

DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY:
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
CELAL BAYAR AND ADNAN MENDERES

A Ph. D. Dissertation

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in

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ANKARA

February 2011

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ABSTRACT

DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CELAL BAYAR AND ADNAN MENDERES

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This study aims to analyze the conceptualization of democracy by Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes. Given the basic assumption of this dissertation, which is that ‘political agency’ is the decisive factor for the democratization path of a country, it is particularly concerned with Bayar’s and Menderes’ conceptualization of democracy. Since they were the main figures of Turkish politics between the year 1945, when the transition decision to democracy was made, and the year 1960, when the Democratic Party government was overthrown by the Turkish military, it is important to examine the understanding of democracy that shaped their political actions and decisions in order to understand the extent to which they contributed to Turkish democracy.

Taking the agency approach as its theoretical background, this dissertation analyzes their political discourse and praxis based on the distinction between minimalist and maximalist democracy. While the minimalist dimension emphasizes the vertical accountability dimension of democracies and finds the presence of the electoral

dimension of political regimes sufficient to define a regime as democratic, the maximalist dimension additionally considers the horizontal accountability dimension and takes the political opposition aspect as interdependent with vertical accountability, and thus as an indispensable aspect of democracies.

This analysis is made using the minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and group meetings of the Democratic Party, selected newspapers and periodicals of the period, speeches and articles of Bayar and Menderes, and the biographies written by their friends or journalists. In addition to the data gathered through these written sources, data collected through interviews with people that witnessed the period is also used. All data is categorized under these two main dimensions of democracy and analyzed according to the extent to which these two dimensions of democracy can be considered crucial for these two political leaders' understanding of democracy.

The analysis of the political discourse and praxis of Bayar and Menderes indicates that Bayar and Menderes accepted both vertical and horizontal dimensions of democracy. However, they did not see them as interdependent and they attached priority to the vertical accountability dimension. Thus, as they disregarded the horizontal accountability dimension, it is found that democracy came under threat and finally collapsed.

Keywords: Democratic Party, Turkish Democracy, Accountability, Political Leader

ÖZET

DEMOKRAT PARTİ VE TÜRKİYE’DE DEMOKRASİ: CELAL BAYAR ve ADNAN MENDERES ODAĞINDA

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Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü

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Bu çalışma, Celal Bayar ve Adnan Menderes’in demokrasi kavramsallaştırmasını incelemektedir. Tez, siyasi aktörlerin bir ülkenin demokratikleşmesinde belirleyici rol oynadığı düşüncesini temel alarak Bayar ve Menderes’in demokrasi kavramsallaştırması ile ilgilenmektedir. Bayar ve Menderes, demokrasiye geçiş kararının verildiği 1945 yılından 1960 yılında gerçekleşen askeri darbe sonucu Demokrat Parti’nin iktidardan düşürülmesine kadar geçen süre içinde Türk siyasetinin temel aktörleri olarak siyaset arenasında görev aldıklarından bu iki siyasi liderin siyasi karar ve hareketlerini şekillendirici ve Türk demokrasisine etkilerini belirleyici temel faktör olan demokrasi algılarının incelenmesi önem arz etmektedir.

Demokratikleşme teorilerinden ‘aktör yaklaşımını’ teorik altyapısının temeli olarak kabul eden bu çalışma adı geçen bu iki liderin siyasi söylem ve pratiğini demokrasinin minimalist ve maksimalist kavramsallaştırmaları üzerinden incelemektedir. Minimalist kavramsallaştırma demokrasinin dikey hesap verebilirlik boyutunu vurgulayarak siyasi rejimlerde seçim pratiğinin bulunmasını bir rejimi

demokratik olarak tanımlamak için yeterli bulurken, maksimalist kavramsallaştırma yatay hesap verebilirlik boyutunu da öne sürerek siyasi muhalefet olgusunu dikey boyutun bir devamı olarak görerek dikey ve yatay boyutların birbirinden bağımsız değerlendirilemeyeceğini öne sürmektedir.

Çalışmadaki analiz Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi ve Demokrat Parti Grup Toplantıları Zabıtları, dönemin gazete ve dergileri, Bayar ve Menderes'in konuşma ve makaleleri ve bu iki liderin arkadaşları, meslektaşları ve/veya dönemin gazetecileri tarafından yazılmış olan kaynaklar üzerinden yapılmaktadır. Bu yazılı kaynaklara ek olarak, çalışmaya konu olan döneme tanıklık etmiş kişilerle yapılan mülakatlarda elde edilen bilgilerden de analizde yararlanılmaktadır. Yazılı ve sözlü olarak elde edilmiş olan tüm veriler yukarıda bahsi geçen demokrasinin iki ayrı kavramsallaştırması çerçevesinde sınıflandırılarak adı geçen liderlerin demokrasi algısında bu iki kavramsallaştırma tarafından vurgulanan olguların ne derece önem taşıdığı sorgulanmaktadır.

Bayar ve Menderes'in siyasi söylem ve pratiklerinin bahsi geçen belge ve bilgiler üzerinden analizi sonucunda iki liderin de demokrasi algısının demokrasinin hem dikey hem de yatay hesap verebilirlik boyutunu içerdiği anlaşılmaktadır. Ancak, buna rağmen bu iki boyutu birbirinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirdikleri ve birbirleri arasındaki bağımlılığı öngörmedikleri anlaşılmaktadır. Buna ilişkin olarak, seçim olgusu üzerinde temellenen dikey boyuta siyasi muhalefet olgusunu içeren yatay boyuta göre daha çok önem verdikleri ve bu sebeple yatay boyutun ihmal edilmeye başlanması ile beraber demokrasinin tehdit altına girdiği ve nihayetinde kesintiye uğradığı sonucuna varılmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Demokrat Parti, Türk demokrasisi, Hesap Verebilirlik, Siyasi Lider

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

CHP Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)

CMP Republican National Party (Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi)

CKMP Republican Peasant's Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi)

DP Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti)

D.P.M.G.Z. Democratic Party Parliamentary Group Minutes (Demokrat Parti Meclis Grubu Zabıtları)

HP Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi)

KP Peasant Party (Köylü Partisi)

MP Nation Party (Millet Partisi)

TBMM Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Purpose of the Study

Political leadership consists of tasks and duties including decision-making responsibilities influencing many people and drawing attention to political leaders. A political leader has a broad scope of influence that provides him/her with the power to shape politics in accordance with his/her values and priorities, especially in countries where institutional and social structures are weak.

Nevertheless, political leaders cannot be viewed independently from the context within which they make choices and decisions (Blondel, 1987: 17). Indeed, they make decisions, but they cannot be totally free to shape the political process because this is also dependent on economic, social, cultural, and political dynamics. However, despite the presence of multiple dynamics, the impact of the political leaders in Turkey, beginning with the emergence of demands for reforming the political regime and transition to democracy in 1945 until the military intervention on 27 May 1960, is particularly crucial; and in this case Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes were the main figures of the era.

Considering the course of Turkish politics without disregarding the conjuncture that restricts the preferences of political actors, it may be argued that the impact of political leadership is evident in the period of analysis of the study. This dissertation argues that the acts of political leaders are shaped by their views of democracy, and thus, understanding their views of democracy is crucial to understanding the course of the democratization process. Accordingly, by analyzing Bayar's and Menderes' political speeches and actions, this dissertation aims to offer a comprehensive and, to the extent possible, objective picture of their understanding of democracy. In other words, as the political leaders on stage during the democratic transition process and as the political leaders in power during the process towards the breakdown of democracy in Turkey, Bayar's and Menderes' political discourse and praxis are analyzed to find out their conceptualization of democracy.

In addition to their impact on politics between 1946 and 1950 as forming the main opposition party, the politics of the period following the DP's taking over the government in 1950 until the breakdown of democracy in 1960 by military intervention can be equated with the names of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes since Bayar was the president and Menderes was both the head of the party and prime minister between the years 1950 and 1960. The impact of political leadership has been observed in the Democratic Party with its establishment in 1946 under the leadership of Bayar and its holding the reins of government between 1950 and 1960 under the leadership of Menderes. For the period between 1946 and 1960, particularly after 1950, Bayar's and Menderes' political actions and decisions, shaped by their understanding of democracy, were the foundation on which Turkish politics of the era and Turkish democracy were constructed. Considering this, analysis of their political discourse and actions to understand their view of

democracy is essential to understand this period and the course of Turkish politics in that era.

Consequently, given the fact that the politics of the mentioned era in Turkey has been strongly shaped by the political actors, this study using the agency approach as its theoretical background aims to analyze the impact of Bayar and Menderes on Turkish democracy from an objective perspective. In other words, contributing to the literature on the role of political elite for Turkey's democratization, the present study analyzes Bayar's and Menderes' conceptualization of democracy in order to understand the role of political actors during mentioned era much clearly.

1.2. Methodology

This dissertation, as will be mentioned in the following chapter, uses the *agency approach*, which emphasizes the acts and decisions of political actors both on democratization and democratic breakdown as the main theoretical perspective. Hence, since the aim of the dissertation is to understand the conceptualization of democracy by Bayar and Menderes and their role as the political leaders in the fortunes of Turkish democracy, their political discourse and praxis will be analyzed. Based on their statements and actions, a conclusion about their view of democracy will be drawn. Given that a political leader's views regarding democracy shape his/her behavior and actions during his/her political career, their political discourse and decisions contain clues to their conceptualization of democracy and thus form the basis of this study.

In order to make an accurate analysis of a political leader, various ways of analysis are suggested, such as observation, interview, biography, and the analysis of primary and secondary resources (Paige, 1972: 194). Despite the advantageous aspects of observing a political leader and/or having an interview with that leader, in this case, we are obliged to analyze the written material and interview people who knew them.

Keeping in mind the problem of subjectivity, biographies written by their friends or journalists, newspapers and weekly and monthly magazines of the period will be analyzed with the sole aim of obtaining information about the period in question. Moreover, the Grand National Assembly records, minutes of group meetings of the DP, and its party programs will also be studied in order to have a grasp on the policies pursued by Bayar and Menderes. For the interviews, people who witnessed the period have been selected: Nilüfer Gürsoy (Celal Bayar's daughter), Talat Asal (Adnan Menderes' lawyer), Aydın Menderes (Adnan Menderes' son), Orhan Birgit (journalist), Mehmet Ali Bayar (nephew of Refik Koraltan, who is one of the founders of the DP).

Based on the analysis of the data provided by written and oral sources, this study will provide answers to some specific questions addressed. The answers to those questions will be sought through the analysis of Bayar's and Menderes' political discourse and actions and will help us arrive at a conclusion about whether their views of democracy come closer to the minimalist or to the maximalist conceptualization of democracy. Did they, as political leaders, prefer anti-democratic policies? Did they take authoritarian measures to manage a political crisis? Did they display similar attitudes towards the electoral and political institutional accountability mechanisms when in opposition and when in government? Were they

committed to the idea of democracy or inclined to choose among anti-democratic policy options? Did they see politics as a zero-sum game? Were they open to political learning that would enable them to resolve conflict in accordance with democratic principles? Did they see compromise as a sign of weakness? Based on the answers to those questions, both their role in the democratization of Turkey and the breakdown of democracy, if any and the extent to which their understanding of democracy corresponds to the maximalist approach will become clearer.

1. 3. Roadmap

The analysis of Bayar's and Menderes' political discourse and praxis will be based on the two different conceptualizations of the concept of democracy, *minimalist* and *maximalist approach*, and on their focus on the different aspects of the *accountability* dimension of democracy. That is why, in the second chapter, the existing literature on Bayar and Menderes and the literature on the concept of democracy will first be explained. The *minimalist* and *maximalist conceptualizations of democracy* and the *aspects of accountability* that are defended by them will be put forward in order to determine which of these adheres the closest to the conceptualizations of Bayar and Menderes. Secondly, three mainstream approaches to explain the democratization process will be analyzed. The first two approaches, *structural* and *cultural*, will be presented in brief, while the third, the *agency approach*, will be elaborated in greater length as it offers the most fruitful framework in which to analyze the political discourse and praxis of these two political leaders in light of their view of democracy.

Based on the second chapter, the following chapters will concentrate on the *electoral dimension of the minimalist approach (vertical accountability)* and *political opposition dimension of the maximalist approach (horizontal accountability)*. In these chapters their political discourse and praxis will be analyzed to determine the extent to which their political practices and decisions conform to the implications of those dimensions.

For this reason, in the third chapter, Bayar's and Menderes' political actions and decisions regarding the electoral accountability that concentrates on the concept of elections will be analyzed. Since "democracy is more likely to survive when no political force dominates completely and permanently" (Przeworski, 2003: 114), it is essential to analyze this dimension. Investigating the way they formulated this dimension in a democracy and the impact of their understanding of this dimension on their political decisions will be the main aim of this chapter. More specifically, the extent to which they attach importance to fairness and transparency in competition and how they see a ruler's being responsive and responsible to the ruled will be a measure for us to gauge their view of democracy. Furthermore, the way they interpret the phenomenon of majority, as this also relates to the problem of only a vertical without a horizontal understanding, will also be taken up in the chapter. Considering that the electoral dimension plays an important role for accomplishing the transition to democracy as Rustow (1970) takes up in his decision phase, analysis of this dimension will help us to evaluate the role of Bayar and Menderes in the transition process in Turkey. In other words, since they were in power for the ten years immediately following the transition to democracy, their political actions and decisions were highly important for the survival of Turkish democracy. In relation to this, their approach to that accountability dimension and political actions due to their

views of this dimension also played an important role in Turkish politics. Thus, in this chapter, both the way they see the electoral dimension and the impact of their understanding of this dimension on their political actions and on Turkish democracy will be examined.

The fourth chapter concentrates on Bayar's and Menderes' understanding of the political opposition dimension in a democratic regime. In addition to the electoral dimension, this dimension is a vital aspect of maximalist conceptualization of democracy since it expands the boundaries of a democratic regime by referring to the mechanisms of checks and balances in a democratic regime necessary to control the executive. The analysis of Bayar's and Menderes' relationship with those mechanisms, that is executive and legislative mechanisms in this dissertation, and analysis of their political discourse and praxis regarding the role of these mechanisms in a democratic regime will enable us to identify their views of this dimension of democracy. The analysis of this dimension will provide us with new findings both about the extent to which they emphasize majority rule and the extent to which they take the role of horizontal accountability mechanisms into account to balance governmental power. Thus, in this chapter, the extent to which Bayar and Menderes accepted the presence of those mechanisms as meaningful components of a democratic regime, displayed tolerance towards the interference of these mechanisms with their political actions and decisions, and cooperated with those mechanisms during the periods of crisis will be investigated. Through the answers to those questions based on the analysis of their political actions and discourse, the findings of the chapter will show us both the place of this dimension in their understanding of democracy and role in the breakdown of democracy.

Based on the findings of these chapters, the concluding chapter will evaluate Bayar's and Menderes' understanding of democracy and their impact on Turkish democracy. The results of the analyses in the previous chapters will be analyzed in tandem in order to find out whether these dimensions were equally influential in their political praxis and thus, whether their view of democracy embraced these two dimensions of maximalist democracy. Their role as political leaders both for the transition process and the breakdown of democracy in Turkey will be assessed.

CHAPTER II

THE CURRENT LITERATURE ON BAYAR AND MENDERES AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND DEMOCRACY

This study, as already noted in the introductory chapter, in analyzing Bayar's and Menderes' leadership, argues that despite the presence of different dynamics limiting the policy options of leaders, the political elites can be considered as primary actors determining both the emergence and survival of democracy. In other words, certain acts and decisions of political leaders strongly influence the chances of democracy's birth and survival, despite the fact that these decisions and acts are, to some extent, affected by structural and cultural dynamics. Adam Przeworski (1986: 48) has emphasized the insufficiency of structural or cultural factors alone and stated that socio-economic or cultural factors constitute "at most constraints to that which is possible under a concrete historical situation but do not determine the outcome of such situations".

Accordingly, both Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes influenced the fortune of Turkish democracy to a great extent. Celal Bayar was one of the four founders and the first leader of the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti- DP*), which was established in January of 1946 as the strongest opposition party to the Republican

People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi –CHP*) of İsmet İnönü and came to power in 1950. With the beginning of the DP's rule in 1950, Bayar became the president of Turkey. During his presidency from 1950 until the 1960 military intervention, another founder of the party, Adnan Menderes was both the leader of the DP and the prime minister of Turkey. Thus, as institutional (political and judicial) and social (civil society and media) elements were still in their infancy in those decades, both the political actions and decisions of Bayar and Menderes were decisive for the democratization path of Turkey that began with the democratic transition decision in 1945 (Heper, 2002: 217).

However, despite the fact that Turkish political life has been strongly shaped by its political leaders and despite the important role Bayar and Menderes played in Turkish politics, there is no scholarly work on their impact on Turkish democracy. Most of the studies on the DP and on them are in Turkish, are either overly critical or unduly favorable, and lack both analytical perspective and evidence on Bayar's and Menderes' views on democracy. Most of them seem to be merely biographical - focusing solely on the details of their life without utilizing any of the comparative analysis or theories available in the political science literature- or they take the form of a political history recounting events in a chronological order. Thus, it is apparent that a scholarly and extensive study of Bayar and Menderes as political leaders becomes necessary to fill an important gap in the scholarly literature on Turkish politics. Literature in this area accepts the impact of political elites on democratization but rarely studies these elites (Karpas, 1981; Dodd, 1983; Özbudun, 1995; Heper and Sayarı, 2002). Hence, the present study will contribute to the literature on Turkish politics and democratization, a body of literature which is scarce indeed when paired with the attitudes and actions of political leaders.

2.1. Literature on Bayar and Menderes

In this regard, there is only the study of Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı analyzing Turkish political leaders in a scholarly manner. The book *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey* (2002) takes up different political leaders in Turkish politics, including Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes. Nevertheless, these rare examples of scholarly work on Bayar and Menderes offer only the limited analyses that a short book chapter can provide and thus do not provide extensive studies of these leaders.

The newspapers of the period, namely *Cumhuriyet*, *Ulus*, *Vatan*, *Zafer*, which form a certain amount of the data for this study, also lack an objective point of view and tend to present the events of the period from a partisan perspective. As newspapers and/or journals of that period supported either the DP or the CHP, it was almost impossible to expect them to provide full information or to interpret the events objectively.

This is also true for the book-length memoirs written by either former politicians or supporters of a political party. In addition to the positions of authors of these works, publication years of those studies can be seen as another disadvantage. In other words, since most of the studies were published just before or after the 1960 military intervention, it is difficult to have an objective perspective in interpreting contemporary events. They present political circumstances -deliberately or not- as the result of political actions committed either by the DP or the CHP and explain the political circumstances focusing on the acts and decisions of either side neglecting the impact and responsibility of the other. However, it may be argued that politics is

based on an interactive dynamic and that is why the praxis and discourse of one side cannot be assessed in isolation from the other actors' reactions.

Besides this, it is also a fact that there is also a similar time bias in studies of events that are distant in time. It is difficult to assume that the accounts of events to be free of bias. Accordingly, the sources published recently reflect the mentioned period from a biased perspective too.

Another problem, which is again common both in the sources published in the 1960s and those published recently, is the fact that many of the sources on this era are written by people having kinship relations with the political figures of the period. They are inevitably bound to a certain point of view defending either the DP or the CHP. Thus, most of them do not either provide full information on a political development or do not present an analytical examination of the era.

The books by Samet Ağaoğlu (1947; 1972; 1992; 2004), who was a close friend of Menderes and a member of the DP General Administrative Council between 1947 and 1960 in addition to his responsibilities in various ministries including the vice prime-ministry, can be given as an example. In addition to his friendship and closely connected political career with Menderes and acquaintance with Bayar, his having stood trial in Yassıada, where, after the 1960 military intervention, the DP members were tried for their political acts, in particular had a clear impact on the works of Ağaoğlu. Accordingly, despite the fact that he has many published books in which he offered detailed information on the issue, his presentation of the period is inevitably influenced by the conjuncture. Thus, while Ağaoğlu's books provide valuable information since he shared much with Menderes and had an acquaintance with Bayar, it is lacking in objectivity. This becomes much

more obvious when the references in his books are analyzed. There are many examples in his books where he defends either the DP or Bayar and Menderes against the criticisms directed toward them. For example, in one of his books, he objects to Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, who defined the DP as a political party lacking certain political ideals. As a response to Aydemir, Ağaoğlu (1972: 53-57) argues that the DP had a very comprehensive party programme that was based on achieving democratic ideals.

As Ağaoğlu refers to Aydemir many times in his books, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir is another author who has written extensively on the Democratic Party. Aydemir is known for his work on political leaders and Menderes. He (2000) provides an account of Menderes from his childhood to the end of his political career, in which there is also a lot information on Bayar. Like Ağaoğlu, Aydemir was also acquainted with the political figures of the period. Nevertheless, while explaining the political conditions, Aydemir in some places omits a number of significant historical events. For example, despite the implications of the 1946 elections for Turkish democracy, he does not mention this period or its impact on the course of Turkish politics and the policies of the CHP government from 1946-1950, but simply focuses on the obstacles experienced by the DP during the party's establishment. He explains his disregard for some important developments in Turkish politics by arguing that they were overemphasized in the newspapers and that is why he puts emphasis on the events that he personally considers important. Thus, he does not present the whole picture. Orhan Cemal Fersey, who will be mentioned below, also argues that Aydemir solely focuses on the events that are to the disadvantage of the DP and of its founders and neglects significant events.

Nevertheless, despite Fersoy's criticism towards Aydemir, the problem of objectivity becomes evident when Fersoy's work is analyzed too. The writings of Fersoy (1978), who was in fact a lawyer and journalist but also held active role in politics such as the Minister of National Education during the 1970s, can be given as an example to see the contradictory points between the memoirs of various persons. For example in his book, Fersoy makes many references to Şevket Süreyya Aydemir and states that the information provided in his own book reflects the truth while Aydemir's arguments about Menderes and Bayar are sometimes distant from reality. Thus, this book also takes the issues from a one-sided perspective, especially DP-sided, and lacks the analyses of these two political leaders while informing on the events of the time.

However, among the works that are based on memoirs, the one produced by Celal Bayar (1986) is especially unique. Given that Bayar was the leader of the DP while the party was in opposition between the year 1946 and 1950, and the third president of Turkey when the party was in government between the years 1950 and 1960, his book provide details about both his own and Menderes' interpretation of certain events. His work covers the period starting from when Bayar and Menderes first met during Menderes' high school years until the 1960 military intervention. Thus, it is helpful to learn about Menderes and to see Bayar's interpretation of the political actions and decisions made by Menderes in addition to his impact on these political actions and decisions. Yet, as a founder of the DP and having an active political life during the period of the study, it is also inevitable that his account demonstrates some bias regarding both the DP and Menderes. Moreover, despite the fact that Bayar provides us with valuable analysis of the politics of that era, it is rarely related to his own and Menderes' conceptualization of democracy.

The accounts of Fahri Belen, who was the Minister of Public Works in the first Menderes government, differ from the sources mentioned above by the efforts of Belen to make an analysis through an emphasis on the development of Turkish democracy (1958; 1960). Belen differs from the above sources with his willingness to criticize his own side, the DP. He focuses on an evaluation of the dynamics of events and their impact on the evolution of Turkish democracy. While doing this, he concentrates on the course of Turkish politics during that era and inevitably on Bayar's and Menderes' political actions. He draws a picture of Turkish democracy based on his own political memoirs and aims to show the impact of critical decisions of these two political leaders, paving the way to the crisis towards the end of 1950s. Nevertheless, the striking point in his books is his disregard for the role he himself played in some political actions of Menderes, considering the fact that he was a fellow-deputy of Menderes at that time. In fact, this is a common drawback of almost all the works about these two political leaders. Almost all authors, being either DP or CHP members or active supporters, disregard their own role in the policy-making process. Despite the fact that this dissertation emphasizes the essential role of political actors in Turkish politics, interestingly, most of the authors neglect the fact that they were also involved in the same political processes that are criticized in their own memoirs.

The books by Rıfki Salim Burçak (1976; 1979; 1994; 1998) can be considered as having a similar approach towards the politics of the era with Belen's approach. Burçak is also willing to criticize his own side. Having been a DP deputy and taken duty as minister in Menderes governments, he additionally accepts his role and the role of the deputies of the era for the preferences of political leaders of the DP. Thus, it can be argued that Burçak's books provide both the linkage between the

DP and Turkish democracy and offer a much clearer picture of the background of Menderes' decisions and the impact of Bayar on Menderes. For example, in one of his books, he states that the DP had committed many mistakes especially after the year 1954. He argues that the measures taken by the DP were beyond the democratic borders and influenced the politics of the era negatively. However, he also notes that the CHP was also responsible for the DP's taking severe measures since the CHP made a very harsh opposition in the second half of the 1950s. Thus, he does not narrate the politics of the era from a biased perspective but presents the responsibilities of both parties for the course of events (Burçak, 1994: 30-31).

Similar to Burçak, Cihad Baban (1970), who was a journalist and was actively involved in politics as a DP deputy, has a book studying various political leaders. In his book, he compares İsmet İnönü, Celal Bayar, and Adnan Menderes. Baban analyzes the reactions of Bayar and Menderes towards the same political developments and questions the impact of Bayar on Menderes. Additionally, he examines Menderes' reactions to similar political developments at different points of his political career and thus the change in his attitude towards his political supporters and opponents. He mentions both the changes in discourse and praxis of Menderes as inconsistencies stemming from the harsh opposition of the CHP and several political crises towards the end of the 1950s, in which Bayar was also greatly involved. Moreover, he makes critical observations about the leadership style of Menderes and the role of Bayar in his leadership. For example, he states that while, at the beginning of his political career, Menderes was a political leader open to criticism, he later became less tolerant when his actions were criticized. Or, he states that Bayar, as the president of the country, was involved in the DP government's policies to such an extent that the idea of separating the presidency from party

leadership in order to have a neutral president towards the political parties was achieved in theory by the DP but not in practice. Nevertheless, despite the critical attitude of his book towards Bayar and Menderes, this book also lacks an analysis of Bayar's and Menderes' views on democracy and does not provide a clear link between their political actions, their understandings of certain political aspects, and their impact on Turkish democracy.

Like Burçak and Baban, Ahmet Emin Yalman (1971), being a strong supporter of the DP, compiled his memoirs in a series of books focusing on a certain period of Turkish politics, which also corresponds to the period dealt in this study. Despite supporting Bayar and Menderes when the DP was in government, Yalman, as a journalist, succeeds in having a critical perspective in the related volume of his four-volume study. In this study, he provides detailed information about the course of Turkish politics during those years. Yalman presents both the positive and negative points of Menderes governments' policies. Despite his being a sincere supporter of the DP, he begins to criticize the behavior of Bayar and Menderes towards the end of the 1950s for not conforming to the requirements of a democratic regime, such as the responsibility of a government to provide electoral safety and allow political opposition to check its policies. He states that the policies of Menderes governments at the end of 1950s clearly contradicted 'the *raison d'être*' of the DP, which was to democratize the country. For example, he criticizes abolishing the status of Kırşehir as a city to punish Kırşehir's support for the opposition in the year 1954 in addition to the role of Bayar within the process. However, he also does not present an analytical study of the period and of the political leaders of the DP.

In addition to the works of DP supporters, there are also works produced by the CHP members of that period, of which the memoirs of Faik Ahmet Barutçu

(2001) can be given as an example. Barutçu, as a member of the CHP, helps the reader to recognize the difference between the interpretation of the same events by the DP and the CHP members. More importantly, his book makes clear the need to use those works carefully, in other words, checking the information from other sources. Since disentangling oneself from the atmosphere of those times was impossible, an unconscious distortion of reality in these works is also likely. Despite this, it is possible to say that Barutçu discusses both the positive and negative sides of a political development. For example, in his book where he narrates the discussions within the CHP following the submission of the Memorandum of the Four by the, at that time CHP politicians, who later became the founders of the DP, Barutçu defines these discussions as lacking a democratic mentality and criticizes the attitude of the party towards its members who object to party's policies. Nevertheless, he also criticizes the opponents within the party and states that he did not find sincere intentions behind the submission of the Memorandum. Though the Memorandum was explained as aiming to reform and democratize the CHP, he argues that its real aim was to form a new political party (Barutçu, 2001: 739-744, Volume II). However, despite his rather objective explanation of the developments of the politics of that era, Barutçu's memoirs cover the period until the year 1954, while the period 1954-1960 includes much to illustrate the understandings of Bayar and Menderes on the concept of democracy, and it does not provide an analysis of these two political leaders.

Metin Toker (1990a; 1990b; 1990c; 1990d), both the son-in-law of İsmet İnönü and a journalist, has also written on the era. His books present many details about the political leaders of the era: İnönü, Bayar, and Menderes. Similar to Yalman who was a journalist and had a relatively critical attitude towards the DP despite

being a strong supporter of the DP, Toker presents very detailed information on the political developments of the period studied in this essay and does not hesitate to criticize the CHP and İnönü, particularly the harsh attitude of the CHP opposition towards the DP government during the second half of the 1950s. In addition to his critical attitude in his books, however, he does not give an analysis of Bayar and Menderes regarding their conceptualization of democracy.

Like Yalman and Toker, Hilmi Uran (1959), who was a minister from the CHP, explains the politics of that era based on his own political experiences. He was also willing to criticize his own side's position. For example, he emphasizes the efforts of CHP members to establish democracy in the country but also argues that, despite their enthusiasm for democracy, electoral defeat was not among the assumed possibilities resulting from elections. However, despite the fact that Uran offers different dimensions of a political development and writes a great deal on the establishment of the multi-party regime and on the role of İnönü, he falls short, too, on providing information on Bayar and Menderes, either on their relationship or their understanding of certain political aspects.

The books by journalist İsmet Bozdağ (1975; 2004) also offer detailed information on several issues such as the opposition within the DP, the formation of political parties by the DP members opposing Menderes, the relationship between Menderes and Bayar, and the reasons behind Menderes' resignation several times while in government. Accordingly, Bozdağ analyzes the relationship among various political leaders and explains the power dynamics among them. His focus on the relationships between Menderes, Bayar, and İnönü is significant to see the political interplay among them. For the period covering the years between 1946 and 1950, he mentions the interplay particularly between İnönü and Bayar on the issues related to

the decision of political transition such as the formation of an opposition party and its role and responsibilities in a democratic system. Similarly, for the period of 1950 and 1960, he explains the interplay among İnönü, Bayar, and Menderes but particularly between İnönü and Menderes on the issues of requirements of democracy such as electoral safety and relationship between the government and political opposition. Given his particular focus on the impact of İnönü on Menderes, Bozdağ's books provide valuable information on the impact of political opposition on Menderes' acts. Furthermore, by providing explanations about the impact of Bayar on Menderes' decisions, he also draws a picture of the pecking order among the DP members. Thus, he provides clues about the reasons behind Menderes' harsh attitude towards the opposition within the party, his expectations from other DP members in addition to his relationship with the President Bayar. However, despite the fact that he provides detailed information about the opposition within the DP and the roles of Bayar and Menderes within this process, he also does not provide any analysis of Bayar's and Menderes' ideas on democracy.

Among the books lacking an analytical examination of these two leaders' conceptualization of democracy, book of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1970), who was a poet by profession, but one who was simultaneously actively involved in politics, can also be given as an example. Kısakürek, who had a close but unstable relationship with Menderes, criticizes the policies of Menderes governments but does not provide an analytical study of either the DP or Bayar and Menderes. For example, in his book, Kısakürek provides information beginning with Menderes' childhood until the end of his political career by making implications about the role of Bayar during Menderes' political career. Additionally, he gives many references to Samet Ağaoğlu and Şevket Süreyya Aydemir. However, it does not touch upon

the rationale behind the political actions and decisions of these two political leaders, but solely narrates the events and criticizes merely the actions of Menderes.

Besides the journalists of those times, current journalists focus on the issue because of its lasting popularity and the documentary prepared by Mehmet Ali Birand and Can Dündar (2006) is among the works to benefit. However, despite the fact that Birand and Dündar's documentary offers detailed information about that era, it does not concentrate on these two political figures in order to have an idea about their understanding of democracy.

2.2. Concept of Democracy

As seen above, the sources on Bayar and Menderes have a different emphasis than the analysis of Bayar's and Menderes' conceptualization of democracy and thus, there appears a need of making such an analysis considering the gap in the literature on Turkish politics and democratization.

The conceptualization of Bayar and Menderes of the concept of democracy will be analyzed based on two primary conceptualizations of democracy existing in the literature. One of these is a "minimalist" conceptualization, which emphasizes the procedural requirements of democracy, and the other is "maximalist", referencing additional criteria deemed necessary to consider a political system as democratic (Warren, 1991: 8).

In the democratization literature, the minimalist definition of democracy often referenced is that of Joseph A. Schumpeter. Schumpeter defines the democratic method as an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which

individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (1943: 269) and/or as "...free competition for a free vote (1943: 271)."

Emphasizing the role of political elites, Schumpeter (1943: 270-272) focuses on the significance of competition for political leadership and the role of elections to determine the ruler. He defends this definition of democracy arguing that it has many advantages: distinguishing democratic governments from others; identifying the way to find a leader; presenting a way to connect sectional interests, public opinion, and the political situation; offering the most possible and the most practical way of competition; taking into account the relation between democracy and individual freedom; presenting the opportunity both to select and evict the government by the electorate; and providing the representation of the will of the majority.

Similar to Schumpeter, Adam Przeworski adopts an elitist conceptualization of democracy. He defines democracy as the way of selecting rulers by competitive elections and shows that this is the only way of getting rid of governments without bloodshed. That is to say, he sees elections as a peaceful substitute for rebellion. He explains why people obey the results of elections even if this goes against their interests in the short run. According to Przeworski, because the cost of rebellion is higher and the losing parties think that they have a chance to win the next elections, they accept the results rather than subverting the system. He also mentions that the same is true for a victorious party, which believes that it is better off holding the next scheduled election rather than cancelling or postponing it (Przeworski, 1991: 19-33; 1999: 23-55). Thus, he states that elections prevent violence by moderating both the ruler and the ruled and encouraging losers to comply with the results as the parties

assume that no political force dominates completely or permanently (Przeworski, 2003: 114).

Hence, the minimalist definition of democracy emphasizes elections as the indispensable characteristic of democracy. Many other scholars put forward additional criteria and expand further the minimalist approach that emphasizes representation (Fishkin, 1995). Interpreting the minimalist definition of democracy as committing the “fallacy of electoralism”, maximalist definitions of democracy concentrate on the idea of checking the government not only during the electoral period but before and after the elections and thus, not only through elections, but through other mechanisms, i.e. political opposition parties, parliament, presidency, and courts (O’Donnell, 1999).

A quite detailed definition of democracy, accepted by the scholars of the maximalist approach, comes from Robert A. Dahl. Dahl (1971: 2-4) starts by stating that there is no ideal democracy and because of this he prefers the term polyarchy rather than democracy. He explains that polyarchy has two dimensions. One is the contestation dimension (inclusiveness), implying the extent of permissible opposition, and the other is the participation dimension (liberalization), implying the right to participate in public contestation that is the elections (Dahl, 1971: 4-5).

Nevertheless, since Dahl states that public contestation does not necessarily imply a fully democratic state, he deduces four categories based on the extent to which the contestation and participation dimensions are present in a political regime. He mentions ‘closed hegemony’ with very low levels of inclusiveness and liberalization, ‘competitive oligarchy’ with higher contestation than participation, and ‘inclusive hegemony’ with higher participation than contestation. Moreover,

when both contestation and participation dimensions increase, he argues that closed hegemonies become ‘polyarchy’ and polyarchies can be defined as popularized, liberalized, and highly inclusive and extensively open systems to contestation (Dahl, 1971: 7-8).

To clarify the term polyarchy, Dahl (1971: 3) introduces certain requirements as follows: the presence of elected politicians having constitutional control over government decisions about policy, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage providing all adult citizens with the right to vote in the election of officials, right to run for offices in the government, freedom of expression enabling citizens express their ideas without the danger of being punished, alternative sources of information protected by laws, and associational autonomy to realize various rights such as forming relatively independent political parties and interest groups.

Instead of defining democracy by listing certain criteria, Juan J. Linz (1970) attempts to clarify the concept of democracy by what it is not, explaining authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. He defines authoritarian regimes as “political regimes with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones” (Linz, 1970:255). He characterizes totalitarian regimes as having “... eliminated almost all pre-existing political, economic, and social pluralism, has a unified, articulated, guiding, utopian ideology, has intensive and extensive mobilization, and has a leadership that rules, often charismatically, with undefined limits and great unpredictability and vulnerability for elites and non-elites...” (Linz and Stepan, 1996b: 40).

Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl (1991) also try to explain differences among regimes with different practices. They define the concept of democracy emphasizing certain components, such as accountable rulers, public realm with collective norms binding on society, citizens with the right to vote and run for office, regular elections, majority rule combining the votes of more than half, cooperation through parties and associations, and elected representatives (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 76-80). Considering that there are many components, they also argue that democracies differ among themselves to the extent to which those components exist in the political regime of a country (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 81-82). However, besides mentioning different components in a democracy, they mostly concentrate on the concept of uncertainty in democratic regimes. They argue that uncertainty is institutionalized in democracies because of the uncertainty of electoral results and thus, emphasize the place of elections in a democracy.

2.2.1. The Accountability Dimension of Democracy

In addition to the criteria listed above in order to describe a regime as a democracy, as a well-known name in the field, Larry Diamond (1999b) offers a developmental view of democracy emphasizing that the improvement and reform of democracy is endless. Each democratic development is a cornerstone for the other, even though there is no guarantee of the direction it will lead. Given his developmental perspective, Diamond explains a range of democracies. He categorizes different versions of democracy, such as non-democracies, pseudo-democracies (semi-democracies and hegemonic party systems), electoral democracy,

and liberal democracy based on the various requirements necessary to define a regime as a democracy.

Confirming Diamond's focus on the need for several other requirements in order to define a regime democratic, Guillermo O'Donnell (1994; 1999; 2003) puts forward the accountability dimension of democracies. Despite the presence of various dimensions and components of different dimensions of the concept of accountability, for the minimalist definitions of democracy, as stated above, regular elections are considered sufficient for democracy, as they are assumed to keep rulers accountable. However "during the intervals between elections, citizens can seek to influence public policy through a wide variety of other intermediaries" (Schedler, 1999: 13). According to Schedler (1999: 13), these various intermediaries are the accountability mechanisms that "express the continuing concern for checks and oversight, for surveillance and institutional constraints on the exercise of power".

The concept of accountability can be analyzed by two notions that are answerability and enforcement. The first, includes informational and explanatory practices aiming to get information about what has been done or will be done and for giving reasons and forming judgment, often realized by the presence of political opposition; the latter implies the accountable ruler's responsibility for not only explaining the governments actions and reasons, but also for bearing the consequences of its actions, such as removal from office through electoral mechanisms (Schedler, 1999: 16).

That way of functioning of accountability -information, justification, and punishment- is observed both in vertical and horizontal dimensions of accountability (Schedler, 1999: 17). O'Donnell (1994) defines these two dimensions: the vertical

accountability dimension stressing the check and balance mechanisms among unequals (rulers and the ruled) and horizontal accountability dimension stressing the check and balance mechanisms among equals (legislative, executive, and judiciary).

The vertical dimension includes electoral and social mechanisms, which are namely elections, civil society, and media, while the horizontal dimension includes institutional mechanisms, such as political parties, parliament, presidency, and judiciary. Given the interdependent functioning of those check and balance mechanisms providing answerability and enforcement, the linkage among these components of the vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms can be understood. In other words, because accountability implies avoiding the abuse of power and because the enforcement—i.e. electoral mechanism—cannot function accurately without a proper functioning of the answerability mechanism—i.e. political opposition—vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms are dependent upon each other.

Thus, what prevents a government from applying its agenda completely is not just the elections but also the other accountability mechanisms which are complementary to elections. In that sense, the vertical accountability should be understood in the narrowest sense as the policy-making and policy-implementation process in which the government is accountable to the voters and horizontal accountability refers to the government's accountability to political and judicial institutions (O'Donnell, 1994, 1999, 2003; Schedler, 1999; Valenzuela, 1992).

Considering above, it can be suggested that the mentioned period of the study in the case of Turkey can be best analyzed from the electoral dimension of vertical accountability and the political opposition dimension of the horizontal accountability

due to the delegative character of Turkish democracy (Özbudun 1996, 1999) in addition its institutional and social weaknesses.

2.3. Different Paths to Democracy

Having presented various approaches to conceptualizing democracy, this section aims to clarify the process of democratization, which starts with liberalization, continues with transition, and terminates with consolidation.¹ Liberalization means “...a mix of policy and social changes, such as less censorship of the media, somewhat greater space for the organization of autonomous working-class activities, the introduction of some legal safeguards for individuals... and most important, the toleration of opposition” (Linz and Stepan, 1996b: 3). Transition refers to the collapse of the authoritarian regime and emergence of a democratic regime (O’Donnell, Schmitter, 1986). In other words, the process from the collapse of the authoritarian regime to the birth of a democratic regime in which the government comes to power with free and popular vote and has the authority of policy making without the intervention of other bodies is the transition process (Linz and Stepan, 1996b: 3). The next step, consolidation of democracy, can be explained with “...the effective functioning of a democratic regime” (O’Donnell, 1992: 18). Rule of law, civil society freedom, political society autonomy, constitutional rules to allocate power democratically, state bureaucracy acceptable and serviceable to democratic government, and sufficient autonomy for economy and economic actors to assure pluralism of civil society, political society, and economic society are the requirements for an effective democratic regime (Linz and Stepan, 1996b: 62-64).

¹ Huntington (1991) argues that democratization involves three steps that are the breakdown of the authoritarian regime, installation of the democratic regime, and consolidation of democratic regime.

To explain the impact of certain factors on the course of those processes, three main approaches will be mentioned below.

2.3.1. Approaches to Democratization

There are structural, cultural, and agency explanations concerning democracy. As mentioned earlier, the first two will be explained briefly and then the main focus will be on the agency approach since the aim of this study is to examine the impact of two important political leader' discourse and praxis on Turkish democracy.

To begin with the structural approach, it can be said that the structural approach attributes the expansion of democracy to modernity. This approach can be summarized by the famous maxim of Seymour Martin Lipset (1960: 31), that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy." Hence, it explains the birth of democracy from an economic perspective and argues that the higher the average wealth, the degree of industrialization and urbanization, and level of education of a country, the higher its chance of being democratized. Even though the approach does not accept these conditions as sufficient for a country to become democratic and includes scholars revising the motto (Moore, 1966; Diamond, 1992; Huber et al. 1993; O'Donnell, 1973), it considers that these are at least necessary and interrelated elements of democratization (Lipset, 1959: 69-105).

Turning to political culture as a pre-requisite for democracy, the cultural approach mainly focuses on civic culture comprising interpersonal trust, tolerance, compromise and democratic legitimacy; those are the aspects of political culture that increase the hope for democratic stability (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart,

1990). In addition, it is also argued by some scholars (Elkins and Simeon, 1979) that the political culture sets the agenda for the decision-makers, who choose a certain way of action from among a range of possible alternatives.

The agency approach considers both the impact of structure and political culture considering that the agent is embedded in both of them but emphasizes the agency dimension as the most important variable for democratization. It introduces 'political agency' as the decisive factor for the emergence and survival of democracy.

One of the leading scholars of the agency approach is Dankwart A. Rustow (1970), whose four-phase model is well-known. Rustow's model focuses on four respective phases of democratization: background condition, preparatory phase, decision phase, and habituation phase. Rustow (1970: 350-352) takes national unity as the essential pre-condition, arguing that it must exist prior to all other phases of democratization. He does so because he thinks that it is necessary for people to be clear about which political community they belong to. In fact, the reason that Rustow argues for the indispensability of national unity is due to the nature of democracy. He (1970: 351) states that because it is "...a system of rule by temporary majorities", "...the composition of the citizenry (must) be continuous" to avoid any problems that might emerge when the rulers and the ruled change. Thus, Rustow mentions the linkage between the rulers and the ruled and implies that the people should be clear about the community from which they would elect the rulers, and the rulers should be clear about the community to which they would be held accountable.

Having mentioned national unity as a pre-condition, Rustow (1970: 352-355) focuses on the preparatory phase and points out that democratization is a dynamic process of uncertain struggle between political actors. He states that despite the fact that the struggle does not usually stem from the goal to establish a democracy, the struggle incidentally ends with the compromise of political leaders in favor of democracy. However, he also notes that the struggle should not be harsh because if it is harsh it might not end with a compromise.

Following the compromise among political leaders to establish democracy, the preparatory phase ends and the decision phase begins (Rustow, 1970: 355-357). While the preparatory phase can be defined with struggle and compromise among political leaders, the decision phase can be summarized as the phase of negotiation among them. Similar to the preparatory phase, the negotiation phase does not occur deliberately but incidentally. Rustow explains his point by stating that the democratic content of the decided procedures are not related to a path decided beforehand among political leaders. Since at the beginning political elites had other political preferences than establishing democracy, they take democracy as the second-best option.

After the decision is made, he states that the decision phase ends and the habituation phase begins (Rustow, 1970: 358-360). He explains this stage with the penetration of democracy into every sphere of life. Furthermore, at this stage, he argues, political leaders and citizens learn to solve conflicts through democratic organizations, political leaders become used to democratic procedures and improve their belief in the system, and politicians and the masses become connected through party organizations.

Thus, as seen above, Rustow's model presents a sequential process "from national unity as background, through struggle, compromise, and habituation to democracy" (Rustow, 1970: 362). It emphasizes the role of political leadership during the whole democratization process.

In addition to Rustow, Juan J. Linz (1978) is another significant scholar arguing for the agency approach. Linz, like Rustow, focuses on political agents and perceives the political process as based on political actors' acts and decisions. He states that political agency has implications not only for the democratization process, but also for democratic breakdown. In other words, for a regime that has recently experienced a transition from authoritarianism to democracy, it is essential to reflect on the impact of a political leader managing and controlling the political process after the transition.²

The willingness of political actors to maintain democracy is indeed important for the stability of democracy. In relation to the importance of political leadership for the maintenance of democracy, the choices of political leaders turn out to be critical considering that "democratic breakdowns are not inevitable but are accelerated by poor leadership and bad choices" (Linz, 1978; Diamond et al., 1995: 16). Accordingly, not being adept at arriving at compromises to avoid crises is considered an indication of inadequate leadership and plays an important role in the breakdown of democracy (Linz and Stepan, 1989: 41-61). In fact, the perception of a political leader concerning the opposition as an integral part of the democratic system and, thus, his/her capability to compromise is vital. If the political leader in

² The impact of leader on this process can be clarified when the cases of Spain and Turkey are compared. Even though in both of the cases democratic transition occurred gradually, in the Turkish case because of the failure in the habituation phase, which means the internalization of democratic rules the process following transition was interrupted by several breakdowns as it was with the 1960 military intervention. For the Spanish case, see Maravall (1982). For the Turkish case, see Özbudun (1994; 1995).

government sees the opposition as worthless and compromise as “a signal of weakness and lack of resolve”, compromise would only emerge as the second best solution (Diamond et al. 1995: 18). Under these conditions, confrontation is preferred to compromise and democracy is threatened.

Furthermore, political actors’ commitment and loyalty to the democratic system itself are essential for democratic stability.³ Despite the fact that democratic culture both at the elite and the mass level are important for democratic stability, political culture at the elite level gains primacy considering that the political leaders are the prime actors responsible for the rule of a country.⁴ Thus, political leaders’ commitment to democratic values and openness to political learning is critical for democratic stability (Diamond, 1994).⁵

Hence, commitment to procedural rules of democracy such as free elections, inclusive suffrage, right to run for office, freedom of expression, and the like on the part of political leadership is essential for the viability of democracy. In addition, political learning to induce pragmatism and moderation between political rivals is also required. It is a fact that political rivals have to avoid conflict from becoming excessively polarized and destabilizing the system, particularly in a country that has recently experienced transition from authoritarianism to democracy (Linz, 1978; Linz and Stepan, 1989; Di Palma, 1990; Higley and Gunther, 1992).

³ Linz (1978) emphasizes the importance of loyalty. In addition to it, Powell (1982: 174) argues that democratic breakdowns, either by executive or military coup, stem from the lack of democratic loyalty by elected leaders. Similarly, Huntington argues that sustainability of democracy depends on the extent of willingness of political leaders to maintain democracy (1991: 279) and weakness of democratic values among key political elites (1991: 290).

⁴ For more information about the importance of political culture, in particular of moderation, system loyalty, restrained partisanship, and accommodation at the elite level, see Dahl (1971) and Higley, Gunther (1992).

⁵ However, in addition to Diamond’s focus on leaders’ values in the short run, Rustow (1970) emphasizes a lot on the habituation phase, during which, political leaders learn solving conflicts in accordance with democratic rules.

Considering the significance of political actors' commitment to the concept of democracy, it is apparent that the democratic breakdown is related to the lack of commitment to democracy on the part of political actors. In other words, while beliefs about democratic legitimacy are crucial for the consolidation of democracy (Diamond, 1999a: 162), they may also play a central role in the collapse of democracy. Thus, the extent of the legitimacy of democracy among the elites determines both the degree to which stability of regime is possible as well as the level of the threshold at which the political actors will no longer resist the pressure to abandon democracy (Merkel, 1998: 59). The impact of legitimacy on the chances of regime survival is, in fact, related to the belief that the existing system is better than its alternatives,⁶ despite the fact that the presence of alternatives can facilitate a rejection of the existing system.⁷ Nevertheless, it should also be considered that the presence of certain alternatives does not necessarily imply the risk of democratic collapse, provided that the political incumbents do not attach merit to those alternatives. Thus, it can be argued that the balance between the role of alternatives and democratic legitimacy is inversely related. While a decrease in democratic legitimacy can increase the importance of alternatives for a system change, when legitimacy is intact, their presence may not appear significant to the political actors.⁸

The legitimacy issue can be defined best by the three dimensions of the consolidation process suggested by Linz and Stepan (1996a): behavioral, attitudinal,

⁶ Lipset (1960: 68) explains the concept legitimacy as "... the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society". Similarly, Linz (1988: 65) defines it as "...the belief that in spite of the shortcomings and the failures the political institutions are better than any others that might be established in a particular country and therefore can demand obedience".

⁷ Przeworski (1986: 51) thinks that what matters for the stability of any regime is not solely legitimacy per se, but presence or absence of preferable alternatives. Similarly, Linz (1978b: 27) states that one type of regime can be replaced with another when the current one is started to be seen as similar with the alternative ones.

⁸ Linz (1978: 18) argues that legitimacy is based on the performance of the regime.

and constitutional. Behaviorally a democratic regime is consolidated when no significant actor attempts to create a non-democratic regime. Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of crisis, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life. Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and non-governmental forces become subject to and habituated to the resolution of conflict within the bounds of specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process (Linz, Stepan, 1996a: 16). This three dimensional explanation shows the direct role of elite level for consolidation at the behavioral and constitutional level and the indirect role at the attitudinal level (Diamond, 1999b: 66-73; Merkel, 1998: 56).

Thus, given the significance of political actors for the democratization path of the country, their conceptualization of democracy is important to understand. As stated before, given the fact that the minimalist and maximalist conceptualizations of democracy are based on their defense of certain dimensions of the accountability concept of democracy, in this study, the main distinction is considered as being between the minimalist and maximalist definitions of democracy. Due to the fact that the maximalist approach includes both the electoral component of the minimalist approach with its vertical dimension and further mechanisms with its horizontal dimension, two crucial sub-dimensions are selected for each of these dimensions: electoral for the vertical dimension and political opposition dimension including the presidency and political opposition for the horizontal dimension of accountability.

In consequence, using the agency approach as the theoretical framework of the study, the analysis is based on the need to see which of the two conceptions of democracy these two political leaders' understanding of democracy corresponds to

most closely. In addition to the essential character of these two sub-dimensions for these two different dimensions of accountability and their use for analyzing the two distinct levels of the concept of democracy as minimalist and maximalist, it can be argued that they are the ones that will best facilitate understanding the Turkish politics of that era, which was lacking strong institutional and social mechanisms as stated at the very beginning of this essay. Accordingly, these two sub-dimensions can be viewed as the dimensions through which the discourse and praxis of the political agents can be analyzed in detail and thus, serve as complementary to the agency approach at most. Furthermore, bearing in mind that both Bayar and Menderes make reference to those dimensions of the accountability concept of democracy in their speeches, a consideration of their praxis in addition to their discourse will be decisive in the following chapters to arrive at a conclusion on this matter.

CHAPTER III

THE VERTICAL DIMENSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN BAYAR'S AND MENDERES' UNDERSTANDING OF DEMOCRACY

In this chapter, Bayar's and Menderes' praxis and discourse on vertical accountability, the main focus of which is the concept of elections, will be analyzed. The analysis will focus particularly on the period before the year 1950, when the DP came to government. This period is significant because it witnessed a plethora of debates in which Bayar and Menderes were greatly involved. Those debates between the government and the opposition were mainly on how to regulate the electoral procedures, the holding of free and fair elections, and the place of elections in a democratic regime. Although the debates around these ideas did not come to an end with the 1950 general elections, the frequency and weight of the debates on electoral accountability are much more abundant between the years 1946 and 1950 and offer many more examples both about the conceptualization of Bayar and Menderes of this dimension of democracy. Hence, in this chapter, the main focus will be on that period.

The debate was mostly held within the framework of electoral accountability, which is based on the assumption that holding free and fair elections is the first and foremost condition of establishing a democratic regime. Especially due to the transition to the multi-party regime, this aspect of democracy was among the most frequently debated; this explains why the debates contain much evidence of how the notion of democracy was conceptualized by Bayar and Menderes regarding the vertical accountability dimension of democracy.

As outlined in the introductory chapter, the debates on different dimensions of democracy will be examined on the basis of assembly minutes, political praxis, discourses of Bayar and Menderes, and newspapers and periodicals of the period - namely *Cumhuriyet*, *Ulus*, *Vatan*, *Zafer*, *Ayin Tarihi*. These help paint an accurate picture of the conjuncture which facilitates our understanding of Bayar's and Menderes' conceptualization of vertical accountability dimension of democracy. Thus, the present chapter will present an analysis based on both the actual events and the debates of the period.

3.1. The Memorandum of the Four (*Dörtlü Takrir*)

On the 7th of June 1945, four of the CHP deputies, who were among the opponents within the party, submitted a proposal named 'The Memorandum of the Four (*Dörtlü Takrir*)' to the CHP Assembly Group (Ağaoğlu, 1972: 75; Bozdağ, 1975: 11-12; Bayar, 1986: 9). This proposal, signed by İzmir Deputy Celal Bayar, Aydın Deputy Adnan Menderes, İçel Deputy Refik Koraltan, and Kars Deputy Fuad Köprülü, was demanding the abolishment of anti-democratic clauses in the laws and the party bylaws (Lewis, 2002: 98).

The Memorandum emphasized the significance of the principle of democracy and stressed that the enforcement of democracy was the first requirement in order to achieve the welfare and contentment in the country. Accordingly, the rationale of the Memorandum was considered as a push for the implementation of measures required for the realization of democracy.

Furthermore, the Memorandum also stated that the democratic spirit of the Constitution had always been respected and obeyed. And given that in the current conjuncture, the movement for and commitment to freedom and democracy were spreading as a wave (Huntington, 1991), it was the right time to attempt further democratization of the political life. Thus, under those circumstances, the following steps to be taken were listed by the parliamentarians submitting the Memorandum:

1-To search for the measures necessary to enable Parliament's supervision (over the executive) in accordance with not only the form but also the spirit of the Constitution given that the parliament's authority to control the government is the most natural result of the principle of national sovereignty.⁹

2-To provide the opportunity for the citizens to use the political rights and freedoms granted in the 1921 Constitution (*Teşkilat-ı Esasiye*).

3-To restructure the party studies in accordance with the aforementioned objectives (Şahingiray, 1956: XXVIII-XXX; Giritlioğlu, 1965: 169-171; Baban, 1970: 131-133; Fersoy, 1978: 83-85; Burçak, 1979: 241-244, Goloğlu, 1982: 34; Albayrak, 2004: 44; Koçak, 2010: 314-316).

⁹ As Karpat (1959: 137) and Dodd (1979: 98) state, according to the 1924 Constitution, the political structure was based on the unity of powers: executive, legislative, and judiciary. The Parliament was granted with the authority to pass laws and there was only the president of the Republic with the authority to veto the laws passed by it.

According to Menderes, the Memorandum was the essence of the perspective of these four deputies. Its intention was to make possible the full implementation of the Constitutional provisions and that is why objecting to these demands was, in fact, an attack against the rights and freedoms of citizens (*Vatan*, July 18, 1946). Similarly, Orhan Birgit, who witnessed the mentioned period as a journalist and Talat Asal, who witnessed the mentioned period as a lawyer, argued that the main aim of the Four while submitting the Memorandum was to encourage the full implementation of the 1924 Constitution. They both found the Memorandum to be a clear evidence of Bayar and Menderes' intention to establish a democratic system.¹⁰

Supporting Birgit's point, by focusing on the Constitution's content, Menderes stated:

In addition to individual rights and freedoms, the citizen also has political rights and freedoms. It is essential not to confuse these two freedoms. There is no doubt that, even though we could not establish a democracy in absolute accordance with the Constitution, the individual freedoms of citizens are under guarantee. That is why it would be unfair to compare Turkey to Nazi and Fascist regimes. However, it is also an indisputable fact that the individual rights and freedoms of citizens are limited. No one can deny that in our country almost all elections, primarily the parliamentary ones, take the shape of acts of appointment. Once again our country, for an unknown reason, cannot liberate itself from the single party system (*Vatan*, September 14, 1945).

Hence, he emphasized that elections should be more than acts of appointment and that political rights and freedoms were indispensable in democracies.

¹⁰ Interview with Orhan Birgit, İstanbul, 30 May 2008.
Interview with Talat Asal, Ankara, 14 March 2009.

3.2. Emphasis on Direct and Fair Elections

The attention that Bayar and Menderes paid to the electoral mechanism was not only evident in the Memorandum of the Four. In addition, as will be mentioned in detail in the next chapter, due to the developments after the rejection of the Memorandum of the Four by the CHP government, on the 7th of January 1946, the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti –DP*) was formed by Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan and the integrity of the electoral mechanism became a core value of the DP.

While the DP was struggling to strengthen its position in the country, it was also continuing to make declarations on how the elections should be held. In 1946, the ‘Law of Elections’ was the main issue in the Parliament’s agenda. On the 13th of February 1946, the DP declared that provided that a direct electoral system be adopted; it would take part in the next elections, which were expected to be held in September (*Cumhuriyet*, February 14, 1946). Particularly Bayar and Menderes advocated this idea, asserting that a direct electoral system was necessary for an advanced democracy. As will be understood below, at the core of their defense for the idea of direct elections was the belief that by avoiding the appointment character of indirect elections; holding direct elections would enable the electorate to directly hold the ruler electorally accountable.

For Menderes, it can be asserted that he defended holding direct elections since the beginning of his political career. When he was elected as Aydın deputy of the CHP in 1931, he made obvious his opposition to the appointment mechanism by the second voter as it is with the indirect voting system and expressed his will for being elected directly by the nation (Atalay, 1959: 11).

The party leader Celal Bayar demanded free and fair elections and insisted on holding direct general elections too (Fersoy, 1978:125). On the 22nd of April 1946, he stated that direct elections are a requirement of democracy. However, he also stated that holding direct elections would not mean fair elections. For fair elections, he added, it is also required that citizens should have the freedom to use their vote without being under any pressure. Thus, while he emphasized the need for direct elections in order to have free and fair elections, he also did not hesitate to express his concern for the fairness of elections and the significance of providing freedom to the electorate.

Hence, these two important figures of the party having emphasized the importance of direct and fair elections, the Party declared that it would not participate even in direct elections if it witnessed any intervention from the authorities, i.e. the majority party, and if the elections were held in an atmosphere lacking of honesty and transparency (*Vatan*, April 24, 1946; Fersoy, 1978: 110).

3.2.1. The Amendment of the Municipal Law

On the 26th of April at its plenary meeting, the CHP government decided to hold the municipal elections on the 26th of May instead of holding them in September (*Ayin Tarihi*, April 1946: 6; Golođlu, 1982: 45). In order to hold the municipal elections earlier, a draft law was prepared by the governing party and on the 29th of April 1946, it was introduced to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi - TBMM*) with the explanation that:

Since the municipal elections and voting in elections take longer than necessary and voting on a single day -as practiced in all civilized countries-

allows for a safer election process, it was deemed necessary to make amendments in the articles related to municipal elections (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 7, Vol. 21: 215).

Moreover, it was stated that the draft would also serve for the realization of electoral security as demanded by the opposition since it would allow to hold the general elections, which had been planned to be held in 1947, with the newly elected Municipal Assemblies (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 7, Vol. 21: 215).

As the session continued with additional explanations on the draft, Minister of Internal Affairs Hilmi Uran repeated this point and stated that with the draft, some important amendments were made to the Municipal Law in order to democratize and secure the electoral mechanism. These were, for example, to hold elections in a single day, to complete all electoral formalities within a month, to increase the number of electoral offices, to authorize political parties to send representatives to the election committees, to hold elections on Sundays, to determine the beginning and ending hours of the elections, and to provide the voters with the right to mark their voting slips anywhere (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 7, Vol. 21: 215-216).

Following Uran's explanations, Menderes expressed the ideas of the opposition as the spokesman of the DP and stated that the most striking point in the draft law was the holding of the municipal elections in May instead of September. The CHP's explanation for holding the elections earlier was to hold the parliamentary elections in 1947 with the newly elected Municipal Assemblies. Despite this, however, Menderes stated that the right decision would be either to postpone the elections or at least to hold them on the date decided by the law (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 7, Vol. 21: 216).

Accordingly, questioning the hidden agenda of the CHP, Menderes interpreted the CHP's decision to precipitate the elections as stemming from its desire not to allow sufficient time for the newly established political parties to organize themselves. He thought that the decision of shifting the elections forward would not only have a negative impact on the electoral turnout, but also would prevent the political parties -excluding the ruling party- from being prepared for the elections. This meant that two important components of the electoral competition, electorate and political parties, would not be able to play their role, as it should have been in a democratic regime. That is the very reason why Menderes saw this decision as an avoidance of the free manifestation of national will.

Menderes, perceiving the right to vote as the only way of making the national will explicit, believed that the democratization of elections was based on eliminating pressure and legal obstacles for political parties, amending anti-democratic laws, and giving a certain period of time to political parties to be prepared for the elections. He explained his views by quoting from the speech given by İnönü at the opening of the parliament for the new legislative year in 1945 (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 7, Vol. 21: 217).

In his address to the parliament, İnönü had declared:

The only weak point in our country is the lack of an opposition party. Many measures have been taken to provide political parties the opportunity to be prepared for the elections. With the 1947 elections, which we insist should be direct; the next government will be elected by the majority vote of the people (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 7, Vol. 20: 7).

On the contrary, Menderes thought that no measures had been taken to provide the political parties with a period of preparation before the elections. Hence, he was not convinced by the reasons given in the bill and believed that the amendment mainly aimed creating a semblance of democracy instead of bettering the democratic quality of the regime (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 7, Vol. 21: 217). His objection to the bill and his idea that the bill aimed to prolong the single party system while creating the image that the government was spending efforts in order to democratize the system shows that Menderes, reminding Diamond's (1992) categorization of democracies on a wide range, was aware of the fact that there are many steps to be taken in order to achieve a real democracy; many of these steps being necessary but not sufficient in themselves. More importantly, it can be deduced that he also perceived that some of these steps could be manipulated to appease the demands for democratization, while maintaining anti-democratic systems.

3.2.1.1. The DP Decision for Boycotting the Municipal Elections

Following the approval of the bill, the DP decided not to participate in the elections. This decision was made public by Bayar in the beginning of May. In his speech, reiterating what Menderes had previously stated; Bayar emphasized that bringing the municipal elections forward aimed at preventing the timely preparation of the DP and could also result in a precipitation of the general elections (Bayar, 1986: 53).

However, despite this initial strict determination of the DP leadership not to participate in the municipal elections, there was indecision within the DP regarding

their participation in the municipal elections. Opposing the DP leadership decision not to participate in the municipal elections, at the local level the tendency was to defend the right to participate in the elections (Toker, 1990a: 102).

Nevertheless, in the midst of the DP's hesitation on boycotting the elections, İnönü declared that the CHP had decided to hold general elections that year and further added that the electoral results were much crucial this time since they would reveal either the people's support for or disapproval of the CHP in the presence of an opposition party that the people could opt for (*Ulus*, May 7, 1946).

Following this, at the end, the DP leadership made its decision in order not to take part in the elections. On the 8th of May 1946, the decision was made official through a communiqué. Considering that it had been decided to hold the municipal elections earlier without a convincing reason, it questioned the idea of participating in the elections considering the relationship between the practice of holding elections and reflection of the national will to the election results. The communiqué stated that:

The DP finds the decision of the governing party to hold elections earlier as running counter to the democratic mentality. Such decisions prevent rather than serve democracy. In relation to this, participating in the elections would be detrimental for the future of Turkish democracy. The DP therefore refuses to take responsibility for such a mistake and will not participate in the elections (*Cumhuriyet*, *Vatan*, May 9, 1946; Tanyeli, Topsakaloğlu, 1959: 33-34, Volume I; Fersoy, 1978: 115).

In addition to this, the DP based its decision not to take part in the municipal elections on the objections clarifying its stance on the link between holding elections and achieving the real manifestation of the national will through the people's votes:

1-Holding the elections before abolishing the decree which blocked the accurate reflection of national sovereignty.

2-Preventing the timely organisation of the political parties before the elections.

3-Difficulty of providing the citizens with electoral freedom before guaranteeing their political rights.

4-Impossibility for the President to be objective while being the leader of the CHP at the same time and the necessity of his withdrawal from the CHP leadership (Şahingiray, 1956: 437-441).

These all show that Bayar and Menderes attached high importance to elections and considered them as a sign of democratic mentality. They stated that holding direct elections in free and fair atmosphere would show the democratic quality of the regime. They considered that holding elections just for the sake of practicing this requirement of democracy without considering the position of the electorate and the political parties taking part in the elections would only be to the disadvantage of the country. In consequence, they believed withdrawing from the elections would be less detrimental to the democratic development of the country than participating in them.

3.2.1.2. Holding Early Elections and the Requirements of Democracy

As mentioned above, approval of the Municipal Law implied holding general elections earlier and this became definite with İnönü's speech of 10 May 1946 at the Extraordinary Congress of the CHP. President İnönü stated his hope that the opposition party would participate in the elections and added that the general elections would be direct and held within a few months under secure and free conditions. Moreover, he explained the reasons behind the decision to hold municipal elections earlier as follows:

Current municipal assemblies are to a great extent composed of CHP members. Since the municipal assemblies are going to take duty in the organization of general elections, we wanted to avoid any possible accusations towards us for anything related to the general elections. We have the right to hope that holding municipal elections earlier with the aim of preventing any fraud in the first multi-party general elections would be accepted as evidence of our bona fides (*İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 1946: 402, Volume I; Turan, 2002: 20).

Furthermore, İnönü implying the DP's written announcement of the 8th of May touched upon the news about the opposition's decision of not participating in the elections and stated that preventing citizens from voting meant denying them a legitimate means of struggle. He added that the CHP's main intention was first to hold free and fair elections and then, if they had the electoral victory, to continue governing the country. Otherwise, he added, they would defend their ideas and policies in opposition. Finally, he also expressed his satisfaction to be setting an historical example illustrating the significance of free votes to elect the ruler (*İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, 1946: 403-405, Volume I; Turan, 2002: 21).

In response to İnönü's statements at the CHP's Extraordinary Congress, the DP published a party statement on the 13th of May 1946 defending its objections to holding early elections. It stated that the change in the election dates was contrary to İnönü's opening speech at the TBMM where he had announced that the general elections were going to be held in 1947. Once more emphasizing the concern for the preparation of the political parties for the elections, the statement argued that if the elections really had to be held earlier, it should have been decided in consultation with the opposition parties and questioned the sincerity of İnönü because he had mentioned the lack of an opposition party as a deficiency in Turkey's political regime in one of his previous speeches (*Vatan*, May 14, 1946). In addition to this, it also became clear that İnönü's speech at the Congress was perceived as a threat by the DP leadership since İnönü equated the idea of boycotting the elections with high treason (Bayar, 1986: 54-55).¹¹

This reveals a difference of interpretation of the DP refusal to participate in the elections; while Bayar and Menderes saw their decision as a legitimate act; the ruling party took it as a betrayal to the interests of the country. Meanwhile, the ruling party interpreted their decision of holding elections earlier as a legitimate act while the DP leadership considered it illegitimate. This presents evidence for Bayar's and Menderes' understanding of the electoral dimension and its place in the democratic development. Bayar and Menderes took the idea of shifting the elections to an earlier date as worsening the conditions for free and fair elections and perceived it as a cover for the aim of prolonging the single party system.

¹¹ Bayar considered that with his statement İnönü implied that a political party boycotting the elections could be considered as acting illegitimately and hence, might be closed.

In addition, they considered this decision of the government as contradictory to the democratization discourse of the government, which was clear in the draft bill. Thus, they thought that this kind of decisions would only delay the democratization of the country and reached the conclusion that participating in the municipal elections would only make them a part of a play, which they found insincere. In other words, viewing the political parties and the electorate as the main players of the game, they attached priority to their being ready for the elections. Unless the conditions were proper for holding elections, they considered going on with the elections would only be overlooking the logic behind the idea of holding elections in democratic regimes. Since elections held under those circumstances would not reflect the national will, the DP leaders thought that withdrawing from the elections would not make a negative impact on the electoral results, which would anyway, under such circumstances, solely be a deficient reflection of the national will.

3.2.1.3. The Municipal Elections

In addition to making Bayar and Menderes' understanding of the place of elections in a democratic regime clearer; the DP's reply to İnönü's speech at the Congress led to the heightening of tension between the opposition and the government. However, it did not stop the DP leadership from making new declarations to clarify their point and for this aim, an article by Menderes was published on the 19th of May 1946 in the daily newspaper *Vatan*. In that article he stated that the CHP's loss of tolerance had become clear with its decision to hold early general elections in order to prevent the opposition from being fully organized:

The reason for holding early elections is well known. The unexpected interest of the people in the DP displeased the CHP, which had previously seemed tolerant. This motivated the CHP to immediately and completely block the development of the DP (“Teessür Verici Bir Manzara”, *Vatan*, May 19, 1946).

Furthermore, considering İnönü’s Congress speech in which he clarified his understanding on the link between boycotting the elections and attempting betrayal to the state, Menderes stated that the CHP could accuse the DP of high treason considering two ensuing announcements of the DP. The first was the decision of the DP announced on the 8th of May about not to participate in the municipal elections and the second was the DP’s 13th of May reply to the Congress speech of İnönü.

In the article, Menderes stated that the DP would not remain silent since it attached high priority to the interests of the country, even though he went on to suggest that when the interests of the country were understood as being at stake in case of the DP’s boycotting the elections, the DP’s taking part in the elections unconditionally could also be considered. Nevertheless, Menderes argued that the government’s decision to hold elections earlier could only be interpreted as putting the CHP’s wish for becoming government above the national will displaying his understanding of the linkage between holding elections timely and the interests of the country. According to him, holding elections timely in addition to holding free and fair elections was crucial in order to achieve the manifestation of the national will.

He understood the organization of elections under the very opposite conditions as neglecting the real manifestation of the national will and stated it

explained why withdrawing from the elections was viewed as a justifiable decision by the DP party leadership. Additionally, in his opinion, recent developments were a result of the CHP's efforts to continue the single party rule and it was a grieving sight. He, therefore, stressed that the CHP's political attitude ran counter to democratic development and only served the continuation of the single party system.

Thus, it was the CHP's moving the national elections from July 1947 to July 1946 with the hope of catching the Democrats before they were fully established which caused the DP's protest. In addition to boycotting the municipal elections earlier in the year, this time the DP even considered boycotting the general elections (Zürcher, 2004: 212).

This emphasis of Menderes on the place of elections in a democratic system, putting this mechanism to the centre of a democratic regime and assessing its presence as a sign of democracy is quite important. But more importantly, despite the importance he attached to the elections, his thinking that holding elections was necessary but not sufficient and that this fundamental democratic practice should be exercised under specific conditions is central to the understanding of his core values. Given this, Menderes interpreted the policies of the government to cancel or postpone elections as an indication of the motivation of going back to an undemocratic system.

Following all these debates between the CHP government and the DP opposition, the municipal elections were held on the 26th of May 1946. The results of the municipal elections were announced on the same day and the results were in favour of the governing party. The opposition claimed that the elections had been corrupt and the DP published a booklet entitled 'The 26th of May Elections'. In the

booklet, it declared that most of the people had not voted as a result of the DP's recommendation to abstain and thus, the level of participation was very low in the constituencies where the DP representatives were present (Toker, 1990a: 154-155).

In accordance with the low level of participation in the municipal elections, the opposition blamed the government for this low turnout and for fraud in the elections (*Cumhuriyet*, May 28, 1946). The Minister of Internal Affairs Hilmi Uran gave a reply to the criticism towards the government on the 31st of May 1946. He stated that in 44 of 61 cities the turnout had been above 50 per cent. Based on these statistics, he considered that the level of participation was normal and rejected the accusations of fraud in the elections (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 7, Vol. 23: 240, Uran, 1959: 439-444, Golođlu, 1982: 49).

3.3. New Law of Elections

During the debates related to the municipal elections, the draft law on the parliamentary elections was on the agenda of the Parliament. The most crucial change proposed in the draft was to hold direct elections in a single day (Erdem, 1982: 184-192).

On the 31st of May 1946, Menderes delivered a speech on the draft. In his speech, Menderes argued that the laws of the single party regime were far from meeting the needs of a democratic regime; especially since voting was open, while counting of the votes was secret. Given this, Menderes stated that the draft included certain amendments improving the existing law such as introducing direct electoral system and allowing the opposition party representatives to act as observers during

the counting of the votes (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 7, Vol. 23: 246-248; Goloğlu, 1982: 50).

He expressed the DP's approval of the change toward the direct electoral system as a vital step towards democracy and stated "although, only the principle of the direct electoral system is considered, we are pleased with the draft as we understand this proposal to be a major step towards democracy" (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 7, Vol. 23: 246). In his opinion, this step evidenced the trust of the state in its people, since it was widely believed that due to the high levels of illiteracy, democracy was not an appropriate regime for Turkey. He said some attempted to show the deficiencies in terms of national education as a proof of inadequacy for Turkey's democratization and for not democratizing the political regime of Turkey. That is why he interpreted the approval of the direct electoral system as the victory of confidence in the Turkish people (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 7, Vol. 23: 246).

Menderes' aforementioned statements show the extent of importance he attached to the people and their will. As can be remembered, he interpreted the direct electoral system as enabling the national will to be manifested clearly. Moreover, his emphasis on the direct electoral system and confidence in people without discriminating them on the basis of education was obvious during the discussions related to the date of the municipal elections. This point shows that he was clear on the points that he defended in relation to the issue of elections and presented these arguments without any hesitation whenever he found an opportunity to do so.

Nevertheless, despite his appreciation for the presence of opposition party representatives as observers during the counting of the votes, Menderes also believed

that, in practice, the presence of only one observer from an opposition party at each polling station would change nothing. He implied that as long as the CHP would be the government, it would be in control of the elections. Considering this, he argued that it would have been more meaningful to recognize the opposition party representatives with the authority to object and to keep minutes instead of only being present at the polling stations under the observer status. He also stated that anything less would betray the democratic spirit proclaimed in the approval of the system of direct elections (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 7, Vol. 23: 247).

These views of Menderes show that, for the DP leadership, the need to secure and guarantee the secrecy of votes was evident, but could not be achieved, even through the recent changes made by the government. They insisted that a system change providing open counting was highly necessary, especially given how recent the transition from single to multi-party regime was in Turkey. Based on this idea, they argued that the governing party should have considered this point among the changes that it put forward with the draft.

As the draft's lacking points, Menderes also criticized the government's disregard for the proportional representation system and judicial control of the elections (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 7, Vol. 23: 248). For him, a proportional representation system would be a guarantee for minority parties regarding the election results. This reveals another implication of the DP leadership's concern for enabling the best use of the electoral mechanism. In other words, since they were in favor of the obtainment of an exact reflection of the national will to the parliament, they did not find the majority system proper to obtain a reflection to that extent (Toker, 1990b: 25). In accordance with his focus on the best use of the electoral

mechanism, his emphasis on the judicial control of the elections clarifies the importance he attached to holding free and fair elections.

Hence, it is seen that the points Menderes appreciated were the ones that improved the electoral dimension of vertical accountability and the ones that he saw important to implement were the steps to further this improvement. His suggestions indicate the DP leadership's awareness about the abundance of steps necessary in order to improve the quality of the electoral dimension, which, in turn, would mean the improvement of the quality of the Turkish democracy.

In short, Menderes defended the idea that, despite the pleasing amendments it brought, the bill on the law of elections should have been prepared with the goal of furthering electoral security and thus, democratic character of the regime. While commenting that certain changes introduced by the new law of elections would provide corporeal security, Menderes emphasized that these would not suffice to prevent spiritual pressure from the government on the electorate. He believed that even the implementation of perfect laws could bring undesired consequences and therefore, the spirit of the application of the law, as well as the integrity of the individuals who applied it, were highly crucial (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 7, Vol. 23: 248-249).

As a result of these debates, the bill on direct voting for parliamentarians passed into law on the 5th of June. This law (Law No. 4918) brought significant changes to the electoral system. It was decided that the elections would be held directly by open ballot and secret counting and that when the counting was over, the electoral slips would be burned (Erdem, 1982: 184-192). After the ratification of the law, it was decided on the 10th of June 1946 to hold elections on the 21st of July

1946, one year earlier than foreseen (Karpas, 1959: 159). Upon this decision, the DP realized that they could not make any changes in the situation by boycotting the elections and thus, with the idea of participating in the elections, it decided to organize a meeting in Ankara in order to mobilize all their strengths (Erer, 1966: 272).

3.3.1. First General Elections in the Multi-Party System

Founders of provincial and county organizations held a meeting on the 16th of June 1946 with the DP leadership. At the end of the meeting, the DP administration decided unanimously to participate in the elections (*Cumhuriyet*, June 17-19, 1946; Şahingiray, 1956: 442-443). Moreover, through a memorandum published at the end of the meeting, the DP stated that the CHP was acting with the aim of hindering serious opposition. Additionally, it claimed that anti-democratic laws had not yet been revised, freedom of voting had not yet been guaranteed, pressure on the electorate had not been eliminated; in addition the role of the president as the CHP leader was still troubling, therefore rendering the need to separate the positions of presidency and party leadership quite obvious. Despite all those caveats, it was finally stated that the DP had decided to participate in the elections for the sake of the interests of the country (Şahingiray, 1956: 443-446).

The DP leader Celal Bayar explained the approach of the DP in his speech of the 29th of June 1946 in Adana:

The country is ruled in accordance with the present law. We ask the people to vote for the political parties that they are in favor of...The oppressors are those who do not obey the national will, who are

afraid of the national will. By having the courage to participate in the elections within the framework of the existing law, we will prove them that obeying the national will is the correct behavior (*Vatan*, June 30, 1946; Sevgen, 1951: 115-116; Şahingiray, 1956: 19-20; Goloğlu, 1982: 60).

With this statement, Bayar mentioned the nature of the democratic regime and the role of the electoral mechanism for the functioning of a democratic regime. He focused on the uncertainty of electoral results and interpreted it as the core of democracy. Emphasizing the need for a legal framework in order to secure the electoral freedom and safety of the electoral results, Bayar implied that relying on and obeying the electoral results constituted the basic rationale behind the exercise of electoral practice and holding elections was among the most basic practices of democracies.

Given the emphasis of the DP leadership on the importance of lack of pressure on the electorate, as demonstrated in Bayar's aforementioned statement, as the election day approached, the DP administration reiterated that they were under pressure (*Ulus*, July 2, 1946). The DP administration denounced these occurrences in a memorandum on the 7th of July 1946, where it claimed that the government was putting pressure on the DP members before the elections by limiting their freedom of travel, opinion, and expression, and applying illegal methods (Sevgen, 1951: 118-119).

During the electoral campaign, Menderes criticized the government in a speech on the 17th of July, in Aydın, stating that the government was exerting pressure on the members of the DP not to organize in the eastern part of the country or in the villages, to accept registration of a limited number of their members, and

not to expect to be in government within the next 40-50 years. Besides this, he also criticized İnönü for using his presidential authority in the electoral struggle (*Cumhuriyet, Vatan*, July 18, 1946).

The opposition party leader Celal Bayar also articulated the DP's complaints during a press conference organized the day before the elections. He claimed that the election slips were arranged before the elections were being held, that the DP representatives were hindered from monitoring the elections, and that the administrative authority exerted pressure on the people that supported the DP (Sevgen, 1951: 130). Thus, although the opposition was continuously denouncing administrative pressure and malpractice, the first direct elections in the multi-party system, which were quite crucial for the Turkish democracy, were held on the 21st of July 1946.

Given its impact on the democratization process in Turkey, the first direct elections held on the 21st of July 1946 were to be the most hotly debated elections in Turkish political history (Albayrak, 2004: 90). The DP continuously criticized the fraud in the elections and it was often to complain that the government had exerted pressure and manipulated the results of the elections to its benefit (*Cumhuriyet*, July 22-23, 1946). For the Democrats, the law put into effect on the 5th of June 1946 prepared the necessary ground for the fraud in the elections because it brought a process with open ballot, secret counting and burning of the electoral slips after the counting (Giritliođlu, 1965: 182-183; Burçak, 1994: 12).

This reminds one of the speeches of Menderes quoted above as the spokesman of the DP, giving evidence both about his and Bayar's ideas on the issue. In this speech, Menderes had emphasized the significance of the mentality in

addition to the practice of holding elections. He had stated that in order to practice a political decision democratically, its being perfect in theory would not be enough for a perfectly democratic implementation. According to this speech, for a political decision to be implemented perfectly, the political actors implementing the decision had to embrace the democratic mentality. In other words, it means that the political agent dimension, according to Menderes, was important to consider.

The emphasis of Bayar and Menderes on the importance of democratic mentality was also expressed by Orhan Birgit. In an interview, Birgit stated that Bayar and Menderes were highly careful about the elections' being free, fair, and in safe circumstances and underlined the necessity of a mentality change from single-party mentality to democratic mentality in order to achieve this goal. Accordingly, he argued that when the DP came to the government, it became the symbol of the change in the mentality of political actors. Birgit mentioned the mentality revolution that the DP achieved during its term and the reliability of the elections held in 1950, 1954, and 1957.¹²

Nevertheless, the issue of fraud in the elections was taken up not only by the DP but also by President İnönü, particularly in relation to the malpractice in İstanbul in the 1946 national elections (Giritlioğlu, 1965: 195). İnönü admitted that he was aware of an issue but claimed that he could not uncover the exact details of the malpractice. In the 21st of July elections, despite the fact that the DP had won all of the 23 parliamentary seats in İstanbul, five of the seats were considered as won by the CHP and thus, the DP only had 18 seats.¹³ Ahmet Emin Yalman reported that

¹² Interview with Orhan Birgit, İstanbul, 30 May 2008.

¹³ Burçak (1994d: 13) narrates from Prof. Tahsin Banguoğlu, who was in charge in the 2nd Hasan Saka, Hasan and Şemsettin Günaltay cabinets as the minister of national education. Burçak quoting

İstanbul Mayor Lütfi Kırdar had told him that he had greatly resisted the CHP pressure. Had he not resisted, he stated, the DP would not have had any seats in İstanbul and this explains why they arranged the electoral results in this way. Yalman also narrated that Kırdar told him that when he took this issue to İnönü, the latter expressed his unawareness of the fraud in İstanbul, as mentioned above (Yalman, 1971: 1364, Volume II).

In the elections, according to the official results, the CHP won 395 seats, the DP 64, and the independents 6 out of a total of 465 parliamentary mandates. The rate of turnout was 85 per cent (*Cumhuriyet*, July 25, 1946; Karpat, 1959: 164; Toker, 1990a: 169).

However, besides the DP's success and the high rate of participation in the elections, the first general elections of the multi-party system were frequently on the agenda due to the fraud witnessed in the elections. Metin Toker addressed the issue of fraud in the 1946 elections and blamed the administrative authorities for this:

Considering those misdemeanors, the change of election slips and the pressure exerted by the government, the fact is that the CHP and particularly the administrative authorities needlessly damaged the 1946 elections (Toker, 1990a: 172).

Similarly, Ahmet Emin Yalman referred to the CHP's deceitful attitude in the elections. He stated that if the elections had been held under free and fair conditions, it would have presented a good example for the following elections and thus, would have been to the advantage of the political system of the country (Yalman, 1971: 75-79, Volume IV).

from Banguoğlu argued the CHP exerted pressure on İstanbul Mayor Lütfi Kırdar in order to obtain the five mandates in İstanbul during the 1946 elections.

For these reasons, the reaction of the DP to the electoral results was sharp. Considering that the 1946 elections had been corrupt (Nutku, 1979: 29; Golođlu, 1982: 65), some of the DP deputies refused to attend the TBMM sessions and proposed going directly to the ‘bosom of the nation’. However, the founders of the party, particularly Bayar and Menderes, as well as some other DP members objected to this proposal and suggested that the opposition be made in the TBMM by legitimate means (Ađaođlu, 2004: 80-81).

As observed several times previously, Bayar and Menderes, once more, showed their concern for respect of the national will. Despite an endless debate on the fraud in elections, they still had respect for the elections and thus for the national will. That is why they opted to struggle in the Parliament instead of going to ‘the bosom of the nation’.

The speech that Menderes gave on the 26th of August 1946 in the TBMM related to the 1946 elections clarified the DP’s approach towards the 1946 general elections to a great extent. In this speech, Menderes argued that the 1946 elections had been held in two phases as the phase before the elections and the phase after the elections.

In the first phase, according to Menderes, despite the transition to a multi-party regime, the CHP had maintained its single-party perspective. Although as the governing party, the CHP had been responsible for improving democracy in this new era, it had taken severe and unfair measures against the newly established parties. Moreover, holding elections one year in advance had secured the next four years of government for the CHP by preventing the opposition parties from organizing themselves in time (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. I: 203).

The second phase, Menderes thought, consisted of the measures taken after the elections by the CHP. In his view, the prohibition by the Istanbul Martial Law Command of any publications on the parliamentary elections with the aim of preventing any complaints was a sign that the government would exert pressure on the press and would prevent further developments in the democratic process (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. I: 204).

3.3.1.1. Objections to the Election Results

In accordance with the DP leadership's understanding of the 1946 general elections as lacking security, the DP raised the accusation of electoral fraud at the opening of the new TBMM session on the 5th of August 1946. The DP members declared themselves ready to go as far as resigning from their parliamentary mandates in order to protest the election fraud (*Cumhuriyet*, August 11, 1946). Menderes was also among those protesting against malpractice in the elections. He was particularly concerned with the situation in Aydın and hence, submitted a report to the Parliament on the issue. However, the 'Committee to Examine the Minutes (*Tutanakları İnceleme Komitesi*)', which was formed to examine the documents related to elections, reported on the 23rd of August 1946 that the complaints and criticisms related to the elections in Aydın were without evidence.

Hence, in his speech on the 26th of August, Menderes declared that he disapproved of this decision. He said that the Committee should have conducted a closer examination of the complaints and gathered additional evidence. He considered that the Committee had fallen short in its duty:

The Committee like a court is obliged to broaden the inquiry to gather evidence, to have an opinion about the way that the electoral procedures were implemented, and to inform the general board. If necessary, it should separately examine each and every complaint. Besides, it should be kept in mind that each and every citizen making a complaint serves the better application of the law and the strengthening of the public order (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. I: 203).

Furthermore, according to Menderes, the general belief in society for the exercise of malpractice in the 1946 elections was showing that the issue was not only limited to the elections in Aydın and hence, should be understood as to be witnessed in various parts of the country (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. I: 204 - 205).

The DP party leader, Celal Bayar, also blamed the government for the corrupt elections and stated:

I declare, I even accuse; wickedness has interfered in the elections. The results of the elections are far from indicating the real will of the nation. If the lawless actions and various pressures imposed upon citizens had not reached such levels our party would have won the elections all over the country...When these pressures and lawless actions proved insufficient, the party in power was forced to falsify the election records...despite official announcements, the nation chose the Democratic Party. The Republican Party is preserving power only through the forceful methods it applied before and during the elections and thanks to the falsifications of election records (Karpat, 1959: 164-165).

The importance that Bayar and Menderes attached to the electoral mechanism becomes apparent in the memoirs of DP members as well. For example, one of them, Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu narrated some important details clarifying Bayar's

perspective about the significance of electoral mechanism in democracies. Cerrahoğlu (1996: 28-29) reported that after the elections she was introduced to an army officer, whom asked her whether she could deliver a message to Bayar. The message delivered expressed the army's willingness to make 'the necessary arrangements' upon Bayar's request. In other words, it implied that the military would be willing to overthrow the CHP from government if Bayar requested it. Cerrahoğlu further reported that upon the deliverance of this message, Bayar displayed a very severe reaction. He told her that while they could still overcome the CHP in the next elections, they would never be able to remove the military from power after such an intervention.

This approach of Bayar was also observed in his reflections related to the nature of democratic regimes. As noted above, he had mentioned the uncertainty of democratic regimes was due to the uncertainty of electoral results. Furthermore, parallel to Przeworki's (2003) emphasis on the significance of obeying the electoral results, mentioned in the introductory chapter, he had argued that whatever the results, they should be obeyed by the political parties. Bayar's understanding of the vertical accountability dimension is also witnessed in the anecdote narrated by Cerrahoğlu.

Therefore, given the emphasis of Bayar and Menderes on the undeniable place of the elections in a democratic regime, they focused on the necessity of holding free and fair elections and thus, their objections to the results of the 1946 elections persisted in the following days.

3.3.1.2. The Idea of Withdrawing from the By-Elections

In addition to the points mentioned above, the question of whether to participate in future elections remained problematic. The amendments demanded in the law of elections were at the centre of a continuous debate on this issue. The party leader Bayar summarized the views of his party on the issue in his speech on the 11th of November 1946:

There is almost no meeting during which the issue of law of elections and electoral procedures is not on the agenda. I can clearly state that the elections are not in the spirit of providing security to the country and the people. There cannot be a greater mistake than to claim that the national will can be expressed in a country in which there is no electoral security (Sevgen, 1951: 135).

In this speech, Bayar indicates a lot about the extent of importance he attached to the electoral dimension of vertical accountability in a democratic regime. It is seen that he equated the electoral mechanism with the security of the people and the country. He considered that its improper functioning would threaten the security of the country and the people. In fact, what he implied is that the improper manifestation of national will to the Parliament would lead to conflicts in the country. In other words, in case of a discrepancy between the demands of the people and the composition of Parliament -which would then not reflect the national will-, it would be inevitable to avoid conflicts among the people and this would endanger the peace of the country.

Not unexpectedly, government's decision of holding early elections in 1946 was a lingering subject of debate of the First Grand Congress of the DP held between the 7th and 11th of January 1947. During the Congress, Bayar stated in a speech that he believed holding early elections was a reflection of the government's desire to secure the upcoming four years to its advantage. He explained that although the DP had agreed to take part in the 1946 elections, the government had rejected the electoral records of two DP deputies without reason, implemented martial law and failed to provide electoral security. In addition, he reiterated his and Menderes' disapproval of the DP members, who were in favour of not attending the TBMM sessions in protest against the electoral results. In the same speech, Bayar emphasized the need to secure principles of national sovereignty and to abolish all obstacles to democratic development. Emphasizing national sovereignty as the first and foremost condition of democratic development, Bayar, once more, showed the DP's concern for the improvement of electoral mechanism (*Cumhuriyet, Ulus, Vatan*, January 8, 1947; Mete, 1947: 9-17; Eroğul, 1970: 16).

At the end of the Congress, the points that Bayar concentrated on were covered by a report based on the studies of the 'Primary Issues Committee' (*Ana Davalar Komisyonu*) that was formed in 1946 by the DP to deal with the anti-democratic laws and policies in power. With the report entitled 'Freedom Pact' (*Hürriyet Misakı*), to which Menderes contributed a lot (Fersoy, 1978: 180), the party clarified its stance and perspective on many issues related to democratic development of the country, including the electoral mechanism (Mete, 1947: 48-54; Tunaya, 1952: 650-652, 673-675). In the Pact, the need to amend the law of elections in order to secure the votes of citizens and to conform to the principles of

national sovereignty was heavily emphasized (*Vatan*, January 12, 1947; *Ulus*, January 13, 1947; Şahingiray, 1956: 65; Goloğlu, 1982: 153).

However, one point mentioned in the Pact had not been previously mentioned in Bayar's speech. It presented the option of leaving the Parliament and continuing the struggle outside of the Parliament. The aim would have been to enable the people's will to be heard. As previously mentioned, the DP had considered and rejected this option before. Once again, this proposal was not put into practice. However, its mention reveals that the DP considered this option several times as a way of coping with the CHP, because it understood the people as an important component of political life and attached importance to their 'participation' in the political life (Eroğul, 1970: 27). Nevertheless, it can be argued that since they considered the Parliament as the place where the national sovereignty was represented, they did not opt for this option but went on struggling within the Parliament.

While these debates lingered on, the DP attended the elections of village headmen held on the 16th of February 1947, but the elections were held in a very harsh atmosphere (Karpat, 1959: 183). According to the official results of those elections, the CHP won 91 per cent, the DP 4 per cent, and the independents 5 per cent of the village headmen (Eroğul, 1970: 27).

Because of the conditions under which the elections were held, the election of the village headmen also led to harsh reactions from the DP. Once more the electoral system was the central theme of Bayar's speeches. For example, he elaborated on the link between national sovereignty and holding free and fair elections when he said:

...the first requirement of democracy is free and fair elections with secret voting. No one can mention the existence of national sovereignty in a country, where elections are not free and are subject to any kind of material or even spiritual pressure (*Vatan*, March 21, 1947).

This speech of Bayar touches upon one of the points that are emphasized by Przeworski, who emphasized the significance of holding competitive elections in a democratic regime. It is seen that Bayar understood the practice of holding elections as the simplest way to access the national will, similarly to Przeworski (1999: 23-55), who expressed the significance of the electoral mechanism in order to replace governments without bloodshed and at minimum cost, especially compared to other ways, such as attempting rebellion. In addition to this, as the minimalist definition of democracy emphasizes elections as the indispensable dimension of a democracy, Bayar referred to free and fair elections as the first and foremost condition of democracy and that is why he expressed his concern for holding them without any corruption.

Due to the problems experienced during the elections of village headmen, the Democrats decided not to participate in the by-elections that were going to be held on the 6th of April 1947. They claimed that the law of elections was not satisfactory, that citizens were still under pressure, and that the single-party mentality was still predominant (*Cumhuriyet*, April 3, 1947; Tanyeli, Topsakaloğlu, 1959: 72, Volume I; Fersoy, 1978: 224-226; Goloğlu, 1982: 165; Toker, 1990a: 245).

It appears that the way of holding elections became a measure for the Democrats in order to assess the attitude and sincerity of the governing party towards the goal of democratizing the country. According to them, in order to

complete the transition from the single party system, holding elections was not sufficient. The manner in which the elections were held was also crucial when assessing whether a real transition, from single-party to multi-party system, was being applied. For this reason, they insisted on the need for amending the law of elections in order to enable profound changes in the governmental system and to conform to the requirements of a multi-party regime.

Thus, on the 3rd of April a statement was published to explain the reasons behind the DP's decision not to participate in the by-elections. In the statement, it was argued that the law of elections were not sufficient to guarantee free and secure voting, that the elections held after the 21st of July were held under pressure, that the governing party was not sincere about providing security in the elections, and that the accusations of the government claiming that 'the DP's decision not to participate in the elections was not in conformity with the country's high interests' were unacceptable.

Moreover, it was stated that the DP felt pressured to leave the responsibility for the elections to the governing party:

We should underline that it would be a serious crime against Turkish democracy if an election was to be held under the current conditions, before guaranteeing electoral security by law and altering attitudes as necessary to achieve neutrality (*Cumhuriyet, Vatan*, April 4, 1947).

The DP leadership had once more mentioned the relationship between the improvement of laws and the improvement of attitudes in order to achieve democratization. Although one could argue that there were no differences between

the mentalities within the CHP and those within the DP, since the DP was mostly constituted of ex-CHP members (Ağaoğlu, 1947; Özbudun, 1995: 230; Aydemir, 2000: 152), it would be a mistake to argue, that these statements did not have any other purpose than to make the electorate think that the DP was different from the CHP. That is why in addition to the discourse of Bayar and Menderes on the issue of elections, their efforts in the process of amending the law of elections have to be taken into consideration. The DP, far from deliberately aiming a deadlock, stated their desire to see a fast improvement of the electoral mechanism.

However, the policies of the DP were interpreted differently by the CHP government. Upon the DP's decision not to participate in the by-elections, Recep Peker stated that the duty of voting was highly important for the citizens. He even added that the survival of democracy was based on the practice of voting. For Peker, the idea of boycotting elections could be understood only in case of the country's foreign occupation (*Ulus*, April 3, 1947). Hence, he equated the DP's decision of boycotting the by-elections to the manipulation of national responsibilities that should have been performed by the citizens:

Boycotting the elections in a country like Turkey, where the conditions for freedom are present to a great extent, is a sabotage of national duties. This sets a bad example and could encourage citizens to neglect their national duties. If widely accepted, this habit may take root, thus spoil national sovereignty. (*Vatan*, April 5, 1947; Goloğlu, 1982: 165).

As seen before, Bayar and Menderes had criticized the national elections' being shifted to an earlier date by the CHP government claiming that this would hinder the revelation of national will. Now, the decision of the DP to boycott the

elections was criticized by the CHP members, for the very same reason. The CHP claimed that the abstention of the DP members from voting in an election would render the results unreliable and therefore, the electoral results could not be considered as reflecting the national will. Thus, this decision of boycotting the elections could be interpreted as a decision contradicting with Bayar and Menderes' commitment to the electoral mechanism at the time.

Nevertheless, it can also be argued that boycotting the elections was the most practical and the least harmful way of showing the objection of the DP towards the attitude of the government on the issue of elections. As remembered, earlier, Menderes had stated that participating in the elections and remaining silent would have been another policy to follow for the sake of the interests of the country. However, given the need for making concrete their reaction to the policies of the governing party in relation to the issue of elections, the DP leadership considered the option of boycotting the elections as a more appropriate solution. Hence, the by-elections were held on the 6th of April 1947 without the DP's participation.

3.4. Amendment of the Law of Elections

As discussed in detail above, with the amendment dated the 5th of June 1946 on the law of elections, the electoral system became direct with open voting and secret counting and that is why, the elections held on the 21st of July 1946 became a matter of debate between the government and the opposition within the framework of the lack of electoral security.

Accordingly, in order to provide electoral security, the DP prepared a bill on September 1946 demanding some amendments in the law of elections, such as the citizens' casting their vote in closed rooms with sealed envelopes, conservation of the electoral slips for a period of time after the elections instead of burning them immediately, and recognition of the party representatives in the electoral commissions with the right to approve the electoral minutes. However, this proposal of the DP was recommended for rejection both by the Committee of Justice and by the Committee of Internal Affairs respectively on December 1946 and May 1947 (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 12).

Following the rejection of the opposition's proposal, the government started to prepare a draft law of elections and this draft led to new debates on the issue. On the 16th of June 1947, the government program, which focused on improving the Turkish democracy, was discussed in the Parliament. As the head of the government, Hasan Saka mentioned the amendments that the government was planning to make in the Law of Elections. He argued that the government attached importance to the amendments under preparation in order to achieve realization of national sovereignty. He stated that the government aimed the establishment of a government elected through popular vote and thus reflecting the national will (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 12: 224).

Thus, one of the first actions of the Saka Government was to amend some articles of the Law of Elections. The government prepared a bill to amend the law that was put into effect on the 5th of June 1946 and the bill began to be discussed on the 2nd of July 1948 in the TBMM.

On the bill, Menderes delivered a speech in order to explain the DP's opinion. In his speech, he firstly took up the Law No. 4918:

We had stated that with such a law it would be unrealistic to expect the voting process to be free of pressure, or to expect that the votes would be counted and recorded without any manipulation in the ballot boxes. Although it was obvious that the draft laid the ground for games and deceptions on ballot boxes and minutes, it became law (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 12: 597).

According to Menderes, with the current law, on the one hand a democratic step had been taken, while on the other hand, the necessary ground for committing illegal acts was made possible. Moreover, he stated that, given the electoral fraud in the 1946 elections, change in the law of elections had become a national issue and therefore, on September 1946 the DP had prepared a bill, which was rejected by the government (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 12: 597).

Following this, Menderes analyzed the reasons for rejection of the bill given by the Committee of Justice and Internal Affairs. He cited the explanations in the report dated December 5th 1946 prepared by the Committee of Justice:

The current law enables the expression of national will in the broadest terms by protecting citizens from any kind of influence and interference and is based on democratic principles. In this respect, it has been decided to reject the draft before analyzing the articles (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 12: 598).

He also concentrated on the report dated May 7th 1947 of the Committee of Internal Affairs. He quoted a paragraph from the report relating the democratic

development to the rate of illiteracy. In his opinion, relating democracy to the rate of illiteracy in the country meant that the government intended to delay the amendment of the law of elections. By criticizing this association of the two phenomena, Menderes reiterated the need for trust in the common sense of the Turkish people and argued that the rate of illiteracy should not be a measure used in the advancement of democratization, as he had mentioned in one of his previous speeches. Within this framework, he stated that:

In order to gain competence to rule, it is necessary to accept that this country is full of people with free minds, desirous of their rights and freedoms, and capable of exercising their rights (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 12: 599).

Having mentioned the recent developments, he also made some explanations on the newly proposed draft on the law of elections. Concerning the amendments that the draft suggested, Menderes interpreted it as a step forward. He especially appreciated the emphasis on secret ballot, the immediate announcement of the results, and the submission of election minutes to the party representatives (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 12: 599 - 600).

However, he also argued that the draft was still insufficient from several aspects. He stated that the formation of electoral committees and the control mechanisms in counting should have been improved but the draft did not bring any suggestions on the issue. Additionally, he went on to argue that the draft should have included suggestions in order to eliminate the lack of judicial control over the elections and the lack of means to object to the elections. Hence, Menderes showed

these points that the draft should have included in order to improve the current electoral system (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 12: 600).

Furthermore, Menderes referred to the draft's allowing party representatives to be present at the polling situations without the authority to interfere or document the illegal acts they witnessed. He emphasized the need to provide the party representatives with the right to keep electoral slips in sealed bags before submitting them to the judicial authorities for safe counting. He focused on the importance of party representatives' membership in the electoral committees and stated that the party representatives' membership in the electoral committees should not be understood as secondary when compared to the membership of the elected members from the municipality. Discussing the issue in relation to its potential impact on the security of elections, he argued that the electoral security could only be improved through providing all members in the electoral committees with the right to document the illegal acts that they witnessed during the elections (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 12: 599 - 600).

In accordance with his emphasis on electoral security, in his speech Menderes also elaborated on a new article, entitled '4th additional article'. The article intended to introduce heavy sanctions on people submitting official objections about the elections. It was about punishing the people when their incriminating reports about civil servants, responsible for the elections' being held under safe circumstances, were found groundless. In other words, if a citizen reported a civil servant for not behaving in conformity with his responsibility and if his report was found to be false, the citizen would be punished (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 12: 601).

However, Menderes was of the opinion that this article put the right to object, secured by the Constitution, under the threat of severe punishment. The aim was not, in his view, to avoid humiliating attacks on the officers in charge but to prevent complaints about the elections. Menderes considered that this inconvenience stemmed from the fact that the current government was not elected through legal ways and thus, was not truly based upon the national will. Hence, only a law of elections providing electoral security would enable formation of a government that was formed by the will of the people (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 12: 601-602).

In brief, the common issue that Menderes concentrated on while assessing the draft was the security of votes. As seen several times before, Bayar and Menderes had expressed their concern for electoral security. Bayar had mentioned the need for a direct electoral system and the need for free and fair elections basically considering the need for the security of electoral results. Similarly, Menderes in almost all of his speeches had emphasized the place of a reliable electoral system as a vital step for making a real break with the single party system. Therefore, Menderes, in addition to clarifying their demands for improving the electoral mechanism, made some suggestions in order to secure the electoral results. Since the real manifestation of the national will would only be possible through a reliable counting system, it seems that the DP insisted not only on the improvement of the voting process but also of the counting process and the process afterwards during which objecting to the electoral results should be made possible. It shows that for them the electoral process did not solely consist of voting, but rather was a comprehensive process with different stages.

Ultimately, in spite of all these discussions, the bill proposed by the government was passed into law as the Law No. 5258 on the 9th of July 1948 (Erdem, 1982: 193 – 199).

3.4.1. Debates Continuing on the Law of Elections

The opposition persisted with its demands for more explicit promises and open manifestations for the improvement of the Law of Elections. Thus, the debate on amending the Constitution in order to improve the quality of democracy was still on the agenda of the political parties at the beginning of 1949.

Celal Bayar stated in relation to the quality of democracy that;

I should say that we are still far from our democratic ideals. Since some anti-democratic laws are still in place, the electoral security has still not been guaranteed, and practices based on an undemocratic spirit and understanding are still witnessed (*Vatan*, January 8, 1949).

With this statement, Bayar went further in his criticisms and pointed out that the required changes in attitude had not followed the practical changes. Therefore, he thought that the necessary changes were still being delayed. Although he did not overlook the improvements put into effect so far, he mentioned the DP's expectation for further democratization. Reminding Diamond's theoretical perspective (1999b), he clarified his perspective on democratization and reminded that it was an ongoing process.

Not unlike Bayar, Adnan Menderes argued that the country was in a state of unrest. He related this unrest to the extended period of transition from the single party system to the democratic system (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 15: 165).

The need for further changes was also accepted by some of the CHP parliamentarians. Behçet Kemal Çağlar, CHP deputy, said:

In my opinion, in order to have a true democracy conforming to the Western mentality, the first thing to do is to strengthen the security of elections in such a way that no one would doubt them, and then, to amend the constitution, which was prepared within a revolutionary atmosphere and with a single party mentality (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 15: 173).

As planned, in January, the government declared that preparations for the modification of the law of elections had started. Hence, the government also accepted the view that Turkey was on the way of democracy and seemed to be fully determined to achieve democracy by amending the law of elections. This was also expressed by Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay. He said that as long as the democracy would not be established in real terms, accurate realization of the national will would not be possible and therefore democracy was only possible after the establishment of free and secure elections (*Ulus*, April 22, 1949).

Thus, in 1949, the government party continued to make promises for democracy and to secure elections. In the face of this, the promises of democracy and secure elections made by the CHP were on the agenda of the Second Grand Congress of the DP.

3.4.2. The Second Grand Congress of the DP

The Second Grand Congress of the DP opened on the 20th of June 1949 with the introduction of the 'Report of the General Administrative Council (*Genel İdare Kurulu Raporu*)'. In the Report, the government was invited to question itself on the possible consequences for the next elections, if these were held with methods similar to those applied for the 21st of July elections. It was also emphasized the need for amending the anti-democratic laws and the law of elections in order to provide electoral security and judicial guarantee (*Ulus, Zafer*, June 24-26, 1949).

Hence, the DP leadership emphasized once again the opposition's dissatisfaction with the efforts of the government within the framework of the democratization goal. However, although similar statements had been made several times before, this time one difference was observed. It mentioned neither going to the bosom of the nation nor withdrawing from the elections if the next elections were held under the same circumstances. Instead, the importance of improving the electoral system before the next elections was at the core of the Report.

After the introduction of the Report of the General Administrative Council, the report prepared by the 'Primary Issues Committee' (*Ana Davalar Komisyonu*), in which Menderes played a crucial role as stated before, clarified the main goals of the DP. In accordance with this, it was designated as the 'National Assurance Pact' (*Milli Teminat Misakı*) by the Democrats, while the CHP referred to it as the 'National Hostility Oath' (*Milli Husumet Andı*) (*Ulus, Zafer*, June 28, 1949; Erođul, 1970: 48-49, Fersoy, 1978: 243; Golođlu, 1982: 273).

The essence of that 'oath' was indicated by Karpat as such;

The report expressed the view that any infringement upon the the Election Law was equivalent to a violation of the individuals' natural rights, which placed the citizens in a position of self-defense. In conclusion, the report advised everyone to refrain from violating citizens' natural rights in order to avoid being subjected to national hostility (Karpaz, 1959: 233).

Thus, the Pact concentrated on the law of elections. It was stated that the main reason for discussing the law of elections and the clauses related to elections was to ensure the true representation of national will. Moreover, it also emphasized the right of citizens to defend their rights in case of any violation within this framework (*Ulus, Zafer, Vatan*, June 26-28, 1949).

3.4.3. New Government with the Promise of a New Law of Elections

Given the expectations and the pressure of the opposition, as the new government was formed on the 16th of January 1949 (Ahmad, 1976: 51), it spoke of the need for the improvement of the existing electoral system. Günaltay, on behalf of the government, had indicated the government's willingness to prepare a new Law of Elections that would provide judicial guarantee (*Ulus*, May 14, 1949).

In relation to this, the government considered the issue of giving judges administrative tasks on election boards. In order to examine the issue, it saw the need to form a 'Scientific Board' (*İlim Heyeti*) with members from the 'Supreme Court of Appeals' (*Yargıtay*), the 'Council of State' (*Danıştay*), the law faculties of Ankara and Istanbul and the Bar Councils of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir (*Ayın Tarihi*, June 1949: p. 16-17).

Moreover, the electoral legislation of several countries was translated into Turkish and the electoral legislation applied since 1877 in Turkey was compiled. Furthermore, views of English, Belgian, and French experts on the essence of election laws after 1948 were examined (Giritliođlu, 1965: 235). Additionally, under the supervision of the Prime Ministry, another board comprised of authorized civil servants of the Ministry of Justice and of Internal Affairs prepared a bill to be taken as the principal subject of study by the Scientific Board (*Ulus*, June 30, 1949).

These preparations of the government were reflected as a continuation of the efforts that the CHP had spent so far in order to democratize the political regime of Turkey. According to Erim, Minister of State and Vice Prime Minister, since 1945 the government's main goal was to achieve the selection of parliamentarians through the votes of the majority. He argued that the replacement of the indirect electoral system with the direct one in the year 1946 had also been for this purpose. Moreover, he also stated that the demands of the opposition were not ignored as the CHP was determined to improve democracy in Turkey (*Ulus*, October 8, 1949).

The concern of the CHP government in the new legislative year regarding the amendment of the Law of Elections was also emphasized by İnönü in his opening speech. İnönü mentioned the necessary steps to be made in order to achieve the goal of furthering the democratic system as follows:

Firstly, maintenance of the democratic regime is based upon providing the opposition with secure conditions... Secondly, political activities should be carried out within the limits of the legal framework... Thirdly, we must prevent the citizens from getting into a fight among each other (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term 8, Vol. 21: 9).

During these studies of the government and the statements made by the government, the DP also prepared a draft on the law of elections to be submitted to the Scientific Board. The report mainly concentrated on maintaining electoral security. It emphasized the need to achieve the organization of fair elections by impartial organs that were not under the pressure of government. Additionally, the idea of holding elections with secret voting and open counting was stressed (*Zafer*, October 24, 1949).

At the end, based on the opposition's suggestions in addition to the studies made by the Board, report of the Scientific Board on the electoral system was presented on the 2nd of December 1949. The most important conclusions that the Scientific Board arrived at were about providing electoral security. It emphasized the need for holding elections under the supervision of judges and the need for creating a 'High Court of Elections' (*Yüksek Seçim Mahkemesi*) to examine any objection related to elections. Upon this, the CHP Parliamentary Group accepted the principle of judicial guarantee on the 6th of December 1949 as promised by the government at the very beginning of its term (*Cumhuriyet*, December 7, 1949).

Thus, the most important topic of the year 1949 was the demands and proposals for conducting free and fair elections, as it had been during the previous years. Due to the upcoming elections, demands were centered on this event and on the possible ways of making the elections more secure and acceptable to all. The DP in particular was still critical of the existing system of elections and apprehensive as to whether the government would obey the election results or not.

Given above, upon the studies of the Scientific Board, the government started to work on a draft at the end of 1949. The government stated that:

In modern states, real rule by the people emerges with a representative government. Principles such as the equality of voters, procedural rules of majority or proportional representation, secret ballot, and open counting are required for the election of representatives in any country that adopted the principle of democracy (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term 8, Vol. 24: 2).

Hence, the point that was mainly focused on by the government in preparation of a new law of elections was holding direct elections by secret ballot and open counting in addition to providing judicial guarantee. In accordance with this, on the 2nd of February 1950, the government finalized its draft. With the draft, parliamentary elections were to be direct and to be held by secret ballot and open counting. The vote was to be under judicial supervision. Objections to electoral results were to be examined by a 'High Board of Elections' (*Yüksek Seçim Kurulu*) consisting of a president and six members elected from among the members of Council of State and Supreme Court of Appeals. The Board was designated as an interim organ charged with preparing reports in its examination of objections to electoral results and with submitting reports to the TBMM, which was authorized to give the final decision (Erdem, 1982: 200-238; Goloğlu, 1982: 292-293).

The draft on the parliamentary election law began to be discussed in the TBMM on the 7th of February 1950. As stated, the bill was about the security of the elections, secret ballot, open counting, and judicial supervision. Although İnönü had qualified the issue of the law of elections inextricable (Özel, 1988: 134), the general attitude towards the bill was positive. The Democratic Party adopted the bill on principle. It considered the bill to be a further step towards national sovereignty. Fuad Hulusi Demirelli, on behalf of the DP, explained the DP's perspective by

saying that the concept of national sovereignty was on the verge of being realized and that the country was on the verge of forming the government according to the national will (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term 8, Vol. 24: 157).

On the draft of the law of elections, Menderes also made a speech emphasizing the importance of free and fair elections for the true expression of national sovereignty. He indicated that the center of the discussions between the government and the opposition was to have a law of elections that would guarantee electoral security. Accordingly, for a true expression of the national will, he emphasized the importance of a law of elections that would rule out any deception and fraud in the elections and would prevent any pressure on the citizens. He also declared that ratification of the law of elections would not be enough and mentioned the importance of the mentality during the application of the law as he reiterated several times before (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term 8, Vol. 24: 706).

As understood, Menderes was strongly committed to the national sovereignty and believed that nothing could be done without the approval of the nation. He considered the people as the only authority to be relied on (Bayar, 1986: 61). Therefore, he assessed the law of elections as the core of all debates between the government and the opposition parties. Accordingly, the electoral system was one of the issues most frequently discussed both by Bayar and Menderes in their speeches. Hence, it can be argued that they both considered the improvement of the electoral system as very important and considered it as an essential stage to realize further democratization.

In the end, the new law of elections enabling direct elections with secret ballot and open counting was approved on the 16th of February 1950 by the majority

vote of the DP and the CHP, despite the negative vote of the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi-MP*) (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term 8, Vol. 24: 710; Golođlu, 1982: 293).¹⁴

The enactment of the bill by the Assembly was interpreted as the beginning of a new era for Turkey (*Vatan*, February 12, 1950).

3.4.4. The Uncertainty of Electoral Results

Before turning to the post-May 14th 1950 elections era, one point needs to be mentioned to fully understand how important free and fair elections were for the DP. Before the elections were held, although this attempt proved unsuccessful, it was reported that the government and the opposition met several times to form a coalition government with the aim of holding elections honestly (Ahmad, 1976: 61).

In February 1950, it became evident that efforts to form a coalition government were more than a rumor and that a group of politicians from the DP, including Menderes, had met with some CHP officials. During these meetings it was agreed to hold elections at a less problematic period (Karpat, 1959: 239). Moreover, Menderes and his colleagues demanded seats in the government to indicate the harmonious relationship between the government and the opposition. Nevertheless, due to the DP's demand to prepare the new law of elections by the said coalition, the proposal was rejected by the CHP (Uran, 1959: 556-558; Toker, 1990a: 243-244).

Bayar explained the DP's perspective on the issue of elections by stating that in case of a coalition during the period of elections, trust in the honesty of elections would be stronger (*Zafer*, March 18, 1950). Besides, the DP was also apprehending

¹⁴ The MP was established on the 20th of July 1948 by a group of opponents within the DP that objected to the DP leadership's efforts in order to maintain a smooth relationship with the CHP government. For more information, see Karpat (1959), Bozdađ (1975), and Albayrak (2004).

the possibility that the CHP would not leave the power, even if the DP had the victory in the elections (Toker, 1990b: 21). It must be noted that the CHP was also involved in the meetings in order to come to an agreement with the DP regarding the next elections (Yalman, 1971: 208, Volume IV; Toker, 1990a: 348-350).

Thus, it seems that both the DP and the CHP had considered forming coalition in order to promote trust in the elections. In other words, considering the rationale behind these meetings, it can be argued that the uncertainty of the election results and the majority system's being a 'win or lose system' was creating anxiety both on the CHP and the DP side and leading them to attempt to find a solution benefiting both parties. Despite the fact that Bayar and Menderes had mentioned several times the need to obey the electoral results, which were uncertain due to the nature of democracy, it seems that the lack of trust towards the CHP government led them to seek alternative solutions in order to eliminate the risk of the electoral results' being manipulated. More importantly, apart from the efforts of the political parties to form a coalition government, the reflections of the lack of trust amongst the political parties will be frequently witnessed in the period following the 1950 elections, and as stated in the introductory chapter and as will be seen in the following chapter, will endanger the democracy.

3.5. Elections of 14 May 1950

The DP's election manifesto for the 14th of May 1950 elections also reflected its emphasis on the vertical accountability dimension of democracy. It promised to infuse the political regime with a democratic mentality, refrain from questioning the acts of the single-party period (avoiding *devr-i sabık*), protect the Republican

reforms, amend the Constitution to prevent the neglect of administration for the rights and freedoms of citizens and the national will, protect civil servants legally to prevent them from being subject to the aims and orders of political groups, regulate state services rationally; and it concluded by saying that it was the nation's turn to speak with the motto "*Enough! Now the people have their say*" (*Cumhuriyet, Vatan, Zafer*, May 9, 1950; Toker, 1990b: 20).

General elections were held on the 14th of May 1950 with a turnout of 88.88 per cent. The DP received 53.59 per cent of the votes, the CHP 39.98 per cent, the MP 3.03 per cent, and the independents 3.40 per cent of the vote. The DP consequently took 83.77 per cent of the seats in the TBMM, while the CHP took only 14.16 per cent (*Cumhuriyet*, May 26, 1950; Toker, 1990b: 25-26).

These results bewildered both the CHP and the DP given the way that the majority system functions (Giritliođlu, 1965: 237; Toker, 1990b: 24). The CHP leader İnönü attributed his party's loss in the elections to the way the majority system operates and expressed his views as follows:

We lost the elections badly. We have 69 out of 487 seats. However, as we have received 40 per cent of the votes, this is the harsh result of the majority system...Had it been a proportional representation system, the ratio would have been 6:4 in favor of the DP (Özel, 1988: 148-149; Turan: 2002, 53).

As mentioned by İnönü, the electoral system was far from reflecting the national will in real terms. Besides its role in the competition between the two major parties, it also had a negative impact on smaller parties by not allowing them any chance to be represented in the TBMM. However, even though the CHP leader

İnönü had stated that whatever the electoral results, the honor of organizing the multi-party elections belonged to the CHP (Özel, 1988: 142; Turan: 2002, 53), it would be a mistake to think that the CHP had not made calculations as to how the majority system would function.

This unfair situation in the elections in fact resulted from İnönü's refusal to make any revisions to the constitution or to the law of elections during the transition process. Given İnönü's decision to rely on the political and legal framework of the single-party regime after the transition to the multi-party regime, the final result was disappointing for the CHP. In other words, because the CHP had been almost sure of an electoral victory, they thought that changing the system would actually work against them (Toker, 1990b: 25; Aydemir, 2000: 152). But the DP had won the elections and was to enjoy the quite unlimited powers that İnönü had presumed would be attributed to the CHP.

Menderes drew attention to this inconvenience in the election results in one of his speeches in the TBMM. When he said, "just as Ebu Cehil, they fell in the deep hole that they had themselves dug", he implied his awareness of the CHP plan to reap the benefit from the deficiencies of the majority system (Barutçu, 2001: 453, Volume II).¹⁵

When the great victory of the DP in the elections was certain, the DP published a memorandum on the 18th of May. Since the elections were held without any fraud (Giritlioğlu, 1965: 244), in the memorandum, the DP expressed its pleasure that the elections had been held in a secure atmosphere, owing to both the CHP and the DP:

¹⁵ Ebu Cehil is considered as one of the enemies of Prophet of Islam, Hz. Mohammed.

The 1950 elections were held under conditions which provided for the free expression of the national will. (While our party has played an important role in securing this situation) the CHP has also played a significant part in making the expression of national will possible (*Vatan*, May 19, 1950; Toker, 1990b: 28).

The approach of Bayar and Menderes towards the electoral mechanism can also be understood through their reply to an army officer just before the 1950 elections. Similar to the anecdote narrated by a DP member, Cerrahođlu, it has been narrated that Bayar and Menderes refused an army officer's offer to overthrow the İnönü government with a military intervention. It was reported that they did not take this suggestion into consideration since they equated the legitimacy of a government with its being based on electoral victory (Dodd, 1979: 179; Ađaođlu, 2004: 62). Thus, given their emphasis on the improvement of the electoral system and safety and reliability of the electoral process, it is important to understand that for Bayar and Menderes electoral success provided them with the legitimacy necessary to govern the country.

As for the political parties, the general elections were considered as a significant step by the press. Nadir Nadi wrote that:

The fundamental characteristic of democratic regimes is to provide all citizens with equal rights, the most important of which is the right to vote (*Cumhuriyet*, May 14, 1950).

On the 15th of May, the main focus of *Cumhuriyet* was on the elections' being held under free and fair conditions. Similarly, Ahmet Emin Yalman emphasized the significance of holding free and fair elections for the country:

With the 1950 election, regardless of the results, the country will win. In Turkey, it is time to enforce the national sovereignty and the rights and freedoms with their actual meaning (*Vatan*, May 15, 1950).

Additionally, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın wrote that the CHP would probably win the elections; however, in case of its failure, he stated that it would leave the power to the winning party and form the opposition as witnessed in any other democratic country (*Ulus*, May 15, 1950).

As Yalçın stressed the possibility of the CHP government's replacement with the DP, Nadir Nadi after the announcement of the electoral results stated that:

For the first time in our history, we are witnessing a change of government without revolution and bloodshed. The popular will, as being the root of a democratic system, has been fully realized (*Cumhuriyet*, May 16, 1950).

Having mentioned the change of the government as a result of free and fair elections, the responsibility of the new government was also concentrated on by the press. Yalçın stressed the role of the DP, which formed the new government. Yalçın, emphasizing the link between the responsibility of the party that formed the government and the goal of democratizing the country, stated that the DP as the new government now had to improve Turkish democracy (*Ulus*, May 17, 1950).

In brief, the elections were considered as a peaceful reform (*Vatan*, May 26, 1950). Hence, they can be interpreted as a sign of political maturity of the Turkish people (Lewis, 2002: 314) and as a sign of an evolution on the way towards further democratization in Turkey (Karpat, 1959: 242).

3.5.1. The DP Government Rescheduling the Elections

The Parliament started its new term on the 22nd of May 1950. With the beginning of this new term, the place of vertical accountability in democratic regimes became evident. The Turkish people realized that they could elect the government and that in order to be elected, the politicians were in the need of their support (Eroğul, 1970: 278-279).

However, from the very beginning, the DP government's excessive stress on the vertical accountability dimension resulted in its disregard for the horizontal - confirming O'Donnell's (1994) and Schedler's (1999) stress on the interdependence between these dimensions- and, even, for the vertical dimension of democracy, as will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter. In the end, this led to doubts on the future of the newly established democracy.

The DP leadership, having formed the government, started to enjoy the legitimacy that they had obtained through their electoral success. Expecting no change in the number of the seats of political parties in the parliament they revised the schedule of elections according to various reasons, such as the tense situation in the country or the expected electoral results. Having come to the government through fair and free elections and with a great number of seats in the parliament, they started to neglect the importance of holding elections timely as they defended while in opposition. In addition, they also started to disregard the significance of the other accountability mechanisms of a democratic regime, as will be seen in more detail in the following chapter.

Menderes' reply to a CHP parliamentarian after they became the majority party displays the DP's attitude about the vertical and horizontal accountability

dimensions of democracy. During the parliamentary discussions on the Oil Law, upon the objections of the opposition parliamentarians and their demand for further explanation on the law, Menderes told Barutçu that the nation could not decide on each item separately but had made its decision for a four-year period. This reply of Menderes to Barutçu presented evidence about the weight of the electoral mechanism in democracies according to his understanding. It made obvious that he put the power of the government stemming from its electoral success above all other aspects of political life, including the political opposition aspect of horizontal accountability (Eroğul, 1970: 279-280).

Accordingly, the DP leadership considered that their legitimacy acquired through their electoral victory granted them the right to alter the electoral schedule at will. The organization of the 1950 elections without any fraud and the DP's coming to power with a great majority, demonstrating the people's high support of the DP, strengthened this mistaken approach of Menderes. As could be expected, the 14th of May elections were a recurrent theme of Menderes' speeches. In the speech delivered on the 29th of May 1950 on the governmental program, he articulated the democratic spirit of the new government when he stated: "it is the first time in our history that our Parliament holds in its hands the fate of the country as a result of the exact and free revelation of national will" (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 9, Vol. 1: 27). Despite the truth of this statement, Menderes' interpretation of the exact manifestation of the national will as providing unquestionable power to the government resulted in the limitation of power of the national will; as seen in the fact that the DP started to postpone or cancel the elections.

The first was related to the by-elections. The DP, having won the majority through the parliamentary elections, decided to postpone the by-elections to the

following year. The Constitution required by elections to be held in 1950. Disregarding this, the DP Party Group decided in its meeting of the 4th of July 1950 to postpone them, arguing that by-elections would not change the constitution of the Assembly (*D.P.M.G.M.Z*, Term: 9, Vol. 6: 8-11). The rationale behind this decision showed the extent to which they understood the electoral mechanism as strongly related to the determination of the national will. Since they took the Parliament as an emanation of the national will, any elections that would not have been influential on the constitution of the Parliament seemed useless to the DP. In other words, they approached the most basic practice of a democratic regime in a very non-principled way. Unsurprisingly, the opposition reacted strongly to this approach on the part of the DP.

3.5.1.1. The Municipal Elections

Since the municipal elections were to be held a few weeks after the August 13th headmen elections; the power struggle between the DP and the CHP, which had been witnessed throughout the electoral competition, continued with the same intensity. The results of the elections favored the DP, who gained a greater number of headmen than the CHP (*Zafer*, September 1, 1950; *Girtlioğlu*, 1965: 288-289).

The municipal elections were to be held on the 3rd of September 1950 and since the municipal elections were held nationally and revealed the opinion of the electorate about the political parties, both sides employed strong propaganda. In the CHP's electoral campaign, the main issue was the government's decision on the 25th of July 1950 to send army troops to the Korean War without consulting the TBMM. The CHP stated that, according to the constitution, the decision for participating in a

war is to be made by the TBMM and thus, claimed that the DP violated the Constitution by making a governmental decision on the issue. In addition to the government's violation of the Constitution, İnönü, as the opposition party leader, criticized the DP policies in general. İnönü stated that the whole country was in discomfort and that the opposition was under threat. On this basis, he urged the people not to vote for the DP (Erdemir, 1956: 19-20, Volume I; Turan: 2002, 56).

In response, Menderes argued on the 29th of August 1950 that the 'National Chief' İnönü's reflection of the conditions under which the opposition functioned was manipulated and subjective. Menderes argued that the statements of the opposition leader about the threats felt by the opposition were not based on truth. Additionally, he stated that the main intention behind İnönü's arguments was to confuse the people and accused the opposition of conducting disruptive campaign propaganda. Moreover, reminding the electoral success of the DP in the general elections of that year, he added that municipal elections were crucial to eliminate the last remnants of the single-party mentality (Kılçık, 1991: 157-159, Volume II).

Therefore, the municipal elections were held in a very tense atmosphere. The DP won close to 90 per cent of the vote. After the announcement of the results, Menderes delivered a speech expressing his satisfaction with the results. As stated before, he had expected the municipal elections would erase the vestiges of the single-party regime. After this victory at the municipal elections, he stated "with the 14th of May elections, the Turkish nation had expurgated the CHP from the government and with the 3rd of September elections the people expurgated it from the opposition" (*Zafer*, September 4, 1950; *Cumhuriyet*, September 5, 1950).

This statement of Menderes presents further evidence strengthening the analyses above, about the DP leadership's belief regarding the vertical accountability dimension of democracy. The electoral mechanism was considered by the DP on a quantitative rather than qualitative ground. If the electoral outcome had led to changes in the balance of power of the parties, Menderes would have attached importance to the results. If not, as witnessed in the DP decision not to hold the by-elections, the qualitative importance of holding elections for its own sake was not attributed significance because the electoral results would not have made a quantitative change.

In addition, with this statement, for Menderes, the primacy of the vertical accountability dimension over the horizontal accountability dimension became obvious. His statement about the purification of the opposition due to the DP's success in the municipal elections presented a clue about the DP's regard for the presence of the opposition in democracies. Despite the fact that the political opposition is an essential component of democratic regimes, it is seen that Menderes related the people's support to the DP as the CHP's loss of power as the opposition. The impact of this kind of understanding of the DP leadership will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter.

3.5.1.2. The By-Elections

As mentioned above, the by-elections were going to be held in the autumn of 1950. However, the DP government, considering that regardless of the results the balance of power would not change, had decided to postpone the by-elections to

1951. For this reason, it was decided the by-elections would be held on the 16th of September 1951 (Toker, 1990b: 142).

On the eve of by-elections, as seen through party leaders' statements above, the relationship between the government and the opposition was tense. This reveals the circumstances under which the elections were to be held. The CHP's considering the option of boycotting the elections despite its leader İnönü's strong belief in the electoral mechanism exemplifies the extent to which the relationship between the two parties was tense.

İNönü expressed his belief in the electoral mechanism as such:

Electoral vote is a holy weapon. There is no power to control the executive other than the votes of the Turkish electorate. If the people would courageously use their vote against the government in the by-elections, it would give the most influential warning and put the government on the right track... (*Ulus*, July 24, 1951).

However, as a result of the government's decision to expropriate both the assets of the CHP and the 'People's Houses' (*Halkevleri*) -as will be discussed in the next chapter-, the relationship between the government and the opposition became very severe. The CHP, at first, announced that if the government did not put an end to the pressure exerted on the CHP and enforced its expropriation of the assets of the CHP, the CHP would not participate in the by-elections (*Cumhuriyet*, July 26-28, 1951). However, then the CHP announced that even though the DP was acting against the democratic principals, the CHP would continue its struggle for democracy (*Ulus*, August 11, 1951).

Hence, under those circumstances, the electoral campaigns of both sides went on. The opposition accused the government of monopolizing the radio and putting pressure on civil servants (*Ulus*, August 25, 1951). The opposition leader İnönü, in his radio speech on the 10th of September 1951, expressed support for the government's foreign policy, but also insisted that the government acted in a partisan manner, used the radio as its own means of broadcast, and prevented the electorate from exercising its rights by either cajoling or threatening them (Erdemir, 1956: 61-63, Volume I).

Menderes responded by arguing that the opposition leader made unfair statements and stated that İnönü's claims were not based on evidence. Emphasizing the importance that they attached to the electoral security, Menderes argued that the DP was the real spokesman of the people with its strong commitment to the right to vote and that İnönü's claims were groundless (Kılçık, 1991: 404-405, Volume II).

Hence, the electoral campaigns were conducted in the midst of a political conflict. The by-elections were held on the 16th of September 1951. According to the official results, the turnout was 54.14 per cent. The DP won 52.69 per cent, while the CHP won 38.65 per cent, the MP 0.8 per cent, and the independents 0.58 per cent of the vote (*Zafer*, September 21, 1951; Toker, 1990b: 148).

3.6. The DP Government Amending the Law of Elections and the 1954 Elections

Four years after the 1950 elections, as mandated, the next general elections were to be held and so, during the meeting of the DP Assembly Group, on the 11th of February 1954, the date of the 1954 parliamentary elections was fixed to the 2nd

of May 1954 (*D.P.M.G.M.Z*, Term: 9, Vol.121: 2). Thus, from the beginning of the year 1954, the government and opposition were in an election mood.

After the approval of the election date, Menderes brought up the need for some legal changes to prevent any fraud in the elections (Kılçık, 1991: 348, Volume IV) and said “elections are the most characteristic manifestation of democratic life” (Kılçık, 1991: 350, Volume IV). Accordingly, on the 17th of February 1954, several articles of the Law of Elections (Law No. 5545) were amended. These amendments covered crucial revisions. For example, the new law (Law No. 6272) provided for a more detailed regulation of electoral registers, formation of the High Election Board and its authorization to examine the election minutes (Erdem, 1982: 238-241).

Given these amendments, as stated several times so far, holding free and fair elections can be shown as the foremost priority of the DP leadership. This priority of Menderes and Bayar became evident once more with the attempt of the DP to amend the Law of Elections before the 1954 elections. Although several changes were observed in their attitude towards holding elections, their emphasis on the significance of holding free and fair elections was observed throughout their entire political career.

However, besides their emphasis on holding free and fair elections, the electoral victory was important for Bayar and Menderes to such an extent that while in government, they displayed a behavior opposite to the one they had advocated while in opposition. The DP government considered the electoral victory essential for the stability of the country (*Vatan*, April 15-17, 1954). That is why President Bayar made tours during the electoral campaign and asked people to support the DP in the elections (Toker, 1990b: 287) in contradiction to the demand the DP had made

while in opposition to separate the presidency of the Republic and the party leadership. Thus, it was seen that, with coming to the government, the idea of separating the presidency and the party leadership lost its meaning for these two political leaders (Baban, 1970: 78). It seems that they only separated these two posts in their discourse. Even though Bayar had noted, after the 1950 electoral victory, that there was a crisis of presidency rather than a constitutional crisis requiring for major amendments in the constitution and that the presidency of the state should be separated from the party leadership (Toker, 1990b: 21-22), in practice, they were still functioning as if the responsibilities of these two posts were carried out by the same person given that Bayar and Menderes had similar orientations as indicated through the analyses made so far.

The parliamentary elections were finally held on the 2nd of May 1954 with a high turnout of 88.63 per cent. According to the results, the DP won 503 seats out of 541, while the CHP only won 31, the Republican National Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi – CMP*)¹⁶ five, and independents two (*Ayın Tarihi*, May 1954: p. 30; Toker: 1990b, 19).

The DP was very pleased with the results and Menderes interpreted them as the approval of the DP's policies by the entire people (Ahmad, 1977: 50). Since Bayar and Menderes perceived the 'national will' expressed through competitive elections as the basis of their legitimacy (Dodd, 1979: 98; Sayarı, 2002: 78), they understood democracy as being in agreement with the people and thus, assessed the electoral mechanism as the way through which this agreement could be realized (Bozdağ, 2004: 103-105).

¹⁶ The CMP was established on the 10th of February 1954 after the closure of the Nation Party.

The results were in fact a much bigger surprise than those of the 1950 elections. The defeat of the CHP was attributed to two main reasons. İnönü, as opposition leader, argued that their failure in the elections stemmed from the unfairness of the majority system and the financial instruments that the government had at its disposal (Erdemir, 1956: 296-304, Volume I). However, despite the emphasis on the deficiencies of the majority system, it was also accepted by the CHP that its unsuccessful policies were the very reason for the CHP's failure in the elections. This point was expressed by Nihat Erim during the 11th General Assembly of the CHP:

We failed to interpret interpret the 1950 electoral results accurately; we assumed that the people were simply mistaken when supporting the DP. However, the DP also won the 1954 elections. Therefore, we should realize that people support the DP and we have to accept their rule as natural (Nutku, 1979: 276).

However, the DP rejected these claims with a memorandum on the 6th of May 1954. It stated that the one could not attribute the results of the elections to anything other than the people's approval of DP policies and that any other interpretation of the DP's electoral victory disregarding this fact would be an insult towards the people (*Ayn Tarihi*, May 1954: 23-24).

Hence, with the 1954 general elections, both the electoral support and the way the majority system functioned secured a decisive majority for the DP in the Assembly. Given the fact that Menderes had been at the helm of the party since the 1950 general elections, this success of the DP in the 1954 elections was perceived as

Menderes' success, while the 1950 electoral victory was interpreted as Bayar's achievement (Sayarı, 2002: 71; Ađaođlu, 2004: 48).

Nevertheless, the size of the 1954 victory strengthened the DP government to such an extent that it led to trouble both for the opposition and for the DP. The DP from that point onwards began to act in an authoritarian manner with the assumption that no authority could stop them (Belen, 1958, 1960). This prepared the ground for divisions within the party (Erođul, 1970: 111; Baban, 1970: 177) as well as for the end of Menderes' political career, which came in the wake of the 1960 military intervention (Cerrahođlu, 1996: 76).

As mentioned before, the DP assessed the electoral victory as providing them the legitimacy to govern without paying attention to the criticisms of the opposition. This was also evident from Bayar's statements following the 1954 electoral victory. After the announcement of the 1954 electoral results, he stated that this success gave licence to the DP to leave the moderate democracy aside. According to him, the people had put forward their desire for and approval of the DP (Toker, 1990c: 26). By leaving moderate democracy aside, Bayar implied that, through the approval of the people, the DP government had obtained the right to rule the country without any limitations. He thought that since the DP had obtained the great majority of the votes through free and fair elections, its policies could only reflect the will of the people and thus, they could neither be criticized nor opposed.

Hence, for Bayar and Menderes, with this landslide victory as being the very manifestation of the national will, the DP had obtained the right to govern without any restrictions. Since they strongly believed in an undeniable link between the electoral success and the legitimacy to govern, they forgot to consider certain other

necessary aspects of democracies, such as the minority's will represented by the opposition.

3.7. Additional Legal Amendments and the Opposition's Boycott of the Elections

After the elections, the government made new regulations on the law of elections as an evidence of the point aforementioned. On the 30th of June 1954, the parliament enacted the Law No. 6428, which amended some articles of the Law No. 5545. According to these revisions, the right of a candidate of a political party from a certain electoral district to be included on the list of another political party or to become an independent candidate for a different district was to be abolished. In addition, the right of a candidate that was not included in the party list to become candidate of another political party or to become an independent candidate was abolished. Some changes were also made to the articles about civil servants becoming candidates. It was now obligatory for civil servants to resign six months before the elections in order to become candidates. Furthermore, the right of political parties to present candidates with a joint list in the elections was abolished (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 10, Vol. 1: 41-42; Erdem, 1982: 244 - 247).

These changes aroused the opposition, which interpreted these amendments as an effort to keep civil servants out of the electoral arena and restrict the right to vote (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 10, Vol. 1: 302-308). However, in spite of these discussions between government and opposition, the law was ratified on the 30th of June 1954 (*Zafer*, July 1, 1954).

Besides the reflections of those amendments to the electoral competition, in the year 1955 the tension between the government and opposition increased to a great extent. The closure of the Nation Party, the enactment of a law for the retirement of members of Supreme Court of Appeals (*Yargıtay*), of Council of State (*Danıştay*), of Court of Accounts (*Sayıştay*) and of university professors if they were at the age of sixty and had served at least 25 years, and the rejection of the DP to recognize the ‘right of proof’ (*ispat hakkı*) to the press allowing them to prove the truth of what they have written -all of which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter- led to the increase in the tension between the government and opposition.

In reaction to these policies of the DP, the Republican National Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi- CMP*) issued a communiqué on the 3rd of August 1955 announcing its decision not to participate in the local elections (elections of village headmen, provincial councils, and municipal elections) to be held in September and November 1955. In the communiqué, need for a rule of law was emphasized. In relation to it, the CMP stated that since the rule of law was not provided and maintained by the government, they would not participate in the elections (*Ulus*, August 4, 1955; Toker, 1990c: 127).

The CHP also issued a communiqué declaring its decision not to take part in the elections, stating that their belief in the possibility of organization of free and fair elections had greatly deteriorated. As the reasons for its distrust in the government’s will and ability to hold free and fair elections, the CHP pointed to the implementation of policies infringing the freedom of press, judicial guarantee, and autonomy of university; to the changes in the electoral rules preventing the electorate from freely expressing its will; and to the attitude to lower the administrative status

of Kırşehir from city to district because it did not support the government in the 1954 elections (*Ulus*, August 6, 1955; Giritlioğlu, 1965: 318).

Nevertheless, the decision of these two opposition parties to boycott the elections was criticized severely by the government. Menderes elaborated:

The current crisis is not to be found in the regime but in the morality in the opposition. According to the CHP, while not participating in the elections in 1948 was equal to defaming the country in the eyes of the world and provoking the people to rebellion by leading them off the legitimate path; today, according to the CHP, the very same act is patriotic (*Zafer*, August 11, 1955).

As the Law of Elections had been democratized and the conditions under which elections were held greatly ameliorated, Menderes criticized the opposition parties' boycott of the elections. Reminding the differences between the conditions under which the elections were held in the 1940s and in the 1950s, he stated that withdrawal from the elections that were going to be held under free and fair circumstances was denying the legal way for competition. Since he related the legitimacy of the ruler to an electoral success gained through free and fair elections, he resented the opposition's decision and made this resentment obvious.

However, the opposition parties did not change their mind and punished the government by boycotting the elections. They made their distrust clear towards the government like the DP had when in opposition. The CMP and the CHP considered the idea of boycotting the elections as a tool to prevent the government from exerting pressure on the opposition parties and to make it reconsider its policies (Karpas, 1959: 186).

Thus, the CHP and CMP did not participate in the local elections which were held between the 25th and 30th of September 1955. The turnout was 39.7 per cent (Ahmad, 1976: 141). The same opposition parties also boycotted the municipal elections held on the 13th of November 1955 (Ahmad, 1976: 143), of which turnout was also similarly low, 37.12 per cent (*Ayın Tarihi*, November 1955: 83).

3.8. Legal Amendments and the 1957 Elections

During the year 1957, the opposition parties attempted to create a coalition for the elections (Turan, 2002: 71). However, due to some amendments to the law of elections made by the government on the eve of the 1957 general elections, the coalition conditions for the opposition parties became highly difficult. With the amendments made on the 11th of September 1957 (Law No. 7053), political parties were prohibited from participating in the elections with a joint list. Additionally, political parties were obliged to nominate a number of candidates equal to the number of deputies to be elected in any given electoral constituency. If political parties did not conform to this rule, they would be considered to have lost the elections in all electoral constituencies. Furthermore, according to the law, one who had applied for candidacy of a particular political party would neither be allowed to be an independent candidate in another electoral constituency nor a candidate of another political party. The law also prohibited the nomination of a candidate of a political party if the individual had belonged to another political party in the six months prior to the elections. Non-respect of this law would incur three years in prison (Erdem, 1982: 249-250).

Thus, due to these amendments, the attempts of the opposition to cooperate in the 1957 elections became fruitless (Erođul, 1970: 141-142). However, these amendments, though successfully hindering the opposition's cooperation efforts, led to further opposition towards the DP government.

Hence, on the last days of the electoral campaign, the relationship between the government and the opposition became highly tense as it was observed clearly through the discussions between the leaders of the DP and the CHP (Karpat, 1959: 429). Menderes and İnönü used every opportunity to criticize each other. In his October 11th speech, in Trabzon, İnönü stated that the country was undergoing a political and economic crisis. Additionally, he complained about the recently amended law of elections. He stated that his party questioned the validity of participating in the elections under these laws. However, he added that because of their belief in the importance of the electoral mechanism they had not decided to withdraw from the elections (Erdemir, 1959: 128, Volume II). On the following day, İnönü made another speech in Rize, where he stated that the law of elections had been amended before the 1957 elections by the DP government in order to avoid the DP's loss of the elections and to enable its stay in the government (Erdemir, 1959: 132, Volume II). Again, on the 16th of October 1957 in Konya, mentioning the idea of boycotting the elections, in relation to the negotiations between the CHP and the CMP before the 1957 elections, İnönü stated that they had considered the idea of boycotting the elections but then, had decided to participate in the elections because they felt themselves responsible towards the electorate supporting them (Erdemir, 1959: 142, Volume II).

In response to İnönü, in a speech he made in Afyon on the 11th of October 1957, Menderes stated that their only aim was to consolidate democracy in the

country and argued that for the DP, democracy meant tolerating criticisms and thus, unlike what İnönü had claimed, they were open to the opposition's criticisms (Kılçık, 1991: 355, Volume VII). In a similar manner, on the 12th of October 1957 in Erzurum, Menderes argued that there was no crisis in the country (Kılçık, 1991: 357, Volume VII) but if there was one, he stated in Trabzon on the 13th of October 1957, it was in İnönü's mind, as he was upset about losing the government (Kılçık, 1991: 362, Volume VII). On the 15th of October in Giresun, he stated that İnönü had never come to power through the free vote of the people, but rather had been ousted from the government with the introduction of free and fair elections. He also declared that if the DP lost the 1957 elections, they would display the behaviour of a civilized opposition (Kılçık, 1991: 370, Volume VII).

Furthermore, on the 17th of October in Sinop, Menderes criticized the attempts by the opposition to create a coalition for the 1957 elections and questioned the reason why these opposition parties felt the need to cooperate instead of competing in the elections separately even though they argued that the DP had lost the trust of the electorate (*Zafer*, October 18, 1957). On the following day, Menderes made another speech in Amasya, where he criticized İnönü for his claims about the lack of electoral security. Menderes argued that questioning whether the DP would organize free elections was groundless reminding the people of the election fraud in 1946 (*Zafer*, October 19, 1957).

Given the debate above, one can notice that compared to the 1950 pre-general elections period, when the DP was in the opposition, Menderes and İnönü seem to have exchanged roles and attitudes. While the DP was then demanding for further electoral security (Toker, 1990b: 25), now it was observed that the CHP, as the main opposition party, was making the same claims.

This situation can be mainly related to two reasons. One is the functioning of the majority system and the other is the distrust among the political leaders. In spite of any improvement made to the circumstances under which the elections were held, the unfair distribution of seats within the parliament, inherent to the majority system of elections, led the party in opposition to be anxious about the electoral results and the circumstances under which the elections were held.

Accordingly, this distrust worsened the anxiety on the side of the opposition. Due to the lack of trust among the political leaders (Aydemir, 2000: 241; Çulhaoğlu, 2001: 97), the DP government could not convince the opposition parties that the elections would be held under free and fair circumstances and the obstacles put forward by the government concerning the cooperation among the opposition parties in the elections strengthened this distrust.

Hence, the elections were held amidst these debates on the 27th of October 1957. According to the election results, the DP won 424 seats, the CHP 178, the CMP 4, and the Free Party 4 (*Zafer*, October 31, 1957; Giritlioğlu, 1965: 363) showing that while the DP had lost support, the CHP had increased its votes (*Ulus*, November 17, 1957).

3.9. From the 1957 Elections towards the 1960 Military Intervention

The DP's loss of support and the opposition's gain in strength allowed the opposition to increase its pressure on the government. In response to this pressure, the DP adopted harsh measures (Dodd, 1983: 9; Burçak, 1994: 27).

On these measures adopted by the DP, there are various views. Many commentators suggest that although the DP policies were widely criticized for going beyond the limits of a democratic system, the party never intended to establish a dictatorship but rather was afraid of anarchy; this being stated several times by Menderes (Burçak, 1994: 30-34).

For example, in a group speech on the 23th of February 1958, Menderes stated that even the measures taken so far did not suffice to appease the tension within the country. He also argued that in order to provide and maintain stability within the country, certain limits should be imposed to the rights of the opposition. Furthermore, he added that going beyond these borders would mean being on the edge of anarchy (*D.P.M.G.M.Z*, Term: 11, Vol. 218: 30).

The severity of the opposition was even accepted by some of the CHP members. In relation to the tension between the opposition and the government, Prof. Turhan Feyzioğlu, the CHP deputy from the city of Sivas, argued that the struggle between the DP and the CHP was getting unreasonably tough and expressed his regret for not seeking ways of moderation (Burçak, 1994: 29). He added that the conflicting issues were not unsolvable, and therefore considered the lack of dialogue among political leaders to be the primary reason for the political crises (Burçak, 1994: 35).¹⁷

On the other hand, however, the opposite was also suggested. Some argued that the DP started to exert such pressure on the political opposition that its policies would result with the re-establishment of a single-party regime. Moreover, it was stated that creating a dictatorship was the real intention behind the DP's policies and

¹⁷ Feyzioğlu thought that the problems could be resolved but there occurred a deadlock due to the lack of a dialogue among the political leaders of the era.

that this explains why the DP leadership did not attempt to moderate its policies (Giritliođlu, 1965: 390; Toker, 1990d: 291-292).

Nevertheless, one can consider that the efforts of Menderes to defuse the tension in the year 1960 negate the theory arguing that the DP government was taking measures with the aim of establishing a dictatorship. As a way of solution, Menderes decided to hold elections earlier (Toker, 1990d: 296). On the 2nd of October 1959, during the DP General Administrative Council, Menderes clarified his opinion on bringing the elections forward. In fact, Menderes' sincerity in bringing the elections forward can also be understood through the results of the poll carried out by the party. It was found out that the support for the DP in 1960 was much higher than it had been in the year 1957. Thus, holding elections was also to the advantage of the party (Burçak, 1994: 36).¹⁸ Upon this decision, on the 16th of December 1959, Menderes instructed the party rank and file to begin and intensify the electoral campaign in areas where support had been low in the 1957 elections (*D.P.M.G.M.Z*, Term: 11, Vol. 279: 41-42). Accordingly, the opposition was expecting the elections to be held in 1960 and İnönü expressed several times his belief in the elections would be held in 1960 (Özel, 1988; Toker, 1990d: 283).¹⁹

In the interview held on the 5th of May 2008 in Ankara, Aydın Menderes also argued that the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was sincere in the idea of holding elections in the year 1960. He expressed that; however, due to the chaos in the country and the violent attitude of the CHP, Menderes considered that holding elections under much safer circumstances would have been much more auspicious

¹⁸ This was expressed by Menderes in his Yassıada defence.

¹⁹ İnönü focuses on this issue in his letters to his son dated 9 January 1960, 15 January 1960, 20 February 1960, 3 March 1960, and 23 March 1960.

for the country. That is why he decided not to hold elections before the end of the summer 1960.²⁰

Besides the tension, it was also suggested that Menderes abandoned the idea of holding elections in 1960 because of Bayar's disapproval of this decision. Following the announcement of the DP's decision to hold elections in 1960 by bringing them forward, it is stated that Bayar led this decision to be invalid (Aydemir, 2000: 341). In addition to Bayar's disapproval of Menderes' decision to hold elections in the year 1960, it is also reported that, in order to eliminate the conflicts and tensions in the political scene of the time, the resignation of the Menderes government was proposed to Bayar. However, Bayar did not also take this proposal into consideration arguing that a governmental change while passing through a political crisis would lead to negative results (Aydemir, 2000: 378-380).

Thus, while resorting to elections could have eliminated the political crisis witnessed at the end of the 1950s and would have prevented the 1960 military intervention, Menderes' decision to hold early elections in 1960 could not be realized due to Bayar's opposition (Toker, 1990d: 290; Burçak, 1994: 36). However, although Bayar and Menderes had differing attitude towards holding early elections, it can be argued that this also displayed the fact that they both related the idea of holding elections to the legitimacy of the government. It is seen that while Menderes defended the idea of holding elections under the assumption that it would strengthen the legitimacy of the government and thus would help to cope with the political opposition and the political crisis; Bayar defended the idea of not holding elections under the assumption that the elections would not have produced a strong and

²⁰ Interview with Aydın Menderes, Ankara, 5 May 2008.

legitimate government, while a strong government was necessary to deal with the political crisis.

Menderes' emphasis on the electoral mechanism and the legitimacy provided due to the electoral victory was also evident in the speech he delivered in İzmir on the 15th of May 1960. In that speech, he criticized the destructive attitude of the opposition and argued that such a harsh attitude of the opposition closed the way towards the elections. More importantly, he stated that any attempt to eliminate the electoral mechanism would equal an attempt to end democracy, and thus, clarified his understanding of the electoral mechanism as a must for the survival of democracy (Burçak, 1994: 41).

In the same speech, he observed:

If they (the opposition parties) have forgotten, they should learn that we have been in government for ten years as a result of three elections. Moreover, we are on the brink of new elections and in preparation for these elections. Putting forward a deceitful statement to the effect that the elections would not be held and justifying rebellious activities upon such kind of statements are the acts of those who do not have any trust in the electoral results, who do not understand what democracy is, and who consider debilitating the national will as the only foundation for their policies (Kılçık, 1991: 291, Volume IX).

The point emphasized above by Menderes was also expressed by Orhan Birgit, journalist in these years, in the interview held with him. He stated that the DP government had always been based on legitimacy since it first came to government

through free and fair elections. Thus, he argued that the DP had never violated the legitimacy principle, which is vital for a democratic regime.²¹

Similarly, Nilüfer Gürsoy argued in an interview held on the 30th of May 2008 in İstanbul that it had been Bayar and Menderes that had strengthened the concept of elections in the Turkish political system. Furthermore, she stated that both of them had contributed to fostering the electoral mechanism in the Turkish democracy.²²

However, although Bayar and Menderes had placed a great emphasis on the concept of elections as the only way of coming to the government (Eroğul, 1970: 180), they were removed from power by a military intervention. On the 24th of May, Menderes departed for Eskişehir, where the officers showed disrespect towards him by turning their backs on him and the cables of the loudspeakers were cut while he was delivering a speech, part of which underlined the importance of the electoral mechanism in a democracy (Burçak, 1994: 42). This was to be Menderes' final speech as Prime Minister and the military intervention happened on the 27th of May 1960.

3.10. Conclusion

Considering the aforementioned facts and observations, it can be argued that Bayar and Menderes put large emphasis on the electoral dimension of the concept of democracy. They believed that holding competitive elections would give sufficient power and legitimacy to the party in government. It suggests that they perceived the

²¹ Interview with Orhan Birgit, İstanbul, 30 May 2008.

²² Interview with Nilüfer Gürsoy, İstanbul, 30 May 2008.

power and legitimacy obtained through elections as absolute. This, in fact, could explain why Menderes did not consider holding either local or general elections on time as absolutely necessary after the DP came to the government.

Although for both Bayar and Menderes the timeliness of elections had appeared crucial while in opposition, it was witnessed that the DP leadership did not display the same sensitivity later, when the DP became the government. Given the high success rate of the DP in the elections, as the Prime Minister and the leader of the party Menderes regarded such legitimacy as enduring. Accordingly, Bayar considered being in majority both as a necessary and a sufficient condition to legitimize governmental power.

The nature of the 1924 Constitution also provided Bayar and Menderes with the tool that they were in the need of in order to rationalize their political actions (Dodd, 1983: 63). Due to the fact that the 1924 Constitution had authorized the parliament to use sovereignty on behalf of the nation, it served Bayar and Menderes justifying their political decisions by referring to the national will. In other words, since the will of the nation was directly manifested in the parliament, there felt no need to limit the will of the parliament. Accordingly, because it has been noted that the 1924 Constitution considered the parliament as the absolute reflection of the national will and the majority was represented in the parliament, the Democrats had no qualms concerning their legitimacy and considered the actions and decisions of the DP government as legitimate, while considering the CHP and the single-party era as illegitimate.

This particular notion of vertical accountability held by Bayar and Menderes was, of course, evident in their speeches and actions. For example, Bayar argued that

there was a conflict in Turkey on whether democracy should be perceived as absolute national sovereignty or as based on the idea of national sovereignty while still balanced by autonomous institutions. He stated that while the DP government adopted the first perspective, the opposition adopted the second (Ağaoğlu, 1972: 60; Bayar, 1986: 10). Menderes' interpretation of the 1924 Constitution within that framework had also become clear in his defence in Yassıada, where he had stated that, according to the 1924 Constitution, the parliament was the sole representative of the people (Fersoy, 1978: 407).

Thus, contrary to efforts they had devoted to make the Law of Elections more democratic when they were in opposition, due to their awareness of the importance of the legitimacy gained through the elections once in power, it seems that Menderes did not hesitate to manipulate the law of elections to work in favour of the DP and to obstruct coalitions among opposition parties. When he realized that the opposition parties had started to cooperate, he acted against the principles to which he had originally subscribed.

Furthermore, both Bayar and Menderes made the mistake of simplifying the strength of opposition to its quantitative proportion in the parliament. They considered the number of opposition parliamentarians as the sole indicator of the opposition's power (Aydemir, 2000: 305). Stemming from this, the option of cancelling or postponing the elections was frequently considered by the DP government and thus, their interpretation of the majority as a significant component of democracy became obvious.

It can be argued that only two of Bayar and Menderes' main opinions on the issue of vertical accountability did not change whether in opposition or in

government. One is the connection between the governmental legitimacy and the electoral results; the other is the importance of holding free and fair elections. Since they perceived the electoral results as the only ground on which the governmental power and legitimacy were based, while they were in opposition Bayar and Menderes boycotted the elections in order to put the legitimacy of the CHP government under question. In accordance with their emphasis on the electoral results and the legitimacy of the government, once they came to the government, they assessed the DP's electoral success as the most fundamental motive to make decisions without considering the criticisms of the opposition, as will be analyzed in the next chapter.

Hence, further to their emphasis on the governmental legitimacy and elections, it is observed during their entire political career that Bayar and Menderes always insisted on holding direct, free, and fair elections. They consistently emphasized the principle of holding free and fair elections and thus, did not consider the idea of cancelling the electoral mechanism as a policy option given their understanding of elections as a must of democracy.

CHAPTER IV

THE HORIZONTAL DIMENSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN BAYAR'S AND MENDERES' UNDERSTANDING OF DEMOCRACY

In this part of the study, I will try to analyze Bayar and Menderes' discourse and praxis on the political opposition, concerning the political control and balance mechanisms of the horizontal accountability. With this aim, both the period before the 1950 elections and the period between 1950 and 1960 will be analyzed. For the period between 1945 and 1950, the political opposition movements within the CHP leading to the DP's establishment and the relationship between the CHP government, presidency and the DP opposition will be examined. For the period following the 1950 elections until the 1960 military intervention, the relationships between the DP government, presidency, and opposition parties will be analyzed.

Given that the Memorandum of the Four led to the establishment of the DP as a political opposition party strong enough to influence Turkish political life between the year 1945 and 1950, this period will be analyzed in order to see the relationship between İnönü the CHP leader and president, Bayar the DP leader and one of its founders, and Menderes one of the founders and main figures of the DP.

This analysis of this period will focus on the practices of Bayar and Menderes when leading the political opposition movement within the CHP, the process that resulted with the establishment of the DP and the DP opposition. Besides providing us with useful details about the attitude of Bayar and Menderes when they were opponents within the party, analysis of this period will also provide us with some evidences about Bayar's and Menderes' expectations from a political party and the role it should play for further democratization. This dissertation will concentrate on how, as members of the CHP and then as the main figures of the DP opposition, they viewed the role of political institutions in controlling the government, political opposition and presidency. Since during this period, either as members of it or as main opponents, they influenced the majority party with their suggestions on how to achieve further democratization, the analysis will offer some details about the way they saw the role of the government, president, and opposition party.

However, although the period between 1946 and 1950 includes evidences about Bayar and Menderes' understanding of the horizontal accountability dimension of democracy, the present dissertation will expand more on the era between the years 1950 and 1960. The period after the DP came to power has been mostly shaped by both Menderes, who became the DP leader and Prime Minister and by Bayar, who become the President. Therefore, this period includes many proofs about their conceptualization of this dimension of democracy.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, with the removal of the CHP from the government with the 1950 general elections, which can be viewed as a turning point in Turkish political life, the relationship between the government and the opposition parties was usually tense (Sayarı, 2002: 71). For the first time since its establishment, the CHP became part of the opposition and the DP formed a new

government, a relatively short time after its establishment. Due to this, it was not easy for these two political parties to find a middleway enabling a smooth relationship. Hence, as will be analyzed through this chapter, the horizontal accountability mechanisms did not function accurately during the period of the study.

4.1. The Memorandum of the Four (*Dörtlü Takrir*)

Before it became the most important opposition party of that era, the DP had itself appeared as an opposition movement within the CHP. As mentioned in the previous chapter, four of the CHP deputies, who were among the opponents to the CHP ruling cadres, had submitted a proposal entitled ‘The Memorandum of the Four’ (*Dörtlü Takrir*) to the CHP Assembly Group on the 7th of June 1945 (Ağaoğlu, 1972: 75; Bozdağ, 1975: 11-12; Bayar, 1986: 9).

With the Memorandum, the four signatories of the ‘Memorandum of the Four’ expressed their commitment to the principle of national sovereignty. The Memorandum of the Four, quoting İnönü’s May 19th 1945 speech, reminded that İnönü had already expressed that the democratic principles should be given a more important position in political life and thus, the demands expressed in the Memorandum were neither out of line nor untimely. Moreover, it was underlined that the CHP Group members should consider this proposal as the expression of the personal opinion of the four. Finally, the discussion of the proposal in an open session was demanded (Şahingiray, 1956: XXVIII-XXX; Giritlioğlu, 1965: 169-171; Baban, 1970: 131-133; Fersoy, 1978: 83-85; Burçak, 1979: 241-244, Goloğlu, 1982: 34; Koçak, 2010: 314-316).

4.1.1. Discussion of the Memorandum in the TBMM

Although the Four had demanded that the Memorandum be discussed in open session, so as to make its details public; the Memorandum was discussed in closed session for it was considered as an internal matter of the party (Bayar, 1986: 33). It was discussed during a seven-hour meeting on the 12th of June 1945 by the CHP Assembly Group (Şahingiray, 1956: XXX).

When the session began, firstly the Memorandum was read, then the signatories of the Memorandum made explanations on it (*Vatan, Cumhuriyet*, June 13, 1945). Following, many parliamentarians made speeches on the Memorandum to present their views. Although the Four had previously decided that Koraltan would act as their spokesman, after Koraltan's speech, the other three signatories of the Memorandum also took the floor due to the intensity and severeness of the criticisms towards themselves and the Memorandum (Aydemir, 2000: 167).

Menderes tried both to explain the proposal and to reply to the criticisms towards the Memorandum (Bayar, 1986: 33). However, the discussions soon became personalized. Menderes had later explained that the four deputies submitting the Memorandum were personally criticized during the seven hours of parliamentary session, the agenda of which was the Memorandum of the Four (Fersoy, 1978: 88). For Menderes, the severe objections that all four signatories faced when presenting the 'Memorandum of the Four' to the CHP, was an attack to the rights and freedoms of citizens (*Vatan*, July 18, 1946). Hence, Menderes was uncomfortable because instead of discussing the issue within a conceptual framework, as a matter of principle considering the possible repercussions of the Memorandum on the democratization efforts of Turkey; the discussion was personalized and concentrated

on the signatories themselves. The four deputies were of the opinion that the real reason behind this exaggerated reaction was that instead of coming forward with mere criticisms, the signatories of the Memorandum had suggested taking concrete steps in order to go beyond the framework of the single party system, improve parliamentary supervision, that is restructure the party in accordance with their goal of democratization (Fersoy, 1978: 83-85; Burçak, 1979: 241-244; Albayrak, 2004: 44).

After the defense of the Memorandum by the four deputies, Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu gave a talk. He stated that the CHP was already based on democratic principles. Therefore, the party did not need a democratic reform as suggested by the Memorandum and demanded its withdrawal (Bayar, 1986: 34; Aydemir, 2000: 419; Koçak, 2010: 408). However, the four deputies did not take the Memorandum back and it was rejected by the votes of the parliamentarians who attended the session. The group presidency declared that the reason for its rejection was due to procedural reasons. It was argued that in order to change a law, the Assembly was the authority to be applied to, whereas in order to make a change in the party bylaws, the General Assembly of the party was the necessary authority to be applied to (*Ayın Tarihi*, June 1945: 13).

4.1.1.1. Expulsions from the CHP

After the rejection of the Memorandum, the unease in the CHP continued and Menderes was asked to account for the rationale behind his acts by a letter signed by the CHP Secretary-General dated September 6th, 1945 (Tanyeli and Topsakaloğlu, 1959: 27-28, Volume I). In his reply to the Secretary General, Menderes noted that

the Memorandum was neither contrary to the party bylaws nor to the party programme. He argued that the views he had expressed were in the high interests both of the country and of the party. He added that the rationale behind his acts was the very same as the one expressed in the Memorandum of the Four (*Vatan*, September 22, 1945; Şahingiray, 1956: XXXIV; Tanyeli and Topsakaloğlu, 1959: 28, Volume I). Furthermore, he emphasized that his goal was not to cause chaos or disorder in the political system but to suggest some legal and political changes in accordance with his views on democratization, which included supervision of the parliament, use of political rights and freedoms by citizens, and rearranging party structure in accordance with these two aspects. Similarly, for Bayar, the main reasons behind his opposition to the CHP were the issue of national sovereignty and individual freedoms in that respect (Kısakürek, 1970: 56). For Bayar and Menderes, the issues of electoral security and parliamentary supervision were at the top of their political agenda. They took these two issues as the most important steps to be taken in order to achieve democratization.

However, at the CHP Council meeting on the 21st of September 1945, considering their attitude to be against the party, expulsion of the Aydın deputy Adnan Menderes and the Kars Deputy Fuad Köprülü from the CHP was unanimously decided (*Ulus, Vatan*, September 22, 1945). Upon this decision of the CHP, Menderes presented a statement in the daily newspaper *Vatan* (*Vatan*, September 22, 1945). In that statement, he summarized the Memorandum as consisting of aims to enable parliamentary supervision (over the executive), to guarantee the use of political rights and freedoms, and to restructure the party studies in accordance with these two first points. He also touched upon the speech that he had made on the 15th of August 1945 at the Assembly, in which he had pointed out

that the national will should be made the sovereign principle by recognition of the freedom of the right to vote and through the abolishment of anti-democratic laws (Kılçık, 1991: 43, Volume I). Additionally, he noted that the CHP Party Council had interpreted his articles published in daily *Vatan* on the 13th and 14th of September 1945 as evidences of open opposition and that it had caused his expulsion from the party. In the said articles he had stated that any opposition should be made on principles rather than on personal issues. Moreover, he had mentioned the importance of individual freedoms of citizens, of the need to revise the electoral system, which currently was in the shape of an appointment, and of the need to liberate the country from the single-party system (*Vatan*, September 13-14, 1945). Finally, he concluded his statement by saying that his being expelled from the party would not have any impact on his efforts, as the latter were in conformity with the country's high interests.

Considering this statement, it can be argued that Menderes had a certain vision to democratize the political regime and that based upon this vision, he had chosen to act as opposition with his colleagues either within the party or outside of it. Menderes implied that together with his colleagues, he would not cease to spend efforts toward their aim of reforming the political system. He was determined to continue his efforts for democratizing the political system. It seems at the time he was already aware of the possibility of establishing another political party. In other words, he thought that the political institutional mechanisms in the political system were less than adequate and the lack of an opposition in the party constituted part of this weakness.

Following the expulsion of Menderes and Köprülü on the 21st of September, Bayar resigned from his mandateship in the parliament on the 26th of September

indicating that he shared Menderes and Köprülü's ideas (Tanyeli and Topsakaloğlu, 1959: 30, Volume I). In relation to his resignation, it can be argued that Bayar shared the idea held by Menderes about the lack of opportunity to express opposition within the CHP (Şahingiray, 1956: XXXXIII). He favored the restructuring of the political system in accordance with the requirements of a democratic regime and aimed to realize it either from within the party or from the outside of the CHP. Thus, after the expulsion of Menderes and Köprülü, he resigned from his parliamentary mandate and after the expulsion of Koraltan from the Party, he resigned from the CHP on the 3rd of December (Tanyeli and Topsakaloğlu, 1959: 30, Volume I; Bayar, 1986: 47; Koçak, 2010: 699).¹

The resignation of Bayar solidified the idea that a new party would be established under his leadership and indeed, on the 7th of January 1946, the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti –the DP*) was formed by Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan.

4.2. Establishment of the Democratic Party

With the establishment of a new party, both the press and the academia -in the later years- discussed the real intentions behind the submission of the Memorandum by the Four as well as its rejection by the CHP. About the submission of the Memorandum, it was mostly argued that the aim was just to reform the CHP. It has been suggested that since only four parliamentarians submitted the Memorandum, which makes it evident that there was not an organized opposition; it is believable that the Memorandum really aimed to reform the CHP rather than to

¹ Koraltan was expelled from the party on the 27th of November 1945.

establish an opposition party (Albayrak, 2004: 46-47; Zürcher, 2004: 210-211; Koçak, 2010: 408). It has been pointed out that, had the party answered satisfactorily the demands made in the Proposal, the deputies who prepared the Memorandum would not have become a real opposition. Nevertheless, since the demands of these four deputies were not taken into consideration, forming an opposition party was considered as the sole way of expressing different ideas (Karpat, 1959: 410).

About the rejection of the Memorandum and the establishment of a new party afterwards, again different ideas were put forward. One is that the CHP still perceived politics from an authoritarian perspective and that is why it did not display any tolerance towards the opposition of the Four. The other idea is that the CHP deliberately acted so severely to enable the establishment of an opposition party (Karpat, 1959: 146; Koçak, 2010: 691).

However, considerations of the real intentions behind the submission and its rejection aside, Bayar, Menderes, Köprülü, and Koraltan organized a press conference to announce the establishment of the DP and present the programme and goals of the new party. Additionally, in the press conference, it was stated that the party was not dependent on individuals but on principles (*Ulus*, January 8, 1946; Baban, 1970: 29-30).

The establishment of the DP has shown that the political struggle given by its founders, far from being based on personal concerns, was based on the idea of making opposition within a certain political framework, this, in order to bring about democratization. One could expect that this declaration in which the party was going to focus on the importance of democratizing the system meant that they would make opposition without personalizing the conflict between the parties. Hence, one could

expect the relationship between the government and the DP opposition to be based on theoretical ground and therefore, that the differences between the ideas represented by these two parties would not lead to personal fights.

4.2.1. Mentality of the DP Leadership

Nevertheless, despite the emphasis on the differences between the expectations of these two political parties and the way that the DP would follow as an opposition party, some argued that there was not a real difference between these two parties. Although the ideas of the 'Four' submitting the Memorandum were supported by some newspapers and the establishment of the party was welcomed (Zürcher, 2004: 211), it was also a prevalent idea that the mentality of the Four establishing the DP was not different from the CHP mentality since most of the members of the DP were either previous supporters or the members of the CHP (Ağaoğlu, 1972: 52). Additionally, it was also argued that since its establishment, the party had not drawn an ideological framework (Karpas, 1959: 210; Turan, 1984: 11).

These views can be verified considering Bayar's and Menderes' answers to a journalist asking whether the party was a right or left-wing party. To the question, Bayar told the journalist to analyze the party programme in order to position it, while Menderes stated that they could have shown the DP's place, if only they had found the place of the CHP (Bayar, 1986: 48).

However, this does not mean that the DP was established without a certain goal. As stated by Bayar and Menderes in the Memorandum of the Four and during the announcement of the DP's establishment, the goal of democratization was shown

as the main aim justifying the DP's establishment. In the press conference, Bayar was asked whether the DP was also the product of collusion, like the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası –SCF*) that was established by the proposal and support of Atatürk, founder of the Turkish Republic, considering the need for an opposition in a democratic regime. To this question, Bayar responded that the word 'collusion' was improper and the party was grounded relying on the political maturity of the Turkish people, rather than on a political deceit (*Cumhuriyet*, March 14, 1946).

Bayar was implying that the motivation behind the DP's establishment was not based on a hidden agenda but was based on the idea of reforming the system by democratizing it. He interpreted the establishment of the DP as a step taken for the democratization of the regime since he suggested the presence of an opposition party as a requirement of a democratic regime; in other words, as a decision strengthening the horizontal accountability dimension of the regime (Goloğlu, 1982: 42).

In order to further clarify his ideas on the place of opposition in a democratic regime, on the 13th of March 1946, Bayar also stated that establishing a new party did not mean causing conflict and problems for the national solidarity. He criticized the objection of some, who implied that the formation of an opposition party would result with the denial of democracy and the weakening of the national solidarity (Fersoy, 1978: 106- 107).

Bayar's statements provide evidences about the way he interpreted the place of an opposition party in a political regime. It seems that he considered the establishment of an opposition party as a step that should have been appreciated by all. Besides its establishment, he also considered that the mentality behind making

such a decision was crucial. He clarified several times that the establishment of an opposition party would have meant nothing if it had been no more than a collusive idea. He thought that the opposition party had certain responsibilities, such as monitoring the government and making suggestions to it in order to improve the system. Accordingly, he argued that the establishment of an opposition party as a result of collusion would have meant denying all the benefits of having an opposition party in the political system.

All in all, according to Bayar and Menderes, the establishment of the DP was a natural result of a political process. This process had started with the Memorandum and was based on the ideal of realizing the aims expressed in the Memorandum, which could not be realized within the CHP.

4.3. First Disagreement between the Government and the Opposition

However, even though the DP was not a result of collusion, expectations of the CHP from the DP might have been interpreted as a sort of collusion. The CHP seemed to have been seeking for an opposition that would act under the control of the government. Bayar interpreted that the CHP was demanding for a democracy in appearance rather than a real democracy (Burçak, 1994: 10). This interpretation of Bayar also confirms the analysis made above in relation to his statements about the establishment of the DP and its likely impact on the democratization in Turkey. It is seen that, for Bayar, the establishment of an opposition party was crucial for achieving democracy; however, its benefit for the Turkish political life was dependent on its making real opposition rather than acting in conformity with the expectations of the governing party.

Accordingly, despite the fact that the formation of a new political party was welcomed by the CHP, the relationship between these two parties was tense from the very beginning. This had become evident when the programme of the new cabinet formed by Recep Peker was announced on the 14th of August 1946 in the TBMM. Enough time for the opposition to analyze the programme was not provided before it was submitted to the approval of Parliament. Despite the demand of Köprülü and Menderes for two additional days to review the governmental programme, this demand was rejected (Goloğlu, 1982: 74). Upon this rejection, Menderes criticized the attitude of the government by emphasizing the need to consider the ideas of the opposition party in addition to the need for a change in the mentality. He stated that:

The government did not give the opposition the time and opportunity that it required in order to get prepared for the discussions related to the governmental programme in the Parliament. Although this may benefit the governing party, it is sure to be costly for the country... It is high time to leave behind the mentality, procedure, arrangement, or anything else inherited from the single-party regime (Kılçık, 1991: 97-99, Volume I).

Being very similar to Bayar's ideas, Menderes perceived the role and responsibility of opposition as giving direction to the government by supporting it when its policies seemed appropriate as well as bringing new proposals to the government as alternatives to the policies found unsatisfactory. This statement of Menderes can be interpreted as displaying the difference between the DP founders and the CHP members of the time. Despite the fact that the DP founders were previously members of the CHP, it can be seen that the break from the CHP stemmed from the difference in the mentality of the Four compared to the other CHP parliamentarians, as exemplified by the attitude of the CHP. While the DP assessed

having adequate time to study the government programme in order to have healthy discussions on it as a very natural right of the opposition, the CHP did not see it that way and therefore, did not provide the DP opposition with the opportunity to analyze the programme in detail.

Following this, on the 14th of August 1946, the DP members left the session hall (*Ayn Tarihi*, August 1946: 3; *Cumhuriyet*, August 15, 1946; *Karpat*, 1959: 171-172). In fact, considering the aforementioned ideas they held about the role and responsibility of the opposition in a democratic regime; their leaving the session hall can be assessed as a contradictory act. Nevertheless, this event can also be interpreted as a proof of the DP's determination to act as an effective opposition. In addition to their rejection of the claims of collusion; this reaction of the DP indicated the significance they bestowed to the parliament, as the opposition party. Their decision to leave the session showed that they believed the duties of the opposition party should be conducted within the framework of the parliament. Therefore, they considered that it would be meaningless to stay within the parliament, unless it provided them the opportunity to realize these aims.

4.3.1. Budget Discussions and Democrats' Leaving the Parliament

Another issue that estranged the government and the opposition was witnessed during the 1946 budget negotiations. The government presented the budget to the TBMM on the 18th of December 1946 and Menderes criticized the financial policies of the government on behalf of the DP (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 3: 16-23). The bleak picture, drawn by Menderes, annoyed the Prime

Minister Recep Peker and this led him to address Menderes as a ‘psychopath’ (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 3: 23-24).

As a response to Peker’s insult, the DP leader Bayar asked the party rank and file to leave the session and the DP members obliged (Bayar, 1986: 65). Moreover, the DP decided not to attend the TBMM sessions (Golođlu, 1982: 146). The Democrats had stated that unless Prime Minister Recep Peker would apologize from Menderes, they would no longer attend the TBMM meetings. Besides, many telegraphs were sent to Peker from various places of the country. The DP İzmir Provincial Congress expressed an extreme dissatisfaction in relation to Peker’s ‘insult’ against Menderes. In this telegraph, it was expressed that the resignation of DP members would be necessary unless the Prime Minister repented and apologized to the DP (*Ulus*, December 23, 1946).

On the other hand, Democrats’ leaving the Assembly was criticized by the government and by the press supporting the government. The Prime Minister blaming the opposition described its behavior as the intention of the minority to dominate the majority (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 8, Vol. 3: 24).

Additionally, Nihat Erim (CHP), in the daily newspaper *Ulus* dated December 19th 1946, described this reaction of the DP as a childish act and stated that a deputy aware of his duty would stay in Parliament. He argued that the DP’s leaving the session was a mistake made in the name of Turkish democracy. He also defended Prime Minister Recep Peker and accused the Democrats of not doing their duty towards the Turkish nation and history (*Ulus*, December 19, 1946).

Nadir Nadi, the chief editor of the daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, also drew attention to the need of making some efforts to maintain democracy. He stated that

the deputies who were given the right to represent the nation in the parliament with the people's vote should have stayed in the parliament, thus protecting the people's right to be represented. In relation to it, Nadi also criticized the low threshold of the DP's tolerance (*Cumhuriyet*, December 20, 1946).

However, despite the criticisms directed towards the DP's leaving the parliament, it can be argued that Bayar's decision to leave the session indicates that Bayar did not only intend to make a strong opposition but also a healthy opposition. Had stayed within the Parliament, it might have led to chaos within the Parliament by personalizing the budget discussions. Instead, Bayar preferred to see the DP members leave the Parliament, thus preventing the discussions from becoming sour. The party maintained its reaction towards the ruling party and indicated that they interpreted Peker's attitude towards Menderes as an insult towards the whole DP. Indeed, Bayar and Menderes' behavior, as witnessed afterwards, confirmed the idea that they intended to avoid chaos and were open to compromise.

Upon the decision of the opposition not to participate in the TBMM sessions, President İnönü mediated a settlement. He met separately with the DP and CHP leadership cadre. While asking the DP to participate in the TBMM sessions, he also demanded that the CHP guarantee certain rights for the opposition in the parliament. With İnönü's mediation, Democrats resumed their participation in the TBMM sessions on the 28th of December and the relationship between the opposition and the government became more moderate (*Cumhuriyet, Zafer*, December 28, 1946; Fersoy, 1978: 191; Goloğlu, 1982: 148; Toker, 1990a: 160).

Hence, despite their leaving the Parliament, Bayar and Menderes' willingness to find a compromise had been realized by İnönü. Confirming their willingness to

cooperate with the aim of lowering the tension, Bayar emphasized the role that Menderes was playing. Bayar stated that although it had been Menderes who had been personally exposed to Peker's affront; it was again him, who had been ready to convince the party members to resume their participation in the TBMM sessions, before the convening of the First Grand Congress of the DP (Bayar, 1986: 67).

Hence, Bayar and Menderes were aware of the fact that showing a reaction towards the ruling party was necessary. However, it is also seen that they realized that prolonging this reaction would have led to the personalization of the issue, therefore leading to a deadlock. Thus, they accepted İnönü's mediation.

4.3.2. First Grand Congress of the DP and the Freedom Pact (*Hürriyet Misakı*)

The debate between the DP and the CHP after the First Grand Congress of the DP organized between the 7th and 11th of January 1947; however, evinced escalation of tension. At the Congress, Bayar emphasized the need for removing all the obstacles impeding democratic development. According to Bayar, these obstacles should be considered as beyond a party's perspective and therefore their resolution is crucial for the development of the Turkish democracy (*Ulus*, January 8, 1947; Mete, 1947: 9-17; Şahingiray, 1956: 55-64).

Bayar stated that in order to achieve further democratization; abolishing the legal provisions that restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens and that are not in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, freeing the functioning of administrative mechanisms from the governing party pressure, amending the law on elections in order to uphold the principle of national sovereignty and to provide the security and inviolability of the electorate's vote, and avoiding the representation of

both party leadership and presidency by the same person are the vital steps to be taken (Metek, 1947: 19-20, 48-54; *Ulus*, January 13, 1947; Tunaya, 1952: 673-675; Şahingiray, 1956: 65; Golođlu, 1982: 153).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the DP had formed a committee called 'Primary Issues Committee' (*Ana Davalar Komisyonu*) to deal with the anti-democratic laws and policies in application in 1946. This Committee produced the 'Freedom Pact' (*Hürriyet Misakı*), to which Menderes had made significant contribution (Fersoy, 1978: 180; Golođlu, 1982: 156; Albayrak, 2004: 108). The Pact included the aforementioned four important points (Tunaya, 1952: 650-651) and thus included some evidence about Bayar and Menderes' understanding of the requirements of a democratic regime. In the previous chapter, the electoral dimension of the Pact and the views of Bayar and Menderes about this dimension were analyzed in detail. Considering the subject matter of this chapter, it is now in order to discuss the fourth suggestion -related to the representation of the party leadership and presidency by the same person- at some length.

By underlining the principle that the same person should not be both party leader and President, Bayar and Menderes aimed at strengthening the horizontal accountability dimension of the Turkish democracy. They thought that the representation of party leadership and presidency by the same person would hamper democratic development. Especially since, under those circumstances, the President may act in favour of the majority party, which he leads. This kind of institutionalization of the political system would weaken the neutrality of the President and thus, render ineffective the check and balance mechanism of the horizontal accountability dimension of democracy. Therefore, for Bayar and

Menderes, the issue of separation of the presidency and the party leadership was considered as a prerequisite of democratization.

Although, as analyzed, the Pact intended to achieve democratization; the majority party severely reacted to it. It was perceived that the intention of the Pact was to take the government through illegal ways (Us, 1966: 702). Erim commented that such a decision obliged the Assembly to make several important changes in accordance with the DP's suggestions and therefore manipulated the concept of democracy in favor of the DP (*Ulus*, January 13, 1947).

In the face of these comments, the DP leader Bayar made a speech. He replied to the criticisms towards the Freedom Pact and made the following statement:

While the decision of the Grand Congress, entitled the Freedom Pact, is interpreted as smelling of revolution and rebellion, the Pact is, in fact, clear enough not to give way to any bad commentary. The use of legal rights never implies creating an atmosphere of revolution and rebellion. It was stated that this decision is up to the party and therefore, unrelated to the idea of exerting pressure on the government or fostering enmity (*Şahingiray*, 1956: 68).

This statement of Bayar has some important implications. One is that he tried to appease the majority party by pointing out that a political conflict stemming from the Pact would not have done any good to the democratization path of the country. Instead, creating a conflict would only have contributed to the vulnerability of the circumstances and have harmed the democratization efforts. He stressed the importance of the Pact but also mentioned the intention of the Pact. Emphasizing

both its importance and intention, he implied that the Pact included some suggestions in order to promote democratization without causing any conflict.

Menderes also commented on the issue and indicated that decisions made within the framework of the Pact summarized the changes necessary for the transition from a single-party to a multi-party regime. He also pointed out that the comments made about the Pact were incomprehensible. He especially mentioned certain comments, which argued that the decisions of the DP Congress could not exert pressure on the TBMM and stated that assessing the Pact and the Congress decisions in relation to their impact on the TBMM decisions was inappropriate. Furthermore, Menderes found it meaningless not to pay attention to the ideas presented by the Pact and emphasized once again that the real aim of the Pact was to achieve further democratization (*Vatan*, January 28, 1947). In other words, it can be argued that he conceived of the Pact as an action plan defining the steps to be taken in order to realize the goals of the Party and that is why he emphasized the need of discussing the ideas contained within, rather than concentrating on trivial details.

These statements of Bayar and Menderes could be interpreted as evidences of their understanding of the political opposition aspect of horizontal accountability. Both of them mentioned the importance of the suggestions made by the Pact towards democratization. They considered this Pact as a part of their responsibility as the opposition party demanding further democratization. They did not only make demands from the government, but also made a proposal to the government, this, in order to help the government realize these demands on the way of democratization. They clarified their intention to cooperate with the governing party by sharing their ideas with it. Thus, it can be argued that Bayar and Menderes understood making opposition in a cooperative manner as the main responsibility of the opposition party

and pushed for the horizontal accountability mechanisms to gain strength in order to eliminate the obstacles impeding the democratic development.

4.3.3. Second Grand Congress of the DP and the National Assurance Pact (*Milli Teminat Misakı*)

After the Freedom Pact declared at the 1st Grand Congress, another document entitled ‘National Assurance Oath’ (*Milli Teminat Misakı*) was announced at the 2nd Grand Congress of the DP, which was held between the 20th and 25th of June 1949.

In the Pact, it was stated:

We would like to emphasize the necessity of abstaining from illegal acts that would, in one way or another, impede the principle of national sovereignty and the use of political rights and freedoms by citizens, this, for the sake of country’s high interests. It is an unquestionable fact that those attempting to lead the country to the opposite direction would carry a heavy historical responsibility; they would face the animosity of the nation, which is an expression of national consciousness (*Ulus, Vatan, Zafer*; June 26, 1949).

The relationship that was already tense became even more so with the declaration of this Oath (*Ulus*, June 30, 1949; Giritlioğlu, 1965: 230). This second document received an even more severe response than the Freedom Pact had and the government went so far as to call the document ‘National Hostility Oath’ (*Milli Husumet Andı*) (*Ulus, Zafer*, June 28, 1949; Eroğul, 1970: 48-49, Fersoy, 1978: 243; Goloğlu, 1982: 273).

The Council of Ministers met extraordinarily to discuss the Oath on the 27th of June 1949. Before the end of the meeting, the government produced a communiqué. In the communiqué, it was put forward that the ideas presented in the Oath were such that reconciling them with the concept of rule of law would not be possible. It was stated that the Oath urged citizens to act in illegal ways and that such action could lead to anarchy in the country as well as to a feeling of hostility among people. Furthermore, the CHP government expressed its regret that it was made to produce the communiqué while observing a policy of moderation. The DP was criticized for not realizing that the government had deployed such efforts. Besides, the government also criticized the lack of contribution by the DP to the efforts spent by the government to prepare a new law on elections before the 1950 elections. Finally, the government stated its determination to resist any attempts that would lead the regime to dictatorship and put the internal and external well being of citizens in danger (*Ulus, Zafer*, June 28, 1949; Giritlioğlu, 1982: 231).

This communiqué of the government made evident both the importance that the government attached to the Oath and the anxiety that the government felt in relation to it (Albayrak, 2004: 147). This led Bayar to make several speeches in order to clarify the aims of the Oath. On the 28th of June, he stated that the Oath declared in the 2nd Grand Congress mainly intended to warn the government in order to avoid the repetition of the same mistakes witnessed in the 1946 elections, mentioned in the previous chapter (*Cumhuriyet*, June 30, 1949). Similarly, in another speech, he reiterated that the Oath was solely to introduce the DP's ideas on the need for secure electoral mechanism and only aimed to clarify the DP's attitude towards the illegal acts carried out by the government party (*Vatan*, August 10, 1949). Moreover, he denied the accusations directed against them by the government and

expressed their interest in getting involved in the efforts to prepare a new law of elections to be put into effect before the 1950 elections (Eroğul, 1970: 50; Goloğlu, 1982: 274).

This attitude of Bayar and of the DP under his leadership presents further evidence about Bayar's views on the role of political opposition. Bayar tried to relax the atmosphere by clarifying their intention behind the announcement of the Oath. He mentioned the aim of the Oath as drawing the attention of the government to an important issue and thus, made evident his understanding of the role of opposition in a democratic political system. He stated that the DP prepared the Oath in order to prevent the government from making the same mistakes referring to the fraud in the 1946 elections. He also mentioned the DP's willingness to participate in the preparation of a new election law. He indicated that as the opposition party, they aimed to help the government in order to make more appropriate decisions. Thus, he emphasized that they were ready to help and cooperate with the government.

4.4. A New Era Beginning with the 1950 Elections

The 1950 elections led to anxiety for both the CHP and the DP and caused tension between them. Menderes, in his speech before the elections, had expressed his conviction that the CHP would render good services when in the opposition implying his belief in the DP's electoral victory (*Vatan*, May 8, 1950). In addition to the belief in the CHP's maturity to make healthy opposition; in the elections declaration of the DP, it was stated that, in case of an electoral victory, the DP would not question the actions of the single-party period, thus would avoid *devr-i sabık* (*Cumhuriyet*, *Vatan*, *Zafer*, May 9, 1950).

The decision of not conducting *devr-i sabık* was appreciated to a great extent by many. Especially, as many worried that, in case of a DP electoral victory, the people who had been in duty during the CHP government would be punished (Berksan, 1958: 106; Bozdağ, 2004: 97).

However, despite its being appreciated to a great extent by many, the promise of not conducting *devr-i sabık* was one of the two issues that led to a conflict between Bayar and Menderes (Bayar, 1986: 141).² According to Bayar, avoiding *devr-i sabık* meant forgiving the offenses perpetrated during this period and Bayar insisted that the DP General Administrative Council was not entitled to make such a decision. Instead, Bayar argued, the Parliament was the organ authorized to make such a decision and therefore the only thing the DP could do was to promise to attempt to put a law into effect enabling them forgive the past administrative and political wrongdoings. Nevertheless, Bayar stated that he approved the decision without any reservations, provided that the elections were going to be held in the near future (Bayar, 1986: 142-143).

Here, it is important to note that when Menderes mentioned *devr-i sabık*, he underlined that they would not have allowed individuals, who had carried out criminal acts, to be free. Instead, he explained on the 28th of May 1950 that by not creating *devr-i sabık* he meant that they would never opt for making new retroactive laws (*D.P. M.G.M.Z*, Term: 9, Vol I: 217-221).

This decision of not creating *devr-i sabık* and the relationship between Bayar and Menderes despite their disagreement on the issue have had many implications. Firstly, it showed that the real aim of the DP in general and Bayar and Menderes in

² The other issue was the transfer of the CHP assets to the state treasury, as will be explained in detail below.

particular was neither to cause mischief nor to deal with personal matters but rather democratization of the system. The main goal was to achieve democratization within the existing legal framework. Although the *devr-i sabık* decision led to objections and collusion claims being voiced by certain party members, the DP provided such a guarantee in order not to cause chaos within the system. Secondly, it showed that Bayar and Menderes were seeking to establish a smooth relationship between the government and the opposition, if they came to power. Thirdly, they made evident their intention to pursue policies in order to enable the development of the country rather than dealing with the past and leading to inner conflicts within the country. Fourthly, it appeared that even in case of a disagreement between Bayar and Menderes on an issue, they put party interests above their own and were careful not to cause any conflict within the party.

All of these can be explained with Bayar and Menderes' conception of horizontal dimension of accountability in general and their position as political opposition in particular. Since they attached great importance to the role of the opposition in a democratic regime, they did not want the opposition being paralyzed with the issues of the past, this, in order to prevent the opposition from being eliminated from the political arena.

4.4.1. The 1950 Elections and the DP Government Programme

Following these statements, the 1950 elections were held on the 14th of May and the DP was victorious. As mentioned in the previous chapter the DP obtained 83.77 per cent of the seats in the TBMM, while only 14.16 per cent befell to the CHP (*Cumhuriyet*, May 26, 1950; Toker, 1990b: 25-26). Not unexpectedly, the DP

leadership was proud of their electoral victory. However, despite their being proud of the DP's electoral success, a DP member narrated that Bayar displayed some anxiety with the announcement of the electoral results. He told that when Bayar learned that the DP gained a great number of seats, he pointed out that such a large success as would result in a weak opposition. He stated that a lack of opposition would equal a lack of democracy and therefore he did not want the party members to overly celebrate the electoral success of the DP (Cerrahoğlu, 1996: 45).

Bayar's interpretation corroborates the analyses made so far about his understanding of the place of political the opposition within a democratic regime. As seen above, from the day they submitted the Memorandum of the Four, Bayar and Menderes stressed the significance of a strong political opposition for the democratization of the system. They considered that the opposition played a crucial role in controlling the actions of the government. Hence, it can be argued that Bayar's interpretation of the DP's electoral success within that framework showed that they sought a political system including a harmoniously functioning political opposition.

The discussions, held in Parliament, on the DP governmental programme (June 2nd 1950), also offer evidences about the way that the DP leadership approached the idea of political opposition. It is important because while the DP was in opposition, a crisis had emerged between the majority party CHP and the DP opposition because the majority party did not provide the opposition with enough time to examine the governmental programme. Therefore this time, on the contrary, the government gave adequate time to the opposition to examine the programme. This way, the DP, from the very start of their term, made clear how they approached the concept of being institutionally accountable. Furthermore, Menderes expressed

this, by saying “so, we guess we are making evident the importance and place of the opposition in the eyes of the DP” (Kılçık, 1991: 30, Volume II).

Nevertheless, although the DP had attempted to display its acceptance of the role of the opposition by allowing the CHP the required time to examine the governmental program, this tolerant attitude changed radically once the discussions in parliament began. Indeed, although criticisms on the program were to be expected from the opposition, the debates proved to be so tense, that the DP was unable to meet them with the intended prudence. Therefore, the criticisms of the CHP led to accusations of each side to the other (Giritliođlu, 1965: 266).

While the government programme was discussed in the parliament, Barutçu asked for the floor in order to further present the CHP’s ideas on the DP government programme, however his demand was rejected by the TBMM Presidency. Upon this rejection, the CHP objected to the TBMM President for violating the bylaws of the Parliament. Therefore, Barutçu’s right to speak was put to vote in the parliament and as a result of the vote, Barutçu was not allowed to speak. Thus, the CHP deputies left the session. When the opposition leaders, İnönü of the CHP and Osman Bölükbaşı of the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi - the MP*), left the session, the atmosphere in the Assembly became as tense as it had been in the year 1946. However, their leaving did not have any impact on the discussions and on the 29th of May 1950, the government programme was approved with the votes of 282 parliamentarians (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 9, Vol. I: 143).

Following this incident, the CHP members, who regarded this situation as a violation of bylaws, decided to protest it in front of the Assembly Presidency (Toker, 1990b: 39-40). The CHP members did not participate in the voting session for the

vote of confidence and continued their harsh reaction to the government and its programme. The former Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay criticized the DP government severely. In his talk with the journalists, he stated that the DP rulership was leaning towards dictatorship; for this reason, he made a call to the educated youth to decry the DP (Barutçu, 2001: 440, Volume II).

This particular behavior of the CHP led to some doubts about the sincerity of the opposition; even though it can be argued that since the concept of opposition was new for the political figures of the era, it was neither easy for the opposition to consider the margin of error of the government nor for the government to accept the opposition as a fact of life in democracy (Bilginer, 2005: 226). Under these circumstances, while the opposition considered its duty to comprise the criticism of each and every action of the government, the government believed that its quantitative dominance enabled it to pursue any policy (Bozdağ, 2004: 187).

Despite this, the opposition's real aims were questioned. During the author's interview held with Mrs. Nilüfer Gürsoy, daughter of Celal Bayar, she stated that the attitude of the opposition in general and of İnönü, in particular was based on provocation rather than putting forward convincing claims with the aim of warning and/or advising the government about its policies. Supporting her point, she pointed out that the CHP parliamentarians expressed accusations towards the DP after less than a day had elapsed following the governmental vote of confidence. These accusations were all the more unacceptable when considering that it was the first government to be grounded on the national will and to emerge as a result of the first free elections to be held. That is to say that it was irrational to accuse this party to aim for dictatorship, when it had insistently pushed for the democratization of the

system and defended the improvement of the electoral system as the first step towards democracy.³

However, it can be argued that the expectations of both parties for a moderate attitude were evident from the beginning. While the DP had expressed its expectations from an opposition party, as analyzed so far through Bayar's and Menderes' discourse; the CHP had also announced its understanding of the opposition, when declaring that they would not focus on the personalities, would be tolerant towards the government, and aim to establish friendly relations with the government (Bayar, 1986:149- 150).

Thus, instead of such a corrosive opposition (Burçak, 1994: 25), what Menderes was expecting from the opposition was not fitting this picture. Menderes, in one of his speeches made in Aydın on the 14th of November 1950, complained about the CHP opposition and stated that the opposition was not acting responsibly. He argued that so far no parliamentary question had been submitted by the opposition on any issue and reminded the audience that while the DP was in opposition they had scrutinized each and every issue. Accordingly, he expressed his anxiety about a democracy lacking opposition. Furthermore, he stated that as the party in government, they expected their policies to be monitored by the opposition (*Cumhuriyet*, November 15, 1950).

Menderes' expectations at the time can be said to be in line to the attitude of the DP leaders had shown when in the opposition. Although their opposition between the years 1946 and 1950 could be qualified as severe, Bayar and Menderes had always been careful not to go beyond the legal limits and concerned with the

³ Interview with Nilüfer Gürsoy, İstanbul, 30 May 2008.

idea of not passing the legal threshold. This way one can consider that they conducted an efficient and serious opposition (Eroğul, 1970: 56).

Hence, it can be argued that the significance of the political opposition for Menderes was once more evident in the aforementioned statements. Menderes expected the opposition to control the government. Instead of formulating groundless verbal attacks, he believed the opposition should have used its legal rights such as submitting political questions in order to have information about the acts and policies of the government. Accordingly, he implied that making a healthy opposition would be possible based on the information obtained as a result of using such parliamentary instruments. Thus, Menderes considered the role and the pattern of the opposition to be significant for the establishment of appropriate governmental supervision.

4.5. The Issue of People's Houses (*Halkevleri*)

However, some issues witnessed during the DP government also led to doubt on the consistency of Bayar's and Menderes' thoughts about the role of political opposition in the Turkish democracy. For example, the issue of People's Houses (*Halkevleri*) can be considered as an indication of a change in their attitude towards opposition.

People's Houses were established on the 19th of February 1932 as a subsidiary company of the CHP. Thus, the People's Houses were under the CHP's ownership and the finance required for their operation was provided from the state budget, private administrations, and municipalities. The main reason behind establishing these Houses were to educate the people, to instill a national

consciousness in the population, and to make citizens aware of their civic responsibilities. In the Houses, various activities under the categories of sports, literature, social life, history, and language were carried out in order to realize these aims (Giritlioğlu, 1965: 291-292; Dodd, 1979: 63; Toker, 1990b: 132-133).

In opposition, the DP had defended People's Houses as cultural institutions and was in favor of their maintenance. Bayar as the leader of the DP had expressed his ideas about the People's Houses by saying:

People's Houses are cultural institutions... and, as such, should stay. Each citizen should have the right to benefit from them (Sevgen, 1951: 178).

Menderes also defended the functioning of the People's Houses. In 1932, during an opening ceremony of the People's House in Aydın, he had stated that the People's Houses bridged a very important gap in the cultural life of the nation (Giritlioğlu, 1965: 290).

Despite these statements, however, when the DP formed the government, it started to be irritated by the CHP's use of the People's Houses as its own property. After the transition to the multi-party regime, the People's Houses that were established with the money of the whole nation could not be left under the CHP's ownership (Toker, 1990b: 133). That is why the issue of CHP's property holdings in general and the issue of People's Houses in particular were on the agenda of the DP Assembly Group Meeting on the 12th of December 1950.

Prime Minister Menderes in one of his speeches referred to the People's Houses as the secondary sources of the CHP's assets and stated that these establishments obtained financial support from the Treasury as well as private

administrations. Based on this, he argued that the CHP resembled more a company than political party (Kılçık, 1991: 241, Volume II) and stated that the CHP was unfairly stronger than other political parties and this prevented the relationships among political parties from being established on equal grounds (Kılçık, 1991: 251, Volume II). He also argued that a new political term required new conditions and thus the issue of People's Houses in particular and the CHP assets in general required consideration in order to create a democratic order in which political parties would compete on equal grounds (Kılçık, 1991: 256, Volume II).

On the same day, Menderes restated the principals, which he believed the opposition should follow. He stated that the responsibility of the government towards the opposition was not to show limitless tolerance, as this would lead to the collapse of democracy (Kılçık, 1991: 257, Volume II). In his opinion, not only the government but also the opposition was responsible for maintaining order within the system. Accordingly, the opposition was to mind this point while expressing both demands and suggestions to the government. Thus, Menderes was trying to reach a delicate balance between tolerance towards the opposition so as to enable it to carry out its duty and keeping the stability of the political system. However, this delicate balance proved hard to maintain, as a matter of fact, it could not be maintained during the second half of the 1950s. As will be witnessed, as the opposition radicalized, the government took many measures to keep the stability of the political system. However, the increase in number and severity of the measures adopted led the opposition to become more relentless and resulted with an unstable political system.

At the second half of the year 1951, the issue of People's Houses was the main topic on the DP agenda. The DP prepared a bill on the issue of People's

Houses. It was about the return of assets considered to be of public interest and deemed unfairly possessed by political parties (Toker, 1990b: 138). The bill met severe reactions from the opposition. The pro-CHP daily newspaper, *Ulus* described the bill as an example of tyranny on the part of the government that would lead to the elimination of the opposition. As the editor of *Ulus*, the CHP deputy Nihat Erim expressed his ideas on the bill and argued that this bill violated both the Constitution and the rule of law. Moreover, he described the bill's aim as establishing a single-party regime, a dictatorship (*Ulus*, July 22, 1951).

The bill was on the agenda of the DP in the Assembly Group meeting held on the 24th of July 1951. The DP Group, in its meeting, supported the bill as it would lead to the return of both the People's Houses and assets that 'the CHP had unfairly acquired' from the state. The law included the assets donated to the party by the state, public body corporates, and associations serving for the public good. It was stated in the law that these organizations were not allowed to donate chattel or real estate to political parties. In this respect, the buildings used in the service of People's Houses were included among the assets obtained this way and therefore, the decision mandated their being returned to the state (*D.P.M.G.M.Z*, Term: 9, Vol. 43: 134-136; Erdem, 1982: 462-464).

Even though this law was very much criticized as will be reported below, it also highlighted that since its establishment, the CHP's income had mainly come from state conglomerates and donations of municipalities. The proportion of party members' contributions was very small compared to the income coming from state conglomerates and donations of municipalities. The fact that the assets of the CHP, including the People's Houses, consisted of such monetary and estates donations was revealed in the year 1950 (Karpat, 1959: 207; Toker, 1990b: 66). Therefore, it was

considered that the DP government should take action in order to provide equality between political parties in the multi-party era (Minkari, 1992: 10). Thus, this bill became law on the 8th of August 1951 (Law No. 5830) and a part of the CHP's assets and the People's Houses were transferred to the State Treasury (*Ulus, Zafer*, August 9, 1951).

4.5.1. Repercussions of the Bill on People's Houses

The CHP members were defending the protection of the People's Houses as cultural institutions and therefore, reacted strongly to the bill, which they felt would lead to the end of the cultural activities of the People's Houses as well as the 'CHP's elimination from the political arena' due to the loss of an important part of its financial resources. The last Prime Minister of the CHP government Şemsettin Günaltay also described this decision of the DP as a step towards a single-party rule (*Ulus*, July 26, 1951; Toker, 1990b: 139).

The CHP supporters organized demonstrations on the 28th of July 1951 to protest government's decision and broadcasted a communiqué indicating People's Houses aimed for the development of national culture and the consolidation of Republican reforms (*Ulus*, July 29, 1951). Accordingly, İnönü assessed the closure of the People's Houses as an evidence of the DP government's putting party interests and its concern for daily politics above the interests of the country (Turan: 2002, 57). Shortly after, the CHP published another communiqué, stating that the government deliberately allocated only a one-month time period for the party buildings to be emptied before the next by-elections that were going to be held on the 16th of September 1951. More importantly, it indicated that although the majority party was

not acting in accordance with the democratic principals, the CHP would continue its struggle for democracy (*Ulus*, August 11, 1951).

In addition to the expected reaction of the CHP who resented the expropriation of its assets, the law also led to disagreement within the DP. Although the law needed to be signed by the President Celal Bayar, the latter considering this law inappropriate, postponed the signature until the eve of by-elections, when, in order to avoid internal conflicts, he conceded to sign it. As noted by Bayar in his memoirs, one of the two issues that he and Menderes could not agree on was the issue of CHP assets and the People's Houses and the other was, as noted above, the decision of not creating *devr-i sabık* (Bayar, 1986: 141-144). It is important here to note that Bayar's attitude on the issue of CHP assets was related to the decision of avoiding *devr-i sabık*. He thought the decision for expropriating the CHP assets contradicted the promise of avoiding *devr-i sabık* (Bozdağ, 2004: 141-145). However, Menderes' interpretation of the issue was the very opposite of Bayar's. According to him, the decision of expropriating the CHP assets was for the return of state assets to the state and not to punish the opposition, who used state assets for its own gains (Bozdağ, 2004: 97).

Given the fact that Menderes was the head of the People's House of Aydın at the beginning of his political career, it is necessary to decipher his advocating the transfer of some of the CHP assets to the Treasury and the closure of the People's Houses on the 12th of December 1950. It seems that, as time went by, he changed his mind considering that these institutions could not fulfill their mission to infuse the people with the democratic culture as well as support social and national solidarity. He also thought that the People's Houses were considered to be under the impact of a totalitarian mentality (Kılçık, 1991: 245-258, Volume II). As the

People's Houses occupied an important position in his political career, it would not be a mistake to argue that, for Menderes, arriving at such a decision was not easy. This is confirmed by the fact that he discussed the issue several times with Barutçu, the deputy chair of the CHP, in order to find alternative solutions. In his meetings with Barutçu, one of the alternative solutions discussed was changing the status of these Houses to place them under the authority of universities instead of closing them (Giritliođlu, 1965: 292; Toker, 1990b: 136-138).

As for the partial expropriation of the CHP assets and their transfer to State Treasury, it can be assessed as a just act. In the interviews the author held with Mr. Mehmet Ali Bayar (nephew of Refik Koraltan) on the 8th of October 2008 and with Mr. Talat Asal (lawyer of Adnan Menderes in Yassıada) on the 14th of March 2009 in Ankara on the issue of People's Houses, they both stated that the closure of the People's Houses was to break with the past. Moreover, they emphasized that the attitude of the DP in relation to the CHP assets was nothing more than a sign of their attitude of democratization. According to them, the main aim of this policy was to achieve democratization within the state.

Similar to the point emphasized by Mehmet Ali Bayar and Talat Asal, Orhan Birgit (journalist), also stated that the DP only performed its duty by transferring the assets of the people, which were in the possession of the CHP, to the state. That is why, he argued that criticisms towards the DP in relation to this decision were meaningless.⁴ Others too argued that it could be seen as a justifiable decision, interpreting it as the repossession of the estate saved by the CHP during the single-party era (Erođul, 1970: 74).

⁴ Interview with Orhan Birgit, İstanbul, 30 May 2008.

However, the decision was differently interpreted by the CHP. It was interpreted as a move to weaken the opposition (Eroğul, 1970: 74). Moreover, among other things, the DP's closing the People's Houses and its libraries was considered as a terrible mistake. As had also been suggested by some DP members, considering the people's need for education, at least these institution's libraries should have been protected (Berksan, 1958: 349; Albayrak, 2004: 213).⁵

Considering all these different interpretations of the issue, the reason behind the disagreement between Bayar and Menderes becomes clearer within the framework of the horizontal accountability dimension. It can be argued that Bayar interpreted this decision as contradictory to their promise of not creating *devr-i sabık*, and he did not consider this decision within the framework of improving the horizontal accountability mechanisms in the present system. Instead, he perceived it as a punishment of the CHP government for the past. However, Menderes considered this decision as an act of improvement of the political opposition aspect of the horizontal accountability dimension of the regime. He defended this decision by concentrating on the fact that the political parties should have competed on equal grounds. He thought that in a democratic system, there should be limits to the amount of financial support a political party could receive. Beyond these limits, he thought, a political party could no longer be considered as a political party, but rather looked like a company. Accordingly, the competition between them started to turn into an unequal one. It seems that while Bayar did not approve the decision since he considered it weakened the opposition, which he viewed as an important part of the political system, Menderes defended it as a step providing an equal basis for political parties to compete and as such, a necessary step for a stronger political structure.

⁵ This decision was also interpreted as an imprudent decision.

Thus, it can be argued that although both of them viewed the issue within the framework of the need of a properly functioning political opposition, Bayar considered it as weakening the political parties, while Menderes assessed it as for its development.

4.5.2. CHP Assests on the DP Agenda Once More

The remainder of the CHP's assets was also on the agenda of the government two years later. The DP began its discussion on the issue of the illegitimate acquisition of CHP property on the 9th of June 1953.

As mentioned in the above analysis, when Menderes' previous expressions about the image of the CHP as a commercial company rather than a political party are considered, it can be argued that the aim of Menderes was not to weaken the CHP by taking some of its financial resources. In the Group meeting on the 9th of June 1953, he explained his ideas on the issue. He stated that as the political party in government one of their main responsibilities was to provide the opposition parties with safe conditions in order to allow them to constitute a real opposition. The majority party, according to him, should be careful not to anger the opposition parties for the sake of democracy.

He said:

My friends, we have to consider not only today, but also tomorrow. The continuation of the interaction between political parties under healthy circumstances is quite important for the establishment of democracy in this country (*D.P.M.G.M.Z*, Term: 9, Vol. 100: 90).

Menderes concentrated his attention on the interaction between political parties. Accordingly, he emphasized the need for the political parties to compete among themselves on an equal basis in order to achieve democratization of the country. Menderes' main goal and desire were the survival of democracy in Turkey, for this reason the nature of interactions among political parties needed to be improved. While making his decisions, he said, he considered their possible impact on the development of Turkish democracy and the decision on the CHP assets was evaluated within this context as well.

However, Menderes' focus on the issue within the framework of democratization and efforts to maintain a moderate attitude did not suffice to prevent the decision to expropriate a great part of the CHP assets from being taken. On the 17th of November 1953, the DP brought up again the law about the financial resources of the CHP. Besides Menderes' moderate attitude, some of the group members approached the issue from a more radical perspective. They argued that the previous law on the CHP assets was not sufficient to recover the assets illegally possessed by the CHP and therefore that a new law was necessary (*D.P.M.G.M.Z*, Term: 9, Vol.107: 53 -54).

What Menderes concentrated on was that, due to its financial resources, the balance of power could have changed in favor of the CHP. He implied that the political parties should have taken their power not from their financial sources but from the policies that they were developing. Thus, although he was uncomfortable with the financial power of the CHP, he acted carefully so as not to cause anything further than creating the equal conditions necessary for the politics to be conducted democratically. Nevertheless, the demand on the side of partisan DP members to

expropriate all the assets of the CHP was so strong that the moderate attitude of Menderes was replaced by a radical approach.

Given the growing extremism on this issue within the DP, its Assembly Group decided to propose the expropriation of all the assets of the CHP. According to this law (Law No, 6195), all movable and immovable assets and money of the CHP were going to be transferred to the State Treasury. Only the movable goods in the party building, considered, by the Ministry of Finance, as vital for party activities were going to be excluded by the law (Erdem, 1982: 466-467). The bill was presented on the 9th of December 1953 in the TBMM.

On the 10th of December 1953, the CHP issued a communiqué which stated that the issue of CHP assets should have been considered by an independent court instead of a political party (*Ulus*, December 11, 1953; Ahmad, 1976: 117). In accordance with the rationale of the communiqué, İnönü assessed the bill as the government's attempt to put pressure on the parliament. About the bill confiscating the financial property of the Republican People's Party, he stated that it was against the Constitution. Thus, he argued that the issue had become an issue of regime rather than the issue of CHP assets and thus, the legal dimension of the regime was depreciated to a great extent (Toker, 1990b: 256). This speech of İnönü led to discussions within the Parliament and since there was not enough peace and quiet in the parliament to enable him continue his speech, İnönü and the CHP parliamentarians left the session hall in order to protest the government (*Ulus, Zafer*, December 15, 1953).

On the 14th of December 1953, Menderes took the floor after İnönü's speech and criticized the attitude of the opposition. He argued that the opposition did not

produce any idea and instead continuously insulted the government, which only aimed to serve the country (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 9, Vol. 26: 175). He made evident his expectations from the opposition once more. He assessed the decision of the CHP to leave the session as an insult towards the government. He reminded that, in the parliament, the government and opposition parties were to discuss issues and find compromises. Thus, he meant that, although the opposition was not obliged to accept the government's decisions, it should at least respect them and when it felt the policies needed improvement, it should stay within Parliament in order to discuss its views.

He also stated that they would evaluate, based on the elections to be held months later, whether they had committed a mistake by deciding to transfer the illegally obtained CHP assets to the state (*Zafer*, December 15, 1953). With this statement, as argued several times in the previous chapter, Menderes showed once more the priority he attached to the vertical accountability mechanism over the horizontal accountability mechanisms.

It is evident that this law was a turning point in the relationship between the government (Sayarı, 2002: 71; Albayrak, 2004: 218) and the opposition and brought to the surface the ever-increasing distance between these parties' perspectives. While the governing party described this law as aiming the return of the unfairly acquired assets to the state, the opposition party assessed the law as illegal and stated that the decision-making authority for the issue should not have been a political party, the DP, but the judiciary. Accordingly, the CHP interpreted the decision on its assets as stemming from the DP's aim to weaken the party to avoid the CHP's electoral success (*Ulus*, December 14, 1953; Giritlioğlu, 1965: 304-305).

However, in addition to the conflict between these two parties, the law also created conflicts internal to the DP (Nutku, 1979: 244; Burçak, 1998: 176). Some argued that the repossession of the CHP property with the claim that it was owned unlawfully was groundless. They argued that this claim was not supported by a legal ruling and therefore, it was no more than an allegation. In other words, this law was considered as illegitimate both in legal and political terms (Eroğul, 1970: 87).

The law remained for a long time on the agenda of both the press and the public. Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, journalist of daily *Ulus*, in his article dated December 17th 1953, emphasized the futility of groups of citizens sending telegraphs to President Bayar urging him to veto the law, given that the President was not neutral, as illustrated by his position on the issue of the People's Houses (*Ulus*, December 17, 1953). Nihat Erim in his article published in *Ulus* argued that the judiciary, not the majority party, should have decided on the issue (*Ulus*, December 20, 1953).

As mentioned above, the law was criticized not only by the press, but also by the lawyers. Bülent Nuri Esen, a professor of Constitutional Law, interpreted the law as retroactive. More importantly, he stated that the mentality of law was that of jeopardizing the Republican principles and thus not in conformity with the law. Similarly, another Constitutional Law professor Hüseyin Nail Kubalı also criticized the law. He expressed that the law was contrary to the legal principles stipulated by the Constitution and to the international law, which Turkey has adhered to (Albayrak, 2004: 220-221).

Thus, as seen above, in addition to the legal criticisms of the law, the role of Bayar was also questioned. It was argued that expecting Bayar to veto the law was in vain since he was not neutral. This idea is important to analyze considering Bayar's

ratification of the law closing the People's Houses despite his objection to that decision. As stated before, Bayar assessed the decision of closing the People's Houses and transferring part of the CHP assets to the Treasury as contradicting their promise of avoiding *devr-i sabık*. Accordingly, it can be assumed that he did not approve the ongoing course of events. However, despite the separation of the presidency from the party leadership established after the DP became government, he remained the previous leader of the DP and as such an undeniably strong supporter of the party. Thus, it was to be expected that he would inevitably take the party's interests into consideration. For that reason and due to the fact that he was an experienced politician while Menderes was at the beginning of his political career, especially during the first years of the DP government, Bayar supervised both the party and Menderes and therefore, was greatly involved both in the party and in governmental matters (Toker, 1990b: 36; Harris, 2002:50).

Thus, Bayar also took the interests of the DP into consideration while making governmental decisions and this law was an example of this. Almost all of the decisions were made during key periods such as the period before the DP Congress or before the general elections and during such times, the unity and solidarity of the party were particularly important. Knowing this, Bayar could not possibly remain neutral; therefore his objections were only voiced orally. This shows that the DP government's separating the presidency from the party leadership, which they defended while in opposition, did not suffice to strengthen the supervision of the president over the government. In other words, in spite of their intention to improve the supervision over the government, the solution they adopted to achieve this proved insufficient. Thus, despite the efforts of the DP to improve the horizontal accountability mechanisms of the system, due to the structure provided by the 1924

Constitution, cases when the President could not control the government's decisions were witnessed, particularly during periods crucial for maintaining solidarity within the DP.

According to the 1924 Constitution, the TBMM was based on the unity of executive, legislative, and judiciary powers and was granted with the authority to pass laws without there being a body responsible for reviewing the laws passed by it. In a political structure thus designed, the president of the Republic becomes the sole authority able to veto the laws passed by the parliament. However, as mentioned above, since the president was a strong supporter of the majority party, expecting him to act against the best interests of the majority party was unrealistic (Karpas, 1959: 388; Ahmad, 2000: 112-113; Zürcher, 2004: 232). Thus, rather than being shaped by the supervisory attitude of a president over the government; the political process was mostly shaped by the cooperative attitude of Bayar and Menderes, who gave priority to the interests of the DP.

As a result, the Law No. 6195 aiming to expropriate the assets of the CHP was put into effect before the 1954 general elections. Considering the results of 1954 elections, one can argue that if intent of the DP was indeed to weaken the CHP deliberately, it achieved its aim to a great extent as the main opposition party leader İnönü expressed when he said that a party in government with such a great majority could make any decision it seemed necessary without being in the need of the support of the opposition parties (Turan, 2002: 63).

Thus, while the law led to serious disagreement and discussions in political and legal quarters, one may speculate that it provided the majority party with an increased confidence and freedom of movement due to its landslide victory in the

elections. However, as stated in the previous chapter and as will be elaborated below, this was not beneficial to the DP government. Instead, in addition to the weakness of the institutional control of the presidency over the government, the supervision of the government by the political opposition parties was also weakened to a great extent.

4.6. The Ongoing Tension between the Government and the Opposition

The other issue of which legality was questioned was the closure of the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi-MP*) on the 8th of July 1953 on the grounds that it was involved in reactionary activities. The MP held its Grand Congress of between the 27th and 29th of June 1953 in Ankara (*Vatan*, June 28-30, 1953). In the Congress, some delegates suggested the reestablishment of the caliphate, the revival of the sultanic rule, the abolishment of civil law, the application of Islamic law, and the return to the use of the Arabic alphabet (Toker, 1990b: 239).

Following the MP Congress, the DP Assembly Group convened extraordinarily on the 7th of July, 1953. In the meeting, violation of the Constitution with the establishment of associations based on religion was emphasized. In accordance with this, the focus was on the acts and policies of the MP that were understood as aiming to shape the party as a religious-oriented one.

In his speech, Menderes also concentrated on similar points. He argued that the DP did not disapprove of religion, but rather stood against the reactionary tendencies. He stated that:

According to the current regulations, sanctions should be imposed on this network of treachery.

The task and responsibility of avoiding this treachery to continue and to ruin the concurrence and political structure of this country are on you (*D.P.M.G.M.Z*, Term: 9, Vol. 102: 15-16).

Thus, the DP Group decided for the closure of the MP on the 8th of July because of its “use of religion for political interests and attempted misconduct” (Eroğul, 1970: 88). The closure of the party was severely objected to by the party members. The party leader Osman Bölükbaşı accused Menderes of dictatorship and stated that the DP group has started to behave as a court (Toker, 1990b: 241).

As a response, Menderes, at the DP Group meeting held on the 14th of July, stated once more that they would not allow reactionary activities. He argued that since its establishment, the MP that was determined to exploit religion for its political interests did not make a healthy opposition and disturbed the peace and order within the society (*D. P. M. G. M. Z*, Term: 9, Vol. 103: 83-91).

The CHP was apprehensive of this decision of the government and issued a memorandum on the 15th of July 1953 in order to criticize the government’s decision related to the closure of the MP. Firstly emphasizing its commitment to the Republican values and reforms, the CHP criticized the closure of a political party without due process of law (Toker, 1990b: 242-243). It is important here to note that the CHP did not oppose the closure of the MP but rather the manner in which this closure was conducted. They criticized the political procedures applied by the government in order to close a political party while legal ways were available and should have been applied in such cases.

However, the government fiercely criticized this communiqué as it interpreted it as a motion of support to the MP, which was assessed as a reactionary party opposing Republican reforms. Menderes in his speech, given at the extraordinarily held Group meeting on the 16th of July, argued that the government tried its best in order to improve the Turkish democracy. He emphasized the responsibility of the opposition to contribute to those efforts of the government through using its right to criticize and to supervise the government with moderation in order not to lead the country into crisis. Additionally, he criticized both the attitude of İnönü and of the MP because of their tendency to lead the country into chaos (Kılçık, 1991: 33, Volume IV).

With the increase of tension again, the government put into effect the ‘Law to Protect the Freedom of Beliefs and Association’ on the 23rd of July 1953 in order to prevent the exploitation of religion for political interests. The law was entitled ‘National Salvation Law’ (*Milli Selamet Kanunu*) by the press (Ahmad, 1976: 113). Prime Minister Menderes defended the appropriateness of these laws in his speech on the 24th of October 1953 by saying:

Our democratic regime can be subjected to some harsh experiences... These experiences can be so important that taking some measures might be necessary in order to protect the order of the society (Kılçık, 1991: 154, Volume IV).

However, the intention behind the establishment of these laws and the results obtained thereafter did not concur. The consequences of these laws were mainly to the disadvantage of the DP government when the process is examined on the basis of horizontal accountability mechanisms. These measures weakened the opposition to a

great extent and with the loosening of the opposition's control over its decisions, the DP began to lose measure in its policies. It meant that, with the weakening of the political supervision and balance mechanisms, the government, the policies of which were mostly shaped by Bayar and Menderes, started to act much more freely; thus leading to an inevitable abuse of power.

The attitude of the DP towards Kırşehir, which is a city in the Region of Central Anatolia of Turkey, was a flagrant example of this. On the 30th of June 1954, the administrative status of Kırşehir was reduced from that of province to the level of district and Kırşehir became affiliated to the city of Nevşehir (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 10, Vol. 1: 343-344; Eroğul, 1970: 114). The claim of the government, during the negotiation of this law in Parliament, was that Kırşehir was not a developed city as became apparent through its vote for the CMP (Birand et al., 2006: 75). However, this decision was interpreted as a result of Bayar's hatred towards Osman Bölükbaşı. Since many of the Kırşehir votes went to Osman Bölükbaşı and his party, reducing the status of the city from province to district was considered as a punishment to the people in the city and as a warning to the people in other opponent cities (Baban, 1970: 59, 311; Toker, 1990c: 36-37). During the negotiation of this law, there took place harsh accusations between the government and the opposition. As a result of these discussions, Osman Bölükbaşı, the deputy of the Republican Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi- CMP*)⁶, was punished with censure and the law was put into effect on the 30th of June 1954 (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 10, Vol. 1: 352; Eroğul, 1970: 115).

⁶ After the closure of the MP, the Republican National Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi- the CMP*) was established on 10 February 1954 as a successor of the MP.

In addition to aforementioned draft, another important draft law was put on the agenda of the TBMM in June. This law mandated the retirement of members of the Supreme Court of Appeals (*Yargıtay*), the Council of State (*Danıştay*), the Court of Accounts (*Sayıştay*) and university professors, if they were at least sixty and had served at least 25 years. The opposition labelled this law ‘the law of purification’ (*tasfiye kanunu*). Besides the opposition, this law was criticized even by some of the DP members and taken as an indication of the government’s wish to exert pressure on the organs of the state that were likely to oppose its policies (*Vatan*, June 22, 1954; Eroğul, 1970: 116; Toker, 1990c: 39).

The editor of the daily newspaper *Vatan*, Ahmet Emin Yalman, interpreted these decisions of the DP government as a result of the devastating impact of the opposition on the DP leaders (Toker, 1990c: 39). In his article dated 3rd of July, he formulated several warnings to the government. In the article, Yalman criticized the draft law in question:

The Prime Minister and the DP leader Adnan Menderes obtained an exceptional position among the highest statesman of this era. These recent acts do not befit his high achievement, as such, Menderes will certainly soon regard them as odd and corrected them (*Vatan*, July 3, 1954).

Similar to Yalman, Baban despite being a DP supporter, argued that the decisions recently made by the DP did not conform to its real mentality. Upon this, he expressed his expectations from the party leadership to revise their policies in accordance with its democratic mentality (Baban, 1970: 204-208).

However, neither Yalman's nor Baban's aforementioned expectations came true. Or, rather, when Menderes finally realized that the DP government had acted imprudently, it was too late to correct the political mistakes committed during his prime ministry. For example, regarding the Kırşehir decision, it was on trial in Yassıada after the military intervention on the 27th of May 1960, that Menderes stated that it had been a mistake to make such a decision (*Yassıada Yüksek Adalet Divanı Tutanakları Anayasayı İhlal Davası*, Vol. 3, Session: 15: 1223). Nilüfer Gürsoy also interprets this decision of the government as a big mistake but adds that political mistakes can be observed in all periods of political history.⁷

Similarly, for the retirement law, despite all objections to the bill, the government did not take the criticisms into consideration. The law on obligatory retirement was enacted on the 5th of July 1954 by the TBMM (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 10, Vol. 1: 251-255). After this governmental decision, in order to clarify their objection to the government's policies, the CMP and the The Peasant Party (*Köylü Partisi-the KP*)⁸ issued a joint declaration on the 16th of August and announced their decision not to participate in the village headmen elections (*Zafer*, August 17, 1954).

4.7. The Issue of Right of Proof (*İspat Hakkı*)

The policies of the DP leading to serious tension between the government and the opposition continued in the year 1955 due to the issue of right of proof. The

⁷ Interview with Nilüfer Gürsoy, İstanbul, 30 May 2008.

⁸ The KP was established on the 19th of May 1952 by a group of opponents within the DP that objected to the DP leadership's political acts and decisions claiming that they were against the democratic principles announced during the establishment of the DP. For more information, see Karpat (1959) and Albayrak (2004).

criticisms and the corruption claims published by the press led the government to prepare a bill about the abolition of right of proof of the press, which was enabling the newspapers to prove their claims about high government officials whom they accused of corruption or of similarly important mistakes. The bill was accepted on the 9th of March 1954 (Eroğul, 1970: 95).

After this law, the unease both between government and opposition and within the DP increased. However, the crisis within the DP reached such a level that the process resulted in the establishment of a new political party by the opponents within the DP. The crisis in the DP began on the 2nd of May 1955, when the DP deputy Fethi Çelikbaş with a group of DP parliamentarians submitted a motion to the TBMM for the abolishment of this law preventing the journalists from using their right of proof (Karpat, 1959: 424; Giritlioğlu, 1965: 332; Toker, 1990c: 104). The group submitting the motion was called '*İspatçılar*' (those, who prove) because of their motion. In the motion, it was stated that in order to cope with the problems that the country was exposed to and to make possible the surveillance of the government, as the fundamental principle of democracy, providing the press with the right of proof was necessary (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 10, Vol. 11: 526-527).

Nevertheless, Bayar and Menderes remained opposed to providing the right of proof to the press. Bayar thought that, instead a sincere desire to further democracy, this demand of the DP members stemmed from his and Menderes' loss of authority within the party (Toker, 1990c: 107). For Menderes, similarly, relating the issue to democracy was not meaningful and thus, at the DP Assembly Group meeting dated May 10th 1955 criticized the relevance of right of proof to democracy:

One of our opponents (considering that right of proof means democracy) stated that 'if there is no right of proof, then there is no democracy.' I simply asked him: 'By stating that there is no democracy, do you mean that there is a totalitarian regime?' He replied 'Yes, when there is no democracy, then there is despotism without question'. Then, I asked him 'Where you have witnessed a free regime going together with despotism?' Distinguished friends, the first characteristic of a totalitarian regime is to deny elections (*D.P.M.G.M.Z*, Term: 10, Vol. 154: 20-21).

In this statement, despite his statements on the need for opposition in democracies, Menderes emphasized that the opposition should know its limits. As stated several times before, he thought that the attitude of the opposition was significant in order to have a democratic regime. He argued that the opposition had to consider the framework within which it should carry out its responsibilities. If it went beyond this framework, he argued that it would be harmful to the democratic system and would lead to anarchy, which would eventually lead to the collapse of the democracy. Thus, he expressed that besides the presence of an opposition, the methods used while opposing the government were also significant.

Nevertheless, the limits that the DP leadership recognized for the opposition were not considered as sufficient for a democracy, as it is witnessed in the case of right of proof. In the interviews held with Birgit and Asal, Birgit and Asal assessed the DP's not providing the press with the right of proof as a measure against the overly critical opposition. They stated that the right of proof was vital for the freedom of press and therefore that the newspapers should have been provided with this right. Nevertheless, they also stated that the severity of the opposition had

reached such an extent that it was comprehensible for Menderes to consider such a measure as necessary.⁹

In accordance with Bayar's and Menderes' perception of the irrelevance between the right of proof and democracy, the expulsion of the '*İspatçılar*' from the party was discussed (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 10, Vol. 11: 527). On the 13th of July 1955, in the speech he gave at the Plenary Assembly, Menderes stated that the parliamentarians submitting the motion did not have any intention to withdraw it (Burçak, 1998: 329). Accordingly, the number of parliamentarians signing the motion increased in time (*Cumhuriyet*, July 22, 1955; *Karpat*, 1959: 425; Baban, 1970: 164-165; Toker, 1990c: 113).

All of these developments led people to wait for the organization of the 4th Grand Congress that would be held in October 1955. In fact, there were many attempts to soothe the chaos within the party before the Congress. On the 7th of October 1955, Menderes met with some of the opponents in order to find a compromise. Fuad Köprülü also attempted to solve the conflict but was not successful (Toker, 1990c: 107). Then, on the 10th of October 1955, the General Administrative Council of the Party decided to terminate the General Administrative Council membership of two deputies from the '*İspatçılar*' and announced that due to the termination of their membership, they would not be allowed to attend the Grand Congress (Cerrahoğlu, 1996: 75; Burçak, 1998: 333-334). However, even these expulsions did not dismay the '*İspatçılar*' and six more parliamentarians announced their participation to and support for this movement, thus the number of '*İspatçılar*' increased to 19 (Cerrahoğlu, 1996: 75; Burçak, 1998: 336).

⁹ Interview with Orhan Birgit, İstanbul, 30 May 2008.
Interview with Talat Asal, Ankara, 14 March 2009.

On the 13th of October 1955, the DP Ethics Committee, in which Bayar and Menderes had the final word, gathered and demanded that these 19 parliamentarians submit their defense to the Party Council within the same day. This was the starting point of the expulsion process of these 19 members. On the 14th of October 1955, ten of the '*İspatçılar*' were expelled from the party by a decision of Ethics Committee¹⁰ (Karpat, 1959: 425-426; Giritliođlu, 1965: 333; Yalman, 1971: 327, Volume IV; Bozdađ, 1975: 52; Toker, 1990c: 161; Cerrahođlu, 1996: 75-76; Burçak, 1998: 336-337) and formed the base for the establishment of the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi – HP*).

Thus, the most important issue of the agenda of the 4th Grand Congress was the expulsion of the '*İspatçılar*'. Menderes in his opening speech concentrated on the '*İspatçılar*':

Today's opponents are flopping in impotence due to the lack of balance between their power and opportunities and their greed for coming to the power. They believe neither in the truth of their cases nor in their own power. They wish to demolish our party... The current affairs made clear the extent to which the timely expulsion of the elements that work both against our principles and presence is just and propitious (*Ayın Tarihi*, October 1955: 50–51).

After all these developments, at the Grand Congress, the expulsion of the 19 was finalized and on the 20th of December 1955 the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi- HP*) was officially founded by the party members being expelled or having resigned following the unease stemming from the right of proof (*Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1955; Toker, 1990c: 173).

¹⁰ Names of those people are: Fethi Çelikbaş, Enver Güreli, Raif Aybar, İbrahim Öktem, Kamil Mengü, Muhlis Bayramođlu, Ekrem Alican, Turan Güneş, Mustafa Ekinci, and Kasım Küfrevi.

4.8. Attempts of the Opposition to Cooperate

While the tension within the party began, the reaction of the opposition to the policies of the government also increased. At first, both the CMP and the CHP issued a communiqué to announce their decision of not participating in the by-elections (Giritlioğlu, 1965: 318; Toker, 1990c: 127). In the declaration that the CMP made on the 3rd of August 1955, the importance of rule of law was emphasized. It was stated that the rule of law was based on the principles of freedom, equality, and security of citizens. Moreover, it was argued that the rule of law guaranteed rights and freedoms of citizens in addition to being the base of state administration that should have been controlled and balanced by various mechanisms. Accordingly, they declared that they would not take part in the elections unless these requirements of rule of law were guaranteed by the government (*Ulus*, August 4, 1955).

Similarly, the CHP issued a communiqué on the 5th of August in which it expressed distrust towards the government's ability to hold free elections. They focused on the laws mentioned above and stated that these laws harmed the freedom of press, judicial guarantee, and autonomy of university, and prevented the citizens from freely expressing their will (*Ulus*, August 6, 1955; Giritlioğlu, 1965: 318).

The government reacted strongly to these statements and to the decision of both parties to boycott the elections. Menderes said:

It is really difficult to expect salvation of the democratic system of a country where a political party speaks differently whether in government or in opposition and states the very opposite of that which it had expressed before... According to the

CHP, while not participating in the elections in 1948 was equal to defaming the country in the eyes of the world and provoking the people to rebellion by leading them off the legitimate path; today, according to the CHP, the very same act is patriotic (*Zafer*, August 11, 1955).

This speech of Menderes is quite crucial to focus on. In this speech, it becomes evident that Menderes attached importance to the consistency of ideas disregarding the change in the political situation of a political party. In other words, he noted that whether in government or in opposition, a political party should have remained loyal to its ideals and political stance. He interpreted it as a condition for the effective functioning of the democratic system in a country.

Bayar was also of the same opinion as Menderes. He stated that the opposition they carried out between 1946 and 1950 was within the legal framework. Given their views, they expected a similar kind of opposition. However, according to Menderes, the CHP had exerted excessive and ever-increasing pressure on the government since the beginning of the DP government era (Bayar, 1986: 154). Bayar even argued that the length of the period during which Menderes showed patience towards the opposition and until the DP government's taking measures against the opposition showed the extent to which Menderes had respected the idea of opposition (Bayar, 1986: 155). This implied that, thereafter, he would take severe measures (Toker, 1990c: 241).

Thus, it appears that both Bayar and Menderes interpreted the opposition's reaction as excessive. They considered the reaction of the opposition went beyond the acceptable limits and argued that the opposition should have been aware of its responsibility to contribute to the proper function of the democratic regime.

They seemed to have forgotten that the DP had also displayed a similar change in beliefs when in the opposition and in the government. As noted above, when it was in opposition, the DP also used the option of boycotting the elections as a tactic in order to make the government act in accordance with its expectations (Karpat, 1959: 186).

Furthermore, it can also be argued that participating in or abstaining from participating in the elections was an easy and influential way of showing reaction to the government. Due to the weakness of the opposition's pressure on the government, when it felt the need to show its reaction towards the government's acts and policies, boycotting the elections was considered as the easiest method. Had the opposition found alternative ways of showing their objection towards the government, it would have prevented the discord from developing with every new case. It would have enabled the politics to continue in a moderate mode, as Menderes and Bayar had wished, and prevent the opposition parties from boycotting the elections as a means of pressure.

Nevertheless, as the opposition parties felt the ineffectiveness of their supervision over the government, they made use of either the election boycott or of the idea of coalition. This time focusing on the latter option, the opposition parties organized meetings among them (*Ulus*, February 16, 1956). The CHP Party Assembly issued a communiqué on coalition among opposition parties after their meeting between the 6th and 8th of April 1956 (*Ulus*, April 8, 1956). In addition, after the 12th CHP Grand Congress, the CHP published a communiqué on the 24th of May 1956 to announce its approval of the decision of the party assembly about the coalition among opposition parties (*Ulus*, May 25, 1956).

This motion of the opposition gained acceleration when the Press Law (*Basın Kanunu*) and the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations (*Toplantı, Gösteri ve Yürüyüşler Kanunu*) were put into effect in June 1956. With these amendments, several restrictions were brought to the press and the organization of demonstrations by political parties was subjected to official permission (*Ulus, Cumhuriyet*, June 28, 1956). According to Bayar, Menderes saw these laws as measures necessary to prevent the exploitation of freedoms. Since maintaining peace and order was the responsibility of the government, Bayar added that, he did not object to these laws as they were considered necessary by Menderes (Bayar, 1986: 165).

Bayar's explanations and Menderes' attitude illustrated the growing dissatisfaction of the government with the opposition, which did not meet its expectations; growing as well was the dissatisfaction of the opposition with the government. It is apparent that the pressure of the opposition was leading the government to take measures to protect itself. In turn, the government's measures resulted with the opposition parties' decision to cooperate against the government.

In accordance with the analysis above, both the CHP and the CMP criticized the government's policies in a joint memorandum on the 8th of July. In the memorandum, it was pointed out that the government aimed to establish an authoritarian regime and attacked the very presence of the opposition parties. It was announced that the most important issue of the day in Turkey was to avoid attempts against the regime and to maintain a secure democratic system in the country. Moreover, the memorandum underlined the determination of the opposition parties to use all available opportunities to struggle for the survival of the democratic regime (Eroğul, 1970:140).

The stress in the memorandum on the role of the opposition's struggle for the survival of democracy and the dependence of their struggle on the existing opportunities is important to consider. As stated in one of the above analyses, the opposition was seeking for an opportunity to voice its dissatisfaction with the policies of the government. In addition to it, it was considered the opposition's role in the democratic regime to be essential. However, during the second half of the 1950s, Bayar and Menderes thought of the opposition's search for alternative ways of showing their objection towards the government as causing disorder. While they were insistently defending the necessity and significance of the opposition in a democratic regime, they started to lose their sense of accountability towards the opposition, especially as the opposition's reaction to the governmental policies intensified. In other words, the government started to perceive any document published or any speech made by the opposition as an attempt to prevent the government from functioning effectively rather than a genuine attempt to control and balance the governmental power. Thus they believed, the national will was being disregarded and democracy was threatened.

Accordingly, this memorandum was disregarded by the government. Due to the government's indifferent attitude, meetings among opposition members continued and as noted above, the opposition members continued to search for new ways to supervise the government. The HP decided in its group meeting to submit a censure motion against the government (*Ulus*, August 15, 1956; Bozdağ, 2004: 54).¹¹ On the 14th of September 1956, the HP issued another memorandum calling for all the opposition parties to cooperate (Ahmad, 1976: 154).

¹¹ The founders of the HP claimed that not the DP founders but they were the real democrats. They argued that the reason for their splitting from the DP was, in general, Menderes' reluctance for

Nevertheless, no concrete results emerged from this attempt and the idea of cooperation could not be realized (Ahmad, 1976: 154). Thus, the process did not produce any results as the government and the opposition could not find a way to discuss policy alternatives.

4.8.1. Continuing Efforts for a Coalition by the Opposition

As seen above, the relationship between the government and the opposition parties took the form of reciprocal steps aiming to weaken the other; rather than to find a common ground in order to discuss alternative policies and decide on the most appropriate one to be implemented. Accordingly, despite the failure of the opposition parties to create a coalition, due to the persistent incapacity of the government to establish an entente with the opposition parties and to the arrest of the CMP leader Bölükbaşı's on the 2nd of July 1957 for insults to the incorporeal status of the TBMM (Baban, 1970: 450), the opposition parties once more resumed the negotiations in view of the establishment of an opposition front. On the 4th of July 1957, İnönü discussed the recent developments with the leading figures of the HP and the CMP (*Ulus*, July 5, 1957). In the meeting, the HP suggested that, following the next general elections, the new Parliament to be formed act as a Constituent Assembly; thus the political system would be dissolved and restructured. The CMP members emphasized the need to jointly participate in the elections (*Ulus*, August 5-6, 1957; Toker, 1990c: 209).

abolishing the anti-democratic laws, to which he had opposed when he was in the opposition. Among anti-democratic laws they mentioned, for them the issue of the right of proof was in fact particularly important. It was Menderes' being against the recognition of the right of proof to the press that led to the establishment of the HP. For more, see Karpat (1959), Bozdağ (1975), and Albayrak (2004)

Following these meetings, the participating opposition parties announced their intention to cooperate (*Ulus*, August 22, 1957). They issued a communiqué on the 4th of September 1957 indicating their intentions if they were elected. In the communiqué, it was stated that these parties agreed on the independence of courts, the judicial guarantee, the freedom of expression of the press and the assembly, the autonomy of universities, the judicial supervision of the administration, the establishment of a non-partisan administration, the abolishment of anti-democratic laws, the amendment of the Constitution and of the law on elections, the change of the electoral system from majoritarian to proportional, and the designation of the parliament as a Constituent Assembly and its dissolution with the renewal of elections every two years. Moreover, in the communiqué, in order to provide new horizontal accountability mechanisms to strengthen the supervision and balance mechanisms in the current system, creation of a Constitutional Court and acceptance of a bicameral parliamentary system were mentioned among the future plans (*Ulus*, September 5, 1957; Erdemir, 1959: 108, Volume II; Giritlioğlu, 1965: 348; Toker, 1990c: 250).

The government, being aware of the coalition efforts of the opposition, took some counter-measures. One and the most important of those measures can be considered as the decision made in the DP Assembly Group meeting on the 5th of September 1957. In the meeting, the DP decided to hold general elections on the 27th of October 1957, earlier than originally announced (*D.P.M.G.M.Z.*, Term: 10, Vol. 189: 77).

In return, on the 8th of September 1957, the opposition parties met in order to discuss the idea of making coalition between themselves (*Ulus*, September 9, 1957). Following, with the organization of the 13th CHP Congress on the 9th of September,

once again, the idea of coalition among the opposition parties was expressed (*Ulus*, September 10, 1957; Turan, 2002: 71).

As the government realized that the opposition parties were determined to cooperate, it amended the law on elections in a very short period of time, in order to impede the coalition attempts, as mentioned in the previous chapter. After these amendments, the coalition between parties was, indeed, much more strenuous. Thus, following these amendments, opposition parties met on the 13th of September in order to review the recent developments (*Ulus*, September 14, 1957). The HP convened its Congress on the 14th of September and it also approved the coalition (*Ulus*, September 15, 1957). On the 18th of September, the CMP convened its Congress and expressed its wish to cooperate with other opposition parties (*Ulus*, September 19, 1957).

On the 19th of September 1957, leaders of the opposition parties met once more in order to discuss the formation of a coalition against the government (Baban, 1970: 301; Turan; 2002: 71). However, İnönü, due to the recent amendments hindering cooperation, announced that they would not be able to form a cooperation (Baban, 1970: 303). Despite the legal obstacles to form a joint front in the elections as mentioned by İnönü, other opposition parties blamed İnönü for the failure of the cooperation in the elections. In fact, they suspected that İnönü's intention was to allow the CHP to compete against the DP in the elections, while benefiting from the support of the CMP and the HP. However, when it became clear that the aforementioned opposition parties would not agree to such an arrangement, the idea of cooperation failed (Eroğul, 1970: 142; Toker, 1990c: 213).

In brief, the long and tiring efforts in order to form an opposition front failed because of the obstacles that the government's policies created and because of the distrust among the political leaders of the opposition parties. And, since boycotting the elections, according to İnönü, would eliminate the possibility of the electorate's replacing the DP government with a newly elected one (Turan, 2002: 73), the opposition parties competed separately in the general elections held on the 27th of October 1957. According to the official results, the DP received 47.70 per cent, the CHP received 40.82 per cent, the CMP received 7.19 per cent, and the HP received 3.85 per cent of the votes. These results meant 424 seats for the DP, 178 seats for the CHP, 4 seats for the CMP, and 4 seats for the Free Party (*Zafer*, October 31, 1957; Giritlioğlu, 1965: 363). However, despite the failure of the opposition parties to cooperate in the elections, the electoral results of 1957 elections indicated that, compared to the previous electoral results, the opposition gained power (*Ulus*, November 17, 1957).

4.8.2. New Measures by the DP Government

As mentioned before, the opposition started its criticisms towards the DP just after the 1950 elections approaching its actions with prejudice from the very beginning. This led to an unstable relationship between the government and the opposition and the relationship between the government and the opposition deteriorated especially during the election times when the gap of popularity between the DP and the other political parties became clear. The same was witnessed following the 1957 general elections. As the opposition had increased its electoral support in the 1957 elections; it started to follow a more severe attitude towards the

government and in return, the government started to act less tolerantly and seek additional measures to counter the opposition's influence (Sayarı, 2002: 72).

Menderes, in the speech he delivered in the DP Assembly Group meeting on the 14th of November 1957, mentioned the obligation of the government to take measures in order to protect democracy. Accordingly, the meeting resulted with the decision to immediately take the necessary legal and administrative measures for the return of law and order within the country, for the stability of the regime, and for the efficient management of public services (*Zafer*, November 15, 1957).

One of the aforementioned measures was the adoption, on the 12th of December 1957, by the DP Assembly Group, of a bill foreseeing several changes in the Parliamentary Bylaws (*Meclis İç Tüzüğü*). This bill aimed to create a more effective control of the opposition in the TBMM (Toker, 1990d: 41-42; Albayrak, 2004: 515). Accordingly, the bylaws were amended on the 28th of December 1957 (*Ulus, Zafer*, December 29, 1957; Eroğul, 1970: 156; Ahmad, 1976: 174).

With the crucial changes brought by the amendment of several articles of the Parliamentary Bylaws, the formation of a new political party group in the parliament became difficult, punishing the deputies by expulsion from the parliament became easier, it was no longer allowed for anyone but the head of a group or a spokesman to make a speech on behalf of the party group during assembly negotiations, the presence of the majority in the assembly became required only for the start of the negotiations and for the voting sessions, and the ministers were granted with the right to refuse to reply to verbal questions when they considered an answer to be against the general interest (Girtlioğlu, 1965: 417-418).

Since the lack of opportunity to interact with the government led to a communication based mainly on the publication of communiqués and random occasional exchanges, upon these changes the CHP Assembly Group issued a communiqué on the 28th of December 1957. In the communiqué, the recent measures taken by the government were criticized. The CHP stated that with the amendments in the bylaw the control of the legislative organ over the executive weakened and thus, the opposition lost power (Giritliođlu, 1965: 417-418). Furthermore, significance of electoral security under equal conditions, judicial independence, and freedom of press were emphasized (*Ulus*, December 29, 1957).

The CHP also complained about the lack of objectivity on the part of the Assembly Chairmanship. By publishing another communiqué on the 23rd of February 1958, the CHP criticized the limitations brought by the government once more (*Ulus*, February 24, 1958). In addition to these communiqués, CHP leader İnönü complained about the lack of healthy discussions between the government and the opposition (Özel, 1988: 205).

In response to these communiqués, the DP Assembly Group organized a meeting on the same day, the 23th of February 1958. Menderes stating that any crisis in the TBMM would be felt in all parts of the country expressed the DP's determination to protect the Assembly from any kind of attacks (*D.P.M.G.M.Z*, Term: 11, Vol. 218: 29). In other words, Menderes implied that in the future the government would not show any tolerance towards the opposition considering that the criticisms and the attitude of the opposition caused the crisis become much deeper. This approach of Menderes pointed out that he could not measure the potential damage that the measures in question were inflicting to the democracy.

On the issue, Mehmet Ali Bayar stated that the policies followed by the DP government after the year 1957 were the results of an unnecessarily strict policy. Despite the fact that Aydın Menderes admitted that alternative measures could have been adopted, Bayar attributed this strict policy to the corrosive and provocative attitude of the opposition. He assessed the policies followed by the DP during the second half of the 1950s as the only option for a government holding the responsibility to maintain order. Nevertheless, it was a vicious circle. Since the measures of the government worsened the relationship between the government and the opposition, they prevented consideration of moderate policies, which would have stabilized and even furthered the democracy.¹²

Hence, the severe measures adopted by the government and the opposition's propaganda and communiqués issued outside of the parliament constituted the roots of the irresolvable conflict between the government and the opposition (Ağaoğlu, 1992: 287). Through its acts and policies; the government created a political vicious circle. The tension in politics led the government to take strict measures and the increasing severity of these measures led the opposition to grow. The tense relationship between the opposition and the government had its impact on the electoral dimension of political life. As mentioned in the previous chapter, elections were postponed several times due to the political chaos and this damaged the balance of politics.

¹² Interview with Mehmet Ali Bayar, Ankara, 8 October 2008

4.8.3. Opposition Front vs. Fatherland Front (*Vatan Cephesi*)

As seen above, the amendments in the parliamentary bylaws made by the government caused further deterioration in the relationship between the government and the opposition. In addition to the tension in the domestic politics, a military intervention took place in Iraq, neighbour country of Turkey, on the 14th of July 1958; and speeches of CHP deputies about the issue were interpreted by the government as a call for an intervention in Turkey to happen as well (Giritlioğlu, 1965: 394-399; Sayarı, 2002: 72).

In a speech Menderes delivered on the 6th of September 1958 in Balıkesir he stated that the opposition had propagated rumors of an intervention. Moreover, he stated that the government would take all necessary measures to avoid a military intervention and said:

The Democratic Party is the nation's party. It won all of the four elections. Indeed, it was the DP that won the 1946 elections. Then, we won the 1950, 1954, and 1957 elections...We will show how the opposition wants to lead the country to a disaster because of their passions...If they think that we will sacrifice this country to their passions, they are mistaken; we will not allow this to happen (Kılçık, 1991: 341-343, Volume VIII).

In the following day, he restated that the government was determined and ready to prevent the country from experiencing a military intervention (*Cumhuriyet*, September 8, 1957). Through these speeches, it seems that Menderes started to interpret any act of opposition as a threat towards the government and the regime (Toker, 1990d: 150). Therefore, he interpreted any problem encountered as a signal of the need for new measures, which were also approved by Bayar (Harris, 2002: 50-

51). He thought that any act of the opposition would lead to disorder and so, felt the urge to prevent the opposition from disrupting the law and order in the country. He justified the necessity of his policies by pointing out that the opposition had increased its pressure on the government.

The lack of trust of Bayar and Menderes towards İnönü also made a negative impact on the government's policies especially during the second half of the 1950s (Ahmad, 1977: 37, 46; Sayarı, 2002: 75; Harris, 2002: 54). The distrust between Bayar, Menderes and İnönü was so high that almost each and every disagreement between the government and the opposition turned into a conflict and in several cases, they failed to compromise (Karpat, 1981: 7). Both for Bayar and Menderes, cooperating with İnönü would weaken the DP and therefore the DP government could not make use of the opportunities for compromise (Toker, 1990b: 85). Instead of presenting new policies to solve the political crisis, the speeches of the party leaders began to consist exclusively of mutual accusations (Ahmad, 1977: 113; Çulhaoğlu, 2001: 97). Bayar and İnönü met only once during the 10-year government of the DP. As for the relations between Menderes and İnönü, it has been said that Bayar disapproved of Menderes meeting with İnönü (Aydemir, 2000: 229). Menderes' attitude towards İnönü was not different from that of Bayar. It has been argued by a DP deputy that both Bayar and Menderes felt so threatened by İnönü that that it had led to a phobia of İnönü on their part (Aydemir, 2000: 241).

This factor also played an important role for the DP to worry about the organization of a military intervention by the CHP. The DP Assembly Group considering the CHP was planning to foster a military intervention convened on the 9th of August 1958. In the meeting, a group of DP parliamentarians submitted a proposal to the Group and asked for the formation of a committee to deal with the

CHP's corrosive activities threatening the regime and the well-being of the nation (*D.P.M.G.M.Z*, Term: 11, Vol. 234: 159-160).

In the Group meeting dated August 11th 1958, Menderes stated that a primary principle of a democratic regime was the government's confidence that it would not be removed from power through military intervention. In addition, he criticized the opposition for resorting to such methods (*D.P.M.G.M.Z*, Term: 11, Vol. 235: 19). Accordingly, the DP issued a communiqué following the Group meeting and stated that the opposition continuously displayed a provocative attitude towards the government with the aim of overthrowing the government (*Zafer*, August 12, 1958).

These statements of Menderes gave an idea about his perception of democracy. It was apparent that he perceived the lack of fear from being overthrown by the military as a prerequisite for a democratic government. In other words, he thought that in democracies the opposition should only aim to replace the government through elections, not by provoking some other elements in the system. These statements of Menderes can be linked back to Bayar's severe reaction towards an army officer who had implied that the military could support the DP opposition if the latter wished to overthrow the government. Bayar had replied to the officer that once the military had interfered, the democratic nature of the regime would be threatened. Thus, it seems that both Bayar and Menderes viewed the electoral mechanism and opposition as requirements for a democracy. However, they also noted that the opposition should have considered that the government represents the national will and thus, should have been aware of the limits of the pressure it could exert on the government, in addition to the necessity of conducting its duty within a legal framework, instead of provoking external elements (Ağaoğlu, 2004: 61).

Hence, the mounting tension between the government and the opposition again led to a new attempt at establishing an opposition front. Since the policies established by the government made the conditions difficult for opposition parties operate freely, the CHP, as the main opposition party, and other opposition parties reconsidered the issue of forming an opposition front. Thus, they resumed their negotiations on the 7th of October 1958 (*Cumhuriyet*, October 7, 1958). The first step was the unification of the CMP and the KP on the 16th of October 1958, under the name of the Republican Peasant's Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi - CKMP*) (*Cumhuriyet*, October 17, 1958).¹³ Following this first coalition, leadership of the HP began to meet with İnönü and soon afterwards, on the 24th of November 1958, the HP organized an extraordinary Congress, during which the motion to merge with the CHP was adopted (Ahmad, 1976: 187).

These concrete steps towards a coalition of the opposition led the government to seek public support for the DP. As a reaction to the attempts of the opposition to form a common front, the government formed a front called the Fatherland Front (*Vatan Cephesi*). Menderes presented this issue at the DP's Manisa Provincial Congress on the 12th of October 1958. In his speech, he demanded that the citizens establish the Fatherland Front against the 'front of hatred and enmity of the CHP'. Moreover, addressing the opposition, he told them not to continue their act of 'animosity and greed' and put an end to such 'inappropriate conduct' (*Zafer*, October 13, 1958).

Nevertheless, even some of the Democrats disapproved of this formation. They considered this formation was difficult to justify due to the lack of bylaws regulating its establishment in addition to its lack of founders and program

¹³ For more, see Karpat (1959: 431-434).

(Cerrahoğlu, 1996: 100). This formation was accused of inflaming and possibly aggravating the situation, bringing the current political conflict beyond the proper boundaries of politics (Birand et al., 2006: 103) and thus it was not considered as a democratic solution (Bilginer, 2005: 231).

Nilüfer Gürsoy, daughter of Celal Bayar, stated that the Fatherland Front was created by Menderes in order to keep the solidarity and unity within the DP. However, after it was formed, she added, the mentality behind it was greatly distorted. Menderes himself could not see that forming such a front could also result in further enmity and lead to chaos within the society. In the process, he assumed that the government could keep the Front under its control and thus overlooked the likelihood that the Front could act beyond the boundaries expected by the government.¹⁴

However, with the increase of the governmental pressure, the 14th CHP Congress was organized on the 12th of January 1959 and issued a communiqué that clarified the ideas and plans of the opposition in case of their election. This communiqué was entitled ‘Communiqué on Primary Goals’ (*İlk Hedefler Bildirisi*). The communiqué included abolishing anti-democratic laws, methods, and practices; amending the Constitution in accordance with the principles of national sovereignty and the rule of law; adopting the proportional representation system; amending the bylaws of Parliament in order to provide the neutrality of the Chair of the Parliament; and providing the right of proof to the media (*Ulus*, January 16, 1959; Giritlioğlu, 1965: 453-455).

¹⁴ Interview with Nilüfer Gürsoy, İstanbul, 30 May 2008.

Considering that the circumstances were getting worse, the CHP decided to organize tours around the country and İnönü started his tour in Uşak (*Zafer*, May 2, 1959). This tour was called 'Large Scale Attack of Aegean Region' (*Büyük Ege Taarruzu*). In addition to the tension caused by the very designation of this trip, a problem experienced during the Uşak tour played a major role in the degradation of the relations between government and opposition (Toker, 1990d: 229).

It has been narrated that İnönü was warned by the Minister of Internal Affairs Namık Gedik before departing for Uşak that the government would not be able to take measures in order to protect him during his trip. İnönü was told that in case of physical conflicts between the supporters of the government and those of the opposition parties; the security forces might not be capable to prevent his being injured. However, İnönü did not cancel his trip and indeed, experienced many problems both on his way to Uşak and upon his arrival. On the 30th of April 1959, when he took the train to Uşak, at the train station the police forces attempted to prevent the CHP supporters from chanting slogans in favor of İnönü. Also, when he arrived at Uşak, there was an attempt to prevent him from furthering his tour. Moreover, the following day the DP supporters tried to prevent his train from leaving Uşak and İnönü was verbally and physically assaulted (Toker, 1990d: 230-232; Harris, 2002: 51; Küçük, 2008: 64-65).

In addition to the regrettable events witnessed in the Uşak trip, İnönü experienced similar difficulties during his trip to Izmir. Due to the clashes between CHP and DP supporters, İnönü decided to end his trip and move to Istanbul on the 4th of May 1959. Nevertheless, in Istanbul, he experienced another assault. A DP militant attempted an armed assault towards İnönü but thanks to the intervention of an army officer, İnönü was not injured (Küçük, 2008: 64-65).

On May 7th, İnönü went from Istanbul to Ankara. There, upon his arrival, clashes happened between the police forces and citizens. Meanwhile, the DP Assembly Group issued a communiqué after which it activated the ‘Committee of Precautions’ (*Tedbirler Komisyonu*) in order to adopt more effective measures (*Cumhuriyet, Zafer, May 7, 1959; Eroğul, 1970: 168*). As such, the CHP submitted a motion to the Assembly on the 9th of May 1957 about the incidents experienced during İnönü’s trip and demanded the opening of an investigation about Prime Minister Menderes and Minister of Internal Affairs Namık Gedik (*Zafer, May 11, 1959*). This motion was not put on the agenda of the Assembly and therefore, the opposition left the Assembly (*Zafer, May 12, 1959*).

Both for this reason and because of the decision of the government to postpone the by-elections, the opposition organized several tours around the country. One of them was the tour of the CHP Secretary General Kasım Gülek to a sub-district of the city of Çanakkale, where he encountered relentless protests by the DP supporters. The protests turned into a serious chaos and the failure of gendarmerie to prevent the incidents from getting out of control was criticized by the opposition. Moreover, the CHP Group experienced similar incidents during their return to Istanbul, followed by the arrest of several CHP members and press reporters in favor of the opposition (Toker, 1990d: 245-246).

As a result of such developments, the tension was at its peak. Due to the uncompromising attitude of both the leaders of the government and those of the opposition the TBMM had become a field for continuous discussions held on personal grounds instead of harmonious political negotiations stemming from different ideas (Karpat, 1959: 390). This situation contributed to the division of people into two separate fronts, both of which justified their struggle as for the

protection and maintenance of democracy. Menderes in a speech he delivered in Mersin on the 6th of January 1960 said:

Making politics does not necessarily mean expressing something as solely white or solely black. Making politics does not to necessarily imply slandering your rival (Kılçık, 1991: 105, Volume IX).

However, despite this statement by Menderes, which confirmed his awareness of the political situation, nothing changed. In fact, as witnessed several times before in almost each of the political crisis, Menderes gave a declaration testifying to his understanding of the problems and of the alternative ways of solving these problems. Yet, each time, in spite of the efforts displayed to moderate of the political tension, the political conditions could not be stabilized and no resolution could be brought to the lingering crisis.

Thus, elections -being the most reliable way to strengthen the governmental legitimacy- appeared as the easiest way of alleviating the crisis and the political parties were in the mood for elections in the first months of the spring of 1960. Given the DP government's intention to hold early elections, the CHP issued a communiqué on the 15th of March emphasizing the need to hold the elections under free, equal, and honest manner (*Ulus*, March 16, 1960).

Nevertheless, the idea of holding elections earlier did not help to lower the tension. The problematic relationship between the government and the opposition became even worse. The intolerant attitude of the government provided the opposition with greater public support but the opposition's gain of public support urged the government to reinforce the measures it had taken.

4.8.4. Forming an Investigation Committee (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*)

The DP made efforts to maintain its position in government during the years 1957 and 1960; the creation of an investigation committee was another measure taken by the government in order to secure its stay in government (Baban, 1970: 301). The DP Assembly Group met on the 7th of April 1960 and discussed the issue of establishing an Investigation Committee consisting of Assembly members. In the meeting, Menderes stated that taking immediate measures was necessary since the measures taken so far had not contributed to lowering the tension within the country. Additionally, he argued that the Turkish democracy was deteriorating because of the harsh opposition, which aimed to disrupt the state order. He, then, proposed the initiation of a parliamentary investigation as a definite measure of protection of the democracy (Kılçık, 1991: 186: Volume IX). Based on these assumptions, the Group issued a communiqué after the meeting, in which it was noted that the reasons for establishing such a committee were to “investigate and determine the manner and nature of the destructive, illegitimate, and illegal activities of the opposition within the country; additionally, to understand the various causes of illegal political activities observable throughout the country” (*Zafer, Cumhuriyet*, April 8, 1960; Eroğul, 1970: 173-175).

The same issue was again added on the agenda of the following Group meeting dated April 12th 1960. On the issue whether establishing an Investigation Committee would be to the advantage or disadvantage of the country, Menderes defended the creation of the Committee in question by stating that the destructive activities of the opposition had harmful effects for the country. Moreover, he added that since the security forces, the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations, and the

judiciary had proven insufficient to cope with these activities, the creation of such a committee was essential. He justified his idea by arguing that having reached this point, any step back would be doing great harm to the country by leading it into an abyss (*D.P.M.G.M.Z*, Term: 11, Vol. 302: 41). So, instead of strengthening the already existing mechanisms, he considered the creation of a new body authorized with limitless power as the only solution.

However, it did not turn out to be a permanent solution and, instead of protecting it, it negatively influenced the quality of democracy. As noted in this essay, the supervision and balance mechanisms over the government are essential for the strength of democracy. Accordingly, vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms holding the government accountable for its policies are necessary for the proper functioning of a democratic system. The measures taken by the DP government appeared to be weakening these accountability mechanisms. The formation of an Investigation Committee became one of the main hindrances of the opposition's power to supervise and balance the government. Therefore, it can be claimed that by not opposing Menderes on the formation of the Committee, Bayar disregarded the role of the opposition to supervise and balance the government (Harris, 2002: 57). Although, the Committee provided such a great authority to the government that opposition's supervision of the government became almost impossible, Bayar and Menderes considered the Committee's formation to be within the framework of daily politics and of the Constitution. Nevertheless, due to the relationship between the presidency and the government within the framework of the political structure designed in accordance with the 1924 Constitution, the opposition can be understood as the only horizontal accountability mechanism of that era.

Therefore, the use of the Committee for the democratic system as well as its conformity with the Constitution was questioned.

There were many objections from the DP party members, who considered the formation of the Committee to be against the Constitution. Its duties and prerogatives were questioned by some of the DP Group members (Cerrahoğlu, 1996: 107).¹⁵ However, there was also a group defending the formation of the Committee. Their argument was the very opposite. This group was claiming the conformity of such a committee with the Constitution and argued that in order to function properly it had to have some prerogatives. Additionally, they defended the conformity of those prerogatives both with the bylaws of the Parliament and with the Constitution (Ağaoğlu, 2004: 153-154). Within the DP Group, the defenders of the establishment of a committee were in majority; therefore, the motion to create an Investigation Committee was submitted to the TBMM and the discussion related to it began on the 18th of April 1960.

In the motion, it was stated that the CHP, using illegitimate ways, incited and provoked the people to violate laws, to attempt attacks against the governmental, administrative and judiciary authorities, to arm people, to involve the military in politics, to create discomfort within the country by causing distrust about the legitimacy of a government which had the confidence of the TBMM, to establish secret branches functioning as cell organizations, and to issue publications in order to realize these aims. At the final part of the motion, the negative impact of the press was mentioned. It was claimed that the press devastated the foundation of the Republic and democracy, impeded the functioning of the state and its main

¹⁵ The Committee was objected by some DP members not only in the formation process, but also after its formation claiming that it would not provide any benefit to the DP.

institutions, and resorted to disinformation. Based on all these reasons, on the 18th of April 1960 the creation of an Investigation Committee of fifteen members was proposed (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 11, Vol. 13: 190-191).

During the discussion of the motion, the CHP leader İnönü took the floor and stated that the citizens were not treated equally before the law. He also argued that the motion targeted the CHP and that its approval would harm the political life in irremediable ways (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 11, Vol. 13: 194). After this speech, İnönü and other CHP parliamentarians left the Assembly Hall (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 11, Vol. 13: 206) and with the positive votes of the DP parliamentarians, the Investigation Committee was established to function for a three-month period (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Term: 11, Vol. 13: 213). The Committee, without requiring an additional decision from the TBMM or judicial authorities, was authorized to adopt any measures and decisions, including the decision to put an end to any kind of political activity; this for a period of three months (*Zafer*, April 19, 1960; *Eroğul*, 1970: 176).

The law defining its duties and prerogatives was voted and accepted in the TBMM on the 27th of April 1960. Before it was put to vote, the opposition leader İnönü criticized the government. He stated that the government, as all other regimes resorting to illegitimate methods of oppression, supposed that the establishment of a regime of oppression would eradicate all resistance. Accordingly, he implied that such formations would not silence the opposition. Upon this speech, İnönü was deprived of his right to attend the TBMM for twelve sessions (*Toker*, 1990d: 341-342).

Hence, in the period, as the opposition was equalized with treachery, forming such bodies was perceived as essential to avoid the subversive activities of the opposition (Özbudun, 1995: 231). This made the likelihood of finding a compromise between the government and the opposition almost impossible. Instead of ameliorating the conflict as suggested by the government, such bodies contributed to the deformation of the existing system since the government was partially freed from the pressure of the accountability mechanisms. It was the very same reason that led the opposition to object to the law. The opposition concluded that supervising and balancing the government would become much more difficult under those circumstances.

The law defining the duties and prerogatives of the Investigation Committee was also discussed not only by the opposition but also by a number of legal lawyers. On the one hand, legal advisor of Menderes, Prof. Ali Fuad Başgil argued that the Article 22 of the Constitution and the Article 177 of the TBMM bylaws provided the TBMM with the right of opening a parliamentary investigation. However, he also added that an Investigation Committee, established on the basis of Article 177, could make a decision regarding individuals or political parties. He also argued that, among the prerogatives of the Committee, some clauses were against the Constitution (Başgil, 1966: 130-134; Fersoy, 1978: 388).

Nevertheless, while some argued that the Committee had extraordinary powers that were not recognized by the Constitution and that could allow the government to act beyond the democratic framework (Küçük, 2008: 64-65), others argued that both bylaws of the Parliament and the 1924 Constitution allowed the formation of investigation committees (Ağaoğlu, 1972: 225). The principle of unity of powers and the Article 22 of the Constitution providing the TBMM with the right

of parliamentary investigation were interpreted by the supporters of the Committee as enabling its formation. Moreover, considering the bylaws of the TBMM, Article 169 regulating the method and extent of a parliamentary investigation and Article 177 regulating the formation of a committee with the aim of informing the TBMM were interpreted as sufficient legal grounds for the formation of an Investigation Committee (Minkari, 1992: 34).

Accordingly, Orhan Birgit, journalist of the era, and Talat Asal, lawyer of Adnan Menderes, argued that the establishment of an Investigation Committee did not mean the violation of the 1924 Constitution.¹⁶ Supporting their point, Nilüfer Gürsoy, daughter of Celal Bayar, also stated that while interpreting the Investigation Committee, a serious mistake was made by most of the people. She argued that both the formation and the authority of the Committee should be assessed within the 1924 Constitution. She argued that when analyzing the Commission, taking the 1924 Constitution into consideration, one can clearly see that the DP did not violate the Constitution by creating the Committee.¹⁷

Menderes and Bayar also insisted that the law on this issue was in conformity with the 1924 Constitution. However, given the events which followed the establishment of the Committee, one can argue that more than the conformity of the Committee's establishment with the Constitution, the prudence of the establishment of such a committee with so much authority should have been assessed. The conformity of its formation to the Constitution and parliamentary bylaws does not mean that this measure was politically acceptable (Burçak, 1994: 39).

¹⁶ Interview with Orhan Birgit, İstanbul, 30 May 2008.

Interview with Talat Asal, Ankara, 14 March 2009.

¹⁷ Interview with Nilüfer Gürsoy, İstanbul, 30 May 2008.

In relation to it, the events witnessed after its establishment pointed out that the government was mistaken in its defense of the Committee; as its establishment did not help to moderate the political atmosphere. Rather, similarly to the measures taken before the establishment of the Committee, the formation of the Committee contributed to the worsening of the political atmosphere rather than its improvement.

4.8.4.1. Developments Following the Establishment of the Investigation Committee

Following the establishment of the Investigation Committee, student protests were organized in the Faculties of Law and Political Sciences of Ankara University. These protests spread over the country and prepared the necessary ground for similar incidents (Dodd, 1979: 171). On the 28th of April, there were also similar incidents in Istanbul University Law Faculty and in Istanbul Technical University, where students boycotted the classes and made demonstrations. Upon these protests, the government declared martial law in Istanbul and Ankara (Ahmad, 1976: 209; Özbudun, 1995: 231).

Afterwards, the DP Assembly Group convened extraordinarily on the 29th of April. There, in a speech, Menderes argued that the provocateurs were the CHP supporters. He said:

Dear friends, while we were questioning the conformity of our measures with the Constitution and while we were debating what our measures should be, we witnessed a rapid development of events...According to our opinion, the CHP Headquarter has planned all of the demonstrations including the current ones. All the instructions related to the current agitation were given by the (CHP) Headquarter. I ask your permission to

cautiously act in order to catch and punish all of people who contributed to the current state of affairs (Kılçık, 1991: 247-248, Volume IX).

Later that day, Menderes discussed the events witnessed in the universities and some DP members suggested the closure of universities. However, Menderes announced that the universities would only be suspended for one month (Kılçık, 1991: 248, Volume IX).

On the one hand, it appears that Menderes was still able to stand against some of the demands of the party rank and file and was cautious not to take extreme steps that would worsen the existing situation. On the other hand, he considered that these developments stemmed from the lack of timely, serious, and strict governmental measures. Menderes' attitude in this case showed that while he was aware of the fact that putting restrictions to the opposition would be detrimental to the regime, he was also attempting to end the political crisis without weakening the government, which was the representative of the nation and had been legitimized by the national vote.

Compared to Menderes, Bayar was much more committed to the idea of taking severe measures in order to cope with the opposition. Accordingly, he overlooked Menderes' aversion for authoritarian solutions and in fact, encouraged him to take severe measures (Aydemir, 2000: 314-315). Confirming this point, Aydın Menderes argued that Bayar was much more inclined to display an authoritarian attitude while Menderes himself, was much more tolerant and flexible.¹⁸

¹⁸ Interview with Aydın Menderes, Ankara, 5 May 2008.

However, Menderes' defense of a more tolerant policy did not alter the situation, since they shared common beliefs about the place of vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms in democracies. With the legitimacy obtained by the DP's electoral support, they both felt the freedom to make bold decisions (Heper and Landau, 1991: 127). In other words, their attaching priority to the vertical accountability mechanism, in this case elections, over the horizontal accountability organs, in this case the opposition, led them to neglect the interdependence of these mechanisms. They thought that restricting the horizontal accountability mechanism, particularly the political opposition, would prevent the weakening of the legitimacy provided through the functioning of the vertical accountability mechanism, particularly the elections. Therefore, during the DP government, the governmental policies defended by Bayar and Menderes did not help them as they had expected and as one dimension of accountability was threatened, the other dimension also became threatened, thus endangering the whole regime at the end.

As they had disregarded the aforementioned point, the demonstrations persisted. In Ankara, the events organized by students had primarily began at the Faculty of Law and then spread to the Faculty of Political Sciences. Students attacked the security forces with stones and sticks. The doors of the Faculty buildings were broken and the students were dispersed by the use of force. During these events, a few individuals were wounded and the police harassed some faculty members. Following these events, the Martial Law Command, which had been set up on the 28th of April 1960 (Ahmad, 1976: 209), banned all meetings and demonstrations and established a curfew (Eroğul, 1970: 176).

However, the most important event witnessed in Ankara was the protests organized against the government. On the 29th of April 1960, Bayar, Menderes, and some ministers met in order to discuss the events that had taken place between the 28th and 29th of April 1960. During the meeting, the legal position of the Investigation Committee and the events following its establishment were discussed. Professor Ali Fuad Başgil, the legal advisor of the government, criticized the government's policies and suggested Menderes' resignation. Although Menderes found this suggestion acceptable, Bayar objected to the Prime Minister's resignation arguing that it would be perceived as a sign of weakness of the government (Başgil, 1966: 137-138).

Following this meeting, the DP government decided to organize a demonstration in order to show the people's support to the government in Kızılay Square, Ankara. In return, the groups opposing the government also organized a meeting with the password 555-K indicating that the demonstration would be held May 5th, at 5 pm, also in Kızılay Square. As expected, violent incidents happened in these demonstrations and Menderes, who had come intending to reason with the students, left there with great difficulty, by getting into a reporter's car (Aydemir, 2000: 374).

Given all these developments, on the 24th of May 1960, the DP General Administrative Council met. In the meeting, only the half of the Council members was present and Menderes delivered a speech. In the speech, he stated that there would not be any changes in the policy followed against the opposition (Burçak, 1976: 46-48).

Thus, as the course of event unfolded and with the increase of Bayar's influence in the decision-making process, Menderes displayed his preference for resorting to strict measures in order to cope with the increasing tension in politics. He regarded Bayar's interference as an indication of approval and support for his policies (Ağaoğlu, 1992: 187). Bayar's advocating the application of more severe measures than those applied by Menderes, as mentioned above, and his being highly involved in the governmental decisions resulted in the government's resorting to severe measures. As an example of Bayar's high involvement in the governmental decisions and of his insistence for more severe measures, one can mention his order to fire on the 5th of May 1960. It was narrated that Bayar ordered the armed forces for fire if the crowd did not heed the warnings of the security forces and continued their protests. Fire was not opened on that day; however, it showed that Bayar had started to make decisions on his own, instead of being involved in a joint decision-making process as before (Harris, 2002: 55; Birand et al. 2006: 121).

Besides, the uncompromising attitude of both Bayar and Menderes was evident at least in the diaries of the political figures of the era. For example, in the diary of Ethem Menderes, who served as minister in Menderes' governments, there were notes on the statements of Bayar and Adnan Menderes. Ethem Menderes had written that Bayar and Menderes considered the possibility of establishing a dictatorship if they could not solve the political and social conflicts or closing the CHP if they lost the elections in 1960. Moreover, in the diary of Refik Koraltan, Bayar's reluctance for compromise and his push for the government's rejection of the motions to censure submitted by the opposition toward the end of 1950s were mentioned (Küçük, 2008: 66).

Hence, it appears that Bayar and Menderes acted very cautiously while they were in opposition. Additionally, it is also seen that Menderes resisted against the demands to take strict measures towards the opposition and Bayar did not push for the adoption of such measures but rather approved of Menderes' preference for moderate solutions (Fersoy, 1978: 50). However, later, they started to defend the adoption of harsh measures to cope with the opposition even though taking severe measures did not mean finding permanent solutions that would prevent the disorder and chaos from developing in the politics and the society. As a result, because of the uncompromising attitude of political leaders the opportunities for compromise between the government and opposition could not be used and the military intervention happened on the 27th of May 1960 (Sayarı, 2002: 81; Heper, 2002: 221-222).

4.9. Conclusion

Bayar and Menderes initiated an opposition movement while they were within the CHP and then, with the establishment of the DP, became members of the opposition. While the DP was in opposition, they aimed to create a working and moderate relationship between the DP and the CHP government. Nevertheless, they could not maintain such a relationship and the relationships in question soon began to fluctuate between moderate and chaotic.

Although both the emergence of the opposition movement within the CHP and the establishment of the DP had been made possible through Bayar's and Menderes' insistence on the principles stated in the Memorandum of the Four, after the DP's coming to power the relationship with the opposition parties deteriorated

and became mostly based on harsh allegations towards each other. Neither Bayar nor Menderes could prevent the tension arising from these allegations. As the opposition parties' efforts to cooperate to weaken the power of the government continued, it was seen that Bayar and Menderes resorted to authoritarian policies. The Fatherland Front and Investigation Committee were formed to counter the opposition's efforts. However, such policies led to an increase in the intensity of opposition's resistance against the government, which in turn, led the DP government to seek more authoritarian solutions.

Their seeking for conflict resolution through the establishment of severe measures was, as stated before, related to their perception of the electoral legitimacy and of the 1924 Constitution. The majority system and the power stemming from the principle of unity of powers of the 1924 Constitution enabled the majority party to dominate the opposition because it gave priority to the electoral mechanism over the political opposition.

In addition to the impact of the Constitution, their attitude should also be assessed without disregarding the acts of the opposition parties. It is a fact that Bayar and Menderes both understood the role and place of opposition within democratic regimes and the necessity of the opposition's supervising the government. However, they also expressed their belief that the opposition, whether from within the party or the parliament, should be pursued within certain limits. They consistently stated that any criticism or objection to the government should be made within the legal framework as the measures taken by the government were also expected to be within the legal boundaries.

Furthermore, the image of İnönü for DP leaders was also influential for their political praxis. Their perception of İnönü as an unreliable figure continuously seeking for the DP's removal from the government led to the personalization of politics. Since Bayar and Menderes mostly perceived the criticisms of the opposition as İnönü's refusal to accept the DP's electoral success, rather than a natural outcome of a democratic regime, there were some cases when both of them perceived the main opposition party's criticisms more on a personal basis than on principal basis.

In addition to Bayar's and Menderes' understanding of the opposition within the parliament, their relationship also provided evidences about their understanding of the impact of a president on the government, being another organ of check and balance for the government. As seen, Bayar and Menderes were able to find a compromise on most of the issues while the DP was in government and no serious conflicts were witnessed between the presidency and the government. During his entire political career, Bayar was like a mentor for Menderes. Thus, the supervising role of the president over the government turned out to be different within the mentioned period of the study. Rather than controlling and balancing the government, they co-governed the country and made decisions together rendering null and void one of the accountability mechanisms in the government.

Therefore, it can be stated that Bayar and Menderes accepted the importance of the opposition in democratic regimes and its role to check and balance the government. Through their discourse and praxis, they emphasized the necessity of the opposition in order to control the government. However, as the political crisis escalated due to the disagreements between the government and the opposition, both Bayar and Menderes started to emphasize the DP government's legitimacy based on

its electoral success and neglected the necessity of a properly functioning political opposition for the good of democracy.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This dissertation goes to the heart of political leadership and assumes that the political praxis and decisions of leaders have a decisive impact on the democratization story of a country. Particularly considering Turkey, it can be argued that it is essential to study the political praxis and decisions of political leaders in order to understand the country's experience with democratic politics, since their actions have largely determined the path that Turkish democracy has followed. As stated at the very beginning of this study, the role and impact of political leaders on shaping political outcomes in Turkey is especially important because certain institutional and social conditions had not yet developed in those decades of Turkey. Due to the weakness and inability of institutional and social mechanisms to check and balance the acts and decisions of political leaders, the dynamics of politics are decided by political leaders acting in accordance with their understanding of certain political concepts. Consequently, the political actions and decisions of leaders of a country undergoing the democratization process stem from their conceptualization of the concept of democracy. Thus, the framework within which they define the concept of democracy shapes the democratic experience of the country and helps to

explain whether they either increased or reduced the likelihood of further democratization.

Given above, this dissertation aimed to analyze the conceptualization of democracy of two important figures of Turkish politics in order to understand the extent to which they influenced Turkish democracy: Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes. With the aim of identifying their understanding of democracy, the study took the agency approach as one of the mainstream approaches of democratization. Since the agency approach frames the political actors as the main players in politics, this dissertation concentrates on these two important political figures of Turkish politics of the period 1945 to 1960, which was crucial in the democratization experience of Turkish politics.

In 1945 the intention to reform the regime became evident and in 1946 the decision to make the transition to a multi-party regime was made. However, in 1960 a military intervention took place, leading to the breakdown of democracy and interruption of the democratization process. Bayar and Menderes played crucial roles in this period. In 1945 they made their demand to the governing party CHP to reform the system and then established the DP in 1946. The DP was in opposition between the years 1946 and 1950 and in government between 1950 and 1960. Given that they led the party one after the other, their actions and decisions had a significant impact on the course of events, beginning with the transition decision and ending in the breakdown of democracy with the 1960 military intervention. That is to say, their conceptualization of democracy shaped Turkish politics to an important extent and an understanding of this conceptualization is essential in assessing their contribution to Turkish democracy.

Among various categories of the concept of democracy, this dissertation makes the distinction between the minimalist and maximalist democracy in order to reach a conclusion about Bayar's and Menderes's conceptualization of democracy. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, minimalist democracy concentrates on the electoral dimension of the democratic regime, while maximalist democracy accepts additional aspects such as the institutional dimension, which is taken as the political opposition in this study. Analyzing the place of political opposition in addition to the electoral mechanism in Bayar's and Menderes' understanding of democracy, this study aimed to determine to which dimension their conceptualization belonged. In other words, since the process, which ended with the interruption of democracy, was shaped by Bayar's and Menderes' political actions and decisions to a great extent and since their political actions and decisions stemmed mainly from their conceptualization of democracy, it is important to examine their conceptualization of democracy and political praxis and discourse in order to understand the period under analysis and the role played by both during this period.

Considering the details of the period 1945-1960 as explained throughout the dissertation, it can be argued that Bayar and Menderes influenced the democratization of Turkey to a great extent. However, being both the activators of the democratization process and the protagonists of a period which resulted in a military intervention; it is not easy to make a definite and sharp assessment of their role in Turkish democratization. In other words, it would be a mistake to argue that they played either purely a positive or a negative role, ignoring their presence both in the democratic transition process and in the process which resulted in democratic breakdown. On the one hand, they were the ones who pushed for reform of the

system towards democratization. On the other hand, it was again they who could not prevent the democratic breakdown with 1960 military intervention.

It is undeniable that they played important roles in the establishment of the multi-party system. As seen in this dissertation, in the second half of the 1940s they emerged as the political figures most influential in the democratic transition. In addition to the impact of İsmet İnönü, being both the president of the country and the leader of the governing CHP, on the decision-making process, Bayar's and Menderes' positions were equally important in convincing İnönü and leading him to take such a decision.

They appeared as the rivals within the CHP and demonstrated the evident necessity of democratizing the regime. With the Memorandum of the Four, they expressed their objective to democratize the regime. They declared their conviction that the governmental powers should not be used without any restrictions and should be checked and balanced by other mechanisms.

However, it was not easy to impose supervision over the government considering the 1924 Constitution. Since the 1924 Constitution provided the TBMM with the unity of powers -legislative, executive, and judicial-, the TBMM was the most powerful political organ of the state in that particular era. All political structures were based on it. The president was selected from within the Assembly and was authorized to appoint the prime minister. The prime minister was then responsible for forming the cabinet. In addition to the creation of those political authorities based on the Assembly, the Assembly was also the political body authorized to pass laws. However, what gave the Assembly greatest power was the lack of another institution to review the laws passed by it. Only the president had the

right to veto the laws, but given his close ties to the party in government, it was not generally observed that he acted outside the interests of the ruling party. Thus, the only remaining solution in order to check and balance the governmental powers was to have a strong opposition in parliament. In the absence of a strong opposition, the government could easily go beyond the democratic framework.

With the Memorandum of the Four, Bayar and Menderes made the necessity of an opposition evident. Even if the motives behind their submission of the Memorandum could not be definitively established -that is, whether to demand reform of the regime or also the establishment of a new political party-, the consequence of the Memorandum was the establishment of the Democratic Party. Thus, with Bayar's and Menderes' opposition from within the party and then the establishment of the DP by a break-away group, transition to a multi-party regime became possible. Subsequently, as the DP gained power in opposition, democratization of the multi-party regime became the core principle of Turkish politics of the era.

Thus, with the establishment of the DP and general elections in 1946, Turkey entered into an era of political competition and political leaders put electoral success at the top of their agendas. The phases of democratization that Rustow describes were experienced in such haste that the decision to make the transition was immediately followed by the establishment of a multi-party system and political competition. In this regard, the electoral mechanism was taken as the core of democracy by both Bayar and Menderes, being one of the foremost aspects of democracy. Since entering into government was the primary goal of the political parties and since in democracies the electoral mechanism was the only way to gain

and maintain power, Bayar and Menderes attached great importance to the support of the electorate.

In accordance with the importance they attached to the electoral mechanism, Bayar and Menderes always emphasized the significance of holding free, fair, and safe elections. Free and fair elections represented the only and the most effective way to gain legitimate power. Since the beginning of the multi-party system, they aimed to avoid electoral and procedural frauds. As stated repeatedly throughout this dissertation, in line with their perception of the electoral mechanism as the prerequisite of governmental legitimacy, they always complained about the lack of safety in elections when in opposition and argued that this prevented the real revelation of the people's will. Accordingly, when in government, both of them understood elections as the mechanism securing their legitimacy to govern. They considered electoral success as a sanction to apply the policies they considered necessary, even when these policies were opposed to a great extent.

The decision of Bayar and Menderes to leave the Assembly when they were in opposition and despite being apparently contradictory, their objection to the opposition leaving the Assembly when the DP was in government was an expression of the value they put on the majority's will. Because they regarded the electorate's support as the grounds on which the government could legitimately rule the country, when they were in opposition they considered the option to leave the Assembly as their right. They thought that their leaving the Assembly did not contradict the goal of further democratization that they defended. Since the CHP came into government after the doubtful 1946 elections and since its legitimacy was questionable, their leaving the Assembly should not have been interpreted as disturbing the democratic functioning of the Assembly. Instead, they regarded it as a way to exert pressure on

the governing party to amend the undemocratic laws as clarified in the Freedom Pact of the DP.

For the very same reasons, when the DP came into government, the CHP's leaving the Assembly was not assessed in the same way. The DP government's legitimacy was not open to question given its electoral support. Thus, the CHP's boycotting the Assembly was nothing other than a repudiation of the majority will, which was the foundation of the democratic system.

In addition to leaving the Assembly, Bayar and Menderes also considered the idea of boycotting the elections as their right when the DP was in opposition. Since they were insistent on the issue of holding free, fair, and safe elections controlled by the judiciary, they regarded withdrawing from the elections as a means of declaring the need for a new electoral law guaranteeing judicial supervision of the elections. They thought that participating in the elections would weaken their opposition to the CHP on the issue of improving the electoral mechanism.

However, when they were in government, they criticized the CHP's questioning the idea of whether to boycott the elections or not. They interpreted the option of abstaining from the elections as violating the rules of political competition. Given their emphasis on the majority will and their consideration of free and fair elections as indispensable for the survival of democracy, they thought that the opposition should have found another way to express its criticisms. Thus, their concern for the proper functioning of the electoral mechanism in order to achieve an accurate representation of the majority will led them both to boycott elections when they were in opposition and to criticize the opposition for considering whether to abstain from the elections.

Their conception of the significance of majority will and legitimate government became much clearer with the success of the DP in 1950, 1954, and 1957 general elections. With their success in those elections, which were held under safe circumstances without allegation of fraud, they considered themselves the real representatives of the national will. They understood it as the indication of their legitimacy, which would provide them with the right to rule without being questioned.

In addition to their understanding of electoral success as providing them with the right to govern without the need or obligation to accept the criticism of the opposition, the very functioning of the majority system of elections also helped to make the opposition's checking and balancing of the ruling party very difficult. Due to the functioning of the majority system, the result after the general elections was the appearance of an unbalanced picture in the Assembly. While the political party that gained the majority of the votes was acquiring the right to have most of the seats in the Assembly, the parties becoming the opposition could only be represented with a small number of mandates. Due to this unequal distribution of the mandates of political parties, Bayar and Menderes understood the DP's majority as the grounds on which it could rule without necessarily taking into consideration the views and demands of opposition parties. Thus, since the DP came into government based on the electorate's support, Bayar and Menderes thought that questioning its legitimacy would be questioning the majority will, which constitutes the foundation of a democracy and this way of understanding the situation was also favoured by the majority system.

Accordingly, Bayar's and Menderes' equating democracy with the institution of free and fair elections led to some deficiencies in their understanding of the other

aspect of democracy, the political opposition. Because they regarded the will of the majority as the only authority to which they were accountable, they did not develop their commitment to other accountability mechanisms that are essential for a democracy to survive and thrive.

Through both their political praxis and discourse, they emphasized their success in general elections, which seemed to give them the right to neglect other requirements of a democracy, which is political opposition as argued in this dissertation. They admitted that the presence of opposition in democracies was important. However, they also thought that the opposition should be made within certain limits beyond which would imply questioning the legitimacy of the government. They considered that to question the political actions and decisions of the government was to question its legitimacy and since its legitimacy issued from the people, it was to question the will of the majority. As a result, their tolerance of criticism and willingness to compromise on conflictual issues were so low that in the last years of the DP government there were even some efforts to prevent political opposition from getting involved in the policy-making process.

The impact of that kind of perception of electoral success was witnessed clearly after the 1950 electoral win. As mentioned in this dissertation, the criticisms of the CHP put forward promptly after the 1950 general elections were interpreted as an effort to delegitimize the success of the DP. The immediate attempt of the CHP to criticize the DP government was not found sincere by Bayar and Menderes. They considered that the DP, having just come into government, had recently proven its legitimacy. That is why it appeared to them that the CHP's opposition did not have a solid grounding but rather stemmed from the motive to criticize the government and undermine its legitimacy.

In addition to the immediate criticisms of the CHP, Bayar and Menderes did not find its continuing criticisms to be well founded. Besides Bayar's and Menderes' understanding of political opposition given the place of majority will in their conceptualization of democracy, the immediate and ongoing opposition of the CHP also prevented them from taking all of their criticisms into consideration. It can be suggested that they believed that the CHP's criticisms stemmed not from the desire to convince the government to pursue better policies but just for the sake of criticizing.

This belief of Bayar and Menderes was witnessed when the DP government decided to expropriate the CHP's financial assets, arguing that they had been possessed during the single-party era. Besides Bayar's hesitation to enforce this decision considering the likelihood that it would be in conflict with their decision to avoid *devr-i sabık*, they thought that it would produce equality for political parties and competition on equal grounds under the multi-party system. Additionally, Menderes made known his awareness of the importance of the interaction among political parties several times in his speeches and made efforts to reach a compromise with the CHP, holding several meetings with the CHP in order to reach agreement on the issue. Nevertheless, relations between the parties deteriorated to a significant extent following this decision. While Menderes thought that the objections of the CHP were not well founded and that the CHP was not trying to find a consensus on the issue, the CHP opposition understood this decision as a precursor to the establishment of a dictatorship. Hence, as Bayar and Menderes began to interpret the intentions of the political opposition as self-serving and irrational, their inclination to compromise and tolerate the objections of the opposition decreased.

The decrease in their tolerance towards the political opposition continued much more evidently after the 1954 general elections. Bayar and Menderes interpreted the victory of the DP in the elections as the approval of the people for the DP's policies and started to lose their concern for the opposition's criticisms. As they started to exclude the opposition from the policy-making process, the relationship between government and opposition deteriorated. With the dominance of the DP in the parliament as a result of the majority system, this attitude of Bayar and Menderes became much more perceptible. Despite the fact that both the DP and the CHP attempted several times to achieve a moderate relationship between the government and the opposition, the opposition's weak representation in the Parliament following the 1954 elections contributed to the government's tendency to disregard the opposition. This meant that Bayar's and Menderes' promise to provide the opposition parties with an amicable political atmosphere in which they could much more freely check and balance the government was not fulfilled. This caused relations between the government and opposition to become worse. They started to perceive themselves as a threat towards each other.

The mutual feeling of being threatened by the other intensified following the 1957 general elections. Afterwards, the attitude both of Bayar and Menderes and of the opposition became much more severe towards each other. Even though the DP remained in government, the DP felt that its power was under threat as the opposition gained greater support. For the very same reason, the opposition, realizing that the DP lost some of its electoral support, intensified its criticism of the government. This prompted Menderes to seek measures to cope with the opposition.

One of these measures was the amendment of parliamentary bylaws, as a result of which, making opposition within the parliament became very difficult. The

right of the political parties in Parliament to oppose the government was restricted to a significant extent with these amendments.

Nevertheless, the amendments in the parliamentary bylaws unsurprisingly did not help to appease criticism towards the government. Instead, it made the matters worse. The opposition parties felt the need to cooperate among themselves against the government party. Given the likelihood that the opposition parties' efforts to cooperate would be to the disadvantage of the governing party, Menderes defended the necessity to take new measures, which were approved by Bayar.

As the struggle between the government and the opposition became more severe, the DP government's measures also became much more repressive. In return for the opposition's efforts to cooperate among themselves, Menderes proposed the idea to establish a front against the opposition under the name of 'Fatherland Front' (*Vatan Cephesi*). The formation of the Front was intended both to increase the number of DP supporters and to activate them and thus to maintain the DP's popularity under those unstable political circumstances.

In addition to forming the Front, the DP government decided to establish a committee to investigate the activities of the opposition. The 'Investigation Committee' (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*) was formed with only DP members and conferred with great authority, such as banning political activity outside the Assembly and newspaper reporting of the Assembly debates. Both the mandate of the Committee and the way that it was formed were opposed to such an extent that the tension between the government and the opposition reached a point at which compromise became impossible. Nevertheless, Bayar and Menderes defended the establishment of the Committee as essential for the survival of democracy. They

emphasized that its establishment did not violate the Constitution. As mentioned above, given the principle of unity of powers of the 1924 Constitution, they held the legislative power to be unrestrained and thought that their political decisions were justified by the Constitution. Nevertheless, regardless of the conformity of the Committee's establishment with the Constitution, its existence paralyzed the political opposition and led to a deadlock.

Following the measures taken by the government, the political life of the country slid into crisis. The motivation on both sides to find alternative ways of working together within the framework of democratic politics disintegrated. While the government tried to prevail over the mounting political crisis, the measures that it took led only to stalemate. As the political crisis became insuperable, antidemocratic measures followed one upon the other and the relationship between government and the opposition deteriorated beyond repair.

The process summarized above indicates that gaining government was not the only goal of the political parties, staying in power was quite crucial as well. As stated previously, Bayar and Menderes sanctified the role of elections in gaining and maintaining power and so attached great importance to the support of the electorate. Having the majority's support, they saw themselves as authorized by the Constitution to take measures that resulted in the paralysis of the opposition. Nevertheless, the need they felt to take these measures stemmed not only from their electoral support but also from the fear of losing this popular support. In other words, a decrease in popular support caused them to put much more emphasis on the need for majority support. The leaders consequently took several controversial political actions in order to increase electoral support, as witnessed after the 1957 elections.

Thus, when their political actions and decisions had been approved by the electorate and they had secured political power, Bayar and Menderes acted heedlessly in the confidence of the electoral support. However, the same was also witnessed when they perceived a decrease in their electoral support. They again made bold decisions in order to cope with the opposition and to avoid further loss of support. The attitude of Bayar and Menderes showed that there were certain limits within which the political opposition could act. In the event of breaking those limits, the government was capable of taking measures to appease the opposition in order to maintain electoral support and prevent its loss. Towards the end of the 1950s, it was observed that Bayar and Menderes started to retreat from their idea that criticizing the government's policies was the very duty of the opposition in a democratic regime. In spite of the fact that they defined the duty of opposition as supervising and advising the government with the aim of finding the best policy option, when they realized that the government was losing support, they perceived objections towards their policies as a threat to their legitimacy. Hence, they took measures in order to avoid a further loss, which was quite likely given the constant criticism from the opposition.

Nevertheless, not only the DP but also the opposition parties should also be held liable for the eventual course of things. Even though the measures defended by Bayar and Menderes as necessary for the survival of democracy aggravated the problematic relationship between government and opposition, the role of the opposition parties in general and the CHP leadership in particular in the escalation of the political crisis cannot be neglected. As acknowledged by some of the CHP parliamentarians and supporters cited in this dissertation, they were also aware of their role in the heightening of the tension. Many of the parliamentarians of that era

admitted that the strategy followed by the opposition was so corrosive that it was almost inevitable for the government to consider the option of taking severe measures. In addition to the severity of the opposition, their tendency to criticize the government at any opportunity also provoked the DP to take anti-democratic measures. In other words, as the relationship between government and opposition deteriorated, the government took measures provoking the opposition's criticism and another series of measures followed it, as witnessed through Bayar and Menderes' defense of the necessity of these measures.

In addition to the mutual role of the government and the opposition in exerting pressure on the political system, the personal grounds on which politics was carried out also contributed to the deterioration of the political system. Since the DP came into government, and particularly in the second half of the 1950s, it was witnessed that the opposition forgot its primary role to hold the government accountable for the policies it pursued. In return, the government neglected the fact that the opposition was a prerequisite of a democratic system and the government should be checked by it for the good of the state. Due to this, the relationship between the government and the opposition drifted far from the political line. It became almost impossible for the political leaders of the era to examine a problem within the political framework; in time not the political issues but the political personalities became the central issue of politics much more evidently than before. Hence, the disagreements between the political parties frequently resulted in a political crisis.

In accordance with above, the lack of trust between Bayar, Menderes and İnönü influenced the nature of the conflict and the course of politics to a great extent. The relationship between Bayar and Menderes on one hand and İnönü on the other

was so tense that it was almost inevitable to avoid conflict between the DP and the CHP. As witnessed during the whole period but especially in the late 1950s, the politics of the era consisted of mutual accusations. Even a political issue that needed to be seriously discussed and negotiated by the political leaders produced power struggles. While the Democrats were targeting İnönü at any opportunity, the opposition parties were also concentrating on Menderes in their criticism of the government. Thus, purely political issues were becoming personal issues.

It can even be argued that the distrust among the political leaders of the era was such that they regarded each other not as political opponents but enemies. A lack of tolerance and disdain for compromise among the political leaders marked the era that ended with the military intervention. When the accounts of Bayar and Menderes are taken into consideration, it becomes evident that the ‘İnönü factor’ was influential in their political acts. Bayar and Menderes in several cases expressed their displeasure with the attitude of the opposition, particularly of İnönü. They thought that İnönü could not digest the substitution of the CHP government with the DP following its electoral success in the 1950 general elections. They interpreted his criticisms as a product of the electoral defeat of the CHP and as an attempt to defame the government. Thus, given the fact that they perceived İnönü as the main reason that a trivial problem should result in a political crisis, there was no hope for a working relationship characterised by tolerance and flexibility.

In addition to it, it is also important to note that Bayar as president was also backing Menderes’ policy decisions. Despite the fact that the constitutional structure provided the prime minister with a high level of authority, Bayar’s approval was quite important for Menderes. As mentioned before, the body with the highest authority in the political structure designed by the Constitution was the parliament.

The president, not being authorized to dissolve the parliament, did not have an important say over the government's decisions, except the right to veto the laws passed by the parliament, which could be a considerable right if exercised. However, it was not generally observed that the president acted in accordance with the requirements of the democratic regime, but rather with the needs of the political party which he supported. Thus, due to the place of the parliament in the constitutional structure, the prestige of ruling on a significant electoral basis, and the backing of the president, the prime minister could eliminate the pressure of horizontal accountability mechanisms to a certain extent while governing the country.

It was a point heavily criticized by Bayar and Menderes when they were in opposition. They criticized İnönü's support for his party, the CHP, despite their demands from him to be neutral towards the political parties. However, because İnönü was also the leader of the governing party, it was almost impossible to expect him to stay neutral as a president. Because of the connection between the president and the governing party, the same was witnessed during the DP era. Most of the decisions of the era were made together by Bayar and Menderes. Even when they disagreed with each other, either Bayar or Menderes relented in order to find a common point. Bayar did not use his right to veto when the issues of People's Houses and the financial assets of the CHP came onto the agenda of the government, in light of the need to keep order within the party before the 1954 general elections.

The mode of relationship between the presidency and the government was recognized much clearly when Bayar started to defend much stricter policies towards the opposition at the end of the 1950s, while Menderes stated several times that he was seeking moderate ways. In other words, despite the fact that they both believed

in the need to take measures against the opposition, Bayar was much more determined to follow stricter policy options. Considering their own speeches and the accounts of DP members, it is also understood that particularly towards the end of 1950s, Bayar started to interfere in Menderes' policy decisions to a greater extent and as witnessed in the university events, even to bypass him. Thus, besides his responsibility to function as an accountability mechanism, he either supported Menderes' decisions or even pushed for authoritarian measures in order to suppress the opposition which he regarded as threatening the survival of the democratic regime.

Nevertheless, as mentioned on several occasions in this dissertation, the attempts of Bayar and Menderes to preserve the multi-party regime by authoritarian measures served to accelerate its breakdown, which is the paradox that makes the assessment of their contribution to Turkish democracy quite difficult. Since their appearance as dissidents within the CHP, they constantly struggled for the establishment of the multi-party system and when it became real with the DP, they invested great efforts to keep it alive. Hence, their emergence meant that in order to have a democratic regime, political competition and political opposition are the primary dimensions to take into consideration.

Considering the course of Turkish politics examined in this dissertation, it is seen nonetheless that these two dimensions of democracy which were quite essential for Bayar and Menderes started to clash with each other in the DP era. It was witnessed that their emphasis on the need for political competition led them concentrate on electoral success to such an extent that the dimension of political opposition was not considered as being interdependent with the electoral mechanism and thus, an indispensable requirement of democracy. Nevertheless, due to the fact

that one is dependent on the other, the result was the breakdown of democracy. As they began to feel themselves accountable only to the people and not to the political opposition, political life in Turkey entered into a deadlock that could only be resolved with the 1960 military intervention.

Putting popular support at the centre of their political praxis, Bayar and Menderes considered the majority to have the right to act without limitation. In accordance with this, since the government was authorized by the majority through the elections, it also had the right to govern with a great deal of power. As long as a political party came into government through elections held under free, fair, and safe conditions, its legitimacy was undeniable and admitted political opposition only to a certain extent.

Thus, neither Bayar nor Menderes argued for a regime without a political opposition. Rather, they always made it clear that political opposition was an undisputable requirement of democracies. However, they understood it from a limited perspective. They thought that opposition to the government should be offered in the interests of the country. It should be made constructively, with the intention to improve the policies of the government, rather than negatively, to threaten the government's legitimacy.

This narrow understanding of Bayar and Menderes of the place of political opposition in democracies was also favoured by the nature of the 1924 Constitution and the majority system. As the 1924 Constitution was based on the unity of powers and the majority system resulted in an unbalanced representation of political parties within the parliament, the governing party was already granted with a huge amount

of power. This mode of operation also promoted their majoritarian understanding of democracy.

Nevertheless, it does not imply that they attempted to establish a dictatorship. Even though the government was not put under pressure by various check and balance mechanisms provided by the Constitution and the strength of the political opposition was curtailed due to an unbalanced party representation in parliament, Bayar and Menderes always insisted on their belief in the importance of supervising the government. Through their political discourse, it is seen that they frequently made evident that in order to have a democratic regime, the electoral mechanism and the political opposition should first be accepted by the politicians. Their belief in these two dimensions of democratic accountability was also witnessed in their political praxis during the first half of the 1950s to a great extent. However, due to the reasons mentioned so far, it was observed that they started to prefer one dimension to another, forgetting the interdependence between these two accountability mechanisms.

As they started to lose the understanding that both the vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms are equally necessary for the survival of democracies and to concentrate on the government's accountability to the electorate as accepted by the minimalist conceptualization, the process resulting in the breakdown of democracy became inescapable. As the opposition became more corrosive in the second half of the decade, they started to ignore the government's accountability to the political opposition. They thought that the survival of the regime could be secured by preventing the corrosive political opposition from interfering in the government's policies. The measures that were considered necessary for the maintenance of the democratic order stemmed from this idea. In other words,

because they saw the survival of the government as necessary for the survival of the democratic regime, they tried to get rid of any opposition.

Therefore, it can be concluded that Bayar's and Menderes' conceptualization of democracy was not only limited to the minimalist conceptualization of democracy. It was based on both dimensions of democratic accountability. They defended both the necessity of the electoral dimension and of the political opposition dimension of democratic accountability. Accordingly, they contributed to the liberalization and further democratization of the political system. They played the leading role in the establishment of a regime in which multi-party competition and presence of a political opposition were taken for granted. Nevertheless, they could not achieve the stability of this democratic regime as they did not realize the interdependence between these two dimensions of democracy. Once they started to see these two dimensions as conflicting with each other and sacrificed one for the other, the process resulted in the breakdown of democracy. Thus, ironically, due to their conceptualization of democracy, which originally comprehended both dimensions, they contributed both to the establishment and to the collapse of democracy in Turkey. As their conceptualization included both dimensions, they were influential in the transition to a democratic regime and its development; conversely, since their conceptualization of democracy did not recognise that these two dimensions were inseparable, they again were influential in the breakdown of democracy.

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