

A NEO-MARXIST ANALYSIS
OF THE PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY

A Master's Thesis

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To my family and Çağatay

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OF THE PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY

Graduate School of Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

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ABSTRACT

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There is an increase in the role played by non-state security actors in daily lives and in politics during the last three decades. Although a number of different questions and issues related to private security in different contexts are discussed within the existing literature, there is a lack of solid critical political economy analysis of the increasing role played by non-state security actors. This thesis examines the question of how we can understand or make sense of the increasing role played by non-state security actors from a critical political economy perspective. While examining this question, this thesis brings in a neo-Marxist approach by attending to the state-market-security nexus. By considering the privatization of security from a critical political economy perspective, this study focuses on capital accumulation at the global and local level through examining some Western and African countries. Additionally, the thesis makes a historical and contemporary analysis of privatization of security against the background of state's role in security field. In this way, this thesis emphasizes the need for going beyond the existing literature on privatization of security by considering the politics of security as a tool of order which legitimizes the power of the state in protecting capitalist accumulation and the hegemony of capital.

Keywords: Privatization of Security, Neo-Marxism, Political Economy, State-

Market-Security Nexus

ÖZET

GÜVENLİĞİN ÖZELLEŞTİRİLMESİNİN NEO-MARXIST ANALİZİ

Dölek, Burçak
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Özel güvenliğin gündelik ve politik hayattaki rolünde özellikle son otuz yıldır artış görülmektedir. Mevcut literatürde özel güvenlik ile ilgili farklı soru ve konular tartışılrsa da özel güvenliğin tam olarak eleştirel açıdan ekonomi politik analizinin eksik olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Bu çalışma, özel güvenlikteki artışı eleştirel ekonomi politik bakış açısı içerisinde incelemektedir. Bu amaçla, güvenliğin özelleştirilmesi devlet-piyasa-güvenlik bağlantısı çerçevesinde neo-Marxist bakış açısı kullanılarak analiz edilmekte olup; Batılı ve Afrika ülkelerinde özel güvenlikten kaynaklı sermaye birikimine dikkat çekilmektedir. Ayrıca, bu çalışma özel güvenliği hem tarihsel hem günümüz koşulları altında devletin güvenliği sağlamadaki rolü çerçevesinde incelemektedir. Böylelikle, bu tezde özel güvenlik ile ilgili mevcut literatürün ötesine geçilmesi ve devletin kapitalist düzenin sürekliliği için “zor” aracını elinde bulundurmasının gerekliliği göz önünde bulundurularak güvenliğin özelleştirilmesinin incelenmesi gerektiği vurgusu yapmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenliğin Özelleştirilmesi, Neo-Marxism, Ekonomi Politikliği,

Devlet-Piyasa-Güvenlik Bağı

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Especially during the last three decades, privatization has gained motion as an economic policy tool, and has involved also security services. In almost every society across the globe, there is an increase in the role played by non-state actors in the provision of security. The activities of non-state actors in the provision of security are pervasive in modern societies across the globe, and whose clients are composed of NGOs, multinational corporations, individuals and governments. There are many examples to show the growth in the privatization of security at both the national and international level. Companies such as Securitas and Group4Securicor are some of the world's biggest private security companies (PSCs), which have rapidly grown towards Europe and are active in more than 30 countries (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007: 240). Private security is now so integrated even in daily events and politics e.g. banking, education, shopping, as well as warfare and military affairs, that it can be considered as “the untold story” in international politics (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011). Overall, the privatization of security has become one of the most controversial issues both in politics and within academia (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007: 239).

When the existing literature is considered, it is seen that scholars have different perspectives for the analysis of the issue. Accordingly various issues such as what kind of factors trigger the increase in the privatization of security, whether or not the increasing role played by non-state security actors is a positive or negative development, what kind of problems arise as a result of the operations by PSCs and how can they be solved, how private security actors can be regulated to prevent illegal activities, how the role of the state in security provision has been affected by the emergence of private security actors, constituted the main debates in the existing literature on the privatization of security.

As we will see in the literature review chapter of this thesis, different scholars have different positions on the above issues related to the increasing role played by non-state security actors. While some scholars consider the end of Cold War as the main reason for the increase in privatization of security, some other scholars regard neo-liberalism as the cause of privatization of security. Considering the assessment of privatization of security, some scholars regard the increasing role played by non-state security actors as a positive development resulting in the efficiency in protection by effectively ending civil conflicts, whereas others consider it a negative development and emphasize the problems of moral hazards and disruption of order in the society. Related to these problems, some scholars also analyze the legal dimension of the PSCs through suggesting the regulation of them by national and/or international law. Lastly, some authors argue that privatization of security resulted in the outsourcing of the state in the security field and opposed to the traditional Weberian conception of the state, other authors think that what has

happened is the emergence of “security governance” involving both public and private security actors in networks, and yet other scholars are against the view that the state lost power in security provision.

Although a large body of literature now exists on private security, it is interesting to note that a political economy dimension is not central to most of it. Furthermore, when political economy issues are dealt with (e.g. with reference to neoliberalism) it is done in a rather superficial and uncritical fashion. Against this background, the question developed for this thesis is as follows: *How can we understand or make sense of the increasing role played by non-state security actors from a critical political economy perspective?*

As the thesis will show, applying a neo-Marxist approach goes beyond the existing literature to focus on commodification of security, capital accumulation, class relations, securitization of capital and the actual role played by the state vis-à-vis the increasing role played by private security actors for the (re)production of capitalist relations of production. In order to critically understand the increasing role played by private security actors, it is very important to analyze the state-security-market nexus, and how it contributes to the maintenance of capital accumulation. There is a need for a more solid and critical political economy analysis of the increasing role played by private actors in the provision of security based on a critical examination of class relations. Important questions to be addressed include to what extent private security actors have replaced the capitalist state in security provision, or why it is the case that “security” has not been fully marketized in this neoliberal era of ours.

Considering the privatization of security, the thesis will make a historical and theory-informed analysis of the state-security-market nexus at both the local and global level. In that respect, PSCs in Western and developing countries (African) will be analyzed by considering their role in capital accumulation and the role of the state vis-à-vis the privatization of security provision. Different from the arguments in the existing literature, the thesis argues that the increasing role played by non-state security actors contributes to capital accumulation through both the commodification of security and the “securitization of capital”. Moreover, it suggests that much of the existing literature exaggerates the privatization of security through emphasizing the loss of state power in security provision. Different from the other sectors, although there certainly is an increase in the role played by private actors in security provision, the thesis argues that there is a limit to the privatization in that the provision of security by the state is necessary for the (re)production of capital accumulation.

In order to provide such an analysis, chapter 2 of this thesis first conducts a literature review, in which the theoretical assumptions and empirical findings about privatization of security will be examined. The chapter presents how the existing literature understands and assesses the developments in the role played by private security actors and concludes with criticisms of the existing literature. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical basis for an alternative analysis of the increasing role played by non-state actors in the provision of security. It seeks to show the way mainstream theories explain the role of the state and its coercive apparatus in capitalist relations of production at both the national and transnational level. The

chapter will provide neo-Marxist point of view that coercion or violence on the part of a seemingly autonomous and legitimate state is essential for the maintenance of the capitalist system at both the national and global level.

Chapter 4 analyzes the increasing role played by non-state actors in the provision of security from a neo-Marxist perspective. In this chapter, the relationship between neoliberalism and the privatization of security as commodification is analyzed. Then, how security is commodified as a result of neoliberalism and its contribution to capitalist accumulation is discussed. The increasing role played by non-state security actors is analyzed in terms of the protection of capital accumulation at the local- global level and, private security actors in Western and developing African countries is examined. Providing historical analysis of private security against the background of the state's role in the security field, chapter 4 finally discusses the privatization of security and the role of the state in the security field in the contemporary era and argues that the state role in the security field is not abolished vis-à-vis PSCs. Finally, chapter 5 summarizes the findings of this research and presents the implications for the understanding of the increasing role played by non-state actors in security provision.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON THE INCREASING ROLE PLAYED BY NON-STATE SECURITY ACTORS

This chapter will present the existing literature on the increasing role played by non-state actors in the provision of security in terms of how they understand and assess the developments in the role played by private security actors. The chapter is composed of five different sub-sections. In the first sub-section, how the literature explains the increasing role played by private actors is discussed. In this section, different arguments made by scholars — such as the end of Cold War, changing notion of security threats, budgetary concerns and neo-liberal ideology — about the causes of privatization of security are examined. In the second sub-section, how the existing literature assesses the increasing role played by private security actors is discussed and it is understood that while some arguments in the literature consider the increasing role played by non-state security actors as a positive development, some others consider it as a negative development emphasizing the problems of PSCs. Related to problems seen to arise from the privatization of security, the third sub-section discusses different arguments made by scholars about the legal

dimension of PSCs. In the fourth sub-section, another main issue in the literature which is about whether or not the increasing role played by private actors causes the loss of state power in the security field is examined and it is seen that while some authors argue that PSCs results in the decline in state role in the security field and some scholars are against that argument in the literature. In the last sub-section, a general evaluation of the existing literature is made and the existing literature is criticized.

2.1- Different Explanations of the Increasing Role Played by Non-State Actors in the Security Provision

When the way in which the existing literature explains the increasing role played by private security actors is considered, one of the main issues discussed is related with the end of Cold War. According to some authors, the main cause of the privatization of security is related to the end of Cold War. It is argued that the consideration of the state as the main unit of interest in security studies has been challenged with the end of the Cold War; hence, private actors started to play a significant role in the security field (Krahmann, 2005: 3). Accordingly, after the end of the Cold War, the characteristics of wars changed and they resulted in the growth of PSCs (Kinsey, 2005). Hence, ‘new wars’ aim to protect the interests of the groups such as rebellion groups, militias and criminal groups instead of states which resulted the use of PSCs (Kinsey, 2005: 275).

Regarding the arguments in the existing literature about the end of Cold War and the privatization of security, it is also stated that as a result of the end of the

bipolar system, states could not be dependent on the superpowers to prevent internal clashes and supply external security. Therefore, many states found themselves without the means — regarding the funding or skilled manpower — to provide expressive protection themselves (Mandel, 2001). Moreover, the end of Cold War resulted in the lack of clear and direct outside threat. Hence, the money governments spend on defense declined. The decrease in the number of state security personnel also led to the abundance of people having security expertise who had to search for places other than governments for meaningful work. In that respect, the unusual security threats and sources of disorder that presented themselves in the post-Cold War environment did not appear readily containable by the use of conventional security resources (Mandel, 2001).

After the end of Cold War, the changing notion of security threats which includes migration, terrorism and transnational crime also caused the increase in the role played by private security actors. Accordingly, the authority and the resources of the state are not adequate to prevent contemporary security threats and new criminals target civilians instead of military enemy (Krahmann, 2005: 250-151). Therefore, when people have begun to identify these security changes, many groups have ceased to rely on the government and looked for ways of providing their own private security (Mandel, 2001).

The end of Cold War also changed the general understanding about warfare that it is done for a common political aim among citizens. Hence, new type of warfare and new, high technology warfare required the specialized security experts who are provided by private security companies PSCs (Singer, 2001).

Another issue explained in the existing literature for the increasing role played by non-state security actors is related with neo-liberalism, including budgetary concerns of states, profit maximization and economic rationalism. It is argued in the literature that, on the basis of neoliberalism with Thatcherism in the United Kingdom and Reaganism in the United States, the market was regarded as being superior to the government with the assumption that the private sector is both more efficient and more effective (Singer, 2001: 197). Therefore, privatization of security is considered in terms of the normative shift toward the marketization of the public sphere in security, as a result of neoliberalism. It is argued that since neoliberal principles of competition and comparative advantage maximize effectiveness, efficiency and profit, it is expected that these neoliberal policies will bring efficiency and profit in the security field (Singer, 2001: 197).

In the existing literature, it is stated that neoliberal ideology is based on the policies of profit maximization and economic rationalism. Hence, the dominance of neoliberal economic policies facilitated the privatization in the security sector and the 'market authority' of PSCs is considered to be inseparable from the ascendancy of neoliberal ideas (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007: 241).

As a result of neoliberalism, structural adjustment policies have been implemented by governments in developing countries. World Bank and IMF require implementation of structural adjustment programs that cut into military budgets (Mandel, 2000). Therefore, the budgetary problems resulted in the reduction of defense spending. These budgetary concerns of the states about security spending

caused the increase in the non-state actors in chaotic environments as the providers of security in developing countries.

2.2- Assessments of the Increasing Role Played by Non-State Actors in the Security Provision

When the way in which different scholars assess the increasing role played by non-state security actors is considered, it is seen that while some scholars consider the increasing role played by private security actors as a positive development, some scholars have a negative perspective.

In the literature, there are some arguments which make an optimistic assessment of the privatization of security. David Shearer is one of the scholars who argues that privatization of security provides solutions to difficult problems in the security field which promotes national interest through assisting governments with the most advanced information technology and technical expertise. Moreover, he argues that PSCs can help effectively ending civil conflicts in African states that are ignored by some Western states (Shearer, 1998).

It is also stated that PSCs operate more effectively and efficiently as opposed to centralized public security. One reason to this is that PSCs are not constrained by political considerations. Therefore, PSCs regard conflicts as “business opportunity and have taken advantage of the pervasive influence of economic liberalism in the late twentieth century” (Shearer, 1998:71). In other

words, PSCs provide policymaker the opportunity of accomplishing their foreign policy goals without the necessity to get public approval. Therefore, private security services — with the feature of technical expertise and efficiency — have been regarded as a solution to the problems of public foundations about security within the literature.

Besides the positive assessments of the increasing role played by non-state actors in the provision of security, there are also some negative arguments about privatization of security in the existing literature. Ken Silverstein is one of the scholars who has a negative point of view on PSCs and he discusses the problems that has emerged from the increasing role played by non-state security actors with reference to the operations of PSCs in the United States. Accordingly, the growth of private security actors caused decline in the state control and the democratic process (Silverstein, 1997). He also considers this development as one “by which the responsibilities of government are transferred to corporate hands” (Silverstein, 1997: 143). In that respect Silverstein (1997: 143) implies that state institutions which restrain violence in the US are weakened by private actors in the security field and it results in ignorance of the serious issues by concentrating on the profit motives and egos of a small group of hard liners who use PSCs.

Considering the problems discussed in the literature on the increasing role played by non-state security actors, the spread of military armaments to the population at large, the growth of private security forces and the increasing involvement of the mercenaries in ongoing conflicts are analyzed by Mandel (2001). As a result of the increasing role played by non-state security actors, groups

such as private militias, vigilant squads and survivalist enclaves came together with the belief that they should provide their own security by using PSCs since the government is not able to do so in this highly threatening environment (Mandel, 2001: 130). Hence, it is argued that private security actors have become source of insecurity. Moreover, the large amount of the private security is unregulated and it usually hires guards who are less trained (Mandel, 2001). Accordingly, it may result in internal conflict since these private security actors are often “unregulated, unaccountable, badly trained and full of crocks” (Mandel, 2002: 117). Hence, this creates instability in the society.

It is also stated in the existing literature that the marketization of security results in the individualization of security through marketing policies that underlines personal and corporate distinctions in terms of susceptibility to specific security threats. PSCs reflect the present security threats as personal as opposed to collective security with the assertion that “client’s security needs are distinct” (Krahmann, 2012:52). Therefore, PSCs provide security as a private good which results in a decrease in public security and protection from threat instead of eliminating the threat. Moreover, Krahmann (2012:48) suggests that these private actors construct “new subnational territories of security and insecurity”, and gives examples from shopping malls by stating that private security actors produce private zones of security and insecurity. Therefore, Krahmann (2008: 388) argues that private security actors lead to general insecurity in society and the increase in the number of non-state security actors causes to “a militarization of social sphere”.

Similarly, it is argued in the existing literature that privatization of security produces new insecurities through speech acts and practices, and that shapes “the way security is understood” (Leander, 2010: 212). In that point, Leander (2005: 605) argues that:

supply in the market for force tends to self-perpetuate, as PMCs turn out a new caste of security experts striving to fashion security understandings to defend and conquer market shares. The process leads to an expansion of the numbers and kinds of threats the firms provide protection against.

Leander (2005: 606) also states that there is a paradox since the confidence on PSCs deteriorates the bases of public security. The private security market increases the market supply of security which also results in an increase in violence and insecurity (Leander, 2005: 606). According to Leander (2005: 612), the expansion of the market for force changes the consideration of both threats and precautions. She argues that “In the market for force, supply creates its demand” (Leander, 2005: 606). Like in other private sectors, PSCs aim to market their product; hence, PSCs affect the understanding of their clients about “what the threat is” and “how it is responded” (Leander, 2005: 612). Accordingly, Leander states that PSCs have to persuade their clients that the threat they have considered are the most significant threats.

Another point that is emphasized by Leander concerns how privatization of security reconfigures the security boundaries and borders. Therefore, marketization of security has a role in describing “why and how some people become threatening outsiders while others are embraced as protection-worthy

insiders” (Leander 2010:214). She gives the example of private companies, hired into airports, border crossing and check points for border controls.

Regarding the assessment of the increasing role played by non-state security actors in the existing literature, there are also some scholars who are against emphasizing only positive or negative aspects of privatization of security. Avant (2005) criticizes the arguments, stressing only the negative or positive aspects of the consequences of privatization of the security, as disregarding the significant changes that the privatization of security brings. She states that these kinds of arguments just consider the one part of the consequences of the presence of market forces (Avant, 2005: 254):

Neither side pointed out the inevitable trade-offs states, firms, and people will have to make in deciding how to manage this market. The rush to normative judgment about whether the privatization of security was “good” or “bad” impeded analysis of the range of privatization’s effects and clouded understanding of the dilemmas associated with private security. Better understanding will not only lead to more satisfactory political science, but also to more effective analysis and political action.

Accordingly, Avant (2005) regards the issue in terms of the theory of “democratic peace”. She considers the use of PSCs as creating the problem of “redistributing power within democratic, intervening states [...] which lowers the political costs of action” (Avant, 2005: 128). Therefore, she argues that democratic states will have less control in terms of war making. For the explanations of these considerations, she uses the “new institutionalism” which combines economics and sociological institutionalist arguments. Therefore, she argues that marketization of security affects the capabilities of forces different (Avant, 2005:6). However, Avant

(2005:6) emphasizes that it is inevitable that privatization reallocate power “over the control of violence, both within states and between states and non-state actors”. Therefore, she stresses that while the strong states are able to deal with the risks of privatization of security, the weak states cannot manage the private security actors (Avant, 2005:7).

In that point, although privatization may improve the capacity of some states, it alters who affects the use of force (Avant, 2005: 253). She argues that the changes in political control are most serious when private security actors finance coercion in weak states; however it may also be the case in strong states (Avant, 2005: 253). Moreover, Avant (2005: 253) considers that with the privatization of security, the relationship between citizenship and military service changes which is parallel to changes in military professional norms.

Similar to Avant, Singer does not make a positive or negative assessment of the increasing role played by non-state actors in black and white sense. He states that if the necessary legal implementations are done for the PSCs, then they can operate better than public security (Singer, 2004: 548). In the article “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security”, Singer considers the private military companies as having a role through affecting the civil-military balance. They may pose a threat to the institutional balance, or they may contribute to stabilize the civil-military balance. In that respect, private military companies proposes “a neoliberal Third Way” and may permit the executive branch to evade public debate or legislative controls

(Singer, 2001: 218). Hence, private security undertakes what is considered as “a much more rational foreign policy” (Singer, 2001: 218).

Singer (2001) claims that PSCs have some effects on human rights during conflicts. While in some cases, they have positive impacts and adopt good behavior since their long term profits are affected by their public image (Singer, 2001). On the other hand, he argues that PSCs have some negative effects on human rights in terms of “moral hazards, adverse selection and the potential for the diffusion of responsibility” (Singer, 2001: 214). In that respect, he gives the example of “Executive Outcomes” that has careless operations in Sierra Leona and Angola where the private security personnel used fuel air explosives and there occurred painful injuries.

2.3- The Legal Dimension of PSCs

One of the main issues discussed in the literature about the increasing role played by non-state actors in the provision of security is related with the regulation of PSCs. Accordingly, many authors argue that legalization of PSCs is very important. It is said that the problems resulting from the use of PSCs are related to the insufficient administration of them. Carafano (2008: 183) mentions the case of the United States and proposes a solution of increase in the control of PSCs by regulations at national level.

The legal aspect of PSCs in international arena is also analyzed in the existing literature and it is argued that although global PSCs sustain to grow, their legal status at the international level persists to be uncertain (Kinsey, 2005: 207). The literature compares the mercenaries in the past and the PSCs at present in terms of the prohibition of their operations by international law. It is suggested that since the international agreements to regulate mercenaries are not very relevant for PSCs, there is a need to make new international legal agreements for the regulation of PSCs. When the status of mercenaries and PSCs are compared in the literature, it is found that mercenaries in the past served apolitical aim during the decolonization era. Accordingly, the present international law is unable to constitute the legal status of the PSCs and hence, it puts the problem to national regulation (Kinsey, 2005:271). The normative analysis of the legal status of PSCs after the Cold War is made in terms of the legalization of PSCs. In that point, Kinsey (2005) makes a normative analysis and he emphasizes that in such an environment, regulation on PSC is required to make certain that they are accountable for their operations. Furthermore, Kinsey (2005: 280) argues that:

... as ensuring PSCs behave in an appropriate manner, regulation is also needed to make PSCs as transparent as is possible, while introducing some type of oversight mechanism to monitor their activities so that any digression from acceptable international standards of behavior is quickly picked up and dealt with by the necessary authority. However, international law on mercenaries is obsolete and is, therefore, unable to respond sufficiently to the legal challenges posed by PSCs.

Since the present international law on mercenaries cannot be used for regulation of PSCs, Kinsey (2005: 291) emphasizes that there is a necessity of a new international agreement to monitor activities of private security actors and there is a need to political will of the international community which is lacking. In

that respect he stresses the need for the improvement of national legislation for PSCs.

Regarding the increasing role played by non-state security actors, Singer also takes a legal approach. According to Singer (2001: 215), one of the problems with the PSCs is that “they diffuse responsibility”. He argues that the issue about monitoring, regulating and punishing employees of the PSCs still remains as a problem (Singer, 2001). While public security institutions are responsible for obeying the laws in their territory, it is very hard to monitor or regulate the operations of the private security/military companies. Moreover, Singer (2001: 215) suggests that “even if external legal action or sanction were attempted, it is doubtful whether any firm would ever allow its employees to be tried in a weak client state’s judicial state”.

As opposed to the normative arguments regarding the regulation of PSCs by the state, some scholars also discussed the suggestions that for the regulation of PSCs, national and international law are necessary. In his article, Whyte (2003) criticizes those who proposes the regulation to make PSCs transparent. He argues that regulation just legitimizes these companies and strengthens the relation between politicians and companies. Hence, Whyte (2003: 581) states that “state participation in illegal practices that heighten state capacities is a systemic feature”. Thus, “regulatory regimes [should be seen] as constitutive elements of corporate crimes” (Whyte, 2003: 582) since regulation is something that states ‘do’ to private actors. Accordingly, it is stated that regulation is not simply about limiting the terms on which corporations enter markets. Rather, regulatory regimes

forms the foundations that facilitate markets to function and indeed to improve. In that respect, regulation of PSCs establishes a regulatory framework that facilitates the expansion of a market in violence that is illegal (Whyte, 2003: 598).

2.4- Privatization of Security and Outsourcing of the State in the Provision of Security

In addition to the regulation of the PSCs, in the existing literature some scholars examine the increasing role played by non-state security actors in terms of the loss of state power in the security field. Considering the loss of state power in the security field, Singer (2001) argues that different actors such as failing states, regional powers, peace keeping forces or multinational corporations need different security support and that assistance has since the 1990s come not from a state or international organization, but rather from the global market place (Singer, 2001). In that respect, he emphasizes that there is a gradual change in the Weberian monopoly over the use of force and private military companies acting as “the new business face of war” (Singer, 2001: 187). Moreover, he suggests that as a result of the increase in the privatized military industry, the state’s role in the security field has declined in parallel with the other fields such as trade and finance.

Similar to the arguments made by Singer in terms of the loss of state power in the security field, Avant (2005) argues that the increasing role played by non-state security actors shows the irrelevance of Max Weber’s ‘conventional’ definition of the state. Avant’s main argument in her book is that the rise of the

private security market is significant, since it affects ‘how people control the violence’ (Avant, 2005:3). Accordingly, she analyzes “whether or not the privatization of security undermines state control of violence” and “whether the privatization of security can improve the state control of violence” (Avant, 2005: 3).

Avant (2005:1) argues that the operations of the private security actors in the last two decades challenge Weber’s conventional understanding of the state. In that respect, she states that whereas Weber exaggerated the state’s role on monopolizing the use of coercive force from the beginning and in the past, the role of the private actors in security increased in the last two decades (Avant, 2005: 2). Therefore, the role of the PSCs is larger than it was in the past and they offer variety of military services. Hence the market for force weakens “the collective monopoly of the state over violence in world politics, and thus a central feature of the sovereign system” (Avant, 2005: 253). She also emphasizes that not only states but also international non-governmental organizations and multi-national corporations finance PSCs in order to reach their aims (Avant, 2005).

Considering the assessment of the increasing role played by non-state security actors in terms of outsourcing of state as a result of privatization of security, Nagan and Hammer (2008) state that not only politics but also the nature of the state changes. Thus, outsourcing is a “particularly destructive consequence of globalization [... and] an affront to sovereign power” (2008: 450), and weakens “the foundational principles of good governance and democracy” (2008: 459). In that respect, it can be said that their analysis is based on classical realist

assumptions which emphasize states as the main entity in international system. According to them, sovereignty is equal to legitimate governance.

In the existing literature of the increasing role played by private security actors, there are also some Foucauldian arguments which emphasize power perspective. Foucauldian authors consider privatization of security as a change from discipline society to neoliberal governmentality based on neoliberal individual and market (Ruben and Maskovsky, 2008: 200). Therefore, Foucauldian analysis of privatization of security considers private security as the domain of free market and individual which makes the individuals responsible for their own security (Miller and Rose, 2008).

In addition to the arguments in the literature about the increasing role played by non-state security actors in the sense of a decline in the state's role, there are also arguments which propose that there is now a sharing of power in the security field by the state and corporations. Krahmman (2005:3) makes sense of the increasing role played by non-state security actors as "a part of shift from 'government' to 'governance' in security". Hence, according to Krahmman (2012:38), the contemporary proliferation of PSCs created impediments to state-centric understanding of national and global governance. In that respect, Krahmman (2012:39) argues that the growth of PSCs in world politics change the four notions which include "the state monopoly on the use of force"; "the notion that security relates to communities rather than individuals"; "the rule of law"; "the democratic control over the provision of security". Accordingly, the

availability of private security services stands against the role of the state as the provider of security (Krahmann, 2012:47).

Krahmann (2005) analyzes “the emergence of a system of international security governance in which the making and implementation of security policies is shared among overlapping networks of state and non-state actors at the national, regional and global levels.” (Krahmann, 2005:3). Although governments and international organizations have increased their concerns in the security field, inadequate resources, lack of expertise in new areas of security resulted in the division of security policy making (Krahmann, 2005: 11). As opposed to government, which is based on a system of “centralized political control within the state”, governance advocates a divided policy making, composed of state and non-state actors at national and global level (Krahmann, 2005:11).

Accordingly, states retain a significant role in security governance and states affect the geographical dimension of security regimes (Krahmann 2005: 200). Moreover, states advocate neoliberal norms such as marketization and they continue to dominate decision making in international organizations (Krahmann, 2005: 200). In that respect, according to Krahmann (2005:201), states have been the main agents in advocating the rise of private actors in the security field. As a result of neoliberal management strategies including “the reduction of state bureaucracy, market reforms and privatization for increase in efficiency”, states have outsourced security functions to non-state actors who have political neutrality and expertise (Krahmann, 2005:201). Krahmann (2005) also states the

importance of the private actors in terms of influencing government policies through networks.

In the system of security governance, state and private security actors are not totally independent from each other and cooperation is significant (Krahmann, 2005: 203). However, Krahmann (2005) states that there are some problems resulting from cooperation between state and private actors in security field. She conceptualizes these “governance failures” as normative and structural failures which includes the loss of governmental control, the politicization of private actors, the lack of accountability, and inadequate coordination between public and private actors.

Similarly, it is seen that the security governance is also emphasized by Ian Loader (2000: 323) in the existing literature. Accordingly, Loader (2000: 323) argues that:

We are living in the midst of a potentially far-reaching transformation in the means by which order and security are maintained in liberal democratic societies, one that is giving rise to the fragmentation and diversification of policing provision, and ushering in a plethora of agencies and agents, each with particular kinds of responsibility for the delivery of policing and security services and technologies. What we might call a shift from police to policing has seen the sovereign state – hitherto considered focal to both provision and accountability in this field – reconfigured as but one node of a broader, more diverse ‘network of power’.

Regarding how the literature examines the increasing role played by non-state security actors, there are some arguments which are against the case that there is a loss of state power in the security field. Accordingly, Anna Leander (2010)

states that the “privatization of security literature” only tackles with the issue of decline in state role in the security arena. In that respect, similar to Krahmann, Leander argues that the increasing role played by non-state security actors should be considered as “commercialization of security”. Leander (2010) argues that commercialization of security literature interrogate and discuss the key political processes such as societal change, security governance, hybrid networks between public-private and global-local. In that respect, Leander states that as opposed to the ‘privatization of security’ literature which only focus on the loss of state power in security field, commercialization of security literature contributes more to the understanding of the increasing roles played by non-state actors in the provision of security.

Leander (2010: 212) suggests that as opposed to considering the development of security market against the state, which is done by privatization of security literature, there is a need to conceptualize this development “within a broader framework of societal change.” Regarding the relation between the state and the private security actors, Leander (2005: 612) analyzes how PSCs become lobbyists and security advisers through “contributing to the securitization of different issues”. In that respect, Leander (2005: 808) opposes to the arguments on privatization of security about the loss of state power in the security field and argues that although the decision making about security issues is done by governments formally, PSCs are getting to be significant actors since they are close to governments and can affect security policy making. She states that PSCs have board members who have loyalties to their firms and make lobbies for their case (2005: 808). PSCs’ lobbying affects discourses and they aim to make politicians act on the

basis of the interests of the firms. She gives example from lobbying of MPRI (Military Professional Resources Inc.) and its success in terms of persuading the US government to allow it to take on a contract offered by Equatorial Guinea within the frame of the US's 'National Security Enhancement Plan' (2005: 816).

Similar to Krahmman and Leander's arguments, Abrahamsen and Williams (2007: 238) suggest that "non-state actors in security field do not stand in opposition to state power in a zero-sum game" and what is happening is "the institutional transformation within states that legitimate the increased role of private actors" (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011: 93) According to Abrahamsen and Williams (2007), it is not sufficient to look at security only through considering the traditional institutions of state, such as the police and military forces. Instead, it is important to look at the relationship between these institutions and other components of the state included in global processes (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011: 95). Actually, what is very significant for understanding the increasing role of PSCs is to understand the roles of the actors concerned with the relations to the global economy, particularly trade and finance ministries (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011: 95). Therefore, this consequence of neo-liberal governance does not imply the loss of state sovereignty, but it implies the importance of hybrid networks between public-private and local-global. In that respect, institutional transformations of the state and the hybrid networks between public-private and local-global legitimate the increased roles of non-state security actors.

2.5- Conclusion

In this chapter, the existing literature on the increasing role played by non-state security actors is presented from different perspectives. Some scholars explain privatization of security considering the end of Cold War, new security threats, neoliberal economic policies including budgetary concerns. In the literature, there are also different assessments made by different scholars who emphasize the positive aspect and/or negative aspects of privatization of security. Another point touched upon in the literature is about the regulation of PSCs in a normative sense. The loss of state power vis-à-vis the increasing role played by non-state security actors is another issue discussed in the existing literature. While some scholars argue that the role of the state in the security field is diminished as a result of privatization of security, some other scholars do not agree with that.

Although the existing literature includes different arguments made by scholars about the increasing role played by non-state actors in the security provision, it is seen that it mainly identifies certain problems and proposes some solutions without examining what is behind all these developments in the role played by private security actors. Importantly, although the literature engages with certain issues related to political economy (e.g. the impact of neoliberalism), the political economy dimension is not particularly deep or critical. For instance, while the existing literature explains the privatization of security, it tends to take the state and the market for granted as two distinct entities. That kind of approach dehistoricizes social reality, treats social relations at both the national and global level as natural and universal, and ends up viewing the market as a technical field.

However, in order to understand and assess the increasing role played by private security actors, it is very important to analyze it critically within the context of contemporary capitalism. In other words, there is a need for a more solid political economy analysis of the increasing role played by private actors in the provision of security based on a critical examination of the state-security-market nexus.

CHAPTER 3

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Some theories of political economy — such as classical political economy theories — are used to explain and solve the problems through just considering its ‘appearance’ and do not analyze the issues lying behind them. However, some other theories are “more reflective upon the process of theorizing itself in order to become clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorizing, and to open up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world.” (Cox, 1981: 128). Accordingly, the former kinds of theories are identified by Cox (1981: 129) as “problem solving theories”, which consider the world as it is and with the existing power and social relationships. Therefore, these theories do not question the apparent pattern of institutions and relationships and take the world for granted. On the other hand, Cox (1981: 129) conceptualizes the theories, — which are more reflective —, as “critical theory”. Therefore, critical theory distances itself apart from the existing order and questions the prevailing order. In contrast to the problem solving theories, critical theory questions the existing social power relations by concerning itself with their origins and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox 1981, 129).

Although there are many mainstream (problem solving) approaches to the political economy at both the local and global level, neo-Marxist approaches explain the relation between political and economy from a critical perspective. According to neo-Marxism, mainstream theories are problematic in the sense that they are incapable of examining the state-market relation together with the role of the state and its coercive apparatus in the capitalist order. Thus, the third chapter of this thesis first focuses on the general framework of neo-Marxist theory. Second, it examines the neo-Marxist conception of the politics-economics relationship. Third, it analyzes in detail the neo-Marxist understanding of the role played by the state's apparatus of coercion in capital accumulation both at national and transnational level. Finally, the chapter sums up the main points emphasized by neo-Marxism within political economy framework by proposing neo-Marxism as an alternative approach to the increasing role played by non-state security actors.

3.1- Neo-Marxism as a General Political Economy Framework

Although neo-Marxism entails a variety of different schools of thought, there are common core arguments agreed on the political economy framework by neo-Marxists at both national and international level¹. In that respect, the neo-Marxist point of view to political economy enables a critical understanding of modes of production. Neo-Marxism provides that political and social factors establish the relations of production and the mode of production is not opposed to

¹ Neo-Marxism includes different Marxist theories- such as structural Marxism, World system theory, dependency theory, neo-Gramscianism- which reject economic and/or class determinism and which commonly propose a critical political economy analysis.

social factors. Each mode of production has specific relations of production, which provides the system its specific logic. Therefore, as it is argued by Wood (1995: 25):

Neo-Marxism presents relations of production in their political aspect, that aspect in which they are actually contested, as relations of domination... as the power to organize and govern production and appropriation... the object of this theoretical stance is practical, to illuminate the terrain of struggle by viewing modes of production not as abstract structures but as they actually confront people who must act in relation to them.

The political economy argument of neo-Marxism begins with materialism. Accordingly, although human beings work within certain material limits involving physical and ecological factors, the material world is not a natural given (Wood, 1995: 26). It is a mode of productive activity, a system of social relations and a historical product (Wood, 1995: 26). Social relations include human interactions in constituting the features of life. It is a historical understanding which accepts that the products of social relations of human beings become material forces and are not natural givens (Wood, 1995: 26).

Another common issue discussed by neo-Marxism is about class conflict. In neo-Marxist analysis, class has the main role and the capitalist society is based on the class conflict between the capitalist and the proletariat. Class relations of capitalism are based on exploitation of workers who are forced to sell their labour to the capitalist class in order to survive. Accordingly, the main dynamic of social relations according to neo-Marxism is the tension between the means of production and the relations of production. Since the capitalist class owns the means of

production and controls the relations of production, they also control the profits that arise from the labour of workers (Jones and Hobden, 2008: 230).

When the way neo-Marxist approaches consider capitalism is considered, it is seen that neo-Marxism suggests that capitalism is a system based on the commodification and alienation of labour. In that sense, capitalism presupposes the formation of a social atmosphere where capital and labour come together as buyers and sellers of commodities (Rupert, 1993). Accordingly, neo-Marxism is based on the idea that the creation of capitalism included the historical formation of a ‘private’ space where economic interests are fulfilled by the individuals. The capitalist has the control of the production process and takes away the surplus created by labour. Therefore, the exploited is prevented from access to main resources while the exploiter appropriates the labour, and the product and the process of socially organized labour is integrated into the accumulation of capital (Rupert, 2010).

According to neo-Marxism, capitalism is not purely “national” issue because the private social power of capital has a global dimension (Rupert, 2010). Since it intensifies the capitalist mode of production, industrial capital at the global level is transformative in terms of social production. Hence, although there are different certain motives driving capitalism towards imperialism such as the search for raw materials, search for new markets for overproduction, capitalist countries have the aim of fulfilling the requirements of the capital accumulation for the international expansion of capital (Rupert, 2010:164). In such a world there is an ‘inter-imperialist’ rivalry between countries as the source of conflict. At transnational

level, capitalist powerful states need other states having different economic system for its survival. In today's world, globalization is related with exploitation of subordinate economies by imperial capital. Since nation-states are controlled by transnational capitalist forces, they have a tendency to serve the interests of global accumulation.

3.2- Neo-Marxist Conceptions of the Politics-Economics Relationship

There has been a tendency on the part of political economy theories to reinforce the firm conceptual separation of the economic and the political which has served to capitalist ideology since the classical economists considered 'the economy' as being abstracted from political content (Wood, 1995: 19). From a neo-Marxist point of view, this differentiation is both a theoretical and practical problem since political issues such as the character of power to control the production and appropriation process have been isolated from the political sphere and stayed in the economic sphere.

The separation of the state from the market includes some functions embraced by the state for the development of capitalism. Therefore, the state appears as imposing "general formal freedom and equality" which actually implies "the perpetuation of the slavery of labour". The role of the state in maintaining the relations of production is very significant, because it is considered as being "neutral" and protecting juridical freedom, and the equality of free exchange between expropriated and appropriators.

The capitalist state reflects the political and the economic as being two extraneous spheres and it is a reification of social relations in capitalist production process. According to that perspective, since there is an exclusive relation of the state and the market, it needs to be regulated by the capitalist state. In that sense, Clarke (1991:34) suggests that “the separation of the economic and the political cannot be seen as a given structural feature of the capitalist mode of production, nor can the form of that separation and the boundaries between the two be seen as a constant feature of the capitalist mode of production”. Hence, the separation of the state and the market might not mean the separation of the moment of direct appropriation from the moment of extra-economic coercion. The rule of capital requires the capitalist state, which is based on the capitalist class domination and is also the point of concentration of power in society (Wood, 1995: 39).

In that respect, as opposed to the mainstream approach of separation of political and economics, critical political economy perspective analyzes the relation between state and market. It suggests that capital cannot exist without the state. Neo-Marxism presents the world in its political aspect and the critique of political economy aims to show the political face of the economy, which was obscured by classical political economists (Wood, 1995: 20). Neo-Marxism argues that the political sphere in capitalist mode of production has a distinct character since the absolute private property, the contractual relation between producer-appropriator, the process of commodity exchange necessitate the legal and political forms of the state (Wood, 1995: 30). Hence, private property rights, contract rights, laws and the legal apparatus of the state maintain the political and juridical necessities of

capitalist mode of production and they establish the relation based on authority and domination between the producer and the appropriator (Wood, 1995:30). The state is considered as a part of a form of exploitation which preserves living labour and reproduction of labour.

Clarke (1992) suggests that the progressive feature of the capitalist mode of production in the forces of production is based on the identification of the interest of the capitalist class with those of society. Hence, the interests of the capitalist class is represented in the form of a “national interest” for the material continuation of society and of the state, behind which there exists the dominance of capital and the capitalist (Clarke, 1992: 135). The capitalist does this identification through the state and the political triumph (Clarke, 1992: 135). In that respect, besides the direct representation of the capitalist acting as ‘technical’, ‘managerial’ advisers, their political representatives create policies based on securing the expanded reproduction of capital.

3.3- Neo-Marxist Understanding of the Relation Between State Coercion and Capital

The political sphere in capitalism has a special character since coercion or political repression is a significant tool of the state for the (re)production of capitalist relations of production (Wood, 1995: 29). As it is argued by Agnoli (1986), the state is a form of the concentration of the coercive character of owners with the appearance of being independent from them (cited in Bonefeld, 1992: 117). Marx (1969: 33) argues that state is reflected in terms of labor as a form of

oppression by 'perpetuation of the power of capital and the slavery of labour' (cited in Bonefeld, 1992: 119). With the use of force, the state aims to prevent social emancipation as opposed to capitalist domination (Bonefeld, 1992: 120). Hence, it can be said that the state exists as the political concentration of social normalization of social conflict in the form of protecting the rights through coercion in the society (Bonefeld, 1992: 118).

When Wood's conceptualization of the state in capitalist relations of production is considered, she suggests that different from the feudal type of production, capitalist production is based on appropriation of labour through economic mechanism of commodity exchange (Wood, 1995:22). Unlike capitalist mode of production, within feudalism, the power of the feudal lord to direct production had a significant role during the production process. While in feudalism there was a direct expression of economic coercion, in the capitalist state, capitalist market coercion is reexpressed in the state only in a hidden and alienated manner, not in a direct manner (Wood, 1995: 34). In that respect, it can be argued that extraeconomic coercion is alienated from coercion in the market. As it is argued by Bieler and Morton (2003: 471-472):

In contrast to pre-capitalist forms, characterised by the extra-economic direct political enforcement of exploitation and surplus extraction, surplus appropriation and exploitation within capitalism is indirectly conducted through a contractual relation between those who maintain the power of appropriation, as owners of the means of production, over those who only have their labour to sell, as expropriated producers. Capitalist exploitation is therefore conducted within the 'private' economic realm of civil society between appropriators and expropriated, capital and labour, which is presented as separate from the 'public' sphere linked to the coercive political realm of the state. Nevertheless the latter ultimately secures such processes through the guarantee of private property, the contractual relationship between employer and employee and the

process of commodity exchange (Burnham 1995, 145). Hence, the political dimension is intrinsic to capitalist relations of production.

It is a fact that at the abstract level, the process of production within capitalism does not require the state to be involved with its repressive apparatuses in order to be secure. The reason of why there is no direct state coercion in production process is because of the fact that the labour sells its own labour power eagerly as a commodity. Wood (1995:29) suggests that capitalist relations of production seem as if [d]irect ‘extra-economic’ coercion and visible coercion are, in principle, not really necessary to force the expropriated labourer to give up surplus labour. This signifies the process in which the imperatives of the market and the impersonal rule of the market protect the production process. However, Wood (1992:23) emphasizes that to speak of the economic mechanism of commodity exchange does not mean that the state coercion is somehow extraneous to capitalist relations of production. Although the capitalist mode of production is based on economic means of commodity exchange, Wood states that there is a necessity of coercive force in the ‘political’ sphere in order to secure private property and the power of appropriation.

In that respect, the state has an important role regarding the capitalist appropriation of labour and capital accumulation. The political sphere in capitalism has a significant feature since the coercive power supports the capitalist class and this power is not fulfilled by the appropriators of the surplus, but through political means. Although the ‘moment’ of appropriation is different from the ‘moment’ of coercive power, the latter has a significant role in this exploitive relation (Wood, 1995: 29). Therefore, the political power of capital usually exists in the background,

and coercive force of class domination appears in the mask of an ‘autonomous’ and ‘neutral’ state through functioning in the interest of the capitalist class by punishing resisters and forcing people to adopt the capitalist world view.

Accordingly, the state is considered as the coercive character of the capitalist society in terms of both historical premise and result. Historically, there is a link between the necessity of deployment of political repression and the rise and spread of capitalism at both the national and global level. Hence, it is not possible to see the state during fascism as ‘exceptional’ (Poulantzas, 1974). Moreover, the increase in the authority of the state during the crisis of Fordism does not imply a new period in capitalist relations (Hirsch, 1978). Bonefeld (1992:120) also suggests that the coercive form of the state exists as the result of the social reproduction of class antagonism. The existence of the state as the ‘concentrated and organized force of society’ involves the political attempt to protect and continue the control over labor (Marx, 1983: 703). The coercive character of the state and its historically concrete role vis-à-vis the social implies the constitution of the historical presupposition of the state as premise of the social conflict (Clarke, 1992: 134). Hence, it is significant to emphasize the role of extra-economic coercion, which is mediated through the exercise of state power, in securing the different preconditions for an accumulation strategy in capitalist production (Jessop, 1991:146). From a neo-Marxist point of view, capital accumulation is based on a continuing process of violent expropriation. Marx described primitive accumulation as an ongoing process of violent expropriation carried out by capitalist classes with the aim of imposing capitalist relations of production.

Similarly, when Althusser's (1971: 128) arguments about the theory of the state are considered, he emphasizes the two types of state apparatuses: 'repressive state apparatus' and 'the ideological state apparatus', and argues that the reproduction of the social relations of production is based on both apparatuses. According to Althusser (1971), the ideological state apparatus consists of religion, education and family culture. Moreover, while the larger part of the Ideological State Apparatuses (in their apparent dispersion) belong to the private domain, the unified – (Repressive) State Apparatus is part of the public domain. Althusser (1971) suggests that the main difference between the ideological state apparatus and the repressive state apparatus is about the fact that whereas the former functions with 'ideology', the latter functions with 'violence'. However, he also notifies that "There is no such thing as a purely ideological or repressive apparatus" (Althusser, 1971: 93).

Regarding the coercive apparatus of the state, Althusser (1971) states that the domination of the ruling class over the working class is secured through the repressive apparatus of the state which includes the police, prisons, the army and the government. Accordingly, the repressive state apparatus constitutes the basic function of the state as a force of repressive execution and intervention 'in the interests of the ruling classes' in the class struggle conducted by the bourgeoisie and its allies against the proletariat (Althusser, 1971). Hence, the role of the coercive state apparatus also aims to secure the political conditions of the reproduction of capitalist relations of production (Althusser, 1971).

In that respect, the repressive state apparatus both contributes to its own continuity and to the political atmosphere for the production of the ideological state apparatuses. (Althusser, 1971). Although he emphasizes the role of the ideological apparatus of the state in the capitalist relations of production, he states that the last resort of the ideological apparatus is always coercion. Briefly, he suggests that the combined influences of the repressive state apparatus and the ideological state apparatus constitute the atmosphere for the reproduction of social relations of production and capital accumulation (Althusser, 1971: 148). Hence, the capitalist state is conceptualized as the concentration of coercion that is present within a capitalist society.

Neo-Marxist approach to political economy includes different theories such as structural Marxism, imperialism, world system theory and dependency theories concerning the study of national and international level. Similarly, another neo-Marxist approach, neo-Gramscianism, relying on the historical materialist perspective of social transformation, proposes a critical understanding for the state and market relationship. Neo-Gramscianism “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox 1981: 129). In that sense, neo-Gramscian approach to political economy emerged as a significant break from mainstream theories of politics through Cox’s work in 1980s (Bieler and Morton, 2004: 85).

Thus, instead of reifying the state and the interstate system, neo-Gramscian perspective analyzes the nature of the state regarding the complexity of state—civil

society relations. Moreover, it explains “how the nature of state power is related to the strength of the dynamic synthesis between the key forces in the economy and society, operating politically on an inclusive basis” (Gill, 1993: 39).

Neo-Gramscianism underlines the role of the coercion for the establishment and continuation of hegemony. Regarding neo-Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony, the state remained as the main entity where social conflict happens (Cox, 1993: 58). As it is stated by Bieler and Morton (2004: 91), reflection and justification of specific interests of particular groups as general interests is the basis for the establishment of hegemony through both state coercion and consent in world politics. Similarly, Cox (1994: 366) also argues in “Hegemony and Social Change” that

...hegemony is a form in which dominance is obscured by achieving an appearance of acquiescence . . . as if it were the natural order of things . . . it is an internalized coherence which has most probably arisen from an externally imposed order but has been transformed into an intersubjectively constituted reality.

Therefore, the neo-Gramscian approach has an intersubjective understanding of reality. Accordingly, Cox (1997) argues that it is not possible to reach the ‘reality’ only through the material environment of human action; actually, through affecting thoughts and actions, the institutional, moral and ideational atmosphere are significant to reach the ‘reality’ (cited in Bieler & Morton, 2004: 89). Similarly Augelli and Murphy (1993: 130) in their chapter ‘Gramsci and International Relations’ apply Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony and suggest that in order to achieve ‘hegemony’, a social group should exercise “a function of political and moral direction in society”. Thus, according to a neo-Gramscian understanding

of hegemony, it is necessary to be aware of how hegemony is established through influencing ideas and actions by means of institutional and moral environment. Hence, coercion and consent are the main aspects of constituting and maintaining the hegemony of capitalist class rule.

Although the neo-Gramscian perspective emphasizes the significance of the existence of consent for the establishment of hegemony, it does not deny the important role of the coercive apparatus of the state for the constitution and the continuity of hegemony. The political repression is crucial to sustain the appearance of capitalist globalization in the sense that there is no option and it is necessary to adopt the world as it reflects itself.

Neo-Gramscian critical understanding of state and hegemony in its theory of politics is also based on the existence of a historical bloc consisting of the alliance of different social forces represented by classes through the presence of hegemony (Sassoon, 1987: 123). In that respect, bourgeois constitutes a hegemonic culture with state and civil society by showing its own interests as universal.

Accordingly, it is necessary to indicate that “a historical bloc exercises hegemony through the coercive apparatus and bureaucratic authority of the state, dominance in the economic area, and the consensual legitimacy of civil society” (Levy and Egan, 2003: 806). The deployment of political repression constitutes the mass public’s expectation and there appears a hegemonic “common sense” that opposition is vain, criminal or not acceptable (Rupert, 2003). Therefore, the

employment of political force has the role of restraining counter-hegemonic agendas opposed to capitalist relations of production at both the local and global level.

Hence, for an emergent ruling class which aims to constitute an historical bloc, the development of different tools of legitimation and securing a social base in part through state coercion becomes necessary. This necessity is fulfilled by “the combination of the consensual integration through material reward for some, and the coercive exclusion of others that the system is unwilling or unable to co-opt” (Robinson, 2005: 570). In that respect, the ruling class feels the need to give up getting consent and start to use the coercive apparatus of the state. Therefore, in such kind of situation, the problem of social control becomes significant and the coercive apparatus of the state plays a salient role over consent (Robinson, 2005: 570).

In a situation of the crisis of legitimacy, authority, and hegemony, people around the world start to question the system (Robinson, 2005: 570), and in order to get democratic control over the means of production, working class struggle occurs and the resistance perpetuates through questioning the ‘boundaries of the economic and political’ (Bonefeld, 2006: 249). In such crisis times, the so-called constitutional government requires to overcome the crisis and restore the normal conditions through its repression apparatus (Bonefeld, 2006: 249). As stated by Rüstow (1942), “the economic system requires coercion with strong state authority for its protection and maintainance” (cited in Bonefeld, 2006: 249). In that respect,

for the protection of the capitalist social relations, a more or less state coercion is required.

Although capitalism comes to its best point, it always requires extra-economic coercion beyond the nation-state level for the protection of economic coercion itself (Wood, 2003). Market compulsions are very significant for the maintenance of global capitalist system. But they also require extra-economic power at transnational level. Therefore, neither the enforcement of economic compulsions nor everyday social order necessitated by capital accumulation can be accomplished without the support of repressive apparatus beyond nation state (Wood, 2003).

Similar to the coercive force at the nation-state level, state coercion at the transnational level is not reflected directly between subordinate and imperial states, but exists indirectly through protecting the system of economic imperatives. It is certain that the dominant states in the world order cannot improve and protect their economic power without the coercive state apparatus at the transnational level.

Luxemburg (1951), in her classic work “The Accumulation of Capital”, provides a Marxist analysis of capitalism and states that capitalism implies militarism and imperialism. Capitalist militarism has gone parallel with the territorial conquest and, according to Luxemburg (1951: 454), it came to the final point as ‘a weapon in the competitive struggle between capitalist countries for areas of non-capitalist civilization’. She argues that one of the inconsistencies of

capitalism is that “although it strives to become universal, and indeed, on account of this its tendency, it must break down- because it is immanently capable of becoming a universal form of production” (Luxemburg, 1951: 467). Hence, capitalist powerful states need other states having different economic system for its survival, and in order to accomplish this, they also need the pre-capitalist apparatuses of military force, geopolitical coercion and territorial domination (Wood, 2003).

Regarding the role of state coercion at transnational-level, the colonial imperialism in history necessitated direct conquest through military power. Globalization can be considered as a new form of imperialism where capitalist accumulation at the global level requires extra-economic mainly military power. Hence, for the protection of capital accumulation within the system of multiple states, military power is the main insurance (Wood, 2003). The hegemonic state needs powerful military for having global economic domination.

Imperial hegemony is based on local states and global economic hegemony necessitates surveillance of many states in the global economy. By mainstream theories, globalization is reflected in free trade and openness in the world economy. However, from a critical political economy perspective, it is seen that globalization is more related with exploitation of subordinate economies by imperial capital, while the imperial economy is protected by state repression at the global level. In that sense, state military force at the transnational level is always latent. As was the case with state repression at nation-state level, at the transnational level powerful states launch military actions against other states, and this is presented as if it is

operating not for imperial purposes but neutrally for the interests of an ‘international community’ (Wood, 2003: 5).

Different from arguments made by mainstream theories, neo-Marxism argues that the role of the nation state in world politics does not decline as a result of globalization. On the contrary, the state exists in the main part of globalization and it has the coercive role at transnational level for protecting the conditions of global capital accumulation. In that respect, in the international arena the role of the state is also significant. Imperial relations between states through globalization necessitate many nation states for the implementation of coercive functions.

Accordingly, considering globalization as the loss of power of the state prevents us to understand capitalist relations at the transnational level. As Wood (2003) states military force of the state is very significant in terms of the expression of ideology of war. Imperial capital requires permanent option of war in order to maintain its hegemony at the transnational level because in some cases, military force becomes mere choice for states to maintain capitalist accumulation.

For the (re)production of the capitalism at transnational level, the relation between coercion at the transnational level, the capitalist mode of production and the transnational capitalist class (TCC), composed of “the transnational corporations and financial institutions, the elites that manage supranational economic planning agencies, major forces in the dominant political parties, technocratic elites and state managers in both North and South, is also very important (Robinson and Harris,

2000:11-12). In that respect, the arguments of Sklair (2001) regarding the significance of transnational capitalist class and of Robinson (2007) which emphasizes the importance of state and its coercive role at transnational level, show that TCC has existed since 1970s in order to improve capitalist globalization.

Similar to capital accumulation at nation-state level, the repressive transnational state apparatus is also very significant for the protection of capitalist accumulation and the power of TCC at transnational level. Power in social relations of production results in the rise of certain social forces and these social forces grow into powerful sources within states and this forms world order (Bieler and Morton, 2004:89). From a neo-Marxist point of view, historically different social relations of production result in a global, economic and social order that is beneficial to those who have the power, the TCC. Therefore, states include class relations and political institutions; and at the global level TCC relations occur and transnational repressive apparatuses are formed by nation-states. In that respect, the nation state is being turned and gradually engaged functionally into a larger transnational institutional structure that includes complex new relations both between nation states and supra or transnational institutions, and different classes and social forces (Robinson, 2007: 17).

Repression of the counter-hegemonic movements shows the need for the TCC to both constitute consent for its project and deploy coercion when necessary. As it is stated by Cox (1994: 52), "To the extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the front, hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal and deviant cases. Hegemony is enough to ensure conformity of behavior

in most of the people most of the time”. In the current era, for the presence of the political and economic principles of capitalism at the transnational level, transnational repressive apparatus is necessary which operates in the interests of the transnational capitalist class (Robinson, 2007).

Since nation-states are controlled by transnational capitalist forces, they have a tendency to serve the interests of global accumulation. In that sense, the state through the use of transnational coercive apparatus, has played a significant role in imposing the neo-liberal model on the old Third World and therefore in strengthening the class relations of global capitalism (Robinson, 2007: 18). Accordingly, the example of the US imperialism can be considered as the use by transnational elites within US state apparatus in order to maintain and improve the global capital accumulation (Robinson, 2007: 19). Intervention through coercive transnational state apparatus serves the aim of constituting conditions favorable to the condensation of transnational capital and the renewed integration of the intervened region into the global system and opening up its labor and resources to the capitalists in the world (Robinson, 2007).

3.4- Conclusion

The chapter has first discussed neo-Marxism as a general political economy framework and underlined the common characteristics of neo-Marxist approaches of political economy. Second, it has argued that as opposed to the mainstream understanding of the separation of economic and political, neo-Marxism provides that the state has a significant role in terms of having political domination for the

process of surplus value production. Third, the chapter has presented the neo-Marxist theory in terms of the role of the state in using coercion or political repression for the (re)production of capitalist relations of production both at national and international level.

In the light of all the neo-Marxist arguments mentioned above, neo-Marxist point of view to political economy enables a critical understanding of capitalism as an historically specific way of organizing social life which includes economic relation and practices. Moreover, neo-Marxism provides the understanding of property and class relation, as well as the functions of surplus appropriation in capitalist mode of production. Therefore, the thesis will use neo-Marxist approach in terms of state-market-security nexus in order to make sense of the increasing role played by non-state actors in security provision at both the national and international level.

CHAPTER 4

NEO-MARXIST ANALYSIS OF THE INCREASING ROLE PLAYED BY NON-STATE SECURITY ACTORS

In this chapter, the increasing role played by non-state security actors will be analyzed from a neo-Marxist critical political economy point of view. On this basis, the expansion in the role played by private actors in the security field is one of the consequences of neo-liberal policies being introduced across the world. Hence, it is very important to analyze the relationship between privatization of security and capital accumulation from a neo-Marxist point of view at both local and global level. One of the aspects of the contribution of private security to capital accumulation is related to the commodification of security. Another point is that commercialization of security is integral to the capital accumulation since it protects the bourgeois class and capital both at the local and global level. In that respect, on the one hand, there is a “marketization of security” in which security is acquired through commodification which expands capital accumulation; on the other hand, there is “securitization of capital”, in which local and global capital accumulation is expansively being protected in the name of security (Neocleous, 2008: 148).

Although the relationship between private security and capital accumulation is very important from neo-Marxist point of view, it is necessary to analyze the implications of the growing role of private security for the role of the state. In accordance with the theoretical discussion in the previous chapter, the analysis will show that there is nothing to indicate that the role of the state in the field of security is being undermined by the private provision of security. Therefore, from neo-Marxist perspective, this chapter will make a historical and theoretical analysis of state-security-market relationship in the sense that although there is an increase in the role played by non-state security actors, capitalist relations of production needs the coercive power of the state.

This chapter is composed of four sub-sections. In the first sub-section, the relationship between neoliberalism and privatization of security as commodification is analysed. The importance of how security is commodified as a result of neoliberalism and its contribution to the capitalist accumulation is discussed. In the second sub-section, the increasing role played by non-state security actors is presented in terms of the protection of capital accumulation at local and global level. In this section, the position of PSCs in Western countries is emphasized in the sense that they protect the capitalist class and reflect the subordinate classes as a threat to capitalist accumulation. Non-state security actors in developing countries (Africa) are also examined and their role in securing resource extraction for the maintenance of global capital accumulation is discussed. In the third sub-section, historical analysis of private security against the background of state's role in security field is made. In this sub-section, the presence and operations of non-state security actors vis-à-vis their institutionalization by state through legalization is

historically discussed. In the last sub-section, privatization of security and the role of state in security field in contemporary era is discussed. The relationship between PSCs and the state in African and Western countries is examined in the sense that the state role in the security field is not abolished vis-à-vis PSCs.

4.1- Privatization of Security as Commodification

Neoliberalism is a hegemonic ideology which has spreading impacts on political economic practices that is based on bourgeois class dominance. According to Harvey (2005: 2), “neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”

As it is stated by Harvey (2007: 22), neoliberalism aims to restore class dominance to sectors that considered their fortunes put in danger by the rise of social democracy after the Second World War. Hence, neoliberalism shifted “wealth from subordinate classes to dominant classes and from poorer to richer countries” (Harvey, 2007: 22). Neoliberal regime change occurred in Britain and US in the late 1970s and early 1980s which created the first growth of neoliberalism as a wide-ranging economic and political strategy (Jessop, 2002: 457). As a result of the collapse of Soviet bloc in 1989, the domination of western neoliberal forces and then, Western neoliberal forces and organizations with US and Britain’s leadership dominated in European countries (Jessop, 2002: 457).

As opposed to the generation of wealth, neoliberalism redistributes wealth and income through ‘accumulation by dispossession’ which involves commodification, privatization, shift of state owned property to private property (Harvey, 2005: 159). Neoliberalism as a hegemonic project promotes the interest of financial and transnational capital (Jessop, 2002: 455). The proponents of the neoliberal ideology have been in educational institutions, in many ‘think tanks’, in the media, financial institutions, important state institutions (treasury departments, central banks), and also those international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) which regulate global economy (Harvey, 2005: 3). Therefore, neoliberalism has had spreading influence on people’s thought and understanding of the world (Harvey, 2005: 3).

Through commodification and privatization, neoliberalism restructures the circumstances for capital accumulation. The main economic target of neoliberalism has been creating new areas for capital accumulation for profit maximization and it includes privatization of public services such as education, health, transportation and security. Neoliberalism supports market-oriented economic and social reforms. In the public sector, this includes “privatization, liberalization, and imposition of commercial criteria in the residual state sector; in the private sector, deregulation is backed by a new juridicopolitical framework that offers passive support for market solutions.” (Jessop, 2002: 461).

that respect, the neoliberal agenda of state privatization is an economic and political program which endorses deregulation, free market, privatization of state-owned enterprises and state-provided services (Jessop, 2002: 454). As it is stated by Harvey (2005), normalization of inequality between classes has been one of the significant consequences of neoliberalism. Hence, many shifts related to neoliberalism was represented as inevitable and given.

In this regard, the growing dominance of neoliberal economic ideas and policies enable the social power and globalization of private property and capital (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007: 6). Moreover, it results in the claim that those private actors have expertise on related issue and they are better than public actors in dealing with this particular issue.

The “market authority” of PSCs is related with the dominance of neoliberal ideas, and this authority is gathered by property rights and from the relationship between private security and the private property of its clients (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007: 6). The neoliberal changes have resulted in consideration of non-state security actors as market actors who offer a service, a commodity that can be bought and sold in the free market (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007: 6). Hence, security has now reflected a technique that necessitates specialization and a form of expert knowledge that exercised by non-state providers. As a consequence of these practices, hiring non-state security actors has become pervasive for individuals and organizations.

The commodification of security has opened up a new territory for private capital accumulation. Hence, in order to understand the increasing role played by non-state security actors, the critique of political economy for commodification of security is very significant. Tony Blair (1997) states that “security is life’s most precious commodity” (cited in Neocleous, 2008: 143). Since the need for security is not something clear, the creation of the ideology of insecurity is unlimited. There is a variety of commodified security which includes “insurance for life and insurance for death; firewalls in the home to firewalls in the computer;” surveillance cameras, personal monitors, motion detectors (Neocleous, 2008: 154). As it is argued by Marx and Engels (1975) “a social order which rests on the production of goods for exchange rather than the satisfaction of human need generates an everlasting uncertainty and constant agitation of all social conditions” (cited in Neocleous, 2008: 155). In that respect, there is a unity between capital and security. Privatization of security creates the security industry which produces and sells security as a commodity. Therefore, capital accumulation increases under the guise of security.

Security has to experience commodification and reification process for contributing to capital accumulation. At first sight, security is regarded as an unimportant object for human beings. However, as it is argued by Marx “as soon as it emerges as a commodity, it changes into a thing which transcends sensuousness” (cited in Neocleous, 2008: 153). Hence, the increasing role played by non-state security actors signifies commodified relations of production when security has become something bought and sold.

The main aim of the PSCs is to make profit which necessitates constituting insecurities in order to sell their commodity (security). In this regard, the increasing role played by non-state security actors results in the creation of feeling of threat which facilitates the penetration of understanding of security as a needed commodity. That need is reflected as something that can only be satisfied by a security commodity (Neocleous, 2008: 154). According to the existing literature on privatization of security presented in the second chapter, state has lost its power in the security field in the sense that the consideration of “only consumption can provide security” is created by the PSCs (Neocleous, 2008: 154). Hence, security is produced as a commodity which is reflected as a solution to the problem of insecurity by PSCs.

In that respect, the increasing role played by non-state security actors contributes to expansion of capital. Commodification of security is essential to an imagined economy of insecurity which is based on the variety of social and political fears (Neocleous, 2008: 159). Moreover, the capitalist society is fed by this feeling of insecurity and dependent on the idea that more consumption and commodification are necessary for the protection against insecurities (Neocleous, 2008: 159). Therefore, increasing role played by non-state security actors implies commodification of security which is essential for capital accumulation.

4.2- Privatization of Security in the Service of Capital Accumulation

Besides the contribution to the capitalist accumulation through commodification, the increasing role played by non-state security actors implies

operation of private security actors directly in the service of capitalists or practices of capital accumulation at both local and global level. Therefore, the role of private security actors indicates securitization of capital. In this regard, it is significant to analyze the role of the PSCs regarding the relation between marketization of security and capital accumulation in developed Western countries at local level and underdeveloped African countries at global level.

The main aim of private security actors in Western countries is to provide security for capitalist class as opposed to the working class. Therefore, it signifies an expansion of the bourgeois class's coercive apparatus vis-à-vis the working class. Accordingly, not everything and everyone are provided security by PSCs and who is protected by private security services has been bourgeois population and its private property. Hence, PSCs offer variety of security solutions to individual security threats of capitalist class for the protection of capitalist order. In this regard, the increasing role played by non-state security actors should be understood within the context of private property and in relation to class struggles. For example, non-state security actors have role in impeding intrusion on private property, surveillance of merchandise, money, bonds, stocks, notes, valuable documents or papers (Born, Caparini and Cole, 2007: 3). In that respect, protection of cash in transit is one of the significant roles of PSCs.

Through fulfilling the role of crime prevention and repression of the resistance by working class, private security actors also contributes to the capital accumulation by impeding the "threats" coming from the working class to destroy the bourgeois capitalist order including private property. Hence, private security

actors protect the capital and labour relations for the (re)production of capitalist relations of production and prevents any threats that may damage the capitalist order. In that respect, non-state security actors have a significant role in the security of private property and in the repression of the working class at the local level with the aim of expansion of capital accumulation.

The repression by private security actors is crucial to protect capitalist production facilities by making the subordinate to believe that there is no alternative and it is necessary to accept the world as it reflects itself. In other words, through coercion questioning and rebelling against the capitalist system is tried to be prevented. Accordingly, the employment of the private security force has the role of restraining counter hegemonic agendas opposed to capitalist relations of production. In crisis times when the working class questions the existing capitalist order, the capitalists use PSCs for the protection of the social relations of production.

Contrary to the arguments for democratic society based on liberal ideology, capitalist policies results in a social form which is based on inequalities among citizens. Capitalist relations of production have aimed at the subordination of social relations of production into the simple mechanisms of the market which strengthens inequalities in the society. Therefore, these inequalities are required to be managed by repression and non-state security actors are utilized for that purpose which may pose challenge to disrupt the hegemony of the capitalist relations of production.

Besides the fact that the poor segment of the population is left insecure both socially and economically by the neoliberal market friendly policies, through privatization of security, they are reflected as a threat who have the potential to destroy the capitalist relations of production. The increasing roles played by non-state security actors are so significant for the protection of capital accumulation that private security contributes to the creation of commercial places in which an exclusive capitalist order is reinforced (exclusion for those who are unable to purchase that security commodity).

Privately secured segments or places in Europe serve as a means of protection of capital accumulation and capitalist class locally. Bourgeois purchases security services to build protected places which create barrier with unprotected working class. Hence, the increasing role played by non-state security actors gives rise to exclusion of non-consuming working class. Accordingly, while private security is available for the ones who can afford to pay for getting the security service, the poor people are left insecure and treated as a threat to capitalist order. Hence, private security exists too closely with neoliberal policies which seek to exclude the ones other than the bourgeois society through the expansion of capital accumulation.

In Western countries, capitalist private places such as airports, shopping malls, business complexes and the cash dispenser or ATM (automatic teller machine) are very common and their protection is provided by PSCs locally which mainly secure capital accumulation. Moreover, across the developed Western countries, non-state security actors have the role in operating detention centres for

asylum-seekers, migrants and refugees (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011: 53) which are seen as a threat to capitalist society. Furthermore, the installation of monitoring cameras, security lights, car and house alarms have become an essential feature for security considerations of Western countries.

In approximately all European states, non-state security actors protect “sites and buildings, including nuclear plants (e.g., in Germany and Romania), military installations (e.g., Austria, Estonia and Germany), airports (e.g., Austria, Germany, Romania, the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, Greece, France, and Albania), ports (e.g., Albania, Bulgaria, and the Netherlands) and Parliaments (e.g., Bulgaria and Romania)” (Born, Caparini and Cole, 2007: 17). The operations of private security actors also contain setting up and maintaining alarm response services and video surveillance (CCTV), protection of cash in transit (Born, Caparini and Cole, 2007: 17).

When statistical breakdown of the activities, in which non-state security actors are involved, are considered, according to the data gathered by Confederation of European Security Services (COESS, 2011), yearly turnover (2010) of the private security industry in Austria, Belgium, France and Germany is composed of areas such as general guarding, airport security, Cash in Transit, maritime security, monitoring and remote surveillance (see Table:1)

In that respect, the increasing role played by non-state security actors signifies the empowerment of the capitalist class against the working class since

PSCs create an instrument to protect both the capitalist class and the capitalist relations of production against the pressure or resistance coming from the working class. Working class opposes such kind of neoliberal policies and PSCs have a significant role in suppressing such kind of oppositions.

Table 1: Yearly Turnover (2010) of The Private Security in European Countries

Austria	€ 350 million	General guarding: € 281 million Airport security : € 35 million Cash In Transit : € 30 million Monitoring and remote surveillance: € 4 million
Belgium	€ 640 million	General guarding: € 281 million Airport security : € 35 million Maritime security : € 11.8 million Cash In Transit : € 30 million Monitoring and remote surveillance: € 4 million Other segments : € 11.2 million
France	€ 5.29 billion	General guarding : € 3.67 billion Airport security : € 365 million Cash-In-Transit (CIT) : € 5 million Monitoring and remote surveillance:€590 million other segments are € 90 million
Germany	€ 4.39 billion	General guarding : € 2.85 billion Cash-In-Transit (CIT) : € 439 million Monitoring and remote surveillance:€219 million Other segments: € 239 million

Source: Confederation of European Security Services Private Security Services in Europe: CoESS Facts & Figures. Belgium

Therefore, whereas privately provided security offers security for the few, it results in a persistent general state of insecurity for the majority. Accordingly, it is true that privatization of security proposes a barrier between the bourgeois class and the working class locally in European countries with the aim of expansion of capitalist accumulation. .

When the increasing role played by non-state security actors is considered in underdeveloped countries from a neo-Marxist perspective, it can be argued that PSCs are integral to the expansion of capital accumulation and the strengthening of the power of the transnational capitalist class at the global level. African continent provides an excellent place for examining the relationship between commercial security and global capital expansion. .

Neo-Marxist framework of the increasing role played by non-state security actors provide the analysis of the growth of capitalist accumulation at global level. Regarding resource extraction from African countries, extraction companies must stay where the resource is found and this necessitates the protection of these resources within their countries. Persistence of global capital accumulation includes generating security environments that protect its services and non-state security actors have the significant role in these operations.

Those resource rich areas in underdeveloped countries, protected by PSCs, are significant for the benefit of transnational capitalist class. The imperial governing in African states is based on private security forces. Since the oil

extraction from these territories are done by transnational corporations — owned by transnational capitalist class —, PSCs are needed for the protection of these areas which are dominated by unrest and conflict. The unrest in the majority of the African states comes from the economic marginality of citizens and unresponsive states. Moreover, citizens are also against the resource extraction by transnational corporations and they protest against these corporations (Shearer, 1998). Hence, since the global capital accumulation necessitates the secure environment where the resources are extracted safely, the role of the private security actors for the oppression of the resistance coming from marginalized citizens is very significant.

Accordingly, these PSCs do not really aim to secure the society, but they want to secure the areas of the strategic mineral fields which are essential for the expansion of global capitalist accumulation. In this regard, the operation of these non-state security actors in mineral rich underdeveloped countries is called as ‘exploitation of violence for private gain’ (Shearer, 1998: 9).

In African continent, Nigeria is home to approximately 2.000 PSCs and in Kenya some 2.000 companies have about 48.000 people (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011: 21). These are mainly private military companies and their role is not only based on fighting. They have also role of training African continent’s military forces for the protection of oil industry. Hence, African security market has grown very fast globally and this quick expansion attracted the interest of transnational PSCs which look for profit maximization (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011: 96). In that respect, private military companies play a significant role in terms

of providing security for the collapsing, but mineral and oil rich developing countries (Francis, 1999).

Industrialized Western countries look for alternative high quality resources for the expansion of capital and African continent is very important in that field. For example, Nigeria is “the world’s fifteenth largest oil producer and its geographic proximity to Western markets adds a further strategic advantage” (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011: 127). The non-state security actors operating in these developing countries have the role of increasing international exploitation of the mineral rich developing countries which contributes to the global capital accumulation and strengthens the transnational capitalist class (Musah, 2002). In that respect, the role played by private military companies “in search of strategic minerals represents the new face of neo-colonialism under the guise of neo-liberal market policies” (Francis, 1999: 319). These PSCs are owned by transnational capitalist class and they are hired by collapsing and mineral rich countries not just for cash, but for diamond and oil concessions (Francis, 1999: 322).

When the role of the private security actors in Iraq is considered, it is seen that PSCs increase the capital accumulation for transnational capitalist class. Through private security, new territories for capitalist accumulation have been invented, supplementing with primitive accumulation in a transnational neoliberal project that continues largely by “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003: 67). Privatization at global level as a consequence of the neoliberal policies, pursued by Western countries together with “war on terrorism” provides suitable atmosphere for transnational corporations (Weiss, 2007:1). After military operation

by United States and its allies, Paul Bremer who was interim governor of Baghdad appointed by US, stated that “Iraq is open for business” (Neocleous, 2008: 145). Hence, tariffs and duties on imports are lifted and the tax on corporate property are reduced which implies opening Iraqi economy to foreign corporations and reconstruction capitalist state (Weiss, 2007: 2). Moreover, since the reproduction of capitalist order by foreign corporations requires security, the turmoil surrounding U.S. occupation necessitates intensive security for entrepreneurs. In that respect, because PSCs have been required for the provision of security to transnational capitalist class, tens of thousands private security actors were employed for the provision of security in Iraq.

Accordingly, Western countries, especially US and United Kingdom have acted as new imperialists in Iraq case which aim to establish bourgeois constitutional state dependent on transnational capital. Therefore, weak states like Iraq are used by neoliberal globalization through tyranny of market (Harvey, 2003). Neoliberal capitalist relations of production penetrate violently and cause political resistance (Weiss, 2007: 8). Therefore, it necessitates policing society and U.S. occupation in Iraq has attracted over 126.000 private security actors (Weiss, 2007: 8). Accordingly, Western countries utilize PSCs to control any resistance movements in Iraq which may prevent capitalist accumulation.

In this regard, through military intervention, conditions favourable to the expansion of transnational capital and the integration of the intervened region into the global system are produced (Robinson, 2005: 569). When Iraq was announced as being “open for business”, capitalist economic model was introduced in Iraq and

‘development of private sector’ was presented for global capital accumulation (Neocleous, 2008: 147). \$5.8 billion was allocated by US to build Iraqi security and most of the money was used for the private security personnel and private security sector has had a very significant contribution to capitalist expansion. Hence, it shows the significance of private security for global capital accumulation (Neocleous, 2008: 148).

Accordingly, from a neo-Marxist framework, the relationship between marketization of security and capitalist expansion is very important to understand the increasing role played by non-state security actors. However, it does not mean that the role of the state in security field has totally diminished. Hence, although the increasing role played by non-state security actors contribute to capitalist accumulation through commodification of security and protecting capitalist relations of production both at the local and global level, state power in security field exists for the maintenance of capitalist relations of production. While considering the implications of increasing role played by private security actors, it can make sense to look at their position historically.

4.3- Historical Analysis of Private Security against the Background of State’s Role in the Security Field

An historical analysis of the non-state security actors in relation to the role played by coercive apparatus of the state is very significant for the understanding of the increasing role of private security actors from a neo-Marxist approach. Similar to today’s PSCs, the main goals of the use of private policing in 18th and 19th

centuries were based on securing the private property, repressing the uprising of the working class for the maintenance of the social order. Although there was the reality of the existence of non-state security actors during 18th and 19th century Europe, it is seen that the class biased and illegal activities of them damage the capitalist order. Hence, the regulation of these non-state security actors through institutionalization of the state was necessary for the (re)production of capitalist order.

When the security provision in Western countries is considered before the development of the modern police in 19th century, it is seen that during the 17th century, the growing bourgeoisie in England aimed to constitute private policing to protect their suppression of the working class. As it is stated by Swift (2007: 671), one of the illustrations of the non-state policing in England was the “additional constables” which was established in 1662 for the protection of propertied class. The mission of the constables was securing private property and providing security for safe industrial production throughout the period of crises (Swift, 2007: 671). Hence, this type of private security shows that the capitalist order was maintained both by public and private security actors. Before the 19th century, “there was no public police as we know them today, and investigation, arrest and prosecution were primarily the responsibility of the private individuals” (Allen and Barzel, 2009: 552). In that respect, before 19th century, in towns of England bourgeoisie class mainly relied on private policing for suppression of working class’s riots and protection of production process (Jones, 1982: 157).

However, the practices of non-state security actors posed a problem to the social relations of production, since different from security provided by state, private policing had the lack of legitimacy and neutrality. The private policing was based on bourgeois class's security demands. Class (bourgeoisie) biased and illegal practices of non-state security actors were subjected to opposition coming from working class. Hence, for the maintenance of capitalist order in England before the 19th century, there was a need to centralization of public police and limitation of the operations of private security actors through legalization by the state.

Accordingly, in the 18th century England, there were quasi-public offices that operates together with private security actors (Allen and Barzel, 2009: 552). During the second half of the 18th century, the implementation of legalization of the private policing started. For example, in 1777, Worsted Act constituted the legal basis for the private policing which provides security for the production process (Allen and Barzel, 2009: 552). Moreover, in 1760s, government paid to London magistrates from Treasury funds in order to inspect crimes (Allen and Barzel, 2009: 552). Public security actors were constituted step by step and as a last step in 1856 "the County and Borough Police Act" was implemented for the initiation of jurisdictions to be publicly policed (Allen and Barzel, 2009: 552). "By the end of the nineteenth century, the system of public police, courts, and prosecutors had become completely entrenched" (Allen and Barzel, 2009: 552). Therefore, the consolidation of private police in the legal ground was mainly significant that through this kind of acts class biased operations of private security was institutionalized which went parallel with the movement towards the constitution of public police.

The process of centralization of policing and establishment of Metropolitan state in England in 19th century also resulted in the decrease in the ratio of the non-state security actors in the 20th century. According to Williams (2008: 199), the percentage of the additional constables in relation to public security officers in England was 7.3% in 1920, 4.2% in 1939 and 0.7% in 1963.

In that respect, although there was not an entire disappearance of private security actors, there was a decrease, limitation and institutionalization of private security in the state structure since late 18th and 19th century (Williams, 2008: 194). The state administrators had known in the 19th century that unregulated, uninstitutionalized and class-biased nature of non-state security actors' practices created danger to the capitalist order. Hence, the institutionalization and legalization of the non-state security actors showed the necessity of the limitation of private security actors, establishment of modern bourgeois state and impartial coercion of the state for the establishment and maintenance of capitalist society in 19th century.

Accordingly, state officials foresaw the risk generated from insistent form of private security since non-state security actors implied the threat of "arming class against class" (Swift, 2007: 673) which would pose a threat to capitalist order. This kind of consideration caused capitalist state to institutionalize the private security actors through legalization.

Besides the role of the non-state security actors in European countries, practices of private security actors were also common for the protection of private

property and production process in the United States during the 19th and 20th centuries (Weiss, 1986: 87). The practices of private actors in security field in managing the industrial relations was very widespread and they protected mainly the capitalist relations of production (Monkkonen, 1992: 563).

Pinkerton Company was the first private security agency in United States which is established in 1850 (Nemeth, 2005: 9). Its main duty was the protection of the railroads of the Midwest. In July of 1892 there was a strike by workers at the Carnegie Steel Company in Homestead, Pennsylvania for protesting a proposed pay cut (Nemeth, 2005: 10) and it was tried to be suppressed by Pinkerton Agency. However, the result was a full of failure. Three Pinkerton officers and five steel workers were killed (Nemeth, 2005: 10). As a result of this incident, the image of private security was highly damaged that “in 1892 a House judiciary subcommittee initiated an investigation of Pinkerton in specific and private security in general” (Nemeth, 2005: 11).

Accordingly, after Pinkerton incident, there was a redefinition of the roles of non-state security actors and legal limitation was implemented for private security practices regarding the labor surveillance (Nemeth, 2005: 11). In that respect, this incident also illustrated that the illegal and class-biased activities of private security actors pose the risk of damaging the capitalist order. There is the necessity of the so called “impartial” state control on private security actors for the maintenance of capitalist order in 19th century.

When all of these arguments are considered, it is seen that a historical analysis of the non-state security actors in relation to the role played by coercive apparatus of the state is very significant for the understanding that there was a limit to the operations of non-state security actors for the maintenance of the capitalist order. The practices of the non-state security actors created a threat to the capitalist order historically both in Western countries and United States. In that respect, the problem posed by private security actors necessitated the legalization and scrutiny by state regarding the practices of non-state security actors since the “neutrality” of the state has been very important for the presence of capitalist relations of production.

The historical analysis of the non-state security actors shows that “impartial” state role in the security provision is very significant for the protection of class relations in the capitalist order since the private security on its own pose a challenge to bourgeois order. As it is emphasized in the third chapter, the apparent separation of political and economic, state and class have been the basis of the so called neutrality of the state in security field. The development of the modern police and centralization of policing practices in 19th century went hand in hand with the constitution of capitalist order. Working class uprisings were suppressed both by legalized private security actors and public police. Therefore, while analyzing the increasing role played by non-state security actors historically, it is seen that the so-called neutral role of the state for the protection of bourgeois order is very substantial in security field historically that it gets the consent of the subordinate class.

4.4- Privatization of Security and the Role of the State in the Security Field in the Contemporary Era

It is certain that there is a limit to marketization of security in capitalist society and it is also very significant to be aware of the fact that security field cannot be totally privatized since under the appearance of “neutrality”, coercive apparatus of the state is historically needed for the protection and reproduction of public order of capitalism and state’s interest. Moreover, the increasing role played by non-state security actors does not undermine the role of the state in security field. On the contrary, it can be argued to contribute to the authority of the state which implies penetration of state power into society.

When commodification of security is considered, in order to be able to sell their products, PSCs fetishize security. In that respect, commodification of security does not only contribute to capital accumulation. Through commodification, PSCs integrate the ideology of “fear” into society and this also feeds into the legitimacy of the state since state exploits this feeling of (in)security to cover the pro-market policies for the protection of capitalist order. Hence, it can be argued that there is a link between PSCs and the state for the maintenance and reproduction of capitalist society.

As it argued by Marx (cited in Neocleous, 2008: 30), “Security is the supreme concept of the bourgeois society.” In that respect, it is true that the concept of security has become a tactic for accumulation of capital through

commodification of security. However, in contrast to the arguments of loss of state power in the security field, the increasing roles played by non-state security actors imply the strengthening of security ideology in society so that state can implement capitalist policies with the proliferation of control in the civil society. Hence security fetishism keeps the power of both capital and state through nurturing the feeling of insecurity in the capitalist society.

Rather than weakening the role of the state in security field, marketization of security maintains the presence of state power through giving a way to fulfill some state functions for the protection of capitalist order. In that respect, as long as security has existed as a way to accumulation of capital, it has also strengthened the idea of security in capitalist society by reinforcing the power of the state in society.

Besides historical and theoretical analysis of the coercive role of the state, increasing role played by non-state security actors should also be considered in terms of the role of state in regulation of PSCs. Accordingly, commercialization of security does not eliminate the role of the state. Setting the emergence of non-state security actors as state's loss of power in security field is an inadequate analysis that considers security only in relation to the traditional institutions of the state, such as the police, military and paramilitary forces (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011). However, in order to understand the increasing role played by non-state security actors, it is very important to analyze the relationship between state, security and market.

As it is already argued above, the role of the PSCs in Africa is very important for the extraction of resources such as oil and diamond. Hence, the continent is supposed to be a secured place for mining for the benefit of transnational corporations. It is true that African states are weak in the sense that they have limited control over their territories (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011). However, the power of the state in security field is very significant and there is a high level of stateness in security. Although the non-state security actors have a significant role in resource extraction, they do not gather their power from the gun. Their legacy stems from being embedded in government legitimization (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007). Hence, the state regulates PSCs with the aim of preventing them from disturbing the capitalist order. Accordingly, capital accumulation cannot take place without the state, and this means that oil companies generally need state regulation of security companies.

For instance, Nigeria is one of the African countries where the operations of PSCs are very common for the prevention of persistent conflict. Hence, private security in Nigeria has a significant role in protecting both the resource extraction and the authority of the Federal Government whose authority depends on income from oil extraction (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011). Although there is an increasing role played by non-state security actors in Nigeria, the state power of regulation in the security field still dominates. One manifestation of the state power in Nigeria is that “although there is little direct regulation of sector, PSCs are prevented from carrying firearms by the Private Guard Companies Act (1986).” (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011). According to this regulation:

Article 17 “No person approved under the provision of this Act shall bear or possess any firearm or ammunition in the course of his duties.” (Private Guard Companies Act, 1986)

Similar to Nigeria, in Nairobi, which is one of the largest and most insecure cities of African continent, operations of private military companies for resource extraction is very common (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011: 34). However, through state regulation these PSCs are banned from using firearms. In Sierra Leone also, private security is not licensed for carriage of firearms of any sort (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011: 158).

Therefore, state has the ultimate legal authority and control over the exercise of coercion, particularly at the level of lethal force (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011). The PSCs cannot operate outside the purview of the state. Accordingly, non-state security actors function in a situation where the power of state remains central and the armed function of private security actors which may be a threat to capitalist society is banned by state regulation. Hence, as opposed to direct coercive operations, PSCs are allowed by the state to have role in training, surveillance and risk-management for public security actors in Nigeria (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011).

When the setting of private security in European countries is considered, it is true that although there is a significant increase in the role played by non-state security actors, the majority in the security provision still remains in the hands of governments in many European countries. According to data gathered from the Confederation of European Security Services in 2011, in countries such as Austria,

Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Netherlands, the ratio of public police force / population is higher than the ratio of private police force / population.

Furthermore, similar to African case, when the legal status of PSCs in European countries is considered, it is seen that the role of the state in regulating the PSCs is very important and some functions of PSCs — which may be a threat to the capitalist order — are not permitted by the state or highly previewed by the state. Hence, in European countries there is a strict regulation of non-state security actors by the states. There are limitations on the conditions necessary for the possession and on the type of weapon that can be carried (Born, Caparini and Cole, 2007). Accordingly, in Sweden and Finland firearms carriage by private security actors is permitted with special authorization by the state. Moreover, in countries such as Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland and United Kingdom the law regulating the private security industry does not allow armed private security services (CoESS, 2011). Hence, it is true that through state regulation, “private security is put in its place” for preventing it to threaten the capitalist relations of production.

European countries have implemented many regulations for the functioning of non-state security actors. For example, a law was enacted in some European countries which proposes that the total non-state security actors workforce cannot exceed 5% of the size of the public police (Born, Caparini and Cole, 2007: 20). As it is argued by Born, Caparini and Cole (2007:21):

In different EU states, a great variety of oversight institutions exercise oversight of PSCs. In some states, PSCs come under the control of (local) police (e.g., in Greece, Denmark, Slovakia and Hungary); in other states, local civil authorities are responsible for controlling the sector (e.g., Germany, Italy and Sweden); the ministry of the interior controls the PSC sector in Slovenia, Italy, Poland and the Netherlands; the ministry of justice is responsible for oversight in Luxembourg; and, in Ireland and the U.K., a special security authority was established to oversee the PSC sector. As mentioned previously, in the event that the PSC is a competitor of the police, a conflict of interest may arise when the police is tasked with the oversight of the PSC sector.

Accordingly, it is seen that although there is an increase in the use of private security actors, the role of the state in the security field has not diminished for the maintenance of capitalist mode of production. As it is argued by Samir Amin (2004) state is the “collective authority” of the capitalist class which is established by neoliberalism for the implementation of rules of the market and punishing the others who oppose them.

In capitalist system, oppositions that put capitalism in danger are supposed to be reduced by political repression of the state. Hence, policing is arranged by the state as a capitalist class reaction to anti-capitalism. In capitalist era, sustaining capital accumulation necessitates the coercion that will repress the counterhegemonic movements both at the national and international level.

In that respect, in 1999 the case of the Seattle WTO protests was very significant which showed one of the biggest mass protests against the domination of free market capitalism and multi-national corporations. The reaction to that protests by public police was very harsh. Protesters blockaded the WTO ministerial summit in Seattle and prevented its opening session.

When the profiles of the protestors are considered, it can be argued that the protestors in Seattle were made up from a different range of forces, including labour activists, environmentalists, human rights activists, religious groups and consumer interest groups. What united them all was a determination to stand up against the neo-liberal policies which aims the profit of multi-national capital represented by the WTO. Thus, the protests against the WTO have to be considered as a wider protest against the rule of international capital and the destruction that it brings.

The Seattle Police Department launched a brutal attack to suppress the protests. On the streets, the role of the police was to attack non-violent demonstrators and create a no-protest zone, turning downtown Seattle into a police state. Compared to the public police, the private security actors did not have the main role during the suppression of the WTO protests in Seattle. Hence, during one of the biggest mass protest in Western world against the capitalist system, the primary role for the use of coercive apparatus belonged to the state and its police department.

In addition to the Seattle protests, the role of the state police in Wall Street protests at the center of financial capitalism in 2011 was very significant regarding the role played by state in security field. New York Police Department (NYPD) suppressed brutally to the protestors of capitalism and income inequalities it brought. Police arrested 700 demonstrators in one day. The NYPD was acting as guard dogs of finance capital. Although private security actors were promoting

suppression through protecting wealthy from protests, the public police were at the hard core of the capitalist state in Wall Street protests.

In addition to the consideration of the actual role that states maintain in terms of the role of the public police suppressing counterhegemonic movements, it is significant to examine the importance of state military for the protection of capital accumulation. Accordingly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a relevant example for the examination.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which has mainly included public military actors of different countries in the world, was established in 1949. Today, although United States introduced Private Military Companies to support its military, US federal state has surveillance through law making on the private military companies regarding the social and political norms. Other NATO members do not really choose to use PMC since they think that it may challenge the legitimacy of NATO.

At first, NATO was mainly composed of colonial powers like Belgium, Britain, France, Netherlands, Italy and the United States. When NATO was established, there was the dominance of United States within NATO and the main aim was “collective defense” against the Soviet Union (Campbell, 2013).

In 1991, Soviet Union collapsed and it was thought that NATO completed its mission and it was going to be dissolved. However, NATO continued to exist

and became larger. Former members of Warsaw Pact also joined in the organization. The reason of this enlargement was mainly related to the fact that US economy needed a transnational military power eligible to interfere in countries to secure “investments” and “free markets” (Campbell, 2013). In that respect, after the end of Cold War, deregulation became an important concept in neoliberal agenda that it was reflected as being sine qua non for a democratic society.

During President Clinton administration, NATO continued to enlargement. The number of members increased from sixteen to nineteen. NATO has aimed to become global for the protection of Wall Street and the global economy ruled by US (Campbell, 2013). Richard Holbrooke, who was Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian affairs of US, aimed to improve the security and Wall Street relation. In this regard, there was a relation between increase in neoliberal policies, developments in Wall Street and expansion of NATO.

Regarding the necessities of global expansion of capital, IMF economist Simon Johnson (2010: 193) states that “business as usual now means inventing tradable high margin products using their market power to capture fees based on trading volume, taking advantage of their privileged position to place bets on their proprietary trading accounts and borrowing as much money as possible (in part by engineering their way around capital requirements) to maximize their profits”

As it is argued by Samir Amin (2004: 23), “the global expansion of capitalism, because it is polarizing, always implies the political intervention of the

dominant powers in the societies of the dominated periphery. This expansion cannot occur by the force of economic laws alone; it is necessary to complement that with political support (and military, if necessary) from states in the service of dominant capital.”

Globalized military power has become a symbol of bringing democracy. Through neoliberal hegemonia, it is aimed to equate free market with democracy. Democracy has become essential or condition for lending money and credit to other countries. Hence, NATO is reflected as comprised of democratic states where free market works effectively.

Accordingly, developing states were forced to open their economy to global market by international military power (like NATO) and political power (like IMF). In that respect, as it is argued by Campbell (2013: 45) “The discussion around the idea of the “institutional globalization of NATO” maintained that the security threats to capital were global and that NATO should consider itself as a “concert of democracies” keeping the order internationally.” Therefore, although private military companies are common in many countries, there is always a need of public military for the (re)production of capital accumulation.

4.5- Conclusion

The chapter has first presented the relationship between neoliberalism and privatization of security as commodification by analyzing the importance of how security is commodified as a result of neoliberalism and its contribution to the

capitalist accumulation. Second, the increasing role played by non-state security actors has been discussed in terms of the protection of capital accumulation at local and global level by examining the position of PSCs in Western countries and in developing countries (Africa). Third, historical analysis of private security against the background of state's role in security field is made through historically analyzing the operations of non-state security actors vis-à-vis their institutionalization by state through legalization. Fourth, privatization of security and the role of state in security field in contemporary era is discussed by examining the relationship between PSCs and the state in African and Western countries in the sense that the state role in the security field is not abolished vis-à-vis PSCs.

Accordingly, it is true that the relationship between private security and capital accumulation both at local and global level is very important. However, it should be noted that marketization of security is feasible only to a certain extent. Although there is an increase in the role played by non-state security actors, it is seen that, both in historical-theoretical context and state regulation framework, the role of the state is not undermined. Capitalist order always necessitates state's domination in the security field. Hence, it is necessary to analyze the relationship between state, market and security. From a critical political economy perspective, private security-capitalism relation is significant in the sense that there is a limit to commercial security practices for the reproduction of capitalist relations of production.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

As stated in the introduction chapter, the major aim of this thesis is to analyze the increasing role played by non-state security actors from a critical political economy perspective. In chapter 2, we presented the existing literature which is composed of different scholars' arguments about the increasing role played by private actors in the provision of security. The chapter has presented different factors for the explanation of privatization of security in the literature such as the end of Cold War, changing notion of security threats, budgetary concerns and neo-liberal ideology. Moreover, how the existing literature assesses the increasing role played by non-state security actors and what kind of problems arise from the privatization of security was discussed in the chapter. The chapter also discussed different arguments made by scholars about the legal dimension of PSCs. Furthermore, whether or not the increasing role played by private actors causes the loss of state power in the security field was examined in the existing literature of privatization of security. Lastly, a general evaluation of the existing literature was made, and the superficial and uncritical political economy dimension of the literature was criticized. The existing literature mainly shows the problems and

proposes some solutions without examining what is behind all these developments in the role played by private security actors.

In chapter 3, we presented the neo-Marxist framework of political economy. The chapter focused on the general framework of neo-Marxist theory and examined the neo-Marxist conception of the politics-economics relationship. The chapter also presented in detail the neo-Marxist understanding of the role played by the state's apparatus of coercion in capital accumulation both at the national and transnational level. Finally, the chapter summed up the main points emphasized by neo-Marxism within a political economy framework by proposing neo-Marxism as an alternative approach for the analysis of the increasing role played by non-state security actors.

Chapter 4 provided neo-Marxist analysis of the increasing role played by non-state actors in the provision of security. The relationship between neoliberalism and privatization of security as commodification was analyzed in that chapter and the importance of how security is commodified as a result of neoliberalism, and its contribution to the capitalist accumulation was discussed. Moreover, the chapter focused on the increasing role played by non-state security actors in terms of the protection of capital accumulation at the local and global level and the position of PSCs in Western countries has been emphasized in the sense that they protect the capitalist class and reflect the subordinate classes as a threat to capitalist accumulation. Non-state security actors in developing countries (Africa) were also examined and their role in securing resource extraction for the maintenance of global capital accumulation was discussed. Another issue presented in that chapter is related to a historical analysis of private security against the background of state's

role in security field. It also discussed historically the presence and operations of non-state security actors vis-à-vis their institutionalization by state through legalization. Finally, the privatization of security and the role of the state in the security field in the contemporary era was analyzed. The relationship between PSCs and the state in African and Western countries was examined in the sense that the state role in the security field is not abolished vis-à-vis PSCs.

When the implications of the findings of the thesis are considered, it is seen that although the existing literature points out some political economy issues (e.g. neoliberalism), it does not make a solid critical political economy analysis of the increasing role played by non-state security actors. In contrast, a neo-Marxist approach attends to the state-market-security nexus and provides a critical analysis of the increasing role played by non-state security actors through the lens of class conflict. Accordingly, it enables us to see what is behind the marketization of security and how it should be understood in relation to the provision of security by the state.

Therefore, contrary to the logic of the existing literature, by considering the relation between political and economy the thesis showed that the increasing role played by non-state security actors implied commodification of security and securitization of capital which contribute to capital accumulation. Moreover, although there is a growth in the privatization of security at both the local and global level, the historical analysis and the contemporary cases showed that there is a limit to the marketization of security in capitalist society since different from the other sectors, the security field cannot be totally privatized. Under the appearance of

“neutrality”, the coercive apparatus of the state is historically needed for the protection and reproduction of the public order of capitalism.

Moreover, as opposed to the existing literature on privatization of security, the thesis has presented that the increasing role played by non-state security actors does not undermine the role of the state in security field. On the contrary, it can be argued to contribute to the authority of the state which implies the penetration of state power into society.

Besides historical and theoretical analysis of the coercive role of the state, the increasing role played by non-state security actors should also be considered in terms of the role of the state in regulating PSCs. Accordingly, as opposed to the arguments presented in the existing literature on the privatization of security, the commercialization of security does not eliminate the role of the state. Setting the emergence of non-state security actors as state’s loss of power in the security field is an inadequate analysis that considers security only in relation to the traditional institutions of the state, such as the police, the military and paramilitary forces (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011). However, in order to understand the increasing role played by non-state security actors, it has been very important to analyze state-security-market nexus.

The capitalist order is an order which includes social insecurity for the subordinate classes. However, this permanent insecurity increases the politics of security, which becomes the main part of the bourgeoisie society. The politics of

security plays a significant role for the fabrication and maintenance of the capitalist order. In that respect, the politics of security should be understood as a tool of order which legitimizes the power of the state in protecting capitalist accumulation and the hegemony of capital.

Although there is a reality of the increasing role played by non-state security actors, by applying a neo-Marxist perspective, the thesis has shown that only the state, through its assertion of acting for the common good and its neutrality, is capable of maintaining the bourgeoisie class domination by suppressing the resistances against capitalism. If we consider the state as essential for capital, the police and military power is a condensation of the state in capitalist society. The state coercion furthers the accumulation of capital through accelerating the exploitation of the subordinate class. Accordingly, by using neo-Marxist theory, the thesis has showed that different from the other sectors, there is always a limit to the privatization of security. Hence, security cannot be totally privatized since only security provided by the state provides so-called unconditional protection without making any discrimination and seems to be serving the public totally and neutrally.

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