

**MIMESIS AND SOCIALITY:
A READING OF THE QUESTION OF LITERATURE
IN DELEUZE AND DERRIDA**

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May, 2008

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ABSTRACT

MIMESIS AND SOCIALITY: A READING OF THE QUESTION OF LITERATURE IN DELEUZE AND DERRIDA

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The aim of this study is to discuss the significance of Platonic mimesis in the new forms of relationality and sociality proposed in the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida. For a better understanding of this relationship, this thesis makes a detour through the question of literature in the thoughts of these thinkers. In this view, it is argued that the sociality proposed by Deleuze and Derrida challenge the traditional premises of society through the sorcery of becoming and wizardry of pharmakos respectively, criticizing the idealization of a model for citizenship and the originarization of sociality by way of a linear passage between the natural and the political.

KEY WORDS: Mimesis, Simulacra, Platonism, Literature, Law, Becoming, Sociality, Contract

ÖZET

MİMESİS VE TOPLUMSALLIK: DELUZE VE DERRİDA'DA EDEBİYAT SORUNSALININ BİR OKUMASI

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Bu çalışmanın amacı, Gilles Deleuze ve Jacques Derrida'nın felsefelerinde öne sürdükleri yeni ilişkisellik ve toplumsallık biçimleri için Platoncu mimesis düşüncesinin eleştirisinin arz ettiği önemi göstermektir. Tartışma, bu ilişkiyi anlamak için, bu düşünürlerin edebiyat sorunsalına yaklaşımları üzerinden yürütülmektedir. Böylece, Deleuze ve Derrida'nın, öne sürdükleri toplumsallığın oluş ve "pharmakos" vurguları sayesinde, ideal bir vatandaşlık modeli oluşturulmasına ve toplumsallığın kökeninin doğal olandan politik olana doğrusal bir geçişte konumlandırılmasına getirdikleri eleştirilerle, toplumsallığa ilişkin geleneksel varsayımlardan ayrıldıkları noktalar tartışılmaktadır.

ANAHTAR KELİMELER: Mimesis, Simulakra, Platonizm, Edebiyat, Yasa, Oluş, Toplumsallık, Sözleşme

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1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis will evolve around three axes or series that will resonate with each other: mimesis, literature and sociality. We will study how Deleuze and Derrida discuss literature and relate it to the question of sociality. This relationship between literature and sociality in Deleuze and Derrida's thoughts will be presented with a detour to their criticism of Platonic mimesis.¹ The political stakes of their reconsideration of Platonic philosophy will be discussed in the context of literature, as in both Deleuze and Derrida, the question of literature immediately links with the question of the political. Hence, the focus of this thesis will be the interrelations between these three concepts, rather than how each of them has evolved in their respective course of study. We will not be examining how theories of mimesis, literary criticism or political philosophy have been studied historically, but by strolling along the borders of these concepts, we will try to discover the history of overlooking such interrelatedness. For this aim, we will delve into the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida, in order to point to a novel understanding of sociality in their individual ways of intertwining these series. By way of this attempt, we will also be able to reformulate or displace particular questions guiding theories of mimesis, literary criticism and political philosophy which, in fact, will help us making the historical connection by this very rupture.

To study mimesis in the context of literature and sociality is by no means a suggestion to reduce the question of mimesis to literature, or the question of literature to sociality; to the contrary, the suggestion of this thesis is that it is rather more promising to study these terms before their conceptual closure so that we will be able to figure out how the questioning of each of these concepts immediately permeates with other questions, by reinvesting them with certain assumptions, be it ontological or epistemological. Plato, who is indeed renowned for his critical and prohibitive stance towards mimesis, does not take the question of mimesis as a simple concept either, but rather always interrogates it on the borders of art, politics and philosophy. This is why, in Platonic works, we encounter many words in many contexts produced from the root *mimos*: *mimesthai*, *mimesis*, *mimema*, *mimetes*, and *mimetikos*. (Gebauer&Wulf, p.27)

The aspiration of Platonic philosophy is indeed to distinguish and control this very multiplicity of mimetic formations to avoid their unwanted effects. Hence, the relationship between a model and a copy cannot be taken simply as an artistic relationship, but rather is a question of law that subjects the copy to the governance of the model. In this way, the question of mimesis is linked with jurisprudence and politics as well.

The argument of this thesis is that the question of sociality is closely related to the law and politics of resemblance. Any theory of sociality inevitably requires a questioning of mimesis as to account for how sameness and differences relate to each other in a social formation. This claim is best traceable in contractarian arguments of sociality where the State of Nature and the political society are separated by an event, namely the social contract. In the following chapters,

firstly, we will try to show how contractarian views of sociality operate on the basis of a society of similarity which is constituted by an ideal model of citizen. This model is assumed to be the law of society to which every individual in the society must conform in order to be eligible to take part in it and hence, they are ranked according to their degree of participation. Secondly, we will suggest how this Platonic interpretation of law is reversed in Kantian philosophy since for Kant it is the good that follows the law and not the reverse. Although this radical reversal of Kant is supposed to serve the self-sufficiency of law for its source of authority, we will show how it will be haunted by a dependency on the fictive nature of authority. We will also focus on the problem of the passage from the natural to the political, be it a hypothetical or an actual passage that takes place in the past, and we will argue that the concept of democracy-to-come in Derrida and people-to-come in Deleuze puts an emphasis on futurity which abstains from such a linear passage.

Given the aims of this thesis, it might still be unclear why I follow the thoughts of both Deleuze and Derrida together to argue for the conclusion of this thesis. First of all, the primary aim of this thesis is not to locate the differences and similarities between the thoughts of these thinkers who have written occasionally on similar topics. Instead, what we will do here, is to suggest that these thoughts or styles may work together in this particular context, namely, the social implications of their understanding of literature. What enables this co-functioning is their emphasis on the future in their political reservations. For Derrida, since literature as an institution is the hyperbolique condition of democracy in that it is granted with an authority to say everything, it may be the

milieu of subversion of this given right: a particular appropriation or misappropriation of this authority in the creation of a non-response. This particular use points to a future democracy, different from the present democracies of responding citizens whose responses are governed by truth. For Deleuze, in a parallel argument, minor literature is a mode of writing in which individual concerns immediately connect with political ones as statements in literature are always collective assemblages of enunciations. This collectivity, nevertheless, is not the representation of an existing people, but instead fabulates or invokes a new people-to-come. For Deleuze, writing is a process of becoming, and becoming always involves a “peopling”, a creation of new lives, new modes of relationalities. As a process without an end or a reference point, the coming of the people is always a becoming that will never be exhausted in the temporality of the past-present-future. In both Deleuze and Derrida, we might recognize this radical futurity of sociality and hence, we will emphasize that this understanding of futurity is what criticizes the prevailing understanding of sociality where it is considered as an effect of an event that takes place in a hypothetical or an actual past. A futurity that is not reduced to the accomplishment of certain present agenda, in other words, a futurity, not of future anterior, but rather the radical futurity of *à venir* or to-come. In order to argue for the significance of this futurity, I will be employing the works of Deleuze and Derrida complementarily. In my opinion, the complementarity of Deleuze and Derrida might be elaborated via the complementarity of economy and finance.

We will employ the critique of Deleuze as an economical one, in the sense that it consists of agricultural activities (deterritorialization, rhizomatic unrooting), animal husbandry (becoming-animal) and industrial affairs (machines, production and function). In this economical framework, by studying the allocation of resources and exchange within a philosophical system, Deleuze overturns the system of expenditure back upon itself which might be considered as a sort of bankruptcy. It is this by this misappropriation of resources within the economic activity that Deleuze points to the costs of an economic system as a whole, thereby pointing to the irreducible financial element in his thought. In this way, Deleuze's overturning of Platonism might be considered as an economical activity in which Deleuze uses the resources of Platonic economy against itself to emancipate the simulacra from the law of resemblance.

Our employment of Derrida's thought within this complementarity will be a kind of financial analysis that focuses on the external resources, funds and debts due to which constitution of any statement becomes possible. By this financial perspective, Derrida points to the exteriority of an interiority as the conditions of possibility and impossibility of such a demarcation. By emphasizing the losses in the financial scheme of theoretical investments, Derrida offers a generalized writing which does not appropriate any loss as profit by incorporating it back to the theoretical localization. Such localizations, indeed, are the reiteration of a restricted economy which exhausts itself in its claim of exhausting the outside. Out of this vigilance to the outside, Derrida offers an economy, a general economy of writing and thinking. In this way, the complementarity of the economical perspective of Deleuze and the financial perspective of Derrida are

not two incompatible approaches, but rather this relationship should be thought within the general finance or general economy their thoughts themselves create.² It is this complementarity of perspectives that I wish to employ in the critique of sociality they undertake through their studies of literature by making a certain detour to the reconsideration of Platonic premises.

We might briefly sketch the course of this quest by introducing how chapters proceed and interact. In the first chapter, we will discuss Deleuze and Derrida's reconsideration of Platonic philosophy. In the first part, we will argue how Deleuze takes the Platonic thought from the point of the problem of accounting for differences, since according to the theory of Ideas, difference can only be considered as deviations explained by different levels of participation in the original Idea. What the theory of forms suggests is, for Deleuze, the ultimate reduction of all differences to an originary identity or sameness. By studying the movements of thinking across Platonic texts, Deleuze notices the peculiarity of *Sophist* in which Plato attempts to distinguish the genuine fake. In simulacra, Deleuze sees the power of the false to overturn Platonic thought within itself. However, Deleuzian thought is not limited to the criticism of Plato nor is the criticism of Plato limited to the concept of simulacra. With Guattari, Deleuze offers rhizomatics to put forward their concept of multiplicity without making any recourse to the dialectics of One and many. The concept of becoming stands for the lines of flight by which multiplicities open and connect to each other on the plane of rhizome. This formulation of multiplicities does not disavow hierarchical connections since multiplicities involve lines of stratifications as well. Subjectivity follows such a line of stratification instead of the line of

deterritorialization of “haecceities”. The singularity of haecceities accompanies the removal of perceptions and affections from their subjective formations, opening them to affects and percepts that are extracted from their lived actualities, this removal being the task of the artist. It is in this sense, for Deleuze, that literature is always a matter of becoming, a passage of life which offers the traversing of both the lived and the livable. “When one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary can be plugged into in order to work.” (2004, p.5) When a becoming is undertaken through literature, it is not a voyage that takes places only literally, but rather it is a real process, as becoming produces nothing other than itself.

Derrida’s occupation with Platonic thought, focusing on the question of the relationship between writing and speech, suggests how writing cannot be ascribed merely to an imitation of speech. Writing is a pharmakon, a medicine and a poison at the same time, a copy of and an alternative to speech, where speech characterizes the living truth and the writing, dead myths. Writing is marked with a debt to the speaker, the Father who ultimately gives life and controls the words. If writing is underscored as it purports to the absence of the father, Derrida emphasizes the logic of supplementarity operating here in order to argue for how this orphanage of writing may enact a subversive replacement, according to which writing as a pharmakon is external yet at the same time has the power of affecting the living organism of speech internally. What writing stands for is an illusion for the memory, since with writing one might easily confuse genuine memory and wisdom with the fake repetition of writing. The supplementarity of writing is dangerous since it devoids us from the ability to

situate and distinguish certain claims as genuine or fake. In this way, pharmakon can be regarded as the condition of possibility of making such distinctions and the impossibility of sustaining them at the same time. It points to an absence without which presence cannot present itself. *Pharmakos*, for Derrida, as an absent element in Plato's pharmaceutical chain of *pharmakeia-pharmakon-pharmakeus* points to such a play of différance. Pharmakos, meaning wizard or scapegoat in Greek, stands for the citizen to be expelled for the well being of society since society is cured by the exclusion of this poisonous interior element. In this way, the frail relationship between writing as the orphan and speech as the rule of the father is juxtaposed with the singular literary work before the law of literariness.

In the second chapter, we will continue the path opened up by the criticism of Platonic philosophy. With Deleuze, we will discuss how writing or literature points to a possibility of becoming-other through a non-mimetic process of involution. Since becoming is always becoming-multiple according to Deleuze and Guattari, we will be discussing the becomings-pack through literature. The becomings-other in writing is always accompanied by a becoming-other of language itself, and since literature is always a collective assemblage of enunciation rather than an exposition of individual statements, minor literature is granted the fabulative power of invoking a people-to-come. What we will be emphasizing in this chapter, is the fact that becomings involve a pact among two series, and it is by this pact that we will be able to study the people-to-come as a people who do not yet exist. We will try to understand what kind of alliance these pacts build up, with writings of Kafka, Melville and Sacher-Masoch.

The question of literature in Derrida's thought is an engagement with the implications of the question "what is literature?". Derrida argues that literature as an institution, by being allowed to say everything, creates the hyperbolic condition of democracy. It points to a democracy-to-come when it exercises the possibility of using this right to say everything as a subversive instance of irresponsibility, contrary to the responsible citizens of present democracies who are obliged to respond, and respond by telling the truth. For this aim, we are going to refer to one of the most interesting texts of Derrida in which he juxtaposes the question of literature with the question of law. By so doing, Derrida does not seek discuss narrativity as the essence of law, but rather he shows how narrativity of literature itself is determined by a similar process of litigation. By a critical reading of Kantian moral imperative, Derrida reconsiders the inaccessibility of law not as the formal foundation of the good, but as the deferral of the law of *différance*. This law avowing the necessary failure of giving an originary account of law, helps Derrida to argue for a singular relationship between the singular and the universal. Bartleby's delicate relationship with his community, his bizarre response stands as a rupture since it is through this non-response that Bartleby is able to put into play a possibility of duplicating the law as a way of subversion.

In the last chapter, following the social emphasis made in the second chapter, we will attempt to investigate what kind of sociality the people-to-come (Deleuze) and democracy-to-come (Derrida) imply. We have already seen that both Deleuzian and Derridean criticisms of Platonic mimesis employ sophists as a critical move. For Deleuze, as an attempt of isolating the genuine fake in Platonic

text, *Sophis*, gives us the possibility of overturning Platonism within itself. As false pretenders, they pose a threat to the well being of Platonic society, as they devoid Plato the ability to make comfortable distinctions. Derrida, too, in order to show the logic of supplementarity operating in Platonic thought, adds the pharmakos(scapegoat) to the pharmaceutical chain of Plato. Sophists as the wizards or scapegoats of Platonic society are condemned to be expelled from the society, since they exert the danger of displacing Platonic classifications. In this way, we will argue for a sociality in which the individual is not judged against a model of good citizenship and where society is not a molar coming together of individuals. Moreover, unlike the contractarian views of society which always assume a passage between the State of Nature and political society, the notions of people-to-come and democracy-to-come stand for the critique of such a passage. We will show that this futurity invoked by the term “to-come”, refers to an absolute past where no such originary passage would have occurred. Instead of following a social contract which stands for the good model of citizen that every individual in the society should resemble, and instead of the evolutionist anthropology which marks social progress as the centralization of society, Deleuze argues for a society of difference in which parties make contract only in order to create new-multiplicities following vectors of deterritorialization. Derridean thought emphasizes the impossibility of the social contract as a passage from the State of Nature to the political society where the constitution of an originary passage is forbidden by the law of différance.

2. RECONSIDERING PLATONIC MIMESIS

In this chapter, we will discuss Deleuze's and Derrida's reconsiderations of Platonic thought on the axis of mimesis. Formulated as such, it might seem, at first, that we are taking both Plato's thought and its mimetic conceptualizations as obvious and their interrelation as simple. To the contrary, we will employ Deleuzian and Derridean thought, to reveal the economic and financial structure of the Platonic thought in its diverse investments in mimetic determinations. Contrary to the aim of contextualizing and defining what mimesis is, we will try to demonstrate how Deleuze and Derrida walk on the borders of mimesis, without reducing it to any artistic, literary or political framework. This is indeed the way Plato too has worked mimesis in many forms and contexts within the course of his philosophical contemplations. Plato's employment of the concept of mimesis spans from politics to art, and the valorization of this concept is not homogenous between and within these texts and contexts.³ Thus, without reducing this diversity, what we are going to provide by Deleuzian and Derridean criticisms of Platonic thought is this multiplicity is ultimately controlled economically and financially.

In the first part of the chapter, we will follow how Deleuze overturns Platonism back upon itself, by tracing the economic movements of Plato within the topology of Platonic thought. It will be an attempt of reallocating the resources

of Platonic economy to make this economy consummate itself, rather than a revalorization of certain terms that would maintain this Platonic economy in all ways intact. In the second part, we will elaborate Derrida's inquiry into Plato's pharmacy, as a financial investigation, in order to demonstrate the logic of supplementarity operating in the relationship between writing and speech in the mimetic construction of Plato. With this logic of supplementarity, Derrida will argue for the undecidable position of writing, an outsider threatening the interior totality and the truthfulness of speech as if it operates within. Following Derrida's line of argument, we will see an unfinancializable debt to an outside that makes the Platonic classifications and determinations possible. But since this debt is never payable, it is a radical loss pointing to the impossibility of this system as well.

What is made evident with this complementarity of financial and economic analyses is that the mechanisms and criteria of selections and decisions fail when they are pushed to the extreme. At this juncture, sophists turn out to be of crucial importance for both thinkers. For Deleuze, the downward movement of finding the genuine fake is the abyss of Platonic selection; it is the reason why they are continuously dismissed. For Derrida, the exclusion of the sophists is the exclusion of the pharmakon, the poison and the cure of society. As such, Plato's understanding of mimesis is not just a philosophy on model and copy, but also a politics and jurisprudence of this relationship. After elaborating on the former point, we will continue with its political and legal implications in the following chapters.

2. 1. Deleuze's Overturning of Platonism

In *Difference and Repetition* (1994) and *The Logic of Sense* (1990), Deleuze introduces and elaborates the concept of simulacrum which he takes on from Nietzschean assignment to future philosophers: to reverse the Platonic thought. Of course, such a project was not an undertaking unattempted before Deleuze or even before Nietzsche himself. Philosophies of Kant, Hegel or even Aristotle might be regarded as the pioneers of such a reversal according to their own respective styles. So we might ask: What is the point that distinguishes Deleuze's reversal of Platonism from others. And why does Deleuze consider the destruction of Platonism "the most innocent of all destructions" (1990, p.266)?

To begin with, Deleuze's engagement with the propositions of Platonic thought about mimesis does not isolate the problem of mimesis in and of itself, putting it apart from other questions of Platonic thought. Thus Deleuze is interested both in the questions of Platonic philosophy and how the concept of mimesis is employed within the economy of these questions. According to this perspective, Plato's theory of Ideas as the world of perfection to which the world of appearances may only approximate is not simply an attempt to demarcate the genuine, the good, the perfect but also an attempt to produce and justify the criteria to distinguish and categorize. As Daniel Smith suggests, "Plato's singularity lies in a delicate operation of sorting or selection that *precedes* the discovery of Idea [insofar as] the motivation of the theory of Ideas lies initially in the direction of a will to select, to sort out, to *faire la difference* (literally, "to make the difference") between true and false images." (2006, p. 91) Thus, the

ideal does not only consist in what is good, but it also provides us with the criteria of evaluation to select and distinguish the good from the bad, the better from the worse. It helps us to identify and eliminate the false rivals, the fake claimants. As Deleuze suggests:

The one problem which recurs throughout Plato's philosophy is the problem of measuring rivals and selecting claimants. This problem of distinguishing between *things and their simulacra* within a pseudo-genus or a large species presides over his classification of the arts and science... It is a dangerous trial without thread and without net, for according to ancient custom of myth and epic, false claimants must die (1994, p.60).

This motif of rivalry permeating all Platonic texts is indeed a very important social element in the social and political life of the ancient Greeks. As Smith (2006) describes, the Athenian city is constructed with the royal palace in the middle, and the city is organized around a public center, the agora, which is in an equal distance from all citizens. The constitution of these cities, thus, pertains to an agonistic structure which is characterized by a competition of claims and powers of free men. This agonistic relationship applies to the philosophers of that time as well. These philosophers are thought to be claimants of truth, at an equal distance from it competing for the best approximation. If the philosophers claim to be the friend of wisdom, it ought to be determined who is the true friend and the genuine philosopher. Within such a spatium where rivalry is ensured by the right of claim given to everybody, it becomes a primary task to distinguish and separate these claimants in politics, in science as well as philosophy.

In Platonic thought, in order to distinguish the authentic from the fake, the claimants are evaluated according to their participation in the eidos, in the Idea.

The participants are put in the hierarchy of resemblance, the higher being the most similar to the original identity of eidos. The comparison between pretenders relies on two similitudes: “the exemplary similitude of an original identity, and the imitative or “mimetic” similitude of a more or less similar copy” (Smith, 2006, p.97). Ideas as the preexisting foundation of all the resembling claimants, hence treat difference only through the governance of the Same and according to the principle of resemblance. For Plato, the order of this similitude spans from the eidos, demiurge to the phantasm where the phantasm is only the simulacra, and its participation in the ideal is the minimum insofar as it is the furthest from the truth.

The *Sophist* is an important instance in Plato’s thought which Deleuze (1990) carefully considers. If the primary interest of Plato is to provide well-founded divisions, Deleuze focuses on these strategies of dividing across Platonic texts, in particular in *Statesmen* (1995), *Phaedrus* (1977), and the *Sophist* (1993). In *Statesman*, Plato attempts to distinguish the true claimant of governance from the false pretenders such as doctors or merchants who claim to be the shepherds of the men. Similarly, the theoretical aim of *Phaedrus* is to provide the criteria to distinguish the true love from inauthentic love. In order to reinforce his method of division, Plato employs myths. Although, these myths seem to interrupt the method of division, in the end, they unite with the criteria of selection as an integral element. On the other hand, when one reads *Sophist*, one can clearly observe that its theoretical strategy is quite different than the *Phaedrus* or the *Statesmen* which attempt to isolate and put forward the true lover or the true statesmen, trying to ascent towards the ideal. In *Sophist*, to the contrary, the

basic motive is to isolate the fake and to demonstrate the contradictions and the erroneousess of the sophist thought while descending towards the simulacral. In isolating the false, Plato does not need a model or myth, since in the case of Sophist, there is no need to distinguish the true sophist from its fake pretender: “since the true sophist himself the false claimant” (Smith, 2006, p. 98) This shift in the method of division becomes a necessity, since in *Sophist*, what concerns Plato is the being of the simulacrum and the demarcation of sophistry as such. According to Deleuze,

[f]or this reason, it may be that the end of the *Sophist* contains the most extraordinary adventure of Platonism: as a consequence of searching in the direction of the simulacrum and of leaning over its abyss, Plato discovers, in the flash of an instant, that the simulacrum is not simply a false copy, but that it places in question the very notations of copy and model (1990, p.256).

For Deleuze, such a definition will ultimately result in an undecidability between Socrates and the sophists. The reversal of Platonic thought is pointed for by Plato himself in the inscription of this undecidability. Now we can better recognize that the distinction between the world of ideas and the world of appearances is not the true Platonic distinction on which his thought operates. The profound distinction takes place between the claimants, the copies and the simulacra. Copies are defined by their ascension towards the ideal insofar as they have an internal resemblance to the original identity of the eidos. Simulacra, on the other hand, are constituted upon a disparity which is defined by a descent from the truth of ideals. Thus, the world of the idea does not serve only to constitute an opposition to the world of appearances, but more importantly, in doing so, it guarantees the justification of another distinction

between the true images and false ones. Thus, as Smith (2006) suggests, the real conviction of the condemnation of the simulacra is the displacement it summons forth between the model and copy, and that, by doing so, deprives us of the genuine transcendental rules whereby the world is judged. Platonic geometry of classification is a transcendental model that exerts itself onto the things in terms of likenesses. Hence, the Deleuzian project of reversing Platonism takes this displacement brought forth by simulacra and affirms it for an immanent philosophy of the world in contrast to Platonic thought which disavows such a movement by conjoining simulacra to the hinges of copy as being the copy of the copy. This affirmation of the simulacra as such is the affirmation of the difference without being mediated or governed by the originary of sameness. Thus, the critique of Platonism, for Deleuze, accounts for the differences in an immanent philosophy where difference is recognized as difference as such.

According to Deleuze, simulacrum is without resemblance in contrast to the copy which has an internalized resemblance. An image without resemblance is deprived of any resemblance but sustains itself as an image. Thus, its relationship might be better described as a semblance by which the resemblance is sustained only as an external element of that image. By externalizing the resemblance, simulacrum becomes dangerous not because it is the opposite of the originary resemblance, but rather because this exact semblance is indistinguishable from the internalized resemblance of good copies. Smith (2006) explains the displacement of the semblance by Christian demonology. The evil or the peril of the Satan or the demonic is not simply that they oppose to that which is divine, but that in creating a perfect semblance, they deprive us of

the ability to differentiate between the two. The internalized difference is thus not a move to prioritize the false over the true, but undermines categories by which we judge things as true and false. As such the falsity of the simulacrum is deprived of any true model for comparison, and gets affirmed by its power: the Nietzschean power of the false.

Deleuze clarifies the radical transformation of the simulacra by two distinct views of the world: “only that which resembles differs” and “only that which differs resembles” (1990, p.261). Evidently, the first view refers to the Platonic account of difference in which difference is the counter effect of an unsuccessful similarity. The second, on the other hand, is the world of simulacra in which things internalize difference, and resemblance and identity may arise out only as effects. Therefore, simulacrum is not marked by its disavowal of resemblance or identity. It renounces the idea that difference is only possible under a transcendent criterion according to which things are judged and hierarchies are established. Furthermore, this displacement does not propose a new transcendental ground for a selection and judgment. Simulacrum, Deleuze suggests,

harbors a positive power which denies *the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction*. At least two divergent series are internalized in the simulacrum- neither as the original, neither as the copy. ... The same and the similar no longer have an essence except as *simulated*, that is as expressing the functioning of the simulacrum (1990, p.262).

The reversal of Platonism has a peculiar relationship with Platonic thought in that it already proceeds through a way Plato himself pointed to insofar as what

Deleuze does is to take the prospects of the Platonic project to its extreme. For Deleuze, that “the overturning [of Platonism] should conserve many Platonic characteristics is not only inevitable, but desirable” (1994, p.59). This overturning is not a reversal that reinscribes Platonic transcendentalism anew, but rather affirming the power of simulacra, it proposes a philosophy of immanence in which “the different relates to the different by difference itself” (p.299).

This immanent philosophy also implies drastic changes for the Platonic conception of repetition. Platonism offers a repetition which repeats the originary and the same in every instance of repetition. Thus every repetition is marked by its attendance to the original within. According to Deleuze, on the contrary, the variations of repetition do not make any recourse to a premier model. Each element in the series, including the first, is regarded as an element of the series which does not govern other repetitions. Thus, instead of a fixed essence being repeated in the series, Deleuze argues for an essence which is not merely marked by its difference to other essences, but also by its difference to itself as well. “ There is not an originary “thing” (model) which could eventually be uncovered behind the disguises, displacements, and illusions of repetition (copies); rather, disguise and displacement are the essence of repetition itself, which is in itself an original and positive principle” (Smith, 2006, p. 112).

The overturning of Platonism and affirmation of the simulacra has been of great significance in Deleuzian thought for it to posit itself as a philosophy difference and immanence. However, despite this significance, we should note that Deleuze

has abandoned using this term in his later works. In 1993, he writes, “It seems to me that I have completely abandoned the notion of the simulacrum” (qtd. in Smith, 2006, p.116). Of course, we would not expect Deleuzian thought to stick to a few concepts while announcing the rigorous task of philosophy as the creation of concepts. Still, we should be aware of this theoretical move in Deleuzian thought, in order to have a better grasp of certain concepts Deleuze has favored in his later books such as “becoming” and “assemblage”.

According to Smith (2006), we might mention two reasons for this shift in terminology. Firstly, the critical use of the concept of simulacra is limited to the context of Platonic thought in which things are assumed to simulate a transcendental ideal. However, Deleuzian philosophy of event considers the world not as a process of simulation but as an actualization. Clearly, the concept of simulacrum hardly informs us about such a view of events, hence Deleuze prefers assemblage to simulacrum and actualization to the process of simulation in his later texts. Secondly, the philosophers Deleuze was primarily interested in were the thinkers of the XVII. century about whom he has written in his later works. The thoughts of Spinoza and Leibniz, for instance, are sustained more steadily throughout his works insofar as Deleuze does not limit the scope of his critique to a constant relationship with ancient thought. Thus, the Platonic critique constitutes only an introductory sketch of the path Deleuzian thought will be strolling through.

The abandoning of the concept of simulacrum, nevertheless, does not mean that Deleuze abandoned what he had proposed regarding the operations of

representation, repetition and copying, but rather that he started to discuss it in a new context and in a new concept which connects with other philosophical questions. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, in which Deleuze and Guattari (2004) has collaborated, the rhizomatic thought they have proposed has underlined the unexpected and proliferating connections in rhizomatic structures, contrary to arborescent formations in which diversity and plurality is always controlled and located. In order to avoid the economy of the One and many, which always returns to the unity and priority of the One, Deleuze and Guattari propose the concept of multiplicities. Multiplicities consist of determinations, magnitudes or dimensions in the alteration of which other multiplicities get constituted. These multiplicities are not closed on themselves put open to one another; they “are defined by the outside” (2004, p.9), that is by how they create new lines of flight in order to link with other multiplicities. Assemblage refers to the expansion of the multiplicities by coming together with others via lines of flight. We may talk of arborescent multiplicities as well as rhizomatic multiplicities, and these do not oppose each other. The immanent process of rhizome includes “knots of arborescence” yet the arborescent organization always engenders its own escapes. For Deleuze and Guattari, dualisms are necessary enemies, “furniture we are forever rearranging” (2004, p.23). Every multiplicity consists of only lines, but not only of lines of deterritorialization, but also of lines of stratification. In the plane of rhizome, becoming refers to the endless process of connecting multiplicities, a line of difference, a clinamen that comes before any individual points.

Deleuze and Guattari show that Strauss's *Totemism* relies on the model of proportionality which attempts to understand the institution of totem. This model of proportionality is different from the model of resemblance, since it works by a structure as the basis of correspondence between terms. In this structural model, resemblance is not between items or units, but between relations; it is a mimetic relationship that structures different relationships according to a model. Becoming cannot be explained by these relations of correspondence, resemblance or identification. All the more, it is not imaginary. It is a real process, not in the sense that becoming-wolf means turning into a wolf because wolf is an element through which becoming passes. Becoming-child, becoming-woman or becoming-molecular, becoming-vegetable are not movements to be terminated upon arrival of a certain station of being, but rather is a voyage without a destination. Becoming is real, because it "produces nothing other than itself" (2004, p.262).

We should emphasize one more aspect of becoming which indeed is implied by other ones. "A becoming-animal always involves a pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in short, a multiplicity" (2004, p.264). In "1914: One or several wolves", Deleuze and Guattari discuss Freud's article titled "Unconscious", written in 1915, where Freud discusses the difference between the neurosis and psychosis. Such a difference is explained by Freud by always making recourse to a unity, the unity of words and things, in the case of neurotic and psychotic comparisons respectively. This unity which Freud zealously tries to maintain, Deleuze and Guattari stresses, is the unity of the Signifier, the unity of which "replaces multiplicities with the dismal unity of an object declared lost" (2004,

p.31). This interest of Freud prevails in his study and treatment of Wolf-Man as well. The pack of wolves the Wolf-Man sees in his dream is restored back to the familial relationships under the despotism of the Father. However, according to Deleuze and Guattari, this is stupid since “you can’t be one wolf, you’re always eight or nine, six or seven” (2004, p.32). Freud always underscores the multiple element of the unconscious, its crowd. Wolf stands here as an intensity, a band his body is passing through to join this pack. Wolf, in fact, here refers to a wolfing. According to Deleuze and Guattari,

...the proliferation of [wolves,] rats, the pack, brings a becoming-molecular that undermines the great molar powers of family, career and conjugality; there is a sinister choice since there is a “favorite” in the pack with which a kind of contract or alliance, a hideous pact, is made; there is the institution of an assemblage, a war machine or criminal machine... (2004, p.257)

With the above quotation, we configure the other party of the hideous alliance of becoming. It is a “favorite” among other multiplicities that one comes together with in order to constitute a war-machine. It is the demon of the pack with whom one instigates a dangerous affinity. Deleuze and Guattari call this demon the Anomalous. It is this anomalous that functions as a border, the borderline of a multiplicity that should be passed beyond in order to reach the other pack. It is a peripheral position that one cannot definitely be sure whether to include it in the pack or not. Yet, we should emphasize that the relationship between contracting parties is never a relation of imitation. It is a double deterritorialization, a double becoming so that “that which one becomes becomes no less than the one that becomes” (2004, p.336). It is an “aparallel

evolution of two beings that have absolutely nothing to do with each other” (2004, p.11).

To better explain this aparallel evolution, we should explain the Spinozist conception of body of Deleuze and Guattari. According to this view, the body is not defined by what it is, or what organs it consists of, but rather in terms of longitudes – “extensive parts falling under a relation” and latitudes-“intensive parts falling under a capacity” (2004, p.283). As such, the body is not defined from the point of a biological genus either, but rather by its power of affecting and being affected, in other words, in terms of what it can do. The kinetic relationship of movement and rest, speed and slowness constitute the fiber among bodies. In other words, bodies are defined by their power to become, this power being the kinetic relations of intensities for a particular arrangement. We may redefine becoming in terms of this new conception of the body: “starting from the one has, the subject one is, the organs one has, or the function one fulfills, becoming is to extract particles between which one establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness that are closest to what one is becoming, and through which one becomes” (2004, p.300). Hence, this novel conception of the body does not stand in a dualistic opposition to the individuality of the subject and organism, but rather manifests haecceities as the manner which we talk about the individuality of a climate or fog, still containing a minimum of strata of subjectivity to instigate deterritorialization.

Becoming-dog, for instance, does not refer to an attempt to resemble a dog by imitating particular traits of a dog: one need not bark. It rather involves making

one's organism "enter into composition with *something else* in such a way that the particles emitted from the aggregate thus composed will be canine as a function of the relation of movement and rest, or of molecular proximity, into which they enter" (2004, p. 302). Barking, still, is not an obstacle for such a proximity but should accompany the canine kinetics of the body. Here, the dog constitutes the borderline of another multiplicity in order to join the dog pack. In this way, becoming always involves a becoming-pack by rhizomatic connections to other multiplicities. Defined as such, this body can hardly be counted as a subject since it operates in the domain of affects and percepts rather than affections and perceptions of humane relationality.

The significance of arts, painting, cinema and literature, for Deleuze, lies in the fact that they give a life to the affects and percepts. "Life alone creates such zones where living beings whirl around, and only art can reach and penetrate them in its enterprise of co-creation" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1996, p.173). Affects- "non human becomings of man" and percepts- "nonhuman landscapes of nature" is extracted from lived affections and perceptions with the quest of the painter, musician or writer, each in their respective materials and styles.

We have begun this chapter by discussing Deleuze's overturning of Platonism. The notion of simulacra has played a major role in this undertaking, but looking at the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, we see that this term is not sufficient to account for Deleuze's thought as a philosophy of difference or becoming. The question of becoming continues the project of overturning Platonism in a particular way; it is a movement against 'to be', against stationary points upon

which Plato tried to establish the society, society of identicalities. The Platonic renouncement of mimesis on the grounds that it strips us from the criteria to distinguish the genuine from the fake is replaced by another renunciation of mimesis, but this time on the grounds that it restores the movement back to the identical, as a rupture of the flux of becoming. We have emphasized what becoming 'is not' rather than what it 'is', because the outcome of a parallel evolution is not a fixed horizon, but rather a permanent deterritorialization of unity and identity. In order to explain the non-mimetic process of becoming, we have explained how bodies are defined by their power of affecting and being affected. We have also showed that becoming is always a question of population and peopling because it is directed towards new alliances within new packs.

In the next chapter, we will focus on the ways literature extracts these affects and percepts to point to a life that is beyond the lived and the livable. For Deleuze, writing and becoming are inseparable since writing as a passage of life is without beginning nor end, and in this advent, one becomes-animal, woman, plant or imperceptible. As becoming involves an alliance, a peopling, literature also is a collective assemblage of enunciation although it is written by a single author or uttered by a single character. The new life embodied in literary works points to a new people, a new society, a new relationality. We will use these new forms of pacts and relationalities invented within literary works to provide a critique of the traditional view of society and sociality in which society is a body defined by its totality and closure.

However, before discussing Deleuze's thoughts on literature, we will continue with another style of criticism of Platonic thought. Along with Deleuze's treatment of Platonic philosophy, Derrida's reading of Plato will be of crucial importance for the following chapters because it will re-inscribe the play of *différance* into Platonic mimesis governed by the truth of memory, sun and Father.

2. 2. Derrida's account of Platonism

Derrida's consideration of Plato's philosophy is multifarious and multilayered. He does not reduce it to a certain homogeneous discourse but rather attempts to reread and even to retranslate Plato's concepts and provisions in order to comprehend the Platonic moves within his complex topology. This attempt occupies an important place in *Dissemination* (2004), which discusses the Platonic account of the relationship between speech and writing in the first part entitled "Plato's Pharmacy". In the second part of the book, Derrida goes on with his criticism of Plato in "Double Session" where Mallarméan mimesis is investigated in comparison with Platonic provisions on the same subject. In Plato's Pharmacy, Derrida mainly focuses on Plato's *Phaedrus*, in which two characters, namely Socrates and Phaedrus, undertake a dialogue about a speech given by sophist Lysias on love. Yet, within the course of the dialogue, Socrates also mentions the relationship between speech and writing where he refers to the myth of Theuth and his presentation of his invention, namely writing, to the king. The consideration of this myth and its relation to Greek thought occupies

an important place in Derrida's evaluation of the Platonic text. We shall quote Socrates's recitation of this myth with Derrida's remarks in parentheses:

... I heard, then, that at Naucratis in Egypt there lived one of the old gods of that country, the one whose sacred bird is called the ibis; and the name of the divinity was Theuth. It was he who first invented numbers and calculation, geometry and astronomy, not to speak draughts and dice, and above all writing (*grammata*). Now the king of all Egypt at the time was Thamus who lived in the great city of the upper region which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes; the god himself they call Ammon. Theuth came to him and exhibited his arts and declared that they should be imparted to other Egyptians. And Thamus questioned of the usefulness of each one; and Theuth enumerated, the King blamed or praised what he thought were the good or bad points in the explanation. Now Thamus I said to have a good deal to remark on both sides of the question about every single art (it would take too long to repeat here); but when it came to writing Theuth said, "This discipline (*to mathēma*), my King, will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memories (*sophōterous kai mnēmonikōterous*): my invention is a recipe (*pharmakon*) for both memory and wisdom. (qtd. in Derrida, 2004, p.80)

Derrida, in the first instance, prefers to consider the context of this presentation, before paying attention to the response provided by the King. In this recitation of the presentation of Phaedrus, writing is put into a parallelism with drugs (*pharmakon*) which cures and aides the citizens to improve their memories. Writing, as a *pharmakon*, is portrayed as a beneficiary add-in to the general well-being of the society. Derrida's moment of intervention to this recitation is the very moment of the presenting of writing as *pharmakon*. In fact, *pharmakon* also means "poison" in Greek, and this second meaning is also employed throughout Platonic texts. Here, the importance of the translation becomes evident, not only because it points to a certain difficulty of translation between two languages without removing the play of undecidability of a particular word,

but also because the removal of undecidability and the determination and fixation of a meaning is indeed the philosophical problem of deciding. This problem of deciding is the very issue at stake in the passage from non-philosophy to the philosophy.

Writing as a pharmakon is characterized by its forcing one to take leave from one's habits, regular laws. For Derrida, such a taking leave is clearly demonstrated in *Phaedrus*, since it is this book that Phaedrus carries which makes Socrates go with him for a walk: "The leaves of writing act as a pharmakon to push or attract out of city the one who never wanted to get out, even at the end, to escape the hemlock" (2004, p.76). Socrates would clearly not be attending to the stroll, were the text was delivered in speech and not "deferred, reserved, enveloped, rolled up" in writing. What is to be underlined here is that, even before Socrates coins the term pharmakon for writing in the course of their dialogue, this logic of pharmakon operates as the motor of several other distinctions put forth by Socrates: books are presented as dead knowledge whereas speech is associated with the living knowledge. This liveliness and death pertain to the distinction between the myth and truth or pharmakon and medicine.

The stage where Theuth presents writing to the King also informs about the power relations operating in this presentation. Theuth presents his invention to the King for his evaluation and acceptance. Writing is assumed to bear no value before the King evaluates it, the King who himself indeed does not know anything about this novel invention. In fact, as a God, he is not supposed to feel

the lack of such a skill; he is satisfied with what his speech enables him: “he has no need to write” (2004, p.81). Theuth presents his invention to this supreme authority, a supervisor who will appreciate its value accordingly. As a supreme authority in control of his own speech, the King is also a father and his relationship to his son, that is to his logos, is compared and evaluated according to the writing as a son which has no father.

Logos is a son, then, a son that would be destroyed in his very *presence* without the present *attendance* of his father. His father who answers. His father who speaks for him and answers for him. Without his father, he would be nothing but, in fact, writing. ... The specificity of writing would thus be intimately bound to the absence of the father. (2004, p.82)

In Plato, the absence of the father of writing already makes writing half dead with respect to the lively speech which has its father behind, always maintaining the logos by his presence. For Plato, lively speech is indeed a living organism, with its own head and tail. It is a zoological body whose life is sustained by its indebtedness to the father. This debt marks the speech as the representative of the speaker. It is further underlined by Derrida that *patēr*, the Greek word for father, also stands for the Chief, the Capital and the Good(s). Thus the investment of this father-son dialectic goes beyond the spectrum of an orphanage.

On the other hand, the distance between the son and the father in the orphanage of writing, according to Derrida, opens up the very possibility of autonomy and sufficiency. This orphanage becomes something desirable for its “patricidal subversion”. Through the parallelism between the Egyptian myth of Thoth and

Plato's way of reciting the myth, we are not only in the domain of how cultures and mythologies interact, but also of that which made this interaction possible, namely, the supposed relationship between myths and philosophy: "Of a history- or rather, of History- which has been produced in its entirety in the *philosophical* difference between mythos and logos ..." (2004, p.91). This History, in the relationship between Thoth and Ra, is reinscribed since the relationship between the god of death and the god of life is not only a relation of opposition, but of supplementarity as well. Thoth is the nocturnal representative of Ra.

Thoth extends or opposes by repeating and replacing. By the same token, the figure of Thoth takes shape and takes its shape from the very thing it resists and substitutes for. ... In distinguishing himself from his opposite, Thoth imitates it, becomes its sign and representative, obeys it and conforms to it, replaces it, by violence if need be. He is thus the father's other, the father, and the subversive movement of replacement. The god of writing is thus at once his father, his son, and himself. (Derrida, 2004, p.96)

Translating or determining pharmakon as remedy has further implications. We have already noted that its translation as remedy obliterated the ambivalence of the effect of the drug on the organism. Still, the inspiration for such an obliteration relies on the words of the King, since we infer what Theuth has said from the King's response. Such a translation already accepts the sovereignty of the dictations of the King and relies on his logic of distinctions.

Plato is also dubious about the value of pharmakon as a remedy. He does not take its beneficiary effects for granted. Any beneficiary effects would not guarantee the absence of any other harmful effects. Furthermore, pharmakon is

always something external to the living organism; it is an artificial intervention. As an external enterprise, pharmakon is considered as a threat to the living organism. The threat of pharmakon, due to its alien and external nature indicates how disease is defined. Within this perspective, disease is that which comes from the outside of the organism. Pharmakon's ambivalent status is thus confirmed by its externality; it might aggravate the illness instead of alleviating it. The health of a living organism, thus, depends on having no relationship at all with an outside.

Now we can listen to the King's response to Theuth, even if we had much of it because of the determination of writing in Theuth's presentation as a remedy.

... the King said, “ Theuth, my master of arts (Ἵ tekhnikōtate Theuth), to one man it is given to create the elements of an art, to another to judge the extent of harm and usefulness it would have for those who are going to employ it. And now, since you are the father of written letters (patēr ōn grammatōn), your paternal goodwill has led you to pronounce the very opposite (tounantion) of what is their real power. The fact is that this invention will produce forgetfulness in the souls of who has learned it because they will not need to exercise their memories (lēthēn men en psuchais parexei mnēmēs ameletēsiai), being able to rely on what is written, using the stimulus of external marks that are alien to themselves (dia pistin graphēs exōthen hup' allotriōn tupōn) rather than, from within, their own unaided powers to call things to mind (ouk endothen autous hup' hautoōn anamimnēskomeneus). So it is not a remedy for memory, but for reminding, that you have discovered (oukoun mnēmēs, alla hupomnēseōs, pharmakon hēures). And as for wisdom (sophias de), you're equipping your pupils with only a semblance (doxan) of it, not with truth (alētheian). Thanks to you and your invention, your pupils will be widely read without benefit of a teacher's instruction; in consequence, they will entertain the delusion that they have wide knowledge, while they are, in fact, for the most part incapable of real judgment. They will also be difficult to get on with since they will be men filled with the conceit of wisdom (doxosophoi), not men of wisdom (antisophon).” (qtd. in Derrida, 2004, p.104-105)

This royal sentence emphasizes that the appearances writing creates are to be easily mistaken for the truth it conceals. What keeps Theuth from distinguishing between these false appearances and the truth is his paternal good will. It is supposed to produce just the semblance of real knowledge and wisdom, but actually it deprives the ones who employ it from the genuine exercise of memory. Derrida points to another feature of this response: the response builds itself out of a series of oppositions of which 'appearance and truth' counts as only one of them. Oppositions such as good and evil, inside and outside, true and false, pseudo and genuine are all clear cut distinctions the King makes in order to subject the ambivalence of writing to his governance. The operation of such an oppositional logic should not be underestimated. These oppositions, for Derrida, not only assume that each side of the opposition mutually excludes the other, but also that the series of opposition relies on one of the oppositions included within the series making the creation of such an externality possible. The importance of pharmakon lies in its undecidability as it is not comprehensible within this oppositional logic while at the same time providing us with the possibility of talking about such oppositions. It is that which makes this oppositional logic work without being subsumable "within what it situates." This ghostly excess is not simply passing beyond the series, but rather is a displacement of them.

As his reply suggests, another reason why the King disavows writing is its supposed undermining of memory. Writing, for the King, constitutes an alternative memory for the reader, and such an alternative memory would hinder the exercise of genuine memory. Writing turns out to be an impairment

of the memory, instead of reinforcing it. Within this line of thought, there is a clear correlation between memory and truth. The forgetfulness entailed by writing undermines knowledge; hence the man of writing can only be called a fake wise man.

This figure of the fake wise man, for Plato, corresponds to the sophists who only seem to know, yet do not possess any genuine knowledge. On the other hand, sophists are known for their improved mnemonics, their outstanding ability to memorize. This ability is also acknowledged by Socrates in several dialogues: “I am sorry I quite forget about your mnemonic art” (qtd. in Derrida, 2004, p. 110). According to Plato, the mnemonics of the sophists does not rely on memory, but in monuments, inventories and copies; it concerns “not memory, but memorials.” Thus, sophists are considered pretenders in their mnemonic exercise as well. The memory Plato seeks is a memory without supplements, surrogates, without pharmakon, whereas writing is only capable of miming the genuine knowledge. Here, one should underline that Derrida’s consideration of the sophists along with the Platonic texts does not offer an affirmation of the sophist thought as such. Rather, it clearly demonstrates that, with an appropriative decision, Platonism and sophistry is distinguished by a line across which they “exchange their respective places, imitating the forms and borrowing the paths of the opponent” (2004, p.110).

Here the critical question is “why is the surrogate or supplement dangerous?” This danger does not refer to a particular situation of the supplement, but rather to its ultimate nonsituatability within the binarism of absence and presence. The

nonsituatability of the supplement opens up a series of complementarities by which writing, albeit something external to memory, is endowed with the capacity of affecting it. It is something external to memory but not to the extent of being unable to penetrate it. Thus, “the pharmakon is that dangerous supplement that breaks into the very thing that would have liked to do without it yet lets itself *at once* be breached, roughed up, fulfilled, and replaced, completely by the very trace through which the present increases itself in the act of disappearing” (2004, p.113). This double operation ascribed to pharmakon, similar to the operation in thoughts of Saussure and Rousseau, is there to maintain both its exteriority and its power of affecting the memory. According to Derrida, such a move is successfully described by the “kettle-logic” which Freud employs to illustrate the logic of dreams. According to this contradictory logic, writing is external and inferior to the living memory which is unaffected by writing, and writing is harmful to the memory because it is a surrogate of it, and if one writes, it is just because the living memory is finite, meaning, memory is already damaged before writing has any impact on it; thus writing does not have an impact on memory. The oppositions exteriority/interiority, inferiority/superiority, finitude/infinity, genuine/surrogate are appropriated to secure a superior position for writing and an inferior one for its surrogate, but this attempt to determine only confirms a contradictory logic by which these distinctions cannot be successfully sustained.

Both memory and its supplement involve a particular logic of repetition. In memory, truth is supposed to be repeated whereas in writing, the repeater is repeated in his absence. Yet, for Derrida, these two repetitions which count as

the distinction between Platonism and sophistry are like sides of a leaf suggesting an inseparability in its recto and verso. Therefore, the danger of the supplement arises out of its lack of essence, of fixed identity, and of characteristics proper to it. It is the *atopos* which constitutes the *topos* of opposition, “the *différance* of difference.” *Pharmakon* creates the possibility of dialectical philosophy, but only as an excess whose reservations can neither be exhausted nor eliminated by philosophical concepts.

If *pharmakon* is what displaces and constitutes the binarism between absence and presence, Derrida re-reads the Platonic text not as a text closed upon itself but in order to comprehend what it leaves out in this attempt of closure. The presence of the pharmaceutical chain *pharmakeia-pharmakon-pharmakeus* in Platonic texts is sustained by a word which Derrida adds to this chain as a supplement: *pharmakos*. *Pharmakos*, meaning both wizard and scapegoat, denotes the very movement of excluding people from the city in ancient Greece. Thus *pharmakos* is the illness of the society and its cure at the same time. It is something inside but affects the society as an outsider. Thus the absence of the *pharmakos* in the pharmaceutical chain of Plato is an exclusion which becomes the present condition of the possibility of the distinctions and determinations suggested by Plato. It is what makes the framing a text possible, but at the same time, without being exhausted by the border, it constitutes the impossibility of framing.

The opposition between the genuine repetition of truth by the living memory and the fake repetition of the repetition by pretenders is not only a distinction

made to sort out the genuine truth. The repetition of the carpenter, the repetition of the painter, and the repetition of writing are classified according to their involvement in the eidos. Their fake claims concerning their ability to present the living memory or organism makes these operations of repetition akin to each other. The painter or the sculptor has a living model, just as the carpenter repeats the genuine eidos; in a parallel way, writing is supposed to have its living model, speech, whose liveliness it attempts to simulate. As Derrida suggests, if we are to include writing in the Platonic hierarchy of repetitions, it would come after all other three, the God, the carpenter and the painter, because its relationship with the model is not sustained in the repetition it provides; writing does not provide any image of the thing it represents, contrary to all other three forms of repetition which sustain such an affinity with the model to some extent. Thus if the painter produces phantasm, the copy of the copy, writing comes after painting in that it is not even capable of producing phantasm. So we might assert that writing does not imitate, but such an assertion clearly relies on the perfect imitation writing provides.

[Writing is] what imitates it [voice] perfectly because it no longer imitates it at all. For imitation affirms and sharpens its essence in effacing itself. Its essence is its nonessence. And no dialectic can encompass this self-inadequation. A perfect imitation is no longer an imitation. If one eliminates the tiny difference that, in separating the imitator from the imitated, by that very fact refers to it, one would render the imitator absolutely different: the imitator would become another being no longer referring to the imitated. ... It is only good insofar as it is bad. ... [M]imēsis is akin to the pharmakon. No “logic,” no “dialectic,” can consume its reserve even though each must endlessly draw on it and seek reassurance through it (Derrida, 2004, p. 104).

There is a distance between the imitator and the imitated which makes imitation possible. This play of distance is renounced and announced at once, since Platonic hierarchy of repetition considers distance as being remote from the truth and thus disavows it. On the other hand for Derrida, this distance is a distancing by which truth can announce itself as such. By an affirmative move, Derrida considers this distance from truth, father, good, sun, capital, eidos as a chance to demonstrate the distancing without any attempt to consummate it. Thus, the writing Derrida affirms is not a writing that is in opposition to speech, but rather a generalized writing which is the very possibility of identification of speech as speech and writing as writing and the very possibility of their differentiation. Writing as a supplement to the genuine truth of living memory is a pharmakon, a pharmakos which imitates the eidos. The undecidable logic of mimesis is what makes imitation possible, but, at the same time, thanks to an unsubsumable reserve, it elicits a non-referral, by which writing does not write speech, but writes itself according to a “graphics of supplementarity”. What this graphic of supplementarity implies is, contrary to Plato’s designation of writing as the representative of speech, a mode of writing which Derrida calls general writing according to which neither speech nor writing can be thought as outside: “There is nothing outside of the text” (1976, p.178).

Derrida’s reconsideration of Platonic mimesis in the light of this logic of supplementarity is one of the main concerns of the “The Double Session”. To point to the Mallarméan operation, Derrida, in this article, outlines the logic of mimesis and how it is founded thanks to a series of oppositions which results in degrading the simulacrum as the copy of the copy. Mimēsis, similar to the

pharmakon, is both something without value as it gains its value from the model it imitates and something of degraded value because it is worth nothing in itself.

“The Double Session” is a long meticulous reading of a short text written by Mallarmé: “Mimique”. Mallarmé’s text is about a scene of imitation which stages a mime who performs an imitation without imitating anything. This imitation without an imitated has neither prior referent nor prescription to follow. This staging without an anterior reality sustains its operation by way of a reference to another text, “Pierrot Murderer of His Wife”. The text of Mallarmé, Derrida suggests, consists in a double movement of referencing and self-referencing at the same time. This simultaneity is what makes the structure of text a play between its closing on itself and opening again. This self reference is crucial since it is the very production of the gap between the text and itself which creates a double which makes referencing and self-referencing possible.

Derrida’s reading of Mallarmé along with the Platonic mimesis proceeds as an interrogation of the relationship between literature and truth. This relationship rests on the peculiar acts of literature in its encounter with the question “what is?” What should be underlined is that Derrida’s undertaking of a comparison between Mallarmé and Plato does not aim to produce opposing exemplarities to proceed from. Derrida seeks the logic of operation of mimesis in Plato’s and Mallarmé’s text and the relationship between them. Thus, this engagement is the very interrogation of the exemplarity to reveal its conditions of possibility and impossibility. The history of the relationship between literature and truth, for Derrida, relies on a particular understanding of Mimesis and this history is what

he studies, not through what this history summons forth, but rather what summons forth this particular history. For that matter, the proper names of Mallarmé and Plato “are not real references but indications for the sake of convenience and initial analysis” between which “a whole history has taken place” (Derrida, 2004, p.200).

Accordingly, Platonism means for Derrida certain anti-Platonisms as well, which has sustained and fed Platonism throughout the history of western thought. A critique of Platonism would require the interrogation of the distinguishability of the imitator and the imitated and to suggest how the relationship which governs and maintains the superiority of the latter to the former might be displaced. As a supplement to memory or as the relationship between two entities, Derrida suggests, all these kinds of studying mimesis are controlled and contaminated by the priority and anteriority of a truth. This accounts for the importance of the “Mimique”: “The Mime imitates nothing” (p.208). The significance of Mallarmé arises not only from the fact that there is nothing that the imitation refers to but also from the fact that there is still a mimicry maintained which does not break all its ties with Platonic mimesis.

Mallarmé even maintains (and maintains himself in) the structure of the *phantasma* as it is defined by Plato: the simulacrum as the copy of a copy. With the exception that there is no longer any model, and hence, no copy, and that this structure (which encompasses the Plato’s text, including his attempts to escape it) is no longer referred to any ontology or even any dialectic. ... [Mallarméan displacement] is a simulacrum of Platonism or Hegelianism, which is separated from what it simulates only by a barely perceptible veil, about which one can just as well say that it already runs-unnoticed- between Platonism and itself, between Hegelianism and itself. Between Mallarmé’s text and itself. It is

thus not simply false to say that Mallarmé is a Platonist or a Hegelian. But it is above all not true. (p. 218)

The play of mimesis introduced by Mallarmé is a hymen, a simulacrum of ‘Hegelian curtains’ and Platonic walls. By removing the referent and yet sustaining the reference is also the removal of the concealed reality behind the false appearances. The inbetween structure of the hymen stands between desire and fulfillment but cannot be consummated by either. It is not a synthesis or partition but rather something in between them. “The hymen interposes itself between mimicry and mimēsis or rather mimēsis and mimēsis” (p.229) This hymenology, the Mallarméan suspension of opposites explains why Derrida considers this text of Mallarmé as a handbook of literature. This handbook would announce that literature has no essence and “the ‘what is’ in the question of ‘what is literature’ is worth what the hymen is worth” (p. 232).

I will discuss this question “what is literature” along with the possibilities and futurities it implies along with Derrida’s reading of Kafka’s short story “Before the Wall”. By now, we have discussed the Platonic understanding of writing and how Mallarméan text points to a mimesis which is not governed under the sovereignty of truth. Derrida’s notice with regard to Platonic philosophy has been its attempt to determine and control the undecidabilities. If literature’s relationship with truth has only always asserted to be mimetic and secondary, what implication does the play of undecidability have for the question of literature?

3. LITERATURE FOR DELEUZE AND DERRIDA

In the previous chapter we have discussed Deleuzian and Derridean intervention to Plato's thought. The significance of this intervention for Deleuze was a problem of making difference by depriving the Idea from its transcendental rule of resemblance. Derridean intervention is also an insertion of undecidability back in Platonic thought with an operation of re-marking. What we will study in this chapter will be an extension of the previous chapter in the sense that we will focus on Deleuze's and Derrida's criticisms of Platonic 'is' with the notion of becoming and the question of "what is literature" respectively.

Deleuze and Guattari see a revolutionary force in literature not as a literature of revolution but rather as a revolutionariness which is granted only during the course of writing. Writing is a passage of life and a corridor of becoming by which one might take lines of flight from majoritarian formations including that of language. As "becoming" is always becoming-multiple, as to the revolutionariness of literature, Deleuze and Guattari argue for its invoking a people-to-come. Here, we will try to follow the clues of the kind of relationality and sociality is endorsed by the coming of the new people in the pacts of Kafka, Masoch and Bartleby. In the second part, we will proceed with Derridean questioning of literature which takes place on the borders of its subject, pointing to how literature is distinguished from the philosophical and the legal as both of these discourses try to maintain themselves by the exclusion of narrativity. Following Derrida's article on Kafka's short story "Vor dem Gesetz (Before the

Law)”, we will argue for the ways by which literature as a fictive narrativity might provide the hyperbolic conditions of democracy by a simulacral repetition of the law. Under the protection of the laws which conditions its emergence, Derrida introduces a subversive juridicity literature may attain by playing with the law. Within this subversion and irresponsibility, we will find an astute criticism of current democracies in which every citizen should always obey the law of response as a responsible citizen. For Derrida, it is the incalculable life of Bartleby and his undecidable proposition that makes him point to a democracy-to-come without simply being a no-saying rebel. After having discussed these two views on literature, we will pass to the next chapter where we will try to understand how the becoming-pack in Deleuze and the fragile relationship with the law of society in Derrida explicate new forms of sociality.

As in the complementarity we have observed in their criticism of Plato, we might recognize the complementarity of Deleuze and Derrida’s thoughts in the context of literature as well. Here, their reading of Kafka and Bartleby is of crucial importance. What is at stake in their studies of Kafka evolves around the concept of law. Deleuze and Guattari try to liberate Kafka from the psychoanalytic interpretations which reduce Kafka’s text to an obedience to the rule of the Father. If the law is everywhere in Kafka’s texts, this is explainable only by the immanence of the law, the law of desire: “*where one believed there was the law, there is in fact desire and desire alone*” (Deleuze&Guattari, p.49). According to Deleuze and Guattari, the transcendence of the law, the interiority of guilt and subjectivity of enunciation are only the worst ways of reading Kafka, as they do

not consider how these themes operate on the surface to convey the law of desire. Derrida's interpretation of Kafka's story, as well, follows this theme of law in that Derrida explains the inaccessibility of the law by the law of *différance* which defers any appropriation. In a complementary way, both the law of desire and the law of *différance* are criticisms of transcendentalism of the law in the Kantian reformulation of the Good and the Law.

Bartleby, as a story of common interest, may even consolidate this complementarity. For Derrida, Bartleby's undecidable proposition is a critical non-response, which does not acquire its right and responsibilities from the economy of current democracies. Without a decidable affirmation or negation, Bartleby points to a democracy-to-come by presenting a rupture in the dialectics of responsibility and irresponsibility. Deleuze's interest in Bartleby also is because of his "queer formula" of saying no without saying no. In Bartleby's frail relationship with American society, Deleuze finds the reasons why both Soviet and American revolutions in XIX. century both turned out to be unsuccessful. Within this failure, we find the implications of the sociality, of the people-to-come in which Bartleby can comfortably take his walks.⁴ One might instantly notice the emphasis on futurity in both notions of people-to-come and democracy-to-come that will lead us to the next chapter, while in this chapter we will be dealing with how Deleuze and Derrida's thoughts on literature is a political study in that it concerns the relationship between the individual and the society, the particular and the general.

3. 1. Deleuze and Literature

The question of literature in Deleuze's thought, his employment of and references to works and names of literary writers is not a question by and of itself, but rather it is one of many interrelated questions which resonate with one another. First, we shall provide a burrow of these connections, disconnections and quasi-connections that take place across Deleuze's various texts.

First of all, similar to Deleuze's engagement with other styles of art, namely cinema and painting, his engagement with literature does not seek to apply some theories onto literary texts, or search for transcendent conditions to be derived from them, but rather it undergoes an immanent investigation of them, trying to seek how they function and what kind of life they imply.

Although one may encounter many writers, verses, stories that are spread out everywhere in Deleuze's work, *Essays Critical and Clinical* is one of his late books where such references become most intense. In this book, Deleuze (1998) strolls among various writers such as Lewis Carroll, Louis Wolfson, Samuel Beckett, Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, Walter Whitman, Herman Melville, Émile Zola, T. E. Lawrence, Arthur Rimbaud, Antonin Artaud and Franz Kafka, to name a few, through short passages. In *The Logic of Sense* (1990), Lewis Carroll, Klossowski, Michel Tournier and Zola among others. In *Masochism*, Deleuze (1989) focuses on texts of Sacher-Masoch and Marquis de Sade, making remarks on the fragile relationship between psychoanalysis and literature, and in *Proust and Signs* where Deleuze (2000) investigates the signs operating in the texts of Proust as self-differentiating essences. Another important work questioning literature is *Kafka, Toward a Minor Literature* which Deleuze (1986) wrote with

Félix Guattari. In this book, reading the letters, stories and novels of Franz Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari outline the ways in which literary-machines function and they describe what a minor literature is. In all these works, as Smith (in Deleuze, 1998) suggests, it is as if Deleuze is trying to investigate the immanent 'logic' of literature as he investigates that of painting and of cinema in his books on Francis Bacon and on cinema, respectively. It is an attempt to comprehend how literary machines do function, what modes of existence they imply, under what conditions a literature is revolutionary and how it may free our life, our desire. Literature, in that sense, has an essential link to life, a life freed from all determinations that imprison it.

It is in the first chapter of *Essays Critical and Clinical*, entitled 'Literature and Life' that Gilles Deleuze (1998), explains the crucial conjunction between literature and life. Writing, for Deleuze, is always a matter of becoming; always proceeding from the middle: it is never complete. It is via this becoming that one becomes woman, animal, molecular or imperceptible. In writing, these becomings may pass to one another or take place at various levels at the same time. In this way, writing provides a line of escape from dominant formations of thoughts and expressions so that it is impossible not to write. Deleuze asks rhetorically: "The shame of being a man- is there any better reason to write?" (1998, p. 1). This is not a single-layered shame that one can disavow simply by recounting one's memories and what one has lived. For Deleuze, literature is more than mere narration of the places one has seen, the things one has experienced. Literature always operates in excess of the lived and the livable.

“All writers, all creators, are shadows. ... You don’t get very far in literature with the system ‘I’ve seen a lot and been to lots of places,’ where the authors first do things and tell us about them. Narcissism in authors is awful, because shadows can not be narcissistic” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 134).

Literature as an enterprise is more related to enacting new affects and percepts than new affections and perceptions. It is a play on the domain of virtuals that precedes and overflows any subjective formation. The Desert in “Seven Pillars of Wisdom”, The Ocean in “Moby-Dick”, and The Burrow in one of Kafka’s stories are all percepts that go beyond the perceptions of the perceiving subject. Affects and percepts, unlike affections and perceptions, do not assume a subjective individuation, but constitute haecceities, nonsubjectified assemblages that consist of sets of speeds and slownesses. It is in this way that Lawrence becomes indistinguishable from the Desert. Literature, by extracting affects and percepts out of lived experiences, operates without subjective formations, by invention of new virtual conjunctions.

Clearly, this way of writing is different than the way Artaud also mentioned critically of an oeuvre, a book, a text which comes with a promise of totality and guidance. According to Guattari (1996), to write before and after already written books is not the same as writing a book. Writing brings about the possibility of a living text when it is written on a palimpsest, a surface on which one writes over and under already written premises. Writing is not a matter of erasing what has been written but rather an act of underwriting or overwriting the spaces left in order to make the text contradict itself, or to push it until it obliterates itself. For Guattari, this way of writing constitutes a chain: a chain of love. Due to this love

writing enables, we are left with little possibility to talk about a writer or an author, because being a writer always means to become something other than a writer.

The run away induced by writing is an athletic event if not an olympic one, an escape from the formations of the organic body. It is an affective athleticism by which one enters a zone of indiscernability before any subjective formation. In that sense, Melville's Ahab is an athlete escaping to become-whale in the Ocean, where Ocean is not simply a perception but a percept. According to Deleuze (1998), writer as an athlete is similar to the swimming champion of Kafka who does not know how to swim or an "athlete in bed" who might only take stationary flights. This athlete in bed who escapes from the organic body has a very peculiar and delicate health. In fact, for Deleuze, literature is an enterprise of health. This does not necessarily mean that the writers ought to be in good health. To the contrary, being a runaway from the organic formations, writing enables the writer to acquire an anorganic, schizoid life. Neither does this mean that the writer ought to be in bad health. The process of schizophrenization here does not refer to a psychotic or neurotic writer. In fact, these states refer to stations, according to Deleuze, where the becomings, the flows or the overflows are rather blocked and interrupted. As to this fragile health, for Deleuze,

... a drained life or a personal life isn't enough for an artist. You don't write with your ego, your memory and your illnesses. In the act of writing there's an attempt to make life something more than personal, to free life from what imprisons it. The artist or philosopher has a slender, frail health, a weak constitution, a shaky hold on things: look at Spinoza, Nietzsche, Lawrence. Yet it is not death that breaks them, but seeing, experiencing, thinking too much life" (1995, p.143).

Writer is not simply a patient who suffers from bad health, but rather he is a physician, a “physician of himself and the world”. Similar to a philosopher who creates concepts or an artist who creates new sensations, writer as a physician is a symptomatologist who points to new possibilities of living. Thus the anorganic life necessitates both a good health to ease and facilitate the passages and becomings and a bad health without which such becomings would again be impossible.

The literature we are talking about is of course a ‘minor literature’, or a particular mode of ‘writing’, since revolutionariness is only to be granted on the course of writing rather than a privileged situation ascribed to writers or to literature. With this conception of literature, we are no longer interested in the meanings of books, novels or stories, but their functions, whether they function or not. In their book on Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari (1986) explain the conditions or functions to be found in minor literatures. Firstly, a minor literature must instigate a deterritorialization within a major literature by a delicate treatment of language. Secondly, in minor literature, nothing is personal; everything connects to a political immediacy. Individual concerns instantly interpenetrate with bureaucratic, juridical or economic concerns. Thirdly, in minor literature, everything bears a collective value. Any statement does not return to the writer as the subject of individual enunciation, but rather expresses collective assemblages of enunciation.

What does the first condition imply? According to Deleuze and Guattari, if writing is a passage of Life through which one experiences a becoming-other,

this becoming-other is always accompanied by the becoming-minor of an established language. For Deleuze (1986), the major and the minor does not refer to two different languages, this distinction is a matter of usage, functioning. Deleuze points to such effects of literature on language by referring to Proust: “Great books are written in a kind of foreign language.” This peculiar use of language does not aim to create another language, but enacts the becoming-foreign or becoming-minor of language itself. By this minor usage, the formations, structures and grammatical determinations of the major language are challenged such that new ways of expression are invented within it. Thus minor literature is not defined by literature of this or that language, it is not a matter of making distinctions, but rather it is a movement to be engaged in every established literature. Rather than a reterritorialization in a marginalized language or patois, it is a leap, a hole in the constant grammatical relations imposed by the major literature; it is what makes the language stutter.

This mode of writing in which writers are no longer considered clinical cases, also frees text from its sublimational determinations. The act of writing becomes related more to the nonpersonal rather than to personality, since in writing writers attain the possibility of becoming something other than him or herself. When a becoming-other takes place, it is not possible to talk of a personological or psychiatric approach to literary texts. Literature is not regarded as a field where one can always return back to the personal life of an author. As writing itself is a passage of life, no fixed psychoanalytic framework such as the oedipal triangle would exhaust the text totally. As a line of escape, writing obviously escapes from the oedipal structures which imprisons life and obstructs the

functioning of the text. Writing is not a search for the father, but rather a road, a stroll, a voyage away from him by which one becomes road as in Kerouac. In a similar fashion, Kafka's employment of the familial triangle is an adventure within which it merges with various other triangles such as historical, political, economic ones so that the personal always operates on a political basis. In Kafka, the oedipal structure is exaggerated in such a way that with all these new connections, the oedipal structure is deterritorialized, and the problem evolves from being a question of liberty to a question of escape.

Yet, insofar as the comic expansion of Oedipus allows one to see these other oppressor triangles [economic, political, juridical etc.] through the lens of the microscope, there appears at the same time the possibility of an escape, a line of escape. To the inhumanness of the 'diabolical powers,' there is the answer of a becoming-animal: to become a beetle, to become a dog, to become an ape, "head over heels and away," rather than lowering one's head and remaining a bureaucrat, inspector, judge, or judged (1986, p. 12).

As the quotation above suggests, in Kafka, the escape is not only from the father, but also from the director, from the business, from the bureaucrats, from the judges and all interpenetrating structures which come to imprison a life. In this regard, the individual concern always gets permeated with a political immediacy and a revolutionariness, which is in fact the only way of being revolutionary.

As it has been emphasized, these revolutionary flights are not personal or individual, although literary texts are written by singular agents or refer to singular agents. For Deleuze (1986), becoming-minoritarian always implies a kind of collectivity, a sociality. In becoming animal, for instance, there is always

a becoming-pack. Thus literature invokes 'a people' by its very enunciation. According to Deleuze and Guattari,

[t]he literary machine thus becomes the relay for a revolutionary machine-to-come, not at all for ideological reasons but because the literary machine alone is determined to fill the conditions of a collective enunciation that is lacking elsewhere in this milieu (1986, pp. 17-18).

Literature, hence, is the very invention of a people, people who are missing for the time being. This fabulative function of literature defines its political task. Rather than addressing an already existing people, literature aims to invoke a people, a relationality which does not yet exist, and by so doing, becomes a micropolitical intervention of a minority. However, the struggle of a minority should never take the majoritarian formations as its model, but instead should remain in the flux of becoming-minor that incessantly escapes dominant formations. That is why Deleuze (1995) prefers 'fabulation' over 'utopia' for artistic expression. Being given a political stake, fabulation differs from the myth-making of religious and the legend-creating of national literatures. As Lambert (2002) asserts, since the self perception of the minorities is also attempted to be determined by the majority, as the truth is already controlled by the dominant formations, the fabulation of literary texts should turn towards the power of falsehood to realize the principle of fabulation which governs the very production of the truth as well.

To understand why literature, whose three conditions we have been describing is a minor one, we might refer to the concept of minority, a complex notion "with musical, literary, linguistic, as well as juridical and political references" (Deleuze

& Guattari, 2004, p.116). It should be emphasized that the distinction between minority and majority is not a matter of quantity but a matter of relations internal to the quantity. As Deleuze and Guattari explain,

[i]t is obvious that “man” holds the majority, even if he is less numerous than mosquitoes, children, women, blacks, peasants, homosexuals, etc. That is because he appears twice, once in the constant and again in the variable from which the constant is extracted. ... A determination different from that of the constant will therefore be considered minoritarian, by nature and regardless of number, in other words, a subsystem or outsystem. ... There is a majoritarian “fact,” but it is the analytical fact of Nobody, as opposed to the becoming-minoritarian of everybody (2004, p. 116)

Minor literature concerns everybody by the following question: “how to become a nomad and immigrant and a gypsy in relation to one’s own language” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p.19). As an operation within the major language, minor literature is a theft of a baby from its crib. This stolen baby becomes the very possibility of the new sociality, new society, the new pack to come. However, the active solidarity to be brought about by this literature does not grant the writer an organic involvement in the community he lives in. It is rather a frail relationship in which the writer does not simply address his community but writes for and points to a non-existent community, a community yet to come.

We have discussed the three properties which characterize a minor literature. A becoming-other of language comes together with a deterritorialization of subjectivities promising a new sociality to come. But one is compelled to ask: in what ways is this society-to-come invoked by minor literatures? We might

answer this question by reconsidering the concepts with which the concept of minor literature is in affinity. We have already stated that writing or literature as passage of life is inseparable from a process of becoming, rhizomatic connection of multiplicities creating a line of escape from the dominant formations of language and subjectivity. To understand this new sociality better, we might look at what the notion of becoming suggests for Deleuze, as it is in writing that one can enter into becoming-animal, becoming-plant, becoming-woman, becoming-black or becoming-imperceptible.

We have already stated that becoming is never contained within one term, but rather is an aparallel evolution of two series which do not operate according to a model of resemblance or correspondence. It is a trespassing of borders thanks to an alliance, an alliance with a devil, a demon, an Anomalous which serves as the borderline of this reciprocal involution. In a certain way, this new sociality is instigated with a pact. The letters Kafka writes are not only a medium to correspond with the recipient, but rather it has another addressee, “the woman that the father is supposed to have made him lose” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p.29). With the diabolical use of the duality of the sender and receiver, Kafka makes an alliance with the devil, as the letters always sustain a distance against the proximity of a conjugal contract. By letters, a conjugal contract is disavowed for a demonic pact, which presages becomings-animal in the stories and becomings-molecular in the novels, three components of expression continuously traversing one another.

In Melville's *Moby-Dick*, Captain Ahab's becoming-whale is also an alliance; *Moby-Dick* serving as a barrier Ahab wants to pass through. It stands at the borderline of the whale community beyond which any other multiplicity may not pass without a change in its dimensions or magnitudes, meaning a change in its nature. This relationship with the Anomalous is not a domestic or sentimental relationship but a demonic pact by which both parties undergo a becoming. Nevertheless, this demonic pact coexists with the breach of another contract: Ahab betrays the law of whalers according to which when one encounters a whale, one must hunt it.

In another story of Melville, "Bartleby" as well, we may recognize this double contract. Bartleby's queer formula "I would prefer not to" which creates an undecidable statement within the syntax of a familiar language opens him a leeway for living without gaining any particularity. This statement is not at all a rejection or a rejection without a determinable content: it is a rejection of nothing and everything at the same time. If Bartleby had simply rejected the orders the attorney gave to him, he would simply turn into a rebel and thus could not have sustained this delicate exteriority as "a pure outsider [exclu] to whom no social position can be attributed" (1998, p.73). When we consider the bizarre behaviors of the attorney, we might configure the terms of this contract as follows:

... the attorney, following his promotion, had decided to make this person, without objective references, a man of confidence (un home de confiance) who would owe everything to him. He wants to make him *his* man. [Bartleby, in return] will sit near his master and copy, listening to him, but without being seen, like a night bird who cannot stand to be looked at.

After the attorney changes Bartleby's place in the office by moving him next to other officers, he breaches this contract and after this event Bartleby stops correcting and copying texts. Bartleby, from the debris of this broken arrangement invents his smooth expression of hesitation. Out of this breach of contract, he retains a singularity with respect to the attorney, the figure of the Father and the Law.

The main problem of Melville's oeuvre, for Deleuze, is the reconciliation of the singular with the general. As such, what Melville affirms is a "society of celibates" instead of a "society of brothers". This society does not form a nation, a family, a heritage or a Father. For Deleuze, this form of sociality is already envisioned by the Americans before their independence and by Russians before the Bolshevik revolution in XIX. century. The former calling for a 'universal emigration' and the latter a 'universal proletarianization': American pragmatism and Russian socialism. What marks the failure of American pragmatist and Russian socialist revolutions is actually the rebirth of a nation, the coming back of the Father, which annuls the singularities of sons without fathers with the return of paternal authority.

What we see in both Sade's and Masoch's writing is also a confrontation with this law of society in their respective styles. Deleuze underlines the difference of their 'pornological' styles to point to the impossibility of a sado-masochist compound or a relationship of complementarity between them. The masochist educator is distinguished from the Sadist instructor in that the former persistently enters into new contracts whereas the latter is in constant

nullification of all laws. The basis of distinction between the Sadist and the Masochist can be summarized by the distinction between a process of negation and a process of disavowal. The Sadist wants to make his ideal real by a process of negating, whereas the masochist ascends to the suprasensual by suspending the real. According to Deleuze, in Sade and Masoch we can identify a criticism of Kantian conception of law which came as a reversal of the ancient Platonic conception. For Kant, the Good follows the Law, rather than the other way around. Law does not require a higher authority to justify its sovereignty, but it is the justification of its own without need of higher reference. Sade presents the ironic criticism of this conception of law by substituting the law with an anti-law of pure negation. Masoch's humorous criticism, on the other hand, works by an apparent obedience to the law. In masochist rites, even though the laws are applied strictly, we encounter a result which is totally unexpected. His contracts, which are made only to be breached, parody law in the sense that what is forbidden turns into the very outcome of the punishment.

... contract implies in principle certain conditions like the free acceptance of the parties, a limited duration and the preservation of inalienable rights, the law that it generates always tends to forget its own origins and annul these restrictive conditions. Thus contract-law relationship involves in a sense a mystification. To imagine that a contract or quasi contract is at the origin of society is to invoke conditions which are necessarily invalidated as soon as the law comes into being. For the law, once established, violates the contract in that it can apply to a third party, is valid for an indeterminate period and recognizes no inalienable rights. This process of invalidation of contract is reflected, as we have seen, in the peculiar progression of Masoch's successive love contracts, the terms of which become increasingly strict, as if to prepare the way for the law that will eventually override them. Since the law results in our enslavement, we should place enslavement first, as the dreadful object of the contract. One could even say, as a general

rule, that in masochism the contract is caricatured in order to emphasize its ambiguous destination (Deleuze, 1989, pp. 91-92).

As Deleuze suggests, Masoch's contracts with his lovers, which are prepared with utmost care but are ultimately overthrown, is a humorous criticism by placing the origin of law in the contract. This contract is breachable by nature, in other words it breaches itself to gain its sovereign power.

Parallel to Kafkaesque contract with the devil, Ahab's contract with Moby Dick, and Bartleby's contract which displaces both preference and nonpreference, Masoch's contract with his lovers, as well, always come with the breach of another contract, a law which tries to capture the processes of becoming of these characters. Kantian law as that which perpetuates its sovereignty by guilt, which is a pure form stated only through its punishment is the very object of dismantling in Kafka. For Deleuze and Guattari, if themes of transcendent law, interior guilt and subject of enunciation persist in Kafka's texts, it is because Kafka instigates a superficial movement through which all these are displaced. They are only gears of primary affective tonalities of fear, escape and dismantling which are vibrated through letters, stories and novels respectively. What Kafka shows is "*where one believed there was law, there is in act desire and desire alone. Justice is desire and not law*" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p.49). The unrepresentability of justice comes from the unrepresentability of desire. Justice as such is the very renouncement of the idea of transcendence, everything and everybody is part of it, since it is the immanent process of desire.

Accordingly, if the fabulative function of literature consists in making pacts of becoming by breaching the contract of laws, these pacts should be understood by this immanent process of desire as an interminable flux. The alliance in a pact does not try to govern, root or fixate the individual parties, and whenever it does so, the flux recuperates the law of the father, meaning that lines of segmentarity have started to dominate the lines of flight again. The pacts of becoming involve peoplings, but it envisions a community which is not governed solely by a central movement. At this juncture, we might listen to Franny recounting her dream:

There is a desert. Again it wouldn't make sense to say that I am *in* the desert. It's a panoramic vision of the desert, and it is not a tragic or uninhabited desert. It's only a desert because of its ocher color and its blazing, shadowless sun. There is a teeming crowd in it, a swarm of bees, a rumble of soccer players, or a group of Tuareg. *I am on the edge of the crowd, at the periphery; but I belong to it, I am attached to it by one of my extremities, a hand or foot.* I know that periphery is the only place I can be, that I would die if I let myself be drawn into the center of the crowd, but just as certainly if I let go of the crowd. This is not an easy position to stay in, it is even very difficult to hold, for these beings are in constant motion and their movements are unpredictable and follow no rhythm (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p.32).

A very delicate position for living. Bartleby also tries to keep the connection to his swarm without being absorbed in it, "I would prefer not to" is his fragile position in which Bartleby is able to maintain his life. The fabulative function of literature, its inventing of a people lies under this creation of a Life. The society-to-come is thus the society of celibates, of bachelors. It is a society without fathers, an archipelago, a "wall of loose, uncemented stones, where every element has value in itself but also in relation to others: isolated and

floating relations, islands and straits, immobile points and sinuous lines ...”
(Deleuze, 1998, p.86).

3. 2. Derrida and Literature

To give an account of why Derrida has been interested in literature always assumes certain conventional categories Derrida has been problematizing. Clearly, what makes such an occupation as something to be accounted for is the presumption that Derrida as a philosopher, as the “lover of truth” ought to have good reasons and aims to be interested in literature. Within such a speculation, the category of truth does not only constitute the main axis of philosophical thought but also governs literature’s relationship to truth by marking it as something distinct and even inferior to philosophy. If Derrida’s philosophy does not loyally follow this philosophical axis - without rejecting the category of truth- , we should take this opportunity to say that his occupation with literature can not be subsumed under another higher agenda, be it philosophical or of any other sort. If there is a difference between the way Derrida engages with so-called literary texts and philosophical texts, this difference does not rely on the conventional distinction between philosophy and literature but probably owes to the singularity of each deconstructive reading in each instance. Thus if Derrida asks the question “what is literature?”, it is only a quotation to consider the grammatological topology that enables one to pose such a question. In this question, the relationship between “what is” and “literature” is confronted as an issue of origin, of demarcation, of ambitions and goals and at the same time of what literature is not.

For Derrida, each reading of a text bears a singularity which is impossible to reduce to other instances of reading. Yet, the singularity of the text is not posited as an obstacle to iterability, since if it were so, it would be hardly possible to read a text. Thus the peculiarity of this singularity arises out of its particular relationship with iterability, repetition and generality. This iterability constitutes the very possibility of labeling a text as belonging to a certain genre. The text stands before a law, being marked with it. But this law of genre does not operate as a law of belonging, of interiority which closes the text on itself. Rather, Derrida speaks of a re-mark, a double mark which might escape the governance of truth by its displacement.

This re-mark suggests that there is no essence of literature that resist change across various literary texts, there is no border to literariness explainable by what it borders. But still, even if we renounce the essential attributes to literary texts, we are still bound to explain its status in the cultural and political arena within which the literary is described as such. According to Derrida, literature is an institution, a strange and recent one which emerges as a result of certain cultural, political, historical processes. Thus, as an institution which renounces any constitutive definition, the promise of literature lies in a singular relationship with the socio-politico-cultural context it is situated in. It does not enjoy any ahistorical privilege of possessing an immutable essence, but rather, standing before the law, it might question the very historicity it is itself bound with. The position of this institution before the rules is sustained by its ability to say everything. According to Derrida,

... the space of literature is not only that of an instituted *fiction* but also a *fictive institution* which in principle allows one to say everything. To say everything is no doubt to gather, by translating, all figures into one another, to totalize by formalizing, but to say everything is also to break out of [franchir] prohibitions. To affranchise oneself [s'affranchir] - in every field where law can lay down the law (1992, p.36).

This authorization is also connected to the emanation of the idea of democracy. Although this authority to say everything is something granted by the present idea of democracy, only its interruption may call for a democracy-to-come. The right to response in all ways includes a non-response as well, an irresponsibility in responding to someone on account of what one has written. For Derrida, this irresponsibility is in the name of a future, not as a time in which democracy will be there in its presence, but rather as an endless promise for a futurity not governed by metaphysical concepts of time and presence. To come, for Derrida, does not denote a utopia on which present previsions, foresights and descriptions are projected. It follows the structure of the trace which “does not let itself be summed up in the simplicity of a present” (1976, p.66). This future democracy or democracy to come consists in a responsibility to the other, to provide an opening in which the other may find a place without our designations, controls and expectations. The democracy to come is a promise of a relationality or sociality in which the other is freed from any reduction to the same. Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche, Rousseau and Gide during his adolescence, and the political conditions in the fifties makes Derrida think of literature at that time to mean something particular among other things: “I

thought of literature as the end of family, and of the society it represented, even if family was also, on the other hand, persecuted” (1992, p. 39).

The significance of non-response becomes evident in Derrida’s comments on *Bartleby*, in his bizarre response: “I would prefer not to”. Derrida, in *The Gift of Death* (1992a), argues that this statement opens an undecidable promise as a responsible response which actually does not respond. It is an incomplete sentence that escapes saying something determinable, positive or negative. In this non-response, according to Derrida, we find

... the hyperbolique condition of democracy which seems to contradict a certain determined and historically limited concept of democracy, a concept which links it to the concept of a subject that is calculated, accountable, imputable and responsible, one that “must respond” and “ must tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth” (1992a, p. 23).

As we see, Derrida distinguishes between the subjects of present democracies who are obliged to respond loyally to the truths and laws that govern society and the subjects of literary discourse who might, in this hyperbolique condition of non-responsibility, enjoy an opportunity which the social subjects do not. This space opened up by literature, constitutes a futurity without any recourse to the truth-governed democracies of the time.

For Derrida, this is made possible by a simulacral repetition of the law. This doubling or the repetition of the law constitutes one of the main concerns of Derrida’s article on Kafka’s short story “Before the Law”. This article which shares the same title with the story, is a crucial instance insofar as it prefigures

the topology in which we will consider literature and law with reference to one another. The sameness of the titles is an important move, since, for Derrida, the entitling is an issue of topology insofar as any other same combination of words which appear in any other part of the text would not be referring to the same thing with the title which appears *before* the text. The title of Derrida's essay, the title of Kafka's story and the very first words of this story are all "before the law". Thus Derrida's title points to a play of difference *before* his essay begins.

Kafka's story is about a man from the country who comes in front of the guarded door of the law and insistently attempts to get access to the Law. The man is surprised to be denied entrance, since, according to him, as Law is universal, it ought to be accessible to everybody, all the time. But contrary to his suppositions, he is vetoed from the very first doorkeeper and what is more, there are many other doors and doorkeepers along the way. According to the confession of the first guardian, it gets more and more difficult on the way: "The third doorkeeper is already so terrible that even I can not bear to look at him".

Derrida's interest in this short story is more than a literary criticism if literary criticism is to presume a literariness for any criticism. For Derrida, this short story which is also a part of the *Trial*, but has been printed as a separate work constitutes a chance to question the literariness of any text. After all, according to what do we make a decision in order to distinguish between the literary and the non literary? What is the law that governs this separation? Kafka's "Before the Law" is crucial in its literary act, as a 'literary' work it also stages the very operation of the Law.

Derrida begins his essay with three assumptions we might instantly hold about the story *Before the Law*, which he cites at the very beginning of his article. The first assumption is that this text has an identity, a unity, a beginning and an end which is justified with reference to the German original, an original which governs the self-identity of the story. The second assumption is about the author of the text. We presume that the author is strictly a real character who is different than the fictive characters in the text which he authors. Thirdly, this text is a literary one, and not simply because it is narrative, fictive or allegoric, since “there are fictions, allegories, myths, symbols, or parables that are not specifically literary” (1992, pp.186-187).

Although these are the initial remarks of Derrida, he will not be content to respond to these questions just to undermine the generality of a law and its repercussions, but will point to “the singularity of a proceeding which, in the course of a unique drama, summons them [these laws] before an irreplaceable corpus, before this very text, before *Before the Law*.”(1992, p.187) Derrida’s emphasis is on the ‘encounter between law and singularity’ and the enigma of this encounter. Within this encounter, Derrida discusses Kafka’s story in relation to the Kantian moral law which “never shows itself but is the only cause of that respect” (1992, p. 190). For Derrida, the “what if” structure inhabiting Kantian moral law is the introduction of a history and narration into the law which is carefully guarded from such an intrusion. It is these motifs of guard and narrativity in Kantian law that attracts Derrida’s interest in Kafka’s short story. Explained as such, Derrida’s question is a challenge to Kantian

transcendentality: “what if the law, without being itself transfixed by literature, shared the conditions of possibility with the literary object” (1992, p.191)?

The notion of law, as a universal, homogenous and unitary structure is incompatible with the notion of story. This exclusion of narration and history from law is what Derrida calls “the law of laws”. Similar to the man denied the access to the law, historicity is also prohibited such an access. This inaccessibility does not depend on the type of law, be it moral, political or natural. Derrida’s interest is in the concealing of all these laws or of the law of the laws what makes them law as such.

What this distinction between law and law of laws suggest is that any singular instance does not only stand before the law, but also before the law of the laws, before which law itself stands as well. Any attempt of accounting for the origin or sovereignty of law encounters a double impasse: whenever this originarity is attempted to be accounted for, its authority gets impaired as the authority of the law defies necessary explanation, but on the other hand, whenever one abstains from giving such an historical account, then the authority of law remains unthought promoting a blind obedience. The significance of Kant’s moral imperative lies in its attempt of surpassing this double bind. Kant, by putting the law before freedom, alters the scheme by his contention that the more one participates in the law, the freer one is. Sustaining the ahistoricity of the law, Kant aims to maintain the ground of necessary obedience to that law. Derrida’s critical point of intervention to the Kantian model of law is the very point where every singular act is checked on the basis of an “as if” structure in order to be a

lawful act. For Derrida, this structure of “as if” is the very placement of narrativity at the heart of law.

It is indeed this concealing that makes the quest for the origin of law irresistible for Derrida. Nevertheless, it is not only irresistible but also impossible. Since such a quest would both mean both to take the law as the non-historical, and at the same time to continue revealing the ‘history of the non-history’. At this juncture, Freud’s quest for discovering the origin of moral law is exemplary. For Freud, at the origin of morality lies in a repression which is marked by an elevation, the ascending of the nose as to get away from the anal and genital organs. Memory stinks, and our turning away our nose from it, is the repression by which consciousness escapes from this odor. The turn away from impurity is a movement of ascension, and this noble ascension, this highness constitutes the very source of morality for Freud. Freud supposes that he finds the origin of the law of morality, but on the condition that the track of this origin be lost, in order to be able to present the law as the absolute and non-historical.

The ‘nasal protuberance’ appears in Kafka’s story as well, but this time with “the hairs which do not always hide themselves decently inside the nostrils” (p.194). Derrida refers to an important moment in the course of the decision of the man from the country:

these [that he is vetoed by the first doorkeeper and there are much more terrible doorkeepers he has to face even he manages to continue despite the veto] are difficulties the country man has not expected; the Law, he thinks, should surely be accessible at all times and to everyone, but as he now takes a closer look at the door keeper in his fur coat, with his big sharp nose and long, thin, black Tartar beard, he decides that it is better to wait until he gets permission to enter (1992, p.183).

After facing this 'hair promontory', the man makes a decision, he decides not to decide at that moment, and adjourns the decision to enter to another time. This delay, for Derrida, is also in our encounter with the story: "Is not what holds us in check before the law, like the man from the country, also what paralyzes and detains us when confronted with a story..." (1992, p.196)? Hence, "Before the Law" is not only the story of the inaccessibility to the law, but also the story of the inaccessibility to the story telling that "the story of prohibition is a prohibited story" (p.200).

"Before Before the Law" and "Before the Law" shares a topology according to which any access is strictly prohibited. But before the Law there stands also the doorkeeper, not only the man from the country. Even if they both stand before the law, the doorkeeper is his back turned to it, whereas the man from the country is waiting patiently for an opportunity to enter; they stand in opposition to each other. Such a split operates also within the title ('Before the Law') and the narrative body of the story (first line of which is 'Before the Law') and it takes place because of an "entitling authority, in its topical and juridical function" (p.201). The title of the story which comes before the narrative body and enframes the literary text is assumed to be both an element of the work and also something outside of it. It is indeed this invisible division between the title and narrative body which attracts Derrida to the story and not to the same piece of text which is also included in the Trial without a title. The title and the very first sentence of the story are identical but heterogeneous and they do not cite one another because there is not any narrative link between these two occurrences.

The occurrence in the entitling is a *coup* which helps to constitute the story as distinct from its appearance in the Trial, to separate the text as another instance. Derrida argues for the peculiarity of the occurrence in the title in comparison to the occurrence of the same series of words at the very beginning of the story:

The entitling sentence describes the one who turns his back to the law (to turn one's back also means to ignore, neglect, or even transgress)- not in order that the law present itself or that one be present to it but, on the contrary, in order to prohibit all presentation. The other, who faces the law, sees no more than the one who turns his back to it. Neither is in the presence of the law. The only two characters in the story are blind and separated from one another, and from the law. Such is the modality of this rapport, of this relation, of this narration: blindness and separation, a kind of non-rapport (1992, pp. 201-202).

This non-rapport also applies to the doorkeepers, the first of whom is at the bottom of the hierarchy and also of the cruelty, since he too can not stand to see even the third doorkeeper, not to mention the ones following the third. This is when the man, as an ordinary person subject to the law, decides to wait: just after seeing the nose and hairy appearance of the doorkeeper. What is important is that the permission is never absolutely forbidden to the country man but rather this story becomes the story of the postponing of the decision to enter.

For Derrida, "the prohibition of the law is not a prohibition in the sense of an imperative constraint; it is a *différance*" (pp. 202-203). The door is actually open, not at all closed, and even the man has the opportunity to have a look at this space which separates him from the law, since this door is not "firm, opaque or uncrossable" (p.203). Moreover, the doorkeeper does not guard the door physically as a physical barrier but rather asks the man "to interrupt and defer

the passage, to withhold the pass” (p.203). In this deferral, what this man orders himself is not related to the content of the law as law, but rather an order which simply states “do not come to me”. Thus, the man standing before the law gains access to its demand without an actual confrontation with it, without gaining access to the law itself: “one cannot reach the law, and in order to have a *rapport* of respect with it, *one must not* have a *rapport* with the law, *one must interrupt the relation*” (pp. 203-204). The law is in a contradiction of prohibiting itself: the man before it is both subject to the law; but having no access, he is outside it as well. The delay prompted by the guardian, to whom the man has the only access is the *différance* as an interminable deferral. As this deferral suggests, “the discourse of the law does not say ‘no’ but ‘not yet,’ indefinitely” (p.204). Law is that which is deferred and it is this very law which dictates such a deferral.

What should be emphasized here is the coincidence of the ‘brutal’ end of the story with the guardian’s shutting of the door. The closure of the door is accompanied by the closure of the text.

The text guards itself, maintains itself – like the law, speaking only to itself, that is to say, of its non identity with itself. It neither arrives nor lets anyone arrive. It is the law, makes the law and leaves the reader before the law (1992, p. 211).

The text also has its own guardians: the translators, critics, readers might be considered as the doorkeepers of the text who pursue the self-unity and originality of the text against any intrusion. This operation may hold for any text indeed, even if we observe a rather explicit form of it in this kind of a self-referential structure in Kafka’s story which “does and says, saying what it does

by doing what it says” (p.212). With the guardian announcing that he is going to close the door, Kafka gives an end to the story.

For Derrida, the man from the country at the door “had difficulty with literature” (p.213). What is literature after all when we remove all its historical, philosophical, fictional registers? A work is a system of referentiality, a play of framing which hardly counts as a gesture in favor of literature. It still counts, because it is inevitable to talk about a work when we are dealing with literature, since “there is no literature without a work” (p.213). Thus, what distinguishes two identical texts, “Before the Law” and its exact appearance in the Trial is the way in which the play of referentiality and framework operates within these two distinct instances. Yet, Derrida argues that this is still inadequate for any demarcation.

If framing, title and referential structure are necessary for the literary work as such to emerge, these conditions of possibility still remain too general and hold for the texts to which we would hardly ascribe literary value. These possibilities give the text the power to *make law*, beginning with its own. However, this is on condition that the text itself can appear *before the law* of another, more powerful text protected by more powerful guardians (1992, pp. 213-214).

Kafka’s text with its guardians points to these guardians and to the way they are made possible. This duplicity makes it possible to position this text of Kafka within literature. It bears an excess too, insofar as it also tells us about the laws of literature being at the same time before these laws. This excess is indeed for in every work we deem to be a literary work, since the literariness does not

imply a belonging and inclusion but rather a transformation. “The work, the opus, does not belong to the field; it is the transformer of the field” (p.215).

For Derrida, this excess provides literary texts with a possibility of “subversive juridicity”. This subversive juridicity is enacted when the self-identity is not assured, nor is the assuring element in the text. Literature does have “a power to produce performatively the statements of law, of the law that literature can be, and not just of the law to which literature submits” (p.216). These nonlinguistic conditions of literature are indeed the most difficult part of the whole problematic because, “literature itself makes law, emerging in that place where the law is made” (p.216). This performativity might provide these new laws with the means to violate the existing laws from which “it derives protection and receives its conditions of emergence” (p.216). This is a play with the law, “jouer la loi”, by which the performative laws produced are protected by and circumvent the law. Hence, the subversive juridicity of literary texts does not arise out of a privileged position against the laws it is governed by, but rather by complying this very structure of law making, by imitating and doubling it in order to create an opening of disobedience.

At this juncture we might return to Freud’s attempt to find the origin of moral law. The repression lying behind morality is recounted by Freud as an historical event in which sons unite and kill their father, for he does not share his wives: a crime whose commemoration marks the origin of law. However, one should add, this murder is a useless one, since none of the sons will be able to take the place of the Father after his death. He becomes even more powerful. This crime turns

out to be an event which actually changes nothing, as killing does not actually kill the father. “Nothing new happens and yet this nothing new would instate the law, the two fundamental prohibitions of totemism, namely murder and incest” (p.199). It is an event and non-event which nevertheless make a fictive, historical investment. According to Derrida,

[d]emanding and denying the story, this quasi-event bears the mark of *fictive narrativity* (fiction of narration as well as fiction as narration: fictive narration as the simulacrum of narration and not only as the narration of an imaginary history). It is the origin of literature at the same time as the origin of law –like the dead father, a story told, a spreading rumor, without author and end, but an ineluctable and unforgettable story. (1992, p.199)

The guilt and remorse sons feel after the murder implies another moral law prior to that murder, since if there were not one, the children would not have felt any remorse. For Derrida, Freud’s attempt to account for the repetition of this guilt which is to be the constituent of the society, cannot provide an account for the origin of the law since what it does is only to refer to a previous law. The guilt as an effect is supposed to refer to the sovereignty of this law, in the way the Kantian law manifests itself through punishments.

We might assert that the attempt to find an origin must fail but this ‘must’ comes from another law, the law of laws, which is *différance*. The singularity of literature is in its non-investment in the originarization of the law, its ability to make a re-mark which points to this impossibility which makes any law possible. This re-marking accompanies a simulacrum of narration which places a non-event to the origin, a placement that is also the displacement of origin.

The opportunity to conform to the rules of the game, yet being able to subvert it, informs literature's call for democracy-to-come. It calls for a new space in which the relationship with the law is not only that of submission and repression. By this subtle mimesis, literature becomes the positive power of responding to the powers and laws it has been regulated by. This is the reason why the subject of literature, unlike the determined and fixed subjects and subjectivities of present democracies, is both inside and outside the social and political laws. It is this subject's insituatibility within these structures that points to a future democracy. The singularity of Bartleby's undecidable proposition does not come from the fact that he gives a response. It is rather because it produces a statement that may even not count as a determinate genuine response. Bartleby clearly does not comply with the model of good citizenry of current democracies with citizens who have certain rights and responsibilities, in other words, who have rights insofar as they are also responsible. But if Bartleby is not responsible in the traditional sense, from where does he take his right to speak? What should be emphasized here is that democracy to come is not a simple expansion of certain rights and liberties, but rather, an abrupt interruption and displacement of current democracies by presenting statements or mode of lives that are incalculable according to the truth-governed laws of current democracies. Thus, the democracy to come is not a utopic futurity implied in the expectations of good citizens, but rather it is a promise pointed at by the scapegoats (pharmakos) or bad citizens of society. These citizens are not bad because they fail to comply with the duties and responsibilities they should perform to be a good citizen, but rather because they constitute a case in which the notion of

citizenship itself is under critique. A very peculiar relationship with their society, “franchir” and “s’affranchir”, a breaking out and an emancipation, such is the frail relationship of Bartleby to his community.

4. MIMESIS AND SOCIALITY

In the previous chapters we have discussed the question of literature in its relation to mimesis according to the thoughts of Deleuze and Derrida. What we have encountered in them both was a political concern. For Deleuze, minor literature is a collective assemblage of enunciation which fabulates a people-to-come. This people-to-come was further characterized as a society of celibates or a society without Father. For Derrida, literature, as a simulacrum of narration, might acquire a subversive juridicity by a peculiar use of the right to say everything for a democracy-to-come. This democracy-to-come requires a certain irresponsibility in complying with the responsibilities that current democracies impose on their citizens.

In a way, by detour of their criticism of Platonic philosophy, we have already begun a political reading of Deleuze and Derrida by tracing the new sociality they announce against the restricted characterizations of what a political society is and how it gets formed.⁵ For Deleuze, the society of celibates is a wall of uncemented loose stones whose law is the immanent process of desire. For Derrida, the law refers to an impossible passage whose very possibility is endowed by the uncontrollable play of *différance*. From this perspective, we might say that both Deleuze and Derrida's thoughts present a critique of sociality by reformulating the question in terms of an encounter between the singular and

the universal, the individual and society. In Deleuze, becoming as a non-mimetic process of desubjectivation marks a new sociality with becoming-packs. It is evident that these packs are also alliances but very different ones than are centralized communities. These alliances are lines of flight initiated by the pacts as in Kafka, Ahab, Bartleby and Masoch. For Deleuze, the nonrepresentability of law suggests its being desire, the immanent process of which everything and everyone is a part. According to Derrida, the promise of democracy of literature is marked by a societal transformation as well. In literature, Derrida sees the possibility of abolishing family and the sociality it implies. Freud's attempt to find the origin of moral law, by trying to recount a historical event of murder, for Derrida, turns out to be a non-event in which nothing new occurs except the neurotic repetition of guilt, which is assumed to mark the constitution of society. For Derrida, the inaccessibility of the law suggests that the law is *différance*, something that resists historical localization. In this chapter, I will try to investigate how people-to-come in Deleuze and democracy-to-come in Derrida differ from our current communities and democracies by following the traces of their criticism of Platonic mimesis.

Still, one should be cautious to formulate this question in a normative way since what we are investigating is not the conditions of an utopia we are seeking to realize. The people-to-come of Deleuze has nothing to do with an ideal utopia, but rather is a fabulation that gets actualized differently in the texts of Masoch, Sade, Kafka, Melville or others. Nor is Derrida trying to give the future conditions of democracy. To the contrary, the idea of futurity stands for an

encounter with an other which can not be subsumed under the expectations and estimations of the present.

At this juncture, we might make a detour through a traditional concept of political philosophy –social contract- to discuss the new forms of sociality implied by our previous discussions with regard to Deleuze’s and Derrida’s thoughts. The concept of social contract has been carefully considered, revised and transformed throughout the history of political philosophy. It has been a keyword for discussing the origin of authority, its sustainment and justification. The web of components that build up this concept has also been through drastic modifications: the state of nature, self-interested individuals, power, state, sovereignty, government, morality, rationality, property, justice and God has been discussed in various forms as a validation of the socialities proposed in these theories of social contract. Within this lineage of transformation, the concept of social contract also relates and connects to other concepts, since for every concept, “there are usually bits or components that come from other concepts, which correspond to other problems and presuppose other planes” (Deleuze & Guattari, P.18). Here, we will try to reconsider the presuppositions of the concept of social contract which provides the political norms of society. In my opinion, there is an affinity between the notion of society we find in contractarian theories and the idealist philosophy of Plato. Although the theories of social contract are quite different from each other in their conceptual investments, its juxtaposition with the question of mimesis might reveal the ‘dogmatic’ image of sociality prevailing in political philosophy.

In Plato's *Crito* (1989), Socrates gives an explanation to Crito as to why one should abide by the laws of the State and ought to endure the punishments explicated by them. In this dialogue, Socrates imagines that the laws of Athens start to talk to him asking a few questions regarding Socrates's will to disavow the punishment. Socrates's self-questioning is as follows:

Tell us what complaint you have to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the State? In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate marriage?... Or against those of us who regulate the system of nurture and education of children in which you were trained? Were not the laws, who have the charge of this, right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic? ... Well, then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to a father or to your master, if you had one, when you have been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands?... (1989, p. 481)

Socrates argues for an implicit contract which is the very foundation of the State which made him the individual he is then, and hence Socrates with no hesitation should obey what the laws of the State require, even if he thinks that the punishment is, seemingly, unjust. These questions might be summarized in the following question: Would it be just to break "the covenants and agreements", after one has enjoyed all the opportunities it has provided one with? These questions murmur in Socrates' ears, a murmur which prevents Socrates to hear any thing else and leaves Crito speechless as well: "I have nothing to say, Socrates." Looking at this dialogue, we might assert that the contractarian

thought prevails in history of philosophy before the term of social contract was coined in the text of later political philosophers.

Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls are the prominent thinkers of contractarian thought and have discussed how political authority is established and sustained in a society. What counts as the common trait of all these different formulations is that there stands at least one contract which accounts for a passage from a nonpolitical state to a political state. The debates mainly revolve around the context of the prepolitical period to figure out the conditions which make the passage to a political society a necessary, inevitable event. Rationality and morality are two important topics since the idea of contract supposes a kind of general consent and this consent is proposed either as a rational or moral choice and sometimes as both. The problem is to account for how people may pursue their own benefits without preventing others from pursuing their own, as moral or rational agents. These theories attempt to give an account of an actual state and try to explain it by going to the originary instant of its emergence, this origin being an actual or a hypothetical event. In the light of these characteristics, we might reformulate the social contract provisionally as a concept that stands for a theory which attempts to explain and justify the social organization of humans and the necessary grounds of sustaining such an organization around the abovementioned subconcepts. These theories try to describe the conditions under which free individuals ought to obey the terms of contract. The whole attempt is to give an explanation for this negotiated passage to the state of “must”, from natural to the political, from *phusis* to *nomos*.

In the society of contract, one's right and responsibilities are inferred from the contract agreed upon. Standing as the origin or as the cause of political society, the rules of the contract apply to anybody in the society. We may reformulate the question in the light of Socrates' fidelity to the laws of the state. When people may have the right to breach the contract, in what conditions is one's disobedience to the sovereignty justified? If we have already justified obedience by morality or rationality, is disobedience ever tolerable? According to Hobbes, for instance, "there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of its subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection" (in Lessnoff, 1990, p.62). Kant is even more conservative in this point, for in a Kantian society, "all resistance against supreme legislative power, all incitement of subjects to violent expressions of discontent... is the greatest and most punishable crime in a commonwealth.... Even if the power of state or its agent ...has violated the contract... the subject is still not entitled to offer counter-resistance" (p.133). Kant's revolutionary reversal of Platonic hierarchy of Good and Law in favor of the Law, turns out to be a ground for an unshakable sovereignty. This Kantian conception of sovereignty is almost the opposite of the notion of popular sovereignty proposed by Rousseau. Popular sovereignty implies that ultimate sovereignty lies on the side of the people. This sovereignty is sustained by the general will whose injustice is impossible as "no one is unjust to himself." But, for Rousseau, although the passage from State of Nature to the political society is an ambivalent one in that it can not be comfortably considered as a progress, still, if the citizen's actions are not in harmony with the general will, they might be

forced to act so. Hence, the freedom of the individual is always subject to the control of the general will and the harmony between the individual and the general will is always presumed and if not so, then the sovereign might use its legitimate power to establish such a harmony. The contract stands for legitimizing the force that pulls the individual towards the center of society, the governance of the law of general.

Recent theories on contractual thought have provided a thorough criticism of the premises of social contract. Carol Pateman in her renowned book, *The Sexual Contract* (1988), claims that the social contract is not inclusive of everyone in the society, but rather it stands for a pact among men in order to dominate women. For Pateman, if the idea of social contract at first sight stands for the idea of equality, it is only because it distributes the power of the father among sons. She refers to the genesis of civilization as argued by Freud according to which brothers convene among themselves against the sovereignty of the father who reserves the power of domination of woman. Social contract is such a convention in which brothers unite to share the tyranny of the father in his sole sovereignty of dominating women. Pateman's critic has opened a new path of criticism to which many others have also contributed. Many others, for instance, have pointed to economic structure of contractarian theories to claim that social contracts also assume bourgeois men as its participants. Charles W. Mills, as well, in his book *Racial Contract* (1999) attempts to show that this contract is also a racial consensus on the exclusion of others. This way of thought contributed substantially to consider contractarian thought as a covenant which excludes minority concerns, as the conditions of being able to take part in the

contract became of critical importance. In other words, the question has evolved into that of ‘Who is the agent of rights and responsibilities within a society?’

Can social contract become more and more ‘just’ as we re-inscribe the minority groups excluded from being part of the contract back into consensus? This is an impossible vocation because, the contractarian thought of sociality is such that it is almost constructed on an idea of exclusion however much we try to ameliorate it by including the excluded ones. In this sense, contractarian thought of sociality is a Platonic enterprise of thought because a) it works according to the model of the ideal citizen whose rights and responsibilities are strictly determined according to the convention b) For the establishment of the well-order of the society, bad citizens, the pharmakos must always be expelled out of society or punished by the laws to restore their obedience. In this sense, social contract is the tool by which the model of ideal citizenship is negotiated. However, it does not only sustain the law of the good, but also tries to sort out the bad citizens who threaten the well-being of the society.

What is dangerous for the Platonic society is an individual’s inspiration to be several things rather than one. The project of Platonic philosophy, of political philosophy as well, was to distinguish the false pretenders of the society from the ones who make the genuine claims. This was the very reason why Plato did not like democracy: it is a regime in which anybody can lay claim for anything. The philosophical investment of Platonic philosophy, as Deleuze critically outlines, is the very problem of making difference. The Ideas in Plato are not only the perfect models which everything approximate, but the model provides Plato with

the tools he seeks in order to distinguish the genuine and the fake. The Idea marks the center of a hierarchy around which everything is ranked according to the degree of resemblance to the Idea. Making difference is hastily reduced to an operation of resemblance. Likewise, the movement of social contract is the movement of Platonic ideals: it marks the origin of the laws by way of which we distinguish good and bad. The ideal controls the differences of individuals on the basis of an ideal model and sets the limits for the spectrum of allowed difference. Similar to the manner in which the competition between the false pretendants is alleviated with a recourse to their original models, the competing self interests of individuals are resolved thanks to the social contract which suggests the laws any individual must conform to. The contract does not only stand for the origin of the state or sovereignty, but also for the very creation of the model of good citizenship and the proper way of taking part in the society. A contract includes contractual terms which bind the parties of the contract, and in case of a breach of contract, the party who fails to comply with its terms is punished. Thus, as the welfare of the society is assumed to be dependant on the social contract, from this contract arises institutions which justify their authority in this promised welfare. In that way, the social contract is the means by which the society creates the terms of the regulating laws and a mechanism which ensures the sustained compliance with the provisions of these laws. Although the interests of the individual parties differ from each other, this difference is subdued to a harmony which reconciles differences under the regulation of a law. Sophists in the Platonic view of society are the bad citizens because they deteriorate the principle of resemblance the Platonic thought relies upon. They spoil the order

of the society, which is why sophistry must be banned or expelled. The hypothetical social contract requires different individuals come together and relate to each other by a creation of an ideal similarity which they converge upon by the terms of the contract. By this contract, we are provided with a a model of good citizenship, an ideal citizen according to which each citizen is evaluated.

Within a contractarian perspective, Bartleby, with his queer formula, was surely a bad citizen. His undecidable statement “I would prefer not to” which neither affirms nor negates anything determinate, was surely not a behavior in accordance with his responsibilities. In this non-response of Bartleby, Derrida recognizes a responsibility which he himself creates. By such an undecidable statement, Bartleby is able to breach the contract without relying on the framework of rights and responsibilities this contract imposes and without being a straight rebel at the same time. Bartleby’s life is not calculable by the terms of the contract that governs current sociality. He almost finds or invents a gap in the terms of contract so that he cannot be said to simply disavow his responsibilities. His operation is a delicate one which creates his right to refuse by a politics of hesitation without making any recourse to the rights spared to him. He creates his rights and his new way of being responsible. The ideal model of citizen is not capable of locating and ranking Bartleby in the society. Hence, he must be bad, a bad citizen. Like the Sophist, the *pharmakos*, who lays claim on genuine truth without having any right to do so, Bartleby embodies the power of the false to undermine this idea of the ideal citizen whose rights and responsibilities are fixed and delineated by the contract.

With the idea of social contract, we are presented with an evolutionary schema in which all humans are better off by getting into communities of a complex kind by leaving their rudimentary forms of societal interactions. An evolutionary schema by which the rudimentary bands of human beings turn into members of a political civil society. The criticisms made by Pateman, Mills and other thinkers are very important as they point to a *before* of the contract and to the dynamics in the processes preceding the contract. Within such a perspective, the contract turns out to be an alliance, cooperation among a group at the cost of exclusion, non-consideration and domination of some other group. Thus, the self-interested individuals come together only for a group interest, who assume the interest of their group represents the well-being of the whole society. But where are the animals, where are the plants? Do they not play any role in this very constitution of political society?

Social interactions can never be reduced to relations among human beings. Of course, by saying that, we are still pertaining to a school of criticism interrogating the agent of rights and responsibilities, in that this school of criticism with a focus on minorities was attempt to illuminate what constitutes the point of consensus of the contract: the covenant of resemblances to exclude the different. With this line of criticism it is clear that the subject of the contract is not anyone but rather particular people who already bear certain historical and cultural attributes such as gender, social status, race, and humanity- we might also add. This idea is easily verifiable when we look at Kant's understanding of political society. Kant makes a distinction between active and passive citizens on the basis of people's status as independent individuals.

According to this division, only active independent citizens are eligible to vote and passive citizens who consist of women and children who are dependent beings by nature and the servants and tutors who are dependent because of their social context, “do not have civil personality” (in Lessnoff, 1990, p.126). Hence, they are not eligible to participate in the mechanism that determines the terms of the law with which the society is governed. Passive citizens always obey and active citizens determine what is to be obeyed, both of them constituting the society as free and equal individuals whose freedom is established by their dependence on the law. We have been delineating a movement of exclusion, but are we going to be content with other kinds of social formation in which the excluded parties, be it the women or the black, are to be incorporated into the active citizens? What should be emphasized is that, the model of social contract is there to justify the obedience of all citizens. It characterizes citizenship as an institution of obedience. It does not only point to an obligation to the political authority, but indeed this obligation is an obligation to the law of resemblances which is the very law governing political sovereignty.

The political society that emerges out of a social contract endows individuals with certain rights and responsibilities. Within this allocated sphere of movement, everybody is free and is a good citizen as long as they remain faithful to the contract, being faithful to the model of good citizenship. When Hume problematized the temporality of both actual and hypothetical contracts, he casts the question of faithfulness yet another way. If it was a nonhistorical hypothetical contract, then what enables the passage from the hypothetical state to the actual state and how can we stick to the idea that it will be binding for

actual citizens as well? Or even when the contract is held to be an actual one, what would guarantee the faithfulness of coming generations? If we are going to explain this faith by its utility to every individual, then why the insistence on a contract in order to acknowledge such an interest? Hume's arguments are important in that it reveals a certain detour the contractarian arguments appeal to. Masoch's criticism of contract we outlined in the previous chapter is in a way a Humean criticism, since it was also a questioning of obedience on the basis of a contract which is applied to the third parties who not having taken part in it.

When taken as a historical phenomenon, social contract enters the field of ethnology. Pierre Clastres (1987) has prominently argued against the evolutionist arguments of State formation as a passage from rudimentary societal organizations to complex ones. From primitive to sophisticated, from simple to complex: Clastres demonstrated how the social relations within the primitive societies are no less intricate than the societies of State. He argued that these underdeveloped primitive societal relationships were very delicate and cautious in the sense that they involved practices as to prevent state formation. Routine social practices of highly structured societies are actively averted by the so-called primitives. For instance, in Guayaki tribes, there are leaders only as the spokesperson of the tribe and any authoritative attribute of such a position is vigorously avoided. Hence, for Clastres, that state is something these societies lack or that it is a "must" for them, is an unjustifiable assumption of evolutionist anthropology. What is significant in Clastres's thought is his understanding of the State of Nature. The concept of State of Nature, in contractarian theories describes the situation before the emergence of the political society by a social

contract. For example, Hobbes maintains that State of Nature is an egoist period in which every individual seeks to satisfy their wills and wants no matter what harm they might give to others. Locke, on the other hand, stresses that individuals in the State of Nature are not that cruel to the interest of others, because they are already rational beings. The necessity of the relinquishing the State of Nature is due to its risky nature in which there is no guarantee that every body will continue to enjoy their rights freely without the intrusion of others (in Lessnoff, 1990). Regardless of the way it describes the relations of individuals in that period of time, State of Nature logically and temporally precedes the political society in that it stands for the circumstances which make the contract inevitable. It stands for a war-like period or a period that is marked by a possibility of war in which members of society encounter certain threats as a result of which they seek solutions and get ready for making concessions. Clastres introduced a novel understanding for State of Nature: if it was a war-like period, it was only because there was a war against the formation of the state, annulling the inevitability of such a passage.

This novel understanding of war is under consideration of Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* (2004), when they ask “Is there a way of warding off the formation of a State apparatus (or its equivalent in a group)” (p. 393)? They share with Clastres the view that nomadic war-machine is against the state, be it virtual or actual, by aiming to prevent or destruct it. But, what remains unanswered in the framework of Clastres’s argument is how the state emerges in spite of the social practices primitive societies develops to avert the formation of the state. The more Clastres argues for the self-sufficiency of the primitive

societies, the more he attributes their exteriority to an independence. Against the evolutionist formula which characterizes an inevitable passage from a primitive society to a highly structured one, Clastres was only able to offer an unexplainable break between these steps: between the self-sufficient primitive sociality and the miraculous emergence of the State. For Deleuze and Guattari, such a break would not suffice for Clastres to leave the evolutionist hypothesis behind; his understanding of primitive societies recuperates a sort of State of Nature: evolution not as a development but as abrupt transformation.

Still, according to Deleuze and Guattari, we must do away with the classification of communities as inferior packs or structured communities. Bands and herds should not count as inferior social forms just because they are not marked with determinate characteristics. The dynamism of pack is sustained by two positions or forces within the pack multiplicity. Firstly, the central position which tries to collect and gather the individuals in the pack inside. Secondly, a peripheral position, a point in which the individual cannot be determinately told whether it still is in the pack or not. This periphery is the zone of indiscernability, the borderline of a pack multiplicity beyond which there lies another multiplicity characterized with its own borderline. Think of a swarm of mosquitoes with their constant movement inside and outside of their brisk packs. For Deleuze and Guattari, assuming the central movement of a pack as the principal position for this pack explain the conjugal or familial communities or the communities of the State-type in general. Even though every pack multiplicity involves 'vectors of deterritorialization' or centrifugal movements, evolutionism takes the force of centralization as the progress of society. Social contract, likewise, stands for this

force of homogenization where the individuals are pulled back towards the inside. On the other hand, the becoming of multiplicity takes places via a peripheral movement which connects with other multiplicities in their zone of indiscernability. As these two ways of movement characterizing a pack multiplicity suggest, all the societies, even the primitive ones are vulnerable to authoritative formation of family or nation states whenever they are defined by their centers rather than peripheries or borderlines.

But then, how should one explain the emergence of the State apparatus, the commonly recognized political authority? For Deleuze and Guattari, “there has always been a State, quite perfect, quite complete” (2004, p. 397). What they stress is the relationship of State to its outside, an inevitable and fundamental relationship. What marks the sovereignty of the State are these movements of internal localization, hence it involves the law of interiority and exteriority rather than that of State and counter-State as it is in Clastres. But the outside of States should not be reduced to relationships among States. Deleuze and Guattari propose two directions for this exteriority:

... huge worldwide machine branched out over the entire *ecumenon* at a given moment, which enjoy a large measure of autonomy in relation to the States (for example, commercial organization of the “multinational” type, or industrial complexes, or even religious formations like Christianity, Islam, certain prophetic or messianic movements, etc.); but also the local mechanism of bands, margins, minorities, which continue to affirm the rights of segmentarity societies in opposition to the organs of State power (2004, p.397).

These directions of exteriority, it should be noted, are not mutually exclusive insofar as we might observe them equally in all social fields. They do not also

stand apart from the state in a relationship of independence, but rather in a relationship of “coexistence and competition” (p. 398). According to this perspective, one may propose that the contract under investigation is not the thing by which the sovereignty, the political authority of State emerges, but rather it is the result of such a sovereignty, a kind of coming together which takes State as its model. Under such a contract, the individuals, with due rights and responsibilities are determined for what they ought “to be” in the society.

For this reason, what we are going to suggest is that sovereignty is not an outcome of this social contract as an authority to which everybody in the society is responsible. The contract is not a formation of authority, but an authoritative formation that operates on a particular understanding of sovereignty. The sovereignty implied by a contract is of course Hegelian rather than Bataillean, since we know that Bataillean sovereignty itself stands as something uncontractable, in other words, it points to that which escapes consumption within the zone of controllable localities. According to Derrida,

... there is no sovereignty *itself*. Sovereignty dissolves the value of meaning , truth and a grasp-of-the-thing-itself. This is why the discourse it opens above all is not true, truthful, or “sincere”. Sovereignty is the impossible, therefore it is *not*, it is –Bataille writes this word in italics- “this loss” (1978, pp. 270-271).

Sovereignty, for Bataille, is already a loss, which is not to be transported to the internal body of homogeneity, but rather is that which establishes its *différance* as a radical heterogeneity to be sustained. Social contract, on the other hand, is a contract of homogenization. It is the positioning of every individual in a society before the terms of a contract. Sovereignty as a moral or rational outcome which

sustains the order of society is thus presented as something that gathers all the citizens within a totalizable homogeneity. The assumed sovereignty of the social contract as a law which has to protect itself as well is a force that is assumed to leave no exteriority with regard to itself. Sovereignty stands for this very force where any deviance from the consensus is brought back to the center again by marking it by guilt or punishment. But we have seen that for Derrida any originary moment for a law is a necessary impossibility, originarization being made possible by the play of *différance* itself. Hence the sovereignty of the law, for Derrida can only be a moment of confrontation which is not exhaustible either by an absolute accountability or unaccountability. The restricted sense of sovereignty implied in contract theories is only possible with the Batailleian sovereignty that comes before the law of society, law of morality even law of physics as well in an absolute past which cannot be summed up in any presence. Hence the democracy-to-come is always a future event in the form of a promise.

Accordingly, the unrepresentability of law is due to the play of *différance*, which constantly postpones the possibility of any appropriation. Thus, unlike Pateman, Derrida does not see a successful originarization of society in Freud, since the murder of father is already a failure. Social contract as a law binding all the individuals in the society can not be accounted for by a passage from non-law to law, since the law of laws, *différance* forbids such a passage. For Derrida, it is this very impossibility of passage we should keep in mind, because it is the very condition of the possibility of law as well. If at the origin of the society, there lies nothing but the non-event of *différance*, the democracy-to-come is the sociality that sustains the play of *différance* with respect to the position of the

individual before the law of society. Without formalizing a future utopia, it is the welcoming of this impossibility of successful inclusion. We have already stated that the social contract cannot be ameliorated by further inclusions, because it is this very passion to include and subsume that counts as the restricted sense of sovereignty. That which constituted the possibility of a Platonic society will have to confront the sophists both with its poison and its cure: as an outsider who is able transform the society from inside. Pharmakos as the wizard or scapegoat as the bad citizen is the very threat to the established order of the Platonic society. Likewise, for Deleuze and Guattari, becoming is a practice of sorcery, of wizardry since it always includes an alliance, a pact with the devil. But this pact gives the sorcerer the ability to create a hole in the contract which tries to subsume him within the shackles of being.

Direk(2005) interprets Derrida's criticism of Freud about the origin of law in the light of other occasions of Derridean contemplation on Freudian thought. As crime cannot be crime without a law preceding it, the double occurrence of law, both before and after its foundation, is a similar movement with the double temporality of *nachträglichkeit* of traumatic experiences. As the foundation of the law depends on a crime as the neurotic repetition of guilt, for Freud, it is not important whether this event has really taken place. Phantasy comes before reality for neurosis and this very fact defies the question of actuality of this event. What Derrida does here is indeed a very close tracing of the route followed by Freudian thought, but by going one step further, he argues that the *nachträglichkeit* of this non-event is the affirmation of the deference of the law,

since it defers any idea of foundation being at the same time the possibility of any founding.

At this juncture, Direk's introduction of the question of the signature to the law is of crucial importance, since contractarian view of society assumes a sign expressing presence and consent, no matter whether this consent is ensured on rational or moral grounds. The signature manifests an undecidable play here, since it displaces the Austinian distinction between performative and constative speech acts or between the daily language and theoretical language. "The Declaration of Independence of The United States of America" is signed by Thomas Jefferson in the name of a people, who are not only declared but also constituted by this very declaration. As both a declaration and a constitution, the sign not only represents the signing public but presents the public who is supposed to sign as well. We may witness this presentation in the following part of the declaration.

We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by the Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States... (Jefferson, 2005, p.5)

This declaration refers to the "good people" of the states as the source of authority and representation where the term good, "guarantees the goodwill of the signer and the merit of the signature" (Direk, 2005, p. 130). The logic of supplementarity which works by creating exclusions finds another opposition (good/bad) here at the very movement of originarization and hence immediately

renounces the pharmakos. Indeed, this movement of creating such a nation was for Deleuze, the very reason of failure of American revolution of pragmatism.

All these explain why we cannot conveniently label Deleuze and Derrida as contractarian or non-contractarian philosophers. Deleuze is non-contractarian because he is against all State-type communities which are governed by the movement of centralization. He is also contractarian in the sense that at the borderlines of a pack multiplicity, one always enters a demonic pact with another individual at the border of another multiplicity, in order to sustain a constant escape from the force of internalization, invoking a people-to-come in literary acts of enunciation. Derrida, too, is both contractarian and noncontractarian. He disavows the possibility of the historicization of law of contract but at the same time affirms this impossibility for the law of *différance*, which is the very leeway literature subtly resorts to in its simulacral repetition of narrativity to point to the promise of democracy. Hence, in Deleuze and Derrida, we might claim that the society of contract is replaced by a contract-to-come in which the conjugal relationships of interiority are broken, this “distraction” being the very possibility of the future “contract” as well. By this future contract, Platonic society governed by the law of ideal citizen is displaced by the sorcery of becoming and wizardry of scapegoats, in Deleuze and Derrida respectively.

5. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, we have focused on Deleuze and Derrida's criticism of Platonic mimesis, and on their reading of literature as a way of criticizing and reformulating the concept of sociality. For this aim, a detour to Platonic mimesis and literature is fruitful and almost inevitable, as the political philosophies of Deleuze and Derrida do not propose blueprints of a future democracy or sociality. For Deleuze, the overturning of Platonism is necessary as it is devoid of making difference without subjecting differences to the law of resemblance. Derrida's careful rereading of the Platonic chain of concepts proceeds by emphasizing the logic of supplementarity and the movement of exclusion in his theoretical formulations. In the first chapter, we have argued that the question of mimesis is never reducible to an aesthetic, literary or political domain, but rather is better studied on the borders of these domains. What Deleuze and Derrida's complementary criticisms of mimesis revealed is how Platonic philosophy of mimesis is accompanied by positioning of the Sophists as bad citizens.

Deleuze's introduction of becoming in place of being in Platonic philosophy and Derrida's questioning of the Platonic "is" have been studied in the second chapter. This discussion took place in the context of literature, since for Deleuze and Guattari, writing as a passage of life is a process of becoming. It is through

becoming that the question of literature immediately connects to sociality, since becomings always involve becomings-multiple, becomings-pack via demonic pacts. In the second part of this chapter, we have discussed the implications of the question “what is literature”. Taking literature as an institution endowed with the authority to say everything, Derrida argues that this authority to say everything might be turned back upon the law since literature emerges where laws get constituted as their simulacra. The subversive potential of literature is not taken for granted as an element of literariness, but requires incessant lines of flight for Deleuze and keeping the play of *différance* within the constitution of law of literature for Derrida. We might recognize how a certain criticism of mimesis links to the question of sociality: for Deleuze, becoming as a non-mimetic process is always a becoming-multiple and for Derrida, the simulacral repetition of the law is the very questioning of the relationship between the particular and the general.

In the third chapter, we have presented prevalent ways of thinking the social. Following a Platonic stance, the individual in the society gets evaluated according to its conformity to an ideal citizen whose rights and responsibilities are delineated by the sovereign. This view of sociality has been almost reversed in Kantian thought according to which the law of society does not take its sovereignty from its compliance with the perfect, but rather the good is subordinated to the law, perfection to the sovereignty. We have been able to draw these inclinations in contractarian views of political society. The model of ideal citizen relies upon the Platonic premises of mimesis for the model-copy hierarchy it sustains. With Deleuze’s criticism of Platonic thought, the

emancipation of simulacra from models, leads us to a society of difference rather than a society of unity or similarity. In a complementary way, Derrida's point is to reveal the logic of supplementarity and the mechanism of scapegoat creation within such approaches to sociality, these scapegoats being the promise of another democracy-to-come. Although Kantian interpretation of law of society attempts to overcome the problem of self-sufficient ahistorical authority, we argued how it always moves toward an idea of origin, be it an actual or hypothetical one, in its attempt of effacing it, and thereby sustaining a transcendentalism. At that matter, for Deleuze and Guattari, there has always been State since any multiplicity involves both lines of stratification and of destratification, and the issue is how the multiplicities will be defined. Their criticism of the evolutionary view of anthropology holds that society has been defined by the force which homogenizes and carries the individuals of a society back toward the center. The social significance of the becoming-pack lies in its following the reverse force, the centrifugal force of deterritorialization. This force involves a pact, a pact with the Anomalous of another multiplicity, who entertains a frail and peripheral relationship with its own multiplicity. As becoming is a never-ending process, these pacts are not originary sources of building a society taking place in the past, but their revolutionariness come from their future promise for the sociality of a people-to-come. Derridean criticism of the originarization of law revolves around the Freudian interpretation of the institution of law. For Freud, the law originates with a crime in which brothers unite to kill their father who does not share his access to the mother. Upon the killing of the father, the father returns even stronger in the form of a neurotic

guilt which prohibits the children from murder and incest. According to Derrida, this origin of law requires a law that precedes it, since without that law children would not have felt any guilt of violation. This is an impossible passage for Derrida, since at the origin of the law there lies the non-origin, that is the law of *différance*. Hence, if the passage between *phusis* and *nomos* prohibits penetration, this prohibition does not come from the transcendence of the law, but from the law of *différance* which defers any appropriation. It is due to this deferral that Derrida considers democracy as something to-come as a future promise. The emphasis on futurity in both Deleuze's and Derrida's political thoughts avoids assuming an originary constitution of sociality as a linear passage, along with bringing a novel understanding of temporality.

Deleuze and Derrida see the sorcery of becoming and the wizardry of *pharmakos* respectively as that which points to this future sociality. Their broad view of society disseminates many other interwoven questions of jurisprudence, psychoanalysis, anthropology and ethology. What we have tried to do in this thesis was to follow a certain lineage within this resonance by following the criticism of Platonic mimesis in and through minor or subversive literatures. Other lineages of the political propositions of Deleuzian and Derridean philosophies remain to be studied and restudied still as the most promising social critiques.

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NOTES

1 We should note the affinity between Deleuze and Guattari in the works they have published together or individually.

2 We might consider the complementarity of economy and finance parallel to that of algebra and geometry Plotnitsky offers in “Algebras, Geometries and Topologies of the Fold: Deleuze, Derrida and Quasi-Mathematical Thinking (with Leibniz and Mallarmé)” in Patton & Protevi (2003).

3 See Gebauer & Wulf (1992) for a detailed presentation of various usages of the concept of mimesis across Plato’s texts, in Part 1 of the book, pp. 25- 60.

4 See Lambert (2000) where Lambert follows two common interests of Deleuze and Derrida, namely Artaud and Bartleby, in order to discuss what their philosophies ‘share’. In this article, Lambert interestingly suggests that Deleuze’s text on Bartleby might indeed be read as a text commenting on Derrida.

5 See Patton (2000) for an evaluation of traditional concepts of political philosophy from a Deleuzian perspective without manifesting the easy reflex of labelling them as simply irrelevant. Beardsworth (1996) , discussing the politicality of Derridean thought, proceeds on another route putting an emphasis on the notion of aporia.