

AMERICAN PROPAGANDA IN TURKEY AS ECONOMIC MILITARY AND
CULTURAL WARFARE AGAINST GERMANY DURING THE SECOND
WORLD WAR

A Master's Thesis

by

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ANKARA

September 2009

To my parents...

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The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF
HISTORY
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

September 2009

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.

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ABSTRACT

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September 2009

This thesis analyzes American propaganda in Turkey during the Second World War through the increasing economic, military and cultural relations between the two countries. Germany was very influential in Turkey's economic, military and cultural development before the war. This kind of affiliation could have an influence in Turkey's foreign policy. Turkish leaders, on the other hand, attached utmost importance to Turkey's integrity and independence. They thought that entering the war would damage Turkey's sovereignty. Therefore they wanted to keep Turkey out of war.

When the war started Turkey wanted to limit Germany's influence. For this reason Turkey turned to Britain and France which could not satisfy Turkey's needs.

America began to increase its economic, military and cultural relations with Turkey through Lend-Lease aid, chrome sales, sending military experts to and inviting students from Turkey, etc. The improvement of the relations between Turkey and America in those fields aimed to break Germany's influence in Turkey, and to prevent Turkey's entrance to the war on the side of the Axis. In this respect strengthening Turkey in the economic and military fields so that it could fight against the Axis forces was not the main aim. Therefore American efforts during the war should be analyzed as propaganda against German propaganda.

Keywords: Propaganda, economic aid, military aid, cultural relations, foreign policy, The United States of America, Republic of Turkey, the Second World War, espionage

ÖZET

İKİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞI SIRASINDA TÜRKİYE’DE AMERİKAN PROPAGANDASI: EKONOMİK ASKERİ VE KÜLTÜREL ALANLARDA ALMANYA İLE MÜCADELE

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Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Edward P. Kohn

Eylül 2009

Bu tez çalışması Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Türkiye arasında artan ekonomik, askeri ve kültürel ilişkiler yoluyla İkinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında Türkiye’de Amerikan propagandasını incelemektedir. Savaş öncesinde Almanya’nın Türkiye’deki ekonomik, askeri ve kültürel gelişmelerde büyük etkisi vardı. Bu tür bir yakınlık Türkiyenin dış politikasında da etkili olabiliyordu. Türk diplomatları ise Türkiye’nin bağımsızlığına ve bütünlüğüne çok önem vermekteydiler. Savaşa girmenin Türkiye’nin egemenliğini zedeleyeceğini düşünmekteydiler. Bu sebeple Türkiye’yi savaş dışı tutmaya çalışıyorlardı.

Savaş başladığında Türkiye Almanya’nın bu etkisini azaltmak istedi ve bu amaçla İngiltere ve Fransa’ya yöneldi ancak bu iki ülke Türkiye’nin ihtiyaçlarını karşılayamadı. Onların yerine Amerika Kiralama ve Ödünç Verme (Lend-Lease)

yardımları, krom alımı, Türkiye'ye askeri uzman gönderimi ve Türk öğrencilerini Amerika'ya kabul etme gibi yollarla Türkiye ile olan ekonomik, askeri ve kültürel ilişkilerini geliştirmeye başladı. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Türkiye arasında bu alanlarda yakınlaşma Almanya'nın Türkiye üzerindeki etkisini kırmak ve Türkiye'nin Mihver Kuvvetleri yanında savaşa girmesini engellemek amaçlarını taşımaktaydı. Kısacası asıl amaç Türkiye'yi ekonomik ve askeri alanlarda güçlendirerek Mihver Devletleri ile savaşmasını sağlamak değildi. Bu açıdan Amerika'nın Türkiye üzerindeki bu çabaları Almanya'nın propagandasına karşı Amerikan propagandası olarak incelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: propaganda, ekonomik yardım, askeri yardım, kültürel ilişkiler, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, İkinci Dünya Savaşı, casusluk

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank a number of great people who helped me to finish this thesis. First of all I owe a lot to Dr. Edward P. Kohn for his invaluable guidance and encouragement. His comments and his suggestions have been of utmost importance in shaping this work. I am also indebted to Dr. Nur Bilge Criss for her advices and kindness.

I am thankful to the honorable members of my thesis jury, namely Dr. Edward Kohn, Nur Bilge Criss, and Dr. Paul Latimer who have given me advices and suggestions for the final shape of this thesis.

I am also thankful to the department chair Dr. Mehmet Kalpaklı for supporting my visit to Washington D.C. which made it possible for me to have an access to the documents most necessary for writing this thesis. I am also thankful to Dr. Oktay Özel who directed me to find the subject of my thesis, though unknowingly, by his enjoyable assignment of *Firuze*.

I would like to thank all my classmates in Bilkent University, but most important of all I should express my thanks to Gizem Kaşoturacak for her help in every step of this study, and her companionship. Fatma Gül Karagöz and Elvin Otman have also been very helpful in overcoming the stress of the last year. I would like to thank Sevinç Küçüköğlü for helping me with the deep notes and I owe a lot to Muhsin Soyudoğan who dealt with the formatting when I needed most, and thanks for his friendship.

I am thankful to my roommate Pelin Ayan for her patience and moral support. I have to thank Merve Ustalar who turned my boring days and nights in Ankara and at Bilkent Library into fun. My eternal friends Selcan Bayramođlu, Sedef Akmehmet, Gnay imen, Yasemin Demirtař and Esen Kara, I would like to thank them for being my friends.

Finally and most importantly I owe a lot to my family who supported me, and I have to mention my elder sister Elif Avcı who has not spared her support, encouragement and friendship from me.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Turkey was founded with the understanding that it was no longer an empire but a small state. The main aim of the new republic was to keep its sovereignty and independence without depending on other states. It began to form good relations with its neighbors. When Germany started to emerge as a powerful force by eliminating the sanctions of the Versailles Treaty and increase militarization on the one hand and Italy gave voice to its expansionistic ideas on the other, Turkey tried to preserve the status quo by signing the Balkan Entente in 1934. It was mainly against the revisionist countries in the Balkans, therefore Bulgaria did not join the Entente. It was a weak and fragile union in this respect. On July 8, 1937, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan signed the Saadabad Pact to secure peace in the region, especially against Italy, which attacked Ethiopia in 1935. Another accomplishment of Turkey in terms of securing its independence was the Montreaux Convention of 1936 by which Turkey regained the control of the Straits. The Montreaux Convention was also a turning point in the relations of Turkey and England which was one of the forces that tried to demolish the Ottoman Empire and hamper the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. However, Italy's aggression in the Mediterranean forced these two states to find a way to collaborate, and England's support to Turkey on its efforts to dominate in the Straits was a favorable step. They

agreed on a Mutual Assistance Pact in 1939. A month later, when Turkey and France solved the problem over Alexandretta, they also declared a Mutual Assistance Pact similar to the one with Britain. Until the outbreak of war in Europe, Turkish foreign policy depended on forming good relations with its neighbors and finding a powerful ally against the aggression in Europe.

Soviet Russia was one of the most important countries for Turkey in its foreign policy. The relations with Russia depended on mutual assistance. During the National Independence War, the Soviet Union was the only friend of Turkey and this friendship was supported in 1925 with a Non-aggression pact, which remained in force until 1945. Their alliance was against the western powers and mutual national interests brought these two states together. Until the Montreaux Convention the Soviet Union was the only great power supporting Turkey. After 1936, England and France also started to form closer relations with Turkey. Turkey's desire to strengthen this collaboration with the Soviet Union fell through when Moscow and Berlin signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, but it was not until after Saracoğlu turned disappointed from Moscow that Turkey definitely signed the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Alliance on October 1939. Although Turkish diplomats always considered the Russian position at war before directing their foreign policy, this thesis is not dealing with Turkish-Soviet relations.

The relations with the Soviet Union was on the diplomatic base but they did not carry this to the economic and cultural fields. Germany, however, played an important role in Turkish foreign trade. Turkey was buying technological and industrial materials from Germany, while Germany was buying Turkish raw materials on the clearing system.¹ This was favorable for both countries. Germany

¹ Clearing system depends on exchange of products or materials instead of buying in cash on foreign reserves.

also had an influence in Turkish educational and military developments which was a continuation from the late Ottoman Empire. German teachers, advisors and experts worked in Turkish schools and Turkish armed forces. With the beginning of the war, however, Turkey tried to limit Germany's influence both in cultural and economic fields. With the increase in diplomatic relations economic relations also increased between England and Turkey, which caused an economic warfare between England and Germany.² Britain and France tried to take Germany's place in Turkish foreign trade and cultural life but they could not manage this due to the hardships of the war, especially when France fell to the Nazis as early as 1940.

Considering the relations between Turkey and the United States of America, on the other hand, it cannot be said that they were as intense. Diplomatic relations were formed in 1927 officially, and except for the missionary works remaining from the Ottoman Empire, their relations mainly depended on limited trade. Since America turned to its isolationist policy after the Great War and Wilson could not achieve his "Fourteen Points" America did not play a role in the formation of the new government. Because of the powerful Armenian propaganda Turkey had a negative image in America. The reformations of Mustafa Kemal in accordance with westernization ideals, and Admiral Bristol's and the first ambassador to Turkey Joseph Grew's efforts were important in helping to create a new understanding of Turkey but it was not until the Second World War that America became a major force in Turkish economic, military and cultural life. When Britain and France could not fight against Germany's influence in Turkey, America led the economic and cultural warfare. Turkey's strategic importance in the Near East as a buffer state made it essential for the opposing powers' war plans. America's aim was to limit

² Fahir Armaoğlu, *Siyasi Tarih 1789-1960*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1975).

Germany's role in the Turkish economy, military and culture so that Turkey would not join the war on the side of the Axis. In this respect America's role in Turkey during the Second World War should be analyzed as propaganda.

The isolationist sentiment in America was very strong when the war broke out. Although America stayed out of the war it was supporting Britain by sending aid. On November 4, 1939, FDR signed the Neutrality act of 1939. For the first time the US could sell arms to belligerents. The next major dispute came when Churchill asked from FDR to send "forty or fifty of your old destroyers" on May 15, 1940.³ It was signed on September 3, 1940. Another important step in terms of helping Britain was Lend-Lease Act which was signed March 11, 1941. With this act America could send aid of all kinds to the countries whose security was important for America's defense. The importance of the act was that the materials were not sold but were given in return of a "service." When Hitler began to attack British supply lines, the aids on the way to Britain suffered from losses. America started to send convoys by repealing the Neutrality Act of 1939 the last of the neutrality acts was signed by FDR on November 7, 1941.

Even before the repeal of Neutrality Acts Roosevelt was interested in the war and had a cordial relation with Churchill. Two leaders signed the Atlantic Charter on August, 1941. The eight points of the charter were very similar in ideology to Wilson's fourteen points. As Bailey writes "The Atlantic Charter, from the standpoint of the United States, was in effect a formal acceptance of full responsibility for the defeat of Hitler and the establishment of a democratic peace."⁴ It is clear that although America was a non-belligerent nation and the isolationist idea

³ Winston Churchill, "C-9x" May 15, 1940, *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, Vol. I. ed, Warren F. Kimball, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984. p. 37.

⁴ Thomas Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, (London: Prentice-Hall International, Inc., 1980) p. 729.

was very strong until the attack on Pearl Harbor, ideologically America was an ally to England and it tried to help England financially to win the war. H.C. Allen writes that the Second World War formed a “fitting climax in the long-drama of Anglo-American friendship.”⁵ The two countries cooperated closely in winning the war.

However, there were differences between the policies of the two governments and one of them was their attitude towards Turkey. At the beginning of the war America followed British directives in its policy towards Turkey. Britain wanted Turkey to enter the war, but it could not force Turkey. American policy began to differ from British policy towards Turkey after 1941. Washington began to deal with Ankara directly in sending Lend-Lease aid. One of the reasons behind this change of attitude was American post-war plans in the Near East. Another reason was to influence Turkey in terms of showing good-will towards them. Although the Second World War strengthened Anglo-American cooperation, after America entered the war their interests in the Near East began to clash in time. This caused following different policies towards Turkey’s entrance to the war which became significant especially in the Casablanca Conference and later. The American Chiefs of Staff and President’s advisors believed in a military invasion of North-west Europe from the very beginning, so Churchill’s insistence upon an Allied attack in the Mediterranean was rejected. Churchill’s plans contained Turkish entry to the war, while America did not want to divert materials necessary for a successful European campaign to Turkey. Moreover, America was against to send soldiers and materials to Mediterranean to support British post-war plans in the region. Turkey realizing this difference between the policies of America and Britain used the former against the latter to retain its non-belligerency.

⁵ Harry Cranbrook Allen, *Great Britain and the United States*, (New York: St Martin Press Inc, 1955), p. 781.

Many works have been written about the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey during the Second World War and they mainly agree on the main aim of Turkish politicians was to keep Turkey out of the war. Selim Deringil argued that Turkey followed a cautious "balance policy" to avoid entering the war, and would fight for self-defense only if necessary.⁶ Deringil writes that since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, Ankara tried to form and keep good relations with the Soviet Union; and the main concern of Turkey at the beginning of war was fascist Italy's aggression in Eastern Mediterranean, not Russia. In this respect, Deringil opposes Edward Weisband's argument that Turkey was determining its steps according to Russia.⁷ He mainly uses British sources and Turkish newspapers, and he uses printed Foreign Relations of the United States series as the only American archival source. Although his work is intense and fresh in some respects, Deringil does not focus on Turkish-American relations.

Edward Weisband puts forward two main motives in the formation of wartime Turkish foreign policy. The first one is that Turkey knows that it has nothing to gain from this war but a lot to lose. Secondly, if Germany lost the war, the Soviet Union which would have a free hand in Eastern Europe would threaten the independence and sovereignty of Turkey. Therefore, the best policy for Turkey was to stay out of the war. It delayed to enter to the war by trying to warn America and Britain against the Russian threat, and as Weisband describes it "dragged her foot" to preserve its power in case of a Soviet aggression after the war. By starting the book from 1943, when the Russian threat on Turkey was being felt more and more, Weisband analyses the period in terms of the origins of the cold war. However while

⁶ Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War, An 'Active' Neutrality*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁷ Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945, Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973).

doing this he ignores the importance of Germany as another influential motive in the formation of Turkish foreign policy. In terms of Turkey's relations to America, Weisband states that Turkey perceived America as a more solid force than Britain. America's tolerant approach to Turkey with understanding its reasons which kept it away from the war also caused Turkish politicians to favor America more than England. Therefore America's decision to let England to deal with Turkey in the Casablanca Conference of 1943 caused a shock in Turkey. Turks thought that America was backing from the politics of southeast Europe and especially after 1944 America's attitude towards Turkey was neglectful. Therefore, Turkey tried to strengthen the relations with the Soviet Union and England. Weisband does not really focus on Turkey's one on one relations with America.

According to Türkaya Ataöv Turkish policy of self-interest depends on it experiences of World War One and the War of National Liberation.⁸ Like Deringil, Ataöv does not use American archival sources and he does not focus on Turkish-American Relations. Instead they both deal with Turkish-American relations beginning with the Casablanca and Teheran Conferences and do not deal with the impact of either country in the decision making process for each other.

The chapter of the “Second World War” in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1978* was written by Ahmet Şükrü Esmer and Oral Sander.⁹ They analyze this period mainly by the relations between Turkey, the Soviet Union, England and Germany. They include the relations between Turkey and America, yet, through Britain. Although they mention lend-lease aid and chrome trade, the main relation between Turkey and America starts after the Second World War, especially with

⁸ Türkaya Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1965).

⁹ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer and Oral Sander “İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası, (1947-200)” in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1965)*, Mehmet Gönübol et al.,(Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1969).

America's sending the ship *Missouri* to Turkey. Until then, America does not exist in Turkish politics.

In his book *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1918-1948* Vere-Hodge defines Turkish foreign policy during war as a "marked desire for continued neutrality" because, although just before the outbreak of war Turkey signed an alliance with the Allied forces, it doubted an absolute Allied victory, and according to the changes on tide during the war, Turkey sometimes favored Axis victory.¹⁰ Turkey desired to keep its non-belligerency throughout the war, and therefore the decision-makers of the country formed their policy on a balance between the opposed forces. He puts the "traditional Russo-Turkish enmity" as an important motive in the formation of Turkish policy. The influence of the United States of America during the Second World War, however, is not emphasized in the book.

Another important work about Turkey during the Second World War is Cemil Koçak's *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi* in which Koçak states that the main policy of Turkey was to stay out of the war and therefore it followed the policy of absolute balance between the opposing forces.¹¹ However he also states that Turkey in principle favored the Allied forces, so it was not neutral but non-belligerent. Koçak mainly depends on Turkey's relations to Germany and England, yet he states the relations between Turkey and America started in 1942 with the expansion of lend-lease aid to Turkey. Turkey used America as a counter balance against England because it realized that America and England had opposing ideas about the Middle and Near East, and a rivalry between these two countries was emerging. However, until the end of 1942 Turkey did not show any enthusiasm to form a closer relation with America. It was especially after the Casablanca Conference when Turkey tried

¹⁰ Edward Regina Vere-Hodge, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1918-1948*, (Ambilly-Annemasse: Impr. Franco-Suisse, 1950), p. 130.

¹¹ Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996).

to form closer relations with America. England would be weak at the end of the war and because of the 'unconditional surrender' principle taken in the Casablanca Conference Germany would no longer be a balancing force against the Soviet Union. American tolerance to Turkey's reluctance to enter the war also creates an opposition between America and England which let Turkey to act more freely in its diplomatic relations. Koçak describes the attitude of Turkey towards America as another balancing force to retain its non-belligerency against England and Germany's suppressions.

Frank G. Weber's *The Evasive Neutral, Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War* handles the question of Turkish foreign policy from a different angle.¹² According to Weber, Turkey played an important role blocking German expansion to the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf which would be the key points for German use to win the war against England. However, Turkish rejection of German demands was not because of its alliance with the Allied forces or because of its loyalty to democratic principles but only a mere chance. Hitler was persuaded by Franz von Papen, the German Ambassador in Turkey, that there were no land roads to accommodate German tanks to pass from Anatolia, nor airfields where the German Air Force would refuel. Turkey did not commit itself to its obligations according to the treaty of alliance signed with England and France in 1939, but took decisive action against Germany only in 1944. In this respect Turkey disappointed and frustrated its allies. Under the Turkish neutrality policy lay the fear of the Soviet Union and despair of France as important determinants, as well as the wish to gain from the opposing forces as much as it could, including territorial expansion and supplies of arms and ammunitions. Another claim of Weber is that

¹² Frank G. Weber, *The Evasive Neutral, Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War*, (Columbia&London: University of Missouri Press, 1979).

Turkey would have stayed close to Germany if the latter had not chosen the alliance of the Arab world over Turkey's. His analysis of Turkish policy here is out of the context of history which does not deal with did not happen. Weber concludes that Turkey accomplished integrity and independence by diplomacy, but that diplomacy was one of dishonesty. In terms of Turkish-American relations, he does not discuss much other than the American decision in Casablanca to let England to deal with Turkey, and for America entry of Turkey to the war was unimportant compared to the influence of Operation Overlord which was the planned operation to Normandy to end the war.

Ailen G. Gramer's article "Turkey in Search of a Protector: 1918-1947" defines Turkey's foreign policy as depending on the "traditional search for a protector" against the Soviet Union.¹³ According to him, this was the main motive in Turkish-American relations during and after the Second World War, and America kept running to Turkey's aid. In his short article of eight pages, which covers the years of 1918-1947, Gramer analyses the Turkish foreign policy in a superficial way which is far from understanding the dynamics of the Republic of Turkey whose main aim was to be an independent country, by ignoring Turkey's role in the war as a neutral buffer state. Gramer also ignores the other motives like Italian and German aggression, as well as Turkey's and America's relations to England.

Haluk Ülman's book *Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri 1939-1947* is the only one which focuses on Turkish-American relations.¹⁴ According to Ülman, the relations between the United States of America and Turkey during World War Two were important in terms of understanding the cold war alliance. However, he

¹³ Ailen G. Gramer, "Turkey in Search of a Protector: 1918-1947" *Current History* 13:75 (1947 November)

¹⁴ Haluk Ülman, *Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri 1939-1947*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, No. 128-1110, Sevinç Matbaası, 1961).

writes that the relations between the two countries had not been close until the end of the Second World War due to the loose ties in economic and cultural fields and American isolationist policy after the First World War. Their relations were formed generally through Britain. Turkey started to search for American aid to strengthen its position in its relations to the Soviet Union in 1945, when America was not ready to give such assurance. However, there were times when American policy was more favorable to Turkey than Britain, for example the American reluctance of supporting Britain to make Turkey enter the war, during and after the Casablanca Conference. According to Ülman, America was not ready at the beginning of 1945 to support Turkey against the Soviet Union, but at the second part of 1945, and especially in 1946, America started to put its weight on Turkey's relation with Moscow. Ülman looks into this subject from Cold War perspective like Metin Toker in his book *Türkiye Üzerinde 1945 Kabusu: 2. Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk-Sovyet ve Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri Üzerine Bir İnceleme*.¹⁵ Toker analyses the Turkish-American relations starting from 1945 and his main idea is that America played an important role in Turkish foreign policy after 1946, starting with sending the *USS Missouri*. Before that time, the importance of Turkey for America lay only in the regulation of the Turkish Straits, upon which Toker writes, America did not take a decisive action.

Turkish-American relations during the Second World War has been generally analyzed from the cold war standpoint through Turkey's relations to the Soviet Union. Its role as a counterbalance against Britain or Germany was also mentioned especially in the economic field through lend-lease aid and chrome sale. George S. Harris analyzes Turkish-American relations after the war but he mentions that during the war American image in Turkey "was greatly enhanced by the American

¹⁵ Metin Toker, *Türkiye Üzerinde 1945 Kabusu: 2. Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk-Sovyet ve Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri Üzerine Bir İnceleme*, (Ankara: Akis, 1971).

performance in the war.”¹⁶ Still he primarily analyzes the relations between the two countries during the Cold War.

Historians generally focus on Turkish-American relations during the Ottoman Empire and missionary works or during cold war years. American propaganda in Turkey during the Second World War in the economic, military and cultural fields on the other hand has been generally ignored. This however was one of the first times when Turkey realized America’s real power and due to the increase of interest in American politics in the Near East this was also one of the first times when Americans realized Turkey’s strategic position. As Thomas Bryson writes “American presence in the Middle East began in the early days of the republic, but until 1941 there was a lack of political involvement. In 1920s diplomatists began to give higher priority to commercial interests in the region, but it was after 1941 that foreign policy-makers gave the utmost importance in reaching natural sources in the Middle East.”¹⁷

Considering the post-war policy of America in the Near East and Soviet and British policies to force Turkey to enter the war, American interests favored Turkey’s neutrality. When the Allies could not respond to Turkey’s needs in the economic, military and cultural fields America took this role upon itself to prevent German influence in Turkey. Therefore it used the economic, military and cultural aids as a propaganda campaign to maintain Turkey’s neutrality. To understand and analyze American cultural and economic warfare against Germany in Turkey, Ankara’s foreign policy and its reflections on domestic policy will be evaluated in the first chapter. After analyzing the dynamics of Turkish policy in the war, American

¹⁶ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), p. 14.

¹⁷ Thomas A. Bryson, *Seeds of Mideast Crisis, The United States Diplomatic Role in the Middle East during World War II*, (Jefferson North Carolina: McFarland& Company, Inc., 1981), p. 1.

propaganda in economic fields will be analyzed in the second chapter. Finally in the third chapter American propaganda in cultural and military fields to replace Germany will be analyzed.

This thesis generally depends on American archives since the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives are still closed to the researchers. Turkish opinion is majorly analyzed through newspapers and memoirs of diplomats. Mainly the reports of U.S Embassy at Ankara and the correspondences between American ambassadors and Secretary of State will be used. These documents are gathered in The National Archives in Washington D.C. under the Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State. The writers analyzing Turkish-American relations mainly use this record group. Unlike the former researchers and authors who focused on diplomatic relations and neglected the documents of other fields, this thesis analyzes the economic, military and cultural relations between Turkey and America as propaganda. Another collection which will be used in this thesis is RG 226 Records of the Office of Strategic Services. OSS was actively working in Turkey and these records give valuable information about the social, economic and diplomatic condition in Turkey during the war. FDR Library, Congressional Records and American newspapers, mainly *New York Times* and *Wall Street Journal* will be used in terms of depicting American political attitude, and they were accessed from the Library of Congress.

CHAPTER II

SHIFTS IN TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE WAR

Turkish diplomatic relations with the belligerents changed throughout time during the war according to military victories and defeats. The basis of Turkish diplomacy was to stay out of the war. To maintain its non-belligerency Turkey shifted from one side to the other, therefore it could not be defined as a neutral country entirely. These shifts played a role also in Turkish internal policy, and in military, cultural and economic relations with belligerents. Therefore to analyze and understand the economic, military and cultural warfare between America and Germany over Turkey, it is essential to survey Turkish foreign policy with the belligerents during the war. Turkey's attitude towards America and Germany, as the two main characters of this work, and the influence of these two countries in Turkish domestic and foreign policy will be analyzed in this chapter.

The attitude of Turkish policy can be analyzed in three different phases. The first phase was between September 1939, the beginning of the Second World War, and June 22, 1941, German invasion of the Soviet Union. In this phase Turkey was closer to the Allies than the Axis. When Moscow signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact with Germany, its attitude towards Turkey became aggressive. Turkey became anxious about the plans of the Axis, especially Italy. Ankara also believed that England and France would be able to stop the Axis. However, as the war continued, Turks

realized that the Allies did not have enough power, and on the contrary, the Axis was more powerful than they thought. The second phase of the war was between June 22, 1941, Germany's attack on the Soviet Union and the beginning of 1943, when the Allies began to conduct successful operations in North Africa and Soviet repulsion of Germany. In this phase Turkey was more cautious towards the belligerents. Turkish leaders thought that the Allies would win the war. Especially with America's entrance to the war this became almost certain. However, they wanted to keep Turkey out of the war. Therefore, they followed an appeasement policy towards Germany. After 1943 they slowly turned to the Allies, but with fear because Turkey was still anxious about Soviet Russia's plans of the post-war world. They did not want to join the war because Germany was still on the borders of Turkey and could easily bomb important cities. Finally, Turkey cut its diplomatic relations with Germany on August 2, 1944.

2.1 Mutual Alliance with Britain and France

The Anglo-Franco-Turkish Mutual Alliance Treaty was a major step taken by Turkey towards the Allied bloc. The main policy of İnönü was to secure military support of the Allies against the threat of German power.¹⁸ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer and Oral Sander write that with the Mutual Alliance England became a supporting power for Turkey against both the soviet Union and Italy.¹⁹ However, it might be wrong to define England as a supporting power against Russia, because although Nazi-Soviet Pact was a shock to the world, none of the Allied powers, or America took firm

¹⁸ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi, Cilt I*, p. 260.

¹⁹ Esmer and Sander, p. 147.

precautions against that alliance. They were appeasing the Soviet Union, in a way, because they were aware that this alliance would not last long. Secondly, the main adversaries were Germany and Italy for England and France, and Japan for the United States. Russia's relations with Japan were not good either because their interests in Asia clashed. The Allied powers wanted to leave the door open to the Soviet Union because when it severed its relations with Germany, they would try to benefit from the Soviet Union's alliance. Thirdly, as Deringil writes Turkey did not jump into an alliance with Britain, but knowing that its geographical condition attracted Germany too, Ankara used it in bargaining for economic purposes.²⁰ Finally, it should be remembered that Turkey's main policy during the war was to retain its non-belligerency. Turkey re-organized its foreign policy on this basis, adapting its alliances with other nations according to the developing events throughout the war. Deringil writes that the alliance with Britain and France had defensive aims.

... by making the alliance with Britain and France Turkish leaders felt they were taking out an insurance policy for their own benefit. To the British, the treaty with Turkey was an instrument for securing Turkey's effective collaboration in the war effort. This situation led to what I have called the Anglo-Turkish contradiction. The British felt they had the legitimate right to ask Turkey to muster all her strength and join in the fight for what they considered to be a common cause. The Turks, on the other hand, saw no reason to risk their very existence which had cost them so dear in what was primarily a war of the European powers' own making.²¹

This contradiction defined their relations during the war. At the beginning of the war Turks believed that the Allies had the power to stop the war; therefore this agreement would secure Turkey's non-belligerency. However, as the war progressed Turkey realized that England and France were not that powerful because of their failures in battles. In case of a German offensive England could not help Turkey.

²⁰Deringil, p. 82-83.

²¹*Ibid*, p. 4-5.

German victories slowly pushed Turkey towards a strict neutrality from a non-belligerent ally of Britain and France. Turkey approached England with suspicion that it could have forced Turkey to enter the war, against its own wishes.

Turkey's ties to Germany mainly depended on economic and cultural relations. They were allies in the First World War, but after the war Turkey had great reforms and changed its attitude towards the western countries especially after the 1936 Montreaux Convention. Moreover, Turkey did not support Germany's aggression in Europe. When Franz von Papen was assigned as German Ambassador to Turkey, he tried to develop the alliance of the First World War, yet saw that Turkey felt itself under threat and that Turkish diplomats were not thinking to renew the alliance with Germany.²²

Italy entered the war on June 10, 1940 on the side of Germany. On June 13, English and French ambassadors visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Şükrü Saracoğlu and requested Turkey to enter the war according to the article 2 of the Mutual Alliance. "(I) In the event of an act of aggression by a European power leading to a war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the United Kingdom are involved, Turkey will collaborate effectively with France and with the U.K., and will lend them all aid and assistance in her power." However, in ten days France fell and signed an armistice with Germany on June 22, 1940. Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador to Turkey wrote that they were ignorant of the situation in France when they were asking Turkey to declare war.²³

The fall of France was the biggest blow to the Allies. Until the fall of France Turkish newspapers supported belief in the Allies. The U.S. Ambassador to Turkey John Van Antwerp MacMurray reported to the Secretary of State news from several

²² Ataöv, p. 20-21.

²³ Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull, Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, (London: J. Murray, 1949), p. 166.

Turkish newspapers: “As the German army drove back the Allied armies toward the sea, the news commentators pointed out that, even if the Allies lost the battle, they would not have lost the war...Confidence was repeatedly expressed in the eventual victory of England and France, despite their reverses.” However, “upon French acceptance of the armistice conditions, the Turkish press gave vent to its disappointment in severe criticism of the French Government’s action.”²⁴ Turkey denied entering the war and the Prime Minister Refik Saydam declared non-belligerency on June 26, using protocol number 2 as an excuse. Hugessen wrote that not only the fall of France but also other factors were important in Turkish decision to stay out of the war. A Balkan Union was no longer possible, and with Italy’s support Germany could easily turn to Turkey and attack, British supplies were not enough to prepare Turkish armed forces for war and Hugessen accepted that if Turkey had entered the war, it would have caused deadly results for the British strategy in the Middle East.²⁵

The fall of France frustrated Turks, because despite knowing that it was losing, France requested Turkey to enter the war. According to Deringil Turkish diplomats had always admired military success, and Germany’s success in the war was fascinating, but it also destroyed the balance in the Mediterranean. Turkey was anxious about Italy’s new maneuvers.²⁶ Inside Turkey, people were afraid of being on the weak side again. There were even discussions about entering the war on the German side.²⁷ Confidence in the British strength was severely destroyed with the

²⁴ Ambassador J. V. A. MacMurray to Secretary of State, No. 1583, “Developments during the past Seven Months in the Attitude and Policies of Turkey relative to the International Situation” Ankara, Oct. 26, 1940, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 23

²⁵ Hugessen, p. 166.

²⁶ Deringil, p. 106-113.

²⁷ Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Hatıralar*, Cilt 1, (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2001), p. 324-325.

fall of France, because Turkey once more realized that English forces were not as powerful as they had suggested.

On October 27, 1940 Italy attacked Greece. England had given guarantee to Greece in case of such an attack, but England was in no condition to send aid to Greece in the autumn of 1940. Greece asked Turkish aid based on the Balkan Entente which Turkey rejected, because according to that pact Turkey had to enter the war only if a Balkan country attacked another Balkan country. Still, Turkey helped Greece by warning Bulgaria, that if Bulgaria attacked Greece, Turkey would enter the war. Thus Greece was able to use its forces in the Bulgarian front against Italy. Moreover, this attack put into force Article 3 of the Anglo-Turkish treaty:

So long as the guarantees given by France and the U.K. to Greece and Rumania by their respective declarations of the 13th April, 1939, remain in force, Turkey will cooperate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in her power, in the event of France and the U.K. being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees.²⁸

In this case, England did not ask for Turkey's entry to the war. This does not mean that England willingly agreed on Turkish terms, but knowing that Turkey would ask more arms and munitions to enter the war, England avoided it, because if England had had enough military force to send, it would have sent it to Greece directly. Knowing that the aid to Greece was a delicate issue in terms of maintaining Turkey's trust Churchill wrote to Eden that "We are well aware of our slender resources. Aid to Greece must be attentively studied lest whole Turkish position is lost through proof that England never tries to keep her guarantees."²⁹ Churchill, in his telegram to Foreign Secretary, wrote that "We want Turkey to come into the war as soon as possible. We are not pressing her to take any special steps to help Greece,

²⁸ Vere-Hodge, p. 129.

²⁹ Winston Churchill, *The Second World War, Vol. II, Their Finest Hour*, (London; Toronto; Melbourne: Cassell, 1948-1951), p. 474.

except to make it clear to Bulgaria that any move by Germany through Bulgaria against Greece, will be followed by immediate Turkish declaration of war.”³⁰ Instead England wanted to use Turkish air bases. Churchill sent a letter to İnönü, trying to convince him to let Britain use Turkish bases.³¹ However, Turkey knew that if it let England use its air bases, Germany would attack Turkey, in other words there was no difference between entering the war and giving its bases in the minds of Turkish leaders.

Greece had beaten back Italy’s forces and entered Albania. However, German forces entered Greece and defeated Greek forces. England’s inability to help Greece was another sign for Turkey not to trust England’s guarantees. In a conversation between İnönü and Kazım Karabekir on May 12, 1941, İnönü revealed his doubts about British strength against German forces.³² Turkey was anxious of German victories, too. The Turkish press criticized German operations in the Balkans. Necip Ali Küçüka wrote in *Cumhuriyet* that Germany wanted to dominate over the Balkans and Europe to accomplish its financial policies instead of bringing freedom from British domination as they claimed.³³

In the meantime the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union were deteriorating. On November 1940 Russian Foreign Minister Molotov went to Berlin to decide spheres of influence. Turkey’s position in the war and the regulation of the Straits were also discussed in these meetings. According to Molotov, Turkey should give bases in the Straits to the Soviet Union. In response, the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop offered that the latter could pass through the Straits without asking Turkey’s approval but did not approve of giving bases. Germany

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 484.

³¹ Winston Churchill, *The Second World War, Vol. III, The Grand Alliance*, (London; Toronto; Melbourne: Cassell, 1948-1951), p. 30-32.

³² Kazım Karabekir, *Ankara’da Savaş Rüzgarları*, (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1995), p. 288.

³³ Necip Ali Küçüka, “Balkanlar ve Almanya” *Cumhuriyet*, February 9, 1941.

prevented the Soviet Union to take Turkey into its own sphere of influence but Moscow did not give up its requests.³⁴

Moscow's demands were too much and in clash with Berlin's benefits in the region. Hitler decided that it was time to attack the Soviet Union. From that time on, Soviet-German relations began to deteriorate, and Germany started to move its troops in Rumania and they were ready to enter Bulgaria. By May 1941, Aegean islands, Crete, Greece, Yugoslavia were invaded by Germany, and Bulgaria joined the Axis. The deterioration of Soviet-German relations caused the betterment of Turkish-Soviet and Turkish-German relations. Moscow confirmed that the 1925 Alliance between the two countries was still in effect, and if Germany attacked Turkey, Soviet would not have supported Germany from the East.

Germany found Turkish attitude towards Axis powers favorable because the latter refused to enter the war even though it was supposed to when the Axis attacked Greece and France. When Soviet-German relations began to deteriorate Germany held a more positive attitude towards Turkey. Papen, under Ribbentrop's orders tried to improve the relations with Turkey. Ribbentrop also wanted Turkey to allow the transit of war materials to Iraq when Ali Raschid rebelled with support from Germany against British control. Although Turkey was willing to sign a treaty of friendship, Saracoğlu made it clear that Turkey would not allow the transit of German forces and arms across its lands, or sign an alliance. The Turkish-German Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression was signed on June 18, 1941.³⁵ Only four days later Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Deputy Faik Ahmet Barutçu wrote

³⁴ Vere-Hodge, p. 129.

³⁵ After the Turkish-German Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression was signed İnönü and Hitler sent friendly messages to each other. For the texts of these messages see *Aydın Tarihi*, June, 1941, No. 91, p. 71. These friendly messages were harshly criticized by Americans.

that this war caused great joy in Turkey, both among the public and politicians.³⁶ İnönü said that this Treaty affected Turkish-German relations in the most favorable way but added that commitments of his government towards Britain would continue.³⁷ German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop told Turkish Ambassador to Germany, Hüsrev Gerede, that Germany attacked the Soviet Union because the latter wanted to take Turkey and the Balkans under its own sphere of influence and that Germany could not let Turkey to lose its independence. Germany, Ribbentrop said, was for peace and integrity in the whole world.³⁸

The movement of German troops in the Balkans at the beginning of 1940 caused anxiety in England, because Turkey was surrounded by the Axis forces and therefore might not be able to bear German pressures and join the Axis or let the Axis forces to pass through Turkish lands to Middle East. To prevent this, England tried to recreate Balkan Entente and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden visited Turkey. When German-Soviet relations began to deteriorate, Turkey asked help from the United States, to support a bloc of the Soviet Union, Turkey, possibly Greece, and Bulgaria. Turkish Ambassador to the United States of America Mehmet Münir Erteğün informally asked America's opinion. Turkey still had suspicions towards the Soviet Union's ambitions over its lands, but the situation in the Balkans was becoming more dangerous. With the support of America Turkey could also guarantee its independence against any threat which might have come from the Soviet Union.³⁹

³⁶ Barutçu, *Siyasi Hatıralar*, Cilt 1, p. 494-495.

³⁷ *İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'deki Konuşmaları :1920-1973*, (Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu, 1993), 1 Nov. 1941, p. 20-21.

³⁸ Hüsrev Gerede, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Türkiye'nin Berlin Büyükelçisi Hüsrev Gerede'nin Anıları: Harb İçinde Almanya*, (İstanbul: ABC Ajansı Yayınları, 1994), p. 209.

³⁹ "Informal Suggestion by the Turkish Ambassador that the United States Give Support to the Creation of a Bloc of Nations (Soviet Union, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria) to Resist Axis Aggression" Washington, October 9, 1940, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940: The British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, the Near East and Africa*, Volume III (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 957-961.

The American Government did not support this idea at the beginning but after Greece was occupied the importance of Balkan security became a more important issue. On February, 1941, Colonel William J. Donovan visited Ankara as Franklin Delano Roosevelt's personal observer and visited other Balkan countries to see if the conditions were suitable for strengthening the Balkan Union. At the same time Anthony Eden was looking for the support of Turkey to help Greece. This time, however, Turkey could not enter such a union while Germany was on its borders. Still this attempt of America is considerable in terms of showing its interest in the area. It was then impossible for the Balkan countries to take a step against Germany, which was so close to their borders.

This attempt of America was one of the first times when it began to take a place in Turkish politics to prevent the expansion of German influence in Turkey. Although diplomatic relations did not develop to a considerable level between Turkey and the United States, Turkey's perception of America was more favorable than of the European nations. In a State Department report on Turkey prepared by Ray A. Graham, Jr. Liaison Officer in the Office of Lend-Lease Administration on November, 27, 1941, it was stated that Turkey considered the United States as a more benign ally:

It (Turkey) regards all foreign powers, with the possible exception of the U.S.A., as fundamentally hostile to Turkish national interests. It thinks that the Russians want the Dardanelles. It was allied with the Germans in the last war and has no illusions about what it is like to be a small country in a German run world. It knows that the British are not greedy for themselves but it is not at all sure that the British wouldn't give away part of Turkey in payment of their war debts, say the Dardanelles to Russia. Adding these factors up to the Turks would a little rather be on our side but, the only essential thing in their international policy is that they end on the winning side.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ "Report on Turkey" prepared by Ray A. Graham, Jr. Liaison Officer, Office Of Lend Lease Administration, Nov. 27, 1941, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 26.

As it can be understood from the quotation Turkey had lost its confidence to other countries. Since there was not a big clash between the two countries in the past and America's geographical distance and its ideology of America's interests lay in the Western Hemisphere, not in Europe, as it was declared under the Monroe Doctrine, Turkey considered America as a more dependable power. However America's interest in Turkey was not enough to prevent the Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and Turkey. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union Turkey entered the second phase of appeasing Germany.

2.2 Strict Neutrality and Appeasement of Germany

When the Soviet Union was attacked Churchill declared that London would follow the way of cooperating with Moscow against the Axis. Turkey already had doubts about British war plans. In addition to alliance with Moscow, Anglo-Soviet joint operation in Iran irritated Turkish leaders once more. According to the Atlantic Charter the great powers would be respectful of the integrity and independence of the other states. However, Turkey saw that small states could become warring nations when the benefits of great powers necessitated it. The reason of this operation was to send military supplies to the Soviet Union from America and Britain. Britain and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, reasoned that it was to prevent German fifth column activities which were developing to the extent that a pro-German government was about to be founded in Iran even though the Shah of Iran declared neutrality. For Turkey it was only an excuse to invade Iran. Britain was anxious about how Turkey would see this operation. Therefore they asked for American support to inform Turkey that it approved the Anglo-Soviet action in Iran. The Secretary of State of the

United States, Cordell Hull wanted a formal statement from both Britain and Russia that they would respect the territorial integrity of Iran.⁴¹ The important thing here is that Britain was aware of the results of such an action and also it knew that Turkey trusted America more. That is why London sought American support.

When Eden met Stalin in Moscow in December 1941, the concerns of Turkish leaders increased, thinking that Britain could have signed a secret agreement sacrificing a part of Turkish lands or the Straits to the Soviets. In the meantime, Turks were informed that the Soviet Union offered to give Dodecanese Islands, with some parts of Bulgaria and Syria to Turkey. Turks thought that unless the Soviet Union had wanted something from Turkey, it would not have offered those lands to Turkey. Turkey's fears were eliminated partially only after the text of the Anglo-Soviet Alliance was revealed.⁴² The Soviet Union abandoned its aggressive attitude of the first two years towards Turkey. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the latter sent a note to Turkey on August 10, 1941 declaring that it was content with the Montreaux Convention. Turkish concerns were not eliminated by this declaration because Germany published Molotov's designs over the Straits in the Berlin Conference.

After the attack of Japan on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 the United States of America entered the war. On May 20, 1942 an alliance was signed between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union.⁴³ However, America, unlike England, was not an imperialistic power in the eyes of Turks. While this situation was favorable for Turkish leaders they also had fears that America could leave Europe like it did after the First World War. Therefore Turkey did not consider America as a guarantee

⁴¹ Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 142-3.

⁴² Esmer and Sander, p. 173-174.

⁴³ Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih : 1918-1990*, (Ankara : İmge, 2001), p. 122.

against the Soviet Union, but against England's pressure to force Turkey to enter the war.

At the end of 1941 Japan on the Pacific, and Germany on the European theater were successfully leading the war. Germany moved into the middle of the Soviet lands and its dominance continued until August 1942 when German and Soviet armies met in Stalingrad. Deringil writes that until Allied ascendancy, Turkey moved towards stricter neutrality.⁴⁴ Without forgetting their commitments to the Allies, Turkish leaders were forced to appease Germany in the period of German victory in the war.

Turkey desired a negotiated peace between the Axis and the Allies. It did not trust Germany that it would stop fighting after it beat the Soviet Union. It was certain that there would have been no force to stop Germany or Italy if they had won the war, and Turkey's independence and integrity would have been shaken in the Mediterranean and on the Straits. However, they did not trust the Soviet Union either, that the same way there would have been no force to stop Stalin to found a new order in Europe if the Allies had won the war. Turkey wanted none of the powers to be completely destroyed or victorious. America's entrance to the war, on the other hand, made it certain that the Allies would win. Therefore Turkish desire for a negotiated peace was shattered. America was a great power but both geographically and ideologically it had kept its distance from European politics before the war. However, American interests in the Middle and Near East started to rise during 1942.⁴⁵ After that point there was a direct clash of American with British strategies and politics regarding the region, and Germany's economic and cultural realignment in Turkey.

⁴⁴ Deringil, p. 133.

⁴⁵ Bryson, p. 1.

Turkey realizing this clash, benefitted from this condition to maintain its non-belligerency.

After Turkey signed the Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression with Germany on June 18, 1941 the relations between the two countries started to improve. Germany's success at the battlefield was an important aspect in Turkish policy to change its attitude towards Axis and Allied powers. If it had continued the cold attitude towards Germany the latter might have attacked Turkey instead of letting it to slide the side of the Allies. Ideologically Turkey supported the cause of the Allies. British Ambassador at Ankara Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull Hugessen wrote to British Ambassador to the U.S. Lord Halifax describing Turkish position as "sitting on the fence, but at least they are sitting with their faces in our direction and their backs to Germany, though continually squinting over their shoulders to see what danger is brewing behind them – and always squinting sideways at Russia."⁴⁶ It is clear that Turkey did not trust any of the warring countries, but Germany's success forced Turkey to act more favorable to it.

As German-Turkish relations got better, Soviet-Turkish relations continued to deteriorate. The reaction of Turkey to the assassination in Ankara in an attempt to kill von Papen was both a reflection and a reason of this deterioration. On February 24, 1942 Papen was attacked in Ankara but he was not hurt. Turkish police arrested two Soviet citizens accusing them of helping the assassin who died in the explosion. In the Soviet press Turkey was severely criticized. U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Laurence Steinhardt informed the Turkish officials that according to his source the attempt against von Papen might have been conducted by the Gestapo, not Soviet agents. American Government, on the other hand, warned Steinhardt that he should

⁴⁶ "Extract from letter dated June 5th from the British Ambassador at Ankara to Lord Halifax" June 30, 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 23.

not give guarantee about this information, neither to Russia nor to Turkey.⁴⁷ Von Papen wrote that despite claims that it was the Gestapo behind this event, he believed Russians tried to kill him because he supported Turkish neutrality and supported Turkish integrity against the Soviet demands on the Straits.⁴⁸

Turkey could not put a powerful case against the Soviet suspects, and ignored the fact that this could have been done by the Gestapo agents. The Soviet defendants were sentenced to twenty years. Turkish officials told Steinhardt that they had some secret documents which proved the Soviets guilty. They did not want to use those documents in court so as not to worsen the already tense relations with the Soviets.⁴⁹ However, Turkish Ambassador to Moscow told Steinhardt that he would be “authorized to propose to Soviet authorities the release of Soviet defendants ‘at the end of the war’ in the event that their appeal should be unsuccessful.”⁵⁰ Barry Rubin writes about von Papen assassination that Moscow was definitely behind this attempt depending on Czechoslovakia Ambassador to Ankara Milos Hanak and press attaché of the Soviet Union in Istanbul Ismail Ahmedov.⁵¹ This contradiction in Turkish attitude in court was a result of anti-Soviet feelings as well as the fear of Germany which was still very powerful and on the borders of Turkey, having occupied Greece in 1941.

Germany’s rising influence in Turkey was intense especially in its policy towards the minorities. Anti-Semitism in the world increased after Hitler came to

⁴⁷ Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt to Secretary of State, March 25, 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 23.

⁴⁸ Franz von Papen, *Memoires*, (Paris, Flammarion Editeur, 1953) p. 305

⁴⁹ Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt to Secretary of State, June 23, 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 23. Record No: 867.00/3169.

⁵⁰ Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt to Secretary of State, June 20, 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 23. Record No: 867.00/3167.

⁵¹ For further detail about the assassination of von Papen see Barry Rubin, *İstanbul Entrikaları*, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1994), p. 19-36.

power. Turkey was not an exception. Especially after 1933, the attitude of the Turkish government changed towards minorities. In 1934 the campaign, “Speak Turkish” gained momentum especially in Izmir. Jews were pressed to speak Turkish instead of Spanish and French. This campaign heated the discussions about the faithfulness of non-Turkish population. Many Jews were attacked; their houses and shops were despoiled. When the *İskan* Law passed on June 14, 1934 Jews in Thrace were forced to immigrate to other cities. There were also anti-Semitic articles in the press which encouraged the Turkish youth to disturb non-Turkish population.⁵²

There are different approaches to Turkish attitude towards the refugees. Stanford Shaw wrote that Turkey hired Jews running away from the Nazi Government, especially professors to teach at Istanbul University.⁵³ Susanne C. Engelmann wrote to *New York Times* to refuse some claims that Turkey hired Nazi instructors for higher education, they were actually anti-Nazis who ran away from Axis countries.⁵⁴ On the other hand Bali writes that Turkey did not open its arms to Jewish refugees but only gave permissions to a limited number.⁵⁵ An incident which showed Turkish indifference happened in 1941, when Rumanian Jews were trying to go Palestine in a ship, *Struma*. The conditions of the ship did not serve for such a journey, and the passengers did not have the necessary documents to enter Palestine. The ship had to wait in Istanbul, yet the Turkish Government did not send enough aid to the passengers. Finally on February 23, 1942 Turkish police forced the ship to leave Turkey. The following day, the ship was sunk by a torpedo from, most probably, a Russian submarine in the Black Sea. Only one passenger survived.

⁵²Rıfat N. Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri, Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000), p. 330.

⁵³ Stanford J. Shaw, *Turkey and the Holocaust*, (Ankara: İnönü Vakfı , 1992), p. 4-9.

⁵⁴ Susanne C. Engelmann, “Most Professors Anti-Nazi” Dec. 10, 1943 in “Letters to the Times” *New York Times*, Dec. 18, 1943, p. 14.

⁵⁵ Bali, p. 322.

Turkish press showed little attention to *Struma* during the time it was in Turkey. After Anatolian Agency published the events leading to the explosion of *Struma*, Prime Minister Refik Saydam ordered the resignation of the 26 people, all of whom were Jewish officials working in the Anatolian Agency, on May 4, 1942.⁵⁶

British policy towards the Jewish refugees was also influential in Turkey's attitude. Martin Gilbert writes that at the beginning of the war Britain pressed Turkey to forbid passages from reaching Palestine.⁵⁷ Through the end of 1943, however, there was a change in the British policy. It began to support the passage of Jewish refugees to Palestine via Turkey.⁵⁸

Shaw wrote that the Turkish Government tried to protect Turkish Jews from Nazi demands like issuing passports to them under German invasion in Europe and who were former Turkish citizens during the war. Still after Germany invaded the Balkans, Turkey acted in a more conciliatory way to avoid German invasion by limiting the entry of Jews into military schools, as a part of Turkish policy of appeasing Germany.⁵⁹

The most known reflection of this sentiment was the Capital tax. Turkish economy was badly affected by the war. The prices and defense expenditure kept rising while Turkish currency lost its value. "Turkey needed an extraordinary tax on capital," and Capital Tax was passed on November 12, 1942 as Law No. 4305. The aim was to collect money from the people who took advantage of the emergency conditions and made war-inflated profits. However in practice the tax aimed at the non-Muslim minorities who were generally merchants, bankers, commission agents, etc. Faik Ökte, the Finance Director of İstanbul, writes that they had to gather

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 346-362.

⁵⁷ Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History*, (London: Doubleday, 1998), p. 101.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p. 35.

information about the rich minorities to decide their war-time fortunes. “I asked İzmen (Finance Inspector Mehmet İzmen) how these figures were calculated. He responded with a smile: ‘Simply by guesswork’.” There were two lists for the tax payers, the M list, for Muslims, and G list for Non-Muslims.⁶⁰ Ökte also writes that İnönü supported the Capital Tax. The taxes were very high and since the figures were not defined depending on factual information, some people could not pay their debts. These people were sent to labor camps in Aşkale. Yet, forced labor was not applied to Muslim Turkish tax payers.⁶¹ Baskin Oran writes that there was not a direct German propaganda which led the Turkish officials to pass Capital Tax. However, there was indirect influence of nationalist German ideology which Turkey did not want to suppress to ingratiate with Germany.⁶²

On September 17, 1943 the first attempt to cancel the Wealth Tax was taken with cancelation of the debts of small wage-earners and artisans. Shaw wrote that this was with the direct intervention of İsmet İnönü and because the government saw “the futility of removing people from their ability to produce the wealth that the Treasury was trying to tax.”⁶³ On the other hand, it was cancelled right before İnönü went to Cairo to meet Roosevelt and Churchill. Weisband writes that the most influential factor in cancellation of the Capital Tax was to show good-will towards the Allies. The pressure on Turkey to enter the war was increasing and since Turkey rejected all the requests England was getting intense. To develop their relations Turkey decided to show some support by letting the prisoners in Askale free.⁶⁴ The

⁶⁰ Non-Muslim means Gayrimuslim in Turkish, that is why they used “G” list.

⁶¹ Faik Ökte, *The Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax*, (London: Croom Helm, 1987). For further information also see, Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikası*, (İstanbul İletişim Yayınları, 2000)

⁶² Baskin Oran, “Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat ve Sağ-Sol Akımlar”, (229-275), *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, C. XXIV, No. 3, Eylül 1969, p. 244.

⁶³ Shaw, p. 43.

⁶⁴ Weisband, p. 236.

total cancellation of the tax was on March 15, 1944.⁶⁵ At that time Germany had lost its power.

Capital Tax was examined in a report prepared by Vahan Kalenderian of the American Foreign Law Association, “The Legal System of the Republic of Turkey and Its Administration with Particular Stress on Taxation Affecting Domestic and Foreign Interests.” It is written that the tax:

cannot be set apart from the plan of Turkification, Turkey for the Turks, and segregation, if not dispersal, of non-Islams from what is now Turkey in Europe... Within two months after enactment on November, 11, 1942, its real purpose became apparent. It assumed the means for the suppression of foreigners and liquidation of minorities... It is reported that those [businesses] owned by Greeks, Italians and Jugoslavs were taxed almost as heavily as those of the Turkish minorities. French, German and Bulgarian concerns were taxed less heavily and those of American and British suffered comparatively mild exactions.⁶⁶

This report was prepared in 1944. Therefore it analyses the tax in a more objective way. However, the documents of 1943 show that the American attitude towards this tax was less critical. There are documents, written especially by Armenians in America to the American Government asking for its interference to abolish the capital tax in the name of humanity. The response from the State Department to these people and foundations who asked help of the American Government was that although ideologically the American Government disapproved of discrimination of any kind and anywhere, it was also government policy to avoid interference in the internal affairs of other nations.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Ökte, p. 87-89.

⁶⁶ Vahan H. Kalenderian “The Legal System of the Republic of Turkey and its Administration, with Particular Stress on Taxation Affecting Domestic and Foreign Interests” *American Foreign Law Association*, February, 1944, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 23. Record No: 867.044/265

⁶⁷ Chief of Division of Near Eastern Affairs Paul R. Alling to S. B. Maldant, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 29. Record No: 867.4016/1046.

Mr. C. L. Sulzberger was a correspondent in Turkey who wrote about the capital levy tax in *New York Times*. State Department records defined these articles as “alarming.”⁶⁸ Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye write that although America and Britain were absolutely against the tax, they tried to prevent critical articles to be written in the newspapers in order not to lose the support of Turkey in the years of 1942 and 1943.⁶⁹

One considerable example was the publication of “The International Jew” by Henry Ford which was translated into Turkish by Selma Gücüyener, who was known to maintain friendly relations with German circles in İstanbul. A member of the American Embassy staff spoke with Selim Sarper, the Director General of the Press about it. He mentioned that translation and publication of such a book which was written twenty years ago, especially at this peculiar time was surprising. Sarper agreed that it “must have been inspired by Axis circles and expressed regret that this should have occurred since, he said, the Turkish Government was sincerely desirous of preventing anti-Semitism in Turkey where Jewish community has traditionally for many centuries received a friendly asylum.”⁷⁰ Considering the strict censorship of the Government over all kinds of publications during the Second World War, it is difficult to accept that this passed unnoticed by the authorities.

The Allies did not show strong reaction to these kinds of racist elements in Turkey. One of the reasons was that they were also influenced of the anti-Semitic sentiment of the Nazi world. Still, the most important reason was the condition of Turkey. It was strategically important for the Allied plans. Offending Turkey by

⁶⁸ Donald G. Lothrop to Secretary of State, Nov. 15, 1943, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 29. Record No: 867.4016/1053.

⁶⁹ Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, *United States and Turkey and Iran*, (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1971), p. 97.

⁷⁰ Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt to Secretary of State, No. 407, “Translation of ‘The International Jew’ by Henry Ford” July 5, 1943, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 29. Record No: 867.4016/1045

interfering, or showing a strong reaction to its internal affairs would most probably push Turkey to Germany.

Another influence of Germany was on the rise Pan-Turanism in Turkey.⁷¹ The major change in Turkish attitude was seen when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Germany started to support Turkish historical desire of pan-Turanism directly in diplomatic talks on August 5, 1941, to convince Turkey to enter the war against the Soviets by promising autonomy over Turkic nations in the Soviet lands.⁷² After 1941 pan-Turanist movement in the Turkish press became popular, new magazines and newspapers emerged. Germany encouraged pan-Turanism through financial subsidies to some Turkish newspapers.⁷³ Turkish press was under strict control of the government. Therefore it can be said that the fascist approach in the press was in accordance with the Turkish policy of appeasing Germany. As Baskin Oran writes it was another way of keeping its non-belligerency without offending Germany.⁷⁴

Between October 15 and November 5, 1941 two Turkish Generals were invited by Germany to the eastern front and a committee of experts on Turanism was founded in Turkey.⁷⁵ Unofficial contacts were maintained. Nuri Paşa and Zeki Velidi Togan visited Berlin.⁷⁶ It is also a fact that in the Turkish armed forces, important names like Generals Emir Erkilet, Ali Fuat Erden, Asım Gündüz and Fevzi Çakmak were pro-German and were interested in Turanism.⁷⁷ Franz Von Papen was also supporting Pan-Turanism and he was the one who organized that visit to the

⁷¹ Pan Turanism: is the idea of uniting all Turkic peoples from the Volga to China. It had been a recurrent theme since the days of the Ottoman Empire. Deringil, p. 129.

⁷² Günay Göksu Özdoğan, "II. Dünya Savaşı Yıllarındaki Türk-Alman İlişkilerinde İç ve Dış Politika Aracı Olarak Pan-Türkizm" *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, Faruk Sönmezoğlu ed., (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994) p. 367.

⁷³ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, Cilt I, p. 660-674.

⁷⁴ Baskin Oran, "Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat ve Sağ-Sol Akımlar", p. 264.

⁷⁵ Johannes Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, (Ankara: Onur yayınları, 1976), p. 207, and Deringil, p. 131.

⁷⁶ Deringil, p. 130-131.

⁷⁷ Vere-Hodge, p. 149.

eastern front.⁷⁸ Erkilet wrote that in his talk with Hitler, the latter stirred Turkish fears about Soviet intentions on the Straits. Therefore German offense against the Soviet Union had a great value in the eyes of Erkilet, who was also a supporter of pan-Turanism. He wrote about the increasing pan-Turanist sentiment in the Turkic lands in the Soviets.⁷⁹

It is a debated issue whether Turkish Government really supported pan-Turanist ideals. On August 28, Papen reported that İnönü said he would be ready to talk about the future of Turkic nations after Soviet defeat was certain.⁸⁰ Özdoğan writes that during the period of intense German pressure, Turkey seemed to support Pan-Turanism until it became certain which side would win the war.⁸¹ According to Deringil the official policy of the Turkish Government was to deny all the pan-Turanist elements, but they could not remain indifferent to the situation either. Therefore, they waited for the end of the Soviet-German war.⁸² According to Glasneck, Turkey was not trying to develop its relations with the Soviet Union. The leaders believed that the anti-Soviet attitude of Turkey would influence Germany, so that they could claim rights over the Turkic nations after Germany beat the Soviet Union.⁸³ Frank Weber writes that İnönü often met with members of The Historical Society of Ankara which was “a hotbed of militant Pan-Turanism.”⁸⁴ Vere-Hodge also writes that Turkish officials were informally talking about founding Turkic states in the Caucasus, and the Turkish Government was not trying to suppress pan-Turanism. Baskın Oran writes that it was true that Turkey negotiated with Germany

⁷⁸ Emrullah Tekin, *Alman Gizli Operasyonları ve Türkler*, (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2002), 133.

⁷⁹ For detailed information about Erkilet’s visit to the Eastern front see, Emir H. Erkilet, *Sark Cephesinde Gorduklerim*. (İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1943).

⁸⁰ Koçak, *Türkiye’de Millî Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, Cilt I, p. 663.

⁸¹ Özdoğan, p. 358.

⁸² Deringil, p. 130.

⁸³ Glasneck, p. 170.

⁸⁴ Weber, p. 111.

about the future of Turkic states, but did not seriously intend to play a role there. It was only to divert Germany. The major mistake of Turkey in this respect was not to let the Soviet Union know of their real intentions considering the conflicts which could occur in the future.⁸⁵ Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, on the other hand write that protocol number 2 was an indication that Turkey would in no case take up arms against the Soviet Union.⁸⁶

Despite those claims, it is impossible to prove whether the Turkish Government was seriously supporting Turanism because Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives are closed. However, after the foundation of the new republic, Turkey did not want to gain new lands, knowing that the Turks in the Soviet lands were culturally different from the Turks in the Republic of Turkey, and it would cause more problems for Turkey to annex those lands. It could be interpreted as Turkish leaders' efforts to appease Germany. Germany had no intentions to give autonomy to Turkic countries, contrary to the hopes of some Turkish officials and army generals. Instead it wanted to rule those states under its own police control.⁸⁷ In Turkey the decision mechanism was composed of the President of the Republic; İsmet İnönü, Foreign Affairs Minister Numan Menemencioğlu and Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu, and none of them supported annexing more lands or forming autonomy over Turkic states. İnönü said in opening session of the National Assembly on November 1, 1940 that Turkey had no intention to annex lands.⁸⁸ Turkish agents in Germany and officials in Turkey continued to give the impression that Ankara would enter the war as soon as it had enough war materials and when the Soviet

⁸⁵ Baskın Oran, "Türkiye'nin Kuzeydeki Büyük Komşu Sorunu Nedir? Türk Sovyet İlişkileri 1939-1970", (229-275), *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, C. XXV, No. 1, Mart 1970, p. 53-54.

⁸⁶ Thomas and Frye, p. 91.

⁸⁷ Vere-Hodge, p. 153.

⁸⁸ İsmet İnönü, "Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin 6 ncı Dönem 2 nci Yasama Yılıını Açış Konuşmaları" *İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'deki Konuşmaları: 1920-1973*, p. 11.

threat was eliminated by the German army.⁸⁹ However, these claims were almost the same which Turkey said to the Allied countries, that they would enter the war as soon as they had enough materials to resist Germany. Turkey was afraid of a Soviet victory but they were also aware of the threat which they would face in case of a German victory.

It is highly probable that the Turkish Government did not show strong reaction to pan-Turanism because it was trying to give the impression that it would enter the war on the side of Germany as soon as it was ready. From the beginning of the war Germany inclined to offer Turkey some lands. Before the Non-Aggression and Friendship Agreement was signed, Ribbentrop suggested to Von Papen that he could offer Turkey islands in Aegean or lands near Edirne to convince it to allow transfer of armaments to the Middle East.⁹⁰ These lands were strategically important for Turkish security, still Turkey rejected these offers. What Turkey's attitude would be in case of a German victory over the Soviets is unknown. It can be said that Turkey would join the Axis forces. However, as mentioned above Turkey did not trust Germany that it would let Turkey to maintain its independence and integrity which was considered as the basis of the Republic.

In the meantime American interest in the Near East began to grow. Wendell Wilkie visited Turkey on September 7-10, 1942 as personal advisor of Roosevelt. His visit to Turkey was a significant event in terms of the rivalry between America and Britain. Glasneck quotes from Papen who, depending on an American source, learned one of the aims of Wilkie's visit to Turkey was to talk about the post-war world order. Turkey would have a leading role in this new order in the Near East.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Vere-Hodge, p. 153.

⁹⁰ "Ribbentrop'tan Papen'e Telgraf" May 19, 1941, No. 485, *Hitlerin Türk Dostları*, (İstanbul: Düş Yayınları, 2006) , p. 19.

⁹¹ Glasneck, p. 230.

However, İnönü did not see Wilkie because he was on a trip. Actually it was İnönü's excuse to avoid Wilkie. According to Glasneck he did not want to antagonize Germany by meeting Roosevelt's personal advisor.⁹² The Turkish press on the other hand showed great interest in Wilkie's visit.

2.3 Allied Victories at War and Abandonment of the Appeasement Policy

One of the reasons why Turkey did not really trust England was the latter's inability to form a strong resistance to the Axis progress. Through the end of 1942, the Allies started to be more active and successful in the battles against the Axis. Britain successfully stopped Axis forces in North Africa at the end of 1941 and after that date, almost whole North Africa was taken by the Allies and the colonies were taken from Italy.⁹³ On November 1942, American forces landed on the shores of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean of French Africa. With strong resistance and fight of the Allies in Africa, in May 1943 all of the German and Italian units there surrendered.⁹⁴

The most important victory for the Allies was the Stalingrad battle. Hitler insisted upon taking Stalingrad but the Soviet Union fought really hard and the end of 1942 was a turning point in the Second World War because it was the first serious blow to the German armed forces. As Sander writes after that date, while Germany was losing power, the Allies started to penetrate Europe.⁹⁵ Allied operations in North Africa were also influential in changing the Turkish attitude towards the belligerents.

⁹² *Ibid*, p. 229.

⁹³ Oral Sander, *Siyasi tarih : 1918-1990*, p. 114.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 126.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 123.

In *New York Times* change in Turkish policy was described as from “very neutral” to “a non-fighting ally of Britain” after the North Africa campaign.⁹⁶

These developments, while relieving Turkey from German circle around its lands, gave birth to new difficulties. According to Deringil, these developments in war, de-emphasized Turkey’s strategic importance as barring Germany to enter the Middle East.⁹⁷ Turkey started to focus on its inability to conduct an effective warfare since it lacked necessary and modernized weapons and munitions. Allied pressures upon Turkey to enter the war increased after 1942, but Turks were still afraid of German threat which could bomb important cities of Turkey easily, and Soviet intentions on the Straits. England used Turkey’s fears to increase the pressure that is Turkey could guarantee aid from western countries against Soviet expansionism after the war, only by entering the war.⁹⁸

As Germany started to lose battles, the pressure of the Allies increased over Turkey. Esmer and Sander write that after the Soviet Union stopped Germany in Stalingrad, they again became aggressive towards Turkey. Churchill, playing on the fear of the Soviet Union, tried to force Turkey to enter the war. Turkey would be a key point in the strategic war plans against Germany. Until the end of 1942, Turkey blocked German expansion to the Middle East; however, in 1943 Turkey was blocking Allied expansion to Europe. According to Churchill’s plans, through Turkey, they could reach the Balkans and with a successful operation Germany would be beaten. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, wished Turkey to enter the

⁹⁶ Harold Callender, “Turks, Spain and Italy Begin to See the Light” *New York Times*, Feb 14, 1943, p. E5.

⁹⁷ Deringil, p. 182.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 186.

war because in that way, German troops would be diverted to Turkey and it would be relieved.⁹⁹

In the Casablanca Conference Turkey's entry into the war was discussed. Americans were reluctant first because they did not want to divert forces, and secondly they suspected that Churchill was trying to form a sphere of influence in the Mediterranean and the Balkans by using American men and materials. At the end of the conference the big three decided to convince Turkey to allow the use of its airbases.¹⁰⁰

Depending on the decision taken in Casablanca, Churchill went to Adana to talk with İnönü. At the Adana Conference Turkey's military condition was discussed and it was decided to send more armaments to Turkey, and that Turkey would not be forced to enter the war, but it would decide whenever it had enough military power to enter the war.¹⁰¹ Before Adana, Britain tried to invade the Rhodes Island, but German forces beat the British. In this respect, Turkey maintained the claim that German military power was still a threat and that Britain could not insist upon Turkey's entrance to the war.¹⁰²

Another important decision taken at Casablanca was the "unconditional surrender" principle. This meant the absolute defeat of Germany which was the only power that could stop Soviet expansion. Moreover, America again let Britain to handle Turkey. Turks thought that after the war America would move away from European affairs and leave England and the Soviet Union alone. Britain had no

⁹⁹ Esmer and Sander, p. 177.

¹⁰⁰ William Hardy McNeill, *Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946: America, Britain & Russia*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1953) p. 272.

¹⁰¹ Esmer and Sander, p. 179-180.

¹⁰² Deringil, p. 199-204.

power to stop Soviet threat. Therefore Casablanca was a negative development for Turkey's position.¹⁰³

Germany was watching these developments closely, but Berlin knew of Turkish anxiety upon a possible Soviet victory, and so they thought that Turkey would not enter the war on the Axis side, but it would not attack Germany, either.¹⁰⁴ To guarantee Turkish neutrality Germany began to threaten Turkey that if it "entered the war, or even increased its collaboration with the Allies, the German *Luftwaffe* would bomb İstanbul and other Turkish cities."¹⁰⁵ This was not an empty threat. America seemed to connive Turkish fears. "There seems little doubt that not only could the Reich, using Bulgaria as a base, make a stab for the European shore of the Dardanelles[...] but also that it is actually making preparations for this jump should circumstances force the move."¹⁰⁶ It was a fact that although the German forces began to lose power in the summer of 1943, they still could bomb Turkish cities, and it would be devastating for Turkey.

At the Quebec Conference, on August 17, 1943, the Allies were considering opening a new front in the Balkans and although they did not want to force Turkey to enter the war, their pressures increased to make Turkey open its air bases. Soviet pressures and criticism of Turkey were increasing.¹⁰⁷

At the Moscow Conference, on October 19, 1943, Stalin wanted to increase the pressure over Turkey, and if necessary to push Turkey into the war by force. England and America did not support this idea, considering the Overlord Plan to Western Europe. If they had forced Turkey to enter the war, they would have to send

¹⁰³ Weisband, p. 130.

¹⁰⁴ Esmer and Sander, p. 182-183.

¹⁰⁵ Harry N. Howard, "The Entry of Turkey into WWII", *Belleten*, C. XXXI, 1967, (221- 275), p. 237.

¹⁰⁶ George Axelson, "Germans in Bulgaria Held a Threat to Dardanelles" *New York Times*, May 16, 1943, p. E5.

¹⁰⁷ Esmer and Sander, p. 184-186.

a lot of war materials to Turkey which would divert their preparations.¹⁰⁸ Still they accepted to request Turkey to enter the war.

Eden met Menemencioğlu, in Cairo on November 5-6 to discuss the decisions taken at Moscow. He again pressed for Turkish air bases, asked Turkey to stop chrome sales to Germany and to prevent German ships to pass through the Straits. Menemencioğlu, on the other hand, rejected to give bases because in that case they could not stop Germany from bombing important Turkish cities. Turkey would not enter the war unless German threat was eliminated.¹⁰⁹

At the Tehran Conference Turkish position in the war was discussed again, but this time Churchill offered that if Turkey rejected to enter the war, it would lose its chance to take part in peace talks after the war. Stalin, on the other hand, was no more desirous for Turkish entry. He suggested that Turkey should enter the war but England and America should not send more armaments to Turkey because operation Overlord was more important. Stalin wanted to prevent Turkey from strengthening because otherwise, it could threaten Soviet plans for the post-war world.¹¹⁰ Moscow lessened the pressure on Ankara to enter the war because first of all it would mean to divert armaments to Turkey from operation OVERLORD, and secondly to keep the western allies out of the Balkans because they suspected Churchill's plans for the post-war world in that region.¹¹¹ Roosevelt's son Elliot Roosevelt wrote that the Soviet Union was reluctant about Turkey's entrance to the war because it did not want Turkey to have a word in the post-war world.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p. 186-187.

¹⁰⁹ Esmer and Sander, p. 187-189.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 189-190.

¹¹¹ George Kirk, *Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946, The Middle East in the War*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 27.

¹¹² Elliot Roosevelt, *İfşa Ediyorum*, (Istanbul: Nebioglu Yayınevi) p. 139.

Roosevelt and Churchill invited İnönü to Cairo. Their meeting, known as the Second Cairo Conference, took place between December 4 and December 6, 1943. İnönü accepted to go to Cairo only if their meeting would be held among equals that he would not go there just to approve the decisions taken before about Turkey. His conditions were accepted. Germany was not informed of this conference but İnönü attended Cairo with a diplomatic commission headed by Menemenciöđlu. However, there was not a single military officer in the commission. According to Yuluđ Tekin Kurat the aim was to soften German reaction.¹¹³ Jaeschke, on the other hand claims that Turkish rejection was not because they feared a German offensive but because they feared that an “allied” Soviet Union would not leave the Straits.¹¹⁴ Of course both reasons were valid.

Both Roosevelt and Churchill sent private planes to Turkey to bring the Turkish committee. This caused a protocol problem, but it was important also to show the clash between the American and British interests. Cordell Hull described this situation as a “friendly rivalry between Mr. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.”¹¹⁵ İnönü took Roosevelt’s plane while the rest of the committee took Churchill’s plane. This again shows that Turkey looked America better than England.

In the meetings Turkey was asked to enter the war. In principle Turkey agreed but it wanted to satisfy the needs of war materials before it declared war. Turkish leaders constantly repeated their anxiety about Germany. Despite Churchill’s efforts to convince Turkey to enter the war, Roosevelt’s words to Churchill, that if he “were a Turk, he would require more assurance of aid than Britain had promised

¹¹³ Yuluđ Tekin Kurat, “Kahire Konferansı Tutanakları (4-7 Aralık 1943) ve Türkiye’yi Savařa Sokma Giriřimleri”, *Belleten*, C. XLVII, 1984, (295-338), 317.

¹¹⁴ G. Jaeschke “I. ve II. Dünya Savaşlarında Türkiye’nin Dıř Politikası”, *Belleten*, C. XLI, 1977, (733-743), 741.

¹¹⁵ Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. II, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948) p.1369.

before abandoning neutrality and leading his nation into war”¹¹⁶ showed that America did not really support the idea of Turkish entry to the war.¹¹⁷

Ailen G. Gramer writes that American support for Turkey’s reluctance to enter the war in Cairo was the first time when America stepped up to become a “protector” of Turkey.¹¹⁸ It would be misleading to define America as a protector because Roosevelt was thinking of the operation OVERLORD and the war in the Pacific more than the security of Turkey. Still, İnönü rested on Roosevelt’s reluctance to push Turkey into the war, because he believed that America was becoming less interested in Aegean operations, and more in the Asia front.¹¹⁹ Unlike Britain America was “relieved rather than disappointed” by the failure of bringing Turkey into the war.¹²⁰

When Germany faced defeat by the Soviets, Turkish attitude began to change. It held a more positive attitude towards the Allies, and limited its close relations with Germany. Especially after 1942, favorable articles about the Allies in the Turkish press increased. After the Cairo talks as reported in *New York Times* Turkish radio said “Turkey is not a neutral country. She has never been one during this war. She is in reality one of the United Nations, contributing her share to winning this great struggle.”¹²¹ İnönü’s speech at the opening session of the National Assembly on November 1, 1944 was essential in showing the affiliation of Turkish Government towards the Allies. He praised the United States of America emphasizing the fact that the relations between the two countries were developing; England by saying that the friendship between Turkey and England was growing; and France celebrating its

¹¹⁶“Quadripartie Dinner Meeting, December 4, 1943, 8:30 P.M., Roosevelt’s Villa” FRUS *The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 698.

¹¹⁷ Kurat, “Kahire Konferansı Tutanakları”, p. 322.

¹¹⁸ Gramer, p. 280.

¹¹⁹ Weisband, p. 203.

¹²⁰ McNeill, p. 371

¹²¹ “Ankara Never Neutral, Turkish Broadcast Says” *New York Times*, Dec. 16, 1943, p. 5.

liberation, but he did not say anything about Germany unlike in his previous speeches when he pointed the good and balanced relations with all the belligerents.¹²²

Before Turks went to Cairo, for the Second Cairo Conference, they let the prisoners of capital levy tax in Aşkale free. After the break of diplomatic relations with Germany the Grand National Assembly passed a law to release of citizens of Allied countries arrested for political or military crimes. In accordance with this law Soviet defendants of von Papen case were released, too.¹²³ Pan-Turanism was also closed down by Turkish officials. Especially during 1944, Turkish Government showed strong reactions to pan-Turanist elements. One of the reasons, of course, was not to trigger the Soviet enmity. İnönü gave a speech on the occasion of the celebration of the Youth Day denouncing racism and Pan-Turanism and talked about the damage for the unity of Turkey.¹²⁴ Moreover, Government took some people known as pan-Turanists to court.¹²⁵

The Chief of General Staff Marshall Fevzi Çakmak was thought to be pro-German by the Allies. On January 12, 1944 he retired. This was considerable for the Allies because with Çakmak's retirement pro-German administration in Turkish armed forces had come to an end, and instead a pro-Ally administration took over.¹²⁶

Another indication that Turkey's policy had changed according to the events during the war and its attitude became more pro-Ally especially after 1943 was about the passage of German war ships from the Straits. During the war the Allies insisted

¹²² İsmet İnönü, "Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin 7 nci Dönem 2 nci Yasama Yilini Açış Konuşmaları" *İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'deki Konuşmaları*, p. 52

¹²³ Kelley to Secretary of State, telegram no. 1467., Aug. 10, 1944, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 23. Record No: 867.00/8-1044

¹²⁴ Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt to Secretary of State, Telegram no. 918., May 20, 1944, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 23. Record No: 867.00/3280

¹²⁵ Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt to Secretary of State, telegram no. 798., "Pan-Turanian Movement in Turkey" Sept. 21, 1944, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 23. Record No: 867.00/9-2144.

¹²⁶ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, Cilt II, 237-238.

upon Turkey to open the Straits, but Turks rejected depending on the Montreaux Convention. George Lenczowski writes that even if Turkey had opened the Straits to Allied shipping, they could not have used it because of the Axis forces in the Balkans, which could have easily bombed the ships and the Straits.¹²⁷ On the other hand, According to Koçak German archival sources indicated that in 1941 and 1942 German war ships and submarines passed through the Straits under Turks' knowledge, and against the principles of the Montreaux Convention.¹²⁸ Cenap Çakmak, on the other hand claims that Turkey enforced the regulations according to the Montreaux Convention strictly.¹²⁹ This was a great issue which affected Turkey's relations with the Allies, especially with the Soviet Union. Allies protested this regulation that German war ships passed through the Straits under cover of merchant ships.

It was not clear in the Montreaux Convention what the procedure should be for the small ships; for the merchant ships Turkey could only make a sanitary control which had to be limited and quick. Turkish Government therefore rejected all the requests of the Allies not to let the German ships pass through the Straits until June 1944. Menemencioğlu was the one who refused the requests of the Allies. When, however, it was understood that the ships were really war ships, Turkey protested Germany and declared that all the German ships would be examined carefully from then on. Menemencioğlu was considered to be pro-Nazi by the Allies, so he was forced to resign which was again considered by the Allies as a distinct change in Turkish politics towards the Allies.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ George Lenczowski, *United States Interests in the Middle East*, (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1968), p. 594.

¹²⁸ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, Cilt I, p. 644.

¹²⁹ Cenap Çakmak, "Turkey in the Second World War: Evasive or 'Active' Neutral?", *Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, s:26, Ağustos-Ekim 2005, (61-78), p. 68.

¹³⁰ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, Cilt II, p. 245-253 and Weisband, cilt 3, p.58-63.

After the Second Cairo Conference a British military committee went to Ankara to decide the necessary armaments to be sent to Turkey. However, Britain found Turkey's demands too much, while Turks thought that the British were giving not enough.¹³¹ On March 2, 1944, Britain cut armaments aid to Turkey, and America cut Lend-Lease aid on April 1. Moreover, while Britain asked Turkey to enter the war, it did not share its war plans with Turkey. Therefore, Turks, who had doubts about British and Soviet secret post-war plans, could not trust Britain.¹³² The next and final step was the break of Turkish-German diplomatic relations which was on August, 2, 1944.¹³³

Turkey's relations to belligerents changed according to their defeats and victories during the war. At the first years of war Turkey was closer to the Allies but Axis victories and the fall of France in addition to Germany's attack on the Soviets forced Turkey to follow stricter neutrality while at the same time appeasement of Germany both in its economic, domestic and foreign relations. After 1942 with aid coming from America the Soviet Union began to show progress against the German forces, which turned the tide of the war. Although Germany was losing the war, Turks were anxious to trigger them to attack Turkey. Moreover, considering the post-war world, Turkey tried to prevent Russian forces to enter Turkish lands on the plea of helping Turkish forces. Although Turkish politicians repeated their belief in the Allied victory, to maintain their non-belligerency they followed the balance policy. This however was criticized by the other countries, the mildest of all was the United States of America. Turks were not only thinking about the during the war times but also had concerns about the future. Feeling threatened by German attack during the war and Russian intentions after the war in addition to the distrust felt towards

¹³¹ Esmer and Sander, p. 193.

¹³² *Ibid*, 194-195.

¹³³ *Ibid*, 198.

Britain, Turkey turned to America to stay out of the war and to maintain its integrity after the war.

CHAPTER III

AMERICAN ECONOMIC WARFARE IN TURKEY AGAINST GERMANY AS PROPAGANDA

According to Koçak, the core of Turkish-German relations was economic, instead of diplomatic.¹³⁴ After 1933, Nazi Germany tried to develop trade with Southeast Europe, Near East and Balkan countries because Germany did not have colonies to supply its needs. Moreover, Germany needed raw materials and agricultural products but did not have enough foreign currency reserves to maintain regular commercial relations, so it had to trade with the clearing system. Other countries needed a market to sell their raw materials which they could not sell to western countries because they were already getting their needs from a cheaper price from their colonies. Trade depending on clearing system worked for both sides.¹³⁵

Turkish economy was also weak. It mainly depended on agriculture, but lacked the necessary industrialism to process raw materials. In this respect trade with Germany was also profitable for Turkey. Germany was buying Turkish materials at a higher price than the western countries would buy. However this situation caused dependence of the Turkish economy on Germany. Turks believed that economic self-sufficiency meant political independence and integrity which were the most

¹³⁴ Cemil Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri 1923-1939*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), p. 55.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 199-200.

important ideals of the new republic. Therefore, Turkey tried to balance its economic relations with Germany by developing its trade with the western countries, especially after the tension in Europe started to rise with German and Italian aggression.

After evaluating the pre-war economic relations of Turkey with European countries, this chapter will focus on America's increasing role in the Turkish economy by replacing Britain in the economic warfare against Germany. The main purpose of America in developing commercial relations with Turkey was to break Germany's influence more than developing Turkish economy. Therefore American efforts can be described as a means of propaganda.

Turkish-German commercial relations reached its height when Hitler came to power in 1933. Hitler benefitted from economic dependence to accomplish his aims in foreign policy, so after he came to power one of his first actions was to increase economic relations with Eastern Europe and the Balkans.¹³⁶ The biggest German steel, electric and chemistry firms (Krupp, Otto Wolff, Ferrostaahl, Vereinigte Atahl-Werke, Gutehoffnungshütte, Henschel und Sohn, Bergmann-Borsing, Siemens, AEG) were working in Turkey.¹³⁷ In 1937, Turkey started meetings about building ships for Turkish commercial fleet with Germany and almost all of the fleet was built by the Germans. Turkey and Germany signed Turkish-German Aviation Agreement in April 1939, and Lufthansa became a monopoly in Turkish aviation. During the Second World War air traffic between Germany and Ankara continued.¹³⁸ Germany also made investments in Turkish railroad buildings. Turkey mainly sold agricultural products and raw materials to Germany, and bought industrial products in return.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ Armaoğlu, p. 672.

¹³⁷ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, p. 203 and Johannes Glasneck, p. 71.

¹³⁸ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, p. 206-209.

¹³⁹ *Ibid*, 86.

In 1937 Turkish-German relations cooled because of Turkish attempts to form a Balkan Entente and Saadabad Pact which were considered by Germany as against their interests in those areas.¹⁴⁰ Still Germany was the main country in Turkish commercial relations. On August 30, 1937, Germany and Turkey signed Turkish-German Trade Agreement in Berlin and this agreement would be valid between September 15, 1937 and August 31, 1938. In July 26, 1938 a new agreement was signed and that would be valid until August 31, 1939.

In the meantime, realizing that Germany was trying to influence Turkish foreign policy in its favor Turkey tried to break the hegemony of Germany. In 1936 Turkish Ministry of Economy prepared the draft of the second-five year plan which was concerned with the national defense, unlike the previous plan. While the first plan was achieved by Soviet and German aid, the second plan depended on the economic assistance from Britain. This had not only economic but also political importance because it shows that Turkey tried to become closer to western countries.¹⁴¹ Moreover Turkey gave the rights of building iron and steel factories in Karabük to a British firm Brassert in June, 1936.¹⁴² In addition, Turkey bought ships, port equipments, radio broadcast facilities and planes from England. Turkish Air Forces also had several kinds of British, French and American aircrafts.¹⁴³ However these had minor influence compared to the German investments and trade.

Turkey was already buying armaments from Germany but in order not to be depended on one country it wanted to purchase arms from Britain and America. Nur Bilge Criss writes that Turkey wanted to purchase war material and Martin bombers

¹⁴⁰ Vere-Hodge, p. 113.

¹⁴¹ Dilek Barlas, *Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey*, (Leiden: Brill, 1998), p. 177-178.

¹⁴² Koçak, *Türkiye'de Millî Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, Cilt II, 204-205; Vere-Hodge, p. 112-113. However Glasneck writes that Brassert was an American firm and the England office was the responsible of this agreement, Glasneck, p. 79.

¹⁴³ Glasneck, p. 80.

from the United States in the interwar period. However Turkish demands were rejected by the State Department since war materials were forbidden to be sold to foreign countries.¹⁴⁴ American attitude towards Turkey in terms of selling armaments and other technological tools were not favorable before the war.

At the beginning of the 1930s, England and France were appeasing Germany, so that it would threaten the Soviet Union instead of western countries. Therefore England did not react strongly to Germany's hegemony in the South East at the beginning but only in the last years of the 1930s, England and France tried to play a more important role in the Turkish economy.¹⁴⁵ On May 27, 1938 Anglo-Turkish Credit agreement was signed for £16 million.¹⁴⁶

The credit agreement between England and Turkey was threatening for German dominance in the area. Therefore, before France signed a similar agreement with Turkey, Germany attempted to sign a credit agreement. The meetings between the two countries ended with the Turkish-German Credit Agreement on January 16, 1939. This agreement would have come into effect with the exchange of an aide memoire. Although Turkey took steps to validate the agreement, Germany refused it and the credit agreement between Turkey and Germany was not ratified.¹⁴⁷

To prevent Turkey from becoming closer to western countries Germany severed some of its economic relations, but did not end them totally because it was getting very important war materials from Turkey like chrome, timber, leather, wool, cotton and mohair. If Germany had ended economic relations with Turkey, England could have taken its place in the Turkish economy; so Germany decided only to cut

¹⁴⁴ Nur Bilge Criss, "Shades of Diplomatic Recognition: American Encounters with Turkey (1923-1937), *Studies in Atatürk's Turkey: The American Dimension*, George S. Harries and Nur Bilge Criss ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 132-134.

¹⁴⁵ Glasneck., p. 82-83.

¹⁴⁶ Deringil, p. 24.

¹⁴⁷ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, p. 232-239.

the transportation of arms to Turkey and dragged the issue of extending the Turkish-German Trade Agreement.¹⁴⁸ Turkey also did not want to cut its trade with Germany because 70% of German imports from Turkey were not vital for Germany but Turkey could not sell them to other countries, either.¹⁴⁹ In return Turkey reduced chrome transportation. Arms equipment was one of the major parts of Turkish commercial relations because it wanted to develop its armed forces. Meetings were held between the two countries; Turkey was trying to extend the agreement but when the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed in 1936 Turkey rejected to extend the agreement.¹⁵⁰ Turkey was the one who would be affected the most in ending trade with Germany, because the latter could have bought every product except chrome from other countries while Turkey could not sell its products to others.¹⁵¹ The day the war broke out in Europe trade between Germany and Turkey stopped.¹⁵²

The end of trade relations with Germany meant also the end of 50% of Turkish foreign trade. Western countries were unable to fill the vacuum instantly. Moreover, the merchant class in Turkey favored trade with Germany to maintain their businesses. In the Turkish army, German products were used and the army was content with the quality of those products. At the same time Germany was the only country who could produce the necessary replacement parts in case of mechanical problems, otherwise Turkey could not use those products.¹⁵³ Moreover, trade with Germany was made through land and railway, but with the western countries they

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 225.

¹⁴⁹ Ataöv, p. 40.

¹⁵⁰ Yuluğ Tekin Kurat "İkinci Dünya savaşında Türk-Alman Ticareti" *Belleten*, C. XXV, No. 97-100, (96-103), p. 96.

¹⁵¹ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, p. 228.

¹⁵² *Ibid*, p. 231.

¹⁵³ A.C Edwards, "The Impact of War on Turkey" , *International Affairs*, Vol. XXII, July 1946, (389-401), p. 395.

had to use sea transportation through the Mediterranean which was unsafe because of the war in that area.¹⁵⁴

The end of trade with Germany was a big opportunity for the Allies. While Turkey's commerce with Germany was coming to a halt, it signed a financial agreement with the Allies which was attached to the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Mutual Alliance Agreement on October 19, 1939. This financial agreement provided for:

(1) A credit of £ 25 millions by the British and French Governments to cover the supply of war material; (2) a loan of £ 15 millions in gold by the British and French Governments to be repaid in twenty years, the service and amortization of the loan being effected in Turkish pounds which were to be utilized for the purchase of tobacco or other Turkish products; (3) loans equivalent to £ 1 ½ millions by the Turkish Government and £ 2 millions by the British Government to be used in the first place for the transfer of British and French commercial credits recorded in the clearing account on 19th October 1939.¹⁵⁵

At the beginning of the war the aid coming from England, France and Germany was not taken only for economic worries but also for balancing foreign policy. Turkey believed that the Allies would win the war, but France's early fall and Britain's defeats in the war caused Turkey to change its attitude towards Germany. Moreover, despite the credit agreement and promises of the Allies, they could not supply Turkey's economic needs. In April 1940, the Allies could only supply half of the promised aid to Turkey.¹⁵⁶ The United States of America interfered in the economic warfare when England could not respond Turkey's needs.

¹⁵⁴ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, Cilt II, p. 367-368.

¹⁵⁵ Medlicott, *History of the Second World War: The Economic Blockade*, Vol. I. p. 272

¹⁵⁶ Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, Cilt I, p. 311.

3.1 America's Increasing Role in Turkish Economy

Before the war the economic relations between America and Turkey were limited because of the geographical distance and also America could buy its needs from other countries for a cheaper price. Still the Turkish market was the main reason in American recognition of the Ankara Government after the demolition of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey on the other hand, wanted to develop its relations with America to benefit from American capital.¹⁵⁷ Because of Turkey's strategic importance in the British war plans in the Middle East, commercial relations began to improve between America and Turkey. America also sent Lend-Lease aid to Turkey to strengthen Turkey's position in the Middle East. Moreover, especially after America entered the war, its needs of chrome increased and Turkey was one of the major suppliers of that material in the world. Considering the propaganda effect American Government took steps to develop commercial relations. Turkish attitude towards America, on the other hand, kept changing according to the tide of war, though it always considered America as a major economic force which could play an important role in the Turkish economy during and after the war.

Turkish-American economic relations were developing before the war but they were not intense. In 1929 and 1939 two commercial agreements were signed. These were important in terms of regulating trade between the two countries. However due to the global economic crisis, protectionist policies on trade and Turkey's inability to reserve foreign currency commercial relations between the two countries remained limited.¹⁵⁸ However, during the Second World War Turkish-

¹⁵⁷ Bilal Şimşir, "Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinin Yeniden Kurulması ve Ahmet Muhtar Bey'in Vaşington Büyükelçiliği" *Belleten*, XLI, 161-164, 1997, 297-299.

¹⁵⁸ Şuhnaz Yılmaz, *From Strangers to Allies: Turkish-American Relations (1800-1952)*, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 2000), p. 95

American commercial relations showed a considerable growth to break Germany's economic hegemony and decrease its influence on Turkish politics.

In 1940 America sold Turkey agricultural machinery "of a value estimated at 2,500,000 Turkish Pounds", which had a positive effect in Turkey in terms of American image. Turkish Government was very pleased with the machinery and distributed it to several parts of the country.¹⁵⁹ Turkey was buying these kinds of technical machinery from Germany before the war. Turkey also lacked the necessary industry to produce spare parts. Therefore it had to maintain considerable extent of relations after it bought technical tools. In this respect this was an important move for America to break loose Turkey from dependence on Germany's industrial items by replacing them with its own.

When Germany and Italy dominated over the Mediterranean Allied commerce was harmed. The withdrawal of American shipment in the Mediterranean caused a distance in the commercial relations between the two countries. Considering the strategic importance of Turkey in the Near East an American officer Irving Pflaum wrote to William J. Donovan, Coordonator of Information of the Office of Strategic Services on November 18, 1941 that they should act in favor of Turkey by sending a ship to Turkey loading its needs of "military equipment, automobile tires, industrial equipment, agricultural machinery and many kinds of semi-luxuries, including coffee, fancy cotton goods, clothing, office equipment and numerous other similar items." In return the ship could bring back Turkish chrome and tobacco. The report emphasized the fact that instead of economic purposes, such an act would

¹⁵⁹ "Current Developments in Turkey during the Month of July, 1940" from American Embassy at Istanbul, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 23, Record No. 867.00/3098.

have a major effect “from a propaganda point of view.”¹⁶⁰ Turkey was aware of the American economic power and that it was the only nation in the world which possessed the supplies that Turkey needed.

America was also aware of the position of Turkey that it would not trust empty promises like Britain’s. Britain could not supply Turkish needs and they could not buy Turkish products. Koçak refers to Wiehl’s report on Turkish economic situation by saying that Turkey was unable to replace Germany by England and France and therefore was facing economic difficulties.¹⁶¹ Medlicott also writes that although England wanted to prevent Turkish materials from going to Germany, it was impossible to send Turkey all the supplies it needed, or to buy Turkish exports which normally went to Germany, geographically impossible to carry materials to and from Turkey, and could not supply the spare parts which Turkey had to get from Germany.¹⁶² American perception of Turkey’s needs was much more realistic than the British. Irving Pflaum wrote in the same memorandum to Donovan that “The Turks are less interested in what we are going to do than in what we are doing for them.”¹⁶³

When trade with Germany ended and the Allies could not respond to Turkey’s needs, economic problems caused distress in Turkey. It could only handle the economic problems by internal loans or printing unsecured money. Inflation rose steadily during the war. Moreover, the war forced Turkey to mobilize a large army

¹⁶⁰ Irving Pflaum to Colonel William J. Donovan, Nov. 18, 1941, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services: Washington Director’s Office Administrative Files 1941-1945* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 118.

¹⁶¹ ADAP, Series D: 1937-1941, (Die Kriegsjahre), Band VIII, (Erster Band: 4. September 1939 bis 18. März 1940), “Wiehl’den Papen’e”, Nr. 333, 8.11.1939, (4531/144 250-61) in Cemil Koçak, *Türkiyede Milli Şef Dönemi*, Cilt I, p. 486.

¹⁶² W. N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade, Vol. I*, p. 176.

¹⁶³ Irving Pflaum to Colonel William J. Donovan, Nov. 18, 1941, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services: Washington Director’s Office Administrative Files 1941-1945* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 118.

and keep a large budget for military expenditure. In addition, keeping a large army meant moving an important portion of the workforce from agricultural fields.¹⁶⁴

In 1940, the Axis powers were winning the war and it is important to consider that the economic relations had a great influence on diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy entered the war, the Balkans were under threat of the Axis powers soon to be invaded. The British thought that Turkey was non-belligerent but still an ally, so it was under a moral obligation to cut off trade with Germany. However surpluses began to increase and forced Turkey to recommence trade with Germany, because it needed arms, equipment for the army, machinery, and other supplies for the maintenance of its economy.¹⁶⁵

Moreover, as explained in the first chapter, Turkey was anxious about the Axis victories and did not want to threaten Germany by turning its back to it. In addition to the depressive economic situation, Turkey entered into negotiations with Germany thinking of security reasons. Germany's military success, the increase of Turkish needs in spare parts, and inability of Western countries to buy Turkish products as much as Germany did, forced Turkey to form better relations with Germany, and negotiations for signing a new trade agreement between Germany and Turkey gained momentum.¹⁶⁶ Turkish-German Trade Agreement was signed in July 25, 1940 excluding chrome sale and arms transportation through its lands. Moreover, Germany would pay for the delivery of goods to Turkey. However, Germany could not regain its former place in the Turkish economy with this agreement.¹⁶⁷

When Turkey signed the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany on June 18, 1941 America reacted strongly by ceasing Lend-Lease aid. However, the situation in

¹⁶⁴ Mehmet Altan, *Süperler ve Türkiye: Türkiye'de Amerikan ve Sovyet Yatırımları*, (İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1986), p. 66-71.

¹⁶⁵ Edwards, p. 391.

¹⁶⁶ Glasneck, p. 124.

¹⁶⁷ Koçak, *Türkiyede Milli Şef Dönemi*, Cilt I, p. 500.

the Middle East also played a role in this decision of America. British forces in North Africa were losing battles. Moreover, Germany was holding the Balkans. America considered these victories as a threat for the security of the Middle East. In this respect America doubted Turkey's position in case of absolute German victories in the Middle East because Turkey would be surrounded by the Axis forces. Therefore America did not want their materials to be used against the Allies by Turkey. Even if Turkey had fought against Germany, it could not stand long in which case, again American Lend-Lease materials would be used against themselves by Germany.¹⁶⁸ America was afraid that Turkey might "submit to economic and geographical encirclement" of Germany's presence in the Middle East.¹⁶⁹ In any case that was an important chance for Germany to revive trade with Turkey. Moreover, Germany attacked Russia four days after the Non-Aggression Pact. That was an important development for Turkey whose fears of Russia were increasing because of aggressive Russian attitude especially after the Nazi-Soviet Pact. In October the Turco-German trade agreement was signed. According to this agreement Turkey would sell agricultural products and would buy industrial products. This agreement excluded chrome sales though. After the Non-Aggression Treaty and later with this trade agreement the attitude of Turkish press became friendlier towards Germany, yet they never indicated an alliance between the two countries. Abidin Daver wrote that Germany being an old friend of Turkey was also the major exporter and importer in Turkey's foreign trade and Turkey was glad that the economic relations were reformed after discontinuance in 1939.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War 1940-1941*, (New York: Harper, 1953), p. 513-514.

¹⁶⁹ John Ritchfy, "Interpretation: Turkey" *Wall Street Journal*, March 28, 1942, p. 2.

¹⁷⁰ Abidin Daver, "Türk-Alman Ticaret Anlaşması" *İkdam*, Oct. 11, 1941.

The affiliation between Germany and Turkey caused anxiety in the United States. It tried to hamper German plans by reopening regular trade with Turkey. When Dr. Paul Schmidt, press director of the German Foreign Office, went to Ankara on November 1941 American officials counteracted through efforts of improving trade and asked for a formal statement from Secretary Hull immediately on the desire of America to restart trade with Turkey. "This would probably upset Dr. Schmidt, and pave the way, from the propaganda viewpoint, for the announcement of sailings for which we hope."¹⁷¹ As it is seen in the telegram the main aim was to influence Turkish attitude towards Germany by putting itself in the line as a force in the economic front. After some months of discontinuation of trade between America and Turkey, the commercial relations started again.

In the report "Policy of the United States toward Turkey Present Policy-Summary" the increasing role of America in Turkish economy between the periods of September 1939 and December 6, 1941 was described as such:

...Turkish importers grew increasingly dependent on the United States for commodities which shipping and manufacturing difficulties did not permit the Axis countries and Great Britain to supply. In the meantime Turkish exporters to Germany became the object of economic warfare efforts by Great Britain and France and later, as the war progressed, the United States assumed the place left vacant in these activities by the fall of France.¹⁷²

In the same report it was written that after Pearl Harbor, America participated in economic warfare against Germany directly instead of following the instructions of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ Unknown writer, "Proposal No. 2" Nov. 17, 1941, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services: Washington Director's Office Administrative Files 1941-1945* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 49.

¹⁷² "Policy of the United States toward Turkey Present Policy – Summary" Dec 7, 1944, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations Between the United States and Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 2, Record No. 711.67/12-744

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

As mentioned above, Turkey considered America as a major power in the economic field. Ahmet Emin Yalman wrote in *Vatan* on April 28, 1942 that the ties between America and Turkey were growing, and they should also increase their commercial relations. The focus of his article was the economic relations between the two countries. He mentioned the possibility of Turkish silk industry to replace the Japanese silk industry in the American market.¹⁷⁴

The İzmir Fair was a popular event in Turkey. Foreign countries attended the Fair to display mostly their technological and industrial developments. During the war İzmir Fair became an essential propaganda field for the belligerents. Germany was showing great interest to the Fair before the war. American attendance however was a result of war time concerns to maintain its economic presence in Turkey. At the end of 1941 Rome radio announced that Germany and Italy would attend the İzmir Fair in 1942. It was interpreted as another way of putting economic and diplomatic pressure on Turkey by America. It decided to seek invitation from the Turkish Government to be able to attend the Fair “to back up our directive on Turkey, to bolster our proposal to the Maritime Commission, and to demonstrate to the Turks and the various other countries of the Near East that the Axis countries are not the only ones interested in their commercial development.”¹⁷⁵ This document is another example of how the USA was using the economy as propaganda but what is more important in this document is that, America used Turkey as a base to attract other Near Eastern countries.

¹⁷⁴ Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Turkey and America” *Vatan*, April 28, 1942.

¹⁷⁵ Sullivan, Proposal No. 7, Nov. 18, 1941, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services: Washington Director’s Administrative Files 1941-1945*, (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 49.

3.2 Chrome

American direct participation was mainly seen in the sale of chrome ore. Before the war Germany was buying the majority of chrome from Turkey. When the economic relations ended with Germany in 1939 Turkey signed an agreement with France and England according to which Turkey would sell chrome only to these two countries. However, Turkey would sell chrome on condition that the other products would be sold with it. This was problematic for England because it did not need Turkish products. While Germany had internal motives to buy Turkish products, England was buying them only to prevent Germany from getting them and to break the hegemony of Germany in the Turkish economy.

Germany could get it only from the Soviet Union, yet a limited amount. Turkey was the best option for Germany to supply its needs of chrome. Britain feared that if they could not supply Turkey enough, it could have been pulled towards Germany. On October 30, Britain agreed to buy no less than 200,000 tons of chrome, but later Turkey increased the price. Turkey was bargaining as strictly as it could to get the war materials, to develop its economic situation and to create a balanced diplomatic structure to keep itself outside the war. Turkey tried to convince Britain to sign a trade agreement which would let them to buy all the chrome for twenty years, but it was rejected by the latter. This would cause the chrome question later, when Turkey started to sell chrome to Germany.¹⁷⁶

Since the prices were too high for Britain, America was buying Turkish chrome ore. By the autumn of 1940, America needed more chrome and wanted to buy all the chrome of Turkey through England, but according to the agreement, they needed Turkey to give permission for retransfer. England wanted America to buy

¹⁷⁶ Deringil, p. 27-28.

Turkish chrome, too, because of its financial inabilities to buy it itself. Turkey wanted to make arrangements directly with the United States. However it was decided that it would be more feasible to retransfer chrome through Britain.¹⁷⁷ Turkey wanted to secure the chrome sales for the highest price, but at the same time it was one of the tools that Turkey could guarantee its non-belligerency. As German armies defeated the Allies, Turks felt themselves obliged to improve relations with Germany. Germany needed chrome ore, and Turkey had it. If a direct trade agreement with America could have been achieved, Turkey might not have sold chrome to Germany in the coming years of the war, because of rising Turkish distrust to Britain, especially after it allied with Russia at the end of 1941. However, considering Turkish concerns to stay out of the war, they used chrome as a tool to break German pressure to force Turkey to enter the war.

German need of chrome was increasing and it wanted to buy chrome, and Turkey was trying to find a way to sell it. Turkey was obliged to sell chrome to France and England. After France was invaded England promised to buy all the chrome. Still, Turkey was considering selling the part of France to Germany. Although Britain opposed Turkish aims to transfer the part of France to Germany, the prices were too high for the British. America was buying Turkish chrome and wanted to continue to do so. USA bought 100 tons of chrome and on February 25, 1941, it is stated that USA would buy 100 tons more for that year.¹⁷⁸

Turkey entered into negotiations with Germany. However, they made it clear that due to the agreement with Britain they would not sell chrome to Germany until 1943, and they would sell chrome only in exchange of war materials. During the negotiations of selling chrome to Germany, American Ambassador to Turkey

¹⁷⁷ FRUS *The British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, the Near East and Africa*, Vol. III (1940) "Repurchase by the United States of Turkish Chrome Sold to the United Kingdom" p. 944-957.

¹⁷⁸ Glasneck, p. 131.

MacMurray spoke with the Turkish Foreign Minister on September 23, 1941 saying that the main aim of the treaty was to prevent Germany from buying Turkish chrome. The Minister's reply was harsh. He said that Turkey was not obliged to sell America chrome under any agreement or contract. MacMurray reminded him of Menemencioğlu's assurance that Turkey would sell chrome to America as a response to a formal request. However, shortly after the conversation between MacMurray and Turkish Foreign Minister Saracoğlu, the Under Secretary of the Turkish Minister, Numan Menemencioğlu called Kelly "suggesting that this document should take form of unofficial and informal memorandum rather than of official note."¹⁷⁹ Turkish attitude towards America was far away from the tone of a friend. As mentioned in the first chapter, Turkey was appeasing Germany during those years. Although Turkey was aware of the economic strength of America, they could not turn their backs on Germany for fear of a possible offensive to Turkish lands.

According to the Clodius Agreement signed between Germany and Turkey, the latter would sell a maximum of 90,000 tons of chrome in 1943, and 45,000 tons in 1944 in return for military equipment. America, on the other hand tried to hamper the Clodius Agreement by practical solutions. With the loss of Philippines and the increase in war material production American needs for chrome increased. In February 1942 the American Government decided to buy the whole of 1941 and 1942 output and provide shipping for transfer. This also meant that none of the output would remain in Turkey and it was unlikely that Turkey would be able to meet the German need of 90,000 tons.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, the agreement obliged Germany to send military equipments which it needed in the fronts. Deringil notes that Turkey

¹⁷⁹ Ambassador MacMurray to the Secretary of State, telegram no. 352., Sept 23, 1941, *Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 25. Record No. 867.24/180.

¹⁸⁰ W. N. Medlicott, ed. Arnold Tonybee and Veronica M. Tonybee, *Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946: The War and the Neutrals*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) p. 82-83.

sent 13,564 tons in 1943 and 56,649 tons during January and February 1944.¹⁸¹ However, the amounts were still under the promised amount of 90,000 tons because Germany was supposed to send armaments to Turkey in return, but its failure to deliver weapons resulted in reducing chrome shipments from Turkey. Moreover, it was also reported in *New York Times* in 1943 as the official view of Turkey that “in 1941 we were alone and forced to do what Germany wanted, and we informed the British of the plans under the terms of our alliance. Now that Germany is weak, we must still honor our word. We are fulfilling our contract strictly to the letter, but in no way facilitating it.”¹⁸²

In his visit to America upon invitation by the American Government Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın wrote the negative reaction of Americans he got about the Clodius Agreement and he remarked his regrets.¹⁸³ Necmettin Sadak, on the other hand defended Turkey’s decision to sign a chrome agreement with Germany and remarked his anger towards American thoughtlessness about Turkey’s position in the war.¹⁸⁴ Turkey’s argument was that it needed arms and equipment for the army when the time came to fight with Germany. Moreover, Turkey argued that if it got those arms from Germany, it would mean that the latter would have less arms to fight with the Allies, while the Allies could keep their arms to themselves which they could hardly spare.¹⁸⁵

Turkey’s strategic importance forced the Allies to continue their economic relations despite its chrome agreement with Germany. After America entered the war, its needs of chrome increased. German stocks, on the other hand, were limited and they badly needed Turkish chrome to build up armaments. Turkey was rejecting to

¹⁸¹ Deringil, p. 168.

¹⁸² “Germans Lose Out in Turkish Trade” *New York Times*, Aug 17, 1943, p. 8.

¹⁸³ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Krom Meselesi” *Yeni Sabah*, İlk teşrin 9, 1942.

¹⁸⁴ Necmettin Sadak, “Ne Büyük Suç İşlemiştir de Haberimiz Yok!” *Akşam*, 10 İlk teşrin, 1942.

¹⁸⁵ Edwards, p. 391-392.

cease the chrome sale to Germany despite increasing pressures from the Allies. Germany was buying Turkish chrome for a very good price and Turkey, by holding Germany in line, was able to bargain for its own interests.

As mentioned in the first chapter Turkish attitude changed towards belligerents according to their victories and defeats at war. In 1943 Dr. Karl Clodius revisited Ankara to negotiate a new trade agreement. Turkish attitude was depicted as stricter this time comparing it with at 1941. Germany was having a hard time in sending enough armaments to Turkey to get chrome according to the 1941 agreement, and as reported in *New York Times* “now Dr. Clodius is returning to Turkey, according to foreign trade circles here, with his hat in his hand, to play for time and try for what he can get.”¹⁸⁶

When the Allies could not force Turkey to cut chrome shipments to Germany through diplomatic ways, they considered blowing up the transportation lines. The most important of the lines was Maritsa Bridge of the Sofia-Istanbul road. The discussions over the effectiveness of such an action continued until 1944. The Allies did not want to offend Turkey by such an action because it was impossible for them to conduct that operation without the knowledge of the Turkish authorities. They feared that it could jeopardize the future operations of Office of Strategic Services. However, they also believed that Turkey “‘would welcome’ any excuse offered by the interruption of rail traffic to delay delivery by alternative routes.”¹⁸⁷ Finally in 1944, when the Allied pressure increased and Germany lost power, Turkey announced on April 20, 1944, upon the visits of Hugessen and Steinhardt on the previous day, that all chrome exports to Germany would cease. Deingil writes that

¹⁸⁶ Ray Brock, “Reich is Suppliant for Turkish Trade” *New York Times*, March 21, 1943, p. 8.

¹⁸⁷ “Disruption of Rail Communications Between Turkey and Axis Europe” April 10, 1944, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services: Washington Director’s Office Administrative Files 1941-1945* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 5.

Turkey did not cut its trade totally in April.¹⁸⁸ Therefore the Allies conducted the operation of destroying railways. Two railway bridges across the Maritsa River were destroyed on May 29 and May 30, 1944.

3.3 Lend-Lease Aid

Another essential part of the economic warfare as a means of propaganda between America and Germany was seen on sending armaments to Turkey. Turkey was trying to get as much arms equipment as they could from the warring nations. The situation of the Turkish armed forces in 1940 was that the Turkish army lacked the necessary armaments to conduct a successful fight in the war.¹⁸⁹ Turkey's armed forces were strong manpower wise and the Turkish Government was ready to fight in case of an attack, yet army officials were not familiar with the latest technology and lacked modernized weapons. As Şevket Süreyya Aydemir writes, a modernized army needs economic power and raw materials like oil and although Turkey had chrome which was a very important material for modernized weaponry, lacked the sufficient industrialization to process it. Therefore, if Turkey entered the war, it would soon consume the materials it had and then would have to fight with bare hands¹⁹⁰.

America passed the Lend-Lease act, H.R. 1776, on March 11, 1941. This act was praised in the Turkish press. Necmeddin Sadak wrote that American industrial development was greater than Germany's and with American aid, Germany would

¹⁸⁸ Deringil, p. 235.

¹⁸⁹ Mete Tunçay, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Türk Ordusu'nun Durumu" Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milli Müdafâ Vekaleti Ordu Dairesi Şube III, 31140, 3 Mart 1940 in Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, Cilt I, p. 319-321.

¹⁹⁰ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, (İstanbul : Remzi Kitabevi, 1984), p. 130.

not be able to beat Britain.¹⁹¹ With this act, America sent aid to the Allies and neutral countries, one of which was Turkey. At the beginning the aid under this act was coming to Turkey through England but later America started to send it directly. England was obliged to send Turkey arms equipment but it was unable to do so alone. American Lend-Lease aid was a great relief to Britain in terms of its obligations towards Turkey. However, during the war America became more interested in the Near East and started to handle Lend-Lease shipments to Turkey directly, which caused a clash between the policies of America and Britain. Lend-Lease aid had a propaganda aim more than their value to strengthen the Turkish armed forces. The main purpose behind Lend-Lease aid was again to prevent Turkey from entering the war on the side of Germany. Therefore it is important to analyze how and why America took the place of Britain and stood against the influence of German war industry in Turkey.

America started to send Lend-Lease aid through Britain but when Turkey signed the Non-Aggression Treaty with Germany on June 18, 1941, Washington reacted by cutting the supplies to Turkey. Although it was for a short time period, American-Turkish relations were affected badly. Actually, it can be said that the relations reached their most strained period throughout the war.

During this period England continued to send aid to Turkey, both because it was under obligation by treaty to do so and it did not want to isolate Turkey in which case Germany would fill Turkish needs. One of the consultants of the U.S. State Department, Wallace Murray's report advises America to continue sending aid to Turkey because otherwise England would transfer "goods obtained by Britain from America under Lend-Lease... If supplies from America are to reach Turkey by

¹⁹¹ Necmeddin Sadak, "Amerika Birleşik Devletlerinin Yardım Kararı" *Akşam*, March 11, 1941.

reshipment from British-controlled territory, Britain will derive the full good-will of Turkey, while we are blamed by Turkey for refusing to allow Turkey to obtain supplies direct from the United States.”¹⁹² If Turkey had had no importance for America other than being an ally of England, America would have acted according to England’s directives. America suspended Lend-Lease for a month, but for the reason stated above, it re-started sending aid to Turkey.

Britain, on the other hand, was still urging America to send supplies to Turkey. America thought that Turkey should not have sent chrome or other materials to Germany as an ally of England. However, it was learned that British Supply Council disapproved all of Turkey’s requests, claiming that there were not enough funds to finance the payment of such items. It was a surprise for American officials, because England was already pressing America to send more materials, while London was rejecting Turkey’s requests. Mr. Edminster reported his conversation with Mr. G. H. S. Pinset, from the British Supply Council about Lend-Lease aid to Turkey and concluded that “We (America) had been led to believe, and evidently the Turkish Government had received the impression, that the failure of our government to approve more items on the Turkish list was something for which the United States, not the British Government was responsible.” In the final part of the telegram the suspicion towards Britain was revealed that they “may have been endeavoring to divert Turkish criticism toward the United States in the matter of approving requisitions for Lend-Lease supplies.”¹⁹³

¹⁹² Wallace Murray to Mr. Welles, June 25, 1941, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 25., Record No. 867.24/162.

¹⁹³ “Lend-Lease Aid to Turkey” Participants Mr. G. H. S. Pinset and Mr. Edminster, Sept. 17, 1941, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 25., Record No. 867. 24/191.

As America's interest in the area grew, its attitude towards Turkey became more favorable, and therefore the clash between England and America became more obvious. America was considering sending Lend-Lease aid to Turkey directly and mentioned this idea to Turkish Ambassador in Washington on October 3, 1941. However Mehmet Münir Ertegün was not eager because "he had been extremely reluctant to be put in a position of requesting any aid from this country which Turkey was not in a position to pay for" and "that it was more logical for such aid to come to Turkey through the British since the British were bound by a treaty to furnish Turkey with all necessary military supplies, whereas we had no such obligation"¹⁹⁴

Ertegün's reluctance had several causes. First of all, Turkey did not really know how Lend-Lease was regulated and did not want to be indebted to any foreign country, considering the hard times that Ottoman Empire faced because of economic dependency. Turks gave utmost importance to their integrity and independence. Secondly he might have thought that the Turkish Government would not want unpaid aid because it could have been used as an excuse to force Turkey to enter the war in the future. Thirdly, this kind of affiliation with the United States would have given the idea to Germany that Turkey was definitely on the side of the Allies and getting ready to enter the war. This would be deadly for Turkey because Germany had almost surrounded Turkey on all sides, except the Soviet Union and Iran, and could easily invade the Straits and bomb Istanbul. Finally, Ertegün might have thought that the Turkish Government would be obligated to pay for all those materials while it could get them free of charge from Britain under the treaty between these two countries.

¹⁹⁴ "Lend-Lease Aid to Turkey" Participants Mr. Mehmet Munir Ertegun and Mr. Murray, Oct. 3, 1941, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 25., Record No. 867.24/192.

Negotiations with Britain were held to regulate the Lend-Lease aid to Turkey. It was decided that all the “purchases which Turkey desires to make for cash in the United States might be handled direct with the Turks as Lend-Lease transactions, provided there was previous consultation between the British and American military authorities as to the desirability of permitting Turkey to make the purchases desired.”¹⁹⁵ However, except the purchases in cash, Britain was to continue to transfer materials to Turkey “as a result of strong British insistence.”¹⁹⁶ In order to validate this regulation Roosevelt announced that he found the defense of Turkey vital to the defense of the United States on December 3, 1941.¹⁹⁷

The reasons why Britain did not want direct aid from the United States were that, first of all, England was obliged to send materials to Turkey but the Turkish Government complained that England could not keep its promises. If the aid were sent directly by the United States, Turkey could have abandoned its own obligations in favor of Germany. Secondly, if the United States sent aviation materiel, Turkey would be able to expand its own aviation forces which would harm British strategy and aviation plans for the Near East. Thirdly, Britain had been regulating the Lend-Lease transfers for all the Middle Eastern countries and Turkey could not be separated.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ Ambassador Murray to Mr. Welles, Nov. 5, 1941, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 25., Record No. 867.24/193.

¹⁹⁶ Department of State to American Embassy at Ankara, Nov. 6, 1941, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 25., Record No. 867.24/193.

¹⁹⁷ “The President Finds that the Defense of Turkey is Vital to the Defense of the United States and Directs the Lend-Lease Supplies to Turkey” December 3, 1941, *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, Vol. 1941, (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950) <http://heinonline.org>, p. 123.

¹⁹⁸ “Aid to Turkey under Lease-Lend Act” Participants: British Ambassador Viscount Halifax and Under Secretary Mr. Welles, Oct. 21, 1941, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 26., Record No. 867.24/211.

Another reason for American insistence upon having more control over the Lend-Lease was that Britain was acting independently. Turks were complaining about the insufficient and late-coming materials constantly. At the Pell conference in 1941, it was explained that Britain altered the course of the supplies which were supposed to reach Turkey and Turks were incensed. The British thought that Turkey would enter the war only if Germany attacked them. America, to convince the Turks of their sincerity thought to send a “detachment of the Eagle Squadron or American volunteers to Turkey as concrete evidence of American help.”¹⁹⁹ Obviously America did not want to be blamed because of England’s attitude, and wanted to gain the trust and respect of Turkey.

Still with the new regulations, American Government would take a more direct way to regulate Lend-Lease aid to Turkey. In this way it could gain the trust of Turks. On occasions which the British Government was responsible, America would be able to defend itself that it was keeping its promises it had given to Turkey. Also it could secure and consolidate its place in Turkey and the Middle East. According to the new regulations, The Department of State would follow all the steps such as when the aid left America and Britain for re-transfer, when it reached ports and when Turkey received it; the American Government would have the final word on what to send to Turkey and in what amounts; America would be informed of all Turkish requests; and the requests which were not approved by the British authorities and the reasons of rejection of those requests.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ Unknown writer, Proposal No. 7, Nov. 13, 1941, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services: Washington Director’s Office Administrative Files 1941-1945* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 49.

²⁰⁰ Department of State to American Embassy at Ankara, Nov 7, 1941, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 25., Record No. 867.24/195.

The impression in Turkey was favorable. In the newspapers affiliation of Turkey and the United States was cherished but it was emphasized that it was not to mean a formal alliance but “an act of friendship.” Still it “indicated that the United States fully understood and had confidence in Turkish policy” as The Director General of the Press Bureau put it.²⁰¹ The Turkish Ambassador also expressed his appreciation of Roosevelt’s declaration and he again said that this act showed that America “placed confidence in Turkey”²⁰²

Despite the new regulations Britain was dealing with the aid to be sent to Turkey. The Lend-Lease aid to Turkey was not in large amounts relative to other countries because Turkey was a non-belligerent and constantly repeated that it would enter the war only if it was attacked. Britain and America, on the other hand, did not want to send large amounts of materials which were highly needed in the fronts, and also could not be sure of Turkey’s intentions whether they would enter the war on the side of the Allies or the Axis. Finally in case of a German attack on Turkey, the Allies were afraid that the materials could be used against themselves in German hands. Turkey complained about the low amounts of aid. Even after the new regulations Turks complained about British insufficiency to supply Turkey. Rauf Orbay, Turkish Ambassador to Britain, complained to Steinhardt the failure of the British agencies to deliver the materials in time and completely although the requisitions were approved by American authorities. “He said that as a result of these and similar incidents his Government was beginning to question whether Britain really wanted a strong Turkey able to resist Germany aggression and that it was his

²⁰¹ Kelley to the Secretary of State, telegram no. 467, Dec., 5, 1941, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 26, Record No. 867.24/206.

²⁰² “Appreciation of Turkish Ambassador for Statements Issued at the White House December 3” Participants: Turkish Ambassador, Mr. Murray and Mr. Allen, Dec. 4, 1941, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 26., Record No. 867.24/222.

intention upon arrival in London to express the foregoing views to British Government.”²⁰³ Even İnönü himself expressed to Steinhardt his disappointment over British inability to supply Turkey with Lend-Lease aid despite American approvals.²⁰⁴

The new regulations did not improve Turkey’s condition in terms of the amount it got from Lend-Lease. Lord Halifax’s memorandum put the problem as the requisitions of the Turkish Government lead to duplications.²⁰⁵ American officials admitted that Britain had the primary responsibility in the Middle Eastern area and in Turkey, but knowing that Lend-Lease aid to Turkey aimed to influence Turks psychologically rather than materially, it would be better to let the Turks to deal with America directly.²⁰⁶ America realized the growing irritation of Turkey towards Britain. It would be harmful for the future strategic movements in the war and another aim to let Turkey deal directly with American officials was to remove this irritation.²⁰⁷

America used direct Lend-Lease aid as a propaganda tool to pull Turkey to the side of the Allies. Besides their growing interest in the region, they also realized the Turkish distrust and irritation towards Britain might have affected Turkish perception of the Allied cause and tried to prevent that. However, Britain did not

²⁰³ Ambassador Steinhardt to Secretary of State, telegram no. 135, March 9, 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 26, Record No. 867.24/231.

²⁰⁴ Ambassador Steinhardt to Secretary of State, telegram no. 144, March 11, 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 26, Record No. 867.24/232.

²⁰⁵ “Turkey – Lend-Lease Questions” Participants: Sir Renald Campbell, British Minister and Mr. Welles, Under Secretary (Acting), March 16, 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 26, Record No. 867.24/241.

²⁰⁶ “Procedure of Lend-Lease for Turkey” Participants: The British Ambassador Lord Halifax and Mr. Dean Acheson, March 19, 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 26, Record No. 867.24/244.

²⁰⁷ Wallace Murray to Mr. Acheson, March 11, 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 26, Record No. 867.24/284.

want to lose its place in the area. Therefore London continued its pressure over America to rescind the right of organizing Lend-Lease aid to Turkey. They finally reached their goals in the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. The Committee:

(a) Agreed that Turkey lies within a theater of British responsibility, and that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British in the same way that all matters connected with China are handled by the United States of America.

(b) Agreed that, in particular, under the general direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignment Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The onward dispatch to Turkey from the Middle East of such equipment will be a function of command of the British Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. They will not divert much equipment to other uses except for urgent operational reasons, and will report such diversions to the appropriate Munitions Assignment Board.²⁰⁸

Considering the new regulations American control over the Lend-Lease aid was not limited, because Britain still could not divert materials except in very urgent events; and in cases when it diverted the materials they had to inform America about it with the reasons of their actions. However British officials interpreted “all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British” in the first article as in a general meaning, because Roosevelt let “the British be allowed to play the Turkish hand.”²⁰⁹ In later discussions between the American and British officials this matter came up, that America considered it within only military matters. Cordell Hull explained this matter in a letter to Lord Halifax as:

I should point out clearly that notwithstanding any military understanding reached, I am not aware of any commitment made by the President at Casablanca which relates in any way to the surrender by the United States of its full independence of action with regard to relations between the United States and Turkey in either the political or the economic sphere, either during the war or after.²¹⁰

²⁰⁸ FRUS *The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 659-60.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 634.

²¹⁰ Cordell Hull to Lord Halifax, July 10, 1943, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Affairs between the United States and Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 2, Record No. 711.67/120.

Depending on the text of the Casablanca Conference Roosevelt let Britain to have more power over Turkey. American interests lay on the western hemisphere and as a continuation of the Monroe Doctrine it would not interfere with European dynamics. Instead America would handle all matters with China while Britain would handle all matters with Turkey. In this respect there was a conflict between Roosevelt and Hull about how to regulate American relations with Turkey. Through Hull's efforts the privilege given to Britain by Roosevelt at Casablanca was reduced only to military matters. American interests in Turkey, during and after the war were not to be regulated by Britain. This shows that unlike after the First World War, America would have a voice of its own and play a part in the political and economic developments in Turkey. This determination of America unknown to the Turks and the decision reached at Casablanca came as a "stunning blow" as Mr. Richard May, Lend-Lease Administrator, put it.

Mr. May said that the Turkish Military Attaché expressed the firm conviction that the decision to permit Great Britain to retain control of American Lend-Lease munitions to Turkey had resulted from a commitment by Great Britain to "another Ally" [Russia] to keep Turkey weak...Russia had striven to keep Turkey weak, and Great Britain had been forced to concede to Russian insistence in this regard, he felt confident that British insistence upon controlling American Lend-Lease shipments to Turkey was a result of this agreement.²¹¹

Turkey was suspicious of British secret plans with Russia and this quotation shows the fear of Turkey towards Russian plans over Turkish lands. Turkish suspicions of Britain were based on their experiences during the late years of the Ottoman Empire and the years of founding the new Republic. Wallace Murray wrote his doubts about the new regulation reached at Casablanca that Britain actually was

²¹¹ "Lend-Lease for Turkey" Participants: Mr. Richard May, Lend-Lease Administrator and Mr. Allen, Jan. 29, 1943, Ambassador Steinhardt to Secretary of State, telegram no. 135, March 9, 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 27, Record No. 867.24/619.

not gaining anything by insisting upon dealing directly, without the interference of America, with Turkey. Turks were aware of the fact that the materials were coming from America no matter who transferred them to Turkey.²¹²

The new regulation was only applied to arrangements about furnishing supplies to Turkey through Lend-Lease. In a report on Turkey “Policy of the United States toward Turkey Present Policy-Summary” which was prepared on December 7, 1944 the role of the USA was stated as a secondary role relative to Britain. However, as mentioned above this secondary role only referred to military matters, and not economic or political fields. The reason for such a decision was given as “the presence of large British forces in the Middle East and the fact that supplies sent to Turkey over a long and difficult route from the United States were sent at the expense of these British forces fighting in the Western Desert of Egypt.”²¹³ American strength in the economic and military fields made it a potential force in the area in the post-war world and more trustworthy than Britain in the eyes of the Turks.

Lend-Lease aid did not only cover the military equipments, but also health and food aid. In Turkey malaria was very common and threatening the health of many, both civilian and military servicemen. Since Turkey could not form an effective substructure to eliminate this illness every year the malaria threat appeared. Turkey got aid from America under Lend-Lease to beat malaria during the Second World War.²¹⁴

²¹² Wallace Murray to Kelley, Feb. 2, 1943, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 27, Record No. 867.24/582.

²¹³ “Policy of the United States Toward Turkey Present Policy-Summary” Dec 7, 1944, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Affairs Between the United States and Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 2, Record No. 711.67/12-744.

²¹⁴ From C. D. Dillon to Mr. Murphy, Report on Sanitary Conditions in Turkey for Colonel Donovan, Nov. 19, 1941, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services: Washington Director's Office Administrative Files 1941-1945*, (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 118.

Moreover, America sent Turkey wheat under Lend-Lease. Turkey enlisted large numbers of men during the war, yet this caused loss of workforce from the agricultural fields. Also the Turkish Government had to feed the enlarged army which became more difficult under the present conditions. In a report written by Mr. Johnson the dissatisfaction among the Turkish soldiers about the food shortage was mentioned. Civilian people were also facing difficulties in satisfying their food demands. There were continued complaints and protests in several parts of the country regarding the high and increasing cost of living and food shortages. One event was reported that “on or about October 9, 1942, posters were secretly placed at night in the walls of the Salepcioglu and Hacı Huseyin Mosques in Izmir. ...read as follows ‘Ataturk, raise your head from the grave and behold the pitiful state of your nation which is starving.’”²¹⁵

Wendell Wilkie wrote to Roosevelt that the Prime Minister was extremely concerned about the wheat shortage in his country. Wilkie asked for the President to authorize Steinhardt to inform Turkey that America would send more wheat in addition to that on the way to Turkey at once and added that “this would build great good and strengthen present firm intention of Turks in every event to resist Axis invasion. Germans are working hard on Turkish Government.”²¹⁶ Steinhardt also informed the State Department of Saracoğlu’s request made during July about large quantities of wheat shipments from America to Turkey and that it was more important than the war materials for the time being. Steinhardt wrote that:

I believe that prompt and favorable response to Saracoglu’s appeal would be of the utmost value in further fortifying our position in

²¹⁵ From Vice Consul in Izmir Ellis A. Jordan “Political Report – Izmir, Turkey – October, 1942” Oct., 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 23, Record No. 867.00/3207.

²¹⁶ Kelley to Secretary of State, telegram no. 338, Sept. 10, 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 23, Record No. 867.00/3193.

Turkey. In strengthening Saracoglu's position we strengthen our own. His new Cabinet is outstandingly pro-American and pro-British. In my opinion no step that we could take by way of lend leasing war material or these supplies to Turkey with the object of insuring continued Turkish resistance to Axis pressure would under existing conditions carry the same amount of weight as prompt shipment of quantity of wheat relatively unimportant in terms of American stocks.²¹⁷

As it is clear from the quotations, America was trying to supply Turkish food needs, in addition to military equipments to strengthen the position of the Allies and break Germany's influence. Turkey was insisting on receiving armaments from both sides, but at a time when it put wheat needs before the armaments, vast American sources supplied Turkey which was a great benefit in terms of the propaganda point of view.

To conclude, the economic relations between Turkey and America was not intense before the war. Although both countries tried to develop their trade after the Republic was founded due to the economic conditions of the period they could not improve trade to a considerable amount. Instead Turkey had close relations with Germany in the economic field. However, as the tension grew in Europe both the western countries and Turkey itself wanted to limit Germany's economic influence in Turkey to prevent Germany from affecting Turkish foreign policy in its own favor. The early fall of France left Britain as the only country fighting against the Axis, so it could not send enough materials to Turkey, neither could it fulfill its promises to buy Turkish surpluses. With British directive the United States of America began to buy Turkish products, mainly chrome and send Lend-Lease aid to Turkey. However, due to the difficulties of transportation caused by the Axis presence in the Mediterranean, high prices of Turkey for Turkish products and most importantly Turkey's balance

²¹⁷ Secretary of State to American Embassy at Ankara, July 17, 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 26, Record No. 867.24/352.

politics to maintain its non-belligerency, America could not fill Germany's place when the economic relations ended between the two countries at the beginning of the war.

Especially after America entered the war its interest in the Near East increased and it began to follow a more direct economic policy towards Turkey. This direct policy was also a result of Turkish distrust of Britain. In the first chapter Turkey's fears about Russia were described. In this respect America's economic role in Turkey was not only against Germany but also against Britain, too. Turkey's refusal to enter the war until the very end prevented America from sending large amounts of armaments in fear of a German invasion of Turkey. After Germany began to lose power, American Government did not want to increase amounts considerably because they did not want to divert their forces from the Operation Overlord. Therefore American Lend-Lease aid and commercial relations did not aim to strengthen Turkey but instead to keep Turkey out of war and prevent it from joining the Axis. In this respect American economic interest in Turkey during the war had propaganda aim. The major effect of American devotion to the Turkish economy was keeping Turkey from falling under German influence. Moreover this made it possible for the Allies to maintain their relations with Turkey and maintained the possibility of Turkish entrance to the war, or at least made the British believe in that possibility.²¹⁸

The economic relations beginning with the concerns of keeping Turkey out of German influence opened new dimensions in both countries for the post-war world. Having a weak economy Turkey realized American economic and industrial power. The economic relations which brought Turkey closer to the United States during the

²¹⁸ Bryson, p. 154.

Second World War were intended to be developed by the Turkish officials and tradesmen after the war. An article in *Wall Street Journal* informed that a purchasing mission from Turkey would go to America to start negotiations for railroad equipment and rolling stock for over \$ 40 million under a post-war program to improve its transportation system. In the article it was also reported that the Turkish industry lacked necessary modernization to build on its own.²¹⁹ The Second World War brought new opportunities in the economic field for Turkey and America in the post-war world.

²¹⁹ “Turkey in the Market for \$ 40 Million U.S. Railroad Equipment” *Wall Street Journal*, Dec. 28, 1944, p. 3

CHAPTER IV

THE MILITARY AND CULTURAL ASPECT OF THE GERMAN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA WAR IN TURKEY

Turkish-American cultural relations depended on missionary activities during the Ottoman Empire. However, when the new republic was founded Turkey limited the activities of the missionaries, thinking these missionaries were intervening in the domestic policy of the state. Especially after America entered the First World War American missionaries began to leave the Ottoman lands, and after that date missionary activities weakened. The main target group of those missionaries was the minorities and Christian population living in the Ottoman Empire. Turkish treatment of Armenians at the end of the nineteenth century and during the First World War was followed closely by those missionaries. In addition to missionary reports, Armenians who emigrated from the Ottoman Empire to America also reflected Turkish image in a negative way. The American press supported the liberation wars of minorities while criticizing Turkey severely.²²⁰

Although Kemalist reforms in Turkey were a big step towards democratization the Turkish image of “Terrible Turk” was still relevant due to the anti-Turkish propaganda in America. Relations between the two countries were

²²⁰ Çağrı Erhan, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2001), p. 168-336.

affected by the negative image of Turks in America, and strict nationalist attitude of the Republic of Turkey in the first years of its foundation. Robert L. Daniel writes that cultural relations between the United States and Turkey before The Second World War “was conditioned by two dilemmas. The dilemma of the Nationalists was to balance the desire for reform against a deep-seated xenophobia. The dilemma of the Americans was to balance a willingness to be of service against an equally deep-seated dislike of the ‘Terrible Turk.’”²²¹ Still the reputation of America was better relative to Britain and France since the Turks mistrusted them.

4.1 Education

Unlike Britain and France, Turkey had close cultural relations with Germany before the war apart from economic affiliation. Education was an important part of these cultural relations. Being a newly founded state, Turkey tried to replace Ottoman Islamic rules with the Kemalist reforms in the educational fields. Turkey invited German specialists from different areas. They shared their knowledge and experiences for the foundation of several governmental institutions, factories, labs, stock-breeding, as engineers, supervisors, chemists, directors, rectors, teachers, builders, painters and sculptors. The Turkish government also supported Turkish officers, employers and students to receive education or do internships in Germany.²²²

In Turkey there were three German schools and both Turkish and German students could go there. Glasneck writes that the teachers in those schools were also

²²¹ Robert L. Daniel, “The United States and the Turkish Republic Before World War II: The Cultural Dimension” *The Middle East Journal*, (Vol. 21, Winter 1967, No. 1), p. 52

²²² Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, p. 38-45 and 174-184.

members of the Nazi Party and they were also active in propaganda, organizations, and spying.²²³

Turkish military personnel and military students also visited Germany to receive education or do internships in German military factories and armed forces. As the tension increased in Europe, Turkey tried to limit the number of students going to Germany. Eighty per cent of the Turkish students who were studying abroad were in Germany in the spring of 1937, but in 1939, Turkish leaders were thinking of sending Turkish students to England and France in increasing numbers.²²⁴ The Turkish Ambassador to Germany Hüsrev Gerede wrote that one of his first assignments in Germany was to organize the return of Turkish students there.²²⁵

After the war started in Europe sending students to France and England became risky for security reasons. Therefore Turkey turned to the United States in terms of military and educational services, favoring American education over European:

Today foreign exchange problems have greatly reduced the number on private account. The Government has recalled home its bursaries from Continental Europe but not from America. Now and then foreign study is sponsored by individuals for exceptional students, but no regular exchange professorships and scholarships has been established. Families possessing adequate means often send a son to Europe or the United States for professional training. American schools in Turkey have produced graduates well qualified for study abroad and have provided special courses of instruction for groups of specialists appointed for training in this country.²²⁶

In the American archives there are documents reporting Turkey's requests for relevant visas to accept Turkish students to American schools, factories, workshops

²²³ Glasneck, p. 22.

²²⁴ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, p. 181

²²⁵ Hüsrev Gerede, p. 40.

²²⁶ C. D. Dillon to Colonel Donovan, Nov. 14, 1941, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services: Washington Director's Office Administrative 1941-1945*, (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 118.

or other military institutions.²²⁷ Considering the risks of going to America by sea the authorization for relevant visas took time. However, in a note written by Paul H. Alling, the importance of Turkey was emphasized to give authorization. He wrote that “In view of our particularly important relations with Turkey at the present moment, it is recommended that the War Department be urged to give as favorable consideration to the Turkish Government’s request as may be compatible with our defense requirements.”²²⁸ It is seen here that American officials supported the idea of Turkish students and military officials to get education and do their internships to gain practical knowledge in American institutions and schools because of the strategic importance of Turkey in the war. It is also important to note that American interest in developing cultural relations with Turkey began before it entered the war. The influence of American support of Turkey’s requests was aimed to be effective in the propaganda point of view. As mentioned above, after analyzing the risks of admitting foreign students to American military factories and institutions, with the support of American diplomatic benefits the War Department gave authorization for the entrance of Turkish students to American factories.²²⁹

In 1942, as part of American friendly attitude towards Turkey, Democratic Senator from Texas Tom Connally gave a speech on the occasion of nineteenth anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey on October 29. While he celebrated Kemalist reforms in turning Turkey into a liberal modernized democracy, he also mentioned the friendship between America and Turkey. In his speech he

²²⁷ Ambassador MacMurray to the Secretary of State, telegram no. 103, Sept. 16, 1940, *Decimal File 1940-1944*.

²²⁸ Paul Alling, Sept. 23, 1941, *Decimal File 1940-1944*, (Washington: National Archives), Box No. 3746, Record No. 811.22767/49.

²²⁹ Secretary of State to Turkish Ambassador at Ankara, Nov. 17, 1941, *Decimal File 1940-1944*, (Washington: National Archives), Box No. 3746, Record No. 811.22767/56.

praised American aid to Turkey to improve its educational institutions like Robert College and İstanbul College for women.²³⁰

Educational development in Turkey was an important issue for America in terms of strengthening Turkish-American relations. In a memorandum about training Turkish students and officers it was written that “This Government is supporting financially and otherwise American schools and colleges in Turkey as a means of strengthening through education American-Turkish relations, and the education of Turks, both military and civilian, in this country accomplishes the same desirable purpose.”²³¹ This memorandum dates back to September 18, 1944. Considering the progress of war, it was then clear that Germany was losing. Turkey had already cut its diplomatic relations with Berlin in August 1944. Therefore American interest in Turkish educational development was not only a part of war propaganda but it can be said that this interest would continue after the war.

Turkish students and officers went to America generally to pursue their training in industrial and/or military fields. Therefore they had worked, done internships and got education in military factories, workshops, institutions and universities instead of studying social sciences. During the war Turkey turned to America from Germany in those fields realizing German influence was intense both in the Turkish military, diplomacy and cultural life which could have pushed Turkey into the war. It was written in *New York Times* that an “important military authority” in Turkey said “The United States has replaced Germany as the military training center for Turkish officers studying foreign methods of warfare.”²³² America being a

²³⁰ Mr. Connally, “Nineteenth Anniversary of the Proclamation of the Turkish Republic” October 29, 1942, *Congressional Record-Senate*, 88th Congressional Record, 1942, (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress), p. 8681.

²³¹ Gordon P. Merriam “Training of Turkish Officers in Private Industry” Sept. 18, 1944, *Decimal File 1940-1944*, (Washington: National Archives), Box No. 3746, Record No. 811.22767/9 - 1244.

²³² “Turks Sent to Study How We Wage War” *New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1943, p. 1.

distant country was safer than both the Axis and the other European countries in terms of imperialist tendencies. Moreover, American reluctance to force Turkey to enter the war was another aspect in addition to its increasing war industry and vast sources which made Turkey trust America with relief.

Turkish officials wanted to hire American educators, too. When the chair of international law in Istanbul University Cemil Bilsel was about to retire American Embassy was asked informally to investigate a possible American instructor for this post. Steinhardt mentioned the importance of this post as “a position of great Turkish prestige.” He also wrote that the faculty had included many “subsidized Germans and recently a few English men.”²³³ In order to limit German and even British influence; and instead gain more place in Turkish educational life America showed an interest in this assignment.

Especially in the last years of war Turkey tried to look for American support in the cultural and educational fields. Turkish Ministry of Education wanted to use American books, mainly *Basic Science Education Series* in Turkey with proper translation and regulations. In his telegram Donald E. Webster, Embassy’s Cultural Relations Attaché to Harry Warfel from the State Department favored this project by saying that “I hope that in the interest of cultural relations this and similar matters in the future may be worked out satisfactorily.” In the same telegram Webster informed Warfel that The Mayor of Tarsus also asked from the Principal of the American School there if he could get aid for the cultural program in terms of books and plans on building houses suitable for semi-tropical climates.²³⁴

²³³ Ambassador Steinhardt to Secretary of State, Telegram no. 2108, Dec. 29, 1943, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944*, (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 29, Record No. 867.42/136.

²³⁴ Donald Webster to Harry Warfel, April 5, 1944, *Decimal File 1940-1944*, (Washington: National Archives), Box No. 3844, Record No. 811.42767/264.

Arshag G. Solakian wrote to the State Department asking for information about whether there was a copyright agreement between Turkey and the United States. His aim was to translate and publish a book in Turkish. He stated that in Turkey American books were “freely translated, published and sold.”²³⁵ This is important in the views of showing that Turkey became increasingly interested in American books and publications.

Another example was Rüştü Uzel’s, Under-Secretary of Education for Technical Institutions in Turkey, interest in purchasing complete libraries of American books on methods of vocational instruction. Therefore he requested bibliographies of books for examination.²³⁶

The desire to use of American books in Turkish schools is very important in terms of spreading culture and ideology. This shows that Turkey wanted to keep close ties with the United States after the war. This desire of Turkey can also be interpreted in the context of Kemalist reforms whose ultimate aim was to consolidate democratic ideals in Turkey. On the occasion of twenty-third anniversary of the Turkish National Assembly Democratic Senator from Florida Claude Pepper gave a speech on April 23, 1942 in which he after celebrating and praising Kemalist reforms, emphasized the intensity of German propaganda in Turkey.²³⁷ These speeches show another means of propaganda of America through politicians’ approaches to Turkey.

American educational support was also seen in the publication of *The Redhouse Dictionary* for Turkish in the new latin alphabet. This was a non-profit project. The only fund was from the British Council which did not continue after the

²³⁵ Arshag G. Solakian to the State Department, Nov. 12, 1943, *Decimal File 1940-1944*, (Washington: National Archives), Box No. 3926 Record No. 811.54467/3.

²³⁶ Mr. Warfel to Mrs. Soltero, July 24, 1944, *Decimal File 1940-1944*, (Washington: National Archives), Box No. 3844, Record No. 811.42767/7-2444.

²³⁷ Mr. Pepper, “Twenty-third Anniversary of the Turkish National Assmebly” April 23, 1942, *Congressional Record-Senate*, 88th Congressional Records, (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress), p. 3670.

first year. Therefore the American Embassy in Turkey searched for funds from the American Government. The Rockefeller Foundation showed an interest in this project, too considering the cultural and educational affiliation which could be achieved between America and Turkey.²³⁸

Finally, foreign schools in Turkey were also essential institutions in terms of affecting Turkish attitude towards foreign countries. Most significant American colleges in Turkey were Robert College and the Constantinople Woman's College. However, during the Ottoman Empire they generally served Christian students. Therefore they were disliked by Turks. Also efforts of reviving educational relations by the American Board were resisted by the Nationalists during the 1920s.²³⁹ Turkish attitude yet began to change towards the American schools during the Second World War. In 1935 French schools in Turkey led with 1,760 students and were followed by American schools with 973 students while German and Austrian schools had 514 students. Since 1935, however, enrollment in British and American schools had increased more rapidly than the others and American schools doubled in size.²⁴⁰

4.2 Technical and Military Assistance and Turkey's Attitude towards American Internees

German instructors had an influence in Turkish armed forces, too. According to the Versailles Treaty German armed forces were restricted, therefore military personnel

²³⁸ Donald E. Webster to Secretary of State, "Rockefeller Foundation Letter" Telegram no. 845, Oct. 24, 1944, *Decimal File 1940-1944*, (Washington: National Archives), Box No. 3844, Record No. 811.42767/10-2444.

²³⁹ Daniel, p. 54-55.

²⁴⁰ "Social Conditions, Attitudes and Propaganda in Turkey with Suggestions for American Orientation toward the Turks" April 24, 1942, Psychology Division, Divisional Report no. 48, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services: Washington Director's Office Administrative Files 1941-1945*, Microfish, 278.

spread over different countries. One of them was Turkey. They taught in *Yıldız Askeri Harp Akademisi*, and Turkish military students were taking classes in Germany, and Turkish military officers also visited Germany for education.²⁴¹ Some former German military officials took positions in Turkish armed forces as advisors and experts. Germany also made investments in building and developing the Turkish defense industry and military ports.²⁴² Especially with Nazi government the amount of investments was increased, so the number of German specialists also increased.²⁴³ The number of those specialists was 2.000 in the summer of 1939.²⁴⁴ These specialists worked in favor of Germany, and tried to influence the Turkish government not to take steps against Germany's benefits, and tried to prevent British rivalry.²⁴⁵ The officers in Turkish armed forces increased respect for and influence of Germany. The military equipment in the Turkish army was also mostly German made. The aim was to push Turkey towards Germany or at least to prevent it from standing against Germany.²⁴⁶

As the aggression in Europe increased, the Turkish Government took measures to restrict the influence of German advisors and experts in the Turkish armed forces. Criss writes about Turkey's desire to invite American experts to serve as instructors and advisors in the military which was rejected by the American Government. This was an attempt to steer away from the German military officers who were employed in Turkey.²⁴⁷ MacMurray reported to the Secretary of State in 1940 that "Turkish authorities are continuing to get rid of German technical experts

²⁴¹ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, p. 45-48 and Glasneck, p. 76.

²⁴² *Ibid*, p. 51-55.

²⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 176, and 184-200.

²⁴⁴ Glasneck, p. 75.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid*.

²⁴⁶ Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, p. 184

²⁴⁷ Criss, p. 134.

hitherto employed.”²⁴⁸ To maintain its influence in the Turkish army Germany tried other ways to keep their technicians in Turkey. In *New York Times* it was reported that in 1942 Germany offered to deliver Turkey twelve modernized planes of the latest type of Messerschmitts and Junkers-88 on condition that German technicians would accompany the planes. Turkey immediately reacted to this offer because although it needed those planes a lot and in every possible way it was trying to modernize Turkish armed forces, it did not want German technicians inside the country.²⁴⁹

Turkey turned to the Allies in order to meet their needs of technical experts and instructors to replace the positions formerly held by Germans and invited specialists and advisors for the army. Britain could not spare technicians whose services it needed badly in its armed forces for Turkey. Therefore Turkey turned to America instead. The Turkish Government requested the assignment of an American instructor to the Turkish air force which involved teaching both at the War School in Ankara and the Navy School on the coast. American response was affirmative to this request.²⁵⁰ Another example was that Turkish Ambassador in Washington asked for “certain United States Army and Navy aeronautical specifications in behalf of the Turkish Aeronautical Institute.”²⁵¹ As mentioned in the previous chapters, Turkey lacked modernized weapons. Moreover, although it had manpower Turkish military

²⁴⁸ Ambassador MacMurray to Secretary of State, No. 1583, “Developments during the past Seven Months in the Attitude and Policies of Turkey relative to the International Situation” Ankara, Oct. 26, 1940, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 23, Record No. 867.00/3101.

²⁴⁹ Henry J. Taylor, “Nazi Plane Offer Made to Turks, but Proposal has a String to It” *New York Times*, Aug 4, 1942, p. 4.

²⁵⁰ “American Instructor for Turkish Air Force” Nov. 13, 1941, to Division of Near Eastern Affairs *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 29, Record No. 867.248.117

²⁵¹ To Navy Department, Aug 8, 1944, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 29, Record No. 867.24.8-844.

officials needed technicians and experts to be able to use armaments effectively which were being sent under American Lend-Lease aid.

After a request from Turkey asking for an American staff officer to give aviation courses in the Turkish Military and Naval Academies, Wallace Murray urged for the approval of this request. Apart from practical reasons like that an American officer would be familiar with the American planes which were being sent to Turkey, Murray also pointed out ideological reasons. He wrote that:

The United States is regarded in Turkey and elsewhere in the Near East as not only being pre-eminent for technical and aviation efficiency but also for having no imperialistic aims in that area. The modern Turkish Government is reluctant to invite any foreign military instructors, but faced with the necessity of doing so, prefers to turn to us. Our own position in Turkey and the Near East would be strengthened, and the policies of this Government furthered, by compliance with the Turkish request.²⁵²

Wallace Murray referred to England and Germany in this report as the foreign countries which Turkey did not want to ask for such kind of technical help. As it is clear from the quotation Turkey perceived America as a more secure power which would not threaten Turkey with imperialistic tendencies after the war. America, in the same way, enjoyed the trust of Turkey and despite the difficulty of sending trained officers to a foreign country used it as a means of propaganda. Lieut. Colonel Demas T. Crow was assigned for this duty.

During the war, American planes sometimes had to land on Turkish territory going or returning from the operations. Being a neutral, Turkey interned American soldiers and planes like it did to other countries. Although there is not an option to compare Turkish attitude towards American soldiers who landed in Turkey throughout the war because American operations started after 1942, in it is clear the

²⁵² Wallace Murray to the Department of State, Oct. 13, 1941, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944* (Washington: National Archives), microfilm, roll 25, Record No. 867.20/123.

documents that Turkey treated American soldiers in a favorable way. Turkish local people were the ones who “captured” the soldiers generally and they took photos. These landings or photos did not take part in the Turkish press widely though. The reason for this was that if it was known to the Axis world that Turkey kept American soldiers it would be difficult for them to “escape” from Turkey. Steinhardt’s telegram to the Secretary of State mentioned this situation and warned that some of the American correspondents intended to publish all available news which could be described as military secrets. He asked for the help of the Department to persuade the American press “to assist me in furthering the escape of the few highly trained personnel.”²⁵³ The Department agreed on the question of preventing the publication of information concerning the internees in Turkey.²⁵⁴ Despite the efforts to prevent the publications of such events in the American media some of them were reported in newspapers.²⁵⁵

Turkey’s attitude, as mentioned above, was favorable towards the “escape” of American internees. Especially after the Ploesti raid to Rumania the number of the internees in Turkey increased. Steinhardt discussed with Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs about the release of those internees. He suggested that the internees could be regarded as “shipwrecked mariners” and all the wounded aviators could be regarded as unfit for further military service although some of those wounds were very light. Moreover, he suggested that “the Turkish General Staff be instructed not to interpose to many barriers in the path of attempted escapes by others.” Menemencioglu’s reply was in the affirmative though he requested that Americans

²⁵³ Ambassador Steinhardt to Secretary of State, Telegram no. 1362, Aug. 5, 1943, *Decimal Files 1940-1944*, (Washington D.C.: National Archives) Box no. 3753, Record no. 811.2367/11

²⁵⁴ “American Aviators Interned in Turkey” Memorandum, Participants Col. Kenyon, Col. Jadwin, Mr. Alling and Mr. Allen, Aug. 10, 1943, *Decimal Files 1940-1944*, (Washington D.C.: National Archives) Box no. 3753, Record no. 811.2367/11.

²⁵⁵ “Turks Free 23 U.S. Fliers Who Raided Rumanian Oil” *New York Times*, May 1, 1943, p. 8. and “Turks Release Americans” *New York Times*, Aug, 1943, p. 5.

“must not embarrass him by ‘too many escapes’ in the immediate future and particularly while the internment of the planes and crews was in the public eye.”²⁵⁶

On August 25, official decision was given and the American Embassy was informed that the Turkish Government had accepted to regard the American crew as “shipwrecked mariners” and ordered their release.²⁵⁷

It is difficult to compare the Turkish attitude towards American and German internees, however, it is a fact that Turkish attitude towards American internees showed some changes at the end of 1943. Koçak writes that according to Turkish laws wearing uniforms or carrying flags, medals or signs of foreign countries were forbidden. Moreover Turkish police followed closely such acts. Koçak refers to Kroll’s report that despite that law, in Istanbul German Cultural Association, Teutonia, could organize Nazi meetings, and during those meetings Nazi flags, symbols and uniforms were freely worn and carried. Moreover, according to Kroll those meetings and their contents were known by Turkish officials. Although these kinds of practices were limited by the German government thinking of Turkey’s concerns, it is important that they took place under the knowledge of Turkish police and politicians.²⁵⁸

When the American planes returning from the Ploesti raid, four planes had to land in Turkey and one of the pilots, Captain Robert Carleton Mooney died of shrapnel wounds. Ellies A. Johnson reported to the Secretary of State that in Izmir Turkish officials organized a funeral for Mooney. Regarding the request of the members of crews of the other planes which had to land in Turkey to attend the funeral ceremony, Johnson contacted local officials to obtain the necessary

²⁵⁶ Ambassador Steinhardt to Secretary of State, Telegram no. 1388, Aug. 8, 1943, *Decimal Files 1940-1944*, (Washington D.C.: National Archives) Box no. 3753, Record no. 811.2367/12.

²⁵⁷ Ambassador Steinhardt to Secretary of State, Telegram no. 1471, Aug. 25, 1943, *Decimal Files 1940-1944*, (Washington D.C.: National Archives) Box no. 3753, Record no. 811.2367/16.

²⁵⁸ Koçak, *Türkiye’de Millî Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, Cilt I, p. 476-77.

permission from the General Staff at Ankara. The answer from Ankara was that a military funeral should be given with full honors to Captain Mooney and that all officers and men of the Liberators squad may attend the funeral in uniform. In addition to American officials and internees Turkish officials in Izmir also attended the funeral. Johnson emphasized the importance of letting American internees to wear uniforms by reminding a previous forced landing of a Liberator plane in the same district. In the previous landing Johnson wrote that the Turkish attitude towards the internees was stricter. The internees were kept under armed guards all the time and when they were permitted to travel to Ankara they could do so only in civilian clothing. As Johnson wrote this essential change in Turkish attitude towards the American internees comparing Ankara's attitude of the previous year was due to the Allied victories at war and German withdrawal in the Eastern front.²⁵⁹

Despite the wide interest shown by Turks to Captain Mooney's funeral this event was not reported in the newspapers widely, neither in Turkey nor abroad. In *New York Times* there was only short information about Mooney's death as "One Man Buried in Turkey."²⁶⁰ The reason was the reluctance of Turks who were still fearful of triggering German criticism and aggression, by the wide publicity of their favorable attitude towards America.

The American Government also used these forced landings as a propaganda item. Some of the planes and other military items were given to Turkey as a gift from the American Government. Steinhardt recommended to the Department that "this would be of material assistance to us in obtaining concessions from the Turkish Government and would also be helpful in creating a favorable atmosphere when the

²⁵⁹ Ellis A. Johnson to Secretary of State, "Forced Landing of Four Liberator Planes in Izmir Consular District" Aug. 11, 1943, *Decimal Files 1940-1944*, (Washington D.C.: National Archives) Box no. 3753, Record no. 811.2367/18.

²⁶⁰ "Ploesti Reported Half Paralyzed" *New York Times*, Aug 4, 1943, p. 4.

time comes for us to ask permission for Air Transport Command planes to fly over Turkey.” He also mentioned after the examination of the planes that their conditions were not very good due to the forced landings and they had further deteriorated from lying in the open for a long time. In this respect it would cost more to American Government to take them back and repair. Considering all of the disadvantages of cost and advantages of impressing Turks, Adolf A. Berle Jr., Assistant Secretary asked General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces to give necessary permission for the donation of those planes to Turkey.²⁶¹ In response General Arnold gave full authority to Steinhardt to “dispose of U.S. aircraft interned in Turkey.”²⁶²

4.3 Visits of Military and Civilian Turks to America and Germany

Both America and Germany sometimes invited Turkish military officials, students and civilians to their countries to prove their countries’ strength. Not only the students but also the higher ranking military officials including President İnönü was considered to be invited by America for a tour of war industry plants and military activities. The aim was to show American power to Turkey and by doing so strengthen the trust of Turks by impressing them that the Allies would win the war with the wide resources of American military power.²⁶³ Although it was thought that İnönü himself could not leave his country for the time being for such a trip, it is

²⁶¹ Adolf A. Berle to General Arnold, Sept. 25, 1944, *Decimal Files 1940-1944*, (Washington D.C.: National Archives) Box no. 3753, Record no. 811.2367/9-2544.

²⁶² Barney M. Giles to Adolf A. Berle, Oct. 6, 1944, *Decimal Files 1940-1944*, (Washington D.C.: National Archives) Box no. 3753, Record no. 811.2367/10-644.

²⁶³ Lawrence Higgins “Memorandum for the Chief Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State” MID 335.11 Turkey, *Decimal File 1940-1944*, (Washington: National Archives), Box No. 3746, Record No. 811.22767/63.

stated in the same document that being a military figure himself, İnönü would “desire to see our armament progress, or at least to be invited to do so.” It continues as “There is probably no neutral country more important to us at that moment than Turkey.” All the costs of the visit would have been afforded by the American “fund for entertaining military and civil officials of certain foreign countries whose goodwill is desired.”²⁶⁴ However, troubles of transportation and supplying necessary safety measures for the high ranking military officials made this five-week trip impossible. When the Turkish Ambassador declined it “with genuine reluctance” War Department decided to invite forty-one Turkish Army and Naval officers who were already in America for pursuing graduate study and obtaining practical construction experience in factories to give them a tour of a week or ten days to show them developments in the war industry.²⁶⁵

The aim was again to impress Turkey because it was thought that Turkish officers would report back to their government what they had seen of the American production. By doing so, they would gain the trust of Turkey that the Allies would win the war with the vast sources and industrialism of American power. “The War Department feels that the Turkish Government would be appreciative of the courtesy shown to its officers here – a courtesy certain European Governments have been anxious to show.”²⁶⁶ The expenses would be paid by the War Department also. What is meant by “certain European Governments” would be most probably the Axis countries, although there was no reference to them in the documents about this visit. However, considering the cultural warfare between Germany and America to impress

²⁶⁴ Wallace Murray to Mr. Summerlin “Memorandum” Jan. 22, 1942, *Decimal File 1940-1944*, (Washington: National Archives), Box No. 3746, Record No. 811.22767/64.

²⁶⁵ Paul Alling to Mr. Welles, March 31, 1942, *Decimal File 1940-1944*, (Washington: National Archives), Box No. 3746, Record No. 811.22767/68.

²⁶⁶ “Memorandum for Tour for Turkish Army Officers in the United States” Participants Colonel Sullivan and Mr. Allen, March 3, 1942, *Decimal File 1940-1944*, (Washington: National Archives), Box No. 3746, Record No. 811.22767/67.

Turks, it would not be exaggeration to think it as Germany, since it was following the same course to impress the Turks.

In the first chapter the visits of Turkish generals to the Eastern Front upon the invitation by Germany is discussed. The German aim was to show the superiority of the German army over the Soviets and that they would win this war. General Erkilet was one of the generals who went to eastern front in 1942. Erkilet wrote about his visit in his book *Şark Cephesinde Gördüklerim*. His tone is pro-German and anti-Soviet. He mentioned that the attitude of German generals was friendly and that they focused on the alliance between the two countries in the First World War. He even interpreted German war aims as superior meaning while criticizing Russian power to be weak and brutal. Although he did not write about the Allies, Erkilet believed in German victory at the end of the war.²⁶⁷

Orhan H. Erol, Counselor of the Turkish Embassy in Washington, D.C. reported to George V. Allen that Turkish officials who visited American military installations were “tremendously impressed” by the American military industries’ development in the past several months. Moreover, Erol said that their belief in American victory became stronger after they read the report.²⁶⁸ Mr. Erol’s words cannot be taken as the absolute truth without seeing the report which was referred in his talk to Mr. Allen. Still, Turkey believed that with the entrance of America to the war the Allies would beat the Axis, so it can be said that Mr. Erol was sincere in his words of trust to American strength.

²⁶⁷ For detailed information about Erkilet’s visit to the Eastern front see, Erkilet, *Şark Cephesinde Gördüklerim*.

²⁶⁸ “Memorandum about Counselor of Turkish Embassy’s Report of Visit of Turkish Officials to American Military Installations” Participants Mr. Orhan Erol and Mr. George V. Allen, April 29, 1942, *Decimal File 1940-1944*, (Washington: National Archives), Box No. 3746, Record No. 811.22767/69.

James J. Davis, Republican Senator from Pennsylvania gave a speech on the Senate on April 22, 1943, on the occasion of the twenty-fourth anniversary of foundation of the Turkish National Assembly. In his speech he praised the Turkish democratic way of life and put emphasis upon Turkey's strategic position at war. He also mentioned the visit of Turkish military observers to the Allied fronts in Africa with American and British commanders. A Turkish mission under General Salih Omurtak consisting of twelve prominent military and political figures met with General Dwight Eisenhower and other American and British officers in Tunisia. After the inspection tour General Omurtak expressed that he was convinced of the Allied victory, that Allies were much stronger than the Axis powers. Mr. Davis quoted Omurturak that he was extremely well pleased with his tour and very much impressed with the Allied war effort.²⁶⁹

Inviting journalists was another way of impressing Turks through propaganda. Both Germany and America used this. In July and August 1942 a group of Turkish journalists went to Berlin, Vienna and the Eastern front with Selim Sarper, Press Director of the Turkish Government.²⁷⁰ In accordance with the Turkish balance policy a similar group went to England and America upon invitation from these countries. The visit would cover a tour of army, navy and aircraft production centers as in England and in America they would also attend press conferences of the President and the Secretary of State. Five journalists who were to be invited to America were Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, editor of *Yeni Sabah*, who was also a deputy; Ahmet Emin Yalman, editor of *Vatan*, who was a professor at University of İstanbul and a graduate of Columbia University; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, foreign editor of *Ulus*, who was a deputy and also President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the

²⁶⁹ Mr. Davis, April 22, 1943, *Congressional Record-Senate*, 89th Congressional Records, (WashingtonD.C.: Library of Congress), p. 3694

²⁷⁰ Glasneck, p. 23.

Turkish National Assembly, and also a former student in Columbia University; Abidin Daver, editor of *İkdam*, who was a deputy also; and finally Zekeriya Sertel, editor of *Tan*, who was educated at Columbia University.²⁷¹

Yalçın wrote about his visit to America and their meeting with Roosevelt in *Yeni Sabah* in a favorable tone in his return. Yalçın wrote that Roosevelt emphasized Turkish friendship while despising Axis aggression in the world. He also mentioned American aid to democracies like Turkey would help to beat the Axis.²⁷²

Yalman wrote about his visit and his impressions in America in a book. He was impressed by rapid American industrialism and devotion of the American people to increase production and by their determination of winning the war.²⁷³ However he also wrote that after his return he founded that *Vatan* had been suspended for ninety days. The reason was a joke made by Charlie Chaplin who “had spoken via short wave on the Turkish Hour from New York, and had told a Nasreddin Hoca story about men and donkeys, giving it a twist that portrayed Hitler and Mussolini as asses.” The picture of Chaplin caricaturing Hitler was published in *Vatan*. Upon von Papen’s protest of the story and the picture *Vatan* was suspended. Yalman went to Ankara to argue the severity of the punishment and he wrote the reaction of Turkish officials as “Don’t you know that Hitler is mad? Is it right to provoke a madman when he has large armed forces close to our frontier and is asking himself whether he made a mistake in not attacking Turkey before the offensive he has just started in Russia? You deserve ninety days punishment for your thoughtlessness.”²⁷⁴ Although as mentioned above Turkey trusted Allied victory and was impressed by American

²⁷¹ M. J. McDermott to Wallace Murray “Memorandum” Sept. 18, 1942, *Decimal File 1940-1944*, (Washington: National Archives), Box No. 4062, Record No. 811.91267/60.

²⁷² Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, “Roosevelt ve Türkiye” *Yeni Sabah*, October ilkteşrin 7, 1942.

²⁷³ Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim*, p. 322- 327.

²⁷⁴ Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), p. 193-94

technological and industrial development, they had to maintain their strict neutrality. This conflict was a result of the anxiety of Turkey felt for Germany, so they had to pretend in favor of Germany.

4.4 Media

American propaganda in Turkey was not as intense as the German propaganda in the first years of war, yet especially after America entered the war it began to direct propaganda means in a more organized way. The reports on Turkey, their life styles from religion to population as well as technological development in Turkey which could ease the way that America could reach Turks were prepared and the best ways in which America could impress Turkey were analyzed in those reports.

Radio broadcasts were on shortwave by the belligerents in Turkey. They generally supported Turkish neutrality and avoided criticizing Turkish policy. Still radio broadcast were essential in reaching Turks. Germany provided two evening programs from Berlin. The principal aim was to convince Turkey that the Axis would win the war depending on their superior military strength. They also criticized British rule in Iran while working on Turkish fears about Russian threat in the post-war world.²⁷⁵ Germany, instead of making direct political approach, made intensive use of propaganda working on Russian threat to pull Turkey on their side.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁵ "Social Conditions, Attitudes and Propaganda in Turkey with Suggestions for American Orientation toward the Turks" April 24, 1942, Psychology Division, Divisional Report no. 48, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services: Washington Director's Office Administrative Files 1941-1945*, Microfish, 278.

²⁷⁶ Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 30.

Glasneck writes that the main directive in Nazi propaganda in Turkey was anti-communism, by referring to Czarist intentions over Turkey and the Straits.²⁷⁷ Although between the Nazi-Soviet Pact and Turko-German Non-Aggression Treaty anti-communist propaganda was drawn back, after Germany attacked Russia anti-communist propaganda revived.²⁷⁸

American broadcasts were fifteen minutes in length and contained about two thirds news and one-third talks and skits. The major difference from the German broadcasts was the space devoted to, almost fifty per cent, ideological and attitudinal appeals. The main aim here was to convince Turkey that the ideology of the Allies was righteous and therefore they would win the war. While condemning German violence in the occupied countries and their aims in Asia Minor, American radios mentioned the good works and good will of the Allies. Like the British programs, America sometimes also presented unfavorable news. This, it was believed, was the difference between democratic and totalitarian propaganda. By doing so, America wanted to put emphasis upon the truth of the news which was presented and gain confidence of Turkey.²⁷⁹

After Pearl Harbor American propaganda in Turkey increased. Washington tried to convince Turkey that not only during the war against Germany but also after the war it would support Ankara effectively. In this respect they referred to British and Russian imperialism. In terms of American strength against the Axis powers, they decided to follow the method of presenting complete and straightforward news instead of only saying that Germany was weak. The statements should be well

²⁷⁷ Glasneck, , p. 13.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p. 17-18

²⁷⁹ "Social Conditions, Attitudes and Propaganda in Turkey with Suggestions for American Orientation toward the Turks" April 24, 1942, Psychology Division, Divisional Report no. 48, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services: Washington Director's Office Administrative Files 1941-1945*, Microfish, 278.

detailed in order to convince Turks that they were not only talking but acting. While doing these, of course, it was important to avoid criticizing or uplifting Turkey's policies of neutrality. America also stressed the importance of the spoken language, that the speaker should speak perfect Istanbul Turkish because Turks gave utmost importance to language reforms and they criticized radio programs of Germany in which the speakers had a heavy German accent. It was important to flatter the Kemalist reforms by depicting Turkey as a modern and progressive country. Finally, government-sponsored Turkish students in America could be used in the broadcasts as respected representatives of modern Turkey.²⁸⁰

Printed press was another item which the belligerents used in Turkey as propaganda means and increasing cultural affiliation. Germany supported *Beyoğlu*, and *İstanbul* which were published in French; *Signal* in French, German, English and Turkish; *Yeni Dünya* in Turkish; and *Türkische Post* in German.²⁸¹

Movies were made to present the military power of belligerents and were shown to influence people. This kind of propaganda was also used in Turkey. German officials in Turkey, like Von Papen, organized meetings and invited high Turkish officials. In these meetings, generally German movies were shown. The movies presented German high technology, invincible military power and their victories. According to the report "Current Developments in Turkey" of 1940, German movies were widely showing German war films sometimes in public theaters and even in the Turkish Military Academy and at the General Staff School at Istanbul.²⁸²

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁸¹ Glasneck, p. 19-20

²⁸² Ambassador Mac Murray to Secretary of State, "Current Developments in Turkey during the Month of July, 1940" Telegram no. 1537, Aug. 19, 1940, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944*, (Washington D.C.: National Archives) microfilm, roll 23, Record No. 867.00/3098.

After 1942, on the other hand, American movies began to increase and superceded German movies.²⁸³ In a telegram by Lacy W. Kastner, Promotion and Publication Specialist to John M. Begg, Assistant Chief of Division of Cultural Relations the importance of showing as many American movies as they could in Turkey was emphasized. He was asking for the diplomatic assistance necessary for the transfer of those movies to Turkey.²⁸⁴ An excerpt from Steinhardt's letter to Barney Balaban on November 13 shows the importance of showing American movies in Turkey:

Not only have the Germans made every effort to provide films for the Turkish market most of which have a propaganda twist but they have been actively endeavoring to acquire theaters for the presentation of their films. You and the American Motion Picture Industry are in a position to render a definite service to our country and to make a not inconsiderable contribution to our war effort if you will exert your utmost efforts to assure the exhibition of your best pictures in Turkey. I appeal to you, therefore, to keep up a steady flow of current picture during the war.²⁸⁵

The report prepared by Ellis A. Johnson, American Vice Consul, about the American Motion Pictures in Izmir defined the percentage of American movies presented in the city as eighty seven while German movies covered only seven percent. It was also stated that American movies were the most popular ones while movies of Nazi origin were not popular among the public. The influence of motion pictures of American origin had an influence on local political attitudes in favor of the United Nations and the Allied cause.²⁸⁶ Movies also spread American life-style, culture and ideology. As mentioned, Turkey was trying to adapt democratic ideals

²⁸³ *Ibid*, p. 29

²⁸⁴ Lacy W. Kastner to Mr. John Begg, July 22, 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1920-1944*, (Washington D.C.: National Archives) microfilm, roll 29.

²⁸⁵ Ambassador Steinhardt to Secretary of State, telegram no. 1291, Dec. 15, 1942, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1920-1944*, (Washington D.C.: National Archives) microfilm, roll 29, Record no. 867.406 MOTION PICTURES/30.

²⁸⁶ Ellis A. Johnson "Motion Pictures – Izmir, Turkey" Report no. 14, May 3, 1943, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1920-1944*, (Washington D.C.: National Archives) microfilm, roll 29, Record no. 867.406I MOTION PICTURES/56.

and reformatations, so American movies served not only winning Turkey to their side, but also spread westernization.

4.5 Espionage

American propaganda in Turkey aimed to keep Ankara out of the influence of Germany, but it did not intend to force Turkey to enter the war. As mentioned in the first chapter America did not want Turkey's entrance because they did not want to divert their forces from Operation Overlord and also did not want to be a part of British strategic plans for the post-war order to help to create spheres of influence. Another aim of American propaganda in Turkey was to collect information about the Axis plans.

When Roosevelt sent Donovan to the Balkans and the Mediterranean at the end of 1940, the latter returned with information of German psychological warfare. Depending on his experience it was clear that America also had to fight back German propaganda. Roosevelt appointed Donovan as the Coordinator of Information on July 11, 1941.²⁸⁷

Being a neutral country "Turkey was a hive of espionage and a haven for anti-Nazi Germans."²⁸⁸ American and British agents worked in Turkey to gather information about the activities of Axis countries as well as the conditions of the invaded countries. Office of Strategic Services, Turkey was responsible for all OSS

²⁸⁷ White House statement Announcing the President's Appointment of William J. Donovan as Coordinator of Information" July 11, 1941, *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, Vol. 1941, (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950) <http://heinonline.org>, p. 264.

²⁸⁸ Joseph E. Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War, FDR and World War II Espionage*, (New York: Random House, 2001), p. 234.

activities in Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia.²⁸⁹ OSS in Turkey was successful in reaching into the German-occupied countries in Southeastern Europe²⁹⁰

Turkey was conducting a fight against the spies and sometimes Turkish police achieved to catch some of them. In *New York Times* it was reported that Turkey condemned two Germans and an Italian to death for espionage.²⁹¹ However, Turkey's attitude towards the Allied secret organizations was not that strict. The American Office of Strategic Services and the British Intelligence Service even worked actively in Turkey with the connivance of the Turkish government.²⁹² Despite the wide considerable war-time publicity about the intelligence and propaganda organizations which Germany was able to maintain in Turkey, the British and American organizations received less notoriety, and were also substantially assisted by the Turkish authorities and were probably more than a match for their German opponents.²⁹³

Finally depending on an OSS report unlike the British, OSS agents were able to establish a close contact with the principal offices of Turkish Security Organization in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir. Since the Turks themselves were highly interested in active Balkan intelligence they cooperated with OSS agents to a possible extent.²⁹⁴

²⁸⁹ G. Edward Buxton, "Memorandum for Colonel John R. Toulmin about Relationship between OSS, Cairo, and OSS Mission, Turkey" Nov. 16, 1943, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services: Washington Director's Office Administrative Files, 1941-1945*, (Washington D.C.: National Archives), microfilm, roll 118.

²⁹⁰ R. Harris Smith, *OSS, The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, (New York: A Delta Book, 1973), p. 126

²⁹¹ "Turkey Dooms 3 as Spies" *New York Times*, Dec 7, 1942, p. 8.

²⁹² Harry Howard "The entry of Turkey into WWII" p. 258

²⁹³ George E. Kirk, "Turkey", Arnold Tonybee and Veronica M. Tonybee ed., *Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946: The War and the Neutrals*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) p. 352.

²⁹⁴ Lanning MacFarland to William J. Donovan, June 23, 1943, *Records of the Office of Strategic Services: Washington Director's Office Administrative Files, 1941-1945*, (Washington D.C.: National Archives), microfilm, roll 79.

Turkish-American cultural relations have a long history going back to the missionary activities during the Ottoman Empire. These missionaries, however, mainly targeted minority groups and the Christian population. During the First World War the majority of the missionaries left the country and due to the reformatations and nationalism of the Republic American cultural activities weakened. In the Second World War, on the other hand, the American government revived its cultural relations in Turkey as a means of propaganda against the activities of Germany. Although Turkey had close relations with Germany before the war especially in the cultural and military fields, for fear of their influences in the political field, Turkey tried to limit German activities and did not renew contracts of German experts and advisors working in the Turkish armed forces, civilian and military schools. Instead Turkey turned to America to fill that space because unlike Germany, the Soviet Union, and Britain Turks thought America had no imperialistic ideals. America, on the other hand, besides preventing German influence in Turkey, also engaged in espionage activities to obtain information about Axis forces and countries invaded by the Axis. Moreover, they also thought the post-war world to spread American ideals and strengthen democracy in Turkey which would help America to direct their post-war plans in the Near East. Turkey being one of the strategically important countries in the Near East would facilitate American efforts in the region.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

On February 10, 1944 at the sixth meeting of Yalta Conference Stalin revealed his intentions to change the Straits Convention. Although no decision was taken at the Conference Soviet Russia was beginning to realize its plans for the post-war world. Allied pressure on Turkey to enter the war continued until the Normandy Landings which started on June 6, 1944. However after that date Stalin did not want Turkey to enter the war because Soviets could impose their aims on Turkey after the war easily if Turkey maintained its non-belligerency. Turkey cut its diplomatic relations with Germany on August 2, 1944 but it did not instantly enter the war. When Russia declared war on Bulgaria on September 5, 1944 and moved its troops to Turkish borders in the Balkans Turkey felt the necessity to align itself with Britain and America more. Considering the post-war world, Britain and America once more requested Turkey's entrance to the war. The new British Ambassador to Turkey Sir Maurice Peterson told the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hasan Saka that the nations who had not declared war on the Axis before March 1, 1945 would not be invited to San Francisco Conference. Three days after Peterson's visit Turkey declared war on Germany on February 23, 1945. Due to successful landings of the Allies in Europe Germany signed German Instrument of Surrender on May 7 and May 8, 1945 and the European war ended.

Turkey entered the war only after the German threat was eliminated totally, but the main reason behind Turkey's entrance was now Russian threat in the post-war world. In addition to movement of Russian troops to the Balkans and Russian demands on the Straits, on March 19, 1945 Molotov notified the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Selim Sarper that due to the essential changes during the war Russia demanded to abolish Turkish-Soviet Friendship and Non-Aggression Treaty of 1925. These developments forced Turkey to become closer to the Allies and to have a word in the San Francisco Conference where the new-world order would be discussed. During the last years and after the war, Turkey's relations to America and Britain should be defined through its relations to Russia.

However it would be wrong to say that Turkish-American relations began at the end of the war. President Obama said in his speech in Turkish Parliament on April 6, 2009 that "Our nations have changed in many ways. But our friendship is strong, and our alliance endures. It is a friendship that flourished in the years after World War II, when President Truman committed our nation to the defense of Turkey's freedom and sovereignty, and Turkey committed itself to the NATO alliance."²⁹⁵ Turkey began to be defined as an essential country in America's foreign policy after the Second World War, but it should not be ignored the fact that Turkey played an important role in the Allied strategy in the Middle East during the war and that Turkey was defined as one of the most important neutral countries by American diplomats during the war.

The main aim of this work is to prove that Turkish-American affiliation did not start during the Cold War. During the Second World War because of the necessities of war there was an intense affiliation between the two countries.

²⁹⁵ President Obama, *Today's Zaman*, April 07, 2009 Tuesday, <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=171750>.

Turkish-American relations during the Second World War were mainly on the economic and cultural fields instead of diplomatic. American involvement in Turkish economic, military and cultural life began with British directives, but during the course of war America held a more direct policy towards Turkey. This was due to the increase of American interest in the Near East.

American propaganda in Turkey during the Second World War aimed to prevent German influence in diplomatic circles. Unlike cultural relations during the Ottoman Empire which targeted minorities and Christian population, during the war they targeted Turkish people. Economic relations were also aimed to limit German influence. However, due to the pre-war affiliation between Turkey and Germany in economic fields it was harder for America to prevent trade between Germany and Turkey. With Lend-Lease aid and chrome sales in addition to the increasing trade of other materials America became an important trader in the Turkish economy. Moreover, having a weak economy which became worse because of the wartime conditions, Turks enjoyed American economic and military aid, and realizing America's power in this field, tried to form better relations.

However, Turkey used economic relations as a bargaining force to stay out of the war. That is Turkey did not only maintain trade with Germany only for the sake of economic needs but also for security reasons. American aid was also limited because Turkey chose not to enter the war and to send a non-belligerent ally huge amounts of aid would mean to reduce the amount of aid being sent to allied belligerents. Moreover, they could not be sure of Turkey's position in the war, as well as suspected a possible German offensive, in which case the armaments could be used by the Germans against Allied forces. In this respect, American aid and trade had a propaganda aim more than strengthening Turkey.

In the cultural field, on the other hand, America was more successful. Trying to limit German influence in Turkish cultural and military life, Turkish leaders began to send back German officers residing in Turkey and instead turned to America for assistance. Being a newly founded country from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish leaders were trying to solidify secularism and westernization based on democratic ideals. Turks were also thinking of America not as an imperialist power like Britain, France, Russia or Germany. Therefore Turkey's attitude towards America was more favorable than the other belligerents.

The main aim during the war was maintaining Turkey's neutrality, not to gain Turkey's alliance against Russia in the post-war order. Still it would be misleading to undermine the influence of American economic, military and cultural affiliation with Turkey during the war which had a positive effect in establishing a favorable Turkish attitude toward America in the post-war years. It was during the Second World War that Turkish realization of American strength enhanced and sought help against Soviet imperialism. Moreover, the propaganda in the cultural and economic fields brought the American way of life with movies, newspapers, radio broadcasts and education to Turkey.

Considering all of these Turkish-American relations during the war prepared the stage for alliance in the Cold War. However, as mentioned above American interest in Turkey during the war carried the aim of maintaining Turkish neutrality. Being a neutral country surrounded by the belligerents also created opportunity for both sides to conduct espionage. Although Turkish officials were suppressing down some of the espionage works, as mentioned in the third chapter, their attitude towards the Allied organizations were milder relative to the Axis organizations.

Turkey changed its situation during the war according to the victories and defeats of the opposing powers. Therefore it cannot be defined as a neutral country. However Turkey's strict balance policy played Allied aid and influence against Germany's. It could only maintain its non-belligerency this way until it declared war on Germany. Considering the failure of British and French efforts to keep Turkey out of German sphere of influence, it was American propaganda in Turkey in the economic, military and cultural life during the Second World War that prevented Turkey from falling into the sphere of Germany and helped it to maintain its non-belligerency. In this respect, American propaganda in the economic, military and cultural warfare against Germany was highly successful. American efforts at the same time brought the two countries closer in the post-war world.

The use of American archival sources, mainly RG 59 Records of the Department of State and RG 226 Records of the Office of Strategic Services; and American Congressional Records and FDR Library reached from the Library of Congress provided access to American motive in pursuing help to Turkey in the economic, military and cultural fields. These records had been mainly used in describing diplomatic relations while ignoring the other aspects of alignment between the two countries. This thesis argued that although it was a fact that Turkish-American relations gained momentum after the Second World War and they became allies during the Cold War, American propaganda in Turkey during the war had already brought these two countries closer.

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