

THE ANDICAN UPRISEING, 13 MAY 2005

A Master's Thesis

by

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ABSTRACT

THE ANDICAN UPRISEING, 13 MAY 2005

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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union state building process in Uzbekistan became subjected to the social, political and economic problems. When all these factors came together Andican Uprising occurred on 13 May 2005. In this thesis I tried to clarify the basic motives behind the Andican Uprising. By investigating these motives, I attempted to shed light on religious fundamentalism that the Government of Uzbekistan faced after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a part of problematical state building process, role of domestic politics in the emergence of the uprising was also covered by pointing out the characteristics of clan politics and civil society in Uzbekistan. Reasons of the event were also investigated on international level. In this context geopolitical strategy of international actors, the colored revolutions and U.S – Uzbekistan relations were explored. Economic integration of Uzbekistan to world economy and its failing reformation process was explored. While promotion of

democracy in Uzbekistan was necessitating broader freedom for society, religious fundamentalism led the government to intensify its authoritarian character. These two conflicting characteristics of the country created two sides over which international actors played their cards. While the west insisted on the democratization of the country the east supported the Uzbek government's harsh measurement over religious groups. Andican Uprising is an important case in which it is possible to find all prominent characteristics of the Uzbek politics, and therefore this thesis can be taken as a laboratory work in which all relevant traces were investigated to understand Uzbekistan.

Key words: Andican Uprising, Uzbekistan, Karimov, *Ekremiye*, Religious Fundamentalism, Civil Society, and Clan Politics.

ÖZET

ANDİCAN AYAKLANMASI, 13 MAYIS 2005

Kuzu, Durukan

Master tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Sovyetler Birliğinin çöküşünden bu yana Özbekistan, devlet yaratma sürecinde ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasi olmak üzere bir çok problemle karşıya kaldı. Tüm bu faktörlerin bir araya gelmesiyle 13 Mayıs 2005 tarihinde Özbekistan'ın Andican vilayetinde büyük ölçekli bir ayaklanma ortaya çıktı. Bu tezde Andican ayaklanmasıının ardından yatan sebepler açıklığa kavuşturulmaya çalışıldı. Bu sebepleri araştırırken öncelikle Sovyetler Birliğinin çöküsünün ardından Özbekistan'ın yüz yüze kaldığı dini koktenciliğin sebeplerini, doğasını ve derecesini aydınlatmaya çalıştım. Özbekistanda mevcut sivil toplum kuruluşlarının ve klan ilişkilerinin özelliklerini incelemek suretiyle de ülkenin iç politikası üzerinde ayrıca durdum. Bu tezde iç politikanın yanı sıra uluslararası konjonktürün Andican ayaklanmasında nasıl bir etkisi olmuş olabileceğini görebilmek için Orta Asya da görülen renkli devrimlerle birlikte Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Özbekistanla olan

ilişkilerinin bir analizi yapıldı. Karimov hükümetinin mikroekonomik açıdan başarısız mali reformları da ayrıca incelendi. Bu çalışmanın sonucunda varılan nokta Özbekistan'ın iki önemli yapısal özelliği arasında sıkışıp kaldığı yönünde oldu. Bir yandan demokrasinin ilerletilmesi için gerekli görülen özgürlükler öteki yandan demokrasinin özünü oluşturan laik yapıya aykırı dini koktenciliğe karşı arttırlan otoriter yapı mevcut durumu oldukça zorlaştırdı. Batı demokrasi savaşı verirken yakın ilişkilerden medet uman Dogu otoriter Karimov hükümetini destekledi. Hali hazırda ekonomik problemlerden şikayetçi halk Karimov'un otoriter politikalarından iyice rahatsızlık duymaya başladı. Dini gruplar ekonomik olanaklar sunarak yandaş elde etmek suretiyle bu rahatsızlıktan faydalandı, aynı zamanda sosyal baskından bıkmış Özbekler, Amerika ve Avrupa Birliği tarafından sivil toplum kuruluşları aracılığıyla desteklendi. Bu doğrultuda Andican ayklanması tüm bu faktörleri içerisinde barındıran sosyal bir vakkadır ve bu tez Özbekistanı anlamak için bu ilişkilerin incelendiği bir laboratuvar çalışması olarak algılanmalıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Andican Ayaklanması, Özbekistan, Karimov, *Ekremiye*, Kökten Dincilik, Sivil Toplum, Klan Politikası.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On 13 May 2005 the Uzbek government suppressed mass protests in Andican by violent means leaving many questions unanswered. Contradictory views on the nature of uprising were accompanied by different interpretations by international actors over the Uzbek government's response to the event. Not only were international institutions and foreign countries divided on Andican question but also scholars have developed different explanations to clarify what happened on 13 May 2005.

In this thesis, I evaluate domestic and foreign factors, which had an important role in both the formation and suppression of the Andican Uprising. Through the evaluation of these factors I intend to present an authentic picture of Andican Uprising. An investigation of the Andican Uprising not only exposes problematical characteristics of the state building process in Uzbekistan but also reveals the strategic concerns of international actors in the whole of Central Asia. In this study, I will examine the specific characteristics of the Uzbek politics and their implications

for regional and international politics. In this context, the Andican Uprising is a unique event, which enables us to understand the important factors in both regional security perceptions and strategic alignments and rivalries.

Although, I will base my arguments on the causal relationships between different factors in this thesis, I begin from the perspective that in the social sciences every causal relationship is subjected to the effect of unique events, which always possess their own conditions. In the literature, most of the scholars and international actors have tried to explain the event from a one-sided perspective and underestimated the other factors, which were actually much more effective than assumed. I will try to fill this gap in the literature.

In the first chapter, I explore the extent and nature of religious fundamentalism, which threatened the secular character of Uzbekistan for long time, in order to determine whether the Andican Uprising was an Islamic revolution organized and assisted by extremist groups. With this purpose in mind, in addition to describing *Hizb ut-Tahrir* and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, I examine ideological motives and organizational structure of *Ekremiye* group. Effect of threats presented by the first two extremist organizations on the Uzbek government's fear of the activities of the *Ekremiye* group will be questioned. I will also investigate the direct connection of this organization with the uprising in order to examine the role of religious pretexts, which Islam Karimov used in order to justify his aggressive response to Andican Uprising.

In the second chapter, economic factors, which may have contributed to the formation of the Andican Uprising, will be investigated. Failing economic reforms of Uzbek Government after the collapse of Soviet Union and its recent practices that

increased economic discontent among society prior to the Andican Uprising will be pointed out.

In this context, failure of government to carry out feasible economic reforms will be connected to the economic complaints that were voiced by protesters during the Andican Uprising. I will also try to clarify whether or not the government's failed economic policies contributed to the formation and amplification of *Ekremiye* group whose members applied religious principles to their commercial activities.

In the third chapter, how international, regional and domestic politics jointly might have affected the genesis of Andican uprising will be discussed. How the colored revolutions might have affected Karimov's response to Andican uprising will be mentioned within the context of regional politics. At this point I will compare these revolutions with the Andican Uprising to decide if Uzbekistan was also threatened by power politics in the region as Karimov assumed. I will question the possible involvement of the U.S. in Andican Uprising by analyzing its relations with Uzbek government before the uprising.

Karimov believed that the uprising was organized to topple his regime and stressed the role of the U.S funded civil society organizations in the formation of the Andican Uprising. I examine whether the capacity of Uzbek civil society organizations was sufficient to accomplish this.

In addition to these factors, role of clan rivalry in Uzbekistan will also be mentioned to explain how domestic politics might have led to the rise of mass protests in the country. The competition between clan affiliates for getting power and important positions in the government will be revealed to understand its repercussions for the Andican Uprising.

In the fourth chapter, what happened on 12-13-14 May 2005 in Andican will be portrayed. Although the evidence is limited to the information that Uzbek government and refugees from the conflict, I will collate these two sources to obtain a more authentic version of what really happened in Andican. In this part of the thesis extent of violence, number of dead, existence of religious slogans and economic complaints during the events will be investigated to reveal the nature of Andican uprising.

Most of the assessments made by scholars and organizations are based on interviews and thus subjective. Due to the strict control over press members, only video record revealing what happened during the protest was delivered by the Uzbek government and used in the trial of insurgents. However this video record was also reported to have biased characteristics and supposed to be distorted. At this point, lack of an objective assessment makes it necessary to scrutinize the event from contradictory perspectives simultaneously. In addition to the portray of the events in Andican on 12-13 May 2005, aftermath and foreign policy implications of the event will also be given in detail.

CHAPTER II

THE RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND ANDICAN UPRISING

Andican Uprising, which occurred on the night of 12 May 2005, exhibited the peak of an intensifying conflict between the Uzbek government and public groups. The nature of the uprising is dependent on the prior events, which contributed much to the formation of a common discontent in Uzbek society. The uprising was spontaneous by nature, and increased in scale only with the participation of people from different groups, but in the first stage it was obviously flamed by a well-organized small group of people who attempted to free prisoners accused of being members of Islamist *Ekremiye* movement.

Details of the event and real factors behind the public support and participation to this specific event will be given under following chapters but now the preceding affairs related to the *Ekremiye* movement and government precautions leading to Andican Uprising will be the main subject of this part. Hereby, the phenomenology of *Ekremiye* movement, rationale and fears of the Uzbek

government in its responses to religious activities within the country and extent of these religious factors will be analyzed.

In June 2004, 23 businessmen were arrested. They were: Rasuljon Ajikhaliyev, Abdumajit Ibregimov, Tursunbek Nazarov, Makhamadshokir Artikov, Odil Makhsdaliyev, Dadakhan Nodirov, Shamsiddin Atamatov, Ortikboy Akbarov, Rasul Akbarov, Shavkat Shokirov, Abdurauf Khamidov, Muzaffar Kodirov, Mukhammadaziz Mamdiyev, Nasibillo Maksudov, Adkhamjon Babojonov, Khakimjon Zakirov, Gulomjon Nadirov, Musojon Mirzaboyev, Dilshchodbek Mamadiyev, Abdulvosid Igamov, Shokurjon Shakirov, and Ravshanbek Mazimjnov.¹ These 23 members of the Ekremiye group were accused of attempting to disturb the country's constitutional order by organizing an illegal group, handing out pamphlet forming a threat to public security and being members of a religious radical organization.²

As it is seen, the charges in these trials leading to social uprising in Andican on 12-13 May 2005 had strong religious motivations. That's why, before reaching a conclusion about the accuracy of the charges against these 23 businessmen, I believe that to explain the Uzbek government's fear of religious activities would be helpful to make an accurate analysis.

¹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Bullets Were Falling Like Rain- The Andijan Massacre 13 May 2005", *HRW Reports* Vol. 17 No5 (June, 2005).

² BBC Monitoring News file, *Twenty-three Uzbeks stand trial on anti-stage charges, 12 February 2005*, (Text of report by Russia based web site Ferghana.ru on 11 February and Article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan).

2.1 The Government's Fear of Islamic Movements

In today's Central Asian countries Islam has played a crucial role in political life.³ Due to the anti-religious characteristics of the communist idea, after the Russian Revolution, central authorities generally disregarded the spiritual traditions of the people⁴ and authorities regarded religion as a dangerous factor, around which Muslim people could rally in order to form an autonomous political existence.⁵ In this sense Islam was seen as one of the chief internal threats to the Soviet Union and thus continuously oppressed.⁶ However, "Islam has now been transformed from a victim of Soviet oppression into a threat to regional security, democratization and the establishment of open societies in the region."⁷

The turning point can be traced to the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the peoples of the Central Asian countries thought that they would practice their spiritual beliefs without the restraints of prior communist administrations.

However, in the same countries there were elite groups who adopted the principles of Soviet culture and feared of religious factions would claim political power, which they thought, might lead the country to backwardness. In Uzbekistan Islam Karimov thought that lack of authority in the country would inevitably result in the wrong kind of religious activities leading the country to Shari'a rule; in his own words:

³ For Further information on political role of Islam in Central Asia see, Mehrdad Haghayegh , *Islam and Politics in Central Asia* (New York, St. Martin's Press,1995)

⁴ Edward Allworth, *Central Asia, and 130 years of Russian Dominance: A Historical Overview* (Durham, Duke University Press, 1994)

⁵ Olivier Roy, *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations* (New York, New York University Press, 2000)

⁶ Alexandre Bennigsen, *Islam in Soviet Union: general presentation* (Ankara: METU, 1985.)

⁷ Adeeb Khalid, "A Secular Islam: Nation, State, and Religion in Uzbekistan", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 35 (2003) p. 574.

It is common knowledge that the communist ideology –which lacks spirituality, is fanatical and anti-national in character- contributed greatly to the formation of prerequisites for religious fundamentalism and traditionalism within post-Soviet space.⁸

The new role of Islam in the identity of Uzbek nation and the growing influence of Wahhabi Salafism were the evidence used to justify the fears of post-Soviet governments.

2.1.1 Salafism In Uzbekistan

Wahhabism⁹ was created by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 18th century and after the first half of 1950s started to spread into the Central Asian Countries. Wahhabi doctrine in Uzbekistan is generally accepted to have affiliation with Salafism, which arose in the middle of 19th century. The first proponents of Salafiyya were Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and Rashad Rida (1865-1935). In Arabic, basic meaning of the word *Salaf* is “the preceding.” However in Islamic literature this term refers to an understanding in which, “Interpretations not based on the original sources of the religion are viewed as distortions that lead Muslims to stray from the path of God.”¹⁰

According to Salafism, practices of the first Muslims should be taken as the basis of Islamic rules, thus any changes in interpretation of Islam should be corrected by a return to primitive religious practices. “The 1990s saw the emergence of a clear

⁸Islam Karimov, *Uzbekistan on The Threshold of The Twenty-first Century* (Cambridge, MA: Curzon, 1997) pp. 19-29.

⁹ Any religious activity, whatever its context is, has been called ‘wahhabism’ in Soviet and Post-Soviet literature.

¹⁰ Juan José Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe”, *The Middle East Review of International Affairs* 10, no.3 (2006), p.1.

split between reformist or academic Salafism (*Salafiyya al-ilmiyyah*) and fighting or “jihadi” Salafism (*Salafiyya al-Jihadiyyah*).¹¹ The latter faction was violently hostile to non-believers and people who strayed from the path of God as a result of modernization causing changes in basic implications of Islamic rule. This fanatical attitude leaves no room for collaboration with the state or authorized Islamic foundations.

Salafism supporters have been present in Uzbekistan since 1950. One of the most important scholars who can recite the Quran, in Uzbekistan Abdulhakim¹² *qori*¹³, was known as an adherent of the Salafism. Kokand preacher, Muhammad Rustamov, who is known as Hindustani¹⁴ also contributed to spread of Salafism in Uzbekistan through his underground teachings based on the principles of Hanafi Islam.

His students later formed Salafi movement in Uzbekistan and paved a way for militant Islamic organizations to rise. “These students included Allama Rahmatulla *qori*(d.1981), who joined Wahhabis while in Andizhan. An even more prominent figure was Abduwali *qori* Mirzaev, the imam of the great mosque in Andizhan.”¹⁵

During the glasnost period, students of Hindustani found opportunity to mobilize support and give voice to their demands for religious freedom. In January

¹¹ Juan José Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe”, p. 3.

¹² “Abdulhakim *qori* from the city of Margelan is thought to be the father of the Wahhabites. He became a Wahhabite as early as 1954.” See Ashirbek Muminov “Traditional and Modern Religious-Theological Schools in Central Asia” in *Political Islam and Conflicts in Russia and Central Asia*, ed. Lena Jonson and Murad Esenov.(Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1999). www.ca-c.org/dataeng/09.muminov.shtml . (March 25,2008)

¹³ Immams who are capable and authorized to interpret and recite the Quran were used to be called as *qori*.

¹⁴Hindustani (1892-1989) was the Muslim leader of an underground Islamic movement in Tajikistan during the Soviet rule.

¹⁵ Vitaly V. Naumkin, *Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*, (California, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, 2003) p. 32.

1991, a separate Islamic Renaissance Party in Uzbekistan was founded and other religious political groups followed. Groups espousing an Islamic political agenda such *İslam Leşkerleri* (warriors) and *Adalet* were also formed at the beginning of 1990s. The ideological motive of the group was to replace the current government with an Islamic State. *Adalet* party tried to operate within the government's sphere of control to bring order to local *mahallas* through opposing law enforcements.¹⁶

It was originally created as a national militia of Muslims. The active members of Adalet patrolled the streets, detained suspicious persons, and clamped down on gambling, trade in alcoholic drinks, prostitution, and other infringements of "Islamic morals and law." In Namangan and Ferghana, so-called "supporters of Islamic morals" began to enforce their understanding of the norms of Shari'a.¹⁷

2.1.2. Religious Opposition Just after the Collapse of the Soviet Union

Just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, regional threats which frightened Karimov were about the formation of religious fractions in neighboring countries. For example, Islamic Renaissance Party in Tajikistan was claiming political power in opposition to the government of Rakhmon Nabiev.¹⁸ The rise of Taliban movement in Afghanistan was another factor, which increased his anxiety. Despite the existence of such religious threats to the modernization of Uzbekistan, Karimov, in his first years, tried to accommodate the spiritual traditions of the people and even prompted institutions serving to the proper implications of religious traditions.¹⁹ However at

¹⁶ Vitaly V. Naumkin, *Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*, p. 34.

¹⁷ Shukhrat Yovkochev, "Politization of Islam in Uzbekistan Before and After Independence," www.birlik.net/page-18.uk, (April 3,2008)

¹⁸ David Galemba, "The Authoritarian Roadblock on Post-Soviet Central Asia's Long Road to Religious Freedom" *Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion* 8, no.2 (2007), p. 25.

¹⁹ "In the early 1990s Karimov attempted to strengthen his position as a Muslim through public displays of piety, such as quoting from the Koran during his speeches, making the hajj and suggesting that he adhered to Islamic dietary requirements... It was vital that Karimov reinforces his connection

the same time, he established a strict state control, which left no space for extremism. Karimov declared that he would absolutely not tolerate any case of the formation of a political opposition based on religion.

Thus more concrete threats appeared when Karimov observed the formation of dissent religious parties in Uzbekistan. “In February 1992, Adolat, Birlik, Erk, and IRP (Islamic Renaissance Party) asked Karimov to start negotiations in Namangan as a united opposition group.”²⁰ Some of the dissent groups were not organized according to religious motives (Erk and Birlik, for example), but they had also been supported by Islamist groups against Karimov’s party. Regardless of whether their principles were religious or secular, almost all opposition parties enjoyed only limited participation in political life. The most important opposition groups, Birlik and Erk, and the proscribed Islamic Renaissance Party were cut off from the political life in the country, “and its leaders have either been jailed or sent to live in Turkey and elsewhere outside the country.”²¹ Karimov closed and prohibited *Adalet* in March 1992 and put 27 of its members in prison.²² The leader of IRP, Abdulla Utaev, was detained in December of the same year and all such Islamic groups were made illegal. In 1993, after receiving 12 percent of the votes in presidential elections, the leader of Erk Muhammed Salih was forced to move abroad and his party was

to Islam because Uzbek culture was experiencing a ‘re-Islamization’ represented by the surge in the number of mosques a renewed interest in the ritual and dogma of the faith and an increase in students studying Arabic ” See Reuel R. Hanks, “Dynamics of Islam, identity, and institutional rule in Uzbekistan: Constructing a paradigm for Conflict Resolution”, *Communist and Post Communist Studies* Vol.40 (2007) pp. 215-216.

²⁰ Reuel R. Hanks, “Dynamics of Islam, identity, and institutional rule in Uzbekistan: Constructing a paradigm for Conflict Resolution”, p. 215.

²¹ Mehrdad Haghayeghi, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia*, (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1995) p.156. For further detail on Erk and Birlik Party see Abdujabar Abduvakhitov, “Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan” in ‘Russia’s Muslim Frontiers’, ed. Dale Eickelman (U.S.A Indiana University Press 1993) pp. 79–101.

²² Center for Defense Information, “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”, <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm>, (March 08, 2008)

forbidden.²³ These strict policies of Karimov over the political parties were accepted as the most important factor, which empowered the radical groups. For instance Hunter argued that, “The stifling of democracy and the banning of the opposition ruled out peaceful engagement in politics and radicalized Uzbek Muslim activists.”²⁴

In this framework administrative mechanism to regulate and keep religion under state control was an indispensable part of government politics. In 1998 the Uzbek government founded *O'zbekiston Musulmonlar Idorasi* (The Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Uzbekistan) in order to check and control the content of all literature and visual media stuff coming to Uzbekistan from abroad. In the same year officials declared that any kind of organization was strictly prohibited from undertaking any activity related to religion in the absence of state control.²⁵ Muslim directorate of Uzbekistan was put in charge by government to control extremist groups; but sometimes it went beyond controlling illegal activities. For instance “in January 1998, Muslim Directorate outlawed the use of loudspeakers in mosques because it is not one of the fundamentals of Islam.”²⁶

The struggle over religious extremism in Uzbekistan was supported by further regulations in 1998. By a “Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations,” the Uzbek government banned private training in religion.²⁷ Amendments in the criminal code made religious activities without state control subject to five years of punishment.

The main provisions of the Criminal Code used to repress religious activities of unregistered Muslim groups are as follow: Article 156 (stirring up

²³ Vitaly V. Naumkin, *Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*, pp. 24, 34.

²⁴ Shireen T. Hunter, “Religion, Politics, and Security in Central Asia”, *SAIS Review* Vol. XXI No. 2 (Summer-Fall 2001) p. 76.

²⁵ Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 1999* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), p. 307.

²⁶ Adeeb Khalid, “A Secular Islam: Nation, State, and Religion in Uzbekistan”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.35 (2003) p. 590.

²⁷ Adeeb Khalid, “A Secular Islam: Nation, State, and Religion in Uzbekistan, p. 588.

national, racial and religious hatred), Article 159 (anti-constitutional activity), Article 242 (organizing a criminal society), Article 244-1 (inciting mass disorder) and Article 244-2 (production and distribution of materials which create a threat to public security and public order).²⁸

As it is seen above, state control over religious activities was becoming more intense every year. Thus the emergence of these radical groups was a result of both their ideological motives and official state control over them. However intensification of the rules regarding illegal activities with respect to religious issues and the control over the religious activities by the government became stricter, when radical organizations increased the scope of their activities. Due to these dialectical relationships, it is problematic to posit a simple causal relationship between the policies of the Uzbek government and extremist groups' subsequent reactions.

2.1.3. Hizb ut-Tahrir

2.1.3.1. Roots of the Organization

Hizb ut-Tahrir is an organization originally founded by Taquiddin Nabhani in 1953. Nabhani was known as one of the most important Islamic scholars in Eastern Jerusalem.²⁹ Like the leader of the movement himself, most of the members were mainly located in Arab countries, and thus the organization did not penetrate into the Central Asia countries for some time. Karagiannis argued that the *Hizb ut-Tahrir*

²⁸ Human Rights Without Frontiers, “Freedom of Religion and Belief in Uzbekistan”, <http://www.hrw.org/advocacy/ext/0226%20UzbekReport.doc>, (February 24, 2008); “Criminal Code of Uzbekistan” is also available at:

<http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/34/fc/a45cbf3cc66c17f04420786aa164.htm> , (February 24, 2008)

²⁹ Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* (London, Yale University Press, 2002) p.116.

began to be active in Uzbekistan after 1995. It is assumed that Jordanian missionaries who came to Central Asia had set up the first circles of the organization in Uzbekistan. Basic idea lying behind the formation of this organization was the desire to re-establish the caliphate and consequently to create an Islamic state under which all Muslims would be able to unite.³⁰

Due to increasing government control, members of the organization began to flee to Kyrgyzstan from Andican and Ferghana provinces. In order to evaluate the extent of threat posed by this organization, the extent of its membership and the results of their activities should be questioned.

However due to the underground activities of the organization, number of its members and assumptions on the activities of *Hizb ut-Tahrir* does not go beyond prediction; although, “it is difficult to get the exact number of members, most estimates vary between 15,000 to 20,000.”³¹ In 2003 International Crisis Group reported that, “Uzbekistan alone holds some 7000 prisoners associated with *Hizb ut-Tahrir*. ”³²

2.1.3.2. The Ideology of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*

The most appropriate way of analyzing the extent of threat the group poses is to evaluate its political claims and arguments in religious subjects. Although, as Mukhametrakhimova states “party members claim that their aim is to achieve

³⁰ Emmanuel Karagiannis, “Political Islam in Uzbekistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 58 No. 2 (March 2006) pp. 261 – 280.

³¹ Saule Mukhametrakhimova, “Perception and Treatment of the “Extremist” Islamic Group Hizb ut-Tahrir by Central Asian Governments”, *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Volume 4 No. 2 (2006) p. 51.

³² International Crisis Group, *Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir*, ICG Asia Report No 5 (30 June 2003) p. 17.

political change through peaceful means”³³; and despite the fact that *Hizb ut-Tahrir* is not accounted among terrorist organizations, the ideological motives of the group are strongly related with *Salafism* and other radical movements. The organization describes itself as follows;

“*Hizb-ut-Tahrir* is a political party whose ideology is Islam. Its objective is to resume the Islamic way of life by establishing an Islamic State that executes the systems of Islam and carries its call to the world.”³⁴ Democratic regimes are perceived by the organization, as a revolt against the will of God.³⁵

The organization identifies its methods, which would be used in establishing an Islamic State, as non violent. Rather on this purpose, they stress the mobilization of *ummah* (Worldwide Muslim community) by political means.³⁶ The organization claim that the most important function of the state should be “propagation of invitation to Islam”³⁷ *Hizb ut-Tahrir* allows non- Muslims to follow their own beliefs but at the same time all citizens of an Islamic State are considered to be subjected to Islamic rules without discriminating whether they are Muslim or not.³⁸ In this sense, implementation of Islamic rule on non-Muslims in Islamic states makes religious freedom to non-Muslims meaningless.

³³ Saule Mukhametrahimova, “Perception and Treatment of the “Extremist” Islamic Group Hizb ut-Tahrir by Central Asian Governments,” p. 51.

³⁴ Hizb ut-Tahrir, “About Us”, <http://www.hizbuttahrir.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=6&page=1> (July 25,2008)

³⁵ Hizb ut-Tahrir Turkey, “Islamın Demokrasi Hakkındaki Görüşü (Islam’s perception of democracy)” http://www.hilafet.com/kitaplar/hizb-ut_tahrir/index.htm (July 25,2008)

³⁶ Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, “Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Struggle for Khilafah”, <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/wshow/297> (July 25, 2008) “Hizb ut-Tahrir calls upon you to mobilise your forces and rally your ranks to help and support it in its work to establish the Khilafah state” See “O Muslims! Shape the Middle East by your own hands, for you are its rightful owners”, <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/152> (July 25,2008)

³⁷Hizb ut-Tahrir, *Draft Constitution Article 11*, [\(July 25, 2008\)](http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/english/constitution.htm)

³⁸ Hizb ut-Tahrir, *Draft Constitution Article 7*, [\(July 25, 2008\)](http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/english/constitution.htm)

Although the party claims that “*Hizb ut-Tahrir* has no association with any other Islamic or non-Islamic movement, party or organization by name or deed”³⁹ and there is no evidence revealing that this organization has been directly involved in terrorist attacks, the extent of the threat this group presents clear from its assistance to religious extremist movements, which challenges the secular character of the state. In justifying this assistance, Rashid makes reference to an interview he conducted with one of the movement’s leaders in Central Asia:

The HT supports the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and many HT members have fled to safety in Afghanistan... If the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) suddenly appears in Ferghana Valley, HT activists will not sit idly by and allow the security forces to kill them.⁴⁰

While Rashid’s writings are journalistic and not strictly academic his interviews with local people continue to be one of the most popular studies related to the region. With referring to periodicals of the organization, Zeyno Baran, claimed that, after 2001 HT started to demonstrate an inclination to approve the use of violent methods in their movements. In HT periodical *Al-Waie* dating to June 2001, it was stated that suicide attacks are an acceptable form of protesting activities. Baran also states that in March 2002, HT also claimed “suicide bombs in Israel are a legitimate tactic of war.”⁴¹

The Ideological motives of the organization represent an obstacle to any country, which tries to integrate itself to world economics and politics. According to the 186th article of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*’s draft constitution,

The State is forbidden to belong to any organization that is based on something other than Islam or which applies non-Islamic rules. This includes international organizations like the United Nations, the International Court of

³⁹ Hizb-ut Tahrir Media Office, “Does Hizb ut-Tahrir operate under any other name?” <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/english/about.htm#3> (July 25,2008)

⁴⁰ Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad*, p.134.

⁴¹ Zeyno Baran,S Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell, *Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia And the Caucasus: Implications for the EU*.

Justice, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and regional organizations like the Arab League.⁴²

In this context governments of Muslim post-Soviet countries, which have experienced a period of democratization, are in danger of being targeted by *Hizb ut-Tahrir*.

2.1.3.3. *Hizb ut-Tahrir* Operations in Uzbekistan

After the explosions in 2004 around the Israeli and the US embassies, and at the general prosecutor's office, which resulted in thirty and at least three casualties from Uzbek security forces, President Karimov held *Hizb ut-Tahrir* responsible for the attacks. After the blasts, Karimov stated, “the radical extremist organization Khizb ut-tahrir (Freedom Party) is behind the bloody terrorist acts in the Uzbek capital.”⁴³ The organization did not accept the responsibility and claimed that their operational method was non-violent.⁴⁴ However in the same speech, Karimov continued to assert that this organization uses violent means in order to achieve its goals.

Some international human rights organizations that take *Hizb ut-Tahrir* under their wing and protect them say they are innocent lambs. But if this group wanted to create a caliphate (Islamic state) and overthrow the government, how can they do it peacefully, without bloodshed?⁴⁵

⁴² *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, *Draft Constitution Article 186*, <http://www.hizbuttahrir.info/english/constitution.htm> (July 25,2008)

⁴³ Vilor Niyazmatov, “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan not involved in blasts-Karimov”, *ITAR-TASS World Service* (1 August 2004), available at Factiva database (April 3,2008)

⁴⁴ Malcolm Haslett, “Islamists blamed for Uzbek attacks”, *BBC News* (2 August 2 2004), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3528282.stm>, (April 3, 2008)

⁴⁵ BBC Monitoring Central Asia, “Embassy, earlier bombings blamed on same group” (1 August 2004)

The opposition of the Uzbek government to *Hizb ut-Tahrir* not only reveals its effort to protect the secular character of the state but also indicates its tolerance for different kinds of religious beliefs to coexist as long as they have a pacific character. Although members of a very minor *Shia* group in Uzbekistan believe that the government is not defending the right of Shias sufficiently, state approved imams of the group generally agree that “the country’s Shias do not have any difficulties with Uzbek authorities.”⁴⁶

On the other hand, the HT movement’s approach towards Shias is a considerable threat to public safety. By interviewing with local leaders of the organization, Ahmet Rashid sheds light on the *Hizb ut-Tahrir*’s attitude towards shias. “HT is violently anti-*Shia*; the group would expel all *Shia* Muslims from Central Asia if it came to power, a stance that would clearly alienate the *Shia* communities in Southern Uzbekistan.”⁴⁷ Consequently, *Hizb ut-Tahrir* threatens not only the secular principles of Uzbek state but also the region’s *Shia* minorities.

2.1.4. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

2.1.4.1. The Historical Background of IMU

Uzbek Islamists declared the formation of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 1996 and defined their primary goal as the removal of Karimov regime forcibly

⁴⁶ F18News, “Uzbekistan Tight Restrictions on Shia Muslim Minority”, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=307&pdf=Y (March 6, 2008)

⁴⁷ Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad*, p. 123.

and creation of the Islamic rule in Uzbekistan.⁴⁸ However later, they extended the scope of their activities into the whole of Central Asia and redefined their basic goal as the establishment of an Islamic state covering all Central Asia. “In the summer of 2001, the IMU announced it had renamed itself as the Islamic Party of Turkestan (IPT)”⁴⁹

It is generally assumed that IMU has bases in Tajikistan and northern part of Afghanistan. It is strongly associated with the Taliban ideology.⁵⁰ In return, IMU received money from bin Laden, safe heaven from the Taliban, and a hand in the drug trafficking trade between Afghanistan and Central Asia.”⁵¹

The Uzbek government’s strict policy with respect to Islamic groups after 1992-1993 prompted the leaders of the IMU, Tahir Yuldashev, a leader of the *Adalet* party, Jumbaoi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev (latter known as Juma Namangani), the movement’s military leader as well as their rank-and-file members to flee abroad, mainly to Afghanistan and Tajikistan, where the Islamic Tajik opposition (known as United Tajik Opposition or UTO) enjoyed considerable success in their struggle against the communist government of Tajikistan.⁵² After the crack down on Islamic groups in Uzbekistan, future members of the IMU volunteered in the Tajik civil war, survived and flourished in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Karimov’s fear of the movements in Afghanistan and Tajikistan was justified as these two countries provided bases to the terrorist organization which has become a threat to all Central Asian countries.

⁴⁸ Vitaly V. Naumkin, *Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*, p. 26.

⁴⁹ Svante E. Cornell and Regine A. Spector, “Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.25 No. 1 (Winter 2002), p. 205.

⁵⁰ Richard Weitz, “Storm Clouds Over Central Asia: Revival of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 27 No.6 (2004) p. 506.

⁵¹ MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”, <http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4075>, (March 08,2008)

⁵² Richard Weitz, “Storm Clouds Over Central Asia: Revival of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol.27No.6 (2004), p. 506.

2.1.4.2. IMU in Uzbekistan after 1999

IMU became the most important issue for the Uzbek government after the terrorist bombings of 16 February 1999. Six bombs were exploded in cars around the government buildings in Tashkent just before the Karimov's scheduled talking in Cabinets of Ministers.

Sixteen people were killed and upwards of 128 were injured. Several bombs exploded in Tashkent's central Mustakillik Square. At least one bomb went off outside the National Bank. Others detonated near outside the Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Nodirabegim.⁵³

In the following days, government accused IMU after arresting more than thirty suspects, and six terrorists held responsible for bombings were sentenced to death. The authorities believed that this was a sabotage planned in order to assassinate Karimov and to overthrow the government.⁵⁴ Since then, the Uzbek government intensified its precautions against religious activities. Nevertheless, IMU could somehow manage to initiate punitive campaigns in the Ferghana Valley in 1999, 2000 and 2001.⁵⁵

After Al-Qaida's attack on the U.S. on 11 September 2001, the Karimov government could find international assistance in its war on terrorism. Under the title of the American NADR (Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs)⁵⁶ Uzbekistan received considerable aid from the United States in order to combat terrorism. Even though there are some arguments that power of IMU was

⁵³ MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”, <http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4075>, (March 08,2008.)

⁵⁴ Vitaly V. Naumkin, *Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan* (California, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, 2003), p. 26.

⁵⁵ Center for Defense Information, “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”, <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm>, (March 08, 2008.)

⁵⁶ Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2003, Appendix: International Assistance Programs”, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ace/>, (April 20, 2007.)

almost destroyed during US-led war in Afghanistan, the organization continued to pose a potential threat to the security of Central Asia for two reasons.

First, operational bases of the organization not only consisted of the lands in Afghanistan but also throughout the Ferghana Valley. Second, IMU now considers itself to be the representative of a wider group composed of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, Uighur separatists, and Tajik and Kyrgyz Islamists, who together form the Islamic Movement of Central Asia.⁵⁷ In addition, it is also known that Islamic Jihad Group and *Jamaat* are now operating as the splinter groups of IMU.

It is clear to everybody that activities of IMU were obvious and their intention was to destroy the current government of Uzbekistan. Therefore, it is very natural that Uzbek authorities defined this group as an enemy who has been actually a part of its own society and did not hesitate to counteract it. Arguments about what the government should do in this context commonly miss the point that it's very hard for any government to secure the citizens when some of them were in purpose to destroy the regime.

Event though the rise of IMU is commonly accepted as a result of the Uzbek state's crackdowns on them after 1992, the transformation of their aims from the destruction of the Uzbek government to formation of an Islamic State in Central Asia proved that the nature of this organization was much more ideological than reactionary. If this organization was formed as a result of crackdowns by an individual country (Uzbekistan) then why was it attempting to widen its base of operations? It can be true that radicalism increases as a result of oppressive policies however it is also meaningless to assume that it would spontaneously vanish when Uzbek government makes progress in its social policies. It is clear that an

⁵⁷ Richard Weitz, "Storm Clouds Over Central Asia: Revival of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)," p. 506.

organization whose aim is to bring sharia to all Central Asian countries would increase its activities when they find a relaxed area to operate in the home country.

The Uzbek government went on to follow its strict policy against any kind of activities, which had the potential to foster radical Islamism. The *Ekremiye* group was, in this context, one of the social factions, which the Uzbek government perceived as a threat to the secular state.

2.1.5. The *Ekremiye* Movement

Although the state's authorities surely defined *Ekremiye* as an extremist Islamic organization, nature of the group has been very controversial. While scholars like Akiner, Husnuddinov and Babadjanov have argued that *Ekremiye* is a radical Islamic organization; people who were accused of being associated with the *Ekremiye* Movement insisted on that such an organization does not even exist.⁵⁸ After Andican Uprising on 12-13 May 2005, attention has focused on the *Ekremiye* movement, which was surely a brand new fraction to most.

Local experts have presented some important points to support their claim that *Ekremiye* is an Islamic organization whose aim is to replace the current regime of current government with an Islamic state. First point considered by Uzbek scholars is about the individual background of Ekrem Yuldashev, founder of the movement and father of the ideology shared by the members of this community.

⁵⁸ Alisher Ilkhamov, “The Phenomenology of “Akromiya”: Separating Facts from Fiction”, *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Volume 4 (2006) p. 39.

2.1.5.1. Leadership of The Ekremiye Group

Ekrem Yuldashev was born in 1963. After serving in the Soviet army he was selected as candidate for the party membership in the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. However, in 1991 he chose instead to become a member of Islamic party *Hizb ut-Tahrir*. In the following year he left the organization and declared he was to found his own group. It is ironic that while local experts who see the group as an Islamic radical organization point out that Ekrem Yuldashev was formerly a member of *Hizb ut-Tahrir* once and developed his first ideas here⁵⁹ accused members of this community stressed on his pacifist character by indicating that Yuldashev left the group just because “he dismissed the call for an Islamic State”⁶⁰ and contradicted with the operational methods of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*.

Ekrem Yuldashev was jailed on the charges of forming an illegal organization. He was released in 1994 due to the lack of evidence. Government detected his group’s ongoing activities and Yuldashev was arrested again in 1999. It was decided that his prison term would be nine and a half years.

Structure of the community and its activities were used as the evidences to accuse Yuldashev. Critical progress in the construction of sodality among Yuldashev’s followers started when local Andican businessman Bahrom Shakirov began to construct a business community, which would operate in accordance with the ideas of Yuldashev. In this framework Shakirov donated a large tract of land in Andican’s Bogi Shamol town with the aim of providing a base for followers of Yuldashev’s teaching to develop a local Islamic economy.

⁵⁹ Alisher Ilkhamov, “The Phenomenology of “Akromiya”: Separating Facts from Fiction”, p. 39.

⁶⁰ Alisher Ilkhamov, “The Phenomenology of “Akromiya”: Separating Facts from Fiction”, p. 39.

2.1.5.2. Organizational Structure of the Group IMU

From 1993 to 2005, “as many as 10 enterprises eventually opened on Shakirov's land, Yuldashev said, including a bakery, a hair salon, a cafeteria and a shoe factory. All the owners agreed to contribute a fifth of their profits to a charitable fund.”⁶¹

With the assistance from this fund, followers of Yuldashev could afford to promote studies on Islamic education. Their effort to popularize Yuldashev's personal interpretation of Islamic principles was identified by government as an illegal movement in violation of the state control on religious education. (Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations of 1991 required all religious activities and institution to be registered by state authorities.)⁶²

Information on the group's organizational structure can only be obtained from the investigations of a professional team assembled by the public prosecutor of Uzbekistan in 2005. At the conference of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on 2 May 2006, a member of this expert group, Bakhtiyor Babadjanov stated that;

Trusted members of the organization (*Itoatchilar* – “subordinates”) searched for appropriate candidates to fill vacancies. These candidates (*Yollanma ishchilar* – “hired”) would go through a number of preliminary interviews and be offered lump-sum financial assistance. Then, should an *Yollanma ishchilar* seem to be inclined to adopt the ideas of the organization and pass vigorous background checks, he became an *Itoatchi* - a regular member of the organization. Inside an enterprise, workers were divided into *khalka* (“cells”) of 3 to 7 people, led by *Peshqadamlar* (“leaders”). The *Hos moddiy ma'su*

⁶¹ N.C. Aizenman, “The Eye of the Uzbek Storm”, *Washington Post Foreign Service*, Sunday, May 29, 2005, p. A16, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27664-2005May29.html> (March 14, 2008)

⁶² Annette Bohr, *Uzbekistan, Politics and Foreign Policy* (Great Britain, Royal Institute of International Relations, 1998), p.29.

(“supervisor”) was in charge of production, while the *Hos ruhiy ma'sul* (“supervising religious leader”) was responsible for ideology.⁶³

2.1.5.3. The Ideology of the Ekremiye Group IMU

At this point it is very important to understand the ideology and nature of this seemingly commercial organization. “*Yimonga Yu*” [*İmana Yol* in Turkish]- “Road to faith” written by Ekrem Yuldashev and the alleged supplement of this text which clearly defines the stages of an Islamic revolution are the most important sources, which reveal ideological motives of the group. There is no evidence that any adherent of Yuldashev’s “*Yimonga Yul*” raised political demand for an Islamic State.

Nevertheless, according to local experts and the Uzbek government, the principles laid out in these texts functioned as a guide for an Islamic revolution and followers of Yuldashev’s teaching would ultimately come into action when the conditions become ripe. Government officials also used this supplement⁶⁴ to support the view that *Ekremiye* is an Islamic organization and has certain objectives

At a speech in 1999 Yuldashev himself said that “Having written a religious book, I wanted to call people to the truth and kindness to each other.”⁶⁵ However it was obvious from prior developments that this call had eventually led to the formation of an organized group.

⁶³ Bakhtiyor Babadjanov, *Akramia: A Brief Summary*, (Tashkent, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Paper, 2 May 2006),
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=881&&prog=zru> (March 23, 2008)

⁶⁴ This document was presented in the trial of 23 businessmen and used to indicate accuracy of the accusations against them.

⁶⁵ Alisher Ilkhamov, “The Phenomenology of “Akromiya”: Separating Facts from Fiction”, *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Volume4 No.(2006) p. 43.

Zuhridin Husnuddinov, rector of Tashkent University and a special advisor to Karimov on spiritual issues from 2001 to 2005⁶⁶ translated and interpreted five stages of “Yimonga Yul” as follows:

“Stage 1 “Sirli” (secret), the goal of which is the recruiting of new members of the movement;

Stage 2 “Moddii” (material), directing the accumulation of the movement’s financial potential;

Stage 3 “Ma’navii” (moral-spiritual), the goal of which is the indoctrination of the movement’s members;

Stage 4 “Uzvii maidon” (organic union), the essence of which is the infiltration into state institutions;

Stage 5 “Tuntarish” (translated as violent coup d'état), the final point of which is the establishment of a new state order based on *Shariat*, beginning at a local, followed by the central level.”⁶⁷

These objectives in the text seem to be very similar to methods of *Hizb ut-Tahrir* which is available on the official website of the organization. The operational method of the HT consists of three stages. The first stage reveals the importance of cultivating people to generate the idea, the second stage requires educated people to interact with the *Ummah* (worldwide Muslim community) and form an organized group; and third stage foresees the seizure of political power; the establishment and the employment of the ideology through *Ummah*.⁶⁸ These stages also seem to be compatible with some of the stages in “Road to Faith.” Such as, *Sirli*: accumulation

⁶⁶ Sarah Kendizor, “Inventing Akromiya: The Role of Uzbek Propagandists in the Andijon Massacre”, *Demokratizatsiya* (2006) , http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200610/ai_n17194604, (March 14,2008)

⁶⁷ Alisher Ilkhamov, “The Phenomenology of “Akromiya”: Separating Facts from Fiction”, p.39. The translation Ilkhamov used was cited from Husnuddinov, *Islam: Movements, Currents, Sects*, (Tashkent: National Encyclopedia of Uzbekistan, 2000)

⁶⁸ Hizb ut-Tahrir, “The Method of Hizb-ut Tahrir”, <http://www.hizbuttahrir.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=6&page=2>, (March 14, 2008)

of new members, *Uzvii maidon*: penetration into state institutions and *Tuntarish*: formation of an Islamic government evoke the methods of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*.⁶⁹

While Husnuddinov translated the fifth stage as a violent coup d'etat, Bakhtiyor Babadjanov interpreted it as “*Akhirat*”⁷⁰ (outcome), which means an evolutionary progression and does not necessarily require any violent use of force to change the current regime. Even though Uzbek scholars have interpreted the nature of movement differently it was their common view that Yuldashev’s ideas would ultimately lead a regime change in favor of an Islamic state. From this point of view, it can be assumed that no matter the nature of movement was evolutionary or revolutionary, what scared government was ultimate change of the current regime.

Relatives of the accused businessmen claimed that Uzbek authorities fabricated the supplement to Yuldashev’s *Yimonga Yul* in order to justify their position on the eyes of international media. However, First Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Uzbekistan Anvar Nabiev denied these claims.⁷¹ Although the author of this supplement is not known, it strengthened the idea that there is a strong similarity between *Ekremiye* and *Hizb ut-Tahrir*.

Even though the authenticity of this last document is debatable, the existence of “a group” consciousness is obvious. Although nature of the group may not be revolutionary, it nevertheless poses “a potential” threat to the secular character of the state. It is evidently seen that followers of Yuldashev applied spiritual principles in commercial activities; this kind of activities impacted on social life of group

⁶⁹ Alisher Ilkhamov, “The Phenomenology of “Akromiya”: Separating Facts from Fiction”, p.39. The translation Ilkhamov used was cited from Husnuddinov, *Islam: Movements, Currents, Sects*, (Tashkent: National Encyclopedia of Uzbekistan, 2000)

⁷⁰ Bakhtiyor Babadjanov, “The Fergana Valley: Source or Victim of Islamic Fundamentalism, Central Asia and Caucasus”, <http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/10.babadzh.shtml> (March 14,2008)

⁷¹ Sarah Kendizor, “Inventing Akromiya: The Role of Uzbek Propagandists in the Andijon Massacre”,

members and it was enough for Karimov to determine that *Ekremiye* is a part of “a religious threat” in Uzbekistan.

Public support to the group has the potential to turn this social network to a political faction, which shall possibly claim power in a democratic system. Karimov expressed his concerns on the religious activities by stating that, "Attempts to artificially implant democratic processes in Uzbekistan can lead to third forces making use of the situation. These third forces are Islamic fundamentalists."⁷²

The precautionary policies of Karimov government to eliminate this possibility should be evaluated in this context. From this perspective, discrimination between moderate Islamists and radicals did not mean much to Karimov. What the government perceived as a threat was not only armed action but also political and social means that would have potential to inspire such religious activities.

More restrictive policies against this faction started after bombing attacks of July 2004. Even though Islamic Jihad Group took the responsibility for the attacks,⁷³ the government continued to be more careful on possible formation of any other religious organization.

⁷² BBC Monitoring Newsfile, “Uzbek leader warns against ‘artificial’ democratization” 14 May 2005

⁷³ Zeyno Baran, S Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell, “Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia And the Caucasus: Implications for the EU.”

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC FACTORS BEHIND THE UPRISING

Most of the western scholars and analysts interpreted the Andican Uprising as a primary result of an economic dissatisfaction of the people. Since complaints about poor economic conditions were voiced during the uprising, observers concluded that the reason for this violent event should be attributed to an economic squeeze prior to the uprising.

The IMF had reported the economic condition of Uzbekistan as very prosperous. According to IMF reports released in March 2005, GDP growth in Uzbekistan was approximately 7,5 percent. Although this figures indicates a recovery in Uzbek economy, local residents of Andican claimed, “GDP growth here is not improving the lives of ordinary people.”⁷⁴ For many experts of the region, deterioration in the economic conditions of Uzbekistan and its political problems endangered the security and social stability.

Structural reforms in economics are strongly needed to promote better living conditions in Uzbekistan but the political elite has not been willing to accept

⁷⁴ International Crisis Group, *The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan*, (Brussels: ICG, 2005) p. 5.

alterations that would undermine their privileged status. There are several explanations of why GDP growth did not increase but actually worsened the living standards of Uzbek citizens. Restrictive regulations related to the border trade and bazaars, the inability to use oil reserves, strict monetary policies and agrarian disturbances all together contributed to discontent in Uzbek society.

3.1. Economics in Uzbekistan After the Collapse of the Soviet Union

Before explaining the recent implications of the general economic structure, which created a discontent among Uzbek citizens, the rationale of the government behind its economic policies and phases of economic transition after the collapse of the Soviet Union should be explored. This facilitates an understanding of the microeconomic implications of the Uzbekistan's destructive macroeconomic policies for small sized entrepreneurs and the greater part of the population.

In the Soviet system, almost all the republics were dependent upon each other in terms of the flow of raw materials. After the collapse of the Soviet former republics that had previously been designated by the central government as suppliers of raw materials were left with little or no production capacity for consumer goods. Moreover, each republic had been obliged to focus on the supply of a specific commodity. This structure left former Soviet republics vulnerable to the economic deficiencies.

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union Uzbekistan “ran a trade deficit in consumption goods, machinery and fuel, and ran a trade surplus in agricultural

production and light industry.”⁷⁵ Especially the cotton production alone accounted for 2/3 of the GDP in Uzbekistan before the collapse.⁷⁶ Uzbekistan imported oil and energy required for almost all of its consumption despite the existence of “estimated gas reserves of more than 1 trillion cubic meters it produced more than 10 per cent of the union’s natural gas in the 1980s.”⁷⁷

3.1.1. Financial Goals of the Uzbek Administration after Independence

Within this inherently interdependent structure Karimov identified his goal as the construction of a self-sufficient economy that would reduce the negative effects of economic stagnation in other former republics. Although there was no officially planned schedule for the transition period, it was obvious that ruling elite would apply to the centralized state control in the first years of the transition to market economy.⁷⁸

“During the initial years of transition, the country had to spend more than US\$ 1 billion annually for the import of wheat and energy products alone, which together accounted for about 40 per cent of the country’s total import bill.”⁷⁹ That is why the Uzbek government tried to achieve economic independence. Increasing the capacity for domestic production to decrease the dependence was the centerpiece of initial policies.

⁷⁵ Kobil Ruziev; Dipak Ghosh; Sheila C. Dow, “The Uzbek Puzzle Revisited: An Analysis of Performance in Uzbekistan since 1991,” *Central Asian Survey* 26, no.1 (2007), p. 9.

⁷⁶ Asian Development Bank, “Key Indicators: 2006”, <http://www.adb.org/Statistics/ki.asp> (May 27,2008)

⁷⁷ Kobil Ruziev; Dipak Ghosh; Sheila C. Dow, “The Uzbek Puzzle Revisited: An Analysis of Performance in Uzbekistan since 1991”, p. 10.

⁷⁸ Islam Karimov, *Uzbekistan on The Threshold of The Twenty-first Century*, (Cambridge, MA: Curzon, 1997)

⁷⁹ Kobil Ruziev,p. 17.

The transformation from an agricultural base to industrialized one necessitated increasing the budget for investment in industry. In this context the rural sector of the population was sacrificed to the development of industry and consequently most of the Uzbek citizens could not take advantage of the progress in industrial development. Lower subsidies to farmers combined with higher utility bills created discontent in the society.

In addition, the budget necessary for industrialization of the economy under state control was provided through strict price control over raw materials and a high rate of taxation on imported goods. As a result, macroeconomic success in Uzbekistan did not create welfare on a microeconomic scale. The economic policies of Uzbek government, which were conducted to decrease vulnerability and dependency of country, showed mercantilist inclinations.

However, in the initial phases of the transition, the variety of domestically produced consumer goods remained limited. Moreover, the Uzbek population, most of which were living in rural areas and had a low level of income because of the state price controls⁸⁰ of cotton and other targeted products, could not afford the high prices of imported consumption goods.

These factors led low-income holders to obtain imported consumer goods illegally, which decreased the burden of high rate of taxes. Thus the amplification in illegal transactions became the very characteristic of the Uzbek economy. “World Bank statistics placed the informal sector in Uzbekistan at a modest 34% of GNP, however many Uzbeks would argue that the actual figure is much higher, totaling almost half of the private sector activity in the country.”⁸¹

⁸⁰ Kobil Ruziev, Dipak Ghosh, Sheila C.Dow, “The Uzbek puzzle revisited: an analysis of economic performance in Uzbekistan since 1991,” p. 20.

⁸¹ Elena Suhir, *Good Intentions and Bad Consequences: How Over regulation Impedes Uzbekistan’s Growth*, (Washington, Center for International Private Enterprise, 2004), p. 1.

Under these conditions the Uzbek government introduced new rules for eliminating the unregistered economic activity in the country. However these new regulations could not legitimize the informal economic activities but rather tried to eliminate them and in so doing even increased their frequency.

3.2. Agrarian Disturbances

Agrarian problems are one of the most important sources of social unrest in Uzbekistan where “65 percent of the population is rural, and 35 percent of the labor population is active in agriculture.”⁸²

The most problematical feature of government’s agrarian policy was about its strict price controls on strategic products. Farmers were required to cultivate certain products the amounts of which were determined by the government. Producers who could not meet the quota were obliged to sell all of their goods to the government at the very below the market prices.

The state order system is being liberalized as the percentage of the crop that must be sold to the state has been reduced—down to 30% for cotton and 25% for grain by 1998—but these numbers are misleading. If a farm produces less than its target output of cotton, then the entire crop must be sold through the state order system.⁸³

Under these circumstance farmers are consequently prohibited to sell any part of their harvest at the market value. State order price is very low in Uzbekistan when compared to the prices in neighboring countries. In 2004 state order prices for

⁸² Max Spoor, “Uzbekistan Agrarian Transition”, http://www.sls.wau.nl/mi/mgs/publications/activitiespapers/041028%20Spoor_minisymposium.pdfb (June 28, 2008)

⁸³ Richard Pomfret, “Agrarian Reform in Uzbekistan: Why Has the Chinese Model Failed to Deliver?” *Journal of Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 48 (January 2000), p.273.

cotton varied between 50,000 and 80,000 sums (\$50-\$80) per ton, while in Kyrgyzstan, prices over which farmers sold their cotton ranged from 10,000-13,000 Kyrgyz soms (\$250-\$320) per ton.⁸⁴

In the case that farmers produce more than the quota, standard price which government mandated for given goods was applied only to the half of their total output. In such cases even if farmers were allowed to sell the remainder of their harvest at market prices, direct transactions between private entrepreneurs were still limited. All international trade deals are subject to the strict supervision of government.

Cotton is considered as a ‘strategic good’ and the private sector is not allowed to buy it directly from farmers. As a corollary, cotton producers have no other choice than to sell their product to state owned cotton marketing chain at a higher than state order price, but still much lower than the world market price.⁸⁵

Before Andican uprising, the financial implications of the government’s agricultural policy were more keenly felt, because of the heavy rains in the spring of 2003. Farmers faced difficulties to meet the expected quotas of cotton. “Cotton yield decreased from 3.2 million tons in 2002 to 2.85 million tons and the production volume of cotton fiber dropped by more than 6 percent to 945.thousand tons.”⁸⁶ Consequently they had to sell all they got from the harvest to the government at the very low state prices and their income from the harvest decreased remarkably in this year.

⁸⁴ International Crisis Group, *The Curse of Cotton: The Central Asia’s Destructive Monoculture- Asia Report N°93* (Brussels: ICG, 2005) p. 5.

⁸⁵ Kobil Ruziev, Dipak Ghosh, Sheila C.Dow, “The Uzbek puzzle revisited: an analysis of economic performance in Uzbekistan since 1991”, p. 20.

⁸⁶ Grzegorz Zasada, “Uzbekistan: The Major Source of Instability in Central Asia” in *Working Papers - Programa CEI & Países Bálticos*, No. 17, (Buenos Aires: Argentine Center of International Studies, 2005) p. 70.

Another failure of the agricultural policy in the production of cotton was structural. “To redistribute revenue from agriculture to other sectors; and improve rural standards of living”⁸⁷ were other goals of the government. However in practice these two goals contradicted with each other. High taxes on cotton production were collected to provide income, which was to be channeled to other sectors, but this process did not improve the living conditions of rural population.

Since a higher amount of cotton production meant higher tax payments, farmers showed an inclination to produce not more than government quota. This also created an obstacle for the government to increase the production of cotton, which has important share in the Uzbekistan’s total export revenues. (60% of the export revenues in Uzbekistan come from cotton and the contribution of cotton to the country’s total GDP in 2000 was 12.9%)⁸⁸

This reaction of farmers against high taxation accelerated the deficiency of the agricultural economy in Uzbekistan. The most problematic feature of this structure was the continuation of old fashioned *kolkhoz* system under the new name of *shirkat* [firm or company]. The concept of *shirkat* was used in Uzbekistan to identify cooperative agricultural entities, which are the subdivisions of older *kolkhozes*.

These *shirkats* were very similar to *kolkhozes* because they were mainly determined by the state mandate on what crop was to be produced and what the

⁸⁷ Maurizio Guadagni, Dilshod Khidirov, Cotton Taxation in Uzbekistan - ECSSD Working Paper No 41 (Washington, Published by The World Bank, 2006), p. 5.

⁸⁸ Food and Agricultural Organization of United Nations, Meeting Report, “The Contributions of Cotton to Economy and food Security in Developing Countries.” p. 5.
http://www.icac.org/Meetings/cgtn_conf/documents/11_fortucci.pdf (June 29, 2008)

prices of these goods would be.⁸⁹ In this system *shirkats* function as the local representatives of central administration and control whether or not farmers meet the required quota.

Shirkat administrations have an important role in redistribution of lands and the collective farms to individual families. These group farms are called private but no individual farmer actually owns these lands. Redistribution of these collective farms was a matter of land leasing. The property rights, which result from these contracts, are very limited. According to the leasing contracts “the *shirkat* administration provides inputs (seeds and fertilizer) and buys the product”⁹⁰

In addition to the restraint over property rights, corruptions of *shirkat* administration also fostered discontent among farmers. For instance, “ the local administration of the region in which the *shirkat* is located decides applications for private farms in a process plagued with corruption and lack of transparency. Often the best lands go to former *shirkat* bosses.”⁹¹ Moreover, farmers had to plant most of the land they leased with state ordered crops. “*Shirkats* produce 60 percent of the cotton crop but most are loss making.”⁹² If they violated the mandate, the local administration had the right to interrupt the flow of water and break the lease. In such cases farmers were again confined to producing crops, to be sold over at low procurement prices leading to bankruptcy.

State control over cotton prices was not the only cause of increasing dissatisfaction among Uzbek farmers, but it also was a source of tension among the country’s interest groups. “Controlling the procurement and export of cotton and

⁸⁹ Alisher Ilkhamov, “Shirkats, Dekhqon farmers and others: Farm restructuring in Uzbekistan”, *Central Asian Survey* 17, no.4 (1998), p. 544.

⁹⁰ International Crisis Group, *The Curse of Cotton: The Central Asia’s Destructive Monoculture- Asia Report N°93* (Brussels: ICG, 2005) p. 3.

⁹¹ International Crisis Group, *The Curse of Cotton: The Central Asia’s Destructive Monoculture- Asia Report N°93*, p. 3.

⁹² International Crisis Group, *The Curse of Cotton: The Central Asia’s Destructive Monoculture- Asia Report N°93*, p. 3.

distribution channels of export proceeds was obviously source of wealth for some people and groups and cause of rivalry between interest groups”⁹³ For example, Ismail Jurabekov, the leader of a Samarkand clan had a strong position in the country and the reason of that reputation was his control over the cotton business in Uzbekistan. This indicates that an elite group earning money over the existing policies also holds important positions in decision-making mechanism of the state and this elite group has usually been reluctant to alter status quo.

3.3. Financial Regulations preceding the Andican Uprising

3.3.1. Restrictions on Access to Cash

Restrictions on the use of cash in Uzbekistan was one of the factors, which led small and medium sized entrepreneurs increasingly to operate in informal sector. “In July 1996, a complete electronic payment clearing system was introduced by the Central Bank, covering whole Uzbekistan.”⁹⁴ Banking regulations in Uzbekistan introduced strict conditions on entrepreneurs’ withdrawal of money from their own accounts. Permission to individuals to use their own money was subjected to the control of bank staff, which evaluated the limited conditions under which withdrawal was allowed.⁹⁵ “Cash withdrawals by legal entities are only permitted for payment of wages and travel expenses. Cash receipts must be deposited on the same day are

⁹³ Grzegorz Zasada, “Uzbekistan: The Major Source of Instability in Central Asia”, p. 69.

⁹⁴ Alexandre Akimov, Brian Dollery, *The Financial System of Uzbekistan: An Evaluation of Twelve Years of Transition* (Portland, University of New England, 2004), p. 13.

⁹⁵ Elena Suhir, *Good Intentions Bad Consequence: How Over regulation Impedes Uzbekistan Growth*, p. 2.

received.”⁹⁶ Therefore this regulation put the unregistered entities out of business space. Not only were commercial activities in the country were restricted by this legislation but social ones were as well. Only verified, non-governmental organizations could operate within the country, consequently the independent formation of a civil society was restricted by limitations on the circulation of cash.

3.3.1.1. Role of IMF in the Restriction of Access to Cash

In 2002, the Uzbek government made a new agreement with the IMF and adopted a unified foreign exchange regime. This agreement meant that the liberation of Uzbek financial system would begin. The government consequently agreed to abolish the limitations on cash withdrawal, restrictive banking regulations, and credit policy. In order to keep its promises the government of Uzbekistan tried to decrease the supply of foreign currency available to unregistered economic activities.

Demand was reduced by putting tough constraints on the “consumers,” which are predominantly small businesses (including so called “shuttle traders”) that did not have access to official sources of foreign exchange. The supply of foreign exchange was encouraged by creating a shortage of local currency (through delays in wage payments) forcing the population to exchange their foreign currency cash savings to pay for everyday expenses.⁹⁷

The Uzbek government required local administrators and commercial banks to increase their control of cash circulation in order to stop the continuous devaluation of the Uzbek currency. The increase of the National Bank of

⁹⁶ United States- Department Of State, “Investment Climate Statements in 2007– Uzbekistan”, <http://www.state.gov/e/eib/ifd/2007/80761.htm> (June 22, 2008)

⁹⁷ Alexandre Akimov, Brian Dollery, *The Financial System of Uzbekistan: An Evaluation of Twelve Years of Transition*, p. 34.

Uzbekistan's cash assets from 2.717 billion Uzs to 3.265 billion Uzs proved that monetary policies of the government were successful in macroeconomic terms.⁹⁸

3.3.1.2. Social Implications of the Restriction

Although macroeconomic successes were attained in the country, discontent over government's financial policies increased among individual firms, traders and ordinary citizens because of the following reasons.

First, the new rule about the circulation of cash also raised fines for companies that could not deposit their cash receipts in a bank. Their unwillingness was primarily due to the long process of withdrawal and restrictions on access to cash, as a consequence of which officially registered companies suffered, and the number of small enterprises that operated in the informal sector increased.

Second, as a requirement of the law in force, all transactions between private firms in Uzbekistan had to be conducted through bank accounts. However, due to the shortage of cash in the country, Uzbek traders suffered from delays in cash delivery, which caused problems especially when cash flow is strongly required in order to complete the production of the goods ordered. Delays in the delivery of cash caused breakdowns in rural areas, too. Farmers who could not withdraw their returns from banks in a timely manner could not pay workers' wages. Consequently the negative

⁹⁸ National Bank of Uzbekistan, "Annual Report 2003",
<http://209.85.135.104/search?q=cache:i0iom1fCH8sJ:eng.nbu.com/finances/yeareport/2003.php+2001+decree+of+Uzbek+government+tighten+the+control+of+cash+circulation&hl=tr&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=tr> (June 21, 2008)

effects of restriction on cash circulation extended to the daily lives of the rural population.⁹⁹

Third, on 24 September 2004 the Uzbek government decreed that “retail spaces larger than 150 square meters, would be issued licenses only if they had the capability to handle [credit] card transactions.”¹⁰⁰ This decree was issued in order to decrease the use of cash in Uzbekistan, and to change the increasingly informal nature of the economy. The government’s efforts at making a rapid transition, however, failed to realize that the bulk of citizens in the country were operating in bazaars and still using cash for retail purchases.

These regulations left small sized entrepreneurs whose capital was insufficient to open registered stores without the chance to obtain a license for trade. These conditions consequently provided them no other alternatives than to choose between resistance against the government or withdrawal from commerce. This problem, combined with a loss of public confidence towards the banks, caused great discontent both in the business sector and among the ordinary people of Uzbekistan.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Grzegorz Zasada, “Uzbekistan: The Major Source of Instability in Central Asia”, p. 71.

¹⁰⁰ International Crisis Group. *Andijon Uprising -Asia Briefing Report No.38* (Bishkek /Brussels: ICG, 2005), p. 12.

¹⁰¹ In Uzbekistan, the share of state owned banks in total assets was 75% in 2004. Thus Uzbek banking system can be perceived as an implementation tool of state’s policy. People deposited money in bank had experienced difficulties for taking their money back as cash. Also banks have a right to transfer taxes from private accounts without informing the holders.

3.3.2. Regulations on Border Security and Customs

Certification problem and corruption of customs officers remain as two important problems for traders in Uzbekistan. Imported goods are required to have bear certifications and excessive customs documents consisting of a contract, a certification of conformity (in the case of certain products), a certificate of origin, the passport of an import deal signed by importer's bank and a customs officer. All imported goods must be labeled in Uzbek and include veterinary certificates.

The point was actually not the number of documents but arbitrary control of customs officers over them. Border controls were increased, in addition to the practice of using debits cards, which was applied in order to decrease the scope of unregistered economy.

Border controls were consequently increased. "In January 2003, customs administration began to impose harsh measurement on goods crossing borders."¹⁰² However this control policy could not succeed because of the increasing corruption on involving border controls. Many entrepreneurs reported that these officers used their authority to derive improper personal benefit. They had right to confiscate and to sell the goods that lacked the necessary documentation. It became a habit for customs officers to take bribes in return of their approval to imported goods.

On May 2003 Uzbek government issued a decree, which "introduced new customs tariffs for goods imported by private persons (mostly shuttle traders) in the amount of 50 percent for food items and industrial equipment and in the amount of 90 percent for other goods"¹⁰³ While increasing the burden on individual

¹⁰² Elena Suhir, *Good Intentions Bad Consequences, How Over regulation Impedes Uzbekistan Growth*, p. 4.

¹⁰³ Paolo Verme, "Macro Economic Policies and Social Unrest in Uzbekistan," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 22, no. 3 (2006), p. 279.

entrepreneurs whose capital was not sufficient to found a registered company, the tax rate applied to the larger company owners was reduced from 40-45 % to 30 %.¹⁰⁴ One can infer from this data that high rate of taxes on customs for shuttle traders contributed to the success of the government's macroeconomic policies, which clearly benefited registered formally registered companies.

However, the extent to which lower income earners benefited from this success is an open question. The government implemented strict customs controls in order to control the illegal shuttle trade; but this policy added a new twist to the problems of small-scale traders who also suffered from unofficial burden of bribery.

3.3.3. New Rules for Sellers in Bazaars

Contrary to the expected results, the Uzbek government's policies on domestic economy caused the growth of the activities of the informal economy, and increased the number of people who earned money from black market. The illegal shuttle trade allowed low capital businesses to import cheap goods from China. Kyrgyzstan played a crucial role in promoting a base for the black market operation. A bazaar located in the Kara Su town near the Osh City in Kyrgyzstan territory was used by Uzbek entrepreneurs and wholesalers as the center for their transactions.¹⁰⁵ As a result of this economical structure, domestic trade was also concentrated in the local bazaars where local traders could sell the commodities they obtained over the Kyrgyz border.

¹⁰⁴ International Monetary Fund, *Republic of Uzbekistan: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper-Country Report No.05/59* (Washington D.C,IMF, 2005)

¹⁰⁵ Gene Daniels, "Uzbekistan and Central Asia, Problematic Trade Policies", *The Journal of Turkish Weekly* (10 March 2005), <http://www.turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=441> (May 22, 2008)

But in June 2003, Uzbek Government officials issued an ordinance, decree 1150, according to which “clothes and other goods would have to be sold in shops or closed stands, to be built at markets for \$3,000 to \$5,000, a price few traders could afford”.¹⁰⁶ After all these warning signs, the government began to implement its decision to eliminate the local bazaars. In 2004 officials decided to destroy most of these bazaars in order to construct legal business venues, to control the quality of imported goods, and to decrease the share of unregistered activities within the Uzbek economy. “On 10 September 2004, on orders of mayor, Saydullo Begaliyev, government bulldozers began demolishing some 600 trading booths near Andijon’s congregational mosque.”¹⁰⁷

Ghani Rustamov, Deputy Governor of Fergana Province, stated on 23 December 2004 that,

Our goal is to put imported goods under control, because many imports do not have certificates, and can be dangerous for health. With some of the clothes people are bringing from China, if you light a match near them, they'll go up in flames or cause allergies. Those who import must answer for safety and cleanliness of their goods. They need to have legal status and legal accountability. Yes, we are charging higher import duties for individual traders than for legal entities. Why? Our goal is to encourage people to become legal entities with greater accountability. If someone can afford to act as an individual trader, fine, let him pay. We've been explaining this on television since September, but there were some misunderstandings.¹⁰⁸

However the real factor behind these policies was the government's fear of an outflow of currency. As a necessity of structural integration program of the IMF, the Uzbek Sum became convertible to foreign currencies after 2001.¹⁰⁹ Under these conditions, restrictions other than import tariffs were needed by government to

¹⁰⁶ International Crisis Group, *The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan*, p. 5.

¹⁰⁷ International Crisis Group, *Andijon Uprising*, p. 9.

¹⁰⁸ International Crisis Group, *Andijon Uprising*, p. 14.

¹⁰⁹ Martin Spechler, “Returning to Convertibility in Uzbekistan”, *Journal of Economic Policy Reform*, 6, no.1, p 55.

control the rate of import and to promote the use of currency for domestic production.

Therefore, combined with restriction on access to cash and strict controls on borders, new constraints on import for small and medium sized entrepreneurs who mainly operated in bazaars were introduced. The destruction of local bazaars formed only one component of this macroeconomic policy but resulted in an increase of unemployment rates and social unrest. By 2000, the contribution of small and medium sized enterprises to employment in Uzbekistan was approximately 50%.¹¹⁰ With these new rules relating to the bazaars, the hidden rate of unemployment increased, especially around rural Andican where residents now could no longer trade at the Karasu Bazaar and cross the border to Osh in order to trade for a higher profit. As a corollary of these restrictive government regulations, tensions between the government and Uzbek society increased.

3.4. Gas and Oil Shortages

Gas and petrol shortages in Uzbekistan were one of the most significant economic difficulties, which Uzbek citizens had to face prior to the Andican Uprising. The global increase on oil prices may have been one of the most conspicuous reasons for the shortage but the government monopoly in the oil industry was another factor affecting the local supply of gas and oil.

¹¹⁰ Nurullo A Khalmurzaev, “Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in the Transition Economy of Uzbekistan: Conditions and Perspectives” *Central Asian Survey* 19, no.2 (2000)), p. 288.

Self-sufficiency project of the government in the petroleum industry proved to be unattainable. According to Uzbek experts, “New technology could boost production, they say, but instead, cost-cutting and poor management have led to the rapid exhaustion of oil fields.”¹¹¹ During the cold winter of 2004 Uzbek citizens had attempted to demonstrate their anger at electricity cuts and gas shortages to the authorities.

“On 1 December 2004, in the Andican province village of Marhamat, some 300 people, angered at electricity cuts, blocked the Osh- Fergana highway and hurled stones at passing cars. A vehicle of the regional electric department was also attacked.”¹¹² Daily problems of the people in the context of these shortages also contributed to dissatisfaction expressed in the Andican Uprising.

It is clear from the above account that Uzbek officials aimed to decrease the share of unregistered activities in the economy. Uzbek government officials thought that Uzbekistan could improve its economy only by restricting import and promoting local production. In 2002 the Uzbek government had placed 70% tax on imported goods and tried to increase the extent of domestic production under state control.

The government also decreed legal regulations in order to control informal trade. Strict monetary policy was implemented and some controls on taxation, licensing, certification and payment were made. However these regulations created difficulty for small and medium sized entrepreneurs in the country and caused the emergence of a system, which would allow only an elite class to participate into the business sector and to benefit from.

¹¹¹ Ian Macwilliam, “Uzbekistan Facing Oil Crisis” *BBC News*, 10 November 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4424476.stm> (May 21,2008)

¹¹² International Crisis Group, *Uzbekistan Reform Program: Illusion or Reality? Asia Report 46* , (Brussels: ICG, 2003)

From this perspective the problem between public and the administration seems to be stemming from contradictory relationship between the macroeconomic goals of the Uzbek government and general characteristics of small and medium sized business sector in the country.

It would be natural for any transitional economy for long run macroeconomic prosperity to be attained at the expense of short-term individual assets. However in the Uzbek case what dramatically decreased the social stability, was that forfeit of the economic policies had to be paid by the lower income earners of the society while an elite group strengthened its advantageous position. As a result, tension between this elite group and lower income earners increased year over year.

CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND DOMESTIC POLITICS IN THE UPRISING

In addition to the increasing activities of fundamentalist groups, regional conjuncture also affected the government perspective regarding the *Ekremiye* group. U.S. support to moderate Islam in Central Asia¹¹³ and the colored revolutions in neighboring countries were other factors, which led Karimov to assume that religious groups in the country had a considerable potential to change the government.

Some experts charge that President Bush bears some responsibility for raising the expectations of people in places like Uzbekistan. In a speech given to crowds in Georgia just three days before the Andijon uprising, Mr. Bush called for the expansion of freedom throughout the region. "Now, across the Caucasus, in Central Asia, and in the broader Middle East, we see the same desire for liberty burning in the hearts of young people. They are demanding their freedom - and they will have it," Bush said.¹¹⁴

Hill and Jones have argued that "Karimov saw Andijan as a clear sign that Uzbekistan was now infected with the contagion of revolt from Colored Revolution.

¹¹³ For further information on U.S support to moderate Islam see: Graham E. Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2002, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020301faessay7971/graham-e-fuller/the-future-of-political-islam.html>, (April 3, 2008)

¹¹⁴ Christian Science Monitor, "Uzbeki relations with US, Russia tested ; Tuesday, protesters demonstrated in front of the US embassy in Tashkent asking for American assistance", (18 May 2005)

[”]¹¹⁵ From this perspective, Karimov believed that these revolutionary movements in Central Asian countries stemmed from their domestic problems but were provoked by the U.S. which wished to raise allied governments and to strengthen its hand in opposition to the Russia’s regional dominance.

4.1. United States –Uzbekistan Relations before the Andican Uprising

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan turned its face toward the west in order to distance from the Russia’s sphere of influence. The Uzbek government was clearly aware that the economic assistance needed for its transition could only be provided by the American financial institutions.

U.S. was also keen to construct good relations with Central Asian countries including Uzbekistan, because of the following reasons. First, the United States of America wanted to provide balance of power with Russia and China; in this context, as the closest region to both, Central Asia had considerable significance. The Caspian basin’s¹¹⁶ potential and proven 360 trillion cubic feet gas and 140 billion barrels oil reserves¹¹⁷ were an important reason of why the U.S. wanted to increase its influence in Central Asia against Russia. On 22 July 1997 U.S. senate Martha Brill Olcott had told that

It is Central Asia’s wealth of course, which has sparked the American interest in the region. While U.S. policy-makers certainly do not want to see a hegemonic Russia for general geopolitical reasons, the potential costs of such

¹¹⁵ Fionna Hill, Kevin Jones, “Fear of Democracy or Revolution: The Reaction to Andijon”, *The Washington Quarterly*, (Summer 2006), p. 114.

¹¹⁶ Caspian Basin here refers to the south Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and five central Asian Countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan)

¹¹⁷ Martha Brill Olcott, “Pipelines and Pipe Dreams Energy Development and Caspian Society” *Journal of International Affairs* 53, no. 1 (Fall 1999), p. 308.

hegemony become far greater if Russia is able to dictate the terms and limit western access to the world's last known vast oil and gas reserves.¹¹⁸

US concerns about Taliban regime in Afghanistan were another major factor in developing its relations with Uzbekistan before 2001. Rustam Jumaev, chief spokesman for Uzbek president Islam Karimov, declared on 14 October 2001 that "In 1998, after terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Bill Clinton signed a secret intelligence "finding" authorizing the CIA to use covert means to disrupt and preempt bin Laden's operations."¹¹⁹ This secret alliance also included the training of Uzbek soldiers by American experts.

The threat of Islamic militancy in the region and the operations of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan also led the U.S. and Uzbekistan to cooperate in security issues. In January 2001, Uzbekistan and the United States declared their joint policies and signed a declaration promising a common action against natural and human made crises.¹²⁰ In April 2001 John Beyrle, acting advisor to the United States secretary on newly independent states visited Tashkent in order to strengthen the mutual cooperation against terrorism and described Uzbekistan as a trustworthy colleague and donated new night vision goggles to be utilized at Uzbek borders.¹²¹

Although the U.S. desired to derive economic benefits from the region and take steps against religious militancy, problems with democratization and poor human rights record of Uzbek government became the concerns in the U.S. approach towards Uzbekistan. However, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon, the U.S. shaded its

¹¹⁸ Chris Seiple, Revisiting the Geo-Political Thinking Of Sir Halford John Mackinder: United States—Uzbekistan Relations 1991—2005" (Ph.D. diss., Tuft University- Medford, 2006),p. 161.

¹¹⁹Thomas E. Ricks and Susan B. Glasser, "U.S. Operated Secret Alliance With Uzbekistan" *Washington Post*, 14 October 2001, p. A01.

¹²⁰ Shahram Akbarzadeh, "U.S.-Uzbek partnership and democratic reforms" *Nationalities Papers* Vol.32, no.2 (June 2004), p. 280.

¹²¹ Shahram Akbarzadeh, "U.S.-Uzbek partnership and democratic reforms", p. 280.

democratization concerns and brought the “war on terrorism” to the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. In the context of this initiative, Central Asia especially Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, gained a strategic importance because of their geographical proximity to Afghanistan, the homeland of the terrorist *Al-Qaida* organization which was deemed for the 9/11 attacks. In addition, the U.S. was also concerned that the Afghan threat could diffuse into all of the Central Asia.

Thus concerns of the U.S. with respect to democratization in Uzbekistan were put aside for a while in order to guarantee a military base in its war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. On 7 October 2001, Uzbekistan offered the Kharshi Khanabad (K2) airbase to the United States. Within the Status of Forces Agreement, the K2 airbase, which is 90 miles away from Afghanistan, was officially opened to the U.S. forces. “Although the exact size of the U.S. at the K2 base was never officially disclosed, it was estimated to have approximately 1,750 military personnel and 20 C-130 transport aircraft.”¹²²

On 12 March 2002, the United States–Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework was confirmed by Secretary of State Colin Powell and Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov.¹²³ With this declaration of strategic partnership the security collaboration between two was formalized.

The Uzbek Government also promised to take action to achieve “democratic reforms in priority areas such as building a strong and open civil society, establishing a genuine multi-party system and independence of the media, strengthening non-

¹²² Eugene Rumer, “The U.S. Interests and Role in Central Asia After K2.” *Washington Quarterly* 29, no.3 (Summer 2006), p. 146.

¹²³ Eugene Rumer, “The U.S. Interests and Role in Central Asia After K2.” p. 145.

governmental structures, and improving the judicial system.”¹²⁴ In return, during the U.S. Campaign in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2003 the annual aid Uzbekistan received from U.S. increased from \$83.2 to \$171.65 million.¹²⁵ However despite the promises it made, Uzbekistan’s democracy scores worsened and human rights continued to be violated. The results of the “Democracy Report” prepared by Freedom House in 2008 (see Table I, below), shows that Uzbek Government achieved none of the promises mentioned above.¹²⁶

Table I. Uzbekistan Democracy Score

	1999	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Electoral Process	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	7.00
Civil Society	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.50	6.50	6.50	7.00	7.00	7.00
Independent media	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	7.00	7.00	7.00
Governance	6.25	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.25	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
National democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	6.50	7.00	7.00	7.00
Local Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	6.25	6.75	6.75	6.75
Judicial Framework and Independence	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.25	6.75	6.75	6.75
Corruption	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.50	6.50	6.50
Democracy Score	6.38	6.42	6.46	6.46	6.46	6.43	6.82	6.82	6.86

Democracy Score of Uzbekistan by Freedom House¹²⁷ (1 represents the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest)

According to Alexander Cooley, professor of political science at Columbia University, the Uzbek government took advantage of the international situation to gain economic benefit. In order to obtain financial assistance for its anti terrorism efforts, Uzbekistan exaggerated the degree of religious fundamentalism the country

¹²⁴ US Department of State, Fact Sheet “United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework” <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8736.htm> (July 14, 2008)

¹²⁵ US Department of State Office of Management and Budget, “Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2003, Appendix: International Assistance Programs”, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ace/>, (April 20, 2007)

¹²⁶ Freedom House –Bruce Pannier, “Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores: Uzbekistan”, http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh_galleries/NIT2008/NT-Uzbekistan-final.pdf (July 14, 2008)

¹²⁷ Freedom House –Bruce Pannier, “Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores: Uzbekistan”, http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh_galleries/NIT2008/NT-Uzbekistan-final.pdf (July 14, 2008)

was facing. At the same time it also suppressed dissidents in the country by demonizing religious sentiments.¹²⁸

Until 2003, the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Uzbekistan was a matter of a dichotomy between security concerns and promotion of democracy. “State Department and Pentagon worked at cross-purposes. When the former reduced aid due to human rights violations, the latter increased funding for military assistance.”¹²⁹ However the U.S. administration did not continue to ignore the human rights violations in Uzbekistan so as to be consistent within its foreign policy agenda after 2003. The reconsideration of democratic concerns in U.S. foreign policy was prompted by its invasion of Iraq in 2003. The U.S. entered Iraq to take pre-emptive action against the alleged threat posed by weapons of mass destruction possessed by Saddam Hussein’s regime. President Bush also justified U.S. presence in Iraq by claiming that the liberation of Iraq from the authoritarian regime of Saddam and promotion of democracy could be effected only by a global power like U.S. Ostensibly the global promotion of democracy became one of the most important motives of the U.S. foreign policy after 2003 and ever since that time the United States’ approach towards Uzbekistan was shaped in accordance with this policy. As a result, “due to Uzbekistan’s poor human right record the freezing of US aid to Uzbekistan was prompted by Congress’ insertion of human rights baselines into the 2004 Foreign Operations Act.”¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Alexander Cooley, “U.S. Bases and Democratization in Central Asia” *Orbis*, Volume 52, Issue I (Winter 2008), p. 71.

¹²⁹ Parag Khana, *Second World, Empires and Influence in the New Global Order* (UK: Penguin, 2008), p. 138.

Due to the lack of reformation The State department adjusted its assistance fund to the 18 million dollars in 2004 while the Department of Defense promised 21 million dollars independent funding for bio terrorism defense. See, Archana Pyati, “Karimov’s War” *Human Rights Defenders and Counter terrorism in Uzbekistan Series No.3* (2005), p. 18.

¹³⁰ John Heathershow, “Worlds apart: the making and remaking of geopolitical space in the US – Uzbekistani strategic partnership” *Central Asian Survey* 26, no.1 (March 2007), p. 129.

After the suspension of financial aid, relation between the U.S. and Uzbekistan worsened. Emergence of the colored revolutions in the former Soviet Union republics led Karimov to believe that the United States of America was trying to increase its maneuverability by way of promoting democratic revolutions, which would foster allied governments in the region.

4.2. Colored Revolutions

The transitional economies of post-Soviet countries experienced tough times and the economic problems of these countries led to public grievances resulting in revolutions. In November 2003 Eduard Shevardnadze was toppled by the Rose Revolution in Georgia; Viktor Yuschenko in Ukraine came to power through the Orange Revolution in December 2004 and finally public protests in Kyrgyzstan resulted in the abdication of President Askar Akayev, in March 2005, two months before Andican Uprising.

Local civil society and ordinary citizens who suffered economic problems contributed to the formation of these revolutions and they intended to replace their authoritarian regimes with more liberal and democratic ones. Domestic problems were shown to be the primary inspiration of these movements.

Mark Beissinger who studied on common features of democratic revolutions reached the conclusion that lack of suppressive response to protests was a critical factor enabled the opposition groups to turn out the present governments.¹³¹

¹³¹ Mark Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/ Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions” *Perspectives on Politics*. Vol5, no.2 (June 2007), p. 269.

According to him neither the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan nor the Rose Revolution in Georgia were strong enough to succeed. For Beissinger, if the governments of these countries had responded aggressively to protests, these uprisings would have been prevented from having revolutionary effects. Therefore, Karimov's harsh response to Andican Uprising was vital for his regime's survival.

Prima facie, there was no trace of foreign inducement to revolution other than international support of the formation of democratic institutions and of a civil society in these countries.¹³² In the form of financial assistance to non-governmental organizations this support was reported to have no offence on current regimes¹³³

However, Karimov after 13 May 2005 continuously stressed that the Andican Uprising like Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan and Rose revolution in Georgia was organized by civil society organizations supported by foreign countries. Beissinger identified the existence of nongovernmental organizations and western support to dissidents in post-Soviet countries as a factor, which accelerated democratic revolutions.¹³⁴

Karimov also claimed that the interests of the United States had a determinative role in the formation of the colored revolutions. He also viewed the Andican Uprising as the continuation of the democratic revolutions the United States fueled by taking advantage of the problems of state building in post-Soviet countries.¹³⁵

Points that might be relevant to US interest in government changes of Central Asian countries should be indicated in order to examine to what extent Karimov may

¹³² Mark Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/ Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions” p. 269.

¹³³ Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy” *Democratization* Vol 4, no.3 (2004), p.128.

¹³⁴ Mark Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/ Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions” p. 269.

¹³⁵ Evgeny F. Troitskiy, “U.S. Policy in Central Asia and Regional Security,” *Global Society* 21, no.3 (2007), p. 427.

be right in his claims. Now lets see the common motives and problematical issues, which increased social discontent in these countries. Commonalities that facilitated the mobilization of mass movements in these cases should also be indicated to see whether or not the colored revolutions were inspired by the strategic concerns of the United States and enabled by its financial support.

4.2.1. Rose Revolution in Georgia

Eduard Shevardnadze became the president of Georgia in 1993. Although he was the first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party he turned towards the west following independence. Russia continued to use economic and military means to maintain its influence over Georgia taking advantage of its strategic position. Russian military bases in Georgia were the fundamental to Russian interests. “The Treaty on Russian Military Bases on the Territory of the Republic of Georgia granted Russia access to four bases in Georgia for duration of at least 25 years.”¹³⁶ Although Russian bases were closed later, this treaty was an indication of Russian influence in Georgia at that time.

Meanwhile, Shevardnadze established close relations with the United States in the process of democratizing his country. To counter Russian influence was another motive in the development of relations with the U.S. Shevardnadze received over \$700 million of American direct aid until 2000.¹³⁷ After 11 September 2001,

¹³⁶ Robert L. Larsson, “The Enemy within Russia’s Military withdrawal from Georgia” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 17 no.3 (2004), p. 406.

¹³⁷ Stephene Jones, “The Rose Revolution: A Revolution without revolutionaries?” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 19, no.1 (2006), p. 41.

nations of the Southern Caucasus including Georgia received \$64 million US military aid.

Like the situation in Andican in 2005, Georgia was suffering from poor socio economic conditions, including electricity and water shortages, and “more than half of the population were living below the poverty line”¹³⁸ Under these conditions it seemed difficult for Shevardnadze supported party, Citizens’ Union of Georgia, to win the parliamentary election held in November 2003. Mikhail Saakashvili, Georgian Minister of Justice between 2000-2001, participated in the elections with his party, the New National Movement. At the outcome of the 2 November 2003 election, Shevardnadze supported party was announced as the victor. Observers reported fraud in election process. “The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, a Georgian election monitoring organization, conducted a parallel vote and turnout tabulation—a large, statistically valid sample of turnout and results. According to this source, Saakashvili’s National Movement was the election’s clear winner.”¹³⁹

After these events, people, numbering between 500 and 5000, gathered in front of the Georgian parliament and protested the results, demanding the resignation of President Shevardnadze. After ten days, the number of protesters reached 20.000. Shevardnadze wanted to suppress the protests by force, however, internal discord between police forces and the administration prevented Shevardnadze from ending the movement. It ultimately resulted in the collapse of his government.

During this period in Georgia, traces of an authoritarian regime were still apparent. Although corruption in political life continued and liberties were still limited, NGOs funded by foreign assistance worked to improve the civil society.

¹³⁸ Charles King, “A Rose among Thorns: Georgia Makes Good,” *Foreign Affairs* 83, no.2 (March 2004), p. 15.

¹³⁹ Lincoln Mitchell, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution,” *Current History* 103, no. 675 (2004), p. 343.

Contrary to the situation in Uzbekistan, in Georgia civil society have found the opportunity to mobilize and improve under the semi authoritarian regime of Shevardnadze. Scholars such as Jones, King, Carothers and Mitchell claim that it was Georgian civil society, which overthrew the government in November 2003.

According to Mitchell,

Georgian civil society directly benefited from Serbian NGOs' anti- Milosevic experience. At least in part, the November 2003 events were possible because a number of prominent NGOs such as the Liberty Institute were trained in the methods and tactics of non-violent political opposition to authoritarian leaders by Serbian NGOs. George Soros's Open Society Institute (OSI) played a major role in financing not only the general development of Georgian NGOs but also civic actions, which directly contributed to Shevardnadze's fall.¹⁴⁰

From general information about the conditions in Georgia before November 2003 it is clear that the U.S. had already good relations with the Georgian government prior to the revolt. It was not necessary to encourage a revolution for the purpose of raising an allied government against Russian dominance. Georgia's relations with Russia were already in decline and Russia had withdrawn from its military bases in Georgia. However, it should not be denied that non-governmental organizations funded by foreign countries facilitated the necessary means to realize the regime change. Nevertheless, this does not automatically prove that such aid was donated to civil society organizations in a systematic way replacing the government. Georgian society's discontent due to the poor socio economic conditions and the expression of this unrest was inflamed by government fraud in the parliamentary elections. Thus the protests appeared to be formed spontaneously by civil groups who insisted on resisting the continuous corruption in the country.

Although the United States' interests in Georgia were clear, there is no evidence that Rose Revolution resulted from the United States' strategic plan in the

¹⁴⁰ Lincoln Mitchell, "Georgia's Rose Revolution," p.343.

region. The Georgian case thus does not support Karimov's claim that Andican was part of a broader U.S. plan for promoting democratic revolutions.

4.2.2. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine

The pre-revolutionary period in Ukraine was not much different from that in Georgia. Leonid Kuchma had been elected as president in 1994 and since then he ruled the country in a semi-authoritarian fashion. In 1996 he approved a new constitution for Ukraine. By amendments in the constitution, the president was given greater authority, to act without restriction during his period in office. Kuchma started to use this power to strengthen his position in the country and suppressed the opposition groups.

The problems of the Kuchma regime were not limited to his individual leadership. His supporters were nominated as deputies of the new regime and very soon an oligarchy was formed. Most of the deputies were also active in the business sector. "386 of 450 deputies in parliament were founders of 3954 business"¹⁴¹ and bulk of the export and import transaction in Ukraine was being controlled by them. Economic power was concentrated in the hands of this ruling elite and most of them were accused of abusing their authority to gain improper advantage in their business activities.¹⁴² Corruption in business sector was widened by arbitrary sanctions

¹⁴¹ Lucan A. Way, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution, Kuchma's Failed Authoritarianism" *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 2 (April 2005), p. 134.

¹⁴² Theodor Tudoroiu, "Rose,Orange, and Tulip Revolutions: The Failed post-Soviet revolutions" *Communist and Post Communist Studies* 40 (2007), p. 326.

imposed on the individual shuttle traders who helped opposition groups in the country.¹⁴³

The government's strict control of the media was another dimension of the authoritarian nature of Kuchma's regime. Journalists who criticized the government's policies were daunted with attacks. The murder of journalist Georgi Gongadze was a critical point in the mobilization of opposition groups.¹⁴⁴ Rumors that the president ordered his execution increased social frustration and led to a large-scale public protests. These protests later merged with the political opposition whose leaders were former oligarchs in Kuchma's governments. The rightist Yushchenko, socialist Moros and leftist Tymoshenko all voiced their opposition to Kuchma's corrupt policies.

In the 2004 presidential elections, Yushchenko announced his candidacy against the former Prime Minister, Yanukovych who was supported by Kuchma. In the first round of the 2004 presidential elections Yushchenko received 39.9 % of votes while Yanukovych received 39.3 %. Experts expected that Yushchenko would be the victor. However, Yanukovych was declared the winner of the election with 49.5 % of the votes. Election fraud was reported and on 22 November 2004, between 100.000 and 300.000 Ukrainians participated in a mass protest to condemn the election results. The government tried to suppress the protest by force on 28 November but the scale of the crowd made it impossible to do so.¹⁴⁵ With the increasing protests and foreign criticisms, Kuchma decided to renew the elections on

¹⁴³ Lucan A. Way, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution, Kuchma's Failed Authoritarianism," p133

¹⁴⁴ Taras Kuzio, "The Opposition's road to success," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no.2. p. 119.

¹⁴⁵ Dominique Arel, "Is the Orange revolution fading?" *Current History* 104, no. 684 (2005), p. 327.

3 December between the two candidates Yushchenko and Yanukovych. On 26 December 52 % of the votes was accounted for Yushchenko.¹⁴⁶

After protests led to regime change in Ukraine, the international community increasingly focused on the possibility of a chain reaction against authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet countries. From this perspective, the United States' leading role in the promotion of democracy was seen as a significant factor, which might have been effective in the formation of Orange Revolution. Ukraine's fragile relations with the U.S. before the Orange Revolution also supported this presumption. In 2002 Ukraine had sold advanced radars system to Iraq and the subsequent reaction of the U.S. administration worsened the relations between the two countries.¹⁴⁷ President Bush suggested that Ukraine might become internationally isolated and indicated that the sale could result in a suspension of financial assistance. Moreover, the U.S. perceived Ukraine's improving relations with Russia as a threat to its interests in the region.¹⁴⁸ "Ukraine is a strategic battleground in this geopolitical tug-of-war between Washington and Moscow. Ukrainian pipeline routes account for 75% of EU oil imports from Russia and Central Asia, and 34% of its natural gas import."¹⁴⁹

US aid to Ukrainian civil society¹⁵⁰ formation strengthened the suspects on its involvement to formation of opposition movements. Three civil society foundations funded by the U.S. government were involved the protests.

¹⁴⁶ V.L. Hesli, "The Orange Revolution: 2004 presidential Election in Ukraine", *Electoral Studies* 25, no.1, p. 174.

¹⁴⁷ Paul Kubicek, "The European Union and Democratization in Ukraine" *Communist and Post Communist Studies* 38 (2), p. 280.

¹⁴⁸ Paul Kubicek, p.280.

¹⁴⁹ William Engdahl, "Washington's interest in Ukraine: Democracy or Energy Geopolitics?" *Current Concerns*, 17 January 2005, <http://www.currentconcerns.ch/archive/2005/01/20050105.php> (July 25, 2008)

¹⁵⁰ "The federal government spent \$97 million on aid to Ukraine in the fiscal year that ended Oct. 31 for a broad range of social and political projects. About \$28 million of that was spent on what the

The National Endowment for Democracy, which receives its money directly from Congress; the Eurasia Foundation, which receives money from the State Department, and the Renaissance Foundation, part of a network of charities funded by billionaire George Soros that receives money from the State Department.¹⁵¹

Ukraine's record on democratization was quite poor before the Orange Revolution. The suppressive character of the government combined with foreign aid to civil society in Ukraine led to the Orange Revolution resulting in regime change. The deterioration in relations with the U.S. before the revolution in 2004 reinforced the argument that U.S. aid was used to support the opposition groups and to replace the regime with one that would serve to U.S. interests. Thus the Ukrainian case supports Karimov's view that involvement of foreign countries in these revolutions was prompted by their geopolitical interests and facilitated by their assistance to democratization movements.

4.2.3. The Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan

In March 2005, regime change resulting from revolutionary protests in Kyrgyzstan increased the anxiety of Uzbek government. The proximity of the two countries led Karimov to believe that his regime was also at risk. The president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev (1991-2005) maintained a strict control over the media

agency calls democracy projects." See Joel Brinkley, "Dollars for Democracy?: U.S. aid to Ukraine Challenged" *The New York Times*, 21 December 2004.

¹⁵¹ Matt Kelly, "U.S. Money Helped Opposition in Ukraine" *The San Diego Union Tribune*, 11 December 2004, http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041211/news_1n11usaid.html (July 25, 2008)

and could not achieve economic prosperity in his country.¹⁵² The political opposition to Akayev regime was relatively weak because of the extent of rivalry between the clans.¹⁵³ The contrast between clans was also apparent in terms of their geographical concentration. While the south of the country was located by cleavages open to western influence and Uzbek presence, the north of the country was resided by groups favoring Russian policies. In this context Akayev was known as being closer to the northerners.¹⁵⁴ The absence of a united political opposition in the country enabled Akayev to use his power without parliamentary restrictions.

The event, which ignited the Tulip Revolution, was the deception in the parliamentary election of 27 February 2005. In the election, some of the candidates from the south were barred and after the results were revealed a small group from the south protested Akayev regime. However, the mobilization of a broader group of protesters occurred when support came from some of the country's powerful northern politicians and clans. In March 2005, opposition groups united under the name of People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan and insisted on the resignation of Akayev. This movement was not indicative of a new, united political party with a specific program or leadership. It rather symbolized the common grievances of different opposition groups.

On 18 March, the governors' offices in the southern cities of Osh and Jalabad were occupied by demonstrators. Later, airport police stations and TV studios were occupied by crowds. Before 24 March "The Peoples Movement of Kyrgyzstan merged with NGO activists, local businessmen, unaffiliated politicians, and

¹⁵² Alisher Khamidov, Kyrgyzstan's Revolutionary youth: Between State and Opposition "SAIS Review" 26, no.2 (2006), p.87.

¹⁵³ Every kind of tribal, regional and bureaucratic elite formations refers to the concept of 'clan'.

¹⁵⁴ Scott Radnitz, "What Really happened in Kyrgyzstan?" *Journal of Democracy* 17,no.2 (2006), p. 134.

mobilization leaders from others regions”¹⁵⁵ From the media releases, it is clear that most of the protesters who were present in front of the government building in Bishkek, consisted of poor and unemployed men and women. Observers, who stressed poor economic profile of protesters, underestimated the role of civil society organizations in the protests. “NGOs equally played a minor role. Kyrgyzstan like other Central Asian republics has a small urban population and clearly lacks a strong civil society. That is why most of protesters in Bishkek came from the countryside.”¹⁵⁶

Although the United States provided aid to Kyrgyz NGOs in the name of the promotion of democracy, its presence in Kyrgyzstan was much more related to its access to military bases and concerns about security. The US had no difficulty in receiving support from Akayev’s government but his alliances with Russia and China may have led US administration to worry about its relative gains in the region. Kyrgyzstan’s external relations with the U.S., Russia and China also exhibited a kind of strategic competition. The U.S. could get an air base at Manas outside the capital city Bishkek in 2001; next year Russia signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan and by this agreement guaranteed to operate in the Kant air base. In addition to these alliances, relations with China also intensified and Chinese soldiers were allowed to launch operations with Kyrgyz forces in the region¹⁵⁷

Alternatively, the U.S. involvement in the formation of this revolution may be explained in terms of its long-term strategic plans. The U.S. may have wanted to remove the Akayev regime because of its undemocratic policies not simply because he did not show commitment to the U.S. interests. As mentioned previously, the protection and promotion of democracy became one of the U.S top priorities after the

¹⁵⁵ Alisher Khamidov, p. 88.

¹⁵⁶ Theodor Tudoroiu, , p. 333.

¹⁵⁷ Theodor Tudoroiu, p. 332.

2003 invasion of Iraq. U.S. claims could be convincing only if they followed a consistent global policy. In this view, it is not necessary to point out deterioration in relations between the two countries other than the authoritarian nature of Akayev's regime in order to explain U.S. support for the opposition groups in Kyrgyzstan.

However, these assumptions cannot prove the view that the U.S. needed to change the Kyrgyz regime in order to counter Russian dominance and so intentionally supported the dissidents in Tulip Revolution. Even though U.S. aid to the formation of Kyrgyz civil society (mainly on the side of opposition) was a reality there was no other setback in US-Kyrgyz relations, which would justify Karimov's view that democratic revolutions in Central Asian countries were motivated by the U.S.. Stephen Young who was nominated as US ambassador to Kyrgyzstan had warned government not to open fire during the protests in Bishkek. The US ambassador's attitude was also perceived by Karimov as direct U.S. support for opposition groups in Tulip Revolution.

Moreover, civil society groups were not active in the first protests in Kyrgyzstan. Participants in the Tulip Revolution were mainly unemployed people, friends, and relatives of the candidates barred from the election.¹⁵⁸

To sum up, two prominent factors in the Tulip Revolution may justify Karimov's claims. First, the multiplicity of Kyrgyzstan's international alliances may have urged the U.S. to increase its relative position and to foster a new, more loyal, government, which would decrease the extent of its cooperation with Russia and China. Second, democratization problems, which were similar in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, evidently resulted in problematic relations with the U.S. whose foreign policy was identified with the promotion of democracy after 2003 in a more

¹⁵⁸ Theodor Tudoroiu, p. 332.

pronounced way. Therefore this factor also may have led the U.S. to strengthen the Kyrgyz civil society as a means of democratization.

Corruption and undemocratic practices were common in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan prior to the colored revolutions. It was also common that, although the extent of their capacities varied, civil society organizations funded by the U.S. had some role in the mobilization of protesters in these revolutions. Karimov's claims concerning the role of civil society groups in the organization of the Andican Uprising are therefore worth exploring.

4.3. Civil Society in Uzbekistan

Did civil society groups play a role in the organization of the Andican Uprising? Mainly funded by the U.S. and international donors, these organizations and human rights activists in Uzbekistan were accused by the government of creating social instability. Since independence, the establishment of a civil society in Uzbekistan was supported by western aid. “Democracy assistance programs, however, have not been as successful in effecting large-scale structural changes in the region or strengthening grassroots democracy beyond individual local successes.”¹⁵⁹

Exploitation of non-governmental organizations in the formation of civil society did not work in Uzbekistan. Due to fundamental inclinations among the

¹⁵⁹ Fiona Adamson, “International democracy assistance in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan: building civil society from the outside” in *The Power and Limits of NGO: A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia* ed. Sarah E. Mendelson and John K Glenn (New York, Columbia University Press,2002), p. 178.

society, The Uzbek government always viewed the activities of non-governmental organizations with suspicion. That is why foreign aid allocated to the support of NGOs was perceived as benefiting only the secular part of the population.¹⁶⁰ All freedoms are supposed to have related with the progress of civil society and in this context freedom of speech and media are important factors to be utilized in the construction of it. However, in Uzbekistan strict control over media and human rights organizations have created a great difficulty over the formation of the genuine civil society.¹⁶¹

Daniel Stevens stated that during interviews he made with 200 NGO leaders in Uzbekistan, “only one used the term ‘human rights’, the NGO sector in Uzbekistan tended to pursue quiet cooperation with the government in service provision and polite technocratic advocacy.”¹⁶² Non-governmental organizations funded by foreign sources in Uzbekistan were inclined to restrict the problems on which they take on. In this process human rights activists and openly religious people were excluded from the NGOs’ activities in order to avoid from being banded and to continue to be only channel of foreign endowment.¹⁶³ These organizations were called as GONGOs (Government Organized – Non Governmental Organizations.)¹⁶⁴ “Women’s Committee, the *Makhalla* Foundation, ‘*Sogлом Avlod Uchan*’ (a health

¹⁶⁰ David M. Abramson, “A Critical Look at NGOs and Civil Society as Means to an End in Uzbekistan” *Human Organization* Vol 8, no. 3 (1999), p 24.

¹⁶¹ “Journalists, human rights defenders and others jailed for exercising their freedom of expression are as follow Muhammad Bekjanov, Yusuf Juma, Jamshid Karimov, Mamadali Makhmudov, Gayrat Mehliboyev, Ortikali Namazov, Yusuf Ruzimuradov” See International Crisis Group “Uzbekistan’s Farcical Media Freedom Conference Report” 9 June 2008,

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5477> (July 26,2008)

¹⁶² Daniel Stevens, “ Political Society and Civil Society in Uzbekistan: Never the Twain Shall Meet?” *Central Asian Survey* 26, no.1 (2007) p.56

¹⁶³ Daniel Stevens, p.56

¹⁶⁴ Abdumonnab Polat, “Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society?” in *Civil Society in Central Asia* ed. Holt Ruffin and Daniel Waugh (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1999) , p.152

GONGO), *Kamolot* (a youth services GONGO)” were among the organizations in accordance with the government’s policies¹⁶⁵

Apart from these GONGOs there were a few human rights organizations that had legal status in Uzbekistan before Andican uprising. The Legal Aid Society was the first organization registered in 1999. The Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan was accepted as legal by Ministry of Justice in 2002. The Human rights organization *Ezgulik* was the last one to be allowed operate within the country in 2003.¹⁶⁶ According to Brian Grodsky, Karimov’s limited toleration of these three organizations was mainly facilitated by U.S. efforts in promoting democracy and its promise of financial aid to the government.¹⁶⁷

In addition to these organizations’ scarcity in absolute terms their quality and efficacy profile was also limited. According to the NGO sustainability index, Uzbekistan’s score of NGO sustainability was third worst in over all ranking among the former Soviet republics. Uzbekistan’s 5.2 score indicates that the development of non-governmental organizations in the country was already being hindered before the Andican Uprising.

¹⁶⁵ USAID, “The 2005 NGO Sustainability Index For Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.” http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2005/index.htm (July 27, 2008)

¹⁶⁶ Ezgulik means ‘Good Deed’ in English

¹⁶⁷ Brian Grodsky, “Direct Pressures for Human Rights in Uzbekistan: Understanding the US Bargaining Position” *Central Asian Survey* 23, no.3-4 (2004), p. 338.

Table II. NGO sustainability index, selected countries and years¹⁶⁸

Country/year	NGO sustainability index
Estonia 2004	2.1
Poland 2004	2.3
Hungary 2004	2.6
Latvia 2004	2.6
Ukraine 2003	3.9
<u>Georgia 2002</u>	<u>4.2</u>
Kyrgyzstan 2004	4.2
Uzbekistan 2004	5.2
Belarus 2004	5.6
Turkmenistan 2004	5.6


Source: USAID, 2005. The 2005 NGO Sustainability Index For Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia¹⁶⁹

In the determination of NGO sustainability, different parameters were taken into consideration. Factors like legal environment, financial viability, infrastructure, public image, and organizational capacity were evaluated. The small number of registered NGOs indicates a low level of legal environment (5.5), and the low score (6) awarded to financial viability denotes the lack of access to foreign funding. Since the government issued a banking regulation that restricted the circulation of cash money in 2004 and cash payments became subject to the strict control of banks, all of the independent non-governmental organizations suffered from insufficient budgets.

¹⁶⁸ In this index 1 represents the highest level of sustainability while 7 indicates to the lowest point.

¹⁶⁹ USAID, “The 2005 NGO Sustainability Index For Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia,” http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2005/index.htm (July 27,2008)

Table III: 2005 Scores for Uzbekistan



Source: USAID, 2005. The 2005 NGO Sustainability Index For Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia¹⁷⁰

Organizational capacity and infrastructure were also poor because of this financial problem. Government made payment to GONGOs only and ‘Law on non-State non-Commercial organizations’ did not allow NGOs to make profit from any economic activity.¹⁷¹

The Insufficient facilities available to non-governmental organizations combined with their low level capacity to participate into political life make it clear that “civil society” could not have played a vital role in the Andican Uprising. Even though it was obtained from foreign donors, delivery of this aid was subject to strict

¹⁷⁰ USAID, “The 2005 NGO Sustainability Index For Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.- The country profile/ Uzbekistan .) In this index 1 represents the highest level of sustainability while 7 indicates to the lowest point.http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2005/index.htm (July 27, 2008)

¹⁷¹ “The term a “non-governmental organization” is applied in the legislation of Uzbekistan as a “non-state non-commercial organization” (NNO) (Law “On Non-State Non-Commercial Organizations” dated April 14, 1999). It is implied that such an organization is a self-governing organization established on a voluntary basis by individuals and /or legal entities not aimed at generating income (profit) as the main aim of its activity and not distributing the received profit among participants or members.” See *Uzbek Legislation- NGO regulation*, <http://www.legislationline.org/?tid=220&jid=56&less=false> (July 28, 2008)

governmental control and banking regulations blocked direct withdrawal of large sums. In this respect it looks like Karimov who learnt much from the colored revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, might have conducted a pre-emptive policy in order to avoid from being attacked.

4.4. Clan Politics

Clans in Uzbekistan still form an important part of the nation's social structure and continue to be viewed in terms of regional solidarity. These solidarity groups provide advantageous positions to their members and relatives.¹⁷² Consequently membership in a particular clan is more significant than overall Uzbek identity. This clan-based division is common among officials who hold important positions in state posts. After the collapse of the Soviet Union "Karimov poised to consolidate a puppet legislature yet clan interests have prevented the creation of a strong executive party, parties or presidential bloc."¹⁷³

After the Andican Uprising an alternative explanation was presented to clarify the effect of clan politics on the conflict between high number of protesters and Karimov government on 13 May 2005.¹⁷⁴ The protests began in response to the trial of 23 businessmen who were accused of belonging to the illegal Islamic group,

¹⁷² Grzegorz Zasada, p. 74.

¹⁷³ Kathleen Collins, "The Logic of Clan Politics Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories" *World Politics* 56 (2004), p. 251.

¹⁷⁴ "Political explosion in the country might have been triggered by not only the Islamists but also by the clans. One should not forget that Uzbekistan faces presidential elections in 2007. Karimov now faces the problem of finding a successor who could maintain consensus inside the ruling elite and prevent a civil war in the country. Two clans are now ruling the country: the Tashkent and Samarkand clans. The third clan, the Fargona clan, has now been completely removed from power. Incidentally, there is an assumption that it was representatives of this clan who organized the uprising in Andijon, which is in the Fergana Valley." See. BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, "Uzbek eastern clan may be behind Andijon events" (8 June 2005).

Ekremiye. They also known to had close relationships with the impeached governor of Andican, Kobilijon Obdiov who was supported by the Ferghana clan.

Therefore the arrests of these businessmen created suspicion that Karimov had used his power to suppress the dissident members of the clan because of their failure to provide stability in Andican. Saydulla Begaliev, the new governor, began to suppress the supporters of Obdiov. The 23 businessmen who resisted Begaliev's attacks were ultimately arrested. "The businessmen were allegedly advised to sell their enterprises to the allies of the new regional governor. When they refused, they were taken into custody."¹⁷⁵ The Andican Uprising appears to have been rooted in local politics dominated by clan rivalry.¹⁷⁶

While Chris Seiple has claimed that "the political ascendancy of Karimov guarantees that the Samarkand clan is restored to power"¹⁷⁷ Kathleen Collins argues that, Karimov himself is not totally committed to any of the clans.¹⁷⁸ According to her, since 1996, Karimov who acted as mediator among influential clans was trying to eliminate the structural constraints of clan based Uzbek politics. State legitimacy of the state and nation building process was disrupted by private interests of clan networks.¹⁷⁹ Karimov explained this problematical characteristic of nation building process with the following sentences;

Striving for the elimination of such a corrupt legacy [clan politics] is one of the primary strategic tasks of our state ...that is why it is a priority of the highest political importance to urge the need energetically to cut short regionalism and the formation of cliques, which are hampering our common cause. We must continue to emphasize that there is only one Uzbek nation in

¹⁷⁵ Vitaly Naumkin, "Uzbekistan's State Building Fatigue" *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no..3 (Summer 2006), p. 134.

¹⁷⁶ Rustam Burnashev and Irina Chernykh, "Changes in Uzbekistan's Military Policy after the Andijan Events," *China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly* 5, no.1 (2007), p. 69.

¹⁷⁷ Chris Seiple, "Uzbekistan: Civil Society in the Heartland," *Orbis*. (Spring 2002), p. 252.

¹⁷⁸ "Clans fight in order to take over main institutional positions. Depending on the situation of the moment, the President shifts his support from one clan to another." See. Alessandra Ceccarelli, "Clans, politics and organized crime in Central Asia" *Trends in Organized Crime* 10 (2007), p. 26.

¹⁷⁹ The role of clan leaders in drug trafficking was emphasized by Alessandra Caccarelli, p. 26.

the world, and there are no national differences between the descendants of Khorezm Ferghana or Surkhandarya: they are all Uzbeks.¹⁸⁰

At the middle of his tenure of office, Karimov “gradually introduced provincial leaders especially from his Samarkand clan into the political inner circles by restocking the Cabinet of ministers and the presidential councils.”¹⁸¹ However since he was dependent on the support of clans and their relatively equal strength, Karimov was attempting to distribute power between influential clans rather than to eliminate them. In 1992 “The Tashkent clan held 60% of the key posts: Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and First Deputy Prime Minister and 6 of the 10 deputy prime ministers.”¹⁸² In the following years a number of ministers who had affiliation with Samarkand increased while the Tashkent clan lost standing.

Table IV. Composition of Selected State Structures by Region 1992-2001¹⁸³

Region	Cabinet of Minister			State Committees		
	1992	1996	2001	1992	1996	2001
Tashkent	18	15	5	7	3	1
Fergana	5	3	1	0	2	1
Samarkand	3	6	19	2	6	9
Bukhara	1	1	3	1	0	1
Khorezm	2	3	0	0	2	0
Surkan Darya	1	2	1	2	1	1
Kashka Darya	0	0	0	0	1	1
Total	30	30	29	12	15	14

The statistics from 1996 also indicate that Karimov did not support the Samarkand clan to balance the power of Tashkent simply because he wanted to increase the power of his own clan. However, Samarkand’s obvious domination of

¹⁸⁰ Islam Karimov, p. 61.

¹⁸¹ Kathleen Bailey, “Clans and Politics in Uzbekistan” (Ph.D diss., Boston College, Boston 2001), p.360.

¹⁸² Kathleen Bailey, p. 360.

¹⁸³ Kathleen Bailey, p. 374.

the cabinet and state comities in 2001 increased the doubts that Karimov might have intentionally favored it and the balance was actually not a matter of his politics. Two conclusions can be reached on the basis of this evidence. First, Karimov may have supported the Samarkand clan because of his own affiliation with it. Second, he may have wanted to decrease the role of the Tashkent clan because its foreign policy orientation was a potential handicap in view of the improving relations between the U.S. and Uzbekistan. Bailey has argued that Karimov expressed his concern by “a thinly veiled reference to Tashkent’s historical reliance on Moscow that some clan leaders might use external forces to promote their own interests.”¹⁸⁴

Although the above conclusions appear valid, some evidence exists that Uzbek politics necessitated Karimov’s neutral position on clan matters. In addition to the administrative difficulties stem from the rivalry between clan members, economic reforms were suspended. The economic effects of the primacy of clans in Uzbek politics were an important drawback Karimov had to face. The three most influential clans, Ferghana, Tashkent, and Samarkand competed to control the most important sectors of Uzbek economy. The insistence of these clans’ leaders on maintaining and even increasing their share in the Uzbek economy explains the monopoly over the cotton, gold, and gas sectors. For instance, in 2003 state adviser Ismail Jurabekov, a former prime minister and the leader of the Samarkand clan controlled, with his supporters in the cabinet, almost all of the cotton industry in Uzbekistan.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ Kathleen Bailey, p. 333.

¹⁸⁵ International Crisis Group, *Uzbekistan’s Reform Program: Illusion or Reality? Asia Report no. 46* (Osh/ Brussels: ICG, February 18, 2003), p. 23.

Jurabekov had been accused of colluding with regional bosses and fired by Karimov from the prime ministry in 1998.¹⁸⁶ This was also a clear indication of that Karimov was not openly in favor of Samarkand clan. Rather, he was inclined to act against the improper personal benefit of affiliates no matter upon which clan they work. It was also a system in which nobody was allowed to become too powerful. While he played a neutral broker role between clan interests, Karimov himself also made use of this problematical system in order to maintain his leadership.

The financial resources available to clans also affected their capacity to compete with each other in politics. This involved a complex structure wherein clan members who held crucial positions in decision-making used their political power to increase their financial assets while these sources strengthened their political influence.¹⁸⁷ In order to decrease the influence of clans and thus the influence of informal politics, electoral regulations created five different pro-regime parties, which were to represent five distinct social sectors. By this method Karimov's parties could gain 49% of the seats in the 1999 parliamentary elections.¹⁸⁸ The remainder of the seats, however, were dominated by individual politicians who were bound to clans with strong kinship or regional affiliation.

¹⁸⁶ Lawrence Robertson and Roger Kangas, "Central Power and Regional and Local Government in Uzbekistan" in Daniel Kempton and Terry Clark, *Unity or Separation- Center Periphery Relations in the Former Soviet Union* (Westport , Praeger Paperback,2002), p. 276.

¹⁸⁷ "Much of retail trade and import/export operations is largely under the control of Deputy Prime Minister Mirabror Usmanov, who among other interests, controls the Arduz chain of supermarkets. First Deputy Prime Minister Kozim Tulyaganov, a former mayor of Tashkent, is alleged to have widespread property interests. Elior Ganiev, promoted to Deputy Prime Minister in November 2002, has considerable influence in foreign trade issues, and is closely linked to the security forces, which form an increasingly powerful political bloc. Indeed, interior minister Zohirjon Almatov is probably the most powerful of all ministers, and is often mentioned as a potential successor to Karimov. SNB chief Rustam Inoyatov, linked to the Tashkent clan, is considered a rival of the interior minister and has a potent combination of intelligence on all members of the elite and considerable financial resources through family businesses." See International Crisis Group (ICG), *Uzbekistan's Reform Program: Illusion or Reality? Asia Report no. 46*" (Osh/ Brussels: ICG, February 18, 2003), p. 23.

¹⁸⁸ Kathleen Collins, "The Logic of Clan Politics Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories" p. 251.

Table V: Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Uzbekistan in 2000¹⁸⁹

President	Islam Karimov*
Prime Minister	Shavkat Mirziyyayev*
Deputy Prime Minister	Abdullah Aripov
Deputy Prime Minister	Rustam Azimov**
Minister of Culture and Sports	Alisher Azizkhajayev*
Minister of Defense	Ruslan Mirzayev**
Minister of Finance	Rustam Azimov**
Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, Investments, and Trade	Elyor Ganiev**
Minister of Justice	Buritosh Mustafaev*
Chief of Staff, Presidential Administration	Zilemkhon Haidarov*
Chairman of National Security Service (NSS)	Rustam Inoyatov**

* Important Player from the Samarkand Clan

** Important Player from the Tashkent Clan

The allocation of ministries to affiliates of the Tashkent and Samarkand clans proves that the infiltration of informal clan politics into formal parliamentary politics was one of the prominent features of Karimov's regime. Karimov's attempts to balance the power of different clans resulted in a reshuffling of the cabinet.¹⁹⁰ In 2004, before the Andijan Uprising, Juarabekov, the most powerful leader of Samarkand clan was dismissed from his advisory position. Criminal allegations were given as the reason for his dismissal but the general view was that Karimov was trying to control the increasing power of Samarkand clan and channel its economic assets and privileged status to his own family. Former U.K. ambassador Murray

¹⁸⁹ Meaghan Krupa, , *Clans and Democracy : A Mismatch?* (Boston, Boston College, 2007), p. 174

¹⁹⁰ Frderick Starr, "Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia" *Central Asia-Caucus Institute Silk Road Studies Program* (Uppsala 2006), p. 21.

stated that “if you look at the people who were very close to Karimov a few years ago, many of them have now been thrown out; and, in particular, their economic interests and assets have often been diverted to Gulnara [Karimov’s eldest daughter, who controlled the oil, gas, and telecommunication sectors in Uzbekistan.] And there now are a lot of people who used to be very important who now have an interest in seeing Karimov go.”¹⁹¹ Karimov may have also wanted to strengthen Gulnara as a candidate for the next presidential election.¹⁹² This supports the notion that the Andican Uprising could have been organized by Karimov’s outgoing partners and their supporters.


The change of local governor in Andican weakened supporters of former governor Obdiov. Even though it cannot be assumed that the Andican Uprising was a primarily resulted from clan rivalry, it followed the arrest of 23 businessmen. Combined with poor economic conditions these arrests inspired greater public protests in Andican on 13 May 2005. Clan politics appear to have contributed to the rise of the Andican Uprising in two ways. First, clan economic interests made it difficult to liberalize the Uzbek economy, and clan monopoly over crucial commodities damaged the agricultural and business sectors. Thus economic dissatisfaction prompted protests in Andican. Second, the political repression which clans applied to each other when they find the opportunity to do so had social consequences for the supporters of defeated factions. The best example of this practice was when almost one thousand people lost their jobs after their employers (the 23 businessmen) were arrested as a consequence of this political repression.

¹⁹¹ Radio Free Europe- Radio Free Liberty, “Uzbekistan: Karimov Appears to Have Political Clans Firmly in Hand” <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1070977.html> (August 5,2008)

¹⁹² BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, “Uzbek eastern clan may be behind Andijon events” 8 June 2005.

After the Andican Uprising, appointments to the crucial offices changed the balance, and most of these offices were awarded to people who had a SNB background. Rustam Inoyatov led the National Security Service since 1995 and was supported by the Tashkent faction. In October 2006 Begaliev, Andijan governor since 2004, was likewise replaced with the former chief of police in Namangan, Major-General Ahmajan Usmanov, who served in the combating of extremism and terrorism.¹⁹³

Figure II. Rivalry within Ministries¹⁹⁴



The concentration of two factions in the two most important governmental institutions, the Interior Ministry and National Security Council, demonstrates the profound rivalry between them. Almatov could gain more support from police forces and his affiliates could dominate the cabinet in 2000. Thus, for Karimov, increasing the power of this clan had to be curtailed to balance power. After the Andican Uprising “The Samarkand clan suffered another political blow when Interior

¹⁹³ Ruslan Nagaev, Ulhom Ahmedov, “Security Service Veterans Rising to the Top in Uzbekistan,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol.4, Issue 72 , 12 April 2007, http://cache.search.yahoo.net/search/cache?ei=UTF-8&p=saydulla+begaliev&fr=yfp-t-501&u=www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php%3Fvolume_id%3D420%26issue_id%3D4071%26article_id%3D2372096&w=saydulla+begaliev&d=Hr1_EBg5RJWQ&icp=1&.intl=us (August 6,2008)

¹⁹⁴ Meaghan Krupa, p. 123.

Minister Zokir Almatov resigned in late 2005, citing poor health. Karimov appointed a deputy director of the Uzbek National Security Service (SNB) to replace Almatov.”¹⁹⁵ This was important because the SNB was under the influence of the Tashkent clan and now used by Karimov to replace the powerful figures within the Samarkand clan.

All this data demonstrates that Karimov played his cards expeditiously in order to balance the power of clans. He did not always favor the Samarkand faction. Karimov appointed his supporters to important positions but limited their power when they became too powerful. Karimov’s leadership strategy is thus significant for understanding the complex and irregular character of clan politics in Uzbekistan.

¹⁹⁵ Radio Free Europe- Radio Free Liberty, “Uzbekistan: Karimov Appears to Have Political Clans Firmly in Hand” <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1070977.html> (August 5,2008)

CHAPTER V

ANDICAN UPRIISING

The events of 12-14 May in Andijan have been subject to different interpretations. The governmental investigation committee formed to monitor and analyze the uprising reached the conclusion that it was a revolutionary attempt organized by members of the *Ekremiye* Movement and their supporters.

However many human rights activists and western scholars argued that the uprising was primarily the result of economic discontent in Uzbek society. Evaluations of the nature of the uprising, estimates of the death toll, and the authors' identifications of these casualties varied according to the different accounts of witnesses and the analyses of various scholars. That is why it is not possible to make a certain assessment about the events occurred that day. Nevertheless journalists who were already there could clarify the incident to some extent.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁶“An information blackout has been clamped by Uzbek authorities with interruption of foreign TV channels including Russian networks and CNN.” BBC Monitoring Central Asia, “Tashkent clamps information blackout ahead of imminent attack”, 13 May 2005.

In this part of the study, an accurate version of the scenario will be given through considering different assessments made by refugees, human rights organizations, scholars and the Uzbek government.

5.1. The Background of the Uprising

In August 2004, 23 businessmen were arrested on charge of being members of the illegal *Ekremiye* movement. All of the businessmen were most successful entrepreneurs and managers from Andican. Consequently their supporters perceived their arrest as a government attack on the economic activities of a conservative religious community. This view is supported by human rights activists who claim that the government abused its power in order to restrict other elements by accusing them of religious fundamentalism.

While the interrogation of 23 businessmen continued. Uzbek authorities searched for other suspects from the *Ekremiye* group and began to arrest them. On 4 September 2004, armed National Security Service units entered into the homes of twenty employees of Turon Productions Furniture Company and searched for suspects. During their detention all admitted that they were the members of the *Ekremiye* Movement, however later the same detainees claimed that they were harassed and forced to sign a confession.¹⁹⁷ The International Crisis Group revealed

¹⁹⁷ Gulnoza Saidazimova, "Uzbekistan: Protesters Charge Officials With Using Extremism Charges to Target Entrepreneurs", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 11 May 2005, <http://209.85.135.104/search?q=cache:gkFrsrpR4UAJ:www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/05/8ef6fb25-fa97-4fa3-9bc44b185158137.html%3Fnbsp%3D2+Gulnoza+Saidazimova,+Uzbekistan:+Extremism+Charges+to+Target+Entrepreneurs&hl=tr&ct=clnk&cd=4&gl=tr> (May 25,2008)

some of the interrogations conducted with these people after they were released, and one of them said that:

They brought us pre-prepared schemes of the organization. They said it showed the organizational structure, with all our titles and positions and they told us to sign it, and we'd go home in few days—otherwise they'd lock us up for ten years.¹⁹⁸

On 10 February 2005, nine detainees were prosecuted for crimes including association with a radical group and illegal movement.¹⁹⁹ Six of them were held incommunicado. Trials of 23 businessmen began on 10 May of the same year. Parallel to the trials, the families of detainees to support these businessmen initiated peaceful protests. These demonstrations consisted of people's gathering around the courthouse and from 10 February until 13 May no other vocal or written protests occurred.²⁰⁰

5.2. The Prison Attack

Prior events showed that tension was increasing among the crowd protesting the trial of 23 businessmen. On May 13, this tension erupted in violent and bloody events. According to reports on the night of 12 May the businessmen's friends, relatives and supporters,²⁰¹ whose numbers were between fifty and one hundred,

¹⁹⁸ International Crisis Group, *Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising*, p. 4.


¹⁹⁹ BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, "Twenty-three Uzbeks stand trial on anti-state charges", 12 February 2005

²⁰⁰ International Crisis Group, *Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising* p.4.

²⁰¹ Sharifjon Shokirov who is the bother of Shokurjon Shokirov, and Abduljon Parpiev who was arrested after Taskent bombings in 1999 were known as the leaders of the prison attack.

decided to attack the prison and free them²⁰² The action occurred mostly between Babur Square and the Andican prison through Navoi Prospect, where administrative buildings are located.

Figure 1.Andican Center



Andijan Center

Source: Human Rights Watch, "The Bullets Were Falling Like Rain- Andijan Massacre May 13 2005²⁰³

According to the eyewitness the event began around 12.30 a.m. The residents of Gumbaz Makhalla reported that insurgents tried to take over the army post

²⁰² Vasiliy Kashin, Aleksey Nikolskiy, "Uzbekistan is on fire", *Russica Izvestia* 14 May 2005, p.A2

²⁰³ Human Rights Watch, *The Bullets Were Falling Like Rain- Andijan Massacre May 13 2005*, p.1

stationed in the very center of their district;²⁰⁴ this attempt was stopped by troops, however nearly at the same time or after this event insurgents attacked to the police station located 6-7 km away from there. It is known from the official statement that insurgents killed four policemen on duty and obtained various weapons including assault rifles, pistols and hand grenades.²⁰⁵ Uzbek Prosecutor General Rashid Kadirov reported that

During the attack [on the police station], the criminals murdered four personnel of the patrol post, [and] four more were seriously wounded. They took 264 firearms, 40 grenades, and more than 8,000 bullets.²⁰⁶

The same armed group attacked the near by military station and obtained a number of arms, “including 53 machine guns, four rifles, and more than 2,000 bullets, as well as a ZIL-130 truck.”²⁰⁷ Afterward, they left for Andican prison where the 23 businessmen were jailed. Prosecutor General of Uzbekistan reported that five guards were killed, 34 officials were wounded²⁰⁸ and 527 of 734 prisoners were freed. However, the number of prisoners freed was estimated in the thousands by eyewitnesses and some foreign observers.²⁰⁹ There are contradictory statements about the dialog between prisoners and insurgents that night. The interviews made by Human Rights Watch (HRW) with freed prisoners showed that, people who were released were asked to go home or to join the protest and there was no quarrel between insurgents and prisoners. However, according to another eyewitness

²⁰⁴ BBC Monitoring Newsfile, “Extremists’ surrounded, talks under way”, *Uzbek TV*, 13 May 2005

²⁰⁵ BBC Monitoring Central Asia, “Uzbek leader gives news conference on Andijon events - full version” *Uzbek Television First Channel*, (14 May 2005).

²⁰⁶ John C.K. Daly, “The Andijan Disturbances and Their Implications” (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, 29 June 2005, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/3152> (May 23,2008)

²⁰⁷ Gulnoza Saidazimova, *Uzbekistan: Witnesses Recall the Andijon Bloodshed*, (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 10 May 2006, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/05/FEA84E9E-89C7-48B4-ABD5-66D78AAF41AD.html> (May 23, 2008)

²⁰⁸Vasiliy Kashin, Aleksey Nikolskiy “Uzbekistan is on fire”, *Russica Izvestia* 14 May 2005, p.A2.

²⁰⁹ BBC Monitoring Newsfile , “Uzbeks seal Kazakh, Kyrgyz border due to unrest” *Kazakh Khabar TV* 13 May 2005. C. J. Chivers, “Under Pressure, Uzbek President Raises Death Toll From Clashes”, New York Times 18 May 2005

interviewed by Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), “the insurgents urged detainees to join them.”²¹⁰ From the observations of Akiner it seems that there were prisoners who did not want to leave but were forced by the insurgents to do so.

...A prisoner (Pr2) whom the insurgents had thought to be dead regained consciousness. He recounted his story to me himself. He told me that he called out to the crowd to save him, telling them that it was the insurgents, not the guards, who had tried to kill him.²¹¹

Akiner’s account was identical with those of the official figures. Abdulkarim Shodiyev, deputy head of the Interior Ministry’s directorate penal of institutions stated “Over 500 prisoners were released from the Andijon prison by extremists on the night of 12-13 May. Of them, over 400 have returned voluntarily. Many of them are coming with weapons given by extremists”²¹²

5.3. The Take-Over of the *Hokimat* Building²¹³

Afterwards, some of the freed prisoners and insurgents arrived at the *Hokimat* building, six kilometers north of the Andican prison.

Uzbek security services tried to stop the convoy on its way to the *Hokimat* building and killed three insurgents on Oshskoia Street. Nevertheless, the efforts of security services to stop them did not succeed and almost all the group arrived intact at the *Hokimat* building and occupied it. It is interesting that only one guard was

²¹⁰OSCE - ODIHR, *Preliminary Findings on the Events in Andijan Uzbekistan, 13 May 2005* (Warsaw, 2005)

²¹¹ Shirin Akiner, *Violence in Andijan; an Independent Assessment*, (Washington: Silk Road Studies Papers 2005), p.16.

²¹² BBC monitoring Newsfile, “Over 400 freed convicts return voluntarily - Uzbek official” *ITAR-TASS News Agency* 18 May 2005

²¹³ *Hokimat* means Governorship

protecting the building during the night, so insurgents did not have difficulty entering. This shows that government might not have had any intention of using force before the protests turned into a violent uprising and the security services might not have felt it necessary to protect official buildings with a greater number of guards.

Another group of attackers encountered more intense resistance on the way to the *Hokimat* building. It happened while this group was passing the headquarters of the National Security Service (SNB- *Sluzhba Natsionalnoi Bezopasnosti*) and naturally there were a large number of policemen and armed officials around the building. A gun battle resulted in the death of 15-30 insurgents.²¹⁴ However even the most critical human rights institutions reported that “A heavy gun battle broke out around the SNB building, although it is unclear whether the fighting was initiated by the attackers aiming to overrun the SNB building, or by SNB officers trying to stop the attackers’ progress.”²¹⁵

The attackers continued and turned this individual event into a mass movement. Some of the interviewers stated that attackers and freed prisoners called their friends and relatives and asked them to come through Babur Square so as to gain public support.²¹⁶

²¹⁴ Galima Bukharbaeva, “Blood flows in Uzbek crackdown,” *IWPR Reporting Central Asia* No. 377, 14 May 2005. http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=244239&apc_state=henrica2005. (May 30, 2008)

²¹⁵ Human Rights Watch, “The Bullets Were Falling Like Rain- Andijan Massacre May 13 2005”, p.14.

²¹⁶ Shirin Akiner, p. 20.

5.4. Protests at Babur Square

As the number of protesters increased over time, the nature of the movement changed as well, and the violent actions of armed insurgents were transformed into massive civilian protest in the early morning of 13 May. By that time, around 100 protesters had arrived in the square and security forces were waiting to control and suppress the protests. According to eyewitnesses:

Military trucks, ZIL-131 and URALS were standing like a column and a column of ten jeeps followed them. Roads to the square were blocked at Chorquzar Street by two busses; the junction of Kamil Yashin Street and Babur Shah Street was also blocked with vehicles²¹⁷

No cars or other vehicles were allowed to enter to the square, however people could do so by walking. In the meantime people around the city were informed about the protest and their number slowly grew to the thousands. At Approximately 8.00 a.m. tracks came from the direction of Navoi Prospect and shoot at people without warnings

According to the report of OSCE by 11.00 a.m, instances of shooting at people repeated continuously. Around midday the angry crowd began to take hostages from the security services.

At some point between 13.00 and 14.00 hrs police fired from vehicle coming down Kamil Yashin Street. When it reached the roundabout, the crowd stopped it. A group of 5-6 men from the crowd pulled one policeman out of the vehicle and took him to the Hokimat building. The three other police officers escaped, although their weapons were seized by the crowd²¹⁸

²¹⁷ Human Rights Watch, “The Bullets Were Falling Like Rain- Andijan Massacre May 13 2005”, p.15.

²¹⁸ OSCE- ODIHR, “Preliminary Findings on the Events in Andijan Uzbekistan, 13 May 2005” (Warsaw, 2005), p. 13.

The hostage men were taken to the *Hokimat* building and handed over to the insurgents with the help of armed civilians. After the seizure of *Hokimat* building, government officials reported that 50 people were taken hostage and used as human shields by the insurgents. The hostages consisted of various officials including police officers, soldiers, firefighters, and civil servants, the chief of the tax inspection authority, and the head of the prosecutors' office.²¹⁹ The number of protesters after friday prayer increased to approximately 10,000.²²⁰

According to Akiner, it was not a coincidence that the protest of 13 May took place on a friday when Muslims gather in mosques for congregational prayer. This also indicates that people's commitment to religion played an important role in mobilization. In this sense, religious sentiments were not necessarily the origin of their protest but a means bringing the protesters together.

During the protest, citizens expressed discontent with unemployment and the corrupt policies of the local government. There was nothing related to religion in the protesters' speeches at *Babur* Square. An eyewitness described the initial phase of the as follows,

They are shouting social slogans, I would like to stress, not Islamic ones. They say that things are bad, ask why the authorities have brought the people to live in such misery. They explain their actions by this. They say they are for freedom and so forth.²²¹

Consequently most of the media and human rights advocates interpreted the absence of religious claims as if all these events occurred independent of religious motives and resulted from poor economic conditions in Uzbekistan and crooked the government's policies.

²¹⁹ Gulnoza Saidazimova, "Uzbekistan: Spontaneous Popular Uprising in Andijon, Or Terrorist-Led Upheaval", Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, (25 May 2005).

<http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058995.html> (August 1, 2008)

²²⁰ OSCE- ODIHR, p.14.

²²¹ BBC Monitoring Newsfile, , "Tens of thousands rally in Uzbek town, says eyewitness," *Russian Ren TV*, (13 May 2005).

It is apparent from later interviews with refugees in Kyrgyzstan that “people were informed by organizers that the purpose of the meeting was to protest against the government, the unfair trial process, and in particular about the fact that there had not yet been a verdict in the trial against the 23 businessmen.”²²² According to refugees’ statements it seems the protest initially started to criticize the unjust imprisonment of 23 businessmen and later was accompanied by social and economical complaints of the growing crowd. “The prosecution of the businessmen, and the closure of their enterprises, has resulted in the loss of as many as 1,000 jobs.”²²³ Since there were many people who had been employed in the companies of those 23 arrested businessmen, they had lost their jobs and so economic conditions were naturally at the center of their complaints.²²⁴ However all these facts do not necessarily mean that religious issues were irrelevant to the events in Andican on 13 May. Islam underlies the ideological background of 23 accused businessmen and their supporters. Even if the detainees’ commitment to the Ekrem Yuldashev’s ideas does not show any trace of extremism, religion became more important for their supporters in response to harsh measures of the government.

During the day, the protest continued in spite of the violent response of armed officials. “In the afternoon the Ahunbabaev Theatre and the Bakirov Cinema, both in the immediate vicinity of the square were set on fire by unidentified persons”²²⁵ People whom human rights advocates interviewed said that they stayed in the square because they were told that Karimov was coming to listen to their problems. After their expectations appeared futile, armed insurgents brought the chief of the tax

²²²OSCE- ODIHR, p. 11.

²²³ “Uzbek Crowd Storms Prison in Anti-Government Protest”, *Washington Post*, 14 May 2005, p. A18.

²²⁴Voice of America Press, “Townspeople also say the men run businesses, which provide many jobs in the impoverished Ferghana Valley, a region that is known for its anti-government sentiment.” *Russian TV Act Fade*, 14 May 2005

²²⁵ OSCE- ODIHR, p. 17.

inspection authorities and head of the prosecutors' office to the podium in the square. They were obliged to tell the crowd that the trials of the 23 businessmen were not fair and the taxes were too high for traders in the bazaar to survive. After the speeches of these two officials, the angry crowd started to shout slogans and tension increased. At around 14.00-15.00 hours observers reported that policemen began to shoot at crowd from the roof of nearby buildings.

We know from Karimov's speech of on National TV First Channel,²²⁶ that Interior Minister Zakir Almatov negotiated on the phone with insurgents who seized the *Hokimat* Building. The Insurgents said that they had wanted the official release of 23 businessmen. Almatov rejected their demands and offered insurgents a safe corridor to leave the country. He told them

What is done that is done. You have done what you have done. You have reached your goal. But we have a strict word, a condition; let it even be suggestion for you. You will not lose a hair from your heads. Nobody will touch you. If you want you can hand in your weapons or if you do not want to you may not return your weapons, here are three or four buses for you; you can go anywhere you want to in these buses. I repeat again nobody will touch you. Just say: this is the president's promise.²²⁷

"The negotiations continued for the whole day until 5:00 p.m. when the gunmen rejected the last government proposal that would allow them to leave the city."²²⁸ From official reports it appears that those targeted by security services in the conflict were the group of armed men who used the crowd as a "live shield made up of women and children."²²⁹ According OSCE's findings "there were appeals from

²²⁶ BBC Monitoring Newsfiles, "Uzbekistani President Details Negotiations with Andijon Rebels—Full Version," *Uzbek Television First Channel*, 19 May 2005.

²²⁷ BBC Monitoring News files, "Uzbek President Pledges Security to Rebels" *Uzbek Television First Channel* 14 May 2005

²²⁸ BBC Monitoring Newsfiles, "Uzbekistani President Details Negotiations with Andijon Rebels—Full Version," *Uzbek Television First Channel*, 19 May 2005

²²⁹ BBC Monitoring Central Asia, "Uzbek leader gives news conference on Andijon events - full version" 14 May 2005

the organizers not to leave the square.”²³⁰ These appeals are a remarkable indication that the insurgents actually used unarmed civilians as shields without any concern about their safety. This was also not among the concerns of government troops. “At about 18.00, government troops opened fire and began storming the *Hokimat* building. The crowd, numbering between 5,000 and 15,000 dispersed in all directions.”²³¹

5.5. Government Shootings and Departure from the Square

After the government troops opened fire, additional policemen and the military forces were sent to end the protest. These security forces came from the south via Navoi Prospect and from the west by way of Kamil Yashin Street. At the same time Cholpon Street was blocked to the north by a barricade of buses on the corner of Unitel Telecom and there was an ambush on the *Colhguzar* Street behind the *Hokimat* building. According to the eyewitnesses, all exits from the square had been blocked and armed forces were shooting at people indiscriminately.²³² Trucks, which are full of security forces with arms, were shooting from the direction of Navoi Park and TSUM shopping center. Soldiers in the truck that was coming down from the Navoi Prospect shot people who tried to defend themselves by using an UAZ vehicle as a shield.

After continuous shootings, people started to run through northeast Cholpon Street in order to leave the square. While leaving, they took approximately 15

²³⁰ OSCE- ODIHR, p.15.

²³¹ BBC Monitoring Newsfiles: “Government troops open fire on Uzbek protesters, storm building” *Russian Channel One TV*, 13.May 2005

²³² OSCE- ODIHR, p. 17.

hostages and put them front of the crowd because they thought that security forces would not shoot at hostages.²³³ When this group reach to the corner of Telecom building armed forces in trucks were waiting behind the barricade of busses located at the corner of east Parkovaya Street.²³⁴ After a while soldiers stopped shooting and rest of the people could pass near the buses and continued escaping through the street. It is known from the observers that shootings repeated with 15 minutes intervals.

Troops opened fire again from the behind the escaping crowd after they passed the busses and, they reached the Cholpon Cinema. Meanwhile the residents of apartments located on the Cholpon Street did not open their doors to the protesters. Some civilians were seriously injured and most of them were shot near School 15. Realizing that they could not pass the blockade of armed trucks, the group decided to approach Bainalminal Street. During this time gunfire did not stop. As is cleat from interviews made by Human Rights Watch, most of the people Cholpon Street were killed.

Estimates on the number of casualties differ. While the Uzbek Government gives the total number of dead as 173, media, opposition parties and international organizations claim that the more accurate figure is between 800 and 1500.²³⁵ Prosecutor General of Uzbekistan, Rashidjon Kadyrov, stated that “32 of the dead people were police officers and servicemen for the government troops; he added that 50 of the killed terrorists were foreigner and two of them were citizens of Kyrgyzstan.”²³⁶ Foreign involvement in the protest increased the government’s

²³³ OSCE- ODIHR, p. 18.

²³⁴ Human Rights Watch, “The Bullets Were Falling Like Rain- Andijan Massacre May 13 2005”, p.29.

²³⁵ BBC monitoring Newsfile, “Up to 1,500 dead in Andijon unrest - Uzbek opposition party”, *Moscow Interfax news agency*, 18 May 2005.

²³⁶ “Uzbekistan keeps counting corpses” *Russica Izvestia*, 18 May 2005, p. 10.

suspicion on that the uprising was sponsored by foreign countries or organized by international terror networks.

According to Akiner's impressions of after visiting the region in the aftermath, the government's estimations of the death toll are compatible with the official count of the dead in the Andican's morgues. This figure is also supported by the statements of imams who told Akiner that they led 300 funeral prayers during the whole of May.²³⁷ Some claims that many of the corpses were buried in secret graves but there is no evidence to determine the accuracy of these rumors. Yet there were families who could not find their relatives after the events either in the morgues or in the refugee camps.²³⁸ Thus the possibility of that government buried the dead in mass graves cannot be ruled out.

5.6. Escape to the Kyrgyz Border

According to the report by Human Rights Watch based mainly on the accounts of refugees, more than 600 people moved north to reach the Kyrgyz border. After walking all night the group arrived at the border town of Teshik -Tosh at 6.00 a.m on 14 May. One of the surviving refugees told Human Rights Watch that:

When we reached Teshik-Tosh a villager said there was another way to Kyrgyzstan through the hills. We had to reach Kyrgyzstan by any means. He showed the road and we followed him.... I was in the area, in the front were mostly women. Troops were waiting for us up ahead, they were expecting us. We got ambushed, they opened fire on us. I myself saw three dead women,

²³⁷ Shirin Akiner, p. 20.

²³⁸ David Holley & Sergei Loiko, "Lethal Clashes in Uzbekistan Sow fear for the fates of Missing", Los Angeles Times, 20 May 2005, p. A-3.

three dead men and a dead child. A lot of people were wounded in the back; they were shot as they were running away.²³⁹

Since borders were closed due to the strict control over shuttle trade between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the refugees could not easily cross the border, but after negotiating with authorities the border was opened to the people who wanted protection from Kyrgyzstan.²⁴⁰ After determining whether they were armed, Kyrgyz officials let them enter Kyrgyzstan across the *Karadarya* River. According to information provided by United Nations officials “490 Uzbek refugees had registered for asylum in Kyrgyzstan.”²⁴¹ Bakiyev, the president, also stated “Kyrgyzstan has provided all necessary assistance to 539 citizens of Uzbekistan, who appeared on the territory of our country.”²⁴²

5.7. The Aftermath

5.7.1. Restriction on the Flow of Information

During and after the uprising Uzbek authorities prohibited the broadcasting of what happened in Andican on 13 May 2005. Latterly A Russian journalist released

²³⁹ Human Rights Watch, “The Bullets Were Falling Like Rain- Andijan Massacre May 13 2005, p. 34.

²⁴⁰ Steven Lee Myers, “As Hundreds Flee Violence Flares Anew at Uzbek Border” *The New York Times* 15 May 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/international/asia/15uzbek.html> (August 2, 2008)

²⁴¹, “Under Pressure, Uzbek President Raises Death Toll From Clashes” *The New York Times*, 18 May 2005, p. A6

²⁴² BBC monitoring Newsfile , “Tajik, Kyrgyz leaders concerned about Uzbek situation” , *ITARR – TASS News Agency* 18 May 2005.

after the seal of Andican described the government approach towards the media as follows,

The authorities of a district in Andijon Region decided we violated the law, filming things without any special permission, and took us to the local police station. The local policemen were polite but firm. They gave our papers back and sent us to Andijon. We are now on the town outskirts. We have managed to enter the city, but TV is banned from working here.²⁴³

Most of the media interpreted this restriction as an indication of Karimov's effort to obscure the government's violent interposition towards the protesters. When Karimov was asked why journalists were prohibited from covering the events, he said, "In which country have you seen foreign journalists being allowed into areas of military action?"²⁴⁴

Karimov also believed that the uprising was supported by foreign states, which wanted to promote regime change in the region. According to him, the Andican Uprising was organized by these powers and all information they would broadcast to the world about the events would be biased, distorted, exaggerated and used to accuse the government. On 17 May 2005 Karimov stated that;

I respect their (international media mostly western) views. I may not like their reports, but I am obliged to perceive their reports in which they present their views. I am obliged to respect every point of view. But it is very important that they should be based on specific facts and serious evidence.²⁴⁵

²⁴³ BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, " Released Russian TV Journalist on Their Detention, Casualties and Rebels" *Russian Ren TV*, 14 May 2005 .

²⁴⁴ BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, "Uzbek leader raps Russian TV channels over coverage of Andijon unrest", *Russian Ferghana.ru news agency*, 18 May 2005.

²⁴⁵ BBC Monitoring Media, "Uzbek president says Andijon media coverage lacked facts" - *Uzbek Television second channel*, 17 May 2005.

5.7.2. Intimidation and arrests

Interior Minister Zohirjon Almatov said on 15 May 2005 that the Uzbek police have seized at least 70 organizers of the insurgency in Andican.²⁴⁶ However arrests were not confined to the proven organizers. After the government's suppression of the Andican Uprising, control over the activities of human rights organizations was intensified. Karimov charged members of human rights organization with damaging the country's social stability. Representatives of Human Rights Watch reported that Saidjahon Zaynabitdinov, who did not hesitate to criticize violent response of government to Andican protests, was arrested by Uzbek officials on 21 May 2005.²⁴⁷

The chairman of the local branch of a human rights society, Yodgor Turlibekov, and his deputy, Nodir Ahadov, were detained by the police in Qarshi (the centre of [southern] Qashqadaryo Region) on 28 May, when they were about to leave for [central] Samarqand to attend a Freedom House seminar. The chairman of the Qashqadaryo branch of the Ezgulik human rights organization, Zulfiqor Mirzoqulov, was also arrested in the house at that moment.²⁴⁸

The government oppression was not limited to the apprehension of human rights activists. The leaders and members of opposition parties were also detained. Two policemen entered the residence of, Daynov Tashanov, the chief of the Birlik opposition party's local branch, in Qarshi on 29 May 2005. Suspects from the business sector were also kept in custody. Sanjar Umarov, a millionaire businessman

²⁴⁶ BBC Monitoring Central Asia, "Some 70 rioters detained in troubled Uzbek town" 15 May 2005

²⁴⁷ BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union "Key rights activist arrested in Uzbekistan" *Ferghana.ru news agency* 24 May 2005

²⁴⁸ BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union "Pressure on Uzbek rights activists said intensified" *Ferghana.ru news agency*, 30 May 2005.

and leader of Sunshine Coalition²⁴⁹ was arrested in October 2005 on the grounds that he committed economic crimes.²⁵⁰ Director of the Sunshine Coalition, Nodira Khidoyatova, said that throughout the investigation all documents and computer disks were confiscated from the Sunshine Coalition bureau.²⁵¹ Hill and Jones also argued “Karimov moved against independent businessmen in Uzbekistan to prevent them from becoming alternative sources of funding and influence.”²⁵²

5.7.3. The Andican Trials and Asylum Seeking Uzbeks

Uzbek protesters who fled to Kyrgyzstan caused tension between Uzbek and Kyrgyz authorities. Karimov insistently asked the Kyrgyz government not to recognize terrorists as refugees and to send them back to Uzbekistan. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) requested that Kyrgyzstan not to repatriate Uzbek refugees and to act in accordance with the 1951 Convention related to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.²⁵³ On 17 July 2005 the United Nations and other governments called for the recognition of Uzbek

²⁴⁹ Sunshine coalition was established in 2005 and its main priorities was pronounced as follows; “• Respect and observe the constitutional structure of the Republic of Uzbekistan • Confirming the willingness of the Sunshine Coalition to dialogue with the President • Appeal to dissolution of ineffective government • Appeal to consolidation of the constructive powers of society, patriots of Uzbekistan, followers of the country's prosperity • Elaborating of the progressive reform program of the Uzbekistan 's economy as the strategy of surpassing development of the society.” See. Sunshine Uzbekistan, “The Second Congress of Coalition for National Unity Sunshine Uzbekistan.” See.<http://www.sunshineuzbekistan.org/congress.htm> (July 29,2008)

²⁵⁰ International Crisis Group, *Uzbekistan Europe's Sanction Asia Briefing No54* (Bishkek/Brussel, 2006), p.6.

²⁵¹ *The Journal Of Turkish Weekly* “ Leader of Sunshine Ssnjar Umarov arrested in Tashkent.” 24 October 2005. <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=21071> (July 29, 2008)

²⁵² Fionna Hill, Kevin Jones, p.118

²⁵³ [The Times of Central Asia](http://www.thetimesofcentralasia.com) “OSCE Asks Kyrgyzstan To Not Repatriate Uzbek Refugees”31 May 2005

refugees in Kyrgyzstan.²⁵⁴ After Kyrgyz government hosted the refugees for a week, the interior ministry of Romania declared that they would accept the refugees.²⁵⁵ “The 439 refugees boarded plane chartered by the IOM (International Organization for Migration) in Bishkek in the early hours of 29 July for a seven-hour flight to of Romania.”²⁵⁶ The refugees in Romania continually expressed their fear of the possibility of deportation to Uzbekistan and said that they would be tortured and killed.²⁵⁷ According to the observations from the refugee camp in Uzbekistan people gave no indication of espousing signs of Islamic extremism.²⁵⁸ This observation also weakened the Uzbek government’s claim that the *Ekremiye* group and their supporters were fundamentalists and that the Andican uprising was organized with the help of radical groups. However,

Defendant Lochin Imonqulov, captioned as a Kyrgyz citizen, spoke about how they came from Kyrgyzstan. "We came to Uzbekistan from behind the concrete slabs. There were about 70 of us. We were led by a man called Akrom. Half of us had weapons," he said. Defendant Ilhom Hojiyev, shown in video still carrying an assault rifle and posing to camera during the unrest, spoke about how they delivered weapons to Andijon. He said the Islamic group Hezb-e Tahrir and Wahhabis supported the militants. He also spoke about training of militants in Kyrgyzstan. "We learnt to fire pistols and assault rifles in the Kyrgyz hills," he said.²⁵⁹

The speeches of these defendants supported the Uzbek government’s official account of the events on 13 May. Most of the western media found the video record

²⁵⁴ Farah Stockman, “Resettlement Plan Could Test U.S.-Uzbek Relations interviews Process Begins for 400 Who May Seek” *Boston Globe* 17 July 2005, p.A-5.

²⁵⁵ C.J. Chivers, “UN moves Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan Up to 455 to be resettled in 3rd country” *The New York Times*, 28 July 2005, p. A-3.

²⁵⁶ International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Romania: IOM airlifts Uzbek refugees.” 29 July 2005. <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EVOD-6ERCVB?OpenDocument> (July 29,2008)

²⁵⁷ Nicholas Wood, “Uzbek refugees in Romania fear their homeland's reach” *International Herald Tribune* , 19 September 2005, p. 4.

²⁵⁸ Nicholas Wood, “Uzbek refugees in Romania fear their homeland's reach” *International Herald Tribune* , 19 September 2005, p. 4.

²⁵⁹ Uzbek Television first channel, “Militants involved in Andijon events give evidence in Uzbek documentary “ 29 Jul,2005.

used by government in the persecution of defendants to be, biased and driven by offensive motives of the Uzbek government. But this evidence and the defendants' confessions made it clear that some of the armed protesters were not so innocent as international organizations assumed. In September 2005, fifteen men accused of involvement in the Andican Uprising were sent to trial. At the end of the first trial all defendants were sentenced to long prison terms. Due to the lack of transparency the rest of the Andican trials were not observed and that is why the exact number of people sentenced to prison is unknown.²⁶⁰

5.7.4. International Reaction

The International reaction to Andican uprising was shaped by broader geopolitical interests. Thus, different approaches of the east and the west to this specific event can be explained by their effort to balance each other in the region. What happened in Andican was subject to the polemical explanations of the government and protesters. The absence of any consensus about the facts left international actors ambiguous and their differing interpretations of the uprising were produced by their incompatible political motives.

The United States did not know how to respond to this issue. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher said that the armed attack by civilians on government facilities and violence of terrorism would not be tolerated.²⁶¹ Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice emphasized the possibility that uprising may have stemmed

²⁶⁰ International Crisis Group, *Uzbekistan : In For Long Haul Asia Briefing No.45* (Bishkek/Brussel 2006), p. 6.

²⁶¹ Voice of America Press, " US Appeals for Restraint in Uzbekistan Amid Civil Unrest" 16 May 2005

from government authoritarianism and indicated on the necessity of reform in Uzbekistan.²⁶² However, in later days the attitude of the U.S. became more pronounced. John G. Fox, chief of the State Department's Office of Caucasus and Central Asian Affairs stated that "So far as we can tell, the Akramia group is neither extremist nor terrorist"²⁶³ The U.S. also warned Uzbekistan that it would cut financial aid if it was not allowed to conduct an international survey in Andican and subsequently "on 14 July 2005 The Bank of New York blocked the credit line to Uzbekistan."²⁶⁴ The United States also assisted the transfer of refugees from Kyrgyzstan to Romania despite the Uzbek government's objections. Thus the U.S reaction to the Andican Uprising targeted harsh response of government to public interests. Concerned with democratization of U.S. increased the volume of its criticism on human rights after the Andican Uprising.

The EU's reaction to Andican was not different from that of the U.S. On 23 May 2005 the EU's External Relations Council Commissioner Benita Ferro Waldner condemned the Uzbek government's arbitrary use of force on public protests in Andican and asked Uzbekistan to act in accordance with international agreements on human rights. Like the U.S., the European Union also called for an independent investigation of the events in Andican. After the trials of the detainees ended, European Union imposed economic and political sanctions on Uzbekistan. Arms sales to Uzbekistan were prohibited and later twelve Uzbek officials²⁶⁵ who had been

²⁶² International Crisis Group *Andijon Uprising*, p. 7.

²⁶³ Farah Stockman, "Resettlement Plan Could Test U.S.-Uzbek Relations interviews Process Begins for 400 Who May Seek" *Boston Globe* 17 July 2005, p. A-5.

²⁶⁴ BBC Monitoring Central Asia, "Bank of New York Shuts credit lines to Uzbekistan," *Karavan-Almaty* 15 July 2005.

²⁶⁵ Interior Minister Zokirjon Almatov, Defense Minister Qodir Ghulomov, NSS head Rustam Inoyatov, Presidential adviser Ruslan Mirzoyev, Andijon governor Saydullo Begaliyev and General Vladimir Mamo were among these officials.

deemed responsible for the death of 200 civilians in Andican on 13 May were banned from obtaining visas to EU countries for one year.²⁶⁶

Russia and China, on the other hand, gave full support to Karimov after his suppression of insurgents in Andican while the U.S and other western governments criticized him. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan stated “this is fundamentally an Uzbek domestic matter.”²⁶⁷ The Chinese Foreign Ministry clarified that their intolerance for separatism, terrorism, and extremism was the primary motive in backing Uzbek president.²⁶⁸ By declaring that this was a domestic problem of Uzbekistan, China and Russia supported Karimov’s objection to an international investigation. Russia had always seen Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries as a source of instability and religious fundamentalism. As a result Russian support of the Karimov regime, which strictly controlled this threat for long years, was not surprising. Russia may also have wanted to increase its credibility in opposition to the U.S. presence in the region.

5.7.5. Foreign Policy Implications of Andican Uprising

Quickly developing relations with Russia exhibited the reversal of Uzbek foreign policy. The Andican uprising, no doubt, accelerated the increasing cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan. The change in Uzbekistan’s foreign relations was produced by its concerns over the survival of its ruling establishment.

²⁶⁶ Alexander Warkotsch, “Non-Compliance and Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy Promotion” *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, no.2 (2008), p.236.

²⁶⁷ Chris Buckley, “China open arms to Uzbek Chief Beijing Endorses Bloody Crackdown” *International Herald Tribune*, 26 May 2005, p1-R.

²⁶⁸ *The New York Times*, “China Backs Uzbekistan, Splitting with U.S. on Crackdown” 25 May 2005, p A-3.

Karimov saw the Andican uprising as a revolt against his regime sought international assistance for his survival. Closer relations with Russia were also hastened by Uzbekistan's worsening relations of with the U.S and E.U. Severe criticism from these countries regarding the Uzbek regime's indiscriminate use of force during Andican uprising, led Karimov to look for assistance from Russia.

U.S. concerns about human rights violations of the Uzbek government had already prompted Karimov to think that the U.S. would not provide the means necessary for his regime's protection against the internal threats represented by religious fundamentalists. U.S. support for refugees, defined by Uzbek authorities as terrorists, confirmed Karimov's prior assumptions. 439 Uzbek refugees were transferred from Kyrgyzstan to Romania with the assistance of the U.S on 27 May 2005. After days, Uzbekistan demanded the U.S. to leave K2 military base within 180 days.

The expulsion of U.S. troops from the K2 airbase was justified by the claim that Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan had been successfully completed successfully and thus the reason for the U.S. presence in the region had disappeared. In July 2005 this issue was discussed at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and all parties reached a consensus on ending the deployment of the U.S. troops in the region. However the real motive behind their agreement was their common fear from loss of the status, which would possibly be catalyzed by democracy promotion of US.

The Treaty of Allied Relations between Uzbekistan and Russia promised joint action against the threats they might face. It was no coincidence that the strategic partnership between Russia and Uzbekistan was completed with the approval of Treaty of Allied Relations on 14 November 2005 when last U.S.

personnel left the K2 airbase. The comparative advantages Russia offered were immediately exploited by Uzbekistan in order to strengthen its regime and to dispose the presence of foreign actors (U.S and European Union)

The suspension of financial assistance and the E.U. embargo on arms trade with Uzbekistan also pushed Karimov to increase the extent of his cooperation with Russia, which used its energy resources as a mean of political manipulation in the region. “The investment of Russian energy giants Gazprom and Lukoil in Uzbekistan is expected to amount about the US\$ 2.5 billion a figure that would dwarf any US investment so far”²⁶⁹ The Karimov regime, desperately needing flow of cash, was quick to capitalize on the situation.

Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from GUUAM,²⁷⁰ an organization that excluded Russia and aimed at maximal collaboration with NATO, was a consequence of its developing cooperation with Russia.²⁷¹ Uzbekistan’s entry into EurAsEc (Eurasian Economic Community-Unified Economic Space Project)²⁷² on 25 January 2006 was another implication of regional cooperation between Russia and other Central Asian countries. Lastly, Uzbekistan rejoined the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, from which it departed in 1999, claiming that it did not want to be a part of a political military block.²⁷³ The re-establishment of close relations with Eurasian countries and Russia implied that regional cooperation against religious radicalism and the U.S. presence in the region would be used as a balancing power.

²⁶⁹ Matteo Fumagalli, “ Alignments and Realignments in Central Asia: The Rationale and Implications of Uzbekistan’s Rapprochement with Russia” *International Political Science Review* Vol.28 No.3 (2007), 253-271, p. 262.

²⁷⁰ GUUAM: Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. This alliance is known to have an anti Russian characteristic

²⁷¹ Vital Naumkin, “Uzbekistan’s State –Building Fatigue” *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no.3 (2006), p.136

²⁷² Formation of free trade zone and creation of customs union were the basic motives in this project. See, Vital Naumkin, “Uzbekistan’s State –Building Fatigue, p. 136.

²⁷³ Rustam Burnashev and Irina Chernykh, “Changes in Uzbekistan’s Military Policy After Andijan Events”, *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* Volume 5, no 1 (2007), p. 72.

To sum up, it can be deduced from the reversal in Uzbek foreign policy after the Andican Uprising that this domestic event had a profound effect on the changing balances of power politics. Relations with the U.S and EU deteriorated after Andican Uprising. Both the authoritarian response to this event and prior problems related to the social policies of Uzbekistan increased the number of its western critics. These critics then turned to sanctions, which impelled Uzbekistan to search for new alignments. This process resulted in the rise of regional cooperation and increasing collaboration with Russia and China. Thus Uzbek government's domestic affairs contributed to changes in the broader international relations.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Multiplicity of factors in the evaluation of Andican Uprising necessitated the development of a multidimensional perspective to explain this specific event. Reasons, essence and consequences of the event are actually having an interactive characteristic. In order to understand what caused the Andican Uprising, it is necessary to look at the results and the nature of the protest and vice versa.

In addition to the separate contribution of reasons to revolutionary outcome they have also affected each other to some extent. For instance, it was seen that economic dissatisfaction prompted people to organize around the *Ekremiye* group whose motives were not close to secular character of the state. By applying to religious principles is group tried to increase the extent of solidarity among the society. By means of this solidarity they aimed to increase economic prosperity. However, in return of their help to needed people, they required from affiliates to adopt and defend religious sentiments in their daily life. This was clearly seen in the organizational structure and ideological motives of the group. In this context, it was

educed that this group used its financial sources to emit the ideas of Ekrem Yuldashev.

Direct influence of this group with the uprising can be related to the massive support to 23 businessmen who were arrested with the charges of being members of religious *Ekremiye* group. However, destruction of an alternative economic society, which had been created by the members of *Ekremiye* group, also increased the discontent of protesters who lost their jobs after the arrest of these 23 businessmen. In this context the most prominent motivation of protesters in Andican Uprising was not their commitment to religious characteristic of *Ekremiye* group only.

In the beginning of this study, the extent of threat presented by *Hizb-ut Tahrir* and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was analyzed in order to examine the authenticity of Uzbek officials claim that Andican uprising was organized by religious extremist organizations. At the end of this exploration it was seen that *Hizb-ut Tahrir* and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan clearly exposed a threat to the secular character of Uzbekistan.

Hizb ut-Tahrir claimed that its operational method was not violent. However, the conclusion can be drawn from its draft constitution that peril it posed for secularism was quite high. In this context similarity between operational methods of *Hizb ut- Tahrir* and additional text to “Yimango Yul” of Ekrem Yuldashev increased the possibility of connection between these two groups. Although the writer of this additional text was not identified, Uzbek government preferred to trust this document in its persecution of 23 businessmen. This preference of government can be explained by its so far fear from the existence of *Hizb ut-Tahrir* and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. This paper clearly does not either ignore the view that oppressive policies of Karimov may have radicalized religious sentiments of people

in Uzbekistan or interrogate the intimacy of Karimov in his war on fundamentalism. He may have dealt with religious opposition for the survival of his regime only; but this is not an issue of this paper. The question here is that whether or not religious sentiments somehow affected the rise of Andican Uprising; and this paper's answer to this question is yes. Although *Ekremiye* group was neither an extremist nor terrorist organization; it still contributes to the threat over the secular principles in Uzbekistan due to its promotion of religious sentiments in daily life and business sector.

Economic factors behind the uprising were also analyzed in order to measure the actual share of economic discontent in the emergence of Andican Uprising. In the end of the survey it was seen that; although Uzbek government conducted rational policies to stabilize the economy, microeconomic implications of them were destructive for small sized traders and rural population in the country. Restriction on access to cash by government was applied in order to control the devaluation of the currency and decrease the share of import and unregistered trade in the economy. However these macroeconomic policies resulted in loss of jobs and ironically increased the extent of informal activities. Use of credit cards were required by government to decrease the circulation of cash money, this practice consequently necessitated the removal of small sized unregistered traders in bazaars whose accountability had been low. Combined with destruction of bazaars, their insufficient capital to open registered stores left bazaar traders unemployed. Rural population of the country suffered from cash restriction, traditional *shirkat* administrations and state-buying monopoly. All these factors ultimately contributed to the economic dissatisfaction expressed by demonstrators during Andican uprising. In this context

the assumption that economical problems have a greater role in protests on 13 May 2005 was not baseless.

As a part of this study, mutual development of domestic and international factors within the context of Andican Uprising was explored. In this exploration it was questioned whether or not Andican uprising was influenced by colored revolutions which toppled authoritarian regimes in post Soviet countries. In order to reach a decision on this matter, similarities among toppled regimes and their relations with the U.S. were pointed out. Exploration of these possibilities showed that all of the toppled regimes were to some extent authoritarian and corruption of institutions and officials was determining cause in revolutionary movements. It is also true that the U.S has had strategic concerns over the region and its support to civil society organizations under the title of democracy promotion was supposed to have strengthened its influence. Except Ukraine, all of the other countries were keen to collaborate with the U.S. on security issues. However continuing relations of them with Russia may have led the U.S. to increase its relative gains. In this context intense economic relations of Uzbekistan with Russia and their strategic partnership since 2004 might have led the U.S. to take initiative against Karimov regime.

It should not be forgotten that Uzbekistan actually was pushed towards Russia by the U.S. Critics of the U.S. on Uzbekistan's poor human rights record led Karimov to cooperate with more "reliable" powers. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan who was in desperate need of cash flow, had already been attracted by Russian promise for investment in its energy sector. In this context it may be reasonable to think that the U.S. has sympathized Andican Uprising but channels of this sympathy seemed to be locked in Uzbekistan. As a part of this exploration, conditions of civil society organizations in Uzbekistan were investigated. At the end of this investigation it was

understood that neither the number of civil society organizations nor their capacities were sufficient to create and mobilize public protests. Strict control on access to cash and bank regulations made it impossible for them, to withdraw money without a permission from the administration. Therefore, the idea of, civil society organizations could have used the U.S. financial aid to organize an uprising seems unrealistic. Nevertheless, high level of corruption in Uzbek institutions leaves open door to possibility that NGOs could receive and exploit the U.S aid in the absence of state control. However, this assumption remains to be a probability and not supported by evidence so far. Clan politics in Uzbekistan was also explained to investigate its affect on the emergence of Andican Uprising. By exploring the characteristics of informal politics in Uzbekistan I could reach the conclusion that regional fractions had an important role in economic and social discontent of the society. In terms of economic dimension, clan politics brought two important problems. First, clan leaders, who were reluctant to share their power, dominated the major business sectors in Uzbekistan. Second, suppression of loosing fractions' supporters also left many people without job. 1000 thousand people who were left unemployed after the arrest of 23 businessmen in Andican is an instance of this mechanism. Politically this suppression made loosing fractions subjected to harsh treatments during official investigations. Any effort dedicated to elimination of one clan increased the power of another; and problematical leadership of Karimov who used to make advantage of the system for his regime's survival maintained the existence of this undemocratic structure. Balancing the powers of different clans could create stability in the country however it would not necessarily imply any democratic outcome.

At the end, what happened on Andican on 13 May 2005 was portrayed. Depiction of happenings showed that Andican uprising was flamed by an armed

group who released 23 businessmen. These 23 businessmen had been charged with commitment to religious group *Ekremiye*. Supporters of these 23 businessmen formed the first cycles of the uprising. The group who protested unjust trials of these 23 businessmen was latterly accompanied by greater crowd, most of which consisted of women and children. In mobilization of crowd religious slogans were used. However as crowd grew, the nature of protests changed and economic complaints were raised on the stage. This showed that both economic and religious motives were present at the protest. Afterwards of the protest indicated that Andican uprising led to the intensification of state control over civil society and media. International reaction to indiscriminate use of force varied and this variation symbolized the polarization of states that supported or criticized Karimov's regime. States who took different sides on this domestic problem of Uzbekistan also exhibited the characteristics of international rivalry in the region. Foreign policy implications of the uprising displayed the reversal of Uzbek policies in international context. These characteristics of the event proved that border between foreign and domestic policy blurred and balance of power, to which Uzbekistan applied, exhibited the effect of structural system on domestic decision-making process.

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APPENDIX I. PHOTOS TAKEN IN ANDICAN ON 13 MAY 2005



Uzbek soldiers take position outside the administration building in Andijan on May 13. Hundreds died when soldiers opened fire on protesters.



APPENDIX II. IMPORTANT FIGURES²⁷⁴



Uzbek President Islam Karimov
(1991-)



Interior Minister Zakhirjan Almatov
(1991-2005)



SNB chief Rustam Inoyatov
(1995-)



Leader of Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan, Tahir Yuldashev

²⁷⁴ Photos are available on following web sites.

www.nndb.com/people/811/000044679/uzbek prez.jpg, uznews.net/con_images/news/news/0001320.jpg,
www.globalsecurity.org/.../tahir_yuldashev_2.jpg, www.voanews.com/uzbek/images/almatov_1.jpg,
http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/40928000/jpg/_40928744_akram203.jpg

APPENDIX III. PARTIAL DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF HIZB UT- TAHRIR²⁷⁵

Draft Constitution by *Hizb ut-Tahrir*

GENERAL RULES

Article 1

The Islamic ‘Aqeedah constitutes the foundation of the State. Nothing is permitted to exist in the government’s structure, accountability, or any other aspect connected with the government, that does not take the ‘Aqeedah as its source. The ‘Aqeedah is also the source for the State’s constitution and *shar’i* canons. Nothing connected to the constitution or canons is permitted to exist unless it emanates from the Islamic ‘Aqeedah.

Article 2

The domain of Islam (*Daar ul-Islam*) is that entity which applies the rules of Islam in life’s affairs and whose security do Muslims maintain. The domain of disbelief (*Daar ul-Kufr*) is that entity which applies the rules of *kufr* and whose security is maintained by the *kuffaar*.

Article 3

The *Khaleefah* is empowered to adopt divine rules (*aHkaam shar’iyyah*) enacted as constitution and canons. Once the *Khaleefah* has adopted a divine rule, that rule alone becomes the divine rule that must be enacted and then implemented. Every citizen must openly and secretly obey that adopted rule.

Article 4

The *Khaleefah* does not adopt divine rules pertaining to worship, i.e. *ibadaat*, except in connection with alms (*zakaah*) and war (*jihaad*). Also, he does not adopt any of the thoughts connected with the Islamic ‘Aqeedah.

Article 5

All citizens of the Islamic State are entitled to enjoy the divine rights and duties.

Article 6

All citizens of the State shall be treated equally regardless of religion, race, colour or any other matter. The State is forbidden to discriminate among its citizens in all matters, be it ruling or judicial, or caring of affairs.

²⁷⁵ Media Office of Hizb ut-Tahrir. <http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/english/constitution.htm> (August 4, 2008)

Article 7

The State implements the *aHkaam shar'iyyah* on all citizens who hold citizenship of the Islamic State, whether Muslims or not, in the following manner:

- a. The *aHkaam shar'iyyah* is implemented in its entirety, without exception, on all Muslims.
- b. Non-Muslims are allowed to follow their own beliefs and worships.
- c. Those who are guilty of apostasy (*murtadd*) from Islam are to be executed according to the rule of apostasy, provided they have by themselves renounced Islam. If they are born as non-Muslims, i.e., if they are the sons of apostates, then they are treated as non-Muslims according to their status as being either polytheists (*mushriks*) or People of the Book.
- d. In matters of food and clothing the non-Muslims are treated according to their religions within the limits allowed by *aHkam Shara'iah*.
- e. Marital affairs (including divorce) among non-Muslims are settled in accordance with their religions, but between non-Muslims and Muslims they are settled according to the *aHkaam shar'iyyah*.
- f. All the remaining *shar'i* matters and rules, such as: the application of transactions, punishments and evidences (at court), the system of ruling and economics are implemented by the State upon everyone, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. This includes the people of treaties (*mu'aahid*), the protected subjects (*ahludh dhimmah*) and all who submit to the authority of Islam. The implementation on these people is the same as the implementation on the subjects of the State. Ambassadors and envoys enjoy diplomatic immunity.

Article 8

Arabic is the language of Islam and the sole language of the State.

Article 9

Ijtihaad (personal exertion to derive the Islamic rule) is *farD kifaayah* (a collective duty). Every Muslim has the right to exercise *ijtihaad* if he has acquired the necessary conditions to perform it.

Article 10

There is no such thing as a clergy in Islam as all Muslims bear the responsibility for Islam. The State will prevent anything that indicates the existence of a clergy among Muslims.

Article 11

The primary function of the State is the propagation of the invitation (*da'wah*) to Islam.

Article 12

The only evidences to be considered for the divine rules (*aHkaam shar'iyyah*) are: the Qur'an, the Sunnah, the consensus of the Companions (*ijmaa' us-Sahaabah*) and analogy (*qiyaas*). Legislation cannot be taken from any source other than these evidences.

Article 13

Every individual is innocent until proven guilty. No person shall be punished without a court sentence. Torturing is absolutely forbidden and whoever inflicts torture on anyone shall be punished.

Article 14

All human actions are, in origin, restricted by the divine rules (*aHkaam shar'iyyah*), and no action shall be undertaken until its rule (*Hukm*) is known. Every thing or object is permitted, i.e., *Halaal*, unless there is an evidence of prohibition.

Article 15

Any means that most likely leads to a prohibition (*Haraam*) is itself *Haraam*. However if it was (only) feared that it may lead to a prohibition, then it would not be *Haraam*.

THE RULING SYSTEM

Article 16

The ruling system of the State is that of a unitary ruling system and not a federation.

Article 17

Ruling is centralised and administration is de-centralised.

Article 18

There are four positions of ruling in the State. They are: The *Khaleefah*, the delegated assistant (*mu'aawin ut-tafweeD*), the governor (*wali*), the provincial mayor ('amil). All other officials of the State are employees and not rulers.

Article 19

No one is permitted to take charge of ruling, or any action considered to be of the nature of ruling, except a male who is free (*Hurr*), i.e. not a slave, mature (*baaligh*), sane ('aqil), trustworthy ('adl), competent; and he must not be save a muslim.

Article 20

Calling upon the rulers to account for their actions is both a right for the Muslims and a *farD kifaayah* (collective duty) upon them. Non-Muslim subjects have the right to make known their complaints about the rulers' injustice and misapplication of the Islamic rules upon them.

Article 21

Muslims are entitled to establish political parties to question the rulers and to access the positions of ruling through the Ummah on condition that the parties are based on the '*Aqeedah* of Islam and their adopted rules are *aHkaam shar'iyyah*; the establishment of such a party does not require a license by the State. Any party not established on the basis of Islam is prohibited.

Article 22

The ruling system is founded upon four principles. They are:

1. Sovereignty belongs to the divine law (*shara'*) and not to the people.
2. Authority belongs to the people, i.e., the Ummah.
3. The appointment of one *Khaleefah* into office is an obligation upon all Muslims.
4. Only the *Khaleefah* has the right to adopt the *aHkaam shar'iyyah* and thus he passes the constitution and the various canons.

Article 23

The State systems are made up of eight institutions. They are:

1. The *Khaleefah* (*Al-khaleefah*).
2. The delegated assistant (*mu'aawin at-tafweed*).
3. The executing assistants (*mu'aawin at-tanfeedh*).
4. Amir of jihad (*Ameerul jihad*).
5. Governors (*Wulaah*).
6. Judges (*QuDaah*).
7. The state departments (*maSaaliH ud-dawlah*).
8. The council of the Ummah (*majlis ul-Ummah*)

THE KHALEEFAH

Article 24

The *Khaleefah* is deputised by the Ummah with authority to implement the *shar'*.

Article 25

Khilafah is a contract of nomination and acceptance. No one is obliged to accept it and no one is obliged to nominate a particular person for it.

Article 26

Every mature male and female Muslim, who is sane, has the right to participate in the election of the *Khaleefah* and in giving him the pledge (*ba'iah*). Non-Muslims have no right in this regard.

Article 27

Once the contract of the *Khilafah* has been concluded on a person through the *ba'iah* of those by whom the *ba'iah* is legitimately concluded, the *ba'iah* of the remaining people is a *ba'iah* of obedience and not contract. Consequently, those who might disobey or rebel are obliged to give *ba'iah*.

Article 28

Nobody can become *Khaleefah* without being appointed by the Muslims. Nobody can hold the power of the *Khilafah* unless it is convened to him legitimately, as is the case with any contract in Islam.

Article 29

Any country that wishes to give the *Khaleefah* the *ba'iah* of contract, her *sultaan* (authority) must be self-acting that depends on Muslims only and not on any *kaafir* state. The security of the Muslims in that country, both internally and externally, must be maintained by the security of Islam and not *kufir*.

As for the *ba'iah* of obedience only, it can be taken from any other country without such conditions.

Article 30

The individual who is given the *ba'iah* for *Khilafah* need only to fulfill the contracting conditions, even if he did not fulfil the preferable conditions, because what is essential is the conditions of contracting.

Article 31

There are seven conditions needed in the *Khaleefah* so that the *Khilafah* can be contracted to him. They are to be a male, Muslim, free (*Hurr*), mature (*baaligh*), sane ('*aaqil*), trustworthy ('*adl*) and able (*qaadir*).

Article 32

If the post of the *Khaleefah* becomes vacant, due to death, resignation or dismissal, the appointment of a new *Khaleefah* must take place within three days, which includes the nights from the date when it became vacant.

Article 33

The *Khaleefah* is to be appointed in the following manner:

- a. The Muslim members of the *Majlis ul-Ummah* short-list the candidates for that post. Their names are subsequently announced and the Muslims are asked to elect one person from them.
- b. The result of the election is announced and the person who has attained the majority of the votes is to be announced to the Muslims.
- c. The Muslims must hasten to give *ba'iah* to the one who has attained the majority of votes as a *Khaleefah* for Muslims on the condition of following the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Messenger (saw).
- d. Once the *ba'iah* has been accomplished, the name of the man who has become the *Khaleefah* along with a statement that he has met the conditions necessary for holding the office of *Khilafah* is announced to the people so that the news of his appointment reaches the entire Ummah.

Article 34

The Ummah has the authority to appoint the *Khaleefah* but she has no right to dismiss him after he has legitimately attained the *ba'iah* of contracting.

Article 35

The *Khaleefah* is the State. He possesses all the powers and function of the State; he possesses the following powers:

- a. The *Khaleefah* implements the *aHkaam shar'iyyah*, once he adopted them, into law, and as such they become canons that must be obeyed and not violated.
- b. The *Khaleefah* is responsible for both the internal and external policies of the State. He takes charge of the leadership of the army and has the right to declare war, conclude peace, armistice, and treaties.
- c. The *Khaleefah* has the authority to accept and reject foreign ambassadors, and to appoint and dismiss Muslim ambassadors.

- d. The *Khaleefah* appoints and dismisses the assistants (*mu'aawineen*) and the governors (*wulaah*). The assistants and governors are responsible to the *Khaleefah* as well as to the *Majlis al-Ummah*.
- e. The *Khaleefah* appoints and dismisses the chief judge, the directors of departments, the heads of the armed forces and the generals; all of whom are responsible to the *Khaleefah* and not to the *Majlis al-Ummah*.
- a. The *Khaleefah* adopts the *aHkaam shar'iyyah* by which the State's budget is set. The *Khaleefah* decides its sections and the funds required for every field, whether they are related to revenue or expenditure.

Article 36

The *Khaleefah* is restricted in what he adopts by the *aHkaam shar'iyyah*. He is forbidden to adopt any rule that is not soundly deduced from the divine texts. He is restricted to the rules he has adopted and to the method for deduction that he has chosen. Accordingly, he is prevented from adopting a rule deduced by a method that contradicts the method he has adopted, and he must not enact any command that contradicts the rules he has adopted.

Article 37

The *Khaleefah* has the absolute right to conduct the citizens affairs according to his *ijtihaad*, so he has the right to adopt of the *mubaah* matters anything he wants to run the State affairs and to look after the affairs of the citizens. However, he is not allowed to disagree with a *Hukm shar'i* under the name of interest. For example; he cannot prevent a family from having more than one child under the pretext of the shortage in food. Nor can he fix prices on the pretext of preventing exploitation; or appoint a *kaafir* or a woman as a *waali* on the pretext of caring for affairs or the interest, nor anything that disagrees with *sharee'ah* rules. The *Khaleefah* must not forbid any *Halaal* thing or allow any *Haraam* thing.

Article 38

There is no limitation on the *Khaleefah*'s period in office. So as long as he abides by the *shara'*, implements its rules and is able to manage the State's affairs, he continues as a *Khaleefah* unless his situation changes in such a way as to discharge him from the office of *Khilafah*. He is to be dismissed immediately, once such a situation occurred.

Article 39

There are three matters by which the situation of the *Khaleefah* changes, and by such he is discharged from the office of *Khilafah*. They are:

- a. If one of the qualifying conditions of the *Khilafah* contract becomes void, such as apostatising from Islam, insanity or manifest sinfulness (*fisq*) and the like. This is because these are conditions for contracting the *Khilafah* and for its continuity.
- b. His inability to undertake the responsibilities of the *Khilafah* post, for any reason.
- c. In the event of sub-dual, whereby the *Khaleefah* is rendered unable to conduct the affairs of the Muslims by his own opinion according to the *shara'*. If the *Khaleefah* is subdued by any force to an extent that he is unable to manage the citizens affairs by his own opinion alone according to the rules of *shara'*, he is considered to be legitimately incapable of undertaking the functions of the state,

and thus he ceases to be a *Khaleefah*. This situation may arise under two circumstances. They are:

Firstly. When one, or more of the *Khaleefah*'s entourage exerts control over the management of affairs. If there is a chance that the *Khaleefah* could rid himself of their dominance he is cautioned for a specified period of time, after which, if he fails to rid himself of their dominance, he must be dismissed. If it appears that there is no chance of the *Khaleefah* freeing himself from their dominance, he is to be dismissed immediately.

Secondly. Should the *Khaleefah* be captured by a subduing enemy, whether he is actually captured or under its influence. In this case the situation is to be examined; if there is a chance to rescue the *Khaleefah*, he is given a period of time until it appears that there is no hope to rescue him, after which he is dismissed. Should it appear from the outset that there is no hope of rescuing him, he is to be dismissed immediately.

Article 40

The responsibility of deciding whether or not the *Khaleefah*'s situation has altered in such a way as to warrant his dismissal is the prerogative of the Court for the Acts of Injustice (*maHkamat al-maZalim*). It alone has the authority to admonish or dismiss the *Khaleefah*.

APPENDIX IV: MAP OF UZBEKISTAN²⁷⁶



²⁷⁶ <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/uzbekist.pdf>

APPENDIX V: AKRAM YULDASHEV'S COMMENTARY ON AS-SAFF SURAH²⁷⁷

(I begin) In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful
Surah [As-] Saff

1. *"All that is in the heavens and all that is in the earth glorifieth Allah, and He is the Mighty, the Wise."* [61:1]

There would have been nothing unexpected if everything that had been created followed the rules, established by the Creator, and glorified him. As we always see that everything that had been created continuously follows the rules, established by the Creator, although we cannot see how they glorify him. In natural phenomena it is doubtless. For example : the sun, rising into its zenith, gets warmer, and at sunset it gets cooler and the sun goes down. Or, when it gets colder, frosts at winter's heights can be severe, and then, as peak of frosts passes, it becomes warmer in spring. These events daily or yearly have become habitual to us. And therefore, nobody will believe you if you say that constant sun can burn us and constant coldness can freeze us. They would say that no, it will still become warm nonetheless. Because strong and wise Allah invariably established so and one could not leave the boundaries of that law. Laws created by people within the society also submit to these laws. However, because changes here occur slower, people doubt these laws. For example, while repressions of a despotic Padishah rise into zenith, the oppression grows. And when you say that repressions will diminish, nobody believes it anymore, or they think that by the time these repressions diminish, we will vanish. And therefore they think – “Let I go hungry, but calm,”¹ and therefore cease their fight against him. Certainly, when the oppression stops, we and I might perish. But be vigilant – freedom, truth do not die. However, in both case scenarios, we will die regardless. But they are not equal – final retribution for a life spent in a fight for the truth and final retribution for a life spent under the slogan “Let I go hungry, but calm.” The life of those who are in the second of those conditions is disgusting and spent in humiliation. Same will be their death and after-life. The life of first is substantial and victorious, and same will be their death free of fear and fright. On the contrary, their death will be fragrant and such one could only dream of. No, it is not death, but departure to your Lord. And joy of that can be felt with time of departure.

"And call not those who are slain in the way of Allah "dead." Nay, they are living, only ye perceive not" ([Al-] Baqarah 154) [2:154]

"Lo! those who say: Our Lord is Allah, and afterward are upright, the angels descend upon them, saying: Fear not nor grieve, but hear good tidings of the Paradise which ye are promised." (Fusilat 30) [41:30]

Thus, the goal is not to wait for the oppression to end, but to fight it.

However, a fight also has its own rules and it is intolerable to act self-willfully. To learn this rule, let us consider these two ayats.

2. *"O ye who believe! Why say ye that which ye do not?"* [61:2]

3. *"It is most hateful in the sight of Allah that ye say that which ye do not."* [61:3]

Before we commence our study of this ayat, it would be useful to recall the logical reasoning, discussed in the Lessons.² One more addition should be that in order to achieve any goal, it is necessary to go through certain stages at certain times. That is *"Allah created the earth and the heavens and everything that is in between them according to the law and at certain time."* A person going through this stage might have three states of sensations. For example, let us address a state of a fight with the goal of breaking someone's resistance.

The first state can be called a fight without defense - *himoyasiz kurash*. At that stage of entering a fight, a person can be in his weakest form, while an opposing force – in its strongest. Therefore, in this period that person loses himself in the fight and does not even defend himself. His only dream is not to lose his faith.

The second state is a fight with defense - *himoyali kurash*. This state begins from the moment when a person, after a certain victory on his path, expands his possibilities and acquires

¹ This is an Uzbek proverb that literally says “Hungry stomach, calm ears.”

² Reference to Akram Yuldashev's previous essay “Tymonga yu'l” (“A Path to the True Faith”).

²⁷⁷ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Akram Yuldashev's Commentary on as-Saff Surah” <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18453&prog=zru> (August 4, 2008)

inspiration. If the first state is based on the strength of ideas alone, the second one is aided by these ideas, leading to material victories that in a fight are means of materials offerings. It is not said in vain: "Alms draw misfortune away." This second state is a second part of the process [fight] and the person becomes stronger and more inspired in it in comparison to the first state.

The third state can be called a deceptive part - *aldov kismi*. The inspiration appearing at this stage calls for a fight. This is a state when people tell [themselves]: "If sanction was given, I would have entered into the fight." Having said that, one might enter into the fight unprepared. The ayat describes this very state and cautions against it. In this state, there might be conversations based solely on the desire to fight. However, in reality [these conversations] speak of weakness and of excessive arrogance. And this state is called loathsome. That it is specifically mentioned [in the Quran] testifies to the fact that this is a serious period when one needs to be careful and when an offense begins against the fight in which a loss is possible, and when one needs to consider the realities of the situation. In this state, a person, no matter how hard he tries, cannot achieve good results, and discords will appear in the end. This state is similar to when water and gravel are being mixed without cement in an attempt to get concrete. No matter how hard one might try to do it, gravel will not harden and will crumble. The right fight is when this gravel turns whole and solid as stone. The 4th ayat speaks of this solidness.

4. "*Lo! Allah loveth those who do jihad³ for His cause in ranks, as if they were a solid structure.*" (It is like some of our brothers standing in ranks at their trial)⁴ [61:4]

So, what makes this thing (cement) that is needed for a fight in whole and solid ranks as it is said in the ayat? Of that cement we might learn from the story of Moses and Jesus (peace be with them), that is stated in the 5th and 6th ayats.

5, 6. "*And (remember)) when Moses said unto his people: "O my people! Why persecute ye me when ye well know that I am Allah's messenger unto you? So when they went astray Allah sent their hearts astray. And Allah guideth not the evil-living folk. And when Jesus son of Mary said: "O Children of Israel Lo! I am the messenger of Allah unto you, confirming that which was (revealed) before me in the Torah, and bringing good tidings of a messenger who cometh after me, whose name is Ahmad. Yet when he hath come unto them with clear proofs, they say: This is mere magic."*" [61:5-6]

The truth must go through a period of suffering and oppression. At that time, a man, patiently enduring all, proves the falsity of slander and uncovers the open truth. And let that truth be seen with eyes of simple folk. And when a collision occurs from increased oppression, a man finds himself in the third state⁵ that is a state of battle with offense, hujumli kurash.

"*Sanction is given unto those who fight because they have been oppressed; and Allah is indeed Able to give them victory.*" ([Al-] Hajj 39) [22:39]

This is that clear proof.⁶ As in this state, the enemy will not be able to conceal his dirtiness. He will take such actions that even the most compassionate and forgiving man will come to a conclusion that he [the enemy] should be beaten, as there is nothing to justify him, he is guilty and deserving of a punishment. Therefore, in this state the state of battle with offense naturally emerges.

³ Yuldashev used the Uzbek translation of the Quran, published by Alouddin Mansur, an independent cleric from Kara Su (Kyrgyzstan), in 2001. There were two editions of the translation: the first one, published in 2001, was sharply criticized for overly literal interpretation of jihad and removed from libraries and distributors. The second edition, in which Mansur replaced the word "jihad" (Uzbek *Jihod*) with "battle" (Uzbek *Jang*) in the 4th ayat of the As-Saff Surah (the 11th ayat remained unchanged), was published in 2004.

⁴ The author refers to 23 young men, charged with organizing and participating in an illegal religious organization and standing trial in Andijan in the spring of 2005.

⁵ This possibly is a misspelling in the original, and should be read as "the fourth state."

⁶ The author believes that this ayat gives permission to a direct armed uprising ("fight with defense"). However, the majority of mufassirs interpret this ayat in its historical aspect only, as giving permission for Muslims to conduct war against polytheists of Mecca, after the Prophet had to flee (al-hijra). See, for example, commentaries by Abu Lais Nasr ad-din b. Mukhammad b. Ibrahim as-Samarkandi. *Tafsir as-Samarkandi* (*Bahr al-'ulum*), published at <http://www.al-mishkt>.

7. “*And who doth greater wrong than he who inventeth a lie against Allah when he is summoned into Al-Islam? and Allah guideth not wrongdoing folk.*” [61:7]

This ayat testifies to the fact that the enemy no longer has an opportunity to follow a direct path, and that his battle consists only of deception. However, in this state he can not use force. As he can not find forces to use against those who are on the side of the truth. Those, who are on the side of the truth, are given sanction for a battle of ideas only (fikriy kurash). This is similar to a situation when in a dispute between two people, one of them does not understand good arguments, and then the other scolds him. Scolding of a good man, slander of a bad man, and their collision happens in a form, stated in the following ayat.

8. “*Fain would they put out the light of Allah with their mouths, but Allah will perfect His light, however much the disbelievers are averse.*” [61:8]

Therefore, the state when it is necessary to spread the truth in all directions and when the Muslims’ battle is gaining momentum, calls to consider the following: not to pay attention to the fact that the enemy has grown weak; moreover, to consider friends growing more numerous as a result of that weakening. A growing number of friends, enemies transforming into friends or sympathizers, joining of those who used to oppose each other and them finding the ultimate truth, joining of the simple folk, emergence on international arena of well-wishers and through this the possibility of a victory without transitioning from scold to armed actions is high, and this possibility is reflected in the following ayat.

9. “*He (Allah) it is Who hath sent His messenger with the guidance and the religion of truth, that He may make it conqueror of all religions, however much idolaters may be averse.*” [61:9]

However, a man can not shake off this thought: “What if, as a result of scold, the enemy will get frightened, but it would not lead to his surrender?” Such thoughts are like the proverb: ‘‘He who got burried by [hot] milk, blows on kefir.’’⁷ To prevent these worries, when scold turns into a scuffle, one should prepare means for that scuffle. In my opinion, even if clashes approach a battle point, with the blessing of Allah, the enemy will not dare to do something [more decisive] because of his fear. We will win without a battle. This conclusion is related to the historical event, when the Prophet – let Allah give him His blessing and greet him – made a hidjrat to Medina, and when he received sanction for battle actions. However, it is not a proof of that the first state⁸ will not appear first in the following battle actions (jung) that had been prescribed to us. On the contrary, Allah provides arguments that a victory might be without a battle. In order to understand this law, one needs to turn to the 44th ayat of the Surah [Al-] Qalam. “*Leave Me (to deal) with those who give the lie to this Quran.⁹ We shall [lead] them on by steps from whence they know not.*” [68:44]. But what is war does happen?

10. “*O ye who believe! Shall I show you a commerce that will save you from a painful doom?*”

11. “*Ye should believe in Allah and His messenger, and should do jihad¹⁰ for the cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives. That is better for you, if ye did but know.*” 12. “*He will forgive you your sins and bring you into Gardens underneath which rivers flow, and pleasant dwellings in Gardens of Eden. That is the Supreme triumph.*” 13. “*And another blessing which ye love: help from Allah and present victory. Give good tidings to believers.*”¹¹ [61:10-13]

Today, the most offensive suffering is because our friends who had such beautiful, sincere intentions and actions, are suffering in prisons. The enemy once again “closes”¹² our

⁷ An English equivalent is “Once bitten, twice shy.”

⁸ Meaning the state of scold, which, according to the author, precedes armed actions.

⁹ In the Quran, it is “al-hadis” (story, event).

¹⁰ In the Quran, the word is *strive* or *struggle*. Mansur used the word *jihad* in both translation of 2001 and 2004.

¹¹ The Quran reads: “*And (He will give you) another blessing which ye love: help from Allah and present victory. Give good tidings (O Muhammad) to believers.*”

¹² The author is using a slang word for “putting in prison.”