

EUROPEANIZATION AND DEVOLUTION: CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN
TURKEY

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by

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**EUROPEANIZATION AND DEVOLUTION: CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN
TURKEY**

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

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in

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ADMINISTRATION**

**BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA**

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

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ABSTRACT

EUROPEANIZATION AND DEVOLUTION: CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN TURKEY

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PhD, Department of Political Science and Public Administration

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This thesis analyzes the impact of the EU accession process over the central and local levels of administration in Turkey from an institutionalist framework. The analytical tools of historical and sociological institutionalism are utilized in order to analyze whether Europeanization leads to devolution and the city of Kayseri constitutes the case through which the EU impact at the local level is determined. The main argument of the thesis is that although the EU accession process has created a demand at the local level in terms of changing the power relations with the centre, no institutional change has taken place so far in terms of devolution because of the mediating factors such as strong state tradition, lack of self-government culture and the political and historical context of the centre-local relations in the country and the central level managed to reproduce its power vis-à-vis the local political actors.

Keywords: Europeanization, EU accession, Turkey, centre-local relations.

ÖZET

AVRUPALILAŞMA SÜRECİ, YERELLEŞME VE TÜRKİYE'DE MERKEZ-YEREL İLİŞKİLERİ

Çelenk, Ayşe Aslıhan

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Bu çalışma, Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik sürecinin Türkiye'de merkez-yerel ilişkileri üzerinde yarattığı etkiyi kurumsalcılık teorisi çerçevesinde incelemektedir. Tarihsel ve sosyolojik kurumsalcılık teorilerinden yararlanan çalışmada, Avrupalılışma sürecinin Türkiye'de yerelleşmeye ve desantrilazasyona yol açıp açmadığı sorusuna cevap aranmakta ve AB sürecinin yerel düzeydeki etkisi Kayseri örneği üzerinden değerlendirilmektedir. Araştırmanın göstermiş olduğu temel sonuç, AB üyelik sürecinin yerel düzeyde yarattığı çeşitli taleplere karşın, tarihsel ve politik nedenlerden dolayı Türkiye'de yerelleşme biçiminde bir kurumsal değişimin henüz yaşanmadığı ve merkezin yerel karşısındaki gücünü korumakta olduğunu doğrudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupalılışma, yerelleşme, Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği, merkez-yerel ilişkileri.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

As Turkey's accession to the European Union (EU) gained pace since the late 1990s, various areas of policy making began to be discussed within the context of Turkey-EU relations. Political and economic reforms, identity issues and cultural debates were now analyzed through the introduction of a new variable: the EU impact. The EU was portrayed as the initiator of change and the source of motivation, which Turkey needed in order to complete its modernization and democratization. In time, it seems that a positive correlation was perceived between the EU impact and institutional change at the domestic level. One of the areas, in which this assumption was made regarding the EU impact, is the issue of centre-local relations. The commonly held idea, which is almost never questioned, is that as Turkey's accession to the EU becomes deeper, the central state will get smaller, lose its power and the local level will acquire a new power at the domestic setting as a result of the policies imposed by the EU. This process is often equated with democratization and one of the components of Turkey's democratic evolution is considered to be the improvement of the participation of the local level in the political processes.

The starting point of this study is to offer a critique of these simplistic assumptions regarding the EU impact over the relations between the central and local levels in Turkey and to test the relationship between Europeanization and devolution instead of taking the idea of positive correlation for granted. By doing this, the study also aims to contribute to the literature on the study of institutional change through providing a model for change, which takes the context-specific factors into account while dealing with different institutional outcomes and by providing new venues for research.

The main question asked in this dissertation is whether the assumption that Europeanization leads to devolution, i.e. empowers the local level with respect to the centre, can be applicable to the Turkish case. While trying to answer this question, various hypotheses are tested through research. These hypotheses are:

- Europeanization process has empowered the local and regional governance structures in the EU member states and the same impact can be expected in Turkey during the EU accession process (the positive correlation hypothesis between Europeanization and devolution).
- The EU serves as a catalyst in changing the balance of power between the central and local levels in Turkey (the outcome is not necessarily in favor of the local level).
- The context-specific and historical factors have an impact over the prospects for institutional change and determine the outcome of the interactions between the central and local levels.

The case study offered in this dissertation, first of all, deals with the experiences of the EU member states. Then, by drawing on the Turkish case, the study analyzes how the EU affects the dynamics of the relationship between different

levels of administration. In other words, the main questions tried to be answered within the context of the study are whether the Europeanization process always leads to devolution and whether devolution always means institutional change in the form of democratization.

The study, in fact, tries to offer an account of institutional change in terms of the dynamics of centre-local relations in Turkey and analyzes the relationship between the ongoing process of EU accession and the relations between the major central and local political actors. While doing this, the premises of the sociological and historical institutionalism are utilized and the impact of the EU accession process over the changes in the centre-local relations is dealt from the lenses of institutionalist theory. The reason for choosing this theoretical framework lies in the fact that the theory of institutionalism acknowledges the interaction between the structure and agency and stresses on how the institutions and the actors change, constrain and empower each other and evolve together. In other words, while explaining the political processes, the institutionalist theory takes into account how the institutions shape the preferences and actions of the actors as well as the impact of the choices made by the actors at one point on the institutional design and prospects for its change.

In institutionalism, the political actors are not considered as rational, interest-maximizing, independent agents. Thus, the institutional change can not be initiated by the actors according to their choices or wishes. Instead, once they are established, the institutions become political actors in their own right and limit the choices of the political actors. While dealing with the terms and prospects of institutional change, the power and impact of the existing institutions need to be considered as well as the preferences of the actors. The only way of understanding the different responses to

same external factors and how an impetus for change is processed at the domestic level is to deal with the interaction between the institutions and the actors instead of establishing a direct correlation relationship between two variables.

In order to explain the terms of institutional change, the ‘change through networks and learning’ mechanism of sociological institutionalism is adopted, which is essentially based on the idea that as the domestic political actors engage in relations with other actors and networks, they become aware of the differences in values and practices and feel some sort of pressure for adaptation. In this process, their values and choices change, which in return leads to institutional change at the state level. If this model of change is applied to the research question at hand, the EU accession process is operationalized as the process of increased contact with the EU level, during which the misfit between the European and domestic policies become evident and pressures for change occur. The tested outcome of these pressures is the process of devolution, which is operationalized and measured according to the following criteria in the Turkish case:

- Popularly elected bodies are given more decision-making powers in the local affairs.
- The principle of subsidiarity regulates the centre-local relations.
- The relationship between the central and the local levels is re-defined in favor of the latter.
- The local administrative bodies acquire financial autonomy in terms of generating their own resources and deciding about resource allocation.
- The centre adopts a more differentiated policy towards the local.
- The accountability of the administrative bodies are enhanced.

The study aims to determine whether the EU accession process initiated a devolution process in Turkey, through measuring these indicators of devolution. In order to differentiate the impact of Europeanization from that of globalization, which is also argued to empower the local level, the study focuses on the developments after 1999, when Turkey officially became an EU candidate country. Moreover, the research is conducted on the concrete and voluntary responses of the Turkish state to the EU's demands, in order to differentiate the administrative changes from the process of globalization. Although both processes are inter-related and the globalization process has initiated and facilitated the process of Europeanization, the emphasis on the administrative changes with a clear intent of adjusting to the EU helps to single out the impact of Europeanization.

As mentioned earlier, certain intervening variables affect how the pressures for adaptation coming from the EU level are processed and interpreted at the domestic level and shape the prospects and outcome of institutional change. In determining the relationship between the EU accession and centre-local relations, besides the EU impact, two additional variables are utilized. The first variable is the impact of the historical and political context, which follow the point that past choices of institutional design and the historically determined actor positions and values have an impact over the present and future interactions between the agency and structure. The second intervening variable in testing the Europeanization-devolution positive correlation is the actor preferences, since while the institutions constrain the actor preferences, the outcome of the struggles between the major political actors and changes in their preferences have an impact over institutional design. Utilizing both the impact of the historical and political context and the impact of the actor preferences in the study of institutional change is in fact a theoretical requirement,

since the institutionalist framework is based on the interactive relationship between the agency and structure, in which the institutions and the actors evolve together.

The thesis is based on a case study, which mostly focuses on Turkey. However, while testing the validity of the hypothesis and applying the theoretical model, the cases from the EU member states are also utilized to see whether a common practice of centre-local relationship emerged in the EU countries as a result of interactions and Europeanization process.

In order to determine the nature and content of the pressures for adaptation from the EU-level and the misfit between the EU practice and the Turkish practice regarding the management of centre-local relations, the progress reports of the European Commission about Turkey and the concrete demands from Turkey, the National Programs and the Development Plans are extensively analyzed. The analysis of the European experience regarding the centre-local relations and the impact of the EU for different groups of countries will also help to understand the nature of the adaptational pressures.

When it comes to dealing with the Turkish response to these pressures and to understand whether this response entails devolution, the central and local levels are initially analyzed separately according to the actor preferences, historical and political context and the impact of the EU accession process. At the central level, the immediate response to the pressures coming from the EU-level are determined from the legal changes made in the post-1999 period until 2007. The texts of the draft laws, laws, national programs, EU adjustment reforms and development programs are utilized for the analysis of legal change.

In order to determine the positions and preferences of the major actors at the central level and the EU impact over these, the in-depth interviews conducted with

the specialists of Central Planning Agency, the government and opposition representatives, the legal basis of the presidential vetoes about various laws and the political party programs are utilized.

For the analysis of the local level, the study focuses on a single case. This methodological choice may be criticized for not being viable for theoretical generalizations, however, since one of the aims of the study is to determine whether a value and preference change takes place at the local level as a result of the interactions with the EU level, focusing on a single case seems to be a better choice instead of getting lost in finding the points for comparison between different cases. Moreover, focusing on a single case will also contribute to the theory, since it will reveal the impact of the context-specific factors over the institutional outcomes. Conducting this analysis on a single case is also hoped to generate new analytical research questions to be asked in other contexts as well. However, focusing on a single case makes the case choice much more critical for the theoretical integrity of the study and thus, that choice needs to be justified in order to respond to the theoretical concerns.

The case chosen for this study is the city of Kayseri, located in Central Anatolia. The first reason to choose Kayseri is this geographical location of the city. In the debates about the cultural gap between Turkey and the EU, one argument is that although the big cities like Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, the coastal regions and the western parts of the country are already European and have no difficulty in adopting to the ‘EU way’ of doing things, the Central and Eastern Anatolian regions of the country remain non-European and they are resistant to change. Thus, choosing a case from Central Anatolia seems to be both a challenge to explain the impact of the EU accession process and to analyze whether the Anatolian region of Turkey is really

resistant to change. Following this, choosing a case from Central Anatolia over the big cities also helps to respond to the theoretical concern about differentiating the impacts of globalization and Europeanization, since in case of big cities, which are already integrated into the global economic and processes, the EU impact would be harder to single out. In the case of Kayseri, the globalization process has also been influential by initiating the economic transformation of the city and by opening it to the adaptational pressures from the EU. However, as the research will reveal, the impact of globalization has mostly been in economic terms, while the EU accession process initiated a demand for administrative change. In addition to this, since Central Anatolia is the highest recipient of the EU structural funds, a case from this region is a more viable choice in terms of determining the EU impact at the local level.

The reason to choose Kayseri among the other cities in the Central and Eastern Anatolia is simply the fact that Kayseri has the most contact with the EU in terms of the number of EU-funded projects conducted in the city, the amount of the structural funds received from the EU¹ and the economic relations of the business circles of the city in Europe. The intensity of contact with the EU, prepares a more suitable environment for the pressures for adaptation to be channeled from the supra-national level to the local level and for the value change to be related to the EU factor. Moreover, the fact that the city has been governed by the cadre of the same political orientations and positions since the early 1990s also helps to single out the impact of the EU factor over the actor preferences and policy changes as other factors, like political party changes or ideological re-orientation can be controlled.

¹ As of the end of 2007.

The case study conducted in Kayseri is mainly based on the in-depth interviews conducted with the major political actors, who became more important during the Turkey's EU accession process. The metropolitan mayor, officials working in the metropolitan municipality, the specialists in the Central Anatolian Development Agency, the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and managers of certain EU-funded projects were interviewed during the research in order to determine the impact of the EU accession process over the preferences and positions of the local political actors and what kind of change the EU initiates in terms of the balance of power between the centre and the local levels in Turkey.

In order for this analysis to be made, the first chapter of the dissertation gives an account of the theoretical framework, the research question, main variables, hypotheses and the methodology of the research. The basic premises of the institutionalist approach, the way in which the concepts of institution and institutional change are understood within the framework of research and how the historical and sociological institutionalist theories are utilized in the study are discussed extensively in order to lay out the framework for analyses. The first chapter also discusses the research question, operationalizes the hypotheses, the main and intervening variables, and the methodology to be adopted while answering that question in order to offer the roadmap for the later stages of the research.

The second chapter applies the theoretical framework to the European context in order to test the validity of the variables in explaining institutional change and to see whether the hypothesis that the process of Europeanization leads to devolution is valid in the European case. While doing this, the historical and political context of the centre-local relations in different European countries, the importance of the actor preferences and the EU impact are analyzed in order to see how each domestic

setting processes the EU-level adaptational pressures and to understand whether the EU factor has led to a convergence in Europe regarding the way in which the centre-local relations are managed.

The third chapter introduces the Turkish case into the study and discusses the historical and political context of the centre-local relations in Turkey from the late Ottoman period to the 2000s, in order to understand under which conditions and institutional constraints, the central and local political actors have identified their values and acquired their powers. The fourth and fifth chapters deal with the actor preferences, positions, powers and the impact of the EU accession process over these extensively, as this forms the crux of the research. While the fourth chapter focuses on the political actors at the central level, the fifth chapter analyzes the case of Kayseri.

After the analyses of the actor preferences and the EU impact, the sixth chapter offers a general analysis of the Turkish case within the theoretical framework stated in the first chapter, revisits the initially offered questions, variables and hypotheses, and discusses the validity of the positive relationship between Europeanization and devolution by dealing with the findings of the research and the indicators of devolution stated in the first chapter. The chapter also discusses the theoretical contributions of the research together with some conclusive remarks for future research.

CHAPTER II

AN INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH TO THE CENTRE- LOCAL RELATIONS

The nature of politics has been explained from various approaches, using different variables and mechanisms leading to certain political outcomes. While for some analysts, the political outcomes are a direct result of the actions, calculations, orientations and interests of the individual political actors; for others, the structure and other macro-level variables constrain the actions of the political actors and thus lead to the political outcomes. Different levels of analysis, objects of study, causes of change lead to different accounts of political life, each having their own strengths and weaknesses. Without disparaging other approaches, this project aims to adopt the models, levels of analysis and variables of the theory of institutionalism to the question at hand, i.e. the impact of the EU accession process over centre-local relations in Turkey and whether a process of devolution is taking place in the Turkish context.

This chapter lays out the basic research questions of the study together with the hypotheses to be tested and variables to be introduced. While dealing with the

Europeanization-devolution relationship in Turkey, the study builds its theory on historical and sociological institutionalist perspectives, thus the chapter also covers the basic premises and variables of different types of institutionalism as well.

The chapter starts with the general features of the theory of institutionalism, different approaches to the institutions within the theory itself and different ways of defining the concepts of “institution” and “institutional change”. Then, it goes on with explaining the way in which the institutions are defined within the scope of this project and with applying the institutional framework to the research question. While doing this, the main research question and the hypotheses to be tested are explained in detail. Finally, the chapter lays out the main features of the research design and operationalizes the main variables of the research question.

2.1 The Institutional Theory in Social Sciences

The rise of institutionalism² in social sciences was a reaction to the behavioral approach, which saw the politics as the outcome of individual actions and choices. Regardless of the way they define the institutions, for the institutionalists, “institutions are political actors in their own right” (March& Olsen, 1984: 738), “[t]he organization of political life makes a difference, and institutions affect the flow of history” (March& Olsen, 1989: 159). Contrary to the behavioral approach,

² The term “institutionalism” used in this study refers to “the new institutionalism”. While the “old” institutionalism studies the formal institutions of government and used a descriptive methodology to explain the relations between different branches of government and defined institution in terms of political, legal and administrative arrangements of the state; “new” institutionalism brought the institutions back into the political agenda in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a constraining factor over the behavior of political actors, defined them in broader terms and argued that behavior can not be understood without reference to the institution within which it occurs. The old institutionalism composed of detailed configurative studies of different administrative, legal and political structures in different countries. In the 1950s and 60s, the Behavioral Revolution in Social Sciences rejected the formal laws, rules and administrative structures in explaining actual politics and used powers, attitudes and behaviors of the political actors as independent variables instead. New Institutionalism challenged this idea based on the fact that same challenges were given different responses and that the idea of rational behavior can not explain these differences and instead they focused on different institutional configurations of institutions in explaining political interactions. See Thelen& Steinmo (1992) for the details of the timeline leading to new institutionalism in political science.

the theory of institutionalism focuses on the environmental factors, which affect the actions and decisions of the political actors and deals with the impact of structure over agency with its history and characteristics.

Any model of explaining a political phenomenon within the theory of institutionalism is based on the premises that an institution is composed of a set of formal or informal regulative rules, which determine the interactions of political actors; political institutions affect the distribution of resources, which in turn affects the power of political actors; the policy alternatives of leaders are not defined completely by exogenous forces, but are shaped by existing administrative agencies and the explanation of genesis or persistence of institutions lie in prior institutions; not individual choices or actions (Scott, 1995: pp. 6-7; March& Olsen, 1984: pp. 739-740).

As the institutionalist approach evolved in time, there occurred alternative ways of dealing with the institutions within the theory itself. These alternatives offered different definitions of the concept of institution and explained institutional change through different mechanisms. For the Rational Choice Institutionalism, institutions are important to the extent that they provide the context for individual action and create constraints over the behaviors and strategies of self-interested political actors, who are rational interest-maximizers³. On the other hand, the other major disciplines within the institutionalist theory, Sociological Institutionalism and Historical Institutionalism, attribute a much greater role to the institutions than merely being the context for strategic interaction. Moreover, these approaches also give fewer roles to the political actors, as they do not perceive them as rational

³ See Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 7), “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics” in Thelen, Steinmo and Longstreth (eds.) *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

interest maximizers and they focus on how individual goals and preferences are shaped by the institutional context.

In the Rational Choice Institutionalism, institutions are defined as the rules of the game, i.e. the norms, laws and organizational forms, which channel individual rational action and institutional change results from the strategic actions of the political actors. For the Sociological Institutionalists, however, actors, interests and preferences are all socially constructed and endogenous. The informal norms of behavior are as important as the formal rules and the institutional change is a result of diffusion, training and practice, while for Historical Institutionalism, probability of change is lower and it is often a result of an exogenous shock or a crisis situation⁴.

In the Rational Choice Institutionalism, the institutions are important to the extent that they affect the actions of rational political actors. For this approach, the agency is stronger than the structure and it is argued that the actors are capable of creating and controlling the institutions. Rational Choice Institutionalism fails to explain the anomalies within the given institutional setting, which are not driven by the self-interests of the individuals and why certain institutions persist despite their ‘irrational’ character.

In terms of explaining the impact of institutions over the political actors, the Historical Institutionalist approach works better than the Rational Choice Institutionalism by focusing on how they constrain actor preferences and actions through their unintended consequences. This approach deals with continuities and path dependencies, thus it can also at times be problematic in terms of explaining institutional change. While having the power attributed to the institutions over the political actors in common with Historical Institutionalism, Sociological

⁴ See Nielsen (2001). “Review of Institutionalist Approaches in Social Sciences” *Research Papers Network*, for details.

Institutionalism is more open to the possibility of institutional change through learning and adaptation to new norms.

The way in which institutional change is theorized in historical and sociological approaches is worth a deeper discussion for the purpose of this study. However, before dealing with this issue in more detail, one needs to clarify what is meant by the concepts of ‘institution’ and ‘institutional change’ in order to be able to operationalize them in the research question.

2.1.1 Defining “Institution”

An institution can be defined as the totality of formal and informal rules, practices and procedures of interaction, which shape the relationship between individuals within a polity. Following this definition, it is possible to argue that an institution is in fact an organization. However, a more elaborate study of both concepts reveals that while an organization is a concrete body, which serves for certain functions according to given rules, an institution provides the context in which the organizations function. While organizations can be formed and changed easily, institutions are more enduring and more resistant to change. As Douglas North (1996) has put forward, the organizations, which come into existence, reflect the conditions provided by the institutional setting. In other words, an organization is the formal structure that reflects a certain institutional background.

For some scholars⁵, institutions provide the framework for political conflicts to be contested by creating various opportunities for developing political strategies. While the formal rules of the institutional design affect the way in which the powers of actors are channeled into concrete policies, the results of these policies change the

⁵See Immergut, 1992: 85, North, 1996: 344, Olsen, 1991: 96, Wildavsky, 1988: 593 for details.

ways in which formal institutional design works in practice. While some interests and actors are constrained, others are represented in the political processes depending on the institutional setting. In other words, institutions serve the functions of legitimizing, constraining and stabilizing certain actors, interests and political processes.

The way in which institution is defined changes according to the subject matter at hand and this study also needs a definition of institution in accordance with its scope and the questions it tries to answer. Since the aim of this study is to analyze the centre-local relations in Turkey and the impact of the prospects for EU accession over these relations, the object of analysis is the relationship between different levels of government or administration and the changes in the balance of power (if there is any) between these levels. Thus, a broad definition of institution, which consists of informal rules, cultural and historical factors as well as formal rules applying to the relations between different political actors is necessary. In this study, institution is defined as *the totality of formal and informal rules that govern the behaviors of political actors, which are based on the cultural, social, historical, political and economic characteristics, which have accumulated over time and have an effect over policy outcomes and actor choices*. In more specific terms, the nature of centre-local relations in Turkey is analyzed with its historical, social and economic context in addition to its formal and legal characteristics and devolution is taken as a form of institutional change, whose prospects and terms are needed to be determined. As the aim of the study is to find out whether a certain mode of institutional change is taking place in the Turkish context, one needs to clarify and operationalize what is meant by the concept of ‘institutional change’ as well.

2.1.2 Defining Institutional Change

One striking feature of the theory of institutionalism is the fact that institutional change is not considered as an easy-to-achieve political process. Instead, one can see in the writings of the students of institutionalism⁶ that some extreme conditions need to come together in order for a major institutional change to take place and once an institutional design is put into place, it can not be changed that easily.

A crisis situation leading to institutional change is a common theme in institutionalist theory⁷. Institutions are often perceived as resistant to change and “institutional change is neither frequent nor routine because it is costly and difficult. When change does occur, it is likely to be episodic, highlighted by a brief period of crisis or critical intervention, and followed by longer periods of stability or path-dependent development” (Powell, 1991: 197).

Sociological Institutionalism offers a framework for explaining institutional change through socialization (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 8). In this framework, the relationship between the institutions and the individual action is explained with “the logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 1989). According to this logic, there exists a collective understanding of what constitutes a proper action, which affects the actor behavior. When new norms and practices emerge, they are internalized through learning, persuasion and socialization, which lead to an incremental change.

⁶ See March, James and Johan Olsen (1989). *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: Free Press; Clemens, Elisabeth and James Cook (1999) “Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change” *Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 25*: pp. 441-446 and Colomby, Paul (1998) “The New Institutionalism” in Barry Clark and Joe Foweraker (eds.) *The Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought*. London: Routledge for a detailed account of the difficulty of institutional change.

⁷ This theme is based on the “punctuated equilibrium” concept of Stephen Krasner, which argues that significant institutional adjustments follow sudden major challenges to the previous stable system (e.g. war). See Stephen Krasner (1984) “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics” *Comparative Politics Vol. 16, No.2*: pp. 223-246.

One common theme in the institutionalist literature is the impact of prior institutional choices and historical factors over the policy choices of political actors. In other words, the possibilities for intentional institutional change are constrained by earlier choices and institutional history. Once an institution comes into existence, it gains a power of its own, which determines the rules of the game for the future interactions. The phases of institutional creation and institutional operation are distinct from each other (Lindner & Rittberger, 2003: 446) and although the preferences of the creators and executors of the institutions are different from each other, the executors may not be able to realize the desired institutional change because of the power of the institution itself as a political actor on its own.

While dealing with devolution from an institutionalist perspective, one needs to define institutional change in broad terms in accordance with the way in which institution was defined. This definition has to cover all aspects of institutions from formal rules to historical, social and political setting and all types of possible change. “In general, changes are produced through some kind of encounter between the rules (or action based on them) and an environment, partly consisting of other rules” (March & Olsen, 1989: 167). In other words, an exogenous shock and the need to adjust to the new environment provide an impetus for change. However, from a more comprehensive perspective, institutional change is something more than changing the rules of the game; it comprises both “organizational change and value change” (Peters, 2000) and internal factors also need to be assessed in order to give a better account for change.

In analyzing the impact of the EU accession process over centre-local relations in Turkey, three factors, which affect the prospects for institutional change, are to be explored. First of all, the historical and political context, within which the

institutions operate needs to be analyzed. Second, the preferences and the role of the main political actors as the agency of change and their relations to the given institutional setting will be introduced to the equation and lastly, the exogenous shock, i.e. the impact of Europeanization over the change of the institutional setting will be analyzed.

In order to deal with the prospects for institutional change in the Turkish context, the study borrows from both historical and sociological institutionalist frameworks. The historical institutionalist perspective is adopted for explaining the intervening factors in the process and outcome of institutional change, while sociological institutionalism is appropriate for explaining the mechanism through which the institutional change takes place. Although the preferences and the role of the major political actors are considered to be an integral part of understanding the process of change, the rational choice institutionalism is not utilized in this respect. The main reason for this theoretical choice is the fact that the structure-agency relationship is understood in the form of control and constraint of the former over the latter instead of taking the institutions merely as the context of strategic interaction between interest-maximizing and rational actors as the rational choice institutionalism indicates (Steunenberg and van Vught, 1997: 20). In order to justify this choice, a more in-depth discussion of the historical and sociological institutionalist accounts of change with respect to the research question is necessary.

2.2 Explaining Devolution from an Institutionalist Perspective: Historical Context and Change Through Learning

While studying institutions in general and institutional change in particular, one needs to take the historical context into consideration. “Much of the developmental path of societies is conditioned by their past. At any moment in time, actions are constrained by customs, norms, religious beliefs, and many other inherited institutions” (Alston, 1996: 25). Historical institutionalism adopts the idea that “how the parts are put together channels the choices available to individuals and distinctive ways of doing things today will matter tomorrow” (Migdal, 1997: 218). Thus, while dealing with institutional change, the historical and political context is indispensable for determining the intervening factors during the process.

The key concept of historical institutionalism is the concept of ‘path dependency’. This concept reflects the power of institutions as political actors in their own right as it implies that “the policy and structural choices made at the inception of the institutions will have a persistent influence over its behavior for the remainder of its existence” (Peters, 2000: 3). In other words, once a path is chosen, the options, which were available at the beginning, will cease to exist afterwards and the chosen path will determine the future choices and actions of the political actors. Historical institutionalists focus on the continuities and persistence of institutions over time and the unintended consequences of the choices made at a certain period in time while explaining the prospects for institutional change. This approach enables them to explain the persistence of institutions despite their “ineffective and inefficient nature” (Hay & Wincott, 1998: 954) and to understand policy continuities and variations across different settings.

Historical institutionalists are mostly criticized for failing to explain institutional change and rather focusing on institutional persistence⁸. As Peters, Pierre and King (2005: 1276) argue, “historical institutionalism conceives of public policy making and political change as a discrete process, characterized by extended time periods of considerable stability-referred to as path dependency- interrupted by turbulent ‘formative moments’. During those formative periods, public policy is assigned new objectives, new priorities are established, and new political and administrative coalitions evolve to sustain those policies”. Thus, for historical institutionalists, institutional change may be an outcome of a crisis or an exogenous shock, which changes the power relations and preferences and in the absence of this sort of a variable, institutions are more likely to persist. In sum, one may argue that historical institutionalism can explain the persistence of institutions but does not work well in explaining why a certain institution comes into existence in the first place. It does not leave much room for the role of actor preferences, new ideas and necessities in the process of institutional change and its insistence on path dependency and necessity of crisis situations for change neglects the possibility of incremental change. At this point, sociological institutionalism comes into the picture as the framework for explaining the mechanism of institutional change, i.e. devolution and how it is affected by the Europeanization process. In addition to critical junctures, policy initiation, value change, actor preferences, incremental developments and introduction of new ideas and practices may also be a source of institutional change or lack of it. While historical institutionalist theory does not consider these as a possible source of change, for sociological institutionalism, these

⁸ See Thelen and Steinmo (1992): p. 18.

points, especially the introduction of new ideas and the changes in the values of the political actors, are the main variables to consider in explaining institutional change.

According to the theory of sociological institutionalism, institutional change occurs as a result of three mechanisms (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983: pp. 150-152). The institutions may change as a response to formal or informal pressures, they can change as a result of the imitation of the other successful applications for the purpose of legitimacy or institutional change takes place as a result of the diffusion of norms and standards through the interactions with the other institutions or networks. The way in which this change takes place is shaped by the cultural attributes, values, beliefs and identities of the major actors as the perceptions of the actors determine how the input from the external world will be processed and responded to within the domestic setting.

The actions and decisions of the political actors are rooted in their institutional setting and the history of their interactions among themselves and with their environment determine their preferences. The institutions have a constraining effect over some actors, while they empower the others and the institutions and the actors evolve and re-define themselves together. As Doğan (2005) argues, while the power of the actors determines what kind of institutions to be established, institutions alter the distribution of power among these actors during policy implementation.

As Eton Kent (2004: 219) argues, “when politicians fight over devolution, what they are fighting over are the institutional rules that distribute political authority and governing capacity between distinct levels of government”. In other words, devolution affects the rules that govern the relationship between different levels of government, alters the balance of power between these levels together with their rights, duties and responsibilities, which in turn create a change in a wider political

and social scale. Thus, given the broad definition of institution used in this study-as a totality of formal and informal rules and the historical, social, political and economic context-, devolution is first and foremost an institutional change, which has an impact over all aspects of the concept of institution and which can be resisted by various political actors for that reason.

The sociological institutionalist framework explains institutional change as a process of administrative adaptation and value change in response to an external demand. In the case of Europeanization-devolution relationship, a discrepancy between the EU-level requirements and the domestic structure initiates a process of change and the nature and outcome of this process are determined by the administrative tradition and structure (Knill and Lenschow, 1998: 5). In case of an institutional “misfit” (Börzel, 1999), domestic rules, procedures and collective understandings attached to them are challenged (Risse and Börzel, 2000: 5). New norms, rules, practices and meaning structures emerge at the European level as a model and the domestic political actors internalize these new norms in order to remain as legitimate actors in the international community. Through socialization and collective learning, an incremental institutional change occurs at the domestic level as a part of the domestic adaptation process (*ibid*: 2; Börzel, 1999; Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001; Hansen and Scholl, 2002).

Sociological Institutionalism points out to the interaction between the adaptation pressures and different mechanisms of domestic adaptation, where the member states adopt to the EU way of policy making through learning, communication and trade offs in an incremental manner. This approach has to be supplemented by historical institutionalism, which focuses on the context-specific factors and their constraints over institutional change as the organizational culture

and history of each domestic setting have an impact over how they adopt to the supranational pressures.

2.3. Operationalization of the Main Variables

2.3.1 Devolution

Since the main aim of this study is to test the hypothesis that Europeanization (the EU accession process in the Turkish case) triggers devolution in Turkey, first of all, what we need is to have a concrete definition and criterion of what to consider as devolution. Operationalization of the dependent variable in this manner will contribute to the process of testing the main hypotheses listed in the next section.

In simplest terms, “while to centralize is to concentrate by placing power and authority in a centre, to decentralize means to disperse or distribute power from the centre” (Wolman, 1999: 29). However, defining and applying the concept of devolution within the context of political relations is not that simple. The process of devolution involves various levels of government, various political actors with different political agendas and various societal and economic sectors.

One way of defining devolution is as “the process of devolving political, fiscal and administrative powers to sub-national units of governments” (Burki, Perry& Dillinger, 1999: 3). The process of devolution has two basic dimensions: territorial and functional. Territorial devolution involves “the physical dispersal of operations to local offices” (Hambleton& Hogget, 1994: 6) or “transfer of centrally produced and provided public goods and services to local-level units in the government hierarchy of jurisdiction” (UNDP, 1999: 4). When there exists a functional devolution in a given political setting, it means that the central

responsibilities are transferred to either organizations under state control or to the units outside central government's control like non-governmental organizations or private firms (*ibid*: 4).

This study deals with devolution in terms of allocation of power and responsibilities between different levels of government and this allocation takes place in different amounts and forms at each setting. If it takes the form of *deconcentration*, then it means that the subordinate lower-level/sub-units (regional, district, local offices of central administration) have delegated authority in policy, financial and administrative matters without independent local inputs. While deconcentration involves very limited transfer of authority, in case of *devolution*, the authority is transferred to autonomous lower-level units (provincial, district, local) that are legally constructed as separate governance bodies outside of direct government control as in the case of federal states. In this system, local units are autonomous and independent; they have clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries; they are institutionalized service providers in the eyes of citizens; and there exists a reciprocal and coordinated relationship between central and local governments⁹.

Following this distinction, another point that has to be made within the scope of this study is the local government-local administration distinction. The local government refers to a political institution, which controls a sub-national area to a certain degree and whose leaders are popularly elected by the local people. The term ‘government’ implies a certain level of autonomy or independence in administrative matters. However, the term ‘local administration’ implies that the activities at the local level are carried on under direction and control of a higher central authority. In

⁹ Ruşen Keleş, 1992. UNDP, 1999.

other words, while deconcentration creates local administrative bodies, devolution means that a local government, which is accountable to the local community, is in charge of the local affairs. In the Turkish case, since the local authorities function under the tutelage of the centre, the term ‘administration’ will be used while referring to the local level.

In this study, devolution is defined in terms of allocation of both responsibilities and resources and certain indicators are identified in order to determine the course of devolution during the EU accession process of Turkey:

1. Popularly elected local bodies are given more responsibilities in the local affairs in terms of decision-making.
2. The principle of subsidiarity is introduced to the laws and directives, which regulate the centre-local relations.
3. The relationship between the central level and the local level is redefined in a way that empowers the local level.
4. The local bodies are allowed to generate their own resources and to collect and spend their own revenues.
5. The central government allocates the budget and differentiates its policies by considering different local development needs.
6. The accountability of the administrative bodies are enhanced.

Within the scope of this study, devolution is understood with its context-specific variations. Thus, the organizational logic of the study is based on first determining the way in which devolution is understood in Europe, which factors shaped this understanding and what sort of experience can be observed in terms of realizing devolution in Europe. Then the study will analyze the Turkish setting with its dominant understanding of devolution, try to determine the context-specific factors

determining this understanding, the differences between the European and Turkish understandings and finally to see whether Turkey's integration with the EU is likely to create an experience and understanding of devolution in Turkey along with the European understanding.

This brings us to the independent variable of the main hypothesis, i.e. the process of Europeanization-EU accession process in the Turkish case-, which is assumed to have an impact over the process and understanding of devolution in Turkey. Thus, before getting in to the analysis of the Europeanization-devolution relationship, one needs to operationalize the concept of Europeanization as well.

2.3.2 Europeanization

Like devolution, Europeanization is also a broad concept, which refers to various processes. For instance, it may refer to changes in the territorial boundaries of Europe through enlargement; to development of institutionalized governance at the European level through policy co-ordination and coherence; central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance by the European level institutions; to exporting forms of political organization and governance beyond European borders or to a big political project of creating a unified and politically stronger Europe (Olsen, 2002: 3). However, this study takes a narrower definition of the concept and analyzes it only as an interaction between the EU-level institutions and policies and the domestic institutions.

In terms of explaining this interaction, one can observe three main tendencies in the literature. One group of scholars see Europeanization as a form of governance (Bache, 2003; Buller and Gamble, 2002; Guilani, 2003), while another group explain Europeanization as discourse (Hay and Rosamond, 2002), where policy makers and

stake holders construct Europe through language and discourse. Finally, for some scholars, Europeanization is institutionalization (Radaelli, 2004), where the response of the member states to adaptational pressures involves a re-distribution of resources among domestic political actors and institutions and a process of socialization, which depends on the power of the opposing actors and support of the existing institutional structure.

Taking Europeanization as institutionalization seems to work for the purpose of this study and the particular mechanism of Europeanization to be applied is the “misfit model” (Jacquot& Woll, 2003: 2; Börzel, 1999, 2001), a domestic change caused by an incompatibility between the European and national conditions. According to this model, Europeanization changes the distribution of resources among domestic actors if there is a misfit between the EU regulations and the domestic institutional structure. Europeanization creates a misfit, which leads to adaptational pressures and the mediating institutions and preferences and practices of the actors determine the emerging domestic structural or policy change (Börzel, 1999: pp. 574-575; Börzel, 2001: 143; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001: 6). Following the combination of historical and sociological institutionalism, according to the misfit model, the formal rules, informal understandings about appropriate behaviors and institutional culture determine how domestic actors adopt to the new situation (Börzel, 1999). In other words, the impact of Europeanization is institution-dependent and path dependency determines the outcomes of the domestic adaptation to the European norms (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001: pp.1-3; Börzel, 2001: 138) or in other words, how the adaptational pressures from the European level are interpreted at the domestic setting.

This model takes into account the fact that there exist cross-country and cross-sectoral differences in terms of responses towards the inputs from the EU-level (Andersen, 2004: 26). The different ways of adopting to European-level pressures are based on “institutional resources and traditions, pre-existing balance of domestic institutional structures and values which define the appropriate forms of political organization” (Olsen, 2002: pp. 14-15) and these context-specific factors have an explanatory value in analyzing the different responses to the same policy input from the EU level.

In this study, Europeanization is operationalized within the context of centre-local relations and the misfit, which is the triggering mechanism of institutional change, is revealed through examining the differences between the historical and political context of centre-local relations in the European and Turkish settings. The indicators of the adaptational pressures from the EU level are the progress reports, the nature of assistance and the amount of funds given to the local and regional projects by the EU, the national program and reform packages of Turkey and the developments, which have taken place during the screening process. In order to understand whether these adaptational pressures have created a change in the centre-local relations, the nature of the contacts between the local administrative bodies in Turkey and the EU, the projects developed at the local level, the regional policy initiatives, the concrete legal changes and distribution of financial means are thoroughly examined.

2.4 The Research Question and the Methodology of the Study

2.4.1 The Research Question

The puzzle, which this study seeks to solve, is basically whether the commonly held idea that the EU has empowered the local level in the nation-states through devolution can be applicable to the Turkish case. To put it more precisely, the study aims to identify the impact of the EU accession process over the power relations between the central and local levels in Turkey.

The main hypotheses, which will be tested in this study, are:

- The Europeanization process has empowered the local and regional level governance structures in the EU member states and the same impact can be expected in Turkey during the course of EU accession.
- The EU serves as a catalyst in changing the balance of power and redistributing the resources between the central and local levels of government in Turkey.
- The context-specific factors and the historical legacy of the existing institutions will condition/constrain the prospects for institutional change in Turkey in terms of devolution and the EU can only be an intervening variable.

2.4.2 Applying the Sociological Institutional Framework of Change to the Research Question

In this study, three main variables of institutional change, which were explained earlier, will be analyzed in order to analyze the impact of the EU accession process over the centre-local relations in Turkey:

1. Historical and Political Context: This first dimension of institutional change is crucial for the scope of this study as the aim is to assess the impact of the same variable, i.e. Europeanization over different contexts, i.e. the EU member states in general and Turkey in particular. It is also crucial for showing the misfit between the two contexts, which triggers institutional change and for determining the different domestic responses to the same pressure from the supranational level and different mechanisms of institutional adaptation. The political context of the relations is also crucial because of the fact that the defined functions, responsibilities, duties and the division of power between different levels of government and the implications of these formal rules over actual performance of the governance structures will be dealt with as a potential domestic source of institutional change. The study of the norms is also important for the analysis of the relationship between the legal change and value change, which constitutes a significant aspect of the sociological institutionalist model.
2. Actor preferences: While determining the domestic mechanisms of institutional adaptation, the main actors of devolution (the potential losers and winners) will be identified and the nature of interaction among these actors and between these actors and the existing institutional setting will be analyzed to see whether it may have an impact over the prospects for

devolution in Turkey. The analysis of actor preferences is also necessary for the determining the agency-structure relationship and the impact of the power relations over institutional change.

3. Exogenous shock: The main variable for this dimension is the process of Europeanization. In fact, the basic question asked is whether an exogenous shock, i.e. the Europeanization process or the EU-level pressure, is enough to create an institutional change, i.e. devolution, alone. All the inputs coming from the EU level like the regional policy, the application of the principle of subsidiarity and the related phenomenon of multi-level governance will be dealt as possible factors triggering devolution in Turkey, i.e. as the independent variable leading to institutional change.

2.4.3. The Methodology

The research conducted in this study has two main objectives:

1. To show the misfit between the EU practice and the Turkish practice with respect to the relations between the central and local levels of government.
2. To determine the course of institutional change regarding the centre-local relations in Turkey and the EU impact over the course of change.

For the first objective, the historical and political context of the centre-local relations and the administrative practices in Europe and in Turkey will be examined and with the revealing of the misfit, the need for institutional change in the Turkish context will be justified.

The second objective forms the crux of the study and the course of institutional change within the context of this study will be determined through an impact analysis. The impact analysis is carried out mainly through in-depth

interviews and content analyses and it covers three main areas of change: legal change, policy change and discourse change.

For the analysis of legal change, the legal documents, which govern the affairs of central and local administrative bodies in Turkey, are analyzed. This analysis will show how the administrative system functions in Turkey, the nature of the administrative divisions and their compatibility with the EU practice and how the responsibilities and resources are shared between the central and local levels of administration in Turkey.

In order to determine the impact of the EU factor over legal change, the EU progress reports, EU harmonization reform packages, and the administrative reform drafts will be examined together with the timeline of administrative reform in Turkey in relation to the EU accession process.

While determining the impact of Europeanization over policy change, in-depth interviews conducted at the central level of government are utilized. These interviews are mainly conducted with the specialists of the State Planning Agency, which is the main responsible institution for the distribution of funds received from the EU to the various administrative institutions and coordination of EU-related affairs. In these interviews, the main aim is to determine the nature of adaptational pressures received from the EU level and the response of the Turkish state in terms of policy formulation. The questions asked to the officials of the State Planning Agency are listed below:

1. What were the requirements of the EU in terms of regional development and local administration?
2. Did these requirements create any problems in terms of compatibility with the Turkish administrative system?

3. Which projects were developed in terms of meeting these requirements?
4. Which of these requirements were hardest/easiest to fulfill?
5. To what extent have the EU criteria been met?
6. At what point is Turkey with respect to the initial requirements?
7. How much progress has been made?
8. Do you have any policy suggestions regarding regional development and/or administrative reform, which would facilitate the EU accession process?

For the analysis of the third aspect of institutional change, i.e. the discourse change, related documents and in-depth interviews are utilized. The aim of these analyses is to determine the agency-structure relationship, the position of the central and local levels regarding devolution process in Turkey and the impact of the EU factor over the relations between the two levels.

The related documents regarding the discourse change are the political party programs, the speeches and declarations of the major political figures, the records of the parliamentary proceedings and documents about the related laws and reform packages for administrative reform in Turkey.

The in-depth interviews cover the members of the parliament, who played an active role in the preparation of the major administrative reforms, the officials at the municipalities and the managers of the EU-funded local and regional development projects. In order to determine the discourse of the centre, following questions are asked to the interviewees:

1. What were the major demands of the EU regarding administrative reforms in Turkey?
2. Which conditions led to the administrative reform attempts at the time?
3. Were there any obstacles during the preparation phase?

4. What was done to overcome these obstacles?
5. What is your opinion about the EU-funded regional development projects?
6. What do you think about the project selection and funding mechanisms?
7. What is your opinion about the current administrative structure of Turkey?
8. Do you think that an administrative reform is necessary in Turkey?
9. Is the existing administrative structure adequate for Turkey to join the EU?
10. How do you think should the best form administrative structure be?

While determining the position of the local regarding the issue, focusing on a single case is preferred over trying to compare and contrast multiple cases for a more thorough understanding of the changing dynamics of centre-local relations. The case chosen for this purpose is the city of Kayseri, one of the largest and economically prosperous cities of Central Anatolia and Turkey. This choice is justified in the later stages of the research in a more elaborate manner. However, for the methodological concerns, at this point, it is sufficient to note that Kayseri was chosen because of the advantages it offered in terms of differentiating the impacts of Europeanization and globalization at the local level, its close contact with the EU and its openness to the adaptational pressures from the European level and because of the fact that the city is being governed by the same cadre since the early 1990s, which makes it easier to single out the impact of the EU over the value change. In order to determine the EU impact at the local level, the in-depth interviews are conducted with the managers of EU-funded projects and at the municipalities, in order to determine the impact of Europeanization over discourse change. The following questions are asked to the project managers:

1. How many projects have you managed so far?
2. How many of them were funded by the EU?

3. What are the aims and scope of the EU-funded projects?
 4. What was your reason to apply for the EU funds?
 5. What was the role of the EU funds in the formation of the project? Did you have the idea before the existence of EU funds?
 6. How was the application process? (place of first application, direct relationship with the EU-level, the difficulties, the guiding institutions, suggestions about the process)
 7. How was the project conducted? (the obligations, the involved institutions, difficulties, the control, results)
 8. Were the impacts of the project measured by any institutions after it was completed?
 9. How do you define the experience of managing an EU-funded project?
 10. Do you have any suggestions for the improvement of project selection and conducting processes?
 11. What do you think about the role of the State Planning Agency within the EU-funded projects?
 12. What do you think about the role of the EU in the development projects?
- At the municipalities, the participants are asked the following questions:
1. Do you receive any financial assistance from the EU?
 2. If so, how is this financial assistance distributed?
 3. Do you have any particular division, committee or working group about EU-related affairs?
 4. Are you in any sort of cooperation with the municipalities in the EU member states?
 5. If yes, what kind of cooperation is it?

6. Do you have any concrete project related with Turkey's accession to the EU?
7. What is the role of Ankara in your relations with the EU?
8. What are your impressions about the funding and project selection process?
(application procedures, difficulties, problems, suggestions)
9. What do you think about the role of the central government in the administrative affairs?
10. What will Turkey's EU membership bring for the local administrative bodies?
11. What is your opinion about the current administrative structure of Turkey?
12. Do you think that an administrative reform is necessary in Turkey?
13. Is the existing administrative structure adequate for Turkey to join the EU?
14. How do you think should the best form administrative structure be?

At this stage, it is accepted from the outset that analysis of one case may be problematic in terms of theoretical generalizations. However, since the research is concerned with what changes have been taking place in the Turkish context during the EU accession process, understanding the process and change mechanism itself has a priority over reaching at theoretical generalizations. One in-depth case study is understood as a better option in terms of providing a thorough understanding of the ongoing process of EU accession instead of focusing on cross-case comparisons or generalizations. Moreover, the study aims to contribute to the theory by revealing the mediating factors at macro and micro levels to the relationship between Europeanization and devolution, which would provide new analytical tools for further research and in a way, generate a grounded theory, which will help in the future in-depth research on new cases, like other cities in Turkey.

Before getting into the details of these analyses, however, the first step of the methodology needs to be fulfilled and the misfit between the EU practice and Turkish administrative structure needs to be revealed. In order to do this, one needs to analyze the evolution of central-local relations at the European context. This analysis is conducted at the next chapter and the theoretical framework is applied to the European context before dealing with the Turkish case.

CHAPTER III

THE EVOLUTION OF CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE: TOWARDS A COMMON MODEL?

The purpose of this chapter is to apply the theoretical framework of the study to the European context. In other words, the chapter tries to analyze the impact of the process of Europeanization over the centre-local relations in the EU member states by showing the degree of misfit with the EU practice for each case and how each state responded to this misfit. While determining the course of change and which states were more open to change, the contextual variables become crucial as the historical and political context and the actor preferences help to reveal the inter-country differences in terms of responses to Europeanization.

The chapter is organized in accordance with the theoretical framework and in order to underline the different responses of each country to the similar adaptational pressures, it first deals with the impact of the contextual variables in the European setting. The chapter, then proceeds with the analysis of the impact of Europeanization over the centre-local relations in the EU member states and the different responses and patterns of institutional change are tried to be revealed.

3.1. The Historical and Political Context of Centre-Local Relations in Europe

“The tradition of the free or chartered cities and boroughs, based on an acceptance by the state of the contribution they made to shared wealth as free centers of wealth and commerce, is a common root in virtually all European systems” (Norton, 1991: 24). In the history of Western Europe, the commune exists as the unit, which formed the basis of local self-government. The commune “derives from the administrative structure of the Catholic Church and the government of its estate within the feudal system. It later acquired simple administrative secular functions like the registration of births, deaths and marriages” (Bennett, 1993b: 34). As Robert Bennett (1993a) argues, “the ecclesiastical structure of the Catholic Church gave rise to an independent status for commune as a geographical territory with basic administrative functions. The Christian commune has a history of autonomy within a network of centre-local relations within the church. The commune in Western Europe was significant as the foundation for subsequent local power” (pp. 2-3). Thus, the common commune experience of the Western European countries created a potential for strong local self-government in these countries. The early forms local government in Europe were found in places where hard forms of feudalism were absent and the peasants were free to make their own decisions (like England and Scandinavia) and in the parishes under church guidance (Wollmann, 2006: 1421). However, the profound changes throughout Europe altered the position of these bodies and thus the prospects for local self-government. The communes of the middle ages gave way to absolutist centralist states with Reformation, nationalism movements and industrialization.

The 17th and 18th centuries witnessed the emergence of the states in Europe in the modern sense. The kings began to win the struggle they carried on with the nobles for transforming the feudal monarchies into administrative governments and administrative agents were appointed to deal with the local businesses in the territorialized absolute monarchies in order to increase the royal income (Fox, 1992: pp. 3-4). Thus, the European state was under profound transformation with the establishment of “extensive and uniform field administrations, central bureaucracies and taxation systems” (Tilly, 1993: 29). This shift from indirect to direct rule had various purposes such as more resource extraction, securing the boundaries and nation building and resulted in the handling of the local matters by the agents of central government instead of landlords, church or city councils. The emergence of the modern state was achieved through centralization and in the 19th century and early 20th century, the centre-local relations were based on the central control over the local in Europe.

According to Edward Page (1991), three factors were influential over the weakening of the local self-governing bodies in Europe in the 19th century. The first factor was

the system of military conscription, which was based on personal contracts between the monarchy and the nobility, according to which land was granted explicitly in exchange for making up the military. The strict hierarchical character of this relationship destroyed the old county levels of government. [Moreover,] the state building process destroyed the counties and replaced them by new administrative districts supervised by state officials. [In addition to these,] the fact that the local nobility were seen as a threat to the national government required the replacement of the local self-governing bodies with state agencies (pp. 116-117).

As a result of these factors, “across most of Europe, local government in the early 19th century was structured hierarchically in terms of its relations with the centre: central government, through governors or prefects had direct administrative control over the actions of local government bodies” (*ibid*: 132).

Until the 19th century, the European political landscape can be portrayed as “a dual polity, in which central officials and local officials were isolated from each other and wished to be isolated because of the distinction of high politics and low politics¹⁰. Two levels existed autonomously” (Rose, 1985: 15), however in the state-building process of 19th century, local bodies such as regions were seen as obstacles in the construction of national identity and modern state (Keating, 1998a: 12) and the centre extended its control over the local bodies.

Thus, as mentioned above, one of the important aspects of the European heritage, which affected the evolution of centre-local relations, is the existence of communes as a basic social unit, which created a tradition of local self-government. The French Revolution and the administrative structure spread by Napoleon in Europe are the other important factors shaping the centre-local balance in favor of the former. The German unification and the German federalism were a reaction to this administrative centralization in a way and they created another trend within the centre-local relations in Europe. In addition to French Revolution and German unification, the Russian Revolution and the establishment of centralized socialism afterwards also led to a different form of centre-local balance.

The common theme of Europe after 17th century was the state-building process, which had a profound impact over the fate of local self-governing bodies with the redefinition of centre-local relations and the division of responsibilities. However, although the apparent common outcome is centralization of some sort, different countries chose different strategies in redefining the centre-local boundaries. Although “the enduring nature of the commune as the building block of local administration was a common trend in Europe, different paths to state-building

¹⁰ The matters related with the local communities were considered as low politics, as issues of daily life, which should be handled at the local level, without bothering the central officials, who were busy with diplomacy or war making, i.e. the matters of high politics.

and democratization led to different administrative structures” (Newman and Thornley, 1996: 32). The different traditions of centre-local relations across Europe are significant for explaining the different responses given to the common challenges for local government reform in the European countries, thus they are worth a deeper discussion. One way of dealing with the historical and political context of different responses in the European countries is to group these countries according to their similarities. For the analytical purposes of this study, the European countries are analyzed in five groups as the Napoleonic, Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Scandinavian and Central and Eastern European countries with respect to the similar nature of centre-local relations. Later, it will be argued that the countries of each group have responded to the adaptational pressures from the EU-level in line with their organizational heritage.

3.1.1 The Napoleonic Tradition¹¹

The Napoleonic state is based on the idea of “the abstract citizen represented in the National Assembly with no intermediary bodies” (Loughlin, 2000: 24). It is a centralized, unitary nation-state. The French Revolution suppressed all the peculiarities like regions and other self-governing bodies, which were perceived as pre-modern and incompatible with the nation-state (Hueglin, 1986: 441). After the French Revolution, “1791 Constitution established a uniform system of departments and communes as the basic administrative units. [It] imposed a uniform structure everywhere. Excessive devolution was replaced by the fused state system and a centralized administrative state” (Bennett, 1989: 17).

¹¹ France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium and Greece are the countries affected by this tradition.

In the Napoleonic system, the state is divided into “fairly uniform jurisdictions that are larger than the basic units of local governments and over which normally presides an appointed civil servant—the prefect” (Page, 1991: 109). The prefect is the representative of the state at the local level (Siedentopf, 1988: 342) and is appointed by the central government to replace the locally elected officials (Bennett, 1993b: 37, Fox; 1992: 86). In this system, there exists a strong central supervision, leaving little or no discretion to local government (Lane and Ersson, 1999: 182) and the system, which originated in France, spread to other countries, like Italy, Spain, Portugal and Belgium through territorial conquests of Napoleon and left a strong legacy in these countries.

The motive for creating such an administratively centralized system after the Revolution in France was to assure the unity of the country (Johnson, 1993: 52). In 1871 and 1874, two modifications were made in this system with the introduction of the election of a department representative council and a municipal council in the communes (Wagstaff, 1994: 19), however, the hierarchy between the prefect and the mayor remained unchanged until 1980s. The local government concept was replaced by the concept of local administration and “the administration was subordinate to the government” (Meny, 1988b: 273).

“References to the ‘indivisible Republic’ have been a commonplace of constitutional texts over two centuries, as successive regimes have sought to affirm and to strengthen the integral, seamless nature of the French state” (Wagstaff, 1994: 15). This Napoleonic legacy has affected the mode of change in the centre-local relations in France, where “the initiative comes from above, the base of the system has a minor role and is controlled by central government” (Meny, 1988a: 130) and the context of devolution is often the tension between nationalism and localism.

The Napoleonic Legacy was not that strong in Spain because of the historical and political factors specific to the country. Although the country was once under the influence of strong centralization tradition, the late unification of the country, the strength of cultural and linguistic diversities and the impact of uneven economic development throughout the country (Williams, 1994: pp. 85-86), made it easier to overcome this legacy.

For a long time, Spain remained as an artificial territory, which emerged in the 16th century under the authority of one king from a union of kingdoms, achieved either through dynastic marriage or through annexation by force. It consisted of dissimilar territories in cultural and legal traditions and institutions. In 1833, 49 artificial provinces were directly subjected to Madrid. Moreover, the lack of traditional monarchical stability and legitimacy created a power vacuum for the regional identities to develop and the domestic and international failures of the unitary state in the 19th century, like late industrial development, military defeats and the loss of colonies (Diaz-Lopez, 1985: pp. 236-238) made it harder to retain the centralized structure inherited from the Napoleonic Empire and shaped the route that the centre-local relations would take in the country.

Like most of Europe, in Italy, commune was the basic unit of political organization. However, in the Italian case the commune was more significant in the sense that it was a means of “protecting individuality through attaching to local traditions, language and religion” (Melchionni, 1994: 72). This function of the communes and the strong identification of people with their local communities affected the course of centre-local relations in the country.

As it was with the case of France, in Italy administrative centralization was a means of achieving unity. During the time of unification, the main aim of the ruling

class was to harmonize the regional differences. The chosen solution was centralization and the 1865 Law introduced “a rigid prefectorial system along Napoleonic lines. The prefect became the representative of executive power at the local and provincial level” (Bull, 1994: 70). Moreover, a strict legal control mechanism was established over administrative actions. Every administrative action had to be based on written procedures in order to be enforced and this also limited the municipal autonomy, while increasing the central involvement in local matters (Dente, 1985: 135-136).

The Belgian state, another state affected by the Napoleonic tradition, was “an artificial creation, owing its existence to war and the European balance of power in the first half of the 19th century” (Mughan, 1985: 277). Between 1795 and 1815, it was governed by the elite imposed by France. With the Congress of Vienna in 1815, it was given to the Kingdom of Netherlands and after intense religious and political struggles and 1830 Revolution, the Belgian state was created with the 1831 Constitution (Wagstaff, 1994b: 40).

The population of the country “was from the outset divided socially, economically and geographically long linguistic lines with the Dutch-speaking Flanders in the North and French-speaking Wallonia in the South” (Mughan, 1985: 277). The state was structured by the French-speaking elites as a unitary and unilingual one with French as the official language while most of the population spoke Dutch. However, this structure could not last long as at the end of 19th century, the Dutch people were politically mobilized and the result was “a compromise between the Napoleonic model and the traditions of local and provincial autonomy” (Molitor, 1988: 221) with two layers of popularly elected government in the commune and province, a central government in Brussels and two official languages.

At each country, one can observe the traces of the Napoleonic tradition either in the form of administrative structure or as a means of establishing political control over people, which later provided a motive for administrative reform. The country-specific conditions have shaped to what extent the Napoleonic structure would endure and the tensions between the Napoleonic structure and the country-specific factors affected the later form of central-local relations.

3.1.2 The Anglo-Saxon Tradition¹²

The Anglo-Saxon tradition reveals a contradiction with the Napoleonic system as instead of the excessive centralization of the Napoleonic system and its hierarchical structure, the Anglo-Saxon system is based on devolution and delivery of local services with little or no state intervention (Subramaniam, 1988: pp. 88-89). The system itself is based on a dual polity approach, where the central and local levels of government have distinct political spheres and the local government is understood in functional terms as a means of service delivery rather than in a political manner (Newman and Thornley, 1996: 30). In this system, there exists no unified executive, however, although they have distinct political spheres, the central government is capable of supervising activities by setting legal and financial constraints (Bennett, 1989: 13).

The United Kingdom is the most important country in Europe following the Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition, where in the 19th century there was limited state intervention to the local affairs and all the local spending had to be borne locally (Pickvance, 1991: 50). The most important aspect of local government organization in the UK, which has a significant impact over the central-local

¹² The United Kingdom and Ireland are the European countries of the Anglo-Saxon tradition.

relations is the absence of constitutional protection over the structure, powers, functions and responsibilities of the local government (Newman and Thornley, 1996: 31). This situation makes it easier for the central government to make certain changes, which have profound impacts over local self-government and enables the government to supervise the local affairs.

3.1.3 The Germanic Tradition¹³

As an inherently federal structure, the Germanic administrative tradition provides the context, which favors the local self-government, the most. Until 17th century, the German cities were politically and legally autonomous units. With the weakening of towns after the 30 Years' Wars, they integrated into territorial states but this integration did not change the autonomous self-governing nature of the towns. A dualism between the state and the municipalities was developed and local matters were considered as a part of self-administration (Häußermann, 1991: 99-100). When Germany was unified in 1870, the emerging state was a mosaic of different autonomous bodies, it was made up of “a multitude of semi-sovereign kingdoms, principalities and city-states with their own urban, economic and cultural centers. The modern state emerged not as one national state, but as a plurality of territorial states” (Reissert, 1985: 105). This situation had far-reaching implications over the centre-local relations in the modern Germany.

In contrast with the Napoleonic states, where regionalism and region-building were considered as a reaction and an alternative to the national state, in Germany, region-building was a means of state-building. As Brunn (1994) argues, “German regionalism did not develop in relation to a German national state but within

¹³ Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg come from the Germanic tradition in terms of central-local relations.

territorial states approaching administrative perfection” (p. 40). “The regional particularism of pre-unification Germany survived well into the 20th century. Loyalties to regions remained high and Berlin never enjoyed the dominating central strength of some other West European capitals. Political power may have been concentrated in the capital, but administrative power was retained by the constituent states of the Federation” (Urwin, 1982: 176).

When “the local self-administration of the Prussian state extended to the rest of Germany to bond together a new German nation” (Bennett, 1989: 22), the resulting form of state was “a federal system, which was designed as an instrument for the vertical division of powers rather than as an instrument for the integration of centre and periphery” (Reissert, 1985: 122). There was a functional division of labor between the Federal state and the Länder¹⁴, where the federal government was responsible for legislation and the administrative tasks were left to the Länder.

In addition to the inherent regionalism of the political system, another important feature of the Germanic tradition, which affects the centre-local relations, is the importance of the written constitution in contrast with the Anglo-Saxon tradition. The powers, status, functions and responsibilities of the local administrative bodies are under constitutional protection. The constitution clearly states the powers of different tiers of government and it requires a constitutional amendment to make certain changes in the centre-local balance (Newman and Thornley, 1996: 34). This sort of legal protection both empowers the local governmental bodies and prevents a rapid transformation of the institutional setting.

¹⁴ Land (Länder in plural) means state in German.

3.1.4 The Scandinavian/Nordic Tradition¹⁵

The Scandinavian/Nordic tradition is characterized by a combination of a strong relationship between central government and the regions and an emphasis on local democracy. The outcome of this tradition is a multi-level state structure, where the agencies of the central government operate at the regional level for the purpose of supervision next to the autonomous regional and local councils (Lundquist, 1988: pp. 159-160; Newman and Thornley, 1996: 35). In other words, the central government may hold considerable political power over the provincial level but localities have their own autonomy, councils and tasks of self-government (Bennett, 1989: 14; Bennett, 1993b: 42).

Edward Page (1991: 140) observes a shift from strong central supervision to more local government discretion in administrative control and functions in the Scandinavian countries. The administrative and financial autonomy of the local self-governing bodies are under constitutional guarantee (Parlak, 2002: 55) and a trend towards devolution can be observed within the Nordic tradition. As Sharpe (1993: 15) argues, the main reason for this situation is the historical identification of devolution with democratization and its ideological conceptualization as a reaction to the fascist centralization.

3.1.5 The Central-Eastern European Tradition¹⁶

The evolution of centre-local relations in the Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) has a more different point of departure from that of Western Europe. While the commune was the basic administrative unit of the Western European Catholic Church, which created the tradition of local self-government, there was no such unit

¹⁵ Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway.

¹⁶ The former Soviet Republics together with Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic and Slovakia are some examples of this tradition.

in the East European Orthodox Church (Bennett, 1993a: 2). In addition to this, the experience of communism specific to this region, created a whole-different context for central-local relations, where there were “no experience of self-governance, no tolerance to the shifts in the central control and no independent institutions at the local level” (Regulska, 1993: 184).

The roots of the centre-local relations in the CEE countries can be characterized with a high degree of communist party supervision over the local soviets, excessive central planning, which leaves minimal space for local autonomy and the principle of democratic centralism (Bennett, 1993b: 43). According to this principle, popular elections are held for government posts but at the same time, there exists a high level of dual subordination within a single state system. On one hand, all decisions are subject to the next higher level in the state hierarchy, where the decisions of the village soviet have to be approved by the main district soviet, which needs the approval of the communist party (*ibid*). On the other hand, all the administrative departments of a local soviet are responsible to both their soviet and to the same department at the next higher level in the state hierarchy (Yıldırım, Duben & Tıkız, 1993: 79).

This form of state organization leaves no room for local self-government and for the division of powers between the central and local administrative bodies and the local level exists merely as the agent of central government, i.e. the communist party. This legacy of communism institutionalized the high central control in the CEE countries and affected the prospects for devolution.

As these briefly-described forms of state organization demonstrate, the European states (both in the West and in the East) had different points of departure in

the evolution of centre-local relations up to the present. The historical departure point of each country has affected the strategies they have chosen in dealing with the common economic, social and political challenges, which created a disparity between the existing norms of institutional design and the emerging needs and performance expectations.

3.2 The Political Context of the Centre-Local Relations in Europe

The Great Depression and the economic and political consequences of the Second World War in the 1930s and 1940s and the world-wide economic crisis of the 1970s were the major challenges over the performance of the existing organizational structures in the European states and they contributed to institutional change in terms of centre-local relations. The different socio-economic conditions of each period led to a re-definition of state-society relations and the role of the state in economic and social life. This situation was effective over the balance of power between the central and local levels of government and administration throughout Europe. The rise and fall of the welfare state in Europe can be considered as a common response in the European countries in each period. However, the path, which led to these responses and the resistance of certain actors to them reveal cross-country differences and thus, they are valuable for the purposes of this study.

3.2.1 1930-1970: The Emergence of the Welfare State

The period between 1930 and 1970 witnessed the establishment of the welfare state model throughout Western Europe. This situation was a response to the needs of the post-war reconstruction process and other emerging infrastructural, economic and social problems as a result of advanced industrialization and rapid

urbanization (Wollmann, 2006: 1428). In the welfare model, the central state was responsible for health, education and housing services together with the employment and social welfare policies. The nationalization of economic and social policies resulted in “the integration of the local authorities into the national state, centralization of the political power and a model of interventionist state” (*ibid*: 1426-1427) instead of the dual polity structure of the previous century, where the local and central government structures had distinct spheres of action and distinct responsibilities.

The strategic role taken over by the central government in the economic and social life created “a culture of entitlement” (Bennett, 1993a: 13) to certain rights for the citizens. As the central government became the main regulatory actor for providing a uniform life standard for the citizens, central-local balance began to favor the former, where the local governments became the agencies to deliver services and to conduct the centrally-decided policies. During the post-war reconstruction period, as the industrialization advanced in time, the existing local government structure became inadequate for dealing with the new problems, the states opted for acquiring new responsibilities (Sharpe, 1993: pp. 8-9) and became in charge of the macroeconomic policy with various interventionist instruments (Keating, 1998b: 140).

In this centralized system, the local administrative bodies, often the regions, were seen “as a unit for spatial planning and policies, managed by the central state” (Keating, 2004: xii). The regions were significant only in terms of overcoming the territorial disparities and the problems of regional disparities were tried to be solved by various economic development policies, which were formulated and conducted centrally. These policies were perceived as a part of national policy and of the duty

of the state to achieve “equity, uniformity and modernization” (Keating, 1998b: 49). Within this context, any “restructuring of central-local relations was often based on the necessities of indicative national planning and of creating local governments that were of a sufficient scale to deliver services that were increasingly demanded by the citizens” (Loughlin, 2004d: 392).

Until the 1970s, the general trend in Europe was an “asymmetrical relationship between central and local government structures” (Jouve, 2005: 286), where the central government had more political power and more responsibilities in order to cope with the economic and social problems challenging the European states. However, the country-specific factors and the historical context affected the division of powers between the centre and the local bodies in each state to some extent. For instance, As Michael Keating (1998b) points out, in the post-authoritarian regimes of post-war period like Italy and Germany, strong centralization was considered as a threat and devolution was associated with democratization and stability, which resulted in more local involvement in the decision and conduct of welfare policies. In the consolidated Western European democracies, centralized government was the means for modernization and establishment of equality and the local bodies became the agencies of service delivery, while in the authoritarian regimes like Spain and Portugal, strong centralization remained intact until the mid-1970s.

The United Kingdom and France are two examples of high level of centralization after the Great Depression in order to cope with the new problems. When the existing structure became unable to cope with the changing economic, political and technological conditions, in the United Kingdom, the local government activities were reduced and various policies were nationalized in addition to central

supervision of local government spending (Pickvance, 1991: pp. 52-53). Faced with the similar problems, the central government took over the responsibility to cope with the uneven distribution of wealth and economic activities and declining quality of life in France and with the laws of 1940 and 1942, the mayors were appointed by the central government instead of being popularly elected and the local election of municipal councils was also abolished (Wagstaff, 1994a: pp. 20-21).

The social and economic problems and necessities of the period affected the prospects of devolution in Italy, too. Although devolution was on the agenda after the Second World War in order to prevent the rise of fascism again and the country was divided into twenty regions with limited legislative powers in the 1948 Constitution, this was not applied until the 1970s (Bull, 1994: 71) and the strong central government remained in charge. Because of the existence of the Franco regime, Spain also remained as a highly centralist state in the period despite the highly developed sub-national identities and regional demands.

In the Scandinavian countries, one can observe the attempts to combine the centralist responses to the problems of the period with the existing local self-government tradition. The Scandinavian model can be described with its “large public sector, extensive welfare commitments, strong trade union movements, corporatist arrangements and relative social and ethnic homogeneity” (Lidström, 2004b: 344). As a result, although the number of communes was decreased through amalgamation and the financial relations between the central and local bodies were redefined in the Nordic countries, and the public sector expanded, it remained dependent on the lower-level decision-making bodies (Kjellberg, 1988: 43). Thus, the local government expanded in scope for the implementation of development of

programs while it lost its discretionary powers with the standardization of social services, which left little room for local variations.

Germany illustrates a case, where the common trend towards centralized welfare state was in clash with the federal tradition. In the post-war period, the country lived through the difficulty of reconciling the need for uniformity and multiplicity and the result was a tendency towards centralism for the maintenance of uniform living standards and a reduction in the responsibilities of the Länder (Stammen, 1994: 61).

Belgium is the country, which was least affected with the centralist tendencies in the Western Europe during the period between 1930 and 1970 because of its national dynamics and strong cultural and national basis for regional and local demands. Contrary to the empowerment of the central state in the rest of Europe, the advanced industrialization led to the empowerment of the regional level in Belgium as the economic development of the Flemish area led to increased political demands (Wagstaff, 1994b: 46). With a series of new laws in the 1960s, the existence of two linguistic communities was acknowledged officially and these communities acquired cultural autonomy in time. In other words, because of the strength of the existing regional cleavages, the central state had to accommodate the demands of different communities while dealing with the socio-economic problems of the period and this situation established the centre-local relationship more in favor of the local level in comparison to the rest of the Western Europe.

Although one can observe a certain level of increase in the role and power of the central state vis-à-vis the local governments and administrative bodies in Western Europe during this period, it is important to note that this result was easier to achieve in some European countries, while in other countries centralization through the

establishment of welfare state was resisted by certain political actors and thus, a different kind of power sharing occurred.

In countries, which were highly influenced by the Napoleonic tradition, like France and Italy, it was relatively easier for the central state to take over more responsibilities and powers because of the existing unitary and centralist state tradition. In countries, where there were strong regional or local demands, like Spain and Belgium, the major political actors were resistant to more centralization and although a transformation towards centralization occurred, it was a harder one. In the states with a federal tradition of government, i.e. Germany and the Scandinavian countries, the major challenge for the state was the reconciliation of the increasing social and economic demands from the central state and the existing tradition of local self-government. The increased role of the central state was met with suspicion and resistance by the local political actors and the resulting form of central welfare state was a compromise between central and local levels. While this was the trend in the Western Europe during this period, the Central and Eastern European countries were closed to the global demands for transformation and the highly centralized system of government remained intact.

3.2.2 1970-1990: The Retreat of the Central State?

The socio-economic climate of the 1970s created new burdens for the advanced welfare state in Western Europe, which gave rise to a new discrepancy between the performance of the existing institutional structure and the demands from the system. This situation led to a new wave of redefinition of centre-local relations throughout Europe. The oil crisis of 1973, which hit the globe, led to the recession of

the world economies, created stagflation and economic depression. This situation was especially problematic for the welfare state, which had assigned itself to extensive social expenditures as the fiscal pressures created budget deficits. In order to cope with the economic crisis situation, the welfare states had to reduce their public expenditures. The need to cut back welfare measures together with the decline in voting levels, poor government performance to reduce geographical and socio-economic imbalances and increased distrust towards big government led to the redefinition of the boundaries and responsibilities of the central state in Europe (Jouve, 2005: 290; Tonboe, 1991: 30; Khan, 1999: 5; Rhodes, 1997: pp. 41-42; Loughlin, 2000: 17).

The common trend emerging in Europe to cope with the new problems can be summarized as “the contracting neo-liberal state” (Loughlin, 2000: 14), where extensive deregulation and privatization took place, the state cut back of the services it previously provided, devolution and regionalization became the general application together with the marketization of public services and the citizens were perceived as customers instead of being entitled to certain services (*ibid*: pp. 14-15). With respect to the evolution of centre- local relations in Europe, the post-welfare model is significant for the changing role of the central state from controller to a partner with local government and the market. However, as Robert Bennett (1993a: 15) points out, the level of devolution that took place in each country and the emerging form of centre-local relations depended on the antecedent conditions and internal dynamics of the countries.

In France, the devolution reforms of the period occurred in order “to contain expenditures, respond to the fiscal pressures as well as to social demands for regional governance” (Ansell and Gingrich, 2003: 149). “Devolution occurred at the time of

and was inspired by the beginning of a long period of economic crisis” (Gremion, 2002: 73) and in order to cope with this economic crisis, with the series of laws between 1982 and 1986, the territorial structure of the country was reorganized and more role was assigned to non-central tiers of government like municipalities, departments and regions (Preteceille, 1991: 127). With the 1982 reforms, the multiple-office holding among sub-national officials¹⁷ was restricted, the powers of the prefect were reduced and the local administration became more coherent as the territorial and functional characteristics of the communes, departments and regions became clearer (Wagstaff, 1994a: 30; Ansell and Gingrich, 2003: 147). In the case of France, these reforms were an important turning point for the evolution of centre-local relations as they inserted judicial review of local government acts instead of prior central government control, the prefect lost his executive status and became the observer and commissioner of the state and the local authorities obtained the right to determine certain economic and social measures (Meny, 1988a: 139).

In Spain, the internal dynamics of the country were very influential over the devolution of the state in the late 1970s and the 1980s as “by the latter years of the Franco regime, repressive centralism, together with the social tensions related to uneven development and the lack of democratic channels for regional representation had brought about a regional backlash of varying intensity” (Williams, 1994: 86). Thus, when the new regime was founded in 1975, the regional problem was a priority in order to achieve stability in the country. With the purpose of solving the regional question, “the 1978 Constitution radically transformed the centralist non-democratic socio-political regime inherited from fascism and made possible the creation of Autonomous Communities System based on symmetrical devolution”

¹⁷ In France, the mayors, members of the district councils or other local officials can also be members of the parliament, which increases the interdependency and clientelism between the central and local levels of government.

(Guibernau, 2006: pp. 61-62). The Constitution identified three routes to regional autonomy, where the regions with a historical claim to autonomy, i.e. Catalonia, Basque and Galicia, would take the faster route and have a higher level of autonomy; the regions with exceptional cases, like Andalusia, Valencia, Navarre, Canaries, would follow these regions in obtaining autonomy and the remaining ten regions would have lower levels of regional autonomy for the first five years and then would be reviewed and given more autonomy (Williams, 1994: pp. 90-91). This arrangement aimed to create a compromise between the centralist and federalist tendencies in Spain, however, the result was a lot of confusion and difficulties of application, which required the intervention of political actors to the organization of centre-local relations in the country.

The socio-economic problems of the 1970s led to the creation of regions in Italy in 1972, which was stated in the 1948 Constitution and these regions were given the autonomy to administer the income they receive from the State together with certain administrative powers within the scope of the Constitution (Bull, 1994: 72). On the other hand, in Belgium, the devolution trends from the previous period went on with a nationalist motive and the regions, which were legally acknowledged in 1960s gained the autonomy to administer their cultural and linguistic affairs in 1970 and in the 1980s, they gained more responsibilities in the affairs of health care, education, public works and transportation (Wagstaff, 1994b: 47). Thus, the already existing trend towards devolution gained momentum in Belgium in the late 1970s and 1980s.

In the Scandinavian countries, the already existing centre-local partnership tradition in the delivery of public services, made the change of a more gradual and consensual nature. In the 1970s and 1980s, the emerging form of state was a

“decentralized local welfare state” (Tonboe, 1991: 24) and local government discretion increased along with responsibilities and autonomy. The increase in local taxing powers, local control over finances and free commune experiments (Ansell and Gingrich, 2003: 149) demonstrate a smooth transformation of the centralized welfare state into a more decentralized form. The federal states, like Germany, also reveal a case of smooth transformation, where it was relatively easier to redefine the responsibilities of the Länder and the federal government and to assign more powers to the local level because of the existing tradition of dual polity.

The case of United Kingdom illustrates a whole different situation in comparison to the continental Europe as the redefinition of the centre-local relations in the country in the 1980s reveals a paradox, where the revival of the market forces and the socio-economic problems led to more central government control at the expense of local government (Davies, 1993: 83). While a high level of devolution and a general administrative, financial and political empowerment of the local level could be observed in the continental Europe, in the UK, “the local government lost its powers and revenues, central limits and guidelines were set for the local services, expenditure controls and local spending targets were established and local governments lost some of their duties to nongovernmental organizations through privatization” (Bennett, 1990: 9). In the post-1980 period, with the Thatcher government, too much state intervention was highly criticized and “to trim down the state by reducing and restricting it to its core functions” (Wollmann, 2006: 1430) was the basic aim. However, this was not done through devolution, the metropolitan county councils were abolished and the local political institutions were bypassed through privatization and contracting out of services (Pickvance, 1991: pp. 68-72).

The post-1970 period witnessed the retreat of the central state in the Western Europe in general. However, this retreat, which was a response to the similar challenges, took place in different phases and was initiated by different dynamics and actors in each country. The terms and conditions of the retreat of the central state varied in each setting. For instance, in France, where the strong state tradition prevailed, the central state moved with a pure economic motive in sharing the responsibilities with the local level and determined the terms of the division of responsibilities. The Italian state had the similar economic motive and the terms of the retreat were determined by the centre as well. Faced with the same situation of economic crisis, Spain transformed itself into a decentralized state more easily because of the internal dynamics of the country, which demanded more regional autonomy. Belgium followed a similar pattern as the internal dynamics of the country had already initiated the retreat of the central state from the political and economic matters.

The UK presents another striking example of how the internal dynamics of each state affected the responses to the crisis environment of the 1970s. The UK has opted for privatization of the delivery of services instead of delegating them to the local levels of administration and as a result, while the central state shared the burden of service delivery, it retained its political power vis-à-vis the local level. In contrast with the UK, in Germany and the Scandinavian countries, where the strong federalism tradition prevailed, one can observe a re-definition of centre-local relations in a more consensual manner, and a more gradual retreat of the central state from the delivery of services, which was accompanied by the increase in the political powers of the sub-national levels of government.

As the different country experiences in the Western Europe between 1930 and 1990 reveal, the historical and political context of each country has affected how the emerging needs of the time were responded and how easily a required transformation occurred. In this transformation process, another factor that needs to be considered is the role of the major political actors, who have an influence over the re-definition of the terms of the centre-local relations.

3.3 The Actor Preferences in Designing Centre-Local Relations

One striking example of the impact of the political actors in the reconstruction of centre-local relations is the process of devolution, which took place in France in the 1980s. The centre-local relations in France is characterized as “a complex system of relationships between the prefect and his administration and the local politicians (the notables)” (Loughlin and Seiler, 2004: 189). In this system, the local notables ensure the loyalty of the local population to the state in exchange for receiving resources from the centre. The relationships are of a highly informal nature, where networks are important for the distribution of rewards, advantages and privileges (Dupvy, 1985: pp. 96-102; Hunt and Chandler, 1993: 67). Moreover, the members of the national parliament, who can hold local offices as mayors or as the members of department assemblies (Gremion, 2002: 67) further increase the “interdependent relationships” (Cole, 2006: 35) between the major political actors at central and local levels.

Given this interdependent and informal nature of the centre-local relations, one can expect reluctance towards major devolution moves, which would end the status quo among the major political actors. As Peter Wagstaff (1994a: 27) observes,

at the end of 1970s and in the early 1980s, “those with their hands on the levers of central power remained largely antipathetic to the themes of regionalism and devolution as they represented a threat to that power”. When the socio-economic conditions of the 1970s and 1980s urged some kind of restructuring in the centre-local relations, the central elite chose to determine the new institutional design in order to retain their powerful position in the new structure and the devolution measures were dependent on the decisions taken at the centre. In the end, the devolution reforms reallocated the responsibilities between the central and local levels but did not create a profound structural change. “The regional level was given new autonomous powers, but at the same time new contractual relationships between the central and local government were created” (Newman and Thornley, 1996: 158). The devolution process initiated by the central political elite in the 1980s did not create an impact over the existing power relations as the state was still “the primary responsible for the management of the territory and was able to make its own objectives prevail over the local administration” (Marcou, 1990: 266).

The United Kingdom is another example, where the perceptions of the central political elite have had a profound impact over the nature of centre-local relations. The mistrust towards the local government and local politicians and their integrity made the British political elite opt for political centralization. “Regional government and elected regional assemblies were depicted as introducing extra and unnecessary layers of bureaucracy” (Philip, 1994: 113). The municipalities and the metropolitan counties were seen as “inefficient bureaucratic structures functioning according to clientalist and paternalistic logics” (Jouve, 2005: 287). Because of these negative perceptions of the Conservative government regarding the local government structures, the process of shrinking the central state in the 1980s did not lead to the

empowerment of the local structures in the UK, as it was in the continental Europe. Instead, the locally elected officials were bypassed and in 1986, “Quasi-autonomous Non-governmental Organizations-the Quangos¹⁸” (*ibid*), which were financially dependent on the central government, were created for local services.

In Spain, while the sub-national actors initiated the process of devolution with their demands in the mid-1970s, it was the Constitutional Court that played a crucial role in terms of consolidating the process. Between 1975 and 1978, the sub-national actors and the central state negotiated the statutes of the autonomy, which were accommodated in the 1978 Constitution. However, the ambiguities of the terms of the transformation led to confusion and conflict in the country (Diaz-Lopez, 1985: pp. 265-266). After the coup attempt in 1981, there was extensive political pressure in the country for slowing down the devolution process, all regions were urged to take the slowest route to autonomy and the powers given to Catalonia and Basque regions were reduced. However, in 1893, the Constitutional Court came into the picture, ruled out the slowing down of the devolution process and the autonomy granting process resumed in accordance with the Constitution (Williams, 1994: pp. 91-92). By 1989, all regions had full autonomy with varying powers and the process of devolution was guided and consolidated by the Constitutional Court.

“The Belgian experience illustrates dramatic devolution in response to discontent from below” (Ansell and Gingrich, 2003: 148). In other words, in Belgium, the Flemish population was the pioneer of devolution. “Their numerical superiority and increasing dominance in economic terms gradually undermined the hegemony of the francophone minority” (Wagstaff, 1994b: 43) and created a

¹⁸ These were created instead of locally elected councils, they consisted of business leaders as well as bureaucrats and had the purpose of service delivery based on financial assistance from the central government.

sustained pressure over the unitary state for devolution and official recognition of two linguistic communities.

The UK, France, Spain and to a certain extent Belgium are the most striking examples of the impact of the preferences and struggles of the major political actors over the nature of centre-local relations Europe. In the Scandinavian countries, which had corporatist tendencies and deeply-rooted local-self government traditions, the establishment of consensus among the political parties was an important requisite for the restructuring of centre-local relations (Kjellberg, 1988: 56). In Western Germany, the preferences of the Allied Powers for a decentralized structure were an important factor in the establishment of eleven Länder in the country in the post-war period (Stammen, 1994: 51; Keating, 1998: 40), in addition to the already existing federal tradition. In the case of Italy, the clientelist relations between the national politicians, political parties and the regional bodies were an important factor in determining the prospects for local autonomy, increase of local resources and powers (Dente, 1985: 146; Bull, 1994: 73; Cassese, 1988: 300) in addition to the secessionist demands of the Lega Nord, which advocates a federal state of three republics in the north, south and centre based on the claim that the Northern and Southern Italy are two distinct and non-converging societies to be left alone (Bull, 1994: pp. 75-76).

The period from 1930s to 1990s was a time in which the Western European countries have dealt with common problems like the post-war reconstruction, urban and social problems, the fiscal crisis and recession of the 1970s. These problems and the strategies chosen to deal with them affected the nature of centre-local relations. The boundaries and responsibilities of the different levels of government were redefined at different periods as a result of the requirements of the socio-economic

context and the internal political dynamics. While this was the case in the Western Europe, the socialist states of the CEE were closed to these challenges of advanced capitalism. However, in the 1990s, the changing international context and the political and economic developments at the global scale began to affect Europe as a whole and the international wave of democratization and the globalization process came into the picture as the new variables in the evolution of centre-local relations.

3.4 The Changing International Environment in the 1990s and Centre-Local Relations

The most significant international developments of the 1990s with respect to centre-local relations were the further integration of world economies and cultures through globalization, the rise of identity politics and “the re-valorization of local and minority cultures” (Keating, 1998b: 74) in relation to that and the global wave of democratization, which followed the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. This time, the CEE countries joined Western Europe in the trend towards devolution as the process of democratization became increasingly associated with the new concept of governance, which implied “devolution and devolution of power, revalidation of local authorities and rebuilding of local democracy” (Loughlin, 2000: pp. 14-15). The world-wide rise of local cultures and communities and the concept of self-government together with the globalization process had a significant impact over the re-construction of centre-local relations in the European countries¹⁹.

¹⁹ This trend resulting from economic restructuring, state reform, globalization and European integration in the 1980s and 1990s is called “new regionalism” in the literature, denoting the rise of local vis-à-vis the centre in terms of culture, politics and economics.

3.4.1 The European Charter of Local Self-Government

The European Charter of Local Self-Government²⁰, which was adopted by the Council of Europe on 15 October 1985, is an expression of the common understanding about the centre-local relations and the concept of local self-government which has formed in Europe over time. The Charter defines the legal foundations (Article 2), the concept (Article 3), the scope (Article 4), the administrative structures and supervision (Articles 6 and 8), the financial resources (Article 9) and the rights and legal protection (Articles 10 and 11) of the local government and provides a guideline for the signatory countries in designing their governance structures. As Marcou (1993: 52) argues, a major development of the 1990s has been “the wide acceptance across Europe of the common values formulated in the Charter of Local Self-Government”.

In terms of contributing to the re-definition of centre-local relations in Europe, the Charter is significant for stressing the principle of local self-government, introducing the principle of subsidiarity and giving importance to the constitutional protection of financial and political powers and responsibilities of the local governments and administrations vis-à-vis the central level.

As a reflection of these principles, in Western Europe, one can observe an increase in the powers, responsibilities and democratic qualities of the local administrative bodies. For instance, in Germany, “the 1990s have seen a steady expansion of the elements of direct democracy in the Länder and local authorities” (Bullmann, 2004: 109). In France, with 1992 and 1995 laws, consultative committees were created, which brought the elected representatives and the representatives of local associations together for discussing the local matters and local referenda were

²⁰ See Appendix A for the full text of the Charter.

allowed on any question concerning the commune, although they were not binding (Loughlin and Seiler, 2004: 202). Belgium reached an important step in the process of devolution when it became a federal state of three regions (Flemish, Walloon and Brussels) with the 1993 Constitutional amendment (Hendriks, 2004: 295). In 1993, Italy chose its mayors and the presidents of provincial councils with direct elections for the first time (Loughlin, 2004: 227), which created a new generation of local politicians, who were more independent from the political patronage of the centre.

While the European Charter of Local Self-Government reflected a common trend of devolution in the Western Europe, it was a source of inspiration and legitimacy basis for the CEE countries. “The collapse of totalitarianism in eastern Europe in the autumn of 1989 brought a demand for popular representation and local community control” (Wannop, 1997: 142) and the principles outlined in the Charter served as a basis for institutional reform and as “an expression of political will to adopt Western norms” (Marcou, 1993: 52).

“The transformation of the territorial structure of government-its devolution, particularly the introduction of territorial self-government-was considered as an essential task in the process of rebuilding political and administrative systems in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. Indeed, the reforms of territorial government followed closely after the collapse of the Communist regimes and after the transformation of the constitutional bodies and central governments in 1990” (Baldersheim and Illner, 1998: 7). The reforms of devolution were a part of the process of catching up with the Western standards of governance and the Charter provided a basic guideline and starting point in this process²¹.

²¹ In this period, the Council of Europe paid special attention to the CEE, as the Council decision on 18 March 1993 welcomes the attempts in the CEE to establish local self-governing bodies and calls for further democratization and clarification of powers between different levels of government

3.4.2 Globalization and the Empowerment of the “Local”

The concept of globalization has been discussed extensively from various perspectives in international relations, sociology, political science and economics. The diverging views about the meaning of the concept and the interaction between the globalization and the political actors, mainly the national state, demonstrate the fact that the term ‘globalization’ is an umbrella for several economic, financial, cultural, political and social processes around the world, which entail both symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships between various political actors.

With respect to the impact of globalization over centre-local relations in Europe, one can define the process itself as the outcome of “the successful transformation of capitalism itself following the crisis in the 1970s of the Keynesian welfare state model of economic management and the subsequent development of neo-liberal models of free trade, the end of protectionism, and the rapid spread of new technologies, communication, and productive systems around the world” (Loughlin, 2004: 23). With increased cross-border mobility of capital, loss of government control over the market activities and the rising territorial inequalities because of different investment and production activities (Verdier and Breen, 2001: pp. 229-230), the central governments are faced with new challenges like the threat of secession and resource redistribution problems and they need to find new political strategies to deal with the sub-national actors and their demands.

All of these intertwined processes have led to the rise of the political and economic importance of the local level in the world. “The conventional way of looking at the nation-state as genuine compound, integrating feeling of belonging

(Resolution 250 (1993) on Development of Local and Regional Self-Government in Central and Eastern European Countries).

(identity) and compulsory authority in a given territorial space that is deemed sovereign, no longer seems natural or inevitable” (Reis, 2004: 252). The central government is looking for new ways of dealing with the local forces within its territory, which have gained strength during the course of globalization. Thus, especially during the 1990s, the forces of globalization have had a considerable impact over the re-definition of the boundaries of the state, levels of governance and the balance of power between the central and local political actors in Europe. However, in the European context, there was one additional factor, which affected the nature of centre-local relations and which for some, had similar effects to those of globalization: the process of European integration.

3.5 The EC/EU Factor and Centre-Local Relations

The EC/EU has affected the central-local relations in the Member States through the establishment of its regional policy and the deepening of the European integration process. These two processes led to the demands for participation at the EU-level decision making by the sub-national authorities, which created an environment for multi-level governance in time and which changed the balance of power between central and sub-national governments in the Member States.

The six founding members²² of the European Community (EC) were rather a homogeneous group with respect to their economic situation with the exception of Southern Italy. However, the redistribution logic is evident at early beginnings of the Community as in its preamble, the Treaty of Rome refers to the need of “reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favored regions.”²³. This principle was the result of the bargains with Italy for the

²² The original six were France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg.

²³ Treaty of Rome (1957), Preamble. <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/founding.htm>

acceptance of the Treaty of Rome and it led to the establishment of the European Investment Bank and the European Social Fund in 1958 (Springer, 1994: 110; Artobolevskiy, 1997: 88; Martin, 1999: 7).

The real problem of regional disparities within the Community occurred after the 1973 enlargement, when Denmark, United Kingdom and Ireland joined the Community. Denmark did not pose an important problem, however, the backward regions of Britain and Ireland made “the division of the Community between richer and poorer areas, corresponding largely to a geographical distinction between centre and periphery, evident” (Coombes, 1991: 135). In order to cope with these regional disparities, in 1975, the European Regional Development Fund was established along with the other structural funds for Agriculture, Social Policy and Fisheries²⁴. These funds comprised limited resources for the regional development programmes in the areas designated by the Member states and functioned on quota basis (Michie and Fitzgerald, 1997: 17).

In the second half of the 1980s, the regional inequalities became even more critical with the completion of the single market with the Single European Act in 1986 and the Southern enlargement of the Community, which included Greece, Spain and Portugal. This second wave of enlargement increased the income disparities among the member states and together with the anticipated impacts of the single European market over poorer regions, required a reform in the Community’s

²⁴ The Structural Funds are namely, The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which finances infrastructure, job-creating investments, local development projects and aid for small firms; the European Social Fund (ESF), which aids the unemployed and disadvantaged groups in the work force; the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), which finances rural development measures and aid for farmers; the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), which helps to modernize the fishing industry and the Cohesion Fund, which provides direct finance for regional projects to improve environment and develop transport networks (European Commission-Regional Policy) http://europa.eu/pol/reg/index_en.htm

regional policy. With the 1988 reforms, the resources for structural funds were doubled and their principles and objectives became more concrete²⁵.

The 1995 enlargement²⁶ was not very problematic in terms of the regional redistributive mechanisms of the Community, however, the steps towards the political union and the common currency in the 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty, made the regional policy remain as a critical item on the European political agenda. Economic and social cohesion became one of the pillars of the Treaty, the objectives of the structural funds were re-organized²⁷ and the financial resources were increased. The Eastern enlargement posed a similar challenge for the Union and with the prospects for more regional disparities, the structural funds were reformed again in 2000 with a new financial perspective²⁸.

The mechanism of regional policy is based on the idea that “the richer regions subsidize the poorer ones in exchange for the advantages of integration and the Commission regulates the national assistance procedures, where the member states are allowed to subsidize a limited amount of the project costs” (Artobolevskiy, 1997: pp. 96-97). The starting position of the regional policy is the recognition of the fact that not all member states have the same advantages and chances in the process of integration. For this reason, the policy aims to “overcome adverse effects of market integration and disadvantaged regions” (Hooghe and Keating, 1994: 367) through

²⁵ These objectives are basically the areas in which the structural funds are to be concentrated. Objective 1 regions are the ones lagging in development, Objective 2 is the regions suffering from industrial decline. Objective 3 are the regions with the problem of long-term structural unemployment. Objective 4 is directed towards the occupational integration of young people and Objective 5 aims at adjustment of agricultural structures and development of rural areas.

http://europa.eu/pol/reg/index_en.htm

²⁶ With this wave of enlargement, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the Community.

²⁷ Objectives 3 and 4 were combined, facilitation of structural change was added as Objective 4 and adjustment of fisheries industry and development and adjustment of low population density areas were added as new objectives.

²⁸ The previous objectives were combined under three main headings as Objective 1 (development and structural adjustment of the regions whose development is lagging behind), Objective 2 (economic and social conversion of areas facing structural difficulties) and Objective 3 (development of human resources).

financial redistribution and contribution to the growth of regions with structural weaknesses²⁹. This approach is based on the solidarity principle and the need for the equal distribution of the benefits of market integration (*ibid*: 370). The regional policy has a political rationale in addition to its economic orientation as the deepening of the European integration needs to be legitimized especially in the peripheral regions, which might lose from change and the regional imbalances, may form a barrier to integration.

The increased interest in the regional disparities and development at the EU level has an unavoidable impact over the centre-local relations in the member states as the sub-national units become a subject of Community action and face with a change in the nature of their competences, responsibilities and political position within the government machinery.

The conventional argument in the existing literature is that “the regional policy is the leading edge of multi-level governance in which supranational, national, regional and local governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks” (Ollsson, 2003: 285). The EU has provided for the sub-national actors “a new basis for the exercise of political power and authority” (John, 2000: 878) and while dealing with impacts of the Single European Market and competing for receiving funds, the sub-national actors began to mobilize at the EU level as well as the national level (Loughlin, 2004: 395; Mazey, 1995a: 79). The European integration increased the number of decision-makers in the policy areas and thus made the policy outcomes less predictable, led to institutional reforms at the local level, changed the traditional regional policies based on the hierarchy between the central and local governments and administrations, created new policy networks and

²⁹ Article 158 of Treaty establishing European Community. http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.003301.html

new tasks for the sub-national level and made the governance structure more complex by opening it to new strategic interactions and coalitions (Wright, 1998: 44; John, 2000: 879) and all of these processes have increased the power of the local in the end.

According to this ‘empowerment argument’, “the EU affected the internal traditional balance of power and increased sub-national independence” (Zerbinatti, 2004: 1001) as the distinct regional programmes and the structural funds made the central governments devolve new rights to lower levels and reorganize their administrative-territorial divisions (Artobolevskiy, 1997: 2) and encouraged horizontal cooperation in addition to the existing vertical relationships (Bachtler and Turok, 1997: pp. 5-6). With the partnership principle, on one hand, sub-national actors can now participate in the formation of the regional policy and represent their interests at the EU level and on the other hand, the EU legitimizes its activities, achieves a better implementation and can work with the regions as new allies in strategic planning (Onestini, 1995: 172). Thus, the regional policy works for the advantage of the local actors and empowers them in the national context with respect to the central actors, while making it easier for the EU to implement its policies. However, as Michael Keating (1998: 172) suggests, the regional policy also has a political and distributive logic in addition to its policy orientation and this political logic is determined through intergovernmental bargaining in the Council, which makes the central governments an important part of the policy itself. Thus, ‘the empowerment argument’, which gives the EU an important part in changing the balance of centre-local relationships in the member states, fails to explain the complex nature of the process.

In reality, the European integration creates two adverse effects over the sub-national authorities at the same time. On one hand, in line with the empowerment argument, it makes the local units independent players at the EU level through reducing the regulatory role of the state and through the idea of democratic multi-level governance. On the other hand, the European integration also weakens the sub-national authorities as more and more competences are transferred to the EU level from the states, some of which belong to the sub-national authorities. While the existence of structural funds and regional assistance leads to regional mobilization and emergence of new actors at the EU level, the European integration also creates opportunities for further centralization as the Community affairs are essentially seen as foreign policy matters, which fall under the responsibility of the central state.

The European integration has limited the power of the nation-state in various areas, however it has also eroded regional and local competence and created a centralizing effect. One reason for this situation is the primacy of the EU law over national laws and its direct applicability³⁰. The removal of the barriers for the free movement of goods, capital and people with the Single European Market required extensive community legislation in areas which were reserved to regions, while the regions were not formally represented at the decision-making institutions of the Community (Hrbek, 1995: 56) and this situation reduced the autonomy of the local and regional authorities in regional policy. Regional authorities increasingly became subject to and responsible for the EC legislation with the deepening of integration while trying to cope with its socio-economic impacts. Moreover, the representation of their interests at the EU level depended on the domestic political system (Mazey,

³⁰ This principle does not exist explicitly in the Treaty, however, in order to increase the efficiency of the Treaty, the European Court of Justice has created this principle with a series of decisions ruling in favour of the Community legislation against national legislation.

1995b: pp. 81-82), which made the governance structure even more centralized and remote from the citizens.

The way in which the regions are identified³¹ and the distribution mechanism of the regional and structural funds also reveals an essentially central nature, where “the regions are not real protagonists in the process of development” (Storper, 1995: 212). The Council of Ministers decides on the size of the funds, the member states and the Commission determine their scope and the member states submit application programmes to the Commission. The funds go directly to the central governments, which transfer them to the regional authorities and implementing agencies afterwards (Ollsson, 2003: 285; Greenwood, 2003: pp. 244-245). Moreover, the Council has given the states the choice of appointing the authorities responsible for preparation and implementation of the development programmes (Nay, 2002: 249) and as a result, the influence of sub-national authorities over the use of funds and the nature of the projects is exercised under the gate-keeping of the central government.

The Commission engages in the regional policy as a part of bureaucratic and elite apparatus and the central governments are the decision-makers in the usage of funds as the sole contributors (Martin, 1999: 75) and this control mechanism highlights the centralized nature of the process, where the local problems are tried to be solved by the central authority. For this reason, it would be too simple to generalize the impact of the EU over the centre-local relations as a means of further participation for the local level. Although the EU made the sub-national interests more visible at the international arena, in reality “sub-national interests have been drawn into the European arena in diverse ways, and the degree and form of

³¹ The entire EC area is divided into units according to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units System (NUTS). NUTS 1 regions are the largest units, NUTS 2 refers to medium-sized units and NUTS 3 is used for smaller units. These units are identified according to economic criteria, while the sociological factors and differences among administrative units in Member States are ignored.

participation have tended to follow distinctly national patterns. Their influence similarly is still largely determined by their linkages into national government” (Keating, 1998: 176).

As John (2000: 882) argues, “while sub-national governments are not impotent when faced with central government decisions, relations on European policy matters tend to reflect the pre-existing balance of power in central-local policy networks”. Depending on the balance of power, there can be a hierarchical intergovernmental relationship, which is often the case in unitary states, a consultative relationship, where there exists a certain level of devolution or regionalization or a participatory relationship as in the case of federal states regarding the European policy matters. If the sub-national levels already have important powers and responsibilities, they see the European integration as a threat to their sovereignty, they have more to lose and thus they adopt a rejectionist approach towards European integration.³² On the other hand, the sub-national authorities of the unitary states adopt a more positive approach to European integration as they see it as an opportunity for economic gains and as a framework for contesting their political interests³³. While the federal states establish formal ways of participation in the EU policies for the sub-national governments, there exist fewer formal procedures in the unitary states and informal representation at the EU level through lobbying or networks is more common (Mazey, 1995b: 91).

France demonstrates an example for the unitary states, where the European integration is seen as a matter of foreign policy and thus as a job for the central government. As a result of this approach, until very recently, the central government was the sole responsible in the selection, negotiation and distribution of European

³² The Scandinavian countries are examples of this sort of reaction.

³³ The Basque region of Spain and Lega Nord in Italy are some examples.

funds (Marcou, 1990: 275) and all interactions between the EU and the sub-national authorities were carried out by a bureaucratic unit within the office of Prime Ministry (Cole, 2006: 43). With the devolution reforms in 1982, the regional authorities were allowed to open offices in Brussels for information gathering purposes and to join cross-border associations (Loughlin and Seiler, 2004: pp. 205-206). In 2004, they were allowed to have complete control over the management of structural funds only on experimental basis (Cole, 2006: 44). However, despite the devolution reforms, the institutional weakness of the local bodies and the traditional existence of the central state at the local level, enabled the state to re-deploy its power vis-à-vis the local actors. In the domain of regional policy, the state remains legitimate and powerful as an arbitrator and coordinator and thus has reproduced its power at the local level (Nay, 2002: pp. 246-258).

Italy is another regionalized unitary state, where the central government has had an important impact over the relations between the sub-national authorities and the EU-level institutions and the European integration has been utilized by sub-national actors in their political claims. Until 1990, the narrow definition of the scope of international politics by the Constitutional Court reserved the EU affairs for the domain of central government and there existed little direct contact between the sub-national authorities and Brussels. In the 1990s, the desire of the country to join the common currency with the first group of countries led to certain administrative and economic reforms. These reforms, together with the re-definition of the scope of international politics, increased the activities of the sub-national authorities at the EU level (Loughlin, 2004: pp. 224-225). For the sub-national actors with secessionist desires, the European project was seen as an opportunity to unite with their counterparts in other member states (Bull, 1994: pp. 81-82) and this situation made the

central state keep its control over the European-level activities of the sub-national authorities³⁴.

In Spain, the idea of ‘Europe of Regions’ was also highly supported by the autonomous regions (Williams, 1994: 95) and along with the powers they acquired in the national politics, the regions also gained important rights at the EU-level for representing their interests such as the obligation of the government to consult with the Autonomous Communities before making decisions in the areas related to them and the right to be represented at the Council in related issues along with their offices in Brussels (Aja, 2001: 249).

In case of the Scandinavian countries and the UK, one may argue that the internal dynamics went on to determine the course of centre-local relations and they were rather cautious about the European integration process (Lidström, 2004: 353; Giordano and Roller, 2003: pp. 911-912).

Germany, arguably, is the country, where the European integration had the greatest impact over the intergovernmental relations and the sub-national authorities adopted a more reactionist strategy during the integration process. The basic reason for this situation was the fact that the German Länder had extensive competences and “saw the EC as a centralized organization, which threatened their autonomy” (Benz, 1998: 112). In order to protect their autonomy and powers, the Länder demanded national and EU-level participation rights with respect to Community decisions, which fall within their competence. At the national level, they obtained rather significant rights with respect to centre-local relations as it became necessary to get the approval of Bundesrat for any transfer of sovereignty to the EU, which enables

³⁴ For instance, the Italian government resisted the establishment of cross-border cooperation between Austria and Italy in the Tirol region with the fear that it would develop separatist tendencies among the German-speaking elite in the Italian Tirol region. See Perkmann, Markus (2003) “Cross-Border Regionalism in Europe: Significance and Drivers of Regional Cross-Border Co-operation” *European Urban and Regional Studies Vol. 10 No.2:* pp. 153-171, for details.

the Länder to obstruct the European policy making. Moreover, when the issue at the EU agenda is about Länder competence, the Länder governments attend the Council of Ministers meeting and can protect their own interests at the EU-level (Bullmann, 2004: 106; Hrbek, 1999: pp. 220-221).

As these different country experiences reveal, “the real transformation in the relative roles of the sub-national authorities and the central state in EU policy-making has taken place in the intra-state arena and the European policy for the sub-national authorities has become domesticated rather more than they have become internationalized” (Jeffery, 2000: 4). Especially in the federal states, where the sub-national authorities had more to lose with the transfer of competences to the European level and the representation of their interests by the central state, there were attempts to take the European policy into the domain of domestic politics instead of understanding European integration as a foreign policy matter. In these states, the sub-national level sought to find certain ways of representing their interests both at the national and European levels and these attempts were pioneered by Germany, which was the leading figure in putting the regional demands to the Maastricht Treaty and these attempts were supported by Belgium, Austria and Spain (Bullmann, 2004: 106).

The main demands of the federal states were the introduction of the subsidiarity principle, the right to participate in the Council, the establishment of the Committee of Regions and the right to appeal to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for Community decisions (Hrbek, 1995: 57). However, the sub-national authorities could not fully achieve their aims as while they gained the right to participate in the Council³⁵, they were not given the right to appeal to the ECJ and although the

³⁵ Article 146 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.003301.html

subsidiarity principle was introduced³⁶, it was worded rather problematically and in a way that did not explicitly recognize the sub-national authorities³⁷ and the Committee of Regions³⁸, which was established with the Article 198 of the Treaty was only an advisory organ (Hrbek, 1999: pp. 224-225).

When the Union decided to draft a European Constitution, the federal states led by Germany once again tried to increase their participation at the EU policies and demanded formal recognition of the sub-national level at the Constitution, introduction of the consultation procedure and clarification of the subsidiarity principle, a formal EU institution status for the Committee of Regions and the right to appeal to ECJ for the Committee of Regions and the regions (Hrbek, 2003: 68). However, as the absence of a working group on the regional and local dimension of European integration illustrates, the empowerment of the local level in the European policy making was not a priority and these demands were not considered during the drafting phase of the Constitution (*ibid*: 72).

The status of the sub-national authorities within the EU shows that the power relations at the national level affect the functioning of the multi-level governance structure and the Europeanization has weakening effects over the sub-national bodies as well as decentralizing effects. The main reason of this seemingly paradoxical

³⁶ Article 3b “The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action can not be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty.” <http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title2.html>

³⁷ The principle applies only to the relations between the supra-national and national levels, leaving the sub-national level out. It contradicts with the coherence principle in terms of regional policy and multi-level governance. Moreover, the ambiguity of the wording enables each state to interpret it differently. The principle can serve to defend national sovereignty against the Community action, to justify additional competences for the EU or to defend the empowerment of the sub-national level.

³⁸ It is an advisory organ composed of the representatives of regional and local bodies. The different status, competences and authorities of these representatives pose a serious challenge in terms of putting coherent policies forward. See www.cor.europa.eu/en/index.htm for the details of the activities of the Committee of Regions.

situation is the heterogeneity of the European sub-national governments in terms of their degree of autonomy, power and competences (Springer, 1994: 111; Smouts, 1998: 31). This situation creates difficulties in policy co-ordination (Benz, 1998: 118) as “diversity of realities are re-grouped under the term region and the rivalry between different levels of government” (Le Gales, 1998: 248). Together with this, the economic competition within the Community creates a tension between the common interests of the regions at the EU level and their individual interests (Keating, 1998b: pp. 165-166).

The initial political systems and national political circumstances turns the Committee of Regions into a marginal institution with weak powers, limited cohesion and no common purpose and this situation hinders the empowerment of the local level within the multi-level governance structure of the EU. Moreover, the distribution mechanism of the structural funds, which makes the sub-national units dependent on the central state, the presence of the representatives of the central government together with the regional representatives at the Council meetings and the ineffective and un-coordinated lobbying activities of the sub-national units (Jeffery, 2000: pp- 4-5; Greenwood, 2003: pp. 230-231) work to the advantage of the centre in the re-structuring of the centre-local relations during the course of European integration.

3.6 Europeanization and Centre-Local Relations: A Critical Overview

The Europeanization process leads to domestic structural change, if there exists a misfit between the EU norms and the national practices in a way that creates adaptational pressures. In this process, the mediating institutions and the preferences of the main political actors, which are shaped by the existing institutional culture and

tradition, determine the outcome of the structural change (Cowles, Caporaso, Risse, 2001: 6; Börzel, 2001: 143; Börzel, 1999: pp. 574-575).

In the case of centre-local relations, the Europeanization process affected the member states through the deepening of integration and the transfer of competences to the EU-level. The principles of the regional policy and structural funds applied equally to all countries, however, they all responded differently to similar pressures. In the federal states, as it was previously argued, the transfer of competences had a greater impact over the existing centre-local relations and created a bigger misfit, thus higher adaptational pressures, which led to institutional change (Börzel, 1999: 580). On the other hand, in the unitary decentralized states, the sub-national authorities had less to lose with the European integration and they faced with less adaptational pressure, which led to administrative reforms instead of major institutional change (*ibid*: 593).

As the country experiences discussed in previous sections reveal, the administrative traditions and the preferences of the political actors have shaped the way in which the EU countries responded to the economic and political changes, which were created by the European integration. Thus the path-dependency of the institutions and the accumulating institutional culture determine the way in which each state adopts to the European norms. However, this situation does not deny the fact that the Europeanization has been a major factor in the re-structuring of centre-local relations with its re-distributive impacts. In order to better comprehend these impacts, one needs to try to differentiate it from the process of globalization as well.

As Paul Chesire (1995) has argued, “economic integration is not a process which is confined to Europe. Integration in Europe has been occurring against a background of increasing integration in the world economy as a whole” (pp. 31-32). In other words, the Europeanization process was initiated and facilitated by the process of globalization. However, the EC has strengthened this process with the Single European Act, the single currency and by increasing its political legitimacy through reduction of regional disparities. According to the ‘hollowing out of the nation-state’ argument, “global economic integration restricts the ability of the national government to intervene effectively in and guide the development of internal economies. As a result, they transfer their power both upwards to supranational institutions and downwards by conceding power to regional governments” (Amin and Tamaney, 1995: 172). When looked from this perspective, Europeanization and globalization seem to be two different names for the same process as “they both demonstrate the inability of the nation-state to attain desired outcomes through independent action and provide external pressures over the nation-states for integration” (Longo, 2003: 486).

Given this similar impact, one can easily argue that it is not possible to decide whether it was the European integration or the impacts of globalization that created institutional change in terms of centre-local relations. One way to overcome this problem is taking globalization as a variable, which changes the powers and preferences of the actors at the Member State level, which in turn change the preferences of the states at the EU-level policy making (Hennis, 2001: pp. 834-835). In other words, a careful sequencing of the global developments, changes at the domestic level and the European integration becomes critical for differentiating between globalization and Europeanization.

Another and perhaps more useful way of differentiating these two processes is acknowledging inevitability aspect of globalization as opposed the political voluntarism dimension of the Europeanization process. While globalization has decentralizing and deregulatory effects, in the case of Europeanization, a political component is added to the picture, where the member states agree upon centralized decision-making procedures, policy coordination and enforceable policies depending on the consent of the interested parties (Verdier and Breen, 2001: pp. 231-232). Since the regional policy is a result of a political agreement between the member States and entails a transfer of powers between different levels of government, it clearly has a political component and Europeanization is more influential over the centre-local relations than the process of globalization.

The institutionalist framework seems to work in explaining the impact of Europeanization over the central-local relations in the ‘old’ members of the Community (the EU15), where the principles of subsidiarity and coherence create adverse effects of devolution and centralization at the same time and the strength of these effects depend on the existing institutional design and power relations in each member state. In other words, although there exists an agreement regarding the concept of good governance and need for sub-national democracy³⁹, the Community policies also erode the powers of sub-national authorities through transfer of competences and this inherent tension makes the centre-local relations a rather fluid relationship, which prevents the convergence of models of intergovernmental relations. However, it is also possible that Europeanization has different impacts over

³⁹ The White Paper on European Governance (25 July 2001) calls for more openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence within the context of Community action along with a stronger interaction with regional and local governments.

http://eur.lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf

the old members and the new comers into the Community and in order to fully understand the Europeanization-devolution relationship, a brief analysis of the latest Eastern enlargement of the Community is also necessary.

After the fall of communism, while restructuring their state structure, the CEE countries carried the common institutional heritage of the communist legacy, which was basically an undemocratic, highly bureaucratized and centralized system with no territorial self-government understanding (Illner, 1998: 11). Therefore, the institutional culture, which affected the impact of Europeanization over centre-local relations, was also a common one. The concept of local government reform was weak, the establishment of sub-national authorities often ended with deconcentration because of the existing centralizing tendency, political participation was limited and the system was not flexible enough to adopt to the rapid political and economic changes (Regulska, 1993: pp. 187-189).

Given this institutionalized centralization, one may expect that the European integration, which created little convergence in governance patterns in Western Europe, can not pass through the domestic structure and create institutional change. However, the EU has been more effective in the transformation of intergovernmental relations in the CEE countries than it has been over the incumbent members and the misfit model can explain this situation.

For the CEE countries, the Europeanization process has been much more intensive. They engaged within the process through formal accession based on conditionality, where they had to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria⁴⁰ and had a

⁴⁰To join the EU, a new Member State must meet three criteria:

- political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;

very limited maneuvering area for negotiation. Because of the above-discussed communist legacy, there was a great deal of misfit between the EU requirements and the existing domestic structures and this created a higher level of adaptational pressure over the CEE countries. The EU had a strong bargaining position in the accession process and was able to shape the procedures and norms unilaterally. At the national level, the institutional vacuum after Communism created the need to establish new models of intergovernmental relations and the political elites, who were very eager to join the EU, were open to EU influence. This situation facilitated domestic structural change and increased the impact of the Europeanization process over the CEE countries (Brusis, 2002: 533; Grabbe, 2001: pp. 1013-1014).

The brief overview of the European experience regarding the centre-local relations reveals that the impact of Europeanization over the transformation of the balance of power between the central and local levels of government and administration depends on certain contextual factors. These contextual factors have determined the course of and outcome of change and the intensity of the EU influence in each country. Table 1 summarizes these factors and the outcome for each country or group of country dealt in this chapter.

As it can be inferred from the table, the state tradition of each country has an impact over how same challenges and environmental factors are dealt with and to what extent each country is open or resistant to change and transformation. The states with a tradition of strong central government have been more open to the centralization trends and more resistant to giving more power to the local

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- economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
 - acceptance of the Community *acquis*: ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

administrative bodies. In these countries, the balance of power between the central and local levels was redefined according to the terms and conditions of the central political elite and the impact of the EU over this process depended on the choices and consent of the central political elite. In contrast, the countries with a federal tradition and with strong local and regional identities were more prone to devolution trend and the internal dynamics and demands facilitated the empowerment of the local level in time. In this process, Europeanization served as a legitimating device for the local demands and strengthened the hand of the local vis-à-vis the centre.

With respect to the European context, one may also argue that the actor preferences were more influential over the transformation in the countries, where the central political elite had more to lose from a possible change in the existing form of power relations. In these countries, the central political elite have tried to prevent, shape and dominate the transformation process as much as possible.

The analyses also show that the impact of Europeanization varies according to the position of each country within the EU and the level of institutionalization of the centre-local relations. The CEE countries have faced with more misfit and more adaptational pressures as the new comers and the EU had a greater impact over the transformation of centre-local relations in these countries. While the existing members responded to the adaptational pressures from the EU-level through gradual administrative reform and were able to filter the EU influence, the new members of the EU responded to these pressures through institutional change, which was easier because of the institutional vacuum, filled during the course of EU accession. One may develop a similar argument for Turkey, since Turkey is facing with more adaptational pressures from the EU level as an accession country. The remaining chapters discuss the validity of this argument and analyze the relationship between

the ongoing process of EU accessions and the relations between the two levels of administration in Turkey.

Table 1: The Transformation of Centre-Local Relations in some EU countries

COUNTRY	Historical Context	Political Context		Actor Preferences	EC/EU Factor	Outcome
		1930-1970	1970-1990			
France	Napoleonic Tradition-Centralized-Unitary State	Open to centralization trend-easy/little transformation	Retreat of the central state on its own terms-no political empowerment of the local level	High impact-Terms of transformation determined by the central political elite	Gradual influence as a result of adaptational pressures, whose terms are determined by the centre	Learning at the local level, value change, administrative reform according to the terms of the centre
Italy	Napoleonic Tradition-Centralized	Open to centralization trend-easy/little transformation	Retreat of the central state on its own terms	High impact-Clientelist relations between the central and local political elite determining the course of transformation	Gradual influence as a result of adaptational pressures, whose terms are determined by the centre	Learning at the local level, value change, administrative reform
Spain	Napoleonic Tradition-Strong linguistic and cultural diversities preventing centralization	Resistant to the centralization trend because of regional political demands-hard transformation	Retreat of the central state accompanied by the political empowerment of the local level	High-demands of the local political elite initiating the transformation	Empowerment and legitimization of the local demands	Empowerment of the local vis-à-vis the centre, administrative reform
Belgium	Napoleonic Tradition-internal dynamics and strong local identities preventing a centralized state tradition	Local demands stronger than the economic pressures-empowerment of the local	Local demands continues to empower the local level	Low influence-transformation based on the internal dynamics	Empowerment and legitimization of the local demands	Empowerment of the local vis-à-vis the centre, administrative reform
United Kingdom	Anglo-Saxon-Local delivery of	Open to centralization trend-easy	Retreat in the form of privatization-	High influence of the central	Low influence, which is	No significant change in the balance of

	services with a strong central state	transformation	the political power of the centre remains intact	political elite	controlled by the central political elite	power between the centre and the local
Germany	Germanic-Federal State	Resistance to centralization by the Länder-attempts to reconcile the federal tradition with the economic requirements	Gradual and consensual transformation-centre-local partnership	Consensus-Neither central nor the local political elite dominated the process	High influence, adaptational pressures, which empowered the local level	Administrative reform, which strengthened the local vis-à-vis the central and the EU levels
Scandinavian Countries	Nordic Tradition-Multi-level state structure with a strong local level	Resistance to centralization -attempts to reconcile the federal tradition with the economic requirements	Gradual and consensual transformation-centre-local partnership	Consensus-Neither central nor the local political elite dominated the process	Low influence, already established centre-local partnership remains intact	Administrative reform, which strengthened the local vis-à-vis the central and the EU levels
The CEE Countries	Communist-High level of centralization with no experience of local self-government	Closed system-Central planning remains intact	Closed system-Central planning remains intact	Central political elite remains strong	Highest influence, new comers facing with more misfit, more adaptational pressures, open to influence because of the institutional vacuum	Institutional change in order to deal with the EU-level adaptational pressures

CHAPTER IV

EU ACCESSION AND THE CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN TURKEY: THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Following the structure of the analyses about Europe, the analysis about the impact of Europeanization over the centre-local relations in the Turkish context starts with an overview of the historical and political conditions, which have shaped these relations in the first place. For this purpose, the chapter first deals with the origins of the local administration understanding in Turkey. Then the responses to the challenges of the 1930-1970 and post-1970 periods in the Turkish case will be analyzed. Finally, in order to show the significance of the actor preferences and the EU factor in terms of the transformation of the balance of power between the central and local levels in Turkey, the chapter will offer an analyses of the internal dynamics and the strong state tradition in the Turkish context.

4.1 Turkish State Tradition and the Centre-Local Relations

Seeing the centre-periphery relations and the strong state tradition as the key to understand the Turkish politics has been one of the most prominent theoretical

tendencies among the students of Turkish politics. In his elaborate accounts of the Turkish political life, Şerif Mardin (1971, 1973, and 1991), has pointed out the major characteristics of the Turkish centre and the periphery and argued that instead of being in constant confrontation with the centre, the Turkish periphery was under its domination. According to Mardin, “the Ottoman Empire consisted of two-well defined groups: an elite stratum of military and civil establishment and a folk stratum of the administered” (Mardin, 1991: 114). The secularization of the political institutions led to the alienation of these groups from each other and the political and social modernization attempts of the elite failed to establish a linkage with the rest of the society (Mardin, 1971: 199). The duality between the ruler and the ruled and also among the ruling elites was a structural problem inherited by the Republic from the Ottoman period along with “the strong state and a weak civil society” (Heper, 1985:16).

The perception that any reform of the society to be imposed from above or the need for the progress to be guided by the elite (Heper, 1985: pp. 55-60), which was common among the founders of the Republic, has been one of the major historical factors that determined the course of centre-local relations in Turkey together with the inherent centre-periphery cleavage. The distance and mistrust between the centre and the periphery have had an impact over the institutional design in which the central and local administrative bodies have operated and over the prospects for the change of that design since the late Ottoman period.

4.1.1 The Ottoman Period: *Tanzimat* and the Emergence of Local Administration in Turkey

The local administrative bodies have a rather recent history in the Ottoman Empire. The first attempts to officially establish local administration and to define

the duties of the central and local administrations took place in the 19th century after the *Tanzimat* decree of 1839. Until the 19th century, the local services were left to the local notables, foundations and religious organizations (Özgür, 2002: 140; Ortaylı, 2000: 17). The towns, cities and other residing areas did not have distinct legal identities (Öztürk, 1997: 52) and in these areas, all services, administrative matters and legal issues were dealt with single-handedly, by *kadi*, who was supported by the local people. (Tekeli and Ortaylı, 1978: 17). Before the reforms of the 19th century, there were mainly three structures, which provided local services. The guilds were responsible for regulative functions, while the foundations provided health and cultural services and the neighborhood units took over the duty of providing physical and social security for people (Göymen, 1990: 138).

One may argue that until the 19th century, the life at the local level was organized through unofficial networks and solidarity of people, without much control or support from the Istanbul administration and there was no or little interaction between the central and local levels. However, the developments of the 19th century changed this situation. The economic and political opening of the Empire to the world, the growth of some cities as a result of economic interactions and penetrations, the need for financial centralization, the external pressures for the political participation of the minorities and the imposition of the Western European institutions led to the reforms of local administration and gave it an official status (Keleş, 1992: 94; Tekeli and Ortaylı, 1978: 6; Göymen, 1990: 138).

Faced with external and internal pressures for administrative reorganization, the 19th century reformers opted for centralization and in order to establish a strong central government, they took the services carried out by local networks back under the umbrella of central administration through the administrative bodies founded at

the local level. As Ortaylı (2000) argues, the local administration is the product of the efforts of the central bureaucracy to establish political control over the Empire more efficiently, the local administration was understood in functional terms with no purpose of democratization. In the 19th century, the central-local relations were organized in the form of deconcentration, i.e. the extension of central control to the localities (Heper, 1989: 4). The locally elected assemblies, which were introduced in 1860, were mainly responsible for the application of certain tasks, while the decision-making power remained within the domain of the centre. These assemblies were primarily loyal to the centre instead of the local community and they were a means of re-enforcing central control (Köker, 1995: 55).

The first municipality was established in Istanbul in 1854. Its mayor was appointed by the Sultan, which was an indication of the strong central control over local administration. Istanbul can be considered as the laboratory of the local administrative organization as in 1858, the first district municipality was founded in Beyoğlu-Galata district as the 6th Arrondissement- *6. Daire-i Belediye*, with a district head and council, who came to office by appointment. In 1869, a two-tier structure was established in Istanbul with fourteen districts and a mayor. In 1877, there were twenty districts, which were all abolished in 1912 and replaced by nine municipal departments for more centralization of administration (Keleş, 1992: pp. 95-97).

In 1870, the municipal organization of Istanbul was extended to the whole Empire and mayors were appointed by the centre for each *vilayet* (city) (Öztürk, 1997: 59). The 1876 Constitution introduced the councils, which were to be locally elected, into the local administrative system. In 1877, two separate laws were enacted for Istanbul municipality and other municipalities, which assigned a legal personality and various duties to the local administrative bodies (Tekeli and Ortaylı, 1978: 20).

The 1877 Municipal Law required establishment of one council in each city and town and tried to distinguish the duties of the central administration and the municipalities by assigning the duties of administration of the city property, counting of the population, cleaning, fire fighting and opening of the schools to the municipalities. The mayor was to be chosen from the council by the centre and the members of the council were required to speak Turkish (Ortaylı, 2000: pp. 186-189).

The Municipal Law of 1877 provided the legal foundation for the local administrative structure in Turkey in terms of establishing a central tutelage over the local authorities and perceiving the local administration as an extension and representative of the central authority and the administrative organization of the early Republic shows similar characteristics to the *Tanzimat* period.

4.1.2 1930-1970: Centralization Tendencies and Turkey

The period, during which a centralist welfare state was established throughout the Western Europe, coincided with the establishment of the new Turkish Republic (founded in 1923). This situation made Turkey more open to centralist tendencies, since the economic conditions of the time and the political requirements of the new state both dictated a strong central state with a great deal of powers and responsibilities.

One can observe continuity between the late Ottoman period and the early Republican period in terms of the local administration understanding and the economic and political problems regarding the division of powers between the central and local levels. The new state inherited little municipal experience from the Ottoman era together with limited financial means, low public participation to local affairs and lack of infrastructure (Tekeli and Ortaylı, 1978: pp. 30-31). Added to this

were the urgency of post-war reconstruction in Anatolia and the construction of the new capital, Ankara, as the symbol of the new state and the victory in the war. Dealing with these problems and keeping the different groups together within the new state required a centralized administration and the Republican elites opted for that (Mansur, 1955: 12).

The political system of this period was a centralized system based on administrative tutelage of the centre over the decisions, transactions, composition and personnel of local administrative bodies (Heper, 1989: p. 4). The 1930 Municipalities Law, which laid the foundations for the organization of local administration in Turkey, saw the municipalities as the extension of central government and in addition to administrative tutelage, it also brought a uniform administrative structure to be applied in whole country, regardless of geographical, cultural and economic differences (Göymen, 1983: 18). In the law, the municipality was defined as a legal person, which was established to fulfill the common needs of the inhabitants of the area. It was responsible for the cleaning, health, transportation, construction and provision of cultural and sports facilities for people. The municipal council was to be elected by people, while the mayor would be appointed by the Ministry of Interior (Official Gazette, 1930). In order to provide additional financial resources to the municipalities for the fulfillment of their duties, the Provinces Bank was established in 1933. The Bank would collect and redistribute the revenues of the municipalities, provide long-term loans with low interest rates, funds and technical assistance to projects (Özyörük, 1955: 39; Keleş, 1992: 327). When the economic situation deteriorated as one of the implications of the Great Depression, the newly established municipalities became more dependent on the centre because of their lack of financial capacity and their tasks were gradually transferred to the central

government, which in return empowered the hand of the centre vis-à-vis the local right from the beginning.

The early republican period was a period of reconstruction and state-building. Strong central control at the local level suited the political context of the time and issues like the modernization of local administration, development of local democracy and local capacity did not have the top priority on the agendas of the state elite. This situation remained intact during the single-party period and it was the multi-party period and democracy experiences, when the issue of local administration became more important in the Turkish political context.

During the multi-party period (1945-1960), two major factors affected the nature of centre-local relations in Turkey. The first factor was the rivalry between the two main political parties, the Republican People's Party (RPP) and the Democrat Party (DP) during the transition to the multi-party system. Towards the end of 1940s, it was clear that the single-party, which ruled the country since 1923, the RPP, would be replaced by DP with the general elections. However, the political elite of the RPP wanted to protect the existing system and make it harder to change. In the First Administrators Congress in 1947, the party ideologues proposed establishment of bureaucratic control, which would follow the RPP logic, over municipalities independent of the political influences of the government and they wanted to prevent the politicization of the local administrative units (Fişek, 1990: pp. 119-120).

Once DP came to the power, there was an evident tension between the municipalities established by the RPP and the central government. While the local political actors demanded popular elections for the mayors and abolishment of the law about the central approval for the mayors, these demands were not taken into consideration by the DP government. In fact, the government took an even more

reactionary stance towards the local political actors by postponing the municipal elections and making them stay at the office unlawfully (Geray, 1990: pp. 218-219).

In addition to the political tensions of the transition period, the economic problems of the period also led to the empowerment of the central government vis-à-vis the local administrative units. The new problems created by the process of industrialization and urbanization affected the daily lives of citizens. These problems had to be solved at the local level, however, the lack of financial capacity of the municipalities prevented them from solving these problems. Once again, their economic and financial dependency on the centre increased together with the number of tasks transferred from the local level to the central government (Heper, 1989: 6; Göymen, 1983: pp. 51-52).

The 1960 military coup against the DP government added new dimensions to the centre-local relations in Turkey. The 1961 Constitution tried to define the administrative structure of the state together with the forms and duties of local administrative structure and the type of the relationship between the central and local levels. According to the Article 112 of the Constitution, “the administration formed a whole with its organization and functions and it were based on the principles of centralization and devolution” and with the Article 115, the centre-local relations was based on the principle of deconcentration. These principles enabled the central government to have branches and departments at the local level, which would carry out certain tasks on behalf of the centre along with the elected municipal organs. Article 116 of the 1961 Constitution defined the local administration as a legal person that fulfils the common needs of the people in a given area, whose decision-making organs are popularly elected by the local people. The city with its governor, mayor and their related organs and councils and the village were identified as the

local administrative units. The principle of judicial review over the actions of the local bodies was brought instead of governmental control and it was stated that the local administrative bodies would be provided with resources in proportion with their responsibilities. However, the planned economic policy of the 1960s brought more centralization (Altaban, 1990: 319) and other than the direct elections for the mayors, which were held in 1963 for the first time, there was no significant change in the strength of the centre over the local administration. In this period the number of municipalities increased together with the tutelage of the centre over them. There were some projects regarding the reform of administrative structure, like the MEHTAP Project (*Merkezi Hükümet Teşkilatı Araştırma Projesi*) –The Central Government Structure Research Project, which started in 1962 (TODAIE, 1962), however, the major concern of these projects was the reorganization of central administration and they did not deal with the local administrative structure (Başbakanlık, 2003).

4.1.3 1970-1990: The Retreat of the Centre?

During this period, the issue of centre-local relations became more significant on the political agenda after the 1973 local elections. With the 1973 elections, most of the municipalities were won by the RPP, while the centre was mainly right-wing. As it was in the case of early multi-party period, the dominance of different political parties at the central and local levels led to political conflict, tightening of the tutelage and cutting of the resources by the central government and demands for more devolution and financial autonomy by the mayors (Heper, 1989: 7; Belediyecilik Yazılıları, 1983: 10; Güloksüz and Tekeli, 1990: pp. 373-375).

One important step taken by the central government in the 1970s was the establishment of the Ministry of Local Administration in January, 1978. The Ministry coordinated the existing state organizations regarding local administration under one authority and had took over some competences from the Ministry of Interior. It had a short life as it was abolished in November, 1979. The ministry was significant in terms of being a central institution, which dealt directly with the municipalities and being a means of establishing inter-municipal cooperation. However, it was still a central authority, which had extensive political control over the local administrative bodies and it was also heavily criticized for its partisan decisions regarding the distribution of funds among the municipalities (Keleş, 1992: pp. 367-390).

In 1980, another military coup hit Turkey and led to a tighter central control over the local political actors. Between 1980 and 1982, the elections for the mayors and municipal councils were suspended and they were appointed from the centre (Aytaç, 1990: 99). The 1982 Constitution, which is still in effect, reflected the centralist tendencies and defined the administrative structure in a way that consolidated and increased the central tutelage over local administration.

Article 123 of the 1982 Constitution emphasized the integrity of the administrative structure by stating that “the administration forms a whole with regard to its structures and functions, and shall be regulated by law. The organizations and functions of the administration are based on the principles of centralization and devolution”. The local administration had two branches: the provincial administration and the local authorities (the municipalities and the villages). The provincial administration “is comprised by provinces and districts established to take and implement decisions on behalf of the centre. These units are headed by

provincial and district governors" (Ministry of Interior, 1999: 23) and according to the Article 126 of the Constitution, the provincial administration is based on the principle of deconcentration.

The local authorities are democratic entities established outside the central administration to carry out local public services. They are based on the principle of devolution in terms of having their own competences and organs. Their decisions and actions are subject to judicial review. They may form associations among themselves with the permission of the Ministry of Interior and they are given financial resources in proportion to their functions (*Ibid*: pp. 24-27).

The makers of the 1982 Constitution were very much concerned with the unity, order and integrity of the state and for this reason, they opted for a uniform local administration regardless of cultural, economic and geographical differences and established a tighter administrative tutelage over the local level. The central government had a control over the decisions of the local authorities in the form of approval, postponement, cancellation or seeking prior permission; over their acts through the control of legality; over the local administrative organs with the right of the governor to call the municipal council for extraordinary meetings and the Ministry of Interior having the ability to remove the mayor and council from office as a provisional measure in case of an unlawful act. The central government also had tutelage over the local administrative personnel by having the final say in their appointment and discharge from the office and providing their financial and social rights (Ministry of Interior, 1999: pp. 30-32).

In the first general elections held after the coup, the Motherland Party (MP) came to power and it had a reform agenda regarding the local administrations in Turkey. The MP government passed legislation about the municipalities in 1984,

which introduced another tier to the local administrative structure. With the Metropolitan Municipalities Law No. 3030, two-tiered metropolitan system was introduced for the first time in Turkey. The main aim of this law was to increase the efficiency of the service delivery in the cities and for this reason additional resources and duties were transferred to the metropolitan municipalities (Gülöksüz and Tekeli, 1990: pp. 376-378; Heper, 1987: 6). The reforms aimed to delegate certain tasks to the lower tiers of administration, however, they did not contribute to the democratization of the local administrative system. In fact, the tutelage of the centre was reproduced at the local level through the organization of the relationship between the metropolitan mayor and the district mayors, which formed a hierarchy among the popularly elected mayors. According to the Article 14 of the Law No. 3030, the decisions taken by the district municipalities had to be sent to the metropolitan mayor, who could send them back for reconsideration (Official Gazette, 1984). With the responsibilities and powers assigned to him, the metropolitan mayor became another figure in the hierarchy of local administration along with the governor, who had the final say in case of a conflict or unresolved issue among the district mayors or between the district mayors and the metropolitan mayor⁴¹.

Despite not reaching at the district level and not prioritizing democratization, the 1984 reforms were nevertheless a new tendency in the centre-local relations in Turkey as an attempt to renovate the existing administrative structure. The projects of the time like the KAYA Project (*Kamu Yönetimi Araştırma Projesi*)- Public Administration Research Project- of 1989 (TODAIE, 1989) reveal that there has been a new impetus for reforming the public administration as a whole in the 1980s and the issues of public administration reform and centre-local relations became a

⁴¹ Article 24 of the Law No. 3030.

permanent part of the political agenda since then. However, in 1987, took a step back in this reform process and removed some of the duties and competences given to the metropolitan municipalities. These duties and competences were mainly about their financial autonomy and were transferred to the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. The central government criticized the municipalities for poor investments, which had no return in terms of production and which increased inflation rates (Aytaç, 1990) and this situation was utilized by the centre as a means of retaining its economic and political control over the local level.

One may argue that Turkey's response to the challenges of the post-1970 period was based on the political motive of consolidating the system as well as the economic motives. Achieving political stability was more important than getting rid of the financial burdens for the central state and this situation prevented the full retreat of the central state from the political and economic affairs. In the cases, where the centre has delegated certain tasks to the local administrative bodies, there was no transfer of resources nor did powers and the dependence of the local level on the centre remain intact. The result of this situation was the reinforcement of the power of the centre and institutionalization of the central tutelage over the local level in Turkey.

4.2 Public Administration Reform Attempts in the post-1990 Period

The late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed a wave of legal changes and reform attempts regarding the public administration system as a whole and the local administrative system in particular. One of these attempts was the 1998 Draft Law on Public Administration Reform. One may argue that this draft law did not aim to

achieve a radical change in the centre-local relations as the principles of integrity of the administration and deconcentration remained unchanged. The draft law was increasing the number of services to be provided by the local administrations, decreasing the amount of administrative tutelage at the local level and opening ways for inter-municipal cooperation and privatization of local services. However, the draft law failed to provide a concrete division of responsibility between the central and local levels of administration and it was not debated nor voted in the National Assembly.

The Draft Law on Local Administrative Bodies of July, 2001 was more concrete in terms of the division of responsibilities as in Article 1, it gave the centre the responsibility of justice, security and defense, foreign policy, finance, population matters, national education, health, agriculture and social security, while the local administrative bodies would be responsible for the local services in the areas like education, health, social assistance, sports, culture, tourism, environment, construction and transportation. However, according to the draft law, the central government was also responsible for the services, which needed to be coordinated at the national or regional level, for determining the standards of the public policies, preparing and applying national and regional development plans, checking the compliance of the local services to the determined standards and providing guidance and technical and financial assistance to the local authorities. Moreover, according to Article 2, the Ministries were responsible for the local and regional coordination of related policies and governors would provide coordination at the provincial level. Thus, one may argue that, except for the effort to clarify the division of responsibilities between the centre and the local administrative bodies, the 2001 Draft Law did not change much in terms of political devolution and the local level

remained under the control of the centre. Like the 1998 Draft, the 2001 Draft Law also could not be debated and voted at the General Assembly because of the early elections held in November, 2002.

It was the Draft Law on Public Administration Reform of 29 December 2003, which created much debate in the Turkish domestic politics. Unlike the 2001 Draft Law, the 2003 reform proposal was not only concerned with the division of responsibilities between the central and local levels, but it also aimed to reform the centre itself. The division of responsibilities between the central and local levels was essentially same as the 2001 Draft Law, however the 2003 Public Administration Reform also contained provisions on reducing the number and responsibilities of the ministries, transforming the office of Prime Minister into a coordinating position and reorganization of the central administrative structure (Başbakanlık, 2003). The Reform Draft also aimed to decrease the administrative tutelage of the centre over the local administrations as the centre was prevented from establishing agencies at the local level regarding the tasks assigned to the local administrations⁴². However, the governors were made the chief responsible for the delivery of central government tasks and the hierarchy between the appointed governor and the popularly elected municipal institutions remained unchanged. This reform package had been accepted in the General Assembly but was vetoed by the President on 3 August 2004 on the grounds that it was against the unity and integrity principle of the state as stated in the Constitution.

⁴² Article 9 of the Draft Law

Turkey is considered among the Napoleonic states because of its strong central state tradition and this tradition has had a considerable impact over the centre-local relations as it has been the case in the Western European context. Turkey was also affected by the economic crisis situations, which changed the role of the central state in Europe. These crisis periods coincided with the formation and consolidation of the Turkish state and the Turkish state elite opted for strong centralization in coping with economic and domestic political challenges.

As it was explained in the second chapter in detail, in the 1970s, when the central state was in retreat through various means in the Western Europe, Turkey's top priority was to consolidate its newly established democratic system and the central state remained as the primary service provider and decision-maker regardless of the financial burdens of the municipal services. The municipalities were not able to fulfill their various duties because of the lack of financial means and they were dependent on the centre both politically and economically. This situation institutionalized the authority of the centre over the local both formally and informally in Turkey.

The historical and political setting, which affects the impact of the EU accession process in Turkey, increases the importance of the actor preferences and the level of the impact of Europeanization in analyzing the transformation of centre-local relations. Up to this point, the central political elite have been able to reproduce its power vis-à-vis the local political actors by various means while dealing with political and economic challenges. Once the adaptational pressures from the EU level are introduced, the central political elite are likely to try to determine the way in which Turkey will deal with these pressures. The local political actors are also likely to try to redefine the balance of power in their own way. Thus, the actor preferences

need to be an integral part of the analysis of the transformation of centre-local relations in Turkey during the process of EU accession.

As one of the potential new members, Turkey is likely to face with more adaptational pressures like the CEE countries from the EU level. Thus, the nature of the EU-level pressures and the position of the EU regarding the balance of power between the centre and the local levels in Turkey also need to be analyzed. The remaining part of the research focuses on the perceptions of the central and local political elite regarding the centre-local relations in Turkey, the prospects for administrative reform and institutional change and the role of the EU in this process. Together with the perceptions of the major political actors, the position of the EU is also tried to be determined by using various empirical data.

CHAPTER V

THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE CENTRAL ELITE, EUROPEANIZATION AND THE CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN TURKEY

As it was mentioned in the previous section, in Turkey, the dynamics of the centre-local relationship have been determined by the elite of the central state right from the beginning. Following this pattern, one should expect that the perceptions of the political actors of the centre regarding the form of response to be given to the pressures from the EU-level will be crucial in shaping the new balance of power between the local and central levels during the course of EU accession. This chapter aims to analyze the standpoint of the centre about the existing Turkish administrative structure and reform of this structure, its perceptions regarding the demands of the EU about administrative change in Turkey and the impact of the EU as a factor over these perceptions.

The empirical data used for these analyses have been obtained from the legal documents, which organize the Turkish administrative system, the programs of the major political parties, the development plans prepared by the State Planning

Agency, the programs of the governments as well as from the in-depth interviews conducted with the specialists of the State Planning Agency and various political figures (mainly the members of the parliament, who have participated in the preparation of the administrative reforms and the officials of the Ministry of Interior).

In order to determine the impact of EU factor over the transformation of the administrative structure in Turkey, the progress reports have been analyzed and a comparative analysis has been conducted between the progress reports and the national program, development plans and reform packages according to timeline and content. In the last section of the chapter, all of these data are combined in order to reveal the relationship between the EU accession process and the position of the centre, which has a substantial impact over the prospects for an institutional change regarding the centre-local relations in Turkey.

5.1 The Official Discourse of the Centre and Administrative Reform

The most appropriate starting point in determining the official discourse of the Turkish state about the centre-local relations and its transformation in time is the comparative analysis of the Turkish constitutions⁴³. Continuities and differences in terms of the administrative organization of the state provide valuable empirical data for understanding the institutionalization of the central tutelage over the local administrative bodies in Turkey and the implications of this tutelage over the understanding of administrative reform.

⁴³ There have been four constitutions of the Turkish state: 1921, 1924, 1961 and 1982 Constitutions. The first constitution change took place after the founding of the Republic in 1923. The 1961 and 1982 Constitutions were prepared after the military coups of 1960 and 1980. There have been debates about a new and civilian constitution. However, so far there is no consensus about the content of this constitution and the 1982 Constitution is the existing highest legal text in Turkey.

The 1921 Constitution was prepared in the time of the national war of liberation and in the absence of central state machinery. The parliament, which was established in Ankara as an alternative to the Ottoman rule in Istanbul, relied on the support of the local level extensively in order to coordinate the war. This political context led to a constitution, which was based on the understanding of decentralized government. 14 out of 23 articles of the constitution (articles 10-23) were about the decentralized governments and gave extensive responsibilities to the local level, i.e. *vilayets*. According to the 1921 Constitution, *vilayets* were responsible for their own social and economic affairs⁴⁴ and they had councils to be elected by the local people⁴⁵. The governors of the *vilayets* were appointed by the Grand National Assembly and they were to act only in case of a conflict between the general interest of the state and the affairs of the *vilayet*⁴⁶.

To give an important role to the local level for the conduct of state affairs during the war years was the best option for the founders of the Turkish Republic, since there was no central state organization to deal with the daily affairs of the people at the time. However, after the Republic was founded in 1923, the state-building process gained pace and the pioneers of this process were the central state elite. The 1924 Constitution reveals the initial steps for the creation of a strong central state as it tries to create a geographical division of the administration and a local-level administration based on the principle of deconcentration, whose head would be appointed by the centre⁴⁷.

Starting with the 1924 Constitution, one may observe that the emphasis on the unity of administration and the tutelage of the centre over the local administrative

⁴⁴ Article 11 of 1921 Constitution.

⁴⁵ Article 12.

⁴⁶ Article 14.

⁴⁷ Articles 89-91 of the 1924 Constitution.

bodies has increased in the legal documents organizing the Turkish administrative system. The previously mentioned political conditions, the military coups, the problems of state building and democratic consolidation have led the state elite to strengthening the central control over each level of administration in Turkey. The 1961 Constitution stressed the indivisibility of the administration by stating that “[it] forms a whole in terms of organizations and functions”.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the 1961 Constitution defined the local administrative bodies strictly in terms of their function to fulfill the common local needs of the citizens⁴⁹ without giving any reference to their powers to generate their own resources and to contribute to the political and democratic representation of the local population. This situation implied a local level, which was assigned certain functions by the centre and was dependent on the assistance and supervision of the centre while fulfilling these functions.

The 1982 Constitution followed the same pattern as it also emphasized that “the administration forms a whole with regard to its structure and functions”⁵⁰. The 1982 Constitution took one further step in the institutionalization of the tutelage of the centre over the local level as it identified the terms and conditions of the tutelary powers of the centre in extensive detail⁵¹. With the 1982 Constitution, the central administration was given “the power of administrative trusteeship over the local administrative bodies in the framework of principles and procedures set forth by law with the objective of ensuring that the functions of the local administrations are in conformity with the principle of integral unity of administration, securing uniform public service, safeguarding the public interest and meeting the local needs in an

⁴⁸ Article 112 of 1961 Constitution.

⁴⁹ Article 116. of 1961 Constitution

⁵⁰ Article 123.

⁵¹ Article 127.

appropriate manner”⁵². The vague wording of the Article 127 and the lack of the definition of what ‘an appropriate manner’ or ‘public interest’ is have enabled the central state to define the boundaries of its tutelage over the local on its own terms and to gradually increase its control over the lower levels of administration.

A comparative analysis of the constitutions of the Turkish state reveals that the process of state-building and consolidation was accompanied by extensive centralization of the administration. Assisted by the political and economic requirements, the centre was able to establish and institutionalize its dominance over the local and gained leverage in determining the rules of future change and transformation. Within the legal framework of constitutions, which facilitated central control, the laws regarding the administrative structure also became the tools of the centre in supervising the local administrative bodies.

The local administrative organization in Turkey has been designed to facilitate the high involvement of the centre with affairs of the local level. The Turkish administrative structure has two types of local authorities. At the city level, both a popularly elected mayor and an appointed governor are responsible for the administration. At all local levels, the popularly elected rulers and centrally appointed administrators co-exist and the centrally appointed figure has tutelage over the figure elected by the local people.

The co-existence of the governor and the mayor at the local level has been designed as the means of the centre to establish its control over the local. The governor has been appointed as the representative of the government and the state at the local level and has been assigned tutelary powers over the decisions and affairs of the mayors and municipal councils⁵³. The law 1580, which formed the municipalities

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Special Provincial Administrations Law (2005).

in 1930 and went on to regulate their affairs for over 60 years, assigned certain responsibilities to the municipalities such as cleaning, health, transportation and certain construction services, but it did not assign the necessary financial capacity to fulfill these responsibilities⁵⁴. The lack of financial means and the authority of the governors at the local level strengthened the control and power of the centre over the local and increased its role in deciding any prospects for change or transformation.

The Metropolitan Municipalities Law of 1984 illustrates an example for this ability of the centre to guide change. The law 3030 of 1984 introduced a new tier to the local administration in Turkey. In the cities, which contained more than one sub-province within the municipal boundaries, metropolitan municipalities were founded⁵⁵. The law also introduced a new political figure at the local level, the metropolitan mayor, who acquired important powers with respect to district mayors at the city. According to the law, the decisions taken by the district municipalities were to be sent to the metropolitan mayor for approval⁵⁶ and the governor retained its tutelary power over these decisions⁵⁷.

The Metropolitan Municipalities Law gave some of the tutelary powers of the centre to the metropolitan mayor and this situation created a hierarchy among the popularly elected office holders (Heper, 1987: pp. 54-57). The legal and administrative tutelage at the local level was to be exercised by both the metropolitan mayor and the governor and this situation was far from the devolution and democratization of the system. At the same time, the financial deficiencies of the municipalities were still a problem and the political and economic control of the

⁵⁴ Law No. 1580 (Municipalities Law). Official Gazette (14.04.1930), No. 1471.

⁵⁵ Article 1 of Law No. 3030 (Metropolitan Municipalities Law). Official Gazette (09.07.1984), No. 18453.

⁵⁶ Ibid, Article 14.

⁵⁷ Ibid, Article 24.

centre at the local level remained intact as some of the duties of the metropolitan municipalities were transferred back to the centre in 1987.

The 2000s represent a period in Turkish politics, when there has been an extensive debate about public administration reform.⁵⁸ There were several draft laws and reform attempts, which are important for the purpose of this study and the concentration of these attempts in the given period is not a coincidence. The international context and especially the EU accession process have had an important impact over these reform attempts and this impact will be dealt with extensively in the following sections. In this discussion, the word ‘attempt’ is often used, since all of the draft laws were met with resistance within the centre. The government, the president of the time and the opposition parties had different opinions regarding the reform of the administrative system and the prospects for public administrative reform have revealed a clash within the centre itself regarding the reconstruction of the balance of power between the centre and the local.

The first draft law that needs to be considered in this respect is the law about the restructuring of public administration, which was debated in the parliament for seven months, from January, 2004 to July, 2004 and finally accepted on 15 July 2004. The law aimed to redistribute the responsibilities between the centre and local levels according to the principle of unity of administration and the idea of assignment of the duties, powers and responsibilities to the closest and most appropriate level to the recipients of the public services⁵⁹. In other words, the law introduced the principle of subsidiarity to the Turkish administrative system along with the unity

⁵⁸ One of the reasons of this situation was the fact that the AKP government that came to power in 2002 elections had a vast experience in the local administrations and was a strong advocate of administrative reform.

⁵⁹ The Draft Law on the Restructuring of Public Administration (2004), Article 5.

principle and this situation was one of the sources of heated debates within the centre.

While redefining the responsibilities and powers of the central and local levels, the law assigned the central administration with the duty of determining the general principles, purposes, targets and standards at the national level and providing the centre-local coordination according to the principle of deconcentration⁶⁰. The centre was assigned to the duties of justice, defense, security, international relations, the economic and social policies of national scale, national education, social security and citizen affairs, while the local administration was responsible for all kinds of duties, which were related to the common needs of the local population⁶¹. In other words, while limiting the duties of the centre in very concrete terms, the draft law defined the duties of the local administrative bodies in a rather abstract manner, which enabled the widening of these duties in the future only with the justification of meeting the local needs.

In addition to the redefinition of duties and responsibilities, the draft law also attempted to redefine the relations of tutelage and authority between the central and local levels. With the draft law, the centre limited its power by stating that the central administration could not establish organizations, which fall within the boundaries of the powers and duties of the local administration and could not make any legal arrangements, which limit the powers of the local administrative bodies⁶². However, despite increasing the powers and duties of the local level, the draft law did not do much in terms of democratizing the dual administrative structure at the local level. The responsibilities of the centre were left to the special provincial administrations at

⁶⁰ Ibid, Article 6

⁶¹ Ibid, Articles 7 and 8.

⁶² Ibid, Article 9.

the local level⁶³, whose head is the governor, i.e. a figure appointed by the centre and this situation may be considered as a strategy of the centre to decrease its duties while retaining its political power and control at the local level. Although this draft law did not come into effect because of the presidential veto on 3 August 2004, it is still crucial for analyzing whether the public administration reform attempts reflected a change in the philosophy of administration on center's behalf as well as the other legal documents, which attempted to reorganize the Turkish administrative system in this period.

The Municipalities Law of 9 July 2004 (also vetoed by the President) aimed to increase the efficiency of the municipal services and increase the resources of municipalities. The subsidiarity principle was apparent in the law⁶⁴ and the municipalities were assigned with the duties of infrastructure, environment, traffic, construction, culture and art, sports, tourism, social services, pre-school education, construction of school buildings and health facilities services⁶⁵. In order to provide the necessary financial means for the delivery of these services, the law gave the municipalities the right to establish firms and engage in economic activities and to borrow money⁶⁶. The review of the decisions and activities of the municipalities also changed with this law and financial review of the municipalities was assigned to a commission selected from the members of the municipal council⁶⁷. In 2004, the Metropolitan Municipalities Law was also changed and the metropolitan mayor has taken over some of the powers of the governor regarding the approval of the budget and decisions about the boundary changes between the district municipalities⁶⁸.

⁶³ Ibid, Provisional Article 1.

⁶⁴ The Municipalities Law (2004), Article 14.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid, Article 15.

⁶⁷ Ibid, Article 25.

⁶⁸ Ibid, Article 24.

The last step of the public administration reform wave was the new law on the special provincial administrations, which affected the tutelary powers of the governor at the local level as the representative of the state. The law was debated in the parliament for almost a year and came into effect in March, 2005. This law also became one of the battlefields for the different segments of the centre and caused a lot of controversies. The new Special Provincial Administration Law basically tried to decrease the role of the governor and increase the powers of the general provincial assembly, which is popularly elected⁶⁹. The law reflected the principle of subsidiarity, again without directly mentioning it, and the governor was assigned with the duty of coordination⁷⁰ without any open reference to his tutelary powers at the provincial level.

All of these attempts to reconstruct the Turkish public administration system and to redefine the parameters of the centre-local relations were the initiatives of the central government with no considerable local demand. However, these initiatives were met with much resistance from within the centre itself and revealed different opinions regarding the parameters of centre-local relations in Turkey. Thus, the approaches of different segments of the centre to these laws and draft laws are very significant for understanding how the EU factor affected this process.

5.2 Public Administration Reform Attempts and the Clash within the Centre: a Re-definition of the Centre?

Within the context of the public administration reform process, three major actors, whose views have been influential at the central level, come into the picture. The first one of these actors is the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government,

⁶⁹ The Special Provincial Administration Law (2005), Article 6.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

which came to the office after the 3 November 2002 elections. The party has presented itself as the pioneer of the public administration reform and prepared the previously mentioned reform drafts.

The JDP government justified these reforms with the emerging needs of democratic governance and efficient, active and flexible public administration⁷¹. The government often argued that in their existing form, the municipalities are far from delivering the local services they are required to and instead they have become the extensions of the central administration⁷². Moreover, the government emphasized the point that the municipalities lack the institutional structure for the proper delivery of services, including an autonomous decision making mechanism, appropriate financial resources and freedom from the administrative tutelage of the centre⁷³. The government also presented these reforms as an opportunity to show the confidence of the state in the officials elected by the people and to increase the trust relationship between the central state apparatus and the citizens⁷⁴.

During the preparation phases of these draft laws, the government defined its targets as “to facilitate economic development, to increase the administrative efficiency in line with the EU norms and the necessities of the liberal economy and to establish a stable political structure”⁷⁵. Often, the 1921 Constitution was presented as a justification basis and the democratic qualities of the constitution in terms of local administration were presented as an inspiration for the new reforms⁷⁶. Another point that is often encountered in the official discourse of the party and thus, the

⁷¹See the justification for the Municipalities Law, 3 March 2004, www.belgenet.com

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴The report of the Commission of Interior in the Parliament about the Draft Law on Municipalities (26 April 2004).

⁷⁵The report of the Commission of Interior in the Parliament about the Draft Law on the Reconstruction of Public Administration (14-15 January 2004).

⁷⁶The speech of the Deputy President of the JDP, Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat in the Parliament during the debates about the Reconstruction of Public Administration (18 February 2004).

government is the underlining of the fact that the envisioned system in these reforms was not contrary to the unity of administration principle set in the Article 123 of the 1982 Constitution. In each draft law, the principle of the integral unity of administration was set forth at the beginning as the basis of the legal arrangements, however, it was followed by the description of the principle of subsidiarity, which is considered to be against the unity of administration⁷⁷.

The JDP has reflected its understanding of public administration to the draft laws it prepared as the governing party. In the party program of 2001, it is clearly stated that the JDP envisioned a system, which strengthens the local administration as the structures closest to the citizens, where the central state apparatus is responsible only for security, justice, national education, health, coordination and review and the local administration has discretionary powers and responsibilities (JDP, 2001). The democratization, transparency, financial capabilities and accountability of the administrative bodies were often emphasized in the party program and in the office, the party reflected this orientation to the draft laws.

According to the official discourse of the government, the tutelary powers of the centre over the local had gone beyond the original limits defined by the law and the need for the approval of the governor for the decisions of the municipalities have slowed down the delivery of services⁷⁸. The new laws were seen as practical arrangements, which would remedy the extreme bureaucratization of administration and prevent the delays in the delivery of local services⁷⁹. During the phases of preparation and debate of these draft laws, the main opposition party in the parliament was the Republican People's Party (RPP) and it approached these reform

⁷⁷ See the draft law on the restructuring of public administration.

⁷⁸ Interview with the Deputy Director of the Ministry of Interior, Mr. Zekeriya Sarbak (10 October 2007).

⁷⁹ Ibid.

attempts with much suspicion and criticism, which were expressed in the parliamentary proceedings and the statements of the party figures.

Two major points of criticism can be seen in the arguments of the RPP regarding the public administration reform in Turkey and the new arrangements are considered to be problematic in terms of their economic and political implications. In terms of the economic problems, the RPP criticizes the new arrangements for their ambiguity regarding the creation of economic resources for the delivery of services at the local level. The major criticism of the RPP is the lack of specified resources in these legal documents, which would help the local authorities to fulfill their newly assigned duties⁸⁰. Another important concern is the fact that the new arrangements are enabling the municipalities to borrow money. According to RPP, borrowing money would increase the dependency of the local administration on the centre and on other institutions and bring the possibility of the bankruptcy of a municipality⁸¹.

From the political perspective, the major criticism of the RPP was the fact that the new laws were against the principle of the integral unity of administration stated in the Constitution. RPP argued that with the new system, a division of duties between the governor and the mayor was introduced to the local level, which was against the unity principle. Moreover, the draft laws were extensively criticized for decreasing the authority and tutelary powers of the governor at the local level and for the RPP, the local administrative bodies were to be given new duties and resources without any competences and powers, which would seriously endanger the unitary structure of the state given the complex situation in the Southeastern part of the country⁸².

⁸⁰ Interview with Oğuz Oyan (former RPP MP) on 10 September 2007 and the reports of the Planning and Budget Committee on the Municipalities Law (25 June 2004).

⁸¹ Interview with Oğuz Oyan.

⁸² Ibid.

In addition to the resistance from the opposition, the JDP government also faced with the presidential veto during its public administration reform attempts. The president of the time, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, vetoed the Law on the Restructuring of the Public Administration on constitutional grounds arguing that the law was in conflict with the unitary character of the state⁸³. According to the president, the fact that the duties of local administration were defined in abstract terms, while those of the central administration were limited in concrete terms, damaged the balance of power between the centre and the local to the advantage of the latter and this situation constituted a threat to the integral unity of the state and opened the way for the establishment of an administrative system, which was not envisaged by the 1982 Constitution⁸⁴.

The following laws were also vetoed by the President on similar grounds and on each occasion, the President emphasized the necessity of defining the powers and duties of the municipalities in more concrete and limited terms⁸⁵, the importance of protecting the unitary state, unity of the administration, the principle of deconcentration and administrative tutelage as defined in the Constitution⁸⁶. The vetoes of the president were based on the existence of certain conflicts between the prepared laws and the principles of the state as they were defined in the Constitution and this situation posed a major challenge for the government in the administrative reform process, which could only be solved by amending or changing the constitution in a way that would enable the formation of a new administrative system based on new centre-local dynamics.

⁸³ President's veto on the Draft Law on the Restructuring of Public Administration (3 August 2004).

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Presidential Veto on the Municipalities Law (22 July 2004).

⁸⁶ Presidential Veto on the Special Provincial Administrations Law (10 July 2004).

The public administration reform attempts of the 2000s have revealed a tension between the major actors of the centre. While one party appeared to be the advocate of change in the name of democratization, efficiency and reform, the other parties seemed to be the protectors of the status quo. However, one should note that the agenda of public administration reform is not an issue that appeared in the 2000s. The need for reform in the system has begun to be discussed in the 1990s and the current opponents of the reform attempts were once strong advocates of these attempts.

This situation can be proved by a brief analysis of the programs of the governments founded by different political parties since 1997. In each government program⁸⁷, the need to reform the public administration system was emphasized, the redistribution of powers and responsibilities between the central and local levels, the strengthening of the local administrative bodies and increasing democratic participation at the local level were set as the targets of the government. However, while in the 1990s, the approach of the government to reform was based on the efficiency and well-functioning of the state system, in the 2000s, one can see more emphasis on the democratization-administrative reform relationship and democratization, devolution and efficiency of the state machinery were presented as inter-related processes⁸⁸.

In addition to the programs of the governments, the programs of the political parties also reveal a consensus within the centre in terms of the need to restructure the Turkish administrative system. The program of the RPP, for instance, emphasizes the necessity of downsizing the central administrative apparatus as much as possible and strengthening the local administration (CHP, 1994). In its program, the party

⁸⁷ The programs of the 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 and 60. governments were examined. Only the last three are the JDP governments.

⁸⁸ See the program of the 58th government (23 November 2002).

announces that once it holds the office, the RPP will “decrease the tutelage over local administration, reform the municipalities and special provincial administrations by transferring various tasks, powers and resources to the local level, including the educational affairs” (CHP, 1994).

The analysis of the party program shows that the public administration reform understanding of the RPP does not reveal a substantial difference from that of the JDP government. However, despite this fact, the previous account of the post-2002 developments illustrates a suspicion on the side of the RPP towards reform. The interviews with the representatives of the party have revealed that while RPP recognized the need to reform the system, it was against the specific measures chosen by the JDP government. The most common concerns stated by the RPP were the possible weakening of the unitary character of the state and a possible chaos of unclear division of responsibilities between the municipalities and the special provincial administrations at the local level⁸⁹.

This mistrust towards the government on the side of the main opposition party stems from the political dominance of the JDP at the local level⁹⁰. Since the majority of the city and district mayors are from the JDP⁹¹, the RPP sees the strengthening of the local level through the reforms as a means for the JDP to consolidate its political dominance both at the local and central levels⁹². Because of the mistrust towards the relationship between the mayors and the government, the governors are seen as the guarantee of the well-functioning of the state machinery

⁸⁹ Interview with Oğuz Oyan and Tuncay Alemdaroğlu (former mayor of Yenimahalle district in Ankara).

⁹⁰ Interview with Tuncay Alemdaroğlu.

⁹¹ In the local elections of 2004, the JDP got 41.67% of the total votes and 60 out of 81 city mayors were candidates of the JDP.

⁹² Interview with Oğuz Oyan and Tuncay Alemdaroğlu.

and curbing of their authority and tutelary powers is seen as a threat to the established balance of power.

This situation can be considered as a reflection of the state elite-political elite⁹³ clash in Turkey. The RPP has seen itself as a part of the state elite because of the legacy of the founders of the Republic. Traditionally, the RPP elite have been suspicious towards the intentions of the other political parties because of their self-defined role as the guardians of the strong state tradition. The public administration reform is one of the most sensitive issues regarding the prospects for an institutional change in Turkey. Thus, it has naturally become one of the areas, where the clash between the state elite and political elite became apparent. While the RPP and the president tried to defend the status quo in order to prevent the establishment of a system outside of the control of the state elite, the JDP government saw this reform process as an opportunity to increase the power of the political elite within the Turkish administrative system. Both sides desire to control a possible process of administrative change in Turkey, since this process provides the opportunity to redefine the parameters of power relationships in Turkish politics.

In the post-2000 period, an important variable in this struggle about the new rules of the game has been the EU factor. In terms of the perceptions about the impact of the EU over administrative transformation in Turkey, one can observe different approaches of the state elite and political elite. While the state elite see the EU factor as an arbitrary pressure, which does not consider the requirements of the internal dynamics of Turkey and advocate a transformation from within instead of

⁹³ This clash refers to the tension among the ruling elite of the Turkish state, which basically stems from the dichotomy between the state and the civil society. The theme of elite confrontation between the state elite, representing the state tradition and the political elite, who emerged with the transition to the multi-party period has been the defining characteristic of Turkish politics. See Metin Heper (1985), *State Tradition in Turkey* for details.

one triggered by the EU⁹⁴, for the political elite, the EU factor serves as a justification basis⁹⁵ for the restructuring process in a way that will strengthen its position vis-à-vis other major domestic actors of the game. Nevertheless, the EU accession process is an important factor, which has influenced the perceptions of the major political actors, the available options to these actors in terms of creating and preventing institutional transformation and the political context of the struggle between the Turkish political and state elite. Thus, the impact of the EU factor over the position of the centre needs to be analyzed extensively through empirical data.

5.3 The EU Factor and the Re-definition of the Centre

In order to determine impact of the EU accession process over the perceptions of major political actors and centre-local relations in Turkey, first of all, the expectations of the EU regarding the matter need to be accounted and for this account, the Progress Reports prepared by the European Commission provide the primary empirical data. These reports illustrate the extent and content of the adaptational pressure coming from the EU level, which triggers administrative reform in Turkey. For determining the response of the centre to these pressures, the content of the Accession Partnership Document, the National Program, EU reform packages and development plans need to be examined in comparison with the EU demands according to a certain timeline. The final step in determining the EU impact over the centre-local relations will be an analysis of the perceptions of the major political actors regarding the EU factor.

⁹⁴ Interview with Oğuz Oyan.

⁹⁵ Statements of the JDP's important political figures: Minister of State Kürşat Tüzmen and the vice president of the party, Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat.

5.3.1 The Expectations of the EU Regarding Administrative Reform in Turkey

In the first two progress reports of 1998 and 1999, the problems regarding the centre-local relations were dealt with within the context of regional economic differences and the economic progress of the less developed regions. Both reports pointed out the need to develop decentralized and differentiated regional development policies and stressed the importance of establishing an appropriate administrative structure for such a regional development policy (European Commission, 1998; 1999).

It was the 2000 Progress Report that examined the centre-local relations as a part of the compliance with the political criteria for the first time. Thus, it is possible to argue that the administrative reform wave of the post-2000 period in Turkey coincided with the period, when the adaptational pressures from the EU level began to intensify. In the 2000 report, Turkey was criticized for the tutelary powers of the centre over the local level and the lack of administrative reform (European Commission, 2000). In addition to this new political dimension of the adaptational pressures, the report also underlined the misfit between the EU practice and Turkish practice in terms of the coordination of regional development policies and Turkey was called to adopt a classification of regions in line with the EU understanding, to establish local level organizations to deal with the regional development policies and to develop a modern approach to regional policy in accordance with the EU norms (European Commission, 2000).

In 2001, the Commission stated that Turkey did not show any progress regarding the demands in the previous progress report (European Commission, 2001) and criticized the country for the lack of the institutional structure, programming and

financial and administrative planning necessary for the application of a regional development policy (*Ibid*). These criticisms seem to prompt some measures at the central level in Turkey as the 2002 and 2003 progress reports both indicate that Turkey has taken some steps in terms of the formation of a regional development policy in line with the EU norms (European Commission, 2002; 2003). Although these steps were positively acknowledged by the European Commission, both reports pointed to the lack of the institutional framework and local level organizations, which are necessary for the success of these policies in the long run.

The 2004 progress report acknowledged the importance of the public administration reform attempts and stated that if these reforms could be realized, then it would modernize the Turkish administrative system, bring it to the EU standards and facilitate Turkey's accession to the EU (European Commission, 2004). This approach of the EU and the openly given support to the reform attempts of the JDP government have arguably gave leverage to the political elite in the domestic scene in re-setting the parameters of the centre-local relations in Turkey and served as a legitimacy source.

The EU continued to support the political elite in the reform process and the struggle with the state elite as in the 2005 progress report, while the president was criticized for vetoing the Framework Law on Public Administration, and thus blocking the reform the process, the content of the proposed legislation was highly praised for rationalizing the administration and increasing the responsiveness and transparency of the system vis-à-vis the citizen (European Commission, 2005).

In the 2005 progress report, the Commission for the first time established a linkage between the administrative reform attempts and the formation of a regional policy in line with the EU standards. In the report, the public administration reform

process was presented as the prerequisite of the successful implementation of the regional policy and the highly centralized nature of the state system was once again criticized by calling Turkish state to devolve certain responsibilities and executive functions to the lower tiers of public administration and to introduce a measure of local democracy at the provincial level (European Commission, 2005). From that point on, the devolution of public administration in Turkey became one of the conditions for the development of a well-functioning regional development policy. The progress report in 2006 was along the same lines as it suggested the increase of the efforts to decrease the centralist tendencies of the state apparatus and criticized the presidential veto of the draft laws for blocking the modernization and devolution of administration (European Commission, 2006).

The analysis of the European Commission's progress reports between 1998 and 2006 shows that the adaptational pressures from the EU level regarding the transformation of centre-local relations in Turkey have increased over time. These pressures had two different impacts over these relations. On one hand, they led the major political actors at the central level to redefine their positions with respect to institutional transformation. While the political elite strengthened its hand with the open support of the EU, the state elite tried to re-position itself within the new dynamics of the EU accession process. On the other hand, the adaptational pressures also required concrete measures to be taken by the government in terms of decreasing the misfit between the EU standards and Turkish practice about the regional development policies and administrative practices, which contributed to the re-definition of the centre itself and the centre-local boundaries.

5.3.2 The Turkish Response to the EU Demands and Administrative Reform

An important indicator of the importance of the adaptational pressures in the process of administrative reform is the targets set in the Accession Partnership Documents and the National Programs. Both Accession Partnership Documents of 2000 and 2003 have emphasized the establishment of a regional development policy as one of the aims of the Turkish state during the accession process and guaranteed that Turkey would harmonize its regional policy with the EU practice in the long run (ABGS, 2000; 2003). The National Programs, which were prepared as Turkey's roadmap to the EU accession, in 2001 and 2003 followed the Accession Partnership Documents and identified Turkey's targets as preparing development plans, establishing the legal and organizational framework for the regional policy initiatives and realizing a local administration reform, which would accompany these initiatives (ABGS, 2001; 2003). However, it should be noted that the National Program of 2003 is much more detailed and concrete in terms of Turkey's regional development and local administrative reform strategies and it acknowledges the relationship between the administrative reform and economic development as it was suggested by the EU in the progress reports.

Despite this apparent impact of EU accession in the formulation of a systematic regional development policy and administrative reform, it would be misleading to assume that Turkey had no agenda of regional development prior to the EU accession process. Since its establishment, the State Planning Agency, which is a central administrative organization, has prepared National Development Plans for 5-year periods⁹⁶ and the regional development policies and reformation of administration have been a part of these plans right from the beginning. However,

⁹⁶ These periods are 1963-1967, 1968-1972, 1973-1977, 1979-1983, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1996-2000, 2001-2005 and 2007-2013.

one can argue that the way in which these targets were to be achieved and the understanding about the substance of change have transformed in time and the EU accession process has been one of the triggering factors of this transformation.

Until the 1980s, the regional development strategies have always been presented as a part of a bigger national-scale development strategy and the unity of the state and its economic and development policies were highly emphasized (DPT, 1963; 1968; 1973). In the development plans of the 1980s, one can observe the increased emphasis given to the administrative reform aspect as well as the regional economic problems and the acknowledgement of the connection between the two aspects (DPT, 1979, 1985). However, the philosophy of conducting the policies remained unchanged and the central administrative apparatus was designed as the planner and implementer of all development policies (*Ibid*).

From mid-1990s to 2007, one can observe an increased emphasis to the EU standards and practices in the development plans. During this period, the development plans have become more detailed and concrete in terms of the strategies to be followed for regional development and administrative reform. Moreover, the restructuring of public administration was presented as an integral part of regional development (DPT, 2001) and these targets were put into the context of Turkey's accession to the EU (*Ibid*).

The change in the rhetoric and targets of the national development plans shows that there occurred a value change at the bureaucratic apparatus through interaction with the EU as Börzel's (1999) "misfit model" has suggested and "Turkey's accession to the EU began to be seen as an opportunity for the country to realize a substantial institutional change regarding regional development policies and the increased local level participation in the formation of these policies" (DPT,

2007). This value change showed itself in the concrete legal arrangements and as the following table shows, one can see an increase in the responses to the EU-level pressures for change in the recent years.

Table 2: The EU Expectations and Turkish Response

YEAR	EXPECTATIONS	RESPONSE
1998-2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of a regional policy in line with the EU standards • Classification of the regions according to the NUTS II statistics • Local and central capacity building for regional development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No concrete policy response • More emphasis on the EU standards in the national development plans
2001-2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of a regional policy in line with the EU standards • Classification of the regions according to the NUTS II statistics • Local and central capacity building for regional development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NUTS II classification in September 2002 • Regional Development Plans prepared by the State Planning Agency • EU standards accepted as benchmark in the National Development Plans
2004-2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local capacity building • Devolution • Administrative Reform • Strengthening of Local Democracy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Administration Reform Attempts • Establishment of the Regional Development Agencies in 2006. • E-State Project • Administrative Capacity Building

The table indicates that the adaptational pressures from the EU level have led to more efforts on the side of the central government for decreasing the misfit between the EU and Turkish practices in the matters of regional development and local administrative capacity building. In addition to their policy consequences, the pressures from the EU have also had an impact on the perceptions of the centre. However, as a result of the segmented and conflictual nature of the centre in Turkey, this impact was not of a uniform nature.

For the political elite, who were the pioneers of the reform wave in the 2000s, the EU pressure was first of all a source of legitimacy in the reform efforts. Moreover, in their clash with the state elite, the EU factor gave leverage to the political elite as the EU accession was seen as a part of the national modernization and Westernization project by the state elite as well. At a more fundamental level, however, the EU factor created a value change for the political elite and determined the language and philosophy of the reform. The most common reference in the draft laws, development plans and national strategies was to harmonize the Turkish practice with the EU norms and thus the means of institutional change were determined under the influence of the EU-level demands.

On the side of the state elite, however, the EU factor shows itself as another source of suspicion and mistrust since the reform attempts triggered by external demands have often been criticized. The EU-level pressures are criticized for neglecting the unique characteristics of the Turkish administrative system and the state elite tries to protect the status quo by trying to differentiate Turkey's accession process to the EU from the internal affairs of administrative research.

From all these analyses, it can be inferred that by triggering and facilitating the administrative reform process in Turkey, the EU revealed and deepened the clash within the centre between the state elite and the political elite. For the political elite, the EU factor presented an opportunity for creating institutional change and re-defining the balance of power within the centre. For the state elite, however, the same process was a threat to its institutionalized superior position within the centre and they resisted the transformation of the system in order to preserve the status quo. While the power relationships are being re-defined at the central level, it is necessary to consider what is happening at the local level during the course of EU accession in order to understand transformation of the centre-local relations in Turkey and to decide whether a value change is really taking place for the political elite regarding the role of the centre at the local level, which accompanies the legal change.

CHAPTER VI

THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE LOCAL, EUROPEANIZATION AND CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS: THE CASE OF KAYSERİ

In order to understand the relationship between Europeanization and the centre-local relations in Turkey, in addition to the perceptions of the centre, the position of the local needs to be analyzed in detail as well. This chapter seeks to conduct this analysis through the case of Kayseri, one of the largest cities in Central Anatolia and Turkey and to determine whether the EU accession process has created some sort of value change at the local level. Before deriving theoretical conclusions from the analyses, the chapter first justifies the choice of Kayseri for the purpose of the study and gives an account of the methodology of the study conducted in the city. Then the chapter proceeds with the historical and political context of local administration in the city as a part of the theoretical framework. Finally, the data collected during the research are accounted and analyzed in the chapter and the case is reassessed through the revisiting of the theory.

6.1 Why Kayseri?

The most appropriate means of measuring value change is choosing a particular setting and dealing with the past and present of that setting through an extensive observation of all the major actors and intervening factors. Within this context, dealing with multiple cases may not give a well-portrayed picture since the need for finding points of comparison may lead to overlooking the unique attributes of each case. Since this study primarily aims to determine whether a learning process that will lead to value change during the EU accession exists at the local level, concentrating on only one case seems to be a viable methodological choice. However, at this point, the choice of that single case becomes extremely critical as the case serves as the universe from which theoretical generalizations will be derived. Thus, before reaching to the general conclusions, the study is expected to justify the choice of Kayseri as the unit of analysis.

For several reasons, Kayseri was determined as an appropriate case for the purpose of the study at the initial stage. First of all, as it was mentioned in the previous chapters, the regional development funds and their distribution were the main mechanisms through which the EU exerts its adaptational pressures for institutional change. In the Turkish case, the bulk of these funds were reserved for Central Anatolia, where Kayseri is the most economically developed city. Since the EU attention and assistance are concentrated in this region, choosing the case of the study from Central Anatolia seems to be the appropriate way for determining the impact of misfit with the EU and its consequences. The fact that the Central Anatolia Development Agency is located in Kayseri makes the city the appropriate case choice as it reveals the importance of the city within the region.

Table 3: The Distribution of EU funds to the Regions in Turkey

Eastern Anatolia	45 million euros
Black Sea Region	52.33 million euros
South Eastern Anatolia	47 million euros
Central Anatolia	90.67 million euros

Source: State Planning Agency (2007).

As it was mentioned earlier, one difficulty of determining the impact of Europeanization over any aspect of policy making is to differentiate the impacts of the process of globalization from those of Europeanization. The case of Kayseri serves to make this distinction within the context of this study as any other choice of bigger cities like Ankara, Istanbul or Izmir, would not work since these cities were already integrated to and in contact with Europe even before the EU accession process for Turkey began. The impacts of globalization can also be observed in Kayseri. However, these impacts have been mostly in economic terms and facilitated the economic transformation and infrastructure building of the city. The formation of new approaches to the administrative practices and relations with the centre has been a phenomenon of the 2000s, which should be attributed to the EU accession process more than globalization as the research will reveal.

Another reason for choosing Kayseri as the case study is the fact that the city has prepared and conducted the highest number of EU-funded projects in Central Anatolia, which indicates that it has more contact with the EU than the other cities and thus, is more viable for the impact analysis within the context of the study. The final reason, which makes Kayseri the appropriate case in this study, is the fact that it

has been governed by the same cadre since 1994. This situation is critical for the purpose of this study since to deal with the same group of people over time gives more reliable results in terms of observing value change and determining the EU impact over this change, while keeping the other factors constant.

6.2 The Methodology of the Case Study

The methodology of studying Kayseri is essentially based on the application of the theoretical framework to the local context. In other words, the study firstly deals with the historical and political context of local administration in the city. Then it proceeds with the positions of the major actors in the city regarding the centre-periphery debate and it finally tries to determine the impact of the EU over the perceptions of these major actors.

To give an elaborate account of the historical and political context, the works of the historians and interviews with the prominent researchers of the city are utilized as well as the reports prepared by the State Planning Agency, the municipality and special administration of the city and the news collected from the local press.

The nature of actor perceptions and their transformation during the EU accession process are tried to be determined mainly through the in-depth interviews. For the purpose of the study, the Deputy Governor and Mayor of Kayseri were interviewed together with the one representative from each of the following: the Chamber of Industry, the Businessmen Association, the Chamber of Commerce and Central Anatolia Development Agency. In addition to these major actors in the city, the managers of two EU-funded projects were also interviewed for an account of their experiences with the EU and the centre during the conduct of their projects.

The information gathered from these interviews are supplemented by various statistical data about the EU-related activities in the city and the budget of the municipality, which will give an impression about the relationship between Kayseri and the centre and also between Kayseri and the EU. All of this information is then utilized to fit the case to the theory of institutional change and the Europeanization-institutional change relationship.

6.3 The Historical and Political Context of Local Administration in Kayseri

The first municipal administration in Kayseri was established in 1869, during the Ottoman period (Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2007). The municipal status of the city continued during the Republican period and in 1989, it became a metropolitan municipality. Between 1989 and 2004, the city had one metropolitan municipality and two district municipalities (Melikgazi and Kocasinan) in an area of 356 square kilometers (Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2007). With the new municipalities' law in 2004, the municipal area was redefined and the metropolitan municipality of Kayseri was enlarged to an area of 2150 square kilometers, with five district and nineteen first level municipalities (*ibid*).

Table 4: The Municipal Organization of Kayseri

The Metropolitan Municipality
The District Municipalities
Kocasinan, Melikgazi, Talas, Hacılar, İncesu
The First Level Municipalities
Gesi, Mımarsinan, Erkilet, Gürpınar, Hisarcık, Kırıncı, Kızılıören, Güneşli, Ebiç, Zincirdere, Kepez, Kuruköprü, Başakpınar, Erciyes, Bürünç, Turan, Süksün,

Mahzemin, Kuşçu.

Source: Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2007.

In order to understand the inner city dynamics and the nature of the relationship between Kayseri and the state better, one needs to revisit the history of the local administration in the city especially during the Republican Period. The process of post-Independence War reconstruction, the approach of the state to Kayseri in the early Republican period and the characteristics of the cadre, which governed the city since the early 1920s are all important factors in understanding the present with respect to the Europeanization of the city and thus, they are worth a brief discussion.

The major event of the early 1920s, which had an impact over the character of the city was the deportation of the Armenian and the Greek Orthodox population from Anatolia. As a result of deportation and population exchange, the population of the city has decreased enormously during this period (Çalışkan, 1995: pp. 93-94). Kemal Karpat (1985: pp. 186-187) notes that while Kayseri had 154.000 inhabitants in 1914, in 1927, only 100.000 people were living in the city. The changing character of the Kayseri population during this period is significant in terms of understanding the preferences and stand points of the local people on various matters including the integration of the city to the world and to Europe.

Until 1950, when the multi-party period began in Turkey, Kayseri was one of the fields of consolidating the newly established regime for the founders of the Republic and as Doğan (2007) illustrates, the construction of public buildings like the train station, tank-mending factory, the airplane factory, Sümerbank textile factory and the People's Houses were a means for the central government to

transform the city dynamics in accordance with the official ideology. These new buildings were considered as a place for socialization, which could change people's worldviews and integrate them to the system (SubAŞı, 2007). However, various accounts of the period indicate that, the centre has encountered some kind of resistance while applying this strategy of transformation. During the period between 1930 and 1950, the mayor of the city was replaced twenty five times while the governor was changed six times (Dayioğlu, 1998). This situation can be considered as a sign of a clash between the local community and the centre regarding their governors and the strategies followed by these people.

Table 5: The Mayors and Governors, who served for the longest period of time

Mayor Necmettin Feyzioğlu	October 1930- February 1931 and August 1939- August 1942
Mayor Hayrullah Ürkün	September 1936-April 1938 and November 1938-March 1939
Mayor Emin Molu	February 1943-June 1944
Governor Nazım Toker	May 1933-August 1936
Governor Sait Koçak	May 1945-December 1946.

Source: Dayioğlu, 1998.

One can argue that until the 1950s, Kayseri went through a period of consolidation both for the central and the local forces. On one hand, the centre tried to establish the roots of its official ideology at the local level mainly through post-war reconstruction. On the other hand, the local gradually began to exert its pressure

and demands over the centre. This situation has been one of the defining characteristics of Kayseri's relationship with the central state.

After 1950, the dynamics of the city began to change with the major changes taking place in the country. In 1950, RPP was replaced by DP with the general elections. The effect of this result over Kayseri was the appointment of a new mayor in 1950. Mayor Osman Kavuncu, who served between 1950 and 1957, has become one of the most prominent figures of the city politics with his policies, which changed the city life (Satoğlu, 1977). During the Kavuncu period, a more institutionalized understanding of local administration was initiated. For the first time, a concrete city construction plan was formulated and the construction of wide avenues and roads was made a priority. Moreover, the budget was increased in accordance with the new services and Kavuncu managed to attract the public investment and assistance to Kayseri (Dayıoğlu, 1998). One reason for the increase in the central investment was patronage relationship between the local organizations of DP and the central party organization. The local investments were one way of securing the votes of the citizens in the elections and it was often used by the DP government. One of the implications of this situation is the institutionalization of the organic relationship between the centre and the periphery, which is a factor to be considered in understanding the changing dynamics during the EU accession process.

The 1960 military coup changed the political dynamics in Turkey and with the replacement of the DP at the central level, the mayors from DP were replaced with the mayors from RPP. The two mayors of the 1960-1980 period, Mehmet Çalık (1963-1973) and Niyazi Bahçecioğlu (1973-1980) changed the balance of power among the major actors in the city. The alliance between the municipality, the land owners and the commercial bourgeoisie of the DP period was replaced with the new

alliance between the city administration, the workers, public servants and the representatives of the service sector (Doğan, 2007: pp- 150-158). Once again the changes in the balance of power at the central level affected Kayseri and led to the emergence of new important actors in the city.

The 1980 coup and the rise of Islamic, nationalist and conservative elements in Turkish politics and the reconstruction of the party system changed the dynamics of Kayseri again. In the 1983 elections, the newly founded Motherland Party (MP) has won the majority of the votes and took over the government. In the absence of the other parties and as the governing party, MP was able to organize at the local level for the municipal elections. In the 1984 elections, the candidate of the MP, Hüsamettin Çetinbulut, won the %45.51 of the votes and became the mayor of Kayseri for the next five years. The organization of the MP was similar to DP in the sense that the patron-client relationships were an important factor in the distribution of resources from the centre to the local level. As a result, during the period of 1984-1989, the construction projects and the budget of the city increased with the pouring of resources. However, the MP period in Turkey was highly criticized especially because of corruption at the central and local levels. This situation led to replacement of the mayor of Kayseri in 1989 with a social democrat and familiar figure for the city. Niyazi Bahçecioğlu was once again elected as the mayor to serve between 1989 and 1994.

During the second term of Bahçecioğlu a new issue emerged in Kayseri, which has a close relationship with the city dynamics. After the 1989 elections, while the metropolitan municipality and one of the district municipalities were won by the Social Democrat Party (an heir of the RPP), the other district was won by the MP (DIE, 1989) and this created a challenge in the delivery of services in the city. The

problem of clientelism and the issue of the coordination of the services were reproduced at the local level between the metropolitan and the district municipalities. Various interviews with the prominent local figures of the time have revealed that there were times when the internal struggles among the mayors became more important than delivering services to people. The perception about the second Bahçecioğlu period was that the metropolitan municipality had distanced itself from the local capital owners and the poor and troubled people of the city. This situation is seen as one of the reasons of the success of the Islamist Welfare Party (WP) in the 1994 municipal elections as the party had an extensive plan of municipal administration aiming to create a debt-free administration that is integrated with the local people (Kazan, 2003). This attitude and the grassroots level campaign gave the WP %31 of the votes, the metropolitan municipality and the two district municipalities in Kayseri.

The new mayor of Kayseri, Şükrü Karatepe, would be a highly criticized figure in the late 1990s, who would be sentenced to jail because of his anti-Atatürk and anti-Republic statements in 1999. The political personality of the mayor Karatepe during the time was somehow identified with the city and contributed to the image of Kayseri as a closed, religious and conservative city. However, this situation did not have a negative effect over the relationship of the city with the centre and Kayseri managed to retain its important position.

Various researchers have identified a tendency in Kayseri to try too hard to maintain good relations with the state or the government (Korat, 1997: 20; Doğan, 2007). One evidence of this situation is the number of religious associations established in the city between 1945 and 1950. While 84 associations were established in Turkey during this period, there were no religious association in the

city and this situation is accepted as the sign of the willingness to maintain good relations with the central government (Doğan, 2007: 140). In fact, the former mayor, Karatepe, defines Kayseri as the city, which “always tries to keep up with the changing dynamics of the state” (Karatepe, 2001: pp. 250-251). The need to maintain good relations with the government is a prerequisite for the continuation of the commercial activities, which are integral to the city. Thus, the major actors in Kayseri have tried to establish alternative venues for keeping the centre-friendly status of the city. The activities and statements of the mayor Mehmet Özhaseki, who has been in the office since 1999, reveals this somewhat pragmatic approach of the city to the centre-local relations, which will be utilized during the later stages of the analysis. Mayor Özhaseki, describes this situation as keeping the city’s distance from holding a constant political position.⁹⁷ He argues that

although Kayseri is a conservative city in terms of living according to religious and traditional values, this does not mean that the city is resistant to change. It is not like Konya in terms of being oriented to a certain political stance and it has always been at the centre of politics. The city has been governed by all political parties and it has never been a part of political polarization and this is mainly because of the level of economic development in the city.⁹⁸

This brief account of the history of municipal administration in Kayseri has revealed certain clues about the city dynamics in particular and the position of the local vis-à-vis the centre in general. First of all, the implications of the changes in the balance of power at the central level can be observed at the local level in the form of changing powers of the major actors and establishment of new alliances among them. In addition to that, the historical account of Kayseri also reveals that the local level is important for the centre in terms of reasserting and consolidating its power and control. Finally, the tendency of Kayseri to keep a friendly distance with the centre

⁹⁷ The Interview held with the mayor on 14 December 2007.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

and the nature of the local political and economic elite have both facilitated the adaptation of the city to new developments and made it more prone to change and prepared an environment for the centre to exert its pressure at the local level.

6.4 Measuring the EU Impact in Kayseri

At this point of analysis, the values and attitudes of the major political actors in Kayseri regarding the EU and the central government need to be discussed. The analysis is based on the in-depth interviews conducted with the representatives of each of these actors and various reports and statistical information, which will help to determine the EU impact in the city. For this, the perspectives of the municipality, the Central Anatolian Development Agency, which is located in Kayseri, the business circles of the city and the managers of certain EU-funded projects are examined and tried to be integrated into the theoretical framework.

6.4.1 The Metropolitan Municipality

The changes in the administrative structure of the municipality, the new administrative practices, the new principles of administration and the intensity of the EU-related activities all indicate that the EU accession process has initiated new political dynamics in Kayseri. These data and the information gathered in the interviews have revealed that the mechanism of Europeanization is in order and has begun to change the local in the case of Kayseri.

One of the changes in the administrative structure, which may be related to the EU accession process, is the establishment of the city council. The city councils are a novelty in Turkey and various cities have founded them as a part of the new plural and participatory understanding of public administration with the 2000s. These

councils are made up of the representatives of the municipalities, districts, businessmen and the universities in each city. The City Council is an important means of political participation, which establishes the basis for local democracy and changing of the local level in terms of a new administrative understanding. What makes the Kayseri case important is the fact that the City Council has to meet on a regular basis and develop new ideas for the improvement of the city administration. Moreover, within the Council, one of the working commissions is responsible only for the relations of Kayseri with the EU (Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2007). The EU Commission helps the municipality to develop projects to be funded by the EU and to institutionalize the principles of good governance in Kayseri.

Another administrative structure that reveals the importance of the EU accession for Kayseri is the Department of EU Relations, which was established in 2006, in the metropolitan municipality (Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2006). The department is responsible for “the structural transformation and capacity building in Kayseri during the EU accession process, to increase the city’s access to the EU funds and to integrate Kayseri with the EU network” (Ibid: 18). Since its establishment, the department has been actively working to bring Kayseri closer to the EU⁹⁹ and has prepared various project to that end. In 2006, the department prepared three projects to be funded by the EU and two of these projects received funding of a total sum of 1.131.498 euros (Ibid). In 2007, the number of EU-funded projects increased to eight and in the strategic plans of the city, it is planned to prepare ten additional projects for the EU funds in 2008 and fourteen projects in 2009 (Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2007).

⁹⁹ Interview with Mehmet Özhaseki, the Metropolitan Mayor (14.12.2007).

These numbers indicate an eagerness to get access to the advantages of the EU accession process in Kayseri, mainly through getting funds for the projects. However, these projects have a spillover effect in terms of increased contact with the EU level, increased adaptational pressures and development of a new understanding of administration, which contribute to value change. The traces of this change can be observed in various administrative practices, which became popular since 2000.

With the 2000s, one can detect a change in the language of administration in Kayseri. The principles like transparency, participation, legality and efficiency began to be pronounced more often. The municipality began to announce its annual activities, budget and future strategies publicly. The reports regarding the municipal activities became more detailed and legal and financial auditing became an important part of the administrative system. In the annual reviews of the municipality, one can see that the municipality now tries to establish an internal control mechanism for itself in terms of auditing and institutional capacity evaluations, which can be considered as an indicator of changing understanding of administration. This change is to a certain extent related to the EU accession process, as the city's need to reach the EU standards in order to integrate with the world was one of the common themes expressed by the interviewees.

With regard to the changing position of the local in the EU accession process, one important issue that needs to be considered is its financial capacity and dependence on the centre. The following table shows the changes in the budget of Kayseri and the amount of state assistance between 1999 and 2006:

Table 6: The Budget of Kayseri (1999-2006)

YEAR	TOTAL BUDGET IN TL	STATE ASSISTANCE IN TL	STATE ASSISTANCE IN %
1999	12.714.705	5.523.435	%43
2000	19.994.200	9.590.750	%48
2001	29.900.538	15.205.428	%51
2002	50.806.121	31.515.741	%62
2003	65.038.763	37.010.194	%57
2004	75.451.600	52.087.856	%69
2005	120.892.259	68.302.625	%57
2006	214.085.886	87.764.891	%41

Source: Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi Statistics, 2007.

The table indicates that until 2006, the city's budget increased together with the state contribution to Kayseri. In 2006, the state contribution decreased and this situation has two main reasons. One reason is the fact that the terms of distribution of money to the provinces were changed with new legal arrangements. In addition to that, Kayseri found new sources of income and one of these sources was the loans from international financial agencies. The 2007 budget was prepared according to the EU standards and the French Development Agency (AFD) provided the city of Kayseri a loan of 22 million euros for a transportation project without demanding any state guarantee (Kayseri Gündem, 27 November 2007). In other words, the

dependency of the city on the central state has not changed during the EU accession process and through the international loans, the city became financially dependent on the private agencies as well. The fact that AFD did not demand any state guarantee for the loan, was one of the mostly discussed issues in the city during the time and the public was generally really enthusiastic about it and perceived it as a sign of Kayseri's integration to the EU as a 'world city'¹⁰⁰. This development was seen as an indicator of the prestige of Kayseri in Europe and increased the self-perceived power of the city. The interviewees, who participated in this research often described Kayseri as "the proof that Turkey is ready for the EU" and this also reveals the awakening of the city to its economic and political power. As "the shining star of Anatolia", Kayseri is considered to be a European city, which will set a model for the rest of the country.

These developments, the EU-funded education and capacity and infrastructure-building projects and twinning projects with the EU cities reveal the increasing contact of the city with the EU, which started to change the perceptions about governance. At this point, however, what needs to be answered in order to understand the impact of the EU better is the question of the changing perceptions of the local about the centre.

Based on the harmony between the central government and the Kayseri municipalities (both from the same political party) and the fact that the president of the state is a native Kayseri citizen, one may expect that the position of the city regarding administrative issues would comply with that of the centre. However, the interviews conducted at the municipality revealed certain concerns and criticisms

¹⁰⁰ "Fransız Kalkınma Ajansı (AFD), Kayseri Büyükşehir Belediyesi'ne sağladığı 22 milyon Euro'luk kredi için hazine garantisini istemeyerek bir ilke imza attı" (Kayserim.net <http://www.kayserim.net/haberd.asp?id=6902> 20.11.2007, "KAYSERİ'NİN İMZASI YETER" (<http://www.kayseri-bld.gov.tr/haber/haberler/kayserinin.imzasi.htm> 20.11.2007).

about the policies of the central government. For instance, the city is expecting much more independence for the municipal administrations in terms of financial issues and personnel recruitment. The new laws and public administration reform drafts are highly criticized for reproducing the control of the centre at the local level and the EU membership is seen as the only solution to bring a new understanding of administration that will empower the elected administrative bodies at the local level.

These responses reveal the existence of a tension between the central and local levels in terms of redistribution of powers and resources. During this redistribution process, the EU factor is influential in two aspects. Initially, the increased contact with the EU and the learning process, which accompanied it, made the local redefine its identity, functions, expectations and its position vis-à-vis the centre. Then, in the process of redefining the balance of power with the centre, it is utilized by the local level as a legitimacy basis to increase its gains and to strengthen its hand. In other words, during this process, the EU increases the financial means for the local level and serves as a justification basis for the actions in addition to giving leverage in the relations with the central government.

During the process of re-establishing the power balance, the centre also adopts new strategies to reproduce its influence at the local level and to limit the freedom of the local level in terms of its access to the EU. One of these strategies is the establishment of new agencies at the local level, which would exert the power of the centre. The Regional Development Agencies can be considered among these agencies and thus, the Central Anatolian Development Agency, which is located in Kayseri, becomes one of the actors to be assessed in determining the EU impact in Kayseri.

6.4.2 The Central Anatolian Development Agency

The establishment of the regional development agencies has caused extensive debate in Turkey. The agencies were based on the NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units System) classification of the EU, which was adopted in 2002 to the Turkish structure. According to the NUTS classification, Turkey is statistically divided into 3 NUTS levels. NUTS 3 level is composed of all of the 81 provinces in Turkey. NUTS 2 level is composed of the groups of provinces, which are economically, socially and geographically similar to each other and there are 26 NUTS 2 regions. NUTS 1 level is composed of the groupings of NUTS 2 regions and there are 12 NUTS 1 regions in Turkey¹⁰¹. The Regional Development Agencies were established for assisting the development of NUTS 2 regions, which have priority in the development strategies.

When the law establishing the agencies was adopted by the parliament in 2006, the first two agencies were founded for İzmir and Çukurova-Mersin regions and 24 more agencies were planned to follow. However, various groups in society, including the main opposition party, RPP and various professional chambers applied to court for the annulment of the law. It took almost one year for the decision to be taken and on 30 November 2007, the Constitutional Court rejected certain articles of the law. This ambiguous status of the development agencies and the fact that they have not done much in one year prevent a healthy impact analysis. Nevertheless, the philosophy behind the establishment of these agencies and their approach to regional development constitute an important part of the current analysis.

According to the law, the Development Agencies are based on the understanding of welfare state, which is understood to be responsible for the

¹⁰¹ www.dpt.gov.tr

improvement of the lives of its citizens. This justification alone gives a clue about the philosophy, since it shows that these agencies are planned to be a means of the central state to improve the conditions of the local level. In addition to that, these agencies are important in terms of accessing the EU funds as they are a part of the required institutional structure for an appropriate distribution mechanism for the funds.

Within this mechanism, twelve cities from Central and Eastern Anatolia were identified as the centers of attraction and they were reserved %70 of the development assistance funds. According to the EU, these centers of attraction are Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Kayseri, Konya, Malatya, Samsun, Sivas, Sanlıurfa, Trabzon and Van (DPT, 2007). While choosing these provinces, the EU has taken the population and urbanization structure, the potential for emigration, social and economic development level, distance to under-developed regions, potential for growth and the existence of universities into consideration (EU Commission, 2007) and these cities were given a great deal of importance. Among these cities, Kayseri is the city, which has received the most funding from the EU with a total amount of 3 million euros¹⁰² and from a total sum of 575 projects prepared by these cities, Kayseri owns most of the projects with an amount of 98 projects¹⁰³.

Four NUTS 2 regions are subject to same conditions and same development strategies according to the classification of the State Planning Agency. These regions are TR A2 region including Ağrı, Ardahan, İğdir and Kars; TR 72 region of Sivas, Kayseri and Yozgat; TR 52 region composed of Karaman and Konya and TR B1 region including Bingöl, Elazığ, Malatya and Tunceli. The programs and funds reserved for these regions are designed for local development, improvement of small

¹⁰² Information provided by the Central Anatolian Development Agency.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

and middle-sized businesses, capacity building and infrastructure building and they are distributed under the supervision of the State Planning Agency.

Table 7: The EU-funded projects (2005-2007)

Regional development projects	166 projects
Small and Middle-Sized Businesses	277 projects
Infrastructure projects	66 projects

Source: The Central Anatolian Development Agency, 2007.

Out of 509 projects funded by the EU in the above-mentioned 13 provinces, 108 projects were prepared in Kayseri¹⁰⁴ (see Annex 2 for the complete list of these projects), which is another indicator of the willingness of the major actors in the city to gain access to the EU network and resources.

One significant point that came out during the interviews is the fact that the Agencies are only designed to be responsible for the application of the plans. In terms of the planning stage, the centre still has the full authority mainly via the State Planning Agency and this situation seriously limits the capacity of the Development Agencies to contribute to the development and change at the local level and prevents the direct access of the local to the European level.

Another concern, which became apparent during the research, is the fact the same criteria and strategies are applied to all of the thirteen provinces in the NUTS 2 regions. The grouping of the regions are not thought to be adequate for solving the regional development problems and a more differentiated approach, which gives

¹⁰⁴ Central Anatolian Development Agency, 2007.

more discretion to the local level during the planning process as well as administration, is one of the expectations from the central government. However, this expectation is not thought to be realized in the near future as the project selection and fund distribution mechanisms are perceived as the means of Ankara to continue its control over the integration of the local level to the EU. In the interviews, it was even hinted that the other cities were slowing down Kayseri in the process of integration and a development plan and funding mechanism designed according to the special features of Kayseri are thought to be more suitable than the existing system. This attitude can be considered as the reflection of the previously-mentioned awakening of the city about its economic and political potential, which is an indicator of value change in terms of administrative practices and expectations as a result of the impact of the EU accession process.

6.4.3 The Business Circles

In a city like Kayseri, where the commercial and industrial activities are an integral part of the life, the business circles naturally become one of the major actors, who need to be considered in any analysis of political and economic change. In the analysis of the EU impact in Kayseri, the Chamber of Commerce is the main object of analysis for the reason that it is the most active institution in terms of EU-related activities and thus more open to EU influence.

Between 2005 and 2007, the Kayseri Chamber of Commerce has conducted eight EU-funded projects. These projects were not limited to their areas of specialty, i.e. commerce but they also tried to improve the capacity and well-being of the people. With the “Women of Steel Project” initiated in 2007, the Chamber aims to improve the skills of Kayseri women and to contribute to their economic

independence¹⁰⁵. With the projects like Pedal, Anafor and Gençev, the Chamber has tried to bring the employers with the university and vocational school graduates together¹⁰⁶ and these education projects received a total amount of approximately 500.000 euros from the EU. The Chamber also designed various projects for its members such as the Electronic Archive System Project and twinning projects with the Utrecht Chamber of Commerce and UK Foreign Trade Club. In addition to these, the Chamber also started a project to raise awareness about energy sources and consumption, called “If Only Edison Knew...”.

The research has revealed that this extensive amount of EU-related activities is mainly due to the pragmatic approach of chamber to the EU process. When asked, the Chairman of the Chamber basically explained the reason for these projects as “the need for Turkey to take back what it has paid for the assistance programs”¹⁰⁷. In other words, for the business circles, the EU accession process is a process of intensive bargaining and give and takes and Turkey has to take the advantage of the situation as much as possible and to try to get back as much as it contributes. The EU-funded projects are seen as a means of compensating Turkey’s losses and a window of opportunity to increase the economic relations with the EU countries.

In terms of assessing the impact of the EU over the business circles in Kayseri, one can argue that it has increased the awareness about Turkey’s position and potential gains and losses during the negotiation process. Moreover, it can also be argued that the EU accession process is perceived as an asset for the development of Kayseri as the possible ways for the Kayseri businesspeople to integrate with Europe and expand their businesses are constantly searched for through the projects, seminars and other international activities. Following this, the central government is

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Ali Kilci, the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, 5.12.2007.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

expected to increase these opportunities for the business, to facilitate the cooperation of the local business with Europe and to be more assertive about their sectoral interests during the accession negotiations.

6.4.4 The EU Impact and Project Management: Yön-Çiz and KAYHAM

As the previous analysis has revealed the EU-funded projects are the main means of contact of the city with the European level. Thus, the experiences during the conducting of these projects can be a good indicator of how the contact with the EU changes the approaches, practices and values at the local level.

In order to achieve this in this study, two EU-funded projects are analyzed. These two projects were chosen according to their budget, their partners and with the idea that a comparison between one completed project and an ongoing one may provide insight in terms of impact analysis. The ongoing project was conducted by the Chamber of Commerce and it is called “Yön-çiz”. The project, which was completed, is the “KAYHAM” project and was conducted by the university. The analyses are based on the project documents, reports and the interviews with the managers of these projects.

The “Yön-Çiz” project was prepared and conducted by the Chamber of Commerce together with a foundation of education and culture (Sağanak Foundation) located in Kayseri. The focus groups of the project were the firms, vocational schools, teachers and the unemployed people in the city and the aim of the project was to increase the guiding and advising skills of the teachers in Kayseri in order for them to guide the students to proper jobs, in which they would not be unemployed. Within the scope of the project, sixty advisor and counselor teachers

were educated in line with these aims and %90 of the total 54.270 euros of the budget was funded by the EU¹⁰⁸.

The project started in January, 2008 to continue for a year and various activities were carried out in order to realize the project aims. In order to determine the jobs, which will be the most needed ones in the city, surveys were conducted in 643 firms, education seminars were organized for the teachers in order for them to guide their students towards the jobs of the future and a book about entrepreneurship was prepared, published and distributed to the people in the focus group¹⁰⁹. The interview conducted with the project manager has revealed that the people, who worked in this project, also wanted to share their experiences with the other cities in the TR72 region (Sivas and Yozgat) as this sort of capacity-building project that aims to reduce structural unemployment was the first example in the region. Apparently, the conductors of the Yön-Çiz project believe that they have the important mission of setting a model in the region and they think that if similar projects are applied in the neighboring cities, then the migration from these cities to Kayseri will decrease and the economy of the Central Anatolian region as a whole will improve.

Within the context of this study, the main issue that was brought up during the interview was the concerns about the project selection process and the lack of direct contact with the EU level. The fact that the projects, which will receive the EU funds, are essentially determined by the Central Planning Agency and that Ankara has the final say about the selection process is perceived as a form of center's pressure at the local level and there seems to be a mistrust towards the institutions at the central level in terms of the selection process. During the interview, the project manager has claimed that there exists various projects, which were rejected by the

¹⁰⁸ www.kato.org.tr/yon_ciz.html

¹⁰⁹ Interview with the project manager, Şafak Öztaş on 25.11.2007.

State Planning Agency, even though they were suitable for the EU standards in terms of structural assistance. Because of the existence of this perception, there is demand for more direct contact with the EU level during the application and conducting processes of the projects. However, the central level resists this demand as it means the loss of authority within the resource distribution mechanism and the planning process, which will lead to the loss of the power of the centre vis-à-vis the local level.

Another point that came out during the research was the fact that the EU is welcomed as a partner in terms of local development and capacity-building initiatives. According to the project manager Öztaş, the structural funds helped to realize many aims, which could not be achieved because of the lack of resource transfer from the central government. In other words, the EU structural funds replaced the role of the central government in terms of local development and provided more efficient assistance at the local level. However, the central level is perceived as a gatekeeper in terms of receiving these funds and it is criticized for blocking the pace of Kayseri in its integration with Europe.

In order to make analytical generalizations within the theoretical framework of this study, one needs to verify this information with additional research and interviews with the managers of other EU-funded projects. Thus, at this point, it seems both useful and necessary to provide an analysis of another important EU-funded project in Kayseri.

The aim of the KAYHAM project was to gather all of the books, research documents, reports and other related documents about Kayseri in one center. The project was conducted by the university with the support of the Chamber of

Commerce, Chamber of Industry and the Foundation for University-Industry Cooperation¹¹⁰. These partners contributed %10 of the total budget of 62.996 euros and the rest of the budget was funded by the EU. The project was started on 1 December 2006 and it was completed one year later.

The aim of the project was to develop the cultural capacity of the city¹¹¹. The idea was to contribute to the structural, social and cultural transformation of the city through archiving its memory, i.e. its past and offering it to the service of future researchers. After the project was completed, the center was planned to remain under the supervision of the university, so that the continuity would be secured¹¹².

According to the project coordinator and creator, Professor Rıfat Yıldız, the idea of establishing a memory center for Kayseri was born during his contacts at the international level through various EU exchange programs. During his contacts at the European level, he has observed the cultural and social affairs of various cities and felt that Kayseri lacked an archive of its affairs, which can be researched systematically. Thus, the project was the consequence of value change, which took place through contact and learning.

Professor Yıldız also noted that his project was supported enthusiastically in the city and they have received donations from various institutions and people in Kayseri. The volunteers, bookstores, metropolitan and district level municipalities, the special provincial administration, university, academicians, civil society organizations and chambers all donated various books, documents and reports about the economic, cultural and social characteristics of Kayseri¹¹³.

¹¹⁰ KAYHAM Project Document, 2006.

¹¹¹ Interview with the Project Coordinator Prof. Rıfat Yıldız, 1 December 2007.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

The fact that an essentially cultural capacity building project with no immediate material gains was widely supported by the local community indicates that some sort of attitude change is taking place in the city and the importance of cultural development has increased in addition to the importance of the economic prosperity of the city. According to a survey conducted within the scope of the project, %84 of the respondents believed that the project was very useful for the development of the city, while %6 had a negative attitude about it and %10 were undecided¹¹⁴.

The interview with the coordinator of the KAYHAM project has also revealed that the European accession process has provided new channels for the actors at the local level to contribute to their cultural, social and economic affairs. The funds provided by the EU creates the opportunity to realize the various projects, which could not be conducted before because of the lack of the resources and increased the awareness at the local level about participation. The interview with Professor Yıldız also revealed a mistrust towards the State Planning Agency, thus the centre in terms of the selection procedures of the projects as he argued that “there would be even more projects, which received EU funding, if the EU made the decision without the involvement of the State Planning Agency. Thus an inclination to get past the central level and establish a more direct contact with the EU level seems to hold in the case of Kayseri.

The alternative process, which would decrease the role of the State Planning Agency, that came out in both interviews, was to increase the role of the Central Anatolian Development Agency in the distribution of the EU funding as they would be more aware of the local needs than the State Planning Agency in Ankara and

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

distribute the funds to the projects more efficiently. However, since the Regional Development Agencies work as the instrument of the centre at the local level, the only benefit of empowering these agencies would be to gain better access to the funds through effective networking at the local level. The experiences of the project managers have revealed that there exists a demand for more participation at the decision-making process of the distribution of the structural funds as well as their administration at the local level but the centre finds alternative ways to block this demand and prevents the empowerment of the local through various channels.

6.5 Europeanization and the Re-positioning of the Local

The study conducted in Kayseri revealed that two different processes were set in motion with Turkey's EU accession at the local level. On one hand, the local level became more aware of the opportunities to assert its political and economic power and sought alternative ways to gain more access to the EU level, which led to a change in the political values in terms of administrative practices. On the other hand, the centre applied alternative policies to limit this access and to re-adjust the balance of power to its advantage vis-à-vis the local.

The case of Kayseri proved the initial position that the choices and structures of the past have a determining impact over the present relations between the actors and the prospects for change. The pro-business and profit-seeking character of the city elite made it more open to both change and progress and the pressure from the centre. Kayseri traditionally welcomed change if there was any economic and social value in it and the priority of economic prosperity in the city made it a necessity to maintain good relations with the centre as a means of networking, which also opened channels for the centre to exert pressure, if necessary. These features of the city

shaped the process of re-definition of centre-local relations during the EU accession process.

The research has shown that the impact of Europeanization can be observed in the context of Kayseri, which can be differentiated from that of globalization. The administrative changes, which took place in the city, in the 2000s and the increased awareness about the integration with the world after the EU accession process gained pace indicate that the increased contact with the European level set a process of value change in motion at the local level. This change is argued to be a consequence of Europeanization instead of globalization because of the fact that it coincided with the period in which there was an intensive contact with the EU in the form of projects and funds and the administrative changes were made deliberately by the political elite of the city with a clearly expressed motive of realizing the EU standards in Kayseri.

The establishment of the city council and the importance given to it, the EU Affairs Commission within the council, the Department of EU Relations established in the metropolitan municipality, adoption of the new principles of public administration and the intensive activities regarding the flow of the EU funds to the city are all concrete indicators of the EU impact at the local level. The important point that needs to be stressed is the fact that as the local actors see the benefits and immediate positive effects of the EU accession process, especially in terms of the EU-funded projects, they become more supportive of Turkey's EU accession and the EU gains new allies for itself at the local level. The increased contact with the European level and the changes in the values make the local political actors re-position themselves with respect to the centre and the choices of the major actors also become crucial in this process.

The interviews conducted with the major local political figures during the study revealed that the city had a somewhat pragmatic approach to the EU accession process and saw it as a means of improving Kayseri's economic prosperity. In other words, the actors choose to prepare various projects for the EU funds and to establish contacts at the European level because this is perceived as the only way to gain benefits from the EU accession process in the short run. The study also revealed that the EU accession process was perceived as a means of justifying various policies and projects by the local political elite in the eyes of both the community and the centre. In fact, as the city mayor has argued, the new laws of the state regarding the local administration in Turkey were not seen as adequate in terms of empowering the local and the EU was thought to be the only mechanism, which would give financial and economic power to the municipalities.

The case of Kayseri shows that the EU accession process has contributed to the local demands for more financial and political autonomy from the centre. However, these demands were met with resistance by the centre and although the local level have found various means of gaining access to the European level and to empower itself against the centre, the centre managed to block these means and to reproduce its control at the local level.

The financial dependency of the local administration on the centre is one means of control, which the centre managed to retain even after the public administration reforms. Despite sharing the similar political ideas and being from the same party, the mayor of Kayseri also raised various criticisms to the government for "not treating the municipalities properly" and pointed to the need of the municipalities to have more financial autonomy. This situation shows that the centre

has managed to block the empowerment of the local during the EU accession process through retaining its financial control and power.

Another means for the centre to retain its power, as the research has revealed, is to control the framework within which the local level would interact with the European level. The way in which the EU structural funds are distributed, the local projects are selected and managed helps the centre to control the process of Europeanization and to re-establish its power vis-à-vis the local. The regional development agencies lack the authority to control the project planning and selection process and they are only assigned with the duty of coordination and project administration. The State Planning Agency makes the final decision about the projects, which will be supported by the EU and the local entrepreneurs can not contact directly with the EU without any partners from the state agencies and bypassing the State Planning Agency. In a sense, the centre place the role of a gatekeeper during the project management process and becomes capable of affecting the path for structural and institutional change at the local level by deciding which capacity building and development projects will be assisted. However, these projects also contribute to the economic transformation and improvement of the city, which will provide the infrastructure for more local political participation.

The interviews conducted in Kayseri revealed that there exists a certain level of mistrust at the local level towards this way of managing the EU-funded projects and the local level demands more role at the stage of project planning and selection and more direct contact with the EU level. Moreover, the local level also prefers that the centre adopts a more differentiated approach to the planning of regional development programs. Development programs, which are prepared by the local experts, who know the needs and problems of each region, are preferred to the

current approach of the State Planning Agency that entails the application of the same development program to multiple regions.

The analysis in Kayseri has proved the point that the EU accession process has triggered a change in the values, positions and powers of the major political actors at both central and local levels. In this process, the local level has discovered alternative ways to increase its economic and political power. However, with the impact of the historical factors, which made the centre traditionally more powerful than the local, the centre managed to block these alternatives to a certain extent and to control the context in which the mechanisms of Europeanization were in order. Thus, in the Turkish context, it is not possible to claim that Europeanization empowers the local level and leads to devolution. Instead, it would be more accurate to argue that the process of Europeanization changed the balance of power between the central and local levels through adding new parameters to the relationship between the major political actors. With the new parameters, both sides began to reconstruct their positions and retain and increase their powers. At this point, the legacy of strong state tradition came into the picture and although the process of Europeanization had an impact over the values and preferences of the actors, especially at the local level, the centre managed to control how this impact would be channeled into action and to structure the path to institutional change. In other words, the local administration has not transformed into local government yet despite the formation of new demands at the local level towards this direction because of the lack of change in the philosophy of administration at the central level and lack of the consent of the centre.

When the Turkish case is reassessed in a more analytical manner and within the theoretical framework, the above-mentioned struggle between the central and

local levels and its relation with the EU accession process will become clearer. Thus, in the next chapter the theoretical framework, initial hypotheses and variables are revisited and applied to the Turkish case through the data collected during the research.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUDING REMARKS: FITTING THE TURKISH CASE INTO THEORY

The previous three chapters dealt with the three variables of institutional change, which were stated at the beginning, i.e. historical and political context, actor preferences and the EU factor to explain the centre-local relations in Turkey. At this point, however, it is necessary to revisit the theoretical framework and the initial hypotheses and to analyze the Turkish case within the theoretical models set at the beginning. In this manner, it will be possible to both offer an analytical perspective to understanding the Turkish case and to contribute to the theory with the findings of the study.

7.1 Variables of Institutional Change in the Turkish Case

The Turkish case has showed that the historical and political context affects the centre-local relations and the probability of change through operating at both central and local levels. In other words, the local dynamics and history are as effective as the traditions and practices of the state in general. As Robert Putnam

(1993) has argued in his study of civic tradition in modern Italy, the social context and history affect the performance and future of institutions.

The most determining factor in terms of the historical and political context of the centre-local relations is the strong state tradition that has prevailed since the Ottoman period. Beginning with the late Ottoman period and continuing during the Republican period was the tendency to use centralization as a means of reproducing the state's control at the local level. In other words, although local administrative bodies were introduced to the system, their aim was to fulfill certain functions assigned by the state on behalf of the central government instead of taking over a political role like democratization of the system. This initial institutional design has been the major determinant of the future of centre-local relations and any mode of change in these relations.

This initial institutional design was later consolidated and justified because of the political and economic conditions in the country and while the 1970s witnessed the retreat of the central state from the local level in Europe, in the case of Turkey, the economic and political reconstruction process strengthened the centre even more in the absence of a democratic local government tradition. Because of the lack of organizational and economic capacity at the local level, the centre has been very much involved with the political and economic affairs of the local and through the principle of administrative tutelage, the centre retained its control by legal and political means. The concerns about the unity and integrity of the state also contributed to the philosophy of highly centralized and uniform administration and made the centre the sole actor in determining the course of centre-local relations in Turkey.

In the second half of the 1980s, administrative reform came to the agenda of the centre as a part of the economic liberalization policies and the local administrative bodies were assigned new responsibilities. However, the language of the reform was still far from concerns about democratization and it reproduced the power of the centre at the local level through the increased financial dependency of the local on the centre. The EU accession process gave a new impetus to the process of administrative reform in the late 1990s and 2000s and created a new political environment in which the actors had to reposition themselves.

The historical and political factors were also in motion at the local level. As the case study conducted in Kayseri revealed, the history of the relations of the city with the central government and the political and economic character of the city had an impact over how Kayseri positioned itself in the new political environment created by the process of EU accession. The economic infrastructure of the city facilitated the development of civic culture¹¹⁵ based on the idea of involvement and participation in the communal affairs and commitment to the development of the city in all areas.

The economic prosperity of the city and the intensity of the economic activities at both domestic and international scales, made Kayseri more open to both change and the pressures of the centre. On one hand, increased contacts with the other environments set a process of learning and change in motion in the city. On the other hand, the primary importance of the economic activities made it a requirement for the local elite to maintain good relations with the centre and made Kayseri more vulnerable to the control of the centre. The fact that Kayseri has a considerable economic and political potential makes the process of value change during the EU

¹¹⁵ See Robert Putnam (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy*. Chichester: Princeton University Press for the detailed discussion of civic culture concept.

accession process and the struggles with the centre all the more important and the historical and political attributes of the city, such as the fact that the same cadre has been in the office in the local administration of the city for more than a decade, become crucial in understanding process of change at the local level.

The analyses have revealed that the preferences of the major political actors at the central and local levels are the most important determinants of how the EU-level pressures are processed and institutional design changes in the Turkish context. The analyses illustrated the fact that different types of struggles take place among the political actors within the centre on one hand and between the centre and the local on the other hand.

Traditionally, the actors at the central level have followed a trend of centralization and tried to be involved with the affairs of the local level as much as possible. When the need to transfer new responsibilities or resources to the local level became inevitable, it was done without empowering the locally elected bodies politically and in a way that would reproduce the power and presence of the centre at the local level. The fact that there exist no explicit reference to local democracy in none of the new laws on public administration reveals that the centre tries to prevent the empowerment of the local and to determine the boundaries within which the local actors will act through the way in which legal changes are made.

As the Turkish case revealed, another aspect of the centre-local relations is the character of the centre itself and whether there exists a consensus about the terms of institutional change within the centre. As it happened in the Turkish context, in case of disagreement and struggle among the central elite in terms of the rules of the system, the outcome of institutional change becomes more contested. In Turkey, the

historically-rooted struggle between the state elite and the political elite has turned the terms of the centre-local relations into a battlefield as changing the balance of power between the central and local levels was perceived as a means of changing the balance of power within the centre itself. On one hand, as the political elite, the government supposedly wanted to empower the local level as it saw this as a means of re-asserting its power through the existing networks and patronage relations. On the other hand, the state elite, namely the main opposition party and the president of the time, resisted this change as the outcome of this change would change the balance of power at the central level in return. Both sides wanted to control the process of change as its outcome would have implications over their respective positions.

At the local level, the interactions among the major political actors and their perceptions about how centre-local relations should be organized had an impact over their dealings with the central state. The case of Kayseri showed that while the economic and political interests of the major political actors, like the municipalities and the business circles, determined whether the local level would engage in a direct struggle with the centre or would prefer to fine-tune its relationship at different periods.

Traditionally, the local level has been politically weak regardless of its economic potential. The weak democratic governance culture at the local level makes it easier for the centre to reproduce its power at the local level through various institutions and formal and informal mechanisms of pressure. Because of this weak political organization culture, the local level develops a pragmatic approach to its relations with the centre and clears the way for the centre to exert its control. However, as the analyses have revealed, the EU accession process has begun to

change this position of the local level and initiated the re-definition of the power relations between the central and local levels. However, before discussing the outcome of this process of re-definition, the concrete consequences of the EU impact at both levels need to be accounted for.

In the first chapter, the institutional change was defined as a combination of organizational change and value change, initiated by external pressure. The historical and political context identify how the interaction between the external factors and domestic setting takes place and the preferences of the major political actors have a decisive role in the processing of the external pressures. The research illustrated the fact that the EU accession process works at three levels in the Turkish context. Firstly, it serves as a leverage for the political elite at the central level while re-positioning themselves vis-à-vis the state elite through administrative reform. Secondly, at the local level, the EU accession process changes the values of the major political actors and creates new venues for them to pursue and legitimize their interests and increase their power at both domestic and international realms against other actors. Finally, the EU accession process also affects the nature of the centre-local relations and while creating opportunities for the local level to increase its political power, it also makes the centre to invent new ways of controlling the local in order to retain its power.

Since 1999, the EU has exerted certain adaptational pressures over Turkey, which initiated the process of re-definition of the powers of the central and local levels. The expectations from Turkey to re-organize its regional development policy in accordance with the EU standards, the demands for capacity-building and administrative reform for the successful application of the regional development

strategies were all the pressures coming from the EU-level, which would inevitably have an impact over the balance of power between the central and local levels and both levels responded differently to these pressures.

At the central level, the political elite and the state elite had different perceptions about these pressures. For the state elite, the demands of the EU had to be adjusted to the special conditions of Turkey and the state had to retain its unity and control. For the political elite, on the other hand, these pressures served as a source of legitimacy in re-defining the parameters of their relationship with the state elite. Turkey's EU accession and the need for modernization during this process were the common notions in the attempts for administrative reform and they gave the political elite leverage at the central level.

In their dealings with the local level, however, the political elite adopted a different approach and while making the required changes for the EU accession, they invented new ways through which the centre could exert its control at the local level. The fact that the special provincial administrations were given more powers at the local level than the municipalities, the continuing financial dependency of the municipalities on the state and reproduction of this dependency by allowing them to get loans instead of creating their own resources and the ambiguous boundaries of central tutelage were all the alternative ways of retaining control at the local level. Moreover, the centre also retained its power in terms of the planning and resource distribution stages of the regional development initiatives and acted as a gatekeeper in the dealings of the local level with the EU in terms of receiving funds for the development projects.

These indicators prove the point that the EU accession process created a new phase in the struggle between the major political actors and made them re-define

their positions. However, the outcome of the EU impact was not a value change for the actors at the central level. Instead, the centre changed its strategies in dealing with the local level and developed alternative means of retaining its control and power. In other words, the legal changes, which came out during the EU accession process were not accompanied by discourse change at the central level and the formal and informal means of central pressure at the local level remained intact together with an unchanged philosophy of administration.

At the opposite side of the equation, i.e. the local level, the EU accession process initiated value change. The increased contact with the European level and EU-level practices through development projects and structural funds changed the perceptions of the local regarding the nature of centre-local relations. The research conducted in Kayseri revealed that the EU accession process is perceived as an opportunity for increasing the economic and social prosperity of the city and the centre is seen as an obstacle in maximizing the profits of the city in the EU accession process. Moreover, the process also contributed to a change in the civic culture in terms of more participation, mainly through the City Council. However, the increased participation in communal affairs have not yet turned into an institutional change in the form of democratization of centre-local relations because of the lack of the center's consent.

The interviews conducted with the major political actors in the city have pointed out to the new demands of the local level, such as to have more financial and administrative autonomy from the centre and to have direct access to the EU-level, which indicate a value change initiated by the EU accession process. The research also revealed that as the benefits of the European accession become more apparent through the financial assistance and local development projects in the short run, the

local level becomes more supportive of the accession process and the EU gains new allies at the local level. However, in the Turkish case, this value change has not been channeled into the power relations by the local level.

As long as the centre controls the means of contact of the local level with the European level, it will have an influence over how the changing values of the local political actors will be reflected upon the domestic policy processes and the centre will be able to shape the way in which the EU-level pressures are interpreted at the domestic level. Thus, for the Turkish setting, it is possible to argue that the EU accession process has changed the values of the political actors at the local level, however, without the consent of the center, this value change can not lead to an institutional change in terms of centre-local relations. If institutional change is understood as an organizational change that follows value change, as it was done in this research, then it is possible to argue that an institutional change has not taken place yet in terms of centre-local relations as it is the central political elite that determines the terms and channels of administrative reform.

With these inferences from the research, the hypotheses provided at the beginning of the study need to be revisited and the main arguments need to be provided in terms of applying the theoretical framework to the Turkish case.

7.2 Assessing the Europeanization-Devolution Relationship in Turkey

The account of the European experience provided in the second chapter showed that the theory of institutional change adopted in this study actually works and that the Europeanization-devolution relationship is not that straightforward. The analyses showed that the similar stimuli from the European level, which could change the nature of centre-local relations, were processed differently in each setting

according to the impact of historical, political and agency factors and the relationship between the central and local levels was re-defined differently. Besides revealing these differences, the European case also offered certain general principles, which could be applied to the theory of institutional change and the Europeanization-devolution relationship:

1. The states with a strong central tradition are more resistant to the EU-level pressures in terms of changing the balance of power between domestic political actors. In these states, the impact of the actors' preferences, powers and perceptions are more influential over determining the course of centre-local relations than the EU factor. The central political actors control the way in which the EU-level adaptational pressures are processed and determine the outcome of institutional transformation. In France and Italy, for instance, it was the central political elite, who controlled the EU impact and defined the terms of institutional change.
2. The federal state tradition, which historically and politically empowers the local level, facilitate the utilization of the EU impact by the local political actors, decreases the resistance of the central political actors and leads to devolution as a result of Europeanization. In case of the federal states, the historical and political dynamics are more influential than the actor preferences over the way in which the input from the EU-level is processed. In the states with strong local identities, like Spain and Germany, the Europeanization process legitimized the political demands of the local level vis-à-vis the centre.
3. The degree of the institutionalization of the power relations has an impact over the direct effect of the adaptational pressures from the EU. If the costs of

changing the status quo are higher, then the domestic political actors are more resistant to the EU impact.

In terms of testing the hypothesis that Europeanization leads to devolution, the analysis of the European case also provided certain criteria for arguing its validity. As the Central and Eastern European experience regarding the restructuring of the centre-local relationships during EU accession illustrated, Europeanization leads to devolution, if

1. the actor preferences are not institutionalized and already in the process of restructuring in the domestic setting,
2. the intensity of EU's adaptational pressures is higher,
3. there exists no actor resistance to the regulatory role of the EU and
4. the costs of institutional change are lower.

The post-communism experience of the CEE countries created an institutional vacuum, in which the domestic political actors were already in a process of re-defining their preferences and were more prone to external pressures. Moreover, the EU had a stronger position as a regulatory actor in these countries because of the existing accession criteria and higher adaptational pressures. Within this context, the process of Europeanization has led to institutional change in the form of devolution.

When these criteria are applied to the Turkish case, as the analyses conducted in the previous chapters revealed, it is possible to argue that although as an accession country, Turkey is more open to intense adaptational pressures from the EU level, since


1. the actor preferences and positions are highly institutionalized,
2. the costs of institutional change are high and
3. there exists a certain level of resistance to the EU impact,

the EU accession process does not lead to a process of devolution in Turkey.

The study of changing dynamics of centre-local relations in Turkey with the case of Kayseri revealed that no devolution process has taken place in Turkey with the EU accession process contrary to most of the expectations. The locally elected bodies were not politically empowered in terms of decision-making, the new administrative reforms of the 2000s did not contain any references to the concept of local democracy and the financial dependency of the local administrative bodies on the center still continues. Moreover, the regional development and local administration policies of the centre have not been differentiated according to the local needs and the centre managed to reproduce its power at the local level even after the reforms directed to the aim of EU accession. The supremacy of the special provincial administrations over the municipalities at the local level, the continuation of the tutelage principle and the gatekeeper status of the central state in terms of the relations between the supranational and local levels are the indicators of the continuation of the central power over local administrative bodies. Although the study revealed that the demands for more participation and more administrative autonomy emerged at the local level through increased contacts with the EU, these demands have not been channeled into an institutional change in the form of devolution in Turkey because the centre has not given up the status quo in its relations with the local level.

The ongoing process and the existing situation in Turkey can be embedded into the theoretical framework provided in the first chapter as follows:

Table 8: The Mechanism of Institutional Change



In addition to dealing with the prospects for institutional change in the centre-local relations in Turkey, the study also contributes to the theory by generating new questions for future research. Since the study of value change at the local level has been conducted only in one case, it is possible to conduct the same research in other cities or certain regions of Turkey in order to make a comparative analysis of institutional change and gain a deeper knowledge of context-specific factors, which facilitate or hinder change. The same research can also be conducted in the same case in the future in order to re-evaluate the impact of the currently ongoing process of EU accession and provide additional evidence for theoretical generalizations. By

generating new analytical questions and future research topics, the study will contribute to the study of institutions and institutional change in Turkey and at a more theoretical level.

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APPENDIX A

THE EUROPEAN CHARTER ON LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

1. The principle of local self-government shall be recognized in domestic legislation, and where practicable in the constitution.
2. Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population and this right shall be exercised by freely elected council or assemblies.
3. The basic powers and responsibilities of local authorities shall be prescribed by the constitution or by statute. Local authorities shall, within the limits of the law, have full discretion to exercise their initiative with regard to any matter within their competence.
4. Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities who are closest to the citizen.
5. Local authorities shall be consulted, insofar as possible, in due time and in appropriate way in the planning and decision-making processes for all matters which concern them directly.
6. Without prejudice to more general statutory provisions, local authorities shall be able to determine their own internal administrative structures in order to adapt them to local needs and ensure effective management.

7. Any administrative supervision of local authorities may only be exercised according to procedures and in cases provided by the constitution or by statute and it may be done only for ensuring compliance with the law and with the constitutional principles.
8. Local authorities shall be entitled to adequate financial resources of their own, which they may dispose freely within the framework of their powers. Part of these resources shall derive from local taxes and charges, whose rates can be determined by the local authorities. Financial equalization measures shall be adopted in a way that will not diminish the discretion of the local authorities and the grants to local authorities shall not be given for specific projects and the local authorities shall be left discretion to use these grants.
9. Local authorities shall be entitled to co-operate with each other, join an association and to co-operate with their counterparts in other States.
10. Local authorities shall have the right to recourse to a judicial remedy in order to secure free exercise of their powers and respect for such principles of local self-government as are enshrined in the constitution or domestic legislation.”¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ European Charter of Local Self-Government, Strasbourg, 15.10.1985.
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/122.htm>

APPENDIX B

SOME OF THE PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE EU IN CENTRAL ANATOLIA SINCE 2006 (SOURCE: STATE PLANNING AGENCY (www.dpt.gov.tr)

NO	THE RECEIVER OF THE FUND	THE NAME OF THE PROJECT	THE LOCATION OF THE PROJECT	THE DURATION OF THE PROJECT	THE AMOUNT OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE (in euros)
1	1165 ELBAŞI TARIM KREDİ KOOPERATİFİ	MERKEZİ SÜT SAĞIM ÜNİTESİ	KAYSERİ	11	77.975,50
2	AĞRI TİCARET VE SANAYİ ODASI	AĞRI TİCARET VE SANAYİ ODASI TAM OTOMASYON SİSTEMİ	AĞRI	6	25.303,23
3	AKTİF İŞADAMLARI VE SANAYİCİLERİ DERNEĞİ	KOBİLERE YÖNELİK NİİŞİKLİ DIŞ TİCARET ELEMANI YETİŞTİRME PROJESİ	KONYA	7	74.927,99
4	ALTINYAYLA KAYMAKAMLIĞI KÖYLERE HİZMET GÖTÜRME BİRLİĞİ	SOSYAL VE KÜLTÜREL GENÇLİK EĞİTİM MERKEZİ PROJESİ	SİVAS	11	73.917,00
5	ARALIK ZİRAAT ODASI	ARALIK İLÇESİNDE TOPRAK TAHLİLİ VE ANALİZLERİNİN YAPILARAK, UYGUN GÜBRELEME İLAÇLAMA SULAMA VE TOPRAK ISLAH KONULARINDA ÜRETİCİMİZİN BİLİNÇLENMESİNİ	IĞDIR	12	80.085,60

6	ARDAHAN ESNAF VE SANATKARLAR ODALAR BİRLİĞİ BAŞKANLIĞI	DOĞALGAZ TESİSATÇILIĞI	ARDAHAN	10	63.228,14
7	ARDAHAN TİCARET VE SANAYİ ODASI	ARDAHAN TİCARET VE SANAYİ ODASI TAM OTOMASYON SİSTEMİ	ARDAHAN	6	25.303,23
8	ARDAHAN ZİRAAT ODASI BAŞKANLIĞI	ARDAHAN VE KÖYLERİ ÇİFTÇİ EĞİTİMİ VE DANIŞMANLIK MERKEZİ PROJESİ	ARDAHAN	12	91.204,64
9	AYRANCI İLÇESİ KÖYLERE HİZMET GÖTÜRME BİRLİĞİ	KIRSAL KESİMDE KALKINMA VE GİRİŞİMCİLİKİN TEŞVİKİ	KARAMAN	9	27.669,60
10	AYRANCI İLÇESİ KÖYLERE HİZMET GÖTÜRME BİRLİĞİ	BENİM PEYNİRİM DİVLE	KARAMAN KONYA	12	38.056,23
11	AYŞE BALDÖKTÜ MESLEKİ EĞİTİM MERKEZİ	ANADOLU GÜLLERİ - "KADIN GİRİŞİMCİLERİN MESLEKLERİNDE GELİŞME SAĞLANARAK İŞ KAPASİİSERİNİN ARTIRILMASI	KAYSERİ	12	49.342,02
12	BATTALGAZİ KÖYLERE HİZMET GÖTÜRME BİRLİĞİ	KALİTELİ KAYISI ÜRETİMİNİN TEMEL KOŞULLARI	MALATYA	11	60.328,80

13	BİNGÖL ARICILAR BİRLİĞİ	BİNGÖL ARI YETİŞTİRİCİLERİNİN EGİTİMİ	BİNGÖL	8	62.583,64
14	BİNGÖL BELEDİYESİ	BİNGÖL AFET YÖNETİMİ SİSTEMİ PROJESİ	BİNGÖL	12	91.623,29
15	BİNGÖL ESNAF VE SANATKARLAR ODALARI BİRLİĞİ	BİNGÖL ESNAF VE SANATKARLARININ HİZMET KAPASİTESİNİN VE KALİTESİNİN GELİŞTİRİLMESİ PROJESİ	BİNGÖL	12	54.089,10
16	BİNGÖL TİCARET VE SANAYİ ODASI	BİNGÖL TİCARET VE SANAYİ ODASI TAM OTOMASYON SİSTEMİ	BİNGÖL	6	18.568,53
17	BİNGÖL ZİRAAT ODASI BAŞKANLIĞI	ÇİFTÇİLERİN KAPASİYERİN GELİŞİMİ İÇİN EĞİTİM, BİRİM, FESTİVAL VE BAŞVURU KAYNAK DESTEĞİ SAĞLANMASI	BİNGÖL	12	45.693,63
18	ÇEKEREK BELEDİYESİ	ÇEKEREK İLÇESİNDE YAŞAYAN İŞSİZ LİSE MEZUNLARINA BİLGİSAYAR VE İNGİLİZCE DESTEKLİ MODERN TİCARET EĞİTİMİ VERİLMESİ PROJESİ	YOZGAT	10	85.667,40
19	ÇIRAKLIK EĞİTİMİNİ GELİŞTİRME DERNEĞİ	İŞ'DE ENGELLİ (İŞE GÖRE BEDENSEL ENGELLİ)	KAYSERİ	11	69.300,90
20	ÇUBUKLU KÖYÜ TARIMSAL KALKINMA KOOPERATİFİ	ÇUBUKLU'DA HAYVANCILIĞIN GELİŞTİRİLMESİ AMACIYLA YEM BİTKİLERİ ÜRETİMİNDE İYİ TARIM (YÜKSEK VERİMLİ ÇEVRE DOSTU) UYGULAMALARININ	KAYSERİ	12	82.054,33

		ÇİFTÇİLERE AKTARILMAS			
21	DEVELİ BELEDİYESİ	ERCİYESTEN GELEN LEZZET ; CIVIKLI	KAYSERİ	8	66.895,96
22	DİVRİĞİ KÖYLERE HİZMET GÖTÜRME BİRLİĞİ	SİVAS İLİ DİVRİĞİ İLÇESİNİN TURİZM POTANSİYELİNİN DOĞAL VE KÜLTÜREL MİRASIN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ VE SUNUMU ARACILIĞIYLA GELİŞTİRİLMESİ	SİVAS	12	99.230,92
23	DOĞUBEYAZIT BELEDİYESİ	GÜNEŞ DOĞUBEYAZITTAN YÜKSELECEK	AĞRI	12	85.225,81
24	DÖRT EYLÜL KÜLTÜR VE DAYANIŞMA DERNEĞİ	BÜRO YÖNETİMİ VE SEKRETERLİK KURSU	SİVAS	12	86.678,10
25	DR. AHMET KEMAL KÖKSAL SOSYAL HİZMET VAKFI	MADDE BAĞIMLILARI REHABİLİTASYON VE EĞİTİM MERKEZİ	SİVAS	12	68.056,50
26	DR. AHMET KEMAL KÖKSAL SOSYAL HİZMET VAKFI	YARINLAR İÇİN ÖNCE ÇOCUKLAR	SİVAS	12	59.628,96
27	ELAZIĞ BELEDİYESİ	DEZAVANTAJLI GURUPLAR MESLEKİ EĞİTİM VE İSTİHDAM MERKEZİ	ELAZIĞ	10	130.461,40

28	ELAZIĞ KÜLTÜR VE TANITMA VAKFI ELAZIĞ SUBESİ	BÖLGESEL İSTİHDAM VE KOBİ GELİŞİM PROJESİ	BİNGÖL ELAZIĞ TUNCELİ	12	110.937,19
29	ELAZIĞ SANAYİ VE TİCARET ODASI	PAZARLAMA ELEMANI MESLEKİ EĞİTİM PROJESİ	ELAZIĞ	6	30.078,60
30	ELAZIĞ SERBEST MUHASEBECİ MALİ MÜŞAVİRLER ODASI	İŞ ÇÖZÜMLEYİCİ MESLEK PROJESİ	BİNGÖL ELAZIĞ	10	86.483,17
31	ELAZIĞ TİCARET VE SANAYİ ODASI	ETSO ÜYELERİNİN BLİŞİM TEKNOLOJİLERİİNİ ETKİN KULLANIMINI SAĞLAMAK	ELAZIĞ	10	93.404,60
32	ERCİYES ÜNİVERSİTESİ	KAYSERİ HAFIZA MERKEZİ (KAYHAM)	KAYSERİ	12	54.456,43
33	ERCİYES ÜNİVERSİTESİ KAYSERİ MESLEK YÜKSEK OKULU	SEKTÖRDE İHTİYAÇ DUYULAN BİLGİSAYAR VERİTABANI PROGRAMCILARINI YETİŞTİRME PROJESİ(KAYDB)	KAYSERİ	12	54.832,50
34	ERCİYES ÜNİVERSİTESİ SAFİYE ÇIKRIKÇIOĞLU MESLEK YÜKSEKOKULU	TARIMSAL BİLGİ TEMİNİ VE DANışMANLIK DESTEĞİ	KAYSERİ	12	56.466,00
35	ERCİYES ÜNİVERSİTESİ SÜREKLİ EĞİTİM MERKEZİ	ETKİN MESLEKLERE UZANAN EL PROJESİ (EMUEL)	KAYSERİ	12	58.774,26
36	EREĞLİ SAZLIKLARI AKGÖL VE ÇEVRESİNİ KORUMA VE	EREĞLİ-AYRANCI HAVZASINDA DOĞAL KAYNAKLARIN AKILCI KULLANIMI VE DOĞAL ALANLARIN	KONYA	12	110.423,98

	GÜZELLEŞTİRME DERNEĞİ	KORUNMASI			
37	FIRAT ÜNİVERSİTESİ	BÖLGESEL TURİZMİN GELİŞTİRİLMESİ KAPSAMINDA FIRAT ÜNİVERSİTESİ BÜNYESİNDE BOTANİK PARKI KURULMASI	ELAZIĞ	12	114.434,46
38	GAZİ ANADOLU TEKNİK, TEKNİK VE ENDÜSTRİ MESLEK LİSESİ	NİİŞİKLİ İŞ GÜCÜNÜN SAĞLANMASI	ELAZIĞ	11	116.568,90
39	GENÇ KAYMAKAMLIĞI KÖYLERE HİZMET GÖTÜRME BİRLİĞİ	GENÇ İLÇESİNDEN KÜLTÜR MANTARI YETİŞTİRİCİLİĞİ EĞİTİMİ	BİNGÖL	5	61.861,50
40	GÖLE ESNAF VE SANATKARLAR ODASI	AYAKKABICILIK	ARDAHAN	10	64.240,20
41	HACILAR ALİ İHSAN KALMAZ ÇOK PROGRAMLI LİSESİ	İŞSİZ GENÇLERE MESLEK EDİNDİRME EĞİTİMİ	KAYSERİ	8	37.755,00
42	HALIKÖY BELEDİYESİ	HALIKÖY KASABASINDA YAŞAYAN YEREL HALKA KÜLTÜR TURİZMİ AMAÇLI BESLENME, HİYYEN VE YEREL MUTFAK EĞİTİMİ VERİLMESİ PROJESİ	YOZGAT	10	82.846,80
43	HEKİMHAN SOSYAL YARDIMLAŞMA VE DAYANIŞMA VAKFI	KALİFİYE ÇİFTÇİ YETİŞTİRME PEOJESİ	MALATYA	12	83.053,86

44	HİSARCIK BELEDİYESİ	BAYANLARA EKONOMİK ÖZGÜRLÜK	KAYSERİ	10	117.311,08
45	İNCESU BELEDİYESİ	ÜZÜMDEN ŞIRAYA, ŞIRADAN PEKMEZE PROJESİ	KAYSERİ	9	75.142,73
46	İNCESU ZİRAAT ODASI	BAGCILIK SEKTÖRÜ GELİŞİM PROJESİ	KAYSERİ	12	69.027,80
47	İNÖNÜ ÜNİVERSİTESİ SÜRGÜ MESLEK YÜKSEKOKULU	SÜRDÜRÜLEBİLİR BALIKÇILIK KAPSAMINDA BİLİNÇLİ ÜRETİCİ PROJESİ(BİL-ÜRET)	MALATYA	12	73.422,15
48	İYİLİK DERNEĞİ	KOCA ÇINAR	SİVAS	12	64.818,56
49	KANGAL ZİRAAT ODASI	KANGAL SÜT SIĞIRCILIĞINI VE YEM BİTKİLERİ YETİŞTİRİCİLİĞİNİ GELİŞTİRME PROJESİ	SİVAS	10	89.239,50
50	KANGAL ZİRAAT ODASI BAŞKANLIĞI	KANGAL KOYUN YETİŞTİRİCİLİĞİNİN GELİŞTİRİLMESİ PROJESİ	SİVAS	8	54.714,29
51	KARAMAN İLİ ARI YETİŞTİRİCİLERİ BİRLİĞİ	BALLI YAŞAM PROJESİ	KARAMAN	12	95.996,17
52	KARAMAN İLİ DAMIZLIK SIĞIR YETİŞTİRİCİLERİ BİRLİĞİ	BEYAZ GELECEK PROJESİ	KARAMAN	11	27.241,02
53	KARAMAN İLİ MERKEZ İLÇESİ KÖYLERE HİZMET GÖTÜRME BİRLİĞİ	KARAMAN'DA EROZYONLA MUCADELEDE YEREL İNİSİYATİFİ HAREKETE GEÇİRME PROJESİ	KARAMAN	12	59.478,30
54	KARAMAN İLİ MERKEZ İLÇESİ KÖYLERE HİZMET GÖTÜRME BİRLİĞİ	GÖKSU HAVZASI ANTEP FİSTİĞİ AŞILAMA PROJESİ	KARAMAN	7	89.408,55

55	KARAMAN PAZARCILAR ODASI	ÜRÜN KAYIPLARININ ÖNLENMESİ PROJESİ	KARAMAN	9	114.187,31
56	KARAMAN TİCARET VE SANAYİ ODASI	KARAMANDA İSTİHDAMI ARTIRMA PROJESİ	KARAMAN	9	57.358,15
57	KARAMAN TİCARET VE SANAYİ ODASI	KARAMAN TSO TAM OTOMASYON SİSTEMİ	KARAMAN	6	25.303,23
58	KARAMANOĞLU MEHMET BEY ÜNİVERSİTESİ YAPTIRMA VE YAŞATMA VAKFI	YUNUS EMRE KAMPÜSÜ'NDE EROZYONLA MÜCADELE VE AĞAÇLANDIRMA EĞİTİMİ PROJESİ	KARAMAN	12	104.727,54
59	KARAURGAN KALKINMA DERNEĞİ	GELENEKSEL SÜT İŞLEME TESİSLERİNİN (MANDIRALAR) VE SÜT ÜRETİCİLERİNİN KAPASİTESİNİ GELİŞTİRME	KARS	11	68.961,86
60	KARS KASAPLAR ESNAF ODASI	KARSTA KASAPLIK HİZMETLERİİNDE KAPASİTE GELİŞTİRME	KARS	12	67.448,21
61	KARS TİCARET VE SANAYİ ODASI	KARS KOBİ SAHİP VE YÖNETİCİLERİ GENEL KAPASİTE ARTTIRIM PROJESİ	KARS	12	57.331,80
62	KAYISI ARAŞTIRMA, GELİŞTİRME VE TANITMA VAKFI	MALATYA KAYISISINI MARKALAŞTIRMA(MİŞ MİŞ)PROJESİ	MALATYA	4	53.688,95
63	KAYSERİ BÜYÜKŞEHİR BELEDİYESİ	SOKAKTA ÇALIŞAN ÇOCUKLARIN SOSYAL HAYATA VE EKONOMİYE KAZANDIRILMASI (KAYSEVİM)	KAYSERİ	12	116.792,67
64	KAYSERİ DEMİRCİLER ODASI	MEKATEK (METAL KAYNAK TEKNOLOJİLERİ)	KAYSERİ	12	56.448,39

65	KAYSERİ GENÇ SANAYİCİ VE İŞADAMLARI DERNEĞİ	KAYSERİ TASARIM ATÖLYESİ PROJESİ	KAYSERİ	12	109.506,59
66	KAYSERİ GÖNÜLLÜ EĞİTİMCİLER DERNEĞİ	TEKNOKENT	KAYSERİ	11	51.088,98
67	KAYSERİ HACILAR İLÇESİ KÖYLERE HİZMET GÖTÜRME BİRLİĞİ	MEYVE AĞAÇLARINDA KÜLTÜR- TEKNİK İŞLERİNİN EĞİTİMİ	KAYSERİ	8	63.815,40
68	KAYSERİ İL ÖZEL İDARESİ	KAYSERİ İLİ TURİZİM EĞİTİMİ PROJESİ	KAYSERİ	12	65.344,50
69	KAYSERİ KOCASINAN BELEDİYESİ	KAYSERİ DOĞALGAZ MESLEKİ EĞİTİM PROJESİ	KAYSERİ	12	112.189,50
70	KAYSERİ LOKANTACILAR VE PASTACILAR ESNAF ODASI	AŞMAKARNA	KAYSERİ	12	98.085,50
71	KAYSERİ MARANGOZLAR MOBİLYACILAR VE DÖŞEMECİLER ODASI	DESTEK EĞİTİM PROJESİ	KAYSERİ	12	75.566,61
72	KAYSERİ SANAYİCİ VE İŞADAMLARI DERNEĞİ	KOBİ'LER İÇİN İŞLETME GELİŞTİRME PROJESİ	KAYSERİ	12	68.010,84
73	KAYSERİ TİCARET ODASI	YÖNCİZ PROJESİ	KAYSERİ	12	48.843,36
74	KAYSERİ TİCARET ODASI	KAYSERİ TİCARET ODASI ELEKTRONİK ARŞİV SİSTEMİ	KAYSERİ	8	67.924,26
75	KAYSERİ YAPI MALZEMELERİ VE İMALATÇILARI DERNEĞİ	REKABET İÇİN VERİMLİLİK PROJESİ	KAYSERİ	11	71.763,75
76	KEBAN KAYMAKAMLIĞI SOSYAL	ÇOCUK BAKICILIĞI EĞİTİMİ	ELAZIĞ	12	56.074,50

	YARDIMLAŞMA VE DAYANIŞMA VAKFI				
77	KELKİT HAVZASI KALKINMA BİRLİĞİ	SU ŞEHİRİ BAKLAGİLLER EĞİTİM VE ÜRETİM MERKEZİ SUBAM	SİVAS	12	60.245,10
78	KOCASİNAN ZİRAAT ODASI	TARIMIN ÖNÜNDEKİ TAŞLAR KALKIYOR!	KAYSERİ	12	59.761,80
79	KONYA BERBERLER ODASI	EĞİTİM ALTYAPISI OLUŞTURMA PROJESİ	KONYA	12	98.584,20
80	KONYA BÜYÜKŞEHİR BELEDİYESİ	THE PROJECT FOR EDUCATING THE WORKERS WHO WORK IN FOOD PRODUCTION PLANT IN THE CENTRE OF KONYA ON HYGIENE AND TRAINING WORKERS FOR THE SECTOR WHO HAVE HYGIENE EDUCATION AND CERTIFICATE	KONYA	12	78.906,12

