

THE ORIGINAL TURKISH CONCERNS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN
NORTHERN IRAQ

A Master's Thesis

by
KWANGSOO CHOI

Department of International Relations
Bilkent University
Ankara
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THE ORIGINAL TURKISH CONCERNS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN
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KWAGNSOO CHOI

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Masters of Arts in International Relations.

Assistant Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Masters of Arts in International Relations.

Assistant Professor H. Tarık Oğuzlu
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Masters of Arts in International Relations.

Associate Professor Jeremy Salt
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Erdal Erel
Director

ABSTRACT

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Choi, Kwangsoo

M.A., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroglu

May 2008

After the invasion of Iraq by the U.S., Iraq is undergoing significant transition that no one can predict the future perfectly. Such changes in Iraq will lead to the increasing concerns from neighboring countries including Turkey, Iran, and Arab states. Especially, there are historical, demographical, political and geo-strategic contexts of Turkey's longstanding interests in the developments taking place in Iraq; treaties between Turkey and British related to Mosul that goes back to the 1920s, close cultural ties with Turkmen or Iraqi Turk who has lived in mostly northern Iraq, the direct threat of PKK who has stationed in northern Iraq to Turkey and an increased instability of security structure in Middle East. This thesis aims to elaborate the original Turkish concerns of developments in northern Iraq with political, demographical, political and geo-strategic dimensions by taking facts into considerations. Also, in accordance with the assessment of Turkish foreign policy about northern Iraq in particular since 1990s, it attempts to understand Turkish policies about northern Iraq.

Keywords: Mosul, Mudros Armistice, National Pact, Lausanne Treaty, Ankara Agreement, Turkmen, Arabization, Kurdification, PKK, No-Fly-Zone.

Ö ZET

Kuzey Irak'taki Gelişmeler Üzerine Türkiye'nin Asıl Kaygıları

Choi, Kwangsoo

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu

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ABD tarafından işgal edildikten sonra Irak, hiç kimsenin geleceği tam anlamıyla tahmin edemeyeceği bir değişim sürecine girdi. Irak'taki bu değişim Türkiye, İran ve Arap ülkeleri gibi komşu ülkelerin güvenlik konusundaki endişelerinin artmasına yol açtı. Iraktaki gelişmeler özellikle tarihsel, demografik, siyasal ve jeostratejik açıdan Türkiye'yi kaygılandırmaktadır. Bu kaygılar Türkiye ve İngiltere arasında tarihi 1920'lere dayanan Musul ile ilgili anlaşmalar, Kuzey Irak'ta yaşayan Türkmenlerle arasındaki yakın kültürel bağlar, Kuzey Irak'ta yerleşmiş olan PKK'nın sebep olduğu güvenlik tehdidi ve Ortadoğu'da yükselmekte olan güvenlik sorunlarıyla yakından ilgilidir. Bu tezde olaylar göz önünde tutularak, Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak meselesi üzerindeki gerçek kaygıları tarihsel, demografik, siyasal ve jeostratejik açıdan incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Öte yandan, Türkiye'nin 1990 yılından bu yana sürdürdüğü Kuzey Irak politikasının değerlendirilmesine paralel olarak, Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak politikalarını anlamaya çalışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Musul, Mondros Mütarekesi, Misak-ı Milli, Lozan Antlaşması, Ankara Antlaşması, Türkmenler, Araplaştırma, Kürtleştirme, PKK, Uçuşa-Yaşak-Bölge.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	: Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
CPA	: Coalition Provisional Authority
DTP	: Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi)
EU	: European Union
GMEP	: Greater Middle East Project
GNA	: Grand National Assembly
HADEP	: People's Democracy Party (Kurdish Halkın Demokrasi Partisi)
INTP:	Iraqi National Turkmen Party
ITF	: Iraqi Turkmen Front
KDP	: Kurdistan Democratic Party
KRG	: Kurdish Regional Government
LoN	: The League of the Nations
NSC	: National Security Council
OSCE	: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PKK	: Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê)
PUK	: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
TAL	: Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period
TBA	: Turkmen Brotherhood Association
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	: UNSC Resolution
WMD	: Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

After the creation of the No-fly-Zone,¹ the de facto autonomous Kurdish area in northern Iraq has emerged as one of the most important and urgent security challenges from Turkey. More importantly, the deeply increasing sectarian conflicts among Sunni, Shiite and Kurds as well as insurgencies have threatened the fragile federal Iraqi government who had the support of Sunni and Kurds, not Shiite in terms of political, social and territorial unitary. It goes without saying that the fragile Iraqi situation has led various security challenges to the neighboring countries including Turkey, Iran and Syria. Especially, considering the close ties with northern Iraq in various perspectives, the developments of Iraq are deeply connected with the security problems of Turkey.

This thesis aims to elaborate the original Turkish concerns of developments in northern Iraq with the historical, demographical, political and geo-strategic contexts by taking facts into considerations. The other objective of this thesis is to

¹ The creation of the so-called “no-fly-zones” by the United States and Britain, without referring specifically to any United Nations Resolution, which denied the Iraqi military entering the large segments of the Iraqi territory both in the north and in the south, caused much political concern as well as serious security problems for Turkey in many respects.

evaluate Turkish policies about northern Iraq by sampling out the most important decisions of Turkey about northern Iraq since 1990s.

This thesis is significantly different from existing studies on a ground that it focuses on the multi-dimensional aspects rather than the one-dimensional ones. In other words, it is very unique in a sense that it provides the reader with four perspectives of Turkish concerns; the historical, demographical, political and geo-strategic perspectives. Also, the reasons why Turkey cannot help concerning about the developments of northern Iraq are speculated with the evaluation from past to current events.

In the first Chapter, British occupation of Mosul (in the violation of the Mudros Armistice) and the inclusion of Mosul into the Turkish National Pact would be the starting-point of Turkish historical concern for northern Iraq. The contrasted arguments between Turkey and British about the Mosul on the Lausanne Conference was inclined toward British favor by the virtue of the power politics, being accepted the British arguments one-sidedly. The historical approach shows the fact that not only would the arguments of Turkey who was not even a member of the League of Nations (LoN) at that time when the Mosul issue was decided by the LoN not be accepted in the resolutions by the LoN but also even the ratified Ankara agreement that decided the final status of Mosul issue would not be observed.² According to Hasan Tunç, “pursuant to the Ankara Agreement, Turkey conceded the Mosul to the Iraqi government under the mandate of British, not to the particular ethnic groups. If the Ankara Agreement will remain invalid, the right to Mosul shall be returned to Turkey by the guidance of international law.”³

² Turkey joined into the LoN in 1932 whereas the resolution of LoN about the Mosul issue was decided in December 1925.

³ Hasan Tunç, “Tarihten Bugüne Kerkük ve Geleceği(Kirkuk and its future from the history to now),” *Global Strateji*, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, p.22.

In the second Chapter, Turkmen who has the close ethnic ties with Turkey would be analyzed as the demographical factor that causes to Turkish concern. After the concession of Mosul from Turkey to Iraq, Iraqi governments had tried to transform the northern Iraq from the Turkmen land to Arabian one. As illustrative examples, the massacres against Turkmen in 1924, 1946, 1959 and 1991 under the support or silent tolerance of Iraqi governments were the policy of ethnic assimilation in order to make northern Iraq to Arabian land. On the other hand, after the operation of No-Fly-Zone, Kurds supported by the U.S. have carried out the Kurdification of northern Iraq by changing the existing demographical structure favoring their own interests in order to create the Kurdistan state. Furthermore, original Turkmen land, Kirkuk where reserves a lot of natural resource, particularly oil, has been extensive Kurdification process by Kurdish groups for the purpose of including Kirkuk as the zone of Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).

In the third Chapter, Turkish security concern about the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiye Karkaren Kurdistane, PKK), terrorist group, stationed in Northern Iraq will be addressed. Even though it is true that the PKK responsible for over 37,000 casualties (approximately 27,000 PKK terrorists, 5,000 Turkish security forces and 5,000 civilians) has stationed in northern Iraq since 1982 firstly, after the operation of No-Fly-Zone, it has used northern Iraq as the breeding ground under the help of the Iraqi Kurdish groups. More importantly, under such a situation, the de facto Iraqi Kurdish region in northern Iraq would be likely to be a center to attract the Kurds living in Turkey.

Another problem is the difficulty for cross border operations by Turkish military to eliminate the PKK terrorists in northern Iraq without the cooperation of other political actors such as the U.S., Iraq and KRG. Therefore, Turkey also should

try to find out the ways to persuade other political actors to share Turkish concerns about the PKK.

In short, it would not be surprised that Turkey has responded to the current developments of northern Iraqi situation sensitively if we take consideration into the historical, geographical and cultural links of the PKK to Kurdish politicians in northern Iraq.

In the fourth Chapter, taking into a consideration the fact that Turkey is simultaneously located not only in the part of the Middle Eastern regional political system but also in the part of the Europe, the undergoing instability of Iraq, especially the emergence of a de facto autonomous Kurds area, would exacerbate the unstable security structure of Middle East to the actual bloody conflicts in the region. Even though neighboring countries including Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Iran have a subtle difference in seeking to their own national interests in Iraq, all Middle Eastern states have argued that the unitary of Iraq should be maintained in terms of political and territorial aspect. On the contrary to all Middle Eastern states, both the U.S. and Israel who do not have any alliance in the Middle East exception to Turkey have increased the regional instability by giving supports to the Kurdish groups. Also, the policies of Great Powers including the U.S., Russia, European Union (EU) and China about Iraq have been so contrary to each other that the instability of Iraq can be expanded to the entire Middle East.

In the conclusion, after summarizing the original Turkish concerns about northern Iraq, this thesis will analyze the Turkish foreign policies about northern Iraq by sampling out the most important Turkish decisions (the participation of the No-Fly-Zone operation and the Turkish refusal of American request to deploy U.S. army in Turkish territory) and Turkish policy about Turkmen since 1990s.

The methodology used in this thesis is descriptive one based on the secondary sources mostly in Turkish and English books or articles, TV programs and newspapers. In particular, the data of the second Chapter that will explain the situation of Turkmen come from the Turkish books in that the close attractiveness of Turkish scholars to the Iraqi Turkmen in various aspects may lead to study rather than foreign ones.

CHAPTER 2

THE MOSUL QUESTION IN THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

2.1 Introduction

Even though there were many Turkish states such as the “Seljuks of Iraq, the Zengids, the Atabeylik of Erbil, Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu States in the Mosul-Kirkuk region,”⁴ the direct relationship between Turkey and Mosul dated back to 1517 year when the Ottoman Empire conquered the Mosul and Kirkuk.⁵ That is, the historical concern, Mosul issue originated from the defeat of Ottoman Empire in World War One. The Mosul Vilayeti in the past comprising Kirkuk, Mosul, Erbil and Suleymaniyah has been written as the Mosul issue in the various documents due to the territorial dispute between Turkey, the successor of Ottoman Empire and British, the winner of World War One. Mosul issue was one of the most difficult diplomatic problems both states could not solve during a short negotiation time because of the sharp conflict of opinions on this issue. By analyzing various treaties from the Mudros Armistice to the Ankara Agreement between Turkey and British, we can find why Turkey has a concern about developments of Iraq with the respect of the

⁴ Ekrem Pamukçu and Habib Hürmüzlü, *Irak'ta Türkmen Boy ve Oymaklar(Turkmen Clans and Nomadic Tribes in Iraq)*, (Ankara: Global Strateji Enstitüsü, 2005), pp.7-14.

⁵ Henry A. Foster. *The Making of Modern Iraq*, (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935), p.24.

historical perspective. The violation of the Mudros Armistice by British deprived the Turkish right to Mosul. And, the Ankara Agreement, the final agreement about status of Mosul provided Turkey with the legal right to Mosul if Iraq who ratified the Ankara Agreement will be dissolved.

2.2 The Mosul before Lausanne Treaty

During the First World War, there were many secret agreements signed among the Entente Powers which could determine the result of Eastern Question,⁶ which were the Istanbul Agreement,⁷ the London Agreement,⁸ the Sykes-Picot (-Sazonov) Agreement⁹ and the Saint Jeanne de Maurienne Agreement.¹⁰ However, these agreements should be changed by the withdrawal of Russia from World War I, the inclusion of the U.S. and the change of interest calculation of Great Powers. Even though all these agreements included the Mosul issue, the direct causal relationship of current Mosul issue was based on the Mudros armistice signed on October 30, 1918.

⁶ The Eastern Question which is normally dated to 1774, when the Russo-Turkish War, 1768-1774, ended in defeat for the Ottoman Empire, encompasses the diplomatic and political problems posed by the decay of the Ottoman Empire.

⁷ The Istanbul Agreement signed on March 18, 1915 between Russia, Britain and France recognized that Russia possessed Istanbul, the Straits, the European shores of Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara in the event of an Entente Victory. For detailed information, see Salahi R. Sonyel, op cit., pp.1-2.

⁸ In the London Agreement of April 26, 1915 between Britain, France, Russia and Italy, Italy gained the right to share the partition of Ottoman Empire in return for its participation in the war on the side of Entente Powers. According to this agreement, Italy was promised an 'equitable' share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the Province of Adalia. For detailed information, see Salahi R. Sonyel, op cit., pp.1-2.

⁹ The Sykes-Picot agreement signed in May 1916 between British and France just while World War One continued. According to this agreement, northern Iraq was left to French authority. However, in the San Remo Conference on April 24, 1920, France waived its claims on Mosul in return for receiving 25% of share of Mosul oil revenues and Britain's evacuation of Syria. For detailed information, see Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, *Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri(The Relations between Turkey and British)*, (Ankara: Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1978), p.42.

¹⁰ When Italy learned about the Sykes-Picot Agreement, it demanded its share from this agreement. The Saint-Jeanne de Maurienne Agreement signed on April 17, 1917 between Britain, France and Italy replaced the London Agreement. According to this agreement, Italy recognized the Sykes-Picot Agreement and in return the regions of Antalya, Konya, Aydın and Izmir were left to Italy. Russia was not able to join this agreement due to the Bolshevik revolution with the declaration that the international contracts of the Czarist administration never came into effect.

2.2.1 The Mudros Armistice

After the withdrawal of Germany from the war, the Ottoman Empire who lacked the sufficient war materials including human and industrial resources could not help suggesting the armistice to the Allied Powers. Even though the armistice negotiations would place the emphasis on interests of victorious nations regardless of the defeated ones, as the word stands, the victorious nations could gain the advantages by inserting the ambiguous clauses in the Mudros Armistice Treaty,¹¹ in particular, in the 7th articles. In the 7th article, Allied Powers could acquire the right to occupy the strategic locations of Ottoman Empire in an increasing situation where their security could be threatened.¹² Just after the Mudros Armistice became operative on October 31, 1918, the Allied Powers started to occupy the strategic locations of Ottoman Empire like the Straits, Mosul and so on.

Admittedly, the occupation of Mosul can be estimated by one of British policies in order to protect their strategic goals. The Mosul, a large extent, the Iraq gave the strategic importance to British from the two points. First of all, statements of German experts in 1871¹³ that there were rich oil reserves in Mosul region increased foreign attention towards the region but at that time the use of oil was limited and the transportation of it was problematic. However, since that time, the oil in Mosul was the crucial for British in the areas of industry and war. The focus of great powers on the oil was expressed in the words the British Prime Minister Churchill said during the First World War, “one drop of oil is as important as one

¹¹ See Appendix A for the full text of the Mudros Armistice.

¹² Salahi R. Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy(1918-1923): Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement*, (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1975), p.3.

¹³ Suphi Saatçı, “Irak Türkmenleri ve Kerkük Sorunu (İraçî Turkmen and Kirkuk Question),” *Global Strateji*, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, p.25.

drop of blood of our soldiers.”¹⁴ Secondly, in order to maintain the stable control of India, the routes to India should be safeguarded.¹⁵ Thus, British sought to foreign policies which Iran and Iraq were under the control of their own hands. Such intentions of British were presented in various historical events such as the postpone of signing of the Armistice Treaty, the obligation of the Mudros Armistice by the occupation of the Mosul and military threat to the Turkish army who stationed in the Mosul legitimately. The 25th Article of Mudros Armistice regulated as follows; “Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey shall cease from noon, local time, on Thursday, 31st October, 1918.”¹⁶ In other words, despite of the fact that all forces should be stopped at that time when the armistice came into the effect on October 21, 1918, at noon local time, the British forces occupied Hammalil on November 1 and demanded the unconditional withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Mosul to the north and the surrender of Turkish garrison on the next day. Considering the fact that on October 30, 1918 when the armistice was signed, the 6th Ottoman Army commanded by Ali Ihsan Pasha occupied the entire areas of Mosul involving Rakka, Miyadin, Telafar, Dibeke, Cemcema, Suleymaniyah except Kirkuk,¹⁷ the move to Mosul of British army and demand to withdrawal of Turkish army from Mosul were violations of the Mudros Armistice. That is, the starting-point that Mosul issue was

¹⁴ Zekeriya Türkmen, “Musul Meselesi Askeri Yönden Çözüm Arayışlar(The Military Attempts to solve the Mosul Question),” *Global Strateji*, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, p.14; Mehmet Kocaoğlu, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Işığında Ortadoğu Parçalanmak İstenen Topraklar ve İstismare Edilen İnsanlar(People who want to disseminate the Middle East in the international relation)*, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1995), pp.175-176.

¹⁵ Zekeriya Türkmen, “Birinci Dünya Savaşından Kurtuluş Savaşı’na Uzun Süreçte Musul Meselesine Bakış: Mustafa Kemal Paşa’nın Musul Konusundaki Duyarlılığı ve Misak-I Millide Musul (The View of Mosul from the First World War to the Independent War: The Warning of Mustafa Kemal and the Mosul under the National Pact),” *Global Strateji*, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, p.108.

¹⁶ Gwynne Cyer, “The Turkish Armistice of 1918 : A Lost Opportunity : The Armistice Negotiations of Mudros, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 8, No : 2, 1972. For the full text of Mudros Armistice, see Appendix A.

¹⁷ Semih E. Yalçın, *Misak I Milli ve Lozan Konferansı Belgeleri’nde Musul Sorunu(The Mosul Probleme in the Documents of Lausanne Conference and National pact)*, in Misak-ı Milli ve Türk Dış Politikasında Musul, Kerkük ve Arbil Meselerleri Sempozyumu(Symposium about Mosul, Kirkuk and Erbil in the Turkish Foreign Policy), (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırmaları Merkezi Yayınları, 1998), p.157.

decided in favor of Britain later rooted in the violation of the Mudros Armistice directly by the illegitimate force.

2.2.2 The National Pact and Sevres Agreement

By the end of the First World War, the Mudros Armistice, which ended the war between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers, was the final stage of this process and the Treaty of Sevres which disintegrated the entire territory of Ottoman Empire except only the inner Anatolia. Yet, the National Liberation Movement led by Mustafa Kemal rejected the proposed peace terms and established its own government in Ankara on a basis of the National Pact. Elections held in the post-Armistice Ottoman Empire for a new Turkish Chamber of Deputies ended with the overwhelming victory of the Turkish nationalists who were in the line with a Kemalist declaration of political principle known as the National Pact. The basic aims of the National Pact were to create the independent nation-state based on the social, cultural and religious element, not the ethnic one and to encourage both Turks and Kurds who were under the rule of Allied Powers to call for resistance to the partition of Turkish homeland. With the announcement of Mustafa Kemal elected as the first president about the establishment of Turkish Parliament (The Grand National Assembly, GNA) in Ankara on April 23, 1920, the GNA accepted the National Pact as the basic principles of their all policies. The first article of the National Pact related to the Mosul was written as follows;

The destiny of the portions of Ottoman territory under foreign occupation and people by an Arab majority at the time of the signing of the armistice on October 30, 1918 should be determined by a plebiscite of all inhabitants. All such territories inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority, united in religion, in race, and in aspiration, are imbued with feelings of mutual respect, concern, and devotion, and form an indivisible whole.¹⁸

¹⁸ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp.348-349.

According to this article, the Ottoman territories where were not under the occupation of Allied Powers at the time of the Mudros armistice of October 30, 1918 should be transferred to Turkey, the successor state of Ottoman Empire. The Mosul also where British occupied one week after the Mudros armistice became operative by violating it should be remained within the Turkish territory in accordance with the National Pact. Mustafa Kemal presented the fact that Mosul should remain inside Turkey as follows;

On the day the armistice was signed, the country comprised within these limits was practically under the control of our armies. The line delimiting this boundary starts from a point south of the Gulf of Alexandretta and goes toward Antioch, passing between Aleppo and the Katime Station and it meets the Euphrates at a point south of the Jerablus Brides. Then it goes through Der Zor and turns eastward to include Kirkuk, Mosul and Suleymaniyah within or dominion. Besides the fact that the regions within this boundary were defended militarily, they were inhabited by Turks and Kurds, while the southern part of this limit is inhabited by our Arabic-speaking co-religionists. So the country included within this boundary has been adopted as the inseparable home of the Ottomans.¹⁹

On the other hand, the Sevres Agreement, which aimed to disintegrate the Ottoman Empire, was signed on August 10, 1920 by the Istanbul government. According to the Treaty of Sevres, the Arab provinces disseminated from the Ottoman Empire as decided at San Remo; Greece acquired Western and Eastern Thrace including Edirne and Aegean Islands; Izmir also would be under the Greece administration for five years and then it could be incorporated to Greece if the majority of people wished so after five years; Italy gained the Dodecanese including Rhodes; Armenia would be independent state and the current northern Iraq including Mosul was given autonomy and the Kurds would be independent if they wished so; the straits would be under the international control with the terms of demilitarized

¹⁹ Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation(1918-1923)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2000), p.797.

lands near to the straits.²⁰ To put it concretely, the 62nd, 63rd and 64th Articles of Sevres Agreement stated the Mosul issue as follow;

East of the Euphrates River, an Armenian border to be determined in accordance with the 27th Article, sections two and three. Those areas of majority Kurdish population north of Syria and Iraq and within Turkey will be autonomous.²¹

In the 63rd Article;

The Ottoman government declares from now that it will accept any decision and act upon it within three months, that is made by the committee to be. One year after this agreement goes into effect, the Kurds mentioned in Article 62, if those in regions where they make up the majority, can prove that they wish to be independent from Turkey, can apply to the League of Nations, provided that they met the necessary requirements, Turkey declares that it will accept all the decisions made and relinquished all its claims and rights on the region. If this relinquishing of rights and claims by Turkey takes place, when it takes place, the parts of Kurdistan that have remained in the Mosul province until now with Kurds residing in it, can if they will it, join the independent Kurdish state.²²

In the responses to this treaty, not only Turkish but also even some British leading officers criticized the feasibility of it because the Sevres treaty would be so severe that Turks would not ratify it. Consequently, the Sevres Agreement, which was completely reverse to the National Pact, which was accepted as the fundamental aim by the GNA, became invalid with the declaration of the GNA that all treaties, contracts or other obligations signed by the Istanbul government after March 16, 1920 were invalid. Even though the Sevres Treaty was not ratified with the Turkish efforts, the Western attempts to disintegrate Turkey, leaving the small inner Anatolia, were enough to consolidate the “Sevres Syndrome” which has been continued until now among Turks. That is, some see a future independence for Kurds in northern Iraq as a return of the Sevres Agreement being imposed on Turkey once again. Also,

²⁰Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, op cit., p.356. The full text of the Treaty of Sevres can be found at http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Peace_Treaty_of_Sevres.

²¹ Nurer Uğurlu, *Kürt Milliyetçiliği: Kürtler ve Şeyh Sait İsyanı* (Kurdish Nationalism: Kurds and the Sheikh Sait Rebellion), (İstanbul: Örgün Press, 2006), p.61.

²² Ibid., p.62.

the Turkish syndrome about the Sevres Agreement reflected well in a letter Mustafa Barzani²³ sent to President Jimmy Carter in February of 1997 as follows;

The 1920 Sevres Agreement in equivalence with other nations that made up the Ottoman Empire gave Kurds the right to determine their own destiny. But international interests prevented Kurds from realizing this goal.²⁴

Such a view that have been voiced freely by the leaders of the Kurdish movements throughout the decades that followed the Lausanne Treaty caused rightful suspicions and fears among Turks about the true intentions of the Kurds that were asking for autonomy and independence in northern Iraq.

Admittedly, Mustafa Kemal's desire to recovery the Mosul was expressed very well during the liberation war with Allied Powers. Even though there was not an official war between the British and Turkey in Mosul, the struggle of Turkish and Kurdish people against British was strong in order to save Mosul from the occupying British. Both during the First World War and after it, many Turk including the Iraqi Turkmen who mainly came from Kirkuk and Erbil died in battle for the purpose of saving the Mosul from British.²⁵ Also, it is impressive that Turkish nationalists provided the material and morale support with the tribes in Mosul as much as it could, taking into consideration the fact that they did not have enough ability to assist the Mosul people due to the urgent demands in the front of the Anatolia and limited resources in terms of war materials. Also, Mustafa Kemal appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Özdemir bey to the commander of regional forces including the region of Mosul in order to save Mosul by supporting the Revandiz revolts against the British occupation. Özdemir bey was real threat for the British. As one of the most effective

²³ Mustafa Barzani was a Kurdish nationalist leader and President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the father of Massoud Barzani who is the current leader of the KDP and was elected as the President of the Iraqi Kurdistan region by the Parliament of Iraqi Kurdistan in June 2005.

²⁴ Hakkı Öznur, *Caşlar Savaşı-Kuzey Irak Kürt Hareketi ve Musul, Kerkük Meselesi*(*War of the Caş- Northern Iraq Kurdish Movement and Mosul, Kirkuk Problems*), (Ankara: Altinküre Press, 2003), p.242.

²⁵ Cengiz Eroğlu, "Kerkük ve Şehitleri(Kirkuk and the War Dead)," *Global Strateji*, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, pp.177-180.

ways to consolidate the control in Mosul, the British recognized to need to cut the connection between the Turks and Kurds of Mosul in order to put the Kurds under British control. Therefore, the British began their operation on April 11, 1923. With the heavy bombardment, the British burned and demolished all of the cities they passed through and arrived at Revandiz on April 22, rendering the people of Revandiz to leave the city. Even though Turkish unit under the command of Ö zdemir Bey fled to Iran on April 29 due to the operations of British military, the British was impressed with Ö zdemir's resistance which lasted nine months. This was an end of plans for a Turkish operation in Mosul and the tribes lost all hope that the Turks would come back to the region.²⁶

On the other hand, the British efforts to consolidate their powers in Mosul, more broadly, in Iraq was represented in the Cairo conference of 1921 that set the parameters for Iraqi political life continued until the 1958 revolution. In order to make their claim for Mosul, the British established a legal, constitutional framework through this conference.²⁷ Also, they thought that Faisal selected by the first King of Iraq by the British would be accepted by the growing Iraqi nationalist movement because of his role in the 1916 Arab Revolt against the Turks, his achievements as a leader of the Arab emancipation movement, and his general leadership qualities.²⁸ These efforts taken at the Cairo Conference was connected to the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. The British established Anglo-Iraqi Treaty²⁹ used by British

²⁶ İhsan Ş. Kaymaz, *Mosul Sorunu(Mosul Question)*, (Istanbul: Otopsi Yayınları, 2003), p.324-325.

²⁷ British chose a Hashemite, Faisal ibn Husayn, son of Sherif Hussein ibn Ali former Sharif of Mecca as Iraq's first King; they established an indigenous Iraqi army; and they proposed a new treaty. To confirm Faisal as Iraq's first monarch, a one-question plebiscite was carefully arranged that had a return of 96 percent in his favor.

²⁸ Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country*, (British: IB Tauris Press, 2007), pp. 42-45

²⁹ The twenty-year Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which was ratified in October 1922, stated that the king would heed British advice on all matters affecting British interests and on fiscal policy as long as Iraq had a balance of payments deficit with Britain, and that British officials would be appointed to specified posts in eighteen departments to act as advisers and inspectors. A subsequent financial agreement,

argument in the Lausanne Conference³⁰ and signed on October 10, 1922 in order to gain the legitimacy about the occupation of Mosul as well as to conceal the violation of the Mudros Armistice. However, this treaty was also invalid in that it came from the 94th and 132nd articles of the Treaty of Sevres, which was never ratified by legitimate Turkish government.³¹

2.3 The Mosul in the Lausanne Treaty

The decisive military victory over the Greeks made the Mudanya Convention, which ended the Turkish war of National Liberation with the Allied Powers, imperative and enabled the Turks to negotiate peace terms with the Allied Powers on an equal position even if she was a defeated country. There had been a controversial debate about achieving a solution about the Mosul issue in the peace conference held in Lausanne that officially held from November 20, 1922 to January 23, 1923.

2.3.1 The Aims and Arguments of British

As stated above, for British, Mosul was the important strategical point in protecting the stable route to India, obtaining the rich oil reserve and securing a bridgehead to pursuit the successful Middle Eastern policies. British delegation led by Lord Curzon³² argued persistently that the Mosul should be under the rule of

which significantly increased the financial burden on Iraq, required Iraq to pay half the cost of supporting British resident officials, among other expenses. British obligations under the new treaty included providing various kinds of aid, notably military assistance, and proposing Iraq for membership in the League of Nations at the earliest moment. In effect, the treaty ensured that Iraq would remain politically and economically dependent on Britain.

³⁰ The full text of this Treaty can be found at http://wwi.ibu.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne.

³¹ İhsan Ş. Kaymaz, *op cit.*, p.184.

³² Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary was the president of conference.

British and remain within the boundaries of Iraq, suggesting the follows as the evidences supporting his arguments,³³

- The Mosul issue was so related to the boundary dispute that the plebiscite, which the Turkish delegation had offered, was not needed. Also, Kurds and Arabs not only had never asked for a plebiscite but also had not known what really it meant.
- According to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922, both Britain and Iraq had the duty to protect the territorial integrity of Iraqi land. Therefore, Britain could not withdraw from Mosul due to its commitments to Arabs, the people of Iraq and the LoN.³⁴
- Based on the British statistics,³⁵ the population composition of Turk in the Mosul was only 1/12 of the entire Mosul population. Therefore, the concession of Mosul to Turkey would ignore the opinions of Kurds and Arabs who not only did not have the same origins with Turks but also did not support Turks during WWI.
- All the economic relationships of the Mosul Province relied upon Syria and Iraq mainly, not upon Turkey.
- The Christian minority living in Mosul could not be left under the rule of Turkey.
- Considering the close distance from Mosul to Baghdad, Turkey could challenge Iraq's security if Turkey gained the Mosul.
- Mosul was occupied during WWI; as a result, the occupation of Mosul by British was legitimate. The important Turkish towns of the provinces such as

³³ Kemal Melek, *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Musul Sorunu(1890-1926), Mosul Issue with British Documents (1890-1926)*, (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1983), p.42.

³⁴ Henry A. Foster, op cit., pp.143-146.

³⁵ According to British statistics; the population of Mosul was composed of 66,000 Turks, 455,000 Kurds, 186,000 Arabs, 62,000 Christians and 17,000 Jews and totally 786,000.

Kerkük and Altinköprü had been under the British before signing the armistice. Just after the Mudros armistice was signed, the city of Mosul was occupied because the information about signing the armistice was reached to the front lately.³⁶ Furthermore, Lord Curzon said that the armistice contained several decrees that made the occupation possible and that a war ends not with an armistice but with a peace treaty. Also, he denied any connection of oil with the British.

British arguments were unreasonable in various aspects only by seeking their own interests. First of all, the opposition to plebiscite Turkish delegation had offered was the self-contradiction in a sense that not only was the application of plebiscite the Western idea but also British argued that Iraqi people including Mosul had joined into the election to select the Faisal³⁷ as the king of Iraq on August 23, 1922. Secondly, the argument that the information about signing the armistice was reached lately was only a poor excuse in order to hide the violation of the Mudros armistice. Thirdly, now that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty that British argued was not ratified by the legitimate Turkish government, the British argument loses the persuasive power. Other vulnerabilities of British arguments were presented in the Turkish arguments that will be explained in next part as well.

³⁶ İhsan Ş. Kaymaz, *op cit.*, pp.274-275.

³⁷ King Faisal was installed on August 23, 1922 according to the result of a referendum. The British claimed that 96% of the Iraqi people (except 4% who were mainly Kurds and Turks living in Kirkuk) chose Faisal as the king of Iraq. However, the British claim of a majority vote for Faisal was nonsense. The plebiscite was restricted to notables and the people around them. The Kurds completely boycotted the referendum.

2.3.2 The Aims and Arguments of Turkey

For Turkey, it was essential to remain the Mosul in the boundaries of the National Pact due to the ethnographic, political, geographical economic, military-strategic reasons. However, more significantly, at that time Mustafa Kemal was concerned about the possible autonomous Kurdistan state British would establish, which could encourage the Kurds living in South-Eastern area of Turkey to demand their full independence.³⁸ The concerns of Mustafa Kemal at that time that the loss of Mosul can be the magnet to attract the Kurds living in southeastern Turkey well reflects the historical background in the security concerns of current Turkish situation.

Admittedly, the Turkish arguments in the Lausanne Conference could be classified into five parts;

- Racial reasons: Based on the Turkish statistics,³⁹ the rate of Kurds and Turks who had lived in Mosul, Kirkuk and Suleymaniyah was the 4/5 of entire Mosul population. In addition, because there were about 170,000 Turkish, Kurdish and Arab migrant tribes who moved from season to season, it was impossible to calculate their exact number. As the National Pact did not involve any difference between Turks and Kurds in terms of race, religion and tradition, Turks responded to the British claim that Kurds were of Persian origin by saying that Kurds were Turanian in race.
- Political reasons: The British claim that Kurds did not want to live together with Turks was a totally unfounded allegation. And, the British army occupied Mosul after the Mudros Armistice was signed with the violation of it. Also,

³⁸ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Eskişehir İzmir Konuşmaları(1923)((Eskişehir İzmir Speech(1923))*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınlar, 1993), pp. 95-96.

³⁹ According to Turkish statistics; the population of Mosul was composed of 146,960 Turks, 263,830 Kurds, 43,210 Arabs, 18,000 Yezidi and 31,000 Mon-Moslems and totally 503,000.

there was no legal basis for the treaty that aimed to establish a mandate in Iraq because it has been a part of Ottoman Empire.

- Historical reasons: Mosul was under Turkish rule since the 11th century.
- Geographical-Economic reasons: Mosul was the part of Anatolia in terms of its climate and the structure of its land. With the respect of economics, the Mosul relied more upon Anatolia rather than Iraq because of the railway line that connected Mosul to the Mediterranean.
- Military and Strategic reasons: The British argument that the boundary offered by Turkey, 60 miles from Baghdad, threatened the Iraqi security was unreasonable because capitals of many countries were located close to boundaries and Turks were at peace with Arabs for centuries.

Turkish arguments were more reasonable than British in various aspects. First of all, the fact that even though Sevres treaty had envisaged the creation of an independent state in southeastern Anatolia and northern Iraq, Kurds fought alongside Turks in a Liberation War backs up the legitimacy of Turkish argument in terms of the racial reasons. In other words, the vast majority of both Turks and Kurds still identified themselves primarily through religion rather than any concept of race or nation argued by British. As the former part explained, the occupation of Mosul by British Army was the violation of the Mudros Armistice undoubtedly.

Nevertheless, the sharp contrasted arguments between Britain and Turkey were started to be inclined toward the British favors because of various reasons; first, the British was superior in military technology particularly in terms of naval and air technology, second, the Greeks, even though defeated by Turkish nationalists army, could be rearmed and unleashed by British, third, a newly emerging nation, Turkey

needed to establish good relations with British if they wanted to strengthen their position in world politics, forth, even if the Soviet Union could be regarded as the ally of Turkey at the time of the Lausanne Conference, this alliance was not absolutely believable and also Turks was necessary to make British the counterweight to the Soviet Union, fifth, the British understood very well that Turkey did not have enough military capability to enter a new war against British because the National War of Liberation was only recently over and some other countries such as Italy would attack to Anatolia for its own interests without British supports, finally, Istanbul and the Straits were still under the occupation of Allied Powers.

As a result, when the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923, the resolution of Mosul issue was postponed with the direct negotiation between two parties. The final decision about Mosul was stated in the 3rd article of the Treaty of Lausanne as follows;

The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Britain within nine months. In the event of no agreement being reached between the two governments within the mentioned time, the dispute should be referred to the Council of League of Nations. The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of frontier, no their military or other movement shall take place, which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision.⁴⁰

As stated in the 3rd article, the LoN had the right to decide the fate of Mosul issue if it was not solved between bilateral negotiations at the end of nine months.

⁴⁰ Durmuş Yılmaz, *Musul Meselesi Tarihi(The History of Mosul Issue)*, (Ankara: Çizgi Kitabevi Yayınları, 2003), pp.159-160.

2.4 The Resolution of the League of Nations about Mosul

By the provision of the article 3 of the Lausanne Peace Agreement, Haliç Conference was held in Istanbul on May 19-June 5, 1924 with the aim to find out the solution about Mosul issue. Although the main purpose of this Conference was to achieve the mutual agreement about Mosul issue, British did not show any efforts to solve Mosul issue with the intention of transferring the Mosul issue to the LoN where British was a powerful member whereas Turkey was not the member of it at that time. The Haliç Conference could not reach a solution because the two government's arguments were little different from those made at Lausanne.

The Council of LoN decided to establish a special commission⁴¹ to investigate local condition and opinion about whether the people of Mosul wanted to be remained in Iraq or in Turkey. Just after ending their missions, the commission submitted a report to the Council in September 1925 that Mosul should be under the rule of British mandate for 25 years and that the border between Turkey and Iraq should be the line which had been drawn in Brussels.⁴² However, this report had several significant contradictions. First of all, it was based on the last census carried out by the Iraqi authority that could not be understood with the common sense. The censuses of Britain, Turkey and Iraq are as follows;⁴³

Gov.	Turkish Census: Statistics submitted in Lausanne	Estimate made by British Political Officers in 1921	Census by Iraq (1922-1924)
Kurds	263,830	424,720	494,000

⁴¹ The members of commission were Count Telki, the former prime Minister of Hungary, De Wirsén, former Swedish Ambassador to Bucharest and Colonel Paulis, a Belgian veteran officer. Some members from Turkey and Britain would be appointed to help and counsel the commission.

⁴² Brussels Line was determined in November 1924 as a temporary line as a result of Turkey's application to League of Nations because of border clashes. According to Brussels Line, Mosul was left to Iraq while Hakkari was left to Turkey.

⁴³ *Question of the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq: Report Submitted to the Council by the Commission instituted by the Council Resolution of September 30, 1924, (Lausanne: League of Nations, 1924), p.33.*

Arabs	43,210	185,763	166,941
Turks	146,960	65,895	38,652
Christians	31,000	62,225	61,336
Jews	-	16,865	11,897
Yezidis	18,000	30,000	26,257
Nomads	170,000	-	-
Total	673,000	785,648	801,090

The indication of this table that Turkish population was about 38,000, even lower than 61 thousand of Christians could be considered as the evidence that the commission wanted to support the British view. Also, the report included as follows; “it is indisputable that Turkey retains her legal sovereignty over the disputed territory so long as she does not renounce her rights.”⁴⁴ According to this sentence, the Mosul should be remained within the boundary of Turkey because she had never given up the Mosul. Furthermore, the report mentioned that “if a plebiscite had been made, the residents of Mosul would have wanted to stay in Iraq.”⁴⁵ However, the Turkish proposal of plebiscite was not accepted and the report involved that Mosul had to stay under the mandate of Britain for an additional 25 years. On the other hand, the LoN rejected to the British request to include Hakkari to be given to Iraq because of the presence of Nestorian Christians who had rebelled against the Ottoman Empire and could not return to Turkey. However, generally speaking, the decision of LoN about the Mosul issue was influenced by the British, the great power, accepting British arguments one-sidedly.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p.85.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Turkish strong rejection against decisions of a commission that had many self-contradiction factors was an expected result. As a result of Turkey's objections, the Permanent Court of International Justice on September 19, 1925 gave an advisory opinion to the LoN. Just after receiving the negative decision made by the Court from Turkish viewpoint, the Council of LoN made a decision in the meeting on December 16, 1925 in which Turkish committee did not take part that the border between Turkey and Iraq would be Brussels line and the Mosul would be placed in Iraq under British mandate due to an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The reactions against the decision of LoN had been come out from the wide ranges in Turkey. The first reaction was the letter of Tevfik Rüştü, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, which was submitted at the meeting of the Council where Turkish representatives were absent on December 16, 1925. In the letter, he claimed that "the sovereign rights of a state over a territory can only come to an end with its consent and that therefore our sovereign rights over the whole of the province of Mosul remain intact in response to the decision of LoN."⁴⁶ Also, Turkey signed with the Soviet Union about the treaty of neutrality and friendship on December 17, 1925, the day after the LoN made its final decision.⁴⁷ Also, within the Turkish public, the reaction was severe. It was written in *Cumhuriyet* (Turkish Daily Newspaper) of December 17, 1925;

The League's decision "proves once more that the League of Nations is the servant of the strongest, namely Great Britain. Only in the medieval ages do we encounter such unjust and tyrannical decision. As the case was during our campaign for nationhood, so now the rights of the Turks are safe under the sharp bayonets of the Turks, and we know perfectly well how to take back with our hands 'Turkish Mosul' –given to Great Britain by the League of Nations-just as we saved Adana, Bursa, İzmir and İstanbul."⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Zeynep Ö. Alantar, *Türk Dış Politikası'nda Milletler Cemiyeti Dönemi(The Period of Nationalists in the Turkish foreign policy)* in Faruk Sönmezoğlu(ed) *Türk Dış Politikası'nın Analizi(The analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy)*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2001), p.83.

⁴⁷ İhsan Ş. Kaymaz, op cit., pp.566-567.

⁴⁸ Henry A. Foster, op cit., p.176.

However, the strong reactions of Turkey were not connected to the practical actions including military operations. The reasons why Turkish government could not help receiving these decisions despite the strong reactions from Turkish politicians and public may be speculated as follows;

-The External Factors;

- Turkey was still isolated from the international society militarily and diplomatically. Therefore, Turkey needed British friendship for several reasons; the improvement of relationship with the Western nations, especially France, the doubtful trust about the Soviet Union, the concerns of military operations by Italy and Greece.

-The Internal Factors;

- Turkey did not enough military capability to engage a war with British because she had been war throughout 10 years from 1911 to 1922.
- In order to recapture the modern civilization based on the Western values and recovery the damage of war, Turkey needed a peace and stability.
- One of the largest revolts by Kurds mainly in the southeast territory of Turkey, the Shika Sid revolt⁴⁹ caused by the abolition of Caliphate mainly not only weakened the Turkish claims on the Mosul region but also led Atatürk to make important changes in his Kurdish policy.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ With the abolition of the caliphate on March 3, 1924, the most serious Kurdish revolt in the history of Turkish republic took place on February 13, 1925. The revolt was planned by Aside (Freedom), a Kurdish organization founded in 1923 by former militia officers. The leader of this organization was Shaikh Said. The revolt which caused serious problems for Turkey both politically and militarily was suppressed on April 27. Although the Shaikh Said revolt was ostensibly religious, in fact it aimed for the establishment of an independent Kurdish State. Also, even though it is impossible to prove a direct British role in the Shaikh Said revolt, it is understood from the British documents that before this revolt the British had implied they would support it to encourage the Kurds.

⁵⁰ "Türk İngiliz Münasebetleri ve Musul Meselesi(Turco-Anglo Relations and Mosul Issue)," in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası(1919-1973)(Turkish Foreign Policy by Events)(1919-1973)*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, Sevinç Matbaası, 1974), p.81.

These reasons restricted the likelihood of using the force against British and Turkey believed that Britain would consider going to war over the Mosul dispute since it was of vital importance for its interest. Therefore, Turkey was obliged to abandon the aim of the National Pact and followed the realism and non-adventurism based on the fundamental features of Atatürk's foreign policies.

2.5 The Ankara Agreement

The Ankara Agreement which decided the final status of Mosul issue was signed in June 25, 1926 among three governments including British, Turkey and Iraq. This agreement was composed of three parts, Borders, Good Relationships with Neighbors and General Provision including 18 articles.⁵¹ According to this Treaty, the Brussels line became the border line between Turkey and Iraq as the LoN decided and Turkey had the right to take a 10% share from the revenue of Mosul petroleum for 25 years. Instead of the 10% share, if Turkey wanted, then she could receive 500,000 Sterling in place of its share within one year. In a variety of sources, Turkey renounced its right of 10% royalty on Mosul oil in favor of a cash payment of 500,000 Sterling. However, according to Hikmet Uluğbay, "Turkey had chosen to take a 10% royalty."⁵² Also, in his research, "Turkey only had received two million Sterling less than the amount of money that should have been paid by Iraq. The real value of this unpaid money in today's value is somewhere between 755.2-1,644.7 million dollars."⁵³

Meanwhile, one of the most crucial weaknesses of the Ankara Agreement was that there was no legal guarantee about the Iraqi Turkmen. If a guarantee would have

⁵¹ Süleyman Doğan, "Irakta Petrol Savaşı ve Türkmenler(Petroleum War in Iraq and Turkmen)," *Kardaşlık*, January-March 2003, p.17.

⁵² See Appendix C for the further information.

⁵³ Hikmet Uluğbay, *İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Petropolitik(The Oil Politics from the Empire to Republic)*, (Ankara: Ayraç Yanyınevi, 2003), pp.446-447.

been included in the agreement, Turkey could have played a more active role in the massacres of the Iraqi Turkmen that will be explained in the next Chapter. As a result, the Mosul issue, unresolved since 1918, ended in the exact way Britain had hoped with the signing of the Ankara Treaty. This Treaty has given Turkey's southern borders their final shape even if it was at the expense of the Turkish National Pact. But, one of the most important things we must keep in mind is that as the Ankara Treaty indicated, "Turkey made a concession the Mosul to Iraq under the mandate of British, not to any ethnic groups, especially Kurds."⁵⁴

Undoubtedly, from the historical perspective Turkey who lost the region of Mosul due to the defeat in power politics has the political and legal interest in the Mosul and Kirkuk. That is, the occupation of Mosul by British army (in the violation of the Mudros Armistice) and one-sided resolution of LoN in favor of British has consolidated Turkish historical resentment about the loss of Mosul. To make matters more complicated, the more unstable the political situation of Iraq has become, if not the perfect chaos, the stronger Turkish historical resentment about Mosul would be. For example, according to Hasan Tunç, "if the region of Mosul including Kirkuk will not be left in the Iraq territory, the Ankara agreement also will remain invalid. And the situation of Mosul should be returned to the one prior to the sign of the Ankara Agreement by International law. With the invalidity of the Ankara Agreement, the province of Mosul should be made restitution to Turkey who had ruled the province of Mosul for about 1000 years."⁵⁵

⁵⁴Hasan Tunç, op cit., p.12.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.22.

CHAPTER 3

THE TURKMEN ISSUE IN THE DEMOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT

3.1 Introduction

The warning of many Iraqi experts that the existence of racial, religious and cultural differences in Iraq may later develop into fissures affecting the united structure of the Iraqi society is totally justified, for Iraq has long suffered from a suppressive government.⁵⁶ The diverse racial composition that has threatened the federal Iraq also has made Turkey to be concerned about it. The most crucial determinant of Turkish foreign policies toward Iraq since the Gulf War has been “*the Iraqi Turkmen*”⁵⁷ who has the all same origins including the ethnic, linguistic, cultural and historical aspects with Turks. Despite the fact that the Iraqi Turkmen is the third largest ethnic population in Iraq, they could not be organized politically due to the suppressive Iraqi regimes in the period between 1921-1991. Also, just after the operation of the No-Fly-Zone, in place of the improvement, the suppressed situation of Iraqi Turkmen has been exacerbated by the Kurds and Iraqi government ruled by Arabian leaders. In a concrete term, the demographic change in Kirkuk, original

⁵⁶ Turkey-Iraq relations have changed periodically since the foundation of Iraq. However, whether the bilateral relations have been good or not has deeply relied upon the inner Middle East security problems such as the security concerns of Turkey (PKK and its station in northern Iraq), water issue, economic reasons and the situation of Turkmen.

⁵⁷ Arshad Al-Hirmizi, *The Turkmen Reality in Iraq*, (Istanbul: Kerkük Vakfi, 2005), p.7; Turkmen refers to as “Turcomans” or “Turkomans”.

Turkmen city, indicated the assimilation policies of Arab regimes and Kurdish groups. Indeed, the 1957 census showed that Kirkuk city (as distinguished from Kirkuk province or governorate) had a slightly larger Turkmen (39.8%) than Kurdish (35.1%). The Arabs (23.8%) was the third largest ethnic group in Kirkuk.⁵⁸ The 1957 census, on the other hand, indicated that Kirkuk province had a Kurdish majority of 55 percent, while the Arabs numbered only 30.8% and the Turkmens 14.2% percent. The census taken in 1977 in the process of the Arabization policy showed that Kirkuk province had an Arab (44.41%), Kurds (37.53%), and Turkmen (16.31%).⁵⁹ Also, after the fall of Saddam regime in 2003, in order to change the demographic structure in Kirkuk, Kurdish groups have settled at least 500,000 Kurds in Kirkuk in the process of Kurdification policy, notwithstanding the fact that the expelled Kurdish people was 11,800 in the Saddam regime.⁶⁰ To make matters worse, after the operation of No-Fly-Zone, Iraqi Turkmen had been exposed to the bidirectional pressures from the Kurds and Saddam regime. These atrocities against the Iraqi Turkmen have made Turkish people to be concerned about the developments of northern Iraq. Based on the significant fact that Iraqi Turkmen has been treated as the discriminated ethnic in Iraq where the ethnic identities are problematic, Turkey has defended the idea that Turkmen should have the same political, social and cultural rights like the other ethnic groups in Iraq. Through the evaluation of the situation of Iraqi Turkmen chronologically, the reason why Turkey has been concerned about the developments of northern Iraq can be addressed.

⁵⁸ Cengiz Eroğlu, op cit., p.78.

⁵⁹ Michael M. Gunter and M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Continuing Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XII, No. 1, Spring 2005, p.128.

⁶⁰ Suphi Saatçı, "Irak Türkmenleri ve Kerkük Sorunu(Iraqi Turkmen and Kirkuk Question)," *Global Strateji*, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, p.30.

3.2 The Identity of Iraqi Turkmen

Defining the Iraqi Turkmen is the starting-point of analyzing the Iraqi Turkmen. Iraqi Turks were called by Iraqi Turkmen both during the process of Lausanne negotiation by British and after the 1958 coup by the Qasim regime. The fundamental reason for the change of term was that Iraqi Turks did not have a same origin from the Anatolian Turks. Ismet Pasha, the lead of the Turkish delegation, of course, opposed the use of term, “*Iraqi Turkmen*” strongly in the Lausanne negotiation. The term “*Turkmen*” was initialized after the 1958 coup among Turkmen, as it refers to the Oghuz who accepted Islam. The identity of Iraqi Turkmen can be clearly by collecting the information of Iraqi Turkmen in terms of the origin, settlement and population.

3.2.1 Origin

The origin of Iraqi Turkmen based on the Oghuz who migrated from Central Asia to Iraq goes to back to year 54 of Hejira with the use of a Turkic Language. After this time, the immigration of Turkmen to Iraq occurred by many various political situations at different time. The first Turkmen immigration was the settlement of 2000 Turkmen in Basrah by the Umayyad⁶¹ commander, Ü baydullah bin Ziyad in 676 year.⁶² Turkmen who had the excellent power and skill in the battles and conflicts had been used by Abbasids.⁶³ As a concrete example, the Caliph el-Mutasım had tried to settle Turkmen in Iraq due to the deep trust in Turkmen. The unceasing immigrations had marked the peak during the Seljuk period (AD 1055-1200) when Sultan Tuğrul Beg had occupied Baghdad and Abbasids dynasty on

⁶¹ The Umayyad dynasty whose name derives from Umayya ibn Abd Shams, the great-grandfather of Muawiyah I, was the first dynasty of the Muslim Caliphate, 660–750. Their capital was Damascus.

⁶² Şevket Koçsoy, *Irak Türkleri(Iraqi Turks)*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1991), pp.125-126.

⁶³ Abbasid(750-1258) is the dynastic name generally given to the caliph of Baghdad, the second of the two great Muslim caliphates of the Arab Empire, that overthrew the Umayyad caliphs.

January 25, 1055. With the protection of Caliph from the invasion of Shiite Būveyhōğulları in 1055, Tuğrul Bey, the Turkish ruler of Seljuk ruled the entire Iraq by 1200. During the period of Seljuk, the migration of Turks to Iraq was expanded, which the existence of Iraqi Turks had continued for 9 centuries. At that time, Iraqi Turks was called by Turkmen who accepted the Islam with the origin of Oghuz in terms of race firstly.⁶⁴ Like Iraqi Seljuks, the Turkmen founded some states and principdom in Iraq such as “the state of Atabeylik (feudal city states); Mosul Atabeylik (Zengids), Erbil Atabeylik, Kirkuk Turkmen Kipchak Principdom, Ilhanlı, Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu states and ruled there until the expansion of the Ottoman Empire who included Mosul.”⁶⁵

In the period of Ottoman Empire, northern Iraq was occupied by the Yavuz Sultan Selim in 1515. During the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent all Iraqi territory was under the rule of Ottoman Empire and Sultan Murad IV recaptured the Iraq after the regional revolt in 1638.⁶⁶ Many Turkmen's immigration was accordance with the period of Ottoman occupation about Iraq.⁶⁷

3.2.2 Areas where Turkmen had lived

There has been a hot debate about the territory of Turkmen in Iraq. Despite big debates about it, many researchers⁶⁸ have agreed with the fact that historically speaking, Iraqi Turkmen has lived in the areas extending from northwest to southeast of Iraq,⁶⁹ what is called Turkmenli as the strip separating between Kurdish and Arab people. In other words, the settlement of Turkmenli has been the region starting from

⁶⁴ Hasan Tunç, op cit., p.5.

⁶⁵ Ibid., Also see Henry A. Forster, op cit., p.24.

⁶⁶ Hasan Tunç, op cit., p.5.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ These researchers are as follows; Gertrude Bell (the oriental secretary of the British Higher Commissioner in Iraq), Mohammad Dhaifalla Al-Mutairi (a Kuwaiti writer), Geoff Simons (the U.S. writer).

⁶⁹ See Appendix D, for Turkmenli Map.

Bedre region towards the east to the town of Telafar in the west of Mosul.⁷⁰ Some scholars mentioned the strip as the “Great Road” close to all Turkmen villages.⁷¹ The settlement areas of Turkmen have a significant meaning in terms of the economic aspect. The strip from Bedre to Telafar where the Turkmen had used as the itinerary of postal service road was constructed between Istanbul and Baghdad in the period of Ottoman Empire.⁷² Moreover, even though approximately 50 thousand Turkmen resided in Baghdad, the settlement areas of Turkmen in Iraq had been restricted within certain boundaries of Mosul, Erbil, Kerkük, Diala and Slahaddin provinces. These areas are important because of the economic and strategic values; the richest and highest natural resources including sulfur, uranium, phosphorus and especially oil,⁷³ the wide agricultural lands where can provide the rich foods with most Iraqi people who do not have any irrigation⁷⁴ and a kind of buffer zone between Kurdish and Arab settlements.

3.2.3 Populations

The population of Iraqi Turkmen has been a controversial issue from the time of Lausanne Conference to now. According to both the Western and Iraqi resources, they have argued that “the population of Iraqi Turkmen is not over 500,000, a less than 5% of total Iraqi population” whereas others including some Turkmen and Turkish scholars believe in about 2,500,000 Iraqi Turkmen, the 10% of total Iraqi

⁷⁰ Güçlü Demirci, “Irak Türklerinin Demografik Yapısı(Demographic Structure of Iraqi Turks),” in *Türkler Ansiklopedisi(Encyclopedia of Turks)*, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002) Vol.20, p.614.

⁷¹ Cengiz Eroğlu, op cit., p.175.

⁷² İzzeddin Kerkük, *Haşim Nahit Erbil ve Irak Türkleri(Hasim Nahit Erbil and Iraqi Turks)*, (İstanbul: Kerkük Vakfı, 2004), p.47.

⁷³ Mofak Salman Kerkuklu, *Brief History of Iraqi Turkmen*, (İstanbul: Yıldız Yayıncılık, 2004), p.83.

⁷⁴ Mustafa Kayar, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Irak Sorunu(Iraq Issue in the Turkish-American Relations)*, (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2003), pp.99-100.

population.⁷⁵ On the other hand, Kurdish researchers strongly have argued that more Kurdish people have lived in northern Iraq based on the statistical information provided by the Iraqi authority in order to acquire the political advantages.⁷⁶ Also, some historical resources indicated that the population of Iraqi Turkmen is between 1.5 and 2 million.

The debate about the population of Turkmen comes from the fact that any attempts to take a census on a basis of the ethnic structure of communities in Iraq were not realized except for the 1957 census.⁷⁷ In a sense, the 1957 census⁷⁸ is noticeable to the result that 567,000 of the 6.3 million of Iraq's population were Turkmen.⁷⁹ Namely, the argument that the population of Turkmen is estimated to be approximately 2.5 million today is calculated by the 1957 census provided by Iraqi government.⁸⁰ In other words, if the total Iraqi population is 25 million today, it would be reasonable that the population of Turkmen is 2.5 million with the respect of 10% at least based on the calculation of the 1957 census with a growth rate of 2.5 % annually.⁸¹ On contrast, the statistical information provided by the Iraqi authority indicated that the Turkmen have been shown as 2% of the overall population because of some political reasons. In addition, Kurdish resources stated that Turkmen population was 2.6% in 1957 census and this rate was reduced to 1.15% in the 1977

⁷⁵ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Türkiye'nin Irak'ın Yeniden Yapılandırılması İle İlgili Kaygıları(Turkish Concerns about the New Building of Iraq)," *Global Strateji*, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, p.38.

⁷⁶ Tarık H. Oğuzlu, *The Turcomans of Iraq as a Factor in Turkish Foreign Policy: Socio-Political and Demographic Perspectives*, (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 2001), pp.5-13.

⁷⁷ Ziyat Köpürlü, *Irak'ta Türk Varlığı(The Existence of Turks in Iraq)*, (Ankara: Global Strateji Enstitüsü, 1996), pp.6-7.

⁷⁸ There were the censuses in 1927, 1934, 1947, 1957, 1965, 1977 and 1987. Only the 1957 census was based on the ethnic structure of communities in Iraq, basing on the estimation by tongue language.

⁷⁹ Erşat Hürmüzlü, "Kerkük'ün Türkmen Kimliği(Turkmen Identity in Kirkuk)," *Global Strateji*, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, pp.102-103, İbrahim Sirkeci, *Turkmen in Iraq and International Migration of Turkmen*, (Ankara: Global Strateji Enstitüsü, 2005), Zubaida Umar, *The Forgotten Ministry of Iraq*, (London: Inquiry, 1987), p.37.

⁸⁰ Mustafa Kibaroglu, op cit., p.38.

⁸¹ Erşat Hürmüzlü, op cit., p.105.

census.⁸² Therefore, it seems to be impossible to find the exact number of Turkmen in Iraq without the objective census by international organizations. However, it would be true that the calculation based on the 1957 census would be more reliable than others in that there were no exact censuses based on the ethnic structure of communities in Iraq only except the 1957 census.

3.3 The Arabization in Northern Iraq (From 1921 to 1991)

The Iraqi Turkmen was isolated from the politics since the foundation of Iraq. They were exposed to massacres in 1924, 1946, 1959 and 1991. Turkmen leaders responsible for the protection of Turkmen rights were executed during the 1959 Kirkuk massacre and in 1980 by the Baath regime. Even though the Turkmen lived in stable period between 1963-1968, the assimilation policies pursued by the Iraqi governments were not stopped. More importantly, the bloody conflicts between Arabs and Kurds damaged the Turkmen in a sense that most of conflicts occurred in the areas of Turkmen majority despite the fact that Turkmen maintained a neutral position in the conflict of between Iraqi governments and Kurdish groups. Moreover, the Iran-Iraq war gave the Baath party to good chances to suppress the Turkmen by leading to the change of ethnic structure of Turkmen.

3.3.1 The Turkmen in the Period of Mandate and Kingdom (1921-1958)

The basic policies of the Kingdom of Iraq during the time of Feisal I (1921-1933) about Turkmen came from the anxiety that powerful neighbor, Turkey, could absorb the Turkmen with its territory. Such a concern made the Kingdom of Iraq to remain a mere spectator even under the victimization of Turkmen by other ethnic

⁸² Nuri Talabani, *Kerkük Bölgesinin Araplaştırılması (The Arabization of Kirkuk Region)*, (İstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 2005), pp.21-22.

groups, especially, Assyrian forces, in 1924 and deny their existence in Iraq⁸³ with the deprivation of their cultural and educational rights.

Meanwhile, it was natural for Turkmen who had the equal rights in all aspects under the rule of Ottoman Empire not to comply with the difficult situation related to the limited opportunities by the Kingdom of Iraq. As a consequence, they were isolated from the Iraqi politics and then this situation made their political roles much weaker.

The first massacre in Kirkuk against Turkmen was occurred on May 4, 1924 by the Teyyari (Levi) forces⁸⁴ under the silent tolerance of British. Although there was no concrete evidence that British gave the direct support to the Teyyari who massacred the Turkmen, it was through this massacre that British achieved their aims to suppress the growing national awareness among Turkmen people⁸⁵ by preventing Turkmen from acting in favor of Turkey at a period during which the Mosul negotiations were going on. However, the fact that British certainly aggravated ethno-religious relations by using an ethno-religious militia against Sunni, Shiite, Kurds and Turkmen could play a critical role in forming the condition where the Teyyari who had a close religious tie with British attacked to Turkmen with the machine gun. Furthermore, in the process of matter settlement, British refused to punish Levi responsible for this tragic event.

The second massacre was broken out against Turkmens who demanded better labor condition required to civilized human rights legitimately to the Iraq Oil

⁸³ Kadir Mısıroğlu, *Musul Meselesi ve Irak Türkleri (Mosul Issue and Iraqi Turks)*, (İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1985), p.191.

⁸⁴ The Levy was composed of Assyrians regarded as the Christians in faith, and particularly was used during the 1920 rebellion.

⁸⁵ Arshad Al-Hirmizi, *The Turkmen Reality in Iraq*, (İstanbul: Kirkuk Foundation, 2005), p.79.

Company on July 12, 1946. In a demonstration held in the Gavurbağı (Gavurbahgi), 5 Turkmen were killed and 14 Turkmen were wounded.⁸⁶

Despite not only the first constitution of Iraq that provided no discrimination with Turkmen with the respect of the education but also the declaration in the LoN that Iraqi government would respect all minority rights in 1932, the Iraqi government terminated these rights of Turkmen completely in 1937. Furthermore, the Iraqi government deprived the Turkmen of various rights to found associations carrying out social and cultural activities as well as to publish in the Turkish language between 1936 and 1958.⁸⁷ Of course, the status of Turkmen in Iraqi political system had changed with the relationship between Turkey and Iraq slightly. During King Feisal's visit to Turkey on July 8, 1931, "*the Code of Local Languages*" that Turkmen language was recognized as one of the local languages was put into effect.⁸⁸ As a result of this visit, "*Regulation, Trade and Residence Agreements*" that regulated the residence of Turkish nationals in Iraq and Iraqi nationals in Turkey and that gave both nationals to the right to have employment and property made it easy for Turkmen to reside, work, carry out trade, acquire property and send their children to schools in Turkey.⁸⁹ In the additional protocol of "*the Treaty of Amity and Good Neighborhood*" signed between Turkey and Iraq on March 29, 1946, "*the Protocol of Educational and Cultural Cooperation under the Turkish-Iraqi Treaty of Amity*" provided the Turkmen with the opportunity to attend Turkish Schools.⁹⁰

However, generally speaking, the Iraqi Kingdom took steps in order to carry out the Arabization in northern Iraq and to change the ethnic structure in the period of Mandate and Kingdom. As a concrete example, the Iraqi Kingdom settled the

⁸⁶ Ibid., pp.91-94.

⁸⁷ Mofak S. Kerkuklu, op cit., p.111.

⁸⁸ Bilal N. Şimşir, op cit., p.40.

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp.89-90.

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp.109-110.

Arab tribes such as “Al-Ubeyd and Al-Cubur tribes on the Al Huvayca plain in the southwest of Kirkuk by distributing the lands to them and providing the irrigation project.”⁹¹ Moreover, the policy of Arabization had been accelerated with the increasing fears of Iraqi Kingdom with some international events. For example, firstly, the solution of Hatay⁹² in favor of Turkey worsened the Turkmen situation in Iraq. Because the Iraqi Kingdom was afraid about the likelihood that northern Iraq was united to Turkey like the case of Hatay if the rights of Turkmen were upheld.⁹³ Secondly, in the unstable international security structure in 1930s by the Italian expansion under the leadership of Mussolini, Turkey sent the delegation to Baghdad in order to make the collective security organization, the Sadabad Pact.⁹⁴ The visit of Turkish delegation to the Mosul and Kirkuk caused the excitement among the Turkmen. After returning to the Baghdad, Nuri as-Said, the Iraqi Prime Minister reported the Turkmen to the Cabinet as follows;

The Turks should be kept under pressure all the time. They are likely to possess and rule us one day as they possessed and ruled the Abbasid state. We have just got rid of the Turkish authority, therefore let us do not allow them to do it again, let us be careful.⁹⁵

The social and cultural activities of Turkmen were forbidden and historical buildings belonging to Turkmen were destroyed by the policies of Arabization. Many

⁹¹ Nuri Talabani, op cit., p.33.

⁹² Hatay was a province of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 to the end of the World War I and was called Snjak of Alexandretta when it was occupied by France. France kept control of Hatay when it granted Syria independence in 1936. A census conducted by the French Authorities in 1938 on a system devised by the Turkish Government declared that Turks constituted 46% of the population and were thus dominant ethnic group in Sanjak in 1939. Hatay’s population strongly endorsed the transfer to Turkey in a referendum in which they voted overwhelmingly in favor of becoming part of Turkey. As a result, Hatay joined Turkey through a process of self-determination. Turkey achieved to solve the Hatay issue through diplomacy by using the revisionist-anti revisionist struggles in Europe between 1937-1939. It is worthy to express that if the French had not agreed, in order to prevent Turkey from siding with Germany once again, Hatay would remain Syria.

⁹³ Bilal N. Şimşir, op cit., p.112.

⁹⁴ Turkey initialized the Pact of Nonaggression with Iraq and Iran on October 2, 1935. This document initialized by three neighboring countries including Turkey, Iran and Iraq was converted into the Sadabad Pact with the participation of Afghanistan.

⁹⁵ Nefi Demirci, *Kerkük(Kerkük'ün Siyasi Tarihi)(Kirkuk)(The Political History of Kirkuk)*, (İstanbul: Detay Ofset, 1986), p.49.

Turkmen intellectuals were arrested and exiled to southern areas after the visit of Turkish delegation.

In sum, during the time of mandate and Kingdom, the Turkmen were gradually exposed to the process of assimilation of Arabization by the Iraqi administration. With the development of Arabization policy, the demographic structure of Turkmen started to change. Such a suppressed situation of Turkmen during the rule of Iraqi monarchy had been continued to next Iraqi government after the regime change.

3.3.2 The Iraqi Turkmen in Abd al-Karim Qasim Period (1958-1963)

The transformation from the monarchy to republic gave the hope to Turkmen on the ground that they supported the military coup when General Abd al-Karim Qasim abolished the monarchy with the support from the leftist and Arab nationalist officers on July 14, 1958.⁹⁶ Unlike the first declaration of General Abd-al-Karim Qasim and his deputy General Al-Salem Aref⁹⁷ that regarded Turkmen as one ethnic group who constituted the Iraq, the new government reversed an earlier opinion about rights of Turkmen equal to other ethnic groups.

. Even though the Turkmen was cooperative relationship with the Kurdish nationalists for the sake of resisting the Communist party because the Turkmen did not internalize the Communist idea, the return of Mollah Mustafa Barzani⁹⁸ to Kirkuk caused tension between Kurdish groups and Turkmen. The third massacre of

⁹⁶ Fazlı Demirci, *Irak Türklerinin Dünü Bugünü (The Past and Present of Iraqi Turks)*, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1991), p.17.

⁹⁷ He carried out the coup against Qasim regime on 1963 with the cooperation of Baath party and Iraqi nationalists.

⁹⁸ He was one of the most inspired, tenacious and resilient Kurdish leaders with a commitment to the struggle for Kurdish interests. After the 1958 coup, as a result of the fact that political criminals were pardoned by the new regime, Mollah Mustafa Barzani returned to Iraq from Moscow where he had lived in exile for eleven years. His son, Massoud Barzani, is the current leader of the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and was elected as the President of the Iraqi Kurdistan region by the Parliament of Iraqi Kurdistan in June 2005.

Turkmen, following the 1924 and 1946 massacre, took place in 1959 just after the visit of Barzani to Kirkuk. Even if the victims of this event involved not only Arab nationalist as well as Baathists, Turkmen had been exposed to a great damage by this event in a sense that it occurred in the Kirkuk where resided a majority of Turkmen.

Before the outbreak of this massacre, Kurds and Communists were assigned to the main political posts in Kirkuk. For example, the moderate commander of the second division in Kirkuk was changed by the communist one. And Kurdish person was appointed as the mayor of Kirkuk. Furthermore, the Communists and Kurds under the aegis of the Iraqi government were under arms with the political and military superiority over Turkmen by using the Communism as a good excuse.⁹⁹ Although this event would give a damage to certain groups including Arab nationalist, Baathists and Turkmen, not communists, one of the most largest victims was the Turkmen who did not possess the political and military power in Iraq.

Since the first gunfire on July 14, 1959, the massacre against Turkmen would be continued for three days.¹⁰⁰ In the process of the 1959 Kirkuk massacre not only were the leading Turkmen persons killed but also main buildings belonging to Turkmen were vandalized. This massacre made the Turkmen being preoccupied with only the choice to immigrate to other areas, especially Baghdad in order to avoid the tragic repetition of the massacre coupled with the instability and unemployment. Also, the vacant space of Turkmen who left to other areas was replenished with Kurds and Arabs.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi society was awakened to new significance of Turkmen through the 1959 massacre. A lot of news which were published in the headlines about the Kirkuk massacre everyday made the Turkmen become a center of interest

⁹⁹ Oğuz Osman, *14 Temmuz 1959 Kerkük Katliamı (14 July 1959 Kirkuk Massacre)*, (Istanbul: Kerkük Vakfı, 1999), p.7.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.6-8.

between anti-communist Arabs, intellectuals and journalists. The misunderstanding of which Arabs in southern Iraq called Turkmen “*Kirad*” which means Kurdish was corrected certainly even if the Iraqi republic proclaimed that Iraqi Turk were named as “*Turkmen*” just after the coup.

On the other hand, in response to the oppressions by Iraqi governments and Kurds, Turkmen started to think about the unity, cooperation and interdependency among themselves through the foundation of the official and secret organizations.¹⁰¹ The establishment of *Turkmen Brotherhood Association (TBA)*¹⁰² in 1960 could be understood within the context of follow-up measures of Turkmen who suffered the pain from the 1959 masscre. Although some people responsible for the 1959 massacre were condemed to death, quite a few poeple were released and the death penalty of some people was not executed.¹⁰³ On the other hand, according to Nuri Talabani, the 1959 massacre of which 31 Turkimen were killed and 180 were injured¹⁰⁴ was “the direct root of separation and hostility between Turkmen and Kurds to this day.”¹⁰⁵

3.3.3 The Iraqi Turkmen in Aref Brothers Period (1963-1968)

The officer group of Arab nationalists under the leadership of Abdul Al-Salem Aref cooperating with the Arab Socialist Baath party overthrew the Qasim regime that faced with the external and internal problems¹⁰⁶ through the coup in

¹⁰¹ Nefi Demirici, op cit., p.83.

¹⁰² This association was established by Turkmen who migrated to Baghdad in order to improve the cultural and political rights of Turkmen. The important thing to which this association contributed was the publication of the “*Qardaslk*”, magazine in Arabic and Turkish languages.

¹⁰³ Shphi Saatci, *Tarihten Günümüze Irak Türkmeneri(Iraqi Turkmen from Past to Present)*, (İstanbul: Ötüken Meşriyat, 2003), p.227.

¹⁰⁴ Arshad Al-Hirmizi, op cit., p.134.

¹⁰⁵ Nuri Talabani, op cit., p.100.

¹⁰⁶ As the internal problems, the Qasim regime faced with the armed Kurdish insurgencies and disagreements inside his army. In terms of external problems, the limitation of the interests of foreign oil company and threat toward Kuwait led to the opposition from Britain and Arab states.

February 1963.¹⁰⁷ After Aref came to the power, some of prominent Turkmen leaders and administrator of the TBA required Aref to understand racial discrimination of Turkmen, especially the injustice of 1959 massacre.¹⁰⁸ Those 28 people who had been sentenced death due to the responsibility of 1959 Kirkuk massacre were executed in Kirkuk on June 23, 1963. As the impartial execution of law by military junta indicated, under the rein of Aref Brother, Turkmen could live in a more stable period.¹⁰⁹

Alongside the abolition of 1958 constitution, the new regime made public the temporary constitution including the article 19 that the Iraqi people were equal without any discrimination based on the ethnic structure, languages or other reasons and without considering difference in rights and duties.¹¹⁰ Namely, under the rule of the Abd Al-Rahman Muhammed Aref, the successor as well as the brother of Abdul Al-Salem Aref, Turkmen also enjoyed civil rights since the 1923 firstly. In concrete term, Dr. Nizamettin Arif, a Turkmen, was appointed to the position of the Minister of Economy and Commerce as deputy.¹¹¹ The magazine *Qradaslik* published by the TBA could add the new part of Turkish alphabet between 1963 and 1968.

3.3.4 The Iraqi Turkmen in Baath Period (1968-1991)

The coup against Aref Brothers regime was carried out by the Baathists based on the Baath doctrine on July 17, 1968 ideologically.¹¹² Saddam Hussein who came to the power in 1979 was appointed to the position applicable to the second man owing to the distinguished services in the process of coup. The situation of Turkmen

¹⁰⁷ Suphi Saatçı, 2003, op cit., p.228.

¹⁰⁸ Fazlı Demirci, op cit., pp.25-26.

¹⁰⁹ Nefi Demirci, op cit., p.78.

¹¹⁰ Habib Hürmüzlü, "*Irak'ın Hukuki Yapısında Türkmenlerin Yeri (Turkmen in the Legal Structure of Iraq)*," in Ali Ahmetoğlu Hayrullah Cengiz, Yahya Başkan (ed.), *Irak Dosyası (Iraq File)*, (İstanbul: TATAV, 2003), p.132.

¹¹¹ Fazıl Demirci, op cit., pp.25-26.

¹¹² Geoff Simons, *Iraq from Sumer to Saddam*, (London: MacMilan Press, 1996), p.277.

in the Baath period was deeply connected with the Baath doctrine. At the heart of Baath doctrine was a kind of Pan-Arab nationalism conceived as the proposition that the Arab nation separated artificially firstly by the Ottomans and then by Western imperialism and Zionism should be united within one Arab nation. Thus, the fact that northern Iraq was under Turkish rule for long years caused the Baathist party to seek for an assimilation of Turkmen into Arabs with the inferiority complex. Those who opposed the Baath party were arrested and executed publicly in order to discourage the opposition movement. In the executed people, Nizamettin Arif, the Minister of Commerce as deputy from Turkmen was included.¹¹³

Meanwhile, temporary 1968 Constitution of Iraq that provided Turkmen with the rights equal to other ethnics was converted into the 1970 Iraqi Constitution based on the two major nationalities, “Arabs and Kurds”, ignoring the existence of Turkmen. In this Constitution, the official languages were accepted as Arabic and Kurdish, granting the Kurdish autonomy in the Kurdish region.¹¹⁴ On the other hand, Baath party paid lip-service to Turkmen only by proclaiming documents related to cultural rights of minority in order to gain the support from them.¹¹⁵ Some documents issued by Iraq government such as “*Cultural Rights of the Turkmen Nationals*” and those covering the termination of racism and racial segregations of the United Nations General Assembly in 1970 had never been and would never be sincere.¹¹⁶ According to Haradan Al-Tikriti, the former Minister of Defense in Iraq

¹¹³ Suphi Saatçı, *Tarihi Gelişim İçerisinde Irakta Türk Varlığı (The Historical Development of the Turkmen Existence in Iraq)*, (İstanbul: TTT, 1996), pp.226-227.

¹¹⁴ Habib Hürmüzlü, op cit., pp.132-133.

¹¹⁵ Fazlı Demirci, op cit., p.29.

¹¹⁶ Erşat Hürmüzlü, op cit., pp.62-63.

who was one of those who played an important role in the coup in 1968, “the Baath party did not have any will to respect these rights.”¹¹⁷

The disappointment among Turkmen due to the nonfulfillment of policies related to the cultural rights by Baath party was connected to the protests. For Baath party, these protests were used by a good opportunity to assimilate Turkmen into Arabs. At that time, 50 Turkmen who protested to the discrimination policies were under the severe torture and detention in Kirkuk. In terms of political and economic areas, Turkmen could not work in the state place as well as could not have any support from the government.¹¹⁸ Especially, the suppression against Turkmen language covered a wide range; the limitation of education of Turkmen language, the abolition of the schools who offered the Turkmen language, the exile of Turkmen teachers, the ban of the use of Latin alphabet in the *Qardaslik* magazine that the TBA published, the transfer of the control about the newspaper “*Yurt*” and magazine “*Birlik Sesi*” from *the Association of Turkmen of Letters and Turkmen Directorate of Culture* under the Ministry of Press to the Baath party.

To the contrary to the situation of Turkmen, the Baath party granted rights to the Kurds equal to those of Arabs with the agreement consisting of 15 articles related to their cultural, executive and political rights. Pursuant to this agreement between the Baath party and Kurds, not only would they be represented in parliament but also an autonomous Kurdish territory would be established, a Kurdish vice president would be appointed, the domestic income would be shared fairly and Kurdish language would be accepted as the official language with the Arabic in the Kurdish region.¹¹⁹ Therefore, based on this agreement, the destiny of Turkmen who would

¹¹⁷ Ziyat Köprülü, op cit., p. 46, See also Zubaida Umar, *The Forgotten Minority of Iraq*, (London: Inquiry, 1987), p.40.

¹¹⁸ Shphi Saatçı, 1996, op cit., pp.237-239.

¹¹⁹ Suphi Saatçı, 2003, op cit., p.46.

subordinate themselves to either the Kurds or Arabs came to be determined by the plebiscite to find out the boundaries of Kurdish Autonomou Territory¹²⁰ that was planned to be held on October 26, 1970. However, because of the increasing conflicts between Baathists and Kurds who followed the Barzani who wanted to gain their own favor in the plebiscite, the plebiscite was not held. One of the most important another obstacles between Baath regime and Kurds in holding the plebiscite was the Kirkuk where reserves a lot of natural resources, especially oil. Kurdish groups wanted to include the Kirkuk into the Kurdish region whereas the Baath party never had any intention to include the Kirkuk to the Kurdish region.

The process of Arabizaiton in northen Iraq where Turkmen made up the second largest ethnic group was committed under the support of central Iraqi government. Arabs who moved to the Kirkuk took the resettlement funds and financial supports from the Iraqi government. Due to theses policies, even villages composed of entire Turkmen were allocated to Arabs. The name of Kirkuk was changed to “*Al-Tamim*” which meant nationalization in accordance with the order of Presidency number 41 of January 20, 1976.¹²¹ The ban of sales of immovable property between Turkmen and the restriction of purchases of land and building for Turkmen worsened the conditions of Turkmen. Furthermore, for the sake of changing the ethnic structure of Turkmen fundamentally, Baath party gave the 10 thousand Dinars (\$33,000) to Arabs who married with the Turkmen girls.¹²² Also, the TBA who represented the Turkmen in Iraq lost their own functions by entering into the control of Baath party.¹²³

¹²⁰ Marion Farouk Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq since 1958*, (British: Short Run Press, 1990), p.131.

¹²¹ Nefi Demirci, op cit., p.175.

¹²² Ibid., p.165.

¹²³ Suphi Saatçi, 2003, op cit., pp.240-242.

When Saddam Husein came into the power in 1979, the Turkmen should face with the most awful violations of human rights based on the assimilation policies. Not only the continuation of restrictions to the rights touched above had been maintained but also Turkmen leaders¹²⁴ had been executed although they were innocent. The execution of Turkmen leaders who demanded as well as defended the Turkmen rights implanted the hopelessness about Iraqi government in Turkmen. Subsequently, the despair of Turkmen about the Baath party was connected to seek refuge in other states.¹²⁵

The Iran-Iraq war which had been continued for eight years supplied Saddam with a good opportunity to change the ethnic structure of Turkmen in 1980s.¹²⁶ The Baghdad government dispatched many Turkmen to the front of battle, whereas a lot of Kurds were exempted from the military service. Both before and during the war, Iraqi government put many Turkmen to death on suspicions of being the espionage giving information to Turkey.

The unsatisfaction of Baath party about the assimilation policies had been connected to plan to force Turkmen to migrate from Kirkuk to the province of Amara in the south of Iraq by building 20,000 houses.¹²⁷ Even if Iraqi government did not put this plan into practice due to the Arabs who fled from Basrah,¹²⁸ the destory of Turkmen villages in Kirkuk was not stopped. Two thousand more houses were broken down becaue of various reasons in some Turkmen territories; building military facilities, a highway of a width of 600 meters and an international train

¹²⁴ These people included Abdullah Abdurrahman, the chief of the Turkmen Brotherhood Association, Dr. Rıza Demirci, the secretary General of Turkmen Brotherhood Association, Necde Koçak and Adil Şerif.

¹²⁵ Erşat Hürmüzlü, op cit., pp.66-67.

¹²⁶ Fazlı Demirci, op cit., p.41.

¹²⁷ Ibid., pp.37-41.

¹²⁸ The disadvantageous situation in the Iran-Iraq war produced many Arabs refugees in the Basrah.

station and so on.¹²⁹ In November 1985, in the name of search activities carried out by the Iraqi force, the Turkmen was looted and attacked by Arabs and in 1988, many Turkmen who lived in Telafer, the largest Turkmen town in Mosul district, were killed.¹³⁰ In 1990 Republican Constitution of Iraq, the legal identity of Turkmen was refused once again with the declaration of government that Iraqi public is consisted of Arabs and Kurds.

3.4 The Kurdification in Northern Iraq (From 1991 to Now)

While the safe region was being constructed by the U.S. and Britain with the operation of No-Fly-Zone, Kurds gained the opportunity to strengthen their political power to some extent to change the demographic structure of northern Iraq. Namely, the establishment of No-Fly-Zone fostered Kurdish nationalism in northern Iraq. The Turkmen was exposed to KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) pressures and attacks led by Barzani and Talabani in particular since 1996. Turkmen was placed in much worse situation than before because the bidirectional pressures had come from Kurdish groups and Saddam regime. This is because 85% and 90% Turkmen populations were under the rule of Saddam regime after the operation of the No-Fly-Zone. And, Turkmen who was under the operation of No-Fly-Zone was exposed to the pressures of Kurdish groups.

After the Iraqi War of 2003, the Turkmen was also isolated from the reconstruction process of Iraq by the Coalition Forces Authority (CPA). It was natural that almost all interim Iraqi organizations including Governing Council and Governing Administration and the new constitution drafted by these organizations directed by the CPA did not consider the Turkmen rights. The Turkmen, who has

¹²⁹ Suphi Saatçı, 1996, op cit., pp.245-246.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p.247.

not gained any political rights in the newly established Iraqi government, likewise the past, has confronted with more serious Kurdification policies. In particular, the Kirkuk where Turkmen have made up the majority has been regarded as the Capital of Kurdistan by the Kurdish peshmerga, carrying out the Kurdification policy.

3.4.1 The Iraqi Turkmen from No-Fly-Zone Operation (1991-2003)

The invasion of Iraq to Kuwait¹³¹ on August 8, 1990 caused the huge reactions across the world and the Security Council of the United States (UNSC).¹³² At the time of Iraqi defeat by the Coalition Forces under the American leadership, in March 1991 insurgent activities that began from the Iraqi Shiite region spread out northern Iraq.¹³³ The suppression of Saddam regime against insurgencies produced the approximately 1,500,000 refugees in northern Iraq and then made them to seek to the refugee in Turkey and Iran.¹³⁴ The noticeable thing was the fact that in conflicts between Kurds and military forces of Baghdad regime, Turkmen was the victims targeted by both sides. The fact that 28 Turkmen in Tazehurmatu and approximately one hundred Turkmen in Altünköprü were killed for no reasons by the military force from the Baghdad regime proved the tragic actions of Baghdad regime.¹³⁵ And PUK and KDP invaded the governmental agencies and buildings and

¹³¹ The reasons why Iraq invaded the Kuwait are explained as follows; ostensibly, the extraction of oil from the controversial Rumeyla Oil zone, the historical argument about the Iraq but actually, the economic and social problems caused by the war between Iraq and Iran, Iraq's attempts to increase its military power, Saddam's desire to become the political leader in Arab world, Iraq's wish to dispose of internal unsteadiness through external political adventure.

¹³² The UNSC adopted resolutions numbered 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 669, 670, and 674, between August 2 and November 30, 1990. Especially, the Resolution of 678 permitted member states to use all means including military force in order to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

¹³³ Ümit Özdağ, *Türkiye Kırak ve PKK Bir Gayri Nizami Harbin Anatomisi(Turkey, Northern Iraq and PKK, the Anatomy of Irregular war)*, (Ankara: ASAM, 1999), p.64.

¹³⁴ Baskın K. Oran, *Horoz-Çekiç Güç ve Kürt Devleti(Poised Hammer and Kurdish State)*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1998), pp.52-53.

¹³⁵ Şemsettin Küzeci, *Kerkük Soykırımları(Kirkuk Genocides)*, (Ankara: Teknoed Yayınları, 2004), p.186.

burned the civil registration records with the aims to destroy the data regarding Turkmen existence in the region.¹³⁶

In order to solve the problem of refugees, Turgut Özal, Turkish President initiated the buffer zone along the border. However, his proposal was refused because of the fear that the new Gaza Strip could be created. Instead, the U.S. President, George H.W Bush warned the Saddam to obey the “No-Fly-Zone” that declared the territory where military operations above the 36 parallel and fly over Iraqi airplanes had been forbidden.¹³⁷ In fact, No-Fly-Zone was meaningless for Turkmen in that 85-90% of the entire Turkmen population were left outside No-Fly-Zone, while the north of 36th parallel and the south of 32nd parallel were put under protection and thus Turkmen were actually divided into two. Also, Kirkuk and Mosul were placed under the authority of Baghdad regime. Although Suleymaniya was under the line of 36 parallel, it was under the control of PUK led by Talabani.¹³⁸

In the No-Fly-Zone that could not be controlled by any countries, the separatist Kurdish groups including KDP and PUK have tried to establish the independent Kurdistan state by using a created power vacuum in northern Iraq.¹³⁹ Such a movement of Kurdish groups gained a driving-force with the financial supports.¹⁴⁰ In order to fill the authority gap in the newly-established area, parliamentary election was held on May 19, 1992. In the election into which

¹³⁶ Meşruke Y. Börklü, *Irak'ta Yaşayan Türkleri Yakın Siyasi Tarihi(The Nearby Political History of Turkmen Living in Iraq)*, (Istanbul: Kerkük Vakfı, 2001), pp.6-9.

¹³⁷ Kemal Kirişçi, “Huzur mu Huzursuzluk mu Çekiç Güç ve Türk Dış Politikası (Peace or lack of Peace Poised Hammer and Turkish Foreign Policy),” in Faruk Sönmezoğlu(ed) *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi(The analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy)*, (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 2001), pp.200-201.

¹³⁸ See Appendix E for No-Fly-Zone map in Iraq.

¹³⁹ Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kısılcında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası(Foreign Policy within the American Constrains: Gulf War, Turgut Özal and Afterwards)*, (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2000), p.331.

¹⁴⁰ The roots of financial resources are the Habur Border Gate, oil, illegal income and foreign support. For details, see Sedat Lançiner, *Sosyo-Ekonomik Dış Politika: Türkiye-Irak İlişkileri Örneği(Socio-Economic Foreign Policy: Turkey-Iraq Relation as an Example in Irak Kriz(2002-2003))(Iraq Crisis(2002-2003))*, (Ankara: ASAM, 2003), p.245.

Turkmen did not participate, “KDP received 44.58% of the votes and PUK received 44.33% of the votes. Both parties gained the 50 seats out of 105 seats and the remaining 5 seats were assigned to Assyrians.”¹⁴¹ In the Draft of Constitution provided by the newly elected parliament in Erbil in 1992, Turkmen was portrayed as the minority instead of the nation, so was the election of parliament and Kirkuk was proclaimed as the capital of Kurdistan state. Soon after, KDP and PUK started a conflict by ending the cease-fire between them in order to maintain the priority over each other in northern Iraq.¹⁴²

In a conflict between KDP and PUK, PUK had the dominant power in Erbil in May 1993 and the result of parliament election was annulled.¹⁴³ In order to take the reins in Erbil, KDP militia with the cooperation of Saddam’s force made a surprise attack on Erbil on August 31, 1996. During the raids, Turkmen who took a neutral attitude suffered from this conflict, as the past nightmares although they maintained the neutral position. 34 Turkmen were killed or arrested and Turkmen schools built by the Iraqi National Turkmen Party (INTP)¹⁴⁴ in Erbil were destroyed.¹⁴⁵ As a consequence of 1996 Erbil raid, KDP became dominant in Erbil and Dohuk regions whereas PUK were settling into Suleymaniya region. Both parties established their own administrations.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴¹ Tuncay Özkan, *CIA Kürtleri ve Kürt Devletinin Gizli Tarihi (CIA Kurds and The Secret History of Kurdish State)*, (İstanbul: Alfa Yayın, 2004), p.96.

¹⁴² Vedat Yenerer, *Düşman Kardeşler (Enemy Friends)*, (İstanbul: Bulut Yayınları, 2004), pp.34-35.

¹⁴³ Ümit Özdağ, 1999, op cit., p.124.

¹⁴⁴ There were many organizations for the political struggle of Turkmen; Turkmen Brotherhood Association (TBA), Iraqi National Democratic Turkmen Organization (INCT), Iraqi National Turkmen Party (INTP), Turkmenenli Party (TP), Turkmen Independence Movement (TIM) and so on. INTP was founded in 1988 but openly declared itself only after Iraq invaded Kuwait due to the repressive Baghdad regime. It contributed the spread of the Turkmen problems to the world. See further information about Turkmen Political Parties in Iraq, Bilal. N. Şimşir, op cit., pp.212-216, Hasan Yılmaz, “Irak’ın Gizlenen Gerçeği: Türkmenler (The Hidden Reality of Iraq: Turkmen),” *Stratejik Analiz*, May 2003, pp.26-28, Muzaffer Arslan, “Irak Türkmenlerini Siyasi Yapılanması (Political Construction of Iraqi Turkmen),” *Türk Yurdu*, Issue:65, January 1993, p.23.

¹⁴⁵ Vedat Yenerer, op cit., p.108.

¹⁴⁶ See Appendix F, a map that shows the region both under the control of KDP and PUK after 1996.

Just after establishing their own administrations, both parties took serious steps not only for the foundation of the actual Kurdish state but also for the destruction of Turkmen attempts to obstruct to build the Kurdish state. The main policies that Local forces including KDP and PUK have pursued can be explained as followings;

- Local forces regarded the Turkmen as the cat's-paw of foreign forces and required the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) to leave out the Erbil.¹⁴⁷

The main argument is that Turkey, the sponsor of Turkmen, has obstructed the political and economical development in northern Iraq through the use of Turkmen. Also, in order to infuse the biased image of Turkmen like betrayer into the Kurds, KDP has used the printed and visual press as tools. KDP succeeded in creating feelings of hatred among the Kurds in northern Iraq against Turkey and Turkmen.¹⁴⁸

- Local forces established puppet parties of Turkmen in order to disintegrate the Turkmen political movement.

Puppet parties such as “Turkmen Brotherhood Party, Turkmen Unity Party, Kurdistan Turkmen Cultural Society, Turkmen Liberation Party, Turkmen Liberal Democratic Community, Turkmen People’s Party, and Turkmen Naissance Party”¹⁴⁹ financed and established by the Kurds can be not so much the protector of Turkmen rights as the agencies used by the interests of Kurds, the U.S. and British.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Mazin Hasan, “Türkiyenin Türkmen Politikası:Yapılması Gerekenler(The Turkmen Policy of Turkey:Needs to be Done),” *Stratejik Analiz*, April 2003, p.28.

¹⁴⁸ Hasan Yılmaz, op cit., p.31.

¹⁴⁹ Mazin Hasan and Soran Şükür, “Kerkük-Kerkük(Kirkuk-Kirkuk),” *Stratejik Analiz*, March 2004, pp.17-37.

¹⁵⁰ Bilal. N. Şimşir, op cit., p222.

- Local forces attempted to get rid of a true Turkmen organization, especially ITF by force.

On 10-11 August, 1998 when KDP militia made a raid against ITF, 86 Turkmen security guards were arrested.¹⁵¹ Also, KDP militia attacked the buildings and organizations belonging to ITF on 11-12 July, 2000, leading to the tragic result that 2 Turkmen security guards were killed and 4 Turkmen were seriously wounded.¹⁵² These events made Turkmen to believe that the racist movement against them shall occur later and regional administration in northern Iraq exists only for Kurds.

With the transformation from the dual containment policy of the U.S. in 1998¹⁵³ to the policy of overthrowing the Saddam regime, the U.S. started to focus on Iraqi opposition groups. Through the mediation by the U.S., KDP and PUK signed the peace agreement in Washington in September 1998. The American efforts to overturn the Saddam regime and establish the democratic administration based on the human rights were operated with the establishment of the “*Act on Saving Iraq*” put into effect on January 20, 1999.¹⁵⁴ The U.S. also began to contact the several Iraqi opposition parties who did not include any Turkmen organization. What the U.S. did not involve even one legal Turkmen organization in such an *Act* reflected Washington’s negative view towards Turkmen.

In a meeting held on December 14-16, 2002 by Iraqi opposition groups, they declared that Iraq was consisted of Arabs, Kurds and others. This declaration meant that Turkmen who are the third largest ethnic group in Iraq was counted as the

¹⁵¹ Suphi Saatçı, “Irak Türklerinin İki Ateş Arasında Kaderi Değişecek mi?(Will the Destiny of Iraqi Turks Change between Two Fires?),” *Kardaşlık*, October-December 2001, pp.8-10.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ The main goals of the Dual Containment policy were to impose the economic embargo on Iraq and Iran and to isolate both countries from the international community.

¹⁵⁴ Cüneyt Mengü, “1999’den 1999’a Irak Muhalefeti ve Türkmenler(From 1991 to 1999 Iraqi Opposition and Turkmen),” *Kerkük*, August 1999, pp.4-8.

equivalent to a few Assyrians. Once again, in the Iraqi opposition meeting held in Sleahaddin, Northern Iraq in February 2003 in order to discuss the destiny of Iraq after the fall of Saddam regime, Turkmen was not included in the composition of administration. KDP officials argued in the meeting that “the Turkmen was so small in the ethnic construction that they could not be considered.”¹⁵⁵ The argument of KDP could not be acceptable to Turkmen who are the second largest ethnic population in northern Iraq. In other words, it is natural that the initial exclusion of Turkmen in the process of discussing about the future of Iraq has been connected to the elimination of Turkmen rights in the reconstruction of new Iraq.

Meanwhile, Turkmen had being pressurized from not only Kurds but also Saddam regime since 1991 year.¹⁵⁶ After the implementation of the embargo on Iraq, 85-90% of Turkmen population under the Saddam regime was exposed to bad hunger, disease, poverty, unemployment and despair. All political and economic pressures forced the Turkmen to migrate to the Turkey, Europe and America.¹⁵⁷

3.4.2 The Iraqi Turkmen after 2003 Iraqi War (2003- Now)

The U.S. declared war against Iraq on 19 March, 2003 with the aims to overthrow the Saddam regime, to destroy the weapons of mass destruction and to democratize the Iraq in the line of the continuation of the combat with terrorism. Yet, although the collapse of Saddam regime and the declaration of victory by G. W. Bush, the current President of the U.S., the unstable and fragile Iraqi situations are still going on with the increasing number of resistance movement.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Erşat Hürmüzlü, op cit., p.109.

¹⁵⁶ Suphi Saatçı, 2001, op cit., pp.8-10.

¹⁵⁷ Meşruk Y. Börklü, op cit., pp.6-9.

¹⁵⁸ It was reported that number of attacks is 150/day, Iraqi civilian deaths is 94/day. According to Iraq Situation Report, approximately 63428 Iraqi civilians were killed until now.

After the fall of Saddam regime that had subjugated the Turkmen, Turkmen was full of hopes that the U.S. would encourage the democratization to Iraq, as they justified their invasion as the improvement of democratization. However, the U.S. forces that opened northern Iraq front with the help of Kurdish groups has followed a pro-Kurdish policy against the Arabs and Turkmen rather than balanced policies among all ethnic groups. For instance, when the U.S. forces allocated the seats of Kirkuk provincial council to the ethnic groups, they did not reflect the impartial ratio of ethnic groups. What is worse, even the seats allocated to Turkmen were provided to Turkmen puppet parties.¹⁵⁹ The U.S. and PUK peshmerga forces carried out an operation against the Turkish Liaison Team Office in Sulymaniah on July 4, 2003 and 11 Turkish soldiers were under the detention as the result of this raid. This event gave the Turkmen to the psychological disappointment by showing that the Turkish officers were so weak that they could not protect themselves, let alone the Turkmen. During this raid, the branch of ITF was attacked and the Turkmen was arrested. Also, the joint operation of the U.S. forces and Kurdish militia in the Telafer region in September 2004 prior to the November 2004 census¹⁶⁰ made thousands of Turkmen to become homeless.

In terms of a formal political system of Iraq, the 25 members of Iraqi Governing Council established by the CPA on July 13, 2003 came from the party leader or representatives of political parties whereas no one of ITF who represented the Turkmen ethnic were not included in the member. The appointment of one Turkmen, Songül Ç abuk to the member as the one quota did not represent in proportion to the Turkmen population.¹⁶¹ Such a partial allocation was reflected in

¹⁵⁹ Giles Trendle, "A Hotbed of Ethnic Tension," *the Middle East*, December 2003, p.13.

¹⁶⁰ The census was not conducted due to the security and political reasons.

¹⁶¹ Mariam Shahin, "The Quota Council," *The Middle East*, August/September 2003, p.10.

the “*Designated Interim Government*”¹⁶². It was natural that *Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL)* written by the Governing Council and the CPA portrayed the Turkmen as the position of minority, not as the third largest ethnic group. The new interim government selected on June 28, 2004, was a mosaic constructed to satisfy the Kurds and Shiites. The key positions were divided up between Shiites and Kurds. The members of KDP and PUK were appointed to the powerful positions.¹⁶³ On the contrary, the Turkmen was once again ignored, as the only Turkmen who held a post under the Governing Council, Dr. Rashad Mandan, continued his symbolic role as Minister of Science and Technology. Pursuant to the TAL, the first democratic election in Iraq on January 30, 2005 was held in order to elect the ‘*Transitional Government*’ which would draft a permanent constitution and establish the necessary conditions for the election of a permanent government. During this election, the Iraqi Shiites and Kurds went to cast their votes and the results of election gave all power to their respective political parties. The Iraqi Sunnis paid a heavy price for their boycott of the elections, as their diminishing status as political players in Iraq was dealt another heavy blow. After the elections, most of important posts including the prime minister, the vice president, the minister of interior and the oil minister were filled with the Iraqi Sunni. In the case of Kurds, Jalal Talabani, the PUK leader, became the new president of Iraq and Messud Barzani was happy with his role as the head of KRG. Also, the Foreign Minister of Iraq came from the Kurds. Also, through the election of January 2005 the temporary 277 member Iraqi Council of Representatives were selected. 11 Turkmen entered into the National Assembly in total 277 seats. However, 4 out of 11 Turkmen came

¹⁶² It was established by the CPA on 1 September 2003. Dr. Rashad Mandan was appointed as the minister of science and technology for one chair allocated to the Turkmen out of 25 seats.

¹⁶³ Messud Barzani and his KDP were given the following positions; Vice President-Rowsh Shaways, Foreign Minister-Hoshyar Zebari. Jalal Talabani’s PUK were given the Ministry of National Security, Barham Salish becoming the new Minister.

from the 'Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan and from the ITF there were only three Turkmen.

Admittedly, the Transnational Government established through the election of January 2005 submitted the new proposed constitution to a referendum on October 15, 2005. The new constitution to set up a 'Democratic Federal Iraqi Republic' got approved when 79% voted in favor in the referendum.¹⁶⁴ The referendum results conveyed just how polarized and divided Iraq had become along ethnic and sectarian line. In Kurdish and Shiite majority areas, the referendum for the draft constitution got approved with high margins, in some provinces as high as 97%. On the other hand, the voters of Sunni Iraqi were only 24% in favor of the referendum. In the case of northern Iraq, the new constitution gained the 99% approval from Kurds whereas there was 14% approval in the Mosul and 2% in the Anbar.¹⁶⁵

Following the ratification of the Constitution of Iraq on October 15, 2005, a general election was held on 15 December, 2005 to elect a permanent 275 member Iraqi Council of Representatives. Although Iraqi Sunnis participated in this election, the power move in the Iraqi politics did not take place due to large segments of Sunnis Iraqi population that was discontent at the developments taking place. The Cabinet which resulted from the elections kept almost all important ministries either in Iraqi Shiite or Kurdish hands. In the case of Turkmen, even one Turkmen ministry of Youth and Sports was a part of the Kurdistan Gathering, Turkmen puppet party.

One of the most important regions where the Kurdification has prompted is the Kirkuk. Kirkuk adjacent to oil fields holding 40 % of Iraq's reserves as well as surrounded by some of Iraq's richest agricultural land can not be given up from the

¹⁶⁴ Hasan Tunç, op cit., p.14.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p.19.

Kurdish groups who have wanted to annex the Kirkuk to the Kurdish autonomous region by changing its demographic structure. However, the fact that Kirkuk is purely a Turkmen city prevented Kurdish groups from adding the Kirkuk to their autonomous territory. The desire to include the Kirkuk as the Kurdish territory was well presented in 1970s by the saying of Barzani;

Even if one single person is determined to be of Kurdish origin according to the census which shall be conducted, Kirkuk shall be Kurdish territory. If we do not conquer Kirkuk, our struggle is useless. The Northern region which was legally left to our administration had been already in our hands in the past. Now we want Kirkuk.¹⁶⁶

In order to change the demographic structure in Kirkuk, Kurdish groups burned the citizen records in Kirkuk and Mosul in April 10, 2003.¹⁶⁷ Also, Kurdish groups have begun to settle the Kurds to Kirkuk to secure enough constituents capable to include the Kirkuk to the autonomous Kurdish region through a planned referendum based on the Article 58 of TAL.¹⁶⁸ According to the Article 58 of TAL in the process of normalization that has restored the changed demographic structure to the original state prior to the Arabization in Kirkuk, the number of Kurdish immigrants to the Kirkuk reached 600,000 much more than 11,800 Kurds expelled from Kirkuk in the Saddam regime.¹⁶⁹

The situation of Kirkuk is stipulated in Article 140 of the new constitution of Iraq as follows;

Article 140:

First: The Executive Authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law.

Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional

¹⁶⁶ Bilal N. Şimşir, op cit., p180, Suphi Saatçi, 2001, op cit., 243.

¹⁶⁷ Hasan Tunç, op cit., p.18.

¹⁶⁸ See Appendix G for the Article 58.

¹⁶⁹ Suphi Saatçi, "Irak Türkmenleri ve Kerkük Sorunu(Iraqi Turkmen and Kirkuk Question)," *Global Strateji*, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, p.30.

Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority elected in accordance with this constitution, provided that it completes(normalization and census and concludes with a Referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), in a period not to exceed(the thirty first of December two thousand and seven)¹⁷⁰

In other words, pursuant to the Iraqi Constitution (Art 140), Kurds have gained new legal rights to negotiate over Kirkuk and disputed lands as well as over other sensitive issues such as revenue sharing, petroleum rights and finances.

Until now, Barzani who evaluated that the migration of Kurds to Kirkuk was achieved to the good result in the referendum has argued as follows;

All groups in Kurdistan will get to vote freely and according to their own conscience in the referendum. About 80% of Iraqi has agreed on the Constitution, and that Article 140 is the legal basis for dealing with the Kirkuk question. We need to go ahead with a referendum, as further delays can only destabilize the situation. Foreign intervention on this issue is unacceptable.¹⁷¹

In terms of the Kirkuk issue, the position of Turkey with a deeply close connection with Turkmen from the demographical perspective is based on the one postponing the referendum to an undisclosed date. Abdullah Gül, the current President of Turkey, while he was Foreign Minister in May of 2007, stated this issue;

It's only a matter of time until the Kirkuk referendum gets postponed. Iraqi Constitution's Article 140 will determine Kirkuk's status. It should not be rushed into. It should take into account the welfare and future of all Iraqi people according to the will of all members of Iraqi parliament groups, with compromise in areas that will contribute to the final solution.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ *Constitution of Iraq*, also available at <http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?smap=&Ingnr=12&rn=107&anr=12329>.

¹⁷¹ "Kirkuk Referendum Needed Soon, says Iraqi Kurdish Leader," *Committee on Foreign Affairs European Parliament*, May 8, 2007), also available at <http://web.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?Ingnr=12&smap=02010200&rnz73&anrz17784>.

¹⁷² "Dışişleri'nden Kerkük Uyarısı(Foreign Ministry's Kırkuk Warning)," *ANKA News Agency*, May 2, 2007; also available at <http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6445723>.

Admittedly, the efforts of Kurdish groups not only to give the support to the PKK that will be explained in the next Chapter but also to change the demographic structure in the Kirkuk was well reflected in the report written by a Member of Parliament (MP) in the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), Mr. Çömez who was sent on a fact finding mission to northern Iraq as follows;

PKK terrorists are settling in Kirkuk with heavy weaponry. Their Identification Cards are supplied by the KDP and PUK. The Turkmen community which I am in touch with stated that a lot of PKK terrorists are coming into Kirkuk. The outcome of the referendum which will be conducted in Kirkuk by the end of this year is predetermined and the intention behind it is obvious. Turkey should declare now that it will not recognize the referendum. There are 50 Kurds coming into Kirkuk for every Arab that leaves. The demographic structure of the region was seriously changed in favor of the Kurds.¹⁷³

Although in September of 2007 the Iraqi Parliament took a decision to postpone the proposed referendum to May 2008 due to the lack of technical preparation needed to conduct the referendum, the conflicts among Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkuk has been increased. In Kirkuk where most of Iraq's ethnic and sectarian divisions meet, "it is possible that the civil war will be ignited."¹⁷⁴

In sum, Turkmen have been suffered from the assimilation policies by Arabian administrations and Kurds since the foundation of Iraq. And, the current situation of Turkmen has made Turkey to be concerned about the developments of northern Iraq because of its cultural and ethnic closeness with Turkmen.

¹⁷³ Babacan, Coskuner, "PKK Kerkük(PKK is in Kirkuk)," *Hürriyet(Turkish Daily)*, February 6, 2007.

¹⁷⁴ Gunter, M. Michael and Yavuz, M. Hakan, "The Continuing Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XII, No.1, Spring 2005, p. 129.

CHAPTER 4

THE PKK TERRORISM IN THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

4.1 Introduction

The Kurdish question of Turkey who has the largest Kurdish population in the world have rooted in the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 when victorious powers in WWI agreed to establish an independent Kurdistan state in what now is southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq. Since that time, the Kurd question has occupied both the domestic and foreign policy of Turkey with the wide demands of Kurds from full secession to federalism and the recognition of individual rights as Turkish citizens within the framework of the process of Turkey's entry into the EU. The worst symptom of the Kurdish ethno-nationalism in contemporary history has been terrorism led by the PKK¹⁷⁵ against the Turkish state and moderate Kurds.

The establishment of PKK, terrorists organization, in 1974 by Abdullah Öcalan, a Kurdish student at Ankara University's Political Science Department has made the Kurdish question more complicated. The PKK have aimed at the creation of an independent Kurdistan state carved from the southeastern territories of Turkish

¹⁷⁵ Other names or aliases the PKK has used or is known by are as follows; *Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan*, *Kongra-Gel*, *Halu Mesru Savenma Kuvveti(HSK)*, *Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress*, *Kurdistan People's Democracy Congress*, *Kurdistan People's Congress(KHK)*, *People's Congress of Kurdistan*, *The People's Defense Force*. For further information, see "Country Reports on Terrorism 2005," the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2005, p.206; also available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65462.pdf>.

republic by using multi-dimensional political as well as military strategies. The fighting between Turkish soldiers and PKK has resulted in an estimated 37,000 death¹⁷⁶ in wide Turkish territories including main cities and southeast region since 1984 with the increased Turkey's defense expenditure at the expense of education and healthcare.¹⁷⁷ Also, the PKK has been used by both regional and Western states as the trump card in order to exercise their influence over Turkey. A world tour of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of PKK, with the admissions of external powers represented the concrete example.¹⁷⁸

Undoubtedly, one of the main reasons for the sensitivity of Turkey towards the developments in northern Iraq is the Kurdish terrorist organization, PKK. More importantly, the problem of PKK that has challenged the Turkish security stability since its foundation has been much dangerous to Turkey than ever before because the emergence of autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq after the Operation of No-Fly-Zone has functioned as the platform for PKK. Also, PKK has used the process of democratization of Turkey. To satisfy European Union access in rules, the Turkish parliament eliminated capital punishment, sparing Öcalan's life despite overwhelming public desire for his execution.¹⁷⁹ In August 2003, the Turkish government passed an amnesty law, providing the group's members to a chance to

¹⁷⁶ According to the Turkish government, 26,532 PKK terrorists, 5,185 Turkish security forces and 5,209 civilians lost their lives by PKK terrors.

¹⁷⁷ The economic impact of extraordinary security precautions, the lack of investment, unemployment and military expenses are said to have cost the Turkish state around 100 billion USD since the mid 1980's.

¹⁷⁸ For instance, after Öcalan was forced out of Syria on October 9, 1998, he was sent to Moscow for a little over a month. After Turkish Intelligence contacted Russian authorities and informed them about their knowledge of Öcalan's whereabouts, the Russians, despite denying the allegations, forced Öcalan out the backdoor. In November of 1998, Öcalan arrived in Rome and stayed there until January of 1999. The next stop on Öcalan's world tour was Athens. Greeks decided that keeping Öcalan in Athens was too much of a risk and sent him to their embassy in Kenya. Through the help of the CIA with its large Nairobi office, Öcalan was finally caught by Turkish authorities on February 14th, 1999 after he exited the Greek embassy in Nairobi. For detailed information, see Kemal Kirişçi, "The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy," in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis(eds.), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (London: MIT Press, 2004), p.278.

¹⁷⁹ *Zaman*(Turkish daily), July 31, 2002.

leave the PKK. Giving no attention to Turkish efforts, the PKK¹⁸⁰ bombs and snipers killed twenty-three Turks inside Turkey on July 2006 and clashes continued after the cease-fire. Also, Turkey has feared that KRG who emerged actually in 1992 in northern Iraq serves as a center to attract the restive Kurds in Turkey or it might lend them to direct support by forming the sympathetic feeling of international society for the idea of wider Kurdish national self-determination, possibly leading ultimately to a sovereign Kurdish state who can include the southeastern Turkish territory.¹⁸¹

To make matters more complicated, the cross border operations by Turkish Army have faced a difficulty to achieve the perfect elimination of PKK in northern Iraq due to diplomatic problems with Iraq, the opposition of KRG and a reluctant attitude of the U.S. about the cross border operation of Turkish military. Such a difficulty to operate the unilateral military attack against PKK has required Turkey to drag out the cooperation from other political actors. Furthermore, the Iraq war in 2003 and the refusal of the Turkish government to join the U.S. troops created a new opportunity space for the PKK.

4.2 The PKK since the No-Fly-Zone Operation

Turkey has faced with the serious security concerns from PKK since its foundation. As many experts about PKK suggest, the strategic changes that ostensibly announced the end not only of the PKK's bid for a separate Kurdish state but also of the violent struggle for Turkish military have actually been a tactics in order to gain time to regroup the PKK terrorists.¹⁸² The PKK who moved into

¹⁸⁰ PKK changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress(Kongreya Azadiu Demokrasiya Kurdistan, KADEK) and renamed itself as PKK-Kongra-Gel(Kongra Gele Kurdistan, Kurdistan People's Congress) again.

¹⁸¹ Bill Park, "Iraq's Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for US Policy," *Parameters*, Autumn 2004, p.22.

¹⁸² Michael Radu, "The Rise and Fall of the PKK," *Orbis*, Vol. 45 Issue 1, Winter 2001, p.57.

northern Iraq where was under the power vacuum¹⁸³ since the operation of No-Fly-Zone supported by unilaterally the U.S. and U.K. has continued the terrorism attacks to Turkish military forces as well as civilians.

Since the unilateral invasion of Iraq by the U.S. with Turkish refusal against American request to deploy the U.S. forces from the Turkish territory to northern Iraq in March, 2003, Turkey has faced with more difficult obstacles to eliminate the PKK. Anyone including the U.S., the Baghdad government and Kurdish groups (KDP and PUK) has not taken sincere steps against the PKK. The situation of post-Iraq war has been flowed to be unfavorable to Turkey on the ground that it is without other political actors' cooperation, especially the U.S. and Kurdish groups that Turkish force can not root out PKK terrorists in northern Iraq. By the same token, the increasing sympathy and interest in PKK by Iraqi Kurds have intensified the Turkish concerns.

In sum, the unwillingness of the U.S. about the Turkish cross border operations for sweeping out the PKK and the ethnic and cultural closeness of PKK to KDP and PUK, even if the Kurdish political parties have been hostile to each other sometimes because of the ideological and political objectives, have recreated the "Sevre Syndrome" to Turkey.

4.2.1 No-Fly-Zone Operation and PKK

The time when northern Iraq was used the sanctuary by PKK firstly went back to the 2nd Congress¹⁸⁴ of PKK held on August, 1982 in the Bekka valley under Syrian control. At that time, Messud Barzani, the leader of KDP, who controlled

¹⁸³ The No-Fly-Zone means that there is no government because Saddam was kept out, neither British and the U.S. were prepared to take a responsibility for what was happening on northern Iraq, including the activities of the PKK terrorists.

¹⁸⁴ Ümit Özdağ, *Türk Ordusu'nun Kuzey Irak Operasyonları*(Turkish Military Operations against northern Iraq), (İstanbul: Pegasus, 2008), p.45.

northern Iraq did not refuse the PKK because Syria approached him for permissions. While some PKK terrorists crossed directly to northern Iraq, those who could not do due to the Iraqi security controls were transported through Iran with the help of the Iranian intelligence.¹⁸⁵ That is, the triangle of Syrian, Iranian and KDP/PUK assistance allowed the PKK to act freely in northern Iraq. However, the emergence of northern Iraq where has functioned as the breeding ground for the PKK seriously coincided with the No-Fly-Zone operation.

The violent suppression of Iraqi Kurdish rebellions staged in the wake of Saddam regime's defeat by coalition forces in February 1991 triggered the international atmosphere to consolidate the Iraqi Kurdish autonomy. The international interests in the Iraqi Kurds' tragedy led to the adoption of UNSCR 688 on April 5, 1991, deciding that the situation of Iraq was a "threat to the peace." Several Western powers based on this resolution imposed a No-Fly-Zone north of the 36th parallel, deploying 15,000 troops to northern Iraq to create a Iraqi Kurdish safe area.¹⁸⁶ However, the noticeable thing is that the Western military intervention in northern Iraq included a legal problem in that there was no Security Council mandate authorizing military measures to enforce resolution 688 which ensured the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq.¹⁸⁷

Dubbed "*Operation Provide Comfort*" and renamed "*Operation Northern Watch*" in 1996, the operation basically was undertaken from Turkey's Incirlik airbase. As explained above, Turgut Özal, the President of Turkey was one of the strongest advocates, or perhaps even the architect, of the concept of a safe haven for Kurds as the solution to deal with the humanitarian crisis that accompanied the

¹⁸⁵ Ü mit Özdağ, *Türk Ordusu'nun PKK Operasyonları: 1984-2007(PKK Operation of the Turkish Army: 1984-2007)*, (İstanbul: Pegasus, 2007), p.43.

¹⁸⁶ Nigel D. White, "The Legality of the Threat of Force Against Iraq," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 30, March 1999, p.78.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

sudden influx of nearly half a million refugees. However, from the Turkish perspective, active involvement into the enforcement of No-Fly-Zone has confronted with numerous dilemmas as the time goes by. That is, the aim of No-Fly-Zone to consolidate the Kurdish autonomy with the goal to deter Saddam regime from mistreating its Kurdish population paved the way for stationing the PKK because northern Iraq became the free autonomous region without the control of the central Baghdad government. In short, “*Operation Provide Comfort/Operation Northern Watch* could be regarded as the double-edged sword from Turkey; as a necessary humanitarian tool to protect Iraqi Kurds by taking preventive measures about the refugee problem and at the same time as a shelter of the PKK.”¹⁸⁸ In other words, the PKK’s activities inside Turkey were immensely facilitated when the reassurance of sanctuary in northern Iraq was so freely available at no cost. The absence of the effective central authority in northern Iraq and continued battle for many years between KDP and PUK further had consolidated the PKK’s ability to menace Turkey from the outside. Turkish concern about No-Fly-Zone operation was reflected in the briefing addressed by Yaşar Büyükanıt, Turkey’s General Staff on 12 April, 2007 who stated the relationship between No-Fly-Zone of 36th parallel and PKK as follows:

The No-Fly-Zone also established a protected area for PKK forces to operate in. This situation still continues. The list of casualties I stated previously, all correspond to this time frame, this was the turning point. Unfortunately the third has also been as a result of another Gulf War. Turkey has once again been hurt by the war for two reasons. The first being, it has been locked into its geography. The second being, PKK has gained immense freedom and huge amounts of weapons and ammunitions have fallen into its hands from the remains of the former Iraqi army. You might ask this: ‘Should a military operation be conducted in northern Iraq?’ Yes it should. This has two dimensions. The first, when looked at through the eyes of the military, yes it should be conducted. Will it have benefits? Yes it will.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸ Duygu Sezer, *A Turkish Perspective* in Lyle Goldstein and Ahmed Hashim(eds.), Center for Naval Warfare Studies, *The Future of Iraq Conference Proceedings*, (the U.S.: Rhode Island, 2002), p.159.

¹⁸⁹ *Hürriyet Newspaper(Turkish Daily)*, April 12, 2007.

The message given in this speech draw conclusion that since the No-Fly-Zone Operation, the PKK has been able to deliver blows to the Turkish security forces. Considering the fact that the PKK has always prospered when Turkey's neighboring regions have been unstable, northern Iraq has become the most suitable breeding ground for PKK.

On the other hand, the PKK decided to concentrate on the political struggle rather than military one in the 6th Congress held on August 5-22, 2001, following the declarations of Öcalan in trial.¹⁹⁰ Despite the fact that the terrors by PKK were decreased to the extinguished level between 2000-2002, the tactical changes of PKK have made Turkey to be faced with the difficulty to detect the PKK terrorists who acted under the mask of political rights.¹⁹¹ With the strong demands of EU to Turkey in terms of political reformations, the political struggles of PKK inside Turkey has been intensified, following a somewhat success in the election system.¹⁹²

4.2.2 The PKK since the Iraq War

Turkish opposition to the U.S. invasion against Iraq in 2003 due to the fears over the ramifications for the Kurdish issue was neglected by the U.S. As the time goes by, the Turkish fear about PKK supported by the Iraqi Kurdish groups in northern Iraq has become evident. Furthermore, the Turkish unwillingness to support the U.S. war in Iraq in March 2003 has made Turkey to be remained on the sidelines and undercut its working relationship with the U.S. military.

¹⁹⁰ The PKK's determination to lay down their arms and secessionist agenda for a short period with the support of democratization and pluralism, as Öcalan argued in the defense trial in 1999, helped to generate political movements supportive of a moderate Kurdish agenda

¹⁹¹ Ümit Özdağ, 2008, op cit., p.269.

¹⁹² The political parties who have a deeply close relationship with the PKK terrorist, DEHAP, gained 6.2% vote in 2002 election, even though it failed to cross over the 10% threshold. The growing prominence of DTP, the successor of DEHAP who won 24 seats in Turkey's 500 seat parliament held at the July 2007 elections in Turkish politics.

The war in Iraq provided the PKK with a good opportunity to consolidate its safe haven in northern Iraq strongly. Moreover, Iraqi Kurds groups (KDP and PUK) did not have any intention to take actions against the PKK.¹⁹³ If the KDP and PUK would cut the logistical lifelines for the PKK, the group would be hard to survive. But rather than crack down, the PUK and especially KDP see the PKK as a useful bargaining chip with Turkey.¹⁹⁴ Also, the U.S. who has played a critical role in rebuilding the post-war Iraq, despite White House rhetoric of a global war on terrorism,¹⁹⁵ has not taken concrete steps in dealing with the PKK terrorists who have stationed in northern Iraq. To make matters worse, the Iraqi government of Baghdad, traditionally the Kurd's worst enemy, is now reliant on Kurdish support for its existence. The fact that since 2003, no military actions has been taken against PKK on Iraqi soil by anyone proved the silent tolerance of the U.S., Iraq and KRG about PKK. Under the silent tolerance of them, at least perhaps 5,000 PKK members enjoy refuge in northern Iraq and they established an enclave in various areas of northern Iraq including Kandil Mountain on the Iraq-Iran border as a sanctuary.¹⁹⁶ More importantly, the expansion of PKK into northern Iraq has occurred with the systemic supports by Kurdish groups, for example, giving the identification cards, weapons and foods to the PKK.

¹⁹³ The main Kurdish parties are all hard-line socialist influenced by the Communism. The KDP and its Iranian brother party were founded in Stalin's protection. The KDP was released from the Soviet Union's guidance in the 1960s whereas the PUK was founded to defend fundamentalist Marxism. PKK was affected by Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse Tung's thought. Therefore, these three Kurdish groups share a common belief in the idea that a state on their own would solve all the problems of the Kurds and the problems are understood as basically economic exploitation based on the idea of communism. Each party has its international sponsors: PUK has historically leaned at Syria and KDP at Turkey. PKK has leaned at both Syria and Iraq. Historically speaking, the Kurdish parties are fighting each other, being used by regional states. For detailed information, see, Antero Leitzinger, Kurds and Kurdistan, *The Eurasian Politician*, Issue: 3, February, 2001.

¹⁹⁴ Soner Cagaptay, "Can the PKK Renounce Violence?" *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 14, Issue 1, Winter 2007, p.47.

¹⁹⁵ The U.S. included the Kurdish terrorist groups(PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL) in Turkey to the terror lists in January 13, 2004.

¹⁹⁶ The Washington Post, May 10, 2005. See the Appendix H, the map of PKK camps in northern Iraq.

The sympathy as well as support of Iraqi Kurds to the PKK has been announced publicly in northern Iraq controlled by KRG. Denise Natali who lectures at the Politics and International Relations Department of the University of Kurdistan in Erbil explained the move of Iraqi Kurds feeling about PKK as follows:

Kirkuk and Turkey are the two issues that unite people here. This discussion has done Turkey no good at all. People's (Iraqi Kurds) sympathy for the PKK has been growing greatly- although it's not an ideological sympathy, but a sympathy for them as the people who are still carrying on the national struggle.¹⁹⁷

Moreover, while many Iraqi Kurds have started to recognize the Kurdish parties (KDP and PUK) as the tarnished groups, the PKK has been regarded as a more pristine nationalist profile by them. The sympathy to the PKK of Kurds in the Kurdistan region has been dispersed with the television programs that have portrayed the PKK as the heroic organization battling for Kurdistan against Turkish oppression. These deep sympathies may well be pushing Iraq's Kurdish parties to take stronger positions on both Kirkuk and Ankara's demands for military operations against the PKK.

The PKK increasingly also has taken advantages of Turkey's relaxed political environment to complement its military wing with a political front. For example, DTP composed by three former Turkish parliamentary deputies from People's Democracy Party (Kurdish Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP) on October 23, 2005 was deeply related to the Öcalan. What is more, Öcalan also acknowledged his role in shaping DTP's policies published in the Kurdish nationalist daily *Özgür Politika*.¹⁹⁸ The growing prominence of DTP who won 24 seats in Turkey's 500 seat parliament held at the July 2007 elections in Turkish politics suggests that while

¹⁹⁷ Jon Gorvette, "PKK Popularity Grows in Iraq's Autonomous Kurdistan Region," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, Vol. 26, Issue 5, July 2007, p.30.

¹⁹⁸ *Özgür Politika*(Frankfurt), April 18, 2005, July 31, 2005, October 23, 2005.

previously Kurdish nationalist political parties such as HADEP closed down in 2003 by the determination of Turkey's Constitutional Court because of its perceived links to the PKK were secondary to the PKK, now the political party is the main body of the organization with the military wing working for its sake in northern Iraq.¹⁹⁹ Such a change of PKK with the respect of the change of their tactics was presented in the warning of PKK to other political parties exception to DTP in 2007 election as follows;

With the exception of DTP all candidates in Van and Hakkari from CHP, MHP, DYP and AKP must withdraw themselves and offer their support to Kurdish people. Our people must demonstrate their Kurdishness in the elections. If any different approach develops, our approach will also be different. [...] Whoever continues the activities we mentioned here will be punished. Who ever damages our movement or our party [DTP] will not be forgiven in any way. They should know that they are facing death.²⁰⁰

Since the Iraq war, the PKK have restarted to launch the military attack against Turkey. One of the PKK leaders, Murat Karayılan claimed that “the Lausanne Treaty remained invalid because the Saddam regime was fallen, requiring the *Legitimate Self-Defense War* to the PKK terrorists in order to accelerate the political struggles and to demand the release of Abdullah Öcalan to Turkey.” More importantly, in the Congress held on May 6-16, 2004, Osman Öcalan (the brother of Abdullah Öcalan) demanded “the PKK terrorists to restart the violent attacks under the name of the *Legitimate Self-Defense War* with the abolition of the temporary cease-fire for six years.”²⁰¹ In May 2004, disappointed by the Turkey's reluctance to ease the conditions of his imprisonment, Öcalan ordered the PKK who retained still around 5000 militants under arms in the mountains of northern Iraq to resume its terrorist attack to Turkey from June 2004 in spite of the objection of most PKK

¹⁹⁹ Soner Cagaptay, op cit., p.49.

²⁰⁰ “PKK'dan Büyük Tehdit(The Big Threat From PKK).” *Hürriyet(Turkish Daily)*, May 14, 2007.

²⁰¹ Ümit Özdağ, 2008, op cit., pp. 273-276.

leadership based on the acknowledgment that their organization was too weak to fight with Turkish security forces. More importantly, despite the order of Öcalan to restart the terrors, it would be impossible for the PKK to restart the terror attacks without the help of Iraqi Kurdish groups, especially KDP. With the restarting of the violent struggle, the PKK changed their military tactics based on the effectiveness in terms of the military strategies; firstly, the PKK has pursued a two-front strategy combining a rural insurgency in southeastern Turkey with an urban bombing campaign,²⁰² adding the political struggles through the use of DTP mentioned above, secondly, the PKK has attacked to inflict high casualties and to secure a propaganda victory nowadays rather than to seize territory, with the recognition that they can not achieve the military victory over the Turkish force, at the same time, avoiding a high number of casualties during the early 1990s. In line with the change of their strategies, the PKK began to launch operations using over 100 militants, giving up the mass attacks with as many as 500 militants highly vulnerable to hot pursuit operations, in particular, the attack of *Cobra* Helicopter, by the Turkish military.²⁰³

Under the help of Iraqi Kurds and the American tolerance, the PKK who could be armed with heavy weapons remained by the defeated Saddam forces²⁰⁴ has started to launch operations against Turkish security force, resulting in 23 casualties on July 2006 and sequent nearly 40 casualties of Turkish soldiers in October 2007. Behind the bold change of the PKK's tactic from temporary cease-fire to the violent attack was the belief that Washington would prevent Turkey from launching a military incursion against the bases of PKK in northern Iraq.²⁰⁵ By the same token, to be sure, the PKK wants Turkey to engage in full-scale warfare not just with the PKK

²⁰² Gareth Jenkins, "Turkey and Northern Iraq: An Overview," *The Jamestown Foundation*, Occasional Paper, February 2008, p.12.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.20.

²⁰⁴ Ümit Özdağ, 2008, *op cit.*, p.20.

²⁰⁵ Gareth Jenkins, *op cit.*, p.20.

in northern Iraq but with the Iraqi Kurdish groups and to draw in the U.S. and other foreign powers.

4.3 Turkish Strategies to Eliminate the PKK in Northern Iraq

Turkey has tried to sweep out the PKK in northern Iraq since the first station of PKK in northern Iraq. One of the most representative methods for Turkey to use has been the cross border operations. However, the main obstacles against these military operations have been revealed with the pressures from Iraqi Kurdish parties and especially the U.S. Although there was a bilateral agreement about the cross border operation between Turkey and Iraq, this agreement was cancelled by Iraq unilaterally in 1988. Also, the insufficient information about where the PKK have been stationed in northern Iraq may damage to innocent Iraqi people, rendering the international society to demand the Turkey to stop the cross border operations. It becomes more difficult for Turkey to collect the precise information about PKK, considering the fissure between the U.S. and Turkey after the 2003 Turkish refusal to the American request.

Since the 2003 Iraqi war, unilateral cross border operations by Turkey have been almost impossible without the consent of the U.S. The U.S. reluctance to agree with Turkish operations is not so much due to both countries' restricted relationship recently as due to the U.S. strategic aim to maintain the stability in northern Iraq. Because, the U.S. do not want a little stable northern Iraq to be become other unstable regions of Iraq. Also, the growing sympathy to the PKK as well as hostility against Turkey in the issue of Kirkuk among Iraqi Kurds also have played a critical role in forming the change of Kurdish parties' policy about the PKK.

Under such limited situations, Turkey has tried to gain the support from other political actors in eliminating the PKK in northern Iraq with the use of military means. The cooperation with neighboring countries and the diplomatic efforts to isolate the PKK from the outside helps can be interpreted within the context of sharing of the basic concept with other political actors that terrorist groups should be suppressed. In particular, such recognition of Turkey that the decisive factor in eliminating the PKK in northern Iraq depends on the cooperation of Kurdish groups (KDP and PUK) has been connected to practical policies.

4.3.1 Cross Border Operations of the Turkish Military

The legal basis for the 25 cross border operations that the Turkish Armed Forces conducted from 1983 to 2008 was the February 1983 treaty between Turkey and Iraq on '*Border Security and Cooperation*.'²⁰⁶ This treaty allowed both states to engage in hot pursuit of terrorists. The term 'Hot Pursuit' founded on a 1982 United Nations Maritime Law that permitted states to pursue those who have violated its law into international borders if need be.²⁰⁷ However, this treaty was concealed by Iraq in 1988 because Turkey refused the request of Iraq who would want to cross into Turkish soil in pursuit of Kurdish refugees on the ground that the refugees did not present a national security threat to Iraq.²⁰⁸ Consequently, the Iraqi government protested against cross border operations by Turkish military in northern Iraq. However, the cross border operations of Turkey were the inevitable choice since Saddam regime was supporting the PKK terrorists at that time.

There had been 25 cross border operations the Turkish military engaged in from 1983 to 2008. More importantly, the thing we should keep in mind is that in

²⁰⁶ Ü mit Ö zdağ, 2008, op cit., p.47.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p.134.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p.138.

February 2008, the restart of cross border operation in a more decade has been launched in response to the increasing terror attacks by the PKK founded in the bases in northern Iraq. It will be more reasonable to look at the major operations that effected on the PKK rather than the chronological operations.

The first military incursion into northern Iraq by Turkish Armed Forces was May 25, 1983 when the PKK had settled into the camps owned and operated by the KDP as well as located in very close Turkish border. About 7,000 Turkish troop that crossed 5 km into the Iraqi border attacked KDP camps.²⁰⁹ The success of this operation could be measured through the words of Şemdin Sakık, the PKK's top militant at that time. Sakık captured in a secret raid in northern Iraq on April 13, 1998 recalled, "I was at the KDP-controlled 'Haftanin' Camp on 22nd May, 1983 (the period of the Turkish Military Operation). We felt defeated, destroyed. On 15th June, 1983, I crossed back into Şırnak."²¹⁰

Admittedly, it was possible for Turkish military to achieve the modernization in terms of weapons related to attack the terrorists under the full support by Turgut Özal government in 1990s. Especially, the purchase of *AH-1 W Super Cobra Attack Helicopters* that could operate at night through 1990 improved the ability to oppress the PKK without the restriction of the time.²¹¹ Furthermore, there were three major military incursions into northern Iraq during the Demiral and Çiller governments. The first operation during this time was the *Hakur Operation (Hakur Operatoion)* of October 1992 that aimed to destroy attempts of PKK to create 'salvaged' areas free

²⁰⁹ Ibid., p.133.

²¹⁰ Tuncer Günay, *Şemdin Sakık Anlatıyor: Kobralar Üzerimize Gelince Aklımızı Kaçırıyorduk*(*Şemdin Sakık Describes: When the Cobras Came at us We used to Lose Our Mind*), (İstanbul: Doğan Press, 2007), pp.30-31.

²¹¹ Ümit Özdağ, 2007 op cit., p.119.

of the presence of Turkish Armed Forces during the Demiral government.²¹² In the case of the second operation, *Zeli Operasyonu (Zeli Operation)* of January 1994, Turkish army crossed into northern Iraq with the heavy booming under the Çiller government. The third major incursion into northern Iraq under the Çiller government was *Çelik Operasyonu (Steel Operation)* on March 1995 that was the biggest military operation conducted by the Turkish military outside to its borders. Around 35,000 troops with the air support attacked the PKK located in the city of Zakho close to the Turkish border. At that time Turkey believed that PKK would cease to be a major threat to Turkish security forces any longer because of the deep damage by the operation. Below is that then Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller talked about the operation in March of 1995:

This is not a 10 day operation! We will stay until we are a 100% satisfied that we have met our objectives. We did not limit our operation in time or in scope. This will be a decisive blow to the PKK. We needed to clean Northern Iraq to fully control the regions on our side. Due to the lack of authority present there, and disputes between Barzani and Talabani, PKK was able to gain strength in Northern Iraq.²¹³

The products of Çiller government who was the most enthusiastic for fighting PKK terrorist was connected to the scatter of PKK around northern Iraq. In the sixth Congress of the PKK held through 1st May, 1996 to 15th May 1996, after this operation Öcalan decided to adopt the strategy of suicide attacks. The determination to take the suicide attacks by PKK was interpreted by many analysts as the difficult situation of them who were driven to the last ditch.²¹⁴

In 15th May, 1997 when 10,000 Turkish Armed Forces armed by 250 tank undertook the cross border operation, so called *Balyoz Operasyonu (Hammer*

²¹²“Chronology of the PKK Terrorist Organization, 1978-2006,” International Strategic Research Organization, 2006; also available at http://www.usakgundem.com/pdfs/USAK_PKK_Kronoloji.pdf.

²¹³ Lyons, “Turkish Jets Blast Kurds in Iraq,” *The Independent Newspaper*, March 21, 1995.

²¹⁴ Saygı Öztürk, *Madalyalı Mahkım (Convict With a Medal)*, (İstanbul: Doğan press, 2007), p.109.

Operation), under the air support, 87 terrorists would be killed and the number of PKK terrorists would be decreased to 1200 according to the briefing provided by Chief of Turkish General Staff.²¹⁵

As stated above, the cross border operations by the Turkish Armed Forces in 1990s under the full support of the administration have made the PKK to find itself losing ground on all fronts. Successive cross border operations by the Turkish military in the 1990s would destroy PKK's bases and camps in northern Iraq. Although Turkish military efforts to eliminate the PKK both within the Turkish territory and in northern Iraq have produced many casualties in the side of Turkey also, the necessities to undertake the cross border operation continuously were well reflected on the briefing by General Yaşar Büyükanıt, current Chief of Turkish General Staff as follows:

In the year 1992: 496 soldiers died in action, 955 wounded due to the battle with PKK terrorism, in 1993: 538 soldiers died in action, 996 wounded, in 1994: 867 died in action, 206 wounded, in 1995: 615 died in action, 342 wounded. To day you can not generate solutions by keeping the PKK separate from northern Iraq and northern Iraq separate from the rest of Iraq. They are all organically related. The first turning point in the war against the PKK was the first Gulf War. During this war Turkey gave full support to the Coalition forces. But in the end Turkey ended up suffering as a result. At the end of the war hundreds of thousands of refugees piled up at Turkey's borders.²¹⁶

Also, Turkish Military Operations against PKK including cross border operations have helped decrease the number of PKK terrorists and PKK terrors, leading to the success if not perfectly. According to a report by the General Staff of the Turkish military, the number of PKK terrors fell steadily from 3,328 in 1994, to 1,500 in 1996, and to 589 in 1998. Similarly, the number of PKK terrorists dropped from approximately 10,000 (both inside and outside Turkey) in 1994 to 4,000 in

²¹⁵ Ümit Özdağ, 2008, op cit., pp.207-209.

²¹⁶ *Hürriyet Newspaper(Turkish Daily)*, April 12, 2007.

1999 and the PKK was able to keep only 25 percent of them within the country, compared to 65 percent in 1994.²¹⁷

Most recently, following air raids of Turkish F-16s against PKK bases in Qandil Mountain, *Güneş Hareketi* (Sun operation) began on 21st February 2008 when 10,000 Turkish Armed Forces who crossed into northern Iraq struck at PKK despite the protest of the Iraqi Kurds.²¹⁸ The restart of the first substantial ground operation in more than a decade illustrated the Turkish concerns about northern Iraq where has functioned as the shelter of PKK terrorists.²¹⁹

4.3.2 The Cooperation with Other Political Actors

It is absolutely true that 25 cross border operations would greatly contribute to weaken the capability of PKK in northern Iraq. However, it is also true that only the military actions can not eliminate the existence of PKK in northern Iraq on a ground that the external powers have used the PKK as trump card to counterweight to Turkey in order to maintain the influence into Turkey. As the historical events indicated, the PKK could not struggle against Turkish security forces without outside helps including Syria, Iran, Armenia, Greece and Iraqi Kurdish groups. For example, Syria offered the safe heaven to Öcalan in 1990s. Iran who had taken ambiguous position vis-a-vis Kurdish separatism in Turkey and Iraq allowed the PKK to use Iranian territory to open new fronts along Turkey's eastern frontier. The newly independent Armenia who emerged out with the collapse of the Soviet Union provided enough help for PKK to threaten northeastern Turkey. Greece encouraged

²¹⁷ *Milliyet Newspaper(Turkish Daily)*, September 29, 1999.

²¹⁸ *Cumhuriyet(Turkish daily)*, February 22, 2008.

²¹⁹ Gareth Jenkins, op cit., p.20.

the PKK for more than a decade as the event of Öcalan's arrest revealed.²²⁰ In addition to these outsiders who shared a historical hostility with Turkey, the Western countries have turned a blind eye to the illegal acts of PKK in their territories, if not direct support to the PKK.

However, the helps to PKK from outsiders have been decreasing owing to the various factors; the efforts of Turkey, the wide spread of terror image about PKK in the international society and the shared threat perception of neighboring countries against the de facto Kurdistan region after the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. For example, Syria's support to the PKK has been decreased by the warning of Turkish military with the warm political ties and bilateral trade. Even Iran who tolerated rather than actively supported the PKK during the 1990s has forbidden its activities in her territory due to its own Kurdish insurgency.²²¹ In May 2002, EU declared the PKK who renamed *KADEK* and then *Kongra-Gel* as the terrorist group. In practice, Dutch security forces closed down the PKK training camps where had conducted terror attacks in Turkey, arresting 29 PKK terrorists. Also, many broadcastings²²² sympathetic to the PKK were shut down in Germany although still several EU countries have continued to tolerate the PKK and its fronts.²²³ Moreover, even though the American reluctance to confront the PKK has intensified distrust among Turkey's policymakers, she has declared the PKK as the terrorist groups with the

²²⁰ Kemal Kirişçi, "The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy," in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis(eds.), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (London: MIT Press, 2004), pp.278-279.

²²¹ Tehran is now facing with the Kurdish insurgency led by the Kurdistan Free Life Party(PJAK) which was founded in 2004 and is ideologically affiliated with the PKK.

²²² For example, on September 5, 2005, Germany shut down E. Zani Press and Verlags, publisher of the pro-PKK *Özgür Politika* newspaper although Germany's federal administrative court overturned the decision. On September 19, the Germany authorities closed down Welat Press Verlag, operator of Mezopotamia-Nachrichtenagentur news agency(MHA) and the websites of Roj Online.

²²³ There are many propaganda of PKK inside EU. For example, *Kurdishinfo.com*(the website hosted in Brussels), *Kurdistan Youth Freedom Movement*(a violent group hosted in Denmark until recently), *Kurdistan People's Congress*(a website hosted in Brussels, Belgium), *Officio de'Informazione del Kurdistan in Italia*(the website for the Rome-based PKK information bureaus is hosted in Italy), *Roj TV* and *Mezopotamya television* (the pro-PKK news and propaganda including interviews with PKK leaders and calls for violent action against Turkey hosted in Denmark), *Freedom for Öcalan*(with both a physical and website presence in Germany).

inclusion of PKK into the list of terrorist groups in 2004. Since the invasion of Iraq by the U.S., many neighboring countries that supported the PKK have started to share the common threat perceptions from the Kurdish question like Turkey. The emergence of the autonomous Kurdish government in northern Iraq suggested the neighboring countries that include many Kurds that Kurdish question can not be limited only on the Turkish concern.

In order to predict whether Turkey can achieve the elimination of PKK in northern Iraq, we should consider the roles of the U.S. and Iraqi Kurdish groups. As 25 cross border operations has illustrated, unless Turkey cooperates with the U.S. and more importantly KRG, military incursions into northern Iraq are likely to give only short-term damage to the PKK.

Meanwhile, there are no long term alliances or hostilities in northern Iraq. The relations between the Kurdish groups in the region have been affected by all internal as well as external actors. In line with the influences of all actors, all agreements and disagreements would be temporary and subject to change by developments in the region. For instance, shortly after the cross border operation of May 1983 by Turkish Armed Forces, the KDP and PKK signed a '*PKK, KDP Cooperation Principles*' in July of 1983.²²⁴ However, KDP decided to end the alliance with the PKK due to the disagreement with Öcalan and the press of Turkish military on 1987.²²⁵ Instead of KDP, PUK would sign a similar alliance agreement with PKK because the complicated nature of the hostile relations between Barzani and Talabani played a big role in contacting with PKK. Also, Barzani invited the Saddam forces to expel the PUK from Erbil in 1996. When the battles between KDP and PUK broke out in 1994, Turkey allied with KDP because PUK allowed the PKK

²²⁴ Hakkı Öznur, op cit., pp.622-634.

²²⁵ Fırat Kürkçüoğlu, op cit., p.136.

to move freely under the PUK's control. Since then, Turkey has protected the KDP by the direct use of force against the PKK and the PUK. In the same process, the KDP, by its control of the Iraqi side of Habur customs gate at the border with Turkey, has had an important source of revenue, with the aid to the KDP in sizable amounts of armaments, money, trucks and technical equipments from Turkey. However, the relations between Turkey and KDP started to weaken from late 2002 and KDP has attempted to form new policies in light of the cooperation with the policies of the U.S. In the case of the U.S., since the refusal of Turkey to the American request in March 2003, the U.S. has sought to maintain warmer relationship with KRG who helped to open a new northern front than with Turkey. However, by mid-October 2007, 40 Turkish soldiers killed by PKK terrors in a less than a month made the Turkish public and government to become unsustainable, leading the U.S. to share Turkish concerns a little. Such a shared Turkish concern rendered the U.S. to provide Turkey with actionable intelligence on PKK bases in northern Iraq under the condition that Turkish military actions would be limited.²²⁶ In this sense, the complex interests of all actors made the Turkish policy-makers to understand the fact that winning the military aspect does not ensure success to eliminate the PKK in northern Iraq.

4.3.3 Using Economic Leverage

Along with the military operations against PKK, Turkey could affect in the region by using various methods in order to persuade both Kurdish parties (KDP and PUK) and the U.S. not to tolerate the presence of PKK in northern Iraq.²²⁷

²²⁶ Gareth Jenkins, *op cit.*, p.20.

²²⁷ For example, Turkey provided both Kurdish parties with various advantages: the issuing of Turkish diplomatic passports to Barzani and Talabani, economic aid, multi-national NGO's entering through Turkey, black market petroleum flow into Turkey from northern Iraq, the supply of basic goods from

One of the most effective policies is that Turkey would function as the role of joker in conflicts between all actors. Especially, in conflicts between KDP and PUK, Turkey took advantage of this division and acted as a broker of peace in order to make the Kurdish groups to be hostile to the PKK in northern Iraq. With the respect of the U.S., the strategic value of Turkey for the U.S. still remains valid because “Turkish model based on the secularism and democracy can provide the U.S. with the good evidence of Greater Middle East Project (GMEP). Also, the strategic value of Turkey during the cold war has not been removed due to the presence of the powerful Russia.”²²⁸ These strategic values of Turkey can not be ignored by the U.S. easily.

On the other hand, Turkey can also use the economic leverage in order to make it clear to all the major players in northern Iraq that Iraq’s territorial integrity, the status of Kirkuk, Turkmen and PKK terrorism need to be resolved in manner that addresses Turkish security concerns. Habur Gate is one of the key elements to control the KDP because the customs revenues of the KDP decreased dramatically when disputes arose between the KDP and Turkey.²²⁹ Given that KRG does not have any effective outside route because of the limited geographical position except to the Habur Gate, Turkey can gain the leverage to project their power into northern Iraq.²³⁰ After Gulf War II, the border gate system became the most important source of income for Kurdish groups, whereby they gained 300 million USD in permits for

Turkey, the Turkish military and Special Forces presence and cross border operation. For a detail information, see Ekrem, “Türkiye’nin Kuzey Irak Perspektifi ve Hareket Alanı(Turkey’s Northern Iraq Perspective and Areas of Movement),” *Stratejik Analiz*, June 2007.

²²⁸ Burak B. Özpek, “Hatay ve Kıbrıs Olayları Bağlamında Kerkük Değerlendirmesi(The evaluation of applying events of Hatay and Cyprus into the Kirkuk),” *Global Strateji*, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, pp.231-232.

²²⁹ Cemalettin Taşkıran, “Kuzey Irak Türkmenler ve Dış Politikamız(The Turkmen in Northern Iraq and Our Foreign Policies),” *Global Strateji*, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, p.58.

²³⁰ Suphi Saatçı, 2007, op cit., p.34.

the entry of Turkish trucks to northern Iraq.²³¹ We should keep in mind that to maintain an open border, Iraqi Kurds established security agreements with the Turkish government which included shared efforts to search out terrorists from the PKK. An offer similar to this was made by the former '*Coordinator for the Fight against Terrorism*', General Edip Başer as follows;

On the Turkish side, besides a military intervention to northern Iraq, there are other alternatives we can look at. For example, if we were to close the Habur border gate for a few days this would mean a serious warning for them (KRG and furthermore the U.S.). If we stop giving them electricity and cut the flow of oil, they will understand the seriousness of the situation. Of course such actions will hurt us economically as well. But everyone has to be understanding if such a decision were to be made. If need be, the state should bear the burden of these actions.²³²

There has been recent discussion of closing this gate down and opening another border gate that passes through Turkmen territory at Ovaköy.²³³ Although this discussion lay on the table because of the possible attack of KDP to Turkmen, if another gate would be opened in Turkmen area, only discussion aroused the strong reaction from KDP. As illustrated the event of KDP using force against PUK to secure the border gate revenue in 2006, the issue of Habur Gate could be a critical methods to maintain the influence on the Kurdish groups. Also, the warning about closing down of Habur Gate to the U.S. can be method to make the U.S. to take active measures against PKK, considering that a lot of logistic materials have passed through the Habur Gate.

In addition to the Habur Gate, the KDP and PUK have been deeply dependent on the Turkish goods including foods, materials and so on. For example, Turkey has given the KDP and PUK to some materials including foods and military weapons in

²³¹ *Hürriyet Newspaper(Turkish Daily)*, March 21, 2004.

²³² *Hürriyet Newspaper(Turkish Daily)*, June 13, 2007.

²³³ Uğur Ergan, "Habur'a İkinci Kapıya Gnelkurmay'dan Ret(Turkish Deneral Staff Refuese a Second Gate at Habur)," *Hürriyet Newspaper(Turkish Daily)*, August 9, 2007.

return for their extents of efforts to attack the PKK in northern Iraq.²³⁴ More recently, a MP of the opposition party in Turkey, Republican People's Party (CHP), Erdal Karademir bitterly criticized the policies of AKP about Iraqi Kurds in terms of the providing of electricity. He stated:

The electricity needs of PKK camps in northern Iraq are provided by Turkey. And if this were not enough, the electricity that is sold to the Turkish people for 9.5 cent is sold to the Kurds for 6.7 cents. The money lost in the process is being subsidized by the Turkish Treasury. The AKP government and the Turkish Energy Sector Arrangement Committee gave special permission to a company by the name of Black Sea Whole Sale Electricity Ltd (KARTET) to export electricity to Iraq. KARTET is the only private company in Turkish which has permission to export electricity.²³⁵

Consequently, the economic prosperity that the KRG enjoys today has a lot of to do with Turkish assistance. As stated previously, Turkey has a power to use the reliance of KRG upon its assistance in order to attain the result favorable to Turkey such as putting a stop to the presence of the PKK in northern Iraq. In other words, the warning to close down the Habur Gate, to open new gate in Turkmen territory and to cut off the electricity will be counted as the serious stick by KRG. Also, the large American dependency on Turkey in terms of the logistic route can be the leverage to apply pressure on sensitive subject such as the PKK.

²³⁴ Ümit Özdağ, 2008, op cit., pp.259-264.

²³⁵ "Elektrik Barzani'ye 9, Halka 12. 4 Kuruş(Electricity to Barzani is 6.7 Cents, for the People, 9.5 Cents)," *ANKA News Agency*, July 16, 2007.

CHAPTER 5

THE REGIONAL INSTABILITY IN THE GEOSTRATEGICAL CONTEXT

5.1 Introduction

As Abdullah Gül, the current President of Turkey has noted, “for Turkey, the situation of Iraq and the tasks we undertake there is not just simply another item on the global agenda. Iraq is our close neighbor and its future is inter-linked with the stability of the region.”²³⁶ Abdullah Gül’s comment implies that the geo-strategic significance of northern Iraq is far more profound for Turkey than for other states because Turkey is simultaneously located not only in the part of the Middle Eastern regional political system but also in the part of Europe. To the extent that the situation in Iraq brings the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq into the agenda, it reactivates the “Sevres Syndrome” because of the potential spill-over effects of ethnic strife on Turkish southeastern territory mainly composed of the Kurds.

Meanwhile, the stability of the Middle Eastern security deeply relies upon the future of Iraq who has included various ethnic groups such as Arabs (Sunni and

²³⁶ Abdullah Gül, “Turkey’s Role in a Changing Middle East Environment,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 15 Issue 1, 2004, p.5.

Shiite), Kurds, Turkmen and so on. The proposition that the future of Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq will be the future of the Middle East is fairly reasonable and well-grounded. The possible emergence of Kurdish state would involve not merely the disintegration of the state of Iraq as it existed since 1920 but also a radical overhaul of the geopolitical map of the Middle East and Gulf region that prevailed in the twentieth century. According to Mustafa Kibaroglu, "if the Kurds should claim for their independent state, a mosaic of different ethnic and religious groups who have lived in one state may follow the case of Kurds that may render the whole Middle East into a political chaos."²³⁷ Namely, the idea of the independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq would produce a domino effect on Kurdish secessionism in the countries such as Turkey, Syria and Iran who include many Kurds. Because, the logical ultimate goal of Iraqi Kurds who has tried to establish the Kurdish state in northern Iraq would be the union of Kurds disseminated in various countries.²³⁸

As another factor to cause the conflict in the Middle East, considering the fears of Arabs and Iranians that Iraqi Kurds supported by the U.S. and Israel in northern Iraq can be the spokesperson of the West in the Middle East, the northern Iraq would be likely to be changed to the second Gaza Strip. In particular, both Syria and Iran who include the significantly high population rate of Kurds like Turkey²³⁹ can be left to the danger to be challenged the territorial integrity by the autonomous Kurdish region supported by the U.S. and Israel in northern Iraq. On the contrary to both Syria and Iran, the U.S. and Israel who do not have any reliable allies in the

²³⁷ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey's Concerns About the State-Building Efforts in Iraq," *The Iranian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XVIII, No.4, 2005, p.446.

²³⁸ Duygu Sezer, op cit., p.158.

²³⁹ The exact number of Kurdish people living in the Middle East is unknown, due to both an absence of recent census analysis and the reluctance of the various governments in Kurdish-inhabited regions to give accurate figures. According to the CIA World Factbook, Kurds comprise 20% of the population in Turkey, 15-20% in Iraq, perhaps 8% in Syria, 7% in Iran and 1.3% in Armenia. In all of these countries except Iran, Kurds form the second largest ethnic group. Roughly 55% of the world's Kurds live in Turkey, about 20% each in Iran and Iraq, and a bit over 5% in Syria. These estimates place the total number of Kurds at somewhere between 27 and 36 million.

Middle East have regarded the Kurdish groups who have controlled the northern Iraq as the regional-political actor in terms of geostrategic aspect, if not perfect ally for the West until now.

In addition to the complex as well as conflictive interests of regional powers about the developments of northern Iraq, the external powers, especially great powers including the U.S., Russia, EU and China have sought to project their powers into northern Iraq. The conflictive interests of great powers about northern Iraq have accelerated the instability as well as instigated political unrest in the Middle East.

In short, the possible emergence of Kurdish state in northern Iraq will leave the negative legacy to the Middle East like the case of Israel. Under the high likelihood that various ethnic groups can attempt to achieve the autonomous status like the Kurds, that can lead to the domino-effect in the region. To be sure, such a tragic scenario would be possible if conflictive interests of both regional and external powers could affect on the regional stability negatively. Consequently, these weak territories will become a battlefield for regional and external powers. Also, the chaos in these inevitably weak and porous territories will act as safe heavens for terrorist groups which will probably act as proxies of their allies as the PKK and Ansar terrorist groups have acted in northern Iraq as their field of activities.²⁴⁰ Moreover, taking consideration into the fact that northern Iraq has the rich oil in terms of the energy security, no one can be certain that the external great powers and regional powers will refrain from attempting to influence the unfolding events to their unilateral advantage.

²⁴⁰ “The Future of the Kurds is the Future of the Middle East,” *Turkish Daily New*, December 28, 2007.

5.2 The Conflictive Interests of Regional Powers about Northern Iraq

Iraq is the miniature of the Middle East in terms of the composition of ethnic groups. The Kurds in northern Iraq have links with the Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Syria; the Shiite Iraqi Arabs living mainly in the south area of Iraq are deeply connected to Arab and non-Arab Shiites in Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia; the Sunni Iraqi Arabs living in the middle area of Iraq have relations with the Sunni Arabs in Syria and Jordan and Islamic movements in the Arab world; and the Turkmen have links with Turkey. Therefore, all neighboring countries have their own national interests in Iraq while their different policies pursued by Iraqi neighbors will inevitably cause the conflict in the region. To make matters worse, the common efforts to try to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq shared by Turkey, Arab states and Iran do not give the green light to Israel surrounded by potential enemies. Also, Arabs, Turks and Iranians have recognized the American words that she has tried to restore the stability in Iraq in order to avoid the menace of civil war as the propaganda clichés. Such a fear of regional states has a great persuasive power in a sense that the U.S. has sought to the “divide and rule” policy based on the ethnic groups about Iraq as well as the preferable policies for the Iraqi Kurds.

5.2.1 The Concerns of Arab States

The basic concerns of Arab states about the developments of northern Iraq come from the fall of the Saddam regime who maintained the territorial unitary in Iraq. In addition, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries would not admit the establishment of a second Shiite or Shiite-dominated state in the Middle East plus Iran. These countries are also concerned about the Arab Shiite in southern Iraq, given that they have significant Shiite minorities in their nearby provinces. Moreover, some

Arab states see Iraq as part of Arab nation and oppose the establishment of a Kurdish state in Iraq as well as the policy of turning Iraq into a Shiite country which could easily fall under the direct or indirect influence of Iran. However, the American occupation to Iraq consolidated ethnic and religious divisions, while “divide and rule” became a useful instrument to govern the conflictive Iraq. Therefore, many Arabs started to believe that the U.S. aimed to break up Iraq into the three ethnic and religious groups by supporting the independent Kurdish state.²⁴¹ The preferable policies toward Kurds of the U.S. since the operation of No-Fly-Zone made these concerns of Arab states not to be groundless. Many in the Arab media even have criticized the Kurdish peshmerga for being American mercenaries trying to subdue the Arab people. Arab states’ interests in Iraq were emphasized often by the Arab leaders. During the first official visit of Syrian President Bashar al-Asa to Turkey early in January 2004, he stressed, “Turkey and Syria were not only against a Kurdish state in the region but any state that could break the integrity of Iraq.”²⁴² When the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak visited to Ankara in February 2004, he stated that “Egypt should together against any effort with Turkey that aimed to harm the integrity of Iraq.”²⁴³

One of the most important initiatives related to Iraq at the regional level has been appeared in Iraq’s Neighbors Meeting. From the opening of Iraq’s Neighbors Meeting²⁴⁴ that started on January 23, 2003 when the invasion against Iraq by the U.S. was looming to today, the neighboring countries of Iraq have still emphasized that the territorial unitary of Iraq should be maintained and the regional stability should be sustained.

²⁴¹ Michael M. Gunter and M. Hakan Yavuz, op cit., p.122.

²⁴² *The Daily Star*, January 7, 2004.

²⁴³ *Turkish Daily New*, February 13, 2004.

²⁴⁴ The meeting has been participated by the ministries of foreign affairs of Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Hashemite Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria.

Admittedly, the fundamental background of Arab states about developments of northern Iraq roots in the deep distrust of the biased Western policies, especially the U.S., with the historical experiences of betrayal by the Imperial powers. Arab states have doubted the word of the U.S. to the neighboring states of Iraq that she has tried to establish the democratic state in Iraq within the structure of the societal, political and territorial integrity. Arab states' distrust in the U.S. words is not groundless in a sense that a declared opposition of the U.S. to the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia did not prevent the collapse of these states.

One of Arab states who are most significantly wary about the developments of northern Iraq is the Syria who has been hostile to Israel since 1948 when Israel was founded by the support of the West. Also, Syria who shares long borders with Iraq and includes approximately 1.5-2 million Kurds who have lived in near northern Iraq would feel the danger of the territorial integrity. Although Syria has a short borderline with Israel, the emergence of autonomous Kurdish region supported by Israel has increased the threat perception of Syria. The fact that the relations among Turkey, Iran and Syria have significantly improved in recent years reflects the increasing concern of Syria despite the strained relations in the 1980s and 1990s due to her support to PKK.²⁴⁵

5.2.2 The Concerns of Iran

As an influential regional power, Iran, no less than other states in the regional and global system, has tried to produce the hegemonic power. At present, the future of northern Iraq deeply related to the one of Iraq can challenge the vital interests of Iran in multidimensional aspects; national, regional and global position. In this way,

²⁴⁵ Latrobe, F. Stephen, op cit., pp.105-106.

understanding the Iran's current concerns about Iraq is much more complex than the Arab states. First of all, at the national level, Iranian concern derives from the emerging factionalism which can instigate the Kurds who have lived in Iran. The fact that Iran who contains the second-largest number of Kurds in the world, followed by Turkey, has beaten the Kurdish national movement continuously²⁴⁶ is to illustrate Iranian concern about northern Iraq. In addition to the possible disintegration of Iraq, the plausible coalition of the KRG with other regional states, particularly Israel, can be the main threat to Iran.

On the other hand, another Iranian interest is deeply connected with the position of Shiites in the Iraqi political system. Although Iraqi Shiites seized the important positions in Iraqi politics, a struggle for supremacy power within the factions of Iraqi Shiite²⁴⁷ can also create the tension in the domain of Iranian foreign policy.²⁴⁸ At the regional sphere, the new birth of Iraq demands the revision of the regional security structure in the Middle East. It would be more likely for such a change to lead to the instability rather than the stability in the Middle East. From the international perspective, one of the most important Iranian concerns stems from the feelings of encirclement created by the U.S. force presence in Iraq. Not only a continuous hostility between the U.S. and Iran but also a recent confrontation of them about Iranian nuclear ambition have played vital roles in worsening the relationship between the U.S. and Iran. In other words, to Iran, the presence of the

²⁴⁶ The Kurdish national movement in Iran has been continued strongly. For example, immediately after WWII, Quiz Muhammad, the Kurdish leader established the Mahanadi Republic of Kurdistan in Iran by using the power-vacuum despite the short-lived period. In order to obstruct these rebels, Iranian government assassinated the Kurdish leaders. Also, after the establishment of Islamic Republic by Khomeini, Iranian government had no place for minorities within the Islamic Umma. For recent background, see Faired Koochi-Kamali, *The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran: Pastoral Nationalism*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003).

²⁴⁷ All Iraqi Shiite groups-from the far right of Ahmad Chalabi to the far left of Moqtada al-Sadr and moderate groups like those of Al-Sistnai and Al-Hakim-have required the Iran to support in order to increase their domain of power.

²⁴⁸ Kayhan Barzegar, "Understanding the Roots of Iranian Foreign Policy in the New Iraq," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XII, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp.50-51.

U.S. force in Iraq can threaten to the Iran security immediately. “Even if Iran has taken a moderate stances to recent Iraqi politics, Iranian politicians have tried to establish a close relationship with the Iraqi Shiites groups in order to resist the uncompromising the U.S. demands to her.”²⁴⁹

5.2.3 The Interests of Israel

Israel completely surrounded by potential enemies, Arab states, is small in size and has no strategic depth.²⁵⁰ Turkey and Israel maintained the perfectly cooperative relationship throughout the 1990s in that both countries could satisfy desires of each other; Israel needed the space, the strategic depth, whereas Turkey needed the advanced technology of Israel in terms of military. However, such a warm relationship becomes fluctuated with the respect of the positions of northern Iraq. That is, according to Mustafa Kibaroglu, “the possible emergence of the Kurdistan state would be the worst scenario for Turkey whereas it would be beneficial to Israel.”²⁵¹ From the perspective of Israel, one of the most overwhelming national concerns would be Iran who has attempted to develop the nuclear weapons recently despite the pressures from the U.S. It is absolutely true that the geostrategic position of northern Iraq would provide Israel the most effective way to monitor the Iranian nuclear effort, furthermore, threats posed by countries like Pakistan and Central Asian states that are coming to the radical Islamic states.²⁵² Another reason why Israel has given the importance to northern Iraq stems from the fear that Turkey,

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Shmuel Limone, *The Arab Threat: The Israeli Perspective*, in UN(ed.), *National Threat Perceptions in the Middle East*, (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995), p.9-11.

Duygu Sezer, “A Turkish Perspective” in Lyle Goldstein and Ahmed Hashim(eds), “The Future of Iraq Conference Proceedings,” p.159.

²⁵¹ Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Clash of Interest over Northern Iraq Drives Turkish-Israeli Alliance to a Crossroads,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 59, No. 2, Spring 2005, p.247.

²⁵² Ibid., pp.258-259.

the traditional ally of Israel in the unstable Middle East, is becoming an anti-Israel country. For instance, publicly criticizing the Israel's tragic suppression against Palestinian, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish Prime Minister, said "Israel security forces retaliated to suicide bombings by committing state terror against innocent Palestinians."²⁵³

On the other hand, another threat perception of Israel would be to depend on outside sources of energy. To protect the secure oil resources from the non-Arab states would be problem that Israel has confronted since her foundation in 1948. The fact that northern Iraq controlled by non-Arab people, namely Kurds, retains enormous natural resources is the attractive element to encourage Israel to give the financial and military support to the Kurds. According to the BBC broadcasting, "Israelis trained Kurdish troops in Iraq more than one year ago, although both Israeli government and Iraqi one denied this broadcasting."²⁵⁴ Considering the numerous Israeli media about the similarity between Israel and the Kurdish-state-in-being with both surrounded and besieged by hostile states. Israel will not abandon to support the Iraqi Kurdish groups with their long-term strategic thinking based on the fragmentation of the Middle East into ethno-religious states in order to weaken the consolidation of the Arab states hostile to the Israel.

5.3 The Conflictive Interests of External Powers about Iraq

In addition to the deeply different interests of the regional powers adjacent to Iraq, the conflictive interests of External powers as well about Iraq have played a vital role in leading to the instability in the Middle East. From beginning to end of

²⁵³ For a number of such statements made by the Turkish Primer see for instance Zübeyde Talcin and Vnren Mesci, "Ve Israile Sari Kart!(And Yeollow Card to Israel)," *Sabaha Newspaper(Turkish daily)*, May 26, 2004.

²⁵⁴ "Israelis Trained Kurdish Troops in Iraq," *BBC2 Broadcast*, September 29, 2006.

the Iraqi war, Russia has opposed to the U.S. policies in Iraq, regarding the U.S. actions as the illegitimate ones. More broadly, Russia has thought that the American intention to invade the Iraq is to lay a foundation for engaging into the Caspian, Caucasus and Central Asia in order to ensure the energy resources and control the expansion of Russia and China.

On the other hand, although EU and China who do not have enough military capability competitive to the U.S. have not opposed to the U.S. as much as Russia publicly, their hidden attitude to the U.S. is also negatively. Such conflictive interests of Great Powers can bring into the stability rather than the instability in Iraq, more broadly in the Middle East.

5.3.1 The Interests of the U.S.

No one can deny the proposition that the political actor who can the most strongly effect on the fate of northern Iraq is the U.S., the only superpower in the world. The U.S. policies about Iraq are fundamentally based on strategies about the Middle East. The basic aims of the U.S. in the Middle East are as follows:

- To ensure the oil and energy resource in the region
- To protect Israel from the potential enemies and to weaken the strength of potential enemies such as Syria and Iran who can threaten the security of Israel
- To weaken the movement of radical Islamism or Islamic fundamentalism
- To remove weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the region²⁵⁵

²⁵⁵ Cemalettin Taşkıran, op cit., p.50.

However, after 9.11 terror, the U.S. added new aims that should be achieved in the Middle East; to democratize all regimes including authoritarian and Islamic nations and to keep her hand on the Middle East and Central Asia firmly, at the same time to control all peripheries of China and Iran during the process being undertaken operations.²⁵⁶

Shortly after the victory against Afghanistan who has supplied the al-Qaeda with the military base and financial support, the U.S. indicated the Iraq as the second target on the ground that Iraq had the close connection with al-Qaeda and possessed the WMD which could target to the U.S. However, when George W. Bush administration came to the power, they were critical of the previous Iraqi policies sought by Bill Clinton government. In fact, “the September 11 attack only made the invasion against Iraq earlier and helped the administration to frame within the context of a broader war on terrorism.”²⁵⁷ Namely, in order to achieve the aims mentioned above, the U.S. chose the Iraq as the starting-point of the strategic achievement in the Middle East. In addition to the Middle East, the U.S. could secure a bridgehead to control the Gulf, Caucasus and Central Asia by controlling the Iraq. In short, in the context of the GMEP, the U.S. has regarded the Iraq as the strategic point for pressuring the Islamic system or at least for neutralizing its anti-American policies.²⁵⁸

As the prerequisites of achieving the strategic goals mentioned above, the U.S. should form a strong secular central government who can lead to the stability in Iraq. In the process of achieving the stability in Iraq, the pro-Kurdish element in the U.S. policy was not inevitable but rather arose from failures and disappointments

²⁵⁶ Gamze Güngörmüş, “Kerkük ve Rusya Rederasyonu(Kirkuk and Russia Federation),” *Global Strateji*, Vol. 9, Spring 2007, p.191.

²⁵⁷ Meliah B. Altunışık, “Turkey’s Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond,” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, August 2006, p.184.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.52.

with other forces. The American relative isolation in its Iraqi policies, facing hostility from many Sunni, some Shiite Iraqi, Turkey, Iran, a number of Arab states, a significant part of EU and Russia, has made her to be dependent on 70,000 pro-coalition Kurdish peshmerga.²⁵⁹ To make matters complicated, being developed into more confused situation of Iraq, the initial calculation of the U.S. that Iraqi people suppressed by the tyrant, Saddam, will welcome the U.S. forces has been cracked down by the continuous insurgencies. Due to the strong opposition to the Iraqi policies of Bush administration within the U.S. domestic politics as well as the growing military spending, the U.S. was necessary to find the reliable ally who could alleviate the burden of the U.S. in Iraq. In sum, being confronted with triple pressures from the U.S. domestic, international and Iraqi resistance, Bush administration has sought to the preferable policies to Iraqi Kurds regardless of the oppositions of other states in the process of Iraqi reconstruction, more broadly, in the process of the reorganization of regional security structure in order to weaken the pro-Iranian Islamists and protect the Israel..

However, we should need to understand the American policies about Iraqi Kurds in terms of the long-term strategic aims mentioned above. The fact that the U.S. has supported to Iraqi Kurdish groups in Iraq and Iran whereas she has not taken any actions against the PKK can be interpreted in the context of the American strategy to coincide with the long-term Israeli strategic thinking based on the fragmentation of the Middle East into ethno-religious states.

As concrete examples, under the support of the U.S., the Iraqi transnational constitution did grant many rights to the Kurds such as the recognition of the KRG, the formation of a federal system for Iraq on the basis of geographic and historic

²⁵⁹ Aram Rafaat, "U.S.-Kurdish Relations in Post-Invasion Iraq," *MERIA Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 4, December 2007, p.81.

realities, the Kurds' right to veto and a proposal for a solution to the issue of Kirkuk. Also, in May 2005 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice went to the Kurdistan in a first visit to Iraq before Baghdad for the purpose of bolstering the Kurdish leader's position in Iraqi political system. Then, in November 2005, Barzani officially was invited to the White House as the president of the KRG. During that visit, he took the assurance that "the U.S. would accord the Kurds special status in Iraq."²⁶⁰

Furthermore, the warm American policies about the Iraqi Kurdish groups which came from the long-term U.S. policies about the Middle East had been intensified a little with the refusal of Turkey to the U.S. request in March 2003. Since that time, the Iraqi Kurds suddenly were assumed to the American ally. The crack of alliance between the U.S. and Turkey clearly was reflected in the accident in July 2003 when the U.S. forces detained 11 Turkish soldiers in Sulaymaniya who had performed their duties in northern Iraq as mentioned in the second Chapter. The Sulaymaniya incident was recorded as the worst crisis of confidence in the U.S.-Turkey relations since the creation of the NATO alliance.²⁶¹ However, the limited relationship between the U.S. and Turkey about Iraqi situation including the American good attitude to the Iraqi Kurdish groups stems from the long-term American strategy rather than Turkish unwillingness to support the U.S. invasion about Iraq.

In short, such American policies about the Kurds has led to the serious disorder on a ground that most regional powers except Israel as well as great powers are objected to the American policies.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p.82.

²⁶¹ Michael M. Gunter, "The Kurds in Iraq: Why Kurdish Statehood is Unlikely," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XI, No. 1, Spring 2004, p.109.

5.3.2 The Interests of Russia

Vladimire Putin, the President of Russia, strongly criticized that “the U.S. have attempted to create the unipolar system in the world and that the U.S. unilateral actions have given current world system to serious harm in Munich Security Conference in February, 2007.”²⁶² Putin’s speech evoked a large echo to some extent that some experts evaluated as the starting of the new cold war. Such a speech well reflects the Russian aims and concerns as well. Seeking to regain the past hegemonic position equal to the U.S. during the bio-polar system, Russia has been wary about the power projection of the U.S. into the region where Russia has been dominant. Also, she was very critical of the U.S. policies about Iraq by saying that “unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problem, moreover, they (the U.S.) have caused new human tragedies and created new centers of tension.”²⁶³ Although the U.S. and Russia can find the common ground in the “war on terror,” religious extremisms and the prevention of the spread of WMD with the respect of the Iraqi problem, Moscow has been indeed consistent through the pre-Iraq war, war and post-war periods in her opposition to the U.S.’s use of force against Iraq.²⁶⁴

From the strategic perspective of Russia, the Iraq can be regarded as the “buffer-zone by Russia in maintaining their dominant position in the Caspian, Caucasus and Central Asia” including a lot of energy resources.²⁶⁵ That is, the occupation of Iraq by the U.S. can threaten the dominant position of Russia in the region she has maintained dominance. The American establishment of a close

²⁶² Full Transcript of President Putin's Speech at the Munich Security Conference, *New York Times*, February 14, 2007.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Glia Golan, “Erratum to Russia and the Iraq War: Was Putin’s Policy a Failure?” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 38, 2005, p.424.

²⁶⁵ Gamze Güngörmüş, op cit., p.191.

relationship with Central Asian states in terms of military in order to control the expansion of Russia and China under the name of the “war on terror” as well as to ensure a lot of energy of Central Asia also deeply has caused to a harsh Russian reaction to Iraqi policies of the U.S. The GMEP to which Bush administration has sought can affect the Central Asian situation owing to the geopolitical as well as the cultural closeness. In other words, the instability of the Middle East can be connected with that of Central Asia. Therefore, Russia as the predominant power and the great power with the most at stake in the Central Asia, Caucasus and Caspian until now wants stability in Iraq.

5.3.3 The Interests of EU

EU has not had any united voice about the U.S. policies about Iraq because the four major countries of EU produced the different reactions about the invasion of the U.S. against Iraq initially in 2003.²⁶⁶ Although EU agrees with the basic idea of democratization in Iraq that the U.S. suggested as the cause of the Iraqi war, there are U.S.-EU disagreements on the rationale and methods of the democratization in the Iraq.

Although roles EU can play in the Iraq, furthermore, the Middle East are mostly non-military until now, still without credible military force with peacekeeping and crisis management capacity, the EU has realized that she will hardly be able to attain various advantages such as economic (oil), political (democratization) and security (threat prevention) strategies in the region.²⁶⁷ For example, shortly following the Iraqi invasion, the participations of EU countries exception the U.K. have been limited in terms of funding and aid for the

²⁶⁶ British and Spain backed the U.S. military action while Germany and France opposed to it.

²⁶⁷ Siret Hursoy, “EU’s Long –Term Stability Strategy for the Middle East.” *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, June 2003, p.5.

reconstruction of Iraq.²⁶⁸ Regarding trade with Iraq, the U.S. is the main partner with total 40.7 % whereas the EU possesses the 20.7% of total amount traded during post-Iraqi war. Furthermore, the EU is long way to regain the level of pre-1991 year in terms of oil supply from Iraq.²⁶⁹ As the economic trade shows us, the key factor to restrict the economic restoration of EU with Iraq would be the opposition of principal European countries to the Iraqi invasion.

But, in the aspect of military, the EU will not be able to achieve a power projection force capable of fighting a major contingency in Iraq in the near future because it is currently falling inferior to the technological superiority of the U.S. military capabilities. Therefore, the EU's key military roles in the Middle East will most likely to be assisting individual friendly states in dealing with internal and low-level conflicts, helping in peacemaking and nation-building exercises and assisting the U.S. in the formation of various coalitions where the US would find regional alliances with Middle Eastern states more beneficiary in dealing with the region's problems.²⁷⁰ However, the tension between the U.S. and EU about the Iraqi policies would be so clear that it would be doubtful that EU will be the active supporter of the U.S. in the Iraq, more broadly, in the Middle East.

5.3.4 The Interests of China

No one can easily object to the suggestion that in feasible future the main competitor of the U.S. will be the China who rapidly has expanded their powers into

²⁶⁸ The total of \$33 billion was contributed for the reconstruction of Iraq. Of this sum, fully \$20 billion came from the U.S., \$5 billion was donated by Japan and \$1 billion by the U.K.. In the case of France, the main opponent to invade Iraq declined to make any contribution. In total, \$1 billion was donated by the EU countries. For detail information, see, Jonathan Spyer, "Europe and Iraqi: Test Case for the Common Foreign and Security Policy," *MERIA journal*, Vol. 11, No. 2, June 2007.

²⁶⁹ Jonathan Spyer, "Europe and Iraqi: Test Case for the Common Foreign and Security Policy," *MERIA journal*, Vol. 11, No. 2, June 2007, p.102.

²⁷⁰ Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Role of Europe in the Middle East: An American Perspective," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Prepared for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, March 11, 2002.

all areas including economy, military, diplomacy and so on. However, Beijing can not help but acknowledge that the military power of the U.S. and its allies is a generation ahead of that of China. Far from posing any genuine military challenge to the U.S. at least in conventional terms, “the China will not make any direct confrontation with the U.S. for future several decades.”²⁷¹ With an overwhelming desire to avoid a direct confrontation with the lone superpower, some Chinese nonetheless have predicted a collision course of between the U.S. and China in the not very distant over, primarily, the issue of Taiwan.²⁷² As Iraq represented the pre-emptive doctrine of Bush administration,²⁷³ Beijing has been concerned that the unilateral military action of the U.S. like the case of Iraq will be broken out in the case of Taiwan or North Korea under the situation where Chinese military power was low level compared to that of the U.S. Given the present aggressive U.S. foreign policies taken place in many countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the establishment of missile and military bases in Poland, Georgia and the attempt to consolidate the military and economic relationship with the Central Asian countries adjacent to the China, it would be possibly more likely that the U.S. will provoke China. And Chinese leadership also has been wary that her long-term acquiescence in American expansionism would give negative effects on China’s relations with the Arab and Islamic world.²⁷⁴

Perceived as the disadvantageous position, the main goal of Chinese interests in the Iraq is to ensure the stable oil supplies, avoiding the direct military

²⁷¹ Brendan Taylor, “US-China Relations after 11 September: a long engagement or marriage of convenience?” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 2, June 2005, p.192.

²⁷² Feil-Ling Wang, “Preservation, Prosperity and Power: what motivates China’s foreign policy?” *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 14, No.45, 2005, p.688.

²⁷³ Brendan Taylor, op cit., p.183.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.183.

confrontation with the U.S.²⁷⁵ However, the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the ensuing instability placed the Chinese expectation to hold in terms of the acquisition of Iraqi oil.²⁷⁶ Unlike Russia, although china has not criticized the Iraqi policies of the U.S. publicly, the hidden attitude of China toward the U.S. in terms of Iraq problem is the objection.

²⁷⁵ Charles E. Ziegler, "The Energy Factor in China's Foreign Policy," *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 2006, p.9.

²⁷⁶ In 1997 China signed a deal with Iraq to develop the Al Ahdab oilfield in central Iraq and in 1998 began negotiations for the Al Halfayah field. See for the detail information, see Chalres E. Ziegler, op cit.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

- **Evaluation of Turkish Concerns about Northern Iraq**

If we estimate Turkish concerns about northern Iraq from various perspectives, in today's Turkey, the issue of an independent Kurdish state in the northern Iraq is perceived as a matter of survival.

The Turkish basic thought that current northern Iraqi situation may not be occurred, if the British would not violate the provisions of Mudros Armistice, is the historical driving-force for Turkey to engage in northern Iraq. Pursuant to the Ankara Agreement that decided the Mosul issue ultimately, Turkey conceded the Mosul to the Iraqi government under the mandate of British, not to the particular ethnic group, Kurds. The argument of Hasan Tunç that “if the Ankara agreement would be remained invalid because of the disintegration of Iraq, Mosul province should be returned to the original possessor, Turkey, by the guidance of international law”²⁷⁷ has a strong persuasive power.

Turkmen who has the same ties with Turks in terms of origin, culture and language has lived under the strong suppressions by other ethnic groups supported by Iraqi ruling powers and Kurds. The exposure of Turkmen to massacres in 1924, 1946,

²⁷⁷ Hasan Tunç, op cit., p.22.

1959 and 1991 by Arabs and Kurds has demanded Turks to protect their brothers who have not gained any political and cultural rights in the Iraqi political system from the past to now. The just and great cause to invade into Iraq that the U.S. suggested, the democratization, has not been applied to Turkmen. Under the newly regulated constitution by the federal Iraqi government supported by the U.S., the political rights of Turkmen was ignored again like other constitutions established by past Iraqi regimes. Furthermore, Kirkuk, the original Turkmen city, has been targeted by Kurdish groups who want to involve this city to the region of KRG through the referendum expected in 2008 by changing the demographical structure. It is quite natural that Turks should try to pursuit the foreign polices to protect the rights of Turkmen in northern Iraq along with human rights.

From the political perspective, although there are many positive changes of Turkish politics about the Kurdish question, the PKK, terrorist group, has not abandoned the military struggle against Turkey. Their declaration about the cease-fire against Turkish security forces was revealed as the one of the tactics to secure the recharging time and military resources in order to attack Turkey again. Also, using the power-vacuum taken place in northern Iraq due to the No-Fly-Zone Operation, the PKK has strengthened their positions in northern Iraq with the support from the Kurdish groups and the deep sympathy to them by Iraqi Kurds as well as under the tolerance of the U.S. While the PKK has succeeded in intensifying their powers in northern Iraq, Turkey has faced with various obstacles to eliminate the PKK because of the unwillingness of the U.S. and Kurdish groups to attack them.

Meanwhile, the complex interest calculations of all actors including regional and external powers about the future situation of northern Iraq will be likely to lead the unstable security structure in the Middle East. In the future, the advent of the de

jure Kurdish government that overcomes the de facto level in northern Iraq in today can drive the whole Middle East into the bloody conflicts. In other words, considering the mosaic composition of ethnic groups in the region, the advent of the Kurdish state will encourage other ethnics to attempt to achieve the same status equal to Kurds. Also, neighboring countries such as Turkey, Iran and Syria who contain many Kurds has been wary that KRG not only strongly financed by the trade of oil with other states but also supported by the U.S. and Israel serves as a center to attract the restive Kurds in neighboring countries. Otherwise, KRG might lend them to direct support by forming the sympathetic feeling of international society for the idea of wider Kurdish national self-determination, possibly leading ultimately to a sovereign Kurdish state that can include the Kurds scattered in three countries.

In addition to the deeply contrasted interests about northern Iraq among regional powers, the conflictive interests of external powers can contribute to obstruct the stability in the Iraq, furthermore, the Middle East. The antagonistic relationships between the U.S. and Russia plus tacit oppositions of EU and China against the U.S. policies about Iraq also have played a vital role in leading to the instability in the Middle East.

- **Evaluation of Turkish Foreign Policies about Northern Iraq**

Turkish new activism on the Middle East is a significant departure from traditional Turkish foreign policies espoused by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern Turkish republic. His main guidance of Turkish foreign policy was that Turkey should limit its involvement in Middle East affairs. Turkey's recent focus on Middle East, however, does not mean that Turkey is about to turn its back on the West. The changes of Turkish foreign policies mainly have derived from the

structural changes in its security environment since the end of the Cold War; growing Kurdish separatism, sectarian violence in Iraq that could spill over, the rise of Iran and the increasing radical Islamic groups.

Admittedly, there have been controversial debates about Turkish foreign policies about northern Iraq. Turkish supports to the U.S. operations such as No-Fly-Zone sometimes were criticized by some scholars arguing that Turkey functioned as providing Iraqi Kurds, more broadly, the PKK terrorists with the safe heaven where would be the starting-point of current question in northern Iraq. However, by supporting the U.S. initiative, Turkey could carry out operations on northern Iraq against the PKK terror organization. If *Poised Hammer/Operation Northern Watch* were not supported, Turkey could face problems in the international community. Also, the Turkish refusal of the U.S. request to deploy the U.S. army in Turkish territory in March 2003 has been criticized by some scholars because the refusal has made Turkey to be placed on the sideline with the respect of Iraqi question by helping Kurdish leaders to gain the upper hand in northern Iraq vis-a-vis the Turkish government. As a result of Turkish refusal, red lines²⁷⁸ established February 2002 in an agreement between the U.S. and Turkey has been changed. However, Turkish decision to refuse the U.S. request was indispensable one because of various factors. Turkey had cooperated with the U.S. since the Gulf War amid lingering suspicions about its real intentions with the disappointment of Turkey about the U.S. who did not give any importance to Turkish national interests in northern Iraq. In terms of economy, estimates of Turkey's cumulative economic losses in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War were between 40 and 60 billion dollars, including indirect costs.²⁷⁹ There were similar concerns about the adverse economic impact of a new

²⁷⁸ The red lines included that Mosul and Kirkuk would be occupied by the U.S. force, not by Kurdish troops and that the U.S. would not permit the PKK/Kongra-Gel to gain strength in the region.

²⁷⁹ Meliha B. Antunişik, op cit., p.186.

confrontation with Iraq on a Turkish economy already weakened by the 2001 financial crisis. From the domestic viewpoint, the newly established party, AKP who received an impressive 35% of the votes in 2002 election did not ignore the 90% Turkish people who opposed the Iraqi war. It would be natural for AKP to see the trend of public sentiment in a sense that AKP's main strength derived from that public support.²⁸⁰ The Turkish military, the main supporter about the alliance with the U.S., was equally reluctant to take sole responsibility for an unpopular decision and apparently wanted to share it with other actors, especially political parties. On the other hand, if Turkey would involve in a war without international legitimacy, it might have negative effects on its relations with both EU and Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, from various aspects, the determinations of Turkey in 1991 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq war can be evaluated as the best choice at that time as well as situation.

However, generally speaking, Turkish foreign policies have made a big mistake in dealing with Turkmen. In fact, Turkey did not have a specific foreign policy towards the Turkmen between 1921 when the Mosul was conceded to Iraq and 1991 when the Gulf War was begun. Although activities of Turkey towards the Turkmen increased from 1991 to 1996, these activities remained limited, focusing on the cultural and education rights of Turkmen. After the Iraqi war of 2003, Turkey has demanded the same political, cultural and social rights for Turkmen as the other ethnic groups. The motivation for Turkey to begin to discover its previously forgotten Turkmen was based on a sense of crisis that the Iraqi Kurds were moving toward statehood as a counterbalance against the Iraqi Kurds.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p.188.

Turkey should give support to Turkmen economic and cultural dimensions to make them a political and economical power in Iraq. Besides, the Turkmen are important for Turkey in terms of security reasons. The aim of Turkish policy is not to let the Kurdish state to be established, defending territorial and political integrity of Iraq. In order to achieve such a goal, Turkey should try to make the U.S. who has pursued policies in favor of Kurds rather than balanced policies among all the ethnic groups in northern Iraq to share the Turkish concerns about northern Iraq. If the wrong policies of the U.S. and misperceived by Kurds especially in Kirkuk where is called as little Iraq with its ethnic mixture (Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians and so on) will be sustained, the tension between ethnic groups may be transformed into the bloody conflicts among ethnic identities in Iraq.

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APPENDIX A

TEXT OF THE ARMISTICE CONCLUDED AT MUDROS

Sections included in the armistice project agreed at Versailles on October 6-8 but omitted in the final armistice agreement are in italics. Sections not in the Versailles draft but added at Mudros are in capital letters. The order of the terms as agreed at Versailles was different from that communicated to Calthorpe at Mudros and given below, having been rearranged in order of importance by Wilson on October 21.

1. Opening of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and secure access to the Black Sea. Allied occupation of Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.
2. Positions of all minefields, torpedo tubes and other obstructions in Turkish waters to be indicated and assistance given to sweep or remove them as may be required.
3. All available information as to mines in the Black Sea to be communicated.
4. All Allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned persons and prisoners to be collected in Constantinople and Handed over unconditionally to the Allies.
5. Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army except for such troops as are required for surveillance of frontiers and for the maintenance of

internal order. (Numbers of effectives and their dispositions to be determined later by the Allies AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT.)

6. Surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters or in waters occupied by Turkey; these ships to be interned at such Turkish port or ports as may be directed, EXCEPT SUCH SMALL VESSELS AS ARE REQUIRED FOR POLICE OR SIMILAR PURPOSES IN TURKISH TERRITORIAL WATERS.
7. The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points IN THE EVENT OF A SITUATION ARISING WHICH THREATENS THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIES.
8. Free use by Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation and denial of their use to the enemy. SIMILAR CONDITIONS TO APPLY TO TURKISH MERCANTILE SHIPPING IN TURKISH WATERS FOR PURPOSES OF TRADE AND THE DEMOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY.
9. *Use of Constantinople as a naval base for the Allies and Use of all ship repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.*
10. Allied occupation of the Taurus Tunnel System.
11. Immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from North-west Persia and trans-Caucasia to behind the pre-war frontier HAS ALREADY BEEN ORDERED AND WILL BE CARRIED OUT. PART OF TRANS-CAUCASIA HAS ALREADY BEEN ORDERED TO BE EVACUATED IF REQUIRED BY THE ALLIES AFTER THEY HAVE STUDIED THE SITUATION THERE.

12. Wireless telegraphy and cable stations to be controlled by the Allies,
TURKISH GOVERNMENT MESSAGES EXCEPTED.

13. Prohibition to destroy and naval, military or commercial material.

14. Facilities to be given for the purchase of coal and oil-fuel and naval
material from Turkish sources AFTER THE REQUIREMENT OF THE
COUNTRY HAVE BEEN MET.

NONE OF ABOVE TO BE EXPORTED.

15. Allied Control Officers to be placed on all railways, including such
portions of trans-Caucasian railways now under Turkish control, which
must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities.
DUE CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN TO THE NEEDS OF THE
POPULATION.

This clause to include Allied occupation of Batum and Baku. TURKEY
WILL RAISE NO OBJECTION TO THE OCCUPATION OF BAKU BY
THE ALLIES.

16. Surrender of all garrisons in Hejaz, Assir, Yemen, Syria, AND
Mesopotamia Cilicia to the nearest Allied Commander or Arab
representative; AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM
CILICIA, EXCEPT THOSE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN ORDER, AS
WILL BE DETERMINED UNDER CLAUSE 5.

17. Surrender of all Turkish officer in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the
nearest Italian garrison. TURKEY AGREES TO STOP SUPPLIES AND
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THOSE OFFICERS IF THEY DO NOT
OBEY THE ORDER TO SURRENDER.

18. Surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to the nearest Allied garrison.
19. *The handing over* of All Germans and Austrians, naval military and civilian, to *the nearest British or Allied Commander* TO BE EVACUATED WITHIN ONE MONTH FROM TURKISH DOMINIONS; THOSE IN REMOTE DISTRICTS AS SOON AFTER AS MAY BE POSSIBLE.
20. Compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for the disposal *and disposition of the Turkish Army and its equipment, arms and ammunition, including transport* OF THE EQUIPMENT, ARMS AND AMMUNITION, INCLUDING TRANSPORT, OF THAT PORTION OF THE TURKISH ARMY WHICH IS DEMOBILIZED UNDER CLAUSE
21. Appointed of Allied officers to control Army supplies. AN ALLIED REPRESENTATIVE TO BE ATTACHED TO THE TURKISH MINISTRY OF SUPPLIES IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD ALLIED INTERESTS. THIS REPRESENTATIVE TO BE FURNISHED WITH ALL INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE.
22. Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allied Powers. THE RELEASE OF TURKISH CIVILIAN PRISONERS AND PRISONERS OVER MILITARY AGE TO BE CONSIDERED.
23. Obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.
24. In case of disorder in the Armenian Vilayet, the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of them.

b. The occupation of Sis, Hajin, Zeytin and Aintab in accordance with the 7th, 10th, and 15th articles.

25. HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND TURKEY SHALL CEASE FROM NOON, LOCAL TIME, ON THURSDAY, 31st October, 1918.

Signed in duplicate on
board His Britannic
Majesty's Ship
'Agreement' at Port
Mudros, Lemnos, the
30th October, 1918.

Source : Gwynne Cyer, "The Turkish Armistice of 1918 : A Lost Opportunity : The Armistice Negotiations of Mudros, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 8, No : 2, 1972.

APPENDIX B

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IRAQ AND TURKEY REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT OF THE FRONTIER BETWEEN TURKEY AND IRAQ

**Signed at Ankara, June 5, 1926; ratifications exchanged at Angora, July
18, 1926**

CHAPTER I. Frontier Between Turkey and Iraq

Article 1

The frontier line between Turkey and Iraq is definitely laid down following the line adopted by the Council of the League of Nations at its session on the 29th October, 1924, and set forth hereunder: Nevertheless the above mentioned line is modified to the south of Alamun and Ashuta so as to include in Turkish territory that part of the road which connects these two places and which crosses Iraq territory.

Article 2

Subject to the also paragraph of Article 1, the frontier line described in the above-mentioned article constitutes the frontier between Turkey and Iraq, and is traced on the map annexed to the present treaty. In case of divergence between the text and the map the text will prevail.

Article 3

A boundary commission shall be appointed to trace on the ground the frontier defined in Article 1. This commission shall be composed of two representative appointed by the Turkish Government, two representatives appointed jointly by His

Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq, and a president, who shall be a Swiss national, to be nominated by the President of the Swiss Confederation, if he is willing to do so.

The commission shall meet as soon as possible and in any case within six months from the coming into force of the present treaty.

The decisions of the commission shall be taken by a majority and shall be binding on all the high contracting parties.

The boundary commission shall endeavor in all cases to follow as nearly as may be possible the definitions given in the present treaty.

The expenses of the commission shall be divided equally between Turkey and Iraq.

The states concerned undertake to give assistance to the boundary commission, either directly or through local authorities, in every thing that concerns the accommodation, labor, material necessary for the accomplishment of its task.

They undertake further to safeguard the trigonometrical points, signs, posts or frontier marks erected by the commission.

The boundary marks shall be placed so as to be visible from each other. They shall be numbered, and their position and their number shall be noted on a cartographic document.

The definitive record of the boundary laid down, and the maps and documents attached thereto shall be made out in triplicate, of which two copies shall be forwarded to the governments of the two interested states, and the third to the Government of the French Republic, in order that authentic copies may be delivered to the Powers signatory of the Treaty of Lausanne.

Article 4

The nationality of the inhabitants of the territories ceded to Iraq in virtue of the provisions of Article 1 is regulated by Articles 30-36 of the Treaty of Lausanne. The high contracting parties agree that the right of option provided for in articles 31 and 34 of the said treaty may be exercised during a period of twelve months from the coming into force of the present treaty.

Turkey reserves nevertheless her liberty of action in so far as concerns the recognition of the option of such of the above-mentioned inhabitants as may opt for Turkish nationality.

Article 5

Each of the high contracting parties accept as definitive and inviolable the frontier line fixed by Article 1 and undertakes to make no attempt to alter it.

CHAPTER II. Neighborly Relations

Article 6

The high contracting parties undertake reciprocally to oppose by all means in their power any preparations made by one or more armed individuals with the object of committing acts of pillage or brigandage in the neighboring frontier zone and to prevent them from crossing the frontier.

Article 7

Whenever the competent authorities designated in Article 11 learn that preparations are being made by one or more armed individuals with the object of committing acts of pillage or brigandage in the neighboring frontier zone they shall reciprocally inform each other without delay.

Article 8

The competent authorities designated in Article 11 shall reciprocally inform each other as quickly as possible of any act of pillage or brigandage which may have been perpetrated on their territory. The authorities of the party receiving the notice shall make every effort in their power to prevent the authors of such acts from crossing the frontier.

Article 9

In the event of one or more armed individuals guilty of a crime or misdemeanor in the neighboring frontier zone, succeeding in taking refuge in the other frontier zone, the authorities of the latter zone are bound to arrest such individuals in order to deliver them, in conformity with the law, to the authorities of the other party whose nationals they are, together with their booty and their arms.

Article 10

The frontier zone to which this chapter of the present treaty shall apply is the whole of the frontier which separates Turkey from Iraq and a zone 75 kilometers in width on each side of that frontier.

Article 11

The competent authorities to whom the execution of this chapter of the treaty is entrusted are the following;

For the organization of general cooperation and responsibility for the measures to be taken;

On the Turkish side : the military commandant of the frontier;

On the Iraqi side : the *mutes-sarifs* of Mosul and Erbil.

For the exchange of local information and urgent communications;

On the Turkish side : the authorities appointed with consent of the Valis;

On the Iraqi side : the *kaima-kams* of Zakho, Amadia, Zibar and Rowanduz.

The Turkish and Iraq Government may, for administrative reasons modify the list of their competent authorities, giving notice of such modification either through the permanent frontier commission provided for in Article 13 or through the diplomatic channel.

Article 12

The Turkish and Iraq authorities shall refrain from all correspondence of an official or political nature with the chiefs, shaikhs, or other members of tribes which are nationals of the other states and which are actually territory of that state.

They shall not permit in the frontier zone any organization for propaganda and meeting directed against either state.

Article 13

In order to facilitate the execution of the provisions of the present chapter of the treaty, and, in general, the maintenance of good neighborly relations on the frontier, there shall be set up a permanent Frontier Commission composed of an equal number of officials appointed from time to time for this purpose by the Turkish and Iraq Governments respectively. This commission shall meet at least once every six months or oftener if circumstances require it.

It shall be the duty of this commission, which shall meet alternatively in Turkey and Iraq to endeavor to settle amicably all questions concerning the executions of the provisions of this chapter of the treaty, and any other frontier question on which an agreement shall not have been reached between local frontier officials concerned.

The commission shall meet for the first time at Zakho within tow months from the coming into force of the present treaty.

CHAPTER III. General Provision

Article 14

With object of an enlarging the field of common interests between the two countries, the Iraq Government shall pay to the Turkish Government for a period of 25 years from the coming into force of the present treaty 10 percent on all royalties which it shall receive :

- (a) From the Turkish Petroleum Company under Article 10 of its concession of the 14th March, 1925;
- (b) From such companies persons as may exploit oil under the provisions of Article 6 of the above-mentioned concession;
- (c) From such subsidiary companies as may be constituted under the provisions of Article 33 of the above-mentioned concession.

Article 15

The Turkish and Iraq Governments agree to enter into negotiations as soon as possible for the purpose of concluding an extradition treaty in accordance with the usages prevailing among friendly states.

Article 16

The Iraq Government undertakes not to disturb or molest any persons established on its territory on account of their political opinions or conduct in favor of Turkey up to the time of the signature of the present treaty, and to grant them full and complete amnesty. All sentences pronounced under the above heading shall be annulled, and all proceeding already instituted shall be stayed.

Article 17

The present treaty shall come into force on the date of exchange of ratifications. Chapter 2 of the present treaty shall remain in force for a period of ten years from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty.

After the termination of a period of two years from the coming into force of the present treaty each of the contracting parties shall have the right to denounce this chapter in so far as its provisions concerned that party, the denunciation taking effect one year after the date on which notice thereof shall have been given.

Article 18

The present treaty shall be ratified by each of the high contracting parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Certified copies of the treaty shall be communicated to each of the states signatory of the Treaties of Lausanne. In faith whereof the above named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and affixed thereto their seals. Done at Angora, the 5th day of June, 1926, in triplicate.

R. C. Lindsay.

Dr. T. Rouchdy

Nouri Said

Source : The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1927.

APPENDIX C

IRAQI GOVERNMENT ROYALITES AND PAYMENTS TO TURKISH BUDGETS

Years	Iraqi Government Royalties Pounds	Calculated % 10 Royalties		Payments to Turkish Budgets(TL)	
		Pounds	Turkish Lira	Estimated	Realized
1931	401,400	40,140	387,752	2,000,000	3,126,000
1932	579,400	57,940	429,335	450,000	1,711,682
1933	742,971	74,297	521,566	518,000	617,469
1934	1,484,126	148,413	945,388	500,000	682,304
1935	1,009,400	100,940	622,800	500,000	596,818
1936	1,049,833	104,983	656,146	800,000	618,212
1937	1,251,591	125,159	780,993	800,000	714,990
1938	1,896,533	189,653	1,168,264	800,000	1,065,416
1939	2,230,146	223,015	1,264,496	1,100,000	919,807
1940	1,786,941	178,694	934,572	1,000,000	687,261
1941	1,380,541	138,054	722,021	700,000	619,362
1942	1,763,061	176,306	922,076	620,000	621,735
1943	2,209,161	220,916	1,153,181	620,000	808,161
1944	2,451,644	245,164	1,318,012	750,000	1,033,522
1945	2,664,147	266,415	-	-	-
1946	2,724,092	272,409	1,834,751	1,000,000	1,108,777
1947	2,705,143	270,514	3,064,925	2,250,000	2,452,932
1948	2,137,781	213,778	2,432,800	2,450,000	2,430,750
1949	3,126,316	312,632	3,188,851	2,450,000	1,277,320
1950	6,781,583	678,158	5,337,105	1,500,000	2,138,066
1951	15,100,000	1,510,000	11,883,697	2,200,000	3,910,729
1952	40,600,000	4,060,000	-	6,000,000	-
1953	58,300,000	5,830,000	-	35,000,000	-
1954	68,400,000	6,840,000	53,625,588	75,000,000	4,055,490
1955	73,700,700	7,370,070	0	100,000,000	-

Sources: Mikdasha, 1966, p.106; Issawi and Yeganeh, 1962, p183; Maliye ve Bumruk Bakanlığı(Ministry of Finanace Budget Accounts) Genel Butçe Kanunları, Cilt I, Ankara, 1992; Maliye ve Gumruk Bakanlığı (Ministry of Rinance, Realized Bdgetary Accounts), Kesin Hesap Kaunuları, 1931-1955, Ankara.

APPENDIX D

MAP OF TURKMENLAND




APPENDIX E

MAP OF NO-FLY-ZONE



APPENDIX F

MAP OF NORTHERN IRAQ WHERE WAS UNDER CONTROL OF PUK AND KDP AFTER 1996



APPENDIX G

THE ARTICLE 58 IN THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSNATIONAL PERIOD (TAL)

(A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, and especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other relevant bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime's practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing migration in and out of the region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting nationality. To remedy this injustice, the Iraqi Transitional Government shall take the following steps:

- (1) With regard to residents who were deported, expelled, or who emigrated; it shall, in accordance with the statute of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other measures within the law, within a reasonable period of time, restore the residents to their homes and property, or, where this is unfeasible, shall provide just compensation.
- (2) With regard to the individuals newly introduced to specific regions and territories, it shall act in accordance with Article 10 of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission statute to ensure

that such individuals may be resettled, may receive compensation from the state, may receive new land from the state near their residence in the governorate from which they came, or may receive compensation for the cost of moving to such areas.

(3) With regard to persons deprived of employment or other means of support in order to force migration out of their regions and territories, it shall promote new employment opportunities in the regions and territories.


(4) With regard to nationality correction, it shall repeal all relevant decrees and shall permit affected persons the right to determine their own national identity and ethnic affiliation free from coercion and duress.

(B) The previous regime also manipulated and changed administrative boundaries for political ends. The Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall make recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying these unjust changes in the permanent constitution. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of recommendations, it shall unanimously appoint a neutral arbitrator to examine the issue and make recommendations. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree on an arbitrator, it shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a distinguished international person to be the arbitrator.

(C) The permanent resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, shall be deferred until after these measures are completed, a fair and transparent census has been conducted and the permanent constitution has been ratified. This resolution shall be consistent with the principle of justice, taking into account the will of the people of those territories.

APPENDIX H

MAP OF PKK CAMPS IN NORTHERN IRAQ



Sources: Ümit Özdağ, *Türk Ordusu'nun Kuzey Irak Operasyonları (Turkish Military Operations against Northern Iraq)*, (İstanbul: Pegasus, 2008).