party's discourse on democracy, which emphasized the will of the nation, was already similar to the notion of populism.

Nationalism was, and to this day remains, among the more debated principles of Kemalism. In retrospect, Turkish nationalism can be interpreted on two levels: the international aspect and the domestic aspect. The international aspect of Turkish nationalism was initially about putting an end to foreign occupation, earning full independence, removing the capitulations and securing the borders with an internationally recognized treaty (Karpas, 1991: 53). These issues were addressed mostly in line with Turkey's preferences by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. From 1923 onwards, the international aspect of nationalism had been about Turkey's efforts to be a respected member of the international community and ensure equal treatment in the international arena with other respected nations (Köker, 2007: 153). This aspect of Turkish nationalism did not raise any considerable domestic debates and was widely shared by leading political actors.

The domestic aspect of Turkish nationalism was a different issue and the Turkish national identity became a matter of debate once the borders

were secured through the Treaty of Lausanne (Karpas, 1991: 53). The theme of the debate was to identify on which grounds Turks and Turkish citizenship would be defined. The 1924 Constitution defined all citizens of the Republic of Turkey as Turks regardless of their ethnic origins and religious beliefs. The constitutional description favored a civic rather than a cultural interpretation of nationalism. The main difference between civic and the cultural interpretations of nationalism lies in the fact that the latter notion underlines a subjective identity whereas the former emphasizes an identity of an objective nature. In the civic version of nationalism, declaring loyalty to a state is enough for being registered as a citizen of that state. In the cultural version, there are preconditions for citizenship such as sharing common values, ideals, faith and attitudes (Heper, 2007: 89).

In practice, Turkish nationalism also had the elements of cultural vision. The cultural aspect of Turkish nationalism derived from the emphasis on Islam and the Turkish language. As already mentioned the reference to Islam was removed from the 1924 Constitution although the divorce did not extend to “sociological” terms. Islam remained an important component of the national identity (Heper, 2007: 91). Turkish language was also defined as “one of the strongest links” among the Turkish citizens (Çağaptay, 2008: 14) and it was imposed on different groups such as the Kurdish and the non-Muslim citizens whose mother tongues were other than Turkish. Campaigns such as “Citizen Speak Turkish” (Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş) launched in 1928, were directed at non-Muslims who continued to

use their native languages (Çağaptay, 2008: 25-26).¹² Likewise, speaking Kurdish in public was banned, although the implementation of this ban was not always observed strictly.¹³

In this “civic-cum-cultural” (Heper, 2007) version of Republican nationalism, the Turkish race and its “superiority” also was occasionally brought up by the state. Initiatives to promote Turkishness and the Turkish language included the Sun Language Theory and the Turkish History Thesis. The Sun Language theory was introduced during the Third Turkish Language Congress in 1936. The theory purported the Turkish language to be the first spoken language (Çağaptay, 2008: 256). On the other hand the Turkish History Thesis, which claimed Turks as the ancestor of all civilized nations, including Sumerians, Egyptians and the Greeks, was introduced from 1931 onwards through the activities of the Turkish Historical Society and the history congresses. The initiative was developed by Atatürk’s adopted daughter, anthropologist Afet İnan and was supported by him (Çağaptay, 2008: 246). In effect, pursuits such as the Sun Language Theory and the Turkish History Thesis were often attempts to inject a sense of pride in Turkish citizens and were not related to an ethnic interpretation of nationalism (Mardin, 1990: 204; Heper, 2007: 179). After a while, Atatürk lost interest in these initiatives (Heper and Criss, 2009: 315).

On the nature of Turkish nationalism it should finally be noted that the republican nationalist vision had another precise objective as brought up

¹² This was not an official campaign raised by the state. It was initiated by the Istanbul University’s Student Union and it was inspired by a speech the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü delivered. Despite the unofficial character of this initiative, Turkish statesmen supported this campaign and some municipalities passed regulations banning languages other than Turkish to be spoken in public. See Çağaptay, 2008: 26.

¹³ See Heper and Yiğit, 2012: 19.

several times by Atatürk. Atatürk defined this objective as reaching the level of advanced civilizations and nations (Köker, 2007: 153-154). This task could be brought about by working for a “progressive and civilized” nation (Heper, 2007: 92). In other words, Turkish nationalism had a civilizing vision too.

Policies related to nationalism invoked different reactions depending on ethnic or religious background of those who were affected by policy practices. The non-Muslim population had already become insignificant in terms of numbers after the population exchanges in the early years of the Republic. Consequently the non-Muslim Turkish citizens did not organize mass movements against practices of cultural nationalism such as the imposition of the Turkish language. Besides, due to the guarantees of the Treaty of Lausanne, the non-Muslim Turkish citizens had the means to teach their native languages and practice their religion. Nevertheless, this guarantee certainly did not stop initiatives such as “Citizen, Speak Turkish”.

On the other hand, Kurdish originated citizens of the Republic were not provided with similar means in terms of their language. Combined with sometimes-arbitrary practices of the state officers/officials on the ground in the Eastern regions and resentment toward the principle of secularism, Kurds rose against the Republican regime in the early years of the Republic. The 1925 Shaikh Said, 1930 Ağrı and 1937-1938 Dersim uprisings were the major Kurdish revolts during the early years of the Republic.

The practice of nationalism during the CHP and the DP governments was not very different from each other. The DP sought to develop close ties

with the Kurdish and non-Muslim citizens but in policy practice, the DP governments did not implement different policies related to these groups. For instance the Capital Levy (*Varlık Vergisi*) funds collected from non-Muslims in 1942-1943 were not returned despite the electoral promise to do so. Yet, the non-Muslims preferred the DP over the CHP in elections and non-Muslim candidates were elected to the Parliament from the DP lists (Bali, 2004: 14). The reason for this preference might have been non-Muslim Turkish citizens' deep distrust toward the CHP due to the experiences of the single party years.

A similar observation can also be made about the DP's contacts with Turkish citizens of Kurdish-origin. For example, during the 1957 national elections, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes became instrumental in Shaikh Said's grandson Abdülmelik Fırat's election to Parliament on the DP slate (Heper and Yiğit, 2012: 10). Yet in practice, this did not result in a shift in the Republic's policies toward the Kurdish origin citizens. The DP governments, for example, continued changing the names of Kurdish villages into Turkish.¹⁴

Secularism was also among the more controversial principles. In 1928, Article II of the Constitution, which defined the state's religion as Islam, was amended and the referral to the religion of the state was completely removed from the Constitution. In 1937, the principle of secularism was added to the same article. However, separation of religion and state had started before 1928. The Caliphate was abolished in 1924,

¹⁴ In 1956-1958 names of 554 villages and 330 neighbourhoods in the east and the southeast of the country were replaced with Turkish names (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 11, Volume 4: 54).

secular schooling was adopted in 1924 through the Law on the Unification of Education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*), sufi and dervish lodges were banned in 1925, Sharia courts were annulled in 1926, and Islamic civil law was replaced with a Swiss-inspired family code the same year.

Nevertheless, these reforms did not bring about the state's withdrawal from the domain of religious activity. The state continued to oversee, control and regulate the organization of Sunni religious activity through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, a sub-branch of the prime ministry established in 1924 to replace the Ottoman state office of Sheikh-ul Islam, the head of the Sunni establishment in the Ottoman state (Karpas, 1991: 53; Hale and Özbudun, 2010: xvii).

Turkish secularism was not only about these political and institutional arrangements. Just like the principle of nationalism, secularism also presented a civilizing vision for the citizens of the new Republic. The civilizing aspect was related to the goal of changing the system of values based on religion (Köker, 2007: 161). In this regard, secularism envisaged the "liberation of individual mind from restraints [imposed] by traditional Islamic concepts and practices" (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 385).

Similar to the principle of nationalism, the principle of secularism also caused protests. The 1925 Shaikh Said revolt in the east of the country was mainly directed against the secular rule of the Republic as various sermons delivered by the Shaikh Said himself prior to the uprising show.¹⁵ Another violent incident against secular rule took place in the small western town of

¹⁵ See Heper, 2007: 149-150.

Menemen in the city of İzmir where a group of Sunni Muslims led by a cleric demanding the reinstatement of a Sharia regime revolted. When a young officer, Lieutenant Kubilay, attempted to calm down the protestors, the crowd fiercely beheaded him (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 60). In both cases, the revolts were suppressed by military means and the rebels were executed.

The basic understanding behind the principle of secularism remained essentially unchanged over the years. Nevertheless, in practice the strict interpretation of secularism, strict in the sense that the presence of Islam in the public sphere was substantially limited, was loosened to a degree by the CHP in the aftermath of the transition to the multiparty phase. For instance, religious instruction was introduced to the primary schools, a number of prayer leader and preacher training courses were initiated and the Faculty of Theology was established as part of the Ankara University (Tachau, 1991: 104). Also, foreign currency began to be provided to the people who were going on the pilgrimage (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 28).¹⁶

The DP also continued with these liberalization measures in religion. Of the six principles of Kemalism, the DP was by far most criticized for degenerating the principle of secularism. The DP governments in fact took a populist approach to the issue of religion as they sought to appeal to voters. For instance, they lifted the ban on the recitation of the call to prayer in Arabic in 1951, allowed the broadcasting of pieces from the Koran on state radio and further increased the number of prayer leader and preacher schools. More funds were made available for the Directorate of Religious Affairs and 15.000 mosques were built during 1950-1960. Among the DP

¹⁶ Pilgrimage is one of the five pillars of Islam.

ranks there were numerous deputies and party members who had strong links with religious sects in the east of the country (Sarıbay, 1991: 128; Hale and Özbudun, 2010: xix).

Despite the criticism and the mentioned policies and actions, the DP had an instrumental rather than a substantial approach to the issue of religion, and in essence this approach did not pose a threat to the principle of secularism. The DP leaders made Islam a significant part of their political discourse only after the mid- 1950s, when they faced serious economic difficulties (Heper, 1986: 375; Altunışık and Tür, 2005 : 31; Sarıbay, 1991: 124). Even then they did not, for example, discuss the amendment of the civil and criminal codes in line with Islamic law nor did they open the principle of secularism to public debate (Hale and Özbudun, 2010: xix). On the contrary, whenever there emerged a serious threat to secularism, they acted rigorously. For instance in 1951 when members of the fundamentalist *Ticani* Order destroyed quite a few Atatürk statues the DP government immediately reacted and initiated judicial procedure. Likewise in 1953 the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*) was banned due to its “fundamentalist and religious agenda” (Hale and Özbudun, 2010: xix).

Étatism was also among the more debated principles. However, in contrast to secularism and nationalism, which caused controversy and unrest among wider segments of the population, debates on étatism were mainly restricted to the political and intellectual elite. The cause for the debate was the vagueness embodied in the constitutional definition of étatism regarding the extent of state intervention in the economy (Ahmad, 2003: 63).

Étatism was originally developed in response to the world economic crisis in 1930 and as will be elaborated upon in the economic policies section, it was a sharp departure from the Republic's earlier liberal economic policies in 1923-1929 (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 390). Étatism implied that the state would intervene in the economy to undertake major investment projects while at the same time continuing to support private enterprise (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 390). Private enterprise was not marginalized in this formulation (Köker, 2007: 189).

The notion of state intervention in the economy through the principle of étatism was carefully framed as a temporary policy specific to Turkey and Turkish conditions at the time, in order to distinguish it from socialism (Hale, 1980: 105). Thus, étatism in Turkey did not have any implications in the realm of politics, in contrast to the socialist systems in which state ownership and control of economic activity was complemented by the total regulation of political and social life. Turkish étatism was a technical answer to the question of how to achieve economic and industrial growth of the country.

In practice, the interpretation of étatism changed from period to period and even from minister to minister (Koçak, 1990: 109), as the economic conditions also kept changing. As it was a time and problem-specific formulation, which was continuously updated according to needs, étatism was one of the most flexible principles of Kemalism.

The principle of reformism was related to the methodology to be followed while undertaking reforms. The debates evolved around the

question of whether the Republican reforms should completely break ties with former practices or if a transformative phase should be allowed. The decision was made in favor of the former option because the objective was to realize the transformation from a traditional to a modern society in the shortest time frame possible (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 384). The most dramatic example was presented by the alphabet reform. In 1928, the alphabet, which consisted of Arabic letters was officially replaced by the Latin alphabet without a transition period. This approach was adopted in other reforms as well. Once the more substantial reforms had been introduced, the debates on reformism ended and it became an umbrella concept referring to the state's commitment to continuous reform.

2.2.2 The Opposition and Opposition Parties

The study of opposition parties in 1923-1960 is relevant to our topic for two reasons. First, the political opposition and the issues that caused tensions between opposition and government parties in 1923-1960 form an important part of the political and historical background during Bayar's leadership years. Second, as one of the founders of the first major opposition party in 1946, Bayar had firsthand experience of being in the opposition. It should be noted that Bayar was not affiliated with the first two opposition parties in the Republican period, the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*-TCF) established in 1924 and the

Free Party (*Serbest Fırka-SF*) established in 1930.¹⁷ Yet, although he was not involved in these short-lived attempts, it can be assumed that he derived some lessons from them on how to organize political opposition in the Republican era.

The first political party of the Republic, initially the People's Party (*Halk Partisi*), renamed in 1924 as the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP*), was established in August 1923 (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 17). From then onwards, the CHP evolved into the single political party of the Turkish regime. Despite the fact that the 1924 Constitution did not place restrictions on the establishment of political parties, the CHP became the de facto single party of the early republican era.

Turning to the two opposition parties of the early years of the Republic, the Progressive Republican Party was formed by some of the core personalities of the Turkish War of Independence era such as Refet Bele, Adnan Adıvar and Rauf Orbay. The founders' main concern was Mustafa Kemal's unilateral control of domestic affairs (Koçak, 1990: 98). The party's founders also shared a different political worldview, which can be described as more gradualist as opposed to the radical reformist approach of the CHP core (Ahmad, 1991: 66, 79). In policy practice this difference in worldviews meant that the TCF emphasized an approach that adopted "continuity" rather than "drastic change" in social and political reforms that

¹⁷ The founder of the SF Fethi Okyar had sought Bayar's membership in his party however Atatürk rejected his request by saying that he himself required Bayar's services (Barlas, 22 May 1982, *Milliyet* daily).

were undertaken (Ahmad, 1991: 79) and that it was after “reform”, not “revolution” (Dodd, 1992: 18).

One of the more significant implications of this difference in worldviews from the perspective of the new Turkish political regime was related to secularism. The central TCF administration did not have a fundamentalist religious agenda. Despite that, the party’s more conservative outlook led to its association with religious fundamentalists. Such association was deemed threatening at the time of the Shaik Said uprising (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 381). Besides, certain members of the party were tried by the Independence Tribunal (*İstiklal Mahkemesi*) and found guilty of participating in the revolt (Koçak, 1991: 101). As a result, the Independence Tribunal initially forced the TCF to close down its local branches in the Eastern provinces. Finally, in June 1925 the government completely closed down the party (Koçak, 1990: 101).

The second opposition party, the SF was established under the control of Atatürk unlike the TCF, which was established as the outcome of an independent opposition movement. Both Atatürk and İnönü thought that throughout the years they were cut off from the people and an opposition party could provide a useful means to rediscover the needs and problems of the population (Heper, 1998: 177-178). Thus Fethi Okyar, a close acquaintance of Atatürk whom he could trust to abide by the fundamental tenets of the Republic, initiated the SF upon Atatürk’s request (Weiker, 1991: 86).

The central divergences between the CHP and the SF were mainly in economic and financial matters (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 382). The SF had a more liberal approach to the economy and in the party program the abolition of state monopolies and decreases in tax burden were proposed. This would eventually lead to an economy that was more open economy to international markets (Weiker, 1991: 87).

Although the party program did not make any promises on matters related to religion, the new party attracted the attention of religious fanatics far beyond expectations. Due to the overwhelming number of membership applications it received, members could not be carefully screened, contrary to Okyar's earlier promise (Weiker, 1991: 88; Mango, 2008: 168). This was how religious fundamentalists could get into the party. Upon these developments, Atatürk told Okyar that he could no longer remain welcoming to the SF (Heper and Criss, 2009: 255). Okyar understood and in order to avoid the escalation of any tension around the principle of secularism, the party abolished itself in November 1930.

From 1930 to 1946, opposition in the form of political parties was nonexistent in Turkish politics. However, Atatürk was in favor of political deliberation and he did not support attempts to silence different political opinions completely. Different channels of expression were introduced for an opposition in the absence of opposition parties. For instance in the 1931 elections, thirty seats were reserved for deputies who were not members of the CHP to be elected to the Parliament. In the 1935 elections, the number of seats was reduced to sixteen, but a legal change was made to allow the

formation of assembly groups, which gave the opposition formal privileges in parliamentary debates (Weiker, 1991: 92).

In retrospect, the first two opposition parties in 1924-1925 and 1930 were not long-lived, mainly due to the worries that they would cause backslides in the reform agenda and prevent the effective carrying out of reforms (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 380). It can be concluded that the experience from these parties highlighted two issues for opposition parties to come. First, it showed that maintaining the fundamental characteristics and tenets of the republican reforms was of primary importance to the state establishment. Thus, whenever a threat against these main tenets, especially against secularism and nationalism, emerged, opposition parties were considered the guilty party.

Second, even if the opposition party leaders might be devoted to the basic principles of the Republic, their leaders needed to have strong control over their party organizations so that these organizations and the parties' supporters did not pose a threat to the Republic. In other words, any successful opposition party and party leadership would not only give guarantees to the state establishment that the party would be loyal to Republican values, but it would also have a firm grasp on its political base.

The first long-lived opposition party, the DP was officially established in 1946. The DP remained in opposition in 1946-1950 with the CHP as the government party. Throughout these four years, there were often tensions between the CHP and the DP. The DP claimed that the government hindered its activities by using the police and gendarmerie. The government on the

other hand accused the opposition of engendering anarchy. In most cases, President İsmet İnönü skillfully negotiated to ease the tension. For instance in December 1946 when Prime Minister Recep Peker called the DP deputy Adnan Menderes a psychopath for his criticism of the following year's budget, the DP group as a whole withdrew from Parliament. President İnönü was able to convince the DP group to return to the Parliament, through his negotiations with one of the principal founders of the DP, historian Fuat Köprülü, and Celal Bayar (Albayrak, 2004: 99). When tension again rose in 1947 for similar reasons, it was once again İnönü who announced the July 12 Declaration (*12 Temmuz Beyannamesi*). In the Declaration İnönü pointed out that the opposition party was entitled to benefit from the same rights as the government party. The government, according to İnönü, had to pay attention not to put pressure on the DP's activities and the DP for its part had to stay within the lawful framework and not to seek illegal ways to come to power (Heper, 1998: 184).

Apart from İnönü's individual efforts to develop better conditions for the activities of the opposition parties in this phase, certain structural changes were also introduced to comply with the requirements of a multiparty regime. These changes were often related to improving freedom of speech. For example, the government delegated its mandate to ban newspapers to the courts (Akşin, 1996: 216). The autonomy of the universities was also increased (Turan, 2010: 147). The 1946 University Act granted universities a relatively high degree of autonomy "within the limits of the Republican ideology" (Turan, 2010: 147). The 1938 dated Law of

Associations was also amended in 1946 and restrictions on the foundation of class-interests based political parties and associations were partially lifted.

Following the 1950 general elections, the DP came to government with a landslide electoral victory. The CHP became the main opposition party and remained so for the entire decade. During this phase, the DP gained enough success at the 1950, 1954 and 1957 elections to form majority governments. In the initial years of DP rule relations between the government and the opposition were quite balanced in comparison to later years. During these initial years, the DP contributed to the expansion of the freedom of expression and individual freedoms through the adoption of a relatively liberal press law and the amendment of some of the restrictive laws (Sarıbay, 1991: 126).

This situation changed dramatically after 1953 and confrontations between the opposition and government became a common occurrence. The government introduced restrictive laws and regulations to reduce the amount of criticism against its rule. The DP government, for instance, passed a law in 1954 which forced civil servants, including judges and professors, to early retirement after twenty-five years of service or once the age of sixty was passed. This was considered an attack against the bureaucracy's existing autonomy from the executive (Sarıbay, 1991: 126). The press law was tightened and the press was kept under significant pressure.¹⁸ For instance, the government issued twenty-three publication bans and fifty journalists were sentenced to different penalties in 1959 for undermining the

¹⁸ For an overview of press-government relations in 1950-1960, see Korkmaz, 1998.

government's authority, the stability of the country and the personal integrity of government members (Robinson, 1965: 192).

In addition to putting limits on the freedom of expression, the DP also restricted the activities of opposition parties. In 1953, a law that transferred all the CHP movable and immovable properties to the Treasury, with the exception of buildings used as party branches, was passed. The party's affiliated newspaper *Ulus* had to suspend its operations due to this regulation (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:410-411). A number of changes were introduced to electoral practices. The electoral law was amended so that a candidate rejected by one political party could not seek candidacy in another party for subsequent elections. Electoral cooperation between political parties was also banned and opposition parties were prohibited from using state radio as part of their election campaigns (Saribay, 1991: 126).

During this period, the most severe limitation to the opposition and the press was brought in April 1960 when the Parliament established the Investigation Committee (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*) composed of solely DP deputies. The Committee's tasks were described as investigating the opposition parties' activities and preventing the alleged provocations of the opposition to involve the army in political matters. In practice, the Committee worked to further limit the opposition's activities and the freedom of the press (Karpas, 2004a: 44-45).

One of the Committee's first acts was to ban press coverage on its own activities (Akşin, 1996: 228). Later on, the Committee's powers were increased and it was given the mandate to ban publications, close

publication houses and limit political activities of the opposition as it saw fit. When İnönü criticized these measures, he was banned from the Parliament for twelve sessions (Akşin, 1996 : 229). In legal terms, the committee and the judicial powers granted to it were violations of the principle of competitive politics and against the distribution of political power in that system (Turan, 1984: 98).

In practice, besides restraining the opposition's freedom of expression, these limitations resulted in provoking physical attacks against the members of the opposition by the DP partisans. For instance, in April 1959 the DP partisans sabotaged the opposition leader İnönü's visit to İzmir. He was hit on the head with a stone. On his return to Istanbul, he was stopped by a mob in Topkapı on his way from the airport to his residence. He was saved in the last minute with the efforts of a passing officer (Akşin, 1996: 228). Other CHP members such as Kasım Gülek, Secretary-General of the CHP also became victims of similar attacks.

The difficulties experienced by the opposition parties in 1950-1960 had many reasons. As already explained in the section on the constitution above, the legal and constitutional framework was insufficient to provide guarantees for the opposition. Beyond the legal framework it was also a matter of political culture and historical legacy. The DP had been born out of the single party tradition and senior DP members were previously single party elites. The DP simply did not know how to treat the opposition in a multiparty system (Sarıbay, 1991: 127). Consequently there was no vision on how to treat the opposition in a multiparty system (Sarıbay, 1991: 127). The opposition's activities were viewed as treasonous by the government

and any criticism directed against the government was often seen as questioning the government's legitimacy, rather than criticism of its policies and program (Rustow, 1973: 104; Sarıbay, 1991: 128).

2.2.3 The Armed Forces

The role of the Turkish armed forces in politics can be broken into two phases during 1923-1960. The first phase, 1923-1950, is on the whole characterized by the withdrawal of the army from everyday politics. The former officers had a considerable presence in the Parliament during the Turkish War of Independence and this made them potential wielders of political power in the Republican era. Against this possibility Atatürk forced the officers who were pursuing political careers to choose between the two paths through a law legislated in 1924. This law made membership in the Parliament incompatible with active service in the military (Rustow, 1959:547).

This operation was not motivated by a concern to establish civilian control of the state and the government. It was introduced to eliminate a potential rival to the ruling elite (Cizre, 2008: 305). Yet irrespective of the motivations, the armed forces and civilian authorities of the state and the government were on an equal footing in 1923-1946 as they had separate functions (Mango, 2008: 166). In institutional terms, the armed forces were removed from the supervision of the president and brought under the direct control of the prime minister in 1944 and placed under the ministry of national defense in 1949 (Harris, 1986: 157).

The second phase started with the DP's electoral victory in 1950. The army became suspicious of the new government even before the DP government succumbed to restrictive measures in the second half of the 1950s. In 1950, for instance, Adnan Menderes had been warned that the army was planning a takeover. The government responded by decommissioning fifteen high-ranking generals and one hundred and fifty colonels (Albayrak, 2004: 191-192). Similarly, the so-called nine officers incident in 1957 revealed a group of officers' intentions for a military intervention. In 1957, Major Samet Kuşçu informed the government of a plot devised by a group of nine officers to topple it. The government failed to take effective action against this warning. Although the nine conspirators were initially arrested and questioned, in the end it was only the informer Samet Kuşçu who was sentenced to two years of prison (Ahmad, 1977: 59).

There were a number of reasons for the military's unfavorable stance toward the DP rule and for the military intervention in 1960. Firstly, the DP government's policies were thought to be harmful to the Kemalist principles and to made concessions to the Islamist fundamentalists (Ulus, 2011: 13). Secondly, the army had been concerned by the government's increasing authoritarian tendencies (Heper and Tachau, 1983: 21; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 86). Thirdly, the military class had suffered from a loss of social standing and economic income due to the DP government's inflationary policies (Ahmad, 1977: 67).

During Bayar's term in office as Prime Minister (1937-1939) in the single party years, the military's influence was not among the issues that were likely to preoccupy a prime minister. Due to this background, most of

the DP leadership was not aware that the Turkish military was a potential political actor that could become active under certain circumstances. However, as will be elaborated in the next chapters, with his political experience Bayar himself was aware that the military might pose a threat to the government.

2.2.4 The International Context: From Regime Consolidation to Alliance Formation

Turkey faced a number of considerable challenges during 1923-1960 in the domain of international politics. The first and foremost challenge was to secure the physical borders of the country by an internationally acknowledged treaty, thus to gain international recognition (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 95). This objective was largely realized with the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. However, a few contested issues remained on the Turkish foreign policy agenda, such as the status of Mosul and Alexandretta (Kayalı, 2008: 146; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 42). Mosul, currently within the borders of northern Iraq, was mentioned as part of the Turkish homeland by the 1919 National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*). However, the city fell under British occupation in a clear violation of the 1918 Armistice of Mudros, which excluded the lands controlled by the Ottoman forces at the time the treaty's signing from Allied occupation (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 42).¹⁹

Turkey based its claim on Mosul on the argument that it was demographically composed of Turks and Kurds and would thus be a natural

¹⁹ The armistice was signed between the Ottoman State and Great Britain, on behalf of the allied powers and it set the terms of the Ottoman surrender.

extension of Turkish borders. Another supporting argument for Turkey's claim was that the British forces were in fact twelve miles away from Mosul when the armistice was declared. The League of Nations and International Court of Justice resolutions rejected Turkish claims and the Turkish demand for a plebiscite in Mosul. In the end, a compromise was reached when Turkey gave up its territorial claims and agreed to receive ten percent of oil revenues generated from the region for twenty-five years (Findley, 2010: 263; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 42).

Similarly, the Alexandretta (currently Hatay) matter was solved through foreign policy dialogue with France. Alexandretta was first occupied by Britain in the aftermath of the Mudros Armistice. The city was later passed to France under a special administrative regime, as a requirement of the 1921 Ankara Agreement signed between Turkey and France. When Syria started negotiations for independence with France, Turkey brought up the matter of Hatay's status. The issue was settled when the League of Nations supported the establishment of a self-governing entity, which in 1939 voted to join Turkey (Altunışık and Tür , 2005: 97).

Toward the Second World War Turkey once again faced the challenges of securing its borders and staying out of the conflict. Before the war, it had tried to enhance its ties with Britain and France as a precaution against Italian and German threats (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 397-398). The Italian threat was particularly prominent as Italy made demands on the Mediterranean coasts of Turkey. Once the war broke out, Turkey came under pressure from both Germany and Britain to enter the war on their side. Threats to the country's territorial integrity and neutrality continued

throughout the war as Bulgaria and Greece were invaded by German armies (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 63). However, President İnönü and the government successfully resisted the German and British pressures. Turkey declared war on Germany in February 1945, only after German defeat was certain.

By the end of the war, Turkey was already established as a “security conscious state” due to threats against its territorial integrity (Lesser, 2010: 258). The Cold War eventually became the central concern of Turkish foreign policy (Karpas, 2004g: 509) and it further increased Turkey’s security concerns. The priority was again to defend the borders and the regime, but this time against a possible Soviet threat (Lesser, 2010: 266; Karpas, 2004g: 509). This threat had been evident since 1945 when the Soviets did not renew the 1925 Treaty of Friendship signed with Turkey. This was accompanied by verbal demands of the restoration of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet territory, parts of Thrace to Bulgaria and a revision of the 1936 Montreux Agreement in favor of Soviet demands (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 400; Aydın, 2000: 107).

Turkey’s response to the Soviet threat was to increase its efforts to deepen the ties with its Western allies, especially through institutional organizations. Following its participation in NATO’s 1951 Korea operation, Turkey became a NATO member in 1952. Turkey’s admission to NATO showed that the international community now acknowledged the strategic importance of the country. NATO membership was also a natural outcome of the Western orientation in Turkey’s foreign policy (Aydın, 2000:111). Turkey’s strategic importance was further recognized when the country took a seat in the United Nations Security Council in 1951-1952 and 1954-1955.

Another defense alliance that Turkey joined in 1955 was the short-lived Baghdad Pact, which aimed to form a buffer zone against possible Soviet expansion to the Middle East (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 106).²⁰

This short overview of Turkey's responses to the challenges in international politics makes clear that the principles employed to address them remained the same all throughout this phase: alliance-seeking, the peaceful resolution of conflicts and a Western orientation in foreign policy. Throughout this period Turkey not only sought to be a member of major international organizations but it also focused on establishing its own international alliances with its neighbors. As early as 1933 Turkey headed the efforts to form the Balkan Pact between Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, and itself. In 1937, the Sadabad Pact between Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran was established to oppose the threats that might arise from Turkey's eastern borders. Although these pacts were rendered ineffective for several reasons, they demonstrated Turkey's willingness and inclination to establish regional cooperation organizations.

The international alliances Turkey pursued during 1923-1960 were not only defense-oriented. Turkey became a member of Western economic, political and social cooperation organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1948 and the Council of Europe in 1949. Turkey also applied for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959.

²⁰ The pact, in fact further divided the region. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser who was becoming the champion of Arab nationalism and non-alignment movement harshly criticized it, and his verbal attacks against the organization scared even the countries that had excellent relations with the Western bloc, such as Jordan and Lebanon into staying away (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 106).

The Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy remained in place throughout this period. Before the Second World War, the foreign policy was Western oriented but this orientation was mostly derived from the fact that the new Turkish regime was essentially Western in its civilizing vision. In other words, modernization was described as Westernization and a Western-oriented foreign policy was only a natural outcome of this. Yet during this time, Turkey still maintained close ties with the USSR (The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and that country was not considered to be the main threat to the Republic. However, as tensions with the USSR increased, the Turkish regime's ideological orientation toward the West became accompanied by tangible security concerns, as expressed through Turkey's vigorous search for alliances.

The security-oriented foreign policy had a number of important consequences for politics in Turkey in 1923-1960. First, Turkey rarely showed interest in movements such as anti-colonization or those of non-aligned nations (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 76). Thus Turkish foreign policy did not evolve into a direction where values such as democracy, human rights and self-determination would have gained prominence in its foreign policy discourse. It was a strictly security oriented foreign policy that refrained from voicing an opinion about regimes and their shortcomings, an approach that may be expressed through the term non-interventionist.

Second, the focus on security, often defined through a fear of a Communist takeover, had an impact on domestic politics as anti-communism became the motto of subsequent Turkish governments. As a result, Communist movements were attributed a capacity beyond their

support base in Turkey and members of Communist organizations were ruthlessly prosecuted.

The predominance of the Turkish leaders in the planning and conduct of Turkish foreign policy should be mentioned to complete this short tour of Turkish foreign policy. For the most part, Atatürk had been the most influential foreign policy actor until his death and later İnönü assumed a similar role. The DP government also approached the issue in a comparable manner granting the executive leaders a firm grasp over foreign policy. Parliament was often not involved in the processes related to foreign policy (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 92). In sum, the Republican tradition until Bayar's presidency allowed presidents to potentially play an important part in the foreign policy making and implementation

2.2.5 The Economic Background

Deprived of a large part of its young population, foreign trade revenues and state income due to subsequent wars, the Turkish economy was in a state of devastation in 1923 (Hale, 1980: 102). In nominal terms, the continuous state of war from 1912 to 1922 had caused a 20 percent decline in the population and 40 percent decline in per capita income. This made the question of economic development one of the undisputed priorities for the Republic, perhaps only second to the objective of securing the borders.

For the Republican elites economic recovery and growth were not purely technical pursuits. The objective of economic growth had a strong

political component for two reasons. First, the new Turkish economy had to be national, in other words the means of the economy should be owned and the economy should be carried out by Turks. This was a lesson the new leadership had derived from the experience of the Ottoman state where economic dependence on Europe resulted in grave problems (Pamuk, 2008:276). The search for a national economy thus comprised the replacement of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie by a Muslim Turkish bourgeoisie who had the ownership of capital.

Second, economic development and growth were defined as a part of Turkey's modernization ambitions, especially with regard to industrialization. The new regime considered industry and civilization to be complementary, thus achieving "the goal of civilization" without industrialization was not possible (Ahmad, 2003: 93).

Although these two principles remained central to the Turkish economy, phases and methods in the pursuit of economic development varied in 1923-1960. The initial phase was the first five years that followed the Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty removed the capitulations, which had for centuries provided privileges to foreigners doing business in Turkey. However, the Treaty also established that the new Republic would be free to formulate its own commercial policies only after five years (Pamuk, 2008:276). For instance, Turkish government would not be able to impose certain tariffs during that phase (Lewis, 1968: 281). The Treaty also obliged

Turkey to pay 67 percent of the prewar Ottoman debt (Barlas, 1998: 122).²¹
This was a considerable burden on the finances of the new Republic.

Due to the Lausanne arrangements, in 1923-1928 the Turkish economy was completely open to the international markets. There were no restrictions on foreign capital in the form of direct investment or credit. The value of foreign currencies was determined on the market as there was no Central Bank to regulate it (Keyder, 1981: 3). Although the government could not have much say on the financial markets during that time, it nevertheless did undertake a number of initiatives to support industrial development.

One such measure was the establishment of the *İş Bankası* (İş Bank) in 1924 under the leadership of Celal Bayar. The bank was to provide credit to entrepreneurs (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 18). The following year, the Turkish Industrial and Mining Bank was established to provide capital to the government for the development of state industries in those fields (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 390). Another initiative was the Law for the Encouragement of Industry promulgated in 1927. The rationale behind all this economic activism was to stimulate industrial growth. Under these circumstances in 1923-1929 the economy grew at a “healthy rate” and a yearly increase of circa 9.5 percent was reached on average. This signaled recovery to prewar levels (Hale, 1980: 103). However, the government’s initiatives did not result in industrial growth at desired levels and the share of industry in the gross domestic product (GDP) remained at the same level as it was at in 1923 (Hale, 1980: 103).

²¹ The remaining debt was divided between Greece, Syria and Lebanon (Barlas, 1998: 122).

By 1929, Turkey's obligations under the Treaty of Lausanne came to an end. The outbreak of the Great Depression that same year presented difficulties to be addressed by the economy planners of Turkey. The main effect of the world crisis on the Turkish economy was the decline in the world prices of agricultural products, which were Turkey's main exports and a large source of income (Pamuk, 2008: 277). The government's response to the crisis and the lack of industrial development was to take matters into its own hands from 1929 onwards, as it now had the freedom to pursue its own financial policies (Pamuk, 2008: 276).

First, protective measures were taken to support Turkish entrepreneurs against foreign competition. A series of protective custom duties were introduced. The Central Bank, established in 1930, further assured government control over the currency and domestic financial markets (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 368; Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 19). As a result of these protective measures, the economy evolved into a protective phase from the open economy of the initial years (Pamuk, 2008: 277). Second, in order to achieve industrial growth, the strategy of *étatisme* was put into effect in 1930. It established the state as the "leading producer and investor" in the field of economy (Pamuk, 2008: 277; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 390).

The main framework of the statist economic policies was laid by the two five- year economic plans in 1933-1937 and 1938-1942. The first plan emphasized the chemical, earthenware, iron, paper, sulfur, sponge, cotton textile, worsted hemp and sugar industries as targets of state investments (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 392). The second plan emphasized heavier industries such as mining, electricity, ports and heavy machinery. This

plan's implementation, however, was interrupted by the Second World War (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 392). In these plans, the state was defined as the major engine of industrial and economic growth. Growth was to be achieved through state ownership and the establishment of major industrial premises by the state (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 19). The étatism of 1930 did not outlaw private enterprise, but in practice privately held initiatives remained insufficient for a number of reasons. First, potential private entrepreneurs lacked the capital required for investment (Lewis, 1968: 283). Second, the few who had capital were intimidated by the preceding years of war and reluctant to undertake major-scale investment operations under a new and thus, unfamiliar regime (Lewis, 1968: 283). Third, private capital refrained from investing in industries where the state invested heavily (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 393). In the final analysis by the end of the 1930s, state-owned industries became quite significant and the state even became the principal producer in certain sectors such as textiles, sugar and iron (Pamuk, 2008: 277).

Despite the negative effects of the Second World War and problems of inefficiency, when the DP came to power in 1950 the economic record was relatively good, with a balanced budget and considerable gold and cash reserves (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 70). Aid schemes such as the 1947 Truman Plan provided by the United States, amounting to a sum of 150 million dollars had contributed a considerable cash flow (Altunışık and Tür, 2005:104). The DP's macro-economic approach was to promote a liberal economy but on a moderate level and through moderate means. This meant that the DP refrained from taking dramatic measures such as

abolishing state enterprises in line with a radical liberal interpretation of the economy (Dodd, 1983: 9).

Instead, the DP governments loosened the state hold on the economy, gave further support to private enterprises and founded the Industrial Development Bank (*Sınai Kalkınma Bankası*) (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 70). To stimulate industrial growth the government increased the amount of land available to cultivation and used Marshall Plan funds, initiated by the United States in 1948, to increase the use of machinery in agriculture (Pamuk, 2008: 281).

Until 1954, the DP's record in the economy was quite positive as indicators of industrial infrastructure and agricultural output continued to show improvements (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 72). However after 1954, the Turkish economy gradually fell into a crisis. In 1954, GDP fell for the first time during the DP rule (Çakmak, 1998: 26). The conditions that had led to the increase in demand for Turkish agricultural products and conditions that contributed in an increase in Turkey's agricultural supply simultaneously decreased. Favorable weather conditions that had increased agricultural output deteriorated after 1954 and world demand for Turkish agricultural products declined with the end of the Korean War (Pamuk, 2008: 282). Decreasing exports and the fall in the agricultural output led to increases in foreign debts, balance of payment issues and higher inflation (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 73).

The government's search for international credit also proved futile as the United States refused to provide further credit to Turkey. In 1958, the

crisis succumbed to such a level that the DP government had no option but to accept the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) recovery plans. As a result the Turkish lira was devalued and price increases were introduced, with a substantial impact on the lives of Turkish citizens (Akşin, 1996 : 225). The Turkish lira was devalued up to 330 percent overnight in 1958 (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 81). Public debt more than tripled from 1950 to 1960 (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 409). The economic crisis of 1958 and the devaluation of the lira particularly affected state employees who were on a fixed payroll, their purchasing power declining considerably. Economic conditions deteriorated even further toward the 1960 military intervention.

In sum, the DP provided an example of agriculture-led economic growth in the first half of the 1950s and despite the attempts to support industrial growth, industry did not become the largest sector of the economy (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 71; Pamuk, 2008: 281). Yet, the DP was able to promote the expansion of private capital and the number of private establishments doubled from 1950 to 1960 (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 70). Also, considerable state investment made possible major public infrastructure projects, such as the renovation of Istanbul and construction of modern roads.

As this short introduction aims to show, macro-economic policies in 1923-1960 had to address many different issues. This provided leaders of the Republic with both challenges and opportunities. The challenges lied in the scale of the problems faced. Recovery and growth out of a war economy, which had already been considerably crippled during the last

years of the Ottoman state, was not an easy task. The opportunity also derived from the same challenge. Economic difficulties presented the leaders with a venue to display their skills and have success in a field where there were plenty of problems to address.

2.2.6 Concluding Remarks on the Non-Institutional External Resources

The discussion introduced above draws attention to four major factors to consider during Bayar's leadership years in terms of non-institutional resources of leadership. First, the regime was in a process of establishment when Bayar became involved in politics. Thus there was plenty of room for individual leaders' input about the shape of things to come. For the same reason, there was also room for differences of opinions, which would eventually lead to political polarization that proved hard to contain under this imperfect system.

Second, the immediate priorities of the regime were quite prominent in the political choices made. These priorities were maintaining the physical security of the state and of the nation against external threats and building up economic wealth. Over the years, these priorities did not lose their importance and often dictated Turkish statesmen's policy preferences.

Third the regime had a clear ideological scope expressed through its six principles. It was committed to the goals of Westernization, nationalism and secularism. These ideals would not be compromised under any circumstances. Fourth, the regime lacked the institutional background and the political culture to accommodate a well-functioning democracy. In

particular, checks and balances mechanisms that would provide a healthy background for democracy especially in terms of the opposition's rights and an effective legal control on the executive were absent. Besides, in political practice the executive office holders did not follow the constitutional descriptions of their powers and duties as further detailed in the next chapters on institutional leadership. The political culture was also not accommodating for the groups that were not in power. The political actors who became operational through this unfavorable political culture maintained their unwelcoming approach to opposition regardless of their political party affiliation. All in all, the Turkish political regime in 1937-1960 did not qualify as a fully institutionalized regime.

CHAPTER III

CELAL BAYAR'S POLITICAL VIEWS AND CORNERSTONES IN HIS LIFE

3.1 Cornerstones in Bayar's Life

There are certain life experiences that Bayar emphasized in his memoirs, interviews and, more generally in his political discourse. His emphasis on these experiences highlight the impact that they had on his politics. Such experiences and cornerstones in Bayar's life are examined below as components of his internal leadership resources.

3.1.1 Bursa and İzmir: Banking and Economic Activities

Bayar had the reputation of an economist before having that of a politician (Harris, 2002: 56). He owed this initial reputation to his particular understanding of economics and the practice of this understanding in the offices he held. Bayar's approach to the economy will be further taken up in detail in a subsection of Chapter IV. In the current section, Bayar's background in economics is explored, as these experiences certainly had an impact in shaping his approach toward economic policy.

Bayar began working as a clerk at the Agricultural Bank (*Ziraat Bankası*) in Mudanya branch, a town in the northwestern city of Bursa, at the early age of eighteen in 1911. He had ranked first in the entrance examination. Due to his success in the bank, he was then employed by the Deutsche Orient Bank Bursa branch in 1915. In the Deutsche Orient Bank office, he was the one of the two employees who had the authority to sign papers on behalf of the bank (Bozdağ, 2005: 13-14). When he was promoted to senior manager, he is likely to have been one of the first Muslim Turks to rise to such commercial success (Rustow: 1967: 12).

Having worked in a Turkish and later in a German bank, Bayar was able to compare the two working cultures and he found them strikingly different. He thought that the Turkish bank was preoccupied with minor everyday issues (*kırtasiye*) whereas he found the German bank was preoccupied with more substantial issues. In contrast to the Agricultural Bank, the bureaucratic procedures in the Deutsche Orient Bank were not overwhelming and employees were encouraged to take initiative (Kocatürk, 1986). Bayar appreciated the effectiveness of this new working environment (Kocatürk, 1986).

In those years drawing upon his observations of the local economy, Bayar arrived at the conclusion that in the Ottoman state non-Muslim Ottomans and foreigners controlled most of the economic activity. He reasoned that it was necessary to develop Turkish business to compete with these groups who were in an advantageous position due to the Capitulations.²² To work for this end, Bayar got in contact with wealthy Turkish local notables in Bursa, persuaded them to

²² The Capitulations were economic privileges granted to European states from the sixteenth century onward. They were abrogated with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. For further details on the Capitulations, see İnalçık, 2003.

establish a maritime company, *Hüdavendigâr*, and to save the profits for further investment (Bozdağ, 1986: 15-16). This was the first company established with local capital in Bursa.²³ The company transported local Bursa products and passengers to Istanbul. Competition with foreign companies operating on the same route lowered the prices and as a result, producers of the local products as well as passengers became quite content with the company's services (Bozdağ, 1986: 15-16).

Bayar had further plans for developing the local economy in Bursa, such as improving the conditions of the silk industry prominent in the area and preventing the flooding of Nilüfer River in order to decrease the loss of crops. He could not, however, initiate these projects as he was assigned to İzmir by the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti-İTC*) (Bozdağ, 1986: 16).

Bayar followed similar economic pursuits in İzmir where he endeavored to enhance Turkish involvement in the local economy. In order to bypass Greek merchants who sold the agricultural products of İzmir to foreign markets and earned considerable profits, Bayar established a cooperative that took over the marketing of agricultural products. As a result, producers were able to make greater profits from their products (Bozdağ, 1986: 19). Bayar also established an employment bureau in İzmir through which he supported the employment of Turks in various functions (Şenşekerci, 2000: 48).

In those years Bayar developed a particular approach to the problem of business and capital generation which he employed in later life on major and

²³ Interview with Tülay Duran, online correspondence, April 2, 2012.

minor scales. This approach can be summed up as support for entrepreneurship. Details and examples are provided in Chapter IV. Here it should only be stated that as part of this understanding, Bayar recognized the importance of supporting entrepreneurs through state institutions as a method of boosting economic growth. In particular he brought together entrepreneurs with moderate capital, encouraged them to establish various businesses and allied them with experts to administer these businesses (Bozdağ, 1986: 16-17).

3.1.2 Committee of Union and Progress

Bayar's reputation as a politician eventually overtook his initial image of economist. He started political life as a member of the İTC. Bayar highlighted the importance of the İTC in his political life on many occasions and did not refute his İTC heritage even when the party was discredited following defeat in the First World War. In the records of the last Ottoman Parliament Bayar's occupation preceding his membership in Parliament was referred to as the İTC İzmir representative. There were no other former İTC members in that Parliament who declared their ties with the failed İTC so openly (Tunçay, 2002:18). As Bayar told in an interview, the years he spent at the İTC were "his university training" and he called himself an İTC member (*İtt'hatçı*) before everything else (Barlas, 16 May 1982, *Milliyet* daily).²⁴

For Bayar, İTC membership was a serious commitment that also regulated other aspects of his life. He stated that the night he made his vow to the İTC at the age of 25, he slept the most peaceful sleep of his life (Bozdağ, 1986: 13). After

²⁴ Bayar did not have a university education.

taking his vow, he told his wife that they had to get a divorce because he had become involved in a risky political pursuit and did not want to put his family in danger (Barlas, May 19, 1982, *Milliyet* daily). Such a divorce did not, however, materialize.²⁵ Bayar's commitment to politics remained strong in later years. In an interview after his withdrawal from active politics, he was asked about his private life with his family. In his reply he stated that he did not make a separation among his private and public life. He said he had one life and he devoted it completely to the Turkish nation.²⁶

3.1.2.1 Bayar's Engagement in the Committee of Union and Progress

Bayar first got introduced to the ideals of freedom and nationalism through his uncle Mustafa Şevket, an ardent *Jeune Turc*.²⁷ Mustafa Şevket had fled from the capital due to his part in Ali Suavi's assault on the Çırağan Palace and taken up a position of judge (*kadı*) in Baghdad.²⁸ When he returned to Umurbey, the birth-place and residence of Bayar in his younger years, he introduced his young nephew to the works of nationalist writers such as Namık Kemal (1840-1888) (Bozdağ, 1986: 6-7).

Later on Bayar became friends with members of the Bursa İTC branch and was offered membership in 1907 (Bozdağ, 1986: 10). He accepted it

²⁵ Bayar's wife Reşide Bayar, stayed on his side until she passed away in 1962 during a train ride to visit her husband in the Kayseri prison (Ağaoglu, 1982: 12). After the military intervention in 1960, Bayar received a lifetime prison sentence and spent three years in the Kayseri Prison until his release due to health reasons in 1964.

²⁶ Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

²⁷ *JeuneTurcs* started as a group of intellectuals reacting against Sultan Abdülhamit II's authoritarian way of ruling the country. This group established the Association for the Union of Ottomans in 1889, which later evolved into the Committee of Union and Progress, see Heper and Criss, 2009:337.

²⁸ This was a coup attempt which aimed to replace Sultan Abdülhamit II with Murad V (Heper and Criss, 2009:11).

enthusiastically. He thought this was the way to work for the survival of the Ottoman state and prevent its dissolution (Bozdağ, 1986: 11-12). When senior İTC members from Bursa took posts in the capital after the 1908 restoration of the constitutional system, Bayar became the head of the Bursa branch (Şenşekerçi, 2000: 30).

In 1914, Bayar was assigned as the head of the İTC İzmir branch. The decision for this assignment was taken in a high-level İTC meeting participated by Enver Pasha (1881-1922) and Talat Pasha (1874-1921) in July 1914 (Bayar 1997: 104-105, 108, Volume 5).²⁹ This indicates that Bayar was a senior member of the İTC and decisions related to him were taken on a senior level. Bayar defined his objectives in İzmir as implementing political measures that included the inspection of the local administration and the prevention of “harmful activities” (Bayar 1997: 104-105, 108, Volume 5). In practice, Bayar’s task was mainly confined to the field of economy and he sought to nationalize the local economy in favor of the Turkish population vis à vis the non-Muslim communities (Kocatürk, 1986). This assignment was also in line with the macroeconomic policy pursued by the İTC, which had the objective of supporting the Ottoman industry and local products by Muslim Turks over foreign ones even when the local prices were higher (Zürcher, 2004: 125-126).³⁰

Although Bayar’s İzmir assignment was mainly related to economic tasks, he also implemented policies that were not strictly related to economics. For instance, in line with the İTC directives he forcefully drove 130.000 Greeks away

²⁹ Enver Pasha was the Minister of War. With the Minister of Public Works and Navy Cemal Pasha (1872-1922), these three pashas controlled the Ottoman state and the İTC during the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918).

³⁰ For a detailed analysis of the İTC’s vision of national economy, see Toprak, 1982.

from İzmir, to Greece (Zürcher, 2004: 125-126; Şenşekerci, 2000: 35). Bayar sought to employ Muslim Turkish personnel for the railroads as the railroads were staffed by non-Muslims whom Bayar did not want to rely upon during the wartime. Thus, he headed the efforts to establish a school for training railroad staff (Şenşekerci, 2000: 37-38). That school, *İzmir Şömendifer Mektebi* started operating from June 1915 onwards.

Bayar's İzmir assignment ended when the İTC dissolved itself in its ninth Congress on November 1, 1918.³¹ After the İTC's dissolution, Bayar maintained his respect for the İTC heritage. He continued his friendship with some of the former İTC members in Turkey and abroad (Tunçay, 2002: 19). He thought that the former İTC members were honest men who placed the welfare of the country before their own gains. He did not blame them for the state's participation in the First World War because he thought the Ottoman Empire had already been "rotten to its roots" and the İTC was merely attempting to restore it (Barlas, May 21, 1982, *Milliyet* daily).

However, Bayar's respect for the İTC did not have any political implications once the Party was dissolved. Bayar read the changes in the political context right and reacted accordingly. He considered the İTC as a thing of the past under the current republican regime established in 1923. Thus for him being a former *İtt'hatçı* was not in contradiction to his CHP affiliation in the Republican phase. He legitimized his İTC membership by saying that Atatürk was also an *İtt'hatçı*. He also said that once Atatürk had scolded him and asked "do you think

³¹ A new party with the name Reform Party (*Teceddüt Fırkası*) was established in 1918 in İTC's place. Bayar declined the offers of membership to this new party (Kutay, 1982: 27-8).

you are the only *İtt'hatçı*" (Barlas, May 21, 1982, *Milliyet* daily), implying that he himself was also once affiliated with that group.

Bayar did not hesitate to stand against his former colleagues in the new political settlement when the political circumstances forced him to do so. For instance, when asked about the executions of certain former İTC members such as Cavit Bey and Doctor Nazım on the allegations that they were involved in the assassination attempt on Atatürk's life in 1926, Bayar compared those times to the French Revolution and said that strict measures were necessary (Barlas, May 16, 1982, *Milliyet* daily). Upon hearing of the incident, Bayar travelled to İzmir at once and promised Atatürk that violence in politics should disappear completely from the Republican political scene (Barlas, May 21, 1982, *Milliyet* daily). All this confirms that Bayar considered the İTC to be a thing of the past.

3.1.3 The Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923)

Bayar devoted most of his memoirs to the Turkish War of Independence. This is a sign of the importance he attributed to the independence struggle. Bayar's involvement in the war can be explored in two phases: before and after joining the Ankara movement.

Bayar's participation in the independence struggle began with the dissolution of the İTC. Simultaneously, an arrest order for Bayar, who was then the İTC's İzmir representative, reached the Aydın Governor İzzet Bey. Bayar was able to flee from İzmir before the arrest could be realized (Şensekerçi, 2000: 52-53). By then Bayar had arrived at the conclusion that what cannot be defended through intellectual efforts can only be defended through armed struggle (Bozdağ,

1986: 25). In other words, he had decided that armed struggle was the only way to defeat the occupation forces in Anatolia. The Ottoman State had entered the First World War on the side of Axis powers in 1914 and suffered the defeat at the war. Following the Armistice of Mudros signed on October 30, 1918 several parts of Anatolia had fallen under the Allied forces' occupation. French forces occupied Mersin, Adana and its environs in the south, the English forces occupied the area from Maraş to the east. Later on throughout 1919, the Italian forces landed in Antalya and moved inland. The same year Greek forces occupied İzmir and they also moved to inland (Kayalı, 2008: 116, 120). There were numerous other occupied areas throughout the Ottoman landscape, including Istanbul occupied by the Allied forces in 1918. Bayar meant to fight against these assaults.

After his departure from İzmir, Bayar joined the militia forces in Aydın and Ödemiş, both in the west of the country, under disguise as a *hodja*, in other words a preacher of Islam. Inspired by his teacher's name in Umurbey, he called himself Galip Hodja (Victorious Preacher) during these days, as he thought that they would defeat the occupation (Kocatürk, 1986). Bayar descended from an *ulema* (clerical) family; he had gotten considerable religious training from his father. Under disguise he organized the local population for resistance and served as the commander of the forces on the Balıkesir front (Şenşekerci, 2000: 56).

In 1919, Bayar was elected to the Ottoman Parliament from the Saruhan (currently Manisa) region (Kocatürk, 1986). The Parliament stayed open for only four months. During this short phase, Bayar concentrated his efforts to share the atrocities he witnessed in the Aegean region with the Parliament. In the parliamentary session on January 12, 1920 Bayar told the other parliamentarians of the violence inflicted upon the Turkish population by Greek occupation forces.

He defined the task of the Parliament as putting pressure on the government to fight against these atrocities and make them known in the international domain (*Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi*, Term: 4, Volume 23: 463-465). He recalled this speech as one of the most exciting speeches he delivered during his entire political career (Bozdağ, 1986: 28). This speech must have been found quite influential also by the occupation forces in Istanbul as its publication was banned by the central administration (Bozdağ, 1986: 30). The political chaos in the Ottoman capital increased and on April 21, 1920 Sultan Vahdettin (1861-1926) dissolved the Parliament. Bayar fled to Bursa to avoid imprisonment.

Upon his arrival in Bursa, he received a telegram from Mustafa Kemal, asking him to counter the Anzavur forces marching toward the city.³² The encounter with Anzavur's forces did not materialize (Bozdağ, 1986: 30) but Bayar was able to form a group of soldiers from the army reserves (Şenşekerçi, 2000: 75). At the same time he organized a counter fatwa movement against the Istanbul *sheikh-ul-islam's* (the religious authority based in Istanbul) denouncement of the independence movement organized from Ankara. This counter fatwa movement, contributed to by certain scholars of religion in Bursa declared that the Istanbul fatwa was invalid because the capital was under occupation (Bozdağ, 1986: 31).

The first phase of Bayar's role in the Turkish War of Independence ended when Bayar joined the national movement in Ankara in April 1920 (Şenşekerçi, 2000: 333). In Ankara Bayar initially served as Minister of Economics (August 10, 1920-January 14, 1922).³³ He was charged with the task of financing the

³² The Anzavur uprising led by Anzavur Ahmed broke in October 1919 and was suppressed by April 1920. For a detailed history of this uprising, see Hülügü, 1998.

³³ In August 1920, he was assigned as the acting Minister of Economics in place of Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, who had to leave to Moscow on official business. On February 27, 1921 he was fully assigned to this office (Şenşekerçi, 2000:333-4).

Turkish War of Independence. As a part of his efforts to raise revenues, he reinstated coal extraction in the Zonguldak mines, and in the absence of a ministry of agriculture, he organized agricultural production (Şenşekerci, 200:100-101). In the Lausanne negotiations (November 1922-July 1924) which were conducted to arrive at an agreement on a peace treaty, Bayar also played a role.³⁴ He drew attention to the risks of repayment on gold basis and insisted that repayment should be in terms of paper francs (Bozdağ, 1986: 33). Repayment in gold at that time would have been detrimental to the finances of the new Republic (Şenşekerci, 2000: 110). Bayar's insistence on the repayment issue was also appreciated by the chief Lausanne negotiator İsmet İnönü who later became Bayar's rival in politics (Kutay, 1982: 162). A deal on the terms of repayment could not be reached during the Lausanne negotiations. The issue was settled with another agreement in 1928, which required repayment in gold pounds (Barlas, 1998:123).

There was one major exception to Bayar's mainly economy-oriented activities during his time in office as minister of economics. In 1920, Bayar submitted a draft bill to Parliament for the establishment of Independence Tribunals to suppress uprisings in Anatolia and prosecute deserters from the army. The two other signatories to this proposal were Tevfik Rüştü (Aras) and Refik Şevket (İnce). The proposal went through and tribunals were established.

³⁴ The issues discussed during the Conference included the debts of the Ottoman state, the Turkish-Greek border, Mosul, the Capitulations, occupied status of Istanbul, status of the Aegean islands, status of non-Muslim minorities under the new Turkish regime, the straits, compensation for war damages and status of the patriarchy in Istanbul. Among these matters, only the Mosul issue could not be resolved in the conference in terms of core political issues.

Decisions taken by these bodies later became a major target for criticism.³⁵ Nevertheless, Bayar considered the Independence Tribunals as necessary. He compared this period with the French revolution and found the existence of such courts indispensable for the survival of the Parliament (Şenşekerci, 2000:82).

In sum, the Turkish War of Independence years had an important impact on Bayar in two ways. First, he earned recognition in the political circles that established the Republic. Second, as this struggle was about the survival of the Turkish nation, Bayar developed a security-oriented approach that he maintained in later years. This orientation often dominated his policies, as shown through several examples below.

It should also be noted that for Bayar the struggle for national independence had also a very personal aspect. There was one early lifetime experience were pointed out by his relatives and colleagues and brought up also by Bayar himself several times.³⁶ That experience left a deep mark in his vision. Bayar's family had fled to the town of Umurbey in Bursa from Pleven, currently in Bulgaria, due to the Ottoman defeat by Imperial Russia in the War of 93 (1877-1878). In other words, Bayar belonged to a generation of Turks whose native lands were lost due to wars that eventually destroyed the Ottoman state. Bayar feared that this could also be the case in Anatolia, and the Turkish population there might have to leave a substantial part of its homeland. Therefore, for Bayar

³⁵ The Independence Tribunals remained in force for a while and took decisions on a number of critical events such as the Shaik Said revolt in 1925 and the assassination attempt against Atatürk in 1926. Six hundred sixty people were executed on charges related to the revolt. As for the assassination attempt, four high-ranking former İTC members were executed due to their alleged participation in the assassination attempt (Zürcher, 2004: 173-174). The courts were abrogated in 1927.

³⁶ The trauma of territorial losses and their impact on Bayar have been brought up in the interviews with Tülay Duran, Üner Kırdar and Demirtaş Bayar.

the Turkish War of Independence was an endeavor to avoid the repetition of the same tragedy he experienced in his own family.

3.2 Celal Bayar's Views on Major Political Issues and Concepts

As part of the study of Bayar's internal resources of leadership, this section examines Bayar's interpretation of certain political concepts that he emphasized. Before moving on to this part, Bayar's understanding of politics in general is discussed. The first characteristic of Bayar's conceptualization of politics was his appreciation of the political context. He always considered the political context and realities of his time before taking any political action. For instance, as the founder of the first successful opposition party Bayar was certainly in favor of a multiparty system. Nevertheless, he did not think that the political context prior to 1945 was suitable for a multiparty regime (Bayar, 2009: 114-115). Thus, he did not participate in the two former opposition parties.

For that reason, he also disliked ideologies. Bayar considered ideologies to be inflexible and incapable of adapting to the realities of time and changing conditions. He argued that policies should be determined by prevailing conditions in society rather than rigid ideologies. In this respect, Bayar said that if he were living in a society where the working class was suppressed by the bourgeoisie, he would turn out to be a Marxist revolutionary (Bayar, 2009: 188). In line with his dislike of ideologies, when referring to Atatürk's political legacy Bayar preferred the term methodology (Bayar, 2009: 50).

Second, Bayar was in favor of strong leaders for an effective political regime. For him the concentration of power in one person in a political party was a crucial prerequisite for a functioning political system. He believed that having many different opinions flowing from various sources of authority within the parties would result in conflict. Menderes' appointment both as the party leader and as prime minister was a decision taken with this idea in mind. Bayar thought that the possibility of conflict between the government and the party's administration, a condition suffered by the İTC in 1908-1918, could be prevented with Menderes' strong leadership (Ahmad, 1977: 78).

Lastly, Bayar defined the legitimate actors in politics quite narrowly. He thought that only political parties and the elected representatives of the nation could engage in political activity. In that respect, associations (*dernekler*), for instance, should have social and professional rather than political focus. Trade unions also fall into a similar category with associations. Bayar did not consider trade unions to have a right to comment on the status of, for instance, state security courts (*devlet güvenlik mahkemeleri*) or to call a general strike to prevent the legislation on the courts in 1973 (Bayar, 2009: 14). Similarly, Bayar thought that the business community should also refrain from supporting particular political movements through financial means (Bayar, 2009: 15). In Bayar's understanding, civil society organizations should not act as pressure groups on the Parliament because he considered this a violation of the sovereignty of that institution (Bayar, 2009: 150). Last but not least, Bayar also criticized the press, which in his opinion should limit itself to reporting news rather than forming public opinion (Bayar, 2009: 193).

3.2.1 Bayar's Interpretation of Democracy

In this section, Bayar's understanding of democracy is examined with regard to three particular phases in his political career: 1946-1950, 1950-1960, and 1960 and beyond. In these phases, Bayar placed emphasis on different aspects of democracy. In a section that follows this discussion, broader observations that combine the common patterns from Bayar's perspective in these phases will be shared and his understanding of democracy will be conceptualized.

3.2.1.1 1946-1950: Fair Elections and Individual Rights

In 1946-1950, Bayar employed a two dimensional political discourse which emphasized free and fair elections on the one hand and individual rights and freedoms on the other. In order to draw attention to these priorities, Bayar brought up issues related to these matters in his public discourse. He also took up these matters in his negotiations with the members of the government and state. Especially his dialogue with İsmet İnönü was a crucial part of Bayar's efforts to work for these ends. Bayar's dialogue with İnönü on these and other matters is detailed in Chapter V.

The first aspect of Bayar's political discourse on free and fair elections developed mainly in response to the structural shortcomings in the election laws. Bayar thought the two-tiered elections, open voting, secret counting of votes and lack of independent electoral supervision were the main flaws in the electoral regime (Şahingiray, 1999b: 47). He felt that his party had to engage in an unfair struggle against the government as long as electoral guarantees were missing. He also thought that in a democratic setting, his party would normally have to engage

in a struggle against another political party (Şahingiray, 1999b: 95-96). These demands were partially addressed after the CHP congress of 1946 decided in favor of direct elections and the Parliament partially changed the electoral law. Yet contrary to Bayar's and the DP's demands the plurality system and the secret counting of votes were still maintained (Koçak, 1990: 142).

The DP entered national elections in July 1946 without sufficient guarantees for free and fair elections. The elections were thought to have been rigged but the DP's protests did not lead to the reconsideration of the results (Koçak, 1990: 143). The problems encountered in the 1946 elections further enhanced Bayar's and the DP's emphasis on free and fair elections.

Bayar's demands for free and fair elections were addressed completely by the time the May 1950 national elections were held. The electoral law was revised comprehensively in February 1950. Secret ballot, open counting of votes and judicial supervision of elections were introduced (Özbudun, 2000: 17). Bayar appreciated these changes in his Bolu and Düzce speeches, on April 29, 1950 and April 30, 1950 respectively (Şahingiray, 1999c: 48, 50).

The second aspect of Bayar's discourse in 1946-1950 was his emphasis on the promotion of individual rights and liberties. This focus was mainly in response to the difficulties faced by DP members while engaging in political activities. Members of local DP branches often complained about the arbitrary behavior of the security forces. Bayar regularly mentioned these abuse of rights in political speeches and interviews. He interpreted the restrictions implemented by the security forces and the state administration as violations of individual rights and liberties. Bayar also thought that these arbitrary acts of the state officers could

cause people to lose their attachment to the state (Şahingiray, 1999b: 166-167, 169). To address the problems related to the practice of rights and freedoms, Bayar advocated for the removal of all anti-democratic laws that limited personal freedoms (Şahingiray, 1999b: 88-89).

In response to Bayar's and the DP's demands and criticisms on personal freedoms, the government issued a partial amnesty for convicted journalists and revised some of the more restrictive articles of the press code. The law on associations was also revised. The authority to ban associations was taken from the government and was given to the courts (Karpat, 1967: 139-140).

There were two exceptions to Bayar's critical discourse in 1946-1950 and his demands for democracy. First, he focused his criticism on current political issues and refrained from referring to earlier legislations and policies. For instance, in an interview published in the *Tasvir* Daily on April 29, 1946, he pointed out that the laws his party objected to were legislated and put into force in extra-ordinary times that required such measures. However now it was the right moment to revise them according to the needs of the time (Şahingiray, 1999b: 49). He also shared similar thoughts with the journalist Cihad Baban, to whom he said that he accepted the past, with its mistakes and successes because he thought all past policies were implemented with good will and to protect the Republic. However, as the times had changed, there was an urgent need to adopt a new approach (Baban, 1970: 30).

Second, Bayar paid attention to containing the conflict between his party and the government to the political realm. He wanted to avoid any polarization in the society, for instance between the state's security forces and DP members. For

this end, he kept the DP party organization under control. He was in close communication with the local branches on how to respond to the arbitrary acts of state security forces. For instance in a note he sent to local DP branches he asked the DP members who had been restricted from taking part in political activities to inform the DP Central Committee, provide proof of violations and refute the accusations posed by the security officers in a calm manner (Şahingiray, 1999b: 425).³⁷ He advised the party members to refrain from reacting strongly and to avoid damages to the nation's unity and the peace in society.³⁸

Bayar also advised senior DP members to act in a similar way and avoid dramatic responses to verbal attacks by the government. For instance, after the disputed 1946 national elections, certain DP members considered not taking their seats in Parliament. It was Bayar who convinced them to remain in the mainstream framework of politics, take seats in Parliament and use it as a venue to voice their opposition.³⁹

3.2.1.2 1950-1960: Will of the Nation

During 1950-1960, Bayar placed primary importance on the concept of the will of the nation (*milli irade*) as the driving force of Turkish democracy. This meant that Bayar considered the legislative body as the legitimate representative of the nation. In practice, during those years it was the executive, i.e. the government rather than the legislative body that held all political power. As the government was, according to Bayar, the embodiment of the nation's will, he

³⁷ The date for this note has not been mentioned.

³⁸ For instance, see Bayar's Kastamonu electoral speech on April 30, 1950 (Şahingiray, 1999b: 53).

³⁹ Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

considered any criticism of the government as an attack against the legitimacy of the executive and against the will of the nation. Consequently, during that phase Bayar considered opposition parties' criticism of the government inconsequential and at times illegitimate. He thought that the criticism of opposition parties and mainly the CHP harmed national unity and peace in the society.

This understanding made Bayar take an unfavorable attitude toward the opposition. For instance in 1960, he advised the government to take extraordinary measures and follow a courageous and dynamic policy against the opposition parties. He did not articulate the details of such a policy to the government members (Burçak, 1976: 28-29) but his remarks implied that he was in favor of strict measures. For that reason when the government tightened the press code, used the state radio in a unilateral manner for its own propaganda, forced civil servants into early retirement and prevented the opposition from forming electoral alliances, Bayar found these measures justified (Ahmad, 1977: 30).

Bayar's support to the Investigation Committee (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*) in 1960 was another example of this understanding. This Committee has been criticized as a major attack against the opposition's existence and has been pointed out as a primary example of the DP's poor track record in democracy. Bayar did not consider it this way. He thought that the Parliament had a right to establish such committees and exercise the state's judiciary function on behalf of the nation (Bozdağ 1991: 40-41). Further examples of Bayar's relations with opposition parties in 1950-1960 is provided in Chapter V throughout the discussion on his impartiality as president.

3.2.1.3 1960 and Onwards

After 1960, Bayar returned to the individual rights and freedoms discourse he had employed earlier in 1946-1950. In 1946-1950, the objective of this discourse was to achieve guarantees for the political activities of the DP members. After 1960, the driving motive of this discourse became to address the consequences of the Yassıada Tribunal's decisions. Five hundred fifty two DP members and affiliates were tried in the course of eleven months on Yassıada. Fifteen senior DP members were condemned to death sentences and three of these sentences were carried out. The rest of the death sentences were converted into lifetime imprisonment. Besides the twelve DP members sentenced to life in prison, other senior DP affiliates were also sentenced to varying prison terms. Under article 68 of the 1961 Constitution former DP members were also deprived of their rights to stand for election.

Bayar's prison sentence was pardoned in 1964 due to his failing health. However, like all former DP members, Bayar was not allowed to stand for elections (Karpaz, 2004a:59). He raised his last major political struggle to regain this right for himself and the remaining DP members. In 1973, he campaigned with the recently established Democratic Party (*Demokratik Parti*) under the leadership of Ferruh Bozbeyle because that party had promised to support his struggle to regain political rights. At the advanced age of 90, he traversed the entire country from Edirne in the west to Adana in the south to raise support for the Democratic Party.⁴⁰ Bayar did not see this struggle as party politics because he thought that political rights were actually human rights. He defined the major

⁴⁰ Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

objective of this struggle as getting equal rights with other citizens in the country (Kirişcioğlu, 1975: 31).

In this phase, Bayar continued to emphasize the will of the nation to justify his and the former DP governments' policies and acts. He did not approve of the 1961 Constitution, which he considered as a devaluation of the nation's will. The new constitution, according to Bayar, replaced the strong executive of the 1924 Constitution with a weak executive, and subjected the government to the will of the civil bureaucracy whereas the reverse was the ideal situation under democracies (Bayar, 2009: 87). Bayar counted the institutions such as the National Security Council, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (*Türk Radyo Televizyon Kurumu-TRT*), the State Planning Agency (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı-DPT*) and non-elected members of the Senate among these bureaucratic partners (Bayar, 1997: 173 Volume 8).

In line with his resistance to non-elected bodies in the political structure, Bayar declined the offer to become a member of the Republican Senate. According to the 1961 Constitution, as a former President Bayar had the right to join the Senate when his political rights were returned in 1974. In his letter dated April 28, 1974 and addressed to Tekin Arıburun, President of the Senate, Bayar wrote that he considered "...institutions such as the Senate to be in contrast with the rule of democracy" (Hüsman, 1982:107).

3.2.1.4 Bayar's Conceptualization of Democracy

Bayar's understanding of democracy introduced above through examples can be conceptualized as a majoritarian understanding of democracy.⁴¹ The defining characteristic of majoritarian democracy is its emphasis on a strong executive (Karpas 2004f: 310). In line with this majoritarian interpretation Bayar identified three ideal characteristics of Turkish democracy: (1) sovereignty belongs to the nation, (2) a plurality system is the ideal electoral system,⁴² (3) sovereignty should only be exercised by the Parliament, not by intermediary institutions such as those introduced through the 1961 Constitution (Bayar, 2009: 84).

Bayar opposed the pluralist understanding of democracy introduced with the 1961 Constitution (Mazıcı, 1996: 151). There were two reasons for this. First for Bayar democracy meant that majority was always more intelligent, moral and capable than the minority (Bayar, 1991:42). Thus, he found it unacceptable that the mandates of governments elected through national elections would be limited by the bureaucracy and institutions. Second, Bayar thought that the notion of pluralist democracy was born out of circumstances specific to Western Europe. Such democracies, according to Bayar, sought the coexistence of different political and economic classes and deliberation among these different classes was vital for the survival of these systems. Bayar thought that Turkish society was classless and for that reason he found the pluralist model of democracy to be irrelevant for Turkey (Bayar, 2009: 84).

⁴¹ For a study on the DP's interpretation of democracy with particular reference to Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, see Sütçü, 2011.

⁴² In this system, candidates who obtain the most votes get elected to parliament. In the Turkish case, the multinomial constituency was employed until 1960. For a detailed explanation of this and other electoral systems and their implementations in the Turkish case, see Özbudun, 1995.

Bayar interpreted political opposition also in line with his majoritarian understanding. His prerequisite for the opposition and opposition parties' presence was that they should work toward maintaining peace and order in society and refrain from acts, which might harm these principles. He thought that the opposition should primarily concern itself with the protection of domestic peace. Accordingly if the opposition party loses its respect for the government and if its activities lead to unrest in society, then it loses its legitimacy. Opinions of the opposition would also be taken into consideration as a custom of democracy; however, this did not necessarily imply that the government would act according to the opposition's preferences (Bozdağ, 1991: 42-43). Bayar defined the opposition parties that followed these principles as "constructive" opposition parties (Kemal, 1980: 65-66).

Bayar also placed emphasis on the freedom of expression in certain phases of his political career, for instance in 1946-1950. Bayar did not interpret freedom of expression broadly. He thought that political movements that were "harmful to the unity of the nation and safety of the regime" were not entitled to promote their views publicly and to form political parties. For instance, according to Bayar Marxists in Turkey should not have the freedom of expression because he thought that freedom of expression can only be granted if the demanding party is ready to give the same rights to other political movements. A Marxist state, he thought, would not provide such a right to other political views-thus Marxists in Turkey were not eligible for the freedom of expression. For this reason, Bayar was in favor of restrictions on the freedom of expression under certain conditions and he

was against the removal of article 141 and 142 of the Criminal Code.⁴³ He thought that the removal of these and similar regulations would be like “asking for gasoline to burn one’s own house (Bayar, 2009: 29)”.

3.2.2 Nationalism and Different Groups

In certain phases of his political life, as part of the political agenda Bayar had to address matters related to ethnic and religious groups in Turkey and in the Ottoman state. Below first examples of Bayar’s policies and activities related to these groups are taken up and second a general framework for the evaluation of these policies is presented.

3.2.2.1 Non-Muslim Communities

3.2.2.1.1 1914-1918 İzmir Mission

Bayar thought that non-Muslim communities, particularly Ottoman citizens of Greek origin, enjoyed a higher position in the social life and local economics of İzmir in comparison to Muslim Turks who lacked similar resources (Kutay, 1982: 42). He also blamed the Greek population of İzmir for collaborating with the allied powers and “repaying hundreds of years of tolerance with ungratefulness” (Kutay, 1982: 307).

⁴³ Article 141 and 142 of the Criminal Code vaguely regulated the prosecution of groups in the society that wanted to establish superiority on other groups, even in the absence of any violent acts. In practice, these articles were often invoked for leftist groups. Over the years, they have been viewed as major obstacles against the realization of free speech and were annulled in 1991.

Bayar had similar views for the Armenian community. He thought that in the nineteenth century Armenians became the “tool of European imperialist states” that sought to destroy the Ottoman state. He also thought that the mutual trust between Turks and Armenians had been destroyed due to incidents such as the 1905 assassination attempt against Sultan Abdülhamit II by an Armenian gang and the 1896 Armenian raid of the Ottoman Bank in the Galata district of Istanbul (Bayar, 1997: 41, Volume 5). Bayar considered the forcible deportation of the Armenians in 1915 as a necessary step to protect the state’s integrity (Bayar, 1997: 51, Volume 5). Bayar, as an İTC member, was also interrogated by a tribunal in İzmir convened to investigate the Armenian population’s forcible deportation. In this session, he said that he did not receive orders from the central İTC administration to deport the Armenian population of İzmir, but he pointed out that had he received such orders he would not have hesitated to implement them (Bayar, 1997: 36, Volume 5).

In sum during those years, Bayar viewed non-Muslim citizens of the Ottoman state as an impediment against the formation of a Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie and as a security threat against the state. He did not believe in the possibility of Turkish-Muslim’s and non-Muslims’ co-existence under the Ottoman state anymore. He thought that the First World War and the Turkish War of Independence had shown that the efforts to unite different ethnic groups as Ottoman citizens were futile because these ethnic groups had fundamentally different objectives. They had different histories, languages and traditions and were seeking joy in one another’s fall (Bayar 1997: 24, Volume 5).

3.2.2.1.2 The Capital Levy

Bayar had a different approach under the Republican rule. This was mainly because the Republic's borders had been secured with the internationally recognized Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and the non-Muslim population had considerably declined due to population exchanges and forcible deportations. Besides, the formation of a Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie was in order and the ownership of capital was changing hands. Consequently, non-Muslims were no longer seen as a serious security threat. Bayar updated his perspective and policies according to this new context. This change was visible in his criticism of the Capital Levy.

Despite the change in the political context and lack of any obvious threat to state's security from non-Muslim citizens, certain state policies caused injustice toward these groups. The most well-known example in the 1940s was the Capital Levy issued in 1942.⁴⁴ This was a wealth tax introduced to generate revenue for the state during the Second World War. Although the intention was to tax large property owners, big farmers and businessmen alike, in practice 65 percent of the total tax collected came from non-Muslims. Often a non-Muslim taxpayer paid ten times more tax than a Muslim Turkish taxpayer (Lewis, 1974: 135). The taxation commission unilaterally decided on the amount to be demanded and there were no recourse or appeal mechanisms against these decisions. The amount demanded could be many times more than the assets owned by the taxpayer (Findley, 2010: 266). The Capital Levy was put to an end with a law introduced on March 15, 1944. The 1944 regulation wrote off the remaining debt and ended the forced

⁴⁴ For an analysis of the Capital Levy from the perspective of British diplomats, see Bali 2012.

labor service in Aşkale for those who could not afford to pay their taxes (Lewis, 1974: 135).

When the Capital Levy bill was voted upon in the Parliament on November 11, 1942, Bayar was absent and thus, he did not vote in favor or against it (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 5, Vol: 28: 35). However, being absent from the Parliament during a voting session was considered a no vote in those days.⁴⁵ Seventy six deputies were absent from the Parliament during that day (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 5, Vol: 28: 33). On December 23, 1943 Bayar submitted a proposal to the CHP Parliamentary Assembly to end this taxation (Koçak, 1990: 131-132). In a speech defending his proposal, Bayar pointed out that taxation based on wealth was an outdated approach. It was not in accordance with an understanding of modern state and the principle of just taxation. Bayar concluded his speech by saying that the Capital Levy was unconstitutional and would be a cause of shame in the days to come (Bozdağ, 2005: 104). Later in 1946, Bayar criticized the consequences of the Capital Levy and argued that citizens should not be imprisoned due to tax debts and that they should be treated equally in sharing the tax burden. Even under extraordinary circumstances such as war, the tax burden, Bayar argued, should be distributed in a just manner (Şahingiray, 1999b: 73). However, Bayar did not refer to different ethnicities in any of his criticisms against the Capital Levy. Even if he might have thought that the taxation caused injustice against the non-Muslims, he did not reflect this thought explicitly in his public criticism.

⁴⁵ Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

3.2.2.1.3 The 1954 United States Visit

The DP often maintained close ties with the non-Muslim citizens in Turkey and the communities abroad that migrated from Turkey or from the Ottoman state earlier. In return non-Muslim Turkish citizens widely became DP supporters (Bali, 2004: 14). Ten non-Muslim Turkish citizens were elected to the Parliament from the DP list in 1950-1960 (Bali, 2009: 63).⁴⁶

These close ties were evident during Bayar's visit to the United States in 1954. In this visit, he received a warm welcome from Armenian, Greek and Jewish communities that organized dinners and meetings in his honor (Bali, 2004: 16). These communities had high hopes from the DP government on a number of issues such as the repayment of Capital Lexy funds. In the case of the Jewish community, they wished to make a contribution in the improvement of the relations between Israel and Turkey (Bali, 2004:16).

In the meeting organized by the Jewish American Committee on January 31, 1954, Bayar praised the Turkish Jews as "good" citizens of Turkey and said that "...regardless of religious and ethnic differences, we count each citizen as a Turk and give [him/her all the benefits] of Turkish citizenship" (Şahingiray, 1999d:114).

In the meeting organized by the Greek American community on January 30, 1954, Bayar did not refer to the ethnic Greeks, in other words, Rum citizens of Turkey. Instead he emphasized that all the citizens of Turkey enjoyed equal rights. He highlighted the close relations between Greece and Turkey and their common interests as the "children of the Mediterranean" (Şahingiray, 1999d: 113).

⁴⁶ Only two non-Muslim deputies were elected to the Parliament from the CHP lists during the single party years (Bali, 2009: 63).

Bayar's 1954 visit also complements the observation that he updated his approach toward non-Muslim citizens of Turkey and stopped defining them as security threats or as obstacles against the formation of a Muslim Turkish bourgeoisie.

3.2.2.1.4 September 6-7, 1955 Events

The outbreak of the September 6-7, 1955 troubles leading to lootings of non-Muslim property in Turkey's major cities constituted an exception to the harmonious relations between non-Muslim Turkish citizens and the DP governments. Cyprus had become a major issue for the Turkish government from 1954 onwards. Greece had raised its voice to end the British rule on the island and started advocating the island's unification with Athens (Findley, 2010: 310). The First London Conference was convened during August 20 - September 7, 1955 to discuss the status of the island.⁴⁷ In order to create public pressure on the London conference, the Turkish government secretly encouraged rallies against the Greek ambitions (Karpat, 2004a: 42-43; Ahmad, 1977: 54). However, on September 6 initially peaceful demonstration of high school and university students soon degenerated into a mob riot. Non-Muslims suffered considerable financial losses due to this rampage that came about in September 6-7, 1955.

Bayar's role in the organization of the initial protests has been widely disputed. According to the reports of the French and British consulates in Istanbul, Bayar was among the conspirators of these incidents (Güven, 2005: 73). Reports also mentioned Deputy Prime Minister Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, Minister of Interior

⁴⁷ The conference dissolved without any significant achievements.

Affairs Namık Gedik, and Governor of Istanbul Fahrettin Kerim Gökay among other conspirators (Güven, 2005: 73). Bayar himself did not comment on this issue and provide any explanations for his role.

The legal jurisdiction that followed the incident remained insufficient to prosecute the looters. A number of “communists” including Aziz Nesin, Kemal Tahir and Asım Bezirci were arrested for their alleged role in the riots but they were released soon (Çandar, 1995: 53). There were also others tried by courts. In all cases the decisions were taken in favor of the defendants (Güven, 2005: 56). Due to the troubles that the riots provoked within the DP group, several ministers and eventually the third Menderes cabinet as a whole resigned, with the exception of the Prime Minister himself (Albayrak, 2004: 2).

The government’s and president’s role in these circumstances became an issue of the Yassıada trials too. In the end, a non-prosecution (*takipsizlik kararı*) decision was taken for Bayar as it could not be proved that he was linked to the riots (Demirer, 1995: 342).⁴⁸

Bayar expressed his disappointment and frustration about the riots on many occasions. He was deeply moved when he witnessed the damage caused by these attacks.⁴⁹ In a press conference held at the governor’s office after the attacks, he pointed out that Turkey owed its place among European and other world nations to its “civilized” character. These incidents were “uncivilized” and they did not suit the Turkish nation (Erer, 1963: 255). In the Parliament opening speech he delivered on November 1, 1955 Bayar defined these riots as the worst incident of the previous year and said that the aggressors would receive the

⁴⁸ Adnan Menderes, Fatih Rüştü Zorlu and Governor of İzmir Kemal Hadımlı were found guilty for planning the riots.

⁴⁹ Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

appropriate sentences (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 10, Vol: 8: 7). On September 10, 1955 an aid committee was established under Bayar's patronage. The committee aimed to increase the flow of aid for those who had suffered from the attacks and make immediate payments to the affected lower income groups (Güven, 2005:41).

3.2.2.2 Muslim Communities

3.2.2.2.1 The Kurdish Population

Bayar did not use the word Kurd in any of his writings or public speeches. He referred to Kurdish originated citizens Turkey as "Turkish people living in the Eastern parts of Turkey (Toktaş, 2007: 136)". He maintained this approach throughout his political career.

This preference also reveals Bayar's overall approach to the Kurdish issue. He did not consider the revolts in the east of the country from 1925 onwards, such as the Sheik Said (1925) and Dersim (1937-1938) uprisings, as ethnically motivated. He thought that these revolts had been triggered by the economic and social backwardness of the region and the hardships that such backwardness caused.

His remedy to what he interpreted as the problems of economic and social backwardness and the revolts these problems triggered was a two-tiered strategy. The first aspect was related to addressing the developmental and economic shortcomings through governmental policies. The second aspect of this strategy was related to the immediate security concerns that revolts caused.

The economy and development oriented approach of this strategy could best be observed in the Eastern Report that Bayar wrote as Minister of Economics in 1936. In the first part of this report, Bayar provided his interpretation of the problems in the east of the country.⁵⁰ He observed that the Republican regime had not been fully consolidated in these regions (Mazıcı, 1996: 159-160). Bayar pointed out that maintaining the support and allegiance of people in the east would require considerable state investment. The way to consolidate the Republican regime was to work for the economic and social development of the region through supporting education and investment as well as by providing the citizens in the east of the country with proper land and the means to cultivate the lands. He was opposed to the views that excluded the Kurdish originated citizens from state employment and education (Mazıcı, 1996: 159-162). Highlighting the ethnic differences and alienating people in the east on ethnic grounds would only make matters worse for the consolidation of the republican regime.

Elsewhere, Bayar summarized his analysis of the Dersim revolt as follows:

..As prime minister I followed the Tunceli incidents closely.⁵¹ My observations affirmed my former opinions. Most of these troubles can be solved through the introduction of employment opportunities. On the surface, these [Dersim] incidents might appear of a different nature [than economic]. I decided that the state should do everything to rehabilitate the surroundings of Dersim. We shall not abandon these people living in mountainous regions. We shall find lands that will make them happy in our spacious Turkey. There are industrial regions where thousands of workers can be employed (*Millet* weekly, December 19, 1946).

⁵⁰ Complete text of this report has been published as an appendix to Nurşen Mazıcı's *Celal Bayar, Başbakanlık Dönemi: 1937-1939*. The references to this report are taken from Mazıcı's appendix.

⁵¹ The name of Dersim was changed into Tunceli with a law issued in 1935. In the quoted piece Bayar uses Dersim and Tunceli interchangeably.

Here Bayar identified the main problem in Dersim as lack of employment opportunities. The solution was to introduce these opportunities through investments in the region. If these investments would fail, Bayar supported the relocation of people from Dersim to other areas of the country as a way to increase employment.

The second aspect of his strategy was toward pressing security concerns during revolts. Bayar defended the repression of the revolts by military means and without compromises. For instance in his address to the Parliament on June 29, 1938 as prime minister, Bayar mentioned the necessity of further military operations to suppress the ongoing Dersim revolt (1937-1939). He defined the Dersim rebels as enemies of the Republican regime. He also stated that the military would continue its operations until the rebels gave up their pursuits (Şahingiray, 1999a:355). Nevertheless Bayar was against sustaining this militarist approach during peacetime. He emphasized that military measures should be abandoned once the uprising was over (Mazıçı, 1996: 159-160).

Bayar's approach to the Kurdish issue and Kurds did not change substantially in the multiparty phase. In his election campaign speeches, he did not make any references to Kurdish ethnicity but he highlighted the individual rights and freedom abuses that took place in the eastern regions. These rights abuses were often results of the arbitrary behavior of state officers in the eastern regions.⁵² Bayar also promised to end the extraordinary legislations and

⁵² See Heper and Yiğit, 2012.

administrative decisions implemented particularly in this region (Şahingiray, 1999b: 178).⁵³

During the election campaigns, Bayar also praised the people from the East for certain characteristics. For instance on October 5, 1947 in his Erzurum speech Bayar praised the people of the Eastern region as “courageous and heroic defenders of the borders” (Şahingiray, 1999b: 171). In another Erzurum speech, he further highlighted the issue of defending the borders and said that all citizens were “carved out of the same wood” and that they were all equally patriotic (Şahingiray, 1999b: 177). In his Diyarbakır speech on May 6, 1950, Bayar expressed his fascination with the fact that the people from this region had converted to Islam at its inception. As such, they represented Islam and Turkish identity in the states that had previously been established in that region (Şahingiray, 1999b: 58). It can be argued that Bayar emphasized common religion to avoid issues related to different ethnicities. For this reason he made frequent references to Islam and to the religiosity of the “Eastern people”.

3.2.2.2.2 The Alevi Community

Issues related to the Alevi community did not occupy the mainstream political agenda during Bayar’s active time in politics. Consequently, Bayar rarely referred to the Alevi community in his public discourse and writings. His only firsthand contact with the Alevi community had been during the Turkish War of

⁵³ Among these extraordinary practices, the Inspectorates General (*Umumi Müfettişlikler*) and the forceful resettlements should be mentioned. The inspectorates were established mainly in the Eastern regions in 1927, following the lifting of the martial law imposed after the Shaikh Said revolt. Their main objective was to provide order in the region. In 1927 and 1934, two laws were legislated to resettle certain residents of the eastern regions who were thought to be involved in the revolts. See Heper and Yiğit, 2012 and Koçak, 2003.

Independence while he was serving as the commander of the Akhisar front in 1919. When he noticed the lack of volunteers from among Alevis on the front, he elaborated on its reasons and visited Alevi villages to motivate them to send volunteers. When he asked why they did not have volunteers joining the national fight, the villagers replied that they would have joined the struggle had they been asked before. Bayar understood that the Alevi community's hesitation was due to the Sunni-Alevi tension, which he found to be meaningless. The next day, volunteers from the village joined the independence forces (Bayar 1997: 27, Volume 8). While commenting on this matter in his memoirs, Bayar wrote that Alevis had "pure Turkish blood" (Bayar 1997: 27, Volume 8). In this case, he followed a similar discourse to the one when he referred to Kurds but he reversed it and highlighted ethnicity as the common denominator instead.

3.2.2.3 Bayar's Conceptualization of Nationalism

Bayar was an ardent nationalist. As the examples provided above support, Bayar depended on forms of civic and to a lesser extent cultural nationalism (Heper, 2007: 126). His description of nationalism shows how he combined civic and cultural elements in his understanding:

“..accepting all the citizens living within the borders of the Republic as Turks regardless of their sectarian and ethnic differences, giving them equal rights as Turkish citizens, viewing each citizen who fulfills the requirements of the law with good intentions, also watching these principles in practice, rejecting all the separatist movements and depending on common culture and common goals” (Bayar, 1997:80, Volume 2).

In the first part, Bayar pointed out that sectarian and ethnic differences do not matter. However, he ended his description with an emphasis on common culture, which can be interpreted to refer to common religion as well.

Despite the fact that he referred to culture and ethnicity/race occasionally, Bayar did not have a radical approach. He thought that under the republican rule religious and ethnic bonds among the people had been replaced with the bonds of being a nation and he considered racist movements such as Turanism detrimental to that unity, which he placed before anything else. (Bayar, 2009: 94). Common denominators, i.e. common religion in the case of Kurds and common ethnicity in the case of Alevis, were nevertheless important for Bayar because he thought they also were instrumental in keeping the population together. In the case of non-Muslim Turkish citizens, the common denominator was citizenship which Bayar expressed through a discourse of equal rights and freedoms in the Republican era. If these denominators for any of the mentioned groups were lost or forgotten, Bayar feared that it would disrupt peace and harmony in society.

Bayar's understanding of nationalism also had a strong economic component. He defined his objective as bringing the achievements of economic nationalism to the level of the achievements of political nationalism.⁵⁴ The central achievement of political nationalism was the establishment of the Republic following the victory in the Turkish War of Independence. The economic aspect of nationalism would be the formation of a Muslim and Turkish business class. However, Bayar thought that the economic base of the Republic was not yet strong enough. As explained earlier in this chapter and elsewhere in this study, he had specific methods to promote economic growth. Beyond these policy-oriented

⁵⁴ Tülay Duran, online correspondence, April 2, 2012.

methods, Bayar considered believing in the capacities of Turkish people as a way to bring about growth. For instance while recruiting employees for the İş Bank he paid particular attention to make his choices from among the Muslim Turks rather than the non-Muslim Turkish citizens who already had considerable experience in the banking sector (Kocatürk, 1986). Bayar thought that the Turkish people had to be given chances to increase their capacities in several fields.

Lastly, there was an emotional component in Bayar's interpretation of nationalism. He considered protecting the "honor" and the reputation of his nation against foreigners also as nationalism. Once while he was working at the Bursa Deutsche Orient Bank, two police officers came to take him for an interrogation on his activities at the İTC. When the German manager of the bank stopped the police officers, saying that the bank was working under the German flag and that it was thus German territory, Bayar felt offended. He arrived at the conclusion that it was among his duties to save the country from the capitulations that gave birth to such privileges. He did not accept the manager's offer to help and left with the police officers (Barlas, May 19, 1982, *Milliyet* daily).

3.2.3 Secularism

Bayar valued the principle of secularism and he interpreted it, simply put, as the separation of religious and political affairs (Şahingiray, 1999c: 53). He considered the principle of secularism compatible with Turkish society and customs. According to him, all the Turkish states established earlier in Anatolia and Central Asia were secular and religion was excluded from state affairs. Contrary to theocratic regimes where the state was subjected to religion, Bayar

thought religion had been under state control in the Turkish case (Bayar, 2009: 97-98). Besides its conceptual political meaning, for Bayar secularism also meant commitment to Atatürk and his political legacy.⁵⁵

Bayar expressed his commitment to secularism, but he was often not in a position to pursue policies on matters related to the practice of secularism. During his time as prime minister there had been no controversial domestic incidents that would have led to a manifestation of his interpretation of secularism. On the other hand as president he had no executive powers to devise policies on political matters. As Chapter V of this study discusses, contrary to the constitutional arrangement Bayar was in fact involved in governmental affairs. However, his involvement was not on the issues related to secularism. Yet irrespective of his position, Bayar commented on issues and policies related to secularism on many occasions. Some of them are exemplified below.

During the founding days of the DP, one of the issues that President İnönü considered important was the opposition party's commitment to secularism. In that regard, Bayar was able to convince İnönü that the DP would maintain and protect the principle of secularism (Heper, 1998: 185). In line with this understanding with İnönü, Bayar emphasized the risks of the exploitation of religion for political purposes. Bayar respected the religion of people and their rights to exercise their religious beliefs, but as he pointed out in the 1949 Second DP Grand Party Congress, religious fundamentalist movements could cause disastrous outcomes for the country (Bayar in Aysal, 2004: 449).

⁵⁵ This point has been brought up in the interviews with Mehmet Arif Demirer, phone interview, February 28, 2012 and Tülay Duran, online correspondence, April 2, 2012.

Bayar's cautious approach to religion had been criticized in 1946-1950 by certain intellectuals who expected him to be more accommodating. For instance, an Islamist intellectual and an acquaintance of Bayar, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904-1983) criticized Bayar for grounding his opposition to the CHP on matters of individual freedoms and the rule of democracy and for being distant to the cause of Islam (1970: 56). In a similar vein, novelist Halide Edip Adıvar (1884-1964) also implored Bayar to clarify his position on issues such as including further religion classes in the curriculum and turning the Directorate for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) into an independent body.⁵⁶ Adıvar criticized Bayar for keeping quiet on these issues as she expected him to adopt a welcoming approach (Nal, 2005: 144).

Bayar's cautious approach continued in 1950-1960. As detailed in Chapter II of this study, the DP had an instrumental approach to religion in 1950-1960. Bayar interpreted certain policies adopted in that phase as a necessity and he did not think that they were in contradiction to secularism. For instance on the conversion of the call to prayer (*ezan*) from Turkish to Arabic Bayar thought that there was already a contradiction in the previous practice as the prayers in the mosque were cited in Arabic and yet it was forbidden to have the call to prayer in Arabic (Atay et al., November 12, 2007).⁵⁷ According to Bayar, the DP merely put an end to this contradiction.

Besides, Bayar did not refrain from voicing his criticism when he thought that the DP or Menderes did not pay enough attention to protect secularism

⁵⁶ She was elected to the Parliament from the DP list in 1950 and remained a parliamentarian until 1954.

⁵⁷ On June 16, 1950, the article 526 of the Criminal Code was revised and the ban was lifted by the votes of both the CHP and the DP deputies (Albayrak, 2004:197).

(Karpat, 2011: 135). For instance in 1951, dozens of Atatürk busts and sculptures were damaged by the members of a religious fundamentalist group. A draft law criminalizing these attacks was prepared. However, it was taking some time for the DP to bring the legislation to vote in the Parliament. Bayar was troubled with the delay in the legislation of this draft and said that if the Parliament did not act immediately, he would resign from office and from DP membership.⁵⁸ In the end, the law numbered 5816 and titled Assaults against Atatürk's Personality was legislated in 1951. This law was not related particularly to secularism but as already mentioned Bayar often used Atatürk and secularism interchangeably in his political discourse. In other words, whenever he referred to secularism, he also meant Atatürk's political legacy.

In another case during a 1954 election campaign speech in Konya, Menderes criticized the single party governments' approach to religion. He thought that there were still certain restrictions remaining from that period and promised to lift them.⁵⁹ When it was Bayar's turn to speak, he gave a speech in the opposite direction and said that no one should oppose any of Atatürk's principles. He concluded that Muslims in Turkey were free to practice their religion. However, concessions from the principle of secularism would be disastrous. Menderes was offended and he left Konya without waiting for the President (Bağlum, 1991:190).

Bayar maintained his emphasis on secularism after his executive leadership position ended in 1960. For instance, one of the reasons for his criticism of the 1961 Constitution was due to the freedom of expression that the

⁵⁸ Interview with Mehmet Arif Demirer, phone interview, February 28, 2012.

⁵⁹ Menderes did not specify these restrictions in this speech.

new constitution provided for religious sects. He thought that Islamists exploited this opportunity and religion became a matter of everyday politics (Bayar, 200: 102).

3.2.4 The Army's Role in National Politics

As a former İTC member, Bayar was aware of the army's potential to get involved in political affairs. The İTC cadres, on both senior and junior levels had been filled with officers from various ranks. Their membership in the İTC resulted in the military's involvement in the Ottoman politics and government, as the İTC controlled the Ottoman state in 1908-1918.⁶⁰ Bayar considered the İTC's involvement in government affairs through its officer members as an outcome of the political context and he approved of it to keep the state united and to reform it (Bayar, 2009: 46).

However, he did not see the Republican context in a similar light. He thought that the military did not have a role to play in Republican politics beyond its task to protect the regime and the borders against threats (Altuğ, June 16, 1981, *Tercüman* daily; Bayar, 2009: 164). The army should by all means be subject to the Parliament's will and control (Altuğ, June 16, 1981, *Tercüman* daily; Bayar, 2009: 164).

Bayar expressed his trust in the army as a state organ, yet he was alert to the threats of its politicization. His reaction to the nine officers incident detailed in Chapter II of this study is one example of his caution. When the conspirators of this plot against the government were uncovered in 1957, Bayar tried hard to

⁶⁰ For the details of through which channels the İTC exercised its control on Ottoman policies, see Tunçay, 1990: 27-52.

convince the government members to investigate the matter closely. He warned Minister of Justice Celal Yardımcı that this plot was likely to be rooted in the army beyond the nine officers (Yardımcı, 1982: 209). But Bayar could not convince the government of the scale of this threat (Ağaoglu, 1972:143). When these officers were acquitted due to lack of evidence Bayar found it unacceptable (Lewis, 1974:151; Bozdağ 1991: 55) but as president, there was not much he could do against it.

As a politician overthrown by military intervention, Bayar was in principle against the military's involvement in politics. However in practice he interpreted the interventions (1960, 1971, 1980) according to the nature of the political context. It was his political principles that dictated him to consider unity and peace in society above anything else. Thus, there is need to elaborate on his approach to military interventions in Turkey separately.

Bayar was entirely against the 1960 intervention. He blamed three sets of forces for it (Atay et al., November 10, 2007). The first one was the USSR. In his opinion Turkish policy toward the USSR had shifted with DP rule and NATO membership.⁶¹ Bayar thought that the USSR plotted to reverse this relation between Turkey and NATO. The second force was what Bayar called the İsmet İnönü factor. Bayar thought that İnönü always regretted the DP victory and had

⁶¹ Bayar's interpretation of the DP's USSR policy does not hold true for all of the DP phase. For instance, in 1960 the DP was trying to build closer ties with the USSR mainly due to the hope of getting financial credits. It has been noted by Üner Kırdar that Menderes had sent his father Lütfü Kırdar, Minister of Health at the time, to the USSR in order to start building closer relations starting with cooperation in the health sector. Üner Kırdar noted that Menderes himself was planning a trip in July 1960. Üner Kırdar, online correspondence, April 30, 2012. Mehmet Arif Demirel also pointed out that the DP was trying to develop friendlier relations with the USSR in 1960. Interview with Mehmet Arif Demirel, phone interview, February 28, 2012.

difficulty in accepting it.⁶² Thirdly, he held the military conspirators, junta responsible. He thought that the presence of these forces made it impossible for him to prevent the intervention from occurring (Barlas, May 18, 1982, *Milliyet* daily).

Bayar also raised his voice against the March 12, 1971 Memorandum, which forced the government into resignation. He compared the officers who planned and implemented this intervention to the Ottoman janissaries who overthrew viziers and grand viziers. The difference was that the conspirators of March 12 relied upon the National Security Council to impose the army's will on the elected government, whereas the janissaries depended on brute force to displace viziers and grand viziers (Bayar, 2009: 89-90).

Bayar had a different opinion of the 1980 military intervention. The day that the intervention took place his grandson Demirtaş Bayar was with him. Bayar told his grandson that a military intervention is the worst thing to happen in a country. However, he also pointed out that it put an end to the anarchy in society, which could not be overcome otherwise.⁶³ He also thought that the 1980 intervention was different from the 1960 intervention because the military's line of command was not broken. The intervention was planned and carried out by senior officers in contrast to the 1960 intervention, which had been planned and carried out by junior officers.⁶⁴ Because of these factors, Bayar supported the 1980 intervention.

⁶² This view also does not stand viable when İnönü's leading role in the transformation to the multiparty system is considered. Yet it is true that the CHP was taken by surprise by the DP's electoral victory in 1950.

⁶³ Interview with Demirtaş Bayar, Istanbul, June 19, 2012.

⁶⁴ Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

Yet, he also stood against certain practices of the military that he considered undemocratic. He wrote a letter to Chief of Staff Kenan Evren, before the referendum in 1982 took place. In this letter, Bayar asked Evren to reconsider the referendum because in it the electorate was asked to vote for the new constitution and the presidential candidate Kenan Evren simultaneously.⁶⁵

3.2.5 (Anti) Communism

Anti-communism occupied an important place in Bayar's political discourse. Especially during the later years of his life, he perceived Communism as the greatest threat the country was facing. Bayar had different encounters with Communism and communist circles in his political life. Below some of these encounters are discussed and the reasons for Bayar's emphasis on Communism are highlighted.

It has been claimed that Bayar was a member of the Green Army (Yeşil Ordu Cemiyeti), a resistance movement against the Allied occupation of Anatolia with communist and Islamist inclinations alike (Şenşekerci, 2000: 84-85).⁶⁶ However Bayar denied this claim and argued that he had close friends who were members of the Green Army and he often visited them. He thought his visits might have caused rumors of membership (Kocatürk, 1986).

It has also been claimed that Bayar was a member of the Communist Party. The Communist Party was established in 1920 on Atatürk's demands to increase the flow of aid from the Russians to the Turkish War of Independence (Mazıcı, 1996: 6) and to decrease the influence of the Green Army movement

⁶⁵ Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

⁶⁶ The movement dissolved the same year. For more on the Green Army, see Arslan, 2001.

(Şenşekerci, 2000: 86). Bayar denied such an affiliation. He explained that Atatürk had asked him to become a member of the Communist Party but that he did not act according to Atatürk's wish at that point. His new assignment as Minister of Economics in 1921, Bayar thought, would not leave time for other activities (Mazıcı, 1996: 7-8). Allegations of Bayar's membership in the Green Army or the Communist movement could not so far be proved through proper documentation.

In the 1920s and the 1930s Bayar did not have the anti-communist emphasis that later became so predominant in his political discourse. During these years, as already evaluated in Chapter II of this study, Turkey and the USSR had friendly relations. In line with the overall state policy, Bayar was also emphasizing ties with the USSR. For instance as the minister of economics he announced the signing of a new credit agreement worth 8 million dollars to the Parliament on May 12, 1934 referring to "our Russian friends" (Şahingiray, 1999a: 206). In those years, besides these technical cooperation issues, he rarely referred to communism and the USSR.

It can be argued that until 1946, Bayar maintained this position. He did not define Communism as a threat to Turkey and he even had some contacts with leftist circles. For instance, leftist publisher and political activist Sabiha Sertel (1895-1968) noted having discussed matters of foreign policy and domestic politics with Celal Bayar in 1942 (Sertel, 1966: 254). Likewise in 1945 during the founding days of the DP, Bayar and certain other affiliates such as Tevfik Rüştü Aras and Adnan Menderes got in contact with both Sabiha Sertel and her husband, Zekeriya Sertel, also a publisher and political activist. They wanted to discuss the possibilities of publishing a magazine for the presentation of the new party's

opinions. These contacts are confirmed in both Sertels' memoirs.⁶⁷ It was decided that the *Görüşler* (Opinions) magazine that the couple launched on December 1, 1945 could be a good venue for the expression of the new party's agenda. Bayar, Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü decided to contribute to the second issue. Bayar had promised to grant an interview, Köprülü and Menderes would write articles.

When the first issue of the *Görüşler* was published, the tone of criticism in the magazine caused uproar in the government. On December 4, 1945 the Tan Press House, owned by the Sertels became the target of a mob attack and was completely burnt down.⁶⁸ Bayar and his colleagues put an immediate end to their cooperation and publicly declared that contrary to the announcements made by the publishers in the first issue they did not intend to contribute to the *Görüşler* magazine (Kabacalı, 1994: 186-188; Sertel, 1968: 266; Sertel, 1966: 332).

Bayar did not refer to the content or framework of this initial cooperation between the Sertels and the DP founders in any of his writings or interviews. He only pointed out that the "rumors" of cooperation between the DP and the Sertels were exaggerated and that the "allegations" of these initial talks were of no consequence (Şahingiray, 1999b: 470). Also in rather vague terms, he claimed that during the establishment of the DP, communists tried to infiltrate the DP organization without any success (Bozdağ, 1991: 29). He did not mention the Sertels in this remark but he was most likely referring to them as this cooperation was heavily criticized later.

⁶⁷ See Sertel, 1966: 298-300 and Sertel, 1968: 262.

⁶⁸ The conspirators of this raid have not been found out. The group that attacked the establishment was a mixed crowd of university students and mostly rightwing protestors. None of the aggressors were tried in court.

After the Tan incident and also with the Cold War becoming the defining reality of the international context, Bayar's emphasis on anti-Communism started to build up. In 1950-1960 as president he defined Communism as one of the greatest domestic and international threats to the Turkish nation, the state and the regime. Bayar did not identify separate communist groups. He viewed the communist movement in Turkey as a unified bloc and at times identified the press and the opposition as members of this bloc (Şenşekerci, 2000: 242). For instance in 1978 he accused the CHP of being used by the communists (Bayar, 2009: 199-205).

Bayar was aware that his emphasis might seem an exaggeration but he defended his views by saying that although there was only a handful communists in Turkey, their influence extended beyond their numbers. He thought that the significance of communists and Communism in Turkey was due to the USSR's support behind them (Bozdağ, 1991: 52).

Bayar maintained the same approach in the 1970s and the 1980s. During those years he viewed some of the topics discussed in the society as communist manipulation. For instance, he considered the attempts of purification the Turkish language in the 1970s as a communist plot to destabilize the bonds among members society and to damage the relations between people in the Turkish speaking Soviet Republics and Turkey (Bozdağ, 1991: 108).

He also feared physical Soviet aggression against Turkey. When the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Bayar sent a letter to the Shah of Iran and warned him that the next target of a Soviet assault could be Iran. He was also worried that after Iran, Turkey might also become a victim of Soviet pursuits. Bayar thought

that the source of this threat was the USSR's ambition to take over the Turkish straits as a gateway to the Mediterranean and beyond.⁶⁹

In the last analysis, Bayar's approach to Communism in Turkey resulted from his interpretation of the international political context. For Bayar, the USSR was the greatest threat to the regime and to the unity of the nation.⁷⁰ To what extent did his interpretation match with the actual political situation? It can be argued that Bayar's interpretation of the Soviet threat and his fear of a communist takeover in Turkey was an exaggeration. Turkey had certain political left or even communist movements but none of these transformed into major political movements with a wide support base in society.⁷¹

3.3 Final Remarks: An Assessment of Bayar's Political Views and Political Experience

Depending on the discussion introduced above, two overarching principles that shaped Bayar's political decisions and acts can be mentioned. These principles were his emphasis on the unity of the nation on the one hand and the domestic as well as the international security of the state on the other. Bayar interpreted political circumstances that he had to react to or comment upon through the lenses of these two principles. He was willing to disregard a number of other ideals, such as pluralism in politics, in order to ensure these objectives.

⁶⁹ Interview with Tülay Duran, online correspondence, April 2, 2012.

⁷⁰ Fear of communism was shared by Turkey's allies. For instance, in the USA anti-communist rhetoric had grown very strong after the end of the Second World War. What came to be known as the McCarthy phase (1950-1954), named after senator Joseph McCarthy, witnessed a wave of arrests and public campaigns against those who were thought to be communists.

⁷¹ For an evaluation of the leftist movements in Turkey from a multitude of perspectives, see Gültekingil, 2008.

The section on Bayar's interpretation of democracy provides an extensive discussion of the ideals Bayar was ready to overlook.

The next question is why Bayar adopted these specific principles; in other words from where these principles originated. It can be argued that Bayar's personal and political experience rendered these principles important to him. Particularly, his family's flight from Plevna and their resettling in Umurbey, Bursa might have had a crucial impact in shaping Bayar's political perspective. Other similar land losses of the Ottoman state might have also further highlighted Bayar's sensitivities in this matter. The theme of loss of homelands was a common trauma for Bayar's generation. It has been documented that almost half of the Republic's core political leaders came from the lands that were recently lost due to wars (Zürcher, 2005: 383).

Later on this common trait evolved into what came to be referred as the "Sèvres Syndrome". The Sèvres Treaty (1920) was signed following the Ottoman defeat at the First World War between the Ottoman State and the Allied powers. It distributed the remaining Ottoman lands among different ethnicities living previously under the Ottoman state and left to ethnic Turks only a small homeland in the heart of Anatolia. Although the Treaty was never ratified, it is believed that it further strengthened the republican leaders' emphasis on territorial unity enhanced their sensitivities against land losses. This is believed to affect later policy actions and choices. The combination of the Ottoman State's land losses, personal tragedies that these losses inflicted upon the republican elites and the Sèvres Treaty led the founders of the Republic to assume that there were external and internal enemies that could pose threats to the Republic's existence. Second World War and the Cold War also contributed to increasing the state's threat

perceptions. Nevertheless their sensitivities were not addressed at reclaiming the lost lands. They were more interested in protecting the new homeland Anatolia (Zürcher, 2005: 388).

Such a focus helps to understand, for instance, how Bayar's fears of the Soviet aggression transformed into extreme anti-Communism and why he preferred a majoritarian rather than a pluralist democracy. Likewise it also explains why he supported the 1980 military intervention.

Where did this particular perception of politics situate Bayar among the Turkish political actors? The latter actors can be categorized as state elites and political elites. The state elites, including bureaucratic and military elites and the leading members of the single-party establishment (1923-1946), had been the non-elected actors decisive in a number of vital affairs of the state. This group had been most influential in undertaking major Westernizing reforms in the early years of the Republic and later established itself as the guardians of the reforms and what they considered to be the long-term interests of the country (Heper and Keyman, 1998: 259; Heper, 2002:140; Heper, 1985).

The political elites emerged on a major scale after the state elites introduced multiparty rule and they were the victors of the elections. As opposed to state elites who described themselves as defenders of the long-term interests of the nation and state, the political elites considered their role as defending more particularistic interests (Heper, 2002: 140). In political practice, after 1950 the political elites adopted the motto of "national will against the state's will" (Heper and Keyman, 1998: 260). It can be suggested that the political elites' objective

was promoting the interests of various groups in the society, sometimes at the expense of other groups.

These two factions antagonized each other during the 1950s due to disagreements on a number of topics. The major political conflicts of the 1950s have already been detailed above and it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to study these conflicts from the perspectives of the state elites and the political elites. Here it should only be stated that the state elites became critical of the DP's economic policy of providing incentives to foreign investors and became suspicious of certain other DP policies that they considered to be anti-secularist (Heper and Keyman, 1998: 264). The political elites for their part recognized this challenge from the state elite and responded with a number of measures, such as introducing restrictions on the channels that made the bureaucracy's political engagement possible. The DP's attacks against the CHP throughout the 1950s can also be considered in association with the DP's stance against the state elites, because within the DP discourse the CHP was perceived as state elites.

In his political career from 1937 to 1960 Bayar was associated with both the state elites and the political elites. Although Bayar challenged established views on the economy during the single -party period, on more substantive political issues, such as nationalism and secularism, he did not oppose the state elites. Besides, Bayar was not only a long time CHP member but he was also emotionally attached to that party to a considerable extent. When the disagreements among the CHP members surfaced on the question of the Memorandum of the Four (*Dörtlü Takrir*) in 1945 and eventually led to the establishment of the DP, Bayar did not immediately resign from the party. He

resigned from Parliament instead. He went through a considerable pain before resigning from the CHP.

In the later part of his career, Bayar maintained certain characteristics of the state elites in his political thinking, although he was categorically a member of the political elite during the multi-party period. Bayar's in between position was especially obvious in his understanding of the role of the state. Bayar, like the state elites, placed the state at the center of his political thinking. In his interpretation, Turkish society was "classless," and the state occupied the central place in these "classless societies". Similar to the state elites, he considered the state as the only "motor of modernization and progress" (Zürcher, 1992: 246).

However, Bayar's understanding of the state's role resembled to that of the political elites. His emphasis on the state did not mean a strong bureaucracy that controls the state; rather, he maintained that the bureaucracy should be subject to the government's will. In his opinion, if there was no harmony between the bureaucracy and the state in terms of objectives and ideals, there would be chaos, as in the last years of the Ottoman state (Bayar, 2009: 90). In that matter, i.e. how to bring about a powerful state, Bayar diverged from the state elites. For him, the way to achieve this was to have a strong parliament, not a strong bureaucracy. Consequently, Bayar also diverged from the state elites in his take to the question of who would exercise state power, the bureaucracy or the elected political elite? Bayar supported the latter option.

Bayar's understanding of democracy provides additional grounds for placing him among the political elites. He was against institutions such as the Senate or the Constitutional Court that limited the powers of the executive and of

the legislative, because in his view non-elected elites should have had less power than the elected ones.

It should nevertheless once again be highlighted that Bayar did not qualify completely as a political elite because he did not side with state elites on all issues. As noted above, he did support the 1980 military intervention. This is a rather strong contradiction for a politician who placed the will of the nation before anything else. In matters such as secularism, nationalism and perceptions of the security of the state, Bayar's thoughts were not unlike to those of the state elites.

CHAPTER IV

CELAL BAYAR AS PRIME MINISTER, 1937-1939

4.1 Institutional Background: Prime Minister According to the Constitution and in Practice

The 1924 Constitution established a regime that resembled a parliamentary system where political responsibility was held mainly by the prime minister and the council of ministers. Article 46 appointed the council of ministers as the responsible body for government policies. As the head of the council of ministers, the prime minister had considerable weight in this system although the Constitution did not describe the powers and duties of the prime minister in detail. According to article 44 of the Constitution, the president designated the prime minister from among the members of Parliament. Upon this appointment; the prime minister formed the council of ministers and submitted it for the president's approval. Following president's approval of the cabinet, it was up to the Parliament to give a vote of confidence to the newly established government. Under this arrangement, the president had functioned as the head of state, as further examined in the next chapter. The constitutional description of the powers and duties of president and prime minister was not strictly followed in practice during the single party era. So far, a structural analysis of the relationship between

prime ministers and presidents in the Turkish political context has not been carried out systematically. Such a task also exceeds the purposes of this section. Nevertheless, observing the manner of prime ministers' selection and removal from office may provide some valuable insight into the practice followed until Bayar's designation as prime minister. The prime ministers were designated according to Atatürk's preferences from within the Parliament as dictated by the Constitution. According to constitutional terms, prime ministers were responsible to the Parliament, but in practice they had to justify their political actions and policies to President Atatürk. When they failed to do so, they were removed from office. Atatürk worked with three different prime ministers: İsmet İnönü (October 30, 1923-November 22, 1924 and March 3, 1925-November 1, 1937); Fethi Okyar (November 22, 1924-March 3, 1925); Celal Bayar (November 1, 1937-November 11, 1938).

On October 29, 1923 Atatürk designated İsmet İnönü as prime minister and İnönü consequently formed the first republican government. On November 22, 1923 he resigned on his own will, giving his deteriorating health as the official excuse (Mango, 1999:599). However, it has been suggested that replacing the hardliner İsmet İnönü with the liberal Fethi Okyar was a maneuver by Atatürk to contain the liberal wave that rose following the establishment of the Progressive Republican Party (Ahmad, 2003: 58). Liberalism mentioned here mostly concerned economic matters, as further detailed in Chapter II.

When the Shaikh Said Rebellion broke out in the East from February 1925 onwards, Atatürk invited İnönü to the Presidential Palace at once to discuss these developments. Prime Minister Fethi Okyar had already denied excessive use of force in addressing the rebellion. Atatürk made it clear that he was against

Okyar's moderate approach in this matter. Okyar's approach was also discredited by the CHP Assembly and consequently he had to resign. In the end, Atatürk appointed İsmet İnönü in Okyar's place (Mango, 1999: 606). It is suggested that Atatürk favored İnönü and did not take sides with Fethi Okyar because İnönü took the Shaikh Said rebellion more seriously than Okyar (Heper, 1998: 66).

Following this replacement, İnönü stayed in office for 12 consecutive years. The causes for Atatürk's and İnönü's falling-out in 1937 are detailed below but here it should be stated that one of the main reasons was Atatürk's insistence on controlling governmental affairs closer than İnönü was willing to accept. In his memoirs, İnönü stated that during his last years Atatürk preferred the government members to be attached to him in their work and that he was ready to use arbitrary measures to guarantee such attachment (İnönü, 2008: 251, Volume 1). İnönü also mentioned his discontent with Atatürk's habit of changing and humiliating certain ministers in public (İnönü, 1998: 68).

When it was İnönü's time in office as president, he also followed a similar suit to Atatürk's. For instance, as will be further detailed below, he asked Bayar to resign from office in 1939. Thus it can be argued that during the single party rule, the presidents had power that extended well beyond constitutional terms (Koçak, 1990: 96-97). Atatürk and İnönü were the actual rulers of the country regarding the most significant policy issues. The prime ministers were assigned the task of implementing policies envisaged by the presidents (Yeşilbursa, 1999: 185). When there was no way of aligning government policies with their own preferences, Atatürk and later İnönü preferred to dismiss their prime ministers.

4.2 Celal Bayar in Office

4.2.1 Celal Bayar's Designation

Atatürk replaced Prime Minister İsmet İnönü with Minister of Economy Celal Bayar on November 1, 1937. Bayar thus became the first Republican prime minister with a civilian background. Contrary to the previous time when İnönü resigned from office in 1924 and still retained his position of deputy chairman in the party, this time he was stripped from that title (Tunçay, 1981: 105). Bayar was appointed the deputy chairman of the CHP.

The official explanation provided to the public for this change was that Prime Minister İnönü had been granted 45 days of leave on his own request (Ahmad, 2003: 68). At the end of these 45 days, acting Prime Minister Bayar was given the task to form a new government. Bayar recalled his appointment in the following words: "Atatürk summoned me and told that he was going to designate me prime minister. I replied, 'on your orders', because we owed everything to this great man. I considered his wishes as orders" (Altuğ, June 16, 1981, *Tercüman* daily).

Atatürk's decision to replace İnönü with Bayar was due to a number of differences between İnönü and himself. These differences were either in practical and daily political issues or in approaches to the resolution of certain major political conflicts. It is important to examine these differences because they give a background to what would be expected from Bayar as prime minister. These differences can be summed up as follows:

(1) Differences in foreign policy: Although İnönü and Atatürk did not have major differences on the founding principles of Turkish foreign policy and its objectives, there was nevertheless a difference in the way that they reacted to certain foreign policy questions. While discussing İnönü's resignation on the train from Ankara to Istanbul on September 20, 1937,⁷² Atatürk mentioned the matters of Hatay and Nyon among the reasons for his decision to ask for İnönü's withdrawal (İnönü, 2008: 252, Volume 1).

The Nyon Conference, indeed, provided an occasion for the differences to surface. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), pirate submarines in the Mediterranean Sea were attacking ships carrying supplies to Spanish Republicans. The USSR was blaming Italy for these assaults. In order to find a solution to the attacks, the Nyon conference was convened on Britain's initiative on September 14, 1937. Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras represented the Ankara government in this conference. An agreement implying that in case of need Britain and France could seek Turkey's military aid was reached. Atatürk considered this as a necessary co-operation and thought it highly unlikely that the British and French would actually ask for aid considering their advanced military and technical capacities (Atay, 1969: 495, 497). İnönü however was alarmed that this commitment might threaten Turkish impartiality in the eyes of Italy (Birlik, 2010: 266). In the end, on İnönü's orders Aras was able to obtain a written guarantee that Turkey would not be called upon to get involved in an armed conflict (Mango, 1999: 726).

⁷² This date is not mentioned in İnönü's memoirs. It is extracted from Altuğ, June 15, 1981, *Milliyet* daily.

Atatürk and İnönü had different opinions also on how to address the Hatay matter. This was among the main foreign policy challenges encountered during the Republic's early years. Details regarding this matter have already been presented in Chapter II. Atatürk argued in favor of insisting on Hatay's inclusion within Turkish borders. In his memoirs, İnönü mentioned being worried about the possibility that Atatürk might be considering a surprise military intervention in Hatay to solve the matter at once (İnönü, 1998: 58). İnönü had a different opinion. He thought that insisting on Hatay's inclusion to Turkey might put the French-Turkish relations under strain at a critical time when Europe was heading toward another war (Mazıcı, 1996: 92). İnönü also thought that insisting on making Turkish the official language in Hatay was offensive, whereas Atatürk did not accept any compromise on the language issue either (Kinross, 1999: 560).

(2) Differences in economic policy: In his memoirs, İnönü mentioned that while discussing the reasons for his withdrawal, Atatürk complained about İnönü's habit to administer the state budget "like a bank" (İnönü, 2008: 251-252, Volume 1). The problem Atatürk brought up concerned the financial losses of state enterprises, which were covered by the state budget (Karpas, 2004e: 230). Such enterprises were established after 1930 according to the étatist approach (Karpas, 2004e: 230). In the background Atatürk's criticism highlighted a difference between the two leaders' understanding of étatism. İnönü saw it as a permanent solution that was preferable to liberal capitalism (Zürcher, 2004: 198). Yet, this inflexible understanding of étatism was creating difficulties in making effective use of already scarce resources (Koçak, 1990: 117). As a result, Atatürk thought that İnönü's approach to the economy was falling short of providing the necessary stimulus for achieving the desired economic growth, as well as creating

problems of inefficiency. When Atatürk replaced Minister of Economics Mustafa Şeref Özkan with Bayar in 1932, he had already made it known that he was ready to support and try Bayar's approach (Mazıcı, 1996: 21), whom he considered to be the leading Turkish economist (Barlas, May 21, 1982, *Milliyet* daily). By 1937 Atatürk's efforts to introduce a fresh approach to the question of economic development intensified. Bayar's name came forward as the most reliable candidate who could develop this fresh approach. It was thought that Bayar would provide a solution to the bureaucratic barriers and inflexibility restricting economic growth as he was considered a man of action rather than doctrine, sometimes at the expense of bureaucratic procedures (Mazıcı, 1996: 147-148). Bayar was also expected to put the statist element in the CHP under control (Ahmad, 2003: 90) and decrease the role of the bureaucracy in conduct of the economy by providing more room for the private sector (Ahmad, 2003: 68).

Was Bayar's approach to étatism significantly different from İnönü's? Bayar's difference lay in his flexible approach with regard to the establishment and operation of financial institutions and enterprises. He wanted to decrease bureaucratic procedures in order to increase the efficiency of state enterprises and sought private sector co-operation whenever possible. This approach had already proved successful with the İş Bank, established by Bayar in 1924. During the 1930s, the bank contributed to the Turkish economy's growth through loans it provided for private initiatives and through its own investments in certain sectors. In 1924-1947, the Bank took part in the management and establishment of more than 20 companies including four insurance companies, four banks, two textile factories, one cotton factory and one oil facility (Boztemur, 1996: 77). Whether

Bayar achieved to repeat the success of the İş Bank on a more macro-scale is discussed in the next parts of this chapter.

(3) Incidental differences: There were a number of issues that did not result from Atatürk's and İnönü's different approaches to the economy and foreign policy. These issues were purely incidental matters such as the so-called beer factory dispute or the disagreement on the Atatürk Forest Farm. The former issue concerned the establishment of a new beer factory in Ankara and putting an end to the privileges provided to the Bomonti beer factory in Istanbul (Mazıcı, 1996: 38). The Farm matter was the story of a tense evening when Atatürk invited İnönü to dinner in order to discuss the donation of the farmland in Ankara to the Ziraat Bankası (Agricultural Bank). Such matters ended up escalating the tension between Atatürk and İnönü.

In light of these differences between Atatürk and İnönü, it can be argued that while Bayar was expected and encouraged to introduce changes and reforms in economic policies, there were no such expectations in the area of foreign policy. In other words Bayar was favored over İnönü in the realm of economics but when it came to foreign policy, what was favored was the absence of İnönü rather than the presence of Bayar. In this case, the government and as the head of government, Bayar would simply be counted upon to support and implement President Atatürk's policies and introduce them to Parliament. Atatürk made this clear immediately upon appointing Bayar. On the day of his assignment, Atatürk told Bayar, among a number of other things, not to get involved in foreign policy issues and that foreign policy was his own responsibility (Barlas, May 18, 1982, *Milliyet* daily).

4.2.2 Relations with President Atatürk

Before moving on to an account of Bayar's policies as prime minister, it is important to evaluate Bayar's relation to President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The dynamics of this relation not only inspired Bayar in his political rhetoric, but also drew the limits of his policy making as prime minister. In order to achieve the mentioned task (1) the formation of this relationship in earlier years (2) relations between Prime Minister Bayar and President Atatürk and (3) Bayar's thoughts on Atatürk will be taken up, in this order.

Bayar heard Mustafa Kemal's name for the first time in Bursa. The İTC Bursa delegate who participated in the İTC Thessalonica Congress in 1909 had brought the news of discussions that took place there. Bayar was impressed with the Tripoli delegate Mustafa Kemal's suggestion to separate the army's and the party's, i.e. the İTC's affairs and prevent the mingling of these two ideally distinct realms (Bayar, 1955:14). Bayar heard of Mustafa Kemal's military achievements and patriotic character (Bayar, 1955: 14).

With the prorogation of the last Ottoman Parliament, in which Bayar was a deputy from the Saruhan (currently Manisa) region, Bayar fled to Bursa to avoid imprisonment or exile in April 1920. A few hours after his arrival in Bursa, he received a telegraph from Mustafa Kemal at his home. In that telegraph, Mustafa Kemal was asking Bayar to counter the Anzavur forces marching to Bursa and defend the city against them with the National Forces (*Kuvay-i Milliye*) troops that were present in the city (Bayar, 1955:76). Atatürk also recalled this telegraph incident in later years and said that it was not a coincidence that he asked for such a thing from a person he had not even met. He was following Bayar closely and

had already built a positive opinion of his worth (Bayar, 1955: 76-77). This was probably due to Bayar's achievements on the Aegean front before he joined the Ankara movement, further explained in Chapter III of this study.

The expected Anzavur and *Kuvay-i Milliye* confrontation did not occur and in 15-20 days Bayar left Bursa for Ankara. In Eskişehir, while on his way to Ankara Bayar received an invitation from Demirci Efe, a local fighter against the Greek occupation to join his forces in Aydın. Bayar was indecisive and sent a telegraph to Mustafa Kemal, asking whether he should go to Aydın or come to Ankara. Mustafa Kemal asked Bayar to come to Ankara and once there Bayar went to the Parliament to meet Mustafa Kemal in person (Bayar, 1955: 76-77).

After that meeting, Bayar and Atatürk worked together on several occasions. In most cases, it was Atatürk who asked Bayar to take up an office or a task. For instance, in 1924 he asked Bayar to set up a new national bank. Likewise in 1932 he asked Bayar to take office as minister of economics. This appointment was also the outcome of a dispute in which Atatürk supported Bayar. In 1932, the then İş Bank Chairman Bayar and Minister of Economics Mustafa Şeref Özkan had a disagreement about a pulp factory, to be established in İzmit. İş Bank would be responsible for setting up of this facility and would raise funds for the construction. Bayar had shared the plans with the Ministry of Economics and was waiting for their confirmation. However, Minister Özkan instead prioritized the establishment of a clock factory in Yozgat and delayed the approval for the pulp facility. When Atatürk found out about the problem, he had Özkan replaced with Bayar despite Prime Minister İnönü's protests (Altuğ, June, 14-15 1981, *Tercüman* daily). As mentioned above, when Bayar became Prime Minister in 1937, it was again on Atatürk's wishes. Atatürk encouraged Bayar to take office

as prime minister and when the latter hesitated about his ability to control the army, Atatürk assured him that he would provide the necessary support to Bayar in this matter as well (Mazııcı, 1996: 41).

Thus when Bayar was appointed prime minister, he already had a well-established relationship with Atatürk, was used to working under his command and had a great deal of respect and admiration for him. Bayar showed his appreciation of Atatürk in the government program he introduced to Parliament on November 8, 1937. In the program, Atatürk was referred to 45 times and the Kemalist regime five times (Demirer, 2006: 31). The manner of his assignment, the government program and the background of this relationship all implied that Bayar was most likely to follow Atatürk's policy preferences and most unlikely to challenge him on fundamental political matters.

Bayar worked with Atatürk for a little more than over a year until the latter passed away on November 10, 1938. During that time Bayar always sought Atatürk's approval before putting government's plans to work. As a matter of fact, the government program was also drawn up on Atatürk's directives (Mazııcı, 1996: 44). In return, Atatürk closely supervised and followed Bayar's policies and acts. In his memoirs, Bayar wrote that after a few months of his inauguration as prime minister, Atatürk asked a prominent CHP member's opinion on Bayar's work. The member, whose name is not revealed in the memoirs, replied that Bayar was mostly concerned with daily issues. On a following night, Bayar was invited to president's residence and Atatürk welcomed Bayar to sit next to him. Then he informed Bayar of this observation. In return, Bayar gave an account of the deeds that the government had been engaged in and also said that they were preparing a long-term plan. The person who made the initial comment on daily

issues was also seated at the table and Atatürk told that person to focus on major matters rather than daily ones (Bayar, 1955: 105-106). This anecdote illustrates that Bayar was under the supervision of the President and that he had Atatürk's support.

This state of affairs might have changed with Atatürk's deteriorating health. Bayar started paying weekly visits to Istanbul in order to follow Atatürk's health and give him information on government activities. In those visits, Bayar attempted to include Atatürk in the decision-making but Atatürk's poor health must have limited this co-operation. His disease restricted him to bed and long hours of rest and comas. Yet he continued to supervise Bayar as much as he could. For instance, Bayar sought Atatürk's approval for the second five-year plan, which was negotiated and agreed upon in principle during a council of ministers meeting.⁷³ The plan envisaged a number of investments including the purchase of new boats, construction of a power plant in Kütahya and of irrigation infrastructure in Sakarya among many others. Bayar felt the need to share the plan with Atatürk before putting it into action. In his regular weekend visit, he brought up the issue (Bayar, 1955: 85). Atatürk listened carefully, said that the approaching war in Europe might restrain Turkey's economic growth efforts and that the government should be quick in the implementation of the suggested plan (Bayar, 1955: 87).

Another time, Atatürk was not able participate in the fifteenth year celebrations of the Republic in Ankara due to poor health and could not deliver his speech in Parliament as he used to do each year. Atatürk and Bayar compiled a

⁷³ Bayar occasionally calls these plans four or five year plans.

speech together and Bayar read it in Parliament (Bayar, 1955: 94). When the celebrations were over, Bayar reported extensively to Atatürk (Bayar, 1955:96).

These anecdotes support the view that Bayar worked closely with President Atatürk. It seems likely that in 1937-1939 Atatürk devised the major policy lines in cooperation with Bayar and that the government as a whole was responsible for converting the major policy lines into executive plans and implement them. As proof of this observation, the word Bayar used most commonly during his time in office was directive. He considered each word of Atatürk as a directive and based all of his policies on these directives (Aydemir, 2010: 156). Bayar referred to this short time he worked with President Atatürk as his most industrious and effective term.⁷⁴

The next question is how Atatürk came to exert such influence on Bayar. Firstly, Bayar appreciated Atatürk's role in the Turkish War of Independence. Bayar thought that before Mustafa Kemal took the initiative and organized the national independence movement from one center in Ankara, the efforts of numerous individuals throughout occupied Anatolia were good-willed but futile.⁷⁵ Bayar believed that it was due to Atatürk that these individuals united in their struggle and that the Turkish homeland was saved from occupation.

Secondly, Atatürk had a wide influence on Bayar's political thinking. In 1973, Bayar wrote a book titled *To Think like Atatürk* in which he sought to create a methodology following Atatürk's thinking to address political difficulties irrespective of time. Atatürk's thinking, or rather Bayar's interpretation of Atatürk's thinking had a central place in his conceptualization of politics.

⁷⁴ Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

⁷⁵ Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

Consequently, Bayar presented Atatürk as a reference point in his political thinking and advised the Turkish nation to do the same. On November 16, 1938, the date İnönü became President, Bayar spoke the following words in his parliamentary speech: “Atatürk, to love and honor you is the national duty and virtue of each Turkish patriot” (Şahingiray, 1954: 357). When he came to the conclusion that Atatürk was not understood well enough among the Turkish people, he updated his line to “Atatürk, to comprehend you is national worship” (Bozdağ, 2009: 29). That was the task he undertook in writing his 1973 book, to teach people the ways of thinking like Atatürk.

As for Bayar’s interpretation of Atatürk’s political thinking, Bayar thought that Atatürk was well aware of the ideological and dogmatic currents of his time yet he was neither a positivist nor a pragmatist although at times he appeared as both. “He was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk” (Bozdağ, 2009: 31). For Bayar, Atatürk represented a unique political approach embodied in a unique personality. When an advisor to the American president asked Bayar which historical/political leader Atatürk was looking up to, Bayar replied that Atatürk was unique in every way and that he never took any political figure as role-model (Kocatürk, 1986: 18).⁷⁶

Bayar considered Atatürk’s political views and decisions to be always accurate. When he first arrived in Ankara and got to know Atatürk during the War of Independence years, there had been instances when they had disagreements. However, such differences of opinion ended in six months and Bayar arrived at the conclusion that Atatürk had always been right in matters they disagreed on and he began trusting Atatürk in all matters (Kocatürk, 1986: 17-18). Bayar

⁷⁶ Bayar did not specify the date for this chat with the advisor from the USA. Thus it is not possible to identify the president nor the identity of the advisor.

thought that Atatürk was superior to him in terms of judgment (Atay, et al., Coşkun, November 10, 2007).

Bayar did not refrain from defending his opinions on Atatürk in later years, even against his associates in the DP. One of the biggest disputes Bayar had with the DP was on damage inflicted upon a number of Atatürk sculptures in 1950-1 by a religious fundamentalist group. President Bayar condemned these assaults and threatened that if the government did not find a way to fight effectively against them, he would resign from office, from Parliament and from the DP (Erkmen, 1982: 77). Also, as detailed in Chapter V Bayar took personal interest in the completion of the *Anıtkabir* (Atatürk's mausoleum) and spent effort in order to convert Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki into a museum.

Bayar's admiration of Atatürk was often not one sided. Atatürk returned Bayar's admiration with certain gestures and he appreciated Bayar. For instance when Atatürk listened to Bayar for the first time in Parliament addressing the assembly, he thought that Bayar was a decent man but that he was also a revolutionary (Bayar, 1955: 82).⁷⁷ In another instance, Atatürk said that if there is going to be a peaceful revolution in Turkey some day, Bayar was likely to be the leader of that movement (Şahingiray, 1999b: 38). Atatürk in these instances expressed his belief in Bayar's capacity to lead substantial political transitions wisely without bloodshed.

Another instance of Atatürk expressing his support for Bayar was during the establishment days of the İş Bank in 1924. Fethi Okyar was then Turkey's ambassador to France. Henri Stegg, formerly General Director of the Ottoman

⁷⁷ The date for this remark is not mentioned. The exact expression Mustafa Kemal used is as follows: *Dikkat edin bu adama, efendi adamdır, fakat ihtilalcidir.*

Bank for 17 years, had paid a visit to Okyar in Paris to warn him about this new banking initiative. Okyar passed Stegg's warnings to Atatürk, who replied in the following manner: "I know Celal Bayar who is in charge of the İş Bank initiative. He handled more difficult affairs without leaving any gaps. I fully trust in his experience and knowledge" (Yeşilyurt, 1997: 68). Later on, while referring to the İş Bank, Atatürk said that he gave Bayar a sack of gold and Bayar in return delivered a national bank (Kinross, 1999: 527).

In his Great Speech (*Nutuk*) in 1927, Atatürk praised Bayar's contributions to the independence struggle in the following words: "Following İzmir's occupation by Greek forces, certain army members and patriotic people from the local population were working in Aydın to unite the people against the occupation. In this respect, Celal Bey who left İzmir and joined them in disguise showed great efforts and sacrifice" (Atatürk, 1969:451, Volume 2). In 1936 Atatürk made a voice record for Bayar where he praised Bayar's accomplishments as minister of economics (Bozdağ, 2005:78-79).⁷⁸ As already mentioned, Atatürk considered Bayar to be the leading economist in Turkey.

Their relations were also warm on a personal level. Bayar's last name was suggested by Atatürk. Bayar meant a noble person in Northern Turkish dialects and Atatürk considered this to be a suitable name for him (Mazırcı, 1996: 23). In another instance, Atatürk asked Bayar if Bayar's children would love him. Bayar replied that they most certainly would.⁷⁹ Atatürk himself did not have any children besides his adopted daughters. When Bayar wrote his memoirs of the Turkish War of Independence in eight volumes in later years, it was also due to

⁷⁸ For the full account of this recording incident and the text of Atatürk's speech, see Bayar 1955: 111-112.

⁷⁹ Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

Atatürk's request. The question Atatürk addressed to Bayar when Bayar gave an account of his memoirs of the war was "Have you written all these?" That is also why Bayar named his volumes *Ben de Yazdım* (I Also Wrote), in reply to Atatürk's question (Bayar, 1955: 80).

4.2.3 Policies and Activities in Office

The fifteen months Bayar stayed in office is a rather insufficient period of time to make an assessment of Bayar's policies- not only due to the briefness of this term but also for three other reasons:

(1) President Atatürk was severely ill and so this was not an ordinary period. Bayar found himself under the consuming tasks of following the condition of Atatürk's health, coordinating government policies with Atatürk as much as the latter's health allowed and defying scenarios and plots that were discussed for the post-Atatürk transition in various circles. As a result, Bayar was regularly spending three days, from Friday to Sunday, in Istanbul each week for the last six months of Atatürk's life (Mazırcı, 1996: 44). When he was not in Istanbul, Bayar was following Atatürk's health through daily reports submitted to him (Altuğ, June 16, 1981, *Tercüman* daily). Therefore, it is quite likely that Bayar was preoccupied with the urgencies of this extraordinary phase and as a result, he had less time left for other policy matters, such as reform in the bureaucracy or the economy. This observation does not mean that Bayar chose to deal with these issues rather than pursuing a reform agenda. It was the context that put him face to face with these challenges and he could not have ignored them.

(2) Besides being extraordinary, this was a very short period to undertake any transformative reforms, observe outcomes of these reforms and make further adjustments depending on outcomes. For instance, Bayar was expected to reform the bureaucracy but such reforms would have demanded a much longer time commitment for any considerable outcome as the bureaucracy was deeply entrenched in the state structure (Ahmad, 2003: 69). From the 17th and the 18th century onwards, the bureaucracy had eventually expanded its share in the control of the state (Heper and Criss, 2009: 54) and thus the Republic of Turkey took over a pattern of a strong bureaucracy. In the 1930s, “the Republican version of the bureaucratic ruling tradition” was already well in place (Heper and Criss, 2009: 55).

(3) Bayar’s field of activity had already been restrained to certain areas by President Atatürk, as elaborated above. Bayar was not in charge of a considerable extent in policy issues.

The Bayar government certainly had an agenda and Bayar was expected to bring forward some changes, as explained in the reasons for his assignment. He provided a comprehensive government program, twenty times longer than the last İnönü government’s program. It had the widest scope on matters related to the economy and the least on foreign policy. Investment in transportation infrastructure, reform in financial structures and trade policies, as well further planning mining policy, among many other issues, was promised in this plan. However, the context was so unfavorable that his initial agenda soon became irrelevant. A different outcome might have been likely had the political context been different (Koçak, 1990: 119).

Beyond all impediments that the context presented for him, Bayar had substantial success as prime minister. He administered the post-Atatürk transition and election of İsmet İnönü to the presidency most skillfully. Consequently, he earned the respect and confidence of İnönü. This confidence later resulted in İnönü's approval and support of Celal Bayar as the opposition party's chairman (Mazııcı, 1996: 151). His policies and his role in the transition to İnönü's presidency are detailed below.

4.2.3.1 Economics

In this section, Bayar's impact in the formulation and implementation of economic policies are taken up. Here there is a deviation from the time scale followed in this chapter because Bayar was appointed minister of economics in 1932 and so he already had an ongoing agenda and an impact in the field of economy when he was appointed prime minister. It should also be indicated that when Atatürk replaced the former Minister of Economics with Celal Bayar, the initiative in the planning and implementation of economic policies shifted from the prime ministry to the ministry of economics (Mazııcı, 1996: 23). Bayar thus already had a prominent position in the macro-economic planning from 1932 onwards. For this reason 1932 is taken as the start for this section. This section includes three subsections: Bayar's views on the conduct of macro-economic policy and the concept of étatism,⁸⁰ the importance of institution building in Bayar's policies, and international economic agreements.

⁸⁰ Bayar's political views have been taken up in Chapter III. However, in order to avoid repetition and provide a smoother flow of narration, his views on the economy are taken up in this section.

The context should be reminded briefly. Before Bayar was appointed minister of economics, Turkey was suffering from the consequences of the Great Depression that hit the world economy in 1929. Although Turkey could not have been considered as deeply integrated into the capitalist world market at that time, the national economy suffered from the fall of agricultural product prices as these were the main export items. A major source of revenue was thus shaken and the country faced difficulties in financing its imports with its declining export revenues (Lewis, 1968: 281). In order to address these difficulties, étatism was officially introduced in the 1931 CHP congress (Zürcher, 2004: 197; Karpat, 2004e: 226) and Bayar undertook its implementation according to his own interpretation.

4.2.3.1.1 On Etatism and the Economy

Bayar placed emphasis on both the private sector and the state as engines of economic growth, complementary to one another. He likened the economy to a “delicate mimosa that reacts to all kinds of external influences”. For it to function smoothly, the economy had to “flow in the channels” that are prepared in advance. One of the state’s main functions was to provide these channels and intervene to regulate and fix whenever their function was impaired (Bozdağ, 2009: 188-189; Karpat, 1967: 257).

Although Bayar is mentioned as liberal in some resources due to his emphasis on private enterprise, this is a misleading statement as he defined his task as prime minister and minister of economics to eliminate liberalism from the

Turkish economy.⁸¹ Liberalism had already been discredited by 1932 due to the lingering effects of the Great Depression and Bayar had been summoned to manage an economic program shaped around étatism. Bayar was a proponent of the étatist rhetoric. He referred to liberalism in the following terms: “Liberalism, I cannot even pronounce it properly, is an alien notion to me” (Kuruç, 2009: 312).⁸² Bayar’s strong dislike of liberalism was related to his dislike of ideologies, as discussed in Chapter III. Bayar’s accommodating approach toward the private sector and his methods to increase efficiency in the economy did not mean that he was a liberal. He was in favor of a combination of state involvement in the economy and the promotion of private enterprise through state incentives (Mazıcı, 1996: 103).

Bayar was aware that his understanding, which designated an equally pivotal role for private enterprise, was relevant only under normal economic conditions and could not be exercised in times of crises. Bayar agreed that the Turkish economy was in a state of crisis in 1932-1939, and intensified state intervention was crucial for a temporary period (Ahmad, 2003: 90). He embraced étatism, developing and eventually implementing his own interpretation. He thought that the short-term objective of Turkish economic planning and policies should be a quick recovery from the effects of the Great Depression and capital accumulation. These objectives called for the state’s substantial intervention in the economy. Turkey, in Bayar’s words, did not have the financial capital and the human capital to realize these objectives through private sector activity alone (Karpat, 1967: 256). Bayar estimated that if the task was left in the hands of the private sector, it would take at least 200 years for the economy to recover (Hale,

⁸¹ For instance, see Ahmad, 2003: 64, 68.

⁸² In the Turkish text, “*dilim dahi dönüyor*”.

1980: 107). From 1932 to 1939, the weight of the state in the country's economy increased considerably. In 1932, the state's overall share in the country's industrial establishments was 2.1 percent. By 1939, the percentage rose to 9.7 (Boztemur, 1996: 78).

Bayar considered *étatisme* as a policy implemented on a global scale. He thought that the consequences of the Great Depression made most nations follow statist policies (Şahingiray, 1999a: 282-283). He defended the state's undertaking of major industrial and financial investments by giving examples from Germany, France and the United States that adopted statist policies. Yet Bayar saw *étatisme* employed in Turkey to be born out of the country's specific needs and considered it to be unique to Turkey (Bozdağ, 1986: 44). It is likely that Bayar made this point on the authenticity of Turkish *étatisme* with a motivation to differentiate Turkish *étatisme* from statist policies of socialist economies such as the USSR. Bayar was also opposed to state capitalism, highlighting that the objective of *étatisme* was not the creation and retention of profitable state monopolies in certain economic sectors (Bayar, 1946:2).

For Bayar, *étatisme* was not a strictly defined thinking that had the same policy solutions for different challenges nor was it limited to state's undertaking of certain economic investments. Bayar had a much broader interpretation of *étatisme*: “*étatisme* is the struggle to realize a nation's highest potential in terms of culture, social issues and economy and the core of this struggle is to minimize the time required to make achievements in this pursuit” (Bayar, 1946:2). Thus Bayar's *étatisme* was not strictly economy centered. Since the necessities of his time as minister of economics and prime minister presented economic challenges, it was in this field, on which the state focused its energies. Had another policy

field required state's attention, the same interest would be shown in that field too (Bayar, 1946:2).

Beyond time and context specific policy approaches, Bayar defined the objective of any economic activity and planning as being the creation of a national economy (Bayar, 1946:2). The emphasis on the national aspect of the economy can be seen in most of Bayar's speeches and comments because he thought that being an independent state did not necessarily mean full independence unless supported by a well functioning economy (Bozdağ, 1986: 17).⁸³ Bayar even referred to the ministry of economy as ministry of national economy until he was warned by his legal advisors that the latter title was in contradiction with the legal title (Kutay, 1982: 11).

4.2.3.1.2 Etatism in Practice: Institution Building, Planning and Nationalization

Bayar laid the framework of his policies in the two industrialization plans and the government program he introduced in Parliament. The first industrial plan covered 1934-1938 and the second plan covered 1939-1943. These plans were not developed on the basis of sophisticated economic calculations or future economic projections. They consisted of a number of objectives in distinct sectors of the economy (Hale, 1980: 101). The scope was broad and the objectives raised in the plans were numerous. National industrial development rather than agricultural production was prioritized among the objectives. The plans focused on the chemical, earthenware, iron, paper, sulfur, sponge, cotton textile, worsted and

⁸³ Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

hemp sectors. It was hoped that an increase in the output of these sectors would decrease the amount of imports and help to achieve trade balance (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 391). The government program repeated the objectives set out in the first industrial plan.⁸⁴

The most significant method Bayar employed to reach the mentioned objectives as minister of economics and as prime minister was institution building. Bayar's skills of institution building had already been recognized by the state elites earlier in his İzmir and Bursa years, as detailed in Chapter III. His success at the İş Bank drew further attention to these skills. In the governmental posts he took Bayar continued institution building, now on a larger scale.

As minister of economics, he contributed to the establishment of Sümerbank (Sumerbank) in 1933 and Etibank (Hittite Bank) in 1935. Both these banks brought state owned enterprises under a single umbrella and presented these enterprises certain advantages, such as the right to borrow from the Central Bank with a low rate of interest (Zürcher, 2004: 198). Sümerbank undertook a substantial role in the establishment of light and heavy industrial estates, operated state owned factories, often co-operated with private capital by participating in other operations and provided borrowing facilities for private business like a regular bank (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:391). Etibank focused on mineral and gas extraction and exploitation, coal mining, setting up power plants and marketing these products to domestic as well as international markets (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:392).

⁸⁴ For the full text in Turkish of Bayar's government program, see <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP9.htm>

Another bank established in 1933 was the *İller Bankası* (Bank of Provinces). This bank sought to invest in provincial, municipal and more local development projects (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:392). Bayar also set up the *Denizbank* (Maritime Bank) in 1938. The bank's objective was to operate the recently nationalized merchant fleet, conduct freight operations and build port facilities, among other things (Shaw and Shaw, 1977:392). In 1933 the *Halk Bankası* (People's Bank) was established to provide loans that would be used in the establishment of small scale industries, which would provide spare parts for large scale industrial operations (Bozdağ, 2005: 64-65). *Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi* (The Office of Soil Products) was established in 1938 to establish minimum prices for agricultural products on the market and provide a certain amount of stocks for scarce years (Hale, 1980: 109). Bayar had a role in the establishment of all these banks and institutions.

As mentioned, the overarching goal of Bayar's economic policies was to enhance the national aspects of the economy. Besides supporting national industry and production by lowering imports, the most straightforward way to nationalize the economy was to take over foreign owned companies mostly established during the Ottoman era. In 1933-1938, the following companies were nationalized and put under state management: the Mudanya-Bursa railroad, the İzmir-Afyon railroad, the Manisa-Bandırma railroad, the Turkish Water Company, the İzmir Dock Company, the Istanbul Dock and Warehouse, the Istanbul Phone Company, the Ereğli Dock, the Zonguldak railroad and coal mines, the Eastern Railroads, the Aydın Railroad, the İzmir Phone Company, the Istanbul Phone Company, and the Istanbul Lighthouses Company (Mazıcı, 1996: 24).

In retrospect, Bayar's policies had certain positive outcomes. New industrial sectors such as pulp, mining, ceramics and textile were introduced to the country and economic growth reached a yearly average of nine percent and industrial enterprises grew at a rate of 10.2 percent from 1932 to 1939 (Mazıcı, 1996: 24). Favorable conditions were established for the smooth functioning of the domestic market, production related matters were organized in a modern way and necessary steps to realize price standardization were taken. Credit options for business were expanded and interest rates were decreased. On an international trade level, domestic production was organized in line with foreign demand and international trade started to be treated in an institutional and professional manner. The cost of living decreased, especially with regard to certain items, for example meat products (Mazıcı, 1996: 105).

As a result, the economy gradually recovered from the state of crisis. As Turkey's strategic importance was acknowledged more due to the approaching world war, major international actors also began to contribute to Turkey's finances. Turkey was able to secure a 16 million sterling loan from Britain and immediately after the British loan, it was offered a 150 million mark loan by Germany (Mango, 1999: 742). On the negative side, the fiscal discipline that marked the period before 1932 was loosened and there emerged an imbalance in the budget by 1938 due to the high growth rates and less emphasis on fiscal discipline (Kuruç, 2009: 307-308).

Regarding the objectives laid out in the first and second industrialization plans, most of the sectors mentioned in the first plan could never be taken up through policies (Aydemir, 1999: 354-355). The broad scope and the unrealistic nature of the objectives laid out must have brought about such an end result. As

for the objectives of the second plan, they could never be truly pursued due to the outbreak of the Second World War (Aydemir, 1999: 354-355).

4.2.3.1.3 International Economic Agreements

As minister of economics and later on as prime minister, Bayar worked to conclude a number of trade and economic co-operation treaties with foreign nations. These agreements were not in contrast or an alternative to Atatürk's foreign policy. They were complementary to President Atatürk's policy as he was also involved in the planning of these agreements. Yet Bayar's role and input were also substantial.

International economic agreements were important because they laid the ground for future political co-operation with the signatory states. One example is the agreements signed with certain Balkan states. Bayar stated that Atatürk assigned him the task to prepare the economic and financial background of the Balkan Pact.⁸⁵ For that purpose, Bayar concluded financial agreements with the future Balkan Pact countries (Bozdağ, 2005: 57). The Sadabat Pact also developed as a result of a similar process where economic co-operation was followed by political co-operation.⁸⁶

The following economic agreements were signed during Bayar's prime ministry: the Turkey-Japan Trade Agreement (1937), the Turkey-Romania Trade Agreement, the Turkey-Latvia Trade and Clearing Agreement, the Turkey-Sweden Trade and Clearing Agreement, the Turkey-Germany Financial

⁸⁵ The Balkan Pact is the agreement signed between Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania on February 9, 1934.

⁸⁶ The Sadabat Pact was the agreement signed between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan on July 7, 1937.

Agreement,⁸⁷ the Turkey-United Kingdom Financial Agreement, the Turkey-USSR Trade Agreement (all in 1938), and the Turkey-Afghanistan Trade Agreement extension (1939) (Mazıcı, 1996: 86-87).

4.2.3.2 Domestic Political Issues

For reasons already mentioned, an ambitious agenda in domestic politics could not be expected from the Bayar governments. Yet this should not imply that Bayar and his government were totally passive. As prime minister, Bayar communicated with Atatürk in the decision making process, took his policy preferences into consideration and devised the government's policies accordingly. When it came to major issues such as the Dersim uprisings and its suppression, it was President Atatürk's choices that determined the policies to be implemented.

In the government program, Bayar provided a picture of how he interpreted the political context in 1937. According to him, there were no domestic political conflicts in Turkey, in contrast to certain other countries where domestic political violence was a major concern. Thus, he added, the context provided a favorable background for the planning and implementation of a wide variety of policies and activities in various economic sectors (TBMM, 2011b: 2). Despite the extensiveness of the government program, Bayar did not include any references to press freedom, academic research matters and labor issues (Özoral, 2004: 44). It can thus be said that matters related to core political issues such as the freedom of the press, the academia or workers' rights were not problematized in the government program. It was made clear from the outset that the Bayar

⁸⁷ This was rendered dysfunctional when Germany abolished the promised credit to Turkey in October 1939 due to Turkey's co-operation agreements with the United Kingdom and France (Mazıcı, 1996: 103).

government did not have the intention to address core political matters. The program focused on economic development. Nevertheless, as will be shown in the following parts, the political context posed certain challenges to the Bayar government besides economic matters and Bayar had to implement policies to address these challenges.

In terms of the laws legislated during Bayar's term in office, two seemingly opposite trends in relation to state control are observed. On one hand, there were signs of loosening the grip on political expression. The annulment of political undersecretaries in 1937 and the 1938 Amnesty Law were two signs of this change. The Amnesty Law promulgated in the fifteenth year of the Republic on June 29, 1938, allowed for the return of 150 dissidents whom the Kemalist regime had earlier exiled. The amnesty decision was taken by Atatürk himself and the procedure was implemented by Bayar (Mango, 1999: 742). Bayar mentioned two reasons for declaring an amnesty. Firstly, among elites of the regime it was agreed that the Republic and the Kemalist regime had been consolidated and "the unfortunate who betrayed the regime or fought against it" should be shown the Republic's accomplishments. Secondly, Bayar mentioned that they wanted to prove to the world that the regime had become consolidated and had nothing to fear for its stability (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 5, Volume 26: 507).

Annulment of the political undersecretary positions in November 1937, almost immediately after their introduction in March 1937, was also a sign that the regime was not willing to introduce a firmer grasp on political actors. The officially stated justification for the establishment of political undersecretaries had been raising statesmen and facilitating the relations between the ministries and Parliament (Birlik, 2010:256). In practice, it meant putting ministries under the

control of the party in an indirect manner. According to a new article placed in the 1924 Constitution, political undersecretaries were chosen by the prime minister from among parliament members and their final appointment was subject to the president's approval (TBMM, 2011a).

Atatürk thought this was an unnecessary practice, that it intervened in the usual functioning of ministries and that it was a tool employed by totalitarian governments (Mazıcı, 1996: 49, 52). Atatürk also thought that if the politicians in undersecretary positions had anything to say regarding the ministries or other political matters, they should do this in Parliament. He wrote a letter to Prime Minister Celal Bayar in which he summarized his views on undersecretaries and said that if Bayar also shared his point of view, he intended to put an end to the office of political undersecretaries (Birlik, 2010: 284). Bayar supported Atatürk's opinion and the office of political undersecretaries was thus annulled (Bozdağ, 1986: 55).

On the other hand, the Bayar government undertook certain policies and measures that limited the freedom of expression. The Law on the Unity of Press (*Basın Birliği Yasası*) and the Law on Associations (*Cemiyetler Kanunu*) both legislated on June 28, 1938 were examples of such restrictions (Mazıcı, 1996: 66). With the former law, the press was put under the close surveillance of government and permits to issue new publications were made more difficult to acquire. Consequently, freedom of press was considerably curtailed (Mazıcı, 1996: 66). The Law on Associations defined barriers for activities of the associations. New regulations included restrictions on associations' rights to attain real estate and bans on student clubs' political agendas. Limitations on the usage of the terms "republic" and "national" in associations' names were also introduced (Mazıcı,

1996: 67). Setting up associations was also made harder. Before this law, setting up associations was not subject to any legal constraints. However, in practice even before the law was legislated the founders of associations had to acquire the permit of state authorities. With this law, the obligation to obtain a permit was legally codified (Tanör, 2011: 319).

Although at first instance the amnesty decision and the abandonment of political undersecretaries on one side and restrictions brought upon the freedom of press and associations on the other might seem to be contradictory, they were all responses to certain domestic and foreign developments. The removal of political undersecretaries was Atatürk's decision. Atatürk thought such institutions would make the Turkish regime resemble certain totalitarian regimes of Europe and he did not want such an association on an institutional level. The amnesty law was also contextual as the regime was thought to have been consolidated. On the other hand, increased control of the press was likewise contextual, probably prompted by growing nationalism, inspired by but not modeled after Italian and German examples as well as the impact caused by the Dersim uprising (Mazıcı, 1996: 150).

Besides these major legislations, the Bayar government had to address a number of policy issues that emerged during 1937-1939. One such matter was Hatay. The details of the matter have already been shared in Chapter II. Here it should be restated that Atatürk, rather than Bayar, was influential in the conduct of affairs on Hatay. Bayar did not devise his own policy line in this matter and followed Atatürk. Bayar mainly informed the parliament of the progress that was achieved throughout the negotiations. For instance, in his address to parliament on June 29, 1938, in rather vague terms he mentioned that the negotiations with

France on Hatay were continuing and that a settlement with the French government was due in weeks (Şahingiray, 1954: 352-353). Bayar also tried to raise awareness in favor of the Turkish cause in Hatay and encourage the people of Hatay to seek their rights. He publicly accused the French of provoking chaos in Hatay through inflicting violence upon groups that demonstrated in support of Turkey's cause throughout the city and advised the people of Hatay to maintain their stand against the French (Shields, 2011: 190).

Another substantial issue was the Dersim revolt that had been continuing since March 1937. Like most major policy issues, Dersim was also in President Atatürk's domain. Bayar emphasized that the decision to engage in military operations in Dersim was taken by Atatürk and that he witnessed one of the moments when one such decision was arrived. Chief of Staff Fevzi Çakmak (1924-1944), Bayar and Atatürk were following the army's maneuvers in Dersim and discussing the strategy to be adopted. Bayar considered himself as an observer in this conversation rather than a participant because he thought Atatürk and Çakmak were experienced soldiers and that they were more qualified to speak on that matter. As this conversation was continuing, they were informed that some gendarmerie stations in Dersim had been attacked by rebels. Upon these news, Atatürk declared that he took all the responsibility and that there would be a major military operation in Dersim (Altuğ, September 17, 1986, *Tercüman* daily).

Bayar informed the Parliament on the incidents taking place in Dersim. He also worked on long and mid-term socio-economic development plans for Dersim. For instance in his address to the Parliament on June 29, 1938 he mentioned that the army was going to conduct "maneuvers" in Dersim and that the government was already implementing a rehabilitation program there which focused on the

construction of roads, bridges, police and gendarmerie stations as well as schools. (Şahingiray, 1954: 352).

4.2.4 İnönü's Election and Bayar's Role

Bayar was closely following Atatürk's deteriorating health and all the discussions related to the post-Atatürk period to act against possible conspiracies (Koçak, 1990: 120). Falih Rıfkı Atay recognized Bayar's cautious approach when the latter uttered the following words: "...how can I tell Atatürk to hold a new [presidential] election. After Lenin's death, [Leon] Trotsky was the natural candidate for the new Russian leadership. In order to eliminate Trotsky in favor of Stalin, millions of people were killed. We have no room for such tragedies" (Atay, 1969: 499).⁸⁸

Bayar highlighted the significance of the transition process in the following words: "...[for me] this was a question of the regime. It was so important to me that if I had sensed a threat, I would first get the conspirators executed and get the court hearing only later". Bayar was aware that this meant disregarding the constitution but in such a time of crisis he found guaranteeing the unity and peace of the nation and the state more important than observing legal procedures. He also mentioned that this was the only time that he dared to ignore the word of the constitution. He thought in case of such emergency, insistence on usual procedures and rules might result in a violent civil war and open the way to discussions of the restoration of the caliphate and the abolition of the Republic (Bozdağ, 1986: 60-61).

⁸⁸ Atay did not specify which elections Bayar referred to however it is quite certain that he meant presidential elections.

Bayar also followed the press closely regarding the news of Atatürk's health condition. For instance in August 1938 when Ahmet Emin Yalman wrote about Atatürk's failing health in the *Tan* daily, Bayar declared such articles to be detrimental to the peace in the country. Upon Bayar's directives, Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya had the *Tan* daily banned for three months (Mazıcı, 1996: 113-114). Bayar feared that any public discussion and speculation on this issue could result in severe political conflict.

Bayar not only prevented the emergence of any major conspiracy, but he also made İnönü's election to the presidency easier. For instance, he refused to engage in dialogue with İnönü's adversaries and maintained contact with İnönü during Atatürk's illness (Zürcher, 2004: 184). In his memoirs İnönü wrote that as Atatürk's illness became more severe, Bayar began to inform him of Atatürk's condition regularly (İnönü, 2008: 255, Volume 1). Besides, Bayar had not engaged in any acts that would marginalize İnönü in 1937-1939 and alienate him from the political scene. Thus, Bayar had already helped İnönü to maintain a political base for his future political activities (Koçak, 1990: 121). Lastly, Bayar refused to seek the presidency for himself.

News of Atatürk's death came when Bayar was in Ankara. He learnt that the regular health report would this time be sent coded in the evening. Bayar understood the gravity of the situation and summoned the council of ministers to his home. He also thought İnönü should be present at such a critical moment and picked up İnönü from the latter's home himself (Altuğ, June 17, 1981, *Tercüman* daily).

Bayar skillfully negotiated with several stakeholders before the presidential election in Parliament. For instance he paid a visit to Chief of Staff Fevzi Çakmak to ask about the military's candidate for the presidency and found out that the military was not willing to be involved in this process. Çakmak stated that he would not seek the office for himself and that the military would recognize the Parliament as the only authority for the next president's election (Barlas, May 17, 1982, *Milliyet* daily).

In November 1938, the CHP group was summoned under Bayar's chairmanship to discuss the presidential candidate. Bayar asked the group members to write down their preferred candidate on a piece of paper and said that whoever got the most votes would be elected president in Parliament. During the election held in Parliament on the same day, İnönü obtained 322 votes out of 323 and was elected president (Bozdağ, 1986: 62). One vote was cast for Bayar by Hikmet Bayur (Mazıcı, 1996: 120).⁸⁹

4.2.5 The End of Bayar's Term as Prime Minister

Bayar resigned from office following İnönü's election on November 16, 1938. He was re-appointed by President İnönü and served until his second resignation on January 25, 1939. Just like Atatürk used to be, İnönü also became the most decisive influence on Bayar. Bayar considered Atatürk's impact to be purely positive and he referred to the short period they worked together as very efficient.⁹⁰ Bayar did not expect to have a similar experience with İnönü,

⁸⁹ Hikmet Bayur (1891-1980) was a member of Parliament in 5th, 6th, 7th and 10th as well as 11th terms. He was also minister of education from 1933 to 1934.

⁹⁰ Interview with a close acquaintance of Bayar, who prefers to remain anonymous.

nevertheless he accepted the latter's offer to stay in office for two reasons. Firstly, Bayar considered this as a part of his duties as a statesman. İnönü had told him that this was an obligation he could not refuse, considering the political context (Mazıcı, 1996: 123). İnönü must have referred to the necessity of creating a sense of continuity with the Atatürk phase when he mentioned the political context. Secondly, Bayar also pointed out Atatürk's final wishes to have been influential in his decision to stay in office. Atatürk had told Bayar that they were at the beginning of a radiant road and that they should accomplish the objectives set out. Atatürk was talking in broad terms but it is likely that he also referred to objectives in the economy. The Bayar government had not yet been able to achieve these objectives. For these reasons Bayar thought that he should work more for the accomplishment of economic growth. Nevertheless Bayar was aware of the difficulties this new arrangement would bring for himself. The government program Bayar presented to parliament on November 16, 1938 was much shorter and less detailed than the first Bayar government's program (Zürcher, 2004: 185) although content wise they were mostly identical (Bozdağ, 1986: 63). This was a sign that the government was not going to be long-lived.

Bayar felt İnönü's influence from the start of the latter's presidency. Bayar had to introduce certain changes to his cabinet as per President İnönü's requests (Uran, 1959: 324). In the second Bayar government, Bayar replaced Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya with Refik Saydam and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras with Şükrü Saracoğlu.⁹¹ It came as no surprise to Bayar that İnönü insisted on these changes (Mazıcı, 1996: 123). İnönü also confirmed his part in

⁹¹ According to Mazıcı, the reason for this change in the cabinet was İnönü's wish to appoint ministers who were closer to him.

these changes writing in his memoirs that he requested changes in the cabinet and that Bayar agreed after a slight hesitation (İnönü, 2008: 255, Volume 1).

On January 25, 1939, after the CHP assembly took the decision to hold national elections on March 26, 1939, Bayar declared his resignation from office (Bozdağ, 1986: 64). İnönü accepted Bayar's withdrawal and thanked him for his services in a letter (İnönü, 2008: 257, Volume 1). The second Bayar government had remained in office for only 74 days. The official reasons provided for the government's withdrawal were the approaching elections and the necessity to enter the elections under a new government. In his letter of resignation, Bayar explained that the reason for his resignation was to “..take our party to elections with a new and fresh force” (Mazıcı, 1996:143). Bayar repeated the same reason in his interviews.⁹² Refik Saydam succeeded Bayar as prime minister and stayed in office until his death in July 1942 (Zürcher, 2004: 185).

In reality there were other reasons for this break-up:

(1) The second Bayar government was in a fragile position. İnönü mentioned corruption allegations around the Impex company, *Denizbank* and a plane smuggling issue that made him lose his trust in the government (İnönü, 2008: 256, Volume 1).⁹³ Thus the government found itself under the close scrutiny of President İnönü who was conducting an investigation of the activities undertaken by the first Bayar government. Essentially the second Bayar government was on an unpleasant ground where it was asked to assist the inspection on the activities

⁹² See for instance Kutay, 1982: 164.

⁹³ An export and import company, Impex had been working with English companies and promised to get these companies government tenders in return for a commission. Denizbank allegations concerned alleged misconduct involved in the purchase of boats from Germany. The plane smuggling issue was related to the allegations that an international smuggling network was selling aircraft to Spain in Turkey's name during the Spanish Civil War. For a detailed account of these incidents, see Mazıcı, 1996: 129-142.

of the first Bayar government (Koçak, 1990: 125). The government's prestige and standing was impaired during the investigation of the allegations (Koçak, 1990: 125) because certain government members were thought to be associated with these corruption cases.⁹⁴ Although none of the investigations followed by court cases convicted any government member guilty for corruption, İnönü was nevertheless not happy with the results of these investigations. He noted that he called Prime Minister Bayar to discuss these allegations and then a "necessity for Bayar's withdrawal occurred" (İnönü, 2008: 256, Volume 1). Upon Bayar's resignation, İnönü wrote in his journal that he had been relieved after the government's resignation because he had thought that it would have been difficult to work with the "discredited" government until the elections (İnönü, 2008: 256, Volume 1).

For his part Bayar expressed that he was aware of the investigation that İnönü was conducting. Bayar remembered the moment when he incidentally found out about this investigation. While visiting İnönü in his office, Bayar overheard İnönü's conversation with İş Bank manager Muammer Eriş. Eriş was telling İnönü that Bayar owed 45.000 Turkish Liras to the Bank. Upon hearing this, İnönü commented that this was proof of Bayar's honesty, because it showed Bayar's ability to expand the bank's operations without getting any benefits for himself otherwise he would not need any loans from the Bank. This was the loan that Bayar owed to the bank for an apartment he bought (Bozdağ, 2005:100). Yet, despite his appreciation of Bayar in this matter, İnönü thought that the government as a whole was discredited.

⁹⁴ See Mazıcı, 1996: 129-142.

(2) The conduct of the economy continued to be a source of friction between Bayar and İnönü. In his memoirs, İnönü stated that he would have ideally wanted to work longer with Bayar because he considered Bayar to be an honest man. But İnönü also wrote that he had no hopes of diverting Bayar's economic policies to a different path, and thus gave up on Bayar (İnönü, 2008: 257, Volume 1). İnönü thought Bayar's current economy management left too much room for "demagogy" and that his policies were destroying the state's fiscal condition, the currency and the trade balance (İnönü, 2008: 256, Volume 1). In return, Bayar thought that İnönü did not have a wide grasp of economic issues, due to his military background, and sought to protect the status quo and the bureaucracy rather than pursue reforms (Mazıcı, 1996: 144). This major policy difference between Bayar and İnönü made it impossible for them to work together in the long run.

(3) İnönü also mentioned conflicts among cabinet members as a reason for his criticism of the government. Before asking Bayar to withdraw, İnönü had informed a senior CHP member, Hasan Saka, and Minister of Justice in the second Bayar government, Hilmi Uran, about his decision to ask for the government's withdrawal. İnönü thought that the cabinet members could not get along well and this created chaos (Uran, 1959: 346). However, this observation about conflicts among the government members cannot be substantiated from other accounts.

Following his resignation from office, Bayar remained as a deputy from İzmir and did not take part in major political disputes until 1945, when the decision to establish the opposition party DP was taken.

CHAPTER V

CELAL BAYAR AS PRESIDENT, 1950-1960

5.1 The Presidency According to the Constitution and in Practice

According to the 1924 Turkish Constitution the president lacked institutional mechanisms to be involved in government's affairs (Gönenç, 2008: 492; Arsel, 1954: 9). The most considerable powers of the president were to designate the prime minister from among the members of Parliament and return the laws to the Parliament for reconsideration within ten days following the day of legislation.⁹⁵ However, the latter was not an effective veto tool as it could be overrun by a simple majority vote. The president did not have a right to return the same law to the Parliament for further reconsideration (Sevinç, 2002: 115).

The president was not in a position to determine and execute government policies. However he had the right to preside over the council of ministers meetings whenever he found it necessary (Arsel, 1961: 45). The president was

⁹⁵ During the single party years, presidents did not return any law to Parliament for reconsideration (Güneş, 1964: 175).

also not allowed to take part in parliamentary discussions or vote although, he was, by definition, a member of Parliament (Arsel, 1961: 46).

The only exceptions to president's enforced absence from parliamentary discussions were his annual addresses to the Parliament each November. According to article 36, in these speeches the president was entitled to speak about the government's activities in the previous year and point out the measures that should be taken in the coming year regarding several policy issues. If the president was not in a position to deliver the speech him/herself, he could appoint the prime minister to read it in his place.

The president also had the obligation to represent the Republic of Turkey in dealings with representatives of foreign nations. Finally, the president also acted as commander in chief of the Turkish armed forces on behalf of the Parliament. As for the manner of election, presidential candidates had to be members of Parliament in order to run for the office. The president was elected for a term of four years by Parliament and there were no restrictions on his re-election.

It is often stated that the 1924 Constitutional arrangement sought to create an impartial presidency (Arsel, 1954:9; Özbudun, 2012: 48). This argument is raised on three grounds. First, it is pointed out that the president's exemption from parliamentary vote and dissociation from government affairs showed that the makers of the 1924 Constitution wanted to dissociate the president from everyday politics (Arsel, 1954: 9). Second, it is emphasized that the regime created by the 1924 Constitution resembled that of a parliamentary regime (Özbudun, 2012: 37) and it did not bear any resemblance to a

presidential regime. Under a parliamentary regime, it is the prime minister who holds the political power and the initiative. Third, the powers granted to the president by the 1924 Constitution, such as the power to chair the council of ministers meetings whenever necessary, are also attributed to a search for an impartial presidency. It was thought that these powers would enable the president to act as an impartial negotiator above daily political conflicts (Özbudun, 2012: 46) and make necessary interventions in the conflicts without having to be politically engaged with a certain group or party. Nevertheless the impartiality principle is not openly mentioned in the text of the 1924 Constitution. This absence and the lack of mechanisms to ensure such impartiality caused political conflict during 1950-1960 as further detailed below. The drafters of 1961 and 1982 constitutions paid attention to including the impartiality principle explicitly.

The drafters of the 1924 Constitution paid attention not to create a powerful presidency. In order to avoid this, the original draft of the 1924 Constitution, proposing a seven-year term and considerable veto powers that could be overrun only by at least two thirds of the parliamentary votes, was revised. Consequently the powers of the president were curtailed (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 12).

Nevertheless during the single party years, presidents were in practice the most powerful figures of the political regime and they exercised more power than stated in the Constitution (Gönenç, 2008: 492). They were strong political leaders who placed the domestic and international consolidation of the new regime before anything else. In order to realize this objective they kept the political regime under their personal control. They were not ready to consider

abandoning their positions before they were convinced that the regime and its main tenets were safe.

The de facto influence of the first two presidents was also the outcome of the single party discipline that aligned the government and the Parliament under the leadership of one person. The presidents, being also the chairpersons of the CHP, took their place at the highest level of the political hierarchy (Gönenç, 2008: 492). Consequently, it was considered normal for the first two presidents to make policy recommendations, express their opinions or even issue directives as the chairpersons of the governing party (Koçak, 2009: 120). This understanding was rarely challenged during the single party years. As a rare exception to this observation, İnönü attempted to formalize the government in the 1920s and the 1930s because Atatürk frequently bypassed İnönü's regulations and insisted that ministers report to him directly (Heper, 2000:67). However İnönü did not have any success in changing this practice. During his own presidency, he also established a personalized style that very much depended on him as the "national chief" (Heper, 2000:67).

The 1924 Constitution posed certain challenges for presidents to assume an impartial position. Firstly, the requirement to be a deputy in order to run for office often implied affiliation with a political party, unless the presidential candidate was elected to the Parliament independently. This requirement also implied that politicians seeking office would first have to campaign for their election to Parliament.

This obligation did not raise any controversies during the single party years. After 1946, however, it became a matter of dispute. During the multi-

party era it has been observed that the obligation to have a seat in Parliament to run for office put the president in a difficult position. It raised concerns over the question of how a president who, supposedly, spent the former four years arbitrating between different political parties could campaign for his election as a deputy from a particular political party (*Forum* bi-weekly, May 15, 1954). As will be further taken up below, as a consequence of this constitutional arrangement Bayar was involved in the DP's election campaigns in 1950-1960 and this caused some observers to conclude that he was not impartial.

Secondly, the constitutional obligation to deliver an annual parliamentary speech on the policies of the government also created an awkward situation. This speech was, on paper, an overview of the previous year's activities followed by a set of recommendations. It mainly reflected the president's opinions. The content of this speech in practice could be partisan and lead to the association of the president with the government. Bayar was criticized for adopting a non-critical and partisan approach in these parliamentary speeches. This non-critical stance led to the allegations that was not impartial. Such allegations are further detailed below.

These two stipulations in the Constitution were not changed during the transition to the multi-party era. The 1924 Constitution did not include specific references to a single party system and thus it was in theory compatible with a multi-party system (Koçak, 1990: 96-97). Consequently, the institutions of the single party phase and the Constitution were not revised. In practice, political conditions had changed with the transition to multiparty politics and these stipulations on the presidency posed certain problems. After 1945, the presidents' impartiality became a matter of dispute regarding the terms of both

İnönü and Bayar. A revision of the Constitution on the president's position and enhancing the impartiality principle began to be debated.⁹⁶

5.2 Bayar's Term as President

As will be taken up in the following sections, scholarly as well as popular writings on the DP period often emphasize the role of Menderes rather than Bayar in substantial political matters. Typically a limited number of incidents and quotes are repeated in lieu of discussing Bayar's role in the 1950-1960 period.

Bayar's memoirs and interviews between 1950-1960 do not provide an extensive resource for examining his impact in this phase. These resources are often comments or observations about the governments' activities or the opposition's pursuits, rather than an elaboration of his own role and input. In his memoirs on his time as prime minister, minister of economics and chairman of the DP, Bayar used a different approach-here he provided information on his input, activities and views. Despite the lack of reliable resources to discuss his presidency, Bayar is best remembered as the third president of the Republic and most criticized for the failures of the party he founded (Tunçay, 2002: 22).

Before moving on to an account of Bayar's presidency, his understanding and interpretation of this position should be mentioned. Bayar thought that each president should bring his own interpretation to the office. For instance, he disliked the police escorts that accompanied the president's car and consequently put an end to this practice (Bayar 2010: 168). He did not want his portrait

⁹⁶ See Feyzioğlu, 1956: 13.

painted on stamps and money or for it to be hung on the walls of official buildings (Harris, 2002: 57).

Regarding the president's constitutional role, Bayar thought that the president did not have the power and authority to interfere in governmental affairs (Atay et al., November 10, 2007; Bozdağ, 1986: 91). Bayar was aware that as the president he had to maintain his impartiality toward political parties and that he might have to tolerate political views that he had earlier opposed. However, although Bayar subscribed to this interpretation in his discourse, he has been criticized for not being impartial as will be discussed in the following sections.

5.2.1 Bayar's Election

In the aftermath of the DP's electoral victory in 1950, several names were considered within the DP leadership for the presidency. These names included the retired General Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Chairman of the Court of Appeal Halil Özyörük jurist and academician, and politician Sadri Maksudi Arsal (Albayrak, 2004: 181). Bayar was also considered among the candidates and there were different opinions on his prospects as the president. The debate on Bayar's candidacy did not result from doubts over his suitability for office. Since the establishment of the DP, Bayar's presence in the party had been perceived as a guarantee that the party was not going to challenge the basic tenets of the Republic. He was the least controversial figure among the DP members and there was little doubt that he was acceptable to all political segments of society either as president or as prime minister (Ahmad, 1977: 77; Zürcher, 2004: 221).

The debate was more related to practical issues and concerns. Those who supported Bayar's presidency saw the office as a position of prestige and pointed out that it had to be filled with someone who could represent the state. Bayar had such experience.⁹⁷ On the other hand, those who advocated that he should remain the chairman of the party and take office as prime minister considered Bayar's political skills vital for the multi-party system until democracy was consolidated.⁹⁸

Bayar himself was also indecisive for a while. In his memoirs he mentioned that prior to the DP's electoral victory, he had not made plans and had not considered suitable candidates among the DP ranks for major governmental positions and the presidency (Bayar, 2010: 143). He also told Cihad Baban that he did not have the intention of becoming president even if his party wins the elections (Baban, 1970: 48, 50-51).

Bayar changed his mind and was elected to office on May 22, 1950, earning the votes of 387 out of 453 parliamentarians (Albayrak, 2004: 181). He accepted the candidacy that was nominated by the DP parliamentary group on the grounds that he never refrained from responsibility and serving the Turkish nation when it was asked of him (Bayar, 2010: 146). He did not comment on the reasons for his change of mind. Bayar might have refrained from voicing his thoughts on the presidency because he wanted to wait for the maturation of the political context and wanted to take a clear view of the circumstances he faced to understand whether they were favorable for his presidency or not.

⁹⁷ For instance, see Burçak, 1976: 11.

⁹⁸ For instance, see Karacan, 1950; Baban, 1970: 48, 50-51.

For the rest of the DP period, Bayar's presidency did not become a matter of any debate. Parliament re-elected him as president in 1954 and in 1957. Bayar got 486 votes from 513 deputies in the former election and got 413 votes out of 413 deputies in the latter. He was also the DP deputy from Istanbul in the ninth, tenth and eleventh legislative years.

5.2.2 Relations with Key Political Figures

Leaders' relations with their close circles and opponents form an important part of leadership analyses. Institutions define the framework of relations between political party leaders, prime ministers and presidents. Yet, addressing these relations on an entirely institutional level is not sufficient, as practice may divert from the institutional framework. Individual relations between leaders are also decisive. For instance, in certain cases, like Menderes and Bayar, there might be a background of common struggle and this background might influence the relations between political figures. Likewise, if leaders have different interpretations of basic political notions, such as İnönü and Bayar did, and if they have difficulties in reconciling disagreements deriving from these different interpretations, this might also affect the course of relations. For this reason, Bayar's relations with two key political figures during his presidency, Adnan Menderes and İsmet İnönü, are taken up in the light of personal and institutional contexts.

5.2.2.1 Relations with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes

Bayar and Menderes met for the first time in İzmir in 1913. At the time Bayar was serving as the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti-İTC*) İzmir representative. Menderes, then a student at the Kızılçullu American College, had visited him to make a complaint about missionary activities taking place in their school.

Their next encounter was in 1930 during Bayar's visit to the Aegean region as a state representative conducted in order to make an assessment of the failed Free Party (*Serbest Fırka-SF*) experience. During this visit Bayar got in contact with the former SF members. He also met with Adnan Menderes who used to be head of the SF Aydın branch. Bayar was instantly impressed with Menderes' candid manners and in-depth analysis of the macroeconomic conditions (Kutay, 1982:102). On his return to Ankara, he mentioned Menderes to Atatürk and expressed that he was positively impressed with him (Bayar, 2010: 33). Bayar did not directly recommend Menderes for a seat in Parliament, but it can be argued that his words created a positive image of Menderes in the eyes of Atatürk, who was quite decisive in choosing the candidates to run in elections.⁹⁹ Consequently, Menderes got elected to the Parliament in 1931.

Eventually, as they became the co-founders of the DP, Bayar and Menderes began to share a common path (Baban, 1970: 52). It has been stated that Bayar became an elder brother for Menderes, balancing and supporting him in his initiatives throughout the latter's political career.¹⁰⁰ Menderes proved his

⁹⁹ Atatürk had also met Adnan Menderes during a visit to Aydın and asked him to prepare a report on the social and economic conditions encountered in the countryside (Karpaz, 2011: 123).

¹⁰⁰ Phone interview with Mehmet Arif Demirel on February 28, 2012.

political skills to Bayar during the party's formation and opposition years. When it was time to designate the prime minister in 1950, Bayar thought Menderes to be the most eligible person for the office (Bayar, 2010: 148). Menderes, according to Bayar, was an appropriate candidate because he proved his capacity to understand and appeal to the common people, especially to the peasants, among whom he grew up in Aydın (Ahmad, 2003: 114). In Bayar's eyes, Menderes' closeness to the people, combined with his energy and enthusiasm, made him a sound candidate who was likely to be successful as the prime minister.

Between 1950-1960, Bayar appointed Menderes five times to form the government, three times following elections and twice following cabinet crises. Bayar thought that as time passed Menderes became a better prime minister due to experience he earned in office (Bayar, 2010: 232). Bayar never openly considered designating any other politician as prime minister even during times of crises. For instance, when the government's withdrawal was seen as a remedy to the political tension that accumulated in 1960, Bayar did not consider Menderes' resignation as an option (Uyar, 2001: 82).¹⁰¹ When it was mentioned to him that Menderes should be replaced by another leading figure from the DP, he resisted this by saying that the "horse should not be switched while crossing the river (*dere geçerken at değiştirilmez*)".¹⁰² According to Ali Fuat Başgil, this was because Bayar did not want to give up on a friend who had been on his side for fourteen years (Başgil, 1966: 142).

¹⁰¹ The reasons for the accumulation of political tension in 1960 is explained at length in Chapter II.

¹⁰² Skype interview with Üner Kırdar on April 30, 2012.

Their last encounter was in the Yassiada trial hall where they were forbidden to speak to each other. On the day of Menderes' execution, Bayar organized a religious ceremony in Menderes' and the other executed government members' memory. Upon the prison administration's attempt to prevent the ceremony, Bayar expressed his feelings in the following words: "We lost a person very dear to us. Can we not pray for him?" (Ilicak, 1989: 234). Bayar, who was at the time in Kayseri prison, felt so upset on the first anniversary of Menderes' death verdict on September 15, 1962, that he decided not to leave his cell for three days and refrained from eating warm dishes during that time (Bayar, 1999: 82).

The most discussed aspect of the Bayar-Menderes relation has been who had more control over the other and who had said the last word in cases of disagreement. Bayar's authority as chairman of the DP was undisputable. He had a strong grip over party affairs once the authority of the founders was consolidated.¹⁰³ Therefore Bayar had control over Menderes and other figures in party affairs during the opposition years (Kabasakal, 1991: 200; Harris, 2002: 57).

After 1950, the balance of power in the party shifted in favor of Menderes. As prime minister and chairman of the DP, Menderes had "unlimited power" over the party and the government (Karpas, 2011: 134). Bayar maintained a certain degree of influence over Menderes mainly due to his experience in governmental affairs and his affinity with the structures of the

¹⁰³ The party went through an initial turbulence until such consolidation occurred. Due to major differences of opinion among party members, a group of dissident Democrats, most of whom were also deputies, broke their ties with the DP and founded the Nation Party in 1948 (*Millet Partisi*) (Lewis, 1968: 308).

regime, such as the bureaucracy (Karpat, 2011: 133-134). Especially in times of crises, Bayar's support became crucial. According to Mehmet Arif Demirer, with his nerves of steel acquired during the Turkish War of Independence, Bayar was capable of giving advice to Menderes at such times.¹⁰⁴ For instance toward the 1960 intervention, Bayar increased his visits to the prime minister's office (Yavuzalp, 1991: 40-41, 45, Ilıcak 1989: 215; Yeşilbursa, 2005: 124). This was also to give advice to Menderes in time of political crisis.

In the final analysis, Bayar's influence on Menderes between 1950-1960 was nevertheless limited and could not be continuous for a number of reasons. First, as already detailed above, on an institutional level Bayar lacked mechanisms that could enable his involvement in government affairs. In this case, Bayar's influence over Prime Minister Menderes had to work through behind the scenes channels of influence, which would depend on his personal authority.

Second, and on a more personal level, Bayar's authority and influence over the party as well as over Menderes shrunk throughout the years. In academic resources, there is often a consensus that the main actor in the party and government affairs, especially after 1954, was undisputedly Menderes.¹⁰⁵ Nineten fifty four is cited as the year that Bayar lost a considerable part of his remaining influence. This was mainly due to the success that the party attained in the national elections held that year. This success was mostly attributed to Menderes and his performance in government (Karpat, 2011: 133-134).

¹⁰⁴ Phone interview with Mehmet Arif Demirer on February 28, 2012.

¹⁰⁵ For instance see Ahmad, 2008: 237; Şenşekerçi, 2000: 245; Yeşilbursa, 2000: 4; Karpat 2004c: 115, Karpat, 2011: 133-4.

Bayar was aware of the decline of his influence after 1950 and for this reason, he did not push forward for the acceptance of his opinions by Menderes. Samet Ağaoğlu, a close witness of political circles of the time as a minister in the Menderes governments, also made a similar observation and mentioned that Bayar did not push for his own opinions on critical issues such as the so called “Nine Officers’ Incident” (Ağaoğlu, 1972: 142).¹⁰⁶

In anecdotes narrated by political figures of the time it is often stated that Bayar and Menderes had several disagreements.¹⁰⁷ Bayar was aware of these discussions of his relationship with Menderes. He mentioned that he was seeking a relationship with Menderes that was similar to the relations between himself and Atatürk. This meant that he did not want to make life difficult for Menderes but instead provide him support and advice in his policies (Baban, 1970: 51-53; Nutku, 1979: 372).¹⁰⁸

Bayar wrote that there had only been two issues that they disagreed upon in 1946-1960. The first disagreement was on the CHP and whether it should be held liable and charged for its former unconstitutional acts, such as rigging the 1946 national elections. Bayar was of the opinion that should the DP become victorious in the 1950 elections, the CHP should be tried. Likewise Bayar also thought that promises of exemption from trial should not be made in the DP program or in the election manifesto. Menderes had a contrary view and thought that pursuing the former disagreements would harm the harmony of the new political era. This approach has been referred to as not to question the past (*devr-*

¹⁰⁶ This incident is explained in Chapter III, in a section on Bayar’s thoughts on the military’s involvement in politics.

¹⁰⁷ See Baban, 1970:46, 57; Kabasakal, 1991:50; Nutku, 1979: 90, 92; Başar, 1960:58.

¹⁰⁸ Phone interview with Mehmet Arif Demirel on February 28, 2012.

i sabık yaratmamak). In the end, Bayar did not oppose Menderes' view and charges based on these former matters were not brought up by the DP after 1950 (Bayar, 2010: 197-199).

The second disagreement mentioned in Bayar's account took place during his presidency. The DP government had decided to issue a law that would transfer some of the CHP assets accumulated during the single party years to the state treasury. CHP assets were thought to provide that party an unfair source of income and damage the competitiveness of other political parties (Tunçay, 1990: 179).

Bayar was opposed to this law. He thought that the CHP should not be put under such pressure. As president, he had to sign all the laws issued by the government and when the law entitled "Transfer of the Unfairly [Acquired] CHP Funds to the State Budget" was sent for his approval, he reflected on returning it to Parliament for reconsideration. But Bayar was aware that it would not have any impact as he surmised the Parliament would keep the content unaltered and he would find the same text sent for his signature. As president, Bayar did not have the power to submit the same law for further reconsideration of the Parliament (Bayar 2010: 120). Nevertheless he spoke against the legislation of this law during his meetings with Prime Minister Menderes and DP deputies to convince them to withdraw this proposal (Bayar, 2010: 120). He was not unsuccessful in his pursuit, and the mentioned law was passed in December 1953 (Tunçay, 1990: 179).

5.2.2.2 Relations with the CHP Chairman İsmet İnönü

An elaboration of relations between İnönü and Bayar is also essential because it has been suggested that the political rivalry between Bayar and İnönü had a negative impact on politics in 1950-1960 (Başgil, 1966: 27; Birand et al., 1991:22; Kutay, 1982:16; Ağaoğlu, 1972:152; Bilgiç, 1982: 46). The political impact of disagreements between Bayar and İnönü is examined below. Before that, in order to put their relations and disagreements into context, a brief overview of their personal relations is provided.

Bayar and İnönü met for the first time in the Parliament during Bayar's early days in Ankara before the proclamation of the Republic (Altuğ, June 13, 1981, *Tercüman* daily).¹⁰⁹ They started working closely after 1932 when Bayar became the Minister of Economics in the İnönü cabinet. Bayar and İnönü had certain disagreements mainly on economic issues at the time and not unexpectedly their rivalry intensified during the multiparty years.

Despite their political disagreements, which will be taken up below, Bayar and İnönü maintained mutual respect and conducted their affairs in a civilized manner.¹¹⁰ For instance, when asked about his opinions on the Free Party and its leader Fethi Okyar, Bayar said that he would prefer İnönü to Okyar without any hesitation (Bozdağ, 2003: 70).¹¹¹ İnönü appreciated Bayar's warnings against paying the Ottoman debt in gold during the Lausanne negotiations and acknowledged that he had at the time not realized or grasped the importance of that issue (Bozdağ, 1993: 62). Bayar's appointment as prime

¹⁰⁹ Bayar did not specify the date of this first encounter.

¹¹⁰ There are anecdotes and memoirs which claim that their political rivalry resulted in a personal grudge and that they did not have respect for each other. For these accounts, see Szyliowicz, 1966:279; Kirişcioğlu, 1975: 123.

¹¹¹ Bozdağ does not specify the date of this remark.

minister in 1937 had caused a number of people to turn their back on İnönü but Bayar did not take sides with them and always showed respect for İnönü (Atay, 1969:449). When İnönü was elected president, Bayar praised him as “the most respectable character of the Turkish revolution and Atatürk’s regime, and the greatest son of the Turkish nation” (Uran, 1959:326). İnönü for his part acknowledged Bayar’s role in a smooth transition to the post-Atatürk period and noted that if there had been someone with bad intentions in Bayar’s place, the country would have faced a catastrophe (Bozdağ, 1986:64).

The establishment of the DP without any major problems was also due to the harmonious dialogue between Bayar and İnönü during the founding days and early times of the DP. For instance in 1946 İnönü asked Bayar not to open branches in the eastern areas and promised that the CHP would dissolve its own branches in that region. When Bayar disagreed, İnönü did not push the issue forward (Heper, 1998: 156). Likewise, Bayar was able to persuade İnönü that his party would follow the basic tenets of the Republic in secularism, education and foreign policy (Heper, 1998: 185).

Bayar also appreciated İnönü’s attempts to negotiate the political tension in 1946-1950 through arranging meetings between the government and the opposition. In these meetings, İnönü advised Prime Minister Recep Peker and Bayar to put an end to accusing each other and have a common understanding of the main issues of dispute. This would eventually lead to a healthy dialogue between the government and the opposition (Bayar 2010: 114). Bayar considered the Declaration of July 12, 1947 to be a sign of İnönü’s goodwill and far-sightedness (Karpat, 1967: 169). The Declaration was issued by İnönü to

make it known that the opposition was entitled to benefit from the same rights as the governing party.

After becoming president, Bayar asked the staff members at the office of the presidency to maintain their ties with İnönü and offer their services should he require them. Bayar thought İnönü was a leader of historical importance and ignoring him would be a display of an “eastern attitude” (*şark zihniyeti*) (Derin, 1995: 260). İnönü congratulated Bayar in Parliament upon his election as president and Bayar in turn paid a visit to İnönü’s residence (Kirişçioğlu, 1975: 123).

Despite the mutual respect evident in these instances, several times İnönü and Bayar found themselves in political conflict and the frequency, as well as the intensity of these conflicts escalated after 1950. The ground for dispute was already laid from 1946 onwards. According to Bayar, İnönü had total control over politics during his presidency (1938-1950), consequently he held İnönü responsible for certain difficulties and restraints that the DP faced during its opposition years. Bayar, for instance, thought that the Memorandum of the Four (*Dörtlü Takrir*) was rejected by Parliament because İnönü wanted it so (Bayar, 2010: 44).¹¹² In 1947, the tension between the DP and the government further escalated as the opposition accused the government of preventing its activities. Bayar believed that it was İnönü who made the government and Prime Minister Recep Peker act in this repressive manner (*Müstakil Demokratlar Grubu*, 1949:11; Karakuş, 1977:138).

¹¹² Differences of opinion among the CHP members surfaced during the debates for the Land Reform Law in Parliament in 1945. In response to these differences, four CHP members, Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, Fuat Köprülü and Adnan Menderes submitted a proposal to the CHP group asking for the restoration of democratic freedoms and for Parliament’s control of the executive. This proposal, referred to as the Memorandum of the Four, was rejected by the CHP (Karpaz, 2004c: 106).

In 1950-1960, Bayar thought İnönü provoked dissent during his visits to different parts of the country (Bozdağ, 1991: 89-90). He wanted to reduce İnönü's influence and prevent the activities that he considered provocative. In Bayar's thinking the only way to achieve this end was to follow an energetic and bold policy; the government had to be decisive and to some extent authoritarian (Burçak, 1976: 28-29). Bayar also accused İnönü of provoking the military intervention in 1960 and thought that İnönü was in contact with the conspirators of the military intervention (Bozdağ: 1991: 94).

Bayar was sidelined from mainstream politics after the Yassıada tribunal convicted him to a lifetime sentence. He stayed in prison until 1964 and his political rights were not returned before 1974. Bayar was not in contact with İnönü during most of this period with the exception of two meetings in 1969 to discuss the situation of former DP members who were seeking political amnesty.¹¹³ It was Bayar himself who brought up the issue of meeting İnönü to obtain his support for the political rights struggle (*Milliyet* daily, December 31, 1969). Turhan Dilligil, journalist and deputy from the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi-AP*) arranged the initial meeting.

Even though it was Bayar himself who introduced the idea, he was hesitant when it became serious. Bayar mentioned not having slept for two nights before giving his final consent to the meeting (Firat, 1996: 63). During the meeting that took place in May 1969, Bayar was more reserved and quiet in comparison to İnönü (Dilligil, 1969: 62, 106).¹¹⁴ İnönü in return paid a visit to Bayar's residence in Istanbul the following month. In the end, İnönü was

¹¹³ The former DP deputies were banned from engaging in political activity and running for the Parliament (Çavdar, 2004: 110).

¹¹⁴ For a full account of this meeting and how it was organized, see Dilligil, 1969.

influential in the granting of political amnesty to the former DP members (Heper, 1998: 223).

In retrospect, the main reason for political conflict between Bayar and İnönü was their different interpretations of political concepts such as democracy and different approaches especially with regard to macro-economic conduct.¹¹⁵ Bayar thought İnönü's understanding of democracy did not depend on a rule of the majority. He described his own understanding of democracy as the absolute sovereignty of the nation, exercised only through the representatives of the nation. Bayar thought that İnönü was in favor of limiting the power of the nation's elected representatives through institutions that shared political power (Altuğ, June 19, 1981, *Tercüman* daily). Bayar had in mind institutions such as the Constitutional Court, Senate or National Security Council introduced by the 1961 Constitution. Differences regarding their interpretation of macro-economy have already been taken up in Chapter IV. Here it should only be repeated that Bayar's understanding of the economy was more in favor of private enterprise in comparison to İnönü's.

Politicians' different interpretations of political concepts is a natural attribute of multiparty systems and it does not necessarily lead to major conflict. However, in the case of Turkey, the political culture in the immediate aftermath of the single party phase was not well equipped to facilitate the co-existence of different political perspectives. As already explained in Chapter II, different political views and criticism toward the government was interpreted as questioning of the government's legitimacy, not as a legitimate criticism of its

¹¹⁵ In some accounts, it is mentioned that their rivalry was rooted in the early years of the Republic when Bayar replaced İnönü as Prime Minister. It is also claimed that Bayar accused İnönü of causing the death of his son. See Baban, 1970: 60-61; Başar, 1960: 53; Erer, 1963: 75.

policies. The relations between Bayar and İnönü in 1946-1960 briefly introduced above should also be viewed in this context.

5.2.2.3 Bayar's Impact on Menderes-İnönü Relations

Menderes' decisive role in politics in 1950-1960 has already been stated. Consequently, it is important to examine the relations between the three leading politicians of the time: İnönü, Menderes and Bayar. Bayar influenced the course of relations between Menderes and İnönü. In other words, Bayar was partially responsible for how the relations between Menderes and İnönü evolved. Initially İnönü and Menderes had warm feelings toward each other, which is likely to have contributed to the creation of political dialogue between the government and the opposition. Menderes always admired İnönü's political and historical role (Bağlum, 1991:66) and İnönü felt sympathy for Menderes (Toker, 1966:16).

The maintenance of smooth relations between head of the main opposition party İnönü and Prime Minister Menderes were crucial because if the two maintained a good communication and understanding, they could work together to address the crises that arose between the government and the opposition. These instances have already been detailed in Chapter II. However, İnönü and Menderes could not maintain the initial course of their relations. Bayar did not make it any easier because he failed to facilitate a dialogue between İnönü and Menderes.

In several accounts it is stated that Bayar provoked Menderes against İnönü and prevented him from getting in contact with the opposition. For instance in May 1957, Menderes and Bayar discussed the Cyprus issue during a

dinner in the town of Dalaman in Western Turkey in the presence of other guests. When Menderes suggested that the opposition should clarify its approach to the issue and put forward its policy recommendations, Bayar resisted this idea saying that if the government asked the opposition's views, it would give the impression that these views are valuable (*Akis* weekly, May 11, 1957). On another occasion, upon increased opposition activism in 1959, Bayar asked Menderes: "Adnan Bey [Mr. Menderes], why are you waiting to show İnönü the state's power?" (*Devir* weekly, April 23, 1959; Kılıç, 1973: 48).

When İnönü welcomed Menderes warmly at the Ankara railway station following the London plane crash incident in 1959 and Menderes returned his welcome with a warm attitude, Bayar disapproved of this (İlıcak, 1989: 162-163; Bağlum, 1991:67-68).¹¹⁶ When it was time for Menderes to pay a visit in turn for this welcome, Bayar opposed it because he thought İnönü attempted to undermine the DP with his behavior in the train station (Birand et al., 1991: 156) and that the CHP could not be trusted (Bulut, 2009: 134). This was typical for the DP in 1950-1960 as they feared that İnönü would try to bring his party back to government through any possible means (Karpal, 2011: 148).

Bayar had an adverse impact on the development of a harmonious opposition-government relationship. He encouraged the government and Menderes to appear fully in command and in his understanding harmonious relations with İnönü were a sign of weakness for the government. Beneath this understanding lies a rather limited interpretation of government-opposition relations. Yet, it is hard to say that it was only Bayar's fault that the opposition-

¹¹⁶ Menderes' plane had crashed on its way to London Gatwick Airport on February 17, 1959 but Menderes survived the crash without any major injuries.

government relations did not follow a constructive path under the DP rule. There were structural shortcomings, such as the insufficient political guarantees in the Constitution and the immature political culture on how to conduct opposition and government relations. Besides as already established in a section above, Menderes was the main political actor of the era. He could have arguably formulated his relations with İnönü in a different fashion regardless of what Bayar thought.

5.2.3 Bayar's Policies and Priorities in Office

Bayar's policies in office should first be viewed in light of the political context in 1950-1960. That context was considerably different from the single party years, which accommodated strong presidents. The single party structure that had rendered a strong presidency possible was absent during Bayar's presidency. Consequently, it was more difficult for an individual leader to acquire political power that was comparable to the single party years. The support of the DP group was essential for the success of individual DP leaders who wanted to gain superiority against their competitors (Birand et al., 1991:83). DP leaders were often able to come to terms with the group, but they could never ignore its opinions. This was not the case with the CHP group during the single party phase. Besides, Bayar was not the chairperson of the government party.

Second, even when a single leader was able to acquire political power, as Menderes eventually did, it was not likely that the president would have comparable power. As already mentioned, the constitutional framework did not

also allow for a strong presidency and the political context did not present any opportunities for the president in 1950-1960. As a result, Bayar did not have the necessary mechanisms that could provide him with the channels to develop and implement policies and have considerable influence over the government.

Being in a mostly ceremonial office deprived of any significant powers and having a different stature from the former presidents does not imply that Bayar lacked a program for his presidency. Bayar naturally had an agenda that he pursued as president. He mentioned five priorities for his term in office: improving the military's infrastructure and enhancing the higher education system, the completion of the construction of the Anıtkabir (Atatürk's mausoleum), full-scale implementation of the 1924 Constitution, ensuring the state's political security and making Turkey more prosperous through economic investments (Bozdağ, 1986: 91). He thought this agenda was an essential contribution to the "welfare and the security of the Republic" (Bayar, 2010: 202-203).

Among these objectives, the first two were specific and thus it is relatively easier to study Bayar's impact on these fields. Bayar mentioned participating in the government's efforts to advance the army's technical infrastructure and supporting the government throughout the time of DP rule for further investment in the army's needs (Bayar, 2010: 162-163). The DP governments were, indeed, enthusiastic about modernizing the army's technical infrastructure. Resources allocated for military spending increased from 248 million USD in 1950 to 381 million USD in 1953 and kept rising in the coming years (Ahmad, 2003: 124). The DP governments also improved the economic

conditions for the high-ranking officers. These improvements did not, however, reach the lower ranks (İnan, 2007: 134).

Bayar contributed to the establishment of four new universities and participated in their groundbreaking ceremonies.¹¹⁷ These universities were Atatürk University in Erzurum, the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, the Karadeniz Technical University in Zonguldak and Ege University in İzmir. Bayar also got in contact with the university professors in order to find out their requests and institutional needs. The budget for universities increased considerably during the DP phase (Bozdağ, 1982: 372). Although it was mainly the government's initiative to make investments in the education sector, Bayar regularly reminded them of this issue.

As for the construction of Atatürk's mausoleum, in Bayar's daily list of things to do, tasks related to the Anıtkabir always took first place until its completion in 1953 (Bayar 2010: 170). The construction had started in 1944 and Bayar thought that the delay in its completion was unacceptable.

The rest of the objectives Bayar mentioned in his presidential agenda were loosely defined and thus it is more difficult to point out Bayar's impact on these issues. The broad nature of these objectives is understandable as Bayar's ceremonial position would not allow him to define any specific focus in these matters. So, these three objectives stand rather as an expression of his overarching view of politics than as a plan of action. These remaining objectives are examined below.

¹¹⁷ Phone interview with Mehmet Arif Demirel on February 28, 2012.

On the full implementation of the constitution, Bayar thought that Turkish citizens were not enjoying their constitutional rights fully due to a number of unconstitutional laws (Bozdağ, 1986: 92-93). These unconstitutional laws mentioned by Bayar and Menderes were mostly concerned with basic rights and freedoms. Bayar did not specify these laws in his political discourse and he referred to them in loose terms.

In the absence of a Constitutional Court, it was up to political actors to advocate and inspect the constitutionality of laws. Bayar and Menderes agreed that the way to address the issue of unconstitutional laws was, first, to increase the freedom of press in order to find out problems that resulted from unconstitutional laws and caused resentment among the people. The second step would be to remove these unconstitutional laws (Bozdağ, 1986: 94; Bayar, 2010: 157).

Yet in the final analysis, although the DP governments initially put some effort into the removal of unconstitutional laws and by extension press liberalization, from 1951 onwards the government violated and undermined the freedom of press through a number of new regulations (Tunçay, 1990: 179). Changes to the press law in 1953, 1954 and 1956 increased the penalties for “offences” committed through the press and, for example, introduced penalties for humiliating press coverage of ministers. As a result, a considerable number of journalists served prison sentences for vaguely defined offences (İnan, 2007: 137). Also, official advertisements, a considerable resource of revenue for the press, were channeled to pro-government establishments.

Bayar's other objective, to ensure the state's security was about the enhancement of Turkey's position in the international arena, mainly vis-à-vis the Soviet threat and on a broader level through increasing the country's prestige. Bayar's method to work for these ends was to establish contacts with several heads of state and conduct visits to foreign countries (Bozdağ, 1982: 369).¹¹⁸ As the discussion in the next section on Bayar's foreign policy also shows, Bayar was an active foreign policy actor and he saw an assertive foreign policy as vital for protecting the Turkish state against external threats. Bayar was involved both in the planning and implementation of foreign policy. He did not have any foreign policy goals conflicting with those of the government (Şenşekerci, 2000: 243).

Regarding his objective in the field of economy, Bayar considered increasing investments as the method to build a prosperous Turkey. As an experienced economist Bayar pursued his objective by advising the government on economic issues. He gave advice to the government during the council of ministers meetings he chaired (Bayar, 2010: 190-191). He especially provided insight for the government's industrialization plans (Bozdağ, 1986: 104).

Bayar drew the government's attention to the importance of economic issues on other occasions than council of ministers meetings as well. For instance, during the 1956 annual parliamentary break, he called Parliament into a meeting to debate and legislate a law on forestry because he thought this was a priority for further economic investments and should be legislated at once without delay (Budaklıoğlu, 1982: 56). There are examples of more specific cases where he discussed matters related to the economy with individual policy

¹¹⁸ Phone interview with Mehmet Arif Demirer on February 28, 2012.

makers and implementers. For instance, he convinced a senior ministry bureaucrat on the necessity of building more cement facilities against the bureaucrat's worries of over-production (Bayar, 2010: 192-194).¹¹⁹

Sıtkı Yırcalı, Minister of Trade in Menderes' governments also observed that Bayar advised his ministry's staff on economic matters and encouraged them to invest further rather than being indecisive or shy about investments (Yırcalı, 1982: 229). Bayar also reminded Menderes of the urgency to increase the living standards of the citizens through major infrastructure projects (Bayar, 2010: 190-191).

Bayar's engagement in the planning of the economy should not imply that he pursued an agenda of his own in that matter. He approved of and supported the DP's economic policies (Şenşekerci, 2000: 242). These policies have already been mentioned in Chapter II. To remind of them briefly here, DP governments were in favor of supporting the private sector through state aid (Tunçay, 1990: 180).

Bayar's presidential agenda, shaped around these five objectives introduced here, did not raise any major criticisms as this agenda was loosely defined and could be read as an expression of good will. The major source for criticism, as is taken up in a section below, was that he went beyond this agenda, and took sides with the DP governments on every issue.

¹¹⁹ The name of the bureaucrat and the ministry are not revealed in Bayar's memoirs.

5.2.3.1 Bayar's Foreign Policy Activities

Bayar's role in Turkish foreign policy planning and implementation in 1950-1960 is examined in a separate section because foreign policy is the only realm in which Bayar's activities and contributions as president can be taken up through micro-scale case studies. A similar approach cannot be taken in the study of his policies in the economy or in removing unconstitutional laws, because as a president with limited institutional tools Bayar could not have any visible impact nor implement policies in these realms. Behind the scenes influences that he might have exerted in these matters are also difficult to determine. Bayar's memoirs do not reveal much of his involvement in government affairs as president and the memoirs of other political actors are far from being consistent with one another.¹²⁰

Foreign affairs are, however, of a different nature for a number of reasons. It is true that the 1924 Constitution did not give the president a distinct focus and mandate on foreign policy but in article 37 of the Constitution it was stated that the president appoints Turkish ambassadors to foreign states and accepts visits from representatives of foreign states. This statement already gave presidents some space to be involved in foreign affairs, albeit on vague terms.

Second, the Turkish political context presented several foreign policy challenges. In the French and American political systems, it is the political regime that gives presidents more weight in foreign policy. In the American case, Congress has less control over the president in foreign policy matters in

¹²⁰ Bayar's grandson Demirtaş Bayar pointed out that Bayar was often discrete about political issues and he refrained from sharing information on many critical matters. His memoirs also support this observation. Interview with Demirtaş Bayar on June 19, 2012, Istanbul.

comparison to domestic affairs. Thus, in most cases presidents might prefer to implement ambitious foreign policy agendas rather than bold domestic agendas (Elgie, 1995: 193-194). Faced with the cohabitation situations, where president and prime minister are from different political parties, French presidents also often focus on foreign policy issues due to the difficulties of taking decisive positions in the domestic policy areas (Elgie, 2005: 7).

Unlike the French and American systems where the political regime obliges presidents to be influential in foreign policy rather than domestic politics, the first two Turkish presidents were influential in foreign policy due to contextual obligations. In Atatürk's case, it was the immediate aftermath of the Turkish War of Independence and consolidation as well as acceptance of the new Turkish regime internationally was essential for the state's survival. In İnönü's case, the Second World War was the most serious immediate concern and this time the security of the regime was under threat. As the most powerful actors of the political system at the time, both presidents devised and implemented policies to address these challenges.

In these early years, foreign relations attained a non-political character in the sense that foreign policy rarely became a topic of political debate. The DP also maintained this perspective of foreign relations. During its opposition years, it often refrained from criticizing the government's foreign policy. Likewise, the CHP opposition showed solidarity with the DP governments on most foreign policy issues. The CHP embraced NATO membership without any major criticism. The only criticism it raised against sending troops to Korea in 1950 was related to the method that the decision was taken. The government had decided to send troops without consulting with the opposition and Parliament

(Aydın, 2000: 117). Likewise, the CHP did not turn the Cyprus issue into a topic of criticism and domestic politics in 1955 (İnan, 2007: 120).

As was the case with the two previous presidents, Bayar was an influential foreign policy actor. Contrary to his impact in domestic politics, Bayar's contributions to foreign policy can be observed through his foreign policy activities as they were neither of behind the scenes nature nor subject to the constitutional limitations the way that his domestic political activities were.

Bayar took several steps to contribute to the government's policies. One example is the process that ended with the deployment of Turkish troops in Korea in 1950. Bayar chaired the council of ministers meeting on July 25, 1950 in the Presidential Palace during which the decision to send troops to Korea was taken (Akkaya, 2012: 5-6). Prior to that, Bayar held meetings with the Turkish Ambassador to the United States Feridun Cemal Erkin, Minister of Defense Refik Şevket İnce, Chief of Staff Mehmet Nuri Yamut, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, and Speaker of Parliament Refik Koraltan in order to discuss the technical and political aspects of sending troops to Korea.

Bayar also actively participated in Turkey's accession process to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He thought that the international context put Turkey in a delicate situation. He considered taking part in an international security alliance as essential for the defense of the country against the Soviet threat (Bozdağ, 1986:96, Altuğ, June 21, 1981, *Tercüman* daily). He took the initiative for promoting NATO membership and chaired the council of

ministers meeting during which the decision to seek NATO membership was taken (Bayar, 2010: 178-179).¹²¹

Turkey's NATO membership did not come easily. Bayar worked to address the difficulties that Turkey encountered in its membership pursuit. NATO's Defense Committee had initially encouraged Turkey to co-ordinate its military planning with the NATO command but it had not offered membership to Turkey. Bayar expressed his disappointment with this policy to the American Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee who visited Ankara in February 1951. He told McGhee that nothing less than full NATO membership could address Turkey's security concerns (Leffler, 1985: 822-823).

After this declaration, Bayar had another long meeting with the American ambassador to Ankara, during which Turkey's NATO membership prospects were further discussed (Yardımcı, 1982:208). During this negotiation process, Bayar also took the opinions of Turkish foreign policy experts into consideration. For instance, he invited Turkish ambassadors to main foreign capitals to Ankara and sought their opinions on the difficulties that Turkey faced in its NATO membership application (Bayar, 2010: 182).

Bayar's and the government's decisiveness led the American policy makers to think that failing to extend NATO membership to Turkey would cause that country to abandon its pro-Western stand in favor of neutrality (Leffler, 1985: 823). Turkey became a NATO member in 1952 and Bayar was present in the parliamentary session during which Turkey's NATO membership was ratified on February 19, 1952 (Erer, 1963: 100).

¹²¹ Bayar did not specify the date of this meeting.

Bayar supported the government in its other foreign policy initiatives as well. For instance, he spoke in favor of the Northern Tier, an initiative developed by the United States to establish a defense network for certain countries in the Middle East and Asia geographically vulnerable to the Soviet threat, such as, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Bayar thought Turkey could take a leading role in this initiative (Sever, 1998: 74-75). These efforts resulted in the signing of the Bagdad Pact in 1955.

In order to attract other countries in the Middle Eastern region to this initiative, Bayar travelled to Amman in 1955 (Yeşilbursa, 2011: 89). He kept frequent contacts with the key American figures such as US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles during the establishment of the Bagdad Pact (Yeşilbursa, 2001: 66). Bayar also provided support to the government's Cyprus policy through his contacts with Greek policy makers and reminded them of the Turkish position in the conflict (Kutay, 1982:119-120).

One of the activities that established Bayar as a major foreign policy actor was his long visit to the United States in 1954 (Harris, 2002:57).¹²² Bayar considered closer relations with the United States necessary for rendering Turkey's international position stronger and safer (Bora, 2009: 553) and he described his visit as a cornerstone in Turkish-American relations (Kutay, 1982: 187). He was invited by the American President Dwight Eisenhower as an expression of the United States' appreciation for Turkey's anti-communist stance and its participation in the Korean War (1950-1953) (Bali, 2004:15).

¹²² This visit started on January 18, 1954 with Bayar's departure from Istanbul and ended on March 10, 1954 with his return (Erer, 1963: 190, 194). For a detailed account from the perspective of Feridun Cemal Erkin, Turkey's ambassador to the United States at the time see Erkin, 1987:448-458.

Beyond enhancing relations on a political level, Bayar had two very specific requests from President Eisenhower during this visit. The first was for a university that would attract Turkish students and students from the Middle Eastern countries. The second request was for American guidance in establishing a high capacity and advanced technology steel facility to process iron in Turkey (Kutay, 1982: 184). The Middle East Technical University is the outcome of the former and the Ereğli Iron and Steel facility is the byproduct of co-operation for the latter (Kutay, 1982: 186).

Bayar's visit has been criticized for knotting Turkish foreign policy with the United States without any preconditions and laying the ground for American influence on Turkish domestic politics.¹²³ Bayar's speeches delivered throughout the visit have also been criticized for being too enthusiastic. However, criticism on the speeches does not take into consideration the diplomatic language of the 1950s, which was quite different from the contemporary usage.

The language of 1950s was much more redundant and it was excessively refined or polite in comparison to contemporary usage. Judged according to the contemporary usage of Turkish, Bayar's speeches would appear overly enthusiastic but in the 1950s, such language was the norm. An overall analysis of Bayar's speeches delivered during his foreign visits and his reception of foreign representatives in Ankara show that Bayar used similar formulations while talking about Pakistan, Iraq or Iran. As for bringing in continuous American influence on Turkish politics, this could hardly have been realized with a single visit. Besides, it has been documented that there were different

¹²³ For example, see Eroğlu, 1970: 83; Bora, 2007.

opinions and several disagreements between the DP policy makers and their American counterparts on a number of issues and that co-operation did not automatically occur on every issue.¹²⁴

Bayar's role in foreign policy was not criticized during his term in office. It was also not considered as a breach of the president's mandate and power. Later however Bayar's role in NATO membership and his efforts to increase Turkey's ties with the United States were criticized.

5.2.4 The Issue of Impartiality

Bayar tried to highlight his impartiality through a number of acts and statements. He resigned as chairman of the DP once it became clear that he would be the DP's candidate for office (Birand et al., 1991:74). This was a substantial diversion from the earlier practice as the two former presidents remained chairmen of the CHP during their term in office (Yeşilbursa, 1999:1-2). Nevertheless Bayar remained a DP member.

In a message he sent to the DP congress convened in 1951, he said that in order to fulfill the requirements of an impartial presidency he completely withdrew from the party affairs. In the same message he also mentioned that he wanted to begin a tradition of impartial presidents (*Milliyet* daily, October 10, 1951).

As part of his emphasis on impartiality, it has also been observed that he wanted to put some distance between himself and party members in the initial

¹²⁴ For an analysis of these differences in the light of American and Turkish archives, see Sever, 1998.

days of his presidency. When one of the DP parliamentarians addressed him in an informal manner during a dinner he hosted in the presidential palace in 1950, Bayar warned him to show respect for the president (Baban, 1970:64). During the same dinner, he warned his former colleagues that they should address him as *beyefendi*, rather than Celal Bey (*Sir Weekly*, October 15, 1960), which implied more formality.¹²⁵ However, his acts in the following years caused contrary arguments regarding his impartiality.

Critical accounts of Bayar's presidency usually focus on his failure to be neutral vis-à-vis the political parties. These critical assessments are raised on two grounds. First, Bayar's election campaigns and annually delivered parliamentary speeches are mentioned as proofs that he was plainly favoring the government, speaking on their behalf, acting with them and criticizing the opposition for the same reasons that the government criticized them. Second, Bayar's involvement in the daily political issues are taken as further indication of his taking sides. The second category of criticism refers to Bayar's involvement in the DP's internal affairs and his unfavorable attitude toward the opposition parties.

There are methodological difficulties in studying this second category scientifically. As already mentioned elsewhere in this study, Bayar could not have exerted influence on government through official channels as such mechanisms were nonexistent. He could have exercised influence only through his individual contacts with key figures in the DP. There is a methodological

¹²⁵ Celal *Bey* is translated into English as Mr Celal. The English translation for *Beyefendi* is, on the other hand, Sir.

difficulty in establishing to what extent key decision makers of the DP took Bayar's choices into account.

Bayar himself did not write about his involvement in the government's or the DP's affairs. There are conflicting anecdotes and observations in memoirs of political figures of the time. Popular accounts of the DP period often written by journalists are also influenced by the authors' own political perspectives. Thus such accounts cannot be considered reliable enough to base the discussion upon them here. For this reason, the following sections examine Bayar's involvement through an analysis of his own statements unfortunately which do not touch upon his role extensively, anecdotes that are narrated and confirmed in more than one resource and press coverage of the incidents in question.

5.2.4.1 Election and Parliamentary Speeches

Bayar expressed his approval of DP policies in election speeches he delivered as part of the 1954 and 1957 election campaigns. For instance in the Diyarbakır speech he delivered on April 18, 1954 Bayar asked the residents of Diyarbakır to compare the pre-1950 context to the current one. He mentioned that the pre-1950 era was poorer in terms of economic development, education opportunities and the exercise of basic rights and freedoms. He asked the voters to decide according to the outcome of this judgment (*Ayin Tarihi*, April 1954). Bayar expressed further support for the DP during his İzmit speech on April 21, 1954. He proclaimed that the DP and the Turkish nation were a unified whole and that they were inseparable from one another (*Ayin Tarihi*, April 1954).

Likewise on October 17, 1957 in his Urfa speech, he argued that they [the DP] did not refrain from hard work and never tires of working (Eroğul, 1970: 143).

In these and other election speeches he delivered Bayar defined himself as president and also as a deputy seeking re-election.¹²⁶ In these speeches he did not distinguish himself from the DP or the government. For instance when asked in Adana on April 25, 1957 how much longer the current wheat support policies for farmers would be in force, Bayar replied that such incentives would continue until farmers are able to pay their loans back and accumulate some wealth (*Ayın Tarihi*, April 1954). It can be expected that as president Bayar was not in a position to comment on these issues in such a decisive tone.

Bayar for his part did not see his electoral speeches to be in contradiction to and in violation of his impartiality. He thought it was his moral responsibility to inform the Turkish people about his policies and activities in office. In his Diyarbakır speech on October 18, 1957, he justified his involvement in the election campaigns and speeches in the following words: “..Constitutionally I am not accountable for my acts however; I have a great deal of moral responsibility. Presidents have responsibility regarding the laws legislated in their term because they sign these laws. Thus, it is only natural that the president explains his acts to [the] people. It is due to this responsibility that I speak to you” (Erer, 1963: 311).

Bayar’s annual parliamentary speeches also raised criticisms for not giving voice to the discontent of opposition parties and for speaking in favor of

¹²⁶ See *Milliyet* daily, October 21, 1957.

government policies.¹²⁷ In theory, article 36 of the Constitution stipulated that the president's annual speech had to cover government activities in the previous year and introduce policy recommendations for the next year. An analysis of Bayar's nine parliamentary speeches delivered in 1950-1960 shows that Bayar most of the time followed this description. He often delivered highly technical speeches, which mentioned the DP governments' policies and achievements in a very detailed way. He structured his speeches according to the activities of the ministries and he provided extensive statistical details for each ministry. At times, he even referred to single ongoing hospital or school constructions. He also mentioned the laws that were legislated in the previous year by Parliament. Recommendations he put forward in these speeches were not on the substance of governmental activities. They were rather expressions of support voiced in broad terms.

As an example of his support for government policies, Bayar started his 1958 speech by saying that "as it has been for all the years, in the last year too, a considerable amount of work has been realized and our endeavors to carry our nation to the level of advanced civilizations and welfare have delivered results in each field". When he drew attention to specific policies that should be adopted in macro-economy management, he also said that the government has already laid the groundwork for such policies in its program (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term 11, Vol 5: 6-7).

¹²⁷ See the *Akis* issues November 6, 1954 and October 27, 1956. In both issues, Bayar is criticized for ignoring the restrictive press regulations introduced and failing to take into account the opposition's point of view. It has even been claimed that Bayar did not write these speeches himself and they were delivered to him to by the government (*Devir* weekly, November 6, 1954). However this seems to be a misplaced criticism as Bayar's work on these speeches has been confirmed. For instance, see Derin, 1995: 303.

Although not as frequently, Bayar also briefly touched upon domestic political issues that caused tension between the government and the opposition. For instance in his 1950 and 1951 speeches he referred to the government's efforts to remove undemocratic legislations issued prior to 1950 (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term 9, Vol 2: 4, Vol 10: 4). Likewise, in 1954 he spoke in favor of changes introduced to the press law that the opposition found repressive. He said that the change was necessary to maintain the dignity of the individuals that the press reported on and to preserve the security of the state (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term 10, Vol 2: 9). In 1957, he referred to the contentious political atmosphere during the election campaign and highlighted the need for peace and stability to increase economic growth and welfare. He also added that democracy and freedom could not be thought of separately from order and stability (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term 11, Vol 1: 11). In this speech, although not openly, he was referring to the opposition's activities.

Bayar did not agree with the criticisms that these speeches were violations of his impartiality. He retorted that he provided useful counsel to the government and the opposition in his parliamentary speeches. He also thought that in these speeches and elsewhere he advised the government to avoid engaging in polemics with the opposition parties and concentrate on delivering the promises of their government program (Bayar, 2010: 188-189).

In the final analysis, both Bayar's parliamentary and election speeches were the outcomes of rather problematic constitutional arrangements. These arrangements put the president or presidential candidate in case of election speeches in a rather awkward position as they were in contradiction with the implicit understanding of impartiality hinted in the Constitution. It required

serious commitment from a president to be impartial in these instances. Besides, expecting impartiality from a candidate seeking re-election in the national elections, would be naïve.

Bayar certainly could have interpreted his constitutional role differently. He could have attempted to neutralize the negative effects of these constitutional arrangements, for example by considering the opposition's views for his parliamentary speeches and having lower profile campaigns for his re-election. However, Bayar did not go down that path.

5.2.4.2 Involvement in the DP Affairs

Bayar did not truly withdraw from DP affairs in 1950-1960. Although not regularly, he participated in or chaired official DP gatherings or meetings, such as the party's Central Executive Board meetings. Bayar's involvement in party affairs was most prominent during the crises that the party encountered over the years. Bayar often intervened to reconcile the tensions among the DP members (*Akis* weekly, December 10, 1955). For instance, when the government banned the Turkish Nationalists' Association (*Türk Milliyetçiler Derneği*) chaired by DP Deputy Sait Bilgiç in 1953, Bilgiç was expelled from the party. After 14 months, Menderes requested Bilgiç's return. According to Bilgiç, Bayar was influential in convincing Menderes to end the conflict (Bilgiç, 1982: 43).

Another crisis among the DP members was caused by the so called right of proof (*ispat hakkı*) incident in 1955. The ground for conflict was laid in 1954 when the government introduced certain changes to the press law and placed

press offences under the jurisdiction of criminal courts. In reaction to this new regulation, ten DP deputies submitted a law, referred to as the right of proof, for the consideration of Parliament in May 1955. The proposed law sought guarantees for the press to back up their claims through evidence and thus be spared from prosecution (Albayrak, 2010). Parliament's rejection of this proposal started a considerable opposition movement within the party.

Bayar worked hard to contain the conflict before it caused break-ups from the DP group. He chaired the board meeting on October 14, 1955 during which the right of proof was discussed (Albayrak, 2004: 279). He also attempted to convince the leading figures of the group in favor of right of proof including Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, Minister of Health until May 1954, through his individual contacts (Toker, 1966: 141-144). In the end, despite Bayar's efforts the conflict could not be contained and nineteen DP deputies who supported the right of proof were expelled from the party. This group established the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*-HP) the same year.

In another case, Bayar worked actively to help the formation of the fourth Menderes cabinet in 1955. The third cabinet had fallen due to the government crisis that followed the right of proof incident and the chaos caused by the September 6-7 riots. Bayar once again appointed Menderes to form the government. However, the party had not yet fully recovered from the right of proof clash and it was a challenge to reconcile differences so that a cabinet could emerge. Bayar worked hard until a consensus in the party regarding the new government was reached. He worked long hours in Parliament, had meetings with several DP deputies and senior DP members (Toker, 1966: 133). Once he

was able to ease the tension among the DP members to some extent, Menderes took over the task of forming the government (Toker, 1966: 135).

Bayar's involvement in DP affairs was not only limited to his occasional presence in the DP platforms. He also discussed matters related to the DP in official state gatherings such as the council of ministers meetings. For instance, in a council of ministers meeting, he agreed upon the 1957 national election campaign program with Menderes (*Milliyet* daily, October 8, 1957). This shows that Bayar saw nothing wrong in discussing party related affairs in a council of ministers meeting.

5.2.4.3 Relations with the Opposition

Bayar's close relations with the government party were accompanied by his unfavorable position toward opposition parties, especially toward the main opposition party CHP. On this matter, he followed a policy close to that of the government. Certain policies and acts of the government kept provoking the resentment of the opposition in 1950-1960. Resentment rose further after 1957. To give examples of the government's acts against the opposition, in the 1957 general elections the opposition parties were banned from access to the state radio. In other words, they could not use the state radio for their election campaign although the government party could use it. Forming electoral alliances between political parties was also banned (İnan, 2007: 120). After 1957 head of the main opposition party CHP İnönü came to face several restrictions and even physical attacks as detailed in Chapter II. The pro-opposition press also suffered from government policies. After the 1957 elections, a number of

journalists were imprisoned due to the tightened press law and lowered the compulsory age for civil servants' retirement. These incidents have also been detailed in Chapter II.

Bayar often expressed his support for such policies against the opposition parties and press. He approved them as “putting an end to refined democracy” (Ahmad, 1977: 30).¹²⁸ For instance, he spoke in favor of the imprisonment of CHP Secretary-General Kasım Gülek in 1955 due to his criticism of the government in a speech he delivered in Bilecik (Shaw and Shaw, 2005: 411). Bayar pointed out that “our jurists found his speech in violation of the law. If their party leader acts the same way, we will also put him on trial” (Derin, 1995: 300). This was an expression of Bayar's open support for the government in a highly controversial political matter.

In 1954 when the Foreign Investment Law became a topic of controversy between the government and the CHP, Bayar not only spoke in favor of the government's position but also attacked the opposition for its criticism. This law was hoped to facilitate the procedures of foreign investment in Turkish domestic markets and increase the foreign investment flow. In a speech he delivered in Istanbul on April 24, 1954, Bayar stated that he did not understand why the opposition resisted this law (*Ayın Tarihi*, April 1954). It is natural that president expresses his opinions on matters. However, Bayar's self-expression on this matter was provocative and dismissive of the opposition's concerns. He advised the prime minister to pass this law in Parliament at once and disregard the opposition's concerns (Albayrak, 2004: 257).

¹²⁸ For more on Bayar's interpretation of democracy, see Chapter III.

Another instance in which Bayar spoke in favor of the government and against the opposition's demands was during the debate on constitutional change in 1957. The CHP was promoting certain changes to the 1924 Constitution as a part of its 1957 national election campaign. These changes were concerned with maintaining the impartiality of public institutions such as the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (*Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu*-TRT) and the universities in their decision making and establishment of a constitutional court and a second chamber within Parliament (Bayar, 2010: 85-86). Bayar was against the opposition's views on constitutional change and made this known (Bayar, 2010: 86). It is to be expected that as head of state, Bayar would work to create a favorable context for debate between the government and opposition on this important issue. Instead, he openly took sides with the government and did not leave any room for negotiations as far as he was concerned.

Another speech Bayar delivered on November 28, 1958 on the CHP and the HP captures his views on the opposition quite accurately: “..the circumstances and statistics [on the state of economy] tell us that good things are happening. What stands against the continuous security that our nation should enjoy? If there is a barrier against the realization of such security, the nation's will is capable of crushing it like an ant” (Eren, 1963: 353). Bayar considered the opposition to be a barrier against the realization of the nation's security and the DP government as the embodiment of the nation's will.

Bayar often discussed matters related to the opposition with members of the government. For instance in a meeting with Menderes and Speaker of the Parliament Refik Koraltan, Bayar discussed the opposition's activities (*Milliyet* daily, October 8, 1958). On November 3, 1958, Bayar chaired a council of

ministers meeting during which measures to be taken against the oppositions' activities were debated. The activities that the council of ministers wanted to take measures against were not made public (*Milliyet* daily, November 4, 1958). However, an informed guess can be made considering the political context of 1957-1958. İnönü had headed efforts for the establishment of the National Opposition Front (*Milli Muhalefet Cephesi*) among the opposition parties in August 1957. This eventually led the government to blame the opposition for planning an unlawful takeover of the government (Albayrak, 2010). It is likely that these matters were brought up in the mentioned council of ministers meeting.

Bayar's approval and support of the so-called Investigation Committee (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*) in 1960 is the most commonly cited example of his unfavorable position toward the opposition. The justification for the Committee's establishment was to investigate the opposition's activities and prevent the opposition from provoking the military's involvement in political affairs. The Committee was composed of fifteen DP deputies and its activities were regulated by a law issued on April 27, 1960. As further explained in Chapter II, the Committee's work resulted in limiting the opposition's activities and tightening press freedom even further (Karpas, 2004a: 44-45).

Bayar voiced his opinions on the Committee during a meeting participated by some of the main DP figures on April 26, 1960 in the Presidential Palace. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Speaker of Parliament Refik Koraltan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Ali Fuat Başgil, a pro-DP professor of constitutional law at Istanbul University, were

present at the meeting (Başgil, 1966: 129).¹²⁹ Başgil's opinion on the legal background of the Committee's existence was sought. Başgil pointed out that the Committee was not unconstitutional; however certain regulations that organized the activities of the Committee were undemocratic in essence and contrasted with the Constitution (Başgil, 1966: 130).

Başgil essentially recommended a reconsideration of the law regulating the activities and composition of the Committee. He also argued that the Committee should avoid taking and implementing harsh measures against the university students. Bayar did not agree with Başgil on these matters. He thought that a reconsideration of the Committee's mandate and composition would make the government appear weak. He perceived the Committee as constitutional and he thought it was the government's legitimate right to find out if the opposition party was planning a military takeover of the government (Bozdağ, 1991: 36-37). As for Başgil's point on responding moderately to the youth protests, Bayar thought that the government should act without any hesitations and that such protests should be suppressed decisively. Bayar even used the term *tenkil* (doing away with) which implied use of force when referring to the level of decisiveness that should be adopted (Başgil, 1966: 134). Later Bayar said that with this word he referred to the necessity of disciplinary action against the War Academy cadets (Harbiye) who broke their school's internal regulations.¹³⁰

Another example of Bayar's emphasis on decisiveness and his firm stance vis-à-vis the opposition was his reaction to the rally that took place in the

¹²⁹ Başgil declared his intention to run for the presidency in 1961 elections after re-transition to multi-party politics but he withdrew from the presidential race later on.

¹³⁰ Bayar did not remember using the word *tenkil*, but he considered the people who took notes of the meeting as honest and said that if they noted him using that word, he would not deny it (Bozdağ, 1982: 378).

Kızılay Square in Ankara on May 5, 1960, an incident that later came to be known as 555 K. The 555 K stood for May 5, 1960, 17:00 Kızılay Square, the main venue for demonstrations in Ankara at the time. This was a major protest against the government. Bayar asked Minister of Interior Affairs Namık Gedik to go to Kızılay Square and announce that if the crowd did not disperse voluntarily, the police would open fire (Yavuzalp, 1991: 45). This was a recommendation that would escalate the conflict on a societal level instead of containing it in other peaceful ways.

Due to his approach described through the examples above, Bayar did not have a positive impact on negotiating the political tensions that accumulated in the second half of the 1950s. He did not take the initiative to consolidate government-opposition relations through a declaration similar to the Declaration of July 12, 1947 (Aydemir, 1973: 199; Aġaoġlu, 1972: 142). Further detailed in Chapter II, the Declaration of July 12, 1947 had been useful in addressing the concerns of the DP at the time. It had also facilitated the dialogue between the opposition and the government as President İnönü brought central leaders from both parties together several times before he issued the Declaration. Bayar's role in 1950-1960 was different. He did not create opportunities for the government and opposition to have a healthy dialogue. Even certain leading figures from the DP, such as Speaker of Parliament Refik Koraltan and Minister of Defense Ethem Menderes, noted in their diaries that Bayar did not have any positive impact in addressing the political tension (*Sir* Weekly, October 15 , 1960).

It should be noted that in retrospect Bayar did not think that he was taking sides with the DP and acting against the opposition. He either did not think that the activities of the opposition party were hampered by the

government (Erer, 1963: 317-318). He sided with the government on most of the political issues because he believed that the policies promoted or implemented by the government were right and that, therefore they should be supported. Bayar stated that had he thought that the government's policies were flawed, he would have stood against them without hesitations (Bayar 2010: 217).

Bayar also thought that he acted to contain the tension between the opposition and the government. He claimed to have advised Menderes to refrain from getting into polemical situations with the opposition (Bayar 2010: 192). However, he did not point out for which circumstances he made such recommendations and if such recommendations had any effect on Menderes. He also thought that he could not have done more to relieve the tension between the opposition and the government because the 1924 Constitution did not provide him more powers and that he was later accused of not using powers that he did not have (Bozdağ, 1986: 113).

In the final analysis on this matter, despite Bayar's argument that he did all in his power to negotiate the tensions between the government and the opposition, the examples provided above point to the contrary.

The final question that should be brought up in this section is why Bayar pursued this style and failed to be an impartial presidency. Firstly, Bayar's interpretation of democracy as elaborated in Chapter II made him support the electoral victors without much restraint and consider them as the only representatives of the nation. Bayar relied on a majoritarian understanding of democracy that considered electoral victors as the ultimate holders of power. He

considered any force that attempted to limit the will of the electoral victors, be it the opposition or institutions such as a constitutional court, illegitimate.

Secondly, Bayar was not able to break his ties with the party he founded. He had resigned from his position as the chairman of the party; however he remained a member of the DP. Several times he found himself in a position where he had to resolve the problems caused by the internal tensions of the DP, as exemplified above.

Thirdly, although the Constitution hinted an impartial office of the presidency, it did not introduce mechanisms to ensure the president's impartiality. The principle of impartiality and disassociation with any party group was effectively introduced only with the 1961 Constitution (Savcı, 1963: 324). Under the 1924 Constitution the president could be aware of this impartiality principle as Bayar expressed he was, but this did not guarantee impartial action. It created a vague context where much depended on the president's own interpretation of his position.

Lastly, the DP phase can be seen as an extension of certain earlier patterns in Turkish domestic politics. Similar to Atatürk, İnönü or even the Ottoman Sultans Mahmud II and Abdülhamid II, Bayar also maintained the old concepts of government and statehood, which emphasized authority. During the DP rule the authority of the leader was expressed through a strong executive rather than a strong monarch as it was during Ottoman times (Karpas, 2004f: 309-310) or a single leader as was the case in the single party era. Bayar was simply following this old habit and adapting it to the then current political context.

This should not come as a surprise because as a political entity the DP shared the same background with the CHP. Core members of the DP were previously CHP members and their political careers matured under the conditions of single party rule. In this sense, DP rule was a continuation of the single party period's legacy (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005: 89; Sarıbay, 1991: 127) especially with regard to government's approach to political opposition. The DP leadership was as suspicious of the opposition as the CHP leadership had been in 1923-1950.

5.3 The End of Bayar's Term

Bayar's presidency ended with the 1960 military intervention. He was arrested on May 27, 1960 by a group of soldiers headed by General Burhaneddin Uluç. His first reaction was to resist the arrest. He argued that he was elected to office by the people and would leave only if the people demand it from him (Karakuş, 1977:500). When officers asked for his resignation, he did not accept it because "he did not want to take his place in history as a coward" (Öymen, 1986:254).

Bayar did not consider the intervention legitimate. He considered it a breach of the nation's will (Bayar, 2010: 87). Bayar's years after 1960 and his presidency are beyond the scope of this study, but it should be mentioned that his dignity and uncompromising attitude from the moment officers arrested him in the presidential residence to the trial days, earned the respect of many observers (Bilgiç, 1982: 46; Sarol, 1982: 162; Ağaoğlu, 1972: 145; Tunçay, 2002:22; Bozdağ, 1986: 117). The decision taken at the Yassıada trial

condemned Bayar to a death sentence, which was later commuted into lifetime imprisonment because of his old age. Bayar spent nearly three years in the Kayseri Prison and was released in 1964 due to his failing health (Şenşekerci, 2000: 263).

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In previous chapters, Bayar's executive leadership positions, his approach to certain political concepts and his political experience have been taken up in detail. The interactive approach has provided the framework for this analysis. The major objectives have been to identify the internal and external resources of Bayar's leadership and to provide a basis from which an accurate portrait of Celal Bayar as a political leader could be construed. In this chapter the findings of the previous chapters will be considered all together. For this purpose, first the interactive method employed for this study will be briefly elaborated. Next, the internal and external resources of Bayar's leadership will be pointed out. An analysis of how these resources affected Bayar's leadership will follow and the question what kind of a political leader portrait did Bayar present will be addressed. The interactive approach will then be revisited in the light of the findings of this study. The chapter will close with some recommendations for further studies.

6.1 Interactive Approach

The interactive approach seeks to identify the resources that dictate or influence a leader's political decisions and activities as a way to study individual leaders in particular and leadership in general. For this purpose, the interactive approach defines two broad categories, which have been referred to as internal and external resources throughout this dissertation. In general external resources are defined with regard to institutional arrangements that regulate executive leadership offices; the nature of the political regime; the political culture and history; and the political context, i.e. daily political issues and challenges that leaders face. The internal resources are, on the other hand, key to an analysis of how leaders perceive these external resources. Internal resources are often the combination of a leader's perception of certain key political concepts, such as democracy, and his/her life experience which is likely to have an impact on the leader's later decisions and activities. This categorization of internal and external resources is crucial, because leaders act against the backgrounds set by the external environment (Hargrove, 2004: 580; Llanos and Margheritis, 2006: 86).

The interactive methodology does not offer any universal scheme for the study of leaders beyond these broadly defined categories; and it recommends that external and internal resources of leadership should always be defined with reference to specific case studies. The proper definitions of internal and external resources on the exercise of leadership change according to the leader, the country and the period studied. None of the contemporary scholars working on the questions of leadership have attempted to provide a universal scheme of external and internal resources that can be applied to the study of all leaders at

all times and places. It has been noted that “it would be artificial to discriminate in an abstract manner between personal characteristics, positional context and environmental constraints without reference to specific cases” (Cole, 1994a: 467). Each leadership study that uses the interactive method has to identify the external and internal resources that have an impact on the leader under focus.

This emphasis placed on case studies results from the unique character of each political leader, of the period that s/he was active in and of differences in the political regimes that the leader operated under. This flexibility also implies that the external and internal resources of leadership are not static (Elgie, 1995: 8; Helms, 2005: 20). Leaders affect their political environment and they themselves change due to their interaction with the political environment. The extent of this change also depends upon the leader under focus. Thus although the external factors may constrain the leaders in many ways and partially determine the political issues to be addressed by them, leaders are not hostages of their environment (Helms, 2005: 20).

There is also no predetermined hierarchy between the resources of political leadership. According to the interactive approach, external and internal resources are both important for an accurate analysis of leadership. The comparative weights of these impacts change depending on individual cases. It has also been highlighted that it is always a combination of external and internal impacts that influence the leader under concern and that external and internal resources of leadership are not mutually exclusive.

6.2 External and Internal Resources in Bayar's Case

Throughout this study three categories of external resources have been defined for Bayar's leadership in 1937-1960. The first group is the non-institutional external resources that result from political history and the political regime of the period under study. In terms of political history, unfavorable attitudes toward the opposition was one external impact Bayar inherited. In terms of the political regime, the transitional character of the regime, lack of efficient checks and balance mechanisms on leadership, the regime's priorities of Westernization, nationalism and secularism, as well as its security orientation, were consequential external resources for Bayar.

The second category of external resources, which are also non-institutional were those that occurred due to the political context and the challenges it presented. In Bayar's case, the most significant of those resources were the Cold War and its undeniable weight in Turkish foreign policy and the effects of the 1929 Great Depression. There were also some less consequential external resources that can be considered under this category, such as the 1937-1939 Dersim uprising and the 1936-1939 Alexandretta dispute with France. The Kurdish revolt in Dersim was a major security concern for the regime and it was repressed by military means under Atatürk's control. The Alexandretta dispute with France concerned the status of the current city of Hatay which turned into an independent entity, subsequently voting to join Turkey. The reasons for their lesser impact are discussed further below.

The third set of external resources has been defined with regard to institutions and institutional arrangements. These were the constitutional

characteristics of the offices of prime minister and president as opposed to actual political practice. The ceremonial presidency, lack of barriers on the president's re-election, the requirement to be a deputy in Parliament to be able to run for office, and finally Bayar's relations with other executive office holders and these other leader's impacts on him should also be referred to as a part of the institutional external resources.

The internal resources of Bayar's leadership have been considered with regard to his lifetime experiences and his reading of major political concepts. The most consequential lifetime experiences as a part of internal resources have been Bayar's experience in the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti-İTC*), his pursuits to boost the local economy in Bursa as well as İzmir and his participation in the Turkish War of Independence. With regard to his reading of political concepts, his understanding of Communism, democracy, nationalism and secularism were the significant internal resources for his leadership in 1937-1960.

6.3 External and Internal Resources and Bayar's Leadership

Certain internal resources, in combination with certain external resources turned into leadership opportunities for Bayar. For instance his successful record in the local economy, which is an internal impact, combined with two major external impacts, i.e. the worldwide economic crisis of 1929 and the general failure to address its consequences, opened the way for Bayar's becoming a minister in 1932 and eventually for his prime ministry in 1937. Likewise Bayar's commitment to the new Turkish regime's priorities, i.e.

secularism, nationalism, Westernization and its security orientation also turned out to be favorable for him. Thanks to his attachment to these principles Bayar emerged as a reliable political actor in the eyes of the leading statespersons. For instance İnönü's acceptance of Bayar as head of the opposition party in 1945 was mainly due to Bayar's adherence to these principles.

Another favorable external impact when combined with Bayar's commitment to the regime's principles was the regime's transitional character. The new political regime was being formed at the time Bayar became involved in politics. The urgencies and necessities of this transitional setting presented him with opportunities to turn him into a vital asset for the new Turkish regime. This in practice meant that Bayar could have an impact on how certain institutions and political practices would evolve. The major example is Bayar's role in the economy. Eventually Bayar was able to carve a leadership role for himself in macro-economic management and planning.

In other cases, his other internal leadership resources, for instance his interpretation of the political context, had a negative impact on his leadership assets. When the Cold War became the dictating political reality for Turkish foreign policy after 1946, a major external impact on any Turkish leader, Bayar interpreted this challenge in rather narrow terms. He approved of and called for the restriction of freedom of expression for communist-minded intellectuals and politicians. At times his obsession with the Communist threat facing Turkey obscured his judgment of the political circumstances for Bayar misread the political circumstances.

Similar to his interpretation of the Communist threat, Bayar's understanding of the notion of democracy was widely criticized. Bayar was in favor of majoritarian democracy in Turkey. In 1950-1960, Bayar's preference seriously undermined the chances of developing healthy relations between the government and opposition and eventually became one of the reasons for the military intervention in 1960. In this case, Bayar's reading of democracy, which can be seen as an internal impact on his leadership, created negative consequences for the political developments and eventually for his leadership.

External impacts had mixed influences on Bayar's leadership. As mentioned, the new regime's priorities, its transitional nature and the 1929 economic crisis posed favorable opportunities for Bayar's leadership assets. On the other hand, the Dersim revolt or the Alexandretta dispute with France did not turn into such opportunities. These were critical matters for the regime and on paper they provided the prime minister of the time a chance to display his leadership skills. However, Bayar was not able to take any initiative because he was not in charge of policy planning on these critical political issues. The political context offered policy questions for his leadership to shine through but the same context also placed restrictions on his activities. Bayar's own interpretation did not have a critical impact on the course of events such as the Dersim revolt and the Alexandretta dispute.

The institutional aspect of external resources also had a mixed impact on Bayar's leadership. For instance the requirement to be a deputy in Parliament to be able to run for office ended up in the president's association with the dominant party in Parliament, first in order to be elected to Parliament and then to the office of president. After such a close association with the party in

question it was difficult for any president to cut their ties with their former political party and stay impartial, especially when they depended on the same group for their re-election. Bayar was widely criticized for his close association with the government party. Likewise, Bayar's decade as president also highlighted the lack of barriers against the president's re-election. As opposed to the later Turkish constitutions, the 1924 Constitution did not place any barriers against a president's re-election. This in practice meant that as long as Bayar was elected to Parliament as a deputy and retained the support of the DP group in the presidential election, he could be re-elected president for an unlimited number of terms.

A further deficiency revealed throughout the decade with regard to both the regime and the institutions was the lack of a higher court that could act as a barrier to the president's political agenda by intervening in critical matters on which the president took sides with the government. Discussion on these deficiencies had been mostly absent or marginal during the terms of the two former presidents, Atatürk 1923-1938 and İsmet İnönü (1938-1950). By the end of the decade, matters such as the obligation to guarantee the president's impartiality came to be recognized as indispensable. The constitutional arrangements that followed addressed these matters.

The favorable institutional leadership resource for Bayar was his harmonious relations with President Atatürk, but this was not a continuous asset for Bayar. For instance the appreciation of his skills in economics by Atatürk was a temporary opportunity. The opportunity faded away when İnönü became president in 1938. Bayar's skills in economy management were not

found adequate by the new administration. A change in the political context thus put an end to Bayar's executive leadership.

Was it the external or the internal resources that were more influential in Bayar's exercise of leadership? As already pointed out, it is difficult to answer this question definitively, as it is practically without exception a combination of these factors that dictate a leader's acts. To begin with, Bayar's internal resources made him a reliable candidate for political office in the new Turkish regime. Certain other internal leadership resources, for instance his conception of democracy and his assessment of the Communist threat, turned into unfavorable resources for Bayar's leadership. In other words, his adherence to the main tenets of the Republic rendered him an undisputed candidate for high political office, but his narrow interpretation of certain political concepts caused many observers to question his success as a leader.

Nevertheless in the final analysis certain external resources seem to have relatively more impact on Bayar's leadership practices. In particular Atatürk's trust in Bayar and later İnönü's approval for his leadership of the opposition party appear to have been more influential on the course Bayar's career took. Likewise, Bayar's leadership story could be expected to evolve differently if İnönü had not objected to his prime ministry in 1939 or if the military intervention in 1960 had not put an end to his presidency and placed further limitations on his political career through the Yassıada court rulings. Yet, there was no way of predicting what would have happened at the time.

A further objective in this dissertation has been to answer the question what kind of a leader portrait Bayar presents. As already stated, Bayar's

interpretation of certain political concepts placed him in between a political and a state elite. Turkish state elites, including bureaucratic and military elites and members of the single-party establishment were non-elected actors influential in a number of vital state affairs. Political elites, on the other hand, were victors of the elections. The state elites considered themselves to be defending the longer interests of the state and the nation whereas the political elites were often concerned with defending more particularistic interests.

To remind here briefly of an observation earlier shared, Bayar's role first as minister of economics and later as prime minister, and his CHP affiliation since the early years of the Republic made Bayar one of the core members of the political elites. Although Bayar challenged established views on the economy during the single party phase, he did not contradict the state elite on more core political issues, such as nationalism and secularism. The importance he attributed to the state in political life was another quality that he inherited from the state elite.

The primary matters that placed Bayar close to the political elites were his opposition to non-elected bodies in the political structure, such as the Constitutional Court and the Senate established by the 1961 Constitution and the prominent role he thought that the bureaucracy wanted to play. This was related to his broader understanding of democracy. He thought such institutions were against the will of the nation because their members were unelected but instead appointed by state elites.

The study of Bayar's executive leadership roles and his activities in those roles further confirm his liminal position with regard to his internal resources of

leadership. It should again be highlighted that Bayar was not in charge of policy-making as prime minister in 1937-1939 or as president in 1950-1960. In the former period, initially President Atatürk and then Prime Minister İsmet İnönü were primarily in charge of policymaking and in the 1950s Prime Minister Adnan Menderes mostly controlled the political agenda. For this reason, it is difficult to trace actual policies that qualified him as part of either the state elite or the political elite. Nevertheless, his support of the Dersim operations against the uprisings, his efforts to nationalize the Turkish economy mainly due to his security concerns, and the restrictive press and association laws legislated during his prime ministry should be mentioned as examples of his statist policies. His much disputed stance as president, aligning himself with the government and against the opposition, on the other hand, was the primary example of his political elite attitude.

The last question that should be considered for drawing a complete portrait of Bayar as a leader is whether Bayar's political goals changed over time. Studies of several political leaders have shown that leaders' goals often do change over time. Had this also been the case for Bayar? In this study, two overarching principles that shaped Bayar's policy choices have been defined. These principles were his emphasis on the unity of the nation and the domestic as well as the international security of the state. It can be argued that Bayar had more narrow policy goals, which appealed to time and context specific problems, but in retrospect achieving these two principles were his non-changing goals. Bayar updated his daily policies according to contemporary challenges that were faced in adhering to these principles. The support he gave to the 1980 military intervention was a major example of this. Bayar's commitment to these two

overarching principles also partially explains why Bayar at times acted as a political elite and at other times as a state elite. In matters that he considered critical, he nevertheless maintained a position closer to the state elite.

6.4 Revisiting the Interactive Approach

The findings of this study contribute to the theory of the interactive approach especially with regard to non-institutionalized regimes. An institutionalized regime refers to a regime where the rules governing executive offices are not subject to constant scrutiny and where there is not much room for widely diverging interpretations of major legal texts such as the constitution. In the studies that employ the interactive methodology it has been affirmed that under non-institutionalized regimes, institutional arrangements to some extent lose their defining impact on leadership. The interactive theory, however, fails to indicate which other leadership resources replace the institutional and constitutional arrangements under non-institutionalized regimes. The study of Bayar's leadership in 1937-1960 has highlighted certain resources of leadership that partially replaced constitutional and institutional arrangements.

The first such resource is the relations between individual leaders. The interactive method puts emphasis on relations between executive offices, for instance relations between the legislative body and the executive body as part of the external resources of leadership. However, it fails to recognize the significance of personal relations between power holders. The study of Bayar's leadership in 1937-1960 has shown that under regimes that are not fully institutionalized personal relations between political leaders might become much

more influential on a leader's career than the constitutional and institutional arrangements and should be considered as a part of de-facto institutional setting.

For Bayar, the influential actors on his leadership were Atatürk, İnönü and Menderes. His relation to Atatürk and the latter's confidence in him provided certain leaps in Bayar's career. His relations with İnönü, which were sour for a number of reasons, on the other hand often had contrary impacts on Bayar's leadership. For instance, his less than harmonious relations with İnönü in 1950-1960 became a matter of controversy and has been cited as one of the reasons for the accumulation of political tension in those years. Earlier exceptions to this negative pattern of relations between Bayar and İnönü were Bayar's support for İnönü's presidency in 1938 and İnönü's approval of Bayar's leadership of the opposition party in 1945. İnönü's approval in these cases provided Bayar with a considerable leadership opportunity.

Bayar's relations with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes also had an impact on his leadership assets. Bayar was unable to maintain a distance between himself and Menderes. Such a distance could have given Bayar the necessary leverage needed to restrain certain political acts of Menderes, which turned out to be detrimental to the regime's stability. Besides Bayar also encouraged Menderes to take stern measures toward the opposition wherever that opposition came from. Bayar's relations with Menderes resulted in even further establishing his association with the government in the Turkish public's eyes.

According to the findings of this study the second leadership resource that replaces institutional and constitutional arrangements under non-

institutionalized regimes is a leader's interpretation of his/her powers and duties. There is plenty of room in non-institutionalized contexts for different readings of political offices. This is important firstly because in non-institutionalized regimes executive leaders might be restrained by de-facto arrangements that are not written in the constitution. In this case, they might have to work to develop a different interpretation of their powers and duties. Secondly, in the absence of effective checks and balance mechanisms, such as higher courts that supervise the leaders, there is little to stop a leader from pursuing policies of his/her choice other than his/her interpretation of political office. Bayar experienced both of these situations in his leadership roles as prime minister and as president.

Strong prime ministers have been defined as having the power to designate and dismiss ministers of the cabinet, exercising a superior position over the rest of the cabinet members and having a strong say on the activities of ministries (Helms, 2005: 13-14). According to the 1924 Constitution, Bayar had these powers, which in theory should have rendered him a powerful prime minister; however, that was not the case. Bayar's field of activity was demarcated not by the constitution but first by Atatürk's and later by İnönü's choices. His agenda was loosely defined by Atatürk and his task was to detail these narrowly defined objectives into thorough work programs and implement them. As prime minister, Bayar was often not in a position to devise major policies by his own initiative under the prevailing circumstances. This state of affairs continued under İnönü's presidency. Bayar interpreted his position as prime minister in line with this political reality and did not consider challenging it.

Bayar's presidency also draws a similar picture. As president, Bayar was constitutionally obliged to refrain from participating in daily political issues and party affairs. Bayar conformed to this rule in his political rhetoric and paid attention to highlight his impartiality, but in practice he was involved in governmental affairs and was closely associated with the government. There were no efficient checks and balances on the presidency and thus it was to a great extent up to the president himself how to interpret his position. Bayar preferred taking sides with the government on most of the issues. These two external resources identified above might be useful for further studies that use the interactive approach especially with regard to non-institutionalized regimes.

6.5 Recommendations for further Studies

This study has also highlighted a number of deficiencies from the perspective of Turkish leadership studies, which may be addressed in subsequent studies. Firstly, analyses of political institutions in Turkey are scarce. Although individual leaders or periods in Turkish politics have been studied, there is no analysis of how prime ministry or presidency has evolved over time. Such studies have only been conducted in legal terms where the institutional framework is considered with reference to the constitutional text, rather than a combination of the constitution and the leaders in practice.

Secondly, studies that take up the common and differing characteristics of various Turkish political leaders with a focus on internal and external resources of leadership have not been made. This means that there has not yet been any attempt to develop an overall analysis of Turkish political leadership and show

whether there is a Turkish model of leadership. There is a need to identify the common grounds for Turkish political leaders in different periods and engage in a discussion for a Turkish model of leadership. The interactive approach would offer a convenient methodology for such a task. It can then also be established whether Bayar was an exceptional Turkish leader or if he conformed to a common pattern shared by Turkish leaders in general.

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