

CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
IN TURKEY

A Master's Thesis

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September 2011

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CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

of

İhsan Dođramacı Bilkent University

by

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In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

İHSAN DOĐRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY

ANKARA

September 2011

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ABSTRACT

CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY

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September 2011

Maintaining civilian control over military constitutes the classical problematique of the civil-military relations (CMR) scholarship. Besides, the relationship between military and civilians are taken as conflictual. Constructivist approach, on the other hand, argues that roles of social actors are not constant but they are socially constructed through an interaction process. Building on the constructivist approach, this thesis aims to focus on the relationship between military and civilians as an outcome of a process. Its argument is that the nature of relationship between civilians and soldiers are socially constructed within the social interaction process. Thus, it uses constructivism as its theoretical framework to provide insights to the factors determinant on the role of military in the political system. It uses a “theory-building case study” method and intends to make some theoretical implications derived from Turkish case. It analyzes the role construction of military in two domains: Organizational domain; societal domain. While organizational domain focuses on the legal status and self-perception of Turkish Armed Forces, societal domain is composed of political sphere and citizenry. The study shows that instruments such as ideology, compulsory military service system, education and media are used to build a strong military role. It makes a comparison of two periods. First period is between 1980 and 2001. The thesis argues that a strong and active military role can be observed in the first period. The second period is post-2001 period. In the second era, it is observed that there is a structural and discursive change in the military’s role in Turkish political system with the effect of the relations with European Union. The thesis makes a modest contribution to the civil-

military relations literature by using a theoretical framework which has not been used very often in the literature.

Key Words: Civil-military relations, social constructivism, role construction, Turkey, Turkish Armed Forces, European Union.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’DE SİVİL-ASKER İLİŞKİLERİNİN İNŞAASI

Halistoprak, Burak Toygar

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nil Seda Şatana

Eylül 2011

Ordunun siviller tarafından kontrolü sivil-asker ilişkileri alanının klasik sorunsalını teşkil etmektedir. Ayrıca, ordu ve siviller arasındaki ilişki ihtilafı olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Diğer yanda ise, inşacı yaklaşım, sosyal aktörlerin rollerinin sabit olmadığını ve bu rollerin bir etkileşim süreci içerisinde inşa edildiğini iddia eder. Bu tez, inşacı yaklaşımdan yararlanarak, ordu ve siviller arasındaki ilişkilere bir sürecin ürünü olarak odaklanmaktadır. Tezin savı, siviller ve askerler arasındaki ilişkilerin doğasının bir sosyal etkileşim süreci içerisinde inşa edildiğidir. Bu nedenle, bu tez, ordunun politik sistem içindeki rolü üzerinde etkili olan faktörleri anlamak amacı ile, inşacı kuramı teorik çerçevesi olarak kullanmaktadır. Tez, “teori inşa edici vaka analizi” yöntemini kullanmakta ve Türkiye örneğinden yola çıkarak bazı teorik öngörülerde bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Ordunun rolünün inşası iki alanda analiz edilmektedir: Kurumsal alan, toplumsal alan. Kurumsal alan Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin hukuki statüsü ve kendi algısı üzerine odaklanırken, toplumsal alan, politik çevre ve vatandaşlardan oluşmaktadır. Bu çalışma; ideoloji, zorunluk askerlik, eğitim ve medya gibi araçların güçlü bir ordu rolü inşa etme sürecinde kullanıldığını göstermektedir. Tez iki dönemin karşılaştırmasını yapmaktadır. İlk dönem 1980-2001 arasındaki dönemdir. Bu dönemde güçlü ve aktif bir ordu rolü gözlemlenebilmektedir. İkinci dönem 2001 sonrası dönemdir. İkinci dönemde, Avrupa Birliği ile olan ilişkilerin etkisiyle, ordunun rolünde yapısal ve söylemsel bir değişiklik gözlemlenmektedir. Bu tez, sivil-asker ilişkileri literatürüne, pek sık kullanılmamış bir teorik çerçeveyi kullanarak, mütevazı bir katkı yapmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil-asker iliřkileri, sosyal inřacı kuram, rol inřası, Tırkiye, Tırk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, Avrupa Birlięi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the support of the people and institutions I have mentioned below.

I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis supervisor Asst. Prof. Dr. Nil S. Şatana. Without her invaluable assistance, support and guidance, this project would not have been completed. I also would like to express my appreciation to thesis committee members, Asst. Prof. Dr. Pınar İpek and Asst. Prof. Dr. Zeki Sarıgil, without whose constructive comments and criticisms, this thesis would not have been successful.

Special thanks to TÜBİTAK and İhsan Doğramacı Association for their financial support to me to attend two international conferences in which I have presented brief versions of this thesis.

I would like to convey my thanks to my mother Bahire, my father Mustafa and my sister Hazal, for their understanding, love and endless support.

I am heartily thankful to my friends Deniz Çil, Seçkin Köstem and Dr. Burak Bilgehan Özpek. My time in Bilkent became meaningful for me with their invaluable friendship. I also would like to express my special thanks to my best friends in Ankara, Ersan, Hande and Handan.

Finally, I am fairly certain that I have to acknowledge Tugba for her endless support, love and patience to me. Whenever I pass through hard times, I have always felt her support, understanding and encouragements. I would have forgotten how to smile without her.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Research Question

Turkey entered into 2007 with hot debates on upcoming presidential elections. As the presidential elections approached, discussion focused on the question of who will be nominated by the government for presidential candidacy. The main opposition party, Republican People's Party (RPP) was stating that it would be damaging for democracy if all three top administrative positions, namely the Presidency, Prime Ministry and the Speaker of the Parliament, are assumed by the same political movement, which come from a political Islamist origin. Thus, RPP was inviting the government to nominate a candidate who can be internalized and accepted by all societal segments of the country. However, Justice and Development Party (JDP) preferred to nominate Abdullah Gül for presidential candidacy, who is known with his active carrier in banned political Islamist parties, Welfare Party (WP) and Virtue Party (VP) and whose ideological attitude has been strong. Following this

development, a usual problem of Turkish politics recurred. On the midnight of April 27, the Office of the Chief of the General Staff published a press release on its official web page. In the declaration, it was stated that the candidate for presidency should be a person who internalized the principles of secular republic. Furthermore, it was explicitly put that Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) “will display its attitude and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary (Sarigil 2009: 711).” Once again, the military was intervening a civilian process or threatening the civilians with a possible intervention. Although it was not a direct intervention in the form of a coup, TAF was reminding to all civilian segments that guarding the regime is attributed to TAF as a duty by laws in the last paragraph of the declaration.

Looking at the last fifty years of the Republican era, it can be asserted that military’s direct/indirect interventions to political processes are not surprising for Turkish political system. The democratic process has been suspended with two coups and two memorandums from 1960 to early 2000’s. However, following the declaration, civilian government acted in a certain manner, which was unusual for Turkish politics. Just a day after that declaration was published, on April 28, government’s spokesman Cemil Çicek stated that the press release of the TAF is perceived as targeting the civilian government (NTVMSNBC News Portal).¹ Çicek strongly stressed that “it is unacceptable in a democratic state of law that the Office of the Chief of the General Staff acts against the government, as an institution depended to Prime Ministry.” The spokesman stated that this is an intervention to a civilian process and this situation has the potential to cause instability within the country. Considering the past experiences, it can be asserted that the attitude of the government to TAF’s press release was not a usual example. In the past, the civilian

¹ <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/406662.asp> (Last Access 21.08.2011)

governments remained silence or passive once the military initiates such an intervention to the politics. The processes following such interventions resulted in the consequences, which military wanted to be realized (Brown 1989: 391). Although Supreme Court ruled that the presidential elections in the parliament, which was held on April 27 with the participation of 358 parliamentarians, were invalid due to the participation below 367, the process ended with the election of Abdullah Gül as the eleventh president of Turkey. In other words, the military's attempt to intervene to the process did not succeed to prevent the consequence that civilian government intended to get.

Since this process gave birth to a different consequence from past experiences, it prompted discussions about whether the military's position in Turkish politics is changing. Much of the students of Turkish civil-military relations agreed on that the role of the military in Turkish politics has been in a changing path (Demirel 2005; Satana 2008, Aydınli 2009). According to Aydınli (2009), there was a paradigmatic shift in the nature of the civil-military relations in Turkey and he asserted that the coup era in Turkey is closed. This altering nature of the civil-military relations in Turkey shall naturally require all actors to adapt their new role. The military should redefine its role, internalize and exercise it differently from it did in the past. Besides, civilians should also reconsider the position of the military in Turkish politics.

This thesis intends to analyze the construction of the social roles of actors in civil-military relations by focusing on the Turkish case. At this point, I should note that the main focus of the thesis is not to analyze the April 27 incident specifically; rather it intends to scrutinize the question of how military's role is constructed and how this role construction affects the civil-military relations. It uses the Turkish case

to examine the construction of military's role in general. If we talk about a change in the role of TAF, why such a change happened? How differently was constructed the role of military from its previous roles? I will return the case selection and research question below.

Maintaining civilian control over the military constitutes the classical problematique of the civil-military relations (CMR) scholarship. The debates in the literature focus on the question of how to accommodate democratic oversight of the military by civilian authorities. According to Huntington (1957), military should be professionalized to curb its interference in politics. The professionalization of the military would bring a military model that is isolated from politics. Thus, he proposes the framework of "objective civilian control" to keep military outside of politics, while it has a relative autonomy in its domestic affairs. Janowitz (1960) claims that keeping military isolated from the society in the name of professionalization would not necessarily contribute to the aim of keeping military outside of politics. On the contrary, he proposed further convergence between military and civilians to fill the gap between the two worlds. According to Janowitz, the more military and civilians interact; the easier it is to maintain civilian control over the military. Feaver (1996: 153) argues that civilians should remain political masters. Thus, he proposes a principal-agent relationship, in which civilians are the decision-makers as principals, while military is the implementer as the agent.

This brief introduction to the CMR literature shows that scholars have different answers for the question of how to control military. Many other theoretical frameworks proposed by CMR scholars are discussed in the Literature Review Chapter. Although scholars propose different models of civilian controls and debate

about its scope, there is a general agreement in the literature about military should be controlled by civilian authority and it should not interfere in politics (Feaver 1992; Burk 2002; Desch 2008; Schiff 2009). This is an expression of a concern based on the assumption that if military is not controlled; it could try to influence politics. This concern has a historical legacy indeed. Modern military emerged as a political institution. With the emergence of nation-states, armies of empires in Europe were transformed to citizen armies in which citizens were conscripted. This structural change in the military model resulted in politicization of the armed forces. With this change, some militaries of Europe were not only guardians of territories but they also take their part in nation-building processes in different parts of Europe. For example, sociologist Eugen Weber (1976) focuses on how ordinary French peasants turned into modern French citizens. According to him, French Army, which transformed to a citizen-army after the Revolution, was the place where national awareness is indoctrinated to people in rural France. Similarly, German Army was an important actor in the politics of Germany's post-unification period. According to Showalter (1983: 605), German Army played an important role in politics and modernization process of Germany in late 19th and early 20th century, until Hitler isolated the Army from the public and redesigned it within the Nazi regime. Hence, although it is not generalizable for all European countries, some European armies did not remain as the protector of the borders, but they transformed into institutions which affect and sometimes influence politics of countries. Thus, it is reasonable that CMR scholars have doubts on military's possible engagement in politics. However, this doubt limited the literature to the narrow question of "how to maintain" or "how to reinforce" civilian control over the military.

Turkish Army also followed this active military model, which takes initiative in the politics of the country (Brown 1989; Narlı 2000). Nevertheless, not all armies, which took part in nation-building processes, remained politically active. Many armies in Europe stepped back from political sphere and left this domain to the civilians. This is why the dynamics that are effective on the military's role differed from case to case. The role of military in each case has been constructed differently. Thus, presence of military's active role in the formation of the political system of the country should be taken as one input in the role construction process of military. Military's role is shaped in each case by passing through different processes, which led different military models.

This thesis intends to examine this role construction process rather than the narrow focus on the civilian control of the general CMR literature. At this point, I would like to briefly mention why role construction process is important in the analysis of civil-military relations, though it is elaborated in detail in 2.2. According to constructivist assumption, role and interests of the actors are not fixed and inherited to those actors. Rather, the roles of actors are directly related with their identity, which is the outcome of a construction process. In the same vein, military's role in a particular political system is also constructed within a process. Thus, any military role –interventionist/non-interventionist; political/non-political- is not naturally embedded in the existence of the military, but this role emerges depending on its identity that is an outcome of a social process. At this point, I conceptualize the role construction process as the social interaction process in which different actors offer inputs in the identities of one another.

In this context, the research question of this thesis is “what factors affect construction of military's role in different domains?” Furthermore, it is important to

investigate how those factors shape military's role in the construction process. Construction process is analyzed in two domains. First is the organizational domain, in which military's self-perception of its role emerges. Historical legacy of a strong military model can be effective at institutional domain and shape the self-perception of the institution. Second domain of the role construction process is the societal domain, which is further divided into two societal segments. Military's role is constructed in its discourse and as a legal status within the political sphere.

The other societal segment in which military's role is constructed is citizenry's perception. My research on this construction process shows that different instruments are used in these three domains to construct Turkish Armed Forces' role. Firstly, the political mechanisms offered significant tools to the military to exercise a wide range a political power. Military rule of the country from 1980 to 1983 prepared the legal infrastructure of the military's engagement with politics. 1982 Constitution, the Internal Service Code and several other legal documents provided military a strong position over the Turkish politics. The Constitution granted National Security Council, which was a military dominant organ from 1980 to 2001, broad authority.

Secondly, the economic activities of the military were another important tool for military to reinforce its position. Besides, the historical narration of the military, which centers itself within the liberation of the state and the nation, strengthened the strong self-perception of the military.

Thirdly, presence of the militarist discourse in civilian education and absolute autonomy of the military in its internal indoctrination offered effective tools to military to express itself within civilian sphere comfortably.

Finally, the press and media were other instruments, which facilitated to construct a strong military position in the perception of the society. In addition to these material instruments, conceptualization of the security threats provided a discursive advantage to the military to legitimize its strong presence within the politics. At this point, the question is “who has used these instruments?” Since the constructivist approach takes the process as an interactive concept, it can be asserted that these instruments are not used by specific actors; rather they have been inputs of the process, which have not shaped only the role of military but perceptions of other actors.

This research question contributes to the literature by dealing with the process instead of the outcome of the process. It takes civil-military relations as a process which can result in different military role models in different political constructions. I contend that a social constructivist approach is useful to understand the process in which military’s role is socially and gradually constructed. In this regard, this thesis makes a contribution to the CMR literature by using social constructivism as its theoretical framework, which has been under-utilized in the CMR literature. Anthony Forster underlines that (2002: 5) “... recently constructivist approaches have offered analytical tools for understanding how the concepts of ‘civilian control’, ‘professionalization’, ‘modernization’ and ‘security sector reform’, have been used as means to transfer particular western values, ideas and institutions...” However, he also notes the limitedness of these works. Ender et al. (2009) focus on how U.S. cadets construct their own conceptualization of “social problems”. Campbell’s doctoral dissertation that was completed in 2008 claims that a social constructivist theoretical model can be utilized to understand effect of countries’ bilateral relations on civil-military relations. Despite the

presence of these studies, however, Lambert states that (2011: 164) “it is too early to assert that there has been a ‘constructivist turn’ in civil-military relations...” Thus, this thesis will make a modest contribution to constructivist approaches to CMR, while it applies it to the Turkish framework.

Another novelty of this thesis is about the approach it uses. In the CMR literature, western models of civil-military settings are highlighted as the goal. Thus, western civil-military settings constituted the core of theoretical framework used by the CMR scholars. In many case studies in the literature, the theoretical frameworks derived from western models are tested against those cases. Bland emphasizes that theoretical approaches in CMR literature are “weak or even entirely lacking (1999: 7)” because studies are too bound to cases. Similarly, Rebecca Schiff (1995: 8) states that current theory in CMR “assumes that American institutional separation should be applied to all nations to prevent domestic military intervention.” The assumption that western model of CMR is the ideal one neglects several dimensions. First, since the construction process differs from case to case, theoretical frameworks that are used in these studies remain limited to explain the political situation in different cases. Secondly, the status of military is not only a matter of politics but it is also ritualized as a practice of culture. Hence, this thesis uses a “theory-building case study” to show how social constructivism applies to understanding civil-military relations, by deriving a specific approach from Turkish case. Therefore, theoretical implications that this thesis derives from the Turkish case are not to generalize but to form theoretical propositions to explain similarly constructed cases.

1.2. Methodology: Theory-Building Case Studies

Case study is a research strategy which focuses on a specific setting and intends to analyze it within the proposed theoretical framework. According to Yin, case study intends to analyze limited number of social events with qualitative analysis (Yin 1994). Similarly, Gerring defines case study as a method, which studies intensively on a single unit, to make generalizations on larger proportion of similar units (Gerring 2004: 342). Thus, it can be asserted that case studies are not only used to specialize on a specific social event, rather they are used in the literature to make generalizations for relevantly constituted cases.

Case studies are conducted for different goals. Some case studies are conducted to make descriptive analyses. These kinds of case studies focus on a unit and examine it intensively within its historical flux. These case studies do not aim to make a generalization on similar social events; rather they focus on how to categorize the case in question. Testing a theory can be another motivation to conduct a case study. Case studies can be used to apply a certain theory in the literature to the case, and explore whether the theory is reciprocal for various cases. If the findings of the case support the predictions of the applied theory, it can be classified as a “theory-confirming case study.” Findings derived from the case may not always support theory. This kind of study is called as “theory-infirming case studies” (George and Benett 2005). Finally, case studies can be conducted to engender theories.

In this thesis, I aim to focus on the Turkish case to generate new theoretical propositions on civil-military relations. Theory-building case study method requires

an inductive research perspective (Eisenhardt 1989). In this method, the findings of the case study help to build a theoretical framework. Thus, this theoretical framework tends to be more specific and capable of explaining similarly developed cases, rather than being a general theory which claims to be explanatory for each case in the same field. Another aspect of theory-building case study is that its aim is to extend the existing theory to an understudied dimension or generate a new theoretical approach which has not been used before (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007: 28). According to Eisenhardt (1989: 536), since the theory-building case study aims to generate a theoretical framework, it should be conducted as close as possible to the ideal of no hypotheses to test against the case. Rather, its preliminary aim should be to lead to hypotheses that can be applicable to similar cases. Theory-building case study method is claimed to be less precise and rigorous compared to a large scale hypothesis testing (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007: 26). Thus, it is important to explain why a theory-building case study is needed instead of a theory-testing approach. According to Eisenhardt and Graebner, a key response to this challenge is to define the research question in detail and explain why existing literature remains incomplete to answer this question (2007: 26).

1.3. Case Selection: Why Turkish CMR?

According to Flyvbjerg, it is a misunderstanding about case studies to claim that case studies are useful only for hypothesis testing but not suitable to build theories (Flyvbjerg 2006: 221). Rather, “it depends on the case one is speaking of and how it is chosen (2006: 225).” Hence, in this section, I aim to explain why I have picked

a theory-building case study approach by focusing on case of Turkey as the method of this thesis.

In this thesis, I focus on the case of Turkey to build a theoretical framework and generate hypotheses to understand how the military's position in the political system is constructed. At this point, I want to explain why I focus on Turkey to build a theoretical framework. The case of Turkey is appropriate for such an inductive research because of several reasons. Firstly, Turkey has been a case which is easy to observe its military's strong role in its political system. Military's political power has appeared in the form of military coups and memorandums. Even, in the times of civilian governments' rule of country, military's involvement in politics was noticeable. Such a case, in which military's strong role is obvious, is easier to develop a theoretical framework explaining construction of a strong military role compared to a case in which practices of civilian control are consolidated; because, in a case like Turkey, it is easier to detect indicators of strong position of military in different domains. Thus, Turkish case presents an opportunity to engender a theoretical framework to explain similar cases which have strong military influence in politics. Secondly, social construction of Turkish military's role has been challenged by re-definition of its role, which I examine under the titles of "deconstruction" and "reconstruction"; hence, Turkish case is appropriate to build a theoretical framework to see how different processes can interactively shape military's role in politics.

I analyze two different time periods of Turkish civil-military relations. The first period that I analyze is from 1980 to 2001. I took 1980 as the beginning of my temporal analysis, because, I intend to examine the direct effects of military coup of 1980 on the construction of military's role at different domains. 2001 is the

beginning of the second period that I analyze, because I aim to see the effect of international relations on military's role. In 1999, Turkey was acknowledged as an official candidate to European Union (EU). This development carried Turkey's relationships with EU into a more serious dimension compared to fragile relationship in late 1980's and early 1990's. With the initiation of harmonization packages in 2001, the political setting in Turkey significantly reformed. EU has been a pushing force for Turkey to reform its structure of civil-military relations in accordance with the EU criteria. Thus, I believe that comparison of these two periods provide the opportunity to examination of different construction processes.

1.4. Organization of the Chapters

This thesis is composed of three other chapters apart from this introductory chapter. The following chapter reviews different literatures to link them to one another. In the first section of the literature review chapter, I examine the general arguments of civil-military relations theory. This review of the literature shows that the problem of military's civilian control constitutes the core of CMR studies. The second section of the chapter focuses on social constructivism and its use in comparative politics. Next, this theoretical framework is applied it to the civil-military relations context. The focus is on the identity construction process to see constructivism's approach to construction of social actors' roles. Finally, a brief review of Turkish civil-military relations literature follows. In this section, I observe that scholars of Turkish CMR agree on the historical position of the army providing the military a justification of its strong presence within politics. Besides, studies generally recognize that the pattern of the Turkish civil-military relations has been in an

altering path since early 2000's. This chapter is finalized with the discussion of the gaps within CMR literature and opportunities to utilize a constructivist approach to analyze military's role specifically in Turkish case.

Chapter 3 constitutes the main body of the empirical research to apply the constructivist perspective to Turkish civil-military relations. This chapter tackles the military's role construction at different domains. I compare two different periods in Turkish politics. First period of analysis is 1980-2001 and the second period is post-2001. In this section, I analyze the military's role in two domains: Organizational and societal. I briefly present findings from archival research on mainstream media published in early post-1980 coup era.²

Chapter 4, which is the concluding chapter, summarizes the research: makes concluding remarks and underlines the implications of the theoretical propositions for further research.

² The self-perception of the military leaders should ideally be researched and analyzed by interviewing these leaders. However, this thesis depends on archival data and intense to use interview data in future research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The following review of three different bodies of literature, civil-military relations (CMR), social constructivism and Turkish CMR, shows that studies using social constructivist approach to civil-military relations are limited in the literature.

The chapter is organized into four sections. In the first section, the CMR literature in general is reviewed and analyzed. In this section, it is identified that CMR literature has mostly focused on the problem of how to keep military under civilian control. In the second section, constructivist approaches to comparative politics are reviewed. Concepts such as identity, social construction of the actors are elaborated. Third section focuses on the Turkish civil-military relations in a historical chronological order. Final section seeks to identify the gaps in CMR literature and briefly lists the opportunities provided by the constructivist approach to fill these gaps. It also explains why this thesis argues that a new theoretical approach is needed in the studies of civil-military relations.

2.1. Civil-Military Relations Theory

In the early literature, the tendency was to emphasize the separation between military and civilian worlds (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960). Thus, theories of early scholars focused on the CMR as the study of problems between military and civilians derived from the difference of paradigms in these two worlds. According to Huntington (1957), military world is conservative and aggressive in its nature; hence, it is not possible to analyze the military's attitude with the paradigms of the civilian world.

In contrast, Rebecca Schiff (1995) criticized the absolute distinction between military and civilian worlds (1995: 10). According to her, it is inevitable that military and civilians penetrate into each other's spheres; thus, the distinction is more or less bound to the American case of CMR (1995: 10). Feaver's theory is a turning to absolute distinction between two worlds. According to him, civilians and military should be considered as separate; otherwise the theory would not be about civil-military relations (Feaver 1996: 168). Feaver defines the civil-military problematique as the "tension caused by the increasing or decreasing scope of delegation and monitoring the military's behavior (1996: 168)".

The idea that military should not interfere in political sphere in such manner that can harm the democratic process is generally agreed among CMR scholars (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Lyons 1961; Feaver 1992; Schiff 1995; Feaver 1996; Bland 1999; Moskos, Williams et al. 2000). Rather, the debate is about how to build a civil-military model in which military do not go beyond the borders of its

own sphere and penetrate into politics. Civilian control of the military is proposed to keep military outside of political sphere.

Analyses on civilian control of military take Huntington as the beginning point of modern CMR theory of civilian control. Early debates in the literature were built on three concepts: Professionalization, civilian control of the military and effect of external threat to military's position in politics. Huntington's model of civil-military setting is based on separate military and civilian worlds. Thinking and acting patterns of two worlds significantly differ from each other both in practical and theoretical levels. Separation of two worlds is important in terms of further theory building. He proposes that militaries, which have been professionalized, are less likely to have political power (1957). Although he does not propose a politically autonomous model of military, he states that military should have autonomy on its inner practices to provide military security, which is another aspect that Huntington takes into account. Thus, the concept of professionalism seems to be a key concept for Huntington's model of civilian control of military. The "objective civilian control," which he claimed to be the best way of maximizing military security within a military system controlled by civilian politicians, could only be provided by professionalizing the military (Huntington 1957: 83). In this model, the military is controlled by civilians in decision making level. Issues related to daily politics in the monopoly of civilians, yet, they consult military if necessary. However, the internal autonomy of the military, Huntington suggests, should not be intervened by civilians. When the model turns into a system in which internal autonomy of military is intervened by civilians, Huntington names it "subjective civilian control" (1957: 80). In such a model, military can be subject to civilian rule; however, military security might be highly damaged by the civilians who have totally different conditions of

existence compared to military world. At this point, Huntington's attitude towards civilian control of military is limited since he attributes a damaging potential to civilian control. Although they do not take the problem in a constructivist framework, rationalist scholars also intend to question the roots of military's political power. Huntington proposes that ideological model of the society affects the military's role in the politics. Anti-military and pro-military ideological systems are two categories suggested by Huntington (1957: 96). According to him, ideological patterns of society shape military's role in politics. However, Huntington's theory lacks the explanation of how these ideological models emerge. If ideological models vary from case to case, theory should also focus on the factors contributing the differentiation of these ideological patterns. The absence of the focus on this dimension constitutes one of the gaps in Huntington's theory building.

In Huntington's model that is based on separate military and civilian worlds, if military penetrates into political area, which is supposed to remain civilian, this intervention requires a justification. Considering that military mind has a more pessimistic characteristic than civilian mind (Huntington 1957: 60), it is possible to predict that military's attitude towards issues of civilian politics would be more conservative compared to civilians. Thus a role construction process, which this thesis intends to analyze, is needed to legitimize the military's intervention and justify its conservative approach. According to Huntington, the role of military becomes praetorian and politicized if the society lacks effective political institutions to mediate, refine and moderate political action of civilian actors (1968: 195-196). As a result of the absence of effective political institutions, the political power is fragmented among different actors (1968: 196). Although Huntington does not further elaborate how military's role becomes dominant in this fragmented power

structure, this can be taken as a beginning point for the necessity of an analysis on military's role construction in a broader context.

Like Huntington, Janowitz also focuses on the concept of professionalism. It is possible to assert that Janowitz is in an agreement with Huntington about separate civilian and military worlds exist. He defines the professional soldier as naturally conservative unlike the civilian individuals (1960: 23). Hence, a natural tension between military and civilian elites finds its place in Janowitz's theory as similar to Huntington's model. However, his separation of military and civilian worlds is based on a co-existence. He suggests that maintaining civilian control on professional army can be achieved with a rapprochement between military and civilians. This rapprochement can prevent an unwanted political activation of military. Unlike Huntington, Janowitz asserts that when more civilians are included in different processes of military's internal practices, such as military indoctrination, and assignment of military officers, it is possible to fill the gap between two separate worlds. According to him the gap between two worlds is the reason of classical civil-military tension. In other words, Janowitz suggests a civilianization of military mind via convergence of military and civilians. However, it can be questioned that what guarantees that a militarization of civilian mind would not occur rather than a civilianization of military mind, which Janowitz predicts, via this convergence.

Janowitz's theory gives the signs of military's role construction to some extent, by analyzing both internal and external political dimensions. According to him, conditions of Cold War era caused an installation of "constabulary force (1960: 418)" duty to the American military. The threat perception, which is perceived by American military, was reflected to civilians as military should always be prepared to act against Soviet threat. He states that this transfer of perception from military to

civilians created an inevitable politicization of American military, which constitutes a challenge to civilian supremacy (1960: 435). Besides the societal dimension, Janowitz underlines the importance of institutional dimension. At institutional level, military seeks to reinforce the cohesion among military personnel and society, and intends to impose its own perception of its role to the society. Military education and military service system are two important tools for shaping military's role in a political system (Janowitz 1964). Since Janowitz came from a sociologist background, it's not surprising that he focused more on societal perception of military's role compared to Huntington, however, he is not going further in detail about how military shapes the civilian perception and is shaped by it.

Abrahamsson (1972) also challenges the Huntingtonian professionalism. He states that military is a rational actor, which seeks its own institutional interests (1972: 150-154). Thus, military cannot be taken as a politically neutral actor in Abrahamsson's approach. Thus, he asserts that professionalization of military can curb its ties with politics in western democracies where institutions and control mechanisms are consolidated. However, in the cases in which military initiate coups against civilians, professionalism extends the duration of military regime.

Finer approaches civil-military relations with a different understanding from his counterparts. In contrast to Huntington and Janowitz, Finer focuses on the question of why military intervene in politics but not how to maintain civilian control over it. According to him, the ideal setting of civil-military relations is the model in which military is democratically controlled by civilians (2002: 21). However, he also notes three basic factors render military more advantageous in front of the civilian politicians (2002: 6). Firstly, according to Finer, soldiers are organized in a superior structure compared to civilian actors. Thus, they can pursue a cohesive discourse

while civilian actors are more prone to differ from each other. Secondly, the military in most cases are based on an emotionalized status. Narratives about the heroic military figures provide soldiers a privileged place in the perception of society. Finally, military is the organization which holds the monopoly over legal violence and arms. Thus, it provides an absolute material superiority compared to other actors. In this regard, Finer questions why military do not intervene in politics while it has such an advantageous position. At this point, he agrees with Huntington and Janowitz about military and civilian worlds are completely different existences. Thus, the separation of military and political spheres emerges in its historical process as the necessity of this dramatic difference between military and civilian worlds. He differentiates from Huntington and Janowitz in his approach to professionalism. As touched upon above, Huntington suggested professionalism as the key of civilian control. However, Finer counters this argument and states that professionalized army can intervene in politics as well as unprofessional armies. He gives the German and Japanese armies as the examples of highly professional armies, which engaged with politics in the past (2002: 25-27). According to Heper (2011) in his forthcoming article “this is because military may start perceiving itself close to the state rather than to political government and, at the same time, military would be able to act more decisively.”

As touched upon above, Huntington and several other early authors of CMR built their argument on the assumption that high risk of external threat increases the likelihood of a politically active military model. However, Desch puts a counterargument. Desch (1999) pays attention to the effect of threat environment on the military’s role in domestic politics. He also accepts that ideal case in the civil-military relations is the civilian control of military and civilians’ prevalence in the

decision-making mechanisms. (1999: 5). Desch's main argument is that less challenging threat environments causes weakening of the civilian control over the military (1999: 3). With this aspect, Desch's argument challenges the assumption that presence of threats leads a politically active military model. He notes that "it is easiest for civilians to control the military when they face primarily international (external) threats and it is hardest for them to control the military when they face primarily internal threats (1999: 6)." He finds former literature weak because he asserts that existing literature's emphasis on individual or institutional aspect does not properly explain military's political power. Instead, his theory builds on the effect of external factors which have an influential role on military's role in the domestic politics.

Welch (1992) scrutinizes the factors facilitates military's disengagement from politics. According to him, many scholars focus on the process in which military steps back from involvement in politics in different cases. However, they have not developed systematic and common patterns to explain this disengagement process. Rather, "studies present disengagement as random events (1992: 324)." Most important reason of this gap in the literature is that the CMR literature has been developing under the influence of western paradigm. He states that scholars' "common democratic heritage may unconsciously shaped the evidence they seek" in the cases that they focus on. This is another example of the criticisms that I touched upon in the introduction, stating that CMR literature has been bound to western models of civil-military settings.

Welch categorizes disengagement process of military in two titles (1992: 325-326). "Planned extrication" is the process in which military consciously steps back from the politics. Second model of the disengagement is "unplanned breakdown" of

the military regime. In this model, some factors trigger turmoil in the society, political structure of the country and this process leads breakdown of the military regime. Factors which facilitate the military's disengagement from politics are Welch's focus. He underlines several preconditions for military's disengagement from politics. First, he emphasizes the significance of intramilitary factors (1992: 327). According to him, institutionalized militaries have more definite role descriptions compared to other militaries which have not consolidated their institutional framework. This can be taken as a claim of correlation between military professionalization and institutionalization. Attitude of "top brass" toward the disengagement is another determinant factor on the process. Reluctance of the high ranked officers has a potential to blockade the disengagement process. Thus, it can be asserted that Welch takes the organizational will of the military to disengage from politics into account.

Social events are also important to analyze the disengagement process. Civil disputes and suffering economic conditions can increase the possibility of a military regime while social cohesion can promote disengagement process. According to him, most of the African coups are directly related with the deep ethnic fragmentation of these countries' populations (1967: 315; 1992: 331).

Welch's emphasis on several important gaps in the literature is important in terms of further theory building. First, he believes greater scholarly effort in the field coming from third world can contribute the expansion of the literature's scope. It would contribute to aim of developing a general pattern for understanding military's disengagement from politics. Secondly, more knowledge is needed about intramilitary attitudes. At this point, I believe this thesis contributes to this gap by elaborating Turkish military's self-perception of its role in Chapter 4. Finally, he

touches upon that political culture should be included more in the CMR analysis. He asserts that “political culture affects perceptions of military, political parties and the legitimacy of the system as a whole (1992: 338).” Thus, I believe that this is another important gap in the literature addressed by Welch, and I focus on the strength of the militarist discourse in the political culture of Turkey to understand construction of TAF’s role in the manner that Welch identified.

Schiff agrees on that challenging external threat environments can cause more political armies. However, she criticizes the absolute distinction of the civilian and military spheres. Rebecca Schiff’s Concordance Theory brought a strong emphasis on cultural and historical issues to the CMR theory. Schiff criticizes the former theory in terms of two points. Firstly, as discussed within CMR definitions, Schiff rejects an absolute distinction between military and civilian spheres (Schiff 1995). According to her, the distinction between two spheres is bound to American case, which has traditionally separate military and civilian spheres (1995: 10). This case is not always the same everywhere in world; thus, former theory -Schiff’s critique is generally on Huntington’s conceptualization- fails to cover general CMR framework. Secondly, former theory lacks the cultural and historical emphasis, which expectably varies from case to case. Institutional analysis, according to Schiff, takes the separation as a natural phenomenon as an ideal and optimum norm of CMR, however, even the American case is an outcome of cultural experience derived from historical context (1995: 11). Schiff suggests four points to be agreed on by the three societal segments. These segments are the military, political leadership and the citizenry (1995: 12). At this point it is important to note that Schiff, unlike former theories, does not take political elites as the fundamental civilian component to be analyzed. Rather, she criticizes this approach of former theories and makes a separate

analysis based on citizenry, which this thesis tends to adopt under a similar categorization: “Political sphere” and “Citizenry”. The four issues to be agreed on these three segments are composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, recruitment method and military style. According to Schiff, if military, political elites and citizens agree on these four issues, there would be less likelihood of military to intervene politics. Schiff can be criticized of being shallow about how the agreement would be provided between actors. An agreement among different segments requires certain processes. These processes can be negotiation or coercion. It can be questioned that which dynamics have a role on these three actors came to a common point. What would be the reasons of a possible disagreement? Why does the scope of agreement vary from case to case? These are the questions worth exploring in a broader context, which this thesis intends to do.

Scope of military’s autonomy has been another important point discussed in the literature. David Pion-Berlin’s categorization of military’s autonomy is based on two models: offensive autonomy and defensive autonomy (Pion-Berlin 1992). In offensive model, autonomous military seeks to enhance the scope of its political power and strengthen its own decision-making powers (1992: 85). Pion-Berlin suggests that offensively autonomous militaries are expectably likely to have a great political power like in Latin American cases. On the other hand, militaries with defensive autonomy have an institutional basis seeking to protect its inner procedures from excessive political intervention. Undoubtedly, categorization of military typologies is helpful for understanding the differentiated roles of militaries. However, Pion-Berlin’s categorization is based on an analysis only at the institutional level. Since he focuses on Latin American cases, it lacks analysis on different dimensions that have role on military’s autonomy model. Typology of the

autonomy model is based on a monological process, in which military has an absolute influence on determination of its own autonomy model, rather than a dialogical one in which different actors interact during the construction of their role.

Feaver is in an agreement with Huntington and Janowitz about distinctness of military and civilian spheres. Thus, his theory is critical about Schiff's argument stating that the idea of distinct military and civilian spheres is flawed. According to him, Schiff's critique is bound to Huntingtonian definition of distinctness, which he claims having normative bias in favor of keeping the spheres completely distinct (Feaver 1992: 168). Feaver's definition of CMR focuses on a specific framework. The theory, according to Feaver, is not about documenting all forms of contacts between military and civilians, rather it should specifically focus on a narrow framework, which is the tension derived from disputes on monitoring the military's behavior in various areas by civilians. With this aspect, Feaver's theory is limited to analyze the classical dilemma of CMR: how to control military? His proposal of a new theory is based on these assumptions. He argues that "principal-agent model (2003: 54-117)", which is borrowed from management discipline (2003: 54), is applicable to CMR theory. In this model, the distinction between military and civilian spheres has an important place. The principal institution, which is the civilian part, establishes the agent institution, the military, to protect itself. In this relation, agent is subjected to direction of the principal institution, in other words, military, which is established by civilians, should be under civilian control (2003: 57).

At this point, Feaver's theory can be questioned as "what if principal and agent institutions would not be as in Feaver's prediction?" In his theory, it is as simple as the military is located in agent position which is established by civilians;

thus there is no doubt that civilians should be in principal position. However, military institutions, in many cases, can have a different role on foundation of political system, modernization of the society, even on economy, as happened in Northern African cases (Janowitz 1977). Hence, Feaver's theory can remain limited these cases which have different dynamics of political formations.

Douglas Bland (1999) also underlines the narrow and limited scope of theory in the literature. According to him, different answers exist in the literature to the question of how to maintain civilian control over military. However, he asserts that these answers are unconnected and remain as "unidimensional descriptions that address only parts of the problem or even only particular problems in some states (1999: 8)." According to him, problems of civil-military relations occur in all societies to some degree despite the conditions that affect them change in different cases. Thus, theory's aim should be to create a common theoretical ground for these cases and relate them to one another within this theoretical framework. This "unified theory" should address all problems of CMR within one model and this model should be tested against different cases. At this point, he proposes a theoretical framework designed to civilian control of military in the basis of a shared responsibility. According to him, place of the military is not only an advisory mechanism for guidance to civilians in technical issues, but it also takes responsibility in the formation of a stable civilian control. In this context, military shares responsibility with civilians in four domains: strategic decisions, organizational decisions on arrangement of the sources, social issues such as society's approach to armed forces and finally practical operational decisions. It can be asserted that Bland's theory does not takes civilian control as a pure civilian process, rather, in this model, military also contribute to the process going to maintaining civilian control over itself.

Forster (2002) argues that we are passing through a period in which the focus of the CMR changes as the consequence of three reasons. Firstly, Forster states that the epistemology that the former CMR literature is built on has been challenged by broader epistemological approaches. In this regard, “it is important to highlight the plurality of the ‘New Civil-Military Relations’ methods, rather than a single theoretical approach (Forster 2002: 71).” Secondly, authors of CMR are recently focusing on the issues that are previously overlooked in the literature. Finally, relations of the military to civilian world are getting wider compared to Cold War era. Thus, the scope of CMR is extending in the manner that including military’s relations with several other civilian segments such as NGO’s, international organizations, trade unions. This extension in the scope of the CMR raises new questions, which are neglected by the “Old” CMR. As a result of these reasons, Forster argues that a redefinition of the field is needed.

In this regard, Forster states that reconceptualization of the social knowledge by constructivist authors such as Wendt offers new contributions to the field (Forster 2002: 73). Hence, Forster (2002: 74) argues that “constructivist approaches have offered analytical tools for understanding how the concepts of ‘civilian control’, ‘professionalization’, ‘modernization’ and ‘security sector reform’, have been used as a means to transfer particular western values, ideas and institutions...” In the vein that Forster offers, in this thesis, I aim to use constructivist approach to examine the military’s role in particular CMR settings. Hence, in following section, I examine constructivist literature’s approach to role construction of the social actors.

2.2. Social Constructivist Literature

In this section, I examine the general perspective of constructivist approach to social research. I search an answer to the question of “why process is important in social research”. Besides, I focus on how role construction process is considered in the constructivist literature. In this regard, we see that the constructivist scholars argue that there is a connection between the identity and the role and preferences of an actor. Thus, I examine the approach of several constructivist works to identity construction processes.

Since this thesis suggests that using a social constructivist understanding in CMR theory would contribute to the CMR literature, it is worth exploring why this kind of an approach is relevant CMR studies. Green (2002: 4) states that rise of non-state actors in a globalized structure of world are not explicable by the traditional approaches which tend to be generally state centric. Although states still have a considerable degree of sovereignty in various areas of politics, there are other dynamics such as non-governmental organizations, interest groups and non-state political actors that diminish and challenge the sovereignty of state. Furthermore, it is not possible to make a clear distinction between foreign and domestic politics, as traditional approaches keep foreign politics insular from domestic politics. This understanding requires a revision of conceptualization of concepts such as identity (Cable 1995). It can be asserted that in this new era, identity of political actors is not formed unilaterally, but with the effect of other actors in the political system. Secondly, the constructivist approach tends to include perceptions, culture and some other normative dimensions as inputs of theory building (Green 2002: 10). The constructivist approach takes any kind of relationship that constitutes the matter of

analysis as an outcome of a construction process. With this aspect, it may offer insights also into the different dimensions of the relationship between military and civilians.

At this point, I would like to further elaborate the general aspects of the constructivist approach related to politics. The very difference of constructivist approach to social research lies in its conceptualization of social reality. Collin states that social reality is not a self-existing phenomenon but it is “generated by the way we think or talk about it (Collin 1997: 2).” According to this understanding, perceptions of various actors are inputs in the social reality. Constructivist literature includes different approaches towards the constitution of social reality. According to Wendt (1999), social facts are constituted by internal and external structures. Internal structures imply the inherited inputs in the existence of the fact. For instance, water is constituted by two hydrogen and one oxygen atoms. These are constant inputs. They are objective and not subject to any change throughout the process. Wendt argues that these are not antecedent conditions for existence but they rather make these facts possible. (p. 84). Thus, Wendt recognizes that existence of a fact includes an inherited and constant dimension. However, social facts are not only composed of these inherited and constant inputs. He emphasizes that it is not only the internal structure that constitutes the social facts. External effects hold an important place in the answer to “how-possible” questions. For instance, Wendt (1999: 313-316) scrutinizes the concept of power. According to him, power can be defined in material and subjective bases. The material conceptualization of power is based on measurable values, such as having strong and well developed military technology. These constitute the input in the existence of power that Wendt calls “internal structure”. Subjective conceptualization of the power, however, includes a social

dimension. In this dimension, different perceptions of power by various actors can be effective on the existence of power as a social fact.

Although Wendt examines the concept of power in the area of international politics, his ideas can be applied to the study of military's political power. Military's political power can be defined according to the definition of its role in legal documents. However, with a constructivist approach, it can and should be analyzed with its different reflections within different actors' perception. According to Wendt (1999: 318), existence of social facts has a dual structure. For example, to define the concept of terrorism, there should be first a definition of legal use of violence. In other words, the concept of terrorism exists because there is a legalized use of violence, which is executed by the state. In sum, social facts are dependent on these internal factors, which are about the actor itself and external factors, which come from outside world.

This approach to social theory symbolizes an absolute departure from the materialist definition of the social facts, because it does not only include the material value but also attributes importance to some other inputs as the constituent elements of the social facts. Once it is applied to the concepts of the civil-military relations, it gives the opportunity to analyze military's political power with its different dimensions. In this regard, the legal status of the military in the political system can constitute the input that Wendt calls internal structure of military's role in politics. Broad descriptions of military duty can enable military to carry its role beyond military affairs. However, it is not only legal status that constitutes the role of military. Some other external factors can be determinant on military's role. Thus, constructivist conceptualization of the social facts provides an opportunity of broader analysis on constitution of military's role.

Adler (1997: 321) argues that constructivism does not explain social world as the sum of simple behavioral responses of actors that emerge in a given set of conditions. Rather, the behavior of actors is shaped within the process in which material world gains meaning through the interpretation of social actors on material world. The material world is interpreted by actors through the shared knowledge, which is the outcome of the construction process. Thus, constructivism problematizes the process in which this shared knowledge has been continuously shaped. I will return to the vital place of the concept of “process” in the constructivist literature later.

According to Adler, constructivism does not reject the existence of a material dimension within the social facts. Rather, it includes materiality as a constituent element of social facts. Material facts are interpreted and attributed meaning by actors and they become an integral part of the social facts. In other words, Adler argues that materiality constitutes the raw material of the social facts. Thus, Adler underlines that constructivism holds the “middle ground” between classical rational choice theories, which build the social reality on pure materiality, and post-positivist/post-structuralist theories that rejects the materiality’s place within the social reality.

Finnemore and Sikkink (2001: 391) conceptualize constructivism as “an approach to social analysis that deals with the role of human consciousness on social life.” Inclusion of the human’s logic within social theory brings a plurality to social reality. In this regard, “human interaction is primarily shaped by ideational factors but not material ones (p. 393).” Besides, the social facts that constructivism intends to analyze are not built on material bases but they exist because people collectively believe that they exist. For instance, the concept sovereignty is a power that we

attribute to the state. Thus, constructivist theorizing attributes importance of the perceptions of actors and this reference to perceptions requires recognition of social reality may vary depending on the context and structure. At this point, Finnemore and Sikkink underline the mutual constitution of the agents and structures. In constructivist approach, agents are not only shaped by structures but they are constituent elements of one another (2001: 394). The agents' perception of the structure reshapes the borders of structure, while structure restrains the agents to act in a particular context. Thus, they are in a continuous reproduction process.

At this point, another corner stone concept in the constructivist approach, the *process*, is worth exploring. To conceptualize the social reality as the outcome of a process is general tendency in the constructivist literature. Constructivist literature also sheds light why the process is important. According to Wendt (1999), the process is determinant on the outcome. Roles, preferences and interests are not self-existent concepts. The process is important, because actors, interests and identities are produced and reproduced within this process but they are not exogenously given to the actors. In other words, social facts are outcomes of processes. Wendt argues that identities, interests and roles of the social actors are continuously being shaped throughout the process (1999: 316). Thus, constructivist approach recognizes that outcome of the process is not static but continuously changing and dynamic. In this regard, Wendt attributes importance on the process to explain not only the outcome but also the social change. Since social facts are constructed continuously within the process, different variables can produce new outcomes. Hence, analysis of the process and exploration of the inputs that affect the evolution of the process provide the opportunity to examine the structural change in politics. However, Wendt recognizes that this structural change is difficult (p. 315). In this regard, Wendt

believes that although process is effective on the outcome, radical change in the outcome is not easily achieved. Wendt argues that asking a “how-question” is important to grasp the dynamics of the process. According to Wendt, how-questions intend to elaborate the process which puts an outcome. However, the word “how” alone does not necessarily add the process into the focus. His example on how question of “how did World War II start?” shows that such a question can be followed by a genetic and solely descriptive analysis. One can still answer this question with a pure descriptive assessment on the causal mechanisms that lead to the War. However, “how-possible” questions can direct the student into the process, which constructs the reasons and environment that made World War II possible (Wendt 1999: 83). Thus, a research based on constructivist approach should include questions which aim to examine the causal mechanisms through which those factors affect the dependent variable, by including a “how-possible” dimension.

Adler argues that process is a key concept to explain the difference between “being” and “becoming” (Adler 1991: 43). The difference between being and becoming is about the facts’ way of existence. Being is the way of existence of natural facts. These are not subject to change. Constituent elements of these facts are constant and inherited, in other words, they are embedded within the natural phenomenon. Becoming, on the other hand, is the way of existence of social facts. Social facts do not come into existence in the same way that natural facts do. They are not pre-given. Constituent elements of these facts are social inputs, which are not constant and inherited. Thus, constructivist approach argues that social facts cannot be analyzed in the same way we approach to natural facts (1991: 46). In social research, according to Adler, to apprehend social facts better, the social inputs, which change depending on the context, should be analyzed. At this point, Adler states that

the process is where all the social interaction among actors and social inputs happen. Thus, process in which different variables take part in the constitution of actors is a key concept in constructivist approach to social analysis. The approach that focuses on politics as an outcome of an interaction process facilitates the explanation of dynamism in the core of the social facts (1991: 47).

In this thesis, I explain the military's status within politics by explaining its role construction process. In this process, the role of military is constructed via the interaction among the actors of social process. Thus, in this section, I examine constructivist approach views role construction process of actors.

An actor's role determines its preferences, ideas and approach toward social events. Scholars studying identity (Wendt 1994; Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995) argue that identity of the actor creates its preferences and decisions. Hence, in this section, I examine the constructivism's approach to identity.

Constructivist approach to identity is based on the criticism of a Hobbesian approach to identity. Hobbesian conceptualization of identity and interest is built on the conservative assumptions of "self-interested" human nature. According to this view, specific patterns of behavior can be expected from the actors in a given structure of conditions (Fierke and Wiener 1999: 723). This is the necessity of the pre-given and inherited nature of the actors. In this regard, actors are self-interested and this characteristic is embedded in their existence. Thus, roles of the actors are "prescribed by the pre-existing cultures" and dynamics of the actors' role can be rooted in human nature (Epstein 2010: 339). As a result, this approach takes identity and interests as constant and fixed beyond borders, which are determined by pre-given structures. However, there is a strong emphasis of dynamism of identity in constructivist literature. According to Abrams and Hog (1990), a social actor takes a

social role and develops its preferences concertedly with its social identity. Hence, interests, preferences and social role of an actor are inseparable from its social identity. Besides, the social identity of an actor is not the result of any pre-given structure, such as human nature; rather it is constructed within the process in which social actors interact (1990: 21). Thus, the process of identity construction determines the role of the actor. In this regard, I further elaborate the concept of identity and how it is constituted to analyze the role construction process in the constructivist literature.

Similar to Abrams and Hog, Alexander Wendt argues that interests and preferences of an actor depend on its identity (1994: 385). Thus, he states that identity is the key concept to analyze an actor's position in the social structure. Wendt (1994) defines the identity as a dynamic concept. He underlines that identity is the product of the process in which actors interact, change and reproduce their identities. It is continuously produced and reproduced within this construction process. Thus, analysis of the process facilitates to see an actor's changing patterns of action. Wendt's construction is based on the critique of understanding that attributes some exogenously given characteristics to the actors. According to his approach to identity, interests and preferences of the actors are not naturally given to them but they are constructed within the process. They are not the result of any pre-existing structure such as human nature. Rather, interaction among the actors shapes the identities, may change them within the process and create new sets of interests. Still, Wendt avoids an over-socialized approach to the constitution of the identity (1994: 384). Thus, he distinguishes the constitution of the identity into corporate and social constitutions. "Social identities are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others as a social object (1994: 385)."

According to Wendt, social identities are affected by the process, constructed by the interaction with other actors and therefore, they are subject to change within the context of construction process. The actor perceives its social role and interests, develops policies and act in accordance with this social identity. Since Wendt argues that social identity is subject to construction via interaction among actors that is key link in the mutual constitution of the actors' identities. An actor may have multiple social identities which enable it to act in different forms and take roles according to conditions. On the other hand, process has a limited effect on the corporate identities. According to Wendt, corporate identity shapes the intrinsic interests of the actor. This dimension of the identity includes given elements which occur as a result of the actor's existence. For example, an actor naturally has the interest to protect its physical and ontological security. This interest, according to Wendt, can be seen in the identity of each actor. Such interests have a limited "constructedness" and they are independent of the social context that is based on interaction. In the absence of these elements, actor's identity is not explored. Thus, for further construction of the identity, corporate interests should be explored by the actor. In other words, according to Wendt, exploration of the given and intrinsic corporate interests is one step prior to the process in which identity is further constructed and reproduced. Even so, Wendt's approach to identity is dynamic. Identities and interests are always in process and reproduced via interaction among the actors. There may be seen relative stability in those; nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that they are given. Rather, this stable period can be "ongoing accomplishment of practices", which are elements of identity construction process (Wendt 1994: 386).

Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995: 73) have a similar approach to the constitution of the identity. They argue that "identity represents a reference by which costs and

benefits are defined and within the framework of which preferences are constructed.” They assume that the actor’s set of practices emerge as a result of this constructed identity. In other words, the actor takes a role, practices this role and creates its preferences in accordance with its constructed identity. Similar to Wendt, interaction among the actors is a key concept also for Eisenstadt and Giesen, in their approach to the process which shapes the identity of the actors. They conceptualize identity as follows: “It is the intentional or non-intentional consequence of interaction [that is] socially patterned and structured (1995: 74).” The identity construction process is not only about the actor itself but also contributed by all other actors which interact within the process. Identity of a particular actor includes inputs which evolved with the effect of other actors. Conceptualizing the identity as a product of interactive process brings two important consequences. Firstly, since it is constructed within the process, identity becomes a dynamic concept, which changes throughout the process. Secondly, since the product of the process is constructed via the interaction among the actors, the identity of each actor is mutually constituted by different actors’ contribution as similar to Wendt’s approach to identity construction.

Eisenstadt and Giesen argue that identity construction aims to create a similarity among the members of this identity (1995: 74). Social practices such as ceremonial rituals are used as tools of creating similarity within this process. Most important part in the identity construction is to define the “inside” and the “outside” (1995: 75). They argue that constructing the borders of intended identity constitutes the core of the identity formation process (1995: 74-75). According to them, as touched upon above, the identity is dynamic and thus subject to change. However, they underline that the process in which identities are constructed starts with the exploration of self-evident and given elements of spatial, temporal and individual

dimensions. At this point, Eisenstadt and Giesen predict that there are primordial roots of the actor's existence as a social object, as similar to Wendt's emphasis on corporate interests. The identity of the actor starts with the self-exploration of the "here", "now" and "I" (1995: 76). These are primordial and exogenously given elements of the identity. They are objective and unquestionable, thus not subject to change (1995: 76). They note that primordial elements constitute the first ideal type of collective identity. For example, the clan identity is based on the exploration of the kinship, which is a given and natural type of characteristic. In this regard, it can be asserted that although Eisenstadt and Giesen define identity as a dynamic concept, they argue that its construction starts with the exploration of constant and given elements.

Either "primordial elements" underlined by Eisenstadt and Giesen or "corporate interests" touched upon by Wendt are constant, independent of construction and the authors argue that these are prior to the process which shape the identity. According to Zehfuss (2001), such an approach towards the identity's roots has the potential to undermine its constructedness. Zehfuss criticizes Wendt's approach to identity and underlines that his recognition of "givenness" in the root of identity undermines his constructivism. She states that "Wendt needs identity to be constructed but at the same time in some ways given (2001: 316)." Identity is important to examine the basis for interests. In this regard, Zehfuss is in an agreement with Wendt about identity's significance in the analysis. She agrees that conceptions of self and other and consequently interests of the actors are shaped through the interactive process. Thus, interests of the actors are the results of the identity. General patterns of practices among the actors do not emerge as natural facts but they are shaped and reshaped within the process. However, Wendt's

approach to given “corporate interests” makes his conceptualization conservative and restrains its construction. Zehfuss summarizes Wendt’s approach to identity construction in three steps of which one represents “givenness” while two are based on interactive dimensions. “Signaling” is the first step where the actor notices given corporate interests. This step is the beginning of the existence of the actor as a social object. Following two steps are interactive: Interpretation and response. Interpretation of other actors about a particular actor’s existence and response to this existence are two elements of the interaction process. While the first step is directly about the actor, following two steps include the perceptions and perspectives of other actors. Furthermore, while first step is given and primordial, latter steps are interactive and available for further change. Thus, Zehfuss criticizes Wendt’s construction process of being limited only to outside world and conservative about actor’s own existence. The first step, which Wendt takes as prior to interaction process, is not subject to change through process. The process has the potential to reshape latter steps of the construction. Thus, Zehfuss argues that Wendt’s approach to identity construction process is not general enough to explain the structural changes in the identity. Rather, the construction that Wendt analyzes is the behavioral changes of the actors (2001: 319). After all, Zehfuss’ criticism on Wendt’s emphasis of given dimension of the identity, namely the corporate interests, can be taken as a general counter-argument for identity’s limited construction.

As similar to the general constructivist assumption, Checkel also argues that the study of politics is not just about the structure composed of actors with fixed given preferences, rather a contextual analysis of the process which reshapes and changes the preferences is needed (Checkel 1999). In this regard, the role and preferences of an actor is bound to the output derived from the construction process,

namely the identity. He emphasizes three schools of thought about identity formation. Rational choice school is based on the assumption that actors are constrained on the behavior derived from pre-given self-interested motivations. Historical institutionalist, on the other hand, actors are rational but institutions can affect the actor's way of existence in a long term. In this process, institutions can be both intervening and independent variables. Thus, it recognizes the changeability of the preferences. Finally, sociological institutionalist approach argues that institutions shape the identity and interests of the actors not only in a distant future but in a near-term. Checkel brings an institutionalist emphasis to interest and identity formation. He believes that institutions can be dominant sociological structures that have the potential to reproduce the general context of interaction. Thus, institutions are not only agents that are produced within the process; rather they construct and change the game of politics (Checkel 1999: 547). As a result, they can be independent variables, which are influential on the output that is the identity of the actors. His approach to the process is different from Wendt's. According to him, in the former constructivist literature, the process is defined as where random interaction among actors happens. However, he argues that the process is not based on random interaction; rather there is an asymmetry among the actors of interaction in the manner that broader institutional contexts such as norms and discursive structures are more capable to reshape the identities (1999: 549). Through the process in which institutional structures have a dominant influence on the output, the actors acquire new interests and preferences (1999: 548). At this point, Checkel also problematizes the effectiveness of the interaction process. According to him, the process shapes the identity of the actors when there is a high density of interaction. Continuousness of the interaction is an independent variable, which affects the output, the identity. In

sum, Checkel's approach to identity formation systematizes the patterns of relationship between actors of interaction process, and does not take the process as the set of random interaction in which actors have equal inputs.

Fierke and Wiener (1999) problematize a more specific point in the identity and interest formation. They focus on how institutional identities and interests are transformed (1999: 723). They build on a "Wittgensteinian" constructivist approach. They agree with the general argument shared in the constructivist literature: "context of social and cultural norms shapes actor identity and behavior. (1999: 723)." Besides, they recognize the inseparability of identities and interests. However, they criticize the identity conceptualization of sociological constructivists, such as Wendt. They believe that although Wendt criticizes the rational choice model's explanation of interest formation, he also takes rationality prior to the development of any identity formation process. Referring to Wendt's approach, they state that "in (such) constructivist accounts, meanings are instrumentally deployed by rational actors or rationality appears to be prior to the development of any shared context of meaning. (1999:724)." In other words, in Wendt's corporate interests, we encounter an actor which makes rational calculations of cost-benefit and attributes itself a given set of interests and preferences. According to Fierke and Wiener, this understanding remains limited to explain the preferences of actors which are beyond the calculations of material benefits. They build on Wittgensteinian understanding of interest formation "where meaning and language are central to the constitution of identity and interests (1999: 724)." According to this approach, norms and context are reduced to "causes" of constructed identity in Wendt's conceptualization. While Wendt questions what kind of outcome can be expected as a result of the identity construction process in which norms and context are social inputs, Fierke and Wiener

problematize the context itself by asking “in what kind of context the outcome would be meaningful (1999: 725).” To elaborate the context, they use Kratochwil’s emphasis on discourse and meaning. According to this approach, the discourse is the constituent element of identity and interest formation. Kratochwil argues that saying something is doing something (Kratochwil 1989: 8; Fierke and Wiener 1999: 727). However, language itself cannot be the focus of analysis to examine the identity formation. There is a relation between the meaning of the discourse and the context of the process. The discourse can have different meanings in different contexts. Furthermore, the discourse is not always observed in the form of language. Sometimes, practices of an actor can carry discursive meanings (Kratochwil 1989: 14). For instance, military exercise of a state can be a direct message to another state, although it is not delivered in the form of words.

Since there is a direct relationship between the context and the meaning of the discourse, changing context will naturally change the meaning of the interests and identities. In sum, identities and interests are constituted not only by the norms and other social inputs, but the relationship between the context of the process and the discourse of the actors may attribute new meanings to identities.

2.3. Turkish Civil-Military Relations

Since problems regarding civil-military relations have been a “never-ending” issue in Turkey, plenty of studies have been published to analyze Turkish military’s position in politics. Much of them agree on that Turkish Armed Forces’ position in Turkish politics cannot be observed as dependent from the position of army in Turkish

history (Tachau 1983; Heper 1996; Narlı 2000). Researchers on Turkish military agree on that the roots of the strong position of TAF can be observed in its active role in the “evolution of the social, economic and political structure of the Turkish state (Karabelias 1999: 130).”

Tachau and Heper (1983) correlate the military’s strong presence in Turkish politics with two factors. Firstly, as similar to general agreement in Turkish CMR literature, armed forces’ historical position in Turkish history enables military to exercise a wide range of political power compared to European armies. Tachau and Heper argue that the roots of military’s privileged position in Turkish society go even back to pre-Ottoman times. According to them, Muslim culture recognizes that army is an integral part of the community and over-glorifies its status as the saver. Thus, credibility that is attributed by Turkish society to the military is not only derived from army’s strong presence in Ottoman social life, but also because Turkish society is the heirs of Muslim culture (1983: 18). The prominent role that military took in modernization movements in 18th and 19th century also reinforced its position and turned military to an essential part of Turkish political life. Secondly, Turkish political culture is based on a high esteem to authority. “Turkish political culture has traditionally placed great value to governmental authority. No group could be expected to take this matter more seriously than the military (1983: 26).” Thus, Turkish Armed Forces filled the need of a strong political authority, which is a part of Turkish political culture, with the effect of its historical position in Turkish culture and politics. According to Tachau and Heper, the position of TAF can be classified somewhere between “moderator”, “guardian” and “ruler” military models (1983: 21). According to Nordlinger’s classification of armies, moderator and guardian army models are based on the conservative goal to preserve the prevailing status quo and

intervene in politics rather than seizing the power overtly like ruler army models. Looking at the three direct interventions of TAF until 1983, which is the year their article was published, Tachau and Heper puts TAF somewhere different from ruler army's of Latin America, although it is involved in direct governing mechanisms between 1960 and 1961, and between 1980 and 1983. Thus, according to Tachau and Heper, TAF can be classified as an army model which has moderator and guardianship functions due to its historical position within Turkish political culture, as well as a ruler army, which take over the governing mechanisms for particular time periods.

Historical legacy is an important factor that facilitates Turkish military to extend its role into civilian politics. However, Brown (1989) argues that this dimension alone cannot explain the all factors that led TAF to intervene politics. Actually, it was Mustafa Kemal who forced military out of politics and envisaged a political system in which military do not intervene into political processes.. However, Turkish military remained as a crucial element in Turkish domestic politics (Brown 1989: 400). Especially with late 1950's, it continuously kept a watchful eye on civilian governments. Since, Mustafa Kemal's ideas, which locate military outside of politics, are part of military's historical legacy, later political activism of TAF, which turned into three direct interventions to political process, needs explanation. In other words, historical legacy can explain political activism of Turkish military to some extent. Brown examines the officer recruitment patterns of TAF to see ties between its strong political position and composition of the officer corps. Brown observes that the officer corps of TAF is generally representative of wide range Turkish society (Brown 1989: 392-396). As a result of this representation capacity, they are attributed an important esteem from the rest of the society.

According to Brown (1989: 400), TAF “is sincere in its attachment to the democratic process and its concern that it works effectively.” However, since military’s role in the existence of the liberated nation is prominent, it keeps exercising high degree of autonomy. With the effect of its social representation capacity, military’s engagement with political processes is only challenged by a limited proportion of the society. As a result, Brown argues that justification of TAF’s guardianship role is the result of its officer corps’ composition (Brown 1989: 401).

Karabelias (1999: 139) argues that the special role of military, guarding the regime, caused military turn to a class within the society, just as worker class or peasant class. In such a structure, military has been capable to reproduce itself, renew its description of duty in accordance with the political conjuncture and determine its values with “minimum interference” of civilian segments of the society. This situation facilitated military to reinforce its inner cohesion and determine an identity. The officer corps, which Brown claims representing the general structure of Turkish society, constituted the core of this class.

Later studies are focused on bringing theoretical explanations to Turkish military’s strong political positions. Meanwhile, the tendency to correlate military’s strong position with its historical narrative remained popular. Narlı (2000) also emphasizes the relationship between army’s historical legacy and strong position of Turkish Armed Forces in politics. According to Narlı, TAF’s strong presence in the politics and society is the result of two essential factors. Firstly, Turkish military has appeared as defender of the national unity and secular democracy. Secondly, although the republican system decreed the equality of all citizens regardless of their differences, structure of Turkish society has been based on the vertically organized hierarchic Ottoman society system, in which armed forces find itself a room in the

ruling class (2000: 108). Besides, Narlı underlines military's prominent role in the Turkish modernization and the liberation process. These factors facilitate military to exercise a strong position as a privileged institution in Turkish state organization. However, the question of "why/when military intervenes in politics" still needs explanation. Narlı uses Schiff's Concordance model to explain the conflictual nature of Turkish civil-military relations. As mentioned in 2.1., Schiff's Concordance Theory predicts that agreement of three segments of society –military, political elites and citizenry- on four indicators –composition of the officer corps, decision-making, recruitment method and military style- decreases the likelihood of military intervention. In this regard, Narlı explains the unstable nature of Turkish civil-military relations with the "fragile concordance" among three segments of Turkish society on four indicators. The partnership among military, political elites and citizenry have been fragile due to the military's privileged position within Turkish political system, with the effect of its historical position and its position as the guard of the national unity and secular democracy (2000: 318).

More recent studies on Turkish civil-military relations recognize that with early 2000's, the pattern of civil-military relations in Turkey started to change (Demirel 2005; Satana 2008; Aydınlı 2010). In this new period, option of the military intervention started gradually fall off the agenda of Turkish politics. Demirel (2005) argues that this new understanding is derived from the Turkish society's past experiences of military interventions. According to Demirel (2005: 246), "nature of an outgoing authoritarian regime has a significant impact on a new democracy." In this regard, the past experiences of military regimes in Turkey contributed the democratic environment, which undermined the military's role. Demirel observes that the reason that Turkish military is credited by society is not only about military

and its historical narration that puts military into the hearth of nation's existence. Once we talk about societal judgment toward a regime type, it is inevitable to ignore the perceptions and normative values of society. According to Demirel (2005: 253), society makes comparison between democratically elected civilian governments and military regime, once the military intervenes. In Turkish case, while civilian government periods represent conflictual stalemates, economic collapses and corruption, military interventions have been seen as pragmatic and fast solutions to the deadlocks that civilians caused. In other words, civilian governments were so discredited that military interventions became a viable option in the perception of both society and military itself. However, these past experiences contributed to accumulation of democratic knowledge both in civilians and military elites. Thus, the new relatively democratic era, which started with the early 2000's, utilized this accumulation of democratic knowledge.

Satana (2008) observes a change in the patterns of civil-military relations in Turkey. According to Satana (2008: 357), the democracy in Turkey is passing through a consolidation process with the contribution of "lengthy but persistent transformation of the military." Satana (2008: 358-359) argues that democratization process is composed of two phases: transition and consolidation. Building on Linz and Stepan, democratic transition can be accounted to be complete when civilian government is elected in the free elections. Thus, Turkey has passed through and completed the transition period long ago. According to Satana (2008: 358), Turkey is "still struggling in the consolidation phase." In this phase she observes a diminishing tendency in the effect of the military over Turkish politics. At this point, Satana establishes the correlation between democratic consolidation and military's role on politics as different from the general assumption in the democratization literature,

that democratic consolidation diminishes military's role. According to her, democratic consolidation gained momentum in Turkey with the contribution of military's own commitment to transformation. She argues that (2008: 382) "Turkish military has been going through a gradual transformation of its behaviors to the society and civilian government" and this attitudinal change contributes the democratization of the political system in Turkey. Thus, diminishing effect of the military is not only the consequence of democratic consolidation but military's own transformation is also one of the significant contributors of this consolidation process.

Aydınlı (2009) agrees on that the common point in the literature that the Turkish society has seen the army as the ultimate guard of the regime. However, he also adds that "Turkey has been undergoing major democratic transformations (Aydınlı 2009: 581)." In this new era, the nature of the relationship between military and civilians is subject to change as well as the general paradigm of the politics. However, the question is whether TAF will adapt its new role in this new era. According to Aydınlı, position of TAF in Turkish society and politics does not fit with the four models of military typologies, namely European, Former Soviet, Latin American and American models. Rather, the military constitutes a protector of the regime, which is based on secular unitary state model. Aydınlı argues that this guardianship role satisfied throughout the republican era the expectancies of the society, which is constructed with the effect of two factors. Firstly, since Turkish military is recruitment method is based on a conscript army model, the credibility of the army among the societal segments has been always high. Secondly, the military also manipulated the hot topics of Turkish political agenda such as separatist terrorism and political Islam, to legitimize its strong presence within political issues.

Besides, the relationship between army and the society in Turkey is built on a centuries-long historical experience, in which military took political roles many times (Aydınlı 2009: 592-595). Although, the popularity of the military did not altered in this new era, Aydınlı argues that political reforms diminished the role of military and liberalized the political system in Turkey. Furthermore, Aydınlı calls this change a “paradigmatic shift” in the nature of the relationship between army and civilians and claims that coup era is closed in Turkey.

Review of the literature on Turkish civil-military relations shows that there is a general agreement on that Turkish military’s strong presence can be correlated with its historical role in Turkish modernization. Turkish military exercised a high degree of autonomy during some particular periods of republican era. However, another agreement point is that the nature of the civil-military relations in Turkey has been in a transformation since almost a decade. The nature of this alteration in the civil-military relations in Turkey begs an explanation, which this thesis seeks to analyze. The following section discusses the opportunities derived from three distinct literatures.

2.4. Gaps in the Literature and Opportunities for Further Theory Building

Reviews of distinct literature give us the opportunity to identify the gaps in these literatures and build an efficient theoretical framework to explain the military’s role in a constructional context.

In the CMR literature, the general tendency is to take the relationship between military and civilians as inherently conflictual. In other words, civil-military relations field is built on the possibility of military intervention to civilian process, if the

military is not controlled by civilian authorities. Yet, Schiff challenges this argument by stating that the relationship between military and civilians is not always built on a conflictual base as presented in Huntington's argument. In this regard, the concept of civilian control remains bound to specific cases. In some cases, the relationship can be built on a co-operative base, may be in the form of civil-military partnership. According to Schiff, the cultural issues are important in the construction of the core of relationship between military and civilians. This is important in terms of bringing cultural relativity dimension to CMR literature. Actually, scholars of CMR have been predicting factors that affect the military's role in the politics. They present several independent variables, which they claim increase or diminish the role of military in politics. Huntington argued that challenging external threat environment can increase the likelihood of a strong military model. Desch, on the other hand, stated that a military that faces external threat shall focus on the issues such as national security; thus, external threats have a diminishing effect on military's political role. Rather, he argued that internal threats may increase the likelihood of a political army. Janowitz claimed that isolation of the army from civilian segments of the society may cause politicization of the army, due to its discrete role in its inner processes. The isolation of army from the rest of the society deepens the gap between civilian and military worlds, and this increasing gap can cause a conflict in civil-military relations.

These are all independent variables, which CMR scholars argued to be effective on military's role. Still, these are presented as piecemeal arguments of their theoretical framework. Claim of such an independent variable means actually that in the absence of these variables, a different set of military role may appear. That shows that military's role is not inherited or fixed but shaped with the effect of several inputs. Constructivist literature sheds light to this role construction function of social

inputs. According to constructivist approach, roles and interests of the actors are not fixed or naturally embedded in the existence of the actors. Role of an actor is determined in accordance with its identity, which is the outcome of the construction process. At this point, the process is where social inputs interactively create an outcome. The thesis of “co-constitution” mentioned above presents opportunities to discover the social inputs that constitute the identities, policies and ideologies of the actors. In this regard, the identities of the actors may include “primordial elements”, which are pre-given and prior to the construction process. However, the process may alter the preferences and roles of the actors. Military is also an actor, which puts inputs into the process as well as shaped by it. Thus, constructivist approach offers opportunities to grasp the structural changes in the military’s role. Besides, it provides ground for a wider analysis of military’s interaction with different segments of the society.

Looking at the literature on Turkish civil-military relations, we see that scholars grasp that strong presence of Turkish Armed Forces within politics is built on a historical narrative, in which the army took active roles in nation-building and modernization processes. Second point that scholars agree is the presence of the support that is attributed to the military’s engagement with politics by the society. The army has been in a privileged position in the perception of Turkish society. Many scholars (Brown 1989; Narlı 2000; Heper 1996) argued that the popularity of the army in the Turkish society is also a consequence of the historical position of the military. Demirel (2005) correlated this popularity of army is the consequence of the failure of the civilian politicians. Finally, third point that can be observed in the literature is that the pattern of the civil-military relations of 2000’s in Turkey is different from the period started with 1980 coup. This change is related with the well

functioning of democratic process in post 2001 period (Demirel 2005), the transformation in the military's self-perception and democratic consolidation in Turkey, and finally with a paradigmatic shift in the nature of the civil-military relations in Turkey.

At this point, a constructivist approach to military's role may contribute to the literature by shedding light to the process in which different patterns of civil-military relations are constructed. Specifically in Turkish case, the guardianship role of the military is underlined by scholars of Turkish CMR. Then, the question is what social inputs have been effective in the construction of this role? How have these inputs been used as social instruments? How have they affected the social process in which military's identity, societal perception and political position of the military's constructed? On the other hand, if we are talking about a change in the civil-military relations with the beginning of the 2000's, this implies that a new construction process is being passed through, which produces a different outcome. Why such a new process has started? Which different social inputs have been effective in this new process?

After all, constructivist approach requires taking the military's intervention into civilian sphere is the result of such a construction of military's identity. A broader analysis should focus on the dimension of how this role is constructed. The difference between an interventionist army and a democratically controlled army lies in the differently evolved roles of these two army typologies. Thus, the theory should seek exploring the factors affecting the role construction process. Also, in the existing literature, military's role is evaluated generally on an institutional base. However, military is also a social actor. The institutional base on the military is useful to understand the inner conditions of military. However, within a social

constructivist framework, institutional definitions of the military's role are just one part in the formation of its general role in the society and politics. The core of the relationship between military and other societal actors is also directly related with the social construction of the military, its role and its perception in different domains. Any kind of relationship between military and civilians –conflictual or stable- is not a natural existence but an outcome of a constructed process. Hence, the theory should discover how these actors shape one another's structure. Finally, literature takes the civilian and political segments under the same unit of society, as civilian. As Schiff indicates, in several models, it is not unusual to see dramatic differences among civilians, political leaders and military in terms of perceptions. In some cases, two of these actors can act co-operatively while one has a different attitude, or each of these three actors can have discrete positions. Therefore, political sphere should be analyzed distinctively from civilians and military, although it constitutes an integral part of the society.

In the next chapter, I focus on the Turkish case as a “theory-building case” to examine different processes of military's role construction.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY-BUILDING CASE STUDY: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TURKISH CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

3.1 Theoretical Contribution of the Case Study

Armed forces have been established as a modern institution to provide a self-guard to state. While the nation-state model has been changing since Westphalia, the structure of the military has also been subject to change in its context and nature. Military's relationship to the civilian world constitutes the core of civil-military relations studies. Peter Feaver explains the classical debate of CMR as the scholarly effort to guard the civilians from the institution that was founded to guard the civilians (Feaver 1992). Thus, as the previous chapter shows, existing literature on CMR focuses more on the problem of keeping the military subject to civilian supremacy and less on how military's role in a society is constructed. Anthony Forster names this former understanding of civil-military relations scholarship as the "old Civil-Military Relations" (2002), while Rebecca Schiff refers to it as "normal theory of CMR" (Schiff 2011). This approach to CMR can be challenged in terms of several points.

First, the focus of “Old CMR” has been narrow and conservative. Civil-military relations are a field, which has come into vogue especially in the Cold War era. This era was predominantly shaped by the perception of the threat coming from an external party. Hence, the focus of CMR was undoubtedly affected from the security concepts of the Cold War paradigm. Specific case studies, as well as theoretical works, were written in a paradigm which was shaped by the Cold War’s security perceptions. Since these concepts were defined in such an era, military definitions of these concepts have come forward (Burk 2002: 9). The construction of these definitions has caused politically active military models, which have tendency to guide political process in accordance with the militarily defined security concepts.

Accordingly, in the western world, where CMR field has been intensively studied, the field is based on the analysis of conflictual relations with military and civilians. For example, according to Hendrickson, development of civil-military relations field is directly related with the American Military’s over engagement with the political process especially in early 1970’s (Hendrickson 1988). On the other hand, it was the military itself, which was seen as the guardian of the political system in the Second World. The Soviet system was based on a huge bureaucratic guarding elite in which military constituted the most important and vivid cornerstone (Taylor 2003: 175-205). As a result of this era, CMR scholars narrowed the focus of the field to the problem of controlling the military in the democratic political system. The relationship between military and civilians has been defined in an inherently conflictual way. The demise of the Cold War paradigm rendered this conservative CMR understanding narrow. Rather the “new” civil-military relations studies should cover the issues not only as a conflictual sphere between military

and civilians but also as an interactive area in which each actor has an effect on other actors' role, if possible in a partnership context (Schiff 1995).

Secondly, in the existing CMR literature, institutions have been main referent objects. According to Forster (2002), scholars coming from realist and neo-realist school in the CMR field have an understanding that states are the major actors which shape the political structure. Thus, the civilian part of the CMR is considered as the institutions that are formed by civilians, which constitute the civilian wing of the state structure. According to Buzan and Waever's securitization theory of international relations, since the major referent object has been the state in former security studies, security is expectably conceptualized in a state-centric approach in world affairs (Buzan and Weaver 2009).

Although Buzan and Waever tackle international relations, the outcome of such a state-centric approach to politics leads to the neglect of the differentiation of citizenry and civil society from the civilian political institutions in domestic political studies. As a result of the strict institutionalist emphasis in the field, vast majority of the CMR scholarship focused on the nature of relation between military and political institutions. This is not problematic from an analytical institutionalist's point of view that presupposes that institutions shape the society and, as a result, represent the cleavages within the society.

However, this understanding has limitations. Rebecca Schiff (1995; 2009) argues that current CMR theories rely on political institutions as the main civilian component of analysis and neglect the differentiation between the opinions of political institutions and citizenry (1995: 13). For example, according to data presented in Kull et al., the public support for Iraq War was as low as 30% in the

countries which sided with the U.S., while political authorities of these countries were in alliance with the U.S. administration (Kull, Ramsay et al. 2004).

Another example of the discrepancy has been experienced in Turkey in 2003, during the debate about sending troops to Iraq. After getting the absolute majority in the Parliament in 2002 elections,³ Justice and Development Party (JDP) faced the decision of whether to support U.S. in a possible operation to Iraq. After several meetings in the U.S., the government decided to support the Iraqi operation. However, this caused a visible negative attitude in Turkish public opinion (Gordon and Shapiro 2004: 76-81). As a result, the strong antiwar public opinion showed its effect in the Parliament, and the proposal was rejected by not only the votes of opposition party but also the, JDP's parliamentarians⁴. In sum, the civilians that are mostly considered as unitary do not always react to political decisions in the same way.

The civilian control of the military is consolidated via the institutions. These institutions, which are components of civilian bureaucracy, should develop an institutional memory to be efficient control mechanisms (Forster 2002: 77). On the other hand, the institutional memory of the military is another important condition to maintain a stable civil-military interaction. Construction of these memories occurs within a process in which civilian and military components of the analysis get into interaction in different domains.

In the light of these points, in this chapter I aim to carry out an analysis of the construction of the military's role in the Turkish political system by concentrating on processes instead of outcomes. In this analysis, the focus is not

³ JDP got the 34.7% of the votes in the elections; however, due to the 10% election barrier, it got the 371 of the 550 seats in the Parliament.

⁴http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/bASjtdmm2MHxi_x2F_6lgnekLw_x3D_x3D_ (Last Access: 20.07.2011)

only the relationship between military and political system, rather I extend the scope of analysis into three domains of analysis. First, it is important to discover how military perceives its own role and which steps it follows to construct its own identity. Thus, analyzing the self-perception of military on its role in the political system is important in terms of elaborating the process in which military's role is constructed (Nunn 1995). Self-perception is also important to analyze the changing role of military (Perlmutter 1980: 99). For example, so called "Redemocratization" of the Latin American regimes is directly related with the reconstruction of the self-perception of the Latin American armies (Perlmutter 1980: 103).

Secondly, I analyze the construction of military's role in the societal domain. This domain is divided into two divisions: Political sphere and citizenry. I focus on these two divisions of the society separately. In this context, I elaborate the question of how the military's role is constructed in the perception of the society. According to Rosen, society and the societal perception of the political concepts matter in terms of determining the military's position both in internal and external politics (Rosen 1995). Hence, the empirical data, which show how militarily defined concepts are perceived by the civilian segments is utilized to contribute to the theoretical framework.

Finally, the external factors' effect on military's position in the political system is elaborated. In civil-military relations theory literature, the external factors have been examined generally on the basis of the threat concept. It is generally accepted that if the state is under certain external threats and feels itself insecure, its military is more likely to have political power in internal politics (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Feaver 1992). On the other hand, Desch suggests a counter argument. Desch's main argument is that there will be greater civilian and military

disunity, and a consequent weakening of civilian control in a less challenging external threat environment (Desch 2008). However, external relations of the country with international organizations, which develop its own criteria of civil-military relations, such as European Union, is also an important factor on the role of this country's military. In this context, I examine the Turkish case in the order mentioned above.

3.2. Role Construction Process of Military

Military's role in the political system is associated to its position in that political system. This role is either constructed or attributed to it by different actors. According to an interpretivist approach, an actor's way of existence is not only related to its own attitude but also to other actors' perception of this actor (Green 2002: 14). In other words, existence is also the outcome of how it is narrated by different actors. This approach is applicable to analysis of military's position in the society. In this section, as previously explained, I carry out an analysis on the construction of Turkish Armed Forces' role in three domains. The first domain of analysis focuses on organizational domain: military's self-construction of its role. The second one is the societal domain, which I separated into two: Political sphere and citizenry and I analyze how these two civilian domains constructed the military's identity.

3.2.1. Organizational Domain: Military's Self-Perception of Its Role, 1980-2001

According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), an organization institutionalizes its mission by creating its "formal structure" (1977:347). The formal structure of the organization is not only based on the legal document that regulates its status and working procedures. Formal structure is the aggregation of the organization's legal status and its own perception of this status. This approach is simply applicable to civil-military relations theory. In the same way, it can be asserted that civil-military conflict occurs when two components of formal structure differ significantly from each other. The mission of the military is determined under constitutions, laws or service codes. Description of military's duty, mission and its organizational autonomy is legalized within these documents. This is the legal component in the formal structure of military. However, Meyer and Rowan (1977: 351) argue that the legal component in the formal structure generally holds a minor significance comparing to organizational perception of this legal status. Although legal status constitutes the basis of the institution's role and function, this legal border can expand further due to a broader interpretation of its status by the institution. Thus, the self-perception of the institution about its role and function becomes a corner stone in the formation of its institutional identity. Applying this framework to civil-military context, it can be asserted that composition of military's formal structure determines its role in the political system. At this point, there are two important aspects that should be considered. First, it is important to analyze which component is more dominant in the composition of military's formal structure. Is the formal structure of military shaped by its legal status or by its self-perception, predominantly? Second question that should be taken into account is that what is

the degree of deviation of military's self-perception from its legal status. To what extent the role that military attributes itself reaches beyond the borders determined in the legal documents? These two dimensions are elaborated further within empirical analysis.

“Organizational Field” is a similar concept that was suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) to explain an institution's position in the political system. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define this concept as the specific sector determined by the organization to create its peculiar practices (1983: 153). Accepted forms of practices constitute the borders of institution's description of duty. Organizational field is determined according to the practices that are internalized by the organizations acting in similar fields. In general, military constitutes the monopoly in the security sector. Thus, one can assert that the organizational field of military, which includes the determination of military's role, is determined by military itself (Finer 2002: 142). On the other hand, it is also possible to argue that security sector is globalized, thus, global security sector is composed of different military organizations. As a result of this holistic definition of the security sector, it could be asserted that the organizational field in which a specific military acts in is determined by the practices, norms and definitions by other military's, which are members of the global security sector. Since the formation of military has some peculiar characteristics related with its geographical location (Collins 1998), regime type (McKinlay and Cohan 1975) and political culture (Farrell 1998), I argue that homogenization of forms of practices by different military organizations is not completely possible, thus, military has a considerable autonomy in determining its organizational field.

These two concepts are important to understand the process in which military's self-construction of its role emerges. Turkish case demonstrates how Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) has constructed its self-identification. The role perception of TAF in politics can be explained by the construction of its formal structure and organizational field.

Scholars studying on Turkish civil-military relations generally agree that TAF has a dominant role in Turkish political system, whose borders reach beyond the liberal western model of civil-military settings (Tachau and Heper 1983; Brown 1989; Hale 1994; Heper and Güney 1996; Narlı 2000). The republican era has been intervened by two military coups in 1960 and 1980, and a memorandum in 1971, which caused the collapse of the government. Moreover a so-called e-memorandum led to the resignation of the government in 1997. The formal structure of the TAF is one reflection of this politically active military model. As mentioned above, formal structure consists of two components: legal status, and organizational perception of this status.

3.2.1.1. Formal Structure: 1980-2001

Major source of TAF's legal status in the political system between 1980 and 2001 is the 1982 Constitution of Turkey. The 1982 Constitution was prepared after a military coup in 1980, which overthrown the government and set up a military regime which ended with the elections in 1983. The junta established National Security Council (NSC)⁵ just after the coup. This council was presided by the Chief

⁵ This is not the same institution that is regulated in Article 118 of Turkish Constitution. The National Security Council, which still exists as a constitutional organ, will be elaborated later.

of General Staff, Kenan Evren, and composed of four other commanders of forces.⁶ An advisory council is formed by the initiative of this NSC to prepare a new constitution. Members of the advisory council was directly assigned by NSC and General Evren (Özbudun 1996: 125). Since the 1982 Constitution is prepared by the absolute supervision of the organs initiated by the junta regime, this constitution is the outcome of a military regime and draws very broad borders for military's status in the political system. According to Cizre, the constitution attributes a tutelary role to the military on Turkish political system (Cizre Sakallıoğlu 1997). There are specific articles in the Constitution, which regulate the constitutional status of TAF. According to Article 117 of the Constitution, the Supreme Commander of Military is the president. However, this duty carries a symbolic meaning. The Chief of General Staff does this duty on behalf of the President during wartime. The Chief of the General Staff is appointed by the President upon the offer of the Council of Ministers.

The same article renders the Chief of General Staff responsible against the Prime Minister. This situation is discussed in the literature in terms of being appropriate for having a democratic model of civil-military relations. According to Volten and Drent (2008) there is not any single model of practice in Europe in terms of institutional position of the chief of general staff (Volten and Drent 2008: 15). Their empirical research on Germany, France and Romania shows that the organizational scheme, which regulates the position of chief of general staff towards the civilian government, can vary from case to case in European model of civil-military relations. On the other hand, others argue that in the western model of civil-military relations, the chief of general staff is subject to the control of the

⁶ Names and positions of the commanders: Nurettin Ersin (Commander of Land Forces), Nejat Tümer (Commander of Naval Forces), Tahsin Şahinkaya (Commander of Air Forces), Sedat Celasun (General Commander of Gendarmerie)

Ministry of National Defense (Diamond and Plattner 1996; Cizre 2004). According to this group, TAF's position is problematic because of its responsibility to the Prime Minister but not to Minister of National Defense. This shows that TAF has a privileged institutional position in Turkish political system. Besides, since Office of the Chief of the General Staff is subordinate to the Prime Ministry, the Chief of General Staff's position in the state protocol list is at fourth place following the Prime Minister, which is above the place of ministers including Minister of National Defense⁷.

The Internal Service Law of Turkish Armed Forces is another legal source, which regulates armed forces' duty and position. The law was first initiated after 1960 coup. Article 35 of this law has been in the centre of discussion about Turkish civil-military relations. The article entrusts Turkish Armed forces to protect and watch over Turkish Homeland and Republic that are defined in the constitution. This article is referred by TAF several times as the legal source of its intervention in political process. In the announcement of the 1980 coup, General Kenan Evren made reference to this article and pointed out that TAF decided to do its duty defined in the Internal Service Law and seized the control of government⁸. Sariibrahimoğlu argues that this article gives TAF a political power and source of legitimization for its interventions into political process (2006). The article enables TAF to protect the country against external threats as well as internal threats. However, since the definition of internal threat is controversial, the article gave TAF an area in which it can make its own threat conceptualizations. For example,

⁷ For more information on state protocol list, please see: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_b_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=1962&P5=B&page1=61&page2=61 (Last Access: 4.07.2011)

(Official webpage of Turkish Grand National Assembly)
⁸ Turkish version of the declaration is on http://www.belgenet.com/12eylul/12091980_01.html Last (Access: 4.07.2011)

in the declaration of 1980 coup, General Evren stated that “deviant ideological opinions” emerged which led to military intervention. In other words, several ideological positions were demonized by TAF and perceived as threats against the existence of Republic.

Another problematic point in the TAF’s legal position between 1980 and 2001 is about the status and composition of the National Security Council (NSC). Roots of this organ dates back to early republican era. In 1933, Supreme Defense Council was founded as an institutional organ which was dominated by civilian politicians. However, with the coup in 1960, this council was abolished; instead, the new constitution in 1961 established a new council under the name of National Security Council. The number of the civilians in the council was significantly decreased with the new regulation brought by 1961 Constitution. The council is reserved after the 1980 coup and placed in the new constitution, which entered into force in 1983. According to Article 118 of 1980 Constitution, the Council was composed of five civilian and five military members and the president of the Council was the Head of State. Since the decisions were made by majority vote, with the presidency of Kenan Evren, who was elected as the president in the constitutional referendum in 1982, the Council turned into a soldier-dominated organ (Zürcher 2004: 176-206). Between 1980 and 2001, article 118 of the Constitution stated that the decisions of NSC are taken into government’s agenda with priority. Thus, the NSC became not only an advisory council but also a dictating organ over the civilian governments.

Beside the legal position of Turkish Armed Forces, it is also important how TAF perceives its own role. At this point, it is important to further elaborate the historical position of the army in Turkish politics. Turkish Armed Forces has

always associated its position with its historical role in Turkish politics. According to official webpage of the Land Forces, establishment date of Land Forces is given as 209 B.C., which is the establishment date of Hun Army by Mete Khan (Modu Chanyu).⁹ This shows that TAF intends to establish a correlation between historical myth of armed forces and its current position in the politics.

According to Karabelias (1999), any analysis intending to examine Turkish military's position in politics would remain shallow without observing its role in earlier periods (Karabelias 1999: 131). According to many researchers on Ottoman and Turkish history, the army has been one of the most important elements in the social, economic and political structure of the Ottoman era. Ottoman societal structure composed of two groups. The ruling class was including the Sultan, military officers, bureaucratic and religious elite, *ulema*. This class had the monopoly on access to governing mechanisms. Second group was the *re'aya* that composed of ordinary population including both muslim and non-muslims. This group had no access to government (Levy 1982). As cited in Karabelias (1999: 130), Lybyer (1913) stated that "the Ottoman government had been an army before it was anything else. In fact army and government were one." Considering the Ottoman political structure, this analogy seems fair to describe the military's position in Ottoman politics. Military officers were not only soldiers who were responsible to serve in military affairs, rather, high ranked officers were also appointed as *nazır*, which were the ministers. These officers were not only appointed as "*harbiye nazırı*" which means minister of war, but they also became ministers in other fields. There have been eight *maliye nazırı*, the minister of treasury, from 1891 to 1909 who were serving as officers in the Ottoman Army

⁹ <http://www.kkk.tsk.tr/GenelKonular/Tarihce/> (Last Access: 4.07.2011)

(Pakalın 1944: 48). These officers were not required to retire from the Army when they were appointed as members of the cabinet. Thus, the military had a room in the politics.

Role of military in Ottoman system was not only about its active involvement in the administrative processes. Much of the researchers on Ottoman history agree that the military had a catalyst role in the transformation of the Ottoman political system. In the beginning of the 19th century, Ottoman elites realized that the state remained considerably inferior compared to continental European powers and Britain. The acceptance of Europeans' economic, technical, military and political superiority triggered several reform initiations. The reforms initiated between 1789 and 1807 were named as *Nizam-ı Cedid* which means new order. These reforms were initiated first towards the military restructuring. Sultan Selim III formed a new structure within the army and this new model was named *Nizam-ı Cedid* Army. The ultimate goal of this new structuration in the army was to catch the European rivals' military superiority (Shaw 1965). This army was built to create a military capable of being mobilized with the order of its commander who is responsible against the Sultan. Strong autonomy of the Janissary Army was seen as the source of instability and anti-Sultan coup attempts which reached its peak during late 18th century. Hence, *Nizam-I Cedid* was an army model which was responsible and controlled directly by the head of the state, the Sultan, as similar to its European counterparts. Following this restructuring in the Army, new officers were disciplined to catch the European trends. After the death of Selim III, the abolishment of the Janissary Army by Sultan Mahmud II was another important step to form a modern army. Mahmud II suppressed the Janissary riot in 1826 with a severe violence and following the fights, he declared that Janissary Army is

abolished to be replaced by a newly structured modern army (Levy 1971). The new army, *Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-yi Muhammediye*, was more autonomous comparing to Selim III's *Nizam-I Cedid* Army. Although it was directly subordinate to the Sultan Mahmud II, its internal processes such as promotions of the officers and curricula of education were left to high ranked officers. Members of the officer corps were sent to several European countries as military attaché. Besides, the military schools were organized with a modern structure similar to European military educational institutions (Levy 1971: 27). Thus, it can be asserted that the Europeanization and modernization efforts were first initiated in the military in Ottoman Empire. In other words, military personnel were the only members of ruling class who were educated in institutions that were organized similar to its European counterparts. This background of military personnel helped to the creation of a cohesive institutional identity. Military elites gradually came to believe that military should be the leading and pushing force for the modernization efforts.

Such a self-perception showed its effect on major constitutional changes in Ottoman Empire. Military figures were the dominant pushing force during the proclamation of the *Kanun-i Esâsî* of 1876, which is accepted as the first written constitution of Ottoman Empire. Midhat Pasha who was claiming that the Ottoman state structure should be based on a constitutional framework, was the leader of the council that prepared this constitution (Mithat 1973: 71). During the political crisis, which was caused by the opposition of Sultan Abdulaziz against the preparation of a constitution, Midhat Pasha and the movement gathered around him was so strong that were capable to disenthroned two Sultans; Abdulaziz and Murad V (Devereux

1963). Following the Abdulhamit's succeeding to the crown, the constitution was imposed on him by Midhat Pasha and the pro-constitution movement around him.

Military's role in the political change has been significant also during the republican era. Current Turkish political system is the outcome of a revolution which was led by strong military figures. Many scholars agree that the idea of a radical transition from an Islamic empire to a modern republican political system did not have a broad ground at the society during the time revolution was initiated (Ahmad 1993; Lewis 2002). The leader of the movement, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was an Ottoman officer before his principal resignation from the military with the intention to mobilize a national liberation movement. According to Ahmad, republican system in which the sovereignty has given to people but not to traditional religious authorities was not familiar with Turkish society during the Turkish War of Independence. Rather it was the radical reform plan of a small military elite led by Mustafa Kemal (1993: 41). Thus, the formation of modern Turkish political system can be accepted as an outcome of a revolution process which was initiated, mobilized and finalized by strong military figures.

Koonings and Kruijt (2002: 19) use the concept of "birthright principle" to explain the politicization of a military and define this concept as "... the military [is] perceived to have been at the birth of the nation, or that without sacrifices by the armed forces the nation would not have been formed or survived. Moreover, it is not important whether the myth is historically true." What matters is that military narrates such a foundational myth and places itself in the centre of the nation's liberation and existence. They argue that Turkey would be the best example of the military models which associates its foundational myth with such a liberation movement and places itself in the construction of the current Turkish political

system. Turkish Armed Forces' founding role granted military a wide sphere in which military act and became politicized. Turkish political system has been classified as a typical regime in which military attributes itself a strong guardianship role (Güney 2002: 162-178). Military's self-perception regarding to its guarding role on the regime has fed from its historical legacy. As cited in Güney (2002), Özdağ stated that Atatürk defined military's role as "the ultimate guardian of the republic" (2002: 163).

After defining the TAF's role based on its historical legacy, its practices regarding its self-perception of guardianship can be examined between 1980 and 2001. TAF has had a politically active character in this period. Military's self-perception of its role has continued to internalize the mission of guardianship. Military's formal structure has exceeded the borders drawn in the legal documents due to the broad self-perception of its role. First, it should be noted that this period that I examine starts with a military coup which brought a junta regime that lasted for three years. The reasons of the coup can be discussed within a broad context which examines internal and external causes; however, it is fair to underline that one of the reasons that encouraged military to intervene in democratic process is its self-perception of guarding function. The signs of this self positioning are observable in the proclamation text of 12 September 1980 coup. On 12 September 1980, General Evren, the chief of the general staff and the leader of the junta gave voice to the proclamation on state radio channel, and reasoned this intervention as "...to maintain the national unity, restore the security of life and property by preventing anarchy and terrorism... (Brown 1989: 391)" The proclamation made a direct reference to the Internal Service Law as the source of the intervention's legitimacy. It shows that two components of military's formal structure consolidate

each other. While the legal definition of military's role is referenced as the source of legitimacy, this legal status causes the extension of military's function which enables it to intervene in democratic process. Another reflection of the military's self-perception of its guarding function is its attitude towards the political activities and democratic process. The junta declared that all political activities were stopped and political parties were banned. However, it was also stated that the aim of the intervention was to eliminate the reasons that prevent democratic system from functioning. This message was to imply that the junta's plan was not to stay for a long time such as happened in Latin American military coups, but to allow political process to continue. Military's guardianship perception has depicted itself in the preparation of the constitution that was presented in 1982 referendum. Regulations on the status of NSC decisions and its composition is another evidence of military's self-perception of its role which is the dominant component in the military's formal structure. In 1982 constitution, the NSC was formed as an institution in which military personnel constitute the majority. Besides, it was stated that the decisions of this organ are given priority by the government. According to Güney (2002), the structure of the NSC between 1980 to early 2000's was one of the cornerstones of the tutelary role of the military in Turkish politics.

The self-perception of TAF has affected also the post-coup period. The junta and General Evren intended to shape the post-coup political structure by letting only three political parties to enter into elections. Moreover, the parties had to get the confirmation of General Evren for each candidate who would compete in the election held in 1983 (Birand 1987). I argue that the junta's intention was to create a party system which is similar to British or American cases. In such a model, two or three major parties get the biggest share of the votes whereas small

parties remain symbolic political actors and outside of the parliamentary representation. Thus, Turgut Özal's Mother Land Party (MLP), Turgut Sunalp's Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP) and Erdal İnönü's Populist Party (PP) had been the three political parties to represent whole political spectrum in Turkey. The Mother Land Party and Nationalist Democracy Party were two parties to represent the center-right and right tendencies while Populist Party was representing social democratic and center-left tendency. According to some, the junta supported implicitly Turgut Sunalp's NDP, and this party was designed to govern the post-coup civilian politics. However, the junta was surprised when the election results were declared because MDP has got the 23% of the votes while Özal's MLP got 45% and had the right to form a single party government (Waterbury 1992: 131).

Turkish Armed Forces' self-perception of its role has been reinforced by two threat conceptualizations: Political Islam and Kurdish separatism. These two issues have been the major cruxes of Turkish political agenda especially during the period between 1980 and 2001. The Kurdish question of Turkey has been somehow kept under control until late 1970's. The Kurdish political movement has been placed within several leftist movements rather than being organized as specific ethnic oriented movements. Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) was established by Abdullah Öcalan and his friends in 1978. The movement turned into a paramilitary organization with the first attacks to military units in Eruh and Şemdinli in 1984. Actors of Turkish politics and military perceived this movement as a sole security problem during middle 1980's (Ergil 2000). As Global Terrorism Database (GTD) illustrates, PKK attacked more on Kurdish civilians in the southeast Turkey rather than military targets in 1980's. With early 1990's it attacked more intensely on security forces including police and gendarmerie. Some scholars called this period

as a typical ethnic civil war (Kaufmann 1996: 136; Cornell 2001: 31). Intensity of the confrontations reached its peak during 1992, 1993 and 1994. The military was seen as the major and single method to fight PKK during this period. Military's conceptualization of security has been the dominant element that affected Turkish political agenda. The military's self-perception of its guarding role has been reinforced both among military personnel and at institutional domain. Thus, it can be argued that construction of military's perception of its guarding role has been directly affected by the Kurdish question which was defined as a security problem during this period. In other words, the Kurdish separatism reinforced further the self-perception of military about its guardianship function on the territorial integrity of the country.

Secondly, guarding discourse of TAF focused on the secular regime of Turkey. Political Islam and "reactionary" movements were defined as one of the major threats to Turkey's democracy in the National Security Policy Document (NSPD) that was prepared in this period (Akay 2009). Akay indicates that the threat conceptualizations in this document were directly made by military elites who were the dominant in the NSC (2009: 11). The document which was prepared in 1991 and updated in 1997 was a direct evidence that military perceives its role as the guardian against this threat, because the document was saying that military is the guarantee of the Turkish Republic in the fight against these internal threats (Akay 2009: 12).

Military's perception of guardianship showed itself in the form of direct intervention to political process in the period between 1980 and 2001. Political Islam in Turkey has preferred to take place in center right parties such as Democratic Party, Justice Party until the beginning of the 1970's. Necmettin

Erbakan, who was elected as an independent deputy from Konya in 1969 elections, established National Order Party (NOP) in June 1970. Two other deputies joined to NOP and the party was represented with three deputies in the parliament until it was banned in March 1971 due to “being the focus of the reactionary movements” (Kona 2006). Second party of political Islam in Turkey, National Salvation Party (NSP) was founded by the same political figures gathered around Necmettin Erbakan in 1972. Although NSP did not have any absolute election success, throughout the 1970’s it took parts in three coalition governments (Toprak 1984: 133). The 1980 military coup banned NSP with all other political parties. The movement established a new party, Welfare Party (WP) in 1983 to participate upcoming elections. However the junta did not let Necmettin Erbakan and his friends enter into elections in 1983 which was the first elections held after 1980 military coup. WP entered into the parliament in 1991 elections. The local election of 1994 was the first serious election success of the political Islam in Turkey. WP got the 19% of the votes and became second party after MLP. Besides, it took the municipality of two biggest cities, Istanbul and Ankara. Following year, results of the general elections depicted the rise in the votes of political Islam .WP got the 21% of the votes and the majority in the parliament. It alarmed the laicist settings in Turkey including the military. Although WP got the majority in the parliament, it could not succeed to get the support of other parties to form a coalition government. However, in 1996, WP got the support of True Path Party (TPP) and leader of WP, Necmettin Erbakan became prime minister. Looking at its historical path, it is clear that political Islam became one of the major actors of Turkish politics in last 25 years which started with election defeats but succeed to get on power.

The guardianship perception of military was once more triggered by this election success of political Islam. Erbakan's prime ministry created an observable counter attitude among military elites and it renewed military's traditional intention to refashion Turkish politics (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 310). The decisions taken in the summit of National Security Council (NSC) which was held in 28 February 1997 started a process which ended with the ban of WP. The President Süleyman Demirel chaired the meeting of NSC which was dominated by military staff in that time. According to many researchers, the decisions taken in that meeting were made by coercion of military. Erbakan's resistance¹⁰ to sign the declaration of the decisions proved that the decisions were targeting WP and the political tendency of the movement. Besides, after the summit, WP wanted to soothe the tension and stated that the decisions were taken co-operatively within NSC; however, the Office of Chief of the General Staff refuted this public release and stated that "Turkish Armed Forces works in harmony only with those who internalize the fundamental principles of the secular republic founded by Atatürk."¹¹ The decisions were bringing several regulations in many ordinary areas of life which military cannot be even thought to intervene in any western democracy. According to these decisions, it was stated that eight year compulsory education is needed; all of the dormitories should be controlled by Ministry of National Education, religious personnel should be educated in harmony with Atatürkist thought; Supreme Military Council should be used effectively to obviate reactionary movements to get into TAF. Within this process, the representatives of higher judiciary organs were invited to the Office of

¹⁰ Many of the newspaper in that period has written that the Prime Minister did not want to sign the decisions taken in the summit. One of these newspaper headlines can be found at: http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/zitFJfbkeiqNU5RZSP9LBg_x3D_x3D (Last Access: 12.06.2011)

¹¹ http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/zitFJfbkeiqNU5RZSP9LBg_x3D_x3D (Last Access: 12.06.2011)

Chief of the General Staff and given briefings about “threat” of reactionary movements. The process was not a sole legal tension between the military and the civilian authority. Many other actors such as President, civil societal network and media were mobilized for an anti-government attitude (Cizre and Çınar 2003: 310). Welfare Party was banned due to “being the focus of movements against secularism”¹² in January 1998 following the trial in the Constitutional Court.

The process showed that the military have not refrained intervening politics and reconfigure the political fragmentation in the country. Military’s perception of its role provided a justification to military when it feels the need to restructure the politics. Given that the empirical analysis, two predictions can be made regarding the TAF’s formal structure. First, the dominant component in the military’s formal structure is its self-perception of its role. The legal status, which is the other component of the formal structure, has been restored in accordance with the military’s self-perception in the era between 1980 and 2001. Thus, broader self-interpretation of the role caused expansion of military’s legal status. Considering that the legal status of the civil-military relations in Turkey between 1980 and 2001 were determined after a coup, it is obvious that military prepared the legal source of its strong position within the context of the constitution and specific laws. Second, as a result of construction of military’s legal status in accordance with its perception, the deviation between two components has not been dramatic. Rather, the legal status of the military has been restored in post-coup era to constitute a source of legitimacy for military’s perception of its position in the political system. Thus, the deviation between two components has not been the core of the instability of civil-military relations, as the sociological institutionalist theory suggests.

¹² http://www.belgenet.com/dava/rpdava_g01.html (Last Access: 14.06.2011)

Instead, preponderancy of the military's self-perception in the construction of military's formal structure resulted in expansion of the sphere of military. Thus, I argue that the core of the instability in civil-military relations is not the difference between two components of formal structure but one component intends to expand other one's borders.

After this discussion, the question is whether a hypothesis can be generated from this section. Looking at the discussion of the formal structure of TAF, it is possible to assert that military perceives its current role as a continuation of its active historical position in Turkish politics. Once the focus is military, traditions, history and myths about this institution reinforce the organizational wisdom of the institution and cause a broad and rigorous self-perception of its role, which becomes problematic in terms of stable and democratic civil-military relations. The historical narration can be based on the leading role of the military in a war of independence or on being catalyst of modernization. However, presence of a historical legacy does not automatically cause a politically active military model in the future politics. We may observe many militaries with the claim of historical legacy, but not politically active today. For instance, German military, which took a prominent role in the German unification and nation-building processes, cannot be classified as a political army today. The reason behind this specific case may be the absolute defeat of the German army in Second World War. This experience caused a deep break off between pre-War and post-War Germany. In other words, the paradigm of politics in pre-War Germany was completely different from the period following the Second World War. The new paradigm of the politics has been settled on the experience of the defeat in Second World War. The political system in which Turkish Armed Forces takes its place, on the other hand, is the continuation of the

new system, which was established by a movement led by strong military figures. Thus, although there have been many significant developments, which affected the political process during the era from 1923 to today, the regime is still based on the same paradigm, which was imposed by military elites as the new political system of the country in 1923. Thus, it can be asserted that this historical experience of Turkish military has an increasing effect on the determination of military's self-perception of its role. Based on this assumption, below hypothesis can be formulated:

- A military, which played a prominent role in state/nation-building, modernization and social evolution processes might attribute itself a politically active role in the post-state/nation-building period.

3.2.1.2. Organizational Field of Turkish Armed Forces: 1980-2001

Organizational field of the Turkish military is considerably broad compared to other military organizations in European and western model of civil-military relations. Its activities can reach beyond the borders of the military affairs and penetrate into civilian spheres of which examples I examine below. In this section, I examine the activities of TAF within economic and educational spheres. Empirical data presented below show that economic and educational activities of TAF are important factors that facilitate construct a strong organizational role of the armed forces.

Most important institutionalized structure of TAF's economic activity is Armed Forces Pension Fund (AFPF) [OYAK]. AFPF has been a controversial institution in terms of its status and activities. It was established in January 1961 by

the Law No. 205.¹³ Since it has a specific law which is enforced to determine its status and activities, it can be considered as a state institution. However, the regulations in the Law No. 205 render it a privileged institution which carries the characteristics of a private enterprise while enjoying the facilities of a state institution. Article 1 of the law defines its mission to “provide social aid to the personnel of Turkish Armed Forces.” While the law makes AFPF depended to the Ministry of National Defense, its administrative structure is so complicated that it constitutes a problem in terms of the institution’s status. Administrative structure consists of three organs. According to Article 3 of the law, Council of Representatives is headed by Minister of National Defense. The members of this organ are appointed by Minister of National Defense upon the nomination by the commanders and chiefs of the units that provide natural members of AFPF. Since most of the units that provide members to AFPF are military institutions, the Council of Representatives expectably consists of military personnel predominantly. Second administrative organ of AFPF is General Council. General Council is composed of forty members of which twenty are among the members of Council of Representatives. Seven of the rest twenty members are civilians including the Minister of National Defense. Thus, military personnel are also the dominant element in the General Council. Last administrative organ is the Executive Council. According to Article 8, the Council is composed of seven members of which four are civilian members. Although the civilians are the majority in the Executive Council, military personnel have a considerable majority in the general structure. This puts AFPF into an indecisive position in terms of being whether civilian or military based institution. Another point that makes AFPF

¹³ Full version of the law can be found at:
http://content.oyak.com.tr/AFPFdosyalar/media/editor/files/KURUMSAL/AFPF_Kanunu.pdf
(Official webpage of AFPF) (Last Access: 07.07.2011)

controversial lies in the Article 37. According to this Article 1 of Law No. 205, AFPP enjoys rights and priorities of other state institutions and assets, although it is subjected to the terms of Private Law.

AFPP has been one of the biggest economic powers in Turkey between 1980 and 2001 (Demir 2010). By the late 1990's, AFPP was the one of three biggest economic enterprise. It included more than fifty firms in its structure with around 35,000 employees (Demir 2010: 4). Besides, AFPP Bank, which acted in a position carrying the characteristics of both public and private banks, was the biggest shareholder in the banking sector of Turkey in middle 1990's.

AFPP's status is important in the discussion of TAF's organizational field because AFPP is claimed to constitute the economic division of the project which aims to create a strong military structure in Turkey. Demir states that "the presence of such a large hybrid military-business holding helps shield the military from negative effects of economic downturns while the rest of the society has no such safety net (Demir 2010: 5)." As a result, AFPP has been the major project which facilitates TAF's intention to carry its organizational field into economic sphere.

Another important area which military perceives as its organizational field is education. Military's activities in the area of education can be examined under two titles: Educational activities of military via "National Security Lesson" in the high school curricula; Military's internal education. National Security Lesson is placed in the curricula of the high school's second year. Scope and principles of the lesson are regulated under Regulations on National Security Lessons which was enforced in February 1980. According to Article 1 of the Regulation, the aim of the lesson is "...reinforce the conscious of national security according to requisites of total war", "enlighten the students about their duties on psychological, political,

economical and civilian dimensions of modern war” and “introduce armed forces to students and form a liaison between them and the military based on love and longing.” It shows that TAF intends to extend its organizational field into civilian educational area via accommodating military discourse in it. According to Altınay (2003), National Security Lesson is an application of military indoctrination within the civilian education (2003: 140). Article 7 states that instructors of the lessons are appointed by the garrison commander of the closest garrison among officers in service. If there are not enough amount officers who can be instructor, it can be appointed also among retired officers. The officer who is the instructor is required to go to lessons wearing his military uniform. The lessons can also be given primary and secondary schools in the status of elective courses. Article 5 states that, if the lesson is in primary school curricula, military marching styles, military anthems, and games which promote the feeling of soldiership can be placed. The context and implementation of National Security Lesson can be claimed that they are designed to construct military’s role in the perceptions of the society’s legally junior members, which will be further elaborated in following section that scrutinizes societal perception of military’s role. Yet, the military’s existence in such an area, which is supposed to be solely civilian, shows that expansion of the military’s organizational field by going beyond the military area holds an important place in the military’s self-role construction process.

Military’s internal education is also worth examining to discover the borders of military’s organizational field. Uyar and Varoğlu (2008) focuses on the curricula of Turkish Military Academy in its historical context. Their study shows that the curricula of the Military Academy can be examined in two periods. In early republican period, the curricula of the academy were kept very limited. According

to Uyar and Varoglu, in this period, a conservative approach was ascendant in the designation of the curricula (2008: 192). This approach saw no need to give education to the officers in any area other than military issues. According to this approach, the aim of the military academy was war readiness of the military personnel. Even, “World History” and “Modern Turkish History” courses were added to the curricula as late as 1947 (2008: 191). Besides, in this period, several technical lessons were added to provide some basic information which is useful to learn the functioning of specific war material. With middle 1970’s, several reforms have been initiated in the officer training system. In this second period, the reformist approach defended that scope of education in the military academy, which tends to discipline the officers only in military area remains shallow. It was in contradiction with the pioneering mission of the military in Turkish modernization (2008: 192). In this period, the aim was to train “multi-faceted and real intellectual” officers. As a result of this approach, several new departments, such as Economics have been established within the academy and lessons such as Behavioral Sciences were added to the curricula. However, with 1980 military coup, conservative approach became dominant again. The raise of conservative approach caused closure of several departments. In the era between 1980 and 2001, the curricula and the structure of the academy did not remain same as early 1980’s. The end of the Cold War and the change of the paradigm forced military review its attitude towards officer training. In 1990’s, military academy wanted to open to civilian area in accordance with the aim of training intellectual soldiers who were capable of make academic debates in civilian area. Master’s degree programs were established within Staff College. Besides, many military personnel were sent to the United States and Europe for postgraduate studies. In this period, Turkish military

was the leader in the number of the officers sent to U.S. Naval Post Graduate School comparing to other countries' military personnel (Uyar and Varoglu 2008: 195). To sum up, the military's internal education has been subject to changes. The intention of being more active in civilian sphere showed its effect in the designation of Turkish Military Academy's curricula. Especially with the demise of Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, military's initiation to make opening to civilian sphere was more visible and observable in the curricula.

In sum, economy and education constitute important place in the determination of the military's organizational field. TAF has had a considerable autonomy in the determination of its organizational field's borders. The broader interpretation of military's role shows its effect in the organizational field, which penetrates into civilian spheres such as economic enterprises and civilian education. Can this observation be formulated in the form of a hypothesis? The military's activities within economic and education spheres require military to interact with civilians. According to Janowitz's argument that is mentioned in the Literature Review Chapter, the existential difference between military and civilian worlds gets narrower, as the military interact more intensely with civilians. Janowitz argues that diminishing of the gap between these two worlds would provide an appropriate ground for a democratically controlled military model. However, in the Turkish case, we see that military's activities in civilian areas provide ground for a stronger military presence within society. In other terms, military's economic and educational activities are used as instruments to reinforce military's position in the society, and they appeared as the reflections of a strong military. Based on this observation, following argument can be made:

- A military with a strong self-perception of its role might use several civilian sectors to reinforce its position within the political system.

Several theoretical implications can be derived from this section. The empirical research on Turkish military's self-perception of its role presented in 3.2.1 prove that one important domain of analysis in the study of military's role is the organizational domain. In this domain, the military's self-perception of its role is constructed with the contribution of several social inputs. Two concepts, which are used to explain this process, are formal structure and organizational field. Derived from the observations, TAF perceived its role as the continuation of the historical Turkish military figure, which took active roles in the state/nation-building and modernization processes. Since it locates itself in the center of the nation's existence under a liberated state, and modernization process, its self-perception has been based on a "guarding" function in Turkish political regime. Thus, it can be asserted that elaborating the historical position of an army might shed lights to the current role of this military. Not only politically active militaries but also different military models can be understood and analyzed better by observing historical roots. Specifically, TAF's self-perception of its role enhanced the legal borders of its activities, which has caused a problematic civil-military relations model in the era between 1980 and 2001. Such a broad self-perception of the military has also been effective in the expansion of the organizational field of TAF. In Turkish case, it shows that broader self-perception results in expansion of the sectors in which military act, while this expansion provides more power to military in the political system.

3.2.2. Societal Domain: 1980-2001

Any intervention of military into civilian sphere needs justification. The legal documents that are the source of legitimacy for the intervention constitute the legal component of the justification. However, legal sphere is just one part of the justification that is needed for a stable setting in post-intervention era. Thus, any military regime seeks ground for its intervention not only at legal sphere but also in the perception of society. Expectably, any military wants to face with minimum societal resistance to its intervention. Military interventions lacking societal support suffer generally from instability and put more effort to accommodate the political setting that is intended to be established via the intervention. For example, the regime in Burma¹⁴ is a typical case of military regimes that lacks public support (Fink 2001). In the case of Burma, military regime faced with public resistance many times, which resulted in severe violence. As the duration of Burmese military regime approaches to a half century, the estimated number of deaths in the resistance movements of Burmese people against military regime is above 35,000 (Fink 2001: 29). Thus, military that intend to shape political process seeks societal justification to its military intervention (Sundhaussen 2002: 331).

In the case of Turkey, societal perception of military constitutes a major source of power to military. Sarigil (2009) examines the public opinion on confidence to military. According to the data he includes in his research, TAF enjoys a high degree of public confidence. He argues that this popularity reinforces military's position once it intends to find a source of legitimization for its intervention in political sphere (2009: 711). Similarly, Atlı (2010) claims that major source of TAF's capability to legitimize its intervention comes from the social confidence attributed to TAF. Demirel also makes a similar point stating that “a

¹⁴ The official name of the country is changed as Republic of the Union of Myanmar by the junta on power.

lack of negative evaluation of military rule led civilians and soldiers alike to consider military coup as a viable option (2005: 264).”

While examining the Turkish case, the societal perception is not only important to analyze how TAF’s interventions have been justified by the perception of the society but it is also crucial to understand the strong position of the military in Turkish political system. Turkish Armed Forces was one of the major actors in the political sphere between 1980 and 2001. This active position of military in the political system has been directly correlated with the accordingly constructed societal perception of military. The guardianship function of military has been normalized widely in the society. Besides, TAF has been the most credible institution among the society (Sarigil 2009: 710). In the construction process of military’s role at societal domain, militarist discourse has been dominant in society as well as in political area. In this section, I examine this construction process by elaborating different instruments that are used to shape the societal perception of military’s role. I focus on political sphere and citizenry separately as the components of civilian segment. In the political sphere, I observe that militarist discourse has found itself a broad ground in the politics via the nationalist ideology. On the other hand, I examine three instruments which have effect on citizenry’s perception of military’s role: conscription system, education and the media.

3.2.2.1. Political Sphere: 1980-2001

I have focused on the foundational myth of the Turkish Armed Forces in 3.2.1.1., which places TAF in the center of the nation’s existence and foundation of the current republican system. I argued that existence of such a foundational myth

granted military wider defined self-perception of its role. However, Altınay and Bora (2001: 140) points out that: “Foundation of Republic of Turkey following a war is not unique, as contrary to it is often thought to be so. Militaries and wars played a founding role for almost all nation-states’ foundation. However, the position of the military after the state was established has been different in each of these nation-states.”

Hence, strong position of TAF in the Turkish political system cannot be explained only with military’s self-perception. Societal construction of TAF’s role is another important domain of analysis that can enlighten the general construction process.

Analyses that are made in the CMR literature generally take the civilian part only as the political institutions. Although, I agree that politics is supposed to be the affair of civilians, it should be noted that political sphere does not represent the whole concept of civilian, but it is an integral part of civilian sphere. Thus, this section attributes a specific importance to political domain, as one component of civilian sphere.

To understand the strength of military discourse in the Turkish politics, it is important to elaborate the liaison between Turkish nationalism and militarism. Nationalism has been an ideology which is agreed on to some extent by almost all major political parties in Turkish politics (Kadioglu 1996). It is possible to examine Turkish party system between 1980 and 2001 under three segments. First, center-right political parties, such as True Path Party and Mother Land Party internalized the nationalist identity as a component of their institutional identity, which is composed of classical conservative elements of center-right political approach. Secondly, Nationalist Action Party (NAP) claimed that it has been the true address

of nationalist political movement during this period. Thirdly, social democratic political parties, such as Social Democratic Populist Party (SDP) and Republican People Party (RPP) were significantly affected by Kemalist doctrine, which is based on a unionist approach to Turkish nationalism. Thus, nationalism has been a privileged ideology which constitutes the core of many political movements in Turkish politics in this period. Nationalism has had also a legal status which constitutes the source of its privileged position in Turkish politics. Law of Political Parties, which entered into force in April 1983, states that “political parties work as depended to Atatürk’s principles...”¹⁵ Considering that nationalism is one of six principles of Atatürk, the law states indirectly that political parties cannot act against the nationalist ideology.

There has been a strong connection between Turkish nationalism and militarist discourse. Militarism can be defined, as cited in Altınay (2004), as the over-glorification of military concepts, practices and norms in the civilian areas (Chenoy 1998: 101). In other words, in a militarist environment, actors of the civilian sphere would think, plan and act in accordance with the militarily defined concepts. Most visible characteristic of Turkish nationalist ideology has been dominated by a strong militarist jargon. Turkish nationalist discourse has been based on epic narratives of Turkish soldiership. It should be noted that Turkish nationalism cannot be defined under a single political movement. Turkish nationalists have been organized and have taken part in different political parties, such as in center-right parties, in NAP and even in parties that describe itself as social democratic. However, the myth of military has been an integral and vital part of the discourse of these different nationalist movements. Charismatic leader of

¹⁵ Article 4 of Law of Political Parties, Law No: 18027 (24.04.1983) For full version of the Law, please see: <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/2820sk.htm> (Last Access: 01.07.2011)

Ülkücü movement, Alparslan Türkeş was a military officer, who took part in 1960 military coup. Militarist jargon had an important place in the discourse of the *Ülkücü* movement and Nationalist Action Party. Reha Oğuz Türkkan, who is one of the leading figures of Pan-Turkist nationalism¹⁶, stated that “if war is the necessity of the modern world, Turks should be the masters of this world because; Turks were born to be soldiers. Thus, Turks should fight. Turks will exist by fighting (Önen 2001: 362).” Finally, Republican People Party, which represents the left wing discourse of nationalism, has been criticized to develop a discourse based on military bureaucracy and militarist jargon (Dağı 2008). In sum, Turkish nationalism has significantly been influenced by militarist discourse.

On the other hand, construction of TAF’s role at political domain has not only been via usage of militarist discourse in nationalist ideology. Turkish Armed Forces have been the place where Turkish nationalist discourse has been produced and shaped. Kemalism defines nationalism based on citizenship. Kemalists claim that Turkish nationalist ideology has not been bound by race but it makes reference to an egalitarian citizenship (Deringil 1993: 166). However, several internal practices of TAF depict that nationalist discourse has been reproduced sometimes based on ethnicity and religion. As a typical example of this reproduction a non-Muslim citizen of Turkey has not ever been officer in any domain in Turkish Armed Forces (Altınay and Bora 2001: 148). In the era between 1980 and 2001, we see that militarist reproduction of nationalist discourse by TAF has influenced political sphere. Researchers on National Security Policy Document (NSPD) claim

¹⁶ Many researchers on Turkish nationalism agree on that Türkkan’s ideology is based on Turkish racism. Although Türkkan rejected that his approach to nationalism is based on racism, his definition of nation in the base of blood and race shows that he was significantly impressed by the racist ideology. For more information on Türkkan’s ideas please see Önen, N. (2001). Reha Oğuz Türkkan. *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*. T. Bora. İstanbul, İletişim.

that¹⁷, in the NSPD which was revised in 1993, activities of non-Muslim minorities were ranked third in the list of threats against national security following threats of terrorism and political Islam (Karakas 2010)¹⁸. Considering that NSC, which is the institution that prepares NSDP, was dominated by officers in until 2001, military's own interpretation of nationalist discourse has not only remain in internal practices of military, but also shaped the political agenda of Turkey.

As touched upon above, Turkish nationalism cannot be classified under single political movement. Nationalist discourse found itself place in many political movements from right to left wings of the political spectrum. However, the military reshaped the Turkish politics as representing the “true nationalism (Bora 2001: 691)” in this period. The junta banned Nationalist Action Party following the proclamation of the coup. The leader of the party, Türkeş was arrested and banned from politics for almost a decade. Besides, many members of the *Ülkücü* movement were arrested as well (Arikan 1998: 125). In other words, the nationalist movement was included in the “deviant ideologies”, which were underlined in the proclamation of the coup. Thus, military has not only been the institution which internalized nationalist ideology, it has reproduced the “legitimate” Turkish nationalism and determined the borders of the political discourse engaged with nationalism.

Spread ground nationalism in Turkish political life, and its strong relationship with militarist jargon granted military a room in Turkish society. Political parties and political elites have been influenced by nationalist discourse in

¹⁷ According to official web page of NSC, National Security Policy Document (NSPD) is a top secret document. However, after each revision of the document, debates and news about the documents take place in media. Researchers on NSPD generally make comment as based on these debates in the media.

¹⁸ <http://www.stargazete.com/yazar/eser-karakas/milli-guvenlik-siyaset-belgesi-haber-273547.htm>
(Last Access: 6.07.2011)

which militarist concepts hold a vital place. Political sphere has been dominated by the terms that have been developed under the influence of militarist jargon. Thus, strength of nationalism in Turkish politics enabled military to express itself within political sphere. In other terms, nationalist ideology has been a door for military that is opening to political segment of the society.

3.2.2.2. Citizenry: 1980-2001

Citizenry is the second component of civilian segment that I focus. As touched upon before, building on Schiff (1995), I believe that citizenry should be analyzed separately from political sphere. This is not to say that politics does not belong to civilian sphere. I agree that politics should remain civilian. However, the instruments used in the military's role construction can differentiate in politics and citizenry. Thus, I believe separate analysis of politics and citizenry is healthier. Below, I examine the instruments that are used in the construction of citizenry's perception of military's role. The instruments that I examine are compulsory military service system, education and media.

Compulsory conscription has been the most important instrument that is used by military to shape the society's perception of military's function in politics (Altınay 2004: 87-89). To understand the influence of the compulsory conscription on the societal perception, a brief review on the literature is needed. Compulsory military service is a phenomenon that is applied as a result of the emergence of nation-state (Sasson-Levy 2005). Before this structural change in the state model, armies of European empires were based on legionnaires, who were paid soldiers. France has been the first nation-state that built an army based on compulsory

conscription. According to Eugen Weber (1976), conscription played an important role to create “French” nation (As cited in Altinay and Bora 2001: 140). According to Janowitz (1976: 357), modern definition of citizenship has been based on “participation in armed conflicts” after the creation of compulsory conscription system. In this sense, compulsory military service has been an integral part in nation-state’s project of citizen creation.

A brief review on the countries that apply compulsory military service shows that there is a strong relationship between compulsory conscription system and strength of the militarist discourse in that society (Kestnbaum 2000). According to Horowitz and Kimmerling (1974), strength of the militarist discourse in Israeli politics is a natural result of the strict implementation of compulsory military service. It is noteworthy that Israel is a country where compulsory system is not only required for male but also for women. Best example of the relationship between military service and citizenship in Israel is that Israeli state has the right to execute the deprivation of citizenship for those who escape from military service (Levy 2003). Another example of the militarized societies as a result of strict military conscription can be Caucasus countries. According to Faber and Kaldor (2006), one of the most important reasons of militarized political sphere in several Caucasus countries, such as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, is that they did not abolish the strict conscription policy which is applied during the Soviet era. Since Caucasus is a region where there are newly established nation-states, the conjuncture is very suitable for an instable environment in the region. However, strength of the militarist discourse in the region results in deadlocks in the negotiations for the solution of the conflicts among countries in the region. In this sense, Faber and Kaldor underline that military service system is the most

important instrument in the construction of this strong militarist societal perception in the Caucasus countries (p. 149). On the other hand, according to Roghmann and Sodeur (1972), the decrease of the militarist discourse in Germany in post-World War II era is directly related with the new regulations enforced in middle 1960's that softened the conscription system. In these new regulations, Germany recognized the right to prefer to serve in public institutions instead of being conscripted. In sum, compulsory military service system is an important instrument for military to adopt its discourse in the societal domain.

In Turkish context, compulsory military service system has been an important instrument in the construction of military's role at societal domain. Compulsory conscription was first initiated in 1927 with several amendments in the 1924 Constitution (Jenkins 2007: 341). Looking at the newly appearing nation-states of that era, it is possible to underline that compulsory military service system was a general method that is applied by many nation-states. However, in Turkey, military service was not only a conscription system that was required by the necessities of time, but it also helped the mythicising of military's historical role. According to Jenkins (2007), introduction of the compulsory military service system strengthened the discourse that is based on the identification between nation and army (p. 341). In this sense, Altınay emphasizes that the creation of "myth of military-nation" was not only providing military a limitless human source, but also created an approach toward military service as a historical reality of Turkish identity. Adopted daughter of Mustafa Kemal, Afet Inan's (1969) emphasis of military service is an important example of this approach toward military service (borrowing from Altınay 2004: 29):

"Military training can be given in a matter of years, whereas military spirit is an ore that is born from the hammering of the abilities and capabilities of humankind

throughout the centuries on the anvils of experience and transformation into steel in the fire of life that has been fanned with raging storms. That is why the Turkish nation is the nation with most developed military spirit... A nation with high military spirit is a nation with history of civilizations.”

Thus, it can be asserted that military service in Turkey was not only applied as the necessity of the conjuncture but also presented as the most important characteristic and historical reality of Turkishness. Another noteworthy meaning of the military service in Turkey is that it is an integral part in the construction of male identity and masculinity. Serving in the military is perceived not only as a duty of citizenship, but also as a necessity of being a “real man” (Sinclair-Webb 2000: 72).

In the era between 1980 and 2001, presence of the strong meaning of military service affected social life of the citizens. Firstly, it is possible to claim that duration of the military service in this period has been long compared to other countries applying compulsory conscription. According to the table given in the webpage of Ministry of National Defense¹⁹, the duration of military service in this era had a decreasing tendency comparing to 1970’s. In 1970’s the duration of the conscription was 20 months including 30 days of vacation leave. Effective from March 1985, different durations for university graduates have been introduced. According to this amendment, university graduates served for 15 months while conscripts with lower degrees served 18 months. In 1990’s decreasing tendency of the durations continued. In 1992, the duration was lowered to 15/8 months by continuing the implementation of different conditions for university graduates. However, due to the rise in terrorism in 1993, the military declared that all discharges are stopped for four months, and extended the scope of suspension for further three months in 1994. Following this development, 18 month conscription system was reintroduced in January 1995.

¹⁹ http://www.asal.msb.gov.tr/er_islemleri/gun.kadar%20askerlik%20hiz.htm (Official Webpage of the Ministry of National Defense) (Last Access: 5.07.2011)

Long duration of the military service in Turkey turned into an element of social pressure. With the rise of militarist discourse in middle 1990's due to terrorism, military service became some kind of prerequisite for individuals to take part in social life. Compliance of military service has been a precondition for many firms seeking new employees. Besides, "many families –and women themselves– would not favour marriage until the prospective husband completed his service (Sinclair-Webb 2000: 74)." On the other hand, in this period, many people were punished to deprivation of citizenship due to escaping from military service.

To sum up, it is obvious that military service has been perceived as an important aspect of Turkish citizenship, male identity in the country and shaped the societal perception of TAF. At this point, I would like to make a brief discourse analysis of the slogans, mottos and anthems that are sang by soldiers to see how inner practices of military service indoctrinates the conscripts with the militarist discourse. I believe these practices are important, because these symbols constitute an integral part in the identity of individuals (Cerulo 1993). I should note that these slogans and anthems are not official; hence they are not under record of any academic sources. Rather, I collected these data by interviewing with officers serving in the military and with people who were conscripted especially in early and middle 1990's. Another point that I would like to note is about the translation of these slogans and anthems. I translated these pieces by myself. I recognize that literary translation is a specific field that requires expertise. However, I sought to express the epic meanings of several concepts included in these anthems and slogans. Hence, I preferred to stick to the original manuscripts during translation.

I would like to start with a very general slogan, which turned almost into an aphorism:

“Every Turk is born a soldier.” (*Her Türk asker doğar.*)

This slogan is shouted rhythmically by conscripts especially during the running. It perfectly reflects the understanding that Altınay (2004) names “myth of military nation”. Obviously, it makes reference to historical meaning of military and identifies nation with soldiership.

Another very popular slogan is as follows:

“Martyrs are immortal, our land is indivisible.” (*Şehitler ölmez, vatan bölünmez.*)

This slogan is so popular that it can be heard from civilians marching in a funeral of a soldier. According to me, it depicts the understanding that normalizes death for country, which is a typical assumption of militarist discourse. At this point, I would like to touch upon the meaning of a word: *vatan*. This word can be translated into English as homeland, soil or country. However, I believe that this word includes a specific epic meaning that differs from standard meaning of homeland. Expression of this word in Turkish context indicates an emotionally over glorified meaning. Thus, I argue that this slogan follows the Atatürk’s approach to *vatan*: “If the matter is *vatan*, the rest is inessential.” (*Söz konusu vatansa, gerisi teferruattır.*)

We can observe the same understanding, which trivializes the life comparing to *vatan*, in another slogan with:

“My life to sacrifice for *vatan*” (*Vatan sana canım feda.*)

I collected lyrics of several anthems sang by conscripts by interviewing both military officers including those in active duty, and also regular soldiers who were conscripted for their compulsory military service. Some of my interviewees

requested to keep their name anonymous while some others do not have any problem with publishing their names.

My first interview was with a professional sergeant (*uzman çavuş*) whose family live in Ankara although he still serves in Malatya. He underlines that these songs and anthems are very helpful to keep the motivation of soldiers alive, especially in the risky regions such as southeast Turkey. Malatya is the sixth city where he was appointed, while four of former cities that he served in were in southeast Turkey. I noted one “Commando Oath” and one song that are sang by soldiers that he trained when he was in Tunceli.

A part of commando oath is as follows:

“...I am Turkish Commando,
I defeat the enemy with my steel pounce.
I am everywhere. On air, in land, in sea, in deserts,
In mud and in quag.
Everywhere and every time,
In Siirt, in Hakkari, in Tunceli,
In Gökçeada, in Bolu.
I am ready all the time...”

In this so-called oath, we can observe the aim that my interviewee underlined: keeping the motivations of soldiers alive. Especially first two lines can be taken as the expression of the self-confidence. A more interesting point is the cities that are included in the lyrics. Siirt, Hakkari and Tunceli are the cities of which population is dominated by Kurdish citizens of Turkey, while Gökçeada is an island where members of Greek minority live. Thus, it triggers me to ask whether there is a specific message for inhabitants of these cities, and my interviewee answers this question politically: “There is no need to speculate on this.” At this point, he feels the necessity to repeat that these anthems are not officially included in any documents, but they are just practices that can

differentiate in various regions. He adds that this oath is taught to soldiers in first 45 day period of their service to adapt them the spirit of soldiership.

The song that I noted from this interview uses a very aggressive language:

“My stouthearted, do not relent for those dogs,
Remember, how they massacred your sister,
Time for death is getting closer.
Fire the bullet to ratty brains,
Let Gabar burn, and bring Cudi down.”

Apart from the aggressive language of the lyrics, it is noteworthy that Gabar and Cudi are two mountains where armed conflicts between PKK militants and armed forces appear very often.

In another interview with a person who completed his military service first in Burdur then in Tunceli, I noted a poem that is shouted rhythmically by soldiers during their morning sport.

“Commando, do not forget that you owe this *vatan*,
The border and the sanjak are your rectitude.
Commando, make the mountains unbearable,
To communists, secessionists and jackals.”

In this piece, we observe the “deviant ideologies”, which were referred in the proclamation of 1980 coup by General Kenan Evren. It is interesting that communism is included in this poem as a demonized ideology, as well as secessionism.

Finally, I would like to include a song that I noted in an interview with a person who served in Cyprus, Girne in 1998. He noted that after the sergeant taught this song to soldiers, he was reprehended by his officer who heard soldiers singing this song. However, my interviewee adds that they kept singing this song altogether several other times.

“He holds his grenade in one hand, and flask in other,
We entered into Athens,

Our Mehter Anthem is heard from Athens,
We hold our head straight against the Greek.”

Considering the place where he completed his military service, the aggressive language of the song against Greeks is meaningful. It is also helpful to understand how militarized discourse perceives the neighbor, who represents a figure of historical threat (Brauer 2002).

To sum up, I argue that there is a strong relationship between a strong military figure in politics and the compulsory conscription system in Turkey. In that sense, compulsory military service system is an important instrument for spreading the militarist discourse among society. Compulsory system provides military the opportunity to train at least the half of the society, while other half is also affected by the militarist discourse.

I made a brief introduction to the military's interest in education in the section where I analyzed the organizational field of military. In this part, I focus on military and militarist discourse in the Turkish education system in a more general context.

Education has been another important instrument in the construction of militarist discourse in societal sphere. According to Altınay (2009), the education in Turkey is not only affected by military, but it is a wholly “militarized” area (p. 143). First, National Security lessons should be focused on to understand militarist discourse in Turkish education system. As touched upon in while elaborating organizational field of TAF, National Security lesson is typical implementation of military training in civilian education. The teachers of the lesson can be officers both in active duty and retired. Legal regulation on the lesson rules that the instructor should wear his uniform during the course. As a student who took this course during my high school education, I can argue that the relationship between

students and the instructor is the same as the relationship between soldier and his officer. The course starts with a typical salutation ceremony. The students who want to get the floor for a word request the permit of the instructor and introduce themselves and speak standing up. Altınay underlines that the course were designed to prepare students to military service in the beginning, however, the scope of the course reached beyond this aim especially after 1980 coup. After the coup, the syllabus of the course intended to raise a youth who adopted the principles of Atatürk and make them aware of the threats the country faces (2009: 142). At this point, threat conceptualization of the course is important. As Altınay's research on the course's syllabus shows, almost all neighbors of Turkey are perceived as sources of threat against Turkey in the context of the course. Iran intends to export its political regime which is based on religion; Armenia aims to establish "Greater Armenia" including eastern Turkey; Syria's plans on Hatay are still valid; and "Megali Idea" is the primary goal of Greece to reestablish a greater Greece in the Aegean Region (p. 143). In this sense, it is a course in which current political issues are discussed. According to Altınay, the message of this is the emphasis that the politics should be approached with a military attitude (p. 143).

Militarist discourse's engagement with education is not limited to National Security lesson. In a more general context, we can observe the militarist discourse in Turkish education system in this era. The title of Altınay's another study (2009) on militarist discourse in Turkish education system is a typical example of the strength of the militarist discourse in education: "I die, I shed blood." (*Can veririm, kan dökerim.*) This is a song that is taught to secondary school students in the context of Music lessons, and it continues with "I cannot relinquish from this right." Thus, violence in the name of *vatan* is not only presented as a duty but also a

right. Besides, the emphasis on sensitive geopolitics of Turkey can be observed in the textbooks of two other courses apart from National Security lesson: “Geography” and “Citizenship”. In this context, it is emphasized that Turkey faces several threats because of its strategic location and it needs a strong military power.

Altınay identifies three points in textbooks that are in contradiction with human rights (2009: 145-160). Firstly, she underlines that Turkish education system glorifies the myth of military-nation. Thus, education can be taken as the process in which Turkish society is indoctrinated with preliminary militarist discourse. Secondly, general discourse in the education normalizes the violence and death in the name of concepts such as *vatan* and flag. Finally, the citizen model that the education system in Turkey intends to raise is a militarized figure.

Finally, I focus on the construction of military’s role in media, which is another component of civilian sphere. I specifically examined the general discourse of mainstream media just after the 1980 coup, to see how 1980 coup was perceived in the media.

Building on my brief archival research in the National Library in Ankara, I can argue that mainstream media’s attitude towards 1980 coup was generally in a supportive tone. In my research, I have skimmed many columns in newspapers such as *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Tercüman* and *Cumhuriyet*. In this section, I aim to analyze some of these columns.

Oktay Akbal’s article in 13 September 1980 was a kind of salutation of the “12 September 1980 Operation.” He was saying that “... supporters of Atatürk’s principles, the Military could not ignore the recent situation.” “... they invited the politicians to the path of Atatürk, as they did in 1960 (Akbal 13.09.1980).” Cüneyt Arcayürek was stating that operation aims to achieve the ideal of democratic and

laic Turkey (Arcayürek 14.09.1980). In my research in Milliyet's archive, which is available online, I found Özdenoğlu's article which I believe reflecting the general attitude of Milliyet toward 1980 coup. Lawyer Şinasi Özdenoğlu's named the coup as a "bloodless revolution." He stated that:

"... 12 September Operation is internalized in the whole country. If there was a referendum, Turkish society would prefer this way for salvation... From this moment on, only and common aim should be to provide the appropriate conditions for operation to achieve its goals... Everybody should know that 12 September is synonymous with existence for Turkish nation (Özdenoğlu 01.10.1980)."

Özdenoğlu also stated that "the operation should not deviate from its goal, because this operation can only achieve its goal by taking the support of society." Thus, the importance of societal perception of military's role can be observed once again in the article of Özdenoğlu. Another famous columnist, Güneri Cıvaoğlu was claiming that "steps taken by the 12 September movement show that we should not identify the operation with other military regimes in world (Cıvaoğlu 04.10.1980)."

Finally, I found the leading article of Milliyet, which was written by Mehmet Barlas, that was published in 14.11.1983. Barlas underlined that transition to democracy and preparing of new constitution that was presented to referendum showed that those who made 12 September operation kept their promise. Besides, he expressed his confidence to Kenan Evren's statement that he is loyal to democracy (Barlas 14.11.1983).

As the brief archival research shows, media is another civilian sphere in which military's guardianship role is constructed. Thus, it should be noted as one of the areas that shape society's perception of military.

Based on the observations presented in this section, several arguments can be generated. First of all, it is showed that there is a connection between the power of the nationalism in the society and ground for the expression of militarist discourse in societal domain. In the Turkish case, we see a strong militarist discourse embedded within Turkish nationalism. This may not be generalizable for all nationalisms. However, in general, militaries hold a significant place within nationalist discourses (Posen 1993: 83). Still, I believe Turkish nationalism includes specific constructional roots which facilitate disperse of militarist discourse among societal segments. Thus, to generalize this situation may lead flawed arguments, which cannot explain other cases, in which nationalist ideology is strong but militarist discourse is not. Yet, in the case of Turkey, we see that strength of the nationalist ideology provided an important ideological instrument to construct societal perceptions in the manner that favoring a strong military model.

Secondly, it is obvious that compulsory conscription system provides a huge human resource to military to express its discourse to wider segments of the society. As touched upon above, scholars argue that the countries which have compulsory military service system are more prone for a strong militarist discourse. During the military service, ordinary citizens are subjected to intense military indoctrination and training. In the case of Turkey, we see that the duration of the military service was considerably lengthy. Besides, military service has been glorified by the civilians, not only as a legal obligation but as a necessity of Turkishness. It is obvious that the military service system is an important input in the construction of societal perception of military's role. Building on such an observation, following argument can be asserted:

- Strict and lengthy implementation of compulsory military service might cause an appropriate environment for a strong militarist discourse among the society.

3.3. Effect of International Relations on Military's Role and De/Reconstruction of TAF's Role: Post 2001 Period

Constructivist approach should not neglect that social constructions are not static but are subject to further change. Jackson and Nexon (2002) underline a flawed understanding in comparative politics, which neglects social constructions' dynamic structure. They name this understanding unit stability (p. 95). Building on the understanding of social constructions are subject to further change, they argue that "states, societies, nations, (...) social movements are all examples of social constructions in the most banal sense: They cannot exist without being actively produced and reproduced by the social activities of human beings (p. 100)." At this point, I agree with Jackson and Nexon about the dynamic structure of social phenomena.

I aim to make a comparison of two different processes which I believe that they are product of different constructions. In this sense, I believe post 2001 period in Turkey is an era in which a different discourse on civil-military relations has been constructed. Thus, I intend to develop a theoretical approach to explain this change. I use two concepts to analyze this period: Deconstruction and Reconstruction. At this point, a brief discussion of these two concepts is useful for further analysis.

I should start with noting that the concept of deconstruction is very general term which is used in different fields of study. Hence, I had to limit my search of

this concept in political science literature. Diane Elam (1994) uses this concept to explain the challenge to prevailing political order. She focuses on the issue of masculinity of the institutions in her book. According to her theory, the masculinity of the political order is the outcome of the institutions and legal settings (p. 89). The masculine discourse is produced by these institutions. At this point, since her focus is development of the feminist theory, she argues that a healthy development of feminist theory can be achieved following the deconstruction of the current structure of politics. This usage of deconstruction can be simply applied to the scope of this thesis. I argue that the change in the militarist discourse can only be achieved by challenging the institutions and political settings which are in the source of militarist discourse's production. With this in mind, I conceptualize the deconstruction as follows: It is the process in which the legal and structural sources of the former discourse are challenged by a new setting. In the light of this definition, I argue that deconstruction comes one move ahead of reconstruction. Without challenging the legal sources of the militarist discourse, development a new and different discourse would not be possible, or it would be dominated by the prevailing discourse.

In civil-military relations context, deconstruction is generally starts with the effect of an external factor. There are two reasons of this. First, military world is conservative in its nature. Politically active military models struggle to preserve the status quo that they constructed. Thus, a radical change in the nature of the military's relationship with the rest of the actors would face with reluctance of military. Second reason is the globalized structure of the current world politics. Because of globalization, developments in politics can be followed by very wide populations in all around the world. Besides, there is not a strict border between

domestic and foreign politics anymore, due to the globalized structure of world politics. Thus, stable models of civil-military relations that are adopted by significant actors of world politics can constitute example for other countries, which experience problems in its civil-military settings. These external factors can easily trigger a will to reconstruct the relationship between military and civilians.

Reconstruction process follows the deconstruction of the former structure of civil-military relations. I conceptualize reconstruction as the restructuring of the military's role in a general context. Thus, reconstruction aims to reshape the discourse on military's role, as well as changing the former structure of civil-military relations. Major difference in the conceptualizations of deconstruction and reconstruction is about the unit that they intend to change. While deconstruction reshapes the legal sources of the discourse, reconstruction develops a new discourse in accordance with the new setting brought by deconstruction.

In post 2001 period, Turkey has been experiencing deconstruction and reconstruction process concomitantly. Relations with European Union (EU) triggered the deconstruction of civil-military relations in Turkey. Many amendments have been adopted with the beginnings of 2000's. In this section, I examine these structural changes in the context of civil-military relations in Turkey. Then, I examine reconstruction of the discourse on military and daily practices of civil-military relations in accordance with the structural changes.

The international factor that facilitated the change in the course of Turkish civil-military relations was the Helsinki Summit of European Union in 1999. In this summit, Turkey was acknowledged as an official candidate to EU. EU made Turkey's candidacy official in this summit, because the Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit expressed Turkey's determination to enforce the reforms required for

harmonization to EU context (Milliyet, 12.12.1999). Following this development, several harmonization packages have been adopted to reform Turkish political system in accordance with EU context. The coalition government of Democratic Left Party, Nationalist Action Party and Mother Land Party enforced National Program and one harmonization package until they were all defeated in 2002 elections. In 2002 elections, Justice and Development Party came to power by taking the absolute majority in the Parliament and continued to adopt new harmonization packages. At this point, it should be noted that the opposition, Republican People's Party supported this process. Opposition's support in the Parliament accelerated this process and Turkey gained an important momentum between 2002 and 2004. Although harmonization packages were including reforms in many different areas, the course of civil-military relations was also affected by these reformations.

NSC's structure was reformed significantly within the scope of harmonization packages. According to Özcan (2008), before the harmonization packages that reformed NSC's status, it was a "shadow government." NSC's status was normalized by this reforms and NSC. What were those structural changes in the status of NSC? First of all, NSC composition was changed in a way that civilian members get majority. Before this change, the numbers of civilians and soldiers were equal to each other. However, due to the strength of the militarist discourse during 1990's, the Council was an organ in which military imposed its attitudes to civilian members of NSC. With the amendment to Article 118 of the Constitution in 2001, vice prime ministers became the members of Council. As a result, number of the civilians in the council became eight including the chair, the President, while military personnel's number remained five. Another important change in NSC's

structure is about the status of its decisions. National Program which was adopted in 2001 amended the Article 118 of the Constitution, and NSC's decisions became "advisory". Before this regulation, NSC decisions were to consider with "priority" by the Council of Ministers. The change in the status of NSC decisions implies a radical change in the legal context of Turkish civil-military relations. As touched upon before, NSC was so strong that it was determining the political agenda of country (Özcan 2008). Even, decisions taken in the NSC summit in 28 February 1997 caused to fall of *Refah-Yol* Government. Thus, undermining the NSC's status in Turkish political system is an important reform for harmonizing Turkish civil-military relations with European Union context.

The amendments adopted in 2003 reduced the duties of Secretariat General of NSC. Before this amendment, description of Secretariat's task was very broad. Borrowing from official webpage of Secretariat General of NSC, before the amendment the Secretariat was responsible of "conduction of joint work with the Ministries and relevant institutions on the preparation of the decisions of the National Security Council and in the implementation of these decisions through the acts of the Council of Ministers" and "coordination all defense services that did not fall within the responsibility of the Armed Forces and follows the arrangements concerned". With the amendment the duty of the Secretariat was reduced to ordinary secretary services, such as correspondence affairs among the members.

All these changes in the legal structure of NSC can be taken in the scope of deconstruction. On the other hand, we can observe a radical change in the appointment practices of Secretariat General. Although it was not a legal obligation, all of the 44 Secretary General of NSC were retired or active generals

until 2004²⁰. In 2004, former ambassador to Athens, M. Yiğit Alpdoğan was appointed as Secretary General of NSC. Two successors of Alpdoğan, Tahsin Burcuoğlu and Serdar Kılıç (current Secretary General) were also retired ambassadors. Thus, appointment of civilians as the Secretary General of NSC is a new practice for Turkish civil-military context. This can be given as an example of reconstruction of a new set of practices in post 2001 period.

Changes in the legal sources of militarist discourse are not limited to reforms in the structure of NSC. Second harmonization package that was adopted in 2002 amended the Law No. 2803 (ABGS 2007), which regulates the duties and status of Gendarmerie. Before the amendment, according to Article 9 of the Law, highest ranked Gendarmerie officer in a city could serve on behalf of city governor in case of his/her absence. This article was an expression of officers' primacy to the mayor of city, who is an elected person. With the amendment in 2002, this statement was abolished.

Harmonization packages also limited military personnel's membership in several civilian administrative councils. The Sixth Harmonization Package that was adopted in July 2003, ruled that representative of Secretariat General of NSC can no longer be a member of the committee which decides on the appropriateness of music, video and cinema pieces for distribution. Before the amendment, representative appointed by Secretariat General of NSC was one of three members of that committee. A similar regulation made in 2004 within the scope of Eighth Harmonization Package. Before the amendment, representative sent by General Secretary of NSC was member of Higher Council of Radio and Television (RTÜK), Higher Education Council (YÖK), even in the Council of Protecting

²⁰ List of Secretary Generals served from 1938 to present can be seen at official webpage of NSC: <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/genelsekreterler1.html> (Last access: 01.07.2011)

Children against Harmful Publication. With the amendments, membership of NSC representative in these councils and organs was abolished. All these regulations can be classified as deconstructive implementations of military's role in social and political life of Turkey. The reforms prepared a ground to diminish the militarist discourse in post 2001 period.

In Seventh Harmonization Package adopted in August 2003 the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians was limited. It amended the Article 11 of Law No. 353, which ruled that civilians can be trialed in military courts if they committed a crime in military zones. With the amendment, trial of civilians in military courts was rendered to the permission of Ministry of National Defense. Within the scope of the same package, expenditures of TAF were subjected to oversight of Turkish Court of Accounts.

Following the start of negotiations with EU in October 2004, several other reforms were adopted. Constitutional amendment package that was presented to referendum on 12 September 2010 was including important new regulations which affected context of civil-military relations. According to Article 125 of the Constitution, decisions taken in Supreme Military Council were not subject to judicial control. Article 11 of the amendment package changed this situation and recognized the right to sue decisions of the Council for those who were discharged from TAF. Secondly, according to temporary article 15 of 1982 Constitution, it was not possible to judge the initiators of 1980 coup. Article 24 of the package repealed this article, and enabled prosecutors to sue the members of National Security Council that was established just after the coup and ruled the country until the elections in 1983. Finally, Article 15 of the package amended the Article 145 of the Constitution, which regulates the procedures of civilian's trial in military courts.

With this amendment, it is not possible anymore to judge civilians in military courts except war times. Besides, the same article of the package ruled that crimes of military personnel against the regime are subject to control of civilian courts.

Reconstruction of the discourse on military can be observed concomitantly with the deconstruction process. Reconstruction process can be examined in three domains. First, the self-perception of military is affected by the deconstruction process, although this effect was limited. Ünsaldı contends that the structural reforms in military's position did not play a significant role in diminishing the military's own definition of its role (2005: 264). Yet, there are scholars who defend that military's self-perception of its role is in a changing path. According to Satana (2008), Turkish Armed Forces is one of the major actors which facilitate the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. She contends that the recent move of democratization in Turkey which started with 2000's is affected by military's own will to democratize. Aydinli (2009) also states that TAF recognized that it is not possible for them to take an active role in politics as they did in 1990's. I agree with that TAF's self-perception of its role in politics is in a changing path. We can observe this path in a release of former chief of the general staff, İlker Başbuğ. Başbuğ stated that (Milliyet, 23.06.2009) "struggle against terrorism must be on the basis of human. Struggle with terrorism is not only military's affair. Precautions against terrorism should not contradict with the principles of universal law." This is a visible change in the discourse of military on terrorism. Still, the issue of whether the military's former perception of its role is in a changing path is controversial. According to Sarigil (2009), although many important reforms have been adopted within the EU harmonization framework, Turkish Armed Forces still enjoys its strong role in politics. We have witnessed a visible practice of this ongoing strong

position in 2007. Military published an ultimatum-like press release in the webpage of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff in the midnight on 27 April 2007. In this release, it was stated that;

“The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender of secularism...It will display its attitude and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary (Sarigil 2009: 711).”

According to Sarigil, this demonstrates that problem of the civilian control of military is not completely solved.

Secondly, reconstruction of a new understanding is observable in societal sphere. According to Satana(2008: 372), in this new period “it is possible that the public will stop seeing the military as the only available modernizing institution.” Ergil (2010) contends that the public showed its support on 12 September 2010 Referendum to the new regulations diminishing the military’s tutelary role on Turkish political system. We can also observe the changing patterns of thinking in the general elections in 2007. The elections were important in terms of following the ultimatum-like press release mentioned above. Significant increase in the JDP’s vote from 34% to 47% was commented as the reflection of negative attitude of public towards the ultimatum.

Finally, we can observe reconstruction in political sphere. Today, almost all actors of the Turkish politics agree on that military should not have an interest in politics. According to Tosun (2010), even Republican People’s Party reconsiders and reshapes its policy towards military’s role in politics. We can see this change in election program of the party. According to Article 2 of the party’s program for

2011 elections, “Military Administrative Courts should be closed.”²¹ Furthermore, RPP touched upon a very radical point according to its historical attitude towards the military, during the 2011 election period. In the report of the Party on a new constitution, it was declared that new constitution should include a regulation on conscientious rejection.²² Thus, it is possible to claim that in current Turkish politics, attitude of politicians toward military’s role is different compared to pre-2001 period.

To sum up, a changing discourse and political setting have started to be constructed with early 2000’s in Turkey. Development of such a new discourse is the outcome of the deconstruction process which challenged the former legal setting of civil-military relations and the reconstruction process following this challenge to old order. At this point, presence of a strong relationship with an international actor facilitated the construction of a new discourse. Since the EU has an institutionalized model of stable civil-military relations, it became a pushing force for deconstructing the former course of civil-military relations in Turkey. On the other hand, commitment and support of domestic political actors, namely the military, the civilians and politicians for the process provided a different discourse in post 2001 period from the era between 1980 and 2001. Although, it is not still perfectly stabilized, it is possible to contend that relation between civilians and military in Turkey is in a changing path, which gets closer to Western models of civil-military settings.

²¹ Full text of the election program can be found at: <http://www.chp.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/41vaat1.pdf> (Official Weppage of the Party) (Last access: 12.07.2011)

²² <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/17917723.asp> (Last Access: 12.07.2011)

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

This thesis finds support for the proposition that patterns of civil-military relations have been gradually changing in Turkey. The period between 1980 and 2001 has been built on the paradigm that was introduced with the 1980 coup. Actually, the paradigm of this period was not new for Turkish politics. Looking at the past experiences, it is obvious that the army has started to politicize with the change of the government's control in 1950 as a result of transition to multi-party system. In 1960, this politicization showed itself as a military coup. However, this intervention was not the last one in Turkish politics. After this coup, the instability in the Turkish politics sharpened the military's reflex to guard the regime. After the 1960 coup, Turkish politics experienced direct interventions of military almost in every decade. Thus, 1980 coup was not a surprising development for Turkish politics, which was struggling with left-right violent conflict in the streets and the deadlock of presidential elections. The junta that ruled country from 1980 to 1983 designed a new political system in accordance with the opinions of the junta. In this regard, 1982 Constitution attributed a considerable power to the National Security Council

(MGK), which was designed as a military dominant organ. The Council was not designed only as an advisory organ. Rather, it was capable enough to shape the national security policy of the country and determine the security threats. Besides, the military's position in the political system has been reinforced further with the effect of other laws such as Internal Service Law of Turkish Armed Forces. As a result, it is possible to observe a strong military presence within Turkish politics during this era. However, students of Turkish politics argue that the military's influence on Turkish politics has been decreasing since the early 2000's. This thesis intended to analyze this change in the Turkish military's role in specific, and focus on how the role of military is constructed in general.

In this regard, the field of civil-military relations analyzed the roles of different military models. In the literature, the western practices of civil-military relations have been idealized as the intended model of the relationship. Thus, many authors (Feaver 1992; Schiff 1995; Bland 1999) underlined that the field has developed as bound to western models, and theoretical frameworks remained limited to explain different paradigms of civil-military relations. This approach is narrow and conservative in its nature and context. Once the focus is military's role, it should not be neglected that an interventionist military model is just one type of military role. A military may internalize an interventionist position as well as it may be fully subordinated to civilian authority. Then, the question is how this differentiation in the roles of militaries emerges. The answer of this thesis is the concept of "role construction process." According to this, any type of military role is not inherited, or exogenously given but it emerges as an outcome of this process. Role construction process is where social actors interact and contribute to the outcome. In this context, I examined constructivist approaches to role construction process. Two general

assumptions come forward in the constructivist literature. Firstly, according to constructivist scholars, social concepts that we intend to analyze in social research are constructed through a process. The process is built on an interactive base. Social actors interact within this process and it puts an outcome. Thus, constructivist approach justifies why we should analyze the process to discover constructional roots of social concepts such as “role of military.” Secondly, constructivist scholars argue that roles and preferences of social actors are shaped by their constructed identity. Thus, the construction process in which actor’s identity is constructed should be examined to analyze this actor’s role.

Three points can be inferred depending on this approach to role construction. First of all, any military role –interventionist/non-interventionist- is not exogenously given to military, which is a social actor. Secondly, role of a social actor is not static or constant; rather it is continuously changing. Finally, since the process is interactive, this role is constructed in different domains. Based on these points, I analyzed military’s role construction process in organizational and societal domains. While the organizational domain refers to military’s legal status within Turkish politics and its self-perception of its role, societal domain is composed of two spheres: Political sphere and citizenry.

It can be inferred that Turkish military enjoyed a significant monopoly in the construction process at organizational domain. The legal status of the military was considerably strong in the era between 1980 and 2001. Since this period followed a military coup, the legal ground for strong military presence within politics were prepared within the legal documents. 1982 Constitution was one of the primary sources of the military’s legal status. By the constitution, decisions of Supreme Military Council were left outside of judicial review. Besides, National Security

Council was designed as a military dominant organ. It was authorized to set up national security agenda of the country. Since the Council was dominated by military personnel, it turned into an organ in which military dictated its security concepts to civilian government, especially during the presidency of Kenan Evren. In addition to its legal status, military's self-perception of its role is another input of the role construction process at organizational domain. Military's self-perception of its role is built on its active engagement with state/nation-building and modernization processes in Turkish political history. Turkish Armed Forces has identified its position in Turkish politics with this historical figure. It correlated itself with the existence of the nation and state. Thus, it developed a reflex to preserve the secular republican regime. Military reinforced its organizational identity by enjoying a high degree of autonomy in the designation of its internal education. It reinforced the cohesion among its personnel by using the instrument of education. Also, its economic enterprise, Armed Forces Pension Fund (OYAK) provided a huge economic resource to active and retired military personnel.

Role construction of military in societal domain is the second phase. As underlined by Rebecca Schiff (1995), former civil-military relations theory literature takes the political institutions as the main component of civilian segment. However, this thesis agrees with Schiff that civilian segment should be analyzed separately in political sphere and citizenry. Thus, it analyzes the role construction in societal domain separately in political sphere and citizenry. It is obvious that political sphere in Turkey has been influenced by a strong militarist discourse in the period between 1980 and 2001. Strength of Turkish nationalism offered an important mechanism for the expression of militarist discourse. As Bora and Altınay (2001) showed, Turkish nationalist ideology includes strong militarist elements. Since nationalist ideology is

dispersed into a broad political spectrum in Turkey, militarist discourse found itself a vital place in different political movements in Turkey. In addition to nationalist ideology, security threats that Turkey faced during 1990's constructed a political environment in which military's guardianship role is justified both among political elites and citizenry. The separatist terrorism led by PKK, severe violence of it that targeted civilians, civil servants and security forces especially in the southeast region of the country reinforced the societal perception on necessity of a strong military. Besides, strengthening of political Islam (Welfare Party), and its success in 1995 elections, alerted secular segments of society. Once again, military was seen as the guarantee of the secular regime.

Three important civilian mechanisms provided important tools to military to disperse its discourse among citizenry. Firstly, the compulsory military service provided a huge and unlimited human source to military to express and disperse its principles. At least half of the society has been subjected to intense military indoctrination. Besides, meaning of the military service in Turkey has gone beyond a simple legal obligation; rather it has been an element of a social pressure to exercise ordinary experiences of social life such as finding employment or marriage. Besides, military service has been an integral part within the masculine identity. Secondly, civilian education has influenced by a strong militarist discourse in Turkey. Altınay's study (2004) on secondary and high school textbooks depicts that several courses, such as "History" and "National Security" course are influenced by militarist elements. Especially in the National Security Courses, which are in the secondary and high school curricula, students are taught how Turkey faces significant internal and external threats and Turkish Armed Forces' importance in the struggle with these security threats. Finally, media has been another social input in the construction of

military's role in societal domain. Especially in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the mainstream media's attitude toward the operation was highly supportive. Most of the columnists stated that military's intervention has been useful to obviate the chaotic political environment and left-right violence in the streets.

In the post 2001 period, we see the signs of a new set of construction of civil-military relations. Most important reason of this change was an external factor: the momentum of the relationship between Turkey and EU with early 2000's. Harmonization packages and other reforms in the legal status of the Turkish civil-military relations challenged and deconstructed the strong role of military in politics. With this aspect, limited but notable change in this period was encouraged by an external actor, European Union. EU became a pushing force for reformations and encouraged the domestic actors to reconfigure their perception of the Turkish civil-military relations in the context of democratization. Following these structural changes in the core of the relationship, a new discourse on military's role in politics started to be reconstructed. In this reconstruction process, actors of Turkish politics supported this change in the civil-military relations to some extent.

Very recent development in Turkish politics, that became a very hot issue in Turkish political agenda when this thesis was about to finish, can be showed as an example of the changing pattern of civil-military relations in Turkey. On 29 July 2011, the Command Echelon of the Turkish Armed Forces presented their resignation to the Prime Minister just two days before the August summit of Supreme Military Council. The Council meets two times in a year. The promotions of the officers are determined in the August summits of the Council. August 2011 summit was important in the sense that the decision about promotions of the military personnel who are currently judged in Ergenekon and Balyoz Trials. On

July 29, the Chief of the General Staff have met with the Prime Minister. After learning from Prime Minister that these personnel will not be promoted in the August summit, the Chief of the General Staff, the Commander of the Land Forces, the Commander of the Navy and the Commander of the Air Forces demanded their retirement. This development is important in terms of showing that in this new era, once the dissensus appeared between the military and civilian authority, it did not turned into a crisis in civil-military relations. Rather, the military elites remained within the boundaries of democratic process.

In the final word, opportunities for further research should be briefly mentioned. First of all, since this thesis intends to build a constructivist theoretical framework that can be used in the analysis of civil-military relations, I believe further research can be conducted on this dimension. The weakness of the theoretical emphasis in the literature has been mentioned by several CMR scholars. Besides, Forster (2002) underlined that constructivist approach may provide insights to the concepts such as “civilian control”, “professionalization.” At this point, I would like to note that this study is not claiming that it is capable enough to become a general CMR theory. Rather, it intends to explain the case of Turkey and make several theoretical implications for similarly constructed cases. Thus, more general studies that utilize constructivist theoretical framework can be conducted to seek ground for building a theoretical framework that is capable enough to explain general civil-military relations.

The empirical data show that compulsory military service system in Turkey provides an appropriate environment for the construction of a stronger military role. It is possible to see similar arguments in the literature, stating that countries that apply compulsory conscription system are more prone to have a politically active

military. However, concrete data on this correlation is limited. Thus, collection of data that shows the correlation between military service system and civil-military relations would make an important contribution to the literature. Such a research can offer an insight to questions such as “is there a correlation between duration of the military service and strong military presence within politics?”

Finally, self-perception of military and citizenry’s perception has been the focus. More specific research can be conducted to discover the differentiation of the perceptions among different divisions of these segments. For example, is it possible to take military as a monolithic structure? Are there any divisions within military about military’s role in the system? How different perceptions do these divisions have? Similarly, how do different divisions of society perceive military’s role? For example, how do minorities consider military’s role? What differences can be observed in minorities’ perception of military’s role from the rest of the society’s perception? These questions can provide opportunities to conduct fruitful research to contribute to the CMR literature.

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