

To my precious mother
AYSEMA AĐDAŐ,

THE BIRTH OF ANTI-SOVIET IMAGE IN THE TURKISH PRESS
FOLLOWING THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS REFLECTIONS
AFTER THE DEATH OF STALIN (1953 - 1964)

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ABSTRACT

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This study aims to analyze the construction of the anti-Soviet sentiment in the Turkish press at the beginning of the Cold War, and its evolution during the period from the death of Stalin in 1953 until the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964. After an assessment of the antagonism towards Russia in the Turkish public before 1945, the immense rise of anti-Sovietism in the Turkish press during the Straits of the Crisis between the Soviet Union and Turkey will be analyzed. The long term influence of anti-Soviet stance during the crisis, which was also reflected to the quarrel between *Tan* and *Tanin* newspapers in 1945, over the period 1953–1964 will be examined. Three main issues will be analyzed: The

influence of the Turkish governments over the press in terms of the construction of a negative Soviet image will be questioned. The anti-Soviet stance among the Turkish journalists apart from the state influence will be assessed. The reasons for the relaxation of anti-Sovietism up to 1960s will be analyzed. In this context, the general tendency of the Turkish press will be examined with regard to the examples from the anti-Soviet content from eight prominent newspapers of that period. Primarily *Ulus*, as the official press organ of the Republican People's Party; and *Zafer*, as the semi-official press organ of the Democratic Party; and six independent newspapers, *Akşam*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Dünya*, *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Vatan* will be surveyed in terms of their anti-Soviet content. The prominent journalists in these newspapers will be also emphasized to observe the individual anti-Soviet perspectives in the press. The changing attitudes in the press will be assessed with regard to the developments in the Cold War.

Key words: Turkish press, anti-communism, anti-Russianism, Turco-Russian relations, Cold War.

ÖZET

TÜRK BASININDA İKİNCİ DÜNYA SONRASINDA ANTI-SOVYET
GÖRÜŞÜN DOĞMASI VE BUNUN STALİN'İN ÖLÜMÜNDEN SONRAKİ
DÖNEME ETKİLERİ (1953 – 1964)

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Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş'ın başlangıcında Türk basını tarafından yaratılan Sovyet karşıtı hissiyatı ve bunun Stalin'in 1953 yılındaki ölümünden, Hruşçov'un 1964 yılında devrilmesine kadar olan dönemdeki evrimini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Türk kamuoyunda Rusya'ya karşı 1945'ten önceki düşmanlığın değerlendirilmesinin ardından, Türk basınında Sovyetler Birliği ve Türkiye arasında Boğazlar Krizi sırasında büyük bir yükselişe geçen Sovyet aleyhtarlığına değinilecektir. 1945'te *Tan* ve *Tanin* gazeteleri arasındaki kavgaya yansıyan bu Sovyet karşıtı tutumun, 1953–1964 yılları arasındaki döneme uzun vadedeki etkileri incelenecektir. Üç ana konu irdelenecektir: Türk hükümetlerinin, olumsuz bir Sovyet imajı inşa etmek anlamında Türk basınındaki etkisi sorgulanacak, Türk

gazetecileri arasında devletin etkisinin dışındaki Sovyet aleyhtarlığı değerlendirilecek ve bu karşıtlığın 1960'lara doğru zayıflamasının sebepleri irdelenecektir. Bu bağlamda, basındaki genel eğilim dönemin önde gelen sekiz Türk gazetesinden Sovyet karşıtı içerikle ilişkili olarak gözden geçirilecektir: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin resmî basın organı *Ulus*; Demokrat Parti'nin yarı resmî basın organı *Zafer*; ve altı bağımsız gazete, *Akşam*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Dünya*, *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, ve *Vatan* Sovyet aleyhtarı içerikleri bakımından incelenecektir. Türk basınında bireysel Sovyet karşıtı perspektifleri gözlemek için, bu gazetelerin önde gelen yazarları da mercek altına alınacaktır. Basında değişen tutumlar Soğuk Savaş'ın gelişmeleriyle ilişkili olarak değerlendirilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk basını, Sovyet karşıtlığı, komünizm karşıtlığı, Türk-Rus ilişkileri, Soğuk Savaş.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Turco-Russian relations are mostly evaluated in terms of rivalry since the beginning. Hostility between the expanding Russian Empire and declining Ottoman Empire reached its climax during the 19th century. The emergence of this process can be directly related with the wide territorial expansion of the Imperial Russia, including Ottoman lands. Following the annexation of the Crimean Khanate in 1783, Russia became the first Christian state, which permanently annexed an Ottoman territory with a majority of Muslim inhabitants whose loss the Ottoman Empire could never reconcile itself. With the rare exceptions of temporary Russian aid to the Ottomans once against Napoléon¹ in

¹ During Napoleonic Wars a major war broke out also between Russia and Ottoman Empire (1806 – 1812). Here, the aid refers to the alliance in the Second Coalition (1799 – 1802), in which Great Britain, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire were in the same front. Russia did not send aid directly to the Ottoman Empire in its struggle against French in Egypt but the joint campaign of the Coalition forces to French Alps forced Napoléon to withdraw from the Ottoman lands. For detailed information, see Aryeh Shmuelevitz, ed., *Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land: Articles Presented at the 2nd International Congress of Napoleonic Studies Israel, July 4-11, 1999* (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2002); Timothy C.W. Blanning, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars* (London; New York: Longman, 1986).

the first decade of 19th century and later against Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha (or Muhammed Ali)² of Egypt in 1833, Russia was often considered as the ‘protagonist’ among the rivals of the Sublime Porte until 1917. Thus, a solid anti-Russian sentiment became apparent especially among the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire, which was very deeply rooted due to several wars fought against Russians.

The international conjuncture in the aftermath of the First World War triggered an instrumental alliance between newly born Bolshevik government of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and the revolutionary government of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, both of which attributed them an anti-imperialist character. In contrast to prior alliances between Russians and Turks, this partnership remarked the first (and still the last) ideological rapprochement between the parties. Both regimes were planning to reconstruct their societies with a new set of values over the ashes of their predecessors. In both regimes, it meant the abolishment of all ‘obsolete’ values and their replacement with ‘new - modern’ values. As a matter of fact, the ideological character of the Soviet Union was always the prime aspect of its polity until 1991. On the other side, foreign policy of the Turkish Republic was also based on the mixture of some traditional values and Kemalist principles after the declaration of the republic.³ Construction of new values in all areas of life (certainly including political perceptions) could be a proper chance to forget past

² As a necessity of anti-nationalist (or anti-rebellious) policies of Nikolay I, a Russian fleet arrived to Constantinople in order to balance Egyptian forces and their supporters, Great Britain and France. For detailed information about the relations between the Mohammed Ali’s uprising and the rise of the Eastern Question, see Mohammed Sabry, *L’empire Egyptien Sous Mohamed-Ali et la Question d’Orient (1811-1849)* (Paris: Librairie orientaliste, P. Geuthner, 1930). For Russian view about the Egyptian Question, see: Rene Cattai, *Le Regne de Mohamed Aly d’Après les Archives Russes en Egypte* (Cairo: Pour La Societe Royale De Geographie D’Egypte, 1931).

³ The influence of the “Ottoman Legacy” is a widely accepted phenomenon within the republican policies. Turkish foreign policy is defined as a combination of Ottoman experiences and vision of the new regime. For a brief assessment, see: William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp.38-39.

transgressions and former animosity, as new political doctrines of Turks and Russians had some common points, such as anti-imperialism.

The short term alliance and following period of amity from 1923 to 1939 could resemble like the opening of a clean sheet between the successors of two rival empires. However, the economic contribution of the Soviet Union to the development of Turkey would remain insufficient to eliminate the mistrust among Turks about Russia. Moreover, the Turkish state consequently gained an official anti-communist identity during the first decade of the Cold War. The notable point of the transformation in Turkish foreign policy was the sudden change (or reinstatement of Russian fear) in Turkish public stance towards Russia. In other words, the same Kemalist government had a liability to direct the press to praise Turkey's friendship with the 'peace loving' Soviet Union during 1930s and then to renounce any kind of rapprochement between them and their 'aggressive' northern neighbor after 1945. Turkey had concrete reasons to follow a careful path against the Soviet Union, such as the changing conjuncture of the international system and the instable attitude of Stalin towards Turkey.⁴ However, the shift was quite drastic and perhaps the unique example in the history of Turkish foreign policy, as it even did not influence the severe competition between Republican People's Party (RPP) and Democratic Party (DP). Neither the transfer of the authority between Turkish parties nor Stalin's death resulted with a

⁴ Stalin's change towards Turkey can be obviously related with the consolidation of his power after the Great Purge. However, Stalin's inconsistency was not new for the Soviet Union in 1938. Some of Stalin's decisions were extraordinarily drastic. Even his decision for the signing of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was not the outcome of a well-planned strategy but a quick shift in his perceptions. Alliance with Germans would constitute a natural shift against Turkey. It is mostly claimed that self-assertive Stalin often ignored experienced Soviet statesmen such as Maxim Litvinov, who had proposed the containment of Germany. Although the existence of Stalin's early tendencies to approach Germans, it seems invalid according to Soviet archive documents. One important claim belongs to Jonathan Haslam, who opposes Robert C. Tucker's theory about the early tendencies of Stalin. See Jonathan Haslam, "The Making of Foreign Policy under Stalin" in Teriyuki Hara and Kimitaka Matsuzato, eds., *Empire and Society* (Sapporo: Hokkaido University Slavic Research Center: 1997).

détente between the governments. Instead, anti-communist sentiment, which became synonymous with anti-Russianism, was a very popular theme in both pro-RPP and pro-DP press, as the only common aspect of these parties was foreign policy.

This study aims to question the influence of the Turkish state over the press from Stalin's death (1953) to 1964, uncoincidentally the same year of sudden deterioration in Turco-American relations with Johnson's letter and Khrushchev's ouster from Soviet leadership. Did prominent journalists in Turkish newspapers foment anti-communism in 1950s independently or did they serve governmental circles, who strove to achieve at least some semblance of the public consent in their anti-Soviet foreign policy? The Soviet efforts for rapprochement after Stalin's death remained insufficient until 1960s and the new crises emerged between Turkey and the Soviet Union. As the press was the most effective tool of the Turkish state for propaganda, the evolution of the Soviet image in the Turkish press was essential to recognize whether the Turkish leaders between 1945 and 1960 (until the coup d'état on May 27, 1960) aimed to construct a hostile Soviet image in the society to improve the public support behind them. Instead, were the journalists of 1950s and 1960s freer from state manipulation than they were supposed?

CHAPTER II

FROM THE TEMPORARY AMITY TO THE PERMANENT ENMITY: RUSSIAN IMAGE IN TURKEY UNTIL THE SECOND WORLD WAR

2.1 Mutual Hostile Images between Turks and Russians

The prevalent anti-Russian sentiment among Turks until the collapse of the Tsarist regime was probably the primary factor for the birth of suspicions for the communist Soviet regime among the Turkish public and governmental circles. Unlike the anti-Russianism in 1940s and 1950s, which was suddenly fomented by particular people, the negative Russian image in Turkey until 1920s emerged as a natural consequence of the frequent wars lasted three centuries between the Ottoman Empire and Russian Empire.

2.1.1 Anti-Muslim Sentiment in Russia until 1917

It is possible to claim that the immemorial anti-Muslim sentiment in the Russian society was the main ferment of Turco-Russian antagonism. The roots of this negative image go back to the archaic anti-Tatar sentiment in Russia, which had been the consequence of the long-term rule of the Golden Horde over the medieval Russian principalities. Following the terrifying rule of Tatars lasted nearly three centuries from 1223 (Battle of Kalka) to 1480 (the Standoff on the Ugra), Russians gradually levied heavy burdens on Tatars and banned them from a variety of rights after their *reconquista* beginning from Kazan (1552). Following the conquest, unconverted Tatars around Kazan were expelled from their ancient capital.⁵ However, Russians continued to struggle with Tatars until the fall of the Crimean Khanate. Therefore, anti-Muslim sentiment of Russians had been already settled, when they faced with Ottomans first time.

The second essential component of Russian's antipathy for Turkish was the conquest of Constantinople by Ottomans, which caused a long-lasting trauma for the entire Orthodox world. In the midst of the 16th century, the Ottoman Sultans established their authority over all Orthodox lands up to Southern Bug River,⁶ while Russia remained as the sole independent orthodox Christian country. After the loss of Constantinople, from the 16th century on Russia began to style Moscow as the 'Third Rome', after the fall of the 'second' Rome to infidels, while

⁵ Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, *Idel Tatarları: Milli Çıdamlığına Tarihi Kararış* [The Volga Tatars – A Profile in National Resilience] (Moscow: İnsan Publishing House, 2000), pp. 37–48.

⁶ The raids of Crimean Tatars to Ukrainian lands promoted Ottoman control up to this region. Ottomans assumed the control of the northern regions of the modern Ukraine in different interims according to their periodic alliances with Zaporozhian Cossacks. A notable one was Doroshenko's oath of allegiance and acception of the Ottoman suzerainty. See Philip Longworth, *The Cossacks* (London: Constable, 1969), pp.156-157. The last alliance between Ottomans and Zaporozhian Cossacks was formed in the eve of unsuccessful Pruth Campaign of Pyotr Velikiy (1711) and Cossack Hetmans Ivan Mazepa and Pylyp Orlyk fought alongside the Turks last time. For detailed information, see Longworth, pp.167–168.

the first had been already under the control of the ‘Catholic heretics’. This claim was also legitimized after the marriage of Russian grand prince Ivan III, with Sophia (or Zoë) Paleologos, the niece of the last Byzantine emperor, Constantine IX Paleologos.⁷ These long-term claims constituted a solid base for future aspirations of some Russian Pan-Slavists to create a Pan-Slavic empire ruled from Constantinople.⁸ These age-old aspirations also seemed relevant with Stalin’s foreign policy in the Straits Crisis of 1945, as Soviet Union tried to legitimize the invasions of Finland and Baltic Republics in 1940 with prior Russian control over these areas.

Anti-Muslim sentiment also gained a cultural aspect in the 19th century, with the debates about the ‘real’ historical place of Russia in world history and the question “where Russia belongs to.” Thus, *tatarskoe igo* (Tatar Yoke) became a rudimental element of the philosophical paradigm of especially *Zapadnik*⁹ faction in the Russian *Intelligentsia*, notably after Pyotr Iakovlevich Chaadaev, and later Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen. Chaadaev claimed that Russia was about to reach the peak in its era of enlightenment just before the Mongol conquest. On the matter of the severity of Mongol devastation, he even agreed with his arch rival, prominent Slavophile, Aleksey Stepanovich Khomiakov (1804-1860).¹⁰ After Chaadaev, Herzen’s account also seems like a justification for Russian isolation

⁷ Mentioned legitimacy is still debated by many historians and theologians. As an example, see John Meyendorff, “Was There Ever a “Third Rome”?: Remarks on the Byzantine Legacy in Russia” in *Rome, Constantinople, Moscow: Historical and Theological Studies* (New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press: 1953).

⁸ Constantinople centered Pan-Slavic Empire project did not belong to entire Pan-Slavist circles, but was first mentioned in individual works of Nikolay Ia. Danilevsky and Rostislav A. Fadiev. For detailed information, see Michael Boro Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism 1856-1870* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 269–271.

⁹ Westernist

¹⁰ Raymond T. McNally, “Chaadaev Versus Xomjakov in the Late 1830’s and 1840’s” *Journal of the History of the Ideas*, Vol. 27, No. 1, (Jan.-Mar. 1966), pp.84–86.

from Europe.¹¹ The ‘Tatar Yoke’ was not grown as a state sponsored idea among the progressive circles in Russia, but as a natural consequence of a historical and societal legacy.

The Russian state did not officially support an ideology, promoting the theory of the Tatar Yoke, but they also did not act as lenient patrons over their Muslim subjects, whose number would reach 18 millions just before the First World War.¹² Tatars, who were previously subjected to forced conversions in medieval times, then faced the cultural assimilation projects such as the orthodox mission of Nikolay Ivanovich Ilminsky.

Anti-Muslim sentiment was turned against the Ottoman Empire, when the Russian Pan-Slavism emerged as a political doctrine, aiming the emancipation of Central European and Balkan Slavs from the rule of Habsburgs and Ottomans. Russian state always aimed at checking the development of nationalism under its own control, defining their official ideology during 1840’s associated with the name of Sergey Semionovich Uvarov, minister of public education from 1833 to 1849.¹³ The Russian Pan-Slavist movement had firstly emphasized on the cultural rights of Central European Slavs. During this period, the leading Pan-Slavist intellectuals in press, especially Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov openly declared Austria as the primary enemy for Pan-Slavism, due to its cultural hegemony over Central European Slavs and its ambitions over Balkan Slavs.¹⁴ However, the fury of Pan-Slavism turned to the Ottoman Empire after the revolts in Herzegovina and Bulgaria, which triggered the outbreak of Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.

¹¹ For Herzen’s ideas, see Alexandre Herzen, *La Russie et l’Occident*, trans. André Prudhomme (Paris: Editions des Portes de France, 1946), pp.33–54.

¹² Aleksandre Bennigsen, *Islam in Soviet Union: General Presentation* (London: Pall Mall, 1967), p.3.

¹³ For detailed information, see Nicholas V. Riazanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia 1825 – 1855* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 52–72

¹⁴ Petrovich, pp. 244–245.

During this war, the ideas of the Pan-Slavist intellectuals were beneficial for the Russian state. On the other hand, this did not mean the termination of governmental inspections over Slavic Benevolent Committees, main civil organizations of Russian Pan-Slavists.¹⁵ The end of the Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878 also refers to a great demise in state's favor for Pan-Slavism. Although the Pan-Slavist bureaucrats, scholars and journalists pursued their anti-Austrian ideas even to the degree of forcing the Russian state to challenge Austria in 1908 after Bosnian Crisis,¹⁶ they did not undertake a major anti-Muslim or anti-Turkish role after 1878. In contrast, anti-Westernism was about to become a common point between the Russian and Turkish intellectuals. For instance, in 1908, the Russian newspaper *Novoe Vremia* drew attention to common anti-Western doubts of Turkey and Russia on the eve of the Bosnian Crisis, in reference to similarities between Russian and Turkish societies.¹⁷

The anti-Turkish sentiment in Russia was the direct outcome of the anti-Muslim feelings among Russians, which had mostly been associated with the Russian's antipathy towards the Tatars and other Muslim subjects in their borders. Although the plans of Russian expansion aimed the Ottoman lands to a very large extent, including particularly Constantinople, anti-Ottomanism was not the sole sentiment, which directed Russian foreign policy during the Tsarist regime.

¹⁵ Petrovich, pp.241-243.

¹⁶ Sidney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1935), pp.378-385.

¹⁷ Ulaş Mangıtlı, "Turkish-Russian Relations and the Evolution of Identities, Images and Perceptions" *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu* on 5 March 2005, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p69504_index.html (accessed June 28, 2008), p.12.

2.1.2. General Russian Image among Ottomans until 1920s:

In contrast to the republican period of Turkey, the negative Russian image emerged as a gradual and natural phenomenon in the Ottoman Empire. The rise of this negative sentiment among Turks was related directly with several wars with Russia, and indirectly with the memories of the emigrants fled from the Russian oppression both in war times and peace times, including intellectuals. Hundreds of families from every province of the Empire could have the pain of losing a family member in a war against Russia, but anti-Russianism was stronger especially among the inhabitants of the Danubian principalities, Rumelia and Eastern Anatolia, who directly faced with the invasion of Russian armies. Therefore, the negative image of the 'Russian' often had a distinguished place among the other xenophobic images among Ottoman Muslims. Beyond other traditional words, used for common usage such as *Frenk* (a common word used for any kind of European, despite its obvious origin from 'French or Frank') or *küffar* (infidels), the word *Moskof* (Muscovite) gradually gained a derogative meaning among people. The reflections of anti-Russianism have been obvious even in folkloric elements.

As a secondary factor, the negative experiences and memories about the 'evil' treatment by the Russians came to the Ottoman lands, along with great numbers of emigrants first from Crimea and Caucasia, later from the newly lost Balkan provinces. This negative stance not only contributed greatly to anti-Russian sentiment of formerly invaded provinces, but also spread to the central Anatolian provinces, which had never seen Russian armies directly.

The reflections of popularly growing sentiment against Russians could also be partially seen among the enlightened circles of the Ottoman Empire, although the antipathy was not as deep as the popular hatred for Russians. Given the aggressive Russian stance towards the Ottoman Empire throughout most of the 19th century, it was almost impossible to observe a pro-Russian group in Ottoman intellectual circles. Long periods of tension in 19th century, including two major wars with Russia and intensive Russian support for the nationalist uprisings in the Balkans, prevented the emergence of pro-Russian parties inside the Ottoman bureaucracy. The common characteristic of pro-British, pro-French, and later pro-German factions in the bureaucracy was their fear for Russia, while each of them proposed alliance with different great powers against the Tsar. As an exception, Mahmud Nedim Pasha, grand vizier of Sultan Abdülaziz in two terms from 1871 to 1872 and from 1875 to 1876 could be considered as pro-Russian. The reason behind his strong tendency was probably his allegiance to the Russian Ambassador to the Porte, Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatiev, or his opposition to the Young Turks, most of which were generally perceived as pro-British or pro-French. Nedim Pasha's sympathy for an alliance with Russia made him quite unpopular and even led to nicknaming him *Nedimoff*.¹⁸

After two great wars with Russia, Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals began to publish first accounts, reflecting their anti-Russianism. However, these accounts did not always Russian state itself but blamed particular figures for the deterioration of Turco-Russian relations. For instance, the accounts of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha,¹⁹ a prominent Turkish general in Russo-Turkish War of

¹⁸ İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnal, *Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadriazamlar*, (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), Cüz 1, p.309.

¹⁹ Ahmed Muhtar, *Sergüzeşt-i Hayatım'ın Cild-i Evveli*, prep. Nuri Akbayar et al. (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), pp. 104–05, 109.

1877-1878, and Abdurrahman Şeref,²⁰ the last official chronicler of the Sultanate, depicted Ignatiev as an ‘evil’ man who had personally incited the revolts in the Balkans.

Despite the fact that the Ottoman intellectuals did not have connections with St. Petersburg like the strong ties established especially by the Young Turk exiles in France, Switzerland, and Great Britain, Ottoman press was never remained ignorant over the developments in Russia. Ottoman newspaper *Tasvir-i Efkâr* informed its readers about the daily progress of the Polish Rebellion of 1863 in February.²¹ Old friendship with Poles against Russia (as the common foe), had already created sympathy in the Ottoman public opinion towards the ethnic groups suppressed by Russians, perhaps due to the fear of sharing the same fate. Constantinople became an important center for nationalist refugees fleeing from the Tsarist persecution. Polish nationalists, notably Adam Mickiewicz and Hungarian nationalist refugees of 1848 led by Lajos Kossuth briefly stayed in the Ottoman Empire. Some of refugees (mainly Poles) permanently settled in Constantinople, while some were even converted to Islam such as Mustafa Celâleddin Pasha,²² who was murdered coincidentally during the suppression of Herzegovinian Uprising of 1876, supported by the Russian Pan-Slavists. It is quite possible that already existent Russian image was complemented by those figures. Nevertheless, their influence seemed limited, as they were ineffective to convince the government for a war against Russia.

²⁰ Abdurrahman Şeref, *Musahabe-i Tarihiye*, prep. Mübeccel Nami Duru (İstanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1980), pp. 179.

²¹ *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, issues: 66 (14 February 1863), 67 (18 February 1863), 68 (21 February 1863).

²² born as Konstanty Borżęcki, grandfather of Nâzım Hikmet Ran, and owner of a disputable theory in Turkish nationalist project, stating the ethnic kinship of Turks with Indo-European race.

Turkic émigré intellectuals from the Tsarist Empire also contributed the Russian image among the enlightened circles. Languished (but never disappeared) cultural ties between Ottomans and Muslims of the Russian Empire were strongly improved after the emergence of cultural nationalists, such as Azerbaijani poet and linguist Mirza Feth Ali Ahundzade (or Ahundov) and especially the Crimean Tatar journalist and enlightener İsmail Gasprinsky (or Gaspıralı) with his newspaper *Tercüman*, simultaneously with the improvements in Ottoman intellectual life under European influence. Especially after the rise of *Usûl-ü Cedit*, the enlightenment movement of Russian Muslims, many notable intellectuals arrived to Constantinople. Particularly after October Revolution, many *cedid* had to flee Turkey in order to escape from the Bolshevik persecution, including Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Agayev,²³ Sadri Maksudî Arsal,²⁴ Mehmet Emin Resulzâde, Zeki Velidî Togan,²⁵ Akdes Nimet Kurat.²⁶ Apart from having a comprehensive knowledge of the Russian language and culture, they were also very much concerned about their Turkic kins in the Tsarist Empire. As such, they were *sui generis* figures in the Turkish press and academic environment, and they had essential contributions to new culture of the Republican Turkey, especially in the construction of modern Turkish nationalism. Although the *cedids* were incredulous to think about friendly relations with Russia, this did not mean that they had denied Russian influence in their ideas. The cultural aspects in the Pan-Turkist paradigm have similarities with the Pan-Slavism.

²³ later adopted the surname 'Ağaoğlu'

²⁴ born as Sadri Nizameddinovich Maksudov

²⁵ born as Ahmet Zeki Velidov

²⁶ born as Akdes Nimetov

2.2. Smoldered Animosity until Atatürk's Death:

It is generally claimed that the Soviet aid to the Turkish nationalist revolutionaries during the Turkish War of Independence opened a new period for the perceptions of Turks about their aggressive northern neighbor. After their functional partnership, Bolsheviks and Kemalists initially seemed to smolder the prevalent animosity between Turks and Russians, whereas the former hostilities would be revealed after the Second World War. However, the Kemalist leadership did not seem to have much intimacy towards the Soviet Union, as the government had rigid measures to prevent communist propaganda from any origin in Anatolia.

2.2.1 Kemalist-Bolshevik Alliance (1920–1923) as a Turning Point:

Political perspectives of different Turkish writers have dominated the discourse in the historical debates about 'the Soviet aid to Kemalists' for a long time, while it is still difficult to present a clear definition neither for the real intentions of Bolsheviks nor for the real perspective of Mustafa Kemal. However, both the pro-Soviet and the anti-Soviet historians in Turkey agree on the realist characteristics of Kemalist-Bolshevik rapprochement, instead of questioning the existence of ideological sympathy. The possibility of such a tendency was even denied by the supporters of *Milli Demokratik Devrim* (National Democratic Revolution) movement of 1960s, whose supporters were persistent to make references to the similarities of Bolshevik and Kemalist revolutions. As a notable example, Rasih Nuri İleri a leading nationalist figure of Turkish Labor Party in

1960s and the founder of National Democratic Revolution Association in 1968. In his account, *Atatürk ve Komünizm*, İleri defines Mustafa Kemal as a reasonable leader and a true realist.²⁷ İleri states several reasons for the impossibility of the establishment of a Bolshevik regime in Anatolia. For instance, ‘the lack of an adequate executive bureaucracy to conduct socialist revolution’ and ‘the inability of Atatürk to eliminate landlords and rich merchants, who were the strongest supporters of his party’,²⁸ are accurate points of the author for the impossibility of a Bolshevik project in Kemalist regime. Although İleri has some controversial claims such as the tendency of Mustafa Kemal to form a government in Anatolia under Soviet example²⁹, he does not deny that the Turkish revolutionary leader approached Bolsheviks in order to secure the eastern borders and to struggle against the same foes.³⁰

Under these circumstances, the positive statements in the speeches of Mustafa Kemal Pasha might be regarded as a necessary strategy to maintain cordial relations.³¹ Apparently, Soviet Union had great expectations for Anatolia at first. A very early article published in *Izvestiya* on April 23, 1920, depicted the unrest in Anatolia as the first socialist revolution in Asia.³² However, Lenin recognized that Mustafa Kemal was not a communist, and that he was leading a movement with bourgeois characteristics, but a valuable ally, as he informed Semion Ivanovich

²⁷ Rasih Nuri İleri, *Atatürk ve Komünizm* (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınları, 1994), p.23

²⁸ İleri, pp.24–25

²⁹ Ibid, p.38

³⁰ Ibid, p.39

³¹ The messages sent from Mustafa Kemal to Lenin were later published even in the earliest Soviet accounts. For instance, see: I.V.Kluchnikov–A. Sabanin, *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika noveishevo vremeni v dogovarokh notakh i deklaratsiakh* (Moscow: 1925–1928), quoted in Jane Degras, *Calendar of Soviet documents on foreign policy 1917-1941* (London; New York: Royal Institute, 1948), p.43

³² Stefanos Yerasimos, *Ekim Devrimi'nden "Millî Mücadele"ye Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1979), p. 107

Aralov,³³ the first ambassador of RSFSR to Ankara. Mustafa Kemal was conscious of value of the Soviet aid, as Bolsheviks were in a desperate situation economically.

Mustafa Kemal's cordial attitude towards Bolsheviks was a milestone in the history of Turco-Russian relations. The diplomatic messages of Kemal would be later mentioned in Soviet historical accounts as a sign of his positive perception for the Russian Revolution and his role as a staunch ally.³⁴ Aralov later became a close figure to Mustafa Kemal and joined him in several journeys in the countryside. During these journeys, Aralov had much time to have long conversations with the leader of the Turkish revolution. Aralov mentions about Mustafa Kemal's intimacy, as once he thanked Soviet Union not to demand mandate or vassalization from Turkey in return for their aid and praised Bolshevik's struggle against imperialism.³⁵

After an official visit of Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze to Ankara representing Ukrainian SSR, a speech of Kemal was published in January 4, 1922 in the columns of *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*, the official newspaper of revolutionaries.

Turkey and the Turks, who were incurred to the most violent offenses of the imperialism, knew that there were nations struggling against the same ambitions across the Black Sea.³⁶

The careful diplomacy of Mustafa Kemal Pasha was essential, as the relations between Kemalists and Bolsheviks were still vulnerable. For instance,

³³ Semyon İvanoviç Aralov, *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Hatıraları*, trans. Hasan Ali Ediz (İstanbul, Burçak Yayınları: 1967), p. 37–38.

³⁴ For instance, Mustafa Kemal sent a personal telegraph to Lenin on December 18, 1920, celebrating the independence of Daghestan Republic and presents his greetings to Lenin with an intimate language. Soviet accounts considered this as a positive sign for Kemal's intimacy to the Bolsheviks. See: Mikhail Averkievich Kharlamov, *Leninskaya Vneshniaya Politika Sovetskoi Strany 1917–1924* (Moskva: Nauka, 1969), pp.137–138.

³⁵ Aralov, p.114.

³⁶ “Emperyalizmin en şedid taarruzlarına hedef olan Türkiye ve Türkiyeliler Karadeniz'in öbür tarafında aynı ihtirasata karşı mücadele eden milletler bulunduğunu bilirlerdi”. See: Yavuz Aslan, *Mustafa Kemal-M. Frunze Görüşmeleri: Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinde Zirve* (Beyoğlu, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2002), pp. 85–86.

Kemalist diplomatic mission in Moscow jeopardized the ongoing good relations in April 1922, when they were connived a diplomatic scandal with British and Polish diplomats.³⁷ For this reason, it is almost impossible to determinate the extent of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's intimacy to approach Bolsheviks. On the contrary, the Soviet deputy commissar for foreign affairs, Lev Mikhailovich Karahan, did not extend the problem and the commissar for foreign affairs, Georgy Vasilyevich Chicherin, joined Lausanne Conference in 1923 as an ardent supporter of Turkish claims.

2.2.2. A Janus-Headed Stance towards the Bolsheviks (1923–1939):

The war-time partnership with Bolsheviks could not entirely divert the Turkish political behavior towards the Soviet Union and to the internal communists. It seemed that the mistrust of Turks against the Russian Empire did not wane, because Turkey never regarded Moscow as the unique alternative in its foreign policy. Since the Lausanne Conference, Turkey had signaled its intention to remain neutral between the Soviet Union and the West. The Turkish delegation in Lausanne showed limited interest to the Soviet delegation. Even though Chicherin had a series of fiery speeches to defend the rights of Turks on the Straits, the Ankara delegation avoided establishing a front against the British. According to Timothy Edward O'Connor, a biographer of Chicherin, Turkish delegation was trying to form a balance between British and Soviet delegations,

³⁷ Erel Tellal, "1919-1923 Sovyetlerle İlişkiler", Baskın Oran, ed., *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar – Cilt 1: 1919-1980*, (İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları: 2001), p.175.

but it was embarrassed after witnessing Chicherin's ardent defense of Turkey.³⁸ Turkish delegation also did not voice a strong protest after the assassination of Vaslov Vorovski a member of the Soviet delegation in Lausanne by a former officer of the White Army.³⁹

In fact, the new Turkish government pursued its misgivings for the Soviet Union. The ever-suspicious about Russia had the potential to transform into hostility against communism (bolshevism). The government took positive measures to prevent Soviet propaganda, as it banned several newspapers published in Turkish language and printed in the Soviet Union; such as *Yeni Fikir* (New Idea)⁴⁰ in July, *Yeni Hayat* (New Life), *Rençber* (Farmer), *Kommunist*, and *Başkurt*⁴¹ in September 1923. These were only an overture for what was in store in the future. Moreover, the government not only forbade Soviet publications. In 1925, the Vienna edition of *International Press Correspondence*, the official publication of the Third International (Comintern), was banned to be brought into Turkey.⁴² This indicates the unwillingness of the government for a cultural – ideological rapprochement with the Soviet Union. However, Turkey felt that it did not have many alternatives among the great powers, after the Mosul conflict was resolved in favor of the Great Britain. The Security and Friendship Treaty between Turkey and the Soviet Union in 1925 was signed on December 17, 1925, uncoincidentally just one day after the League of Nations' resolution over the status of Mosul.

³⁸ Timothy Edward O'Connor, *Diplomacy and Revolution: G.V. Chicherin and Soviet Foreign Affairs, 1918–1930* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1988), p.124.

³⁹ Yerasimos, p.512.

⁴⁰ T.C. Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (hereafter will be cited as BCA) [Republican Archives of the Turkish Prime Ministry] (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.18.1.1, Yer No: 7.25.18.

⁴¹ BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.18.1.1, Yer No: 7.30.11.

⁴² BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.18.1.1, Yer No: 13.25.12.

The intolerance of the Turkish state against communist activities was not reflected into the relations between the countries. Although state leaders did not have any sympathy for communists inside Turkey, their perspective for the Soviet Union was generally positive. After the two new treaties, the Trade and Navigation Agreement of 1927, and the 1929 Protocol for the extension of the 1925 Treaty,⁴³ Lev Karahan visited Turkey. In a telegraph dated 15 December 1929, Prime Minister İsmet (İnönü) informed Mustafa Kemal about the negotiations between him, Lev Karahan, and foreign minister Tevfik Rüştü (Aras), stating that he felt cordiality in Karahan's attitude and therefore he was convinced after the conversation with the Soviet representative.⁴⁴

The spread of the influence of the Great Depression to young republic encouraged Atatürk to survive the crisis by a new leap, allowing a party for opposition. However, the unexpected consequence of this new trial (Free Party) motivated government to legislate the rigid law of press in 1931, which enabled the Turkish state to close any newspaper or periodical if it was regarded harmful for the state interests.⁴⁵ On the other hand, Kemalist state desired closer economic relations with the Soviet Union after 1929. Thus, improvements in the economic ties between Turkey and the Soviet Union in early 1930s would cause a strict inspection over publications about the Soviet Union.

⁴³ Erel Tellal, "1923-1939 Sovyetlerle İlişkiler", Baskın Oran, ed., *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar – Cilt 1: 1919-1980*, (İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları: 2001)pp.316–318.

⁴⁴ BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.1.0.0, Yer No: 1.5.32.

⁴⁵ BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.18.1.2, Yer No: 21.50.15. ; According to Walter Weiker, press was cowed by state authorities to support FP during municipal elections of 1930, and this might be the main factor behind this decision. See: Walter F. Weiker, "The Free Party, 1930" in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau, eds., (London; New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1991), p.85; In another account, Çağlar Keyder draws attention to economic plans, mentioning the press law. See: Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: a Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso, 1987), pp.99–100.

After İnönü's visit to Moscow in 1932, Soviets accepted to lend 8 million dollars 'interest-free' credit in exchange agricultural products, in addition technical support to Turkey both for the preparation of Soviet-style '5 year economic plans' and the assignment of technical labor in projected factories in Turkey.⁴⁶ This loan played an essential role for Turkey, as the government used this to buy weapons for defense.⁴⁷ Before the payment in 1934, a Soviet delegation led by Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov (People's Commissar for Military and Navy Affairs of the time) organized an official visit to Ankara on October 29, 1933, the tenth anniversary of the declaration of the Turkish Republic. During the visit, young Soviet director Sergey Iosipovich Yutkevich (1904-1985) filmed the celebrations and made his movie *Ankara – Serdtse Turtsii* (Ankara – Heart of Turkey).

In fact, the Soviet credit would remain marginal after 1938 in comparison to the loans from Germany, which had reached 150 million Deutsche Marks.⁴⁸ However, the Soviet Union was the mere hope for Turkey for loans until Montreux Convention. Although the Turkish proposal was supported and praised by Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov,⁴⁹ the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs would soon recognize that the Turkish tendency was to approach Great Britain. This would cause a sudden decline in relations, as Tevfik Rüştü Aras, who was considered as a pro-Soviet figure, faced with a cold reception in his visit to Soviet Union in 1937.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Tellal, p.319.

⁴⁷ BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.18.1.2, Yer No: 43.18.12.

⁴⁸ BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.18.1.2, Yer No: 85.117.17.

⁴⁹ Litvinov's gentle personality enabled Turkey to negotiate with a relatively respectful Soviet delegation in Montreux, while they would face with insistent attitude of Vyacheslav Molotov during negotiations for a Turco-Soviet non-aggression pact in 1939. See: Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1968), p.73, pp.149–153.

⁵⁰ Tellal, p.322.

As a matter of fact, the fluctuations in relations directly influenced governmental tolerance to published works about the Soviet Union in newspapers and periodicals. Leftist journals such as *Resimli Ay* (Illustrated Monthly), published by Sabiha - Zekeriya Sertel couple, had enjoyed a relatively undisturbed period. *Resimli Ay* had been previously subjected to state prosecution twice, firstly sent to Independence Courts⁵¹ in 1925, and secondly subjected to prosecution in 1929, having accused of insulting Turkish identity.⁵² It was not a coincidence that the first socialist-realist novel of Turkish literature, *Çıkrıklar Durunca* (As the Spinning Wheels Stopped),⁵³ by Sadri Etem Erdem was published in 1931. Any kind of anti-Soviet worldview, especially the Pan-Turkist publications, which were previously outlawed and replaced by an official nationalism, had to face persecution. In midst of 1930s many Turkic émigré intellectuals from the ex-Tsarist empire were either expelled (such as Zeki Velidî Togan) or voluntarily left Turkey to publish their works abroad. Until 1940s, it is almost impossible to see the words Turan, Turkistan, Azerbaijan, which could pose a threat for the fragile relations with the Soviet Union. Government banned the importation of several Pan-Turkist publications, such as *Yaş Türkistan*⁵⁴ (published in Paris), and the works of Azerbaijani politicians Mirza Bala Mehmetzâde (Kutluk)⁵⁵ and Mehmed Emin Resulzâde⁵⁶ published in Berlin.

In addition, the prominent members of Atatürk's inner circle, such as İsmet İnönü and parliamentary Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu (1889-1974) wrote in *Kadro* (Cadre) journal from 1932 to 1934, which was under the strong

⁵¹ BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.18.1.1, Yer No: 13.31.11.

⁵² BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.10.0.0, Yer No: 36.214.16.

⁵³ First edition of *Çıkrıklar Durunca* was printed in *Resimli Ay* Printhouse. The second edition of the novel had to wait 70 years to be published in 2001 by *Otopsi Yayınları*.

⁵⁴ BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.18.1.2, Yer No: 50.87.6.

⁵⁵ BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.18.1.2, Yer No: 84.81.8.

⁵⁶ BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.18.1.2, Yer No: 79.89.4.

influence of two Marxist journalists, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1897-1976) and Vedat Nedim Tör (1897-1985). In fact, later researchers, who analyzed the ideological structure of *Kadro* movement showed that the main proposal of the *Kadro* movement was not the establishment of socialist model in Turkey.⁵⁷ According to Mustafa Türkeş, they observed the Soviet system to understand NEP and centrally planned economy, as they later offered land reform in order to provide solidarity with peasants.⁵⁸

During 1930s, the Turkish government seemed to follow a Janus-headed policy, as they aimed to distinguish the governmental pressure over communism from ongoing intimate relations with the Soviet Union. During the re-establishment of cordial relations with the Soviet Union in early 1930s, the state pressure over communists eased to some extent, while the deterioration of the relations motivated state to increase its inspections over the internal communist propaganda. In a cabinet resolution dated August 17, 1931, four journals and newspapers; *Yeni Kafkas*, *Otlu Yurt*, *Bildiriş*, and *Azeri Türk*; were closed because of provocative publications about a “friendly neighbor of Turkey.”⁵⁹ On the other hand, another official document shows that state intelligence had a very cautious eye on the communist movement in the country even during 1932, at the peak of relations with the Soviet Union.⁶⁰ The Janus-headed policy of state is visible in another notable document, which informs that the state authorities had investigated a Soviet propaganda film gifted by the Soviet embassy in Ankara, showing the official visit of İsmet İnönü to Moscow in 1932. The author of the document, inspector Rahmi, reported that the film includes obvious signs of

⁵⁷ Mustafa Türkeş, *Kadro Hareketi: Ulusçu Sol Bir Akım* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999), p.215

⁵⁸ Türkeş, p.218.

⁵⁹ BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.18.1.2, Yer No: 22.59.13.

⁶⁰ BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.10.0.0, Yer No: 208.421.19.

Bolshevik propaganda, but state should not ban the film in order not to disturb the Soviet embassy.⁶¹

Especially during the period of uncertainty between 1936 and 1939, the Turkish state had efforts to control the public perspective about the Soviet Union. In September 1938, the government ordered the suppression of several communist publications⁶² four days after the official permission to *Ulus* (the official organ of the ruling RPP) to print information about the economic developments in the Soviet Union.⁶³ Thus, the Kemalist state had a special concern to control press at least in order to prevent any kind of non-Kemalist propaganda that could harm interior and foreign policy of the government.

⁶¹ BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.10.0.0, Yer No: 146.43.19.

⁶² BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.18.1.2, Yer No: 84.82.17.

⁶³ BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.10.0.0, Yer No: 85.558.6.

CHAPTER III

FROM THE SECOND WORLD WAR TO STALIN'S DEATH: BEGINNING OF THE ANTI-SOVIETISM IN TURKISH PRESS

3.1. From the End of Turco-Soviet Honeymoon to 1945:

The Turco-Soviet relations had a gradual deterioration period from the Montreux Convention (1936) to the Crisis of the Straits (1945). As it has been mentioned, the Kemalist perspective for the Soviet Union was quite positive before 1936, especially in press. It was usual to see several articles in Turkish newspapers, which praised the Soviet Union or Soviet statesmen. For instance, in 1935, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, who would be 'the villain of 1945 Crisis' had been praised several times in the Turkish press for his supreme qualities and his contributions to the Turco-Soviet friendship.⁶⁴ However, Atatürk's death put an end to the the foreign ministry of pro-Soviet Aras, who

⁶⁴ Abidin Daver, "Türk-Sovyet Dostluğu" *Cumhuriyet*, 2 February 1935.

held the office for 12 years. The appointment of Şükrü Saraçoğlu, was a sign of a drastic change in the relations.⁶⁵

Şükrü Saraçoğlu led a diplomatic mission to Moscow, in order to sign a pact with the Soviet Union. However, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had been signed one month before Saraçoğlu's arrival to Moscow. Therefore, a pact between Turkey, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union became impossible. The mission could not dare to accept the Soviet proposal for a triple alliance between the Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and Turkey,⁶⁶ as the İnönü administration had already accepted an alliance with Great Britain and France. This meant the end of the Turco-Soviet partnership, after which the Turkish state would feel itself free to choose either British or German side.

Government had to be careful between German and the Soviet Union for the sake of neutrality. Therefore, *Ulus* followed a careful policy of publication, while other newspapers was about to divide into pro-Axis and pro-Allied camps. Especially during the first month of the Operation Barbarossa, the sudden increase in the number of Anti-Soviet articles disturbed governmental authorities. In an official instruction Prime Minister Refik Saydam ordered the Istanbul Press Office

⁶⁵ Political stance of Saraçoğlu between Germans and British remained obscure in many primary accounts in Turkish language. For instance, experienced Turkish diplomat Feridun Cemal Erkin, who was also present in Turkish delegation for Moscow negotiations in 1939, had no comment on Saraçoğlu's personal tendency in his book *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi*, although Saraçoğlu was seen pro-British during negotiations with Molotov in 1939. See: Erkin, pp.145–156; On the other German ambassador to Ankara, Franz von Papen, mentions the existence of a close relationship between von Papen and Saraçoğlu during 1942. See: Franz von Papen, *Memoires* (Paris: Flammarion, 1953), pp.292–309; In fact, it is certain that Saraçoğlu never showed a pro-Soviet stance. Selim Deringil states that once Saraçoğlu even expressed his personal hope for the destruction of the Soviet Union and von Papen reported it to Berlin. See: Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: an 'Active' Neutrality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.123; However, Saraçoğlu's personal could not direct the route of Turkish Foreign Policy under the strict control of President İnönü, in contrast to the influence of Tevfik Rüşü Aras over Atatürk. See: Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 193.

⁶⁶ Erkin, pp.136–143.

to take measures against these ‘unpleasant’ publications.⁶⁷ Turkish side initially planned to maintain their quasi-docile attitude towards Moscow, but the unexpected German victories confused their minds. In addition, it is mostly claimed that the number of the supporters of Germany were higher than those of others in Turkish bureaucracy and bourgeoisie,⁶⁸ after German progress. It should not be dismissed that Germany was the only great power which did not declare war upon Turkey and memories from the First World War partnership were still fresh. However, this was not enough to explain the support to Germany from the majority of press between 1941 and 1943, after Yunus Nadi Abaloğlu, editorial writer of *Cumhuriyet*, had published an article, accusing the Western Allies with hypocrisy as they had to help Russia, their number two enemy yesterday. After Yunus Nadi’s article, *Cumhuriyet* continued to publish articles, praising German victories in the Eastern front.⁶⁹

3.2. The ‘Tan - Tanin’ Clash under the Shadow of the Straits Crisis:

The Second World War caused mutual mistrust between Turkey and the Soviet Union and resulted with a political conflict between these governments. The Soviet decision to terminate the Security and Friendship Treaty between Turkey and the Soviet Union in 1925 caused a great fear among the Turks. The result was the defection of Turkey to the Western camp.

⁶⁷ BCA, (Ankara), Fon Kodu: 30.1.0.0, Yer No: 30.179.1.

⁶⁸ For governmental proximity, see: Kemal H. Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi* (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1967), p. 125 and p.227; For societal sympathy, see: Keyder, p.111.

⁶⁹ Deringil, p.123.

In addition, the political crisis between Turkey and the Soviet Union also triggered a domestic clash in the Turkish press between the newspapers of *Tan* and *Tanin*. This was the first example in the Turkish press, in which newspapers actively contended to shape the perspective of the public opinion in different camps, during a foreign policy crisis. In the first scene, the quarrel aroused between *Tan* and *Tanin* newspapers, which resulted with the end of the former. In the second part, *Tan* was closed and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın (1875-1957), editorial writer of *Tanin*, published a series of anti-Soviet articles, which also signaled the political direction of the RPP government at the beginning of the Cold War.

The first publication of *Tanin* was between 1908 and 1925. During this time, Hüseyin Cahit's newspaper was a supporter of the Committee of Union and Progress Party (CUP) until the newspaper was closed in 1925, during Kemalists' suppression of the former CUP members. Hüseyin Cahit was sentenced to a lifetime exile in Çorum⁷⁰ after being arrested and stayed in the same prison cell with Zekeriya Sertel.⁷¹ Yalçın returned to party politics after Atatürk's death upon İnönü's invitation. After his rehabilitation, *Tanin* rejoined the Turkish press, this time as a supporter of governmental policies.

Tan was an exceptional newspaper in Turkey during the first half of 1940s. The newspaper was firstly founded as a publication of Türkiye İş Bankası (İşbank), but gained its prominence after being bought by two famous and somewhat oppositional journalists of the time, Mehmet Zekeriya Sertel (1890-1980), and Ahmet Emin Yalman (1888-1972). Later, Yalman would terminate his contract with Zekeriya Sertel and establish *Vatan* in early 1940s.

⁷⁰ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, *Siyasal Anılar* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 1976), p.284.

⁷¹ Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2000), p.133.

Zekeriya Sertel was one of the first journalists received education on journalism in the United States with his wife, Sabiha Sertel (1895-1968), who was a well-known Marxist and a pioneer of feminism in Turkey. Their publication career began in 1919 with a weekly journal, *Büyük Mecmua*⁷² and continued with *Resimli Ay* from 1924 to 1931. This was a monthly illustrated magazine in American style but it also had a strong political content, which could even disturb the state authorities, as it was mentioned. *Resimli Ay* initially followed a liberal path until 1929. In this year, the Sertel couple hired Nâzım Hikmet Ran⁷³ (1902-1963) as a redactor and the journal summoned many young leftist authors such as, Sabahattin Ali (1907-1948), Sadri Etem Erdem (1898-1943), and Suat Derviş (1903-1972).⁷⁴ This caused a conflict between Sertels and the concessionaires of the journal which would lead to the end of its publication. Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel returned to press with *Tan* as well-known journalists.

The importance of *Tan* was its oppositional stance during the Second World War, first against pro-Axis newspapers in press, and later against the ‘so-called’ pro-democratic newspapers. Although *Tan* would be labeled by its rivals as the center of communist propaganda, the majority of Zekeriya Sertel’s articles in his daily column indicated that he presented himself as a supporter of the Atlantic Charter 1941.⁷⁵ In other words, Zekeriya Sertel concurrently praised the Western Allies and the Soviet Union against the supporters of the Axis.

⁷² Zekeriya Sertel, p.80.

⁷³ Nazım Hikmet launched his famous campaign “Demolishing the idols” in *Resimli Ay* against senior Ottoman poets such as Abdülhak Hamit Tarhan, possibly under the influence of the similar manifest of Vladimir V. Mayakovsky. See: Saime Göksu and Edward Timms, *Romantic Communist: The Life and Work of Nazım Hikmet* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), pp.84

⁷⁴ Göksu and Timms, pp.78–100.

⁷⁵ M. Zekeriya Sertel, “Moskova Konferansı Muazzam Bir Muvaffakiyetle Bitti,” *Tan*, 31 October 1943; idem, “Kahire Buluşması İle Aydınlanmış Olan Meseleler” 12–14 December 1943; idem, “Moskova Anlaşmasınının Mânası,” *Tan*, 1 November 1943; idem, “Birleşmiş Milletlerle İşbirliği Yapmanın Zarureti,” *Tan*, 20 December 1943.

In her column, Sabiha Sertel mostly evaluated the internal problems of the country during war time. She discussed various problems rotationally with her husband such as the bread shortage,⁷⁶ the privileges given to the high officials of RPP,⁷⁷ bribery,⁷⁸ and even the destructive consequences of the 1942 property tax (or capital levy).⁷⁹ The acts of the Sertel couple were quite audacious, while other newspapers adapt their publications to official RPP policies. Therefore, their articles attracted a harsh criticism from the pro-government journalists. Although *Tan* published positive comments about Soviet regime both in the columns of Sertels and translated articles from the western press,⁸⁰ but these did not bring a furious reaction until 1945. After Stalin's speech, in which he celebrated the 26th anniversary of the October Revolution, Zekeriya Sertel stated that "this could be considered as a forerunner for all nations, which long for their freedom and independence."⁸¹ Either being frank or producing his articles on a special purpose, Zekeriya Sertel's optimism was excessive about the Soviet Union, as he even claimed that the Soviet Union aimed at the democratization of "tiny nations" instead of Bolshevization.⁸² Although his comments were equally optimistic about the American contribution to world peace, he previously offered an alliance with the Soviet Union.⁸³ This probably played an essential role behind the accusations of receiving support from the Soviet Union.

⁷⁶ Sabiha Sertel, "Demokraside Halkın Murakabesi Şarttır" *Tan*, 28 November 1943.

⁷⁷ Sabiha Sertel, "Suistimalin Kökünü Kurutmak Lazımdır" *Tan*, 30 January 1944.

⁷⁸ M. Zekeriya Sertel, "Harpten Doğan İdarî ve İctimai Hastalıklar" *Tan*, 8 November 1943; idem, "Gayrimeşru Servet Yapan Memurları Meydana Çıkarmalı" *Tan*, 31 January 1944.

⁷⁹ M. Zekeriya Sertel, "Şehrimizde 50.000 Aç Var" *Tan*, 17 November 1943.

⁸⁰ For instance, see: Joseph R. Davies, "Stalin Kalkınmasına Övgüler" *Tan*, 25 October 1943.

⁸¹ M. Zekeriya Sertel, "Sovyet Rejiminin Yıldönümü Münasebetiyle Stalin'in Nutku" *Tan*, 8 November 1943.

⁸² M. Zekeriya Sertel, "Küçük Milletlerin İstikbaline Dair Sovyet Görüşü" *Tan*, 6 December 1943.

⁸³ M. Zekeriya Sertel "Birbirimizi Tanımak İhtiyacındayız" *Tan*, 25 June 1944; idem, "Sovyetler Birliği İle İttifaka Kadar Giden Bir Dostluk" *Tan*, 1 July 1944; idem, "Sovyetlerle İttifak Mümkün Değil midir?" *Tan*, 9 July 1944.

After the invasion of Normandy, Sertels stepped up their pro-Allied propaganda with a careful language. While Zekeriya Sertel warned the government about the time to join war⁸⁴ and applauded the victories of both Americans and Russians, the Turkish government was preparing its policies for the post-war period. In Turkish historiography, Turkey's accession to Western Alliance is generally assessed with the 'unexpected' Soviet threat in 1945. However, some accounts claim that İnönü tried to exploit the Soviet aggression to diminish internal dissent against his government, because exhausted patience of the people must have directed the president to implement new strategies to maintain his control. The easiest way to call people to solidarity was to foment fear against an 'evil' foe, which wanted to invade Turkey unjustly.⁸⁵ Sertels and *Tan* must have been the first victims of the government, after Sertel couple (mainly Sabiha Sertel) found themselves in a harsh quarrel with RPP deputy Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and his newspaper *Tanin*.

As it has been mentioned, Zekeriya Sertel expressed his personal comment in favor of an alliance either with the Soviet Union or the Western Allies. In the midst of 1944, his perspective became more pro-Soviet, as he questioned the possibility of an alliance between Turkey and the Soviet Union. There was no initial reaction to Zekeriya Sertel's ideas, because the possible attitude of the government was still uncertain, while Soviet Russia still fought in the Allied front.

⁸⁴ M. Zekeriya Sertel, "Türk-İngiliz İttifakına Yeni Bir Şekil Vermek Lazımdır" *Tan*, 12 May 1944; idem, "Müttefiklerle İşbirliği Yapmak Ne Demektir?" *Tan*, 6 August 1944.

⁸⁵ Available articles in the Turkish archives are insufficient to produce a certain explanation, while the memoirs of politicians of that era could help us to understand the motives of RPP politicians. For instance, see: Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar (1939-1954)*(İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları, 1974), p.316, quoted in Gencer Özkan, *Turkey's Relations with the Soviet Union (1945-1980)*, *PhD Thesis* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, 1992), p.75; In his PhD thesis, Gencer Özkan also mentions about an interview of English journalist A. K. Helm with Feridun Cemal Erkin (Secretary of the Foreign Ministry at the time) proving İnönü's tendencies to control press, in reference to a document from the Public Record Office (PRO) in London. See: Özkan, pp.75-76.

During the first days of 1945, both government and press expressed their sympathy to Russia.⁸⁶

In *Tanin*'s editorial article, published on January 15, 1945, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, wrote overblown praises for the 'moral power' of the Red Army, and stated that the Soviet Empire would be the most glorious empire of the world, if they were eager to bear the honorary flag of peace.⁸⁷ This was quite meaningful in terms of the expectations of the Turkish government from Stalin on the eve of the Yalta Conference. Eventually, Turkish government had been alarmed by the intentions of Allies to accept Stalin's demand for amendments in the Montreux regime on the Straits in Yalta.⁸⁸ After the conference, the İnönü government seemed to wait for some time to leave their friendly stance towards Soviet Russia, as three deputy journalists of RPP; Necmettin Sadık Sadak (1890-1953), Falih Rıfık Atay (1894-1971) and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın launched an anti-Soviet campaign in their newspapers, *Akşam*, *Ulus*, and *Tanin*. This must have been the consequence of a planning process, because Yalçın's attitude was still calm after the Soviet rejection for the extension of the 1925 Treaty on March 7, 1945. On April, Yalçın still wrote that Russian behavior was normal in diplomatic terms and he did not believe that Soviets were planning an exploitative treaty like Hünkâr İskelesi (1833).⁸⁹

Against the staunch bloc of the RPP controlled press, *Tan* could be considered as the unique bastion of the opposition, but Zekeriya Sertel's perspective on the Straits regime did not contrast with the RPP journalists. For

⁸⁶ Gencer Özkan informs the speeches several members of the Turkish Parliament, flattering the contributions of Soviet Union and its reflections on press in the articles of RPP journalists, notably Yalçın. See: Özkan, pp.38-39.

⁸⁷ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Yeni Rus Taarruzu" *Tanin*, 15 January 1945.

⁸⁸ *Erkin*, pp.268-271.

⁸⁹ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Türk-Rus Münasebetleri" *Tanin*, 14 April 1945.

instance, Zekeriya Sertel also expressed his anxiety for Anglo-American support for the Soviet demands during the planned conference in Germany.⁹⁰ After the electoral victory of Clement Attlee in the Great Britain, he even supported Yalçın's idea for a triple alliance between the British, Russians and the Turks.⁹¹

Beginning from June 28, 1945, Zekeriya Sertel and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın continuously criticized each other in their columns.⁹² As a matter of fact, the polemic between Sabiha – Zekeriya Sertel and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın was not merely based on the Straits Question, as it was supposed. The articles of the Sertels must have been disturbed the government. Especially Sabiha Sertel directed her sharp pen to the former Nazi supporters in the bureaucracy, explicitly to the Pan-Turkists, who did not face state persecution, until the government decided to side with the Allies.⁹³ Criticism of Sabiha Sertel became fiercer during the 1945 fall. Sabiha Sertel began to criticize RPP harshly, due to its protection of some party members, who previously supported fascism.⁹⁴ The joint criticism of the Sertel couple even included negative comments about the autocratic implementation of some of the Kemalist reforms, such as the language reform.⁹⁵ The patience of RPP was probably exhausted after the brave accusations of the Sertel couple about the insufficiency of RPP to establish democracy.⁹⁶ On the opposite side, Yalçın wrote several articles with a careful language, pretending to

⁹⁰ M. Zekeriya Sertel, “Boğazlar Meselesi” *Tan*, 3 Temmuz 1945.

⁹¹ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Türkiye-İngiltere-Rusya Arasında Üçüzlü Bir İttifak Bütün Zorlukları Ortadan Kaldırabilir” *Tanin*, 1 August 1945; M. Zekeriya Sertel, “Akliselim İçin Yol Birdir” *Tan*, 4 August 1945.

⁹² Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Üçüncü Cihan Harbi Tehlikesi Karşısında Türkiye” *Tanin*, 27 June 1945; M. Zekeriya Sertel “Türk Efkarının Aydınlığa İhtiyacı Vardır” *Tan*, 28 June 1945.

⁹³ Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 115 – 117.

⁹⁴ Sabiha Sertel, “Demokrasiye Tahammül Edemiyen Zihniyet” *Tan*, 28 August 1945; idem, “Hitler’in Ne Günahı Vardı?” *Tan*, 10 October 1945.

⁹⁵ M. Zekeriya Sertel, “Bu Bir İnkılâp Değil, Bir İrticadır” *Tan*, 28 September 1945.

⁹⁶ M. Zekeriya Sertel, “Bu Zihniyet Durdukça Demokrasi Olabilir mi?” *Tan*, 11 November 1945; idem, “Demokrasi İnkılâbını C.H.P. Yapamaz” *Tan*, 22 November 1945; idem, “Anti-Demokratik Kanunlar Ne Vakit Çıktı?” *Tan*, 25 November 1945; Sabiha Sertel, “İnkılâpçı Parti” *Tan*, 21 November 1945.

be respectful to the Sertels in order to mask his harsh criticism partially. At first, he claimed that Moscow Radio had blamed Turkey to maintain fascist aspects in its regime⁹⁷ and later gradually indicated the so-called parallels between the Sertels and Moscow Radio.⁹⁸ After an anti-fascist article by Sabiha Sertel,⁹⁹ Yalçın asked Sabiha Sertel whether she was a Muscovite, due to labeling all Soviet oppositionists as fascist.¹⁰⁰

After the November attacks of Sertels, the fury of both sides suddenly increased, as Sabiha Sertel criticized Yalçın for his intolerance to opposition,¹⁰¹ while the latter blamed Sertels for being rebellious against the authority of the parliament.¹⁰² Yalçın also published speculative news about the support of Moscow behind Zekeriya Sertel.¹⁰³ This quarrel ended with a well-known tragedy in Turkish press history. A provocative article entitled *Kalkın Ey Ehli Vatan!* (The Sons of the Fatherland, Arise!), by an anonymous author, was published on *Tanin*'s first page on December 3, 1945. The article targeted Sabiha Sertel's two articles in their periodical *Görüşler* and implied the urgency of action against the 'traitors.'¹⁰⁴ Consequently, printing house of Sertels was busted by a furious mob of students on December 4, 1945. The Sertel couple was barely escaped from being lynched. Thus, publication career of the Sertel couple in Turkey was finalized.¹⁰⁵

Beyond speculations, it was true that the majority of the articles written by the Sertel couple praised Soviet Union for its role in the allied camp, but

⁹⁷ Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Moskova Radyosunun Hücumları" *Tanin*, 29 June 1945

⁹⁸ Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Bolşevikler Hakkında Bir Müşahade" *Tanin*, 26 September 1945

⁹⁹ Sabiha Sertel, "Türkiyede Faşist Yoktur" *Tan*, 20 October 1945

¹⁰⁰ Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Türkiyede Faşistlik Dâvası Üzerinde" *Tanin*, 21 October 1945

¹⁰¹ Sabiha Sertel, "Zâtâlinizi Tenkit Etmeme Müsaade Eder misiniz?" *Tan*, 11 October 1945; idem, "Beyefendi Rahatsız Olur" *Tan*, 8 November 1945

¹⁰² Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Değişiklikleri Kim Yapacak?" *Tanin*, 7 November 1945

¹⁰³ "Moskova Radyosu Zekeriya Sertelin Fikirlerini Yayıyor" *Tanin*, 1 December 1945

¹⁰⁴ "Kalkın Ey Ehli Vatan!" *Tanin*, 3 December 1945

¹⁰⁵ Tevfik Çavdar, *İz Birakan Gazeteler ve Gazeteciler* (Ankara:İmge Kitabevi,2007), pp. 546–549

Zekeriya Sertel also continued to praise the US government's role for the world peace until the last days of *Tan*.¹⁰⁶ However, *Tan*'s absence had a great contribution to pro-American propaganda of the government during late 1940s. In fact, Turkey had a great diplomatic success in the Straits Crisis to convince the Truman government for Stalin's prospective aggressions. In his memoirs, Feridun Cemal Erkin, who was the undersecretary of the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs at the time, confessed that Turkey would be ready to accept the revision of Montreux Convention even in favor of the Soviet interests, unless the Americans changed their policy, and Turkey's acceptance was informed to US government on December 6, 1945.¹⁰⁷

The Crisis of the Straits, which had begun with Molotov's explicit declaration of Soviet demands from Turkey for the revision of Montreux and opening of Soviet military bases on the Straits for common defence later vaned, but another implicit pressure from the Soviet Union, as the expression of the theoretical rights of the Georgian SSR on the cities Kars and Ardahan in the Soviet press,¹⁰⁸ opened the second phase of the crisis in 1946. The material and political capability of the Soviet Union to launch an invasion on Turkey is questionable, but it might have been regarded as a golden opportunity for government both to request funds from Marshall Aid, and to deal with the post-war dissent in the society, around the idea of solidarity of the nation against a historical 'evil' neighbor. After *Tan* was silenced, Yalçın and his colleagues in *Ulus* and *Akşam* obtained a wider place to foment anti-Soviet sentiment in Turkish

¹⁰⁶ M. Zekeriya Sertel, "Dünya Sulhünde Amerika'nın Rolü" *Tan*, 30 October 1945.

¹⁰⁷ Erkin, p.272.

¹⁰⁸ For the original Russian version and Turkish translation of the letter, entitled "Our Legal Demands from Turkey" written by S. Djanashina and N. Berdzenishvili from Georgian Academy of Sciences, published at December 20, 1945 in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, see: Erel Tellal, *Uluslararası ve Bölgesel Gelişmeler Çerçevesinde SSCB-Türkiye İlişkileri (1953-1964)*, PhD Thesis (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Yayınları, 2000), pp. 239-254.

public opinion. At this point, several older aspects of anti-Russianism would have a great revival, but the Crisis of the Straits became a notorious stereotype among the Turkish journalists until 1960s.

During 1946, Yalçın brought the flag of the ‘so-called democratic’ forces. One week after the *Tan* Incident, he stressed the protest of the Soviet Ambassador Sergey Aleksandrovich Vinogradov about the demolition of *Tan* Printhouse. He continued to attack Soviet government with a harsh language, once even calling Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky as a ‘new Hitler.’¹⁰⁹

Four points are quite important to analyze the characteristics of the behavior of Turkish press during the Crisis of the Straits. First, the influence of press was considered serious both in Turkey and abroad. The aggressive language of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın disturbed the Soviet government and caused an official warning from Vinogradov.¹¹⁰ Second, Turkish press continuously stressed the arrogance of the Soviet Russia to offer common defense of the Straits as an attack to Turkish national sovereignty from 1945 to 1960s. However, later documents denoted that the idea of common defense had been first offered by the Turkish delegation in Lausanne to Chicherin; it was but refused by the Soviet government.¹¹¹ Third, the respectful attitude of Turkish press to Soviet Union from 1920s to 1944 had a very sudden change. For instance, Yalçın mentioned the partnership between Turkish revolutionaries and Bolsheviks against common western foes on April 1945,¹¹² but he named the same partnership as a “myth that had to be refuted” at the end of the same year.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Ruslar Kendilerini Açığa Vurdular” *Tanin*, 6 February 1946.

¹¹⁰ Erkin, p.250.

¹¹¹ Yerasimos, p.498.

¹¹² Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Türk-Rus Münasebetleri” *Tanin*, 14 April 1945.

¹¹³ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Yıkılması Lazım Bir Masal Daha” *Tanin*, 26 December 1945.

The fourth and the most important point is the uncertainty of the influence of pro-Soviet stance of *Tan* over the governmental hatred for the Sertel couple, because Zekeriya Sertel never criticized the governmental behavior of Turkey in terms of foreign policy during the crisis. The only difference between pro-RPP editorial writers and Zekeriya Sertel was the assessment of the circumstances. For Zekeriya Sertel, there was not a crisis and Turkey could easily obtain American support to resist the Soviet Union.¹¹⁴ Moreover, Zekeriya Sertel expressed a realist comment about the tension, stating that Turkey should make sacrifices if the Western Allies had accepted Soviet demands.¹¹⁵ In his last article about the Straits Question, he expressed his disappointment about the aggressive and impatience attitude of the US government in the crisis, which could damage Turkey's will to solve the problem giving the least possible concessions.¹¹⁶ Although Yalçın blamed Sabiha Sertel to praise the Soviet Union, he signaled her article in the first issue of the journal *Görüşler*, in which Sertels also published the heavy criticism of Mahmut Celâl Bayar and Ali Adnan Menderes, who had newly left from RPP and founded DP. As it had been mentioned, especially Sabiha Sertel's harsh criticism about the corruption of the RPP bureaucracy was carefully observed and responded by the governmental newspapers. *Tan* Incident was also a warning for the four founders of DP, who were supported by Sertels. Although the founders of DP did not back Sertels after the disaster, Yalçın and the rest of the RPP journalists were ready to direct their bows of criticism towards the democrats. In May 1946, Yalçın claimed that Celâl Bayar had an interview with an American newspaper, in which he denied any kind of Soviet threat.¹¹⁷ In the

¹¹⁴ M. Zekeriya Sertel, "Yine Boğazlar Meselesi" *Tan*, 13 August 1945.

¹¹⁵ M. Zekeriya Sertel, "Boğazlar Meselesinde Türkiye'nin Görüşü" *Tan*, 18 September 1945.

¹¹⁶ M. Zekeriya Sertel, "Boğazlar Meselesinin Son Safhası" *Tan*, 13 November 1945.

¹¹⁷ Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Celâl Bayar ve Rus Meselesi" *Tanin*, 4 May 1946.

article, Yalçın implicitly questioned whether Bayar had supported the Soviet Union. This was a forerunner of Yalçın's next campaign. On July 13, a long furious manifest was published on the first page the *Tanin*, which claimed that the so-called 'Red-Fascists' of DP were supported by the Moscow Radio and RPP is the only savior of the country from the Soviet threat.¹¹⁸ Three days later, Yalçın asked the comments of DP members about the [so-called] resistance of RPP against Soviet demands over the Straits and the eastern provinces, accusing them of remaining silent.¹¹⁹ It was not difficult to see the connection between Yalçın's accusations with the upcoming elections on July 21, 1946.

3.3. From the Straits of the Crisis to Stalin's Death

The Straits Crisis was resolved briefly after the revelation of American attitude. After the first gestures of the United States, such as the famous visit of USS Missouri to Istanbul, Turkey included into Marshall Plan in 1948 and later applied NATO for full membership.¹²⁰ With Turkey's defection into Western Camp, the Soviet pressure over Turkey changed its shape gradually and transformed into a typical Cold War rivalry. On the other hand, the pro-American foreign policy of Turkey was perhaps the only common aspect of RPP and DP, as the preferences of the former were maintained by the latter. In addition, the DP

¹¹⁸ Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Bolşevikler Maskeyi Yüzlerinden Attılar" *Tanin*, 13 July 1945; Nilgün Gürkan, *Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçişte Basın* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1998), p.207.

¹¹⁹ Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, "Vatan Menfaati Her Şeyin Fevkindedir" *Tanin*, 16 July 1946.

¹²⁰ Mehmet Gönlübol & Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, eds., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: Alkım Kitabevi, 1989), pp. 238–236.

rule between 1950 and 1960 was a continuation of anti-Soviet inclination in the Turkish press.

Democratic Party sought the support of all oppositional forces in Turkey until their victory in the parliamentary election held on May 14, 1950. Before 1950, especially the leftist Turkish intellectuals faced governmental persecutions especially during the late 1940s. Nazım Hikmet Ran had been in prison since 1938, despite intense protests in Istanbul and Paris for his release.¹²¹ The leftist writer Sabahattin Ali was murdered, leaving the doubts of a conspiracy behind his death. Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel had to leave Turkey, while rest of the socialist journalists such as Aziz Nesin (1915-1995) had to deal with oppression.¹²² Many leftist professors of the Ankara University, Faculty of Language, History and Geography including Niyazi Berkes, his wife Mediha Berkes, Muzaffer Şerif Başoğlu, Behice Boran, Pertev Naili Boratav, and İlhan Başgöz were purged in 1946.¹²³ In this atmosphere, DP seemed as a light of hope for the leftist intellectuals. However, they suddenly inherited the anti-communist sentiment from RPP. From 1950 to 1953, both RPP and DP newspapers continued to publish several anti-Soviet articles. This three-year period also refers to a relatively peaceful period between RPP and DP in comparison to the second half of 1950s, at least in foreign policy decisions, as both of these parties had a consensus over sending Turkish soldiers to Korean War and the membership to NATO.¹²⁴

The consensus between RPP and DP also influenced the patterns of DP domestic policy, especially the attitude of the new government towards

¹²¹ Protests in Turkey were led by family members of Ran and supported by the popular poets of the time, Orhan Veli Kanık, Melih Cevdet Anday, and Oktay Rıfat Horozcu. In France, lots of world-wide authors, including Jean Paul Sartre, Louis Aragon, and Pablo Neruda joined to the protests to create a pressure over the Turkish government. See: Göksu and Timms, pp.202–216.

¹²² Yıldız Sertel, *Annem: Sabiha Sertel Kimdi, Neler Yazdı?* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi, 1995), p.230.

¹²³ *Ibid*, p.228.

¹²⁴ Türkkaya Ataöv, *N.A.T.O. and Turkey* (Ankara: Sevinç Printing House, 1970), pp.102 – 105.

communist movements in the country. Improving relations with the United States motivated DP leaders to transform Turkey into an entirely anti-communist regime. Menderes government did not terminate the oppression over internal communists and the leftist press. Initial tolerance of DP to leftist movements suddenly ended. Although they released Nâzım Hikmet, the famous poet had to flee from Turkey after he faced another series of persecutions.¹²⁵ Moreover, the new Prime Minister Adnan Menderes made several speeches and denied the existence of communist movements in the country, declaring Turkey as a staunch castle in the struggle against universal communism. Even though one of the main purposes of government and the press was to reflect Turkey as a democratic member of the Western alliance, the regime implied policies to struggle internal communism, differently from the European democracies, in which communist parties were legal and able to lead the cabinets.

The support of RPP to DP in the struggle against communism also influenced the press organs of the country. Until 1953, the Turkish press was like a monolithic organ to operate an anti-Soviet propaganda. DP also adopted the strategy of RPP to foment external threats to call people to solidarity. Various issues about the Soviet Union, such as the cruelty of the Stalinist regime, the aggressiveness of the Soviet leaders, the economic problems of the Soviet Empire, and indeed the historical ambitions of Russians over Turkey became a part of the daily routine in the editorial writers of pro-RPP and pro-DP newspapers. From 1950 to 1952, the Soviet fear and hatred in the newspapers could be regarded as a reasonable reaction, depending on aggressive Soviet reactions towards the entrance of Turkey to Korean War and Turkey's NATO membership. The Soviet

¹²⁵ Radiy Fish, *Nazım Hikmet*, (Moskva: Molodaia Gvardiya, 1968), p.281.

criticism became a part of daily routine in the Turkish press. This time, anti-Soviet statements could be seen any day without regard to a particular crisis in Turco-Russian relations.¹²⁶

3.4. Prominent Turkish Newspapers of 1940s and 1950s

The number of Turkish newspapers continuously increased in 1950s. Multi-party politics not only triggered the appearance of rival newspapers, supporting different political parties, but also foundation of several independent newspapers. In this study, eight prominent newspapers were observed, two of which, *Ulus* (The Nation) and *Zafer* (Victory) were regarded as the official organ of the Republican People's Party and the semi-official propaganda organ of the Democratic Party, respectively. The three among them; *Cumhuriyet* (The Republic), *Vatan* (The Motherland), *Dünya* (The World), were important political newspapers directed by significant editorial writers. Their major difference from *Ulus* and *Zafer* was their relatively independent structure, which enabled them to make some shifts in their political trends. The last three of them, *Akşam* (The Evening), *Milliyet* (Nationality or Nationhood), and *Hürriyet* (Freedom) were not predominantly political newspapers in comparison to the prior group, but their considerable circulation rate gave them a significant place in press.

¹²⁶ These articles mostly praised the “peace-loving” policies of the USA and the historical “evil” aspirations of the Russians. For instance; see: Abidin Daver, “Kuvvet Vasıtasıyla Barış” *Cumhuriyet*, 6 March 1950; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Almanya ve Bolşevikler” *Ulus*, 5 September 1950; idem, “Türkiye'nin En Meşgul Olduğu Mesele” *Ulus*, 26 June 1951; idem, “Rus Notası” *Ulus*, 6 November 1951; Mümtaz Faik Fenik, “Atlantik Paktı İnkişaf Ederken” *Zafer*, 23 September 1951; Nihat Erim, “Türkiye ve Rusya” *Ulus*, 6 November 1951; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, “Nota ve Cevabı” *Ulus*, 14 November 1951; Falih Rıfki Atay, “Atlantik Paktı” *Ulus*, 22 February 1952.

The political perspectives of these newspapers were mostly expressed in the daily columns of their editorial writers, many of which were too close to political circles. Some of them such as Necmettin Sadık Sadak, the editorial writer of *Akşam* until his death, and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, who was the editorial writer of *Ulus* after *Tanin*, already had a political past in RPP front. Falih Rıfkı Atay, another significant figure in RPP as a close colleague of Atatürk had joined *Dünya* of Bedii Faik Akın (1921 -) and followed a pro-İnönü line in his editorial articles until 1960s.

On the opposite front, Mümtaz Faik Fenik (1904–1974) editorial writer of *Zafer*, was elected to parliament in 1950 from DP. Under the auspices of their pro-American editor Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Vatan* praised the government for a long time. Although the relations between the government and Yalman deteriorated after 1957, Yalman preserved its anti-Soviet stance and he never criticized Turkey's allegiance to NATO and the US government. As one of the oldest and most influential newspapers of the republican period, *Cumhuriyet* followed a similar perspective like *Vatan*. The young editor Nadir Nadi Abaloğlu (1908-1991) published several anti-Soviet articles during the first half of 1950s, before he shifted his attention to domestic political turmoil of the late 1950s.

The rising tension in the first decade of the Cold War attracted the attention of the Turkish press to the foreign politics. Many Turkish newspapers had foreign policy columnists at the first half of 1950s. In addition, these newspapers published numerous serial articles, interviews and also feuilletons about the characteristics of the Soviet leaders and life in Russia. Majority of these did not belong to famous writers; but they were mostly written by western journalists, whose names were unfamiliar to Turkish readers.

The domestic political context of Turkey disabled the emergence of an oppositional front against NATO membership of Turkey. The newspaper *Tan* was reopened in 1949, but this time the newspaper was directed by Ali Naci Karacan (1896-1955), who shared the anti-communist sentiment with other journalists. In the last publication period of *Tan*, which lasted from 1949 to 1957, the attitude of the newspaper towards the Soviet Union was not different from the others. From its first days, the newspaper appeared with anti-Soviet headlines and news.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ “Kominform Türkiyeyi İçten Vurmak İçin Tedbir Alıyor” *Tan*, 5 January 1949; “Zavallı Polonya! Komünist Zulmü Bütün Şiddetile Polonya’yı Kasıp Kavuruyor” *Tan*, 12 Şubat 1949.

CHAPTER IV

THE FEAR OF STALIN'S GHOST: FROM THE LEADERSHIP OF MALENKOV TO THE HUNGARIAN UPRISING (1953 – 1956)

4.1. On the Eve of Stalin's Death (January – February, 1953):

The 'New Year' articles of many editors did not include great expectations for the year 1953. However, this time the rhetoric of newspapers was not equally fiery as it was in 1945. For instance, Necmettin (Sadık) Sadak avoided using an aggressive language, although he showed no hope for world peace, unless Stalin's rule ended.¹²⁸ However, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer (1893-1982), the foreign policy columnist of *Ulus*, stated that Soviet Union could not prevent the so-called "peace caravan" of NATO in reference to a pejorative Turkish proverb.¹²⁹ The harsh attacks of Esmer and his boss, Yalçın, would soon be contributed by the most pro-

¹²⁸ Necmettin Sadık Sadak "1953 Nasıl Bir Yıl Olacak" *Akşam*, 1 January 1953.

¹²⁹ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer "Kervan Yürür" *Ulus*, 12 January 1953.

American journalist of the time Ahmet Emin Yalman, who was still receiving treatment after he survived from an attempt of assassination by a radical Islamist student in Malatya on November 22, 1952.¹³⁰ During his absence, *Vatan* did not stop publishing anti-Soviet news and articles.¹³¹

The first issue about the Soviet Union in the Turkish press at the beginning of 1953 was ongoing persecutions in the country. The editors of many major newspapers assessed the ‘cruelty’ of Soviet leaders after the arrest of several Jewish doctors, who was suspected to poison Stalin. Independent journalists, such as Nadir Nadi questioned the reason for this persecution after three decades of high reputation of Jews in the “Red Tsardom,”¹³² while RPP and DP journalists expressed their routine animosity, blaming Soviet government with terrorism.¹³³

It might be questioned whether the Menderes government adopted the methods of RPP to seek popular solidarity to call nation to the so-called fifth column of the USSR in Turkey. In his speech in Gaziantep on January 18, 1953, Menderes declared Turkey’s decisiveness to struggle with communism.¹³⁴ Menderes claimed that the two dangers for the country were the Islamic fundamentalists and communists, implying that the radical Islamists might have received support from the Soviet Union, also with an implicit attack to National Party (NP), who was alleged to support radical Islamists. According to Menderes

¹³⁰ This student, Hüseyin Üzmez, later became a well-known ultra-rightist journalist in the Turkish press. During the rest of his life, he was arrested several times due to political reasons. In 2008, he was lastly arrested due to allegations for sexual harrasment.

¹³¹ Majority of *Vatan*’s news, especially the information about ongoing Korean War included obvious American propaganda, instead of submitting proven data. For instance, see: “Komünist Kaybı Batının 10 Misli” *Vatan*, 3 January 1953.

¹³² Nadir Nadi “Bu Kin Neden” *Cumhuriyet*, 27 January 1953.

¹³³ Falih Rıfık Atay “Bu Şiddet Rejimlerinin Sonu Gelmeyecek mi?” *Dünya*, 17 January 1953; Mümtaz Faik Fenik “Rusyada’ki Yahudi Aleyhdarlığı ve Kara Basın” *Zafer*, 18 January 1953; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer “Tethişçi Doktorlar” *Ulus*, 15 January 1953.

¹³⁴ For the full text of the speech, see: *Zafer*, 19 January 1953.

“the atmosphere of Turkey was impossible to breathe for communists.”¹³⁵ In fact, Islamist movement in Turkey could not have relations with the Soviet Union. The majority of Islamist publications, notably *Hür Adam* (Free Man), and *Sebilürreşad* (The Way of True Path) expressed an extreme hatred for communism.¹³⁶ The real target should have been the NP leader Osman Bölükbaşı, who was a famous master of rhetoric and an active figure of the opposition.

Allegations for the collaboration between communists and Islamists would gain eminence after the Gaziantep speech, which was responded by flattering remarks in the headlines of Turkish newspapers. The press ardently supported the attitude of Menderes to regard all oppositional groups on the same front.¹³⁷ Interestingly, one of the praising articles¹³⁸ was written by the *Akşam* columnist Vâlâ Nureddin Vâ-Nû (1901-1967), who was the closest friend of Nâzım Hikmet and joined his long journey to the Soviet Russia¹³⁹ in 1921. However, Stalin’s death would distract the attention of the editors until October before the launch of joint anti-NP propaganda of *Ulus*, *Dünya*, and *Vatan*.

During the last three months of the Stalinist regime, three newspapers *Ulus*, *Vatan*, and *Zafer* should be distinguished from the others due to the high number of anti-Soviet news and articles, as Yalman’s absence even could not diminish the pace of *Vatan*. Especially feuilletons were quite popular in 1950s as a good way of attracting readers. At the height of the Cold War, political

¹³⁵ “Günün Meseleleri: Komünistlerin Metodları” *Zafer*, 19 January 1953.

¹³⁶ The most obvious target of *Büyük Doğu* was Nâzım Hikmet Ran, but their list of so-called pro-Soviet ‘traitors’ was excessively long and even included F.R. Atay and A.E.Yalman. The cartoon on the cover of the 165th issue of *Sebilürreşad*, dated August 8, 1953, depicted Ran, Atay, and Yalman together carrying a portrait of Stalin. See: Göksu & Timms, p.255

¹³⁷ “Başbakan Mühim Demeçte Bulundu: Siyasi Mürteci, Dini Mürteci, Komünist ve Diğer Sapıklar, Hürriyetin Düşmanlarıdır. Bunlarla Mücadele Edeceğiz.” *Vatan*, 19 January 1953; “Başbakan, Milliyetçiliğin Komünistlik Olduğunu Belirtti: Demokrasimiz İçin Tehlike Olan Üç Nevi İrtica ve Komünizmle Şiddetle Mücadele Edilecek” *Akşam*, 19 January 1953.

¹³⁸ Vâ-Nû “Menderesin Ferahlık Veren Sözleri” *Akşam*, 20 January 1953.

¹³⁹ For the memoirs of Nâzım H.R. and Vâ-Nû, see: Vâlâ Nurettin, *Bu Dünyadan Nâzım Geçti* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1988).

feuilletons seemed more popular than non-political ones in the public opinion, as it could be observed that the majority of these serial writings were political. Another important detail was the proximity of the political attitude of these feuilletons with the governmental policies. As a meaningful example, in a typical anti-Soviet feuilleton of the time, the author drew attention to Soviet propaganda tactic to manipulate religion and religious circles in its first issue.¹⁴⁰ Another feuilleton, written by an American journalist declared the “treachery of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg” to Turkish readers in the pages of *Ulus*.¹⁴¹ The difference of the reaction was obvious between the Doctors’ Plot and the Trial of Rosenbergs.

Frequent anti-Soviet and anti-communist articles in *Ulus*¹⁴² and *Zafer*¹⁴³ denoted the intolerance of the two major parties towards the communism in Turkey. Mümtaz Faik Fenik did not hesitate to stress the relation of his newspaper with the government, calling all media to support Menderes.¹⁴⁴ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın used pejorative words for the Soviet Union including “fraudulent”¹⁴⁵ and asserted that the attack could come in any moment. With the return of Yalman,¹⁴⁶ the newspaper retook its place in the struggle against communism. When a rally was organized for the workers under the banner ‘the Damnation of Communism,’ in Eskişehir on February 22, 1953, *Vatan* highly appreciated this organization on

¹⁴⁰ Aziz Alpaut “Kızıl Ahtapot” *Vatan*, 25 January–4 February 1953.

¹⁴¹ Rebecca West “Rosenberg’ler Niçin İhanet Ettiler?” *Ulus*, 23–30 January 1953.

¹⁴² *Ulus* was also among the supporters of anti-communist campaign of Menderes. H.C.Yalçın contributed the claims of the Prime Minister, stating that the Soviet government used religious groups in Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan for espionage. See: Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın “Komünistlikle Mücadele” *Ulus*, 8 February 1953; idem, “Yeni Bir Vahşet Vakıası” *Ulus*, 22 February 1953

¹⁴³ “Ortadoğuda Kızıl Propaganda Arttı” *Zafer*, 23 January 1953; Rıfki Salim Burçak “Komünizm” *Zafer*, 24 January 1953; Mümtaz Faik Fenik, “Milliyetçiler’in Faşizm Metodları” *Zafer*, 26 January 1953; idem, “Kökü Dışarda Olan Tahrikler” *Zafer*, 29 January 1953; idem, “Ortadoğu Sulhü ve Araplar” *Zafer*, 25 February 1953; idem, “İran’daki Vahim Hadiseler” *Zafer*, 2 March 1953.

¹⁴⁴ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, “Basın’la İktidarın İşbirliği” *Zafer*, 1 February 1953.

¹⁴⁵ “Böyle Hilekâr Bir Düşmandan Her Türlü Tecavüz Beklenebilir.” See: Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın “Karadeniz’in Müdafâası” *Ulus*, 14 February 1953.

¹⁴⁶ Yalman made reference to struggle against the communism even in his first article after the assassination attempt. See: Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Allah’a Hamd Ediyorum” *Vatan*, 9 February 1953.

its headlines.¹⁴⁷ Next day, Yalman published an article with high praises for the decisiveness of the workers to struggle against communism.¹⁴⁸

One of the most notable columnists of the time was Mehmetzâde Mirza Bala, the former Azerbaijani émigré writer, who returned to Turkey after the Second World War. At the beginning of 1953, he still published weekly articles about the Soviet Union. The main difference of Mirza Bala from other anti-Soviet authors was his outstanding knowledge about the Bolshevik Revolution. Mirza Bala was the unique columnist, who narrated memoirs and special comments about many Soviet politicians. In his articles, Bala made several references to a variety of events from the February Revolution to the Trotskyist schism¹⁴⁹ and the personalities of a variety of revolutionary figures from Georgiy Valentinovich Plekhanov to Maksim Gorkiy. Although Mirza Bala's comments were even harsher than Yalçın and Yalman, his accounts had a supreme quality due to his first hand knowledge over the Soviet politics and politicians. Mirza Bala usually stated the impossibility of democratic reform in Russia, which never had a democratic tradition.¹⁵⁰ Unlike his pro-American colleagues, Mirza Bala even criticized the optimism of Harry S. Truman.¹⁵¹ Mirza Bala wrote his anti-Soviet articles in *Milliyet* rotationally with Hüseyin Hüsni Emir Erkilet, a retired Major General in the Turkish army and a prominent pro-German Pan-Turkist of 1940s, who even had an intimate contact with von Papen.¹⁵² Erkilet's attitude was also

¹⁴⁷ "Eskişehir İşçi Mitinginde Komünizm Tel'in Edildi." *Vatan*, 23 February 1953;

¹⁴⁸ Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Vatansever İşçilerimiz" *Vatan*, 24 February 1953.

¹⁴⁹ Mirza Bala, "Stalin Kan İzlerini Örtüyor" *Milliyet*, 7 February 1953.

¹⁵⁰ Mirza Bala, "Rusyadaki Milletler Meselesi" *Milliyet*, 14 February 1953; Mirza Bala, "Moskovanın Ruslaştırma Faaliyeti" *Milliyet*, 21 February 1953; Mirza Bala, "Bolşeviklerin Vaat Ettiği İstiklâl" *Milliyet*, 28 February 1953.

¹⁵¹ In one of his latest speech as the US President, Truman had an optimistic view for the world peace and the democratization of the Soviet Union. See: Michael J. Lacey, ed., *The Truman Presidency* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.410; Mirza Bala, "Sovyetler Birliğinin Akıbeti" *Milliyet*, 17 January 1953.

¹⁵² Landau, p.113

pro-American, therefore appropriate to the general atmosphere of the Turkish press, although it was also possible to see implicit justifications for Hitler's ideology.¹⁵³

In terms of the immense rise of anti-Sovietism in press, the period from May 14, 1950 to March 5, 1953 was exceptional. The last three month period also bore the routine characteristics of anti-Sovietism. Aggressive editorials, full of anti-Soviet criticism and pejorative cartoons¹⁵⁴ on the front pages could be seen any day without regard to a particular incident in Turco-Soviet relations.¹⁵⁵

4.2. Pessimism after Stalin's Death (March – September, 1953)

The unexpected death of Stalin suddenly changed the agenda of the press. *Akşam* (an evening newspaper), was first to declare the death of the terrifying dictator on its headlines.¹⁵⁶ *Akşam* was also the only newspaper, which had a calm reaction after Stalin's death.¹⁵⁷ However, the other newspapers explicitly showed their hatred for Stalin. For instance, *Hürriyet*, which was usually criticized as being a somewhat tabloid newspaper, was also among these newspapers. Sedat Simavi (1896-1953), in the editorial of *Hürriyet*, wrote as follows.

¹⁵³ H. E. Erkilet, "Milliyetçilik – Irkçılık" *Milliyet*, 22 February 1953.

¹⁵⁴ Ali Ulvi "Esnaf" *Cumhuriyet*, 31 January 1953; "Sovyet Cenneti" *Vatan*, 14 February 1953; "Kervan Yürür" *Vatan*, 27 February 1953.

¹⁵⁵ "Kremlinin Emniyet Tertibatını Kuran Profesör Öldü" (narrated from *Samedî Soir*) *Akşam*, 22 January 1953; "Rusyada Mecburî İş Kampları" *Akşam*, 29 January 1953; Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Kızıl Radyo Vazife Başında" *Dünya*, 29 January 1953; Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Moskof Parolası" *Vatan*, 28 February 1953; During this time, *Cumhuriyet* also concentrated on oppressed Turkic-Muslim peoples of the USSR. For instance, see: Sir David Kelly, "Yeni Rus İmparatorluğu - Rusya'da, Türklere ve Müslümanlara Karşı Şiddetli Baskı Hareketleri" *Cumhuriyet*, 20 – 22 February 1953

¹⁵⁶ "Stalin Öldü" *Akşam*, 4 March 1953.

¹⁵⁷ The articles and interviews in *Akşam* about Stalin in the following days were quite calm in comparison to other newspapers. For instance, see: "Sovyet Rusya Lideri Mareşal Stalin Kimdi?" *Akşam*, 5 March 1953.

According to a rumor, Stalin has been in agony. According to another rumor, the villainous red dictator had already kicked the bucket. I wish the 'red dictator' had recovered for a short time after a long moribundity and find a chance to read all about him in world press, before he deliver his soul to the Angel of Death... Now, the entire Free World is in joy.¹⁵⁸

With the verification of the Stalin's death by the Soviet officials, H.C. Yalçın,¹⁵⁹ F.R. Atay,¹⁶⁰ and M.F. Fenik,¹⁶¹ expressed their comments about the hopelessness for a change in the Soviet regime. Only A.E. Yalman was somewhat optimistic, stating his wishes for the end of the "Cruel Muscovitism."¹⁶²

During the following days, Stalin's death maintained its position as the main topic in the Turkish press. In March, all newspapers were full of articles,¹⁶³ and feuillets¹⁶⁴ about Stalin, which included quite pejorative statements. An interesting detail was the criticism of the Stalinist regime by all means, even including the perspective of the Trotskyism.¹⁶⁵

Although the new Soviet Premier Georgy Maksimilianovich Malenkov seemed in favor of the maintenance of the world peace in his declarations,¹⁶⁶ the

¹⁵⁸ "Bir rivayete göre Stalin can çekisiyormus. Başka bir rivayete göre evlere şenlik kızıl diktatör çoktan kuyruğu titretmiş... İsterdim ki kızıl diktatör epeyce can çekistikten sonra biraz kendine gelsin ve ruhunu teslim etmeden evvel dünya matbuatının kendisi için neler yazdığını okusun...Bütün hür dünya şimdi sevinç içindedir." See: Sedat Simavi "Evlere Şenlik" *Hürriyet*, 5 March 1953.

¹⁵⁹ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Stalin'den Sonra Çok Değişiklik Beklemiyoruz" *Ulus*, 5 March 1953; idem, "Büyük Hata" *Ulus*, 6 March 1953.

¹⁶⁰ Falih Rıfki Atay, "İstalinsiz Rusya" *Dünya*, 6 March 1953, idem, "İstalin Öldükten Sonra" *Dünya*, 7 March 1953.

¹⁶¹ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Stalin ve Sonrası..." *Zafer*, 6 March 1953; idem, "Stalin'in Nabzı Durdu Fakat..." *Zafer*, 7 March 1953.

¹⁶² Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Bir Sayfa Kapandı" *Vatan*, 6 March 1953; idem, "Şer Yolunun Yolcusu" *Vatan*, 7 March 1953.

¹⁶³ Mirza Bala, "Stalin'in Asıl Hüviyeti" *Milliyet*, 7 March 1953; H. E. Erkilet, "Stalinden Sonra" *Milliyet*, 8 March 1953; idem, "Stalinin Ölümünden Sonra" *Milliyet*, 11 March 1953; Şükrü Kaya, "Stalin İhtilâlcisi" *Hürriyet*, 8 March 1953; idem, "Stalin Diktatör" *Hürriyet*, 10 March 1953; M. Feridun Bellisar, "Stalin'den Sonraki Rusya" *Hürriyet*, 9 March 1953.

¹⁶⁴ "Kızıl Müşavirin Acı Pişmanlığı" *Akşam*, 13 March 1953; W. Averell Harriman & George W. Herald, "Stalin ve Stalin'den Sonra Rusya" *Vatan*, 18 March 1953; The feuillets mostly emphasized on Stalin's illegal past, depicting him as a bank robber. See: "Stalin" *Ulus*, 14 – 31 March 1953.

¹⁶⁵ "Kızıl Diktatörlüğün Mirası Nasıl Pay Edilir" [from Trotsky's memoires] *Zafer*, 6 – 9 March 1953; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Stalinizm" *Ulus*, 7 March 1953.

¹⁶⁶ Bilge, Suat, *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye-SovyetlerBirliği İlişkileri (1920-1964)* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1992), pp.338–339.

Turkish press preserved its pessimism about Malenkov.¹⁶⁷ However, the aggressive – incredulous stance of the American Foreign Minister John Foster Dulles was appreciated in the headlines of the Turkish newspapers.¹⁶⁸

Another notable discussion was the future of Malenkov's rule. For many people, Malenkov would not leave Stalin's path.¹⁶⁹ Only Mirza Bala questioned the leadership qualities and capabilities of Malenkov, asserting that he was quite "insufficient to be a new Stalin."¹⁷⁰ In general, the majority of the journalists affirmed that they were hopeless for the pacification between the superpowers, but it was doubtful whether they were aware of the real circumstances of the Cold War. For instance, Yalçın mentioned that the best solution was to give ultimatum to North Korea and Communist China instead of an invasion in the Soviet Union, as if it was possible for NATO to launch an invasion into the Soviet Union.¹⁷¹

In spite of the prevalent misgivings about Malenkov, the Soviet Union sent a peaceful verbal note to Turkey on May 30, 1953, and declared that they relinquished the territorial claims of the Georgian and the Armenian SSR over

¹⁶⁷ "Sovyetlerin yeni sulh propagandası: Batılılar, Malenkov ile Arkadaşlarının Sulh Manevralarına Aldırmıyacaktılar" *Akşam*, 7 April 1953; "Rusya Büyük Tavizlere Hazır: Bunun Tek Sebebi ve Hedefi Almanyanın Silâhlanmasına Mâni Olmak" *Akşam*, 16 April 1953; A. İhsan Barlas, "Masum imişler..." *Dünya*, 8 April 1953; Falih Rıfki Atay, "Rusya'da İçin İçin Kaynaşan Ne Var?" *Dünya*, 21 April 1953; idem, "Moskovanın Sesini İhtiyatla Dinlemek Lazım" *Dünya*, 27 April 1953; idem, "Bir Emperyalizmin Hiç Değişmeyen Karakteri" *Dünya*, 16 May 1953; "Malenkov'un Sulh Taarruzu genişledi" *Cumhuriyet*, 2 April 1953; H. E. Erkilet "Kremlin efendilerinin korkuları" *Milliyet*, 15–16 March 1953; idem, "Barış mı, Tuzak mı?" *Milliyet*, 9 April 1953; idem, "Malenkov'un Sulh Taarruzları" *Milliyet*, 28 April 1953; Mirza Bala, "Bolşevikler Barışa Yanaşır mı?" *Milliyet*, 28 March 1953; Ahmet Emin Yalman "Tuzaklar Karşısında" *Vatan*, 26–28 April 1953; idem, "Moskova Ne İstiyor?" *Vatan*, 15 June 1953; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Rusya ile barışmak" *Ulus*, 21 March 1953; idem, "Yeni Rus Politikası" *Ulus*, 5 April 1953; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Rusya ve Batı Devletleri" *Ulus*, 6 April 1953; "Malenkov'un Barış İsteğine Güvenilmiyor: Talep, Amerikan Menafilinde Şüphe ile Karşılandı ve Manevra Diye Tavsif Olundu" *Zafer*, 17 March 1953; Mümtaz Faik Fenik "Rusyadaki Yumuşamanın Sebebi Nedir?" *Zafer*, 31 March 1953

¹⁶⁸ "Moskova'nın Barış Taarruzunun Hedefi" *Cumhuriyet*, 4 April 1953

¹⁶⁹ "Malenkov'un Sırdaşı idim!" *Cumhuriyet*, 25 April – 10 May 1953; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Rusya'da İç Boğuşma" *Ulus*, 26 April 1953; "Jozef Stalin'in Cahil Talebesi Malenkov" *Zafer*, 16 April 1953

¹⁷⁰ Mirza Bala, "Malenkov, Stalin Olabilir mi?" *Milliyet*, 14 March 1953

¹⁷¹ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın "Fırsatı Kaçırmamalıdır" *Ulus*, 7 March 1953

Eastern Anatolia.¹⁷² However, the Turkish government did not regard this move as an intimate attempt for peace, but a tactical change in the Soviet plans.¹⁷³ The perspective of the government seemed to have a direct influence over the press. Before the Soviet move, many editors (notably Yalçın) reproached the possible supporters of a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Yalçın even condemned the Western world, who he thought was fooled by the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁴ He expressed that Turkey was the first country, which really perceived the Soviet threat.¹⁷⁵ In fact, the attitude of the press was parallel to the government's stance, as it could be seen in the articles about the official visit of Dulles to Turkey at the end of May. This visit was praised in all newspapers and the independent newspapers.¹⁷⁶ On the other hand, the Menderes government did not seem willing to inform the Turkish press about its negotiations with the Soviet Union. Even *Zafer* seemed uninformed, if it had been ordered by the government circles to keep the Soviet note as a secret.

The Soviet note was published on the headlines of the Turkish newspapers on June 11, when foreign agencies informed the Turkish press after the Paris Radio informed its listeners about the new diplomatic attacks of the Malenkov government.¹⁷⁷ None of the newspapers considered this note as a step for the improvement of Turco-Soviet relations, except for *Akşam* which informed the news with optimistic headlines.¹⁷⁸ On the other hand, other newspapers were insistent on maintaining their mistrust for the Soviet Union, as the Menderes

¹⁷² For the full text of Soviet note and Turkey's reply on July, 18, see: Tellal, *Uluslararası ve Bölgesel ...*, pp.258 – 259.

¹⁷³ Erkin, pp.349 – 352; Özkan, pp. 124 – 126.

¹⁷⁴ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Ruslarla Görüşme" *Ulus*, 24 May 1953.

¹⁷⁵ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Sovyet Rusya İşleri" *Ulus*, 15 April 1953.

¹⁷⁶ Nadir Nadi, "Dulles'i Karşılarken" *Cumhuriyet*, 26 May 1953.

¹⁷⁷ "Sovyet Rusyanın Türkiyeye Teklifleri" *Cumhuriyet*, 11 June 1953.

¹⁷⁸ "Rusya, Moskova Elçimize Bir Dostluk Notası Verdi: Kars, Ardahan ve Boğazlar Üzerindeki Eski İddialardan Vazgeçildiği, Daha Dostane Müsansebetler Kurulması İstendiği Bildirildi." *Akşam*, 11 June 1953.

Government did. *Dünya* divided its banner headline into two pieces on June 11, 1953; on the left side the Soviet verbal note was informed, and on the right side there was a photograph showing the tears of a woman from East Germany.¹⁷⁹ This might be regarded as a meaningful act to remind the readers of *Dünya* about the perspective of the newspaper. The next day, F. R. Atay commented on the note with a careful diplomatic language, claiming that Turkey should not leave NATO in order not to hurt the Western countries.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, *Ulus*, *Vatan*, and *Zafer* were relatively indifferent to the (uncertain) peace efforts of the Soviet Union. In general, the articles of Yalman and Yalçın included common claims such as the “peace-loving” Turkey was innocent during the 1945 Crisis, therefore Turkey should not have shifted its place.¹⁸¹ Mümtaz Faik Fenik wrote only one article about the Soviet note, in which he insisted on his doubts about the Soviet regime and accused Moscow Radio for having used a “profane language” for Turkey.¹⁸²

The pessimism about the Soviet attempt was not surprising, because the Turkish press had never left the agitated atmosphere since 1945. It is reasonable to consider that Stalin’s death might have remained insufficient to end all misgivings about the Soviet Union. However, the newspapers were still eager to foment speculations. For instance, it was quite possible to find several speculative issues about the so-called ‘World War plans’ of the Soviet Union, just after the declaration of the USSR that they had produced the first hydrogen bomb.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ “Sovyetler Türkiye’ye Yeni Bir Nota Verdi: Notada, Her İki Devlet Arasındaki Münasebetlerin Daha Dostane Bir Şekilde Gelişmesi Temenni Edilmektedir.” *Dünya*, 11 June 1953.

¹⁸⁰ Falih Rıfki Atay “Sovyetler Birliği Notası Üzerine” *Dünya*, 12 June 1953.

¹⁸¹ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Türk Rus Münasebetleri” *Ulus*, 18 June 1953; idem, “Sovyetler Ne İstiyorlar” *Ulus*, 24 June 1953; Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Yolumuzdan Şaşmıyalım” *Vatan*, 2 July 1953; idem, “Moskova’ya Cevabımız” *Vatan*, 7 Temmuz 1953.

¹⁸² Mümtaz Faik Fenik “Rus Notası İyi Niyeti İspat Eder mi?” *Zafer*, 15 June 1953.

¹⁸³ “Rus Askerî Planlarına Dair Mühim Açıklama: Bir Çek Subayı, Sovyetlerin 1955 Senesinden Önce Harp Çıkartmağa Hazırlandıklarını Söyledi.” *Cumhuriyet*, 24 May 1953; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Komünist Blokunun Tepkisi” *Ulus*, 27 March 1953.

On the other hand, the press was extremely optimistic for the support of the United States. *Vatan* once claimed that NATO would give atomic bomb to Turkey, if war outbreaks.¹⁸⁴ At the same time, the Menderes government continued its anti-communist policies. *Zafer* carried the banner of the anti-communism, while M.F. Fenik intended to label all oppositional groups in a single front.

Communism has been uprooted in our country. Turkey is the homeland of the real patriots.

It could be observed that the purposes of all (foes), either leftist or rightist, are the same: to damage social order and to create turmoil! For this reason, we have to imply the necessary legal measures urgently.¹⁸⁵

Mümtaz Faik Fenik would soon direct his sharp pen to NP with a bitter language.¹⁸⁶ However, the final propaganda campaign against NP would be launched in October, when NP began to be tried after the accusations of threatening the country's regime. This time, both Fenik and Yalman implied that the Islamists were in collaboration with the communists.¹⁸⁷ It is quite possible that the new propaganda campaign was directed by DP, because these allegations were not supported by the pro-RPP press and independent newspapers. As a matter of fact, *Vatan* and *Zafer* did not continue their claims about a partnership between the fundamentalists in Turkey and the Soviet Union after the closure of NP at the end of January 1954.

¹⁸⁴ "Savaş Hâlinde Türkiye'ye Atom Bombası Verilecek" *Vatan*, 15 May 1953.

¹⁸⁵ "Memleketimizde Komünizmin kökü kazanmıştır. Türkiye hakikî Türk vatanperverlerinin yurdudur." See: Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Nazım Hikmetin İfşaatı" *Zafer*, 15 April 1953; "Dikkat edilecek olursa, ister sağcı ister solcu olsun hepsinin takip ettikleri gayeler birdir: İçtimâî nizamı bozmak, ve memleket içerisinde şuriş çıkarmak! Onun içindir ki, bu hususta gereken kanunî tedbirleri süratle almak zaruretindeyiz." See: Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Komünizme Karşı Olduğu Gibi..." *Zafer*, 13 March 1953.

¹⁸⁶ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Buna Hâlâ Parti Diyecek miyiz?" *Zafer*, 2 July 1953; Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Parti Değil Âdi Bir İsyân Çetesi!" *Zafer*, 9 July 1953.

¹⁸⁷ Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Yol Kesenler" *Vatan*, 26 September 1953; Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Beş Koldan Hücum" *Vatan*, 11 October 1953.

Soviet note on May 30 was replied in July 18, 1953. Turkey's attitude was deliberate, because it was too early to predict the real tendency behind the Soviet act. Moreover, Turkey was still receiving aid from the West.¹⁸⁸ The atmosphere of the newspapers was naturally reflected the ongoing mistrust of the government. When the Soviet government sent a new note, the press did not show a joint reaction. Instead, the reaction was limited and mostly expressed by Yalman, Yalçın, and Fenik. Before the reply of Turkey on July 18, Yalman had previously warned the government not to leave the Western alliance.¹⁸⁹ However, he remained silent after the Soviet note on 20 July, protesting the visit of a NATO fleet to İstanbul. On the other hand, Fenik had a furious reaction, naming the last verbal note as "weird."¹⁹⁰ Three days later, he published a more severe article, blaming the Soviet Union to push Turkey into a "war of nerves," and added that "Turkey's nerves were as strong as its peace-loving sentiment".¹⁹¹ Like *Zafer*, *Ulus* also criticized the second note, ignoring the cold reply of Turkey to the first note of the Soviet Union. Nihat Erim (1906-1980) stated that Turkey's reply was proper, as the visit of the NATO fleet did not violate the provisions of the Montreaux Convention.¹⁹²

Among all Turkish newspapers, *Dünya* and *Akşam* had greater emphasis on the foreign affairs and the Cold War issues, while the others mostly focused on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in terms of its relations with Turkey. *Dünya* had previously published news about the power struggle between Beria and Malenkov, while *Akşam* was the only newspaper, which brought the July 1953

¹⁸⁸ Harris, George S., *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective* (Washington D.C.: Hoover Institution, 1972), p.72.

¹⁸⁹ Yalman, "Yolumuzdan...", 2 July 1953.

¹⁹⁰ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Yeni ve Garip Bir Rus Notası" *Zafer*, 23 July 1953.

¹⁹¹ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Son Rus Notasına Cevabımız" *Zafer*, 26 July 1953.

¹⁹² Nihat Erim, "Sovyetlere Cevabımız" *Ulus*, 21 July 1953.

unrest in East Berlin to its headlines.¹⁹³ Other newspapers generally published ordinary news about the Soviet Union and the struggle against the communists in Turkey.

The uncertainty about the Soviet Union after Stalin during the summer of 1953, revealed one of the greatest problems of the Turkish press. Turkish newspapers were deprived of reliable sources of information directly associated with the Soviet Union, which could be regarded as an alternative for the news received from TASS. Therefore they were dependent on the Western press and continuously published western oriented news, including the most speculative ones. The most eminent example was the sarcastic rumors about Lavrenti Beria. After *Pravda* declared the arrest of Lavrenti Beria, only *Dünya* informed Beria's fall and rumors concerning him in its headlines.¹⁹⁴ Moreover, Beria's fall did not seem to create optimism for many editors. Fenik asserted that his mistrust had been intensified after the uncertainty in the Soviet leadership.¹⁹⁵ Altemur Kılıç (1924-), the young foreign policy columnist of *Vatan* even claimed that Beria's elimination also referred to the elimination of the Soviet regime.¹⁹⁶ However, *Zafer* and *Vatan* published the speculative rumors about the veteran Soviet hangman that he had fled to Latin America and was ready to confess all military secrets of the USSR, two months after the arrest of Beria.¹⁹⁷ This contradictory rumor occupied a vast place in both newspapers. On the other hand, neither *Zafer* nor *Vatan* had such a great intention, when the facts about Beria were revealed.

¹⁹³ "Stalin'in Ölümünden Sonra Çarpışan Liderler" *Dünya*, 17 Haziran 1953; "Doğu Almanya ve Polonyada İsyân Devam Ediyor" *Akşam*, 5 July 1953.

¹⁹⁴ "Rusya'da Büyük Temizlik Başlıyor" *Dünya*, 12 July 1953.

¹⁹⁵ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Beria'nın Tasfiyesi ve Rus Siyaseti" *Zafer*, 12 July 1953.

¹⁹⁶ Altemur Kılıç, "Beria'nın Tevkifi Dolayısıyla Sovyet Rejimi Yıkılmalıdır" *Vatan*, 11 July 1953.

¹⁹⁷ "Beria, Rusya'dan Kaçarak Tarafsız Bir Memlekete Sığındı; Haber Amerika Tarafından Resmen Teyid Edildi; Beria'nın Türkiye'ye Sığındığı Haberleri Yalanlandı" *Vatan*, 21 September 1953; "Beria Kaçmış! Beria Amerikaya Gelmek İstedliğini ve Kremlin'e Ait Bütün Sırları da Haber Vereceğini bildirdi!" *Zafer*, 21 September 1953.

Beria's execution occupied only a few lines in *Zafer*, at the end of the December.¹⁹⁸

As it has been mentioned, Turkish press was reluctant to discuss Malenkov's first step to renounce the former territorial claims. Malenkov's second step was to underline the intention of the USSR to improve relations with Turkey, during one of his speeches in the Supreme Soviet. Although the text of the speech was published in *Pravda*¹⁹⁹ on August 8, 1953, the Turkish press seemed disinterested. *Ulus* and *Vatan* brought the speech into their headlines,²⁰⁰ but neither Yalçın nor Yalman appreciated Malenkov's attitude, as it was usual. *Zafer* was completely silent about the new move of the Soviet Union. It could be interpreted that the Menderes government preferred to avoid expressing its view. Otherwise, *Zafer* would have reflected the stance of the government. The unique solid reaction was the relatively warm article of Atay published on August 10. Atay's rhetoric was calm in comparison to others, but the author was still far from believing the cordiality of the Soviet moves. Instead, Atay once more repeated the classical perspective that he shared with Yalçın, Yalman, Fenik, and others. According to him, in 1945, the peace was endangered not by Turkey, but by the Soviet Union, which was also responsible for the bloodshed in Asia and Central Europe.²⁰¹ Erkilet also regarded the new Soviet move as a trap.²⁰² Yalçın contributed Atay's ideas, writing a late comment over Malenkov's speech. In his editorial article on August 14, Yalçın claimed that the only purpose of Turkey was

¹⁹⁸ "Beria ve 6 Arkadaşı İdam Edildiler" *Zafer*, 25 December 1953.

¹⁹⁹ Tellal, *Uluslararası ve Bölgesel...*, p.74

²⁰⁰ "Malenkov'un Barış Teklifi" *Ulus*, 9 August 1953; "Malenkov Yeni Bir Sulh Taarruzuna Girişti" *Vatan*, 9 August 1953.

²⁰¹ Falih Rıfık Atay, "Malenkov'un Nutku Üzerine" *Dünya*, 10 August 1953.

²⁰² H. Emir Erkilet, "Rus Ağına Düşmiyeceğiz" *Milliyet*, 12 August 1953.

to maintain peace, and Turkey never had demands from the Soviet Union.²⁰³

Yalçın supplemented his ideas in another article and asserted his personal view for the impossibility for a détente between the two superpowers.²⁰⁴

Despite the relative relaxation in the press, the routine anti-Soviet attitude and mistrusts still continued. The Turkish press was ultimately biased to regard Senator Joseph McCarthy only as a ‘popular personality’ in the United States.²⁰⁵ On the other hand, the reactions against the execution of Rosenbergs in the Western public opinion were not published in the Turkish newspapers, both the RPP front and the DP front continued their attacks, either directly or indirectly.

The efforts for rapprochement by Malenkov could not provide a change in the attitude of the Turkish press.²⁰⁶ Up to September 1953, pro-DP front was one step ahead. *Zafer* simultaneously carried two different propaganda campaigns, both of which it was contributed by *Vatan*. In one of these campaigns, the “weaknesses of the Soviet Union” was exposed. Both newspapers denied the progress in the Soviet military power, even after the declaration of the Soviet Union, that they had produced the hydrogen bomb. This did not create an immense panic, but pessimism to some extent. The news was placed in *Vatan*’s headlines²⁰⁷ but Yalman did not have any comment about the issue. On the other hand, Fenik had already asserted that the hydrogen bomb could not be more powerful than the atomic bomb.²⁰⁸ Moreover, *Zafer* conveyed a series of anti-Soviet articles from the foreign press, following the declaration of the hydrogen

²⁰³ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Türkiye ve Malenkof” *Ulus*, 14 August 1953.

²⁰⁴ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Bir Siyasî Rûya” *Ulus*, 24 August 1953.

²⁰⁵ “Amerika’yı Yerinden Oynatan Adam: Senatör McCarthy” *Zafer*, 1 June 1953; “Senatör Mc. Carthy: İdarecilerin Değil halkın Tuttuğu En Popüler Adam” *Zafer*, 27 March 1954.

²⁰⁶ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Komünistlik İflas Etmiş” *Ulus*, 6 July 1953; Arthur Koestler, “Niçin Komünist Oldular, Döndüler?” *Dünya*, 19 August – 5 October 1953.

²⁰⁷ “Rusya Yeni Tip Atom Bombası İmâl Etmiş” *Vatan*, 19 September 1953.

²⁰⁸ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, “Bu Harbin En Tesirli Silâhı” *Zafer*, 28 August 1953.

bomb.²⁰⁹ One of those anti-Soviet articles was unusually placed in the weekend magazine supplement.²¹⁰ The second joint campaign of *Vatan* and *Zafer* was to attack NP as being alleged to center of the “Moscow sponsored Islamists.” Yalman was the greatest champion of these claims.²¹¹

Anti-Soviet headlines were also common in the independent newspapers. *Akşam* was an exception, which published a calm headline on July 20, 1953, emphasizing on the peace efforts of the Malenkov regime.²¹² However, *Akşam* also had to return to an aggressive language just one day later, due to the Soviet note about the Istanbul visit of the NATO fleet. One week later, *Akşam* chose a speculative headline and claimed that a coup d’etat was being expected in the Soviet Presidium, although this was only a speculation born in the American political circles.²¹³ Around September, *Cumhuriyet* and *Vatan* accentuated the agricultural crisis in the Soviet Union.²¹⁴ *Cumhuriyet*’s attitude was tranquil in comparison to *Vatan* and the other independent newspapers. At least Nadir Nadi stopped to focus on the Soviet antagonism in his editorials. Still, *Cumhuriyet* maintained its anti-communist stance. For instance, it reported the “traitor” Zekeriya Sertel had attended to a communist congress in Budapest.²¹⁵

The two anti-Soviet authors of *Milliyet*, Erkilet and Mirza Bala continued to express their hopes for the collapse of the Soviet Union periodically. Mirza

²⁰⁹ The name of the articles were presented with their translator, Orhan Remzi Yüreğir, but the writers of these articles were not denoted. See: “Rusya Kaybetmiştir...” *Zafer*, 4 September 1953; “Komünizm Faciasının Söndürdüğü Ocaklar: Kızıl Dehşet” *Zafer*, 14 September 1953; “Sosyalizm Çöküyor!” *Zafer*, 17 September 1953.

²¹⁰ “Kremlin Sözüünü Böyle Tutar” *Zafer Gazetesi Haftasonu Eki*, 16 August 1953.

²¹¹ Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Zincirin Halkaları” *Vatan*, 14 July 1953.

²¹² “Rus Siyasetinde Barış Alâmetleri” *Akşam*, 20 July 1953.

²¹³ “Rusyada Sekerî Bir Hükümet Darbesi Muhtemel Görünüyor: Yüksek Sovyet Şurası Toplantısının Tehiri Amerikan Siyasî Çevrelerinde Çesitli Tefsirlere Yol Açtı” *Akşam*, 28 July 1953.

²¹⁴ Both newspapers seemed glad to witness the failure of Soviet policies. As a matter of fact, none of the Turkish newspapers mentioned the later success of Khrushchev in agricultural policies. See: “Rusya’da Ziraat Politikası Fiyasko ile Neticelendi” *Cumhuriyet*, 14 September 1953; “Rusya, Zirai Buhrana Çare Arıyor” *Vatan*, 16 September 1953.

²¹⁵ “Zekeriya Sertel Komünistlerin Kongresinde” *Cumhuriyet*, 23 June 1953.

Bala even chose speculative titles for some of his articles even though making substantial references for his claims.²¹⁶

4.3. The Passive Anti-Sovietism (October 1953 – August 1955):

No serious political crisis was witnessed in the Turco – Soviet relations until 1957. However, the negative anti-Soviet legacy of the near past prevented the relaxation of the Turkish press for a long time. Until 1955, the newspapers continued to publish anti-Soviet content, but in a decreased level. Another reason for the decrease in the extent of anti-Soviet content in the press was the increased tension in domestic politics.

4.3.1. Nationalist Reaction against the Soviet Union:

One of the notable points of anti-Soviet sentiment in the Turkish press was its deficiency of a common ideology behind it. The Crisis of the Straits did not emerge as a result of an ideological clash, but as an incident relevant to *realpolitik*. Anti-Soviet nationalism before 1945 referred to the Pan-Turkist circle of Hüseyin Nihal Atsız. As it has been mentioned, the ideas of Pan-Turkists contrasted with the nationalism of the Kemalist republic, especially in terms of the relations with the Soviet Union. The sudden rise of Russian antagonism enabled

²¹⁶ Mirza Bala, “Sovyetler Nasıl Parçalanacak” *Milliyet*, 2 May 1953; idem, “Sovyetlerin Temeli Sarsılmıştır” *Milliyet*, 1 August 1953; idem, “Sovyetlerde Kolektivizmin İflâsı” *Milliyet*, 19 September 1953; idem, “Stalinizm Tarihe Karışıyor” *Milliyet*, 10 October 1953.

former Pan-Turkists to utter their comments easier in this anti-Soviet context. Apart from Pan-Turkists, many dissident writers such as Mirza Bala and Mehmet Emin Resulzâde returned to Turkey. Until 1954, Mirza Bala contributed nationalist criticism to the Soviet Union, publishing several articles about the history of the national movement of Azerbaijan and Soviet oppression over the Azerbaijani people.²¹⁷ However, he was alone, because the main concern of the Turkish press then was Turkey's security. On the other hand, this time nationalists (either former Pan-Turkish circles, or émigré writers) were not subjected to severe criticism from the Republican and Democratic press organs. Instead, Atay once warned the government not to regard Turkish nationalists on the Soviet side, as they were essentially anti-leftist and anti-Soviet. The veteran RPP journalist seemed to forget governmental persecution of his party over Pan-Turkists just before a decade, not to mention his fierce articles against the Pan-Turkists" back in 1944.²¹⁸

Nonetheless it was still possible to see some articles and news in *Cumhuriyet* about the Russian persecution of Turkistani leaders, Uyghurs' struggle against the Communist Chinese, or the Soviet pressure to control Muslim rituals.²¹⁹ The prominent Pan-Turkist writer Reha Oğuz Türkkan also wrote several articles in *Cumhuriyet*. However, Türkkan only narrated notes from his

²¹⁷ Mirza Bala, "Azerbaycan Türklerinin Mâtemi" *Milliyet*, 25 April 1953; idem, "Sovyetlerin Rusçuluk Siyaseti" *Milliyet*, 16 May 1953; idem, "Azerbaycan İstiklâl Bayramı" *Milliyet*, 30 May 1953; idem, "Azerbaycanda Beklenen Hâdiseler" *Milliyet*, 16 June 1953; idem, "Azerbaycanda Temizlik" *Milliyet*, 25 July 1953; idem, "Sovyet İşgalindeki Kafkasya" *Milliyet*, 26 September 1953; idem, "Rusyada Tehcir Devam Ediyor" *Milliyet*, 21 November 1953; idem, "Kafkasya ve Kırım'ın Matemi" *Milliyet*, 20 February 1954; idem, "Azerbaycanın Millî Matemi" *Milliyet*, 24 April 1954; idem, "Kafkasya ve Türkistan" *Milliyet*, 10 April 1954; idem, "Sovyetlerin Açlık Siyaseti" *Milliyet*, 17 April 1954; idem, "Rusyadaki Mahkûm Türkler" *Milliyet*, 1 May 1954; H. Emir Erkilet, "Kırımın İstiklâl Davası" *Milliyet*, 29 April 1954.

²¹⁸ Falih Rıfki Atay, "Kızıl Radyo İş Başında" *Dünya*, 29 January 1953.

²¹⁹ "Türkistan'da Rus Baskısı Artıyor." *Cumhuriyet*, 15 January 1954; Godfrey Linz, "Doğu Türkistanlıların Komünistlerle Mücadelesi" *Cumhuriyet*, 21–25 February 1955; "Rusyada İslâm Dinini Tenkid! Bolşevikler Halkın Dinî Bayramlara Bağlı Olmasını Beğenmiyorlar" *Cumhuriyet*, 19 May 1955.

own experiences in America, usually mentioning the superiority of the United States in the Cold War.²²⁰ It is somewhat surprising to see the indifference of *Zafer* and *Vatan* to the issue. Neither Fenik nor Yalman condemned Soviet rule over Turkic–Muslim peoples. Only once, *Vatan*’s headlines informed the execution of the ‘three Turks’²²¹ who were accused of espionage for Turkey. The rest of the news was merely consisted of articles and feuilletons. These texts did not seem to aim at attracting the attention of the public opinion to the nationalist cause, as the prevalent examples were written in the style of fictional adventure series.²²²

Until the end of 1954, Mirza Bala mostly wrote about the failures of the Soviet policies,²²³ labor exploitation in the Soviet Union and its satellites,²²⁴ gloomy life conditions,²²⁵ and the implications of the Soviet imperialism, inherited by the Tsarist regime.²²⁶ Interestingly, some of his articles were identical with the later perspectives of the Cold War Turkish historiography, including the statements about the historical aspirations of the Russian Empire over the Straits and the historical role of Turks in the construction of Russian national identity.²²⁷ However, Mirza Bala and Erkilet terminated their articles in *Milliyet* after May

²²⁰ Reha Oğuz Türkkân, “Amerikanın Bolşevizme Mukabelesi: Halkın Kapitalizmi” *Cumhuriyet*, 1 March 1956.

²²¹ Two Azerbaijani (Zeynel, Aslanov) and a Crimean Tatar (Ismailov). See: “Moskova’da Üç Türk Casusluk İddiasıyla Kurşuna Dizildi.” *Vatan*, 20 May 1955.

²²² “Komünizm, İslâm Diniyle Mücadeleyi Çetin Görüyor” *Vatan*, 20 May 1955; “Türkistanlı Kaçakların Müthiş Maceraları” trans. M. Öney, *Zafer*, 3 December 1955.

²²³ Mirza Bala, “Sovyetlerin Beş Yıllık Planları” *Milliyet*, 4 April 1953; idem, “Sovyetlerin İktisadî Durumu” *Milliyet*, 3 April 1954.

²²⁴ Mirza Bala, “Köle İşçiler Âleminde” *Milliyet*, 29 March 1954; idem, “Kızılların İşçiyi İstismarı” *Milliyet*, 1 September 1954.

²²⁵ Mirza Bala, “Komünistlerin İki Yüzlülüğü” *Milliyet*, 12 January 1954; idem, “Sovyetlerde Hayat Seviyesi” *Milliyet*, 23 January 1954; idem, “Ukrayna’nın Akıbeti” *Milliyet*, 30 January 1954; Mirza Bala’s articles about the deficiency of the living conditions of the USSR were also supplemented by various feuilletons in *Milliyet*. For instance, see: Dennis Barden, “Rusyada Gençliğin Hoşnutsuzluğu” *Milliyet*, 18 August 1954; “Hürriyeti Seçen Bir Doktorun Maceraları” *Milliyet*, 2–12 September 1954.

²²⁶ Mirza Bala, “Rusların Yayılma Siyaseti” *Milliyet*, 6 February 1954; idem, “Sovyet Emperyalizmi” *Milliyet*, 20 March 1954.

²²⁷ Mirza Bala, “İstanbul’un Fethi ve Rusya” *Milliyet*, 23 May 1953.

1954. At the end of the year, there were some structural changes in *Milliyet*. The newspaper adopted the popular style of *Hürriyet*, in which tabloid news had a priority over the political context. After 1954, there was not a permanent anti-Soviet figure among the *Milliyet* writers, and the rhetoric of the newspaper was tempered about the Soviet Union. Moreover, active nationalist journalists of the time, such as Reha Oğuz Türkkan, Peyami Safa, and Orhan Seyfi Orhon did not publish articles to criticize the Soviet treatment of the Turkic and Muslim peoples of the USSR.

Turkish nationalists would become one of the main centers of the Soviet antagonism in Turkey up to 1970s. The common feature of the Soviet Union and China, two empires possessed the lands of Turkestan, was communism. However, the writers with Pan-Turkist tendencies (or simply Turkic nationalists) were not numerous in 1950s. On the other hand, neither Pan-Turkists nor Turkic – Muslim nationalists were not regarded as the premier internal threat (as the former faced with persecutions in 1940s and latter in 1930s) under the heavy influence of the anti-Soviet *Zeitgeist* of the time. Moreover, pro-Americanism could be adopted by some former Pan-Turkists as the sole antidote for the confrontation of the Soviet Union, as it could be observed in Erkilet's articles.²²⁸

²²⁸ H. E. Erkilet, "Birleşik Amerika'nın Azmi" *Milliyet*, 25 February 1953; idem, "Amerikanın Korktuğu Yeni Bir Perl-Harbur" *Milliyet*, 5 April 1953; idem, "Amerika'nın Dış Siyaseti" *Milliyet*, 15 April 1953; idem, "Eisenhower'in Mukabil Barış Taarruzu" *Milliyet*, 19 April 1953; idem, "B. Amerika'nın İstiklâl Yıldönümü" *Milliyet*, 8 July 1953.

4.3.2. Continuation of the Routine Anti-Sovietism until 1955:

As it has been mentioned, the extent of anti-Sovietism had a minor decrease after Stalin's death, but the attitude of the certain anti-Soviet figures were still the same. *Ulus* and *Zafer* particularly sustained their harsh anti-Soviet statements, although the domestic competition between RPP and DP suddenly increased before six months before the parliamentary elections in 1954.

Political struggle between RPP and DP had continued since 1946, but the ongoing clash between the parties became more rigorous after the year 1953. In December, the government confiscated all properties of RPP, including central building of the party.²²⁹ The name of *Ulus* had to be changed to *Yeni Ulus* (The New Nation) in December 1953. This extreme measure against the opposition triggered a harsh quarrel between *Yeni Ulus* and *Dünya* versus *Zafer*. The weirdest detail of the quarrel was the continuation of anti-Soviet articles and usage of anti-Soviet elements even in the tensest day of the clash.

Before the quarrel between RPP and DP, Falih Rıfki Atay was among the supporters of the government's allegations about the "collaboration between Islamists and communists". Although Atay previously expressed his optimism about NP leader Hikmet Bayur's loyalty to the laïc regime of the country in his previous articles,²³⁰ he later joined Yalman's front and accused NP of collaboration with the Soviet spies. Atay claimed that the Soviet Union trained two kinds of spies: "The first type spies, who would infiltrate into the Western countries, were trained in the Warsaw University. The second type spies were trained in Tashkent University and sent to the Muslim countries to foment

²²⁹ Hikmet Bila, *CHP 1919–1999* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 1999), p. 153.

²³⁰ Falih Rıfki Atay, "Hikmet Bayur ve Millet Partisinin Kurultayı" *Dünya*, 17 June 1953.

communist propaganda with Islamic values,” in reference to Tudeh Party in Iran, and Nation Party in Turkey. Atay’s unexpected accusation of NP could be interpreted in reference to the ongoing closure trial of the party. Thus, RPP could monopolize the opposition against DP in the elections.

In December 1953, the Turkish parliament witnessed a turbulent period of quarrels, after DP’s disreputable decision to expropriate RPP property. Before the decision, the quarrel had been already brought to the press, including anti-Russian statements. In his editorial article on December 10, 1953, Falih Rıfki Atay attacked DP minister Samet Ağaoğlu “as the grandson of a Tsarist officer.”²³¹ While *Ulus* was about to be seized, after being confiscated as a RPP property, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın initially expressed his fury to this move,²³² but he interestingly concentrated on anti-Sovietism during the hardest days of his newspaper, beside his anti-Menderes articles. Yalçın’s rhetoric in this period was extreme as it was in 1945. On January 21, 1954, he stated:

However, Bolsheviks ever so much blemished the concept of ethics with mud, as we still witness the frustrating parades. For instance, a letter published in the Literary Newspaper [*Literaturnaya Gazeta*] about the “cleansing” of Beria and his friends, brightly enlightens the current situation of the Muscovite characteristics.²³³

Apart from criticizing the Bolsheviks’ way to eliminate Beria, his attitude was quite incoherent in this paragraph. It was unclear whether he differentiated the Russians and Bolsheviks or not. Moreover, Yalçın continued to warn the

²³¹ Falih Rıfki Atay, “Pekiy Ağaoğlu’nu Anlatayım” *Dünya*, 10 December 1953.

²³² Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Diktatörlük” *Yeni Ulus*, 29 December 1953; idem, “Şahsiyetsiz Parti” *Yeni Ulus*, 2 January 1954.

²³³ *Fakat Bolşevikler ahlak mefhumunu o kadar çamurlara buladılar ki Rus milletinin mânevi seviyesini o kadar düşürdüler ki insanı hâlâ hayrette bırakabilecek nümayişlere şahit oluyoruz. Meselâ Beria ve arkadaşlarının “temizlenmeleri” meselesinde Moskova’nın “edebi gazetesinde” çıkan bir mektup bu bakımdan Moskof ruhunun şimdiki hali üzerine kuvvetli bir ziya serpmektedir.* See: Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Büyük İnsaniyet!” *Yeni Ulus*, 21 January 1954.

country about the “approaching” danger of the bolshevism, urging government not to damage the friendship with the United States.²³⁴

Both (*Yeni Ulus*) and *Zafer* published many articles about the Soviet danger, despite the approaching parliamentary elections on May 2, 1954. The parties still had a consensus in their foreign policy perspectives, but Yalçın began to criticize the failures of the Menderes government in foreign policy, notably after a political scandal in Cairo.²³⁵ However, the tacit agreement between the parties in terms of anti-Sovietism still continued. Ahmet Şükrü Esmer called DP to avoid discrimination in favor of partisanship, at least in foreign policy, in order to secure Turkey’s place in the international arena.²³⁶ On the opposite side, *Zafer* furiously attacked RPP and (*Yeni Ulus*) until the election, but continued to manipulate anti-Soviet sentiment. For instance, it claimed that the Russians were terrified after the construction of the Esenboğa Airport in Ankara.²³⁷

Following the landslide victory of DP in the elections in 1954, the oppression over the RPP organ rose. *Yeni Ulus* had to change its name to *Halkçı* (Populist). Although *Halkçı* and its editor Yalçın had the harder times, the newspaper still supported the government in its foreign policy. On May 6, Yalçın targeted an article in *Pravda*, which assessed the results of the Turkish parliamentary elections, and claimed the Soviet Union aimed at intervening Turkey’s the domestic affairs.²³⁸ On September 23, 1954, *Halkçı* informed its readers about the arrestment of their editor at the age of 79. The veteran journalist Yalçın was subjected to the same situation with the Sertel couple, after a decade.

²³⁴ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Bolşevik Tehlikesi Artıyor” *Yeni Ulus*, 23 January 1954; idem, “Amerikan Dostluğu Tehlikeye Düşürülmemelidir” *Yeni Ulus*, 16 February 1954.

²³⁵ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Dış Siyaset” *Yeni Ulus*, 16 April 1954.

²³⁶ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, “DP ve Dış Politika” *Yeni Ulus*, 22 April 1954.

²³⁷ “Rusları Dehşete Düşüren Hava Meydanı: Esenboğa” *Zafer*, 5 February 1954.

²³⁸ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Moskofların İçişlerimize İlgileri” *Yeni Ulus*, 6 May 1954.

Until his release, Yalçın wrote some articles from his prison cell, but he still continued his anti-Soviet stance, and made warnings about the communist activities in the Middle East.²³⁹

On the opposite side, *Zafer* writers also aimed at labeling the rivals of DP as the supporters of the Soviet Union. In an article, Mümtaz Faik Fenik insulted the journalist Nurettin Ardıçoğlu due to an article, which criticized the insufficiency of the American aid. Ardıçoğlu was also one of the founders of the Republican Nation Party (RNP), successor of the Nation Party. Fenik claimed that the ideas like the ones in Ardıçoğlu's article could be published only on *Pravda*.²⁴⁰ A few months later, Fenik also accused *Ulus* of treachery. According to the editor of *Zafer*, *Ulus* had served Russians, publishing misinformation about the municipality elections, which was previously protested by RPP.²⁴¹ The noteworthy point here was the common characteristics of the accusations by pro-RPP and pro-DP journalists. From Atay to Fenik, all of them accused the particular figures from the opposite side of pro-Russianism. Although, the accusations also seemed directly related with communism in a synonymous fashion, it should be noted that the pejorative elements in the rhetoric of the correspondents were pre-dominantly connected with pro-Russianism.

Apart from accusing the members of RPP and NP of collaborating with the Soviet Union, *Zafer* also continued its severe anti-Soviet stance, jointly with *Vatan*. Mümtaz Faik Fenik and the foreign policy columnist Mücahit Topalak continuously repeated warnings about the Soviet threat.²⁴²

²³⁹ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Ortadoğu'da Komünizm" *Halkçı*, 25 October 1954.

²⁴⁰ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Milletçi Değil Pravdacı" *Zafer*, 13 June 1954.

²⁴¹ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Moskova Radyosuna Malzeme, *Zafer*, 12 November 1954

²⁴² Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Yeni Bir Rus Oyunu" *Zafer*, 1 December 1954; Mücahit Topalak, "Rusya'ya Cevap" *Zafer*, 5 September 1954; idem, "Vişinski Plâni" *Zafer*, 2 October 1954; idem, "Molotov Teklifleri" *Zafer*, 8 October 1954; idem, "Sovyet Notası" *Zafer*, 15 November 1954.

During 1954, *Vatan* also insisted on the pretentiousness of Malenkov's peace efforts.²⁴³ In addition, both newspapers continued to publish anti-Soviet news and feuillets both about the Soviet Union and its satellites behind the Iron Curtain.²⁴⁴ These two newspapers were also supplemented by the independent newspapers, which still supported the foreign policy of the government. As an exception, *Akşam*'s stance was more optimistic in the first headline of 1954,²⁴⁵ but this did not necessarily mean that *Akşam*'s optimism was permanent. Until the end of 1955, the majority of the news and articles in the newspaper reflected a pro-American stance like the other newspapers.²⁴⁶ The stance of *Akşam* also indicates that the pro-Soviet sentiment might have also been regarded as a commercial asset. For instance, *Akşam* published a half-fictional serial feuilleton about the activities of the Soviet spies, during 250 days.²⁴⁷

Although Turkey and the Soviet Union continued the skirmish of the verbal notes during 1954 and 1955,²⁴⁸ the relations were relatively stable during

²⁴³ Burhan Erilkun, "Sovyet Rusya İçin Akdeniz'in Önemi" *Vatan*, 15 May 1954; Nuri Aksel, "Sovyet Ticaret Filosu Casuslukta Kullanılıyor" *Vatan*, 31 May 1954; Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Moskova'dan Zeytin Dalı" *Vatan*, 30 April 1954; idem, "İkazlarımızda Hak Kazandık" *Vatan*, 19 Temmuz 1954; Altemur Kılıç, "Sovyet Rusya'nın Tehditleri" *Vatan*, 16 December 1954; idem, "Taktik Değişikliği" *Vatan*, 28 December 1954.

²⁴⁴ 11 - 24 Aralık Harrison E. Salisbury, "Stalin Nasıl Öldürüldü?" trans. Raşan Ecevit, *Vatan*, 11-24 December 1954; "Sovyetler İçkiye Neden Düşkün?" *Vatan*, 29 December 1954; Kızıl Çarice Anna Pauker'in İç Yüzü, 27 July 1954; "Baltık Memleketlerinde Sovyet Mezalimi" *Zafer*, 18 November 1954; "4 Sovyet Ajanı Hürriyeti Seçti" *Zafer*, 15 August 1954.

²⁴⁵ "Rusya Sulhu Sağlamak İçin Elinden Geleni Yapacak" *Akşam*, 1 January 1954; "Kremlin'de Esen Yumuşak Hava" *Akşam*, 11 November 1954.

²⁴⁶ "Sovyet Rusya Hürriyetten Korkuyor" [in reference to a speech of J. F. Dulles] *Akşam*, 25 February 1954; Vanu, "Define Türkiyededir" *Akşam*, 3 March 1954; "Sovyet Rusya'da 780 Milyoner Var!" *Akşam*, 8 April 1954; "Amerika'da Tasarı Kanunlaştı - Komünizm Kanun Dışı Edildi" *Akşam*, 17 August 1954; "Dulles Hattı nedir? Sovyetler Birliğinin Güneyinde Yeni Bir Savunma Zinciri" *Akşam*, 23 August 1954; "Komünizme Karşı Arap Devletleri Askerî Bir İttifak Yapıyorlar" *Akşam*, 24 August 1954; "Stalinin Oğlu Bir Kampta Ölmüş" *Akşam*, 7 January 1955; "Rusların İade Ettiği Amerikalının İfşaati" *Akşam*, 12 January 1955; "Kremlinde Mücadele Hâlâ Devam Ediyor" *Akşam*, 20 March 1955; "Stalin'in Kızı Svetlana" *Akşam*, 23 March 1955; "Sovyet Rusyanın Yeni Bir Şantajı: Moskova, Aktettiğimiz Tedafüi Paktların Tecavüzî Emeller Güttüğü İddiasındadır" *Akşam*, 17 April 1955; Türkiye'de Atomik Tesisler Kurulacak" *Akşam*, 4 May 1955; "Rus Liderlerinin İlk Başarısızlığı" *Akşam*, 28 May 1955.

²⁴⁷ İhsan Boran, "Rus ve Komünist Casuslar: Rus Gizli Servisinin Tarihi" *Akşam*, 18 January - 30 September 1955.

²⁴⁸ In 1954, the Soviet Union sent a verbal note to protest Turkey's alliance with Pakistan.

Malenkov's administration. The unexpected resignation (or ouster) of Malenkov²⁴⁹ opened the way of new speculations, and contributed the mistrust among the Turkish journalists. As a matter of fact, the attitude of the Turkish press was reasonable. Malenkov's fall might have referred to a sign for the reaction of the Soviet leadership against the attempts for détente. Moreover, Malenkov's declaration of his own failure after his forced resignation made several correspondents to think the possibility of a struggle between the Soviet leaders, which could open the way for instability. In fact, Malenkov's foreign policy was more desirable in comparison to the rigid foreign policy Stalin, which had not satisfied the members of the Politburo.²⁵⁰ On the other hand, the domestic policy originated conflict between Malenkov and Khrushchev was reflected to the foreign policy. For instance, the Khrushchev faction forced Malenkov to renounce his famous speech on March 14, 1954, in which Soviet premier stated that the nuclear war "would be a new holocaust for the world."²⁵¹ Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for Turkish press to sustain their misgivings. Actually, the resignation of Malenkov did not cause a panic, but many journalists stated their anxiety about a shift in the Soviet policy towards Stalinism.²⁵²

²⁴⁹ Malenkov's example was the first in the Soviet history, in which a leader resigned confessing that the leadership failed. See: R.S. and G. Malenkov, "Malenkov's Letter of Resignation" *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1(Jul., 1955), pp.91-93.

²⁵⁰ Paul Marantz, "Internal Politics and Soviet Foreign Policy: A Case Study" *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Mar.,1975), p.132.

²⁵¹ Under the influence of Molotov and Khrushchev, Malenkov had to amend his speech to the *Kommunist* journal on 26 April, 1954, stating that the nuclear war would be the end of not the whole world, but the capitalist world. See: Ibid., p.134.

²⁵² "Malenkof'un Devrilmesi Üzerine Rus Dış Politikası Biraz Sertleşecek" *Akşam*, 9 February 1955; "Sovyet Topraklarında Yeni Stalin Belirmiş Bulunuyor" *Cumhuriyet*, 9 February 1955; Cafer Kırmıner, "Rusyada Bulganin'in İktidara Gelmesi Münasebetile" *Cumhuriyet*, 11 March 1955; Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Malenkov'un Değişmesinden Ne Çıkar?" *Dünya*, 10 February 1955; "Malenkov'un Çekilmesi" *Halkçı*, 9 February 1955; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Türk-Rus Münasebetleri" *Halkçı*, 2 March 1955; Altumur Kılıç, "Malenkov ve Kös Dinleyenler" *Vatan*, 5 January 1955; idem, "Malenkov da Düştü" *Vatan*, 9 February 1955; Ahmet Emin Yalman "Yeni Bir Stalin" *Vatan*, 10 February 1955; Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Rusya'da Tek Diktatör!" *Zafer*, 10 February 1955; idem, "Yeni Rus Politikası Ne Olacak?" *Zafer*, 11 February 1955; Mücahit Topalak, "Malenkof" *Zafer*, 9 February 1955.

4.3.3. Assessment of the non-Soviet Communists and Leftist Movements:

One of essential questions about the negative Soviet image in Turkey was the extent of the correlation between the anti-Russian (or anti-Soviet) and anti-communist sentiments. It is almost impossible to assess the entire Turkish press monolithically, because the perspectives were quite different even between the two journalists in a newspaper.

It is possible to claim that the anti-Sovietism and the anti-communism were amalgamated from the beginning of 1940s until the second half of 1950s. The main reason for this was the uniqueness of the Soviet Union as a great communist power, and its universal leadership in the communist movement. However, the schism between the Soviet Union and other leftist fractions (mainly European socialist parties) became apparent also for Turkish correspondents in 1950s. In addition, Turkish press began to perceive the differences of the USSR from the other communist regimes, especially after the deterioration of the Soviet Union's relations with Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China.

The attitude of the Turkish press also depended on the foreign relations of the government. An eminent example was the praises for Tito, during a long time following the official visit of the Yugoslav Premier to Ankara.²⁵³ Most of them were naturally published in *Zafer* in order to justify the diplomatic strategy of Adnan Menderes.²⁵⁴ As a notable detail, Mümtaz Faik Fenik never used the word "communism" for Tito and Yugoslavia in his editorial,²⁵⁵ because the official press organ of DP still continued depicting a "demonic" image for communism.

²⁵³ Vânu "Yugoslav Milletine Selam" *Akşam*, 14 April 1954; Falih Rıfık Atay, "Tito Yugoslavyası" *Dünya*, 4 May 1955.

²⁵⁴ "Dost Yugoslavyanın Sayın Devlet Reisi Tito Dün Akşam Geldi" *Zafer*, 13 April 1954.

²⁵⁵ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Çok Güzide Misafirimiz Mareşal Tito" *Zafer*, 13 April 1954.

Vatan, which still supported DP independently, was at first reluctant to praise Tito, but Ahmet Emin Yalman soon published editorials praising Tito.²⁵⁶ As an ardent supporter of the American regime, Yalman's animosity was mainly directed against communism instead of Soviet Russia. Along with Altemur Kılıç, he never hesitated to criticize the ruling communist parties in the NATO members and their rapprochements with the Soviet Union.²⁵⁷ Following the Moscow's rapprochement with Belgrad, *Vatan* began to attack Tito, accusing Yugoslavia of collaborating with the Soviet Union for the revival of the Pan-Slavist aspirations.²⁵⁸

After 1953, the perspectives of the newspapers about the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, either communist or not, differed. However, the relations of the Soviet Union also shaped the views of the Turkish correspondents. For instance, it was possible to observe contrasting accounts about the leaders of the Third World, such as Mohammed Mossaddeq, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Jawaharlal Nehru. For instance, democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister, Mosaddeq was mostly labeled as a dictator, although the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was never depicted as such in the Turkish press. Mosaddeq's close relations with the Tudeh Party and his confrontation of the Western countries must have convinced the Turkish press to assess Mossaddeq as a pro-Soviet figure.²⁵⁹ In contrast to Mosaddeq, Nasser was praised in the Turkish newspapers until 1956, especially in *Zafer* and *Vatan*, with regard to the initial expectations of

²⁵⁶ Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Yugoslavya: Yeni Müttefikimiz" *Vatan*, 17 August 1954.

²⁵⁷ Ahmet Emin Yalman, "İtalya'da Demokrasinin Müdafaası" *Vatan*, 11 December 1954; Altemur Kılıç, "Fransa ve Rusya" *Vatan*, 25 December 1954.

²⁵⁸ Altemur Kılıç, "Diktatörlük Diktatörlük'tür" *Vatan*, 27 January 1955; Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Tito ve Moskova" *Vatan*, 22 June 1956.

²⁵⁹ "Musaddık Oğlunu Şah Yapmak İstiyor" *Akşam*, 29 April 1953; "Musaddık'ın İdam Edilmesi Muhtemel" *Akşam*, 9 September 1953; Falih Rıfıkı Atay "İran'da Hânedanlık Rejiminin Sonu" *Dünya*, 18 August 1953.

Menderes from him.²⁶⁰

Although the pro-RPP journalists drew an early attention to anti-Turk speeches of Nasser,²⁶¹ *Zafer* waited until the revelation of Nasser's stance after the Suez Crisis. Egypt would eventually be one of the main targets of the Turkish newspapers after the intense Soviet support to this country and the protagonist role of Nasser in the tensions between Turkey and Syria.

There were no diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Communist China in 1950s. Therefore, the newspapers were totally free to attack China, but the assessments about the Mao regime was rarely seen in the press.²⁶²

One of the most noteworthy contrasts about the Turkish press of 1950s was the existence of several leftist correspondents in the newspapers, despite the ultimate anti-communist atmosphere. Many novels of the socialist authors such as Kemal Tahir, Orhan Kemal, and Yaşar Kemal were published as feuillets in several newspapers.²⁶³ Only between 1953 and 1956, during the most dominant period of anti-Sovietism in the Turkish press, it was possible to see the articles of the leftist intellectuals in various newspapers. The notable examples were the painter and poet Bedri Rahmi Eyüboğlu and jurist Tarık Zafer Tunaya in *Cumhuriyet*; painter Fikret Otyam in *Dünya*; sociologist and historian Niyazi Berkes in *Vatan*. Until 1960, it was rare but possible to see the newspapers

²⁶⁰ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Türkiye-Mısır" *Zafer*, 1 September 1954; idem, "Çölü Fetheden Mısır" *Zafer*, 31 December 1954; "Mısır Başvekili Abdünnasır Çok Dostane Bir Yazı Neşretti" *Zafer*, 2 December 1954; Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Mısır'da Vardığım Kanaatler" *Vatan*, 6 January 1955.

²⁶¹ Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, "Araplar, Müslümanlık ve Mısır" *Dünya*, 8 February 1955; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Arap-Sovyet Flörtü" *Ulus*, 31 May 1955.

²⁶² The Communist China attracted the attention of the Turkish correspondents after 1960. During 1950s, Turkish newspapers not much emphasized on the Red China until the schism between Mao and Khrushchev deepened. For exceptional accounts; see: Nadir Nadi, "Çine Dikkat" *Cumhuriyet*, 5 August 1953; "Çin Rusyaya Rakib mi?" *Cumhuriyet*, 20 July 1953.

²⁶³ Yaşar Kemal's masterpiece *İnce Memed* was published in *Cumhuriyet* in 1954. Orhan Kemal's *Bereketli Topraklar Üzerinde* was published in *Dünya* in 1953 and *Devlet Kuşu* in *Ulus* in 1957. In addition Fakir Baykurt's were seen in *Cumhuriyet* in 1959. Following Yalman's leave, Kemal Tahir's novels were published in *Vatan*; *Esir Şehrin İnsanları* in 1960, *Yorgun Savaşçı* in 1961.

employing leftist journalists among their permanent staff such as Aziz Nesin (in *Akşam* after 1958) and Çetin Altan (in *Milliyet* after 1959). In addition, several stories translated by Hasan Ali Ediz were seen in the inner pages of *Cumhuriyet* after in 1957.

No radical changes in the attitude of the Turkish press towards the leftist ideologies were observed until 1960s. However, some journalists began to evaluate European socialism separately from the Soviet communism. On March 13, 1955, Nadir Nadi's complained about the confusion of communism and socialism in Turkey, distinguishing European socialism from the "evil" communism of Moscow.²⁶⁴ His ideas were later supported by Şükrü Kaya.²⁶⁵ On the contrary, the governmental newspapers still insisted assessing the Soviet Union and the European leftist parties as a single whole.²⁶⁶

4.4. The Silence before the Storm: Brief Serenity on the eve of the Hungarian Uprising (September 1955 – December 1956):

Under the influence of the relaxation of the Turco-Soviet relations between 1953 and 1955, there were changes in the general atmosphere of the Turkish press in terms of Soviet antagonism. The period between the fall 1955 and the end of 1956 witnessed the cohabitation of the different perspectives in the Turkish daily newspapers. However, the relaxation of anti-Sovietism temporarily lost its pace after two notable incidents: The pogrom against the non-Muslim

²⁶⁴ Nadir Nadi, "Solcu Öcü Değildir" *Cumhuriyet*, 13 March 1955.

²⁶⁵ Şükrü Kaya, "Komünistler ve Sosyalistler" *Hürriyet*, 30 October 1956.

²⁶⁶ Mücahit Topalak, "Kominform" *Zafer*, 19 April 1956; Ahmet Emin Yalman, "İtalya'da Demokrasinin Müdafaası" 11 December 1954.

minority in İstanbul on September 6 and 7, 1955, and the shock of the Hungarian Uprising in 1956.

4.4.1. From the Istanbul Pogrom until the Hungarian Uprising:

The famous incident, which sparkled on September 6 and lasted until September 7, 1955 was called “The Incident of 6–7 September” in Turkish, Σεπτεμβριανά (The September Events) in Greek, and Istanbul pogrom in English accounts. The pogrom was generally evaluated in the context of Greco-Turkish relations, with regard to the beginning of the Cyprus Question. However, the events also had implications over the anti-Soviet sentiment in the Turkish press, not only in terms of anti-communism but also anti-Sovietism, after the government explicitly alleged communists in Turkey as the conspirators.

Prior to the incident, *Zafer* had published a press conference of Menderes on June 8, 1955, as the semi-official DP organ usually did. During the interview, the Prime Minister was asked by a correspondent whether there was a “fifth column” of the communists in Turkey. Menderes denied any kind of communist movement in Turkey with a decisive language, stating that “it was impossible to adapt communism to Turkish mentality. As the Turkish people became aware of the communist spies, knowing that communism was a tool of the Soviet imperialism, they appreciated the legal measures taken by the government.”²⁶⁷ This was the last example of the speeches, in which Menderes defined Turkey as a staunch castle against communism.

²⁶⁷ Mümtaz Faik Fenik, “Başvekilin Beyanâtı” *Zafer*, 8 June 1955.

The Istanbul pogrom was sparked after the appearance of a speculative but provocative banner in the second edition of an evening newspaper published in Istanbul.²⁶⁸ Before the suppression of the riot, the evening newspapers on September 7, and the morning newspapers on September 8, attacked communists as who was responsible for the “undesired” events, in reference to the official declaration of the government on the second day of the riot, including *Dünya*.²⁶⁹

Ulus condemned the incident but the journalists of *Ulus* (even Yalçın) did not name the conspirators as “communist.” Moreover, the governmental declaration published in *Ulus* did not include the allegations for communists.²⁷⁰ In addition, this time *Vatan* and *Cumhuriyet* did not publish the governmental declaration and therefore did not target communists in the first days.²⁷¹

At first, the incident was not related to the Soviet Union in the Turkish press. At least, there was not such news in *Zafer* or other newspapers, which supported the government. However, a few months after the incident, Ahmet Emin Yalman published an article, which directly accused the Soviet Union as the power behind the riot. In this article, Yalman assessed the indictment of the martial law court, which had been *ad hoc* established after the incident. The mentioned indictment targeted various people and groups from the socialist ELAS forces in the Greek Civil War to Nâzım Hikmet Ran, who was insulted by Yalman as “the most vulgar of the traitors.”²⁷² This was one of the last times that Yalman

²⁶⁸ “Atamızın Evi Bomba ile Hasara Uğradı” *İstanbul Ekspres*, 2nd Edition, 6 September 1955.

²⁶⁹ “Bu Sabah Neşredilen Hükümet Tebliği: Komünist Tertip ve Tahrikine Maruz Kaldık” *İstanbul Ekspres*, 7 September 1955; “Memleket Ağır Bir Komünist Tertip ve Tahribine Maruz Kaldı” *Akşam*, 7 September 1955; “Nümayiş Gecesi Tahrikât Yapan Otuzdan Fazla Komünist Yakalandı” *Hürriyet*, 8 September 1955; “Hükümetin Tedbirleri” *Zafer*, 8 September 1955; “33 Komünist Tahrikçi Yakalandı: İstanbul ve İzmirdeki Müessif Hâdiseleri Kızıl Sabotörlerin Yarattığı Anlaşıldı” *Dünya*, 9 September 1955.

²⁷⁰ “Hükümetin Son Tebliği” *Ulus*, 2nd Edition, 7 September 1955.

²⁷¹ “Selânikteki Menfur Tecavüz” *Cumhuriyet*, 7 September 1955; “Selânik’te Ata’mızın Evi ile Konsolosluğa Bomba Atıldı” *Vatan*, 7 September 1955.

²⁷² Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Asıl Suçlu Moskova” *Vatan*, 13 February 1956.

explicitly supported the claims of the government. After 1956, the relations between *Vatan* and the Menderes government drastically soured.

Except for Yalman's aggressive article, the press generally did not attack communists after a while. This was an important sign of relaxation in the anti-Soviet sentiment in the Turkish press, depending on the low tension in the relations with the Soviet Union. The routine anti-Soviet and synonymously anti-communist stance had continued before the Istanbul Pogrom and did not wane immediately. On the other hand, this time press was divided into two groups. The permanently anti-Soviet journalists such as Yalman and Yalçın were insistent on the Soviet threat, but the ideas of many journalists, including Şükrü Kaya were somewhat relaxed. Kaya seemed convinced by the peace guarantees given by the Soviet Union.²⁷³

4.4.2. Fruitless Tears for the Budapest Martyrs:

The temporary relaxation of anti-Sovietism had a halt at the end of 1956 with the Hungarian Uprising, after which the world public witnessed the merciless response of the Soviet Union towards the political deviation in its satellites. The Soviet invasion of Hungary naturally influenced the prevalent anti-Soviet authors in the Turkish press. In comparison to the year 1953, contrasting attitudes could be observed in the Turkish press in its perspective towards the Soviet Union, especially in the independent newspapers, such as *Dünya*.²⁷⁴ Until the Hungarian

²⁷³ Şükrü Kaya, "Cenevre Konferansının Üçüncü Maddesi" *Hürriyet*, 9 November 1955.

²⁷⁴ A. İhsan Barlas "Sovyet Şurasında" *Dünya*, 8 August 1955; "Sovyet Rusya 640 Bin Kişiyi Terhis Ediyor" *Dünya*, 14 August 1955.

Uprising, it was possible to observe exceptional articles by Falih Rıfka Atay. For instance, he once claimed that should be open to trade with the Soviet Union.²⁷⁵ However, the harsh Soviet criticism continued in *Dünya*.²⁷⁶ In addition, *Ulus* also stopped to support the government in its struggle against communism, although the newspaper was stagnant in its anti-Soviet stance, in comparison to *Dünya*.²⁷⁷

At the beginning of 1956, permanently anti-Soviet Yalman and Yalçın stated that their expectations in the New Year were quite low in terms of world peace. According to them, the only way for peace was the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, from its satellites.²⁷⁸ On the other hand, the other newspapers did not emphasize the Turco-Soviet relations in their New Year comments, as they continuously did during the previous decade. However, this did not mean a complete relaxation in their attitudes, because they were still dismal after the drastic 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

Unexpected decisions after the 20th Congress of the CPSU (14 – 25 February 1956) included the restabilization of the foreign relations especially with Yugoslavia and Turkey, among various implications of the de-Stalinization.²⁷⁹ On the other hand, de-Stalinization was not considered seriously in Turkish

²⁷⁵ Falih Rıfka Atay, “Dış Politikamızın Nazik Noktası” *Dünya*, 29 January 1955.

²⁷⁶ “Sovyet Liderleri Arasında İktidar Savaşı Hızlandı!” *Dünya*, 26 January 1955; Falih Rıfka Atay, “Kominform’un Yeni Manevrası” *Dünya*, 1 February 1955; Falih Rıfka Atay “Moskova Kendi Oyununda” *Dünya*, 16 May 1955; “Sovyet Peyklerinin Giriştiği Kampanya” *Dünya*, 26 May 1955.

²⁷⁷ “Peyklere Uçurulan Balon” *Ulus*, 9 March 1955; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, “Yeni Rus Taktiği” *Ulus*, 22 April 1955; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri Dolayısıyla” *Ulus*, 4 May 1955; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, “Yeni Rus Barış Plânı” *Ulus*, 19 May 1955; Although *Ulus* did not support anti-communist claims of the government, following Istanbul Pogrom, it published similar comments with the other newspapers, in terms of claiming connections between the Greek Cypriots and the Soviet Union (as it became routine to label all rivals of the Turkish government as the Soviet-sponsored conspirators), such as asserting that Cypriot Archbishop Makarios was communist. See: “Makaryos Gerçekten Komünist Bir Papazmış: Bir İngiliz Gazetesi İngilterenin Bunu Delilleriyle Tesbit Ettiğini Yazıyor” *Ulus*, 4 July 1955.

²⁷⁸ Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Kruşçev’in Sözleri” *Vatan*, 2 January 1956; “Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Bolşeviklerin Dostluğu” *Ulus*, 4 January 1956.

²⁷⁹ Bertram D. Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin’s Ghost: Text, Background and Meaning of Khrushchev’s Secret Report to the Twentieth Congress on the Night of February 24-25, 1956* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), pp.47–48.

newspapers. The congress was not evaluated in the newspapers separately from the routine events in the foreign countries. On the eve of the congress, *Dünya* and *Akşam* drew attention to the new positive diplomatic moves of the Soviet government in reference to *Pravda*, while the other newspapers, especially the primary organs of RPP and DP were seemed quite disinterested to the future of Moscow.²⁸⁰

Dünya and *Vatan* maintained their misgivings after the congress.²⁸¹ *Zafer*'s attention to the congress was also limited. The foreign policy correspondent of the newspaper of the government mentioned the decision of de-Stalinization only once and did not consider it as a serious move.²⁸²

Zafer was also silent about the news published in the neutral newspapers, related to the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Following the congress, the diplomatic moves from the Soviet Union increased. *Dünya* and *Cumhuriyet* and even *Ulus* informed their readers about the Soviet offers for financial aid and the official invitation of the Prime Minister with a warm language.²⁸³

It could be observed that the Turkish press could have sudden changes, when the issue of financial aid for Turkey was mentioned. After the news about the Russian offer, even Yalçın temporarily seemed among the supporters of the rapprochement, denying the animosity for Russia in Turkey.²⁸⁴ The only

²⁸⁰ "Pravdanın Önerisi" *Akşam*, 8 February 1956; "Rusya'nın Türkiye'ye Yaklaşma Teşebbüsü" *Dünya*, 8 February 1956.

²⁸¹ "Yeni Rus Liderleri Stalin'i Kötülüyor" *Dünya*, 20 February 1956; Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Vatan Haini Stalin" *Zafer*, 20 February 1956.

²⁸² Mücahit Topalak, "Stalin'e Hücum" *Zafer*, 19 February 1956; idem, "Kominform" *Zafer*, 22 April 1956; in the latter article Topalak also commented about the "solidarity" of socialism and communism.

²⁸³ "Sovyetler, Türkiye'ye Yaklaşmak İstiyor: Resmî Rus Gazetelerine Göre Türk İdarecileri Yakında Rusya'ya Davet Edilecek" *Ulus*, 17 March 1956; "Sovyet Basını Bizimle İyi Münasebette İsrar Ediyor" *Ulus*, 20 March 1956; "Türk-Sovyet Muahedesinin 35. Yıldönümü Münasebetiyle: Vorosilov Bayar'a Mesaj Gönderdi!" *Dünya*, 20 March 1956; "Ruslar, Menderesi Moskovaya Davet Edeceklerini Bildiriyorlar" *Cumhuriyet*, 17 March 1956; "Rusya Bize İktisadi Yardım Teklif Etmiş" *Cumhuriyet*, 6 April 1956.

²⁸⁴ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Türkiye ve Rusya" *Ulus*, 26 March 1956.

exception was Yalman, who explicitly reflected his fury for the Soviet moves. The main reason behind Yalman's stance must have been his reliance for the United States, both in terms of financial aid and protecting Turkey from the external threats. Yalman stressed the importance of the American aid several times.²⁸⁵ However, his perspective should be considered separately from the government, as the relations between Yalman and the Menderes government began to deteriorate.²⁸⁶

The Menderes government did not seem impetuous after the Soviet moves. Therefore, the newspapers did not maintain their optimism about the shifts in the Soviet foreign policy, especially in terms of the hopes of change after the 20th Congress. The Soviet Russia was still regarded as the descendant of the "cruel Tsars" by the Turkish correspondents.²⁸⁷

Despite ongoing antagonism towards Russia, the reaction of the Turkish press varied in different newspapers after the Hungarian Revolt. Some newspapers, especially *Vatan* and *Cumhuriyet* explicitly supported Poles and Hungarians after 22 October 1956. These two newspapers observed the events carefully and informed their readers with fiery headlines, which ardently supported the revolutionaries.²⁸⁸ Yalman did not mention the disasters in Hungary except one editorial article, in which he expressed his hope for the destruction of

²⁸⁵ Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Hızır nereden gelecek?" *Vatan*, 9 June 1955; idem, "Amerika ile Anlaşsak" *Vatan*, 27 Kasım 1955; idem, "Amerika Bize El Uzatıyor mu?" *Vatan*, 29 April 1956

²⁸⁶ On June 1, 1956, *Vatan* protested the restrictive law of press legislated by the DP controlled assembly. See "Basın Hürriyetini Yokeden Tasarıyı Komisyon Kabul Etti" *Vatan*, 1 June 1956; Henceforward, Yalman's newspaper began to criticise government in its domestic and foreign policies. On June 11, 1956, *Vatan* began to publish news about the Algerian Independence Movement, in contrast to governmental policy to support France.

²⁸⁷ Cafer Kırımer, "Son Komünist Kongresinden Sonra Rus Siyasetindeki Değişiklik" *Cumhuriyet*, 1 May 1956; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Stalin ve Halefleri" *Ulus*, 2 April 1956; idem, "Sosyalistler ve Komünistler" *Ulus*, 15 Nisan 1956; Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Ekim İhtilâli: Çarlığın Halefleri Nereden Geldiler, Nereye Gidiyorlar?" *Vatan*, 7 November 1956.

²⁸⁸ "Kruçev'in Durumu Vahim" *Vatan*, 23 October 1956; "Macar Halkı Ayaklandı" *Vatan*, 25 October 1956; "Macarlar Hem Rusya Hem de Komünizmle Savaşıyor" *Vatan*, 27 October 1956; "Macar Milliyetçileri Komünistleri Dize Getirdi" *Vatan*, 31 October 1956; M.H. Zal, "Türkler, Macar İstiklâline Hususi Sevgi Duymuştur" *Vatan*, 31 October 1956.

the Iron Curtain.²⁸⁹ In addition, *Vatan*'s attention was shifted to the Suez Crisis, which emerged a few days after the Hungarian Uprising, but *Cumhuriyet* continued to publish the daily progress of the revolutionaries in Hungary. However, Nadir Nadi did not write one single article for the revolutionaries.

In a sense, the press supported the Hungarians with agitated headlines.²⁹⁰ However, none of the newspapers were as furious against the USSR as in 1953. Moreover, none of the editors had a special emphasis over the Soviet invasion. For instance, *Dünya* reported the revolt day by day, while Atay did not publish any article about the "Soviet cruelty" which was previously condemned by him several times. The stance of *Ulus* was also noteworthy. The RPP newspaper did not neglect the Hungarian Uprising, but the reaction of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın only directed to the "hypocrisy" of the Soviet Union in its relations with Turkey.²⁹¹ The inhuman Soviet treatment in Hungary was only once assessed by Yalçın.²⁹²

Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt was also protested by Şükrü Kaya in *Hürriyet*. The veteran minister of Atatürk also protested the Soviet Union, although he previously claimed the possibility to establish stable relations with Moscow. The difference of Şükrü Kaya's reaction from the other correspondents was his rational assessment of the Soviet reaction. He mentioned that "it was even possible to observe a reversal in the Soviet attitude towards humanitarianism,

²⁸⁹ Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Çatırdayan İmparatorluk" *Vatan*, 15 November 1956.

²⁹⁰ "Budapeşte Harabe Haline Geldi" *Akşam*, 26 October 1956; "Macaristan'da kan gövdeyi götürüyor" *Akşam*, 28 October 1956; "Kukla Macar Hükümeti de Sürgüne İtiraz Etti" *Akşam*, 16 November 1956; "Polonya Dün Moskovaya Karşı Başkaldırdı" *Cumhuriyet*, 21 October 1956; "Peştede Patlak Veren Kanlı İhtilâl, *Cumhuriyet*, 25 October 1956; "Peşteye Yeni Rus Taarruzu" *Cumhuriyet*, 5 November 1956; "Kahraman Macaristan Yeniden Ayaklandı" *Cumhuriyet*, 7 November 1956; "Peşte ve Diğer Macar Şehirleri Yanıyor, Milletperverler Ruslarla Hâlâ Çarpışıyor" *Cumhuriyet*, 8 November 1956; "Bugün 18 inci Gün: Kahraman Macar Milleti Hâlâ Çarpışıyor" *Cumhuriyet*, 9 November 1956; "Sovyet Rusya Bütün Macar Gençlerini Trenlere Doldurup Sibiryaya Sürüyor" *Cumhuriyet*, 14 November 1956; "Macaristan'a 200bin Rus Askeri Daha Giriyor: Sovyet Askerleri Peşte Sokaklarında da Kızlara Tecavüze Başladılar" *Cumhuriyet*, 19 November 1956.

²⁹¹ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Rusya'nın Dostluk Taarruzu" *Ulus*, 2 November 1956; idem, "Bolşevik Tehdidi" *Ulus*, 16 November 1956.

²⁹² Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Bolşevikler Yola Gelebilirler mi" *Ulus*, 26 November 1956.

because the Soviet Union would lose their possessions, unless it relaxes its oppression over the satellites and stop persecutions.²⁹³

Apart from its political dimension, some newspapers also included interesting allegations about the ongoing skirmish. A notable one was the allegations about the murder of the famous Hungarian football player Ferenc Puskás.²⁹⁴ Moreover, the pro-DP front was more silent than the pro-RPP newspapers and the independent press. It could be claimed that Zafer had neglected the issue. In comparison to Cumhuriyet and Vatan, the most pro-DP newspaper was quite silent. Zafer informed its readers about the Soviet occupation in its inner pages. The first headline on Zafer about the Hungarian Revolt was seen on November 5 after the second invasion of Budapest by the Soviet tanks.²⁹⁵ Furthermore, foreign policy columnist of Zafer steadily stated that the Hungarian “rebels” were about to lose the war.²⁹⁶ None of Zafer’s editorials was related with Hungary.

It is questionable whether the limited interest of the newspapers (especially editors) to the Hungarian Uprising could be another sign for the relaxation of the anti-Soviet sentiment in Turkey. Because a harsher reaction could be expected at least from the permanent carriers of the anti-Soviet banner, in accordance with the severe anti-Soviet stance of the Turkish press since 1945 up to 1955. In 1945, the anti-Sovietism was limited with the condemnation of the Soviet aspirations over the Straits. However, in 1953, almost entire Turkish press frequently dwelt on a variety of topics from the inhuman treatments and persecutions in the Soviet Union to the agricultural crises. Individual reaction of Yalman was still prevalent,

²⁹³ Şükrü Kaya “Kurt Masalı” *Hürriyet*, 9 November 1956.

²⁹⁴ “Puşkaş’ı Öldürdüler” *Hürriyet*, 27 November 1956.

²⁹⁵ “Macaristan Tekrar İşgal Edildi” *Zafer*, 5 November 1956.

²⁹⁶ Mücahit Topalak, “Sonun Başlangıcı” *Zafer*, 10 December 1956.

but the other anti-Soviet editors and foreign policy correspondents, including Yalçın, Esmer, Fenik, and Atay showed less interest to a disputable move of the USSR.

The Hungarian Uprising was the last event, in which the Soviet antagonism in the Turkish newspapers rose simultaneously. After 1956, the total anti-Sovietism lost its prominence in the press gradually. It could be seen as one of the direct results of the revision of Stalinist foreign policy. However, Malenkov's relatively "softer" stance was not enough to eliminate the anxiety of the press. The attitude of the Turkish press was also indirectly related to the governmental direction in the foreign policy. The Menderes government still seemed confident about the American support. Although the former foes of Moscow, primarily Tito's Yugoslavia, seriously appraised the Soviet moves to revitalization of the relations, Turkey was still reluctant to respond Moscow's call for the rehabilitation of Turco-Soviet partnership.

There were two differences between the periods 1944-1953 and 1953-1956. At first, state control over the press was much less rigid than it had been in 1945. During 1950s Turkish newspapers were free to narrate news from the foreign agencies and choose their place between the government and the opposition. On the other hand, this freedom was existent, if and only if government did not face a fiery opposition, as RPP had been previously challenged by *Tan* in 1945. The situation would change during late 1950s. Moreover, the attention of the press would be repelled, after the tension in domestic politics rose, triggering an increased governmental oppression over several Turkish newspapers, including former supporters of Menderes, such as Ahmet Emin Yalman.

CHAPTER V

THE OVERHADOWED SOVIETOPHOBIA DURING THE TURBULENT YEARS OF TURKEY (1957–1960)

5.1. On the eve of the Syrian Crisis (January – August 1957):

The extent of anti-Soviet content in the Turkish press continuously diminished after the suppression of the Hungarian Uprising, but it was still present. In fact, the foreign relations were not neglected in the press until the parliamentary election of 1957, but the anxiety caused by the Soviet threat remained under the shadow of the Cyprus Question, which had already become the most pressing concern in the Turkish press. Still, Turkish correspondents were eager to associate the Soviet antagonism with the Greek Cypriots, claiming the existence of an “immense support” of Moscow for the Greek Cypriots.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁷ “Yunanistan Rus Himayesinde” *Milliyet*, 22 February 1957; “Kıbrıs ve Sovyetler” *Cumhuriyet*, 4 April 1957; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Dönüp Dolaşım...” *Ulus*, 7 May 1957; “Makarios Rus Peyklerini Yardıma Davet Ediyor” *Akşam*, 5 May 1957; “Sovyet Rusya Kıbrıs İşinde Yunanistan’ı Destekliyor” *Vatan*, 27 July 1957; Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Pan-Slavizm Yunanlıların Kapısında” *Vatan*, 9 August 1957

General perspective of the Turkish press about the Soviet Union was not much different than the period of 1953 – 1956. Many Turkish correspondents were still incredulous about the Soviet moves. After a semi-official speech of Khrushchev in the New Year's Eve, in which he praised Stalin, several Turkish newspapers claimed that the Soviet Union would return to Stalinism.²⁹⁸

This could be regarded as a direct result of the ruthless reaction of Khrushchev government during the Hungarian Uprising, which had contributed to the mistrust of the Turkish public opinion. It was still possible to see Hungary in the headlines of Turkish newspapers, but now the calm rhetoric of the press showed that many journalists were convinced that the hopes for Hungary were over.²⁹⁹ As a result, the new Soviet attempts for a rapprochement under the auspices of the new Soviet foreign minister, Dmitriy Trofimovich Shepilov were interpreted with suspicion among the Turkish correspondents.³⁰⁰

The fear of the Soviet Russia was not intense as it had been in 1953, but the press still continued its warnings about a possible Russian aggression. After the replacement of Soviet foreign minister Shepilov with Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, who would hold the post for 28 years, several newspapers published speculative comments about the new minister, regarding him as the new executor of Stalin's foreign policy. As a matter of fact, it seemed to become a usual

²⁹⁸ "Rusya'da Stalin Zihniyeti" *Ulus*, 2 January 1957; "Kruşçev Yeni Yıla Tehditle Giriyor" *Vatan*, 1 January 1957; "Kruşçev 'Hepimiz Stalinciyiz' Dedi" *Vatan*, 2 January 1957; "Rusya ve Peykleri Macaristan'da Gizli Bir Toplantı Yaptılar" *Cumhuriyet*, 7 January 1957; "Kruşçev Yine Stalin'i Övdü" *Akşam*, 19 February 1957.

²⁹⁹ "Macaristan'da Sefalet Korkunç Bir Hâl Aldı" *Zafer*, 3 January 1957; "Macar Milliyetçileri Kıyma Yapılmışlar" *Milliyet*, 5 January 1957; "Macaristan'da Rus Tankları Yeniden Faaliyete Geçti" *Vatan*, 11 January 1957; "Peştede Çarpışmalar Dün Tekrar Başladı" *Cumhuriyet*, 12 January 1957; "Macarlar 15 Martta Yeni Bir İhtilâl Hazırlanıyorlar" *Akşam*, 12 February 1957.

³⁰⁰ Celâl Kural, "Sovyet Rusya ve Son Hareketleri" *Cumhuriyet*, 19 January 1957; Ömer Sami Coşar, "Rusların Barış Taarruzu Ne Mânâ İfade Ediyor" *Cumhuriyet*, 13 February 1957; "Rusya, Türkiye'ye Karşı Yeni Bir Barış Taarruzuna Girişti: Sovyet Hariciye Vekili, Çepilof, Yapılacak Teklifleri Türkiye ile Tetkike Hazırız, Dedi" *Vatan*, 14 February 1957; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Rusya ile Dostluk" *Ulus*, 17 February 1957.

reaction in the Turkish press.³⁰¹ On the other hand, the comments about the American – Soviet conflict indicated that the Turkish press still trusted the American support, especially after the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Yalman, as usual, praised the Eisenhower Doctrine as the “savior of the Middle East.”³⁰²

It was somewhat difficult to interpret the simultaneous existence of the confidence of press for the American support to Turkey and their anxieties towards the Soviet Union. The Turkish journalists apparently kept their disbelief for the ongoing “de-Stalinization” in the Soviet Union, as they were still interested on the frequent intrigues in the Soviet leadership.³⁰³ In addition, it was still possible to observe speculative news and routine Soviet criticism about the Western culture.³⁰⁴

This relative relaxation could be even visible in the most severe anti-Soviet figures in the Turkish press. The rhetoric of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın in his last articles was quite calm in comparison to the past.³⁰⁵ The last anti-Soviet article of the veteran journalist before his death on October 18, 1957, was a self-criticism for Turkey, in which he stated his disappointment about the

³⁰¹ “Sovyet Dış Bakanı Çepilov Azledildi” *Cumhuriyet*, 16 February 1957; “Şepilov Azledildi: Sovyet Hariciye Vekilliğine Stalinci Gromiko Getirildi” *Milliyet*, 16 February 1957; “Sovyetlerin Dış Siyasetinde Bir Değişiklik Olmıyacakmış” *Vatan*, 17 February 1957; “Sovyet Rusya’daki Ufak Değişiklik!” *Zafer*, 18 February 1957.

³⁰² “Amerika, Rusyanın Ortaşarka Nüfuz Etmesini Önleyecek” *Hürriyet*, 2 January 1957; Şükrü Kaya, “Geç ve Güç, Fakat Zarurî” *Hürriyet*, 2 January 1957; “Orta-Doğu’da Rus Oyununa Paydos” *Milliyet*, 6 January 1957; ““Dulles “Orta Doğu Komünizmin Eline Düşerse Dünya İçin Felâkettir” Dedi” *Akşam*, 8 January 1957; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, “Eisenhower Doktrini” *Ulus*, 8 January 1957; Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Eisenhower Hızır Rolünde” *Vatan*, 8 March 1957.

³⁰³ “Kruçev’in 6 Marifeti” *Dünya*, 8 January 1957; Şükrü Kaya, “Hile ve Fitne” *Hürriyet*, 9 January 1957; “Moskovaya Göre Türk - Rus Dostluğunu Molotov Bozmuş” *Vatan*, 8 July 1957; Rusya’da Tasfiye” *Ulus*, 4 July 1957; “Sovyet Rusyadaki Tasfiye Hareketi Devam Ediyor” *Cumhuriyet*, 6 July 1957; “Malenkof’u Temizlemek İçin Hazırlıklara Başlandı” *Ulus*, 8 July 1957; Şükrü Kaya, “Tasfiyeler ve Sonraları” *Hürriyet*, 16 July 1957; “Zhukov’un Parlak Yıldızı Hrutçef’i Gölgeleştiriyor” *Cumhuriyet*, 30 July 1957.

³⁰⁴ “S. Rusya Ekonomik Bir Kriz İçinde Bulunuyor” *Zafer*, 28 January 1957; “Moskovadaki Esrârengiz Hasta Kim?” *Cumhuriyet*, 5 February 1957; “Çepilof’a Göre Rock and Roll” *Milliyet*, 5 April 1957.

³⁰⁵ Amerika ve Rusya, *Ulus*, 22 June 1957; idem, “Sovyetlerin Bizden İsteddiği” *Ulus*, 24 June 1957.

backwardness of Istanbul in comparison to Moscow in terms of the municipality services.³⁰⁶

It was also meaningful to observe that the relaxation of anti-Sovietism was accelerated after the serious offers of the Soviet government, concerning financial aid, and investment in Turkey, following the appointment of a new ambassador to Ankara, Nikita Semionovich Ryzhov.³⁰⁷ The majority of the Turkish newspapers had positive headlines about the Soviet Union.

5.2. “The Summer Madness” (September – December 1957):

The improvement in the trade relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey halted after a sudden crisis in Turco-Soviet relations. The prevalent hostility between Turkey and its Soviet-sponsored neighbor Syria caused a new tension between the Menderes government and the Soviet leadership. The minor crises between Turkey and the USSR could be considered as normal with regard to the hostility since 1945, but this time the tension might be assessed as a surprising incident, as the relation between Turkey and the Soviet Russia had begun to improve. Therefore, the real reasons behind the Syrian Crisis of 1957 (i.e. “The Summer Madness”) could be related with the internal politics both in Turkey and in the Soviet Union.

³⁰⁶ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Moskovaya’da imrenecek miyiz?” *Ulus*, 27 July 1957.

³⁰⁷ “Rusya Türkiye ile Ticarî Münasebetlerini Geliştirmek İstiyor” *Cumhuriyet*, 24 May 1957; “Rusya Bize Kredi Vermek İstiyor: 300 Milyon Dolarlık Kredi İçin Görüşmeler Yapıldığı Söyleniyor” *Akşam*, 1 August 1957; “Rusya ile Ticarî Temaslar” *Milliyet*, 1 August 1957; “Moskova Radyosu Türk-Rus Münasebetlerini Övüyor” *Akşam*, 5 August 1957; “Sovyetler Türkiyeye 2 Bin Kamyon Satacak: Moskova Radyosunun İlâve Ettiğine Göre, Ruslar İzmir’de Bir Sun’i Elyaf ve Dokuma Tezgâhı Fabrikası İnşa Edecekmiş” *Cumhuriyet*, 25 August 1957; “Aker, Rus Heyeti Reisi ile Görüştü” *Milliyet*, 30 August 1957.

The Democratic Party of Menderes and the Republican People's Party of İnönü, along with two new minor oppositionary parties,³⁰⁸ had a fierce competition before the parliamentary elections in 1957. Both sides were ready to utilize any means of propaganda against the other, certainly including the mutual allegations for pro-Sovietism. For instance, both İnönü and Bayar had accused each other of seeking alliance with the Soviet Union during the heyday of the Straits Crisis of 1945.³⁰⁹ A direct threat from the Soviet Union on the eve of the elections could confuse the minds of the voters.

In fact, the tension between Syria and Turkey was not new. Following the increased Soviet attention towards the Middle East, the Turkish press had already begun to criticize Syria after 1955 to open its lands to the Soviet imperialism.³¹⁰

The crisis emerged after the formation of a radical leftist government in Syria, which increased the suspicions of the West about a possible Soviet intrigue over the Syrian regime. In fact, Turkey did not have greater aspirations over Syria than Iraq, Jordan, or the Western governments had. However, when a secret summit was held in Ankara between Menderes, Miner (American Ambassador to Ankara), and the Iraqi crown prince Abd al-İlah, the Turkish Prime Minister seemed the most enthusiast one for the intervention to Syria.³¹¹ According to the reports of the American diplomats, the Menderes government aimed to declare

³⁰⁸ These parties were Republican Nation Party (RNP), as the direct descendant of NP, and Freedom Party (FP), which consisted of a group of dissenter deputies in DP.

³⁰⁹ Kemal H. Karpat, "The Turkish Elections of 1957" *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Jun., 1961), p. 446.

³¹⁰ "Kızıl Ajanların Aleti Haline Gelen Şam Hükümetinin Tehlikeli Bir Ateşle Oynamağa Başladığı Belirtiliyor" *Akşam*, 28 March 1955; Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Suriye'de Kızıl Ajanlar" *Zafer*, 3 April 1955; "İngiliz Basınının İfşaati: 15 Aydır Türk Boğazlarından Ticaret Gemileri İçinde Geçirilen Silahlarla Suriye Bir Rus Üssü Hâline Geldi" *Cumhuriyet*, 23 November 1956; "Suriye Rusların Silâh Deposu Oldu" *Akşam*, 26 November 1956.

³¹¹ Philip Anderson, "Summer Madness: The Crisis in Syria, August-October 1957" *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 22, No.1/2 (1995), p.27; American diplomat Loy W. Henderson even defined Turkey as the "deadly earnest," in addition Turkey expected the same attitude from the USA. See: *Ibid*, p. 28.

war upon Syria after concentrating their troops on the south, even after Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said objected the Turkish intervention, though he desired an active move to Syria.³¹²

As usual, the Turkish press was not informed about the Turkish plans. Therefore, several newspapers, especially the pro-DP journalists, had an angry reaction since the first Soviet warning, and they made several references to the speeches of Menderes, in which he denied the Soviet allegations.³¹³ Only *Zafer* did not publish the Soviet accusations. In fact, the press did not emphasize much on the issue, except for Yalman, who furiously attacked Russians and warned the public opinion, claiming that Russians had settled on the Mediterranean with its military bases in Syria.³¹⁴ The other newspapers did not depict the situation as a near threat.

On the other front, it was also doubtful that the Soviet Union could dare to attack Turkey or any other country for the sake of Syria. The “Summer Madness” also referred to the same period with the climax of the political struggle between Khrushchev and Zhukov.

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was *de facto* the most powerful man in the Soviet leadership, though he had not consolidated his power as the supreme authority in the Politburo, yet.³¹⁵ As it had been mentioned, Khrushchev had

³¹² Ibid, pp. 31–35.

³¹³ “Rusya Bizi Kışkırtıcı Bir Eda ile Bizi İtham ve Tehdit Ediyor” *Hürriyet*, 15 September 1957; “Rus Diktatörü Hrutçef Bizi Tehdit Ediyor: Suriye Hududuna Asker Yığdığımızı Dair İddialar Tekrarlandı: Hrutçef’e Göre Bu Yüzden Rus Hududunu “Çıplak” Bırakmışız” *Cumhuriyet*, 9 October 1957; Falih Rıfkı Atay, “Sovyet Tehditlerinin Manâsızlığı” *Dünya*, 25 October 1957; “Rusların Memleketimize Karşı Açtıkları Sınır Harbi Genişliyor” *Milliyet*, 15 September 1957; “Başvekil’in Mühim Beyanâtı: Suriye Hadiselerini Dikkatle İnceliyoruz” *Milliyet*, 25 September 1957; “Menderes Bulganin’in Mesajına Cevap Verdi: *Milliyet*, 5 October 1957; “Kruşçev’in Tehdidi Gülünç Karşılandı” *Milliyet*, 5 October 1957; Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Bulganin’in Tehdidi” *Vatan*, 16 September 1957; “Rus İddialarını Reddettik” *Vatan*, 1 October 1957; “Rusya Bizi Suriye Sınırına Asker Yığmakla İtham Etti” *Ulus*, 15 September 1957.

³¹⁴ Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Moskoflar Akdenizde” *Vatan*, 27 August 1957.

³¹⁵ Hugh Seton-Watson, *From Lenin to Khrushchev: the History of World Communism* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p.359–360.

accused Malenkov of fearing from the West. In 1957, another struggle between Khrushchev and Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov, the popular commander of the Red Army, arose. A possible reason for Khrushchev to foment an international crisis could be his aim to gain power and reputation against Zhukov.³¹⁶ As a matter of fact, Khrushchev tactically denied the existence of a crisis, when he appeared in the Turkish embassy in Moscow for the 34th anniversary of the Turkish Republic, on October 29, 1957. However, Khrushchev's speech did not appear in Turkish newspapers, except for *Dünya*.³¹⁷ This also indicated the disinterest of the press against the Soviet threat, in contrast to their perspective in the previous years. Either the confidence of the Turkish press about American support or simply their lack of information prevented the emergence of a new anti-Soviet period in the press. Especially *Zafer*'s silence was a key point to understand the intentions of the government. After the "Summer Madness" Turkey and the Soviet Union did not have a serious confrontation until the Cuban Missile Crisis. On the other hand, the attention of the press shifted to domestic matters until the fall of Menderes.

5.3. From Sputnik to the End of the DP: (January 1958 – May 1960)

"The Summer Madness" overshadowed the worldwide remarkable success of the *Sputnik I* on October 4, 1957. Although the general interest of press on the Soviet Union diminished due to the news concerning 1957 elections, the political

³¹⁶ Armstrong, John A., "The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy" *International Affairs*, Vol. 41, No.1 (Jan., 1965), p. 41.

³¹⁷ "Kruşçef Ortadoğudaki Durumun "Barış Yoluna Çevrildiğini" Söyledi" *Dünya*, 30 October 1957.

struggle in the Soviet leadership still found place in the newspapers, but not on the headlines. For instance, Zhukov's fall was informed to Turkish readers by *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* newspapers in their inner pages.³¹⁸

No article was published in the political newspapers to inform the launch of *Sputnik I*. Only *Hürriyet* published the news in an inner page article two days after the launch.³¹⁹ In a sense, it might be claimed that the Turkish journalists did not take it seriously, when they received the news from the foreign agencies. However, the newspapers began to publish news about the *Sputnik II* with a limited interest. Some newspapers, such as *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Ulus* used a calm language,³²⁰ while *Vatan* had an unfriendly hostile rhetoric.³²¹ Anyway, the *Sputnik* Program was not reflected as a sensational progress initially by the Turkish press. Once, an article appeared in *Zafer* with a title related to *Sputnik*, but it was only an ironic criticism about RPP, which were usually seen in *Zafer*.³²² Instead, there were still false speculations. *Akşam* claimed that Russians had established a radar network in the Armenian SSR, which was able to divert the Turkish airplanes to the Soviet lands.³²³ (This is even impossible with the contemporary technology of the 21th century).

After the recognition of the temporary Soviet supremacy in the space race, the newspapers began to evaluate the news about the Soviet Union with a relatively respectful language. It was even possible to observe appreciations or

³¹⁸ “Zukov kaabiliyetine göre bir göreve getirilecek” *Ulus*, 30 October 1957; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, “Zukov Muamması” *Ulus*, 31 October 1957; “Hrutçef Dün Mareşal Zukov’u Tasviye Etti” *Cumhuriyet*, 3 November 1957.

³¹⁹ “Sunî Peyk Uçuruldu” *Hürriyet*, 6 October 1957.

³²⁰ “Ruslar İkinci Sun’î Peyki de Fırlattılar” *Cumhuriyet*, 4 November 1957; “Ruslar İkinci Peyki Attılar” *Milliyet*, 4 November 1957; “Sovyetler İkinci Suni Peyki de Fırlattılar” *Ulus*, 4 November 1957.

³²¹ “2. Sputnik’in Sesi Kesildi: Laika Yere İnmiş” *Vatan*, 13 November 1957.

³²² “Mahrekinden Kaymış Sputnik III.’ün Sukutu Devam Ediyor!” *Zafer*, 29 November 1957.

³²³ “Kızıllar Hududumuzda “Radar Ağı” Kurdu” *Akşam*, 25 October 1957.

praises.³²⁴ However, this did not refer to the end of speculative news and hostile comments about the Soviet progress in the space race.³²⁵

In 1958, there was a temporary increase in anti-Soviet articles. However, none of the newspapers published serial editorials concerning the “Soviet threat.” After the death of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın on October 18, 1957, another veteran author, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu began to write editorials for *Ulus*, but his perspective was not as harsh as Yalçın’s and he rarely assessed the Turco-Soviet relations. On the other hand there were speculations about a possible Soviet attack, in reference to the rumors about the Soviet military maneuvers in Transcaucasia.³²⁶

In fact, a sudden rise of anti-Soviet articles was observed mostly in *Akşam*, which did not occupy a primary place in the anti-Soviet press bloc in early 1950s. However, the newspaper was still interested to publish the news about the Soviet Union with a suspicious language. As a typical example, *Akşam* interviewed the players of the Galatasaray SK to ask questions about the daily life in the Soviet Union, following their return from Russia, after they vanquished Zenit Leningrad on July 8, 1957.³²⁷

³²⁴ Sami Kohen “1957 Sputnik Yılı” *Milliyet*, 2 January 1958; “Fezanın Fethinde Amerika Rusyadan Neden Geri Kaldı” *Akşam*, 23 February 1958; “Ruslar, Üçüncü Sputnik’i Attı” *Milliyet*, 16 Mayıs 1958; “Ruslar Ay’a İlk Yolcuyla Nasıl ve Ne Vakit Göndereceklerini Açıkladılar” *Cumhuriyet*, 29 Eylül 1958; Rasim Yargıcı, “Ay’ın Fethine Doğru” *Akşam*, 4 January 1959; “Nixon, ‘Ruslar Ay’a vardı diye paniğe lüzum yok’ Dedi” *Akşam*, 15 September 1959.

³²⁵ “Ruslar Fezaya İnsan Fırlattı” *Vatan*, 7 January 1958; “Ruslar Fezâ’ya 4 İnsan Fırlatmış: Bir İtalyan Haberler Ajansı, Biri Kadın Olan Pilotların Öldüğünü Bildirdi” *Milliyet*, 14 December 1959; “Amerika Güneşe Peyk Fırlattı” *Milliyet*, 12 March 1960.

³²⁶ “Rusya Dün Kafkasyayı Yasak Bölge İlân Etti: Kafkasya ile Kırım, Ukrayna ve Merkezî Rusya’dan Bütün Yabancılar Çıkarıldı” *Cumhuriyet*, 3 April 1958; “Sovyet Rusya Soğuk Harbe Başladı: Kafkasyadaki Ordu Manevra Yapıyor” *Akşam*, 18 July 1958; “Hudut Birliklerimize Dün Hazırol Emri Verildi: Rus, Suriye ve Irak Hudut Birliklerimiz Takviye Ediliyor” *Akşam*, 19 July 1958.

³²⁷ “Galatasaraylıların Getirdiği Haberler” *Akşam*, 13 July 1957; This was the first victory of a Turkish team against a Soviet club. However, the match was not reflected with a hostile language in the sport pages. Only *Akşam* claimed that 100,000 spectators (full capacity of the Kirov Stadium) bood Zenit after seeing the poor play against Galatasaray. See: “Galatasaray Şahane Oynadı” *Akşam*, 8 July 1957.

The press discussed the fall of Bulganin with anxiety. The reactions were not as anxious as the previous times, such as the death of Stalin and the resign of Malenkov. In general, Turkish newspapers informed their readers about the Khrushchev's rise to power and his characteristics with a moderate rhetoric.³²⁸ Only *Vatan* and *Dünya* maintained their previous suspicions, naming Khrushchev as the "Second Stalin," as they also did during the first days of Malenkov and Bulganin.³²⁹ Yalman, who had been currently assessing the *Sputnik* in his editorials as a serious warning for the West, found a brand new issue to discuss.³³⁰ Yalman was parallel with the routine anti-Soviet stance of the RPP front. Ahmet Şükrü Esmer and Yavuz Abadan (1905-1967), who wrote editorials for *Ulus* for a short time before Karaosmanoğlu, also continued the Soviet antagonism in the RPP newspaper. However, neither *Ulus* nor *Dünya* was much severe as before.³³¹ Moreover, the improvement in the relations in 1959 would temporarily change Esmer's negative perspective. On November 9, 1959, the veteran journalist celebrated the 42th anniversary of the October Revolution in his column and expressed his optimist belief for Khrushchev's efforts "to repair Stalin's mistakes."³³²

³²⁸ "Bulganin Devrildi: Stalin ve Malenkovdan Sonra Kruşev Diktatörlüğü Ele Aldı" *Akşam*, 28 March 1958; "Sovyet Başbakanı Bulganin Azledildi: Komünist Partisinin Şefi Hrutçef Başbakanlığı da Üzerine Aldı" *Cumhuriyet*, 28 March 1958; "Kruşçef Bulganin'i Başbakanlıktan Attı" *Hürriyet*, 28 March 1958; Kruşçev Rusya'nın Mutlak Hâkimi Oldu" *Milliyet*, 28 March 1958; "Kruşçef Sovyet Başvekili Oldu" *Zafer*, 28 March 1958.

³²⁹ "Kruşçev Rus Başvekili Oldu: Haberi Hür Dünya Endişe ile Karşladı" *Vatan*, 28 March 1958; "Rusya'nın Yeni Stalini: Kruşçef" *Dünya*, 28 March 1958; Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Yeni Stalin" *Vatan*, 29 March 1958; "Kruşçef'in Yolu Çarlık Yönünde!" *Dünya*, 29 March 1958; Falih Rıfka Atay, "Kruşçef Stalin'in Yerinde" *Dünya*, 2 April 1958; "Kruşçev:2nci Stalin" *Vatan*, 4 April 1958

³³⁰ Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Sputnik'in İksiri" *Vatan*, 21 January 1958.

³³¹ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Ruslara Göre Demokrasi" 24 March 1958; idem, "Bulganin'den Kruşçef'e" *Ulus*, 30 March 1958; idem, "Amerika ve Sovyetler" *Ulus*, 8 August 1959; Yavuz Abadan, "Kremlin ve Ötesi" *Ulus*, 10 December 1958; idem, "Fezanın Kontrolü" *Ulus*, 19 December 1958; idem, "Sovyet Teklifleri" *Ulus*, 28 December 1958; idem, Sovyet Oligarşisi *Ulus*, 12 February 1959; Falih Rıfka Atay, "Yalta Korkusundan Kurtulmak" *Dünya*, 1 September 1959; idem, "Bizim İki Rusyamız Var!" *Dünya*, 5 September 1959; idem, "Kruşçef'in Dil Değiştirmesi" *Dünya*, 19 March 1960.

³³² Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Sovyetlerin Kırkikinci Yılı" *Ulus*, 9 November 1959.

The only exception for the relaxation was Yalman, who never left pro-American stance. As it had been mentioned, up the end of 1950s, Yalman's relation with the governmental circles soured. It was possible to see pejorative cartoons on *Zafer*, depicting Yalman mostly as "a producer of lie and an ardent supporter of the American mandate."³³³ In order to improve his relations with Menderes, Yalman published open letters to the Prime Minister, reminding their common aim with him to struggle against communism.³³⁴ As a matter of fact, Yalman never stopped its antagonism towards Moscow³³⁵ until he was unjustly arrested due to his criticism of the government. After his release, Yalman concentrated on the domestic politics and future of the regime after the fall of Menderes. On the other hand, even *Vatan*'s attitude was not as harsh as before. On May 27, 1959, the newspaper published the travel notes of author Âgâh Sırrı Levent, who visited Moscow as a guest of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Levent's account depicted Moscow as "one of the most beautiful capitals of Europe."³³⁶

The tendency to relate any kind of anti-Americanism with the Soviet intelligence continued until 1960s, but to a decreased extent. After the coup d'etat of General Abd-el Kerim Qasim in Iraq, the word "communist" was not referred to him in the press. In addition, only Nadir Nadi alleged the involvement of the Soviet Union in the events in Iraq.³³⁷

³³³ "Cemaziyülevvel... Cemaziyülahir" *Zafer*, 15 November 1957.

³³⁴ Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Sayın Menderes'e 2.ci Açık Mektup - Komünizme Karşı Bekçilik Dâvasına Dair" *Vatan*, 15 September 1958.

³³⁵ Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Amerika Çok Şükür Uyandı" *Vatan*, 17 July 1958; idem, "Tehdit Altındaki Berline Gidiyorum" 24 - 31 December 1958; idem, "Manevi Kıymetler Cephesi Kurulmalıdır" *Vatan*, 11 February 1959; idem, "Hangi Dünyada Yaşıyoruz" *Vatan*, 27 April 1959; idem, "Diktatörlük ve Komünizm" *Vatan*, 11 August 1959; idem, "Ya Birlik Ya Komünizm" *Vatan*, 27 September 1959; idem, "Komünistlerin Bir Oyunu" *Vatan*, 25 November 1959

³³⁶ Âgâh Sırrı Levent, "Moskova'da" *Vatan*, 27 May 1959.

³³⁷ Nadir Nadi, "Sürekli Dikkat Gerek" *Cumhuriyet*, 26 July 1958.

From 1958 until mid-1959, *Akşam* surprisingly seemed the only newspaper in the Turkish press, which increased its voice in terms of anti-Sovietism. This newspaper emphasized both the government's struggle against the government on one hand, and insisted on the prevalence of the Soviet threat on the other hand. However, the anti-Soviet news and articles were not frequent as before, except for a feuilleton about the Communist China.³³⁸ In addition, *Akşam* did not employ a harsh anti-Soviet figure in the press equal to Yalman or Yalçın's level. Once, Hıfzı Topuz (1923 -) a young journalist from *Akşam* wrote two exceptional articles about the Soviet threat but did not continue.³³⁹ The attitude of *Akşam* also relaxed up to 1960.

The press also did not launch a new wave of anti-Sovietism in these years, in spite of the emergence of negative incidents, such as the shooting of a few Turkish villagers by the Soviet border troops on August 21, 1959.³⁴⁰ The issue was neglected after a short time. Instead, some newspapers, especially *Cumhuriyet*, concentrated on the mutual diplomatic visits between the USA and the USSR in contrast to another group of newspapers, which neglected the Cold War affairs, while foreign issues were extensively dwelled on domestic politics

³³⁸ "Gizli Komünistlerle Mücadele Programı Hazırlandı: Tatbikatla Milli Eğitim, Milli Savunma ve İçişleri Bakanlıkları Meşgul Olacak" *Akşam*, 5 January 1958; "Komünist Sızmalarına Karşı Müessir Tedbirler Alınıyor: Pasaport ve Vize Kontrolları da Daha Büyük Titizlikle Yapılacak" *Akşam*, 23 March 1958; "Fransa'daki İşçiler Bile Komünizmden Yüz Çevirdi" *Akşam*, 7 October 1958; Ergun Birol, "Ruslara Atılan Şamar: Batı Berlin Seçimleri" *Akşam*, 14 December 1958; "Kruşçef, Komünizmin En Büyük Şarlatanıdır [from the speech of Paul-Henri Spaak, secretary-general of NATO]" *Akşam*, 22 February 1959; "Komünist Ajanları Din Âlimi Kisvesine Giriyor [from the speech of Şemsettin Günaltay, former Turkish Prime Minister]" *Akşam*, 13 April 1959; "Komünist Tehlikesi Gittikçe Yayılıyor" *Akşam*, 22 June 1959; "Karadenizdeki Rus Filosu Büyük Tehlike Teşkil Ediyor" *Akşam*, 12 July 1959; Joachim Heidt, "Kızıl Çin – Dünyayı Bekleyen Büyük Tehlike" *Akşam*, 4 April - 8 May 1959.

³³⁹ Hıfzı Topuz, "Sovyet Tehdidi" *Akşam*, 16 September 1957; idem, "Antikomünist beyanname" *Akşam*, 28 September 1957.

³⁴⁰ "Türk - Rus Hududunda Bir Tecavüz Hâdisesi: Sovyet Askerleri, Çayır Biçmekte Olan 4 Vatandaşımızı Ateş Yağmuruna Tuttular" *Cumhuriyet*, 22 August 1959; "Rus Sınır Nöbetçileri Dört Vatandaşımıza Ateş Etiler" *Dünya*, 22 August 1959.

during the increased tension between the government and the opposition.³⁴¹ Moreover, several newspapers began to be closed temporarily by the government after 1958. It was forbidden to publish news, which mentions the oppressions of the government over the opposition.³⁴²

During the peak of the domestic political tension in Turkey, foreign affairs of Turkey lost its prominence temporarily. During the official visit of Menderes to the United States, *Zafer* published the full text of all speeches of the Prime Minister. However, the government's newspaper never highlighted the positive or negative comments from him. For instance, *Vatan* emphasized Menderes' criticism over the "pretentious behavior of Russia" in their "peace-loving" stance, in his speech in Dallas, while *Zafer* did not mention the part about Russia in its headlines.³⁴³ Similarly, *Zafer* was silent about the official visit of a Turkish delegation to Moscow led by Lütfü Kırdar, Turkish Minister of Health, while *Cumhuriyet* notified the public about the event.³⁴⁴ On March 1960, *Akşam* informed its readers about a suspicious shipwreck of a Soviet freighter on the shores of Dardanelles, but none of the other newspapers assessed this incident.³⁴⁵

The relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey continued to improve, when Menderes was officially invited by Khrushchev. As a result, the atmosphere

³⁴¹ "Eisenhower'in Muavini Dün Moskovaya Vardı" *Cumhuriyet*, 24 July 1959; "Rusya Bize Çattı" *Cumhuriyet*, 25 July 1959; "Eisenhower, Hrutçef'i Amerika'ya Davet Etti" *Cumhuriyet*, 4 August 1959; "Eisenhower "Barışa İnanınız Harb Olmyacaktır Diyor: Hrutçef ise Bir Amerikan Dergisine Yazdığı Makalede "Sonunda Komünizmin Bütün Dünyada Muzaffer Olacağını" İleri Sürdü" *Cumhuriyet*, 4 September 1959; "Kruşçef Amerika Yolunda" *Ulus*, 15 September 1959; "Sovyet Başbakanı Kruşçef Amerikada" *Dünya*, 16 September 1959; "Kruşçef - Eisenhower Görüşmeleri Ümit Verici Başladı" *Dünya*, 17 September 1959; "Hrutçef'in Amerikalı Sendikacılarla Kavgası" *Cumhuriyet*, 22 September 1959.

³⁴² Şapolyo, Enver Behnan, *Türk Gazeteciliği Tarihi: Her Yönüyle Basın* (Ankara: Güven Matbaası, 1971), pp.270–272.

³⁴³ "Menderes Dallas'da Yaptığı Konuşmada Rusların Sulhçuluğuna İnanmamalı Dedi" *Vatan*, 13 October 1959; "Türkiye, Sulh Yolunda Müttelikleri ile Eleledir" *Zafer*, 14 October 1959.

³⁴⁴ "Türk-Rus Münasebatı" *Cumhuriyet*, 16 December 1959; In fact, the article in *Cumhuriyet* was not on the headlines. It occupied a very tiny place in the first page.

³⁴⁵ "Gelibolu'da 3 Rus Gemisi Hâdise Çıkardı" *Akşam*, 25 March 1960; "Yardım Reddeden Rus Şilebi Şüphe Yarattı" *Akşam*, 26 March 1960; "Rus Şilebinin Esrarı Hâlâ Devam Ediyor" *Akşam*, 27 March 1960.

drastically changed. All newspapers, including *Ulus*, published optimistic articles about the Soviet Union, reminding of the cordial relations in Atatürk's time.³⁴⁶ This time, Falih Rıfkı Atay was alone in keeping his misgivings. According to him, "the difference between Stalin, who never left the USSR, and Khrushchev, who travelled thousands of kilometers could only be explained in terms of pragmatism."³⁴⁷

The last Cold War tension before the end of the Menderes government was the U-2 Incident. Under normal circumstances, this vital moment of the Cold War would be published in press. In a sense, this was a problem, which was also related with Turkey, as it was claimed that the pilot Gary Powers took off from Turkey.³⁴⁸ However, there was only a limited reaction after the incident for two reasons. At first, the political turmoil in the country overshadowed the U-2 crisis. Secondly, lots of newspapers, including *Cumhuriyet*, *Dünya*, and *Ulus* were closed in early May, 1960, due to publishing the student demonstrations against Menderes on April 28, 1960. Nevertheless, it was possible to observe limited but careful observation on the course of events related to U-2 Crisis.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁶ "Menderes, Temmuzda Moskova'ya Gidiyor" *Akşam*, 12 April 1960; "Başbakan Temmuzda S. Rusya'ya Gidecek" *Dünya*, 12 April 1960; "Menderes Rusya'ya Gidiyor" *Milliyet*, 12 April 1960; "N. Kruşçev Memleketimizi Ziyaret Edecek" *Vatan*, 12 April 1960; "Türk-Sovyet Müşterek Tebliğinin Akisleri" *Zafer*, 14 April 1960; "Durum: Türk - Sovyet Münasebetleri" *Milliyet*, 12 April 1960; Halûk Y. Şehsuvaroğlu, "Türk - Rus Münasebetlerine Dair" *Cumhuriyet*, 20 April 1960; Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, "Başbakanın Rusya Seyahatı" *Ulus*, 22 April 1960

³⁴⁷ Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Sovyetler ile Münasebetler" *Dünya*, 13 April 1960.

³⁴⁸ John Newhouse, *The Nuclear Age: From Hiroshima to Star Wars* (London: M. Joseph, 1989), pp. 143 – 146.

³⁴⁹ "Kruşçev "Bir Amerikan Uçağı Düşürdük" Dedi: Bunun Adana'dan Havalandıktan Sonra Kaybolan Uçak Olduğu Tahmin Ediliyor" *Milliyet*, 6 May 1960; "Kruşçev Türkiye'ye Dün İhtarda Bulundu" *Akşam*, 8 May 1960; "Rusya Dün Türkiye'ye Protesto Notası Verdi" *Akşam*, 14 May 1960; "N. Kruşçev Konferansı Baltaladı" *Dünya*, 20 May 1960.

5.4. “Coup d’Etat of May 27” and Its Aftermath (May – December 1960):

The Coup of May 27 did not divert Turkey from its way on pro-Western foreign policy. On the other hand, Menderes’ fall could be regarded as an excuse for the deterioration of Turco-Soviet relations (similar to Khrushchev’s tactic to accuse Stalin for Turkey’s defection into the Western camp), although the anti-Soviet policy predated his leadership. Now the former Prime Minister could be blamed either for confronting the Soviet Union or making plans for alliance with Khrushchev.³⁵⁰

Until September 1, the relations with the Soviet Union were rarely discussed in the press, although there were news about the U-2 Crisis and some minor skirmishes on the Turco–Soviet border.³⁵¹ The mutual diplomatic visits between the countries were cancelled as a natural result of the coup in Turkey.³⁵²

Between June 28 and July 8, 1960, Khrushchev and the new Turkish Premier, Cemal Gürsel, exchanged letters.³⁵³ This correspondence did not cause a drastic change in the course of the relations. However, the press was not informed until September 1. The Turkish press was still backward from the events, but did not omit the event. In general, the press evaluated the correspondence as a sign of confidence of the Soviet Union for the new regime in Turkey.³⁵⁴

³⁵⁰ In a press conference, a journalist asked the Committee of National Unity (the leaders of the military junta) “whether Menderes had plans to sell Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet Union in return for financial aid,” but the respondents stated that they could not answer the question. See: “A. Menderes, Yardım Almak İçin Ardahan’ı Ruslara mı Teklif Etti?” *Cumhuriyet*, 17 June 1960

³⁵¹ “U-2 Meselesi İçin Tahkikat Başladı” *Ulus*, 28 June 1960; “Sovyetler Birliği Silâhsızlanma Konferansından Çekildi” *Ulus*, 28 June 1960; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, “Leninizmken Sonra Kuruşçevizm” *Ulus*, 10 July 1960; idem, “Silah Üstünlüğü Amerikada” *Ulus*, 30 July 1960; “Rus Hududumuzda Bir Çarpışma Oldu” *Akşam*, 28 July 1960.

³⁵² “Kruşçev’in Türkiye’yi Ziyareti İptal Edildi” *Milliyet*, 21 June 1960.

³⁵³ For the full text, see: Tellal, *Uluslararası ve Bölgesel...*, pp. 263–267.

³⁵⁴ Yeni İnkılâp Rejiminin Moskova’da Uyardırıldığı Akisler Gayet Müspet” *Hürriyet*, 1 September 1960; “Gürsel ile Kruşçev’in Karşılıklı Mesajları” *Ulus*, 1 September 1960.

During the efforts for the resettlement of the democratic regime in Turkey, the relations with the Soviet Union lost its prominence in the press, as a continuation of the period from 1956 to 1960.³⁵⁵ It could be claimed that there were three main reasons for the relaxation of the anti-Soviet sentiment in the Turkish press. First, during the last four years of the Menderes government, the Cyprus Question became the most essential foreign policy question in the Turkish foreign policy. Second reason was the severe clash between RPP and DP resulted with the coup. Third reason could be the death and retirement of old journalists (such as Abidin Dâver, Necmettin Sadık Sadak, Şükrü Kaya, and certainly Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın).

³⁵⁵ Until the end of 1960, optimistic views about the Soviet Union could be observed in the press, following the financial offers of Khrushchev. However, the positive news were still published simultaneously with hostile articles. For instance, see: “Kruşçev, İktisâdi Yardım Teklif Etti” *Akşam*, 8 October 1960; “Kruşçev Karadeniz Manevraları İçin Tehdit Savurdu” *Milliyet*, 9 September 1960.

CHAPTER VI

THE DIMINISHED ANTAGONISM TOWARDS THE USSR: FROM GAGARIN TO KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL (1961 – 1964)

6.1. Popularity of “The New Left” Perspective in the Turkish Press:

There were several direct reasons for the continuation of the reduction in the Soviet antagonism in press, such as the intense domestic political agenda, including the trials of the former DP members, preparation and ratification of a new constitution and the elections. Consequently, the pro-DP front in the Turkish press, many of which followed the anti-Soviet stance of the government, was oppressed. *Zafer* was closed and could not be published until late 1962.

An indirect reason for the gradual weakening of anti-Sovietism between 1961 and 1964 could be the rise of the left ideology in Turkey. The most essential aspect of the Turkish press after 1961 was the drastic changes in the perspectives of some newspapers. The democratization period after the Coup of May 27

opened way to the flourishing of the new ideologic streams in Turkey, especially in terms of the establishment of a democratic leftist faction. The supporters of this new stream, which was predominantly under the influence of the Western socialism, held a strong place in the Turkish press. Ironically, *Vatan* became their first press organ.

The transformation in *Vatan* was a turning point in terms of the relaxation of the anti-Sovietism, as the change also referred to Yalman's resign. A conflict between Ahmet Emin Yalman and other shareholders of *Vatan* resulted with the leave of Yalman in early 1961. One year later, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir began to write the editorials of *Vatan*. After Aydemir, several prominent leftist figures, including Behice Boran, Çetin Altan, Oktay Akbal, and Doğan Avcıoğlu (1926-1983), the founder of the nationalist-leftist *Yön* journal, joined *Vatan*. The leftist stance of *Vatan* did last long, but played an influential role until 1963. The new left was also implicitly supported by *Akşam*, *Milliyet*, and *Cumhuriyet*.³⁵⁶

After leaving *Vatan*, Yalman initially wrote some articles for *Dünya* as a guest author. Later he opened *Yeni Vatan* but it became a great disappointment for the veteran journalist. After this failure, *Yalman* sometimes sent articles to newspapers, but did not work in the permanent staff of a newspaper. With the leave of Yalman, the second strongest figure of the anti-Soviet sentiment in 1950s resigned from the press.

Consequently, lots of articles and even editorials, which assessed the socialism and its differences from communism, were appeared in the newspapers.³⁵⁷ Surprisingly, it was also possible to see anti-communist accounts

³⁵⁶ Kemal H. Karpat, "The Turkish Left" *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Left-Wing Intellectuals between the Wars (1966), p. 184.

³⁵⁷ Vecihi Ünal, "Sosyalizm ve Demokrasi" *Akşam*, 6 March 1961; Bülent Ecevit, "Sosyalist Olmadan Sosyal Devlet" *Ulus*, 15 April 1961; Oktay Akbal, "Yugoslavyada 15 Gün - Rusyadan

in the same newspapers, which concurrently praised socialism.³⁵⁸ Indeed, the leftist journalists did not launch an explicit propaganda in favor of pro-Soviet foreign policy. However, their relatively neutral stance between the USA and the USSR estranged them from pro-Americanism, which simultaneously referred to anti-Sovietism. Moreover, the rise of the ‘new left’ would motivate the RPP politicians to adopt the identity of the “left of the centre,”³⁵⁹ although the journalists of *Ulus*, especially Ahmet Şükrü Esmer maintained his anti-Soviet tendencies for a while.

6.2. Hailing “the Space Conquerors” (January 1961 – September 1962):

Although the Turkish press neglected the Soviet success in the space race after the launching of *Sputnik I*, the following steps of the USSR, especially after the return of the Soviet cosmonauts Yuriy Alekseyevich Gagarin and Valentina Vladimirovna Tereshkova, respectively as the first man and woman in the space. Unlike in 1957, the new successes of the USSR did not arouse negative comments or criticisms in the Turkish press.

After Gagarin’s voyage, the headlines of some newspapers denoted that many journalists were astonished by the Soviet success and no more eager to publish suspicions about the Soviet progress.³⁶⁰ On the other hand, misgivings

Ayrı Bir Sosyalist Ülkede Politika” *Vatan*, 24 July 1961; Yavuz Abadan, “Sosyal Demokrasi” *Ulus*, 18 November 1961; Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Niçin Sosyalizm?” *Vatan*, 1 February 1962.

³⁵⁸ Naim Tirali, “Komünizmle Mücadele” *Vatan*, 16 January 1962.

³⁵⁹ İsmet Giritli, *Fifty Years of Turkish Political Development* (İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1969), p. 149.

³⁶⁰ “Asrın Olayı: Feza’ya İnsan Gitti ve Döndü - Feza Yarışını Rusya Kazandı” *Akşam*, 13 April 1961; “İnsanoğlu Fezaya da Gidip Geldi” *Hürriyet*, 13 April 1961; “İnsanlığın Zaferi: Feza Fethedildi” *Ulus*, 13 April 1961; “İnsan Fezaya Gitti ve Döndü” *Vatan*, 13 April 1961; the positive

were still prevalent to a small extent. For instance, Nadir Nadi warned the public about “the possible Russian manipulation of Gagarin’s victory as a tool for propaganda, after appreciating the success of the northern neighbor of Turkey.”³⁶¹ On the other hand, this positive moment did not mean an entire turn. The same newspapers supported the USA one week later, during the American-sponsored Bay of Pigs Invasion, and Berlin Crisis on August 1961, although the latter was overshadowed by the declaration of Menderes’ sentence of death.³⁶²

The space race was assessed generally out of the ongoing discussions of the Cold War in the Turkish press. The new successes were generally regarded as positive steps for humanity without separating the moves of two superpowers.³⁶³

Another aspect of this period was the association of the classic anti-Soviet sentiment with the sympathy for the new regime. The most eminent examples were Falih Rıfki Atay’s editorials in *Dünya*. Atay did not join his colleagues celebrating Gagarin. Instead, he condemned the Soviet Union due to the co-existence of the space conqueror and the poverty in the same country.³⁶⁴ In the following days, Atay praised the Turkish Army to defend the country from

approach in *Akşam* and *Ulus* were also followed by the articles, appreciating the Soviet Union. For instance, see: Yavuz Abadan “İlmin Zaferi” *Vatan*, 15 April 1961; “Feza Fatihî Dün Konuştu” *Akşam*, 16 April 1961; “Rusya Ay Yolunda” *Hürriyet*, 16 April 1961.

³⁶¹ Nadir Nadi, “Üç Konu Üzerine” *Cumhuriyet*, 15 April 1961; The attitude of *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Akşam* were also normal. See: “Ruslar Dün Fezaya İlk İnsanı Gönderdiler” *Cumhuriyet*, 13 April 1961; “Nihayet İnsan Fezaya Gitti” *Dünya*, 13 June 1961; “Fezaya İlk İnsan Gitti ve Döndü” *Milliyet*, 13 April 1961.

³⁶² Orhan Karaveli, “Küba’ya Yazık Oluyor” *Vatan*, 19 April 1961; “Başkan Kennedy Kruşçef’e Cevap Verdi” *Akşam*, 20 April 1961; “Kennedy Hrutçefe Çok Sert Bir Cevap Verdi” *Cumhuriyet*, 20 April 1961 “S. Rusyanın Tutumu Sulhu Tehdit Ediyor, *Akşam*, 21 April 1961; Küba’da: İhtilâlciler Havana’yı Bombaladı: Rusya Askerî Bir Müdahaleye Kalkışırsa Karşısında Birleşik Amerika’yı Bulacak” *Hürriyet*, 20 April 1961; “Küba Komünizme Terkedilmeyecek” *Hürriyet*, 21 April 1961; “Amerikan Milletine Hitabeden Kennedy: “Berlin’i Korumaya Azimliyiz” *Cumhuriyet*, 27 July 1961.

³⁶³ “Amerika Fezaya Adam Gönderdi” *Akşam*, 6 May 1961; “Fezanın İkinci Fatihî Başarıyla Gidip Döndü” *Ulus*, 6 May 1961; 2. Rus Pilotu Dünya Etrafında Dönüyor” *Cumhuriyet*, 7 August 1961; “Fezada Randevu” *Akşam*, 13 August 1962; “Fezaya İlk Kadını Ruslar Gönderdiler” *Cumhuriyet*, 17 June 1963; “Ay’ın Fethine Doğru Yeni Bir Adım” *Akşam*, 13 October 1964.

³⁶⁴ Falih Rıfki Atay, “Yarışmanın İki Cephesi” *Dünya*, 19 April 1961.

communism.³⁶⁵ In a sense, there was no radical difference in Atay's ideas, at least in terms of his enmity towards the Soviet Union. In 1962, he even implied the possibility of a "collaboration of the Justice Party (JP) and the New Turkey Party (NTP)³⁶⁶ with the Soviet Union," similar to his old days, in which he attributed the pro-Soviet label to any kind of opposition to his ideas.³⁶⁷ At the same time, his colleague A. İhsan Barlas used a very polite language for Khrushchev, in contrast to his old times.³⁶⁸ The classic anti-Soviet news and articles were mostly published by *Ulus* (especially Ahmet Şükrü Esmer with his frequent Soviet criticism), and were contributed by *Akşam*.³⁶⁹

The anti-Soviet content also decreased in 1962, in spite of the continuous misgivings of *Ulus* journalists, who insisted on the "warlike" characteristics of Khrushchev as the successor of Stalin.³⁷⁰ On the other hand, this time the USA was also criticized in the press first time. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir questioned the characteristics of the same country, "which showed its most generous side to Turkey, but was also responsible for the incredible massacres in the South Vietnam."³⁷¹ Nevertheless it was still early to mention a balance in the Turkish press between the pro-American and anti-American sides.

³⁶⁵ Falih Rıfık Atay, "Moskovaya Kabahat Bulmayınız!" *Dünya*, 17 May 1961.

³⁶⁶ Both parties were established to descend the tradition of the Democratic Party.

³⁶⁷ Falih Rıfık Atay, "Kızıl Kolun Deprenmesi" *Dünya*, 27 March 1962.

³⁶⁸ A. İhsan Barlas, "Bay Hruşçov'un Kararı" *Dünya*, 7 March 1962; idem, "Bay Hruşçov'un Cevabı" *Dünya*, 24 March 1962.

³⁶⁹ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Sovyetlerin B.M.i Yıkma Teşebbüsü" *Ulus*, 5 March 1961; idem, "Stalin Rolünde Kruşçef" *Ulus*, 14 August 1961; idem, "Moskova'nın Yeni Sahte Vesikaları" *Ulus*, 27 August 1961; Eren Sargut, "S. Rusya Kıbrıs'a Kur Yapıyor" *Ulus*, 23 March 1961; "Ruslar, Türk Sınırına Asker Yığıldı" *Akşam*, 14 September 1961; "Türkiye, Rus Hücumunu Püskürtecek Güçtedir" *Akşam*, 23 November 1961; "Hudut Köylerinde Dolaşarak "Türkiyede Sefalet" Olduğuna Dair Propaganda Yapan "Komünist Bulgar İdarecileri İşi Azıttı" *Akşam*, 7 June 1962;

³⁷⁰ Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, "Kremlin Neden Susuyor?" *Ulus*, 26 January 1962; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Kruşçef'in Başağrısı" *Ulus*, 18 March 1962; idem, "1839 ve 1962 Rusyaları" *Ulus*, 5 August 1962; idem, "Utanc Duvanı Bir Yaşında" *Ulus*, 13 August 1962; idem, "Rus Taktiği: Lokma Lokma Yutmak" *Ulus*, 3 September 1962.

³⁷¹ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, "İki Amerika, İki Amerikalı" *Vatan*, 1 September 1962.

6.3. Strange Tranquility During the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962):

The Cuban Missile Crisis was not only a turning point in the Cold War, but also the most serious threat Turkey faced since 1940s. However, the attitude of the Turkish newspapers was controversial in terms of reflecting the real extent of the threat, as if Turkey was out of the crisis. The only possible reason for the limited interest of the Turkish press during the Cuban Missile Crisis could be the lack of knowledge in Turkish public opinion about the Jupiter Missiles, for which Turkey could have been embroiled to a possible Third World War.

The Jupiter Missiles were installed on Turkey in 1959.³⁷² The public was not notified with this step of the Menderes government. It was only once implied in an article of *Vatan*, which made reference to the Dallas speech of Menderes in 1959.³⁷³

The presence of the missiles was a matter of debate since the first day of the crisis. For instance, *Akşam*'s headline on October 24, 1962, states that the crisis was serious enough to drag the world into a nuclear war. The newspaper did not deny the existence of the missiles but depicted them with an exaggerated range of 2400 kilometres.³⁷⁴ *Akşam* was the only newspaper, which warned that Turkey could be pulled into the crisis and three days later declared undesired entrance of Turkey to the course of events.³⁷⁵ In fact, there was a noteworthy confusion among the different newspapers. *Akşam* and *Vatan* had explicit

³⁷² Barton J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 95, No. 1 (Spring, 1980), pp.98–102; Harris, pp. 92–95.

³⁷³ "Türkiye'de de Füze Rampası Kuruluyor" *Vatan*, 13 October 1959.

³⁷⁴ "Küba Krizi Dünyayı Atom Harbi ile Karşı Karşıya Bıraktı" *Akşam*, 24 October 1962.

³⁷⁵ "Amerika Teminat Verirse Küba Silâhlanmada Israr Etmeyecek" *Akşam*, 25 October 1962; "Buhran Türkiye'ye Atladı" *Akşam*, 28 October 1962;

publication, which never denied the existence of the missiles. *Vatan*'s editor Aydemir expressed his fear for both sides in a possible war, while Doğan Avcıoğlu complained about the missile bases, which could not protect peace, but easily pose threat to peace.³⁷⁶

A second group of newspapers, including *Hürriyet*, did not deny the existence of the missiles in their headlines but also avoided attaching their personal comments about the presence of the Jupiters in Turkey.³⁷⁷

The third group completely denied the claims about the missiles. In this group, the pro-RPP newspapers, *Dünya* and *Ulus* existed alongside with *Zafer*, which was newly re-established and joined into press as the supporter of JP. Interestingly, Bedii Faik Akın did not attack the Soviet Union, instead expressed his fury about Fidel Castro. According to Akın, “Castro was unjust to allow the installation of offensive bases in his country, which were incomparable with the defensive NATO bases in Turkey,”³⁷⁸ ignoring the Bay of Pigs Invasion, two years ago. In addition, Fürûzan Tekil, the new editor of *Zafer*, adopted the perspective of Akın.³⁷⁹ *Dünya* regarded the claims of Khrushchev merely as false allegations.³⁸⁰

After the crisis was over, John F. Kennedy accepted the deployment of the missiles, which had been previously considered as a threat in the hands of Turkey

³⁷⁶ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, “Dünya Rejim Harpleri Başlarsa?” *Vatan*, 25 October 1962; Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Füze Üsleri” *Vatan*, 4 November 1962

³⁷⁷ “Mecliste Küba Hakkında Konuşan İnönü: “Buhranı Türkiye’ye Sıçratmak İçin Gayretler Var” Dedi” *Hürriyet*, 25 October 1962; “Kruşçef, Türkiye’yi İleri Sürdü: Kruşçef’e Göre Memleketimizdeki Füze Üsleri Rusya’ya Tevcih Olunmuş” *Hürriyet*, 28 October 1962; “Memleketimizdeki Füze Üslerini Kaldırmak İçin Türkiye, Rusya’dan Garanti İstiyor - Erkin: “Bizdeki Üsleri Tehdide Karşı NATO Kurdu” Diyor - Amerikan yardımının devam edeceği açıklandı” *Hürriyet*, 1 November 1962; “Kruşçef Üslerimizin Kaldırılmasını İstedi” *Zafer*, 28 October 1956

³⁷⁸ Bedii Faik Akın, “Guardian’ın Unuttukları” *Dünya*, 25 October 1962

³⁷⁹ Fürûzan Tekil, “Küba Üsleri Nato Tesislerine Asla Benzemez” *Zafer*, 30 October 1962

³⁸⁰ “Moskova Radyosunca Kruşçef Tarafından Kennedy’ye Gönderildiği Bildirilen Bir Mesajda Türkiye’de Amerikan Roket Üsleri Olduğu İleri Sürüldü” *Dünya*, 28 October 1962

by the Americans.³⁸¹ Many accounts on the Cold War agree on the Kennedy's trade of the Jupiters in Turkey in exchange for the missiles in Cuba.³⁸² However, the Turkish press was not cognizant about the negotiations between the superpowers. The press was still discussing the speculations concerning the American aid, after *Hürriyet* claimed that "the US government could stop financial aid, after they detected two Turkish ships carrying Russian grain to Cuba."³⁸³ In addition, *Akşam* was the only newspaper in the Turkish press, which informed its readers about the deployment of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey without reference to the US government. According to the news in *Akşam*, "the missiles were deployed because of remaining obsolete and their places were detected by the Russians."³⁸⁴

The incoherence of the news, published in the Turkish press during the Cuban Missile Crisis once more showed the insufficiency of the resources of the press. In addition, the foreign policy content of the newspapers was lower than it was before. Furthermore, the newspapers emphasized neither Soviet imperialism nor American behavior, which jeopardized the security of Turkey, during the following days.

³⁸¹ Bernstein, p.102

³⁸² According to Barton Bernstein, Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of Defense at the time, even offered the deployment of the missiles in Turkey, and to attack Cuba after the deployment of the Jupiters in Turkey. See: Bernstein, p.120

³⁸³ "Küba'ya Rus Buğdayı Götüren İki Türk Şilebi Başımıza İş Açtı" *Hürriyet*, 31 October 1962

³⁸⁴ "Türkiye'deki Füze Rampaları Sökülüyor" *Akşam*, 17 December 1962

6.4. Until the Ouster of Khrushchev (December 1962 – December 1964):

The Turkish correspondents were somewhat jolted after the American decision for the deployment of the Jupiters, but the reaction was still limited. Four months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the famous journalist Metin Toker (1924-2002), who was the son-in-law of İsmet İnönü, complained about the removal of the missiles, stating that “the West should consider the security of Turkey as a priority for the security of the West.”³⁸⁵ However, the Soviet Union seemed out of the agenda during 1963. As a noteworthy detail, none of the Turkish newspapers but *Cumhuriyet*³⁸⁶ informed the public about the establishment of Moscow – Washington Hotline (a.k.a. The Red Telephone), which played a critical role after the Cuban Missile Crisis as an initial sign of rapprochement between the superpowers. Another neglected event was the death of the most famous Turkish dissident, Nâzım Hikmet Ran, in the Soviet Union on June 3, 1963. None of the Turkish newspapers assessed the death of the famous poet, although they had published lots of speculative news about him in the past.³⁸⁷

From the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis until the rise of ethnic conflict in Cyprus on December 1963, the tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union was low. On the other hand, the press reflected the ongoing intolerant attitude of the junta regime towards the communists in Turkey.³⁸⁸ The simultaneous improvement of the relations between the Soviet Union and the maintenance of

³⁸⁵ Metin Toker, “Füzesiz Türkiye ve Kuzeydeki Komşumuz” *Milliyet*, 18 February 1963.

³⁸⁶ Kayhan Sağlamer, “Kırmızı Teleks” *Cumhuriyet*, 22 June 1963.

³⁸⁷ The last speculative news about Nazım Hikmet appeared in late 1950s. “Nâzım Hikmet Macaristan’da” *Milliyet*, 8 October 1958.

³⁸⁸ “Gürsel ve İnönü Gençler ile Görüştü: Memlekette Karışıklık Çıkarılmak İstendiğini Söyleyen Gürsel Dedi ki: “Komünizm Ciddi Tehlike Hâlinde” - C. Gürsel, Gençliğin Politika Dışı Kalmasını İstedi” *Akşam*, 13 January 1962; “Komünizm ile Mücadele Sokaklarda Yapılmaz” *Akşam*, 15 January 1962; “Adli Makamlar Harekete Geçti: Sol Propagandası Yapan 7 Yedeksubay Öğretmen Yakalanarak Tevkif Edildi - “Komünist Avı Nihayet Başladı” *Zafer*, 6 October 1964; Falih Rıfki Atay, “Sağ Sol Tuzakları” *Dünya*, 26 December 1964.

the state oppression over communists signaled the return of the Janus-headed policy.

The Turkish journalists also began to evaluate the Sino–Soviet Split, especially after the expansions and wars in China. Following the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the attention of the Turkish correspondents was shifted to China. Apart from hostile articles about the “cruel” treatment of Chinese over the Uyghur Turks or other ethnic groups, objective assessments were also visible, such as the editorial of Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, who pointed out the nationalist tendencies in the communist world, as the primary reason for the split.³⁸⁹

In spite of the relative stability in the relations with Moscow, it was still possible to see agitated news and articles about the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the majority of the news of this period was mostly related to the Soviet oppression over its satellites. For instance, it was quite popular to publish either jolly or tragic stories about the East German refugees, who tried to pass the Berlin Wall.³⁹⁰ Although the number of the news related to the daily life in the Soviet Union was drastically decreased, and the praises for the reforms in the Soviet Union, such as the abolition of censorship over the foreign correspondents in Moscow.³⁹¹

Another remarkable step for the Turkish press in early 1960 was the emergence of different views related with the Turkish foreign policy among the journalists. In contrast to the period from 1945 to 1960, the newspapers began to criticize the foreign policy directions of the government. As a typical example,

³⁸⁹ “Talihsiz şehir: Berlin - Berlin’e giren Ruslar evvelâ kadınlara saldırıp, sonra bütün şehri yağma etmişti” *Hürriyet*, 11 August 1961; “Sadece Başımı Biraz Eğip Berlin Duvarını Aşıverdi” *Dünya*, 29 May 1963; “Komünistler, Batı Berlin’e Kaçmaya Çalışan Genç Bir Çifte Hunharca Ateş Ettiler” *Cumhuriyet*, 3 August 1963.

³⁹⁰ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, “Çin ve Sovyetler Birliği” *Vatan*, 10 July 1963.

³⁹¹ Orhan Karaveli, “Moskova Sansürü Kaldırdı” *Vatan*, 31 March 1961; M. Piri, “Sovyet Rusya’da Sansür Kalktı” *Cumhuriyet*, 6 April 1961.

Zafer criticized the foreign policy of RPP, which aimed to improve the relations with the Soviet Union in order to achieve the support of Moscow in the Cyprus Question.³⁹² This also enabled the transfer of discussions related with the foreign aid to the newspapers. During 1950s, the USA seemed the best alternative for financial aid. However, the American aid gradually decreased.³⁹³ After 1960, the suspicions about the end of the American aid were reflected to the press.³⁹⁴ Therefore, the government had to evaluate the new alternatives. Beginning from 1959, the Soviet offers for the financial aid were discussed in the Turkish newspapers.³⁹⁵ Previously, Turkish journalists interpreted financial offers of the Soviet Union as the part of a strategy and this perspective was still visible in 1961.³⁹⁶ This also contributed to the improvement of the Soviet image in the Turkish press. Improvement in the trade relations positively updated the view of journalists for the Soviet Union.

The improvement in the Turco-Soviet relations also prevented the emergence of the crises similar to 1950s. The tensest moment with the Soviet Union until the fall of Khrushchev was on early 1964. After the rise of ethnic clashes on Cyprus, the Turkish press began to foment the public opinion to legitimize that the intervention of Turkey as a guarantor until mid-1964. First, the press alleged the Soviet Union sold weapons to Greek Cypriots,³⁹⁷ following a

³⁹² Fűrüzan Tekil, "Umut Politikası" 6 October 1964.

³⁹³ Fatih Tokath, *The Policy of Eisenhower Administration Towards Turkey, 1953-1961*, Master Thesis (Ankara: Bilkent University, 2004), pp. 44–46; Harris, pp. 74–76.

³⁹⁴ "Amerikan Yardımının Kısılması İsteniyor" *Cumhuriyet*, 13 June 1959; "Amerika, Türkiyeye Yardımda Bir Kısıntı Yapmıyor" *Akşam*, 15 Mart 1962.

³⁹⁵ "Rus Sefiri, Kruçef'ten Gürsel'e Selâm Getirdi" *Cumhuriyet*, 1 August 1961; "N. Rijov Sarper'le Görüşti" *Ulus*, 12 August 1961; "Rusya, Yardım Teklif Etti" *Akşam*, 31 Aralık 1961;

³⁹⁶ A. İhsan Barlas, "Sovyet Yardımı" *Dünya*, 21 March 1961; "Parlamento Heyetimize Ruslar, Büyük Yardım Teklif Etti: Kruçef Tarafından Yapılan Teklifler Maksatlı Görülüyor" *Zafer*, 24 June 1963.

³⁹⁷ "Ruslar Makarios'u Destekliyor" *Hürriyet*, 2 January 1964; Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Sovyetler ve Papaz Makarios" *Dünya*, 8 February 1964; "Rusya Makarios'a Silah Veriyor" *Akşam*, 10 February 1964; "Ruslar Rumlara Dün de Harp Malzemesi Gönderdi" *Vatan*, 26 February 1964; "Rusya Ada Rumlarına Yardıma Devam Ediyor" *Zafer*, 27 February 1964.

verbal note of the Soviet Union.³⁹⁸ In fact, the problem between the Soviet Union and Turkey was resolved after the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin to Moscow at the end of the year. The majority of the press supported the rapprochement with the USSR; even the oppositional *Zafer* did not assess the visit with negative criticism.³⁹⁹

The last apparent example of the relaxation of the negative Soviet image was the calm reaction after the fall of Khrushchev. As it has been mentioned, the Turkish press had strong anxieties about after the replacements in the Soviet leadership. On the other hand, Khrushchev's fall did not cause an agitated atmosphere as before. The majority of the newspapers published the ouster of the Soviet Premier only one day, while none of them considered his successors (Kosygin or Brejnev) as the "new Stalins."⁴⁰⁰ In fact, some journalists were still ready to believe the speculations fabricated in the West. For instance, Falih Rıfki Atay claimed that Khrushchev could be overthrown due to his hostile policy against China.⁴⁰¹ However, the anxieties vanished after Erkin's visit to Moscow on November, 1964.⁴⁰²

In fact, the Turkish press was still not informed about the infamous letter of the US President Lyndon Johnson to İnönü, in which he warned Turkey not to intervene Cyprus.⁴⁰³ The Johnson's Letter launched a new period in Turkish

³⁹⁸ Cihat Baban, "Rusyanın Notalar-ı" *Ulus*, 10 February 1964.

³⁹⁹ Rıfki Salim Burçak "Türkiye-Rusya Münasebetleri" *Zafer*, 25 October 1964; Abdi İpekçi "Türk Sovyet Münasebetleri ve Erkin'in Moskova Ziyareti" 30 October 1964.

⁴⁰⁰ "Başbakan Kruşçef İstifaya Mecbur Edildi" *Akşam*, 16 October 1964; "Sovyet Başbakanı N. Kruşçef Dün Görevinden Azledildi" *Hürriyet*, 16 October 1964; "Kruşçef'çiler Temizleniyor" *Dünya*, 17 October 1964; Ahmet Şükrü Esmel, "Kruşçef'ten Sonra Sovyetler" *Ulus*, 25 October 1964; Oktay Akbal, "Kruşçov Sahneden Çekildi" *Vatan*, 19 October 1964; Rıfki Salim Burçak, "Kruşçef'ten Sonra" *Zafer*, 1964.

⁴⁰¹ Falih Rıfki Atay, "Sırlar Henüz Çözülmedi" *Dünya*, 24 October 1964.

⁴⁰² Giritli, p. 159.

⁴⁰³ Haluk Şahin, *Johnson Mektubu* (İstanbul: Gendaş, 2002), p.16; Süha Bölükbaşı, "The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement between 1954 and 1996" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Aug., 1998), p. 418; Glen D. Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 95, No. 1 (Spring, 1980), p.50.

foreign policy, in which Turkey considered the stable relations with the Soviet Union. The rapprochement with the Soviet Union was a regarded golden opportunity to balance the USA, as Turkey did not approach Soviet side even after the American embargo against Turkey following the Cyprus Crisis of 1974.⁴⁰⁴

This would naturally influence the perspectives of the journalists. Up to 1970s the both supporters of the cordial relations with the Soviet Union and the oppositional figures were existant among the Turkish correspondents. Two articles of Atay at the end of 1964 was like the summary of the last four years since May 27 Coup: Although Atay was still intolerant to the communists in Turkey⁴⁰⁵ he was expressed that his hopes flourished after Erkin's visit. Atay made reference to the cordial relations during Atatürk's leadership and stated that "to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union did not mean to leave the Western alliance."⁴⁰⁶

This perspective signaled the return to the Janus-headed policy, in which the Turkish state distinguished the relations with the USSR from its struggle against communist movements inside Turkey. Consequently, the closest rapprochement between Turkey and the Soviet Union would appear in 1967, during the prime ministry of the new JP leader, Süleyman Demirel. The young prime minister would allege RPP for the sympathy for communism, after the ideological shift of İnönü's party to the "central left." Demirel fabricated the slogan "*Ortanın Solu, Moskova Yolu*" (Centre of the left, Road to the Moscow). In fact, an article by Falih Rıfki Atay was like the self-criticism of the prejudicial perspective over the Soviet Union in the Turkish press. After the electoral victories of the socialist parties in many European countries, he frankly confessed the prejudice of Turkish press for the left:

⁴⁰⁴ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs* (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl, 2000), pp. 307 – 350.

⁴⁰⁵ Falih Rıfki Atay, "Sağ Sol Tuzakları" *Dünya*, 26 December 1964.

⁴⁰⁶ Falih Rıfki Atay, "Erkin'in Moskova Yolculuğu" *Dünya*, 30 October 1964.

...Because we are not among the societies of the Western civilization, we live uninformed about the developments in the new world. We are obsessed with a [specific] image of communism, which we are not able to distinguish from the memories of the first days of anarchy during Lenin's leadership.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁷ “Biz Batı medeniyet toplulukları arasında olmadığımız için yeni dünyada neler olup bittiğinden habersiz yaşıyoruz. Bir komünistlik tutturmuş gidiyoruz ve bu komünistliği de Lenin devrindeki ilk anarşi günlerinin hâtıralarından bir türlü ayıramıyoruz.” See: Falih Rıfki Atay, “Batı Komünistliği Çevresinde” *Dünya*, 12 November 1964

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The negative Soviet image in the Turkish public between 1945 and 1991 was a key phenomenon in understanding the political stance of the Turkish leaders during the Cold War. Although the emergence of anti-Sovietism in Turkey in 1945 seemed the natural consequence of the deep rooted anti-Muscovitism in the Ottoman Empire, the publications of the state-controlled press in 1945 demonstrated that Turkish state authorities must have been intentionally fomented the antagonism towards the Soviet Union. Without regard to the seriousness of the Soviet threat for Turkey in 1945, “anti-Sovietism” must have been used as an influential political weapon by the Turkish leaders to call people solidarity for two reasons. First, fear of the “Soviet Threat” would motivate people to support pro-Western foreign policy of the government. Second, both the Republican People’s Party and the Democratic Party accused all opposition groups of collaborating with the Soviet Union. Incidentally, it was easier for them to mobilize the public against these pro-Soviet “traitors.” As it has been mentioned in this study, any party could accuse each other of pro-Sovietism and this continued until 1960s. For

this reason, the anti-Sovietism was manipulated in several incidents such as the closure of the Nation Party in 1953 and Istanbul pogrom in 1955. Therefore, there is strong evidence to indicate the governmental role over the rise of anti-Soviet sentiment between 1945 and 1953.

Another important detail is the synonymous consideration of the Soviet Union and communism. During Atatürk's leadership, the Turkish state continued its struggle against communists inside Turkey, although the government maintained cordial relations with the Soviet Union. However, the deterioration of Turco-Soviet relations triggered the amalgamation of anti-Russianism and anti-communism after 1945. The fury of the Turkish press was not only subjected to the Soviet imperialism. The press also attacked all kinds of leftist factions, even considering the socialist parties in Europe as the "fifth column" of the Soviet Union in their countries. The anti-communist sentiment was later separated from the anti-Russian sentiment again. Turkey readopted the Janus-headed policy after 1964. On one hand, the Turkish state sought better relations with the Soviet Union (especially in terms of signing financial treaties). On the other hand, it increased the level of oppression over the Turkish communists.

The anti-Sovietism in the Turkish press between 1945 and 1960 was constructed as a mixture of deep rooted anti-Russian legacy and the suspicions over the ideology of communism, which was quite unfamiliar for the Turkish society. If the correlation between the anti-Russian and anti-communist sentiments, it could be easily observed that anti-Russianism dominated the anti-Soviet image. Two examples in this study indicate the dominance of anti-Russianism over the anti-communism. First, the press cordially welcomed the Yugoslav premier Josip Broz Tito in his official visit to Ankara in 1954. Tito was

also a communist, yet a rival for the Soviet Union, therefore considered as a friend of Turkey. Second, many journalists made references to the historical imperialist aspirations of the Tsarist Russia in their articles.

In the process of fomenting anti-Sovietism, the press was the primary instrument for the Turkish government. On the other hand, it was not accurate to claim that the press was always under the control of the state. In 1945, the Republican People's Party was able to monopolize its control over the press and eliminate the dissenters for the government. However, the situation drastically changed in 1950s. In 1960, the Menderes government had to deal with a staunch bloc of oppositionist newspapers. Moreover, the prominent anti-Soviet correspondents, especially Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Ahmet Emin Yalman, never stopped producing anti-Soviet articles, even after the Menderes government decided to respond the Soviet diplomatic moves for the rapprochement with Turkey. In a sense, the Turkish press was no more monolithic. The anti-Soviet content diminished in the articles by many independent journalists, including Nadir Nadi Abaloğlu and Şükrü Kaya. In addition, the decreased extent of the anti-Soviet content in *Zafer* after 1956 indicated that the anti-Sovietism was no more the primary concern of the Menderes government. On the other hand, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın continued to attack the Bolsheviks even during the hardest period of his newspaper, when DP accepted the confiscation of all RPP property, including *Ulus*.

As it had been mentioned in the study, various newspapers in the Turkish press were full of anti-Soviet content at the beginning of 1953, while the Soviet threat was a routine issue in the editorials. Any typical news related to the Soviet politics, such as the "Doctors' Plot," could be published on the headlines with

large fonts. A decade later, at the end of 1964, the majority of the newspapers did not inform even the ouster of Khrushchev on their headlines. Therefore, the relaxation of the Soviet antagonism in the Turkish press was obvious, along with the diminished interest towards Soviet affairs. As a matter of fact, the relaxation of the anti-Sovietism in the Turkish press was not only related to the international conjuncture or shifts in the foreign policy of the Turkish government. After the leave of some prominent anti-Soviet journalists, the staunch anti-Soviet bloc in the Turkish press also weakened. The two notable losses in the anti-Soviet group were the death of Yalçın in 1957 and the retirement of Yalman in 1961.

The strong anti-Soviet legacy of Cold War Turkey was mostly associated with the three-century-old imperialist ambitions of Russia in Turkish historiography. However, this study indicates that the Turkish politicians and the journalists of 1940s and 1950s were also responsible for the revival of anti-Russianism, even in a stronger level than it was during Ottoman times. Although Soviet antagonism waned both in governmental circles and the press, the influence of this second wave of anti-Russianism (which was directly associated with anti-communism) was even visible in contemporary political culture of Turkey in 21th century.

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