

**GREEK POLICIES TOWARDS TURKEY WITHIN
THE EU FRAMEWORK**

A Master's Thesis

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May 2008

To my family

GREEK POLICIES TOWARDS TURKEY WITHIN
THE EU FRAMEWORK

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
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ABSTRACT

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This thesis examines Greek policies towards Turkey with an emphasis on the effect of Greece's membership to the European Union. The research question is how EC/EU membership was used by Greece in the bilateral relations with Turkey. The focus period is from Greece's gaining of membership status in 1981 until the Helsinki Summit in 1999, where Turkey was granted candidate status for EU membership. For a thorough understanding of the period, the period by the end of the Second World War until 1981 is also examined in terms of Greek foreign and defense policies, Greece-EC relations and relations with Turkey. This work represents the usage of EU membership by Greece as a bargaining power in its relations with Turkey for solution of the disputes.

Key Words: Greek Foreign and Defense Policy, Turkish-Greek relations, PASOK, Cyprus, Aegean disputes, Greece-EU relations, Turkey-EU relations.

ÖZET

AB ÇERÇEVESİNDE YUNANİSTAN'IN TÜRKİYE'YE KARŞI İZLEDİĞİ POLİTİKALAR

ÖZTÜRK, DUYGU

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Bu tez Yunanistan'ın Türkiye'ye karşı izlediği politikaları, Yunanistan'ın Avrupa Birliği üyeliğinin etkileri üzerinde durarak incelemektedir. Araştırma sorusu AT/AB üyeliğinin Yunanistan tarafından Türkiye ile olan ikili ilişkilerde nasıl kullanıldığıdır. Odaklanılan zaman dilimi 1981'de Yunanistan'ın adaylık statüsü kazanmasından Türkiye'nin AB üyeliği için aday gösterildiği 1999 Helsinki Zirvesine kadardır. Bu dönemin derinlemesine anlaşılması için İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan 1981'e kadar olan zaman dilimi de Yunan dış ve güvenlik politikaları, Yunanistan-AT ilişkileri ve Türkiye'yle ilişkileri açısından incelenmektedir. Bu çalışma, AB üyeliğinin Yunanistan tarafından Türkiye ile olan ikili ilişkilerdeki sorunların çözümünde pazarlık unsuru olarak kullanıldığını göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yunan Dış ve Güvenlik Politikaları, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri, PASOK, Kıbrıs, Ege Sorunları, Yunanistan-AB İlişkileri, Türkiye-AB İlişkileri.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Second World War, various factors have been affecting and shaping the foreign and defense policies of Greece. Among those factors Turkey has always had a place sometimes as the main center of threat and sometimes as a ‘compulsory’ ally under common threats; but almost all the time appeared at the top of Greek foreign policy agenda.

The aim of the research is to bring explanations to the question of how EC/EU membership was used by Greece in the bilateral relations with Turkey. While the research was inspired with this question, the outcomes of the research are shown in the thesis in a way to reflect both the role of Turkey or the ‘Turkish threat’ on the formation of Greek foreign and defense policies with a special emphasis on Greece’s relations with the European Union, and how Turkish-Greek relations, or Aegean disputes and the Cyprus issue were affected by Greece’s membership to the Union.

The methodology of the research is qualitative because of the characteristic of the main question asked, though some means of quantitative research methods

like statistical data were used when they were seen useful for making a better understanding. The main sources of the research were various primary sources such as speeches of politicians, official documents like agreements, treaties and European Union (EU) Commission Reports and Council Conclusions, and secondary sources of articles, books, and newspapers.

The thesis consists of four main chapters. However, the first two chapters are introductory chapters of the subsequent ones making a basis for a better understanding of Greece's policies within the EU towards Turkey. It was aimed in the first chapter to explain political and economic reasons behind Greece's first steps taken closer to European Community (EC). What the main factors behind the formation of Greek foreign and defense policies were by the end of the Second World War, the driving forces behind the application of Association membership and why these kinds of relations were chosen instead of membership to the Community are the main questions. Besides, Greece's relations with Turkey during the 1950s is analyzed with an emphasis on the break out of the Cyprus crisis and whether Turkey had any affect on Greece's signing of Association Agreement is discussed.

In the second chapter, the main aim is to provide an understanding of the Aegean disputes and the Cyprus issue which broke out again in the 1970s. These two issues had the power to direct the progress of the relations in the next decades. Instead of bringing one-sided arguments on the issues and day by day development of the disputes, it is aimed to demonstrate the reasons why those issues became disputes between the two countries. This point is important to understand the positions of Greece and Turkey in the coming years and the Greek perception of

Turkey as the ‘main threat’ to its existence for more than two decades. It is worth to state that the expression of ‘relations’ was almost a synonym of the expression of ‘disputes’ in Turkish-Greek relations until the last continuing *rapprochement* since 1999.

In the third chapter, the ten years of Greek membership in the EC/EU was analyzed in two sub-titles. Firstly, the reasons behind Greek application for membership are analyzed and the perception of Turkey as ‘the main threat’ among the reasons is emphasized. Turkey’s reaction to Greece’s membership to the Community is discussed in-depth since it reflects the first estimations about the way Turkish-Greek relations would be affected in the following years. Under the second sub-title, Greek foreign policy of the 1980s with an emphasis on the ‘Turkish threat’ and Turkey’s application for EC membership, the reasons and outcomes it brought are analyzed. The changes in domestic political scene in Greece and Turkey and their foreign policy aims are also discussed since they formed the main reasons behind policies. Also, the striking facts of the period, the 1987 crisis and Davos process were analyzed. This chapter is important to show how EC membership was used by PASOK against Turkey during the 1980s in order to solve the disputes between them. It is argued that EC membership was used by Greece as an obstructive factor by the usage of its veto power to prevent the development of Turkey’s relations with the community and the regular implementation of the Ankara Agreement and Additional Protocol. Turkey had to face the Greece obstacle in its relations with the EC.

In the last chapter of the thesis it is aimed to analyze Greece’s policies during the 1990s with a focus on its relations/disputes with Turkey and how the EC

continued to be affective in bilateral relations. Because of the crucial change in the standing of PASOK with Simitis, the period is analyzed in two main parts. In the first part, the main reasons behind the formation of post-Cold War Greek foreign and defense policies with existence of new threats and relations with Turkey during the first half of the 1990s under the influence of the EU and Cyprus issue are analyzed. The reasons and political outcomes of signing the Customs Union between Turkey and the EC regarding Cyprus, and the policy of Greece during this process are the issues discussed. In the second part of the last chapter, three years, 1996-1999, were put under scrutiny. Even tough it is a very short time in the lives of states, vital changes happened in PASOK which deeply affected the vision of the party. With Simitis, Greece started to follow more constructive policies towards the Balkan countries and Turkey. The reasons behind those policies and how they were reflected in the disputes with Turkey are discussed. In addition, the main disputes, Kardak/Imia, S-300 and Ocalan crises along with the EU Luxembourg and Helsinki Summits are analyzed since they were intertwined within the Turkey-Greece-EU triangle.

CHAPTER 2

GREEK FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

This chapter aims to analyze Greek foreign and defense policy since the end of the Second World War until the 1970s. Within this general framework, the main focus will be on Greece's relations with the European Community (EC) and Turkey. Firstly, Greek foreign and defense policy determinants and aims will be analyzed. The communist threat for Greece, relations with the United States of America (USA) and its NATO membership will be looked over. The reasons of why Greece chose Associate Membership in EC, provisions and objectives of the Association Agreement will be explained. In terms of relations with Turkey, the focus will be on general course of the relations under the Cold War conditions, and the outbreak and solution of Cyprus problem.

2.1 Reasons Behind the Greek Application for Associate Membership in EC

2.1.1 Post-war Greek Policies and NATO Membership

The Greek journey on the way of the EU membership started on June 8, 1959 “when Greece became the first country to apply for an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community”.¹ Signing of the Association Agreement came at the end of a period because of economic, political and security reasons rooted in the first decade of the Cold War Era and psychological instigations growing out of European identity.

When the Second World War broke out in Europe, the aim of Greek dictator Ioannis Metaksas was to keep the country out of it.² Metaksas was not successful in realizing this aim and Greece found itself at war by the invasion of Italian forces in October 1940. In a short time, all of Greece was under Axis occupation.³ The fate of Greece was changed by strong Greek communist guerilla fighters and intense British military involvement and aid. However, the strength of the communists, led to a civil war which had roots reaching 1941 and increased its tension by 1944.⁴ During 1944-1949, Greece suffered a bloody, socially and

¹ Susannah Verney, “Greece and the European Community,” in *Political Change in Greece: Before and After the Colonels*, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 253.

² Richard Clogg, *Modern Yunanistan Tarihi*, trans. Dilek Şendil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), 149.

³ Bulgaria took Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, Albanians took the northern part of Epirus, Germans occupied Athens, Salonika, the province of Evros on the Turkish frontier, Crete and some other islands, and the rest of the country was left to Italian occupation, for details see, L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453* (London: Hurst & Company, 2000), 785.

⁴ The Greek Civil War which is generally explained in two phases had the seed in the years when the Greek Communist Party (KKE) created National Liberation Front (EAM) and its armed wing Greek People’s Liberation Army in late 1941. ELAS forces fought along with the British forces against Axis occupation. EAM and ELAS had two major aims: first to save Greece from Axis occupation, and then establish a regime close to Moscow. With these political aims and military power of 60,000 fighters, Greece lived the most destructive war of its history for the regime to be

economically destructive civil war which is mostly defined as the first battleground of the Cold War. After the civil war, Athens could not focus on economic and social recovery programs. During the 1950s, its priority was to be secure against communism. Since Greece did not have enough political, economic or military power and capacity to resist against such a worldwide communist threat alone, it succeeded in saving its territorial integrity and regime with bilateral or multilateral alliances and cooperations. Moreover the first steps for long term policies concerning EU membership could be taken.

Against the communist threat, the main power to provide economic and military aid and assistance to Greece was no one else but USA. Since the civil war, Greek security was identified with American defense policy and Greek forces were exclusively equipped with American arms.⁵ It was a situation which served both American and Greek defense and foreign policies within the new international environment against communism. For Greece, involvement of a great power to its domestic and foreign policies was not a new situation. From the time of establishment in the 19th century, Greece had lived through foreign intervention and dependence and formed its policy priorities in accommodation to great power policies in a broader policy framework. Van Coufoudakis finds the reason for this situation in the strategic location, vulnerable military, weak finance, and in the

established after the Second World War. For detailed information about Greek Civil War see, Dominique Eudes, *Kapetanos Yunan İç Savaşı 1943–1949*, trans. Yavuz Alogan (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1995); Richard Clogg, *Modern Yunanistan Tarihi*, trans. Dilek Şendil (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997); John Newsinger, “Churchill, Stalin and the Greek Revolution,” *Monthly Review* (April 1999); “Greek Civil War,” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/greek.htm> (accessed May 9, 2008).

⁵ Thanos Veremis, *Greek Security Considerations A Historical Perspective*, Athens, Papazissis Publishers, 1982, p. 79.

unstable politics of Greece.⁶ From time to time Greece could turn this situation to its advantage on the issues where it could not be effective alone as a small-state and sometimes had to suffer from foreign interventions and dependence when there was a contradiction between its small-state interests and great power interests. After the end of the Second World War, Greece was in a situation supporting the former argument, in that it was seeking foreign intervention and dependence against the communist threat which it was not able resist alone.

It was not a situation that Greece chose United States as ‘the big brother’ to protect itself from a possible Communist attack from the north and to help it in economic recovery. The Cold War conditions, the change in British policies concerning Greece and Turkey, and the new Truman administration in the USA opened the way for active American involvement in the regions. Until the last months of the Second World War, the USA was following a policy of isolation and disinterest in the territories which were miles and seas away from the American mainland. This situation was changed with the existence of a bipolar international system which defined the security perceptions and defense policies of states in the new international environment. In addition to that, the leadership of President Harry S. Truman in the reconstruction of new US foreign and defense policies cannot be ignored. Until Truman’s presidency, the USA showed neither serious interest nor any involvement in Greek politics. This foreign policy of the US can be explained by its general pre-war isolation policy, pre-war American security spheres and threat perceptions, and last but not the least the heavy British influence

⁶ Van Coufoudakis, “Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-1965: Seeking Independence in an Interdependent World – Problems and Prospects,” in *Political Change in Greece: Before and After the Colonels*, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 230.

and involvement in Greece. Greece was under much British influence and involvement in domestic and foreign politics from the day of its establishment since the 19th century. This situation also continued during the Second World War. The USA was pleased with the situation that the Middle East and Mediterranean were under the control and backing of a friendly state. However, this situation in the USA left its place to uneasiness in the diplomatic circles and in public opinion towards the end of the war when a power struggle appeared between the British military forces and Greek communist guerilla fighters about the regime to be established after the war. The Secretary of State Edward Stettiniues expressed this uneasiness in a statement broadcast over the Voice of America:

US policy has always been to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of the other nations (...) US will make no attempt to influence the composition of any government in any friendly country. The American people have naturally viewed with sympathy the aspirations of the resistance movements and the anti-fascist elements in liberated countries.⁷

In addition to this declaration, the State Department informed President Franklin D. Roosevelt that “American opinion was shocked by the spectacle of armed conflict between the British and the Greeks and strongly reacted against British action”.⁸ However, this point of view did not last long. In the peace conferences it was understood that the Soviet-American cooperation could not continue more in a world where their interests had started to clash.

The death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 and the Presidency of Harry S. Truman marked the beginning of a new phase in American foreign and defense policy understanding along with the developments in 1945 and 1946. Most of the

⁷ Quoted in John O. Iatrides and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, “International Dimension of the Greek Civil War,” *World Policy Journal* (March 22, 2000): 94-95.

⁸ Iatrides and Rizopoulos, 95.

policy makers of Truman administration were convinced by the developments in East Europe and the Middle East that “the Soviet Union was indeed pursuing a policy of global expansion which had to be opposed by the US”.⁹ In addition to the Soviet threat and redefinition of security spheres of the US, in February 1947, the British announcement that it could no longer provide economic and military support to Greece and Turkey forced the USA to adopt an active foreign policy. Within those circumstances, President Truman did not wait to show American economic, political and military support to Greece and Turkey and to other non-communist countries with his Doctrine in 1947 and the Marshall Plan in 1948. With the Truman Doctrine, which came out as a result of Truman’s speech in the Congress on March 12, 1947, the Congress allocated \$400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey, and military assistance for postwar construction.¹⁰ Even though it was an economic and military aid, the outcomes of it for Greece and Turkey were much more. For both of the countries, it was a kind of proof that the US had taken them within its security zone. From the Greek point of view, the Truman Doctrine meant that a new breath of life would be blown into the tiring government’s efforts to prevent Greece from becoming communist.¹¹ Economic aid and military assistance to Greece under the Truman Doctrine became the key factor of victory against communist guerilla fighters in 1949 with the undeniable effect of Tito’s policy of closing Yugoslavia’s borders to communist guerillas.

⁹ Theodokis Karvounarakis, “In Defense of <<Free Peoples>>: The Truman Doctrine and its Impacts on Greece during the Civil War Years, 1947-1949,” <http://www.eliamep.gr/eliamep/files/op0106.PDF> (accessed October 25, 2007), 5.

¹⁰ \$300 million of this aid was allocated for Greece because of the civil war situation in the country and \$100 million was left for Turkey. For the speech of President Truman in the Congress known as Truman Doctrine, see <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/03/documents/truman/> (accessed September 21, 2007).

¹¹ Theodore Couloumbis, *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), 27.

Truman Doctrine was followed by Marshall Plan in 1948. Marshall Plan was more comprehensive in terms of states included and more limited in terms of issues covered. It was an economic aid to European countries to strengthen their economies, help their post-war repairing process and provide solidarity among them. With this Plan, the US aimed to bring an accelerating economic and political cooperation with the European countries and stop the Soviet expansion in Europe.¹²

With the *ad hoc* American economic and military aid and political support, Greece could feel secured against communism up to a certain point. There was no official guarantee for the continuation of American backing in case of a communist attack. This uncertainty left a vacuum to be covered in the defense policy of the country. For this reason, Greece was searching for possibilities of permanent regional alliances against communist attack. Within this policy, Turkey which would be the main source of threat starting in the late 1960s, was taken as a militarily powerful, friendly state suffering from the same threat and proceeding on the same way with Greece in terms of defense and foreign politics. A military alliance with Turkey would make Greece feel more secure since it would not have to increase its armed forces to meet the alarming environment at the expense of its economy by sharing the costs with Turkey. Greece gave voice to this intention in Paris in March 1948 when Greek and Turkish representatives came together for the European Recovery Programme. Greek deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Constantine Tsaldaris approached Turkish ambassador to Athens

¹² Çağrı Erhan, “1945-1960 ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler”, in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol.1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 538-540. Under the Marshall Plan, \$17 billion financial aid to European countries was approved in the US Congress.

Necmettin Sadak and asked him to help Greece in its present difficult situation by making some friendly gesture.¹³ As a result of positive response from Sadak, a joint Statement of Friendship and Adhesion to the United Nation's principle of safeguarding the integrity of national territories was made. It was formalization of Turkey's friendship and political support to the Greek government in the war against communist guerilla fighters however this did not bring Turkey either economic or military responsibilities.

While Greece was searching ways for a possible regional alliance with Turkey, United Kingdom, France and the Arab countries with the support of USA,¹⁴ a defense alliance was formed by the trans-Atlantic countries. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in April 1949 with the signatures of USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Britain, France, Portugal, Iceland, and Italy. It was a defense alliance created to bring a collective military defense in case of an armed attack on one or more of the parties.¹⁵ Even though it was not stated officially, within the political polarization after the Second World War, with the words of British Lord Ismay who was the Secretary-General of NATO during the 1950s, NATO was established "to keep the Russians out, the Germans down and USA engaged".¹⁶

¹³ Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952; The First Enlargement of NATO* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 96.

¹⁴ For Greece's struggles for regional alliances see for detailed information, Ekavi Athanassopoulou.

¹⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization articles 5-6. For the full text of Treaty see, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>, (accessed October 27, 2007).

¹⁶ <http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO>, (27.10.2007).

After the establishment of NATO, the main defense policy goal of both Greece and Turkey was to be a member of the organization.¹⁷ They were not responded to positively by the NATO members since the inclusion of Greece and Turkey would bring more responsibilities while making them less secure against the communist threat. However, neither the USA nor Britain had any question marks about the strategic importance of those two countries against the Soviet expansion and their worries about being isolated by the exclusion from NATO. When the Atlantic Pact was signed, American President Truman and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin (1945-1951) made a statement declaring the continuing interests of the United States and Britain in the security of countries which were not covered by the Pact.¹⁸ But neither for Turkey nor for Greece, it meant a guarantee for collective defense in case of Soviet attack and efforts to be included in the Pact continued.¹⁹

The negative point of view within NATO about membership of Greece and Turkey changed with the outbreak of Korean War. The United States became convinced that the danger of Soviet expansion was strictly a military one, and that

¹⁷ Melek Fırat, "1945-1960 Yunanistan'la İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 587.

¹⁸ Athanassopoulou, 124.

¹⁹ Turkish Ambassador to Washington Feridun Cemal Erkin gives detailed information in his memories about the period and his lobbying activities not only for Turkey but also for Greece to be included in the NATO. At the time when the Pact was signed and Turkey was left out of it with Greece, Ambassador Erkin brought forward establishment of a Mediterranean Pact which would include Turkey, Greece, the UK, France and the USA. With this way, the objections of the small states of the Pact which was shown as the main obstacle for their inclusion would be overcome and an effective collective defence would be created in the Mediterranean against Soviet expansion. Negative reactions to this suggestion showed that the reasons of their exclusion from the NATO was not only objections from the small states. The changing attitude in the USA with the Korean War, the insistence of Turkey for membership, and the intense lobbying activities of Erkin in the USA and in the European countries brought NATO membership for Turkey and Greece. For detailed information about how the process proceeded, see Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl Vaşington Büyükelçiliği II 1. Kısım* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992).

it could not be resisted only by political and economic reforms but by reliance on military elements, not merely in strictly military matters, but in politics as well.²⁰ The war not only changed American point of view about Turkey's and Greece's place in a military alliance, but also made them feel more insecure than before with the likelihood of aggression by the Soviet Union or by a Soviet satellite directed against them. Following the UN resolution, Greece and Turkey sent troops to the Korean War with the hope of being rewarded with NATO membership. However, it was not only because of its military contribution, but the Korean War itself that brought NATO membership to Greece. Even though there were NATO members that did not share the American point of view, Greece and Turkey became NATO members in 1952 which also formed the first enlargement of the alliance.

It would not be enough to stress only the military side of NATO membership to understand what this meant for Greece. First of all, with NATO membership Greece secured the permanent promise of collective defense in case of a Soviet attack. This is what Greece had been trying to obtain since the end of the Second World War. In addition to that, intense military assistance and economic aid from NATO and USA also had a "psychological effect on the country by creating a feeling of security among the Greek people"²¹; a situation essential for Greece's economic recovery and future relations with the EEC. Hatzivassiliou points out the effects of intense economic and military aid, in particular American aid, on Greece-EEC relations with the words "footing a large part of Greek defense

²⁰ Thanos Veremis, "Greek Security: Issues and Politics," in *Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance Adelphi Library 12*, ed. Jonathan Alford (Great Britain: Biddles Ltd., 1984), 16.

²¹ Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "Security and the European Option: Greek Foreign Policy, 1952-62," *Journal of Contemporary History* 30, no. 1 (Jan. 1995): 194.

bill, Washington paid Greece's entry ticket to the EEC (European Economic Community).”²²

NATO not only had positive effect on the formation of Greek-EEC relations and economic recovery, it also opened ways for regional alliances with Turkey and Yugoslavia. Without securing themselves under the umbrella of a collective defense organization, neither Greece nor Turkey would draw close to a defense alliance with Yugoslavia which could cause Soviet aggression. In February 1953 Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia signed the Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration and in August 1954, it was followed by the Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation and Mutual Assistance; known as the Balkan Pact.²³ With the Balkan Pact, Greece secured its borders with Yugoslavia. It would not be wrong to point out that these two treaties were the result of international situation and friendly Turkish-Greek relations of the time under the common communist threat and similar political and economic developments and goals as realizing economic and military integration with the capitalist countries of Europe. In addition to the developments regarding Greece and Turkey, containment policy of the USA and the changes on Yugoslav side were among the main reasons of creation of the Pact.²⁴ However, when the Pact was signed the necessary

²² Hatzivassiliou, 194.

²³ With the Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration, the three countries aimed to strengthen defense and security measures, cooperate in preserving peace, developing economic, technical and cultural relations among themselves. The 1954 Balkan Pact, on the other hand, was a defense treaty against Soviet threat.

²⁴ After Yugoslavia's break with the Cominform in 1948 as a result of Tito-Stalin split, Yugoslavia faced with economic blockade and the threat of invasion with the Soviet and satellite propaganda. While this situation led Tito to change direction towards the West, it also brought much American interest in the region within the containment policy. After the establishment of NATO and especially integration of Greece and Turkey within Organization, the need for association of Yugoslavia in the Western defense structure increased since it stayed like a hole in the region. This situation was overcome with the signing of Treaty of Friendship and Balkan Pact which linked Yugoslavia indirectly to NATO. For detailed information about the role of the USA on the

conditions for the survival of it had already started to change. After Stalin's death in 1953, he was succeeded by Khrushchev who adopted a policy of restoration of broken relations with Yugoslavia. The Tito-Khrushchev compromise eliminated the reason of the Pact for Yugoslavia.²⁵ Not only for Yugoslavia, but also for Greece and Turkey the priorities changed. The emergence of Cyprus issue at the time when Greece and Turkey secured themselves against Communist threat under the NATO umbrella provided them a free hand to focus on their bilateral relations. Violence in Cyprus, political and social attitude towards the issue cut off the 'compulsory' friendship of Greece and Turkey, which had formed the backbone of the Balkan Pact.

2.1.2 Association Agreement with the EEC

After NATO membership, the first step of one of the most important foreign policy achievements of Greece was taken with the application for Association Agreement (AA) with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, which was signed in 1961. This application had economic, political, psychological, and security reasons stemming from Cold War conditions even though the EEC did not possess any military elements or goals. Although it was a NATO member, Greece still had the "fear of exclusion and isolation that may push her under the influence of Eastern bloc because of its trade volume with them."²⁶ While it was taking part in the opposite ideological camp, Greek foreign trade volume with the Eastern bloc

formation of Balkan Pact see Levent İşyar, "Containing Tito: US and Soviet Policies towards Yugoslavia and the Balkans" (Master's Thesis, Bilkent University Department of History, 2005).

²⁵ For detailed information about Tito-Khrushchev compromise see İşyar, 120-124.

²⁶ Verney, 255.

countries had risen from \$3 million in 1952 to \$37.2 million in 1958.²⁷ In terms of Greek exports, by 1961 25% of it was to the Eastern bloc; a situation that made some suspicious about the possibility that “growing economic dependence would open the way for eventual political domination.”²⁸ It was strongly believed that the AA with the EEC would save Greece from falling under communist rule by developing economic relations with West European countries. In addition to developed economic relations, with the AA Greece would be able to get economic support to recover its economy which would result in rapid economic growth and rise in the general standards of living, modernization of Greek industry and increased level of production. While the main reasons of application for the AA were rooted in security and economics, it was also strongly believed that closer relations with West European countries, in the words of Ioannis Pasmazoglou who was the leader of Greek delegation which negotiated the association agreement, “would stabilize and strengthen the forces of Democracy and Liberty in Greece in this critical region of Europe”.²⁹ Besides those reasons, there were no suspicions about the European identity of Greece since it was seen as the birthplace of European civilization. This common acceptance was also another encouraging situation for Greece to become a part of European integration.

2.2 Relations with Turkey and the Outbreak of Cyprus Issue

Among the reasons of Greece’s application for association agreement with EEC, Turkey did not take place as a factor. Turkey and Greece at that time enjoyed a

²⁷ Hatzivassiliou, 192.

²⁸ Verney, 255.

²⁹ Hatzivassiliou, 197.

period of solidarity. Both countries ignored disagreements in bilateral relations after the end of the Second World War until the Cyprus issue re-appeared in 1960s and eventually paving the way for 1974 intervention. Hatzivassiliou defines Turkish-Greek relations in the first decade of the Cold War as “strategic interdependence”.³⁰ In the event of a war, Greece’s position would be very difficult if Turkey did not fight – the situation that Greece argues it had lived in the Second World War – and if Greece were not a NATO country, Turkey’s position would be desperate, since there would be no geographical contact between the Turkish and the other NATO forces.³¹ The ‘compulsory’ solidarity between Greece and Turkey was so strong and had the support of Western Bloc, in particular of the USA, that the outbreak of the Cyprus question in 1950s was not allowed to rule the whole relations and was resolved on an international platform. However, it was not a lasting solution for the island and the issue re-broke out in the first five-year of the Republic shaking the core of the Turkish-Greek relations and the Greek foreign policy formation.

In solving of the first Cyprus dispute, the personal role of Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis - and Adnan Menderes- should not be ignored. Karamanlis, who was the Greek Prime Minister from 1955 to 1963, had the objective of solving the Cyprus problem, modernizing the national economy and reforming public life, which were all together would serve the main goal of integrating Greece more closely with Western Europe.³² He focused on the recovery of Greek economy and securing it against communist neighbors. A

³⁰ Hatzivassiliou, 191.

³¹ Hatzivassiliou, 191.

³² C. M. Woodhouse, *Karamanlis The Restorer of Greek Democracy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 55.

problem with Turkey was one of the last things that Karamanlis wished to face. However, the confrontation could not be prevented as a result of developments on the island and in Turkey, and of the attitude taken by the Greek opposition parties.

During the 1950s, the Greek solution for the Cyprus problem was *enosis*, which meant unification of Cyprus with Greece. The idea of *enosis* had its roots in the 19th century since Britain had started to govern the island. However, this sentiment became stronger during the Second World War and in its aftermath. With the cession of the Dodecanese islands by Italy after the Second World War, the same situation was expected for Cyprus and it came out louder in March 1947 in the Greek parliament with the unanimously passed resolution for cession of the island to Greece. In the first years of the 1950s the Greek policy was to realize *enosis* by bilateral negotiations with Britain since Turkey was not seen as a part of the issue. Britain on the other hand, in the first years of the 1950s did not favor an independent Cyprus or its unification with Greece because of its strategic position in the Mediterranean for British interests in the Middle East. During this period, Turkey preferred to follow a policy of denial of existence of the Cyprus issue and supported the status quo on the island, in other words, supported British policy.³³ This policy becomes meaningful when the Cold War conditions of the time are considered. Turkey did not want its relations with the West to be crippled because of a crisis with Greece about Cyprus. However, while it was the official side of the policy, Turkey also started to provide military assistance and equipment for Cypriot Turks by 1955.³⁴

³³ Firat, 598.

³⁴ I am grateful to Prof. Criss for her valuable insight on the informal side of this policy.

Besides the accelerating violence on the island, developments in the Middle East concerning the Suez Crisis changed the balances in the region.³⁵ After its failure in the Suez Crisis, the British lost power and prestige in the Middle East. This situation also decreased the need for keeping Cyprus. By then, holding on to certain military bases on the island was enough for British interests. As a result British power and influence in the Middle East and Cyprus were replaced by the Americans with the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957.³⁶ The violence and uneasy situation on the island and the dispute between Greece and Turkey attracted American interest because of the fact that this could undermine NATO's south wing and bring a convenient situation for the Soviet Union to increase its power in the region. An urgent solution to the dispute was needed and the American solution was independence of the island. This policy was put into reality by the end of the 1950s with Zurich and London Agreements to which Turkey, Greece, Britain, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots adhered. According to Zurich and London Agreements, an independent Republic of Cyprus was to be founded with British

³⁵ For detailed information about Suez Crisis see, Atay Akdevelioğlu and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "1945-1960 Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler", in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar 1*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 627.

³⁶ In his message to Congress on January 5, 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower opened the way for the Middle East countries to be included in the US security zone. Under the Doctrine, a Middle Eastern country could request American economic and military assistance to defend the territorial integrity and the political independence of any nation in the area against Communist armed aggression. For the full text of the Doctrine see, "The Eisenhower Doctrine on the Middle East, A Message to Congress, January 5, 1957," <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1957eisenhowerdoctrine.html> (accessed May 5, 2008). This doctrine was motivated in part by an increase in Arab hostility toward the West, and growing Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria following the Suez Crisis of 1956. As a result of the Suez conflict, a power vacuum had formed in the Middle East due to the loss of prestige of Great Britain and France. Eisenhower feared that this had allowed Nasser to spread his pan-Arab policies and form dangerous alliances with Jordan and Syria, and had opened the Middle East to Soviet influence. Eisenhower wanted this vacuum filled by the United States before the Soviets could step in to fill the void. Because Eisenhower feared that radical nationalism would combine with international communism in the region and threaten Western interests, he was willing to commit to sending U.S. troops to the Middle East under certain circumstances. see, "Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957," <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/82548.htm> (accessed May 5, 2008).

sovereign military bases; the integrity and the constitution of the state were to be guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey; Greece and Turkey would contribute contingency forces 950 and 650 respectively.³⁷

The first Cyprus dispute was solved by the endeavors of Turkey, Greece, Britain and USA on an international platform. The interests of the two neighboring countries were once more shaped within the conditions of Cold War and great power politics. This situation also served both Greek and Turkish foreign policies regarding keeping close relations with Western countries. On the other hand, a republic was created for Cyprus which did not respond to the demands of Greek Cypriots. Within a few years, the tension and the uneasiness on the island could not be prevented. This time the solution could not be as easy as it was in 1959 and brought crucial changes for Greek foreign and defense policies to last for decades.

2.3 Athens Agreement: Greek Association Agreement with the European Community

Settlement of the Cyprus dispute was an important step for Greek Association Agreement with the EEC. If it had remained unresolved, it would have negatively affected Greece's relations with the EEC. After signing of the founding agreements of the Republic of Cyprus, Greek King and Queen accompanied by Evangelos Averoff, Greek foreign minister, visited Italy in May 1959 to discuss the possibility of Greece's association with the EEC.³⁸ The process was concluded in a short time. On July 15, 1959, Greece applied for Association Agreement,

³⁷ Veremis, 11.

³⁸ Woodhouse, 89.

negotiations started on March 21, 1960, and Treaty of Association was signed on July 9, 1961, to become operational in November 1962.

Two main reasons are seen from EEC's side to sign Association Agreements with third parties. They are "either as an end in itself, to formalize relations with countries who had no chance of becoming members of the EC, or as a first stage of a process leading to full membership."³⁹ For the aim of Athens Agreement, Article 72 was proof of the latter argument that without putting a timetable, the possibility of Greece's membership to the community was preserved. According to article 72:

As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Greece of the obligation arising out of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Greece to the Community.⁴⁰

While the Agreement kept the possibility of future membership of Greece open, it aimed to bring a customs union and harmonization of economic policies for the functioning of the association. With those goals, the long term objective of the Agreement defined in its first article as:

to promote a continuous and balanced strengthening of the commercial and economic relations between the contracting parties with full consideration of the need to ensure the accelerated development of the economy of Greece as well as the elevation of the level of employment and of the living standards of the Greek people.⁴¹

One of the main questions about Greece-EEC relations is why Greece chose to sign an Association Agreement rather than applying directly for

³⁹ Christopher Preston, *Enlargement and Integration in the European Union* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 47.

⁴⁰ Iacovos S. Tsalicoglou, *Negotiating for Entry the Accession of Greece to the European Community*, (USA: Dartmouth Brookfield, 1985), 10.

⁴¹ Werner Feld, "The Association Agreements of the European Communities: A Comparative Analysis", *International Organization* 19, no. 2 (Spring 1965): 230.

membership. This situation can be explained especially by economic development of Greece. The disparity between Greece's level of economic development and EEC countries of that time made accession impractical for the immediate future.⁴² However, as Hatzivassiliou states it, "when they signed the Association Agreement in 1961, the Greeks regarded it as nothing less than a stepping stone for eventual full membership".⁴³

The Greek application for Association Agreement was followed immediately by Turkey's application. Even though they did not perceive direct threats from each other during the 1950s, none of them wanted to take the risk of being one step behind the other. Of course, Greece's application was not the only reason behind Turkey's application but among the most important ones. Citing similar reasons with Greece, Turkey applied on July 31, 1959, for Association Agreement only two weeks after the Greek application. In September 1963 Turkey's Association Agreement was signed mostly on the same conditions with the Greek one.⁴⁴

⁴² Verney, 257.

⁴³ Hatzivassiliou, 196.

⁴⁴ The economic provisions of the two agreements were similar however, being different from the Athens Agreement the Ankara Agreement envisaged a preparatory stage before the transition period during which the custom duties would be gradually abolished. With the preparatory stage, Turkey would be able to strengthen its economy with the aid of the Community but without making any specific concessions to the Community in return. For details see Feld, 230-234.

CHAPTER 3

NEW THREATS, NEW DISPUTES: RE-FORMATION OF GREEK DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICIES IN THE 1970S

In this chapter, the reasons behind re-formation of Greek foreign and defense policies in the 1970s will be analyzed. Foreign and defense policies of Greece which were formed against the communist threat –as explained in the previous chapter–, started to change in the 1960s with the re-emergence of Cyprus issue and concluded its evolution with Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus. The aim of this chapter is to represent the main disputed issues between Greece and Turkey along with the Cyprus issue. Why Cyprus issue re-emerged in a very short time and could not be re-settled like the previous one, and which reasons were behind emergence of Aegean disputes will be the main questions finding answers. This chapter is important to understand the issues, Turkish and Greek arguments in Aegean disputes which would be the main focus not only in the bilateral relations but also in Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU) after Greece’s membership to the Club.

3.1 Re-emergence of the Cyprus Issue in Turkish-Greek Relations

As a result of foreign policy achievements of the 1950s, the 1960s started in a good way for Greece. On the one hand, the Cyprus issue was solved in peaceful terms with the establishment of Republic of Cyprus with Zurich and London Agreements. On the other hand, Greece felt to be a part of Europe more than before with NATO membership and with the Association Agreement. However, before reaching the midst of the 1960s the climate was reversed with the developments in Cyprus. Re-emergence of Cyprus issue in a more bloody way and new disputes in the Aegean Sea in the 1970s with Turkey fundamentally changed Greece's threat perceptions and made Athens form new foreign and defense policies in the 1970s which would last for more than two decades.

Even though treaties establishing the Republic of Cyprus were signed by Greek and Turkish Cypriots, they were only negotiated by the representatives from Greece and Turkey under US pressure in Zurich and the agreed points became binding in London with the signatures of Fazıl Küçük, the representative of Turkish Cypriot community and of Archbishop Makarios, who was the spiritual and political leader of the Greek Cypriot community. Even though there was not a *taksim*, the treaties were a kind of success for Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. *Taksim* meant partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey and was the countering policy of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots against the *enosis* policy of Greece which was coming to surface with strong public supports mostly at times of crises. The vital demands of Turkish community on the island were secured with the treaties. The British also did not raise any objections to what had been agreed in Zurich since their own interests were safeguarded by the provision of sovereign

bases for the British forces.⁴⁵ On the Greek side the situation was different. Karamanlis returned from Zurich to Athens with satisfaction. In Greece he was criticized by the opposition with betraying to Hellenism for sake of the interests of NATO and the USA.⁴⁶ From Karamanlis' point, the island was kept from partition and an independent Cyprus on the agreed terms was not a situation of giving up the Hellenic ideal. Furthermore, there was "one nation with two voices in all international bodies".⁴⁷ But convincing Makarios to sign the treaties had not been an easy task. Makarios hesitated signing the treaties until the last moment in London. In a letter to Prime Minister George Papandreou in 1964, he wrote the reason of his hesitation of signing the treaties that there had been no alternative possible under the prevailing circumstances and he had not believed for a moment that the agreements would constitute a permanent settlement.⁴⁸ Woodhouse defines Makarios' explanation as both fear and hope: a fear that the settlement would break down completely and a hope that it would lead after all to *enosis*.⁴⁹

Archbishop Makarios, the spiritual leader of Greek Cypriot community and one of the leading opponents of the Zurich and London Agreements, was elected as the President of the Republic. Only two years after the establishment of the Cyprus Republic, Makarios' provocative speeches in favor of *enosis* started. From the very beginning, the Greek Cypriots had claimed that the treaties gave Turkish Cypriots

⁴⁵ Woodhouse, 85.

⁴⁶ Clogg, 188.

⁴⁷ Woodhouse, 87.

⁴⁸ Woodhouse, p. 87.

⁴⁹ Woodhouse, p. 87.

more rights than they should have had regarding their population percentage.⁵⁰ For this reason the constitution was evaluated as unfair and unworkable.

The famous 13 amendments to the constitution, the first step for the collapse of the Cyprus Republic, were introduced by Makarios in November 1963. With those amendments, the bi-communal spirit of the Zurich and London Agreements would be abolished and an integrated, unitary state where the Turkish Cypriots would be lowered from equal partners to minority status would be created.

The timing of Makarios for announcing the aim to revise the constitution was noteworthy. It was made in November 1963 just after the general elections in Greece. Elections brought Centre Union (*EK –Enosi Kentriou*) of George Papandreou to power after Karamanlis' premiership since 1955. Papandreou had always been a strong critic of Karamanlis' policies especially about becoming an associate member with the EEC, NATO's military existence in Greece, the Cyprus issue and relations with the USA and Turkey. He supported the view that Greece should have followed a more independent foreign policy to protect its national interests and serve Hellenism. He argued that until then the national interests of Greek people were smashed under US and NATO's interests. His attitude about Cyprus also had vital importance on the growth of the issue in the coming years. He was one of the strongest supporters of *enosis* and that a critic of Zurich and London Agreements.

Just after the constitutional amendments of Makarios, attacks of Greek forces on Turkish settlements and inter-communal fighting started on the island.

⁵⁰ Thirty percent in the parliament, in state services and 40% in military services were left to Turkish Cypriots who made up 18% of the population of the island.

The war situation continued until Turkish military intervention in 1974. Before that date, there had been possibilities of Turkish intervention on the island; once in 1964 and then in 1967. In both cases, the main power which stopped Turkish intervention was the USA. The main reason of USA' interference was to avoid a war between Greece and Turkey and the fact that war between them would not only weaken NATO, but it would be also open the way for Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean. With the violence and inter-communal clashes starting after Makarios' announcement of the constitutional amendments, demographical change also started on the island with Turkish Cypriots moving to the north and Greek Cypriots to the south. This change would bear important results in the post-1974 period.

Before any action was taken, Prime Minister Ismet Inonu informed the USA of the situation with the hope that the US would not let a war within NATO and press on Greece and Greek Cypriots to solve the issue.⁵¹ However, instead of putting pressure on Greece and Greek Cypriots, USA preferred to warn Turkey to face the possible outcomes of such an action. In the infamous letter to Inonu, President Johnson stated that "NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies".⁵² A short time after the Johnson's Letter, a peace project was proposed in 1964 by Dean Acheson, who was assigned by the

⁵¹ Melef Fırat, "1960-1980 Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 726.

⁵² Tozun Bahçeli, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955* (Boulder: Westview press, 1990), 63. At that time, Soviet leader Khrushchev was threatening Turkey with nuclear war if it interwined in Cyprus. I am grateful to Prof. Nur Bilge Criss for her comments on the issue.

US president to find a settlement to the disputes. Acheson Plan can be seen as an *enosis* plan with a piece of *taksim* inside. Both the Turkish and Greek governments thought the plan worthy of discussion.⁵³ However, because of Makarios' objection to negotiate it, Papandreou felt obliged to retreat and follow him.⁵⁴ This situation showed that different from the 1950s, a solution without the full consent of the Cyprus' communities would not be possible. Since the 1960s, Turkish and Greek Cypriots had more to say for their future and started to rule their destinies by their actions more than before.

The second highest possibility of Turkish intervention came in 1967 after the attacks on two Turkish villages *Boğaziçi* and *Geçitkale*. Mobilization of forces for a possible intervention brought intense diplomatic activity by the international powers, especially by the USA. An agreement was reached as a result of Greece's compliance with Turkey's demands. The change in Greece's attitude is worth analyzing. After Papandreou's complete victory in the elections of February 1964, the situation did not continue long to his advantage. Starting in summer of 1965, Greece entered a period of unstable governments.⁵⁵ On April 21, 1967 this ended when the Colonels took over. Until 1974, Greece stayed under military dictatorship. A few months after they had seized power, the Cyprus issue broke out. Different from Papandreou, the junta had to follow moderate policies because of the need to have some support for their unfavored regime. In addition to that, the Cyprus issue appeared on their agenda only six months after they had seized power

⁵³ Bahcheli, 67.

⁵⁴ Woodhouse, 173.

⁵⁵ Between July 1965 and December 1966, three governments were established and all of them failed because of lack of parliamentary confidence. After December 1966 until the military takeover in April 1967, two caretaker governments ruled the country.

and the regime was not strong enough to follow independent policies. In order to get the support of Europeans and Americans, the Colonels chose to compromise by accepting the withdrawal of 12.000 Greek troops from the island, which were sent secretly to the island after the clashes had started. This situation is evaluated by Tozun Bahcheli from a more pragmatic approach for the future of the island. He states that with “the withdrawal of those troops, Greece lost a very important deterrent against Turkey’s future military intervention on the island”.⁵⁶ Today, even though it cannot be known whether Turkey’s reaction would have been different if those troops had stayed on the island, the reasons for Turkey’s military intervention did not change.

On July 15, 1974 the military regime of Greece attempted a coup against Makarios who had been following more independent policies, getting the sympathy and support of Soviet Union and diverging from the *enosis* policy. He was overthrown and replaced by a *pro-enosis* government. This event was the last drop bringing Turkish intervention on the island. Before the unilateral intervention, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit had called in Britain for an intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee but it was refused. On July 20, depending on its right from Treaty of Guarantor to maintain the survival of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish forces landed on the island. The reason and the aim explained by Ecevit was that Greece’s action on the island aimed to destroy the independent Cyprus Republic, and it was against the agreements signed. Being responsible for the territorial integrity and constitutional order of Cyprus Republic, Turkey exercised the

⁵⁶ Bahcheli, 73.

authority and duty given by the treaties.⁵⁷ According to Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee “each of the guarantor powers reserved the right to take unilateral action, if necessary, but only with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the... Treaty”.⁵⁸ In addition to this right, Turkey also kept “the right of individual self defense under U.N. Charter Article 51” since the coup in the island posed a danger to Turkey by “bringing Greek military power to judicially independent island forty miles away”.⁵⁹

Within those circumstances the first Turkish intervention was accepted by many Western observers in line with the international law and treaties. However, the situation was reversed with the second intervention on the island which happened when the sides could not reach an agreement in Geneva talks. Totally different from the reactions towards the first intervention, the second intervention was evaluated in the international society as ‘occupation’.

It would not be wrong to state that the second Turkish intervention on Cyprus was a turning point for Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Since then, there has been a divided island in the Mediterranean where the Greek Cypriots have been acting as the legal authority; Turkish Cypriots have been marginalized from the rest of the world and dealing with economic and political problems. One of the outcomes of the intervention which was evaluated to be positive, was the fact that it brought the end of military dictatorship in Greece. Without any domestic and international support, the junta was left nothing but to call back Karamanlis to power. In July, democratic regime in Greece was established. In addition to this

⁵⁷ Kudret Özersay, *Kıbrıs Sorunu Hukuksal bir İnceleme* (Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 2002), 95.

⁵⁸ Glen D. Camp, “Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus,” *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 1 (Spring, 1980): 47.

⁵⁹ Camp, 48.

positive outcome of the intervention, it is worth to emphasize that no Cypriot Turks have been killed since then.

While 1974 was the year of return to democratic regime for Greece, it also pointed out the start of a new era for Greek foreign and defense policies. Until the midst of the 1990s, Turkey was the main determinant of Greek foreign and defense policy, under the discourse of ‘the threat from East’. Strengthened with the existence of Aegean disputes, this perception was not only effective in the bilateral relations of the two countries, but was also fundamentally effective on their relations with third parties especially with the European Community (EC).

3.2 Aegean Disputes

Besides the Cyprus issue, new disputes started to appear in Turkish-Greek relations since the 1970s. Partly because of the negative atmosphere caused by Cyprus, partly because of newly existing concepts in international law, problems related to sovereignty rights in the Aegean were brought to Greek and Turkish agendas. The *de facto* situations resulted by unilateral Greek declarations had not been denied by Turkey either during the times of cooperation and friendship of the 1930s or during the years of ‘compulsory’ friendship of the Cold War. With the Cyprus issue and existence of the continental shelf problem, the other Aegean problems were also brought to surface within the atmosphere of threat and lack of confidence. As it is stated by Aydin, “although Cyprus and Aegean disputes are quite separate issues, there is an obvious psychological linkage between them”.⁶⁰ Also in the academic and diplomatic environments of the 1970s, it was accepted that Cyprus issue,

⁶⁰ Mustafa Aydın, “Crypto-optimism in Turkish-Greek Relations. What is next?”, *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 5, no. 2 (August 2003): 228.

Aegean airspace and continental shelf disputes had been affecting each other at different levels and would continue to do so.⁶¹ Now it will be helpful to go through the main Aegean disputes and arguments of Greece and Turkey for a better understanding of policies followed by Greece towards Turkey within the EU.

The sovereignty rights of Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea had been designated in the Lausanne Treaty which was signed on 24 July 1923. After Lausanne, some amendments were made about the regime of the Straits in the Montreux Convention of 1936. Those amendments ended the international governance of the Straits and increased Turkish sovereignty over them. However, it opened a way for a dispute between Greece and Turkey about militarization of the Greek islands of Lemnos and Samothrace. These were not the only islands and their demilitarization status was not the only issue of disagreement between Greece and Turkey. Militarization of the Dodecanese Islands, unilateral declarations of Greece about territorial waters and airspace, existence of the ‘continental shelf’ concept in the International Law of the Sea, and FIR control were the other disputes that have been keeping Greece and Turkey busy for decades.

Indeed, there has also been disagreement between Greece and Turkey about which the problematic issues were in the Aegean. Lack of a common understanding about Aegean problems has also brought complications to the issue. According to Greece, there is one issue of dispute, which is the continental shelf issue, and the rest of the issues are violations of its sovereign rights in the Aegean. On the other hand, for Turkey continental shelf is one of the disputed issues in the Aegean besides territorial waters, airspace, FIR line, demilitarization of the Eastern

⁶¹ *Ege Kıta Sahanelığı Türk-Yunan Bern Müzakereleri Raporu 31 Ocak - 2 Şubat 1976*, (Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1976), 2.

Aegean islands. Turkey advocates political negotiations for the settlement of the disputes and since 1996, after the necessary steps are taken in bilateral negotiations, taking the issue as a package before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been supported.

3.2.1 Continental Shelf

Continental Shelf is quite a new concept in international law and relations. As a law concept it came on the scene in September 1945 in a declaration of the American President Truman.⁶² In this declaration, Truman pointed out American interests and right of usage of the natural resources under the sea bed which formed the continental shelf attached to American coasts and were under open seas. This declaration opened the way for new arguments in international law of the sea and bilateral relations of coastal countries because of clashing zones of continental shelves. After President Truman's declaration, the main step about the continental shelf rights of states came in the 1958 Geneva Convention. Accordingly, the outer limits of a continental shelf of a country can be decided in two different ways: 200 meters depth or beyond to a depth where exploitation is technically feasible.⁶³ This open explanation had the strong potential to create problems among coastal states depending on the development of technology. In addition to the outer limit explanation of the Convention, it also stated that islands can also have continental shelf. This Convention forms the basis of Greek arguments.

⁶² Hüseyin Pazarıcı, *Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri II. Kitap* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1999), 393.

⁶³ Pazarıcı, 394.

After the Geneva Convention, the other contribution to the issue of continental shelf was brought by the ICJ in 1969. A declaration was made about the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases between Netherlands, Denmark and Germany. For the issue, the court expressed that the basic principle in continental shelf is the natural prolongation of the coastal state under the sea.⁶⁴ This declaration forms the basis of Turkish argument about the continental shelf issue in the Aegean.

In the case of Aegean, the continental shelf issue is “very much related to existence of oil in the Aegean” however, “the Greek discoveries turned out to have been much smaller than originally estimated, and the Turkish explorations located no oil”.⁶⁵ Both sides have different views about the existence of the dispute. According to Turkey, the dispute appeared in 1970 when the Greek junta started explorations around Thasos.⁶⁶ On the other hand, Greece argues that the dispute started in 1973 when Turkey awarded mineral exploration rights in the Eastern Aegean to the Turkish State Petroleum Company, TPAO.⁶⁷ This permission was supported by the map published in the Turkish *Official Gazette* “giving the limiting line of the Turkish continental shelf as being west of the Greek islands of Samothrace, Lemnos, Agios Efstratios, Lesbos, Chios, Psara and Antipsara.”⁶⁸ Turkish surveys started in 1974 with *Çandarlı* ship and continued in 1976 with *Sismik-1*. Those surveys brought Greek response since there was an overlapping

⁶⁴ Pazarıcı, 394.

⁶⁵ Aydın, 230.

⁶⁶ Alexis Heraclides, *Yunanistan ve “Doğu’dan Gelen Tehlike” Türkiye Türk Yunan İlişkilerinde Çıkmazlar ve Çözüm Yolları*, trans. Mihalis Vasilyadis and Herkul Millas, (Ankara: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2002), 204.

⁶⁷ Andrew Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute,” in *Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance Adelphi Library 12*, ed. Jonathan Alford (Great Britain: Biddles Ltd, 1984), 94.

⁶⁸ Wilson, 95.

situation with the continental shelf that Greece accepted as its right to explore and exploit.

To understand the importance of continental shelf issue, the political and military sides of the issue should also be taken into account. Those were the years when there was high tension between Greece and Turkey because of Turkish intervention on Cyprus, illegal militarization of the Aegean islands and foundation of the Fourth Army, the so-called the Aegean Army. Within the atmosphere of lack of confidence and threat, every step taken by one of the sides was evaluated as an offensive action by the other. For this reason besides economic reasons, the continental shelf issue was closely related to the political and military issues in bilateral relations.

According to Greece, what Turkey is doing is not in line with international law. Having the advantageous situation of thousands of islands and islets⁶⁹ in the Aegean, Greece defends that like the mainland, islands also have continental shelves. Greek islands form a unity with the mainland and a median line between Greek islands and Turkey should be applied.⁷⁰ In this way, the unity of Greek lands would not be disturbed. On the other hand, Turkey finds the Greek argument offensive in the way to make Aegean a Greek lake. Taking the declaration of ICJ as the basis, Ankara defends ‘natural prolongation’ and ‘equity’ for the solution of the continental shelf issue. According to the Turkish point of view, open sea rules cannot be applicable in the Aegean because of its special characteristics and semi-closed character. In accordance with the principles of equality and equity, natural

⁶⁹ There are more than two thousand Greek islands and islets in the surrounding waters around it. 227 of them are inhabited and only 78 of them have more than 100 inhabitants. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_island (accessed May 13, 2008).

⁷⁰ Baskın Oran, *Yunanistan’ın Lozan İhlalleri*, Ankara, SAEMK Yayınları, 1999, p. 85.

prolongation principle should be applied in the Aegean for a settlement. About the Greek islands, Turkey argues that “they are the elevations on the Turkish continental shelf” and do not create any this kind of rights for Greece.⁷¹ Since the natural prolongation of Anatolia reached the west coasts of Greek islands, it is Turkey’s right to have the exploration and exploitation of the area and it does not form any threat to Greek existence or territorial integrity of its islands. However, within the high tension of the 1970s, Greece had the fear of enclosure of Eastern islands by Turkey and losing communication with its islands, even losing the islands.⁷²

The two states have different views for the solution of the dispute. Greece has been advocating the view that the issue should be taken before ICJ and a judicial solution is needed. Turkey, on the other hand, defends that like the other Aegean disputes, continental shelf issue is also a political issue and should be settled in bilateral negotiations between Greece and Turkey. However, since 1996 Turkey does not reject to go before the Court if bilateral negotiations fail and the disputes are treated as a package.

3.2.2 Territorial Waters

Territorial waters of a state are the waters that surround its lands and are regarded the same with territories in terms of sovereign rights over them. Territorial waters of Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea were determined in the Lausanne Treaty as 3 nautical miles (n.m.). This situation was changed unilaterally by Greece in 1936 as 6 n.m. For almost 30 years, Turkey did not respond to Greek action within

⁷¹ *Ege kıta Sahaneliği Türk-Yunan Bern Müzakereleri*, 26-27.

⁷² Heraclides, 204-206.

the friendly atmosphere between the two countries and the potential Italian threat in the Mediterranean. Turkey followed Greece in 1964 by extending its territorial waters to 6 n.m. at a time when the Cyprus issue was at the top of their agendas. With 6 n.m. territorial waters, Greece, due to its nearly 3000 islands and islets, possessed %35 while Turkey held %8, 8 of the Aegean.⁷³

Territorial waters started to become a disputed issue between Greece and Turkey in the 1970s. With the Cyprus Peace Operation, both of the countries started to handle the territorial waters issue within national security concerns.⁷⁴ The very core of territorial waters issue derives from the possibility of Greece's extension of its territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 n.m. Depending on the general international tendency of extension of territorial waters up to 12 n.m., Greece argued to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 n.m. "Were she to do so, and Turkey to follow suit, the Greek share of the Aegean would rise to 63.9 % and the Turkish only to 10 %, the proportion of remaining High Sea would fall from 56 % to 26.1 %".⁷⁵ In this case, "all ships sailing westwards from Turkish Aegean ports to the Mediterranean would be obliged to pass through Greek waters".⁷⁶ Giving the right of free passage to the control of another state, even if it is a friendly one, is not an acceptable situation for Turkey.

Putting forwards the semi-closed characteristic of the Aegean, Turkey argues that territorial waters of 12 miles cannot be applicable. Within the negative atmosphere of relations, Turkey responded to the Greek demand by declaring a

⁷³ "Karasularının Genişletilmesi Sorunu," www.turkishgreek.org/karasula.htm (accessed December 12, 2007).

⁷⁴ "Karasularının Genişletilmesi Sorunu".

⁷⁵ Wilson, 94.

⁷⁶ Wilson, 94.

casus belli in 1974. According to this decision of the Turkish government, and extension of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean beyond 6 miles, would be considered as a reason for war.

An important event for the territorial waters issue was the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). According to article 3 of the Convention which was accepted during the 3rd UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), “every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles.”⁷⁷ While Greece was part of the Convention and a strong supporter of 12 miles territorial waters since it was bringing very advantageous situation arising of her thousands of islands and islets around the mainland, Turkey has not signed the Convention and rejects Greece’s demand in the Aegean. Still today, Greece argues that it has the right to enlarge its territorial waters up to 12 n.m. and Turkey violates international laws by preventing Athens from using rights deriving from international law. For the territorial waters dispute of Greece and Turkey, Monteagle Stearns states that “Greece reserves a right that she does not intend to use, Turkey reserves a threat that she does not intend to realize”.⁷⁸

3.2.3 Airspace and FIR Line

According to the Chicago Convention of 1944 on Civil Aviation, the airspace of a state is the airspace above its territory and its territorial waters. Just like the territory and territorial waters, states have full sovereignty within their airspaces.

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www.old.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/turkeys_claims_aigialitis.html (accessed December 23, 2007).

⁷⁸ Heraclides, 241.

The outer limit of airspace is also the outer limits of territorial waters.⁷⁹ However, it seems that the only exception in the world to this rule is the Greek airspace.⁸⁰

In the Lausanne Treaty, the airspaces of Greece and Turkey were determined as 3 miles, the same with their territorial waters. In 1931, Greece extended its airspace to 10 miles. This situation was not rejected by Turkey during those years when civil and the military air traffics were very limited.⁸¹ Even though Greece is unique with its airspace situation, it tries to get over this situation by the application of “double arrangement”.⁸² After the declaration of 6 n.m. of territorial waters, Greece stated that there are two different lateral limits of territorial waters: “a 6-mile territorial sea, for general purposes, established by Law in 1936, with a 10-mile territorial sea, established by Decree in 1931 for aviation and air policing purposes”.⁸³ In addition to that, for the security for the islands, it is advocated that 10 miles was necessary.

For 44 years, Turkey did not make any objections to Greece’s 10-mile airspace. The issue was brought on the agenda in 1975 with the other Aegean disputes and Cyprus issue. In order to avoid the situation from becoming a customary rule in international law, “Turkish military crafts systematically and periodically have been entering the 4 mile zone which is not accepted as Greek airspace”.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ Pazarci, 442.

⁸⁰ Heraclides, 212.

⁸¹ Heraclides, 212.

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www.old.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/turkeys_claims_aigialitis.html (accessed December 23, 2007).

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www.old.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/turkeys_claims_aigialitis.html

⁸⁴ Fırat, “1960-1980 Yunanistan’la ...,” 759.

The other issue concerning airspace over the Aegean is the FIR (Flight Information Region) line. FIR is an airspace established to provide necessary information to civilian aircraft for safer flights. While it brings states the responsibilities of provision of information, it does not bring any sovereignty rights on the stated region. The Athens Flight Information Region was agreed at the Regional Air-Traffic Conferences of 1950, 1952, and 1958 in which Turkey participated and had fully accepted the boundaries of Greece's FIR.⁸⁵ According to this decision except for the Turkish airspace on its territory and territorial waters, the air traffic over the Aegean would be controlled by Greece. The reason for Turkey's leaving of the control of the FIR to Greece laid in the economic brunt by the technical equipment necessary for the FIR control.⁸⁶ Like the other Aegean disputes, FIR issue appeared to be a problem between the two countries after the military intervention to Cyprus in 1974. In order to protect its security against in case of an attack from the Aegean, Turkey issued NOTAM 714 (Notice to Aircraft) on August 4, 1974. With this notice, Turkey unilaterally extended its area of responsibility up to the middle of the Aegean through Athens FIR, asking for information in advance before the aircraft pass to the East of the new line.⁸⁷ The situation was worsened with Greek declaration of NOTAM 1157 in September which stated the air corridor between Greece and Turkey as a danger zone. Both of the states, first Turkey then Greece, pulled back their declarations in 1980 mainly as a result of the impractical results and international pressure on them. However, it did not end the FIR issue between Greece and Turkey. The dispute within the

⁸⁵ <http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/bilateral/aegeen.htm> (accessed January 23, 2007).

⁸⁶ Firat, 760.

⁸⁷ <http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/bilateral/aegeen.htm>.

FIR line has continued for the status of the military aircraft. According to Greece, “in accordance with ICAO rules and international practice, all civil and military aircraft should submit their flight plans prior to their entry into the Athens FIR for reasons of safety for civilian flights.”⁸⁸ However, Turkey argues that depending on article 3 of the Chicago Convention, this should not be applied to state aircraft which includes the aircraft used in military, customs and police services.⁸⁹ Since then, Turkey refuses to submit flight plans for entry of its military aircraft into Athens FIR. Turkey, on the other hand “demands a modification of the Aegean FIR responsibilities on the grounds of equity and national security”.⁹⁰ Greece wills to preserve the status-quo because of the fear that any kind of responsibility given to Turkey in the west of the Greek islands might later lead to further demands regarding their sovereignty.⁹¹

3.2.4 Demilitarization of the East Aegean Islands

The militarized situation of the East Aegean islands which are a few miles beyond Turkish coasts, forms one of the most important issues of the Aegean for Turkey while Greece defines the situation as legal depending on changes in the international environment.

In the Lausanne Treaty, the demilitarized status of six Greek islands closest to Turkish coasts, stated as the Eastern Mediterranean islands in the said treaty,

⁸⁸<http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-Eastern+Europe/Turkey/Turkish+claims/FIR/> (accessed January 23, 2007).

⁸⁹ Article 3, *Chicago Convention*, <http://www.aviation.go.th/airtrans/airlaw/chicago.html> (accessed January 23, 2007).

⁹⁰ Mustafa Aydın, 230.

⁹¹ Mustafa Aydın, 230.

were defined. For the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Nikaria, the article 13 states that:

No naval base and no fortification will be established in the said islands; Greek military aircraft will be forbidden to fly over the territory of the Anatolian coast. Reciprocally, the Turkish Government will forbid their military aircraft to fly over the said islands; the Greek military forces in the said islands will be limited to the normal contingent called up for military service, which can be trained on the spot, as well as to a force of gendarmerie and police in proportion to the force of the gendarmerie and police existing in the whole of the Greek territory.⁹²

While the demilitarized situation of those four islands were put out clearly in the Lausanne Treaty, the situation for Lemnos and Samothrace were cleared in the Convention Related to the Regime of the Straits which was signed on the same day with Lausanne Treaty and took place in article 23 with the declaration that they had the same force and effect on the contracting parties. In the Straits Convention of 1923, the demilitarization of Samothrace and Lemnos was declared in article 4 with the Turkish islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands for free passage and navigation from the Straits.⁹³ The last group of islands, the Dodecanese Islands, was ceded to Greece by Italy after the Second World War in 1947 with the Treaty of Paris. According to article 14 of this treaty, except for internal security forces, those islands would be free of military forces.⁹⁴

The issue of militarization of the Eastern Aegean islands mostly started to take place in the 1970s within the atmosphere of security perceptions and considerations. After the Cyprus military intervention, Greek foreign and defense

⁹² *Lausanne Treaty 24 July 1923*, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne (accessed January 24, 2007).

⁹³ *The Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits 24 July 1923*, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Straits_Treaty (accessed January 24, 2007).

⁹⁴ Wilson, 105.

policies were to be shaped against the Turkish threat. Within the existing international conditions Greece tried to justify the militarization of those islands. Greece has been putting a legal base for the militarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands in three ways. First of all, Greece argues that the 1936 Montreux Convention on the Regime of the Straits gave the right of militarization of Lemnos and Samothrace. For Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria, it is argued that the Lausanne Treaty does not foresee total demilitarization of the islands and “Greece does indeed maintain a military presence on these islands in light of the need to protect her eastern frontier.”⁹⁵ For the militarized status of the Dodecanese, Greece argues that Turkey does not have a say since it is not a part of the 1947 Paris Treaty. Among the main reason of militarization of the islands Greece states was the foundation of Turkish Aegean Army in 1975 which is not given under NATO command. This army was founded for a possible attack from the Aegean, and as a reaction to America’s arms embargo after the Cyprus intervention, Turkey preferred to keep it out of NATO. Because of the existence of this army, Greece expresses that she feels threatened and as a result of its right deriving from the UN charter, for legitimate defense, those islands have been militarized.

⁹⁵ <http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/bilateral/aegeen.htm>.

CHAPTER 4

RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: GREECE IN, TURKEY OUT 1981-1990

This chapter will analyze the first decade of Greece in the EC as a full member with special emphasis on Turkish-Greek relations and Turkey's relations with the Community. Firstly, reasons behind the Greek application for EC membership and Turkey's place among these reasons will be discussed. Greece's application for membership forms a milestone not only in the Greek history but also in the history of Turkish-Greek relations – a situation known well by Greece, Turkey and by the Community. Secondly, the main ideas and policies of PASOK under leadership of George Papandreou and its counterpart in Turkey, ANAP led by Turgut Özal will be analyzed since they ruled their countries almost for the entire decade. This analysis will be helpful to have a better understanding of reasons behind Turkish application for EC membership and Greek reactions to it. Lastly in this chapter, the two other important developments of Turkish-Greek relations in the 1980s, the crisis of 1987 and the Davos process will be discussed.

4.1 Foreign Policy of Karamanlis and Greece's EC Membership

4.1.1 Greece's Application for EC/EU Membership

The year 1974 was the starting of a new era in Greek politics with new threat perceptions. Whatever the ideological and foreign policy understanding they had, Greek governments since 1974 had a common view of the existence of a 'Turkish threat'.⁹⁶ The perception in Athens was that because of its relative strategic importance compared with that of Greece, with the support of the US and NATO and the toleration of the Soviet Union, Turkey attempted to achieve a unilateral revision of the status quo established by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the 1936 Montreux Treaty and the 1947 Treaty of Paris.⁹⁷ Actually to see Turkey as a threatening neighbor was not rootless. According to Michalis Papakonstantinou, the former Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 'threat from the East' had already existed in the subconscious of the Greek people; it was not difficult to find a threat to take the place of 'the threat from the North' which it had been weakened with détente between the blocks.⁹⁸ Détente had undeniable effect on inter bloc relations and brought to surface various disputes within the blocs. In the Western bloc, Greek-Turkish disputes were the first to appear with the Cyprus crisis.⁹⁹ For the period 1974-1996, Heraclides states that it was the period of Cold War between Greece and Turkey which had the potential for hot conflict.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Andreas D. Mavroyannis, "Kıbrıs Sorununun Türk-Yunan İlişkilerine Etkisi", in *Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı*, ed. Semih Vaner (İstanbul: Metis Yayıncılık, 1990), 140.

⁹⁷ Coufoudakis, p. 234.

⁹⁸ Heraclides, 26.

⁹⁹ Fırat, 716.

¹⁰⁰ Heraclides, 29.

The period “1974-1981 was formulated and conducted largely under Karamanlis’ personal control and the assistance of his diplomatic advisor, Petros Molyviatis”.¹⁰¹ When Karamanlis came back to power, he first thought of declaring war on Turkey however; the unprepared situation of the army kept him away from this kind of action.¹⁰² As a reaction to Turkish military intervention and to the USA who did not prevent Turkish action, Greece withdrew from NATO’s military flank. Also, the Greek lobby in the US was effective for the enforcement of an arms embargo on Turkey after the military intervention in Cyprus.

The foundation of Greek foreign policy after the re-establishment of democracy was based on Karamanlis’ principle of ‘we belong to the West’.¹⁰³ This principle also shaped the way Karamanlis handled relations with Turkey. The main foreign policy goals and the way issues would be handled were expressed in his first speech in the parliament after the 1974 elections as Prime Minister. In the speech, “he announced for the first time his intention to secure full membership of the European Economic Community”.¹⁰⁴ “Karamanlis saw membership as marking the end of a long period of political isolation which would strengthen Greek independence and bargaining power in the relations with the third parties, while allowing Greece to actively participate in the political development of Europe”.¹⁰⁵ Signs of a more independent policy than before were given with the aim of closer co-operation in the Balkans and with the Arab countries of the Middle East.¹⁰⁶ In

¹⁰¹ Coufoudakis, 236.

¹⁰² Firat, 750.

¹⁰³ Van Coufoudakis, “Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1983 the View from Athens”, *International Security* 9, no. 4 (Spring, 1985): 205.

¹⁰⁴ Woodhouse, 227.

¹⁰⁵ Preston, 49.

¹⁰⁶ Woodhouse, 227.

terms of Cyprus issue, “he promised moral support but emphasized that ‘Greece prefers negotiation to confrontation’”.¹⁰⁷

Among the foreign policy goals, without doubt, membership to EC first came for Karamanlis. As it is stated in the official web site of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, four main reasons, which were mainly political existed for the application.¹⁰⁸ First of all, it was thought that under the institutional framework of the community, stability could be brought to the democratic political system and institutions. Secondly, it was expected that membership would contribute to the development and modernization of the Greek economy and society. In addition to those domestic reasons, there were foreign policy aims behind the will of to join the Club. EC was seen “as a potential counterbalance to the two superpowers”.¹⁰⁹ There was intense anti-Americanism in Greek society because of “the widespread conviction of CIA involvement in the military coup and profound disappointment with NATO’s stance of non-intervention in the Cyprus question”.¹¹⁰ In addition to that, the USA was accused of not preventing Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Within those circumstances, EC membership was evaluated as a way to loosen Greece’s ties with the USA. Besides, it would also empower Greece’s regional and international position. ‘Turkish threat’ was also among the driving forces of Greece’s application for full membership. It was thought that membership to the community would raise Greece’s power of negotiation against Turkey in bilateral disputes. In addition to political and economic reasons of Greek membership

¹⁰⁷ Woodhouse, 228.

¹⁰⁸ “The Course of Greece in the European Union”, http://old.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/greece/history.html (accessed October 27, 2007).

¹⁰⁹ Verney, 259.

¹¹⁰ Verney, 259.

application, Richard Clogg argues the existence of psychological reasons behind the Greek will to be in the Community; “as if Greece was not a part of Europe, Greeks were talking about entering the Europe.”¹¹¹

It was a situation known by Greece, Turkey and the EC that Turkish-Greek relations and Greek membership to the community were interrelated. It was commonly known that Turkish-Greek disputes influenced the way Greece acted towards the EC and would also be affected by the level of the relations between Greece and the Community. After the formal application for full membership on June 12, 1975, the Commission’s Opinion came on 28 January. In its opinion, because of three reasons, a pre-accession stage was proposed before a membership status was given. The economic unpreparedness of Greece for membership and the impact of Greek membership on the deepening of the EC were the two reasons put forward by the Commission.¹¹² The other reason was about the balanced state of Turkish-Greek relations. The Community had placed itself at an equal distance from Greece and Turkey with the Association Agreements which kept full membership as their common objective even though they had different time tables for it. Starting the accession negotiations with Greece at a time when it had disputes with Turkey would also draw the Community into the disputed issues and would make it a side. “To avoid this situation, the Commission suggested that the Community should play an active role in helping Greece and Turkey resolve their differences in parallel with the preparatory work for Greek accession”.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Clogg, 252.

¹¹² Preston, 50.

¹¹³ Iacovos S. Tsalicoglou, *Negotiating for Entry the Accession of Greece to the European Community* (USA: Dortmund, Brookfield, 1995), 30.

The Commission's Opinion was rejected by the Council at the meeting on February 9, 1976, unanimously, and Greek application for membership was accepted without any qualifications. In its decision three main reasons may be cited for the Council's positive attitude towards Greek application. First of all, the assurances given by Greece that once it became a full member it would not block the development of Turkey's relations with the Community.¹¹⁴ Even though this assurance did not alleviate Turkey's fears of Greek membership, it had an effective role on the community's final decision. It was thought that "full accession negotiations would help to reintegrate Greece into the Western security alliance at a time of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean".¹¹⁵ The other reason was about the future of EC's role in the Mediterranean. The Community was willing to have a more active role in the consolidation of democracy in the Mediterranean region and delaying the Greek application might have sent wrong signals to Portugal and Spain.¹¹⁶ As a result of the positive response of the Council, the agreement for Greek membership was signed in May 1979 in Athens, became effective on January 10, 1981.¹¹⁷

4.1.2 Turkey's reaction to Greek Membership Application

Without any doubt, Greek membership application to the community caused an uneasy situation in Turkish politics. From the very beginning, it was thought that Greece would attain advantages in political and economic terms once it joined the EC. Turkey's discontent with the situation was, on the surface, confined to the

¹¹⁴ Tsalicoglou, 34.

¹¹⁵ Preston, 53.

¹¹⁶ Preston, 53.

¹¹⁷ Clogg, 218.

diplomacy corridors of Ankara and in their talks with Brussels. Within those conditions there are theses that the 1976 Aegean crisis had the hidden aim behind regarding the Greek application. According to Harris C. Georgiades:

It has been maintained that the purpose of the expedition of the Turkish navy survey ship *Sismik 1* in the Aegean Sea in July 1976 was to provoke a crisis in Greek-Turkish relations and make visible to the Community the dangers involved in accepting Greece as a member state”.¹¹⁸

It was the positive outcomes with Greek membership and the Greek assurance that made the Community ignore Turkish-Greek disputes at that time. Depending on the Greek assurance, the Community also tried to put Turkey at ease by assuring that “Greece’s accession would not affect the development of EC-Turkey relations”.¹¹⁹ However, the developments after Greece’s accession did not affirm either the Greek assurance to the Community or the Community’s assurance to Turkey. Turkey’s relations with the Community, which were only economic at the beginning, started to gain political dimensions with Greece’s membership to the Community.¹²⁰

It is not possible to state that Turkey’s relations with the Community were going absolutely well before the Greek application for membership. The Cyprus intervention and Turkey’s intentions for revisions in the agreements signed with the EC had increased tension. In 1973, the Additional Protocol came into effect. It was an integral part of the Ankara Treaty and laid down the regulations and rules of a transition period of 22 years for Turkey’s participation in the customs union.

¹¹⁸ Harris C. Georgiades, “Greece and the EU-Turkish Relationship”, in *Contemporary Greece and Europe*, ed. Achilleas Mitsos and Elias Mossialos (England: Ashgate, 2000), 423.

¹¹⁹ Georgiades, 423.

¹²⁰ “Türkiye Avrupa İlişkilerinin Tarihçesi”, <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=1> (accessed March 20, 2008).

However, its application process was not without problems. Just five days after the meeting of the Association Council in December 1976, Turkey decided to postpone unilaterally its obligations for one year which were created by the Additional Protocol.¹²¹ After this delay, Turkey's relations with the Community could not be normalized in the last years of the 1970s. The Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit evaluated the situation as an "increasing isolation of Turkey in the European Economic Community of which she is an associate member".¹²² In addition to that, he had foreseen the situation to appear in the 1990s. In a meeting in 1978 with the President, Council of EC, Roy Jenkins, he did not hesitate to point out the difficulties the other EC members might face because of possible Greek veto on issues related to Turkey's relations with the Community:

Of course it is not up to us to say anything as to whether Greece should become a full member or not it is up to Greece and the nine members of the European Community to decide that. But considering that there is a possibility of the right of veto being used in the EEC on many issues, Greece inclusion as a full member when the veto system is still in effect might drag the other existing members of the EEC into such positions where they may find themselves, in spite of themselves, applying embargoes on Turkey similar to that which has been applied by the United States against Turkey for over three years.¹²³

Disrupted relations of the 1970s between Turkey and the EC were frozen by the Community in 1980 as a result of the military coup in Turkey. Normalization of relations was postponed to a date nobody knew at the time.

¹²¹ Çağrı Erhan, Tuğrul Arat, "1960-1980 AT'yle İlişkiler", in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol.1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 850.

¹²² Bulent Ecevit, "Turkey's Security Policies", Jonathan Alford, *Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance*, Adelphi Library 12, Great Britain, Biddles Ltd., 1984, pp.136-141, p. 137.

¹²³ Ecevit, 137.

4.2 The First Decade of Greek Membership to the EC and Turkish-Greek Relations under Its Shadow

4.2.1 The Core Ideas of PASOK and Its Rule in Greek Politics

Just like in Turkey, early in the 1980s, there was an important change in Greek political power. As a result of the elections in October 1981, PASOK – Panhellenic Socialist Movement, *Panellino Sosialistiko Kinima* –got 172 seats of the total 300 in the parliament by getting 48% of the votes.¹²⁴ It was more than a simple success. The party was newly founded in 1974 by Andreas Papandreou and it did not have definite roots in Greek politics. The 1981 elections was not the first and the only success of PASOK. In the first elections in 1974, they showed a good performance by getting the 14 % of the votes and in their third elections of their history they got almost half of the votes and founded the new government of Greece. The PASOK victory was not a temporary one. They directed Greek politics as government for the rest of the 1980s, and more than half of the 1990s, and for the rest of the time they were the main opposition party in the parliament. Today, they continue to be the main opposition party in Greek politics as a result of the 2007 elections.¹²⁵ Pointing out the place of PASOK in Greek politics from the time it was established, to have a thorough analysis of political attitude, perceptions and goals of PASOK with a special emphasis on Papandreou as the

¹²⁴ Clogg, 224.

¹²⁵ In the elections held on September 16, 2007, the New Democracy party had the power to establish the new government as a result of getting the 152 seats in the parliament. PASOK gained 102 seats from the the total 300 and continued to be the main opposition party in the parliament see, “Greek Election Results” <http://eureferendum.blogspot.com/2007/09/greek-election-results.html> (accessed April 3, 2008).

founder will be very helpful to understand Greek policies followed towards Turkey in the 1980s and most of the 1990s.

Since the time it was established, PASOK was a party of center of 'anti-' point of view. Actually it was seen more than a political party by its supporters; it was a movement in the Greek society for "*Megali Allagi*".¹²⁶ When someone had a dispute with PASOK and left the party, it was said that she/he "placed themselves outside the movement".¹²⁷ Even though the situation of being the center of 'anti-' has changed by time, especially for the 1970s and half of the 1980s PASOK kept its anti-European and anti-American characteristics high. It was "extremely successful in combining anti-capitalist discourse with the historically articulated symbols of the political Centre".¹²⁸ The main arguments and policies of PASOK were strengthened with the developments of 1970; particularly with the problems with Turkey in the Aegean, the Cyprus issue and as stated before with the attitude taken by the USA and EU towards the Turkish-Greek disputes.

Against the slogan of Karamanlis 'Greece belongs to the West', Papandreou developed the slogan of 'Greece belongs to Greeks'. The foreign policy of Papandreou was determined within this nationalist-conservative perspective. The harshest expressions were made between 1974-1981 when PASOK was in opposition in the parliament. It was being expressed –a situation either Karamanlis government or other Greek political parties also did not reject– that the main threat was from its NATO ally Turkey instead of the Soviet Union or

¹²⁶ *Megali Allagi* means in Greek 'great change'. It was the main slogan of PASOK movement promising fundamental changes in Greek domestic and foreign policies. See, Coufoudakis, "Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-1985...", 239.

¹²⁷ James Pettifer, *The Greeks the Land and People Since the War* (London: Viking, 1993), 47.

¹²⁸ Gerassimos Moschonas, "The Path of Modernization: PASOK and European Integration", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 3, no. 1 (2001): 11.

any other satellite Balkan country. This perception also formed the basis of security doctrine of PASOK in the 1980s. They had the promise of withdrawal from NATO, removal of US bases from Greek soil and a referendum on whether Greece remain a member of the European Common Market when they came to power.¹²⁹ The anti-Americanism of the party was because of their belief that “CIA had been behind both the dictatorship and the earlier events of July 1965 when King Constantine had manoeuvred the legally elected Prime Minister, Papandreou’s father, into resigning”.¹³⁰ The events of the 1967 coup, 1974 coup and Turkish intervention in Cyprus were seen as the results of American penetration and of the mono-dimensional and one-sided policy of previous governments.¹³¹ Because of its relatively more important strategic position, it was believed that Turkey was in a favored situation from the American point of view and this situation was damaging the Greek national interests. PASOK was not only against close relations with the USA, but also against any kind of American existence on Greek soil. They opposed the presence of US military facilities and nuclear weapons in Greece since they were causing danger for Greece in the event of a world war, limiting the possibilities for an independent foreign policy and it was even thought they could be used against Greece in the event of a Greek-Turkish conflict.¹³² NATO, instead of making Greece feel more secure, was threatening because of the fact that Greek national interests were crushed under the priority of Turkish interests which were aligned with the American interests.

¹²⁹ Pettifer, 45.

¹³⁰ Verney, 260.

¹³¹ Coufoudakis, “Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-1985...”, p. 238.

¹³² Coufoudakis, 239.

PASOK did not have positive thoughts either about the EC. Seeing the EC as “common market of monopolistic capitalism”, PASOK was opposed to Greek membership in the Community.¹³³ In addition to alleged economic damages it would cause to Greece, the dependency caused in foreign policy was the main reason that brought PASOK’s criticisms about membership. Besides them, just like the US, there was lack of confidence on EC about its attitude in Greek-Turkish disputes. Perceiving the Community as a “junior partner” of the USA, PASOK argued that the membership of Greece could be traded for concessions on Cyprus and the Aegean in favor of Turkish interests which would also satisfy the Americans.¹³⁴ During the voting in the parliament about membership to the community, PASOK left the parliament in protest stating that “Greece ought to find some other arrangement to cooperate economically with the European Community”.¹³⁵ For ‘other arrangement’, what PASOK favored was a ‘special relationship’ with the Community like the Norwegian example.¹³⁶ In addition to this suggestion, it was believed that the decision of membership to the Community should have been taken as a result of a referendum where Greek citizens would directly decide about their destiny.

Even though anti-thoughts about the US, NATO and EC were at the core of PASOK’s political stance and very bold commitments had been made during the election period, the policy-making of PASOK was not that bold. After the 1974 Cyprus intervention, Greece had withdrawn from NATO’s military flank in protest

¹³³ Coufoudakis, 239.

¹³⁴ Verney, 260.

¹³⁵ George A. Kourvetakis, *Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics* (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1999), 311.

¹³⁶ Moschonas, 13.

to the USA because Athens thought Washington favored Ankara over Athens. Since that time, Greece's return was obstructed by the veto power used by Turkey. This situation was changed in 1980 after the military take over in Turkey. As a result of the efforts of American General Rogers, the head of the military junta General Kenan Evren accepted to pull back Turkey's veto on Greece's return to NATO's military flank in return for bilateral negotiations between Greece and Turkey to solve the Aegean disputes.¹³⁷ However, Turkey took this decision without putting any signatures under any document for the commitments. The situation that oral commitments between states do not actually give guarantees for the realization of those commitments came true for Turkey with the victory of PASOK in Greece. Despite the promises made to the Greek public about Greece's withdrawal from NATO, Papandreou neither pulled Greece out, nor rejected returning to its military flank. Indeed, Greece turned back to military flank of NATO by the Rogers Plan but Papandreou rejected bilateral relations with Turkey for the solution of Aegean disputes.

Not only the commitments about withdrawal from NATO, but also the ones for EC membership did not happen. When PASOK came to power in October 1981, Greece had been an EC member state almost for 10 months. Neither a referendum for the continuing membership status was held, nor were any steps taken in the parliament to revise the membership of Greece with a special status. Indeed, especially for the first half of the 1980s, PASOK benefited from the membership with cash flowing from the Community.

¹³⁷ Melek Fırat, "1980-1990 Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 2 (Ankara: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 105.

While seeing the USA, NATO and EC as structures damaging to Greek national interests, Papandreou was advocating development of relations with the neighboring Soviet satellites and third world countries. By stating that “Greece belongs to the third-world periphery which is exploited by the capitalists of Western Europe and the United States”, Papandreou called all ‘non-aligned’ Mediterranean countries to join forces against Great Power influence”.¹³⁸ Within the Mediterranean countries, he saw Turkey and Israel as two pillars of American influence in the region. In addition to that, PASOK preferred developed relations with Palestine and Middle East countries especially with Iraq during their time of rule. In the first period of PASOK government, Yasser Arafat visited Greece and also Libya’s President Gaddafi was invited to Athens.¹³⁹

PASOK’s nationalism was clearly evident in Greek-Turkish issues and Cyprus.¹⁴⁰ With the existence of the Aegean disputes and the Cyprus intervention, the source of threat was changed from the eastern bloc to Turkey. “PASOK assessed Turkey’s long-term objectives towards Greece as expansionist, aiming at the partition of the Aegean, and/or some other formula under which sovereignty could be shared by the two countries”.¹⁴¹ The Cyprus intervention was also perceived as an example of Turkish expansionism against Greece in addition to the efforts which had been made to change the status-quo in the Aegean. During its opposition in the parliament in the 1970s, PASOK was strongly criticizing Karamanlis’ government because of the ‘soft’ policies they were following

¹³⁸ Veremis, 23-24.

¹³⁹ Veremis, 25.

¹⁴⁰ Coufoudakis, p. 239.

¹⁴¹ Van Coufoudakis, “Greek Party Attitudes towards Turkey: 1974-1989”, in *Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s Domestic and External Influences*, ed. Dimitri Conostas (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 46.

towards Turkey for EC membership. During the 1976 Aegean crisis created by the voyage of the *Sismik 1* to carry out explorations between the islands of Lemnos and Mytilini, Papandreou called for the sinking of the ship while Karamanlis chose to apply to international authorities.¹⁴² For PASOK, no dialogue could be formed between Greece and Turkey as long as Turkey continued to keep soldiers on Cyprus and claimed sovereignty rights in the Aegean which was under Greek sovereignty. There was one issue in the Aegean needed to be solved and it was the continental shelf issue which should be taken to the ICJ. They argued that if Greece selected the way of bilateral negotiations, Athens would lose rights since it did not have any claims over areas under Turkish sovereignty.

The uncompromising attitude of PASOK was reflected in the policies followed towards Turkey during the 1980s. The second half of the 1980s, was more dynamic. In 1987, Turkey and Greece lived a crisis in the Aegean that brought them to the edge of war. Immediately afterwards, Turkish application for full membership to the EC and a process of negotiation for the development of bilateral relations was started in Davos even though it did not last.

For the Cyprus issue, just like the Aegean problems, Papandreou preferred a policy of internationalization of the issue. Instead of seeing the issue as one between Greece and Turkey or an issue within NATO, Papandreou saw the issue as one to be considered under UN decisions and in international conferences.¹⁴³ This is actually what the Greek Cypriots seemed to support, however, mostly in rhetoric. The uncompromising attitude of Greece and Greek Cypriots towards

¹⁴² Richard Clogg, "Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-1974 Period", in *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s Domestic and External Influences*, ed. Dimitri Constans (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 16.

¹⁴³ Firat, p. 107.

peaceful solution has easily come out during the negotiations under the auspices of the UN and towards the plans proposed by UN since the 1980s. In addition to internationalization of the Cyprus issue under UN, it entered a new stage first with Greek membership to the community and Turkey's will for accession, secondly with accession of Southern Cyprus as the legal government of the whole island.

4.2.2. Özal Era and Turkey's Application for Full Membership of the EC

One of the main arguments today about Turkey's relations with the EC in the 1970s involves the question of why Turkey did not apply for full membership immediately after Greece in 1975 as it had done in the case of Association Agreement. The strongest supporter of membership application at the time of Greece's membership was Ambassador Tevfik Saracoglu. According to Saracoglu, if Turkey had applied for membership along with Greece, the Community had to take Turkey in or leave Greece out.¹⁴⁴ The main reasons given for the delay in Turkey's application for full membership are the ones which mainly arose from domestic politics. "Domestic political instability and civilian unrest (...) under weak coalition governments" were the main reasons that kept Turkey away from that kind of application immediately after Greece.¹⁴⁵ After Greek application for membership in 1975 until the date it became officially a member of the Community in 1981, five different governments were formed in Turkey. During their short-lived periods, it is possible to say that none of them could think of taking such a big step while there was political instability in the country. In

¹⁴⁴ Mehmet Ali Birand, *Türkiye'nin Avrupa Macerası 1959-1999* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2000), 318.

¹⁴⁵ Ziya Öniş, "Greek-Turkish Relations and the European Union: A Critical Perspective", *Mediterranean Politics* 6, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 35.

addition to this situation, relations with the Community were not positive. The view that Association with the EC was damaging Turkey's economy and the need for more revisions and privileges was common in the Ecevit and Demirel governments.¹⁴⁶ However, in the last government of the 1970s, which was established as minority government under Demirel's premiership in November 1979, it was possible to see the intention for full membership. This intention was reflected in the Association Council meetings of the 1980s however, no application was put forward.¹⁴⁷ It can be argued that the situation could have been different if Demirel had established a majority government instead of the minority one supported by conservative right-wing parties of the parliament. The minister of Foreign Affairs Hayrettin Erkmen was a strong supporter of membership application before the Greek membership came into effect in January. However, because of the opposite attitude of National Salvation Party against the EC, Prime Minister Demirel preferred to postpone the application.¹⁴⁸ Before taking steps on the way of application, relations were disrupted this time with the military coup of 12 September 1980.

It took three years to restore the civil regime in Turkey. The new constitution was more restrictive than the constitution of 1961 in terms of political and individual rights. Those restrictions would cause various problems in Turkey's relations with the community during the 1990s and 2000s. The elections were

¹⁴⁶ For detailed information about relations with EC in the second half of 1970s, see Çağrı Erhan and Arat, "1960-1980 AET'yle İlişkiler".

¹⁴⁷ Erhan and Arat, 852.

¹⁴⁸ For detailed information about the intention and postponing of application for membership to the EC, see Birand.

evaluated as a “pseudo-competitive and unfair transition election”¹⁴⁹ This was the evaluation not only in Turkey, but also in the EC it was foreseen that the elections in Turkey would not be real democratic elections.¹⁵⁰ Three political parties were allowed to join the elections. Two of them, Populist Party – *Halkçı Parti (HP)* and Nationalist Democracy Party – *Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (MDP)* were founded by the military. The other one was the Motherland Party, *Anavatan Partisi, (ANAP)* which was founded and led by Turgut Özal. As a result of the elections, the Özal Era with *ANAP* started in Turkey. It would not be wrong to say that in addition to changes in the international arena, the policies of Özal and his personality were affective in starting a new period in Turkey, influences of which can still be seen in Turkish politics.

In order to understand the policy followed at the time of membership application, it will be helpful to examine the way Özal saw foreign affairs, EC and Turkey. Even though he was a new face in politics and ANAP did not have any official roots or bounds with pre-coup political parties, Özal had been “in the highest posts of the Turkish civilian bureaucracy, functioning as a technocrat working in electrification projects, in the directorship of the State Planning Organization (DPT), and finally as undersecretary of the prime minister’s office in 1980”.¹⁵¹ He had studied in the USA and he was a strong “admirer of the American political, cultural and economic system”.¹⁵² According to Laçiner, his ideology consisted of “American secularism, American democracy, American

¹⁴⁹ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party”, in *Political Parties in Turkey*, ed. Barry Rubin and Metin Heper (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 42.

¹⁵⁰ Birand, 416.

¹⁵¹ Kalaycıoğlu, 41.

¹⁵² Sedat Laçiner, “Özalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy?”, *Journal of Administrative Sciences I*, nos.: 1-2 (2003-2004): 172.

capitalism and American liberalism”.¹⁵³ Different from the previous politicians, he was very courageous to follow policies which had not been followed before and brought new openings in Turkey’s political and economic relations with the world. While he was aiming at the development of economic relations with Middle Eastern countries, he also saw Turkey’s place within the EC. For Özal, the Turks were European Muslims; therefore they did not need to change mentality or civilization to be European.¹⁵⁴ The ties between Europe and Turkey were based on secularism not religion and he saw this kind of relation more solid than religious ties.¹⁵⁵

For the “dying relations” with the EC, the solution of the Özal government was a “shock treatment”.¹⁵⁶ Even though there were negative attitudes from the EC countries when Turkey gave signals of membership application, the official application was made on April 14, 1987. There were several economic and political reasons for Turkey’s haste. To start with the political reasons, there was the fear of being left out of European integration after the membership of Portugal and Spain because of increasing anti-enlargement voices in the Community.¹⁵⁷ It should also be taken into account that, after the 1986 enlargement, Turkey was one of the three European-NATO countries besides Iceland and Norway which were not members of the Community. When it is thought that Iceland and Norway preferred to stay out of this integration process, Turkey seems to be the only

¹⁵³ Laçiner, 172.

¹⁵⁴ Laçiner, 168.

¹⁵⁵ Turgut Özal, *Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey* (Nicosia North Cyprus: K. Rustem & Brother, 1991), 328.

¹⁵⁶ Çağrı Erhan and Tuğrul Arat, “1980-1990 AT’yle İlişkiler, in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol.2 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 90.

¹⁵⁷ Birand, 432.

European country, a NATO ally to be left out of this process.¹⁵⁸ Secondly, Turkey's integration with Europe had been accepted as a natural result of its Westernization and modernization policies and there was the strong belief that this integration would bring political stability and help development of the democratic culture.¹⁵⁹ In addition to that, the Greek factor should not be forgotten. From the time Greece had made application for full membership, there was the fear that Turkey's relations with the Community would be negatively affected because of Greek veto and also bilateral problems with Greece would be transformed into Turkey's problems with the Community. It became possible to see the negative effects of Greek membership since the first day of its membership and in order to not to let the gap between Greece and Turkey grow, and to counteract the relatively advantageous situation Greece had captured, Turkey's application was urgent.

Besides the political reasons, there were also economic reasons behind Turkey's membership application. Because of the problematic situation in the relations between Turkey and the EC, none of the sides were implementing the responsibilities arising from agreements already signed. In addition, within Özal's economic program, there was much need for foreign investments and credits. The fact that the EC had become an important economic power especially after participation of the UK, Özal saw EC membership vital for the new economic initiatives. Both in economic and political terms, EC had become indispensable and irreplaceable for Turkey.

¹⁵⁸ Erhan and Arat, 96.

¹⁵⁹ Erhan and Arat, 96.

4.2.3 The Reaction of EC and Greece towards Turkish Application

After Greece's application for membership in 1975, Turkey's application was expected in Brussels as a natural development.¹⁶⁰ Keeping this possibility in mind, Turkey was being warned in every opportunity that it had time to apply for membership. Because of the domestic developments, Turkish application for membership came in 1987.

The application "met with an extremely unfavorable response".¹⁶¹ Actually, it was still an application evaluated to be 'early' by the Community. The opinion of the Commission came in quite a long time.¹⁶² Two and a half years after the official application of Turkey, the Commission report reflecting its opinion about Turkey's membership to the Community was issued. It can be easily stated that the report was prepared very carefully. It put out the reservations of the Commission about Turkey's membership arising both from Turkey's economic and political unpreparedness and from the deepening process the Community had already engaged. Explicitly, it is seen that the core reservations of EU today about Turkey's membership had already existed in the Commission report of 1989 and during the time elapsed there was no progress on the issues pronounced years before.

In the report, it was shown that the timing of the application was not right. Emphasizing "the further deepening and the completion of the Single Market by 1992", it was stated that "further enlargement of the community was not on the

¹⁶⁰ Haluk Kabaaliođlu, "Büyükelçi Tevfik Saraçođlu'nun Öngörüleri: Yunanistan'ın Avrupa Birliđi Üyeliliđinin Türkiye-AB İlişkilerine Etkisi", *Avrupa Arařtırmaları Dergisi* 9, sayı 1 (2001): 2.

¹⁶¹ Öniř, 35.

¹⁶² For example, after the Greek application for membership in 1975, the Commission report was issued in January 1976.

agenda at the time of the application, at least until 1993".¹⁶³ This was the explanation proving the accuracy of Ambassador Saracoglu's point of view. He had emphasized that in addition to the preparedness of a country, the EC membership was an issue of conjecture; when the appropriate conjecture exists, membership occurs.¹⁶⁴ For Turkey, the appropriate conjecture for Turkey's membership had not come yet according to the Community or it had passed or lost according to Saracoglu.

In addition to the reason derived from the deepening process that the community had already engaged, strong reasons questioning Turkey's political and economic preparedness for the membership were overtly declared. Before the explanations questioning Turkey's preparedness, the commission emphasized "in the particular case of Turkey" on "two aspects [which] are all the more significant".¹⁶⁵ Still continuing to be one of the main arguments about Turkey's accession to the community, the Commission paid attention to the geographic area and the population of Turkey". Even though these aspects have not been declared officially as obstacles for Turkey's accession to the community, it is worth to express it that in the first formal document made about Turkey's accession, the anxieties of the community deriving from Turkey's unchangeable characteristics were quite clearly pointed out.

Accepting the situation that there is no question about the eligibility of Turkey and the progress both in economic and politics terms achieved since 1980, the report was shaped around the 'development gap' between Turkey and the

¹⁶³ Öniş, 35-36.

¹⁶⁴ Kabaalioğlu, 12.

¹⁶⁵ *Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community*, Sec (89) 2290 Final/2 (20 December 1989), 4.

Community average. This development gap was both within the economic and political contexts. Within the economic context, the community pointed out four kinds of difficulties to be overcome which were structural disparities in agriculture and industry, macro-economic imbalances, high levels of industrial protectionism, and low level of social protection.¹⁶⁶ In addition, within the political context the attention of the Commission went to two main areas: human rights and respect for minorities, and problems with Greece and the Cyprus issue. Actually, they have continued to be the main focus areas in the more recent documents of the Community concerning Turkey's progress for accession. In the report of Commission Opinion, emphasizing that there had been developments in the human rights situation and in respect for the identity of minorities, they were considered not enough to reach the level required in a democracy.¹⁶⁷

Under the title of political context, the other issue emphasized was Turkey's problems with Greece and the Cyprus issue. With the words in the Commission Report:

Examination of the political aspects of the accession of Turkey would be incomplete if it did not consider the negative effects of the dispute between Turkey and one Member State of the Community, and also the situation in Cyprus, on which the European Council has just expressed its concern once again.¹⁶⁸

It should be remembered here that it had been stated both by Greece and by the Community just after the Greek application that Greece's membership to the Community would not affect Turkey's relations with the community and it was expressed by Turkey several times that not only Turkey's relations with the

¹⁶⁶ *Commission Opinion on ...*,5.

¹⁶⁷ *Commission Opinion on ...*,7.

¹⁶⁸ *Commission Opinion on ...*,7.

Community, but also Turkey's bilateral relations with Greece would be seriously affected by Greece's membership. This report vindicated Turkey's anxieties and can be seen as a sign from the Community that "bilateral conflict between the two countries [Greece and Turkey] was no longer (...) a conflict between two major external partners which the EC would view from outside with a certain distance; rather the conflict was now between an 'insider' and an 'outsider' and of direct and profound interest to the Community itself".¹⁶⁹ Within all those circumstances, the Commission expressed its opinion for further enlargement with Turkey that "the political and economic situation in Turkey [led] the Commission to believe that it would not be useful to open accession negotiations (...) straight away".¹⁷⁰ However, besides its negative opinion about Turkey's accession to the Community, it also recommended development of relations with Turkey and proposal of a series of substantial measures to enable both partners to enter on the road towards increased interdependence and integration bringing the completion of Customs Union.¹⁷¹

Among the EC members, one of the most negative responses for Turkey's application came from Greece.¹⁷² Greece responded negatively for the application "citing the poor record of Turkey on the issue of human rights, as well as the Turkish aggressive policy against Greece and the lack of progress on the issue of Cyprus".¹⁷³ Those issues would be the points that Greece would bring on the table in the future for a progress in Turkey's relations with the EC. Questioning the

¹⁶⁹ Öniş, 36.

¹⁷⁰ *Commission Opinion on ...*, p. 8.

¹⁷¹ *Commission Opinion on ...*, p. 8.

¹⁷² Besides Greece; Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg were the other EC members showing strong objections about Turkey's application for membership.

¹⁷³ Georgiades, 424.

democratic level of the administration in Turkey, Greece aimed to block the application in the Council meeting before it was sent to the Commission for its opinion.¹⁷⁴ In this case, Turkey's adventures on the road to membership would be curtailed even before they started. Even though Greece had applied for membership only one year after returning to democracy in 1974 and membership was seen as a way to develop the democratic regime, existence of the same reason in Turkey's application and the possibility that the Community would hold the same opinion with the one it had for Greece in the 1970s was ignored. Although there were views within the EC opposing to transference of Turkey's application to the Commission for opinion, they could not be successful since the application was made according to article 238 of treaty of Rome just like the previous applications.¹⁷⁵

Actually it was not the first event showing negative attitude of Greece towards Turkey within the EC since 1981. During the 1980s, there were two main problems in the Community's relations with Turkey: problems in the running of the Association Agreement and the meeting of the Association Council with Turkey after the return to democracy in Turkey. After becoming an EU member, Greece did not undersign Turkey's Association Agreement with the Community.¹⁷⁶ It meant that the already acquired rights of Turkey in the Ankara Agreement and in the Additional Protocol were blocked to run within the entire EC area as a result of the fact that the validity of the agreements were not approved for Greece. In addition to blocking the enforcement of the treaties within its borders, the

¹⁷⁴ Birand, 449-451.

¹⁷⁵ Birand, 451.

¹⁷⁶ Georgiades, 423.

strongest objections came on the issue of financial cooperation by vetoing the grant of 600 million ECU (European Currency Unit) under the Fourth Financial Protocol.¹⁷⁷ In addition, since 1980 the Association Council could be met at the ministerial level. About holding the meeting, Greece expressed that it was against meeting of the Council unless human rights and Cyprus issues were not included.¹⁷⁸ The meeting of the Association Council was scheduled to take place on April 25, 1988. However, it was postponed when the Turkish delegation learnt that a statement that the Cyprus issue would be affecting Turkey's relations with the Community had been put in the joint declaration of the Community as a result of Greek insistence.¹⁷⁹

It can be said that the late Turkish application for EU membership gave Greece the strongest card to be used against Turkey, for obstructing Turkey's membership to the Community with resolution of their bilateral disputes in the way Greece demanded. With its veto power on the Community's decision, the policy of Athens was to mark that "the entry visa of Ankara was in the hands of Greece, and getting it was dependent on solution of the Cyprus issue".¹⁸⁰ By 'the solution', without doubt, withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus and reunification of the island under a federation which accepted existence of two communities but not

¹⁷⁷ Greek policy of using the economic terms within or outside the EC/EU was not unique for Turkey. In the 1990s, in order to protest the usage of term 'Macedonia' in its official name, Greece put an economic embargo against FYROM even though it was against the rules of EC. In addition, because of 'Omonia event', Greece put veto on EU aid package to Albania and obstructed it until the prisoners were freed. For brief information about Greece's relations with Balkan countries in the 1990s, see Daphne Papahatjopoulos, *Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era*, CEPS Paper No. 72, (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 1998).

¹⁷⁸ Erhan and Arat, "1980-1990 AT'yle...", p. 99.

¹⁷⁹ Constantine Stephanou and Charalambos Tsardanides, "The EC Factor in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle", in *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s Domestic and External Influences*, ed. Dimitri Constatas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 212.

¹⁸⁰ Birand, 461.

separate zones was implied. The Association Agreement of Turkey was signed by Greece on April 1988 a few months after the Davos process to be operational starting with the New Year. It should be noted that the Greek ‘concession’ came “after receiving concessions by Turkey on the issue of the Greek properties in Turkey”.¹⁸¹ The Turkish concession was a result of the Davos atmosphere reflecting Turkey’s goodwill for development of relations with Greece. The lifting of Greek veto, as a response, was a simple example of the policy where the EC membership card aimed to be used against Turkey concerning bilateral relations. There will be another example of it in the 1990s which would have complicated results for Turkey and bring more difficulties on the way to EC/EU, by taking Cyprus into the EU picture as a candidate country.

Even though Greece had been showing itself, or shown, as “the only and main obstacle to the accession of Turkey into the Community”, it is not possible to state that the rest of the Community members were so eager to take Turkey in and that they were stopped by Greek veto.¹⁸² As it was stated in the Commission Report in 1989 quite clearly that Turkish political and economic deficiencies with its size and population excesses were the main problems pending before Turkey for obtaining membership. However, what was preferred was to show Greece as the “sole culprit” of the problematic relations with the Community since it was

¹⁸¹ Georgiades, 424. The mentioned Turkish concession about the Greek properties in Turkey was abolishment of ‘1964 Protocol’ which blocked the movement of money and domains of the Greek nationals who had been living in Turkey and were coerced to leave in 1964 with the protocol. For detailed information about the 1964 Protocol, see Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Turkey and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992).

¹⁸² Georgiades, 424.

convenient for EC in order not to offend the strategic country of the Eastern Mediterranean and for Greece as well to prove its power against Turkey.¹⁸³

4.2.4. Aegean Crisis of 1987 and the Davos Process

Besides Turkey's application for accession to the EC, there were three more events at the core of Greek-Turkish relations during the 1980s. They were: declaration of independence of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, the 1987 Aegean crisis, and the Davos process.

Just a few days after Özal's victory in the 1983 November elections, the Turkish Federated State in Northern Cyprus declared its independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). This development was a turning point in the Cyprus issue. Even though it has only been recognized by Turkey, the Cyprus issue was not anymore an issue between the two communities but between two states on the island.¹⁸⁴

Since the 1976 crisis, "the most serious crisis in Greek-Turkish relations" broke out.¹⁸⁵ Like the 1976 crisis, it came out because of continental shelf issue, particularly because of exploration of oil in disputed waters. Just in a few days, Greece and Turkey came to the edge of war just like it would re-occur in the 1996 Kardak/Imia crisis. However, more than a military confrontation in the Aegean and a real threat of break of war between Greece and Turkey, there appears explanations and evaluations that the crisis was 'created' mostly by the rhetoric of

¹⁸³ Georgiades, 424.

¹⁸⁴ Firat, 108.

¹⁸⁵ Clogg, 19.

policy makers.¹⁸⁶ The starting point of the 1987 crisis was the oil exploration program of Denison Mines Ltd. dated on March 28th. Denison Mines was an entity formed by a Canadian, two American, a German and a Greek company. Turkey opposed the exploration depending on the 1976 Bern Protocol between Greece and Turkey signed after the crisis of that year.¹⁸⁷ According to the protocol, none of them would undertake any activity in the Aegean that would prejudice the settlement of the continental shelf dispute.¹⁸⁸ Papandreou declaring the protocol inactive, expressed that “Greece had ‘sovereign rights’ over the continental shelf and Athens would decide ‘when, where and how it would explore the resources of the seabed’”.¹⁸⁹ Against the ‘offensive’ rhetoric of Greece, Turkey did not remain silent and on March 26th, it was stated by the Turkish officials “that the *Sismik 1* exploration vessel, accompanied by seven warships would conduct seismological surveys in the sections of international waters claimed by Turkey”.¹⁹⁰ Two days later *Sismik 1* sailed with two warships in the legally declared and recognized Turkish territorial waters. For 3 days the Greek forces stayed on alert. At the end, tension was calmed down, the forces on alert were sent back to their headquarters and the survey of Denison Marines was not conducted.

¹⁸⁶ For detailed information about the development of the 1987 crisis, see Panagiotis Dimitrakis, “Greek Military Intelligence and the Turkish “Threat” During the 1987 Aegean Crisis”, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 25 (2007): 99-127.

¹⁸⁷ After the 1976 crisis in the Aegean, Greek and Turkish representatives came together in Bern to negotiate the continental shelf issue. On November 2, 1976, Bern protocol was declared. In the declaration it was stated that both sides kept their views on the continental shelf issue but they would refrain from unilateral actions that may impede the resolution of their bilateral problems. This declaration was important because it confirmed the rights and interests of both sides in the Aegean Sea stated that these rights and interests would not be removed by unilateral actions. See Bahar Rumelili, “The European Union’s Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict”, *Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflict Studies*, no. 6 (January 2004), 4; Fuat Aksu, “Ege Sorunlarının Geleceği ve Türkiye AB Üyelik Sürecinde Türkiye’nin Seçenekleri”, *Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi* 3, Sayı 5 (Temmuz 2005): 16-17.

¹⁸⁸ Dimitrakis, 102.

¹⁸⁹ Dimitrakis, 102.

¹⁹⁰ Dimitrakis, 107.

Actually more than the chronological escalation and de-escalation of the tension, the reasons should be examined to understand how so easily and quickly Turkey and Greece came to the edge of war and how the tension deflated like a balloon. It can be argued that more than military preparations, the rhetoric of the two countries were effective on the escalation of the tension. In his speeches Papandreou stated that Turkey was behaving in an aggressive way; NATO and particularly the USA were accused of the crisis since they did not stop Turkey. In one of his declarations, Papandreou put out clearly how the situation was perceived in Greece. The tension was seen as a game of Turkey supported by the USA and NATO to bring Greece to the negotiation table to cede its 'sovereign rights' in the Aegean.¹⁹¹ As a reaction to the USA and NATO, "the ambassadors of Warsaw Pact countries in Athens were briefed on the crisis in advance of their NATO counterparts".¹⁹² Greece was drawing a picture of being alienated within the Western block and showing that it was not alone as it was thought by keeping close relations with the Warsaw Pact countries.

On the Turkish side, it was being expressed that Greece was following expansionist policies, violating the Bern protocol, and causing trouble. Turkey would not step back but would defend its national interests even if it cost a war against Greece. Not so different from Greece, the public declarations were to show the strength of Turkey and the intention that they would not hesitate to go for war against Greece if its national interests were threatened. The timing of the crisis is worthy. It is argued that since Prime Minister Özal was out of Turkey for medical treatment and the military was heavily controlling the process was one of the

¹⁹¹ Dimitrakis, 109-110.

¹⁹² Clogg, 20.

reasons for the high tension created.¹⁹³ While making preparations for membership application to the EC, it can be argued that Özal would have avoided being involved in crisis with Greece in order not to strengthen their veto possibility.¹⁹⁴

It is clear that neither Greece nor Turkey had the aim of starting a military conflict. Greece had offensive preparations even though “the Turkish armed forces did not constitute an imminent threat” despite the tough rhetoric of Ankara.¹⁹⁵ On the Turkish side, there was not a serious military preparation. This was shown by the sailing of *Sisimik 1* with two warships instead of seven as it had been declared. As the crisis was created mostly by the discourses, tension was de-escalated again by the words of leaders. Prime Minister Özal stated on BBC while he was returning to Turkey that there was no reason for tension because Turkey would not proceed to explore in the disputed areas if Greece would also not initiate exploration.¹⁹⁶ In addition to the discourse of Özal and the survey of *Sisimik 1* within Turkish territorial waters, Kalaitzaki argues that there was effective NATO mediation on the subsidence of the crisis.¹⁹⁷ There is also literature arguing that the crisis was ended as a result of ‘successful deterrence’. It is equally possible to face arguments supporting both Greece and Turkey about deterrence. However, for Turkey it seems a small possibility to see the military force of Greece as a deterrent power when the volume of military force is taken into consideration. On the other hand, for Greece it again seems that there was not a military deterrence from

¹⁹³ Firat, 113.

¹⁹⁴ For information about Greek and Turkish policies of avoiding crises during times of application for EC membership, see Bahar Rumelili, “The European Union’s Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict”, *Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflict Studies*, no. 6 (January 2004).

¹⁹⁵ Dimitrakis, 100.

¹⁹⁶ Dimitrakis, 114.

¹⁹⁷ Theodora Kalaitzaki, “US Mediation in Greek-Turkish Disputes since 1954”, *Mediterranean Quarterly* 16, no. 2 (Spring 2005), 119.

Turkey making it step back at the time of the crisis since there was no military preparation parallel with the tough discourses of Turkey. For Turkey, the main deterrence can be thought to be involved in a crisis with an EC member at a time when application was about to be made. For Greece, it was sure that fighting against Turkey with its relatively weak economic and military power at a time when anti-American, anti-NATO and anti-European attitude was strong would not bring any profits at the end of the day.

The last important development for Turkish-Greek relations of the 1980s was the bilateral meetings between Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers starting in January 1988 during the meeting of World Economic Forum in Davos. Named as the Davos process, the bilateral negotiations which had big expectations ended in an unexpected way. After that, within the ‘spirit of Davos’, Papandreou and Özal came together two more times, one in Brussels in March and the other in Athens as a result of Özal’s visit. To the question why the Davos process started in 1988, there are quite many answers helpful to draw the picture of the time. Actually, the process did not suddenly start in 1988 only because of the 1987 crisis. The crisis was the accelerator reason of the Davos process but was not the only one. For the creation of the Davos spirit the personal role of the leaders and especially of Özal cannot be neglected. Since the establishment of the Özal government, he “repeatedly offered to open talks with the Greek government about all issues – especially cooperation in the spheres of economics and tourism –without any preconditions”¹⁹⁸. However, there were not impending conditions for Greece to

¹⁹⁸ Heinz Kramer, “Turkey’s Relations with Greece: Motives and Interests”, in *The Greek- Turkish Conflict i the 1990s domestic and External Influences*, ed. Dimitri Conostas (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 66.

start talks with Turkey especially at a time when PASOK had come to power with its harsh discourse against Turkey. While Turkey was willing to start talks without any preconditions, Papandreou expressed several times that a dialogue could not be started before the Turkish troops in Cyprus left the island. After the 1987 crisis, the coercive reasons for Greece were also on the surface even though they were not recognized by many Greek officials, the press and public.

The common reason behind the ‘Davos spirit’ was that lack of dialogue had been bringing crises and the last example was one of 1987.¹⁹⁹ Hence, Papandreou and Özal made a joint statement in Davos emphasizing “the need to avoid the kind of confrontation that, in March 1987, had brought them to the verge of war”.²⁰⁰ In addition to that, for Greece, the second half of the 1980s was not as easy as the first half. Especially, existence of economic problems, the austerity policy to reach to level of other EC countries, and the need to use money in the fields outside military pressed Papandreou to take steps to decrease the tension caused by the discourse of ‘Turkish threat’. Coufoudakis also argues that “Papandreou may have wished to disprove Western and Turkish allegations as to his intransigence and of using Greek-Turkish issues for domestic purposes”.²⁰¹ For the Turkish side, the main reason to start a dialogue with Greece was to eliminate “one of the obstacles to increased US military and economic assistance and to her EC membership application”.²⁰²

¹⁹⁹ For detailed discuss on this argument, see Mehmet Ali Birand, “Turkey and the ‘Davos Process: Experiences and Prospects”, in *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s Domestic and External Influences*, ed. Dimitri Conostas (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 27-39.

²⁰⁰ Richard Clogg, 20.

²⁰¹ Van Coufoudakis, “Greek Political Party Attitudes towards Turkey: 1974-1989”, in *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s domestic and External Influences*, ed. Dimitri Conostas (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 50.

²⁰² Coufoudakis, p. 50.

However, both Greece and Turkey had very valid reasons to start a continuous dialogue in 1988 but the failure of the process could not be prevented. The main reason given for the failure is the situation that the spirit could not be spread within the general climate including the politicians, officials, press and the publics. Özal's visit to Athens on June 13th, which was the first visit after 35 years at the level of prime ministers, faced with demonstrations. Even though the crowd did not only consist of Greeks and Greek Cypriots –because there were also “Kurds and Armenians” protesting Özal– it had vital importance on the loss of the Davos spirit.²⁰³ The attitude of the Greek public had already been reflected in the polls which were made a few days before Özal's arrival in Athens. According to one poll, only one-third of the Greek public supported rapprochement, in another one it was indicated that 30% saw Özal's visit to Athens as ‘provocation’.²⁰⁴ The Greek press held a positive or at least a neutral attitude towards the rapprochement. The Press preferred a critical attitude expressing Davos as a ‘mistake’ and accused Papandreou of starting talks without realization of the precondition of withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus.²⁰⁵

Discontent of the Greek public was expressed in the general elections and in April 1990, Greece started the new decade with a new government established this time by the New Democracy Party under the leadership of Constantine Mitsotakis. Even though rapprochement with Turkey was not the only reason of defeat of PASOK, the timing of the process had speeded it up. In Turkey there was

²⁰³ Geoffrey Pridham, “Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish *Rapprochement*”, in *The Greek- Turkish Conflict i the 1990s domestic and External Influences*, ed. Dimitri Conostas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 83.

²⁰⁴ Pridham, 85.

²⁰⁵ Pridham, 84.

also important change in domestic politics. Prime Minister Özal became the new president of Turkey in November 1989. Until his death in 1993, he served as president. His presidency showed the end of Özal factor in active political life and started a new era both for ANAP and Turkey.

CHAPTER 5

GREECE WITHIN THE ‘NEW WORLD ORDER’

After Greece became a member of the EC in 1981, a new period started for Turkish-Greek relations. During the 1980s, Greece used its membership to the Community to block Turkey's relations with the Community, particularly by vetoing the financial packages and obstructing the Association Council meetings. This policy changed in the 1990s depending on the changes in the international environment and especially in PASOK. The core aim of this chapter is to analyze the Greek policy towards Turkey during the 1990s. In order to have a thorough understanding of it, the changes in the international system and changes in the Greece's security perceptions depending on existence of new independent states in the Balkans will be examined. While there was not a big shift in the Greece's policy towards Turkey during the first half of the 1990s, the change occurred in the second half of the decade bringing Turkey candidacy for EU membership. While the reasons behind the shift in the Greek policies towards Turkey are discussed, the major events of Turkey-Greece-EU triangle, such as the crises in Turkish-Greek relations and related EU Summits, will be represented.

5.1 Greek Foreign Policy Priorities during the 1990-1995 Period

5.1.1 The Broad Picture at the Beginning of the 1990s

The 1990s was not a simple start of a new decade for the whole world. Actually the change had started within the second half of the 1980s with the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of *perestroika* –restructuring– and *glasnost* –opening up– which were introduced in 1985 to bring reorganization for a better performance of the communist regime. However, instead of bringing a new breath in the system, his policies accelerated the process of dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ruin of communist ideology.

At the beginning of the 1990s, there was a very different world map. Even though it is named as 'new world order', it could just as well be named as the "new world disorder".²⁰⁶ Political disorder, ethnic-religious clashes and economic collapse in the Balkans, Middle East and the Caucasus were the issues to engage the world agenda. Greece and Turkey were the two countries of the Western block, now at the center of fire. Being surrendered with countries of disorder and ethnic clashes, they faced new threats and even new opportunities within the new system. At the very beginnings of the decade with astonishment, both Greece and Turkey held the view that they lost their strategic importance with disappearance of Communist threat. However, it was quickly cast away with the break of the Gulf War and the importance of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East in particular for the USA. Greece and Turkey were no more two states to

²⁰⁶ The concept 'New World Disorder' is used by Theodore A. Coulombis in "Greece in a Post-Cold War Environment", in *Contemporary Greece and Europe*, ed. Achilleas Mitsos and Elias Mossialos (England: Ashgate, 2000), 373.

prevent Soviet expansion throughout the Eastern Mediterranean but now they were perceived as bridges between the Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus.²⁰⁷ While facing disorder, wars, and instabilities around themselves, there were also opportunities for new openings for their foreign relations with the existence of independent states in the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. By looking around from the glasses of active involvement in international arena, the famous Turkish statement of “*Adriyatik’ten Çin Seddi’ne Türk Dünyası*” –Turkic World from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China– came out.²⁰⁸ With the fear of encirclement by Turkey, Greece also followed policies to circle Turkey to limit its area of influence.

5.1.2. Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans during the 1990-1995 Period

The collapse of communism did not bring any decrease in the strategic importance of Turkey for the Western world, in particular for the USA. Instead, it opened the way for new relations for Turkey putting Greece on alarm. Not only did this situation have influence on the bilateral relations of the two countries, but it closely influenced the general foreign policy formation of Greece. In order to narrow down Turkey’s area of influence and prevent its free movement, Greece chose to follow a containment policy in the Balkans, Caucasus and in the Middle East. The Balkans had already been seen as a natural area of influence area for Greece since it was the only Balkan country at the same time member of the EU and NATO. However, a constructive role could not be assumed within the perception of natural

²⁰⁷ Stearns, Monteagle, “The Greek-American-Turkish Triangle: What Shape After the Cold War?”, *Mediterranean Quarterly* 4, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 21.

²⁰⁸ For details about the active policy of Turkey, see Gülden Ayman, *Neo-Realist Bir Perspektiften Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Yunan Dış Politikası: Güç, Tehdit ve İttifaklar* (Ankara: SAEMK, 2001).

area of influence immediately at the beginning of 1990s because of problems with the newly independent states in the region, namely Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania. The tension in the Balkans was accelerated with the uncompromising and combative policies of PASOK followed to solve the problems with FYROM and Albania and with the attitude taken during the Croatian and Bosnian crises.

It has been argued that it was not the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but the collapse of Yugoslavia that created the real challenge to Greek security.²⁰⁹ The existence of new independent states in the Balkans was an opportunity to develop relations with those countries but also a source of new threats and disputes for Greece. The Macedonian Question and the problems with Albania took priority in the Greek agenda next to disputes with Turkey during the first half of the 1990s.

Since the date FYROM declared independence with the name ‘Republic of Macedonia’ in September 1991, Greece rejected recognition and followed a policy of obstruction of its international recognition unless the official name of the country was changed, the irredentist articles in the constitution were abolished and the usage of Greek symbols as symbols of a different Macedonian identity were abandoned.²¹⁰ For the solution of disputes with the new neighbor, Greece preferred

²⁰⁹ Kalipso Nikolaydis, “Giriş: Yunan Paradoksu nedir?”, in *Yunan Paradoksu*, ed. Graham T. Allison and Kalipso Nikolaydis (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 1999), 21.

²¹⁰ According to Greek point of view, there was not a Macedonian identity apart from the Greek identity and culture. The usage of term ‘Macedonia’ in the official name of the newly founded state, and the emblem of the ancient Macedonian dynasty found on the tomb of father of Alexander the Great, King Philip II, on the national flag of the state was perceived as usurpation of Greek heritage and culture which were the core elements that the Greek national identity and state were founded on. In addition to that, in the constitution it was stated that the rights of Macedonian minorities in other states were under protection and there was a call for the reunification of Macedonian people and territories. Those articles were perceived as a direct threat to the territorial integrity of Greece which had a region called ‘macedonia’ in the north, centered with the city Thessaloniki. For more information about the Macedonian Question, see Daphne Papahadjopoulos, *Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era*; Murat Hatipoğlu (ed.), *Dünden Bugüne Makedonya Sorunu* (Ankara:

tough policies and tension was accelerated with PASOK's return to power in 1993. The policy of blocking its entry into the UN and recognition by the international community especially by the EU countries was supported with a unilateral trade embargo. The name issue was overcome with development of a temporary name, 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'. Macedonia entered into the UN with this name and today still continues to use it since an agreement with Greece on the name has not been reached. The uncompromising attitude of Greece, particularly the introduction of trade embargo damaged Greece's international image and raised questions in Europe about its role in the European system especially as it coincided with the Greek Presidency of the EU. The European Commission brought a lawsuit against Greece before the European Court of Justice arguing that it violated the Treaty of Rome by breaking EU rules which prohibited a member state from unilaterally closing one of the EU's external borders.²¹¹ The problems were half-solved with mediation of the USA however it left the name issue pending. The main reason behind the success of US mediation can be explained with the growing perception inside and outside the EU that Greece was the spoiled child of Europe and needed to be kept under control, and its isolation within the international community –a situation decreasing Greece's effectiveness on issues where it had vital interests. With the Interim Accord signed in September 1995, normalization of diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries started with lifting of the embargo on FYROM in return of change in FYROM's

Avrasya Bir Vakfı, *Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi*, 2002); Thanos Veremis, *Greece's Balkan Entanglement* (Athens: The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1995); Thanos Veremis, "The Revival of the 'Macedonian' Question, 1991-1995", in *Ourselves and Others*, ed. Peter Mackridge and Eleni Yannakakis (Oxford: Berg, 1997).

²¹¹ Papahadjopoulos, 16.

flag and abolishment of the irredentist articles of the constitution, leaving the name issue for a future date.²¹²

Even though Albania was not a new neighbor, the changing political system bore new problems with Greece. The problems were the illegal immigration from Albania to Greece and the worsening conditions of the Greek minority in Albania. With the collapse of the communist regime in 1990, thousands of Albanian citizens left the country in the direction to Italy and Greece.²¹³ For Greece, the problems occurred because of illegal migration which started to bring social and economic problems in a short time. In addition to illegal migration, relations were affected negatively because of the treatment of the Greek minority in Albania. The relations were at the lowest level with the conviction and long prison sentences given to five members *Omonia*, the Greek rights organization in Albania, because of a terrorist attack on an Albanian military camp in 1994.²¹⁴ As a response, Greece vetoed the EU aid package to Albania until the prisoners were freed in 1995 as a result of international pressure.

Besides the problematic relations with Albania and FYROM, the Balkan policy of Greece was clearly pro-Serbian which was shown during the crises of Croatia and Bosnia. During the wars, Greece acted in defiance of the arms embargo imposed on all of former Yugoslavia as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 713 and provided all kinds of support for the Serbs. This policy was

²¹² According to article 5.1 of the Interim Agreement and two Security Council Resolutions 817/93 and 845/93, FYROM officially accepted that the name issue is subject of bilateral relations with Greece to reach an absolute solution. For details about the name issue and Greek official point of view, see, "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) & Greece The name Issue", <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-Eastern+Europe/Balkans/Bilateral+Relations/FYROM/FYROM+-+THE+NAME+ISSUE.htm> (accessed April 16, 2008).

²¹³ Papahadjopoulos, 23.

²¹⁴ Papahadjopoulos, 23-24.

strongly inspired by the historical relations between the Serbs and Greeks. However, another reason behind this policy was “to do the opposite of the policies that Turkey had been following”.²¹⁵ It resulted from the fear of encirclement by a “Muslim arch”, which would be led by Turkey and contain Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bulgaria because of their Muslim populations.²¹⁶ However, instead of being advantageous, the pro-Serbian policy of Greece caused reaction from the European countries and as a result of being the only country within the EU to give support to Serbian activities Athens “was accused of behaving like a ‘Balkan’ country more than a ‘European’ one”.²¹⁷

Besides the Balkans, Greece continued its encirclement policy in other regions where Turkey had new neighbors. In the same logic with pro-Serbian policy, Greece followed a policy of development of relations with the neighboring countries of Turkey with which it could not yet establish trustful and stable relationships. Among those countries, Russia, Syria, Armenia, and Iran came first.²¹⁸ With the point of view that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, Greece followed a policy of forming economic, political and even military relations with those countries to narrow Turkey’s area of influence, and was successful in causing anxieties in Turkey.²¹⁹ The same reason lied behind Greece’s relations with the

²¹⁵ Kamil Mehmet Büyükçolak, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Yeni Bir Boyut: Balkanlar”, in *Türkiye-Yunanistan Eski Sorunlar, Yeni Arayışlar*, ed. Birgül Demirtaş-Coşkun (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2002), 124.

²¹⁶ Büyükçolak, 124.

²¹⁷ Haluk Alkan, “Avrupa Birliği’ne Entegrasyon sürecinde Yunanistan: Gerilimli bir Dönüşümün Hikayesi”, in *Türkiye-Yunanistan Eski Sorunlar, Yeni Arayışlar*, ed. Birgül Demirtaş-Coşkun (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2002), 79.

²¹⁸ For detailed information about Greece’s relations with Middle Eastern and Caucasian countries at the beginning of 1990s, see Ayman, 55-66.

²¹⁹ The expression of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ was used by Alexis Heraclides for the political, economic and military support provided by Greece for the terrorist organisation PKK. See Heraclides. However, this point of view could be enlarged to the policies of Greece which had the aim of encirclement of Turkey during the first half of 1990s, Büyükçolak, 125-126.

terrorist group *PKK* which would come to an end with the capture of *PKK*'s leader Öcalan, in the Greek Embassy in Kenya.

Not only with the countries that Turkey had problems, but also with the Turkic Republics and Caucasian states with whom Turkey succeeded in establishing healthier relations, Greece followed a policy of forming friendly relations in order to prevent Turkey from being one step further.

5.1.3. Relations with Turkey: Turkey within Greece, EU and Cyprus Triangle

The first half of the 1990s did not bring any development in Turkish-Greek relations since there was not any change in the way Greece perceived its Eastern neighbor. Moreover, the 'Turkish threat' was strengthened with the fear of being surrounded by a Muslim arch led by Turkey whose strategic importance was accelerating because of the instabilities and disorders in its neighborhood where the USA had vital interests. Not only Turkey but also reconciliation between Greece and Turkey, at least prevention of conflict or clash, were very important for US interests in the region. For this reason, just like in the previous years, the USA continued to be one of the main actors of mediation between Greece and Turkey at times of crises.

In those circumstances, Turkey's place in Greek foreign and defense policies did not change. Although the end of the Cold War allowed many countries to plan arms reductions, it had the opposite effect in case of Greece since the military expenditures continued to increase deterrence against the possibility of a

Turkish attack.²²⁰ Because of not being able to get involved in a ‘quantitative race’ –it was apparent that Greece was not able to provide a deterring power against Turkey in terms of numbers– with the provision of new technologies in military equipments, strategic and military agreements, Greece intended to provide a ‘qualitative military power’.²²¹ About the qualitative improvement of Greek armed forces, Greek Minister of National Defense Akis Tsohatzopoulos stated that:

Considering the dimensions of our country, the condition of our economy and the demographic problem, quantitative armament competition with any hostile power would constitute a particularly costly effort for Greece with an uncertain outcome. Emphasis, therefore, should be put on quality, by adopting a modern strategic and operational doctrine (with emphasis on combined/joint operations), improving personnel training, restructuring combat units (with the aim of successfully carrying out defensive operations, but also with the ability to transfer operations on enemy territory), obtaining the necessary modern weapon systems (smart weapons and especially force multipliers), and rapidly integrating them in our Armed Forces.²²²

Within this context, the military-defense rapprochements with Russia, Iran, Syria, and Armenia can be seen as an important part in the formation of qualitative power. A short time after the New Democracy came to power in 1990, a Defense and Cooperation Agreement which was negotiated in the 1980s, was signed with the USA. With the agreement the status of the American bases in Greece was cleared and also it was perceived by Greece as balancing political and military power with Turkey.²²³

²²⁰ For example, in 1995 Greece spent 4.6% of its GDP on defense, the highest rate in NATO, Daphne Papahatjopoulos, 31.

²²¹ For details of Greek military structuring, see Ayman, 37-41; Thanos Dokos, “Greek Security Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era”, <http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/summer98/security.html> (accessed April 20, 2008).

²²² Dokos.

²²³ “Yunan Dış Politikası’nda Türk-Yunan İlişkileri ve İç Politika Kaygıları”, <http://www.turkishgreek.org/> (accessed April 18, 2008).

One of the interesting points of Post-Cold War Greek defense policy was the Doctrine of Joint Defense Area which put Cyprus directly inside the Greek defense zone. It was “a policy of extended deterrence” with a “clearly defensive character” to prevent aggression from Turkey by “improving co-operation and common training between the armed forces of Greece and Cyprus”.²²⁴ According to the Doctrine, as long as Turkey maintained an ‘occupation’ force of more than 30,000 troops in Cyprus, Greek and Cypriot defenses would increase their level of co-operation. In this context, any attack against the Republic of Cyprus would constitute a *casus belli* for Greece.²²⁵

The other development at the beginning of the 1990s evaluated from Greek point of view as a ‘victory’ was its membership to Western European Union in 1992. In 1988, first Turkey and then Greece had expressed their intention to join the organization and it resulted in 1995 with Greece’s membership to the Union being the last member of it till today.²²⁶ Greece’s application to join the WEU was motivated mainly by its aim to gain greater West European support for its position vis-à-vis Turkey.²²⁷ However, WEU membership was not a military guarantee which can be used in case of a Turkish attack. According to EC’s decision at Maastricht that Article 5 of the modified Treaty of Brussels, which provides a

²²⁴ Dokos.

²²⁵ Dokos.

²²⁶ Initially, a treaty was signed in Brussels on 17 March, 1948 between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom with the core aim of providing collective self-defence and economic, social and cultural collaboration between the signatories. On 23 October 1954 the Treaty was modified to include Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, thus creating the Western European Union. It led existence of new military and economic organizations in a more broad Europe and in Atlantic region and its core aims were transferred to those organizations which became more influential. For detailed information about West European Union, see www.weu.int, (19.04.2008). While Greece is a full member of the WEU since 1995, Turkey is an associate member of the organization.

²²⁷ See R. R. Krebs, “Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict”, *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 343-377.

security guarantee in case of attack on members, does not apply between member states of NATO and WEU.²²⁸ It may be thought that this decision was taken to prevent a conflict between NATO and WEU because of problematic Greek-Turkish relations. It is argued by Veremis that this decision has somewhat diminished the importance of WEU membership from the Greek point of view.²²⁹ However, it may also be argued that with the development of Common Foreign and Security Policy within the deepening process of the Union, the role of WEU especially for Greece and Turkey was revived since there were efforts in the EU to “incorporate WEU into its new European Security and Defense Policy”.²³⁰

Within Turkey-centric foreign and defense policies of Greece, one of the strongest trump cards continued to be its EC membership. During the first half of the 1990s, there was not a change in Greece’s policy of usage of this card. The way of “blocking the deepening of Europe’s relations with Turkey as a means of getting concessions from the latter on Greek-Turkish disputes” continued.²³¹ Because of this policy until 1996, Veremis’ argument seems very strong that “the use of the EU lever as a short-term instrument of pressure against Turkey seemed attractive and also politically less risky and more rewarding.”²³²

The 1990s were important years in terms of both deepening and widening of the Community.²³³ With the Maastricht Treaty, known as the Treaty of European Union signed in 1991 and came into effect in 1993, structural change

²²⁸ Mustafa Aydın, op. cit., p. 236.

²²⁹ Thanos Veremis, *Greek Security: Issues and Politics*, Adelphi Paper, No. 179, IISS, London, 1982, p. 125.

²³⁰ Aydın, 236-237.

²³¹ Papahatjopoulos, 50.

²³² Rumelili, 11.

²³³ For details about deepening of EC and Maastricht Treaty, see *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, Avrupa Birliği Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002).

was brought to the Community. Inspired by the appearance of ancient Greek temples, the new structure of the Community was settled on three pillars forming the European Union.²³⁴ It was a big step taken by the Community on the way of political union in addition to economic and monetary integration. In terms of Turkey's relations with the Union, the Treaty bore two crucial results: The WEU, which Turkey was not a full member, was put in a position of implementation body of Common Foreign and Defense Policy of the Union and the approval of the European Parliament was made compulsory for further enlargement.²³⁵

The collapse of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe with the existence of newly independent states in the Balkans –which were identified as ‘Southeast European countries’ within their ‘Europeanization’ processes– brought new venues for widening of the European Union. Bringing re-determination of the EU's enlargement policy, it also closely affected Turkey's progress on the way of membership in some future. Besides economic, political and security reasons, incorporation of those countries, which also had historical and cultural importance for the Community, in the European integration process was embraced by all of the Community members.²³⁶ The widening plans of the Union were mainly prepared according to those countries putting Turkey in the waiting room for some more

²³⁴ The three pillars of the European Union are: The Community pillar which includes the three Communities of the European Community (EC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); the pillar of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and the pillar of Police and Judicial Cooperation in criminal matters. Since CFSP is mentioned in the thesis, it should be noted that the Union has not yet developed a CFSP binding all member states. It is still an issue worked on by scholars and policy-makers.

²³⁵ Sanem Baykal and Tuğrul Arat, “1990-2001 AB'yle İlişkiler”, in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol.2 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 329.

²³⁶ Baykal and Arat, 326.

time at a time when louder voices questioning Turkey's place in the European identity and culture started to be heard.

There were two more developments in the first half of the 1990s fundamentally affecting Turkey's relations with the Community in the long run: the Copenhagen Summit of the EU which brought economic and political criteria for future enlargement of the Community and the membership application of Greek Cypriots on behalf of the whole island. In the Copenhagen Council meeting of the EU on June 21st and 22nd, 1993, crucial decisions were taken to be effective on the future enlargement processes. It was stated that the accession of an associated country depended on its "ability to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required".²³⁷ As the economic and political conditions that a candidate country needed to achieve for membership, the Council determined "the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union".²³⁸ In addition to those criteria which were actually in the hands of the candidate countries to fulfill or not, one more thing was also expressed in the Conclusions of the Presidency, "as an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries"; which was "the Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of the European integration".²³⁹

²³⁷ "Conclusions of the Presidency", *European Council Meeting in Copenhagen 21-22 June 1993*, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/72921.pdf (accessed April 20, 2008), 13.

²³⁸ "Conclusions of the Presidency", 13.

²³⁹ "Conclusions of the Presidency", 13.

It can be easily argued that this point was visible in the relations of the Community with Turkey since formal application was made in 1987 and it was reflected explicitly in the Commission report of 1989. The Union's reservations arising from Turkey's size, population and identity continued to be effective on the progress of relations during the 1990s. The aim of the process was successfully turned by the Community into reaching a Customs Union though, keeping the final aim as Turkey's full membership without pointing to specific date.

Actually, the idea of Customs Union had appeared in the minds of Europeans after Turkey's formal application for membership. In his meeting with Prime Minister Özal in Turkey in 1988, former President of France, Raymond Barre, suggested that Turkey sign the Customs Union since a positive outcome could not come for its membership application under these circumstances. As it was cited by Barre:

Be realistic and put into effect the Customs Union which is also included in the agreements already signed. A country signed Customs Union cannot be left out, full membership will be indispensable. Also, Greece cannot veto it since it appears in their agreements.²⁴⁰

The will for a Customs Union with Turkey to be concluded by the end of 1995 was declared within the Cooperation Package, known as 'Matutes Package' unveiled in 1990, but its adoption faced Greek veto in the Council.²⁴¹ Like in the previous years Greece used its veto power to block Turkey-EU relations and dropped it again with a concession, which was acceptance of Cyprus as a candidate country –a concession to change the color of relations between Turkey and the Union in the following years.

²⁴⁰ Birand, 478.

²⁴¹ http://www.turkishembassy.com/II/O/Turkey_EU.htm (accessed April 20, 2008).

From Turkey's point of view, there were political and economic reasons behind the will to sign the Customs Union. First of all, with economic cooperation under a Customs Union, the 'infrastructural integration' with the Union would be provided and 'political integration' would be facilitated.²⁴² Fresh air would be blown into the stagnant relations and membership would be indispensable. As it was commonly evaluated, with the Customs Union, Turkey would enter the Union "from the postern".²⁴³ In terms of economic reasons, it was thought to bring stability in macro economics, open the way for foreign investments, increase the quality and the quantity of production since there would be production for a larger market and increased competition with European firms.²⁴⁴

Even though there was strong will for a Customs Union both from the Union and Turkey, it was not called into being painlessly because of the Greek veto. Using its privileged position provided by membership status, a crucial concession was received in return of lifting the veto. Greek Cypriots applied for EU membership in 1990 representing the whole Cyprus with the title of the 'Republic of Cyprus'. Turkey's response to it was shaped around emphasis on the empty words of the application and warnings of integration with TRNC.²⁴⁵ During high tension, the Union avoided an immediate response to the application and preferred to keep silent. The response of the EU came in 1993 with the Commission report which expressed the eligibility of Cyprus for membership with the belief that "the political and economic advantages of EU accession would

²⁴² Baykal and Arat, 333.

²⁴³ Birand, 487.

²⁴⁴ Baykal and Arat, 333.

²⁴⁵ For details of political and legal reasons put forward by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, see Melek Fırat, "1990-2001 Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol.2 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 453-455.

provide an incentive for a settlement.”²⁴⁶ For the progress of the process, the strongest supporter was Greece while stronger opposition came from Turkey. Signing of the Customs Union was bound to opening the way for Cyprus’ membership. The Greek veto continued until the last moment when preparations were completed for signatures. The meeting of Association Council on December 19, 1994 could not be realized because of the Greek veto showing up one more time “that the key was in the hands of Greece and they would not give the green light before a date was taken for Cyprus”.²⁴⁷ The deadlock ended with resignations of Turkey and the EU to Greek demand. The Customs Union, which would be effective starting 1996, could be signed in the Association Council meeting on 6 March 1995, with the EU announcement that “accession negotiations with Cyprus would start six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference”.²⁴⁸ However, even though the Greek veto on Customs Union was lifted, it did not mean a total end of Greek vetoes. The financial aid package of the EU under the Customs Union Agreement for Turkey was blocked by Greece and kept as a trump card for the resolution of Aegean disputes.²⁴⁹ This situation was explicitly expressed by Prime Minister Kostas Simitis in 1997 to *Newsweek*. As a response to the question whether Greece would release its veto over EU funds owed Turkey if the Kardak/Imia dispute was solved, Simitis said that “If [Turkish Prime Minister] Mesut Yilmaz says clearly that he refers the matter to the International Court, he will get the money”.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁶ Papahatjopoulos, 47.

²⁴⁷ Birand, 486.

²⁴⁸ Papahatjopoulos, 47.

²⁴⁹ Papahatjopoulos, 52.

²⁵⁰ Lally Weymouth, “A Tremendous Step”, *Newsweek* 130, issue 6, Nov 8, 1997.

With the signing of the Customs Union, the last phase of the Association Agreement began which included free movement of capital, services and persons in addition to goods, adjustment to the Common Agriculture Policy of the Union and remaining preparations for full membership which was the final aim of the Association relationship.²⁵¹

5.2 Change in PASOK, Change in Greece (1996-1999)

5.2.1. Premiership of Kostas Simitis and the European Vision in Greek Politics

The year 1996 started with a change for PASOK which would also bring change in every aspect of Greek politics from domestic politics to foreign relations in the coming years. As a result of resignation of Prime Minister Papandreu from premiership because of health problems, he was replaced by Kostas Simitis who had served in different ministerial posts in every PASOK government and was seen as “the head of party’s reformist wing”.²⁵² Holding the title of “party rebel”, he had “resigned from Cabinet posts twice after opposing Papandreu’s economic policies”.²⁵³ His election was evaluated as the completion of “the transfer of power to a younger generation of Greek political leaders, less charismatic than their predecessors but more in tune with the rest of Europe”.²⁵⁴

²⁵¹ Baykal and Arat, 340-341.

²⁵² Kerin Hope, “End of an Era”, *Europe*, issue 353, Feb 1996.

²⁵³ Christina Pirovolakis, “New Leader Breaks Gently with Greece’s Socialist Past”, *Christian Science Monitor* 88, issue 158, July 11, 1996.

²⁵⁴ Hope.

With the simplest expression, Simitis aimed at “bringing Greece closer to Europe”.²⁵⁵ The priority of the new PASOK administration was to bring reforms in the economic structure of the country and to take it to the level of other European countries.²⁵⁶ “After 1996, accession to the Eurozone came to be (...) a national goal in Greece, upon whose realization the prestige of the country and its national pride depended.”²⁵⁷ In terms of foreign policy, Simitis aimed to break the title of ‘spoiled child of Europe’ and to take its place among the ‘core’ states of the European Union by following more constructive policies in the Balkans. Being the only EU and NATO member among the Balkan countries, Greece created for itself the mission of taking place at the center of EU stability policies for the region by becoming one of the strongest supporters of integration with EU and NATO.²⁵⁸ Within this point of view, relations with the Balkan countries were put on a developing schedule especially in terms of economic relations with increase in trade volumes and Greek investments in those countries.²⁵⁹

The policy towards Turkey was also closely affected by the moderate approach of PASOK. High military expenses, which formed an indispensable part in the post-1974 Greek defense policies, were a huge obstacle before Greece to reach the level of economical development of most European countries. Curtailing military expenses was directly linked with relations with its neighboring countries,

²⁵⁵ Kerin Hope, “The Simitis Era Begins”, *Europe*, issue 353, Feb 1996.

²⁵⁶ In February 1996, Greece had the highest inflation rate, highest budget deficit, biggest national-debt ratio, lowest productivity, the worst trade balance and the growth rate over the last 15 years at the half of EU average. See, “A Glam of Hope in Greece”, *Economist* 338, issue 7954, Feb 2, 1996.

²⁵⁷ Rumelili, 12.

²⁵⁸ Büyükçolak, 120-121.

²⁵⁹ For detailed information about Greece economic relations with the Balkan countries, see Charalambos Tsardanidis and Evangelos Karafotakis, “Greece’s Economic Diplomacy towards the Balkan Countries”, <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/volume5/september-november2000/volumevn3charalambos.pdf> (accessed April 21, 2008).

in particular with Turkey, which had been sitting at the core of its defense and foreign policies, forming the main threat to the country for more than two decades. In addition to the need of cutting down military expenses, with the policy of erasing the image of ‘Europe’s spoiled child’, adopting a moderate attitude in relations with Turkey was also crucial. It would rescue Greece from being the ‘scapegoat of the Union’ by bringing on the scene the other countries which had been against Turkey’s membership but were hidden behind Greek vetoes. Moreover, for Greece “A European Turkey [would] be a much easier neighbor to live [with] than an isolated and militarized Turkey”.²⁶⁰ It would be much easier to deal with a Turkey progressing on the way of EU membership according to the criteria set by the Union. Making the EU an active part in the bilateral disputes rather than using its membership as a veto machine against Turkey would not only facilitate Greece’s work but also transform Turkish-Greek disputes into conditions needed to be realized by Turkey for EU membership.

However, the obvious reflection of moderate policies in relations with Turkey were to be postponed for some more time because of the military confrontation in the Aegean and the cropping up of the Greek support behind the terrorist group *PKK* by the capture of Öcalan at the Greek Embassy, Kenya.

²⁶⁰ Theodore Couloumbis, “Greece in a Post-Cold War Environment”, in *Contemporary Greece and Europe*, ed. Archilleas Mitsos and Elias Mossialos (England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2000), 383.

5.2.2. The Long Three-Years of Turkey between Greece and the EU

5.2.2.1 Sovereignty Dispute in the Aegean: Kardak/Imia Crisis

Only a few days after Simitis was elected as the new Greek Prime Minister, one of the most important events in recent Turkish-Greek relations broke out. Defined as “the first Turkish–Greek media war in the history”, Turkey and Greece found themselves suddenly in a military confrontation because of disagreement about the sovereignty of a pair of rocky islets, called *Kardak* in Turkish and *Imia* in Greek, 3.8 n.m. away from Turkish coasts.²⁶¹ At the time when a Turkish coaster ran aground over those islets “nobody could see that simple incident would start a series of events that brought two allies to the edge of war”.²⁶² Tension was accelerated by exaggerated attention of the media in both of the countries and by the discourses used both by the politicians and journalists.²⁶³ The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the new cabinet under Simitis’ premiership, Theodoros Pangalos stated that “it was the first time that Turkey demanded territory from Greece”.²⁶⁴ Even though Simitis was brought to power for his moderate approach aiming to bring change in Greek politics, he could not keep away from following the traditionalist route since he did not want to be the focus of intense critiques just before getting the vote of confidence.²⁶⁵ The ‘flag race’ on the islets brought harsh discourses of the two prime ministers. As a response to Simitis’ promise that the Greek flag would not be taken back, tension was accelerated with the words of

²⁶¹ Mustafa Aydın, “Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Şüpheli İyimserlik”, Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun (trans.), in *Türkiye-Yunanistan Eski Sorunlar, Yeni Arayışlar*, ed. Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2002), 212.

²⁶² Aydın, “Crypto-Optimism ...”, 224.

²⁶³ For the development of the crisis, see Fırat, “1990-2001 Yunanistan’la ...”, 464-469.

²⁶⁴ Fırat, 464.

²⁶⁵ Fırat, 464.

Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller that the Greek flag would be taken down and the troops would leave.²⁶⁶ It cannot be known how the crisis would develop if the two countries were not in the strategically important Mediterranean region. Like in many Turkish-Greek crises, this one was also cooled down by US mediation. American position accepted by the parties of the conflict was that “in case of not opening fire against the Turkish soldiers and if the Greek military force withdraws its presence and the Greek flag, the Turkish military forces will do the same”.²⁶⁷ Eventually, the crisis ended without any shooting at one another and without bringing any clear agreement on the status of the rocks.

Kardak/Imia crisis was not the first crisis of short and high tension that brought Turkey and Greece almost war, but it also created a new dimension within the frame of Aegean disputes.²⁶⁸ Even though it was evaluated by the foreign press as Greece and Turkey were fighting over the sovereignty of an uninhabited rocky islet, the situation that there are hundreds and maybe thousands of islets and rocks in the Aegean makes it important. After the crisis, the concept of ‘grey zones’ was brought on the table by Turkey stating that there were islets and rocks in the Aegean, whose belongings were not declared in the treaties. Greece, on the other

²⁶⁶ Aydın, “Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde ...”, 213.

²⁶⁷ Kalaitzaki, 121.

²⁶⁸ After the Kardak/Imia Crisis a similar dispute with very low tension and without military confrontation occurred in May. The crisis came out when Greece demanded inclusion of Gavdos, a small island located southwest of Crete, in the NATO trainings. Turkey opposed it by stating that the sovereignty over it was controversial. The issue took attention of the Greek politicians and the media but not the Turkish ones. Without causing any hot confrontation like Kardak/Imia, the dispute was settled by US declaration that there was a misunderstanding in the issue and the island belonged to Greece. This event was another indication of attitude of Turkey for the existence of Grey Zones in Aegean.

hand, opposed this point of view by stating that the signed treaties were clear enough to declare the sovereignty rights in the Aegean.²⁶⁹

The attitude taken by the EU Commission about the Kardak/Imia Crisis was significant. The first step was taken on the way of pulling Turkish-Greek disputes within the EU.²⁷⁰ In the declaration of the Commission after the Crisis, it was expressed that the southern borders of the Union were Greek borders and the Union was in solidarity with Greece; it was reminded within the Customs Union frame that high level relations were aimed with Turkey and at the base of those relations were democratic principles, respect for international law and non-use of force.²⁷¹

The new Greek policy was effective in bringing an immediate change in the Turkish point of view regarding third party interventions. The new Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz declared on March 24th, Turkey “would not rule out third-party solutions in the Aegean if all the interrelated issues were treated as a package”.²⁷² It was a step taken towards the Greek solution however; the point of existence of other disagreements besides the continental shelf issue did not change. This step taken did not bring a positive attitude from Greece because it was conditional. However, it was obvious that the declaration of the Commission pointed out the new Greek policy vis-à-vis Turkey was effective. The Commission’s declaration was shared by the Council and a similar emphasis took

²⁶⁹ For detailed information about Greek and Turkish point of views on the ‘grey zones’, see “The Imia Islets. Turkish positions on “grey zones” in the Aegean”, <http://64.237.101.224/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=45&article=83> (accessed April 21, 2008); “Egemenliği Antlaşmalarla Yunanistan’a Devredilmemiş Adacıklar ve Kayalıklar Sorunu”, <http://www.turkishgreek.org/> (accessed April 21, 2008).

²⁷⁰ Fırat, 466.

²⁷¹ Fırat, 466.

²⁷² Papahatjopoulos, 39.

place in the General Affairs Council Declaration of 15 July 1996. In the declaration it was specified that Turkey-EU relations “should be based on a clear commitment to the principles and respect of international law and agreements, and that disputes created by territorial claims should be referred to the International Court of Justice”.²⁷³ Since then, the Aegean disputes started to take place in the official documents of EU under the title of ‘Turkey’ emphasizing the need for more efforts for the settlement of the disputes as well as the Cyprus issue in accordance with UN resolutions.

5.2.2.2 S-300 Missile Crisis

Shortly after the Kardak/Imia crisis, Turkish-Greek relations were once again tense, this time by developments in Cyprus. The agreement of the Greek Cypriots with Russia in January 1997, about the deployment of S-300 missiles brought attention to the region. With deployment of the missiles on the island, the balance in favor of Turkey would be demolished. It was not a situation acceptable for Ankara and harsh statements including warnings of use of force came in order to avoid deployment.²⁷⁴ In addition to Turkey’s opposition, it was not a favorable situation for the USA since existence of Russian missiles in the Mediterranean could serve Russian influence in the region. Turkish and American opposition prevented the deployment of the missiles in Cyprus by sending them to Crete. Even though the crisis ended in the way Turkey demanded, it was successful in

²⁷³ Papahatjopoulos, 52.

²⁷⁴ Birgöl Demirtaş-Coşkun, “Ankara-Atina İlişkilerinde Son Dönem: Değişenler ve Değişmeyenler”, in *Türkiye-Yunanistan Eski Sorunlar, Yeni Arayışlar*, ed. Birgöl Demirtaş-Coşkun (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2002), 196.

bringing attention of the global powers on Cyprus.²⁷⁵ The belief on the urgency of solution to the Cyprus issue which could be possible with the EU was strengthened.²⁷⁶ Like the Aegean disputes, the Cyprus issue also started to take part in the official documents of the EU concerning progress in Turkey-EU relations.

Just like in the previous crises, after the Kardak/Imia and missile crises, Turkish and Greek leaders came together, this time in the Madrid Summit of NATO in July 1997 issuing a common declaration. Even though not binding for the parties, it was seen as an important step for the improvement of Turkish-Greek relations. In the declaration it was stated that “no threats of war or use of force [would] be made and that differences [would] be settled peacefully”.²⁷⁷ However, it was reflected by Greece in the international press as a retreat of Turkey rather than a common declaration. In his speech to *Europe* the Greek Foreign Affairs Undersecretary, Yannis Karanidiotis stated that “Turkey had accepted to abide by the international law and by international agreements as regards its relations with Greece. At the same time, Turkey had accepted to withdraw its threat of force against Greece”.²⁷⁸

The Madrid declaration did not go beyond wishful thinking. The developments within the EU framework and reaching the peak of tension in Turkish-Greek relations in 1999 bore the same end as with the Bern negotiations of 1976 and Davos process.

²⁷⁵ Coşkun, 174- 211.

²⁷⁶ Firat, 472.

²⁷⁷ Lally Weymouth.

²⁷⁸ Robert J. Guttman, “Greek Foreign Policy”, *Europe*, issue 370, Oct 1997.

5.2.2.3. Big Disappointment: Agenda 2000 and Luxembourg Summit, December 1997

The atmosphere of victory in Turkey created with the signing of Customs Union did not last long. Starting with Agenda 2000, the EU clearly put out the difference in the considerations of Turkey's and Central and Eastern European countries progress on the way of membership.

Agenda 2000 was prepared by the EU commission to determine a strategy for future enlargement of the Union and the necessary measures needed to be taken in order to end this process with success without damaging the strength and deepening of the Union.²⁷⁹ In the document, an assessment was made on the preparedness for membership of the ten Central and Eastern European applicant countries with Cyprus and it was recommended to start accession negotiations with six countries including Cyprus in early 1998.

Regarding Turkey, the document did not specify either a candidacy or membership. In a separate part, the eligibility of the country for full membership was re-emphasized but also the deficiencies in democracy and human rights, need of civilian solution for the problems arising in Southeastern Turkey, solution of the Cyprus issue and settlement of disputes with Greece were pointed out.²⁸⁰ The 'exclusion' of Turkey from the foreseen enlargement was not actually a total surprise. Before the preparation of Agenda 2000, the Turkish demand for getting candidacy status was expressed openly, but it faced negative attitude from the Union particularly from Germany. Because of the German general elections, the

²⁷⁹ For details of the issue covered in the Agenda 2000, see "Agenda 2000: For a stronger and Wider Union, A Historic Opportunity", ec.europa.eu/agenda_2000/overview/en/agenda/htm (accessed April 22, 2008).

²⁸⁰ Birand, 501.

Christian Democrats did not want to risk their success by opening the way for Turkey's membership. This situation was stated explicitly by the German Prime Minister Helmut Kohl to Mesut Yilmaz, the Prime Minister in Turkey at that time.²⁸¹

While the voices questioning Turkey's cultural differences, the attitude of Greece was noteworthy. Simitis' new foreign policy opening started show in the attitude taken for Turkey-EU relations. In March 1997, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodoros Pangalos, who had had harsh expressions in previous years, showed his softened attitude with the words that "I object to the thesis that Turkey could not fit in the EU because of cultural differences. Turkey befits" and the subsequent leader of PASOK, George Papandreou, stated that he supported Turkey's entry to the Union.²⁸²

If an evaluation is to be made about the timing of the change in Greek expressions concerning Turkey-EU relations, it can be stated that this was perfect timing. When the attitude of supporting Turkey's membership appeared on the Greek agenda, Aegean disputes had already started to take part in the Commission and Parliament reports and in the EU Council reports either under the title of Turkey as problems with Greece or border disputes. The policy of the Union was made clear in Agenda 2000 that "the border disputes of the candidate countries needed to be solved before membership status is gained".²⁸³ The situation was even further ahead of the Cyprus issue. The promise for the start of accession negotiations of Cyprus taken in 1995 was clearly declared in Agenda 2000 without

²⁸¹ Birand, 501.

²⁸² "Yunanistan Bize 'Abi'lik ediyor", Baskın Oran'la röportaj, *Radikal*, April 9, 2001.

²⁸³ Fuat Aksu, "Ege ve Kıbrıs Sorunlarının Çözümünde Avrupa Birliği'nin Tutumu", <http://www.turkishgreek.org/makaleler/egevekibris.htm> (accessed April 22, 2008).

requiring the need of a solution of disputes before membership. After then, the Cyprus issue was no longer under the monopoly of Turkish-Greek bilateral relations. Having disputes with a candidate country which would be incorporated in the Union within the first enlargement, EU was becoming the respondent of Turkey. Both in Aegean disputes and in the Cyprus issue the EU was not any longer at equal distance to Greece and Turkey.

The disappointment of Turkey caused by Agenda 2000 was formalized in the Luxembourg Summit on 12 and 13 December 1997. The enlargement process was declared to start on 30 March 1998 for the ten Central and Eastern European countries and for Cyprus within a single framework, leaving Turkey out of the process. The situation of Turkey was expressed under the separate title of ‘A European Strategy for Turkey’, repeating Turkey’s eligibility for membership and an emphasis that Turkey would be judged on the basis of the same criteria as other applicant states.²⁸⁴ However, the Council also preferred to make an emphasis on the relations with Greece and Cyprus issue which were muddying the previous expression. It was stated that:

(...) that strengthening Turkey’s links with the European Union also depends on (...) the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice; and support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.²⁸⁵

²⁸⁴ About detailed information about the decisions taken in the Luxembourg Summit, see http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm (accessed April 22, 2008.)

²⁸⁵ http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm (accessed April 22, 2008).

This expression was important for the subsequent years of Turkey-EU and Turkish-Greek relations. The attitude of the EU on Aegean disputes and Cyprus issue was explicitly declared in the Presidency Council Conclusions of the Summit and emphasis was made on their resolution for the future of relations with Turkey. It can be seen also as the official declaration of the EU that it was a part hereafter in those issues and would even be the main respondent in the following years.

The decisions of the Summit brought a tough response from Turkey. The exclusion from the enlargement meant that “the doors of EU would be closed to Turkey for at least more than 20 years”.²⁸⁶ In addition to that, assessment on Aegean disputes and the Cyprus issue and domestic politics in Turkey accelerated the toughness of Turkey’s response. On December 14th, the Turkish government declared that Turkey’s relations with the Union would continue within the context of Association Partnership, which did not include the political issues declared in the Summit conclusion, and the development of relations depended on the attitude of the Union in the future.²⁸⁷ While it was stated that Turkey would not continue its political dialogue concerning the stated issues, it was also declared that the integration process with the TRNC, which was development of economic integration and formation of a common defense doctrine, would be speeded up as a reaction to starting of Greek Cypriot accession negotiations on behalf of the whole island.²⁸⁸

The tough reaction of Turkey may have been effective in softening of the discourses of the EU in subsequent Summits about the improvement of the

²⁸⁶ <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/1997/12/14/hurriyet.asp> (accessed April 24, 2008).

²⁸⁷ “Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkilerinin Tarihçesi”, www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=1 (accessed March 20, 2008).

²⁸⁸ <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/1997/12/15/19501.asp> (accessed April 24, 2008).

European strategy to prepare Turkey for membership. However, in the final decision of the Helsinki Summit about giving Turkey candidacy status, there were other reasons more important than Turkey's reactions.

5.2.2.4. The Year 1999: Crisis, Pain and New Hopes

On February 16, 1999, the attention of the international community but mostly of Turkey and Greece was focused on the crisis in Kenya. The event was the capture of *PKK* leader Abdullah Öcalan in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi by Turkish intelligence officials. The event brought a quake in domestic politics of Greece and shook its prestige in the international arena especially within the EU by explicitly putting out Greek support for terrorist activities in a neighboring country. Starting in the 1980s, with the policy of 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend', Greece had provided military, political and economic support for *PKK* and there had been sympathy established in Greek society for the "rebel Kurds" such that they pointed to similarities with their former situation and Greece's independence in 1829.²⁸⁹

After the capture, Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodoros Pangalos, Interior Minister Alekos Papadopoulos and Public Order Minister Philipos Petsalnikos were removed from office and the head of Greek intelligence resigned.²⁹⁰ These were the direct and immediate results of the capture which also meant for Simitis getting rid of the nationalist-populist staff of Papandreou who could not be dismissed before because of domestic political reasons.²⁹¹ For the post of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the son of Andreas Papandreou, George Papandreou, who had

²⁸⁹ "The Ocalan Crisis", *Economist* 350, issue 8107, Feb 20, 1999.

²⁹⁰ Marcia Christoff Kurop, "Ocalan's Greek Tragedy", *Christian Science Monitor*, 2/23/99, Vol 91, Issue 60.

²⁹¹ Firat, 477.

always sided with Kostas Simitis in opposition from the very beginning, was assigned. This assignment was very important for the relations with Turkey. After the Öcalan crisis, the policy became to erase this event from memory with the moderate policies and closer relations, to establish a dialogue between the two countries and to draw the Turkish-Greek disputes within the European Union.²⁹² While the earthquake disaster in Turkey fastened this process, with the decision of the EU concerning Turkey's status, a new period started in Turkish-Greek relations.

On August 17, 1999, Turkey lived one of the biggest disasters of its history. Causing great pain, economic and social problems and a new phenomenon in the lives of Turkish people, especially living in the Marmara region, the only positive outcome of it was the start of reconciliation between Turkish and Greek societies. Probably for the first time in their histories, Greek people were seeing on television Turks suffering.²⁹³ Among the first rescuers to arrive on the scene was the Greek search-and-rescue group.²⁹⁴ The civic movement in Greece to send more help to Turkey, the rescue of the Greek team of a boy alive from the rubble of an apartment, Turkish people's applause on the streets of the Greek rescuers during their drive to the airport to return home and headlines of newspapers prepared the necessary bases in Turkish and Greek communities for political rapprochement—a situation whose absence had resulted in the failure of the Davos Process. Just as expressed by Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou after the disaster, Greece

²⁹² Firat, 478.

²⁹³ Personal meeting with Yorgo Kirbaki, Athens, 2006.

²⁹⁴ Alan L. Heil, "Fallout from 'Earthquake Diplomacy' leads to unprecedented thaw in Greek-Turkish relations", *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 19, issue 3, Apr2000.

and Turkey had become spiritually much closer.²⁹⁵ The atmosphere established after the earthquake in Turkey was strengthened after the earthquake in Greece on September 7th, but this time Turkey running to help Greek people.

It would not be wrong to state that the earthquakes created the necessary conditions in the societies for the success, at least continuation, of ‘Europeanized’ Greek policies towards Turkey. Ziya Onis states that:

(...) The recent Greek-Turkish *rapprochement* has an important romantic or idealistic dimension, marking the start of a new relationship based on mutual trust and co-operation, originating from civil initiatives in both countries and signaling the path through which co-operation could be built in the future.²⁹⁶

Like the Davos Process and even stronger, there was the intent in the political powers for improvement of relations. In the reflection of these politics to the other side, personal leadership of Papandreou and Cem cannot be denied. With existing public support, both politicians were able to hold olive branches tight. The intention of the politicians was immediately shown with Papandreou’s visit to Ankara in January 2000. During his visit, agreements on ‘soft issues’, “cooperation in fighting organized crime, in preventing illegal migration, in promoting tourism, and in protecting the environment” were signed.²⁹⁷

Besides the reflections of reconciliation in bilateral relations in soft politics, there was change in the attitude of Greece within the EU in terms of financial issues. After the earthquake, “Greece partially lifted her veto on EU aid to Turkey”, which was a part of the Customs Union and vetoed by Greece because of

²⁹⁵ Heil.

²⁹⁶ Onis, 38.

²⁹⁷ Heil.

the Aegean disputes, without asking concessions.²⁹⁸ The peak of the transformed Greek policies came out in the Helsinki Summit. Among the most important decisions of the Summit was the grant of candidacy status to Turkey. It was stated in the Conclusions of the Summit that “Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States”.²⁹⁹ In this decision not only the change in Greek attitude but also changes in other European countries, particularly in Germany, should be mentioned. In addition to general Greek foreign and domestic political aims stated before, the belief came over that “it would not be in a position to settle its (...) bilateral disputes with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea if Turkey was left isolated and outside the orbit of the European Union”.³⁰⁰ Bargaining power of Greece was directly related to Turkey’s will to be incorporated in the Union and favored solutions could be reached through European Union mediation. Besides the release of Greek veto, change in the political power in Germany and Washington’s pressure on the EU to keep Turkey close had a crucial effect on the decision taken.³⁰¹ In addition to those reasons, after the Luxembourg disappointment, voices advocating the view that “Europe is an ethnic-religious club that will never

²⁹⁸ “Olive Branches”, *Economist* 352, issue 8137, Sept 09, 1999.

²⁹⁹ Article 12, *Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999 Presidency Conclusions*, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hell_en.htm#a (accessed April 25, 2008).

³⁰⁰ Onis, 38.

³⁰¹ Before the Helsinki Summit, as a result of the general elections in Germany, the Christian Democrats were replaced with the Social Democrats. It was important for Turkey’s relations with the Union since the Christian Democrats were strongly against Turkey’s membership because of the fear of huge Turkish immigration to the country. In addition to the political change in Germany, the continuing unrests in the regions –Caucasus and Kosovo- around Turkey kept its strategic position important for the EU and mostly for the USA. Because of Turkey’s strategic position and its close relations, a Turkey within the EU would be favored by the USA when there was initiatives for developing a mechanism besides NATO for the security and defence of Europe. For detailed information about the reasons behind granting Turkey candidacy, see Baykal and Arat, 351-353.

accept a country of 65 million Muslims” raised in Turkey.³⁰² The discussions that Turkey should turn face its to Asia and develop relations with Eastern countries and Turkic republics increased. The EU policy of keeping Turkey at “arms length” seemed to lose effect and in order to get Turkey back into the mould a step was needed.

In terms of Turkish-Greek relations, the decision included crucial points that were to affect the future of relations regarding Aegean Disputes and the Cyprus issue. In the document it was stated that:

(...) like the other candidate States, [Turkey] will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a).”³⁰³

In the 4th paragraph, emphasis was on the peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes in accordance with the UN Charter. Within this condition, the Union calls for the candidate states to make every effort for resolutions. If the process fails, the Union promotes their settlement through the International Court of Justice at the latest by the end of 2004.³⁰⁴ In the paragraph 9(a) of the document, the Cyprus issue was mentioned. It was stated that the talks started in New York under the auspices of the UN for a settlement of the Cyprus issue were supported by the Union.

³⁰² Phil Gordon, “Europe’s Helsinki Summit: Now Make Turkey a Serious Offer”, *International Herald Tribune*, December 10, 1999, <http://www.iht.com/articles/1999/12/10/edgordon.2.t.php>, (accessed April 25, 2008).

³⁰³ Article 12, *Helsinki European Council ...*

³⁰⁴ Article 4, *Helsinki European...*

As much as the decision of candidacy, those two paragraphs were important both for Turkey's progress towards accession and in its relations with Greece. Starting with the document of Accession Partnership with Turkey, the Cyprus issue and Aegean disputes, namely border disputes, started to take place in the EU documents related to Turkey's progress. The Helsinki Summit was the last step of transforming Turkish-Greek disputes into Turkey-EU disputes. Since then, Greece was the respondent of Turkey in the negotiations for settlement of disputes however; EU was the real respondent with sanction power holding the carrot-stick policy. At the peak of transformed Greek foreign policy of the 1990s, the Helsinki Summit was also proclaimed as 'the end of history for Greece' by Greek scholars such as Couloumbis and Tziampiris.³⁰⁵

³⁰⁵ Rumelili, 14.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to analyze the Greek policies towards Turkey within the EU framework. It was particularly shaped around the question of how Greece's EU membership was used in the bilateral relations with Turkey since the former became a full member of the Community until the candidacy status was given to Turkey in Helsinki, 1999. The outcomes of the analysis were presented in two main chapters reflecting different policies at different time periods, which were supported by two introductory chapters to provide basic information for a better understanding of the issues analyzed.

By the end of the Second World War, Greece found itself surrounded by communist states while dealing with economic, social, and political problems inside because of the civil war. For the first decade in the Cold War period, the main Greek foreign and defense policy was to secure itself against an attack from communist neighbors. Consequently, it chose to become a member of NATO

along with Turkey. After NATO membership was achieved, Greece turned its face to the European Community (EC) with the same security considerations even though the Community did not have an entity to provide military security next to economic and particularly political reasons. At that time, Turkey did not take place among the reasons behind Greek policy of establishing closer relations with the EC. Instead, under the common threat of communism, both states lived a period of 'compulsory' friendship.

However, friendly relations did not last long after they secured themselves under the NATO umbrella, and closer relations were established with the EC and American assistance was felt on their shoulders. With the thaw in the Cold War during the 1970s, disputes came to the surface in bilateral relations to effect formation of their general foreign and defense policies in the following years. The Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 formed a turning point in Greek defense and foreign policies pointing out Turkey as the source of threat for the next two decades. With Aegean issues which appeared as 'disputes' on the agenda after the Cyprus intervention, dominated the bilateral relations, and simultaneously their respective relations with the EU.

Among the reasons of Greece's application for membership to the EC, Turkish threat took place next to other economic and political reasons under the broad slogan of Karamanlis, 'We belong to West'. This situation was known commonly by all parties of the issue and it was also foreseen by the Community and Turkey that their relations might be affected by Greek membership. However, this possibility did not prevent the EC from taking steps for Greece's integration and that came into effect in January 1981.

EC membership of Greece brought a new factor in Turkish-Greek relations. Being a member of an entity that Turkey has been trying to get in, gave Greece a big advantage strengthening its position in disputes with Turkey. However, the usage of EC/EU tool differed from the 1980s to the second half of the 1990s directly related to the change in PASOK administration.

During the entire 1980s and early 1990s, Greece used its EC membership against Turkey as a veto tool in order to force Ankara to make concessions on disputed issues. While refusing to bring the Ankara Agreement within its borders, the main Greek vetoes came on the Association Council meetings regarding Turkey and on financial packages. During this period, the EC did not make declarations about the way the Cyprus issue as well as Aegean disputes should be solved avoiding taking side in Turkish-Greek relations. The Greek veto was used by the Community to reflect Greece as the main obstacle on the development of relations with Turkey. Greece also had the advantages of this policy since it was increasing its bargaining power against Turkey.

However, this policy left its place to more constructive policies with Simitis' premiership in Greece starting in 1996. In the transformed policies EC membership continued to be an important card in Greece's hands but now as a 'carrot' more than a 'stick'. This was a policy not only towards Turkey, but also towards the Balkan countries under the new role Greece shouldered for the stabilization of the region, which was to coach them to NATO and EU memberships as being the only Balkan country holding those titles in the second half of the 1990s. In terms of the usage of EC membership as a 'carrot' vis-à-vis Turkey, Greece started to express its will for Turkey's integration with the EU.

This policy of Simitis was closely related with his macro economy-politics. In order to be included in the euro zone, there was an urgent need to curtail military expenditures of the country to reach the targets set by the Community. And this curtailment was related with relations with Turkey since Ankara had been perceived as the main threat to the country. In addition to the economic goals of Simitis, the attitude of the EU about Cyprus issue and the Aegean disputes started to change. In 1995, the start of accession negotiations of Cyprus was guaranteed as a response to lifting the Greek veto on Customs Union with Turkey. By this way, the main step to make Cyprus a problem of the EU was taken. Besides, after the Kardak/Imia crisis, the Commission took the attitude of supporting Greece's arguments and solutions for the Aegean disputes. Since then, both Cyprus and Aegean disputes started to take place in the official documents of the Union concerning relations with Turkey. The last step bringing the direct involvement of the Union into Turkish-Greek disputes was taken in the Helsinki Summit with the granting of candidacy status to Turkey with the caveat of correlating the solution of the Cyprus issue and settlement of border disputes with Greece, namely Aegean disputes with progress of Turkey on the way of membership. After transforming the Aegean disputes into steps needed to be taken according to criteria set by the EU, Greece now takes place among the stronger supporters of Turkey's membership to the Club.

Eventually, Greece was successful in Europeanization of its disputes with Turkey before the end of the 1990s. It was a clear diplomacy success of Simitis. Taking the disputes within the framework of the EU, Greece made the Community the main respondent of Turkey. This diplomacy brought Greece the bargaining

power which it would not have alone regarding its relative economic and political power. This diplomacy not only relieved Greece in terms of disputes with Turkey but also erased the label of 'spoiled child of Europe' and brought it close to core states of the Union.

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