

**DURATION OF CIVIL WARS FROM A WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
PERSPECTIVE: THE CASES OF ANGOLA, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF CONGO AND SIERRA LEONE**

A Master's Thesis

by

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July 2011

To my Family

“DURATION OF CIVIL WARS FROM A WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
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CONGO AND SIERRA LEONE”

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
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by

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ANKARA

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ABSTRACT

DURATION OF CIVIL WARS FROM A WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS PERSPECTIVE: THE CASES OF ANGOLA, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND SIERRA LEONE

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Since the end of the Second World War, civil conflicts emerged as one of the major threats to security not only in their respective regions but also for the whole world, especially for powerful states. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the number of new intrastate wars decreased, but the existing wars increased in duration. This thesis examines this phenomenon from Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems analysis perspective by arguing that the flow of capital from the periphery states to the core countries that takes place during the conflict increases the duration of the respective civil war. The main objective is to shed light on the causes of the entrenched civil warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa. This research uses theory building case study method, looking at civil wars in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. The evidence presented in the cases suggests that the powerful core states and firms located in these countries affect the duration of civil conflicts through engaging in activities aimed at increasing their capital. These states carry out international trade in illegally extracted natural resources, most notably 'blood diamonds', which provides funding for the warring factions. In addition, private security firms or mercenaries drain both money and resources from war-torn states under the covert support from the core states. This thesis contributes to the theoretical framework of Wallerstein's world-systems analysis and to the literature on civil conflicts.

Keywords: civil conflicts, world-systems analysis, natural resources, privatization of security, mercenaries, exploitation, Sub-Saharan Africa, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone

ÖZET

DÜNYA SİSTEMLERİ ANALİZİ BAKIŞ AÇISIYLA İÇ SAVAŞLARIN SÜRESİ: ANGOLA, DEMOKRATİK KONGO CUMHURİYETİ VE SIERRA LEONE OLAY İNCELEMELERİ

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İkinci Dünya Savaşının sonlanmasından bu yana, sivil çatışmalar güçlü ülkeler açısından sadece kendi bölgeleri için değil aynı zamanda tüm dünya için güvenliğin ana tehdit unsurlarından biri haline gelmiştir. Sovyetler Birliğinin dağılmasıyla birlikte ülkelerarası meydana gelen savaşların sayısı düşüşe geçmiş olup, halihazırda var olan savaşların süreleri ise uzamıştır. Bu tez, mevcut bu olguya Immanuel Wallerstein'in dünya-sistemler analizi kuramı ve bakış açısından incelemekte ve Sahraaltı Afrika'daki kemikleşmiş savaş halinin ardındaki nedenlere ışık tutmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu araştırma teori kurma durum çalışması yöntemi kullanarak, Angola, Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti ve Sierra Leone ülkelerindeki sivil savaşları ele almaktadır. Bu vaka incelemeleri ile ortaya konan kanıt, güçlü merkez ülkelerin ve bu ülkelerde konuşlanmış şirketlerin, sahip oldukları varlıkları arttırmak amacıyla giriştikleri uygulamaların neticesinde sivil çatışmaların sürelerine etki ettiklerini göstermektedir. Bu ülkeler, savaşan gruplara kaynak sağlayan yasadışı olarak çıkarılmış doğal kaynakların – ya da daha bilinen şekliyle 'kanlı elmasların' uluslararası ticaretini yürütmektedirler. Bunun yanında, özel güvenlik firmaları ya da paralı askerler, merkez ülkelerin örtülü desteğiyle hem para hem de kaynakları savaş içerisindeki bu ülkelerden hortumlamaktadırlar. Bu tez, Wallerstein'in dünya-sistemler analizinin teorik yapısına ve iç savaş literatürüne katkıda bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: sivil savaşlar, dünya-sistemler analizi, doğal kaynaklar, güvenlik özelleştirmesi, paralı askerler, sömürü, Sahraaltı Afrika, Angola, Demokratik Kongo Cumhuriyeti, Sierra Leone

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECLA	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
EO	Executive Outcomes
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KPCS	Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
MAR	Minorities At Risk
MLC	Congolese Liberation Movement
MPRI	Military Professional Resources Inc.
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force

UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WSA	World Systems Analysis
WST	World Systems Theory

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Cold War the number of interstate wars significantly decreased, while the number of ongoing intrastate wars declined in time. During the period between 1990 and 2001 the world witnessed fifty-seven major armed conflicts that took place in forty-five states, out of which only few were interstate conflicts, including a border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Brown, 2007). These findings may be explained by the fact that civil wars that started during the Cold War terminate at a rate lower than the rate of civil war onset. Fearon and Laitin (2004: 21) argue that ‘the rate at which rural guerilla wars in third world have ended has been lower’, while the rate at which new wars occur has been steady. The contemporary civil conflicts cause continuous humanitarian crises, like under-nutrition, lack of clear potable water, lack of habitation, insecurity, increasing poverty in war-torn states, leading to an increased number of failed and/or incapacitated states that are not able to perform basic functions that a state is expected to perform. All of the aforementioned is especially true for the African states. This situation continues throughout time and instigates scholars to conduct more and more research on the

topic. In addition, according to Fearon and Laitin (2004: 6), such problems, including the humiliation in the third world have become “‘public bads’ for the major powers” and today represent one of the most significant threats to national security in Western states, as opposed to major power rivalry and possible mutual assured destruction with nuclear weapons, which constituted major threat perceptions during the Cold War years¹.

This thesis deals with duration of civil conflicts. The major research question is why civil conflicts last as long as they do. This is an important question because the longer a civil war is, the more suffering it causes, both to its own people and the surrounding environment. In this context, civil conflict is defined as “an armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas, 2001, 2006). In this thesis, such terminology as civil conflict, civil war, civil strife, intrastate conflict, intrastate war, as well as domestic or internal strife are used interchangeably. The duration of civil conflicts is measured in years, which is more suitable for showing the entrenchment of a conflict than other, less lengthy, indicators such as months or days.

This topic is the object of study since there is limited academic research on civil war duration, in comparison to civil war onset, which has been a focal point of conflict studies since the end of the Cold War (Gurr, 1993; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Dixon, 2009). Conflict endurance seems to be of lesser interest for international relations scholars, and when studied upon, concentration is usually on international interventions and peacekeeping missions of the United

¹ Some scholars argue that the contemporary time period is an “unprecedented period of peace among the former colonizers” (Henderson and Singer, 2000: 275).

Nations and regional organizations, such as, for instance, the African Union. Moreover, when duration in the context of civil wars is studied in the literature (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Buhaug et al., 2005), the approach is mostly state-centric since this literature is dominated by traditional theories such as realism and liberalism. In addition, conflict duration negligence in the civil war literature can be explained by the fact that realist and liberalist scholars are not concerned with this subject, because protracted warfare mostly affects human suffering. In this vein, human emancipation and human security are of academic interest to scholars of critical theory, not of realism and liberalism.

In this light, the current research contributes to the existing literature on intrastate wars by both focusing on a subject less investigated and presenting a different and multi-actor perspective on the issue through the use of Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems analysis (WSA),² which so far has not received any attention from the scholars studying civil wars.³

The literature on civil conflicts highlights grievance vs. greed as causes of civil strife. While grievance refers to psychological expectations that are unfulfilled, greed refers to material shortcomings that lead to frustration. While these are causes of conflict onset, duration of the conflict can hardly be explained with these factors only. Thus, this thesis argues that once the conflict escalates, interference of the international actors in the war economy increases the greed of domestic actors and combined with the greed of the core and semiperiphery states' governments and firms,

² Wallerstein's world-systems analysis is referred to as sometimes a theory or an approach. Since Wallerstein himself prefers "analysis", this thesis will generally refer to his work as "analysis" and less often as "approach".

³ Wallerstein himself has some work on anti-colonial conflict in Africa (i.e. Wallerstein, 1982) but these works do not tackle civil wars in the post-Cold War period, nor do they deal with civil war duration.

the situation develops into a vicious cycle. Consequently, I argue that a mutually constitutive relationship exists between the greed of powerful states and different firms that are headquartered in these powerful states, including private security firms or mercenaries, leading to a cycle of exploitation of the weak states, which further increases civil conflict duration, which is again followed by exploitation on the part of the powerful states. This vicious cycle starts with the onset of civil war, which draws international actors to the natural resources and capital accumulation opportunities in the war-torn country. The greed of these actors urges them to exploit the country's war economy. Profiting from instability in a civil war state, these actors are not trying to stop the war, on the contrary, their involvement becomes permanent, leading to continuous exploitation of war state's wealth and draining capital to powerful actors. Thus, a mutually constitutive relationship exists between the exploitation of the periphery states by the core and semiperiphery states and civil conflict duration.⁴

Methodologically, the world-systems analysis is used in a theory building multiple case study setting in the thesis. The case study method is most suitable for this kind of research, where a new perspective is applied and it is essential to choose a way of research conduct that would be most illustrative. Concomitantly, case study method provides a ground for not only taking into consideration "just the voice and perspective of the actors, but also of the relevant groups of actors and the interaction between them" (Tellis, 1997: 2). For the study of civil conflict this means that not only major actors, such as states, are the focus, but also less influential ones, such as private companies, groups and organizations, which is essential for a world-systems analysis.

⁴ In this cyclical relationship, it is important to mention that domestic actors and the environment are also decisive for war duration and termination. This thesis acknowledges the impact of the domestic factors, nevertheless, focuses on international dynamics to explain why civil wars last.

These actors are most active in the African continent; thus, this thesis examines three Sub-Saharan African states: Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone. These particular countries have experienced protracted civil wars⁵, they have very rich natural resources and despite these resources, they are still underdeveloped. The people living in these countries have tremendously suffered from outside interference in their civil wars. The selection of these African states is also an attempt for filling the gap in “Western-centric” security studies, which long dominated the field (Bilgin, 2010).

This thesis, while building on it, critiques Wallerstein’s approach as missing several other forms of exploitation than the capital accumulation of core states by using periphery. Moreover, Wallerstein focuses on the system level, thus, his work mostly applies to international struggles. However, in this work, I show the applicability of the WSA in state level analysis, particularly in civil conflict analyses. I add to this framework other factors such as exploitation of natural resources in the context of civil wars as well as other actors such as mercenaries and private security firms.

Taking all the aforementioned into consideration, the main objective of this research is to give a new perspective on the causes of civil war duration. Building on Jack Levy’s (2007: 20) argument that “any interpretation of a particular war must explain why that war occurred when it did, and not earlier or later”, this thesis aims to shed new light on why civil wars last as much as they do, and not less and how duration of civil wars have added to human suffering.

⁵ While the wars in Angola and Sierra Leone came to an end in 2002, the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the longest civil war in the world, still continues.

This research not only contributes to the literature on civil conflict but also to Wallerstein's theoretical framework, particularly by building a bridge between them through incorporation of the world-systems analysis into the civil conflict literature. Additionally, this study is beneficial because emancipation of people from the ills of protracted civil wars and promotion of peace in developing states, will lead to the stability of not only Sub-Saharan Africa but also other regions, and global security in general.

This thesis is organized into five chapters. Next chapter presents a review of the literature on civil conflicts. The objective is to trace major trends in the literature, and find out whether there are studies that apply the world-systems analysis perspective in the study of civil conflicts. The chapter itself is further divided into several parts. Thus, it has three large sections, incorporating literature review on the causes of conflict onset, conflict duration and an analysis of the previous sections. The former two are further divided into domestic and international causes of civil conflict to understand the common trends and patterns in the study of intrastate wars; in addition it proves to be a good system for deriving international factors affecting civil conflicts from the domestic ones.

Chapter III elaborates on the theoretical and methodological perspective used in the thesis. First section in this chapter presents historical background preceding the emergence of Wallerstein's world-systems analysis. The chapter continues by focusing on the theoretical framework and the major concepts, as well as critiques of the theory. This chapter provides justifications for the relevance of this particular theory for conflict and peace studies, particularly for civil war scholarship.

The chapter further discusses the research design and explains case selection. A timeframe between 1990 and 2010 is chosen, in order to eliminate the effects of superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, who intervened in civil wars in the developing world to increase their leverage and prevent the opposing side from achieving the same. The last part of Chapter III explains the selection of civil wars in the Sub-Saharan Africa, which can be considered to be the most unstable region in the world, thus requiring attention to the problems plaguing the region from the academia and global community.

Chapter IV presents the theory building case studies, which are civil wars in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. At the beginning of each case a historical background is build up, in order to give the reader a fuller understanding of the conflict itself, and the political and economic situation inside the war-torn state. The conflict is then examined from a new perspective based on the WSA. The analysis section dwells on the facts introduced in the case studies.

Conclusions and summary of the thesis are presented in the final Chapter V of this thesis. The chapter briefly summarizes the study and elaborates upon conclusions drawn from the previous sections. The chapter also includes propositions directed at changing the existing order, preemptive measures that could be taken in order to prevent the occurrence and endurance of civil wars in the Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, and in the world in general.

New facts discovered during this research, which provide insights for future scholarship, were not included in the main body of the thesis, but are given in Appendix I.

CHAPTER II

CAUSES OF CIVIL WAR ONSET AND DURATION

“The more remote in time and the more intensively analyzed the internal war, the longer the list of hypotheses.”
Harry Eckstein (1965: 138).

This chapter presents different views expressed in the literature, concerning the causes of civil conflict onset, duration and termination. Since the research question of this thesis is why civil wars endure, the literature on this particular subject is given after a discussion of why civil wars occur in the first place. The reason for choosing conflict duration as a topic for this work is due to the fact that, civil war duration is much less studied and literature on it is limited. Most studies in the literature focus on the causes of civil war initiation, and are very diverse in terms of reasoning and explanation, while the causes of conflict endurance are given much less attention. For that reason, the first part of the literature review will include the extensive literature on the domestic and international causes of civil conflict onset while the causes of duration of civil conflict will follow. I review both because the onset causes are strictly related to the causes of duration of the civil war.

The definition of civil conflict most commonly accepted in the field of civil war studies is the one compiled by Sambanis (2004b: 829-831) and is as follows: civil conflict is an armed conflict against the government in a state that is a member of the international system, with a population of 500,000 or greater, between the militarily organized parties that stated their political aims, with the state as the main combatant, and insurgency recruited and stationed locally. The onset of the civil conflict is defined as the first days of the fighting. The duration of civil conflict is characterized by sustained violence with at least 500 to 1,000 deaths in the first year. In addition, the weaker party must be engaged in effective resistance, as well as be able to inflict at least 100 deaths upon stronger party.⁶

Although this is a very comprehensive definition, it is very specific for my thesis, as I am looking at civil conflicts in Africa and specific data, such as battle-related deaths, may not be available for wars in Africa. For this reason, I am using more general definition of Kalyvas, who defines civil war as “an armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas, 2001, 2006).

⁶ Sambanis’ definition of civil conflict is very extensive and detailed; for this reason the definition introduced in this thesis was adopted from it by stating most important aspects of the definition, relevant for the topic of this work. See Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. “What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (6): 814-858, for the entire definition of civil war.

2.1 Root Causes of Civil Conflict Onset

2.1.1 Domestic Causes

This section seeks to present and analyze root causes of civil conflicts as have been touched upon in numerous studies on this particular subject. After the Second World War the topic of internal conflict, of which civil conflict is an integral part⁷, has received enormous attention both from the academia, media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, and international organizations. Was it because many nations worldwide, having witnessed two major wars in just 32 years with around 100 million casualties and many more injured or disabled, committed to maintaining peace and security around the globe and to ‘never again’ see such atrocities? Or was it because the historical events that followed 1945 made conflict an inseparable part of our lives? Whatever the reasons, the fact is a fact: civil wars have increased since the end of the Second World War, however, since the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War this increase stopped⁸, but was followed by an increase in ongoing civil conflicts’ duration.

Fearon and Laitin (2003: 77) argue that in 1990s civil wars broke out at a rate of 2.1 per hundred country-years, and the largest number of civil wars, 31 wars from their data, occurred during this period of time, while only 19 and 25 civil conflicts started in 1960s and 1970s respectively. According to Mack (2002: 518), the United

⁷ Eckstein argues that an internal conflict ‘stands for the genus of which others [revolution, civil war, revolt, rebellion, uprising, guerilla warfare, mutiny, jacquerie, coup d’état, terrorism and insurrection are species’. See Eckstein, Harry. 1965. “On the Etiology of Internal Wars.” *History and Theory* 4(2): 133-163. I take civil conflict as a limited form of internal conflict and later define the concept accordingly.

⁸ See Figure 4 in the Appendices section and Table 1 on page 12.

Nations officials could not comprehend the fact that “there had been a decline of more than 35% in the number of armed conflicts in the 1990s – the decade of Srebrenica, Somalia and Rwanda /.../, [i]ronically, /.../ part of the reason for that decline was the sharp increase in peace agreements in the 1990s – many of which had been brokered by the UN”.

The fact that the rate of civil conflict onset is in decline does not render this subject unimportant, on the contrary, while civil war outbreaks decrease, the duration of some civil wars increase, as these conflicts get more protracted with each year. One example to support this argument can be civil conflict in Congo. According to PRIO Duration Database⁹, internal conflict in Congo, later Zaire, and today the Democratic Republic of Congo, started in 1960 and with interruptions lasted until 2003. If minor interruptions of conflict are not to be considered as a separate conflict, but as a part of the ongoing war, then it is possible to state that civil war in Congo lasted for 43 years and there is still occasional recurring fighting. In addition, Table 1 shows that in the timeframe between 1994 and 1999, civil wars in the Sub-Saharan Africa were the longest in comparison to conflicts in other regions, and lasted on the average one and a half years.

⁹ See <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Onset-and-Duration-of-Intrastate-Conflict/Duration-Data-v1-2006b/> for full data on conflict duration. Last accessed on July 10, 2011.

Table 1: Civil War Outbreaks and Related Statistics by Region & Period¹⁰

	Europe and North America	Latin America and Caribbean	Middle East-North Africa	Asia (including South)	Sub-Saharan Africa (including Sudan)
1945–1999					
War starts	10	18	27	32	40
Dead	15000	4000	20000	30000	65000
Displaced	305000	90500	500000	74500	182500
Duration (months)	15.5	18	36	51.5	54
1989–1999					
War Starts	6	3	8	1	13
Dead	27500	3000	13750	12589	10000
Displaced	353000	52000	250000	150000	300000
Duration (months)	15.5	24	30	60	36
1994–1999					
War starts	2	1	1	0	2
Dead	45000	3000	2000	0	125250
Displaced	393000	52000	0	0	385350
Duration (months)	15	12	6	0	18

The subject of civil conflict, as noted above, has been extensively studied producing a wide range of hypotheses concerning the causes of civil wars. Some researchers divide these causes into two categories of greed and grievance referring to material and non-material causes of conflict (Collier, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Regan and Norton, 2005; Şatana, 2010). In addition, natural resources as a cause of civil conflict have received a wider attention after Klare’s study, which attests that with the increase in demand for natural resources “conflict over disputed zones will only grow more intense” (2001: xiii). Paul Collier (2003), a scholar who has done extensive research on civil wars for the World Bank, states that the potential for

¹⁰ War starts refers to new war episodes that were initiated within the relevant period. Values for deaths, displacements, and duration are medians for each region for wars starting in each period. *Source*: Sambanis, 2002: 217.

conflict is much higher in poor countries that have declining economies as well as those that depend heavily on natural resources. This latter research undertaken for the World Bank was not the first one in which Collier dwelled on natural resources; however, it is his first one, in which he acknowledges the role of diamonds in the initiation of conflict. These studies were followed by others (Humphreys, 2005; Fearon, 2004, 2005; Ross, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore, 2005; Lujala, 2010) on natural resources and especially the relationship between oil and ‘blood diamonds’ and conflict.¹¹ The literature on natural resources and their connection to civil conflict has become so extensive that it deserves a more comprehensive analysis in the following sections.

2.1.1.1 Grievance

In contemporary conflict research, scholars usually came to define the causes of civil conflict into two categories: grievance and greed. The former is further divided into sub-causes; for instance, grievances can be identity-based, religious, socio-economic, or environmental. The greed and grievance debate has existed in the field of Political Science and International Relations for several years, and it gained popularity, and many works on civil conflict today are based on it (De Soysa, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Regan and Norton, 2005).

¹¹ Blood or conflict diamonds, in United Nations definition, are diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments, or in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council. See <http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html>. Last accessed on May 14, 2011.

When talking about grievances as a cause of civil war, we are referring to *relative deprivation*, a term coined by a well-known scholar of rebellion, Ted Gurr (1968: 252-253), which he defines as “perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their environment's apparent value capabilities”. To put it simply, relative deprivation occurs when one finds that his/her life conditions are worse than they should be, taking into consideration his/her abilities and societal opportunities, in comparison to other people. Such a situation sparks frustration and resentment, or grievance in modern terms. According to Gurr (1968: 252), there are further three ways for groups to behave: either they resign, express their grief through non-violent protests, or apply force. An aggression or rebellion is thus an attempt to retake what was not given or what was taken away, to gain what is considered to be rightly belonging to the frustrated group. Gurr sees relative deprivation as a *precondition*¹² for civil war, in Harry Eckstein's (1965: 133-163) words, and the more intense the relative deprivation, the greater the likelihood for potential conflict, as well as its intensity, are.

While further studying the effect of different grievances on the minorities' engagement in protest and rebellion, Gurr (1993: 161) comes to the conclusion that communal groups, defined as “cultural and religious identity groups that do not have recognized states or institutionalized political status-have”, that are involved in political protest or rebellion have been the major obstacle for both domestic and international change. Gurr identifies distinct factors that have great effect on

¹² Eckstein argues that there are *preconditions* and *precipitants* of an internal conflict. In his opinion such distinction helps reduce confusion with small and long term causes of a conflict. He explains preconditions as frustration inside the society that makes it possible for a precipitant or an immediate cause of the initiation of a strife, to bring about violence.

grievances a certain group has: cultural identity, inequalities, and historical loss of autonomy. Supporting their argument by the MAR data, Gurr and Harff (1994: 4) state, “about 80 percent of the politically active ethnic groups in the 1990s were disadvantaged because of historical or contemporary discrimination”. It should also be underscored that, according to Gurr (1993: 161), whether a group will resort to political protest or rebellion is defined by “[d]emocracy, state power and institutional change”. He also points out that grievances of the communal groups were the reasons behind the most protracted civil conflicts in the period since 1945 until 1990s, including conflicts in Burma and Ethiopia (1993: 188).

The research on group grievances was further developed and is empirically studied by the Minorities At Risk (MAR) Project, founded by Ted Gurr in 1986, which “monitors and analyzes the status and conflicts of politically-active communal groups in all countries with a current population of at least 500,000”.¹³ This project focuses on groups that have “political significance” or power due to their status or political actions, with “significance” defined in terms of sufferings or benefits that a group receives through discrimination process vis-à-vis other groups in a state, as well as is at the center of group mobilization with the aim of promoting or defending its “self-defined interests”. The group-level data compiled by MAR is widely used by the scholars of civil conflict and rebellion. An example would be a research made by Regan and Norton (2005), which will be examined in the *Greed* section.

While studying grievances as a cause for civil conflict outburst, some scholars apply other theories and approaches, besides realist and liberal ones, in order to explain conflict onset. For instance, Aspinall (2007) uses a constructivist approach to

¹³ See <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/> for MAR data. Last Accessed on July 2, 2011.

this particular subject with the aim of finding explanation for the fact that the Aceh province of Indonesia experienced fierce civil war from 1970s to 2005, while other provinces, similar to Aceh in terms of patterns of natural resources' extraction (such as gas) did not witness any enduring violence. According to Aspinall (2007: 950-951), this issue is connected to grievances, not in their usual predetermined meaning, but to those that are socially constructed. For natural resources' exploitation to cause the civil war onset, certain process of identity construction should take place beforehand. Aspinall (2007: 968) argues that "Acehnese grievances about natural resource exploitation only arose and became politically consequential for violence as part of a wider discourse of deprivation that positioned the Acehnese as victims of the Indonesian state", in other terms, violence in the Aceh province occurred as a result of identity construction process inside the Aceh community and assertion of legitimacy to violent means. Aspinall stresses the importance of looking at grievance taking into account the environment in which they are entrenched (2007: 968-969).

2.1.1.1.1 Insurgency vs. Elites

The subject of insurgency is vastly studied in the literature of conflict. It is sometimes called opposition, rebels, rural guerilla fighters; state leaders when confronted with an internal struggle against the government may call it terrorism. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003: 75), insurgency can be defined as a "particular form of military practice that can be harnessed to diverse political agendas" and a "technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerilla warfare from rural base areas". The conditions that favor insurgency, as expressed by

the scholars, are poverty, leading to the weakening of the state financially and bureaucratically, political instability, rough terrain, and large population size. Fearon and Laitin (2003: 75) see these factors as better explaining why some states face higher risk of civil conflict while others do not. They state that under certain favorable conditions only a small number of guerilla fighters of approximately 500 to 2000 can inflict a lengthy civil war upon a state, and the production and reinforcement of grievances during the war is one of the objectives of the rebels. As civil wars get more protracted with each year, it becomes more evident that the aim of the rebels is not actually winning the conflict but to ensure its durability, so that it can continue to be their 'milking-cow'. Civil wars today have come to be perceived as 'business' by many. In fact, Levy and Thompson (2010: 192) argue that it is more important to maintain the opportunity for profiting from civil wars, than to end them and make a transition to peace. In support for this argument, de Soysa (2002: 395) states, "very slight political liberalization leads to conflict, but larger increases reduce the danger considerably, supporting the view that conflict is driven by opportunistic behaviour rather than by grievance". Moreover, Hegre and Sambanis (2006: 508) argue, "variables representing ethnic difference in the population are robust only in relation to lower level armed conflict". Thus, it can be inferred that a civil war causes grievances, but not the other way around.

Connected to the issue of insurgency is the one on incumbents, which is receiving more attention in the field of conflict, with researchers studying responses that the government or the incumbents make in times of unrest inside the state. However, there is a lesser number of studies concerning the impact of elites or

incumbents on the start of civil conflict than there is on the subject of insurgents or rebels. The insurgents respond to the incumbent elites that are in power in the state. Therefore, this relationship is important to comprehend civil war dynamics, yet understudied.

According to Eckstein (1965: 145), the fact that the elite is under-studied is unsurprising because, in the end, “it is the rebels who rebel”. However, he argues further that it is also important not only to inquire how the rebels or insurgents gain their power against the ruling government, but also how the elite loses it, when studying the causes of civil strife. Characteristics of the elite may be a sufficient explanation for the outbreak of civil conflict. Eckstein bases his argumentation on the example from Mosca’s *The Ruling Class*, which he cites in his article (1965: 146). Mosca talks about the separation between the rebels and the elite, the alienation of the latter from the former, due to appropriating of new foreign values, traditions, norms of conduct, as a cause for the rebellion against it. Mosca introduces an example of the Polish elite and peasantry rebellion against it. He argues that even though the Polish elite was ruthless and restored to violent measures against the peasantry in the Middle Ages, there was no revolt against it. However, interestingly, when the elite acquired French tastes and manners, including dances and giving balls, despite more humane treatment of peasantry by the elite, “vicious and frequent revolts attended the estrangement of the nobles from their people”. Therefore, almost every internal war is preceded by malfunctioning of the elite. Eckstein (1965: 147-148) notes that internal wars are rare in societies that are either highly modernized, or whose elites have

retained a close connection to its people. In this way, the reasons for the outbreak of an internal war are understood as being connected to the issue of grievances.

As opposed to the grievance related explanations of conflict onset, other scholars base their arguments on greed, so called material factors, as a major cause of the start of a civil war.

2.1.1.2 Greed

The main scholar who put forward economic conditions as a cause of civil war is Paul Collier, who was the Director of the Research Development Department of the World Bank between 1998 and 2003, and is a Professor of Economics and Director of the Centre for the Study of African Economies at the Oxford University. In one of his main articles¹⁴ on the topic of greed and grievances in civil war (2004: 563), co-written with Anke Hoeffler, Collier argues that having analyzed a new data set on wars between 1960-1999, he came to the conclusion that social and political variables most correlated with grievances “have little explanatory power”, while economic variables, even though they may be connected to grievances, are most correlated with viability of civil strife and “provide considerably more explanatory power”. Having applied the logistical regressions on the new data set to predict the outbreak of civil war, Collier and Hoeffler came to the conclusion that opportunity as a cause for rebellion predicts the initiation of civil war well.

¹⁴ Ron (2005: 445) uses Thomas Kuhn’s terminology to describe Collier and Hoeffler’s work as an “exemplar”, which serves as a founding model, and provokes further research in the same paradigm.

Furthermore, Collier and Hoeffler identify three factors that affect opportunities for intrastate conflict. The first one is the availability of finances for the rebels. Here they touch upon primary commodity exports, as a potential risk factor for the initiation of conflict, due to the fact that rebels may see in it the opportunity for extortion, providing them with easy access to financial resources. Collier and Hoeffler also include diasporas as a source of funding. The cost of rebellion is the second factor that impacts the outbreak of conflict. Their research shows the secondary education of male population, per capita income, and the growth rate to be statistically significant, which is interpreted as signifying that low income prior to the conflict makes it easier for the conflict to occur. Notwithstanding, the scholars acknowledge that low income can impact the initiation of civil war, because it can also be connected to grievances, and not just because the rebellion is made cheaper, when per capita earnings are lower. On the other hand, if per capita income is higher, it reduces the risk for the outbreak of civil conflict: when a country has half mean income, the probability of civil war is 0.63, but when a state has double mean income, this possibility for conflict falls to 0.15 (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998: 568). In support of these findings, Fearon and Laitin (2003: 83) also argue for the statistical significance of per capita income on the initiation of civil war, with the decrease of \$1000 in per capita income associated with 45% higher risk of civil war onset. The third factor that has an impact on the opportunity for rebellion is military advantage, including mountainous terrain that has advantages for rebels, such as a good hiding place (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 587-589).

In Collier and Hoeffler's (2004: 589) opinion, the greed motivation for the initiation of conflict has more explanatory power with respect to grievance motivation; however, they conclude that the latter can also cause conflict if grievances are "sufficiently widespread to be common across societies and time". This finding crosscuts with the finding presented in Gurr's work (1993: 189), in which he argues that grievances are most essential in the beginning of group mobilization, however, "become less significant than group organization leadership and state response once campaigns of organized political action are underway".

Similar to Gurr's argument on grievances, Reagan and Norton, basing their research on the Minorities at Risk database, find that different grievances, such as "income and distributional issues, repressive policies of the state /.../ are each associated with the onset of protest, rebellion, and civil war" (2005: 320). Contrary to Collier and Hoeffler's argument, Reagan and Norton find per capita income to be insignificant for the onset of civil war, while political repressions and ethnolinguistic heterogeneity are both associated with the outbreak of civil conflict. This finding is a contradiction to greed-based research by Collier (2003), and Collier and Sambanis (2005), where ethnic and religious diversity are stated as reducing the risk of civil war, because it is difficult to bring and keep together a rebel group that is highly diverse in terms of religion and ethnicity. This argument is supported by de Soysa's research (2002: 395), which argues that ethnicity is associated with the risk of conflict only in "moderately homogenous" societies. In ethnically heterogeneous states, Collier (2003: 40) argues, when civil wars occur they can run along ethnic lines, but this does not bear the meaning that ethnicity is the cause of the conflict. Distant history also does

not present a very good explanation for the recent civil conflicts; instead, Collier (2003: 40) proposes to look at recent history, and most importantly at the state's economic condition.

The argument of ethnic diversity is extended by Fearon and Laitin (2003: 75) in their infamous article "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War". They come to the conclusion that if one controls for per capita income, countries that are more diverse ethnically or religiously do not face increasing risk of civil conflict outbreak with regard to states that are more homogenous in these terms. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000b), while studying the fact that the African continent witnessed so many civil wars in comparison to other regions, come to the same conclusion. In their opinion, the frequency of civil war onset in Africa is not connected to grievances based on ethnicity or "ethno-linguistic fragmentation of its countries", but rather is caused by "high levels of poverty, failed political institutions and economic dependence on natural resources" (2000b: 244-245). They suggest that, contrary to the general belief that ethnic diversity obstructs peaceful and stable development, ethnic diversity is helpful in promoting peaceful development inside a state, when a group is "adequately represented by their national political institutions and if the economy provides opportunity for productive activity" (2000b: 244).

In sum, while scholars such as Regan and Norton argue that greed does not matter in ethnic conflicts, Collier and Hoeffler as well as Fearon and Laitin argue otherwise. Nevertheless, there may not necessarily be a dichotomy of greed vs. grievance. In that vein, Berkeley (1997: 5) connects the discussion on ethnicity with greed by arguing that "[i]t is not conflict itself that feeds further conflict" but there is

another reason for the occurrence of civil conflicts in Africa, which are tyrants playing on ethnic feelings. These leaders are accountable to no one, and are able to act in a way most beneficial to their interests. African dictators were usually the proxies of major powers during the Cold War, such as the American proxy Mobutu in former Zaire or French proxy Habyarimana of Rwanda. With the end of the Cold War the financial support from the superpowers ceased, which prompted the leaders of African states to seek new ways for staying in power. For this purpose, they used the subject of ethnicity to destabilize the state, leading to internal violence. In other words, both greed and ethnic grievances became triggers for war.

Like the existence of greed vs. grievance debate in the conflict literature as a whole, this section also showed that within causes of civil conflict onset, grievances based on identity and greed for economic gain become two rival explanations for the outbreak of civil wars, discussed most frequently in the literature. Next section deals with natural resources as a cause of civil war, which is studied as a separate category by conflict scholars.

2.1.1.2.1 Natural Resources

Natural resources and their abundance have received a major focus in the literature of conflict, especially after the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which was established in 2000 with the adoption of United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/56 and further support was provided by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1459, adopted in 2003. The Process has been widely supported by the international community. Its aim is to ensure that so-called

'blood diamonds' that fuel civil war or finance human rights violations did not get into the market.

Today, research on natural resources include not only diamonds and other gemstones, but also timber, oil, gas, non-fuel minerals, agricultural commodities, as well as drugs. With some resources becoming more difficult to sell, the rebels search for new ways of obtaining money. This new finding was recently brought to light to the general public in *Haber Türk* newspaper (May 10, 2009), although this fact was already acknowledged by the UN Security Council in 2001 (S/2001/357), 2002 (S/2002/1146) and 2003 (S/2003/1027). The *Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a Period of Six Months* (2001, 2002, 2003) pointed to the example of the mineral columbo tantalite or coltan, from which metal tantalum is extracted and later used in the production of electronic parts. The illegal exploitation of this mineral presented financial opportunities not only for rebel groups inside Congo, but also for businessman from Uganda and Rwanda, and produced grievances for local population who were forced to leave their land and work in mines. It is argued that Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme makes it hard for 'conflict diamonds' to be sold on the legal international market, which in its turn leads to decrease in 'blood diamonds' trade. Nevertheless, rebel groups found another way to get financial resources and they are now selling industrial minerals that are used in mobile phones, laptops and digital cameras. This activity supports violent protests of rebel groups in Congo. This new finding from the UNSC reports confirms the

importance of other natural resources, besides oil and diamonds, in initiation, escalation and prolongation of a civil strife.

The same as with other causes of civil conflict researchers have divergent views on whether, how and why natural resources impact the outbreak of civil conflict. According to Michael Ross (2005), who is an expert on the topic of natural resources, natural resources are associated with exploitation rights that the rebels hope to acquire during the conflict, which he calls 'booty futures'. He argues that for rebels to be able to topple the government in a resource rich country, they need financial resources, which in this case can be acquired through selling booty futures. This sale was a key source of initial funding for the rebels in minimum five natural resource abundant African countries in the time frame between 1989 and 2004 (Ross, 2005: 3). Ross stresses the importance of distinguishing between the ordinary sale of natural resources by the rebels and the sale of booty futures. The former is less threatening in a way that with the introduction of Kimberley process and its state of physicality, meaning that the sale of natural resources is physical, has physical evidence, like deforestation in case of timber, can be traced, and has to be transferred to the purchaser, makes the sale of conflict natural resources more preventable. On the other hand, the sale of *future* rights to exploitation is extremely difficult to trace because, as one would assume, such deals are not made public in any way, and since it tends to strengthen the weaker party to the conflict (Ross, 2005: 3, 7). In general, Ross (2001: 15) connects natural resources, especially oil and minerals both to grievances and greed: the abundance of natural resources in poor countries may lead to different grievances produced by human rights violations, environmental disasters, or

expropriation of land; but it can also lead to greed as the rebels may try to acquire funding by capturing and selling lootable resources.

James Fearon (2005) tries to refute the findings of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), which they present in their renowned article “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, in which the researchers argue that countries with a higher percentage of national income from primary commodity exports have been more prone to civil war. Giving credit to Collier and Hoeffler’s study, Fearon (2005: 483) argues that the results of their work are fragile, due to the fact that “minor changes in the sample framing and the recovery of missing data undermine it”. Fearon (2005: 483, 487) takes an example of oil as a primary commodity export product and argues that oil predicts civil war risk not because owning oil makes it easy for the rebel groups to start their ‘business’ and gain profit for their activities, but rather because “oil producers have relatively low state capabilities given their level of per capita income and because oil makes state or regional control a tempting ‘prize’”.

Supporting his argument by the study made by Michael Ross (2004b), Fearon brings up an example from the research that Ross found only one case when selling future exploitation rights for oil helped finance the rebels. Thus, exports of primary commodities, such as oil or crops, provide financial resources not for the insurgents but for the governments (Fearon, 2005: 487).

As mentioned above, Collier and Hoeffler in this particular study (2004), as well as in the articles entitled “On Economic Causes of Civil War” (1998) and “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity” (2000) do not touch upon such natural resources as diamonds, which are widely discussed in the literature. However, in a

study entitled “The Market for Civil War” Collier (2003: 41) includes diamonds into the list, arguing that diamonds are “a rebel’s best friend”. The role of diamonds in the initiation of civil conflict is very controversial, because scholars seem to fail to come to a common conclusion on this topic. Moreover, lootable diamonds or secondary diamonds positively relate to the onset of civil war, while kimberlite diamonds or primary diamonds that are difficult to reach because they form inside rocks, decrease the likelihood in civil conflict (Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore, 2005: 538). On the other hand, there are scholars who argue that the presence in a country of such natural resources as diamonds or gemstones, in general, is not a strong indicator of high risk of civil war; on the contrary, their existence decreases the possibility for the outbreak of conflict (Regan and Norton, 2005: 330). Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009: 651, 670-671) come to the same conclusion in their research. They argue that there is no reason to denominate natural resources as impediments to internal peace, and that their abundance decreases the risk of civil war outbreak through income distribution. However, Brunnschweiler and Bulte acknowledge the fact that, while their variables exclude lootable diamonds from the list of resource wealth, it is possible that the latter may affect both the outbreak and the duration of a conflict.

Jeremy Weinstein’s work (2005) furthers the research on natural resources and links them to rebel recruitment mechanisms. Weinstein (2005: 621-623) argues that resource abundance and its absence define the composition of rebel groups. The former gives rebel leaders an opportunity to provide ready payment to the recruits, thus attracting more wealth-seeking fighters with low commitment to the long-term goals of the organization. This in turn makes defection a problem for the rebel leaders,

as recruits may leave the group when faced with an opportunity to profit more than they are paid. On the other hand, when resources are scarce, the rebel leaders make promises of future gains, which leads to the elimination of opportunistic fighters, leaving the ones that are most committed to the causes of the group. In the first instance greed is the driving force for the people to join a rebel group, while in the second one it is grievance. Weinstein's research contributes to the greed vs. grievance debate by shedding light on "why both greed and grievance-driven rebels exist at the same time in history" (Ron, 2005: 447). He also contributes to the natural resources debate that scholars such as Michael Ross developed.

Macartan Humphreys (2005) presents a counter argument to the studies of Ross (2001, 2005) and Fearon (2005). He argues that the past resource production affects the onset of civil conflict more than the potential production in the future, which supports the hypothesis on the weak state mechanisms leading to the initiation of conflict, rather than greed-motivated rebel hypothesis. On the other hand, Humphreys states that the effect of natural resources on civil conflict is independent of state strength, however, countries that are most dependent on the export of agricultural commodities are most at risk of experiencing civil conflict. Novelty of his argumentation is that Humphreys tries to connect civil wars to regional or international actors, which are not active participants to the conflict. He claims that natural resources of a state can provide not only for the greed of insurgents but also for third parties, which may find resources in another country attractive, thus, making a foreign state or corporation more eager to engage in or incite civil wars (Humphreys, 2005: 508, 511, 534). This approach is indeed the closest to the theoretical framework

that this thesis will draw from in the next chapter since Humphreys focuses on both domestic and international actors.

Humphreys' argument on the involvement of foreign powers in the civil war is supported by Ross' (2004a) interesting analytical research of different studies produced in this field. In his work, Ross looks at thirteen cases of recent civil conflicts in order to establish a link between natural resources and conflict. In four cases he finds that regional powers were trying to gain access to natural resources in another state by directly intervening or providing support to insurgents against incumbent governments (Ross, 2004a: 56). Ross' research once again shows the contradictions associated with different studies of conflict. His findings refute the argumentation of Regan and Norton (2005). In general, his overall argument states that the abundance in natural resources *does* increase the likelihood of civil war onset (Ross, 2004a: 61). Concomitantly, it is essential to differentiate natural resources and not blend them all together. The impact that natural resources have on the conflict onset depends on whether resources are 'lootable' or not, meaning whether they can be appropriated by a small number of unskilled people. Different natural resources lead to different types of conflict in Ross' point of view (2003a: 47-48, 64-67). For instance, non-lootable resources such as oil, gas or deep-shaft minerals, such as kimberlite diamonds, tend to increase the risk of the outbreak of separatist civil conflicts, while on the other hand, lootable resources, such as alluvial diamonds, drugs, or agricultural crops, tend to increase the likelihood of non-separatist conflict, while generally having no effect on separatist conflicts. Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005: 538) come to the same conclusion in their research.

Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) further the research on the connection between natural resources and civil conflicts, and try to fill in the gaps that exist, in their opinion, in the literature. Their state-centric framework concentrates on revenues the government, not the insurgents, receives from the extraction of resources, as an indicator of potential violence. They argue that government's ability to suppress rebellious moves, in a country that is abundant in lootable natural resources, depends on certain aspects, such as the availability of non-lootable resources, the modes of resource extraction, as well as the patterns of state spending (Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005: 563, 590). The presence of non-lootable resources is in government's favor, as only the state has the capacity and resources to extract the former, thus increasing the revenues received by the government. Concomitantly, if the ruling elite has the power to control and manipulate the extraction process, it can do so in a manner that most suits its causes and interests. Thus, an industrial extraction is more easier to trace and tax, than an artisan one, and brings more financial resources to the state. Snyder and Bhavnani argue that because the Sierra Leone leader Siaka Stevens managed to bring all the diamond trade into the hands of the small Lebanese elite, it was easy for the government to tax the latter, thus receive revenues from alluvial diamonds (2005: 590).

In connection to this line of research, Fjelde (2009) argues that in oil-rich countries high corruption does not necessarily lead to conflict. The government in such states may use the revenues from oil in order to buy loyalty, thus decreasing the possibility of violent protest. According to the scholar, even though both oil production and corruption increase the possibility of violent civil war outbreak, the

impact of oil on conflict is mitigated when the levels of corruption in a state increase. Fjelde (2009: 199) argues that despite the fact that corruption contributed to impoverishment of people and increase in inequality, it also “helped cement powerful alliances with a stake in the continuation of the corrupt regimes”. Thus, according to this particular research, corruption caused by revenues from oil production may lead to the endurance of the present regime, decreasing the possibility for the onset of civil conflict.

The link between natural resources and civil conflicts has become the focal point of many studies in the recent years, generating numerous hypotheses, with respect to the questions of how exactly resource wealth affects the onset of civil conflicts. While this literature is extensive, the approach is rather state-centric and the debate is still revolving around greed vs. grievance. Thus, the theoretical approach that will be introduced in Chapter III aims to build on this literature; however, without falling in the traps of a state-centric and problem-solving theoretical approach.

So far, I reviewed the literature on domestic causes of civil conflict onset; however, one needs to examine international causes as well for a fuller understanding of why civil wars occur.

2.1.2 International Causes

The studies discussed in the previous section mostly concentrate on domestic factors that influence the onset of civil conflicts; however, Gleditsch (2007: 293) argues that civil wars of today “display a transnational character, where actors, resources, and events span national boundaries”. According to Gleditsch, not only domestic factors,

but also transnational factors and the links between the states can increase the risk of violent civil war outbreak in a state. One such transnational factor, as discussed in the literature, is the flow of refugees from war-torn states into the neighboring countries. Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) find a link between refugees and the onset of violence in their host states. According to the scholars (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006: 335), the existence of refugees increases the probability of violence onset in that state, thus pointing to the fact that refugees, as a factor of the causes of civil war onset, is an important one, which has to be taken into consideration, when assessing the risk of possible civil conflict involvement in a state. They support the argument by the examples of refugee flows from civil war-torn Liberia into Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire, causing instability in those countries (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006: 338). In another study, Gleditsch (2007: 293) finds that the more there are trans-border ethnic groups, the higher the risk of civil conflict onset. Concomitantly, if a state is surrounded by democratic neighbors and is highly involved in interstate trade, it is less likely to experience violent internal conflict (Gleditsch, 2007: 293, 298-299, 303). This argument corresponds to Hegre and Sambanis' study (2006: 533), in which they find that a country, which has "bad neighbors" or is surrounded by undemocratic states, is more likely "to see democratization efforts resulting in prolonged periods of institutional instability, which /.../ are associated with increased risk of civil war".

Thyne (2006) applies bargaining theory and rational expectations framework in order to understand the link between interstate relations and the possibility of civil conflict emergence. Dividing signals into costly and cheap ones, he argues that signals of support or threat that are expressed by external actors may affect the decision of

actors of engaging in violence. Thyne finds that costly signals¹⁵ do not affect the onset of conflict as actors are able “to shift their position to adjust for changes in capabilities due to external support or hostilities”, while, on the other hand, cheap signals¹⁶ increase the possibility for civil war onset, because they “introduce uncertainty into intrastate bargaining” (2006: 937, 956-957). When signals’ character changes from supportive to hostile, violent civil conflict is more likely to emerge. Thyne (2006: 957) also finds that the change from hostile to supportive signals increases conflict probability as well. In support of his argumentation the author brings up an example of Nicaragua of 1977, when U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s “cheap rhetoric”, such as a threat of withdrawing aid, probably greatly affected the decision of the opposition to rebel (Thyne, 2006: 958).

From an empirical point of view and following the contemporary events it is possible to infer that in some cases civil wars may be caused by an international intervention itself. The world has witnessed the unfolding of sectarian violence and its further escalation into a civil war in Iraq, following the U.S. led international intervention in 2003, with a pronounced aim of preventing Saddam Hussein’s regime from acquiring and developing biological and chemical weapons. Based on this example, it can be argued that international interventions by interested states may not only prolong or shorten an ongoing conflict, as will be shown in the *International causes* part of the following section, but may also *cause* the emergence of conflict itself.

¹⁵ Indicators being militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), sanctions, alliances, and trade (Thyne, 2006: 957).

¹⁶ Include day-to-day conversations and rhetoric (Thyne, 2006: 941).

In sum, the literature on the causes of civil war onset generally concentrates on domestic factors as most affecting the risk of violent civil conflict outburst; however, there are scholars who find transnational factors are not of less significance for understanding the causes of civil war onset.

2.2 Root Causes of Civil Conflict Duration

This section focuses on the causes of internal conflict duration and tries to find answers as to why some civil wars seem to last forever, while others are short and do not recur in the future. The subject of conflict duration has been studied less than that of the causes of conflict onset. At first, it may seem that conflict onset is more important in terms of security, stability and life-saving, however, it should be noted that it is not the initial outburst of civil war that is responsible for most casualties and consequences produced by it, on the contrary, it is the duration and intensity of a given civil war that most affects the situation inside and outside the belligerent state. Thus, the subject of conflict duration is essential for the study of civil conflicts. According to Hegre (2004: 244), “[p]olicies targeted at shortening conflict and reducing the risk of recurrence are a necessary supplement to policies aimed at reducing the risk of war initiation”.

The so-called Brahimi Report (A/55/305-S/2000/809, 2000), addressing United Nations peacekeeping operations, is relevant for the discussion of duration of conflict, as some parts of the report include characteristics of an internal conflict that is difficult to terminate. According to the Report (2000: 4), one of the major impediments to the establishment of peace are ‘spoilers’, meaning “groups (including signatories) who

renege on their commitments or otherwise seek to undermine a peace accord by violence”. These spoilers are more likely to violate the truce when they have independent sources of finance, which may come from the export of illicit narcotics, gemstones or other high value commodities. Brahimi Report (2000: 4) states that third-party states may affect the duration of civil war by either providing the fighters with safe areas inside the state, or allowing the passage of illicit products that the rebels are trying to sell through its territory, thus contributing to continuing flow of money into the rebels’ hands. The views of scholars of conflict on the varying durations of civil wars are as divergent as the ones on the causes of conflict onset. Like the latter, the subject of conflict duration has both domestic and international dimensions, as can also be inferred from the Brahimi Report. Researchers argue that intervention in a civil conflict by external actors affects whether the war will be protracted or short-lived. These and other views are discussed in the following sections.

2.2.1 Domestic Causes

With respect to domestic causes of conflict duration, the views expressed in the literature are ranging from economic to domestic power politics factors. According to Cunningham (2006), the common assumption that a civil conflict consists of two parties is misleading and impedes our understanding of the nature of civil wars. Thus, it is important to take into consideration multiple parties involved in a conflict. Civil wars that have more veto players or actors in a conflict that must approve the

settlement are “substantially more resistant to resolution” (Cunningham, 2006: 875, 891).

Some studies concentrate on the state’s capabilities, as a cause for conflict endurance. DeRouen and Sobek (2004: 317) argue that if state’s bureaucratic capabilities are effective, it undermines rebel victory, while regime type and the size of state army do not seem to have an important effect on rebel victory. If a government has a strong army but is not able to secure a quick victory over insurgents, the further use of such armed forces may, to the contrary, exacerbate the conflict. Other factors, such as democracy, provide little or no effect on the duration of conflict. This argument is supported by Fearon’s study (2004: 277), in which he states that such “standard candidates for predicting civil war duration” as democracy, ethnic diversity, per capita income, as well as the character of civil war, have little or no independent power when they are controlled for. Contrary to Fearon’s reasoning, Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004: 268) argue that moderate levels of ethnic diversity, low per capita income and high inequality are the “key structural characteristics that lengthen conflict”. The scholars state that two factors affect the duration of civil war: the structural conditions that existed before the conflict onset (in other words, the causes of conflict that were previously discussed) and circumstances that occurred during the conflict. With respect to conflict termination, Collier et al. (2004: 268) argue that the chances of ending the conflict decreased in 1980s and 1990s, possibly due to an easy access to global markets that the rebels needed to acquire financial resources by selling plundered commodities and to purchase the weaponry. The subject of the

impact that natural resources have on civil conflict is also valid for the duration of conflict, even though it covers only a humble proportion in the literature.

According to Ross (2005: 3, 30), the sale of booty futures, discussed in Section 2.1.1.2.1, can also increase the duration of conflict. He supports his argument by bringing up an example of four recent civil wars in Africa (Angola, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo), in which the incumbent governments tried to sell booty futures when the insurgents were prevailing and the government were about to lose the war. They did it in order to purchase weaponry and soldiers' support, and succeeding in three of them, they prolonged the existing conflict, which could have ended otherwise. However, while the sale of future exploitation rights is important for the duration of conflict, the natural resources also matter. According to Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala (2005: 26-27), geography of conflict is significantly important, because if the fighting is near the area where natural resources are in abundance, it provides the opportunity for the rebels to prolong the fighting by exploiting the resources. They find also that the duration of a civil war is increased if the fighting takes place close to the international border.¹⁷ An alternative reasoning that is absent from Buhaug et al.'s article might be that the rebels prolong the conflict not only by exploiting the resources but also to exploit them for a longer period of time.

Power politics and rebels' capabilities and opportunities, as a factor for conflict endurance, are also discussed by Cunningham et al. (2006). In fact, the scholars argue that their research was the first one on civil conflict to consider the duration of the

¹⁷ See also, Lujala, Päivi. 2010. "The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources." *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (1): 15-28.

existence of a certain rebel organization, rather than considering the duration of a conflict in general. They find that a conflict lasts longer under three circumstances: firstly, if a rebel organization is weaker in comparison with the government; secondly, a civil war is more likely to become protracted the rebel control the territory in the periphery of the state; and thirdly, when insurgents have no other option, excluding violence as a mean, to refer to (Cunningham et al., 2006: 3). The scholars argue that even weak in terms of power and capabilities insurgents may fight against a strong government for a long period of time, thus increasing the duration of conflict, and they support their argument by bringing up the example of Colombia and its low intensity civil conflict, lasting for more than forty years, and the inability of the central government to defeat the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels, despite the enormous military aid from the United States government (Cunningham et al., 2006: 33-34).

The type of civil conflict seems to have an impact on its duration as well. Fearon (2004) examines different types of civil war and finds that civil wars arising from coups or revolutions, as well as civil wars in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and colonial wars tend to be short. On the other hand, ‘sons of the soil’ types of conflict, which involve “land conflict between a peripheral minority and state-supported migrants of a dominant ethnic group are on average quite long-lived” (Fearon, 2004: 275, 281). In addition, civil wars that involve rebels who acquire financial resources for fighting from contraband of opium, diamonds, or coca, also tend to be protracted (Fearon, 2004: 275).

In the literature on civil conflict duration, a research by Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) presents an alternative to the arguments put forward in this thesis. The scholars examine the domestic factors that impede the establishment of permanent peace. Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008: 365) argue that the end of fighting in civil wars is dependent on the rebel-military integration mechanism, usually established by peace agreements. In this vein, the recurrence of fighting is caused by an untimely and inadequate implementation of peace agreements. Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008: 381) come to the conclusion that overall military integration strategies can be useful in addressing security issues inside a state until its implementation is structured and consistently executed.

In conclusion to this part, it should be mentioned that Walter (2004: 385) points to the duration of civil conflict as an important factor in the light of possible recurring civil war in the same state. She states that longer conflicts provide possible future rebels with enough prior knowledge with respect to the costs of waging war, thus reducing the risk of war recurrence. On the individual level, the reasons for people to join a rebel movement are connected to socio-economic and political grievances. Thus, individuals whose quality of life is critically low and stays this way after the conflict, are more likely to re-enlist in a rebellious movement (Walter, 2004).

So far, the literature on the domestic causes of civil war duration focused on internal factors, such as rebel finances, rebels' access to natural resources, duration of the rebel organizations, and their integration into the military. However, international factors matter as well in civil conflict duration, thus, the limited literature on these factors will be discussed next.

2.2.2 International Causes

The subject of external causes of conflict protraction, as of the domestic causes, is under-studied in the civil conflict literature. The available research mostly concentrates on multilateral international intervention, such as United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, or unilateral interventions by interested states as well as the characteristics of third party states and the civil war states that reinforce the decision to intervene (Şatana, 2006). Some scholars, despite introducing new causal explanations for conflict duration in their research, do not focus on the international factors in detail. For instance, Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006: 354) limit the topic to simply mentioning the effect of the refugee flow from other countries, caused by internal violence in their respective states, on the instability and possible violence in the host state. The authors then leave this subject for further inquiries. According to Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006: 354), “refugees will generally make it harder to settle conflicts and thus are likely to increase duration”; an illustrative example might be the case of Rwanda and Burundi. Each country has two ethnic groups: the Tutsi and the Hutu. With the unfolding of 1994 Tutsi massacres in Rwanda, which took lives of about 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu, the flow of refugees from Rwanda into Burundi, with its own fragile balance between the two groups, destabilized the neighboring country, bringing with it political instability and instigating internal tensions between the Tutsi and the Hutu inside Burundi.

Third parties to the conflict may affect the duration of civil war by providing shelter and safe heavens for the rebels. This gives the insurgents a good opportunity to strengthen their forces, acquire weapons and engage in fiercer fighting. During the

civil war in Sudan, some neighboring countries, particularly Uganda and Eritrea, gave shelter to Sudanese rebels, which increased the duration of the conflict, and gave the Government of Sudan “an excuse to stay away from the negotiation table” (Nasong’o and Murunga, 2005: 70).

Most scholars agree that an outside intervention in a civil war makes a difference in terms of its outcome and duration; however, the ways in which the conflict is affected is highly debated.

Diehl (1988), in his article on peacekeeping operations, even though not directly stating, implies that the UN peacekeeping force may in a way prolong the resolution of civil conflict, thus increasing the duration of the conflict itself, by taking away the pressure from the belligerent parties, and as a result decreasing the urgency or “immediate need for a resolution”(1988: 505-506). This situation provides the parties to a conflict a possibility to harden their stance on issues debated under conflict resolution, thus, making it more difficult to reach a compromise that would suit all the parties. Having analyzed the peacekeeping operations that already took place or were unfolding during the time of writing, Diehl comes to the conclusion that from those operations only one (UNEF II¹⁸) “facilitated the peaceful resolution of the underlying conflict”, however pointing out that its overall contribution was small and “[t]he breakthrough between Egypt and Israel [could] be explained by reference to the leadership of Anwar Sadat and the intervention of the United States, rather than the efforts of UNEF II” (1988: 505). Overall, Diehl finds that UN peacekeeping

¹⁸ UNEF II – Second United Nations Emergency Force, located in the Suez Canal sector and later the Sinai peninsula, and lasting from 1973 to 1979. For further information see <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unefii.htm> Last Accessed on May 12, 2011.

operations may serve as applicable tools of international intervention for preventing further blood spill, if this is the “top priority” for a given conflict (1988: 506).

DeRouen and Sobek (2004: 317) find that the UN intervention is a crucial factor influencing the duration and outcome of a conflict. Despite the prevailing assumption that the UN involvement makes the conflict short by imposing certain conditions on the government and rebels, such as giving up weapons, creating a buffer zone between the belligerent parties, encouraging a constructive dialogue with an aim of ending violence, the authors argue that, on the contrary, the UN intervention increases the time that is necessary for either side’s victory, while decreasing the time needed for establishing a treaty or a truce. This view is supported by Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000a: 16) who find the external intervention to be positively associated with the duration of civil conflict. This means that the involvement of the UN may increase or decrease the duration of civil conflict, depending on the domestic factors, such as rebel motivation. The latter may find it profitable to continue fighting despite the UN presence or may try to increase its leverage and gain more from the truce by continuing to fight back.

Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000), Regan (2002), and Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004) come to the conclusion that a neutral external intervention increases the duration of conflict. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000: 637-638) find that an intervention that does not explicitly support one of the parties to the conflict “corresponds to a greater likelihood that a stalemate will emerge and the civil war will endure for a significantly longer period of time”. Collier et al. (2004: 268) argue that if an intervention is in favor of the rebels, it will shorten the conflict. Contrasting to

these views, Regan (2002: 55) argues that regardless of the type of an intervention, whether it is neutral by providing no explicit support for any party to the conflict, or biased in favor of one of the parties, it increases the expected duration of a conflict, although a biased intervention is more effective than a neutral one. Interestingly, his findings show that the timing of intervention provides for little or no independent effect on conflict's duration.

Balch-Lindsay and Enterline's research (2000) on civil war duration differs from other studies by putting civil conflict into an international perspective. According to the scholars, civil wars do not occur independently from the interstate system, rather they are "embedded" in it (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline's, 2000: 637). They argue that some third parties may consider ending a conflict rather quickly because of humanitarian reasons, but on the other hand, there are external actors that may try to increase the duration of conflict acting on the urge of its self-interests, with the aim of exploiting natural resources of a state at war in the future, or decrease the amount of resources that a rival third party has at its disposal (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline's, 2000: 615, 637-638). Contributing to this debate, Humphreys (2005: 508) argues that natural resource abundance in a state may contribute to decreasing the duration of civil war by inducing external actors to cooperate in ending the conflict because the natural resources of that state are of particular importance to the international community and protracted fighting inside the belligerent state can obstruct the normal supply system and lead to instability in resource recipient countries.

Another scholar that studies international causes of civil wars, Thyne (2006) argues that the findings of some scholars presented in this section (Regan, 2002, and

DeRouen and Sobek, 2004) are contrary to the evidence that he presents in his article. According to Thyne (2006: 957), there is “strong evidence that both the government and opposition incorporate expectations for external aid or hostilities into their prewar decisions”. Thyne states that although other scholars view the principal decision to engage in violence as having reasons other than the (possibility of) external intervention, the data he presents in his research contradicts this assumption by showing that external expressions of threat or support may affect the duration of civil conflict, depending on the type of prewar signals and the ones that are expressed during the intervention. The scholar argues that if both signals do not match, it may cause confusion on the part of belligerent actors and have “dramatic effects” on the conflict involvement (2006: 957-958). In this way, third parties may affect the duration and outcome of a given conflict without fully realizing the role that their actions played in the decision of conflicting actors.

In general, the literature on conflict duration finds external intervention to be positively associated with conflict duration, although there are divergent views as to whether it shortens, or prolongs the conflict, and what kind of intervention is most likely to contribute to establishing peace in a belligerent state, whether a biased or a neutral one.

2.3 Summary and Analysis

This literature review chapter to this point presented different views on the causes of civil war onset and duration. From the close examination of civil conflict literature it

seems that most of it is written in either grand theories of realist or liberal perspectives; or by using mid-range theories that cannot be categorized under grand theories. Ted Gurr started the *grievance* literature focusing on non-material causes of rebellion, which had greatly affected the study of civil conflict. His research, as well as other studies based on it, argues that the major causes for a rebellion are grievances or *relative deprivation*, in Gurr's terminology.

On the other hand, Paul Collier, who impacted the proliferation of research focusing on material causes of civil war generally called *greed*, concentrates on economic reasons as causes for onset or duration of civil conflict; this research has also received much attention in the recent years.

However, these two dichotomous approaches do not always help in understanding the nature of such phenomena as civil wars. According to Butler and Gates (2009), power theories or realism theories present only limited comprehension of civil conflict, because during the civil war the incumbent government is not always able to directly engage in attacks on or battles with the rebels, as both entities are involved in asymmetric fighting. Power theories freeze relative power in time, while these are the dynamic shifts in power that force the rebel groups to engage in different tactics of warfare, such as terrorism, guerilla or conventional warfare. In Butler and Gates' point of view, realist theories do not explain very well the onset of civil wars; neither do they help with understanding why a civil war does not easily come to an end.

In addition, according to Mack (2002: 515-516), realist theories are "largely irrelevant to the task of explaining civil wars" as they mostly concentrate on *interstate*

wars, which is logical, as realism is a state-centric theory, studying state behavior in the international system, characterized by anarchy or absence of global governance. Mack (2002: 516) argues that the only occasion when realist theories *may*¹⁹ explain civil conflict is when the government fails and state descends into anarchy, however, they are unable to provide explanations for the state failure. On the other hand, quantitative research that dominates conflict studies in general is, according to Mack (2002: 516-518), largely incomprehensible, especially to the policy makers, due to the fact that most researchers rarely explain the implications of their work. Concomitantly, qualitative research tends to produce different databases for diverse studies, even if made on the same subject, thus contributing to the general confusion of comprehending which one is most relevant for a particular topic (Mack, 2002: 516-518).

In addition, Dixon (2009: 731) argues that the large variety of quantitative research on the outbreak of civil conflict has produced an extensive list of different propositions, which, however, lacks “a consensus model of civil war onset”. According to Dixon’s study (2009: 707), from among 200 independent variables there is a certain degree of consensus on only 30, and a high degree of consensus on no more than seven variables. This points to a significant level of contradictions that exist in quantitative studies on civil war, and the need to concentrate on providing explanations for such differences, by generating more sound research, which would create comprehensive theories, rather than partial ones with “the lack of specificity /.../ creat[ing] problems of multicollinearity and omitted variable bias that undermine the validity of empirical results” (Dixon, 2009: 731). For these reasons, both liberal

¹⁹ Italic font was kept as in the original.

and realist literatures on civil conflict, which are dominantly quantitative, are short of providing more than a bunch of correlations on civil war onsets and they lack comprehensive causal explanations of protracted civil conflicts.

It is important to note that such an extensive literature review was essential for this research as the thesis argues that the current literature is lacking in many levels and thus a new perspective is necessary to shed light on the duration of civil conflicts, especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa. The literature review shows that there are plentiful studies on the onset of civil conflicts; however, the ones on the conflict duration are limited. Moreover, since most studies are quantitative and data on non-Western countries, used in these quantitative analyses, are more readily available, these studies are mostly Western-biased.

As a result, two particular weaknesses are identified in the literature: first, research on natural resources as a cause for civil war duration is much less studied, mostly plagued with conflicting conclusions about the role of natural resource abundance in internal violence. Second, the limited literature on duration is even more limited when it comes to the studies of international factors that prolong a civil war. I argue that these two weaknesses are inherent in the traditional theories of international relations; thus, a critical approach to civil conflict studies will enrich the field. For that purpose, in the next chapter I introduce Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems analysis and discuss how this approach is relevant to civil war duration studies. I argue that introducing new framework by building upon the incorporation of world-systems analysis into the civil conflict literature will provide explanations to the mechanisms behind civil war endurance. In Chapter IV, theory building case studies of three Sub-

Saharan African civil war states, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone will follow building on the world-systems analysis.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND CIVIL WAR STUDIES

3.1 Immanuel Wallerstein's World-Systems Analysis

In this chapter, I review Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems analysis (WSA) framework in detail to identify how his approach to the world-economy can be applied to civil conflict duration in the context of greed and grievance. I argue that Wallerstein's approach, if incorporated into the conflict studies literature, will yield a more fruitful approach than the limited greed vs. grievance debate examined in the previous chapter. Therefore, this chapter will first give a brief background of the theoretical framework, main concepts, critiques and later discuss how Wallerstein's WSA perspective is relevant for comprehending civil war duration, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.

3.1.1 Historical Background

Immanuel Wallerstein's version of world-systems theory (WST) is probably one of the most known versions of this particular theory. As Wallerstein (2004a, 2004b) himself when describing his theory preferred the term *analysis*, this section will refer to it hereinafter as world-systems analysis.

The emergence of the WSA in its present form dates back to the 1970s with (Wallerstein, 1974a&b), while its origins and major concepts emerged in 1940s and 1950s. With great changes occurring globally in the aftermaths of the Second World War, scholars of social sciences were faced with a reality, in which they had to either radically change the subject of their inquiry, or be looked upon with suspicion because their former research subjects were no longer appropriate (Wallerstein 2004b). As an example of this transition, Wallerstein (2004b: 11) talks about *Orientalism* and its gradual disappearance, with its scholars changing their academic orientation towards history. Such radical changes called into question commonly accepted knowledge, which was further intensified by the inflow of scholars from the non-Western world.

Starting from the end of the Second World War until 1970s, several debates influenced the appearance of WSA, including, according to Wallerstein (2004b: 10-11, 15), a debate that took place between communist scholars, with respect to modes of production in Asian countries, as well as the development of the core-periphery concept by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), and the work by Braudel (cited in Wallerstein, 2004b: 15), in which he criticized history as dominated by events that makes it hard to see the real structures behind it. Braudel was also the one to study world-economy as a unit of analysis.

In addition, there were historical events that contributed to the emergence of world-systems analysis, including the political turmoil of 1968, the “revolutions” in Czechoslovakia and all over the world, caused by the United States policies and war in Vietnam, the “passivity” of the Soviet Union, and “the inefficacy of the traditional Old Leftist movements in opposing the status quo” (Wallerstein, 2004b: 16). Again, these events taken together with the developments in the academic field, and the reassessment of general truths were raised to the agenda. Firstly, scholars became concerned with neglected areas, such as “women, ‘minority’ groups, indigenous populations, groups with alternative sexual dispositions or practices”, but later their attention turned to the “underlying epistemologies of the structures of knowledge” (Wallerstein, 2004b: 16).

All the aforementioned transformations affected the development of WSA in the 1970s, which questioned the existence of some research subjects, proposing to concentrate instead on different units of analysis: minisystems and world-systems, which are divided into world-economies and world-empires. According to Wallerstein, these systems should not be understood as systems in itself, but as empires, systems and economies that “*are a world*” (2004b: 16-17).

It is essential to note that the WSA emerged as a political protest “against the ways in which social scientific inquiry was structured for all of us at its inception in the middle of the nineteenth century” (Wallerstein, 2000: 129). This scientific inquiry came to be comprised of unquestionable assumptions. Wallerstein argues that this was the reason behind the inability of scholars to present other historical alternatives beside the accepted one. The world-systems analysis, thus, challenges this scientific

inquiry on the basis of its propositions on the “possibilities of systematic knowledge about social reality” (Wallerstein, 2000: 129).

Wallerstein’s approach to scientific inquiry is quite relevant to this thesis since I argue that a critical perspective is lacking in civil war studies, especially in the war duration related literature. The next section will make it more clear how this particular theoretical framework is in tandem with the greed strand of the civil conflict literature.

3.1.2 The Modern World-System and Major Concepts of WSA

According to Wallerstein (1976b, 1979, 2004b), the modern world-system is a capitalist world-economy and stayed the same from the 15th-16th century, when its location was mostly parts of Europe and the Americas. However, in time, particularly since around 1815, this world-system expanded to such proportions that it now covers the whole world, becoming a “global system” (Wallerstein, 1979: 196).

From its onset, the European world-economy has always been an entity not known before, despite the fact that some other world-economies existed previously – like those of China, Persia, and Rome – they all were sooner or later transformed into empires, while the European system persists until today (Wallerstein, 1974: 15-16). Following a Marxist approach, the reason behind this particular system being a world-*economy* is that “the basic linkage between the parts of the system is economic, although this was reinforced to some extent by cultural links and eventually /.../ by political arrangements and even confederal structures” (1974: 15). Concomitantly, it is a *capitalist* system not because people or companies aim at making profit, but due to the fact that the system as a whole “gives priority to the endless accumulation of

capital” (Wallerstein 2004b: 24), meaning that the accumulation of capital in itself represents means for accumulating even more capital.

The modern world-system is not a unitary body: it consists of a variety of political units that are “loosely tied together” and make up an interstate system within the world-system (Wallerstein, 2004b: 23). Additionally, the latter incorporates different groups and cultures with their indigenous traditions, religion and language; all, however, display the acquisition in different amounts of common culture that Wallerstein (2004b: 23) calls ‘geoculture’. This process of different groups’ incorporating common values is one characteristic of a world-economy, in which there cannot be either political or cultural homogeneity.

The most significant characteristic that unifies the structure most strongly is the division of labor, meaning which production processes occur inside a state. This proposition runs parallel to the idea of *deindustrialization* cited in Cohen (1998: 37), which states that industrialization of one country implies deindustrialization of another. Thus, some states are left with secondary activities, while the richest states hold their right to “industrializing industrialism” (Cohen, 1998: 37).

According to Wallerstein (2004b: 24-25), a capitalist world-economy consists of multiple institutions, connected to each other. The most basic of them are the markets. Other institutions include firms, competing with each other, countries, households, classes and status-groups. Although these institutions have some similar aspects to institutions that existed before the European world-economy emerged in the 15th-16th century, it is essential to consider modern institutions as “contextually specific” to the contemporary ‘world’, in which we live.

The market is described as “both a concrete local structure in which individuals or firms sell and buy goods, and a virtual institution across space where the same kind of exchange occurs” (Wallerstein, 2004b: 25). The markets are not absolutely free, as they are usually pronounced to be, on the contrary, they are partially free. Totally free markets would render the whole system of profiting impossible by providing the buyer an opportunity to lower the price of a product in a way that would render all the profit the seller could have non-existent. On the other hand, partially free markets allow space for a monopoly to occur, which can obtain large profits by creating a substantial gap between the cost of production and the sales price of a product. The monopolies are created through the process of patent acquisition, as well as through state restrictions of import and export, state subsidies and tax benefits Wallerstein (2004b). It is essential to add that no actor in the system has a *complete* control of the market (Wallerstein, 2000: 92).

Wallerstein (2004b: 26) argues that the ways, in which state interferes in the virtual market, are so wide-ranging that it becomes the major force that determines profits and prices. Despite the fact that there is fertile ground for the creation of monopolies, this process still has several control mechanisms that enable other producers to compete on the market, and, at times, lead a monopoly through the process of creation, expansion and decline. Nevertheless, the average lifespan of a monopoly is still significant, which leads to an endless cycle of leading products: when one vanishes, another takes its place and so forth (Wallerstein, 2004b: 26-27).

Major actors on the market are firms, which compete with one another for capital accumulation. Firms can be of different sizes, with larger ones having more

political leverage, which in its turn makes a firm more vulnerable to different attacks from other actors (Wallerstein, 2004b: 27-28). Wallerstein's multi-actor approach to world politics is very important to understand civil war duration in the next sections.

As the modern world-economy is divided into core, semiperiphery and periphery states (Wallerstein, 1974a, 1974b, 1979, 2000, 2011a, 2011b), so do the products have two groups: the core-like and periphery products. Under the core-periphery concept, Wallerstein (1979) talks about the profit margins of the production process. The core-like products are associated with high profits, while the peripheral with low profits. This gap contributes to the enrichment of the core: the periphery products become more competitive, and thus are in weaker position with respect to quasi-monopolized products, produced in the core states. This inequality leads to 'unequal exchange' as the process of the transfer of surplus-value from the periphery to the core (Wallerstein, 1979: 18-19). This exchange will be discussed in detail further in this section.

It is important to point out that in a world-economy, products can shift places: the one that once was a core-like product may with time become a periphery one; and there will always be products for replacement of the ones that became competitive on the market. Wallerstein (2004b: 29) gives an example of textile production, which represented a core-like product in the 1800s, however, two hundred years later it is one of the least profitable areas of production, and represents a periphery product. Another contemporary example could be the cocoa beans, which was an important product in the Americas before its discovery by Christopher Columbus in 1498. It was later brought to Europe and received great popularity. Nowadays, despite being a vital

product, and its massive production, with just Côte d'Ivoire producing 1,382,000 millions of tons per year (2008)²⁰, it changed and became a periphery product, competitive on the market. On the other hand, technology has now become a core-like product and dominates the market in terms of price, and will probably continue to lead the way into the future, with old technology being replaced by the new one in an infinite cycle until a new core-like product emerges that would be able to substitute technology.

There is also a geographical dimension to the aforementioned process, as monopolies need patronage from strong states, which, as was mentioned previously, influence the market in different ways. As a consequence, large monopolies tend to be located in a small number of strong countries, while the peripheral mode of production tends to be present in a large number of weaker states (Wallerstein, 2004b: 28-29).

Wallerstein (2004b: 29) describes the states in the system and the division of labor between them as follows:

The role of each state is very different vis-à-vis productive process depending on the mix of core-peripheral processes within it. The strong states, which contain a disproportionate share of core-like processes, tend to emphasize their role of protecting the quasi-monopolies of the core-like processes. The weak states, which contain a disproportionate share of peripheral production processes, are usually unable to do very much to affect the axial division of labor, and in effect are largely forced to accept the lot that has been given them.

In addition to the core and periphery states, there are also states that are in between: semiperiphery states. These countries combine both the core-like processes and periphery ones. In this vein, for core counties they sometimes represent the

²⁰ See <http://faostat.fao.org/site/339/default.aspx> for more detail on cocoa beans production. Last accessed on May 17, 2011.

periphery, while for the periphery they act as the core (Wallerstein, 1979: 97). The semiperiphery is most eager to implement aggressive policies meant to protect their inner production processes (Wallerstein, 2004b: 29), because their position in the world-system predisposes them to take precaution measures in order not to fall back and become a peripheral state, but also to work their way up to the core. In line with this argument, the periods of economic downturn seem to be beneficial to the semiperiphery states that can not only increase their control over internal market, but also enlarge their access to the markets in the neighboring periphery. Such expansion is made possible at the expense of the core states. (Wallerstein, 1976a: 464)

All modern states in the interstate system are sovereign, and as sovereign states they impose their authority on some issues that are directly connected to their interests; in this thesis, only two are mentioned for their relevancy in civil wars. First, states have an exclusive control over their borders, including rules, which define what goods, labor and capital can cross the borders and under what circumstances. Secondly, states have the power to affect decisions taken by other states when it may impact firms located within their borders, and the stronger the state is in the system, the more leverage it has with respect to “trans-boundary transactions” and the easier it is for a state to intervene in internal affairs of another (weaker) state and “everyone is aware of that” (2004b: 46, 55).

The world-economy has three types of states, divided in this way with respect to labor division and production processes (high/low profit), occurring inside those states (Wallerstein, 1979). These states can be further characterized as strong or weak states regarding their power in establishing authority both on the domestic and

international arena. According to Wallerstein (2004b: 55) there are other ways in which strong states can affect the decision-making process in the weak states, beside the aforementioned instances:

Strong states relate to weak states by pressuring them to keep their frontiers open to those flows of factors of production that are useful and profitable to firms located in the strong states, while resisting any demands for reciprocity in this regard. /.../ Strong states relate to weak states by pressuring them to install and keep in power persons whom the strong states find acceptable, and to join the strong states in placing pressures on other weak states to get them to conform to the policy needs of the strong states. /.../ Strong states relate to weak states by pressuring them to follow their lead in international arenas (treaties, international organizations). And while strong states may buy off the individual leaders of weak states, weak states buy the protection of strong states by arranging appropriate flows of capital.

Such distribution of power in the interstate system leads to 'unequal exchange'.

This term stands for a process, which leads to the enrichment of the core states leaving periphery with little opportunity for the accumulation of capital. Through this process the surplus value of the entire world-economy is transferred to the core (Wallerstein, 1979: 18-19). This transfer is made possible through power relations, which allow strong states to achieve the conditions of trade most beneficial for them through their leverage on the international arena. The core states push the periphery into accepting the conditions necessary for core enrichment. This process can be better understood through the following example: periphery states export raw materials to the core states and the prices for such commodities are usually low in comparison to the prices, which periphery states have to pay to the core states for imports of technology, parts of which are made from raw materials produced in the periphery. Thus, unequal exchange with time leads to the enrichment of the core, while impoverishing the periphery.

One contemporary example on unequal exchange not from Wallerstein's works is on China and Tibet. According to Kenneth Christie (1998: 10), since 1950s China saw Tibet as a periphery, which it can exploit "from the perspective of extracting natural resources which are then transferred to enrich core areas of China". Even though Tibet at that time ceased to be independent and was occupied by the Chinese, it still shows the underlying mechanisms of the relationship between the two territories.

With respect to the twentieth century and development that took place after the Second World War, Wallerstein (1993: 3) states that since 1960s the world has entered a new cycle – Kondratieff B-cycle²¹ – which is characterized by severe competition among the core states for profit and reduced unemployment levels at the expense of other states. This competition, he argues, takes place in the "situation of contraction" or decline. This was followed by "world revolution" starting in 1968, which opposed both the U.S. hegemony in the world-economy and the Soviet conspiracy; and later by the decline of the U.S. relative power and "disillusionment with developmentalism in the Third World" (Wallerstein, 1993: 4).

Overall, Wallerstein (1979: 22-23) argues that three factors contribute to relative political stability of the world-economy: first, the military power is located in the dominant region; second, the belief of the systemic actors in the interconnectedness of their welfare and system's survival, which leads to the prolongation of the status quo; and third, the division into different regions (core, semiperiphery and periphery). This division puts the majority of system's "staff" into the periphery and semiperiphery, which establishes a sort of pyramidal world

²¹ Usually referred to as Kondratieff wave or long economic cycles that represent periods of rapid and slow economic growth from forty to sixty years.

structure. Wallerstein (1979: 23) argues that without this division the world-economy would cease to exist.

3.1.3 Critiques of WSA

Like every theory or approach, the world-systems analysis is not immune to critiques. Even better is self-critique coming from a theorist.

Wallerstein himself identified four fields that point to the weaknesses of the WSA: the positivists, the orthodox Marxists, the state autonomists, and the culturalists. There are two types of critique coming from the positivists: the first one is connected to their objections to WSA's attempt to create a "structured vision of historical phenomena"; secondly, the nomothetic positivists argue that WSA analysts do not present sufficient quantitative data and are unable to present falsifiable propositions (Wallerstein, 2004a: 10).

The orthodox Marxists criticize world-systems analysis due to its deviation from the focus on the class struggle and class analysis, thus arguing that WSA "eliminated the presumption of an inevitable progression of historical stages of development". According to Wallerstein, the orthodox Marxists oppose to any proposition made by WSA that are contrary or do not go in line with classical²² socialist propositions (Wallerstein, 2004a: 10).

The state autonomists oppose to merging the activities of states with the activities of capitalist entrepreneurs. In addition, the state autonomists, as well as the

²² Propositions put forward by the German Social-Democratic Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

positivist and the orthodox Marxists, all argue for using state as a unit of analysis, which is contrary to the basic concept of world-systems analysis (Wallerstein, 2004a: 10).

Finally, the culturalists generally oppose other social analysts in focusing on either market or states activities, arguing that cultural aspect has been avoided, while it should have been a prime factor in explaining social order. According to Wallerstein (2004a: 10-11), the culturalists are especially troubled “by the proposition that the so-called political, economic, and sociocultural spheres are merely a construct of centrist liberalism and have no lasting intellectual utility”.

These critiques, in Wallerstein’s (2004a: 11) view, are solely directed to the WSA perspective in general. In this thesis, I critique Wallerstein’s approach as missing several other domains of exploitation than the capital accumulation of core states by using periphery. Moreover, Wallerstein focuses on the system level, thus, his work mostly applies to international struggles, while the WSA can apply to state level analysis, in particular to analyses of civil conflicts. I add to this framework other factors such as exploitation of natural resources in the context of civil wars. In the next section, I explain how and why the WSA perspective is useful in understanding civil conflicts and how it can be improved to explain civil war duration.

3.2 Relevance of WSA for Civil Conflict Studies

Wallerstein’s WSA discusses social conflict in general in many of the author’s works. However, he covers in a very limited way the subject of civil wars. Especially after the

dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War, WSA is relevant for the study of internal conflict due to its theoretical framework. One of the major elements of WSA is the argument that everything is embedded in the world-economy, which can be directly applied to civil wars. Internal conflicts do not occur in a vacuum; on the contrary, they are a part of the whole system, with many states playing explicit or implicit roles in the conflict itself. In other words, a civil war has not only domestic but also international causes.

This approach by Wallerstein was also elaborated upon by other scholars from the conflict studies literature, as was shown in the previous chapter, like Gleditsch (2007) who argues that contemporary internal conflicts possess a transnational character, meaning that there are external factors affecting the evolution of a conflict, and the latter does not represent an isolated event, but is embedded into the international system. Unfortunately, conflict studies scholars have not used Wallerstein or the WSA in their studies of civil conflict, neither for war onset nor duration.

In line with internal conflicts, Wallerstein himself dedicated several of his works to the subject of social conflict in Africa. Wallerstein argues that although civil conflicts, for instance, in Sudan or Nigeria, are *ethnic*, or display “strong ethnic loyalties”, they are, in fact, class struggles. Wallerstein argues that even though social tensions that occurred in the African states ran along ethnic, racial or religious lines, they were all “inefficacious and self-defeating expression of class frustrations” (Wallerstein, 1991:198). Thus, in these works on African ethnic conflicts, Wallerstein (1979: 179) mostly focuses on the subject of class and class struggle, which may be

considered as 'grievances' related to relative deprivation. Gurr's (1970) concept of relative deprivation refers to the lack of access to one deems pivotal in his or her life compared to others. Wallerstein's approach to class struggle thus focuses on relative deprivation of one class compared to the other. However, Wallerstein's perspective would still point to greed as the root cause of any grievances. In other words, ethnicity or any other identities are not main grievances as the grievance literature would argue according to the WSA. In that context, I argue that Wallerstein's approach to African conflicts is quite limited but useful and should be expanded on.

On the other hand, Africa as a research subject in general seems to have been of great interest to Wallerstein, who spent some time travelling through post-independence African states. In his work (1980: 30), he argues that even though Africa was incorporated into the modern world-system rather recently, the transition was not unexpected. On the contrary, the system was already present in African daily life for around two centuries. Before that, Africa comprised of its own world-systems that were not capitalist, but they were connected to other world-systems outside the region, and one of them was European capitalist world-economy. In line with that argument, the underdeveloped Sub-Saharan countries of Angola, DRC and Sierra Leone that are examined in the chapter contributes to Wallerstein's work and expands on it by showing how these countries are deeply embedded in world-economy and as a result how their civil conflicts are prolonged.

From the literature review in Chapter II, it is possible to infer that most frequently cited causes of conflict onset and duration are greed in the form of poor groups wanting to become wealthier. Rebels mostly finance civil wars through illegal

activities such as ‘booty futures’ selling (as Ross 2005 calls it) or illegal extraction of natural resources, usually applying violence towards the native population. These causes are all a part of the international trade system and their processes can be explained in detail through WSA. In other words, I add to the WSA framework natural resources, as a part of the causal mechanism leading to war duration. Moreover, Wallerstein’s approach includes several international actors such as firms and national governments based in core states and focuses on how core states control transnational borders including periphery states’ borders to control the flow of products into the markets. Therefore, applying WSA’s multi-actor approach and its focus on transnational nature of borders to civil war studies fills an important gap in that literature. Taking all this into consideration, I argue that there is a cyclical relationship between the exploitation of the periphery by the powerful international actors, due to their greed for natural resources and capital, and the duration of civil conflict.

3.3 Research Design and Case Selection

3.3.1 Research Design

This section elaborates on the design of the research and the method, and provides explanations for the reasons behind case selection. This thesis uses theory building case study method to expand Wallerstein’s WSA theoretical framework on civil war duration. The aim is to contribute to the theory of world-systems analysis by studying three Sub-Saharan African countries that have not been examined using this approach. Since a critical approach to international relations values comprehensive analyses of

cases instead of large-N quantitative studies, this method is deemed useful to contribute to theory building in this thesis.

In addition, the case studies are very useful in a thorough and detailed research, which needs in-depth inquiry into the subject in question. This method “give[s] a voice to the powerless and voiceless” (Tellis, 1997: 2), because it not only looks at the major actor, but also on other ones that are relevant for the research. Thus, the theory building case study method provides a good opportunity to learn in detail the processes that are in place, although such method is not appropriate for making generalizations. Thus, the cases examined in the next chapter contribute to theory building, however, other case studies on other African countries would make this research more generalizable in the future.

As this research is conducted in the WSA perspective, the actors that will be of focus are selected according to the major concepts of this approach. In the WSA, the modern world-economy consists of not only states, but also firms, diverse organizations and various groups, pertaining to different ethnic and cultural origins. These actors are thus closely examined in the next chapter.

In this work, I will look at the cases of civil wars in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, in the timeframe between 1990 and 2010. These wars were chosen particularly due to their explanatory power, which is essential for case studies, especially when a new perspective is applied. Three conflicts are different from each other, but still possess common features, which provide evidence for the applicability of WSA to conflict studies, even after the end of the Cold War.

The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a former Belgian colony, is one of the most enduring conflicts in the world, which started in 1960 and still continues with small interruptions until today. Much research was done on this conflict due to the fact that it was a battleground not only for domestic actors and secessionist movements, but also for superpowers with their Cold War rivalry. The conflict also oversaw the deployment of one of the first UN peacekeeping missions (ONUC) in 1960-1964.²³

The Angolan conflict (1975-2002), a former Portuguese colony, also started during the Cold War, and like Congo was seen by the superpowers (U.S. and USSR) as an opportunity to engage in indirect and discreet fighting for power and control. This war differs from the war in Congo as it evolved as one of the bloodiest and deadliest civil wars with heavy international intervention on the part of superpowers and the UN peacekeeping mission between 1988-1991.

The conflict in Sierra Leone (1991-2002), a former British colony, appeared in the timeframe that this thesis looks at, from 1991 until present, and is in this way different from other civil wars in Africa, which started during the Cold War and endured into the late 20th and the start of 21st centuries. This conflict also got intervened by external actors such as the UN in 1998-1999 and 1999-2005.

In order to be able to eliminate the rivalry between the two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as a potential factor affecting the internal strife, like in the

²³ ONUC – United Nations Operation in the Congo (July 1960 – June 1964), and later MONUC – United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was renamed into MONUSCO - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in July 2010. For more details see <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>.

cases of the Angolan and Congolese civil wars, I chose to look at the periods of these wars that took place after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Finally, it is important to determine which countries in the WSA framework are accepted as core, semiperiphery and periphery since these concepts are the basis of the WSA theoretical framework. Piana (2006: 16) is helpful to accomplish this hard task for the modern state system since he updates Wallerstein's work on such categorization. Piana argues that states at war and those that have unstable regimes do not provide reliable statistical data for the research, particularly data on imports for the years under study. This is probably the reason why there are no civil war-torn states in his list of countries, defining them with respect to core, periphery, or semi-periphery. Consequently, there are no data on African states that experience internal violence for the years of 1998 and 2003 in the list compiled by Piana.²⁴ However, it is most probable that those states would be regarded as peripheral countries, as are other African states in the list, with the sole exception of South Africa (semi-periphery). The exclusion of war-torn states from the data, though logical, still requires some additional remarks. Despite the conflict, the production of materials still occurs, even on the micro level: if it was not for this process the rebels and the government would run out of resources needed for the continuation of war. Thus, I argue that even a country experiencing civil conflict is part of the world-economy, and can (and should) be studied from the WSA perspective.

In the next section, I discuss why Africa region is studied as opposed to any other region.

²⁴ Piana's list is in the Appendix E.

3.3.2 Case Selection: Why Africa?

There are two main reasons for choosing Africa as a research region in this thesis. First of all, the African continent can be regarded as the most unstable region in the world, in terms of intrastate violence and human security.²⁵ Sub-Saharan Africa has hosted the world's longest civil war (in Congo) and one of the most outraging atrocities of the twentieth century (the 1994 Rwandan genocide of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu). In the last forty years, around 20 Sub-Saharan African states experienced at least one civil conflict, and according to estimates, some 20% of the population of this region lives in countries, which are in a state of war (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000b: 244-245). From twenty UN Security Council resolutions adopted so far in 2011, fourteen are on Africa. One of them, S/RES/1983 (2011)²⁶ is concerned with the maintenance of security and peace, and it underlines how conflicts can not only bring physical destruction to countries, but also physiological jeopardy to the people who live there, caused by sexual violence, which in turn leads to the spread of the HIV virus. This is one of the most significant factors affecting stability in the African region, and the fact that conflict and internal violence exacerbate it, makes it only more essential to study the reasons that lead to protracted civil wars in Africa, thus increasing the knowledge that the international community has with respect to the problem, making the conflict resolution more likely to take place. One of the aims of a

²⁵ One could argue that the recent events in the Middle Eastern countries, particularly Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Syria and Jordan and the so-called Arab spring can make that region a good candidate for theory building. However, these countries, with the exception of Yemen, are known for their authoritarian stability since their independence. Thus, Sub-Saharan Africa with its rich resources, low GDP and a myriad of civil wars is a better region for the kind of study this thesis undertakes.

²⁶ See <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/365/66/PDF/N1136566.pdf?OpenElement> for the whole text of the resolution. Last accessed on June 15, 2011.

critical perspective of international relations is emancipation of people and studying Africa is crucial for that purpose as well.

Secondly, this work looks at the subject of civil conflict from a new perspective; it is only logical that the most illustrative cases are chosen to contribute to the theoretical framework by applying it to conflict studies and particularly to internal conflict. Civil wars in Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, proved to be the most “exemplary instances of the phenomenon being studied” as case studies (Yin, 2003: 10). The past centuries left an inerasable imprint of colonial legacy on the region, and it takes years to change the existing order and fight stereotypes created by the former colonial powers. The Rwandan genocide is an illustrative example of the extent, to which the colonial powers affected the life inside colonies. It is now a widely acknowledged fact that the system of identity cards with ethnic affiliation inscribed on it, put into practice by the Belgians, as well as the singling out the Tutsis as a group and putting them above the majority Hutu population ignited ethnic hatred towards the former with an estimated death toll of around 800,000 people in only a month.

Some evidence in support of studying this particular region with respect to the influence that imports from the Western states and international trade may have on the domestic violence in the African states lies in the study conducted by Craft and Smaldone (2002). They argue that in the timeframe between 1967 and 1997 the imports of arms and weapons coming mostly from the Western states, including the United States (major supplier of weapons for the years 1992-1996),²⁷ do “contribute to

²⁷ See Table 5 in the Appendices section.

conflict processes in sub-Saharan Africa” (2002: 705). Thus, it is essential for the international peace and security to learn the factors that bring about or intensify civil conflicts in the most deprived region on the globe.

In addition, Africa is interesting to study from the perspective of world-systems analysis, due to the fact that in the 1600s Africa was not considered part of the world-economy (Wallerstein, 1974b: 17), but with time it became its integral part and is now one of the most essential producers of raw materials. The contemporary relationship between the former colonies and former colonizer states and their interactions, in terms of distribution of labor, production and trade, make it both compelling and important for contribution to the general knowledge to reveal the mechanisms that are in action today.

What makes natural resources that African states produce a competitive product, as was elaborated upon in the theory section, is that in war-torn states such sources of funding are essential for the belligerent parties, thus must be produced on a measurably significant scale, as well as sold for a price that is lower than it could have been were the circumstances different and production not taking place during the civil conflict. This causal mechanism will be examined in greater detail in the following chapter.

Table 6 and 7 show how this tendency was not significantly altered in almost twenty years from 1992 to 2009, with major powers contributing the most to the international arms trade.

CHAPTER IV

WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND CIVIL WAR DURATION IN ANGOLA, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND SIERRA LEONE

In order to reach a sound understanding of the violent logic of protracted conflicts /.../ the dynamics, developments and social changes that evolve during a war have to be taken into account. For this reason, the fundamental question “why war?” has to be completed with the equally essential question: “who profits from it?”

Endres (2003: 134)

It is therefore the interference of the West in the economies of the Third World which has produced the underdevelopment which it was supposed to be curing /.../ Development agencies are becoming increasingly aware that multinational companies are siphoning off the wealth of poor countries.

Michel Fortin cited in Chua (2003: 248)

This chapter uses the world-systems approach to expand its theoretical framework to the explanation of civil war duration in the cases of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone from 1990-2010. The first section of the chapter provides an introduction to the chapter. The second section discusses general trends in

economic developments of these countries starting from the end of the Cold War until 2010, including empirical facts concerning proved reserves of natural resources in the respective states. The third section presents the case studies from the world-systems analysis (WSA) perspective. First, this section traces the historical timeline of the conflict itself, concentrating on major events that occurred during the war, and their implications and consequences for the latter; then applies the world-systems approach to understand the mutually constitutive nature of exploitation of periphery states by core states and civil war duration. The final section analyzes empirical facts from the previous sections, and analyzes the complex relationship between international actors, natural resources and civil war duration.

4.1 Introduction

This section examines three civil wars in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone from the end of the Cold War until 2010. These cases stand out in the civil conflict literature since they all have rich natural resources and abundance of natural resources in a state, at times, is denominated as a ‘curse’ for a country that possesses them (Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore, 2005).

However, another African country, Botswana proves to be a counter example to this argument, with its natural resources, such as oil, diamonds, and recently discovered uranium ores. Botswana is highly dependent on mineral resources,²⁸ nevertheless, it did not experience civil strife since its independence from Britain in 1966. Concomitantly, Botswana was characterized by the UNDP (Human

²⁸ See Table 3 on page 122.

Development Report, 2010: 3) as having strong institutions supported by strong economic growth, and the number three country in the world, after South Africa and China, which GNI per capita has shown such a rapid growth. In addition, Botswana is sometimes called “a symbol of peace and prosperity in southern Africa” (Edie, 2003: 27). Thus, protracted civil wars in Africa have nothing to do with a ‘curse’, but are the result of other causes and processes in which the core countries are the most powerful in economic and political terms in the whole world-economy. They are able to exercise leverage on other periphery and semiperiphery states when their interests or interests of the firms situated on their territory are affected. Taking into consideration that their major aim is the accumulation of capital with its further use to accumulate even more capital, conflict environment presents a good opportunity to gain different contracts or concession for prices that would be impossible to bargain in stable countries (UNSC, 2003: 6). I will show these dynamics throughout the case studies in this chapter.

As explained in greater detail in the previous chapter, the three case studies were chosen for two particular reasons: firstly, these are the most illustrative ones, meaning that they are most vivid examples among other civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa of the economic and political processes that exist in the world today. Secondly, the propositions that are made in this thesis might be considered politically sensitive for the post-Cold War period, which is probably the reason behind the lack of academic work on this topic and little amount of data in general. However, these cases have received some attention both in the media and the academia providing the ground for this research, and making it possible to study these civil conflicts through a WSA

perspective. Since the thesis aims to provide a critical analysis of civil war duration in especially Africa, the cases of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone constitute theory building case studies that build upon Wallerstein's world-systems analysis.

4.2 Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone in the post-Cold War period from a World-Systems Analysis Perspective

The two volumes on world-systems, written by Immanuel Wallerstein in 1974, elaborate on the historical evolution of the modern world-economy, starting from the sixteenth and into the eighteenth century. Wallerstein later applies his theory to modern times as well and Sub-Saharan Africa is certainly a place that can use the world-systems approach to understand how greed of the core and semiperiphery states and firms can lead to exploitation of periphery states, resulting in prolonged conflict, which in turn motivates more greed and leads to further exploitation. To understand how core and semiperiphery states' economic will affects periphery states from a WSA perspective, one needs to tackle economic indicators. Moreover, since I argue that in addition to capital, natural resources in periphery increase the core's greed resulting in further exploitation and prolonging the civil war, an overview of natural resources in Angola, the DRC and Sierra Leone is necessary.

In 2002, the *New York Times* published a report on globalization and its effects on states in the system.²⁹ According to the report, the United States seems to be the only country besides China that benefited from the process of globalization, which can

²⁹ See <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/21/world/losing-faith-globalization-proves-disappointing.html?pagewanted=3&src=pm> for complete text. Last accessed on June 20, 2011.


be perceived through the fact that “huge inflow of capital has helped allow Americans to spend more than they save and to import more than they export”. The report quotes George Soros, financier and philanthropist who is considered to be one of the leading critics of globalization, who argues that “[t]he trend of globalization is that surplus capital is moving from the periphery countries to the center, which is the United States”. The elevation of the U.S. can be traced through the evolution of its GDP, which almost tripled from 1990 to 2009, continuously increasing with just one exception of 2009, which can be attributed to the global economic crisis, and is now a little over 14 trillion U.S. dollars. Such argumentation parallels one of the main propositions put forward by the WSA (unequal exchange), making WSA applicable to the modern states’ system.

With respect to Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, all three countries now have larger GDP and GNI than in the aftermaths of the dissolution of the Soviet Union with a small decline in 2008-2009. If for Angola and Sierra Leone this increase was significant, for Congo it was not as such, with only very slight variation in the indicators. In 1990 a UNDP report placed Sierra Leone in the five countries with the lowest human development index, while the Democratic Republic of Congo (which was then called Zaire) and Angola followed by approximately fifteen states, with twentieth and twenty second placing respectively. The adult literacy rate in Angola was 41%, in the DRC – 62%, and Sierra Leone – 30%. Over a half of Sierra Leone’s population did not have access to safe water or health services, these numbers being 23-25 millions for the DRC and 6.7 millions for Angola. If compared to the 2010 UNDP report, the situation does not seem to have

altered in any positive way: from 169 counties on the list, the DRC was designated number 168, Sierra Leone – 158, and Angola – 146. The first two changed places, but even Angola, which had a higher increase in GDP, did not make any significant progress in twenty years. In 2008 around 43-50% of Angolan people did not have access to safe water and sanitation, this number being 51-87% for Sierra Leone, and 54-77% for the DRC. As for the human security factor, only 47% of the DRC and 53% of the Sierra Leone and Angola's population perceive themselves to be safe. Slight improvements in the adult literacy rate can be seen in the DRC and Sierra Leone, with Angola having increased this rate up to 69.6%.

It is also essential to inspect the reserves of natural resources in all three states. According to the CIA Factbook, Angola has 13.5 billion of barrels of proved reserves of oil, and 271.8 billion cubic meters of natural gas; in addition to this, Angola has reserves of diamonds, iron ore, phosphates, feldspar, bauxite, uranium, as well as gold. As can be seen from Figure 1 (on the next page), Angola's GDP and GNI rapidly increased, however, this is tightly connected to the rents coming from natural resources. Angola's economy is highly dependent on natural resources as a source of state's income; despite this fact and the abundance in natural wealth, forty percent of Angolans still live below the poverty line.

Figure 1: Evolution of Angola's GDP, GNI and Total Rents from Natural Resources between 1990-2009



Source: World Bank Data.


It is also interesting to mention that almost all Angola's export partners are core states, such as China, the United States, and France, with one semi-periphery – South Africa. Angola's export consists of raw products, such as crude oil, diamonds, cotton, timber, and coffee, though it also exports refined petroleum products. In turn, Angola's imports are mostly machinery and electrical equipment, vehicles and spare parts, medicines, food, textiles, as well as military goods. Consequently, Angola is

highly dependent on both exports and imports: the former represents most significant part of its GDP, while the latter bring into the country half of the necessary food.³⁰

The DRC is, like Angola, rich in natural resources, and as Figure 2 (on the next page) shows it has been increasing its activities in this sector since 2003, which led to increase in amount of total rents, and GDP and GNI in general. The DRC has proved reserves of 180 million barrels of oil and 991.1 million cubic meters of natural gas, as well as diamonds, gold, copper, and cobalt. Export partners of the DRC are China, the U.S., Belgium, Zambia and Finland, of which the first three are core states, Zambia – periphery, and Finland – semiperiphery, but export to the last two represents only 10.16% of the total.

³⁰ See <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html> for more economic indicators of Angola. Last accessed on June 29, 2011.

Figure 2: Evolution of Democratic Republic of Congo's GDP, GNI and Total Rents from Natural Resources between 1990-2009



Source: World Bank Data.


DRC exports raw commodities, such as diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt, wood products, crude oil, and coffee, while its imports comprise of food, mining and other machinery, transport equipment, and fuels, which is very similar to Angola. And yet again, despite this wealth, 71% of country's population lives below the poverty line.³¹

The case of Sierra Leone is, unfortunately, similar to the previous two, but it is interesting in its own way as well. Figure 3 shows that the amount coming from the

³¹ See <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html> for more economic indicators of Democratic Republic of Congo. Last accessed on June 29, 2011.

total rents from the natural resources remained infinitesimal during the period of civil war, and did not increase even after the peace treaty was signed and the war came to an end in 2002.

Figure 3: Evolution of Sierra Leone’s GDP, GNI and Total Rents from Natural Resources between 1990-2009



Source: World Bank Data.

Sierra Leone’s offshore oil was discovered in 2009-2010 by Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, headquartered in Texas (U.S.)³², which will take time to

³² See <http://www.portaltofrica.com/news/africa/general/multinational-companies-drill-for-oil-off-coast/>. Last accessed on June 29, 2011.

develop into a profitable industry, depending, however, on the amount of the offshore oil.

Today Sierra Leone exports 502.4 barrel per day, but imports more than ten times of this amount (8,316 barrels per day). As in the case of Angola and the DRC, Sierra Leone's exports consist of raw materials, such as diamonds, rutile, cocoa, coffee, fish, while imports include food, machinery, equipment, fuels, lubricants, and chemicals. The export partners of Sierra Leone are U.S. (core), Belgium (core), UK (semiperiphery), India (semiperiphery), Greece (semiperiphery), Netherlands (periphery), and Cote d'Ivoire (N/A)³³. According to CIA Factbook, the alluvial diamonds represent almost half of Sierra Leone's exports.³⁴ The poverty level is similar to the one in the DRC with 70.2% of the population living below the poverty line.

To sum up, all three countries, since the end of the Cold War, have been, on the one hand, exporting mostly raw commodities to core or semiperiphery and several periphery states, and, on the other hand, importing either food or technological products and machinery. Although their GDP's rose in the last years, this increase was not significant for the DRC and for Angola it was a result of increased exploitation by the Angolan government of the natural wealth the country owns, which makes it vulnerable on the international market due to volatility of prices for raw materials, especially crude oil. In addition, Angola is dependent on imports of food, which puts it in a reliant position on its food import partners. Also, all three states, despite their wealth in natural resources, have significant portions of population living in poverty.

³³ See Piana (2006) for a complete list of countries in the Appendix E.

³⁴ See <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html> for more economic indicators of Sierra Leone. Last accessed on June 29, 2011.

In the next section, I examine each civil war and next I link the civil wars to the economic indicators explained here to show how economic interests (greed in civil conflict studies terminology) of core states increase the duration of these civil wars, which in a vicious cycle leads to more exploitation of sources in the vulnerable war economy of the civil war state.

4.3 Civil War in Angola³⁵

4.3.1 Historical Timeline of Civil War in Angola

Angola's civil war started in 1975 when the country received its independence from Portugal. It claimed from 500,000 to 1 million people, and lasted 27 years, officially ending in 2002 with the killing of Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, the founder of National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), who fought a guerilla war against the colonial rule, and after the independence engaged in warfare against People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Civil war was waged primarily between UNITA and MPLA who were on the opposite verges of the political ideology spectrum, with the former being a right-wing organization and the latter a left-wing, social democratic movement. Today, it is a well established fact that during the war and before the fall of the Soviet Union, MPLA received support from the communist empire, while UNITA was backed by the United States, with Angola becoming a major battlefield for their proxies.³⁶

³⁵ See the map of Angola in Figure 5 in the Appendices section.

According to Edie (2003: 22, 26), since its independence and at least until 1992, Angola has been under a single party rule of MPLA, which, despite challenges in the 1992 election from UNITA, managed to remain in power. The war itself is usually divided into three periods: the first one between 1975 and 1991 is called War of the Bush (Guerra do Mato), the second one between 1992 and 1994 bears the name War of the Cities (Guerra das Cidades), and the third one lasted from 1998 and 2002. This thesis is concerned with the second and third phases of the conflict, however, it is important to mention that close to the end of the first war and the establishment of the Bicesse Accords of 1991 and the withdrawal of all foreign troops, including from Cuba, the support from the superpowers started to reduce, which urged the parties to seek other sources of finance. During the Angolan civil war, the incumbent government of MPLA sustained itself through revenues from offshore oil field, and UNITA through illegal diamond mining (Harsch, 2007: 17). This division created resentment among the UNITA members who felt that due to MPLA's control over oil, the United Nations "was biased in the government's favor" (Sheehy, 1997: 113).

In 1992, after the general elections were held, UNITA refused to accept the result, broke the Bicesse Accords, and engaged in a more furious battle with the governmental forces of MPLA. According to some estimates, this period was the bloodiest one with some 182,000 people dead between May and October 1993 (Global Witness, 1998: 1). By that time, around 70% of Angola's territory was under UNITA's control; however, MPLA forces continued to push the rebels back. In 1994, the Lusaka peace talks started with the United States, Russia and Portugal (former

³⁶ I shall note once again that the analyses of all the cases start after 1990 to avoid the effects of the Cold War dynamics on civil war duration.

colonial power in Angola) chosen as observers. The peace talks ran parallel to the continued fighting on the ground. In 1993, United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 864,³⁷ prohibiting any sale to UNITA of military equipment, including weapons, vehicles, petroleum and petroleum products, and demanding UNITA to cease all fighting and withdraw from the territories it occupied.

The period that followed was mostly characterized by illicit trade in weapons to each belligerent party, as France being only one of the core states that was involved in this weapons trade (Le Billion 2001b: 631). The war came to an end with the death of UNITA leader Savimbi in 2002. In the same year both parties signed an amendment to the Lusaka protocols and the UN passed a final Resolution 1439³⁸ that suspended travel ban on members of UNITA and their families. The conflict, on the contrary to the case of Congo, ended and did not start again after 2002 for the reasons that will be explained from a world-systems perspective.

4.3.2 World-Systems Analysis and the Duration of Civil War in Angola

The civil conflict in Angola evolved from being the battleground for superpowers with opposite ideologies until the end of the Cold War, to becoming a new kind of business, involving the core and semiperiphery states and the firms after 1990. The Angolan conflict after the end of the Cold War is similar to the conflict in Sierra Leone in many ways since both countries witnessed the activities of mercenary firms and experienced

³⁷ See <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/502/71/PDF/N9350271.pdf?OpenElement> for a complete text of the resolution. Last accessed on June 14, 2011.

³⁸ See <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,UNSC,RESOLUTION,AGO,,3dda0f2c4,0.html> for a complete text of the resolution. Last accessed on June 14, 2011.

the effects of international trade in illicit natural resources, which will be elaborated in the next section.

4.3.2.1 Weapons Trade and Mercenaries in the Angolan Civil War

Mercenaries are not new in the international arena: their history dates back to the times before Christ: for instance, the Greek mercenaries who were recruited to fight for Xerxes I of Persia against Greece. Today, this topic is sometimes neglected by powerful governments, but still manages to remind of itself, such as the recent news of the recruitment of mercenaries from Liberia to fight in the Ivory Coast after the incumbent President Gbagbo refused to step down having lost the elections and violence spilled into the streets (Dickinson, 2011).

Not only weak states hire mercenaries to establish internal order or conduct other activities, but also powerful countries, such as the United States that in the 2007 report by the UN Panel of Experts on Human Rights was accused of using Blackwater USA mercenaries for military activities in Iraq, who officially were recruited to act as security guards. An incident in which Blackwater personnel killed 17 civilians in Iraq further underlined the necessity to determine whether such companies are reliable in the conflict environments (Higgins, 2007).

In 1989, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Resolution (A/RES/44/34), entitled *International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries*, which provides a definition of the word *mercenary*:

1. A mercenary is any person who:

- (a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
- (b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party;
- (c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
- (d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and
- (e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.

2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:

- (a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at:
 - (i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State; or
 - (ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
- (b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material compensation;
- (c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is directed;
- (d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
- (e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is undertaken.

The document states that recruitment, training, financing, as well as conducting mercenary activities themselves are considered a grave offense to the aforementioned Convention; thus, states should refrain from such measures or face appropriate penalties. It is essential to point out that neither the United States, nor the United Kingdom are signatories to this Convention, which means that most powerful core states do not abide by these rules.

Francis (1999: 323) argues that these mercenary firms today are:

privately approved by Western governments and international financial institutions because they supposedly make Africa safe for investment. When

Western governments are unwilling to intervene in a domestic conflict, mercenary armies are covertly supported to do their 'dirty' jobs. Their strategic impact provides some semblance of coercive stability thereby making it possible for mining operations to take place.

Thus, it is possible to conclude that mercenary firms act on two purposes: they either fulfill a certain objective given to them by a powerful state, but without going public with it, or they engage in a civil war, even if they are hired by the incumbent government of that state, not to create a secure environment, but to obtain lucrative concessions in minerals and other natural resources with the aim of self-enrichment. In the words of Shearer (1998: 9), these mercenaries "exploit violence for private gain".

The proliferation of mercenaries since the dissolution of the Soviet Union could have been caused by "the reluctance of Western powers to intervene unilaterally in civil conflicts in the post-cold war era, the declining strategic interest of continents like Africa, huge cuts in Western defence budgets and military forces reduction, the 'strategic over-stretch' of the UN, and public intolerance of casualties from national armies fighting abroad" (Francis, 1999: 322).

The mercenary intervention in Angolan civil conflict, and overall in Africa, is not new: the British mercenaries were already involved in the conflict in its second year, which led to an investigation into their activities that was published in the Diplock Report (Francis, 1999: 320). Later on, in 1995, the United States sought to protect its interests in Angola. According to Francis (1999: 333), the U.S. threatened to deny Angola the UN aid if it would not end its contract with the Executive Outcomes (EO), a mercenary company, and recruit the Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) instead. The latter was to "ensure the protection of U.S. interests like onshore Soyo oil fields and maintain significant access for U.S. business

to the Luanda government”. This tied both the Angolan and the U.S. government closely together. Since the Angolan government lost the support of the Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War, U.S. appeared as a good ally for the government in their fight against the UNITA. It should be added that three shareholders today are in the fields: SONANGOL (a partially state-owned company of Angola), Texaco Panama Inc. (a U.S. company pertaining to Chevron), and TOTAL (a French multinational oil company).³⁹

Such use and covert approval of mercenary activities in conflict-ridden countries eliminated the need of the government in a core state to account for its actions: Shearer (1998: 63) argues that MPRI engagement in the Angolan civil conflict made it feasible for the U.S. government to “achieve foreign-policy goals free from the need to secure congressional approval and safe in the knowledge that should a situation deteriorate, official U.S. participation can be denied”.

This new form of military activity came to be known as “security for strategic minerals” (Francis, 1999: 335) and illustrates one instance of how the core states protect their interests in the periphery by using private security companies that claim to have as an aim the restoration of internal security but in reality are a part of the modern capitalist system with its own ambitions for self-enrichment and capital accumulation of their host governments.

Another example is related to opening the economic markets of the periphery to the core states’ companies. In 1998-1999, the government of Angola allocated major shares in its oil industry to small firms that were mostly unknown in the industry, but were alleged to have connections with the business of arms dealing.

³⁹ See <http://www.mbendi.com/facility/f0e1.htm>. Last accessed on July 26, 2011.

These companies seem to be associated with the core, for instance, Falcon Oil & Gas company with most of its offices located in the U.S. and Pierre Falcone who was a Franco-Brazilian arms broker (Le Billion, 2001a: 64), convicted in 2009 in France for arms trafficking. Pierre Falcone was in a way connected to the French Ministry of Interior: according to Le Billion (2001b: 631), Falcone worked as a mediator for Sofremi, a consortium of French security equipment companies, which specialized in exports. One third of Sofremi was said to be under the control of the French state and under the *de facto* management of the Ministry of Interior. Falcone was covertly supported by the French government in aiding both parties to the conflict because the French had major oil interests in Angola, similar to other African countries, such as Gabon, Cameroon and Congo, and the economic stakes in a risky endeavor of supporting just one party were considered to be too high (Le Billion, 2001b: 631).

Some other major companies were said to have been involved in the conflict: it was argued that a French oil company TotalFina-Elf was involved in corruption during the civil war. The company was said to possess a multimillion fund for financing the African leaders, including the Angolan President dos Santos; however, Total has denied all the accusations (Human Rights Watch, 2001: 2).

The powerful countries also directly contributed to the fighting in Angola by selling weapons to the belligerents: in 1999, Russia was the major supplier of weapons to the MPLA-run Angolan government (Human Rights Watch, 2001: 7), which allowed it to engage in continuous fighting with the rebel forces. The extent to which the arms trafficking amid the UN arms embargo evolved can be better understood through the example of France. In 2009, several people were pleaded guilty in

providing the Angolan government with weapons, despite the restrictions implemented by the UN. One of the defendants was the son of former French President Jean-Christophe Mitterrand. De Morais (2009) argues that the conviction itself shows “the impunity with which arms traffickers supplied weapons to Angola during its 27-year civil war”. This increased demand for arms after the Bicesse Peace Accords in 1992 and later the Lusaka Protocol of 1998 failed, bringing about the renewal of hostilities. A major contributing factor was also the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, which made Angola no longer a ‘vital’ strategic country for the superpowers, consequentially putting an end to major power support (Le Billion, 2001b: 629) and leading the country to become the playground of economic interests of international actors as well as the domestic ones.

Thus, some core states and companies were engaged in capital accumulation activities during the Angolan civil war, contributing to the increase in its duration, by either discreetly supporting mercenary activities inside the warring state or providing weapons that led to the escalation of fighting.

4.3.2.2 The Profiteers from the Angolan Diamond Industry During the Civil War

Diamonds, along with oil, were the major source of funding for the belligerent parties. Not only domestic actors profited from the sales of illegally exploited diamonds, but also foreign companies took their share (Le Billion, 2001a: 70). The total amount of diamonds produced under UNITA’s control in the timeframe between 1992 and 2000 was estimated to be around 3-4 billion U.S. dollars, but the real profits are unknown (Le Billion, 2001b: 630).

It is essential to note in the beginning that in the contemporary diamond business three entities stand out from the rest due to their size in the market, functions and leverage. The De Beers group, headquartered in South Africa, is the largest producer and purchaser of diamonds in the world, and is said to influence diamond prices in the market (Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton, 2000: 3). Central Selling Organization (CSO), as an associate of the De Beers and also headquartered in South Africa, manages the supply and demand of rough diamonds on the market. The Diamond High Council in Belgium is considered to represent the whole Belgian diamond industry, located in Antwerp, which is the center of the world for rough diamonds. Antwerp also imports a half of total rough diamonds produced in the world (Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton, 2000: 3). The description of how rough diamonds are distributed between the producers is presented by Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton, 2000: 3:

The CSO sources diamonds from De Beers mines as well as from the ‘outside market’ – diamonds produced by non-De Beers firms. Diamonds purchased by the CSO are in turn sold at ten annual ‘sights’ (sales) to 160 ‘sightholders’. Sightholders are designated by De Beers and are presented with mixed ‘parcels’ of diamonds. The parcels are packages of combined rough gem quality and industrial diamonds, and may include stones from a combination of countries. Parcels are priced by De Beers and are bought by sightholders – ironically enough, sight unseen. Sightholders then take the diamonds to other cities where they are resorted and repackaged for onward sale, or for cutting and polishing.

Apparently De Beers is the major player in the diamond business, and as such its activities are expected to have an impact on diamond producing states, such as Angola and Sierra Leone. De Beers was thus the number one benefiter from the Angolan conflict in terms of capital accumulation. Until 1998, the company was directly buying diamonds from Angola and its neighboring states, where the diamonds were arguably

smuggled. Global Witness (1998: 3) claims that the reason behind De Beers' heavy purchase of Angolan diamonds when most mines were under UNITA's control was "the drive to keep the lucrative outside market buoyant /.../ despite the consequences this might have for the people of Angola during this period". After that De Beers denied any purchases of diamonds from UNITA, however, as was mentioned above, due to its vast diamond interests it is almost inconceivable that such purchases did *not* take place considering UNITA's control in the region. Le Billion (2001a: 76) argues that De Beers implied that the resumption of Angolan civil war and sanctions against UNITA's illegal diamond exports proved beneficial to the company because the quotas that were applied to CSO supporting mines were relaxed. For the company, this means increased profits: "reduced extraction due to warfare made De Beers-CSO activities more profitable. Along with rising sales for 'millennium' diamond gifts, this profitability brought 250 percent increase in the share value of De Beers during 1999" (Le Billion, 2001a: 76). The media hardly believed De Beers' claims.

In line with this argument, Roberts (2003: 224) states that even when De Beers was buying the so-called 'conflict diamonds' from the zones under UNITA's control, it was already aware that without the U.S. support UNITA was losing the war. Taking into consideration the fact that by some estimates the unexploited diamonds left in Angola accounted for around 50-60 billion U.S. dollars, De Beers wanted to obtain a monopoly right to these diamonds. De Beers used the services of Maurice Tempelsman, a Belgian American diamond merchant and businessman, who through his leverage secured the aims of the diamond giant in obtaining sole right to the remaining Angolan diamonds. (Roberts, 2003: 224-225) It is important to mention that

Tempelsman also established a smooth trade between De Beers and the UNITA, with allowed the rebel group to “continue peaceful existence”. This was done with tacit approval of the Clinton administration in the United States. (Roberts, 2003: 225) Such activities contributed to the prolongation of civil conflict in Angola, and, thus, a stalemate between the belligerent parties, by providing UNITA with constant flow of necessary cash for waging war.

According to Le Billion (2001a: 78) most companies and institutions that were involved in providing the Angolan government with loans did not possess any moral dilemma, the same could probably be said about those who profited from illegal diamond exploitation and its further sale to the international market.

The impact of revenues coming from diamond sales increased the duration of civil war in Angola since the revenues were the major source of funding for UNITA and without the diamond revenues; it is unlikely that the rebel group could have sustained its activities for a long period of time. In fact, as the international support to UNITA declined both in terms of weapons sales, and diamond trade, the rebel group’s power gradually evaporated especially after the external mercenaries sided with the government (Francis, 1999). When UNITA’s leader died in 2002, the group demobilized its armed forces. “Under an amnesty agreement, UNITA soldiers and their families, comprising roughly 350,000 people, were gathered in 33 demobilisation camps under the ‘Program For Social and Productive Reintegration of Demobilized and War Displaced People’” (Sheehan and Yong, 1999: 34). Once UNITA lost

support from international actors through selling diamonds, the war was finally terminated and the economy of Angola started improving after 2002.⁴⁰

As the civil war prolonged in this war economy, it contributed to a higher toll in civilian casualties in Angola, accounting for tens of thousands innocent people (Le Billion, 2001a: 71). Another problem associated with illegal mining in Angola was the fact that “many in the international community saw UNITA’s control of diamonds as a legitimate counterbalance to the MPLA’s control over oil revenue” (Le Billion, 2001a: 68), which contributed to a certain balance between the warring parties, making it difficult for one of them to prevail. This is a familiar theme in the ‘stalemate’ literature on how stalemate situations may make war termination and conflict resolution harder (Zartman, 2000). The international actors such as foreign governments and companies trying to get their share from the diamond trade contributed to the stalemate between the Angolan government and the rebels.

In sum, from a world-systems analysis perspective, during the Angolan civil war both the core state (the U.S.) and a major diamond producing company (De Beers) profited to a large extent along with several other core states such as France. These and other activities, such as tacit agreement to let go of the UNITA’s trade in illegal diamonds, increased the duration of civil war, which in turn led to more complex economic relations and dependence in the periphery country.

⁴⁰ See Figure 1 on page 77.

4.4 Civil War in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)⁴¹

4.4.1 Historical Timeline of Civil War in Democratic Republic of Congo

Civil war in the DRC is sometimes called “Africa’s First World War”, because it involved seven nations, and only since 1998 took the lives of 5.4 million people (Shah, 2010). The conflict first started after the country was pronounced independent from the colonizer state, Belgium in 1960. The events that followed unfolded rapidly, with the Katanga province declaring its independence, the Belgian troops entering the country in order to protect its nationals as well as its mining interests in the seceded province. The conflict, as in the case of Angola, became a proxy war for the superpowers until the end of the Cold War, in which the United States supported President Kasavubu and the Soviet Union backed the Prime Minister Lumumba. The crisis was aggravated by the political developments when Lumumba dismissed Kasavubu, and Kasavubu, in turn, dismissed Lumumba. In 1961 Lumumba was arrested and murdered in custody, by some accounts with the U.S. and Belgian complicity. In 1963, the Katangese secession was ended and its leader, Tshombe, was appointed Prime Minister.

In 1965, both Kasavubu and Tshombe were displaced in a coup led by Joseph Mobutu, who established, in a way, a one-man rule, renaming both the country as Zaire and himself to Mobutu Sese Seko. Between 1973 and 1974 many foreign companies were nationalized, but three years later Mobutu tried to undue this by inviting foreign investors back, although without much success.

⁴¹ See the map of DRC in Figure 6 in the Appendices section.

In 1990-1991, in the aftermaths of riots by unpaid soldiers, Mobutu agreed to end a ban on multiparty politics and form a coalition government with the opposition leaders, but he still retained power over important institutions. In 1993, both pro- and anti-Mobutu governments were formed. In 1996-1997, Tutsi rebels captured most of Zaire's territories, ousted Mobutu, renamed the country into the Democratic Republic of Congo, appointing Laurent-Desire Kabila the President. The following year the fighting resumed as the rebels supported by Uganda and Rwanda rioted against Kabila, and took control over most of the territory. Later on, the fighting emerged between different rebel factions backed by different states: Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) rebels supported by Uganda and Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) rebels supported by Rwanda. In 1999, after the Lusaka peace accords were signed by six Heads of State and more than fifty rebels leaders (ICG, 2000: 1), the UN sent troops to monitor the cease-fire; however, the fighting still continued. In 2001 President Kabila was shot dead, which brought his son to power. The government of the DRC signed treaties with the parties to the conflict – Uganda, Rwanda, and major rebel groups. Since then, the fighting still continued but at a low level. The crisis intensified when the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army⁴² entered the DRC and established bases on its territory. Recent events, such as an attempted coup against the President that left 19 people dead,⁴³ showed that even though DRC has become more stable than it was before, occasional fighting still erupts. A recent article (Dickinson, 2011) in *Foreign Policy* described the DRC as “both one of the world's richest countries - its soils are host to massive deposits of gold, coltan, and other minerals -

⁴² Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army is a sectarian religious and military group that was engaged in fighting with the Ugandan government since its formation in 1987.

⁴³ See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1072684.stm>. Last accessed on July 4, 2011.

and one of the most underdeveloped places on Earth”, and this is the Democratic Republic of Congo today.

4.4.2 World-economy, Natural Resources and the Duration of Civil War in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo is the longest among the three cases examined in this thesis and it is widely accepted as the longest civil war in the world. It has become a complex civil war with many different actors intervening in the process, mostly with the aim of promoting self-interests and exploiting resource wealth of the DRC.

As discussed in Chapter II, natural resources are associated with high levels of poverty and protracted civil war. According to Harsch (2007: 21), the city of Mbuji-Mayi, which is frequently called the “diamond capital of the world”, and its province may be considered a “slum”, with high illiteracy and infant mortality rates, and around 60% of children under the age of five suffering from malnutrition; on the other hand, there are domestic and foreign merchants engaged in diamond trade, who lead an unimaginably wealthy way of life. Such inequalities inside a state that was torn by violence since 1960 greatly contribute to the political instability and increase grievances of the local population, which facilitates a rebel recruitment process; however, there are other causes that also affected the duration of civil conflict in the DRC.

The evidence suggests that there are two types of core states’ involvement in the conflict that increases its duration: a direct and indirect one. This section will

further discuss the mechanisms of how the core states affected conflict endurance in the DRC. In this regard, since the end of the Cold War the DRC itself was no longer considered of strategic importance for the Western major powers, and their interests were now guided not by political reasons but by “basic cost/benefit strategic analysis and/or on the availability of other global opportunities” (Grignon, 2004: 44).

In 2000, the UN Security Council (S/PRST/2000/20)⁴⁴ requested from the Secretary General Kofi Annan to establish a Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The mandate for this panel was renewed several times with several submitted reports over the time period of three years. According to the report dated April 2, 2001, during the DRC civil war both mass-scale looting and systematic exploitation of natural resources took place. The report (UNSC, 2003) compiled a list of companies, whose activities directly or indirectly contributed to the financing of war, thus, prolonging the conflict itself. Companies were divided into several categories with respect to actions taken and are as follows:

- Category I – Resolved – no further action required
- Category II – Resolved cases subject to NCP⁴⁵ monitoring compliance
- Category III – Unresolved cases referred to NCP for updating or investigation
- Category IV – Pending cases with Governments for individuals and companies
- Category V – Parties that did not react to the Panel’s report

The list contains 56 companies that are located in the core states, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Belgium, Germany, France and China. All these

⁴⁴ See <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20SPRST%202000%2020.pdf> for complete text of the report. Last accessed on June 15, 2011.

⁴⁵ National Contact Points.

firms through their activities in the DRC were contributing to the entrenchment of internal violence. The report states (UNSC, 2003: 5) that

annexes I and II comprised of individuals and companies that were involved in natural resource exploitation in a way which could be linked directly with funding the conflict and the resulting humanitarian and economic disaster in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. /.../ Even when business activities involved the payment of taxes to rebel administrations and therefore might seem to be legitimate, none of those funds were used to benefit the communities in which mineral exploitation was occurring. Instead the taxes went to fund the elite network's military activities. Secondly, there were those parties that, while having indirect commercial ties to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, still bore a responsibility to ensure that those links did not, albeit inadvertently, contribute to funding and perpetuating the conflict. They comprise annex III of the report.

From the list of the companies, more firms from Belgium have annexes I and II; UK follows second. Other companies originating in the core countries that have been assigned annex III were also included due to an obvious violation of OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which is a non-compulsory code for business ethics.

These companies were either directly on the spot pursuing their business interests in a way that prolonged the conflict or were indirectly involved through purchases of looted resources either from the Congo or through neighboring states, such as Rwanda and Uganda that both were involved in the fighting and had their own proxies in the rebel fractions.

The panel stated that a certain Belgian Sabena Cargo firm was carrying illegally extracted natural resources from the Congo to Europe; no comments from the company came as a response to the Report (2001: 15). Other companies were associated with local commanders or even protected them. Gesellschaft für Elektrometallurgie (GFE) of Karl Heinz Albers had a partner, Emmanuel Kamanzi,

who was the head of the RCD (rebel group backed by Rwanda) Finance Department (UNSC, 2001: 17).

Some core countries were directly signing deals with the Government of the Congo. China made a million dollar deal with the latter, the details of which are not supplied by the Panel, but it is stated that the deal was made due to the necessity of the DRC Government to obtain military equipment and weapons. The Report states that, in exchange for the contract, the Government of the Congo gave mining concessions to a “joint venture between a Chinese company and a parastatal” of the DRC (UNSC, 2001: 37).

Additionally, there were instances when foreign companies hired rebel groups to protect their businesses in the DRC. This is the case of Germany that supported and provided loans for the business of Karl Heinz Albers (mentioned earlier with regards to his connections with local commanders) with an aim of expanding his coltan business in the country. His business was protected by a rebel group called RCD-Goma (UNSC, 2001: 41). In this way the rebels received direct payment for their services from a company associated with a core state. As in the case of Angola, direct involvement of international actors made the war environment profitable for both those actors and the domestic ones such as the rebel groups.

The duration of the civil conflict in the periphery state DRC was also increased through indirect involvement of the core. As was mentioned in the theory chapter, the modern world-system ties different entities together through economy, and in this environment, the core states have a greater prerogative of controlling their borders with respect to goods that enter its markets, in comparison to periphery states that are

usually pressured by the countries in the core to establish conditions favorable to its companies. In addition, the goods that the core purchases from the periphery countries are raw materials, some of them rare, which the former uses to enrich itself: like the trade in coltan used in mobile phones and computers. In this way, the goods that the core allowed to enter its territory had direct impact on the situation inside Congo, and provided further incentives to the warring parties to plunder resources because the market was open for them.

According to the UN report (UNSC, 2001: 8), during the civil war in the DRC, from 1998 onward, RCD rebels and the Rwandan forces that supported them laid their hands on the seven years' worth of coltan, taking them around one month to complete its removal to Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. The Panel argues that, according to some sources, the allied forces removed approximately 2,000-3,000 tons of cassiterite and 1,000-1,500 tons of coltan, however, the official record provided by the RCD claims removing only 6 tons of coltan and 200 tons of cassiterite, an amount accounting for 722,482 U.S. dollars. These minerals were further exported to the international market and were imported mostly by companies located in the core states, such as Belgium, Germany, UK, and Russia, as well as semiperipheries – India (UNSC, 2001: 49).

The core states not only bought rare minerals, but also other raw materials, such as timber, gold, diamonds that were illegally extracted in the DRC and later exported to Rwanda, Uganda or Kenya. The resource looting can be understood through statistical data that the Report (UNSC, 2001: 22-27) provides: Rwanda, for instance, in 1995 and 1996 was producing just 1 kg of gold per year, however, in 1997 this amount increased tenfold; concomitantly, Uganda's rough diamond production in

1998 increased from 1,511.34 carats per year to 11,303.86 carats, and stayed at this level for at least three years. With respect to diamonds, Rwanda's production increased almost 184 times from 1998 to 2000, although the Rwandan officials emphasize the fact the Rwanda does *not* produce diamonds. Contrary to their statement, World Trade Organization and High Diamond Council of Belgium acknowledge the fact that Rwanda *was* exporting diamonds. The report (UNSC, 2001: 27) further connects the exploitation of Congo's diamond mines with power transition in Kinshasa to one of the rebel factions, supported by Rwanda.

Another example is timber and DARA-Forest, a Uganda-Thai company, which is accused of obtaining concession from the rebels (RCD-ML) and exploiting Congo's forests around Mambassa, Djugu, Komanda, Beni, Luna, Mont Moyo and Aboro without applying even minimum requirements for forest harvesting. This illegal extraction on the territory of a sovereign state was followed by its export to Kenya and Uganda without any certificates. The Report (UNSC, 2001: 10-11) argues that the importers of such uncertified cargo were mostly companies in Belgium (core), China (core), Japan (core), United States (core) and Denmark (semiperiphery). Some companies were even partners in the illegal exploitation scheme of DARA-Forest: DARA Europe GmbH Germany, Shanton President Wood Supply Co. Ltd China, DARA Tropical Hardwood, Portland, Oregon, USA.

The importation of illegally exploited raw materials originating in Congo but brought to the world market through other countries contributed to the endurance of the civil war because parties found it profitable to use the chaotic environment of the

conflict. The importers gave the opportunity for them to proceed with the exploitation, to which the peace process and the end of fighting would have been an impediment.

The report of the Panel itself is a very controversial issue: it concentrates more on illegal exploitation committed by Uganda and Rwanda, and does this for a particular reason. According to Grignon (2004: 46), the political environment at the time when the Panel was established was favorable to France that was the major driving force behind the Report. The Panel was directed by Safiatou Ba-N'Daw from Côte d'Ivoire, who was closely affiliated with France. Grignon (2004: 46) argues that the Panel was implicitly given a mandate of proving that Rwanda and Uganda were intervening in the civil war in Congo not for the sake of their national security but to exploit the country's resource wealth, and conspired with their enemies to achieve this goal. The Panel excluded from inspection other parties to the conflict, such as Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, while providing meticulously detailed observations concerning illegal exploitation of the Congo resources by other two neighbors.

Indeed, the reports of 2001 and 2003 though include firms from the core countries that cause the prolongation of the conflict, provide very little detail and data, in comparison to Rwanda and Uganda. This omission, some argue, was not coincidental. The Panel was claimed to have omitted a controversial section that included details on how illegal business networks continue to exploit Congo's natural resources, including diamonds and gold. According to Walsh (2003), the Panel came under pressure from the UN management and was heavily lobbied by "powerful Western business interests and governments". The firms from the core states with businesses associated with coltan, which is a rare mineral being used in the

technological production process and extraction and trade of which were made in conditions similar to slavery, found themselves under no investigation from their respective governments. Western powers applied their political leverage in order to make the Panel remove their companies from the list. How their leverage still affects international politics is seen by the fact that the Panel “resolved” cases against more than 40 companies without requirement for further action (Walsh, 2003). Thus, when their interests are affected, the core states move in to protect them regardless of the fact that their activities contribute to the prolongation of civil conflicts resulting in the increase of the death toll.

The Panel was further politicized when it compiled the aforementioned list of different companies, including those that are located in the core countries. Some of those firms threatened to take the UN to courts. Even though the effect the report had on the peace process was obvious, the decision was made to terminate the mandate of the Panel when the member states saw its further investigation as politically unsuitable (Grignon, 2004: 48-49).

The report (UNSC, 2003: 19) comes to the conclusion that a vicious cycle contributes to the endurance of civil conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This report is very much in line with the expectations of this thesis that the application of a world-systems analysis perspective to civil war duration is quite explanatory since it takes into account international actors of core states and their ‘greed’ for using natural resources of the periphery. The vicious cycle stands for the link between the conflict, exploitation of natural resources and arms trafficking. The report (UNSC, 2003: 19) states that

[e]ach of those three elements thrives on the other two. Without the wealth generated by the illegal exploitation of natural resources, arms cannot be bought, hence the conflict, which almost always involves grave human rights abuses and large-scale population displacement, cannot be perpetuated. Without arms, the ability to continue the conflict, thereby creating the conditions for illegal exploitation of resources, cannot be sustained.

Thus, in order to curb the conflict it is essential to prevent parties to the conflict from illegally exploiting natural wealth of the DRC, and stop the flow of money to the warring fractions, which enables them to acquire weapons, and continue the cycle of plundering and violence. However, taking into consideration the actions of the core states when their interests are at stake, it is most likely that most of the firms from the core will continue their activities in the periphery countries unabated and unaltered. The conflict in the DRC is of “lucrative nature” with a “win-win” situation for every belligerent party, and the “only loser in this huge business venture is the Congolese people” (UNSC, 2001: 44).

4.5 Civil War in Sierra Leone⁴⁶

4.5.1 Historical Timeline of Civil War in the Sierra Leone (1991-2002)

It is very unfortunate that such a country like Sierra Leone, which used to be a symbol of hope and peace, witnessed one of the greatest atrocities in human history, claiming around 75,000 people’s lives.

More than two centuries ago, Freetown, which later became the capital of Sierra Leone, was established by 1,200 ‘free Negroes’ who came from Nova Scotia. In

⁴⁶ See the map of Sierra Leone in Figure 7 in the Appendices section.

1808 Sierra Leone became the first modern state in Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by the establishment of the first university in the region, Fourah Bay College (Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton, 2000: 11). Yet, in the upcoming one and a half centuries this country would witness British colonial rule, independence, violence that took place after the general elections in 1967, followed by military takeover, single party rule of Siaka Stevens, the spread of corruption, and violence over and over again. The situation erupted in 1991 when Revolutionary United Front (RUF), supported by the forces of Charles Taylor of Liberia, attempted to overthrow the incumbent government of the former army chief Joseph Momoh, which proved unsuccessful and sparked violence across the country. RUF's war tactics were marked by violence against civilian population, including torture, rape and crude amputation of facial parts, hands and legs, directed mostly at women and children, as well as abduction of the latter and forcing them to become child-soldiers.

In 1992, Momoh was ousted in a coup, in which a 27-year old Captain Valentine Strasser assumed power. While the fighting still continued, traditional hunters, the Kamajor militia joined forces with military forces of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG⁴⁷, which was established prior to the start of the conflict due to the eruption of internal violence in Liberia and was stationed in Freetown. In 1994, the RUF rebels captured diamond, bauxite and titanium mines, but were driven out in 1995 by private mercenaries hired by National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), which for a time decreased rebel activity. However, when the mercenaries departed, the fighting started again. In 1996, another coup took place bringing Major Paul Koroma to power, who

⁴⁷ ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) was a force combined from several armies of West African States, though the major force contribution was from Nigeria.

invited RUF and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)⁴⁸ to join the government. Around this time, UN Security Council established UNAMSIL.⁴⁹ In the end, after UN peacekeepers were held hostage by the RUF and the British intervened in the domestic situation in Sierra Leone, it was possible to halt rebel activities and force them to sign a peace treaty in 2002, which ended the brutal war that lasted for eleven years. To this day, the civil war did not recur in Sierra Leone.

4.5.2 World-economy, Mercenaries, Diamond Concessions and the Duration of Civil War in Sierra Leone

The civil war in Sierra Leone can be most vividly characterized by the exploitation of oil, illegal diamond mining and the involvement of foreign mercenary firms. But beneath these factors, there is another dimension to the conflict, not usually seen at first glance. The involvement of the core powers in the international trade of illicit diamonds and ‘discreet intervention’ and concessions’ granting through mercenaries and private security firms are the dark sides of the Sierra Leone’s intrastate violence. The following sections will discuss all these factors in greater detail.

4.5.2.1 Private Mercenaries – Angels of Security or Demons of Exploitation?

The mercenary business may be an unknown phenomenon to many people in the world, but it has become its integral, though candid, part. Francis (1999: 319) argues that the mercenary business today represents a new form of neocolonialism “operating

⁴⁸ Armed Forces Revolutionary Council was formed by former members of Sierra Leone armed forces.

⁴⁹ UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone).

under the guise of neoliberal market policies”. These privatized security firms, he continues, serve as “viable foreign policy proxies for Western governments in the pursuit of [their] national interests”. In parallel to Francis’ argumentation, this thesis argues that mercenaries exacerbate civil wars because they use the pretext of establishing internal security to gain access to lucrative mining regions and cash in weak but resource rich states, thus contributing to “their international exploitation and marginalisation” (Francis, 1999: 319).

The mercenaries of contemporary warfare are motivated primarily by oil, diamonds, and other mineral concessions, which is the reason behind their tactics of securing first the “strategic mineral fields”. Once security on the ground is established, these fields and mines are handed over to the acting government that further “grants valuable concessions to private companies owned by or affiliated with these mercenary companies” (Francis, 1999: 322). This is the payment for the war.

Sierra Leone, a small poor country in West Africa, entrenched in a brutal civil war, but possessing vital mineral mines,⁵⁰ from the start of the war was a fertile ground for the proliferation of the mercenaries. It is important to present a ‘family tree’ of one multinational company, which shows how these mercenary firms are associated with other mining and security companies (Francis, 1999: 322):

the parent multinational firm Strategic Resources Corporation (SRC) comprises a series of companies including Executive Outcomes (EO) and the Branch-Heritage Group, a mining and exploration company. The Branch-Heritage Group includes Branch Energy (mining); Diamond Works (diamonds) and Sandline International (security and military support). Branch Energy is

⁵⁰ According to Rex Diamond Mining Corporation based in Toronto (but a de facto location in Antwerp, Belgium) just Tongo fields in sierra Leone are worth about 3.3 billion U.S.\$, or 18.9 million carats for a price of 175 U.S.\$ per carat. See http://www.infomine.com/press_releases/rxd/pr012897rxd.html for more details. Last accessed on July 5, 2011.

registered in the Isle of Man, UK; Diamond Works is registered on the Toronto and Vancouver stock exchange. Branch Energy sold its diamond concessions in Sierra Leone in October 1996 to Diamond Works and received about a 30% share in the company in exchange.¹³ Other SRC companies include Heritage Oil and Gas, with oil and gas exploration in Angola and Branch Minerals, with gold concessions in Tanzania and Uganda.⁵¹

These companies are and in need of being affiliated with one another in order to be able to accumulate more capital and provide a sort of façade for their activities: if an incumbent government were to grant concessions to a private security company, this would have been too blatant a move, however, if a concession is given to a mining company, then, at least on the surface, everything is logical.

When in 1995 RUF took into its control some mining fields, the ones to suffer mostly were Western companies who had concessions in those areas: a bauxite mine at Mokanji was owned by a Swiss company Sierra Ore and Metal Company (SIEROMCO), Serra Rutile operations owned by the United States and Australia, and diamond fields in major diamond districts of Kono and Kenema were granted as concessions. The incumbent government of Sierra Leone was no longer able to provide security for the international businesses. The military forces of Sierra Leone were weak and had already established itself as a ‘Sobel’, meaning soldiers during the daytime, but rebels at night. This was when private security firms entered the domestic arena (Francis, 1999: 325).

The first mercenary firm to engage in fighting in Sierra Leone was the Gurkha Security Guards Ltd, composed of Nepalese nationals but pledging allegiance to the British government and the Queen. Despite their almost half a century history (at the

⁵¹ It was essential to provide the whole list of companies first of all to better understand the mechanisms of mercenary action scheme, and to know the connections between the companies because these are the major firms that were involved in at least two Sub-Saharan African conflicts: in Sierra Leone and Angola.

time of its involvement) the Gurkhas were unable to ensure secure environment or in any way challenge the existing warfare. The firm withdrew following the killing of its commander, Colonel Robert Mckenzie, in 1995 (Francis, 1999: 326).

Following the end of Gurkhas' services, the NPRC government hired probably the most notorious mercenary firm, known for its activities in Africa, the Executive Outcomes (EO), which was already mentioned in the case of the Angolan civil war. This firm was stationed in a semiperiphery state, South Africa, mainly consisted of former Special Forces and members of South African Defence Force, former South African Armed Forces until 1994. Unlike the Gurkhas, the EO was able to establish a satisfying level of security and decrease fighting, due to the fact that it managed to push back the RUF from the capital, and, most importantly, from the major diamond mining fields in the Kono district. These coercive measures brought the RUF to the negotiation table, and in 1996 they signed the Abidjan Peace Accord. However, soon after that, the contract with the EO was terminated, and with its withdrawal the security situation deteriorated once again.

Notwithstanding the EO minor achievement in terms of security for a small period of time, there was another dimension to its services in Sierra Leone. Being a private firm in a world-economy, the major aim of the EO was capital accumulation through the exploitation of unstable domestic situation in its client state. Its services led to the outflow of the capital from the war-torn state to foreign companies. First of all, hiring the EO to establish security was not a cheap enterprise from the start: its employment cost the incumbent government 1.7 million U.S. dollars⁵² per month, and represented what Zack-Williams (1999: 150) called "a major drain" from Sierra

⁵² Francis (1999: 326) puts this figure at 1.225 million U.S.\$.

Leone's economy. Secondly, after the EO drove the rebels out of the diamond mines in Kono, the Branch Energy that presented the EO to the Sierra Leone's government was granted a lease for diamond concessions for 25 years (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazleton, 2000: 7).

The third private security firm that operated during the Sierra Leonean civil war was Sandline International Ltd. It was hired after the coup took place. The ousted government hired the firm with a mission of providing the weaponry and training militia that were loyal to this government. Sandline International, a London-based company, engaged in its activities in Sierra Leone with a "covert approval of the British Foreign Office, to help restore civilian government" (Francis, 1999: 328). The deal between the ousted government and the mercenaries was to bring great diamond concessions and mining rights to Rakesh Saxena, a businessman who supported Sandline International's operations in Sierra Leone. He also had a controlling interest in Diamond Works (Vancouver) bought by Branch Energy, which also received concessions from the government, as was mentioned before. The firm also received money from Jean-Raymond Boule, director of a major mining company in Sierra Leone, Nord Resources, for the first plan of restoring the civilian government; however, this deal was further canceled because of mercenaries' cooperation with other rivals of Nord Resources, such as Branch Energy and Diamond Works. Rakesh Saxena interests did not lie in restoring democracy and civilian rule *per se*, or decreasing civilian casualties for that matter, but in "protect[ing] his huge mining interests and to further secure new production rights" (Francis, 1999: 331). Sandline International ensured the delivery of Bulgarian arms and ammunition to the ousted

governmental forces of President Kabbah in the amount of 10 million U.S. dollars with an aim of providing support for a planned coup, which later turned into a “considerable embarrassment for the Blair government /.../ known as the ‘Arms to Sierra Leone Affair’” (Francis, 1999: 328). According to the BBC timeline⁵³ of the scandal, Sandline argued that it kept both Foreign Office and Whitehall defense intelligence staff fully informed about the deal, including holding briefing meetings with British and American governmental officials and intelligence officers on the coup preparations.

According to Francis (1999: 333) mercenaries have double loyalty: to the client who recruited them and to the shareholders. This duality was behind the fact that all three mercenary firms were unable to implement the goals they were given and establish a permanent secure environment in Sierra Leone, although the EO made some progress in this field. This success, however, was essential for the firm itself, as its payment depended on the acquisition of the mineral mines from the rebels (Francis, 1999: 329).

The mercenary activities also created insecurity. Their military tactics contradict their statements: they engaged in looting and disregarded civilian lives. When the commander of the Gurkhas was killed in an ambush, the recovery of his body turned into a bloody mess. The EO is also known for its brutality towards civilians: the rescue operation of three personnel from the RUF was characterized by high civilian casualties. (Francis, 1999)

Such mercenary companies thrive on civil war and internal violence, and taking into consideration that their main goals were to secure the mining fields and

⁵³ See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/90526.stm. Last accessed on July 27, 2011.

receive concessions from the government, there is a possibility that they can “prolong violence in order to secure further mining concessions” (Francis, 1999: 333). Their intervention in the civil war left the country more impoverished than it was before they got involved, as they not only requested enormous salaries, but also received concessions to vital natural resources. Their activities, thus, seem to represent simply another form of periphery states’ exploitation, occurring for the personal gain of the exploiter.

In all of the cases examined in this thesis, including Sierra Leone, one may ask whether there is any connection between the mercenary companies and the national government, particularly in the core states. The evidence proves that this link *does* exist. Mercenaries in the United States and the United Kingdom have strong, though covert, connections with their governments. This link serves as a way to pursue foreign policy objectives, without using regular armies or political accountability. For instance, in Sierra Leone, the EO’s activities were discreetly approved by not only Western government, such as the UK, but also international institutions, such as the IMF that “approved of the payment of EO salaries in the government budget” (Francis, 1999: 333-335).

The British interests in Sierra Leone lied primarily in the iron-ore and minerals: the fight for human rights or democracy turned into mostly a cover for obtaining lucrative deals from the incumbent government. In addition, it is said that a strategic competition existed between the UK, U.S. and Nigeria over manipulation of Sierra Leonean President Kabbah (Francis, 1999: 334). The British succeeded in achieving their goals: today Marampa iron-ore mine in Sierra Leone, which is

estimated to have around one billion of metric tons of iron ore, is under exploration by the London Mining company. A small BBC documentary (2011) on this particular mine states that the extracted iron will be delivered to China, and the Western countries that are most in need for this raw material, which corresponds to the trade cycle in the world-economy.

4.5.2.2 Blood Diamonds and the International Trade

Not only mercenary activity and interests of their patrons affected the duration of civil war in Sierra Leone. As was shown in two previous cases, for the fighting to continue the warring parties needed financial resources to purchase weaponry and ammunition. Conflict or blood diamonds played a major role in the internal strife and “developed a momentum of its own”; however, beneath a simple rebel financing scheme was the international trade in illegally extracted diamonds that found its place of final destination in developed, core countries.

According to the report on Sierra Leone prepared by Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton (2000: 2) in 1998 the international diamond industry produced a total amount of around 115 million carats of rough diamonds, whose approximate value on the market was 6.7 billion U.S. dollars, while the output value of the product rose to 50 billion U.S. dollars. Thus, the difference between rough material and the processed one is near tenfold, which generates huge profits for the producers and sellers of the processed diamonds, not of the former.

As was argued previously, Sierra Leone contains diamond mines with a high capacity, which attracts a lot of profiteers, ranging from large corporations such as De Beers to rebel groups, selling looted diamonds to the international market.

The involvement of De Beers into Sierra Leone's diamond mining sector started long before the civil war erupted in 1991. Before 1980s the company had a direct connection to the business on the ground because it had concession on diamond mining offshore, however, since then the involvement became indirect. De Beers moved its buying office to Guinea and sustained a diamond trading company, Polestar Limited, in Liberia. De Beers claims that it did not purchase diamonds from Sierra Leone during the civil war (Dickey, 2000), however, as Liberia is considered to be a major transit country for illicit diamonds (Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton, 2000: 3), with many diamonds that come from Liberia actually having Sierra Leonean origin, it is absolutely impossible for De Beers *not* to have purchased conflict diamonds.

As an example of how great the amount of diamonds smuggled from Sierra Leone to the international market through Liberia is, the following numbers should be introduced: according to the statistics, Liberian annual diamond mining capacity is estimated to be between 100,00 and 150,000 carats, however, according to Diamond High Council in the time period between 1994 and 1998, the peak of civil war in Sierra Leone, Belgium imported 31 *million* carats from Liberia (Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton, 2000: 4), while official data suggest that this number should not have exceeded 750,000 carats at its maximum capacity.

According to Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton's report (2000: 33) the Belgian diamond industry and the government are not interested in retrieving the real origin of

diamonds: their only interest lies in dealers inside Belgium, who must be registered with the Diamond High Council. The international diamond community that does not deal with these numbers and accepts these imports from Liberia as legitimate not only “actively colludes in crimes committed or permitted by the Liberian government” (Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton, 2000: 73) but also affected the duration of the civil war in Sierra Leone by providing the looters and the rebels an opportunity to sell illicit diamonds without any obstacles.

The trouble with conflict diamonds stands from the fact that they can be easily transported to every corner of the globe because of their size and weight, which means that the real origin is very difficult to trace. In addition, a transit country may be written as the origin of the diamonds: in 1999 the UK was estimated to have imported very little diamonds from “sensitive” states, however, 41% of its rough diamond imports were from Switzerland, while the latter does not import almost any rough diamonds (UNSC, 2000: 8).

In addition, minor companies were also engaged in the civil war through their connections to the rebels and the incumbent government, as well as mining interests in Sierra Leonean diamonds. These companies emerged on the domestic arena of this small West African state after the official withdrawal of De Beers in 1990s, while some sources point to the year of 2000 (Epstein, 2000). One of them – Rex Diamond – though officially a Canadian company, its *de facto* origins are in Antwerp, with subsidiaries in Belgium and South Africa. This company is said to have been on friendly terms with both the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF rebels, and have interests not only in mining but also in domestic politics (Nbumbe, 2001: 99). Rex

Diamond was even involved in supplying the government with ammunition and mechanical parts worth 3.8 million U.S. dollars after the government's most "effective weapon against the RUF" – the only combat helicopter – crashed during the war. The officials of Rex Diamond denied any connection of the deal with its mining interests in the country (Smillie, Gberie, Hazleton, 2000: 6).

Diamond Works was another company that played its part in the duration of the civil war in Sierra Leone. Though considered to be a Canadian firm, its headquarters are located in London, which makes it a company from a core state. Diamond Works purchased Branch Energy, previously mentioned due to its connection to mercenary firms like the EO. The Branch Energy acquired diamond concessions from the Sierra Leone's government after the mercenaries took control over the mining fields. In addition, Diamond Works seem to have played a role in the shipment of weaponry to the forces of the exiled President Kabbah. Smillie, Gberia and Hazleton (2000: 7) report that "[i]n 1997, Diamond Works' Sierra Leone country manager was seconded – as a 'private citizen' – to Sandline, in connection with a controversial arms shipment intended for the briefly exiled government of Tejan Kabbah", despite the UN arms embargo (UN Resolution S/RES/1132)⁵⁴.

These companies, small and large, as well as different institutions, profited from the illicit diamond trade. Their disregard for the real origin of rough diamonds allowed the opportunists and the rebels to exploit Sierra Leone's civil war for their own advantage, entrenching the conflict itself, because the chaotic environment provides the best ground for illegal activities. Rex Diamond and Diamond Works are

⁵⁴ See [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1132%20\(1997\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1132%20(1997)) for complete text of the Resolution. Last accessed on July 3, 2011.

stark examples because they appeared in Sierra Leone “after the formal instruments of the state had all but disappeared, notably law, order, probity and justice” (Smillie, Gberie, Hazleton, 2000: 7). The market openness for conflict diamonds increased the duration of the civil war by providing the warring parties with financial support that was used to buy ammunition and weaponry, which was facilitated by these firms, despite the UN Resolution prohibiting arms sales to Sierra Leone. In addition, the link between the ‘blood diamonds’ and conflict was not only acknowledged by the international institutions, but also by some politicians in the core states. In 2000, the British Foreign Secretary accused the international diamond industry and the rebel groups of being the reason behind the Sierra Leonean civil conflict (MacAskill, 2000).

In sum, the civil war in Sierra Leone was prolonged due to several factors including the British reluctance to end the war through pressuring the Kabbah government to disband the EO and giving a tactical advantage to the RUF in the fighting (Kargbo, 2006: 235). Once the international community forced the UN to show more resolve to end the conflict, the British carried out an attack in cooperation with Sierra Leone’s neighbors. A disgruntled RUF that lost safe havens asked for a ceasefire, which brought the end of the conflict. As the British involvement in the conflict declined both in terms of weapons sales and diamond trade, the civil war was terminated. Once the war finally ended, the economy of Sierra Leone started improving after 2002.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ See Figure 3 on page 80.

4.6 Analysis of the Case Studies and Policy Implications

The three case studies on Angola, DRC and Sierra Leone aimed at presenting the economic dynamics of civil conflicts from a world-systems (WSA) perspective and to understand why the intrastate wars today are so entrenched. The evidence shows that these conflicts represent a new form of capital accumulation not only for the core states, but also mostly for different firms and mercenaries located in the core and the semiperiphery.⁵⁶ In line with the WSA perspective, these firms and governments are primarily interested in either raw materials or concessions to natural resources, or opportunities presented by war economies. Their activities increase the duration of civil strife by providing the belligerents, especially the rebels, an opportunity to sell looted resources and, thus, obtain weaponry necessary for maintaining the fighting and further resource plunder. If we incorporate this argument into the general picture presented in the case studies, the mutually constitutive relationship between the exploitation of the periphery and the duration of civil wars becomes evident. The war environment provides international actors with opportunities of capital accumulation that would not be possible were the conditions stable and civil war not present. The civil war literature points to grievance vs. greed as causes of civil conflicts. As such, once the conflict escalates, interference of the international actors in the war economy increases the greed of domestic actors and combined with the greed of the core and semiperiphery states' governments and firms, the situation develops into a vicious cycle. This greed leads to the exploitation of the weak states, fuelling the conflict,

⁵⁶ These capital accumulation-based relations of course benefit the elites within the periphery that get involved in deals with the core government and firms.

which again provides ground for further exploitation. This cycle was present in all the cases of three Sub-Saharan African states.

From the cases of Sierra Leone and Angola, it is evident that since the end of the Cold War, the core states tried not to engage directly into civil wars, but they supported the mercenaries to achieve their economic goals. This put aside for them legal accountability and paperwork. Their involvement was also very difficult to trace back, making mercenaries a perfect tool for achieving foreign policy and economic aims.

The involvement of private companies in civil wars not only increased civil war duration, but also contributed to the decrease in periphery's sovereignty and control over its own natural resources. Harsch (2007: 19-20) citing a study conducted by a research group on mining activities in Africa at the University of Quebec (Canada) states that the extensive process of incentives' and concessions' granted to foreign mining companies left African governments with "little regulatory control and their treasuries and economies derive few benefits", which in the end has a negative effect on state's sovereignty.

While the economic indicators that were presented at the beginning of this chapter on natural resources supported the notion that the situation in Angola, the DRC and Sierra Leone is in line with the WSA predictions on periphery states. In line with the WSA, Ross (2003b) identifies all the three countries as having had civil conflicts related to resource wealth as shown in Table 2, thus directly connecting natural resources to civil wars.

Table 2: Civil Wars Linked to Resource Wealth, 1990-2002 Country⁵⁷

	Duration	Resources
Afghanistan	1978-2001	Gems, opium
Angola	1975-2002	Oil, Diamonds
<i>Angola (Cabinda)</i>	1975-	Oil
<i>Burma</i>	1949-	Timber, tin, gems, opium
Cambodia	1978-97	Timber, gems
Colombia	1984-	Oil, gold, coca
Congo, Rep.	1997	Oil
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1996-97	Copper, coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1998-	Copper, coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt
<i>Indonesia (Aceh)</i>	1975-	Natural gas, marijuana
<i>Indonesia (W Papua)</i>	1969-	Copper, gold
Liberia	1989-96	Timber, diamonds, iron, palm oil, cocoa, coffee, marijuana, rubber, gold
<i>Morocco</i>	1975-	Phosphates, oil
<i>Papua New Guinea</i>	1988-	Copper, gold
Peru	1980-1995	Coca
Sierra Leone	1991-2000	Diamonds
<i>Sudan</i>	1983-	Oil

Ross puts Sierra Leone second following Botswana with respect to non-fuel resource dependence as seen in Table 3 on the next page.

⁵⁷ Separatist conflicts are listed in italics. *Source*: Ross, 2003b: 29.

Table 3: Non-fuel Mineral Dependent States⁵⁸

	State	Minerals Dependence
1.	Botswana	35.1
2.	Sierra Leone*	28.9
3.	Zambia*	26.1
4.	United Arab Emirates	18.2
5.	Mauritania*	18.4
6.	Bahrain	16.4
7.	Papua New Guinea	14.1
8.	Liberia*	12.5
9.	Niger*	12.2
10.	Chile	11.9
11.	Guinea*	11.8
12.	Congo, Dem. Rep.*	7.0
13.	Jordan	6.3
14.	Bolivia*	5.8
15.	Togo*	5.1
16.	Central African Republic*	4.8
17.	Peru	4.7
18.	Ghana*	4.6
19.	Bulgaria	4.0
20.	Angola*	3.6

According to Ross, Angola comes first with respect to dependence on oil as shown in Table 4 on the next page.

⁵⁸ Highly Indebted Poor Country; bold signifies a civil war since 1990. Mineral Dependence is the ratio of non-fuel mineral exports to GDP; figures are for 1995. *Source:* Ross, 2003b: 30.

Table 4: Oil Dependent States⁵⁹

	State	Oil Dependence
1.	Angola*	68.5
2.	Kuwait	49.1
3.	United Arab Emirates	46.3
4.	Yemen*	46.2
5.	Bahrain	45.7
6.	Congo (Brazzaville)*	40.9
7.	Nigeria	39.9
8.	Oman	39.5
9.	Gabon	36.1
10.	Saudi Arabia	34.3
11.	Qatar	33.9
12.	Algeria	23.5
13.	Papua New Guinea	21.9
14.	Libya	19.8
15.	Iraq	19.4
16.	Venezuela	18.3
17.	Norway	13.5
18.	Syria	13.5
19.	Ecuador	8.6
20.	Bhutan	6.8

These tables show clear support to the argument that natural resources in all three states had a direct effect on the civil war.

The subject of civil wars has provoked many questions, but the one that comes up before all is *what can be done to prevent them?* A viable solution is not easy to find, taking into consideration that we live in a capitalist world, where everything is directed upon capital accumulation. International trade in illicit natural resources made by the core states is almost impossible to halt, as these states possess most leverage in

⁵⁹ Highly-Indebted Poor Country; bold signifies a civil war since 1990. Oil Dependence is the ratio of oil, gas, and coal exports to GDP; figures are for 1995. *Source:* Ross, 2003b: 31.

the international system. Berkeley (1997: 13) argues that if a solution to the continual crisis in Africa is to be found, its major focus should be on an attempt to bring before justice those who in the past were involved in criminal violence. This would serve as a deterrent example for others. However, in this regard, there is another puzzle to solve: if those who committed illegal activities and were contributing to intrastate violence are firms protected by powerful states, as was seen in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, how to hold *them* accountable? Political and economic superiority give powerful states an enormous leverage on the international arena, thus, decreasing the possibility for the persecution of these firms. What could be then a viable solution in this situation?

International and domestic accountability should be increased, encouraging states and firms to engage in more open policies with respect to their activities in war-torn states. On the other hand, this might be difficult to implement, as many companies do not like to show how they conduct their businesses and, unfortunately, as of today there is no powerful entity that could make them openly state their actions.

An effort to halt illegal diamond exploitation in countries experiencing civil conflict was taken by the international community, when it launched the Kimberley Process, a certificate scheme that includes the origin of the diamond. Although, this process seems to have made significant progress (with a 100 times increase in U.S. dollars value in legally exported diamond from Sierra Leone (Harsch, 2007: 18), it is still not enough.

It is, though, important to increase the awareness of people around the world on such matters. This work lies in the hands of the academics, the international

organizations, media and the politicians. The more aware people are, the more pressure will be exerted on the core and semiperiphery states and firms, which eventually may cause change in their policies. In addition, it is essential to understand in detail the mechanisms of powerful states' and companies' involvement in conflict zones. Malone and Sherman (2007: 647) propose the following scheme of action:

developing a better understanding of companies' strategies and motivations in situations of conflict; /.../ acknowledging the legitimate concerns of corporations in conflict zones; and /.../ soliciting their views in developing more effective responses, both voluntary and binding, available to them and to other stakeholders, including international policymakers, to minimize the former's direct or indirect contributory role in violent conflict.

This shows that the subject of civil conflict, taking into consideration both the case studies presented in this thesis, still needs exhaustive work if it is to contribute to promoting peace and security in the whole world for people's emancipation.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The day the killing began at Nyamata, in the street where the big market was held, we ran to the parish church. A large crowd had already assembled there, because when massacres begin it is Rwandan custom to take refuge in houses of God. Time granted us two peaceful days, then the soldiers and the local police came to patrol around the church, yelling that we would all soon be killed. I remember that you would think twice about breathing and speaking. The interahamwe arrived before midday, singing; they lobbed grenades, they tore down the railings, then they rushed into the church and started chopping people up with machetes and spears. They wore manioc leaves in their hair, they yelled with all their might, laughing scornfully from the throat. They thumped left, right and center, they chopped randomly. People who were not flowing in their own blood flowed in the blood of the others, it was totally awful. Then they began to die without any more protesting. There was a great din and great silence at the same time. In the middle of the afternoon, the interahamwe burned little children before the front door. With my own eyes, I saw them writhing from the burns completely alive. There was a strong smell of meat, and of petrol.

*The narrative of Cassius Niyonsaba cited in Semelin
(2007: 211-212).*

The machetes mentioned in the narrative, and that served as lethal weapons against Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda, were imported from China some time before the genocide took place, their total worth being around 0.75 million U.S. dollars,⁶⁰ which

⁶⁰ See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3572887.stm>. Last accessed on June 11, 2011.

shows that the events of 1994 were planned before the execution took place, thus they could have been prevented. For many people around the world it took time to grasp the fact that such atrocities were possible in the twentieth century. Indeed, what took place in Rwanda was so horrifying that it could only be compared to the Nazi extermination of the Jews during the Second World War. Thus, it is essential not only for academics, but also for the global community to study such issues from every perspective, to find the underlying reasons for why neighbor stands against neighbor, why brother or sister engage in fratricide, how for many centuries peaceful countries turn into bloody baths, where all that is left is pain, fear, loss and hopelessness, so as to save the world from other Rwandas. The cases of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone civil wars did not get as much attention from the international/academic community as much as Rwanda; however, the atrocities in these cases deserve similar attention.

After the end of the Cold War, one of the major threats to the security and stability of the world, and of powerful states in particular, are civil conflicts that mostly take place in the underdeveloped regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, which possesses natural resources that the whole world needs. This thesis focused on the duration of such conflicts by building a new perspective through Wallerstein's world-systems analysis (WSA), which previously had limited application to the study of intrastate violence, and adding the subject of natural resources as well as actors such as mercenaries to world-systems analysis theoretical framework. This thesis argued that the incorporation of WSA into the civil conflict literature, particularly greed vs. grievance debate, expands both Wallerstein's WSA theoretical framework and the

literature on civil wars. This is a major critical contribution to civil conflict studies that is in need of such a perspective. Moreover, since civil war literature pays limited attention to war duration, this perspective in the thesis contributes to the literature by tackling an under-studied topic from a new and critical perspective.

This thesis applied a theory building case study method to develop and reinforce the WSA. The facts presented in the cases showed that in the civil conflicts in three Sub-Saharan African states – Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone – the core and semiperiphery countries and firms located in these states played one of the major roles in increasing the duration of the conflict through various activities, aimed at the accumulation of capital and pursue of national interests, which in turn led to further capital acquisition. Their actions were caused by greed for the natural resources and opportunities of capital accumulation in the war economies.

The countries that were studied in this thesis were all from the periphery, meaning that with respect to labor division these states were and still are the producers of raw materials, which are exported to the core states and sometimes semiperiphery states. All three states have high levels of poverty, despite their natural resource wealth. Their main export partners are the states in the core, and their major imported goods represent either food or technology. This systems leads to continuous flows of capital from the periphery to the core, leaving the former more impoverished than ever, and more conflict prone.

As most critical theorists agree on the constitutive nature of relationships (McCann, 1996), the narratives of the case studies pointed to the cyclical relationship between the exploitation of the periphery by the core states and the duration of civil

wars in the periphery. The core and semiperiphery's exploitation of the war-torn states prolonged the civil conflict, which provided grounds for further exploitation of natural resources and capital, which in turn added more fuel to the flames of the civil wars. *This* is the vicious cycle of war and exploitation.

Although this thesis concentrated on international actors affecting the duration of civil conflicts and exploiting the periphery, for further studies' sake it should be mentioned that this exploitation of the periphery could not be possible if domestic factors were not suitable and domestic actors and leaders not profiting from this kind of activities. In this way, it is possible to argue that a double exploitation existed during the three civil conflicts discussed in this thesis: one perpetrated by international actors, and another by domestic actors.

Overall, the activities that the core and semiperiphery states and firms were engaged in ranged from international trade in illicit natural resources, the most notorious example are the so-called 'blood diamonds', usually illegally extracted by the rebel factions or other parties to the conflict from the war zones. Other activities included covert support for the mercenaries or private security firms and their interests in obtaining lucrative deals from the incumbent governments, as opposed to establishing permanent secure environment; the arms sales to the warring factions amid UN restrictions also had an effect on the duration of the civil strife.

With respect to conflict termination, three cases examined in this thesis showed that civil conflicts can end due to various reasons. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo is still sustained through low level fighting occurring from time to time, which is the reason why this particular conflict at this point in time is not useful

in providing clues on causes of conflict termination. However, the conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone showed that civil war termination could be connected to both domestic and international factors. In the case of Sierra Leone, the scandal around the arms shipments to the ousted government could have been a triggering event for a rigorous intervention on the part of the United Kingdom, which left RUF without safe heavens. On the other hand, the killing of UNITA leader in Angola was most probably the major impact factor, which led to war termination. Still, such international aspects as UN arms embargo and Kimberley Process Certification Scheme probably contributed to the civil war end in Angola.

With regards to the subject of conflict prevention, civil war studies in general have provided different solutions to avert deadly conflicts from occurring in the first place. However, the lack of consensus on major propositions among the researchers renders these solutions fruitless. The agreement on commonly accepted propositions regarding the causes of conflict onset and duration will be the first step for creating viable formulas for conflict prevention. More importantly, scholars need to tackle war termination because sometimes it is very difficult to prevent a civil war, which means termination is an area of study that is overlooked and should be brought to the forefront. When the argument and the facts presented here are taken into consideration, it is possible to conclude that so long as the persisting order of things exists and goes unaccountable and unpunished, as in the case of the firms in the core states, protected by their host countries, conflicts in the underdeveloped periphery states are less likely to become phenomena of the past.

It is important to add that due to the sensitive nature of the arguments presented here, it was, at times, difficult to find explicit evidence because since the end of the Cold War powerful states seemed to be less willing to explicitly or even implicitly demonstrate their links to the conflicts. As in the case of the DRC, the core states used their political leverage to protect the interests of their firms that were implicated directly or indirectly contributing to the intrastate violence in Congo by pressuring and lobbying the UN to drop the accusations against the firms and clean their names from the ‘shameful’ list compiled by the panel of experts. This example most vividly illustrates the modern interstate system, in which powerful core states possess both political and economic leverage for achieving their interests at the expense of weaker states.

In conclusion, this thesis presented a new perspective on civil war duration through theory building case studies based on Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis. The aim of this research was to try to uncover mechanisms behind the enduring civil wars. The cases examined in the previous chapter contributed to theory building, however, other case studies on other African countries would make this research more generalizable in the future. In addition, new interesting facts were discovered during this research, but were not included into the main body of the thesis.⁶¹ These facts can provide fertile ground for further scholarly research.

Civil conflicts destroy not only human lives – sometimes even whole generations of innocent people bear signs from their past tragedy, just like many Sierra Leonean people are forced to accustom to a new life without arms, legs, or even facial parts – but also natural environment, and countries that experience them. These

⁶¹ These facts are presented in the Appendix I.

conflicts cause humanitarian crises and displace millions from their homes. With all said and done, civil wars should be studied further, particularly from the world-systems analysis perspective, and the evidence, as was presented here, should be brought to the attention of the world community, in order to prevent intrastate violence from ruining even more lives, and improve human security and assist emancipation of people from the periphery.

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
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Figure 4: Number of Armed Conflicts by Type, All Levels, 1946-2001⁶²



⁶² Source: Gleditsch et al., 2002: 624.

APPENDIX B

Figure 5: Political Map of Angola⁶³



⁶³ Source: www.maps.com

APPENDIX C

Figure 6: Political Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo ⁶⁴



⁶⁴ Source: www.maps.com

APPENDIX D

Figure 7: Political Map of Sierra Leone⁶⁵



⁶⁵ Source: www.maps.com

APPENDIX E

The List of Core, Semiperiphery and Periphery Countries⁶⁶

Name	Region in 1998	Region in 2003	Code
Albania	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	ALB
Algeria	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	ALG
Andorra	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	AND
Argentina	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	ARG
Australia	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	AUS
Austria	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	AUT
Azerbaijan	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	AZE
Bangladesh	INDEPENDENCE	INDEPENDENCE	BGD
Belarus	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	BLR
Belgium	SEMI-PERIPHERY	CORE	BEL
Bolivia	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	BOL
Brazil	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	BRA
Bulgaria	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	BGR
Cameroon	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	CMR
Canada	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	CAN
Chile	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	CHL
China	CORE	CORE	CHN
Colombia	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	COL
Costa Rica	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	CRI
Croatia	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	CRO
Cyprus	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	CYP
Czech Rep.	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	CZE
Denmark	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	DNK
Ecuador	SEMI-PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	ECU
Egypt	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	EGY
Estonia	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	EST
Ethiopia	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	ETH
Faeroe Isds	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	FAE
Finland	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	FIN
France	SEMI-PERIPHERY	CORE	FRA

⁶⁶ The list was compiled by Piana (2006: 36-38).

Germany	CORE	CORE	GER
Greece	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	GRC
Guatemala	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	GTM
Honduras	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	HND
Hungary	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	HUN
Iceland	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	ICE
India	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	IND
Indonesia	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	IDN
Iran	SEMI-PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	IRN
Ireland	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	IRL
Israel	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	ISR
Italy	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	ITA
Ivory Coast	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	IVO
Japan	CORE	CORE	JPN
Jordan	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	JOR
Kenya	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	KEN
Kyrgyzstan	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	KGZ
Latvia	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	LVA
Lebanon	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	LBN
Lithuania	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	LTU
Madagascar	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	MDG
Malawi	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	MWI
Malaysia	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	MYS
Maldives	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	MDV
Malta	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	MLT
Mauritius	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	MUS
Mexico	PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	MEX
Mongolia	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	MNG
Morocco	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	MOR
Nepal	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	NPL
Netherlands	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	NTH
New Zealand	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	NZL
Nicaragua	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	NIC
Nigeria	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	NGA
Norway	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	NOR
Oman	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	OMN
Pakistan	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	PAK
Panama	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	PAN
Papua New Guinea	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	PNG
Peru	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	PER
Philippines	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	PHL

Poland	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	POL
Portugal	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	PRT
Qatar	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	QAT
Rep. of Korea	SEMI-PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	KOR
Rep. of Moldova	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	MDA
Romania	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	ROM
Russian Federation	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	RUS
Saudi Arabia	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SAU
Senegal	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	SEN
Singapore	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SGP
Slovakia	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	SVK
Slovenia	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	SVN
South Africa	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SAF
Spain	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SPA
Sweden	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SWE
Switzerland	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SWI
Taiwan	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	TAI
TFYR of Macedonia	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	MAC
Thailand	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	THA
Tunisia	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	TUN
Turkey	SEMI-PERIPHERY	SEMI-PERIPHERY	TUR
Uganda	INDEPENDENCE	INDEPENDENCE	UGA
United Kingdom	CORE	SEMI-PERIPHERY	GBR
Uruguay	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	URY
USA	CORE	CORE	USA
Venezuela	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	VEN
Viet Nam	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	VNM
Zambia	PERIPHERY	PERIPHERY	ZMB

APPENDIX F

Table 5: Country Suppliers to the International Arms Trade, 1992-1996⁶⁷

\$10-50m	\$50-100m	\$100-200m	\$200-\$1bn	\$1-10bn	\$10bn
Chile	Australia	Argentina	Belarus	Canada	United States
Denmark	Indonesia	Austria	Belgium	China	
Egypt	Norway	Bulgaria	Brazil	France	
Finland	Romania	Poland	Czech Rep.	Germany	
Greece	Singapore	Portugal	FRY	Israel	
Hungary	South Korea		Iran	Russia	
India	Turkey		Italy	U.K.	
Japan			Netherlands		
Jordan			North Korea		
Kazakhstan			South Africa		
Kyrgyzstan			Spain		
Malaysia			Sweden		
Mexico			Switzerland		
Pakistan			Ukraine		
Saudi Arabia					
Taiwan					
Uzbekistan					
Zimbabwe					
Market share					
0-1%	1-2%	2-5%	5-10%	35-45%	40-50%
<p>Note: Canadian defense exports were U.S.\$1.1bn (\$800m to United States) in 1995 and \$1.6bn (\$1.2bn to United States) in 1996. Canadian exports to the United States are excluded owing to the unavailability of data prior to 1995.</p>					
<p>Source: <i>The Military Balance 1997/98</i>, (London: Oxford University Press, 1997).</p>					

⁶⁷ Source: Keller and Nolan, 1997-1998: 116.

APPENDIX G

Table 6: Arms Deliveries to the World, by Supplier 1996-2003⁶⁸

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
United States	40.74	39.08	57.82	45.68	39.51	57.08	58.55	47.47
Russia	8.89	5.41	4.78	8.08	12.34	10.73	8.09	11.83
France	10.51	15.76	14.52	11.87	7.52	4.85	4.91	4.17
United Kingdom	17.51	17.17	7.76	12.88	18.66	11.50	11.77	16.35
China	1.89	2.59	1.39	1.01	2.11	1.79	1.96	1.74
Germany	5.12	2.82	2.98	5.56	3.91	1.79	1.96	4.17
Italy	0.27	0.94	0.40	1.77	0.90	1.02	1.23	0.35
All Other European	9.43	10.35	6.57	7.33	8.73	5.37	5.15	8.35
All Others	5.66	5.88	3.78	5.81	6.32	5.88	6.38	5.57
[Major West European*]	33.40	36.69	25.67	32.09	31.00	19.16	19.87	25.05]
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Source: U.S. Government								

⁶⁸ Expressed as a percent of total, by year. Major West European category includes France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy. *Source*: Grimmett, 2003 : 82.

APPENDIX H

Table 7: Arms Deliveries to the World, by Supplier 2002-2009⁶⁹

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
United States	34.14	31.48	33.47	37.30	35.54	35.40	33.34	41.00
Russia	12.61	12.19	15.84	10.45	17.27	14.64	16.45	10.55
France	5.26	6.97	16.13	8.55	4.89	6.60	4.46	3.42
United Kingdom	17.52	19.74	9.22	11.72	13.81	5.74	6.14	6.27
China	3.15	2.32	2.59	3.48	3.74	6.03	5.86	5.13
Germany	4.20	7.26	5.76	6.02	6.91	8.33	10.60	7.98
Italy	2.10	1.16	0.58	3.17	0.86	2.30	1.67	1.71
All Other European	10.86	11.90	7.20	9.82	10.65	12.06	13.11	13.40
All Others	10.16	6.97	9.22	9.50	6.33	8.90	8.37	10.55
[Major West European*	29.08	35.13	31.68	29.45	26.47	22.97	22.87	19.38]
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Source: U.S. Government								

⁶⁹ Expressed as a *percent* of total, by year. Major West European category includes France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy. *Source*: Grimmett, 2010: 77.

APPENDIX I

Additional Facts Discovered during the Research

During this research some interesting facts emerged, which were not included in the main text of the thesis, however, require to be elaborated upon here, so as to provide ground for future scholarship. Evidence presented concerns three states – East Timor, Burkina Faso and Nigeria – and shows how semiperiphery states and multinational companies create instability in the periphery states in their pursuit of capital accumulation and self-interests. It should be noted that because all three states under discussion were not experiencing internal violence level equivalent to the one of civil war, these examples could not be included as case studies.

First of all, the case of East Timor and Australian influence should be mentioned. According to Piana's list of countries⁷⁰, Australia is a semiperiphery, which from the WSA perspective means that it seeks to become a core state, and in this pursuit of higher position a semiperiphery is more likely to conduct aggressive policies in order to protect its internal production processes. From this point of view, Australia acted aggressively with respect to East Timor in order to protect its interests and production processes. Australia started putting pressure on East Timor already months prior to the latter's independence in 2002, when it withdrew its recognition of the maritime boundary jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, which in turn left East Timor without any legal roadmaps for contesting the boundary dispute. Greater Sunrise gas field,

⁷⁰ See Appendix E.

which is considered to be the largest gas reserve in the Timor Sea, lies at the center of the dispute. Australia proposed East Timor to pay the latter 2.4 to 4.0 billion U.S.\$ over the period of thirty years if it declines its demand for a share larger than 18%, while an estimated value of gas reserves in the disputed region is around 30 billion U.S.\$ or more (Lamb, 2005). According to Lamb (2005), Australia's aim was probably buying off East Timor due to its poor economic situation and recent independence from Indonesia. In 2006 two countries signed a shared agreement to develop gas and oil fields in the Timor Sea and despite the fact that Greater Sunshine fields are completely in the maritime borders of East Timor, by this agreement the royal share was given to Australia, leaving only 18%, as was mentioned above, to the small nation of East Timor⁷¹.

Another disputed issue between Australia and East Timor is offshore oil fields that the former claims jurisdiction to. England (2004) cites ex-President of East Timor, now Prime Minister, Xanana Gusmão, who in 2004 accused Australia of taking oil revenues from his country, which in total was 365 million U.S.\$ per year or 1 million U.S.\$ every day. This dispute is again centered around the maritime boundary, with Australia's desire to draw a line that would "follow its extensive continental shelf, which would bring Australian control to within 90 miles of East Timor's coast", while the latter poses arguments that a maritime border between two states should be drawn half-way between their coastlines under international law (England, 2004).

Such Australian policies impede economic development of East Timor, which would proceed faster were it also to receive revenues from both oil and gas fields that

⁷¹ See <http://www.climateimc.org/en/breaking-news/2006/01/11/australia-signs-great-east-timor-oil-heist> for further details. Last accessed on June 24, 2011.

are under claimed jurisdiction of Australian government, but should belong to East Timor according to the international law. The issues like these are given limited attention in the literature on civil conflicts, however, it should be otherwise, in order to ensure the just and right implementation of laws and agreements, and prevent stronger nations from pressuring smaller states into providing them with more capital.

Secondly, grievances should be taken more into consideration, though much of contemporary research mostly concentrates on the issues of greed. Grievances seem to have a much more deeper dimension, not simply limited to being in a less beneficial state than ought to be, in comparison to another person or ethnic group. One illustrative example of this is a protest that took place in the town of Gaoua in Burkina Faso in 2006. The protesters, though their numbers small (150 people) and armed with “cutlasses, clubs and bows and arrows” tries to confer their grievances with respect to the illegal gold mining activity on a hill that the local Lobi community respect as sacred (Harsch, 2007: 17). Such more or less peaceful protests may turn into violent riots if grievances would be disregarded for a long period of time. In order to eliminate the possibility of violence, the international community and the academia should bring such issues to the contemporary agenda and encourage the governments to deal with them.

Grievances not only associate with illegal exploitation of resources and ethnic beliefs of people, living in the vicinity of the illegal mining zones, but as it turns out, some grievances may be caused by actions of multinational corporations. The oil giant Shell was accused of human rights violations and collaboration with the military government of Nigeria in the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, leader of the organization

Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, and eight Ogoni tribe leaders, who started their non-violent protests and agitation in 1990s against Shell⁷², claiming that the oil giant ruined the ecosystem of the Niger delta. The allegations included Shell's helping the army forces in tracking down and hanging the leaders, in torturing and killing the Ogoni people, providing the army with military equipment, co-planning raids on villages, as well as bulldozing villages to make space for oil pipes. In 2009, despite denying the accusations, Shell agreed to pay 15.5 million U.S.\$ in legal settlement, which caused many human rights activists argue that Shell yielded because it was "anxious about the evidence that would have been presented had it gone ahead [with the court proceedings]", and decided to buy itself off (Pilkington, 2009). This case is considered to be one of the first, when a multinational corporation was taken to court due its human rights violations, and many hope that this settlement will have an impact on other corporations as well (Pilkington, 2009).

The facts presented above are essential for the study of civil conflicts, because they clearly show how states and multinational firms may affect situation in another state by engaging in aggressive policies or collaborating with the incumbent governments to ensure favorable conditions for itself on the ground, increasing in this way its capital. Even though, these facts were not incorporated in the main part of the thesis, they are worth dwelling upon, so as to encourage further research that may include them and bring such instances to the fore.

⁷² Shell's activity in the Niger delta started in 1958. Today Shell possesses 90 oil fields on the territory of Nigeria, and is the largest business company in that country (Pilkington, 2009).